BOOK V POPE PIUS II, A.D.1458-1464

CHAPTER IV.

OPPOSITION TO PAPAL AUTHORITY

The state of ecclesiastical and political affairs in France and Germany was such as to cause the Pope even greater anxiety than the troubles of his native land. The indifference of these two great powers to the Crusade was in itself a serious sign of the lessening influence of the Church. The effects of the false doctrines promulgated at Constance and Basle manifested themselves in both countries in a yet more alarming manner, in persistent efforts to destroy her monarchical constitution. All attempts of this kind were resisted by Pius II with a clear apprehension of the dignity of his office as Head of the Priesthood. His zeal and firmness in vindicating the authority and the inalienable rights of the Holy See against the assaults of the Conciliar and national parties are doubly admirable when we consider the difficult circumstances of his time.

Twenty years had elapsed since, by the Pragmatic Sanction of Bourges (July 7th, 1438), France had assumed a semi-schismatical position. The Resolutions drawn up during that period of confusion hardly left to the Pope any influence in ecclesiastical appointments in France, and also deprived his Court of the revenues formerly drawn from that country. Moreover, since they reaffirmed the Decree regarding the Superiority of Councils, they also threatened the monarchical constitution conferred by Christ on His Church. The Pragmatic Sanction, in the opinion of a non-Catholic student, was an abiding memorial of the Conciliar ideas, principles and aims, and of the opposition of the national spirit to the theory of the Universal Church. It expressed the pretension of the tem­poral ruler to order ecclesiastical matters in his kingdom according to his own good pleasure. As long as France adhered to it, a precedent existed to which other nations could appeal, and which constituted a perpetual menace to the Papal power. While it remained in force the restored Papacy could not consider its authority to be perfectly re-established. France had based her position on the Decrees of Constance and Basle, and was accordingly compelled to sympathize with every movement which aimed at the maintenance of the superiority of Councils over the Pope.

Efforts had not been wanting to procure the repeal of this law, which had proceeded from an authority absolutely incompetent to deal with ecclesiastical matters. Eugenius IV, Cardinal d'Estouteville, acting for Nicholas V, and finally Calixtus III, had all laboured, though vainly, in this direction.

Pius II took up the question energetically. The picture which he drew in his Memoirs of the effects of the Pragmatic Sanction shows how deeply impressed he was with the necessity of obtaining its revocation. “The French Prelates”, he writes, “supposed they would have greater liberty; but, on the contrary, they have been brought into grievous bondage, and made the slaves of the laity. They are forced to give an account of their affairs to Parliament; to confer benefices according to the good pleasure of the king and the more powerful nobles; to promote minors, unlearned, deformed and illegitimate persons to the priestly office; to remit the punishment of those whom they have justly condemned; to absolve the excommunicated without satisfaction. Any one conveying into France a Bull contrary to the Pragmatic Sanction is made liable to the penalty of death. Parliament has meddled with the affairs of the Bishops, with Metropolitan Churches, with marriages and matters of faith. The audacity of the laity has gone so far that even the most Holy Sacrament has been stopped by order of the King when borne in procession for the veneration of the people or for the consolation of the sick. Bishops and other Prelates and venerable priests have been cast into common prisons. Church property and the goods of the clergy have been confiscated on trifling pretexts by a secular judge, and handed over to lay people”.

At the Congress of Mantua, Pius II had made no secret of his opinions. In the memorable audience in which he justified his action in favour of Ferrante and against the Angevine claims supported by France, he strongly expressed his disapprobation of the abnormal position of the Church in that country of which the Pragmatic Sanction was the cause. The prohibition of appeals from the Pope to a Council, published at the conclusion of the Congress, was explicitly directed against the theory on which the French law rested.

The irritation produced in Paris by this measure was evinced by the attitude of the University quite as much as by that of the king. This body, which from the first had been bitterly hostile to Pius II, had, even in the time of Calixtus III, nominated a committee for the interpretation and execution of the Pragmatic Sanction. On the 16th May, 1460, it further determined that these delegates should receive a salary. Negotiations with the king and the Parliament for the defence of the so-called liberties of the Gallican Church were also set on foot. Charles VII was all the more disposed to take up the matter, on account of his grudge against Pius II in regard to the contest for the throne of Naples. Through his Procurator-General, Jean Dauvet, he published a very disrespectful protest against the Pope's discourse at Mantua. Pius II was attacked for his “praise of the Bastard, which he would have done better to keep to himself”; he was admonished to take care what he did against France, to leave the Council and its decrees in peace, and to summon a free Council, not in the Lateran, but in France. Meanwhile the King would uphold the Conciliar decisions in his dominions, and should the Pope trouble him or his subjects on this account, he would appeal to a future Council; and if the Pope failed to call one in a free place, he, together with other Princes, would take the matter into his own hands. The Pope was still further insulted by the contemptuous treatment of the ambassa­dors whom he had sent to negotiate with Charles regarding the war against the Turks, and who were kept for months without an answer. Under these circumstances it can hardly be deemed strange that the requests of the King for the appointment of Cardinals agreeable to him were not granted. Later on, when the anti-Papal feeling in Germany had grown very strong, fears were entertained at the Roman Court that the enemies of the Holy See in France and Germany might make common cause. These apprehensions were by no means unfounded, for at this very time Gregor Heimburg, the most violent opponent of Pius II, was sent to the French Court in order to bring about a general combination against Rome, and to procure a Council. The Pope, therefore, deemed it prudent to ignore the conditional appeal of the French monarch to a Council, “a formal condemnation of the Paris acts would necessitate lengthy legal proceedings at the Court of Rome”. But he did not modify his decrees in any way, and in his Briefs to Charles VII constantly insisted on the revocation of the Pragmatic Sanction.

It was an important advantage for Pius II in dealing with the ecclesiastical affairs of France, that the Dauphin Louis, then an exile in Burgundy, and uncertain as to his succession, was on his side. Negotiations conducted by the ambitious and learned Bishop of Arras, Jean Jouffroy, had resulted in a formal promise from Louis that, if he should succeed to the throne, he would abolish the Pragmatic Sanction. This event was hastened by the excesses of Charles VII, which had told most injuriously on his feeble constitution. In the summer of 1461 he was attacked by toothache; fearing poison, he refused food and drink for a considerable time, and this led to his death on the 22nd July. Louis XI became King of France.

The great question now was whether the new King would hold to the engagement which had been made under such different circumstances. The uncompromising opposition to his father’s system, which he manifested from the first moment of his accession, gave rise to the most favourable anticipations.

As early as the 18th August, 1461, the Pope, in an autograph letter, reminded him of his promise; adding that the special negotiations regarding this important matter would be entrusted to a prelate, who would be acceptable to his Majesty, Jean Jouffroy, the Bishop of Arras.

It seems, however, as if Pius II at this time had but little confidence in the progress of ecclesiastical affairs in France. The Bishop of Arras was accredited to England, Scotland, and Burgundy, but not to France, as if it was feared that in that country his authority as Legate a latere might meet with opposition. The Cardinal of Coutances was urgently exhorted to persevere in his efforts for the restoration of the Papal authority, and to do everything in his power to assist those of Louis XI.

Jouffroy, who was honourably received by the King, entered upon his task with the greatest zeal; but his zeal, and the means which he employed, were far from being pure. To this ambitious man the revocation of the Pragmatic Sanction was nothing but a ladder for his own exaltation. He hoped by success in this matter to earn the Cardinal’s hat, which he had already vainly sought, through the intervention of the Duke of Burgundy. With this aim in view Jouffroy began to insinuate himself into the good graces of the new King, and thanks to the “courtly address”, which was his undoubted characteristic, he was soon successful.

The dislike of Louis to everything that his father had done greatly facilitated the accomplishment of the task entrusted to the Bishop of Arras. He also represented to the King that if once the arrangement made in 1438 were abolished, the influence of the nobles in the matter of Church preferment would be at an end. The idea of lowering and weakening the power of the Vassals of the Crown had, at this time, taken possession of the mind of Louis XI. In the course of these negotiations no doubt the old grievance in regard to the large sums of money drawn out of France by Rome was again revived. We have not sufficient information to follow in detail all Jouffroy’s intrigues, but it is probable that these apprehensions were met by the assurance that the Pope would appoint a Legate to reside in France, who would institute to all benefices, and that thus the money would remain in the kingdom.

Louis XI seems to have expressed to the Legate a confident hope that, in acknowledgment of the abrogation of the Pragmatic Sanction, the Pope would change his Neapolitan policy and favour the claims of France; and Jouffroy no doubt confirmed this expectation, although well aware of its fallaciousness. At Rome he said little or nothing of this, but dwelt much on Louis’ noble sentiments and his firm determination to repeal the anti-Papal Law by his own authority.

On the reception of these good tidings, Pius II at once wrote a long letter of thanks to the King. He commended Louis’ decision as a great and good deed, and begged him not to defer its accomplishment. “If your Prelates and the University desire anything from Us”, he says in this letter, “let them only apply to Us through You; gladly will We grant all that can fittingly be granted”. At the same time he admonished the King that it was his duty to take his part in the rescue of Christendom from the Turks.

The first and most urgent demand of Louis XI was that Jouffroy and Prince Louis d'Albret should be raised to the purple. Pius II perceived the necessity of granting this request, which had already been made by Charles VII, if the repeal of the Pragmatic Sanction were to be accomplished. It cost him much trouble, however, to obtain the consent of the Sacred College. There were long and excited discussions, of which the Pope gives a detailed account in his Memoirs. Many of the Cardinals were extremely averse to any increase in the numbers of the Sacred College, others brought forward objections which as d'Albret was a man of strictly moral life, were only applicable to Jouffroy. Cardinal Alain in particular painted the character of his countryman in the darkest colours. Pius II did not contradict his statements, but pointed out the necessity, under the circumstances, of choosing the least of two evils. In the event of his refusing the king’s request, the Pragmatic Sanction would not be repealed; Jouffroy would be furious and would have no difficulty in turning Louis completely against the Pope, since he was already dissatisfied with the policy of the Holy See in regard to Naples. In the beginning of December an agreement was arrived at. On the 18th, the names of seven new Cardinals were published, and amongst them were those of d'Albret and Jouffroy.

Just at this time tidings reached Rome that Louis XI had really revoked the Pragmatic Sanction. The King himself wrote to the Pope on the 27th November, 1461, to announce the event. “As we perceive”, he said, “that obedience is better than sacrifice, we consent to admit that which you have announced to us, namely, that the Pragmatic Sanction is injurious to the Holy See, and that, originating in a time of schism and revolt, it robs You, from whom all holy laws proceed, of Your authority, and is contrary to right and justice. Although some learned men have sought to refute this and have greatly dissuaded Us from the repeal of the Pragmatic Sanction, yet knowing and perceiving that You are the Prince of the whole Church, the head of religion, the Shepherd of the Lord’s flock, we follow Your teaching and cleave to it with full consent. Therefore, as You require, we set aside and proscribe the Pragmatic Sanction in our whole kingdom, in Dauphiné and all our dominions, in which from henceforth Your jurisdiction shall be unquestioned. Even as the members in the human body are directed without conflict by one head and one spirit, so will the Prelates of the Church in our kingdom yield complete obedience to Your Sacred Decrees. Should any, however, offer resistance and make objections, We pledge our royal word to Your Holiness to have Your instructions carried out, to exclude all appeals, and to punish those who should prove refractory”.

When Pius II imparted this Letter to the assembled Consistory, he could not refrain from tears of joy. His confidential secretary, Gregorio Lolli, at once sent a copy to Siena, adding that it was long since any Pope had achieved so great a victory as had now been won by their fellow-countryman.

Antonio da Noceto, a brother of the well-known Pietro da Noceto, was sent to France to convey to the King a consecrated sword. On the blade was engraved an in­vitation to the Turkish war composed by Pius II, who also sent an autograph letter, praising his conduct in the highest terms.

On the 26th December, 1461, Gregorio Lolli had triumphantly informed his Sienese fellow-countrymen that the repeal of the Pragmatic Sanction was the most important intelligence that could have been imparted to the Apostolic See; with one stroke a country so great as France had been won back to its allegiance, and the obedience of all Christians confirmed. They ought to thank God that His Church had been thus exalted in the time of a Sienese Pope; for their fuller information, and that they might see how unreservedly Louis XI had revoked this enactment, he sent them a copy of two letters from Cardinals Longueil and Jouffroy. But by the beginning of January, 1462, a report from Jouffroy of a very different character was in the Pontiffs hands. “After Jouffroy had entered the sure haven of the Cardinalate”, Pius II writes in his Memoirs, “he brought forward that which he had hitherto concealed, namely, that the Pragmatic Sanction would certainly only be repealed when the King's wishes regarding Naples had been complied with”. Pius II answered the observations of the new Cardinal regarding the practicability of carrying out the royal Decree on the 13th January, 1462. Jouffroy would, he said, no doubt be able to remove the difficulties which were arising, he could not believe in a change of purpose on the part of the pious King. The conduct of Louis XI at this time was well calculated to confirm the Pope’s impression. The Parliament was commanded to have the letter of 27th November, 1461, registered as a Royal Ordinance; the King would brook no opposition. The objections of the Parliament and the University were sternly silenced. When a deputation from the University of Paris appeared before the King in January, 1462, while he was at Tours, “Go your ways!” he exclaimed, “I care not to trouble myself about such as you”.

Louis XI hoped that the Pope would reward this zeal by completely changing his policy in regard to Naples, and either openly espousing the cause of Anjou, or at least abandoning that of Ferrante. The monarch who, according to Monstrelet, could speak with the tones of a syren, did not hesitate on occasion to resort to threats. At the end of January, 1462, the Florentine Ambassadors had informed Cosmo de' Medici that Louis had sworn to avenge himself on the Pope in case he should refuse to support John of Calabria. A Council was to be called, and whatever else could most harass and annoy the Court of Rome was to be done. The mere mention of the word Council was enough greatly to disturb the Pope; and to trusted friends, such as the Milanese Ambassador, he spoke bitterly of Gallic pride and arrogance. But he concealed his vexation from the king, and again on the 24th February wrote to him in the most friendly manner, saying that he was awaiting proposals from Jouffroy, and would refuse nothing consistent with honour and justice.

Pius II was, in fact, at this time seriously considering the advisability of a complete change of policy in regard to Naples. The French King’s threats of an anti-Roman Council and a schism had begun to take effect. As the day of the arrival of Jouffroy and the other Ambassadors approached, his anxiety increased. Coppini, Bishop of Terni, was indefatigable on the Cardinal’s side, insisting on the threatening attitude of Louis XI, and declaring that unless Pius II took the part of Anjou, the French King would ally himself with the Venetians, send an army into Italy by way of Savoy, and so harass the Duke of Milan that he would be compelled to abandon Ferrante. Thus the whole burden of the Neapolitan war would fall on the Pope.

Pius II was able to conceal his agitation from the world at large, but to a few who enjoyed his confidence he made no secret of his uncertainties regarding the possibility of continuing to support Ferrante. A remarkable report, written by the Milanese Ambassador, Otto de Carretto, to Francesco Sforza on the 12th March, 1462, bears witness to this. “Today”, writes the Ambassador, “after having dismissed all who were present in his room, the Pope said to me : ‘Messer Otto, you are a faithful servant of your lord; and as his affairs are most closely connected with my own, I will quite secretly impart certain matters to you and then ask your advice concerning them’.”

Then, continues Carretto, Pius II proceeded to sketch the present political situation. He began with Milan and pointed out that the Duchy was surrounded by States like Savoy, Montferrat and Modena, whose sympathies were partially or entirely with France. In the case of an attack from that country, the most that could be expected from Florence would be some secret and small pecuniary aid. Venice would, no doubt, make use of a war between Milan and France for her own advantage. Francesco Sforza could reckon with certainty only on the Marquess of Mantua, whose power was not great. The discontent of many Milanese subjects, some of whom leaned to the side of France, and others to that of Venice, must also be taken into consideration.

The Pope looked upon Ferrante's position in Naples as hopeless. His treasury was empty, and his. subjects detested him; nothing but sheer force kept him on the throne. The nobles who had submitted to him might at any moment again revolt, some were already wavering; his government had no solid foundation.

He then went on to draw a melancholy and even exaggerated picture of his own difficulties. The powerful party of the Colonna was, he said, entirely devoted to France. The Savelli and Everso of Anguillara would gladly renew their alliance with Jacopo Piccinino. Many others in the dominions of the Church were discontented because their excesses had been restrained. In the Marches, the Vicar of Camerino, Giulio Cesare Varano, was a great enemy of the Holy See. He preferred to say nothing of Sigismondo Malatesta, of Forli, and the Vicars of the Romagna. Florence and Venice had no more ardent wish than that the temporal power of the Church should be weakened. He could rely on no one in Italy save the Duke of Milan, and if his resources were taxed in another direction, what was to become of the Papal Government? His treasury was exhausted, his annual revenues from all sources did not altogether amount to more than 150,000 ducats. Then the spiritual power of the Holy See was a matter of incomparably greater importance than the temporal, and what was the prospect here? In Italy the religious situation was no better than the political. In Germany, by maintaining, as he was in duty bound, the honour of the Holy See, he had incurred the enmity of the powerful Duke Sigismund of the Tyrol and of the Elector of Mainz. Several of the German Princes, and especially the Count Palatine Frederick, had joined the latter. Other Princes of the Empire were hostile to the Pope because of his friendship with the Emperor. The King of Hungary, who had entered into an alliance with Louis XI, was also against Frederick III. The King of Bohemia was half a heretic, the Duke of Cleves was also anti-Roman in his sympathies, because the Holy See had not yielded to his unjust requisitions, upon the Church of Cologne. Spain was almost entirely led by France, and so were Burgundy and Savoy. How easy would it be for the French monarch to place-himself at the head of these malcontents, especially in ecclesiastical matters. Louis XI had indeed repealed the Pragmatic Sanction, but now, it was said, he required! Rome to desist from assisting Ferrante. If his demand were refused, there was reason to fear that, under the cloak of zeal for the Church, he would insist on the summoning of a Council. All these enemies of Rome, and even many of the Cardinals, would join him in this. A schism might easily be the consequence. He greatly feared some threat of this kind from the French Ambassadors now on their way to Rome. The Cardinals, partly from fear of a schism and partly from a leaning to France, would think it better that he should make friends with the French King in time, rather than run the risk of all the troubles that might ensue. Carretto was now required to give his opinion, but he was to speak to no one of this conversation; for the Pope had as yet kept his uncertainties secret, fearing the pressure to which he might be subjected if they were known. Moreover, he had been informed that even in the Duke’s own Court there were but few who considered it expedient to persist in supporting Ferrante.

The Milanese Ambassador replied that, notwithstanding all difficulties, his master was disposed to hold to Ferrante. The French Ambassadors, he said, must be appeased by soft words. He was, however, ready to lay before the Duke the doubts which the Pope had manifested to him.

Pius II replied that Carretto was to express his views not as an Ambassador, but as a private individual. The latter then acknowledged all the difficulty of the situation, but also maintained that a change in the Italian policy of the Pope would in no way mend matters. He was in honour bound still to support Ferrante. What kind of impression would be made if Pius II, who had hitherto helped him in every possible manner, were now, on account of French threats and persuasions, to reverse all that he had done? In regard to immediate advantages, it was to be considered that the French custom was to promise much and perform little. Moreover, it was doubtful whether Louis XI would really engage so deeply in Italian politics. Venice would hardly suffer French influence to become all-powerful in Italy. In the Milanese territory the people were not so discontented as the Pope seemed to suppose. On the contrary, never had a Prince been more loved and honoured by his subjects than was the Duke; every one of them would suffer anything rather than submit to another ruler. If Louis XI were to interfere personally in Italian affairs, time would still be required for the necessary preparations, and meanwhile the rising in Naples might be quelled.

At the conclusion of his statement, Carretto again reverted to the opinion which he had expressed at the beginning. Admitting, he said, the existence of all these dangers, a change in the Italian policy of the Holy See would produce others of a yet more serious character. If France should acquire a preponderating influence in Naples, Genoa, Asti, Florence and Modena, the haughty young King, having seen that a word had sufficed to subdue the Pope and the Duke of Milan, would soon subjugate the rest of the Peninsula. Whose fault would it then be that Italy was at the mercy of France, and the Pope reduced to the position of Chaplain to her King? What, after this, could hinder Louis XI from placing a creature of his own on the Papal Throne, and again transferring the supreme government of the Church to his dominions? Italy and the Apostolic See ought not to be exposed to such dangers as these, in the vain hope that the French King would take part in the Turkish war. If the Cardinals, Prelates and others about the Court, were in favour of an agreement with France, the Pope must remember that they were actuated by selfish motives.

The day after this conversation the splendid Embassy from the King of France, headed by Count Pierre de Chaumont, arrived in Rome. It was received with great pomp and solemnity. As the Cardinals of Arras and Coutances were among the Envoys, most of the members of the Sacred College went as far as the Porta del Popolo to meet them. They alighted at the Convent at this gate, where newly-appointed Cardinals were accustomed to await their formal reception in Consistory.

During these days the Milanese Envoy was indefatigable in his activity. His representations made a great impression on the Pope, but it soon became evident that other means also must be employed to counteract the menaces of France and to hold Pius II fast to his treaty. Carretto turned to those who had most influence with the Pontiff—to Cardinals Forteguerri and Ammanati, to Gregorio Lolli, and also to Scarampo, Bessarion, Carvajal and other eminent members of the Sacred College. He deemed it a matter of the greatest importance that the French offers of large military assistance in the war against the Turks should be appreciated by that body at their real worth.

Before the reception of the French Ambassadors, Carretto had two other interviews with Pius II. In the latter of these the Pope told him that he had resolved to reply to the French in an amicable manner, and to bestow on them due praise for the abolition of the Pragmatic Sanction; and with regard to Neapolitan affairs, to inform them that he must persevere in the course which he had adopted, but that he was ready to gratify Louis XI in any way consistent with his honor. Above all, he would not break with France; it was to be hoped that in the end some means might be found of reconciling conflicting claims. “My most anxious endeavour”, writes Carretto in concluding his report, “will be to keep his Holiness firm in this matter, and to take care that no one should know of his vacillations”

Cardinal Jouffroy had in the meantime also seen the Pope. Even in his very first audience, forgetful of his duty as a Prince of the Church, and a member of her Senate, he showed himself simply and solely a French­man, the paid agent of his King. He tried by every means in his power to turn the Pope from his alliance with Ferrante. He painted in the darkest colours the disadvantages of the policy which he had hitherto pursued, in order to contrast them with the benefits which the French King could confer, dwelling especially on the great things in store for the nephews of Pius II. The Pope replied that he duly valued the friendship of France, and was sensible of the debt of gratitude which he owed to the King for the abolition of the Pragmatic Sanction; but that what Louis demanded in regard to Naples would bring disgrace on the Holy See, and that he could not, and would not, yield in this matter. In the course of a long interview, Jouffroy, acting on his own authority, proposed that Ferrante should be compensated by the grant of the principality of Tarento. Pius II expressed a doubt whether the Neapolitan King would consent to this plan, and finally the Cardinal took his leave, declaring that he hoped, on the next occasion, to find the Pope better disposed.

The solemn audience of the French Ambassadors took place on the 16th March. Pius II, in full pontificals, sat on the throne in the great Hall of the Consistory, the Cardinals were opposite to him, while the middle space was occupied by the Bishops, Prelates, Notaries, and other officials, together with numerous spectators. When the Ambassadors had kissed the foot of the Pope, and presented their credentials, Jouffroy made a long speech. After a pompous eulogy of the French nation and its monarch, he did homage on behalf of Louis XI, read the royal decree concerning the abrogation of the Pragmatic Sanction, and made magnificent promises in regard to the Turkish war. His King would lead an army of 70,000 men against Mahomet, and only asked in return that the Pope should assist him to reconquer Genoa, and support John of Calabria instead of Ferrante in the Kingdom of Naples.

All present were filled with astonishment at the eloquence and fluency of the discourse which Pius II made in reply. So deep was the silence, says a Milanese chronicler, that it seemed as if there were no one in the Hall. The Pope did not fail to praise the French King, but made no allusion to his demands in regard to Genoa and Naples. After a formal document concerning the repeal of the Pragmatic Sanction had been drawn up by a notary, the hat was conferred upon Jouffroy, to whom a seat among the Cardinals was then assigned.

On the 17th March, Gregorio Lolli announced to his fellow-countrymen the unconditional revocation of the Pragmatic Sanction. This was, he declared, the most solemn and important event which had occurred for many years at the Court. It was celebrated by processions and festivities.

In Rome the tidings were received with an outburst of joy. Bonfires were kindled and the air was filled with the sound of trumpets and bells. The Pope was praised all the more highly because the expectations of success had been but small. No one, he says in his Memoirs, had looked upon the repeal of the law as a possibility; it was deemed a great thing that the evil had not extended yet further.

The event was one of those which leaves its mark in the world’s history. The Pope’s thoughts must have reverted to those days in the spring of 1447, when, as Ambassador of Frederick III, he had procured the reconciliation of the greater part of the Holy Roman Empire with the Holy See. On neither occasion can his joy have been unmixed; yet Pius II had good reason to be satisfied at the great effects which, at least for a time, were produced by the concession of Louis XI.

During the succeeding days, Cardinal Jouffroy and the Count de Chaumont had several prolonged audiences of the Pope. All their eloquence failed to bring Pius II over to the cause of Anjou. He indeed proposed a truce or a compromise, but all negotiations for this purpose proved fruitless. Threats were freely employed by the French. How, they asked, will the Pope’s resistance to the House of France be looked upon by Christendom, when it is known that Louis XI has manifested his perfect obedience by revoking the Pragmatic Sanction, and has also promised such great assistance in the war against the Turks? Will it not be said that Pius II has abdicated his position as head of the nations, and no longer concerns himself with the defence of the Faith?

The Pope, indeed, was well aware that the enemies of the Holy See might thus turn the Turkish question to account, but on the other hand he had from the first understood the real value of the magniloquent promises of France regarding this war. Any possibility of misapprehension on the subject was removed when Jouffroy and Chaumont declared that the offers of Louis XI were made only on condition that his demands in regard to Genoa and Naples should be satisfied.

On the 3rd April, after three weeks had been consumed in negotiations, the Count de Chaumont with the Bishop of Saintes left the City. The Ambassadors saw that they had failed to accomplish the principal object of their mission, and on their way back expressed their vexation in no measured terms. Chaumont, when in Florence, declared that his master would recall all the French prelates from Rome, and revenge himself in such a way as should make the Pope repent.

A new French Ambassador, the Seneschal of Toulouse, used equally menacing language. Pius II, however, was not alarmed, for he knew on good authority that the Ambassador was not empowered to carry these threats into execution.

During the whole of this time an uninterrupted correspondence was maintained between Pius II and Louis XI, but their estrangement continued to increase. On one side-question indeed an agreement was arrived at, as Louis XI gave back to the Church the Countships of Dié and Valence, which had been annexed by the last Count, and retained by Charles VII. In return for this act of restitution Louis was to keep the portions of these territories lying on his side of the Rhone. Antonio da Noceto was sent to France to take possession of those which were restored to the Holy See. Jouffroy and Louis XI again proposed a marriage between one of the Pope’s nephews and a daughter of the French Monarch. At the same time the prospect of a Franco-Bohemian alliance was used as a bugbear to constrain the Pope to alter his Italian policy; but both the proposal and the menace were fruitless. By the repeal of the Pragmatic Sanction the King had expected not only to win over the Pope to the side of Anjou, but also to acquire the patronage of all the more important ecclesiastical benefices. When this anticipation also proved illusory the irritation of Louis knew no bounds. He wrote an insolent letter to the Pope and Cardinals in which he criticized all the acts of Pius II’s government, and even accused him of fomenting divisions among the Princes of Christendom, instead of uniting them for the Turkish war as he professed to do. The Pope sent Nuncios, and wrote several autograph letters to appease the wrath of Louis. All was in vain, chiefly owing to the machinations of Cardinal Jouffroy, who, fearing the discovery of his own intrigues, was more bitter even than the King against Pius II, and kept constantly fanning the flame. Amongst other serious charges against Jouffroy contained in the Memoirs, the Pope accuses him of having misrepresented to him the contents of Royal letters, and attributed to the King desires which he had never entertained, and in his reports falsely represented the Pope as an enemy of the French Dynasty, and untrue to his word.

In the autumn of 1463 the relations between Louis XI and Rome were strained to the uttermost, and alarming rumours were daily arriving from France. The King was said to have behaved very rudely to Cardinals Longueil and Alain. It was reported that the Bishoprics of Uzés and Carcassonne, the Abbey of St. Jean d'Angeli and other benefices, which the latter held in commendam, had been sequestrated. Certain Royal Edicts, directly opposed to the rights of the Holy See, were said to have been issued. It is thought, wrote the Envoy of Mantua on the 4th October, 1463, from Rome, that the King will renew the Pragmatic Sanction; he writes angry letters to the Pope in defence of Jouffroy, who is, he affirms, set aside because he does his duty!

The King did not, indeed, go so far as to re-establish the law of 1438; but on the other hand, from 1463, he did his best to recover that which he had yielded in the previous year. In 1463 and 1464, a number of Decrees were issued “to defend ourselves against the aggressions of Rome, and for the restoration of the ancient Gallican liberties”, by which most of the concessions obtained in the revocation of the Pragmatic Sanction were nullified. Pius II complains in his Memoirs that the hostility to the Church manifested by Louis in these Decrees far exceeded his former loyalty and zeal in the repeal of the Pragmatic Sanction. The conduct of the King in regard to two benefices which had fallen vacant in Angers and in Paris at the end of 1463 or beginning of 1464 is another instance of the high-handed tone which he now assumed. He requested the Pope to confer them upon Jean Balue, adding that this favourite had already taken possession of them, and that he would himself defend him against all opponents! Pius II refused, and asked the King if he would suffer any one to say to him, “Give me this castle freely, or I will take it by force”.

From the time that Louis’ antagonism to the Pragmatic Sanction had cooled, a good understanding had existed between him arid the national party among the French clergy, who thus unconsciously aided the King in weaving the “web in which he purposed to entangle them” and to destroy the independence which he professed to defend against the aggressions of the Pope.

Cardinal Jouffroy left Rome to return to France on the 24th October, 1463. Some curiosity may have been felt as to the reception he would meet with from Louis. He was detested by the Parisians, who had made him the subject of many satires and caricatures, and when he entered the city no one took any notice of him. But the King showed him the greatest favour. He knew that this man would now enter into his anti-Roman policy with no less zeal than that which he had formerly displayed in the opposite direction. King Louis and Cardinal Jouffroy were a well-matched pair.

Besides the revival of the so-called Gallican liberties, Louis had, in the Turkish question, another means of revenging himself on the Pope. The manner in which he thwarted the great designs of Pius II in this important matter will appear in the sequel.

While the monarchical power in France was thus gathering up all the forces of the nation to subserve its own ends, the mortal sickness which, to use the words of Nicholas of Cusa, had attacked the Holy Roman Empire, was making ceaseless progress. “God help us”, writes a contemporary, “the whole Empire is so shattered and torn on all sides that it nowhere holds together. Cities against Princes, Princes against cities, wage endless wars, and no one is of too low estate to challenge his neighbour. There is no quiet corner in the whole of Germany; turn where you will, you have to guard against ambush, robbery, and murder; the clergy enjoy no peace, the nobility no honour”.

Amidst this general confusion two princely factions became prominent, one of which, assuming a threatening attitude towards the Emperor, demanded Reform. At the head of this party, which pursued its own selfish ends under the cloak of the renovation of the Empire, were the two Princes of the House of Wittelsbach, Frederick I the Victorious, Pfalzgraf of the Rhine, and Louis the Rich, Duke of Bavaria-Landshut. The champion of the other party, who found it profitable to pursue their own interests under the shelter of the Imperial authority, was Albert Achilles, Margrave of Brandenburg. Albert, “the clever man of Brandenburg”,

Whose inventions so subtle

Are fathom'd by none,

surpassed all contemporary German Princes, not only in statesmanship and decision, but also in cunning. The fundamental idea of his policy was, with the help of the Pope and the Emperor, to obtain the chief magistracy of the Empire, and to make Franconia a Duchy and the chief Principality between the Maine and the Danube.

The House of Wittelsbach was his natural opponent, but its downfall seemed at hand when in June, 1459, the Emperor Frederick III outlawed Duke Louis of Bavaria for having violently seized upon the free Imperial City of Donauworth. Albert Achilles undertook to carry out the sentence. At this perilous crisis Pius II sent his Nuncios to an assembly held at Nuremberg in July, 1459, and succeeded in restoring peace. This, however, was of short duration, and the beginning of 1460 witnessed the outbreak of a war between the houses of Wittelsbach and Hohenzollern, which soon devastated a great part of Germany.

Just at this time Cardinal Bessarion came thither provided with the most ample powers for the promotion of the Turkish war and the pacification of the Empire. This mission undertaken by the devoted Cardinal at the age of sixty-five, and in the depth of winter, is justly described by his biographer “as a martyrdom”.

By the 20th February Bessarion had arrived in Nuremberg, where the Diet agreed upon at Mantua was to be opened on March 2^nd. The Cardinal of Augsburg and the Bishops of Spires and Eichstatt attended as Commissioners from the Emperor. Of the German Princes, Albert Achilles, who was desirous of keeping up a peaceful appearance, alone was present. Duke Louis had sent his Councillors, merely charging them to make complaints of the bad faith of the Margrave. The Greek Cardinal in a striking exhortation urged upon all the preservation of peace which Christ had bequeathed to his disciples. The divisions of the Christian Princes had, he declared, increased the power of the Turks to its present extent. It would be a scandal if Germany did nothing to oppose the enemies of the Cross. The bad example alone would do incalculable harm.

These words unfortunately fell upon deaf ears, for the thoughts of all were absorbed in the struggle now imminent between the Wittelsbach party and that of the Hohenzollern. Those present, as a contemporary chronicler informs us, did nothing “but blame and revile one another”. Even when Cardinal Carvajal wrote from Hungary, telling of a fresh incursion of the Turks, and Bessarion, with tears, implored them to unite in taking up arms against the enemy, no impression was made. The utmost he could obtain was to induce them to agree that another Assembly should meet at Worms on the 25th March.

Meanwhile war had already broken out on the Rhine, in Swabia and Franconia, and as Bessarion journeyed to Worms he saw its sad traces. Under these circumstances it was not surprising that the Diet at that city was as fruitless as the one of Nuremberg had been. “Deeply dejected and discouraged, Bessarion informed the Pope of his failure and returned to Nuremberg. As Hungary could look for no external aid, Pius II was most anxious that at least her own forces should be available for the defence of the young King”. Accordingly, as early as the 28th March, he earnestly requested the King of Bohemia to use his influence to restrain the Emperor from all attacks on Hungary. On the 20th April, while in Nuremberg, the Cardinal Legate received a Brief from the Pope, “which, together with words of consolation and encouragement, contained an express charge to use all possible diligence in supporting King George”. Meanwhile Pius II, distrusting the powers of the sickly and irritable Legate, commanded the able jurist, Francis of Toledo, to repair to the Imperial Court in order to influence Frederick III. The negotiations, however, had already broken down before Bessarion had time to take part in them.

According to the decision taken at Mantua, the Diet ought to have assembled at the Imperial Court on the 30th March. But, on account of the war, Bessarion had been constrained, much against his will, to consent to its postponement until the 11th of May.

The Cardinal left Nuremberg in good time, and on the 7th May reached Vienna, where he was honourably received by the Emperor. The opening of the Diet, however, was impossible, for, instead of the Princes who were expected, only a few Ambassadors had arrived, and these few were not furnished with adequate instructions.

A further postponement until the 1st of September was inevitable. The Pope and his Legate, as well as Frederick III, issued urgent letters of invitation to this Assembly. Nevertheless, not one of the Princes appeared at the time appointed. Several weeks again were spent in anxious expectation, and not till the 17th September was the Diet opened.

Meanwhile Albert of Brandenburg, whose allies did little or nothing for him, had succumbed. On the 23 June, 1460, he had been obliged to sign the treaty of Roth, which was so unfavourable to his interests that his “eyes filled with tears”, as it was sealed. The harshness of its conditions made Pius II fear that the peace would be of short duration.

Even more distressing to Albert was the defection of Archbishop Diether of Minz which soon followed. On the 4th July, 1460, Diether was defeated at Pfeddersheim near Worms by the Count Palatine Frederick, who constrained him to enter into alliance with him. The Archbishop’s motive in thus changing sides from the Hohenzollern party to that of Wittelsbach was the hope that the Princes who were in opposition would afford him more support against Pius II than he could have obtained from his former friends.

Diether of Isenburg belongs to that class of ecclesiastics of whom a Rhenish chronicler of the fifteenth century says: “Alas! with most Bishops the sword has supplanted the crosier; Bishoprics are sought after chiefly for the sake of the temporal power they confer. Spirituality is now the rarest of qualities in a dignitary of the Church”.

Diether, who was born about 1412, appears as a Canon at Mainz as early as the year 1427. Besides holding prebends in the Cathedrals of Cologne and Treves, he was, in 1442, appointed Provost of the Collegiate Churches of St. Victor and St. John in Mainz. In 1453 he became Custos in the Cathedral Chapter of that city. But these dignities did not suffice to satisfy the ambition of a man who was so ignorant that he scarcely knew a word of Latin. In 1465 he was a candidate for the Archbishopric of Treves, but the majority of the electors preferred the Margrave John of Baden. On the death of Dietrich I, Archbishop of Mainz, on the 6th May, 1459, Diether was again an eager aspirant for the vacant post. This time his efforts were successful and he obtained the coveted position of an independent Prince with territory and subjects. On the 18th June he was elected Archbishop by a compromise, said to be simoniacal, giving him a majority of one vote over Adolph of Nassau. Three days after his elevation, in consequence of the Election Capitulation, he was obliged to renew the league which his predecessors had concluded with Albert Achilles and Ulrich of Würtemberg against the Count Palatine Frederick. Owing to the party position in which he was thus placed from the very first, the Papal Confirmation was a matter of the greatest importance to him. He accordingly at once dispatched Envoys to Mantua, where Pius II was holding the Congress.

Immediately on hearing of the departure of this mission the Pope sent word to Diether that if he sought to obtain Confirmation he must present himself in person at the Papal Court. But the Archbishop took no notice of this admonition, even when it was soon afterwards reiterated. Pius II was already much annoyed at the non-arrival of the Princes summoned to the Congress, and this disregard of his expressed wishes on the part of a petitioner was not calculated to soothe his irritation. He made many difficulties regarding the Confirmation of the Election, and the grant of the Pallium, and he is said to have required Diether’s Envoys to pledge their master to support the levy of the tithe on all ecclesiastical revenues in the Empire, and to promise that he would never press for a Council or consent to a general Assembly of the States of the Empire without Papal permission. It cannot be ascertained with certainty whether the Pope really imposed these conditions; in any case they were not again mentioned.

The active support of the Margrave Albert of Brandenburg in Mantua did much to promote Diether’s success. A second mission from Mayence received the Bull of Confirmation and the Pallium, after having solemnly sworn that within a year Diether would appear in person, and that the Annates claimed by the Apostolic Treasury should be paid. The Treasury estimated the expenses of the Confirmation at 20,550 Rhenish florins, a sum which the Envoys do not seem “to have considered at all so excessive” as Diether afterwards represented it to be. Roman money-lenders advanced the amount, the Envoys giving a bond. When the Pope’s portion was paid, the Cardinals and inferior members of the Court also bound themselves to reimburse the money-lenders in case Diether should not discharge his debt.

Diether failed to fulfil a single one of the conditions on which the Confirmation had been granted. He did not appear at the Papal Court, he protested against the amount of the Annates, and refused to pay them. When the time allowed for the payment had elapsed, the Papal Judge pronounced the sentence of lesser excommunication; in spite, however, of this censure the Archbishop continued to be present at public worship, and even to officiate. When, soon after, the Diet met at Vienna, the first ecclesiastical Elector of the Empire appeared as the leader of the opposition against the Pope.

None of the German Princes thought of personally attending this Assembly. Many of the cities, as, for example, Mainz and Wetzlar, did not even send representatives, excusing themselves on the score of their poverty and the insecurity of the times. Bessarion lost heart so completely that Pius II found it necessary to exhort him to be patient. Events fully justified the apprehensions of the aged Cardinal. Not one of the Princes arrived, for, says the Chronicle of Spires, “they had too many quarrels among themselves on their hands to want another with the Turks”. The worst dispositions prevailed in the assembly, and the reading of the Bull conferring plenary powers upon Bessarion contributed to aggravate these. This document, without reference “to the consent of the Diet, simply directed the Legate to carry out the Papal commands”. The Envoys accordingly felt called upon to defend their right and to take counsel together and come to a decision regarding the expedition against the infidel, and the tax for the war. Their spokesman was Heinrich Leubing, Diether’s representative, who eagerly availed himself of this opportunity of resisting the Pope. It was, Leubing declared, “a praiseworthy usage and custom that when a matter so high and great, affecting the Christian faith or the Holy Roman Empire, was to be considered, this should be done by His Imperial Majesty with the Council of his Electors”. A fresh Diet must therefore be held.

In vain did Bessarion labour to influence the deputies, both privately in his own abode and collectively in their public sittings, and to awaken some enthusiasm and devotion to the holy Cause. The prospect of success grew fainter and fainter. His one consolation was the Emperor's readiness to comply with the Pope’s demands, but the only result of this was that the Assembly now turned against Frederick.

Conscious of the purity of his own motives, the Greek Cardinal became more and more embittered by the obstinate opposition of the Envoys. The terrible fate which threatened his fellow-countrymen filled him with an ardent desire to render assistance as soon as possible. Unfortunately he was utterly wanting in self-control. Regardless of his office and of his dignity, he poured forth menaces and invectives against the German Princes, and cast doubts on their good-will towards the holy Cause. The Envoys answered in a similar tone and left the Diet.

Bessarion in his grief and disappointment now begged to be recalled. But Pius II would not take such a step without first consulting his Cardinals. They were utterly opposed to it, and to any interruption of the negotiations. On the 4th November, 1460, Pius II imparted their decision to his Legate.  “God’s honour”, he said, “and the honour of the Apostolic See require that we should be steadfast in hope, using every means by which the minds of men may be led to better counsels. If others withdraw from the work, it does not become us to follow their example. Perseverance in good leads to good even those who are ill disposed, and hearts that are now depraved may not be so always. The conversion of men is wrought by a hidden power, and the way of salvation often opens where no one expects it. Your departure would give a great advantage to our enemies. If the cause of Christendom seems despaired of, they will believe that everything already belongs to them, and will be more audacious in attacking us, and it will be hard for the faithful to stand firm if their hope grows faint. The Hungarians also have hitherto been restrained rather by shame than by good-will. They may seize upon this opportunity as an excuse and conclude a peace or a truce with the Turks. The disgrace then would be ours, and not that of the Germans. You know how calumnies pursue good deeds. It is therefore all the more needful, now that the negotiations have been broken off, a thing which has in itself a bad appearance, that we should aim at maintaining the reputation of the Church, and act in such a manner that the servants of the Holy See may not be blamed. Moreover, as in many places, the subsidies determined on at Mantua have been carefully collected, the perverse would take occasion from this to complain, and the dilatory would make it an excuse for altogether withholding their assistance; and thus all would fail us. Finally, as we have so often proclaimed to you, to our brethren and to the world that we will only give up the work of the Diet with life itself, our words would appear nothing but empty boasting devoid of truth and steadfastness. The glory of God, the salvation of Christendom and the liberation of your oppressed country are at stake. You can labour with great merit in this cause, both by preserving peace and by the conduct of business. Therefore, worthy brother, we encourage you to persevere until some good result appears. Let our beloved son, John Cardinal Carvajal, who is now in the fifth year of his labours as Legate, and champion of the faith, serve for your consolation and example”.

In this same Brief Pius II reverts to a bold proposal which he had already made to his Legate on the nth October. It was that the warlike head of the Wittelsbach party should receive the banner of the faith and of the Empire, insist on the payment of the tithe by the clergy, and equip the army. Should he refuse, the Legate was to turn to one of the other German Princes; if need were, as he himself had once said in Mantua, he must “beg for soldiers from door to door. If all fails, we will take this course and diligently pursue it as our last possible hope; meanwhile consider the ways and means of carrying it out and impart to us in writing what appears to you best fitted to promote the end in view”. Bessarion’s Reports are unfortunately missing. The Secret Archives of the Vatican contain only one letter from him referring to the matter. This was written on the 29th March, 1461; it justifies his proceedings, especially in regard to the question of the tithe, and gives a most interesting picture of the German situation.

In order to understand this letter, we must bear in mind that Pius II, in view of the threatening storm, and acting on the conviction that the opposition of the German Princes was chiefly occasioned by pecuniary considerations, sent two Legates to Germany, charged with reassuring explanations concerning the tithes. Moreover, on the 12th February, 1461, he sent the Cardinal of Augsburg to conduct the affair. On the 4th March, Bessarion was instructed to recall any order which he might have issued concerning the tithes, and to make it generally known alike by word and by letter that it was not the Pope’s intention to demand anything without the consent of the nation. Bessarion replied from Vienna on the 29th March:

“The excuses of the German Princes are vain and empty pretexts. In regard to the tithes I have said no more than what I have already written to your Holiness. I represented the extraordinary outlay of the Holy See for the cause of the Faith, to which I added the declaration that your Holiness does not demand from the German Princes the tithes, but the promised army. It is true that in a fatherly way I com­plained and admonished and counselled them as became one who had the matter much at heart. But I have not proceeded beyond remonstrances, or issued any commands regarding the levy of the tithe which, according to your instructions, I should have to recall. Their charges against me were therefore unfounded in this respect. Meanwhile, if I have wronged them in anything, it is only because they had desired that, for their excuse and justification, I should accuse the Emperor and lay everything to his charge. They had already, at that time, begun to work in secret against Frederick III, as it appeared afterwards. Seeing that for cogent reasons I would not yield to them, I became the object of their hatred; they looked upon me as quite devoted to the Emperor. In this they were by no means mistaken. I have the highest esteem for Frederick III, because I know how greatly your Holiness and the Emperor are attached to one another. This is the cause of their dissatisfaction, and they say it quite openly. Many other convincing proofs of these things are before your Holiness, amongst them the extravagances which have lately been widely circulated from the pen of the shameless heretic, Gregor Heimburg. I had scarcely the patience to read them once, and then threw them away, and I will not send them to your Holiness. Did I not know that You are well aware that the causes of this agitation are other than the tithe question, I should perish with grief. Yet, Holy Father, many causes have combined to produce this state of things. First, the disgraceful ingratitude of Diether. I will now speak freely of this man, in whose house, as Rudolf of Rudesheim informed me on my return from Worms to Mainz, Rome is daily reviled by that crazy Dominican Bishop who came to Mantua about his Confirmation, as well as by his other companions. I bring a witness; your Holiness can examine him at your pleasure. Then came the excommunication of the Archbishop of Mainz on account of the Annates, whereupon he became so excited that he threatened to move heaven and earth. He and the rest utterly disregard this excommunication. He also seeks to tread in the footsteps of his predecessor who was by no means devoted to the Holy See. Who was better acquainted with these intrigues than your Holiness, whose task it formerly was to frustrate them? From the appeal of the Princes it is evident that they do not complain of the tithes alone, but also of the Annates, Indulgences and pretended extortions of various kinds. They are also constantly stirred up by France and the perpetual complaints of Duke Sigismund. Concerning the tithes I have, as I informed your Holiness in two letters, taken sufficient care in the matter. For the rest it would be very well to send new Ambassadors, capable of settling the affair with prudence and discretion. As the Diet to be held in Frankfort is put off until Trinity Sunday, the Ambassadors might with advantage be charged in the meantime to visit the Princes individually and to treat with each in particular”.

A short time after this report was written, Pius II had himself arrived at the conviction that Germany was lost to the cause of the war. “I perceive”, he wrote to Bessarion on the 2nd May, 1461, “that almost everything for which you were sent to Germany being hopeless, the reconciliation of the Emperor with the King of Hungary is now your only remaining duty”. But the sufferings entailed on the sickly Cardinal by these numerous journeys were aggravated by vexation and the severity of the climate, and he hailed with joy the truce of Laxenburg (6th September, 1461), which permitted him to bid farewell to the Imperial Court and quit the barbarous country where” no one cared for Latin and Greek”.

In his Report to the Pope on the 29th March, 1461, Bessarion speaks of the Archbishop of Mainz and Duke Sigismund of the Tyrol as the chief authors of confusion in Germany. Some further details must be added in regard to the proceedings of these two.

The mischievous action of the Envoy from Mainz at the Diet of Vienna was a foretaste of the future. Before the conclusion of the year 1460, Diether of Isenburg and the Count Palatine Frederick, bound themselves to assist George Podiebrad, who aspired to become King of the Romans. The compact between Diether and the King of Bohemia was concluded in the early days of December. Podiebrad, in return for the support of his pretensions to the Crown of Germany, was obliged to promise that he would establish at Mainz a supreme Court of the Empire, to be called a Parliament, would preserve peace and unity, and as soon as possible, with the advice of the Electors, undertake an expedition against the Turks. He promised not to sanction the levy of the tithe, nor any other tribute imposed by Pope or Council; he undertook to cause a General Council to be assembled in a German city on the Rhine, and there to “repeat and administer” the Basle Decrees, especially those concerning Confirmations, Annates and the jurisdiction of the Roman Court, to take care that the Pope should claim from Diether for the Pallium no larger sum than was customary, and, finally, with his people to abandon the Utraquist heresy and return to the Roman Church.

Immediately after the conclusion of this compact an Assembly of the Princes took place at Bamberg, where the opposition to Pope and Emperor was strongly manifested. Princes and their Envoys spoke with unexampled bitterness against the two heads of Christendom, and, as might have been expected, Diether of Isenburg was the most violent. He it was who laid before the Assembly a document protesting against the demand of ecclesiastical tithes and appealing against all ecclesiastical censures. The Councillors of Saxony and Brandenburg, however, refused to sign this. The King of Bohemia, and Duke Louis of Landshut, led by him, would not hear of any measure against the Pope, and could not be induced to give their signatures to the appeal. The result of this meeting accordingly in no wise answered the anticipations of Diether and the other opponents of Rome. Violent language against the Holy See was again indulged in at Eger on the following day; but nothing came of it, for Podiebrad contrived to divert the stream of opposition almost entirely from Rome, and turn it against the Emperor.

Rebuffs of this kind might certainly have taught a lesson of moderation to one of another stamp, but they only roused the passionate Diether, supported by the Count Palatine Frederick, to greater energy in his agitation against the Apostolic See. On the 22nd of February, 1461, he took into his service Gregor Heimburg, the bitterest enemy of Rome and Pius II.  This man had already been excommunicated by the Pope and had done much to aggravate the conflict between Duke Sigismund of the Tyrol and Cardinal Cusa.

The contest in question was closely connected with Cusa’s zeal for the liberty and purity of the Church entrusted to his care.

The ecclesiastical troubles of preceding years had paved the way for grievous abuses in the Tyrol, as well as in most parts of Germany, and fearful immorality prevailed amongst clergy and laity. It was only natural that Cusa, full of zeal as he was for the reform and welfare of his country, should concentrate all his energies on the diocese which had been entrusted to his care in the spring of 1452. The Cardinal set to work with all the vehemence of his Rhenish temperament, but the majority of his flock failed to cooperate as they ought to have done in his labours for the true welfare of their country. Cusa was too great for the narrow politics of the Tyrol, the extraordinary powers entrusted to him by Rome were not respected, and conflicts arose on every side.

Difficulties such as these would have damped the courage of an ordinary man, but that of Cusa rose to the occasion. He was resolved at any cost to carry out the reform of his Diocese; his special attention was directed to the Religious Orders, the scandal of whose moral corruption was aggravated by their profession of a life of poverty and self-abnegation. The extent of the evil may be estimated by the violent opposition which the regulations of the new Bishop encountered. The Poor Clares of Brixen in particular were distinguished by the obstinacy of their resistance, and even the intervention of the Holy See was ineffectual. The nuns treated the Papal Brief with as little respect as the Interdict and Excommunica­tion pronounced by the Cardinal. Experience has long since shown that the only effectual resource in such cases is the introduction of fresh members thoroughly imbued with the religious spirit, and by this means Cusa at length succeeded in improving the state of the Brixen Convent. In other places also, as, for example, in the ancient Premonstratentian Monastery of Wilten, near Innsbruck, he accomplished the necessary reform by summoning monks from a distance.

Cusa’s most serious contest was with the nuns of the Benedictine Convent of Sonnenburg, in the Pusterthal, where a secular spirit had made terrible inroads. The right of jurisdiction over this house was doubtful. A dispute had arisen between the nuns and their dependents in Enneberg, and the former had applied to Duke Sigismund as Governor and Sovereign, and the latter to the Bishop of Brixen. Both Cusa and Sigismund brought the matter before their respective tribunals, and a violent quarrel was the result. Cusa thought it right to cling all the more firmly to his claim of jurisdiction over the Convent as a means of carrying out the ecclesiastical reform which he had so much at heart. This, however, was precisely what the nuns of Sonnenburg were determined to resist. They maintained that the Cardinal had no concern with the reform, but only with the temporalities of the Convent. When he insisted on the observance of the decisions of the Synod held at Salzburg in 1451, especially of those regarding enclosure, they turned to Duke Sigismund for protection. This dissolute Prince was a strange champion for a convent of nuns, but he was equal to the occasion. The assistance which he promised to the nuns rendered them so stiff-necked that Cusa thought it necessary to adopt strong measures. In 1455, the sentence of greater excommunication was pronounced on the obstinate inmates of the convent, who thereupon appealed to the Pope. Calixtus III disapproved of the Cardinal’s severity, and recommended, for the sake of avoiding scandal, that the matter should be amicably adjusted. Cusa, however, would yield nothing, and the nuns persevered in their resistance, relying on the protection of the Duke.

The Sonnenburg dispute caused the learned Cardinal to make a thorough investigation of the old documents, charters and privileges of his Church. The result of his researches was to convince him of his right to claim the dignity of a Prince of the German Empire, ranking immediately after the King of the Romans. Sigismund declared these pretensions outrageous on the ground that they ignored the legitimate developments of more recent events. The Sonnenburg question soon fell into the background and resolved itself into a contest between the sovereignty which had grown up and the imposing immunities of the early mediaeval period.

Cusa’s severity towards the Sonnenburg nuns is hardly surprising when we find that so hostile a spirit soon manifested itself against him as a “stranger”, and he seriously thought of abandoning a sphere in which he encountered so many hindrances, and even commenced negotiations for resigning his Bishopric to a Bavarian Prince. The situation became more and more insupportable. The secular and regular clergy, who had no wish to be reformed, vied with each other in placing difficulties in the way of their Bishop. “Since the rebellion of Jezabel” (the Abbess of Sonnenburg), wrote Cusa to his confidential friend, the Prior of Tegernsee, “the Poor Clares at Brixen have also become incredibly audacious. The Premonstratentians at Wilten, who had begun to walk in the way of salvation, are looking back; my doings are not to the taste of my Cathedral Chapter, for they love the peace of this world. The nobles threaten more and more. The Prince keeps silence or favours ;my adversaries, and as they cannot yet reach me, they stir up others to violence in order to intimidate me”. The common people disregarded the Cardinal’s commands even when accompanied by threats of the severest penalties. Under these circumstances “Cusa everywhere suspected plots even against his life, and saw dangers where none really existed”. To escape from these supposed perils he fled in July, 1457, to Andraz, an almost inaccessible mountain fortress in Buchenstein, hired mercenary troops in the Venetian territory, and accused Duke Sigismund to the Pope of intending to take his life. Calixtus III accordingly threatened the Duke with excommunication, and his dominions with an Interdict. Eight days were allowed him to restore to the Cardinal that perfect liberty and security which he required for the exercise of his pastoral office.

The Duke on receiving the Pope’s Bull applied to a friendly lawyer, and by his advice issued on the 1st November, 1457, a protest against the sentence of the Holy See, founded, he complained, on a mere rumour, and appealed to the Pope better informed. At the same time he sent a safe-conduct to Cusa signed with his own hand. There can be no doubt that the friend whose influence induced the Duke to take this momentous step was Gregor Heimburg, the declared enemy of the Holy See. This highly gifted, but violent man, “henceforth became the leading spirit in all the serious opposition to Rome”. From the time that Heimburg took part in the dispute there was small hope of coming to a satisfactory arrangement. The breach was further widened, and its bitterness intensified by the claims which Cusa’s representative urged at the Diet of Bruneck (13th January, 1458). He demanded the restoration of the Castles which had in ancient times been taken from the Church of Brixen, the recognition of the Cardinal as the lawful ruler of the Innthal and Norithal, and the restitution of all fiefs of the Diocese held by Duke Sigismund in these valleys, on the ground that they had escheated. On the 6th of February, 1458, Sigismund made a second appeal, accompanying it with a declaration that he did not acknowledge the Interdict. The spirit which at this time prevailed among the Tyrolese clergy is shown by the fact that the greater number joined in the appeal and paid no heed to the sentence.

The death of Calixtus III summoned Cusa to Rome, where he found his friend Aeneas Sylvius, under the title of Pius II, in the chair of St. Peter. The new Pope at once undertook the part of a mediator, and summoned Cusa and Sigismund to appear in his presence at Mantua in November, 1459. The appointment of Gregor Heimburg as his agent was a strange return for the fatherly kindness with which Pius II received Sigismund. We have already spoken of Heimburg’s intrigues against the crusade, and of his abuse of the Pope. The selection of such a man to conduct negotiations on his behalf was little calculated to promote the restoration of peace, and Cusa’s irritation and his claim to the exercise of absolute spiritual and temporal power within the limits of his diocese destroyed any lingering hope of success. Notwithstanding the exasperation of the contending parties, Pius II still strove to mediate between them, and to bring about an agreement clearly defining the relations between the Bishop of Brixen and the temporal lord of the Tyrol. Sigismund rudely rejected these proposals, he even protested against the competency of the Papal tribunal, and, to the great grief of Pius II, left Mantua on the 29th of November.

In spite of this failure the Pope again resumed the negotiations, but his efforts were frustrated by the persistent and increasing animosity of the two opponents. In March, 1460, at a Synod at Bruneck, Cusa renewed the Interdict which the Pope had suspended for two years, and proceeded to inform the Duke that, in the event of mild measures proving ineffectual, he would make over to the Emperor all the fiefs of the Church of Brixen. Sigismund then resolved upon an act of violence, and, on Easter Day, caused the unsuspecting Cardinal to be arrested and imprisoned at Bruneck. Cusa was not released until he had signed an unfavourable treaty.

The consternation of Pius II was extreme when he heard of the outrage offered to a Prince of the Church, one personally dear to him and bearing a name honoured alike throughout Eastern and Western Christendom. The deed perpetrated at Bruneck was in his eyes a grievous insult to the Apostolic See, to the Sacred College, and to the Church at large. It was an encouragement to all who had a mind to lay violent hands on her property or her dignitaries, an attack on her liberty and on the inviolability of her members and possessions, and a challenge to her authority. He therefore resolved to withstand the Duke with all the resources of his spiritual power. Legal proceedings were at once commenced, and Sigismund was required to appear in person and answer for himself on the 4th August.

The Duke’s reply was an appeal from the Pope ill-informed, to the Pope better informed, and in this appeal the majority of the Tyrolese Clergy supported him. On the 8th August, in consequence of his disobedience to the Papal summons, the sentence of greater excommunication was pronounced at Siena against him and his adherents. Even before the tidings of this excommunication reached the Ducal Court at Innsbruck, Sigismund took a step “which was in every way calculated to render the breach irreparable”. He entrusted the whole conduct of his affairs to the impetuous Heimburg, who carried the irresolute Duke away with him in his passionate and reckless opposition to the Holy See, in which personal aversion had no small share. On the 13th August, Sigismund issued a fresh and yet stronger appeal to the future Roman Pontiff and to a general Council, utterly disregarding the decree of the Pope at Mantua, which expressly prohibited such a course. Heimburg was the author of this document.

The revolt was now fairly inaugurated, and Pius II at once met it by decisive measures. Briefs were dispatched in all directions, announcing the excommunication of Sigismund, and prohibiting all intercourse with him or his territory. A manifesto of the 19th August detailed the reasons of the excommunication, and the Emperor and the Bund were required to wrest the Tyrol from the Duke. Switzerland was the only country in which this proclamation had any effect. The German Princes condemned the action of the Pope, the majority of them openly espousing the cause of Sigismund; the prohibition of intercourse was disregarded by almost all the cities. Even the Princes of the Church for the most part neglected to take any measures for carrying out the Papal commands. In the Tyrol itself the laity and most of the clergy declared themselves on the side of the Duke, who displayed a feverish energy in face of the dangers which threatened him. He applied for assistance not only to his father-in-law, King James of Scotland, but to other Princes who, like Diether of Isenburg and Charles VII of France, were more or less hostile to the Holy See. A memorial against the Pope was at once drawn up in Latin and circulated throughout the Tyrol; and in the beginning of September a defence in Latin and German was sent out from Innsbruck to the temporal and spiritual Princes far and near. This document strongly insisted on Sigismund’s “rights as Lord of the country”. On the 9th September, the appeal of the 13th August was reiterated. The Cathedral Chapter of Brixen also appealed and declared the Papal Interdict invalid.

Sigismund’s new appeal and the defence both proceeded from the pen of Heimburg. These writings, like the productions of Luther and Hutten in a succeeding generation, were disseminated throughout the whole of Germany with extreme rapidity. The numerous copies to be found in the German Libraries bear witness to their extensive circulation. The appeals were like the Papal Indulgences affixed to the Church doors in Germany and Italy, and even as a hostile demonstration in Florence and Siena.

In the autumn of 1460 Pius II took proceedings against Heimburg in person as the chief instigator of the Duke, and the author of the obstinate opposition to the Apostolic See. He was excommunicated by name, and all the ecclesiastical and temporal authorities of Germany were desired to seize this “son of the devil”.

Heimburg now gave free vent to his rage. He began by appending a series of abusive marginal notes to the Bull which condemned him, directed not only against the person, but also against the Primacy of the Pope. This was followed by a new appeal to a Council, an invective exceeding all former attacks in violence. He accuses the Pope of being more garrulous than a magpie, and of having at Mantua praised adultery and crimes against public morality, and maintains the supremacy of Councils. “Hold fast what you have gained”, he says to the clergy, “the Council is the fortress of your liberties, the corner-stone of your dignity. Rend the feeble nets and break the worthless bonds which you have taken pains to forge for yourselves in your scholastic philosophy. And you, Princes and soldiers, who are accustomed in warfare to exercise your skill in seizing the best positions before the enemy can reach them, make haste to secure this most important point of the General Council, Should the Pope succeed in wresting this stronghold from you, you will find yourselves left without shield or spear and constrained to buy your lives at a heavy price, in the tribute which, under the mask of the Turkish war, is levied only to be spent for shameful and criminal purposes”. The Decree of Mantua is stigmatized by Heimburg as vain and senseless and the Pope is called a dotard and a heretic.

Pius II meanwhile had taken a further step against the Tyrolese rebels. On the 23rd January, 1461, he summoned Duke Sigismund, Gregor Heimburg, Lorenz Blumenau, Bishop George of Trent, all the Duke’s Counsellors, the Cathedral Chapter of Brixen, most of the Abbots of the Tyrolese Convents, a number of other spiritual and temporal Lords, and all clergy and laity of the Tyrol who had condemned the ecclesiastical Interdict, to appear within fifty days before his Tribunal to vindicate their orthodoxy, especially in regard to the article, “I believe in one holy Catholic and Apostolic Church”.

Heimburg replied on the 16th of May, 1461, by another appeal or rather manifesto, pouring contempt on the Papal summons, and full of revolutionary doctrines in regard to the spiritual power of the Papacy. “This appeal”, to quote the words of an historian who favours the Duke, “was certainly a considerable advance on the part of Sigismund and Heimburg, and it might seriously be asked whether they still remained within the sphere of the Catholic body, or had withdrawn from it and taken refuge in that abstract and universal church which exists only in the imagination”. On Wednesday in Holy Week, 1461, Pius II solemnly excluded Gregor Heimburg as a heretic from the Communion of the Church. On Maundy Thursday (2nd April) he reiterated the sentence of greater excommunication pronounced against him, as well as against Sigismund and his adherents. Sigismund retorted by causing Heimburg’s insolent manifesto of the 16th of March to be posted up in four places in Rome, but it was immediately torn down by the incensed populace.

The bad effects of the Duke’s example were but too apparent in the hostile attitude assumed by the Archbishop of Mainz in the spring of 1461. Heimburg had brought about an alliance between these two Princes. The day after he entered Diether’s service, the deliberations of the Diet of Nuremberg began (23rd February, 1461). In this Electoral Diet the anti-Papal opposition reached its climax.

Diether of Isenburg was the leading spirit of this Assembly. The lesser excommunication pronounced by the Papal judge in consequence of his non-payment of the Annates had so incensed him that he threatened to do his utmost against Rome. Emboldened by finding such a goodly array of Princes assembled in Nuremberg in answer to his summons he cast aside all consideration for the Head of the Church.

However unbecoming the action of the Papal judge might have been in thus proceeding against the first Prince of the Empire, it certainly was neither so important nor so irrevocable as to justify the extraordinary step at once taken by Diether. For, instead of availing himself of the nearest legal remedy, or complaining to the Pope of the treatment to which he had been subjected, he issued a formal appeal to a Council which, according to the decisions of Constance and Basle was to be held once in every ten years, committing himself, his Church and all who would join him to its protection. He declared that he could not appeal to the Pope, inasmuch as it was thought that he was a party to the judge’s act. Nevertheless, he was willing to do so if Pius II would refer the matter to the arbitration of some Prelate who was above suspicion; otherwise he appealed to his successor, who would have the right to revise his proceedings.

A Protestant historian considers that it would have been almost impossible to offer a deeper insult to Pius II than such an appeal, which passed over all the ordinary legal means and completely ignored the authority of the Pope. It was true that he had himself in former days at Basle defended this method of procedure. But his recent decree at Mantua had expressly forbidden it, denounced the principle on which it rested as a dangerous and destructive heresy, and declared that all authors and abettors of such an appeal from the Emperor himself down to the clerk who transcribed it would thereby incur the greater excommunication from which the Pope alone could absolve them at the hour of death. Most probably it was Heimburg, who was at this time in Nuremberg, who induced the Archbishop to take this rash step. The appeal bears marks of having been written by him. Diether’s rupture with Rome was now final.

In obedience to the Pope’s command, Cardinal Bessarion had at once sent an Embassy to Nuremberg to explain that it was not the intention of Rome to demand anything, however small, without the consent of the nation. Neither this Embassy, however, nor the two Nuncios seem to have arrived in time to intervene in the deliberations of the Diet.

Diether had now full scope for his anti-Roman agitation. He enjoyed the triumph of seeing not only the Count Palatine Frederick, but also the Elector Frederick of Brandenburg, his brothers, Albert and John, together with the Bishop of Wurzburg, likewise appeal. The Bohemian Ambassadors alone held aloof from this demonstration, as their master had good reasons for not breaking with Rome.

Frederick III also was bitterly attacked at Nuremberg. Antagonism towards him was in many ways interwoven with opposition to the Pope, and each gathered strength from the other. On the 1st of March the Electors of Mainz, of the Palatinate, and of Brandenburg, addressed a threatening letter to the Emperor. They described the deplorable condition of the Empire, complained of the negligence of Frederick, who for fifteen years had not been seen in this portion of it, and invited him to a Diet at Frankfort on the Sunday after Pentecost (31st May). Should the Emperor fail to appear they would decide and act without him, as might be necessary for the welfare of the Empire. On the same day the Electors bound themselves by a solemn promise, equivalent to an oath, not to suffer themselves to be turned from their purpose by Pope or by Emperor.

On the 2nd March the Elector Frederick and the Margraves, Albert and John, together with the Count Palatine, addressed a letter to the Pope expressing their astonishment that he should have required from Archbishop Diether a larger sum than his predecessors had paid for the Pallium. This demand, they declared, inflicted fresh injury on the Church of Mainz, which was once the most powerful in the Empire, but had suffered considerably from wars and calamities, it infringed the rights of the Councils, and violated the Concordats which former Popes had concluded with the German nation, and would lead to the ruin of the Church in Germany. They most humbly begged His Holiness to be satisfied with the ancient tax which the Archbishop was ready at any moment to pay and to remove the penalties inflicted upon him and his adherents. If the Pope refused to grant their request, concluded the letter in a tone of menace, they and almost all the Princes of the German nation would range themselves on Diether’s side and support him by word and act.

As if the Apostolic See had not been sufficiently offended by his first appeal, Diether shortly afterwards issued a second. In this he complained of the attitude of Bessarion in Vienna, and of the numerous Indulgences by which the coffers of the devout were emptied and of the exorbitant claim of Annates. This appeal and a joint manifesto in accordance with it were signed by a large number of the Princes and Envoys. A yet more important symptom of the general feeling was the fact that the Council of Archbishop John of Treves eagerly took part in all these measures against the Holy See. The ultimate goal of the opposition conducted by Diether and Heimburg was evidently a German imitation of the Pragmatic Sanction of Bourges; the bond between the German Church and the centre of unity was to be as far as possible loosened, and Germany placed in a semi-schismatical position.

It is very remarkable that the opposition should have been so strong in Germany against a Pope whose own countrymen accused him of German sympathies. But it is easy to see how little importance is to be attached to all these fine words about the liberty and honour of Germany; they were but a mask to cover selfish aims and private interests. Where was the patriotism of men who did not shrink from an alliance with the French monarch who was still hankering after the Rhine country? Full details are wanting, but it is a fact that Heimburg was sent to the French Court to consult with the King as to measures to be taken by the German and French opposition in common. Nor did the German Princes scorn other foreign assistance, they thought of a treaty with King Rene, who was in active antagonism to the Pope on the Neapolitan question. It is obvious that the triumph of King Rene, and with him of French influence in Italy, would not have promoted the interests of Germany.

After the Count Palatine Frederick and Diether had on the 6th March joined the Electoral Union, the dissolution of the Diet was decided upon. This body demanded amongst other things a general Council and a fresh Assembly in Frankfort on the 22nd May; all private negotiations with the Roman Court were prohibited.

The dissolution of the Diet was accepted unanimously, but discontent and mistrust soon broke forth again among the confederates, who were occupied solely with their own private interests, and no one of whom was prepared to make any sacrifice for the cause which he professed to advocate. The Assembly which had seemed so seriously to threaten the two chief powers of Christendom had but glossed over for a time the ancient party strifes. Margrave Albert discovered to the Emperor “in profound secrecy” the plans which had been framed in the Diet, and in the course of a few months Diether’s work was undone, and everything that had been sealed and sworn to at Nuremberg was forgotten.

The tidings of these proceedings had caused the greatest consternation alike at the Imperial and the Papal Courts. Frederick III turned to Pius II for assistance. “Consider, Holy Father”, he wrote on the 7th April, “how rampant the factions in the Empire have grown. See how they presume to lay down the law to Us both. It is absolutely necessary that We should at once combine to oppose their designs. We beg Your counsel and assistance. In Diether you may see the consequence of granting ecclesiastical confirmation without consulting the temporal ruler. At any rate do not let him be consecrated Archbishop”. Frederick III sent his Marshal, Henry of Pappenheim, throughout the Empire to dissuade and threaten those who might have been disposed to attend the proposed Diet at Frankfort.

The dangerous nature of the situation had been recognized first in Rome, and decisive measures had been taken. Even before the arrival of the alarming tidings from Germany, Pius II, ever watchful and armed, had dispatched, as his Nuncios to that country, the Canon Francis of Toledo and Rudolf of Rüdesheim, the Dean of the Cathedral Chapter of Worms. They were to treat with the German Princes in regard to their grievances, and in particular to give reassuring explanations on the subject of the levy of the tithes. They showed great skill in accomplishing the difficult task of quieting the storm which threatened ecclesiastical authority. No doubt in their conflict with this many-headed movement, they were at an advantage in being the servants of a united power. Still it is greatly to their credit that they were able so completely to soothe the partisans of the Council, and to separate them from the Archbishop of Mainz, as Pius desired.

The Papal Nuncios next succeeded in detaching Albert Achilles from the party of opposition. They assured him that it was not the Pope's intention to impose the tithes without the consent of the nation. They formally apologized for Bessarion’s threatening language in Vienna. He had had no such instructions from the Pope, but had been carried away by his own eager interest in the matter and wounded feelings. They also justified Pius II’s proceedings against Duke Sigismund and the friendly relations with the King of Bohemia, which he had hitherto maintained. In regard to the Council they declared that Pius II. would consent to it on condition that the temporal powers should cooperate in carrying out the reforms decreed by the Bishops.

When the Nuncios had also induced the Count Palatine Frederick and the Archbishop of Treves to withdraw from the appeal, the isolation of Diether was almost complete; and the failure of the Assembly at Frankfort which was opposed by the Pope as strongly as by the Emperor, might be predicted with certainty. Nevertheless, following the counsels of the impetuous Heimburg, he would not hear of yielding. In vain did his clergy urge him to retrace his steps, in vain did the Papal Nuncios declare themselves ready to come to terms if the Archbishop would but recall his appeal. When Frankfort, the Imperial city of Germany, at the command of Frederick III, refused to receive the proposed Assembly, he changed its place of meeting to his own Episcopal City.

The Diet of Mainz was very ill-attended, “the Imperial Cities in general, as well as the Electors of Cologne, Treves, and Bohemia were unrepresented. The Archbishop, in fact, stood alone with the Tyrolese Envoys; there were no others, and these had private reasons for their hostility to the Church”.

The proceedings began on the 4th June with a defeat for the opposition, for the excommunicated Heimburg was prevented by the Papal Nuncios from attending the Sessions. On the following day Diether, in a long speech, brought forward his complaints against Rome and demanded a General Council as the only remedy against the encroachments of the Apostolic See. He characterized the Tithes and Indulgences as frauds, and the Turkish war as merely a pretext to support them.

Rudolf of Rüdesheim, distinguished alike as a diplomatist and a canonist, defended the Holy See against Diether’s attacks with equal courage and success. His discourse was a masterpiece, temperate in its language, prudent and conciliatory in its treatment of questions of general interest, broad in its point of view, uncompromising and trenchant in dealing with the particular cases which touched the authority and doctrines of the Church. At the same time the two Nuncios emphatically declared that it had never been the intention of the Pope, and was not now his will to burden the German nation in opposition to the wishes of its Princes and Prelates with the imposition of the tithe determined at Mantua, nor to inflict on any one the spiritual penalties threatened in the Bull on this subject.

These words dealt a heavy blow to the opposition. These ardent reformers once convinced that they would not be required to put their hands in their pockets for the expenses of the Crusade, forgot all about the oppressions of Rome, together with their grand projects of a General Council and a Pragmatic Sanction, and left Diether to his fate.

The defeat of the Conciliar Party was sealed shortly afterwards by Diether’s promise, in the hope that the Pope would also make some concession or would extend the time for the payment of the Annates, to desist from whatever was displeasing to the Holy Father and to comply with his wishes. We can hardly be surprised that this unprincipled man was not trusted in Rome, especially when we find that he soon made a fresh attempt at opposition. With a view of bringing pressure to bear upon the Pope, he invited the German Princes, Prelates and Universities to resume the Diet of Mainz at Michaelmas, in order again to discuss the Turkish war, the tithes and the grievances of the nation and adopt suitable resolutions.

This meeting did not take place. Pius II having found another candidate for the Archbishopric in the person of the Canon Adolph of Nassau, secretly sent John Werner of Flassland as his agent to Germany, with Bulls, depriving Diether, and granting the Papal institution to his opponent. Flassland arrived safely at Mainz, where Adolph of Nassau at once summoned a meeting of the Cathedral Chapter. Diether, who had heard of the danger which threatened him, was present. Adolph, however, was by no means perplexed; with the Papal Bull in his hand he announced Diether’s deposition and his own appointment. The former at once protested and appealed from the Pope ill-informed to the Pope better informed, but he was not able to hinder the enthronement of his adversary. He also issued a violent defence, in which he related his whole contest with Rome, protested against his deposition, and declared that he did not acknowledge the prohibition of appeal on the ground that it had not the sanction of the Council, and was contrary to all justice, human and divine. “If”, he said, “no one is to appeal from the oppression of a Pope to a future General Council, then we are all at the Pope’s mercy”.

Diether’s position was from the first far from encouraging, for the Imperial party, led by Albert Achilles, which had opposed him before now, unanimously took the side of Adolph of Nassau. The deposed Prelate nevertheless determined to fight. He trusted in the powerful Count Palatine, but when this crafty Prince assumed a procrastinating attitude, he for a moment completely lost courage.

Unprincipled as ever, wavering between submission and defiance, he at first promised to yield, and then again took up arms. On the nth November, 1461, Diether entered into a solemn agreement with Adolph, by which he undertook to give up his See on condition of receiving absolution from excommunication and a considerable indemnity in land and men at the expense of the Church of Mainz. Peace seemed to be thus restored, but on the very day when this contract was sealed and sworn, Diether sought assistance against Adolph. On the 12th November his Envoys absolutely denied, in a letter to the Council of Mainz, the existence of any treaty between them. On the 19th he made a fresh alliance with the Count Palatine for the vindication of his claim to the Archbishopric, assigning to him the cities and castles of the Bergstrasse as the price of the aid he was to render.

A fierce conflict now broke forth, involving all the country bordering on the Rhine in the miseries and horrors attendant on the warfare of the period. Early in the following year the feud between the families of Hohenzollern and Wittelsbach blazed forth afresh, and the greater part of the Empire was filled with the din of arms. The vicissitudes of this struggle do not enter into the scope of our work.

On the 8th January, 1462, Pius II published a severe Bull against Diether. He required him within the space of eighteen days to give up all lands belonging to the archbishopric; in the event of his disobedience the heaviest ecclesiastical penalties were to be inflicted on him and his adherents, and all places in which they might sojourn were to be laid under an Interdict. Immediately after this, urgent requisitions were sent from Rome to the cities of Cologne and Frankfort, calling upon them to support Adolph of Nassau. On the first February the proceedings against Diether were justified in a detailed memorandum which also claimed help for Adolph, and insisted on the execution of the Papal censures. Francis of Toledo and Pietro Ferrici were sent to Germany as Nuncios to labour in the cause of the Pope, which they zealously did by word of mouth, by letters and manifestoes. But this time success was more difficult, for the rebels were now attached to Diether’s cause by-strong ties of material interest and advantage, both actual and prospective.

At Spires the Papal Bull of excommunication was torn down from the Cathedral door; the Count Palatine forbade its publication in his camp under pain of death. He, like Diether, appealed to the Council, as if he could thus wipe out the Pope. On the 30th March Diether addressed a manifesto from Höchst to all temporal and spiritual Princes, calling upon them to take to heart and consider how very unjustly and dishonourably he had been treated, imploring them not to hinder him in the maintenance of his righteous cause, but rather to punish such ungodly dealing, and to grant him help and support. By means of Gutenberg's printing-press, numerous copies of this manifesto which, it was hoped, would arouse a strong feeling against Rome, were disseminated throughout Germany.

Pius II had no thought of yielding. A fresh Encyclical of May 1st, 1462, called upon all the Estates of the Empire to assist Adolph of Nassau

Diether made great efforts to prevent the clergy from observing the Interdict. With this object in view he appeared in person at Frankfort-on-Maine on the 19th September, 1462. The Town Council would not allow him to proceed against the loyal clergy within the walls. The Archbishop, however, could not be prevented from going to St. Bartholomew’s. Here the doors were of course shut, but he was not to be so easily hindered; he caused the doors to be broken open, and as far as was necessary, the windows, and thus by main force celebrated Divine worship in the Church which had for weeks been closed on account of the Interdict.

The capture of the City of Mainz by his enemies on the 28th October, 1462, was a serious blow to Diether. Deprived of this stronghold he became more and more dependent on the Count Palatine. Many attempts were made to end this unholy warfare. But all were fruitless until the spring of 1463, when Rupert, brother of the Count Palatine, was elected Archbishop of Cologne, and anxious to secure the Confirmation of his Election, made serious efforts to bring about a peace. At Oppenheim he succeeded in inducing the contending parties to consent to a truce from April 24th to November nth, 1463. At the expiration of this period, it seemed likely that war would break forth anew, when affairs took a most unexpected turn.

The adherents of Nassau had long been desirous of breaking the alliance between Frederick and Diether. This at length came to pass. Diether, who had some reason to distrust his self-interested friend, entered into an agreement with Adolph in October, 1463. In con­sideration of being left in possession of a small territory, he renounced the Archbishopric, while Adolph promised to be responsible for all his debts and to bring about his reconciliation with the Pope and the Emperor. This agreement was soon afterwards ratified at Frankfort in presence of Pietro Ferrici, the Nuncio to whom Pius II had entrusted plenary powers. Diether, in token of his abdication, gave up his Electoral sword to Archbishop Adolph in a public assembly and did homage to him as his Lord. Then on his knees he asked for and received absolution from the sentence of excommunication.

The Count Palatine Frederick was more difficult to deal with; at length, however, the representations of his brother Rupert induced him to agree to a peace on very favourable terms. Adolph promised to obtain absolution for him and his followers from the Pope, and together with his Cathedral Chapter, acknowledged the mortgage on the Bergstrasse. In the middle of March, 1464, at a Diet at Worms, he was solemnly received back into the Communion of the Church by Bishop Onofrio of Tricarico, and Canon Pietro Ferrici, the Papal Legates. Before his absolution the Count was required to make a declaration that during the contest he had never intended to withdraw from submission to the Apostolic See and that for the future he would always be loyal and obedient to it.

These two leaders of the anti-Papal opposition in Germany were far surpassed in obstinacy by Duke Sigismund of the Tyrol. The conflict between the democratic Conciliar theory, represented by Heimburg and Sigismund, and the monarchical constitution of the Church upheld by the Pope, had reached its climax in the Manifesto of the 16th March, 1461. The contest now entered upon its last stage, that of negotiations for peace. The exasperation of both parties was still intense; the violent measures of the Duke against those who respected the Papal censures must have produced a very painful impression in Rome. Yet fresh proposals of mediation were constantly brought forward. The inefficacy of the Papal penalties, together with the course of events in Germany, induced Pius to consent to negotiations. But Sigismund would not hear of making any kind of apology until the Pope should have withdrawn his censures. This, and the large demands made by Cusa, frustrated the conciliatory efforts of the Venetians who earnestly desired the end of a contest which seriously impeded their trade through the Tyrol.

In consequence of a happy combination of circumstances, a solution was at length brought about by means of the Emperor. “Most Holy Father”, wrote Frederick III on the 2nd February, 1464, “it is time that this matter should be settled. The authority of the Church, as we see, is too little respected. In consideration of the times in which we live a little indulgence is necessary. We beg your Holiness to consent to our continuing the negotiation and to commission the Bishop of Lepanto to return to us and to give him authority when the matter is settled and absolution is sought, to grant it together with the removal of the Interdict and whatever else may be necessary for the complete restoration of peace. For as soon as an arrangement has been arrived at in regard to the restitution and things depending thereon, We, in the name and stead of our cousin, in accordance with the Mandate which We shall receive, will solemnly and humbly beg of your Holiness or your Commissary, absolution, removal of penalties, restitution, and everything that is required”.

The sudden death of Cusa (11th August, 1464), which was followed three days later by that of Pius II, brought all these troubles to an end. On the 25th August, the proposals which had been solemnly presented by the Emperor on the 12th June were accepted. The principal articles were the following: The Bishopric of Brixen was to be restored to the Cardinal who was to hold it as his predecessors had done before the Compact of Bruneck, which was to be considered null and void. Obligations contracted previously to that event were to continue in force. All ecclesiastical and secular persons were to be reinstated in their former possessions and dignities. The Poor Clares whom Sigismund had banished from Brixen were to return to their convent. In regard to the jurisdiction over the convent of Sonnenburg and other points left undecided by this Convention, they were to be arranged in accordance with former deeds. The Cardinal, as Bishop of Brixen, was to grant investiture to the Duke, in the same manner as his predecessors had granted it to the Duke’s forefathers. All who have adhered to Sigismund are to be absolved; the Chapter of Brixen retains its ancient privileges. Frederick III having, with head uncovered, besought pardon and absolution for Sigismund from the Papal Legate, the latter absolved the Duke from excommunication and the other censures, and removed the Interdict. Heimburg was not absolved; from the time that the Emperor undertook the work of reconciliation, he vanishes from the scene in the Tyrol. The Czech King, George Podiebrad, subsequently furnished him with another opportunity of joining battle with Rome.

CHAPTER V. ATTEMPTED RECONCILIATION OF BOHEMIA WITH THE CHURCH