CHAPTER IX.

THE THIRD COALITION.

I.

(1805-6.)

On January 2, 1805, a month after his coronation as Emperor, Napoleon wrote to George III proposing peace, as neither nation had anything to gain by war. There was a marked change in his tone from that of 1803, when he declared that Great Britain was no match for France, and that, if the English were the first to draw the sword, he would be the last to sheathe it. Whether he had brought about the rupture of the Peace of Amiens of set purpose, or had built overmuch on Andreossy’s assurances of the pacific temper of the British ministry and people, he had little reason to be satisfied with the result. Europe was too narrow a field for his activity; and his mind was incessantly revolving schemes of conquest and colonial expansion in east or west, to which England was the great obstacle; but the renewal of war with her had not furthered them. French trade had been driven off the sea; the French fleets were blockaded in their ports. Santa Lucia and other West Indian islands had again passed into British hands; San Domingo, for the reconquest of which such great efforts had been made, had secured its independence; and Louisiana, the new acquisition from which so much was hoped, had been sold to the United States.

England had kept her hold of Malta, and had become a focus of conspiracies against Napoleon’s government and person. French troops had, indeed, occupied Hanover; but that was an affront to George III and an embarrassment to Prussia, rather than a blow to Great Britain. A superb army had been assembled round Boulogne, with wings at Brest and Texel, for the invasion of England and Ireland. This army numbered 170,000 men; and there were 280,000 men elsewhere (in France, Holland, Hanover, and Italy) to be provided for. The public expenditure of France rose to thirty millions sterling; and it became necessary to supplement direct by indirect taxes. The outbreak of war had caused a financial crisis; and public credit was so low that deficits could not be met by loans. The burden of taxation and conscription provoked much discontent in France; and Napoleon tried to shift this burden, so far as possible, on Italy, Switzerland and the Rhine lands. He had gained a reluctant ally in Spain, which, as we have already seen, declared war against England on December 12, 1804. But Spain was already paving an annual subsidy to France, and was making naval preparations under orders from Paris; so it was an advantage to Great Britain to be able to treat her as an enemy. In England trade was prosperous and credit good. Supplies of more than £53,000,000 were voted in 1804; yet at the end of the session the Speaker could say: “We have now the proud satisfaction to see that the permanent debt of the nation is rapidly diminishing, at the same time that the growing prosperity of the country has strengthened and multiplied all its resources.” Pitt, “the pilot that weathered the storm”, had been recalled to the helm, and had begun to form the Third Coalition.

Napoleon had good reason for desiring peace; but, as usual, he desired it on his own terms. These, as stated to the Legislative Body by Champagny on Jan. 1, 1805, were such as justified the British Government in regarding his overtures as a mere repetition of his manoeuvre of five years before, designed to exhibit Pitt as the obstacle to peace, the irreconcilable enemy of the French people and of the institutions they had chosen, and to strengthen the hands of Fox and his associates The reply to Napoleon’s overtures was that the King must communicate with the Continental Powers, to whom he was united in the most confidential manner, and particularly with the Emperor of Russia, before he could give a specific answer. It was suggested to the Tsar (January 21) that he should send an envoy to Paris to state on behalf of both Governments the indispensable conditions of peace. At the same time Pitt included in his budget a sum of five millions for foreign subsidies.

Alexander had been mortified at the secondary part he had played in the settlement of the affairs of Germany after the Treaty of Lunéville. His wishes, and even the promises made to him, had been disregarded by Napoleon; and he had recalled his ambassador, Markoff. The despatch of a French division to Taranto made him uneasy; for, while ostensibly a counter-stroke to the British retention of Malta, it was a step towards the annexation of southern Italy and the prosecution of Napoleon’s cherished designs in the East. In October, 1803, the Austrian Government was invited to make arrangements for joint action with Russia; but it shrank from the prospect of war. At length, in November, 1804, it consented to sign a declaration—the word “treaty” was studiously avoided—by which the two Powers bound themselves to help one another in resisting any further French aggressions in Italy or Germany, or upon the integrity of the Ottoman Empire.

Alexander was a compound of sentiment and self-seeking. Charm of manner and lofty aspirations veiled a steady pursuit of his own ends. The execution of the Due d’Enghien (March 20, 1804) “fired a mine already loaded”; the Tsar put his Court into mourning, and sent an indignant protest to Pans and to the German Diet. The French answer was that the First Consul did not interfere with the internal affairs of Russia, and would permit no Government to meddle with the internal affairs of France; and there was a significant reference to the assassination of the Emperor Paul. A complete rupture of diplomatic relations between the two countries followed.

The Russian Government had made overtures to Great Britain, as well as to Austria, in the autumn of 1803, with reference to French designs on Turkey; and the conditions of cooperation were discussed more actively after Pitt’s return to office and the breach between Russia and France. Pitt was ready to find money for the Continental Powers, but not for mere measures of self-defence. He desired a league, not against future aggressions on the part of France, but for the restoration of the status quo ante bellum, and for the erection of solid barriers. In November, 1804, Count Novossilzoff was sent to London to negotiate an alliance on such a basis. But the Russian Government had other things in view. Prince Adam Czartoryski, whom Alexander had lately made his Foreign Minister, was an ardent young Pole, who hoped to bring about the reunion of his country under the kingship of the Tsar, compensating Austria and Prussia on their western borders for the loss of their Polish provinces. He maintained that, if occasion should arise for dealing with the Turkish possessions in Europe, Moldavia and Constantinople should fall to Russia, while the rest might be formed into separate States under a Russian protectorate. On the other hand, England must amend her maritime code, and must hand over Malta to Russia; France might be compensated for her surrenders in Europe by an enlargement of her East Indian colonies; and in case of war, the promised British subsidy ought to be increased.

It is not surprising that, when such ideas as these prevailed at St Petersburg, the negotiation of an alliance proved difficult. A treaty was at length signed there on April 11, 1805, by which the two Powers agreed to form an European league for the restoration of peace and the balance of power. North Germany, Holland, Switzerland, and Italy were to be liberated from French control. Piedmont was to be restored to the King of Sardinia, and enlarged. Holland, Switzerland, and Prussia were also to receive additional territory, with the object of presenting a solid barrier against future French usurpations. The Allies disclaimed any intention of dictating the form of government in France. Great Britain, besides employing her own forces by land and sea, engaged to pay an annual subsidy of £1,250,000 for every 100,000 men employed by the Continental Powers against France, provided that the total number should not be less than 400,000. Of these Russia was to furnish 115,000, besides reserve corps on her own frontiers. It was agreed that England should restore the colonies and settlements in the East and West Indies which she had taken during the war; but Pitt resisted the Russian demands respecting Malta and the maritime code, and this delayed the ratification of the treaty for more than three months.

Napoleon clinched the Coalition when it seemed not unlikely to fall through. He had determined that the Italian (formerly Cisalpine) Republic should follow the example of the French Republic, and become a monarchy. Napoleon destined the crown for his brother Joseph, and so informed foreign Rowel's; but Joseph declined to renounce his right of succession to the throne of France for a nominal kingship. Louis also declined; whereupon Napoleon decided to assume the crown himself. He announced his decision to the French Senate on March 17, 1805, adding that the arrangement was provisional, and that the crowns would be separated on the advent of peace. By this concession he hoped to soothe not only Italy but Austria. He placed the iron crown of Lombardy on his own head at Milan on May 26, and chose his stepson, Eugene Beauharnais, as Viceroy.

An envoy from the Court of Naples demurred to the new title King of Italy, and drew from Napoleon one of his customary outbursts, in which he threatened to drive Queen Maria Carolina out of the peninsula. On June 4 he received a deputation from the Ligurian Republic, asking to be annexed to France. He granted the prayer which he had himself prompted, and so added to his naval resources the port of Genoa, and some thousands of excellent sailors. Lucca was turned into a principality for his sister Elise; and Parma and Piacenza were annexed shortly afterwards. By these steps, all Italy west of the Adige and north of Tuscany was brought under the direct rule of Napoleon; and little doubt was felt at Vienna that he would soon demand Venetia.

Austria had not recovered from the state of exhaustion to which she had been reduced by the wars of the Revolution. Her debt had risen to fifty millions sterling, while her annual revenue was under ten millions; and she had been driven to an inconvertible paper currency. The loss of Venetia would be a heavy blow to her financially, and would shut the door on her hopes of recovering lost ground in Italy. The Emperor Francis had at first shared the view of Archduke Charles that peace, retrenchment, and reform were the only way of salvation for the monarchy. He had made the Archduke War Minister in December, 1801, and had narrowed the functions of the Aulic Council for War. But the changes brought about by Charles did not find favour in high circles at Vienna; and there grew up a strong opposition to him. Champagny, the French Minister, wrote on July 26, 1802: “Archduke Charles, honoured by his own people, valued by all Germany, esteemed throughout Europe, is not loved in his own family: he is too big for them.” The Emperor was conservative by instinct, mistrustful of himself, but not inclined to delegate power. He sought wisdom in a multitude of counsellors, and preferred the old system of government by boards to the new system of ministers meeting in conference, which the Archiduke had persuaded him to adopt.

Charles was deeply impressed with the defects of the army, and wanted time to carry out his reforms. Both from a military and from a national point of view he was in favour of peace at almost any price. He pointed out (in a memoir dated March 3, 1804) that France could draw upon a population of 40,000,000 for her armies, while Austria had only 25,000,000, and could not apply conscription to more than half of them. Her finances were unequal even to a peace establishment. War would mean bankruptcy, for the British subsidies would not cover more than a quarter of the expenditure. Past experience showed how little the Russians were to be depended on as allies; and, even if Russia furnished 150,000 men, this would not make Austria a match for France. Prussia would be neutral or perhaps hostile; no help could be looked for from the secondary German States; and Great Britain would employ such troops as she could spare from home in enterprises against French and Dutch colonies. Instead of war, he urged alliance with France, which, being based on solid advantages for both sides, would be durable.

Cobenzl had made an attempt in this direction in 1801, when he succeeded Thugut as Foreign Minister; but it met with no success. Napoleon leaned to Prussia and Bavaria; and each year had brought changes to the disadvantage of Austria. His endeavours, as soon as he became Emperor, to represent himself as the successor of Charlemagne, roused the fear that the House of Habsburg would lose the titular headship of Germany, and led Francis to adopt a new title for himself, “Roman Emperor Elect, Hereditary Emperor of Austria” (August 11, 1804). Both he and his minister gradually drifted towards the war party, made up of the Archduke’s opponents. They came to the conclusion that war with the help of allies would be a less evil than peace with isolation. If they feared Napoleon, they also feared Alexander; and they were above all things anxious that Russia should not come to an understanding with France unless Austria were a party to it.

Charles was perhaps too prone to play the part of Jeremiah. A man prepared to prophesy smooth things was found in General Mack. He was a fluent talker who had risen from the ranks, and had Keen chief of Coburg’s staff in the campaigns of 1793-4. He had unbounded confidence in himself; and not only the Emperor Francis, but British officers and the British Government, took him at his own valuation, though Napoleon spoke of him as a charlatan. He had commanded the Neapolitan army in 1798, and had been forced to capitulate; but the blame was laid on his troops. In spite of the strongest opposition on the part of the Archduke, Mack was made Quartermaster-General in the spring of 1805, and had the chief voice in the preparations for war. The Aulic Council of War was restored to its old predominance, on the plea that the Archduke could not act as War Minister while commanding in the field.

Novossilzoff was waiting at Berlin for passports to proceed to Paris as the bearer of the reply of England and Russia to the peace proposals made by Napoleon at the beginning of the year, when Alexander received news of the annexation of Genoa. The Tsar at once recalled his envoy, considering the annexation a gross insult at such a moment, and pressed the Austrian Government to decide whether it would join the Coalition. If it consented, he was ready to increase his own contingent to 180,000 men. If it refused, it must not look to him in future for support against France. On July 7, 1805, the Austrian Government sent an affirmative reply, and acceded formally at St Petersburg on August 9. It undertook to furnish 315,000 men; but its army fell far short of that number. Sweden also joined the Coalition, and promised 12,000 field troops. Prussia declined to join, and asked Austria to unite with her in an attempt to mediate.

The French occupation of Hanover had given Prussia ample cause of quarrel. It was an infringement of the Treaty of Basel; it brought French troops into the midst of the Prussian dominions; and it was a severe blow to Prussian commerce, for it led the British to blockade the mouth of the Elbe. Napoleon was deaf to remonstrances on this subject, and he rejected the proposal that Prussia should guarantee the neutrality of Germany; that, as he told Lucchesini (November 27, 1803), would close the road from Strasbourg to Vienna, which he should have to take if he went to war with Austria. Nothing short of an alliance would satisfy him. At the Court of Berlin the general sentiment was strongly anti-French, but there was the old jealousy and distrust of Austria; and the arguments for keeping on good terms with France were pressed by men like Haugwitz and the Cabinet-Secretary Lombard, who had the ear of the King. Others were against taking either side, and maintained that as much might be won by wise and skilful diplomacy as by war, with less risk, and without any sacrifice of men or money.

This course commended itself to Frederick William III, who was diffident, irresolute, and parsimonious. He declared that he would have no war unless he was himself attacked. Early in 1804 he appealed to the Tsar to know if he might count on him in case of need; and on May 24 declarations were exchanged at Berlin, providing for joint resistance to any fresh aggressions by France east of the Weser. The seizure of Sir George Runibold, the British envoy at Hamburg (October 24, 1804), was a flagrant act of this description; and Hardenberg, who was by this time associated with Haugwitz as Foreign Minister, persuaded the King to send a remonstrance to Paris. Its terms were milder than Hardenberg wished; and Frederick William wrote at the same time to Haugwitz, asking how the matter might be settled without war if Napoleon disregarded it. The Emperor had wanted Rumbold’s papers rather than his person, and he made a merit of releasing him at the request of the King of Prussia; but he said privately that he had had a bad quarter of an hour which he hoped to pay back with interest.

There was great exultation in Berlin at the unexpected efficacy of the King’s intervention; and the relations of the two Powers seemed to be on a better footing than before. Napoleon was acknowledged without delay as Emperor of the French, and later as King of Italy; and Black Eagles were sent to Paris in exchange for the Golden Eagles of the newly-founded Legion of Honour. This brought friction with Gustavus IV of Sweden, the Quixote of legitimism, who returned his own Black Eagle to Berlin that he might not be on the same roll with Bonaparte. He received a warning from the Prussian Government that troops would be marched into Swedish Pomerania if any steps were taken there which might affect the neutrality of northern Germany; but he signed treaties with Great Britain and Russia, and the Tsar sent a counter-threat to Berlin.

Swedish Pomerania was one of the borderlands which Prussian statesmen coveted, to round off their own fragmentary territory. But they hankered much more after Hanover; and Napoleon was convinced (as he told the Austrian ambassador in May, 1803) that he could at any time secure Prussia by giving her a bone to gnaw. He had several intimations, especially after Hardenberg (who was himself a Hanoverian) became minister, that Prussia would like to occupy Hanover, if only as temporary custodian. Towards the end of 1804, the Prussian Government sounded the Tsar on this point; but he strongly disapproved of an arrangement which would release 25,000 French troops for use elsewhere.

In the summer of 1805 General Winzingerode paid a fruitless visit to Berlin, and then went to Vienna as the Tsar’s military representative. He had conferences there with Mack and other Austrian officers, which ended in a protocol drawn up on July 16. The plan of operations was based upon the memoir already referred to, prepared by Archduke Charles in March, 1804, which (as Lord Mulgrave remarked) “presents rather the laboured detail of obstacles to any attempt at opening a campaign against the power of France, than a system of action and vigorous operations.” The conclusion of the Archduke was that Austria, if successful, could hope to gain territory only in Italy; while, on the other hand, it was by way of Italy that the enemy could most easily reach Vienna. On that side, therefore, the Austrians should take the offensive in force; in the valley of the Danube they should occupy the line of the Iller, and wait for the Russians to join them.

In accordance with this general conception, it was settled at the end of August that the army of Italy should number 94,000 men, and be commanded by Archduke Charles; there should be 34,000 men in Tyrol and Vorarlberg; and 58,000 men should form the army of Germany, commanded nominally by the Emperor, or by the young Archduke Ferdinand of Modena in his absence, with Mack as chief of the staff. A Russian army of 55,000 men, under Kutusoff, was to cross the Galician frontier in the middle of August, and reach the Inn by the middle of October, twenty days (as it was reckoned) before the French army could arrive there from Boulogne. It was to be followed by two others under Bennigsen and Buxhowden. A Russian force was also to be sent to Stralsund, to form part of an army of 50,000 men under Gustavus, made up of Swedes, Danes, Hanoverians, and English, which was to recover Hanover and invade Holland; while an Anglo-Russian corps of 30,000 men, with 20,000 Neapolitans, was to drive the French out of southern Italy.

The utmost secrecy was observed about the negotiations and the preparations for war, lest the Austrians should be crushed before the Russians could join them. But Napoleon was on the alert, and took note of the gradual increase of Austrian troops in Italy and Tyrol. He warned the Court of Vienna, in June, 1804, that his attention was not absorbed by his preparations against England; and his tone became threatening when the recognition of his Imperial title was delayed. At the beginning of 1805 he demanded and received pacific assurances; at the same time he reinforced his army in Italy. He thought it unlikely that Austria would compromise herself when she had “nothing to hope for, and everything to lose”; and in any case he reckoned that she must show her hand three months before she would be ready for war.

In the meantime he hoped to carry out his project for the invasion of England, to which he clung with characteristic tenacity. The varia­tions in this scheme and the events which hindered its execution have already been described. When, on July 28, Villeneuve, after his in­decisive action with Calder, put into Vigo for repairs, Napoleon was beginning to change his mind about the intentions of Austria. On August 13 he told Talleyrand that he must know within a fortnight whether Austria meant peace or war, as the season was far advanced for a campaign. Late as it was, however, the Emperor Francis should understand that, if he elected for war, he would not spend Christmas in Vienna. The time had come to give Prussia her bone and to secure her help, in order either to paralyse the Coalition while Napoleon crossed the Channel, or to overpower it, if war should break out on the Continent. On August 8 the French ambassador at Berlin made a definite offer of Hanover, with a guarantee that the cession of it should be an essential condition of peace between France and Great Britain. Frederick William had scruples; he hesitated, but seemed inclined to negotiate; and to hasten the negotiation and settle details of cooperation Napoleon sent Duroc to Berlin at the end of August.

The invasion of England had been given up some days before. Some authorities have held that Napoleon never entertained, or had long abandoned, the hope of crossing the Channel. The Prussian ambassador, Lucchesini, and Archduke Charles, suspected at the time that the scheme was an excuse for keeping a large army on foot for use on the Continent; but the enormous expenditure incurred for the expedition, and the incompleteness of the preparations for a Continental war, militate against this conclusion. Napoleon, however, was not the man to dwell exclusively on a single scheme. It was his custom, as he said, “faire toujours son theme en deux façons”. The many disappointments he had met with, and the remonstrances of his naval officers, could hardly fail to cause him some misgivings about his project; and he had foreseen for some months that the action of Austria and Russia might oblige him to postpone it. No doubt it was with a sense of relief that he now turned his back on the sea, and entered upon land operations against troops which he had so often beaten. At any rate he could afford to wait no longer. He directed Talleyrand to prepare a circular showing how Austria had forced him into war; and on August 26 his army began its march from the Channel coast to the valley of the Danube.

The “Grand Army”, as it now became, consisted of seven army-corps, six divisions of heavy cavalry or dragoons, and a division of the Imperial guard, numbering altogether 190,000 men. The 1st corps, under Bernadotte, was in Hanover; the 2nd, under Marmont, in Holland; and the 7th, under Augereau, at Brest. The 3rd, 4th, 5th, and 6th corps, commanded respectively by Davout, Soult, Lannes, and Ney, were in the neighbourhood of Boulogne. Murat acted as the Emperor’s lieutenant, and had general command of the cavalry. It was the best army that Napoleon ever led. Nearly half the men had seen some war service; and a quarter of them had served throughout the wars of the Revolution. Four years of continental peace and the prolonged encampment at Boulogne had given opportunity to make good all defects; and the officers of corps and divisions had learnt to work together. The generals, while rich in experience, were in their prime, on an average barely over forty years of age. But the captains and subalterns were not much younger; and, though they knew their business, most of them had lost the spring of youth, and were confirmed grumblers.

Owing to the sudden change of plan, there was a great deficiency of supplies and transport; and this was aggravated by the rapidity with which the army moved. Cloaks and shoes were ordered at the last moment; and some of the dragoons were without horses. The proportion of field-guns was small, less than two to a thousand men. Magazines were formed at Strasburg and Mainz, and subsequently at Ulm and Wurzburg; but the army practically lived upon the country as soon as it left France. “Pillage became authorised”, says the Duc de Fezensac, “and the districts through which we passed suffered cruelly; yet we were none the less famished throughout the campaign”. This developed the habit of marauding and relaxed discipline.

To gain time, Napoleon told Talleyrand to change his tone: “Il ne faut plus d'audace, il faut de la pusillanimité”. But it was too late. On September 3 the Court of Vienna rejected the French ultimatum; and, on the 8th, the Austrian troops crossed the Inn. The Elector of Bavaria was called upon to unite his forces with those of Austria, but he had already thrown in his lot with France. Leaving Munich, he retired northward with his troops (27,000 men) to Wurzburg and Bamberg, to await the arrival of the French. Apart from hereditary antagonism to the House of Habsburg, the personal sympathies of Maximilian Joseph were with France, as were those of his minister, Montgelas. By the act of mediatisation which followed on the Peace of Lunéville, Bavaria had gained a quarter of a million in population, with a richer and more compact territory; and the Elector hoped for further gains. He would have preferred neutrality, but Napoleon would not hear of it; and on August 24 he signed a treaty of alliance with France. Hope and fear led other South-German States: Würtemberg, Baden, and Hesse-Darmstadt, to take the same course. The German people, to whom revolutionary France had brought more benefit than injury, made no protest.

The Austrian army advanced to the Iller; and by the end of September there were about 60,000 men between the Lech, the Danube, and the Lake of Constance. This forward position had been recommended by Archduke Charles, in order to cover Tyrol and watch the defiles through the Black Forest; but he now supported Archduke Ferdinand, who urged that Napoleon would be at Munich with 150,000 men before the Russians reached the Inn, and that only flying columns should be sent into Bavaria. Mack, however, persuaded the Emperor that it was impossible for Napoleon to bring more than 70,000 men across the Rhine.

On September 23 Napoleon explained to the Senate his reasons for war, and obtained an unconstitutional vote authorising him to call out all the conscripts of 1806 as well as the reserve conscripts of previous years. This yielded him 180,000 men, of whom three-fourths were actually under arms before the end of the year. On the 26th he arrived at Strasbourg; and Murat crossed the Rhine there with the cavalry and Lannes’ corps. This confirmed Mack in his belief that the French would approach the Danube, as in former wars, either through the Black Forest, or by skirting its southern border. But Napoleon intended to reach the Inn before the Russians, and to thrust himself between them and the Austrians; and this could only be done from the north.

On the 27th Ney passed the Rhine near Carlsruhe and pushed on to Stuttgart, where he was joined by Lannes and Murat, when their demonstration had served its purpose. Soult and Davout crossed lower down, at Speier and Mannheim, and took up the line of the Neckar to the north of Ney. Bernadotte marched from Gottingen to Wurzburg, where he found part of the Bavarian army, and was joined on the 30th by Marmont. By the beginning of October more than 200,000 French and Bavarians were assembled on the Neckar and the Main. Augereau’s corps, 14,000 strong, was on its way from Britanny; and contingents amounting to 16,000 men were being drawn from Baden, Würtemberg, and Hesse-Darmstadt. In the north of Italy Massena had nearly 50,000 men, while Saint-Cyr had 20,000 in the south.

Taking a south-easterly course and moving with a wide front, the Grand Army reached the Danube on October 6. It crossed at various points near Donauworth and Ingolstadt, driving before it the weak corps of Kienmayer, the only Austrian troops east of the Lech. Ney was left to the north of the Danube, to bar the roads leading from Ulm towards Bohemia. Bernadotte marched on Munich with his own corps and the Bavarians, while the rest of the army converged upon Augsburg, which was occupied by Oct. 10. The troops had marched two hundred miles in a fortnight, in terrible weather and with scanty food. Napoleon had effected his object, but for some days he was not aware of the full measure of his success. He thought it probable that the Austrian army, whose strength he put at 80,000 or perhaps 100,000 men, had retreated southward into Tyrol, or had escaped eastward by skirting the base of the Alps. Assuming that only a small garrison would be left in Ulm, he ordered Ney to take it. Dupont’s division thereupon advanced; but at Haslach, four miles north of Ulm, it encountered superior forces (October 11), and was obliged to retreat, leaving the northern roads open to the enemy.

If what has been aptly called “the fog of war” led Napoleon astray, much more was this the case with his antagonist. Archduke Ferdinand received instructions that, in case of any difference of opinion, he was to be guided by Alack, on whom rests, therefore, the whole responsibility. Alack was concentrating his troops at Ulm, when he learned that the French were on the Danube, fifty miles or more to the east of him. He began a movement on Augsburg; but his leading division came across Lannes’ corps at Wertingen, and was nearly destroyed (October 8). Checked in this direction, and refusing to retreat on Tyrol, he determined to strike northward, and cut the French communications. This plan was soon dropped, and then again taken up; and on the 13th one corps (Werneck’s) advanced halfway to Nordlingen. But by this time Napoleon had fully grasped the situation; Soult, Marmont, and Lannes were hastening to envelop Ulm on the southern side. When the heads of their columns were approaching the Iller, a report reached Alack that British troops had landed at Boulogne, and that there was a revolution in France. He jumped to the conclusion that the French army was in full retreat, cancelled his previous instructions, and issued orders for pursuit. His dream, as he afterwards called it, was soon dispelled. By the 15th the investment of Ulm was complete. The Archduke had ridden northward with a few squadrons; but Alack remained at Ulm with 25,000 men. It was not a place that could be defended against a serious attack, and it was short of supplies.

On October 17 Mack agreed to capitulate, unless he should be relieved within eight days. Two days afterwards he consented to an alteration of the terms; the surrender should take effect immediately, but the corps of Ney should remain at Ulm till the 25th. The point about which Mack showed most concern was that Napoleon should not think ill of his generalship. Meanwhile Murat was in hot pursuit of the Austrians who had gone northward. Werneck’s corps was overtaken and surrendered; but the Archduke, with about 2000 cavalry, escaped into Bohemia. The corps of Jellachich, which had been sent to rein­force Mack, made its way back to Vorarlberg much reduced. The total number of prisoners secured by the French was about 50,000.

Napoleon waited to see the troops at Ulm lay down their arms. On October 21, the day on which his naval power was shattered at Trafalgar, he left Ulm for Augsburg, after inviting his soldiers to deal with the Russians as they had dealt with the Austrians, and to settle the question whether the French infantry was the second or the first in Europe. He had still no easy task before him. Kutusoff had reached Braunau with 40,000 Russians, and was joined there by 25,000 Austrians. In a few weeks another Russian army would come up; and Archduke Charles might bring his troops from Italy to help in barring the road to Vienna, or might descend on the flank or rear of the French army as it moved down the valley of the Danube.

Prussia, too, had changed her attitude. Hardenberg had been in favour of accepting Hanover with the conditions attached to the transfer. He disliked the system of neutrality which had been so long adhered to, and believed that a more spirited and less drifting policy was better for Prussia. Her enlargement and consolidation were his persistent aim, and he saw more prospect of effecting them by an alliance with France than by union with the eastern Powers. He was supported by the Duke of Brunswick; but Haugwitz advocated an armed neutrality. That was the course which the King decided on; and Duroc (who arrived shortly afterwards) could not move him. He would give no facilities for the movement of French troops across neutral German States. Duroc reported, however, that the Prussian army was quite unready to take the field; and Napoleon, while beginning to feel some distrust of the Prussian Government, felt more contempt for it. He blamed Bernadotte for deviating from the direct route from Gottingen to Wurzburg on account of scruples about neutral territory, and told him to pass through Ansbach oil his further march to Ingolstadt.

The news of this affront reached Frederick William at a critical moment. The Tsar had been pressing him to join the Coalition, or at any rate to allow the Russian troops to cross Silesia. He had refused, and, when he was told that the Russians would force their way, he had put his army on a war establishment. Alexander was unwilling to carry out his threat; and the march of the Russians was delayed for some weeks. He sent Dolgorouki to Berlin with a fresh appeal; but on October 6 the King reaffirmed his unalterable resolution to declare against any Power which should violate his territory. He learned immediately afterwards that the French had passed through Ansbach three days before. His indignation was extreme, and was shared by his army and people, which had long felt sore at the mean part which Prussia had come to play in Europe. The desired permission was at once given to the Russian troops. On October 25 Alexander was cordially received at Potsdam; the sovereigns renewed the friendship which they had formed at Memel in 1802, and swore before the tomb of Frederick the Great to be faithful to each other. A convention was signed on November 3, by which Prussia undertook to present to Napoleon conditions of peace substantially the same as those laid down in the Anglo-Russian treaty, except as regards Piedmont and the Netherlands. The King promised, if these proposals were rejected, to put 180,000 men into the field in order to enforce them; and a plan of operations was settled. Four weeks were to be allowed for negotiation with France, to give time for military preparations.

Prussia was to obtain a better frontier, either by new acquisitions or by exchange: and the Tsar promised his good offices to bring about the cession of Hanover. He sent Oubril to London with this object; but Pitt, while willing to pay a subsidy, declared that, “as for the exchange of Hanover, no minister would be imprudent enough to make such a proposal to the King, and great care will be taken always to conceal it from him.” The British Government had been urging for some time past that the influence of France over Prussia should be met “by uniting temptation with menace, and by acting at the same time upon the fears and upon the cupidity of the Prussian Government.” They proposed to extend its possessions west of the Rhine up to a line drawn from Maestricht to Luxemburg, so that it might form part of the French barrier. This proposal was now renewed as an alternative to the cession of Hanover; but it was less attractive to Prussia, and was not regarded favourably by Austria or Russia. It was an offer, too, of part of the bear’s skin before the bear was dead.

The affair of Ansbach is an example of that recklessness on Napoleon’s part which made Simon Woronzoff say of him: “Avec toutes les qualiteés d’un vrai scéléerat qu'il possède en perfection, il finira ma, faute de bon sens.” But, if he wantonly added new enemies to old, no one ever knew better how to deal with them in succession, and to make up for opposing odds by celerity and precision of stroke. By a rapid advance on Vienna he hoped to defeat Kutusoff before he was reinforced, and to force Francis to make peace, as he had done in 1800. He sent Nev with the Bavarians into Tyrol, and ordered Augereau to follow with his corps as soon as it arrived. He directed Bernadotte and Marmont on Salzburg, where they would cover his own flank, and would be able to turn the left of Kutusoff if he should try to hold the line of the Inn. But Kutusoff made no such attempt. In spite of Austrian remonstrances, he fell back from one line to another as the French approached, and fought only rearguard actions.

On November 5 Napoleon was at Linz. There he received proposals for an armistice from Francis; but, while ready to treat for peace, he refused to stop the march of his columns. Archduke Ferdinand had gathered about 9000 men in Bohemia, and a Russian force was rumoured to be there also; so Napoleon formed a new corps under Mortier, made up of divisions from other corps, which was to march down the left bank of the Danube and push out reconnaissances. This made Kutusoff uneasy, for he thought the object was to cut him off from the army which was crossing Silesia. Parting company with the Austrians, he crossed the Danube at Mautem, fell upon the leading division of Mortier’s corps, and nearly destroyed it. He then marched towards Olmütz, followed by Bernadotte. The Austrian corps which had been cooperating with him turned southward into the mountains, to keep the road over the Semmering open for the army of Italy, but was so roughly handled by Davout and Marmont, that only fragments of it found their way to Pressburg.

Napoleon entered Vienna, which was undefended, on November 13, and took up his residence at Schonbrunn. He at once organised an administration of the archduchy, and imposed a war contribution of four millions sterling. By a ruse de guerre, possession was gained of the bridge over the Danube, which was to prove a formidable obstacle in 1809. Murat was sent on with the cavalry and with the corps of Lannes and Soult to intercept Kutusoff. He ought to have succeeded, but he allowed himself to be tricked in turn by the Russian general, who professed that he was authorised to treat for the retirement of the Russian armies into Poland, and so gained time to reach Znaym. Bagration’s corps had to be left behind in presence of the French; but it succeeded in rejoining the army, after losing a third of its men in a fight against great odds at Hollabrunn. By November 19 Kutusoff had effected his junction with Buxhowden’s army between Brünn and Olmütz.

While the Austrian defence in the valley of the Danube had so completely collapsed, the vigorous offensive, which, according to the plan of campaign, was to be taken in Italy, had come to nothing. When Archduke Charles took command of the army of Italy on September 20, he found his divisions under strength and short of equipment and transport. He was soon called upon to send assistance to the army of Germany. He was a man of more ability than energy, cautious rather than enterprising, and subject to nervous convulsions. His disapproval of the war and foreboding of disaster perhaps quenched his activity. At any rate he accepted the proposal of Massena that six days’ notice should be given before hostilities began; and under this convention the two armies remained passive till the middle of October. By that time the Archduke had 90,000 men under his command, including 15,000 men in southern Tyrol. Massena had only 53,000, but Saint-Cyr was bringing 10,000 from southern Italy. By dint of threats, Napoleon had forced a treaty of neutrality upon the Neapolitan Government, which was ratified on October 8.

In spite of his inferiority in numbers, Masséna denounced the convention and took the offensive. On November 19 he gained possession of the Castel Vecchio bridge at Verona, which enabled him to pass the Adige. On the 29th he attacked the Austrian army in its intrenched position behind Caldiero. Three days obstinate fighting ended in the repulse of the French; but the Archduke did not follow up his success. He had heard of the disaster at Ulm, and had already suggested that the Austrian forces should evacuate Italy and Tyrol. He had sent off some of his guns and stores, and now seized the opportunity to begin his retreat. Massena followed and harassed his rear-guard, but did not seriously interfere with him.

On November 8 the Archduke reached the Tagliamento, and halted there some days to give his brother John time to bring away the troops in Tyrol. Some of the corps there were cut off; Jellachich surrendered to Augereau; and Rohan, after an adventurous march which brought him almost to Venice, surrendered to Saint-Cyr. With the remainder, John made his way by Villach to Marburg, where he was joined on the 26th by the army of Italy. Knowing that Napoleon had gone to meet the Russians in Moravia, Charles had thoughts of forcing the Semmering and recovering Vienna. The task should not have been too much for 80,000 men. He decided, however, to march round by Hungary, where he would meet with no opposition; and he had reached Kormond when he heard, on December 6, of the battle of Austerlitz.

Napoleon had joined Murat at Brünn on November 20. He had hoped to dictate peace at Vienna; but Francis, though he continued to negotiate, could not be brought to cede Venetia and Tyrol. In spite of his successes, or rather by reason of them, Napoleon’s position grew critical. He was five hundred miles from the French frontier. Winter was approaching, and his soldiers were longing to get home. The conscription was causing great discontent in France; there were plots and a financial crisis in Paris. The corps of the Grand Army were scattered, forming a huge horse-shoe round Vienna, Bernadotte was at Iglau, watching the Archduke Ferdinand; Davout had his head-quarters at Pressburg, to hold Hungary in check; Marmont was guarding the passes of Styria; Ney, having done his work in Tyrol, had moved on into Carinthia; while Augereau had been sent north into Swabia. Mortier’s divisions garrisoned Vienna. Massena, who was expected to be at Gratz, had halted at the Venetian frontier. Napoleon had only about 40,000 men with him at Brünn; while at Olmütz nearly 90,000 Russians and Austrians were assembled towards the end of the month, with the two Emperors at their head. If he attacked them, he could only hope to win a costly and barren victory, a prelude to a winter campaign. In a few days they would be reinforced by another Russian corps, that of Essen. By the middle of December their numbers would be more than doubled by the arrival of Bennigsen’s army and that of Archduke Charles, while the Prussians would also come into the field. The British ministers were reckoning that more than three-quarters of a million of men would be available for the next campaign.

While giving his troops a few days of much-needed rest, Napoleon tried to break up the Coalition by means of diplomacy. Talleyrand urged him to make a friend of Austria, and to compensate her at the expense of Turkey for the sacrifices he required of her in Germany and Italy. As a powerful Danubian State, she would be a buffer against Russian encroachments ; and her interests would be bound up with those of France. But Napoleon hankered after an understanding with the Tsar. The news of Trafalgar had lately reached him; and, in the indirect war against England to which he was now reduced, the war of blockade, he looked upon Russia as his best ally. Stadion and Gyulai, who came to his headquarters to reopen negotiations on behalf of the Emperor Francis, were sent on to Vienna, to be kept in play by Talleyrand. Haugwitz, the bearer of the Prussian ultimatum disguised as an offer of mediation, was detained two days at Iglau that he might not meet Stadion. Haugwitz had a short interview with Napoleon, in which he was careful not to commit himself; and he, too, was sent on to Vienna. There he was profuse in his assurances to Talleyrand that the King was bound to nothing more than the tender of his good offices. Meanwhile Napoleon wrote to the Tsar, proposing a personal interview. Alexander declined, but sent his aide-de-camp, Dolgorouki, who was met by Napoleon at the French outposts on November 30. In reply to a suggestion that Russia should annex Moldavia instead of quarrelling with France, Dolgorouki said that the Tsar’s policy was quite disinterested, and he stated the conditions which the Allies insisted on. These (as Napoleon wrote that day to Talleyrand) included the withdrawal of the French from Belgium, which was to be united to Holland. “What, Brussels too!” said Napoleon, “not even if you were on the heights of Montmartre”.

By this time, however, another way of escape from his embarrassments was opening for Napoleon. The allied army began to advance on Brünn. Czartoryski advised Alexander to leave the army to Kutusoff, whose command was only nominal while the two sovereigns were with him. But Alexander had cooled towards his favourite, who was anti-Prussian, and had powerful enemies in the Old-Russian party. He lent a willing ear to courtiers like Dolgorouki, who assured him that his presence and control would secure victory for his troops and glory for himself. He had chosen an Austrian, Colonel Weyrother, a man of the Mack type, as chief of the staff, and was persuaded by him that Napoleon’s unwonted inactivity showed he felt himself no match for the Russians, and that he might be cut off" from Vienna. A move in some direction was imperative, as supplies were running short at Olmutz; so it was decided to advance.

On November 28 the French outposts at Wischau were driven in. Napoleon at once penetrated the design of the Allies, and did his best to encourage them in its prosecution. He drew his troops back, and chose a position between Brünn and Austerlitz, which seemed to lend itself to that turning movement at which Weyrother was aiming. He determined that this should be no ordinary battle, but should finish the war with a clap of thunder. The plateau of Pratzen offered such strong ground that the enemy might be deterred from attacking him there; so he left it to them, and concealed his troops, so far as possible, in the hollows behind it. He intrenched a hill on the Olmutz road, and seemed to be making preparations for a rear-guard action to cover his retreat. He called up Bernadotte from Iglau, and one of Davout’s divisions from the Danube, so that by the day of battle he had 65,000 men at his disposal. The leisurely movements of the Allies gave him ample time.

The French position extended about seven miles along the Goldbach, from the Olmutz road southward to Tellnitz. The southern half of it was occupied by a single division (Legrand’s) of Soult’s corps; but a few miles to the west lay Friant’s division of Davout’s corps, which reached Raigern Abbey on the evening of December 1, after marching seventy miles in forty-four hours. In the northern half of the position, Lannes’ corps was astride of the Olmutz road; Murat’s cavalry was on his right; and to the right of Murat were Bernadotte’s corps and two divisions of Soult’s corps. The Imperial Guard and Oudinot’s grenadiers were in reserve behind Bernadotte. Napoleon massed his troops here for a counter-stroke against the enemy’s centre, when their left should be engaged in turning the French right. His confidence was such that, on the eve of the battle, he told his soldiers what would happen.

Early on the morning of December 2— the first anniversary of Napoleon’s coronation— three columns of Russians under Buxhowden, with an advanced guard of Austrians, more than 30,000 men in all, descended from the plateau of Pratzen upon Tellnitz and Sokolnitz. They expected to meet with little resistance there, and wheeling northward they were to join hands with a fourth column of 16,000 men, under Kolowrat, which was directed upon the centre of the French position. On the right, the corps of Bagration and some 10,000 cavalry under Liechtenstein advanced against Ijannes and Murat, mainly as a demonstration. The Russian Guards remained in reserve.

Napoleon did not wait for these attacks to develop. As soon as “the sun of Austerlitz,” breaking through the mists, showed him that the plateau of Pratzen was comparatively bare of troops, he ordered his left and centre to advance. Soult’s divisions (Saint-Hilaire and Vandamme) encountered Kolowrat’s column at the village of Pratzen, drove it back, and reached the plateau, cutting the allied army in two. Bernadotte and Lannes also drove back the enemy in their front. There were some brilliant cavalry charges, which ended to the advantage of the French; and, after four or five hours’ hard fighting, the battle was won. The Austro-Russian right and centre retreated in disorder on Austerlitz, the two Emperors with them. Meanwhile Buxhowden’s columns had been making slow progress against the obstinate resistance of Legrand and Friant. Before they realised what had taken place on the plateau, their direct line of retreat was cut off. Their only way of escape was by the dyke which separated the lakes of Mönitz and Satschan; and on this the French guns concentrated their fire. Many were drowned in trying to cross the thin ice of the lakes. It is uncertain how large a deduction should be made from the 20,000 of the Thirtieth Bulletin, or even from the 2000 of Thiers; but, at all events, 30 guns were afterwards recovered from Lake Satschan. Most of Buxhowden’s force laid down their arms. The total loss of the Allies was about 26,000 men and 180 guns; that of the French was about 7000.

But the losses were no adequate measure of the victory. It was Napoleon’s chef d’oeuvre, the battle of which he was most proud; and it completely demoralised the beaten army. “There were no longer regiments or army corps”, says Czartoryski, “there were only disorderly bands of marauders.” Austrians and Russians blamed one another for their defeat. They retreated in a south-easterly direction to Goding, where they crossed the March into Hungary. They were not closely pursued, for Murat by mistake took the road to Olmütz. Alexander was deeply depressed, and listened to those who told him he had done enough for others, and must now think of himself. With his concurrence Francis asked for an interview with Napoleon, which took place on the 4th. An armistice was granted, on condition that the Russians should evacuate Austrian territory within a month, and that no other foreign army (i.e. the Prussian) should enter it. Napoleon is said to have offered to leave Austria intact, if Russia would join in a treaty of peace excluding British trade from the Continent. Alexander would not consent, but he told Francis not to reckon any longer on the Russian army; and he sent word to the King of Prussia that he hoped he would find means of coming to an arrangement with France. At the same time he placed the corps of Tolstoy and Bennigsen, which were in northern Germany, at the disposal of Frederick William.

Negotiations for peace between France and Austria were begun at Nikolsburg, and completed at Pressburg (December 26). No representatives of other Powers, except Bavaria, were allowed to take part in them. Austria recognised all the changes already made by France in Italy, and ceded Venetia (including Istria and Dalmatia, but not Trieste) to the King of Italy, subject to the promise already made by Napoleon that the crowns of France and Italy should be separated at the general peace. The Emperor Francis renounced all feudal rights over Bavaria, Würtemberg, and Baden. He ceded Tyrol and Vorarlberg with several smaller districts to Bavaria, while his possessions in Swabia were divided between Baden and Würtemberg. The Electors of Bavaria and Würtemberg were recognised as kings; and so, by the irony of fate, Napoleon bestowed a crown on the daughter of George III. Bavaria was authorised to annex the free city of Augsburg, and Austria to annex Salzburg, the ex-Grand-Duke of Tuscany receiving Wurzburg in exchange for it. On the whole, the Emperor Francis lost nearly three millions of subjects and one-sixth of his revenue. He agreed to pay forty millions of francs in lieu of the unpaid portion of the war contribution imposed on his hereditary States. On the advice of Archduke Charles, he replaced Cobenzl by Stadion, in order to appease Napoleon. The Archduke had an interview with Napoleon on December 27, but was unable to obtain any mitigation of the terms. The treaty was ratified on January 1, 1806.

The Austrian negotiators had been placed at great disadvantage by the signature of a treaty between France and Prussia a few days before. Haugwitz had held back his ultimatum till he could learn the result of the battle which was imminent; and after Austerlitz he suppressed it. Talleyrand wrote on that day, “He seems to have come to await events rather than with any other object.” On December 14 he was received by the Emperor at Schonbrunn. Napoleon had no exact knowledge of the Potsdam agreement, but he had learnt something of it, especially from Dolgorouki, and he poured out threats and reproaches. Later in the day he sent for Haugwitz again, and told him that Austria was ready to become his ally and was asking for Hanover for one of the Archdukes, but he would prefer alliance with Prussia. Haugwitz suggested a triple alliance, to include Russia. Napoleon said he asked for nothing better, but that would be a work of time, and he could not wait. “Napoleon’s art of diplomacy,” says Seeley, “was very similar to his fashion of making war. It was a singular mixture of cunning and audacity, made more effective by extreme rapidity.” It prevailed with Haugwitz, who, on December 15, signed at Vienna the treaty dictated to him. The terms of this treaty were that there should be an alliance, offensive and defensive, between France and Prussia. The latter should cede Cleves to a Prince of the Empire, to be designated by Napoleon (it was to be Murat), Neuchatel to France, and Ansbach to Bavaria, receiving in exchange Hanover and a rectification of the Baireuth boundary. Prussia was to guarantee the changes made in Germany and Italy.

Having disposed of his principal antagonists, Napoleon turned his attention to the minor operations in the north and south, which he had hitherto disregarded. Augereau was sent northward; and Massena was directed to march on Naples with 40,000 men, accompanied by Joseph as the Emperor’s representative. Napoleon had refused to admit any stipulations on behalf of the Neapolitan Bourbons into the Treaty of Pressburg; and, on the very day on which that treaty was signed, he declared his intention to “hurl from the throne that criminal woman who has so shamelessly violated everything that is sacred among men” (Bulletin 37). The Court of Naples had delivered itself into his hand. It had no sooner ratified its treaty of neutrality with France than it assured the Russian minister that this convention, extorted by force, was not binding, and called on the Allies to furnish the assistance they had promised. Towards the end of November, 1805, 13,000 Russians from Corfu and 7000 British troops from Malta disembarked in the Bay of Naples. They were joined by a few thousand Neapolitans, and by the middle of December they reached the northern frontier of the kingdom. When news came that the Allies had been defeated at Austerlitz, and that a strong French army was marching on Naples, it was at first decided to retreat into Calabria; but the Russian general Lacy, who was in chief command, received orders from the Tsar to bring his troops away; and, in spite of the bitter reproaches of the Queen, they reembarked for Corfu in the middle of January, while the British forces sailed for Messina. The King and his consort retired to Palermo.

The army which was to recover Hanover and invade Holland, under the leadership of the King of Sweden, proved equally ineffectual. About 20,000 Russians and Swedes assembled at Stralsund in October, and after some delay (owing to differences between Gustavus and the Prussian Government) marched into Hanover. There they were to be joined by 30,000 British and Hanoverian troops under Lord Cathcart; but some of the British ships were delayed by adverse winds till the end of December. The Allies had done nothing but sit down before Hameln, where there was a small French garrison, when the victory of Austerlitz and the changed attitude of Prussia caused the army to break up. The British force reembarked at Bremen in February, 1806; and the Swedes and Russians retired to Stralsund.

Lord Harrowby had gone to Berlin in the middle of November, 1805, to settle the terms of alliance between Great Britain and Prussia. He was authorised to promise subsidies for 250,000 men; and, if Prussia hesitated to accede to the Anglo-Russian alliance, he might agree to some more limited engagement, such as the deliverance of Holland and north Germany. On Dec. 22 Hardenberg told him that, owing to the turn events had taken, the treaty must lie by for the present, but asked for a loan of £1,000,000. He also stated that, to prevent a fresh occupation of Hanover by the French, Prussia intended to occupy it. The Russian troops there had been placed at the disposal of the King of Prussia; and he proposed that the British and Swedish troops should receive orders to retire behind the Prussians, but support them if they were attacked. This proposal, to which Pitt was not indisposed to agree, aggravated the bad faith which acceptance of the Treaty of Vienna would involve. The terms of that treaty were not known at Berlin till Haugwitz arrived there on the 25th; and, even then, they were not disclosed to the British and Russian ministers. A State Council was held on January 3, 1806, to consider the terms. Hardenberg opposed the ratification of the treaty; Beyme was in favour of it; Haugwitz and the Duke of Brunswick recommended that it should be ratified with certain modifications. This last was the course which the King adopted. He had repented, even before Austerlitz, of having committed himself to the Coalition, and is said to have given Haugwitz private instructions to prevent a breach with France in any circumstances. The modifications made were as follows. The alliance must be defensive only; Hanover should not be annexed, but occupied provisionally; Hamburg and Bremen should be included in the transfer to Prussia; but Ansbach, the patrimony of the House of Hohenzollern, should not be given up. Laforest, the French Minister, exchanged ratifications of the treaty as modified, but subject to the Emperor’s approval; and on January 14 Haugwitz set out for Paris to obtain it.

Harrowby had left Berlin a few days before, as the Anglo-Prussian treaty had fallen through. At his farewell audience, the King told him that he was endeavouring to make an arrangement by which he hoped to preserve the tranquillity of north Germany until a definitive peace, and trusted he should be supported in the event of failure. Of the details Harrowby learnt nothing. His return was anxiously looked for by Pitt, who was then on his deathbed. He died on January 23; and the Coalition, already dismembered, lost its soul. The events of December hastened Pitt’s end; but the “Austerlitz look” was already in his face before that battle was fought, when he could still say, “England has saved herself by her exertions, and will, as I trust, save Europe by her example.” An impracticable sovereign and a virulent Opposition had overtaxed a constitution never robust. It added to the European significance of his death that none of his colleagues could take his place; in the new ministry which was formed Fox was the principal figure.

Macaulay has described Pitt as a good peace minister, but “unequal to surprising and terrible emergencies,” and has contrasted him with Chatham. But the difference in their performance as war ministers was in the circumstances rather than in the men. The father had the good fortune to have Frederick as ally; the son had Napoleon as antagonist. Pitt’s spirit was as lofty and steadfast as Chatham’s; and, if he was less inspiring, he was a better administrator, far more competent to deal with the financial problems on which the continuance of the struggle depended. Pitt suffers most by comparison in his excessive deference to the King, who was jealous of ministerial interference in military matters. But it should be remembered that, while Chatham reaped the benefit of the breach between George II and the Duke of Cumberland, caused by the Convention of Klosterzeven, Pitt’s hands were tied by the state of George III’s health, and by the character of the war, a war of established authority against revolution.

CHAPTER X.

THE THIRD COALITION.

II.