MEDIEVAL HISTORY LIBRARY |
CHAPTER VII.
FREDERIC I. [1166—1174.
Frederics Fourth Expedition to Italy—Lombard League —
Frederic and Faecal at Rome—Dieasters—Affairs of Germany—League against Henry
the Lion—Hie formidable power—State of Schism—Archbishop Christian in Italy—
Siege of Ancona.
Late in the autumn of 1166, Frederic, accompanied by
his Empress, again crossed the Alps, now at the head of an army fully equal to
asserting and enforcing the Imperial sovereignty. But again he did not, as was
expected, hurl death and destruction amongst his rebellious Lombard subjects.
He evidently desired rather to alarm by the display of his power, and so
influence, than to coerce by its exercise. His appearance in such strength, and
the energy of Archbishop Christian, who, in company with Archbishop Reginald,
had already returned to Italy, seem to have sufficed at once to check the
progress of the— nominally anti-Pascal—Venetian Confederation, and to prevent
the evils it might have occasioned. The cities were, for the moment, quiet; and
Frederic would not, for the sake of chastising past misdemeanours, risk
impeding his main business in Italy, to wit, installing Pascal in the Lateran,
by engaging in hostilities that might prove tedious. He advanced pacifically to
Lodi, where he spent the short remainder of 1166, in the administration of
justice and decision of disputes, as well between town and town, as between the
towns and his own officers.
The most important of the affairs brought before the
Emperor at Lodi was again the contest between Genoa and Pisa for Sardinia. The
war, which, in consequence of Barasone’s transfer of his vassalage to the
latter, as mesne Suzerain of that island, had broken out anew, had proved
unfavourable to Pisa, and she it was that now appealed to an Imperial tribunal.
The Emperor listened attentively to the arguments of both parties, though the
Genoese urged theirs with such reckless audacity, that all present looked for
their immediate chastisement, and a sentence in favour of Pisa. But Frederic,
calmly observing, “I gave King Barasone those rights only which were mine to
give, without prejudice to those of any third party;” reserved the question of
the conflicting claims of the two cities for more deliberate investigation,
which he directed the two Archbishops of Mainz and Cologne to make. Pending the
inquiry, he ordered the prisoners on both sides to be released; a command which
both sides disobeyed, even whilst, by the offer of troops or ships to assist in
the impending enterprise, both were contending for Imperial favour. In this
contest Pisa triumphed; having offered the double of Genoa’s proposed
contingent, her offer was of course accepted. And this, it is alleged,
influenced the investigation, as Pisa seems to have obtained the investiture of
her magistracy with the island of Sardinia, for which she is said to have paid
a feudal due of about half what Barasone had promised. But surely the original
agreement between the cities at the conquest of the island, if it could not
give Pisa a right, in opposition to Imperial or to Papal claims, was amply
sufficient as a bar to any Genoese pretensions.
In January, 1167, the Emperor quitted Lodi to
accomplish his purpose of placing his own Pope in the proper seat of papal
government and sovereignty. He sent the two Archbishops, Christian and
Reginald, with one division of the army through Tuscany, to visit Lucca, where
Pascal chiefly resided, in their way; and thence escort the pontiff either to
Rome, or to such place in its vicinity as they should deem most convenient. He
himself, with the main body, marched soon afterwards by Bologna and Ravenna to
Ancona. That city, if no longer actually held by the Greeks, being still
intimately connected with the Eastern Empire, and the very focus of Byzantine
intrigue, he there halted, and laid siege to it. To this measure, which, by
delaying his advance upon Rome, proved in the end incalculably prejudicial to
some of his views, he was probably impeded as much by his knowledge of the
negotiations then in progress between Manuel and Alexander, as by his own
chivalrous spirit.
The Constantinopolitan Emperor, though brave as brave
may be, bad more of the politician than of the knight in his nature. His great
ambition was to recover the Sicilies for the Eastern Empire, and in Frederic,
as German Emperor, he saw the chief obstacle; in the friendship of the Pope, if
obtainable, the greatest possible furtherance to his attainment of that object.
He had, therefore, for years assiduously encouraged and fomented with gold,
every Lombard tendency to insurrection; he sought for influence in Rome, by
giving a niece in marriage to a member of the then preponderant family of the
Frangipani. He had latterly gone further in the overtures he made to Alexander.
Not only had he solicited the crown of the Holy Roman Empire at his hands; not
only had he offered him troops and money to aid his struggle against Pascal; he
had actually proposed to reunite the Greek to the Latin Church. Such a reunion,
such a restoration of a really Catholic Church, under the Roman successor of
St. Peter, could not but be the first, the warmest wish of every Pope, its
achievement the greatest possible glory of any pontificate. Alexander must have
felt the temptation very strong; nevertheless, he was too clear-headed to
suffer himself to be allured even by this, the most irresistibly alluring of
all conceivable phantasms. He well knew that the temper of the Greek Clergy
placed the reunion nearly, if not quite, beyond the power of the most despotic
Emperor; and he dreaded the entanglement which such a disposal of the crown of
the Western Empire, lawfully placed on Fredericks brow by his predecessor,
Adrian IV, must create. But he made use of the negotiation to obtain more Greek
subsidies for his Lombard allies, and thus to determine and expedite their
meditated insurrection.
Thus excited and assisted, whilst incessantly
stimulated by the prayers of the deeply humbled Milanese, the Lombards grew
with every passing day more impatient of extraneous authority, even
independently of any misgovernment; and frequently did they suffer
misgovernment from arbitrary or rapacious German governors, who disregarded the
commands of their habitually distant Lord. In numbers far greater than had ever confederated with Milan,—divers of
the ordinary Ghibeline towns having gradually imbibed something of their
neighbours’ spirit of independence—they accordingly now resolved really to
emancipate themselves from the sovereignty of the Emperor. This resolution gave
birth to the far-famed Lombard League.
Upon the 7th of April, 1167, deputies from Bergamo,
Brescia, Mantua, Ferrara, the long loyal Cremona, and some towns of less note,
secretly met at the monastery of San Jacopo in Pontide, situate between Milan
and Bergamo, where they concluded a convention, the terms of which were pretty
nearly as follows : “Inasmuch as it is better to die than to live in shame and
slavery, we engage upon oath that every confederated city shall from this time
forward assist every other, to which the Emperor or his Commandant, or any one
in his name, shall offer fresh wrong: all without prejudice to the allegiance
we have sworn to the Emperor.” The deputies further resolved that Milan should
be restored to her former strength and dignity; and they fixed a certain early
day upon which every confederated city should expel all Imperial officials,
still without prejudice to their allegiance. This was the first germ of the
Lombard League, which plays so prominent a part through the remainder of this
century and part of the next. Such a reservation of allegiance, whilst
projecting such decidedly insurgent measures, must to the modem reader appear
either irony, or a hardly plausible fallacy, introduced for the relief of
tender consciences, thus enabling them to delude themselves into the belief
that they were still loyal subjects. But in the twelfth century, the relative
rights and duties of sovereign and subject were so vague, so undefined, that
only Jurists could be expected to form distinct ideas upon the subject. When
the absolute authority of the monarch was nearly nullified by the equally
absolute authority of great vassals; when those vassals, imitated by the
powerful cities, made war on each other and treaties of commerce with foreign
states—an anomaly, which however, by forcing the recognition of rights in
subjects, probably preserved Europe from Oriental slavery—it really is possible
the Lombards might entertain some confused notion of adhering to their
allegiance, whilst rejecting all control by the sovereign to whom they owned
that allegiance due. To conduct and language so incompatible, according to
modern ideas, with the position of subjects, may very possibly be attributed
the prevalent impression of the Lombard cities having been so many independent
republican states, which the Emperor, without any claim to lawful authority
over them, laboured to conquer.
The League, which Greek deputies were urgently
persuading Venice to join, proceeded without loss of time to the execution of
its plans, beginning with the restoration of Milan. For this purpose it was
essential that the dispersed Milanese nobles, who had retired to their castles
when the citizens were made villagers, should be reassembled, without
awakening suspicion of design. To accomplish this, early in April, a pretended
maniac, in fantastic guise, galloped through the country in all directions, everywhere
drawing children and rabble about him by the sound of a pipe. The noble in
those days came forth like the peasant, to see what was passing, when the
pseudo-maniac whispered the appointed day in his ear. Upon this appointed day,
the 27th of the same month of April, the Milanese were formally reinstalled in
the city, or rather upon its site; when they and their allies set diligently to
work, first to rebuild the walls and towers and clear out the ditch, then to
repair or reconstruct the ruined houses, the archiepiscopal palace included. It
is averred that Constantinopolitan money greatly promoted and facilitated the
whole business, if it were not its original instigator. But if so, it rather
enkindled than supplied the place of patriotism, which was actively displayed
upon the occasion. The women proved the genuineness of their feelings by the
sacrifice of their jewels, to assist in new decorating the churches, and restoring
the cathedral, which had been accidentally injured in the general destruction
of Milan. Tortona likewise was rebuilt and reoccupied.
Every day other cities joined the League, which thus
demonstrated its power and its boldness. But the confederates were bent upon
gaining Lodi to their cause; the position of that city, which commanded the
supply of provisions to Milan, rendering its possession most important to both
the League and the Emperor. But Lodi, mindful alike of the favours received
from the Emperor and of the injuries suffered from Milan, was Ghibeline in
heart and soul; the Lodesans positively refused their adhesion. Their old allies,
the long equally loyal, and equally favoured Cremonese, were then commissioned
to win these obstinate Imperialists to the Lombard cause; and a Cremonese
deputation visiting Lodi, urged the citizens to join a confederation whose sole
aim was the general good of Lombardy, its emancipation from foreign thraldom.
“You!” exclaimed the Lodesans in reply, “you, who helped to rebuild our city
destroyed by Milan; you, who like brothers undertook our protection against
Milanese tyranny, who co-operated with us in punishing that tyranny, how are
you so strangely altered that you would now urge us to commit unnatural
outrages, to break our oaths, and sacrifice our benefactor to our enemies”.
This second refusal brought the forces of the League upon the faithful city,
whose crops were burnt, whose fields, vineyards, villages were ravaged. Still
Lodi stood firm, and ere commencing a regular siege, a third embassy, composed
of the nobles and principal citizens of the League cities, repaired thither.
Upon their knees these embassadors repeated the arguments and entreaties of
their predecessors, whilst threatening utter destruction as the penalty of
refractory pertinacity. The Lodesans repeated their refusal to act in any way
against their sovereign, the Emperor. The siege was thereupon formed, in
numbers sufficient to establish a complete blockade. Frederic was at that
moment engaged in the siege of Ancona: and whether he would not be recalled to
Lombardy, and involved in quelling its revolt until he should have first installed
Pascal in .Rome, or that he feared to damage the reputation of his arms, should
he raise the siege of Ancona (as to which strong feelings, as will be seen,
were entertained),or were unaware of Lodi’s inability to endure a long
blockade, he remained in his camp, merely pressing forward his operations to be
the sooner at liberty. Ere they had made any progress, Lodi was starved into a
surrender. The Lodesans took the prescribed oath, still, their loyalty unshaken
by the Emperor’s apparent neglect, carefully insisting upon the reservation of
their allegiance. The Lombard arms were next turned against Trezzo, which had
been rebuilt by the Emperor again as a safe stronghold in which to establish
his treasury, and again, with that treasury, it was taken.
Whilst these things were passing in Lombardy, and the
Emperor was engrossed by the siege of Ancona, the Archbishops, with Pascal in
their company, were advancing slowly towards Rome, gaining adherents to their
Pope on their way, gaining him some even within the walls of Rome. It had never
been intended, however, that Pascal should attempt to enter the Papal capital
without his Imperial protector; the two Archbishops, therefore, left him, with
troops sufficient for his security, at Viterbo, whilst they led the bulk of
their army to join the Emperor and assist in the siege.
The Papal capital continued meanwhile to be occupied
by Alexander; but, notwithstanding his invitation thither, and his pompous
reception, he had found there little comfort and less obedience. Despite his
entreaties and earnest remonstrances, the Romans refused to move against Pascal
at Viterbo; choosing rather to indulge their old neighbourly hatred of the
Tusculans, by plundering and ravaging the territories of those old enemies,
than to do battle in the cause of the Pope they acknowledged. Such was the devastation
they wrought, that the Tusculans, and their Lord, Rainone, applied to the
Emperor for aid and redress; which he, conceiving the relief they prayed a
matter of no difficulty, directed Archbishop Reginald to afford. The prelate
threw himself, with the small corps he had taken with him, into Tusculum; but
was besieged there by a Roman army, 20,000 strong, and he made urgent demands
for reinforcements. Frederic assembled a council of war, to which he submitted
the question, whether it would be proper to raise the siege of Ancona, in order
to lead the whole army to the assistance of his Chancellor. The Council decided
that, upon no consideration must the Emperor disgrace his arms by raising the
siege; but Archbishop Christian, indignant at such neglect of the peril of his
brother-prelate, collected, upon his own responsibility, a body of volunteers,
with whom he hastened to Tusculum. Upon reaching the vicinity of the besiegers,
so disproportionately superior were their numbers found, that even this warlike
churchman offered to treat. The Romans, confident in that numerical
superiority, tauntingly replied to his overtures: “It is mighty gracious of the
Emperor to send us his priests to say mass to us; but we shall sing to them in
a different key. This day shall the Archbishop and his whole army be food for
the beasts of the field and the fowls of the air”. Upon receiving this answer
Christian unfurled his banner, began, as was his usual practice, a hymn, in
which his whole army joined, and with his wonted impetuosity fell upon the
enemy. Reginald, noting the movement, sallied with his men and the Tusculans to
support his friends, and the boasters were terror-stricken at the sudden double
onslaught. Their cavalry fled first; then the infantry; and according to the
most moderate computation, in this rout rather than action, the Romans lost
2000 killed and 3000 prisoners.
Tivoli, Albano, and other hostile neighbours of
Rome—in Italy neighbour and enemy might in those days be almost called
convertible terms—now eagerly joined the Germans in ravaging the crops and
vines of the Romans; whilst from a distance only, from Lombardy or the
Sicilies, could Alexander, implicated upon this occasion against his will, hope
for assistance. Both were ready to yield it. The Regent of Sicily saw that the
complete subjugation of Alexander would be followed by the invasion of Apulia,
in retaliation of the assistance her deceased consort had given that pontiff.
She therefore sent him money with which to reward or attract partisans and
troops for his protection, offering ships to bring him away, should he wish to
remove from the scene of danger.
These vigorous measures of the Sicilian government
convinced Frederic that his advance upon Rome must be no longer delayed. He
therefore, however loath, after the sacrifices made to obviate the necessity
that he deemed disgraceful, treated with Ancona; accepted, as ransom, or
composition, a considerable sum of money, and took hostages for the future
neutrality of the town. He then raised the siege, and marched southward so
rapidly, that the Sicilian troops, fearing to be cut off, hastily retreated.
Pisan vessels at the same time occupied the mouth of the Tiber; and the
reunited Imperial army encamped before Rome.
But Frederic’s protection of Tusculum, by
disappointing the Romans of their anticipated triumph, had changed their
political inclinations. They now forgave Alexander his refusal to sanction
their war upon that city, and cordially embraced his defence, co-operating with
the troops in his service. Churches, monuments of classical antiquity, if the
site were opportune, became fortresses; the Coliseum had long been the
stronghold of the Frangipani; and a week elapsed ere the Emperor had mastered
even the then strongly garrisoned and well-defended Leonine city. But no sooner
was he thus in possession of St. Peter’s and the Castle of St. Angelo, than he
invited Pascal to join him, duly escorted as well for safety as for honour.
The Tiber alone now separated the rival Popes, each
occupying a portion of the Eternal City; and Frederic, through the Archbishops,
proposed a compromise. It was, that both pontiffs should simultaneously and
spontaneously renounce their claims, and the Cardinals of both parties unite in
conclave for a free, and really canonical, election. With such election he
pledged himself not to interfere, promising moreover, upon its satisfactory
completion, to release the prisoners, and restore the booty taken before Tusculum
to the Romans. It seems hard, that the prince who proposed this compromise
should be represented as the pertinacious adherent of anti-popes as such, and
instigator of their election. The contemporaneous Romans appreciated him
differently. The proposal charmed the would-be masters of the world, who were
already tired of fighting for a choice between Popes; and the offensive as
successful protection of Tusculum being now partly expiated, partly forgotten
amidst the annoyances that a siege brought in its train, they w ere again
seized with their frequent longing for a resident emperor. Vehemently they
urged upon Alexander the acceptance of the terms, as a sacrifice which it was
incumbent upon the pastor to make, for the preservation of his flock. But
Alexander, who had no intention of closing the schism at his own expense, would
listen to no compromise; and his Cardinals, to whom the proposal had been
addressed, replied that God alone could judge a Pope, who was superior to all
human tribunals. The answer displeased the Romans; as, indeed, it very
reasonably might—the question being not of judging a pope, but whether an
individual were pope or no. They repeated their urgent entreaties that he would
accept the offer; and when they found their wishes slighted, began to desert in
alarming numbers. The nobles, in their urban fortresses, still held out; but
the people, now favouring the Emperor, evidently inclined to acknowledge
Pascal. Alexander perceiving the impossibility of longer maintaining himself in
Rome, secretly fled with his Cardinals, taking refuge in Benevento.
The Romans immediately threw open their gates, and
took the oath of allegiance to the Emperor, submitting their republican
institutions to his pleasure; when he at once ratified all the rights and
privileges of the municipality and people. Pascal, upon his admission into his
capital, devoted his attention to, and employed himself in, purifying the
altars, profaned by an anti-pope; and then, upon the 1st of August, solemnly
crowned Frederic and Beatrice. Frederic, having been previously crowned by an
undisputed Pope, Adrian IV, his going through the ceremony a second time upon
the occasion of his Empress’s coronation, may be conjectured to have been a
compliment to Pascal, designed to mark him to the Romans as Adrian’s proper
successor. It is to be observed however that ceremonies, emblems, ensigns of
dignity, both visible and tangible, were to the taste of the age; sovereigns
wore their crowns upon all state occasions, at least, and were not unwilling to
create the occasion; so that it may have been no more than a conjugal attention
to Beatrice. After the ceremony, Frederic and Pascal swore fidelity to each
other, and swore further never to seek a dispensation from this oath.
Frederic now seemed really in a position to reduce the
Lombards to obedience, and compel the Normans to acknowledge his suzerainty;
thus more than restoring the complete empire of the Othos, if not quite of
Charlemagne. But the siege of Ancona had hindered him from reaching Rome during
the cooler season; and the usual obstacle, the deleterious effect of an Italian
summer upon German constitutions, again blighted his prospects. The usual
epidemic was now increased by the malaria of the Roman Campagna, and further
envenomed by superstitious fears. A church had been unfortunately burnt during
the siege, when the flames melted some metal images of the Saviour and the
Apostles; and the troops saw the judgment of Heaven upon this sacrilege, in the
marsh fever that was hurrying them to the grave. Common men and campfollowers
were the first swept away by this pestilence, but not they alone were its
victims. Besides 2000 gentlemen, many earls, prelates, and even princes were of
the number; the most distinguished being the Emperor’s highly valued
Chancellor, the Archbishop of Cologne, and his two cousins, the Duke of Swabia
and the younger Duke Welf. An historian may be permitted to add the name of
Acerbo Morena, the son of the Otto Morena, and continuator of his father’s
chronicle.
Frederic, in the midst of his triumphs, actual and
anticipated, yielded to this irresistible necessity, and leaving Archbishop
Christian with a small body of troops at Rome to protect Pascal, led back the
remains of his erst formidable host to Pavia. He continued to lose men by the
way, and carefully avoided all hostile encounters. At Pavia he halted j and
confident that in the cooler climate of northern Italy his troops would recover
their health, he prepared for chastising the Lombard League. To this end he
convoked a Diet there, naturally summoning those only upon whose loyalty he
could rely. The Marquesses of Montferrat and Malaspina—the last had with his
men escorted the pestilence-stricken army from Rome—Earl Biandrate, the Signori
or Lords of Belforte, Leprio and Martesano, with the Magistrates of Pavia,
Novara, Vercelli and Como, appear to have constituted the assembly, in, whose
presence, and with whose concurrence, the Emperor threw
down the gauntlet to the League. Upon the 21st of September he
denounced the ban of the Empire against all the confederated cities, except
Lodi and Cremona, which, as having joined it under compulsion, were exempted.
He further asserted the Imperial sovereignty, by appointing governors,
podestas, &c., to the insurgent cities.
Those cities, undaunted by Imperial wrath, renewed
their engagement, and made some progress in the still vague organization of
their confederacy. Upon the 1st of December, Milan, Venice, Verona, Vicenza,
Padua, Treviso, Brescia, Bergamo, Parma, Piacenza, Mantua, Ferrara, Modena,
Bologna, and even the favoured Lodi and Cremona—whether still coerced or
having changed their politics—by their deputies, signed a document, pledging
them to the following points. The first, never to pay money or do service to
the Emperor, beyond what had been customary between the death of Henry and the accession of Frederic (that is to say,
during the virtual abeyance of Imperial authority in Italy). The second, to
expel all Imperialists and confiscate their property. The third, not to make
peace or war separately, but to support each other against all foes (no reservation
of allegiance now); and to refer all disputes amongst themselves to
arbitration; such arbitration, and the general government of the League, being
committed to a congress of Rectors, to be chosen from the Consuls, Podestas, or
other Magistrates of the confederated towns. The fourth and last point, was to
oblige all inhabitants between the ages of sixteen and sixty to swear to this
League.
In Frederic Barbarossa, the spirit of chivalry was singularly,
for that age, blended with the statesmanship of the sovereign; but he yielded,
upon the present occasion, too eagerly to the impulses of the former, when,
with an army thus weakened, he rashly defied the Lombard League. The
reinforcements brought him by the few faithful Lombards could in no degree
supply the place of the Germans lost by death, by sickness, by returning home
with or without leave, and by retiring into monasteries to expiate the
sacrilege—either of accidentally burning the church and its contents, or of
having warred, perchance, against the true Pope—which had brought down disease and
death upon their devoted heads. With these reinforcements the Emperor indeed
ravaged the territories of Milan and Piacenza, in retaliation of the injuries inflicted
upon Lodi; but he found the Lombards too strong to allow of his undertaking any
important operation. He returned to Pavia, where he was even menaced with a
siege, and resolved again to seek support in Germany. He left Archbishop
Christian, with the major part of the small residue of his army, to re-occupy
Rome and her territory when the season should render a southward move feasible.
But the Lombards, well aware of the object for which
he then desired to visit Germany, endeavoured to detain him in Italy, where,
with his reduced numbers, they hoped to destroy him. With this view they
guarded the Alpine passes: that by Susa over Mount Cenis alone remaining open,
because beyond their reach. The Earls of Maurienne, in Savoy, who had acquired
the Marquesate of Susa by marriage with the heiress, but not the title
apparently, had no connexion with the League. Humbert, the then Earl, who seems
to have first substituted Savoy to Maurienne in his designation, as indicative
of a more extensive principality, bargained with the Marquess of Montferrat, to
keep this road open to his sovereign, upon receiving a sum of money.
Frederic, with forces reduced indeed, quitted Pavia,
and marched with all convenient speed for Susa, a large Lombard army
threatening to intercept him. As a measure of prevention that should deter
hostility, he ordered the execution of two or three of the hostages given by
Milan and by divers revolted cities, prior to their present insurrection, to
answer for their fidelity; and announced that in case of an attack by the
troops of those cities, the lives of all the rest would be the forfeit. The
feelings of the modern world naturally recoil from this sacrifice of
unoffending men: but again it is to be remembered that Frederic Barbarossa was
a son of the twelfth century, when human life was of little account; and that
in truth the very meaning of giving hostages for the observance of an
engagement, is that their lives are forfeited by a breach of engagement on the
part of those for whose faith they are responsible. Hence even whilst we
shudder at the barbarity of an execution, which in the nineteenth century makes
the blood run cold, the clemency that had spared the forfeited lives of the
whole body of hostages, after the rebellion of those for whose loyalty they
were in pawn, is entitled to admiration. And indeed one of the startling facts
of mediaeval history, is the little regard habitually paid by givers of
hostages to the danger to which their revolt, or other violation of compact,
exposed the persons so given. Upon the present occasion, however, this was not
the case. The menace, and the sanguinary proof that it was serious, answered
the intended purpose. The Lombard army abandoned its threatening posture, and
in March, 1168, Frederic, with little more than an escort, reached Susa.
But though in the city of a prince professing loyalty,
the dangers of the Emperor were by no means over. Just before his arrival
there, some treachery was detected in Zilio di Prando, one of the Brescian
hostages. Frederic sentenced him to death, and despatched the rest of these
unlucky guarantees for their recklessly forsworn countrymen, to Biandrate, a
strong town, where it was thought they might be securely held in the custody of
a sufficient German garrison. The Susans, who as Piedmontese sympathised more
with their Cisalpine countrymen than with their Savoyard Lord, took fire at
Zilio’s doom, the rather, perhaps, as occurring upon their domain. They
declared that if they had suffered their Earl to promise the Emperor a free
passage with his attendants, they would never permit the Lombard hostages to be
either dragged out of Italy or detained prisoners in it, and insisted upon
their immediate liberation. Frederic very naturally refused to part with the
only security—such as it was—he had for his own safety, at least until he
should be on the northern side of the Alps; nor indeed was there any good
reason beyond inability to keep them, for their being even then released. But
the angry Susans upon this refusal conspired to murder him, or, if that be
doubtful, at least to take him prisoner, in the ensuing night. The plot was
betrayed to Frederic by his landlord, and as his escort was now too weak to
encounter the citizens even of a single town, he left Susa secretly, attended,
the better to avoid observation, by only five persons, and began the ascent of
the mountain at dusk. Those of his suite who remained behind kept up the
appearance of the Imperial service, to avert the discovery of his departure
till he should be beyond the reach of Italian rebels; for which purpose Hermann
von Siebeneichen, a genuine Knight, laid himself down in the Emperor’s bed to
await his intended murderers. The conspirators upon discovering the substitution
appear to have been touched by this self-sacrificing loyalty, and spared
Hermannis life. But ten others of the Germans left at Susa they seized, and
delivered over to the widow of Zilio di Prando, to be dealt with at her
pleasure. What that pleasure was does not appear.
With his five companions only, the erst triumphant
Emperor re-entered Germany, a fugitive. The garrison he had placed in Biandrate
was immediately besieged there with overwhelming numbers, and its resistance
overpowered. The hostages, whose lives, now indisputably forfeited, the
garrison, either in obedience to the Emperor, or from humanity, or as a measure
of prudence, had spared, were of course set at liberty; but the conquerors, far
from being softened by the recovery of their friends unharmed, massacred the
whole garrison. The fierce wrath of the Lombards thus slaked, the remainder of
the Germans who had attended the Emperor to the neighbourhood of Susa, were
permitted to take refuge in Ghibeline cities, and in the service of Ghibeline
nobles.
The exultation of the Lombards at this final triumph,
for which they forgot that they were mainly indebted to the Italian climate and
the Roman malaria knew no bounds. All Imperial officers were forthwith
expelled, the loyal struggles of Lodi finally crushed, the domains of Biandrate
conquered, and the Earl himself, as also Marquess Malaspina, constrained to
join the League. The Marquess of Montferrat and the city of Pavia, alone in
Lombardy, remained loyal. Milan was now completely fortified, the League
further organized, and every pretence of continued allegiance almost openly
discarded; every appeal to any Imperial tribunal, upon whatsoever plea, being
prohibited. As though their arms alone had vanquished the whole power of the
German Emperor, the Lombards now looked down upon the Constantinopolitan
Emperor as an insignificant ally; or perhaps suspected his purpose of
succeeding to the sovereignty they had wrested from Frederic. Any gratitude,
they might be supposed to owe him for various most seasonable succours, was
wholly superseded by republican pride and self-confidence. The Milanese
insulted his bust, and the Congress of the League forbade its members to treat
with him without especial permission.
But, if the Emperor had quitted the southern portion
of his Empire unwillingly, he had not sought the northern before it required
his presence. He appeared there indeed shorn of the glories he had hoped to
bring home, and that in great measure through his own fault; first, by so
losing time in the siege of Ancona, as to delay his visit to Rome until the
sickly season; and secondly, by menacing the Lombard League when he was not in
a condition to strike. But he showed himself, nevertheless, on his arrival, every
inch a King, resolute as ever to enforce obedience to the laws, abstinence from
private warfare included. Such sovereign interposition was especially needed in
the north of Germany, where civil war was even then raging; the transgressor of
the realm’s peace being his favoured kinsman, the potent Duke of Saxony and
Bavaria. The Lion represented himself, however, as the aggrieved party; and
with respect to the actual breaking out of hostilities, he in some measure was
so; inasmuch as the princes, whom he had separately wronged, had, in order to
recover their losses, united to attack him, whilst, as they hoped, not fully
prepared for war with such a coalition.
This ambitious prince, indisputably the original aggressor,—who,
at the Emperor’s last departure for Italy, had recently celebrated his marriage
with Princess Matilda of England—had not accumulated the mass of domains that
excited the jealousy of his compeers, and might reasonably have caused some
apprehension to the Emperor, without provoking proportionate enmity in the
jealous. Whilst Frederic was present in Germany, this enmity had been sullenly
smothered; but awaited only his being called away, to explode. Accordingly, no
sooner was their sovereign beyond the Alps, immersed in Italian politics, in
the struggle against Italian rebellion, than the Margraves of Brandenburg and
Misnia, the Landgrave of Thuringia, the Archbishop of Magdeburg, with other
princes and prelates of less account,—but all of whom had suffered from the
violence, or the manoeuvres of the Duke of Saxony and Bavaria—burst into his
dominions. Simultaneously with their invasion, broke out an insurrection to
which Waldemar, incensed at Henry’s desertion of him the preceding year, had
stimulated Pribislaf; to whose support the Danes hastened on one side as did
the Pomeranians on the other. All seemed to prosper with the allies. The
Landgrave surprised and took Haldensleben; the Earl of Oldenburg occupied
Bremen for the Archbishop, who had forfeited it, and was joyfully welcomed; the
citizens having found the Lion a far more oppressive and more rapacious master
than their banished ecclesiastical prince.
Both as a warrior and as a politician, the Duke met
his enemies with all the boldness with which he had provoked them, and fortune
still favoured him. The Slavonian insurrection, as fomented and aided by
Denmark, he deemed the most fraught with peril; and with it therefore he began,
dealing with it in the latter character. A quarrel with Norway dividing
Waldemar’s attention, prevented his supporting Pribislaff as efficiently as he
had promised; and Henry, seizing the opportunity, appeased, by all sorts of
concessions, the wrath of his royal neighbour, and induced him to conclude a
new treaty of peace. He next bought off the Pomeranian princes; and having thus
stripped Pribislaff of all assistance, he, by the generous offer of a pardon,
with the renewed and somewhat enlarged grant of part of his father’s dominions
in fief, converted a dangerous insurgent into a grateful vassal. Whether Pribislaff
received baptism seems doubtful; but Christian or Heathen, he never again broke
his oath of fealty. The insurrection thus suppressed, Henry, at the head of his
collected forces, attacked the enemies who from the eastern side had invaded
his duchy, and drove them before him as far back as Magdeburg. Then leaving
them upon the territory of the Archbishop, he turned westward, and presently
scared the Earl of Oldenburg from Bremen. Entering the evacuated city, he,
without the indispensable legal reference to Diet or Emperor, by his sole
authority, laid it under the ban of the Empire, and exercised such severities,
that the citizens were glad to redeem themselves from his vengeance by a fine
of 1000 marks of silver. Finally, asserting that Archbishop Hartwig, even in
his retirement at Hamburg, was preparing to recover the temporalities of his
see by arms, and that the Bishop of Lubeck had refused to do him homage for those
belonging to his, he successively attacked these prelates, destroyed the few
fortresses still remaining to the Archbishop, compelled him to fly to Magdeburg
for shelter, and took possession of the diocese of Lubeck. The ravages
committed by both parties during this campaign are described as unusually
horrible.
This was the state in which Frederic found northern
Germany, when, in the spring of 1168, escaping from assassination at Susa, he
returned in a condition so seemingly depressed, that those most conscious of
having broken his laws, perhaps flattered themselves he would shrink from the
task of enforcing them. But his spirit, as before intimated, was undepressed.
He at once summoned all parties before a Diet to be held at Frankfurt. He there
impressively remonstrated with them, one and all, upon the contempt of his
exhortations to preserve the peace of the Empire, shown in their breach of his
laws prohibiting private wars. He reproached them with having withheld, for use
in their feuds and hostilities, the troops that should have reinforced his
army, when weakened by sickness; and thus exposed the Head of the Empire to
disgrace, from his inability duly to chastise the Italian rebels. These
reproaches he more especially addressed to the allies, as having been, if not
the original aggressors, yet the first to begin hostilities; and upon his
steadily asserted principle that an illegal attempt at selfredress forfeited
the right to legal redress, he refused to listen to the complaints and
statements by which the Duke of Saxony and Bavaria’s enemies would fain have
palliated, if not justified their conduct. Finally, he commanded the
restitution of all conquests on both sides, and the re-establishment of the status
quo ante bellum.
To this assertion of sovereign authority all bowed. To
Henry the sentence brought rather more gain than loss: but, even had the latter
preponderated, he might have rejoiced to be so cheaply relieved both from a
formidable league of aggrieved rivals, and from any, possibly, apprehended
consequences of his mischief-working defalcation in Lombardy. The confederated
princes, fearing that resistance on their part would impel the Emperor more
decidedly to support the Duke, judged it best to wait for a more favourable
opportunity of seeking that legal redress, now refused as the penalty of their
own conduct. All submitted, except the Earl of Dasemberg; and him, thus left
single-handed in the struggle, the Lion promptly obliged to follow their
example. Tranquillity was thus restored throughout the greater part of Germany.
That is to say, intestine tranquillity, for to live
really at peace with all his neighbours seems to have been to Henry the Lion an
actual impossibility. He now engaged in war as the ally of the King of Denmark:
who, having settled his quarrel with Norway, addressed himself to completing
the subjugation of Rügen; which various accidents, his desertion by the Duke of
Saxony and Bavaria being one, had hitherto interrupted. The Duke now joined
Waldemar in extirpating Slavonian idolatry from its last and chiefest
stronghold, on the remotest point of this singularly shaped island. Professedly,
he did so as amends for his desertion of him, amidst their last war against the
Slavonians; but he seems to have been actuated by the wish to share the spoils;
since, the Pomeranian princes lending their aid, in expectation of .obtaining
the island in vassalage of the Danish crown, the success of the enterprise was
nearly certain. Jointly the conquest was completed; but Waldemar was as
unscrupulously rapacious as Henry; when he no longer needed assistance he both
disappointed his Pomeranian allies of their recompense, and arrogantly refused
the Duke any participation in the booty, lands, contributions, or
ecclesiastical patronage. Henry thereupon invited his Slavonian vassals to resume
the piratical incursions of their Heathen forefathers upon Denmark. Delightedly
they complied; spreading such desolation through Waldemar s dominions, that,
upon one market day at Mecklenburg, seven hundred Danes were sold as slaves.
The annoyance brought Waldemar to terms. He agreed to divide the Rugen
hostages, tolls, and dues with Henry: and the affianced bride of his son Canute
having died in infancy, he accepted for him, in her stead, the Duke’s eldest
daughter, the widowed Duchess of Swabia. Henry, at the same time, gave an
illegitimate daughter in marriage to a son of Pribislaff.
And now, at length, the whole Slavonian district,
since forming the duchies of Mecklenburg, was incorporated with the duchy of
Saxony, to which some of the Pomeranians appear to have been tributary. Piracy
was strictly prohibited; the fisheries, trade, and agriculture were actively
encouraged. Pribislaff built towns; Henry castles, cloisters, and churches,
whilst founding bishoprics; and, in the last three, placed German clergy to
convert those who were still idolaters, to instruct and confirm in Christianity
those already converted. He granted uncultivated districts at fixed rents, with
the privilege of electing their own magistrates to Hollanders, Flemings, and
Frieselanders; and the colonization of Slavonian lands with Germans, which had
been so long in progress, was completed. The provinces flourished wonderfully.
But, if Henry the Lion were thus successful in the
north, in the south his injudicious economy was preparing a grievous
disappointment for him. Welf Duke of Spoleto, it will be recollected, early
appeared in the unamiable character of an uncle, endeavouring to usurp Bavaria,
the patrimony of his infant orphan nephew, who probably never forgot the
attempt; and though subsequently Welf appears for some considerable time to
have conducted himself in an unobjectionable manner, the original taint,
intense selfishness, remained. When his only son died at Rome, he sought
oblivion of his sorrows in excitement and sensuality. He abandoned all
political concerns, separated himself from his wife, the equally bereaved
mother of Duke Welf,—to whose physical efforts some authors have, it will be
remembered, asserted that he owed his safety at the fall of Weinsberg—filled
his Court with dependent boon companions and courtesans, and lavished such
extravagant sums upon these associate upon dress, banquets, hunting parties,
entertainments, and orgies of all descriptions, that his ample means were soon
exhausted, and he found himself deeply involved in debt. He applied for
assistance to him, who, since his only child’s death, was his natural heir, his
brother’s son, the powerful Duke of Saxony and Bavaria; coupling his request
with a promise of bequeathing him his large share of the Welf patrimony. Henry
closed with the proposal, but delayed upon various pretexts to perform his part
of the contract; trusting, perhaps, that the death of his now hard-living old
uncle would prevent its necessity. The Duke of Spoleto, harassed and irritated
by repeated disappointment, now applied to his sister’s son, the Emperor, to
whom he owed his Italian possessions, and against whom, just before his son’s
death, he is believed to have caballed with Alexander III. This application was
immediately successful; and either through kindness or policy he was relieved
from his embarrassments. The effect was every way happy. The aged Duke was,
perhaps, the more touched by the liberal act, from the really austere morality
of his Imperial nephew, and his mind apparently recovered its tone. Sickening
of the licentious pleasures in which he had been wallowing, he dismissed his
profligate associates, invited back his Duchess Uta, distributed alms, endowed
churches and cloisters; and, in natural gratitude for many benefits, named
Frederic Barbarossa his universal heir. The tenor of the Duke of Spoleto’s will
was, it should seem, no secret; and the example was followed by his
brother-in-law, Rudolph Earl of Pfullendorf; who, having no children by his
wife, a sister of Jutta Duchess of Swabia, named Jutta’s son, the Emperor
Frederic, his heir. The anger of Henry the Lion, at his uncle Welf’s thus
disposing of possessions that he had deemed his future property, would not be
lessened by the consciousness that he had lost them through his own fault. His
resentment is said to have been attested by a prohibition ever to give the,
till then favourite, family name of Welf to any of his descendants; and it is
at least certain that none of them have ever borne it.
These bequests following his inheritance of the duchy
of Swabia and the Franconian family fiefs from his deceased childless cousin,
together with the lapse to the crown of various scattered fiefs for want of
male heirs, and the occurrence of some opportunities to purchase or exchange,
had gradually gathered in Frederic’s hands, prospectively at least, a mass of
domains, that balanced those of the Duke of Saxony and Bavaria, and enabled the
Emperor to ensure an adequate provision to his five sons, against they should
be of man’s estate. At the Whitsuntide Diet, held at Bamberg, A.D. 1169, the
eldest, Henry, still a child, was, upon the proposal of the Archbishop of
Mainz, then in Germany, elected King of the Romans; and, on the 15th of August,
crowned at Aachen by Philip von Heinsberg, who had succeeded Reginald von
Dassels as Archbishop of Cologne. To the second son, Frederic, was assigned the
Duchy of Swabia, with the Welf fiefs of the Duke of Spoleto and the heritage of
the Earl of Pfullendorf; to the third, Conrad, the family fiefs in Swabia and
Franconia, whether with or without the title of Duke of Franconia, seems
doubtful, in this prospective allotment amongst children, for the most part
still in the nursery; to the fourth, Otho, his mother’s county of Burgundy, to
which was attached the rectorate or Lieutenancy of the Arelat (that of Upper
Burgundy remaining in the Dukedom of Zäringen), and, according to some writers,
a promise of the kingdom of either the Arelat or Burgundy. To the fifth son,
Philip, then just born, a few lapsed fief were secured, as a temporary
provision; but the Emperor seems to have had an idea of educating this little
prince for the Church, with the view of hereafter seating him in St. Peter’s
Chair.
During the seven years that Frederic now passed in
Germany, he resided much in Swabia; which he esteemed convenient, as in some
measure a central position, and to which he was attached as his hereditary
duchy. It flourished under his fostering care, and the city of Ulm, especially,
attained to the level of long prosperous rivals. But his paternal solicitude
was not limited to his family possessions. The Empire was indebted to it for
many improvements, for the remedy of many crying evils. He destroyed numerous
strongholds of robber-knights, and prevailed upon some of the princes so far to
follow his example in repressing outrages obstructive of civilization and
prosperity, as to impose heavy fines upon such of their knights as should
plunder travellers. At the same time he encouraged and patronized to the
uttermost the Reichsritterschaft or immediate Chivalry of the Empire: the nobly
born but poor, who were ready to serve in any war, under any prince, in fact to
live by their swords, as much as did the robber-knights, only lawfully instead
of unlawfully; and who offered both an imperfect substitute for a standing army
and the material out of which one was to be formed, or at least officered.
Another great evil of the epoch was the oppression of
Cloisters by their noble Stewards. The remedy which Frederic proposed for this
grievance was to make all monastic establishments immediate vassals of the
Empire; attaching a general Stewardship to the Crown, to be exercised by
Deputy-Stewards, responsible for their conduct to the Emperor. This was a
course, which many cloisters for both sexes had petitioned him to adopt in
their respective cases. The scheme was, however, found impracticable as a
whole, being opposed by what in modern phraseology would be termed vested
rights; viz., rights reserved to themselves and their families, by Princes and
Nobles, when founding or endowing such establishments. He was therefore obliged
to rest content with making the change for individual religious houses,
wherever it appeared to be feasible. In many parts of Germany, he renounced by
charter a highly valued but often most oppressively used prerogative of the
crown, to wit, the right of disposing of vassals’ daughters and widows in
marriage. And to divers cities he granted divers chartered rights, especially
to Worms, which he pretty nearly emancipated from the authority of its Bishop.
It was about this period that the wealthy freemen who
neither held nor granted fiefs, anglice freeholders or franklins,—still,
notwithstanding the progressive changes, an important body—began to adopt the
names of their castles or mansions as family surnames; and henceforth the task
of the genealogist is easy. The nobility had earlier taken this means of
distinguishing races; or it should, perhaps, be said the higher nobility had
thus set the example, for Pfister calls these freeholders a middle order of
nobility, in fact constituting the German Baronage—the German form of the title
Baron being Freiherr, and Freifrau, literally free sir and free
dame or woman. The pride which these franklins still took in their freedom,—the
offspring of the early German horror of vassalage—though much declined from
what it was when, in the tenth century, his son’s acceptance of an Imperial
fief drove the haughty Etico into a monastery—is happily illustrated by a
trifling anecdote of Frederic’s reign; which will therefore, whether or not
belonging precisely to these seven years, here find an appropriate place. It
offers a whimsical contrast to the complicated scheme of feudalism, which
allowed not only the great Duke of Saxony and Bavaria to be the vassal of
bishops within his own duchies, but even the mighty Emperor himself to hold
lands as Trueisess, or Sewer, to the Bishop of Bamberg.
As Frederic was one day riding towards the Swiss city
of Constance, a man, sitting at his own gate by the roadside, doggedly refused
to rise, make obeisance, or show any of the usual tokens of respect, as the
Emperor passed. He was sharply rebuked by the Imperial attendants, and brought
before the Emperor to answer for his irreverence. Boldly he said, “I pay thee
not the honours required, because from me they are not due. I owe the Emperor
military service, but nought further; for I, the Herr von (Lord of) Keukingen,
am no one’s man (i. e. vassal), not even the Emperor’s.” Frederic praised his
spirit of independence, wished he had many such to serve him in the field, and
added, “ That you may serve me there the more effectively, accept a fief from
me.” The Lord of Keukingen was not quite as sturdy as old Etico, and accepted.
During these seven years, Frederic maintained internal
peace and order unbroken; everywhere he enforced submission to the Imperial
authority, and compelled the ever-resisting Poles, and Bohemian Czechs, to
acknowledge, and the latter to obey, his sovereignty. But still, even here the
schism was his bane. Many individuals, if not a large body of the German
clergy, were convinced that, whatever Alexander’s election might have been,
Pascal's was certainly illegal; and Frederic felt bound to assert the lawful
authority of the Pope he acknowledged. Several Cistertian Abbots were therefore
deprived of their monasteries, and the Bishop of Passau was deposed, as
partisans of Alexander. The Emperor’s uncle, Conrad Archbishop of Salzburg,
unshaken in his conviction by the forfeiture and spoliation he had suffered,
died a faithful adherent of Alexander’s, in the abbey of Admont, to which he
had retired. Thereupon the Chapter, Clergy, and Vassals of Salzburg, imbued
with their lost pastor’s opinions and spirit, hastily united to elect as his
successor, his nephew, Prince Adalbert of Bohemia. To Frederic the choice was
agreeable, and he invited his youthful ecclesiastical relation to Bamberg,
where he was then holding a Diet, to receive investiture of his temporalities.
Adalbert obeyed the friendly summons; but he, as his electors probably well
knew, entertained the same opinions as bis deceased uncle concerning the
schism. He had, immediately upon his election, applied to Alexander for
consecration; had received it, and appeared at Bamberg wearing the pall sent
him by the Emperor’s enemy. Frederic had no choice but to refuse investiture to
the prelate elect, consecrated by a Pope whom he did not recognize as such. He
refused even to receive Adalbert, although he came accompanied by his royal
father, the faithful and valuable friend of Frederic, to whom he owed his royal
dignity. Subsequently the princely archbishop either changed his opinion upon
the schism question, or thought proper to submit to Imperial authority. He
renounced his spiritual allegiance to Alexander, acknowledged his rival, and
was invested with the temporalities of his archbishopric.
CHAPTER
VIII.
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