CHAPTER II.

THE SENATE AND THE ARMY

I.

SEVERUS ALEXANDER: DOMESTIC POLICY

THE new emperor, Alexander, was born in the Phoenician town of Area Caesarea, 1 October 208 is usually given as his birthday. It is true that he, like his predecessor, was dedicated to the service of the Sun God of Emesa, but his mother, Julia Mamaea, who had gone to Rome with her imperial nephew, had been sensible enough to keep her son away from the practices of his cousin. Julia Maesa was therefore able to play him off against Elagabalus, when the Augustus had fallen into contempt and the position reached its crisis. The over-tension of a despotism that was alien in character led to Elagabalus’ bloody end, but this was not due merely to race-hatred, for Rome was already permeated with Oriental elements and was used to them. By intelligent management the Syrian princesses achieved their purpose: Alexander was proclaimed Augustus, and was accepted without protest by the Senate.

Marcus Aurelius Severus Alexander, as he was now called, ascended the throne in his fourteenth year (6 or 11 March 222). It is certain that his mother, in view of his expected succession to the Empire and because of her active interest in the spiritual currents of the time, had given her son the best of educations, and the Emperor doubtless continued to receive her maternal care. He may indeed have been a well-brought-up and charming youth, with a great desire to learn, and matured at an early age. However, what his later biographer in the Historia Augusta has to say on  details of his manners and character is not to be used as a really historical account. For in this account Alexander’s permanent lack of independence is ignored, and the picture is drawn of the ideal restitutor rei publicae—a picture which made such an impression on Jakob Burckhardt that to him ‘this person so incomprehensible against the background of his times’ could appear as ‘a true St Louis of antiquity.’ But there was no Life of a Saint in the mind of the biographer: for, as has been shown, it is the picture of Julian which is reflected in the Life of Alexander. When, further, the writer of the Vita, like other sources, infers from the name Severus the Emperor’s especial severity towards the soldiers, he contradicts his own observations upon his hero as a friend of the military. But, above all, this interpretation misunderstands the point in the programme of the government which seems bound up with the choice of this name—the linking of the regime with the founder and the good times of the Severan dynasty. Alexander meets us in inscriptions as ‘Divi Severi nepos,’ ‘Divi Magni Antonini Pii filius,’ and in his decrees he speaks of ‘divi parentes mei’ and calls Caracalla ‘pater meus.’ Passing over Elagabalus, he deliberately proclaims himself the youngest and true scion of the dynasty of the Severi. Herein we see the influence of the two Augustae—for Mamaea also had by now been elevated to that rank.

Now that they had so plainly set this end before them, the imperial princesses, Mamaea in particular at this time, shrewdly recognizing the demands of the age, were able to steer the ship of State upon a changed course towards the desired goal. The new government broke with the challenging religious policy of its predecessor, which had awakened disgust and loathing even in the altered Roman character, and went back to the traditional religious practices. It also made an attempt to allow the senatorial class, whose position in the State was threatened, to play once more, at least in appearance, an honourable role, and this without any change of the dynastic purpose and without any diminution of the historically established authority of the emperor and its sole prerogative. But whether the young emperor’s Council of Regency, entrusted to sixteen chosen senators of high standing, or even the Council of State (consilium principis)to which, besides men of equestrian rank, many senators were summoned, could effectively throw their weight into the scales, remains an open question. Still, Herodian received the impression that under Severus Alexander’s government the People and the army and even the Senate were content with the form of the imperial rule, which from a disgraceful tyranny had assumed the appearance of an aristocracy. This judgment, which already overstressed the goodwill of the new regime to the senatorial order, then became the point of departure for a valuation which saw in the govern­ment’s actions, not only the expected opposition to the indefensible conditions of the immediately preceding years, but also a yet more significant opposition to the policy inaugurated by Septimius Severus, who, realizing the practical needs of the Empire, had sought to conciliate and favour both the army and the equestrian class. Thus the impression is in fact created that through a thorough-going reform the re-establishment of the Augustan principate was being attempted, while in many modern accounts this fiction is carried to such lengths as to give rise to a belief in the revival of senatorial supremacy.

But the only basis for this view is, unfortunately, the Vita Alex­andria a biography which has been described as a historical novel. For apart from the Regency Council of Sixteen already mentioned, nothing is said by Herodian or Cassius Dio about changes in the established governmental order. It is true that the historian Dio can show us how, in the mind of a man who was an active politician and was permitted to hold along with the Emperor a second consulate in 229, facts and wishes combined to shape his thoughts on the relation of the monarchy and the Senate. The beginning of Augustus’ principate gave the historian an opportunity for having the question of a re-establishment of the Republic or a creation of a monarchy discussed by Maecenas and Agrippa in set speeches before Augustus. In this discussion Dio reveals his own attitude on the question. Agrippa defends the re-establishment of the Republic with ideas and phrases borrowed from the language of the schools of rhetoric; but the possibility of their practical realization can at most have played a part only in the dreams of incurable romanticists. Maecenas, however, advocates the mon­archy as a necessity, and, furthermore, his monarchy bears the features of the time when the second century was passing into the third. It is true that no mention is made of the actual power of the armies. Yet the monarchy does not figure as dependent on the Senate. A demand is indeed made for the honours due to this corporation, based on the reflection that ‘it is in the nature of men to find pleasure in being reckoned by the more powerful as of equal rank.’ If the Senate thus remains—to quote another of Dio’s phrases—‘the ornament of the State,’ the noble gesture may suffice which leaves to it the appearance of an extensive authority. But this only strengthens the other demands that the emperor should have the sole right of appointing officials and that a larger sphere should be given to the equestrian order in the administration of the empire. While fully safeguarding their high dignity, Maecenas is yet willing to see the old magistrates treated as hardly more than municipal officials. He even speaks in favour of the assimilation of Italy in administration to the provinces of the empire. Since Dio can hardly be considered an opponent of the Senate, his Maecenas speech indicates the highest role which an intelligent senator could at that time expect his order to fill. Thus where the Vita Alexandri exceeds these limits in describing the Senate’s power, its credibility is in any case poor. And not much more effective are the arguments for the theory that the speech of Maecenas is a criticism of the actual or contemplated reforms of the Emperor. This is so even if allusions are made in Dio’s programme-speech to matters which were actually handled differently by Severus Alexander’s government.

It is of little importance that a change was made in the cursus honorum of the senators, and that the number of those who after the quaestorship could omit the tribunate or aedileship and rise at once to the praetorship appears to have been now considerably increased, so that these two intermediate stages soon vanished completely. But the burdening of the quaestorship with the expenses of the games prevented this abridgment of the cursus honorum from being a relief. It may, however, be regarded as an increase in prestige that the curatores regionum urbis sacrae, who were associated with the City Prefect, had now to be of consular rank.

A reform that cut deeper may be detected in the biographer’s account of the change in the position and rank of the Praetorian Prefects. In this very confused report, which does not do justice to the previous exceptional cases and confounds the granting of the ornamenta with the real adlectio inter senators, we must attribute an increased importance to the sentence, ‘praefectis praetorii suis senatoriam addidit dignitatem, ut viri clarissimi et essent et dicerentur.’ The epigraphical material shows, indeed, for the period after Severus Alexander, that the incompatibility of the position of Praetorian Prefect with actual membership of the senatorial order did, in fact, no longer exist; but it is still true that this Prefecture continued to be in the majority of cases the crown and consummation of an equestrian career. For the reign of Severus Alexander there exists only one piece of trustworthy evidence in a papyrus of a.d. 232, bearing an official character, in which the prefects, whose names are not mentioned, are termed lamprotatoi, that is, viri clarissimi. On the other hand, we find that the title eminentissimus vir was still retained. This title had been reserved solely for the Praetorian Prefects, and they may have continued to use it, to show their exceptional position, even when in virtue of the imperial decree they were ennobled as viri clarissimi. Further, when one sees that Ulpian, even before his Prefecture, was concerned with the rank of the Praetorian Prefects and considered it correct that a vir praefectorius who had not yet been granted the consular ornamenta should have precedence over the wife of a consularis vir, the conclusion may be drawn that this influential man had endeavoured to obtain a rise in rank in the sense indicated. Furthermore, the biographer claims to know that the Emperor, the friend of the patres, took this step in order to prevent a non-senator from sitting in judgment on a senator. Actually, however, with all respect for the wishes of the senators, the result of this change could only be to enlarge the judicial powers of the Praetorian Prefects and at the same time to strengthen the authority of the emperor. The composition of the consilium which was summoned by the emperor may also reflect a concession to the Senate. Nevertheless, in the inclusion of the iuris consulti we may recognize the co-operation of the equestrian officials in the central administration, admitting, however, the possibility that those jurists, especially, who came from the equestrian order such as Ulpian, for example, and probably Paulus too, could play a leading role thanks to their superior knowledge of business methods.

Thus we can accept the fact that a change did occur in favour of the Senate, but not to the extent that the Historia Augusta would lead us to believe. It is certain that there was a desire to make concessions to the prestige of the Senate. The government might even hope thereby to gain an increase in strength and to create or to preserve a certain counterweight against the excessive demands of a pampered army. With all this the patres could naturally indulge the hope of better times; but, with the complete collapse of such hopes in the confusions and crises which followed, the memory of Severus Alexander’s reign was likely to be coloured with the rosy tints of a dream. And although the young emperor, under the influence of his entourage, appears to have been neither desirous nor, because of his lack of force, capable of turning back the wheel of history, yet, while the Empire continued its ever­advancing development towards autocratic absolutism, Alexander’s reign shows one more endeavour to let the Senate play its role within the limits of possibility as ‘the ornament of the State.’

The accession of Alexander had been accompanied by the damnatio memoriae of Elagabalus with all its consequences. Sure proof of this is found in the erasure of his name from the inscriptions. But the change of personnel in the government was not so important as the biographer asserts, if even a Comazon Eutychianus, to whom Elagabalus owed his accession to the throne, became praefectus urbi once more. Cassius Dio was, it is true, not subject to the same odium, but he had been in the previous reign curator of Pergamum and Smyrna, and now he was made proconsul of Africa and afterwards governor first of Dalmatia and then of Upper Pannonia. On the other hand, L. Marius Maximus appears to have been rewarded with the consulate of 223 because he had not served under Elagabalus. The Praetorian Prefecture was given to Flavianus and Chrestus, who had both probably taken part in the overthrow of Elagabalus and of their predecessors in this office. The jurist Domitius Ulpianus was promoted as early as March 222 to be praefectus annonae and was already Praetorian Prefect before 1 December. The empress-mother had seen in him the man who, thanks to his legal knowledge and his experience of affairs since the reign of Septimius Severus, could in this office render the best service to the Empire, and one who also appeared willing to keep the insolent Praetorians in check. In this policy, however, he does not seem to have received from his two colleagues the support that was expected; for, when an attempt on his life was discovered, Ulpian believed that both were implicated in the plot and in consequence both were put to death. Nor was he capable, as events proved, of mastering the Guard. For trivial reasons street-fighting broke out in Rome between the soldiers and the populace and lasted for three days, when the people were forced to give up the conflict for fear the troops might set fire to the whole city. Finally the man whose intelligent and far-sighted rule might have brought further blessings to the Empire fell a victim to his Praetorians in the very palace of the Emperor, who was unable to protect him. Whether Ulpian had up till then been sole Prefect cannot be safely affirmed or denied from our sources, although the subsequent history of his office rather points to a negative conclusion. Nor is the date of his death recorded. There is no reason to put it very near the beginning of his Prefecture; but one might well be tempted to connect the bloody riot of the Praetorians with the difficulties and dissensions in the imperial household.

Mamaea had married her son in 225 to a woman of a senatorial family, Cn. Seia Herennia Sallustia Barbia Orbiana, the daughter of Seius (?) Sallustius Macrinus. Orbiana received the rank of Augusta, and her father became Caesar. But good relations did not long continue in the imperial house. Even in the lifetime of her mother Maesa, Mamaea had obtained the predominant influence, and, when her mother died and was consecrated Diva, she saw that the time had come for her to exercise as ‘mater Augusti et castrorum’ a quasi-autocracy. Ambitious as she was, she now became jealous of the real or supposed influence of her daughter-in-law. The masterful and imperious conduct of the empress-mother caused the Caesar to turn with complaints to the Praetorians; but this only cost him his life on the ground of attempted revolution, and his daughter was forced to go into exile in Africa (227/8). From this time onwards Severus Alexander remained unmarried; for Mamaea guarded against a repetition of this experiment. Coins of the Emperor with the legends ‘Salus’ and ‘Felicitas Augusti’ and those of Mamaea with ‘Felicitas publica’ proclaim the success and desires of the empress-mother. Soon after this, her title was enlarged to that of ‘mater Augusti et castrorum et senatus atque patriae’, and finally she is even likened to the mother of the gods with the addition of ‘et universi generis humani.’ One may presume that the Praetorians, who with the collapse of the Caesar Sallustius had lost an opportunity of showing their power, now became refractory. Their anger was finally discharged upon Ulpian, whose death may thus be placed in the year 228. This may also explain why the Emperor suggested to Cassius Dio, his colleague in the consulship for 229, that he should spend his consulate outside Rome; for Dio had gained the dislike of his Pannonian troops by his strict enforcement of military discipline, and thus was rendered suspect to the Prae­torians also. Dio’s proud resolution is proved by his showing himself nevertheless to the soldiers in Rome and in Campania in the company of the Emperor before leaving for his Bithynian home. Small wonder, then, that he concluded his history with the words of the Iliad:

‘And Zeus drew Hector to safety from the shafts and dust, from blood­shed, slaughter, and the din of strife.’

Examples of this sort prove the weakness of the Emperor in the face of the soldiers. He did not even venture to proceed directly against Epagathus, the chief culprit in the murder of Ulpian, and he was only brought to book when Alexander had got him out of the way by promoting him to the governorship of Egypt. But the tension between the soldiery and the government could not be lessened, since the imperious Mamaea, who doubtless knew how to appreciate the power of money, was suspected of having become miserly to the detriment of the troops.

Disorder in the finances assuredly demanded the cutting down of expenses to bare necessities. But recognition of the crisis and efforts to meet it could do but little to better conditions as a whole. Many taxes may have been abolished, or at least reduced; but whether the aurum coronarium was among these must remain uncertain. In any event, in view of the needs of the State, no reduction of taxes can have been made to the extent asserted by the Historia Augusta. And if in some rare instances a shifting of obligations from the traders to the producers was attempted, this did not reduce the burden of taxes sustained by the general public. The government persisted in the further collection of an additional tax (anabolikon) on raw and manufactured products from Egypt, since the free market was unable to satisfy particular requirements, especially those of the imperial capital. It is true that the fiscal administration was ordered to deal justly and moderately with the subjects, but at the same time there can be traced an intelligible anxiety to secure that the taxes prescribed by law were in fact duly paid. Forced labour and liturgies, that is to say compulsory service of all kinds, remained as formerly a heavy burden on the lower classes of the population. In this connection it is possible that the relations of the State with the collegia—the various guilds of ship-owners, merchants and craftsmen—were subjected to a revision. There was no nationalization, but there may well have been a more rigorous control of those corporations whose services were of paramount importance to the State. From this time onwards the old formula ‘permitted by decision of the Senate’ (puibus ex S.C. coire licet) disappears, and we may see therein a cessation of private enterprise in the formation of such guilds, the place of which may have been filled by some intervention on the part of the State. A better employment of State­industry to repair the finances is shown, for instance, in the creation of the ratio purpuraria,which appears under Severus Alexander and is probably to be connected with sale of purple from imperial factories. On the other hand we cannot speak of a reform of the monetary system; only the extensive minting of a copper currency of good quality seems to point to some effort at improvement. The legends on the coins, ‘Moneta Restituta’ and ‘Restitutor Monetae,’ refer only to the recoining of the dupondius; the coins in precious metals are no better than they were under Alexander’s predecessors. It appears, however, that there were discussions at this time of projects prompted by the extensive depopulation of important areas. Thus Dio, through the mouthpiece of Maecenas, advocates the founding of a State mortgage-bank, and the beginnings of a State credit policy towards owners of land can still be traced in our sources.

The government, too, despite the weakness of the financial position, maintained the traditional expenditure. Five congiaria were made in cash payments to the Roman populace on the occasions of the three consulates of the Emperor, perhaps at the consecration of the temple of Juppiter Ultor and after the Persian war. Rome was embellished with magnificent buildings. On the Campus Martius the Baths of Nero were enlarged to create the Thermae Alexandrianae, equipped with a separate water-supply and a library, in the construction of which Sextus Julius Africanus assisted. Also the Baths of Caracalla were completed and the Amphitheatrum Flavium was restored. In Italy and the provinces works of public utility, such as bridges, aqueducts and baths, were undertaken, and to meet the cost of these part of the revenue of the cities was placed at their disposal. The building and improvement of roads, especially in the Danubian provinces, served at the same time the special purpose of increasing Rome’s military preparedness. There was further undertaken an extension of the frontier defences in the direction begun by Septimius Severus, whereby in certain provinces the peasants of the frontier districts were concentrated in fortified places; and thus was pressed forward the assimilation of the rural population to the frontier troops now transformed into settlers. With this went the endeavour, not exactly to urbanize that part of the population which was important for military purposes, but as far as possible to render it more civilized. The literary papyri which have been found are evidence for the spread of school education; and we know from a passage in Ulpian that there were elementary teachers even in the villages. In this passage the principle is maintained that these teachers should not be exempt from the services required by the State, but that the amount of such services should be fixed by agreement with the provincial governors. There is reason to think that Ulpian was in general keenly interested in the provincial administration: he had devoted a part of his extensive writings to the duties of its officials. We can hardly therefore assume that during his prefecture administrative practice was in essentials altered from that which prevailed before the reign of Elagabalus. There is certainly no reason to think that a beginning had already been made in the separation of civil and military authority in the provincial administration. As one special case, it is worth observing that, in spite of the extension of the citizenship by Caracalla, a decree of 224 enjoined on the provincial governors the duty of keeping to the existing customary law. A comparison with two passages from Ulpian’s de officio proconsulis reveals the author of the decree.

The other legislation affords evidence of some improvements in the civil law, but it still follows the trend of those legal concep­tions which the jurisprudence of that epoch had developed. In his handling of the criminal law Severus Alexander deliberately sets his own age in opposition to the regime of his predecessor, especially as regards the Lex Iulia maiestatis, where a tendency to lessen the harshness of the law can be observed. The Emperor himself says ‘etiam ex aliis causis maiestatis crimina cessant meo saeculo.’ On the other hand he speaks in the Lex Iulia de adulteriis of the ‘castitas temporum meorum,’ and demands a stricter enforcement of penalties. An identification with the prevailing juristic trend can perhaps be seen in a rescript on the Lex Cornelia de falsis in the formula ‘secta mea non patitur.’ In any event the proceedings against the Christians under this government were not conducted in accordance with the letter of the existing regulations. If it is true that in the seventh book de officio proconsulis Ulpian adopted a codification under the lex maiestatis rather than under the sacrilegia of the penalties prescribed against the Christians, reason for this procedure could be seen in the more lenient application of the former law. But to this the will and desire of the empress-mother may have contributed with even greater force. However strong the endeavour to wipe out the memory of the invasion of unmixed Orientalism into religious worship, the fact of a far-advanced syncretism remains. The increasing permeation of religion with the philosophy of the time, or, perhaps more correctly speaking, the permeation of this philosophy with religious elements is reflected in the attitude of the circles interested in matters of the spirit. Mamaea was no Julia Domna; still she was acquainted with the spiritual currents of her day, and she may have concerned herself with the ‘new philosophy.’ Hippolytus of Rome could thus dedicate to her a treatise on the Resurrection, and later, during the Persian war, she summoned Origen to the imperial headquarters in order to acquaint herself with his theology. But all this, in spite of the Christian tradition from the time of Eusebius, does not make Mamaea a Christian.

The same is true of her son, even if there is nothing extraordinary in the account given by his biographer of the erection of a statue of Christ together with other figures worthy of reverence in the imperial Lararium or house-chapel¹. Benevolent tolerance of the Christians, which was probably affected by an increasing number of believers in the imperial household, is the kernel round which the later legend was able to grow. It, however, is quite understandable that the Christians in the Emperor’s entourage should have made use of the change in the administration of the law of treason to improve the lot of their brethren, since in general the reign propagated the idea of a State ruled by law. For this one has only to read the ordinance on the possibility of direct appeal to the emperor, which was intended to meet the excesses of the procurators and governors, who, it is true, felt in their turn the pressure of the fiscal authorities³, or the preamble to a decree by which not even the emperor could become an heir if a will were not formally completed. Here it is expressly stated that ‘even though the law conferring the imperial authority (lex imperii) may have released the emperor from the ordinary formalities of the laws, there is nothing which would be so peculiarly characteristic of the imperial power as to live according to the laws.’ Perhaps we have here a personal expression of opinion by Alexander, since Ulpian had, for certain cases, laid down the principle that the emperor is above the laws—‘princeps legibus solutus est.’

 

II.

SEVERUS ALEXANDER: FOREIGN POLICY

 

The reign began with a few years of relative quiet, and there was reason to hope that the tasks of internal reconstruction could be advanced in peace. Riots of the Mauri in Tingitana, campaigns against the Isaurian hill-tribes and a single inroad by some Germans did not give rise to any serious alarm. But towards the end of this decade a threatening storm arose from the east. The Parthian empire had succumbed to the attack of the Persians under Ardashir (Artaxerxes) the son of Pabak. After the overthrow of the Arsacid Artabanus V, Ardashir had become King of Kings by the grace of Ormuzd. A pronounced national sentiment, supported by intense religious feeling for the possession of Zarathustra’s teaching in what they thought was its old purity, animated the king and his fellow ­warriors. With the coming of this new Persian empire of the Sassanids—as they are called after the grandfather of the first king—the East laid aside its defensive policy for an offensive. Ardashir already envisaged as his political goal the re-establishment of the old empire of the Achaemenids. Rome’s claim to universal empire was now matched by that of a new and powerful State. By the issue of a gold coinage the king opposed to the hitherto unchallenged prerogative of the Empire a claim to an equality of rights. In the year 230 alarming news reached Rome. Ardashir had broken into Mesopotamia and was besieging Nisibis; his horsemen were already endangering Syria and Cappadocia. Diplomatic action led to no result. War was inevitable and demanded the use of strong forces. The supreme command must be assumed by the Emperor in person—the need was admitted by Mamaea, concerned though she was for her son. Wide and careful preparations were made for the campaign. Troops were raised in Italy and the provinces. It is possible that the legion IV Italica was recruited on this occasion. Detachments (vexillationes) were summoned from the legions on the Rhine and the Danube. P. Sallustius Sempronius Victor received an extraordinary command of the fleet to secure the seas and protect the dispatch of reinforcements.

In the spring of 231 Severus Alexander left his imperial capital accompanied by his mother. On his overland route to the East he collected an army which, consisting of picked troops, seemed equal to the task which lay before it. It was not clear, however, what was the temper of these forces, in spite of the repeated minting of coins with the legends ‘Fides exercitus’ and ‘Fides militum.’ The repetition of this rallying-cry rather gives one the impression that desire and reality did not correspond. Not long before, the legions in Mesopotamia—Parthica I and III—in spite of the dangers of the hour had mutinied and killed the governor Flavius Heracleo. And when the Emperor had established his headquarters at Antioch, and from there had sent a second embassy to Ardashir, with, it is true, no better result, riots had to be suppressed among the Eastern contingents. A usurper, named Uranius Antoninus, whose name and coins suggest a reaction of the admirers of Elagabalus, had risen in Edessa with the support of Syrian troops, perhaps legio III Gallica. There was also a mutiny among the detachments summoned from Egypt, who certainly belonged to the II Traiana.

These unwelcome events were the prelude to the opening of the Persian war in 232. The army of operations was divided into three parts. In the north the division of the left marched towards Media by way of Armenia, where Rome’s allies the Arsacids still maintained their resistance. The division of the right advanced in a south-easterly direction over the route taken by Septimius Severus in 197. The main army, under the com­mand of the Emperor himself, was intended to advance eastwards through North Mesopotamia. But the excessive caution of Alexander prevented these latter troops from ever engaging the enemy. Ardashir was thus able to concentrate superior forces and annihilate the rightwing as it was operating on the Euphrates. Thereupon the Emperor, who with all the European soldiers was suffering severely from the climate, withdrew his own forces and ordered the northern division also to retreat to Antioch. This division had successes to record in Atropatene, but during its retreat it suffered severely in the Armenian highlands from the inclement weather. In spite of all this the enemy themselves must have sustained no inconsiderable losses; for the Persian king nowhere pressed the pursuit, and even remained inactive for four years. The Roman offensive had failed. Its net result was the doubtful success of seeing the frontier for the time being still intact. And now a new peril threatened in the West. The removal of strong forces stirred up the Germans. The danger of a war on two fronts, which Augustus had sought to avoid by a diplomatic solution of the Eastern question, and which later had proved no real danger because of the growing weakness of Parthia, remained from now onwards an anxiety and heavy burden on those who directed the foreign policy of the Empire. The news from the West caused the vexillationes drawn from that quarter to demand their immediate return. Herein was shown the disadvantage of making the soldier a settler. The Persian war was therefore broken off in 233 without the conclusion of peace. Before his return to Rome the Emperor took measures for the defence of the frontier in the East. At Rome he was received with the honours of a conqueror and celebrated a triumph as ‘Parthicus Maximus’ or as ‘Persicus Maximus.’

The return of the European contingents seemed to have removed the worst danger on the Rhine and on the Danube; but an ambitious campaign was prepared against the Alemanni. On this occasion Pannonia furnished most of the recruits, who were collected on the Upper Rhine in 234. Their training was entrusted to C. Julius Verus Maximinus. The Rhine army was strengthened by detachments from other legions; besides the II Parthica from Italy, special contingents of light-armed auxiliaries were dispatched; these had returned from the East with Severus Alexander. In the same year the Emperor, again accompanied by his mother, proceeded to join his army, which was concentrated at Mainz. The passage over the Rhine had already been secured by a pontoon bridge. But instead of giving battle Alexander, still swayed by the Augusta, began to negotiate. He hoped to maintain peace by cash-payments. But in this policy he failed to take into account the fighting spirit of his troops, who misconstrued his conduct as cowardice and who also perhaps thought that the Roman money would be better expended on themselves. Dislike for Mamaea with her supposed avarice, and antipathy towards an emperor who could never show a will of his own, led to a revolt. The Pannonian recruits proclaimed their commander Maximinus as emperor. In vain did Severus Alexander hope for the support of the other troops, especially those from the East. When Maximinus advanced against him he found himself deserted, and in mid-March 235 he was killed in Vicus Britannicus (Bretzenheim near Mainz). His mother shared the same fate.

They both fell victims to those forces in which the founder of the dynasty had seen the surest defence of his house, and they paid with their lives for the failure of their attempt to reach the goal of the first Severus by other means than his. The plan of serving the interests of the Empire and of the dynasty by winning the support of the upper classes for a regime based on military supremacy was bound to fail if it did not succeed in mastering the unruliness of the armies. But as soon as the danger from without the empire had strengthened the self-consciousness of the soldiery through the feeling that they were indispensable, as soon as they had begun to desire a soldier for their emperor, there was no hope left. For precisely those qualities which this hour demanded were just those which Severus Alexander lacked, however well-meaning and sensible of his imperial duties he may have been. The last of these Syrian emperors could not fulfil his role, since he was neither a Severus nor an Alexander.

III.

THE FIRST SOLDIER-EMPEROR AND THE SENATORIAL OPPOSITION: MAXIMINUS THRAX, THE GORDIANS, PUPIENUS AND BALBINUS

 

Maximinus was the first representative of a new type of ruler. The son of a Thracian peasant—only a falsification of history has made him a Goth—a man who attracted attention by his extraordinary strength and size, he had risen from the ranks, and when admitted into the equestrian order he had made a career for himself. As legionary prefect he commanded the legio II Traiana in Egypt in 232, and at the time of the Persian war he was governor of Mesopotamia (praefectus Mesopotamiae). His soldierly qualities and his skill in handling troops were the reasons for entrusting the training of the recruits to him in 234 as praefectus tironibus. He was a man after the soldiers’ heart: he shared their sentiments; he knew what they wanted. It is no wonder that shortly after his elevation he doubled their pay.

The news from the Rhine soon reached Rome. We know nothing of the manner in which Maximinus obtained his recognition from the Senate; but the patres, thus surprised, could do nothing else than bow to the inevitable and confirm him as emperor. Proof of this is found in the co-option of Maximinus into the priestly colleges on 25 March 235. In any case the Senate, in order to maintain its position, had taken the customary constitutional steps. The patres, it is true, may have given vent later to their rancour and their aversion to the hated upstart by denying the ratification by the Senate, thus preparing the way for the conception of an immediate open opposition of that body, which even is supposed to have raised Alexander to the gods. But the erased inscriptions tell another story. Not until the period of overt rebellion against Maximinus was the Senate able to act as it may well have desired to act at the time—for there was resentment right from the beginning. This and the fact that Maximinus, occupied with the urgent tasks on the frontier, did not visit Rome either at this time or later were bound to prejudice his popularity, even though he made the expected gesture to the inhabitants of the granting them a donative on taking over the government.

The prosecution of the war against the Germans appeared to Maximinus to be his first and most important task, buth to joined battle he had to deal with opposition in his own army. A number of centurions and senatorial officers had planned his removal. It was their intention to deliver the Emperor into his is enemy’s hands by breaking down the bridge after he had crossed to the right bank of the Rhine. A distinguished senator named Magnus was to take his place. The plot became known, and  Maximinus had the real or suspected culprits put to death without  trial. The historian Herodian, who is biassed against this emperor, attempts, without good reason, to make his readers believe that  the plot existed only in the imagination of Maximinus. He does, however, mention other men who could not reconcile themselves to the fait accompli. The Osrhoenian archers forced the purple on Quartinus, a man of senatorial rank and a friend of the murdered Augustus. This movement must have been prompted by the jealousy of the Oriental troops towards those of the West. But Quartinus had hardly been raised to this dignity when he fell by the hand of Macedo, the former commander of the Osrhoenians,  who had himself provoked the mutiny. His double game brought him the punishment of death instead of the reward he expected. But it is no wonder that the Emperor’s suspicions could never afterwards be allayed. By nature rather brusque and in no way never sympathetic towards the senators, who prided themselves on their rank and education, Maximinus used these revolts as an excuse for removing the senatorial officers and replacing them by professional soldiers. But this was still in the future. Foer the  Osrhoenians took part in the fighting against the Germans, and it was only after this that they were punished. It is hardly to be assumed that Maximinus should have given this heavily compromised contingent an opportunity of rehabilitating themselves only to disband them after their victories.

The Emperor crossed the Rhine near Mainz and led his army far into the enemy’s country, following an opponent who retreated before his superior forces. The light troops, the Oriental archers and the Mauretanian javelinmen, proved their skill in skirmishes with the Germans, to whom their tactics were unfamiliar. It was not until they reached marshy country that the enemy took their stand for a decisive battle. The bravery of Maximinus fired his troops to attack, notwithstanding the difficulties of the ground. Despite heavy losses they inflicted a crushing defeat on the Germans. The field of battle must be sought in the frontier district of Northern Wurttemberg and Baden, and thus we may conclude that the enemy were Alemanni. With justifiable pride the Emperor could accept the triumphal title of Germanicus Maximus and commemorate the ‘Victoria Germanica’ on the coinage of the following year. A picture of the battle which was publicly displayed before the Curia in Rome spread the fame of the victorious emperor. This energetic advance re-established peace for some time along the Rhine and Upper Danube. Additions to the limes forts show the strong interest taken in the maintenance of the frontier defences. Maximinus could consider this victory over the Germans as confirming his title to the throne; accordingly he now (in 235) raised his son C. Julius Verus Maximus to the rank of Caesar, the ceremony possibly forming part of the festival of victory held at Sirmium, where he had taken up his winter quarters. If he had in fact projected a new attack upon the Germans for 236 and planned conquests on a large scale, such schemes had perforce to be abandoned, for the Sarmatians and Dacians gave him trouble. The triumphal titles Sarmaticus and Dacicus Maximus and tombstones of soldiers who fell in the Dacian campaign are the only evidence of these struggles in the years 236 and 237. In the spring of 238 we find the Emperor again in Sirmium.

The subject peoples of the empire soon came to feel that a keener wind was blowing. It is true that the practical recognition of the right of the Praetorian Prefect to make general decrees, provided only that these did not modify the existing legislation, was implicit in the previous development. Further there are inscriptions which give evidence of expenditure on public works, one. of which expressly praises the Emperor as ‘Aquileiensium restitutor et conditor,’ while road-building especially was continued with undiminished energy. Yet the increasing claims of military requirements were ever more markedly felt. Moreover, through the Emperor’s distrust of a covert opposition, the followers of the last dynasty were continually exposed to threats and police spying. Herodian recounts all the evil consequences of the widespread activity of informers, including confiscations, which reduced many rich families to beggary, and an organized Terror maintained by the barbarian tyrant, whose persecution of the upper classes is notably exemplified in his cruel treatment of high senatorial officials. The wife of the Emperor, Caecilia Paulina, tried to exercise a restraining influence upon him. But she must soon have died. She was consecrated Diva, so that the later Christian tradition that Maximinus had his wife executed can therefore be explained only through the hatred felt by the Christians for an emperor who, after a period of quiet, had initiated a fresh persecution.

This new persecution of the Church began soon after the Emperor’s accession; it sprang, according to Eusebius, in the main from political considerations; it was a reaction against the regime of the last emperor, who had been friendly to the Christians. Maximinus feared hostility on the part of the Christians, and, to prevent possible difficulties, began at once to enforce against them the existing regulations, but only to the extent of ordering that, in special cases, proceedings should be taken against the clergy. This was a measure of domestic security, and not a systematic persecution for religio-political reasons, as happened later under Decius. In 235 Pontianus, bishop of Rome, and with him Hippolytus, were deported to Sardinia; and Origen’s Exhortation to martyrdom, addressed to Ambrosius and Protoctetus, in which he contemplates a threat to his own safety, further shows the effect of the imperial edict in Palestinian Caesarea. In the cases of Hippolytus and of Origen we may, in view of their relations with Mamaea, see action against or at least a threatening of men politically suspect. On the other hand, in Cappadocia and Pontus a purely local persecution of Christians broke out which had no connection with the imperial instructions of 235. Here it was the governor Serenianus who intervened at the instance of the pagan population, the atheistic Christians being held responsible for the devastating results of an earthquake. We may, however, note the perspicacity of the Emperor in appreciating the importance of the clergy in the structure of the Christian communities and thus of the Church as a whole. It appears that the threatening danger passed quickly and harmlessly by. Political caution on the part of the Christians must have contributed to this outcome. For this reason Maximinus does not figure in the list of persecutors given by Lactantius, though he does appear in the tradition of Eusebius and probably also in the Apocalypse of the so-called Testament of our Lord, where he is described, in traits which we also find in Herodian, as an emperor from a foreign people, a murderer of men and a grasper after gold.

Ancient critics constantly harp on the avarice of Maximinus. He is said to have confiscated even the public moneys of the municipalities, endowments of all kinds, votive-offerings from the temples and the ornaments of public places in so far as these last were made of mintable metals. It is possible that this generalization is exaggerated and that the critics wilfully overlooked the fact that the defence of the empire required a large part of the means thus provided; nevertheless the statement is a faithful echo of the feeling of those who in all this wished to see only a means to the end of enriching the soldiers at the expense of all the other subjects of the empire. Whether the soldiers really became dissatisfied with these proceedings, as Herodian asserts, under the influence of reproaches which are said to have been made to them by their relatives and friends, it is difficult to decide. But at least the action of the Emperor cannot be explained as the result of the hatred of the townsfolk felt by a peasant soldier, since in the last resort the peasants certainly suffered no less than others under the harsh pressure of the taxes. We may, however, conclude from the analogy of other experience that the severe screwing up of taxation not only made the propertied classes nervous but very seriously damaged the public spirit that had expressed itself in voluntary services, the more as the State exchequer now and later became increasingly like the sieve of the Danaids. It was therefore this unconscionable financial policy, the result of the pressure of circumstances, which gave the signal for a new rising.

The imperial procurator in Africa, under the compulsion of the government, proceeded in the collection of taxes without mercy or regard for justice. This drove a number of rich young nobles, who saw their inherited possessions thus endangered, into armed resistance. They mobilized their tenants and servants, and killed the procurator in Thysdrus (the modern El Djem). This done, the only means of securing themselves was to proclaim a rival emperor. The proconsul M. Antonius Gordianus Sempronianus permitted himself to be forced to accept the purple. On or about 19 March 238 this eighty-year-old proconsul became Augustus. He was said to be descended on his father’s side from the Gracchi and on his mother’s side from Trajan. He was a rich landed proprietor, interested in literature—he had studied with Philostratus—but had become consul suffectus only late in life and had not taken a prominent part in politics. Maximinus had therefore left him in the position which he had occupied under Severus Alexander. He was a personality whose qualities would recom­mend him as a rival to a hated emperor, and he was ambitious enough to feel flattered at the thought of ending his days in the imperial dignity. After a few days the new Augustus made his entry into Carthage together with his son of the same name, whom he had appointed co-emperor. An embassy, headed by the quaestor, now left for Rome with a proclamation to the Senate and the People, while Gordian I appealed in private letters to his fellow nobles. Vitalianus, the commander of the Guard, as a supporter of Maximinus, must first be removed. The envoys obtained an introduction to him by a ruse, alleging that they had been sent by Maximinus on a secret mission, and killed him.

The programme of the new government could now be pub­lished. It promised to stop the informers’ activities, to make losses good and to recall the exiles. The Senate went over to the Gordians’ party and confirmed their imperial titles (2 April). They voted the damnatio memoriae of Maximinus, and perhaps at the same time consecrated Severus Alexander. The Roman populace gave vent to its feelings in wild excesses: the images of Maximinus were destroyed, his followers hunted out and killed. The City Prefect Sabinus also fell a victim to the popular anger. Meanwhile the Senate had acted with extraordinary energy. A committee of twenty consulars—‘vigintiviri rei publicae curandae’—was constituted and charged with securing the defence of Italy against the expected attack of the deposed emperor. Then an appeal was made to the provinces, calling upon them to make common cause with the Senate’s emperors, each of whom received, in addition to the title Africanus, the other significant name of Romanus. However, the Roman mint had no time to take up these new titles on the coinage, for the fall of the dice had already gone against the Gordians. Capellianus, the governor of Numidia, remained faithful to Maximinus. Fighting against his well-armed troops, the legio III Augusta and its auxiliaries, Gordian II fell at the head of his poorly armed militia. His father thereupon committed suicide, and their African followers were visited with terrible punishment. But with this episode, which had ended in a trial of strength decided in favour of the army, the game was by no means over.

With the recognition of the Gordians the Senate had once more assumed a political rôle, and it could not now retreat. The senators assembled in solemn session in the temple of Juppiter on the Capitol. None could or wished to think of a restoration of a Republican régime. But an attempt was made to set up a principate in conformity with the revived prestige of the Senate. Thus the two most highly respected members of the Committee of Twenty, M. Clodius Pupienus Maximus and D. Caelius Calvinus Balbinus, were elected to the imperial dignity. Pupienus had climbed the ladder of office from humble beginnings, and had made a reputation as an efficient officer and provincial governor. He had twice been consul suffectus, and as City Prefect he had displayed both prudence and firmness. It was the irony of fate that the Senate, to defend itself against the soldier-emperor, should have required the services of a man at whose birth also there had been no dream of his elevation to the imperial throne. Balbinus was of noble birth: he was quite young when he became a member of the Salian priesthood of the Palatine. He too had been twice consul, and in 213 was even consul ordinarius. This double election of two emperors was a new departure constitutionally. In their complete equality of rights—so that on each of them was bestowed for the first time even the hitherto indivisible dignity of Pontifex Maximus—we see, not so much an indication that the Senate considered the double principate as the general rule, but rather a memory of the duality and equality in power of the highest magistracy of the Republic. The close relation of the new Augusti to the Senate can be seen in the legend on the coins ‘patres senatus’—though this, it must be admitted, was not its first appearance—and still more in the retention of the Committee of Twenty. But the proceedings of the Senate met with no undivided approval. The election of Pupienus, who since his City Prefecture was anything but liked by the populace, was answered with rioting. And followers of the Gordians, relying on the dynastic tradition, demanded and forced the elevation to the Caesarship of M. Antonius Gordianus, a grandson of Gordian I by the marriage between his daughter Maecia Faustina and Junius Balbus. Both the Gordians were now consecrated. A donative of 250 denarii per head contributed to the further appeasement of the people’s temper. Pupienus set about gathering an army in North Italy, while Balbinus stayed in Rome. But it is an error to see in this an endeavour to separate civil and military power even as between the two emperors.

Maximinus had received the news of the African rising while he was at Sirmium. After two days’ consultation with his intimates he addressed the army in a speech which had been prepared for him. He described the impotence and the military weakness of his opponents and uttered violent threats against Rome and the Senate. A generous donative did not fail of its effect. The fol­lowing day the whole army began its march, in its ranks being many Germans, for the most part cavalry, with which the tribes . on the right bank of the Rhine had furnished him either voluntarily or under compulsion. The unforeseen departure and the huge baggage-train were hindrances to his progress. On the fall of the Gordians, the situation remained unaltered, but that fall at least disclosed the fact that the appeal made by the Senate to the provinces had not met everywhere with approval. Thus, besides the provinces whose defence he had secured, Dacia and Spain and, according to the inscriptions on coins, Asia Minor also, stood firmly by Maximinus. The Pannonian regiments, which formed the advance guard, found Emona evacuated. All supplies had been carried away or destroyed in accordance with orders. This action on the part of the enemy, which was repeated as the army progressed, led to a shortage of food with its unfavourable con­sequences. Aquileia was the first town to offer resistance, which had been organized, on the instructions of the Senate, by the consulars Crispinus and Menophilus. An attack by the advanced guard was repelled. Negotiations, which were conducted by Maximinus through a tribune who was a native of the town, came to nothing. The Emperor then ordered a general attack, which was, however, delayed because floods from the melting snows had destroyed the bridge over the Isonzo. Not until a pontoon bridge had been improvised from casks was it possible on the third day to force the passage. In spite of the energy of Maximinus, all efforts were in vain. The defenders maintained a stubborn resistance, inspired by their confidence in their local patron deity, Belenus. Increasing losses, the threat of hunger, and resentment at the Emperor’s unjustified severity towards some officers, whom he accused of failing in their duty, undermined the discipline of the besiegers. The fate of the undertaking was finally decided by the soldiers of the second Parthian legion, whose families and goods in Alba were held by their opponents. On 10 May they murdered Maximinus and his son. But the besieged did not as yet open the gates to them, although the army had rendered homage to images of the senatorial emperors which were shown to them from the city-wall. Only a market outside the wall was granted to the half-starved troops.

Mounted envoys from the army, now tired of war, bearing the heads of the slain emperors as their bloody credentials, met Pupienus in Ravenna, where he was concentrating the volunteers and the levies from Rome and Italy. He hastened to Aquileia, where the leaderless army did him homage. After offering sacrifice in thanksgiving for this victory Pupienus addressed the troops, stressing their obligation of faithfulness to the Senate and People of Rome and to the emperors elected by them. He then dismissed the troops to their permanent stations. At the head of the Roman garrison troops and the Germans, whom he had taken into his service in reliance on their loyal spirit, which he knew from the time of his German command, Pupienus returned to Rome. Everywhere he was greeted with enthusiasm as victor. In Rome the news of Maximinus’ death had been hailed with frenzied joy. Amid general jubilation Pupienus entered the capital in state accompanied by his co-Augustus and the Caesar. The power of the senatorial emperors—and therewith a new phase in the consti­tution of the Empire—appeared secure. Men forgot and wished to forget that a short while before a bitter struggle had been raging in Rome. The Praetorians who had remained there, provoked by the conduct of two senators, had waged a savage battle against the populace, which had attacked them; during this, before calm was restored, large districts of the City had gone up in flames. The government was undoubtedly at fault in not at once clearing up its attitude towards the Praetorians, all the more so since the excessive exultation over the fall of Maximinus and the preferment of the German life-guards did not allow the disaffection to be healed. Soon the legends on the coins which declared the wishes of the government, such as ‘Concordia,’ ‘amor mutuus,’ ‘fides mutua Augustorum,’ were powerless to conceal the fact that jealousies were rife. Pupienus stressed his peculiar merits by using the name Maximus on a series of coins. Balbinus repaid the upstart with a haughty demeanour. The common task of defending the empire against external foes might perhaps have brought about a change. Pupienus was to have proceeded against the Persians, who had again broken into Mesopotamia, and Balbinus against the Goths, who had crossed the lower Danube. But the Prae­torians had decided otherwise. During a festival they seized Pupienus, who had in vain asked the mistrustful Balbinus to intervene with the Germans, and then they captured Balbinus. Both were brought amid ignominy and mockery into the Praetorian camp, and there were murdered. Then at last the Germans showed a desire to hurry to their assistance, but on receiving the news of the two emperors’ deaths they took no action. The rebels pro­claimed the Caesar Gordianus as Augustus. By this proclamation (July 9) the hopes of the Senate were, after ninety-nine days, shattered by the self-will of the soldiers. Once more it could only submit to the compulsion of force, though its disappointment may have been lessened by the fact that the young Augustus came from one of the most distinguished senatorial families.

 

IV.

GORDIAN III

Gordian III became Augustus at the age of thirteen. This was a grave reaction against the attempt to entrust the Empire to the best citizen. Who conducted the business of State for the dependent emperor? Whereas from the year 241 we can recognize in the Praetorian Prefect Timesitheus the real controller of the Empire we can draw no sure conclusion for the first few years. Gordian’s father must have died before 238, and even the influence of his mother Maecia Faustina is mentioned only in highly suspect passages of the Historia Augusta, the epigraphical and numis­matic evidence which we should expect for an influential empress­mother is entirely lacking. However, the efforts of members of his mother’s household to use the situation for their own advance­ment may have given a handle for the malicious tradition of an administration run by eunuchs and court-favourites in these early years. The assured facts rather point to a continuance of senatorial influence. Thus, for instance, L. Caesonius Lucillus Macer Rufinianus, proconsul of Africa and later City-Prefect, and Meno- philus, governor of Lower Moesia, were both previously members of the Committee of Twenty. A certain Annianus, who under the senatorial régime had been charged with holding the levy in North Italy, was later made commander of the legion stationed at Mainz, the XXII Primigenia. The Praetorian Prefecture was held by Aedinius Julianus, a man of equestrian rank who had previously risen to be prefect of Egypt, and then, after admission to the Senate, had become governor of Lugdunensis. Domitius is mentioned as holding this office in 240 either with Julianus. or after him. Further, it is certain that after 241 two Praetorian Prefects still held office together. The advisers of the Emperor were apparently desirous of shaping the imperial administration, if not in the spirit of the last reign, at least in continuation of the regime of Severus Alexander.

Many decrees published in the first years of the reign, although they deal for the most part with questions of civil law, permit us to perceive certain general directions of policy which were retained even after 241. The nefarious activities of the delatores were com­bated according to the promise of Gordian I. A decree published 6 September 238 orders the provincial governors to see that nothing should happen which is not in accordance with the prin­ciples of the age². In the administration of the provinces the position of the governor was reinforced, especially in its judicial authority. Unjustified decisions of military judges in civil matters were forbidden³, and efforts were made to restrict the encroach­ments of the financial procurators in cases where they had not to administer the law as deputies of the governors (vice praesidis), a practice which became in course of time more frequent. Only when they were so deputed could they in private lawsuits appoint the judges or hear cases reserved for the governor. One may recognize a certain strengthening of the central administration conducted by the Praetorian Prefect in the right of appeal to the Prefect against a decision of the governor, or in the fact that an official who did not fulfil his duties was to be dealt with either by the Prefect or by the governor⁶. In fiscal matters the rights of the fiscus and its administration were often emphasized, but there were also proceedings against breaches of the law, and particularly precautions against straining the law in favour of those who were in the employ of the State. Among other things steps were taken against attempts to obtain the support of the fiscus by the cession to it of part of any property in dispute ^[3] . A significant case of governmental intervention has been preserved in the inscription of Scaptopare, commemorating a petition of the inhabitants of this and another village in the territory of Pautalia in Thrace. Their complaints were directed against the oppression and extor­tion of soldiers, minor imperial functionaries and others. The local hot springs and the proximity of a much-frequented market had previously in times of peace brought a good income to the villagers. Conditions were now entirely changed; they were so impoverished by excessive billeting and requisitions that they threatened to leave their homes. The Emperor ordered an examina­tion of the case, and the erection of the inscription proves that the villagers of Scaptopare were satisfied with the success of their appeal. Also the repeated reminders of the prohibition against money-lending by imperial officials, either in their own names or through men of straw, point again to the beneficent aims of the government ^[4] . Under Severus Alexander the right of inflicting punishments had been withdrawn from the financial procurators, and now it was also taken from the supervisors of municipal administration called curatores rei publicae. To lighten the burdens of town-councillors a period of respite was decreed between the taking over of the separate offices and duties. At the same time it is clear that the honour of belonging to the municipal council (ordo) was accompanied by a certain compulsion: for men who were condemned to exile for a period were to be ordered on their return to resume membership of the ordo, and were to be excluded from its honours only for as many years as their exile had lasted. In other respects, too, the government was little disposed to free men from services and duties. For instance, of the freedmen in the service of a senatorial patronus only one was released from the obligation of taking over the duties of guardian and tutor. Care for public education is shown in the decree allowing the muni­cipalities to dismiss the grammatici and rhetors appointed by them, if they were proved incompetent.

The populace of Rome were amply supplied with donatives and games. There was however a decline in building activity; for we are informed only of the reconstruction of the Balneum Surae and the enlargement of the barracks of the marines who had been detached for service in the amphitheatre. It may be, however, that the government co-operated in the removal of the damages caused by the street-fighting. The finances of the Empire must have been subjected to heavy strain, and the government was compelled to reduce the State grants made to the priests; at least, the last entry of payment preserved in the Arvai Acta of 241 shows that the usual sportula of 100 denarii had been reduced to 25.

The soldiers received the customary donatives. Also numerous decrees show that, as under Severus Alexander, efforts were made to secure their legal position, especially under the law of inheritance. One gains the impression that, in spite of the attempt to maintain discipline, a far-reaching and prudent compromise was practised as before. It is true that as early as 238 Gordian had disbanded the legio III Augusta for its share in the overthrow of the first two Gordians. Its officers and soldiers, apart from those who were more heavily punished, were transferred to other corps—a considerable number of them are found fifteen years later in the formations concentrated in Raetia—and it was intended that their place should be supplied by a regrouping of African auxilia. But this action proved a source of weakness: for when Sabinianus’ rebellion broke out in Carthage in 240 the governor of Maure­tania, probably Faltonius Restitutianus, had to be called up with his troops. The usurper’s attempt soon failed. It is possible, however, that on this occasion detachments from the Rhine frontier were sent to Mauretania for additional security^.

On the Rhine there was still peace resulting from the German victory of Maximinus. But the departure of his army had once more set in motion the enemy on the Danube. Attacks by the Goths and their neighbours, the Dacian Carpi, probed the weakness of the defence. In 238 Istros was pillaged. The peril was not averted until Menophilus, as governor of Lower Moesia, had intervened with a large army. Negotiations with the Goths and the grant of annual payments induced them to withdraw, first handing over their prisoners. A similar demand by the Carpi was put off until Menophilus, supported by a reinforced and well-drilled army, was able to decline it. For three years the enemy remained quiet, while the defence was strengthened by the building of roads and the erection of new fortifications in the towns. Upper Moesia received the right of coinage in order to supply the new requirements. According to the coins minted at Viminacium they now reckoned there by a provincial calendar which began on 1 July 239.

The revolts in Africa and the increasing burden of military problems, which was especially due to the renewed danger upon the eastern frontier, may have created the desire to have in charge of the central administration a man who was equal to these demands. We do not know who brought Timesitheus to the Emperor’s notice. In 241 Gordian appointed him Praetorian Prefect and himself married Furia Sabinia Tranquillina, the daughter of Timesitheus, perhaps as early as May, but certainly before 23 September. C. Furius Sabinus Aquila Timesitheus, whose name is transformed in Greek sources to Timesikles or Timesokles, and in the Historia Augusta is contracted, perhaps in derision, to Misitheus, had acquainted himself by personal experience with a great part of the empire. An inscription from Lyons gives us his career. He served in Spain as prefect of an auxiliary cohort. As financial procurator in the administration of the imperial treasury and domains he served in the provinces of Belgica and Arabia, where he was twice deputy governor. He then came to Rome and there held the office of manager of the imperial stage (logista thymelae) and later that of chief of the Inheritance Tax Office. He next went as procurator to Syria and Palestine, charged with the collection of the outstanding special taxes arising out of the Persian war of Severus Alexander. Returning to Belgica as deputy of the procurator patrimonii he became at the same time vice-governor in Lower Germany. Then followed a procuratorship with increased powers in Bithynia, Pontus and Paphlagonia, a similar post in Asia as deputy governor for the proconsul, and finally the pro­curatorship of Lugdunensis and Aquitania. A man who, without prejudice to his career, had weathered the storms of repeated changes of emperor was certainly a capable administrator, con­cerned with affairs and not with persons. His ambition, which cannot be denied, was satisfied with the position of Praetorian Prefect. For some three years this man of outstanding culture and eloquence was the real controller of the Empire, a faithful servant of the State and an expert adviser of his imperial son-in-law. An apocryphal inscription to his honour in the Historia Augusta lauds Timesitheus as Father of the Emperor and Protector of the Empire, thus truly rendering the real significance of his person and his position.

How much of the manifold efforts in road-building to serve the peaceful, and in time of need, the military communications of the empire, can be attributed to Timesitheus, is uncertain, but the least that can be said is that he continued what others had begun. In Africa the construction of a limes gave security to Numidia. The advanced post of Msad was withdrawn, and the course of the limes was fixed on the line from Thabudis following the Oued Djedi, then bending in a north-westerly direction to El Gehara, with covering forts at Gemellae in the oasis Ducen and Ausum (Sadouri). The reinforced numerus Palmyrenorum here guarded the frontier. In Mauretania the completion of the fortified settle­ments of frontier peasants and military settlers, begun under Severus Alexander, was pushed on under the governor, Faltonius Restitutianus, especially supervised by Felix, the procurator of the imperial domains. But the main military efforts were concentrated on the campaign against the Persians, which the Emperor inaugurated in the spring of 242 by the solemn opening of the temple of Janus, the last observance of this ceremony.

While Maximinus still reigned, Ardashir had captured Nisibis and Carrhae. Shapur I, the son who succeeded him in 241, pursued his father’s plans of conquest. A renewed thrust into Syria seriously endangered Antioch on the Orontes. Meanwhile Gordian, accompanied by Timesitheus, had joined the army, which on its passage overland to the East was to gather up the mobilized contingents of the Danubian army. The removal of these troops, and also, perhaps, the previous recall of Menophilus, tempted the enemy to the attack. Bands of raiders, especially of the Carpi, pushed forward as far as Thrace. But the intervention of Timesitheus soon re-established peace. After this success the army was transported from Thrace to Asia. In 243 Timesitheus, who had also shown his mettle as organizer of the campaign, through his skilful leadership—one blow fol­lowing rapidly upon another—succeeded in freeing Syria from the Persians and in retaking Carrhae. A decisive battle near Resaina secured to the victorious Romans the whole of Meso­potamia with Singara, and even Nisibis became theirs once more. Edessa in Osrhoene, where previously under king Abgar X an Osrhoenian client State had been once more set up, became again a Roman colony. A further advance was contemplated, leading along the Chaboras to the Euphrates and then following the latter river towards Ctesiphon. Suddenly Timesitheus was cut off by illness. His successor was the forty-five year old M. Julius Philippus, the son of an Arab sheikh from Trachonitis named Marinus. The career of his brother C. Julius Priscus does not correspond with the tradition of his lowly origin. Philip had probably already risen to the position of deputy Prefect. His burning ambition did not allow him to rest content with the place of most influential subject: he wished to wear the purple himself. Disaffection was aroused among the soldiers by difficulties pur­posely created in the commissariat, the fault of which was attri­buted to the Emperor’s incapacity. If Gordian really did attempt to compound for the position of co-emperor, or at least for the Caesarship, he had not realized the true character of the Arab. In the neighbourhood of Zaitha, between Circesium and Doura-Europus, Gordian’s fate was sealed: he was murdered by the soldiers. Philip became emperor (end of February or beginning of March 244). As late as the Persian campaign of the Emperor Julian the cenotaph of Gordian III still stood near Zaitha, at once the record of the successes gained under his name and a memorial which showed what forces were in fact at that time determining the Empire’s fate.

V.

PHILIP THE ARABIAN

 

Once proclaimed Augustus, Philip endeavoured to obtain as soon as possible his recognition by the Senate. To this body he reported that Gordian had succumbed to an illness, and succeeded, through his subsequent conduct, in getting this official version accepted by the public, since he steadfastly paid the utmost respect to the memory of his predecessor, to whom the Senate was com­pelled to render the supreme honour of consecration among the Divi. The mortal remains of Gordian were taken to Rome, and, as we have seen, a cenotaph was erected near Zaitha. Without any hesitation the Senate recognized the new Augustus, and confirmed the appointment as Caesar of his son M. Julius Severus Philippus, who was at most but seven years old. Philip had already con­cluded peace with the Persians. His desire to gain personal contact with Rome with all possible speed may have been increased by the memory of the fate of Maximinus. By the terms of the peace the Empire retained possession of Lesser Armenia and Mesopotamia. We cannot accept the report of Zonaras according to which the Emperor first ceded Armenia and Mesopotamia, only to withdraw from this compact under the pressure of the ill-feeling thus created. For this must have meant the renewal of the war, and of that we have no record. On the other hand a criticism by Zosimus² of the consequences of the peace may find its justification in the fact that henceforth relations with Greater Armenia became less close. Philip returned home to the West as ‘Parthicus’ and ‘Persicus Maximus’. He left his brother Priscus behind as governor of Mesopotamia; Nisibis and Singara each received the additional name of Julia; the old Sichem-Neapolis was dignified as ‘colonia Julia Sergia Neapolis’; at the place probably where Philip was born in Trachonitis near the Shuhba of today, was founded the town of Philippopolis with the rights of a colonia, and Bostra received the distinguishing title ‘colonia metropolis.’ The Thracian Philippopolis also received from this emperor the status of a colonia, possibly on his return march from die East. Coins give evidence of the celebration of games on this occasion at Beroea in Macedonia. On 23 July, 244, at the latest, Philip entered Rome. A first donative, to be followed by three more, proves that he felt the traditional anxiety to win the good will of the citizens. His relations with the Senate seem to have developed favourably from the beginning. What was expected of the new ruler is shown in the encomium of a contem­porary. rhetorician, entitled Eis basilea, which, is preserved in the collection .of Aelius Aristides’ orations. In this pamphlet is sketched, in clear contrast with the abuses of recent times, the ideal picture of the just, ruler, equipped with the Stoic virtues, who should be above all a benevolent prince: the best man should be emperor: he should be the master, not the servant, of the soldiery. How far the reality corresponded with this ideal it is impossible to say; but at least it is certain that the reality fell short of the ideal in one respect: for Philip sought to found a dynasty. Marcia Otacilia Severa, the mother of his little son, was raised to the rank of Augusta; his brother was advanced to an important office, and soon afterwards, in the spirit of this family policy, Severianus, the Emperor’s brother-in-law, was honoured with a high command. Philip even had his father Marinus consecrated, in order to procure for his family a further title to legitimacy.

Zealously and earnestly the Emperor devoted himself to his imperial duties. A touch of clemency may be seen in the decree declaring a general amnesty for those suffering exile or relegation. A number of decisions in the Codex Justinianus, especially those which date from the beginning of the reign, are concerned with questions of civil rights. A noteworthy ordinance provides that appeal-could be made only to the emperor against a decision which had been given by an official acting for the emperor (vice principis), i.e. the Praetorian Prefects or their deputies. The co-operation of the consilium principis is also mentioned once in the Code of Jus­tinian. Philip also had to intervene against the injustice of the Treasury administration. Yet on the other hand his government could not waive the legal claims of the State against its subjects, in view of the heavy demands upon its finances. For instance, the fact that a son was a prisoner of war was not to be an excuse for his father’s failure to fulfil his obligations. Though poets were expressly forbidden to claim immunity from taxation, there is no need to infer from this that Philip was a man of no education or that he was hostile to culture. As ambassador of Athens, his birthplace, the sophist Nicagoras presented an address to the Emperor. Some would see in Nicagoras the author of the Eis basilea, but in that case it cannot be identified with his Pres-beutikos or ambassadorial address, for that must have referred to the purpose of his mission and no such reference is to be found in the Eis basilea. The position of members of the municipal councils is illuminated by the fact that sons of the decuriones were compelled to undertake posts of honour and fulfil public duties in their fathers’ communities. For the rest, Philip was a good enough soldier to continue on his part the building of roads. But with all his good will he was not able every­where to remove the prevailing abuses. It is thus a bad sign for the security of communications that in Petra Pertusa in Umbria a company of marines from Ravenna had to be called up to combat brigandage³. An example of oppression of the worst type is contained in a petition addressed directly to the Emperor from imperial coloni of the Phrygian village Arague (before the summer of 247) complaining of unprecedented extortion at the hands of officers and soldiers, municipal officials and imperial functionaries. Whether imperial subjects elsewhere really enjoyed that peaceful and quiet life which was praised by the petitioners in contrast with their own unhappy experiences may fairly be doubted, for, from the second year of this reign at latest, the empire had to suffer from war and soon from riots also with all their consequences.

Perhaps as early as 244 the Carpi threatened the frontiers, and when in 245 neither Prastina Messallinus, governor of Lower Moesia, nor Severianus, who commanded a still larger force, was able to drive the enemy back over the Danube, Philip himself took over the supreme command before the end of the year. By this time however Lower Moesia, Thrace and Macedonia had been extensively ravaged, as is proved by the cessation of the coinage. In the summer of 246 the Emperor was in Dacia, where he granted to the sorely afflicted province the right of coinage. The provincial Era which is reckoned from this grant begins about 20 July in this year. The triumphal title ‘Germanicus Maximus’ is our only evidence for successful conflicts with the Germans, presumably the Quadi. In the next year Philip was able to add with pride the title ‘Carpicus Maximus.’ After winning a battle he drove a body of the Carpi to shut themselves up in a fortress. A sortie and an attempt at relief were both repelled, thanks to the valour of his troops, the Moors in particular, and he was able to force the weakened enemy to conclude peace. He then returned to Rome, and there, availing himself of the im­pression produced by this victory, raised his son to the rank of Augustus (before June 247). The empress Otacilia now received the honorific appellation of ‘mater Augusti et castrorum et senatus et patriae.’ By the imperial dignity of the young Philip a real double principate was again created, for the son was also Pontifex Maximus. It is noticeable too that hereafter on inscriptions and coins his tribunicia potestas is so reckoned as if he had already received it while he was as yet only Caesar. It is reasonable to see in this, as well as in the use of the title Sebastos before the actual promotion to Augustus, nothing else than an attempt to give more than his legal due to the son of the emperor and the heir to the throne. But the practice of Philippus himself must have inspired this attitude, since even from the beginning of the reign his decrees were published in the joint names of himself and his son the Caesar; and this again may be connected with his dynastic policy.

Meanwhile the year had dawned which, according to the Varronian calculation, concluded the first millennium from the foundation of the City of Rome. At the beginning of this year of jubilee on 21 April 247 the Emperor was in the field, and so the secular games and millenary celebrations had to adorn its close. With impressive magnificence the two Augusti, as consuls of the year, the father for the third and the son for the second time, fulfilled the traditional religious ceremonies and presided over the splendid games in the Circus Maximus, for which had been preserved the many wild beasts collected in expectation of Gordian III’s triumph over the Persians. The new dynasty was thus able to regard itself as the starting-point of a new saeculum and was celebrated as such. In these exuberant festivities the favour of the Roman populace could be wooed; for Philip’s government had otherwise been able to spend but little on the capital. We hear only of the building of a water reservoir (lacus) in Transtiberim. But what a change had come over the Roman world in the two hundred and fifty years since Augustus had celebrated the birth of a new saeculum—nay, even in the century which had elapsed since the ninth-centenary festival of Antoninus Pius! He who now bore the name of Augustus was an Arab, and however closely he may have identified himself with the duties of his imperial station, yet the true Rome and the Roman character, to which men thought that in those days of festival they were doing homage, remained for him, and must remain, alien and foreign. But where in Rome were these things then to be found? A strange dispensation of fate had decreed that this millenary jubilee was to be the last secular celebration. This changed world is strikingly exemplified in the work of the Christian historian Orosius, who, by a misreading of the facts, makes Philip cele­brate the festival in honour of Christ and of the Church.

There were, however, counter forces still at work which sought to maintain the old order. Now begins the period when the Danubian troops, especially the Pannonians, feel themselves to be the representatives and guardians of the true Roman virtus. Thus the same army with which Philip had won his victories, already perhaps in reaction against the new Oriental dynasty, set up a rival emperor in Ti. Claudius Marinus Pacatianus, an officer probably of senatorial birth. Not long after the millenary festivities, which Pacatianus commemorated on his coinage with the legend ‘Romae aeter(nae) an(no) mill(esimo) et primo,’ the recently gained security of the provinces on the lower Danube was again endangered. The sequel to the revolt of the army was an invasion of the Goths, to whom the annual allowances had recently not been paid, or rather could not be paid. Under Argaithus and Gunthericus the Goths broke into Roman territory. The Carpi, Taifali, Asdingian Vandals and Peucini followed their example in large numbers. Marcianopolis was besieged, but the city stoutly resisted, thanks to its renovated walls and the valour of its inhabitants who were led by a Thracian called Maximus. After a second vain assault the enemy withdrew with heavy casualties. Even before the usurpation of Pacatianus had produced its fatal consequences, revolts broke out in the East, the cause of which is to be found in the far too strict régime which had been enforced by the Emperor’s brother Priscus. After serving as governor of Mesopotamia he had been entrusted, as ‘praefectus praetorio rectorque orientis,’ with super­vision of the general administration of the East. The excessive pressure of taxation led to disturbances in which one Jotapianus assumed the purple in the border territory between Cappadocia and Syria. In Syria itself appeared a third usurper, Julius Aurelius Sulpicius Uranius Antoninus, in whom we should doubtless see a relative of the Uranius of Severus Alexander’s reign. This latter pretender was able to hold out, in the critical time which followed, until 253/4.

These repeated blows of misfortune, threatening the dissolution of the Empire, shook Philip’s self-confidence to such a degree that in the Senate he offered to abdicate. Decius, who was then probably City Prefect, was the only member who opposed this offer. His reference to the weakness of these usurpers was justified in the case of Jotapianus and of Pacatianus; for the latter was soon afterwards killed by his own soldiers, and the former also met his end before the close of Philip’s reign. And now the Emperor, in attempting to clarify and secure affairs in the Danubian pro­vinces, pursued a course which was destined to lead to his own downfall. In Decius he recognized the man who could re-establish order there. It was with reluctance that Decius, who foresaw the result of a military success, allowed himself to be persuaded into accepting this commission which gave him the supreme command in Moesia and Pannonia. If we may believe the account of Jordanes in his Getica, a part of the soldiers had madecommon cause with the Goths. However, before the year 248 had reached its close, Decius must have succeeded in discharging his mission by some means or other; for an inscription of this year from Romula (now Recka on the right bank of the Alt), which had been fortified and probably made a colonia at this time, speaks of Philip and his house as ‘restitutores orbis totius.’

The energetic action of Decius seems to have repressed the Goths and their allies, for in spite of the turmoil of the following year they kept peacefully within their own territory. But the more the general succeeded in getting his troops in hand and in winning their confidence, the more worthy they thought him of the imperial power. In June 249 they compelled him to assume the purple. He sought an understanding with Philip and pro­mised to lay aside his imperial insignia on arrival in Rome. His sincerity may be gauged from the fact that he did not at first have his name and image stamped on the coins: he may perhaps have even continued to coin money in the name of Philip. The latter, however, did not trust Decius, and gathered an army. The Emperor had already stationed auxiliary troops in the fortified Concordia in Venetia and a strong detachment of the legion XIII Gemina at Aquileia. Apart from the troops in garrison in Italy we have no information about the composition of the army at whose head Philip, now in ill health, marched to meet Decius. But numerically it is said to have been superior to that of his opponent when the two forces met in September near Verona. Philip met his death in the battle, and the fortune of war decided in favour of the Pannonian Decius. On receipt of this news in Rome the Praetorians put the young Philip to death in their camp. A late tradition declares that the Philips were deified; but the fictitious claim of the Emperor Licinius Licinianus to be related to the house of Philip may have given rise to the story. The erasure of their names from inscriptions proves the contrary for the time of their downfall.

But in the Christian tradition the fact that Philip fell at the hands of Decius has brought him the place of honour as the first Christian emperor. It is true that at the beginning of 249 a pagan mob attacked the Christians in Alexandria; but for this there was certainly no official responsibility. Thus Dionysius, the contemporary bishop of Alexandria, could call the conduct of the Emperor a benevolent toleration. That Philip observed such a principle is shown by the fact that in his reign the bishop of Rome, Fabianus, could transfer to the capital the bones of Pontianus, who had died in exile in Sardinia. Letters which Origen sent to the Emperor and his wife prove only that they took an interest in religious questions; and from the fact that Eusebius knows of these letters but does not use them in proof of Philip’s Christianity it is clear that the Emperor was not a Christian, neither bap­tised nor catechumen. But to a generation of the faithful who had witnessed the horrors of the persecutions and who could, not wholly without reason, see in Decius’ persecution a reaction against the policy of Philip, the benevolent tolerance of the latter was a sufficient proof of an inner inclination towards Christianity. The time, however, had not yet come when a Roman emperor was to fill with new life the universal claims of the Imperium Romanum by uniting them with the equally universal claims of the Christian Church. Those threatening years still lay ahead in which Church and Empire alike were to undergo the severest trials. The fall of Philip was the preface to this period of distress. His rise as well as his overthrow had shown once more in the sharp illumination of inexorable facts that ‘ an emperor could be made elsewhere than at Rome.’ And, for those who had eyes to see, it could no longer remain a secret that the army created the emperors. Harsh reality had trampled underfoot the swelling ambitions of the Senate. What was left to it was merely the right, uncontested indeed but hardly ever in the future freely exercised, to co-operate in conferring that legal sanction which established a new master of the Roman world.