CHAPTER IV.

THE BATTLE OF SSU SHUI

AD. 620-621

 

The early part of the year ad 619 had been unfortunate for the Tang arms not only in Shansi but also in Honan. Wang Shih-Chung had profited by the defeat of Li Mi to extend his authority eastwards. By the end of the year he had occupied Kai Feng Fu with other cities to the east of that place, and was threatening the districts along the lower course of the Yellow river, which had recently submitted to the Tang emperor. Even more serious was the progress made by Tou Chien-Ti, emperor of Hsia. After he had destroyed the army of the regicide Yu-Wen Hua-Chi, Tou Chien-Te turned his attention to the cities north of the Yellow river which Prince Huai An had brought under the authority of Chang An.

Moving down the great northern road the army of Hsia captured Kuang Ping Fu, where the emperor of Hsia fixed his capital, then Chang Te Fu, farther south, and by autumn was advancing on Wei Hui. If this city fell into enemy hands all communication between the Tang territories in the eastern plain and Chang An would be interrupted. Prince Huai An and Li Shih-Chi, the Tang generals, were then at Li Yang, forty miles north-east of the threatened city. The Tang forces were greatly inferior in numbers to die army of Hsia, consequently there could be no question of meeting the enemy in open battle. Instead Li Shih-Chi made harrying attacks on the flank of the enemy columns until Tou Chien-Te sent reinforcements to drive him off.

The Tang strategy failed in its purpose, the deliverance of Wei Hui, for Tou Chien-Te ecided to attack Li Yang first, and crush the Tang eastern army before advancing south. This change of plan took the Tang generals by surprise. The army of Hsia carried the city by storm, taking prisoners all the prominent Tang leaders in the east. Apart from Li Shen-Tung Prince Huai An, the prisoners included a sister of the Taeng emperor; Wei Cheng, and the father of Li Shih-Chi. Li Shih-Chi himself, fearing that his father would be injured, was induced by motives of filial piety, which no Chinese could ignore, to surrender to the emperor of Hsia. Tou Chien-Te acted with unusual humanity towards these captives. Prince Huai An and the princess were kept in honourable captivity. Li Shih-Chi, whose ability was much esteemed, was given the post of garrison commander at Li Yang, though his father was retained at the Hsia court as a hostage for his loyalty. Wei Hui and all the smaller cities of the region surrendered to the emperor of Hsia on hearing the news of this disaster.

Li Shih-Chi only served his new master by compulsion and with regret. He eagerly sought some opportunity to return to his old allegiance without involving his father in danger. Open revolt was for this reason out of the question. Instead, Li Shih-Chi devised an elaborate plot. Pretending to espouse the cause of his new sovereign, he proposed an invasion of Honan, declaring to Tou Chien-Te that the Tang areas in the east of that province and in southern Shantung could be conquered without difficulty. He planned to attack the camp of the Hsia emperor when the army reached Li Yang, slay Tou Chien-Te, and release his own father. Li Shih-Chi believed that in the confusion which would follow such a bold stroke it would be easy for him to make himself master of all the Hsia territory. With this magnificent service to his credit he would have no difficulty in obtaining pardon for his enforced desertion of the Tang cause.

Although Tou Chien-Te fell into the trap and marched down to Li Yang to invade the eastern Tang districts, the plot miscarried through the precipitate action of some of Li Shih-Chi’s supporters. The surprise having failed, there was nothing to do but escape. Li Shih-Chi managed to get away on a fast horse, making his way across country till he reached Tang territory. Li Yuan pardoned his temporary desertion, tending him to join Shih-Min, who was then engaged in the Shansi campaign described in the preceding chapter. Tou Chien-Te, who had a chivalrous character, refused to put the hostage to death. “Li Shih-Chi”, he said, “is a loyal servant of the Tang dynasty. Is that a crime for which his father should be executed?”

While the emperor of Hsia was extending his territory and winning the allegiance of the people by such acts of moderation, Wang Shih-Chung, the new emperor of Cheng, seemed determined to alienate all his supporters by his arbitrary actions. In this year he lost two men of mark, Chin Shu-Pao and Lo Shih-Hsin. They had first become prominent as Sui officers against the bandits of Shantung, when Lo Shih-Hsin, then aged thirteen, had gained great fame by his intrepid behaviour. Both had subsequently submitted to Li Mi and, after his defeat, to Wang Shih- Ch’ng. The latter treated them with such scant courtesy that both left his service to join the Tang. Lo Shih-Hsin was appointed to the command of a border district in western Honan. There he made frequent harassing raids upon the territory of his former sovereign, on one occasion even penetrating by night into the outer defences of Lo Yang itself.

‘These tactics were effective in one respect. They weakened the morale of the Chéng army, which began to desert whenever opportunity occurred. Wang Shih-Chung, to prevent these defections, took hostages from his generals and officials, who were made responsible for their subordinates. The suspects and hostages were compelled to dwell in the inner or Palace City, where there were soon as many as thirty thousand people confined. Drastic laws were enacted against all who attempted to desert. The offender was not only himself all who attempted to desert. The offender was not only himself punished with death, but his family also was exterminated. These severities only increased the number of fugitives, for when one person fled, his family and friends hastened to follow him lest they be put to death. Discontent spread far and wide through the dominions of Wang Shih-Chung.

This was the state of Honan when Li Shih-Min, famous from his recent victories in Shansi, came south to take com­mand of the Tang army which was preparing to invade the empire of Cheng with Lo Yang  as objective. The overthrow of Liu Wu-Chou and the consolidation of the Tang empire in the west had left Shih-Min free to pursue his “horizontal” strategical design. Moving eastward along the Yellow river, he wished to secure a belt of country stretching from the border of Shensi to the sea on the south Shantung coast. China would then be cut in half, and the pretenders in the north could not communicate with possible allies in the south. Tou Chien-Te would be ringed round with Tang territories, and his ultimate defeat made certain. Already the allegiance of Tu Fu-Wei had forged one important link in this encircling chain. The defeat of Wang Shih-Chung would make the ring complete.

Marching eastward from Shan Chou, an important point on the great western road from Lo Yang to Chang An, Shih-Min encountered no real resistance till his army was approaching Lo Yang. Wang Shih-Chung, who was already looking for assistance elsewhere, did not wish to risk a battle. Frequent skirmishes took place, in one of which Shih-Min becoming separated from his supporters had a narrow escape from capture, returning alone to the camp so covered with dust that the sentries could not recognise him, and would not admit him till he spoke, and was known by his voice.

Meanwhile the Tang army had encamped close to Lo Yang, and was daily harrying the supply trains with which Wang Shih-Chung sought to provision the city for the inevitable siege. The Cheng emperor, though he still avoided battle, led out a strong force, and parleyed with the Tang prince across the water of the Lo river. Wang Shih-Chung Proposed a partition of the empire, by which the Tang dynasty should renounce all ambitions in the east. Shih-Min sent his general, Yu-Wen Shih-Chi, to reply that no such conditions could be discussed, but if Wang Shih-Chung surrendered at once, the Tang prince would guarantee his life. The emperor of Cheng indignantly rejected this offer.

The Tang court was more anxious to conciliate Tou Chien-Te, lest the powerful ruler of Hsia should come to the rescue of Ching. There was the greater danger of this as Ching and Hsia had never engaged in serious hostilities with each other, and were equally menaced by the rising Tang power. These negotiations were not conclusive. The emperor of Hsia could easily perceive the latent menace to his territory involved in any Tang conquest of Honan, but he was not yet ready for an open breach, so as some evidence of goodwill he released the Tang princess captured at Li Yang.

If Tou Chien-Te had hoped that the Tang army would fail in the war with Cheng, and so save him the risk of joining in the campaign, he was doomed to disappointment. By the end of the year (ad 620) so many of Wang Shih-Chung’s cities in eastern and southern Honan had surrendered, that the Cheng emperor was virtually confined to Lo Yang itself. Alarmed at this general defection, Wang adopted more aggressive tactics. One day Shih-Min, accompanied by Yu-Chih Ching-Te and 500 horsemen, was riding round the advanced Tang positions 00 an inspection. To get a wider view of the country he rode up on to the vast tomb mound of the Wei emperor, Hsuan Wu, which still stands on the slopes of Pei Mang Shan, a hill overlooking the city.

Wang Shih-Chung, seeing the prince so lightly attended in this advanced position, made a sudden sortie at the head of 10,000 men. Although the swift advance of the Cheng troops surrounded the tomb mound, Shih-Min and Yu-Chih Ching-Te cut their way through the enemy to safety. Chu-Tu Tung arrived with large reinforcements at this moment, and the actions became general. Shih-Min vigorously counter-attacked and drove the Cheng force back to the walls with a loss of 1000 dead and 6000 prisoners. This unfortunate end to the sortie made Wang Shih-Chung more chary of rash attacks.

In the next month the loss of the city and pass of Ssu Shui caused far graver injury to the cause of Cheng. This city, fifty miles east of Lo Yang, commands the road to the cast, which at thus point leaves the tumbled loess hills of western Honan to enter the vast expanse of the eastern plain. When this city, abandoned through the folly of Wang Shih-Chung’s eldest son, fell into Tang hands, the communica­tions between Ching and Hsia were interrupted. Already Wang Shih-Chung had sent an embassy to Tou Chien-Ti suggesting an alliance and common action against the Tang power, and these pleas were now reinforced by the logic of events. Hsia had never ceased to make attacks on the Tang city of Yu Cho which was held by the general Lo I, who had submitted to the Tang dynasty.

When the emperor of Hsia called upon his ministers for their advice, he found the court in favour of war. “If”, they said, “we permit the Tang dynasty to crush Cheng, we will be unable to withstand its power, and our future ruin is certain. Whereas, if we succour the Cheng empire, we may defeat the Tang. Then we will be in a position to absorb the weak Cheng empire and can at leisure complete the conquest of all China”.

Tou Chien-Te decided to follow this advice. While mobilising his foil strength, he sent an embassy to Shih-Min requiring him to raise the blockade of Lo Yang and quit the territories of Cheng. To this embassy Shih-Min made no reply.

The news of Tou Chien-Te’s intervention having reached Lo Yang, Wang Shih-Chung, who had remained inactive since the battle at the tomb of Wei Hsuan Wu, decided that he might now risk a more offensive attitude. His first sortie made some headway against Chu-Tu Tung, but when Shih-Min came up with his bodyguard of 1000 heavily armed horsemen, the Cheng troops gave way and were driven into the city with a loss of 6000 killed. This victory, and the capture of a large convoy of provisions which Wang was endeavouring to bring into the city, made Shih-Min decide to convert the blockade of Lo Yang into a close siege. Permission for this move having been obtained from Chang An. In the second month of AD 621 Shih-Min gave orders for a general advance to siege positions.

Wang Shih-Chung, who had had bitter experience of siege conditions in Lo Yang when Li Mi was investing the city, made a last effort to frustrate the Tang plan. He marched out with his entire field force, which still numbered about 20,000 men. The Tang army was drawn up to receive them on Pei Mang Shan, the long bare ridge which overlooks the city on the northern side. This was the site of Li Mi’s disastrous defeat by Wang Shih-Chung in AD 618. The memory of that victory inspired the Cheng army to make a desperate effort.

Shih-Min established his headquarters on the tomb mound of Wei Hsuan Wu, the site of the battle two months before. The battle was very fiercely contested; Chu-Tu Tung, who led the first Tang attack, was repulsed. Shih-Min re-established the line by repeatedly charging the Cheng army at the head of the heavy cavalry. In the melée his horse was killed under him, and the prince was forced to fight on foot till remounted by one of his officers. Wang Shih-Chung stubbornly maintained the battle till noon, when despairing of victory he fell back within the walls of Lo Yang. Nevertheless the Ching loss did not exceed 7000 killed, and these casualties were not much greater than those of the Tang army.

Well contested though the battle was, the army of Ching henceforward made no attempt to break out. The siege was pressed by every device then known to the science of war. Catapults, hurling a heavy stone two hundred paces, bombarded the walls. Eight-fold bows, a kind of multiple cross­bow, which could shoot an arrow 500 yards, were directed against the defenders when they showed themselves above the parapets. The city was assaulted on all foot sides both by day and by night. But the immense walls resisted the bombardment, and the defenders were not discouraged. The successful defence of Lo Yang against Yang Hsuan-Kan and Li Mi had proved that the Sui capital was not easily forced.

The Tang generals, dismayed by this strenuous resistance, and by the severity of the midwinter cold, urged Shih-Min to raise the siege. When the prince peremptorily refused, furthermore declaring that anyone who advocated such a course would be executed for mutiny, the generals secretly sent word to the court, and induced the emperor to order a retreat. But Shih-Min was not so easily dissuaded. He sent his own messenger to Chang An, who prevailed upon the vacillating Li Yuan to issue counter-orders permitting the siege to be continued.

While these intrigues were taking place outside the city the defenders were suffering acutely from famine. Of the 30,000 suspects whom Wang Shih-Chung had imprisoned in the Palace City, not more than 3000 survived. Even the highest officials were to be seen with sunken cheeks and swollen bodies wandering about the streets in search of scraps of food, while the corpses of those less fortunate and influential encumbered the public roads. Nevertheless, buoyed up by his one remaining hope, the assistance of Tou-Chien-Te, Wang Shih-Chung rejected all suggestions of capitulation and doggedly held on.

He had reason. The emperor of Hsia was at last on the march. In spite of flank attack from Shansi, by which the Tang court endeavoured to distract him from his purpose, Tou Chien-Te, leaving strong garrisons in his home cities, passed the Yellow river with a huge army, estimated to exceed 300,000 men. Capturing the smaller dries which lay in his path, the emperor of Hsia moved westward along the road to Lo Yang, his supply trains coming up the Yellow river by boat.

Shih-Min was now faced with the most critical military decision of his life. The army of Hsia was more numerous than his own, well armed, and hitherto successful. It had defeated Tang generals such as Prince Huai An and Li Shih-Chi. Nor was this armament his only foe. The army of Wang Shih-Chung, though cooped up in Lo Yang, was not impotent. The investment of Lo Yang had to be maintained by large forces. The newly captured cities in Honan were not to be trusted. These places had surrendered to the Tang dynasty when Shih-Min’s star seemed to be in the ascendant, but if he retreated, or was beaten, they would instantly embrace the cause of the victors.

To await the approach of Ton Chien-Te at Lo Yang meant certain destruction. Caught between two fires the Tang army could not hope to conquer. Nor could Shih-Min obtain reinforcements which would equalise the struggle. The Turks, inspired by all the enemies of Tang, were more hostile than ever, raiding the frontier, watching for their opportunity. Two courses remained open for the Tang commander-in-chief. The first, which was vehemently urged by generals of the older, experienced, generation such as Chu-Tu T’ung, was to raise the siege, abandon Honan, and retire to defend the passes leading into Shensi.

The adoption of this plan meant the final abandonment of all hope of conquering eastern China and reuniting the empire. Once Ton Chien-Te had occupied Honan he would absorb the exhausted Cheng empire, consolidating his rule over all the central and eastern plain, then the most populous and fertile part of China. Such Tang supporters in the south­east as Tu Fu-Wei, isolated by the advance of Hsia, would be forced to submit to the new power or face certain defeat. Retreat would be fetal to the dream of unity, perhaps in the end fetal to the Tang dynasty itself.

And yet, resistance, the only alternative plan, contained even greater dangers. To keep Lo Yang under siege and still defeat the vast host of Hsia with a smaller army seemed impossible, and the penalty of failure was more terrible. If the Tang army was routed in Honan, there would be no obstacle to prevent Ton Chien-Te from following up his victory by an invasion of Shensi, the capture of Chang An, and the extinction of the Tang dynasty. Nevertheless, it was this, the more hazardous policy, but which held promise of the greater prize, that the young general determined to follow, in the face of the repeated warnings of his older advisers.

Fifty miles east of Lo Yang, the confused loess hills which stretch eastward along the south bank of the Yellow river from the Shensi border end abruptly at the stream of Ssu Shui. The stream flows in a flat valley about a mile broad, bordered to the west by the loess hills which end in a steep slope. To the east the stream has in past ages scoured out a low, vertical cliff, on the top of which the great plain begins; flat, featureless, dotted at intervals with villages in groves of trees. The stream itself, receding from this cliff in the course of time, now flows in the centre of the sunken valley, with a stretch of flat land on either bank. The road from the east to Lo Yang and Shensi descends into the ravine, crossing the stream at the little city of Ssh Shui, before entering the hills by a narrow defile among precipices.

This was the position which Shih-Min chose as the best place to await the advance of Tou Chien-Te. The Tang army had a double task. Not only must Tou Chien-Te be blocked at Ssu Shui, but Wang Shih-Chung, starving and desperate, had to be held in Lo Yang. The advance of the one, or the escape of the other, would be equally final to Shih-Min’s plans. He had therefore to leave the strength of the army, under his younger brother Yuan-Chi and Chu-Tu Tung, to blockade the wide compass of Lo Yang’s walls, while he himself, with only 35oo men, all picked troops, rode east to Ssu Shui. If Wang Shih-Chung noticed some diminution in the number of his enemies, he judged it too small to justify a sortie by his starving troops.

 

There was already a Tang garrison at Sail Shui, but its numbers are not stated by the historians. Even with this reinforcement it is not likely that the Tang army can have exceeded 10,000 men, but they were picked troops under a commander of genius. The prince’s first operation at Ssu Shui was intended to raise the morale of his troops and show them that he was not overawed by the vast numbers of the Hsia host. At the head of 500 horsemen he crossed the stream, climbed the cliffs beyond, and rode out into the plain a durance of seven miles towards Tou Chien-Te’s camp. Leaving part of his forces posted in ambush under Li Shih-Chi and Chin Shu-Pao, the prince rode on with only four or five horsemen, among whom was his faithful Yu-Chih Ching-Te, until he was within a mile of the Hsia camp. As Shih-Min was remarking to Yu-Chih Ching-Te, “You with the spear and I with my bow are a match for a million of them”, they encountered a party of enemy scouts who, not expecting any Tang troops so close to their lines, at first took the prince and his escort for foragers from their own camp. Shih-Min speedily disillusioned them by shouting out, “I am the Prince Chin”, at the same time he loosed an arrow which pierced the officer commanding the enemy party. As he had intended, this daring action roused the enemy from which five or six thousand horsemen came dashing out.

Shih-Min’s followers changed colour at this alarming spectacle, but the prince remarked, “You go off first; Ching-Ti and I will act as rearguard”. When the foremost pursuers were within bowshot Shih-Min picked off their leader, and while the others hesitated to come within range of his terrible arrows, he and Yu-Chih Ching-Te retreated farther. Three times the enemy horsemen closed in on the prince, but on every occasion he took such toll with his bow that the pursuers dared not press on. In this way Shih-Min decoyed them past the ravine where Li Shih-Chi and the 500 Tang horse were concealed. These troops, suddenly issuing from their ambush, fell upon the startled Hsia cavalry, slaying more than 300 men and capturing several high officers.

After returning to Ssu Shui, Shih-Min sent a letter, couched in the style of sovereign to subject, to Tou Chien-Te. The emperor of Hsia was advised to keep to his own country and leave Cheng to its fate, lest he should meet with misfortunes which he would have reason to repent too late. Tou Chien-Te replied by making a fruitless assault on Ssh Shui city. Finding the position too strong to be forced, he returned to encamp on the open plain. The days lengthened into weeks, and still the huge army of Hsia remained inactive before this Chinese Thermopylae. Shih-Min, except to send parties of cavalry to harass the enemy convoys, rested passively on the defensive.

He had nothing to lose by delay. Lo Yang was slowly starving, the army of Hsia incapable of rendering relief to the doomed city. In all his campaigns Shih-Min paid the greatest attention to the rime factor. Few generals have been so skilful in making time and weather fight on their side. It was not only Lo Yang which suffered from this delay. The, army of Tou Chien-Te met with increasing difficulty in maintaining its supplies. The Tang convoys came down the river laden, with the advantage of the strong summer current. But the Hsia boats had to toil upstream folly loaded, and only benefited by the current when returning empty. The great size of the Hsia army was a further difficulty, making demands upon Tou Chien-Te’s treasury which were increasingly difficult to meet.

The generals of the Hsia council, impressed by this disadvantage, and seeing the futility of trying to force a position like Ssu Shui, suggested an alternative plan to their chief “Across the river”, they said, “is the Tang province of Shansi, lightly garrisoned, almost undefended, and open to attack. Why not withdraw from our present position, leaving a sufficient force to prevent pursuit, and invade this province? The Tang army will then be obliged to go to the defence of their own territory, the siege of Lo Yang will be raised, end we can re-occupy Honan at our leisure.”

Tou Chien-Te was inclined to follow this advice, when the ambassador of Cheng, who realised that his master could not hold out more than a few weeks at most, came in tears to press the urgency of Lo Yang’s plight.

Tou Chien-Te had a chivalrous character. He was unwilling to adopt a plan which would expose him to the reproach of abandoning his ally to pursue conquests for his own profit. He therefore listened to Wang Shih-Chung’s ambassador and rejected the advice of his own council. That night his consort, the Lady Tsao, a woman of unusual penetration, urged him to follow the generals’ plan. “Shansi is empty”, she declared, “we will meet no resistance. With the Turks already harrying their northern frontier, the Tang army will have no choice but to raise the siege of Lo Yang and retire to defend Shensi. Whereas if we go on camping here we will waste money and discourage the soldiers to no purpose.”

Tou Chien-Te must have known that his wife was right. But he had made up his mind and would not be shaken. He merely replied, “This is not a matter women can understand. I came to save Lo Yang, which can scarcely hold out from dawn to dusk If I abandon this purpose and go elsewhere, is it not a breach of faith?”. Instead of invading Shansi the Hsia emperor prepared to make a grand assault on the Tang position.

Early in the fifth month, the beginning of summer, Shih-Min, who guessed that the enemy would soon be forced to take the offensive, made his own preparations. He crossed the river with part of his troops and 1000 horses, which, with their grooms, were left on the north bank, in order to deceive Tou Chine-Te into the belief that Shih-Min had divided his army to guard against an invasion of Shansi. The prince Led back all the troops from the north bank under cover of darkness. The device worked. Ton Chien-Te, believing that Shih-Min’s force was weakened by this partition, decided that the opportunity to force Ssu Shui had at last arrived. He broke camp and marched down into the sunken valley of the Ssu Shui stream.

The emperor of Hsia did not assault the Tang position. He hoped to induce Shih-Min to fight in the open. Therefore the Hsia army was drawn up in a line extending from the banks of the Yellow river along the valley of the Ssh Shui, for nearly seven miles. The army did not cross the stream, leaving that as a natural moat in advance of their position. Shih-Min, whose forces were drawn up on the heights west of the valley, rode to a point which commanded a wide view. After studying the enemy dispositions, he said to his officers: “The enemy come from the eastern plains, and have never fought in hill country. Now that they have come down into the ravine they are in a bad position. Their purpose in approaching is to defy us, and by coming so dose it is dear that they despise our power. We will stand firm, and let their courage cool. Presently, drawn up in battle array as they are, their troops will become thirsty. Then they will begin to fall out in order to find water and their formation will be relaxed. At that moment, if we attack, they will be caught in the ravine and routed. I promise you that before evening the victory will be ours”.

Tou Chien-Te, who was anxious to make the Tang army engage, confident that with his superior numbers he would be easily victorious, sent 300 horse across the stream to insult the Tang lines, with a herald who challenged Shih-Min to send an equal force against this squadron. The prince, who only wanted a pretext to delay the general action, while keeping the Hsia army under arms in the hot June sun, sent 200 lancers to engage the enemy squadron. The action was indecisive, the two forces wheeling and charging about the flat meadows on the banks of the Ssu Shui river, until both retired exhausted to their respective armies.

A Hsia officer, who had a very beautiful horse which had come from Yang Ti’s stables, next rode up and down below the Tang positions displaying the merits of his steed, challenging the Tang officers to attack him. Shih-Min observing this horse remarked upon its beauty, whereupon Yu-Chih Ching-Te asked permission to go and capture it. The prince would not agree, saying, “What, for one horse risk the life of a good officer!” But Yu-Chih, paying no attention, dashed down the slope with two companions. Before the Hsia army could realise what was happening, the three Tang officers had captured horse and rider and were safely back in their own lines.

Shih-Min had already sent orders to bring over the 1000 horses from the north bank of the Yellow river. He was waiting for these to arrive before joining battle. As the morning wore on to noon, the Hsia army, which had been drawn up under arms since dawn, became wearied. Some sat down on the grass, while others went to the stream for water, or wandered back to bring up food. This was the opportunity for which Shih-Min was waiting. The horses from the north bank had now arrived, and all the cavalry could be mounted. The prince called Yu-Wen Shih-Chi and ordered him to take 300 hone and ride along the Hsia front, from their right flank, moving up the valley of die Ssu Shui stream, “If the enemy stand firm, leave them alone and ride back to our lines”, he commanded. “But if they start falling back as yon approach, and get confused, then charge them.”

When Yu-Wen Shih-Chi’s squadron drew near to the Hsia line, the enemy soldiers, dispersed and out of formation, showed a confused movement, some falling back, and others trying to form up. Shih-Min, watching, exclaimed, “Now we can attack”. The prince put himself at the head of the cavalry, and followed by the whole Tang army, swept down the steep slopes, across the flat land and the shallow stream, to charge the disordered Hsia army.

The emperor of Hsia was holding council in his tent when the news of the Tang attack was brought. He ordered his cavalry to make a counter-attack to give the infantry time to form up. Unfortunately the generals were all at the council and could not get back to their posts in time. The impetus of the Tang onslaught had thrown the Hsia army into confusion, in which the orders of the generals never reached the soldiers. Tou Chien-Te attempted to control the situation, but finding himself in danger of capture fell back to the low cliff which formed the eastern boundary of the Ssu Shui valley. With their backs to this natural wall the Hsia troops rallied for the moment. The battled was undecided when Shih-Min’s young cousin, Li Tao-Hsuan Prince Huai Yang, a youth of eighteen, charged furiously through the Hsia line till he emerged behind the enemy, when, turning round, he cut his way back to the Tang host. Repeating this exploit, he once more hacked a corridor through the enemy army till “His armour was thick with arrows like the quills of a porcupine”. This time, though his horse had been he was remounted by Shih-Min, who led the cavalry after him into the heart of the melée.

While the dust “filled the sky” veiling the confused battle from the enemy commanders, the Tang prince and his cavalry cut their way through the enemy till they gained the high ground behind the army of Hsia. There they displayed the Tang standards, and at this sight, which seemed to menace the only way of escape, the Hsia army broke into flight. The rout was disastrous. The Tang army chased the flying mob for ten miles, slaying as they went. Though the killed did not number mote than 3000, Shih-Min took 30,000 prisoners, while the rest of the huge army of Hsia dispersed over the country-side. The fate of Tou Chien-Te himself completed the disaster to his cause. Carried away in the press of the rout, he was thrown from his horse while being pursued by two Tang officers As they were about to spear him, Tou Chien-Te cried out, “Do not shy me. I am the emperor of Hsia, and can richly reward you”. The Tang officers thereupon dismounted and secured this valuable captive, whom they led back to Shih-Min.

The capture of Tou Chien-Te prevented any tally of his army. Only a few hundreds of horsemen escaped to Kuang Fing Fu, the Hsia capital. The vast army of Hsia had ceased to exist. After this prodigious victory, which eliminated all danger from the east, Shih-Min led back his army and captives to Lo Yang. Some of the Hsia officers were sent into the city to make known the extent of the disaster, and Tou Chien-Ti himself was brought to the foot of the walls to inform his ally that all was lost. Wang Shih-Chung, mounting the ramparts, heard from the lips of the deliverer in whom his hopes had reposed the melancholy tale of defeat. Unable to restrain their emotion, the two emperors, who met for the first time in these tragic circumstances, broke down and wept

After a brief discussion, the council of the Cheng emperor urged Wang Shih-Chung to make an unconditional surrender. There was no possibility of further resistance in starving Lo Yang. There remained no hope of escape to another refuge, or of relief from any other ally. At the head of his entire court, with his coffin at his side, Wang Shih- Chung in mourning robes led the dismal procession out of the gates of Lo Yang to make submission to the conqueror. When the fallen emperor of Ching was brought into his presence, freely perspiring with the emotion of such a moment, Shih-Min said to him, “You always used to say, I hear, that you would like to meet that boy”. Now you see the boy, how are you going to behave?” Wang Shih-Chung bowed his head and made apologies.

Except for certain Cheng officials, who were regarded as traitors, to the Tang dynasty, and were decapitated, none of the inhabitants of Lo Yang suffered any harm. Only some of the magnificent palaces, which Yang Ti had erected at the cost of so much suffering, were, by Shih-Min’s orders, burned. The prince remarked that this luxury, purchased as it was by the life’s blood of the people, was the teal cause of the downfall of the Sui dynasty. As a warning to the age and an example to posterity such buildings should be destroyed. The records of the Sui empire were found to have been burnt by Wang Shih-Chung, though vast spoils and treasures still remained from Yang Ti’s extravagant court.

The fall of Lo Yang ended this war. The empire of Ching had ceased to exist, and that of Hsia was occupied without resistance. The remnants of Ton Chien-Te’s army, after looting the treasury of Kuang Ping Fu, yielded the town to the Tang troops and dispersed. The great battle of Ssu Shui brought all North China from Tibet to the sea under the authority of Chang An. Only the southern pretenders, Hsiao Hsien and Li Tzu-Tung, remained outside the new empire.

Shih-Min on his return to court made a triumphal entry into Chang An. Clad in a suit of golden armour, the conqueror rode through the city, followed by two captive emperors and their courts, twenty-five of his own generals, and 10,000 heavy armed horsemen. Such were the fruits of the famous battle of Ssh Shui which, since it established the Tang dynasty on an unshakable basis, and made possible the reunion of China, may well be reckoned as one of the decisive battles in the history of the world.