READING HALL

THE DOORS OF WISDOM

ATHENS . 478—401 B.C.

CHAPTER VI

SICILY

I

THE TYRANTS OF SYRACUSE AND ACRAGAS

WE have now to resume the story of Sicily from the death of Gelon which occurred in 478 b.c., two years after the victory of Himera. At that date the island seemed destined to enjoy a period of tranquil prosperity: in his own city the steps by which the ruler of Syracuse had risen to power had been forgotten, the usurping tyrant had been an acknowledged king: outside it his hegemony, resting in part upon a cordial alliance with Theron of Acragas, was, if not welcomed, at least unquestioningly accepted; and the common victory over the Carthaginian invader might seem to have drawn together the Greeks of Sicily into a strong and abiding union. But this was not to be. Such union could only be maintained by the sacrifice of independence, by the subjection of Syracuse to a single ruler, and of the other cities to Syracusan domination. As in Old Greece, so in Sicily, centrifugal tendencies proved too strong. Less than twenty years after Himera, tyrants and ‘kings’ had disappeared, and the several cities regained their full autonomy.

If we accept the account of the division of power determined upon by Gelon before his death, we may believe that it was intended to secure his dynasty and to prevent friction between its members; but in this his judgment was mistaken. The arrangement for the succession met with no opposition from the citizens of Syracuse; but from the first the real power seems to have been in the hands of Hiero; in fact our principal authority, Diodorus, speaks of Hiero as the successor of Gelon without qualification : a fact which supports the suggestion that Polyzelus was not a partner in the rule of Syracuse, but a vicegerent at Gela. Whatever the position of Polyzelus may have been, it was such that Hiero determined to get rid of him. An opportunity soon presented itself. The people of Sybaris, who since the overthrow of their city had maintained themselves in their colonies of Laus and Scidrus, were once more hard pressed by Croton, and appealed to Syracuse for help. In response, Hiero enrolled a force, largely consisting of mercenaries, and ordered Polyzelus to proceed to the assistance of the Sybarites. He thought that there would be little chance of a successful resistance to Croton, and that his brother would fall in battle; failing that, the mercenaries might be trusted to see to it that he did not return victorious to Syracuse. Polyzelus, however, suspecting the plot refused the commission, and an open breach ensued between the brothers. According to another less probable account, he accepted it and waged a successful campaign in Italy. In any case he found it necessary to leave Syracuse, and threw himself upon the pro­tection of his father-in-law, Theron of Acragas. The result was that Hiero declared war upon Theron. This bare fact is all that we are told. It seems astonishing that Hiero should have been so ready to attack a state which had so recently been his predecessor’s ally; we can only suppose that, with the removal of the barbarian danger, the friendship between Syracuse and Acragas had cooled, and the relation of suspicion and jealousy, normal between Greek states whether in east or west, had re-appeared at the death of Gelon, or before it.

Theron marched into Syracusan territory and the two armies faced one another on the banks of the Gela river. An actual conflict, however, was averted at the last moment through the mediation, it is said, of the poet Simonides, who held an honoured position at the court of Hiero. The nature of his pacifying counsels we do not know, but it is clear that Theron at least had reasons for suspending hostilities. It was probably at this time that he was embarrassed by the rebellion of his cousins, Capys and Hippocrates, while further trouble was threatened from Himera. That city was now under the rule of Theron’s son, Thrasydaeus, and to escape from his oppression her citizens had turned to the tyrant of Syracuse, promising to surrender to him their city and to join in the attack upon Theron. In the upshot Hiero, whose motives are unknown to us, betrayed the Himeraean plot to Theron, who massacred the ringleaders and made peace with Hiero on the condition of Polyzelus’ restoration to favour. It does not appear, however, that Polyzelus hereafter exercised any power at Syracuse; he passes out of the story and certainly died before 466 b.c.

Hiero’s intervention in favour of Sybaris may perhaps have had another motive besides the wish to get rid of his brother. From the outset of his reign he showed a desire of making his influence felt amongst the ltaliotes. In this sphere he had a com­petitor in the person of Anaxilas, tyrant of Rhegium and Zancle. The rivalry between Anaxilas and Gelon has been described in an earlier chapter; it seems that after the rebuff encountered by the pro-Carthaginian tyrant in the battle of Himera Anaxilas had made some sort of submission to Gelon. For the moment his ambitions had been crushed, but it was not for long. In 477 we hear of him threatening war against Locri, whose maidens, as Pindar sings, owed their deliverance to the generous intervention of the lord of Syracuse. We may conjecture that a stronger motive than the befriending of a weak state was Hiero’s determination to cut short the ambitions of a reviving opponent or rebellious vassal. The mere threat of intervention in arms was sufficient. What Hiero especially desired to prevent was the growth of a strong power in southern Italy, especially in the hands of the tyrant of Zancle. The support accorded to the Sybarites may be explained as another instance of the same opposition to the growth of a strong Italiote power.

To the year 475 we may ascribe an act which Hiero reckoned as perhaps his greatest title to fame, the foundation of the city of Aetna. If we knew more of the story, and could more fully understand the motives of the act, we might perhaps appreciate better the praises heaped by the lyric poets upon the founder of Aetna and upon the son, Deinomenes, whom he charged to rule it. The account as we have it from Diodorus is a mere record of wanton cruelty and vaingloriousness. The inhabitants of Naxos and Catana, cities which formed part of the inheritance of Hiero, were driven out and transplanted to Leontini, while the site of an enlarged Catana was assigned to ten thousand new settlers, half drawn from the Peloponnese, half from Syracuse. Thus Aetna was but Catana enlarged and repeopled. The motives assigned by our historian are, first, the desire to have a city of refuge in emergency—by which presumably is meant a revolt at Syracuse—and, secondly, the hope of posthumous honour. We need not reject these motives, though possibly they were deduced from subsequent events: Hiero was, in fact, honoured as a ‘hero’ by his new city after his death, and his son and successor did receive timely support therefrom in his hour of need. But what chiefly needs explanation is the treatment of Naxos and Catana. If, as seems probable, Hiero’s foreign policy was largely dictated by fear or jealousy of Rhegium, it is tempting to conjecture that the two Chalcidian colonies had been, or seemed likely to be, attracted within the sphere of influence of Anaxilas. By removing their inhabitants to Leontini Hiero would have them close under his eye, and at the same time the new settlers would be well placed to keep vigilant and faithful watch upon their founder’s rival, the ruler of Zancle and Rhegium.

A year after the foundation of Aetna there occurred an event of far greater significance. The Chalcidian colony of Cumae, the oldest of Greek colonies in the west, was hard pressed by the Etruscans. In the sixth century the power of Etruria had been at its height, but by now it was on the decline. Latium had thrown off her yoke, and the result was that the Etruscans in Campania were now separated from their fellows in the north. By sea, however, they were still powerful and threatened to subdue the Greek settlements on the Bay of Naples. The people of Cumae appealed to Hiero and a squadron was sent to their defence. In a great battle the Etruscans were humbled and Cumae relieved of her fears. The prince of Syracuse had rescued Greece from the burden of slavery to the barbarian, as Pindar proudly claims in lines which set the deed of Hiero side by side with that of Gelon six years earlier. A memorial of the victory is still preserved in the bronze helmet dedicated by Hiero at Olympia, now in the British Museum, on which the inscription tells of the spoil won by Hiero, son of Deinomenes, and the Syracusans from the Etruscans before Cumae. But while defending Greek civilization from barbarian aggression, Hiero was also extending the power of his own city and of his own dynasty. Syracusan influence in this distant region was to be maintained by a colony or garrison on the island of Pithecusa (Ischia) just outside the Bay of Naples. This had previously been the site of an Eretrian settlement, which had been abandoned in consequence of earth­quakes and volcanic eruptions. The same cause very shortly terminated its occupation by the Hieronian settlers.

The several attempts made by Syracuse to extend her influence in the Italian peninsula came indeed to nothing, but that they did not escape the notice of rival powers is shown by the events of the following years, 473—471. The Greeks of Tarentum who had for long been extending their territory at the expense of their native neighbours, the Iapygians and Messapians, were suddenly faced with strong resistance. A boundary dispute led to plundering raids, and these to regular warfare. The battle that decided the issue in favour of the native peoples is described by Herodotus as involving greater carnage than any battle hitherto fought by Greeks. But from the point of view of Sicilian history the interesting circumstance is that Tarentum was supported, and her defeat shared, by the troops of Rhegium. Anaxilas had died in 476 and Rhegium was now ruled by one Micythus as the guardian of his two young sons. The action of Micythus in thus allying himself with a distant city, though he had nothing to fear from barbarian attacks, calls for explanation, particularly as we learn that the alliance was forced upon the citizens of Rhegium against their will. The probable explanation is that the successor of Anaxilas sought to continue his policy of opposition to the ever-growing power and prestige of Syracuse. Hiero’s championship of Locri, his oppression of the Chalcidian cities of Naxos and Catana, and, above all, his recent establishment in the neighbourhood of the Chalcidian colonies on the Bay of Naples, must have strengthened the apprehensions of the Chalcidian city on the Straits of Messina. An alliance with Tarentum seemed to offer the needed support.

In addition to a military pact there was probably a commercial agreement. Since the early sixth century, trade-rivalry had played an important part in the history of the Italiote cities, and the progress of Hiero was now menacing the trade interests of Tarentum and Rhegium alike. With the passage through the Strait of Messina liable to be blocked by the vessels of the Syracusan fleet, it was to their joint interest to develop an alternative route for the extensive trade passing between Greece and the shores of Campania, Latium and Etruria, or farther west. The key to the situation lay in the resettlement, now undertaken by Micythus, of Pyxus on the Tyrrhenian Sea. It cannot be doubted that this is to be brought into connection with the Rhegine-Tarentine Alliance. Tarentum, at whose excellent harbour all ships coming from the east put in, was to give Rhegium a commercial preference by developing or rather redeveloping the old trade-route up the Siris valley and across to Pyxus. This was the return for Rhegine military assistance: the military and commercial pact between Rhegium and Tarentum was thus an answer to the political and commercial hegemony which Syracuse was endeavouring to secure in southern Italy. We have seen already how the plan of Hiero miscarried: equally unsuccessful was the attempt at opposition; for in addition to the severe defeat of the allies by the Iapygians, the new life of Pyxus came soon to an end.

This fact is perhaps to be attributed to the intrigues of Hiero. It is at least certain that the last recorded action of that prince, whose death occurred probably early in 466, was a direct attempt to weaken the power of Rhegium. Sending for the sons of Anaxilas, who were by now of full age, he reminded them of the clemency shown to their father by his own predecessor Gelon after the battle of Himera, and urged them to call upon Micythus for an account of his stewardship and to assume the reins of government for themselves. Micythus, thus challenged, defended his acts as regent with such complete success that the young princes and their friends were fully satisfied and begged him to retain the government. Their request however was refused by the regent, who left Rhegium and ended his days at Tegea in Arcadia. The sons of Anaxilas ruled Rhegium and Zancle until 461—460, when they were expelled by a democratic revolt. The story plainly reveals an effort on the part of Hiero, at least partially successful, to weaken the position of Rhegium by getting rid of the able and experienced Micythus and substituting the young princes whom he counted upon over-reaching or bending to his own designs. But, as has been said, his own death ensued after a few months.

Except for this intrigue our record of Hiero’s actions between the battle of Cumae and his death is practically a blank. Of the general character of his reign we have two sharply contrasted though not necessarily contradictory pictures: the one from the court poets, Pindar and Bacchylides, the other preserved by Diodorus. Hiero in fact appears now as an Augustus, now as a Tiberius. On the one side is the prince ‘kind of heart to his citizens, envying not the good, wondrous to strangers’, ‘plucking the topmost fruits from every tree of excellence’, ‘holding the scales of Justice in even poise’, ‘the favourite of the gods, the lover of horses, the warrior who bears the sceptre of Justice-guarding Zeus, and has fellowship with the Muses of violet locks’. On the other side is the crafty and suspicious despot with his swarms of spies, propping up his throne by the aid of mercenary hirelings, feared and hated. Two generations later, it is Hiero that is taken by Xenophon to sit for his portrait of the typical evil tyrant. It may be that the account repeated in Diodorus blackens him unduly, but it has been justly observed that even amongst the praises heaped by Pindar upon the munificent patron of the Muses and the Stadium there runs an undercurrent of warning, such as the hint that Croesus is a better model for tyrants than Phalaris. But undoubtedly Micro did good service to Greece and to the world in fostering the new literature of lyric; nor should it pass unmentioned that the founder of Greek Comedy won kindly welcome at his court, and the greatest master of Greek Tragedy not only saw acted at Syracuse his drama portraying Greece triumphant over Persia, but also composed a play whose title is plainly a tribute of honour to the founder of Aetna. In partial defence of Hiero’s tyranny must be set the fact that for the last seven years ot his life he sutiered from a painful disease.

Meanwhile at Acragas Theron had reigned until his death in 472 b.c. In these eight years after Himera, Acragas had flourished and prospered exceedingly. The large number of Carthaginian prisoners that fell to her share had given an impulse to the adorning of the city with magnificent temples, amongst which that of Zeus is said to have been the largest in European Hellas. We hear also of the construction of water-courses, of a huge artificial fishpond, and an extensive drainage system. Moreover it is very probable that it was in these years that the circuit of the walls was widened, as part of the scheme of temple-building. Of Theron, unlike Hiero, the voices of history and of poetry unite in a common strain of praise. Diodorus tells us in general terms that he was a good ruler, thoroughly popular with his citizens, who followed the examples of the Syracusans at the death of Gelon by according him the worship of a hero. The honour was well deserved, for it has been justly said that if Gelon was the second founder of Syracuse, Theron was equally the second founder of Acragas. Hiero too was accorded the same honour, not however at Syracuse, but at Aetna, the city of his foundation and the place of his death.

II.

THE FALL OF THE TYRANTS

The successors of Theron and of Hiero alike failed to maintain their power for more than a few months. Of Thrasydaeus, son of Theron, we have seen something as tyrant of Himera: as ruler of Acragas he displays all the regular characteristics of the ‘bad’ tyrant; lawless, cruel and arbitrary, hated and distrusted, he relies for support on large mercenary forces. We are told that these, with a leavening of citizen troops from Acragas and Himera, amounted to 20,000 horse and foot. It was perhaps for no better reason than a belief that his position would be strengthened by successful military adventure that Thrasydaeus entered upon a war with Syracuse; if there was any better reason, we are not told it. Hiero, however, was more than ready for him, and a battle ensued which, according to Diodorus, established a record for carnage as between Greek and fellow Greek: but the Syracusan loss was only half that of their enemies. For Thrasydaeus it meant the end of his career not merely at Acragas and Himera, but in the whole island. He fled to Megara in old Greece, where he was condemned to death and executed: so much our brief record tells us and no more. Such was the end of tyranny at Acragas, which now established a democratic government, and made peace with Hiero, receiving, we may suppose, the status of a quasi-independent ally; for it is hardly probable that the ruler of Syracuse would demand no sort of requital for an unprovoked attack. Himera, too, which was bound to Acragas only through subjection to a common master, regained its freedom.

At Syracuse the citizens found the recovery of liberty a harder task. On Hiero’s death, early in 466 b.c., the power passed into the hands of the youngest and only surviving brother, Thrasybulus. The character of his rule is described in precisely the same terms as that of Thrasydaeus. It appears, however, to have been challenged from the outset. The son of Gelon was now growing, or grown, to manhood, and a movement in his favour was initiated by certain members of the ruling house who are unnamed, but may probably be identified as Chromius and Aristonotis, brothers-in-law of Gelon appointed by him as guardians of the young prince. But their revolt was soon merged in a wider movement, a general rising against tyranny itself. The bid for freedom was bold and by no means certain of success. The tyrant could depend not only on his mercenaries but also upon the citizens of Aetna, who doubtless felt their fortunes bound up with the prosperity of their founder’s dynasty. He displayed promptness by occupying the fortified parts of Syracuse, the ‘island’ of Ortygia and Achradina to the north. The citizens had no choice but to establish a position in the quarter called Tycha, to the west of Achradina, of which we now hear for the first time. Help was sought in all possible directions, and it was not refused. From Gela, Acragas, Himera and Selinus came contingents of horse and foot, so that the forces of the liberators outnumbered the 15,000 troops disposed of by the tyrant. Warships too were provided by some of the allies, for Thrasybulus must be defeated on sea as well as on land. It was in fact on sea that the first conflict took place, and Thrasybulus was defeated with heavy loss. A sally from Achradina led to an equally decisive defeat on land. We hear that, before the actual fighting began, the tyrant had been abandoned by his allies and had to trust to his mercenaries alone. The reference to allies would seem to mean that the men of Aetna proved faithless in the end. After his second defeat Thrasybulus capitulated, and was permitted to withdraw to Locri, where he ended his days.

Thus in 466 fell the house of the Deinomenidae. Its fall is attributed by Diodorus to the evil character of its last representative, but in truth the progressive deterioration of Syracusan tyranny, as shown in the succession of the three Deinomenid brothers, is a regular feature in Greek history. The rule of the first tyrant is tolerated and even welcomed because it frees the mass of citizens from oligarchical oppression, or from foreign menace. But with his successor the normal Greek hatred of autocracy revives and the tyrant has to base his rule on fear and force: it is probable that Thrasybulus could not, even with the best intentions, have won the goodwill accorded to Gelon. In the Politics of Aristotle the tyranny at Syracuse, which is reckoned as having lasted eighteen years, is mentioned as an example of duration beyond the ordinary.

The fall of Thrasybulus is noted by Diodorus as marking the beginning of a period of freedom and renewed prosperity for Sicily in general: and though for some years longer tyranny or kingship continued both at Zancle and at Aetna, all the cities which had been subject to Syracuse now became free and independent. At Syracuse itself the new constitution was inaugurated with great enthusiasm: annual games and sacrifices were instituted on the day that marked the tyrant’s fall. Nevertheless within a very few years further troubles arose. Amongst the citizen body there were left some seven thousand of the ten thousand foreign mercenaries settled there by Gelon, and not unnaturally their presence excited the distrust and suspicion of the older citizens; if Syracuse were to be made safe for democracy, these quasi-aliens must be at least debarred from holding magistracies. A resolution to this effect was therefore passed. Whether this measure was adopted simultaneously with the democratic revolution in 466, or not till three years later, is not clear; in any case it was in 463 that the excluded mercenaries decided on an appeal to force. The situation of a few years earlier was now repeated. The mercenaries seized Ortygia and Achradina as Thrasybulus had done; the citizens occupied Tycha and the high ground in the direction of what was afterwards known as Epipolae: a wall was built opposite the wall of Achradina which cut off the mercenaries from the interior. A sea-fight was fought in which the citizens gained the day, but by land the attempts to drive the mercenaries from their positions failed owing to their superior military skill. In the end hunger compelled them to risk a battle outside their fortifications: it was a desperate struggle, but at last the citizens proved vic­torious. Of the subsequent political settlement we are told nothing, but it may be assumed that Syracuse was troubled by the presence of these aliens no longer: the aftermath of tyranny was swept away and democracy was left with a clear field.

In the other cities of Sicily a similar resettlement occurred at or about the same time. At Zancle the rule of the sons of Anaxilas came to an end in 461-60 b.c., and with it her political union with Rhegium. At Acragas, Gela and Himera the foreign elements, whether mercenaries from abroad or Siceliotes transplanted by the tyrants from other cities, were removed. At Acragas and Gela at least, force was required for their removal; on this point we are fortunately able to supplement the account of Diodorus from a recently discovered papyrus. The mercenaries of Gela took refuge at two places in the vicinity, Omphace and Cacyrum, those of Acragas at Heraclea Minoa. In the struggles which ensued both cities obtained the aid of Syracusan troops. Finally by common agreement the several cities took back the exiles into their citizen bodies, and settled the mercenaries all together in the territory of Zancle, which from this time comes to be regularly called by the name of Messana given to it by Anaxilas. The choice of Messana for this settlement was a happy one, for the mixed population which had existed there since 486 would have less distaste for this new admixture than any other city in the island. It is interesting to find that on occasion the Siceliotes could thus act together for the common interest: and it may be supposed that Syracuse took the lead in a measure which is explicitly attributed to the general desire to avoid further conflicts.

Among the cities now resettled was Catana, the Aetna of Hiero’s foundation, where Hiero’s son Deinomenes probably still ruled. The story of its re-settlement is interesting, more particularly because a part was played therein by the Sicels. It was of course at the expense of the natives of the island that Hiero had enlarged the territory of Catana before handing it over to its new inhabitants. No resistance was offered at that time, but now in 461 there was a favourable opportunity at hand and a man of enter­prise to seize it. The overthrow of Deinomenid rule at Aetna was desired alike by Ducetius the Sicel leader and by the Syracusans, and the work was done jointly. The Hieronian settlers were driven out, and established themselves in the Sicel town of Inessa, ten miles distant and close under the mountain; and with them they took the name of their city, so that Inessa becomes Aetna and Aetna becomes Catana once again, its old inhabitants returning from their exile at Leontini. The story however is in some points obscure or incomplete. We hear of a partition of lands between the Syracusans and their Sicel allies: if correct, this can only refer to the additional territory by which Catana had been enlarged for Hiero’s foundation, for it must be presumed that the original site of Catana was restored intact to the returned exiles: it is quite possible that the sacrifice of some Sicel territory was the price which Ducetius had to pay for Syracusan help. A similar difficulty arises in regard to the occupation of Sicel Inessa by the men whom Sicels had helped to expel from Aetna: we can hardly believe that Ducetius welcomed this arrangement, and it seems clear that of the fruits of the joint victory the greater part went to Greeks and not to Sicels—a circumstance which may help to account for the subsequent career of Ducetius.

Before we come to the story of that career there is one further act of resettlement to be recorded, namely the restoration of Camarina. It will be remembered that since its original foundation in 599 b.c. Camarina had been destroyed by its Syracusan founders as punishment for its revolt, had then been re-established by Hippocrates, and again wiped out by Gelon, who transported its inhabitants to swell the population of his enlarged Syracuse. The present restoration was the work of the citizens of Gela, but in this its third lease of life neither Gela nor Syracuse attempted to violate its political independence. Within a few years of its restoration an Olympic victory won by the son of a citizen of Camarina gave Pindar, or more probably an imitator of Pindar, the opportunity of celebrating in lyric song the reviving aspirations of the new-built city.

III.

THE SICEL REACTION

For the next twenty years our interest is centred in an enterprise of a different nature from any that we have hitherto had to record. It is a determined effort made by the Sicel communities of the island to establish political domination over the Greeks, an effort which seems to have come very near success. That this was the aim of Ducetius, there can be no reasonable doubt; but if it was not less than this, it was also not more. There was no question of exterminating Greek civilization, as there had been, and as there was to be again, half a century later, in the Carthaginian invasion. If the Sicels had realized their aspirations, the Greeks would have lost political freedom but Greek culture would have continued to develop under Sicel protection. For by this time the native com­munities must have gone far in the direction of Hellenization, which in another hundred years was complete. The whole career of Ducetius proves that a strong national sense animated the Sicel tribes against the Greek enemy: yet at the same time the Greeks were, as has been justly said, not merely their enemies, they were also their masters and their models: and on the other side the dealings of the Greeks with Ducetius prove that they were far from thinking of the Sicels as barbarians. Hence the attitude and aim of Ducetius have not unfairly been compared to those of Philip of Macedon.

It was in 459 b.c. that Ducetius began his work of welding together the separate Sicel communities into a political federation, and it was not until 453 that that work was finished. Of the way in which it was done we know hardly anything. Force was sometimes necessary, as in the case of the powerful town of Morgantina, and one place, Hybla, the so-called Galeatic Hybla south of Mount Aetna, stood aloof to the end. The centre of Ducetius’ power was at first at Menaenum or Menae, a stronghold situated high on a peak at the northern end of the Heraean range of mountains, some thirty miles west of Leontini. Later he abandoned this site in favour of one in the plain below where he founded Palice, so called from its proximity to the sanctuary of the divine Palici, the ancient protectors of the Sicel folk. This fact shows that Ducetius was not insensible to the importance of attaching religious sentiment to his political schemes. As to the position of Ducetius himself it is impossible to speak with cer­tainty, for our sole authority, Diodorus, has not cared to explain it: it may be that he ruled as king at Menaenum and Palice, while acting as President of the Sicel confederation. But we have no information as to Sicel political institutions at any period. In any case the essential point is clear, that for some years Ducetius was the acknowledged leader of practically the whole Sicel population.

That he attained this position unmolested by the Greek states is to be attributed to the internal troubles in which they became involved during these years. It is of Syracuse alone that we have any details. The compressed narrative of Diodorus sets all the events that follow under a single year, 454-3, but it is impossible that this can be correct, and we shall be fairly safe in supposing them to cover about the same six years as those in which Ducetius was consolidating his position. In part, the troubles of these years were the after effects of tyranny. Syracuse had expelled her tyrants, she had expelled the mercenaries that supported the tyrants, but not all traces of the tyranny were thereby effaced. Disputes arose in particular about the tenure of land, much of which had no doubt been confiscated or changed hands under the tyranny: its redistribution could hardly be effected without raising grievances. Another source of difficulty lay in the register of citizens: for the rule restricting citizenship to the pre-Gelonian inhabitants must have been found difficult or im­possible to apply in all strictness, and doubtful cases must have been numerous. Party distinctions began to emerge, and we seem dimly to descry the lines of cleavage familiar to the Greek commonwealths, the ‘respectable’ as Diodorus sympathetically calls them, that is to say the wealthy and conservative classes, ranged against the ‘revolutionary’ poor. It is hardly surprising that in these circumstances a candidate for tyranny appeared in the person of one Tyndarion or Tyndarides. He is described in conventional terms as a bold demagogue surrounding himself with the inevitable bodyguard. After his trial and condemnation to death an attempt was made by his followers to rescue him, and a riot occurred which led to the execution, or perhaps the lynching, of the revolutionaries.

After Tyndarion other would-be tyrants arose, either in reality or in the imagination of the conservatives, and to safeguard the constitution a measure was introduced directly copied from Athenian ostracism. By the law of petalism, so-called because the olive-leaf took the place of the potsherd, it was enacted that the citizen assembly could pronounce a decree of banishment for five years against any one whose power they deemed excessive. So far as we know, petalism could be applied without restriction whenever the majority of the assembly desired it, and nothing beyond a bare majority was required either in the vote for its application or in the selection of the individual to be exiled. Fortunately this amazingly crude and ill-considered imitation of ostracism, which, even with the restrictions limiting it at Athens, was oppressive enough, lasted only for a short time: it is peculiarly vexatious that the negligence of Diodorus in matters of chronology prevents us from knowing its duration more exactly, but from his account it would seem to have been a question of years rather than months. Its consequences were what might be expected; men of ability and character were deterred from public life, and political influence became the monopoly of unprincipled adventurers and glib demagogues. The cure in fact had but aggravated the disease: the old disorders and dissensions continued and increased, until the law was repealed.

It is to be supposed that other cities as well as Syracuse ex­perienced similar troubles. At Acragas the democracy established after the expulsion of Thrasydaeus had found an ardent supporter in one of that city’s most famous sons, Empedocles. Embedded amongst the mass of legend which became attached to his name we find a few words of serious historical import. It appears that, during the first years of the city’s freedom oligarchical tendencies had made themselves felt: the Council of the Thousand, which is evidently the administrative body, had become a preserve of the wealthy and acted in the interests of a class. This Council Empedocles, by means unknown to us, reconstituted in the interests of the democrats. For some years the reformer exercised great influence on the politics of Acragas and we are even told that he refused an offer of kingship. But he had made enemies, and ultimately was forced to leave the city, perhaps by a formal decree of banishment. It is most likely that this happened in 461 when the old citizens came back to Acragas as to other places: for their numbers would strengthen the opposition to the advanced democracy and its champion. What is certain is that Empedocles spent a considerable part of his life in exile, that the party opposed to him were able to prevent his return, and that he died in the Peloponnese about 436.

In addition to her internal troubles, the attention of Syracuse was diverted from the doings of Ducetius by an external menace. The Etruscans who had had twenty years to recover from their defeat at Cumae, were in 453 infesting Sicilian waters with their pirate galleys. A squadron was sent to the Etruscan coast under Phayllus, who however did nothing beyond carrying out a raid on the island of Aethalia (Elba): on his return he was condemned to exile on the ground of accepting a bribe from the enemy. A second expedition under Apelles raided Corsica, then an Etruscan possession, and occupied Elba, bringing back a large amount of spoil and a number of prisoners. The Etruscans were quieted, but no permanent occupation of Elba was maintained. In this same year 453 a war broke out in the west of Sicily, quite unconnected with events in the east of the island, except in so far as any troubles in which Greek states were involved may be deemed to have favoured Ducetius. The record of this war is so confused that we cannot be absolutely certain who the combatants were, but it was probably fought between Selinus and Elymian Segesta, cities which we shall find again at variance in 416 b.c., and it arose out of a boundary dispute. It seems that Segesta was supported by a neighbouring Elymian town, Halicyae, but that the victory went to Selinus: for an inscription of about this date is extant which records a victory of Selinus over some unnamed enemy. But the interesting point is that Sicilian cities are now for the first time brought into political connection with Athens. In 453 the Athenian Assembly received an embassy from Segesta which resulted in a treaty between Athens, Segesta and Halicyae. Its terms are unknown. If, as seems probable, military aid against Selinus was asked for, it was certainly refused: Athens was in no position to accede to such a request, weakened as she was by the recent disaster in Egypt. We may however see in this treaty both a continuation by Pericles of that policy of developing Athenian connections, political and commercial, with the West which had been foreshadowed by Themistocles, and also the first step on the road that was to lead to Athens’ great disaster forty years later.

The work of union completed, Ducetius began his greater task in 451 b.c. by a successful attack on Aetna, the formerly Sicel Inessa. He captured the town and slew by craft its ruler, whom we may suppose to have been Deinomenes, son of Hiero. He next invaded Acragantine territory, and besieged and captured a fort called Motyum. These successes alarmed Syracuse, which sent troops to the support of Acragas. The allies however were defeated in a pitched battle. During the winter of 451 operations were suspended and the Syracusan commander Bolcon was executed on a charge of treachery during the campaign. Early in the summer of 450 a new and strong force was sent from Syracuse, and a second battle ensued at an unidentified spot called Noae in which the Syracusans, this time unsupported, utterly defeated the Sicels. At about the same time the Acragantines recovered Motyum by an assault. A statue set up by Acragas at Olympia and seen by the traveller Pausanias, representing boys stretching out their hands in prayer, probably commemorates the recovery of this fort. Thus in less than a year the success of Ducetius had been completely reversed. Those of his troops who survived the battle took refuge for the most part in various Sicel strongholds: a few remained to share the fortunes of their leader, but even these he had reason to suspect of plotting against his life. In his extremity Ducetius took the bold step of throwing himself on the mercy of the Syracusans. Riding across country by night, he entered Syracuse before day-break and threw himself down a solitary suppliant at the city’s altars.

The scene which followed in the assembly has seized the imagination of Diodorus, and recalls to us a more famous debate to be held a quarter of a century later in the Assembly of Athens. But when Cleon and Diodorus come to plead for and against the extremity of punishment for conquered Mytilene it is a question of justice against expediency: here at Syracuse the city’s honour is involved, for her defeated enemy is a suppliant at the altar of her gods. The appeal to generosity and religious scruples prevailed, and the cry of ‘Save the Suppliant’ rang out on all sides. It was decided that Ducetius should be sent to Corinth and a grant for his maintenance there was allotted from the Syracusan treasury. Four years later he returned to Sicily, and the circumstances of his return demand some discussion, for the narrative of our single authority again presents difficulties. One point however at least is clear: in returning to Sicily about 445 Ducetius violated a pledge given to Syracuse on his departure, and this fact is irreconcilable with the supposition that it was with the permission or connivance of Syracuse that he came back. In the next place the return of Ducetius was in some way connected with a dispute between Syracuse and Acragas which led to a declaration of war by the latter city in this same year. The grievance felt by Acragas is said to be, not that the Syracusans had suffered the common enemy to return, but that they had let him escape without consulting her. This in itself need not imply that the quarrel between the two cities broke out before the return of Ducetius: it might mean that Acragas complained that his return had been made possible by the fact that Syracuse had previously let him go. Nevertheless it is likely that Ducetius would choose for his return a time when the minimum of opposition would confront him; in other words, a time when the two cities whom he had chiefly to fear were in conflict with each other. For these reasons it seems probable that the declaration of war by Acragas upon Syracuse occurred shortly before Ducetius set foot again in Sicily, and that he saw in that war a favourable opportunity for renewing his designs. It has indeed been argued that he would not have been permitted to leave Corinth with a large company of followers unless the authorities there were assured that Syracuse approved his doing so. But we do not know that it was from Corinth that he sailed: the narrative is quite compatible with the supposition that he remained at Corinth not for four years but for as many months.

The ostensible project of the Sicel prince was to found in obedience to an oracle a settlement in the district on the north coast known as Cale Acte, the district to which Scythes of Zancle had lured the unfortunate Samian emigrants in 494. The colonists consisted partly of Greeks brought by the founder from the mother-country, partly of Sicels from the domain of a neighbouring chief, Archonides of Herbita. There can be little doubt that the foundation of this new colony was regarded by Ducetius simply as a step towards the recovery of his hegemony over the Sicels, and that he intended in due time once again to try conclusions with the dominant Greek powers in the island. Nevertheless it may well be that his sense of racial antagonism had been somewhat weakened during his four years’ sojourn in Greece: he may have aimed now rather at personal leadership of Sicels and Greeks alike rather than at the establish­ment of a supremacy of Sicel over Greek: such at least is a natural inference from the mixed population of his colony, and perhaps also from the Greek name of his chief ally, Archonides. Whatever may be the precise nature of his plans they were cut short by death in 440 or 439 b.c.

Meanwhile Cale Acte had flourished, and that seemingly without opposition: a remarkable fact, for the explanation of which we are driven to conjecture. That Acragas should have offered no opposition is natural enough, for she had been de­cisively defeated by Syracuse and was consequently weakened: other cities—in particular Himera and Messana—may not have felt their interests threatened: but the inaction of Syracuse is difficult to explain, especially as she entered upon a fresh Sicel war immediately after Ducetius’ death. It looks as if there were some agreement between Ducetius and Syracuse, entered into after the defeat of Acragas—perhaps an undertaking to enlist Sicel aid in keeping Acragas quiet. Moreover the action of Ducetius’ ally, Archonides of Herbita, has to be taken into account. In the war between Syracuse and Acragas we are told that the Sicel cities were engaged, some on one side, some on the other. If we may assume that Archonides supported Syracuse, it would help to explain why Syracuse tolerated the existence of the colony which Archonides helped to establish. The death of Ducetius in some way changed the situation, for in 439 we hear that Syracuse, which had already brought all the other Sicel cities under her subjection, proceeded to reduce the most important of them all. This city appears in the text of Diodorus as Trinacia, but no such place is elsewhere heard of, and from the description given it is highly probable that Palice is meant. Syracuse had suspicions that Palice, the former capital of Ducetius, had inherited his plans for hegemony of the Sicels: and after a desperate resistance offered by the men of Palice, unsupported by allies, she was conquered and destroyed. This was the end of Sicel resistance to the Greeks: but the statement of Diodorus that the whole body of Sicels had now become subject to Syracuse is certainly untrue; the evidence of Thucydides shows that Syracusan dominion was confined to the more low-lying districts of the middle and lower Symaethus valley, whereas the Sicels of the northern districts, the upper Symaethus valley and the Ncbrodian mountains, never lost their independence.

IV.

SYRACUSAN HEGEMONY

The defeat of Acragas in 445 B.C. is taken by Diodorus as marking the definite establishment of Syracusan hegemony in Sicily, a hegemony acknowledged by all the other cities. And it is probable that Diodorus is right in saying that Syracuse aimed now, as she had perhaps before aimed under Hippocrates and Gelon, at something more than hegemony. The measures adopted in 439 included the building of 100 new triremes, the doubling of the cavalry, and the reorganization of the infantry: and they were measures which aroused the apprehensions of other Sicilian cities, especially the Chalcidian, and which led indirectly to the more active intervention of Athens in Sicilian affairs. We have seen that in 453 Athens made a treaty with Segesta and Halicyae; there is no reason to suppose that her motive in doing so was fear of Syracuse, but, once involved in political connections with Sicilian cities, she could not remain indifferent to the advance of the most powerful amongst them. The policy adopted by Pericles was to support the Chalcidian cities, Rhegium and Leontini, which were most hostile to Syracuse and which alone were in a position to check Syracusan aggression. We do not know the precise date of the treaties made by Athens with these two cities; but two inscriptions of the year 433 record their renewal, and we may suppose that they were then not less than ten years old. It is thus at least probable that Athens and the Chalcidian cities took steps to protect their joint interests in the island very shortly after Syracuse had attained her dominant position by the defeat of Acragas in 445. For Athens the alliances were destined to have momentous consequences in years to come; but a policy of aggression in Sicily was not contemplated by Pericles and was only adopted by Athens after his death. The story of the active intervention of Athens in Sicily, which begins in 427, is bound up with that of the Peloponnesian War, and will be reserved for a later chapter.

If the date above suggested for the Athenian alliances with Rhegium and Leontini is correct, they may be brought into connection with another act of Athenian policy in the West, the foundation of Thurii on the site of Sybaris in 443. The history of southern Italy is always bound up more or less closely with that of Sicily; and although the settlement of Thurii was not, so far as we know, in any sense a move against Syracuse, yet in so far as it turned the attention of Athens towards western waters it was a step towards the expedition of 415; and we shall find Thurii supporting Athens at the siege of Syracuse, though not in the operations of 427-4 b.c. The details of the settlement will be given elsewhere: what needs to be mentioned here is that Syracuse must have felt a potential menace in the establishment of a city, Panhellenic indeed in population, but under Athenian auspices. The intention of Pericles was plainly not aggressive: we need attribute to him no more than the desire to improve Athenian trade facilities in the West and to increase Athenian prestige. But this could hardly be appreciated at Syracuse, where the event would naturally be viewed in relation to the support given by Athens to the Chalcidian cities.

Although the record of Sicilian history from 466 to 439 is mainly one of wars and civil disturbances, yet the period is one of continued prosperity, and indeed this holds good of the years which follow down to the second Carthaginian invasion in 406. The cities which the tyrants had enriched and adorned with splendid buildings continued, as free republics, in the paths marked out for them by the tyrants. At Acragas, the line of temples along the southern wall, begun under Theron, was still in course of completion when the Carthaginian invader returned. It is of this city’s wealth and splendour that we hear most in this period, owing to the fact that she was destined to be sacked hereafter by the barbarians, but the general picture may be taken as applying to the other cities also, in varying degrees. It is a picture of wealth and luxury, but not of vice or moral decadence: the bounty and liberality of some of the citizens of Acragas became proverbial, and her culture is attested by the numerous pictures and statues in the possession of private individuals which were carried off later as spoil by the invaders. The main source of her prosperity was her trade with Carthage, to which she exported the fruits of the vine and the olive. At Selinus the famous sculptures of her temples show to how high a point Greek art was developed even in one of the less important of the Sicilian cities. It was in Sicily too that the art of rhetoric, of such vast importance both in the literary and political history of the Greek peoples, had its first beginnings. Initiated by Corax and Tisias of Syracuse in the early days of Syracusan democracy, when the ability to argue a case with force and persuasion was coming to be a practical necessity in the assembly and the law-court, it was carried on by one of the most famous of Greek teachers, Gorgias of Leontini, whom we shall meet later pleading his city’s cause at Athens. It is perhaps enough to say of Gorgias here that he, more than any other, inspired the prose of Thucydides. Another famous Sophist,—Gorgias is generally classed amongst the Sophists, though he himself disclaimed the title—Hippias of Elis, is said to have visited Sicily, and to have won fame and profit in a place where we might hardly have looked to find such appreciation of the new learning, the Sicel town of Inycum. The statement, which there is no reason to doubt, shows as much as any single fact could show, how highly developed was the intellectual life of Sicily in the middle of the fifth century, and how rapidly the Sicels were becoming assimi­lated to the Greeks.

CHAPTER VII