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HISTORY OF THE POPES FROM THE CLOSE OF THE MIDDLE AGES

BOOK V

POPE PIUS II, A.D.1458-1464

 

CHAPTER V.

ATTEMPTED RECONCILIATION OF BOHEMIA WITH THE CHURCH

 

The opposition to the authority of the Holy See in both France and Germany proceeded from the Princes and men of learning, and was schismatical rather than heretical in its character. In Bohemia, however, the case was different, and the movement was all the more dangerous because most of the people had become alienated from the teaching of the Church.

In the summer of 1451, as Nuncio in Bohemia, Pius II had been able, from personal observation, to judge what deep roots these anti-Papal sentiments had taken in the nation. The so-called Compact, concluded in 1433, between the Bohemians and the Synod of Basle, had soon proved an absolutely insufficient basis for the establishment of a true and lasting peace. The Basle party to whom it was of the utmost importance to gain a palpable advantage over Eugenius IV, acted with as little good faith as the Bohemians. The document which granted the chalice to the laity was amply furnished with evasive clauses, and the Bohemians took it as a simple confirmation of their heresy with all its varying doctrines, forms and rites, without troubling themselves as to the exact import of the articles. On the 5th July, 1436, the Compact was published at the Diet at Iglan in Sigismund’s presence, but on the very next day fresh differences regarding the administration of the Sacrament arose between Rokyzana and the Legate from Basle, and they parted without being able to agree. No formal decision was given for a long time with regard to a great many of the disputed points, and no agreement was ever arrived at in regard to the reception of the Eucharist by children. Both parties were interested in ostentatiously misrepresenting the Compact. The Council acted as if the Bohemians had submitted, and the Bohemians as if their heresy had been sanctioned.

The concessions contained in the Compact were accepted by the Utraquists, but the accompanying conditions and obligations were utterly disregarded. Accordingly the Utraquist Clergy, while administering the Blessed Sacrament under both kinds to the laity, neglected to remind them that Christ was wholly and entirely present in each species, although the Compact plainly required them to do so. The conditions which bound them to conform to the Church in other matters of Dogma and Ritual were no better observed; they continued to deny the Catholic doctrine regarding Purgatory, Prayers for the Dead, Indulgences, and the use of images of the Saints. In 1448 the Councillors of Prague went so far as to forbid the private or public administration of the Sacrament of the Eucharist under one kind, at the same time proclaiming “with curious logic”, that the Compact was to be maintained inviolate! The meaning of all this was made clear when negotiations with the Byzantine Schismatics were set on foot. In this same year, 1448, the Catholic Cathedral Chapter and all the German Professors and students were compelled to leave Prague because they would not recognize Rokyzana, who had not received Archiepiscopal confirmation from Rome. Utraquism ruled supreme in the Bohemian capital. From the pulpit of the Teyn Church, Rokyzana could, without let or hindrance, abuse the Roman Church and proclaim the Pope to be closely connected with the Beast in the Apocalypse.

Thus it will be seen that the Compact had long been broken before Rome formally annulled it. The Holy See had always abstained from any recognition of the agreement entered into with the Synod of Basle. Throughout the weary period of the contest with the Conciliar Party the Popes had silently tolerated the exceptional position of affairs in Bohemia, while they clearly perceived that its continuance would constitute a danger to the Church.

The action of Rome in annulling the Compact was amply justified by the practical working of the treaty which proved more and more adverse to Catholic interests, while an Utraquist Church was growing up with the granting of the Chalice to the laity as its distinctive symbol. It was plain that no less decided measures would suffice to reunite Bohemia to the Church. But all efforts in this direction were frustrated by the fanaticism of the Czechs in regard to Communion under both kinds.

Better days seemed to dawn with the accession of George Podiebrad to the throne. His abjuration of the Hussite heresy and his Coronation Oath must have awakened hopes in Rome, that with his assistance the nation might be brought back to Unity. But his habitual duplicity was not laid aside in his dealings with the Apostolic See. Previously to his Coronation he had solemnly sworn, before two Catholic Bishops and a small number of witnesses, not only to be himself loyal and obedient to the Church and her Head, but also to bring his people back from all errors and heresies to complete obedience to the Roman Church, and union with Rome in ritual and worship. This oath was thoroughly Catholic, and left no room for any Utraquistic interpretation. It abandoned the Compact; nevertheless, the King made no difficulty in swearing to maintain the privileges of the Bohemian kingdom, amongst which the Utraquists reckoned this agreement. It was evident that he was aware of the contradiction between these two oaths from the pains which he took to keep both his abjuration of heresy and the Coronation Oath a profound secret.

It was only to be expected that double-dealing of this kind would sooner or later bring its own punishment. The non-fulfilment of his Coronation Oath exposed the King to the well-merited reproaches of the Holy See, while the attempt to redeem his solemn promise was equivalent to a declaration of war against the Utraquists, who were his most important partisans. All Podiebrad’s ingenuity was accordingly exercised in postponing the decisive moment when he must lay aside the mask and openly declare himself for or against Rome, in the meantime deriving all possible advantage from his ambiguous position.

At first things went better than he could have expected. In the beginning he had stipulated that time should be allowed him for the fulfilment of his promises, and this made it the more easy for him to put off the Holy See. Moreover, circumstances were taken into account at Rome, and the King was not pressed to hurry on the work of reunion.

In order to keep the Papal Court in good humour, George Podiebrad at once took up the question which was justly considered as the most important of the day, and as a matter of life or death to Christendom. He had already made splendid promises to the aged Pope, Calixtus III, in regard to the Turkish War, and he now continued to speak in the same tone to Pius II. It is not surprising, therefore, that it was determined in Consistory to send the Bohemian King an invitation to the Congress at Mantua, similar to that which was addressed to the other Christian Princes. Podiebrad lost no time in making use of this Brief, in which the Pope addressed him as “dear son”, for his own profit, and, as a matter of fact, the “little letter” brought many cities and districts to his feet. But, on the other hand, these evidences of friendly relations with Rome incited Rokyzana to fresh attacks upon the Catholics. By the instigation of this leader, Decrees were published in 1459, in the Utraquist districts, to the effect that no one should enter into possession of an inheritance, or acquire property unless he bound himself by oath to live and die in the use of the Chalice. Marriage in the Church and burial in consecrated ground, the right of citizenship in Prague and of admission to the Corporation, as well as the power of exercising a handicraft were all made dependent on the same condition. The great influence possessed by Rokyzana, as head of the Utraquist party, induced the King to tolerate, if not to sanction, this Edict which was equivalent to a breach of the Compact. If Pius II took account of these circumstances, and attributed the Edict to Rokyzana, and not to the King, yet he was evidently aware that the Bohemian monarch was playing the same game with him that he had so long carried on with his predecessor, Calixtus. The solemn Embassy, which had been empowered to complete the Union promised to that Pontiff, never arrived. By holding out expectations and making empty promises, George sought to obtain from the Holy See a full recognition of his position, and at the same time to avoid any step which would compromise him before the Hussites. He was most anxious that the validity of his title should be acknowledged by the whole Catholic world at the approaching Congress, if he made up his mind to send representatives there. But the Pope demanded a complete and public profession of obedience in his own name and that of the kingdom of Bohemia, and George did not think it possible to go so far. Accordingly, in February, 1459, Provost John of Rabenstein was sent to the Papal Court to promise obedience to the Pope in the name of the King and the Royal family, but not in that of the king­dom, and this act was to be performed in a Secret Consistory. Pius II continued firm in his determination not to recognize George publicly as King until he should have made a public profession of obedience.

The Congress which had now just opened at Mantua gave Podiebrad a very favourable opportunity for treating with the Pope. Pius II, whose mind was almost exclusively engrossed by the Turkish War, here experienced the first great disappointment of his Pontificate. The more indifferent the Christian Princes in general appeared in this matter, the greater was the apparent zeal on the part of Podiebrad. He announced the speedy arrival of his Envoys, and broadly hinted that he hoped to stifle the arrogance of the Hussites, and wipe out the stain of heresy in the war against the Turks. The effect of this crafty policy was to induce Pius II. to modify his attitude. In his answer to the announcement that Bohemian Envoys would appear at the Congress, he for the first time, without circumlocution, styled George, King, begging him to come in person to Mantua, or to send Ambassadors; and further explained that if Rabenstein had not been received as a Royal Envoy, it was because he had come in a private manner.

Podiebrad neither came in person nor sent representatives to the Congress, excusing himself on the plea that until he was lord over all his subjects, he could undertake no step in the matter of union. This had reference especially to the people of Breslau, who withheld their allegiance on the ground that he was a heretic. In the beginning of September, Jerome Lando, Archbishop of Crete, and Francis of Toledo were sent to Silesia to settle this difference. As they were also to treat of the Turkish War and the reconciliation of Bohemia with the Church, they went, in the first instance, to Prague. Here George used every effort to win over the Papal Nuncios, and was completely successful. At Breslau, where he was hated more as a Czech than a heretic, they experienced considerable difficulty. At length, however, they were able to bring about a settlement, and it was arranged that, after the expiration of three years, homage should be rendered to him as a Catholic King.

The last remaining antagonism to Podiebrad was thus removed by Papal intervention. The King was lavish in expressions of gratitude, and declared that nothing lay nearer to his heart than the reconciliation of Bohemia with the Church, and the war against the Turks. But his deeds did not correspond with his words. Month after month went by, yet his Envoys did not arrive at Mantua. The delay necessarily awakened distrust in the mind of the Pope, who, unable any longer to conceal his impatience, sent the Royal Procurator, Fantino de Valle, who was at the time in Rome, to Prague to remonstrate with Podiebrad. But the Bohemian monarch contrived so thoroughly to convince this messenger of his sincerity that from henceforth he became his most ardent defender in Rome. On the 12th September, 1460, the King assured the Pope that he adhered with unchanging fidelity to his oath; his delay arose from the difficulties of his position, but in the following February at the latest his Embassy would arrive to do homage; his sincere desire was by prudence to prepare the way for the restoration of the true faith.

Meanwhile, in reality George’s mind was occupied with matters of a very different nature. He sought to win the Crown of Germany, and as, with this object in view, he entered into a close alliance with the anti-Papal party there, he naturally again aroused the suspicions of the Roman Court; when this project failed, he next conceived the bold idea of becoming King of the Romans with the help of the Pope. Had Podiebrad really been a champion and Martyr of the Hussites, as some prejudiced historians have represented, it would have been impossible for him to have cherished such a- scheme as this. In reality his religious convictions, as far as the term has any meaning as applied to a man of his stamp, always retired out of sight whenever his political interest or his schemes of personal aggrandizement required them to disappear.

Accordingly he now offered his services to Pius II, against the German opponents of the Papacy, formerly his own political friends, for he really cared as little about a rearrangement of ecclesiastical affairs in Germany as about the so-called reform of the Empire. This is proved by the Instruction for treating with the Pope, a draft which, though never seen by Pius II, is still a most important document. How, it may be asked, did George intend to win the Pope to his views? By nothing less than the reunion of Bohemia with the Church. He declared himself ready to consent that the Pope should appoint an Archbishop of Prague, or invest a worthy ecclesiastic with Archiepiscopal powers until such time as one should be lawfully appointed. If Pius II would send a qualified Legate to Bohemia, the King, conjointly with the Administrator of the Archdiocese, would find means to restore the unity of faith in the kingdom without bloodshed. Nor would he have any difficulty in publicly and solemnly doing homage and professing obedience to the Holy See in the name of his whole kingdom, as his predecessors had done before him. The severe measures taken by the King against the smaller sects in his kingdom (from March, 1461) seemed in harmony with these professions. The Utraquists became very uneasy, and the storm broke when, on Maundy Thursday, 1461, the Bishop of Breslau, of course in the absence of the wily Podiebrad, preached openly in the Castle of Prague against the administration of the Chalice to the laity. It now became evident that Rokyzana, supported by the Utraquist mob, was more powerful than the King, who, while stretching out his hand to grasp the Roman Crown, felt the ground beginning to give way under his feet. The excitement in Bohemia reached such a pitch that he deemed it prudent to abandon his hopes of the crown, and unreservedly to recognize Utraquism. An extraordinary Diet was assembled at Prague in the month of May, at which he solemnly promised to maintain the use of the Chalice for the laity, and also the Compact.

Meanwhile Podiebrad had come to be thoroughly distrusted in Rome. “If the Bohemian Envoys do not soon arrive” wrote the faithful Fantino, “your Majesty will be disgraced; all now look on me as a liar”. A letter of safe-conduct for the Bohemians had been issued on the 30th June, 1461, but still no one came. Pius II waited yet another half-year, and at the end of that time his patience was at length exhausted. On the 1st January, 1462, he wrote to the Archbishop of Crete, whom he had sent to Vienna, Prague, and Breslau, and empowered him, in case the King should still delay to carry out his obligations as to the question of faith, indefinitely to postpone the submission of the citizens of Breslau. He was also to bring about an alliance against the King between that city and all the neighbouring powers, both within Silesia and beyond it, and pronounce void all contrary oaths, promises and agreements.

At length, after three years of delay, Podiebrad made up his mind to send the Embassy. Its object was twofold, to do homage to the Pope in the name of the kingdom of Bohemia, and at the same time to ask for the confirmation of the compact! Its composition was in harmony with its purpose, for it had two chiefs—the Catholic Chancellor Procopius von Rabenstein, and the Hussite, Zdenko Kostka, of Postupitz. Two Utraquist theologians, Wenzel Wrbensky and Wenzel Koranda, were among its members, and most of our information regarding the ensuing events is derived from the reports of these last.

The Envoys travelled slowly southwards, passing through Vienna, where Wolfgang Forchtenauer joined them as the representative of the Emperor. They reached Rome on the 10th of March. Here the general feeling was very unfavourable to the King. It was well-known that he only adopted this line of action because his plans had failed in Germany. Cardinal Cusa, whom the Pope had charged to examine the Bohemian affairs, was full of distrust. Pius II himself, on the 11th of March, told the Milanese Ambassador in confidence that “the semi-heretical King of Bohemia was utterly untrustworthy, and had been a dissimulator from his childhood”. No more unfortunate moment could have been selected by George for obtaining concessions which had hitherto been steadily refused by the Papal Court. The whole position of ecclesiastical and political affairs had apparently changed greatly to the advantage of the restored Papacy. Sigismund of the Tyrol persevered in his revolt, but the Archbishop of Mainz was virtually subdued, the German Conciliar party was broken up, and now the King of France was abandoning the Pragmatic Sanction. By a strange coincidence the Bohemian Ambassadors arrived just in time to witness this fresh triumph of the Papacy. In a private interview, Cardinal Bessarion at once pointed out to them the splendid example of Louis XI, who had renounced the Pragmatic Sanction; “and you must know”, he added, “that in France one hundred and one Bishops, many great Abbeys, and a large number of the Clergy opposed this measure with all their might, but the King’s determination carried it through. You see what renown he has gained by this. Your King has only to act in a similar manner to obtain a like reward”.

On Friday, the 19th March, Kostka, the most confidential Councillor of King George, was summoned alone into the Pope’s presence. In this interview Pius II vainly endeavoured to convince the Bohemian Baron that the Compact was no longer valid, inasmuch as the generation to which it had been granted had nearly died out; moreover the Bohemians had violated it in many ways, and thus forfeited all right to it.

On the following day the Envoys had their audience. After an introductory discourse from the Imperial Pleni­potentiary Forchtenauer, Chancellor Rabenstein spoke, excusing his master's long delay and proffering the profession of obedience in his name. Upon this the Pope remarked, “You make the profession of obedience in the King’s name alone, whereas it is customary to make it in the name of the kingdom”. The Chancellor hesitated, and did not venture to satisfy the Pope until Kostka, who was standing near him, had given his consent. Pius II then asked if they had anything further to say, whereupon Professor Wenzel Koranda, who was opposite the Pope, began his address. “He spoke rapidly in a loud voice, and in the bold and arrogant tone which was usual among the Hussite preachers and disputants”. His long discourse culminated in a request that the Pope would confirm the Compact.

The Utraquist Professor in his conceit imagined that he had acquitted himself brilliantly; but the impression left upon his Roman audience was that the Bohemian movement was, as it had formerly been, a revolutionary one, and that its spirit was thoroughly antireligious. Its dangers were more clearly perceived than they had been, and there was a stronger conviction of the necessity of eradicating it at any cost. He was not ashamed, wrote one who had been present at the audience, to maintain before these learned fathers that Communion in both kinds was necessary to salvation, being in accordance with the ap­pointment of Jesus Christ; much of what he said was not to the point, and indeed simply ridiculous.

Pius II at once replied. Well acquainted as he was with Bohemian affairs he had no difficulty in thoroughly confuting his adversary. His address lasted two hours. He went back to the origin of the State of Bohemia and its conversion to Christianity. He painted in glowing colours the intellectual and material prosperity of the country, and the happiness of the nation in the 13th and 14th centuries, while it remained in the unity of the Faith and enjoyed the blessings of a truly Christian life. Then, turning to the period since the rise of the Hussite heresy, he pointed out the contrast. The country was devastated. Learning had fallen into decay, and the political power of the nation was weakened, and its internal peace destroyed by the division of the people into two bitterly hostile religious bodies. The Compact, he said, was the melancholy symbol of this confusion. It had never been formally acknowledged by the Church, and on that very account was strenuously supported by the Hussites. Far from being a means for the restoration of a union between Bohemia and the Church, and of internal peace which the Holy See so earnestly desired, it was the chief hindrance in the way.

The question to be considered, therefore, was not how these articles might be confirmed, but how they might be set aside, and as the matter was one of the greatest importance, out of respect for the King, the Pope wished to take counsel with the Cardinals before giving a final answer to the Envoys.

Fresh negotiations took place between the Bohemians and a Commission of Cardinals, but with no result. It was only agreed that Rome should send a Legate to Bohemia to treat with the King of matters for which the Envoys had no powers.

Meanwhile Pius II had determined to draw out the logical conclusions which followed from the profession of obedience. On the 31st March an open Consistory was held in the presence of four thousand persons. In calm and unimpassioned language, the Pope explained the reasons which made it impossible for him to recognize the Compact. It had only, he said, been agreed to on certain conditions. The Chalice had been granted to the laity on the understanding that in every other matter they should conform to the Church; this condition had never been fulfilled, and therefore the concession which depended on it did not hold. “We, with our brethren the Cardinals, have revised the copies of that agreement and found, and hereby publicly declare, that your priests cannot lawfully give the Chalice to the laity. You have, indeed, requested us to grant permission, but this is for many reasons impossible. In the first place, our predecessors have constantly refused to do so, and the concession would give scandal to the rest of Christendom. In the second place, it would be prejudicial to you, for there would be danger of encouraging a heretical belief that Christ is not wholly present under one species. A third reason is the risk of spilling the Precious Blood on the ground, which has often happened in former times. Fourthly, the unity and peace of your kingdom would be endangered, for the majority of the Bohemians will not hear of Communion under both kinds. Concessions cannot be required from those who are walking in the footsteps of their forefathers, but rather from those who have turned aside to novelties. Fifthly, should we accede to your desires, your good relations with your neighbours would be imperilled. You do not know what a hurtful thing you are asking. As a faithful shepherd guards his sheep that they may not stray, so are We bound to watch that the nations do not wander from the way of salvation. Because We desire your salvation therefore We refuse your request. Unite yourselves with the rest of Christendom, and the glory and peace of former days will again return to your kingdom”.

When the Pope had concluded his speech, Antonio da Gubbio, Commissary for matters of Faith, read the following declaration:—“The Compact which the Council of Basle granted to the Utraquists is annulled and abolished; Communion under both kinds is not necessary to salvation; the Holy Father will not recognize the obedience professed in the name of the King of Bohemia, until both the King and the nation shall have conformed to the Catholic Church in every particular”.

The abolition of the Compact was a most important step, and was not determined upon without anxious deliberation on the part of the Holy See. The matter did not admit of further delay: “now that the reforms of Basle had been almost universally repudiated, the Compact would have been a scandal to the other nations, and a constant danger of schism and heresy to the Bohemians”. Moreover, the Compact had been intended to bring about the reunion of Bohemia with the Church, in return for the grant of the Chalice to the laity; the Bohemians, however, used it as an instrument for the destruction of all conformity with the Church. What right had they now to complain of the repeal of an agreement which they had themselves so often broken and so greatly abused? Was the Compact, as it was now interpreted, the same as that made by the Council of Basle? Was not this request for its confirmation equivalent to a demand for the sanction of the abuses which had been practiced by its means?

Podiebrad did not at once stand up to defend the Compact, but let a considerable time pass before he declared himself. His position had from the first been a false one, since in his secret Coronation Oath he had promised that it should be abolished. It had now become impossible for him to fulfil his engagement. Hitherto the existence of this Oath had been concealed from all but a few confidential persons. In May the Pope resolved to make it more widely known. By this means pressure would be brought to bear upon George, for Pius II still hoped that the King could be induced to submit. If he could be persuaded to set the example by conforming to the Catholic ritual, the people were sure to follow. Such was the spirit of the instructions given to Fantino de Valle, formerly Procurator to the King, when he was sent to Prague. Fantino had up to this time confidently maintained in Rome that the King intended to fulfil his Coronation Oath. Who could be better fitted now to call upon him to redeem his word?

The Legate reached Prague in the fourth week after Easter, but had to wait a long time for an audience from the King, who hoped by delay to strengthen and improve his position. He was at this time much occupied with an extravagant project suggested to him by Antoine Marini, a Frenchman, who had recently entered his service. The fundamental idea of Marini's scheme was that all Christian Princes and nations would never cease to cling to Rome and be loyal to her as long as the Holy See alone took thought for the defence of Christendom against the advance of the Turk. The Turkish question must therefore be taken out of the hands of the Pope. It was to be solved, and the pacification of Christendom was to be secured by a grand Alliance to be concluded between Bohemia, Poland Hungary, France, Burgundy, and Venice. The Holy See, was thus to be deprived of its European influence, and George was to obtain the Imperial Crown of Byzantium. A General Council, moreover, was to assemble to reform the Church, that is to say, to depose the Pope and confirm the Compact. The plan also included an International Court of Justice, and a Parliament of States, in which, apparently, the French King was to preside, and which was to settle all disputes among the Confederates.

This wild project, which aimed at revolutionizing the whole political system of Europe, found little favour at the different Courts. Casimir of Poland, indeed, who was involved in a serious contest with the Pope regarding the appointment of the Bishop of Cracow, developed a sudden zeal for the war against the Infidel. But the powerful Republic of Venice, although at the time somewhat at variance with Rome on account of Malatesta, was utterly opposed to the exclusion of the Holy See from the Turkish war. The Duke of Burgundy, who was friendly to the Pope, showed no disposition to let himself be beguiled by Marini. Louis XI treated him with more courtesy; an alliance between France and Bohemia might be useful for bringing pressure to bear on Pius II, but the Council was rejected by the French monarch, and he was by no means overzealous in promoting a scheme by which Podiebrad would be the chief gainer.

Meanwhile diplomatic action on the side of Rome had also commenced. It was characterized by a far greater unity of purpose and practical efficiency than that of its opponents, being based upon fixed principles and real existing relations. Fantino had now received special powers enabling him to enter into alliances with the Catholic Lords of Bohemia, the Silesian Princes and the Bishop of Breslau, and to treat more fully with the City. Next came the publication of the Secret Coronation Oath.

This was a well-considered step; if the King kept his promises the Document revealed only that which all the world might know; if he did not, it convicted him of perjury and duplicity. The Czech monarch preferred the latter alternative.

On the 12th of August, 1462, negotiations were opened at Prague with the Court, which had been transferred thither, and Podiebrad, emboldened by the improvement in his position, determined to lay aside the mask by which, at the time of his election and Coronation, he had sought to gain the Pope, the Bishops, and the Catholic Party. He now formally and solemnly declared himself an Utraquist. He concluded his speech on that day with the following words:—“Let all men know that we have been born, brought up, and by the Grace of God have ascended the Throne in the practice of Communion under both kinds. We are resolved to maintain it, and to live and die in it. Our Consort, our Children, and all who love us must likewise uphold the Compact”.

George’s speech had a twofold object: first, by a strong demonstration in favour of the grant of the Chalice to the laity, he meant to secure the Utraquists, and secondly, to take the Catholics by surprise. He hoped to raise his own personal quarrel to the rank of a question of State, and to obtain the sanction of the nation for his double-dealing. He completely failed, though Kostka, as the spokesman of the Utraquists, promised unconditional adhesion, Zdenko of Sternberg, the leader of the Catholics, declared that in temporal matters they would render obedience to him, but they had never had anything to do with the Compact. He had taken it up without asking their advice; let those now help him who had counselled the step.

On the 13th August Fantino was admitted to the King's presence, but he was not given the rank of a Papal Nuncio. He began by claiming the freedom of speech conceded to Ambassadors, well aware that in the King's present temper an appeal to the right of nations was by no means superfluous. He then enlarged on the absolute necessity of the abolition of the Compact, and insisted that, in virtue of his Coronation Oath and of his profession of Obedience, Podiebrad was bound to carry out the reunion of Bohemia with the Church. If we may believe the Breslau chronicler, who from his party position was deeply interested in the course of these events, the Catholics were much encouraged by the clear and practical discourse of the Legate, which made an impression also on the advocates of the Chalice. Had Girsik (George), says the chronicler, but said the five words, “I will obey the Pope”, the whole nation would have stood by him. The King, however, bluntly rejected the demand of the Papal Legate. It had never crossed his mind, he said, to abolish the Compact; on the contrary, he meant to live and die in it.

If we remember how firm a champion Fantino had hitherto been of George’s good faith, we can understand the shock which the Legate must have received on hearing this cynical denial of his obligations. He stood speechless for a moment, as if stunned by a blow. Then he reminded the King of his engagement, adding that if he persisted in adhering to this declaration he might justly be charged with perjury. The King angrily interrupted him, but the Nuncio was not to be intimidated. In a louder tone he proclaimed all ecclesiastics who held to the Compact to have forfeited their posts; should the King and his family persist in their error they too would incur the penalties of the Church. As he had himself become the King’s Procurator in the firm belief that he would give up the Compact and Communion under both kinds, he now resigned his office.

For a moment it seemed as if the King, who was pale with rage, would have sprung upon his adversary, and it was with some difficulty that he at length controlled himself sufficiently to allow Fantino to depart. But as soon as he was gone his wrath burst forth afresh; he would not live another moment without avenging himself; Rome was not the Holy See, but a plague spot; the Holy See was formed by the union of all the faithful, and that was certainly not to be found in Rome.

The effect produced by the uncompromising attitude of the Champion of the Roman Church can hardly be overestimated. It was, indeed, long since such words had been heard in Bohemia! Many a one, while adhering to the Chalice, had deemed himself by virtue of the Compact a good Catholic Christian. Now he found both it and himself condemned by the Pope. Many another, while rejecting the Chalice, had, for the sake of peace, held fellowship with those who received it, and now it appeared that the Pope judged such peace and fellowship a sin. Decision and courage in the defenders of a cause go a great way in making it popular Recognizing this danger, the faithless King took a fresh step on the downward path, and on the morrow, in gross violation of the right of nations, sent the Papal Envoy to prison.

At this direct outrage on the Pope and the Catholics, the Bishop of Breslau, Sternberg, and other noblemen indignantly left the Bohemian capital. The breach with Rome and with the Catholics of Bohemia was now an accomplished fact.

When King George came to himself he perceived that his impetuosity had driven him to the brink of an abyss. He wrote letters to friendly Princes, and one even to the Holy Father himself, in which he styled himself his obedient son, and sought to palliate conduct which was in fact inexcusable. Pius II, in firm but calm language, required that Fantino should be released; and on the 26th of October he was set free, his servants and horses, however, being retained. From this time forth George strained every nerve to avert by diplomacy and dissimulation any decided action on the part of Rome, and even to obtain the confirmation of the Compact.

It is difficult to understand how the Czech monarch could cherish such vain hopes. The explanation is perhaps to be found in his early training. Reared from his childhood in party strife, George Podiebrad was an adept in political chicanery, and had unlimited faith in the power of corruption and intimidation, and all the arts of diplomacy. It was incredible to him that any political power could be really guided by principles or by moral motives. He supposed the differences between himself and the Holy See to be merely a question of politics, and therefore capable of being solved at any moment by a change of circumstances.

The King of Bohemia had gained an important advocate in the Emperor. Frederick undertook, as a reward to Podiebrad for having delivered him out of the hands of the rebels at Vienna, to arrange the dispute with Rome and avert its unpleasant consequences. His influence with the Holy See did in effect prove strong enough to induce the Pope, at the end of 1462, to suspend all the ecclesiastical penalties incurred by George. He chose, however, to understand the settlement as including a confirmation of the Compact, an interpretation which, it need hardly be said, was at once repudiated by Pius II. When, soon after, the Pope took the people of Breslau under his protection, the King reverted to his project of a European Confederation of Princes. Formerly he had endeavoured to win the Pope by fair words and promises, now he intended to intimidate him by menaces Louis XI’s irritation against the Holy See seemed likely to make him look with favour on a scheme which meant opposition to Rome, and, in fact, he appeared to welcome the proposals of the King. He kept clear, however, of any definite engagements; and when Marini visited Venice in February, 1463, the promise of a levy of forces against the Turks was gratefully acknowledged, but the necessity of an understanding with Rome, as well as with Hungary, was also insisted on.

Through Antonio da Noceto, who was in his service and living in France, Pius II had in January, 1463, heard of Marini’s intrigues at the French Court and lost no time in taking measures to counteract them. In October of this year, Rome, Burgundy and Venice entered into a League against the Turks, and thus effectually worsted the Bohemian King and his hare-brained Councillor.

The Pope had accordingly nothing further to fear from this side. Why, it may be asked, did he, notwithstanding the importunity of the citizens of Breslau, still hesitate to proceed further with the Bohemian question? Many motives combined to keep him back. In the first place, Pius II was naturally averse to violent measures. And, in spite of all that had taken place, he was not exasperated against George, whose difficult position he understood, and who, he believed, had power and skill enough, if he would be firm and courageous, to bring the Hussites back to the Church. Then the ever-growing danger from the Turks drove the interests of Bohemia into the background. Finally, it was an ancient and abiding principle with Rome to neglect nothing, but to hurry nothing. In the end, however, the patience of Pius II was exhausted by the perpetual prevarications of the King, who only aimed at gaining time and bringing Breslau into subjection. In the spring of 1464, in the midst of the preparations for the expedition against the Turks, proceedings founded on his Coronation Oath were commenced against George as a perjured and relapsed heretic. In an open Consistory (16th June, 1464), it was decided that he should be summoned to Rome and the Bull of Citation had actually been drawn up when the Pope died.

 

 

CHAPTER VI

THE EASTERN QUESTION, 1460-1463.