CRISTO RAUL.ORG

READING HALL

THE DOORS OF WISDOM

OCTAVIUS CAESAR AUGUSTUS :

THE LIFE AND TIMES OF THE FOUNDER OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE

CHAPTER VI

PERUSIA (PERUGIA) AND SICILY

The campaign which ended with the second battle at Philippi and the death of Brutus had been won at the cost of much physical suffering to Octavius, who only completed his twenty-first year some days after it. He had been in bad health throughout, barely able to endure the journey across Macedonia, and only performing his military duties with the utmost difficulty and with frequent interruptions. On his return journey he had to halt so often from the same cause that reports of his death reached Rome. The slowness with which he travelled also gave time for all kinds of rumours to spread abroad as to farther severities to be exercised upon the republican party on his return, and many of those who felt that they were open to suspicion sought places of concealment for themselves or their property.

Octavius Caesar sent reassuring messages to Rome, but he did not arrive in the city till the beginning of the next year (BC41). He found Lucius Antonius consul, who had celebrated a triumph on the first day of the year for some trifling successes in Gaul. The real control of affairs, however, was being exercised by Fulvia, the masculine wife of Marcus Antonius, widow successively of Clodius and Curio, against whom Lepidus had been afraid or unable to act. Fulvia and Lucius professed to be safeguarding the interests of Marcus and fulfilling his wishes, and Lucius adopted the cognomen Pietas as a sign of his fraternal devotion. But the moving spirit throughout was Fulvia. Octavius Caesar’s first business in Rome was the allotment of land to the veterans. This had been begun a year before in Transpadane Gaul, on the establishment of the Triumvirate, by Asinius Pollio, left in command of that district, and Vergil has given us some insight into the bitterness of feeling which it often roused;

“Shall some rude soldier hold these new ploughed lands ?

Some alien reap the labours of our hands ?

Ah, civil strife, what fruit your jangling yields !

Poor toilsome souls—for these we sowed our fields!"

When there was public land available for the purpose, the allotment could generally be made without much friction; but as there was not enough of it, the old precedent of “colonisation” was followed. A number of Italian towns (nineteen in all) were selected, in the territories of which the veterans of a particular legion were to be settled as colons, with a third of the land assigned for their support. No doubt in each case the lands held by men who had served in the opposite camp were first taken as being lawfully confiscated; but it must often have happened that there was not enough of such lands, and that those of persons not implicated in the civil wars were seized wholly or in part. In such cases it was understood that the owners were to be compensated by money arising from the sale of other confiscations. But this money was either insufficient or long in coming. Petitions and deputations remonstrating against the injustice poured in upon Caesar, who, on the other hand, had to listen to many complaints from the veterans df inadequate provision made for them and of promises still unfulfilled.

This was a sufficiently thorny task in itself. But it was made still more irksome by L. Antonius and Fulvia. Their pretext was that the veterans in Antony’s legions were less liberally treated than those in Caesar’s own; and Lucius claimed, as consul and as representing his brother, the right of settling the allotments of Antony’s veterans. Caesar retorted by complaining that the two legions to which he was entitled by his written agreement with Antony had not been handed over to him. Starting from these counter charges they were soon at open enmity, embittered by the frequent collision between the constitutional authority of the consul and the extra-constitutional imperium of the triumvir. Lucius and Fulvia made capital out of this, maintaining that Marcus was ready to lay down his extraordinary powers as triumvir, and to return to Rome as consul. Fulvia was credited with a more personal motive. Antony’s infatuation for Cleopatra was becoming known in Rome, and it was believed that Fulvia designedly promoted civil troubles in the hope of inducing her husband to return.

The first meeting of Antony and Cleopatra, when the queen was rowed up the Cydnus in her barge, dressed as Venus with attendant Cupids, seems to have been in the autumn of BC42. He had seen her once before in BC56 when he accompanied Gabinius to restore her father. But she must have been a mere child then.

At any rate she and Lucius took advantage of the ill-feeling against Octavius caused by the confiscation of land. They feigned to plead for the dispossessed owners, maintaining that the confiscations had already produced enough for the payment of all claims, and that, if it were found that this was not so, Marcus would bring home from Asia what would cover the balance. They thus made Octavius unpopular with both sides—with the veterans who thought that he might have satisfied their claims in full; with the dispossessed owners, who, over and above the natural irritation at their loss, thought that his measure had not been even necessary, and that he might have paid the veterans without mulcting them, or might have waited for the money from Asia. Especially formidable was the anger of landowners who were in the Senate. The discontent was increased by the hardness of the times; for corn was at famine price owing to Sextus Pompeius and Domitius Ahenobarbus infesting the Sicilian and Ionian seas. Octavius was therefore in a serious difficulty. Unable to satisfy veterans and Senators at the same time, he found how powerless is mere military force against widespread and just resentment. His own answer to senatorial remonstrance had been, “But how am I to pay the veterans?”. Now, however, he found it necessary to let alone the properties of Senators, the dowries of women, and all holdings less than the share of a single veteran. This again led to mutinies among the troops, who murdered some of their tribunes, and were within a little of assassinating Octavius himself. They were only quieted by the promise that all their relations, and all fathers and sons of those who had fallen in the war, should retain lands assigned to them. This again enraged a number of the losers, and fatal encounters between owners and intruding “colonists” became frequent. The soldiers had the advantage of training, but the inhabitants were more numerous, and attacked them with stones and tiles from the housetops, both in Rome and the country towns. The burning of houses became so common that it was found necessary to remit a whole year’s rent of houses let for 500 denarii and under in the city, and a fourth part in the rest of Italy.

Octavius was also made to feel that attachment to Antony meant hostility to himself; for two legions despatched by him to Spain were refused passage through the province by Q. Fufius Calenus and Venidius Bassus, Antony’s legates in Gallia Transalpina. Alarmed by the aspect of affairs, he tried to come to some understanding with Lucius and Fulvia, but found them resolutely hostile. The mediation of officers io the army, of private friends and Senators proved of no avail; though he produced the agreement drawn up between Marcus and himself, and offered to allow the Senate to arbitrate on their disputes. Satisfied that by the refusal of this offer Lucius and Fulvia had put themselves in the wrong, he determined to rely upon his army. For Lucius had been collecting men among those offended by Caesar, and Fulvia, accompanied by many Senators and equites, had occupied Praeneste with a body of troops, to which she regularly gave the watchword as their commander, appeared among them wearing a sword, and frequently harangued the men.

The men of Octavius Caesar’s army, no doubt acting on a hint from, himself, now took the matter into their own hands. They suddenly entered Rome, affirming that they wished to consult the Senate and people. Assembling on the Capitol, with such citizens as ventured to come, they ordered the agreement between Caesar and Antony to be read, voted its confirmation, constituted themselves judges between the disputants, and named a day on which Fulvia, Lucius, and Octavius were to appear before them at Gabii. Having ordered these resolutions to be written out and deposited with the Vestals, they peaceably dispersed. Octavius was present and of course consented to appear; but Lucius and Fulvia, though at first promising to attend at Gabii, did not do so. They scoffed at the idea of a mob of soldiers, a senatus caligatus (from caliga, “a soldier’s boot”), presuming to speak for Senate and people. They were therefore voted in their absence to be in the wrong, and Caesar's acta were confirmed. The show of legality thus gained for him was used by his officers to justify the collection of money in all directions. Temples were stripped of silver ornaments to be coined into money, and troops were summoned from Cisalpine Gaul, which in spite of the claims of Marcus Antonius, was now made a part of Italy without a provincial governor having a right to maintain troops. Lucius also, as consul, enrolled men wherever his authority was acknowledged, and once more there was civil war in Italy. It was in many respects a recrudescence of the republican opposition lately headed by Brutus and Cassius. For Sextus Pompeius had been joined by Murcus with vessels carrying two legions and 500 archers, and was reinforced with the remains of the armies of Brutus and Cassius, which had taken refuge in Cephallenia. In Africa Antony’s legate, Titus Sextius, though he had surrendered the province to Octavius Caesar’s legate Lurco, had resumed possession and put Lurco to death. Lastly, Domitius Ahenobarbus was threatening Brindisi with seventy ships. It was not clear how far these movements were known or approved by Antony; but the old republican party hoped that their upshot would be the dissolution of the triumvirate, the downfall of Octavius Caesar, and the restoration of the old constitution.

For the present Octavius left Sextus Pompeius alone. But he sent a legion to Brindisi and summoned Salvidienus with his six legions from his march into Spain. Salvidienus had been opposed by Antony’s legates Pollio and Ventidius, and was now harassed in his rear by them when he turned homeward along the Via Cassia. Open hostilities, however, began elsewhere. Some legions showed signs of mutiny, and both Octavius and Antonius started for Alba, hoping to secure their adhesion. But Antonius got there first, and by lavish promises won them to his side. Octavius only came in time to skirmish with Antonius’s rearguard under C. Furnius, and then moved northward to renew his attack on Furnius, who had retreated to Sentinum in Umbria. On his way he unsuccessfully attacked Nursia, where Antonius had a garrison, and while he was thus engaged Antonius himself led his main army to Rome. Such troops as Octavius had left in or near the city surrendered to him; while Lepidus, without attempting resistance, fled to Octavius, and the other consul made no opposition. Lucius summoned a contio, declared that he meant to depose Octavius and Lepidus from their unconstitutional office, and to re-establish the just authority of the consulship, with which his brother Marcus would be fully satisfied. His speech was received with applause; he was hailed imperator; and the command in a war was voted to him, though without the enemy being named. Reinforced by veterans of his brother’s army he started along the via Cassia to intercept the returning Salvidienus.

Informed of these transactions Octavius hurried to Rome, leaving Sentinum still besieged. But it was Agrippa who struck the decisive blow. With such forces as he could collect he, too, marched on the heels of Antonius along the via Cassia, and occupied Sutrium, about thirty miles from the city. This cut off L. Antonius’s communications with Rome, who, with Salvidienus in front of him and Agrippa in his rear, could neither advance or retire along the Cassia without fighting. With an enemy on both sides of him he did not venture to give battle, but turned off the road to Perusia. At first he encamped outside the town expecting to be soon relieved by Pollio and Ventidius. But finding that they were moving slowly, and that three hostile armies—under Octavius, Agrippa, and Salvidienus—were threatening him, he retired within the walls; where he thought he might safely winter. Octavius at once began throwing up lines of circumvallation, and cut him off from all chance of supply. Perusia is on a hill overlooking the Tiber and the Trasimene lake. But its position, almost impregnable to assault, made it also somewhat easy to blockade. Fulvia was active in urging the legates of Antony in Gaul and North Italy to come to the relief of Lucius. But Pollio and Ventidius hesitated and doubted, not feeling certain of the wishes of Marcus; and though Plancus cut up one legion on its march to join Octavius, neither he nor any of the others ventured to engage him when he and Agrippa threw themselves in their way. Pollio retired to Ravenna, Ventidius to Ariminum, Plancus to Spoletium, leaving Lucius to his fate; while Fufius Calenus remained in the Alpine region without stirring. Meanwhile Salvidienus proceeded to Sentinum, which he took, and shortly afterwards received the surrender of Nursia.

Octavius was thus able to use his whole force against Perusia. The blockade lasted till March, BC40, when L. Antonius was compelled to surrender by hunger. Octavius had taken an active share in the siege throughout, and had run serious risks, at one time being nearly captured in a sally of gladiators while engaged in sacrifice; at another being in danger from a mutiny in his own army. On the fall of Perusia the townsmen suffered severely from the victorious soldiery, apparently without the order, and perhaps against the wish, of Octavius; and in the course of the sack the town itself was accidentally set on fire and in great part destroyed. There is again a conflict of testimony as to Octavius’s severities. Suetonius says that he executed a great number, answering all appeals with a stern “Death!” (moriendum est): and his enemies asserted that he deliberately enticed L. Antonius into the war to have an excuse for thus ridding himself of his opponents. Some also reported that he caused 300 to be put to death on the Ides of March, at an altar dedicated to Iulius. On the other hand, it is certain that L. Antonius was allowed to go away in safety; and Livy says that Octavius pardoned him and “all his soldiers.” Appian attributes the death of such leading men as fell to the vindictiveness of the soldiers. Velleius, of course, takes the same view; while Dio, equally of course, agrees rather with Suetonius. The first writer to mention the Perusinae arae a is Seneca; but as his object was to contrast the clemency of Nero with the cruelty of Augustus, it is fair to suspect that he was not very particular as to the historical basis for his allegations. If there were some executions and also sortie altar dedicated to Iulius—both of which are more than probable—it would be easy for popular imagination to connect the two. No doubt all in Perusia who were implicated in the assassination, or had been on the proscription lists, would have short shrift. The altar story is unlike the usual good sense of Augustus; but it seems that in this siege he desired to emphasise the fact that he was the avenger of his “father,” some at least of the leaden bullets used by the slingers bearing the words Divom Iulium. At any rate, whether during the siege or by executions after it, there seems no doubt that at Perusia a blow was struck at the old republican party—already decimated by civil war and proscription—from which it never recovered. The victory, moreover, left Octavius supreme in Italy. The legates of M. Antonius for the most part abandoned their legions and went to join him, or to Sicily to join Sextus Pompeius, who was already negotiating with Antony. Fufius Calenus, indeed, refused to surrender his eleven legions; but he died shortly afterwards, and his son handed them over to Caesar. Plancus, abandoned by his two legions, escaped to Antony. Ventidius seems to have done the same; while Pollio, though not leaving Italy, hung about the east coast in expectation of Antony’s arrival. Among others, Tiberius Nero abandoned a garrison which he was commanding, and, with his wife Livia (soon to be the wife of Augustus) and his infant son (afterwards the Emperor Tiberius), fled to Sextus Pompeius. Thither also went Antony’s mother Iulia, whom Pompeius received with respect and employed as envoy to her son; while Fulvia embarked at Brindisi and sailed to Athens to meet her husband. In Italy there was no one to rival Caesar, who by these surrenders and desertions had now a formidable army. What he had still to fear was a combination of Antony and Sextus Pompeius and an invasion of Italy by their joint forces.

Such an invasion was, in fact, contemplated. Antony was in Asia when he heard of the fall of Perusia. Crossing to Athens he met Fulvia and his mother Iulia, the latter bringing an offer from Sextus Pompeius of support against Octavius. Antony was in no good humour with his wife or his agents, whom he must have regarded as having blundered. Nor was he prepared to begin hostilities at once. But he promised that if Sextus did so he would accept his aid; and that, even if he did not, he would do his best to include him in any terms made with Octavius. Meanwhile, though the veterans were shy of enlisting against Antony, Octavius found himself at the head of more than forty legions, and with such an army had no fear of not holding his own on land. But his opponents were strong at sea, and, if they joined with Sextus Pompeius, would have the coasts of Italy at their mercy. He therefore tried on his own account to come to an understanding with Pompeius. With this view he caused Maecenas to negotiate his marriage with Scribonia, sister of Scribonius Libo, and aunt to the wife of Scribonia, Pompeius. He had been betrothed in early life to a daughter of his great-uncle’s colleague, P. Servilius Isauricus, and in BC43 to Antony’s stepdaughter, Clodia. But neither marriage had been completed, and at the beginning of Fulvia’s opposition, in BC41, he had repudiated Clodia. The present union was one of political convenience only. Scribonia had been twice married, and by her second husband had a son only a few years younger than Octavius himself. She was therefore much the older, and seems also to have been of difficult temper. That at least was the reason he gave for the divorce which followed a year later, on the day on which she gave birth to her daughter Iulia. But a truer reason (besides his passion for Livia) was the fact that by that time circumstances were changed, and it was not necessary, or even convenient, to have such a connection with Sextus Pompeius any longer.

Antony arrived off Brindisi in the summer of BC40, and was joined by Sextus and Domitius Ahenobarbus. The three made some descents upon the coast and threatened Brindisi with a blockade. But before much damage had been done the interference of common friends brought about a reconciliation. Antony consented to order Sextus Pompeius to return to Sicily, and to send away Ahenobarbus as propraetor of Bithynia. A conference was held at Brindisi, at which Pollio represented Antony, Maecenas Caesar, while M. Cocceius Nerva (great-grandfather of the Emperor) attended as a common friend of both. The reconciliation here effected was to be confirmed by the marriage of Antony (whose wife Fulvia had just died at Sicyon) to Octavius’s sister Octavia, widow of C. Claudius Marcellus, the consul of BC50. The two triumvirs accordingly embraced and agreed to a new division of the Empire. An imaginary line was to be drawn through Scodra (Scutari) on the Illyrian coast. All west of this line, up to the Ocean, was to be under the care of Octavius, except Africa, which was already in the hands of Lepidus; all east of it, up to the Euphrates, was to go to Antony. The war against Sextus Pompeius (unless he came to terms) was to be the common care of both, in spite of Antony’s recent negotiations with him. Octavius, on his part, agreed to amnesty all who had joined Antony from the armies of Brutus and Cassius, in some cases even though they had been among the assassins. Lastly, both were to have the right to enlist an equal number of soldiers in Italy, This agreement was followed by an interchange of hospitalities, in which Antony displayed the luxury and splendour learnt at the Egyptian court, while Octavius affected the simplicity of a Roman and a soldier.

But Sextus did not tamely submit to be thus thrown over. He resumed his old plan of starving out Italy. His freedman, Menodorus, wrested Sardinia from the governor sent by Octavius, and his ships cruising off Sicily, intercepted the corn-ships from Africa. The people of Rome were threatened with famine, and on the arrival of Octavius and Antony to celebrate the marriage, though an ovation was decreed to both, there were serious riots in which Octavius’s life was in danger, and which had to be suppressed by Antony’s soldiers. They were forced by the outcry to renew negotiations with Sextus, whose brother-in-law Libo—in spite of the advice of Menodorus—arranged a meeting between him and the triumvirs at Misenum, early in BC39. Every precaution was taken against treachery at the hands of Pompeius. And not without reason. The execution of Bithynicus three years before had been followed and surpassed by the treacherous murder of Statius Murcus, followed by the cruel crucifixion of his slaves on the pretence that the crime had been theirs. The conference was therefore held on temporary platforms erected at the end of the mole at Puteoli, with a space of water between them. But an agreement having been reached, Antony and Octavius accepted a banquet on board his ship; and when Menodorus suggested to Pompeius that he should cut the cables and sail away with them as prisoners, he answered that Menodorus should have done it without asking, but that he himself was bound by his oath. The terms made between them were that Sextus Pompeius was to remain governor of Sicily, Sardinia, and Corsica, with his fleet, as well as in Peloponnesus, but was to remove all garrisons from Italian towns and undertake not to hinder commerce or receive runaway slaves, and should at once allow the corn which he had impounded to reach Italy. On the other hand, all men of rank who had taken refuge with him were to have restitution of civil rights and property. If they had been on the proscription lists, they were to recover only a fourth; and if they had been condemned for the assassination, they were to be allowed a safe place of exile. Those—not coming under these three classes—who had served in his army or navy, were to have the same claim to pensions as those ill the armies of the triumvirs.

Pompeius then returned to Sicily, the triumvirs to Rome. Thence they went different ways: Antony and Octavia to Athens; Octavius to Gaul, where the disturbed state of the country required his presence. Now, therefore, begins the separate administration of East and West, and the different principles on which it was carried on contributed largely to the final rupture between the two men. Antony’s was the otiose policy of setting up client kings who would take the trouble of government off his hands and yet be ready to pay him court and do him service, because their dignity and power depended upon his supremacy. Thus Darius, grandson of Mithradates, was appointed to Pontus; Herod to Idumaea and Samaria; Amyntas to Pisidia; Polemon to a part of Cilicia. To Octavius, on the other hand, fell the task of preserving order and establishing Roman rule in countries nearer home, peace and good government in which were essential to the comfort of the city. Above all, he was bound to prevent Sextus Pompeius from again interrupting the commerce and corn supply of Italy. The only service of any of Antony’s partisans near enough to be of active interest to Rome was the victory of Pollio over the Parthini, for which he was awarded a triumph.

But the war with Sextus Pompeius soon became Octavius Caesar’s chief task, and its renewal was with some justice laid at Antony’s door. For being as he thought unfairly treated by Antony as to the Peloponnese, which the latter had declined to hand over till he had collected the year’s taxes, Pompeius once more began harassing the Italian shores and intercepting corn-ships. Octavius answered this by bringing troops from Gaul and building ships. He established two depôts—at Brindisi and Puteoli—and invited Antony’s presence at Brindisi to discuss the question of war. Antony doubtless found it inconvenient to be closely pressed on this matter, for he was greatly responsible for the difficulty. Though he came to Brindisi, therefore, he left again immediately, without waiting for Octavius, who had been delayed. He gave out that he was opposed to any breach of the treaty with Pompeius, ignoring the fact that Pompeius had already broken it. He even threatened to reclaim Menodorus as his slave, on the ground that he had been the slave of Cn. Pompeius, and had therefore passed to him as the purchaser of Pompey’s confiscated estate. Unable, therefore, to reckon on help from Antony, Octavius undertook the business himself. He strengthened assailable points on the Italian coasts; collected ships at Rome and Ravenna; and took over Corsica and Sardinia from Menodorus, who deserted to him and was made joint admiral with Calvisius. He set sail himself from Tarentum, Calvisius from Cosa in Etruria; while a large army was stationed at Rhegium. Pompeius was almost taken by surprise, but yet managed to reach Cumae and all but defeat his enemy’s fleet. This was followed by a violent storm in which Caesar’s fleet suffered severely, off the Skyllaean promontory, and by a second battle in which it only escaped destruction by nightfall. A second terrible storm, which Pompeius’s more experienced mariners managed to avoid, still further reduced Octavius Caesar’s sea forces. Pompeius, elated by these successes, assumed the title of son of Neptune, and wore sea-green robes as a sign of his origin.

Octavius did not give in, but he changed his generals. Agrippa was summoned from Gaul, where he had been very successful, and for the first time since the expedition of Iulius Caesar, had led an army across the Rhine. The construction and command of a new fleet were entrusted to him. With characteristic energy he not only built and manned a large number of ships, but began the formation of a new harbour (portus Iulius) for their safety and convenience, by piercing the causeway between the sea and the Lucrine Lake, deepening the lake itself, and connecting it with the lake Avernus. Here he practised his ships and men during the winter, and by the summer of BC36 was ready for action. Meanwhile fresh negotiations with Antony were conducted by Maecenas, and in the spring of BC37 a reconciliation was arranged at Tarentum, with the help of Octavia. The two triumvirs met on the river Taras, and after an interchange of hospitalities they agreed: First, that the triumvirate should be renewed for a second period of five years, that is, to the last day of BC 33. Secondly, that Antony should supply Octavius with 120 ships for the war against Sextus, and Caesar give Antony 20,000 men for the Parthian war, which was now becoming serious. Some farther mutual presents were made through Octavia, and Antony started for Syria leaving her and their child with her brother.

Caesar’s plan of campaign for BC37 was that on the 1st of July a combined attack should be made on Sicily, from three points—from Africa by Lepidus, from Tarentum by Statilius Taurus, and from Puteoli by himself. Another violent storm baffled this plan; Octavius had to take refuge at Elea; Taurus had to put back to Tarentum; while, though he reached Sicily, Lepidus returned without effecting anything of importance. Another winter and spring had to be spent on preparations, and it was not till the autumn of BC36 that the final engagements took place. At that time Pompeius’s fleet was stationed along the Sicilian coast from Messana to Tyndaris, with headquarters at Mylae. After reconnoitring the position from the Aeolian islands, Octavius left the main attack to Agrippa, while he himself joined Taurus at Leucopetra. Agrippa repulsed the enemy’s ship, but not decisively enough to enable him to pursue them to their moorings. It was sufficient, however, to enable Octavius to cross to Tauromenium, leaving his main body of men on the Italian shore under the command of Valerius Messalla. Here he soon found himself in the greatest danger. Pompeius’s fleet was not held up by Agrippa, as Octavius thought, but appeared off Tauromenium in force. Messalla was unable to cross to his relief and a body of Pompeian cavalry attacked him while his men were making their camp. Octavius himself managed to get back to Italy, but he left three legions, 500 cavalry, and 2,000 veterans, under Cornificius, encamped near Tauromenium, surrounded by enemies, and without means of supply. He himself landed in a forlorn condition, with only one attendant, and with great difficulty found his way to the camp of Messalla. Thence he sent urgent orders to Agrippa to despatch a force to the relief of Cornificius; commanded Messalla to send for reinforcements from Puteoli; while Maecenas was sent to Rome with full powers to suppress the disorders likely to occur when the ill-success against Pompeius was known.

The force despatched by Agrippa found Cornificius and his men in a state of desperate suffering in the difficult district of Mount Aetna, and conveyed them to the fleet off Mylae. So far, though Pompeius had maintained his reputation at sea, he had not shown himself able to follow up a success on land. And now the tide turned against him. Agrippa seized Tyndaris, in which Pompeius had large stores, and Octavius landed twenty-one legions there, with 2,000 cavalry and 5,000 light-armed troops. His plan was to assault Messana while Agrippa engaged the fleet. There was a good road from Tyndaris to Messana (via Valeria), but Pompeius still held Mylae and other places along the coast with the defiles leading to them. He was misled, however, by a report of an immediate attack by Agrippa, and, withdrawing his men from these defiles and strong posts, allowed Octavius to occupy them. Finding the report to be false, he again attempted to intercept Octavius as he was marching with some difficulty over the district of Mount Myconium. But his general (Tisienus) failed to take advantage of Octavius Caesar’s unfavourable position, who, having meanwhile been joined by Lepidus, encamped under the walls of Messana. He was now strong enough on land to send detachments to occupy the various towns from which Pompeius drew supplies; and therefore it was necessary for the latter to abandon Sicily, or to scatter the fleet of Agrippa and so open the sea to his transports. In a second battle off Mylae, however, the fleet of Pompeius was nearly annihilated, and though he escaped himself into Messana, his land forces under Tisienus surrendered to Octavius. When he discovered this Pompeius, without waiting for the eight legions which he still had at Lilybaeum, collected seventeen ships which had survived the battle and fled to Asia, hoping that Antony in gratitude for former services would save and possibly employ him.

The danger which for so many years had hung like a cloud about the shores of Italy was thus at an end. But there was one more danger still to be surmounted before Octavius Caesar’s authority was fully established in Sicily.

The eight Pompeian legions from Lilybaeum under Plennius presently arrived at Messana. Finding Pompeius fled, as Octavius happened to be absent, Plennius handed them over to Lepidus, who was on the spot. Lepidus added them to his own forces, and being thus strengthened, conceived the idea of adding Sicily to his province of Africa. It had not been definitely included in any of the triumviral agreements; he had been the first to land there, and had in the course of his march forced or persuaded many cities to submit,— why should he have less authority to deal with it than Caesar, whose office was the same as his own? He had originally bargained for Narbonensis and Spain: he had been shifted to Africa without being consulted, and his provinces had been taken over by Octavius. He was now at the head of twenty-two legions, and would no longer be treated as a subordinate. His arguments were sound; but they needed to be backed by a determination as fixed as that of his rival, and, above all, by the loyalty of his army. Neither of these advantages were his. In a stormy interview with Caesar he showed that he could scold as loudly as another. But when they had parted, he failed from indolence or blindness to detect that Octavius Caesar’s agents were undermining the fidelity of his men, especially in the Pompeian legions, by informing them that without Octavius’s assent the promises made them by Lepidus would not be held valid. On his next visit to the camp of Lepidus with a small bodyguard, Octavius was mobbed by the soldiers, and even had some of his guard killed, but when in revenge for this he invested Lepidus with his main army, the forces of the latter began quickly to melt away, and before many days he was compelled to throw himself at Octavius’s feet. He was forced to abdicate the triumvirate, and sent to reside in Italy, where he remained till his death (BC13), in a private capacity and subject to constant mortifications. He retained indeed the office of Pontifex Maximus, because of certain religious difficulties as to its abdication, but he was never allowed to exercise any but the most formal functions. This treatment of a colleague was not generous; but the whole career of Lepidus since the beginning of the civil war had been weak and shifty. He was “the greatest weathercock in the world” (ventosissimus), as Decimus Brutus told Cicero, and he certainly presents the most pitiful figure of all the leading men of the day.

The old policy of Philippi and Perusia was followed as regards the forces of Pompeius. Senators and equites were, it is to be feared, in many cases put to the sword; while the rank and file were admitted into Octavius Caesar’s army, and an amnesty was granted to those Sicilian towns which had submitted either to Pompeius or Lepidus. Africa and Sicily Octavius took over as his part of the Empire and appointed propraetors to each. He did not attempt to pursue Sextus Pompeius; he preferred that Antony should have the responsibility and perhaps the odium of dealing with him. In fact, he did some years afterwards make his execution a ground of complaint against Antony. Yet Antony seems to have had little choice in the matter. For Pompeius acted in Asia much as he had acted in Sicily and Italy, capturing towns and plundering ships, while sending peaceful embassies to Antony, offering to serve him against Octavius Being at last compelled to surrender to Amyntas (made king of Pisidia by Antony), and being by him delivered to Antony’s legate Titius, he was taken to Miletus and there put to death. But it was, and still remains, uncertain whether this was done by Antony’s order.

He was just forty, and had led a strange life since he witnessed his father’s death from the ship off the coast of Egypt. He seems to have had some generous qualities which attached men to him. But the times were out of joint, and he was compelled to live the life of a pirate and freebooter, having a grievance against every successive party that gained power at Rome, trusting none, and feeling no obligation to treat them as fellow citizens or even as noble enemies. He seems to have missed more than one chance of crushing Octavius; but his troops, though numerous, were fitted neither by spirit nor by discipline to encounter regularly trained legions in open fight. We cannot withhold a certain admiration for the courage and energy which maintained him as virtual ruler of no inconsiderable portion of the Roman Empire for nearly twelve years.

CHAPTER VII. ACTIUM