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BOOK II.
THE COUNCIL OF CONSTANCE
1414 — 1418.
CHAPTER VI.
SIGISMUND’S JOURNEY, AND THE COUNCIL DURING HIS
ABSENCE.
1415-1416.
The Council had displayed its zeal for the promotion
of the unity of the Church, both within and without, by deposing a Pope and
burning two heretics. But there still remained other pretenders to the Papal
dignity; and the trials of Hus and Jerome were only episodes in the more
important question of the resignation of the contending Popes.
Gregory XII, weary of the conflict, and seeing himself
abandoned on every side, submitted with good grace to abdicate. After a few
negotiations about preliminaries, the abdication was formally carried out by
Carlo Malatesta, acting as Gregory’s proctor, in a
general session of the Council, on July 4, 1415. The two Colleges of Cardinals
were united, Gregory’s acts in the Papacy were ratified, his officials were
confirmed in their offices; he himself received the title of Cardinal of Porto
and the legation in the March of Ancona for life; he was declared ineligible
for re-election to the Papacy, but was to rank next to the future Pope. At the
same time a decree was passed that the Council should not be dissolved till it
had elected a new Pope.
There still remained Benedict XIII, who had agreed to
be present at a conference at Nice between Ferdinand of Aragon and Sigismund,
in June, 1415. But the exciting scenes which followed on the flight of John
XXIII obliged Sigismund to defer his departure till July 18. Owing to the
illness of the King of Aragon, the place of meeting was changed from Nice to
Perpignan. Thither went Benedict XIII in June, and waited till the end of the
month, when he declared Sigismund contumacious and retired to Valencia.
Sigismund, in a speech to the Council before his departure, announced his
intentions on a grand scale. He purposed first to appease the Schism, then to
make peace between France and England, between Poland and the Teutonic knights;
and after this general pacification of Europe, to undertake a crusade against
the Turks. It was Sigismund’s merit that he formed great plans of European
importance; it was his weakness that he never considered what means he had to
carry them into execution. To obtain money for this journey, which was to have
such mighty results, he was compelled to raise 250,000 marks by making over
Brandenburg to the wealthy Frederick, Burggraf of
Nurnberg. Frederick had already lent him 150,000 marks, and now, for the
additional sum, obtained from the needy Emperor a grant of Brandenburg and the
electoral dignity.
Sigismund set out in state with a train of 4000
knights, amid the good wishes of the fathers of the Council, who ordered a
solemn procession to be made every Sunday, and mass to be said for his safety.
He journeyed over Schaffhausen to Basel, and thence to Chambery and Narbonne,
where he arrived on August 15. There he stayed for a month, waiting for the
arrival at Perpignan of Ferdinand of Aragon, whose health scarcely permitted
the journey. On September 18, he entered Perpignan, where Ferdinand awaited
him. Benedict, who had raised objections about a safe-conduct, and had demanded
that Sigismund should treat him as Pope, was at length driven by Ferdinand’s
pressure to appear also towards the end of September. The efforts of Ferdinand
and Sigismund could do nothing to bend the obstinate spirit of Benedict to
submit to the Council. He answered that to him the way of justice seemed better
than the way of abdication. If, however, the kings thought otherwise, he was
ready to abdicate, provided that the decrees of the Council of Pisa were
revoked, the Council of Constance dissolved, and a new Council called in some
free and impartial place—in the south of France or Aragon. As regarded the
election of a new Pope, he claimed that he alone should nominate, as being the
only Cardinal appointed by Gregory XI before the Schism. If that was not
acceptable, he would appoint a committee of his Cardinals, and the Council
might appoint an equal number of their Cardinals; the new election should be
made by a majority in each committee agreeing to the same person. After such
election he would abdicate, retaining his Cardinals, with full legatine power
over all his present obedience.
Benedict was true to his old principles. He had been
elected Pope by as good a title as his predecessors, and he saw no reason why
he should abandon his legal rights. Threats were useless against his
stubbornness. When the Kings of Aragon, Navarre, and Castile threatened him
with a withdrawal of obedience if he did not give way, he only grew more
determined in his refusal. Sigismund found himself unsafe at Perpignan; his
enemies seemed resolved to attack him when he was in a foreign land. A fire
suspiciously broke out in a house adjoining his own, and the Infante Alfonso rushed to his rescue with assurances of his
father’s protection. Some of Sigismund’s German followers rode away and left
him without giving any reason. A suspicious embassy came from Frederick of
Austria, which was said to have two notorious poisoners in its train. Fearing
for his personal safety, Sigismund withdrew to Narbonne in the beginning of November,
where he was followed by the ambassadors of the Spanish princes and of
Scotland. New negotiations were set on foot, and Benedict, seeing himself
threatened with a withdrawal of obedience, fled to the neighboring fortress of Collioure, intending to take refuge in Sardinia; his
galleys, however, were destroyed by the ships of the neighboring ports. Several
of his Cardinals, at the request of the King of Aragon, returned to Perpignan;
and Benedict, who scorned to yield, retired to the rocky fortress of Peñiscola, which belonged to his family. Popular feeling
was everywhere turning against him; his staunch upholder—the great Dominican
preacher, Vincent Ferrer—went as ambassador to urge Benedict to resign, and on
his refusal raised his voice in favor of union with the Council of Constance.
Negotiations went on rapidly between Sigismund and the
King of Aragon. At last, on December 13, twelve articles were drawn up at
Narbonne between the representatives of the Council and those of Benedict’s
obedience. It was agreed that the Council of Constance should issue a summons
to the princes and prelates of Benedict’s obedience to come to Constance within
three months and form a General Council; a similar summons was to be addressed
by Benedict’s obedience to the Council of Constance. When in this way the
dignity of both parties had been preserved, the General Council so formed was
to proceed to the deposition of Benedict, the election of a new Pope, the
reformation of the Church, and the destruction of heresy. Benedict’s acts till
his first summons to withdraw on November 15 were to be ratified, his Cardinals
and other officials recognized by the Council, and a safe-conduct given to
himself if he chose to appear.
Great was the joy of the Council when, on the evening
of December 29, the news of this compact was brought t0 Constance.
Communications with Narbonne had been rare, and rumors of every sort prevailed.
The Council found their proceedings a little dull in Sigismund’s absence.
Commissioners might sit and discuss various questions of Church reform, but it
was clear that nothing would be done till Sigismund was back again. The
expenses of a stay in Constance began to weigh heavily, and the representatives
of universities and other corporations found it necessary to urge on their
constituents the importance of the work on which the Council was engaged, and
the need of their continued presence at Constance. The first joy of the Council
at the good news from Narbonne was a little checked when it came to consider
the formalities that had to be gone through before its real business could
proceed any further. Sigismund had not obtained, as had been hoped, the
resignation of Benedict XIII; the way was not yet open for ending the Schism;
but the union of Spain with the Council would bring about again the union of
Christendom. Hopes of ending the Council by Easter, 1415, were exchanged for
expectations that it might be over in September, 1416. The good news that
Ferdinand of Aragon had on January 6 ordered the publication throughout his
dominions of the withdrawal of allegiance from Benedict XIII hardly compensated
for the news that Sigismund proposed to make a journey to Paris and London to
arrange for peace between France and England. The ambassadors of the Council,
who returned on January 29, assured them of the great use of this step in
procuring the unity of the Church, and brought Sigismund’s promise that he
would return as soon as possible.
If Sigismund, before leaving Constance, had set forth
as one of his objects the establishment of peace between France and England,
events that had happened since then had increased the danger which the union of
Christendom was likely to incur from the growth of national animosity. In
August, 1415, Henry V had sailed to France, in September had taken Harfleur, and in October had inflicted on the French army
the crushing defeat of Agincourt. The Council thought that Sigismund’s presence
was consequently more than ever necessary at Constance to keep the peace and
hasten on the business. But Sigismund had his own ends to serve while serving
the Council. He had already succeeded in asserting anew the glories of the
Imperial name in the affairs of the Church; he was equally resolved to assert
it in the politics of Europe. His scheme of uniting Europe in a crusade against
the Turk might be a dream; but at least it was a noble dream. In matters more
immediately at hand—the full reunion and reform of the Church—Sigismund saw
that nothing could be done on a satisfactory basis unless Europe were agreed. As
bearing the Imperial name, Sigismund resolved to try and unite Europe for this
purpose. It is true that he had little save the Imperial name to support him in
his good intentions; yet, if his plan succeeded, he would work a lasting result
for the good of Christendom, and would assert the old prestige of the Empire.
Full of hope, he entered Paris on March 1, 1416,
and was received with splendid festivities. But the fierce p antagonism of the
Burgundian and Orleanist factions had been
intensified by the national discomfiture, and Sigismund found that in the
disturbed state of Paris he could obtain no definite understanding: what one
party accepted the other refused. Yet Sigismund tried his utmost to win the
French Court to his projects: he offered to wed his daughter Elizabeth with the
second son of Charles VI, and so make him heir to the Hungarian throne, as he
had no male offspring. When he found that he could do nothing in Paris, he
pursued his way to England, and even on his journey was treated with contumely
at Abbeville and Boulogne. It was clear that there was a strong party in France
which had no wish for peace.
Sigismund arrived in London on May 3, and there also
great festivities were held in his honor. He took with him William, Duke of
Holland, an ally of England, a relative of the French King, and consequently
likely to be trusted by both parties. Henry V was willing to accept Sigismund’s
offer of mediation and agree to a truce for three years, on condition of
retaining Harfleur, a small compensation for the
glorious campaign of Agincourt. Preliminaries were agreed to, and a conference
between the three monarchs was arranged; but suddenly negotiations were broken
off by the successful intrigues of the Count of Armagnac. William of
Holland abruptly left England, and Sigismund found his mediation ignominiously
disavowed. Sigismund was bitterly disappointed, and was placed in an awkward
situation by this sudden change in the policy of France. Public opinion in
England regarded him with grave suspicion, and he was entirely in the hands of
Henry V. The Imperial honor had been sullied and the Imperial dignity outraged
in this negotiation, from which Sigismund had hoped so much. He wrote angrily
to the French King, and withdrew from further complicity in his affairs. He had
indeed cause to be aggrieved, for he had not merely failed, but his failure
threatened to be disastrous. He could not return to Constance crestfallen and
discredited; he could not even leave England suspicious of his good intentions.
One course only remained open for him—to abandon his
alliance with France, and draw nearer to England. Henry V, on his part, was
ready enough to renew the policy of Edward I and Edward III, of forming an
alliance with Germany against France. On August 15 Sigismund concluded at
Canterbury an offensive and defensive alliance with Henry V, on the ground that
the French favored the Schism of the Church, and opposed all efforts to make
peace with England. It was an event of no small importance in European
politics; it was a breach of the long-standing friendship between France and
the house of Luxemburg—a friendship which Sigismund’s grandfather, John of
Bohemia, had sealed with his blood on the field of Crecy. At the end of August
Sigismund went to Calais, where Henry V soon joined him, and again a conference
for peace was held; to it came the Duke of Burgundy, who, in his hatred against
the Count of Armagnac, was ready to listen to Henry V’s proposals for a
separate alliance. When the conference was over Sigismund bethought himself of
returning to Constance. He was so short of money that he had to send his trusty
servant, Eberard Windeck,
to Bruges to pawn for 18,000 ducats the presents which he had received from
Henry V and his Court. From Calais he went by sea to Dordrecht, and then made
his way slowly up the Rhine to Constance, where he arrived on January 27, 1417,
after an absence of nearly a year and a half.
Great was the delight of the Council at Sigismund’s
return; he was met outside the wall, and was escorted in solemn procession to
the cathedral. But the account of his reception shows us how strong an element
of discord the national animosity between the French and English had introduced
into the Council. The English observed with pride that Sigismund wore round his
neck the Order of the Garter; and the Bishop of Salisbury, after meeting
Sigismund, rode hastily away to the cathedral, that he might frustrate Peter d'Ailly, and get possession of the pulpit for the purpose
of delivering a sermon of welcome. Sigismund, on his side, did not scruple to
manifest in a marked way his wish for a good understanding with the English. On
January 29 he received the English nation at a private audience, shook hands
with each of its members, praised all that he had seen in England, and assured
them of his wish to work with them for the reformation of the Church. On
Sunday, January 31, he wore the robes of the Garter at high mass, and was
afterwards entertained by the English at a magnificent banquet, which was
enlivened by a miracle play representing the birth of Christ, the adoration of
the Magi, and the massacre of the Innocents.
During Sigismund’s absence from Constance the Council
had been unanimous only in condemning Jerome of Prague for heresy. The rest of
its business had advanced but slowly. It is true that at the end of July a
commission had been appointed to report upon the measures necessary for a
reform of the Church in head and members. The commission consisted of
thirty-five members, eight from each of the four nations, and three Cardinals,
D'Ailly, Zabarella, and Adimari.
There was no lack of material for the labours of the
commissioners: sermons, memoirs, and tractates furnished them with copious
lists of grievances. But the difficulty was to decide where to begin. All were
anxious to do something; but each regarded as sacred the interests of his own
order, and it was impossible to attack the fabric of abuses without endangering
some of the props which supported the existing organization of the hierarchy.
The general outline of the reforming scheme was clear and simple enough: it was
a demand that the Pope should live on his own revenues, should abstain from
interference in episcopal and capitular elections and
presentations to benefices throughout Christendom, and should not unnecessarily
interfere with episcopal or national jurisdictions. All these questions were
really questions of finance, and the times were not favorable to serious
financial reform. The Papal dominions in Italy were in the hands of the
invader, and there was little revenue which could at that time be said to
belong indisputably to the Pope. If the Pope were to be prohibited from making
any demands on ecclesiastical revenues, he would be left almost penniless, and
the Cardinals who depended on him would be destitute. Moreover, the Pope’s
claims to raise money were the sign of the recognition of his supremacy, and it
was difficult to forbid his extortion without impairing his necessary
authority. The College of Cardinals during Sigismund’s absence regained its
prestige and influence in the Council, and had a direct and personal interest
in preventing any unreasonable diminution of the Papal revenues or of the Papal
power. The reform commission found it necessary to proceed slowly and
cautiously: they could only obtain unanimity on unimportant points; when they
discussed matters of graver moment it was a question what was to be allowed to
remain in the present necessity.
The tax which the French were most anxious to see
reformed was the one called annates, which included
French payments demanded by the Curia on the collation to a benefice. Such
dues seem to have had their origin in the custom of making presents to those
who officiated at ordinations, a custom which the Papacy had organized into a
definite tax on all bishops and abbots, whose nomination passed through the
Papal Consistory; the tax was levied upon a moderate assessment of the yearly
value of their revenues in the books of the Consistory. During the Schism this
sort of revenue was extended, it is said by the ingenuity of Boniface IX, to
all benefices, and incoming incumbents were in every case required to pay half
the revenues of the first year to the Pope, under a penalty of excommunication
if they refused. The abolition of this oppressive impost was loudly demanded by
the French deputies in the commission; but the Cardinals offered determined
opposition to their pleadings, and urged that annates were the chief support of the Pope and the College of Cardinals, if they were
abolished at present the Pope and Cardinals would be left penniless. Their
opposition so far weighed with the representatives of the other nations that
they agreed to allow this question to stand over. In truth, the question of annates affected France more closely than any other
kingdom, as the necessity of supporting a Pope during the Schism had weighed
most heavily on France. England had withstood the attempts of Boniface IX to
extend the payment of annates to all benefices, and
the old payment only was made by bishops. In Italy benefices were of small
value, and the civic communities knew how to protect themselves against Papal
aggression; in Germany the bishops were more powerful than in France, and so
could defend themselves. The French complained that they paid more than all the
other nations put together, and bore the burden and heat of the day. This might
be true; but when a proposal was made to substitute for annates a yearly tax of one-fiftieth of the value of all benefices above ten ducats for
the maintenance of the Curia, we are not surprised that the more favored
nations hesitated to adopt the new scheme.
The French were not so ready as the other nations to
let the question of annates stand over. When they
Failure of found that they were beaten in the commission, they tried to bring
pressure to bear upon that body by taking action in their own nation.
Accordingly, on October 15, 1415, the French nation discussed the question for
themselves. Their debates were tumultuous, and extended over seven sittings, as
each man gave his vote and stated his reasons separately. At last, on November
2, the majority was declared to be in favour of the
abolition of annates, and the appointment of a
commission to consider the means of making a fair provision for the Pope and
Cardinals in their stead. This conclusion was communicated to the other
nations, and their cooperation was invited to carry it out; but the Italians
entirely rejected the proposal, and the Germans and English did not think it
advisable to discuss the matter at that time. The Cardinals called on the
Procurator Fiscal of the Apostolic See to lodge a protest against the proposal
as an encroachment on the Papal rights. The French replied by setting forth at
length their grievances; but nothing was done. The failure of this first
attempt at common action in the matter of reform damped the ardor of the most
advanced reformers, and showed the Cardinals their strength as a compact body
when opposed to varying national interests.
After this effort of the French the Reform Commission
was left to continue its labors in peace. On December 19 the German nation
moved that the Council proceed to consider measures to put down simony, but no
practical steps were taken. Even on the question of the reform of the
Benedictine Order agreement was so difficult that, though the Council
definitely appointed commissioners on February 19, 1416, the matter was allowed
to stand over. On April 5 Sigismund wrote from Paris to the Council, begging
them to suspend all important matters till his return, and meanwhile to employ
themselves with considering the reform of the clergy, especially in Germany. He
recommended for their consideration such points as the manners, dress, and
bearing of the clergy, and the prevention of hereditary claims over the lands
of the Church. He urged them also to reconsider their proceedings in the matter
of Jean Petit.
This last question was, in fact, the only one in which
the Council had shown any ardor, and it was simply a transference to Constance
of the political animosity by which France was convulsed. As the struggle in
Bohemia between the Czechs and Germans had made its way to the Council Chamber,
so the struggle in France between Orléanistes and
Burgundians penetrated into matters which craved for ecclesiastical decision.
Louis of Orleans, brother of Charles VI of France, had been murdered in 1407,
and there was no doubt that the murder had been instigated by his opponent, the
Duke of Burgundy. It might have been expected that such an act would have met
with reprobation at the hands of those who were the guardians of public
morality. But Louis of Orleans had been the supporter of Benedict XIII, who was
the opponent of the policy of the University of Paris, and had shown
himself willing to diminish its privileges and importance. One of the doctors
of the University, Jean Petit, made an apology for the Duke of Burgundy before
the helpless King on March 8, 1408. He justified his patron by a series of
ingenious sophistries which affected the very foundations of political society.
He set forth that any subject who plots against the welfare of his sovereign is
worthy of death, and that his culpability is increased in proportion to his
high degree. Hence it is lawful, nay, meritorious, for any one, without waiting
for an express command, but relying on moral and divine law, to kill such
traitor and tyrant, and the more meritorious in proportion to his high degree.
Promises which are contrary to the welfare of the sovereign are not binding,
and ought to be set aside; nay, dissimulation is justifiable if it renders
easier the death of the traitor. Besides enunciating these propositions, Petit
assailed the memory of the Duke of Orleans, and accused him of sorcery and evil
practices to compass the King’s death. Arguments might serve for a time to
justify, in the opinion of his partisans, one who was master of the situation.
But the moderate party in the University, headed by Gerson, looked with alarm
on the enunciation of principles which they considered subversive both of moral
and political order. So long as the Duke of Burgundy was supreme they could do
little to make their voices heard; but when in 1412 the Armagnac party
succeeded in driving the Duke of Burgundy from Paris, they were eager to
justify the memory of the murdered Duke of Orleans and fix a moral stigma on
their opponents. In 1413 the Bishop of Paris summoned a Council to examine the
doctrines of Petit, who had died two years before. After some deliberation nine
propositions drawn from the writings of Petit were condemned in February, 1414,
and his book was publicly burned. The Duke of Burgundy appealed against this
decision to the Pope, and John XXIII deputed three Cardinals to examine the
matter. Their deliberations were yet pending when the Council was summoned, and
so this important controversy was transferred to Constance. The representatives
of the University of Paris were chosen from those opposed to the views of
Petit; the Burgundian ambassadors were ordered to prevent Petit’s official condemnation. It was this state of parties that led John XXIII to hope
for help against the Council from the Duke of Burgundy, and the Council was by
no means anxious to alienate so powerful a prince.
As soon, however, as the Council was rid of all fear
from John XXIII, and by its proceedings against Hus had shown its zeal to
maintain the purity of the faith, Gerson pressed for the condemnation of the
doctrines of Petit. On June 15, 1415, a commission was appointed to examine the
matter; and as Sigismund was anxious to have something decided before he went
away, the Council on July 6, the same day on which it condemned Hus as a
heretic, passed a decree which it hoped might be an acceptable compromise in
the matter of Jean Petit. The decree set forth that the Council, in its desire to
extirpate all erroneous opinions, declares heretical the assertion that any
tyrant may be killed by any vassal or subject of his own, even by treachery, in
despite of oaths, and without any judicial sentence being passed against him.
The decree made no mention of France or of Petit; it was purely general, and
did not go into the details of Petit’s arguments, but
merely condemned an abstract proposition without any reference to the events
which called it forth.
Gerson was indignant at this lenient treatment of
Petit, especially when contrasted with the severity shown at the same time
towards Hus. He asserted that if Hus had been allowed an advocate, he would
never have been condemned. He went so far in his indignation as to say that he
would rather be tried by Jews and heathens than by the Council. He entered with
strong personal warmth into the controversy, and was not content to let it
rest, although the prospect of a war with England made the French Court anxious
that nothing should be done which could alienate the Duke of Burgundy. He
pressed for a further decision on Petit’s propositions, and involved himself in a dispute with the Bishop of Arras, who
argued that they concerned points of philosophy and politics rather than
theology. Gerson carried his zeal beyond the limits of discretion, and wearied
the Council with his repeated expostulations. Naturally the Council did not
like to be told that they, who had not spared a pope, ought not, through fear
of a prince, to desert the defense of the truth. Taking advantage of this
feeling, a Franciscan, Jean de Rocha, presented before the Commission for
Matters of the Faith twenty-five articles drawn from Gerson’s writings, which
he declared to be heretical. The Bishop of Arras similarly accused of heresy
Peter d'Ailly. The Council which was the scene of
such proceedings had entirely lost its moral force. When the learned fathers of
the Church tried to brand as heretics those who took the opposite side in
national politics, we cannot wonder that the condemnation of Jerome of Prague
by such a tribunal did not at once carry conviction to the rebellious
Bohemians. They had some grounds at least for arguing that the wisest of the
Council, Gerson and D'Ailly, were eager for the condemnation of Hus, that it
might pave the way for the condemnation of Petit,—that Gerson’s suspicions of
the sincerity of Jerome’s recantation were sharpened by the feeling that his
own orthodoxy was not above attack.
It would seem that the majority of the Council were
heartily wearied of this question, and in the beginning of 1416 was a general
request that the Commissioners on Matters of Faith should pronounce an opinion,
one way or the other, on the nine propositions of Petit. But the matter was
further complicated by the action of the Cardinals Orsini, Zabarella,
and Pancerini, who had been deputed by John XXIII to
consider the appeal of the Duke of Burgundy against the decision of the Council
of Paris. They now gave their judgment on that appeal, and quashed the
proceedings of the Parisian Council on grounds of informality. It had proceeded
in a matter of faith of which only the Pope could take cognizance, and also had
not summoned the accused parties, but had founded its judgment on passages
which were not authentic writings of Petit The Cardinals seem to have taken
this step from a desire to reserve the whole question for the decision of
a future Pope.
But in France the position of parties had again
changed. After the defeat of Agincourt, the Orléanistes represented the national and patriotic party, and the Duke of Burgundy had to
flee to Flanders. The Orléanistes possessed
themselves of the royal authority, and in the King’s name pressed for the
condemnation of Petit. On March 19 they appealed from the decision of the
commissioners to that of the Council. The commissioners in their defense
published the opinions of canonists which they had collected: twenty-six were
in favour of condemning Petit, sixty-one were against
the condemnation. It may seem to us monstrous that such should have been the
result.
But the Council had already pronounced its decision
against the general principle of the lawfulness of tyrannicide,
and many thought that it was undesirable for political reasons to go farther.
Many regarded the question as not properly a theological question, and objected
to its decision on purely theological grounds; many regarded it as a mere party
matter in which the Council would do well not to meddle. Moreover, the question
in itself admitted of some doubt in a time when political institutions were in
a rudimentary stage. Political assassinations wore a different aspect in days
when the destinies of a nation might rest on the caprice of an individual.
Classical and biblical antiquity supplied instances of tyrannicide which won the admiration of posterity. Many felt unwilling in their hearts that
the Church should absolutely forbid conduct which it could not be denied was
sometimes useful.
Still Gerson pursued his point, and the struggle
between himself and the Bishop of Arras waxed warmer. Sigismund wrote from
Paris urging that the decision of the three Cardinals against the proceedings
of the Bishop of Paris should be recalled; but the Cardinals wrote back a
justification of their own conduct. The weary controversy still went on and
occupied the time and energies of the Council. It awakened such strong feeling
that the Burgundian prelates separated themselves from the rest of the Gallican
nation. Gerson flung himself entirely into this question, and so diminished the
influence which his learning had previously gained him at Constance. The
Council would not decide the matter, but preferred to leave it for the future
Pope. Gerson exclaimed that no reformation could be wrought by the Council,
unless it were under a wise and powerful head. When Sigismund returned to
Constance, Gerson hoped that he would use his influence to have the matter
settled. But the change which the English alliance had wrought in Sigismund’s
political attitude made him unwilling to offend the Duke of Burgundy. The
French prelates remained in a state of gloomy dissatisfaction, and the
animosities which this dreary question had raised destroyed the unanimity of
the Council and did much to hamper its future labors.
Nor was this the only cause of disunion in the
Council. The assembled fathers were eagerly waiting the opportunity of
finishing their greatest and most important task, the restoration of the unity
of the Church. For this purpose they needed the incorporation of the Spanish
kingdoms and the formal deposition of Benedict XIII. The death of Ferdinand of
Aragon on April 2, 1416, caused some delay in sending ambassadors; and his
successor, Alfonso V, though anxious to carry out his father’s plans, was not
in a position to do so at once. Not till September 5 did the Aragonese envoys arrive, and they were at first unwilling
to join the Council till they had been joined by the representatives of
Castile. At length their scruples were overcome, and on October 15 a fifth
nation, the Spanish, was constituted in the Council. But this process was not
completed without difficulties which portended future troubles. First the
Portuguese, who had joined the Council on June 1, protested against the
formation of a Spanish nation as disparaging the honor of Portugal, which
claimed to be a nation by itself. Next the Aragonese claimed precedence over the English, and the English protested against their
claim. The French then allowed the Aragonese to sit
alternately with themselves, protesting that they did so without prejudice to
the dignity of the French nation.
The alliance thus made between the French and Aragonese was used by the French as a means of French
annoying the English. The Aragonese raised the
question of the right of the English to be considered a nation. Loud hissings
were heard in the Council Chamber at this attempt to introduce a spirit of
faction, and the Aragonese ambassadors left the room.
The question was dismissed, but the ill-feeling created by it remained; the
English and French wore arms in the streets, and there was constant fear of an
open collision. So serious was the discord that, on December 23, a congregation
continued wrangling till late at night, and then fell to blows, so that the Pfalzgraf Lewis and Frederick of Nurnberg had to be hastily
summoned to preserve order.
This was the state of things that awaited Sigismund on
his arrival at Constance, and his change of political attitude during his
absence deprived him of the power to exercise any moderating influence upon the
discord which wasted the energies of the Council.
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