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MODERN HISTORY LIBRARY |
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CHAPTER XIX. CHARLES
XII AND THE GREAT NORTHERN WAR.
Charles XI had carefully provided against the contingency
of his successor’s minority; and the five Regents appointed by him entered upon
their functions immediately after his death (April 15, 1697). The Regents, if
not great statesmen, were, at least, practical politicians, who had not in vain
been trained in the austere School of Charles XI; during the seven months in
which they held sway no blunder was made, and no national interest was
neglected. At home the Reduction was cautiously pursued, while abroad the
successful conclusion of the great peace congress at Ryswyk was justly regarded
as a signal triumph of Sweden’s pacific diplomacy. The young King, a lad of
fifteen, was daily present in the Council; and his frequent utterances on every
subject, except foreign affairs, showed, we are told, a maturity of judgment far
beyond his years. He had been carefully educated by excellent tutors under the
watchful eyes of both his parents. His extraordinary courage and strength of
character had, from the first, profoundly impressed those around him, though
his dogged obstinacy occasionally tried them to the uttermost. His wise and
loving mother had been at great pains to develop his better nature by
encouraging those noble qualities—veracity, courtesy, piety, and a strong sense
of honour and fair play—which were to distinguish him throughout life, while
his precocious manliness was not a little stimulated by the rude but bracing
moral atmosphere to which he was accustomed from infancy. Intellectually he was
very highly endowed. His natural parts were excellent, and a strong bias in the
direction of abstract thought, and of mathematics in particular, was
noticeable at an early date. His memory was astonishing. He could translate
Latin into Swedish or German, or Swedish or German into Latin at sight, and on
his campaigns not infrequently dispensed with a key while inditing or
interpreting despatches in cipher.
Almost from
infancy the lad had been initiated into all the minutiae of the administration.
When, in his later years, Charles XI went his rounds, reviewing troops,
inspecting studs, foundries, dockyards and granaries, it was always “with my
son Carl”. For the science of war
On Saturday,
November 6, 1697, the Swedish Riksdag assembled at Stockholm; and, on the
following Monday, the Estate of Nobles, jealous of the authority of the
Regents, and calculating upon the grateful liberality of a young prince
unexpectedly released from the bonds of tutelage, sent a deputation to the King
inviting him to take over the government of the realm. Charles received the
delegates graciously, but suggested that on so important a matter the Senate,
should first be consulted. The Senate and the Regents, weakly determining not
to lag behind the nobility in their devotion to the Crown, waited upon the King
forthwith; and Chancellor Bengt Oxenstiema, acting as spokesman,begged his
Majesty to gladden the hearts of his subjects by graciously assuming supreme
power. Only when Charles had expressed his willingness to concur with the
desires of his faithful subjects were the three lower Estates of the realm
formally acquainted with the action of the nobility and invited to cooperate.
The lower Estates proved to be as obsequious as the gentry, for a joint
deputation from all four Estates thereupon proceeded to the palace ; and, in
answer to their earnest solicitations, Charles declared that he could not
resist their urgent appeal, but would take over the government of the realm “in
God’s name.’’
A short
period,of suspense ensued, followed by bitter disappointment. The Riksdag was
dissolved after a three weeks’ session, and a humble petition
of the nobility
for a remission of their burdens was curtly rejected. The
subsequent coronation
was marked by portentous innovations, the most significant of
which were the
King’s omitting to take the usual coronation oath and placing
the crown upon
his head with his own hands. The Government assumed more and
more of an
autocratic complexion. The French Minister, d’Avaux, describes
Charles at this
period as even more imperious in public than his father had
been Antimonarchical strictures, however respectful or indirect, were
promptly and
cruelly punished. Many people began to fear “a hard reign”.
Yet the general
opinion of the young King was favourable. His conduct was
evidently regulated
by strict principle and not by mere caprice. His
But, while
Charles XII was thus serving his political apprenticeship at home with
exemplary diligence, the political horizon abroad was darkening in every direction;
and a league, of apparently overwhelming strength, had already been formed for
the partition of Sweden. The person primarily responsible for the terrihle
conflagration known as the great Northern War was Johan Reinhold Patkul, a
Livonian squire. A Swedish subject, he had entered the Swedish army at an early
age, and was already a captain when, in 1689, at the head of a deputation of
Livonian gentry, he came to Stockholm to protest against the rigour with which
the land-recovery project of Charles XI was being carried out in his native
province. But his representations were disregarded, and the violent and
offensive language with which, in another petition, addressed to the King three
years later, he renewed his complaints, involved him in what is known as the
great Livonian process.” To save himself from the penalties of high treason,
Patkul left the country, and was condemned in contumaciam to lose his right hand
and his head. His estates were at the same time confiscated. For the next four
years he led a vagabond life, but in 1698, after vainly petitioning the new
King, Charles XII, for pardon, he entered the service of Augustus II of Poland.
There can be
no doubt that Patkul was harshly treated by Charles XI. Moreover, he was an
exile from Livonia so long as it belonged to Sweden. But we must be very
cautious in speaking about the patriotism of Patkul. He acted exclusively from
personal motives; his point of view was that of the German junker; and he had
no thought for the liberties of the Livonian people, who to him were mere
serfs. He did not care to whom Livonia might belong, so long as it did not
belong to Sweden. The aristocratic Republic of Poland was, however, the most
convenient suzerain for Livonian noblemen; and the present King of Poland, as a
German, was pecul arly acceptable to them. Accordingly, in 1698, Patkul
proceeded to Dresden, and overwhelmed Augustus with proposals for the
partition of Sweden. The first plan was a combination against her of Saxony,
Denmark, and Brandenburg; but, Brandenburg failing him, he was obliged to admit
Russia into the scheme instead. This he did very unwillingly, shrewdly
anticipating that the Tsar might prove to be the predominant
partner. Peter was to be content with Ingria and Esthonia, while Augustus was
to obtain Livonia, nominally as a fief of Poland, really as an hereditary
possession of the Saxon House. Military operations against Sweden’s Baltic
provinces were to be begun
Patkul,
accompanied by the Saxon general Carlovitz, arrived at Moscow in September,
1699. They found that they had been preceded by a Swedish embassy sent by
Charles XII to confirm the Peace of Kardis. Peter, on this
occasion, went far towards justifying the accusation of inveterate duplicity so
frequently brought against him afterwards. He was sufficiently superstitious,
indeed, to avoid kissing the cross on the renewal of the treaty. But the
temptation to secure the Baltic sea-board, with all its commercial and
civilising possibilities, was too strong for his easy morality. He solemnly
assured the Swedish envoys that he would faithfully observe all his treaty
obligations; yet, at a secret coriferenfce, held at Preobrazhenskoe with the
Saxon and Danish envoys, he had already signed (November 22, 1699) the
partition treaty. Everything was done by Peter to allay the growing suspicions
of the Swedish Minister, Kniperkrona. When questioned point-blank as to the
designs of Augustus, Peter professed incredulity and indignation. “If the King
of Poland dares to seize Riga,” he said, “I shall take it away from him
myself.”
During the
remainder of 1699 both Sweden and Denmark vigorously prepared for war. A Danish
army, 17,800 strong, assembled in Holstein; while Charles XII equipped his
father’s fleet, and mobilised a Swedish army-corps which was to penetrate into
Holstein from Pomerania and Wismar. At this juncture, western Europe was
startled by the tidings that the Saxons had invaded Livonia. But, in May, 1700,
the troops of Augustus II, repulsed from Riga by the veteran Dahlberg, were
defeated at Jungfemhof, and driven over the Dwina; the Livonian gentry showed
no disposition to rise in arms at the appeal of Patkul; and the discomfited
Augustus, already in difficulties, urged the Tsar to
Battle of Narva. Peter did not
wait for his youthful antagonist. He knew that his wretched recruits could not
be pitted, against veterans; indeed, he would never have brought them to Narva
at all had he conceived the appearance of Charles XII to be even a remote
possibility. He could not help them if he stayed with them, while any mishap to
himself would, inevitably, have brought about the collapse of the new Russia
which he was so painfully uprearing., At all events, he fled away to Novgorod,
taking with him Golovin, whom he also could not afford to lose, and leaving his
demoralised army in the charge of a mysterious adventurer, presumably
The very ease
of his victory was injurious to Charles XII. His beat counsellors now urged him
to turn all his forces against the terrified fugitives; establish his
winter-quarters in Muscovy; live upon the country till the spring, and then
take advantage of the popular discontent against Peter to make him harmless
for the future. But Charles declared that he would postpone the settlement of
the Russian quarrel till he had summarily chastised Augustus. “There was no
glory in winning victories over the Muscovites,” he said; “they could be
beaten at any time.” It is easy from the vantage-point of two centuries to
criticise Charles XII for neglecting the Muscovites to pursue the Saxons, but,
in the circumstances, his decision was, apparently, correct. Charles had every
reason to think the civilised and martial Saxons far more formidable than the
Muscovites; and he had good cause for hating Augustus more than his other
enemies. The hostility of Denmark, on account of Gottorp, was perfectly
intelligible; and so was that of Muscovy so long as Sweden held old territory
formerly Muscovite and barred Muscovy from the sea. There was no excuse at all
for the Elector of Saxony. Yet he had been the prime mover in the league of
partition. He had deceived Sweden to the veiy last moment with false assurances
of amity, and Charles could never trust him to remain quiet even if they made
peace with each other. From this point of view Charles’ policy of placing a
nominee of his own on the Polish throne in lieu of the incalculable Augustus,
was a policy, not of overreaching ambition, but of prudent self-defence.
Nevertheless,
it saved Peter, who was immensely relieved by the withdrawal of his great
rival. He had cut a sorry figure enough at Narva; after the defeat his tenacity
and resourcefulness once more extort our admiration. Adversity always seemed to
stimulate rather than depress him. He at once formed the nucleus of a new army
out of the
The troops
left by Charles XII to defend the Baltic provinces amounted only to 15,000 men.
In the most favourable circumstances these could not seriously hope to defend
against a tenfold odds, a frontier extending from Lake Ladoga to Lake Peipus,
from Lake Peipus to the Dwina, and from the Dwina to the Gulf of Riga. And the
circumstances were unusually unfavourable. Charles not only took his
best men and his best officers away with him to Poland, but forbade the Senate,
which ruled Sweden during his absence, to send any reinforcements to the
Baltic provinces, so long as the more important Polish war lasted. Peter, he
argued, could easily be kept in check by a few raw corps till Augustus had been
dealt with. It was a fatal miscalculation.
With Pskoff
as their starting-point, the Muscovites, during 1701 and 1702, made frequent
incursions into Ingria and Livonia. On January 7, 1702, the Swedish general
Schlippenbach was overwhelmed by Sheremetieff at Errestfer, losing 3000 killed
and wounded, and 350 prisoners. Peter was in ecstasies. “Narva is avenged,” he
cried. Sheremetieff received his marshal’s baton. Urged on incessantly by
Peter, the new Field-marshal attacked Schlippenbach a second time, in July,
1702, at Hummelshof, and with a force of 30,000 men inflicted a still more
terrible defeat upon him, the Swedes losing 5500 out of 8000 men. To intimidate
the enemy still further, and prevent him from drawing Upon the country for
supplies, Sheremetieff, by the express command of Peter, proceeded,
methodically, to devastate as much of Livonia as lie could reach with his
Cossacks and Calmucks. Between Pemau and Reval, and thence round by the sea to
Riga, everything was obliterated. In September, 1702, Peter himself appeared at
Ladoga, in order to superintend the conquest of Ingria. The little fortress of
Noteborg was taken by assault after a heroic defence by its garrison of 410 men
against 10,000. Peter renamed it Schlusselburg. On May 12, 1703, another small
fortress, Nyen, or Nyenskans (renamed Slottburg), at the mouth of the Neva, was
captured by Sheremetieff. Presently the woodman’s axe was busy among the
virgin forests in the marshes of the Neva, and a little wooden village began
to rise up on the northern shore of the river. This little village was called
St Petersburg. For the defence of the town on the sea-side, the fort of
Kronslot, subsequently called Kronstadt, was
Campaign of 1704.—Position of Sweden. In the spring
of 1704 the Muscovites, after reducing all the open towns of Ingria to ashes,
sat down before the two great fortresses of Dorpat and Narva. Sheremetieff,
with 20,000 men, began the siege of the former place in the beginning of June,
and it surrendered on July 24. Narva was besieged, by the Scotch general
Ogilvie, whom Patkul had picked up at Vienna and enlisted in Peter’s service
for three years On August 20 the fortress was taken by assault, and a frightful
massacre ensued, in which not even the women and children were sparedt. Peter
arrived two hours after the place had fallen, and stopped the carnage by
cutting down a dozen of the plunderers with his own hand.
Peter would
now have made peace with Sweden, had he been allowed to retain St Petersburg.
He was in possession of all he wanted, for, as yet, he had no intention of
conquering Livonia for himself (hence his barbarous treatment of it), inasmuch
as he still regarded it as Augustus’ share of the spoil. But he required time to
consolidate his position in the Baltic provinces; and for this purpose it was
necessary to keep Charles “sticking in the Polish bog” a little longer, by
actively assisting Augustus, who was again in serious difficulties. Meanwhile,
Charles XII, after the campaign at Narva, had gone into winter-quarters round
Dorpat, fixing his head-quarters at Lois Castle, midway between Dorpat and Lake
Peipus, so as to be able to commence hostilities in the early spring.
Meanwhile,
an event occurred which completely changed the face of European politics. In
November, 1700, died Charles II of Spain, bequeathing the Spanish monarchy to
Philip of Anjou, the grandson of Louis XIV, who thereupon openly repudiated the
partition compact which he had made with the Maritime Powers. A war between
France and the Maritime Powers was now inevitable, and both sides looked to
Sweden for assistance. The competing French and Imperial ambassadors appeared
in the Swedish camp, while the English and Dutch were equally busy at
Stockholm. Oxenstierna saw in this universal bidding for the favour of Sweden a
golden opportunity of ending “this present lean war, and making his Majesty
the arbiter of Europe.” But Charles met all the representations of his Ministers
with a disconcerting silence. At last the urgent appeal of Baron Lillieroth,
the able Swedish representative at the Hague, who stated that both William III
and Heinsius were uneasy at the unnecessary prolongation of the Northern War
and desirous of knowing the real sentiments of Charles, drew from him the
reluctant reply“ It would put our glory to shame, if we lent ourselves to the
slightest treaty accommodation with one who has so vilely
On July 8,
1701, Charles transported his army across the Dwina, in the face of 30,000
Russians and Saxons, strongly entrenched on the opposite shore at Dunamiinde,
routed them in a two hours’ engagement, and followed up his victory by
occupying Courland, then a Polish fief, which he at once converted into a
Swedish governor-generalate. Then, after recapturing all the Swedish forts on
the Dwina, and purging the land of Saxons and Russians, he established his
winter-quarters round Wiiigen in western Courland (September to December,
1701).
Charles’ proximity to the Polish border had greatly disturbed Augustus; and the Polish primate, Cardinal Radziejowski, had written to Charles reminding him that Poland was at peace with Sweden, forbidding him in the name of the Republic, to cross the border; and offering to mediate between the two monarchs. Charles’ reply excluded every hope of negotiation. He bluntly demanded the deposition of Augustus, threatening, in case of non-compliance, himself to punish the common foe. After this it is not surprising that a reaction in favour of Augustus began in Poland itself; and Patkul, who, in 1702, exchanged the Saxon for the Russian service, did all in his power to induce the Republic to join the anti-Swedish league. The Tsar also now concluded an offensive and defensive alliance with Poland, and it became clear that, with the exception of the powerful Lithuanian family of Sapieha, most of the Polish nobles were still on the side of the King in possession. In January,
1702, Charles established himself at Bielowice in Lithuania, and, after issuing
a proclamation declaring that “the Elector of Saxony” had forfeited the Polish
throne, set out for Warsaw, which he reached on May 14. The Cardinal-Primate
was then sent for and ordered to summon an extraordinary Diet for the purpose
of deposing Augustus. A fortnight later Charles quitted Warsaw to seek his
enemy, and on July 2, with only 10,000 men, routed the combined Poles and
Saxons at Klissow, on which occasion his brother-in-law, the Duke of
Holstein-Gottorp, was shot dead by his side. Three weeks later, Charles, with:
only a cane in his hand, stood before the citadel of Cracow, and captured it by
an act of almost fabulous audacity. Thus, within four months of the opening of
the campaign, the Polish capital and the coronation city were both in the
possession of the Swedes.
During the
next two months Charles remained inactive at Cracow, awaiting reinforcements,
and regarding impassively the chaotic condition of the unhappy Polish Republic.
After Klissow, Augustus made every effort to put an end to the war, but his
offers were not even considered. The campaign of 1703 was remarkable for
Charles’ victory over the Saxons at Pultusk (April 21), and for the long siege
of Thom, which
The
insecurity of the new King was demonstrated when Augustus, taking advantage of
a sudden southward raid of Charles’, recaptured Warsaw (August 26). But his
triumph was of short duration. In October, Charles routed the Saxons at Punitz,
and, after chasing them as far as Glogau, returned to Poland, and pitched his
camp at Rawitz, completely cutting Augustus off from Poland. There he remained
for eight months, using every effort firmly to establish Stanislaus. A
coronation Diet was summoned to Warsaw in July, 1705; an attempt to disperse it
by an army of 10,000 Saxons was frustrated by the gallantry of the Swedish
general, Nieroth, with 2000 men; the difficulty about the regalia, which had
been carried off to Saxony, was surmounted by Charles himself providing his
nominee with a new crown and sceptre; and, finally, Stanislaus was crowned
King, with great splendour, on October 4, 1705. The first act of the new King
was to conclude an alliance between Sweden and the Polish Republic, on the
basis of the Peace of Oliva, whereby Poland agreed to assist Sweden against the
Tsar.
Early in
1705, Peter, encouraged by favourable reports from his Minister, Peter Tolstoi,
at Stambul, resolved to help Augustus by transferring the war to Poland. He had
previously (August 30, 1704) put some heart into his ally, by making a fresh
treaty of alliance with him in which the Republic was also included. By this
treaty Peter undertook to provide Augustus with 12,000 Muscovite auxiliaries;
to pay for the maintenance of an additional Polish army-corps of 26,000
infantry and 21,000 cavalry, and to furnish subsidies amounting to 200,000
roubles a year till the war was over. An attempt of the indefatigable Patkul to
bring the King of Prussia into the anti-Swedish league failed because of
Frederick I’s fear of Charles and his jealousy of Peter’s
During the
winter, Patkul made fresh efforts to gain the King of Prussia by holding out
the bait of “Royal” or Polish Prussia; but the negotiations failed, because
Russia had yet to show by conquering the unconquerable King of Sweden that
she was able to fulfil her promises. From Berlin Patkul proceeded to Dresden to
conclude an agreement with the Imperial commissioners for the transfer of the
Russian contingent of troops from the Saxon to the Austrian service. The Saxon
Ministers, after protesting in Vain against the new arrangement, arrested
Patkul, and shut him up in the fortress of Sonnenstein (December 19),
altogether disregarding the remonstrances of Peter against such a gross
violation of international law.
The campaign of 1706 But the fate
of Patkul was speedily forgotten in the rush of events which made the year 1706
so memorable. In January, Charles XII suddenly appeared in eastern Poland to
clear the country of the partisans of Augustus, and attack the Russian army,
under Ogilvie, entrenched at Grodno. But Ogilvie could not be tempted out of
his entrenchments, and all that Charles could do was to cut off his communications
with Russia and ruin his sources of supply. Augustus, meanwhile, had hastened
from Grodno to Warsaw, and united his Russian and Polish troops with the Saxon
forces under Schulenburg, for the purpose of crushing the little Swedish army
stationed under General Rehnskjold, in the province of Posen, intending
afterwards to return and fall upon Charles at Grodno, while Ogilvie attacked
him in front. This plan was frustrated by Bebnskjold’s brilliant victory at
Fraustadt (February 3) over the combined forces of the allies whom he almost
annihilated, only 5000 out of 20,000 succeeding in escaping. Fearing for his own
army at Grodno, Peter thereupon ordered Ogilvie to retreat into the heart of
Russia, burying his heavy guns in ice-holes, and breaking up his army into
numerous detachments, so that at least some of it might escape. Ogilvie
protesting, he was superseded by Menshikoff; and the Russian army, favoured by
the spring-fioods of the Niemen, which obstructed the pursuing Swedes,
retreated so rapidly upon Kieff, that Charles was unable to overtake it, and
abandoned the pursuit among the trackless morasses of Pinsk. Leaving his
exhausted troops to rest for a few weeks in Volhynia, he hastened off to Saxony
to finish with Augustus, to the intense relief of Peter in his paradise,
It
was now that Peter seriously attempted to come to terms with his terrible
opponent. This he could only do by soliciting the mediation of the Powers, as
Charles steadily refused to have any direct communication with him. He began
in London. At the end of 1706, Andrei Matvieeff was sent there from Holland to
promise Peter’s adhesion to the Grand Alliance, if Great Britain would bring
about a peace between him and Sweden. If necessary, Matvieeff was to bribe
Harley, Godolphin, Marlborough, and the other Ministers. “I know not whether
Marlborough would be inclined thereto, as he is already immensely rich,” wrote
Peter privately, “but you may promise him £1000.” After a long procrastination,
Harley informed Matvieeff that the Queen could not at present afford to quarrel
with the King of Sweden, especially as he had engaged not to attack the
Emperor. On the Continent, Peter’s Dutch agent, Huyssens, negotiated with
Marlborough direct. The Duke promised to meet the Tsar’s wishes if a
principality in Russia were granted to him. Peter at once gave him the choice
between Kieff, Vladimir, and Siberia, besides promising him, in case a peace
with Sweden was concluded by his efforts, 50,000 thalers a year, “a rock ruby
such as no European potentate possesses,” and the order of St Andrew
in brilliants. But nothing came of it, although Peter now declared his
willingness to surrender all his Baltic possessions except St Petersburg. In
the spring of 1707 Peter negotiated for the mediation of France, through
Desalliers, the French Minister at the Court of Francis II Rákóczy, Prince
of Transylvania, whom Peter, for a moment, had thought of setting up in Poland
as a rival to Stanislaus. Charles was approached on the subject of peace; but,
recognising that the line of the Neva was really vital to the existence of
Sweden’s Baltic empire, he refused to cede St Petersburg, and insisted on
Peter’s restitution of all his conquests and the payment of a war indemnity.
Meanwhile the Swedish Ministers at Vienna, the Hague, and elsewhere, insisted
perpetually that, if Russia were allowed to increase, all Europe would be
exposed to the peril of a second Scythian invasion; and all Europe was inclined
to believe them. Prince Eugene, to whom Peter now offered the throne of Poland,
refused the dangerous gift; and the Emperor hastened to recognise Stanislaus
for fear of offending Charles. At Berlin, even the offer of 100,000 thalers
could not tempt the Prussian Ministers to undertake the ungrateful task of
mediation. Peter was evidently given up for lost.
Mazepa. [1707 All
diplomatic expedients for pacifying Charles having failed, Peter prepared to
bear the brunt of a war a outrance with the invincible Swede. At a Council of
War, held at the village of Mereczko, in Lithuania, in 1707, he decided not to
oppose the Swedes in the open field, but to retire before them, drawing them
further and further from their base, devastating the country before them and
harassing them as much as possible, especially at the passage of the principal
rivers. He had previously commanded that all the country-folks should be warned
beforehand of the approach of the enemy that they might have time to hide their
stores of com in pits, or in the forests, and drive their cattle into the
trackless swamps. The Cossack Hetman, Ivan Mazepa, was entrusted with the
defence of Little Russia and the Ukraine. Kieff, with its congeries of
fortress-monasteries, was additionally fortified and well supplied with
artillery. All the light troops, including the Cossacks, were to fall back
behind the Dnieper.
Charles’
departure from Saxony had been delayed for twelve months by a quarrel with the
Emperor, against whom he had many just causes of complaint. The religious
question presented the most difficulty. The Court of Vienna had treated the
Silesian Protestants with tyrannical severity, in direct contravention of the
Treaty of Osnabriick, of which Sweden was one of the guarantors ; and Charles
demanded summary and complete restitution in so dictatorial a fashion that the
Emperor prepared for war. But political considerations prevailed. The sudden
apparition of the King of Sweden and his “blue boys” in the heart of the
Empire fluttered all the western diplomatists; and the allies at once suspected
that Louis XIV had bought the Swedes. Marlborough was
Delayed
during the autumn months in Poland by the tardy arrival of reinforcements from
Pomerania, Charles XII was not able to take the field till November, 1707, when
he had under him an army of 24,000 horse and 20,000 foot, two-thirds of whom
were veterans. The respite was of incalculable importance to the Tsar, who, at
this very time had suddenly to cope with a dangerous Bashkir rising on the
Volga, followed by a rebellion of the Don Cossacks under Kondraty
Bulavin, against “the innovations.” So hardly pressed was he as to be forced to
employ barbarians against barbarians, Calmucks against Bashkirs, for want of
regulars. On Christmas Day, 1707, Charles reached the Vistula, which he crossed
on New Year’s Day, 1708, although the ice was in a dangerous condition. On
January 26 he entered Grodno, only two hours after Peter’s departure. “For
God’s sake,” wrote Peter to Menshikoff on this occasion, “entrust the command
of the rearguard to faithful men of our own people and not to foreign fools.”
The sneer is illuminating. It shows that even in the service of war the
Muscovites were beginning to dispense with leading-strings.
On February
12, Charles encamped at Smorgonie on the Velya, one of the tributaries of the
Niemen. Two courses lay open to him. Either he might recover the lost Baltic
provinces before attacking the Tsar, or he might pursue Peter into the heart of
his Tsardom, and dictate peace to him after destroying his army. His ablest
officers strongly advised him to adopt the first course as being both “cheap
and reasonable”; but the alternative appealed irresistibly to the young hero’s
love of adventure, and tempted him by presenting difficulties which would have
been unconquerable by anyone but himself. And, unfortunately for Sweden, he
adopted it. This plan was, apparently (for even now it is largely guess-work)
first, after crossing the Dnieper, to unite with the army-corps of Lewenhaupt,
which was advancing from Riga to join him, and then to winter in the fruitful
and untouched Ukraine, whose fortresses were to be held at his disposal by the
Cossack Hetman Mazepa. Simultaneously, the Finnish army under Lybecker, with
the help of the fleet, was to take St Petersburg and recapture Ingria, while
Stanislaus, aided by a third Swedish army under Krassow, was to quell all
disaffection in Poland. In the summer of 1709, the three Swedish armies,
reinforced
After a brief
rest at Smorgonie, Charles XII resumed his march eastwards. The superior
strategy of the Swedes enabled them to cross the first two considerable rivers,
the Berezina and the Drucz, without difficulty, but on reaching the Wabis,
Charles found the enemy posted on the other side, near the little town of
Holowczyn, in an apparently impregnable position and evidently bent upon
barring his passage. But his experienced eye instantly detected the one vulnerable
point in the six mile long Russian line; on July 4, 1708, he hurled all his
forces against it; and, after a fierce engagement, from daybreak to sundown,
the Russians fell back with a loss of 3000 men.
The victory
of Holowczyn, memorable besides as the last pitched battle won by Charles XII,
opened up the way to the Dnieper; and four days later Charles reached Mohileff,
where he stayed till August 6 waiting for Lewenhaupt. The Swedes now began to
suffer severely, bread and fodder running short, and the soldiers subsisting
almost entirely on captured bullocks. The Russians, under Sheremetieff and
Menshikoff, would not risk another general engagement, but slowly retired
before the invaders, destroying everything in their path, till at last the
Swedes had nothing but a charred wilderness beneath their feet and a horizon of
burning villages before their eyes. Moreover, the Muscovites now began to
display an unusual boldness, attacking more and more frequently, with
ever-increasing numbers, as, for instance, at Chernaya Napa (September 9),
where they fell upon an isolated Swedish division which lost 3000 men and was
only saved from annihilation by the arrival of Charles himself. By the time the
frontier of eighteenth century Russia was reached at Micbanowich (October 1) it
was plain to Charles that he could go no further eastwards through the
devastated land, and at Tatarsk he held his first council of war. Rehnskjold
prudently advised the King to wait for Lewenhaupt, whose reinforcements and
caravan of provisions were becoming indispensable, and then to retire to
Livonia, so that he might winter in his own lands. But Charles, partly from a
horror of retreating, partly because of an urgent summons from Mazepa, resolved
to proceed southwards instead of northwards, and to this resolution everything
else was sacrificed.
And now began
that last march of the devoted Swedish army through the forests and morasses of
Severia and the endless steppes of Ukraine which was to be a long-drawn-out
agony, punctuated by a constant succession of disasters. The first blow fell in
the beginning of October, when the unhappy Lewenhaupt joined Charles with the
debris of the army he had saved from the not inglorious rout of Lyesna, where
the Russians witk
The unlooked-for
collapse of Mazepa was a terrible blow to Charles XII. He had built his hopes
of ultimate victory on his alliance with the Cossack Hetman; and, in justice to
Charles, it must be admitted that this alliance, so far from being a mere
mirage luring him on to destruction, as which Swedish historians generally have
regarded it, was really the one solid and substantial element in his fantastic
combinations. The fact has been quite overlooked that, in those days, the
Hetman of the Zaporogian Cossacks was often the determining factor of Oriental
politics. Chmielnicki had held the balance even between Poland and Muscovy for
years. Doroszenko, as the ally of the Sultan, had, for a time, been more
powerful than Tsar and King combined. Mazepa himself was not so much the
subject as the semi-independent tributary of the Muscovite Crown. He ruled on
the Dnieper with more than princely power. 100,000 Cossacl horsemen were at his
disposal. The whole Ukraine obeyed his lightest nod. The Khan of the Crimea
addressed him as “my brother.” If Charles X of Sweden, one of the astutest
statesmen as Well as the greatest warrior of his age, in the plenitude of his
power considered it not beneath his dignity to seek the alliance of the Hetman
Chmielnicki against Poland, why should not his grandson, Charles XII, have
sought the alliance of the Hetman Mazepa against Muscovy, now that Poland also
was on his side? The power and influence of Mazepa were fully recognised by
Peter the Great himself. No other Cossack Hetman had ever been treated with
such deference at Moscow. He ranked with the highest dignitaries in the State,
sat at the Tsar’s own table, and flouted the Tsar’s kinsfolk with impunity.
Mazepa would
doubtless have remained loyal, had not Charles XII crossed his path. At the
very beginning of the great Northern War, the crafty old Hetman began to have
his doubts how this life-and-death struggle, going on before his very eyes,
would end. As Charles continued to advance, and Peter to retreat, Mazepa made
up his mind that Charles was going to win and that it was high time he looked
after his own interests. Moreover, he had his personal grievances against
Peter. The Tsar was going so fast, that the arch-conservative old Cossack could
not follow him; and he was jealous of the omnipotent favourite Menshikoff. More
than once, some of his Cossack squadrons had been taken away from him to be
converted into dragoons, and he deeply resented it. But he proceeded very
cautiously. Not till September 27,
At the end of
1708, the Swedes had to encounter a new and terrible enemy in the great frost,
the severest that Europe had known for a century. So early as the beginning of
October the cold was intense; by November 1, firewood would not bum in the open
air and the soldiers warmed themselves over big bonfires of straw. But it was
not till the vast open steppes of the Ukraine were reached that the unhappy
Swedes experienced the full rigour of the icy Scythian blast. By the time the
army arrived at the little Ukrainian fortress of Hadjach, which they took by
assault (January, 1709), wine and spirits froze into solid blocks of ice; birds
on the wing fell dead; saliva congealed in its passage from the mouth to the
ground. The sufferings of the soldiers were hideous. “You could see,” says an
eye-witness, “some without hands, some without feet, some without ears and noses,
many creeping along after the manner of quadrupeds.” “Nevertheless,” says
another eye-witness, “though earth, sky, and air were against us, the King’s
orders had to be obeyed, and the daily march made.” Never had Charles XII
seemed so superhuman as during those awful days. It is not too much to say that
his imperturbable equanimity, his serene bonhomie, kept together the perishing,
but still unconquered, host. His military exploits were prodigious. At Cerkova
he drove back 7000 Russians with 400, and at Opressa, 5000 Russians with 300
men.
The frost
broke at the end of February, 1709, and then the spring floods put an end to
all active operations for some months. The Tsar set off for Voronezh to inspect
his Black Sea fleet; while Charles encamped at Rudiszcze, between the Orel and
the Worskla, two tributaries of the Don. By this time the Swedish army had
dwindled from
Battle of Poltawa—Second league against Sweden. [1709 At last Peter
had resolved to make a firm stand. “With God’s help I hope this month to have a
final bout with the enemy,” he wrote to Admiral Apraksin. Yet even now, though
the Swedes were a famished, exhausted, dispirited host, surrounded by fourfold
numbers, Peter decided at a council of war, held soon after his arrival, that a
general attack was too hazardous. Charles XII had never yet been defeated in a
pitched battle, and Peter was determined to take no risks. Only when the
garrison of Poltawa contrived to let him know that their powder had run out,
and the enemy’s sappers were burrowing beneath their palisades, did he order
his army to advance. On that very day a crowning calamity overtook the Swedes.
While reconnoitring the Russian camp, Charles received a wound in the foot from
the bullet of a Cossack patrol, which placed him hors de combat. On hearing of
this mishap, Peter resolved not to refuse battle, if it were offered him.
Charles was equally ready to fight, and at a council of war held on June 26,
Marshal Rehnskjold, whom he had appointed commander-in chief in his stead, was
ordered to attack the Russians in their entrenchments on the following day.
The Swedes joyfully accepting the chances of battle in lieu of miseries of all
sorts and slow starvation, advanced with irresistible elan, and were at first
successful on both wings. After this, one or two tactical blunders having been
committed, the Tsar, taking courage, irew all his troops from their trenches,
and enveloped the little band of Swedish infantry in a vast semi-circle,
bristling with guns of the most modem make, the invention of a French engineer,
Le Metre, which fired
The immediate
result of the battle of Poltawa was the revival of the hostile league against
Sweden. On hearing of Peter’s victory, Augustus sent his chamberlain, Count
Vizthum, to arrange for a conference; and the two monarchs met on a bridge of
boats in the Vistula, a mile from Thorn, where, on October 17,1709, a treaty
cancelling all former compacts was signed. Peter undertook to assist Augustus
to regain the throne of Poland; and, by a secret article, it was agreed that
Livonia should form part of the victor’s hereditary domains. Previously to this
(June 28), an alliance had been concluded at Dresden between Augustus and
Frederick IV of Denmark, “to restore the equilibrium of the north, and keep
Sweden within her proper limits.” Nevertheless, for fear of the Western Powers,
which were amicably disposed towards Sweden, and by no means inclined to part
with the Danish and Saxon mercenaries in their service, so long as the War of
the Spanish Succession continued, the two Princes agreed to exempt Sweden’s
German possessions from attack unless their own possessions in the Empire were
attacked by Sweden. The confederates then proceeded to Berlin, to persuade
Frederick I of Prussia to accede to the new alliance; but the Prussian
Minister, llgen, restrained his royal master from taking any decisive step.
Consequently, “ the league of the three Fredericks ” was of so general a character
that it did little more than engage the King of Prussia to prevent the passage
through his territories of any Swedish troops bent on invading the territories
of Denmark or Saxony.
And now
Frederick IV, despite the angry remonstrances of the Maritime Powers, resolved
to attack Sweden at the very time that the Tsar was harrying the remnant of her
Baltic provinces. But Sweden was now to show the world that a military State,
whose strong central organisation enabled her to mobilise troops more quickly than
her neighbours, is not to be overthrown by a single disaster, however serious.
She could still oppose 16,000 well-disciplined troops to the
But,
suddenly, alarming news from the south interrupted the Tsar’s career of
conquest in the north. Immediately after Poltawa, Peter Tolstoi, the Russian
ambassador at the Porte, demanded the extradition of Charles and Mazepa. This
was a diplomatic blunder, as it irritated the already alarmed Turks. Tolstoi
next reported “great military preparations made in great haste.” In August he
offered the Grand Mufti 10,000 ducats and 1000 sables, if he would hand over
the fugitives; but the Mufti gravely replied that such a breach of hospitality
would be contrary to the religion of Islam. Evidently the Turks wished to
prolong the Russo-Swedish War till they were ready to take the field
themselves. Nor was Charles himself idle. For the first time in his life, he
was obliged to have recourse to diplomacy; and his pen now proved almost as
formidable as his sword. First he sent his agent, Neugebauer, to Stambul with a
memorial in which the Porte was warned that, if Peter were given time, he would
attack Turkey as suddenly and unexpectedly as he had attacked Sweden in 1700.
The fortification of Azoff and the building of a fleet in the Black Sea clearly
indicated his designs, and a Suedo-Turkish alliance was the only remedy against
so pressing a danger. “Reinforce me with your valiant cavalry,’’ concluded
Charles, “and I will return to Poland, reestablish my affairs, and again
attack the heart of Muscovy.” These arguments, very skilfully presented, had a
great effect upon the Porte; and, when Neugebauer was reinforced by Stanislaus
Poniatowski, Charles’ ablest diplomatist, the crisis became acute. At first,
indeed, the Muscovite prevailed. In November, 1709,
The campaign of the Pruth. On March 19,
1711, war was solemnly proclaimed, in the Tsar’s presence, against “the
enemies of the Cross of Christ”, in the Uspensky Cathedral; and Peter immediately
set out for the front. At Iaroslavl, on June 12, he concluded a fresh alliance
with Augustus, confirmatory of the Treaty of Thom. The petitions and promises
of the Orthodox Christians in Turkey now induced the Tsar to accelerate his
pace, and he concluded on his way a secret treaty of alliance with Demetrius
Cantemir, Hospodar of Moldavia. Peter had expected that a general insurrection
of the Serbs and Bulgars would have compelled the Grand Vezir to recross the
Danube; but unexpected difficulties suddenly accumulated. On June 27,
Sheremetieff, the Russian commander-in-chief, reported that the whole land had
already been sucked dry by the Turks and he knew not where to look for
provisions and provender. At a council of war, held at the end of June, Peter
decided to advance still further, in order to support Sheremetieff and unite
with the Orthodox Christians. On July 16 he reached Jassy, by which time the
question of supplies had become so pressing, that all other considerations had
to be subordinated to it. On the rumour reaching him that an immense quantity
of provisions had been hidden by the Turks in the marshes of Fulchi, near
Braila, Peter crossed the Pruth, and searched for these phantom supplies in the
forests on the banks of the Sereth. On August 8 the advance- guard reported the
approach of the Grand Vezir; and the whole army hurried back to the Pruth,
fighting rear-guard actions all the way. On August 11 the Muscovites, now
reduced to 38,000 men, entrenched themselves ; and the same evening 190,000
Turks and Tartars, with 300 guns, leleagiitred them on both sides of the Pruth.
An attack upon the Russian camp on the same day was repulsed; but the position
of the Russians, with provisions for only a couple of days, and no hope of
The only
person who took no part in the general rejoicing was the Tsar. After loudly
declaring his intention of delivering the Christian population of Turkey from
the Mohammadan yoke and driving the Turks out of Europe, he had signed a peace
by which he abandoned the Sea of Azoff, and undertook to destroy the choicest
works of his own hands, his fortresses, and his costly new-built fleet! Peter’s
desponder cj is clearly reflected in the letter which he addressed to the newly
instituted Senate, while the negotiations with the Porte were still proceeding.
In this letter he informs his Ministers that he is surrounded by a countless
Turkish army, and, without a special manifestation of God’s grace, sees nothing
before him but a hopeless pitched battle or Turkish captivity “ In the latter
case,” he continues, “regard me no longer as your Gosudar, and obey no orders
from me, though they may be under my hand and seal, till I appear among you.
And in case of my death, elect the worthiest as my successor.”
Two days
before the Russian army departed from the Pruth, Charles XII, who had provided
the Grand Vezir with a plan of campaign beforehand, arrived on the scene of
action. Only then did he receive the unwelcome news that peace had been
concluded. Well might he denounce the conduct of Baltaji as a treason to the
Sultan as well as to himself. “He seems to have more regard,” wrote Charles,
“for the
On retiring
from the Pruth, Peter, after a brief visit to Carlsbad, proceeded to Krossen
(November 13, 1711) to concert measures with his allies for the vigorous
prosecution of the Swedish war, which was now transferred to Germany, where the
long struggle for the dominion of the North was to be fought out.
By this time
Sweden’s position had distinctly deteriorated. In March 1710, the Swedish
Senate had concluded a neutrality compact with the Emperor, Prussia, Hanover,
Great Britain and Holland, whereby Charles’ possessions in northern Germany
were guaranteed against attack, on condition that Krassow’s army in Pomerania
abstained from hostilities, within the German Empire and was not employed
either in Poland or Jutland. This guarantee treaty was, in the circumstances, a
prudent act of statesmanship; but Charles incontinently rejected it, as
interfering with his plans, thereby greatly irritating the Maritime Powers,
already by no means so well disposed towards Sweden as heretofore in consequence
of the depredations of the Swedish privateers in the Baltic: In 1712, the
unwisdom of Charles’ summary renunciation of a compact intended for his special
protection became apparent. Not only did the Tsar and Augustus II determine to
proceed against the Swedish possessions in Germany, but they persuaded
Frederick IV of Denmark to join them. The plan of the allies was for the Danes
to invade the Bremen and Verden territory, where Stade was the chief fortress,
while the Russians and Saxons simultaneously attacked Stralsund. Stade
capitulated (September 7) to the Danes, who thereupon occupied Bremen and
Verden; but the allies failed to make any impression on Stralsund, and the
abortive siege led to a violent quarrel between the Kings of Poland and Denmark
which the Russian Ministers barely succeeded in comppsing.
But now a
fresh danger suddenly threatened Peter and his allies. From the first the
Maritime Powers had been far more amicably disposed towards Sweden than towards
Muscovy. This anti-Russian bias was strongest in England, where the
interference of semi-barbarous Muscovy in European affairs was felt to be far
more offensive than the haughty aloofness of the Swede. Before Poltawa, Sweden
was generally regarded as the natural counterpoise to Russia and entitled, so
far as she
This
obstinacy was to cost Charles dear. At Bender he had elaborated a fresh plan of
campaign too heroic to be practicable. Magnus Stenbock was to form a new
army-corps in Sweden, convey it to Pomerania, and, invading Poland from the
north, reinstate Stanislaus on the throne, and drive out Peter and Augustus,
while Charles and the Turks cooperated from the south. On September 24,1712,
Stenbock succeeded in transporting an army of 9400 men, a park of artillery,
and a quantity of transports laden with stores, to RÚgen, despite the
disturbing presence of a large Danish fleet which subsequently destroyed the
greater part of the transports. After reinforcing himself from the garrison of
Stralsund, he had at his disposal an effective army of 17,000 men. He rightly
refused to accept the responsibility of plunging blindly into Poland leaving
Sweden’s German possessions to their fate, especially as Prussia also now began
to adopt a threatening tone; but, since it was equally impossible for him to
remain at Stralsund, from lack of provisions, he marched westwards into
Mecklenburg, reached Wismar in safety, and proceeded to live on the land. But,
even here, he could not long remain in safety. The Danes were advancing against
him from the south-west, the Russians and Saxons from the south-east; and, to
prevent their junction, he resolved to attack the weaker foe, the Danes, whose
army was little superior to his own. By forced marches he overtook the Danes
near Gadebusch, before the Saxons could join them or overtake him, and won a
victory
No sooner was
Stenbock safely shut up in Tonning, than Peter went in search of fresh allies.
But neither the Elector of Hanover nor the King of Prussia, to whom he
successively applied, would listen to him. Peter hereupon determined to conquer
Finland in order “to break the stiff necks of the Swedes,” and have something
definite to surrender, when the time for negotiation should have arrived. The
necessary preparations were made immediately after his return to St Petersburg
in March, 1713; and on May 21 the Russian fleet sailed. The defence of Finland
had been entrusted to the incapable Lybecker, who heaped blunder upon blunder;
and his gallant successor, Karl Gustaf Armfelt, with hopelessly inadequate
forces, could do little but retreat skilfully northwards. His own and Finland’s
fate were finally decided on March 13,1714, at the bloody battle of the
Storkyro, when the Swedish general stood at bay with his raw levies against
threefold odds and was annihilated. By the end of 1714 the whole grand-duchy
was in the enemy’s possession.
In Germany,
during the summer of 1713, the Swedish fortress of Stettin had been besieged by
the Russians and Saxons. It capitulated in September and was occupied by
neutral Prussian and Holstein troops on the understanding that it was to be
restored to Sweden at the conclusion of a general peace. “The Stettin
Sequestration,” as it was called, was primarily the work of the Holstein
Ministers von Gortz and Bassewitz. Their object was to tempt Prussia over to
Charles; and the Court of Berlin actually agreed to drive the Danes out of
Holstein and guarantee the neutrality of Charles’ German possessions in the
hope of subsequent compensation. But the diplomatists had reckoned without
Charles XII, who at once denounced “the Stettin Sequestration,” naturally
refusing to recognise the right of Prussia, a neutral Power, to occupy one of
his fortresses under any conditions.
During the
summer of 1714, owing to the incurable jealousy between Denmark and Saxony, the
war languished; and fresh efforts were made
In April,
1714, the Elector of Hanover came forward with a fresh scheme of partition.
According to this project, Prussia was to have Stettin, while Bremen and Verden
were to be assigned to Hanover, and Schleswig-Holstein to Denmark, who with
Prussia should undertake to capture Stralsund, Hanover occupying Wismar, which
was to be transferred to Mecklenburg. Peter warmly approved of the Hanoverian
scheme; but it foundered on the hostility of Denmark, who naturally refused to
part with her own conquests, Bremen and Verden. A simultaneous attempt by the
Marquis de Chateauneuf, the French Minister at the Hague, to bring about an
understanding between Peter and Charles failed because of the Tsar’s profound
distrust of France. At this juncture, an event occurred which profoundly
affected northern politics—the death of Queen Anne (August 1, 1714). The
Suedophil Tory Ministry disappeared; and the most unscrupulous of Charles XIFs
despoilers ascended the English throne as George I. Three months later, Charles
XII reappeared upon the scene. On September 20 he had quitted Turkey, and,
after traversing Austria, and making a long ditour by Niimberg and Cassel, to
avoid the domains of the Saxon Elector, arrived unexpectedly, at midnight,
November 11 (0. S.), at Stralsund, which, besides Wismar, was all that now
remained to him on German soil.
The year 1715
was memorable for the conclusion of the so-called “English affair,” which
resulted in the formation of a third coalition against Charles XII. The author
of this league of spoliation was the new King of England; and the preliminaries
were arranged in February at Copenhagen. Prussia had all along been playing a
waiting
It had become
evident to all the members of the anti-Swedish league that, till Charles had
been attacked in the heart of his own realm, the war might drag on
indefinitely. But when it came to the execution of the plan of invasion,
insuperable obstacles presented themselves. Saxony and Hanover were jealous of
Denmark; and all three were incurably suspicious of the Tsar; yet, without
Peter’s active cooperation, Charles was practically unassailable. At the
beginning of 1716, Peter justified their suspicions by his high-handed
interference in German affairs. At the end of January, he punished the
independent city of Danzig for trading with Sweden, even going the length of
seizing all the Swedish vessels in the harbour, and compelling the Danzigers to
build him privateers for nothing; but when, on May 11, by the Treaty of Danzig,
he guaranteed Wismar and Warnemiinde to Duke Charles Leopold of
Mecklenburg-Schwerin, on his marriage with Peter’s niece, the Tsarevna
Catharine Ivanovna, the prospect of seeing Mecklenburg a Russian outpost
infuriated George I and Frederick IV.
There can be
no doubt that the Mecklenburg compact was a blunder. The most capable and
experienced of Peter’s own diplomatists, Prince Boris Kurakin, now at the
Hague, had strongly dissuaded him from it.
The Duke was
of notoriously bad character; and he was not even divorced from his first wife.
Kurakin counselled his master at least not to imperil the profitable British
alliance by aggrandising Charles Leopold at the expense of Peter’s own allies.
The Tsar disregarded this advice; and complications immediately ensued. Prince
Repnin, sent by Peter with an army-corps to help Hanover and Denmark to reduce
Wismar, was informed that his services were not required; and when the fortress
capitulated (April 15) the Russian contingent was refused admittance. Peter was
deeply offended. But his necessities compelled him to dissemble his wrath;
and, at a meeting between the Tsar and Frederick of Denmark, at Altona, on June
14, the invasion of Scania, where Charles XII had established himself in an
entrenched camp defended by 20,000 men, was definitely arranged. On July 28,
Peter arrived at Copenhagen with his squadron; and
The Peace Negotiations of Baron Görtz. Peter’s
resolution was duly communicated to the Danish and Hanoverian Governments, and
produced a storm of indignation which nearly blew the league of spoliation to
pieces. In October the Russian troops quitted Denmark, and went into
winter-quarters at Mecklenburg. The same month Peter concluded a fresh
defensive alliance with Frederick William of Prussia at Havelberg, whence he
proceeded to Amsterdam, where he was joined by his six most eminent
diplomatists, including Shafiroff, Tolstoi, and Kurakin, and where he received
tidings from London of the arrest of the Swedish Minister, Count Carl
Gyllenborg, for alleged participation in a Jacobite conspiracy engineered by
Charles XII, who was said to have sent, or to be sending, a fleet with an army
of 17,000 men to Scotland. Such an escapade seemed to Peter just the sort of
thing to which Charles XII was likely to put his hand. He anticipated a war
between Sweden and England at the very least.
“Am I not
right in always drinking to the health of this enterprising hero?” he wrote
to Apraksin; “Why, he gives us for nothing what we never could buy at any
price!” But the Tsar was wrong. The whole scheme originated in the fertile
brain of Baron von Gortz, who in 1715 had passed out of the Holstein-Gottorp
into the Swedish service; but it was sternly discountenanced by Charles.
Indeed Peter’s relations with George I now became worse instead of better, for
George refused to have any dealings with Peter personally till Mecklenburg had
been evacuated by the Muscovites.
Unable to
obtain anything from England, Peter now turned to France, since the death of
Louis XIV less hostile to Russia. The political outcome of Peter’s visit there
(May 7—June 20, 1717) was the Treaty of Amsterdam (August 15), between France,
Russia, and the United Provinces, guaranteeing each other’s possessions. But
this treaty meant very little so long as Sweden continued to show a bold front
against the divided league of partition; and after a fresh coldness had arisen
between Peter and George, owing to the curt refusal of the latter to place
fifteen British line-of-battle ships at the former’s disposal “ to bring the
King of Sweden to reason,” Peter resolved, at last, to treat directly with
Sweden. The chief intermediary was Görtz, who, gifted with uncommon astuteness
and audacity, seems to have been fascinated by the heroic element in Charles’
nature. He owed his extraordinary influence over the King to the fact that he
was the only one of Charles’ advisers who believed, or pretended to believe,
that the strength of Sweden was still far from being exhausted, or, at any
rate, that she had a sufficient reserve of force to give impetus to a
high-spirited diplomacy This was Charles’ own opinion. Charles was now willing
to relinquish a portion of the duchies of Bremen and Verden, in exchange for a
commensurate part of Norway, due regard being had to differences of soil and
climate. Thus, his invasions of Norway in 1716 and 1718, so far from being mere
adventurous escapades, were mainly due to political speculation. It was obvious
that, with large districts of Norway actually in his hands, he could make
better terms with the provisional: holders of his ultramarine domains. But the
exchange of a small portion of Bremen and Verden for something much larger
elsewhere was the utmost concession he would make; and this was an altogether
inadequate basis for negotiation. Anyone but Görtz would have retired from the
affair altogether. But he trusted in his ability to persuade Charles into
treating, and thus bring him over gradually to his own plans.
GÓrtz
first felt the pulse of the English Ministry, who rejected the Swedish terms as
excessive; whereupon he turned to Russia. Formal negotiations were opened at
Lofo, one of the Aland Islands (May 23, 1718), Gortz being the principal
Swedish, and Osterman, Peter’s most astute diplomatist, since the disgrace of
Shafiroff, the principal Russian, commissioner. .
In view of
the increasing instability of the league of partition, Peter uncerely desired
peace with Sweden; but he was resolved to retain the bulk of his conquests.
Finland he would retrocede, but Ingria, Livonia, Esthonia, and Carelia, with
Viborg, must be surrendered by Sweden. If Charles consented, Peter undertook to
compensate him in whatever direction he might choose. It was not oidy peace,
but an alliance with the King of Sweden, that the Tsar wanted. “When all
ancient grudges and sorenesses are over between us,” wrote Peter privately “we
two between us will preserve the balance of Europe.” Görtz was promised a
gratuity of 100,000 roubles if peace were concluded.
Two things
were soon plain to the keen-witted Osterman—that Gortz was hiding the Russian
conditions from Charles, and that the Swedish feeling was altogether opposed to
the Russian negotiations, rightly judging that nothing obtained elsewhere could
compensate for the loss of the Baltic provinces. Twice the negotiations were
interrupted in order that Görtz and Osterman might consult their principals. In
October, Osterman, in a private report to the Tsar, accurately summed up the
whole situation. The negotiations, he said, were entirely Gortz’ work. Charles
seemed to care little for his own interests, so long as he could fight. In the
circumstances, it might fairly be argued that he was not quite sane. Sweden’s
power of resistance was nearly at breaking-point. Every artisan and one out of
every two peasants had already been taken for soldiers. He strongly advised
that additional pressure should be brought to bear by a devastating raid on
Swedish territory. There was, however, a chance that Charles might break his
neck, or be shot in one of his adventures; “and such an ending, if it happened
after peace had been signed, would relieve us from all our obligations.”
Osterman’s
anticipations were realised in an extraordinary way. On December 12, 1718,
Charles XII was shot dead in his trenches while on the point of capturing the
Norwegian fortress of Fredrikssten. The irresolution of the young Duke Charles
Frederick of Holstein-Gottorp, the legitimate heir to the throne, sealed the
fate of a party already detested in Sweden because of its identification with
Gortz, who was arrested the day after Charles’ death and executed for alleged
high-treason in February, 1719. In March, Charles’ one surviving sister, Ulrica
Leonora, was elected Queen of Sweden, and the negotiations at Lofo were
resumed. But the Swedish plenipotentiaries now declared that they would rather
resume the war than surrender the Baltic provinces; and, in July, a Russian
fleet proceeded to the Swedish coast and landed a raiding force which destroyed
property to the value of 18 millions of roubles. The Swedish Government, far
from being intimidated, hereupon broke off all negotiations with Russia (September
17); and pacific overtures were made instead to Hanover, Prussia, and Denmark.
By the Treaties of Stockholm, November 20,
On September
14, a courier, with a sealed packet, containing the Treaty of Nystad, overtook
Peter on his way to Viborg. On opening the packet the Tsar declared, with
perfect justice, that this was the most profitable peace Russia had ever
concluded. “Most apprentices,” he jocularly observed, “generally serve for
seven years; but in our school the term of apprenticeship has been thrice as
long. Yet, God be praised, things could not have turned out better for us than
they have done;” And, indeed, the gain to Russia by the Peace of Nystad, which
terminated a war of twenty-one years, was much more than territorial. In
surrendering her choicest Baltic provinces, Sweden had also lost the hegemony
of the North, and all her pretensions to be considered a Great Power.
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