THE GREEK REVOLUTION.

 

CHAPTER XIII.

THE SIEGE OF MESOLONGHI.

 

“ Pride points the path that leads to liberty.

Back to the struggle, baffled in the strife,

War, war is still their cry—war even to the knife.”

 

 

The second siege of Mesolonghi is the most glorious military operation of the Greek Revolution : it is also one of the most characteristic of the moral and political condition of the nation, for it exhibits the invincible energy of the people in strong contrast with the inefficiency of the military chiefs, and the inertness and ignorance of the members of the government. Never was greater courage and constancy displayed by the population of a besieged town; rarely has less science been shown by combatants, at a time when military science formed the chief element of success in warfare.

Greek patriotism seemed to have concentrated itself within the walls of Mesolonghi. Elsewhere hostilities languished. While the citizens of a small town, the fishermen of a shallow lagoon, and the peasants of a desolated district, sustained the vigorous attack of a determined enemy, the fleets and armies wasted their time and their strength in trifling and desultory operations. An undisciplined population performed the duty of a trained garrison. Here, therefore, the valour of the individual demands a record in history. Yet, though private deeds of heroism were of daily occurrence, the historian shrinks from selecting the acts of heroism, and the names of the warriors that deserve pre-eminence. All within the town seemed to be inspired by the warmest love for political liberty and national independence, and all proved that they were ready to guarantee the sincerity of their feeling with the sacrifice of their lives.

Reshid Pasha of Joannina, who, it has been already said, was generally called Kiutayhé by the Greeks and Albanians, had distinguished himself at the battle of Petta. When he assumed the command of the Othoman forces destined to invade Western Greece in the year 1825, much was expected by the sultan from his known firmness and ability. On the 6th of April he seized the pass of Makrynoros, which the Greek chieftains neglected to defend, and where the Greek government had only stationed a few guards under the command of Nothi Botzares, a veteran Suliot. No three hundred Greeks were now found to make an effort for the defence of these Western Thermopylae. Reshid advanced through Acarnania without encountering any opposition. The inhabitants fled before him. Many, with their flocks and herds, found shelter under the English flag in Calamo, where the poor were maintained by rations from the British government; others retired to Mesolonghi, and formed part of the garrison which defended that place. On the 27th of April, Reshid established his headquarters in the plain, and two days afterwards he opened his first parallel against Mesolonghi, at a distance of about six hundred yards from the walls. His force then consisted of only six thousand men and three guns.

Mesolonghi was in a good state of defence. An earthen rampart of two thousand three hundred yards in length extended from the waters of the lagoon across the promontory on which the town was built. This rampart was partly faced with masonry, flanked by two bastions near the centre, strengthened towards its eastern extremity by a lunette and a tenaille, and protected where it joined the lagoon to the west by a battery on an islet called Marmaro, distant about two hundred yards from the angle of the place. In front of the rampart a muddy ditch, not easy to pass, separated the fortress from the adjoining plain. Forty­eight guns and four mortars were mounted in battery. The garrison consisted of four thousand soldiers and armed peasants, and one thousand citizens and boat­men. The place was well supplied with provisions and ammunition at the commencement of the siege, but there were upwards of twelve thousand persons to feed within the walls.

The army of Reshid never exceeded ten thousand troops, and a considerable part of it never entered the plain of Mesolonghi, for he was obliged to employ about two thousand men in guarding a line of stations from Makrynoros and Karavanserai, on the Ambracian Gulf, to Kakiscala on the Gulf of Patras, in order to keep open bis communications with Arta, Previsa, Lepanto, and Patras. But in addition to his troops, Reshid was accompanied by three thousand pioneers, muleteers, and camp-followers. It was not until the commencement of June that the besiegers obtained a supply of artillery from Patras, which increased their force to eight guns and four mortars. For several weeks, therefore, Reshid trusted more to the spade than to his fire, and during this time he pushed forward his approaches with indefatigable industry. Early in June he had advanced to within thirty yards of the bastion Franklin, which covered the western side of the walls. But his ammunition was then so much reduced that he was compelled to fire stones from his mortars instead of shells.

While the Turks were working at their approaches, the Greeks constructed traverses and erected new batteries.

Little progress had been made in the active operations of the siege, when a Greek squadron of seven sail arrived off Mesolonghi on the 10th of June. It encouraged the besieged by announcing that Miaoulis would soon make his appearance with a large fleet, and by landing considerable supplies of provisions and ammunition. The garrison, confident of success, began to make frequent and vigorous sorties. In one of these, Routsos, a native of Mesolonghi, was taken prisoner by the Turks, and was terrified into revealing to the enemy the position of the subterraneous aqueducts which supplied the town with water. The supply was immediately cut off, but fortunately the besieged found fresh water in abundance by digging new wells, so that very little inconvenience was felt, even during the greatest heat of summer, from the destruction of the a. aqueducts. The besiegers, who had pushed on their operations with great activity, at last made an attempt to carry the islet of Marmoras by assault, which was repulsed, and entailed on them a severe loss.

On the 10th of July the Greeks met with their first great disappointment. The defenders of Mesolonghi were looking forward to the arrival of the fleet, which they fondly expected would compel Reshid to raise the siege. Several vessels were descried in the offing. Their joy reached the highest pitch, and they overwhelmed the advanced-guard of the besiegers, which consisted of Albanians, with insulting boasts. Soon, however, fresh ships hove in sight, and it was evident that the fleet was too numerous and the ships too large to be Greek. The red flag became visible both to Turks and Greeks, and gradually the broad white streaks on the hulls and the numerous ports showed that the fleet was that of the capitan-pasha. The besieged were greatly depressed, but their constancy was unshaken.

Reshid now assumed the offensive with great vigour. He introduced a number of flat-bottomed boats into the lagoon, gained possession of the islands of Aghiosostis and Prokopanistos, which the Mesolonghiots had neglected to fortify, and completely invested the place both by sea and land. On the 28th of July he made a determined attack on the bastion Botzares, and on the 2d of August he renewed the assault by a still more furious attempt to storm the bastion Franklin, in which a breach had been opened by his artillery; but both these attacks were gallantly repulsed.

Before the assault on the bastion Franklin, Reshid offered terms of capitulation to the garrison of Mesolonghi. His offers were rejected, and, to revenge his defeat, he ordered Routsos and some other prisoners to be beheaded before the walls. Reshid had expected to carry Mesolonghi by assault before the arrival of the Greek fleet, of whose approach he had been informed by the cruisers of the capitan-pasha before it was known to the besieged.

The Greek fleet, consisting of forty sail of the best ships which Greece still possessed, under the command of Miaoulis, Saktures, Kolandrutzos, and Apostales, was descried from Mesolonghi on the 3d of August. Next day the Othoman fleet manoeuvred to obtain an advantageous position. The Hydriot squadron in the end succeeded in getting the weather-gage of the advanced ships of the Turks; but the Greeks, in spite of this success, could not break the line of the main division, which consisted of twenty-two sail. Three fire-ships were launched in succession against the capitan-pasha’s flag-ship; but the Turks no longer entertained a senseless fear of these engines of attack, and they manoeuvred so well that the blazing vessels drifted harmless to leeward without forcing them to break their line of battle. Khosreff was, nevertheless, so intimidated by the determined manner in which the Greeks directed their attacks against his flag, that he avoided a second engagement. He claimed the victory in this indecisive engagement merely because he had escaped defeat, and he made his orders to effect a prompt junction with the Egyptian fleet a pretext for sailing immediately for Alexandria. His cowardice left the flotilla of Reshid in the lagoon without support, and as the Greeks had captured one of the transports laden with powder and shells for the army before Mesolonghi, the besiegers were again inadequately supplied with ammunition for their mortars.

Miaoulis aided the Mesolonghiots in driving the Turks from all the posts they occupied in the lagoons, and in destroying their flotilla. Five of the flat-bottomed boats were captured by the Greeks, who recovered the command of the whole lagoon. The Greek fleet then sailed in pursuit of the capitan-pasha, leaving eight ships to keep open the communications between the besieged and the Ionian Islands, and to prevent any supplies being sent by sea to the besieging army.

Reshid was now placed in a very difficult position. He received his supplies of provisions with irregularity, and his stores of ammunition were so scanty that he could not keep up a continuous fire from his guns, and was compelled to abandon the hope of carrying the place by an artillery attack. He had no money to pay his troops, and was unable to prevent the Albanians from returning home, though he allowed all who remained double rations. The besieged daily expected to hear that a Greek army had occupied the passes in the rear of Reshid, and felt confident that he would be forced to raise the siege at the approach of winter. If he persisted in maintaining his position, it was thought that his army must perish of want and disease. The armatoli of Romelia, who had quitted the Peloponnesus after their defeats at Navarin, were said to be marching into the mountains behind Lepanto, whose rugged surface is familiar to classic readers from the description which Thucydides has left us of the destruction of the Athenian army under Demosthenes.

Reshid weighed his own resources and estimated the activity of the Greek irregulars with sagacity. His guns could not render him much service, but he still believed that the spade would enable him to gain possession of Mesolonghi before winter. He set his army to raise a mound by heaping up earth, and this primitive work was carried forward to the walls of the place in defiance of every effort which the besieged made to interrupt the new mode of attack. So strange a revival of the siege operations of the ancients excited the ridicule of the Greeks. They called the work “the dyke of union,” in allusion to the mound which Alexander the Great constructed at the siege of Tyre. The mound was commenced at about a hundred and sixty yards from the salient angle of the bastion Franklin, and it made an obtuse angle as it approached the place. It was from five to eight yards broad at the base, and so high as to overlook the ramparts of the besieged. By indefatigable perseverance, and after much severe fighting in the trenches, the Turks carried the mound to the ditch, filled up the ditch, and stormed the bastion Franklin. Even then they could not effect an entry into the place, for the Greeks had cut off this bastion from all communication with the rest of the defences, and they soon erected batteries which completely commanded it. The besieged then became the assailants, and after a desperate struggle they drove the Turks from their recent conquest. On the 31st of August all the ground they had lost was regained, and they prepared for a great effort against the mound. Several sorties were made in order to obtain exact knowledge of the enemy’s trenches. At last, on the 21st of September, a great sortie was made by the whole garrison. The Turkish camp was attacked in several places with such fury that Reshid was unable to conjecture against what point the principal force was directed, lie was in danger of seeing his batteries stormed and his guns spiked. The fighting was severe, but the Greeks carried the works that protected the head of the mound, and maintained possession of their conquest until they had levelled that part of it which threatened their defences. While a. d. 1825. every spade in Mesolonghi was destroying the mound, bodies of troops cleared the trenches, and prevented the enemy from interrupting the work. As the Greeks had foreseen, rain soon rendered it impossible for Reshid to repair the damage his works had sustained.

The garrison of Mesolonghi received considerable reinforcements after the capitan-pasha’s departure. At the end of September it still amounted to four thousand five hundred men, and was much more efficient than at the commencement of the siege. Hitherto the fire of the Turkish artillery had been so desultory and so ill directed, that not more than one hundred persons had been killed and wounded in the place. This trifling loss during a six months’ siege induced the Greeks to form a very erroneous idea of the efficiency of siege-artillery, while the facility with which provisions and ammunition had been introduced inspired them with a blind confidence in their naval superiority. The only severe loss they had suffered had been in their sorties, and in these they had hitherto been almost invariably the victors.

The operations of the Greek army to the north of the Isthmus of Corinth were feeble, desultory, and unsuccessful. The leaders could not be prevailed upon to act in concert. Party intrigues, personal jealousies, and sordid avidity, prevented them from combining at a time when it was evident that a vigorous effort would have delivered Mesolonghi. Northern Greece was then occupied by a numerous body of armatoli. Even in the year 1830, after the losses sustained at Mesolonghi and Athens, Capodistrias assembled six thousand veterans belonging to this army. By a bold advance, the communications of Reshid with his resources in Arta, Previsa, and Joannina might have been cut off. The treason of Odysseus has been urged as an apology for the inactivity of the Romeliots at the opening of the campaign of 1825, but it ought to have excited them to increase their exertions, as it rendered their services more necessary. But very little patriotism was displayed this year by the armatoli, either before or after the treason of Odysseus.

Odysseus was a man of considerable ability, but he was too selfish to become a dangerous enemy to a national cause; and when he became openly a traitor, his career was soon terminated. He would not trust himself in the power of the Turks, and the Turks knew him so well that they would afford him no assistance unless he openly joined their army. In trying to over­reach everybody he overreached himself, and was easily overpowered. On the 19th of April 1825 he surrendered himself a prisoner to Goura at Livanates.

The treason of Odysseus is the most celebrated instance of treachery among the Greeks during their Revolution. But it derives its importance more from the previous fame of the traitor, and from his tragic end in the Acropolis of Athens, than from the singularity and baseness of his conduct. Many chiefs of armatoli, who, like Odysseus, had been bred up in the service and imbibed the moral corruption of Ali of Joannina, felt like Albanian mercenaries rather than Greek patriots. Several committed acts of treason : Gogos, Varnakiottes, Rhangos, Zongas, Valtinas, and the Moreot captain Nenekos, were all as guilty as, some of them even more guilty than, Odysseus. Gogos was a far greater criminal, and his treachery on the field of Petta inflicted a deeper wound on Greece.

Odysseus never attached any importance to political independence and national liberty. His ambition was to ape the tyranny of Ali in a small sphere. His conduct from the commencement of the Revolution testified that he had no confidence in its ultimate success. He viewed it as a temporary revolt, which he might render conducive to his own interests. He attempted at times to make use of popular feelings which he did not understand, and whose strength he was of course unable to estimate. His opinions prepared him to act the traitor, but he was so far from being a man of a daring character, that a prudent government might have retained him in its service, and found in him a useful instrument, for he possessed more administrative capacity than most of the Romeliot chiefs. Kolettes’s influence caused Konduriottes’s government to leave him without employment, and to stop the pay and rations of the soldiers who followed his banner. When he saw chiefs of inferior rank, who had previously served under his orders, named captains of districts, and observed that every soldier who quitted his band received a reward, he became alarmed for his personal safety. He believed that Kolettes designed to treat him as he had treated Noutzas and Palaskas, and fear made him a traitor. He opened a negotiation with the Turks, with the hope of securing to himself a capitanlik in Eastern Greece like those held by Gogos and Varnakiottes in Western Greece, but the Turks would not trust him unless he joined them openly. When forced to choose his side, it was fear of Kolettes which decided his conduct. A small body of Mussulman Albanians was then sent to his aid, but his movements had been long watched, and he was quickly surrounded by superior numbers. Goura, his former lieutenant, commanded his assailants, and to him he surrendered himself a prisoner. Goura did not deliver him up to the vengeance of the members of the government. He was kept prisoner in the Acropolis until the disastrous measures of Konduriottes and Kolettes roused general indignation. Goura then feared that Odysseus might escape, and regain his former power. Interest prevailed over gratitude, and Odysseus was murdered on the night of 16th July. After the murder, his body was thrown from the Frank tower in the southern wing of the Propylaea, in order to give credit to the assertion that he perished by a fall in attempting to escape. Thus one of the most astute of the Greek chiefs fell a victim to the policy of a rude Albanian soldier whom he had raised to a high rank. And the son of that Andrutsos, who first raised the standard of revolt against the Othomans in 1769, is the traitor at whose name the finger of scorn is pointed by every Greek. Odysseus perished like his patron and model, Ali of Joannina, a sacrifice to his own selfishness; and he will be execrated as long as the memory of the Greek Revolution shall endure.

Tricoupi mentions that Goura tortured his benefactor to learn where his treasures were concealed. Odysseus fortified a cavern near Velitza (Tithorea), of which Trelawney, who married his sister, kept possession until he was severely wounded by Fenton and Whitcombe, who were suborned by agents of the Greek government to assassinate him. Tricoupi erroneously supposes this cavern to be the Corycian Cave, and quotes Pausanias, who proves the contrary.

On the 17th April 1825, Abbas Pasha crossed the Sperchius with two thousand men and two guns. The surrender of Odysseus, who had been expected to make a vigorous diversion, prevented this small force from advancing southward until the kehaya of Reshid marched into the heart of Etolia with about the same number of chosen Albanians. The kehaya routed the Greek captain Saphaka, who attempted to oppose his progress, occupied Vetrinitza, defeated the Greeks a second time at Pentornea, and entered Salona in triumph, where he was joined by Abbas Pasha at the end of May.

About the same time, the Romeliot troops, who had abandoned the Morea after their defeat by Ibrahim, formed a camp at Dystomo, round which large bodies of Greek troops rallied. This force arrested the advance of the Turks, who were inferior in number. But anarchy prevailed among the Greek leaders, and prevented them from availing themselves of their superiority. Abbas Pasha was allowed to establish himself at Salona, and no attempt was made to raise the siege of Mesolonghi. The military operations of the Greeks in continental Greece during the whole campaign of 1825 were conducted in the same desultory and feeble manner as in the Peloponnesus.

Goura was commissioned by the Greek government to enrol six thousand veteran soldiers. He assumed the chief command at Dystomo, where the troops under his orders drew daily eleven thousand six hundred rations, though their number hardly ever exceeded three thousand men. A trade in provisions was openly carried on both by the officers and the soldiers. They sold their surplus rations to the families of the peasants, whom patriotism had induced to abandon their villages rather than submit to the Turks.

While the advanced-guard of the army of Eastern Greece skirmished with the Turks at Salona, a body of troops under Karaiskaki and Djavellas marched into Western Greece. Karaiskaki threw himself into the rear of Reshid’s position. Djavellas forced his way into Mesolonghi on the 19th of August. The summer was consumed in trifling skirmishes, in struggles for booty, or in contests of military rivalry. The country was laid waste, and truth compels the historian to record that the cultivators of the soil suffered quite as much from the rapacity of their countrymen who came to defend them, as from the Turks who came to plunder them. The Turks occupied Salona until the 6th of November, when it is the immemorial custom of the Albanian and Turkish militia to return home, for the habits of the timariot system are still preserved.

The victory which the garrison of Mesolonghi obtained over the besiegers on the 21st of September, convinced Reshid that he must think rather of defending his own position from the sorties of the Greeks than of prosecuting the siege. He had almost matured his plan when a vigorous sortie of the besieged, on the 13th of October, inflicted a severe loss on his army, and accelerated his retreat from the trenches. He immediately fortified the position which he had selected for his camp at the foot of Mount Zygos, and on the 17th of October withdrew the remains of his army to this new station. His cavalry enabled him to keep open his communications with Krioneri, where his supplies of provisions were usually landed. He now anxiously awaited the return of the capitan-pasha, and the reinforcements which Ibrahim Pasha was about to bring. But with all his vigour and ability, had the Greeks employed the superiority which they possessed at this time with skill, courage, and unanimity, his position might have been rendered untenable long before assistance could arrive. He had not now more than three thousand infantry and six hundred cavalry fit for service. The garrison of Mesolonghi was more numerous, and a considerable body of Greek troops under Karaiskaki and other captains had occupied strong positions in his rear. Nothing but the irreconcilable jealousies of the Greek chieftains and their military ignorance, which prevented their executing any combined operations, saved Reshid’s army from destruction. The pasha remained for a month in this dangerous situation, liable to be attacked by an overwhelming force at any moment, but determined to persist in his enterprise—to take Mesolonghi, or perish before its walls.

The Greeks amused themselves with destroying the works of the besiegers; but their confidence in their ultimate success was so great that they executed even this triumphant labour with extreme carelessness. They also committed a blamable oversight in not transporting to Mesolonghi a supply of grain which had been collected in magazines on the western coast of the Morea, consisting of the produce of the land-tax from the rich plains of Elis and Achaia. The sea was open, and these supplies might have been removed without difficulty.

The Othoman fleet returned to Patras on the 18th of November, saved Reshid’s army from starvation, and furnished him some reinforcements and ample supplies of ammunition. The Greek fleet, which ought to have engaged the Othoman in the waters of Patras, did not reach the entrance of the gulf until the capitan-pasha had terminated the delicate operation of landing stores at Krioneri.

A series of naval engagements took place, in which the Turks succeeded in baffling the attempts of the Greeks to cut off their straggling ships and to capture their transports. Both parties boasted of their success. The capitan-pasha kept open his communications with Patras and Krioneri. Miaoulis threw supplies into Mesolonghi, and kept open its communications with the Ionian Islands. The real victory remained with the Turks; their fleet kept its station at Patras. The Greek fleet quitted the witters of Mesolonghi on the 4th December 1825, and returned to Hydra.

A new and more formidable enemy now appeared before Mesolonghi. The campaign in the Peloponnesus had proved that neither the courage of the armatoli nor the stratagems of the klephts were a match for the discipline and tactics of the Egyptians; and Ibrahim now advanced to attack the brave garrison of Mesolonghi, confident of success. He encountered no opposition in his march from Navarin to Patras. The pass of Kleidi was left unguarded, and he captured large magazines of grain which the collectors of the tenths had stored at Agoulinitza, Pyrgos, and Gastouni, and which ought either to have been previously transported to Mesolonghi or now destroyed. These supplies proved of great use to Ibrahim’s army during the siege.

On the 29th of November a council of war was held by the Othoman pashas at Lepanto, to settle the plan of their operations. The capitan-pasha, Ibrahim, Beshid, and Yussuf were present, and they engaged mutually to support one another as much as lay in their power, to act always with unanimity, and to prosecute the siege with vigour. They kept their promises better than the Greek chiefs usually kept theirs. Yussuf at this meeting pointed out the measures which had enabled him to defend Patras for nearly five years. He soon after quitted Greece, being raised to the rank of pasha of Magnesia as a reward for his prudence and valour.

The month of December was employed by Ibrahim in forming magazines at Krioneri, and bringing up ammunition to his camp before Mesolonghi. Heavy rains rendered it impossible to work at the trenches. The whole plain, from the walls of the town to the banks of the Fidari, was under water, or formed a wide expanse of mud and marsh. The Egyptian soldiers laboured indefatigably, and the order which prevailed in their camp astonished. Reshid, who was said to have felt some irritation when he found that Ibrahim never asked him for any assistance or advice, but carried on his own operations with unceasing activity and perfect independence. A horrid act of cruelty, perpetrated by Reshid, was ascribed to an explosion of his suppressed rage. A priest, two women, and three boys, were impaled by his order before the wails of Mesolonghi, because they had conveyed intelligence to their relatives in the besieged town.

The Greek government became at last sensible that it had too long neglected the defence of Mesolonghi. It had often announced that Reshid was about to raise the siege, and, believing its own sayings, it had neglected to do anything to force him to retreat. It now learned with surprise that Reshid’s camp was well supplied with provisions; that the garrison of Mesolonghi was in want of ammunition; and that the Greek troops sent to cut off the supplies of the Turks were in danger of starvation. An attempt was made to raise money by selling national lands; but as these lands were already mortgaged to the English bond­holders, and the sale of national lands was expressly prohibited by national assemblies, the bad faith of the members of the government was too apparent for Greeks to part with their money on such security. The conduct of the members of the executive body was in this case both impolitic and dishonest. It proved that they were dishonourable enough to violate every national engagement, and so incapable that they made a display of their bad faith without any profit. A sum sufficient to enable a Greek fleet to put to sea was soon raised by private subscription. Individual patriotism has generally displayed itself on every emergency in Greece, when not thwarted by the action of the government. Many Greeks who were not wealthy subscribed largely; ministers of state, shipowners, chieftains, and officials, who had enriched themselves with the produce of the English loans, or by farming taxes, endeavoured to conceal their wealth by their illiberality.

The sums collected equipped twenty Hydriot and four Psarian ships. On the 21st of January 1826 these vessels, reinforced by three Spetziot brigs which had remained in the waters of Mesolonghi, forced the Turkish cruisers to retire under the guns of Patras, and enabled the besieged to communicate directly with the Ionian Islands, and lay in stores of provisions and ammunition for two months. The crews of the Greek ships were only paid in advance for a single month. The spirit of patriotism was not then powerful in the Albanian islands; and the Hydriot sailors, in order to escape being obliged to give their services to their country for a single hour gratuitously, sailed from  Mesolonghi, after remaining in its waters only a fort-night.

Three weeks after the departure of the Greek ships, Ibrahim commenced active operations. On the 25th of February he opened his fire from batteries mounting forty pieces of artillery, and on the 27th and 28th two unsuccessful attempts were made to storm the walls by the united forces of the Turks and Egyptians. The gallant resistance of the besieged convinced Ibrahim that it would cost too much to take the place by storm, unless he could attack it by sea as well as by land. He soon launched a flotilla of thirty-two flat-bottomed boats, and obtained the complete command of the lagoon. Vasiladi, the fort which commanded the entrance of the lagoon which leads from the sea directly to the town, was taken by storm on the 9th of March 1826, and Anatolikon capitulated on the 13th.

The Greeks now perceived that the progress of the besiegers, although not very rapid, would soon render the place untenable. The supplies of provisions re­ceived in January, added to what was then in the public magazines, ought to have furnished abundant rations to the whole population until the end of April; but these stores were wasted by the rapacity of the soldiery. Ibrahim and Reshid contrived to be well informed of everything that was said or done within the walls of Mesolonghi, and they learned with pleasure that watchfulness and patience would soon force the Greeks to surrender the place or to die of hunger.

The moment appeared favourable for offering a capitulation, but the besieged rejected all negotiation with disdain. Sir Frederic Adam, the Lord High Commissioner in the Ionian Islands, convinced that the loss of Vasiladi and Anatolikon rendered the fall of Mesolonghi inevitable, endeavoured to prevent farther bloodshed. He visited Krioneri in a British ship-of-war, and offered his mediation. But the two pashas were now sure of their prey, and as the Greeks refused to treat of a capitulation directly with their enemies, Sir Frederic was obliged to retire without effecting anything—an example of the folly of too much zeal in other people’s business. As soon as he was gone, Ibrahim and Reshid sent a written summons to the garrison, pretending that the Greeks had expressed a wish to negotiate terms of capitulation. They offered to allow all the Greek troops to quit Mesolonghi on laying down their arms, and they engaged to permit the inhabitants who desired to leave the town to depart with the garrison; but they declared also, that all those who wished to remain should be allowed to retain possession, of their property, and should enjoy ample protection for themselves and their families. To this summons the Greeks replied, that they had never expressed any wish to capitulate ; that they were determined to defend Mesolonghi to the last drop of their blood; that if the pashas wanted their arms they might come to take them; and that they remitted the issue of the combat to the will of God.

The only post in the lagoon of which the Greeks held possession, was the small islet of Klissova, about a mile from Mesolonghi, to the south-east. This post was defended by a hundred and fifty men under Kitzo Djavellas. The Greeks were advantageously posted,  and protected by a low rampart of earth from the artillery of their assailants; while a low chapel, with an arched roof of stone, served them as a magazine and citadel. On the 6th of April the Albanians of Reshid attacked Klissova. The shallow water prevented even the flat-bottomed boats of the Turks from approaching close to the shore, so that the attacking party was compelled to jump into the sea and wade forward through the deep mud. While the gunboats fired showers of grape, the Greeks kept themselves hid under their earthen rampart; but as soon as the Albanians were in the water, they rose on their knees, and, resting their long guns on the parapet, poured such a well-directed volley on their enemies, that the foremost fell dead or wounded, and the rest recoiled in fear. Several officers were standing up in the boats directing the landing : they offered a conspicuous mark to the best shots among the Greeks, and most of them fell mortally wounded. The Albanians retired in confusion.

Ibrahim then ordered his regular troops to renew the attack. The result was similar; but the Egyptians were led back a second time to the attack, and again retreated under the deadly fire of the Greeks. Seeing the advantage which the defenders of Klissova derived from their position, Ibrahim ought to have abandoned the assault and kept the islet closely blockaded until he could bring up a few mortars. But he was eager to prove that his regulars were superior to the Albanians of Reshid. He therefore ordered Hussein, the conqueror of Kasos, Sphakteria, and Vasiladi, to make a third attack. Hussein led his men bravely on, but as he stood up in his boat giving orders concerning the formation of the storming parties, he was struck by a musket-ball, and fell down mortally wounded. The steady fire of the Greeks prevented the regulars from completing their formation. The men turned and scrambled back into the boats in complete disorder. After this repulse the pashas drew off their troops. Five hundred men were killed or wounded in this vain attempt to storm a sandbank defended by a hundred and fifty good marksmen.

The victory of Klissova was the last success of the Greeks during the siege of Mesolonghi. Provisions began to fail, and rations ceased to be distributed to any but the men who performed service. Yet as relief by sea was hourly expected, the garrison remained firm. At last the Greek fleet made its appearance, but the hope it inspired was soon disappointed. The Turks were in possession of the lagoon, and Miaoulis arrived without any flat-bottomed boats to enable him to penetrate to Mesolonghi. A. feeble attempt was made by the Hydriots on the 13th of April to penetrate into the lagoon by the channel of Petala; but it was easily repulsed, and never renewed. The naval skill of the Greeks no longer insured them the command of the sea, nor did they now possess the heroic enterprise which they had often displayed during the first years of the Revolution. They had refused to adopt any scientific improvements either in their ships or their artillery ; the Turks had done both. Miaoulis entered the waters of Mesolonghi with the same ships as those with which he had combated Kara Ali; the Turkish fleet, which stood out of the Gulf of Lepanto to engage him, was very different in construction and armament from the fleets that sailed from Constantinople in 1821 and 1822. The Turks kept their line of battle, and held their position to windward of the Greeks, exchanging broadsides, and frustrating all the manoeuvres of their enemy to bring on a general action or cut off straggling ships.

On the 15th of April Miaoulis found that the Turks had completely closed the communication with the  lagoon, and held their position between him and the shore. He attempted to throw their line into confusion by sending down a fire-ship on two frigates; but the exposed vessels tacked, kept the weather-gage, and allowed the blazing brulot to drift away to leeward and consume itself ineffectually. Fire-ships had ceased to be a terror to the Turks. The Greek fleet at this time consisted of only thirty sail, and the Turkish of sixty; but at the commencement of the war this disparity would have hardly enabled the Othomans to keep the sea. It now insured them a decided victory. Miaoulis, baffled and cut off from all communication with the besieged, was driven out to sea, and the besieged town was abandoned to its fate. The glory of the Greek navy was tarnished by the tameness with which it declined to close with the enemy, and retreated without an effort to emulate the heroism of the defenders of Mesolonghi.

When the Greek fleet departed, the magazines of Mesolonghi did not contain rations for more than two days. The garrison had now to choose whether it would perish by starvation, capitulate, or cut its way through the besiegers. It resolved to face every danger rather than surrender. The inhabitants who were unable to bear arms, the women, and the children, showed as much patience and courage in this dreadful situation as the veteran soldiers hardened in Turkish warfare. A spirit of Greek heroism, rare in the Greek Revolution—rare even in the history of mankind—pervaded every breast. After deliberate consultation in a numerous assembly, it was resolved to force a passage for the whole population through the besiegers. Many would perish, some might escape; but those who fell and those who escaped would be alike free. The plan adopted for evacuating the town was well devised; but its success was marred by several accidents.

About sunset on the 22d of April 1826 a discharge of musketry was heard by the besieged on the ridge of Zygos. This was a concerted signal to inform the chiefs in Mesolonghi that a body of fifteen hundred armatoli, detached from the camp of Karaiskaki at Platanos, was ready to attack the rear of the Turks and aid the sortie of the besieged. The garrison was mustered in three divisions. Bridges were thrown across the ditch, and breaches were opened in the walls. There were still nine thousand persons in the town, of whom only three thousand were capable of bearing arms. Nearly two thousand men, women, and children were so feeble from age, disease, or starvation, that they were unable to join the sortie. Some of the relations of these helpless individuals voluntarily remained to share their fate. The non-combatants, who were to join the sortie, were drawn up in several bodies, according to the quarters in which they resided, or the chiefs under whose escort they were to march. The Mesolonghiots formed themselves into a separate band. They were less attenuated by fatigue than the rest; but being collected from every quarter of the town, their band was less orderly than the emigrants from the country, who had been disciplined by privation, and accustomed to live and act together during the siege. Most of the women who took part in the sortie dressed themselves in the fustinello, like the Albanians and armatoli, and carried arms like soldiers; most of the children had also loaded pistols in their belts, which many had already learned how to use.

At nine o’clock the bridges were placed in the ditch without noise, and a thousand soldiers crossed and ranged themselves along the covered way. Unfortunately a deserter had informed Ibrahim of the projected sortie, and both he and Reshid, though they  gave little credit to the information that the whole population would attempt to escape, adopted every precaution to repulse any sortie of the garrison. When the non-combatants began to cross the bridges the noise revealed to the Turks the positions in which crowds were assembled, and on these points they opened a terrific fire. Crowds rushed forward to escape the shot. The shrieks of the wounded and the splash of those who were forced from the bridges were unnoticed; and in spite of the enemy’s fire the greater part of the inhabitants crossed the ditch in tolerable order. The Mesolonghiots still lingered behind, retarded by their interests and their feelings. It was no easy sacrifice to quit their property and their relations. For a considerable time the garrison waited patiently for them under a heavy fire. At last the first body of the Mesolonghiots crossed the ditch, and then the troops sprang forward with a loud shout and rushed sword in hand on the Turks.

Never was a charge made more valiantly. The eastern division of the garrison, under Nothi Botzares, struggled forward to gain the road to Bochori; the central division, under Kitzos Djavellas, pushed straight through the enemy’s lines towards the hills ; and the western division, under Makry, strove to gain the road to the Kleisura. All three intended, when clear of the Turks, to effect a junction on the slopes of Zygos, where the road ascends to the monastery of St Simeon.

Almost at the moment when the garrison rushed on the Turks, that portion of the Mesolonghiots which was then on the bridges raised a cry of “back, back.” Great part of the Mesolonghiots stopped, fell back, and returned into the town with the military escort which ought to have formed the rearguard of the sortie. The origin of this ill-timed cry, which weakened the force of the sortie and added to the victims in the place, has excited much unnecessary speculation. It evidently rose among those who were in danger of being forced into the ditch. It was repeated so loudly that it created a panic.

The three leading divisions bore down all opposition. Neither the yataghan of Reshid’s Albanians, nor the bayonet of Ibrahim’s Arabs, could arrest their impetuous attack; and they forced their way through the labyrinth of trenches, dykes, and ditches, with comparatively little loss. Only some women and children, who could not keep up with the column as it rushed forward over the broken ground, were left behind. But for the information which had been given by the traitor, the greater part of the defenders of Mesolonghi would have escaped. In consequence of that information, Ibrahim and Reshid had taken the precaution to send bodies of cavalry to watch the roads leading to Bochori, St Simeon, and Kleisura. The horsemen fell in with Greek columns when they were about a mile beyond the Turkish lines, and were beginning to feel secure. The division of Makry was completely broken by the first charge of the cavalry. The others were thrown into confusion. All suffered severely, yet small bands of the garrison still kept together, and, by keeping up a continuous fire, enabled numbers of women and children to rally under their protection. At last the scattered remnants of the three divisions began to recover some order on reaching the slopes of Zygos, where the irregularities of the ground forced the cavalry to slacken the pursuit.

The fugitives prepared to enjoy a short rest, and endeavoured to assemble the stragglers who had eluded the swords of the horsemen. They thought that the fire they had kept up against the cavalry would draw down the fifteen hundred men of Karaiskaki’s corps to their assistance. While they were thus engaged in giving and expecting succour, a body of Albanians, placed in ambuscade by Reshid to watch the road to the monastery of St Simeon, crept to their vicinity unperceived, and poured a deadly volley into their ranks. Instead of friends to assist them, they had to encounter one thousand mountaineers, well posted, to bar their progress. The Greeks, surprised by unseen enemies, could do nothing but get out of the range of the rifles of the Albanians as far as possible. The Albanians followed and tracked them in order to secure their heads, for which the pashas had promised a high price. The loss of the Greeks was greater at the foot of the hills, where their own troops ought to have insured their safety, than it had been in forcing the enemy’s lines and in resisting the charges of the cavalry. Most of the women and children who had dragged themselves thus far, were so exhausted that they were taken prisoners.

About midnight small parties of the garrison of Mesolonghi, and a few women and children, succeeded in reaching the post occupied by the Greek troops; but instead of fifteen hundred men they found only fifty, and only a very small supply of provisions to relieve their wants. Here they learned also, with dismay, that the camp at Platanos was a prey to the ordinary dissensions and abuses which disgraced the military classes of Greece at this period. The weary fugitives, in order to escape starvation, were soon compelled to continue their march to Platanos. Even there they obtained very little assistance from the chiefs of the armatoli; and when they had rested about a week, they resumed their journey to Salona. Many perished from wounds, disease, and hunger on the road. About fifteen hundred reached Salona during the month of May, straggling thither generally in small bands, and often by very circuitous roads, which they had followed in order to procure food. Of these about thirteen hundred were soldiers; there were several girls in the number of those who escaped, and a few boys under twelve years of age.

As soon as Ibrahim and Reshid found that the greater part of the garrison had evacuated Mesolonghi, they ordered a general assault. Their troops occupied the whole line of the walls without encountering resistance. The Greek soldiers whom wounds or disease had prevented from marching, had established themselves in different buildings. The party which occupied the principal powder-magazine, when surrounded by the Turks, and summoned to surrender, set fire to the powder and perished in the explosion.

It was not until morning dawned that the Turkish officers allowed their men to advance into the interior of the town, though several houses near the walls had been set on fire during the night. A whole day was spent by the conquerors in plundering Mesolonghi. A second powder-magazine was exploded by its defenders, who perished with their assailants. A windmill, which served as a central depot of ammunition, was defended until the 24th of April, when its little garrison, having exhausted their provisions, set fire to the powder, preferring death to captivity.

The loss of the Greeks amounted to four thousand. Ibrahim boasted that the Turks had collected three thousand heads; and it is probable that at least one thousand perished from wounds and starvation beyond the limits which the besiegers examined. The nearest points where the fugitives could find security and rest, were Petala, Kalamos, and Salona. The conquerors took about three thousand prisoners, chiefly women and children. About two thousand escaped; for besides those who reached Salona, a few found refuge in the villages of Etolia, and some of the inhabitants of Mesolonghi and of the surrounding country evaded the Turkish pursuit by wading into the lagoon, and ultimately reached Petala and Kalamos, where they received protection and rations from the British government.

Many deeds of heroism might be recorded. One example deserves to be selected. The Moreot primates have been justly stigmatised as a kind of Christian Turks ; and, as a class, their conduct during the Greek Revolution was marked by ambition and selfishness. Yet a Moreot primate displayed a noble example of the purest patriotism at the fall of Mesolonghi. Papadiamantopulos of Patras, a leading Hetairist, was one of the members of the executive commission intrusted with the administration of Western Greece. In the month of February he visited Zante to hasten the departure of supplies. His friends there urged him to remain. They said that as he was not a soldier he could assist in prolonging the defence of Mesolonghi more effectually by remaining at Zante, to avail himself of every opportunity of sending over supplies, than by serving in the besieged town. But the noble old gentleman silenced every entreaty by the simple observation: “I invited my countrymen to take up arms against the Turks, and I swore to live and die with them. This is the hour to keep my promise.” He returned to Mesolonghi, and died the death of a hero in the final sortie.

The conduct of the defenders of Mesolonghi will o awaken the sympathies of freemen in every country as long as Grecian history endures. The siege rivals that of Plataea in the energy and constancy of the besieged; it wants only a historian like Thucydides to secure for it a like immortality of fame.

 

CHAPTER XIV.

THE SIEGE OF ATHENS