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CHAPTER XIX.
THE LATIN STATES UNDER
AMALRIC I
: 1162-1174
Since Baldwin III left no children, he was
succeeded by his younger brother, Amalric I (1163-1174). Totally unlike his
brother in temperament and character, Amalric, nevertheless, possessed
qualities which made him an admirable king. He was a man of medium height and,
despite his habitual moderation in food and drink, excessively fat. He was more
fond of active amusements like the chase, than the performances of minstrels.
But he was singularly gifted intellectually and enjoyed reading and discussion
with such men as William of Tyre. In fact, it was at his request that William,
then archdeacon, commenced that record of the king's doings which he later
expanded into a full-fledged history. Brave, even daring, in battle, cool and
decisive in command, well informed on the strategic problems of the orient,
Amalric was well suited to that military leadership so necessary to a Levantine
ruler.
With all his accomplishments, Amalric did not
inspire the affection or popularity which his brother had enjoyed. He lacked Baldwin's
affability and was inclined to be taciturn and sometimes arbitrary. Married
women were not safe from his advances. Clergy complained that he illegally
violated their rights and properties. Excessive taxes, never popular, he
justified on the grounds of military necessity. Amalric's succession to the throne was not unopposed. The clergy and people together with
a few magnates approved, but a number of barons expressed objection, presumably
because of the king's wife, Agnes of Courtenay, whom they declared to be
unworthy. Although no specific complaints were mentioned, it is true that in
later years Agnes was to prove herself an accomplished intriguer and to exert a
sinister influence on the affairs of the realm. Widow of Reginald of Marash, and sister of Joscelin III, she was related to
Amalric; and a former patriarch, Fulcher, had opposed the marriage in the first
place. Evidently Amalric regarded the barons' opposition as serious, for he
promptly obtained an annulment from the patriarch, Amalric of Nesll, and the papal legate, the cardinal John. Their two
children, Baldwin and Sibyl, were recognized as legitimate and their succession
rights guaranteed. The appointment of Miles of Plancy as seneschal also aroused antagonism. Miles was to marry Stephanie, widow of
Humphrey of Toron, and thus control the fief of
Montreal (1173-1174). Although the king may have felt it necessary to appease
the magnates in order to assure his succession to the throne, legislation
enacted in the first year of his reign strengthened his position measurably. By
his Assist sur la ligece he required
all rear vassals to render liege homage to the king directly. Thus the power of
the tenants-in-chief was lessened since rear vassals could now seek redress in
the king's court. So long as a strong king stood at the center of this system,
in fact so long as Amalric lived, this legislation fortified royal power in a
manner more reminiscent of the Norman rulers of England than of their Capetian
confrères. Amalric also appears to have established two new courts for maritime
litigation, the Cour de la Fonde and
the Cour de la Chaîne.
Indeed, Amalric's role in the legal development of
Jerusalem is evidenced by a number of significant references to his name in
the Assises of the kingdom. These matters will receive more
extended treatment in a later volume.
The foreign policy of Amalric, largely a series
of attempts to conquer Egypt, had been foreshadowed by Baldwin III when he
captured Ascalon. And it was logical that Amalric,
who had been entrusted with the government of Ascalon,
should be interested in the south. The combination of circumstances which had
motivated Baldwin still existed. The union of Aleppo and Damascus under
Nur-ad-Din made the whole matter more urgent. For if Egypt fell into the power
of the Syrian Sunnite Moslems, the Latin states would be encircled. Add to
these strategic considerations the immense commercial value of Egypt with its
great port of Alexandria, and it is not difficult to understand why Amalric
persistently pushed southward.
Unfortunately for the success of Amalric's ventures, Nur-ad-Din, as we have seen in an
earlier chapter, was equally concerned over developments in Egypt. Moreover,
the atabeg was able not only to intervene directly in Egypt, but also to hamper
Latin action by creating diversions along the frontiers of the kingdom and the
northern states. Indeed, these border attacks were often costly to the Franks.
The heavy losses thus sustained must be considered in any estimate of Amalric's Egyptian policy.
The king's first venture was in September 1163.
Taking as a pretext the non-payment of tribute promised in the time of Baldwin
III, Amalric crossed the isthmus of Suez and besieged Bilbais.
Only by cutting dikes were the Egyptians able to force a withdrawal. Meanwhile, Shavar, a former vizier recently ejected from Cairo
by his enemies, had persuaded Nur-ad-Din to support his cause. Accordingly, in
April 1164 an expeditionary force under the Kurdish emir Asad-ad-Din Shirkuh set out with Shavar for
Egypt. At the same time the atabeg provided an important diversion by
continuing operations on the frontiers of northern Syria. As a consequence, Shirkuh reached Cairo safely and Shavar was restored to power (May 1164).
Once he was reinstated, Shavar proved recalcitrant and refused to pay a tribute which had been promised Shirkuh. The latter thereupon seized Bilbais and the entire province of Sharqiya to the east of
the delta. Accordingly, Shavar, following a precedent
set by his former enemies, appealed to the Franks, promising military support
and financial aid. Since a number of crusaders arrived from Europe about this
time, Amalric felt able to equip an invasion army without seriously depleting
the kingdom's defenses. He therefore took counsel with his barons, put Bohemond
III of Antioch in charge of the realm, and set out a second time for Egypt.
Junction with Shavar was made and Shirkuh was besieged in Bilbais. After three months
(August-October, 1164) the city's fall seemed near. But Amalric had learned of
formidable attacks in northern Syria by Nur-ad-Din and proposed to Shirkuh that both abandon their projects. Nearly at the end
of his resources, Shirkuh agreed and returned to
Syria. Thus an otherwise promising campaign ended in a stalemate owing partly
to the king's overly optimistic judgment regarding the strength of the northern
frontiers. Notwithstanding, prompt action had preserved the independence of
Egypt.
Nur-ad-Din's activities which had so alarmed
Amalric had commenced with a siege of Harim and an invasion of the plain of Buqaiah southwest of Krak des
Chevaliers. Forces composed of Greeks and Armenians from Cilicia and a number
of Latin knights from the northern states at first routed the invaders. But not
long after, Nur-ad-Din was able to divide the Christian troops and captured
Bohemond III of Antioch, Raymond III of Tripoli, Constantine Coloman, Greek governor of Cilicia, Hugh of Lusignan, and Joceslin III, titular count of Edessa. Harim fell to the
atabeg on August 12, 1164. Captured flags and the heads of fallen Christians
were sent to Shirkuh with instructions to exhibit
them on the walls of Bilbais to frighten the
besiegers. Harim had been a bastion potentially menacing to Aleppo. Its capture
opened the way for a Moslem invasion of Antioch.
Whether or not Nur-ad-Din could have taken
Antioch is a question. Certainly its defenses were weakened and its ruler was a
captive. But the atabeg countered the urgings of his own officers by pointing
out that in an emergency the Franks would summon Byzantine aid. No such
misgivings prevented him from attacking farther south. Moreover, since the king
and the bulk of the Latin troops were still in Egypt, and Bohemond and other
leaders were in captivity, the kingdom was vulnerable. After circulating a
rumor that he would attack Tiberias, Nur-ad-Din besieged Banyas,
the important stronghold some miles north of the city. Probably because of
incompetence, although treason was suggested, the defenses failed and Banyas fell to the atabeg.
As soon as the king reached Jerusalem from Egypt
and learned further details of the situation, he hastened northward accompanied
by Thierry of Alsace, who had returned to the orient. Defenses were set in
order, and arrangements were made for the liberation of Bohemond III in the summer
of 1165. In Tripoli Raymond III had been able to designate Amalric as regent.
Indeed, the king held the bailliage of Tripoli for the ten
years of the count's captivity. Thus Amalric's forthright action and Nur-ad-Din’s fear of Byzantine intervention restored the
balance of power in northern Syria.
In January 1167 the persistent Shirkuh set out once again to recoup his fortunes in Egypt.
Amalric heard of his preparations and summoned an important assembly at Nablus
where he publicly outlined the danger which threatened the kingdom. Indeed his
words so moved the hearers that they voted a ten per cent tax. Since a
preliminary expedition into the southern desert failed to intercept Shirkuh, the king reassembled his forces at Ascalon. On January 30 a Christian army marched a third
time toward Egypt and reached Bilbais without
incident. Thence they moved south past Cairo and camped near Fustat (Babylon). At first Shavar,
apparently unaware of Shirkuh's movements, doubted Amalric’s intentions. Indeed, he received from Shirkuh an invitation to unite against the foes of Islam.
But on learning more of the Turkish advance, he elected to renew his
engagements with Amalric in a formal treaty. In addition to the annual tribute,
the sum of four hundred thousand gold pieces, half to be paid at once, was
agreed upon as adequate compensation to the Franks. The king, on his part,
pledged himself not to leave Egypt until Shirkuh and
his army had been destroyed or driven from the country. Hugh of Caesarea was
chosen to head a delegation to ratify the treaty with the caliph.
In a remarkable passage, William of Tyre
describes the amazement and wonder of the Frankish delegation as they saw for
the first time the caliph's magnificent palace, lavishly but exquisitely
decorated. “They were led past fish pools, cages of strange birds and animals,
through even more beautifully appointed buildings to the caliph's presence.
There, to the consternation of all present and to the embarrassment of the
caliph, Hugh insisted that the contract be sealed in the Frankish manner by
each party holding the bare hand of the other. After considerable hesitation,
the caliph offered his gloved hand. Still Hugh refused. At length the caliph,
whom Hugh later described as of an extremely generous disposition, consented
and repeated after him the words in good faith, without fraud or deceit”.
The following days were spent in various
attempts to make contact with Shirkuh’s army which
had, meanwhile, successfully crossed the Nile, and camped at Giza across the
river from Fustat and Cairo. After a month of
stalemate broken only by minor engagements, Shirkuh moved rapidly southward at night. Amalric crossed the river, pursued his enemy,
and made contact at al-Babain (March 18, 1167).
Apparently the Christians were outnumbered. Nevertheless, Shirkuh hesitated to give battle and was only persuaded to do so by his more warlike
officers, among whom was his nephew Saladin (Salab-ad-Din).
In the ensuing engagement many Christian knights were killed or captured and a
great deal of equipment taken, but the survivors retreated in good order.
Moreover, when Amalric counted his forces he discovered only one hundred men
lost as against an estimated fifteen hundred for the Moslems.
After the battle Shirkuh marched to Alexandria, where the citizens welcomed him, but where he was soon
besieged by the Christian army. All means of entrance or exit were carefully
guarded and a fleet blocked all river traffic. After about one month had
elapsed and conditions within the city had deteriorated, Shirkuh managed to lead a small force secretly past the king into upper Egypt. Amalric
at first pressed south in pursuit, but was dissuaded by the advice of an
Egyptian nobleman who pointed out that Alexandria was in desperate straits and
close to surrender. Accordingly, reinforced by another contingent from the
kingdom, the Christians began bombarding the city and making repeated assaults.
Saladin, whom Shirkuh had left in command,
desperately tried to stem the growing tide of defeatism and secretly
informed his superior of the critical conditions within the city. At
length Shirkuh, after one or two unsuccessful
raids, decided to sue for peace. Arnulf of Tell Bashir, one of the Latin
captives, was sent to negotiate with Amalric. The king was not unwilling to end
hostilities. His own losses had been serious, and he was again concerned about
Nur-ad-Din's movements in the north. It was agreed, therefore, that both armies
would return prisoners, evacuate Egypt, and leave Shavar in possession of power. Shirkuh, disconsolate over
his failures, reached Damascus in September 1167. The Christian army was
permitted to "tour" Alexandria before departing for Palestine. The
men marveled at the city's magnificence and wondered that so small an army
could shut up a city with so many able to bear arms. Amalric reached Ascalon in August 1167.
Before leaving Alexandria, Amalric had accorded
the courtesies of war to Saladin, for whom he provided an escort, and,
according to his original agreement with Shavar,
raised his flag on Pharos island. Shavar also agreed
again to an annual tribute and to the installation of a Frankish commissioner
and guard in Cairo. Shirkuh had not been destroyed,
but for the moment the Latins were in the ascendant in Egypt.
If the events of the early years of Amalric's reign demonstrated the weakness of Egypt, they
also brought into clear focus the precarious nature of Frankish defenses in
northern Syria. As a consequence, the position of the Byzantine emperor Manuel
Comnenus took on added significance. Indeed, he held the balance of power in
the Levant, and the Latins, though fearful of the emperor's designs on Antioch,
were coming to realize their dependence on his support. An ambitious ruler,
whose far-reaching plans envisaged a reconciliation with Rome and an extension
of Byzantine power westward as well as to the east and south, Manuel on his
part showed a marked willingness during this period to cooperate with
westerners. It was not long before these developments that Manuel had married
Maria, sister of Bohemond of Antioch, and somewhat later that Bohemond married
the emperor's niece, Theodora.
It is not surprising, therefore, that Bohemond
should have hastened to Constantinople shortly after his release from
captivity. When he returned with gifts which perhaps enabled him to pay off his
ransom, he was accompanied by a Greek patriarch, Athanasius, whom he installed
in Antioch. Aimery, the Latin patriarch, placed the
city under an interdict and took refuge in the castle of Qusair some miles to the south. And although the Latin clergy continued their protests
which were supported by pope Alexander III, and echoed by the Jacobite
Christians, Athanasius remained in Antioch until 1170 when he lost his life in
an earthquake. Evidently Bohemond was sufficiently appreciative of Byzantine
assistance to risk the opposition of his subjects.
There were also important relations between the
emperor and Jerusalem. Following his separation from Agnes, Amalric had sent a
delegation to Constantinople. And shortly before the close of the recent
Egyptian campaign, Hernesius, archbishop of Caesarea,
and Odo of St. Amand, the king's marshal, returned
bringing with them Maria Comnena, daughter of John,
Manuel's nephew, and protosebastos.
Amalric met the party at Tyre, and he and Maria were married there on August
29,1167, just after his return from Egypt.
In the following months a plan for a joint
Franco-Byzantine military expedition to conquer and partition Egypt was
elaborated. It is possible that the project was first proposed by Amalric. But
Manuel's interest in the Egyptian situation is evident and the first
discussions of which we have certain knowledge resulted from the visit of two
imperial envoys in the summer of 1168. A formal treaty of alliance was drawn up
and William, who had recently been named archdeacon of Tyre, accompanied the
envoys on the return journey. He was empowered to ratify the agreement in the
emperor's presence. Since the negotiations were deemed urgent, William was
taken to the emperor's military headquarters in Serbia, His mission was
successfully accomplished and he set out for Palestine on October 1, 1168.
Before William reached home, however, Amalric had already started again for
Egypt.
What prompted the king to proceed without
Byzantine aid and to break his agreements with Shavar is not clear. Although in retrospect it is easy to understand William of Tyre's disappointment, and to agree that the venture was a
mistake, it is difficult to believe that Amalric would have jeopardized the
Latin predominance in Egypt without adequate reason. Moreover, there are
certain possible explanations. It appears that the tribute which Shavar had agreed to pay seemed even less palatable to the
Egyptians after the immediate danger had past. More irritating was the presence
of the Frankish commissioner and guard who, apparently, behaved with
inexcusable insolence. As a consequence, certain negotiations were commenced
between Cairo and Damascus, and disquieting rumors reached Jerusalem. An
immediate invasion, opposed by the Templars under Philip of Milly, was
vigorously urged by their Hospitaller rivals under Gilbert of Assailly. A warlike and greedy element among the barons,
perhaps unwilling to contemplate a division of Egypt with the Greeks, added its
pressure. It appears that the king withstood this pressure for a while, but the
decision was ultimately made and the army set out for Egypt in October 1168.
Undeterred by the pleadings of Shavar's emissaries the Christian army entered Egypt and
took Bilbais on November 4. A shocking slaughter
followed, and captives were taken indiscriminately. Many of the victims were
native Christians. The siege of Cairo was commenced on November 13, but,
according to William of Tyre, not pressed energetically because the king only
wanted to force a money payment. It is however, possible that Amalric realized
that the city would resist to the end rather than suffer the fate of Bilbais. Further, on November 12, Shavar had inaugurated a scorched earth policy by ordering that Fustat be burned. The conflagration lasted fifty-four days, a horrible example of what
might happen in Cairo. Thus a kind of haggling between the king and Shavar continued. The latter paid one hundred thousand
dinars as ransom for his son and nephew, who had been captured, and gave
hostages for the payment of another one hundred thousand. Accordingly Amalric
withdrew to at-Majariyah and then proceeded to Siryaqus about sixteen miles northeast of Cairo. Meanwhile,
a Christian fleet appeared at the entrance to the Nile and occupied Tinnis. Further progress was blocked by Egyptian ships and
before Humphrey of Toron and a detachment of the
king's army could seize the opposite shore, rumors of Shirkuh's approach reached the king and he ordered the fleet home.
Amalric then hastily returned to Bilbais, left a guard, and on December 25 marched out to
intercept Shirkuh. But Shirkuh successfully crossed the Nile. Since Amalric knew that his enemies could now
easily be reinforced, he elected to abandon the project entirely. By January
2,1169, the army was on its return journey. Shirkuh,
who was generously supported by Nur-ad-Din, was able, therefore, to reach Cairo
unhindered. There he was welcomed by the caliph and the citizens. Shavar was assassinated (January 18, 1169), and Shirkuh became vizier. Within two months, however, he had
died and was succeeded by his nephew, Saladin. By August of the same year the
young Kurd had replaced a number of the caliph's officials, dispossessed
Egyptian landowners and substituted Syrians, massacred the caliph's negro
guard, and, in short, made himself master of Egypt.
These events produced a revolution in the
balance of power in the Levant. The Frankish protectorate over Egypt with all
its advantages, economic as well as political, was ended. To all intents and
purposes Moslem Egypt and Syria were united, and there began that encirclement
of the Christian states which in future years was to prove so disastrous.
The gravity of the situation was well understood
in Jerusalem, and early in 1169 ambassadors and letters were sent to Europe.
Western princes were too occupied with their own concerns, and the ambassadors
returned without accomplishing anything. Fortunately for the Latins, Manuel
Comnenus was still anxious to fulfill his part of the agreement arranged by
William of Tyre in September 1168. Indeed, the fleet and equipment which
arrived at Acre in September 1169 were more imposing than had been stipulated,
and restored Christian command of the sea.
The Latins were overjoyed and obviously
impressed by the Byzantine preparations. But since Amalric had to reorganize
his forces after the previous Egyptian expedition and post sufficient troops to
guard against any action by Nur-ad-Din, prompt attack with the element of
surprise was impossible. Byzantine food supplies, for some unexplained reason
not sufficiently provided for, began to run short, and it was found necessary
for the Greek troops to disembark at Acre and march overland with the Latins.
On October 15, 1169, the combined armies left Ascalon and after nine days reached Pelusium near the sea on
the eastern branch of the Nile where the fleet had preceded them. They were
ferried across the Nile add by following the shore of Lake Manzala reached Damietta two or three days later.
Since Saladin had evidently not expected attack
at this point, the city was inadequately defended. William of Tyre insists that
a quick attack could have succeeded, and it appears that Saladin was worried.
But there was a delay of three days. Moreover, although the river was blocked
by an iron chain, it was open above the city. Thus Damietta was speedily
reinforced by boats from the south. A full siege was, as a consequence,
necessary, and the Christians had to construct war machines with considerable
labor. At length a huge engine of seven storeys was
built. But the defenders, now constantly reinforced, fought back with skill and
bravery. Meanwhile, taking advantage of a strong onshore wind, the Moslems
launched a fire boat which was blown into the Byzantine fleet riding at anchor
in close array. Six ships were burned, and a disaster was averted only by the
prompt action of Amalric, who roused the crews.
As the siege was prolonged food ran short in the
Christian camp. Torrential rains added to the discomfort. Finally, Andronicus,
commanding the Byzantine forces, proposed a desperate all-out assault. Amalric
was opposed, holding that the city's defenses were too strong and needed
further battering by the machines. Although he had been directed to obey
Amalric, Andronicus made preparations to attack alone. But before he had
started, the king's messengers informed him that negotiations for withdrawal
had begun. After a few days of fraternizing, during which the Christian were
permitted to enter Damietta and trade as they pleased, war machines were burned
and the withdrawal commenced. The Latin and Greek troops reached Ascalon on December 21, 1169. Less fortunate was the fleet.
A violent storm wrecked many ships, and others were deserted by sailors who
feared the emperor's wrath. Disappointment accentuated the mutual
recriminations of Latins and Greeks as each blamed the other for the
expedition's failure.
Although it was not apparent at the time, the
failure of the combined Franco-Byzantine expedition of 1169 marks a turning
point in Levantine history. Had Amalric not acted on his own in 1168, the
alliance might have prevented the union of Egypt and Syria. With more careful preparation
— and in the matter of food, the Byzantines were possibly to blame — the
combined forces could perhaps have defeated Saladin before he consolidated his
hold over Egypt. As it turned out, no other joint expedition was undertaken and
the final victory lay with Saladin.
Although the Christian failure strengthened
Saladin's position in Egypt, communication between Syria and Egypt was still
endangered by Frankish possessions in the south, especially the fortresses of
Kerak or Krak des Moabites, sometimes mistakenly
termed by the crusaders Petra Deserti, and Krak de Montreal (ash-Shaubak).
Moreover, a temporary lull in hostilities resulted from the terrible
earthquakes of June 1170. A large part of northern Syria, both Christian and
Moslem, was devastated; thousands were killed; and many churches and castles
destroyed. But in December 1170 Saladin attacked Darum and Gaza. The outer defenses of Darum were breached.
A number of persons, including women and children, refugees from the
surrounding country, were killed at Gaza. Saladin, evidently unwilling to risk
an engagement with the royal army, withdrew to Egypt on its approach.
Early in 1171 Amalric summoned the high court to
discuss the critical problems which now faced the kingdom. Although Frederick,
archbishop of Tyre, had not yet returned from the embassy of 1169, it was
agreed that another appeal to western rulers should be made. Europe remained
uninterested in the plight of the Holy Land. Frederick finally returned having
accomplished nothing, and his companion, Stephen of Sancerre, on whose
assistance the king had counted and who had been chosen as a prospective
son-in-law, left after six months of disgraceful conduct. Indeed, there is no
further mention of the European legation, and the members of the high court
realized that their only salvation lay in again securing Byzantine aid. The
king insisted on leading an embassy to Constantinople himself. He set sail from
Acre on March to with an impressive retinue and ten galleys.
Manuel, overjoyed though at first surprised, went
out of his way to receive and entertain the royal party in a suitable manner.
Daily conferences alternated with visits to churches and other places of
interest. There were games and musical and dramatic performances ax the circus.
The visitors were shown the mast precious relics and presented with costly
gifts. Although Greek sources describe Amalric as performing a kind of homage,
William of Tyre mentions only that at the initial reception, the king occupied
a throne slightly lower than that of the basileus. Presumably, as in 1159, such
gestures carried no implication of vassalage in the western feudal sense. At
any rate Amalric succeeded, at whatever cost, in persuading the emperor of the
necessity and feasibility of subjugating Egypt. As a consequence, the
Franco-Byzantine alliance was renewed and put in writing over the seals of both
parties. The king returned in July 1171, his mission accomplished, but with no
productive results.
Manuel Comnenus, like his father John and his
grandfather Alexius, had proved himself an able emperor, pursuing the best
interests of his realm with single-minded determination, but his conception of
the best method of accomplishing this was both less prudent and less favorable
to the Franks than his predecessors’ had been. The unfounded accusations
against Alexius and John, the bitter hostility common to Normans of Antioch and
Latin Christians of western Europe, the failure to unite Christians of either
high or low degree against the Moslems — all these were intensified during
Manuel’s reign, with more basis in his own actions than had previously been the
case. His obstructionism and other hostile relations with the Second Crusade
have been examined in a previous chapter, while we have covered in some detail
his ineffective alliance with Amalric against Egypt, as well as his fruitless
purchase in 1150 of the remnants of the county of Edessa and the devastation of
Cyprus by Reginald and Toros II in 1156.
The recovery before 1150 of the Taurus
fortresses by the Roupenid prince Toros had not
seriously affected Greek power, but his conquest of Mamistra in 1151 and the rest of Cilicia in 1152 had necessitated the great expedition
of 1158, which like John's two decades earlier won great renown but little of
permanent value: control of Cilicia for a few years, suzerainty over Antioch
effective only during the presence of a Byzantine army, a truce with Nur-ad-Din
which postponed the full onslaught of Moslem Syria against the Frankish
littoral. His peace in 1161 with the Selchukids of
Iconium was more fruitful, but its effects were to be dissipated in 1176 at Myriokephalon, the absolute end of Byzantine control over
any part of Anatolia except the coastal cities, since Mleh the Roupenid ex-Templar had reconquered Cilicia in
1173.
To return to Amalric's visit to Constantinople, however, we may note that it marks the climax of his
reign. The situation in the Moslem world was serious, but so long as the rift
between Nur-ad-Din and Saladin continued, not yet hopeless. The Byzantine
alliance should have insured power adequate to break Saladin's hold over Egypt.
This project, however, so full of promise was destined never to be carried out.
Events beyond the frontiers of Jerusalem and Byzantium delayed the expedition.
On Amalric's death in 1174 the alliance lapsed.
Furthermore, in 1171, Saladin, at first
reluctantly following Nur-ad-Din's directives, had ordered that at Friday
prayers in Egyptian mosques the name of the caliph of Baghdad be substituted
for the Shiite, al-Adid. Then, on September 13, al-Adid had died, and no successor was named. The
politico-religious revolution which had been thus quietly consummated in Cairo
was of tremendous importance. A schism of centuries’ duration which had
contributed materially to the security of the Latin states had ended. Only the
strained relations between Saladin and Nur-ad-Din prevented the encirclement
from being fully effective.
King Amalric's reign
was drawing to a close. In the summer of 1173, despite the Byzantine alliance,
the king once again sought assistance from the west. Sometime in the fall of
1173 or early in 1174 Raymond III of Tripoli was released from captivity. The
king, who had helped procure the ransom money, welcomed him and restored the
county over which he had acted as bailli. On May 15, 1174
Nur-ad-Din died and Amalric immediately tried to take advantage of the discord
which followed by attacking Banyas. After a short
campaign he agreed to a truce. On his return he complained of illness. Neither
oriental nor Latin physicians were able to give more than temporary relief and
the king died on July 11, 1174, at the age of thirty-eight.
The death of Amalric came at a most unfortunate
time for the Latins. It is impossible to say whether, had he lived, he could
have averted the eventual union of Damascus and Cairo. In any event the Latins
derived no advantage from the death of Nur-ad-Din. Amalric's own death caused the Franco-Byzantine alliance to lapse, and the field was left
free for Saladin. Although the historian may thus reproach Amalric for the
inopportuneness of his death, he was one of the best kings of Jerusalem, the
last man of genuine capacity to hold the reins of government. In the years to
come men were to sec the resources of the kingdom — and they were still great —
wasted through want of adequate leadership.
CHAPTER XX
THE NORMAN KINGDOM OF
SICILY
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