BOOK IV.

THE PRUSSIAN UNION.

 

CHAPTER I.

LEAGUE OF THE THREE KINGDOMS.

 

In the spring of 1848 the power of the old Confederation was broken; in the spring of 1849 the attempt to establish a new Imperial Government failed. So that the form of government for a united Germany seemed to have become Anarchy, or, to use Metternich's ex­pression, instead of there being too much, there was nothing.

The duty of establishing an order of things for the future naturally fell, for the most part, to the two Great Powers. Each of them had, as we know, a very definite programme, carefully planned out in detail. The course of events evolved neither for the Court at Vienna nor for the one at Berlin any new constitutional projects; it was therefore determined no longer by discussion over the problem of a constitution, but by the development of the struggle between the growing forces of the two rival parties. For the former, a hurried outline will accordingly be enough for our consideration; but we shall busy ourselves the more particularly with the relations between Prussia and Austria, and with the details of the contest which decided the question of power.

The scene opens with Prussia advocating her projects for the future Imperial Constitution. Austria was meanwhile busy with more immediate concerns. Her defeat in Hungary was so complete that Prince Schwarzenberg decided, on the 1st of March, to accept the often proffered assistance of the Russian Emperor. Until this aid appeared, she spent all her time and strength upon the restoration of her seriously-demoralized and beaten forces. Her participation in the German question was limited, for the moment, to the simple rejection of all Prussia’s proposals.

On the other hand, Prussia made a last futile attempt, on the 28th of April, to convince the National Assembly of the correctness of her views, and sent, on the same day, invitations to all the German Governments to send Plenipotentiaries as soon as possible to Berlin, who should consider and decide upon some practical form of a Constitution. Inasmuch as Würtemberg and the Petty States had just accepted as final the constitutional work of the Assembly in the Cathedral of St. Paul, only the remaining Kings could be expected to send representatives to Berlin,—a condition of things that was not at all unpropitious to Frederick William’s favorite scheme of a College of Kings.

The King summoned his personal friend, General von Radowitz, from Frankfort to Berlin for the sake of a confidential conference. This remarkable man had begun his career in military service in Hesse-Cassel, and had enjoyed a deservedly high reputation in the city of Cassel as a teacher of military science; but at the time when the Elector, William II, on account of his confirmed dissipated habits, had broken with his wife and son, Radowitz was obliged, as a declared partisan of the Electress, a Prussian Princess, to take refuge in Prussia. Here he won by enthusiastic devotion and Christian zeal the full sympathy of the King, who was not disturbed by the fact that his friend was distinctly Catholic.

Radowitz was a man of thoughtful mien, whose strongly-marked features always wore a serious expression. His manner was firm and deliberate; he never lost the control of his passions. He possessed vast stores of learning; and if it was true that in some departments his knowledge was that of a dilettante, it may be safely said that he was a savant in the fields of mathematics and history, theology and archaeology, and at the same time was skilled in the science and lore of genealogies and heraldic blazonry. He was a master of conversation as well as of oratory. In every instance he spoke only after thorough preparation, and then with the whole force of the mature idea, the polished form, and the tempered keenness, which soon made him one of the most celebrated speakers in the Cathedral of St. Paul, admired and courted by all parties. He was fond of remaining silent a long while, and leaving the hearers then to surmise from his following remarks the weight of argument and of thought that lay concealed beneath the unspoken words. lie thus kept his audience in a constant state of eager expectancy. Accordingly, wherever he appeared, he made a great impression; but he did not easily gain the confidence of wide circles, because his very reserve and his enigmatical attitude did not clearly discover his character nor his aims.

The Prussian Liberals suspected the Catholic Orator, who in all ecclesiastical questions favored the demands of the Ultramontanes, which latter were, in Frankfort, always the advocates of an “entire” Germany and enemies of Prussia. The Conservatives and Feudalists, too, were utterly unable to fathom the aims of the man, who in Frankfort belonged to the extreme Right, and who now, as friend of the King, pursued a decidedly Liberal course in regard to German affairs. In short, all parties were beyond measure apprehensive, as this inscrutable personage now assumed the most influential position in the control of Prussian politics. His most intimate associates in his official work at this time agreed, however, in honoring him to the end as a man of a character as noble as his mind was great, and above all, as a loyal Prussian patriot that followed unswervingly and persistently the aim of German-Prussian development. Against the purity of his motives we have nothing to say; but it is certain that, with all his talent and learning, he lacked the one simple and yet necessary element of a great statesman, that practical sense which knows how to choose its aims according to the existing means, and to adapt the means to the accomplishment of the desired aim.

It was not under a clear sky and promise of fair weather that the Prussian Government began its work upon a German constitution. The thunder of the Democratic Revolution was rolling along the horizon on all sides. The party, through its societies founded in March, 1848, had, as we have seen, a firmly-united organization, which was extending into all the German lands; and now, in March, 1849, the Imperial Ministry received the news from Paris, that a long series of insurrections had been planned along the Rhine. The refusal of the Imperial Crown by the Prussian King provided the Republicans with a popular war-cry: Force the rebellious Princes to submit to the Parlia­ment and its Imperial Constitution.

In the beginning of May the Bavarian Palatinate arose with this cry, and the people were joined by bands of mutinous troops. Some days later, the revolt began in Baden, where the Government had already recognized the Imperial Constitution, and where, consequently, the useful “national” pretext was wanting and the true aim of the movement was clearly revealed. The soldiers, who had long been insubordinate, either drove away or killed their officers, and entered the service of the Revolution. The Grand Duke, having no means of resistance at hand, fled into the Prussian Rhine Provinces, and the Republicanized Government endeavored without hesitation to spread the rebellion farther into Würtemberg and Hesse-Darmstadt.

Even earlier than this, on the 3d of May, a so-called Provisional Government in Dresden had summoned the people to revolt. The troops here remained true to their colors; they were, however, not strong enough to quell the rebellion, and it was only after the arrival of a regiment of the Prussian Guards and after a bloody struggle of several days that this was accomplished.

In Prussia, the Lower House had declared the Imperial Constitution to be valid after the vote of the National Assembly; the House was, therefore, dissolved by the Government, and a portion of the militia was at once called out for the preservation of order. This was the signal for protests and tumults in the east and in the west of the Monarchy. Numerous towns declared their approval of the Imperial Constitution, and demanded the dismissal of the anti-Liberal Ministry of Brandenburg. In many Westphalian, Rhine, and Thuringian towns the militia disobeyed the summons, and committed wild excesses of every sort. Dusseldorf and Elberfeld were for many days in the hands of Republican hordes. In Breslau order could be restored only by a murderous, battle with the barricaders. Some attempts to build barricades were made even in Berlin. The Government, meanwhile, employed the most severe and vigorous measures. The troops of the line nowhere refused to obey orders, and toward the end of May the authority of the law was again recognized in all sections of the country.

This success was hailed with joy by the Governments of Hanover, Brunswick, and Hesse-Cassel, where the excitement had been no less, and where in many places, forces were being collected for the assistance of the South German insurgents; the plans for revolution were now postponed by reason of the strength of the resisting armies.

From Hesse-Darmstadt, however, and from the Grand Duke of Baden, as well as soon afterwards from the Bavarian Government, urgent requests for help were sent, not only to the powerless Imperial Regent, but also to the King of Prussia as their only strong Confederate ally and savior. Frederick William promised on the spot his active and wholly unconditional assistance.

Under such circumstances, the Berlin Cabinet might naturally hope that the Lesser States would show toward their mighty protector an accommodating spirit in the matter of a constitution. But, as we know, the King cared even more about a mutual understanding with Austria, and the first step in these important negotiations was directed to Vienna. Prince Schwarzenberg had repeatedly declared that his Emperor would in no case subordinate himself to any other German Prince, and that the newly-formed and united State of Austria would allow no German legislation to have force in her territory. So that even the King saw that any participation of Austria in a Federal Union such as was longed for by the German Nation was impossible; but so much the more did he then consider it desirable to bring about a close and indissoluble connection between the great bodies, Austria and Germany. The circular of the 23d of January was taken for the basis of negotiations, and this involved a renewal of Gagern’s system of a restricted union and a more comprehensive alliance. As soon as Radowitz had completed his Draft of a German Constitution, and fully a week before the beginning of the conferences with the Lesser States, the royal proposals about the more comprehensive alliance were sent to Vienna. These proposals were as follows: that Germany should form a Federal Union under Prussia’s leadership; that this Federal Union should then form an eternal alliance with Austria; that both parties to this alliance should pledge each other mutual support, to the extent of their power, in securing internal and external safety, and in warding off every hostile attack from without; that everything possible should be done to promote internal prosperity and to foster mutual intercourse; that the two parties to the alliance should share equally in a common Government, by appointing each two representatives to the same, who should control the foreign politics of the whole by the appointment of all ambassadors and consuls. Prussia expected that, in return, Austria would accede to the formation of the restricted German Federal Union according to the Draft of Radowitz, which was submitted to her examination, and would assent at once to the assumption of the control of its Provisional Central Government by the King of Prussia.

However attractive these proffered advantages might perhaps under other circumstances have appeared to the Austrian Cabinet, it remains nevertheless a matter of astonishment that the message was sent to Vienna with such confident assurance on the part of Prussia. How could it ever happen that an old, proud, and mighty Power like Austria should meekly resign such a historical and traditional position as that of the most influential leader in Germany, especially when a youthful, exuberant ruler, and a statesman of the temperament of Felix Schwarzenberg, stood at its head?

Whoever wanted to set up a German Federal Union without Austria, must count upon war with Austria: this was the inevitable result of the course which things had been taking for several centuries. The irrefutable arguments of advantage and of expediency rebounded without effect from the feeling in Vienna that Austria’s honor could never submit to such a retreat from Germany. Never, unless in virtue of a decisive war, could the idea gain ground in Vienna that Austria and Germany were no longer to be peaceful members of the same household, but yet were to be neighbors and friends bound to each other in an offen­sive and defensive alliance.

Schwarzenberg’s answer on the 16th of May, accordingly, rejected absolutely all Prussia’s propositions. In consideration of the present uncertain state of things, the Prince spoke politely and even cordially. But he stuck to his point: for the permanent Government of Germany, a triple Directory (Austria, Prussia, and the Lesser States); for the temporary conduct of affairs, a Provisional Central Government arranged likewise in the shape of a College (Austria, Prussia, and one of the Lesser Kings). He would not listen to anything about a restricted union and a more comprehensive alliance, nor about a Lower House in any union. For the time, he contented himself with the observation that be could in no way give his assent to a constitution that had as yet no more definite shape than a draft.

This reply of Schwarzenberg spoiled at the outset the first flush of the King’s enthusiasm in his undertaking. Meanwhile the work was pushed eagerly, in order to lay before the Prince as soon as possible a definite Constitution in place of the Draft. The sole thought of the King was, now as ever, that of union and voluntary agreement; however much he hoped that all the Governments would join in the enterprise, his first principle was that no one should be forced into participation, and the first sentence of the Draft declared that the Federation consisted of those States that accepted the Federal Constitution. Yet he desired, in any event, to see maintained with the Governments that held aloof a firm, even if not very close, bond of connection; and so he lighted upon the unfortunate idea of basing his whole undertaking upon the Confederate Rights of 1815, by asserting that his new Federal Union rested upon Article 11 of the old Act of Confederation (the right of the German States to make alliances of any sort, provided they did not interfere with the safety of the Confederation), and reserved at the same time to the non-participants all their rights implied in the Treaties of 1815.

Camphausen had pointed out, a few weeks before, that by the summoning of the German Parliament and the establishment of the constitutional monarchical Government of the Imperial Regent, the whole Confederation of 1815 had been exploded, and that consequently Prussia would be entirely free to strike out in any direction. The Ministry had recognized the truth of this position, but the King would not go quite so far. He considered that although the Confederate Diet had, indeed, been annihilated, yet the Decrees of the Act of Confederation were entirely independent of that, and still remained in force. He gratified his conservative tendencies by the mere fact of making the old treaties the basis of his new operations; but he was soon to learn what strong weapons he thus put into the hands of his adversaries.

In view of the general ferment of excitement, which had filled all Germany since the beginning of May, it seemed very desirable to separate the liberally-minded citizens from the Republican party, and to win the former to the cause of a monarchical system. With this view Radowitz obtained the royal assent to the proposition of laying the outline of the Frankfort Constitution at the foundation of his own work, and of making only those changes and necessary amendments which were required from a conservative and monarchical point of view.

Accordingly, the direct elections by universal suf­frage were abolished, and indirect elections put in their place, by which the original voters, divided into three classes according to their wealth, were to choose electors. The “fundamental rights” were modified in many places, with special reference to public regulations and to varieties of local conditions. In the Diet, the Upper House was to have as much voice in financial matters as the Lower House, and no bill was to become a law without the consent of the Federal Executive. The functions of the Federal Government were sharply defined with reference to those of the individual Governments, and direct interference by the former was limited to a few instances. Finally the position of the German Princes was considerably improved, compared with their treatment at the hands of the National Assembly.

In the place of an hereditary Emperor, a College of Princes was to form the Government, consisting of Prussia, Bavaria, and four representatives of the others arranged in four curias. By the side of this College, the King of Prussia was to assume the Presidency of the Federation. Between these the functions were arranged in such a way that the College of Princes should share in the work of legislation, in accordance with the principles of the Constitution, while the President should exercise the executive power, that is, should be the ruling Head. By this means, Radowitz expected to conciliate the independent pretensions of the Princes.

This hope was doomed to serious disappointment; for although the Lesser States were well pleased with the amendments to the Frankfort Constitution proposed by Radowitz, yet their exclusion from the Fed­eral Government was enough to make the Constitution as a whole unpalatable to them. They had been contented under the working of the old Act of Confederation, and saw no reason for any change. If, however, in view of the critical condition of affairs they were to be obliged to transfer a portion of their royal prerogative to a new Supreme Government, they wished, at least, to have an independent representation in the same. Such a system Austria had offered to them in her proposition of a Confederate Directory, in which, moreover, they would be on an equal footing with Prussia, whereas Radowitz had allotted to them a subordinate r6le. It was no wonder that in secret their longing eyes turned exclusively toward Vienna. Had Austria only been able, at this time, to bring as many battalions as Prussia into the field against the Revolution!

On the 17th of May, Radowitz began the conferences with the deputies from Austria and three royal Lesser States over the question of a constitution. The Austrian Ambassador, Baron Prokesch-Osten, attended the first session, and then announced that he should be unable to take further part in them. The Bavarian deputy was regularly present, offered frequently his personal views, for the most part non-committal, and constantly expressed his regret that he had as yet received no instructions to make binding promises. Saxony and Hanover, represented by their Ministers, Von Beust and Strive, risked still less than Bavaria an open opposition, owing to their geographical position. They confessed that they held contrary opinions, but finally voted in the affirmative; they complained that Radowitz was in too much of a hurry, and yet could find no arguments against his assertion that every delay only placed incalculable advantages in the hands of the Revolution.

A Constitutional Draft and an electoral law were at last settled upon in the course of nine sittings; and in the night session of the 26th of May, a final agree­ment was reached between Prussia, Hanover, and Saxony.

A League was formed between the three Kingdoms for one year. The Compact upon which it was based provided for mutual protection and assistance (also to be extended to all States that might join the League later), gave to the Crown of Prussia the direction of the affairs of the League, determined the appointment of a common Federal Council for the transaction of special business, and promised the German Nation a Constitution after the plan of the Draft, which was to be examined and discussed by a Convention to be summoned forthwith; amendments proposed by this Convention were to be subject to the approval of the members of the League; and finally the establishment of a provisional Court of Arbitration was authorized. A circular drawn up at this time, but afterwards dated the 28th of May, containing the terms of the Compact, the Constitutional Draft and the Electoral Law, was sent to all the German Governments with an invitation to join the Federal League.

All this was accepted and properly signed in the dawn of the 27th, Saxony and Hanover reserving only their final decision about the Presidency. But when, on the following day, this decision was formally presented, it was found to contain not a word about the Presidency, but in its place an explanation to the effect that both Governments had given their assent only with the understanding, that the proposed Constitution was to be the common property of the whole German Nation (apart from the consideration of Austria), and not merely of a portion of the same. If, therefore, the Southern States, especially Bavaria, should not have joined the League by the time of the convening of the first Diet, then both Governments reserved the right of demanding fresh negotiations with the view of appropriately remodelling the Constitution.

According to the wording of this document, its contents might be understood to mean that the two Courts would no longer hold themselves bound to the League and its proposed Constitution, if at the time of the elections Bavaria and Würtemberg had not already joined. Yet such an interpretation seemed to the Prussian Government impossible. A reservation of this kind had neither been made nor announced, when the signatures had been given to the Federal Compact and other related papers; its later announcement could certainly affect in no way the binding force of those documents, which had been signed and approved by the two Courts. In fact, such a reservation would stand in direct contradiction to these documents.

The Draft of the Constitution declared in its first Article that the Federal League included those German States that accepted the Constitution; the Federal Compact reserved to others their old rights; the circular promised that a Diet should be summoned as soon as possible, which should be composed of deputies from those States which had joined the Federal League; every word throughout the whole work had been based, not alone upon the hope that all States would join, but at the same time upon the determination, even in the contrary event, to put the Constitution into execution for those States that did participate in the undertaking. It was in this shape, that Saxony and Hanover had confirmed the work by their signatures: and now twenty-four hours later, did the two Courts reserve to themselves the right of withdrawing from the whole thing, if a single German State refused to join in it?

As has been said, to the Prussian Government this seemed impossible. The simple interpretation put upon the matter was that the two Courts wished to announce now their propositions for changes in the Constitution, in case Bavaria and Würtemberg did not join — in order not to see their propositions dismissed later a limine with the remark, that the Constitution had already been framed and prepared in a way to provide for such a contingency. Accordingly, their reservation was filed away without receiving any reply whatever.

Unfortunately, this was a fresh mistake on the part of Prussia. Saxony and Hanover were most positively determined to secure for themselves by this declaration the privilege of withdrawing from the League, if Bavaria held aloof. And more than this, they knew very well, even at that time, that Bavaria would never voluntarily accept the Constitution proposed by Radowitz; and scarcely fourteen days had elapsed after they had signed the papers, before they signified to the Emperor Nicholas their intention to withdraw. Theirs was the cunning of the weak. Just at this time, while Austria’s support was still uncertain, the Courts would not venture to reject Prussia’s proposals boldly and openly. Framing their acceptance in ambiguous terms, they kept for themselves a postern open, through which they could slip out and join the enemy’s camp, after the raging of the revolutionary tempests had ceased.

But for the present, they took part in the negotiations as if no such reservation existed. On the 30th of May they united with Prussia in establishing a Federal Court of Arbitration for the settlement of all kinds of controversies arising between members of the League; and on the 11th of June they gave their assent to a memorial concerning the interpretation of the Draft of the proposed Constitution, in the first paragraph of which the reasons were stated why this Constitution, unlike the one projected at Frankfort, did not include in the new Federal League all the territory embraced by the old Confederation, but limited it to those States that voluntarily joined the League, and consequently summoned only those States to send deputies to a common Diet. Who could have thought that behind these official acts a secret reservation was lurking, which would allow certain members to hinder the convention of the Diet, and to turn their backs upon the League, if Bavaria did not see fit to join it?

While these conferences were being held, the war­measures projected against the Palatinate and Baden gradually began to take shape. There were, in those countries, about thirty thousand men in the service of the Revolution: a heterogeneous throng of soldiers of the line, local militia, and foreign volunteers, loosely organized and disciplined, only partially trained and equipped, and with no acknowledged leader exercising firm authority, until Mieroslawski, known to us already in Posen, had put himself recently at their head.

Among their adversaries, the tension existing between Austria and Prussia had already led to a bitter quarrel. The Archduke and Regent of the Empire had, as we have seen, notified the Government at Berlin of his wish to retire from office, and the King had signified his readiness to assume the direction of the Central Government. Austria would not allow this, and consequently the Archduke, obeying superior orders, remained at his post. The Prussian Government, however, considered that with the fall of the National Assembly the power of the Imperial Regent, who was in every way dependent upon the Parliament, had also ceased; and therefore Prussia announced to the Arch­duke that she had taken into her own hands the important business of settling relations with Denmark, and would no longer recognize any right on the part of the Central Government to interfere.

The Archduke angrily replied that it was his own business to determine the date of his withdrawal, and that he would allow no one to oust him from his office; whereupon he received a note from Berlin, saying in the politest possible terms that on account of the above- mentioned reasons, the Prussian Government did not consider that his office any longer existed.

The forecasting craftiness was now brought to light, with which Herr von Schmerling had guided the last steps of the Confederate Diet, and the short-sighted zeal with which the overwise Count Usedom had seconded him. The Imperial Ministry announced to the Berlin Cabinet that the Archduke had not merely been placed by the National Assembly in the possession of a new executive authority, but that he had also received from the Confederate Diet every one of its own rights and functions, and that he was fully determined to maintain and exercise these until the establishment of some new central executive power by the Confederation itself. The Court of Berlin was in a rage at this jugglery, which conjured up from its grave on the 12th of July the old Confederate Diet, which had been buried by the Decree of the 28th of June, of the preceding year; and it was decided that henceforth Prussia should entirely ignore the Imperial Regent.

The Archduke then did his part, by hindering, or at least by rendering as difficult as possible, the Prussian advance against Baden: it certainly did not lie in the interest of Austria to allow Prussia to gain rapid triumphs in the West, while in the East the rebellious Magyars were defiantly continuing their revolt. The Central Government had hitherto maintained a motley corps of troops, numbering eighteen thousand men, brought together from eight different States, and under the command of the former Minister of War, the Prussian General von Peucker, to protect the Hessian frontier against Baden. The Archduke now sent an urgent request to the Grand Dukes of Baden and of Darmstadt, not to accept further assistance offered by Prussia, inasmuch as the Central Government was now able to add to the former corps seventeen thousand Austrians and a corresponding force from Bavaria and Würtemberg under the supreme command of the Hessian Prince Emil (a well-known Prussia-hater with which it would be an easy matter speedily to put an end to the Revolution. Both Princes, however, knew only too well the actual probability of the realization of that magnificent scheme for raising an army; so without giving it more than a passing thought, they declined the offer of the Archduke, and the first week in June the Prussian columns were seen on the borders of the revolutionary territory.

Prussia had formed two small army corps for the suppression of the South German Revolution: one under General von Hirschfeld, numbering about twenty thousand men, and directed temporarily against the Bavarian Palatinate; and another of about fifteen thousand men under General Count Groben, whose business it was to guard the line of the Neckar by the side of Peucker. The Prince of Prussia was Commander­in-Chief over the whole; and he, avoiding Frankfort, summoned the leaders of the three corps to a council of war at Manz on the 13th of June.

General von Peucker presented himself with the other two. It was understood without any formal explanations that he also was, for the future, to be under the superior command of the Prince. Since the forces of the Revolution were stationed along the lower Neckar, it was decided that Groben should keep them busy there, while Peucker went up the river to Zwingenberg, where he should cross the stream and take up a position at Sinsheim in the rear of the rebels. At the same time Hirschfeld, in whose corps the Prince of Prussia was to have his headquarters, should take possession of the Palatinate, and then, crossing the Rhine at Germersheim, should march to Wiesloch to join Peucker and complete the enclosure of the enemy’s forces. It was hoped that by the 21st of June all these movements could be effected, and the whole war thus quickly terminated.

The successes of Hirsehfeld in the Palatinate fulfilled these expectations. Wherever his vanguard appeared, militia and volunteers dispersed after a few shots. One of their leaders reported: “The Prussians are everywhere: there is nothing to be seen but the sky and Prussian helmets.” It was very evident that neither definite convictions nor fanaticism had induced the common people to take part in the Revolution, but merely the fascination of being unbridled and unconstrained. The country was subdued in a few days. On the 20th of June Hirsehfeld crossed the Rhine; and on the following morning, leaving behind at this point five thousand men under the command of General Hanneeken, he pursued his march with the main corps in a southeasterly direction toward Bruchsal.

On the 20th, Mieroslawski had received the news at Heidelberg, that Prussian troops had crossed the Rhine. Supposing that it was an advanced detachment which he could drive back into or across the river, he immediately collected about eleven thousand men, and in the course of the forenoon of the 21st fell upon the small company under Hanneeken at Waghausel with a force twice as numerous. The Baden troops of the line, well knowing what a severe punishment awaited them if their cause failed, fought with unwearied cour­age ; so that Hanneeken, after a brave resistance of several hours, was obliged to decide upon an orderly retreat to Philippsburg.

But at this very moment fresh cannonading was heard from Wiesenthal at the southern extremity of the enemy’s position. At the Prussian headquarters the fire of Hanneeken’s company had been heard, and a force of about three thousand men had been sent back to his assistance under General von Brun, who did not hesitate to attack the enemy wherever he found them,—which, after Hanneeken’s retreat, might have proved very disastrous to himself. But among the rebel troop, the appearance of Brun; at the time when the main body of the Prussian army was supposed to be on the other side of the Rhine, caused great surprise and terror. And when, soon afterwards, a Prussian corporal of the 7th Regiment of Lancers, who had been taken prisoner and brought before Mieroslawski, announced to him that the Prince of Prussia with the whole army was already at Bruchsal and coming onward to attack him, the Pole at once gave the order to cease fighting and to retire as quickly as possible to Heidelberg, in order thence to pass by way of Sinsheim in front of the Prussians, and to gain the road to the south.

This was rightly planned, but the attempt to carry it out ruined the whole cause. The soldiers, having no strict military training and thoroughly frightened by the sudden appearance of the enemy at their backs, lost all trace of discipline at the order to retreat, and only a few shots from Brun’s division were sufficient to create an irresistible panic among them. In hasty flight and tumultuous confusion the multitude surged toward and through Heidelberg. If the Prussian plan of the 13th had been punctually carried out in every point, the rebellious hordes —for one can no longer speak of them as an organized army—would have run directly into the arms of Peucker’s corps at Sinsheim, and the whole Revolution would have been terminated within three days. But the Imperial corps, clumsy at best on account of its semi-independent elements, and led very cautiously and comfortably by Peucker, came up to Sinsheim twenty-four hours too late, just as the last squad of the enemy's rear was leaving the town.

To be sure, this slip did not seriously affect the outcome of the war; for it was impossible again to organ­ize the scattered bands of insurgents into a united army. A few detached companies offered still a bloody resistance on the banks of the Pfinz, and a few days later, on the Murg; but after that, it was all over, and whoever was not captured fled in haste across the Swiss frontier. On the 23d of July the last stronghold of the Revolution, Rastadt, surrendered unconditionally, and everywhere the legitimate authorities were reinstated in the exercise of their functions. The people, who had everywhere paid dearly enough for the reckless practices of the rebellious leaders and their associates, were thoroughly cured of their notions of Liberty, and made proof against the fascinations of Revolution for a long time to come. For several years afterwards, the saying was often heard in Baden:

“ The Chambers are more liberal than the People, the Ministers more liberal than the Chambers, and Grand Duke Frederick more liberal than they all.”

Since the 21st of June, the march of the victorious Prussian banners had been uninterrupted and brilliant, even as far as Lake Constance; and during the same time, very similar results had been achieved in Jutland against the Danes. Rarely had the Prussian flags floated so triumphantly over such large areas of territory. The impression which this produced was for the moment a powerful one. If Count Brandenburg had been in a position on the 22d of June to send invitations to the German Governments to signify within a week their acceptance or rejection of the Federal Constitutional Draft of the 26th of May, and could have announced at the same time that in those States that joined the League the election of deputies to the first Diet would be held on the 1st of July, the number of those that did not join would have been very, very few.

In order to gain time, the Bavarian Minister, Von der Pfordten, hastened himself on the 23d of June to Berlin, and negotiated for two whole weeks about possible modifications of the Draft, naturally without success, since he insisted upon the admission of Austria into the Federal League, upon the alternation of the Federal Presidency between Austria and Prussia, and even further, upon the relegation of the whole Federal authority to the College of Princes, which meant the abolition of any Presidency whatever; nor would he be satisfied with any other concessions which Radowitz offered to him.

In Vienna, everybody was furious over Prussia’s successes during the past few weeks. The Archduke John, surrounded on all sides by Prussian influence and rendered completely powerless, pleaded illness, and withdrew from Frankfort to Gastein: after this, the “Provisional Central Government” retained merely the semblance of an existence.

What could Prince Schwarzenberg do about it? The entry of Russian troops into Hungary took place very slowly.

Radetzky refused to allow a decrease in the army in Italy: not ten thousand men could be put into the field in Germany. But the weaker he was in actions, the more violent was Schwarzenberg in words, he assured all the ambassadors in Vienna that Hungary would shortly be subdued, and he would then cut down Prussia's pretensions with the edge of the sword. “Believe me,” said the Hanoverian Ambassador at the Court of Vienna to his Prussian colleague, “here’s going to be a war ; and in that case the troops of Saxony and Hanover, your Federal associates, are going to desert to the Austrians. You may depend upon it.”

Meanwhile Schwarzenberg tried, through the Austrian ambassadors, every possible means to prevent the German States from joining the Prussian League; at many Courts he succeeded, at least, in causing a long postponement of the decision. For so pressing a demand as I have intimated above was wholly contrary to the principles of King Frederick William ; he did not wish any State to join in consequence of any pressure whatever, but only voluntarily after careful consideration. For these reasons, favorable responses to the invitation were received at long intervals and one at a time.

On the other hand, the mighty preparations against Hungary were inaugurated by the two Emperors during the first weeks of July; and it was at once clear that the suppression of the Magyar Revolution was now a question of only a short period of time. Thereupon, Minister von der Pfordten broke off the negotiations at Berlin, which had become aimless, and sent, on the 12th of July, a circular to all Bavarian embassies, declaring that it was now very evident that Prussia had no other object in view than the illegal aggrandizement of her own power; that this behavior was rendering imminent a war between her and Austria; and that it was to be hoped this would not lead to any further European complications. Von der Pfordten’s letter declining to negotiate further was as uncivil as possible, but had no other effect than to call forth a painful note of apology from the Prussian Court, which was even followed in a few weeks by a repetition of the inquiry, whether Bavaria would not, after considering the matter in a more favorable light, join the League after all.

But by that time, the latter part of August, the war in Austria had been decided; the rebellious Hungarian armies had surrendered at discretion, and Venice too, the last centre of national resistance in Italy, had opened her gates to superior forces. The Courts of Munich and Stuttgart hesitated no longer, but sent official notifications to Berlin of their final rejection of the Constitutional Draft of the 26th of May. It was now said on all sides that Austria would soon teach the upstart and obtrusive Prussia how she must behave, and what she must do.

The enthusiasm shown in Vienna for new exploits in arms was not, after all, so great as the Munich states­man had on the 12th of July feared, or hoped. The painful consequences of a severe civil war had laid sore burdens upon all portions of the country and upon all branches of the Administration. Prince Schwarzenberg wished above all things to come to some definite understanding with the Lesser States, and until then to hold the question of relations with Prussia in the background. Moreover, he was also influenced by the emphatic monitions of the Russian Emperor, who, much as he abhorred an attempt to establish a German Union in any form, was equally anxious to prevent an open rupture between the two German Great Powers. Prince Schwarzenberg, accordingly, did not raise his voice in opposition, when, in the course of August, Archduke John definitely announced his resignation, and through his assistant Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Baron von Biegeleben of Darmstadt, made the proposition that the functions delegated to the Imperial Regent on the 12th of July, 1848, should be provisionally placed in the hands of Austria and Prussia, who should exercise them in common, through a Commission consisting of four members, until the 1st of May, 1850, and that during this time the establishment of a constitution should be left to the free choice of the Governments acting in concert.

When Biegeleben laid this proposition before the King in Berlin, Frederick William was at once inclined to accept it; and after further negotiations had resulted in gaining some concessions from the Imperial Court of Vienna, the matter was happily decided. Until then, Austria had, as we have seen, always insisted upon the participation of the Lesser States in any form of a new Provisional Government; this demand was now abandoned, and in the proposed double rule equal rights with Austria were fully conceded to Prussia. And again, Austria had hitherto stubbornly refused to recog­nize the Prussian Federal League; in the draft of this compact, there was, indeed, no express acknowledgment of it, yet it was considered as understood in the clause which referred the question of a constitution to the free choice of the Governments acting in concert. The “Compact of the Interim” was signed, as it stood, on the 30th of September in Vienna.

This was a new move of Prussia’s in the direction of the resuscitation of the old Confederate regime,—a virtual assent to the assertion of Austria, that the Imperial Regent had been vested with the functions of the Confederate Diet, which he now, by the establishment of this “Interim Government,” delivered into the keeping of the two Great Powers ; or, in other words, that the functions and rights of the Confederate Diet had never ceased to exist. No one in Berlin seems to have had an idea that this was opening the flood-gates to a host of dangers which stood in the path of Prussia's ambitions. General Radowitz himself was innocent enough to make the official declaration on the 24th of October in the Prussian Diet, that in keeping with the treaties of 1815, Prussia recognized unreservedly the duty of every German State, after the dissolution of the Confederate Diet, to see that a new form of central government should be established in its place.

Favorable responses to the invitation to join the League of the 26th of May had meanwhile been received from almost all the Petty States. Beside Luxemburg and Holstein, only Liechtenstein, Hesse-Homburg, and the free city of Frankfort, were still wanting. In Berlin, it was now considered the proper time to inaugurate definite measures for the establish­ment of the German Federal League, by the convention of a Federal Diet. No one thought of encountering any opposition within the League, since Saxony and Hanover had never again mentioned their reservation of the 27th of May, but on the contrary, during the negotiations with Nassau, Brunswick, and the Saxon Duchies concerning their admission to the League, had constantly affirmed that their accession must be uncon­ditional, since outside of the Federal Compact, the Constitution Draft, and the Circular of the 28th of May, there were no regulations to determine the rights and duties of members, and had asserted that all changes in the Constitutional Draft were subject to the unanimous approval of all the members of the League.

It is obvious that all these statements were inconsistent with a reservation providing for voluntary withdrawal from the League, in case Bavaria should not join it; this consideration naturally confirmed Prussia in her original interpretation of the document of May 27th. The Nassau Plenipotentiary, on the 26th of September, proposed that a day be fixed for holding elections to the Federal Diet; and the Prussian President of the Federal Council, which was intrusted with the transaction of business relating to the League, placed this item upon the order of the day for the session of October 5th.

But it soon appeared that since the 26th of May the times had changed. Then, Austria’s hands were tied, and Prussia was the only bulwark against the storms of anarchy; now, Prussia had finished her task of suppressing the Revolution, and Austria too was again free to move as she pleased. Then, it behooved the States to follow the dictates of Prussia, in order not to be overwhelmed by the Revolution; now, under Austria’s protection, they could proceed to rid them­selves of their obligations to Prussia.

On the 5th of October, all the other members of the Federal Council assented to the motion of Nassau; but Hanover opposed it emphatically. She said that the Constitutional Draft itself contained a reservation with regard to an understanding with Austria, and therefore until this understanding was effected the Draft could not be ratified nor the Constitution be­come binding; further, that the Draft itself referred often to the old Confederate rights, and consequently must imply their continued validity; that according to the Act of Confederation the Confederate Constitution could be altered only in accordance with the unanimous vote of the Confederate Diet, and consequently now, after the dissolution of the latter, only in accordance with the unanimous decision of all the German Governments. The proposed Draft contained numerous changes from the old Constitution, and therefore, it was argued, it needed, before it could become valid, the sanction of all the German Governments, no matter whether they had chosen to join the League of the 26th of May or not. Without the approval of Austria, Bavaria, etc., no step whatever might be taken towards the establishment of the proposed Federal League, and certainly no step could be more important than the convention of a Diet: for these reasons, Hanover, seconded in every point by Saxony, would enter an official and solemn protest against the holding of elections to a Diet.

Prussia, Nassau, Darmstadt, and Weimar protested amid great applause against the grounds upon which Hanovers whole speech was based, and against the pretended validity of any part of the old Confederate Constitution after the abolition of its only organ, the Confederate Diet. Upon that, Hanover, and always Saxony along with her, took refuge in their reservation of the 27th of May. When it was maintained that in view of Hanover’s own later declarations, no significance could justly be attached to this document, Hanover, and always Saxony along with her, covered her retreat by protestations of her longing for German Unity, and the complaint that a Constitution for the whole Fatherland had been promised to the German people, whereas a League without Bavaria and Würtemberg would be no move toward the Unity, but toward the dismemberment of the German Nation.

These cheap phrases could not make any very great impression; and after the negotiations bad been prolonged through several sessions, the Federal Council decided, with only the two dissenting voices of Hanover and Saxony, to fix as the date for the parliamentary elections the 15th of January, 1850. Hanover, and Saxony along with her, arose once more, and went so far as to assert that the Federal Council had no right at all to act upon votes of a majority, and that for every single measure the unanimous consent of all the members was imperative. The reply was not far to seek: inasmuch as the Federal Compact of the 26th of May in no place mentioned such a restriction, the validity of a majority vote was understood as a matter of course. Thereupon, the Representatives of the two Kingdoms gave notice on the 20th of October that they could no longer participate in the deliberations of the Federal Council, and that they therefore should return to their homes; that their Governments, however, would remain loyal members of the League of May 26th, and would do their part in executing the Constitutional Draft proposed at that time, so soon as the necessary conditions had been complied with.

Thus in the course of six months the League of the Three Kingdoms had lost two of its members, who proceeded at once to assist in the formation of a Counter-League with the most glowing professions of mutual fidelity. As for Prussia, the declaration made by the King on the 2d of April had proved true: without the Kings a Federal Constitution would be impossible; the relation of Prussia to the Petty States would be that of a Protector, and the Constitutional Draft would need to be altered accordingly.

 

CHAPTER II.

THE COUNTER-LEAGUE.

 

Prince Schwarzenberg was not the man to let an uncovered point on his adversary pass unnoticed. Hitherto he had been content to withhold his support from the Prussian plan of a Federal League. The withdrawal of Saxony and Hanover, and Prussia’s recognition of the validity of only a portion of the old Confederate Rights, now gave him the best opportunity for an attack. Inasmuch as Prussia had, quite of her own accord, asserted the continued force of some single parts of the old system, he now maintained the validity of the Act of Confederation as a whole, in accordance with which it was the privilege and the duty of every member, whenever untoward circumstances made a rent in the system, to secure its reparation as speedily as possible.

In a proclamation made on the 12th of November, Schwarzenberg expounded this doctrine in detail, supporting his claims throughout by quotations from Prussia’s assertions. lie then sent a second despatch to Berlin, in which he declared that the Constitutional Draft of the 26th of May, and the projected Federal League based upon it, were wholly illegal according to the decrees of 1815; that it was vain for Prussia to appeal to Article 11 of the old Act of Confederation, for in that Article the right of making alliances was granted to the German States only so far as this might accord with the safety of the whole Confederation ; and that nothing, indeed, could possibly endanger this safety more seriously than the formation of such a distinct League as was now projected, to which were to be transferred the functions and aims of the great Confederation, whereby the very existence of the latter would be menaced.

Starting out from these premises, Schwarzenberg proceeded to protest authoritatively against any attempt to bring into life this distinct League, referring especially to the convention of the Diet whose members were to be elected on the 15th of January, 1850, and whose decrees would be in every respect null and void. He further declared that Austria would assist and protect with her united forces every State that might be injured by such proceedings, and thus transparently identified the realization of the Prussian Federal League with a declaration of war.

The Prussian Minister, Baron von Schleinitz, replied to this, that the doings of the 26th of May in no way weakened the guaranty of safety to any member of the German Confederation, but rather strengthened it, and, accordingly, was perfectly in keeping with the regulations of Article 11 of the Act of Confederation. That the members of the League might transfer certain prerogatives to its President and to the College of Princes was likewise very expressly authorized, he said, by Article 6 of the Vienna Final Act. Prussia would, therefore, pursue undisturbed the course she had meditated, and await conclusive proof from any German Government, that it had been injured in any way by the formation of the League. Herewith, the glove which had been thrown down by Schwarzenberg was complacently — shall we say picked up or ignored?

Yet, although Prince Schwarzenberg in his attack upon Prussia had based his position upon the old Confederate system, he was very far from wishing to build his own plans for Germany’s future upon this foundation. On the contrary, his present designs for a thorough reformation of the Confederation differed in no way from those which we have already noticed in his correspondence with Berlin and Frankfort: namely, the admission of entire Austria into the German Federation as well as also into the Prussian Tariff-Union: in place of the Confederate Diet the establishment of a Directory of Seven (Austria, Prussia, the four Lesser States, and the two Hesses together); the requirement of unanimity only in case of changes of the Constitution; the abolition of all popular representation in the Federation; and the division of Germany into six sections, each of which should be under the leadership of a royal head.

The details of such a system were hardly as yet definitely determined. The Prussian Ambassador at Vienna, however, learned that the Austrian Court was very much exercised over Prussia's recent acquisition of Hohenzollern, which would be for her an outpost lying far into South Germany. This made it more advisable in the projected division of Germany, to prevent Prussia from getting a firm footing on the North Sea, by assigning to her, at the most, Mecklenburg or Anhalt; and it would be very necessary to raise Hanover by her side to be a strong Power bordering on the German Ocean by the annexation of Oldenburg and Brunswick. These plans were naturally very alluring to the Lesser States. They were ravished with Schwarzenberg's energetic protest against the Prussian League.

At the end of December, 1849, Bavaria laid before the three other Kingdoms the Draft of a new German Federal Constitution framed in accordance with Austria’s ideas. It was agreed upon so quickly, that on the 23d of January, 1850, an outline of the work undertaken by the four Kingdoms was published in the Württemberger Staatsanzeiger. Upon that, Prussia sent a note to Dresden and Hanover, inquiring how the declaration of the two Courts that, in spite of their protest against the parliamentary elections, they were still members of the League of May 26th could be reconciled with their participation in such a hostile undertaking. This induced Saxony and Hanover to urge at Munich a renewal of negotiations with Prussia concerning the proposals made formerly by Pfordten in Berlin. Pfordten, however, positively refused, on the ground that those proposals were based upon conditions which were now happily of the past; for at that time, in June, Austria’s participation in a Federation was uncertain, whereas she was now prepared to further the scheme with her whole influence and means; therefore there could be no more use in especial negotiations with Prussia. Hanover and Saxony said no more about this matter; and the work upon the future Federal Constitution went on in the hands of the Four, accelerated by the prospect of a further very important secession from the Prussian League, which had been brewing during these last weeks : namely, the Elector of Hesse, Frederick William, who had originally joined the League for especial reasons,—we shall speak of these later,— suddenly dismissed his Liberal Ministry on the 23d of February, and placed at the head of his Government a fanatical Reactionary, Daniel Hassenpflug.

On the 27th, in Munich, the Constitutional plan determined upon by the four Kings was formally ratified, and the vote passed, that it should be at once recommended for acceptance in Vienna and Berlin. Hanover had already, four days before, announced in Berlin her withdrawal from the League of the 26th of May; and yet, apparently from a certain sense of propriety, she declined to put her signature to the Munich project, although constantly affirming her sympathy and active share in it. Baron von Beust, however, considered such scruples superfluous, and without hesitation signed the compact with the others ; so that Saxony was now, at one and the same time, officially a member of the League and also of the Counter-League.

The Draft of this Constitution corresponded in most points with Austria’s demands, although that fact was in some places manifested only by modest allusions. The functions of the Federal Authority in internal affairs were termed throughout “supervisory,” and among these was the supervision of “ the common interests of customs and trade,” which bore especial reference to Austria’s admission into the Tariff-Union. The Directory of Seven was denominated the Federal Government; and it was to decide questions by a vote of the majority, requiring unanimity only when changes in the Constitution should be concerned. Austria’s presidency was not mentioned, but probably understood as a matter of course.

Although Prince Schwarzenberg objected to any popular representation whatever in the Federation, and would at most admit a Chamber composed of plenipo­tentiaries from the Governments, yet in Pfordten’s brain there were so many memories of his Radical youth that he ardently advocated a Federal Parliament, and in this he was supported by his three colleagues out of regard for their own Chambers. The result was, finally, a compromise in the shape of a “national” representation, to be chosen by the Chambers of the individual States: one hundred members from Austria, one hundred from Prussia, and one hundred from the remaining States. This number was to remain the same in the case of the Great Powers, whether they joined the Federation with the whole or with a part of their territory—an expression of willingness to welcome the Austrian Magyars, Slavs, and Italians. That this so-called “national representation” should contain no elements of danger was provided for beforehand. It was to be convened every three years to approve possible Federal laws, and to appropriate the necessary enrolment-fees (the only source of revenue contemplated for the Federation), but otherwise was to be summoned, adjourned, and dissolved only at the discretion of the Federal Government.

A Federal Court of Arbitration was provided, but nothing was said about its composition or functions. Lastly, Schwarzenberg’s system of sections, or groups, was mentioned with constrained indefiniteness: the seven directing heads were named, and then it was left to the other members of the Federation to attach themselves to whichever one of these they chose. Without doubt Bavaria, who had no neighbors suitable for annexation, did not feel especially enthusiastic over this portion of Schwarzenberg’s scheme.

As a matter of course, when the Draft in this shape reached the Courts to which it was first sent, the official reply from Vienna expressed enthusiastic approval, and in Berlin it awakened no sympathy whatever. On the contrary, the Prussian Ministers saw themselves forced to hasten the realization of their restricted League with all speed. To be sure, they could not very well talk about a Federal or Imperial League after the secession of the Kings; it had already been decided that it should be called a Union, and that in a supplementary act to the Constitution the same should be developed in detail. The Constitution of the 26th of May, together with this “Supplementary Act,” was to be laid before the Parliament about to convene at Erfurt on the 20 th of March, 1850, and to be accepted by the same without change, perhaps at the first vote. Inasmuch, however, as the secession of the two Kingdoms necessitated several modifications, an immediate revision of the Constitution thus accepted was to be proposed to the Parliament.

The acceptance of the Constitution as a whole would be at once, and in itself, the formation of the Union; the loyal Governments would be bound together by a firm tie, and the danger of their separating before they were officially united would thus be avoided. On the other hand, the discussion of the Constitution, Article by Article, would be giving their enemies free play; and a demand for such discussion would signify a desire to break up the whole scheme of a Union. After the acceptance of the Constitution as a whole, Prussia could at once take her position as President of the Federal League, or Union; and in place of the Federal Council a Union Government could be formed dependent upon Prussia. Only in this way could any basis be established for negotiations about a more comprehensive alliance; once in a secure position, they could receive their opponents and await favorable proposals. Such was the unanimous decision of the Ministerial Council on the 9th of March, all members being present.

But the King entertained a decidedly different opin­ion. The Union, which could now no longer stand for a German Empire, had, in consequence, entirely lost favor in his eyes. Ilis whole interest was now centred, in the hope of coming to some understanding with Austria about the more comprehensive alliance and its definite constitutional basis. After that, a Union might be formed within this larger alliance and conformable to its principles. He was, for the present, in favor of a preliminary discussion of the Constitution by the Parliament; but he straightway expressed his doubts, and very soon his disapproval with regard to the acceptance of it at one vote, and peremptorily refused to assume in that case the Presidency of the Union.

He did not attempt to conceal the fact, that the very Constitution offered by himself to the German people on the 26th of May had become in his own eyes a matter of questionable expediency. It had been framed at that time, in view of the revolutionary excitement, with an especial reference to the liberal sentiments of the citizens; but the King now believed that those sentiments had changed, and that appropriate modifications should be made in the Constitution. If the Parliament did not make these alterations, then he must, in spite of an acceptance en bloc of the whole, reserve to himself the right of withdrawing from the Union.

The condition of things in Prussia had indeed changed during the last year. After the dissolution of the Chambers in April, 1849, the Government had established a new electoral law, similar to the one proposed by Radowitz for elections to the Imperial Diet. The Democratic party replied to this with violent protests affirming its illegality, and with universal abstinence from voting; so that, since street­tumults had been effectively suppressed, the Democrats disappeared entirely from the political arena. In the new Chambers, the men that had been members of the Imperial party at Frankfort found themselves now ranked among the Moderate Liberals of the Left; opposed to them, upon the extreme Right, stood a strong party of Feudal and Ultramontane Royalists under the leadership) of the President, von Gerlach, and Professor Stahl.

After the Constitution of the Prussian State had been definitely announced upon the 31st of January, 1850, the attitude of both parties to the Union and its Constitution of the 26th of May was a foregone conclusion. A convention of the old Imperialists at Gotha—the Democratic leaders here again commanded inaction—expressed their approval of the Constitution, and also their determination to be present at Erfurt and to advocate the acceptance of the Constitution en bloc. They maintained their position even after the secession of the two Kingdoms; for they trusted in the inherent power of the cause to win over, as the Tariff­Union had done, those that still opposed it.

The Feudal party, on the other hand, had not much enthusiasm for any Union at all, and were therefore so much the more earnest in opposing the acceptance of the Constitution unchanged. The chief reasons for their attitude were three in number. In the first place, they feared a diminution of monarchical authority, if the Prussian King, who had already had severe struggles with the popular representatives in Berlin, should henceforth have two Parliaments to deal with. Secondly, they foresaw that from an alliance with a number of small states, Prussia could not expect to gain any considerable increase of power, but might, on the contrary, be hampered in very important matters concerning her internal and external policy by the legitimate intervention of the College of Princes. Finally, they were convinced, judging by Austria’s previous behavior, that the execution of the proposed plan of a Union would lead to a war with that Power and perhaps with Russia; and a graver misfortune for Germany and for Europe they could not imagine.

This party had by its position in the Prussian State Parliament completely won the sympathy of the King. In the sessions of the Ministerial Council he repeatedly emphasized the fact, that he considered it necessary for the Royal Commissioners and Ministers to go hand in hand in Erfurt with the extreme Right; fora misunderstanding between the Government and this party would involve the most serious consequences. Accordingly, the Parliament must be given to understand from the very first day. that Prussia would never consent to execute the Constitution, unless the required changes were made. Radowitz succeeded, however, in gaining from the King permission to recommend the acceptance of the Constitution as a whole, with the understanding that it should be revised forthwith, and that unless such revision should be made and should result favorably, the King might give up the whole project of a Union.

The important difference between this and the Ministerial vote of the 9th of March lay, as will be easily seen, in the fact that according to the latter a constitutional Union Government was ipso facto established after the acceptance en bloc of the Constitution and before the revision of the same, whereas the King’s assertions meant that the Union could not exist until after the revision and its ratification by the Princes, which was in effect the postponement of the Union indefinitely. Nor was this enough! It could not properly be said to exist, according to his notion, until after the establishment of the more comprehensive alliance with Austria and the consequent repeated revision of the Union Constitution in accordance with the conditions of this alliance!

It is very evident that the whole affair was thus rendered hopeless. And why not say so on the spot? The King’s ideas were not determined by political judgment and deliberation, but by subjective senti­ments. And just here the trouble lay. It seemed to him magnanimous towards Austria not to proceed with the Union faster than with her. It seemed to him magnanimous towards the Petty States, who stood in need of a protector, not to announce to them a Prussian protectorate prematurely. That a king may not at the expense of the state intrusted to him be generous towards a third party, any more than a guardian may at the expense of his ward be generous towards the latter’s debtors,—of this Frederick William had no conception! By his universal magnanimity he involved Prussia in an enterprise, the accomplishment of which he himself hindered at every step, and which he finally was forced to give up in a manner which very seriously compromised Prussia’s honor.

When the Parliament convened on the 20th of March, 1850, it was at once evident that a large majority of the members would surely vote for the unconditional acceptance of the Constitution as a whole, together with the Supplementary Act. No Democrat was present in the Assembly. The leading advocates for the acceptance of the Constitution en bloc were, beside Simson and Gagern, Beseler and Vincke, the former Prussian Ministers Von Bodelschwingh and Ludolf Camphausen, and the later Prussian Ministers of Finance, Von Patow and Otto Camphausen. They knew very well that their votes would not bind the Prussian Government; but they were anxious to secure, by the acceptance of the Constitution laid before the Parliament by the allied States, a firm basis of Union, which, as the Prussian Ministerial Council had contended on the 9th of March, would remove every pretext for secession out of the reach of those States that might be inclined to be disloyal.

That such considerations were in place was verified by the presence and behavior of the Hesse-Cassel Minister, Hassenpflug, who in the Council proved himself to be inimical to the whole undertaking, and who on the 13th of April, in a lengthy letter to the Berlin Cabinet, declared that before coming to an understanding with Austria and the members of the Federation formed at Munich the Parliament at Erfurt ought not to proceed a single step farther in the course they had begun. This letter, of course, struck the key-note in the heart of the King, and at the last minute he instructed Radowitz to persuade the Parliament at least to undertake first the revision, and then, in order to guard against the event of lion-concurrence on the part of the Governments, not to accept the original Constitution, but only to express the intention to accept it, after it had been approved by the Governments.

But the leaders of the Majority were not to be shaken from their single-minded apprehension of the matter. On the 15th of April the Lower House, and immediately afterwards the Upper House, accepted the Constitution and Supplementary Act en bloc, in spite of the sighs and fears of Radowitz lest the success of the Union should thereby be endangered. The Parliament turned its attention at once to the proposed revision, which it carried out in all important points according to the wishes of the Prussian Government, even if not quite according to the doctrines of the extreme Right. This labor ended, its task was completed; and its sessions were concluded on the 29th of April amid general recognitions of its prudence and its patriotism.

Perhaps these expressions would not have been so favorable and friendly had not the ill-will of the King towards the Parliament been thrown into the background by the hostile steps taken by the advocates of an “entire Germany.”

The King of Würtemberg had already in his Address from the Throne at the opening of the Royal Parliament, on the 15th of March, uttered such incredibly insulting attacks upon the Prussian Government that the latter found itself forced to break off diplomatic relations with Stuttgart entirely. During the succeeding weeks, reports became more and more frequent and trustworthy, that, in consequence of influences set at work in Vienna and Munich, not only Hesse-Cassel, but also the Sovereigns of Hesse-Darmstadt, Anhalt, Lippe-Schaumburg, and Mecklenburg-Strelitz, were about to turn their backs upon the Prussian Union. But at last, and with a decisive crash, a blow of another kind, dealt by the Austrian Government, struck at the very core of the whole controversy.

Since the establishment of the “Interim,” negotiations about the German question had been carried on uninterruptedly between Vienna and Berlin. In Vienna, where the project had been conceived of breaking up the monopoly of the political advantages arising from the Tariff-Union, hitherto enjoyed by her rival, Berlin, a movement had been set on foot to secure the admission of Austria into a great commercial league with all Germany. The Prussian Cabinet, no less determined to maintain its leadership in the department of German trade, recognized in commending terms the importance of the Austrian proposition, although it unfortunately entertained directly opposite opinions about the proper method of carrying out the same.

The Prussian Ambassador, Count Bernstorff, had also many conversations with Prince Schwarzenberg concerning the formation of a provisional German Central Government at the close of the “Interim” period. At first, their views were directly antagonistic to each other. Prussia desired a prolongation of the Interim, and a continued administration of the Central Government by the two Great Powers, until a definitive Constitution should be established for the whole of Germany, which meant, until Austria should recognize the legitimate existence of the Prussian Union, or at least not actually deny it. All this Schwarzenberg threw aside, and demanded, even as a provisional form of the Central Government, the substitution of the Directory of Seven and his proposed system of groups; but Prussia would not listen to this any more than formerly. A Nassau Councillor, Forsboom, a man highly esteemed both by the Prussian Minister Schleinitz and by Prince Schwarzenberg, made, in April, 1850, certain conciliatory propositions, which, after some few modifications, Schwarzenberg accepted, and Bernstorff on the 12th of April recommended to his Government. Only in a few points was there still a difference of opinion, and Count Brandenburg confidently expected a speedy adjustment of these.

Then it happened on the 15th of April, as we have seen, that the Popular House in Erfurt accepted the Union Constitution en bloc ; and it must have appeared to outsiders hardly credible, that the Prussian King could neglect to make proper use of this fact in establishing the Union upon a firm basis. If he, however, should seize the opportunity, and if the Union should now emerge into vigorous life, Schwarzenberg knew well enough that it would draw, as the Tariff-Union had drawn, all the other German States irresistibly into its vortex, and thus actually crowd Austria out of Germany. To counteract this danger, the Prince needed some handle that would add to the material power he already possessed the weapons of an apparently just cause, that the semblance of right might be on his side. Nor, in casting about for such an instrument, did he need to look far. In view of the previous course of events and negotiations, he lighted upon the revival of the Confederate Diet, which had been inactive since July 12th, 1848, as a means to his end.

Accordingly, Schwarzenberg decided upon a prelim­inary step. On the 19th of April he gave notice, by a circular sent to all the Governments except Prussia, that the time of the Interim fixed upon on the 30th of September was about to expire on the 1st of May, that Germany could not exist without some Central Authority, although that might temporarily be a provisional one; that the negotiations carried on with Prussia had unfortunately led to no amicable agreement; that, consequently, so far as he could see, nothing remained but to hold a Congress of all the German States, which should establish in common a new Central Government; and that Austria, intrusted as she had been by the Act of Confederation of 1815 with the Presidency of the Confederate Diet, felt herself called upon to take the initiative in convening such a Congress. Concerning the authority and powers of this Congress, the Minister added the observation, that whoever did not appeal would lose his vote, but of course be none the less subject to the decrees of the Congress.

Nevertheless, the Prince had not yet wholly decided to break with Prussia. The King's intentions were not fully known, and Schwarzenberg’s former friends did not everywhere express themselves cordially. The Czar protested that the admission of the whole of the Austrian Empire into the German Federation would be inconsistent with the compacts of 1815; and the Bavarian Minister continually annoyed the Prince by repeatedly demanding a popular representation in the Central Government. In both of these points. Schwarzenberg believed that he might rely upon favorable advances from the Court of Berlin ; and even on the 20th of April. Forsboom wrote to Herr von Schleinitz that the Prince was in a propitious humor and wished to turn from his associations with the Lesser States to friendly relations with Prussia.

Meanwhile the Prussian Cabinet had learned through the Bremen Government of the circular of the 19th. which had been withheld from the knowledge of Prussia. The Berlin Government, very naturally, did not know what to make of it. And yet the desire to avoid a rupture was still so strong, that Herr von Schleinitz sent a despatch to Vienna on the 22d, in which he expressed his concurrence with the holding of a Congress on the following conditions: that the invitation be sent out from both Powers together; that nothing be said about a revival of the old Confederate Diet nor of its rights, manner of transacting business, or majority-votes; that the Congress undertake only the formation of a new Central Government; and finally, that no opposition be raised to the fact, that twenty-two German Governments had united in a more intimate alliance, and would in the future, as a close body, also make Frankfort the place of holding their meetings.

This communication at once decided the Imperial Minister. He might have yielded to the first three conditions, Count Bernstorff reported, but the fourth, containing the announcement of the Union as an accomplished fact, was for him the signal for battle.

On the 26th of April a new circular appeared, which, in sharp contrast ta all Prussia’s inclinations, invited, in the name of the presidential authority of the German Confederation, all the German Governments to send to Frankfort, on the 10th of May, plenipotentiaries who should there first form a new provisional Central Government, and then proceed to a revision of the Confederate Constitution in conformity with the Act of Confederation and the Vienna Final Act. It was said in the circular that Austria did not have in mind a simple return to the old system, but would do all in her power to secure a reform of the same adapted to the requirements of the times; that the duty of all members of the Confederation to take part in these deliberations was unquestioned, and had been expressly and repeatedly recognized by Prussia, especially in the speech of the Royal Commissioner (Radowitz) in the Lower Chamber on the 24th of October; that whoever refused to participate in this great work would thereby signify his intention to withdraw from the Confederation; but that such an intention would be contrary to Article 5 of the Vienna Final Act; and that, consequently, the non-fulfilment of the above-mentioned duties would be impossible without a violation of the solemn vows pledged to the Confederation.

In this document the expression “Revival of the Confederate Diet ” did not appear in so many words ; but, as a matter of fact, the contents of every sentence implied it. What the whole National Assembly, with the exception of Robert Blum and his associates, had held to be impossible and incredible, had now come to pass. The same Austrian Government that had pub­licly and solemnly assumed the charge of the office of Imperial Regent upon the ground of the law of June 28, 1848, which declared the extinction of the Confederate Diet, now sent out, in the coolest manner possible, invitations to attend the revival of the temporarily suspended sessions of this extinct Confederate Diet, and even asserted that it was the duty of all members of the Confederation to be present, threatening delinquents with the punishments due to the violation of their Confederate oaths! A feeling of grim satisfaction ran through the ranks of Robert Blum’s associates as they said to themselves: “The so-called Moderates may now see to what ends blind confidence in the good faith of crowned heads will lead.”

When Prince Schwarzenberg declared in his circular that he did not meditate a simple return to the old system, but had in view a thorough reformation of the Confederate Constitution, we know that this was no mere figure of speech. His mind was as firmly fixed as ever upon the plan of a German Directory. Nor had he any cause, on that account, to fear a revival of the Confederate Diet; for his plan could not in any case be realized without the consent of all the Governments, and this could be brought about as well if the conven­tion were called the Confederate Diet as in an isolated Congress. The only question was how he might most safely obtain the power to force this consent; and inasmuch as the Petty States were under the protection of the Prussian Union, the first thing to be done was to find some weapon with which to demolish the Union. The Confederate Diet, itself, seemed to him to furnish just this weapon.

Frederick William felt in his inmost heart deeply wounded and indignant at such conduct on the part of Austria. The equally unlawful and illogical manoeuvre had been made right in the midst of promising negotiations, and a shabby trick had been played behind Prussia’s back. The Confederate Diet had been buried by the unanimous vote of all the German Governments: how could Austria, then, contrive its resurrection without a similar unanimity of consent? On the very grounds of the old Confederate Rights themselves its revival in this way was unlawful: for the Plenum of the Confederate Diet could be assembled only at the call of the Close Council, whose functions, with the consent of all the Governments, bad been transferred to the Central Commission of the Interim; so that only this body, consisting of Austria and Prussia together, could have properly issued such an invitation, and not Austria alone.

But more than all,—how long had Prussia been degraded to a level with, say Waldeck or Bernburg, that the most important step in German affairs could be taken without consulting her, ay, even with the issue of a threat of exclusion and punishment if she dared to make any objections? The King was resolutely determined never to brook such treatment. The Union had already lost much of its interest for him since the withdrawal of the Kings, and the meditated secession of the two Hesses would probably have induced him to give up the whole scheme; but now that Austria had flung in his face, as a challenge, the revival of the Confederate Diet, his sense of honor was aroused, and he declared over and over again that he would never abandon the Union.

Whether this sentiment was censurable or praise­worthy, one thing is very sure. If he desired to keep up the Union and bring it into active existence, there was only one simple course to pursue: namely, to return to the Ministerial vote of the 9th of March, to proclaim that the Constitution of the 26th of May, in virtue of its acceptance en bloc by the Parliament, had become valid and was already in force, and then to establish without delay a Union Government, with the announcement that the Parliament was about to undertake at once a revision of the hitherto provisional Constitution. Not one of the allied States would have had the least right to object to such a method of procedure; and so soon as the Union had been brought into actual existence in this way, its Executive would have had the right and duty of crushing any sign of a disloyal secession with all the means of punishment at the disposal of the Union Court of Arbitration. It was the only proper, honorable, or fitting response to Schwarzenberg’s unjust move.

But the King’s whole nature strove against such a course. In the face of any amount of insult, he could not bring himself to sever so summarily the old friendship with his Confederate ally. Still less could he forget his original determination to have about him only associates that were willing members of the Union—a determination which was without doubt sensible enough when applied to their admission into the Union, but equally senseless after the Constitution had once been accepted and put into force.

Once for all he had protested that he would not rule under the Constitution of May 26th as it stood; and to this decision he firmly adhered, declaring that not the original Constitution, but the revised form of the same, must alone be presented to the members of the Union for acceptance. But then, of course, every one of the allied Governments would have the right to make objections to every one of the Articles changed by the Parliament in the revision, and the Constitution could not be put into force until all the changes had been accepted by all the Governments. This meant postponing the whole thing until the millennium!

In order to surround his sorry purpose with as much external pom]) as possible, the King eagerly carried out a happy thought of the Duke of Coburg, and invited all the allied Princes and their Prime Ministers to a personal reunion on the 8th of May in Berlin. They all appeared, with the single exception of the Grand Duke of Hesse-Darmstadt, who expressed his sentiments clearly enough by commissioning his cousin, the Elector, to represent him.

With proud satisfaction it was averred in Berlin that never in all the history of the world had such a constellation of Crowned Heads gathered about a King of Prussia I After a formal reception and a brotherly embrace. the Princes assembled in a conference, at which the Duke of Coburg, a zealous champion of the Union, presided. The Hessian Elector alleged at once that they had no right to organize a Union, but that their presence was required at Frankfort. Upon being asked his reasons for this assertion, he did not adduce anything tenable, and when he found himself hard pressed, called for his beloved Hassenpflug.

Hassenpflug had been playing exactly the same role in the conference of the Ministers, presided over by Radowitz. He raised technical objections of various kinds, and then, without voting himself, witnessed about twelve of the twenty-two States follow the example of Prussia in accepting the revised Constitution, while the others either made reservations or could not agree to the contents of certain Articles. A plenipotentiary from Darmstadt, who had meanwhile arrived, came with no other instructions than to listen and to report.

The result of the conference was, that the Union Constitution could not be put into practice for the present, owing to the differences of opinion which prevailed. Therefore, Prussia proposed that temporarily, until the 15th of July, a College of the Princes should transact the business of the Union: all approved of this expedient except Hassenpflug, who said that Hesse would not be able to share in this arrangement. Filially, Radowitz inquired how the allied States should regard the Congress at Frankfort, and proposed that they take part in it under the conditions men­tioned in Prussia’s despatch of the 22d of May. Again every one agreed with the proposition except Hesse, Scliaumburg-Lippe, and Mecklenburg-Strelitz. Hassenpflug stated at length that Hesse advocated not simply postponement, but the abolition of the Union Constitution, yet would remain true to the League of May 26th; in other words, she was ready to allow herself under certain circumstances to be protected by Prussia, but would be her own mistress so far as being present and casting her vote at the Frankfort Congress was concerned.

At a grand festival which the King gave at the conclusion of the conferences, Hassenpilug rudely addressed the Duke of Coburg with the remark: “I may now be allowed to ask, why Your Grace manifested so much interest in that still-born child, the Union.” The Duke drew his slender figure up to its full height, and looking down upon the little man, exclaimed: “ I will tell you why. It was because I do not wish to lay my head upon the block where yours belongs, when Right and Justice again reign in Germany! ”

Yet with all this quarrelling, a provisional existence was vouchsafed to the Union until the 15th of July. But on the same day on which the meeting of the Princes closed in Berlin, the plenipotentiaries assembled at the Congress in Frankfort were organized as a Plenum of the German Confederate Diet. This body was composed of the Austrian deputy, Count Thun, who presided, the representatives of the four royal Lesser States and Hesse-Cassel, the deputy from the Netherlands to represent Luxemburg, and —scandalously enough— a deputy from the King of Denmark, who was nominally still at war with Germany, to represent Holstein. Austria, as we have seen, had taken no part whatever in the Danish war, and sent an invitation as a matter of course to Copenhagen. The qualification of the Danish deputy, Von Bulow, was challenged by Saxony upon technical grounds, and Bavaria made no effort to conceal her indignation at the presence of the Dane in the Hall of the German Confederation. But the deputy from Hanover, the hump-backed, witty, and utterly frivolous barrister, Detmold, laughingly cried out: “What! Shall we throw away a royal vote just for the sake of a few Utopian scruples ? ”

Commissioners of Prussia and of the Union negotiated for several months about their admission into the Congress under the conditions insisted upon. These were now as categorically rejected by the President of the Congress as they had been before by Prince Schwarzenberg. Thus Germany was divided into two camps, which stood in open defiance of each other. The battle had not yet begun, but the two rivals were ready to engage at any moment.

 

CHAPTER III.

RUSSIAN INFLUENCE.

 

No other German interest suffered such direct damage through the wretched quarrelling of the two Great Powers as that of Schleswig-Holstein, and in no other case was the interference of the Foreign Powers, invited by the internal confusion of Germany, so detrimental in every way to the future condition of the whole nation. To understand this interference and its consequences, we must here insert a brief sketch of the history of the Holstein question subsequent to the truce of Malmo.

Soon after the ratification of the truce, negotiations for peace were begun in London. Denmark, after rejecting several schemes proposed by England, brought forward (it is said, at the suggestion of Russia) the following proposal, in October, 1848 : Schleswig shall, without affecting its indissoluble union with the Danish Crown, form an independent State, separate as well from Denmark Proper as from Holstein, and having its own Ministry and Assembly of Estates; in proportion to its population, it shall contribute to the common expenses of the civil-list, the public debt, the army and navy, and diplomatic affairs; over the remainder of the revenue the Estates shall have control. The objections to this arrangement were palpable: the inhabitants of Schleswig did not wish a separation from Holstein; the indissolubleness of their connection with the Danish Crown begged the question of the succession; concerning the appropriation and amount of the common expenses no voice was granted to the Schleswig Estates. Therefore the proposition was very coolly received in Frankfort and in Berlin.

On the other hand, it was impossible to deny the force of the Danish allegation, that an actual union of Schleswig with the German Confederate State of Holstein might have been possible in the days of the old loosely-united German Confederation; but now that Germany was going to become a strongly-centralized Empire, this threatened the Danish Crown with the entire loss of Schleswig. And when, in the course of October, the German National Assembly decided that between German and non-German countries no further bond of connection was allowable than the personal one of a common ruler, Denmark could very reasonably protest that no actual union between Schleswig and Holstein was conceivable unless Germany openly meditated the forcible incorporation of Schleswig.

Russia, therefore, recommended Denmark’s proposition most warmly; and on the 12th of December Lord Palmerston laid the new plan before the German Representative in the following abbreviated form: that Schleswig should be independent, in so far that she should have a Constitution separate from that of Denmark as well as from that of Holstein. The most offensive points of the Danish proposal were here omitted; so that, under the increasing pressure brought to bear upon them by the Foreign Great Powers, the Prussian and then, on the 27th of January, 1849, the Imperial Ministry, accepted the new plan. But the Danes were now unwilling to give up, under any circumstances, the clause about Schleswig’s “indissoluble union with the Danish Crown”; and upon Germany’s refusal to admit this, they announced on the 23d of February that the truce was at an end, so that by the end of March hostilities would be renewed.

The arrogant presumptuousness of the Danes was increased by a faithful promise on the part of Russia and France to protect them with arms from German violence; and perhaps in a still greater degree by the assurance from Vienna that the Austrian Government stood unhesitatingly with the other Great Powers upon the side of the just cause, upon the side of the Danes in their struggle against their rebellious subjects, and that the only reason why Austria refrained from active military steps was that she might the better and the more forcibly use her diplomatic influence in Berlin and in Frankfort.

The Germans thereupon sent large bodies of troops into the Duchies under the command of the Prussian General, Von Prittwitz. A new attempt of Lord Palmerston’s to bring about a reconciliation was favorably received in Berlin, but rejected both in Copenhagen and in Frankfort; preparations for war were renewed on the 3d of April, 1849. We will not follow the military operations in detail, however much glory and martial honor many of the battlefields brought to Germany; for so far as the point at issue was concerned, the blood spilled in these engagements was shed in vain: the settlement of the question could only be determined by the diplomatic relations existing at the time between the different States of Europe.

At the very beginning of the new campaign, the Czar, less inimical than Austria to Germany, sent an autograph letter on the 12th of April to the Danish King, in which he sharply reproved the latter's thirst for war, and threatened, in the event of the continuance of such conduct, to withdraw his support. The result of this was the reception in London on the 17th of April of a promise from Denmark to present shortly, and as a preliminary to negotiations for peace, an outline of a Constitution for Schleswig as an independent State; and at the same time a proposal was received, to garrison that portion of Schleswig north of a line connecting Flensburg and Husum during the prospective truce with Danish troops, and the rest of the Duchy with Prussians.

At this point, the paths of Berlin and Frankfort widely diverged. The King had no stronger desire than to get rid of this thorn in his side. “Those Danish affairs,” he once wrote to Bunsen, “are a nightmare to me. Every scrap of paper that comes from there has the hue of mummies and the smell of carcasses. Both parties have fallen upon each other like mad dogs. The victories or defeats of either side pain me unspeakably.” Accordingly, the Prussian Ministry urgently requested the Central Government to accept the offered terms, in order not to forfeit the present good-will of Russia.

But Gagern avouched, on the 27th of April, that, after Denmark’s declaration of war, the intrinsically false basis of Schleswig’s independence must be given up, and the war insisted upon by Denmark must be pursued with all possible vigor. We have already narrated how Prussia at this time refused to recognize the Imperial Regent, and took exclusively into her own hands the question of peace or war with Denmark. So Bunsen, who was too much inclined to war for the Ministry, was relieved of his labors in this field; and the scene of the negotiations, which nevertheless continued to be carried on through English mediation, was transferred from London to Berlin. English influence at Copenhagen succeeded in procuring the appointment of Herr von Reedtz, the most moderate of all the Danish statesmen, to take part in these deliberations, which consequently soon resulted in bringing the parties nearer together.

A general basis of. peace was very quickly agreed upon: namely, the legislative and administrative independence of Schleswig. Prussia was willing to put up with Palmerston’s additional clause: “without affecting her connection with the Danish Crown”; and Reedtz gave up the word “indissoluble” as applied to this union. Now it was of the utmost importance to discriminate and to define exactly, which matters of business were to be controlled by Schleswig independently, and which, by virtue of her union with Denmark, were to be considered interests of both countries in common. But in the discussion over these points, differences of opinion and difficulties increased at every step, so that at last Reedtz proposed to defer all questions involving a complete regulation of a Constitution for Schleswig to the final peace-negotiations.

As far as the new truce was concerned, it was soon settled, that it should last until the end of the year, and after that so long as neither party announced its termination. Prussia again admitted the stipulation, that, until the conclusion of peace, Schleswig should have a separate administration; and Denmark, in turn, agreed that this should be intrusted to a mixed Commission consisting of one Prussian, one Danish, and one English member as umpire. She also gave up the military possession of the Duchy; only upon the islands of Alsen and Ano should there still be Danish troops; in Schleswig, there should be Swedish garrisons north of a line connecting Flensburg and Tondern, and Prussian to the south of it. Denmark dropped also any claim to a share in the regulation of the administration of Holstein; this remained under the viceregency of the Empire.

The truce and the preliminaries of peace containing these conditions were signed on the 10th of July, 1849. Bunsen himself, zealous defender of the Duchies that he was, confessed that that was the best that could be done under the circumstances. In Germany, however, the effect was crushing. The Viceregency stigmatized the separation of Schleswig as a blow struck directly at the honor of Germany. Only five Governments could be persuaded to ratify the Articles; many more entered formal protestations against them. The German press overflowed in expressions of sorrow and of anger.

It was not until January, 1850, that any conclusions were arrived at either in Copenhagen or in Berlin in regard to Schleswig’s future Constitution; and not until then could any final peace-negotiations begin. After Prussia had received from the Commission of the Interim full powers to act in the name of all Germany, these negotiations were directed in Berlin by Herr von Usedom in the name of Prussia, and by Herren von Reedtz, von Pechlin, and von Scheel on the part of Denmark. The English Ambassador, Lord Westmore­land, acted the part of mediator; and the Russian Ambassador. Baron Meyendorff, was constantly present, and assisted with his advice.

Unfortunately, the main question, the practical meaning of the words “Schleswig’s independence” and political union with the Danish Crown,” gave rise again to interminable differences of opinion. The Danes wished to reduce the first expression, and the Prussians the second, to the lowest possible terms. The Danes hoped to arrive at a result which should be the first step towards a complete absorption of the land, while Prussia sought every possible means to hinder the accomplishment of these designs. So they quarrelled and contended over the rights of the Schleswig Estates, over the establishment of a united Council of both countries, over the question whether the citizens of one country should be recognized as citizens of the other, over the organization and position of the Schleswig troops, etc., etc.

At last, on the 17th of April, Herr von Usedom declared that it was impossible at present to settle these points, that in view of their complicated nature many things would still need to be said about them, but that while these things were being said it was by no means necessary for the soldiers to be killing each other: therefore, Prussia proposed the conclusion of a simple peace, with the postponement of all questions relating to mutual rights. Usedom’s proposition consisted of three short Articles: in the first place, peace and friendship shall exist between the Kings of Prussia and of Denmark; secondly, all relations between Germany and Denmark shall be renewed, with the understanding that if unsettled questions arise, the state of thing's before the war shall he taken as the basis for their adjustment; and finally, both royal contracting parties shall reserve to themselves all rights and titles that fall to them in connection with the two Duchies. Holstein and Schleswig; this reservation shall embrace, so far as Germany is concerned, all that the Confederate Assembly has recognized, especially in its decree about the succession, passed on the 17th of September, 1846. Furthermore, Prussia promised to secure the consent of the other German States to such a treaty.

In the eyes of the greatest portion of the German population such a treaty meant the abandonment of the Duchies to the brutal violence of Denmark. This, however, was far from being the opinion of the Danes. They demanded, in the first place, the conclusion of a treaty, not only with Prussia, but also with Germany, in which Germany should pledge herself, in accordance with the old Confederate Rights and with the oft-repeated promise of Austria, to restore, herself, the monarchical system in Holstein. The Danes had, moreover, expected, after the introduction of the preliminaries, to see their intended arrangements in Schleswig formally recognized, at least in the main features, by Germany ; and when Usedom’s proposals cut off these hopes, they made such a tenacious resistance, that the talking back and forth on the subject continued for many a long month.

King Frederick William made another of his special attempts, by an immediate act of his own person, high above the heads of his Ministers, to come to some understanding with his royal brother in Copenhagen. It was as unsuccessful as his similar experiment in sending Wildenbruch, at the beginning of the war. Their Majesties did not accomplish any more than Their Excellencies. It could not be concealed, that Prussia’s prospects of favor in the eyes of the Great Powers grew worse from day to day.

England, the mediating Power, was the first to express dissatisfaction with Usedom’s proposals. “ ‘The state of things before the war’ shall be taken as a basis?” asked Palmerston. “What does that mean? The Danes proclaim succession in the female line, and Schleswig’s union with Denmark: the Germans proclaim succession only in the male line, and Schleswig’s union with Holstein.” The French Government professed its warm friendship for Prussia, but insisted that this quarrel with Denmark, to whom France had in 1721 guaranteed the possession of Schleswig, must straightway be put aside. The Emperor of Russia expressed himself to the Prussian Ambassador, General von Rochow, whom he honored with his personal confidence, somewhat as follows: he considered Denmark’s proposals in every particular equitable, and could conceive of no reason for Prussia’s rejection of them; it was true, to be sure, that a simple peace, such as Usedom advocated, would extricate the Prussian Court from all its embarrassments, but Denmark would be left in the midst of her complications, and this would be in every way unfair.

This was now the time when Austria was calling into life the Confederate Diet, and denying to the Prussian Union with increasing emphasis its right to existence. Count Bernstorff reported that Prince Schwarzenberg in his conversations assumed a more and more arrogant demeanor, that he declared the threat of bitter punishment in the name of the Confederation was meant in all earnestness, and that he painted in the most lively colors the eagerness for war of the Lesser States.

There was already talk about important mobilization of troops in Bohemia (the report sprang from the circumstance that large numbers of the Hungarian militia (J16 lived'), being far from their homes, were being drilled again into Imperial soldiers, — certainly not very reliable material with which to carry on a war, for some time to come). Similar rumors came from Vorarlberg, where fifteen battalions had been collected. Accordingly, the Prussian Ministry, on the 18th of May, ordered some few preparations for defence, such as the fortification of the fortresses in Silesia, and an increase in the equipment of the artillery; and soon afterwards, in response to Bavarian movements in Franconia, small companies of troops were stationed near Wetzlar and Kreuznach.

In consideration of the very great importance to be attached, in the midst of these German complications, to friendly relations with Russia, it was with regret that the Court of Berlin saw these already weakened by the Danish war, and in no way improved by the Czar's disapproval of the Union. As Nicholas was about to make a long sojourn at the palace of Skiemewitseb near Warsaw, it was decided to send the Prince of Prussia to meet him there personally, in the hope of being able through confidential interviews to put an end to all misunderstandings. Major Edwin von Manteuffel should go to meet the Emperor on his journey, and acquaint him officially with the intention of the Prince to visit him. To this Envoy the King himself, on the 20th of May, dictated instructions, which reveal his sentiments and the tenor of his mind in the strongest light.

The King begins with a justification of his Union, founded May 26th, 1849, which had for its object the protection desired by the small States. The continuance of this protection was to him a matter of personal honor, to which he would never prove false. 'Phis was entirely independent of the temporary impractica­bility of the Constitution. Then follows an exposition of the unlawfulness of Austria’s inconsiderate and arbitrary endeavor to revive the old Confederate Diet, to which Prussia could never subject herself. “In regard to the Schleswig-Danish question,” he continues, “His Majesty makes a difference between the claims of the Duchies and their rebellion. The latter His Majesty condemns; but the former cannot be annulled by any mistakes that may have been committed. The Kings of Denmark are Dukes of Schleswig-Holstei ; and as such, and because of these possessions, they have be­come Kings of Denmark. As the matter stands today, it is certain that in Denmark itself a revolutionary party has seized upon the control of power, and first perpetrated injustice upon the natives of Schleswig-Holstein in their quality as subjects. So far as Prussia is concerned, the King considers it a misfortune that the country is at all involved in the affair, and especially the way in which this was brought about. The times in which this occurred were unpropitious, and now demand relentlessly the consequences. His Majesty the King has since done everything in his power to set things right. Partly in the interests of Prussia, and partly in order to make good the past, he concluded both truces, and has now offered peace upon conditions honorable for Denmark, but she will not accept it. If the Great Powers should support Denmark with arms against the Duchies, then the King of course would not be able to make war against all Europe, and would immediately withdraw all his troops. He begs the Emperor not to overlook the original relation of the Duchies to their Duke-King, and the encroachments of the revolutionary party in Denmark. This he considers like a poisoned dagger, which at last injures him who uses it.’’

It is very characteristic of the King, that here, where his conscience is not quite clear upon the point of justice, he declares himself ready to yield to Russia’s decision without any reservations, and only subjoins a request for fair treatment of the Duchies; but when he afterwards comes back to his quarrel with Austria, in which he is sure of the righteousness of his cause, he demands quite as unqualifiedly, if Austria attack him on account of the Union, that Russia shall remain neutral. If, however, Russia, in spite of his request, unite with Austria, then His Majesty cannot be blind to the great dangers which must result for Prussia; yet if defeated, he is ready with confidence to leave the justification of his cause to the decision of History.

Several other papers and memorials about the German questions at issue were also given to the Prince of Prussia, in which especial emphasis was laid upon the threatening attitude maintained by Austria and the Lesser States.

The prospects of success were unfortunately not very favorable for the royal emissary.

The Emperor Nicholas, a man of a clear but narrow mind, of lively emotions and an iron will, had, as a consequence of a long series of brilliant successes, become filled with a mighty consciousness of his own as well as of his nation’s greatness. Ever since the revolutionary upheavals of 1848, he had considered himself and his holy Russia as the repository of monarchical order for all Europe, and consequently as authorized to stretch out his hand in the holy cause, wherever he might help to sustain it in any country on the face of the earth. In his eyes, there was no difference between Liberal and Radical, between Constitutional and Republican: all things that deviated from the system of an absolute monarchy owed their birth alike, for him, to the plague of Revolution.

Although from his early youth he had grown up in warm sympathy with the Royal House of Prussia, and had been filled from the beginning of his reign with a decided antipathy to Austria, yet the mortal struggle of the latter with the Revolution in Italy and in Hungary had commanded his respect, and induced him to give her willingly his assistance. On the other hand, he felt only annoyance and contempt for Prussia, because of the way in which she had compromised with the Revolution by yielding to a very democratical Constitution, and had even hoped upon this basis to increase her own power in Germany. These proclivi­ties were completely fixed by the respective conduct of the two Powers in the Danish affair. In this question, his unalterable decision had been made at the very outset. Hatred of Revolution, faithfulness to engage­ments, and the interests of ambition were for him, in this matter, in the same scale.

As for the first point, Augustenburg and his followers were to him without discrimination rebels given over to the pursuit of crime and felony. For the second point: in the last century, Russia had guaranteed to the Danish Royal House the possession of Schleswig: but the Czar, overlooking the fact that this guaranty could not have the least weight in deciding a quarrel over the succession inside of the Royal House itself, for this reason would not suffer different members of the same to reign in Copenhagen and in Schleswig. With well-calculated humility the Danes had referred to him the settlement of the question of the succession, and in this way completely won his patronage. In response, he had conceived the idea of being quite impartial, and of forcing both contestants, the agnates and the cognates, to abandon their pretensions in favor of the plan of placing the crown of United Denmark upon the head of a descendant of the remote Gottorp line, the hereditary Prince of the Duchy of Oldenburg. In regard to this matter, the Czar had been carrying on negotiations with France and England since May, 1850; and the fact that after the extinction of the Oldenburg family the nearest heir to Denmark would be Russia, did not cause his interest in this plan to wane —a verification of the third point. Hence it is easy to understand his anger at Prussia's devotion to the cause of the rebellious Augustenburg and of the revolting Duchies, as well as his satisfaction with Austria’s open support of the King of Denmark.

In spite of all these considerations, the Czar was most earnestly desirous to prevent a war between the two Powers, which in his opinion would only further the cause of the Revolution. Here, again, he took the stand of an impartial judge in the highest court of appeal, and declared that he would take up arms against the one who made the attack, no matter which one it was. He enjoined upon Austria the advisability of making every fair concession; and at the same time, did not neglect to assure his royal brother-in-law that Austria’s Confederate Diet seemed to him to be of legitimate origin, whereas Prussia’s Union was not. He said that he must give his decision in favor of the party that based its conduct the most thoroughly upon the principles of the great treaties of 1815.

Immediately upon the arrival of the Prince, the Czar asked him why lie expected hostilities from Austria. The Prince referred to the threatening language of the Austrian note, and to the collection of troops in Bohemia and in Vorarlberg. “Threatening language doesn’t prove anything,” answered the Czar. “And in Bohemia there are by no means so many troops as is supposed. Indeed, Austria is not in a condition to carry on a war, unless she has the support of the Russian army. Without that, she could not send her forces into the field; for, at their departure, fresh insurrections would break out at every point. But I,” he continued, “have no idea of war. I shall only aid the party attacked—provided, of course, that the aggressors are not morally forced by a provocation to make the attack.” “We shall give occasion for noth­ing of the kind,” said the Prince. “What we do is justified by the Articles of the Act of Confederation and of the Compacts.” “Do not talk to me about Articles of Compacts, I beg of you,” cried Nicholas. “I know nothing of what that means.” He further remarked that he was displeased with Austria's policy also. It was too irresolute and too wily; but politically considered, prudent: it sought to gain time.

On the very same day, Prince Schwarzenberg arrived, who, having heard of the journey of the Prince, set out himself, with all speed, in order to counteract his in­fluence. In his conversations with Schwarzenberg on the 28th of May, the Prince had ample opportunity to convince himself of the justice of the Czar’s verdict. Schwarzenberg asserted that he had not disputed in the ' least the right of any German Prince to form any Union whatever, but against just that Union with its Constitution of the 26th of May he should continue to make a vigorous protest. The Prince explained to him the duty of Prussia to see that a German Constitution should be established, especially since the whole of Austria had now been transformed into a single State by the Constitution of the 3d of March. “Oh, well!” said Schwarzenberg, “it is true that the Constitution has been granted, but many things may happen to change it. Its execution is still a long way off.” In the same strain he talked about the Munich Constitutional Draft. “The best arrangement,” he said, “would be for Austria and Prussia alone to decide the whole German question, and to do the legislating for the other German States.” He talked with so very little respect for the preservation of the latter, that the Prince roundly declared that the King and he himself were determined under all circumstances to protect the independence of the smaller States.

About the remaining conversations, on the 29th of May, the Prince sent the following statements to Berlin. The Czar will not make any binding promises about his attitude to the German question before the conclusion of the peace with Denmark. Schwarzenberg avoids any discussion in regard to Austria’s designs in Frankfort. He speaks favorably of the plan of a new German “Interim,” and denies explicitly any warlike intentions upon the Union, although under certain circumstances Austria would be forced to draw the sword. Austria and Russia are opposed to the Union chiefly on account of its constitutional basis. Russia sees in it Revolution. Austria, who will put aside her Constitution at the first favorable opportunity, sees in the constitutional Union a contagious example for her own people. In Germany nothing is to be done, because Austria could not participate in any positive progressive movement. The Emperor Nicholas actually wishes that Prussia, too, would kill out by a coup d’état everything constitutional within her borders.

Thus the august visit was productive of no tangible results other than what has been mentioned: the certainty that the Czar regarded the Union with sus­picion, and the revival of the Confederate Diet with sympathy.

The intensity of the mighty ruler’s reactionary desires and of his belief that he was intrusted with the super­vision of political order throughout all Europe was shown, shortly after the return of the Prince, in an unexampled piece of conduct. In June he invited Count Friedrich Dolma, Commander of the 1st (East Prussian) Army Corps, to be present at an immense muster of troops held near Warsaw. The Count was a serious man of the strictest honor, who had in 1812, for the sake of fighting against Napoleon, exchanged for a time the Prussian for the Russian service, and who had, in consequence, been held since that time in the highest esteem at the Russian Court. To him the Czar proposed one day that he should with his army corps march upon Berlin and force the restoration of the absolute monarchy. The Czar himself would also place four Russian army corps at his disposal for that purpose. Count Dohna at once explained to him briefly the reasons why such a procedure would be impossible: to which the Czar replied: “I must respect your arguments; but mark my word! It must sooner or later come to that.”

Count Dohna considered it his patriotic duty never to acquaint the King with this unheard-of suggestion. Even the report made by the Prince of Prussia about the Czar’s longing to see a coup d’état carried out in Prussia received not the least attention in Berlin.

Then the Czar urged with more importunity than ever the conclusion of the Danish Peace. He saw above all, in the instructions given to Major von Manteuffel by the King, strong indications that Frederick William would yield. Nicholas did not feel much concerned about the handful of Democrats in Copenhagen. Appropriate directions were, accordingly, given to Baron Meyendorff, which were to the following effect. Prussia wished to withdraw her troops from the Duchies with the reservation of all her German rights? Very well! Germany had no rights at all in Schleswig; so that that country would not come into consideration. But then, if the Holstein rebels persisted in their unlawful conduct, the Danish troops must be permitted to restore order by force of arms; and if Denmark should not be powerful enough, Russia was willing to help.

When Usedom objected to this on the score that the German Confederation could not suffer foreign troops to enter Federal territory, he received the simple reply, that in that case to the Confederation also belonged the duty to secure in its own territory, with its own forces, obedience to the laws. The King-Duke would then also be ready to propose to the Confederation appropriate measures for the pacification of the Duchies.

It was a cruel choice that was herewith presented to Prussia: she must either see the Duchies overrun by a Russian army, or, after having fought for them two years, see them forced back under the Danish yoke at the order of the Confederation. The Prussian Ministers thought that Russian interference would be the worse evil of the two; for, in the event of the interposition of the Confederation, there might be a possibility, at the same time that the royal authority was established, of preserving for the Duchies their ancient rights. The reports which were received meanwhile from the rest of Europe confirmed this decision.

The Emperor Francis Joseph declared to the King in a memorial of the 20th of June, his horror of a fratricidal war with Prussia, but added, at the same time, that under some circumstances the force of affairs themselves was stronger than the desires of men. Rochow announced from St. Petersburg that in the event of such a German war Russia would under other circumstances perhaps remain neutral, but most certainly would step in and take Austria’s part, if the Danish Peace were not already concluded. The English Minister inclined more and more toward the Danish side at every fresh discussion. While all these influences were being brought to bear upon the King, he was almost driven into a state of frenzy by friendly words from Paris, which seemed to him like a satanic temptation.

The Prussian Ambassador in Paris, Count Hatzfeldt, had at this time a lengthy conversation upon the subject of German affairs with Louis Napoleon Bonaparte, who had been on the 10th of December, 1848, to the surprise of the whole world, chosen President of the French Republic. The new potentate was busying his brain with many schemes that embraced in their extent the whole world, schemes which he had brooded over during the years of his exile, of his imprisonment, and of his wanderings, schemes which he had already to some extent laid before the world in his book about Napoleonic ideas. But for the time, he found it still advisable to be very cautious, watched as he was in internal affairs by the jealous and suspicious Assembly, and limited in European matters by the alliance of the three Eastern Powers, which dated from 1814. Nothing, then, could be more to his purpose than such a rupture between Prussia and Austria as had been becoming more and more imminent since the spring of 1849.

At that time, Napoleon sent one of his confidential friends, Mons, de Persigny, to Germany, to study the temper of the two great Courts. Mons, de Persigny in a conference with General von Radowitz told him that Napoleon felt a deliberate and decided preference for Prussia; that he wished to free Italy from Austrian domination; that as Prussia was striving for the same end in Germany, the two Governments were natural allies; that Napoleon had no ambitions for himself, except that, if public opinion in France forced him to it, he might perhaps ask for Landau or Savoy. Persigny was very politely received and his proposals as politely declined.

He next turned to Vienna, where he likewise hinted at an alliance of France and Austria at the expense of Prussia. But he seems to have had there (on account of the Italian question) even less success than in Berlin ; at least, he mentioned afterwards in a letter to Napoleon, that he had told Schwarzenberg, that a Napoleon could not be treated like Louis Philippe: France desired peace; but at the least provocation Napoleon’s war-cry would shake the world.

Prince Napoleon, meanwhile, preserved his quiet attitude as a spectator. Since Prussia had coolly declined his proffers of good-will, she should be made to feel in a negative way the worth of French friendship. A Prussian proposition to compel Switzerland to extradite political criminals was returned with dignity, and sides were taken with much ostentation in the Schleswig-Holstein question. But yet the Prince had by no means the intention of completely alienating the Prussian Cabinet. On the contrary, his most ardent desire was, by increasing the arrogance of Russia and Austria, to force Prussia into a war; and that would compel her to make an alliance with France. It seemed to him now, in June, 1850, that the hour for this had come.

He told Count Hatzfeldt, that he had not the least objection to make against Prussia’s increasing her power by the formation of a limited Union; that he in every way felt more sympathy with Prussia than with any other Continental Power, because the similarity of culture and of interests between France and Prussia seemed to him to be greater than could elsewhere be found. While Russia and Austria were opposing all the pro­gressive impulses of modern times, Prussia sought to respond to the just claims of these aspirations at the same time that she prevented demagogical excesses, acting, indeed, just as the first Napoleon had formerly done. lie said that the great question now was whether it would come to blows in Germany. Many Frenchmen believed that France must in that case remain neutral. For his part, he considered that impossible, especially if Russia took any part in the war. He felt it his duty to remark that certain influential conservative statesmen favored an alliance with Austria, but as for himself, he was much more strongly drawn to the Prussian side. Yet, if Prussia’s adversaries promised territorial acquisitions to France, of course Prussia would be obliged to do the same, and the most lifting portion of country would be that part of Bavaria lying along the left bank of the Rhine.

At this point, the Ambassador interrupted him by saying: “The least mention of such a wish would be the surest means of making an understanding with Prussia impossible. Prussia’s present endeavors are based upon the strength of the national idea; how can she adhere to this principle in her policy and be expected to give away German lands? Moreover, former French Ministers have themselves said that in this connection France ought not to expect any increase of territory; she would actually gain enough from an Austro-Prussian war without any effort of her own. For the Holy Alliance would be broken up, that firm league between the Eastern Powers, which had for a whole generation shut up France within impassable barriers.” Napoleon confessed the truth of this, and added that he had made his observation only upon the premise that Austria would offer him portions of Prussian territory.

The report of this conversation struck straight to the heart of the King. He had grown up in the midst of imprecations upon the great French Revolution and its despotic soldier-Emperor. His youth and early manhood had been spent in fraternal alliance with Austria and Russia. And now the nephew of that Arch-enemy offered him friendship and protection if he should become embroiled in a war with his oldest friends, in return for prompt payment in the shape of German territory.

It would have been impossible to suggest to the King a stronger motive for avoiding such an unfortunate war. If he should conclude peace with Denmark, Russia would probably be pacified, and this would prevent Austria from risking a war; so that the up­start on the Seine would have no more occasion for interfering.

Accordingly, the Peace was signed, conformable to Russia’s demands, upon the 2d of July, 1850, in Berlin, approved by the King upon the 6th, and sent to all the German Governments for ratification. From Usedom’s outline the mention of Schleswig was omitted, as well as the reference to the state of things before the war, and the special allusion to the Confederate Decree of 1846. The 3d Article now read simply as follows: The royal contracting-parties shall reserve to themselves all rights that fell to them before the war. Then follows a new Article, the 4th: After the conclusion of this Peace, the King-Duke may, conformably to the Confederate Rights, call for the intervention of the German Confederation to assist him in regaining his lawful authority in Holstein, the King-Duke being required at the same time to disclose his plans for the pacification of the Duchy; if the Confederation refuse its aid, or if the same be ineffectual, the King-Duke may at his pleasure extend his own method of military action into Holstein. A special proviso determined the evacuation of Schleswig by the Prussian and Swedish troops. A certain secret additional clause I shall discuss later.

However dangerous this Peace was for the rights of Schleswig-Holstein, and however little honor it reflected upon Prussia and Germany, the people in Berlin drew a long breath as this incubus rolled off their stifled breasts. Without further hesitation and with fresh energy they went to work again upon the German question. On the same 2d of July upon which the Danish Peace had been signed, a despatch was sent to Vienna, in which, considering the unsuccessfulness of the previous negotiations about the “Interim,” a new proposition was made to summon all the German Governments to a convention to discuss a definite plan for the constitution of a future Germany. It was also again asserted in the despatch that such a convention could in no way lay claim to the rights and forms of the extinct Confederate Diet.

At the same time, a circular was sent to the College of Princes (of the Union), suggesting, in view of the approaching expiration of the term for which the Provisional Executive was appointed, a prolongation of the same until October 15th, inasmuch as the well-known reasons still existed for deferring the definite estab­lishment of the Union-Constitution and a Union Government.

Both of these acts on the part of Prussia were in direct antithesis to the mind and will of Austria; and it would be hard to say just what result Prussia felt justified in expecting from them.

 

CHAPTER IV.

THE CRISIS.

 

Just at this time, Prince Schwarzenberg’s eagerness for war had considerably cooled down. In the State itself, the want of money was so pressing that the roll of the regiments had been decreased one-sixth, if not one-third, by extensive furloughs, even in spite of the great anxiety caused by the preparations of Prussia already mentioned. The Emperor Nicholas, too, urged peace and reconciliation. I have already,” he said to Rochow, “impressed it upon the Prince as his most sacred duty to undertake nothing dangerous to Prussia; and now that the Danish Peace has been concluded, Prussia’s good-will is openly recognized in St. Petersburg, however many misgivings may be entertained about the details of the Treaty.”

In this state of things, the importunate zeal of the Lesser States harassed the Prince daily. They feared nothing more than the restoration of a mutual understanding between Vienna and Berlin at their expense, and tried every possible means of keeping alive the quarrel. To this end, they openly represented the war, the burden of which would rest chiefly upon Austria, as an unavoidable matter of honor. But just by doing this, they conjured up the evil which they sought to escape. We have already heard Prince Schwarzenberg declare, in Warsaw, that by far the best plan would be for Austria and Prussia together to make the laws for the rest of Germany. In the same strain he also talked to Count Bernstorff on the 8th of July, when the latter communicated the despatch of the 2d.

“You promise me,” he said, “that the Union Constitution shall not become valid, until it shall have been made consistent with the Constitution of the more comprehensive Confederation : by which you mean, that it must be revised again. It is, then, clear, that in view of the reduced size of the Union, the Constitution of the 26th of May can no longer be applicable. Why don’t you, then, acknowledge this fact, for which you are not to blame, and say at once that the Union must receive another Constitution? This would remove the only barrier to an understanding between us. For we have not the least objection to any Union yon please to establish. Form offensive and defensive alliances with as many German Princes as you please. Convene for the same in each case a common Parliament. We have nothing to say against it. We say only, that a Union, that in its Constitution announces itself to be, or as wishing to become, the German Empire, in other words, as about to crowd us out of Germany, — such a Union we can under no circumstances suffer to exist.”

Following this explanation, he made the offer of establishing an “Interim,” in which Austria and Prussia alone should form the Executive, but all the German States should share in the legislation, according to the proportion of votes in the old Confederate Plenum.

This should continue in force until the completion of the definite Confederate Constitution. Austria was willing to agree to Prussia's proposition, that the Constitution should be decided upon in a series of open conferences rather than by a body calling itself the “ Confederate Diet.” “We should be obliged in that case,” added Schwarzenberg, “to quarrel a good deal with the Kingdoms; but I think we should finally succeed. I cannot, however, wait very long. I am too much teased by the other States, I am not soon set at rest by a move on your part, there is nothing left for me to do but to go forward in my own way.”

This was no mean offer which he made. In return for the nullification of the Constitution of May 26th. he conceded the equal influence of Austria and Prussia in the Confederation, the exclusion of the Lesser States from the Executive, the renunciation of the system of groups and mediatization of the Petty States, and finally the dissolution of the just resuscitated Confederate Diet. Count Bernstorff urgently recommended its acceptance, and Minister von Schleinitz was also inclined to favor it.

Yet, advantageous as this offer was for Prussia, compared with the old Confederate system, it involved her resigning her hopes for the realization of German Unity under Prussian leadership. In place of the restricted Union and more comprehensive Confederation was to be established the Duumvirate of Austria and Prussia over all Germany. In a restricted Union. Prussia alone would hold the control of German affairs; whereas in the Duumvirate, both Powers would have like influence upon German politics. In the one case, Prussia’s gain would be greater; in the other, without doubt, more easily attainable. If she chose the latter, she needed only to take Schwarzenberg’s proffered hand. If the former, she must be prepared for a war with Austria, with the Lesser States, and perhaps with Russia.

The King seems to have wavered for a whole week. At last, an energetic step of General von Radowitz decided the matter. After the Provisional Union Government had been prolonged until October, Count Bernstorff received notice on the 17th of July of the King’s announcement that the negotiations about an Interim were broken off, and that he demanded that the discussion over the definite Confederate Constitution should begin at once, and in open conferences; that he had promised to conform the Constitution of the Union to that of the more comprehensive Confederation, which he of course could not do until the latter should exist; that the abolition of the Union Constitution prior to this would signify a humiliation of Prussia to which the King could never subject himself.

When Count Bernstorff laid this message before Prince Schwarzenberg, on the 19th of July, the Prince expressed his extreme. regret. He observed to the Ambassador that Prussia’s adherence to the Constitution of May 26th made every sort of discussion about the definite Confederate Constitution in open conferences entirely out of the question. Prussia’s relinquishment of that Constitution and Austria’s abandonment of the revival of the Confederate Diet would have been, he said, corresponding steps toward conciliation. But Austria’s honor could not permit one without the other. The promise to conform the Constitution of the Union to that of the Confederation was not enough for him. Inasmuch as the Constitution of May 26th was not applicable to the Union in its present extent, the tenacity with which Prussia nevertheless clung to it proved to him that she wished at a propitious opportunity to bring all Germany within its range. Therefore, he must have some security that Prussia would give this up; and accordingly he should give Count Thun orders to proceed.

On the very same day, a circular was sent to all the German Courts announcing that the executive body of the Confederate Diet, the Close Council, would at once be constituted at Frankfort.

So honor stood against honor. On which side was the subject of dispute worthy of being raised to the rank of a matter that concerned the honor of the State?

In Austria, there was only one opinion. Austria’s controlling influence in Germany, whatever became of Germany, was looked upon as a right sanctioned by centuries and as the most important item in the power of Austria. This creed was false; but, as a natural and inevitable sequel to the past, it was unquestioned in Vienna. They were ready to defend this right with their blood: and to such high ends they did not con­sider the revival of the Confederate Diet too ignoble a means.

In Prussia, the case was quite different. Here, there was no question of defending an old right, but of securing a brighter future for Germany. Nothing could have been more glorious than to succeed in this direction. But it was impossible to close one’s eyes to the complete failure of the League of the Three Kingdoms and the subsequent Union. Almost all of the more powerful members had withdrawn, and a large number of the remainder were either very vacillating or wholly unreliable. In the course of a whole year the Union had not yet received a Constitution that could in any legitimate sense be called valid. The Constitution proposed on May 26th had been, to be sure, accepted by the Parliament, but afterwards emphatically rejected by King Frederick William. The Revision made by the Parliament had been, it is true, approved by the King, but evasively criticised by many of the remaining States, and repudiated by others. But upon one point all the participants were agreed: that for neither of the Drafts having in view a German Empire could any use be found in a league between Prussia and a dozen Petty States. And so they lived on in a provisional way, without any solid foundation nor proper basis, and without any visible ground for the hope that this state of things would ever change for the better.

Moreover, while things were in this condition a division arose in the Prussian Cabinet. With the consent of the Minister of War, General von Stockhausen, the motion was brought forward, on the 24th of July, by the Minister of the Interior, Herr von Manteuffel, to declare the infeasibility of the Constitution of May 26th, to give up herewith the whole Union in its present state, and to offer to the few loyal members a new protective alliance with Prussia. The other Ministers held back somewhat, yet expressed the wish that the unavoidable step might at least be taken as speedily as possible.

But General von Radowitz threw himself with the greatest vehemence in the way of such proceedings.

His reply to Manteuffel’s move was embodied in a memorial of July 25th, which brought forward two arguments against the same. The first was, that Prussia in her work for the cause of German Unity was not answerable to the Princes alone, but to the whole Nation as well, and that without a proper Parliamentary vote she had no right thus to announce the nullification of the Constitution. Now. this would have been true enough, if Prussia had occasioned the present status of the Union; but Prussia could not possibly be held responsible for the secession of the larger States and the consequent non-execution of the Constitution. Radowitz now made an attempt to discriminate between non-execution and nullification. lie might have properly done this, if the Constitution had ever once become valid and then had suffered a suspension. But this was not so. There was no Constitution. There were only drafts of a Constitution ; and so soon as a draft is declared to be impracticable, that is the end of it.

The General’s second argument consisted in the assertion that although Manteuffel indeed desired the dissolution of the Union in the interests of Prussia, yet, after Austria’s threatening command to this effect, no soul would believe that, but every one would see in it a subjection of Prussia to Austria's will, which would be inconsistent with Prussia’s honor. Very well 1 If only the danger had not been imminent, that by the prolongation of the quarrel and the further decadence of the Union, Prussia’s honor should become more and more implicated, and finally reach the point where she must choose between risking her life in fighting for a worthless object just for the sake of the honor, and the alternative of concluding, on account of the very worthlessness of the object, a forced and dishonorable peace.

Before the end of July, Prussia saw this inglorious choice almost forced upon her.

The King, to whom the thought of giving up the leadership in the Empire was equally painful with that of separating from Austria, continued meanwhile to cling to the quibble about the non-execution or the nullification of the Constitution. “Of course,” said he to his Ministers on the 26th, “the difference of opinion among the members will postpone for a considerably long time the execution of the Constitution; but the idea which lies at the bottom of it, the true form of the idea, its legal basis, must not be given up. The foundation may not be used for some time. It may be covered over with earth. But it must not be destroyed. It must be reserved for some more propitious time.” Unfortunately, the legal basis which the King seems to have had in his mind did not exist at all. And, moreover, it is also very clear that abolishing the Union now did not in the least preclude its revival at a more propitious time.

A lively discussion followed, as to whether, and how, and when, the infeasibility at least of the Constitution should be officially announced. Manteuffel wished it to be done at once. Radowitz cautiously urged that it be deferred until October, the expiration of the term of the new Provisional Executive. The King decided to await, for the present, further movements on the part of Austria.

These followed one after another in rapid succession: and all of them were aggressive.

By special agreements with Coburg and Brunswick, Prussia had taken their contingents into her own army. Austria protested against this upon the basis of the old Confederate military organization. At the request of Baden also, who wished to have her mutinous soldiers disciplined away from home, just as Austria did her Honveds, Prussia had consented to station the Baden troops in her garrisons, and to send temporarily a like number of Prussians into Baden to take their place. Schwarzenberg protested likewise against this upon the ground of the old Confederate Rights, and even went so far as to command the Austrian Governor of the fortress of Mainz to allow no Baden troops to pass by land nor by water within the limits of his jurisdiction. This sounded very much like open violence. What right had Austria to send orders to Confederate fortresses? What right had she to give directions to German soldiers on her own authority?

Stormy sessions of the Cabinet followed clay after day in Berlin. The King did not wish to countenance such encroachments, but first desired to remonstrate with the Vienna Court, and in this matter also to await the action of the Close Council. Radowitz then asked: “What if Prince Schwarzenberg throws overboard all expostulations and propositions? Then there is nothing left but force; and first of all the removal of Austrians from Mainz and Frankfort. In that case, too, in view of the Bavarian position about Aschaffenburg, our corps must be strengthened as much as possible in the neighborhood of Wetzlar and of Kreuznach.”

To this, General Stockhausen replied very decidedly that he had no troops of the line to spare for such purposes, and to call out the militia just at harvest time would be very questionable wisdom. Radowitz retorted that if matters stood thus, the whole policy of Prussia hitherto was now no longer tenable. The King intervened and quieted them with promises that a message should be sent to Vienna, and that the military question should be further investigated, which would be sufficient for the present. Within a few days, on the 3d and again on the 5th of August, Radowitz repeated his motions to put themselves in readiness for the event of Austria’s refusal. After telling him again that it would be unadvisable just then to call out the Rhenish and Westphalian militia, Stockhausen at last agreed to increase the two outposts by three thousand men. The further request of Radowitz, that the Bavarians, who had collected more than sixteen thousand men near Aschaffenburg and Anspach, should be kept in check by a corresponding corps stationed at Erfurt,—a step involving no difficulties whatever,—was evaded by Stockhausen with the remark that he would consider the matter further.

The Prussian Cabinet does not seem from this to have been very anxious to draw the sword, with however much truth Radowitz had asserted on the 2d of August the impossibility of carrying the Prussian policy any further without great military preparations. Meanwhile solemn diplomatic remonstrances were sent to Vienna; and Count Bernstorff received instructions to confine himself strictly to official relations, and by all means to avoid holding any confidential conversations with Schwarzenberg.

About the middle of August, one more faint ray of hope broke through the dark clouds of this altercation. Several other considerations were brought to bear upon that angry mood of Prince Schwarzenberg which had led him to reply to the Prussian refusal of his conciliatory offers by the moves just mentioned. These considerations owed their origin to certain phases of the Schleswig-Holstein question.

The immediate result of the Berlin Treaty with Den­mark was the discontinuance of negotiations which the Ducal Government of Schleswig-Holstein had hitherto kept up in Copenhagen. The Danes now hoped to succeed easily in quelling the rebels, after they had been abandoned by Germany. But the Ducal Government, which had united with the people in the interval of the truce for organizing all their powers, was now determined to take up alone the struggle against the Copenhagen factions. After the departure of the Prussians, on the 13th of July, the small Ducal army of about thirty thousand men marched into Schleswig. Thereupon, on the 17th, the Danish forces, numbering about thirty-seven thousand, under General Krogh, crossed from all directions the frontiers of the Duchy. After a few skirmishes, the two armies met on the 27th of July, near Idstedt, not far from the Schley.

The Commander-in-Chief of the Schleswig-Holstein troops was the former Prussian General, Von Willisen, a famous theorist in military science, who only a short time before had begged his friend, General von Hess, to send some Austrian officers to Schleswig as specta­tors. k‘ What I know,” he remarked at that time, “I am sure of. But I don’t know the extent of my ability, and I should like to test it.” The sequel proved that his ability was none too extensive. After General Horst in a victorious assault had already broken through the Danish centre, news came to Willisen that a division of the enemy had gone around him and were in his rear. He was too refined to think of Blucher’s coarse reply to a similar message: Willisen lost his head, ordered a retreat, suffered terrible loss, and thus delivered all Schleswig into the hands of the enemy. The latter, however, could not get any farther. Holstein kept her frontier resolutely guarded, and even made several sallies upon the offensive, although without very much success. Denmark had not at hand the means of overcoming the resistance of these determined and heroic people.

This made the Czar Nicholas the more vehement in demanding, according to Article 4 of the Treaty, the assistance of the German Confederation in the restoration of law and order in the Duchies. But here a peculiar difficulty arose. Of course, nothing could be done upon the ground of the Treaty until the same had been ratified by all concerned. Now, the Prussian Government had in January received from the Central Confederate Commission full powers to negotiate about the peace in the name of the German Confederation, and thereafter to lay the Treaty before all the German States for ratification,—which had in fact been done on the 3d of July. But the Lesser States, who had no longing to relieve Prussia from the Danish shaft which was still sticking in her flesh, now declared that according to the Vienna Final Act of 1820 no one else bad authority to decide questions of peace and war than the Plenum of the Confederate Diet at Frankfort, and that to this Prussia must turn.

It lay in the nature of things that Austria as eagerly took the part of her loyal allies as Prussia renewed her protest against the interference of a really non-existent Confederate Diet. Thus the Danish question was directly complicated with the German one; the ratification of the Treaty could not be secured; and much less could Denmark find any representative of that Confederate Power, to whom she was anxiously looking for help in the subjugation of Holstein.

The Czar Nicholas was furious at this unexpected delay in the execution of his ardent wish; and this time he directed his anger chiefly against Austria. To be sure, he said, Prussia might easily enough join the Confederate Diet, which owed its rise to true conservative principles; but at the same time he confessed that Prussia had really done her best to secure the Peace, that with few exceptions the Princes of the Union had already ratified it, and that Austria’s refusal to do so was an unfair trick. And also in the subordinate questions which were then subjects of dispute between Berlin and Vienna, the placing of Baden troops in Prussian garrisons and the military agreements entered into by Prussia, the Czar coincided with the views of Prussia: however justifiable Austria’s complaints might have been on the basis of the old Confederate Rights, there was no doubt of the expediency of the plan nor that it would conduce to Germany’s military strength.

To Prince Schwarzenberg the situation was by no means pleasant. We can readily believe that he was not filled with gratitude toward the Lesser States, at whose instigation he had taken this step that had cost him Russia’s good-will. To them there was no great risk in bringing about an open rupture with Prussia; but Schwarzenberg knew very well that without Russia’s help, the burden of a war would be very hazardous to Austria, sorely exhausted as she was after the years of the Revolution. Until now, he had had Russia’s unqualified approval of his scheme of summoning the Confederate Diet, and only recently had he succeeded in overcoming the Czar's misgivings about the admission of entire Austria into the German Confederation. It was therefore exceedingly bitter now at the critical moment to find Russia, in consequence of the policy recommended by the Lesser States, upon the Prussian side.

And in many other ways, Schwarzenberg continually suffered annoyance at the hands of his cherished Lesser States. In the very midst of their black and yellow reactionary policy, they were weak enough to make eyes at the Liberal section of their Chambers and of the populace. Hanover, for instance, was unwilling to assist in subduing Holstein; and for the same reason, Bavaria and Würtemberg demanded persistently a popular representation by the side of the Confederate Diet. Influenced by these things, Schwarzenberg came back to the idea of changing the whole system, and of coming to some understanding with Prussia on the basis of governing all Germany in common. Former negotiations had revealed to him Prussia's willingness. It had been only his demand for the abolition of the Union that had spoiled the chances for coming to an agreement.

But now the circumstances were different. By the secession of the two Hesses, the Grand Duchy of Baden was separated from the rest of the Union by large tracts of land: and the actual extent of the Union had been diminishing, until it now included less than a score of the pygmy States of North Germany. The realization of such a Union as that, no matter what its Constitution, could not be any longer the source of much danger.

Hence Schwarzenberg became more kindly disposed toward Prussia. A motion to constitute the Close Council upon the 8th of August, which had been brought forward by one of the Lesser States immediately after the accession of Hesse-Darmstadt, was rejected by the Prince, and the first meeting of the same postponed until the 1st of September.

Inasmuch as Count Bernstorff was forbidden to hold any confidential conversation with him, the Prince now sent the old Aulic Councillor Forsboom, on the 19th of August, to make the proposal to unite upon the following four points : a strong Confederate Executive in the hands of Austria and Prussia; a Confederate legislative body similar in form to the Confederate Diet under the alternating presidency of Austria and Prussia; no form of popular representation in the Confederation for the present; recognition of the Union, provided it should limit itself to North Germany and release Baden from its membership. He did not, however, consider that he had yet bound himself in any way definitely: everything depended in his mind upon Austria’s relations with Russia.

Just then he was informed that the Emperor Nicholas, who was no less anxious for a settlement, had sent his Chancellor, Count Nesselrode, and the cleverest of his diplomatists, Baron Meyendorff, to Ischl, where Francis Joseph and Schwarzenberg were temporarily residing, to urge the ratification of the Danish Peace, and to this end a reconciliation with Prussia. The Prince awaited their arrival with composure. If Russia persisted in her sympathy with Prussia, he could at once come to an understanding with Prussia and would not then need to fear Russia ; if, on the other hand, he succeeded in turning Russia again against Prussia, he could proudly turn his back upon his hated German rival. To win this trick, he had a special high card in his hand.

It will be remembered that a conference had been held in London between Russia, England, and France, over the establishment of a common dynasty for the whole of the Danish territory. It was held at the same time that the Berlin Peace was matured; and in the latter Prussia had, at the desire of Denmark and Russia, assented to a secret article, in which she gave the apparently harmless promise to take part in the negotiations of that conference.

The King supposed that the rights of the various pretenders would be carefully examined, and their claims and demands listened to and considered, with a view to arriving at some definite result. He was, consequently, more than surprised when his London Ambassador, Bunsen, was invited forthwith, on the 4th of July, to join in the signing of a document, which, in anticipation of all investigation, declared beforehand the indissoluble integrity of the Danish State, and thus begged the whole question. At the order of the King, Bunsen peremptorily refused to sign these papers.

Austria was forced for the sake of appearances to follow this example, but at once gave as her reason for doing so the fact that the document did not expressly state the claims of the German Confederation upon Holstein. Inasmuch as this difficulty was at once removed in London, Schwarzenberg was able to receive the Russian diplomatists at Ischl with the news that Austria had already signed the document on the 23d of August.

Thereupon, he explained to them further that the Close Council would be in official existence at Frankfort after the 1st of September, and would be ready not only to ratify the Danish Peace, but also to pacify Holstein without delay; that is to say, by an act of the Confederation to subject the Duchy to the Danish King. In doing this, he went again far ahead of Prussia, whose opinion it was that before any such step could be taken, the announcement of the King of Denmark concerning the form of his intended constitution of Schleswig- Holstein must, in accordance with Article 4 of the Peace, be received and considered.

The Russians were greatly pleased and satisfied with Schwarzenberg’s conduct. In the midst of their interview the Prussian reply arrived, stating that the four points proposed were recognized and accepted as a suitable basis for harmonious action. Nesselrode was highly gratified by the words of this message, and was not disturbed when Schwarzenberg explained that it referred to some old propositions that did not concern nor suit the present situation. In short, at the expense of Holstein, at the expense of Germany, the mutual understanding of the two Imperial Courts in making common cause against Prussia was re-established.

The Confederate Plenum, consisting for the present of eleven States out of the thirty-five, transformed itself on the 2d of September into the Close Council. On the same day the Danish Representative for Holstein made the motion to send an official order to Kiel forbidding any further opposition to the royal troops. Both matters, the ratification and the pacification, were, in the regular order of business, referred to a Committee; and as the South German members, in compliance with the sentiments of their people, had many alterations to propose in the Berlin Peace, it was certain that at least six weeks would pass before a definite Confederate decree would be fixed upon.

The more incomprehensible these last sudden changes in Schwarzenberg’s conduct appeared to Prussia, the more energetically did she continue to protest with her associates in the Union against the unlawful body at Frankfort. The King, who had been from the beginning bitter in his feelings toward the Confederate Diet, which had been re-established without his co-operation and in spite of his opposition, now made it a point of honor to uphold the torn banner of the Union and to treat every decree passed at Frankfort as null and void,—in fact, to withstand the same, whenever he could, to the best of his power.

Since Russia continued to urge a reconciliation with Prussia, Schwarzenberg instructed the Representative who acted as President at Frankfort, to prevent the Confederate Diet from passing any act whatever concerning the Union. There was, indeed, no other business for the Assembly to transact; and there was every prospect that until the report of the Committee on the Schleswig-Holstein matter should be made, it would lead quite as contemplative and quiet a life as Close Council as it had enjoyed hitherto as Confederate Plenum.

At this point, to the German and Danish questions was added a third, which quickly brought to a violent outbreak the quarrel that had now been smouldering for a year. This was the contest over the Constitution in Hesse-Cassel, which had been excited by the Ministry of Hassenpflug.

The Elector Frederick William of Hesse was probably the most wretched prince of his time. By no means without natural gifts, sagacious, shrewd, and possessing a prodigious memory, he grew up withal in the midst of the most scandalous domestic relations. Ill-treated by a profligate father, incited against an excellent mother, and encompassed on all sides by spies, the moral and intellectual side of his nature was stunted in its development, perverted, and vitiated. He filled himself for all time with a misanthropic distrust of humanity. As a Sovereign, he allowed his ministers no independent action, even in the minutest details. Nor was he able himself for weeks at a time to decide any small matter, since behind every motion he suspected treachery. Thus every year found the legislation and administration of the land sinking deeper and deeper into quagmire and stagnation.

Out of his suspicion toward the whole human race there grew a malicious disposition to revenge himself by trickery and spiteful malevolence upon individuals. The most calamitous circumstance, however, was his unequal marriage, founded though it was upon affection. He saw with inward resentment his numerous family of children growing up with no claim to the throne. Thus the greatest blessing of an hereditary monarchy, the union of paternal love and the duties of a ruler, was in his case converted into the opposite : he felt estranged from his country, and by the side of, or in place of, an interest in the public weal, he aimed at the enrichment of his family at the expense of the dynasty and of the State. Consequently, he vented bitter hatred upon the liberal Constitution of 1831, which protected the public servants from his evil moods, and subjected the finances to the close supervision of the Estates. In 1847, he was already planning to overthrow the Constitution by a coup d’état, when he found that his corps of officers would not stand by him; and the old Prince Metternich at the same time explained to him that a Constitution that had been in recognized force for sixteen years could not, according to the principles of the Confederation, be abrogated nor altered except by constitutional proceedings.

Hardly had the Elector swallowed this humiliation, when the great agitation of 1848 reached Hesse-Cassel and wrung from him many popular concessions. He was forced to appoint a Liberal Ministry, who very soon restored order and quiet, but whose life from this time on the Elector succeeded in making as wretched as possible. He hastened to join the Prussian Union in the hope of securing the guaranty or compensation for his civil list, which had been severely criticised in the Hessian Parliament. But the Union offered no help to such financial projects; on the other hand, he found his sovereign prerogatives even diminished by the functions of the Union Government. After months of sharp dispute, his Ministers still resisted his determination to secede from the Union. Finally, in February, 1850, he dismissed them and summoned to the head of a new Cabinet a man who had already in the thirties fought violent and savage battles for him against the Parliament, and was now employed in the service of Prussia; namely, the President of the Court of Appeals, Hassenpflug.

In order to respond to the summons of the Elector and to obtain his dismissal from the Prussian service, he was obliged to apply in person to King Frederick William. At the same time there was hanging over him a trial for forgery on account of having unlawfully signed a voucher for a small item of expense. What took place in his interview with the King has never been made known. Alost probably, he assured the King of his continued love for Prussia, and represented his mission in Hesse as that of purifying the Hessian Constitution from the Democratic rottenness to which the last wild year had given rise. We know that such words would have fully agreed with the sentiments of the King. Certain it is that Hassenpflug received his discharge in spite of the trial, and began his work of forming a Ministry at Cassel.

Here, in memory of his former deeds, he was received, as the curse of Hesse, with an outburst of popular indignation. He did not allow this to disturb him. His very personal appearance revealed his resoluteness of character,—his short, compact figure, sharply defined features, huge nose, and high bald crown circled by bushy locks. A fanatic in his Ultramontane principles and on the subject of monarchical absolutism, yet inwardly convinced of the righteousness of his cause, he was therefore bold to the degree of audacity, and exalted above conventionalities and the consideration of others. By no means affected by any trace of ascetic contempt for the pleasures of a worldly life, he was rather extravagant than avaricious, though by careless management he often exposed himself to this charge. Added to these qualities, he was an adept in the language of the pettifoggers.

It has been often discussed, whether the abolition of the Constitution or the overthrow of the Union was his end in view, and which he used as a means: the actual fact was, that the one could not be brought about without the other. For, according to the conditions of the League of the 26th of May—of which Hesse-Cassel at the Conference of the Princes in Berlin had professed herself still to be a member in spite of the rejection of the Union Constitution—any quarrel over the Hessian Constitution would have been at once carried before the Court of Arbitration at Erfurt; and the case would have been so clear, that a just trial could have ended only in the defeat of the Elector.

But it stood otherwise with Schwarzenberg’s resuscitated Confederate Diet. There the Prince’s word had the weight of authority; and this word was, that all the German Constitutions were good for nothing, the only hope for improvement was by military force. Hence Hassenpflug made haste to join the Confederate Diet, and at the same time to excite the quarrel over the Constitution in Cassel, so that the Confederate Diet might at once be provided with an occasion for intervention.

The means he employed were exceedingly simple. From February till September he demanded from the Parliament taxes and other revenues, but obstinately refused to comply with the constitutional condition for receiving the same, which was the presentation of an official Budget,—and this, although it was well known that his Minister of Finance, Lometsch, had already long before drawn up the outline of such a Budget. When, at last, the Estates declined to prolong his dictatorial right to levy taxes, he declared this, in virtue of the so-called Law of Exceptions of 1832 (which, to be sure, the Confederate Diet had annulled in March, 1848), to be an act of rebellion, and the land, which was enjoying the serenest peace, to be in a state of war. The civil authorities, all of whose officials according to the existing laws were held personally responsible for every unconstitutional official act, no matter at whose order it was executed, refused to take part in this violation of the Constitution.

Thereupon Hassenpflug persuaded the Elector on the 12th of September to leave Cassel and to flee with him to Frankfort, there to consult with the Austrian Representatives to the Confederate Diet concerning further movements. On the 17th, he brought the suitable motion before the Diet; and the latter on the 21st, passed a decree demanding from the Government of Hesse-Cassel an immediate statement of the means that were being employed to suppress the rebellion. This was the prologue to chastisement at the hands of the Confederation.

Hassenpflug at once made the police regulations more rigorous, and increased the discretion of the military authorities in arbitrarily dealing with refractory tax­payers and with every civil official in the courts and public offices that refused to perform the duties required of him. But the officers, all of whom had sworn allegiance to the Constitution, began to be suspicious; and when their commander shouted the order to them, gruffly adding: “Whoever will not obey his Commander-in-Chief may take his leave,” within twenty-four hours nine-tenths of the whole corps had resigned. The Elector's weapon had broken in his hand. But to his Minister the catastrophe was welcome; for now the Confederate Diet could order foreign troops to inflict its punishment upon Hesse-Cassel, and their help would doubly insure a thorough military renovation of the condition of the Electorate.

This rapid course of events could not but arouse great interest in Berlin. The Confederate Diet, hitherto condemned to an apathetic existence by being passively ignored by Prussia, now began to display dangerous activity at a point which was, on account of its geographical position, of the greatest importance not only to the Union, but to the very political continuance of Prussia. By the secession of both Hesses, whose example Nassau seemed ready to follow, the Union had been split into pieces.

Prussia could easily put up with the territorial separation of her East and West Provinces under the peaceful regime of the old Confederate Diet, when her influence in Cassel was undiminished, and two Hessian military roads with halting-stations secured the connection between Cologne and Berlin. But now it was intolerable that a Confederate Power, inimical to Prussia, should propose to occupy this territory with its forces, although the Sovereign of the same was, in name at least, still a member of the Prussian Union, and also that that Confederate Power should in spite of Prussia’s protest set itself up to be the highest authority in the German Nation.

“What do the South German Governments care,” said Count Brandenburg, “for the Hessian Constitution? It is only to humiliate us that they wish to occupy Hesse-Cassel.” A few months later, these words were proved true in Munich. When the Minister, Von der Pfordten, was taken to task in the Bavarian Chamber for his share in the overthrow of the Hessian Constitution, he remarked with cynical frankness: “The Hessian Constitution was a matter of the utmost indifference to us. All that we desired was the downfall of the Prussian Union.”

Prussia had, then, reason enough not to remain idle in view of the movements of Hassenpflug and of the Confederate Diet. Several paths were open to her, in which she could take active steps upon a safe legal basis. For the legitimate solution of the difficulty two methods offered themselves.

The Hessian Constitution itself provided a “Court of Compromises” for all instances of disagreement between the Elector and the Estates; and even those very Laws of Exceptions of 1832 and 1834, to the other provisions of which Hassenpflug himself had appealed, established a Court of Arbitration for just such cases. In Berlin, at this time, Count Brandenburg had temporarily charge of Foreign Affairs, since Herr von Schleinitz, who was very ready in times of peace and good feeling to send polemical notes to Vienna, but who was determined to take no part in any actual quarrel with Austria, had, in view of the present threatening situation, taken a leave of absence. Count Brandenburg, moderate and just as ever, sent a despatch on the 12th of September to the Hessian Government, in which he expressed his regret that the Budget had not been presented, and proposed the restoration of order by referring the matter to arbitration. Hassenpflug flew into a passion as the Prussian Ambassador read the despatch to him, and had the insolence to assert that he had no difference with the Estates, but only with rebellious officers and functionaries.

But the King himself did not wish to pursue this path any farther. It was not the intention of the Frankfort body to overthrow the Hessian Constitution, that had annoyed him in the matter. On the contrary, he considered, precisely as Prince Schwarzenberg, the unanimous resistance of the officers, the civil officials, and the people, to the will of the Sovereign, to be atrocious, heinous, and, as a precedent, in the highest degree dangerous. He shared Manteuffel’s opinion, that if such things could happen under the Hessian Constitution, Hassenpflug was quite right in subjecting the same to a thorough revision. The King there­fore ordered that in the course of negotiations, no judgment should in any way be passed upon the merits of the dispute over the Constitution in Hesse-Cassel. Nor should any reference be made to the League of May 26th. Once for all the King wished it understood that he would have only voluntary associates. Hesse-Cassel should not be forced to submit herself to the dictates of the Union Compact contrary to her free will.

Yet if, in spite of all this, Prussia wished to prevent an Austrian army from entering Holstein, or Bavarian troops from marching into Hesse-Cassel, still one other course was possible, which the most far-sighted men were already convinced was the only practicable one under the existing circumstances. This would have been to leave the Union, the provisional arrangement of which would come to an end within a few weeks, lying upon the ground where it fell, and to seek the enemy in their own camp, by joining with all the members of the Union the Confederate Diet at Frankfort, and there to seize upon the management of affairs,—a course which would not have been at all hindered by any of the questions at issue. In the Holstein affair, Bavaria and Hanover would have at once taken sides with Prussia for the sake of the better protection of State rights. Since the King condemned the Hessian Con­stitution quite as severely as Prince Schwarzenberg, the Lesser States would gladly have left the punish­ment of the Electorate to him. Whether the future German Constitution should be determined upon in open conferences or in the Confederate Diet was as a matter of fact quite immaterial, since in either assembly the unanimous consent of all the States was necessary to any decision.

In short, had Prussia given this turn to her policy, the prospect was certain of gaining important advantages in all directions. But we already know that the feelings of the King were not equal to it. The arbitrary and tricky conduct of Austria in summoning the Confederate Diet had wounded him too deeply. He felt that Prussia’s honor would be dragged in the mud, if, after all his protestations, he should now yield and recognize the unlawful assembly; and how much more so if he should join it! No one of his Ministers would have dared to suggest to him that he was capable of this. Radowitz supported the King most energetically in his sentiments.

There were, then, two points upon which Prussia felt her honor depended: the maintenance of the impracticable Union Constitution, and establishment of open conferences instead of the Confederate Diet. Unfortunately, the amount of energy expended upon these matters was entirely out of proportion to the intrinsic worthlessness of the objects to be attained.

Herr von Manteuffel had even on the 7th of September, and again upon the 14th, made the most vigorous opposition in the Ministerial Council to the continuance of the Union policy; but after the King had seconded Radowitz so decidedly, he held his tongue. When, on the 21st of September, the first decree had been passed in the Confederate Diet concerning the Hessian affair, Radowitz represented to the Ministry on the 24th the necessity of anticipating every movement of the illegal Frankfort Assembly upon Hessian territory, and urged the taking of the necessary military precautions without delay. None of the Ministers dared to raise any objection, and even General von Stockhausen promised to consider forthwith the matter of equipment and preparations.

On the 26th, Radowitz repeated his proposals in the presence of the King, with the observation that these steps ought to be taken only in ease the resolution had been irrevocably made, to carry out the principles at stake under all circumstances and to prosecute the measures once inaugurated with all the means at hand.

The King expressed his approval. Radowitz thereupon took charge himself of the Department of Foreign Affairs, and straightway issued a vigorous protest against all decrees and doings of the pretended Confederate Diet, whose interference in Hesse-Cassel Prussia would never tolerate.

It was soon evident that by these acts the controversy had been transferred to a legally unsafe basis.

Prince Schwarzenberg replied to the Prussian message, by explaining that upon Prussia's own principles of not wishing to force any German Government into the Union, she certainly ought not to prevent those States represented at Frankfort from arranging their own affairs among themselves. If, however, Prussia came forward with such an unheard-of and entirely unwarrantable assumption, then Austria was determined to repel force with force.

Radowitz responded that Prussia for the present pressed no claims against Hesse-Cassel that might arise from the provisions of the Union Compact, but merely wished, as she would if any other State were concerned, to preserve the conditions essential to her own existence, among which were above all things the assurance that Hesse-Cassel and the Prussian military roads, with their halting-stations that lay within the Electorate, should not be occupied by any foreign troops.

This certainly concerned the interests of Prussia; but so long as the guaranteed use of these roads and stations was not interfered with, she had manifestly no legal right to prohibit the sovereign Elector from temporarily inviting allied troops to enter his dominions, any more than she had regarded Schwarzenberg’s protest against the reception of Baden troops in Prussian garrisons and vice versa.

In continuance of these negotiations, Radowitz sent word to Vienna that the King was ready to settle all matters under dispute in an amicable way with the Emperor of Austria on the strength of their ancient friendship: the Hessian and Holstein questions by commissioners appointed by both Powers, and the question of the German Constitution by open conferences attended by all the German Governments. These proposals, in which the Lesser States saw themselves again threatened with a subordinate position, called forth bitter resentment in Munich and in Stuttgart. Tn an outburst of passion, Minister von der Pfordten declared to the Prussian Ambassador that Bavaria would not yield a step, and that Prussia should have war if she wished it. He then ordered fresh equipments and the re-enforcement of the corps stationed at Aschaffenburg.

Hereupon the Prussian Minister of War was at last forced to show some signs of life, even if with the greatest unwillingness. At his request four thousand men were stationed on the 8th of October near Erfurt; but the proposal of Radowitz to let them move forward to the Hessian frontier was not approved by Stockhausen. The division which had been stationed at Kreuznach was removed to Wetzlar, bringing the number here up to ten thousand; and, lastly, thirty-five hundred men were held ready to march at Paderborn.

All these troops were on a peace-footing; and their combined strength was below that of the Bavarian army corps in Franconia. However, Stockhausen said that, if necessary, he could assemble at Erfurt within fourteen days twenty-seven thousand men; but that further preparations seemed to him useless, so long as Austria's attitude was still undetermined.

This uncertainty was removed almost in the same moment. Prince Schwarzenberg had inquired into the opinion held on the Hessian question in St. Petersburg, and had learned with gratification that Emperor Nicholas was indignant at the rebellion of the Cassel officials and entirely approved of the appeal made by the Elector to the Confederate Diet. It was, he said, precisely as judicious as if he himself had dictated the step. Thereupon it was decided in Vienna to go ahead energetically without any regard to Prussia’s opposition. The new Prussian proposals about the settlement of the questions by commissioners and conferences were rejected, and the exclusive authority of the Confederate Diet in every particular officially affirmed.

On the 11th of October the Monarchs and Prime Ministers of Austria, Bavaria, and Würtemberg met at Bregenz, and formed an offensive and defensive alliance against Prussia, agreeing to raise an army of two hundred thousand men. At the table, warlike toasts were drunk, and the King of Würtemberg openly declared: “When the Emperor gives the word, we are ready to march.” “I am proud,” replied the Emperor, “to march against the enemy with such comrades.”

Henceforth there could be no longer any possible doubt about Austria’s sentiments; and yet Stockhausen showed no signs of any “further preparations.” Radowitz himself said that he believed behind those big words of their opponents lay very little thirst for action. Only in one event did he believe war was possible; namely, if Russia also began the offensive against Prussia.

And now General von Rochow announced from St. Petersburg that Emperor Nicholas again planned to make an extended sojourn at Warsaw; it was therefore decided to try again the effect of a personal interview with him with a view to convincing him that in her opposition to the Confederate Diet Prussia was pursuing neither democratic nor revolutionary politics, but only looking after her own interests. For this important mission no less a person was selected than the Prussian President of the Ministry, Count Brandenburg.

In order to meet the views of the Russian Monarch as far as possible, Prussia had made on the 8th of October in the College of Princes the declaration so much talked about, that on account of the great reduction in the size of the Union, the Constitution of the 26th of May, which had been intended for the whole of Germany, had become evidently impracticable, but that it could be suitably modified only after an understanding should have been reached about the constitution of the more comprehensive alliance. Further, it was intended to propose in Copenhagen also the settlement of the Holstein question by a special commission of all the German Governments, and at the same time to request the Ducal Government at Kiel to abstain from military operations. Lastly, the Elector of Hesse, who with the prospect of the threatened collision between the Great Powers began to fear for his own existence, plainly signified in a letter to the King his wish that the Hessian disorders might be settled by the united decrees of all the German States—which, as we have seen, coincided exactly with the Prussian standpoint.

Having all these considerations for a basis of operations, and also provided with a definite proposition concerning the future form of the more comprehensive alliance, Count Brandenburg set out on the 15th of October for Warsaw. He did not give up hopes of success, although the forces collected in Bohemia were daily increasing, and the military divisions of both parties were slowly pushing forward to the Hessian frontier.

Throughout Europe the suspense was breathless. The public mind was convinced that Prussia was determined at any price to gain control of German affairs by driving away in the first place the spectre of the Confederate Diet and by confirming the historical union of Schleswig-Holstein, the good old laws of Hesse-Cassel, and the parliamentary Constitution of the German Nation. As we have seen, it would be hardly possible to imagine a more incorrect conception of the sentiments of the King. Yet there were also some minds that entertained doubts.

In Hesse-Cassel, the State most immediately threatened, any direct appeal to the Prussian King for his mighty protection had been persistently avoided. The Liberal ex-Minister Eberhard, originally a prudent and sensible Hanau merchant, restrained his friends in the Hessian Parliament from such a step. He said: “Prussia opposes the Confederate Diet in order to protect her own interests. When she has once succeeded in this, she will not move a finger for the sake of our Constitution.”