READING HALL

THE DOORS OF WISDOM

A HISTORY OF MODERN EUROPE : A.D. 1453-1900

CHAPTER LXXIII.

THE FRANCO-GERMAN WAR

THE attention of Europe was diverted from unhappy Poland by other scenes of injustice, though not of equal atrocity—the German war against Denmark, and mutilation of that kingdom. The Danish constitution of 1855 was a source of constant disputes with Germany, but we shall pass them over till the year 1863, when they were brought to a crisis. With the view of getting rid of German interference, Holstein, a member of the German Bund, was declared, by a Danish ordinance of March 23rd, to be autonomous and only person­ally united with Denmark. This measure, it was stated in the preamble, was in accordance with the demands of the German Bund, but not to be considered definitive. In fact, however, the Germans wanted something more. They desired that Schleswig, as well as Holstein, should be autonomous, and that the two duchies should be united; and they asserted that in thus separating their constitutions, it was the purpose of Denmark to annex Schleswig. Nor was this charge with­out some colour. In the preceding January the Danish States, or Rigsdag, had voted an address to the King that he should persist in his endeavours to draw Schleswig to Denmark, to which probably he was not disinclined. And the marriage of Alexandra, daughter of Christian of Glücksburg, who, by the Treaty of London, 1852, had been recognized as heir to the Danish throne, to the Prince of Wales (March 10th, 1863), may have encouraged the aspirations of the Danish court by the hopes of a strong alliance.

In the following August Austria and Prussia demanded that the Danish constitution of 1855 should be abrogated; that the project of a new constitution should be submitted to an assembly of the four Danish States, viz., Denmark proper, Schleswig, Holstein, and Lauenburg; and that all four assemblies should be on a footing of equality. A manifest injustice; since Lauenburg, with its population of 50,000 souls, would thus become equal to Denmark. And they further demanded that the mixed Danish and German populations of Schleswig should be put on the same footing as before 1848.

Negotiations ensued which came to nothing. On the 1st October the Bund resolved on federal execution in Holstein, and Denmark was summoned to withdraw the March ordinance within a month. But Denmark was proceeding in a contrary direction. On the 13th of November the Rigsraad passed a law for a new Assembly, to consist of deputies from Denmark and Schleswig only, to the exclusion of Holstein and Lauenburg. This certainly tended to the incorporation of Schleswig, but was not actually such, as both States were to preserve their particular constitutions.

The question entered into a new phase by the death of the weak and incapable King Frederick VII, November 15th, only two days after the passing of the new law. He was succeeded by Christian IX, the Protocol King, as he was called, of the Treaty of London. But the duchies were claimed by Prince Frederick of Schleswig-Holstein-Sonderburg-Augustenburg, a major in the Prussian army, though, as we have seen, his father had renounced all claim to them, both for himself and children. But the Prince maintained that he was not bound by this renunciation; the Holsteiners recognized him, and the majority of the German Bund supported him. Austria and Prussia, which had signed the London Protocol, could not openly join this movement, so they affected the part of mediators. But the Prussian Parliament addressed the king to disregard the Protocol and recognize Augustenburg, who was also supported by the Nationalverein, the Gross Deutschland Reformverein, and the Particularists, as they were called, or opponents of unity, who wanted a Triad, and would have been glad to see another State added. The more outspoken Germans confessed that they were moved by interested views, for the Danish do­minions contained some fine ports which they coveted.

Christian IX being summoned by the Bund to withdraw the law of November 13th, requested time, as a constitutional sovereign, to assemble and consult the Danish Rigsraad; but this was unreasonably refused, and it was resolved to proceed to federal execution. Austria and Prussia, in a joint letter to the Piet, December 5th, stated that they could not violate the Treaty of London, “so long as they recognized its validity” and as that Treaty protected Schleswig, they recommended the Diet to confine themselves to execution in Holstein, while they would take the case of Schleswig into their own con­sideration. This unexpected agreement of the two great Powers excited much surprise, and at first sight, indeed, appears strange enough. But we have already seen that Austria, at this period governed by Count Rechberg, was bent on conciliating Prussia. She wanted also to watch over and control Prussia, and to prevent her from enjoying alone the fruits of victory. On the other hand, though Prussian interests coincided with those of Germany, the democrats in the Prussian Parliament accused the government of returning to the policy of Olmütz, and refused a grant for the war.

By order of the Diet, at the instigation of Austria and Prussia, 12,000 Saxon and Hanoverian troops, forming the army for federal execution, entered Holstein, December 23rd. This was a clear breach of the Treaty of London by the kings of Saxony and Hanover; for those sovereigns, as well as the King of Würtemberg, had acceded to the Treaty, though the German Bund had not. At the same time Austrian and Prussian troops were posted on the Danish frontier as a reserve. The Danes evacuated Holstein, by advice of the neutral Powers; Duke Frederick VIII, of Augustenburg, was proclaimed there, and joined the army of the Bund at Kiel. Prussia connived at this illegal proceeding, though Austria protested. Those Powers had now rejected the Treaty of London, which they had recognized at the beginning of December. On the 14th of January, 1864, they moved the Diet that Denmark should be required to suspend the November constitution within forty-eight hours, and that in case of refusal Schleswig should be occupied as a pledge. England and Russia advised the revocation, but Christian IX again pleaded that he must await the sanction of his Rigsraad. Hereupon it was proposed by the neutral Powers that a Protocol should be made in the names of France, Great Britain, Russia, and Sweden, recording the intention of the Danish Government to make the required concession; but this was also refused by the German Powers, on the ground that if they should stop short after preparing to invade Schleswig, they would be exposed to disturbance and revolution in Germany. In short, they were already resolved to appropriate Schleswig. Bismarck, on being asked whether his Government still adhered to the Treaty of London, gave a vague and equivocating answer. The view in Berlin was that if Schleswig resisted it would lead to war, and that war put an end to treaties. So that a strong Power may release herself from her engagements by making an unprovoked and unjustifiable aggression. For Bismarck himself had declared in the Prussian Chambers, in April, 1849, that the war then pro­secuted against Denmark was a highly unjust, frivolous, and disastrous one, to support an entirely groundless revolution.

The affairs of Denmark had long engaged the attention of the British Cabinet. Lord John Russell, then Foreign Minister, had protested, in 1860, against the interference the Germans in Schleswig. In January, 1862, he had energetically reproved the proceedings of Prussia, but in the summer of that year he accompanied the Queen to Gotha, the centre of the German Schleswig-Holstein agitation, where his opinions seem to have undergone a change. In the autumn he charged the Danish Government with neglecting their engagements as to Schleswig, and proposed to them a new constitution, which would have tended to the dissolution of the monarchy. It is unnecessary to describe it, as Lord Palmerston, then Prime Minister, pronounced it impractic­able. In the autumn of 1863, when matters threatened an open rupture, Lord Russell, who seems again to have changed his views, addressed notes to the Frankfurt Diet, intimating, in a haughty tone, that Great Britain could not remain an indifferent spectator of German pretensions. On the 28th of December the English Cabinet sent a copy of the Treaty of London to the Frankfurt Diet, and invited the European Powers to a Congress, to discuss the Danish question. France at once declined. Only a little before England had rejected Napoleon’s proposal for a Congress about Polish affairs. That refusal was no doubt a wise one, for the French Emperor proposed to open up the Treaties of 1815, and consequently the whole state of Europe, which would have caused endless debate and confusion. But the abrupt style of the reply, which the French characterized as brutal, had given as much offence as the refusal itself. The conduct of France, however, throughout this Danish business was very equivocal, and the key of it must be sought in some disclosures made by Bismarck in 1870. Napoleon III had formed the project of playing the same game with the Prussian Minister as he had done with Cavour, and of getting an accession of French territory by helping Prussia in the same way. With this view a Secret Treaty between France and Prussia had been drawn up by Count Benedetti, the French Minister, which Bismarck neither accepted nor positively rejected. In fact, he played the political jilt, and led on Napoleon with false hopes till such a course no longer served his purposes. Thus Denmark, a little State of less than four million souls, was left alone face to face with her gigantic adversaries; for Russia, employed in stamping out the embers of the Polish revolt, naturally had no compunction for her, nay, may have even felt a secret satisfaction that the acts of the Germans afforded some countenance to her own conduct towards Poland.

Lord Russell renewed his applications to France in January, 1864, and proposed material aid, and at the same time he addressed threatening notes to the minor German Powers. Drouyn de l’Huys, the French Minister at War, contented himself in reply with recommending “benevolent” counsels at Vienna and Berlin. Von Beust, the Saxon Minister, told Lord Russell that no foreign Power had a right to interfere between the Bund and Holstein, one of its States.

The two great German Powers did not scruple to extend their operations beyond Holstein. The Prussian army, under General Wrangel, entered Schleswig, February 1st. By the 19th they had seized Holding. To the remonstrances of the English Cabinet Bismarck replied, that this had been done without orders, but nevertheless the occupation would be continued. The Danes had extended and strengthened the celebrated rampart called the Dannevirke, which stretched forty English miles from the mouth of the Schlei to Friedrichstadt, having the town of Schleswig for its centre. Behind this fortification the Danish army, 50,000 or 60,000 strong, under De Meza, was posted. The Prussians, under Gablenz, having been repulsed in an assault, it was determined to turn the position. Their right wing, under Prince Frederick Charles, took Eckernforde, crossed the Schlei at Arnis, and having thus gotten into De Meza’s rear, he was forced to abandon the Dannevirke, with sixty guns, and retire by Flensborg to Düppel. For this unavoidable act he was superseded by General von Gerlach. Düppel, also a strong place, after a long and brave defence was taken by assault, April 18th. Meanwhile the Austrians had occupied the northern parts of Schleswig, and Duke Frederick was proclaimed there as he had been in Holstein.

In consequence of the German victories a Conference of the Great Powers had been summoned to meet at London, and was opened under the presidency of Lord John Russell, April 25th. Napoleon had insisted that the Bund should be repre­sented, though it had been no party to the Treaty of London, and Von Beust was appointed to represent it. A month’s truce was obtained, May 12th. Prussia required that the duchies should be separated from Denmark, leaving open the question of a personal union. As the Danes would not consent, Prussia joined Austria and Saxony in demanding the duchies for Duke Frederick of Augustenburg. Lord Russell now declared that, in order to satisfy Germany, it would be necessary to separate Holstein, Lauenburg, and the southern part of Schleswig from Denmark, and he proposed a line from the Dannevirke and the mouth of the Schlei, the rest of Denmark to be guaranteed by Europe. France assented, with the proviso that the inhabitants of Schleswig should choose their own sovereign by a plébiscite, which was afterwards modified to a vote of the communities. Denmark accepted this line, but Austria and Prussia claimed a more northerly one, from Apenrade to Tondern, and on this point the Conference failed. Thus England tore up the Treaty of 1852, and agreed to the dismemberment of Denmark.

And now that the question was reduced to a strip of land containing some 125,000 or 130,000 souls, Lord Russell pro­posed to France that they should go to war to maintain the line he had laid down. Drouyn de l’Huys asked, very sensibly, whether, after suffering Denmark to be disintegrated, it would be worth while to go to war now for so trifling an object; and he observed that though only a naval demonstration was proposed, such a course affected France and England very differently, for the French frontier would be endangered, while England would run no risk of the sort. Was Lord Russell prepared to give France unlimited support? He seemed to think that a threat would suffice, but such a calculation might fail. Before the deplorable result of the Polish business, the authority of the two Powers had not been lowered, but now words without blows would be fatal to their dignity. It must be allowed that this of itself was a sufficient and states­manlike answer to the English proposal; but France, as we have already mentioned, had also other secret motives for the policy she adopted.

Denmark had accepted a fortnight’s prolongation of the armistice, although she had the best of the naval war, on the understanding that England would adhere to the line of demarcation which she had laid down. But Lord Russell, after he had failed in his application to France, proposed to refer it to arbitration! Bishop Monrad, President of the Lower House of the Danish Rigsraad, said in his place: “I cannot explain how this proposal was consistent with Earl Russell’s promise.” It is indeed very difficult of explanation, except as a means of escaping from an embarrassing position.

The abortive Conference broke up June 25th, with a painful scene. Von Quaade, the Danish Plenipotentiary, reproached the English Ministers with abandoning Denmark after having encouraged her to resist. Lord Clarendon replied that England had promised nothing, which was no doubt literally true; yet all her conduct had been such as to inspire the Danes with the expectation that she would help them. It is a sad chapter in England’s history. War is a dreadful thing and to be avoided if possible; even the doctrine of peace at any price is intelligible, if accepted with its consequences— isolation, contempt, at last probably absorption by some more warlike Power. But to be determined on peace, and yet to attempt dictation, is as absurd as it is dangerous. Cobden, the consistent represent­ative of the Manchester school, applauded the policy of keeping aloof; but he complained that the want of sagacity of the Foreign Minister had exposed him to rebuffs and the country to humiliation. Apologists of the Ministry allege that the inaction of England was in a large measure due to the fact that English statesmen and public writers found, when they looked into the matter, that the Danes were substantially in wrong. If this be so, it makes the matter worse, for the Ministry must have been treating the subject some years without having looked into it; and in this happy state of ignorance they, at the very last moment, brought the country to the brink of a war about it! Perhaps a better apology for them may be, that they seem to have been embarrassed by the pacific policy of the Peelite section of the Cabinet, led by Gladstone. England, as a French writer observes, in spite of splendid budgets, was made bankrupt in reputation. In the debates which ensued on the subject in Parliament, the Ministry were beaten in the Lords, and escaped in the Commons only by a majority of eighteen. We now return to the war.

The allies overran Jutland, but refrained from crossing over to Funen. Christian IX.was now compelled to sue for peace, and preliminaries were signed at Vienna, August 1st. Christian, as rightful heir, ceded Holstein and Schleswig to Austria and Prussia, yet at the London Conference they demanded them for Duke Augustenburg! Bavaria, Saxony, and Hesse-Darmstadt demanded that Schleswig should be incorporated with the German Confederation; but the claims of the Bund were contemptuously set aside. Austria and Prussia had used it as a stalking-horse, and permitted it to appear at the London Conference ; but when the booty was to be divided the phantom disappeared. Bismarck instructed the Prussian Ambassador in London to express a hope that the British Government would recognize the moderation and placability of the two German Powers, which had no wish to dismember the ancient and venerable Danish monarchy, but merely to separate from it parts with which further union was impossible. Lord Russell despatched a very just and well-written remonstrance; to which Bismarck gave no heed. On the 1st of December Austria and Prussia, in a joint note, summoned the Bund to withdraw from countries which belonged to them by right of conquest; and the Hanoverian and Saxon troops evacuated Holstein.

Thus the one-headed and two-headed eagles had seized their prey, but they were soon to quarrel about the division of the spoil. At first they held joint possession, and in January, 1865, they established in the town of Schleswig a Government in common for both duchies. But such a state of things could of course only be provisory. Austria, having little or no interest in those distant countries, would willingly have traded on the situation to get an extension of territory at the expense of Bavaria, and overtures were made to Bismarck to that effect; who, however, did not entertain them. He felt himself to be master of the situation. Austria feared to break with him. For, besides her internal troubles, she dreaded the resentment of Russia about the Polish business; the Venetian question threatened an alliance between Prussia and Italy, and the friendship of France was ill-assured. Prussia now required to be put in possession of so much territory as would enable her to protect the coast and harbours. But for this purpose, the military system of the duchies must be an integral part of that of Prussia. She must have a military road through Holstein, and the soldiery must take an oath to King William I. The duchies were to be admitted into the Zollverein, from which Austria was excluded. Rendsborg was indeed to be a federal fortress, garrisoned by Austrians and Prussians; but, on the other hand, the important port of Kiel was to be exclusively Prussian. All this was virtually little less than annexation.

Thus little account was taken of the people themselves in whose interests the conquest had been ostensibly made ; and not only the Schleswigers but the Holsteiners also, began to regret their former connection with Denmark. In December, 1864, the inhabitants of Schleswig, in a farewell address to Christian IX, expressed their sorrow at being separated from “the mild rule of the Danish Kings.” The Prussians do not appear to have mitigated the acerbity of their political pretensions by conciliatory manners. When they entered Jutland they had not only amerced it in a heavy contribution and the supply of necessaries for the army, but also demanded luxuries for the officers, as wine, cigars, tobacco, etc. A kind of secret government under the Duke of Augustenburg was formed at Kiel, which was protected by Austria and supported by the German democrats with money as well as noisy demonstrations. But in the midst of the hubbub, Prussia quietly took posses­sion of Kiel, March 24th, 1865.

Austria had begun to perceive that she was being made a cat’s paw. The unpopularity of the Prussian Government seemed to offer a favourable opportunity for resisting their pretensions. The Prussian Lower House opposed all Bis­marck’s measures, refused to pay the costs of the Prussian victories, and assailed him with the coarsest personal abuse. A new Assembly followed the same course. Austria now supported in the Diet the Duke of Augustenburg; while Prussia brought forward the claims of the Duke of Oldenburg, and even revived some obsolete ones of her own. Bavaria, Saxony, and Hesse-Darmstadt, moved the Diet that the question of a ruler should be decided by a general representative Assembly of the duchies freely elected. But, well aware that the public feeling there was averse to Prussia, Bismarck declared that he would adhere to the Treaty of Vienna, and that, if the States were convoked, they must do homage to the Emperor of Austria and the King of Prussia. He perceived that Aus­tria must again be hoodwinked. The King of Prussia met the Emperor of Austria at Bad Gastein, and after some ne­gotiations the Convention of Gastein was effected, August 14th. It was nothing but a prolonged provisorium. Holstein was to be administered by Austria, Schleswig by Prussia, Lauenburg was made over to Prussia, she paying Austria 2,1/2 millions Danish rix-dollars. But though the Lauenburgers had consented to the transfer, it does not appear what right Austria had to sell them. The other articles were conformable to the Prussian demands already mentioned, except that Kiel was to be a federal port. The King of Prussia was invested with the sovereignty of Lauenburg at Ratzeburg, September 27th, on which occasion Bismarck was made a Count.

This Convention has been justly styled the Austrian Olmütz. It is said to have had secret articles, by which Austria was to have a slice of Bavaria if she remained true to the Prussian alliance. The allies let the Diet know that all future negotiations about Schleswig-Holstein would be conducted without their participation. The Duke of Augustenburg entered into some mean negotiations with the Prussian Government with the view of retaining his sovereignty. But Bismarck had obtained from the Prussian crown lawyers a decision that his right, if it had ever existed, was abrogated by the Peace of Vienna. Thus he had been by turns opposed, upheld, and deserted by Prussia, as it suited her views. Both the French and English Foreign Ministers denounced the Gastein Convention in unmeasured terms, the former calling it worthy of the darkest epochs of history. The Convention was a natural consequence of French and English policy. The Nationalverein also protested, and the Frankfurt Deputies branded the acts of Austria and Prussia as unworthy of civilized nations. It was at Gastein, while professing friendship to Austria, that Bismarck began his negotiations with Italy.

Austria was in a false position. She sought to circumvent Prussia by making herself popular in the duchies. Gablenz, her governor in Holstein, was much more loved than Manteuffel, the Prussian governor of Schleswig. With the same view she encouraged the pretensions of Augustenburg; though this was clearly contrary to the Treaty of Vienna and the Convention of Gastein, by which alone she had a footing in Holstein. And to prepare for the inevitable struggle—for it was evident that the present arrangements could not last—she began to set her own affairs in order.

The most material point was to conciliate the Hungarians. Francis Joseph went to Pesth in July, and as a pledge of his good intentions made some changes in the ministry. The unpopular imperial constitution was suspended by a decree of September 20th. At the reopening of the Reichstag in November, 1864, which had been intermitted during the Danish war, the Bohemians absented themselves, as well as the Hungarians and Croats. The empire was now divided into two portions east and west of the Leitha, Count Mailath being set over the former, and Count Belcredi over the latter. But this plan gave even less satisfaction than that which it superseded, and was opposed by all the provinces except Tyrol. The Hungarians addressed the Emperor for the restoration of their ancient constitution, with only a personal union; demands which he would not then concede. To conciliate the Venetians, a general amnesty was granted, and exiles were permitted to return (January 1st, 1866). The Italians looked on these concessions as a sign of weakness, for war between Austria and Prussia was beginning to appear inevitable.

Division of the Austrian Empire. Treaty between Prussia and Italy, 1866.

It is hardly worth while to inquire which Power was the actual aggressor. Prussia appears to have opened the diplomatic correspondence which ended in war; but Austria gave the occasion for it. She had allowed a great popular meeting at Altona in favour of Augustenburg, which demanded the assembling of the Holstein States. Prussia regarded this as a traitorous act, and Bismarck addressed a note to Vienna (January 26th), in which he accused Austria of promoting demagogic anarchy and of being aggressive and revolutionary! Austria declared she would not be dictated to as to her government of Holstein. Bismarck had observed in the Diet in the preceding August that whoever had Schleswig must have Holstein also; and he carried out his policy of annexation amidst the most violent opposition from the Lower Chamber, and in spite of the fears of the King and Court. So unpopular was he become with the democrats that an attempt was made on his life.

Both Powers began to arm. In the middle of March Austria sent large bodies of Hungarians into Bohemia on the pretext of disturbances there, and in a circular called on the minor States to prepare themselves for war. Prussia, on her side, armed the Silesian fortresses, and sounded the middle States whether they would be inclined to side with her. She found but few adherents among them. They were in favour of particularismus, and dreaded her absorbing tendencies and warlike propensities. Bismarck must therefore look abroad for allies. In the preceding summer he had made a commercial treaty between the Zollverein and Italy. While still negotiating with Austria he assured her, April 5th, that nothing was further from his intentions than an attack on Italy, and on the 8th he signed an alliance with Victor Emanuel! General Govone had arrived in Berlin in the middle of March to arrange it. But it had been concocted long before. In opening the new Italian legislature, November 18th, 1865, the King had hinted at an approaching change, which would permit Italy to complete her destinies. Bismarck now began to show his hand more openly. On April 9th, only a day after signing the Italian treaty, Prussia demanded in the Frankfurt Diet a Parliament elected by universal suffrage to discuss federal reform.

In May, Napoleon III renewed his secret negotiations with Prussia, proposing to help her with 300,000 men against Austria, and to procure for her additional territories comprising from six to eight million souls, in return for certain cessions on the Rhine. But Bismarck, fortified by the Italian alliance, thought that he might attain his ends without the help of France. He seems now to have definitely dismissed Napoleon’s suit, and to have told him, like another male jilt of antiquity, “Haud haec in foedera veni.” The history is somewhat obscure; but the French Emperor seems now to have turned his attentions towards Austria, and to have made a secret treaty with that Power, which, among other things, included the cession of Venetia to France. Thus baffled by Prussia, Napoleon resorted to his familiar scheme of proposing a Conference of all the Great Powers; but Austria would not consent to any discussion of boundaries, and so the project came to nothing.

More negotiations went on between Austria and Prussia, containing wonderful insults on both sides: “Very instructive,” says Rustow, “for populations that would learn something.” Among these amenities was a circular of Bismarck’s accusing Austria of provoking a war with a view to help her finances either by Prussian contributions or an honourable bankruptcy! This circular was occasioned by Austria having preferred in the Diet, June 1st, a string of accusations against Prussia; declaring at the same time that she was ready to submit the decision of the Schleswig-Holstein question to that assembly, and stating that she had directed the Governor of Holstein to summon the States, that so the wishes of the people might be known. Bismarck denied the competence of the Diet, as at present constituted, to decide the question, and denounced Austria’s appeal to it, and the assembling of the Holstein States, as breaches of the Gastein Convention. In an extraordinary sitting of the Diet, June 11th, Austria, on her side, denounced Prussia as having violated that Convention, and demanded that the Federal Army, with the exception of the Prussian contingent, should be mobilized within a fortnight. Before the Diet had resolved on a definitive answer, Bismarck proposed to the different German Governments a scheme of federal reform, of which the principal features were that Austria and the Netherlands should be excluded from the Bund, and that the federal troops should be divided into a northern and a southern army, the first to be commanded by the King of Prussia, the second by the King of Bavaria. But the coup de maître was that the constitution of the new Bund was to be settled by a Parliament elected by universal suffrage! The Conservative Minister who had lately denounced the milder proceedings of Austria as democratic and anarchical, assumed the national cockade, adopted the programme of the Nationalverein, substituted for the vote of an Assembly of sovereign princes that of the populace, and proposed to make feudal William I, king by the grace of God, head of Germany, by the will of the people! Thus both Powers displayed the grossest inconsistencies. Bismarck, whilst advocating a democratic Constitution for Germany, showed at Berlin his contempt for the Prussian people and for the Parliament, refused to allow in the duchies any other right but that of conquest, and forbade the convening of the Holstein States to settle their own government; whilst Austria, which had ignored the Bund, in the Treaties of Vienna and Gastein, now appealed to its decisions, and supported the pretensions of the Duke of Augustenburg, which she had repudiated in those treaties as well as in that of London!

Meanwhile matters were coming to a practical issue. Gablenz, the Austrian Governor of Holstein, called an assembly of the States for June 11th, whilst Manteuffel, the Prussian Governor of Schleswig, was directed, if such an assembly were summoned, to enter Holstein with his troops, supported by the Prussian fleet. Manteuffel invaded Holstein, June 8th, and the Austrians, being too weak to resist, retired through Hamburg and Harburg into Hanover. Augustenburg fled, and Prussia then appointed Von Scheel Plessen Governor of Schleswig-Holstein.

The definitive answer of the Diet to Austria’s demand for mobilization was given June 14th, when there appeared to be nine votes for Austria and six for Prussia. Those for Prussia were the Netherlands, all the free towns except Frankfurt, and the rest were minor duchies. Hereupon the Prussian envoy, after stating his case against Austria, declared the Bund dissolved, and signifying Prussia’s readiness to form a new Bund with States so inclined, left the Assembly. Such was the end of the Confederation of 1815. Next day the war broke out. Prussia sent her ultimatum to Saxony, Hanover, and Electoral Hesse, which had voted against her, giving them twelve hours to answer; and as her proposals were not accepted, war was declared. There was no formal declaration of war against Austria.

Austria had regarded Prussia with contempt; such also was the feeling in France, and perhaps throughout Europe. The Prussian army was looked upon as a mere Landwehr, or militia, totally unfit for offensive warfare. But Bismarck had long been preparing for the conflict. In spite of persistent parliamentary opposition, Prussia had a fund of thirty million thalers in specie to begin the war. Every other preparation had been carefully made. The service of the railroads and telegraphs had been completely organized. The troops were armed with a new needle-gun, which enabled them to fire four or five times for the enemy’s once. Accurate maps had been made of the future theatre of war, which were in possession of all the officers ; so that a Frenchman who accompanied the Prussian army describes them as manoeuvring on the enemy’s territory as on a parade ground. The Prussian railways were more numerous and convenient than the Austrian. Add that the Prussian troops were concentrated, while the Austrians were scattered; that they consisted wholly of Germans ani­mated with patriotism, whilst the Austrian army was for the greater part composed of Poles, Hungarians, Italians, Bohe­mians, Croats, etc., many of whom served unwillingly. For the sake of security the various regiments had been intermixed, though none of the privates and few of the officers could understand one another. Nothing had been done to improve the army, which was on the old and obsolete footing, though the artillery was the finest in Europe. Austria, too, as Bismarck was well aware, was ill prepared, and embarrassed by financial and other difficulties. She had sent 164,000 of her best troops to defend Venetia, and the Italians had declared war almost simultaneously with Prussia.

A fortnight after mobilization had been ordered, Prussia had 326,000 men under arms. Of the extraordinary campaign which followed, the military reader will, of course, seek the details in the proper authorities; we can here give only the general outlines. Some 60,000 men, under Von Falkenstein, were to act in Westphalia and the Rhenish provinces against the hostile States of the Confederation. The remainder of the troops, with 900 guns, under the command in chief of the King, was to be employed in Bohemia. It was in three divisions: one, under the Prince Royal, was posted in Silesia; the other two, under Prince Frederick Charles and General Herwarth, were to enter Bohemia through Saxony, and, marching eastwards, to form a junction with the Prince Royal. The whole campaign was conducted by Von Moltke. The Prussian problem was to insure the communication between their forces in the east and west, to circumscribe the two theatres of operations, and to prevent the Bavarians from forming a junction with the Austrians. The Austrian army, consisting, including the Saxons, of 240,000 men, under Field­ Marshal Benedek, stretched from Cracow to Prague, through Prerau, Olmütz, and Pardubitz.

Campaign of 1866

We will first cast a glance at the operations in the west, of 1866. Falkenstein seized Cassel and the Elector himself, who was carried to Stettin, June 24th, while the electoral army retired to Fulda. Hanover, with its territory, was next occupied; blind King George, with his army of about 18,000 men, retreating by way of Gotha and Eisenach, with a view to join the Bavarians. Falkenstein, reinforced by Manteuffel and his Prussians from Holstein, after some manoeuvring and a bloody battle at Langensalza, surrounded the Hanoverians at Warza, June 29th, and obliged them to capitulate. King George was allowed to retire whither he pleased except into his own do­minions; his troops were disarmed and sent home. Thus the Prussian communications were established, and the coalition disorganized.

In the east the Prussians, under Herwarth, entered Saxony, June 16th, when the Saxon army evacuated that country and joined the Austrians in Bohemia. By the 20th all Saxony was in the hands of the Prussians, and Dresden occupied by a reserve brought from Berlin. Meanwhile Benedek had remained inactive. He expected that the main attack would be from Silesia, and that only a demonstration would be made from Saxony, so he fixed his head-quarters at Josefstadt, where he was within easy march of the Silesian frontier. This mistake was fatal. To arrest the Prussian march from Saxony he had posted Clam Gallas, with only about 60,000 men, including the Saxons, at Munchengrätz, who, thus isolated, was exposed to the main Prussian force.

The Prince Royal, having the difficult task of bearing the brunt of the Austrian attack on defiling through the passes of Silesia, waited till the other two armies had entered Bohemia. These were to march to the Iser, while the Silesian army followed the right bank of the Upper Elbe; then, by a converging march on Gitschin and Königshof, the united force was to direct itself on Vienna, by Pardubitz and Brünn. The armies of Prince Frederick Charles and Herwarth entered Bohemia by Gabel and Reichenberg, both directing themselves on Munchengrätz. After one or two fights, especially at Podol, where the Austrians were literally mowed down, the two armies formed a junction. Clam Gallas, threatened by a superior force, retired from Munchengrätz towards Gitschen, but being defeated in a hard fought battle, retreated to Königgrätz.

Benedek now saw his mistake, and resolved to recover the line of the Iser. But this design was arrested by the movements of the Prince Royal, who, having discovered Benedek’s plan, after a demonstration at Neisse, entered Bohemia in three columns; the right by Landshut and Trautenau, the centre by Wunschelburg and Braunau, the left by Reinerz and Nachod. Benedek’s danger now stared him in the face; yet he did nothing effectual to check the Prussian advance, and contented himself with taking up a strong position at Königinhof.

Battle Sadowa 1866.

After some fierce battles, especially at Nachod, the Silesian army forced the passes, and, advancing on Königinhof, drove the Austrians from it, June 29th. On the same day Clam Gallas was compelled to evacuate Gitschin. In the evening the armies of the Prince Royal and of Prince Frederick Charles formed a junction on the Upper Elbe. Herwarth also came up, and the three united armies formed a line of battle of three leagues, facing that part of the Elbe which runs from Josefstadt to Königgrätz. Benedek had concentrated his troops before the latter place. A great battle was now in­evitable. The King of Prussia had arrived, and fixed his head-quarters at Gitschin. On the 2nd of July was fought the Battle of Sadowa. The Austrians were completely defeated, and fled towards the Elbe; the bridges sufficed not for their passage; thousands were drowned, while the Prussian artillery, playing on them from the heights, destroyed thousands more. King William and Bismarck, as a landwehr cuirassier, personally took part in the battle. The Austrians lost 4,861 killed, 13,920 wounded, about 20,000 prisoners, 7 colours, and 160 guns. The Prussian loss was not much more than half that number. Benedek retreated, first to Olmütz, then to Pressburg, followed by the Prince Royal. Gablenz’s corps and the Austrian cavalry retreated towards Vienna by Brun, pursued by the other two Prussian armies.

The Archduke Albert, the victor of Custozza, had been hastily recalled from Italy to take command of all the Austrian forces, which he stationed on the left bank of the Danube. By the 18th of July the King of Prussia had advanced his head­quarters to Nikolsburg, within ten miles of Vienna; so much had the Prussians achieved in twenty-five days after entering Bohemia. The French Emperor had offered his mediation, which was accepted on condition of an armistice, during which the preliminaries of a peace should be arranged. These were signed at Nikolsburg, July 26th, on the following bases: Austria was to leave the German Confederation, to recognize Prussia’s acquisitions in the North, and the new constitution which she meant to propose for the Bund; but she consented to no cessions, except Venetia, and required that Saxony, the only State that had given her any material aid, should be restored in her integrity. Prussia undertook that Italy should adhere to the peace, after she was put in possession of Venetia.

Meanwhile in the West, Falkenstein, after defeating the Bavarians and Hessians in several little battles, entered Frankfurt, July 16th, which Prince Alexander of Hesse had abandoned. Falkenstein took possession of this ancient city, as well as of Nassau and Upper Hesse, in the name of King William I. The Prussians had long owed the Frankfurters a grudge; the rich bankers and merchants of the free city had been used to speak with contempt of the poverty-stricken squireens of the North. The Prussian exactions were terrible, and made in the most arrogant and brutal manner. They were repeated by Manteuffel, who succeeded Falkenstein at Frankfurt. The burgomaster is said to have committed suicide. Manteuffel continued the war, and defeated the Bavarians on the Tauber, July 25th. On the 27th Marienberg was attacked, and the citadel blown up. The Prussians had also achieved other successes in this quarter, and before they heard of the armistice, were in possession of Darmstadt, and had entered Würtemberg.

Peace of Prague, 1866.

The definitive Peace of Prague, signed August 23rd, confirmed the preliminaries of Nikolsburg. Besides the articles mentioned, the Emperor of Austria transferred to the King of Prussia his claims on Schleswig-Holstein, with the reserve that the inhabitants of North Schleswig were to be retransferred to Denmark if they expressed such a wish by a free vote. Prussia confirmed the existence of the Kingdom of Saxony, but it was to belong to the new Northern Bund, on conditions to be arranged by special treaty. The clause respecting the retransfer of the North-Schleswigers, as well as the imaginary division of Germany into two parts, north and south of the Main, appear to have been inserted in the preliminaries through the French mediation. But Bismarck ultimately evaded the execution of the retransfer, and in the negotiations with Denmark on the subject, maintained that he was not bound to her, as she bad not signed the Treaty of Prague, but solely to Austria!

Bismarck had received the plenipotentiaries of the Middle States with great hauteur at Nikolsburg. He would treat with them only separately. With Von Beust, the Saxon Minister, who was highly disagreeable to the Prussian Court, Bismarck would not treat at all, and he was obliged to resign. The Prussian treaty with Saxony left her little more than a geographical integrity and a nominal autonomy. Prussia was to direct her military organization; the Saxon garrisons were to be of mixed troops, but that of Königstein entirely Prussian. Saxon diplomacy at foreign courts was also to be placed under Prussian control. She, as well as Bavaria, Würtemberg, Baden, and Hesse, had to pay heavy indemnities. Bavaria had also to cede districts near Orb in the Spessart and Kaulsdorf, and an enclave near Ziegenruck. Hesse-Darm­stadt ceded the landgraviate of Hesse-Homburg, with pieces of territory to complete Prussian communications with Wetzler. The districts of Hesse-Cassel, north of the Main, were to form part of the new northern Confederation.

Ad interim treaties of alliance, offensive and defensive, were signed between Prussia and the States that were to form the new Northern Bund, till its constitution should be definitely settled. A Congress for that purpose was opened at Berlin, December 15th, and the new federal Pact was signed, February 8th, 1867. The subscribing States were, besides Prussia and Lauenburg, Saxony, Mecklenburg-Schwerin, Mecklenburg-Strelitz, Saxe-Weimar, Oldenburg, Brunswick, Saxe-Meiningen, Saxe-Altenburg, Saxe-Coburg-Gotha, Anhalt, Schwarzburg-Rudolstadt, Schwarzburg-Sondershausen, Waldeck, the two Reuss, Schaumburg-Lippe, Lubeck, Bremen, Hamburg, and Grand Ducal Hesse north of the Main; Luxembourg and Limburg were left out. Saxony, the only State likely to offer opposition, was militarily occupied by Prussia, and King John came to see his new ally at Berlin. The States of the Con­federation retained their domestic autonomy; but, for federal purposes, such as military organization and imposts, they were subject to the decision of the Diet, or Parliament. The legislative power was vested in that body, and a federal Council composed of representatives from the different States. The number of votes in the Council was forty-three, of which Prussia had seventeen, or more than a third. The King of Prussia, as President of the Council, had the executive power, and also commanded the army of the Bund. Bismarck was made its Chancellor.

Prussia also sought to extend her influence over the southern States, and forced them into treaties with her by representing the probable demands of France, who had, indeed, shown her teeth. Secret offensive and defensive treaties were signed with Baden, Bavaria, and Würtemberg, for the reciprocal guarantee of territories, and in case of war, Prussia was to have the command of their armies. They were also bound to her by the Zollverein.

The results of the war for Prussia were the undivided hegemony of North Germany, her supremacy throughout the nation by the overthrow of Austria and her exclusion from the Confederation, the military command of South Germany, and the ground laid for future economical direction. The material advantages were the annexation of Schleswig-Holstein, Electoral Hesse, Nassau, Frankfurt, and some minor territories, increasing her population to 24,000,000, to which must be added, in a military point of view, 5,000,000 in the northern Bund, and about 9,000,000 in the southern States belonging to the Zollverein. Her territory was rendered more coherent and compact; she had received 60,000,000 thalers in indemnities, and she had obtained possession of military ports, which rendered maritime development possible. King William gained some popularity by soliciting from the Prussian Par­liament a Bill of Indemnity for the unconstitutional measures he had adopted, to insure his success and Prussia’s aggrandizement.

The first parliament under the new federal constitution was opened September 10th, 1867. Seven permanent committees were appointed for the affairs of the Confederation, such as war, finance, justice, etc. As regards military arrangements, every citizen from the age of seventeen to forty-two was subject to serve in the army. This was divided into three bodies—the standing army, the Landwehr, and the Landsturm. The army is recruited by conscription, from which there is no ex­emption. Conscripts, and those voluntarily enlisted serve seven years in the standing army, viz., three with the colours and four in the reserve. They then pass into the Landwehr for five years, and afterwards into the Landsturm, till they attain the age of forty-two. In time of war the Landwehr may be called out for active service; the Landsturm only in case of national danger. The total force was computed at 300,000 for the standing army, 450,000 for the Landwehr, and 360,000 for the Landsturm. The armies of the southern States were estimated at 150,000 men in active service, and 42,000 Landwehr. As the total force was under the command of the King of Prussia, and as the southern States were members of the Zollverein, all Germany may be said to have been Prussianized.

Thus Napoleon III, baffled, if not deluded, saw by the affair sudden and unexpected success of Prussia, Germany reconstructed against his will, as he had seen Italy before. When, after the rupture between Austria and Prussia, Napoleon III changed his secret alliance with Prussia for one with Austria, his plan was to look on till some decisive victories, which were expected to be on the side of Austria, should threaten the European equilibrium, when, at the proper moment, he would intervene, and recast the German Confederation. His “ideas” were to take Silesia from Prussia, and give it to Austria, in return for Venice, ceded to Italy. In compen­sation for Silesia and the Catholic provinces of the Rhine, which would, of course, become French, Prussia was to receive large Protestant territories on the Elbe and Baltic, by which she would become compact, and a bulwark against Russia. The combination, says Klaczko, was profound and vast; it had only one fault, but that was a fatal one—it did not contemplate the possibility of a Prussian victory. It was to be achieved by moral force, without drawing sword. Had Napoleon placed 100,000 men on the Rhine, Prussia’s scheme might have been modified, if not overthrown. But the Prussian victories did not allow time for reflection, and he had confidently relied on Austria being victorious. Baffled in his main scheme, Napoleon wanted at least to get something, however small; and having, it is said, made some secret demands at Berlin, which were not attended to, he cast his eyes on Luxembourg. He was ready to buy it from the King of the Netherlands, who, on his side, was willing to sell, and get quit of the German Confederation. Austria, England, and Russia intervened, and a treaty was signed at London, by which Luxembourg was neutralized. Thus ended an affair which at first threatened to disturb the peace of Europe.

Napoleon had just experienced another mortification in the failure of his designs upon Mexico. France, England, and Spain had, in 1862, despatched a joint expedition to Mexico to obtain satisfaction for insults and injuries committed not only on their subjects, but even on diplomatic agents, by Juarez, President of the Mexican Republic. England and Spain soon withdrew after obtaining what they considered satisfactory amends. But Napoleon had formed the chimerical project of establishing in those parts a nation of Latin race, as rivals of the Anglo-Americans, and continued the war. In 1864, Mexico, with the title of Emperor, was offered to, and accepted by the Austrian Archduke Maximilian, and a French army of 25,000 men was sent to support him, which took possession of the capital. But quarrels soon arose between Maximilian and his protectors; the Americans, quit of civil war, began to show hostility towards the new State; public opinion in France pronounced itself against this distant, expensive, and ill-judged enterprise, and in 1866 Napoleon recalled his troops.

Austria, taught wisdom by misfortune, granted to Hungary, in 1867, the constitutional independence she had so long demanded. The reconciliation appeared to be complete, and on the 8th of June Francis Joseph, after swearing to maintain the ancient Hungarian Constitution, was crowned in the cathedral of Buda with the crown of St. Stephen. At the same time a separate ministry was constituted for Hungary under the presidency of Count Andrassy. These measures, the work of Von Beust, the ci-devant Saxon Minister, who had succeeded to the place of Belcredi in the Austrian councils, were accompanied with reforms in the western, or Cis-leithan, provinces of the Empire, and with changes in the method of administration to suit the altered circumstances.

In Italy as soon as the Prussian alliance was completed, preparations were made for immediate war. The King, with La Marmora at his side, took the command in chief; Garibaldi was at the head of the irregular forces, which flocked to him in great numbers. Napoleon III called upon the Italians to disarm, but did not press his objection, and contented himself with declaring that Italy must take the consequences of her act. La Marmora felt secure. The Milanese was in a manner guaranteed by France, and by the Prussian Treaty both Powers had engaged not to make a separate peace. Hence Italy felt bound to decline the secret offer of Austria before the war broke out to cede Venetia to her if she would renounce the Prussian alliance.

Italian campaign, 1866.

Victor Emanuel passed the Mincio, June 2-3rd, 1866. Cialdini was to cross the Po, and operate in the rear of the quadrilateral; Garibaldi was to seize the Trentino, while Persano, with the fleet, threatened Venice. Before these diversions were effected, General Durando, with only five divisions, ventured a front attack, was easily defeated by the Archduke Albert at Custozza, June 24th, and compelled to recross the Mincio. Garibaldi had also been checked at Monte Suello, in Tyrol. But Austria, as before related, now recalled her army from Italy, and ceded Venetia to Napoleon III. The Italians would willingly have done something to retrieve their military honour. After the withdrawal of the Archduke, the Austrians retired into the fortresses of the quadrilateral, when Cialdini overran Venetia without meeting an enemy, and occupied Rovigo and Padua. Persano was defeated off Lissa by the Austrian admiral, Tegethof, with a much smaller fleet; for which Persano was deprived of his rank. The Italians now accepted the armistice arranged at Nikolsburg. Cialdini was directed to retire behind the Tagliamento, and Garibaldi was obliged to evacuate the Trentino. A clamour was raised against the ministry, and La Marmora found it necessary to resign.

After the Peace of Prague Marshal Leboeuf took possession of Venetia in the name of Napoleon III. The Peace of Vienna between Italy and Austria was signed October 3rd. Austria restored the ancient iron crown of Lombardy; Italy, at the dictation of Prance, abandoned the Trentino. According to the favourite practice of the French Emperor, the Venetians were to decide by a plebiscite for annexation to Italy; and the Italians had to endure the humiliation of withdrawing their troops lest they should influence the votes. Annexation was voted almost unanimously, October 22nd.

Ricasoli, who succeeded La Marmora, governed with modera­tion. He was not a rabid enemy of the Church, but he was for utilizing Church property and suppressing convents. A law for that purpose excited a revolt in Sicily, chiefly led by the Benedictines, who possessed many rich convents in that island. The rising, however, was soon put down. Ricasoli was overthrown for having attempted to suppress public meetings, and was succeeded by the more violent Ratazzi. This minister carried out his predecessor’s plans with respect to the Church. It was decided, July, 1867, that ecclesiastical property should be sold, and the produce administered by the State, the clergy receiving a fixed salary. The property of the Church in Italy was estimated at 2,000 million francs (about £80,000,000 sterling); out of the proceeds were to be compensated some 5,000 monks, distributed in 1,724 convents.

Ratazzi indulged in some underhand attempts to get pos­session of Rome. Agreeably to the Convention of September 15th, 1864, the French garrison had been withdrawn from Rome before the end of 1866; but their place had in some degree been supplied by what was called the Antibes Legion, which had been raised for the Pope’s protection. This was virtually a violation of the Convention; for the Legion was mostly composed of Frenchmen, who retained their position in the French army. They were, however, ill-content with the service and the climate, and desertion became frequent. General Dumont, a bigoted Papist, who had formed the Legion, was sent to Rome to restore order, when, putting on the French uniform, he made an harangue to the soldiers, interlarded with abuse of the Italian Government. Ratazzi did not openly respond to the call of the Chambers to repulse foreign intervention at all risks, but he winked at the assembling of insurrectionary committees, and did not sufficiently provide for the safety of the Pope. Garibaldi appeared once more on the scene, organized a rising at Geneva, and had got as far as Arezzo on his way to Rome when Ratazzi caused him to be arrested. He was sent to Alexandria, where the garrison gave him an ovation; while at Florence the streets resounded with cries of “Death to Ratazzi!” who was obliged to shut himself up in his house. Garibaldi was dismissed to Caprera. When the French Government remonstrated against his conduct, he made many false and evasive replies. A few of the insurgents, among them Garibaldi’s son Menotti, en­tered the Papal States, but were easily repulsed by the Pope’s troops.

Some more indirect attempts of Ratazzi against Rome, by permitting Italian troops to cross the frontier in contravention of the understanding with France, led to such serious remonstrances from Napoleon that Ratazzi was dismissed, and General Menabrea became Minister, with a Cabinet more agreeable to the Emperor. Meanwhile Garibaldi had again escaped, and Napoleon, advised of the anxiety of Pio Nono and Cardinal Antonelli, ordered his fleet to proceed to Civita Vecchia. Garibaldi was favourably received in the places on his line of march; the Papal colours were pulled down, and the Italian ones substituted. He defeated the Pontifical troops at Monte Rotondo (October 25th), which commands Rome on the north; but before he could enter the city French troops had arrived from Civita Vecchia, who joined the Papal troops in pursuit of the now retreating Garibaldi, and inflicted on him a severe defeat at Mentana. Garibaldi, on gaining Italian territory, surrendered himself to General Ricotti; and after a few weeks’ detention, he was again dismissed to Caprera.

The affair at Mentana converted the cooling sympathies of the Italians for France into hatred. The French, indeed, evacuated Rome, but only retired to Civita Vecchia, as if to secure a constant entrance. But the time was fast approaching when Rome, like a ripe pear, would fall of itself into Victor Emanuel’s mouth. Italy was still full of disorder. There were many conspiracies and risings of Red Republicans and clerical and Bourbon reactionaries. The state of the finances necessitated increased taxation; payment was in some cases resisted, and had to be enforced by the military.

Rome incorporated with Italy, 1870

Italian history presents nothing more of importance till the breaking out of the war between France and Prussia, and the overthrow of Napoleon in 1870. Italy declared her neutrality, July 24th, and the Government, foreseeing that the war must have a decisive effect on the Roman question, concentrated troops on the Papal frontier. The French, having need of their troops at Civita Vecchia, withdrew them in August; and after their fatal defeat at Gravelotte, Victor Emanuel notified to Pio IX. that his army must enter the pontifical dominions to preserve order and protect the Pope himself against revolutionists. The advance of the Italians, under General Cadona, was opposed only in a few skirmishes. When they arrived at Rome, the garrison was summoned. As the reply was not prompt, a few breaches were made in the walls, when the Pope ordered a surrender, and the Italians entered Rome, September 20th. The people voted annexation to Italy by a great majority, October 2nd. Pio IX fulminated the major excommunication, but without naming the King. He had in vain applied to Austria and Spain. The latter country had just accepted a sovereign of his opponent’s family.

The destruction of the Pope’s temporal rule passed almost unnoticed, overshadowed by the portentous struggle in France. A new parliament, including deputies from the Papal States, voted their incorporation with Italy, December 29th, and the removal of the seat of government to Rome was fixed for the following June. As if to compensate the Pope for the loss of his temporal power, a great addition was made about this time to his spiritual dignity. A General Council, the last since that of Trent, voted the Pope’s infallibility by a large majority, July 13th, 1870. The idea seems to have been suggested by some Jesuits. It had often been debated whether a Pope or a Council were superior. To accept infallibility at the hands of a Council seemed an acknowledgment of its superiority; but to this it was replied, that it was not called to confer infallibility, but merely to declare it. The decree was opposed by many foreign bishops, some of them the most strenuous upholders of the temporal power, as Monseigneur Dupanloup, Bishop of Orleans, and the Austrian Dr. Dollinger.

SPAIN

The war between France and Prussia is connected with the affairs of Spain. The recent history of that country consists mostly of domestic dissensions, and those of an ignoble kind. There were, indeed, many parties, as the Pan-liberals, the Progresistas, the Democrats or Republicans, the Moderados, the Clerical party, etc.; but all, with the exception of the Republicans, who were few in number and without influence, disputed only about the choice of a sovereign or a minister. There were many sudden revolutions, led by military men, but none for any great principle. Centuries of bigotry and clerical rule, the result of Philip II’s policy and of the Inquisition, had extinguished all public opinion, every noble aspiration; hence their endurance of Isabella II, a woman who had failed to gain the respect of her subjects.

But though Isabella was nominally sovereign, she did not reign; that was the function of her Prime Ministers, and hence a continual struggle for the post. O’Donnell, Duke of Tetuan, of Irish descent, was the best of these mayors of the palace. Ostensibly of the Pan-liberal party, he made one of his own out of the rest. Arrived at power in 1854 through Espartero, whom he ousted, he was in turn driven out by Narvaez, but regained his post in 1858, and retained it till 1863. His fall was occasioned by the withdrawal of Spain from the Mexican expedition, which displeased Napoleon III. He was succeeded for a short time by Miraflores, and then by Narvaez, whose reactionary policy caused O’Donnell’s recall in 1865. Isabella’s favourite at this time was Marfori, a domestic of the palace, and she, like her mother, sent large sums abroad to support her numerous children.

One of O’Donnell’s first acts after returning to power was to recognize Italy, thus throwing over the queen’s kinsmen, the sovereigns of Naples and Parma, and insulting the Pope. O’Donnell was not liked at Court, and having made himself unpopular by many executions after a foolish insurrection at Madrid, Narvaez again seized the helm in July, 1866. His policy was retrograde. By a coup d’état, December 30th, he dissolved the Cortes, arrested 123 Members, and caused the President, Rosas, and thirty-five others to be transported.

Narvaez died suddenly in April, 1868, and was succeeded by Gonzales Bravo, also an Absolutist. O’Donnell had also died suddenly at Biarritz, in November, 1867. Bravo transported several military chiefs, including Marshal Serrano; but he, as well as the Queen, were soon overthrown. In Sep­tember, 1868, Admiral Tapete had prepared an insurrection at Cadiz, where he was joined by Prim. Their programme was the sovereignty of the people. Serrano and other banished generals contrived to return, and proclaimed universal suffrage as the panacea for Spain’s ills. Revolutionary juntas were established in several towns; that at Seville first demanded the fall of the reigning dynasty. Isabella, then at St. Sebastian, dismissed Bravo, who fled to France, and appointed General Concha in his place. But the Royalists were defeated by Serrano at the bridge of Alcolea, on the Quadalquiver, and a Provisional Government was established at Madrid, with Serrano at its head, and Prim Minister at War. Barcelona, Saragossa, and other towns rose against the Queen, who fled to France. Napoleon III lent her the château of Pau, but declared himself neutral. A new constitution was promulgated in June, 1869, and Serrano was elected Regent. He expelled the Jesuits, dissolved many religious communities, and proclaimed liberty of conscience; but the Pope’s Nuncio still remained at Madrid, with a Spanish stipend.

The problem was, to find a candidate for the throne; for Serrano and his party had no notion of a Republic. Don Carlos, the rightful heir, had been defeated, in 1860, in an attempt to regain the crown, and compelled to renounce it by an oath. In 1865 arose what was called the “Iberian” party, which wished to unite the whole Iberian peninsula under Dom Luis, King of Portugal; but the Portuguese were averse to such a union, and Luis declined the offer. After the renunciation of Don Carlos, Don John, his younger brother, had claimed the crown; and when Isabella fled, he transferred his pretensions to his son, Don Carlos, Duke of Madrid, who was proclaimed by his party as Charles VII. But he found few adherents. The Duke of Montpensier, Isabella’s brother-in­law, proposed by some, was not approved of by the victorious generals. Espartero declined the proffered crown. It was then offered to Prince Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen, and his acceptance of it, though afterwards withdrawn, occasioned the fatal war between France and Prussia, under circumstances to be presently related. During that war Spain declared her neutrality, and was one of the first Powers to recognize the French Republic, by which it was followed. At length, in November, 1870, the Cortes elected the Duke of Aosta, second son of Victor Emanuel, who assumed the crown he had once refused, and with it the title of Amadeo I.

FRANCE

The Franco-German war of 1870 was the result of Napoleon III’s political situation. The events of the year 1866 had occasioned great discontent in France. A strong opposition, led by Thiers and Jules Favre, made damaging attacks upon the imperial government. It was charged with dangers incurred abroad from the establishment of Italian unity and of the North German Confederation, which were attributed to Napoleon’s undecided policy, and to the principle of substituting nationalities for the ancient theory of the balance of power. Other grounds of complaint were the abortive mediations in Poland and Denmark, and between Italy and the Pope; the congresses so often proposed in vain; the failure of the Mexican business, and of the designs upon Belgium and Luxembourg; the meddling with Eastern policy, and the net of intrigues all over the world. Napoleon had become so despotic that for some time he had not allowed the debates to be published. The finances were in the greatest disorder, yet 900 million francs had been spent in reconstructing and embellishing Paris. Personally the Emperor had lost much of his former energy, owing probably to his bad state of health. It was evident that personal rule could not last much longer, and that even a successful war, though it might check, could not avert its fall.

The years 1867 and 1868, however, passed over without Napoleon’s any very striking events. Napoleon perceived the necessity for some changes. The Ministers who could not before appear in the Chambers were henceforward authorized to take part sometimes in the debates (January, 1867). As if prescient of the approaching struggle, considerable reforms were made in the army. In Paris and the larger towns the elections of 1869 were adverse to Imperialism. In July a new, but short-lived, Ministry was formed, on the principle of parliamentary responsibility. The murder of Le Noir by Prince Peter Bonaparte added to the unpopularity of the Imperial Court. To disarm increasing opposition, a revised Constitution was sanctioned by a plebiscite, May 8th, and a clause in it enabled the Emperor to adopt that method to settle any disputed questions. But it was ominous that 50,000 soldiers had voted “No.” A new Ministry was now appointed, with the exception of Ollivier, who retained office. Count Daru was succeeded by the Duke of Gramont, a pliant courtier, and Marshal Niel was replaced by the incapable Marshal Leboeuf.

Sensible of the change of public opinion, except among that ignorant multitude to whom he loved to appeal, Napoleon III felt the necessity for some brilliant deed to retrieve the drooping prestige of his dynasty; and the acceptance of the Spanish crown by a prince of the House of Hohenzollem offered an opportunity to fix a quarrel on the Power which had principally overshadowed his own glory. Prince Leopold was no member of the Royal Prussian house, though the offspring of a common ancestor many centuries ago. He had been selected by General Prim for the Spanish crown, as possessing the requisite qualifications of belonging to a princely family, of being a Roman Catholic, and of age. As a Prussian subject and distant kinsman, Prince Leopold had requested and obtained from King William I permission to accept the proffered dignity; but had withdrawn his acceptance when it was found to be opposed by the French Emperor. Napoleon III’s grudge against Prussia had been aggravated by the prompt and decided refusal of Bismarck in the spring of 1869 to help him in the acquisition of Luxembourg and Belgium, on his allowing Prussia a free hand in Germany. It is said, indeed, that Napoleon himself was not desirous of war, and his practices to obtain territory without incurring that risk, corroborate this opinion. But he was surrounded by persons who urged him on, the chief of whom were the Empress, the Duke of Gramont, and Marshal Leboeuf. The French Cabinet was ill informed as to the state of Germany. Their envoys had reported a general dislike of Prussia in the Southern States, and the probability of their supporting a French invasion. The Emperor had also been deceived about the condition of his own army, which Leboeuf had neglected, though he falsely represented its efficiency.

The French Cabinet, not content with the withdrawal of Prince Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen, required King William I to pledge himself that he would never sanction his candidate­ship for the Spanish crown, if renewed; and the French Ambassador, Benedetti, rudely accosted the King with this demand on the public promenade at Ems. It was of course refused, for there was no alternative but humiliation. France declared war, July 19th, 1870. The new German Constitution was now brought to the test. The Northern Bund voted 120 million thalers towards the expenses; the Southern States, instead of the anticipated lukewarmness, or even hostility towards the North, announced with alacrity their intention to take part in the war. A French aggression was indeed precisely the thing to inspire Germany with but one feeling, and to consolidate its unity. The Germans were divided into three armies. Two, composed of North Germans, consisted of 61,000 men under General Steinmetz, and 206,000 men, including the Saxon corps, under Prince Frederick Charles. The South German army, under the Prince Royal, amounted to 180,000 men, mixed with Prussians; total 447,000 men, with a reserve of 112,000. The whole was under the command-in-chief of the King of Prussia, assisted by Von Moltke and Von Roon. The King arrived at his head­quarters at Coblenz, August 2nd. All the European Powers had declared their neutrality. England alone had offered mediation, which was declined by both parties.

The French were earlier in the field. Their army consisted of about 300,000 men, and was commanded by the Emperor in person, with Marshal Leboeuf as chief of the staff. Eugenie was made Regent during the Emperor’s absence. The French plan is said to have been to assemble 150,000 men at Metz, 100,000 at Strassburg; and after uniting the two armies, to cross the Rhine between Rastatt and Germersheim, and to in­vade Baden, while Canrobert covered the French frontier with 50,000 men. Had this plan been carried out before the Germans assembled in force, the war might have taken a totally different turn; but Napoleon lost a fortnight in unaccountable inaction. His delay has been variously accounted for. Some ascribe it to bodily and mental weakness; others say that his army was not in a fit state to advance, and that the commis­sariat broke down. However this may be, a defensive attitude, so repulsive to French troops, demoralized the army. Napoleon made a show of taking the offensive by a futile attack on Saarbrück, August 3rd, which the Germans did not mean to defend. Young Prince Napoleon was present with his father at what was called his “baptism of fire.” It was a mere piece of stage effect. On the following day the defeat of the French under McMahon at Weissemburg, by the Prince Royal, initiated an almost uninterrupted series of German victories. McMahon was again completely defeated at Worth, August 6th, where he was wounded. On the same day, the army under Prince Frederick Charles carried the heights of Spicheren. Both French wings being now compromised, they re­tired into French territory in the direction of the Moselle.

By the middle of August the Germans had got into Lorraine. Luneville, Nancy, and other towns surrendered to small detachments of cavalry. The command of the French army was disorganized, Napoleon, still nominal chief, seemed paralyzed. Leboeuf retired and was succeeded by Bazaine, who made Metz his centre of operations. McMahon, who had retreated to Châlons, and Trochu, who had also a corps at that place, were to join him there; but the plan was frustrated by a manoeuvre of Von Moltke. Napoleon and his son had retired first to Verdun, and then to Châlons; whence, being coldly received by the troops there, he went to Courcelles, near Reims. In a military view he was now become a cipher. At Paris demands had been made for his abdication, and he was probably afraid to go there, though it might have been better for his dynasty.

Battles of Gravelotte and Sedan, 1870.

The Battle of Gravelotte, August 18th, the bloodiest of the war, may be said to have decided the campaign. The Prussians gained the victory chiefly by their artillery, Von Moltke having united eighty-four guns in one battery. But there was a loss of about 20,000 men on each side. Bazaine now threw himself into Metz, where he was blockaded by the army of Prince Frederick Charles. Von Moltke directed the army of the Crown Prince, with the Saxons, to march upon Paris. McMahon, who was at Reims with 100,000 men, should now have marched to Paris, united all the French forces before it, and given battle there ; but the Emperor directed him against his better judgment, to relieve Metz, and accompanied his march. Being overtaken by the enemy’s advanced guard, several combats ensued, and especially one at Beaumont, near Sedan, August 30th, in which the French were defeated, and their passage through the Ardennes cut off. Next day they were surrounded in a sort of amphitheatre, the heights of which were occupied by the German artillery. The German army numbered about 200,000 men; McMahon’s, diminished by the previous fights, counted only about 112,000. On the first of September was fought the Battle of Sedan. The French made a brave resistance; but a wound, which obliged McMahon to resign the command, was fatal to their chances. The German batteries closed in upon them, while their own had been demolished. Whole regiments of French were made prisoners, or fled in confusion into Sedan; among these last was the Emperor, who had been present at the battle. In the evening the Germans began to bombard the town. In a Council of War, all the French generals declared that resistance was useless. Napoleon wrote to the King of Prussia, surrendering himself a prisoner; and on September 2nd the town capitulated. The French soldiers were disarmed and made prisoners, the officers dismissed on parole. Napoleon, after an interview with William ., was escorted to the palace of Wilhelmshohe, near Cassel, assigned to him as a residence.

The news of this disaster occasioned great uproar at Paris. The Empress fled to England, and, on the 4th of September, the deputies, coerced by the National Guard and a mob, decreed the fall of the imperial dynasty, and the establishment of a Republic. Gambetta, a young advocate, who had signalized himself by a violent attack on the Emperor, now took the lead, and became Minister of the Interior, with Jules Favre as Foreign Minister. The deputies of Paris constituted themselves a Provisional Government; and General Trochu, made governor of Paris by the Empress Regent, turned with fortune, and retained his post under the Republic. Thiers, who had no post in the Government, undertook a bootless mission to London, St. Petersburg, Vienna, and Florence, to solicit help.

After the fall of Sedan, Prince Frederick Charles blockaded Bazaine in Metz, while the rest of the German army resumed the march to Paris. That capital was invested September 19th, and, on October 5th, King William established his head-quar­ters at Versailles. Part of the French Government retired to Tours, whither also Gambetta proceeded, after escaping from Paris in a balloon. He organized the defence of France with indomitable energy and resolution, though, after the fall of Metz, the case was clearly hopeless. Marshal Bazaine was compelled to surrender that place through want of provisions, October 27th, when 145,000 efficient soldiers, besides 30,000 men in hospital, became prisoners of war. There were now prisoners in Germany, after a war of three months, besides the Emperor, four French marshals, 140 general officers, 10,000 officers of lower rank, and 340,000 soldiers. Marshals Leboeuf, Canrobert, and Changamier were in Metz.

The Germans had also been successful in other quarters. Strassburg had surrendered, September 28th, after a damaging bombardment. Dijon was several times won and lost. Gambetta, by extraordinary efforts, had organized what was called the “Army of the Loire,” of some 150,000 men, under the command of Aurelle de Paladine. But this general was at last completely defeated at Beaune la Rolande, November 28th. The Tours Government accepted the services of Garibaldi, who seems to have been actuated by the spirit of adventure rather than by any liking for the French. He collected a band of followers of all nations at Besançon, but effected little or nothing.

Meanwhile the state of Paris was growing daily worse. To the miseries of the siege was added domestic sedition. The Commune, headed by Flourens, seized Trochu, Favre, and Arago, the leading members of the Government, but they were rescued by the National Guard. Among several fruitless sallies, one of the most important was that of November 30th, led by General Ducrot, when the French, issuing out in two columns, each of 30,000 men, overthrew the Wurtembergers and Saxons, and got possession of several villages on the Marne; but the attack was not properly supported, and, on the 2nd of December, the French were driven back. Want was now growing into actual famine. By the end of October, butchers’ meat had entirely failed, and resort was then had to the flesh of horses and asses. At the beginning of 1871 the famine was become almost unendurable. Small portions of horseflesh, and of bread made of bran, were distributed. Many of the poorer sort died of cold and hunger. The bombard­ment, though not causing much damage, kept the citizens in continual fear. Yet the Parisians, accustomed to all the luxuries of life, bore their privations and dangers with wonderful fortitude. There was no talk of surrender. Men of the higher classes served on the ramparts as common soldiers, and en­couraged the rest by their example.

A last sally with 100,000 men, in the direction of Versailles, made on the 19th of January, seemed at first to promise success, but was ultimately repulsed with great loss. Trochu now resigned his governorship. At this time all the places in the east of France, except Belfort, had capitulated; in the west the Germans had penetrated to Rouen. The French Government had retired to Bordeaux; yet Gambetta persisted in a hopeless defence. The civilians, for want of military knowledge, were more obstinate than the generals, and thus brought on their country many needless calamities. In the north, General Faidherbe, with an army of 120,000 men, first collected by General Bourbaki, was defeated by Manteuffel at Amiens, and again irretrievably by General von Goben at Beauvoir, January 18th. The Germans had taken Le Mans on the 12th, in spite of the able resistance of Chanzy, one of the most capable of the French Commanders, and the army of the Loire was no longer capable of resistance.

Jules Favre went to Versailles, January 23rd, to negotiate a capitulation, but rejected Bismarck’s terms as too hard. The bombardment was now redoubled, and as provisions sufficed not for a week, it was necessary to come to terms. Preliminaries were arranged, January 26th, on the following principal conditions:—an armistice till February 19th; the garrison of Paris, except 12,000 men to keep order, to be prisoners of war; the German troops to occupy all the forts; the blockade of Paris to continue, but the city to be revictualled when arms had been delivered up; Paris to pay 200 million francs within a fortnight; a constituent Assembly to meet at Bordeaux to settle terms of peace; meanwhile the respective armies to remain in statu quo. The armistice applied also to the fleets, but at sea nothing worth relating had been done.

Frankfurt treaty, 1871.

Gambetta, despite the capitulation, proclaimed resistance to the last; but Jules Favre was despatched to Bordeaux to put an end to his Dictatorship. The French army of the East of 80,000 men, being completely cut off and in miserable plight, took refuge in Switzerland at the beginning of February, and delivered up their arms to the Swiss militia. The capitulation of Belfort on the 16th was the last act of the war. It had heroically endured a siege since November 3rd, and the garrison was allowed to march out with military honours. A National Assembly at Bordeaux elected Thiers, who had been returned by twenty electoral circles, President of the Republic. He and Jules Favre, Foreign Minister, negotiated at Versailles the preliminaries of a definitive peace, which were signed February 26th. France was to cede Alsace (except Belfort), German Lorraine with Metz, Thionville, and Longwy; to pay an indemnity of 5,000 million francs (200 millions sterling); the German troops to remain in France till it was paid; portions of Paris to be occupied by the Germans till the National Assembly should ratify the preliminaries. Agreeably to this last condition, 40,000 German troops marched through the Barrière de l’Etoile, March 1st, and bivouacked in the Champs Elysees, but retired on the 3rd, the preliminaries having been accepted. The definitive Treaty of Frankfurt was signed May 10.

Thus was terminated, in less than half a year, one of the greatest wars on record. It annihilated for a time the military power of France and her influence in the affairs of Europe. Russia eagerly seized on the occasion. Towards the end of October Prince Gortchakov haughtily repudiated that clause in the Treaty of 1856 which prohibited Russia from having any fleets or arsenals in the Black Sea. Lord Granville protested, and Odo Russell was sent to Versailles to inquire if Russia acted with the approval of Prussia. Hereupon Bismarck proposed a Conference, which was held in London early in 1871; but England stood alone, and suffered a somewhat ignominious defeat.

The success of the German arms under the conduct of Prussia raised throughout Germany an enthusiasm for that country, and a desire to revive a German Empire by placing King William at its head. The King of Bavaria intimated early in December that he had obtained the consent of the other German Sovereigns and free towns to his proposal that the King of Prussia should take the title of German Emperor. The Diet of the North German Confederation sanctioned this title, as well as a federal union with Baden, Hesse-Darmstadt, Wurttemberg, and Bavaria. The new Empire was solemnly proclaimed in the Hall of Mirrors at Versailles, January 18th, 1871; on which occasion Baron Moltke was made a Count, and Count Bismarck a Prince. It was no re­vival of the Holy Roman Empire, which, as Voltaire remarks, was neither holy nor Roman; nor was the title of “King of the Germans” to be revived, which would have clashed with the rights of the minor German kings. The new Empire was indeed little more than an adhesion of the States of Southern Germany to the Northern Confederation as a nucleus.

Thus, in the period of little more than a decade, one large Empire rose upon the ruins of another, whilst the equilibrium of the European system was materially altered by the establishment of two powerful States in its very centre—the Italian Kingdom and the German Empire. If we compare the work of Cavour and Bismarck in founding these two States, Cavour’s must be pronounced the more complete; for Italian unity is perfect under one Sovereign, whilst that of Germany consists only in a confederation of various States bound together by treaties which may not always bear a stress without breaking. It must, however, be acknowledged that Bismarck’s task was the more difficult one; for Cavour was helped by the revolutionary spirit of the populations annexed, through hatred of their governments, whilst no such symptoms showed themselves in Germany, or, at all events, more rarely, and in a milder form. If we compare the characters of the two great statesmen we discover in both the same far-sighted views, equal skill in the choice of means and instruments, the same unwavering fortitude and perseverance, the like daring combined with prudence.