POPE LEO X

CHAPTER VI.

Leo X and the Imperial Succession.

NO period of the pontificate of Leo X has been more discussed or so differently judged than his attitude regarding the important question of the succession to the Empire. It is very difficult to form a correct judgment of his policy, through all its hesitations and evasions, its deviations and changes, or to bring to light the true motives and objects which he kept so carefully hidden. This difficulty remains in spite of the documentary evidence which, if by no means complete, is sufficiently abundant to make known with tolerable clearness all that is essential to the understanding of Leo’s attitude. By a closer study of the sources of information, it is shown that the opinion held so long, that the Pope allowed himself to be guided in this matter solely by nepotism, is undoubtedly incorrect. On the contrary, what Leo X had most at heart were the temporal power and independence of the Holy See and the so-called liberty of Italy. The exaltation of his relatives, on which he was undeniably too much bent, came only in the second place. All these different objects worked simultaneously with him, and in trying to promote one he was at the same time working for the others. In individual cases it is often difficult to decide with any certainty which motive was strongest, and which was relegated to the background.

If we take a general view of the whole attitude maintained by Leo X in the years 1518 and 1519, we can see that the leading motive of his conduct in the matter of the imperial succession was the care that the temporal and moral influence of the Holy See should suffer no injury, were an already powerful prince to gain possession of the imperial crown. The crown of Charlemagne was still surrounded by a mystic halo ; and if in reality it did not possess the same significance, it might offer to an ambitious prince a title—not to be underrated—to many dangerous claims. Wolsey expressed the opinion of the time when he wrote to his Ambassador in Rome that scarcely anything on earth could be compared with the imperial dignity .

Looked at from this point of view, neither of the two Kings who were the most eager candidates for the imperial dignity was pleasing to the Pope. Either Charles of Spain or Francis I would obtain a supremacy as Emperor, which might be very dangerous to the Holy See and to Italy, especially as one had already a footing in the south, and the other in the north of the peninsula. If at first the dislike of the Pope to the election of Charles was the more prominent, it is easily explained. Charles, to whom, on the 1st of April, 1517, Leo had confirmed the title of “Catholic King,” ruled not only over Aragon and Castile, but also over Naples, Sicily, and Sardinia, as well as over the Burgundian-Dutch territory, in addition to countries of incalculable importance in the New World. Not only was Charles the more powerful of the two, but he held larger views about the imperial dignity; whereas the designs of the French King were not so well known to Rome. Charles, moreover, might be especially dangerous to the Holy See because, by his sovereignty over Naples, he could make a much deeper impression on Rome than could the possessor of Milan. It had been the principle of the Holy See since the time of the Hohenstaufen that the crown of Naples could never belong to the Emperor; and this now weighed heavily in the balance. “Do you know,” asked Leo one day of the Venetian Ambassador, “how many miles it is from here to the borders of the Neapolitan territory? Forty. Then Charles must never be appointed King of Rome!”. Leo had every right to appeal to the Bull of Julius II (July 3, 1510), relating to the investiture of Ferdinand the Catholic with the crown of Naples.

But, on the other hand, an increase of the power of the French King could not be desired by the Pope. Not only as sovereign of Milan, but in a variety of other ways, the ambition and spirit of enterprise of Francis I had already made things very uncomfortable for the Holy See.

After much deliberation, the idea occurred to Leo X whether the imperial crown might not be given to a third party—to some German prince—who was not already too powerful, and who had no connection with Italy. Already Rome had turned her eyes towards the “most earnest and clever” of the Electors, Frederick of Saxony, as a possible candidate for the imperial dignity. In this Leo was not influenced by any worldly or political reason, but solely by the interests of the Church. The Elector of Saxony possessed as his subject that passionate professor of Wittenberg, Martin Luther, whose new doctrines seemed so dangerous that it had been already determined in the beginning of September to procure the help of Frederick against him by the gift of the Golden Rose, which he had desired for three years. On the 7th of October, 1518, Cardinal Cajetan was commissioned to confer this mark of distinction on him, on the condition that he would agree to deliver up Luther. The same idea gave birth to the thought of holding before him the prize of the imperial crown as an inducement to take measures to suppress the Lutheran movement. This may explain the difficulties made by the Elector Frederick, which were such as to lead the Pope to make advances on the same lines to the more ecclesiastically-minded Elector, Joachim of Brandenburg.

The scheme of the Pope to promote the choice of one of the Electors for the imperial crown, can be seen more clearly during the second period of the contest for that supreme dignity, after the death of Maximilian, when, as was but natural, the struggle became more acute. From the beginning, Leo X was sincere in wishing for neither Charles nor Francis—least of all the former. There can be scarcely a doubt as to this, however skilfully he tried to conceal his real opinions, or however often he seemed to waver.

I

Maximilian’s plan to secure his grandson Charles’s succession to the Empire, by ensuring his choice at the Diet of Augsburg as King of Rome, became known at the Vatican in the middle of April 1518, or perhaps sooner, and affected the mind of the Pope most painfully. By the middle of August this election of Charles was supposed in Rome to be immediately impending, even if not already accomplished.

Leo’s attitude towards Charles at that time was fully though cautiously described in a letter from Cardinal Giulio de’ Medici to Cardinal Bibbiena, who was then in France. Two reasons, says Medici, were alleged why the Pope considered that the truth of the report should be duly weighed. First, His Holiness wondered how Maximilian could have contrived to persuade the Electors to choose a King of Rome so quickly and so easily, as hitherto such an election had not taken place before the death of the predecessor, or at any rate before his coronation as Emperor. Secondly, the Pope was astonished how Charles could have accepted the election so unreservedly, in face of the decree of Julius II, in which it was expressly laid down that the investiture to the kingdom of Naples lapsed and returned to Rome, as soon as the occupant of the Neapolitan throne was elected to be King of Rome. The Pope was convinced that when he had secured the title of King of Rome, Charles would still keep possession of the throne of Naples. He feared still more that, after the imperial election had been carried out, the confirmation of Charles as Emperor in the possession of Naples would be demanded of the Holy See, which would gain but little by the concession. In face of this condition of things, Bibbiena was instructed to obtain promptly and by any means, information as to the position of the French King, so that the Pope might act accordingly.

If Francis attached but little importance to the matter of the election, the Pope could accommodate himself to the situation, and draw the best possible advantage from it, even if this should be but slight compared with the great favour at stake. If, on the other hand, he knew for certain that the election of Charles would be displeasing to the French King, and that in the case of a refusal or delay in granting the investiture of Naples, he could rely upon France, he would act otherwise, for the greater dignity and security of the Holy See.

At the conclusion of this remarkable letter the writer once more emphasized the obligation of the Pope to protect his ancient and sacred rights, in the interests of the Roman See. For two hundred years it had never given the investiture of the throne of Naples without the express condition which excluded its union with the title of King of Rome. If he now departed from this rule he would be acting against the precedent given by his predecessors, and also against his own principles, besides exposing himself to great dangers. On the other hand, a refusal of investiture would provoke the anger of Maximilian and Charles; and this he could not venture to do without the help and favour of France.

This letter is very characteristic of Leo’s attitude. No one could infer from it that he would take up a decided position against Charles. Nevertheless, it is no secret that the Pope was by no means desirous of his election, or that he would willingly work against it if he could be sure beforehand of the support of France. Before he had obtained such a certainty he did not wish to cut himself off from the possibility of an arrangement with Charles, which he might turn to account to the advantage of his family. Moreover, Charles’s acceptance of the five years’ truce, and his offers to help in the Turkish war, which had been laid before the Cardinals at a Consistory held on the 23rd of August: deterred Leo from taking open measures against the Spanish King. But that the Pope should, by making a virtue of necessity, have at that time agreed to Charles's election, was not honest. He had not, however, arrived at a final decision. His natural hesitancy was increased by the extraordinary difficulty of the situation; for, as matters stood, he had to choose between breaking with the Emperor and Spain, or with France. In September the news reached Rome that Maximilian had obtained the votes of four Electors for the choice of Charles to be King of Rome; but that the Elector of Saxony was very much against any such plan, and wished the dignity to be conferred on a German. It was believed that his opposition originated in his desire to be chosen himself. This gave birth to the idea of the Saxon candidature for the imperial crown. At first Leo observed great reserve in his outward actions. When Francis I expressed a desire to take energetic measures against the election of Charles, the Pope drew his attention to the difficulties attendant on such an undertaking and the danger of kindling a great war. Leo described the project of Francis I for forming a League between the Pope, Florence, France, Switzerland, and Venice as very delightful in itself, but one which had to be treated with great prudence, lest the general peace should be disturbed. § It is clear that he hesitated to hand over his interests to the discretion of his French protector, in spite of Lorenzo’s strong advocacy of the cause of France. This explains why he kept up communications with Francis, with whom, ever since July, he had been exchanging proposals for the formation of a closer alliance. As the dispensation from the oath of fealty for Naples, which was so urgently needed for the success of the plans of Maximillian and Charles, it was Leo’s policy not to cut off- all hope of an agreement, but to bind himself to nothing.

The difference with Rome, which began in November, 1518, was very injurious to Francis’ aims. The reason of the quarrel has never been satisfactorily explained. It seems that the French King wanted to take undue advantage of his matrimonial alliance with the Pope’s family, and while he asked for much, he gave nothing. Cardinal Medici, in a letter to Bibbiena, complained bitterly of Francis’ conduct. “The Pope”, he wrote, on the nth of November, “sees that his family alliance, far from bringing him an increase of honour and renown, causes nothing but vexation and anxiety. Every day he is showing the King some fresh favour, yet he is being always pressed with some new and weighty demand. These are made just as if he had received nothing before. If his requests are not granted at once, all that has gone before counts for nothing. His encroachments on the spiritual rights of Milan by his appointment to benefices, have been carried so far as to amount to a formal contempt of Papal authority. By his indulgence and complaisance towards the French King the Pope has drawn on himself a number of vexations and disputes”. Francis I had sent a threatening letter to the Pope on this very subject of the Milanese benefices, and this letter was enclosed by Cardinal Medici to Bibbiena, that the latter might see what just cause for complaint the Pope had.

To these complaints there were added others which were retailed to Bibbiena by Cardinal Giulio in a letter of the 28th of November. These related to the salt-mines in the States of the Church, a suspicious alliance with the Duke of Ferrara, as well as various encroachments on the Papal dominions. After all these occurrences, it is not surprising, Medici goes on to say, that His Holiness should suspect Francis of a design to alienate him from the Emperor, and then, having left him stranded, hold him in his power.

These pointed complaints must have made an impression on Francis I, all the deeper because of his fear that the Pope would end by yielding to the pressure of the Emperor and Spain, and remove the obstacles which stood in the way of Charles’s election. These obstacles were twofold. First there was the existence of the oath of fealty for the throne of Naples, the terms of which for bade that crown being worn by one who held the dignity of King of Rome. There was also what had hitherto been the impossibility of an election of a King of Rome in the lifetime of another who had received the title, and who had not received the imperial crown. It was now proposed that the Pope should dispense with the clause in the oath of fealty, and that the imperial crown should be sent to Trent, where the Emperor might be crowned by either Cardinal de' Medici or the Archbishop of Mayence as representative of the Pope. Such was the request made by Charles at the end of November ; but he received an evasive answer.

Soon, however, symptoms were seen of an inclination on the part of the Pope to give way in both the matters of the oath of investiture and the imperial coronation. The cause of these signs of compliance lay in the circumstance that official intelligence had just been received by the Pope that Maximilian had agreed to the five years’ truce, and held out hopes of supporting the Crusade. In the first half of November a Bull was prepared which provided for a dispensation from the obligation of renouncing Naples should Charles be elected King of Rome. But the pressure put on his uncle by Lorenzo caused the postponement of the execution of this deed. Simultaneously with the drawing up of this Bull, Leo X held out the hope to Maximilian that he would do his best to remove the second obstacle, and would perform the ceremony of the imperial coronation, either in person or by deputy, on the borders of the Tyrol and Italy.

For one moment Lorenzo thought that France’s cause was lost, and his only thought was to turn to advantage an opportunity not likely to occur more than once in a hundred years. But Leo had by no means come to his final decision. This was shown only too plainly by his attitude towards Erasmus Vitellius (Ciolek), Bishop of Plock, who was sent to Rome by Maximilian on the 7th of November, 1518, to press the matter of sending the imperial crown to Germany. He could not obtain an audience till the 26th of November. Then with skilful diplomacy he made it clear that Maximilian’s co-operation in the Turkish war depended on the request being granted.

At the same time Spain tried to win the Pope over by making generous offers for the support of the Crusade, as well as for the exaltation of the Medici. But Leo still answered evasively to the effect that, though he would gladly comply with Maximilian’s request, it must be saving his honour. “It is a question”, said he, “of our own person and our own honour”. When Erasmus, alluding to the meeting with Francis I at Bologna, pleaded that the Pope might crown Maximilian, if not at Trent, at Verona or Mantua, Leo alleged against this the opposition which the Cardinals would make to such a journey. To test the feasibility of sending the imperial crown from Rome, a Congregation of Cardinals was called on the 1st of December, the majority of whom were unfavourable to the Emperor’s proposal.

This crisis was contemporaneous with the change already mentioned which had come over the attitude of Francis. After the representations made by Bibbiena, the French King had fully acknowledged the danger which threatened his efforts should the Pope, in his displeasure with him, yield to the wishes of Charles and Maximilian. He therefore resolved to change his tone. The first symptom of this change is to be found in a report sent by Bibbiena to Cardinal de' Medici and Lorenzo on the 26th and 27th of November, which shows the change of mind on the part of the King. Francis I now declared himself ready not only to accede to Lorenzo’s wishes as to the rounding off of his territory, but also— though in this we may assume that he was not in earnest—to renounce his own candidature, and, if the Pope so wished, promote the claims of the Elector of Saxony to be King of Rome. The condition of this was that nothing should be done by Rome in favour of Maximilian and Charles.

Although the Roman Curia had adopted a more conciliatory tone towards Francis I, the latter did not feel sure that the Pope might not after all place himself on the side of his rivals. He adjured Bibbiena to prevent at all costs the sending of the imperial crown, and implored his help to prevent such a possibility as a journey of Maximilian to Rome. In a solemn audience he made the most generous offers about the Crusade, in which he said he would take part personally. He also expressed his willingness to waive all the points on which he was at variance with Rome, to promote the interests of the Medici, and conclude an alliance with the Pope.

Negotiations for an alliance with Francis I were carried on actively by Bibbiena. He was a master of Medicean diplomacy, and succeeded, without binding himself to anything, in raising deceptive hopes in the heart of the French King that the Pope would, in return for his concessions, take his part in the election. Charles was treated in exactly the same way, and he also was left with the impression that Leo would accede to his wishes; though to neither party were any pledges about the election given. When Francis demanded some guarantee, the dangers of a breach with Spain were pointed out. As regarded Charles, the Pope drew back at the most decisive moment, on the plea that such a weighty matter required the most mature deliberation.

Not only was the Bull of dispensation in respect to Naples kept back, but the other matter of sending the imperial crown was indefinitely postponed. The Congregation of Cardinals which the Pope had called to consider the question, demanded the verdict of the Master of Ceremonies, and he, on being consulted, declared that the coronation anywhere but in Rome was an impossibility. On the 15th of December there was a meeting of the Congregation, held in the presence of the Pope, which lasted six hours. On the following day Leo X informed the Bishop of Plock that he had been unable to carry the business through, as the Cardinals had brought forward, as reasons against it, both the novelty of the matter and the existence of Bulls which in times past had been issued in opposition to such a thing. He could not, he said, give the dispensation without the consent of the Sacred College. He would gladly have met the Emperor at Mantua or Verona, but was deterred by the consideration of the dangers to which such a journey might expose Maximilian.

On the 21st of December a Brief to Maximilian was prepared which informed him that his desires, conveyed through Erasmus Vitellius, concerning the Crusade indulgence in his patrimonial dominions, the protection of Croatia and Hungary, and the appointment of Cajetan as Legate in the last-mentioned country, should be granted.

But as to the matter of sending the imperia! crown from Rome, though both Pope and Cardinals had every wish to be conciliatory, the matter, being one of such importance, required further consideration.

By adjourning the decision of the main question, it was evident that Leo wished to gain time, until, in fact, he had made friends with Francis I. This event did not take place as soon as was wished in Rome. In order to win over the French King, the Pope was ready to hand over to his free disposal the second Crusade tenth. The Bull concerning this is dated the 1st of December 1518. It was, however, completed only at the end of that month, after Bibbiena, by his far-reaching assurances, had been able to arrive at an understanding with Francis I. On the 31st of December the French King pledged himself to pay back within four years 100,000 ducats of the Crusade money. At the same time Lorenzo de’ Medici received, “for services rendered,” 100,000 ducats from the King, out of the sum granted through the Pope. This was a shameful misuse of the money raised for the Holy War.

After this arrangement Francis at once, on the 20th of January, 1519, signed the treaty of alliance with Leo X. On one side the French King, and on the other the Pope and Lorenzo, as representing Florence and the family of Medici, pledged themselves to the mutual defence of their possessions, and undertook to impart to one another all state secrets. In particular, Francis promised to acknowledge the spiritual jurisdiction of the Church in Milan, to protect the States of the Church, as well as Lorenzo and the Medici generally. This last took the form of a separate treaty. On the other side, the Pope and Lorenzo pledged themselves to further the French King’s interests in every way in their power. But the question of the election was not touched on in the agreement.

It has been brought to light only by recent researches that almost at the same moment Leo X concluded an alliance of defence with the rivals of the King of France! Like Francis, the King of Spain was won over by the illusion, confirmed by no pledge but carefully fostered, that in the matter of the election the Pope would be on his side. On the 17th of January the text of this treaty, which, as was expressly stipulated, was to be kept secret, was drawn up, and signed by Charles on the 6th of February.

No more than in that with France, was there any mention of the election in the treaty with Charles. By this, both parties pledged themselves to mutual assistance and the protection of their possessions. These, on the Papal side, included not only the States of the Church, but also the possessions of Lorenzo and Florence. On the other side, the term included Charles’s possessions outside and inside Italy, with Naples. Besides all this, the Pope promised Charles, in the event of a serious war, the right to levy a tenth on the clergy of Spain.

By the light of these two treaties we can understand the policy of Leo X, and the manner in which he avoided making any actual decision in favour of either of the rivals who were competing for the imperial crown. By means of unparalleled double-dealing both parties were kept in hand, and moved, each to make a secret treaty, the object of which was the protection of the Pope and the Medici. The question of the Pope’s support at the election, which each party thought was the object of the treaty, was not even mentioned in the document. It is, however, equally true that the special advantages which both Charles and Francis had promised in regard to the States of the Church and the Medici were left quite undefined.

In excuse for Leo’s ambiguous policy it has been pointed out that “in the then condition of Italy, the smaller States could scarcely hope to save their independence except by keeping themselves skilfully in the balance between the two great powers, which threatened to crush all others”. This may have been so; nevertheless, such double-dealing on the part of a Pope must be deeply deplored.

At this moment when the question of the coronation of Maximilian was dividing the whole of Europe, and when the arming of France and Spain was regarded as the prelude of a great war, the “last of the Knights” was snatched away by death on the 12th of January, under the age of sixty. The rivalry between the houses of France and Hapsburg entered on an acute stage which set its mark on European history for centuries.

II.

The unexpected and, to many, the incredible news of the death of Maximilian, which introduced an altogether changed condition of things, reached Rome eleven days after the event. With one stroke it put an end to Leo’s indecision. The danger lest Charles, the least desired candidate, should succeed in obtaining the dignity of King of Rome, which would entitle him to the imperial crown, seemed greater than ever. With unwonted promptitude the Pope came to a decision. Not twenty-four hours after the receipt of the startling news of the Emperor’s death, instructions were sent to Cardinal Cajetan, the Legate in Germany, in which Leo took up his position in opposition to Charles quite openly and unambiguously, and proposed one of the German Electors as a candidate for the imperial crown, thus hoping to thwart the election of Francis as well as that of Charles. The Pope—so ran the instructions to Cajetan —wished, in the interests of the Apostolic See, to promote the choice of one of the Electors, either Frederick of Saxony or Joachim of Brandenburg; he cared not which, though there seemed to be more likelihood of success with the former. The King of Poland also would be pleasing as a candidate to the Holy See; but under no consideration was it to be the King of Spain. The chief reason alleged for this was that the great power already possessed by Charles would be unbearably increased by the extraordinary authority of the imperial crown. These instructions, dated the 23rd of January, were entirely the personal work of the Pope, because Cardinal Medici, on whose co-operation he usually depended in the matters connected with the election, had been called away to Florence in the night of the 22nd, by the severe illness of Lorenzo, and returned thence only on the 26th of March.

The instructions sent to Cajetan to oppose the election of Charles apply equally to those sent in regard to the French King. Though his possessions could not compare in extent with those of Charles, still, his dominions were more united v and richer in resources. There can be no doubt that the Pope did not at all desire the election of the French King ; as a proof of this, when he was passing in review the candidates to the imperial throne, he passed Francis’ name over in silence, as being out of the question. Even in the instructions to Bibbiena on the 27th of January, bidding him try to obtain the support of the French court in favour of the candidature of one of the Electors, there is no mention made of the hope that, even under certain circumstances, Francis might be chosen. But only two days later, on the afternoon of the 29th of January, Leo expressed openly to the French Ambassador his desire in favour of the election of Francis I, advising him to do everything he could to wrest the election from the Hapsburg. In the further course of conversation, he said quite candidly that Francis had better do his utmost to obtain the imperial dignity as the zenith of his ambition. Though Leo was convinced that it might be dangerous to have the imperial crown placed on the head of one already powerful, he would rather see it given to the sovereign of the obedient, religious, and judicious French than to the Catholic King.

Whence this sudden change of mind ? Erasmus Vitellius, who was still in Rome, had shown to the Pope proofs of the absolute certainty of the election of Charles to the imperial throne, by revealing to him the contents of the compact of the five Electors, formulated at Augsburg. Although the conclusion, so favourable to Charles, which had been arrived at by the Diet of Augsburg, had been long since communicated to the Pope, it does not seem that he attached sufficient importance to it, seeing that it was couched in general terms and delivered verbally. Now, for the first time, Leo understood the full significance of the matter. The only hope of checking the election of Charles lay in prompt action.

In this frame of mind, on the 29th of January, Leo made his abrupt request to Francis through his representative, to lay claim forthwith to the imperial crown and work in every way possible against the candidature of Charles. Next day the Pope, through Pietro Ardinghello, sent a very important letter to his Legate in France, in which the question of the election was treated of in the same way. This change was caused by the compact of the Electors shown to the Pope by Vitellius, which put the election before him as being as good as settled, unless it could be promptly opposed. Francis was urged to come forward as a candidate, with every promise of support from the Pope. “If anything”, the letter goes on, “having regard to the powerful position of the King, made the Electors wish for the candidature of a third party, Francis might give this nominee his active support as a means of preventing the election of the King of Spain. This step might be necessary, as Francis, by too strong an advocacy of his own cause, might play into the hands of Charles”. In the first place, the Pope wished for the election of Francis; but if that could not be carried out, then the choice of any other seemed to him to be preferable to that of Charles. The instructions sent to Bibbiena on the 5th and 12th of March are written in the same sense. The Pope, who had just received the ratification of the bond of the 20th of January, repeated the expression of his desire for the election of Francis; but at the same time, in the event of the French efforts being fruitless, he declared the necessity of trying to promote the election of a third party. In any case it must not be Charles.

From such indications it cannot be doubted that Leo warmly espoused the cause of Francis. Whether, in his inmost heart, he really desired his success, may still be considered doubtful. It is more probable that, as an immediate object, he was playing Francis against Charles, without sincerely desiring his election, or even believing in such an eventuality. Whether he became by degrees more favourable to the idea of a French Emperor cannot be said, or whether, if so, it came from a personal liking for Francis I. Probably he was influenced by the thought that nothing—not even that which might be feared most—could weigh in the balance against the increasing power of Charles. In essentials Leo went no further than this until a very short time before the actual election of Charles. Certain vacillations, entirely characteristic of the Medici Pope, must not altogether surprise us, though all through we can trace the dominant thought of Leo : Let there be no Hapsburg! It was labour lost for the Spanish Legate, Egidio Canisio, to petition the Pope on behalf of Charles,  but it is a fact that a third candidate, either the Elector of Saxony or the Elector of Brandenburg, would have been more agreeable to the Pope than either of the others. This became more evident every day. There is also, however, no doubt that the candidature of Francis, though probably taken up at first only as a means of putting aside the claims of Charles, was more desired by him as time went on, and he realized that his successful candidature was the only possible way of destroying Charles’s chances.

Besides the overwhelming extent of Charles’s power, there were many other reasons which weighed in the balance against him in the mind of the Pope : such were the tyranny which Naples might exercise over Rome ; the anti-Papal feeling which had governed so many of the Roman­Teutonic emperors ; their union with the Ghibelline party in the States of the Church. While Leo drew Bibbiena’s attention to these reasons against the candidature of Charles, he referred—but only in the last place, and not as to a thing of primary importance—to his family connection with France. Here then we can see a sign of the Pope’s nepotism as a factor, though by no means the chief one, in his attitude towards the rival powers. The temporal power of the Holy See, as a safeguard of its spiritual interests, was what Leo had most at heart. In the interests of this, together with those of Italian liberty, he could not tolerate that any overwhelming power should hold sway on the Italian peninsula. This object was, it is true, connected with his care for his own house, and for Florence, which was so closely united to the States of the Church ; but these last were by no means the main object. In his unusually difficult position between the two great powers, the Pope tried as long as possible to veer about from one side to the other. When, however, he found himself driven by necessity to a choice between two evils, he saw in that connected with the French sovereign of Milan a lesser danger than that connected with the Spanish King of Naples.

The Pope’s preference for the French candidature was undisguisedly expressed in many ways. In the beginning of March the warm friend of France, Roberto Latino Orsini, Archbishop of Reggio, was sent, armed with Papal Briefs, to the German Electors, where, to the great satisfaction of Francis, he tried to work against Charles in every possible way. On the 12th of March the Pope authorized the French King, by a special Brief, to promise the Cardinal’s hat to the Electors of Treves and Cologne, should he be elected through their help. Two days later the Cardinal Archbishop of Mayence, Albert of Brandenburg, was, under the same conditions, promised the office of permanent Legate in Germany. The significance of this last concession is uncertain. On the 21st of March the Pope expressed himself so decidedly to the Venetian Ambassador, that the latter was quite surprised. “His Holiness”, reports Minio, “who has hitherto endeavoured to deceive both sides, has now put himself entirely on that of France, because he believes that he has more to fear from Charles than from Francis”.

If we call to our minds the character of Leo, who was ever most unwilling to take any part, who never came forward except in a case of utmost necessity, his open partisanship with Francis is most surprising. The ostensible object of driving a still more dangerous adversary out of the field is no adequate explanation of the Pope’s action in the matter of the election of Francis I; and it is only on closer observation, that we find the real reason why Leo entered the lists for the French candidate so much more openly and decidedly than at first. The reason lay in his increasing fear of being isolated. The thought that Francis and Charles might come to an understanding, pursued the prudent Medici Pope like a menacing spectre.

Therefore, on no account must France be given either pretext or opportunity of leaving the Pope to face Charles alone and unaided. Should the King of Spain be elected, the Holy See must at any rate keep a firm friend in Francis. That the rivals should come to an understanding must be prevented at all costs. Once he had com mitted himself to favouring Francis’ cause, Leo’s fear of isolation drove him further and further along the road he had taken. On the 20th of April, he emphatically refused the request of the Swiss to leave the imperial dignity unhindered to the Germans. It was by no means his intention to depreciate the rights of the German nation ; his opposition to Charles did not originate in that, but in the conviction that the Hapsburg, as occupant of the throne of Naples, had no right, by all the promises sworn to of old, to aspire to the imperial crown. It was his policy to adhere to Francis I, because from him the Holy See had no danger of that sort to fear.

Soon afterwards the Pope, on his own initiative—for Cardinal Medici had, on the 3rd of May, gone to Florence to attend Lorenzo’s death-bed—took a step by which he acted contrary to existing rules, and committed himself far more deeply than he had on the 27th of January. A Brief, dated May the 4th, empowered Cardinal Cajetan, as Legate, in case three of the Electors should be unanimous in their choice of a candidate, to declare in the name of the Pope that such an election was valid.

In spite of the zeal which he was showing for the election of Francis, Leo X still fostered his favourite plan of procuring the election of a third party, by choice the Elector of Saxony. His secret idea, that the great diplomatic struggle might be most advantageously settled in this way, was always recurring. The Roman court adopted this project with such zeal that it was even willing to temporize about the matter of Luther.

Meanwhile the Papal Envoys in Germany, having declared that, according to the constitutions of Clement IV, the King of Naples was ineligible for election to the imperial dignity, met with an angry rebuff from the ecclesiastical Electors, whose pride was severely touched. They protested against the unheard-of action on the part of the Pope in wishing to dictate to them about matters of election procedure.

In the north of Germany matters seemed to take a turn more and more favourable for Charles. A popular movement in both Upper and Lower Germany rose in favour of the “broad ways” of the Hapsburg King. The Swiss also declared that they would not suffer the imperial dignity to pass from the hands of a German into those of a foreigner, least of all into those of the French, who had thirsted so long to possess it.

This intelligence reached Rome in the second half of April.  Soon after this, there followed the death of Lorenzo de' Medici. He had been ill of the spleen ever since January. On the 13th of April a daughter—Catherine de' Medici—was born to him, whose birth cost her mother her life: on the 4th of May the father died.

The sad news affected the Pope deeply, though he accepted the blow with Christian resignation. “The Lord gave, and the Lord hath taken away”, said he to his confidant, Pietro Ardinghello. As a Medici the event pained him deeply, but not as Pope; for he resolved to care for nothing henceforth except the exaltation and needs of the Apostolic See. So says the Mantuan Ambassador. Another informant says that when he received the sad news Leo exclaimed : “Henceforward we belong no more to the house of Medici, but to the house of God”.

From these expressions of self-accusation, on which such different judgments have been passed, and his resolutions to renounce nepotism for evermore, it by no means follows that the Pope was conscious of having been hitherto guided solely by family interests. In them there is nothing beyond the acknowledgment that he had considered the, aggrandizement of his relatives more than was fitting. All this he now changed. Consequently, the Duchy of Urbino, with Pesaro and Sinigaglia, were united to the States of the Church; Cardinal Medici received the management of Florentine affairs as Legate of the whole of Tuscany. He remained in Florence till the autumn, when he left behind him as his representatives the Bishop of Pistoja, Goro Gheri, and Cardinal Passerini.

Lorenzo’s death certainly removed one obstacle to a change in the Pope’s policy, though it did not conduce to a reconciliation with Charles. The chief reason of the change in his policy was the conviction that came to him that Francis’ candidature was hopeless. On the 29th of May, Leo confided to the Venetian Ambassador that public opinion was so strong in Germany that the Electors could not choose the French King even if they wished it.

Nevertheless the Pope could not reconcile himself to the thought of Charles as Emperor, and reiterated through his representative that the King of Naples could not at the same time wear the imperial crown. At the beginning of June he made a last despairing effort to avert the evil, and finish the diplomatic strife by a means as yet untried, by proposing the candidature of the Elector of Saxony. On the 7th of June an urgent message was sent to Frederick through the Papal representative and the French Ambassador, pressing him to support Francis; or, if that were impossible, to accept for himself the imperial crown. If the Elector of Saxony could add but two more votes to his own, the Pope promised to confirm his election, and support him by every means in his power.

At the time that Leo X made this proposal, the resentment of the Germans against all the friends of France had reached such a height that the lives of the latter were not safe. Through the leader of the French party, the Archbishop of Treves, the Pope learned that four of the Electors were determined on the election of Charles. On his own confession, this intelligence convinced Leo of the futility and danger of holding out any longer for Francis’ candidature. He must at last accept the inevitable. For his part Charles neglected nothing which could win Leo’s favour; while Francis, just at this juncture, committed the blunder of making a most offensive demand of the Pope. According to the report of the Ambassador of Este, on the 5th of June, a letter arrived from the French King warning the Pope against incorporating Urbino in the States of the Church, seeing that the Duchy belonged to the infant Catherine de' Medici, whom the King regarded as his own daughter.§ That this demand caused a revolution in the mind of the Pope is certain, for he made his final decision in the middle of June. Just then most important news came from Germany; Caracciolo reported that, though ill, he had had himself carried in a sedan-chair to the Archbishop of Mainz, to implore him, in the Pope’s name, to consider the good of the Apostolic See and promote Francis’ election. The answer of the Archbishop was to the effect that under no circumstances would he vote for the French King. At the same time Leo was told that the Elector of Saxony had written a letter, dated the 8th of June, in which “with all courtesy as to form, but incisively and plainly,” he had dismissed both Papal representatives.

These tidings caused the abrupt change in the Pope’s attitude. On the 17th of June an understanding was come to with the Spanish Ambassador, Caroz, by which Leo X agreed, for this once, to the union of the imperial crown with that of Naples, conditional on a Papal veto of the expansion of the power of Spain in Lombardy or Tuscany. On this, the Pope’s representatives in Germany were instructed to make out a new treaty embracing the new concession, and word was at once sent to the Electors that, if they wished to elect Charles, they need not be deterred by considerations about the crown of Naples. Thus, at the last moment—for the Electors were already assembled at Frankfort—Leo X gave in, in face of the probability, nay, more, the moral certainty, that the election of the Hapsburg King would take place, whether the Pope consented or not. Such a grave injury to the dignity of the Holy See must be averted at all costs! That he gave in under compulsion there can be no doubt. He himself admitted as much when he wrote to Cardinal Cajetan saying that it was useless for him to knock his head against a stone wall. Francis also saw at last the futility of any further effort to win the crown. On the 26th of June he withdrew his own candidature, and told his Envoys to work for the election of Joachim of Brandenburg. A second letter, written the same day, instructed them that, should the Archbishop of Treves be in favour of the Elector of Saxony, the latter was to be supported. On the 21st of July the Nuncio Orsini, by the Pope's directions, once more, through Karl von Miltitz, urged Frederick of Saxony either to vote for Francis, or else to stand himself for election. But Frederick positively refused either course, and declared himself in favour of Charles. On the 28th of June, 1519, the grandson of Maximilian was unanimously chosen King of Rome. Although, until he was crowned by the Pope, this was the only name he was entitled to bear, he was thenceforward generally spoken of as the Emperor.

The outcome of the long diplomatic struggle was regarded with deep interest. This is borne witness to by Baldassare Castiglione, who came to Rome on the 26th of May to condole with the Pope on the death of Lorenzo de' Medici. The members of the Curia had been convinced that neither Charles nor Francis had any chance; nor were the French as certain of victory as they had been, though there were still individual Frenchmen who spoke very vauntingly. The general fear was that a grave war would ensue. The Pope alone was of a different opinion as to this, and went undisturbedly about his usual pursuits, while excitement, which expressed itself in a number of wagers, rose to fever height in the city. On the 1st of July the news that Charles had been elected spread throughout Rome; whereat the imperialists rejoiced greatly.

The definite news of Charles’s election reached Rome on the 5th of July, being celebrated by great rejoicings on the part of the Spaniards, Imperialists, and the Colonna. The cry, “The Empire and Spain!” rang through the streets of the Eternal City. Baldassare Castiglione says that “the joy of the Spaniards is as difficult to describe as the depression of the French, who go about like men dead”. The Spanish Cardinals and prelates and all those who held benefices in Naples and Spain took part in the uproarious rejoicings. On two evenings five or six hundred Spaniards, well armed, with music and banners, paraded the streets, stopping in front of the dwellings of the Spanish prelates, where they were given wine and money. The Germans in Rome took offence at the cry of “Spain  Spain!” set up by these men, whereas they would have preferred that of “Austria !” or “Burgundy!”. Thereupon more Spaniards and their adherents mustered in Rome, as though they were the masters of the Eternal City. The consequence of all this was a very painful scene between the Pope and Caroz, the Ambassador of Charles. Leo X could not conceal the deep impression made on him by the election of the Hapsburg. “Ambassador”, said he to Minio, the representative of Venice, “had the French King acted according to our advice, a third party would have been elected. God grant that the election of Charles may conduce to the good of Christendom!”. Such an exclamation shows how set Leo had been in his secret heart on the candidature of the Elector of Saxony.

A few days later Minio found the Pope thoughtful and anxious. “What shall I do,” said he, “if the Hapsburg comes to Italy now? All Germany will back him up!”. On the 18th of July the Venetian Ambassador found him still more agitated, because, as he complained, the French were laying all the blame on him for what had happened about the election. “As you know,” said he to Minio, “I did everything that they wished, and this is the result”.

Next day the Pope communicated to the Cardinals assembled in Consistory the contents of a letter from Charles, in which, briefly and moderately, he announced his election, and professed his good-will, and submission to the Holy See. The Pope did not fail to make use of this opportunity to commend Charles for not having assumed prematurely the title of King of Rome, though powerful enough to assert his claim to it.

Only now  were the customary festivities celebrated in due form. On the 16th of August a letter containing the good wishes of the Pope was sent to Charles, the fine-sounding and bombastic phrases of which could have blinded only the very ignorant to the fact that Leo anticipated with a great fear the attitude likely to be taken by the new Emperor.

CHAPTER VII

The Occasion and Causes of the Reformation in Germany. —The Contest about Indulgences.

CHAPTER I.

Election and Beginning of the Pontificate of Leo X.—His Efforts to make Peace.—End of the Schism of Pisa.

CHAPTER II.

The Medici and the Policy of Leo X., 1513-1515.

CHAPTER III.

The Conquest of Milan by the French. —The Meeting between Leo X and Francis I at Bologna.

CHAPTER IV.

The War of Urbino. —Conspiracy of Cardinal Petrucci —The Great Creation of Cardinals, July 1, 1517.

CHAPTER V.

The Pope's endeavours to promote a Crusade, 1517-1518.

CHAPTER VI.

Leo X and the Imperial Succession.

CHAPTER VII

The Occasion and Causes of the Reformation in Germany. —The Contest about Indulgences.

INTRODUCTION.

JULIUS II, the most powerful of the Popes of the Renaissance, had given the Holy See a firm and substantial basis by his re-establishment of the States of the Church. At the same time, by his generous patronage of art, he had given a prominence, hitherto unequalled, to the great position held by his predecessors in the field of culture. When he convened the Council of the Lateran, the patron of Bramante, Raphael, and Michael Angelo was on the verge of grappling with the greatest and most difficult task of the age—namely, the reformation of the Church—when death snatched him away.

The successor of the Rovere Pope was a member of the house of Medici, who represented, as it has been the lot of few to do, both the good and bad side of the Renaissance. True child of his people and of his age, Leo X was a rare mixture of glorious and inglorious qualities. A thorough Medici and a typical Florentine, he was a clever, not over scrupulous, and indefatigably active politician. At the same time he was an open-handed and appreciative admirer of learning, art, and music. Nevertheless he lacked the courage, greatness, and depth of his predecessor.

For over a century, a cry for the reform of both the Head and members of the Church had resounded from all parts of Europe. Some of the attempts to effect this reform were actuated by no pure motives, while others were made in an unlawful manner; but there is no doubt that many excellent men, moved by the best intentions, did concern themselves, in a lawful manner, with the reformation of abuses in ecclesiastical life and in the government of the Church ; though what was accomplished remained far behind both the expectations formed and the necessities of the time. Many pious, enlightened, and wise men, religious as well as laymen, rose up in response to the call, and tried to apply a remedy to the evils of the day. Many hands were laid to the difficult task, though no decisive results were obtained ; for even the best-intentioned efforts made but slight impression on the general deterioration of ecclesiastical discipline. The task was made the more difficult by the bad example of those belonging to the Roman Curia, which worked against the reformers.

With the dawn of the new century the cry for reform sounded louder and louder from both sides of the Alps, taking the shape of treatises, letters, poems, satires, and predictions, the theme of which was the corruption of the clergy, and especially the worldliness of the Roman Curia. To many the ancient Church seemed to be as rotten as the Holy Roman-Teutonic Empire; and many foretold the downfall of both these buttresses of the medieval system. The signs of the times became more and more threatening. To observant spectators it seemed as if, with the advent to power of the Medici, a heavy storm must break over the Church.

That a man who was not equal to the serious duties of his high office, who, in fact, knew scarcely anything about them, should be raised to the Chair of St. Peter at a moment so fraught with danger, was a severe trial permitted by God to overtake Christendom. With unprecedented optimism Leo X looked into the future without anxiety, and frivolously deluded himself as to the importance of the times. He never gave a thought to reform, on the grand scale which had become necessary. After the delusive results which followed the conclusion of the agreement with France, he gave himself over to a growing feeling of security in respect to the countries on the other side of the Alps

The Pope disregarded even the most serious warnings, such as those uttered by Aleander in respect to Germany in 1 516. He did not co-operate in the half-measures taken, nor in the superficial attempts made to carry out the salutary decrees of the Lateran Council. Therefore the Roman Curia, which had for a long time been held in contempt and made the object of the bitterest satires, remained as worldly as ever. While by many it was scorned for its love of money, equal condemnation fell on the unworthy, immoral conduct of the Roman courtiers, of high and low degree, which the Supreme Head of the Church was either unable or unwilling to check. Political transactions, especially those which concerned the maintenance of the States of the Church, with which the independence of the Holy See was so closely connected, absorbed Leo X more and more. Consequently, though most unnaturally, the concerns of the Church fell into the background, and were usually made subordinate to politics.

The approach of great catastrophes is usually heralded by the dark foreshadowing of future events. At that calamitous time prophetic utterances increased, and notes of solemn warning sounded from all quarters. Shortly before the close of the Lateran Council, the noble Gianfrancesco Pico della Mirandola, in the presence of the Pope and the ecclesiastical assembly, delivered a famous oration relating to the reformation of morals in the Church. Nothing can reveal the necessity of reform in a more startling way than the wretched picture drawn so unflinchingly by this distinguished layman. We have heard a great deal about the making of laws, said he, in apology for his interference, but very little about their observance. Yet nothing could be more urgent. To prove this he described, by the aid of rhetorical antitheses, a picture, painted in the darkest colours, of the corruption which had made its way into the Church. He emphatically pointed out to the Pope that it was his strict duty to remove the crying abuses in ecclesiastical government. In conclusion, he added these words of warning: “If Leo leaves crime any longer unpunished, if he refuses to heal the wounds, it is to be feared that God Himself will no longer apply a slow remedy, but will cut off and destroy the diseased members with fire and sword”. In that very year this oracular prediction was fulfilled.

The most momentous event in modern history, the disruption of the Church in Western Christendom —anticipated and dreaded by many —took place. It was a judgment on all, but not least on the Head of the Church, who was absorbed in politics and worldly pleasures. A canon of Siena, Sigismondo Tizio, who was devoted to the Holy See, writes thus about the Pope : “Many were of opinion that it was bad for the Church that her Head should be absorbed in amusements, music, the chase, and buffoonery, instead of being occupied by the thought of the needs of his flock, and in bewailing its misfortunes. The salt of the earth has lost its savour, and nothing remains for it but to be cast out and trodden on by men”.

The danger of the anti-Papal movement which had broken out in Germany did not escape Leo X, but, absorbed as he was in politics and immersed in the excitements of a worldly life and aesthetic enjoyment, he completely lost sight of his primary duty, and was essentially the wrong man to check the storm at its beginning. He neither realized the full importance of the situation, nor did he understand the deeper causes which had led to the secession from Rome. He was incapable of comprehending that nothing short of a radical reformation in the Head and members of the Church could arrest the movement which had been in preparation for so long. Thus, at this, the most severe crisis which had met her in her fifteen hundred years of history, the right ruler was wanting to the Church. Instead of the Medici Pope, the Church needed a Gregory VII.

Leo’s successor, the noble Adrian VI, the last Pope of Teutonic race, grasped at once the one thing needful, which had been left undone by his predecessor. The pontificate of this distinguished man, though all too short, was rich in decrees for a thorough and trenchant disciplinary reform which covered nearly the whole area of ecclesiastical life. Unfortunately, however, the dry, sober-minded Dutch professor did not in the least understand the Italian temperament, so unlike his own ; nor did the Italians understand him. To the end he remained a foreigner on Roman soil. While in his immediate surroundings he called forth the strongest national antipathy, his trenchant reforms raised up many enemies. His death was, therefore, hailed by the Romans as a happy event.

Though, notwithstanding his good intentions, his clear powers of perception, and honest endeavours, Adrian VI did not succeed during his eighteen months’ pontificate in remedying the evils which were the accumulation of a century and a half, still he has the merit of being the first Pope who had the courage to place his finger on the wound, and indicate what had to be done in the future.

Another Medici followed him. Seldom have high expectations been so cruelly disappointed as they were in Clement VII. In spite of his many good qualities, his temperance, his abstemiousness and piety, and his patron age of literature and art, his pontificate was one of the most disastrous known to history. The chief cause of this is to be found in the inconceivable irresolution and pusillanimity of the Pontiff, who lost courage at once, and let the helm fall from his grasp. It needed the royal spirit, the bold determination the mighty strength of a Julius II. to look consequences in the face, take the lead in Italy’s fight for freedom, and wrest the Papacy from the dominion of Spain. It was obvious therefore that a small-minded, pusillanimous calculator, such as Clement VII, must fail. “This man”, says Guicciardini, “was raised to the Papal See by a wondrous stroke of fortune. But when he reached the summit, the misfortunes which attended him greatly outweighed his good fortune. For what prosperity can be put in the balance against the ignominy of his captivity, the misery of the sack of Rome, or the evil fate of bringing about the ruin of his native city?”

The Florentine historian does not mention what was the greatest misfortune of all. While Clement VII. was so unhappy in his attempts to procure the freedom of Italy and the Holy See, as to end by sealing their dependence on Spain, the defection from Rome in the north assumed terrific proportions. When Clement died, nearly one-third of Europe had broken from the time-hallowed unity of the Catholic faith, which till then, in spite of political and national disturbances, had held all Christian people together.

The religious unity of the Western Church was rent ; the great, the blessed, the civilizing influence of Rome was destroyed in a considerable portion of Europe ; the common defence against the arch-enemy of Christianity was broken, and Christian civilization was rent asunder.

Neither of the Medici Popes had fulfilled his duty as regarded the great secession from Rome ; for that duty consisted above all things in the concentration of their energies on the work of ecclesiastical reform, with a total disregard for every consideration, whether worldly or national. Both these Popes were but too often unfaithful to their charge by subordinating their pastoral duty to politics, power, and love of possession. Both ignored what lay at the very root of the evil, and mistook throughout the only means to be taken for its removal.

In vain did the cry for help and salvation from ruin resound ; and one after another the hopes of better things were shattered. Pain and sorrow filled the souls of the noblest, who sadly asked themselves why it was that Divine Providence permitted the Church to fall into such confusion. But together with this grief over the evilness of the times and the disorders with which a worldly spirit had saturated the Church, there was mingled an angry indignation with the chief pastors who responded so badly to their great vocation. To many it seemed as if all were already lost.

Then help came. As in the days of Gregory VII., so now again salvation came from within the Church. She might be disfigured by hideous evils; she might be oppressed and trodden under foot by her enemies ; but it was now proved that the divine spark of life within her was not extinct.

Nearly the whole of the north, and a great part of central Europe, had broken the bonds of reverence and authority which had for so long united them to the Holy See, and had taken up with a new religion. But in the south there were raised up men who, imbued with the Divine Spirit, holding fast to the treasure of the ancient faith, and obedient to the lawful authority of the Church, worked with ardent zeal and untiring energy for their own sanctification as well as for a general and fundamental renewal and reformation of the life of the Church. Egidio Canisio of Viterbo, when speaking before the Lateran Council, had simply and succinctly summed up the theory of true Catholic reformation. “Men must be changed by religion”, said he, “and not religion by men.”

As in the nth century the Cluniacs, in the 12th the Cistercians, and in the 13th the Franciscans and Dominicans had been raised up to be true reformers, and had stirred up and developed a devoted activity, so now did the noblest among men combine to work for the purification and renovation of the Church. Before the end of the pontificate of Leo X, the Oratory of Divine Love had been formed in Rome. This community grew under Clement VII, and the sack of Rome by the Imperial troops was the cause of its spread over a great part of Italy. The horrible catastrophe which overtook the capital of Christendom terminated the Renaissance. Con temporaries justly regarded it as a divine judgment, and for many it was the occasion of conversion and amendment of life. New Orders sprang into being under the two Medici Popes which corresponded to the needs of the time, and achieved most practical ends. Such were the Theatines, the Capuchins, the Clerks Regular o Somascha, the Barnabites, and, lastly, the most important instrument of all for the Catholic reformation and restoration, the Society of Jesus.

Saints, apostles and heroes sprang up, and by their mode of life introduced a new era for the regeneration of the Church, and solved the problem, already a century old, of ecclesiastical reform. Like most things that are really great, the reformation of the 16th Century grew out of small, hidden beginnings. It grew silently at the foot of the Curia, till at length it embraced those who bore the dignity of the Papacy. Having accomplished this, it made its way triumphantly in ever-widening circles, winning back a part of that which had been lost, and purifying and ennobling that which had remained faithful.

CHAPTER VII

The Occasion and Causes of the Reformation in Germany. —The Contest about Indulgences