READING HALL

THE DOORS OF WISDOM

A HISTORY OF MODERN EUROPE : A.D. 1453-1900

CHAPTER LIX

THE ITALIAN CAMPAIGNS OF 1796 AND 1797

THE Directory having resolved upon war, adopted a plan for the campaign of 1796 upon a scale of grandeur hitherto unparalleled in the annals of modern strategy. Two armies were to penetrate into Austria, one by Southern Germany, the other by Northern Italy and the Tyrol, and, having formed a junction, were to dictate a peace to the Emperor in his capital. Conquests were to be made in Italy which might serve to exchange against the Austrian Netherlands, and the Directory made no secret that Venice especially was destined to be the victim. By way of picking a quarrel they required the Venetian Government to dismiss from Verona the Count of Provence, who, since the death of his nephew in the Temple, had assumed the title of Louis XVIII.

The projected campaign was to be carried out in Germany by the army of the Rhine, now under Moreau, and by that of the Sambre and Meuse still commanded by Jourdan. Moreau was to penetrate into Swabia and advance by the Lake of Constance, keeping pace with the assumed successes and advance of the army of Italy; while the army of the Sambre and Meuse, leaving its right wing on the Rhine, was to advance into Germany on a more northern line, parallel to and supporting Moreau’s left. The neutrality of Switzerland secured the flanks both of the armies of Italy and of the Rhine. The war, especially in Italy, was to be made to support itself by confiscations; and the smaller Italian Princes were to be forced to join the French. Napoleon Bonaparte was appointed to the command of the army of Italy, the first important step in his marvellous career. Scherer had been condemned for not pushing his advantages after the victory of Loano. Bonaparte, now aged twenty-six, had not yet proved himself as a commander-in-chief; but he had shown talent and decision at the siege of Toulon, and in the insurrection of 13th Vendémiaire, while the plan of the Italian campaign betrayed genius. Barras had become his friend, through Bonaparte’s marriage with Josephine, widow of General Beauharnais. He was also supported by the friendship of Carnot and Tallien.

Bonaparte arrived at Nice to take the command of his army, March 27th, 1796. It counted some 45,000 troops, good soldiers, but in a state of destitution. He adopted from the first the custom of working upon the imagination of his men, one of the great secrets of his success. He electrified them by an address conceived in the style of antiquity, in which he promised them not only honor, but also wealth and glory in the fertile plains and rich cities of Italy. His course was facilitated by the want of cohesion and hearty cooperation among the Austro-Sardinians. The Cabinet of Vienna had hardly shown good faith in the Treaty with Sardinia. It had been stipulated that the Germans should fight only in the plains; and the Aulic Council of War had instructed the generals to avoid perilous engagements, to keep close together, and reserve their soldiers for the defence of Lombardy. Austria had only 28,000 men in Italy, now commanded by Beaulieu, De Vins having been superseded. The Sardinian army numbered 40,000 men, but of these 15,000 under the Duke d'Aosta were employed in watching Kellermann, who occupied Savoy, and some 5,000 men were in garrisons. The main body, commanded by Colli, stretched from the Bormida on its left, to the Stura on its right, covering Coni, Mennovì, and Ceva, at which last place it had an entrenched camp. The main body of the Austrians, in order to cover Lombardy, was cantoned in the environs of Alessandria and Tortona, and of the two roads leading to Genoa and Milan.

On the French side, the divisions of Massena and Augereau were posted at Loano, Finale, and Savona; Serrurier was ordered to proceed to Garessio, to observe the entrenched camp at Ceva; and Laharpe was directed to march on Voltri and threaten Genoa. Two roads were open to the invaders: that of Genoa by the defiles of the Bochetta, and that of Savona, between the Col St. Jacques and Col di Cadibone. Bonaparte chose the latter. From Savona to Carcare was only nine miles, over a mountainous route indeed, but which might be made practicable for artillery; and from Carcare several roads led through the Montferrat into the interior of Piedmont. Bonaparte’s route lay through the valley of the Bormida; and here he was to separate the Sardinians and the Austrians, threatening at once Lombardy and Piedmont. The French minister demanded from the Genoese the keys of the fortress of Gavi; thus pretending, in order to cover the real design, that the French army would penetrate into Lombardy by Genoa and the Bochetta. Beaulieu, however, had received information of the real plan of attack, and resolved to seize Montenotte, the key of the French position, which Bonaparte had neglected sufficiently to strengthen, before it could receive further reinforcements. For this purpose he detached D'Argenteau, with instructions to attack Montenotte by April 6th. Thinking, however, that Voltri was not to be neglected, where Cervoni had arrived with Laharpe’s advanced guard, he himself marched thither with his left wing; and being assisted from the sea by an English squadron under Nelson, he compelled the French to a precipitate retreat, April 8th. But by this movement he had receded with his left wing to a distance from the real point of attack at Montenotte, and D'Argenteau, to whom he had entrusted that point, proved incompetent and failed. He had, indeed, nearly succeeded in the first assault, and took two of the French lines out of three. But he had delayed too long. On April 10th, at daybreak, Bonaparte in person, with Augereau’s and Massena’s divisions, debouched from behind Montenotte, attacked D'Argenteau, and drove him back in such confusion that he retreated to Paretto, three leagues beyond Dego, thus abandoning that important post. On hearing the state of affairs Beaulieu hastened to the scene of action, but was detained several hours by the breaking down of his carriage. At Acqui he succeeded in rallying 6,000 or 7,000 men. Boyer, however, interfered, and prevented his forming a junction with D'Argenteau, and Dego fell into the hands of the French. Bonaparte, in his dispatches to the Directory, pretended that he had defeated here Beaulieu in person, although that general was many miles distant. He called his victory in these parts the battle of Millesimo, apparently because Augereau seized the gorges so named in order to attack the castle of Cosseria, which made a spirited resistance. The battle of Millesimo is, therefore, a fiction, nor is that of Montenotte much better, having been merely an affair of outposts. Bonaparte’s fame in these affairs must rest on his general plan and his manoeuvres.

By advancing his left rapidly on the Tanaro, Bonaparte now attained his chief object, of separating the Sardinians and Austrians. Augereau and Serrurier were directed to combine their forces and march on Colli’s camp at Ceva. It is said that, in a military point of view, Bonaparte should rather have attacked Beaulieu at Acqui before he could rally his scattered forces. But the French general was a politician as well as a soldier. His object was to force the King of Sardinia to a separate peace. Striking to the left, he crossed the Tanaro, with the intention of turning the camp at Ceva; but Colli abandoned it in the night of April 16th, and repassing the Tanaro, retired behind the Corsaglia, in the direction of Mondovì, a movement which consummated his separation from the Austrians. Beaulieu informed Colli that if he held out three days at Mondovi he should be relieved. But Bonaparte, leaving Ceva behind, had followed Colli thither, drove him thence after a skirmish which he dignifies with the name of a battle, when Mondovi was abandoned to pillage. Colli now retreated behind the Stura, and took up a position between Coni and Cherasco, in order to cover Turin, where the consternation was extreme. Beaulieu, on learning his retreat, moved his head-quarters from Acqui to Bosco, his left leaning on Novi, his right on Alessandria, to enable him to form a junction with Colli at Asti; and knowing that there was at Turin a party in favor of peace, he demanded to be put in possession of Alessandria, Tortona and Ceva: but Victor Amadeus refused the demand. Meanwhile Bonaparte had pushed on to Cherasco, a very strong place at the confluence of the Stura and Tanaro, the only obstacle to his marching on Turin. At the news of his advance Victor Amadeus recalled Colli under the walls of that capital. In a Council held April 22nd, the King, at the persuasion of Cardinal Costa, Archbishop of Turin, determined to treat at Genoa for a peace with France, under the mediation of Spain. Colli now demanded an armistice; which, however, was refused by Bonaparte, unless the three fortresses of Coni, Alessandria, and Tortona were put into his hands. Pursuing his march, the French general appeared before Cherasco, which, at the first summons of his aide-de-camp, Marmont surrendered without a blow. Victor Amadeus now sent to accept the conditions of the conqueror. A suspension of arms was signed at Cherasco, April 28th, till a definitive peace should be concluded, the treaty for which purpose was signed at Paris, May 15th. The King of Sardinia engaged to renounce the Coalition, to cede to France Savoy, and the counties of Nice, Tenda, and Beuil, to permit no French emigrants to sojourn in his States, to grant an amnesty to all his subjects prosecuted for their political opinions. The French troops were to occupy, till a general pacification, Coni, Ceva, Tortona, the fortresses of Exilles, La Sieta, Suza, Brunetta, and Chateau Dauphin, and either Alessandria or Valenza, at the option of the French commander-in-chief. The French troops to be allowed free passage through the King’s dominions. By this pacification Kellermann’s army of the Alps was rendered available.

Victor Amadeus III rendered himself by this humiliating treaty little more than the vassal of the French Republic. He had yielded to a surprise. No important place was yet in the hands of the French; who, having entered Piedmont through a defile, had not even siege artillery. Bonaparte acknowledged, twenty years later at St. Helena, that the slightest check would have ruined all his plans. In refusing to shelter the French emigrants, Victor Amadeus did not even except his two daughters, married to the brothers of Louis XVI, who had been placed on the list of emigrants. His misfortunes and disgrace probably accelerated his death. He expired October 16th, 1796, in the seventieth year of his age, and twenty-third of his reign, and was succeeded by his son, Charles Emmanuel IV. This Prince is said to have advised the treaty with France; it is, at all events, certain that immediately after his accession, he expressed in the most humble terms his attachment to the French Republic.

Beaulieu had advanced to Nizza della Paglia with 15,000 men, but halted on hearing of the negotiations. He formed Bonaparte a plan to seize by surprise Alessandria, Valenza, and Tortona, which succeeded only at Valenza. Victor Amadeus, however, had required him to withdraw the Neapolitan dragoons, who had seized that place, and to put it into the hands of Bonaparte. But the French general, after animating his troops with one of his magniloquent proclamations, proceeded by forced marches to Piacenza, where he crossed the Po; thus turning Beaulieu’s position, who had crossed at Valenza, and taken the road to Pavia. Beaulieu now retired upon the Adda, with the view both of securing his retreat by Tyrol and throwing a garrison into Mantua; leaving, therefore, his rear-guard at Lodi, with orders to defend the bridge over the Adda, he pursued his march towards the Oglio. On the following day, May 10th, Bonaparte arrived at Lodi, and carried the bridge after a desperate fight, which, however, has been much exaggerated by French writers. Beaulieu’s object was only to detain the French twenty-four hours. Milan, already passed by ten leagues, and now at Bonaparte’s mercy, sent its keys. He entered that city May 14th, not with republican simplicity, but regal pomp, took up his lodging in the Archducal Palace, and organized a new municipal government. The citadel, however, held out till June 29th. Bonaparte did not revolutionize the Milanese; it was to be kept to serve as an exchange in negotiations with Austria.

Bonaparte’s rapid conquests had excited the jealousy and suspicion of the Directory. They apprehended his ambitious schemes, and, in order to defeat them, resolved to transfer to Kellermann the command of the army of Italy, while Bonaparte was to be detached on an expedition to Leghorn, Rome, and Naples. Bonaparte, however, represented to the Directory, in the strongest terms, the impolicy of dividing the command. He gained Barras by informing him that a million livres were at his disposal, at Genoa. Josephine’s influence was exerted with that Director and with Carnot. Both were conciliated; which was the more important, as each had his party. At a second meeting, the Directory reconsidered the matter, and gave Bonaparte their entire confidence. Thus he became virtually the master of Italy.

The Directory had resolved to seize the spoils of Italy, and Bonaparte had adopted the maxim that the war must support itself. Immense contributions were levied on the conquered States. The Lombards had to contribute twenty million francs. The Duke of Parma, although he had not joined the Coalition, obtained a suspension of arms only through the good offices of the King of Spain, his brother-in-law, and by signing a treaty, May 8th, by which he agreed to pay two million livres, to find 700 horses, and to allow the French general to select twenty pictures from his collections. This was the first time in the history of modern warfare that works of art had been subjected to spoliation. The Duke of Modena, a Prince of the House of Este, hastened to follow the example of his neighbors. He purchased an armistice by agreeing to pay within a month 7,500,000 livres, and 2,500,000 more in goods and warlike stores: also, to deliver twenty pictures (May 12th). This enormous sacrifice, however, did not save him. Bonaparte revoked the armistice in October, on the pretext that the Modenese had supplied Mantua with provisions. The Duke had fled to Venice with his private treasures. Other small Italian Princes were also forced to purchase peace. The hatred engendered by these oppressions produced an insurrection against the French in Pavia. Bonaparte instantly marched thither with a small body of troops, battered down the gates with artillery, abandoned the town to pillage, shot the leaders of the insurgents, and returned to his army. Rather later, symptoms of hostility, encouraged by the Austrian Minister at Genoa, began to show themselves in that Republic. The routes through Genoa, Savona, and Nice were almost intercepted: the Genoese nobles secretly supported every plot against the French army. Bonaparte caused the chateau of the Marquis Spinola, at Arquata, the centre of these plots, to be razed.

The van of the French army in pursuit of Beaulieu entered Brescia, May 28th. This town belonged to the Venetians, who despatched proveditori to protest against this breach of their neutrality. But it was a natural result of their irresolute conduct. Placed between two great belligerent Powers, they had not the courage to declare for either, nay, not even to establish an armed neutrality, and they were consequently subjected to the insults of both. Beaulieu also violated Venetian neutrality by seizing Peschiera, a strong fortress on the Mincio, where it issues from the Lago di Garda; behind which river he had determined to make a stand, in order to protect Mantua, to which his left extended. But Bonaparte, after some feints upon Peschiera, attacked his centre at Borghetto, May 30th; and after two days’ hard fighting, attended with great loss, carried all the Austrian positions, and effected the passage of the Mincio. It was in consequence of Bonaparte’s threats to the proveditore Foscarini, at Peschiera, May 31st, that the Venetians resolved to arm; recalled their ships towards the city, and ordered Slavonian regiments to be raised in Istria, Dalmatia, and Albania. Beaulieu, after throwing 13,000 men into Mantua, now retreated on the Adige, pursued by Augereau, and, traversing the Venetian territory, took up a position with 15,000 men in the gorges of Tyrol; while Bonaparte seized Peschiera, and began to threaten and intimidate the Venetians. Venice, one of the oldest European States, was to fall by its indecision. Sending for Foscarini, proveditore of Verona, Bonaparte told him that he should march upon Venice; that he was inclined to burn Verona to its foundations, for sheltering the Pretender, Louis XVIII, thus affecting to be the capital of France; that he had sent Massena to destroy it. To appease his anger the proveditore threw open the gates of Verona. Bonaparte entered that city June 3rd, and immediately seized the citadel, arming it with Venetian guns. Mantua was then invested by the French.

The King of the Two Sicilies hastened to make an arrangement with the French, while his neutrality might still be of some value. By an armistice signed at Brescia, June 5th, he agreed to withdraw his troops from the Austrian army, his ships from the English fleet. Ferdinand IV did not, however, disarm; he made preparations to defend his frontiers in case of attack, kept 60,000 men on foot, and by this spirited conduct obtained more moderate conditions in the definitive treaty of peace than the Directory had attempted to impose upon him. Bonaparte deprecated a war with Naples, for which he calculated that a reinforcement of 21,000 men would be necessary. By the treaty signed at Paris, October 10th, Ferdinand agreed to be neutral, and to shut his ports against all vessels of war belonging to belligerents, that should exceed the number of four. Bonaparte now also dispatched Augereau’s division to invade the States of the Church. The Bolognese had sent a deputation to him at Milan, to solicit his aid in relieving them from the yoke of Rome, and restoring them to that liberty which they had acquired at the period of the Lombard League. The French entered Bologna June 19th. Bonaparte, who was accompanied by the regicide Salicetti, the Commissioner of the French Government, published a manifesto on the 20th, declaring that the relations which had subsisted between Bologna and the Court of Rome since 1513 were at an end, and the Sovereign Power restored to the Bolognese Senate; the Senators were to swear fidelity to the French Republic, and to exercise their authority in dependence upon it. This oath they accordingly took to Bonaparte, seated on a sort of throne in the Sala Farnese. But Bonaparte, as usual, imposed a heavy contribution on the city; and the inhabitants found to their surprise that they were treated rather as enemies than allies; a title with which the Generalissimo had honored the Republic of Bologna. He and Salicetti even laid their hands on the Mont de Pieté, excepting only pledges of less value than 200 lire. But first of all, though surrounded by their victorious bands, they took the precaution to disarm the citizens. Urbino, Ferrara, and Ravenna were next successively occupied by the French troops, and were also amerced in contributions. The Pope, now aged and infirm, and alarmed by the progress of the invaders, despatched the Chevalier D'Azara, the Spanish Ambassador at Rome, to mediate for him with Bonaparte and Salicetti. He could not have placed his interests in worse hands. Spain, under the influence of Godoy, was sinking every day more and more into French vassalage. D'Azara delivered, as it were, the Pope and the Holy See bound into the hands of the young and imperious conqueror. It was only on very hard terms that a suspension of arms was granted. Pius VI engaged to give satisfaction for the murder of Basseville in 1793; to liberate all persons confined for political opinions, to shut his ports against the vessels of Powers at war with France. The legations of Bologna and Ferrara were to continue in the occupation of the French troops, who were also to be put in possession of the citadel of Ancona; but Faenza was to be evacuated. The Pope was to deliver 100 pictures, busts, vases, or statues, to be selected by commissioners appointed for that purpose; in which were to be comprised the bronze bust of Junius Brutus, and the marble one of Marcus Brutus; also 500 manuscripts. He was further to pay 15,500,000 livres in money, and 5,500,000 in merchandise, horses, etc., independently of the contributions of the legations; and he was to permit the passage of French troops through his territories. In these negotiations Bonaparte seems to have followed the instructions of the Directory, and to have disapproved, as at all events premature, the harsh treatment to which the Pope was subjected, on account of his vast moral influence, which would be exerted against France.

While these negotiations were going on with the Pope, Bonaparte, in violation of the Treaty of Paris, establishing the neutrality of Tuscany, dispatched General Vaubois to take possession of Leghorn. All the English merchandise there was seized. Fortunately, however, the English merchants had obtained information of the approach of the French, and had shipped off the greater part of their goods. Bonaparte himself proceeded into Tuscany, and was entertained by the Grand Duke at Florence with almost royal honors. The English, in retaliation for the proceedings at Leghorn, landed 2,000 troops at Porto Ferrajo, the capital of Elba, declaring that they should hold that island till the peace, to prevent its incurring the fate of Leghorn. The neutrality of Genoa was no more respected than that of the other Italian States. From the beginning of the year the French had pressed upon the Genoese a series of demands which were constantly refused. Among these demands was a secret loan of five million francs, for the immediate necessities of the French army; but the English Minister at Turin, having received information of it, declared to the Genoese, that if it was granted, their city would be bombarded by the English fleet, which was then blockading the Riviera. The French, after their victories, renewed their demands in a tone which showed they would take no refusal (June 21st); and the Senate, after long hesitating between the dangers which awaited them from the French armies on one side, and the English fleet on the other, at length decided for the French. A treaty was concluded at Paris, October 9th, 1796, by which the Genoese agreed to close their port against the English, to pay two million francs to the French, and to grant them a loan for a like sum.

The ill success of General Beaulieu determined the Austrian Cabinet to supersede him by General Wurmser, who was then commanding the Austrian army on the Upper Rhine. At the time of Wurmser’s recall the campaign in that quarter was on the point of commencing. The armistice had been terminated by the Austrians giving notice that hostilities were to begin on June 1st. At this time the position of the opposing forces was as follows: Wurmser, with an army of 60,000 infantry and 20,000 cavalry, occupied the right bank of the Rhine from Basle to Mannheim, having its right wing extended on the opposite bank to Kaiserslautern, in the Vosges mountains. Another Austrian army, under the Archduke Charles, which, including the contingents of some German Princes and the garrisons of Mainz and Ehrenbreitstein, numbered 70,000 foot and 20,000 horse, was posted lower down the stream, between the rivers Sieg and Lahn. Moreau was opposed to Wurmser with the army of the Rhine, consisting of 70,000 foot, and 6,500 horse, cantoned along the left bank of the Rhine, from Hüningen to Germersheim in Alsace, and thence across the Vosges by Pirmasens to Homburg. Over against the Archduke stood Jourdan with the army of the Sambre and Meuse, 65,000 infantry and 11,000 cavalry. The numerical superiority was therefore at first rather in favor of the Austrians; but was lost the day before hostilities began by the departure of Wurmser for Tyrol with 25,000 men. Wurmser was succeeded by Latour, and the command-in-chief of both armies was assumed by the Archduke Charles. That Prince, now aged twenty-five, was destined to achieve in this campaign a military reputation only short of that of Bonaparte.

The German campaign of 1796 is somewhat complicated. The army of the Sambre and Meuse took the initiative by crossing the Rhine, Kléber on June 1st, and Jourdan on the 12th, at Neuwied. The Germans in this quarter, under the Prince of Wurtemberg, were driven back as far as Wetzlar, but here Jourdan was defeated by the Archduke Charles, June 15th, and compelled to recross the Rhine. Kléber, who covered his retreat, after engaging the Austrians under Kray at Uckerath and Kirchheim, also repassed the Rhine. Moreau crossed that river higher up, and seized the fort of Kehl, June 25th. The Archduke, leaving Wartensleben between the Lahn and Sieg with 36,000 men to oppose Jourdan, hastened with the remainder of his army to the aid of Latour, but, being defeated by Moreau in an engagement at Malsch, July 9th, retreated to Pforzheim. Meanwhile Jourdan had again crossed the Rhine, and driven Wartensleben beyond Frankfurt. Hence that General continued his retreat by way of Wurzburg to Amberg, with a view of covering the magazines in Bohemia, thus separating himself more and more from the Archduke, and rendering the latter’s situation still more difficult. Charles continued his retreat along the right bank of the Neckar pursued by Moreau, and on July 21st, there was some fighting at Cannstadt and Esslingen. At this crisis of the campaign the Archduke was suddenly deserted by some of the Princes of the Empire with their contingents. The Duke of Wurtemberg, the Margrave of Baden, and the petty Princes of the Circle of Suabia, on the invasion of their territories by Moreau, separated their forces from the army of the Confederation, and obtained from the French General, by heavy contributions, a suspension of arms.

At the same time the Cabinet of Berlin took advantage of the dangers and misfortunes of the German Fatherland to push its own interests. The advance of the French, which seemed to threaten both Empire and Emperor with destruction, and which might have been averted had the Prussians acted with loyalty as members of the Confederation, was employed by them to draw closer their connection with France. On August 5th, as the French armies were penetrating into Franconia and Bavaria, two treaties, one public, the other secret, were signed at Berlin with the French Minister Caillard. The first of these treaties modified the neutral line established by the Treaty of Basle. The new line comprised Lower Saxony and the greater part of the Circle of Westphalia. The States included in it were to withdraw their contingents from the Imperial army and cease their contributions for the war, and the King of Prussia was to assemble an army of observation to guarantee the line of neutrality. The secret treaty was still more important. By this Frederick William II agreed not to oppose the cession of the left bank of the Rhine to the French, and that the temporal Princes who might suffer from this arrangement should be indemnified by the secularization of ecclesiastical domains in Germany. To the King of Prussia himself was to be assigned the Bishopric of Münster, with the district of Rechlinghausen by way of compensation for his trans-Rhenane provinces. That part of the Bishopric on the left bank of the Ems was to be united to the Batavian Republic. The House of Hesse was also to be indemnified by secularizations, and the branch of Cassel was to be elevated to the electoral dignity. If, at the future pacification, the reestablishment of the House of Orange in the Stadholderate should be deemed inadmissible, the French Republic was to use its influence to procure for the Prince of Orange the secularized Bishoprics of Wurzburg and Bamberg, also with the electoral dignity. In case the Prince should die without male issue the Bishoprics were to devolve to the House of Brandenburg. The Elector and the other States of Upper Saxony, whose territories were not included in the neutral line, now hastened to accede to the neutrality, by the Treaty of Erlangen, August 13th, under the mediation of Prussia. The line of demarcation was extended so as to include the Bishopric of Fulda, the County of Henneberg, Upper Saxony, and Lusatia, and the Elector undertook to defend it with 20,000 men. The Saxon contingent was now also withdrawn from the Imperial army.

Prussia, by making concessions to France for which she was to be indemnified at the expense of the Empire, not only ruined the German cause, but also placed herself at the mercy of the French Government in a future settlement. Thus was initiated that selfish and fatal policy which resulted in depriving fifty millions of the German name of their proper weight in the European balance. The English Cabinet viewed her proceedings with alarm. Pitt dispatched Mr. Hammond to Berlin to persuade that Cabinet to resort to an armed mediation between the belligerents. But Hammond, who arrived at Berlin five days after the conclusion of the treaty, found Haugwitz inexorable; nor did he succeed any better in an interview with Frederick William himself.

The Archduke Charles, whose army had been reduced to German 25,000 men by the desertions of the Imperial contingents, gave battle to Moreau at Neresheim, August 11th. The result was indecisive, but it enabled him to cross to the right bank of the Danube, down which he advanced, with the intention of aiding Wartensleben, whom Jourdan had driven beyond the Naab. Moreau was marching on the opposite side of the Danube. Latour, with 30,000 men, including Condé’s corps of French emigrants, was posted on the Lech, which they occupied from Landsberg to Rain. The Arch-duke, having ordered Latour not to risk a battle, but to retire on the approach of Moreau, who had crossed the Danube at Donauworth, continued his march down the right bank of that river, which he crossed at Ingolstadt, August 17th. Having formed a junction with Wartensleben, he defeated Bernadotte’s division at Neumarkt, August 22nd, and again, on the 23rd, at Teiningen. He was now on Jourdan’s right flank, whose headquarters were at Amberg, and whom he attacked and defeated, August 24th. The French general now retreated to Schweinfurt, and the Arch­duke marched to Wurzburg. As this movement threatened Jourdan’s communications with Frankfort, he attacked the Austrians at Kornach, near Wurzburg, September 3rd; but, Wartensleben having come up, the French were entirely defeated. Jourdan now commenced a precipitate and disorderly retreat by way of Gemunden and Hammelburg to the Lahn, during which his troops suffered severely at the hands of the enraged peasantry. After some engagements between the Lahn and Sieg, the army of the Sambre and Meuse, now under the command of Beurnonville, by whom Jourdan had been superseded, recrossed the Rhine.

Meanwhile the Archduke Charles was threatened by a danger which he had not anticipated. Latour, instead of obeying his orders, had attempted to arrest Moreau’s progress, and had suffered a crushing defeat at Friedberg, August 24th, the day of Charles’s victory at Amberg. Latour now retreated on Munich, followed by Moreau. On the approach of the French the Elector of Bavaria fled to Saxony, and the Bavarian States, in the Elector’s name, hastened to conclude an armistice with the victorious general, September 7th, by which they agreed to withdraw the Bavarian contingent, to allow free passage to the French, to pay ten million francs, deliver 3,300 horses, 200,000 quintals of corn, the same quantity of hay, 100,000 pairs of shoes, 10,000 pairs of boots, 30,000 ells of cloth, and twenty pictures to be selected from the Elector’s galleries. But a fortunate turn in the campaign speedily relieved the Elector from this onerous agreement. Latour had been driven beyond the Great Laber when Moreau, hearing of Jourdan’s misfortunes, which placed him in a critical position, commenced his famous retreat. He was pursued by Latour; Nauendorf, with an Austrian division, was in Ulm; while Charles, with part of his forces, threatened Moreau’s line of retreat. His path lay through the Black Forest, which, though beset by Austrian troops, he chose in preference to violating the neutral Swiss territory. To disembarrass himself of Latour before Charles could come up, he attacked and defeated the former general at Biberach, October 2nd, and threaded the narrow and dangerous pass of the Hollenthal without molestation, though pursued by the Archduke. Having emerged into the valley of the Rhine, he engaged the Austrians at Emmendingen, October 19th, and at Schliengen, October 24th, in the hope of maintaining himself on the right bank of the Rhine; but, being worsted in both actions, he recrossed that river at Hüningen, October 26th. An armistice was now agreed upon between the Austrians and the army of the Sambre and Meuse. The French abandoned the tête-du-pont of Neuwied and the right bank of the Rhine from that place to Muhlheim, and went into winter quarters. The Archduke Charles wishing to dispatch a large part of his forces to the relief of Mantua, now besieged by the French, would willingly have abandoned Kehl, but he received directions from Vienna to retake it at whatever cost. Kehl surrendered by capitulation, January 9th, 1797, while the tête-du-pont of Hüningen held out till February 2nd. The Cabinet of Vienna attained its object, but Mantua fell.

Wurmser, who had taken the command of the Austrian army in Tyrol early in July, 1796, was also prevented from pursuing his own plans for the relief of Mantua. The Aulic Council of War, by directing him to divide his forces, marred all his efforts. Agreeably to their instructions, Wurmser having advanced his headquarters to Trent, divided his army into three columns. One of these, under Quasdanovich, was to march by the shore of the Lago di Garda on Brescia; another, under Meszoroz, proceeded by the eastern side of the lake; while Wurmser himself, with the main body, marched straight upon Mantua. The operations of Quasdanovich were attended with success. He seized Salo and Brescia, and advancing thence on the road to Mantua, threatened the French rear. Wurmser at first was no less successful. By July 31st he had forced all the French posts upon the Adige, and was in full march upon Mantua. Bonaparte, thus placed between two fires, was preparing to retire beyond the Adda, when Augereau is said to have counselled him to raise the siege and direct all his forces against Quasdanovich. The Austrian General was thus crushed by a superior force at Lonato August 3rd, and compelled to regain the defiles of Tyrol, while Brescia and Salo were recovered by the French. Having struck this blow, Bonaparte immediately turned, with 28,000 men, against Wurmser, who had only 18,000, attacked him, August 5th, near Castiglione, and, after a series of combats, which lasted five days, completely defeated him, with great loss of prisoners and guns. Wurmser was now compelled to retire to Trent with the shattered remains of his army. The absence of the French had enabled him to revictual Mantua, but after his defeat they resumed the siege of that place.

Bonaparte was now instructed by the Directory to force Wurmser’s positions in the Tyrol, and to form a junction with Moreau, who, as we have said, was at this period victoriously advancing. Moreau’s right wing having seized the important position of Bregenz, was about to enter Tyrol; and the Directory dreamt for a moment of realizing the vast plan by which they were to unite their armies in the heart of Germany, a hope speedily dissipated by the defeat of Jourdan and consequent retreat of Moreau. Wurmser, on his side, undismayed by the posture of affairs, having rallied his scattered forces and received reinforcements, which brought up his army to 50,000 men, had resolved on another attempt to relieve Mantua. Thus both he and Bonaparte advanced simultaneously in the pursuit of entirely separate and independent objects. Wurmser marched by the Val Sugana towards Bassano, whilst Bonaparte took the direct road to Trent, which place he entered September 5th, after defeating, the day before, at Roveredo, an Austrian division of 25,000 men, commanded by Davidowich. The news of this disaster did not arrest the march of Wurmser, who, on the contrary, pushed on more rapidly towards Bassano. Bonaparte was now in an embarrassing position. To advance further into Tyrol would be to abandon all Italy to the enemy; he, therefore, resolved to retrace his steps. Advancing against Wurmser by forced marches, he surprised and captured nearly all his advanced guard at Primolano, and entirely defeated Wurmser himself before Bassano, September 8th. The Austrian General had now no resource but to throw himself into Mantua. During this retreat he suffered great losses in several battles, the last of these being at San Giorgio, a suburb of Mantua September 15th, after which he entered that place with from 12,000 to 15,000 men. The siege was now resumed by Bonaparte, who, on learning the retreat of Moreau, abandoned, for the present, the thought of penetrating into Austria.

The Austrians were not, however, discouraged. A third army of 50,000 men was formed, commanded by Alvinzi and Davidowich. Alvinzi passed the Piave, November 1st, with 30,000 men, defeated Bonaparte on the 6th in a pitched battle at Bassano, and again at Caldiero on the 12th, and compelled him to retreat upon Verona. Bonaparte was in a state of discouragement, almost of despair. Fortunately Davidowich and his division, whom Alvinzi had detached with directions to advance along the course of the Upper Adige, made no movement at this critical juncture, and thus enabled Bonaparte to direct all his forces against Alvinzi. On the evening of November 14th, crossing the Adige at Verona with his army, as if in full retreat, he suddenly turned to the left, and pursuing his march down the right bank of the river, re- crossed it at Eonco, with the intention of turning Alvinzi's position. The French assaulted the Austrian intrenchments at Arcole during three successive days, November 15th, 16th, and 17th, with great loss on both sides. Bonaparte himself was precipitated, with his horse, into the marshes, and was in imminent danger of being killed or made prisoner, when he was rescued by his grenadiers. On the third day Alvinzi began his retreat to Vicenza, disregarding the remonstrances of his bravest and most devoted officers, who urged him to effect a junction with Davidowich, and to march upon Verona, which would have received him with open arms.

Meanwhile Davidowich, advancing along the Adige, after gaining several advantages over the French, especially at La Pietra, November 7th, and at Rivoli, 17th, had succeeded in penetrating to Castel Nuovo, near Peschiera; but at the approach of Bonaparte, who now hastened against him with his victorious army, he was compelled to retreat. Thus the Austrians again lost the campaign by the injudicious plan of dividing their forces.

In January, 1797, Alvinzi, who had received large reinforcements, made, at the summons of Wurmser, a last attempt to deliver Mantua. Dispatching General Provera with 12,000 men towards Ponte Legnano on the Lower Adige, he himself transferred his head-quarters to Roveredo, on the Upper Adige. From these places both generals were to pursue their march to Mantua and form a junction at that town. Provera was successful over Augereau’s division, and com­pelled that General to retreat on Bevilacqua and thence on Ponte Legnano, January 9th. Alvinzi, on his side, after some hard fighting, drove the French under Joubert from their entrenchments at La Corona (January 13th), who then retired to Rivoli. Bonaparte, who was at Bologna, at the news of the Austrian advance, flew to the scene of action, and on January 14th defeated Alvinzi in a decisive battle at Rivoli; which the Austrian General, unaware of the arrival of Bonaparte with reinforcements, had advanced to attack.

On the following day Joubert completed, at La Corona, Alyinzi’s discomfiture, while Bonaparte, with the greater part of his victorious army, marched in pursuit of Provera. That General had arrived at Mantua, and, by concert with Wurmser, was preparing to attack the suburbs of San Giorgio and La Favorita, held by the French, when he found himself surrounded by the troops of Bonaparte and of Augereau, and was compelled to lay down his arms (January 16th). These disasters proved fatal to the Austrian power in Italy. Mantua surrendered by capitulation February 2nd. The Commandant, Canto d'Yrles, a Spaniard, was so confident of the temper of his soldiers and the strength of the fortress, that it was with the greatest reluctance he had admitted Wurmser; and there can be no doubt that the necessity of providing for so many additional mouths accelerated the fall of the place. It has been thought by good military authorities that, with a garrison of from 12,000 to 15,000 men, with provisions and medicines for two years, Mantua might be defended against an army of 100,000 men.

Spain declares against England

France had strengthened herself by an offensive and defensive alliance with Spain, which secured to her the aid of that Power, but, during the present war, only against England. Spain, since the affair of Toulon, conceived that she had some grievances against England; a feeling which the French Government used all their endeavors to inflame. They also cajoled and flattered the vain favorite Godoy, who, at this time, ruled supreme in Spain. It is difficult to divine his motives for the French alliance. He neither liked the French people nor their Revolution; while his Sovereign must have viewed with horror a Government which had murdered or expelled the elder branch of his family. The Treaty of St. Ildefonso, concluded by Godoy with the French Directory, August 19th, 1796, was modelled on the Family Compact of 1761. Its object was to render the wars of one Power common to both; or, in other words, under present circumstances, to place the resources of Spain at the disposal of France. Each Power agreed to provide the other, at three months’ notice, with fifteen ships of the line, six frigates, and four smaller vessels; and with 18,000 infantry, 6,000 cavalry, and artillery in proportion. The eighteenth article of the treaty is the most important, being virtually a declaration of war against Great Britain. This article stated that, England being the only country against which Spain had any direct complaints, the present alliance should be valid solely against her during the actual war, and that Spain should remain neuter with regard to other Powers at war with the French Republic.

After the execution of this treaty the English and Spanish Ministers were reciprocally withdrawn; and the Spaniards against prepared to lay siege to Gibraltar. The manifesto of Spain against Great Britain, containing her alleged grievances, appeared October 6th.

Soon after the declaration of war, a Spanish fleet of twenty-four sail of the line proceeded to Toulon; when Admiral Jervis, the English commander in the Mediterranean, being now no longer strong enough to blockade that port, was directed to carry off the British troops at Corsica, Elba, and Caprera, and to quit the Mediterranean. This was the principal motive with the Court of Naples for making peace with France. Bonaparte, after his expedition to Leghorn, had, through his emissaries, excited an insurrection in Corsica against the English, and before the end of October the French regained possession of that island. Pitt's at-

 The French and Spanish alliance, as well as mistrust of Austria, which seemed to be retained in the Coalition only through fear of Russia, were probably the principal motives which induced Pitt to attempt negotiations with France for a peace. Seizing the opportunity of Jourdan’s defeat at Amberg, Lord Grenville addressed a note, September 6th, to Delacroix, the French Foreign Minister, which was conveyed to him through the Danish Ambassador at Paris. The French Government having refused to treat, except directly, Lord Grenville, encouraged by the Archduke Charles’s further victories, sent another note, September 25th, by a flag of truce direct to Paris, when passports were forwarded for Lord Malmesbury, the English plenipotentiary, and the persons in his suite. The Directory appear at this period to have been sincerely desirous of peace, at least with Austria. Their situation was by no means secure. They were threatened at once by the remains of the Jacobin party and by the Royalists; several conspiracies had been organized against them; they had found it necessary to establish camps in the neighborhood of Paris, and to banish all suspected persons from that capital. One of the most formidable of these conspiracies was that of conspiracy, Francis Noel Baboeuf, a journalist and ultra-democrat, who had assumed the name of Caius Gracchus Baboeuf. In conjunction with Drouet, the celebrated postmaster, and other persons, Baboeuf had plotted an armed insurrection (May, 1796); but his design having come to the knowledge of the Directory, he and the other leaders were seized before they could execute it. Baboeuf was ultimately condemned by the High Court of Vendôme, and stabbed himself on hearing his sentence of death. The reverses of the French armies in Germany had produced a painful impression on the public mind, which was aggravated by the distressed state of the country, and loud cries had arisen for peace. Under these circumstances, the Directory had instructed Bonaparte to make overtures to the Emperor; who accordingly addressed from Milan an insolent letter to Francis, October 2nd, in which he threatened that Monarch with the destruction of Trieste and the ruin of all Austrian establishments on the Adriatic, unless he immediately dispatched plenipotentiaries to Paris. This communication was treated by the Emperor with silent contempt.

Lord Malmesbury arrived in Paris October 21st, and was received with lively demonstrations of public joy. But the Directory, as their conduct soon showed, did not wish a peace with England. Their policy was to isolate that Power by concluding a separate treaty with Austria, and to continue the war against it with the aid of Spain. The English plenipotentiary was treated with open insult by the Government, while General Clarke, an Irishman in the service of France, was dispatched to Vienna by way of Italy to make another attempt at negotiation. Thugut was inclined for a separate peace with France; but the English Ambassador, Sir Morton Eden, persuaded the Emperor not to separate his cause from that of England, and Clarke’s passports were refused.

Death of Catharine II, 1796.

The Austrian Cabinet now communicated to that of England their views with regard to the negotiations at Paris; and on the 17th December Lord Malmesbury presented to the French Government an ultimatum drawn up in conformity with them. England agreed to restore to France all her conquests in the East and West Indies, on condition of the restitution of the Emperor’s possessions on the same footing as before the war, of peace with the Empire, and of the evacuation of Italy by the French troops, coupled with an engagement not to interfere in the domestic affairs of that country. But the French Government refused to restore the Austrian Netherlands, a point which the English and Austrian Cabinets made a sine qua non. Delacroix insisted, that the Netherlands having been annexed to France by a legislative decree, it would be unconstitutional, and out of the power of the Directory, to give them back: thus making the law of France override the law of nations. The Directory declined to offer any counter-scheme; and on December 19th Lord Malmesbury was directed to leave Paris in forty-eight hours. The death of the Empress Catharine II, on November 17th, just as she was on the point of signing the Triple Alliance, had an effect on the negotiations unfavorable to the Coalition. Paul I adopted a different line of policy, and revoked the ukase which had been issued for a general levy.

The Punic faith of the Directory was proved by their urging on during these negotiations the preparation of an armament destined for a descent upon Ireland. The French fleet sailed from Brest December 15th, two days before Lord Malmesbury delivered his ultimatum. The Directory had used their authority over the Batavian Republic, now a mere appendage of France, to fit out another fleet for the same purpose in the Texel. The disastrous result of this expedition is well known to the English reader. Part of the vessels of the French armament arrived in Bantry Bay, the remainder were dispersed by storms. Among these last was the frigate conveying General Hoche, the commander of the troops of debarkation, in whose absence the French admiral refused to land them. Contrary to expectation, the Irish showed themselves hostile to the invaders, and the expedition was compelled to return, after suffering considerable losses both from the weather and by capture. The naval actions and colonial affairs of 1796 were not of much importance. A squadron, dispatched by the Dutch for the recovery of the Cape of Good Hope, was captured in August by Admiral Elphinstone in Saldanha Bay, about thirty leagues from the Cape. In the West Indies, St. Lucia and St. Vincent's were taken by the English, but their attempt on St. Domingo failed.

Bonaparte had scarcely dictated the terms of the capitulation of Mantua when he announced to Pope Pius VI the termination of the armistice of Bologna (February 1st, 1797), and marched with his troops in the direction of that city, while General Victor, with his division, was ordered to enter the Romagna. After the conclusion of that armistice, Pius VI had sent two Plenipotentiaries to Paris to treat for a peace; but the bases proposed by the Directory were so unreasonable that the Papal Ministers declined to adopt them, and were ordered to leave Paris (August, 1796). Negotiations were afterwards renewed at Florence with no better success. The Pope then prepared for war; increased his army to upwards of 40,000 men, which he entrusted to the command of the Piedmontese General Colli; and entered into negotiations for an alliance with the Court of Vienna. The expedition of the French into the States of the Church was, however, little more than a military promenade. The Papal troops entrenched behind the Senio were routed on the first attack; Faenza, Forli, Cesena were successively entered; Bonaparte in person proceeded to Urbino and Ancona, whence, despatching a detachment to occupy Loreto, he took the road to Rome by Macerata and Tolentino.

The Peace of Tolentino, 1797

After the fall of Mantua, Pius had sent to propitiate the conqueror and sue for peace. At the news of his approach, the Pope solicited an armistice, when the French general required him to dismiss his newly levied troops and foreign commanders, and accorded him the space of five days to send plenipotentiaries to Tolentino. The Directory had invited Bonaparte to effect the entire destruction of the Papal Government, which had always shown itself the implacable foe of the Republic. But Bonaparte did not share the hatred of the Directors for the Holy See; and there were circumstances which induced him to come to terms with it. The Austrians were preparing another army; the King of the Two Sicilies had sent a message that he should not behold with indifference the French advance upon Rome, nor consent that conditions should be imposed upon the Pope that were contrary to religion and the existing Papal Government. Bonaparte agreed upon the Peace of Tolentino with the Pope’s envoys, February 19th. The See of Rome withdrew from all leagues against the French Republic, ceded to it Avignon and the Venaissin and the Legations of Bologna, Ferrara, and the Romagna; and accorded to it the possession of Ancona till a Continental pacification should be effected. Besides the pecuniary contributions stipulated in the armistice of Bologna, the Pope was to pay fifteen millions more in cash, diamonds, or other valuables. The contributions in objects of art and manuscripts remained the same. Thus the Holy See purchased a peace by sacrificing more than a year’s revenue and a third part of its temporal dominions. After thus mulcting the Pope, Bonaparte addressed to him a most respectful letter, in which he expressed his veneration for the Holy Father in terms quite at variance with the spirit of his instructions from the Directory, and such as might have become the most devout son of the Church. A little previously the Grand Duke of Tuscany had been compelled to purchase a confirmation of his neutrality.2After the conclusion of the Peace of Tolentino, Bonaparte sent a message to the little Republic of St. Marino, the oldest in Italy after Venice, offering it an augmentation of territory. The Gonfalonier wisely declined the dangerous honor; and this small State, consisting of only 6,000 souls, preserved its independence through all the convulsions of Europe.

Thus, in less than a twelvemonth, Bonaparte had conquered Piedmont, and reduced the King of Sardinia to an ignominious peace; had subdued Lombardy and Mantua; destroyed four Austrian armies; detached the King of Naples, as well as Parma and Tuscany, from the Coalition; laid Venice and Genoa under contribution; deprived the Pope of a large part of his dominions; and occupied all the north of Italy to the Piave. He could boast that he had not only supported his army during eleven months, and handsomely rewarded his generals, officers, and soldiers, but had also been able to send thirty million francs to France.

But notwithstanding Bonaparte’s rapid and brilliant conquests, the main object of the war, the complete overthrow of the Emperor, still remained unaccomplished. To carry out such a task required all Bonaparte’s genius and good fortune. Thugut had trusted to the Russian alliance and to the presence of the English fleet in the Mediterranean to hamper if not defeat the French schemes in Italy. But the death of Catharine II and the withdrawal of the English fleet to Gibraltar, consequent on the close alliance made between France and Spain, destroyed his hopes of aid from Russia and England. But Thugut did not despair. He determined to concentrate all his efforts upon resistance in Italy. The obstacles to a march from Italy to Vienna, if properly taken advantage of by the Austrians, seemed almost insuperable. The resources of the Emperor were far from being exhausted. His hereditary dominions displayed an enthusiastic loyalty. The Hungarian Diet assembled at Pressburg, elected the Archduke Joseph to the vacant dignity of Palatine, voted a considerable subsidy in money, extraordinary supplies in kind, a large levy of recruits, and an insurrection of the nobles, on a scale so extensive that the cavalry alone amounted to 24,000 sabres. Bohemia and Tyrol accorded a levée en masse. The Archduke Charles, whose campaign in Germany had inspired the greatest confidence in his military abilities, was appointed generalissimo of the Austrian forces. Bonaparte had been reinforced by the divisions of Bernadotte and Dehmas, and a treaty of alliance, offensive and defensive, was in progress with Charles Emmanuel IV, by which he was to receive the aid of a considerable body of Piedmontese troops. The French had also been recruited from the conquered districts of Italy. To an army of 45,000 men, inured to service and flushed with victory, the Archduke could oppose only about of 24,000 troops in a state of disorganization and discouragement. Faults were also committed in the conduct of the campaign. Had the Archduke Charles concentrated his forces in Tyrol he might have easily prevented the French from penetrating through those difficult passes, while at the same time Bonaparte would probably have been deterred from taking the route of the Julian and Noric Alps, for fear of seeing his communications intercepted, and himself attacked in the rear. Instead of this, by direction of the Aulic Council, he assembled the main body of his army in the Friuli, and exposed it to the attacks of the French in a long and feeble line on the Tagliamento.

 The Austrians were driven from their position at Valvassone, on that river, at the first attack, March 16th, in which action Bernadotte particularly distinguished himself. The Archduke now retreated beyond the Isonzo. Bonaparte, in close pursuit, left him no time to cover Trieste, drove him through Gradisca and Gortz beyond the Save. Bernadotte was dispatched to seize Trieste, which he entered, March 24th. On the 23rd, Massena, with the French advanced guard, defeated the Austrians, after some brilliant actions, at Tarvis. The Drave was now passed, and Bonaparte entered Klagenfurt, the capital of Carinthia, March 31st, which had been taken by Massena, after a smart action two days before; while Bernadotte entered Laibach, the capital of Carniola, April 1st.

But the situation of Bonaparte was attended with considerable danger. The Directory had informed him that he could expect no timely aid by the advance of the French armies through Germany. He found himself in the midst of a hostile population, advancing further and further from his base of operations; while the Archduke, as he receded, drew nearer to his supports. The Hungarian insurrection had begun to march. General Joubert, who had penetrated to Botzen in Tyrol, was there threatened by the Tyrolese levée en masse, under Count Lehrbach, and compelled to retreat. At several places in the Venetian territories the inhabitants had risen against the French. Bonaparte was alarmed about the intentions of the Venetian Government itself. The Senate, annoyed by the seizure of Bergamo by General Baraguay d'Hilliers (December 25th, 1796), had silently made considerable armaments; had assembled near Venice a corps of 12,000 Dalmatians, the best troops of the Republic; and had entered into secret negotiations with the Court of Vienna, which could not have altogether escaped the knowledge of the French. Bonaparte had extorted from the Republic a subsidy of one million a month, telling them that they might seize the treasures of the Duke of Modena, who was an enemy of France. The manner in which he expressed himself to Pesaro, one of their Commissioners who attended him on his march, betrays the anxiety which he felt regarding Venice; which, indeed, by rising against him at this juncture, might have done him irreparable damage. A few more days, and Bonaparte might probably be cut off from Italy, deprived of the means of maintaining his army, and compelled, perhaps, to attempt a retreat by way of Salzburg, which would have been attended with the greatest difficulties. His alarm, in fact, was so great that he addressed a letter from Klagenfurt to the Archduke Charles (March 31st), with proposals for peace.

Bonaparte did not, however, arrest his march. He pressed  on by St. Veit and Neumarkt, where a battle occurred, to Judenburg in Styria, the Archduke retreating before him. At Judenburg, only a few days’ march from Vienna, an armistice was agreed upon, April 7th, which was followed, eleven days after, by the signature of the preliminaries of a peace at Leoben. Vienna had been seized with a panic at the approach of the French and Bonaparte’s proposal, contrary to the advice of the Archduke Charles, had been joyfully accepted. The truce was extended to Tyrol, where the French were now in full retreat; and thus rescued them when the advance of the Austrians and Tyrolese would have supported a rising against them in the Venetian States. It is unnecessary here to detail the preliminaries signed at Leoben, the articles of which were either confirmed or set aside by the definitive Peace of Campo Formio six months afterwards. They were drawn up with the assistance, but not under the mediation, of the Marquis S. Gallo, Neapolitan ambassador at Vienna. It will suffice to state that the main outline of them was the cession to France of the Austrian Netherlands, the consent of the Emperor to her occupation of the left bank of the Rhine and of Savoy, and to the establishment of a Cisalpine Republic in Italy, Austria relinquishing all her possessions beyond the Oglio; for which sacrifices the Emperor was to be compensated with the continental states of Venice, while that Republic was to receive the possessions wrested from the Pope by the Peace of Tolentino. Thus Austria disgraced herself by deserting Great Britain and making a separate peace, contrary to the solemn assurances of Thugut to the English ambassador only a few days before; as well as by accepting the spoils of Venice, a friendly, or, at all events, a neutral Power, in compensation of her own losses.

Hoche, with the army of the Sambre and Meuse, had passed the Rhine at Neuwied, April 18th, and driving the Austrians before him, reached Giessen on the Lahn, after gaining several battles and marching thirty-five leagues in five days. Moreau, with the army of the Rhine, passed that river on the 21st at Kehl, in face of the enemy drawn up in order of battle; one of the most brilliant passages on record. He made 4,000 prisoners and retook the fort at Kehl; but an armistice concluded June 23rd, in conformity with the preliminaries of Leoben, arrested further hostilities in this quarter.

Bonaparte, in his first overtures to Austria, had not demanded the cession of Lombardy, having no equivalent to  offer in return, and fearing that without it the Emperor would never consent to a separate peace; but before the signature of the preliminaries of Leoben events had occurred which, if they did not justify, might at all events serve to colour and excuse, the spoliation of Venice, and thus provide the desired indemnity. The Italian peasantry, exasperated against the French soldiery, rose and massacred a considerable number of them. In Venice itself demonstrations were made against the French, which were secretly encouraged by three Inquisitors of State, and were also favored by Drake, the English Minister. In spite of the protest of the Venetian Government, the insurrection went on increasing, and had extended to Verona itself. The French garrison in that town consisted of only about 1,300 men, exclusive of the sick, while the Venetian Government had assembled there, besides Italian troops, and a considerable force outside the town, a body of 2,000 Slavonians. Encouraged by the presence of this garrison, as well as by the approach of the victorious Austrians from Tyrol, and the entry of several thousand armed peasants into the town, the inhabitants rose against the French, massacred some of them in the streets, and attacked the garrison in the castle. The arrival of French reinforcements at length compelled the insurgents to surrender at discretion, not, however, before they had killed more than 100 of the French, with a loss on their side of about a quarter of that number. But the most horrible feature in this riot was the murder of more than 400 sick French soldiers in the hospitals; an act of cruelty which procured for it the name of the Veronese Vespers.

Whether the Venetian Government was implicated in this affair or not, Bonaparte, whose hands were now freed by the peace with Austria, took care not to let slip so excellent an opportunity for quarrelling with them. He received the Venetian Commissioners sent to deprecate his wrath, with that blustering fury which always harbingered a storm. Arrived at Palmanuova, he published a regular declaration of war, May 2nd, though he had no authority from his Government for such a step. A body of 20,000 French troops was then assembled on the borders of the Lagoons. Among the Venetians themselves was a strong party in favor of the French and their political institutions. At the head of it were the Senators Battaglia, Dona, and San Fermo; Admiral Condulmer, commandant of the Lagoons; the Doge Manini himself implicitly obeyed its counsels. It had been directed by Lallemand, the French ambassador to the Republic; and when that Minister, agreeably to the declaration of war, quitted Venice, his office as leader of the French party was supplied by Villetard, the Secretary of Legation, who remained behind, and even retained over his door the arms of the French Republic. Thus Venice was threatened both from without and from within.

After a short visit to Milan, which he entered with all the pomp of sovereignty, Bonaparte returned to Mestre, the headquarters of the French upon the Lagoons. Before he arrived there he had granted the Venetians an armistice of twelve days to consider the terms which he offered. No harder ones could have been imposed if the city had been conquered. He demanded the suppression of the Senate and Council of Ten; the arrest and trial of the three State Inquisitors, of the proveditore of Venice, and the Commandant of the Lido or Port; the liberation of all political prisoners; and a total disarmament. Yet, among the Senators, only two, Pesaro and Justiniani, were for resistance; although, with a little resolution, Venice might easily have been defended. The sinuous Lagoons were difficult to pass; the French had no flotilla, while the Venetians possessed between 200 and 300 vessels manned by 8,000 sailors; there were 10,000 Slavonian soldiers in the city, and several English frigates were cruising in the Adriatic, which would have come to the aid of Venice at the first signal. But her fall had already been prepared by her own Government. The Doge had assembled on April 30th an extraordinary and illegal committee of forty-three senators, in which it had been determined that, agreeably to the wishes of the French party, the Government should be rendered more democratic. The demands of Bonaparte were accepted, and three plenipotentiaries were dispatched to treat with him for a peace at Milan, whither he had now returned.

Bonaparte has himself explained, in his confidential letters to the Directory, his motives for entering into this treaty. By means of it the French would be enabled to enter Venice without opposition, to obtain possession of the arsenal and other public establishments, which were to be despoiled of their contents, under the pretext of executing the secret articles. If the peace with the Emperor should not be ratified, the possession of Venice would enable the French to turn its resources against him. Finally, the treaty would appease any clamour in Europe, since it would state that the occupation was a mere momentary act, solicited by the Venetians themselves. Bonaparte added that he intended to seize all their vessels, carry off their cannon, destroy the bank, and keep Corfu as well as Ancona. It was with such intentions that the Treaty of Milan was signed, May 16th, by Bonaparte and Lallemand on one side, and by Dona, Justiniani, and Mocenigo on the other. It consisted of six public and six secret articles. The principal conditions of the public articles were, that the Grand Council renounced its rights of sovereignty, directed the abdication of the hereditary aristocracy, and recognized the sovereignty of the State in the assembly of the citizens. The new Government, however, was to guarantee the public debt, as well as the maintenance of poor gentlemen and the life-pensions hitherto granted under the title of “provisions”. A body of French troops was to be kept in the city till the Government should signify that it had no longer need of them; and all the Venetian territory was to be evacuated by the French at the Continental Peace. By the secret articles, the two Republics were to come to an understanding about the exchange of different territories; Venice was to pay three million livres in the space of three months, and three millions more in hemp, cordage, and other marine stores; she was to furnish three ships of the line and three frigates, fully armed and equipped, and to deliver twenty pictures and 500 manuscripts.

 But while the negotiations for this treaty were proceeding at Milan, a complete revolution took place at Venice. In conformity with Bonaparte’s requisitions the ships had been ordered to be disarmed, the Slavonian troops to be dismissed, and on May 11th the Doge Manini invited the Senators to depose their powers into the hands of a commission of ten persons, to be named with the approbation of Bonaparte. But on the following day, through the influence of the French party, a new democratic Municipal Council was elected, consisting of sixty persons of all ranks and nations. Riots ensued, which lasted three or four days, in which the Slavonians played the principal part, and which had for their object plunder rather than a counter-revolution. They served, however, as a pretext for introducing the troops of Baraguay d'Hilliers into the city, 3,000 or 4,000 of whom were conveyed over the Lagoon on the night of May 15th, in barks provided for them by the French party. The Slavonians, with their commander Morosini, had previously set sail for Zara, after plundering the villages of Lido and Malamocco.

Thus, on the conclusion of the Treaty of Milan a new revolutionary Government had been established at Venice. The new Council ratified the treaty; but as the French troops had obtained entrance into Venice without the aid of its stipulations, Bonaparte refused to ratify, availing himself of the miserable subterfuge that he had not negotiated with the new Government. He now demanded five millions instead of three, and directed the Venetians to seize 100,000 ducats belonging to their guest, the Duke of Modena. The French, by their subsequent barbarous proceedings, realized Bonaparte’s threat that he would prove an Attila for Venice. Before quitting it, they seized the whole Venetian fleet and all the cannon and stores that were serviceable; they demolished the Bucentaur, burnt the Golden Book at the foot of a tree of liberty, and carried off the bronze horses, the spoils of Constantinople, which had so long been the pride and ornament of Venice; thus depriving her even of the monuments and trophies of her ancient glory. By the aid of a Venetian flotilla, the French also took possession of the Ionian Islands. Thus fell the renowned Republic of Venice, the most ancient Government in Europe. More astonishment, however, was created by the Austrians taking possession of Venetian Istria and Dalmatia than by all the proceedings of the French. This step was preceded by a hypocritical manifesto respecting the necessity of enforcing order in those States; but it was in reality a result of the secret articles of Leoben.

The revolution in Venice was soon followed by another in Genoa, also organized by the plots of the French Minister there, Faypoult. The Genoese had in general shown themselves favorable to France; but there existed among the nobles an anti-French party; the Senate, like that of Venice, was too aristocratic to suit Bonaparte’s or the Directory’s notions; and it was considered that Genoa, under a democratic constitution, would be more subservient to French interests. An insurrection, prepared by Faypoult, of some 700 or 800 of the lowest class of Genoese, aided by Frenchmen and Lombards, broke out on May 22nd, but was put down by the great mass of the real Genoese people. Bonaparte, however, was determined to effect his object. He directed a force of 12,000 men on Genoa, and dispatched Lavalette with a letter to the Doge, very similar to that which Junot had carried to Manini, requiring him to liberate all the French who had been imprisoned, to arrest those who had excited the people against France, and to disarm the citizens. These orders were to be executed within twenty-four hours, otherwise the French Minister would leave Genoa, and the aristocracy would cease to exist. Faypoult further demanded the arrest of three of the principal nobles, and the establishment of a more democratic constitution. Bonaparte’s threats were attended by the same magical effects at Genoa as at Venice. The Senate immediately dispatched three nobles to treat with him, and on June 6th was concluded the Treaty of Montebello. The Government of Genoa recognized by this treaty the sovereignty of the people, confided the legislative power to two Councils, one of 300, the other of 500 members, the executive power to a Senate of twelve, presided over by the Doge. Meanwhile a provisional Government was to be established. By a secret article a contribution of four millions, disguised under the name of a loan, was imposed upon Genoa. Her obedience was recompensed with a considerable augmentation of territory, and the incorporation of the districts known as the “Imperial fiefs”. Such was the origin of the Ligurian Republic.

Austrian Lombardy, after its conquest, had also been formed into the “Lombard Republic”; but the Directory had not recognized it, awaiting a peace with Austria. Bonaparte, after taking possession of the Duchy of Modena and the Legations, had, at first, thought of erecting them into an independent State, under the name of the “Cispadane Republic”; but he afterwards changed his mind, and united these States with Lombardy, under the title of the Cisalpine Republic. He declared, in the name of the Directory, the independence of this new Republic, June 29th, 1797; reserving, however, the right of nominating, for the first time, the members of the Government and legislative body. The districts of the Valtelline, Chiavenna, and Bormio, subject to the Grison League, in which discontent and disturbance had been excited by French agents, were united in October to the new State; whose constitution was modelled on that of the French Republic.

Bonaparte was commissioned by the Directory to negotiate a definitive peace with Austria, and conferences were opened for that purpose at Montebello, Bonaparte’s residence near Milan. The negotiations were protracted six months, partly through Bonaparte's engagements in arranging the affairs of the new Italian Republics, but more especially by divisions and feuds in the French Directory, ending in a revolution which we must now describe.

The Directory and the two Councils had hitherto acted together with tolerable harmony, but great discontent prevailed among the public. A strong reactionary, and even Royalist party had grown up, and the elections of May, 1797, entirely changed the aspect of affairs. A third part of the members of the Councils having then resigned, agreeably to the new constitution, their places were supplied by anti-Jacobins, and even by known Royalists; among whom were Generals Pichegru, Barbe Marbois, Dumas, Dupont de Nemours, General Willot, and others. The reactionary party now formed a majority in the two Councils, and were thus opposed to the executive Directory; in which also a change had taken place. Letourneur de la Manche had gone out by lot, and the new Chambers elected Barthelemy to succeed him. Barthelemy, formerly French ambassador in Switzerland, a man of moderate principles, acted with and adopted the views of Carnot; and though these two Directors were far from being royalists, they were still further from agreeing with the violent counsels of their three colleagues, Barras, Rewbel, and La Réveillère-Lepeaux. Thus the majority of the Directory were opposed by the majority of the Councils, a state of things which could not but end in a collision. But though the three Directors who acted together, and who obtained the name of the triumvirs, were opposed by the legislature, they were supported by the army ; a circumstance which naturally led to an appeal to force, and originated that military despotism which far-seeing politicians had foretold as the inevitable end of the French Revolution. As soon as the two new Councils had been constituted, 1st Prairial, an V (May 20th, 1797), Pichegru was elected President of the Five Hundred, and Barbe Marbois of the Ancients. The administration of the Directory was now violently assailed, particularly their war policy and their financial measures, and peace, economy, and an unrestricted liberty of the press were advocated. Camille Jordan, a young deputy from Lyons, enthusiastically pleaded the cause of the clergy. The restoration of Catholic worship, the repeal of the decree of banishment against non-juring priests, as well as that against emigrants, were demanded, and numbers of both those proscribed orders returned into France. In the provinces counter-revolutionary reprisals took place against the holders of the national property. The royalist party established the Club of Clichy, while the triumvirs, who found the power of the Directory almost paralyzed, endeavored to reorganize Jacobinism.

Reactionary movements

In this state of things the reactionary party began to contemplate restoration of Royalty; while the triumvirs, on their side, determined to put down their opponents by a coup d’état, supported by military force. Resort to such a step was indeed their only alternative, as they had no power under the constitution to appeal to the people by dissolving the Councils. Hoche, who now commanded the army of the Sambre and Meuse, a man of extreme principles, was entirely devoted to Barras and his colleagues; and as his army was the nearest to Paris, he was directed to march several regiments on that capital. In spite of the remonstrances of the Councils, these troops, on futile pretences, overstepped the constitutional radius of twelve leagues from the metropolis, and were quartered in the neighborhood of Paris. The views of General Bonaparte were at first dubious. He was too prudent to commit himself at once to the majority of the Directory, like Hoche. Besides, he shared the more moderate views of Carnot and the peace party with regard to the affairs of Italy and the pacification with Austria. In other respects, however, he was by no means inclined to support the reaction. He had been violently abused in the Club of Clichy. His application of the public money for military purposes had been severely censured in the Council of Five Hundred, who had passed a resolution depriving the generals of all control over the finances; but this had been rejected by the Ancients. Bonaparte, moreover, had always been the opponent of Pichegru, and he was the enemy of Willot, a Royalist general in Southern France, whom Carnot had patronized by way of counterpoise to him. He therefore sent his aide-de-camp, Lavalette, to Paris, to offer his services to the triumvirs, but, at the same time, with instructions not to compromise him with Carnot. The triumvirate, in a secret letter, accepted his promise to march on Paris, in case of need, with 25,000 men, as well as his offer of three millions to aid the coup d’état. Thus the conqueror of Italy, the vanquisher of Austria, was to become the arbiter of the government under which he held his command.

Bonaparte urged on the triumvirate the necessity for speedy action. The summer was waning fast; if the negotiations for a peace with Austria should not be brought to a satisfactory conclusion before the autumn, it would be too late to chastise that Power by renewing the campaign. The Cabinet of Vienna, aware of the state of parties in France, was anxiously awaiting the result, and sought every pretext to procrastinate the negotiations. Bonaparte himself, instead of going to Udine, took up his residence at Milan, where he was nearer to the scene of action. On August 10th, the anniversary of the fall of royalty, he caused his soldiers to swear on the autel de la patrie to exterminate all conspirators and traitors. Threatening addresses of the most violent kind from the divisions of Joubert, Augereau, and Massena were got up and sent to Paris. Bernadotte hesitated to follow this example; and the address of his division, when at length made, was in a much milder form than the others. Augereau, a rough soldier, without any political capacity, and of whose rivalry Bonaparte had therefore no dread, was dispatched to Paris with the addresses and to assist the coup de main. He was appointed commandant of the 17th military division, which included the metropolis; and the military posts were also intrusted to officers of the army of Italy.

While the triumvirs were contemplating their coup de main, the Legislature was also preparing a revolution. On the motion of Pichegru, 17th Fructidor (September 3rd), a National Guard was ordered to be immediately formed, after which the troops of the line were to be directed to retire from the neighborhood of Paris. General Willot was for more violent measures : an insurrection of the Sections, and the accusation of Barras, Rewbel, and La Réveillère. But, as it happens in such cases, the counsels of so large a number were paralyzed by hesitation and difference of opinion; their designs were betrayed to the triumvirs, who acted with energy and decision. During the night of September 3rd, the troops placed round Paris entered that city, and, under the command of Augereau, were formed round the Tuileries, to the number of 12,000 men with 40 guns. At four in the morning of September 4th (18th Fructidor), the alarm gun was fired; Augereau presented himself at the grille of the Pont Tournant, where Ramel, who commanded the guard assigned to the Legislature, had stationed 800 grenadiers, a force quite inadequate for effective resistance, even had they been inclined to resist. To Augereau’s question, “Are you Republicans?” the grenadiers responded with shouts of Vive Augereau! Vive le Directoire! and immediately joined his troops. Augereau now caused Pichegru, Willot, Ramel, and other leaders of the reactionary party to be arrested; the Council of Five Hundred was directed to assemble in the Odéon Theatre, that of the Ancients in the Ecole de Médecine, with the view of compelling them to give a legal sanction to the proceedings of the three Directors. These assemblies having declared themselves en permanence, a message was sent to acquaint them with what had been done and the motive for it, the discovery of a conspiracy for the restoration of Royalty. The Council of Five Hundred named a commission composed of Sieyes and four other members to take measures for the public safety.

The law which they presented was in fact an ostracism; nothing more arbitrary or violent had been perpetrated under the Reign of Terror, except that transportation was substituted for the guillotine. Carnot, Barthelemy, and upwards of fifty members of the Council were proscribed, including Pichegru, Boisy d'Anglas, Camille Jordan, Willot, and Barbe Marbois. Proofs of a Royalist conspiracy were got up from some papers seized on the Comte d'Entraigues at Venice, and forwarded by Bonaparte to the Directory; as well as from Pichegru’s correspondence with the Prince of Condé, which Moreau had seized some months before in a carriage belonging to the Austrian general Klinglin. Pichegru’s intrigues had long been well known to the Directory; Moreau himself was implicated in them, and betrayed his friend and patron at the last hour. Moreau was deprived of his command; Barthelemy, Pichegru, and about twenty other persons, were sentenced to be transported to the unhealthy swamps of Guiana. A great many of the proscribed persons, however, never left the Isle of Ré. Carnot concealed himself in the house of a friend, and succeeded in escaping into Germany. The proscription was subsequently extended, and the editors of thirty-five journals were condemned to transportation. Regulations were adopted calculated to strengthen the hands of the victorious faction. The elections were annulled in forty-eight of the eighty-three departments; the laws recently passed in favor of priests and emigrants were repealed; emigrants not struck out of the list were ordered to quit Paris in twenty-four hours on pain of being brought before a court-martial; an oath of fidelity to the Republic and to the constitution of the year III, as well as of hatred to monarchy and anarchy, was exacted from all public officers; all members of the Bourbon family were directed to leave France, even those who had remained in it during the Reign of Terror; the whole administration of the department of the Seine was altered; newspapers were placed under the surveillance of the police during a year. Thus the oligarchy of the three Directors, Rewbel, Barras, and La Réveillère-Lepaux, and of their Ministers, Merlin, Scherer, and Talleyrand, was established solely by the sword of Augereau; the populace took no part whatever in the matter. The Republican party was revived, that of the Royalists defeated and humbled, and prepared for submission under the Consulate and Empire. The two Councils, as altered by the new elections, became subordinate to the Directory, whose number was completed by the addition of Merlin de Douai and Francis de Neufchateau.

The revolution of 18th Fructidor had great influence on the negotiations with Austria. Bonaparte, satisfied that the success of the coup d’état was insured by the military arrangements, proceeded to the chateau of Passeriano, near Udine, before the end of August. The Directory entrusted to him the whole conduct of the negotiations, and he showed himself as able a diplomatist as he had proved a matchless commander. The qualities which he displayed in these negotiations, his broad and statesmanlike views, his clear and penetrating judgment of men and events, contributed as much to pave his way to future empire as the brilliant victories won by his sword. But although the Directory seemed to have accorded their entire confidence to Bonaparte, to whom they were so greatly indebted for their power, yet they were far from agreeing with him as to the objects of the future peace. Barras, Rewbel, and their colleagues, retained their warlike views. They were for rejecting altogether the preliminaries of Leoben as the basis of negotiation; they insisted upon retaining Mantua, which, by the secret articles of those preliminaries, had been conceded to the Emperor; they wished to make the Tagliamento, instead of the Adige, the limit of the Austrian territories in Italy; thus giving the city and port of Venice to the Cisalpine Republic; and to revolutionize Piedmont, Rome, and Naples. With this last view they refused to ratify the offensive and defensive alliance which Bonaparte had concluded in April with the King of Sardinia, and which he regarded as essential to the safety and success of his military operations in Italy. In spite of their obligations to him, they looked with suspicion on the young Corsican who thus aspired to protect Kings and Princes, to overthrow Republics and distribute their spoils, to be sole arbiter of peace and war. They also regarded the continuance of the war as the best security for their hold of power, and the only means of maintaining and paying their armies; and in these views they were supported by the ultra-revolutionary party. By way of counterpoise to Bonaparte, they appointed Augereau to the command of the armies of the Rhine and Moselle and of the Sambre and Meuse, now united into one. The command of the former had been vacated by the removal of Moreau, that of the latter by the unexpected death of Hoche. Augereau, at the head of such a force, and supported by the Government, had he had any political genius, might have become the master of the Revolution, and forestalled the career of Bonaparte. Instead of that, he rendered himself the mere tool of the Directory. On assuming the command, he published an inflammatory address, well calculated to provoke a renewal of hostilities, a step which formed one of Bonaparte’s motives for accelerating a peace.

Bonaparte’s prudence and moderation at this juncture form  a striking contrast to the violent counsels of the Directory. He perceived that more would be gained by peace than by war. The abandonment which he advised of Venice to Austria, thus depriving the Cisalpine Republic of a seaport, and putting into the Emperor’s hands the key of Italy, was, indeed, a point on which great difference of opinion might be fairly entertained. Battaglia and Dandolo, the chiefs of the democratic party at Venice, offered Bonaparte 18,000,000 francs, and an auxiliary corps of 18,000 men, to induce him to unite Venice with the Cisalpine Republic, and continue the war with Austria. But Bonaparte could not be shaken from his resolution. He had calculated the chances of a winter campaign, and he knew that the Austrians had collected an army of 120,000 men on the frontiers of Italy for the purpose of securing Venice. The doctrine that France was to fight for the liberty of other nations he, as usual, threw to the winds. His views at this time are admirably explained in a dispatch to Talleyrand of October 7th. He warns against a rash precipitancy, alludes to the characteristic of the French to be too elated in prosperity; “yet”, he continues, “if such be the order of destiny, I think it not impossible that, in a few years, we may arrive at those grand results of which the heated imagination catches a glimpse, but which only the cool, the persevering, and the judicious ever attain”. He seemed to know instinctively how far he might carry his pretensions and when it was time to retire. Thus, though he abandoned Venice, he settled the question about Mantua without any negotiation, by proclaiming its union with the Cisalpine Republic, September 27th.

The Peace of Campo Formio

 On the renewal of the negotiations at Udine, the Cabinet of Vienna dispatched thither Count Louis Cobenzl, its ablest and most practised diplomatist, after a stormy scene with whom, on October 14th, Bonaparte got his way, and three days later was concluded the celebrated Peace of Campo Formio. It derived this name from its having been signed in a ruined castle situated in a small village of that name near Udine; a place selected on grounds of etiquette in preference to the residence of either of the negotiators. By this treaty the Emperor ceded the Austrian Netherlands to France; abandoned to the Cisalpine Republic, which he recognized, Bergamo, Brescia, Crema, Peschiera, the town and fortress of Mantua with their territories, and all that part of the former Venetian possessions to the south and west of a line which, commencing in Tyrol, traversed the Lago di Garda, the left bank of the Adige, but including Porto Legnago on the right bank, and thence along the left bank of the Po, to its mouth. France was to possess the Ionian Islands, and all the Venetian settlements in Albania below the Gulf of Lodrino; the French Republic agreeing, on its side, that the Emperor should have Istria, Dalmatia, the Venetian isles in the Adriatic, the Bocche di Cattaro, the city of Venice, the Lagoons, and all the former Venetian Terra Firma to the line before described. The Emperor ceded the Breisgau to the Duke of Modena, to be held on the same conditions as he had held the Modenese. A congress composed of the plenipotentiaries of the German Federation was to assemble immediately, to treat of a peace between France and the Empire.

To this public treaty was added another secret one, by the principal article of which the Emperor consented that France should have the frontier of the Rhine, except the Prussian possessions, and stipulated that the Imperial troops should enter Venice on the same day that the French entered Mainz. He also promised to use his influence to obtain the accession of the Empire to this arrangement. The navigation of the Rhine to be declared free. If, at the peace with the Empire, the French Republic should make any acquisitions in Germany, the Emperor was to obtain an equivalent there, and vice versa. The Dutch Stadholder to have a territorial indemnity. To the King of Prussia were to be restored his possessions on the left bank of the Rhine, and he was consequently to have no new acquisitions in Germany. Princes and States of the Empire, injured by this treaty, to obtain a suitable indemnity. In what this was to consist is not specified; but the omission of the Bishops of Basle, Strassburg, and Spires from the list of those who were to receive such compensation, shows that it was not designed to reestablish those bishoprics, and that consequently the Emperor had consented to the secularization of their possessions. The Emperor also virtually acknowledged his recognition of the principle of secularization by the fifth article of the Secret Treaty, by which he accepted the good offices of the French Republic to procure for him the Archbishopric of Salzburg. The open and unconditional acceptance of this principle by Frederick William II in July, at Pyrmont, at the instance of Talleyrand, the French Foreign Minister, had helped to remove the Emperor’s scruples, and thus to facilitate the Peace of Campo Formio, though, as a Catholic monarch and head of the Empire, he had less justification for such an act than the Prussian King. Yet Austria and France agreed to shut out Prussia from participating in the secularizations. On the other hand, the Court of Vienna preserved the three ecclesiastical electorates of Mainz, Treves, and Cologne.

By the Treaty of Campo Formio was terminated not only the Italian campaign, but also the first Continental war of the Revolution. The establishment of Bonaparte’s prestige and power by the campaign was a result still more momentous in its consequences for Europe than the fall of Venice and the revolutionizing of Northern Italy. The war with Austria, declared by Louis XVI in 1792, was now concluded. A struggle of five years’ duration, respecting the territorial rights of some Princes of the Empire on the left bank of the Rhine, had ended with the total alienation of their possessions in that quarter. The Austrian Netherlands had been acquired by France, and were incorporated with that country under the name of the Circle of Burgundy. The United Provinces, which, under the Stadholderate, had been so closely allied with England, had, under the name of the Batavian Republic, been converted into a State entirely dependent upon France. Towards the Alps and Italy the French Republic had acquired Avignon, Savoy, and Nice; the King of Sardinia, under the title of an ally, had become little more than the vassal of the Directory; in Lombardy and Northern Italy had been formed from the spoils of Austria, the Pope, the House of Este, and the Republic of Venice, another of those dependent commonwealths with which the Directory had determined to surround itself. No less striking than these events was the renewal of the Family Compact by a Spanish King of the House of Bourbon with the murderers of Louis XVI, the head of the elder branch of his family. Thus the Revolution, which the German Princes had thought to put down by a military promenade, had proved itself stronger than Europe. The ancient political system of the Continent had been shaken to its foundations. Austria, the most conservative of European States, had joined in the revolutionary Treaty of Campo Formio, based on a partition of the spoils of a neutral Power, and containing in its secret articles the germs of future revolutions and interminable wars. But if the French Revolution had mastered Europe, it had itself found a master in Bonaparte, who was to become for many years almost the sole arbiter both of France and the Continent.

CHAPTER LX.

THE WAR OF THE SECOND COALITION