Chapter III.

Epistemology, Ontology, and Logic

13.

Georg Lukacs.

The Ontological Foundations of Human Thought and Activity

 

Everyone knows that in the last decade, a radical derivation from former epistemological tendencies, neo­positivism, with its fundamental rejection of every ontological inquiry as unscientific, has absolutely prevailed. Further, its dominance extended beyond philosophical circles to the practical sphere. Once we seriously analyze the theoretical motives of the political, military, and economic leadership of today, one finds that it has been determined, consciously or unconsciously, by neo-positivist methods of thinking. They have had unrestricted omnipotence; once the confrontation with reality leads to the beginning of a crisis, the revolution in the sphere of political economy permeates into the field of philosophy (in the broadest sense).

Rather than being concerned with the ontological probings of the last decade, we shall restrict ourself to explaining certain problems initiated by Sartre in this direction.

They arise in relation to Marxism. We know quite well that this historical philosophy was rarely conceived as an ontology. Our study will propose, on the contrary, that the philosophical conclusions of Marx, in fact, were drawn from the logico-ontological idealism of Hegel, arriving theoretically as well as practically with the outlines of an historical materialist ontology. Hegel prepared the way, interpreting ontology historically, in contrast to the religious ontology, by tracing the necessary historical development from the “bottom”, from the simplest, to the “highest”, to the most complicated objectifications of human culture. Obviously, stress was placed upon social being and its productions, and as it was characteristic of Hegel, man appears as self-creating.

Marxist ontology removes all logico-deductive and historico-developmental, teleological elements from the Hegelian. Also, with this materialism “standing-on its feet”, the synthesis of simples disappeared from the series of moving moments of this process. For Marx the starting point is neither the ancient, materialist atom nor the Hegelian, highly abstract Being. Ontologically, there are no such things. All existing things must always be objective, always moving, changing parts of concrete complexes. Two basic consequences can presently be drawn. First, all of being is an historical process: second, the categories are not predicates of something existing or coming into existence, nor, as well, (ideal) formal principles of matter. Rather they are changing and changed forms of matter itself: “forms of existing”, “determinations of existence”. Since the radical position of Marx (departing also from the older materialism) was frequently interpreted in the old spirit, the false idea arose, that Marx de-emphasized the importance of consciousness as against material being. Later we shall show the falsity of this view. What matters now is to see that Marx interpreted consciousness as a later product of material ontological evolution. For a materialist philosophy of evolution the later product must never be conceived to be less important ontologically. Consciousness of reality reflects and possibly changes the bases of its modifying activity, pointing to a measure of real Power, rather than something frail.

Let us deal with the ontology of social being. We cannot grasp its particular nature, if we fail to take account of its arising on the basis of organic being (which develops from inorganic being). Science has already begun to uncover the forms of transition from one level to another. We find a sudden leap, something qualitatively new, which could never be deduced from simpler forms. As the quali­tatively new arises, this novelty is, in many cases, a departure from the manner of reacting of the more fundamental forms to new categories of reacting. One may mention the way in which light works upon plants, in a purely physico-chemical manner, developing later as sight in the higher animals. Thereby there arise unique kinds of being (though the new forms should not be thought of as the original, fundamental existences).

A certain higher development of organic reproductive processes is necessary in order that labor will be able to emerge as a dynamic, structural foundation for a new type of being. The essence of labor consists in its surpassing the forms of living beings in its interaction with its environment. It is not the perfecting of production which creates the essentially detached moment, but rather the role of consciousness which stops being a mere epiphenomenon of biological reproduction: whose product is, Marx states, a result, which was already ideally contained in the beginning of the process, “already in the idea of the worker”.

It is quite striking that the materialistic dichotomy of organic nature and social being attributes a decisive role to consciousness. One should not, however, forget that it is able to maintain its emerging complex of problems (its highest type being freedom and necessity) only by the active role of consciousness, precisely and genuinely ontologically. Where consciousness has no effective power, such a contrast could not appear. When such a role belongs to consciousness, it must resolve these antitheses.

One can with good reason designate the laborer, who through his work moves from an animal to a man, as an active being. Undoubtedly, laboring activity arises as a solution to his needs. If, however, one were to pass over its essence, one would be pre­supposing an immediate relation. On the contrary, man, precisely because he is an active being, because he (parallel with social evolution. in a progressive way), with his goals, the possibilities of his gratification; generalizes his questions, and in his answers to these needs of his activity, establishes and enriches his goals, often through extensive adjustments, Thus, not only the answer but the question as well are direct products of the activity of conscious conduct. Therefore indeed, the answers do not cease being primary in this moving complex. Material need, as the motor of individual as well as of social reproductive processes, first sets the labor complex truly in motion, and all adjustments actually serve the purpose of satisfying it. Certainly by means of this series of adjustments and man’s using and controlling such powers there is effected a higher development of man's capabilities, changing continuously both his relation to surrounding nature, as well as the relationships between men, etc., while drawing from nature practical, effective powers, relations, attributes, which had previously not been released.

In the case of labor, there is also the possibility of its higher development, which it ontologically imparts to it by man acting. Already in this way, but wholly as a consequence of the transformation of the mere reactive-passive adaptation of the reproductive processes in the environment, through its conscious and active metamorphosis; labor does not become merely a fact, in which the new type of social being attains its expression, but (quite ontologically) arrives at a model case of a wholly new form of being.

Labor consists of telic (teleologrischen) projects, which set the respective causal series in motion. This well-established fact eliminates a thousand­year-old ontological prejudice. In contrast to causality, which describes a spontaneous law, in which the movements of all forms of being obtain their general expression, teleology is a way of projecting (Setzulagsweise), one constantly accomplished by consciousness, which, guiding it in definite courses, nevertheless can set the causal series in motion. Since in the earlier philosophies the teleological project was not understood as a special peculiarity of social being, it was necessary to have puzzled out on the one hand a transcendental subject, and on the other a peculiar character of teleological acting relationships, in order to be able to speak about nature and society’s tendency to develop in a teleological manner. The duality in this state of affairs, that in a society which actually has become social, in the majority of its activities, some totality moves the whole, is the teleological origin, is equally its real existence whether the individual remains or is included, yet they remain in causal relationships, which relationships are completely detached from their teleological character; such is the distinctive point of view here.

Every social practice (Praxis), if we think of labor as the model, reconciles these opposites. On the one hand, each man faces the alternatives of which he must decide whether he shall do something or abstain from so doing. Every social act therefore originates from alternatives about future, teleological projects. Social necessity can only be successful in the (often anonymous) pressure on the individual, to accomplish his alternatives, deciding upon a determinate course. Marx pointed out correctly in this situation that men, “under penalty of destruction”, are pressed to act by the circumstances in a certain way. However, men must consummate their activities, in the final analysis, by themselves, even if they often act against their convictions.

From this unavoidable human situation of living in society is derived the entirety of the real problems which we subsume under Freedom. Without infringing upon the sphere of labor in its proper sense, we can refer to the categories of value and duty. Nature knows neither the one nor the other. The transformation of something into another in inorganic nature has, self-evidently, nothing to do with values. The situation is altogether different in respect to work. Knowledge distinguishes in general very clearly the objectively existing Being ­in-itself of objects from its merely conscious Being­ for-itself, which one finds in the epistemic process. Now, however, the Being-for-itself of the products of labor is transformed into its objective real, existing condition, precisely to that through which it can fulfill, if correctly situated and realized, its social function. In this way it becomes valuable (or in the case of failure, worthless, valueless). It is only through the actual, objective development of Being-for-itself that value can be derived. That these spiritual (geistigere) forms are drawn from the higher stuff of social life, does not put aside the fundamental meaning of its ontological genesis.

Duty stands in an analogous relation. Duty constrains one through social goals, determining human ways of behaving. It is the essence of labor that, in all its variety, it must satisfy the initial goals to which men direct themselves. For this reason duty is always implicit in each act. Also here, it does not alter the existing, decisive factors, since this dynamic structure will be transmitted to the purely spiritual laws of action.

It shows itself in opposition to the existing connecting links, which lead from the original to the later spiritual ways of behaving; this in greater clarity, in contrast to the epistemological-logical methods, by which the course that leads from the higher forms from the original, become invisible, so that these appear from our own historical era immediately as antitheses.

When we view something only from the projecting subject from a given point in respect of the total process of labor, thus we see well enough that this indeed consciously takes place within the telic project; and yet at no time is it possible to observe all of the conditions of an activity, much less foresee all its consequences. Of course, this does not stop man from acting. There are countless situations which, at the risk of destruction, must be dealt with unconditionally, despite the fact that man is able to observe only a fraction of the circumstances. Often by laboring man realizes that he commands only a small part of the conditions; he realizes, however, that he is able to accomplish something thereby, since his need pressures him, and his labor also stands as a gratification in expectation.

This unavoidable situation has two important consequences. First, the inner dialectic of the continual perfection of labor while its process is being carried out, owing to the observation of its results, etc.; the extent of the known, achieved results constantly improves and consequently labor itself is always manifold, always comprehending greater dimensions, will always be more and more extensively modified, as well as intensively.

But since this process of perfection exhibits to us basic facts, which the state of partial knowledge of complete conditions cannot overcome (parallel to its growth), the manner of existing of labor brings forth the recognition of a transcendent reality, whose unknown powers man somehow attempts to turn to his advantage. This is not the place to investigate the various forms of magical praxis, religious beliefs, etc., which grew out of this situation. They should not be entirely ignored, however, constituting one form nevertheless of ideological form. In relation to these things mentioned (magical praxis), and because labor is not only the objective, ontological model of all human activity, but also it is the prototype for the divine creation of reality, of all things, by means of an omniscient creator teleologically producing reality’s forms.

Labor is therefore a conscious process, pre­supposing less than complete, concrete knowledge of specific ends and means. Since developments, perfection, belong to its ontological token of essence, labor creates social forms of a higher order. Perhaps the most crucial of these differentiations would be the increasing independence of preliminary, preparatory labor, which, always relative, separates knowledge as ends and means from concrete labor itself. Mathematics, geometry, physics, chemistry, etc., were originally components, instances, of this preparatory process of labor. Gradually, they grew to independent disciplines, without being able to shed completely their original function. At the same time, the more universal and independent these sciences became, the more universal and perfect labor became; the more they spread out, intensified, etc., the greater became the influence of such applied knowledge upon the ends and means of the performance of work.

Such a differentiation takes place already in a relatively highly developed form of social segmentation. This itself, however, is the most elementary result of the development of labor itself. Even before it had been brought to its maximum intensive development, during the same period this consequence already emerged in the hunting situation. What is ontologically noteworthy is the appearance thereafter of a new form of the telic project: namely, it would appropriately not have to work thereby with a part of nature for human projected goals, but a man (or many) would have to set up additional telic projects in a predetermined manner. Since a certain kind of work can only have a uniform, central goal, it implies that means must be found to insure unity of purpose in the preparation and performance of work. Therefore, these new telic projects must develop simultaneously with the division of labor in actuality, and further must remain as indispensable elements in this segmenta­tion of work. From these social segmentations, and with the emergence of social classes having antagonistic interests, these teleological projects become the structural and intellectual foundations of that which is termed Marxist Ideology. From these struggles, which are sharpened by the development of production, ideologies show the forms by which men become conscious of these contradictions, and by which they then fight them out.

Lore and more deeply these conflicts penetrate collective social life. From personal and directly personal, annulled contradictions, and in everyday life, they reach up to these crucial complexes of problems, which mankind had attempted to eliminate in its great social revolutions. However, the most fundamental type of structure always exhibits certain essential, common characteristics: just as for labor itself it was inevitable that real knowledge about its natural process would come to light, in order that the assimilation of nature by society could be successfully administered; thus it is also indispensable, too, that we have a certain knowledge about man's constitution, men’s personal and social relationships, in order that we can bring about those telic projects we desire to see fulfilled. With such vital discoveries, initially taking the form of custom, tradition, and habit, as well as that of myth, there arose the later sophisticated procedures of the sciences. Though we cannot deal with the details in this lecture, his assimilation of nature and ills telic projects influence his knowledge. This fact should not lead to a theoretical exaggeration of unity, nor to absolute difference either. There are ontological similarities and differences existing simultaneously, to which the solutions can only be found in a concrete, socio-historical dialectic.

I have been referring to the socio-ontological principle. Each social event that springs from telic, individual projects is nevertheless a pure, causal character. The teleological genesis has important natural consequences for the totality of social processes. On the one hand, conditions arise (with all of their consequences), which nature would never produce; e.g. the primitive wheel. On the other hand, every society develops so that necessity ceases to operate mechanistically, spontaneously, its method of operating becoming continually stronger to the extent that it causes, pushes, and pressures men towards specific teleo­logical decisions, or to prevent them from making given decisions.

The total process of society is a causal one, which has its own lawfulness, at no time, however, is this total process an objective, consciously designed teleology. Also when they are successful, men or groups of men realize their projected goals, consequently generating a situation quite different from what they had willed. (One can mention, then, how the development of the forces of production in antiquity destroyed the foundations of society, how there emerged, at a given stage of capitalism, periodic economic crises, etc.) This inner contradiction between telic projects and their causal consequences increases with the growth of society, with the intensification of socio-human interest in them. In relation to this widening contradiction, great economic disasters (one can think of the crisis of 1929) can rise, appearing to be unavoidable, natural catastrophes. During the greatest upheavals, e.g. during great revolutions, however, history demonstrates that the role of that which Lenin chose to term the subjective factor was very significant. The difference between the projected goals and their results are indeed expressed as the factual superiority of the material elements and tendencies in the reproductive processes of society. This does not mean for all time that this itself controls necessity, that no enduring oppositions can be accomplished. The subjective factor, arising out of the human reaction to such changing tendencies, remains open to many domains, a constant occasionally modifying them, often being even the decisive factor.

We have attempted to demonstrate how the decisive categories and their relations with social beings have already been present in labor. We shall not detail the gradual advance of labor to its totalization in society. Thus, we simply skip over the most important mediating areas, bringing out more clearly, at least, the most universal connection of the genesis of society and history with their own development. Above all, we propose to examine what economic necessity consists of. At the outset, it should be emphasized that this is not a natural, necessary process, though Marx himself, in his polemic with idealism, occasionally used such an expression.

In previous economic development, we can see three directional developments, which have, it is well-known, come to pass, often very unevenly, independently of men's desires and knowledge, which also lie at the foundation of our telic projects.

First, socially necessary working time, labor-time for human reproduction, tends constantly to diminish. As a general tendency this is not disputed by anyone.

Second, this process of reproduction itself became ever more socially intensive. When Marx spoke of a permanent “recession of nature’s barriers”, he intended, on the one hand, that the basic form of human (and therefore of social) life relative to nature’s processes never entirely ceases; while, on the other hand, the quantitative as well as the qualitative aspects of the purely natural laws recede in production, as well as in the product; that all the decisive instances of human reproduction (such as nourishment and sexuality) become trans­formed permanently and essentially into social moments in their own right.

Third, economic development creates more and more critical qualitative as well as quantitative relations between individuals, who originally appeared in tiny, independent societies. At present one finds realized the greater and greater economic predominance of the international market, already showing, at the very least, an economically unified humanity. This unity lasts certainly only as a reality and formation from real economic unifying principles. It concretely manifests itself in a world in which this integration into our lives creates the most difficult, the sharpest conflicts, e.g. in the Black question in the U.S.A. We try to discern the important tendencies, external and internal transformations of this social being through which its particular structure is maintained, since the process in which man has developed from a being of nature to a human personality, from a relatively highly developed kind of animal to being a human, to mankind. All of that is the result of the initiation of the causal series of complex society. The process itself has no goal. Its higher development, in addition, includes the structuring of higher and higher formations of more and more fundamental contradictions. Progress, indeed, is the synthesis of human activities, but it is no way its consummation, in the sense of a general Teleology: moreover, primitive, yet ever refined, economic stages are destroyed again and again by evolution; therefore, objective economic progress appears constantly in the form of new social conflicts. Thus there is produced from the original community of men the seemingly insoluble antinomies of class struggles; thereby also there are the most vexing forms of inhumanity resulting from such progress. Thus today, the universality of human alienation is a sign that economic development is about to revolutionize the relationship of man to his work.

 

BUDAPEST, HUNGARY  BRIDGEPORT