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BOOK III
THE COUNCIL OF BASEL
1419-1444.
CHAPTER VI.
EUGENIUS IV AND THE COUNCIL OF BASEL.
NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE GREEKS AND THE BOHEMIANS
1434—1436.
At the beginning of the year 1434 the Council of Basel
had reached its highest point of importance in the Position affairs of
Christendom and of the Church. It had compelled the Pope to accept, without
reserve, the conciliar principle for which it strove; it had gone so far in
pacifying Bohemia that its final triumph seemed secure. It looked to further
employment for its energies in negotiating a union betweenthe Greek and
the Latin Churches. Yet the Council’s success had been largely due to
accidental circumstances. Eugenius IV had been subdued, not by the Council’s
strength, but by his own weakness; he fell because he had so acted as to raise
up a number of determined enemies, without gaining anyfriends in return. The
Council’s policy towards him was tolerated rather than approved by the European
Powers; if no one helped Eugenius IV, it was because no one had anything to
gain by so doing. Sigismund, whose interest was greatest in the matter,
was kept on the Council’s side by his personal interest in the Bohemian
question; but he, with the German electors and the King of France, was resolute
in resisting any steps which might lead to a schism of the Church. If the
Council were to keep what it had won, it must gain new hold upon the sympathies
of Christendom, which were not touched by the struggle against the Pope.
Sigismund gave the Fathers at Basel the advice of a
statesman when he exhorted them to leave their quarrel with the Pope and busy
themselves with the reform of the Church. But to contend for abstract
principles is always easy, to reform abuses is difficult. The Council found it
more interesting to war with the Pope than to labour through the obstacles
which lay in the way of a reformation of abuses by those who benefited by them.
Each rank of the hierarchy was willing to reform its neighbors, but had a great
deal to urge in its own defense. In this collision of interests there was a
general agreement that it was good to begin with a reform in the Papacy, as the
Pope was not at Basel to speak for himself. Moreover, the Council had grown
inveterate in its hostility to the Pope. The personal enemies of Eugenius IV
flocked to Basel, and were not to be satisfied with anything short of his
entire humiliation. In this they were aided by the pride of authority which
among less responsible members of the assembly grew in strength every day, and
made them desirous to assert in every way the superiority of the Council
over the Pope.
The first question that arose was concerning the
presidency. Eugenius IV, after his recognition by the Council, issued a Bull
nominating four Papal deputies to share that office with Cesarini. The first
decision of the Council was that they could not admit this claim of the Pope,
since it was derogatory to the dignity of the Council, but they were willing
themselves to appoint two of the Cardinals. Again Sigismund had to interpose,
and with some difficulty prevailed on the Council to receive the Papal
presidents. They were not, however, admitted till they had bound themselves by
an oath to labour for the Council, to maintain the decrees of Constance, to
declare that even the Pope, if he refused to obey the Council, might be
punished, and to observe strict secrecy about all its proceedings. On these
terms the Papal presidents, Cardinal Albergata, the Archbishop of Tarento, the
Bishop of Padua, and the Abbot of S. Justin of Padua, were admitted to their
office on April 26, 1434, at a solemn session at which Sigismund in his
Imperial robes was present.
The pretensions of the Council went on increasing. On
May 2 Cardinal Lusignan, who was sent on an embassy to pacify France, received
from the Council the title of legatus a latere, in spite of the
protest of the five presidents against conferring a dignity which only the Pope
could grant. Sigismund also felt aggrieved by the small heed which the Council
paid to his monitions. Few German prelates were present; the large majority
were French, Italians, and Spaniards. The democratic constitution of the
Council prevented Sigismund from receiving the deference which was his due; he
was not even consulted about the appointment of ambassadors. He felt that a
slight had been offered to himself by the dealings of the Council with his
enemy, the Duke of Milan. He complained bitterly of the irregular conduct of
the Council in granting a commission to the Duke of Milan as its vicar, and so
abetting him in his designs on the States of the Church. The Council at first
denied, then defended, and finally refused to withdraw from, its connection
with the Duke of Milan. Sigismund saw with indignation that the Council adopted
a policy of its own, and refused to identify its interests with his. He sadly
contrasted the purely ecclesiastical organization at Basel with the strong
national spirit that had prevailed at Constance. He determined to leave a place
where he had so little weight that, as he himself said, he was like a fifth
wheel to a carriage, which did no good, but only impeded its progress.
Before departing he seems to have resolved to give a
stimulus to the Council. He sent the Bishop of Lübeck to the several
deputations to lay before them a suggestion that the marriage of the clergy
should be permitted. “It was in vain”, he pleaded, “that priests were
deprived of wives; scarcely among a thousand could one continent priest be
found. By clerical celibacy the bond of friendship between the clergy and laity
was broken, and the freedom of confession was rendered suspicious. There was no
fear that a married clergy would appropriate the goods of the Church for their
wives and families; the permission to marry would rather bring those of the
highest ranks into the clergy, and the nobles would be less desirous of
secularizing ecclesiastical property if it was in the hands of their relations
and friends”. The fathers listened; but “the old”, says Aeneas
Sylvius, “condemned what had no charms for them. The monks, bound by a vow
of chastity, grudged that secular priests should have a privilege denied to
themselves”. The majority ruled that the time was not yet ripe for such a
change; they feared that it would be too great a shock to popular
prejudice.
Before his departure Sigismund addressed the Council,
and urged that it would be better to follow the example set at Constance, and
organize themselves by nations. He wisely remarked that the reformation of the
Church would be better carried out if each nation dealt with its own customs
and rites. Moreover, decisions arrived at by a national organization would have
greater chance of being accepted by the States so represented. He was answered
that the deputations would take his suggestion under consideration. Finally, on
May 19, he departed in no amiable mood from Basel, saying that he left behind
him a sink of iniquity.
After Sigismund’s departure Cesarini besought the
Council to turn its attention to the question of reformation; he said that
already they were evil spoken of throughout Christendom for their delay.
The basis of the questions raised at Constance was adopted, and the
extirpation of simony first attracted the attention of the fathers. But there was
great difficulty in keeping to the point, and little progress was made.
Insignificant quarrels between prelates were referred to the Council as a court
of appeal, and the Council took greater interest in such personal matters than
in abstract questions of reform. The question of union between the Eastern and
Western Churches was hailed with delight as a relief. This question, which had
been mooted at Constance, slumbered under Martin V, but had been renewed by
Eugenius IV. The Council, in its struggle with the Pope, thought it well to
deprive him of the opportunity of increasing his importance, and at the same
time to add to its own. In January, 1433, it sent ambassadors to Greece to
inaugurate steps for the proposed union. In consequence of these negotiations
the Greek ambassadors arrived at Basel on July 12, 1434. They were graciously
received by the Council; and Cesarini expressed the general wish for a
conference on their differences, which he said that discussion would probably
show to be verbal rather than real. The Greeks demanded that they should have
their expenses paid in coming to the conference, and named as the place Ancona,
or some port on the Calabrian coast, then Bologna, Milan, or some other town in
Italy, next Pesth or Vienna, and finally some place in Savoy. The Council was
anxious that the Greeks should come to Basel; but when the Greeks declared that
they had no power to assent to this, their other conditions were accepted.
Ambassadors were to go to Constantinople to urge the choice of Basel as a place
for the conference. The Greeks also demanded that Eugenius IV should give his
assent to the Council's proposals, and envoys were accordingly sent to lay them
before him.
But Eugenius IV, on his side, had made proposals to
the Greeks for the same purpose; and the Greeks, with their usual shiftiness,
were carrying on a double negotiation, in hopes of making a better bargain for
themselves by playing off against one another the rival competitors for their
goodwill. Eugenius IV sent to Constantinople in July, 1433, his secretary,
Cristoforo Garatoni, who proposed that a Council should be held at
Constantinople, to which the Pope should send a legate and a number of prelates
and doctors. When the Council’s proposals were laid before him, Eugenius wrote
on November 15, 1434, and gently warned it of the dangers that might arise from
too great precipitancy in this important matter. He mildly complained that he
had not been consulted earlier. He added, however, that he was willing to
assent to the simplest and speediest plan for accomplishing the object in view.
The question of the place of conference with the Greeks was sure to open up the
dispute between the Pope and Council. The chief reason which Eugenius IV had
given for dissolving the Council was his belief that the Greeks would never go
so far as Basel. He was now content to wait and see how far the Council would
succeed. He already began to see in their probable failure a means of
reasserting his authority, and either transferring the Council to Italy, as he
had wished at first, or setting up against it another Council, which from its
object would have in the eyes of Europe an equal, if not a greater, prestige.
On the departure of the Greek ambassadors the Council
again turned to its wearisome task of reformation, and on January 22, 1435,
succeeded in issuing four decrees, limiting the penalties of interdict and
excommunication to the persons or places which had incurred them by their own
fault, forbidding frivolous appeals to the Church, and enforcing stricter
measures to prevent the concubinage of the clergy. Offenders whose guilt was
notorious were to be mulcted of the revenues for three months, and admonished
under pain of deprivation to put away their concubines; fines paid to bishops
for connivance at this irregularity were forbidden. The Council felt that it
was at least safe in denouncing an open breach of ecclesiastical discipline,
one which in those days was constantly condemned and constantly permitted.
From this peaceful work of reform the Council was soon
drawn away by a letter from Eugenius IV, announcing the hopes he entertained of
effecting a union with the Greeks by means of a Council at Constantinople. The
letter was brought by Garatoni, who, on April 5, gave the Council an account of
his embassy to the Greeks, and urged in favour of the Pope's plan, that it
involved little expense, and was preferable to the Greeks, who did not wish to
impose on their Emperor and the aged Patriarch a journey across the sea. The
Council, however, by no means took this view of the matter; it was resolved not
to lose the glory of a reunion of the two Churches. On May 3 an angry letter
was written to the Pope, saying that a synod at Constantinople could have no
claims to be a General Council, and would only raise fresh discord; such a
proposal could not be entertained. Eugenius IV gave way in outward appearance,
and sent Garatoni again to Constantinople to express his readiness to accept
the proposals of the Council. He was contented to bide his time. But the
Council was in a feverish haste to arrange preliminaries, and in June sent
envoys, amongst whom was John of Ragusa, to Constantinople for this purpose. It
also began to consider means for raising money, and the sale of indulgences was
suggested. This suggestion raised a storm of disaffection amongst the adherents
of the Pope, and seemed to all moderate men to be a serious encroachment on the
Papal prerogative.
It was not long, however, before a still more deadly
blow was aimed at the Pope’s authority. The reforming spirit of the Basel
fathers was stirred to deal vigorously with Papal exactions. The subject of
annates, which had been raised in vain at Constance, was peremptorily decided
at Basel. On June 9 a decree was passed abolishing annates, and all dues on
presentations, on receiving the pallium, and on all such occasions. It was
declared to be simoniacal to demand or to pay them, and a Pope who attempted to
exact them was to be judged by a General Council. Two of the Papal presidents,
the Archbishop of Tarento and the Bishop of Padua, protested against this
decree, and their protest was warmly backed by the English and by many other
members of the Council. There were only present at its publication four
Cardinals and forty-eight prelates. Cesarini only assented to it on condition
that the Council should undertake no other business till it had made, by other
means, a suitable provision for the Pope and Cardinals. The abolition of
annates was, indeed, a startling measure of reform. It deprived the Pope at
once of all means of maintaining his Curia, and to Eugenius IV, a refugee in
Florence, left no source of supplies. No doubt the question of annates was one
that needed reform; but the reform ought to have been well considered and
moderately introduced. As it was, the Council showed itself to be moved chiefly
by a desire to deprive the Pope of means to continue his negotiations with
the Greeks.
The decree abolishing annates was a renewed
declaration of war against the Pope. It marked the rise into power of the
extreme party m the Council—the party whose object was the entire
reduction of the Papacy under a conciliar oligarchy. At the time, Eugenius was
too helpless to accept the challenge. Two of his legates at Basel protested
against the annates decree, and absented themselves from the business of the
Council. The Council answered by instituting proceedings against them for
contumacy. But the matter was stayed for the time by the arrival, on August 20,
of two Papal envoys who had been sent expressly to deal with the Council on
this vexed question—Antonio de San Vitio, one of the auditors of the Curia, and
the learned Florentine, Ambrogio Traversari, Abbot of Camaldoli. The feeling of
the Italian Churchmen was turning strongly in favour of Eugenius IV; they saw
in the proceedings of the Council a menace to the glory of the Papacy, which
Italy was proud to call its own. Reformation, as carried out by the Council,
seemed to them to be merely an attempt to overthrow the Pope, and carry off
beyond the Alps the management of ecclesiastical affairs which had so long
centred in Italy. Traversari, who had been zealous for a reform, and had sent
to Eugenius on his election a copy of S. Bernard’s De Consideratione,
now placed himself on the Pope's side, and went to Basel to defeat the
machinations of what he considered a lawless mob.
The answers which Traversari brought from the Pope
were ambiguous: he was willing that the union with the Greek Church should be
conducted in the best way; when the preliminaries had advanced further he would
be willing to consider whether the expenses had better be met by indulgences or
in some other way as to the abolition of annates, he thought that the Council
had acted precipitately, and wished to know how they proposed to provide for the
Pope and Cardinals, There was, in this, no basis for negotiation; and
Traversari in vain endeavored to get further instructions from Eugenius IV. He
stayed three months in Basel, and was convinced that Cesarini’s influence was
waning, and that it was a matter of vital importance to the Pope to win him
over to his side; he urged Eugenius IV to leave no means untried for this end.
Traversari was shrewd enough in surveying the situation for the future, but for
the present could obtain nothing save an empty promise that the question of a
provision for the Pope should be taken into immediate consideration.
Pending this consideration, the Council showed its
determination to carry its decrees into effect. When customary dues for the
reception of the pallium demanded by the Papal Curia from the newly elected
Archbishop of Rouen, the Council interposed and itself bestowed the pallium on
December 11. In January, 1436, it resolved to admonish the Pope to withdraw all
that he had done or said against the authority of the Council, and accept fully
its decrees. An embassy was nominated to carry to Eugenius IV a form of decree
which he was to issue for this purpose. The reason for this peremptory
proceeding was a desire to cut away from the Pope the means of frustrating the
Council’s projects as regards the Greeks. Its envoys at Constantinople could
not report very brilliant success in their negotiations. They could not at
first even establish the basis which had been laid down at Basel in the
previous year. The Greeks took exception to the wording of the decree which was
submitted to them; they complained that the Council spoke of itself as the
mother of all Christendom, and coupled them with the Bohemians as schismatics.
When the ambassadors attempted to defend the Council’s wording they were met by
cries, “Either amend your decree or get you gone”. They undertook that it
should be changed, and one of them, Henry Menger, was sent back to Basel,
where, on February 3, 1436, he reported that all other matters had been arranged
with the Greeks, on condition that the decree were altered, and that a
guarantee were given for the payment of their expenses to and from the
conference, whether they agreed to union or no. He brought letters from the
Emperor and the Patriarch, urging that the place of conference should be on the
sea-coast, and that the Pope, as the head of Western Christendom, should be
present. The envoys attributed these demands to the machinations of the
Papal ambassador Garatoni.
More and more irritated by this news, the Council proceeded
with its plan of crushing the Pope, and on March 22 issued a decree for
the full reformation of the head of the Church. It began with a
reorganization of the method of Papal election; the Cardinals on entering the
Conclave were to swear that they would not recognize him whom they elected till
he had sworn to summon General Councils and observe the decrees of Basel. The
form of the Papal oath was specified, and it was enacted that on each
anniversary of the Papal election the oath, and an exhortation to observe it,
should be read to the Pope in the midst of the mass service. The number of
Cardinals was not to exceed twenty-six, of whom twenty-four were to be at least
thirty years old, graduates in civil or canon law, or in theology, none of them
related to the Pope or any living Cardinal; the other two might be elected for
some great need or usefulness to the Church, although they were not graduates.
It was further enacted that all elections were to be freely made by the
chapters, and that all reservations were to be abolished.
At the end of the month appeared the Pope’s
ambassadors, the Cardinals of S. Peter’s and S. Crose. They brought as before
evasive answers from the Pope, who urged the Council to choose a place for
conference with the Greeks which would be convenient both for them and for
himself; he did not approve of the plan of raising money by granting
indulgences, but was willing to issue them with the approval of the Council.
This was not what the Council wanted. It demanded that Eugenius IV should
recognize its right to grant indulgences. On April 14 it issued a decree
granting to all who contributed to the expenses of the conference with the
Greeks the plenary indulgence given to crusaders and to those who made a
pilgrimage to Rome in the year of Jubilee. On May 11 an answer was given to the
Pope's legates, complaining that Eugenius IV did not act up to the Council’s
decrees, but raised continual difficulties; he did not join with them in their
endeavors to promote union with the Greeks, but spoke of transferring the
Council elsewhere; he did not accept the decree abolishing annates, except on
the condition that provision was made for the Pope, although he ought to
welcome gladly all efforts at reformation, and ought to consider that the
question of provision in the future required great discussion in each nation;
he did not recognize, as he ought to do, the supremacy of the Council, which,
with the presidents who represented the Pope, had full power to grant
indulgences. On receiving this answer, the Archbishop of Tarento and the Bishop
of Padua resigned their office of presidents on behalf of the Pope and left the
Council. It was a declaration of open war.
Eugenius IV on his side prepared for the contest. He
drew up a long defense of his own conduct, and a statement of the wrongs which
he had received from the Council since his recognition of its authority. He set
forth the Council's refusal to accept the Papal presidents as the
representatives of the Pope, its decrees diminishing the Papal revenues and the
Papal power, interfering with the old customs of election, granting
indulgences, exercising Papal prerogatives, and doing everything most likely to
lead to an open schism. He commented on the turbulent procedure of the Council,
its democratic organization, its mode of voting by deputations which gave the
preponderance to a numerical minority, its avowed partisanship which gave its
proceedings the appearance of a conspiracy rather than of a deliberate
judgment. For six years it had labored with scanty results, and had only
destroyed the prestige and respect which a General Council ought to
command. He recapitulated his own proposals to the Council about the place of a
conference with the Greeks, and the repulse which his ambassadors had met with.
He stated his resolve to call upon all the princes of Christendom to withdraw
their support from the Council, which, he significantly added, not only spoke
evil of the Pope, but of all princes, when once it had free course to its
insolence. He promised reformation of abuses in the Curia, with the help of a
Council to be summoned in some city of Italy, where the condition of his health
would allow his personal presence. He called upon the princes to withdraw their
ambassadors and prelates from Basel.
This document of Eugenius IV contained nothing which
was likely to induce the princes of Europe to put more confidence in him,
alleged no arguments which could lead them to alter their previous position so
far as the Papacy was concerned. But there was much in his accusations against
the Council, where the extreme party had been gradually gaining power. Cesarini
was no longer listened to, and his position in Basel became daily more
unsatisfactory to himself. He had earnestly striven for a settlement of the
Bohemian difficulty, and for the pacification of France, which had been begun
at the Congress of Arras. He was desirous for reformation of the Church and so
had agreed to the decree abolishing annates. But he could not forget that he
was a Cardinal and a Papal legate, and was opposed to the recent proceedings of
the Council against the Pope. Round him gathered the great body of Italian
prelates, except the Milanese and the chief theologians. But the majority of
the Council consisted of Frenchmen, who were led by Cardinal Louis d'Allemand,
generally known as the Cardinal of Arles, a man of great learning and high
character, but a violent partisan, who belonged to the Colonna faction, and
intrigued with the Duke of Milan. He had no hesitation in taking up an attitude
of strong political hostility against Eugenius IV. The French followed him, as
did the Spaniards, so long as Alfonso of Aragon was the political enemy of
Eugenius IV. The Milanese and South Italians were also on his side. The English
and Germans who came to the Council were animated by a desire to extend its
influence, and so were opposed to the Pope.
The organization of the Council gave the Pope a just
ground for complaint. It had been decided at the beginning that the lower ranks
of the clergy should have seats and votes. The Council was to be fully
representative of the Church, and so was entirely democratic. All who satisfied
the scrutineers, and were incorporated as members, took equal part in the
proceedings. At first the dangers of this course had not shown themselves; but
as the proceedings of the Council were protracted, the prelates who took a
leading part in its business became fewer. The constitution of the Council was
shifting from week to week. Only those were permanent who had some personal
interest to gain, or who were strong partisans. The enemies of Eugenius IV
clung to the Council as the justification of their past conduct as well as of
their hope in the future. Adventurers who had everything to gain, and little to
lose, flocked to Basel, and cast in their lot with the Council as affording
them a better chance of promotion than did the Curia. Thus the Council became
more and more democratic and revolutionary in its tendencies. The prelates drew
to the side of Cesarini, and found themselves more and more in a minority,
opposed to a majority which was bent on the entire humiliation of the Papacy.
It was natural that the violence of the French radical
party should cause a reaction in favour of the Pope. Many had been in favour of
the Council against the Pope, when the Council wished for reform, which the
Pope tried to check. They were shaken in their allegiance when the Council,
under the name of reform, was pursuing mainly the depression of the Papal
power, and the transference of its old authority into the hands of a
self-elected and non-representative oligarchy. The cry was raised that the
Council was in the French interest; that it simply continued the old struggle
of Avignon against Rome. The friends of Eugenius IV began to raise their heads,
and attacked the Council on political grounds, so as to detach from it the
princes of Christendom. Their arguments may be gathered from a letter of
Ambrogio Traversari to Sigismund, in January, 1436: “The Council of Basel has
found time for nothing but the subversion of Catholic peace and the depression
of the Pope. They have now been assembled for five years; and see on how
wrongful a basis their business proceeds. In old days bishops, full of the fear
of God, the zeal of religion, and the fervour of faith, used to settle the
affairs of the Church. Now the matter is in the hands of the common herd; for
scarcely out of five hundred members, as I saw with my own eyes, were there
twenty bishops; the rest were either the lower orders of the clergy, or were
laymen; and all consult their private feelings rather than the good of the
Church. No wonder that the Council drags on for years, and produces nothing but
scandal and danger of schism. The good men are lost in the ignorant and
turbulent multitude. The French, led by the Cardinal of Arles and the
Archbishop of Lyons, want to transfer the Papacy into France. Where every one
seeks his own interest, and the vote of a cook is as good as that of a legate
or an archbishop, it is shameless blasphemy to claim for their resolutions the
authority of the Holy Ghost. They aim only at a disruption of the Church. They
have set up a tribunal on the model of the Papal court; they exercise
jurisdiction, and draw causes before them. They confer the pallium on archbishops,
and claim to grant indulgences. They aim at nothing less than the perpetuation
of the Council, in opposition to the Pope”.
There was enough truth in this view of the situation
to incline the statesmen of Europe to take a more languid interest in the
proceedings of the Council. Moreover, the Council had lost its political
importance by the gradual subsidence of the Bohemian question. The Council had
done its work when it succeeded in bringing to a head the divergence of opinion
which had always existed between Bohemian parties. The negotiations with the
Council had given strength to the party which wished to recognize authority,
and was not prepared to break entirely with the traditions of the past. Round
it gathered the various elements of political discontent arising from the long
domination of the democratic and revolutionary party. At the battle of Lipan
the Taborites met with such a defeat that they could no longer offer a
determined resistance to the plan for a reconciliation with Sigismund.
But the hopes of immediate success which the fight of
Lipan awakened in Basel were by no means realized at once. The spirit of the
Bohemian Reformation was still strong; and though the Calixtins were on
the whole in favour of reconciliation with the Church, they had no
intention of abandoning their original position. The Bohemian Diet in June,
1434, proclaimed a general peace with all Utraquists, and a truce for a year
with all Catholics. It took measures for the pacification of the land and the
restoration of order. To Sigismund's envoys, who had come to procure his
recognition as King of Bohemia, the Diet answered by appointing deputies to
confer with Sigismund at Regensburg. Thither the Council was requested by
Sigismund to send its former envoys. On August 16 its embassy, headed by
Philibert, Bishop of Coutances, but of which John of Palomar was the most
active member, entered Regensburg an hour after the Bohemians, chief amongst
whom were John of Rokycana, Martin Lupak, and Meinhard of Neuhaus. As usual, Sigismund
kept them waiting, and did not arrive till August 21. Meanwhile the Council’s
envoys and the Bohemians had several conferences, which did not show that their
differences were disappearing. The Bohemians were requested to do as they had
done at previous conferences, and not attend mass in the churches. They
consented; but John of Rokycana remarked that it would be better if the Council
were to drive out of the churches evil priests rather than faithful laymen, who
only wished to receive the Communion under both kinds. John of Palomar had to
apologize for the Council’s delay in its work of reform; the English and
Spanish representatives, he said, had not yet arrived, and everything could not
be done at once.
When negotiations began on August 22 Sigismund and the
Council's envoys found that the Bohemians were firm in their old position. They
were willing to recognize Sigismund on condition that he restored peace in
Bohemia, which could only be done by upholding the Four Articles of Prague, and
binding all the people of Bohemia and Moravia to receive the Communion under
both kinds. Sigismund appealed to the national feelings of the Bohemians by a
speech in their own tongue, in which he recalled the connection of his house
with Bohemia. About the questions in dispute John of Rokycana and John of
Palomar again indulged in the old arguments, till the Bohemians declared that
they were sent to the Emperor, not to the Council's envoys. They submitted
their request to Sigismund in writing, and Sigismund in writing gave answer,
begging them to stand by the Compacts of Prague. The Bohemians declared their
intention of doing so, but said that the Compacts must be understood to apply
to the whole of Bohemia and Moravia. John of Palomar declared that the Council
could not compel faithful Catholics to adopt a new rite, though they were
prepared to allow it to those who desired it. The conclusion of the conference
was that the Bohemian envoys should report to the Diet, soon to be held at
Prague, the difficulties which had arisen, and should send its answer to the
Emperor and to the Council. Matters had advanced no further than they were at
the time of accepting the Compacts. In some ways the tone of the conference at
Regensburg was less conciliatory than that of the previous ones. One of the
Bohemian envoys fell from a window and was killed. The Council’s ambassadors
objected to his burial with the rites of the Church, on the ground that he was
not received into the Church’s communion. This caused great indignation among the
Bohemians, who resented this attempt to terrorize over them. Still they
submitted to the Council’s envoys a series of questions about the election of
an archbishop of Prague, and the views of the Council about the regulation of
ecclesiastical discipline in accordance with the Compacts. Sigismund besought
the Council for money to act against Bohemia, and some of the Bohemian nobles
asserted that with money enough Bohemia could soon be reduced to obedience. Yet
Sigismund did not hesitate to express to the Council's envoys his many grounds
for grievance at the Council’s procedure. The parties in the conference at
Regensburg were at cross purposes. Sigismund, dissatisfied with the Council,
wished to make it useful for himself. The Council wished to show Sigismund that
its help was indispensable for the settlement of the Bohemian question.
Bohemia wished for peace, but on condition of retaining in matters
ecclesiastical a basis of national unity, without which it felt that peace
would be illusory. On September 3 the conference came to an end without
arriving at any conclusion. All parties separated mutually dissatisfied.
Still these repeated negotiations strengthened the
peace party in Bohemia. Of the proceedings of the Diet held at Prague on
October 23 we know little; but they ended in an abandonment by the Bohemians of
the position which they had taken up at Regensburg. There they had maintained
that, as the people of Bohemia and Moravia were of one language and under one
rule, so ought they to be of one ritual in the most solemn act of Christian
worship. They now decided to seek a basis of religious unity which would
respect the rights of the minority, and on November 8 wrote, not to the
Council, but to the Council's envoys, proposing that in those places where the
Communion under both kinds had been accepted it should be recognized; in those
places where the Communion under one kind had been retained it should remain.
Mutual toleration was to be enjoined, and an archbishop and bishops were to be
elected by the clergy, with the consent of the Diet, who were to be subject to
the Council and to the Pope in matters agreeable to the law of God, but no
further, and who were to regulate the discipline of the Church in Bohemia and
Moravia. It was a proposal for the organization of the Bohemian Church on a
national basis, so as to obtain security against the danger of a Catholic
reaction.
The Council’s answer to the Bohemians was, that they
would again send their former envoys to confer with them and with the Emperor.
The Bohemians, seeing that little was to be hoped for from the Council,
resolved to see if they could obtain from Sigismund the securities which they
wished. A Diet held in Prague in March, 1435, sent Sigismund its demands:
the Four Articles were to be accepted; the Emperor, his court, his chaplain,
and all State officers were to communicate under both kinds; complete amnesty
was to be given for the past, and a genuinely national Government was to exist
for the future. The envoys who brought these demands to Sigismund inquired if
the Council's ambassadors, who were already with Sigismund in Posen, were
prepared to accept the offer made by the Diet in the previous November;
otherwise it was useless for the Bohemians to trouble themselves further or
incur more expense. But the Council's ambassadors had come armed with secret
instructions, and refused to have their hand forced. They answered that their
mission was to the Emperor in Council of the Bohemians assembled, and then only
could they speak.
Many preliminaries had to be arranged before the
Conference finally took place at Brunn. There the Council’s envoys arrived on
May 20, and were received with ringing of bells and all manifestations of joy
by the people. On June 18 came the Bohemian representatives; but Sigismund did
not appear till July 1. Meanwhile the Bohemians and the Council's envoys had
several sharp discussions. Those of the Bohemians who had been reconciled to
the Church were allowed to attend the mass; but the others were forbidden to enter
the churches, and were refused a chapel where they might celebrate mass after
their own fashion. On June 28 some of the Bohemians, on being requested to
withdraw from a church where they had come with their comrades, were so
indignant that they were on the point of leaving Brünn, and were only
appeased by the intervention of Albert of Austria, who had luckily arrived a
few days before
The day after Sigismund’s arrival, on July 2, John of
Rokycana brought forward three demands on the part of the Bohemians: that the
Four Articles be accepted throughout the whole of Bohemia and Moravia; that
those countries be freed from all charge of heresy, and that the Council of
Basel proceed with the reformation of the Church in life, morals and faith. He
asked also for an answer to the demands sent to Eger by the Bohemian Diet in
the previous November. The Council’s envoys answered by justifying the
procedure of the Council and blaming the Bohemians for not keeping to the
Compacts but raising new difficulties. There was much disputation. The
Bohemians professed their willingness to abide by the Compacts as interpreted
by their demands sent to Eger; the legates answered that these demands were
contrary to the Compacts themselves. Sigismund urged the legates to give way, but
they refused. On July 8 the legates demanded that the Bohemians should declare
their adhesion to the Compacts, as they had promised; no promise had been made
by the Council about the Eger articles, otherwise it would have been fulfilled.
It was clear to the Bohemians that the Council regarded the Compacts as the
ultimate point of their concessions, whereas the Bohemians looked on them only
as a starting-point for further arrangements. John of Rokycana angrily
answered the legates, “We are willing to stand by the Compacts; but they cannot
be fulfilled till they are completed. Much must be added to them; for instance,
as regards obedience to bishops, we will not obey them if they order what is
contrary to God’s word. How do you ask us to fulfill our promises when you will
not fulfill yours? It seems to us that you aim at nothing save to sow division
amongst us, for since your coming we are worse off than before, and will take
heed that it be so no longer. We ask no difficult things. We ask for an
archbishop to be elected by the clergy and people or appointed by the King. We
ask that causes be not transferred out of the realm. We ask that the Communion
be celebrated under both kinds in those places where the use exists. These are
not difficult matters; grant them and we will fulfill the Compacts. We do not
ask these things through fear, or through doubt of their lawfulness; we ask
them for the sake of peace and unity. If you do not grant them, the Lord be
with you, for I trust He is with us”. While John of Palomar was preparing a
reply, the Bohemians left the room and thenceforth conferred only with the
legates through Sigismund.
The Bohemian envoys had, in fact, begun to negotiate
directly with Sigismund, who showed himself much more ready to give way than
did the legates of the Council. On July 6 a proposal was made to Sigismund that
he should grant in his own name what the Council refused. Under the pretext of
removing difficulties and providing for some things omitted in the Compacts,
Sigismund promised that benefices should not be conferred by strangers outside
Bohemia and Moravia, but only by the king; that no Bohemian or Moravian should
be cited or be judged outside the kingdom; that those who preferred to
communicate under one kind only should, to avoid confusion, be tolerated only
in those places which had always maintained the old ritual; that the
archbishops and bishops should be elected by the Bohemian clergy and people.
These articles Sigismund promised to uphold “before the Council, the Pope, and
all men”. The legates of the Council strongly deprecated any secret
negotiations on the part of Sigismund; the Bohemians, relying on the promises
they had received, showed themselves more conciliatory. On July 14 they offered
to sign the Compacts with the addition of a clause, “Saving the liberties
and privileges of the kingdom and of the margravate of Moravia”. This the
legates would not accept, as it clearly carried the election of the archbishop
by the people and clergy. Sigismund answered the legates privately, and
besought them to consent, lest they should be the cause of a rupture, and woe
to them through whom that came. When the legates again refused, he angrily
said, "You of the Council have granted articles to the Bohemians, and have
held conferences without my knowledge, but I acquiesced. Why, then, will you
not acquiesce for my sake in this small matter? If you wish me to lose my
kingdom, I do not". He exclaimed in German to those around
him, “Those of Basel wish to do nothing except diminish the power of the
Pope and Emperor”. He showed his indignation by abruptly dismissing the
legates.
Sigismund’s anger cooled down, and the clause was
withdrawn. The Bohemians demanded the acceptance of various explanations of the
Compacts, which the legates steadily refused. At last the signing of the
Compacts was again deferred because the legates would not substitute, in the
article which declared that "the goods of the Church cannot be possessed
without guilt of sacrilege", the words “unjustly detained” (injuste
deteneri) for “possessed” (usurpari). On August 3 the
Bohemians departed, and the legates undertook to lay their demands before the
Council and meet them again at Prague in the end of September.
The Council’s envoys had acted faithfully by the
letter of their instructions; they had stood upon the Compacts, and had
refused to make any further concessions or even admit any material
explanations. The negotiations had therefore passed out of their hands into
those of Sigismund. The Compacts had laid the foundations of an agreement. The
Council had opened the door to concessions; and Sigismund was justified in
declaring that the Council could not claim to have the sole right of
interpreting the concessions so made or regulating the exact method of their
application. The proceedings at Brünn led the Bohemians to think that the
Council had dealt with them unfairly, and after begging them to accept the
Compacts as a means to further agreement, was now bent on doing its utmost to
make the Compacts illusory. The Bohemians therefore turned to Sigismund and
resolved to seek first for political unity, and then to maintain their own
interpretation of the Compacts by securing the organization of a national
Church according to their wishes. In this state of things the interests of the
Council and of Sigismund were no longer identical. The Council wished to
minimize the effect of the concessions which it had made— concessions which
were indeed necessary, yet might form a dangerous precedent in the Church.
Sigismund wished to obtain peaceable possession of Bohemia, and trusted to his
own cleverness afterwards to restore orthodoxy. The one thing that was rendered
tolerably certain by the conference at Brünn was the recognition of Sigismund
as King of Bohemia, and he was determined that the Council should not be an
obstacle in the way. At the same time Sigismund was rigidly attached to the
orthodox cause; but he was convinced that the reduction of Bohemia was a matter
for himself rather than the Council.
The proceedings with Sigismund at Brünn satisfied the
party in Bohemia, and the Diet, which met in Prague on September, ratified
all that had been done. The submission of Bohemia to the Church and to
Sigismund was finally agreed to on the strength of Sigismund's promises. A committee
of two barons, two knights, three citizens, and nine priests was appointed
to elect an archbishop and two suffragans. Their choice fell on John
of Rokycana as archbishop, Martin Lupak and Wenzel of Hohenmaut as
bishops. On December 21 the Bohemian envoys again met Sigismund and the legates
of the Council at Stuhlweissenburg. The legates had heard of Rokycana’s
election, though it was kept a secret pending Sigismund's confirmation. They
were perturbed by the understanding which seemed to exist between Sigismund and
the Bohemians. They had come from Basel empowered to change the words in the
Compacts as the Bohemians wished, and substitute “unjustly
detained” for “possessed”; but before doing so they demanded that
Sigismund should give them a written agreement for the strict observance of the
Compacts on his part. This was really a demand that Sigismund should declare
that he intended the promises which he had made to the Bohemians at Brünn to be
illusory. Meinhard ofNeuhaus, the chief of Sigismund’s partisans amongst the
Bohemians, was consulted on this point. He answered, “If the Emperor publicly
revoke his promises, all dealings with the Bohemians are at an end; if he
revoke them secretly, it will some day be known, and then the Emperor, if he
were in Bohemia, would be in great danger from the people”.
Accordingly Sigismund refused to sign the document
which the legates laid before him, and submitted another, which declared
generally his intention of abiding by the Compacts, but which did not
satisfy the legates. Sigismund referred the legates to the Bohemians, and they
accordingly demanded that the Bohemians should renounce all requests which they
had made contrary to the Compacts. This the Bohemians refused, and Sigismund
endeavored to lead the legates to a more conciliatory frame of mind by telling
them that dissimulation on many points was needful with the Bohemians, that he
might obtain the kingdom; when that was done, he would bring things back to
their former condition. The legates answered that their instructions from the
Council were to see that the Compacts were duly executed; when this was done,
the king's power would remain as it had always been; if the Bohemians wanted
more than the king could grant, they could seek further favours from the Council.
The question of the Emperor’s agreement with the Council again raised much
discussion. The Bohemians refused any responsibility in the matter.
“If there is ought between you and the legates”, they
said to Sigismund, “it is nothing to us, we neither give assent nor
dissent”.
The agreement was at last drawn up in general terms.
The legates contented themselves with Sigismund's verbal promise as to his
general intentions, and a written statement that he accepted the Compacts
sincerely according to their plain meaning, and would not permit that any one
be compelled to communicate under both kinds nor anything else to be done in
contradiction to the Compacts. Iglau was fixed by the Bohemians as a frontier
town in which the final signing of the Compacts might be quietly accomplished,
and the ambassadors departed on January 31, 1436, to reassemble at Iglau in the
end of May.
In all these negotiations the result had been to put
difficulties out of sight rather than to make any agreement. Since the
conference at Prague in 1433 no nearer approach had been made by the
Bohemians to the orthodoxy of the Council. They had rather strengthened
themselves in a policy by which they might obtain the advantages of peace and
union with the Church, and yet might retain the greatest possible measure of
ecclesiastical independence. This they hoped to secure by a strong national
organization, while Sigismund trusted that once in power he would be able to
direct the Catholic reaction; and the Council, after taking all possible steps
to save its dignity, was reluctantly compelled to trust to Sigismund's
assurance.
Sigismund appeared at Iglau on June 6; but the
Bohemians were on the point of departing in anger when they found that the
legates had come only with powers to sign the Compacts, not to confirm the
election of the Bohemian bishops. With some difficulty the Bohemians were
prevailed upon to accept Sigismund's promise that he would do his utmost to
obtain from the Council and the Pope a ratification of the election of the bishops
whom they had chosen. At last, on July 5, the Emperor, in his robes of state,
took his place on a throne in the market-place of Iglau. The Duke of Austria
bore the golden apple, the Count of Cilly the sceptre, and another count the
sword. Before Sigismund went the legates of the Council, and by them took their
places the Bohemian envoys. The signing of the Compacts was solemnly ratified
by both parties. John Walwar, a citizen of Prague, gave to the legates a copy
of the Compacts duly signed and sealed, together with a promise that the
Bohemians would accept peace and unity with the Church. Four Bohemian priests,
previously chosen for the purpose, took oath of obedience, shaking hands with
the legates and afterwards with Rokycana, to show that they held him as their
archbishop. Then the legates on their part handed a copy of the Compacts to the
Bohemians, admitting them to peace and unity with the Church, relieving them
from all ecclesiastical censures, and ordering all men to be at peace with them
and hold them clear of all reproach. Proclamation was made in Sigismund's name
that next day the Bohemians should enter the Church and the Compacts be
read in the Bohemian tongue. Then the Bishop of Coutances, in a loud clear
voice, began to sing the Te Deum, in which all joined with fervour.
When it was done, Sigismund and the legates entered the church for mass; the
Bohemians, raising a hymn, marched to their inn, where they held their service.
Both parties wept for joy at the ending of their long strife.
The next day showed that difficulties were not at an
end, that the peace was hollow, and that the main points of disagreement still
remained unsettled. In the parish church, the Bishop of Coutances celebrated
mass at the high altar, and John of Rokycana at a side altar. The Compacts were
read by Rokycana from the pulpit in the Bohemian tongue, then he added, “Let
those of the Bohemians who have the grace of communicating under both kinds
come to this altar”. The legates protested to the Emperor. John of Palomar cried
out, “Master John, observe the canons; do not administer the sacraments in
a church of which you are not priest”. Rokycana paid no heed, but administered
to seven persons. The legates were indignant at this violation of
ecclesiastical regulations, and said, “Yesterday you vowed canonical
obedience; today you break it. What is this?”. Rokycana answered that he was
acting in accordance with the Compacts, and paid little heed to the technical
objection raised by the legates. Sigismund urged the legates to grant a church,
or at least an altar, where the Bohemians might practise their own ritual. The
legates, who were irritated still more by hearing that Martin Lupak had carried
through the streets the sacrament under both kinds to a dying man, refused
their consent. The Bohemians bitterly exclaimed that they had been deceived,
and that the Compacts were illusory. They threatened to depart at once, and it
required all Sigismund’s skill in the management of men to prevail on the
Bohemians to stay till they had arranged the preliminaries about his reception
as King of Bohemia. The utmost concession that he could obtain from the legates
was that one priest might celebrate mass after the Bohemian ritual. They
refused to commission for this purpose either Rokycana or Martin Lupak, and
accepted Wenzel of Drachow, on condition that they should first examine him to
be sure of his orthodoxy. This Wenzel refused, and the Bohemians continued to
celebrate their own rites in their houses, as they had done previously.
Thus the long negotiations with the Council had led to
no real agreement. The signing of the Compacts was rather an expression on
both sides of the desire for peace, and for the outward unity of the Church,
than any settlement of the points at issue. The conception of a united
Christendom had not yet been destroyed, and both parties were willing to make
concessions to maintain it. But neither side abandoned their convictions, and
the peace which had been proclaimed affected only the outward aspect of
affairs. The Bohemians remained the victors. They had re-entered the Church on
condition that they were allowed an exceptional position. It remained for them
to make good the position which they had won, and use wisely and soberly the
means which they had at their disposal for this purpose.
In political matters also they saw the necessity of
abandoning their attitude of revolt, and entering again the State system of
Europe. They were willing to recognize Sigismund, but on condition that he
ensured the Bohemian nationality against German influences. On July 20
Sigismund agreed to ratify the rights and privileges of the Bohemians, to be
guided by the advice of a Bohemian Council, to uphold the University of Prague,
to admit none but Bohemians to office in the land, and to grant a full amnesty
for all that had happened during the revolt. On August 20 the Governor of
Bohemia, Ales of Riesenburg, laid down his office in Sigismund’s presence, and
the Bohemian nobles swore fidelity to their king. On August 23 Sigismund
entered Prague in state, and was received with joyous acclamations by the
people. The pacification of Bohemia was completed. The great work which Europe
had demanded of the Council was actually accomplished.
If we consider the deserts of the Council in this
matter, we see that its real importance lay in the fact that it could admit the
Bohemians to a conference without injuring the prestige of the Church. A Pope
could adopt no other attitude towards heretics than one of resolute resistance.
A Council could invite discussion, in which each party might engage with a firm
belief that it would succeed in convincing the other. The decree for reunion
with the Church arose from the exhaustion of Bohemia and its internal
dissensions; it found that it could no longer endure to pay the heavy price
which isolation from the rest of Europe involved on a small state. The temper
of the Bohemians was met with admirable tact and moderation by the Council
under the influence of Cesarini. Moral sympathy and not intellectual agreement
tended to bring the parties together. The impulse given at first was strong
enough to resist the reaction, when both parties found that they were not
likely to convince each other. But the religious motives tended to become
secondary to political considerations. The basis of conciliation afforded by
the negotiations with Basel was used by the peace party in Bohemia and by
Sigismund to establish an agreement between themselves. When this had been
done, the position of the Council was limited to one of resistance to the
extension of concessions to the Bohemians. The Council was thenceforth a
hindrance rather than a help to the unscrupulous policy of illusory
promises, which Sigismund had determined to adopt towards Bohemia till his
power was fully established. From this time the Council lost all political
significance for the Emperor, who was no longer interested in maintaining it
against the Pope, and felt aggrieved by its treatment of himself, as well as by
its democratic tendencies, which threatened the whole State system of Europe.
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