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CHAPTER II.
THE
FOREIGN POLICY OF LOUIS XIV.
(1661-97.)
The prominent position occupied in Europe by France
under Louis XIV from the death of Mazarin in 1661 to the Treaty of Ryswyk in
1697 affected in a marked though varying degree the politics of the whole of
Western Christendom. In examining the causes and results of the rise of France
to this position, a distinction must be drawn between the earlier and the later
portion of the period. Till 1688, Louis succeeded in many of his aims, and
during these twenty-seven years he secured for France territorial acquisitions
of enormous value. After 1688, he was opposed by a European Confederacy against
which he barely managed to hold his own. Nevertheless, in 1697 Francp still
stood forth not only as the nation most advanced in the arts of civilisation,
but also as the most powerful of European States, and a danger to the balance
of power among them.
The supremacy
which France had thus attained in both arms and arts, and the partial success
which had attended Louis’ policy of territorial aggression were due to many
causes, chief among which were the consistent internal policy of the two great
Cardinal Ministers and the political condition of the chief European States.
Richelieu and Mazarin had, after infinite labour, reduced the nobility to
obedience and laid down the lines on which the development of France should
proceed. At home, religious toleration, the reduction of provincial autonomy,
and the subordination of the Parlement of Paris to the royal power; abroad,
alliance with England and the United Provinces, and encouragement of the
independence of the Princes of the Empire—such was the substance of the
political legacy bequeathed by the two far-sighted Cardinals to the young King.
It remained
for Louis to take advantage of the political weakness of the great European
States and, following the policy of the Cardinals, so to strengthen the monarchy
that no Power or combination of Powers could by whatever means weaken its
foundations. In carrying out this scheme Louis was aided by a variety of
circumstances. England under Charles II
At the time
of Mazarin’s death the political outlook for France was promising. Louis XIV’s
marriage with Maria Teresa, the Spanish Infanta, brought with it possibilities
of which time could alone determine the value. By the Treaty of the Pyrenees,
France had strengthened herself on her north-eastern frontier by the
acquisition of Avesnes, on the side of the Pyrenees by finally securing
Roussillon, between Sambre and Meuse by the cession of Philippeville and
Marienbourg, and in Lorraine by that of Bar, Clermont, Stenay, Dun, and
Jarmetz. The Duke of Neuburg, the ally of France, had obtained Jiilich; French
troops had acquired the right to march through Lorraine; the League of the
Rhine still more or less looked towards France for guidance.
The
aspirations of the French nation were, however, by no means satisfied. The
frontier of the Rhine had not yet been secured, and the Spanish Netherlands had
not been conquered. Much, therefore, remained to be done; and by Louis XIV and
his most astute advisers the Peace of the Pyrenees was regarded as merely a
truce.
Till the War
of Devolution in 1667, Louis contented himself with making elaborate
preparations, with secretly helping the Portuguese, with concluding alliances
in 1663 with Denmark, and in 1664 with Brandenburg and Saxony, and with taking
an active part in the same year in the internal conflicts of the Empire. With
the opening of the War of Devolution France entered upon a period of conquest
and expansion, and till 1688 success on the whole crowned her efforts. From
1688, however, to the Treaty of Ryswyk in 1697, Louis XIV found himself confronted
by an almost united Europe, and for the first time since the days of Mazarin a
definite check was inflicted on French arms and French diplomacy. Nevertheless,
throughout these years France held the foremost place in Europe. Had Louis XIV
contented himself with following the policy of Richelieu, France would have
been spared many disasters. But both in his home and foreign policy he aimed at
ideals which in certain respects resembled those pursued by the Emperor Charles
V.
1661-97] Decadence of Spain. No serious
opposition to Louis’ schemes was to be expected from Spain. That country was
slowly but steadily declining in power and
In 1665 Count
Caracena, who had superseded Don John, headed a Spanish army which
had been reinforced from Italy and Flanders, and besieged Villa Viciosa. On the
approach of the Portuguese and English forces under Marialva and Schomberg he
advanced, and on June 17, gave battle at Montes Claros, where he suffered a
crushing defeat. Philip IV had failed, and recognised the humiliating
character of his failure. On September 17, 1665, he died, overwhelmed with a
sense of Spain’s ruin and degradation, leaving the crown to his son Charles II,
who was only four years old.
During the reign of Charles II Spain sank to the lowest point ever touched in her history. The causes, both external and internal, of her decadence can be traced back to the days when she was governed by the Emperor Charles V and have, been discussed in earlier volumes of this History. Under the rule of Charles II no steps were taken to arrest the decline that had become almost irretrievable. The last representative of his race, Charles II was small in stature, with large blue eyes, light hair, and a white skin. His health was always deplorable; and, as he grew older, he was frequently attacked by fainting fits. But, though he was so irresolute that he could settle nothing without advice, he was not wanting in intelligence, and the last act of his reign showed that in his own way he had the interests of Spain at heart. On his
accession Charles II was under the care of his mother Maria Anna, sister of the
Emperor Leopold; as he grew older, he became more and more indifferent to all
his duties; unlike Louis XIV, he detested the cares of government, and rarely
attended a Council. “If it was necessary that he should be a Prince,” said the
Venetian Ambassador, “he ought to be a Prince of the Church.” He married twice,
first Marie-Louise of Orleans, who died in 1689, and after her Maria Anna of
Neuburg,
His
death was
followed by the return of the Queen-Mother and the triumph of
the Austrian
faction. Till April, 1685, the Duke of Medina-Celi made vain
attempts to check
the anarchy and misery which prevailed in Spain, and which was
not lessened by
the struggles at Court between the Austrian and French
parties. In April, 1685,
the Count pf, Oropesa succeeded Medina-Celi and managed to
carry out some
reforms. He was a member of the Austrian party, and on the
death of Marie-Louise of Orleans assisted the Queen-Mother in bringing
about, the marriage of
Charles to Maria Anna of Neuburg. The new Queen soon turned
against Oropesa,
who fell in 1691, his duties being transferred at first to the
Count of Melgar,
Admiral of Castile. The rapacity of the Queen and of her
German followers made
her very unpopular and prepared the way for the triumph of
French influences in
1701. Thus, from the death of Mazarin in 1661 to the Treaty of
Ryswyk in 1697,
Spain was unable to offer any effective resistance to the
schemes of Louis XIV;
the European balance was considerably affected by her
disappearance as one of
the great Powers.
Weakness of the chief European States. The Empire as
a whole cannot be said to have realised the danger which threatened it from the
ambitious projects of France till the formation of the Grand Alliance in 1689.
The Augsburg Alliance of July, 1686, though it united in it a considerable
number of Estates, including both Spain and Sweden for their German
possessions, was only an extension of the Luxemburg Alliance of June, 1682,
which had been confined to the Emperor and the Franconian and Upper-Rhenish
Circles. Moreover, the Emperor Leopold was not able to offer any effective
opposition to Louis. Till 1672 he was outwitted by French diplomatists, and,
after fighting against Louis from 1672 to 1679, was glad to make peace. The
Hungarians, too, instigated in part by the diplomacy of the French “Defensor Hungariae”, had risen against Leopold under Count Emeric
Tokolyi (1677-82). Till 1689 the Estates of the Empire could not be relied upon
to offer a united opposition
During the
period from 1661 to 1670, the weakness of the Empire, the decadence of Spain,
and the embittered war between England and Holland, enabled Louis XIV to
formulate and carry out an aggressive policy, deliberately calculated to extend
the boundaries of France and to strengthen and consolidate her position in
Europe. The only Power which showed similar aggressive tendencies was Turkey.
Under Mohammad IV (1648-87) and the Kiuprilis, the gradual decline of Turkey
was checked; and, from 1656 to the siege of Vienna in 1683, the Ottoman Empire
like the French kingdom enjoyed a period of success. The attacks of the Turks
upon Transylvania (1661), upon Hungary (1663), upon Candia (1669), and upon
Poland (1672-8), indeed, aided the projects of Louis XIV; for, by diverting
eastwards the attention of the Poles and Austrians, they weakened the Emperor’s
power of resistance to the French aggressions.
In
the west,
too, the years from the death of Mazarin in 1661 to the
invasion of the Low
Countries by France in 1667 constitute a period in which
events favoured Louis, and facilitated his preparations for taking his
first step towards the
establishment of his daims upon the succession to the Spanish
monarchy. As the
Spanish throne was not then vacant, Louis contented himself
with asserting his
claim to the immediate possession of the Spanish Netherlands.
It was based upon
the so-called jus devolutionis—a local custom of Brabant and Hainault, by
which, though a man might have married more than once, the children
of his first marriage succeeded to his property. Since Maria Teresa, the
consort of Louis XIV, was the only surviving child of Philip IV’s first
marriage, Louis claimed the whole of the Low Countries; though in the course of
his negotiations with Spain in 1662 he had declared his willingness to be
satisfied with instant possession of Hainault, Cambray, Luxemburg, and Franche
Comté.
1665-7] The French invasion of Flanders. The
negotiations with Spain were resultless; but Louis never ceased his efforts to
carry out his object. Already in April, 1662, he had entered into friendly
negotiations with the leading statesman of the United Provinces, John de Witt,
Grand Pensionary of Holland, and had concluded a treaty guaranteeing all the
Dutch possessions in Europe. He had hoped at the same time to arrive at some
arrangement with regard to the Spanish Netherlands. The plan of equal partition
between France and the United Provinces was eventually rejected by de Witt, who
preferred that the Spanish Netherlands should be erected into an independent
Catholic republic, or remain under Spain if the latter Power
England was
thus left practically without an ally, and the Dutch were free from the
necessity of placing too much reliance upon France. During 1666 the war between
England and the United Provinces continued with varying results. In 1667 two
important events took place. On March 31 Charles made the first of his secret
treaties with Louis XIV, agreeing not to oppose a French invasion of the
Spanish Netherlands, on the understanding that the French fleet withheld, all
assistance from the Dutch. But the calculations of Charles were upset in June,
1667, by the Dutch attack on the English ships in the Thames and Medway—which
compelled Charles to agree to the Treaty of Breda on July 81, 1667. For the
United Provinces peace was absolutely necessary, since on May 24 French troops
had crossed the frontier of the Spanish Low Countries, and the War of
Devolution had begun.
For this war
Louis’ preparations had been carefully made. By a treaty with Portugal,
concluded in March, 1667, it was arranged that hostilities between that country
and Spain should continue; by the treaty of 1662 with the United Provinces
their hands were tied; and by the secret treaty of March 81, 1667, Charles II
had bound himself not to enter into an alliance with the Emperor against Louis
XIV during the year 1667. Secure of a free hand in the Spanish Low Countries,
This rapid
success alarmed Europe, and signs of opposition to France at once appeared.
Spain hastily recognised the independence of Portugal (February, 1668), and,
freed from all necessity of continuing her attempts to reconquer that kingdom,
endeavoured to secure the assistance of the Emperor Leopold in the Low
Countries. Her efforts were in vain. Louis, by the able diplomacy of his
ambassador Gravel, contrived to induce the Imperial Diet in October, 1667, to
abstain from active assistance to the Spanish Low Countries (which technically
formed part of the Circle of Burgundy, one of the ten Imperial Circles); but he
was unable to succeed in bringing about by the same means the continuance of
the League of the Rhine beyond its formal term (August, 1668); when, after
much negotiation, it came to an end. Further, by means of his able agent de
Gremonville, Louis not only persuaded the Emperor Leopold to withhold all assistance
from Spain, but actually induced him to agree to a treaty, signed on January
19, 1668, for the eventual partition of the Spanish monarchy between himself
and Louis, should King Charles II, as seemed probable, die without children.
So far, the
success of the French King had been remarkable and unchecked. Having secured by
various means the neutrality of Brandenburg, and that of Sweden, and having
encouraged the war between England and Holland, Louis had met with no serious
resistance in his subjugation of the Spanish Low Countries. By the beginning of
1668 Spain was isolated and the alliance, or at all events the
quiescence, of the Emperor secured. But it was these extraordinary successes of
Louis which brought about the formation of the coalition between England, the
United Provinces, and Sweden, almost distinctively known as the Triple
Alliance.
The Triple Alliance. [1667-8 Some such
coalition was justified, not only by the French invasion of the Spanish
Netherlands, but by the French conquest of Franche Comté, which was effected in
February, 1668. On January 23 England and the United Provinces concluded an
alliance which in April was on certain conditions joined by Sweden. Louis had
thus to face a formidable adverse combination. The importance of the Triple
Alliance lies in the fact that it was the first formal expression of European
resistance to the aggressions of Louis—the first attempt to check a Power
which continued to dominate Europe till the Treaty of Ryswyk. Spain and
Portugal were now at peace (February, 1668), the influence of England being
paramount in the latter kingdom; and Louis could no longer rely upon the
abstention of Spain from active measures in the Low Countries. Moreover, by
consenting to make peace, he would lose little, and would
1668-72] The Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle. In face of
the growing hostility of Europe Louis showed wisdom in agreeing to the Peace of
Aix-la-Chapelle and in adopting a waiting policy. Yet Europe was far from being
united; Brandenburg and other German States were jealous of the Emperor;
England and the United Provinces regarded each other with hostility; Sweden was
ready to fall in with the highest bidder. Some twenty years had yet to pass
before the chief European States, recognising the danger which threatened them
from France, were found prepared to sink minor differences in a united effort
to reduce the power of the aggressive French monarch. Louis XIV, however,
bitterly resented the necessity which forced him to agree to the Treaty of
Aix-la-Chapelle, and from the moment of its signature seems to have resolved to
gain his ends in the Spanish Netherlands by means of a direct attack upon the
United Provinces. This decision ran counter to the policy to which the French
monarchy had adhered since the days of Francis I. For it was distinctly opposed
to the principle of pursuing Catholic interests at home and Protestant abroad,
which had enabled France to secure allies against the Emperor among the German
Protestant Princes. Louis, however, was bent on the reduction of the Spanish
Netherlands; and the surest means to that end seemed to be found in the
overthrow of the Dutch Republic. The magnitude of this blunder became more and
more apparent, as the reign of Louis XIV proceeded. “In Holland,” writes
Mignet, “the old political system of France suffered shipwreck.”
In order to
achieve the end which Louis proposed to himself, the overthrow of the new
combination which had led to the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle was necessary. The
task was at once undertaken. “The years between 1668 and 1672”, writes Camille
Rousset, “were years of preparation; when Lionne was labouring with all his
might to find allies, Colbert money, and Louvois soldiers for Louis”. The task
of breaking up the Triple Alliance itself, however, did not prove to be one of
insuperable difficulty. For a short period after the formation of this Alliance
western Europe remained in a condition of uneasy peace, while the obnoxious
compact was being rapidly undermined.
The Triple Alliance was thus broken up, and, four years after its conclusion, Louis XIV was able to invade the United Provinces. Till 1688 constant attempts were made to form coalitions against France; but, owing to the policy of Charles II and James II of England, to the Franco-Swedish Alliance, to the necessity of defending Germany and Hungary against the Turks, to the divisions existing among the various German States and to their suspicions of the Emperor, no organised opposition was possible. Rise of the Turkish Power. [1656-72 Unfortunately
for the peace of the whole continent, the aggressions of Louis XIV in the west,
which definitely began in 1672, coincided with the attempts of the Turks
to dominate eastern Europe. In 1656 the appointment of Mohammad Kiuprili as
Grand Vizier marked the beginning of the sudden revival of the Ottoman power,
of which some account will be given in a later chapter. His successor, Ahmad
Kiuprili, continued his policy of reform at home and aggressions abroad. With
the help of Louis XIV, who sent a French force to his help, the Emperor Leopold
defeated the Turks in the battle of St Gothard on August 1, 1664, and concluded
the Truce of Vasvar on August 10. Vienna was saved; but the hold which the
Turks had established over Hungary remained unshaken, and a compromise was
arranged with regard to Transylvania. The outbreak of war between Turkey and
Venice resulting in the capture of Crete (September, 1669) showed that the
ambitious aggressive policy of the Ottoman power was as dangerous to the
integrity and peace of eastern as that of Louis XIV was to that of western
Europe. In 1669 the Polish Diet elected not the French candidate,
It was
impossible to hope for a united resistance to the French King, so long as there
was a possibility of a Turkish attack upon Vienna, an opportunity for which was
afforded by the disturbed condition of Poland. In 1672 that country was invaded
by Ahmad Kiuprili; but the Turks were defeated by John Sobieski both before and
after he had, in 1674, succeeded the weak Michael on the Polish throne. In
June, 1674, Louis XIV made a treaty with the new King, who, in consideration
for French subsidies, promised to support the malcontents in Hungary against
the Emperor. The war between Poland and Turkey was brought to an end by the
Treaty of Zurawna, concluded under French mediation on October 27, 1676. But,
though by this treaty Ahmad Kiuprili, who died three days after its conclusion,
left his country in a position in eastern Europe not very unlike that occupied
by France in western, his alliance with Poland was of little benefit to Louis
XIV; and in 1683, when Vienna was besieged by the Turks, it
was the King of Poland who bore away the glory of the rescue. While, however,
John Sobieski was defending eastern Europe during the years 1674-7, the
Emperor, even though aided by Spain, the Dutch, Brandenburg, and Denmark, proved
unable to place any substantial check upon the ambitious policy of Louis XIV.
1669-77] Louis' preparations for war with Holland. In 1670 Louis
had been resolved to win eventually the Imperial Crown, to secure part of the
Spanish possessions, and to conquer the United Provinces. On February 17 of
that year he had concluded a treaty with Ferdinand Maria, Elector of Bavaria,
whose daughter, Maria Anna, was to marry the Dauphin, providing that in the
event of the Emperor’s death every possible effort should be made to secure his
own election to the Imperial throne. The Treaty of Dover of the same year,
followed by the formal detachment of Sweden from the Triple Alliance (April 14,
1672), left the United Netherlands open to a French attack; while the secret
partition treaty concluded with the Emperor in 1668, followed by a treaty of
neutrality in 1671, left it in the power of Louis to renew his occupation of
Franche Comté. Sweden had been gained by the payment of 400,000 crowns and the
promise of an annual payment of 40,000 crowns. In return, Sweden undertook, in
concert with Denmark, to close the Baltic to the Dutch fleet and to land a
force in the north of Germany. Like the alliance with England, that with Sweden
proved of great value to France during the ensuing war. On December 31, 1669,
Louis had made a secret treaty with the Elector of Brandenburg, who, in return
for subsidies, to which was afterwards added the promise of the province of
Spanish Gelders, undertook to aid France in conquering the Spanish Netherlands,
and to support the interests of France in all the affairs of the Empire. Behind
the plan of
The Devolution
War had thus not only disunited Europe, but had been followed by unexpected
developments. In more or less intimate connection with the rivalry of France and
Spain, which, at the time of the death of Mazarin, was the most momentous fact
in European politics, and remained such throughout Louis XIV’s reign, arose
other important questions. In 1668, Louis had, as has been seen, concluded with
the Emperor a secret partition treaty, which was to come into force in the
event of the death of Charles II of Spain. Would that treaty hinder the Emperor
from opposing the schemes of Louis with regard to the United Netherlands,
Flanders, the German lands on the Rhine, and Poland, or interfere with his
intrigues in Hungary?
Though the League of the Rhine was no longer in existence, Louis had, as has been seen, entered into separate treaties with several of the German Powers, such as Bavaria and Brandenburg. Would they remain loyal to their alliance with France, should Louis adopt an aggressive attitude towards the Empire? By the Treaty of Dover England had been detached from the Triple Alliance. But would the English people consent to support the action of the French King, when once they realised the import of his ambitious schemes, and would they allow the national interests of England to be subordinated to the designs of Charles II for the maintenance of his personal power? Thus, at the
opening of the French war with the United Provinces in 1672, the European
situation was extremely complicated. For a time each of the various States
seemed to pursue its separate interests regardless of the welfare of Europe;
and the diplomacy of the period was more than usually tangled. Yet the policy
of Louis had never been clearer. For a successful attack on the Dutch it was necessary,
after breaking up the Triple Alliance, to secure the alliance or neutrality of
the Emperor and of as many German Princes as possible. The Treaty of Dover had
placed at Louis’ disposal the English fleet, which alone could render useless
the Dutch navy; the treaty of April 14,1672, had secured the invaluable help of
a Swedish army in northern Germany. Treaties with Munster, Cologne, Hanover in
July, and with Osnabrück in October, 1671, provided for the unhindered passage
of French troops; and on December 18, 1671, the Emperor Leopold, fearing that
Louis might stir up the Hungarians to rebellion, and encourage the German
Princes to combine against him, promised neutrality so long as Louis abstained
from attacking Spain or the Empire.
Alone among
the chief German Princes, the Great Elector, whose strong Protestant feeling
contributed to his decision, declined Louis’ proposals, and in February, 1671,
concluded a treaty with the Dutch Republic, to become effectual in April, 1672,
by which he promised armed
assistance. Spain also, in December, 1671, signed a treaty with the
States-General for mutual defence; and the Elector of Mainz, though he
maintained friendly relations with France, also resolved to support the Dutch.
1671-4] The French invasion of Holland. Early in 1672
a powerful French force was collected at Charleroi, and on May 5 it was joined
by Louis XIV in person. The invasion of the United Provinces at once took
place, while the forces of Luxemburg, Cologne, and Munster occupied Overyssel
and besieged Groningen, which they failed to take. Meanwhile, the French
overran the southern portion of the United Provinces; but on June 18 the dykes
were cut, and the sluices opened in front of Amsterdam, which was thereby
saved. Louis’ failure to overrun Holland synchronised with the defeat of a
French force which endeavored to overcome Zealand; moreover, on June 7 a
combined Anglo-French fleet had been defeated by de Ruyter in the battle of
Southwold Bay. On July 6 and 8, William of Orange was proclaimed Stadholder of
Holland and Zealand; on August 1, as will be narrated in a subsequent chapter,
the French invasion came to an end, and Louis returned to St Germain, having
conquered Gelders, Utrecht, and Overyssel; on August 20, John and Cornelius de
Witt were murdered at the Hague.
These events
created profound alarm in Europe, although for some years the attitude of the
various European Powers with regard to the French aggressions was uncertain,
and their opposition betrayed great lack of vigour. On June 23, 1672, the
Emperor Leopold concluded an alliance with Frederick William of Brandenburg,
and on October 27 another with the States-General. This coalition, sometimes
called the Great Coalition of the Hague, did not prove very effective.
Turenne’s successes on the lower Rhine and the Weser, and his march upon the
Elbe, forced Frederick William to make peace on June 6, 1673, and thus deprived
the Dutch of their most valuable ally. A peace conference which met in June,
1673, at Cologne having proved a failure, the Emperor formed a second
Coalition, which was joined in the autumn of 1673 by Spain and the Duke of
Lorraine, and in 1674 by Denmark, the Elector Palatine, the Brunswick-Lüneburg
Dukes, and on July 1 by the Great Elector. Further, the English Parliament
forced Charles II to abandon his alliance with Louis, and to make peace with
the Dutch, on February 19,1674.
In June,
1672, the States-General had offered Louis Maestricht and its dependencies, a
number of fortresses stretching from the Meuse to the mouth of the Scheldt, and
six millions of livres. By the advice of Louvois, Louis had rejected this offer.
At the beginning of 1674 the only Dutch towns in his possession were Maestricht
and Grave. Nevertheless, in spite of his mistakes, and notwithstanding the
number of his foes, Louis in 1674 won some brilliant successes. In June Franche
Comté was conquered, on August 11 Condé checked William of Orange
In 1675
Turenne continued his successful campaign, outmanoeuvring the Imperialist
general Montecuculi, and forcing him to retire to Sasbach to the east of
Strassburg. There, on July 27, 1675, Turenne fell, and with his death the
great successes of the French ended. Though Condé preserved Alsace for France,
the Duc de Créquy was defeated on the Moselle on August 11, and Trier and
Philippsburg were lost. The Swedes, on whose intervention in Brandenburg the
French had placed high hopes, had on June 18 been decisively defeated in the
battle of Fehrbellin by the Great Elector and forced to beat a disastrous
retreat. The campaigns of 1676 and 1677 were generally favourable to France.
The towns of Condé and Bouchain were taken by Louis in 1676, and in 1677
Valenciennes, Cambray, and St Omer fell into French hands. William of Orange
also suffered a disastrous defeat at Cassel, and Christian V of Denmark was
overthrown by the Swedes at Lunden. In the Mediterranean the French fleet was
on the whole successful. There Duquesne fought engagements off Stromboli
(January 8, 1676) and Catania (April 22) with a Dutch fleet under de Ruyter;
but both battles remained undecided. The death of de Ruyter, however, was of
immense advantage to the French, who for a time remained supreme in the
Mediterranean.
In 1678 all the Powers were ready for peace. On November 15, 1677, William of Orange had married Mary, daughter of the Duke of York; and on January 10, 1678, a treaty between England and the Republic was signed. It seemed that at last France would encounter the united opposition pf the two countries. But William’s hopes were almost immediately disappointed; for the treaty was never ratified, owing to the resolution of the Republic, in consequence of its suspicions of the terms of the treaty of January 10, to make a separate peace with Louis. In May William, convinced of the treachery of Charles, who the same month signed a secret agreement with Louis, consented to negotiate. But Louis’
attempts to gain undue advantages suddenly changed the
On August 14 William of Orange and Luxembourg fought before Mons, then invested by the French; the battle of St Denys. Both generals knew that peace had been concluded, but William had no official knowledge of the fact. A treaty
between France and Spain was signed on September 17. Spain was not in a
condition to continue the war. Her King Charles II had attained his majority on
November 6, 1675. This event was soon followed by the overthrow of Fernando de
Valenzuela, who, with the Queen-Regent, now fell into disgrace, and by the
temporary ascendancy of Don John of Austria, the King’s illegitimate brother;
Don John, however, soon became unpopular, and, finding himself surrounded by
internal difficulties, was anxious for peace with France. Spain yielded Franche
Comté, Valenciennes, Aire, St Omer, Cassel, Bailleul, Poperinge, Wameton, Ypres,
Cambray and the Cambrésis, Bouchain, Condé, and Maubeuge, all of which were
regarded as necessary for the defence of the French frontier. France on her
part restored to Spain, Courtray, Oudenarde, Ath, Ghent, Binch, Charleroi, and
the duchy and town of Limburg.
1678-9] The Treaty of Nymegen. With the
Emperor and Empire peace was signed by France on February 26, 1679. Louis
restored Philippsburg, but kept Breisach and Freiburg. To Duke Charles V of
Lorraine, his duchy was restored on certain conditions, namely, that France
should keep Nancy, Longwy and Marsal, and control the four principal roads
traversing the country. The Duke refused to accept these conditions, and the
duchy remained in French hands till the Peace of Ryswyk. These four treaties
are known as the Peace of Nymegen, and were supplemented by the Treaty of St
Germain-en-Laye between Brandenburg and Sweden, and by the Treaty of
Fontainebleau between Denmark and Sweden. The first of these treaties was
signed on June 29, 1679. During the war with Sweden the Great Elector had,
besides winning the battle of Fehrbellin, taken Stettin and Stralsund. But, the
Emperor having in the name of the Empire agreed to the restoration of Sweden’s
German possessions, Frederick William was compelled to give up to the Swedes
nearly all his conquests in western Pomerania. By the Treaty of Fontainebleau
sighed on September 26, 1679, Denmark also restored to Sweden the conquests
made in Scania and the Baltic.
The Treaties
of Zurawna and Nymegen reestablished peace in Europe, which now enjoyed a short
period of rest. Though the Treaty of Nymegen had in a general way reaffirmed
the terms of the Peace of
In its origin
the war was an attempt of Louis to conquer and destroy the United Provinces. It
had developed into a European struggle, and its end had been that the United
Provinces had secured the abolition of the hostile tariffs of 1667, and had
gained Maestricht without losing any territory, while Louis secured Franche
Comté and some towns in the Spanish Netherlands. Louis’ object in entering the
war had not been attained, and his triumph was far from being complete.
Moreover, he had roused the suspicions of Europe, and the attitude of the
German Princes towards France in 1678 was very different from what it had been
in 1658. Nevertheless, the concert of Europe was partial and ill-cemented, and,
although peace had been made, could not be other than short-lived in face of
the jealousies of the various States which the fear of France had temporarily
united. The conclusion of the Peace of Nymegen in 1679 seemed, with reason, to
the French people to mark a fresh triumph on the part of their King. In their
eyes Louis XIV had brought additional glory to himself and his country, which
had never stood so high in the eyes of Europe, nor had appeared so strong or so
great.
At the Peace
of Nymegen Louis reached the greatest height of his power. A large part of the
Spanish Netherlands had been added to France, Freiburg in the Breisgau had been
retained, Franche Comté had been definitively conquered. One of Louis’ great
aims since 1661 had been to enlarge and to fortify the boundary of France.
Though he had not acquired the whole of the Spanish Netherlands, and though he
had failed in his attempt to destroy the Dutch Republic, Louis could at any
rate view with satisfaction the extension of the French frontier towards the
Rhine, the acquisition of sixteen fortresses in the Spanish Netherlands, as
well as the possession of Franche Comté. With the King of England he had made a
treaty in May, 1678, which had nullified the effects of the marriage of William
of Orange with the Princess Mary. Till 1689 England remained a cipher in
European politics and offered no opposition to the execution of Louis’ schemes.
There seemed to be no obstacle to the attainment of the main object of Louis’
policy—that the Bourbon House should take the position hitherto occupied in
Europe by the Habsburgs. This implied the
Till the
Peace of Nymegen, Louis had directed his chief attention to Spain, and, taking
advantage of her weakness, had enlarged and strengthened the French frontier on
the north-eastern side of France. After 1679 Louis was chiefly interested in
his plans for strengthening his position in Germany, with the view of ultimately
securing the Imperial Crown. Till 1697, Spanish affairs fell into the
background; nor do they again become prominent till the era of the Partition
Treaties. The time seemed opportune for a further attempt on the part of Louis
to push forward his candidature for the Imperial Crown. The treaty concluded
with Bavaria in 1670, by which the Elector had promised to advance Louis’
claims to the Imperial dignity in the event of the Emperor Leopold’s death, had
roused opposition in Germany, and for a brief period “the Empire stood united
for its Emperor.” But the Peace of Nymegen found Germany again disunited, and
the reputation of the French King at a greater height than ever. The times were
therefore propitious for a new attempt on the part of Louis to secure, in the
event of Leopold’s death, the Imperial dignity. In October, 1679, by a secret
treaty with Louis, the Elector of Brandenburg engaged, in the event of the
Emperor’s death, “to secure the election of his Most Christian Majesty.”
The "Chambers of Reunion."—Luxemburg. [1680-2 The danger to
Europe was real and unmistakable, for the jealousies and selfishness of the
various European Powers rendered them blind to the true meaning of Louis’
ambitious policy, and unwilling to combine in the defence of the liberties of
Europe. Hardly had the Treaties of Nymegen been signed than Louis entered upon
a fresh phase of the policy which he hoped would gain for him the Imperial
Crown. It was necessary in his opinion to strengthen France on her
north-eastern and eastern frontiers. Lorraine was practically in his hands; the
possession of Alsace and Luxemburg would complete the “ceinture de frontières”
and, in Louis’ opinion, would give greater weight to his influence in Germany,
whenever the Emperor Leopold should die, or whenever it should be attempted to
make his son Joseph (who was born in July, 1678) King of the Romans. Placing his
own interpretation upon certain clauses in the Treaty of Westphalia, and
adopting the view that the German Charles the Great was in reality a French
Charlemagne, Louis resolved that “what once belonged to France continued to be
by right the
The first
reply to these aggressions was seen in the opposition in England and Holland to
Louis’ siege of Luxemburg, which began in November, 1681. So antagonistic were
the Dutch to the idea of the town falling into French hands, that, in spite of
their dread of the outbreak of a fresh European war, William of Orange was
instructed to march to the relief of Luxemburg, whenever its capture by Louis
seemed imminent. The outbreak of such a war would have enlisted public opinion
in England in opposition to Louis, who at that mometit desired above everything
to avert a European conflagration. In order, therefore, to tranquillise public
opinion in Holland and England, Louis consented early in 1682 to raise the
siege of Luxemburg.
Louis had
indeed endeavored to win over Charles to consent to the French occupation of
Luxemburg; and, in 1680, the King of England had refused to be united with
William of Orange in laying the foundations of a general alliance against
France. Thus Charles, if left to himself, would no doubt have consented to be
gained; but on the question of Luxemburg the English nation was peculiarly
sensitive, and Charles realised that the occupation of the fortress by Louis
would probably rouse great indignation in England, necessitating the summoning
of Parliament. There was thus, as Ranke says, a close connection between the
siege of Luxemburg and the internal affairs of England. Charles II himself
professed to believe Louis’ assurance that he merely wished to dismantle the
place, not to use it “as a point whence to attack others.” He therefore
undertook to reassure Louis’ opponents on this point, but insisted that while
the negotiations were proceeding Louis should not by a strict blockade force
the surrender of Luxemburg. During the negotiations the divergence between the
views held by William of Orange and those
1682-4] The "Association"—Siege of Vienna. At that
moment Hungary and Austria were threatened by a Turkish invasion, and Louis
with great acuteness declared that, in order not to hamper the German Princes
in their efforts to resist the Ottoman forces, he had withdrawn his troops from
Luxemburg. The real motives which induced him to take this step were,
therefore, not avowed, and the French King gained the credit for moderation and
for taking a keen interest in the welfare of Christendom.
The
year 1682
was thus marked both by the preparations made by the Emperor
to resist the
threatened invasion of Germany by the Turks and by a great
political activity
on the part of Louis XIV, as shown by his treaty with Denmark
and his intrigues
in Sweden, Poland, Hungary and Holland, and by his attempt to
secure the independence
of the Gallican Church. Throughout this and the following
years the general
uneasiness in Europe caused by Louis’ activity and pretensions
steadily
increased. A notable instance of the effects was the
“Association” formed at
the Hague in February, 1683; the origin of which is to be
found in efforts set
on foot by Charles XI of Sweden and William of Orange in 1681,
directly after
the seizure of Strassburg and Casale, for the maintenance of
the Treaty of
Nymegen, and which was joined by the Emperor and the King of
Spain. It was
rendered ineffective by the Turkish advance on Vienna. That
advance, followed
by the siege of the Austrian capital, roused the interest of
Europe and
enlisted its sympathy on behalf of the Emperor. John Sobieski
and the united
Polish and German armies saved Vienna in September, 1683, and
the opportunity
for Louis to come forward as the defender of Christian Europe
against the
infidel had passed away. This success, which once more placed
Austria in the
centre of the resistance to the infidel, imparted fresh
confidence to the Spaniards, who, in December, 1683, declared war
against France. Luxemburg was at
once seriously besieged by the French troops, and was taken in
the beginning of
June, 1684. It was impossible for the Emperor, with the
Turkish War on his
hands, to oppose the French successfully; and on August 15 the
Truce of
Ratisbon was concluded by Leopold and the Empire with Louis.
The Truce of Ratisbon.[1684-8 By this
“truce” it was arranged that for twenty years Louis should continue to hold,
,in addition to Strassburg, all the places assigned to him before August
1,1681, by the Chambers of Reunion. The Spaniards were compelled to make large
concessions to France, including the transfer of many villages in Hainault and
Luxemburg, and the establishment of a Spanish protectorate over Genoa; while
the Dutch, finding it impossible to secure any united opposition to Louis,
accepted a twenty years’ truce. It was necessary for the Emperor, who was
engaged in his great struggle with the Turks; it was acceptable to Louis, who
confidently anticipated that the armistice would be converted into a general
peace, and that all the territory and places made over to him provisionally
would become permanent portions of the French kingdom.
So far, Louis
had owed much of his success to the neutrality of England. Charles II had
consistently refused to unite with William of Orange and Spain in checking
the French aggressions on the northeastern and eastern frontiers. Louis was
thus freed from all fear of an attack on his flank, and enabled to concentrate
all his attention upon his aggressive schemes with regard to Germany and the
Spanish Netherlands. The sole chance of successfully resisting these schemes
lay in a close alliance between England and the continental enemies of the French
King. Charles II had thus facilitated the execution of several of Louis’ most
important designs; it remained to be seen whether James II, who succeeded to
the English throne in February, 1685, would be equally friendly to the French
projects. Owing to Charles II’s compliant attitude, France was in 1685
obtaining a position of incontestable preponderance in continental Europe, nor
had the monarchy ever seemed so strong at home. It was in 1685 that Louis felt
able to expel the French Protestants and to establish religious uniformity.
Under him France had become a Power “uniform in its nationality and
ecclesiastical system, with well-defined frontiers, admirably armed for offence
and defence, both by land and sea.” Previously to the succession of the Stewarts,
English monarchs had for the most part carried out a policy of antagonism to
France. From 1672 onwards, it is manifest that English foreign policy should
have followed similar lines. The rivalry of England and France on the sea was
becoming serious; the colonial interests of the two countries were certain to
clash; the Protestant feeling in England was deeply moved by the Revocation of
the Edict of Nantes, and was inclined to sympathise with the opposition of the
Dutch and of several of the German States to the aggressive policy of Louis
XIV. For three years, however, England was compelled to stand by and watch the
preparations for establishing French predominance in Europe.
These three
years (1685-8) proved to be decisive in the history of England and France not
less than in that of Germany and Holland. James II, owing to his change of
religion, showed himself to be more closely attached to France than had been
Charles II. His self-confidence
By the
beginning of 1686 it was becoming evident that a great European crisis was at
hand. The proceedings of Louis and James II implied the existence of projects
for strengthening Roman Catholicism in England and France; the action of the
French King with regard to the Reunions and Luxemburg signified a definite
resolution on his part to gain the Imperial dignity for himself or his son. The
Truce of Ratisbon had given France for twenty years the left bank of the upper
Rhine, which constituted an eighth part of the Empire; and henceforward Louis
aimed at converting the truce into a permanent peace. In 1686 the predominance
of Louis was fully established, his ally James II was on the English throne,
the Emperor was busy with the Turkish War. The situation was not unlike that of
1672. Had James II remained King of England, and the unswerving ally of the
French King, Louis’ chances of success in his next European war would have been
decidedly good. The events in England during the next two years were,
therefore, of immense importance to Europe, and the struggle on the eve of
being decided in England became an important feature of the great conflict
which was about to engross the attention of the civilised world.
The European situation in 1688. The longer
hostilities were averted, the stronger became the position of the opponents of
Louis. The Emperor Leopold had greatly improved his own by carrying on a
crusade against the Turks. He thus secured the support of Innocent XI, and, as
a Catholic sovereign furthering the cause of Catholicism, assumed the
preeminence which Louis had hoped to assert. Moreover, the Revocation of the Nantes in
1685 roused all the Protestant countries in Europe, while Pope Innocent XI had
been alienated by the French King’s declaration of the independence of the
Gallican Church. Already in February, 1685, the Great Elector, abandoning his
alliance with Louis, had made an alliance with William of Orange, and the
Revocation of the Edict of Nantes only confirmed him in his Protestant
attitude. The resolution arrived at by the Great Elector was all the more
important, seeing that the year 1686 might bring with it a joint attack upon
Holland by the forces of England and France. The Emperor and the Elector of
Bavaria were occupied by the war against the Turks, and James II was the firm
ally of Louis XIV, who was resolved to transform the Truce of Ratisbon into a
peace. He himself declared that “he could not doubt that he should be
attacked, so soon as the war with the Turks had been brought to an end.” The
formation on July 6, 1686, of the Augsburg Alliance, with the object of
preserving the Treaties of Munster and Nymegen, together with the armistice of
1684, justified Louis’ apprehensions. It was a defensive alliance between the
Emperor and members of the Empire, due to fear of a French attack upon the
Palatinate; and Louis was convinced of its hostile purpose. The successes of
the Imperialists against the Turks, therefore, could hardly fail to stir Louis
into action. In 1686 Buda fell at last; and, in August, 1687, the Emperor won a
great victory at Mohacs, in consequence of which the Hungarian throne was,
in December, declared to be hereditary in the Habsburg line. As the clouds
darkened in the east, Louis prepared to take action. He fortified many of the
towns provisionally in his occupation; and it was thus quite evident that he
intended to enforce their definite cession to him. He openly aimed at acquiring
complete military preponderance in Europe, the ecclesiastical independence of
France, and the Imperial dignity for himself or his son. In the pursuit of
these aims he received the full support of James II, under whose rule England
had become “the corner-stone of the fabric” of French aggression.
The situation
in the early months of 1688 was on the whole favourable to the execution of
Louis’ designs, though his position with regard to the lesser German Powers had
become far from satisfactory. The Elector of Brandenburg had definitely thrown
in his lot with the Emperor and with William of Orange; and the Elector
Maximilian Emanuel of Bavaria, who in 1685 had married the Emperor Leopold’s
daughter, Maria Antonia, took a leading part in opposing Louis’ schemes.
Marshal de Villars had in 1687 been sent by Louis to Munich to win over the
Elector of Bavaria to the French cause. Through Villars Louis offered the
Elector, in exchange for an offensive and defensive alliance, his good offices
to obtain the dignity of King of the Romans for him, and to recover Bavaria’s
former rights over Ratisbon, Nürnberg, Augsburg, and the territories between
the Inn and the Danube. He also promised subsidies. In return for these
The year 1688
proved decisive for the future of Europe. The ascendancy of France had become a
standing menace to the peace of Europe; the domination of Louis XIV was not
less dangerous to the European world than was that of Napoleon in the early
years of the nineteenth century. Under a vigorous, intelligent, and centralised
despotism, France, with her immense material resources as yet unimpaired, held
an undisputed supremacy in the west. The French armies were accounted the best
in Europe, and the French fleets commanded the Mediterranean and rivalled those
of England and Holland. French diplomacy had no equal. The effects of the
Revocation of the Edict of Nantes were not yet felt, and the resources of
France had not yet been squandered by interminable wars. So far, all attempts
to form coalitions against the French predominance in Europe had failed, and
the League of Augsburg had had humbler aims. It was not till the Revolution in
England which placed William of Orange on the throne of the Stewarts that the
foundation was laid of the Grand Alliance, which checked the arrogant
pretensions of Louis XIV and eventually removed the danger of French supremacy
in Europe.
The position of the United Provinces. Until that
Revolution had been accomplished, there was a well- founded fear in the minds
of the enemies of France that the events of 1672 might be reproduced, and that
Holland might again be found helpless before the forces of England and France.
The danger was a real one; for, while all the Powers from whom the Dutch
Government could look for support were occupied in the war against the Turks,
James and Louis had come to an understanding with regard to operations against
Holland and the Empire. A quarrel between Denmark, the ally of France, and
Sweden about Schleswig-Holstein had led to an agreement between James and
Louis, with the object of preventing a combination between Sweden and Holland.
It was arranged that an English fleet should put to sea and make a
demonstration so as to prevent Dutch aid being given to Sweden in an attempt
upon the Danish islands. In June, 1688, an English fleet of twenty ships
anchored in the Downs, and Louis undertook that it should shortly be joined by
the French fleet, which had been sent to the Mediterranean to bombard Algiers.
In the same month the Empire was also threatened. In
There seemed
indeed, in the summer of 1688, little chance of any successful resistance being
offered to the execution of Louis’ schemes. He was allied with Denmark; he had
made an agreement with Hanover; his fleet was supreme in the Mediterranean;
James II was his supporter; the continuance of the Turkish War seriously
hampered his opponents. The preponderance of France in Europe implied the
complete overthrow of the balance of power; for not only would Germany be
weakened and divided, but the very existence of the United Provinces would be
constantly threatened by Louis’ supremacy on the Rhine. He would acquire
complete military domination in central Europe, while at the same time
asserting the ecclesiastical independence of France. So long as James II, who
cared nothing for the balance of power in Europe, was on the English throne, there
was small chance of any successful resistance being made to the French King.
Thus, the Revolution of 1688 in England, the deposition and flight of James II,
and the accession of William of Orange to the English throne were events of the
utmost importance in the history of Europe. So long as Louis felt safe from
attack on the part of England, he was able to concentrate his energies upon his
German schemes. The withdrawal of the English regiments from the Dutch service
in the spring of 1688, the attitude of England and France with regard to the
quarrel between Denmark and Holstein, the appearance in June of an English
fleet of men-of-war in the Downs, the intention of Louis to bring the fleet
then employed off Algiers up the English Channel—all convinced the Dutch of the
danger which threatened the balance of power and the cause of Protestantism.
A clear
perception of the full significance of Louis’ policy was shared with the Dutch
by the Protestant Princes of northern Germany. Among these Frederick William,
the Great Elector of Brandenburg, who died in
1688] Louis invades Germany. On his part,
Louis realised in the autumn of 1688 that the continuance of the Imperial
successes against the Turks would imperil his chances of converting the Truce
of Ratisbon into a permanent peace. He also found in the claim to the
Palatinate put forward by him on behalf, but against the wish, of Charlotte
Elizabeth, wife of the Duke of Orleans, and last descendant of the Simmem line,
another reason for invading Germany. Accordingly in September his ambassador at
the Hague warned the Dutch Government against taking any hostile action against
James II, and in the same month French troops invaded Upper Germany and
besieged Philippsburg, which fell on October 29. This action on the part of
France rallied the Princes of Germany to the defence of the Emperor. John
George, Elector of Saxony, at once agreed to march with his forces to the
middle Rhine, thus cooperating with the Emperor on the upper, and with
Brandenburg on the lower, Rhine. Equally anxious to assist in the defence of
Germany were the Brunswick-Lüneburg Dukes at Celle and Hanover, and the Duke of
Brunswick-Wolfenbuttel. Innocent XI had already shown his apprehension of the
growing ascendancy of France. He realized that the triumph of Roman Catholicism
in England would bring with it a close alliance between the English and French
Governments. To avert French predominance in Europe, the Pope therefore felt
constrained to support the European opposition to Louis (October). All that was
now necessary to prevent the triumph of Louis was the adhesion of England to
the opposition offered to him by continental Europe.
On the day of
the fall of Philippsburg, William of Orange first set sail for England. He had
satisfied the Emperor that his expedition was not directed against the cause
either of legitimacy or of Catholicism, but was simply intended to destroy the
alliance between England and France. Had Louis attacked Holland instead of
Philippsburg, William’s expedition could not have taken place. Fortunately,
the relations of James and Louis were at the time somewhat strained. James had
taken exception to Louis’ declaration at the Hague, which he thought implied
that England depended upon France and could only defend itself with French aid.
It was also the view of some of Louis’ advisers that a civil war in England
would best ensure English neutrality during the
Louis XIV,
anxious to throw his forces against Germany and to increase and strengthen his
frontier on the middle Rhine, and not altogether satisfied with the independent
tone assumed by James II, left him to struggle with his assailant. He had
convinced himself that they might be left to carry on a long struggle which
would occupy their energies and resources, while he conquered the Palatinate,
and by his intervention in western Germany hampered the Emperor’s chances of a
decisive victory against the Turks.
There was no
time to be lost; for on September 6,1688, the Emperor captured Belgrade, a
success which seemed likely to prove decisive. Louis at once determined not to
besiege Maestricht, though its siege might have compelled the continued
presence of William of Orange in Holland, and thus postponed for a time the
overthrow of James II. He decided, instead, to declare war against the Emperor
and to invade Germany. He had already shown his determination to allow no
scruple to interfere with his settled plan of “acquiring complete military
preponderance in Europe both for defence and offence.” The election of his
nominee, William von Fürstenberg, at Cologne (June), and the fall of Belgrade
(September), decided Louis to take the equally important step of invading the
Palatinate on September 25. In deciding on this course, Louis and his Ministers
showed that they considered the interests of France were best served by
insisting upon the permanent cession of the territories provisionally allotted
to the French Crown by the Truce of Ratisbon in 1684, and by asserting the claims of the Duke
of Orleans (in the name of his wife) to the Palatinate. William of Orange
landed at Torbay on November 15, and entered London on December 28. James II
fled, and on January 4, 1689, reached the French coast. The House of Stewart
had fallen, and Louis XIV could no longer look upon England as an ally or as a quantité négligéable.
The Revolution in England. [1688-9 The rapid
success of William of Orange and his coronation as King of Great Britain and
Ireland were events of immense importance for Europe. The whole fabric of Louis
XIV’s foreign policy was overthrown, and the year 1689 marked the close of the
period of French aggression. England was no longer a possible ally; Denmark was
unable to make any diversion in favour of France; the Turks were being driven
back. Wishing to concentrate his chief efforts upon Roussillon, Italy, and the
lower Rhine, Louis decided to evacuate the Palatinate; and, by the advice of Louvois,
orders were given in December, 1688, to devastate the country. Heidelberg was
sacked in March, 1689, and shortly afterwards Mannheim, Speier and. Worms
suffered a similar fate;
The year 1689. In many
respects the year 1689 forms an epoch in the history of Europe as well as in
that of France. The fall of the Stewarts and the accession of William of Orange
marked the return of England to the position which she had held in the days of
Elizabeth. In 1689 England had again become the bulwark against all attacks
upon religious freedom, and the champion of the balance of power. Further, the
year 1689 marked the beginning of the struggle between England and France for
supremacy in India and America, and for the command of the sea. It also marked
the destruction of Louis’ hopes of securing the Imperial Crown for himself or
for a French prince. The Revocation of the Edict of Nantes, followed by the
devastation of the Palatinate, had for a time united Germany, and indeed the
greater part of Europe, in opposition to the ambition of France. Failure also
attended the French schemes for the restoration of James II, and the overthrow
of the English sea-power. Consequently, Louis was thrown back upon his early
project of securing the Spanish monarchy for his House. For some four years,
however, after the Revolution of 1688, he still cherished the hope, that, with
James II, his Queen, and his son in France, he had the means of stirring up
civil war in England and rendering her a useless member of the European
coalition against him.
At first,
Louis intended to bring about the restoration of James II by advocating a
religious crusade. He hoped to unite all the Catholic Powers of Europe,
including the Emperor and the Spanish King, for the overthrow of the English
and Dutch Governments. But since the Peace of Westphalia religion had been
steadily losing its influence as an active force in European politics. In 1688
and 1689 political necessities silenced the advocacy of religious partisans.
The Emperor was satisfied that William of Orange had no anti-Catholic aims in
invading England. When James II, early in 1689, appealed to Leopold for
assistance, the Emperor pointed out that the Catholic religion had “suffered
no greater injury than from the French themselves,” who had taken the
opportunity of the Turkish War to attack in the most savage and unjust manner
the
Early in 1689
it was clearly apparent that all idea of a crusade in the West must be given
up. Neither Innocent XI, who died in August, 1689, nor Alexander VIII, nor,
again, Innocent XII, who became Pope in July, 1691, would give any real support
to James II, so long as it was apparent that he was being used by Louis XIV in
the attempt to make France all-powerful in Europe. In the great struggle which
began in
The French
King’s attempt to organise a crusade on behalf of James II had failed. He next
endeavored to secure supremacy in the English Channel, and to stir up in
Ireland a civil war which should occupy the attention and energies of William
III. Ireland would thus be the means of creating a diversion against England; a
long war would ensue; and Louis, unhampered by his chief opponent, would be
able to carry out his aims on the Continent. For the realization of this scheme
the supremacy of the French fleet in the Irish and English Channels was absolutely
necessary. Unfortunately for the success of the plan, Louis miscalculated the
strength of Irish resistance. He sent only 2000 French troops to Ireland, and
he made no attempt to secure supremacy in the Irish Channel. On July 11, 1690,
the battle of the Boyne overthrew the hopes entertained by Louis of a
long-drawn-out struggle in Ireland; and the fall of Limerick (October, 1691)
rendered futile all plans for the restoration of James II by way of Ireland.
Had Louis realised the importance of sea-power, a French fleet could have
commanded the Irish Channel, and the battle of the Boyne would not have been
fought. As it was, on July 10, the day before that battle, Admiral de
Tourville, in command of seventy-five French men-of-war, defeated a combined
English and Dutch fleet in the battle
1690-2] The importance of sea-power. The
importance of the battle of La Hogue, so far as the restoration of James II and
the security of England were concerned, cannot be overestimated. Before the
battle took place, James II was confident that an attempt on England would be
followed by his own restoration, and by the triumph of the principle of
legitimacy. Louis XIV had equally satisfied himself that the probability of
success was considerable. His agents reported that there were few troops in
England, and that the fleet was unprepared. He accordingly placed under Marshal
de Bellefonds a force of 30,000 men, who (in anticipation of Napoleon’s
arrangements in 1805) were to be conveyed across the Channel and to accomplish
the conquest of England. As in 1805, all depended upon the superiority of the
French sea-power and the command of the Channel. A fleet from Toulon was to
meet the Brest fleet under Tourville, and to carry out the invasion of England.
Luckily, tidings of these plans reached the English Government, which at once
took energetic measures. The English and Dutch fleets having been ordered to
unite, Tourville was ordered to prevent, if possible, the junction, and, though
the Toulon fleet owing to contrary winds had not yet reached Brest, to attack
the enemy. His defeat in the battle of La Hogue meant that the plan adopted by
Louis XIV and James II for the invasion of England had utterly failed; that, in
spite of the success of French privateers, under such men as Jean Bart,
Duguay-Trouin, Ducasse, Pointis, and others, the command of the Channel had
definitely passed into the hands of England; and that William would be able to
devote all his attention to the war in
the Netherlands.
There the
struggle was of a fierce and prolonged character. It was
The French
defeat at La Hogue was thus to some extent balanced by the disasters to William
of Orange in the Netherlands. What was more serious, the French naval power,
though crippled in the Channel, had still to be reckoned with in the Mediterranean.
Nor, moreover, had the army which Victor Amadeus, Duke of Savoy, had collected
in Piedmont won any signal success during its invasion of Dauphiné in 1692. No
valuable position was captured, and, owing to the presence of Catinat, and the
illness of Victor Amadeus, the invading army fell back, having accomplished
nothing of importance. Thus the close of 1692 left the issue of the struggle
between Louis XIV and the Grand Alliance still uncertain; and four more years
of warfare followed, during which the influence of the sea-power of England
gradually made itself felt.
1690-9] Further French successes. For some
years, however, it was doubtful if the allies would be able to hold their own
against the French armies. The Emperor had on his hands a war with the Turks;
the English fleet had by no means acquired an unquestioned supremacy at sea;
and both Spain and Savoy seemed likely to be compelled to make terms with the
French King. Moreover, the English attacks upon Martinique, Newfoundland,
Guadaloupe and St Domingo failed, and in 1694 the French reconquered Senegal
and Goree. The complete triumph of the Austrians over the Turks, and the
establishment of British supremacy in the Mediterranean and in the Channel,
were needed in order to assure the victory of the Grand Alliance. Fortunately,
the Emperor in the end proved triumphant over the Turks; and the English
Government, supreme in the Channel after the victory of La Hogue, recognised
the necessity of sending a powerful fleet into the Mediterranean.
It was not,
however, till after some years of fighting that the victory of the Emperor over
the Sultan was assured. The outbreak of the war on the Rhine had at first a
serious effect upon the course of the struggle between the Austrians and the
Turks. Up to 1689 the Imperialists, owing to the uneasy peace that prevailed in
western Europe, had been able to win a series of almost uninterrupted
successes. The continuance of these, which are narrated in a later chapter, was
checked by the
During the
four remaining years (1693-7) of the war in western Europe while the financial
distress of France, aggravated by bad harvests of 1692 and 1693, became more
and more serious; the importance of the command of the Mediterranean was
emphasised in a striking fashion. The withdrawal of English troops from Tangier
in 1684 had been followed by the establishment of French supremacy in the
Mediterranean and by the culmination of Louis’ triumphs. The Truce of Ratisbon
was signed six months after the retirement of the English fleet from the
Mediterranean, and it was not till 1693 that any real attempt was made to
interfere seriously with French naval preponderance in the south of Europe. In
that year, William had been defeated at Neerwinden (Landen), and Tourville had
captured a portion of the great Anglo-Dutch fleet which was making for Smyrna.
The Duke of Savoy had been defeated in the battle of Marsaglia by Catinat, who
was thus enabled to invade Piedmont, while the Spaniards had failed to check
the advance of another French army under the Due de Noailles into Catalonia.
Unless the English fleet made a demonstration in the Mediterranean, it seemed more
than likely that Louis would force Spain and Savoy to retire from the war.
French supremacy in the Mediterranean being thus secured, Louis could withdraw
his forces from the south of Europe and concentrate his attacks upon William
III and the Emperor.
Immediate
action was, therefore, necessary. The Tory admirals were dismissed; Russell was
restored to his former position of Commander-in-Chief; and in May, 1694, he
sailed for the Mediterranean. He arrived at a critical moment. Aided by the
French fleet under Tourville, Noailles had invaded Spain, capturing Palamos and
Gerona. The fall of Barcelona was imminent. The entry of Russell with his fleet
into the Mediterranean at once changed the aspect of affairs. The advance of
Noailles was checked; Barcelona was saved; and Tourville retired to Toulon. It
was obvious that the recovery by the English fleet of the command of the
Mediterranean would overthrow the plans of the French King, and would probably
hasten the conclusion of peace. In 1695, Russell, who had wintered at Cadiz,
planned to attack Toulon or Marseilles, to overthrow Tourville’s fleet, and,
with the cooperation of
The results
of the English command of the Mediterranean during the years 1694-5 had,
however, exercised a most profound effect upon the course of the war. Louis’
plans had been upset; Spain had not been conquered, and the French fleet was no
longer in a condition to carry out any important movement.
The adhesion
of the Duke of Savoy on August 29, 1696, to the French cause, and the
neutralisation of Italy, tended to reconcile William III to the prospect of
peace; for the defection of Savoy would enable Louis to bring some 30,000
troops under Catinat into the Netherlands. William, indeed, on September 5,
1695, had taken advantage of the death of Luxembourg in the previous January,
and had followed up the seizure by the allies of Dixmude and Huy by himself
capturing Namur. For the first time during the war, the French armies had been
badly beaten, and Europe was encouraged to find that Louis was not invincible.
This success, however, was counterbalanced by the defection of Savoy in the
following year, by Vendome’s reduction of Barcelona after fifty-two days’
siege, and by Catinat’s capture of several important Spanish towns in Flanders.
In spite of these proofs of the growing weakness of the Grand Alliance, and in
spite of the overtures of peace made by Louis to Holland and England, William
III was, in the autumn of 1696, supported by Parliament in his determination
not to treat with France except “with our swords in our hands”. Early in 1697,
however, to his astonishment, Louis expressed his willingness to restore Lorraine
and Luxemburg to their lawful owners, to recognise William as King of England,
and to surrender all the conquests made by France during the war. Accordingly,
negotiations under the mediation of Sweden were begun. In May, 1697, the
Congress of Ryswyk was opened, and on September 20 a general peace was
concluded.
The first
treaty was made by France with England, Spain, and Holland. William III was
recognised by Louis as King of Great Britain and Ireland, and Anne, second
daughter of James II, was declared heiress to the throne of Great Britain and
Ireland. Louis, moreover, promised not to encourage plots against William III.
All places won since the Peace of Nymegen were to be restored, France thus
regaining Pondicherry and Nova Scotia, and Spain recovering Catalonia, Mons,
Luxemburg, Ath, and Courtray. On the other hand, France restored Fort Albany to
the Hudson’s Bay Company, which had been driven out of most of its possessions
in 1685. The chief forts in the Spanish Netherlands, such as Namur, Ypres, and
Menin, were to be garrisoned by Dutch troops, and the Dutch were to obtain an
advantageous treaty of commerce with France.
The Emperor
made peace with France very reluctantly, and it was not till October 30 that
William III induced him to agree to a treaty with Louis. By it France ceded all
places taken since the Treaty of Nymegen, except Strassburg and Landau. She
also withdrew from the right bank of the Rhine, yielding Philippsburg, Freiburg
and Breisach, and she restored Lorraine to its Duke, keeping only Saarlouis in
her hands. Louis, moreover, abandoned his candidate for the electorate of
Cologne, and renounced the claims of the Duchess of Orleans to the Palatinate
for a sum of money.
In view of the imminence of the Spanish Succession question and of the financial distress in France, Louis acted wisely in coming to terms with his foes. He hoped, moreover, by his concessions to win over to his side a number of the German Princes, who presumably might be expected to regard with alarm the great increase of the Imperial power consequent upon the defeat of the Turks and the annexation of all Hungary and Transylvania. At any rate, the Grand Alliance was broken up, and France, with her recuperative powers and her well-organised government, remained the strongest and most united Power in Europe.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
James Breck Perkins FRANCE UNDER MAZARIN, WITH A REVIEW OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF RICHELIEU Volume 1
James Breck Perkins FRANCE UNDER MAZARIN, WITH A REVIEW OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF RICHELIEU Volume 2
Airy, O. The English Restoration and Louis XIV
Corbett, J. C. The English in the Mediterranean, 1603-1713. VOLUME 1. Corbett, J. C. The English in the Mediterranean, 1603-1713. VOLUME 2.
Martin Hume The court of Philip IV : Spain in decadence
Victor Cousin Secret history of the French under Richelieu and Mazarin or, Life and time of Madame de Chevreuse
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