POPE LEO X

CHAPTER V.

The Pope’s endeavours to promote a Crusade, 1517-1518.

Ever since his election to the Holy See, the Pope’s mind had been preoccupied by the Eastern Question, which, by the accession to power of the warlike Sultan Selim in 1512, had become very critical. In this anxiety about the encroachments of the Turks, Leo was only following the traditions of his predecessors. The historian of the Turkish Empire has no doubt that Leo X, after his accession, had the matter of a Crusade “really and seriously at heart”, and was honestly bent on making it, together with the restoration of the peace of Europe, the main object of his life. The numerous Briefs which he sent to all the Christian princes in the earlier days of his Pontificate are a proof of his intention.

Even in the earlier sessions of the Lateran Council the Turkish Question was brought up repeatedly. Words were followed by deeds, and remittances of money were sent at once to those places which were most in danger, such as Rhodes and Hungary. Besides this, numerous privileges were granted by Rome to the King of Portugal; to aid him in his fight against the infidels of Africa. The picture of the Turkish peril drawn by the Envoys of the Polish obedientia, on the 13th of June, 1513, impressed Leo so painfully that he burst into tears.

On the 15th of July it was decided to send Cardinal Bakócz as Legate to Hungary, it being rumoured that he was to take with him large sums of money. Leo rejoiced when the news arrived of a victory gained over the Turks by the Hungarians, and took part personally in the thanksgiving service held at Santa Maria del Popolo. Unfortunately the departure of the Hungarian Cardinal was delayed till late in the autumn, and his attempt to preach the Crusade in his own country was an entire failure. The Hungarian peasants took up the Cross indeed, but it was not to fight against the infidel, but against their own hated magnates. A full year passed before this state of things could be set right.

In spite of all these mischances, the Pope, who at the beginning of 1515 had appealed to all Christian princes to help with the Crusade. now sent the distinguished Ban of Croatia and Bishop of Veszprim, Petrus Beriszlo, to the assistance of the hard-pressed frontier cities, taking with him not only the 20,000 ducats already promised, but large contributions of grain, war material, ordnance, gunpowder, and saltpetre. At Ancona a fleet was fitted out, for which Venice was by way of providing guns. But the Signoria, who had renewed their agreement with the Porte on the 17th of October, 1513, showed no desire to support the Pope’s proposed Crusade. They wished rather to prevent the Pope from having at heart the interests of Christendom, and preferred his devotion to personal ambition and the renown of the house of Medici. This false construction of his action was carefully disseminated by Venice, and had a very disastrous effect on the Pope’s efforts to make peace and promote a Crusade. As he learned to realize that nothing was to be hoped for from Venice, which had several times threatened to call in the help of the Turks. Leo turned his thoughts from the danger threatening from Constantinople to another quarter. He wanted to make the alliance with the chivalrous French King conducive to the protection of Christendom. From the assurances given at Bologna, both by Francis I and his chancellor, Du Prat, the Pope hoped for great things from France.

Next to Rhodes, Hungary was the place which stood in the greatest danger, and on the 17th of July Leo urged the French King most pressingly to send to Hungary at least a subsidy of money. Nothing could have been more friendly than the King’s reply, nevertheless no money was sent. King Ladislas, in whom Leo X had always taken a warm interest, died in March, 1516, being succeeded by his son Louis, who was still a child. To complete the difficulties, quarrels broke out among the Hungarian magnates. The Pope’s anxiety in regard to Hungary increased, and on the 2nd of April, 1516, he sent thither his relative, Roberto Latino Orsini. In urgent letters he pressed the Polish King, Sigismund, the King of Portugal, and, above all, Francis I, to go to the help of the menaced country. But even now the French King sent no money, whereas the Pope, in spite of his financial difficulties, sent to the Ban 15,000 ducats. There is no doubt that Hungary would have fallen a prey to the Turks had not the Sultan Selim, in the summer of 1516, embarked on a campaign against Syria and Egypt which engaged all his energies for two years.

The opportunity of making an attack on Constantinople during the Sultan’s absence was not made use of, for the European powers, and, unfortunately, the Pope also, were taken up for a time by their own personal interests. The project of a Crusade was made use of to cover quite other projects. This was especially the case with Francis I, who had at heart other matters, especially the conquest of Naples. Even Leo X was often turned aside from the idea of a Crusade either by the interests of the States of the Church or by those of his nephews, and especially by the war of Urbino, though it is fair to say that he never quite lost sight of it

Scarcely had Francesco Maria been overthrown before the question of the Crusade came once more to the front in Rome. In October, 1516, the Pope again appealed to all Christian princes, and drew attention to the war in which the Sultan Selim was entangled in Asia and Africa. No authentic information about his movements could be obtained in the West, except by Venice, which kept its knowledge to itself. But Leo made a skilful use of whatever intelligence he had received from the East to stir up the crusading zeal of the princes. “If it be true”, was the gist of his representations to them, and especially to Francis I, “that the Sultan has overcome his ancient foes the Egyptians, it is time that we woke from sleep, lest we be put to the sword unawares. If it be not true, why should we not make use of this opportunity, so favourable to us, and given to us by God, to carry out His cause to a good end, and, uniting ourselves, attack the Turks, now hard-pressed and entangled in the Persian and Egyptian expeditions, and march against them under the unfurled standard of the Holy Cross?”

Francis I replied on the 15th of November, by an assurance of his unaltered enthusiasm for the holy cause. He urged the Pope to work for the promotion of universal peace in Europe, adding that, as soon as that had been secured, he would at once put a large army in the field and follow the Pope as his leader in the holy campaign.

But in spite of these high-sounding assurances he was not at all pleased that Leo should have thus taken the business in hand. The secret instructions given to his Ambassador, at the Congress which had met at Cambrai in the beginning of 15 17, reveal his real thoughts. In these he actually lays down, as a result of the victory of the Christian arms, a division of the Ottoman Empire between France, Germany, and Spain, no mention being made of the other powers, and least of all of the Pope. But Leo X soon learned about this project through Maximilian, and became all the more anxious to promote the universal peace of Christendom. The mission of the Dominican, Nicholas von Schonberg, was meant to serve this end.

Meanwhile very disquieting news from the East had reached Rome. There was scarcely room to doubt that both Egypt and the Holy Land had fallen victims to the Sultan’s lust of conquest. During January the equipment of a fleet and the raising of a Crusade-tax were determined on. Various plans were made, and the appointment of a special Crusade-Legate was discussed. At S. Agostino, in the presence of three Cardinals, Egidio Canisio preached an impassioned sermon about the danger with which Christendom was threatened by the Sultan, to avert which the Pope hoped for great things from the Kings of France, England, and Spain, on account of the generosity belonging to their youth.

Then the war of Urbino broke out again. The Pope, though surrounded by difficulties, did not, even at that anxious time, forget the Crusade, and carried on his negotiations with the Ambassadors and princes. In the last session of the Lateran Council he carried, in spite of the opposition of a number of bishops, the resolution that a general Crusade should be solemnly proclaimed, and that for this end a tithe should be laid on all the clergy for three years. At the same time a Bull was published which bade all princes and lords to observe a truce for five years, under the most severe spiritual penalties. Thus, by a solemn decree of the Council, the proposed Crusade became an established fact : there was no longer any question in the matter of if or how or when.

Leo X still wished to keep the conduct of the Crusade in his own hands. A congregation of experienced Cardinals was appointed to make suitable proposals both for carrying out the war and for providing the means. But, owing to the great pressure of the Urbino affair, nothing was done about it that summer. It was only when the disastrous war was at an end, and peace restored among the Christian princes, when the differences between the Emperor and Venice, and between Henry VIII and Francis I about the possession of Tournai, had been arranged. that there seemed to be once more a possibility of the Crusade being carried out. The Pope, who had been contemplating the position in the East with ever-increasing anxiety, now took up the matter with decision. The affair with Francesco Maria had scarcely been arranged before Cardinal Medici declared to the Venetian Ambassador that the moment had now come when the Turks must be attacked; that the Pope was prepared in all essentials, and that a special Nuncio would be at once sent to the Signoria to demand that the Republic should join in the war against the infidel. The Ambassador, whose government was on the very best of terms with the Porte, was so startled by this declaration that he could not make any reply to it. “While awaiting special orders from Venice”, he said, “I must confine myself to generalities”.

Leo X acted wisely in turning first of all to the great sea-power, Venice, for without the co-operation of that state a combined undertaking was not to be thought of. The task of winning the Republic over to the common cause was entrusted to Altobello Averoldo, Bishop of Pola, who was in September appointed permanent Ambassador and Legate de latere. His distinguished qualities, added to the fact that he was a native of Brescia, seemed to fit him in an especial manner for the difficult mission. On the 29th of October Cardinal Medici wrote to Averoldo, telling him that the Turkish Question was more than ever uppermost in the mind of the Pope; that in connection with this affair a special Ambassador had lately arrived from the French court, who had made very friendly overtures ; so that even if Venice continued to hold back, the matter would at last go forward, though indeed the Pope before all things wished to ask the Signoria for advice, so valuable was their experience, as to how the undertaking had best be begun and carried out. Other Nuncios would be required who could form opinions from what was reported of the war.

On the 4th of November Leo X appointed a congregation, consisting of Cardinals Carvajal, Remolino, Fieschi, Grassis, Pucci, Medici, Farnese, and Cornaro. The Ambassadors of the European powers were admitted to its sittings, to which certain men versed in the concerns of the Ottoman Empire were also invited. The three Cardinals belonging to the Dominican, Franciscan, and Augustinian Orders, were called on to preach the Crusade.

The deliberations began on the 6th of November, under the presidency of the Pope ; all the powers were represented except Portugal and Venice. The representative of King Emanuel was excused from attending on the score of illness; but why the Venetian Ambassador was absent, says the Envoy of the Duke of Ferrara, no one knows.

The conference was hurried on so effectually, that by the 12th of November a detailed memorandum was ready, which is one of the most remarkable documents relating to the history of the European movement against the Ottoman Empire in the 16th Century. Six principal questions were presented: (1) Should the war be undertaken? (2) Should it be a war of offence or defence? (3) What obstacles are there in the way, and how are they to be removed? (4) Should the war be conducted by all the princes, or only by some; and if so, by whom? (5) By what means should it be carried on? (6) How should it be started ?

The first question was answered by the memorandum decidedly in the affirmative. As regarded the second, an offensive war was recommended. Such a course would show more courage, and would secure the advantage of an easier discovery of the enemy’s weak point. In answer to the third question, seeing that the chief obstacle must come from discord among the princes of Christendom, the memorandum pointed out that this could be overcome only by the establishment of universal peace, or of a truce for so long as the Holy War lasted. If during that time quarrels arose, these must be settled by the Pope or Sacred College, or else their settlement must be postponed until the war was over. It might, on the other hand, be advisable to make a League of all the princes under the Pope—a kind of holy alliance—by which all would pledge themselves by oath to put down by force of arms those who broke the peace. To this League there might be given the name of the Brotherhood of the Holy Crusade (Fraternitas Sanctae Cruciatae).

As regarded the fourth question, relating to the supreme command of the undertaking, the memorandum said that though the Emperor and the King of France, as the first and most powerful of the princes of Christendom, must certainly be at the head of the combined powers, all the others would be held bound to co-operate in the Crusade according to their strength. The fifth and sixth questions, which concerned the means and manner of carrying out the war, were considered in the memorandum to be the most important. Apart from God’s help, which was to be implored without ceasing, the question resolved itself into two things, namely, money and troops.

The general war expenses were estimated at 800,000 ducats. This sum, says the optimistic memorandum, will not be very difficult to raise. In the first place, all kings and princes will contribute a goodly portion of their income, this being but just and to their own interests, seeing that it is with them that the enemy mostly concerns him elf, taking but little account of the common folk. The Turks have sworn a deadly hatred against the heads of Christendom, and want their lives. Nevertheless, we do not want to fix the amount of the portion contributed by them, for this must be left to their own prudence and generosity. Then, the clergy must be approached in like manner. All, and especially the richer monasteries and foundations should, according to the amount of their income, give a tenth, two-thirds, or even three-quarters of it for this end, limiting their private expenditure to the necessaries of life, so that they may dedicate all the remainder to the holy work, for which they are mainly responsible as the possessors of the heritage of Christ. From the nobles a tenth, and from the burghers a twentieth, of their income might be asked. Finally, the people who live by the work of their hands, artisans and labourers, should each give a suitable contribution. A third of the whole sum must be raised at once for the equipment of the army, while the remainder must be in a state of readiness, to be utilized at any moment when wanted.

The strength of the army will be about 60,000 foot soldiers, 12,000 light and 4,000 heavy cavalry. For the infantry, Swiss, German, Spaniards, and Bohemians would be preferred ; for the light cavalry, Spaniards, Italians, Dalmatians, and Greeks ; and for the heavy cavalry the best men would be found in France and Italy. It is evident that corresponding artillery must be provided. Ships could be supplied by Venice, Genoa, Naples, Provence, Spain, Portugal, and England. It must from the very beginning be a fixed rule that the war by sea be carried on in conjunction with that by land, “for the enemy has already a fleet of three hundred triremes”. It would be impossible to bring an equal number against them, but the Kings of France and Spain could each certainly contribute twenty of these vessels, Genoa the same number, and Venice forty. The Pope himself, with the Cardinals, would endeavour to provide ten. A considerable number of large vessels, even if not triremes, might be expected from France and England.

“It would be very advisable not to divide and split up the various contingents, but to try to mass them on one point, Constantinople being the objective of the attack. The road through Germany and Hungary, or that through Dalmatia and Illyria, might be taken ; but the shortest and easiest method would be to assemble the troops at Ancona and Brindisi, and the fleet at Sicily, because from thence Greece and Egypt are quickly reached”. An alliance with the Shah Ismael would be considered, and the memorandum builds its hopes on an invasion of the border provinces by the Hungarians and Poles, while the main army is proceeding against Constantinople. The division of the conquered countries would be a delicate matter, to be treated carefully and prudently. About this the memorandum says : “Perhaps it will be advisable to appoint arbitrators at once for this object, who at the end of the war would give a portion to each country in proportion with the help it had afforded. This could be arranged either by the Pope and Cardinals, or else by plenipotentiaries appointed by the above-mentioned Holy Brotherhood, when it has been organized. To arrange a division before that which has to be divided is in our possession would be very unfitting. It would be better to regard all conquests as common property at first and make the division later”.

The memorandum, which fixed nothing, but confined itself to suggestions, was communicated by the Pope through his Nuncios to the Emperor, the Kings of France, Spain, England, Portugal, and to the Republic of Venice, with the request for their suggestions and remarks. At the same time Briefs were sent to the chief powers, pointing out the necessity of prompt action in regard to the Turkish danger. The greatest discretion as regarded the Turkish Ambassador and the actual state of affairs was recommended to the Nuncio at Venice.

“Daily,” wrote Cardinal Medici, November 17, 1517, to the Nuncio in Switzerland, Antonio Pucci, “does the matter of the Crusade become more burning. The more that is done about it the clearer does the necessity of action appear. Two things are now certain: that the Sultan has returned victorious to Constantinople, and that his forces by land and by sea are most powerful. The Pope is ready to do everything in his power, and is counting on the assistance of the warlike Swiss”.

This appeal to all Christian princes, on the eve of a new era, was the expression of the mediaeval idea of a solidarity of all Christian States against the infidel. The sending round of the above memorandum compelled the most callous powers to take up a decided position as regarded the Eastern Question. It was with the greatest impatience that the Pope awaited the answers of the various States.

Leo X had great expectations from the powerful French King, to whom, for the second time, the raising of a Crusade­tenth had been allowed. The Pope had greater hopes of winning him over to the cause of the Crusade because he himself was on the point of complying with a project broached by Francis I as early as the autumn of 1516. This concerned a marriage between Lorenzo de’ Medici and Madeleine de la Tour d'Auvergne, the daughter of Jean, Comte de Boulogne, related to the royal house through her mother, Catherine de Bourbon. Ever since October, 1517, negotiations about this alliance had been carried on together with those about the Crusade by Thomas de Foix, Lord of Lescun, the Bishop of St. Malo, the Papal Nuncio, Staffileo, and the Florentine Ambassador in France, Francesco Vettori. An agreement as to this matrimonial alliance was at last arrived at in consequence of which the Pope's nephew at once set out for France. Thus was this matter easily arranged: negotiations about the Turkish question presented greater difficulties.

First of all Francis I put off giving any answer at all ; and at the end of 1517 the Pope was still waiting vainly for the settlement of the plan propounded in the middle of November. On the 30th of December Cardinal Medici once more impressed on the French Nuncio the fact that, in view of the increasing danger from the Turks and their undoubted menace to Italy, a prompt decision was urgently necessary. Often did the Pope himself write to Francis and the other princes, offering, in the cause of the Crusade, all that he had, and even his personal co-operation, but still no decision could be arrived at. While time was being thus wasted in writing and negotiating, the Turks were devoting their whole power to the work of arming themselves. The Pope knew that, were the enemy to choose to attack Italy or any of the Italian islands in the spring, there would be no possibility of resisting him. The Nuncios, said he, must warn, implore, and adjure the King and all persons of influence to do something. The answer of Francis, dated December 23, must have reached Rome soon after this. The objections he raised were chiefly on the subject of money. He agreed to the plan in general, but he wished to have the Crusade funds in his own hands, and also to receive the tithe levied for three years in advance. If this were granted, he said, he would go to the help of the Pope with 12,000 horse and 50,000 foot soldiers. To avoid confusion he recommended that the Emperor should proceed separately by land with the Germans, Hungarians, and Poles, and that Charles of Spain, with the Kings of England and Portugal, should remain with the fleet. The three divisions must be combined in their movements.

The proposal of the Emperor was quite different. The detailed document which he sent at the end of the year 1517, though the language is veiled, shows clearly enough Maximilian's jealousy of the share to be taken in the under taking by the French King. Instead of one campaign, the Emperor in his fantastic way proposed a whole series of campaigns, which were to be spread over three years. The first year, the Kings of France and England were to remain in their own countries, to preserve peace in them and see to the levying of the war tax. Meanwhile Maximilian, at the head of the German and Spanish soldiers, would, in con junction with the King of Portugal, attack the Sultan's possessions in the north of Africa. This campaign would be terminated in the second year by the conquest of Alexandria and Cairo, while, at the same time, Francis I would proceed from Italy to Macedonia, and keep the coasts clear for the Crusaders on their return from Egypt. At length, in the third year, the fantastic undertaking was to be crowned by the conquest of Constantinople and European Turkey. The help of the Shah of Persia might be gained by the cession of Armenia and Karaman. The division of the booty—which reminds us of the well-known story of the skin of the bear—should be made by arbitration under the presidency of the Pope. The Emperor had peculiar ideas about how to procure the means of war. In every parish throughout Christendom, every fifty men were to supply one soldier ; to procure money besides that raised by tenths and indulgences, a tax should be levied on every hearth or family.

The most feeble of all the proposals came from the Spanish King, Charles. His idea was that the powers should at first confine themselves to the protection of the most exposed parts of Italy, such as the Marches of Ancona, Naples, and Sicily. For this object he promised the immediate service of 14,000 men.

This difference of opinion, and the jealousy on the part of the European powers which it revealed, as well as the scarcely veiled pursuit of merely personal ends, must have deeply incensed the Pope; but still more did the reserved attitude of the great sea-power of the West. In spite of the want of good-will shown from the very beginning on the part of the Venetian Ambassador and the Signoria, Leo X persisted in continuing to hope for better things, and a change of mind on the part of the Republic. He therefore showed every indulgence towards the condition of peace which existed between the Turks and the Signoria, in the hopes that at the given moment the latter would not fail to come to the assistance of Christendom.

Meanwhile, most alarming intelligence continued to arrive from the East. At the end of February a boastful and menacing letter from the Sultan was received by Leo X. The Pope’s response took the practical form of demonstrative action by renewed preparations for the Crusade.

On the 3rd of March solemn processions were organized to implore the help of God. At the same time the Pope determined to send four Cardinals to the principal countries of Europe as Legates de latere. Those appointed were among the leading and most gifted members of the Sacred College. Farnese was chosen to go to the imperial court, Egidio Canisio to Spain, Bibbiena to France, and Campeggio to England. In spite of his financial difficulties the Pope himself defrayed the expenses of these legations, whereas hitherto, in similar cases, the Nuncios had been authorized to pay their expenses by means of their lucrative faculties. Leo X made use of this difference to give a signal proof of his disinterestedness.

The questions and resolutions mentioned above, were the result of the consultations which the Pope had held with the special Congregation of Cardinals, consisting of thirteen members and the Ambassadors. As well as these resolutions, there was another idea to which expression was given in a solemn Bull. In this document, dated the 6th of March, which described very impressively the effects of the Sultan’s last victory and the growing danger from the Turks, the Pope urged a five years’ truce between all the Christian powers, to be observed under the severest penalties of the Church. Leo X made special reference to Innocent III, one of the greatest Pontiffs of the Middle Ages, in whose footsteps Leo declared his wish to tread, by making the settlement of all differences to depend on the Holy See.

While special Briefs announced all these preparations to the Christian princes, the preaching of the Crusade was begun in Rome. On the 12th of March the great intercessory processions were commenced in the Eternal City. The shops were shut, and the streets hung with drapery and tapestry, while on all sides altars were set up. On the first day the procession went from S. Agostino to S. Maria in Aracoeli. The Confraternities of Rome, including those of Germany, took part in it, clad in their picturesque and varied habits; after them came the religious orders and the secular clergy, carrying relics, and, lastly, the household of the Pope. On the second day the procession went from S. Lorenzo to S. Maria del Popolo. In it were carried the great relics which the Eternal City claims as its own : the Heads of St. Andrew and St. Matthias, the Chair of St. Peter, the Holy Lance, the Sudarium of S. Veronica, and the large fragment of the True Cross from Santa Croce in Gerusalemme.

The procession of the third day (Sunday, March 14), which went from St. Peter's to S. Maria sopra Minerva, was followed by many Ambassadors of the spiritual and temporal courts, as well as by all the Bishops and Cardinals then in Rome, and, lastly, by the Pope himself, who walked barefoot the whole way, and repeatedly showed signs of religious emotion. High Mass was celebrated in the Church of the Minerva, after which Sadolet mounted the pulpit to preach the Holy War with Ciceronian rhetoric. Mindful of the presence of the Ambassadors, the orator did not fail to eulogize the Christian princes, whose goodwill he rated much higher than it in reality existed.

“Who”, cried Sadolet, “could have the smallest doubt as to our victory when we have Maximilian as our Emperor, a general so experienced in the art of war?” In similar terms did he extol the high qualities and noble purpose of the other princes, of the Kings of France, Spain, England, Portugal, and Poland, not forgetting the two Kings, still minors, Louis of Hungary and James of Scotland, nor Christian of Denmark, about whom scarcely anything was as yet known. He was loud in the praises of the “valiant and invincible” Swiss, as well as of the Venetians and all other princes and people who had distinguished themselves in the fight against the infidel. How could the Turk have the slightest hope of success when he contemplated the union of all the powers? “Hitherto we have been blind, aye, blind, he cried in conclusion ; “we have not looked back sufficiently at what has gone before. But now the night has disappeared and the darkness is dispersed. The glow of true honour shines before our eyes, and truth is made gloriously manifest!”. Before the procession left the church Cardinal Farnese read the Papal Bull relating to the five years’ truce.

Soon the Pope’s commands were sent forth into all lands, to the effect that similar intercessory processions were to be organized in every country to implore the help of God for Christendom, which was so sorely imperilled. The solemn manner in which Leo X had introduced the Crusade, and his appeal to the great Pope whose reign had marked the zenith of the power of the Holy See in the Middle Ages, show us how high his thoughts had soared. Even as in a former age the influence of the Papacy had perhaps found its most marked expression in the Crusades, so now a “general Western undertaking, with the Pope at its head”, would not only protect Europe against her worst enemy, but would bring new glory and increased influence to the Holy See.

The Pope’s efforts to promote a Crusade have found an expression in art in the fresco of the Battle of Ostia; and the memory of these efforts inspired Raphael in his last creation, the Transfiguration. Naturally, poets and writers made use of the theme of the Turkish war; hopes were raised of winning the Pope’s favour by poems and discourses on the subject. The earnestness shown by Leo in the whole matter is beyond question.  It was by the force of his will that these extraordinary efforts were made to gather the Christian princes under the one banner of the Cross, and set them in movement against the Eastern Empire. Alas! all his efforts were shattered by the self-interest of the European powers.

Leo’s most cruel disappointment came from Venice, and this in spite of his having handled the Signoria with the most delicate consideration, so as to save the Republic from the difficulties which might arise from the terms of friendship on which she was with the Sultan. He had refrained from any allusion to such terms, and had said nothing about the mission of a special Legate to Venice. Yet when Sadolet in the discourse mentioned above had allowed his zeal to carry him away so far as to allude to the great services rendered by Venice in the defence of Europe against the Turks, the Venetian Ambassador had at once remonstrated with the Vatican, and had demanded that the passage should be omitted whenever the discourse was printed.

Nothing is more significative of the pusillanimity of the merchants on the Adriatic than the way in which they shrank from their own great past. The prudent, calculating policy of Venice always had for its object the protection of her own immediate interests. The most stirring arguments beat in vain against this short-sighted egoism. When he was organizing the intercessory processions, the Pope had had the foresight to write to the Patriarch of Venice to propose that the same thing should be done in his diocese ; for thus the Venetians were able to declare that the measure had not originated with them, but had been forced on them by the spiritual authority of the Pope. However, the processions could not be organized without the permission of the Venetian Government, and this permission was refused by the Signoria. The Pope accepted this rebuff without a word; though he could not long deceive himself as to the real meaning of the Signoria's repeated assurances that they were ready to join in any expedition against the Turks when the matter was really started. Nor was he ignorant that, even while making these protestations, the Signoria had secretly renewed their terms of peace with the Sultan. What he probably did not know was that Venice had shamelessly betrayed the Christian cause by keeping the deadly enemy of Western civilization informed of all the preparations which were being made for the Crusade.

The whole matter depended on what success the Cardinal-Legates would have in Spain, France, England, and Germany. Leo X wished that the Legates should start on their mission as soon as possible, and this Farnese seemed willing to do. But Bibbiena fell ill, and as combined action between the Legates was intended, a delay was caused. But on the 12th of April, Bibbiena, Campeggio, and Egidio Canisio were able to appear to­gether in Consistory, where the Pope gave them his blessing. Then, accompanied by all the members of the Sacred College, they adjourned to S. Maria del Popolo. Thence Bibbiena started for France on the 13th, Campeggio for England on the 15th, and Canisio for Spain on the i6th. Cardinal Farnese wrote that he was unable to proceed on account of illness, and recommended that the learned Cardinal Cajetan should take his place in Germany. The latter left Rome on his mission on the 5th of May, 1518. Besides the Cardinal-Legates, the Dominican, Nicholas von Schonberg had been entrusted with a mission to Hungary and Poland, to bring about the co-operation of those countries in the Crusade. The first thing Schonberg had to do was to try to arrange the differences between Poland and the Teutonic Order. Later this same Envoy tried to influence the Grand Dukes of Muscovy and the Princes of Tartary. Schonberg’s task was not less difficult than that of the Cardinal-Legates, for each of the powers had its own personal object to gain in the undertaking of the Crusade.

Favourable news came, however, from Spain, where Egidio Canisio preached the Cross to vast multitudes. On the 3rd of August a letter from the King of Spain was communicated to the Cardinals assembled in Consistory, in which he declared his readiness to agree to the five years’ truce.

The intelligence sent by Cardinal Campeggio, who had been appointed to the court of England, was, on the other hand, most unsatisfactory; for the attitude of Henry VIII about the question of the Crusade had been, to say the least of it, very peculiar from the first. He had for a long time delayed giving any answer at all, and when it was at last sent, its only object was to remove all possible doubt as to the King’s intentions. Henry VIII strongly warned the Pope to take heed that his project did not bring great danger on himself, for those on whom Leo set his hopes of peace were those who wished to draw the Pope into war. The most necessary thing of all was that he should check the King of France’s great thirst for power. As to the Crusade, England would, all in good time, combine with Spain, but she must first come to an understanding with King Charles.

It is not difficult to foresee the nature of Campeggio’s reception after such preliminaries. In this Henry VIII exceeded the worst anticipations. His minister, Cardinal Wolsey, emphatically refused either to receive the Bull relating to the truce or the Legate himself; for, said he, it was against precedent that a foreign Cardinal should exercise legatine rights in England. Campeggio could be received only on condition that all his legatine privileges were suspended, and that his authority on all matters of importance were shared with Wolsey. Consequently Campeggio, who had arrived at Boulogne at the beginning of June, had to stay there without being able to set foot in England.

These proceedings were not the only result of Wolsey's jealousy, for the latter had been made a member of the Sacred College two years before Campeggio, and, as Chancellor, he could not tolerate the presence near him of a Cardinal-Legate. The all-powerful minister of Henry VIII not only desired to be appointed Legate for life in England, but wished to wrest from the hands of the Pope the office of making peace in Europe, and thus to secure to England this glorious role. While Campeggio was detained at Boulogne and condemned to inactivity, Wolsey was carrying on negotiations with France not only about the possession of Tournai, but about the conditions of universal peace which the Pope was about to lay down.

Meanwhile Cardinal Bibbiena was in France. His task also was beset with extraordinary difficulties, especially after the question of the imperial succession arose. It was widely believed that through the marriage of Lorenzo de' Medici and Madeleine de la Tour, which had been celebrated with great pomp at Amboise on the 28th of April. Francis I had succeeded in making Leo X a willing tool of the French policy. The real fact was that, however lavishly generous Leo might be towards his nephew and his bride, he was not in the least drawn away by the marriage-contract from his own particular objects or from his policy as to the Crusade. Lorenzo, it is true, thought otherwise, for ever since his marriage he had become quite French in his sympathies, and remained for a long time with Bibbiena in France. He adopted as his own all the French demands, quite regardless of the interests of the Pope. But Leo X had no intention of giving France all she wanted, especially as Francis I paid no attention to his desire to be freed from his promise regarding the cession of Modena and Reggio. On the 28th of May he granted the request for the Cardinal's hat for John of Lorraine, but he did not so readily grant the King's further requests relating to the levying of a tenth.

Meanwhile Cardinal Wolsey was indefatigable in his efforts to make London instead of Rome the centre of the peace negotiations. Rumours were soon heard of an Anglo-French understanding, including the restoration of Tournai and the marriage of Henry's daughter Mary to the Dauphin. Nor was this alliance between the two Kings all, for a general alliance between all the powers was proposed to be concluded in London instead of in Rome. In a masterly manner Wolsey knew how to combine an Anglo-French understanding with the forming di Lorenzo de' Medici (15 18) con Maddalena de la Tour, which had been celebrated with great pomp at Amboise on the 28th of April. Francis I had succeeded in making Leo X a willing tool of the French policy. The real fact was that, however lavishly generous Leo might be towards his nephew and his bride, he was not in the least drawn away by the marriage-contract from his own particular objects or from his policy as to the Crusade. Lorenzo, it is true, thought otherwise, for ever since his marriage he had become quite French in his sympathies, and remained for long time with Bibbiena in France. He adopted as his own all the French demands, quite regardless of the interests of the Pope. But Leo X had no intention of giving France all she wanted, especially as Francis I paid no attention to his desire to be freed from his promise regarding the cession of Modena and Reggio. On the 28th of May he granted the request for the Cardinal’s hat for John of Lorraine, but he did not so readily grant the King’s further requests relating to the levying of tenth.

Meanwhile Cardinal Wolsey was indefatigable in his efforts to make London instead of Rome the centre of the peace negotiations. Rumours were soon heard of an Anglo-French understanding, including the restoration of Tournai and the marriage of Henry’s daughter Mary to the Dauphin. Nor was this alliance between the two Kings all, for general alliance between all the powers was proposed to be concluded in London instead of in Rome. In masterly manner Wolsey knew how to combine an Anglo-French understanding with the forming of a general treaty of peace, to be guaranteed by England and France. By July all parties had agreed so far that the League in its essentials could be presented to the Pope. Leo knew but too well that this League would completely destroy his plan of a five years' truce, and that therefore all his efforts to raise a Crusade were adroitly set aside. He had no doubt whatever that a general peace would put insuperable obstacles in the way of what could only be made possible by a truce. The Pope emphatically pointed out how much more likely to be observed was an agreement concluded for only a limited time, than one which professed to be a permanency.

To all the Pope’s remonstrances, the justice of which was to be proved but too soon by succeeding events, France and England turned a deaf ear. Leo yielded on the point of the Turkish war, bitterly lamenting that Wolsey’s League deprived the Holy See of the office of universal arbitrator; for, by the vagueness of its outlines, the indefinite duration of the proposed peace made any positive results of a Crusade doubtful.

Campeggio, who, after consenting to share his legatine powers with Wolsey had at last been allowed to land in England on the 29th of July, had proceeded to London and was there witness of his rival’s triumph. At the beginning of October, “on account of the danger from Turkey”, there was finally concluded an alliance between England and France.

Leo’s hope of seeing a universal league of peace guaranteed by the Holy See was destroyed, and Wolsey with his counter-project had conquered. A great blow was thus struck at the international position of the Papacy. How painful Wolsey's proceedings were to Leo X is shown by a letter from Cardinal Medici to Campeggio, written on the 6th of October, 1518. With great displeasure”, he says, “has His Holiness learned that Wolsey has set aside the proposal of a five years' truce, because he does not wish to leave the final position of affairs in the hands of the Pope. No Christian— far less a Cardinal should venture to express himself in that way, and least of all Wolsey, who has received so many honours and favours from the Holy Father. From this we can see what the Holy See and the Pope have to expect from the English Chancellor”.

At last the Pope saw before him no alternative except to ratify the London agreement. This he did finally on the 31st of December, 1518, with, however, the proviso that throughout all the arrangements the liberties of the Holy See were to be respected.

At the same time that Wolsey carried off his great diplomatic victory over Leo X, news reached Rome of the closing of the German Diet, at which Cardinal Cajetan, as Papal Legate, had had to defend the arrangements as to the Crusade.

Cajetan, besides being the bearer of a courteous Brief, had with him, for the Emperor Maximilian, the Hat and Sword, consecrated martial insignia which the Supreme Pontiff was wont to send on extraordinary occasions to the most prominent princes. But Cajetan’s mission was made unpleasant by the fact that the Emperor’s ambitious adviser, Cardinal Lang, forbade him to enter the country until Leo X had issued his own appointment as co-legate, which had been agreed to on the 17th of May. Therefore, it was not until the 7th of July that he arrived at Augsburg, where he was solemnly received by the Emperor and the other princes.

When the blessed weapons were presented to him, Maximilian replied that, in spite of his age, he would, “under the protection of the helmet of the Spirit and the sword of Faith, join without fear in the expedition against the infidel”. Four days later, Cajetan, in a fluent Latin discourse, proved before the assembled States the urgent necessity of a war against the Turks, and of the proposals laid down by the Pope for this end. He pointed out emphatically that Germany was in greater danger from the enemy of Christianity than any other country. The proposal he made was that for three years the clergy should pay a tenth, and the well-to-do laity a twentieth, of their income, and that as to the remainder of the population every fifty house holders should provide one soldier for the Holy War. He gave the fullest guarantees as to the proper disposal of the money thus raised ; for all in Rome knew well enough that the States of Germany were less inclined than ever before to make financial sacrifices, and were possessed by the idea that the tithes and other Crusade funds were being raised for the enrichment of the Medici. Therefore Cardinal Farnese had been instructed to observe the greatest caution in handling financial matters, and to avoid everything which could feed the suspicion that there was any other possible destination for the Crusade money than the Crusade itself. That Cajetan was instructed in a similar manner can be seen clearly by his cautious way of proceeding. He emphatically declared that it was left entirely to the Germans themselves to claim, receive, and dispose of the money in their own way. The money was to be devoted entirely to the Crusade, and if the Holy War did not take place within a given time, the money would be returned. Whatever might be said, the Pope wanted none of the money raised, and the disposal of the war funds was to remain exclusively with the German States.

The answer which the Emperor made to this shows that the ever-needy monarch was not pleased with the Pope's disclaimer of any intention of controlling the funds raised, for this cut off all possibility of retaining a portion of them for himself. Therefore Maximilian submitted the following proposal to the States:— If it seemed to them that the method of raising the money among the clergy and laity proposed by the Legate was not a wise one, he would suggest, as an alternative, that each person who went to Holy Communion during the next three years should contribute what he was able according to the dictates of his conscience.

The States eagerly adopted this proposal, and all adverse representations from the Legate, warmly supported by the Polish envoy, proved vain. The end of a lengthy conference was that on the 27th of August Cajetan's proposals were vetoed by the States. The reason they gave was the alleged grievance of the Germans against the Holy See. After a lively description of the impoverishment of Germany by war and other misfortunes, it was proclaimed that the opinion of the people of the land was universally adverse to the present mode of raising money. The common impression was that great sums of money, whether for Crusade or indulgences, would be taken out of Germany under any circumstances, whether the Turkish war was carried out or not. This conviction gave birth to great distrust. The nation was also burdened with annates, increased and extended by confirmation fees and endless other fees for succession and reserved rights. The Concordat was violated, the right of patronage encroached on, and greater and lesser benefices conferred on foreigners. All this had given rise in Germany to such distrust and indignation that any further burden seemed to be out of the question.

In these grievances we can hear the echo of the violent anti-curial feeling which had taken possession of all, not only of the younger generation of humanists, but of the whole German people. There were general complaints of the violation of the Concordat, of the amount of the annates, of the severity of the chancery laws, and of the benefice-hunting which was encouraged by the Pope. The more the people thought that they were victimized financially, so much the more acute was the antipathy to any question of raising money. In this the clergy were quite agreed with the laity. This hostile state of mind was aggravated by malicious pamphlets, the authors of which hid themselves under cover of anonymity. One of these declared openly that the real Turk lived in Italy, and that this “hound of hell” could be appeased only by streams of gold. “From his own dominions”, says this poisoned pamphlet, which is redolent of the most violent invective against Rome, “streams of wealth flow in to the Pope as to no other Christian prince; yet we have to pay for palliums, and send asses laden with gold to Rome, and exchange gold for corn, and rest content with blood-lettings—pardon me, I mean with indulgences! Woe to this monster of avarice which is never satisfied! The craftiness of the Florentine discovers a thousand devices, each one more execrable than the last. Let German freedom be mindful not to become tributary, and not to pay tenths”.

Still more violent in its expressions is a memorandum written apparently by Johann von Vlatten, and presented to the States in the name of the clergy of Liege. The impression made by it can be seen by the judgment which the deputies of the Frankfort Diet passed on it: “So much violence, deceit, and roguery—disguised though it may be in beautiful Latin—is at the present time practised in Rome by the wickedness of Popes and their familiars and courtiers, that the grievances are retailed with a gusto never before known”

In face of the anti-curial feeling thus stirred up, Cajetan’s efforts to carry out his mission could not fail to be fruitless. However little cause existed this time to doubt the disinterestedness of the Pope or his wish to have nothing to do with the money raised, the States persisted in their assertion that his only object was to receive the money into his own hands. Leo complained bitterly over the Legate’s report to this effect. He lamented the dissemination of false views as to his intentions, and of calumnies against the Holy See. He wished to refute these by his actions, so that the calumniators might see for themselves that he had no thought of appropriating the Crusade levies, but intended to leave their disposal entirely to foreign hands. Whether, under the circumstances, and considering the anti-Papal feeling of the Diet, the Pope's representative thought it expedient to pass on these complaints, is doubtful. His words would have made no impression. Even the alarming news which reached Rome at this time, that Hungary was threatened with an attack from the Turks, which Leo used as a lever when pressing his appeal for help to Maximilian, Charles, Francis, and Henry, though it caused fear, did not act as an inducement to these princes to assist Christendom at the cost of any sacrifice to themselves. When better news followed, the balance of opinion swung back, and the Turkish scare was jeered at.

On the 14th of September the States delivered to the Emperor the reply that they must confer with their subjects on the matter of any money grant for the Crusade. At the same time they requested His Majesty to treat with Cajetan about the observance of the Concordat and the matter of annates. Maximilian agreed on this point. As regarded the Turkish war-tax, the States firmly adhered to their resolution that the tenth of a florin should be paid by each person who went to Holy Communion during the next three years. But they repeated that, even as regarded this concession, they must confer with their subjects! At the same time they reiterated their complaints against the Roman See, and demanded redress. Cajetan explained that the proposed method of raising money was at once too insecure and too insignificant; but that he was unable to give his final decision before the reply of the States was put into writing. This was on the 20th of September. Thereupon both princes and States left the Diet, so that no one remained who was able to give the reply demanded by the Legate.

A special memorandum was prepared in Rome in answer to the complaints brought by the States against the Apostolic See. The introduction to this remarkable document acknowledged with astute diplomacy the readiness of the Germans to support the Crusade; though it was urged as of paramount necessity that before the assembly of the next Diet, the princes should be assured of the con sent of the States. The memorandum sought to reconcile conflicting opinions. If, it urged, it were true that Germany was enfeebled by famine and plague, these evils should not keep the people back from raising a Crusade, but should on the contrary spur them on to the enterprise, for their mis fortunes were a warning to them from heaven. To the reproach that in times past the Crusade funds had been turned to other purposes, it was replied that the present Pope was not answerable for the misdeeds of his predecessors: moreover, even when he was Cardinal, he had known by personal observation that the money collected abroad for the raising of a Crusade had never reached Rome. But the plan which had been proposed this time regarding the Crusade funds gave every security against abuse. As regarded the annates, there was no ground for complaint against the Pope, for they were paid only once in the lifetime of each prelate, whereas the holders of all churches and benefices were bound to pay the decima to the Pope. As regarded the newly instituted offices, there was no ground for complaint, as by these measures no one was injured except the Pope himself, who allotted a portion of his own income to the colleges of the newly appointed officiales.

To the reproach about the expectancies and reservations, it was replied by pointing out that these had been practised from time immemorial in Rome, and that the present Pope had introduced nothing new. In the same way the complaints against the chancery laws and granting of benefices were disposed of. As regarded the derogation of lay patronage, the present Pope had acted more circumspectly than his predecessors. As to the violation of the Concordat, it must be shown wherein it had not been observed, except for just and honourable reasons and at the request of the Emperor. He would willingly do away with other “extraordinary burdens”, but he could not possibly allow the liberty of the Holy See to be prejudiced at the will of the irresponsible and easily-led multitude. In conclusion, the importance of a war against the infidel was reiterated, and the Legates were exhorted to leave nothing undone to incline the thoughts of princes and States towards undertaking a Crusade ; as regarded these, they were to do their best to refute unjust accusations, and assure them that the Pope was willing to give up not only annates and all monies hitherto paid, but even his life, for the cause of Christianity.

On the 3rd of October Cardinal Cajetan was directed to leave the Imperial court only when all hopes of attaining his object had vanished. It is a matter of uncertainty whether in Rome, as in Germany, men pretended to be not altogether dissatisfied with the result of the Diet, or whether they were in the main quite satisfied. Certain hopes had, it is true, to be completely abandoned, particularly as the Emperor had at once agreed to the five years’ truce, and promised to promote the Turkish war. These concessions were connected with the Emperor’s efforts to procure for his grandson Charles V the succession to the Empire.

This important question came more and more prominently into the foreground. In order to gain the favour of the Pope in this matter, Maximilian and Charles, as well as their rival Francis I, manifested their willingness, nay, their desire, to carry on a Holy War against the infidel. But, at least on the part of Francis, these offers of assistance were not meant seriously, however emphatic his protestations that before three years had passed he would be in Constantinople or die in the attempt.

Charles's intentions seem to have been more sincere. In a submissive letter of the 20th of November, he declared his desire to devote all that he had to the great undertaking. But it was doubtful whether the young sovereign would be in a position to keep his sweeping promises. The deep-rooted opposition of the Spanish clergy to the raising of a Crusade tax, as well as the many other difficulties with which Charles was beset on all sides, might have dashed the hopes of even such optimists as Egidio Canisio. But then came the question of the election, which swallowed up Charles’s finances. Roman diplomacy also was soon so taken up by the same question, that the matter of the Crusade fell quite into the background.

CHAPTER VI.

Leo X and the Imperial Succession.