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CHAPTER XVII
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THE CAREER OF NUR-AD-DIN
Nur-ad-Din Mahmud succeeded his father Zengi at Aleppo in mid-September of 1146, he was a young
and hitherto, apparently, inexperienced man, who was now faced with the task of
establishing himself. He was surrounded by actual or potential enemies and
rivals, and there were jealousies between his emirs. The division of Zengi’s principality seemed to dissipate at one stroke all
the gains made in the past twenty years, except for the capture of Edessa. Unur at Damascus had lost no time in compelling Zengi’s governor, Najm-ad-Din Aiyub,
to surrender Baalbek, in detaching Homs from Aleppo, and even in gaining over
al-Yaghisiyani at Hamah. After the repulse by Shirkuh, who had also accompanied Nur-ad-Din to Aleppo, of
a raid by Raymond, a more serious threat presented itself in Joscelin’s attempt to recapture Edessa. In this crisis,
Nur-ad-Din showed for the first time what he was made of; he raced to its
defense, not only to counter the crusaders, but also to forestall his brother
Saif-ad-Din of Mosul, and prevented any future attempts of the kind by
destroying its Armenian and Jacobite population.
This striking success over the Franks had in all
probability a considerable effect in consolidating Nur-ad-Din’s position. For
he had still to reach a direct settlement with his brother at Mosul, whose
liberty of action was hampered for the time being by the rising of the Artukid princes Timurtash and Alp
Arslan, and their recovery of their former possessions in the north. That there
were some tensions between Aleppo and Mosul seems to be indicated by a number
of small details, such as Nur-ad-Din’s refortification of Qalat Najm, guarding the bridge over the Euphrates on the Harran-Aleppo road; and it
would appear that one of the main stabilizing factors in the situation was the
friendship between the Mosul vizier Jamal-ad-Din and the Kurdish emir Shirkuh, who made it their aim to maintain the two
principalities separate but in close alliance. Whether, as Ibn-al-Athir asserts, the two brothers, with many precautions, met
outside Aleppo and came to a friendly agreement, or not, it is clear that
Saif-ad-Din accepted the situation. Nur-ad-Din had, in fact, gained the support
not only of the regular regiments of Aleppo but also of the Yuruk Turkoman
tribes who had recently migrated into northern Syria, and was already able at
the time of the attack on Edessa to put an army of 10,000 horsemen in the
field. So powerful a force not only guaranteed his independence against his
brother, though it would appear that Saif-ad-Din was regarded formally as
Nur-ad-Din’s suzerain during his lifetime, but also convinced Unur of the advantages of a reconciliation with him. In the
following March the two Syrian princes were united by Nur-ad-Din’s marriage
with Unur’s daughter; al-Yaghisiyani at Hamah returned to his former allegiance; and the alliance was signalized by
joint operations in May against the Franks in the Hauran,
where a rebel governor, Altintash, had sought
assistance from Jerusalem.
Back in the north, Nur-ad-Din prepared to defend
himself against a more powerful rival. The Selchukid sultan of Rum (central Anatolia), Masud (1116-1155),
now at peace with Manuel, was turning his arms southwards and engaging the
northern garrisons of Antioch. Nur-ad-Din joined in, to occupy the fortresses
in the Afrin valley south of Azaz and on the eastern fringe of the Amuq depression, followed, in spite of Raymond’s attempted
counter-attack, by the capture of Hab and Kafarlatha, which guarded the passage from the Rugia valley to the plain of Aleppo. But before the end of
1147 the news of the approaching Second Crusade brought operations to an end,
as all parties in Syria awaited, in hope or fear, what it might bring.
How far, even yet, the Moslem princes were from
the conviction of a common cause against the "infidel" is shown by
the absence of any consultations or arrangements for mutual defense. It was not
until the decision to attack Damascus became known that Unur sent out appeals for assistance. The panic caused at Aleppo and Damascus by the
early reports of the vast host on the way had already been alleviated by the
disasters in Asia Minor, and was even giving place to some degree of confidence
when the forces actually engaged in the campaign were found to be so much
smaller than had been expected. In the interval Saif-ad-Din had joined forces
with Nur-ad-Din and begun to move southwards, but had advanced no farther than
Homs when the siege of Damascus was abandoned July 28. There can be little
doubt that their prospective intervention was a factor in the decision to do
so, yet the ultimate consequence was to drive a still deeper wedge of suspicion
between Aleppo and Damascus.
The failure of the Second Crusade, coupled with
the curious incident that followed in September, when Raymond II of Tripoli called
in the united forces of the Zengids and Damascus to
dislodge the son of Alfonso Jordan from the castle of al-Arimah,
was utilized by Nur-ad-Din to attack the Frankish castles in central Syria. He
then turned north to raid the lower reaches of an-Nahr al-Aswad, in order to counter a raid by Raymond of Antioch into Selchukid territory. In spite of a reverse at Yaghra, due to the jealousy of Shirkuh at the favor shown by Nur-ad-Din to his minister Ibn-ad-Dayah,
he continued his operations towards Apamea in the following spring, while Unur, calling in the Turkomans, harassed the kingdom until
an armistice was signed in May 1149.
Relieved from further anxiety in the south, Unur was able to answer Nur-ad-Din’s appeal for
reinforcements in the north, and the combined armies, some 6,000 strong, set
out to besiege Inab, on the borders of the Rugia valley. Raymond of Antioch, hastening to its defense
and forced by his barons to engage the superior Moslem forces, was disastrously
defeated June 29 and himself killed in the battle.
This, the most spectacular of Nur-ad-Din’s
victories over the Franks, and coming at this early stage in his career, seems
to have been the turning-point in his own conception of his mission and in the
history of Moslem Syria. In the eyes of all Islam he had become the champion of
the faith, and he now consciously set himself to fulfill the duties of that
role. His first task was to deal with the heretics within his gates. On first
occupying Aleppo he had shown some indulgence towards the Shiites, but in the
last months of 1148, he had perhaps already begun to take measures against them
and to break up their leadership. The Assassins of Masyaf were making common cause with the Franks; their chief, Ali ibn-Wafa, had contributed to the reverse at Yaghra and was killed on the Frankish side at Inab. But
negative measures were not enough; the new counter-crusade was henceforth to be
placed under the banner of orthodoxy, and Nur-ad-Dlin gave active encouragement to all the elements that could contribute to the
revival of the faith, by the foundation of schools, mosques, and sufi convents, and to the unity of popular
feeling, by the service of preachers, poets, and romancers. It entered into his
political ambitions also. The campaigns soon to be opened against Damascus were
preceded and accompanied by poetic denunciations and pointed demonstrations of
the injury done to the cause of Islam by tile alliance of its political chiefs
with the Franks. Later on, it was to range him against the Fatimids of Egypt.
Whatever part private ambition may have had in his policy, it cannot be
questioned that in the twenty-five years that lay ahead of him he was to go far
towards creating the general unity and even exaltation of spirit amongst the
Moslems of Syria of which Saladin was to reap the benefit after him.
For the moment he set himself to make the most
of his victory at Inab, and even hoped to seize
Antioch in its temporary state of defenselessness. Foiled in these hopes by the
patriarch Aimery and the speed of Baldwin’s advance to
its support, he rejoined al-Yaghisiyani, whom he had
previously detached to invest Apamea. After its surrender, he returned to the
north and seized Harim and all the remaining castles east of the Orontes before
concluding an armistice with Antioch. Masud, the
sultan of Rum, also joined in the scramble for spoils, and having captured Marash, Sam, and Duluk, laid
siege to Tell Bashir and appealed to Nur-ad-Din for assistance.
But Nur-ad-Din’s interest at this moment lay in
a different direction. On August 28 Unur of Damascus
had died, and a violent struggle broke out between the prince Abak and rival parties among his officers. Before
Nur-ad-Din could seize the opportunity to intervene, however, his brother
Saif-ad-Din Ghazi of Mosul died also (September 6). On receipt of this news
Nur-ad-Din rode hell-for-leather toward Mosul with a small party of followers,
and reached and occupied Sinjar. A faction in the army of Mosul was favorable
to his interest, but Ali Kuchuk and the vizier set up
a younger brother, Qutb-ad-Din Maudud, as their
prince, and when Nur-ad-Din was joined by the Artukid Kara Arslan, the Mosul forces marched out to give battle. The fratricidal
strife was finally averted by the vizier, who persuaded Nur-ad-Din to surrender
Sinjar in return for the surrender to him of Homs and Rahba.
On his return to Syria Nur-ad-Din, after sending Shirkuh to join the sultan Masud at Tell Bashir, negotiated the raising of the siege on payment of tribute by
Joscelin. His ally, the Artukid Kara Arslan, was
engaged during the autumn and winter months in conquering the fortresses of Joscelin's Armenian vassals on the upper Euphrates,
including Gargar. But Nur-ad-Din himself was mainly
preoccupied with the affairs of Damascus. On the pretext of punishing the
Franks for their raids on the Hauran he demanded
reinforcements from its prince. The prefect, Muaiyid-ad-Din
Ibn-as-Sufi who had by now established his control of the city, pleaded the
treaty with Jerusalem. In the spring of 1150 Nur-ad-Din marched south, encamped
outside the city, and repeated his demand for a thousand men to join him in an
expedition to relieve Ascalon and Gaza. Although it
is evident from the language of the Damascus chronicler that the popular
sympathies lay with Nur-ad-Din, the prefect, no doubt remembering the former
occasion when Damascus troops were sent under Sevinj to cooperate in the "holy war" with Nur-ad-Din’s father, refused the
request in peremptory terms; but in the face of Nur-ad-Din’s threats he agreed
to recognize Nur-ad-Din’s suzerainty, though without admitting him into the
city.
During his absence in the south, his Turkoman
troops remained actively engaged against the territories of Tell Bashir and
succeeded in capturing Joscelin. Instantly, the county was invaded from three
sides. The Artukid Timurtash of Mardin seized Samosata and Bira, with other
fortresses; the Selchukid sultan Masud reappeared before Tell Bashir and was joined by Nur-ad-Din, who had already
captured Azaz. On the transfer of Tell Bashir to the Greek emperor Manuel; the
siege was raised, but the two Moslem forces vigorously harassed the
Franco-Armenian garrison and population on their evacuation to Antioch. During
his withdrawal Masud seized Kesoun, Behesni, Raban, and Marzban, while Nur-ad-Din occupied in the course of the
same autumn and winter Tall Khalid, Cyrrhus, and Ravendan. Early in the next year (1151) his general Hassan
of Manbij renewed the siege of Tell Bashir, and with its surrender on July 12
the former county of Edessa was extinguished.
Nur-ad-Din’s absence in the north brought little
relief to Damascus, where, in addition, the internal conflict was still
unappeased. During the autumn of 1150 his Turkomans were sent to detach the
province of Hauran and fought a pitched battle with a
detachment of Damascene troops. In the spring of 1151 he again encamped outside
the city and though he deprecated the shedding of Moslem blood, his forces
engaged in skirmishes with the local forces and the villages of the Ghufah were plundered by the undisciplined followers of
both sides. This attack on Damascus was the more pointed in that the Egyptian
vizier Ibn-as-Sallar, perhaps taking Nur-ad-Din’s
protestations of a desire to relieve the growing pressure on Ascalon at their face value, had in May 1150 sent an embassy
to him to arrange for a joint attack on the Franks and had received his promise
to participate. But when, in the following spring, the Egyptian fleet attacked
the Syrian coastal towns from Jaffa to Tripoli, Nur-ad-Din remained inactive.
On the approach of the Franks in June, he
withdrew to az-Zabadani and sent a squadron to the Hauran, which subsequently engaged the Franks there and
forced them to retire. He then resumed the siege of Damascus early in July and
cut off its supplies, but held firmly to his decision not to engage in regular
hostilities with its troops and citizens. Before the end of the month a fresh
agreement was reached between the parties, the negotiators including Shirkuh on the one side and his brother Najm-ad-Din Aiyub on the other. The agreement was duly ratified in
October by a ceremonial visit of the prince Abak to
Aleppo, when he was formally recognized as Nur-ad-Din’s lieutenant in Damascus.
Even yet, however, Nur-ad-Din was not satisfied.
The Damascenes still regarded themselves as bound by their treaty with
Jerusalem, and the Yuruk Turkoman irregulars, with or without the knowledge or
consent of Nur-ad-Din, continued to operate in the districts of Damascus. In
December 1151 they inflicted heavy losses on the Frankish garrison of Banyas and were engaged in consequence by the forces of
Damascus; but Aiyub at Baalbek had almost immediately
to take measures against a reprisal raid by the Franks in the Biqa valley. While Nur-ad-Din, in the following spring,
was engaged in the north, where he seized Tortosa and Yaljmur, Abak strengthened
himself by restoring his control over the Hauran,
which had been shaken by the Turkomans.
Early in 1153 Nur-ad-Din determined to exert his
authority once more at Damascus and ordered Abak to
join him with the whole of his regular forces in order to relieve the pressure
on Ascalon. The combined armies, after capturing Aflis, marched to Banyas, where
they split up in disorder and retired (May-June). This was the last straw, and
while the disorders broke out afresh in Damascus, and Ascalon fell to the crusading armies, Nur-ad-Din, encamped at Homs, blockaded Damascus
by preventing the passage of grain convoys. At the end of March 1154 Shirkuh appeared before the city, but was met with
hostility. In April Nur-ad-Din himself arrived, and after brushing aside a show
of resistance forced an entrance on April 25 “to the joy of the people, troops,
and militiamen”. Abak surrendered and was recompensed
with fiefs at Horns, and Shirkuh was invested with
the governorship of the city. Baalbek still resisted, Aiyub having been replaced as governor of the citadel before the fall of Damascus by
another officer, Dabbak; but in June 1155, after
concluding an armistice with the kingdom of Jerusalem for one year, Nur-ad-Din
forced its surrender. Aiyub rejoined Nur-ad-Din’s
service either before or after this event, and was appointed governor of
Damascus with Shirkuh as military commandant.
Immediately after the occupation of Damascus
Nur-ad-Din, in addition to reorganizing its defenses, began to apply there also
his program of religious revival by the foundation of colleges and convents.
Two other institutions of his deserve special note. One was the hospital (Maristan) which long remained one of the most famous
of medieval infirmaries. The other was the dar al-adl or palace of justice, whose
counterpart he had already instituted in Aleppo, where he himself, during his
periods of residence in the city, sat in audience twice a week to deal with
complaints, especially against the officers of the army and the administration.
The stress which he laid on this part of a ruler’s duties is recognized in the
title conferred on him by the caliph, apparently in this same year 1154,
of al-malik al-adil "the just
king".
With the unification of all Moslem Syria, as
well as the former county of Edessa, under his rule, Nur-ad-Din’s military
power was now consolidated. Although little direct or detailed information on
his military organization is preserved in the sources, it certainly followed
the Selchukid feudal system, in which the officers
and a number of the regular troops were assigned estates in lieu of pay,
on condition of presenting themselves with adequate equipment and provisions
for active service when called upon. The officers received estates graduated in
size according to their rank, and were required to maintain a corresponding
number of troops from their revenues; in the case of general officers placed in
command of districts or provinces, these numbered several hundreds. The feudal
army thus consisted of the ruler’s own regiments of guards, numbering perhaps
some 2,000 under Nur-ad-Din, plus the regiments of his district commanders and
vassals. The combined forces of Aleppo and Damascus at Inab amounted, as already noted, to 6,000 horse; and it is probable that the regular
armies under Nur-ad-Din’s direct command never much exceeded this figure. When
reinforced by the Artukid princes or from Mosul, or
by auxiliary bodies of Turkomans or Arab tribesmen, his armies may well have
reached 10,000 or even 15,000, exclusive of foot-soldiers and volunteers.
In one feature Nur-ad-Din’s regular forces
differed from most of the Selchukid armies, namely in
the enrolment of large numbers of Kurds alongside the Turkish mameluks. The brothers Aiyub and Shirkuh were, though the most prominent, by no
means the only Kurdish officers who attained high rank under him; and these in
turn naturally attracted large numbers of their fellow-countrymen, both as
regulars and as auxiliary troops. The local Arab sedentaries and militia, on the other hand, who had played so large a part in Syria during
the preceding century, seem to have been suppressed or discouraged, no doubt as
potential elements of insubordination. They are scarcely mentioned in the
annals of Nur-ad-Diin’s campaigns, and reappear under
Saladin only as auxiliary infantry and siege troops.
Shortly after the capture of Baalbek, Nur-ad-Din
returned to the north to intervene in the complicated struggle between the Selchukid and Danishmendid princes in Anatolia that followed the death of sultan Masud I in 1155. While his successor Kilij Arslan II engaged and defeated the Danishmendid Yaghi-Basan of Sebastia (Sivas) at Aqserai in
September, Nur-ad-Din seized the opportunity to annex Aintab, Duluk, and Marzban, The indignant
sultan retaliated by attempting to organize a coalition against him with Toros
of Cilicia and Reginald of Antioch, but the only immediate action taken was a
raid toward Aleppo by Reginald, who was overtaken and defeated near Harim by
Ibn-ad-Dayah in the following spring. In the autumn
amicable relations were restored between the two Moslem princes.
The next five years were filled with anxieties,
external and internal, for the preservation of the newly unified kingdom of
Syria. In September 1156 began a series of severe earthquakes which repeatedly
destroyed cities and fortifications in the northern half of his territories. In
spite of the renewal of the truce with Jerusalem on the payment of a tribute of
8,000 Tyrian dinars, it was broken again and again by attempts on the part of
the Latins to take advantage of the disordered conditions in the country.
Nur-ad-Din, preoccupied with measures for the defense of the ruined cities,
established himself near Baalbek and sent out squadrons to deal with these
attacks, at the same time sending an envoy to Egypt to organize cooperation
with the Egyptian forces against the Franks.
Encouraged by two successful engagements in
April 1157, in which his brother Nusrat-ad-Din severely handled a force of
Hospitallers and Templars on their way to Banyas with
supplies, and Shirkuh with a body of Turkomans
repulsed the raiders in the north, Nur-ad-Din concentrated his armies at the
beginning of May for an assault on Banyas. Retiring
before Baldwin's advance, he counterattacked the Frankish troops in camp at al-Mallahah on June 19 and destroyed the greater part, Baldwin
himself barely escaping by flight. William of Tyre relates that Nur-ad-Din then
returned to the attack on Banyas, but was forced to
retire by the conjunction of the troops of Antioch and Tripoli with those of
the kingdom. It seems more probable, however, that the reason for his
withdrawal was a renewed series of earthquake shocks which began on July 4 and
continued into November, with particularly serious results in Homs, Hamah,
Apamea, and Shaizar, where the whole household of its Arab princes, the Banu-Munqidh, perished. Having attempted without success to
renew the armistice with Baldwin, he left a force in the field to protect the
territories of Damascus and himself moved north in August to occupy Shaizar and
protect the other cities. By this move he forestalled the advance of the
combined Latin forces, following on the arrival of Thierry of Alsace, count of
Flanders, on the third of his four personal crusades, and on their
concentration at Antioch Nur-ad-Din took up his position at Inab in readiness to meet the expected attack,
Here he was attacked by a severe illness early
in October, and after giving instructions that in the event of his death his
brother Nusrat-ad-Din should be his successor at Aleppo, with Shirkuh as his lieutenant at Damascus, he withdrew to the
citadel of Aleppo. Amidst the confusion which followed, Shirkuh moved south to protect Damascus. The rest of the army was temporarily
disorganized, and the crusaders, reinforced by Toros and his Armenians,
advanced on Shaizar without opposition. But the Assassins of Masyaf had long coveted its possession and seized the
opportunity first; their stubborn defense of the citadel gave time for disputes
to break out between the Frankish leaders, and the enterprise was abandoned.
Meanwhile, in Aleppo itself the Shiites,
thirsting to escape from the severe control of Nur-ad-Din, had, after
extracting from Nusrat-ad-Din promises in their favor, forced the city gates,
and organized a violent demonstration against the governor of the citadel,
Ibn-ad-Dayah. But ocular proof that Nur-ad-Din was
still alive was enough to quell the disturbance, and Nusrat-ad-Din was
dispatched as governor to Harran. The army was still disorganized, however, and
during Nur-ad-Din’s long convalescence failed to intervene when Baldwin, with
the forces of Antioch and Tripoli, besieged and recaptured Harim in January or
February 1158. Shirkuh had lately rejoined Nur-ad-Din
at Aleppo, apparently with the object of reorganizing the Zengid forces, but his absence gave an opening to raiders from the kingdom of
Jerusalem, who ravaged the country south of Damascus with impunity. In early
spring, however, while contingents from Egypt began an extensive series of
raids in the south of Palestine, Nur-ad-Din and Shirkuh returned from Aleppo and, after a raid on Sidon by the latter, joined forces in
an attack on the stronghold called Habis Jaldak, on the south bank of the Yarmuk river (in May). On Baldwin’s advance to the northeast of Lake Tiberias, where
he threatened the Moslem lines of communication, Nur-ad-Din joined battle but
suffered a defeat, retrieved only by his personal courage (July 15). His
proposals for an armistice having been rejected, Nur-ad-Din remained at
Damascus, continuing the negotiations with the Egyptian vizier, but again fell seriously
ill at the close of the year.
In face of the imminent danger to Aleppo implied
in the emperor Manuel’s sudden invasion of Cilicia, Nur-ad-Din had the oath of
allegiance taken by his officers to his brother Qutb-ad-Din and sent envoys to
Mosul to acquaint him with the decision, but before Qutb-ad-Din could arrive
with his troops Nur-ad-Din recovered and himself set out towards Aleppo in
March 1159. Although Manuel had already opened communications with Nur-ad-Din,
his entry into Antioch at the end of March and the subsequent advance of the
combined Greek and Latin forces to Imm made it
necessary to neglect no precautions. On Nur-ad-Din’s urgent summons the forces
of Mosul and contingents from all the vassal and allied principalities in
Mesopotamia joined him east of Aleppo, and the city was further strengthened by
an outer wall. But Manuel had little reason to desire the destruction of
Nur-ad-Din's power, wishing rather to utilize him, negatively, to hold the
Latins in check in Syria, and, positively, as an ally against Kilij Arslan in
Anatolia. Negotiations were accordingly set in train at the end of May, and in
return for Nur-ad-Din's surrender of Bertram of Toulouse, Bertrand of Blancfort, the master of the Temple, and other Frankish
prisoners, the alliance was formed and Manuel withdrew to Anatolia, “having
earned thanks and praise, and without injuring a single Moslem”.
The immediate advantages which accrued to
Nur-ad-Din from this situation were limited to the occupation of Raban, Kesoun, Behesni, and Marash while Kilij
Arslan was engaged against the emperor and the Denishmendid Yaghi-Basan, in the course of 1160. During the same
year Reginald of Châtillon fell into his hands,
captured by Ibn-ad-Dayah on his return from a raid
against Aintab in November. But in spite of the confusion which resulted from
this in Antioch, Nur-ad-Din seems to have been unable to turn it to profit, and
indeed after some raiding, he concluded an armistice with Baldwin. Either
before or after this, however, he made an attack on Harim, which was repulsed
by a combined force of Latins, Greeks, and Armenians, but succeeded in
recovering Arzghan, which had been retaken earlier by
Reginald.
The two-year armistice with Baldwin relieved
Nur-ad-Din’s anxieties over Damascus and the south, which had been exposed,
almost unprotected, to some raiding during his northern campaign in 1160. But
the course of events in Egypt set him a new, and even embarrassing, problem.
When Shavar, driven out by Dirgam in August 1163, appealed for military assistance to reinstate him, Nur-ad-Din,
already burdened with the task of maintaining his extensive territories with
relatively small forces, hesitated. Finally, however, he was persuaded to
accept the proposal by Shirkuh, “a man of great
bravery and strength of character, and impervious to fear”, on the
understanding that Nur-ad-Din should receive one-third of the revenues of
Egypt, less the pay of his troops. Shirkuh set out
late in April 1164 accompanied by his nephew Saladin, and defeated and killed Dirgam under the walls of Cairo in August. Shavar’s failure to observe his engagement led Shirkuh to occupy the province of Sharqiya;
the vizier then called on Amalric for assistance on the former terms, and the
joint forces of the Latins and Egyptians besieged Shirkuh in Bilbais for three months. At length Amalric agreed
to treat; Shirkuh, already hard-pressed, consented to
evacuate the town and return to Syria, and his withdrawal in October was
followed by that of the Franks.
Amalric’s eagerness to leave Egypt was occasioned by the disasters which Nur-ad-Din,
profiting by the engagement of large Latin forces in Egypt, had inflicted on
the Franks during his absence. Although his first diversionary raid towards
Tripoli had ended in the all-but-total destruction of his force at Krak des Chevaliers (Hisn al-Akrad) in May, he had immediately called for and received
substantial reinforcements from Mosul and the Artukid princes of Hisn Kaifa and Mardin, and with these he renewed the attack on Harim. All
the available forces from Tripoli and Antioch, together with the Armenians and
Greeks from Cilicia, rallied to its defense, but were drawn into battle and
totally defeated in the plain of Artah at the
beginning of August 1164. Bohemond III, Raymond III of Tripoli, the Greek duke Coloman, and Hugh of Lusignan were among the prisoners.
The surrender of Harim followed in a few days.
Nur-ad-Din, anxious to avoid drawing the Greeks into the defense of Antioch,
and hoping to utilize the opportunity of Humphrey's absence in Egypt, with
Amalric, dismissed the Mesopotamians and made a surprise march on Banyas. The garrison, deprived of all hope of relief,
surrendered the castle on October 18, and the victory was signalized by an
agreement to divide the revenues of Tiberias. In spite of the failure of Shirkuh'’s expedition to Egypt, therefore, the net result
had been to consolidate Nur-ad-Din’s possessions in Syria and to raise his
prestige to new heights in the Moslem world.
But the continued evidences of Byzantine
interest in Antioch deterred him from further military activities in the north,
and led to a rapprochement with sultan Kilij Arslan, to whom he restored Behesni, Kesoun, and Marash in 1166 or 1167. Minor raids were probably
undertaken in central Syria, and the Damascus troops under Shirkuh captured two cave strongholds, one near Sidon and the other cast of the Jordan.
But on the whole it seems clear that Nur-ad-Din was biding his time, and
watching with caution and possibly with anxiety the course of events both as between
Latins and Greeks and in Mosul. Here his young and feckless brother Qutb-ad-Din
had dismissed and imprisoned the vizier Jamal-ad-Din in the summer of 1163. The
removal of his strong and experienced hand had created new tensions at Mosul,
which the commandant, Ali Kuchuk, was unable to
control. In 1167/1168, now half blind and deaf, he surrendered all his fiefs
and governorships, except Irbil, to which he retired and which, on his death
shortly afterwards, he left to his son Gokbori as his
successor, under the control of his mamluk Mujahid-ad-Din Qaimaz.
His place at Mosul was taken by a white mamluk of Zengi's,
Fakhr-ad-Din Abd-al-Massib, under whom matters
continued to deteriorate.
In January 1167 Shirkuh again invaded Egypt, at the head of a detachment of Nur-ad-Din’s troops, with
Turkoman reinforcements. No reason is assigned for this expedition except Shirkuh’s own desire to avenge himself on Shavar. As on the previous occasion, Nur-ad-Din, on Shirkuh’s departure, summoned the aid of Qutb-ad-Din’s
forces from Mosul and engaged in widespread raiding and destruction in the
territories of Tripoli, capturing al-Munaitirah (Le Moinestre) and destroying Chastel-Neuf
(Hunin). Shirkuh's and Amalric's return, and dissensions between the troops of
Aleppo and Mosul, brought the campaign to an end, and Nur-ad-Dln made over Raqqa to Qutb-ad-Din, who occupied it on the
way back. In the following spring the rebellion of a governor — a rare event in
Nur-ad-Din's career — involved an expedition to Manbij to displace him and a
personal intervention at Edessa. Barely had he returned to Aleppo in April 1168
when the Uqailid prince of Qalat Jabar, Malik ibn-Ali, was captured by the Kalb Arabs and brought to him as a
prisoner. For many months, in spite of promises and threats, the Uqailid refused to surrender his fortress, which withstood
alt the assaults of the Aleppo armies, but finally consented to exchange it for Saruj and other fiefs, and it was made over in
October to Majd-ad-Din Ibn-ad-Dayah.
With this conquest Nur-ad-Din put an end to the
last of the independent principalities in northern Syria and became fully
master of the territories to the west of the principality of Mosul. Only a few
weeks later he received the urgent appeal from the Fatimid caliph and the vizir Shavar which led to Shirkuh's third and final expedition to Egypt. Its addition, in January 1169, to the list
of provinces which acknowledged him as sultan or as suzerain seemed to be the
apogee of Nur-ad-Dln's career. But his ambitions were
growing with the extension of his power. Many years before, he had been foiled
in the attempt to assert his authority over Mosul itself, and he had since
watched for an opportunity to achieve this purpose. In 1166 or 1167, the Artukid prince Kara Arslan of Hisn Kaifa on his death had left his son and heir
Nur-ad-Din Muhammad under the guardianship of Nur-ad-Din, who sharply
intervened to restrain his brother Qutb-ad-Din at Mosul from asserting his
suzerain rights over the principality. This protectorate served Nur-ad-Din’s
purpose when Qutb-ad-Din died, at the age of forty, in August 1170, and the
succession was disputed by his elder son Imad-ad-Din and younger son
Saif-ad-Din Ghazi. Hastily assembling a light troop, Nur-ad-Din crossed the
Euphrates, invested and reoccupied Raqqa, halted at Nisibin where he was joined by his Artukid namesake and other
troops, took Sinjar by force and bestowed it on his nephew Imad-ad-Din, and
advanced to Balad on the Tigris. A few days later
Mosul surrendered, and Nur-ad-Din, having received the caliphs diploma for the
city and its dependencies, reinstated Saif-ad Adin as his vassal, and placed
his own mamluk Said-ad-Din Gumushtigin in command of
the citadel. After receiving homage from Gokbori and Qaimaz of Irbil, he installed his own governors in the
cities of upper Mesopotamia, and returned to Aleppo in March 1171.
This expedition to Mosul could be made with the
greater impunity since in the summer of 1170, beginning toward the end of June,
a further series of earthquakes had laid in ruins a number of cities and their
fortifications in northern Syria, including Antioch, Tripoli, Jabala, and Latakia, as well as Aleppo, Hamah, and Homs.
Both sides, faced with the necessity of rebuilding their fortresses, agreed to
a truce. In the autumn of 1171 this was broken by the seizure of two Egyptian
merchant ships at Latakia. Nur-ad-Din in retaliation called up the troops of
Mosul and upper Mesopotamia and engaged in a violent raiding campaign in the
territories of Tripoli, during which he captured Arqah.
Immediately afterwards he arranged with Saladin, now his lieutenant in Egypt,
to join him in an attack on Kerak (Krak des
Moabites), and in October moved south to meet him there. Saladin set out from
Cairo at the end of September, but returned without meeting Nur-ad-Din, who
abandoned the siege before the Latins under Humphrey could intervene. In the
autumn of the next year he was again engaged against Frankish raiding parties
in the Hauran, and sent a counter-raid against
Tiberias. Although he was still actively seeking to stimulate public feeling in
his territories in favor of the jihad, this was apparently his last
contest with the Franks of Syria.
For already, although he had built up a powerful
war machine to be used against the crusaders, his ambitions had implicated him
in a series of operations in the north which were to lead him into conflict
with the Moslems of Anatolia instead. On the death of Toros of Cilicia in 1168,
his brother Mleh, who held Cyrrhus as a fief from Nur-ad-Din, invaded Cilicia with the support of a contingent
from Aleppo, which remained in his service and assisted him to drive out the
Templars and Greeks from the fortresses and, in 1173, the cities which they
held in Cilicia. An expedition organized by Amalric after his return from
Constantinople in 1171 was interrupted by Nur-ad-Din’s attack on Kerak, and Mleh remained master of Cilicia until Nur-ad-Din’s death.
During these events in Cilicia the Selchukid Kilij Arslan had been actively breaking up the Danishmendid principalities and annexing their territories, Albistan, Caesarea (Kayseri), and Ankara. In 1170 or
1171 he attacked Melitene (Malatya), but was
repulsed, owing to the intervention of the Artukid Nur-ad-Din of Hisn Kaifa.
He then attacked the last Denishmendid stronghold, Sebastia, whose prince appealed to Nur-ad-Din. In the
spring of 1173 he set out from Damascus, and after capturing Marash and Behesni, joined forces
in August or September with Mleh and the troops of Melitene, and marched on Qalat ar-Rum, on the Euphrates north of Bira. At this point Kilij
Arslan sent overtures for peace. The precise terms of the agreement are
uncertain; according to some sources Kilij Arslan consented to restore Ankara
and Sebastia to their princes, and Nur-ad-Din sent
the former vizier of Mosul, Abd-al-Massih, with a
contingent of his own troops to garrison Sebastia,
but these returned to Aleppo on the news of his death.
On his return, Nur-ad-Din made a leisurely
journey to Damascus, where shortly afterwards he fell seriously ill, and died
on May 15, 1174, leaving only a minor son as his heir. Almost instantaneously
the territorial and military organization which he had built up with so much
labor fell to pieces. But, in contrast to his father Zengi,
he had by his life and conduct laid the foundations for that moral unification
of Moslem forces on which alone a real political and military unity could be
reared. It is ironical that the great name and reputation which he left was to
prove one of the major obstacles to the efforts of his true successor Saladin,
to resume his task and bring it to fruition.
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