CRISTO RAUL.ORG ' |
READING HALLTHE DOORS OF WISDOM |
CONTEMPORARY EAST EUROPEAN PHILOSOPHY
6.Nikolai Iribadjakov,
The
Meaning of History
The evolution of the problems in the
philosophy of history shows that the issue of the meaning of history has been
most important during the periods of deep social crises and revolutionary
change. This is why it is not at all strange that at present this problem is of
major importance in the struggle between Marxism-Leninism and bourgeois
ideology; it is not surprising that bourgeois philosophers and historians since
Hegel have never dealt so much with the problem of the “meaning of history” as
during the period after the October Revolution and after World War II. The
problem of the meaning of history is a real one and exceptionally important.
But the manner of posing and solving it stems from philosophical and historical
class-affiliations. Contemporary bourgeois writers have written a great deal
about the meaning of history but they can neither pose the problem correctly
nor solve it, because their reactionary class-interests constitute their
starting point.
Bourgeois writers have often started from the
assumption that history is directed towards a final and supreme goal. This
teleological and finalist view is that of objective idealism. It is to be
noted, however that teleological and finalist conceptions of history have been
developed extra-theologically as well. There have been secular forms, before
Marxism appeared, which played progressive roles to a certain extent, as far as
the development of scientific
knowledge and society were concerned. The views of Herder and Hegel whose names are linked with the establishment of the philosophy
of history as an
independent discipline, as well as those of Kant and Fichte, were dominated by historical optimism. Herder saw this goal in the realization of the ideal of “humaneness”, Kant in “lawful order and eternal peace”, Fichte in the “ideal state”. But its major exponent was Hegel.
In their Holy Family, Marx and Engels
discerned that Hegel’s view of history was '”nothing but the speculative
expression of the Christian-Germanic dogma of the opposition between spirit and
matter between God and the world”. But this does not mean that it was identical
with the theological fatalism of Augustine and his followers. Hegel did not
divide history into “earthly” and “heavenly”, and also did not look for an
explanation outside of human history. In his view, history is a regular,
necessary process of the self-development of the Spirit. Hegel did not exclude
freedom from history, nor did he oppose it to necessity, but rather conceived
of history in terms of conscious necessity. World History is thus a progressive
recognition of freedom, progress recognized as necessary.
Hegel’s teleology, as well as his conception
that history is a progressive, ascending process of evolution, made a deep
imprint on the philosophical and historical views of the majority of 19th
century bourgeois thinkers. Thus Feuerbach considered that the final goal of
history was the realization of man’s “true essence”, Stirner of the “unique one”, Comte of “scientific and industrial society”, etc. On the
whole, bourgeois philosophy in the 19th century was dominated by an optimistic
conception of history, the meaning of history being identified with progress. Such a view was an integral part of the credo of many bourgeois philosophers, sociologists, and
historians even during the first
two decades of our own century. “Between the middle of last century up to 1914”, wrote Carr, “it was scarcely possible
for a British historian to conceive of historical change except as change for the better”. During the period of imperialism, and
especially the contemporary,
transitional period from capitalism to socialism, the question of the meaning of history becomes more topical; simultaneously, fundamental
changes were taking place in the
bourgeois conception of the problem, changes which clearly and pointedly revealed the reactionary and anti-scientific nature of the
contemporary bourgeois philosophy of
history. Its role as an ideological weapon in defence of the bourgeois system and against Marxism-Leninism was illustrated.
Various views of history were overtly
theological, mystical, or agnostic. Some have supported the view that history
has a meaning, while denying the possibility of scientifically understanding
it. At the same time, a theological fatalism was propounded, according to which
history was created and directed by God, mankind being but a helpless tool in
the hands of Divine Providence; thus there was nothing for man to do but submit
to “fate”. According to Berdyaev, for instance, history has an “inner meaning”
which is “absolute”, history being a preordained, universal process, a
“mystery”, having its beginning and end in “heavenly history”. It is not
difficult to see that Berdyaev has not only neglected Marxist theory but also
all progressive philosophical and historical thought, in order to resurrect the
obscurantist philosophy of history of Augustine, representing it as the dernier cri of contemporary philosophy
of history. By way of Augustine, the Neo-Thomist J.
Maritain states that history develops
according to a plan predetermined by God, directed towards the realization of
goals set by God hence, the task of the philosopher of history is to reveal the
meaning placed into history by God. For Maritain, moreover, the meaning of
history is a “mystery which the human mind can only partially grasp, since man
cannot attain a comprehension of God’s ideas and aims”. While such things can
be contemplated, they cannot be scientifically understood. In this way, the
meaning of history becomes a “trans-historical meaning of historical
tragedies”, while the philosophy of history goes hand in hand with a
theological and religious mysticism.
This view of the meaning of history
penetrates into the philosophical and historical views of many contemporary
bourgeois, professional philosophers, economists, sociologists, and historians,
such as E. Jaspers, W. Röpke, A. Toynbee, F. Meinecke, Th. Schieder etc. For Jaspers, “history has a deep meaning but it is not accessible to the
human mind”. In Jaspers’ view no one knows how and where human history
originated, nor is its goal fathomable, since God has laid the ground of
history. This same agnostic view is shared by Schieder. “Wherever we turn”, he writes, “the goal
of history is covered with the darkness of uncertainty, and the answer to the
question about the direction of the development of history remains very
difficult for us”.
Theoretically such views have nothing new to
offer, but ideologically they are of great interest.
First, they mirror the deep crisis and the
ideological poverty of the contemporary bourgeois philosophy of history (as
well as the entire bourgeois ideology), mirroring also a helplessness in
formulating progressive and scientifically grounded historical goals, as well as failing to be clear and rational. That is the reason why they hide their helplessness by affirming
agnosticism, theology, and mysticism.
Second,
they reflect the downfall of bourgeois optimism, which had been connected with the notion
of a regular and progressive
historical development, substituting for it an extremely conservative and pessimistic
outlook. Conceptions concerning
historical progress are dropped for very popular theories about the alleged “cyclic development of cultures” (0. Spengler, E. Mayer, A.
Toynbee, J. Baraclough, H. Frayer, etc.) which overtly
proclaim “the decline of western
culture”. According to Carr : Nicholas I of Russia is said to have issued an order banning the word “progress”; nowadays the philosophers and historians of western Europe, and even the United States, have come belatedly to agree with him. The hypothesis of progress has been refuted. The decline of the west has become so familiar a phrase that quotation marks are no longer required. Carr is right in admitting that
bourgeois philosophical and historical theories of the “decline of western culture” are
“the characteristic ideology of a society in decline”. They reflect the lack of an historical perspective and
the doom of contemporary bourgeois society, its helplessness to find a way out of the constantly deepening crisis of its society and culture its
inability to stop the impetuous
and victorious march of the socialist revolution. Berdyaev, Maritain, and Meinecke see nothing in history but “tragedy”. “All of
history”, writes Meinecke, “is a tragedy”. In his
report Geschichtlichkeit und uberzeitlicher Sinn,
delivered at the XIVth International Congress of
Philosophy in Vienna in 1968, the well-known
West German, bourgeois philosopher, Fritz-Joachim von Rintelen, complained that, today
throughout the “bourgeois world the idea was spreading that in history
everything begins badly”, and in the words of Jaspers “everything is doomed to
failure”. So much discussion is going on about “the futility of our existence”,
the fear of nothingness, and about the complete insecurity of contemporary
life, that once again it is necessary to pose the “question of the meaning of
our historicity”.
Thirdly, theological and finalist views of
history with their pessimism agnosticism, theological fatalism, and mysticism,
are not only a passive reflection of the process of the deterioration and
decline of contemporary bourgeois society and culture. They serve as
ideological weapons of contemporary bourgeois society in the struggle against
all progressive anti-imperialist movements, and above all against the communist
movement and the socialist countries.
The historical merit of Marxism-Leninism lies
in the fact that, revealing the laws of socio-historical development, it
exhibits the temporal nature of capitalism, setting before the working class
and all exploited people a scientifically substantiated goal, viz. the
destruction of the bourgeois system and the substitution of a new higher, and
more just social system. The scientific and revolutionary ideas of
Marxism-Leninism, together with the ideological and organizational activities
of the various communist parties, the contagious example of the October
Revolution, as well as other socialist revolutions, inspires the vast masses of
the working people throughout the world for independent, conscious, organized,
and purposeful historical activity. Contemporary bourgeois ideologists realize
all this, and one of their tasks is to introduce ideological chaos among the
masses, as well as demoralization, lack of confidence,
and passivity, in
order to divert them from the road of independent revolutionary struggle. For instance, in his book, Vom Ursprung und Ziel der Geschichte, after declaring that the goal of
history is cognitively unattainable, Jaspers leaves a door open, maintaining that in spite of everything
philosophy could bring us “closer” to an understanding of this goal. He believes that in creating a “world
empire”, in which this “sole power would govern everybody, world peace will finally be achieved”. But it
is not difficult to see behind this “divine” historical goal the earthly, mad plans of the American
imperialists to create a world empire.
Wilhelm Röpke has
expressed quite clearly the reactionary anti-communist nature of such notions
concerning the “meaning” of history. To Röpke the
struggle between socialism and capitalism which struggle determines the basic
content of our epoch, is nothing but a conflict between Satan and God. After
expressing his confidence that “like all Satan’s doings red totalitarianism
will be liquidated”, Röpke prophesizes: “Finally,
things will happen which are not envisaged in the plan of dialectical
materialism for the development of history, because only God knows how all this
will end”. There is no sense in refuting such prophecies, since they are an
expression of wishful thinking, and they rely on the ignorance and religious
narrow-mindedness of people who still believe in a God directing the progress
of world history.
The progressive segment of bourgeois
philosophers, sociologists, and historians reject such theological and finalist
conceptions. “I have no belief in Divine Providence”, writes Carr, and he continues, “World Spirit, Manifest Destiny,
History with a capital H, or any other of the abstractions which have sometimes been
supposed to guide the course of
events; and I should endorse without qualification the comment of Marx: History does
nothing, it possesses no immense
wealth, fights no battles, it is rather man, real living man who does everything, who possesses and fights”. In the majority of cases, however, such a criticism is carried out from
subjectivist and idealist positions,
and is predominantly non-Marxist in character. According to such bourgeois writers as T. Lessing, W. Theimer, and K. Popper, history in
itself has no meaning. The most
pessimistically minded point out the senselessness of history and of human life. Others try to overcome historical pessimism by working out
a new historical optimism
which is subjective, idealistic, or voluntaristic, or in
many cases irrational in character.
We may point out the popular book of Theodor
Lessing, Geschichte als Sinngebung des Sinnlosen, which appeared
during World War I. Interwoven in Lessing’s views are the irrationalism of Dilthey’s Lebensphilosophie,
Neo-Kantian apriorism, and elements of
existentialism. For this reason Lessing’s views continue to have strong
influence on contemporary bourgeois philosophical trends. Lessing’s enemy is
not bourgeois finalism, but Marxism’s notion of history as an objective,
regular, ascending, and progressive process. According to Lessing, history is
not an objective and regular process of development, rather the historian
creates what we call causal relations, regularity, development, and other such
meanings, out of subjective experiences which are actually empty. As in the
case with other idealists, Lessing identifies history with historiography, from
which it follows that the only way to make history is to write it. By denying
the objective reality of the subject matter of historiography, he negates the
possibility of the existence of objective
historical truth and of history as a science. This explains why Lessing grants
everyone the right to create his own history, placing in it whatever “meaning”
one pleases.
Both Heineman and von Rintelen do not take Lessing’s views seriously due to Lessing’s endless subjective
arbitrariness, but in essence their views do not really differ from his. Like
him they also feel that history itself is meaningless, its meaning has to be
introduced from outside. The only way that sense can be given to history is in
man’s struggle to realize the “basic values” of “love”, “beauty”, etc., values
which have an “atemporal” and “ahistorical”
character, and are, consequently, not subjectively arbitrary. Other bourgeois
writers, however, feel that the “value” of Lessing’s work stems from the very voluntaristic and subjectively arbitrary views he
proclaims. Thus, for instance, the well-known anti-Marxist Walter Theimer considers Lessing’s
voluntarism as the most important ideological weapon in the struggle against
the Marxist-Leninist view of history, particularly against its theory of
historical inevitability. “Whoever shares, the voluntarist view of history”, Theimer writes, “has to abandon the hope found in the view that it is necessary to act
in conformity with an objectively existing meaning of history... To insist that
progress, humanism, or socialism are the meaning of history, that they are
established by forces standing higher or by laws of its development, is wrong”.
To Theimer, while his
philosophy of history denies it all objective meaning; it does not doom
humanity to a passive existence, rather it does just the opposite. “The sober
concept”, he declares, “that no meaning can be found in history does not entail
skeptical passivity. It is more probable that it creates a basis for the will
to create a certain meaning; the lack of any definite meaning is even a
precondition for this. Admitting the fact that until now history has not had any meaning does not lead to the conclusion that it shall never have a meaning. This depends entirely on the people who make history”. Thus socialism is not an objective historical necessity but an ethical
ideal, which is dependent on
what people wish to happen.
Marxism refutes both the older theological
views of history and the modern subjectivist notions. No one has criticized
theological and finalist views of history so profoundly as Marx and Engels. In
their works, The Holy Family and The German Ideology they showed the
utter groundlessness of all speculative idealistic views which see in history
“a special sense which can be discovered”. They refuted every effort to
personify history, to give it a “special character”, converting it into a
“metaphysical subject of which real human individuals are but the bearers”.
“What is designated with the words 'destiny’, ‘goal’,...
‘idea’ of ... history is nothing more than an abstraction formed from later history, from the active influence which earlier
history exercises on later history”. Marx and Engels opposed to such metaphysical and mystical views their own
dialectical materialist conception, which rejects any preconceived plan of history. “Just as knowledge is unable
to reach a perfected termination in a perfect, ideal condition of humanity”,
Engels wrote, “so
is history unable to do so; a perfect society, a perfect ‘state’, are things which can only exist in imagination”.
For Marxists two aspects should be
distinguished when we speak about the meaning of history, viz. the objective
and the subjective aspects; both of which are interconnected. Further,
although the subjective aspect has its own comparative independence, the
decisive role is played by the objective aspect.
The objective aspect of the meaning of history,
or the objective meaning of history is expressed through the existence and action of its
objective laws, history has objective meaning as far as the historical event
are causally determined, and are not chaotic but represent a natural-historical
process subjected to objective laws which determine the successions, mutual
relations, and reciprocal determinations. In other words, the objective meaning
of history is identical with its immanent logic.
If the meaning of history is nothing else but
the objective logic of its development, then its analysis is the major task of
every scientific social and historical theory. Stressing the importance of this
task Lenin wrote : “The most important thing is that the laws of these changes
have been discovered, that the objective logic of these changes and of their
historical development has in its chief and basic features been disclosed. The
highest task of humanity is to comprehend the objective logic of economic
evolution (the evolution of social life) in its general and fundamental
features, so that it may be possible to adapt to it one’s social consciousness
and the consciousness of the advanced and critical a fashion as possible”.
The scientific cognition of the objective
meaning of history is the theoretical basis of the revolutionary and practical
activities of the workers and communist movements in mapping their historical
goals, as well as the means for achieving them. That is why it is not by chance
that bourgeois philosophers, sociologists, and historians try to deny the
objective meaning of history.
In
their efforts to discredit Marxism bourgeois writers identify Marxist-Leninist teachings on the
objective meaning of history with all
sorts of teleological, theological, fatalistic, and irrational views. B. Croce, for instance, ranks historical materialism together with
theological and idealistic
philosophies which find in history a “universal plan”, or which find a kind of “logic”
introduced into it by a transcendental force. Whether this force, says Croce, is called “Idea”, “Spirit”, or “matter” is unimportant. In the final analysis, it
is “only a mask of a
transcendent God who is the only one to invent such a plan, to make people do things, and to supervise their activities”. If such statements
belonged to insignificant and
ignorant critics of Marxism, one could explain them precisely as ignorance, and we would
not have paid much attention to
them. Here, however, we see a deliberate distortion of Marxism, since it is improbable that philosophers such as Croce and Popper fail to
know that Marxism not only
has nothing in common with such mystical views on the meaning of history but, on the contrary, it is their complete and uncompromising
negation.
Just as our knowledge of natural science aids
mankind in changing and mastering the blind forces of nature by means of its
scientific knowledge of the logic of history, the working class and the various
communist parties can realize their historical goals of preserving world peace,
developing world democracy, liberating the dependent countries from imperialist
oppression, doing away with the capitalist system, and building socialism.
The objective and subjective meanings of
history are interrelated, but they are not identical. The “subjective” aspect of the meaning of history is quite different from the objective one, in
that it is connected with the activities of men laying the foundations of history.
The basic drawback of all
subjective, idealistic and voluntaristic views lies in the fact that they do not take into consideration this important
difference between the two aspects of the meaning of history. They fail to understand the objective dialectic of both
in their interrelations and
interdependence, and, as a result of this, they either confuse or identify the two
aspects, or they oppose them to each
other.
Setting the goal and struggling for its
achievement presuppose creatures with consciousness, will power, and energy.
History as an objective, natural-historical process has neither consciousness,
nor will power, nor energy. It is nonsense, absurd, to speak of the meaning of
history in such terms. However, history is not a chaotic play of unconscious
and blind forces; it is not a process which takes place automatically, but is
the activities of people organized in classes, nations, parties.
The existence of historical goals is
undoubtedly a necessary element in making sense of the historical activities of
the characters of history, viz. social classes, systems, and political parties.
Taking these facts as a starting point, the subjective idealists and voluntarists draw the conclusion that people invest
history with meaning, and this meaning can be different depending on their
views and aims. According to Popper, in spite of the fact that history has no
meaning, we can endow it with meaning, depending on our point of view. Thus,
for instance, we could interpret history from the point of view of the struggle
for an “open society”, for a government of reason, justice, freedom and
equality, etc. From that point of view with which we interpret history, the
aims we set for it, and the meaning we give it, depend our conceptions and
decisions, which in turn do not depend on any objective factors.
Neither
nature nor history, writes Popper can tell us what we ought to do. Facts, whether those of nature or those of history, cannot make the decision for us, they cannot determine the ends we are
going to choose. It is we who introduce purpose and meaning into nature and
into history. Men are not equal; but we can decide to fight for equal rights.
Human institutions such as the state are not rational, but we can decide to
fight to make them more rational. The theoretical basis for this subjective and
idealistic conception of the meaning of history is the contention of Popper
that between facts and decisions there is a “fundamental dualism”, because
“facts as such have no meaning; they can gain it only through our decisions”.
Popper sees as one of Marxism’s basic errors the attempt to overcome this
dualism.
It is true that neither facts nor history
make decisions or set tasks. Decisions are made by people, and they set tasks,
but they do not map out their historical goals arbitrarily. Popper says that
people are not equal, but we can decide to fight for equal rights. But what do
“equal rights” and “we” mean? “Equal rights” could mean equal rights in the
ownership of the means of production, equal rights in the distribution of the
means of existence, in government and in making decisions on state problems, in
education and recreation, equal rights to free national, political, economic,
and cultural life. History, however, does not know a single case where the
slave-owning class, or the feudal lords, or the bourgeoisie fought for such
equality. This is the kind of equality the oppressed and exploited have fought
and are fighting for, while the exploiting classes have always tried to fix
inequality firmly. The question then is why different individuals, social
classes, and systems (and their political parties) make different decisions on
the same problem, why they set different and opposing
historical aims.
Just by posing these questions we can see the
entire groundlessness of Popper’s conception. The goals individuals set for
themselves are not arbitrary, subjective, or capricious, and decisions are
determined by the “facts” of social and historical life, i.e. by the objective
social conditions of existence. Material conditions determine historical aims,
and, since the material conditions of existence of different individuals in
various social classes are different, their historical aims and decisions are
different. Exploitation and oppression make the working class fight impulsively
(or in an organized way) against social systems which are based on exploitation
and oppression. The stronger and the clearer the consciousness of the masses as
regards the real causes of their social inequality, exploitation, and
oppression, the more active their struggle will be for social equality.
Individuals and classes which have the political and economic power in their
hands and build their existence and well-being on the exploitation and
oppression of others have an interest in the existence of social inequality,
and that is why they fight with all their might to preserve and consolidate it.
All this shows that the “insurmountable and
fundamental dualism” between “facts and decisions” is nonexistent. It is an
invention, but like many other idealistic inventions it is not purely an
invention, rather it is the result of a one-sided analysis, concentrating on
certain aspects of human conscious activity, human cognition, and stressing
their comparative independence. Men’s social consciousness, their social and
historical ideas, which are expressed in their projections of historical goals,
are determined by their objective social and historical life, and are a reflection
of this life, though they are not always in accord with the objective logic of history.
If history and its facts were really void of
any objective meaning, of any objective logic, people could endow them with any
meaning they wished. But historical practice shows in an indisputable way that
this is impossible, because history and its facts have their own objective
logic independent of human consciousness and will power. Almost two thousand
years now have elapsed since Christianity proclaimed peace among the classes,
“love of neighbor”, “nonviolence”, “selflessness”; it has paid lip service to
one of the ten commandments forbidding theft and plunder, but neither divine
authority nor the threat of eternal tortures in hell made such norms the actual
aim and meaning of history. In practice, the reactionary exploiting classes
have carried out a policy of violence and plunder, of class, national, racial,
and religious enmity, of wars and counter-revolutions; class struggle, then,
has always been the real motor force in history. At the time when the
bourgeoisie was a progressive and revolutionary class, its ideologists painted
as the aim and meaning of its historical activities the struggle for the
realization of “liberty, equality, and fraternity”, but the practical result of
this struggle was the establishment of bourgeois society, with its deep social
inequality, plunderous and
ruinous wars unheard of up till then in history, with class struggle and
atrocity.
Nevertheless, it is a mistake to think that, between the conscious activities of men setting tasks for themselves and the objective logic of history there is a kind of abyss. When historical aims coincide with the requirements of the objective logic of history, when the means and the activity of the masses for achieving the historical goals also coincide with the requirements of this logic, then from a “spontaneous process” history turns into a consciously directed process. Only in this sense can people “introduce” meaning into history. But it is enough for this activity to deviate from the objective logic of history or to violate it, and then history will make us experience clearly that we cannot impose on it the meaningless goals of our own choosing.
|