CRISTO RAUL.ORG '

READING HALL

THE DOORS OF WISDOM

CONTEMPORARY EAST EUROPEAN PHILOSOPHY

Chapter III.

Epistemology, Ontology, and Logic

12.

George A. Brutian

Lenin and Logic

Questions pertaining to logic have an important place in the theoretical heritage of V. I. Lenin. It would be erroneous to see this only in terms of the erudition of the creator of the world's first socialist state. Lenin saw dialectics as the soul of Marxism, ascribing to dialectics not only the highest form of philosophic thought, but also the method of transforming the surrounding world in a revolutionary way.

Logic for Lenin not only had a quite direct relation to dialectics, but was also seen as congruent with dialectics, in a certain sense. The focal question in the problem-complex of logic raised by Lenin was that of the relationship between logic, dialectics, and the theory of cognition. He answered by positing a congruency of all three, seeing all three from a materialist perspective. Lenin’s comprehension of these three was in full accord with the views of the founders of dialectical materialism, Marx and Engels.

Engels had emphasized the historical aspect of materialism by recognizing the transformation of materialism due to each epochal discovery in the histories of the physical and social sciences. This approach is pertinent also to the sciences of logic.

On the whole, the various theories of logic of given eras present by their very nature are responses to the demands the sciences make upon logic at any particular time.

Aristotle’s philosophy and his logical teachings were not dichotomized. His philosophy also had subsumed under it the sciences, expressing the quintessence of the intellectual comprehension of external reality and man's spiritual world. Paradoxically, Aristotle, though it is correct to consider him the founder of logic as a science, did not use the name “logic”, it came into use later with the Stoics. It is also correct that Aristotle’s logic was formalistic, though this needs qualification.

It is undoubtedly correct that Aristotle described with exceptional insight the formal-logical attributes of thought, its structure and construction. But, in addition to his formal-logical description of thought, Aristotle inquired into a range of thinking lying beyond formal logic. Even according to the classic writers of dialectical logic, some aspects of the Aristotelian logic pertained to the problem-complex within the province of dialectics. First of all there is the question of truth as a logical problem, and there is the attempt to discern the contradictory nature of the form of thinking, such issues of Aristotle’s philosophia prima attracted Lenin's attention. Lenin characterized Aristotle’s logic as “the questioning, the search for the approach to logic (later) advanced by Hegel”

Philosophers and logicians in the period following Aristotle touched upon problems, in various degrees, which often went beyond the framework of formal logic. The evolution of these tendencies culminated in Kant’s “dialectical logic”. This development was not just a terminological matter. Kant’s transcendental logic, on the one hand, synthesized many elements of the dialectics of thought, and, on the other, stimulated further development. However, Hegel transformed these questionings, tendencies, and these fragments into an entire system of dialectical logic. It was not unnatural, then, that, in his logical inquiries, Lenin continually addressed himself to Hegel, attempting to sublate him critically, never, of course, rejecting Hegelian dialectics. Lenin copiously summarized Hegel, appending numerous comments, while he concluded that the Science of Logic that most idealist work of Hegel became less and less idealist, more and more materialistic. As the recognized authority in materialistic dialectics evaluated Hegel’s work as the acme of idealistic dialectics.

Moreover, the conception of logic of Lenin was a direct link, a stepping stone, in the evolution of the notions of Mary and Engels. In this regard it is apparent that there is a complete congruity of thought, an identity, of world outlook for and of the goals of Marx, Engels, and Lenin. Hegel’s “critical idealism” was sympathetically viewed by Lenin, as it had also been with Lenin's predecessors, Marx and Engels. Lenin was convinced that a “critical idealism” was closer to a “critical materialism” than to a crude materialism. In contrast, dialectical materialists reject the “vulgar materialism” advocated by Vogt, Büchner, and others. Thus, it is demonstrated that science, in its progressive path, absorbs all that is valuable, everything that was contributed by the founders of logic; even though these contributors and founders had contrary world outlooks to dialectical materialism.

Marx was the first to refashion dialectical logic and to put it into a materialistic mold. He did not place, it is granted, his materialistic notions of dialectics into specific treatises. The purpose which Marx set himself, the goal of providing the working class with a theoretical tool for the revolutionary transformation of the world, determined the form of expression of all of his scientific interests. First of all, Marx analyzed the economic structure of society, thus establishing a political economy, based on the principles of dialectical logic derived from Hegel (but fundamentally reshaped by Marx). This was accomplished to such a degree of perfection that Lenin observed, “though Marx did not have a ‘Logic’, he did have the logic of Capital”.

Lenin’s conception of logic was fully derived from the teachings of Marx and Engels, presenting a new step in their development. Lenin called attention to the subject matter of dialectical logic, its relationship per se to dialectics, in full accord with the postulates of the founders of Marxism which refers to the most general laws of the development of nature, society, and human thought. For Lenin the logical structure of capital, Marx’s main work, is an application of logic, dialectics, and epistemology of materialism to a particular science. Lenin attributed an overriding significance to the fusion of these elements. The congruity of logic, dialectics, and epistemology in materialism overcame, according to Lenin, the gap between ontology and epistemology which had characterized the various philosophic systems prior to Marx. Hegel had perceived this gap, and he established a new system, postulating that logic is identical with Thought about Being. He defined metaphysics as the science of things comprehended in thought. Nevertheless, the identity of Thought and Being, Hegel’s view that thought is the only attribute of reality, of ultimate Being, does not contradict the materialistic conception of the classics of Marxism. Following Marx and Engels, Lenin considered an inquiry scientific when it approached its subject matter dialectically, simultaneously applying the epistemology of materialism and dialectical logic.

This thesis of the congruity of logic, dialectics, and the theory of cognition within materialism has elicited great interest in Soviet philosophic literature. Expositions on the thesis above have formed the content of the works of the following Soviet logicians and philosophers:

M.N. Alekseyev (Dialectics of the Forms of Thinking, Moscow, 1959; Dialectical logic, Moscow, 1960)

 V. Asmuss (Dialectical Materialism and Logic: An Essay on the Development of Dialectical Method from Kant  to Lenin, Kiev, 1924

V.A. Vyazulin (The Logic of Capital of K. Marx., Moscow, 1960),

G. G. Gabrielyean (Marxist Logic as Dialectics and Theory of Cognition, Yerevan, 1969),

D. P. Gorski (The Problems of General Methodology and Dialectical Logic, Moscow, 1966),

A. Kasymdjanov (The Problem  of the Congruity of Dialectics, Logic and the Theory of Cognition, Based on the "Philosophic Notebooks" of V. I. Lenin, Alma-Ata, 1962),

B.M. Kedrov (The Unity of Dialectical Logic and the Theory of Cognition, Moscow, 1969),

P. V. Kopnin (The Philosophic Ideas of V. I. Lenin and Logic, Moscow, 1969),

V. I. Maltsev (Essays on Dialectical Logic, Moscow, 1964),

Z. M. Orubshev (The Unity of Dialectics Logic and the Theory of Cognition in "Capital" of K. Marx, Bakre, 1968),

I. S. Narski (The Problem of Contradiction in Dialectical Logic, Moscow, 1969; Dialectical Contradiction and the Logic of Cognition, Moscow, 1969)

M. M. Rosental (Principles of  Dialectical Logic, Moscow, 1960)

S. B. Tseritelli (Dialectical Logic, Tiblisi, 1965),

and

B. I. Tshvekessov (Materialistic Dialectics and-the Theory of Cognition, Moscow, 1907).

This list is not all-inclusive. Among the works listed the fundamental studies of V, Asmuss, B. M. Kedrov, and P. Kopnin can be singled out.

The postulation of Lenin of the congruity of logic, dialectics, and the theory of cognition is, on the whole, accepted by Soviet logicians and philosophers, who in the course of many years have engaged in lively discussions of these problems. Some, for instance M. N. Aleksyev, V. I. Tscherkasov, V. I. Maltsev, S. B, Tseritelli, with a few variations in their viewpoints, insist on the independent existence of dialectical logic as a science, distinct from dialectical materialism. According to this conception, dialectical logic inquiries into the specific forms of dialectical thinking. The unity of logic, dialectics, and epistemology, moreover, expresses itself in the following manner: logic investigates the dialectical forms of thought as based upon the theory of cognition of materialism. Thus, there are two forms of thought here, one dialectical, one formal-logical. The former constituting the subject matter of dialectical logic, the latter of formal logic. This peculiar “logical dualism” was subject to criticism by its opponents.

Other Soviet logicians identified and explained materialism’s logic, dialectics, and epistemology in a uniform way, since they followed Lenin's view that it is not necessary to have three separate areas, for they all have the same reference. Marxist philosophy was observed to be the science of the most general laws of the development of nature, society, and human thought. Another view, strongly expressed by K. S. Bakhradse, resulted in acknowledging the existence of but one logic, viz. formal logic, seeing logic as the science of the forms and laws of correct thinking. This conception has been criticized, in turn; for, in essence, it denies the existence of dialectical logic.

P. V. Roshin, M. N. Rutkevitch, and a few other Soviet philosophers interpret Lenin’s thesis of the congruity of logic, dialectics, and epistemology as the unity of the parts and the whole. The subject matter of dialectical logic is represented as a part of the subject matter of the Marxist theory of cognition, while the subject matter of epistemology is given as a part of the subject matter of materialist dialectics. The weakness of this view is the reali­zation that it is logically unfounded.

A more correct interpretation of Lenin’s view is offered by those philosophers and logicians (Kopnin, Kedrov, Narski, and some others) who consider that a unified system of logic, dialectics, and materialist epistemology, depending upon the object of application, performs different functions. The method of materialist dialectics as applied to the laws and form of a single structure of human thought, in terms of a function of the reflection of reality, assumes the quality of dialectical logic. Thus logic does not inquire into specific forms of the dialectical form of thought, but rather refers only to the dialectics of the common forms of thought of mankind, whatever they may be, simple or complex. The correctness of this way of looking at it is affirmed by Lenin himself: “in any sentence it is possible (and imperative) to discover the budding of all elements of dialectics, to demonstrate thereby that all human comprehension in the most general form has a dialectical character”.

In full accord with Hegel, Lenin considered that the primary content of logic (dialectical logic) presents itself in relations, i.e. in the transition, in the contradiction, of concepts. In contradistinction to Hegel, Lenin began with the viewpoint that all these concepts, as well as their relationships, transitions, and contradictions, constitute reflections of the objective world. According to Lenin, the dialectic of things creates the dialectic of ideas, not vice versa. This analysis is not to be regarded as an end in itself, but as a necessary condition for reaching truth. As with the German philosophers (in particular Hegel), Lenin equated logic and truth.

To reach truth one must be guided by the entire arsenal of the dialectical epistemology. In one of his works in which he examines the concrete character of the question under discussion, Lenin emphasized these features of dialectical logic: (1) overall comprehension, the inquiry into all aspects of a thing, all its connections and “instrumentalities”; (2) inquiry into the thing in its development, its “automobility” (self-movement), and changes; (3) consideration of human practice in the comprehensive “determination” of the thing; accordingly, practice becomes a criterion of truth, as well as a practical determinant of the connection of the thing with human needs); and (4) the principle of the concreteness of truth.

An important question arises. What is Lenin’s position on formal logic? Does not Lenin’s development of dialectical logic signify a rejection on his part of formal logic? This question is also important since dialectical logic’s opponents (who are also opponents of Marxist philosophy as a whole and of Hegelianism), since they have held up the attainments of formal-mathematical logic, attempt to detect incongruities and contradictions between formal and dialectical logic.

Lenin’s position on formal logic was based upon those of his predecessors, the founders of Marxist philosophy. In principle, there is no difference between Engels and Lenin’s viewpoints. Lenin underlined Engels’ belief of the independent existence of formal logic as a philosophic science. Formal logic has acquired different interpretations, depending on the philosophic position of its interpreters. One should not be surprised that, for the most part, the categories of logic have received a metaphysical and an idealistic interpretation. A careful and thoughtful reading of Lenin’s legacy relative to logic inevitably must result in the  conclusion, that he did not take a critical stand on formal logic and its laws and categories as such. He only subjected the metaphysical and idealistic interpretations of formal logic to criticism. These misinterpretations absolutized formal logic by viewing it as the only principle of truth, resulting in an unwarranted transformation of formal logic into a universal and exclusive method of cognition, according to Lenin.

Opponents of dialectics often advance the following statements: Since dialectics recognizes the contradictions, dialectical logic cannot be considered as compatible with formal logic. Formal logic, basing itself on the law of non-contradiction, rules out, by its very nature, any contradictory thoughts; upon admission of a contradiction any theory loses its value. For example, this kind of criticism can be found in the well-known philosopher Karl Popper.

This critique, however, overlooks its target. It misses a major point, since it does not pay attention to a crucial distinction. Lenin recognized a distinction between dialectical and formal-logical contradictions. Further, there should be no doubt that the classics of dialectical materialism recognized the principle of contradictory development as applying to everything existent. Lenin saw as an essential part of dialectics the splitting of the one into many and the respective cognition of these contradictory parts. He defined dialectics succinctly as the study of the unity of opposites.

Certainly in all those cases, Lenin refers to contradictions in real life. He makes reference to contradictions in the process of thought, not formal-logical contradictions. Against the absence of a distinction between the two types of contradictions, Lenin took a strong stand. He ridiculed those who confused the “contradictions of real life” and “contradictions resulting from erroneous reasoning”.

Lenin categorically asserted that the “logical contradictory”, under conditions of correct logical reasoning, does not have to result in a subject matter rent by contradictions. This kind of concept Lenin demonstrated in such concrete inquiries as economics, politics, and sociology. What he meant was that the dialectical contradiction is to be kept as an ultimate, which by itself does not have to enter into the sphere of every analysis of every subject matter.

UNIVERSITY OF YEREVAN, ARMENIAN S. S. R.