READING HALLTHE DOORS OF WISDOM |
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CHAPTER 2.
HABSBURG AND VALOIS
THE secular struggle between the Houses of Burgundy
and Valois reaches a new stage in the era of the Reformation. The murder of the
Duke of Orleans in the streets of Paris in 1407 involved at first only a junior
branch of the French royal House in the blood feud with Burgundy. The alliance
of Orleans and Armagnac in 1410, and of both with Charles the Dauphin in 1418,
swept in the senior branch, and led to the retributive murder of John of
Burgundy at Montereau in 1419. Steadily the area of
infection widens. A relentless Ate dominates all the early years of Philip the
Good, and then, laid for a while to sleep at Arras (1435), reappears in the
days of Charles the Bold. Not only political and national aims, but an
hereditary dynastic hatred might have inspired Louis XI in his campaigns of war
and intrigue until the crushing blow at Nancy. The grandson of Charles the
Bold, Philip the Fair, seemed, in his jealousy of Ferdinand and his devotion to
the interests of the Netherlands, to have forgotten the ancestral feud. But his
son and heir, whom we know best as Charles the Fifth, inherited, together with
the inconsequent rivalries of Maximilian, and the more enduring and successful
antagonism of Ferdinand, the old Burgundian duty of revenge. Thus the chronic
hostility between the Kings of Valois-Angoulême and the united line of
Burgundy, Austria, Castile, and Aragon has a dramatic touch of predestined
doom, which might find a fitting counterpart in a Norse Saga or the
Nibelungenlied.
But greater forces than hereditary hate drove Europe
to the gulf in which the joy of the Renaissance was forever extinguished. The
territorial consolidation of the previous age in Europe, though striking, had
been incomplete. The union of the French and Spanish kingdoms had gone on natural
lines. But Italy had been less fortunate. At the death of Ferdinand her fate
was still uncertain. The Spaniards stood firm in Sicily and Naples, the French
seemed to stand secure in Milan. Venice had withstood the shock of united
Europe. Florence seemed strengthened by the personal protection of the Holy
Father. But so long as two rival foreign Powers held their ground in Italy,
consolidation had gone too far or not far enough. Italy must be either Italian
or Spanish or French. The equilibrium was unstable. No amicable arrangement
could permanently preserve the status quo. The issue could only be solved by
the arbitrament of arms.
In Germany the case was different. There consolidation
seemed to be out of the question. Neither the preponderance of any single
Power, nor that of any combination of Powers, held out hopes of successful
conquest. And the German nation, inured to arms, could offer a very different
resistance to that which any of the Italian States could maintain. Thus the
history of Europe in this period falls into two well-marked sections. The
Teutonic lands work out their own development under the influence of the new
religious thought, unaffected as a whole by the competition for supremacy in
Europe. They had their own dangers from the Turk and in civil strife. But the
struggle, although ostensibly between the Emperor and the King of France, was
in reality between Spain and France for hegemony in western Europe, supremacy
in Italy. The struggle was dynastic, but dynasties are the threads about which
nations crystallize.
At the outset the forces were not ill-matched. On the
death of Ferdinand in 1516 the Archduke Charles succeeded by hereditary right
to the kingdoms of Castile and Aragon and their dependencies, to the kingdoms
of the two Sicilies, to the Franche-Comté of Burgundy, and to the provinces of
the Netherlands. On the death of Maximilian in 1519, he added to these the
Habsburg inheritance in eastern Europe, which he wisely resigned before long to
his brother Ferdinand. For soldiers he could rely on his Spanish dominions, on
the regular forces organized by Charles the Bold in the Netherlands, on the
less trustworthy levies of Germany and Italy. The Netherlands and Spain gave
him a considerable revenue, which exceeded in gross the revenue of the French
King, but was not equally available for common dynastic purposes, owing to the
difficulty of exporting and transporting treasure, and the cogent necessities
of internal government. The Sicilies might pay for their own government, and
provide an occasional supplement, but the resources of these kingdoms hardly
compensated for the needs of their defence. The
maritime resources of Spain were considerable, but ill-organized and therefore
not readily available.
The French King on the other hand, though his
dominions were less extensive, had manifest advantages both for attack and defence. His territory was compact, and almost all capacity
for internal resistance had been crushed out by the vigorous policy of Louis XI
and Anne of Beaujeu. His subjects were rich and
flourishing, and far more industrious than those of Spain. All their resources
were absolutely at his control. Even the clergy could be relied upon for ample
subsidies. His financial system was superior to that of any other existing
State. He could make such laws and impose such taxes as suited his sovereign
pleasure. Since the Concordat of 1516 all important clerical patronage was in his hands; and the great ecclesiastical revenues
served him as a convenient means for rewarding ministers, and attaching to
himself the great families whose cadets were greedy of spiritual promotion. His
cavalry and artillery were excellent and well organized. His infantry had not
yet been satisfactorily developed, but his resources permitted him to engage
mercenaries, and Germans and Swiss were still ready to serve the highest
bidder. In defence he could fight upon interior
lines. For attack he had a ready road to Italy through the friendly territories
of Savoy. The possession of Milan secured to him the maritime power of Genoa, a
very valuable addition to his own.
In character the two potentates were less equally
matched. Francis was bold, and vigorous upon occasion, but inconsequent in
action; his choice of men was directed by favoritism; his attention was
diverted from business by the pursuit of every kind of pleasure, the more as
well as the less refined. His extravagance was such as to hamper his public
activity. To the last he never showed any increasing sense of royal
responsibility, and preserved in premature old age the frivolous and vicious
habits of his youth.
At the death of Ferdinand Charles was still a boy,
and, until the death of Guillaume de Croy, Sire de Chièvres (1521), his own individuality did not make itself
clearly felt. Chièvres, his old tutor, now his
principal minister, dominated his action. Yet at the election to the Empire it
was his own pertinacity that secured for him the victory when others would have
been content to obtain the prize for his brother Ferdinand. Throughout his life
this pre-eminent trait of manly perseverance marks him with a certain stamp of
greatness. Slow in action, deliberate in council to the point of irresolution,
he yet pursued his ends with unfailing obstinacy until by sheer endurance he
prevailed. Extreme tenacity in the maintenance of his just rights, moderation
in victory, and abstinence from all chimerical enterprise, are the other
qualities to which he owes such success as he obtained. Fortune served him well
on more than one conspicuous occasion; but he merited her favors by
indefatigable patience; and he never made on her exorbitant demands. Of his two
grandfathers he resembles Ferdinand far more than Maximilian. In the course of
his career these characteristics were developed and became more notable; unlike
his rival he learnt from life; but from his youth he was serious, persistent,
sober. In his choice of ministers and judgment of men he showed himself greatly
superior to Francis. He was well served throughout his life; and never allowed
a minister to become his master. Unsympathetic, unimaginative, he lacked the
endearing graces of a popular sovereign; he lacked the gifts that achieve
greatness. But, born to greatness, he maintained unimpaired the heritage he had
received; and, at whatever price of personal and national exhaustion, he left
the House of Habsburg greater than he had found it. When we consider the
ineluctable burden of his several and discrete realms, the perplexing and
multifarious dangers to which he was exposed, the mere mechanical friction occasioned
by distance and boundaries and intervening hostile lands, the inefficient
organization, political, financial, and military, of his countries at that
time, the obstacles opposed by institutions guarding extinct and impossible
local privilege, the world-shaking problems which broke up all previous settled
order, then the conscientious sincerity with which he addressed his mediocre
talents to the allotted work must earn for him at least a place in our esteem.
On neither side was the struggle for world-empire.
Charles would have been content to recover Milan in self-defence,
and the duchy of Burgundy as his hereditary and indefeasible right. France had
good grounds for claiming Milan and Naples. But it is doubtful whether Francis
would have been as moderate after victory as Charles.
The struggle can be considered apart from developments
in Germany. But it has its reaction on German fortunes. Had Charles not been
hampered throughout his career by the contest with France he would not have
been forced to temporize with the Reforming movement until it was too late for
effective action. The Most Christian King was an unconscious ally of Luther, as
he was a deliberate ally of the Turk. Immediately the conflict concerned the
fate of Italy. Indirectly it weakened the resistance of Europe to the Reformed
opinions, and to the Muslim in Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean.
After Marignano (1515) and the Peace of Noyon (1516),
which professed to shelve all outstanding questions and secure perpetual
friendship between Spain and France, Europe had peace for a while. It was
arranged at Noyon that Charles should take Louise, the daughter of the King of
France, to wife, and that the rights over the kingdom of Naples should go with
her. Until this babe-in-arms should become his wife, Charles was to pay 100,000
crowns a year as rent for Naples, and 50,000 until she bore him a son. If
Louise died, some daughter of a later birth was to be substituted as his
affianced bride, and this clause actually took effect. Charles promised satisfaction
with regard to Spanish Navarre, conquered by Ferdinand in 1512; perhaps he even
secretly engaged himself to restore it to Catharine, its lawful Queen, within
six months. The treaty was concluded under the influence of Flemish counselors,
who had surrounded Charles, since he had taken up the government of the
Netherlands in the previous year. It was inspired by a desire for peace with
France in interests exclusively Burgundian. But it had also its value for
Spain, for it gave Charles a breathing space in which to settle the affairs of
his new kingdoms. Maximilian, now in isolation, was forced to come to terms
with France and Venice, and surrender Verona; and peace was secured in Italy
for a while. At a subsequent conference at Cambray in
1517 the partition of Italy between Habsburg and Valois was discussed, but
nothing was definitely settled. English diplomatists looked on askance at the
apparent reconciliation, but their hopes of fishing in troubled waters were
soon revived.
Charles utilized the respite for his visit to Spain in
1517. While here he was not only occupied with the troublesome affairs of his
new kingdoms, but with the question of the Empire. Maximilian, who, although
not yet sixty years of age, was worn out by his tumultuous life, was anxious to
secure the succession to his grandson. At the Diet of Augsburg, 1518, he
received the promise of the Electors of Mainz, Cologne, the Palatinate,
Brandenburg, and Bohemia for the election of Charles as Roman King. The French
King was already in the field, but the promises and influence of Maximilian,
and the money which Charles was able to supply, overbore for the moment this
powerful antagonism. On the receipt of this news Pope Leo X, who had already
been attracted to the side of France, was seriously alarmed. The union of the
imperial power with the throne of Naples was contrary to the time-honored
doctrines of papal policy. Thenceforward he declared himself more openly a
supporter of the French claims. Meanwhile, if Charles was to be elected before
Maximilian’s death, the latter must first receive from the Pope the imperial
crown. This Leo refused to facilitate. In all this the Pope showed himself as
ever more mindful of the temporal interests of the Roman See and of his own
dynastic profit, than of the good of Europe or religion. Both in the coming
struggle with victorious Islam, and against the impending religious danger, an
intimate alliance with Charles was of far more value than the support of
France. But the meaner motives prevailed.
On January 19, 1519, Maximilian died, and the struggle
broke out in a new form. The promises of the Electors proved to be of no
account. All had to be done over again. The zeal of his agents, his more
abundant supplies of ready cash, the support of the Pope, at first gave Francis
the advantage. Troubles broke out in the Austrian dominions. Things looked
black in Spain. Even the wise Margaret of Savoy lost hope, and recommended that
Ferdinand should be put forward in place of Charles. Charles showed himself
more resolute and a better judge of the situation. He had friends in Germany,
Germans, who understood German politics better than the emissaries of Francis.
The influence of England on either side was discounted by Henry VIII’s own
candidature. German opinion was decidedly in favor of a German election, and
although Charles was by birth, education, and sympathy a Netherlander, yet the
interests of his House in Germany were important, and it may not have been
generally known how little German were his predilections. The great house of
Fugger came courageously to his aid and advanced no less than 500,000 florins.
The advantage of this support lay not only in the sum supplied, but in the
preference of the Electors for Augsburg bills. The Elector of Mainz refused to accept
any paper other than the obligations of well-known German merchants. At the
critical moment Francis could not get credit. The Swabian League forbade the
merchants of Augsburg to accept his bills. He endeavored in vain to raise money
in Genoa and in Lyons.
It is needless to pursue the base intrigues and
tergiversations of the several Electors. The Elector of Saxony played the most
honorable part, for he refused to be a candidate himself, and declined all
personal gratification. The Elector of Mainz showed himself perhaps the most
greedy and unfaithful. He received 100,000 florins from Charles alone and the
promise of a pension of 10,000, which it is satisfactory to note was not
regularly paid. Money on the one hand, and popular pressure on the other decided
the issue. The Rhinelands, where the possessions of
four Electors lay and where the election was to take place, were enthusiastic
for the Habsburg candidature. It was here that the national idea was strongest,
and the humanists were eloquent in their support of Maximilian’s grandson. The
army of the Swabian League, under Franz von Sickingen,
the great German condottiere, was ready to act on behalf of Charles; it had
been recently engaged in evicting the Duke Ulrich of Württemberg from his
dominions, and was now secured by Charles for three months for his own service.
Here also money had its value. Sickingen and the
Swabian League received 171,000 florins. At the end the Pope gave way and
withdrew his opposition. On June 28, 1519, the Electors at Frankfort voted
unanimously for the election of Charles. The election cost him 850,000 florins.
It is a commonplace of historians to exclaim at the
fruitless waste of energy involved in this electoral struggle, and to point out
that Charles was not richer or more powerful as Emperor than he was before;
while on the other hand his obligations and anxieties were considerably
increased. But so long as prestige plays its part in human affairs, so long a
reasonable judgment will justify the ambition of Charles. He was still perhaps
in the youthful frame of mind which willingly and ignorantly courts
responsibility and faces risks, the frame of mind in which he entered on his
first war with Francis, saying: “Soon he will be a poor King or I shall be a
poor Emperor”. But the imperial’s Crown was in some sort hereditary in his
race. Had he pusillanimously refused it, his prestige must have suffered
severely. As a German prince he could not brook the interference of a foreign
and a hostile power in the affairs of Germany. The imperial contest was
inevitable, and was in fact the peaceful overture to another contest, equally
inevitable, and more enduring, waged over half a continent, through nearly
forty years.
War was in fact inevitable, and Charles was
ill-prepared to meet it. His affairs in Spain went slowly, and it was not until
May, 1520, that Charles was able to sail for the north, leaving open revolt at
Valencia, and discontent in his other dominions. The fortunate issue of these
complications has been related in the first volume of this History. Diplomacy
had already paved the way for an understanding with Henry VIII, which took more
promising shape at Gravelines, after a visit to Henry
at Dover and Canterbury, and the famous interview of Henry VIII and Francis I
at the Field of the Cloth of Gold. Wolsey’s skilful diplomacy had brought it about that both the greatest monarchs of Europe were
bidding eagerly for his and his master’s favor. A pension and a bishopric for
the Cardinal, a renewal for England of the commercial treaty with the
Netherlands were the preliminary price. At Gravelines it was agreed that Charles and Henry should have the same friends and the same
enemies; and that neither Power should conclude an alliance with any other
without the consent of both. If war broke out between Charles and Francis,
Henry was to act against the aggressor. For two years the agreements for the
marriage of the Dauphin with the English Princess Mary, and of Charles with
Charlotte the daughter of Francis (Louise having died) were to receive no
further confirmation. Towards the end of this period another meeting was to
take place at which another agreement should be concluded. Each Power was to
maintain a regular ambassador at the Court of the other. The pains taken by
Wolsey to reassure Francis and to show that Henry had rejected propositions
from Charles for a joint attack on France prove that he was still anxious to
prevent the Roman King from drawing near to France; but the nett result of the interviews was to guarantee Charles against any immediate
adhesion of England to his rival.
1521] Charles allied with Leo X and Henry VIII.
Fortified by this belief, and leaving his aunt
Margaret of Savoy to govern the Netherlands with extensive powers, Charles
proceeded to his coronation, which took place at Aachen on October 23, 1520.
Meanwhile in Castile and Valencia the troubles continued, until the rising of
the Comuneros was definitely crushed at the
battle of Villalar, April 24, 1521. Charles was thus
relieved from one of his worst anxieties, though the condition of his finances
was so bad that he could only look with alarm on the prospect of war. All his
Spanish revenues were pledged and nothing could be expected from that source.
Still the outbreak of war was delayed, and he was able to bring the Diet of
Worms to a close before any decisive step was needed. And more important still,
in the eager hunt for alliances on both sides, Charles proved the more
successful. On May 29, 1521, a secret alliance had been concluded on his behalf
with the Pope.
From the time of the imperial election Leo had
foreseen the consequences, and had turned his shallow statecraft to the task of
considering what could be got for the Papal See and his own family from the
impending war. At first he had urged a prompt and united attack upon Charles,
in which France, Venice, and England were to join. This might well have
succeeded while Charles was still embroiled in Castile. Then while negotiations
with France and England nagged and each Power was maneuvering for the
weather-gauge, Leo began to see that France and Venice could never consent to
his favorite scheme for the annexation of Ferrara, the one part of Julius'
design which yet remained unexecuted. France was closely linked with Alfonso d'Este, and Venice preferred him as a neighbor to the Pope.
Then Leo turned to Charles, and Charles was ready to promise all that he could
ask: Parma, Piacenza, Ferrara, imperial protection for the Medici, the
restoration of Francesco Sforza in Milan and the Adorni in Genoa, and the
suppression of the enemies of the Catholic faith. In return the Pope promised
the investiture of Naples, and a defensive alliance. Leo would have been glad
to make the alliance offensive, but the Emperor was in no hurry for war, and
still hoped that it might be averted.
The alliance with Leo was valuable to Charles for the
resources, material and spiritual, which the Pope and the Medici controlled,
for the protection which the Papal States afforded against attacks on Naples
from the north, and for the access they gave to Lombardy from the south. Still
more valuable appeared the alliance with England, as securing the Netherlands
against a joint attack. Wolsey at first was anxious to play the part of
mediator or arbitrator between the hostile powers. At length at Bruges the agreement
was reached on August 25. Chièvres was dead (May 18,
1521), and Charles took himself the leading part in these negotiations. Charles
was to marry Mary, the daughter of Henry VIII. The Emperor and King entered the
most solemn alliance not only for the defence of
their present possessions, but for the recovery of all that they could
severally claim. The Emperor, who was meditating a visit to Spain, was to visit
England on the way. War was to be openly declared in March, 1523. But if no
suspension of hostilities came about between Charles and France, the
declaration of war was to take place on the occasion of Charles' visit to
England. All this was to be secured by the most solemn and public declarations
within four months.
The treaty of alliance, solemn as it professed to be,
left something to be desired. France was already effectively at war with
Charles. Robert de la Marck, Lord of Bouillon and
Sedan, early in the year had invaded the southern Netherlands, and Duke Charles
of Gelders, an old ally of France and enemy of the
Burgundian rulers, had attacked the north. Henri d'Albret had marched into Navarre, and at first had met with considerable success. These
attacks were manifestly supported by France, and Charles could therefore claim
the aid of England by virtue of earlier treaties as the victim of unprovoked
aggression. But for the time being it must suffice that England was
neutralized. In the border warfare which succeeded Charles could hold his own. Sickingen chastised the Lord of Bouillon. Henri d'Albret was driven from Navarre by local levies. And
although on the frontier of the Netherlands things looked black for a while,
though Mezières under Bayard held out against attack
and the Emperor himself risked a serious defeat near Valenciennes, though the
Admiral Bonnivet succeeded in occupying Fuenterrabia,
the most important position on the western Pyrenees, all was compensated and
more than compensated by the seizure of Milan on November 19, 1521, by the
joint forces of the Emperor and the Pope. Lombardy with the exception of a few
fortresses was easily occupied, and in the north Tournay capitulated. After these astonishing successes the death of Leo, on December 1,
came as an unexpected blow to the imperial hopes. But his aid had done its
work. His support had been the chief instrument in preventing the Swiss from
assisting Francis with their full force; papal and Florentine money had
supplied the needs of the joint expedition. In return he received before his
death the news that Parma and Piacenza had been recovered for the Holy See.
The campaign in Lombardy had been conducted by
Prospero Colonna, in command of the papal and imperial forces, among which were
16.000 German infantry, brought by way of Trent. The French army was commanded
by Odet de Foix, Vicomte de Lautrec, who owed his
position to his sister's favor with the French King. They were joined by a
considerable contingent from Venice. The Spanish troops under Antonio de Leyva
and the Marquis of Pescara came up slowly from Naples; operations began badly;
no plan of campaign commanded approval; and when at length the siege of Parma
was undertaken, it had to be abandoned owing to danger from Ferrara. In
October, however, on the news of the approach of a body of Swiss, whom the Pope
had induced to serve for the protection of the Holy See, Colonna crossed the
Po. Giovanni de' Medici defeated a Venetian force, and the Marquis of Ferrara
suffered a defeat. Lautrec failed to prevent the junction of Colonna with the
Swiss. There were now Swiss in both armies, and the orders of the Swiss Diet
came to both armies that they were to return. But the papal contingent held
firm, while those in the pay of the French deserted in great numbers. Colonna
forced the passage of the Adda, and Lautrec retired on Milan, where the
exactions and repressive measures of the French provoked a Ghibelline rising,
as soon as the enemy appeared before the walls. The Venetians led the flight,
and Lautrec abandoned the city for Como, whence he passed to winter in the
Venetian territory.
The strange election of Adrian of Utrecht to the papal
throne, which followed on the death of Leo, appeared at first to favor the
imperial side. Adrian had been the Emperor’s tutor and was left by him as
regent in Castile in 1520. But Adrian’s visionary and unworldly character
unfitted him to take the traditional part of the Popes in Italian politics. It
was long before he appeared in Italy, and after his arrival he long endeavored
to maintain neutrality. At last, about a month before his death in September,
1523, Adrian was forced to take a side, and joined the Emperor.
The news of the successes in Lombardy put an end to
the exertions of Wolsey to conclude an armistice between the Powers, and to
secure his own acceptance as arbitrator. The alliance with England was
confirmed, and Charles was free to sail for Spain (May 26, 1522). On his way he
landed at Dover and visited Henry; and on June 19 the treaty of Windsor was
concluded, according to which both sovereigns were bound to invade France each
with a force of 30,000 foot, and 10,000 horse; the date named for this great
effort was May, 1524.
In July, 1522, Charles reached Spain and the last
remnants of rebellion were stamped out. Meanwhile his armies in Italy had been
left almost to their own resources. The ample supplies voted by the Netherlands
in 1521 had been all expended in the war of that year. No more money was
forthcoming from the Pope or Florence. A great part of the imperial army had to
be disbanded. The death of Leo threw the Swiss entirely on to the side of
France. The French King moreover found no more difficulty in hiring German Landsknechte than did the Emperor himself. In the Papal
State the forces of disorder reigned unchecked, and the old tyrants reappeared
in Urbino, Camerino, Rimini, and Perugia.
Early in March, 1522, Lautrec moved across the Adda to
join the Swiss who were coming to the number of 16,000 from the passes of the
Alps. The junction was effected at Monza. But the defensive works of Colonna
executed during the winter rendered Milan impregnable to assault. The
enthusiastic support of the Milanese provided garrisons for the principal towns
of the duchy. Francesco Sforza entered Milan on the 4th of April, and the
Milanese were now fighting for a duke of their own. Lautrec, although
reinforced by a French force under his brother Thomas de Lescun,
could achieve nothing against the defensive strategy of Colonna. At length the
impatience of the Swiss, who demanded battle or pay, forced the French to
attack the enemy in a strong position of their own choosing, called the
Bicocca, three miles from Milan (April 27). Here they were repulsed with
considerable loss, the Milanese militia doing good service side by side with
the Spaniards and the Germans. The Swiss then returned to their homes,
discontented and humiliated, and the French army shortly afterwards evacuated
Lombardy, excepting the three castles of Novara, Milan, and Cremona. Genoa was
stormed and pillaged by the Imperialists on May 30. A new government was set up
in Milan under Francesco Sforza, though the unpaid Spanish and German soldiers
recompensed themselves for their arrears by pillage and exactions. In Florence
the imperial success restored the Medici authority which had been seriously
threatened by malcontents from the Papal States, supported by hopes of French
assistance.
The treaty of Windsor led to an immediate declaration
of war by Henry VIII, and during the summer of 1522 the English and Spanish
fleet raided the coasts of Britanny and Normandy.
Later an invading force under the Earl of Surrey and the Count van Buren
entered Picardy, but little was achieved against the defensive opposition of
the French. A systematic devastation of hostile country took place in this
region.
In spite of their ill-success in two campaigns the
French did not give up their hope of reconquering Milan. Financial distress had
again forced the Emperor to reduce his forces, and the necessary means were
with difficulty collected from the Italian towns and princes. The Netherlands
had up to this time been the only trustworthy source of revenue, and the
expenditure of Charles’ Court had made great inroads upon his treasury. Money
was now coming in to the Castilian exchequer, but these funds had been pledged
in advance. The Italian army was a year in arrear.
Ferdinand was begging for money for measures against the Turks. The desperate
appeal of Rhodes for aid in 1522 had to pass unregarded,
and this outlying bulwark of Christendom capitulated at the close of 1522.
Although Charles was in Spain to stimulate operations, Fuenterrabia was successfully defended by the French against all attacks until February,
1524.
On the other hand, since the autumn of 1522 the allies
had been counting on powerful aid in France itself. The Duke of Bourbon, with
his extended possessions in the centre of France, was
almost the only remaining representative of the great appanaged princes of the fifteenth century. Although his wings had been clipped by
legislative and even more by administrative changes, he still commanded a
princely revenue and considerable local support. His position in the kingdom
had been recognized by the gift of the highest of Crown offices, the post and
dignity of Constable of France. But his title to the vast possessions which he
held was not beyond question. The duchy of Bourbon had been preserved from
reunion with the Crown under Louis XII by the influence of Anne, Duchess of
Bourbon, better known as Anne of Beaujeu, who first
procured for her daughter Susanne the right to succeed her father in the duchy
(1498), and then (1505) married her to Count Charles of Montpensier, her
cousin, who represented the rights of a younger branch of the Bourbon House. By
this marriage Charles of Montpensier was elevated to the duchy of Bourbon, but
when his wife Susanne died without issue in 1521 his title became questionable
at law. From motives probably of cupidity, and of cupidity alone, a double
claim was now advanced against him. The Queen Mother, Duchess of Angoulême,
claimed the female fiefs as being more closely related to the main line of the
Bourbon House, and the King claimed the male fiefs as escheating to the Crown.
Against claimants so powerful Charles of Bourbon felt himself unable to
litigate before the Parliament of Paris. The points of law were nice and the
tribunal amenable to royal influence. He turned therefore to the enemies of his
country. He approached Charles V and boldly asked for his sister Eleonora
(widow of the King of Portugal) in marriage, offering in return to raise 500
men-at-arms and 8000 foot-soldiers and to co-operate with an invasion from the
east.
But the intrigues became known, and although the King
hesitated to arrest his Constable when he had him at Paris in his power, and
though again in August, 1523, when the King passed through Moulins to take part
in the great expedition to Italy, the Constable was allowed to stay behind on a
plea of sickness, at length a peremptory summons was sent ordering him to join
the King at Lyons. On this the Duke, who had been looking in vain for the
approach of aid from the east, took to flight and, after attempting to escape
to Spain by way of Roussillon, succeeded at length in reaching the frontier of
Franche-Comté.
The elaborate plans of the allies, which included the despatch of a force of 10,000 Landsknechte to
Bourbon, an invasion of Picardy by a joint army of 21,000 men, and an attack on
Languedoc with 34,000 men from Spain, were thus defeated. The Constable brought
with him only his name and his sword. But the danger was judged sufficiently
real to prevent Francis from leading his army in person into the Milanese, as
had been intended. Great preparations had been made for an expedition on a
royal scale, but the Admiral Bonnivet was appointed to take command instead of
the King. While Bonnivet was advancing on Italy some attempt was made by the
allies to execute the other parts of the plan. The Duke of Suffolk and the
Count van Buren advanced by Picardy to the neighborhood of Compiègne and Senlis, the German force threatened the frontier from the
side of Bressé, while a Spanish force crossed the
Pyrenees in October and threatened Bayonne. The delays had shattered the effect
of the combination, but the kingdom was almost undefended, and even Paris was
thought to be insecure. Yet little came of all these efforts. The Germans from Bresse made an ineffectual attempt to join with Suffolk and
Buren, but were hunted back across the frontier by the Count of Guise. The
leaders of the northern expedition showed little enterprise, and money as usual
was deficient. The Spanish army advanced upon Bayonne, but was repulsed by the
vigorous defence of Lautrec, and retired ineffective.
In spite of a liberal subsidy in August from the Cortes of Castile, and the
seizure in October of gold coming on private account from the Indies, the great
design for the partition of France proved entirely abortive.
Meanwhile Bonnivet had pursued his path to Lombardy.
His army consisted of 1500 men-at-arms and some 25,000 foot, Swiss, Germans,
French, and Italians. On the 14th of September he reached the Ticino. Prospero
Colonna, who was in command of the imperial troops, had no adequate resources
with which to resist so powerful a foe in the field. Adrian VI, it is true, had
recently announced his reluctant adhesion to the imperial party, and about the
same time Venice had renounced her French alliance and concluded a league with
Charles. But the value of these accessions had not begun to be felt when
Adrian’s death (September 14) introduced uncertainty afresh at the very moment
when Bonnivet appeared in Italy. Colonna was no longer supported by Pescara,
but he had at his disposition Giovanni de' Medici, the celebrated leader of the
Black Italian Bands, and Antonio de Leyva. The imperial leaders abandoned the
western part of the duchy to the French and retired on Milan. If Bonnivet had
pressed on he would have found the capital unready for defence.
But his delay gave time to improvise protection: and when he arrived an assault
appeared impracticable. He determined to endeavor to reduce the city by famine.
Besides Milan, Colonna still held Pavia, Lodi, and
Cremona, and wisely confined his efforts to the retention of these important
posts. Bonnivet divided his forces and sent Bayard to attack Lodi and Cremona.
Lodi fell, but Cremona held out, and Bayard had to be recalled. The election of
Clement VII on November 19 gave for the moment strength to the imperial side.
Money was sent and the Marquis of Mantua brought aid. Bonnivet was forced to
abandon the siege of Milan, and retire upon the Ticino. On December 28 Prospero
Colonna died, but Charles de Lannoy, the viceroy of
Naples, with the Marquis of Pescara, arrived to take his place, bringing with
him a small supply of money and troops. Reinforcements came from Germany, and
the Imperialists, now supported more effectively by Venice, were able to take
the offensive. They drove Bonnivet from Abbiate-Grasso,
then from Vigevano to Novara. The reinforcements which he was eagerly expecting
from the Grisons at length arrived at Chiavenna, but
found neither men nor money to meet them. Giovanni de' Medici hung upon their
flanks and drove the Grisons levies back over the mountains. At length Bonnivet
was forced to leave Novara and endeavor to effect a junction with a force of
8000 Swiss, whom he met upon the Sesia. But this
relief was too late. The moral of the army was destroyed. The remnants could
only be saved by retreat. Bonnivet himself was wounded at this juncture, and
the task of conducting the wearied and dispirited troops across the mountains
fell upon Bayard. Bayard took command of the rear-guard, and, in protecting the
movements of his comrades, fell mortally wounded by the ball of an arquebus
(April 30, 1524). With him perished the finest flower of the French professional
army in that age, the knight who had raised the ideal of a warrior’s life to
the highest point. But his last task was successfully accomplished. The Swiss
effected their retreat by Aosta, the French by Susa
and Briançon. The last garrison of the French in
Lombardy capitulated.
Adrian’s successor, Giulio de' Medici, Clement VII,
had been supported in his election by the imperial influence, in spite of
Charles’ promises to Wolsey. Giulio had long controlled the papal policy under
Leo, and it was assumed that he would tread the same path. But Clement had all
the defects of his qualities. Supremely subtle and acute, he had not the
constancy to follow up what he had once come to regard as a mistake. He relied
upon his own ingenuity and duplicity, and endeavored to sail with every wind.
Thus he failed alike to serve his own interests and those of his allies.
Clement began almost at once to detach himself from
the imperial alliance, dangerous in defeat, oppressive in the event of success.
His efforts however to conclude a truce proved unsuccessful, and on May 25,
1524, a new compact was accepted by the allies. The Duke of Bourbon was to
invade France at the head of the victorious army of Italy. A joint expedition
was to invade Picardy, and a Spanish army was to attack by way of Roussillon.
Henry VIII seemed to see a chance of making good the pretensions of his
ancestors to the French throne, and exacted from the unwilling Duke of Bourbon
an oath of fidelity to himself as King of France.
With troops humiliated, discontented, exhausted,
resistance in the field was impossible. The imperialists adopted the same
strategy that had succeeded so well against Bonnivet. They determined to hold
Alessandria, Pavia, Lodi, Pizzighettone, Cremona. The
citadel of Milan was garrisoned, and it was hoped that the city might be held;
but it had suffered terribly from the plague, and on the approach of Francis
with his whole army, the attempt was given up. Bourbon, Lannoy,
and Pescara retired to Lodi; and the defence of Pavia
was entrusted to Antonio de Leyva. Instead of following up the remnants of the
imperial army to Lodi, and crushing them or driving them east into the arms of
their uncertain Venetian allies, Francis turned aside to make himself master of
Pavia. The siege artillery opened fire on November 6. An early assault having
failed, Francis attempted to divert the course of the Ticino, and by this means
to obtain access to the south side of the town, which relied mainly on the
protection of the river. But the winter rains rendered the work impossible.
Francis determined to reduce the city by blockade. Meanwhile he called up
reinforcements from the Swiss, and took Giovanni de’ Medici into his pay.
On the night of February 24-25 the imperial army broke
into the walled enclosure of the park of Mirabello.
Delays were caused by the solid walls and day broke before the actual
encounter. The news of the attack induced Francis to leave his entrenchments
and to muster his army, which consisted of 8000 Swiss, 5000 Germans, 7000
French infantry, and 6000 Italians. He was not much superior in actual numbers,
but stronger in artillery and cavalry. An attempt of the imperialists to join
hands with the garrison of Pavia, by marching past the French army, which had
had time to adopt a perfect order of battle in the park, proved impossible
under a flanking artillery fire. Nor was it possible to throw up earthworks and
await assault, as Lannoy had hoped. A direct attack
upon the French army was necessary. In the mêlée which ensued it is almost
impossible to disentangle the several causes of the issue, but it seems clear
that the complete victory of the imperialists was due to the admirable
fire-discipline and tactics of the veteran Spanish arquebusiers, to the attack
of Antonio de Leyva with his garrison from the rear, to an inopportune movement
of the German troops of the French which masked their artillery fire, and
perhaps in some measure to the cowardly example of flight set by the Duke of
Alençon. The French army was destroyed, the French King was captured, and all
his most illustrious commanders were taken prisoners or killed. As Ravenna
marks the advent of artillery as a deciding factor in great battles, so perhaps
Pavia may be said to mark the superiority attained by hand firearms over the
pike. The Swiss pike-men were unable to stand against the Spanish bullets.
Once more the duchy had been reconquered, and it
seemed lost forever to France. Francis was sent as a prisoner first to Pizzighettone and then to Spain. Here the unwonted
restraint acting on a man so passionately devoted to field-sports shook his
health; he thought at one time of resigning the crown of France in favor of the
Dauphin, in order to discount the advantage possessed by Charles in the custody
of his royal person; but he was at length constrained to accept the Emperor’s
terms. The result was the treaty of Madrid, signed by Francis on January 14,
1526, and confirmed by the most solemn oaths, and by the pledge of the King’s
knightly honor, but with the deliberate and secretly expressed intention of
repudiating its obligations. Francis was to marry Eleonora, the Emperor’s
sister and the widow of the King of Portugal. He renounced all his rights over
Milan, Naples, Genoa, Asti, together with the suzerainty of Flanders, Artois,
and Tournay. He ceded to Charles the duchy of
Burgundy, in which however the traditional dependencies of the duchy were not
included. The Duke of Bourbon was to be pardoned and restored to his hereditary
possessions. Francis abandoned the Duke of Gelders,
and gave up all claims of d'Albret to Navarre. As a
guarantee for the execution of the treaty the King’s two eldest sons were to be
surrendered to the Emperor’s keeping; and Francis was to return as a prisoner
in the event of non-fulfillment.
In spite of the outcries of historians, the terms of
this treaty must be regarded as moderate. Charles exacted nothing, after his
extraordinary success, except what he must have considered to be his own by
right. But how far his moderation was dictated by policy, and how far by
natural feelings of justice, may remain undecided. The Duke of Bourbon and
Henry VIII had pressed upon him the pursuit of the war, the invasion and
dismemberment of France. Had Charles really aimed at European supremacy this
course was open to him. But he did not take it, whether from a prudent distrust
of his English ally, or from an honest dislike for unjust and perilous schemes
of aggrandizement. That he took no pains to use his own victory for the
furtherance of the ends of England, may appear at first sight surprising. But
Henry VIII had had no part in the victory of Pavia, and almost none in any of
Charles’ successes. English subsidies had been a factor, though not a decisive
factor, in the war, but English armed assistance had been uniformly
ineffective. Even before the battle of Pavia Charles had known of Henry’s
contemplated change of side. Moreover, since the rejection of Henry’s plans for
the dismemberment of France, the English King had concluded an alliance with
Louise of Savoy, the regent of France, and profited by his desertion to the
extent of two millions of crowns. Charles owed nothing to Henry at the time of
the treaty of Madrid.
Francis I was liberated at the French frontier on
March 17, 1526, leaving his two little sons in his place. He at once made known
his intentions by delaying and finally refusing the ratification of the treaty
of Madrid; and on May 22, at Cognac, a League was concluded against the
Emperor, in which Francesco Sforza, the Pope, Florence, and Venice joined with
France. Sforza was to receive the duchy of Milan unimpaired, the States of
Italy were to be restored to all their rights, and the French Princes were to
be released for a ransom of 2,000,000 crowns. Henry VIII gave fair words and
encouragement in abundance, but did not join the League. The aid of France was
equally illusory. The allies talked of peace, but in reality they courted war,
and with it all the disasters which followed.
The adhesion, however vacillating, of Henry VIII to
the party of his enemies, set Charles free from any obligations towards Mary of
England, and in March, 1526, he concluded his marriage with Isabella of
Portugal, a union which he had long desired, securing to him an ample dowry,
and promising peace between the two Iberian kingdoms. The affairs of Italy
still occupied his attention. Francesco Sforza received the first blow. Pescara
was dead, but Charles still had able and devoted servants in Italy. With the
troops at their disposal Antonio de Leyva and Alfonso del Guasto besieged Francesco Sforza in the citadel of Milan. After the League of Cognac
had been concluded the allies advanced to his relief. The imperialists were in
piteous case. Left without means of support, they were obliged to live upon the
country and to levy money from the citizens of Milan. In consequence they had
to deal with an actual revolt of the inhabitants which was with difficulty
repressed, while the siege of the citadel was still vigorously maintained.
Francesco Maria, Duke of Urbino, moving deliberately and cautiously at the head
of the united Venetian and papal army, after seizing Lodi, advanced to the
relief of Sforza, and was only at a short distance from the town when the Duke
of Bourbon opportunely arrived with a small force (July 5). Bourbon had been
named as Duke of Milan to compensate him for the loss of his French possessions
which Francis had refused to restore. The Duke of Urbino then commenced an
attack, which if vigorously pushed might have resulted in the destruction of
the imperialist forces, between the invaders and the citadel, and among a
hostile population. But he showed neither resolution nor activity, and on July
25 the citadel surrendered. The Duke of Urbino, now reinforced by some six
thousand Swiss, the only aid which Francis supplied, turned to the siege of
Cremona, in which he consumed his resources and two months of valuable time.
The final capture of the city (September 23) was an inadequate compensation.
The attitude of Charles towards Clement VII at this
juncture was expressed in his letter of September 17, 1526, in which the
misdeeds of the Pope were systematically set forth. This letter was afterwards
printed in Spain, Germany, and the Netherlands as a manifesto to all
Christendom. The arraignment was severe but not on the whole unjust. In view of
his wrongs, real and supposed, the means used by the Emperor are not
surprising. His emissary, Ugo de Moncada, after vainly endeavoring to win back
Clement, had turned to the still powerful family of Colonna. These nobles, Ghibellines
by tradition, soldiers by profession, and raiders by inclination, after
terrifying the Pope by forays in the south and by the capture of Anagni,
concluded with him a treacherous peace (August 22). The Pope, already
overburdened by his efforts in the north, was thus induced to disarm at home,
and on September 20 the Colonna struck at Rome. They penetrated first into the
southern part of the town, and then into the Leonine city, where they sacked
the papal palace, and the dwellings of several Cardinals. Clement took refuge
in the Castle of St Angelo, where he was shortly forced to conclude a truce of
four months with the Emperor, promising to withdraw his troops from Lombardy
and his galleys from before Genoa, and giving hostages for his good faith. The
Emperor disavowed the actions of the allies but profited by the result, which
was indeed only partial, since Giovanni de' Medici, with the best of the papal
troops, continued to fight for the League, in the name of the King of France.
An amnesty promised to the Colonna was disregarded, and in full Consistory
their lands were declared to be confiscated, and a force was sent to execute
this sentence.
Inert as ever, after the capture of Cremona, the Duke
of Urbino allowed three weeks to pass before, strengthened by the arrival of
4000 French, he moved upon Milan, not to assault but to blockade. These delays
were invaluable to Charles. They allowed him to win the adhesion of Alfonso,
Duke of Ferrara, which was facilitated by the papal hostility. They allowed him
to send troops from Spain to Naples (December), and to collect German levies,
who arrived in Italy under Frundsberg in November.
Their presence in the duchy of Mantua forced the Duke of Urbino to abandon the
siege of Milan. He divided his army, leaving a part at Vauri,
on the Adda, and advanced with the remainder against Frundsberg,
whom he found at Borgoforte near the Po. In the
skirmish which followed Giovanni de' Medici was wounded, and he died shortly
afterwards at Mantua. The Duke of Urbino gave up all further attempt to prevent
the junction of the imperialists, and returned to Mantua. The want of energy
displayed by the Duke of Urbino throughout this campaign is not wholly to be
attributed to his character. He had a well-grounded mistrust of the troops of
which his army was composed, and doubted their competence to face the
Spaniards. Moreover the Venetians were uncertain as to the Pope’s real
intentions and were reluctant to push matters to an extreme. The success of
Charles however was principally due to this policy of inaction. The Duke of
Bourbon now extorted by the extremest measures the
money necessary to enable him to move, requiring, for instance, 20,000 ducats
of Morone as the price of his life and pardon, and at
length the forces met at Fiorenzuola in the territory
of Piacenza (February, 1527). The united army then moved towards the Papal
States, watched at a distance by the Duke of Urbino, while garrisons were sent
to save Bologna and Piacenza. The Pope, in extreme alarm, threatened by Bourbon
from the north and Lannoy with the Colonna from the
south, implored Francis to act, and showed himself willing to make whatever
terms he could with the Emperor. Then on hearing of a small success of his
troops in the south at Frosinone (January, 1527), he determined to pursue the
war.
A sudden raid by Renzo da Ceri on the Abruzzi seemed at first to promise a welcome diversion, but very soon
the invasions of Naples proved as unprofitable as the campaigns in the north.
The project of conferring the kingdom on Louis, Count of Vaudemont,
the brother of the Duke of Lorraine, which Clement had put forward, faded into
the visionary. The Pope shifted his ground again, and on March 15 concluded a
truce of eight months for himself and Florence.
In the main city Renzo da Ceri endeavored to persuade the Romans to protect themselves by breaking down the
bridges, and preventing the entry of the Colonna from the south. But he failed.
The Trastevere was easily captured, and the
imperialists advanced without opposition across the bridge of Sixtus. For eight days the Sack continued, among horrors
almost unexampled in the history of war. The Lutherans rejoiced to burn and to
defile what all the world had adored. Churches were desecrated, women, even the
religious, violated, ambassadors pillaged, cardinals put to ransom,
ecclesiastical dignitaries and ceremonies made a mockery, and the soldiers
fought among themselves for the spoil. The population of Rome had been much
reduced by the plague of 1522, and a rough census taken shortly before the
capture gives the number as about 55,000, of whom 4000 are estimated to have
perished in the Sack. All who were able took to flight, and the deserted city
was left to the soldiers.
The Duke of Urbino came and looked at the city from
without, but decided to do nothing, though the disorder of the imperial troops
gave good hopes for an attack, and the Pope at least might have been rescued.
In default of all aid Clement made terms: the payment of 400,000 ducats, and
the surrender of Ostia, Civita Vecchia,
Piacenza, and Modena being stipulated. The Pope was closely guarded in the
Castle of St Angelo. While he was helpless there the imperialists occupied
Ostia and Civita Vecchia,
but were not able to obtain possession of the other places. The Duke of Ferrara
seized Modena and Reggio: the Venetians, in spite of their alliance, Ravenna
and Cervia. The Papal State was crumbling. From
Florence also the Medici nephews were expelled with their guardian, the
Cardinal of Cortona. A Republic was established, though the city still adhered
to the League. Meanwhile in Rome the Prince of Orange had been forced to
relinquish his command, and Lannoy, who took his
place soon afterwards, died of the plague, which was raging in the army. For
nine months the city and its neighborhood were at the mercy of the lawless and
leaderless troops.
The responsibility of Charles for the Sack of Rome
cannot be accurately weighed. That he who wills the act wills also the
consequences of the act is a principle that applies to both sides. Charles
willed the advance of Bourbon and the armed coercion of the Pope; he willed
that the Pope should be deceived by truces, which he did not intend to honor.
He could not foresee that Bourbon’s army would have been completely out of
control, but sooner or later such must have been the case with these Italian
armies, among whom destitution was chronic. On the other hand, Clement brought
his fate upon himself. He who observes faith with none cannot expect that faith
will be observed with him. He who takes the sword must accept what the sword
brings. And although an honorable motive, the desire to liberate Italy, and a
natural motive, the desire to preserve the real independence of Florence and
the papal power, may have partly influenced his actions, it is impossible to
acquit Clement of a desire for personal and pontifical aggrandizement, while in
the use of means for the accomplishment of these ends he showed neither
rectitude, nor practical wisdom. Even in his own game of Italian duplicity he
allowed himself to be outwitted.
The Pope and the Papacy were crushed into the dust,
but the struggle was not yet over. Before the Sack of Rome, Henry VIII and
Francis had concluded a new and offensive alliance at Westminster (April 30,
1527); and after the news had spread through Europe this was confirmed on May
29, and strengthened still further by the interview of Amiens (August 4). One
more great effort was to be made in Italy to force the Emperor to accept two
million crowns in lieu of Burgundy, and to release the sons of the French King.
The King of England was to give support with money and with men. His zeal was
quickened by a desire to liberate the Pope from imperial control, and to bring
influence to bear on him for the divorce of Catharine.
In July Lautrec set forth once more from Lyons for the
Milanese with an army of 20,000 foot and 900 men-at-arms, to which Italian
additions were expected. Advancing by the usual route of Susa, he easily made
himself master of the western districts, including Alessandria, and took Pavia
by assault. Andrea Doria, the great Genoese
sea-captain, who was in himself almost a European Power, came again into the
King’s service, leaving the Pope, and by his aid the imperialist Adorni were
driven from Genoa, and the Fregoso party set up in
their place. Teodoro Trivulzio was appointed to
govern the city for France. Francesco Sforza was re-established in the chief
part of the Milanese. Milan alone under Leyva resisted.
But without completing the conquest of the duchy,
Lautrec determined to go south to deliver the Pope. Prospects were favorable,
for Ferrara had changed sides again, and Federigo da
Gonzaga, Duke of Mantua, abandoning his policy of neutrality, joined the
League. But while Lautrec was still approaching, the Pope was forced on
November 26 to accept the Emperor’s terms, which, except for the promise to
convoke a General Council to deal with the Lutheran heresy, chiefly concerned
the payment of money, and the grant of ecclesiastical privileges of pecuniary
value; but provided against future hostility by the guarantee of Ostia, Civita Vecchia, and Citta Castellana, and the
surrender of notable Cardinals as hostages. Indeed the Pope, though unlikely to
turn again to Francis, who had deserted him in his need, expelled his family
from Florence, and was now allied with the Duke of Ferrara. Before the day
appointed for his release the Pope was allowed to escape to Orvieto (December
6), his original hostages having been also liberated by the intervention of the
Cardinal Pompeo Colonna. He at once set his influence to work to establish a
permanent peace. Both monarchs were prepared for peace, but the terms were
difficult to arrange. In view of the great expenditure required, whether for
the ransom of Burgundy, or for the alternative of war, Francis called together
an assembly of Notables (December 16,1527) to justify the levy of an
extraordinary imposition. The Church offered 1,300,000 livres, nobles promised
unlimited aid, an offer which they afterwards unwillingly and grudgingly translated
into prose; and those who spoke for the towns guaranteed 1,200,000 crowns.
But the terms which were offered to Charles were
rejected by him in January, 1628, and war was solemnly declared on behalf of
France and England. Charles in reply reproached Francis with having cowardly
broken his knightly word, and offered to sustain his contention with his body.
Francis took up the challenge, and asked that time and place should be named.
But for one reason or another, this fantastic and frivolous proposal never came
to its accomplishment, and it may be doubted if either monarch desired to be
taken at his word.
The Prince saw that the utmost he could accomplish was
to save Naples. But it was with difficulty that he could collect sufficient
provisions for the immediate needs of the troops and city, while Filippino Doria, cruising off the
coast, intercepted supplies from Sicily. An attempt made by Moncada to surprise
and crush the Genoese commander ended in disaster, with the loss of four gaUeys, the death of Moncada and of other captains (April
28, 1528), and almost immediately afterwards Lautrec appeared before the walls.
Naples was now completely blockaded by the Genoese fleet, soon reinforced by
the Venetians, while Lautrec established a siege on land. Meanwhile Henry the
younger, Duke of Brunswick, crossed the Alps with a German force, and on June 9
joined Leyva on the Adda, unopposed by the Duke of Urbino; but instead of
marching to Naples, Leyva at once proceeded to the reconquest of the duchy, a
part of which, including Pavia, he had previously recovered, and Lodi was
besieged. But the country was bare of all sustenance, and even when bills
arrived there was no one to cash them: so after three weeks the Germans refused
to continue the thankless task, and the chief part of them went home. The
imperial government in Milan about this time was reduced to such straits that
they were driven to impose a ruinous tax on bread to meet their most necessary
expenses. French reinforcements were collecting at Asti under the Count of
Saint Pol. Never had the prospects of Spain in the Peninsula looked so black. Suddenly,
July 4, orders came to Filippino Doria from his uncle Andrea, to withdraw his blockading force from Naples.
Francis had made the great mistake of offending the
powerful sea captain. In addition to private slights, Andrea Doria was incensed at the apparent intention of Francis to
develop Savona for war and commerce at the expense of Genoa, and, when he
expostulated with the King, Francis formed the dangerous design of arresting
the captain in his own city, and put a French commander, without experience, Barbesieux, over his head. Charles saw his opportunity and,
by the advice of the Prince of Orange, he won Doria for his own service, on favorable terms of engagement, and with the promise of
liberty for Genoa under imperial protection. In vain, when Francis learnt his
danger, he conceded too late everything that Doria had asked. The Admiral’s suspicion and resentment had been aroused, and he
joined the Emperor once and for all.
This defection changed the whole position of affairs.
While the French camp before Naples was ravaged by the plague, abundance
succeeded to famine in the city. The French fleet under Barbesieux arrived on July 17 bringing a few men, but little real assistance. Lautrec
clung desperately to his siege, and endeavored to collect fresh troops. The
besieged became more and more audacious in their attacks; Doria appeared at Naples with his galleys; and, when on August 16 Lautrec died, the
situation was hopeless. On August 28 the remnants under the Marquis of Saluzzo retired to Aversa, where they were obliged to
capitulate shortly after. On September 12 Doria entered Genoa, and established a new oligarchical Republic, the French taking
refuge in the Castelletto. The form of government
then set up persisted, with some modification in 1576, until 1796, and Genoa
had internal peace at last. In the North Pavia had been retaken by Saint Pol.
The French commander made an effort to recover Genoa, but without success. The
Genoese soon after occupied Savona, and the Castelletto surrendered (October 28). Finally in the spring of 1529 the combined armies of
Saint Pol and the Duke of Urbino determined to reduce Milan, not by a siege,
but by a combination of posts of observation. This plan, unpromising enough in
itself, was frustrated by the conduct of Saint Pol, who attempted to surprise
Genoa, but allowed himself to be waylaid and defeated on his march by Leyva at Landriano (June 20).
With this treaty the first stage in the settlement of
the affairs of Western Europe was reached. To Spain was surrendered the
unquestioned supremacy in Italy, while the territory of France remained
practically undiminished. The agreement seemed stable. Both Powers were
thoroughly tired of war. The minor Italian potentates had begun to learn that
nothing could be gained by war except a change of masters, accompanied by
devastation, exaction, plague, and famine. The Pope had made his choice at
last. The influence of Giberti, which had always been
on the French side, was removed. The moderation which Charles showed in the use
of his success confirmed them in this frame of mind. It was his policy, while
changing as little as possible in the government of the smaller States, to make
such order as should secure to him in each effective supervision and control.
The expedition which Charles had prepared for war in
Italy set forth from Barcelona, after a treaty had been concluded with the Pope
(June 29), and in the hope of peace from the negotiations at Cambray. Charles may have received the news of peace on his
arrival at Genoa, August 12. With the troops that he brought with him, with the
victorious force from Naples, the army of Leyva, and fresh German levies from
the Tyrol, he was absolute master of Italy, and could shape it at his will. His
dispositions were made at Bologna, whither Clement came to confer on him the
imperial crown.
Peace was made with Venice, who restored all her
conquests, and paid a war indemnity. Francesco Sforza was restored to Milan:
but Charles reserved the right to garrison the citadel of Milan, and the town
of Como, and a Spanish force was left in the Duchy. Florence was restored to
the Medici, an operation which required a ten months’ siege (October,
1529-August, 1530). Alessandro de' Medici was appointed as head of the
government of the city by the decree of October 28,1530. The claim of the Duke
of Ferrara to Reggio and Modena was reserved for the future decision of
Charles. In all other respects the Pope was restored to his full rights, and
re-entered on the possession of his temporal power, though his status now
resembled that of an inferior and protected prince. Malta and Tripoli were
given to the Knights of St John. A league of the powers of Italy was formed, to
which finally not only the Pope, Venice, Florence, the Marquis of Mantua now
created Duke, but also the Duke of Savoy, and all the minor States adhered.
The Duke of Ferrara was to join when he had been
reconciled to the Pope. After all was concluded Charles received at the hands
of the Pope the iron crown of Lombardy and the imperial crown, February 23-24,
and left Italy for Germany (April, 1530). All the years of war he had spent in
Spain, and this was the first time he had visited the ill-fated peninsula,
where so much of all that is precious had been expended in supporting and
combating his claims. How much had been sacrificed to these ends may best be
indicated by noting that the battle of Mohacs was fought in 1526, that
Ferdinand was elected to the thrones of Bohemia and Hungary in the same year,
and that the Diet of Speier and the Siege of Vienna are dated in 1529.
The success of Charles appeared complete and
permanent. Far other and even more difficult tasks awaited him beyond the Alps,
but so far as Italy was concerned he might sleep secure. He seemed to have
brought for once in her troubled history unity to Italy. That so much had been
achieved appears at first sight due more to good fortune than good management.
Again and again, above all at Pavia and at Naples, luck had declared in his favour when everything seemed to promise disaster. But good
fortune seldom comes where it is wholly unmerited. Though always unequal in
intellect and resources to the gigantic tasks that were imposed upon him,
Charles had shown perseverance almost adequate to his needs. Moreover, the
brilliant work of his servants, of Pescara, of Leyva, of Lannoy,
of the Prince of Orange, even of the Duke of Bourbon, seems to argue something
in this King which enabled him to choose the right men and retain their
permanent and devoted service. The fidelity of his Spanish and to a less degree
of his German soldiers compares very favourably with
the conduct of other ill-paid mercenaries during this period. The Emperor's
name might count for much, but men may also well have felt that in serving
Charles they were serving one who could always be trusted to do his best, who
would never forget or neglect his duties, even though sheer physical incapacity
might often leave him far below the level of his conscientious aspiration.
But, not less than the inexhaustible persistency of
Charles, the defects of his rivals had contributed to the result. Francis’
choice of men was persistently unlucky. Lautrec and Bonnivet compare ill with
the leaders of the imperial army. French support was never forthcoming at the
crisis. When it came it was ineffectively employed. On the Italian side the
leaders and the policy were similarly deficient. After all excuses have been
made for the Duke of Urbino he must be judged an unenterprising commander.
Giovanni de' Medici, though brilliant as a subordinate, never had a chance to
show if he had the capacity to conduct a campaign. The Venetians never dared to
push home the resolution on which they had for the moment decided. Clement
showed all the characteristics of a man of thought involved in the uncongenial
necessity of prompt, continuous, and definite action. The shadowy figure of
Francesco Sforza flits upon the stage and leaves no clear impression.
Some features of the war deserve particular notice. It
followed the path of least resistance, and was therefore concentrated on Italy.
The invasion of France, of the Netherlands, of Spain, though occasionally
attempted, was always fruitless. Germany was never touched, though an attack
might have been directed upon Wurttemberg, and the Habsburg possessions in
Alsace. In each of these countries national resistance would be real and
vigorous, the population was warlike. Spain was further protected by its
inhospitable country, north-east France and the Netherlands by the numerous
defensible towns. Italy had no effective feeling of nationality, its
inhabitants could fight for others but not for themselves. The immunity of the
county and duchy of Burgundy from attack is surprising, but their security was
mainly due to the guarantee which the Swiss exacted for their Burgundian
friends and neighbours in their French treaty of 1522. Except on this occasion
the national action of the Swiss, which for a brief period had decided the
fortunes of Italy, 1512-15, does not reappear. They fought as mercenaries,
rarely for any national interest, and even as mercenaries their unquestioned military
supremacy was past away. The best Spanish foot was
probably better; good Germans equally good. Moreover religious differences were
beginning to paralyse the Confederation, and the
Reformers discouraged foreign service. Savoy and Piedmont were the highway of
the French armies, exposed on the other hand to the incursions and requisitions
of the imperialists, when they had for the moment the upper hand in Milan.
German assistance in men was more than might have been expected, considering
the difficulties with which Ferdinand had to contend in the hereditary Habsburg
lands. When the war was against the Pope, Lutheran ardour facilitated recruiting The English alliance, though eagerly sought for, proved
of little advantage on any occasion. But the outcome of events in Italy decided
the question of Henry’s divorce, and with it the defection of England from the
papal obedience.
The possession of Milan, on which the struggle chiefly
turned, was a luxury to France, a point of vital importance to Charles, so long
as he held the kingdoms of Naples and Sicily together with the Netherlands. The
continued presence of two first-class Powers in the peninsula was an
impossibility. On the other hand, without the defence afforded by the territory and fortresses of Lombardy, Italy was constantly open
to invasion, and the value of this barbican was shown in the fact that only
once in all these campaigns the kingdom of Naples was seriously threatened, by
the invasion of Lautrec. The other consideration, that Milan was the door by
which the Spanish forces through Genoa, and the Italian forces from the South,
could come to the rescue of the Netherlands in event of civil war or foreign
attack, was not overlooked by Charles and his advisers, but its full
significance was not in fact disclosed until the reign of Philip II. On the
question of right Charles professed to be fighting for a vassal of the Empire
wrongfully deforced; then for an imperial fief forfeited by Sforza’s treason;
and the restitution of Milan to Sforza shows that the plea of right was not
wholly insincere.
We can see that the whole issue of the struggle centred in the question of finance, but unfortunately we
are unable to follow the details or draw up any budget of expenses or receipts
either for France or the Spanish possessions. During the years from the
election to the Empire until the Conference of Bologna, the Netherlands were
the chief resource of Charles. Year after year the Estates voted unheard-of
subsidies; the total contributions of the Low Countries are estimated for
1520-30 at no less than 15,000,000 livres tournois;
and though a considerable part of this was consumed in the defence of the provinces, for the necessities of their government, and the maintenance
of the Court of the Regent, it was to the Netherlands that Charles looked in
the moments of his greatest despair. Castile came next, so soon as the revolt
of the Comuneros had been crushed.
The annual income of Spain may be estimated at about 1,500,000 ducats, in the
first years of Charles’ reign. The Empire and the hereditary Habsburg lands may
for this purpose be neglected.
Money was raised in Castile by pledging the taxes in
advance, by issuing juros or bonds
at fixed interest charged upon the national revenues, by mortgaging to
financial houses every possible source of profit. In this way the great House
of Fugger took over in 1524 the estates belonging to the masterships of the
three military orders, and later the quicksilver mines of Almaden, and the
silver mines of Guadalcanal. The cruzada,
or revenue from indulgences granted on pretext of a fictitious crusade, became
a regular source of revenue, and when, as in the time of Clement, the papal
sanction was refused, the King did not scruple to raise it on his own
authority, and to pledge it for many years in advance. The fifth on all
treasures imported from the Indies was since the conquest of Mexico becoming a
valuable supplement, and as an exceptional measure the treasure could be seized
and juros issued in recompense. But the objection of
the Spaniards to the export of treasure from the peninsula made the use of
these resources at a distance a very difficult operation, which could only be
negotiated by the aid of the most powerful financial houses. From his early
years Charles relied greatly on the Fuggers; Genoa
from the first, except when it was in French hands, and in the later years of
his reign Antwerp, were mainstays of his financial power. Charles was very
punctilious in defraying at least the interest if not the capital of his debts,
and thus he was at all times able to borrow upon terms. His juros were sometimes issued at a price equivalent to a rate of 7 per cent.: but in
times of greatneed and danger, when time was the
dominant factor, he was obliged to pay as much as 12 and even 16 per cent, for
loans. As time went on the revenues of the Netherlands were similarly pledged
in advance.
The revenues of the Duchy of Milan in time of peace
might have been considerable. In time of war they were whatever the army could
raise from the impoverished inhabitants; and before the war was over the state
of the country was such that not only was there no superfluous wealth, but the
army and the inhabitants alike seemed in a fair way to perish of starvation.
The case of Naples and of Sicily was not quite so desperate, in spite of two
rather serious risings in Sicily which we have not had occasion to mention. But
here a considerable army of occupation had to be kept up and a fleet, if
possible, for the protection of the coast, if not from the French and the
Genoese, at any rate from the pirates of Algiers. The surplus revenues of the
southern kingdoms cannot have been large, and although very often in an
emergency Lannoy produced money to content some
starving troops or to move some paralysed army, the
sums which are mentioned are almost always small, and give but a poor idea of
the capacity of the kingdoms to assist their King. Here also the same ruinous
policy was pursued as in Castile, of pledging everything in advance, of selling
everything that could be sold; and years of peace would be required before the
kingdoms could recover.
In Italy another valuable source of occasional revenue
was the subsidies raised from the lesser Italian States, which, unless actually
at war with the Emperor, could generally be coerced into payment, and, if in
his alliance, were expected to contribute handsomely. The Pope was the largest
giver, but Venice could sometimes be bled, and Florence, Lucca, Siena, Ferrara,
Mantua, were often in a condition which made refusal difficult.
The King of France had a better financial system and
was not troubled like the Spanish King by the necessity of consulting his
Estates. His entire revenue was somewhat less than the joint revenues of Spain
and the Netherlands, but on the other hand he could increase it more rapidly by
raising the taille, and it was entirely at his disposal; nor was he
troubled like Charles by the necessity of difficult financial operations before
he could fit out an army. On the other hand, when his army was abroad these obstacles
confronted him also. His financial ministers were not conspicuous for honesty,
and the institution of the Tresor de l'Épargne in 1523, to receive all casual and
unexpected sums of revenue and to build up a reserve fund to be at the King’s
absolute disposal, was not so great a success as was hoped. The deficits during
the years of war reached an alarming figure, and it is difficult to see how
they were met. For the credit system in France was not developed as it was in
Augsburg, Genoa, and Antwerp. The first public loans in France were raised on
the security of the revenues of particular towns; and it was not until 1542
that the King began to build up Lyons as a financial centre to perform for him the same functions that the bourses of Genoa and Antwerp
were fulfilling for Charles. The attempt had some success, and similar bourses
were started at Toulouse (1556), and at Rouen (1563). Henry II on his accession
acknowledged the debts of his father, and the royal credit sensibly improved.
At the outset the King was obliged to pay 16 per cent, for advances, but by
1550 the rate had fallen to 12 per cent. But confidence was rudely shaken when
in 1557 the King suspended the payment of interest on the debt, which at that
time amounted perhaps to five million crowns. We can thus get a glimpse of the
methods by which the enormous expenses of these and subsequent wars were
liquidated. All the spare cash of Europe, withdrawn from commerce and industry,
flowed at a crisis into the King's coffers; the road was opened to national
bankruptcy, which was general soon after the treaty of Cateau-Cambresis. Princes had learnt to borrow, but they had not
learnt to pay. The sources of wealth were diverted from profitable and useful
enterprise to destructive war; and in the long run not even the financiers
profited, though in the interval some capitalists built up fortunes, which are
almost comparable with those of our own day.
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