CHAPTER III.

THE CONQUEST OF WESTERN CHINA,

A.D. 618-20

The first campaign which Shih-Min undertook as commander­in-chief followed immediately after the occupation of Chang An. It was directed against Hsueh Chu, the pretender who was recognised as emperor in Kansu province. Hsueh Chu, who had invaded Shensi (Shaanxi) by the valley of the Wei river, had hoped to capture the prize of Chang An before the Tang army could arrive. Although disappointed in this hope, he had already arrived at the city of Fu Feng, sixty miles to the west. Fu Feng sent a message promising submission to the Tang dynasty and begging for relief Shih-Min, entrusted with the task of raising the siege of this place, was completely successful. In a sharp action beneath the city walls Hsueh Chu’s forces were defeated and driven to retreat into Kansu.

The Tang army did not pursue this campaign further. The eastern border was as yet insecure, consequently Shih-Min did not dare to lead the strength of the army into the remote highlands of the west, especially in the depths of winter. During this campaign Shih-Min was joined by Hsiao Yu, who governed a district in this area. Hsiao Yu will be remembered as Yang Ti’s brother-in-law, who had offered the best advice when that emperor was besieged in Yen Men. Hsiao Yu became an influential civil minister at the Tang court

It has already been pointed out that in seizing the hill-girt province of Shensi the Tang leaders were conforming to an ancient strategic plan, which had been followed by all the great conquerors of the past. The control of this province gave the new dynasty a sure base from which expeditions for the conquest of the other provinces could be launched.

Judging by the course of the subsequent campaigns it would seem probable that Shih-Min, who was now in charge of all military operations, had studied the military history of the warring states period of the Chou dynasty, 400-213 bc. At that time the contesting kingdoms strove with varying success to achieve one or other of two rival political and strategic concepts. Chin, the ultimate victor, a state which occupied the province of Shensi, aimed to accomplish what was called the “horizontal” plan that was to conquer a belt of country from Shensi eastward along the valley of the Yellow river to the sea, and so cut off the rival states in the north from all possibility of cooperation with their allies in the south

These states for their part sought to put into effect what was called the vertical plan, and establish a north-to-south chain of allied kingdoms which would form a barrier against the eastward progress of Chin. A study of the map of North China will show that these rival plans embody abiding strategic verities conditioned by unchanging geographical facts, which will remain true in all ages. Similar plans were framed in the civil wars of 1923-30, and during every contest between the western hill provinces and the great eastern plain, the “horizontal” and “vertical” plans of the ancient Chou strategists reappear in all essentials unchanged.

Geography and the lessons of history thus forced Shih-Min to adopt the “horizontal” plan, since his base, like the kingdom of Chin, was Shensi province. His opponents, less educated or less quick-witted than he, were slower to under­stand that only the rapid consummation of the “vertical” strategy could save them from ultimate defeat.

In the early spring of a.d. 618 Shih-Min was occupied in the east. Chu-Tu Tung, the Sui general commanding at Pu Chou Fu, was induced to submit after the fell of Chang An, and this obstacle to an eastward advance being removed, Shih-Min and his brother Chien-Cheng moved into Honan along the Lo Yang road. Without encountering serious opposition the Tang army reached the neighbourhood of that capital, which was still being besieged by Li Mi. Had Li Mi been willing to submit to the Tang there is no question that the combined armies could have carried the city by storm, but Li Mi was too ambitious to accept a subordinate role. His attitude was so ambiguous that Shih-Min decided to retreat, giving his opinion that even if Lo Yang could be taken, it would be difficult to hold the city while campaigns in the far west, which was still unpacified, would require the full strength of the army.

Although for the moment abandoning any designs on Lo Yang, the Tang army took care to seize and garrison the cities along the main road to the west of the capital, securing the route for a future invasion.

Shih-Min’s decision not to embark on large scale operations in Honan was justified by the news which he heard on returning to Chang An. Hsueh Chu from Kansu had made a fresh advance, and had reached Pin Chou, sixty miles north­west of Chang An. While on the way to check this invasion Shih-Min was incapacitated by an attack of fever. He was forced to resign the command to Liu Wen-Ching, to whom he gave strict orders not to engage battle. Shih-Min had a reason for enjoining inaction. He knew that the enemy, who were a long way from their base, were having difficulty in obtaining supplies. He therefore intended to play a waiting game till he could force Hsueh Chu to engage battle under unfavourable circumstances.

Unfortunately Liu Wen-Ching and the other generals imagined that Shih-Min held their ability in low esteem, and was acting upon the defensive only because he himself was too ill to take command. Piqued by what they felt to be a boy’s unreasonable contempt, they ignored Shih-Min’s instructions, and gave battle to Hsueh Chu near Pin Chou. The Tang army suffered a disastrous defeat from which the generals themselves escaped with difficulty. Shih-Min gathered the fugitives and fell back on Chang An. Liu Wen-Ching and his associate generals were deprived of their commands and rank

The defeat of Liu Wen-Ching left the Kansu pretender free to advance on the Tang capital. Hsueh Chu’s death, when already on the march, averted the immediate danger; for his son and successor, Hsueh Jen-Kuo, did not press the campaign in this direction. Instead, he endeavoured to consolidate his position in the west. A Tang force was driven into Ching Chon, on the Kansu-Shensi border, and the city besieged. Another force, sent to extricate the first, was itself defeated and compelled to seek safety in the same city, where the starving garrison, after earing their horses, were forced to subsist on a meal made by crushing the bones of these animals.

Hsueh Jen-Kuo scored a further success by capturing the strong fortress of Lung Chou, which was betrayed to him by an officer who had made a false submission to the Tang in the hope of finding an opportunity of delivering the city to his real master. The progress of the enemy was not arrested till Shih-Min, who had recovered from the fever, advanced in the later autumn to the vicinity of Lung Chou, where he made an entrenched camp. There he remained inactive for more than sixty days, waiting till the coming of winter caused a shortage of provisions in the enemy army. Hsueh Jen-Kuo, whose rule was harsh and tyrannical, did not enjoy his father’s popularity in Kansu. When the scarcity in his army became acute, several officers with their troops deserted to the Tang.

When Shih-Min judged that these desertions had sufficiently weakened both the strength and morale of the enemy, he detached a portion of his army to make a new camp at the springs of the Chien river (Chien Shui Yuan), the very place where Liu Wen-Ching had been defeated a few months previously. As he had expected, the Kansu army, seeking an easy success, made haste to attack this camp, and were no intent on their attack that they failed to observe the movements of the Tang main body. Shih-Min evacuated his original camp and led his troops by a detour through the hills to a position which menaced the rear of the Kansu army. The enemy, discovering their dangerous predicament, endeavoured to retreat, but being now taken between two fires were utterly defeated. The Tang army drove the fugitives to the walls of Hsueh Jen-Kuo’s capital, a city on the Ching river near Ching Chou, Kansu. The Kansu pretender rallied the fugitives with the intention of giving bottle once more, but his followers were in no mood for further fighting. At the approach of the Tang army so many deserted that Hsueh Jen-Kuo was forced to retreat into the town without fighting. As soon as the siege was formed, the soldiers of the garrison profited by the night to slip over the walls and surrender, till in a few days Hsueh Jen-Kuo, deserted by all his followers, was compelled to make an unconditional submission. In accordance with the custom of the time he was taken to Chang An and decapitated in the market place. So ended the first of Shih-Min’s rivals, and by his defeat all the north-west of China was added to the Tang domain.

While this campaign had been occupying the Tang armies in the west, important developments had occurred in Honan, where Li Mi was besieging Lo Yang. His strife with the Sui general, Wang Shih-Chung, was now interrupted by the approach of a common enemy, the regicide Yu-Wen Hua-Chi, who had come north with the mutinous imperial army after the massacre at Yang Chou. The Sui officials in Lo Yang, hard pressed by famine, with no hope of relief in any direction, conceived the plan of “pardoning” Li Mi, so that he might fight Yu-Wen Hua-Chi. By this plan two dangerous enemies would be weakened while Lo Yang was given a chance to revictual.

The scheme appealed to Li Mi, who, for his part, reflected that once he was allowed into Lo Yang he could make short work of any who still supported the hopeless cause of the Sui dynasty. Pardoned and appointed grand-general by the Sui Prince Yueh, Li Mi marched away east to meet Yu-Wen Hua-Chi at the city of Li Yang, on the Yellow river near Ta Ming Fu. Here Li Mi twice defeated the regicide, the second time so severely that Yu-Wen Hua-Chi was driven across the river with only a remnant of 20,000 men. Had not Li Mi himself been wounded in this battle, a misfortune which delayed the pursuit, the regicide would not have escaped. Even as it was Yu-Wen Hua-Chi realised that all hope was gone. After reaching the temporary haven of Ta Ming Fu he abandoned himself to a life of wine and debauch, in the midst of which he one day exclaimed, “Death is certain. Can I not be emperor if only for a day?”. Forthwith he gave orders to slay the shadow Sui monarch whom he had set up at Yang Chou, and proclaimed himself emperor.

Li Mi’s victories in the east were very unwelcome news to Wang Shih-Chung who, with his army, was still at Lo Yang. His reputation had suffered greatly from his repeated defeats at Li Mi’s hands. It was bitter for him to see his old adversary not only pardoned but appointed to the highest posts. Wang feared, with reason, that if Li Mi entered Lo Yang in triumph after his return from the east, he himself would be the first victim of the ex-rebel’s all-powerful influence. To protect himself he decided to prevent Li Mi from entering the city. His intrigues came to the ears of those Sui officials who favoured Li Mi and feared Wang Shih-Chung. They decided that Wang, whose services would no longer be required, and who could not be expected to work in harmony with Li Mi, had better be removed.

Their plans were not well kid and leaked out. Wang Shih-Chung acted with speed and determination. At the head of his troops he attacked the palace, overpowered the guards, and dragged his principal enemies from the very presence of Prince Yueh to instant execution. He then made a massacre of all the officials opposed to his party, and had himself appointed generalissimo and minister with plenary powers, the recognised first step to usurping the throne. Prince Yueh “had but to sit on his throne with folded hands ”, as the historian puts it.

On hearing the news of this revolution, Li Mi, then marching back to Lo Yang, threw over his allegiance to the Sui prince, and prepared to renew the siege of the capital. Wang Shih-Chung, realising that Lo Yang was in no condition to withstand a fresh blockade, decided to risk everything on one battle. After impressing upon his troops the desperate plight of the city, and the absolute necessity of victory, he marched out to confront Li Mi. That rebel, over­confident since his victory over Yu-Wen Hua-Chi, believed that success was certain. Disregarding the wise advice of his generals, who were in favour of delay, he made a rash attack upon the army of Wang Shih-Chung. But the Sui army, keyed up by their desperate situation, fought with unusual valour, and achieved a complete victory. Most of Li Mi’s principal generals were slain, while he himself, escaping with difficulty from the rout, fled with such troops as remained to him, less than 20,000, to submit to the Tang emperor.

Li Yuan felt distrustful of a submission which was manifestly only the result of defeat and ruin. Although Li Mi was invited to Chang An and given rank and titles, he was deprived of the command of his army. Li Mi, for his part, felt slighted at the Tang court. He had still many partisans in the eastern part of Honan, who after his defeat were left in much uncertainty. While some submitted to Wang Shih-Chung, the most important, Hsu Shih-Chi (Li Shih-Chi), followed his chief’s example and swore allegiance to Li Yuan. The Tang dynasty thus acquired a detached territory in the eastern plain. For this service Hsu Shih-Chi was rewarded with the imperial surname of Li, and it is as Li Shih-Chi that he is known to history.

Li Mi, persuaded that his old officers would rise in his favour if he returned with an army to Honan, asked to be given charge of an expedition to the east, which he said could easily be brought under the authority of the Tang emperor. Li Yuan consented after much hesitation. Many at the court were strongly opposed to the plan. “To send Li Mi to Honan”, said one, “is like loosing a tiger on the mountain, or throwing a fish back into the river. He will inevitably revolt.” The prediction might perhaps have proved untrue if Li Yuan, with typical indecision, had not acted in such a way as to rouse Li Mi’s fears. When the general was already east of the Tung Kuan pass, at the head of his army, Li Yuan decided to recall him. When Li Mi received this order he was alarmed and angered. Aware that he had so fax been perfectly loyal to his new master, he suspected that some intrigue had been set on foot against him, and that if he returned to Chang An he would be put to death. Besides these fears, his pride made it difficult, after several years of independent leadership, to obey the vacillating orders of one whose ability to command was far inferior to his own.

Instead of returning to the court, he slew the imperial messenger and raised his own standard in revolt. But fortune had now finally deserted the adventurer. The Tang troops stationed in the cities of western Honan, on hearing of the revolt, ambushed Li Mi’s army in a defile among the loess hills of that country. Inthe battle Li Mi himself was killed, and with his death the rebellion collapsed.

Li Shih-Chi did not take part in the revolt of Li Mi. The territories along the lower course of the Yellow river which he had presented to the Tang dynasty formed a detached area which was menaced on the west by Wang Shih-Chung, on the north by Yu-Wen Hua-Chi and the emperor of Hsia, Tou Chien-Te. To succour these places the Tang court despatched an army under Li Shen-Tung Prince Huai An, Shih-Min’s uncle. Prince Huai An and Li Shih-Chi had at first considerable success in this region. Ta Ming Fu was wrested from the regicide Yu-Wen Hua-Chi, who was forced to take refuge in the smaller city of Pu Chou (not to be confused with Pu Chou Fu, in Shanxi). There he was closely besieged.

The progress of the Tang armies in this country aroused the hostility of a far more formidable foe, Tou Chien-Te, emperor of Hsia, whose territory already covered the greater part of the eastern plain north of the Yellow river. Tou Chien-Te, hearing of the Tang successes against Yu-Wen Hua-Chi, decided to demand his share of the spoils. The regicide, who could not hope to withstand his enemies for long, offered to submit to the Tang dynasty, supposing that Prince Huai An, as the weaker party, would be glad of his assistance against Tou Chien-Te. But the prince preferred to leave the prey to the emperor of Hsia rather than make a composition with the regicide, who was held in universal detestation.

Although Tou Chien-Te had been one of the first to rebel against Yang Ti’s tyranny, he had professed the greatest horror at the news of the massacre at Yang Chou. He put his court into mourning for the sovereign against whose authority he had been for many years in open rebellion. With these sentiments it was not surprising that he attacked Pu Chou with determination, and carried the city after a short siege. The regicide was taken prisoner, together with the treasure and harem of the fallen Sui emperor. Tou Chien-Te immediately executed Yu-Wen Hua-Chi, his brother Yu-Wen Chih-Chi, and all those who had been implicated in the tragedy of Yang Chou. The Empress Hsiao, who Yu-Wen Hua-Chi had carried off at his departure from Yang Chou, received kindly treatment from the emperor of Hsia, who later managed to send her to the Turkish khan, where she received shelter from the khan’s Chinese wife, the Sui princess, I Chcng.

In the spring of ad 619 Wang Shih-Chung made it clear that he too must be regarded as a claimant to the empire and no longer a loyal subject of the Sui dynasty. He had already obtained the title of prince of Cheng; now he presented his sovereign, Prince Yueh, with a peremptory demand that he should yield the throne. Yang Tung Prince Yueh had courage and ability worthy of a happier destiny. He flatly refused to surrender his heritage. But Wang Shih-Chung was not deterred by his failure to obtain the formality of his sovereign’s consent. He imprisoned Prince Yueh and appropriated the imperial ornaments, after which he was proclaimed emperor, taking the name of his principality of Cheng for the new dynasty.

The change was not popular in Lo Yang, where Wang’s arbitrary methods were resented by the polished courtiers of Yang Ti’s former capital. A plot to assassinate the usurper and restore Prince Yueh was formed. Unfortunately the conspirators were careless, and information of their designs came to the knowledge of the new emperor. After decapitating all suspected of complicity in the plot, Wang Shih-Chung decided to prevent further conspiracies by removing the person in whose interest they might be formed. A cup of poisoned wine was sent to the imprisoned Prince Yueh, The unfortunate young man, when he realised the grim nature of his visitor’s mission, asked for time to take leave of his mother, but his request was inhumanly refused. Then, falling on his knees before the altar of Buddha, the last ruler of the Sui dynasty uttered the memorable prayer, “May I never, in any future life, be reborn a prince or an emperor”. The poison not taking effect as rapidly as the assassins wished, they hastened his end by strangling him with a scarf.

The rival pretenders in central and eastern China had hitherto been too occupied with their own ambitions to check the progress of the Tang dynasty in the west and north The Tang leaders for their part had been absorbed in the task of consolidating their position in Shensi and Kansu. Li Yuan for these reasons had not paid sufficient attention to the latent menace of Turkish hostility. Accepting the treaty made in ad 617 with Sibir Khan, he had ignored the danger of an attack by Liu Wu-Chou, the pretender in north Shansi who had accepted Turkish suzerainty. It was from this quarter that the Tang dynasty had now to resist an onslaught more determined and sustained than those it had so far encountered.

When Sibir Khan accepted the offer of Tang friendship in AD 617 he was following his policy of supporting as many Chinese claimants as he could find in the hope that their dissensions would pave the way for a Turkish conquest. The rapid progress of the Tang armies under Shih-Min was unwelcome to the Turk, who began to fear that the Tang dynasty was growing too powerful. To redress the balance Sibir Khan decided to give active support to his two vassals, Liang Shih-Tu, who held the country north of Shensi province in the “loop” of the Yellow river, and Liu Wu-Chou, who reigned in north Shansi In the spring of ad 619 the main strength of the Turkish hordes crossed the Yellow river “loop” to assist Liang Shih-Tu, while Liu Wu-Chou was ordered to attack Tai Yuan Fu.

This formidable invasion was about to break in along the whole line of the northern Tang frontier, when Sibir Khan died. He was succeeded by his younger brother Chur Khan, who was not prepared, on the morrow of his accession, to undertake a major campaign. While consolidating his position on the insecure Turkish throne he contented himself with encouraging the two Chinese pretenders. Liang Shih-Tu harried the border cities without much success. The operations of Liu Wu-Chou, 0n the other hand, rapidly developed into the most serious menace that had yet threatened the Tang dynasty.

When the Tang court was established at Chang An, Tai Yuan Fu and the province of Shansi had been left in the care of Li Yuan-Chi Prince Chi, Shih-Min’s youngest brother, who, as it proved, was a most unsuitable choice. Yuan-Chi’s age is not stated, but as Shih-Min himself was only nineteen at this time, Yuan-Chi cannot have been more than seventeen years old. At that age Shih-Min had planned and directed the Tang revolution; but Yuan-Chi had few qualities in common with his elder brother. Finding himself the master of a province, with wide powers, he gave himself up to a life of pleasure and outrageous violence, which did the greatest harm to the Tang cause in its original home itself.

Arming the women of his palace, the young prince forced them to engage in sanguinary, and sometimes mortal, gladiatorial combats for his amusement. When passing through the streets of the city he would take snap shots with his bow and arrows at the citizens, in order “to see If they could dodge the arrows”. At night he would sally out accompanied by a troop of libertines, and entering at will into any private dwelling, spend the night there in debauch. Like his father, Li Yuan-Chi was passionately devoted to hunting, often saying, “I can go three days without food, but not one without a hunt”. On this pastime he lavished the revenues of the province.

The people and officials of Tai Yuan Fu, outraged by this barbarous behaviour, sent a petition to the emperor, who had the sense to respond by promptly relieving the young savage of his post. Unfortunately Yuan-Chi knew how to play upon the weakness of his father’s character. By a show of contrition he obtained his reinstatement at Tai Yuan Fu. The emperor’s weakness was to have dangerous consequences. Liu Wu-Chou, who had observed Yuan-Chi’s conduct, came to the conclusion that the people of Shansi were not likely to regret a change of masters. Early in the summer of this year (ad 619) he invaded the province in great strength.

Yuan-Chi, who had given his officers little reason to respect his judgment, sent an inadequate force against the invaders, in spite of the protests of the officer placed in command. This officer, convinced that his small force could not hope to gain the battle, and knowing that if he was defeated he would be executed by the young tyrant, escaped from this dilemma by joining the invaders and leading them to the capture of Yu Tzu, a city twenty miles east of Tai Yuan Fu.

Sung Chin-Kang, who commanded the army of Liu Wu-Chou, next besieged Tai Yuan Fu itself, while detached forces, roving over the plateau, captured Ping Yao and Chieh Hsiu. The latter city is an important strategic point which commands the northern mouth of the Squirrel pass (Chiao Shu Ku) the narrow defile through which the Fen river comes down from the Tai Yuan plateau. In consequence, the Tang army from the south of the province, hurrying up to the relief of Tai Yuan Fu, found its advance blocked at this point. The generals rashly gave battle, but Sung Chin-Kang, who had placed part of his troops in ambush, scored another victory, driving the Tang army back into the pass.

After this check the command was given to Pei Chi, the eunuch, a foolish choice, for which Li Yuan was responsible. Pei Chi, on joining the army, made a new attempt to take Chieh Hsiu, for without this city in his hands he could not advance on to the plateau. He encamped before the walls, but his position was so unskillfully chosen that the enemy were able to cut off his water supply. Sung Chin-Kang waited till the Tang army, suffering from thirst, had dispersed in search of water, when be made a sudden sortie, which caught the improvident eunuch general unawares. The Tang army suffered a disastrous defeat, Pei Chi himself only escaped by covering the seventy miles to Ping Yang Fu in a day and a night.

Following this calamity every city in the province north of Ping Yang Fu surrendered to Sung Chin-Kang. The crowning misfortune came when the incompetent Li Yuan­Chi, the cause of all these disasters, fled panic-stricken by night from Tai Yuan Fu itself, which, on heating of the prince’s desertion, promptly surrendered. Li Yuan was furious at this news, for the city had a strong garrison and provisions for a long siege. The fall of this place might mean the loss of all Shansi. Nothing now arrested the advance of Sung Chin-Kang. Ting Yang Fu, the second city of the province, was taken, and the smaller places in the south-west of Shansi fell one after another into his hands. It seemed as if the triumphant advance of the Tang army through this same region two years before was now to be repeated—this time by their enemies.

The ill-advised strategy of Pei Chi contributed in no small measure to these enemy successes. In the hope of checking the progress of Sung Chin-Kang, the Tang general ordered the rural population to burn their crops, now ready for harvest, and assemble in the cities. This policy meant ruin and starvation for the peasantry. Their resentment was so keen that a revolt broke out, the rebels capturing the town of Hsia Hsien which they handed over to Sung Chin-Kang.

The loss of Shansi seemed so final that Li Yuan, always easily discouraged, abandoned all hope of recovering the province, proposing in council to make the Yellow river the frontier of his empire, and renounce all ambitions for the conquest of eastern China. This pusillanimous proposition was vigorously combated by Shih-Min. He pointed out that Shanti had been the base from which the Tang dynasty had drawn its strength in the opening phase of the revolution. From this country they had advanced to capture Chang An. If Liu Wu-Chou was to be left in possession, he too would use the resources of Shansi to organise a further invasion of the Tang territories.

Li Yuan, as usual, yielded to the arguments of his younger son. Instead of evacuating the country east of the Yellow river, Shih-Min was appointed to command a new army with full authority to carry on the war against Liu Wu-Chou. It was already late in the year when Shih-Min at the head of these fresh troops crossed the Yellow river north of Pu Chou Fu. His first act was to abolish the unwise regulations with which Pei Chi had alienated the peasantry. The news that Shih-Min was in command was the most potent factor in restoring the confidence of the people and the army. Before long Shih-Min’s camp was abundantly supplied with provisions.

The new commander-in-chief was not prepared to take the offensive in the depths of winter. Before undertaking major operations he wished to restore the morale of the army, badly shaken by the disasters of the previous summer. To this end he engaged the enemy raiding parties in frequent skirmishes. On one of these expeditions Shih-Min met with an adventure which nearly proved fatal. He had left the camp, attended by a squadron of light horse, to reconnoitre the enemy position. As the country was cut up by deep defiles, his force gradually dispersed till the prince was accompanied by only one officer. He had ridden to the top of a mound to get a view of the country, when a large band of enemy horsemen, emerging from a defile, surrounded the position.

Shih-Min and his companion would have been surprised beyond any hope of escape had it not been for a stroke of luck, which the popular imagination later attributed to divine intervention. The officer in attendance, who had dismounted and was lying oct the grass, was suddenly startled by a snake, which, in pursuit of a field mouse, passed close in front of his face. Leaping up with a shout, he caught sight of the enemy, who were more than one hundred strong. Shih-Min and his companion owed their lives to the prince’s skill at archery, for when Shih-Min had picked off the officer leading the enemy, the rest fell back, enabling the prince to escape to his camp.

Operations on a larger scale began with an attack on the rebels in the town of Hsia Hsien. The Tang force which had been detached for this expedition encountered a vigorous defence from the enemy general, Yu-Chih Ching-Te, by whom it was severely defeated. Shih-Min did not allow this battle to go unavenged. While another Tang force engaged Yu-Chih Ching-Te around Hsia Hsien, the prince himself, by a forced march, outflanked the enemy, and at the city of An I totally defeated Yu-Chih Ching-Te, who had difficulty in escaping from the field. After this victory most of the generis were in favour of pressing the offensive against Sung Chin-Kang's main force, but Shih-Min did not con­sider the moment opportune.

Instead, he remained inactive till the spring. His reason for this delay was the difficulty which the enemy encountered in maintaining their supplies. In the depths of winter they were unable to find sufficient forage for the horses or food for the soldiers. Shih-Min decided to wait till a long and hungry winter had weakened their cavalry, when he could force them to engage battle in circumstances which favoured the Tang army. His own camp was plentifully supplied by means of the Yellow river and its tributary, the Wei, which enabled him to draw provisions for men and beasts from Shensi. Liu Wu-Chou, fearing that this delay would prejudice his plans, attempted to create a diversion elsewhere in order to draw the Tang army out to battle. He sent raiding parties over the mountains into south-east Shansi which had hitherto been undisturbed. At first he met with some success, capturing two small cities. Shih-Min, however, refused to be drawn, and the raiders were driven out of the south-east by the local Tang garrisons.

Towards the end of spring, in the fourth month, the army of Sung Chin-Kang, having exhausted its supplies, was forced to retreat. This was the opportunity for which the prince had waited so patiently. He started in pursuit, and after a forced march came up with die enemy rearguard at Ling Shih, a town at the southern mouth of the Squirrel pass (Chiao Shu Ku).

His object was to engage and defeat the enemy before they could pass this defile. As has already been mentioned the Squirrel pass, by which the Fen river descends from the plateau of Tai Yuan Fu, is a position of great natural strength, where for nearly twenty miles the river and road wind together through a narrow ravine bordered by steep cliffs of rock and loess. If the position is held strongly no army coming from the south could force its way up on to the plateau.

The swift pursuit of the Tang army took the enemy by surprise; the rearguard was scattered and the Tang cavalry launched in pursuit. Shih-Min, pressing to the utmost the attack upon the retreating enemy, broke through the defence and prevented any rally. The army of Sung Chin-Kang was given no chance to reform. Pausing neither for food nor rest, the Tang army drove the enemy headlong through the defile, fighting ten separate engagements, after covering nearly seventy miles in twenty-four hours. After a prodigious slaughter of the flying mob, the prince drove Sung Chin­ Kang out of the northern month of Squirrel pass into the city of Chieh Hsiu. Then the Tang army, exhausted by these efforts, was allowed to encamp. The generals, who feared that the prince would be exposed to danger in this furious chase, had begged him to take rest, but Shih-Min, who had waited months for this moment, replied, “Opportunity comes seldom and is easily missed. Superiority, acquired with difficulty, can be lost in a moment". During this pursuit Shih-Min took no food for two days and did not put off his armour for three. When at last the army encamped, only one sheep could be found for the prince and his staff. This they cut up with their swords and shared between them.

Chieh Hsiu, the city in which Sung Qun-Kang, with the remnant of 20,000 men that remained to him, had taken refuge, is a square, solidly walled city, standing on the edge of the plateau about two miles from the Fen river. This place was the next objective of the Tang army. If Sung Chin­Kang retreated farther he would be defenceless in the wide Tai Yuan plateau, but if he remained in the city, he could be blockaded by a part of the Tang army, which was now greatly superior in numbers. Faced with these alternatives, Liu Wu-Chou’s general decided to risk a last battle in the hope of recovering control of the Squirrel pass. Leaving the general Yu-Chih Ching-Te in charge of the city, Sung Chin­ Kang led out his army and formed a line of battle with his rear protected by the city wall.

As this formation prevented Shih-Min from employing his customary outflanking manoeuvre, he ordered Li Shih-Chi, who had joined the army earlier in the year, to engage the enemy with the infantry, while Shih-Min held off with the cavalry until he judged the enemy were tiring. Then giving the order to charge, the prince swept through the weary ranks of Sung Chin-Kang’s smaller force,  which broke into flight. The enemy commander with a few attendants managed to escape from the field, but the army, relentlessly pursued, was dispersed and destroyed. Yu-Chih Ching-Te, who had witnessed the tout from the walls of Chieh Hsiu, decided to surrender, yielding the fortress to Li Tao-Tsung Prince Jen Cheng, a cousin of Shih-Min, a young commander who was to achieve great feme in later years.

The rout of Squirrel pass and the battle of Chieh Hsiu were decisive. The army of Liu Wu-Chou had ceased to exist. The pretender himself fled from Tai Yuan Fu to the Turks; but as he had ceased to be of use to Chur Khan, he was put to death not long afterwards, and his faction died with him. Sung Chin-Kang met with no better fate. More resolute than his chief, he had attempted to raise a fresh army, but meeting with no success he endeavoured to escape to the north-east, only to be killed on the road. Tai Yuan Fu and every other city which had been held by Liu Wu-Chou surrendered without opposition on the approach of the Tang army.

In this campaign Shih-Min had given outs tanking proof of his military genius, and it was now that he collected round him a brilliant staff of subordinates who in later years carried the Tang standards to victory across the vast deserts of Central Asia. Besides Li Shih-Chi, already well known, the Shansi campaign proved the merit of Li Tao-Tsung Prince Jen Ching, Yu-Wen Shih Chi, a brother of the regicide—but one who had taken no part in the massacre Yang Chou—and Yu-Chih Ching-Te, who though he had fought for the enemy was now granted a command in the Tang army and became the captain of Shih-Min’s personal guard.

After the fall of Tai Yuan Pu, Shih-Min left the task of pacifying the frontier to his generals, marching south, where his genius and determination were urgently needed to repair the disasters which had befallen the Tang arms in eastern Honan. On his way he passed Hsia Hsien, the city which had rebelled against Pei Chi’s harsh legislation and welcomed the invaders. The prince summoned the rebel city to surrender, and when the inhabitants rashly refused, he ordered the army to take the place by storm, and exterminate the citizens for the double crime of revolting and now refusing to return to their lawful allegiance. These orders were carried out. The massacre of the people of Hsia Hsien is one of the few bad acts recorded against Shih-Min. Although the laws and customs of the time were not opposed to such severity against contumacious rebels, the historians consider that in this action Shih-Min did not live up to his character. He himself regretted his cruelty, and in after life, when faced with a similar situation in Korea, ransomed the inhabitants himself, although by the laws of war they were the prey of his soldiers.

The victorious conclusion of the Shansi campaign, which not only restored the lost Tang territories, but eliminated another rival emperor, produced a profound impression even in distant parts of China. Already the rebels who had over­thrown the Sui officials in eastern Shantung had acknowledged Li Yuan as emperor. Their example was now followed by Tu Fu-Wei, the young leader who dominated the Huai valley in the east, and by Kao Kai-Tao, who, calling himself prince of Yen, ruled the north-eastern part of Hopei province from Yung Ping Fu. Tu Fu-Wei, invested with the title of prince of Wu, was given plenary authority to conquer and administer the lands south of the Huai. Before the end of the year he had justified this trust by capturing Nanking from Li Tzu-Tung, an “emperor” who ruled the south-east coast. Szechuan had already been conquered by the Tang prince Chan (Li Hsiao-Kung), son of Shih-Min’s uncle, Li Shin-Tung Prince Huai An.

There still remained Hsiao Hsien, the ruler of the middle Yangtze and southern provinces, and two, more formidable, foes in the north—Tou Chien-Ti, emperor of Hsia in the eastern plain, and Wang Shih-Chung, the new emperor of Cheng at Lo Yang. These two, menaced by the rising power of the Tang dynasty, were driven to form an alliance which should oppose its united strength in a final struggle for mastery.

CHAPTER IV.

THE BATTLE OF SSU SHUI

AD. 620-621