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ANNALS OF WAR. 1700-1815 |
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ANNALS OF WAR_ 1700-1815 A.D.
1718.
1. THE QUADRUPLE ALLIANCE.—2. GREAT BRITAIN AND SPAIN
PREPARE HOSTILE ARMAMENTS.—3. ADMIRAL BYNG ENTERS THE MEDITERRANEAN.—4. THE
NAVAL BATTLE OFF PASSARO. — 5. MESSINA TAKEN BY THE SPANIARDS.—6. WAR
IN THE NORTH.—7. DEATH AND MILITARY CHARACTER OF CHARLES XII.
1. The Quadruple Alliance.
The great powers of Europe beheld with astonishment
Spain awakening from the lethargy of a hundred years, and displaying a vigour
and enterprise worthy the brightest days of that monarchy. The King, when
questioned, promised to suspend all operations after the conquest of
Sardinia, but he, nevertheless, continued all his warlike preparations,
both by sea and land. The apprehension of a renewal of a general war in
Europe roused the courts of St. James and Versailles, gave firmness to the
determination of the British Government, and fixed the wavering policy of the
French Regent. The two ministers, Stanhope and Dubois, agreed upon terms
for an accommodation that might be offered for the outbreak between the
Emperor and the King of Spain; and on the other hand means were taken
to hasten the peace between the former and the Sultan; these negotiations
at length produced a treaty between Great Britain, France, and Holland,
which was at first called the triple, but after it was joined by the
Emperor, it was named the quadruple alliance, against the unjustifiable
conduct of Spain.
2. Great Britain and Spain prepare
hostile Armaments.
Accordingly on the 4th of June twenty-one sail of the
line under Admiral Byng left Portsmouth for the Mediterranean, with peremptory
orders to attack the Spanish armament wherever they should find it, if
engaged in any hostile enterprise against Sicily or Naples. Cardinal Alberoni protested loudly against these naval preparations,
although he was at the same time assembling one of the greatest and most
formidable armaments that had been ever equipped by Spain since the days
of the grand Armada. Twenty-nine ships of the line, with a host of
transports, having on board 35,000 troops, 100 pieces of heavy artillery,
forty mortars, and a vast supply of ammunition and stores of all kinds,
were now preparing under the command of Admiral Castañeta and General the Marquis de Lede, who bad captured Sardinia the preceding
summer. Tins armament was equipping at Cadiz, but no one knew its
destination. As Byng passed Cadiz, he transmitted a copy of his
instructions to the British minister, Stanhope, who communicated it to Alberoni. The Cardinal tore the paper, and threw it on the
ground in a paroxysm of rage,
returning only for answer, “Byng will of course execute the orders he
has received from the King, his master.” A few days later this powerful
Spanish armament set sail from the port.
3. Admiral Byng enters
the Mediterranean.
The. English fleet went on, entered the Straits, and
sailed up the Mediterranean, coming to anchor in the Bay of Naples. The
arrival of Byng is said to have presented a magnificent spectacle; the
whole city was in a tumult of joy and exultation. The shore was
crowded with multitudes of coaches and people. The admiral, on
landing, was saluted by all the cannon from the city and castles.
The Austrian viceroy, Count Daun, received him with exceeding joy,
and placed a palace at his disposal. The people received him with
the greatest acclamations, and with all the honours and ceremonies
paid to a viceroy. There was not, however, a single Spanish ship
there, and Byng was informed that they had all sailed away, and
were already arrived in Sicily, where they had landed and were
reducing Messina to extremity.
Byng forthwith sailed from Naples, and on the 9th of
August was in sight of the Faro of Messina. Here he found the Piedmontese governor
besieged. Meanwhile the Spanish troops had landed, and taken possession of
Palermo on the 13th of July. The admiral despatched a polite message to
the Marquis de Lede, proposing a cessation of arms in Sicily for two
months. The Spanish general replied, he had no power to treat, and
consequently could not agree to an armistice; but should obey his orders,
which were to reduce Sicily for the King, his master. The Spanish fleet
had sailed from the harbour of Messina on the day before the English
squadron appeared; but the admiral descried, in the off ng, two
Spanish galleys, and, standing after them through the Faro, they led him
to the Spanish fleet, amounting to twenty-seven sail, besides fire-ships, bomb-vessels,
and galleys, drawn up in order of battle. They were commanded in chief by Don Antonio Castaneta, under whom were four rear-admirals,
Chacon, Guevara, Mari, and Cammock. At sight of the English fleet,
they “ stood away large,” and Byng gave chase for all the
rest of the day, but in the morning of the 11th of August, the Spanish
Admiral Mari, with six ships of war and all the fire-ships and galleys,
separated from the main fleet, and stood in for the Sicilian shore. Byng
then detached Captain Walton, with six ships, in pursuit of them, and they
were soon engaged. He himself continued to chaise the main fleet, and about ten
o'clock the battle began.
4. The Naval Battle off Passaro.
The English in this engagement had 8885 men, and 1400
guns, in twenty-one ships; the Spaniards 8830 men, and 1284 guns,
in twenty-nine ships; besides which, the Spaniards had seven
galleys of great use in battle, especially in calm weather. It was ten
o'clock when Captain Falkingham, in the “Orford,” of seventy guns,
and Captain Nicholas Haddock, in the “Grafton,” another seventy
came up first with Castañeta’s main body. The
Spaniards began to fire with their stern-chase guns, but Falkingham soon
came to closer fire, and attacked and took the “Santa Rosa,” of sixty-four
guns. The “Prince Asturias,” a large seventy-four, was
crippled by Captain Haddock, who left her to be taken by the “Breda,” and
stretched ahead after another Spaniard, who had kept firing on his
starboard bow during his engagement with the “Prince of Asturias.”
Captain Mathews, in the “Kent,” with less than a broadside made the
“San Carlos” strike, and about one o'clock came up with and engaged
the “St. Philip,” the admiral’s ship. Two heavy Spaniards rallied
on their admiral’s quarter, and fired into the “Kent,” when
Captain Masters, in the “Superb,” sixty, bore up to rescue her.
Upon this, Castañeta’s ship, and the two
Spaniards, that had stood by him hauled off and made a running fight,
until about three o'clock in the afternoon, when the “Kent” bore up and
crossed under Castañeta’s stern, then gave him a
broadside, and kept to leeward. The “Superb,” a minute or two after, fell upon
the Spanish admiral’s weather-quarter, when Castañeta shifted his helm to port to rake the “Superb” in return, but the “Kent”
ranging up under his lee-quarter, he now thought himself obliged to
strike, and lowered his flag accordingly. In the meanwhile, the English
admiral, in the “Barfleur,” had engaged the
Spanish Rear-Admiral Guevara, who, after giving a broadside, stood in for
land, with Byng after him. The admiral thus got away from the main body of
his own fleet, but had no success in the pursuit of Guevara, and could not
get back till two hours after sunset. His captains had been, in the main,
more successful. The “Essex” had taken the “Juno,” of thirty-six guns; the
“Montague” and “Rupert” the “Volante,” of forty-four; and the
“Dorsetshire,” Rear-Admiral Delavat, had captured the
“Isabelle,” sixty. The English ships had received but little damage. The “
Grafton,” the best sailer in the fleet, suffered
most—her brave captain having always pursued the headmost, engaged several of
the enemy, one after another, leaving the ships he had disabled or damaged
to be taken by those that followed him, whilst he made the best of his way
after the fast-sailing Spaniards that were attempting to escape.
This action, which was chiefly decided off Cape
Passaro, on the Sicilian shore, was fought on the 11th of August. The
Spaniards stood to their guns with much bravery, and maintained the
contest until dark; by which time Byng had captured the Spanish
admiral Commanding in chief, a rear-admiral, five ships of the line, and
two large frigates. On the 10th, two days later, Captain Walton, who had
been detached after Mari and the Spanish galleys, with six ships of the line,
wrote this laconic and often-quoted despatch to Byng, “Sir, we have taken
and destroyed all the Spanish ships and vessels that were upon the coast,
the number as per margin.” By his marginal reference, it appeared that he
had captured four ships of war, one mounting sixty guns, commanded by Mari
himself, one of fifty-four, one of forty, and one of twenty-four guns,
with a bombketch; and he bad burned and destroyed
four men-of-war, one of fifty-four, two of forty, and one of thirty; and
after having done all this, had quietly gone into the ancient port of
Syracuse, to “await further orders.” The Spanish fleet was, in fact,
annihilated by this one blow.
5. Messina taken by the Spaniards.
Byng having collected his ships after the action, put
into Syracuse, which was at this time blocked up by a detachment of the
Spanish army, and was garrisoned by Count Maffei, the Duke of
Savoy’s viceroy of Sicily, in person. Byng had orders to make good such
a footing in Sicily, as might, if possible, enable England and her
allies to land an army there; and this brave and skilful
commander thought it his first duty to save the citadel and recover the
town of Messina, which was defended by a Piedmontese garrison,
under Marquis d'Andorno. The Duke of Savoy,
being unable to reinforce it, had solicited the Emperor for assistance,
and Baron Wetzel, with troops, had been sent in Byng’s ship for that
purpose; but the viceroy was so elated with Byng’s success, that he
thought he could get on without him, and tried to temporize before he
received the troops. Byng, however, was firm, and Maffei, seeing he could
no longer avoid it, permitted the German troops to enter the citadel
of Messina. Lede was, however, no faint-hearted officer, and kept
still in the town, pushing forward the siege of the citadel with so
much vigour, that the Savoyard governor capitulated on the 29th of
September, to the great mortification of the Imperialists and the
British admiral.
At the end of the year’s campaign the Spaniards were
masters of all Sicily, except Syracuse, Trapani, and Melazzo, in which
three places the Duke of Savoy had considerable garrisons. The
Spanish army was numerous, and well appointed; and the affections of
the Sicilians seemed rather to incline to their old masters than either
to the Savoyards or Germans.
The destruction of the Spanish fleet at the battle of
Passaro was a subject that employed the deliberations and conjectures of all
the politicians in Europe. Admiral Byng not only had no declaration
of war against Spain to justify him, but he openly declared that the
destruction of the Spanish fleet was not to be interpreted into such
a declaration; his instructions, however, were positive; and
fortunately for him there happened no ministerial change at home to
tarnish his laurels by representing it as an “untoward event.”
The Cardinal felt that the defeat off Cape Passaro, if known in Spain,
would destroy his power, and had recourse to the absurd expedient of
prohibiting all information, or even discourse, about the disaster. He
wrote at once to the Spanish ambassador in London, Monteleone,
commanding him to quit England immediately, and he seized all the British
goods and vessels in the ports of Spain, imprisoned or dismissed all
the British consuls, and gave letters of marque to privateers.
6. War in the North.
Charles of Sweden set off a second time for the
conquest of Norway, in the month of October: he had so well prepared his
measures, that he thought to make himself master of this kingdom in
six months. He loved to contend for victory amidst the snows and
ice, that kill the very animals; and his glory was more flattered at taking
rocks in winter, than the most lovely provinces of Germany in a fine
season. In the month of December, Charles sat down before Frederikshall.
The soldiers could scarcely penetrate the soil to form the trenches, from
the effects of the frost, which made the ground like the rock. His
constitution of iron, acclimated by eighteen years of hardship, endured
sleeping in the open fields of Norway, in full winter, with the simple
covering of a cloak; but his soldiers died of cold at their posts.
Nevertheless, they did not care to complain, when they saw how the King
exposed himself to the same suffering.
On the evening of the 11th of December he visited the
trenches with Megret, a French engineer, who
conducted the siege. He complained that the works were not sufficiently
advanced, and stopped with him at a spot where the trench entered the
parallel. He was resting on his knees, with his elbow on the parapet, surveying
the workmen, who were opening the ground by starlight, when he was seen to
fall on his head, on the parapet, and utter a deep sigh. He was taken up
dead, with his forehead beaten in by a halfpound shot. Death must have been instantaneous, nevertheless he instinctively
placed his hand to his sword, and was discovered in that attitude. The
death of the King occasioned the immediate raising of the siege. The
Swedish people, more overwhelmed than flattered by the glory of their Prince,
sought to make peace, and to repress the inordinate power possessed by
Baron Gdrtz, who was immediately arrested and brought to the scaffold by
the nobles, who had been offended by the insolence of his behaviour
towards them. The death of Charles was fortunate for the allies. It put an
end to the many intrigues both of Cardinal Alberoni and Görtz. Sweden was powerless any longer to resist, and the Czar, the
King of Denmark, and King George of Hanover, were well pleased to keep
possession of what they had acquired (not all of them very honestly) in
the course of the war.
7. Death and Military Character
of Charles XII.
This Prince, on coming to his authority, had wrongs to
redress, and injuries to retaliate. His neighbours, the Czar, the Kings
of Denmark and Poland, and the Elector of Hanover, in a most unprincipled
league, endeavoured to spoil the minor of his territories; but, if we
except his cruel treatment of Patkul, vengeance was not one of his chief
characteristics, and was not the motive of his conduct. He followed war for its
pleasures and for its excitement;—
“No joys to him pacific sceptres yield,
War sounds the trump, he rushes to the field.”
It was the excitement of war, not the object to be
obtained by it, that inspired him. Accordingly, he could scarcely be called a
great commander; for though he commanded armies, gained victories,
and understood the commentaries of Caesar, he had no notion of
tactics; he neither possessed any extensive military genius or
knowledge whatever; nor did he evince any of the resources of a
well-informed mind in matters of difficulty. All he ever did, from Narva
to Pultowa, was to dash forward with any portion of his army
that could keep up with him, and without any consideration of
the number of men who were opposed to him, or how posted; he went
into the melée perfectly indifferent
how many of his soldiers perished with or without him. He made war with no
object; bis ambition did not lead him to desire territory, and he had no
principle of public or national feeling to advance. When he had gained
a victory he did not know what to do with it, and only longed
for another. He was utterly indifferent to all that became his
station in manners, habits of life, or equipage. Though not rude to
women, he paid them very little attention, and at a time when his
army occupied Leipsic, and he was constrained to pay a visit of
ceremony to the Queen of Poland, (to whom he especially owed sympathy
and compassion,) he did not speak above three words with her, but
talked during the whole visit with a foolish little dwarf, whom her
Majesty had in her suite. In his habits he was slovenly and
filthy—the yellow leather waistcoat and breeches, which are such a
characteristic in all the pictures of tins Sovereign, “were so greasy
that they might have been fried." His meals consisted of small
beer, which he drank at a great draught, with coarse bread, on which
he spread butter with his thumb. He was never more than a quarter of
an hour at table, and never spoke a single word whilst he was eating. He
had no sheets or canopy to his bed, but rolled himself up in a rug upon
the tressels, and stretched and shook himself
for all his toilet when he awoke; he never combed his hair but with
his fingers, which were never very clean; and he wore gloves only when
on horseback. His horses were ill selected and worse groomed, with rough
coats and thick bellies, and were covered with sackings instead of
horse-cloths, when not saddled,—which, however, they mostly were, awaiting
the King's rides; and these were solitary and very extensive. The grooms
were in keeping with the stable, and were the veriest loons that ever served a Monarch. The only thing that looked fine in his
equipage was a large gilt Bible, which always lay at his bedside. He had very
many characteristics of a savage chieftain—indomitable courage, reckless
of consequences, and never calculating chances; but he was inferior even
to him in the military qualities of caution and circumvention. He was just
a wilful man with an iron constitution, strong determination, and an utter
disregard of danger, who came early into the possession of power, and
was beyond all control of friends. It has been well said of this
Prince, “qu’il n’était point Alexandre, mais qu’il aurait le meilleur soldat d’Alexandre” (that he
was not Alexander, but that he would have Alexander's best soldier.)”
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