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CHAPTER
I
PERSIA,
FROM XERXES TO ALEXANDER
I.
XERXES
AND HIS SUCCESSORS
SALAMIS and
Plataea settled that Persia should not expand into Europe. Her European
conquests could no longer be held; in 479 she lost Sestos and the Hellespont,
in 478 Byzantium and the Bosporus; with the fall of Eion soon afterwards Thrace
and Macedonia recovered their independence. Doriscus and some forts in the
Gallipoli peninsula remained, but were lost after the Eurymedon. During the
rest of the century Persia’s foreign policy turns on two questions: are the
Greek cities of the Aegean seaboard to be in her sphere or in that of Athens,
and can she continue to hold Egypt? These two questions are treated elsewhere,
and this chapter deals only with Persia’s internal history.
Xerxes’
return to Sardes after Salamis was not a flight, but was due to a fresh revolt
of Babylon, where one Shamash-erba had assumed the crown, with the full royal
title of ‘King of Babylon and King of the Lands’; from Sardes Xerxes could keep
touch both with Babylon and Mardonius. Babylon’s final revolt was easily
suppressed, and Xerxes now deprived the city of her exceptional position in the
empire and made Babylonia an ordinary satrapy. He ordered the destruction of
Marduk’s great temple, E-sagila, which Alexander found in ruins, and removed
from it the statue of Marduk, thus rendering meaningless the accession ceremony
of taking the hands of Bel; he razed Babylon’s remaining fortifications,
abolished various native customs, and bestowed upon Persians the estates of
many prominent Babylonians. The name of Babylon was dropped from the royal
title, and henceforth Xerxes and his successors call themselves only ‘King of
the Lands’; and Aramaic gradually replaces Babylonian as the language of
official intercourse west of Babylonia. About the same time Xerxes’ brother
Masistes, satrap of Bactria, also failed in an attempt to revolt; the empire
was far too strong as yet for isolated local movements to succeed. Xerxes built
himself a new palace at Persepolis, which was never completed; otherwise he
seemingly spent the rest of his reign in idleness and sensuality at Susa, a
period which supplies the background for the book of Esther, until, some time
before April 464, in the 21st year of his reign, he was murdered by a courtier,
Artabanus. He may not have been a personal coward, but he had few merits; he
was vainglorious and weak, licentious and cruel, and even his pride was not of
the kind which illumines misfortune. His murder represented a definite movement
against his house. Artabanus also murdered his eldest son Darius, with the
alleged help of his third son Artaxerxes (Artakhshatra), to whom he represented
that Darius had murdered Xerxes. Artabanus must have had much support, for he
reigned seven months, was recognized in Egypt, and defeated Xerxes’ second son
Hystaspes. But Artaxerxes outwitted him; he bided his time, allowed Artabanus
to remove those who stood between him and the throne, and then turned on the
usurper and defeated and killed him.
Artaxerxes I,
called Long-Hand—whether from a physical peculiarity or political capacity is
uncertain,—dated his reign as from Xerxes’ death. It opened with the revolt of
Inaros in Egypt. Though the revolt was ultimately suppressed, Artaxerxes
nevertheless made concessions which left Inaros’ son Thannyras and one
Psammetichus in possession of subordinate princedoms, and after Amyrtaeus’
death his son Pausiris was also permitted to retain his father’s principality.
These concessions may be evidence of political wisdom on Artaxerxes’ part
rather than of weakness, for the destruction of the Athenian expedition in aid
of Inaros had been a notable victory; certainly when during his reign Herodotus
visited Egypt he found it quiet and well-ordered. Artaxerxes also showed a
tolerant wisdom in his dealings with the Jews. In the West however he suffered
a definite setback, and at the so-called Peace of Callias in 449—8 Persia
definitely abandoned the Aegean and the cities on its seaboard. In domestic
affairs, he was not strong enough to resist his mother Amestris, Xerxes’ widow
(who had already exhibited her cruelty during Xerxes’ life in her mutilation of
a supposed rival), and though Inaros had submitted under definite covenants,
Artaxerxes surrendered him to Amestris’ importunity and a horrible death; it
was the beginning of the palace rule of women which for two generations was to
weaken Persia. The immediate result was the revolt of Artaxerxes’ friend
Megabyxus, the conqueror of Egypt, who had guaranteed to Inaros his life. The
obscure story which has survived shows Megabyxus as alternately in revolt and
in favour, as exiled and restored, his changes of fortune depending upon the
intrigues of Amestris and Artaxerxes’ wife Amytis; the political reasons behind
the story are lost. Artaxerxes died in spring 424, after reigning 40 years.
What can be descried of his character is an energy in youth that afterwards
died out, some political wisdom, and a vein of weakness. But he seems to have
been a better ruler than his father or his son.
The usual
struggle for the throne followed his death. His sole legitimate son succeeded
him as Xerxes II, but was promptly murdered by his half-brother Sogdianus, who
reigned some months and was then defeated by another half-brother, Ochus, and
thrown into a slow furnace, a punishment which now becomes usual. The
Babylonian chronology did not recognize Xerxes II and Sogdianus as kings, and
seemingly added the duration of their reigns to that of Artaxerxes. Ochus took
the crown very early in 423 as Darius II; Greeks nicknamed him Nothos, ‘the
bastard.’ He did not lack courage, but was otherwise a worthless character,
dominated by his half-sister and wife Parysatis, a monster of cruelty. Her
government provoked a series of blind revolts. First the King’s brother Arsites
rose and was overthrown and put to death; in this war, if tradition be true,
both sides for the first time used Greek mercenaries. Then Pissuthnes of Lydia
rose, and was defeated by Hydarnes’ son Tissaphernes, a man who was to play a
large part in Persian history; in 413 he received the Lydian satrapy as a
reward, but did not reduce Pissuthnes’ son Amorges till 412. A brief outbreak
in Media in 410 was followed by Terituchmes’ conspiracy. Darius’ eldest son
Arsaces had married Tissaphernes’ sister Statira, and his daughter Amestris
Tissaphernes’ brother Terituchmes; and Terituchmes formed a wide-reaching plot
to overthrow Darius. He was betrayed and killed, and Parysatis in her vengeance
almost exterminated Hydarnes’ house; Arsaces’ prayers indeed saved Statira, but
Parysatis poisoned her many years later. Tissaphernes she could not reach; but
in 407, taking advantage of his failure to prevent the temporary revival of
Athens’ power, she persuaded Darius to appoint her favourite younger son Cyrus
satrap of Lydia, Phrygia, and Cappadocia, with the supreme command in Asia
Minor.
Tissaphernes
thus lost Lydia and was restricted to Caria and the Ionian cities, and
Parysatis’ actions naturally made him the irreconcilable enemy both of herself
and Cyrus. The weakness of Darius’ rule did not affect the efficiency of his
satraps, as Pharnabazus, Tissaphernes, and Cyrus all showed in their dealings
with Greece; but it undoubtedly encouraged Egypt to revolt.
In 405 Darius
contracted an illness which raised the question of the succession. Of his
thirteen children by Parysatis many were dead; Arsaces, the eldest son,
naturally expected the crown, but Parysatis hoped to secure it for Cyrus. The
story, however, that Cyrus had a good claim according to the precedent set by
Darius I in Xerxes’ case, because he had been born after his father became king
and Arsaces before, cannot be true; otherwise Cyrus could not have been over
sixteen when in 407 he was sent to the coast as commander-in-chief, and this
seems impossible. Darius in his illness sent for his two sons, and Cyrus came
with Tissaphernes, who pretended to be his friend; but on Darius’ death, some
time before April 404, Arsaces secured the succession, and Tissaphernes at once
denounced Cyrus to him as plotting his murder. Whether it was true cannot be
said; Cyrus was imprisoned, but Parysatis saved his life and procured his
return to his satrapy, where, enraged and humiliated, he prepared to enforce
his pretensions in arms. Arsaces took the name of Artaxerxes II; he was
nicknamed Mnemon (Abiataka), from his excellent memory.
II.
THE
ENTERPRISE OF CYRUS
Cyrus is the
one sympathetic figure among the later Achaemenids, though it is difficult to
disentangle the real man from Xenophon’s eulogies, not only in the Anabasis but
also in the Cyropaedia (if it be true that Xenophon’s portrait of the elder
Cyrus partly represents what he believed the younger Cyrus would have become).
Cyrus obviously possessed ambition and courage, great energy, and the power of
attracting men’s devotion; he was generous in giving, more generous in
promising; and beyond any other Persian he seems to have understood Greeks and
been understood by them. But his unprovoked murder of his cousins, and his
barbarous mutilation of all offenders, attest his inherited cruelty, and his
defects of judgment were serious. He failed throughout to understand that
Tissaphernes was his real danger, and his knowledge that Greek hoplites could
defeat Persian infantry blinded him to the fact that Persia’s strength did not
lie in infantry; his expedition had failed before it started, for, with all
Cappadocia at his disposal, he set out to conquer the empire with some 2600
horse.
His first aim
was to collect a Greek force without alarming Artaxerxes. All the Ionian cities
except Miletus had revolted to him from Tissaphernes, and the siege of Miletus
gave him a pretext for enrolling mercenaries; he subsidized a Spartan exile,
Clearchus, to raise troops and employ them in Thrace till required; and his
Greek friends Aristippus of Larissa, Sophaenetus of Stymphalus, Socrates of
Achaea, and Gorgias’ pupil Proxenus of Boeotia, also recruited men, who were
engaged to attack either Tissaphernes or Pisidia. There was hardly as yet a
regular class of mercenaries in Greece, and the men were largely adventurous
spirits who hoped to make money, and included some rough characters. Xenophon,
a young Athenian and pupil of Socrates, came simply as Proxenus’ friend,
without military rank; he liked war, and his admiration for Sparta perhaps made
continued residence in Athens uncomfortable. Sophaenetus wrote the first story
of the expedition, and Xenophon probably wrote his own account, the Anabasis,
largely because he thought Sophaenetus had overlooked his merits; he published
it under the assumed name of Themistogenes. He must have kept a diary, but on
the retreat it was sometimes scantily posted up, and though he gives each day’s
distance in parasangs (said to be Persian for ‘milestones’), these are not
accurate measurements; along the Royal Road from Sardes to Thapsacus the
distances were known, but after Thapsacus his parasangs can only represent some
rough system of time-measurement; even to Persians the parasang, like the
modern farsang, varied in different districts with the nature of the
ground. As, in addition, he wrote many years after the events he records, some
mistakes are inevitable; but the real weakness in his vivid narrative is that
there is only his own word for the part he himself played.
Early in 401
Cyrus collected most of his army at Sardes, and announced that he meant to
chastise the Pisidians; but Tissaphernes guessed his real objective, and with
500 horse rode hard to Susa to warn the King. About March Cyrus started; at
Colossae Menon of Larissa, another pupil of Gorgias, joined him, bringing
Aristippus’ men, and Clearchus joined at Celaenae, completing his force, which
included (besides Asiatics) 9600 Greek hoplites and 2300 Greek and Thracian
peltasts and light-armed; they brought a long train of carts and many women,
both free hetaerae and slave girls. Clearchus, who commanded, was a stern
disciplinarian, not popular, but trusted in battle. As Cyrus approached
Iconium, Syennesis IV of Cilicia, Persia’s vassal, found himself in a dilemma;
he wanted to be on the winning side, but did not know which side it would be;
so he sent his wife Epyaxa to Cyrus with a large sum of money, which enabled
him to pay the Greeks, and reinsured himself by sending his eldest son to
Artaxerxes. From Iconium Cyrus went by Tyana in Cappadocia toward the Cilician
Gates, the impregnable pass over the Taurus through which a camel could not go
without unloading till Ibrahim blasted the modern road. He had saved Syennesis’
face by sending Menon with Epyaxa into Cilicia by Laranda, which officially
turned the Gates; Syennesis duly withdrew his men, and Cyrus passed through,
but Menon lost 100 men plundering, and the Greeks in anger sacked Tarsus. They
now suspected that their objective was Artaxerxes, and mutinied; but Clearchus
handled them very well, and Cyrus promised extra pay and assured them that he
was only marching against Abrocomas, satrap of Syria.
At Issus
Cyrus was joined by his fleet, commanded by the Egyptian Tamos, father of his
friend Glos, and also by a Spartan squadron; Sparta had not officially declared
war on Artaxerxes, but she had encouraged Clearchus and was unofficially
supporting Cyrus. The fleet brought him 700 hoplites under the Spartan
Cheirisophus, while 400 Greeks deserted to him from Abrocomas. Cyrus had
brought up the fleet in order to turn the ‘pillar of Jonah’, the pass between
Issus and Myriandrus, if Abrocomas held it, but Abrocomas, who was possibly
playing a double game, was not there; the pass was open, as were the Syrian
Gates beyond Myriandrus, and Cyrus reached the Euphrates at Thapsacus without
incident. There he announced that he was marching against Artaxerxes, and
overcame the hesitation of the Greeks by higher pay and still higher promises.
Abrocomas had hurried to Thapsacus before him and after crossing had burnt all
the boats, but the river was exceptionally low, and Cyrus’ men waded across; it
was taken as a sign of divine favour that the Euphrates had done obeisance to
the future king, a curious parallel to the sea’s obeisance to Alexander at
Mount Climax. They now turned down the Euphrates and marched southward along the
east bank; the country was chiefly desert, the later civilization along the
river being largely a creation of the Seleucids, and the sportsman in Xenophon
found much to interest him: the wild asses, which could only be taken by
driving; the ostriches, which no one could get near; and the bustards, which
could be ridden down, like wild turkeys on the Pampas. Early in September they
reached Babylonia, and perceived that an army was retiring before them. They
passed a great trench, with a narrow passage left between it and the
Euphrates—whether it was a canal or (as Xenophon thought) a fortification seems
very doubtful—and the next day came somewhat unexpectedly upon Artaxerxes’ army
near the village of Cunaxa, some 45 miles north of Babylon; possibly the mound
Kunish south of Felluja.
III.
THE
BATTLE OF CUNAXA
Artaxerxes
had deferred battle as long as possible, for he was expecting his brother from
Susa and Abrocomas from Phoenicia; but both came too late (Abrocomas having
presumably taken the regular Tigris route), and he had to stand to cover
Babylon without them. He had only three satraps with him, Tissaphernes, Arbaces
of Media, and Gobryas of Babylon, and probably something over 30,000 men; the
infantry were poorly armed, but he had at least 6000 horse, perhaps more, most
of them probably Persians and Medes. It was an army collected in a hurry, and
far from representative of Persia’s strength; and though it depended for
victory entirely on its cavalry, the absence of the satraps of Eastern Iran,
Armenia, and Syria (Cappadocia being controlled by Cyrus) shows that none of
the cavalry which was to form the powerful wings at Gaugamela was present. The
scythed chariots, as the battle shows, were few and inefficient; Xenophon’s 200
is a stereotyped figure which recurs at Gaugamela, and an extant work which
passed as Xenophon’s shows how the Persians had neglected this arm. Xenophon
says that Cyrus had 10,400 Greek hoplites and 2500 Greek and Thracian peltasts
and light-armed, figures which presuppose that not a man had fallen out on the
march from Celaenae; as the men were numbered, Xenophon must have omitted some
reinforcements. Cyrus also had about as many native infantry, but only some
2600 horse, 600 of whom were his bodyguard, heavily-armed swordsmen; in all
perhaps somewhere about 28,000 men. Xenophon’s statement that Cyrus had 100,000
Asiatic troops and Artaxerxes 900,000 is of interest, as it shows that to an
educated Athenian a figure like 100,000 had no meaning. Both armies were drawn
up in similar order, and the battle shows there was little difference in length
between the two lines. Artaxerxes’ infantry were in line on either wing, and in
the centre between them were Tissaphernes with a strong cavalry force and
Artaxerxes with the 1000 horse of the guard; the other two satraps with their
cavalry were on the flanks. The Greek hoplites under Clearchus, less a strong
camp-guard, formed Cyrus’ right wing, the Asiatics under his friend Ariaeus his
left; between them were Cyrus and his bodyguard; the peltasts and 1000 horse
covered Clearchus’ right flank and rested on the Euphrates, the remaining 1000
horse covered Ariaeus’ left.
Xenophon’s
account of the battle of Cunaxa is unsatisfactory; he saw little of it, and was
misled both by a report he heard that Tissaphernes was on the left and by his
own absurd figures, which brought Artaxerxes himself outside Cyrus’ left; and
his story is inconsistent with the certain fact that Cunaxa left Tissaphernes
the man of the hour and that to him Artaxerxes ascribed his victory.
Fortunately traces remain of a more understanding account, probably that of
Sophaenetus, which explain this. As Cyrus knew that a Persian king always took
the centre, his dispositions were so obviously wrong that some later writer
invented a story that he had ordered Clearchus to occupy the centre and
Clearchus had refused. What Cyrus did do when he saw his mistake—Xenophon heard
the order given—was to order Clearchus to incline to the left, to bring the
Greeks opposite Artaxerxes; but Clearchus, who saw that the Greeks would in any
case be threatened on their left flank by the strong Persian cavalry of the
centre, refused to expose his right flank also by withdrawing it from the
river. One cannot blame him; Cyrus had put him on the right, and Alexander’s
diagonal advance at Gaugamela shows that Cyrus’ manoeuvre would have been
impossible unless the flanks had been as well guarded as Alexander’s were. The
battle opened with the Greeks charging and easily routing the infantry of
Artaxerxes’ left, while the cavalry on the Persian left charged through the
peltasts along the river. Neither attack produced any result; the Persians rode
straight on instead of taking Clearchus in rear, and Clearchus threw away the
one chance of the day by going straight on, though he was on Artaxerxes’ flank.
As Ariaeus with Cyrus’ left was held, Clearchus’ advance opened a gap in the
line, and Tissaphernes decided the battle by throwing his cavalry into the gap,
followed by Artaxerxes and the guard, threatening alike Clearchus’ rear and
Ariaeus’ inner flank; it was the manoeuvre which the Persians nearly brought
off at Gaugamela and Antigonus I did bring off at Paraetacene. Cyrus,
hopelessly deficient in cavalry, had nothing with which to meet them but his
bodyguard; with these he charged, in a gallant attempt to retrieve as a soldier
the battle he had lost as a general. He cut his way through to Artaxerxes and
slightly wounded him, but was then over borne and killed; his left wing,
outflanked and with nothing more to fight for, fled; and Artaxerxes’ crown was
secure, while Clearchus was still uselessly pursuing the defeated infantry. The
Greeks returned to find the battle over; the Persian horse, with no need to
charge unbroken hoplites, watched them till dark, retreating when they
advanced, and at nightfall the Greeks returned to their camp, while 340
Thracians deserted. Cyrus’ death was a good thing for Greece; for the weapon
subsequently furnished to Persia by the King’s Peace might, in his energetic
hands, have transformed Greek history.
IV.
THE
RETREAT OF THE TEN THOUSAND TO TRAPEZUS
A formal demand for the unconditional
surrender of the Greeks was made next day and refused. The Persians took some
days to decide how to deal with them. A century later they would naturally have
entered Artaxerxes’ service; but seemingly he regarded them as Cyrus’ friends
and hated them accordingly. They were so slow to grasp the real position that
they offered Ariaeus the crown, which of course he declined; Cyrus’ friends
were only thinking of how to make their peace with Artaxerxes. They could count
on Parysatis’ help, and presumably Parysatis and Tissaphernes, who had the
support of his sister the queen Statira, were struggling for the control of the
weak King; the result was ultimately a compromise. Cilicia became a satrapy,
but otherwise Cyrus Asiatic friends were pardoned; later on Ariaeus became
satrap of Phrygia (now definitely severed from the Hellespontine satrapy),
Mithridates of Cappadocia, and Glos Artaxerxes’ admiral. This was as far as
Parysatis’ influence reached. The King could not deny his debt to Tissaphernes;
he gave him Cyrus’ satrapies, the command in Asia Minor, and full power to deal
with the Greeks. It was not Tissaphernes’ aim to destroy them; he had not
nearly enough cavalry in any case, and the canals made it impossible to wear down
the Greeks as the Parthians were later to wear down the Romans at Carrhae. His
fear was that they might establish themselves permanently in some strong
position among the canals and give much trouble, and his first object was to
get them out of Babylonia by any means. The Greeks on their side knew that they
could not cross the Mesopotamian desert again without supplies; they occupied
some villages, but, fortunately for themselves, did not accept a treacherous
proposal by Ariaeus to guide them home; and when after two days Artaxerxes
offered them a truce, Clearchus, who had learnt that he could not fight
successfully without cavalry, gladly accepted. Tissaphernes came and went,
sympathizing with their desire to go home, till the struggle at court was decided;
then he pledged himself to secure their safe return, and they swore to do no
harm. He led them south-east into Babylonia, making for the bridge of boats
over the Tigris at Sittace on the Babylon-Susa road; on their way they passed
the ‘Median wall’ near Babylon, the rampart some 171 miles long which
Nebuchadrezzar had built from Opis (subsequently a village of Seleuceia) to
Sippara to guard Babylon, at the point where the Tigris and Euphrates most
nearly approach each other. After crossing the Tigris Tissaphernes turned
north, and took them straight up the river past Opis, and so without incident
to the greater Zab, its principal tributary. This section of Xenophon’s
narrative is in disorder; he misplaces Opis—he may have transferred the name to
another town—and never mentions the lesser Zab.
At the Zab
the suspicion which had been growing between the two armies came to a head, and
Clearchus sought to remove it by a conference with Tissaphernes; among other
things he offered him the services of the Greeks to put down the revolt in
Egypt. Tissaphernes disclaimed any idea of treachery, and invited Clearchus and
his officers to dinner; Clearchus went with Proxenus, Menon, Socrates, Agias,
and 20 company commanders; all were seized and sent to Artaxerxes and all were
put to death except Menon, who according to report died later under torture. Xenophon
has much ill to say of Menon, and Ctesias, Artaxerxes’ Greek physician, makes
him responsible for Clearchus’ death; but Plato had a different idea of Menon,
and the accusations may only mean that, while Xenophon and Ctesias admired
Clearchus, Menon notoriously did not. Tissaphernes’ treachery was possibly due
to personal hatred of Clearchus, the friend of Cyrus and Parysatis, and to the
belief that without leaders the Greeks would be helpless, and must either
surrender or be destroyed by the Carduchi; but possibly he was merely obeying
Artaxerxes’ orders.
The Greeks
were at first stunned by Clearchus’ death; but they decided to go on, and chose
new generals, Xenophon, who says he played a leading part in the decision,
receiving Proxenus’ command, while Cheirisophus as a Spartan took the lead,
important steps being settled in general conference. To move more easily, they
burnt their carts and tents, which must have meant that the women had to go on
foot; if the march of the Ten Thousand was a feat, the march of the women was a
marvel. The horses, however, they used as pack-animals; one man brought away
3000 gold darics, another some valuable carpets. They advanced in hollow square
up the Tigris past the ruins of ‘Larisa’ (Calah) and ‘Mespila’ (Nineveh),
Cheirisophus leading and Xenophon commanding the rearguard, while Tissaphernes
followed, worrying them with cavalry and slingers to keep them moving; they
improvised a few horse and slingers as a reply. Thus amid frequent skirmishes
they reached Jezireh, where the modern road crosses the Tigris and the hills of
Kurdistan come down to the river. A Rhodian offered to take them across the
river native fashion on skins stuffed with grass, but a strong body of cavalry
on the farther bank rendered this impossible; they had not the catapults which
enabled Alexander thus to cross the Jaxartes in face of cavalry. So they struck
into the hills of Kurdistan, which Persia had never conquered; and Tissaphernes
left them.
The aim of
the Greeks was, roughly, to reach ‘Paphlagonia’, i.e. Sinope or one of her
colonies, and they believed that to do this they must sooner or later cross the
arrow-swift Tigris: and prisoners had told them that beyond Kurdistan lay
Armenia, where they could cross the Tigris near its source and go anywhere they
chose. They followed the regular route through Kurdistan, but began with a
battle, for the route ran uphill through a pass which was held in force by the
Carduchian archers. They caught two natives, and by killing one induced the
other to speak; he showed them another though difficult path which turned the
pass, and after a severe fight and considerable loss they got through. They
took seven days to traverse Kurdistan, fighting perpetually, and Xenophon had
to neglect his diary; and when they reached the Centrites, the Armenian
boundary, they found Artaxerxes’ son-in-law Orontes, satrap of ‘Eastern
Armenia’ (i.e. Darius’ eighteenth satrapy), holding the farther bank. Some
foragers however found a ford higher up, and by skilful strategy the army got
across, outmanoeuvring Orontes, whose men gave little trouble; but the Carduchi
swarmed down on them as they were crossing, and afforded Xenophon the
opportunity of a brilliant little rearguard action. They crossed the Bitlis
river, which they thought was the Tigris, went by Bitlis to Mush, crossed the
Teleboas (Murad su) into ‘Western Armenia’ (the thirteenth satrapy, Armenia
proper), met its satrap Tiribazus, and made an agreement with him that neither
side should harm the other.
Henceforth
their route is uncertain; Xenophon does not say what they knew, or if they were
aiming at a particular point or going blindly northward; probabilities alone
can be indicated. From Mush they probably bore westward to the Gunek river; on
their way they honoured their agreement by burning some houses, and when a
deserter reported that Tiribazus, who had followed them, meant to ambush them,
they sent out a force which surprised and plundered his almost empty camp.
Their one thought now was to escape quickly from his neighbourhood lest he
should occupy the passes ahead. It had begun to snow; but apparently they left
the road and went north across the hills for three days with local guides till
they struck the western Euphrates, which they crossed somewhere westward of Erzurum.
They were now not far from Gymnias and the road to Trapezus, and had taken a
good line; but whether this was due to luck or judgment is unfortunately
unknown. But the snow was increasing every day; it prevented them striking into
the hills north of the Euphrates, and they turned and went slowly eastward
along the river for two days, with the bitter wind in their faces. On the third
day the gale became a blizzard; the snow deepened rapidly, and they spent a
terrible night in the open; they were suffering from hunger, frostbite, and
snow blindness, and many men and animals died. Next day Cheirisophus pushed on
with the main body, while Xenophon had a hard task to round up and bring in the
sick and stragglers; but after great difficulties all were collected and safely
housed in a group of prosperous underground villages on the Erzurum plateau,
where they rested and feasted; the headman of Xenophon’s village told them that
to the north lay the Chalybes, and that he knew the road.
After a
week’s rest they started with the headman as guide; but before leaving someone
carried off his son, and Xenophon took 17 horses which he was rearing for
Artaxerxes, exposing the man to the King’s vengeance. Naturally therefore he
led them astray, and guided them, not north to the Chalybes, but east to the
upper Araxes. On the third day Cheirisophus saw something was wrong, and struck
the man, who escaped; Xenophon and Cheirisophus quarrelled over this, and
Xenophon’s slurred account of these unhappy days suggests that they were not a
memory he cared to dwell on. They were now completely lost; but, finding that
the Araxes was locally called Phasis, they thought it was the river of Colchis
and that by following it they would reach the Black Sea. They followed it
eastward for seven days before discovering their mistake; they retraced their
steps for two days and then turned north towards the country of the independent
Taochi, one of the fixed points of their route; they successfully turned the
tribesmen who were guarding the ascent, and reached the plain of Kars. Here
they found it hard to get food, for the Taochi had brought their cattle into
the fortified villages; one village gave them a desperate fight, and when taken
the women first slew their children and then themselves; even Xenophon seems to
feel that all was not quite right. How far north they went is uncertain, but
ultimately they fought their way through the mountains of the warlike Chalybes
and reached the Harpasus river; and eight days easy marching along the river
brought them to the native town of Gymnias, to which they had been so close
seven weeks before when the snow turned them. From Gymnias a road ran to
Trapezus; but the guide they got diverged from the road in order to attack a
hostile tribe. It was here, when crossing a mountain called Theches
(unidentified), that Xenophon heard a great commotion in the van and galloped
forward, thinking it was the enemy; but the men were cheering and pointing to
the distant Euxine, and crying 'Thalatta, thalatta—‘The sea, the sea.’ A few
days later they were at Trapezus.
V.
THE
TEN THOUSAND: FROM TRAPEZUS TO PERGAMUM
From the
Taochi to Trapezus they had come through tribes which had never been subject to
Persia, and west of Trapezus the one-time Persian rule had vanished; the north
of Asia Minor was an impossible country to hold from the southward, as
Alexander’s successors found. Darius’ nineteenth satrapy, which had extended
from the Macrones west of Trapezus to Paphlagonia, no longer existed; while
beyond it Corylas, the native king of Paphlagonia, was Persia’s vassal in name
only, and Bithynia was completely independent. The sea and the coastal trade
were controlled by the Greek cities of Sinope and Heraclea, Sinope having a
chain of tributary colonies—Cotyora, Cerasus, Trapezus—stretching eastward; the
once independent Amisus apparently belonged to Corylas. None of these cities,
not even Sinope, was a match for this great body of armed men which had
suddenly issued from the mountains. Trapezus was friendly, but could not supply
shipping to take them home by sea, as they hoped. She did her best; they camped
on her territory and she sent out food; she gave Cheirisophus a ship, and he
went off to Byzantium to the Spartan admiral Anaxibius in the hope of getting
transports; and when the army, on Xenophon’s proposal, decided to collect ships
for themselves by piracy, she lent them two warships. A Lacedaemonian,
Dexippus, and an Athenian were put in command. Dexippus promptly deserted and
took his ship to Byzantium; but the Athenian, more conscientious in
wrong-doing, brought in all the merchantmen he could catch. Food however ran
short, and Trapezus, fearing they would raid her subject villages, directed
their arms against a hostile tribe, the Drilae, at whose hands they nearly met
with disaster. Lack of supplies then compelled them to move on; they put the
women and baggage on ship-board and themselves marched to Cerasus; their
numbers were now reduced to 8600, which implies a loss of nearly 4000 fighting
men since leaving Cunaxa, a loss chiefly inflicted by lighter-armed tribesmen.
At Cerasus
they began to get out of hand. Danger had held them together on the march to
Trapezus; with that pressure removed, their voluntary discipline vanished, and
each section claimed to act for itself. The native villages of Cerasus’
territory were friendly, and sent food; nevertheless one company attacked a
village and was cut to pieces. The village sent ambassadors to the army, and
Xenophon accepted the good offices of the magistrates of Cerasus; but the army
murdered the ambassadors, nearly stoned a magistrate, and created such a panic
that the townspeople fled to their ships or into the sea. How Xenophon got the
army away is not recorded, but later he did persuade them to hold an enquiry,
and three officers were fined; he may have felt a certain satisfaction in
recording that Sophaenetus was one. From this time Xenophon becomes more and
more the one force making for order among these turbulent men; as an Athenian
he really was more civilized than the majority, though the ascendancy he
acquired was due to his own character.
After leaving
Cerasus they entered the land of the Mossynoeci, ‘tower-dwellers,’ who are
described as most uncivilized: they tattooed themselves and talked to
themselves out loud, and prized their children in proportion to their breadth.
Their clans were ruled by kings who lived each at the top of a wooden tower
seven stories high, whence he administered justice; he was never allowed to
come out—a well-known and widespread form of taboo. They had a supreme king in
a tower which the Greeks called Metropolis, and had conquered some iron-working
Chalybes, who acted as their blacksmiths. The Greeks found a civil war going
on; they allied themselves with the nearer clans, took the Metropolis for them,
and burnt the unhappy god-king alive in his tower. Thence they went through the
Tibareni to Cotyora; but Cotyora had heard of their doings at Cerasus and
closed her gates, and some envoys from Sinope threatened, if Cotyora’s lands
were touched, to call in Corylas and his Paphlagonians; Xenophon in reply
suggested that the Greeks might help Corylas to take Sinope, whereon the envoys
became less truculent and friendship was established. But Xenophon was so
impressed by what he heard of the difficulty of crossing the rivers Iris and
Halys that he thought it would be better if the army settled somewhere and founded
a city, obviously with himself as ‘founder’, and a design was attributed to him
of turning back and seizing Phasis; the troops nearly stoned him when they
heard of it, but he talked them back into good humour. Meanwhile some of the
leaders had discovered some wealthy merchants from Sinope and Heraclea, and by
threats extorted a promise of sufficient transports and a large sum of money.
With Corylas they made a treaty, and entertained his envoys with an exhibition
of their different national dances, ending up with a slave-girl with a little
shield who danced the Pyrrhic dance very prettily. The ships came, but not the
money, and there was more trouble before they finally went on board and sailed
to Sinope; there Cheirisophus rejoined with
the news that Anaxibius would engage and pay them when they reached the
Straits.
Their
preoccupation now was to get booty to take home, and, as they thought they
might do better under a single leader, they offered Xenophon the command, and
on his prudent refusal elected Cheirisophus. They then sailed to
Heraclea—hardly as yet the powerful state of a century later—and proposed,
against Cheirisophus’ wishes, to hold the city to ransom; Heraclea manned her
walls, Cheirisophus’ brief command ended, and the army broke up into three
fractions. One tried to raid the Bithynians, and was cut up and surrounded and
only saved—so Xenophon suggests—by the Bithynians guessing that he was coming
to the rescue. The three fractions reunited at Calpe on the Bithynian coast,
where Cheirisophus died. Meanwhile Pharnabazus, satrap of Hellespontine
Phrygia, had come to the support of the Bithynians, hoping by their aid to
prevent the Greeks entering his satrapy, and when part of the Greeks next went
out to plunder they unexpectedly met his cavalry, who slew 500 of them; there
was great alarm in the camp at Calpe, and they stood to arms all night. But
Xenophon understood that attack may be the best defence; he led out the army
next day, and for perhaps the first time in Greek history employed reserves,
stationing three companies behind the line with orders to reinforce threatened
points; they were not true reserves, as they were not under the general’s hand,
but nothing of the sort was seen again till Gaugamela. There was however no
real battle; the light-armed Bithynians drove in Xenophon’s peltasts, but were
not going to face the spear-line, and Pharnabazus confined himself to covering
his allies’ retreat, while the Greeks made little attempt to pursue, ‘for,’
says Xenophon, ‘the cavalry made them afraid’; few lives were lost, and
Xenophon’s reserves never got a chance. The Greeks returned to Calpe, and again
Xenophon seems to have thought of founding a city; but nothing came of it.
They now came
in touch with the power of Sparta. They hoped that Cleander, the Spartan
harmost (governor) of Byzantium, would come for them with a fleet; he came with
only two triremes and Dexippus, the man who had deserted from Trapezus, and
walked straight into a dispute about some captured cattle. There was the usual
riot; the army tried to stone Dexippus, and Cleander himself had to run. He was
furious at having shown fear, and threatened to have the army outlawed from
every Greek city; and for the first time Xenophon was afraid, for he knew that
Cleander had power to carry out his threat. He prevailed on the two men implicated
to surrender themselves, and Oleander behaved very well; having satisfied his
honour by securing the culprits, he forgave and released them, and promised the
army a welcome at Byzantium. The army went on to Chrysopolis near Chalcedon;
thence, at Pharnabazus’ request, Anaxibius brought them across to Byzantium,
where Xenophon proposed to leave them and remain. Anaxibius told the men they
would get their promised pay outside the city; they quitted it accordingly,
whereon he shut the gates and left them outside without money or food. When
they perceived the trick they burst a gate and forced their way in again;
Anaxibius fled to his ships, and there was universal panic, for the men were
thoroughly angry and Byzantium lay at their mercy. But Xenophon, who was still
there, went to them, persuaded them to pile arms and listen to him, and then
talked them round into leaving the city quietly without doing any damage; it
was far the greatest thing he ever did.
They left
Byzantium and camped near Perinthus, where many deserted, and the supersession
of Cleander and Anaxibius led to Xenophon joining them once more; but
Cleander’s successor was hostile, and even sold their sick whom Cleander had
humanely housed in Byzantium; and Xenophon and the 6000 who remained, left
destitute and without prospects in a Thracian midwinter, took service with
Seuthes, a dispossessed Thracian prince living by brigandage. They spent the
winter sacking villages for Seuthes from the Aegean to the Euxine, and he
cheated them of their pay; but by spring (399) the position had altered again;
Sparta had declared war on Tissaphernes and sent Thibron to Asia, and two of
Thibron’s officers came to Thrace and engaged Xenophon’s force. He took them
across to Lampsacus and led them to Pergamum, then held by his friend Gongylus,
one of a group of Greek dynasts ruling petty principalities in Aeolis; and on
Gongylus’ advice Xenophon, who was penniless, turned freebooter himself,
attacked the stronghold of a wealthy Persian landowner, and after a preliminary
repulse captured the man and all his property, securing booty enough to set him
up for life.
Here the
story of the Ten Thousand really ends, those who remained—under 6000—being
merged in Thibron’s army; they had left Cunaxa over 12,000 strong, and
(allowing liberally for desertions at Perinthus) must have had at least 5000
casualties before reaching Byzantium. Whether Xenophon stayed with them is
uncertain, but apparently his own city had no use for his considerable military
talent; he subsequently joined Agesilaus, served under him in Asia, and fought
for Sparta against Athens’ friend Thebes at Coronea (394), for which Athens
formally exiled him. Sparta, however, gave him an estate at Scillus in Elis,
then under her control, where he lived for some twenty years, hunting on the
mountains and writing many of the books which have made him famous; the
Anabasis itself may be later, between 370 and 367. He lost his estate after
Leuctra (371); but the political position then enabled Athens to recall
Sparta’s friend, and to Athens he returned, though possibly he died at Corinth.
It is tempting to apply to him Juvenal’s most famous lines: he performed a
march without precedent across savage mountains; his reward has been to become
a textbook for schoolboys.
Cyrus’
expedition has often been regarded as a prelude to Alexander’s, a view which
Arrian emphasized when he took Xenophon’s title, Anabasis, for his own
book, and outdid the list of superlatives applied by Xenophon to Cyrus with his
own more eloquent list in eulogy of Alexander. Cyrus to Xenophon was as much
the king by natural right as Alexander to Aristotle: the forces of nature do
homage to both. But the prelude must not be taken to mean too much. The march
of the Ten Thousand, though a great feat of courage and endurance, was
unfortunately useful to Isocrates’ propaganda against Persia; and Isocrates, to
prove his contention that Persians were cowards (one figures Alexander smiling
over the Panegyricus) drew a picture which has coloured much of literature
since—a picture of 6000 men, the scum of Greece, defeating the whole strength
of Asia, till Artaxerxes in despair betook himself to treachery, preferring to
face the gods rather than the Greeks, and even so failed, and the 6000 returned
home in greater security than many a friendly embassy. It is barely even the
conventional half-truth. Cyrus marched almost the whole time through friendly territory
or desert; he was defeated by an army quite unrepresentative of Persia’s
strength; only about half of the Greeks got back to Byzantium; and Xenophon,
very honestly, records their fear of the cavalry of a single satrap. As the
Greeks on their retreat were never attacked in earnest by any Persian army,
that retreat no more proved Persia helpless than the destruction of the great
Athenian expedition to the Delta had proved her invincible. Cyrus made men feel
that Persia had become accessible; but her real weakness, the fact that her
landsystem could not produce infantry capable of facing Greek hoplites, had
long been known. From the military point of view, the position as between Greek
infantry and Persian cavalry in Asia was, at best, indecisive; and the one
lesson taught by Cyrus’ expedition was that no one need hope to conquer Persia
without a cavalry force very different from any which Greece had yet envisaged.
That was the lesson which Alexander was to apply.
VI.
THE
GREAT KING AND THE SATRAPS
The internal
history of Persia from 401 to 335 BC is the story of a struggle between the
central government and its outlying provinces. The position at the end of the
struggle was, that Darius’ conquests east of the Hindu Kush and the provinces
along the south coast of the Black Sea were permanently lost, though when and
how the Indian districts secured independence is unknown; but Egypt,
independent until 343, was reconquered, the western seaboard, after many
vicissitudes, was re-incorporated in the empire, and the separatist tendencies
of the western satraps were for the time overcome. Though Darius’ empire was
not fully restored, the tradition of Persia’s weakness only partially accords
with the facts; and if she passed through a period of confusion, so did Greece.
The quarrels in Greece and Agesilaus’ abortive expedition, which are described
elsewhere convinced the Achaemenid kings, unfortunately for themselves, that no
real danger could threaten from the West; and throughout the period their preoccupation
is with Egypt, which consistently supported every revolt against them.
Meanwhile a great change was proceeding in Greece; perpetual wars, the large
number of exiles, and the absence of any outlet by colonization for the surplus
population, had enormously increased the class of Greeks ready to serve as
mercenaries; these tended to form a world by themselves, and Persia came to
depend too much upon them.
After Cunaxa
Tissaphernes began attacking the Greek cities, with the result that in spring
399 Sparta declared war on him. The successive Spartan commanders, Thibron and
Dercyllidas, freed some Aeolian towns; but the war dragged on till Conon
returned from Cyprus to Tissaphernes’ enemy Pharnabazus, and the two secured
Artaxerxes’ consent to attack Sparta seriously by sea. Then (396) Sparta sent
Agesilaus to Asia. In successive campaigns he overran Lydia, defeated
Tissaphernes before Sardes, penetrated inland to Paphlagonia, and wasted
Pharnabazus’ satrapy. He had no plans beyond plunder, and only met the coastal
satraps; but he brought about Tissaphernes’ fall and death, Artaxerxes
surrendering the man who had saved his throne to Parysatis, who thus
annihilated Hydarnes’ line and avenged Cyrus. Pharnabazus, however, by lavish
subsidies, raised a Greek league against Sparta; in 394 Agesilaus was recalled,
and in the same year Conon and Pharnabazus defeated the Spartan fleet off
Cnidus, and restored the Long Walls at Athens. In 389 Conon’s friend Evagoras
of Salamis, who had hellenized his city, revolted with support from Athens and
Achoris of Egypt, and mastered Cyprus. Meanwhile Sparta had come to realize
that she could not maintain her position without Persian support; after much
intriguing her envoy Antalcidas secured this, and in 386 Athens was compelled
to accept the shameful ‘King’s Peace,’ dictated to the Greek states by the
King. The Asiatic Greek cities, and Cyprus, were abandoned to Persia; the
provision that all other Greek cities should be independent, and that any who
did not accept the peace would be compelled by Persia to do so, made Persia the
arbiter of Greece, with the right of perpetual interference. It was the
greatest success in the West which Persia ever achieved.
With Sparta
firmly bound to Persia, Artaxerxes was free to attack Egypt; but this obscure
war (385—3) brought him no success, while Egypt’s ally Evagoras raised
Phoenicia against him. Thereon he changed his plans, and in 381, after great
preparations, attacked Evagoras. Evagoras’ fleet was defeated by the Persian
admiral Glos off Citium, and he was shut up in Salamis. Achoris deserted him,
but he succeeded in playing off the Persian commanders Tiribazus and Orontes
against each other; Orontes gave him good terms (380) and he kept his kingdom
as Persia’s vassal. Artaxerxes then collected an army to attack Egypt, now
ruled by Nectanebo I, the Egyptian Nakhtenebef, and gave the command to the
Carian Datames, satrap of Cappadocia, who had just conquered Paphlagonia and
Sinope, and again carried Persian arms to the Black Sea. Datames, however, was
first diverted to the reconquest of Cataonia and then removed; he had been too
successful to please the jealous king. Pharnabazus succeeded him and in 374
invaded Egypt; but he quarrelled with the leader of his mercenaries, the
Athenian Iphicrates, and the expedition failed. In 367, thanks to Pelopidas,
Persia abandoned Sparta for Thebes, henceforth her most consistent friend in
Greece.
Datames had
fled to Cappadocia, and defied all efforts to subdue him; he was practically
independent, with his capital at Sinope, whence he controlled the coastal
trade. His success brought on the Satraps’ Revolt. About 366 Ariobarzanes of
Hellespontine Phrygia rose, followed by Orontes, who was hereditary satrap of
Armenia; Mausolus, the native dynast and satrap of Caria, now a separate
satrapy, secretly favoured them. Many Greek cities, and most of the coast
peoples from Syria to Lydia, also revolted; and when Autophradates of Lydia, at
first loyal, had to join, Persia seemed cut off from the sea. Orontes, who was
of royal blood, had the supreme command; as he coined gold, he was possibly
aiming at the throne. Finally Tachos of Egypt, Nectanebo’s successor, supported
the rebels, and as Persia stood with Thebes, Athens and Sparta aided Tachos;
Agesilaus took command of his army, and the Athenian Chabrias of his fleet.
Chabrias showed him how to raise money by holding the priestly colleges to
ransom, and he prepared to invade Syria. But the satraps were united by no
principle and distrusted each other, and treachery served Artaxerxes where the
sword had failed; Orontes came over, and received Mysia and the coast as a
reward; Datames was assassinated, and Ariobarzanes betrayed and crucified; in
359 a revolt in Egypt replaced Tachos by his son Nectanebo II (the Egyptian
Nakht- horehbe). Autophradates and Mausolus made their peace and kept their
satrapies; Phoenicia and the coast peoples must have made their peace also, but
Paphlagonia, Northern Cappadocia, and Pontus were definitely lost. The Greek
towns suffered in the war, and some fell into the hands of tyrants.
By 360 or 359
the revolt was over; and between December 359 and March 358 Artaxerxes died in
peace, at an advanced age. Greek writers call him mild and magnanimous; his
acts reveal him as sensual and weak, cruel and faithless. He sacrificed the
enemies of Cyrus to his mother, the friends to his wife; to succeed in his
service was more fatal than to fail, as Tissaphernes and Datames found. He left
Persia weaker; for the recent troubles had not really been liquidated. He built
the great throne-room at Susa; and his reign has a certain religious
significance, for he introduced Asiatic polytheism into Zoroastrianism, raising
temples to the nature-goddess Anaitis in the chief cities of his empire and
establishing the Sacaean festival.
VII.
ARTAXERXES
III AND THE RECONQUEST OF EGYPT
His son
Artaxerxes III (Ochus), who succeeded him after putting his numerous brothers
to death, was cruel enough; but he possessed energy and a policy, and was
efficient up to a point. The source of the late troubles was the right which
the satraps had long arrogated of waging private war; he dealt firmly with
this, and in 356 ordered them to disband their private armies. Most obeyed, and
again became subordinates. Two only refused: Artabazus, who had succeeded
Ariobarzanes in Hellespontine Phrygia, and Orontes. Artabazus had relations
with Egypt as brother-in-law of the Rhodian Mentor, who commanded Nectanebo’s
mercenaries; Athens too at first supported him, but was frightened off when
Ochus sent an ultimatum. Then in 353 he obtained help from Thebes; but after
some preliminary success he was beaten and fled with Mentor’s brother Memnon to
Philip of Macedonia. Why Thebes changed sides is obscure. Whether Orontes
remained in arms is uncertain; in any case, Ochus thought that his rear was now
sufficiently secure for him to attack Egypt. He invaded Egypt (probably in 351,
but the date is very uncertain) by the dangerous sea-road along the great
Serbonian bog, lost part of his army, and had to return; his failure was the
signal for renewed risings. The Athenian commanders at the Hellespont offered
Orontes help; most of Cyprus, led by Salamis, revolted, together with part of
Phoenicia, where Ochus had been mad enough to ill-treat the Sidonians; Tennes
(Tabnit) of Sidon allied himself with Nectanebo, who sent him Mentor and 4000
mercenaries. Ochus again secured the friendship of Thebes by a subsidy for the
Sacred War, and possibly that of Philip of Macedonia, and somehow isolated
Orontes, who apparently lost Mysia but managed to retire to Armenia. Cyprus was
ultimately reduced by Idrieus, Mausolus’ successor in Caria, aided by the
Athenian Phocion with 8000 mercenaries, and one Pnytagoras installed at
Salamis; but the satraps detailed to reduce Sidon were defeated, and Ochus took
command himself. Apparently in 347 he diverted Sidon’s traffic to Ake; but
Sidon itself he did not take till 345, the captives for his harem reaching
Babylon in October. The tradition says that Tennes, having won over Mentor,
finally betrayed the city, but the people fired it and destroyed it and
themselves. Sidon, however, if damaged, was soon restored; but, except for Tyre
(which gained by Sidon’s overthrow), Phoenicia remained disaffected at heart,
as did much of Cyprus, hampering Persia at sea. Mentor and his mercenaries
entered the Great King’s service.
In 343 Ochus,
his rear secure at last, again prepared to attack Egypt, and sent envoys to
Greece for assistance. Thebes, in return for his subsidy, gave him 1000 men,
Argos 3000, and the Asiatic Greeks 6000. Athens refused aid, but promised
friendship, provided he did not attack Greek cities; that is, she undertook not
to help the Egyptians. Ochus invaded Egypt that winter. Nectanebo held the
river line (the Pelusiac arm of the Nile) with a strong force of Greek
mercenaries; but Ochus had the sense to give his Greek generals a free hand,
while Nectanebo did not. Mentor sowed distrust between Greeks and Egyptians;
Nectanebo abandoned the river line before it was really forced, and retired to
Memphis; and Ochus mastered the country, but outraged Egyptian sentiment by
violating temples and killing the Apis calf. Nectanebo vanished into Ethiopia,
to reappear in Egyptian romance as the father of Alexander, the avenger of Egypt
on the Persians.
The conquest
of Egypt made Mentor and his fellow-general Bagoas the Chiliarch, who worked
together, the most important forces in Persia; the Chiliarch, commander of the
Guard, had now really become Grand Vizier. Mentor was appointed general on the
coast and proceeded to reduce various petty dynasts in Asia Minor; late in 342
he captured and sent to Ochus Hermeias, tyrant of Atarneus and Assos, the
friend of Aristotle, who married his niece and had lived at his court till 344,
when he went to Mitylene. Hermeias had relations with Philip; and Aristotle’s
nephew Callisthenes, in his panegyric on Hermeias, said that he refused to
reveal Philip’s plans to Ochus, and was executed, showing great constancy.
Certainly Aristotle wrote an ode in his honour and dedicated his statue at
Delphi. But very different accounts of Hermeias were also current (for, like
Callisthenes himself later, he became a battleground for opposing interests),
and it may be doubted if Ochus thought much about Philip’s plans, or regarded
Macedonia in a different light from the various Greek states; for, though he
helped to prevent Philip taking Perinthus in 340, he refused Athens’ request
for a subsidy for the war against Philip, and let Athens and Thebes fall
unsupported at Chaeronea, a terrible blunder. Whatever his grievance against
Athens for her refusal of help in 343, Thebes was his friend, and since 342 he
had the power to intervene, had he desired.
Mentor had
procured the recall of Artabazus and Memnon; he died before 338, and Memnon
took over his mercenaries, but not his extensive powers. In the summer of that
year Bagoas poisoned Ochus and made his son Arses king. Ochus had had great
success, but he was no statesman; he left his successors to face Macedonia with
Phoenicia disaffected and Athens and Thebes
crushed. In 336 Bagoas poisoned Arses, and set up as king a collateral, Darius
III Codomannus, who promptly poisoned Bagoas, the best thing he did.
Nothing had
happened in the 65 years since Cunaxa to show that Persia was too weak to
resist a serious invasion, especially if anything should arouse Iranian
national sentiment. It was however a noteworthy phenomenon that some of the
coastal dynasts, like Mausolus the Carian and Hermeias the Paphlagonian, had
perhaps begun to foreshadow Hellenism, i.e. the extension of Greek culture to
Asiatics. Hermeias established a coterie of philosophers at Assos, and in the
‘companions’ who shared his power some have traced the influence of philosophic
ideas, though others consider them his partners in business. Mausolus certainly
adopted Greek elements; he enlarged Halicarnassus by a synoecism of
neighbouring towns in Hellenic fashion, and the Mausoleum, the tomb built for
him by his widow Artemisia, was a great Greek work of art. But these were
externals; in spirit the satrap Mausolus remained an Asiatic, and did not
always know how to conciliate the Greeks under his rule. The strongest link
between Greece and Persia was forged by the mercenaries; this outer Hellenic
fringe caused many in Greece to regard Persia as their champion against
Macedonia, and probably even contributed elements to the literary tradition
about Alexander.
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