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CHAPTER XII.
THE WAR OF 1809.
The war between Austria and Napoleon in the year 1809 was
no mere fortuitous conflict. It arose almost spontaneously, as a historical
necessity, out of the three hundred years’ contest between France and Austria
for European supremacy. In the eighteenth century the struggle against the
supremacy of Louis XIV culminated in the war of the Spanish Succession. A
century later, in the war of 1809, the House of Habsburg once more gathered its
forces in order to break down the tyranny of Napoleon, which weighed so heavily
on central Europe. But the war of 1809 has a character of its own; it was the
first time since 1792 that in any continental State the whole force of a nation
was united for military ends. Bearing in mind the almost simultaneous national
risings in Spain, Tyrol, and northern Germany, we may regard the years 1808 and
1809 as the starting-point of the popular reaction against the despotism of
Napoleon.
The Spanish rising in 1808 gave Austria the decisive
signal to take up arms, a year later, against the French Emperor. The signal
came from abroad; it found the ground prepared at home. The domestic reasons
for the step taken by Austria date back to the Peace of Pressburg (December 27, 1805). That treaty, notwithstanding its stringent conditions,
left Austria, though shorn of the prestige of a German Emperor, a great
position in the concert of the Powers. It was, in the first place, the
overthrow of Prussia, but, above all, the alliance between Napoleon and the
Tsar, completed at the Congress of Erfurt, which doomed Austria to political
isolation, and thereby exposed her to the danger of annihilation by Napoleon
whenever it should suit him to attack her. The first who fully grasped this
danger was Count Stadion, the Austrian Minister of Foreign Affairs, a man of
large views and conspicuous political ability, and an ardent patriot, who
combined with great energy of character a detestation of the narrow-minded
Austrian bureaucracy. It was he who, with the active support of the courageous
Empress, Marie Louise Beatrix, and of Count Clemens Metternich, then Austrian
ambassador in Paris, finally succeeded in urging his Imperial master to the
point of war. Metternich believed that the French people were tired of war, and
unlikely to support Napoleon much longer; so that, in the event of a conflict,
there was reason to expect a popular revolt against the Napoleonic régime. Strange to say, Metternich found some support
in Talleyrand, who, behind the scenes, was indirectly encouraging Austria to
fight. The decision, apart from military and financial considerations, was not
an easy one for Austria, seeing that the general attitude of Europe offered no
certain prospect of her finding allies in the ensuing conflict. Before, however,
we describe the struggle, we must briefly consider the general political
situation; for war is simply “the carrying-out of diplomacy by forcible means.”
In the spring of 1808, Napoleon’s violent and despotic
interference in the internal affairs of Spain, at that time his ally, confirmed
the opinion prevalent in the Court of Vienna, that the French Emperor’s lust of
conquest was insatiable, and that, after the overthrow of Spain, it would be Austria’s
turn. Napoleon had not been backward with unfriendly acts, and even with open
threats, against that country; nor had it escaped his notice that preparations
for war had been going on for some time on the Danube. According to Count
Stadion’s views, it was simply a question of gaining sufficient time for the
completion of military preparations, and, if possible, for a fresh coalition
against France. Archduke Charles, who was superintending the reorganisation of
the army, was of the same opinion, at least in principle. The memorial
addressed by him to the Emperor Francis on April 14,1808, is specially interesting. He therein solemnly adjured his
Imperial brother, above all things, to introduce into the public administration
a more harmonious system. Such a change, unfortunately, did not take place; but
something was done to facilitate the preparations for war. Among other
measures, the formation of a Landwehr was ordered by the Imperial edict
of June 9, 1808. In this force were enrolled all male subjects, from eighteen
to twenty-five years of age, who were capable of bearing arms, and not already
serving in the standing army. The edict called forth from Napoleon a more than
ordinary burst of anger. On August 15, in Paris, at the reception of the
diplomatic corps, there was a violent scene between him and Metternich. The
Emperor tried to represent Austria as a disturber of the peace, and threatened
a war of extermination if her preparations were not instantly stopped. He also
referred to England as the “invisible hand” which was pushing forward this war.
As a matter of fact, since the death of Pitt, there had been no intimate
relations between London and Vienna.
In a second interview with Metternich, Napoleon
endeavoured to efface the impression of his menaces by more amicable phrases ;
but Metternich was too experienced a diplomatist to be misled in such a way. He
knew perfectly well that, between the two interviews, bad news had arrived from
Portugal, where, in consequence of the landing of British troops, the French
under Junot were hard pressed. On the strength of this news, he sent word to
Vienna that, in view of the development of affairs in the Iberian peninsula,
Napoleon could certainly not be meditating any immediate attack on Austria.
The Congress of Erfurt, which followed on these
events, helped to throw the Austrian difficulty into the background in
Napoleon’s mind. Count Stadion, on the other hand, did his utmost to force the
Emperor Francis to an energetic decision. He met, it is true, with opposition
from most of the other ministers; and even Archduke Charles used all his
influence to secure delay, urging that it was better to put off the war a
little longer, until the military and internal affairs of the State should be
on a more settled footing. The war party, on the other hand, could count on the
support of the nation. Indeed, throughout purely Catholic Austria, recent
events—the occupation of Rome by the French, the seizure of the Pope, and his
appeal for help to Catholic Christendom—all served to increase the general
detestation of Napoleon.
Early in December, 1808, councils were held in the Hofburg in which Metternich’s representations turned the
scale in favour of war. These representations (contained in three memorials,
two of a political nature, the third headed Armée française:
guerre d’Espagne), starting from the assumption
that Napoleon’s supremacy was a permanent danger to the existence of Austria,
led up to the conclusion that, in view of recent events in the Iberian
peninsula, now or never was the moment for Austria to strike. A deep impression
was made by Metternich’s calculation that, in a war with Austria, Napoleon
would not have more than 206,000 men at his disposal. Stadion had arrived at
similar results; he, indeed, placed the number as low as 197,000. These
calculations, it may here be observed, proved later to be incorrect; the number
had been underestimated. Archduke Charles considered the views of Stadion and
Metternich too sanguine. He reiterated his protest against an early declaration
of war, and suggested the end of March as the earliest possible date for the
commencement of hostilities, if war should eventually be declared.
It was the object of the Court of Vienna, in the
interval that remained, to seek the support of those Powers whose interests
might presumably incline them to the side of Austria. But the prospect of
forming a new Coalition was far from favourable. Among possible allies, the
first was Great Britain, the traditional friend of Austria and the most implacable
enemy of the Napoleonic system. But, as has already been stated, no close
relations existed at that time between the Governments of the two countries;
and even in Vienna it was admitted that, in the most favourable circumstances,
the utmost that could be counted on from Great Britain was a subsidy. That she
would also intervene by means of a military diversion on land (as she
afterwards did at Walcheren) could not at that time be foreseen. It was after
the outbreak of the war that Count Starhemberg was despatched
to England by the Viennese Cabinet, to conduct negotiations which had hitherto
been carried on through the Hanoverian Ministry.
There was some room for hope that Prussia would be won
over. The so-called “Reformers”, who after the catastrophe of 1806 had been
bent on the political, military, and social regeneration of Prussia, such men
as Stein, Scharnhorst, Gneisenau and others, backed
as they were by the profound hatred of Napoleon felt by the population of
northern Germany, were ardently in favour of the Austrian alliance. At the
outset it seemed likely enough that Prussia would be drawn to Austria’s side.
Even after Stein’s resignation, the war party in Berlin refused to acknowledge
its defeat; and in January, 1809, a convention was actually concluded in Vienna
by Major von der Goltz, in which it was agreed that Prussia should place 80,000
men in the field. But it did not accord with the cautious character of King
Frederick William III, any more than with those formal pledges by which he had bound
himself to Napoleon in the convention of September 8, 1808, to form so bold a
resolution—a resolution made more difficult, it is true, by the Franco-Russian
alliance. During his stay in St Petersburg in the beginning of January, 1809,
he was strengthened in his tendency to remain neutral; and, in the end, he
rejected all binding arrangements with the phrase: “Without Russia I cannot
join you.”
That Russia should join must, to any dispassionate
judge of the situation, have appeared out of the question. Her friendship with
France had gained for her Finland and the reversion of the Danubian Principalities. All the same, various diplomatic attempts were made to lure the
Emperor Alexander from Napoleon’s side. But in vain. On March 2, 1809, the Tsar
drily informed Count Schwarzenberg, the Austrian ambassador, that he would
fulfil his obligations to France; that is to say, he would despatch an
auxiliary force to help her against Austria. Nevertheless there was still some
ground for the hope that Russia would not carry military coercion too far. As
for the minor Powers, Denmark was on the side of France; Sweden was occupied by
the war with Russia; and the smaller German States had, through the
Confederation of the Rhine, become the vassals of Napoleon and the adversaries
of their former Emperor.
Thus, when on February 8, 1809, war was finally
decided upon by an Imperial Council under the presidency of the Emperor,
Austria found herself alone, without an ally, pitted against the most powerful
State and the greatest military genius of the time. She was still alone, when
on March 2 Metternich declared in the Council that the movements of the French
troops in Germany, and the mobilising of the Rheinbund contingent, had compelled the Emperor Francis to place his own army on a war
footing. Formal declaration of war there was none. Its place was taken by a
lengthy official report, issued by the Court of Vienna and widely circulated,
and by a stirring proclamation, addressed-to the army and the nation.
France, from a military point of view, was then in the
zenith of her power. By force of numbers, military capacity, admirable
organisation, and masterly leadership, the French army was in the hands of
Napoleon a terrific engine of war. In the winter of 1808-9, by means of a
conscription relentlessly carried out, the nominal strength of this army (never
actually reached) attained the number of 800,000 men. This included
field-forces about 300,000 strong in Spain, 100,000 in the interior of France,
200,000 drawn entirely from the Rhenish territory on the right bank of the
Rhine, and about 60,000 in Italy.
At the same time, one fact must be clearly borne in
mind: that the French army of 1809, as regards both its internal cohesion and
its military discipline, was not the equal of the Grand Army of 1805, which
Napoleon himself described as “the best army he ever commanded”. The causes of
this falling-off were various. In accordance with his widening schemes of
supremacy, the Emperor was possessed by a sort of rage de nombre; and the army, both officers and men, thus lost
in quality what it gained in quantity. The financial resources of France were
also so severely strained by incessant wars that the clothing, equipment, and
provisioning of the troops left much to be desired; and pay was frequently in
arrears. Moreover, many officers in the higher ranks of the service were
beginning to be tired of war, and longed to enjoy their hard-won honours and
positions in peace and quietness. Napoleon therefore was driven to economise in
the once lavish items of rewards, so that his paladins might have something
left to fight for.
But these defects were of but slight importance
compared with the brilliant military qualities of the French army. Looking back
on the overwhelming victories of the last ten years, it might well regard
itself as invincible, so long as Napoleon was at its head. For pure fighting
quality the infantry stood indisputably in the front rank. We shall see later what
marvellous deeds were done, especially at Aspern and Essling, by the French infantry (including the German
auxiliaries there engaged). In any ease, the mass of the French infantry must
be regarded as superior to the Austrian, and the tactical skill of its leading
was most decidedly greater. The French cavalry was brave, numerous, and wellmounted;
and it was commanded by a large staff of distinguished officers. Its weakness
lay in the rider’s lack of care for his horse, which led to large numbers of
animals dying on the march. But, as was proved by its brilliant charges at the
battle of Aspern, the cavalry, when it came into
action, was extremely efficient. The artillery had attained a prominent place
in the French army; and Napoleon, who had himself risen from this branch of the
service, knew how to handle it in a masterly fashion. In the war of 1809, the
“grand battery” of Wagram became the classic instance of successful handling of
large masses of field artillery.
The military resources of Austria, with a population
only half as large as that of France, were very inferior to the French.
According to official calculations, there were available, in the spring of
1809, 283,000 troops of the line and 310,000 of the reserve. But these numbers
were never reached. The actual strength of the field army, at the outbreak of
war, amounted to no more than 265,000 men, including 15,000 militia. It is true
that the army had been in every respect reorganised since the catastrophe of
1805. Archduke Charles had then taken upon himself the functions of Minister of
War; and to his circumspection and practical energy was mainly due the
improvement in organisation and tactics that now became apparent. New
service-regulations were introduced; equipment and arms were perfected. But
the end chiefly aimed at was to rouse the spirit of the troops. Such words as
“People”, “Freedom”, “Fatherland”, were heard for the first time in
the army—words which, however, before long were again to be excluded from the
language of Austrian policy. In 1809 a lofty sentiment of patriotism permeated
the army, especially the German portion of it; and it was this universal
enthusiasm for the fatherland which inspired its heroic conduct in the battles
of Aspern and Wagram.
Among the various branches of the service, ancient
tradition had allotted a leading place to the thirty-five regiments of the
Imperial cavalry, which (except at Marengo) had invariably distinguished itself
in war. The infantry, numbering 78 regiments and nine Jager battalions, was somewhat
clumsy in action, but admirable in discipline; and its grenadiers formed a
picked body of troops, which remained unconquered at Aspern and Wagram. The field artillery, consisting of four regiments, was well
trained, and during the campaign of 1809 superior to the French in the number
of its guns.
The mobilisation of the Austrian army commenced in
January, 1809. On February 25, 1809, the strategical concentration began. The
plan of operations was to attack the French troops under the command of Davout in
central Germany, together with the Rheinbund troops (in all about 230,000 strong), and to defeat them before Napoleon could
bring up his reinforcements. The Austrian army in Germany was under the command
of Archduke Charles, who was appointed commander-in-chief. The “army of Inner
Austria”, under Archduke John, was to proceed simultaneously against the
French forces in Italy and Dalmatia; while a third army, under Archduke
Ferdinand, was to invade the Grand Duchy of Warsaw. In accordance with this
plan of operations, Archduke Charles assembled, towards the end of March, six
army corps in western Bohemia. This position was opposite to the centre of the
enemy’s radius of concentration and close to northern Germany, in which a
rising was expected. Two army-corps were also concentrated in Upper Austria in
order to invade Bavaria on both banks of the Danube. Archduke John had orders
to invade north-eastern Italy from Willaeh-Laibaeh with two army-corps, and to despatch a column to Tyrol, to form a nucleus for
the expected rising in that country, which bore unwillingly the Bavarian yoke.
A detachment was to advance into Dalmatia and cover the rear of Archduke John’s
army. Archduke Ferdinand’s army-corps was to move from Cracow and to occupy
Warsaw so as to reach, from thence, the Elbe above Breslau. Clearly, this plan
of operations did not fail on the side of comprehensiveness.
On the French side, the situation did not admit of
plans so definite in their aim, not only because the French army was at first
strictly limited to the defensive, but because, scattered as it was over a wide
extent of country, it could only proceed to the scat of war by sections.
Napoleon had, it is true, completed his military preparations by the middle of
January, 1809. While still in Spain, he sent orders to the princes of the Rheinbund to place their contingents on a war
footing. Troops were sent from France; and the Imperial Guard was despatched
from Spain to Germany. The French troops under Davont,
then dispersed over northern Germany, received orders to march into Bavaria.
But these orders were insufficient to secure to the Emperor at the outbreak of
war those two most important factors of success—numerical superiority and
initiative. At the beginning of April, the entire force which he could dispose
of at the various seats of war (exclusive of Spain) amounted to only 165,000
men (French and Rheinbund troops) in Bavaria; 18,050
(Poles) in the Grand Duchy of Warsaw; 20,000 in Saxony; 57,000 in Italy north
of the Po; and 10,000 in Dalmatia. In Bavaria the French army was not only
inferior in numbers to the army of Archduke Charles, and far weaker in
artillery, but it was also seriously dislocated. And in Bavaria lay the crux of
the whole war.
Archduke Charles’ original plan of operations had to
be altered even before its execution began. The Archduke had meant to take the
field at the end of March. But, as all the troops had not yet arrived on the scene
of action, and as news had come that the French army of the Rhine was
approaching Ratisbon, the commencement of operations was put off till the second
week in April, while the main army advanced from Bohemia to the Brannan-Passau
line. Here, on the evening of April 9, were finally marshalled 116,000 men,
forming a front scarcely twenty-eight miles in length. Besides these, 50,000
men under General Bellegarde were at Tachau, and
10,000 under General Jellachich at Salzburg. In all,
176,000 men crossed the Bavarian frontier on April 10. The Austrian offensive
found the French army of the Rhine not yet assembled. Davout was engaged in
carrying out the directions sent by the Emperor from Paris to Berthier, who was
then at Strassburg and was temporarily entrusted with
the conduct of operations. These directions ordered a concentration upon Donauworth. At the same date the various divisions of the
French army, numbering 89,000 men, distributed in five groups, were drawn up on
the line Munich-Ratisbon-Würzburg (a line 112 miles in length), behind which
76,000 men lay between Augsburg and Donauworth.
Archduke Charles had meant by rapid marches to reach
the Isar in the direction of Landshut, while
Bellegarde was to march upon Ratisbon, and Jellachich upon Munich. It would have been quite possible for the Austrian main army to
reach the Isar by April 14. Instead of this, owing to
the defective arrangements of the commissariat, it advanced very slowly, and
accomplished only half a normal march daily. Herein lay one of the principal
causes of the later Austrian reverses. In war the most valuable of all
commodities is time ; and the French generals knew how to handle it so
economically that by April 13 the various divisions of their army were already
drawn closer together in the direction of Donauworth.
Then, all of a sudden, Berthier interfered disastrously in the course of
operations, with a view to effecting a concentration at Ratisbon. A change of
orders became necessary, proving the truth of the adage: “Order—counter-order—disorder”. To be sure, Berthier might have said
he was only acting in obedience to Napoleon’s commands; but Napoleon did not
leave Paris till April 13; and even he, at such a distance, was not in a
position to make arrangements in accordance with the actual condition of
things.
Consequently, when the Emperor entered Donauworth early on April 17, he found the situation far
from favourable, since the dislocation of the French forces made it possible
for Archduke Charles to attack and defeat the scattered units one by one. But
the Archduke, whose advanced forces had won several unimportant successes
between the 11th and the 15th, had in the meanwhile become “sicklied o’er with
the pale cast of thought.” Although, on the 16th, he had driven the Bavarians
out of Landshut, and thus possessed himself of the line of the Isar, he abandoned his design of breaking through the
enemy’s front, and decided on the 18th to attack the French left wing under
Davout at Ratisbon, maintaining the defensive against the Bavarians on the
right.
With the personal intervention of Napoleon the course
of operations underwent a complete change. In the end, his energy succeeded in
rectifying the strategic blunders of Berthier. But even here, as in the Marengo
campaign, Napoleon’s merit has been much overrated. But for the remarkable
tactical achievements of his marshals and the blunders of Archduke Charles, the
“Ratisbon campaign” (as the military movements of April 19-23 are called) would
have had a different issue. It was, above all, a serious mistake on Napoleon’s
part that he miscalculated the date when hostilities were likely to commence.
He did not expect them to begin till a fortnight later, and he ought to have
been much earlier on the spot.
The Emperor had originally intended to concentrate his
forces on the left bank of the Danube, at a point further to the west, between
Augsburg and Ingolstadt; but, having reconnoitred the enemy’s position, he
decided, on April 17, to effect his junction on the left bank in the
neighbourhood of Abensberg. The orders relating to
this movement were conceived, it is true, in masterly fashion; but, as ought to
have been foreseen, they became impracticable, in the most important details,
when on the 19th the Austrian commander carried out his intention of making a
determined attack, with all his available forces, on the French left wing. This
wing consisted of four divisions under Davout, whom Napoleon had directed to
approach the main army by marching to Neustadt in a southerly direction. Such a
march, with the Danube in the rear and a vastly superior enemy in front, could
only be carried out as a flank movement, one of the most difficult of all military
operations. Napoleon himself would have been the first to condemn any other
commander for attempting a movement so contrary to all the rules of war.
Moreover, recent researches have shown that Napoleon gave this order without
knowing how Davout was situated; it was, therefore, an order based on false
assumptions. Davout, by means of magnificent generalship,
succeeded, after a fierce battle at Haussen on April
19, in escaping the overthrow that threatened him; but this was chiefly if not entirely
owing to the fact that, at the last moment, Archduke Charles failed to bring
his entire force (which was far superior to Davout’s) energetically into the
field. Thus the Marshal succeeded in joining Lefebvre’s corps, which on the
19th had also fought with equal success at Abensberg against isolated detachments of the Austrian army. If the events of the 19th
meant no decided victory for the French, they had great influence on the whole
future course of the campaign, seeing that, from this point onwards, Napoleon altered
his tactics, acting solely on the offensive, while Archduke Charles confined
himself to the defensive. Now, as Moltkc said, “the
offensive alone is real generalship”; and this was
proved by the later incidents of the campaign of 1809.
On April 20, Ratisbon, where only one French regiment
was posted, fell into the hands of Count Bellegarde, who formed with his two
armycorps the extreme right wing of the Austrian army, and had till now been
operating by himself on the left bank of the Danube. But the possession of
Ratisbon had no further influence on the course of the operations, for on the
20th Napoleon with his united forces fell upon the Austrian left wing, and in
the battle of Abensberg inflicted on it a decisive
defeat. The following day Napoleon pursued the battle against the Austrian left
as it was retiring upon Landshut, and cut it off from the main army. Davout
advanced simultaneously upon the right wing and forced it to retreat. But the
decisive blow against that part of the Austrian army which was under the direct
command of Archduke Charles was not struck till the battle of Eckmühl (April
22). Here, in spite of a stubborn resistance, the Austrians were beaten; and a
general retirement along the whole line of front became inevitable. This, however,
could take place only by the separation of the army into two bodies. The left
wing, under Hiller, disappeared in a south-easterly direction towards the Isar; while the main army under Archduke Charles, going
north, attempted to gain the left bank of the Danube. This it succeeded in
reaching on the 23rd by way of Ratisbon, which the French, after an obstinate
defence on the part of the Austrian rear-guard, stormed on the evening of the
same day.
Thus ended the five days’ campaign of Ratisbon, in
which the Austrians lost nearly 40,000 men in killed, wounded, and prisoners.
The Austrian army was broken up. Its condition after the defeat was such that
the French Emperor had no further opposition to fear in his march on Vienna. On
the morning of April 23 Archduke Charles himself wrote to his Imperial brother:
“Napoleon’s position grows steadily stronger; and I shall be very lucky if,
after yesterday’s defeat, I succeed in bringing the army with honour across the
Danube. I have given your Majesty an accurate account of my position; and I
must add that against such an enemy nothing more can be expected from what is
left of this army.”
As a commander-in-chief Napoleon remains to this day
unequalled in the relentless following-up of victory. Ceaselessly pursuing
Hiller’s division of the Austrian army, the French Emperor appeared before
Vienna on May 10. Three days later he rode into the Imperial city, which had
offered only a feeble show of resistance. Meanwhile, Archduke Charles, who had
reassembled his army, approached the Danube from Budweis in the direction of
Vienna, and about the middle of May took up his position in threatening
proximity on the left bank. His intention was to cross to the right bank, and
so threaten, if possible, the French communications. This plan, however, was
frustrated by Napoleon, who was firmly determined to win a decisive victory by
a vigorous offensive. The battle was to be fought on the Marchfeld,
where the Archduke had effected a junction with the troops under Hiller—that
historic field where Rudolf of Habsburg conquered the Bohemian king Ottokar,
and thereby founded the power of his House.
Napoleon’s plan of attacking Archduke Charles on the Marchfeld was bold in the extreme, because he would first
have to cross the Danube, and then to fight with the river in his rear. On May
18 he had gathered together 70,000 men south-east of Vienna. Having planted
himself firmly on the left bank of the Danube at Aspern and Essling, he commenced operations by transporting
his army by means of four military bridges to Lobau,
an island formed by one of the numerous arms of the Danube. From Bisamberg, a hill commanding a view of the wide plain of
the Marchfeld, Archduke Charles had watched the movements
of the French. He quickly brought his troops into order of battle, and
determined to fall with his full strength upon the feeble forces which
Napoleon, who did not believe the Archduke to be so near him, had transported
to the left bank of the river.
These troops did not amount to more than 17,000 infantry,
with 5000 horse and 52 guns, under Marshal Bessières. Against these, about noon
on Monday in Whitsun week (May 21), 80,000 infantry, 15,000 horse, and 300
guns, formed in three columns, advanced to the attack. But, in spite of all
their courage, the Austrians failed to take Aspern and Essling, the two points d’appui of the
French. Aspern was defended by Masséna with Molitor’s
division, Essling by Marshal Lannes with that of
Bonnet. Repeated attacks were made on these positions, only to be repulsed in
every case by the indomitable defenders. On the other hand, the attempt made by
Napoleon to break through the centre of the enemy’s line by a great cavalry
charge failed signally, owing to the steadiness of the Austrian infantry.
Equally unsuccessful was a second attack of the combined French cavalry, made
about eight o’clock in the evening upon the Austrian horse. When it grew dusk, Aspern was only partially in possession of the Austrians,
while they had been altogether unable to force an entry into Essling. Nevertheless, the Austrian army held the French
(as Massena, the defender of Aspern, expresses it in
his memoirs) “closely hemmed in by a ring of fire and steel”; and during the
night the battle repeatedly flared up afresh.
At 3 a.m. on the 22nd Massena recommenced the bloody work with a vigorous and unexpected
attack on the Austrians in Aspern, and drove them
from this fiercely contested position. Further fighting took place at Essling, which finally remained in the hands of the French.
At seven o’clock Napoleon began to deploy the forces massed between Aspern and Essling for a combined
attack. During the night fresh bodies of troops, the 2nd corps, under Lannes,
the grenadier corps, under Oudinot, and the Imperial
Guard, had crossed the Danube; so that in all about 55,000 men, with 8000
horse, pressed forward against the Austrian lines. Before the tremendous onset
of the French, who advanced in close order with the regularity of men on
parade, some of the Austrian battalions began to waver, when Archduke Charles,
seizing the banner of the Zach regiment, flung himself into the fray. His
heroic example inspired his troops; and the advance of the French infantry was
checked. Similarly the French regiments of horse, after overthrowing the
enemy’s cavalry in a magnificent charge, finally retired before the advance of
the Austrian grenadiers. In the centre the battle came to a standstill.
At nine o’clock the news reached Napoleon that the
enemy had set on fire and destroyed the largest of the military bridges. This
was disastrous news. It might mean the annihilation of the French army, if the
Austrians succeeded in taking Aspern and Essling; for in this case the French retreat across the
Danube would be seriously imperilled. A furious conflict therefore again broke
out round the two villages, whose position was now marked only by heaps of
smouldering ruins. The struggle for Aspern and Essling is one of the most memorable and also the most
sanguinary combats in military history. At 3 p.m. the French won back Essling, which they had lost; and
they held it till the end of the battle. Aspern, on
the other hand, fell finally into the hands of the Austrians later in the day.
But their strength also was exhausted. They were no longer able to hamper the
retreat of the enemy, who, the same evening and during the following night,
crossed over to the island of Lobau, after having
with immense labour succeeded in restoring the bridges. The losses on both
sides were enormous. The Austrians had lost from 25,000 to 26,000 men; the
French from 18,000 to 20,000, the gallant Marshal Lannes being among those who
perished.
The battle of Aspern made a
powerful impression on both friend and foe. For the first time, the prize of
victory had escaped the hitherto invincible Emperor. This fact remained
unaltered by the boastful bulletin issued by Napoleon on May 23, in which he
estimated the French losses at 4000, and declared that on May 22 he “remained
master of the battlefield.” On the other hand, there is some ground for the
reproach brought against Archduke Charles of having let slip the opportunity
offered him by the critical position of the French army, which was forced to
wait several days on the island of Lobau without food
or ammunition. There is justice in this accusation as regards the afternoon of
the 23rd; but afterwards there appear to have been political reasons for the
delay. At the end of May the Prince of Orange made his appearance at the
Archduke’s head-quarters, as confidential envoy of the Prussian Court, with
the promise of help from Prussia. In the beginning of June it seemed likely
enough that King Frederick William III, under the pressure of the war party,
would actually decide on taking part in the war. But when, at Konigsberg, oil
June 18, the Austrian ambassador, Baron Steigentesch,
delivered letters to the King, both from the Emperor Francis and Archduke
Charles, and endeavoured to obtain a definite engagement, the King deferred his
decision in the hope that things might become clearer in the future. Steigentesch returned with his mission unaccomplished.
Between the armies a seven weeks’ armistice was
arranged, which was used by both to obtain reinforcements. In the beginning of
July an army of 165,000 men—partly French, partly troops of the Rhine Confederation,
and including 25,000 horse—was marshalled on the island of Lobau,
ready to repeat the attempt of the previous May. The French now had a numerical
superiority, for Archduke Charles had but 135,000 men, including 15,000 horse,
though he certainly held a strong position behind the Russbach with the Marchfeld before him. His artillery was
slightly superior in numbers to the French.
In the night of July 4-5, amid thunder and lightning
and in torrents of rain, the French columns began to cross the Danube on the
four bridges. On July 5, at midday, their approach completed, they advanced in
close columns from Gross-Enzersdorf against the
Austrians, who at seven in the evening repulsed with heavy loss an assault upon
the heights of Wagram. But the real attack did not take place till the
following day. Napoleon had determined to direct it against the enemy’s left
wing, while the Austrian centre was to be broken simultaneously by a charge of
densely-packed masses of cavalry and infantry. Archduke Charles had also
decided to take the offensive, directing his main attack upon the French left,
which was to be surprised at early dawn. But the order reached his generals too
late; and the Archduke was obliged to change his plan. At 6 a.m. he pushed forward his centre, and
fell upon the French in the village of Aderklau. The
struggle for the possession of this place was bitter and prolonged, resembling
that for Aspern two months before. Fortune
alternated; in the end the village remained in the hands of the Austrian
grenadiers under the heroic General d’Aspre. On their
right wing also the Austrian columns pressed forward victoriously by Sussenbrunn and Breitenlec to the
banks of the Danube. At this moment matters looked critical for the French; but
the Emperor, hastening to the centre of the fight, ordered 100 guns, the
historic grand battery”, to be massed at Sussenbrunn to check the Austrian advances. Soon
afterwards he launched against the enemy a solid column, consisting of 30,000
infantry and 6000 horse, moving in one compact mass under Macdonald’s command.
Though the French eventually succeeded, with heavy loss, in attaining their
object, it was. not at this point that the issue was decided. This took place
in another part of the field, near Markgrafen-Neusiedel,
where Marshal Davout beat the enemy’s enfeebled left wing under Prince
Rosenberg, rolled it up, and so tore a breach in the Austrian front. Their
right wing was also forced back by Massena at Aspern.
Everywhere limited to the defensive, with no prospect of the long-expected help
from Archduke John (who was to have advanced from Pressburg and fallen on the enemy’s right flank), Archduke Charles reluctantly gave, at
two o’clock, the order to retreat.
Though a defeat for Austria, the battle of Wagram was
one of the most brilliant feats of arms in Austrian history. The Austrian
losses in the two days’ fighting, amounted to 24,000, killed and wounded. Those
of the French were estimated at 18,000. On the following day Archduke Charles
drew off his army in good order in the direction of Znaym and Iglau, pursued, though but feebly, by the French.
There was some more fighting at Znaym on July 10 and
11; but an armistice on the 12th put an end to further hostilities. The Emperor
Francis at first refused to sanction this; but on the 17th, at Komorn, he reluctantly consented to the ratification.
We must now turn to review the course of the war
elsewhere. At the outset of the struggle, Austria was compelled to reckon on a
conflict not only with the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, but also with Russia, since both
these States were allied with France. Consequently, in March, 1809, a force of
25 battalions, 44 squadrons of cavalry, and 76 guns (30,000 men in all) were
concentrated, as a 7th army-corps, in western Galicia, and placed under the
command of Archduke Ferdinand. On April 15, the Archduke, from his base at Nowe-Miasto, commenced operations, aiming in the first
place at the capture of Warsaw. This enterprise was open to the strategic
objection that it exposed the right flank to a Russian force stationed on the Pruth; but it was not expected that this force would push
forward with speed or decision. In addition to 40,000 Russians under Prince Galitzin, the Austrians had to face 17,000 Poles and 2,000
Saxons, whom Prince Poniatovski had assembled near Raszyn,
a day’s march south of Warsaw.
Archduke Ferdinand advanced rapidly, beat Poniatovski
at Raszyn (April 19), and occupied Warsaw (April 22);
the tête-du-pont at Praga—a
suburb of Warsaw on the right bank of the Vistula—remained, however, in the
hands of the Poles. Early in May Poniatovski took the offensive, and on the
5th, after a successful combat, occupied Gora, at which point the Austrians had
intended to cross the Vistula. The Archduke, finding himself unable to advance
further against the main Polish army, determined to make a demonstration in the
direction of Thom, in order to divert the attention of the enemy from Galicia.
The plan failed, however; for Poniatovski led his troops up the Vistula,
occupied Lublin (May 14) and Sandomir (May 18), and
on the 20th stormed Zamosz. At the same time the
Russians advanced towards Lemberg, while a strong Polish force approached
Warsaw. Thus threatened on all sides, the Archduke was forced, on June 3, to
evacuate the city, and to withdraw to Opatoff, in the
upper valley of the Vistula. Although the Austrians made some successful raids
from this point, the further advance of the Russians from Lemberg, and the
presence of 25,000 Poles, strongly posted near Radom, made the Archduke’s
position untenable. Early in July he fell back upon the line Viniary-Zarnoviez, but soon afterwards received orders to
retire upon Olmutz by way of Cracow. On July 16 the news of the armistice of Znaym put an end to hostilities in this quarter. The
Austrian Government has been blamed, with some justice, for undertaking the
Polish campaign at all. The decision of the war lay, in any case, with the main
army under Archduke Charles; and Poland was so far distant that events in that
country could have no serious influence on the issue. On the other hand, the
30,000 men, who fought bravely but uselessly under Archduke Ferdinand, might
well have turned the scale at Aspern or Wagram.
Nor was this the only deficiency which stood in the
way of Austrian success. It has been mentioned above that, on the afternoon of
July 5, Archduke John was vainly expected on the battlefield. Till that time he
had been independently conducting the operations of the army of Inner Austria,
consisting of 48,000 men, 5000 horse, and 150 guns, which had crossed the
Italian frontier at Tarvis on April 9. On April 16,
at Sacile, he came upon a Franco-Italian army of
36,000 men, led by Eugene de Beauharnais, Viceroy of Italy, and inflicted on it
a decisive defeat. He followed up this blow by another at Caldiero on the 29th.
But the bad news from Germany obliged the Archduke to retire to Willach early in May. After a series of collisions, the
issue of which was unfavourable to the Austrians, he had to abandon Carinthia
to the Viceroy (who in the meanwhile had received considerable reinforcements),
and to withdraw into Hungary. On June 7 he arrived before the fortress of Raab, followed by Eugene, who was now attempting to cover
the movements of the main French army towards Hungary. In Croatia and Dalmatia
also there had been fighting with Marshal Marmont’s corps, ending in the retreat of the Austrians.
On June 14 the Archduke again challenged the fortune
of arms at Raab, but was beaten and obliged to
retreat by way of Komorn to Pressburg,
whence he was summoned to take part in the battle of Wagram. It was his own
fault that he arrived too late for effectual interference. In any case, it is
doubtful whether Archduke John, who could bring no more than 13,000 men into
the field, would have been able to turn the tide of war at Wagram.
At the beginning of the campaign, Archduke John was
also commissioned to deliver Tyrol from Bavarian rule, under which it had
fallen by the Peace of Pressburg. He despatched
General Chasteler with 10,000 men, who were to push
forward up the valley of the Drave by way of Brixen towards the Brenner and form the nucleus of an army to assist the general
rising of the loyal Tyrolese. Popular levies speedily rallied on all sides
round their self-constituted leaders, attacked the feeble Bavarian garrisons,
and drove them, in some cases after obstinate fighting, to leave the country.
In four days the whole of northern Tyrol was freed; and the Imperial flag waved
once more in Innsbruck. General Chasteler now
advanced to Trient and even as far as the Lake of
Garda. He was, however, compelled to hasten back again to northern Tyrol, the
recovery of which had been undertaken by the Bavarian General Wrede, who
invaded the country with strong forces from the north and east about the
beginning of May. In spite of the heroic efforts of the Tyrolese, who in their
mountain valleys fought the detested enemy with rifles, scythes, and rocks, the
Bavarians made progress and occupied Innsbruck on May 22.
General Wrede now despatched part of his forces to
join the French main army; but he had no sooner done so, than the tocsin
sounded again the call to arms. On May 29, 20,000 Tyrolese under Andreas Hofer,
the innkeeper of Passeyer, and such popular leaders
as Speckbacher and Peter Hasper,
appeared before Innsbruck, which, after a fierce battle on the Iselberg, fell the same day into their hands. For the
second time the Bavarians were compelled to evacuate Tyrol. But as the Tyrolese
refused to recognise the terms of the armistice of Znaym,
the full weight of the French Emperor’s fury was turned against the little
country, which, in its courageous loyalty, believed itself strong enough to defy
even a Napoleon. From all directions strong columns pushed into the Tyrolese
valleys. But everywhere they met with so obstinate a resistance that they were
forced to draw back; and on August 15, after a sanguinary conflict on the Iselberg, the Tyrolese for the third time marched
victoriously into Innsbruck. As “commander-in-chief in Tyrol”, Hofer now
undertook not only the military but also the political direction of affairs.
Europe beheld with amazement the triumphant resistance of the Tyrolese, who in
very deed had proved the truth of Schiller’s words:
“Unworthy is that
people,
Which on its honour dares not stake its all.”
Yet this heroic struggle was in the end to be crushed
by sheer brute force, through the enemy’s numerical superiority. Napoleon,
furious at the repeated failure of his arms, gave orders to the Viceroy of
Italy to invade the country from the south, while the Bavarians poured into it
from the north and east. The conflict raged with alternating fortunes in the
hard-tried land, for even after the Peace of Schonbrunn (October 15) the Tyrolese did not abandon the struggle. But, when Hofer, after
the so-called fourth battle on the Iselberg (November
1 and 2), was compelled to retreat, he himself bade his fellow-countrymen give
up the unequal contest. Nevertheless he countermanded the order, and once more
sent forth the call to arms. But to alter the fate of his country was beyond
his power, although the sanguinary strife was prolonged till December,
incessantly renewed, like the battles in the Peninsula, with extreme bitterness
on either side. At length Andreas Hofer was betrayed into the hands of the
French; and, after a trial by martial law, he was shot at Mantua, on February
21, 1810. He maintained his heroic demeanour to the last, and himself gave his
executioners the word to fire. The revolt of the Tyrolese, their heroic fight
for their Emperor and for the deliverance of their country, will remain for all
time one of the noblest pages in modern German history.
The rising of Austria against Napoleon gave the signal
for several efforts in Germany to shake off the French yoke. At the end of
April, 1809, in Hesse, which had suffered heavily through the bad government of
King Jerome, there was a general rising under the leadership of Baron von Dornberg, a cavalry captain. It was, however, suppressed
with much bloodshed. Equally unsuccessful was the attempt of some officers,
formerly in the Prussian service, to surprise the fortress of Magdeburg.
More importance attaches to the enterprise of the
Prussian major, Frederick von Schill, who already in the campaign of 1806-7 had
won a reputation for gallantry. On April 28, 1809, he left Berlin at the head
of his regiment of Hussars, and crossed the Elbe at Wittenberg, in order to
carry the insurrection into Hesse and Westphalia. On May 5 he beat the French
troops who had been despatched against him from Magdeburg; on the 15th he
captured the small fortress of Dömitz in Mecklenburg on the lower Elbe, meaning
to move thence to Stralsund, where he intended to await the arrival of English
ships. On the march thither, having meanwhile received reinforcements,
including four guns, he fell (May 27) upon a body of Mecklenburg troops, which
he put to flight, taking many prisoners, four standards, and two guns. On the
following day Stralsund, after a brief resistance, fell into Schill’s hands.
But on May 31 some Danish and Dutch troops appeared before Stralsund and
stormed it, after a fierce fight in which most of Schill’s volunteers were
killed or wounded. In the melée Schill himself met with a soldier’s
honourable death; and on September 16, eleven officers of his corps, who had
been taken prisoners, were tried by martial law and shot, by Napoleon’s orders,
on the ramparts of Wessel. Although this attempt was doomed to failure, it at
least served to rouse the spirit of patriotism throughout the length and
breadth of northern Germany, and to kindle hatred against the alien rule of the
French. Round Schill and his brave band poetry and legend soon wove a web of
popular glamour, which deepened the feeling of common nationality throughout
Germany.
The same may be said of the heroic campaign of Duke
Frederick William of Brunswick-Oels. At the outbreak
of the war, he had formed a volunteer corps in Bohemia; and at its head,
together with some Austrian troops, he invaded Saxony. On June 11 they occupied
Dresden, and after several successful combats, forced the Saxon and Westphalian
troops under King Jerome to retreat. After the armistice of Znaym,
the Duke conceived the bold plan of fighting his way to the mouth of the Weser
and there taking ship to England. On July 20 he started from Greiz with 2000 men, and, repeatedly beating back the
French troops, won his way to Brunswick, which he entered on July 30. On the
following day he and his “Black Troop” (so called from their dark uniforms)
again defeated the enemy, who had pressed in hot pursuit to the very gates of
his capital. Surrounded on all sides, the Duke was forced to leave Brunswick,
whence he reached the lower Weser, and embarked with his men on board British
ships at Elsfleth. His little troop became the
nucleus of the “King’s German Legion”, which subsequently fought with much
honour under Wellington in Spain.
If it was only indirectly that England thus did a
service to the “good cause,” she had in the meanwhile, independently of events
in Spain and Portugal, taken direct action in the war by the expedition to the
island of Walcheren. In April, 1809, Count Starhemberg had been hastily sent to London as ambassador from the Austrian Court, to
persuade the British Cabinet, not only to grant a subsidy, but to undertake a
military diversion on the German coast. After lengthy negotiations, Canning
granted a monthly subsidy of £150,000. On the other hand the British Ministry
declined the plan suggested by the Austrian Government for a landing at the
mouth of the Weser with a view to raising an insurrection in northern Germany.
They determined instead on an expedition to the Scheldt. From a military point
of view this plan was certainly not a happy one; it was chiefly dictated by
political and commercial considerations. The chief point with Great Britain was
to render Antwerp innocuous.
The expedition did not leave the English harbours till
July 28. It was in five divisions. A fleet of 38 ships of the line, 36
frigates, and a large number of gunboats, under Sir Richard Strachan, escorted
the land-forces, which numbered nearly 40,000 men, under Lord Chatham, who was
commander-in-chief. On July 30 the army landed on the island of Walcheren; on
the 31st Middelburg, Vere, and Zierickzee capitulated. On August 1 General Fraser captured Fort Haake.
The French squadron retired up the Scheldt to Antwerp, and found safety under
the shelter of its guns. The British troops now advanced to the siege of
Flushing, the most important point on Walcheren, defended by General Mounet with 5000 men. On August 2 General Hope occupied the
island of South Beveland ; but the attack upon Cadzand, opposite Flushing, failed. Flushing was by this
time not only besieged from the land side, but bombarded by the British fleet
from the sea.
Meanwhile the French had recovered from their first
shock of surprise caused by the landing on Walcheren; and troops were rapidly
despatched from all directions for the defence of Antwerp and the Scheldt.
Marshal Bernadotte took over the supreme command. On August 16, however,
Flushing was forced to capitulate. The British forces now attempted to press on
up the Scheldt; but the river was so well guarded by its forts that they could
make but little way. Meanwhile the French fleet had been carried up the river
beyond Antwerp, where it was out of reach ; the French fortifications had, by
dint of great energy, been placed in a fair condition for defence; and a large
body of troops stood ready for action in the open field. The naval and military
commanders on the British side were unable to agree as to the further course of
operations; and the troops suffered terribly from the malarial climate of
Walcheren and South Beveland. On September 2 the
British ships made another attempt to sail up the Scheldt, but without success; and on September 4 South Beveland was evacuated,
after a council of war (August 26) had decided that the expeditionary force
under Sir Eyre Coote should concentrate on
Walcheren. On Sept. 14 Lord Chatham returned to England.
The French took no offensive measures, but left the
destruction of the enemy to the climate and to sickness. Walcheren fever, as it
was called, made terrible ravages among the British troops, so that at the end
of December hardly half of this fine force (the largest that had ever yet
sailed from English harbours) were able to bear arms. On December 23 the
remainder, after destroying the fortifications of Flushing, left Walcheren, and
returned home. In England there was universal indignation over the result of
this expedition, which had sent so many brave soldiers to a useless death, and
swallowed up a large sum of money. In Parliament fierce attacks were made upon
the Government; but the commission of enquiry failed to come to any conclusion,
except that there had been a want of unanimity among the commanders. Eventually
the discussion led, not only to a rupture, but to a duel between Canning and
Castlereagh, in consequence of which Canning resigned office.
During many months the peace negotiations, which had
been begun at the outset of the armistice, made no progress. More than once
they were on the point of being broken off; and a renewal of the war, for which
the Empress Marie Louise Beatrix, Archduke John, and Count Stadion were very
anxious, was expected. But presently Stadion’s influence began to pale before
that of Metternich, the result being a disastrous dualism in the conduct of
affairs, inasmuch as, since Wagram, Metternich had gone over to the peace
party, and had ended by becoming a keen supporter of the Napoleonic system. He
was upheld by Archduke Charles, who, immediately after the unfortunate issue of
the Ratisbon campaign, had urged the conclusion of peace. But, after the
armistice, serious differences of opinion arose between the Archduke and his
Imperial brother, in consequence of which the former resigned the supreme
command and retired into private life—an irreparable loss to Austria and her
army.
In the last week of July the pourparlers for the peace negotiations began. These were opened at Altenburg on August 15
between Metternich, Nugent, and Champagny. But their
course was anything but smooth. It was found impossible to accept in toto (on
this point the Emperor Francis stood firm) the conditions of Napoleon, who demanded,
in the first place, the abdication of the Emperor Francis, as well as large
concessions of territory. In the middle of September it looked as if the
Emperor of Austria had determined to continue the war, especially as a secret
Prussian envoy, Colonel von dem Knesebeck,
had declared the willingness of his sovereign to join Austria under certain
conditions. Eventually, however, the arguments in favour of peace prevailed;
and on September 25 the Emperor Francis despatched Prince Liechtenstein with
Count Bubna to Napoleon’s headquarters in Vienna,
there to conclude peace. Peace was signed at Schonbrunn on October 15.
The Peace of Schönbrunn laid very severe conditions
upon Austria. She ceded large districts in Upper Austria, Carniola, Carinthia,
and Graubünden to Bavaria and France; the whole of western Galicia and part of
eastern Galicia to Russia and Saxony. Moreover, she was no longer to maintain
an army of more than 150,000 men. This treaty relegated Austria to a place
among the Powers of the second rank. Her attempt to shatter Napoleon’s
supremacy on the Continent had disastrously failed. Metternich henceforward
took into his hands the conduct of affairs. With Stadion’s retirement Austria
lost a statesman of the first class, a man whose views were in harmony with
the spirit of his time, who would have guided, not only the foreign, but also
the domestic policy of the Austrian Empire into happier paths. The system which
Metternich established was very different. So early as the autumn of 1809, he
was already spinning the first threads of the intrigue which led to the
marriage of the Archduchess Marie-Louise with Napoleon; and down to the year
1813 he steadily pursued a policy, in regard to foreign affairs, of
acquiescence in the supremacy of France; while, in regard to domestic
government, he from the outset displayed the reactionary tendencies which were
in the end to prove disastrous to Austria.
The war of 1809, unfortunate as was its immediate
issue, had one notable result. It destroyed, in the eyes of Europe, the halo of
invincibility that had encircled the head of Napoleon. It marked the beginning
of the national awakening, the first step towards the overthrow of Napoleon’s
power.
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