READING HALLTHIRD MILLENNIUM LIBRARY |
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THE LIFE OF SIMON DE MONTFORT . EARL OF LEICESTERCHAPTER X.
THE GOVERNMENT OF SIMON DE MONTFORT.
The first measure of the Earl of Leicester after the
battle of Lewes was to dictate a preliminary edict, declaring the general
principles on which the government was to be carried on, and sketching out a
new court of arbitration, to which the principal matters in dispute were to be
referred. This document was in the form of a treaty, and is called the Mise or
Compromise of Lewes. The text is not preserved, but we have a contemporary
abstract, by which it is seen that the composition of the court was to be of a
mixed nature, English and foreign, lay and clerical, with the addition of the
Cardinal-Legate Guido. These commissioners were to discuss everything but the
fate of the prisoners; their decision needed not to be unanimous, but whatever
the majority should determine was to hold good. On some points however it
appears the court was not left to decide. The king, it was declared, was to
rule justly, and without respect of persons; none but Englishmen were to be made councillors, high officers, or bailiffs of any sort.
The charters were to be confirmed, and precautions to be taken against the
abuse of judicial and ministerial power. The king was to be kept under a
sort of financial tutelage until his debts should be paid, and he should be
able to live on his own revenue, without oppression of any
one. The Princes Edward and Henry of Almaine were bound over as hostages for the preservation of peace till the arbiters
should give their decision. Full indemnity was granted to the Earls of
Leicester and Gloucester and their followers. Lastly, the discussion was to be
carried on in England, and to be concluded by Easter 1265.
The spirit of the edict must be regarded as remarkably
just and moderate, when we consider that the fate of war had compelled the
royalist party to an unconditional surrender. The only point that has any
appearance of unfairness is that of the choice of arbiters. We are not told how
they were to be chosen, but it is evident that the defeated side could have had
but little voice in their selection. That the cardinal-legate was to join in
the discussion is however a proof that their interests were not neglected.
According to another account, the arbiters were to be selected by the King of
France, from French and English prelates and nobles; but much uncertainty on
this point prevailed, and it is hardly likely that Simon can so soon have been
willing to submit again to the influence of King Louis. The terms dictated to
the conquered were all but identical with those proposed before the war; nay,
they are at first sight even more moderate, for no part of the Oxford
Provisions or the questions under dispute was exempted from arbitration, except
the statute as to the expulsion of aliens from all offices of State. But
this extreme moderation is rather in appearance than reality. It does not seem
that the question of the form of government was to be submitted to arbitration;
it was impossible to wait, in the present state of confusion, till the verdict
should be given. Some form of government was absolutely necessary, and the
nature of this could not be left to the decision of so narrow a
tribunal. It would of necessity remain with de Montfort to decide what
points should be arbitrated on, and what these were we cannot with any
certainty say. They would possibly include the exact method of appointing
sheriffs and other officers, the general principles of which were laid down in
the Ordinance of London; the king’s household, a financial committee, and
other points not of primary importance, would be touched on.
Constitutional questions are in fact omitted in the fragmentary copy of
the Mise which we possess; but since the Ordinance of London and the
constitution therein adopted were considered to be in accordance with the Mise,
we may conclude that the lost portions included some general decrees on this
most important point. The document was probably intended to allay men’s fears,
and to act as an announcement of peace. For this purpose its moderate and
reassuring tone was well adapted, and marks at once the statesmanlike wisdom
and the honesty of purpose which distinguished its author.
From Lewes the earl, after having deposited his less
noble prisoners in safe places, but taking Henry with him, moved to London. An
universal suspension of hostilities was decreed, as well as mutual restoration
of prisoners without ransom; breaches of the peace and even the carrying of arms
were forbidden under very severe penalties; instead of the sheriffs,
provisional guardians of the peace, doubtless from the number of Simon’s
friends, were appointed, and various other measures taken to restore a state of
quiet to the land. The most urgent necessities having been provided
for, a Parliament was summoned to meet in London, and the thorough nature of
Simon’s reforms was at once apparent. The guardians of the peace were
instructed to see that four knights were elected for the purpose of attending
Parliament by and for each county. The exactness of the wording of this clause
shows the importance which was attributed to the measure.
The Parliament met on June 23, and there is no reason
to doubt that the county members were present. The transactions were most
important. The difficult question of lay and clerical jurisdiction was handled
in a way which, though fragmentary, shows de Montfort’s ecclesiastical
tendencies, and the importance of the aid rendered by the Church to the cause
of liberty. At the same time it must be allowed that the regulations now issued
tended to perpetuate the evils arising from the dominance and isolation of the
priestly class. On the other hand, it may be argued that they placed a bulwark
in the way of the extension of royal power, formed out of that body which had
from the first been most closely connected with the defence of national rights. In cases of robbery, where both an ecclesiastic and a
layman were concerned, the bishop of the diocese was to judge the cause. In
cases where there was suspicion of the unlawful imprisonment of ecclesiastics,
the bishop was to decide. The distinctness of the clerical profession was
guarded by an enactment against the bearing of arms by the clergy. A committee
of three bishops was appointed to enquire into the injuries suffered by the
Church within the last year, and their decisions were to be supported, if need
were, by the strength of the secular arm. Finally, Archbishop Boniface was
commanded to return at once, and perform the duties of his high office. Simon
had to repay the confidence and good faith of the Church; his gratitude found
expression in these perhaps too favourable provisions.
In the second place, the general principles
enunciated in the Mise of Lewes were confirmed, with more special
regulations as to the free entry of foreign merchants, if they came unarmed and
in not excessive numbers. But the most important point was the formation
of a scheme of the constitution. It is most desirable to know if this constitution
was intended to be permanent or not; but from the obscurity of the preamble it
is impossible to speak on this point with certainty. It appears most probable
that it was to last during the rest of Henry’s reign, and for so long a period
of that of Edward as the latter should decide; whether his decision was to be
made now or when he came to the throne does not appear. That is to say, it was
intended to be as permanent as any constitution could be expected to be under
the circumstances. The Ordinance, as this form of government was called, was
confirmed the next spring; and in consequence of this the hostages were
released. Now the hostages had been given in order that the arbitration might
take its course, and that the peace of the kingdom might be placed on a firm
basis. That this was considered to have been done in March 1265 is shown by the
release of the hostages; and it was done by the acceptance of this constitution
of June 1264 and certain other subsequent arrangements. Thus it was on the
existence of this constitution that the peace of the country was held to
depend; and the constitution was not meant to last, as might perhaps be
inferred from the preamble, only till the permanent arrangements for the
preservation of peace were complete. It was itself the most important of these
arrangements. That however it did not complete them, but was in reality
only the first step, is shown by the fact that the hostages were not released
till after many additional arrangements had been made and collectively confirmed
in March 1265.
According to this scheme of government there are to be
“chosen and nominated” three persons, called electors. These electors are to
receive authority from the king to elect or nominate, on his behalf, nine councillors. By counsel of these nine, three of whom by
turn are to be always at Court, the king is to transact all business of State.
If any State official, great or small, transgress, the king is at once, by
counsel of the nine, to depose him, and substitute another in his place. If any councillor perform his duty ill, or if there be any
other reason for his removal, the king shall, by counsel of the electors,
remove him and substitute another. If the councilors cannot agree on any
question, the electors or two of them shall decide. If the electors disagree,
that which two of them decide shall hold good, provided that in ecclesiastical
questions one of the two shall be a prelate of the Church. Finally, if it shall
seem good to the whole body of prelates and barons that any one of the electors
should be removed, the king shall, by counsel of the aforesaid body, appoint
another in his place.
This scheme of government may fairly be regarded as
the creation which more than any other marks the genius of Simon de Montfort.
Other matters—his courage, constancy, sympathy with the oppressed—may call
forth more general admiration. His adaptation of the existing county machinery
to parliamentary representation marks his ingenuity and insight into
contemporary politics. But that which bears the most unmistakable stamp of
political genius is this constitution of 1264. So far as it goes it is perfect;
elaborate, yet simple; a constitution, in the true sense of the word; that is,
a form of government which will stand by itself, a building so composed as to
exist without any external assistance. It shows an advance upon the crude ideas
of six years before, which would be inexplicable were we obliged to believe
that Simon had any but the smallest share in the planning of the earlier
scheme. The principles on which it rests are almost precisely the same as those
of the constitution under which England has been governed for the last century
and a half.
First of all, it is a purely electoral system. The
electors are to be chosen, though it is not stated by whom they were to be
chosen in the first instance. They were in fact at first self-elected, though
nominally chosen by the king; but the theory was that they were chosen by someone;
and, once appointed, their position depended on the will of the community, who,
in conjunction with the king, could depose any or all of them if they saw fit.
The basis then of government, the ultimate holder of power, is the community of
prelates and barons, including not only the greater barons but the smaller too,
who were now enabled to attend through their representatives from town and
county; that is therefore, at any rate, the whole class of which the old Great
Council was theoretically composed. The king is the exponent and executor of
the will of all three bodies—the electors, the council, the community; the centre in which they all meet, the representative by whom
they act, the embodiment of the State, through whom it touches and becomes
visible to the nation. The king has no absolute will of his own, any more than
any other single officer or collection of officers; he is but the highest
officer of the State; the only absolute and independent will is that of the
community. The only occasion in which it appears that the king is to have the
initiative is in the appointment of the councillors,
for here he, being the centre of the executive, may
be supposed to know best who is fitted for the post, But even here he is not
absolute; he is to act by counsel of the electors, the representatives of the
community. The electors stand in the position of a prime-minister, who is in
fact chosen by the force of public opinion, finding expression in the kings
uttered choice. The means of deposing the electors, as of deposing the
prime-minister, may vary; it may be the adverse vote of the community, or some
other way, but the electors and the prime-minister are in fact equally in the
hands of the community. Again, the prime-minister receives authority from the
king to appoint his fellow-ministers, and he submits the list for the king’s approval
: similarly the electors are authorised by the king
to appoint the councillors. In neither case is the
king the absolute granter of the authority; that he shares that authority with
the community is shown by the fact that the latter have the power of
determining with him the person to whom he shall transmit it.
There are, it is hardly necessary to say, differences
between our system and that of de Montfort: the power of the community to
appoint their own chief ministers is not yet even in our day fully recognised, the theory being that the authority is
conferred absolutely by the monarch, however little it may be so in reality.
The fact however is there, though it is not formally recognised;
in this respect Simon’s constitution is more advanced than ours, for he
insisted on the cooperation of the king and the community in the actual choice
of the ministers, while we have only the practical right of a veto on an
appointment disagreeable to the nation. Simon recognised the impracticability of any other system than that which we have gradually
adopted, holding that, in any constitution that is to stand, the real rulers
must be those who, from whatever cause or in whatever way, have most power. The
inevitable result of any other system is an outbreak of the confined forces;
in other words, a revolution. Other differences, such as that between the
triumvirate of electors and the single prime-minister, are only such in
appearance, since in the former case unity of action was secured by the vote of
the majority. Others again, such as the restriction of the electors to the
right of appointing and of acting as a kind of high court of appeal, in cases
where the councillors could not agree, compared with
the multifarious powers exercised by a prime-minister, are comparatively
unimportant. The community in Simon’s constitution was not so wide as in ours;
but in both cases it is limited, in both cases the electoral right within the
electorate is equal. The ground-principle is the same; that is, the mutual
dependence of all parts of the government, the division and distribution of
power, resting finally on the broadest basis possible, the whole of the
electorate.
One must not forget that the constitution of 1264 was
incomplete. What we have is a mere sketch, doubtless intended to be filled in
by the teaching of experience. We have for example no idea as to how
legislation was to be carried on, as to the right of taxation, what voice
Parliament was to have in foreign affairs, or in the ordinary
administration of government; there was no provision for the regular summons,
no definition of the class to be represented. We have however what was of
paramount necessity, the ground-plan; the rest could wait awhile. The
constitution broke down before it had had time to get into working, because it
was premature, and that in two ways : in the first place, the political
instinct necessary for working it was not yet in existence; in the second, the
limits of the franchise were too wide, and power was granted to those who were not
yet able to hold it. The point at which this constitution drew the line
was far below that at which it had been drawn at the Conquest; and, while in
the interval the power of parliament had become real instead weakness of
nominal, the difference between the strongest and franchised the weakest of the
holders of power had enormously increased. Thus, whereas two centuries ago the
baronage had been nearly on the same level of inferiority to the monarch, the
powerful few were now almost his equals, and stood as high above the weakest of
their peers as the king had stood above them in former years. This change in
the relative positions of the greater and smaller barons increased the
difficulty of enfranchising the weaker members of the class. They had been unable
to hold the power conferred on them by Magna Carta: they were still unable to
hold what Simon gave them; he took the step of enabling them to use their right
by means of representation, in order to draw out their power and support
himself by it, but it gave way under the strain. Still the gift taught the
receiver to use his strength, which grew with the desire to use it: in the next
generation the class was strong enough, and the gift granted by Simon was
renewed by Edward to a worthier generation, and was not taken away again. Since
then, the breadth of the electorate has grown, as each successive class has
grown more powerful. Simon, whether consciously or unconsciously, formed a
perfect constitution embodying this principle. His constitution died with him;
but England, half consciously, half unconsciously, has been following the same
direction ever since.
The step for which Simon de Montfort is generally
renowned, the summoning of four knights from each county in 1264, and still
more the summoning of members from counties and boroughs in 1265, is not so
great a mark of his genius as this constitution, though it is perhaps a more
remarkable proof of his statesmanship. He was in fact compelled by the jealousy
of the upper classes to seek for support elsewhere. The object with which he
had grasped the supremacy was, next to the preservation of England from foreign
influence, the enfranchising of the class of smaller barons, the “bachelorhood”
of England. Nominally members of the Great Council since the days of the
Conquest, they had, from a variety of reasons, dropped out of power, and the
rising influence of Parliament made their exclusion from it the more bitter. De
Montfort was but redeeming a pledge and following the spirit of Magna Carta
when he secured their representation. Without them a victory of the baronage
resulted, as we have seen, in an oligarchy, just as a victory of the king
without the aid of the greater barons must have ended in a tyranny. On the
other hand, had the greater barons enlisted faithfully under de Montfort’s
standard, it would not have been necessary for him to appeal to the next class
in the social scale; had he won by their aid, they would have hampered him in
his endeavours to raise the lower order. Granting
that his sympathy with that class was deep and true, it is still possible that,
had he been in a position to do so, he would have considered it sufficient to
carry his administrative reforms, his measures for the welfare of the people,
in an autocratic manner, without any reference to the wish of those who were to
gain by those measures. He might, had he had the greater barons to back him,
have followed the maxim of Frederick of Prussia, and done “everything for the
people, but nothing through the people”. But this was not so; he had to call in
their aid, and they thus acquired the right to an independent position, the
right to make themselves heard in matters concerning their own welfare. Thus
it was that the popular cause, in its truest sense, actually gained through its
desertion by those who should have protected it.
But if the people gained by the selfishness of the
greater barons, they also profited by the weakness of the king. Had Henry been
able to rule alone, he might have reduced the greater barons, and therefore
still more the lower vassals, to the level at which they stood under his
grandfather. Had he even known how to use their divisions, had he understood
the support which an able king might have won from what may be called the
upper-middle classes of the day, he might have played off one against the
other, and our political institutions might have passed by a natural transition
from feudalism into the condition to which a despotic monarchy reduced them in
France. But the incapable attempt at despotism which was made during the half
century after Magna Carta supplied a stimulus to the movement, while it was
unable to prevent it from gaining strength and consistency at its most critical
period, so that when a strong king appeared the plant was too vigorous to be
rooted out. It is the undying honour of Simon de
Montfort, not that he sowed the seed, nor that he garnered the crop, but that
he fostered and directed its growth in the hour of weakness. With an eye far
keener than any of his fellows he saw the only possible cure of the evils which
all felt, he perceived the principles which underlay the popular movement, and
the way in which they were to be applied; when others, in cowardly fear for
their own interests, shuddered at the spirit which they had raised, and sought
to retrace their steps, he went boldly on, knowing that while there was one to
lead the spirit would follow, and would be a servant and not a master.
How he applied the principle of self-government to the
supreme authority of the country we have seen in the constitution of 1264. The
Parliament of 1264 was the first step in the execution of that idea. The
principle was then applied, though not for the first time, to the election of
members by the people. What is most remarkable in Simon’s action in this matter
is not however so much this step, as the fact that what was before merely
tentative was in him a principle and a conviction. The only real novelty in the
Parliament of 1265 was the recognition of a distinction between county and
borough, a great advance indeed, but hardly to be called the introduction of a
new principle. The representative system has been traced back into the earliest
periods of English history, and has its roots in the popular institutions of
the Anglo-Saxon township. Applied by Henry II to the jury system, extended from
civil to criminal cases, and thence to the assessment and valuation of land for
the purposes of taxation, it was first adapted by John to purely political
affairs. Thus even in political matters the idea of representation was no new
one; it was acted on in 1213; its unconscious growth is traceable, though at
first sight not apparent, in Magna Carta. In that document the presence of a
number of members in the Great Council, much larger than usually attended, is looked
upon as legitimate; their attendance is not insisted on, and the possible
results of their non-attendance are carefully guarded against, by the provision
that the proceedings of the council are not to be considered null and void if
all the members do not appear. So far then there would seem to be no
thought of representation in the charter; but in this very disregard for the
personal attendance of the smaller barons the idea is visible; for the latter
do not choose their own representatives, because they are in fact considered to
be represented by the more powerful members of their class. Those present speak
for the whole body; the absent are bound by the vote of the few who attend,
just as if they had elected them. This fact, though not observed at first, was
gradually recognised by the greater barons; it was a
necessary consequence of the right possessed, or at least claimed, by the whole
body of tenants-in-chief to assent to taxation. In some cases the whole body is
said to have consented to a tax when all could not have attended to give their
consent. Whether in such cases the greater barons took upon themselves to authorise a tax levied on the whole body, or whether they
in some way or other conferred with the smaller barons and gained their consent,
is uncertain. But that this fact of representation and the responsibilities
dependent on it were acknowledged by this time is shown by the action of the
barons in 1258, when they declined to vote an aid on behalf of the whole body,
until they had consulted the community, whose representatives they regarded
themselves. In the constitution of 1258, the principle of representation,
however maimed and imperfect its expression, was through the appointment of the
twelve representatives of the community confirmed as a regular and constant
element in the supreme tribunal of the nation.
Thus the growth of the idea in general and its gradual
application to different parts of the machine of government are plain enough;
but many important details are very obscure. In the first place, what is the
“community” which was represented by the twelve members in the constitution of
1258? Who were the persons who chose the four knights in 1264, the borough and
county members in 1265? From what class were the knights representative taken?
Was every elector also eligible? These and other questions it is very hard to
answer with any confidence. It seems certain however that the word “community”
in the first instance included the whole body of the baronage, the
tenants-in-chief of the Crown, or in its narrower sense, when used in
distinction from “the barons”, the rest of that body, the smaller barons who
did not personally attend. This is evident from its connexion with what we know of the constitution of the Great Council, the difference
between its legal and its actual members, the allusions in Magna Carta, the
subsequent appearances of this body on subsequent occasions. It is this class
of smaller military tenants-in-chief, and not those below it, which is most
prominent among the unrepresented during this whole period. There appears no
reason to suppose that the mention of them in Magna Carta, especially as the
clause was suppressed, brought about any real change in their political
position. They were the first of the non-governing classes of the day, so that
it is impossible not to connect them with the “four lawful and discreet
knights”, who were to be elected by the counties in 1226, to declare before the
magnates their causes of complaint against the sheriffs; with the two knights
summoned in 1254 to Westminster, “to provide an aid in time of need ; with the
four knights elected in 1258 and 1259 by the counties, to report on grievances
against the sheriffs. It is probable that many of this class were included in
the number of those tenants-in-chief, a hundred or more, who appeared at Oxford
in 1258; for so large an assembly was very rare, and must have contained other
than the usual elements. They did not however appear there as representatives,
but only as individual tenants-in-chief. The bachelorhood who were so ill
represented by the twelve in 1258 that they complained next year to Prince
Edward, must be in the first instance the lords of small manors and owners of
knights fees, though others may have, and probably did, join in the
remonstrance.
But, if it is probable that the knights representative
stood at first for the smaller military tenants-in-chief, and for no others, it
is pretty certain that at the time we have reached the class represented by
them was far less limited. The smaller barons were at first separated by very
vague limits from the greater members of their class, by nothing else in fact
than the distinction between the special and the general summons. But as these
limits became more strictly defined through the consequences of that
distinction, and by constant usage, those separating the smaller barons from
the classes below seem to have become less strict. Through the falling-in of
escheats and other causes the number of small tenants-in-chief by military tenure
was constantly on the increase. The subtenants, the whole class of freeholders
and socage-tenants increased as rapidly. The amalgamation of all these
classes is natural enough, and is traceable perhaps to the action of two main
causes. Since all freeholders were on certain occasions liable to military
service, those who held their land of the king in chief by military tenure, and
were therefore legally members of the Great Council, tended to coalesce with
those who, though not holding their lands by military tenure, might still be
received as members of the same class. Secondly, the want of representation was
equally felt by all; and the and ancient right of one part of the unrepresented
class would naturally be used to further the claims put forward on behalf of
the whole body. The military tenants-in-chief by escheat, who seem to have been
considered to possess no legal claim to a seat in the council, formed a link
between the old tenants-in-chief and the subtenants; while the more
important subtenants would be unlikely to acquiesce in the possession of even
nominal political rights by the many tenants-in-chief who were weaker than
themselves. Thus common military service and common lack of political power
tended to obliterate the artificial distinctions of feudalism.
This tendency towards amalgamation is apparent in the
fluctuating use of words, and in the usurpation of titles by those not
originally possessing them. We have heard Henry revile those “London boors who
styled themselves barons” : the rioters of London called themselves
“bachelors”, seeing clearly enough the advantage of connecting themselves in
name at least with their superiors. Municipal dignities would probably be held,
at least in the great towns, by some who had a right to a still higher position
: we hear of “Barons of the Cinque Port”, whose position, as defenders of the
coast, gave them military and political importance. Those who shared with them
municipal power would probably aspire to share with them political power as
well. Moreover, this extension of the electorate, which must have been rendered
almost necessary by the gradual coalition of classes, appears still more
probable when we regard the fact that in all the instances of the election of
representatives it is the regular county machinery which is set in motion. It
is the sheriff who is bidden to superintend the election; the knights are
elected by and for the county; the writs place no restriction on the right of
election. In after times the knights of the shires were elected at the county
courts by the suitors of those courts. We can hardly imagine any other means of
electing the members, if, as was provided with such care by Simon de Montfort,
the members were to be anything more than mere nominees of the sheriff. It is
pretty certain therefore that all who owed suit at the county court joined in
the election. An exact definition of those suitors is hard to give; they cannot
however have been limited to the military tenants-in-chief.
But supposing the body represented to have been so
large as this, it seems impossible that all who composed it can have had the
right of being elected as well as that of electing. The definition of the
county members, that they were to be “legal and discreet knights”,
shows that they were limited to such military tenants as held
sufficient land to qualify them for knighthood. It was indeed hardly possible
yet for any but those whose profession was in the first place that of arms to
sit in Parliament, even as members for the boroughs. That subtenants were
however eligible, is shown by the lists of those who attended the parliaments
of Simon de Montfort. It is uncertain how far the sheriff was able to interfere
in the election, or to limit the number of those who might act as
representatives; but it is evident that he must have had great power in this
respect, perhaps to the extent of presenting a certain number of persons to the
county court for election. He may have even nominated the knights
representative in 1213, for no mention of election is made. The long struggle
for the right of appointing sheriffs shows the great influence those officers
must have exercised in political matters, an influence similar to that of the
prefects under the French empire. It is hardly probable that they would have
allowed the election of any one below the rank of a military tenant-in-chief.
In 1264 it appears likely that the four knights belonged to the class of barons
not personally summoned. The words of the writ for the appointment of guardians
of the peace contemplate a settlement of affairs by the king and barons, which
shows that the Parliament to be assembled was a Parliament of barons only. But
in the same writs the election of the four knights to sit in this Parliament is
ordered. These knights were therefore included under the name barons, and can
only have belonged to the smaller baronage, the greater members of which
attended in person. The passive right of election was therefore probably much
more limited that the active. It is unfortunate that the evidence we have is
not sufficient to guarantee very positive declarations on these points, but, in
leaving this portion of the subject so uncertain, we do but follow the
precedent of the Lords’ Report, which declares the whole matter “to be involved
in great obscurity”.
There remains the question as to the first occasion on
which the representatives actually took part in the discussions of Parliament.
We have no documentary proof that they did so till 1264. The knights whom John
summoned in 1213 were to consult with him on affairs of State. The words used
do not imply more than that they were to appear and to speak with the king; not
necessarily that they were to sit in council with the greater barons. In 1237
mention is made by one authority of “citizens and burghers” being “in council”.
But besides the extreme improbability that borough members were present in the
kings council at so early a date, the vagueness with which the chroniclers
speak makes them most untrustworthy witnesses in such matters. The presence in
Parliament of elected knights in 1252 might be inferred from the words of the
writ in which the “earls, barons, knights, and others”, tested the confirmation
of the charters; but we cannot lay much weight on the expression, for these
knights may have been members of the exchequer, or other high officers, who
would naturally attend a council. The summons for two knights of the shire to
grant an aid, in 1254, is so carefully worded, and the object for which they met
so distinctly stated, that it is hardly possible to doubt that they actually
appeared. Whether they assembled in the same chamber as the greater barons of
the council is however uncertain. The object of their summons being restricted
to the granting of an aid, it seems improbable that they took part in the
regular discussions which would have taken place in the council. It is not
likely that the greater barons in 1258 admitted the large number of
tenants-in-chief who appeared at Oxford to the actual discussions on the form
of government; their interests would have obtained more attention had they had
a voice. In 1261 the attendance of knights representative was no doubt
contemplated by the Earl of Leicester, but we have no proof, nor is it on other
grounds at all probable, that that meeting, or the one called in opposition to
it by the king, ever took place. But in the year 1264 we are no longer left in
doubt. The concluding words of the Ordinance of London, made at this
Parliament, are explicit. “This Ordinance was made at London, by consent, will,
and command of our sovereign lord the king, also of the prelates, the barons,
and lastly of the community then present in the same place”. The prelates and
barons are the ordinary members of the national council hitherto; the community
can mean no other than the elected knights. The presence of the county and
borough members in the great Parliament of 1265 is not certified in so distinct
a manner, but cannot be doubted, That in the confirmation of the charters, issued
in March 1265, this Ordinance is referred to as made by assent of king,
prelates, earls, and barons, does not invalidate the above argument; it does
not imply the exclusion of the knights, any more than the former writ implies
the exclusion of the earls. Besides the occasions above mentioned, it is not
unlikely that they were assembled on others too. They may have been frequently
consulted when necessary, without taking part in the discussions of the
council, as the assembly of minor ecclesiastics often met when the prelates
attended Parliament.
The union of these distinct chambers was one of the
great objects of Simon de Montfort. As far as the laity were concerned, he
carried out his intention in the Parliament of June 1264. It is not so well
known that he intended to apply the same principles to the clergy. He was not
content with the system of convocation, to which, if the above supposition is
correct, these occasional assemblies of the smaller lay baronage in some
measure answered. Neither of these bodies could have any real power as long as
they met separately, and were merely consulted at will by the members of the
more important assembly. Accordingly he summoned to the Parliament, which was
to have met at Winchester in June 1265, two canons from each
cathedral chapter. This stroke of de Montfort’s political genius, which is
in itself as remarkable as the summoning of the lay members, though of far less
political importance, and was a logical complement of that measure, does not
seem to have been sufficiently noticed : the reason probably is that his death
prevented the execution of the plan, and it remained therefore, unlike the
corresponding measure with regard to the laity, a mere intention.
It was then in the Parliament of 1264 that one great
and lasting constitutional advance was made. The other was reserved for the
Parliament of 1265. It was in this latter that the distinction between borough,
county and borough members first appears. In the ranks of the smaller baronage
were included not a few inhabitants of the towns; the nobles of the seaports
joined in the remonstrance of 1246. Especially remarkable in this respect is
the appearance of the Mayor of London, who acted as witness to Magna Carta and
to the Ordinance of London in 1264. In what capacity he attended does not
appear; he may have been considered a member of the council, or may have been
summoned simply to witness an important writ. In both cases he must have
attended as representative of the great city which had so largely contributed
to the victory of the popular cause. But apart from him there is no trace of
special members for the boroughs till 1265. For the purpose of electing
representatives the towns would have been hitherto merged in the counties, and
thus far they were already represented. The representation of Middlesex was
doubtless practically the representation of London, since the city had gained
municipal freedom, and even become responsible for the county in which it lay.
But other towns were not so well off, and it was a remarkable piece of
political insight to recognise the justice of
their claims on separate representation. What towns were invited to send
representatives we are not told; the number, apart from London and the larger
sea-ports, was probably not large. The Cinque Ports were distinguished from the
rest by sending four knights each to the Parliament of 1265, while other
boroughs sent two apiece. How many members represented London we do not
know; there is, strangely enough, no evidence that a writ was addressed to the
city, but that it was represented it is impossible to doubt.
It need hardly be remarked that the Parliaments of
1264 and 1265 were in a sense very incomplete. As Mr. Pearson says, “It was no
longer felt necessary to admit a royalist element”. He might have said, “It was
no longer possible to admit a royalist element”. When the royalists aimed at
nothing less than the total destruction of all that the Parliament was summoned
to do, it would have been the merest absurdity to ask them to take part in its
debates. As well might the National Assembly in 1791 have allowed the émigrés
to discuss with them on equal terms the groundwork of their new
constitution. When the infant State had become consolidated and able to stand
alone, then it would have been time enough to admit those who were its sworn
enemies. Hence the incompleteness of de Montfort’s Parliaments. We do not know
the names of the members who composed the Parliament of 1264; but in that
members of 1265, though the Church was very fully represented, summonses were
issued to only five earls and eighteen barons. This list however does not
include all who were present, for the names of some are mentioned afterwards,
who must have attended, but to whom no writs are stated to have been issued. A
certain number of counties were also apparently excluded from representation in
the Parliament of 1264, though for almost all the omissions reasons can be
given; and the omission of any summons addressed to London in 1265 warns us not
to depend too much on the correctness of the list.
Thus then there appears in the work of Simon de
Montfort, apart from the two most important points explained above, hardly so
much novelty as he usually receives credit for. He can hardly be called without
reserve the “creator of the House of Commons”, though to him doubtless is owing
far more than to any other individual. Still less can the famous Parliament of
January 1265 be said to consist of completely new elements”. Simon would have
been the first to repudiate so radical a change as these words imply. His mind
was as truly Conservative as it was truly Liberal. It seems therefore: useless
to guess whether he was influenced by a possible acquaintance with the popular
institutions of Aragon, or took hints from the constitution which Frederick the
Great set up in his kingdom of Sicily. With a far wiser spirit of reform he worked upon existing materials, and with his adopted
country he made her principles his own. His claim to our gratitude is a claim
which has hitherto seemed to belong specially to English reformers, a claim
which rests on the development and adaptation of popular institutions, on a
constant and disinterested pursuit of the truest political education of the
people. The constitution of 1264 shows Earl Simon in the light of a far-seeing
politician, a man of great ideas. The Parliaments of 1264 and 1265 prove him a
wise statesman and a practical reformer. He can afford to have the claim for
novelty put in the second place, for greater praise cannot be given to a statesman
than that he has clearly perceived and has fostered into a stronger life that
which already exists of good.
CHAPTER XITHE LAST YEAR.
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