POPE LEO X

CHAPTER IV.

The War of Urbino. —Conspiracy of Cardinal Petrucci —The Great Creation of Cardinals, July 1, 1517.

The good terms on which Leo apparently stood with the old friend of his family, Duke Francesco Maria of Urbino, at the beginning of his pontificate, received a rude shock when Giuliano de' Medici fell ill and his young nephew Lorenzo was given supreme command of the Papal troops. The Duke of Urbino might reasonably have been affronted at being passed over; but, on the other hand, his subsequent conduct could not have failed to exasperate the Pope. Regardless of his oath of fealty, and in spite of admonitions and threats. Francesco Maria, being already in secret communication with France, delayed at the most critical moment to send the assistance he was bound to give to the Papal troops. Moreover, after the victory of Francis I, the Duke of Urbino did all in his power to stir up the French King against the Pope. When, in spite of his machinations, Leo and Francis I made friends, such fear seized the Duke that he placed his only son for safety in the fortress of San Leo, and raised a body of troops.

The fate of the Duke had been decided at Bologna. In vain did Francis I appeal for mercy on his behalf. The Pope maintained, amicably but firmly, that, Francesco Maria having forgotten his duty as feudatory, there could be no question of his pardon. Were he to be left unpunished, every petty baron in the States of the Church would do the same thing or worse. After this the King made no further attempt to save his friend. The deposition of the Duke was a foregone conclusion; and it was furthermore decided that his Duchy should be given to Lorenzo de' Medici. This last development did not emanate from the Pope, but from the ambitious Alfonsina Orsini, who was determined at any cost to see a princely crown on her son's head. Unfortunately, Leo did not this time have the strength of mind to resist the wishes of his sister-in-law, which he had shown when that ambitious woman had hoped to secure for Lorenzo the usurped principality of Piombino. The Pope now agreed to the proposal, though he did not conceal the fact that he yielded unwillingly. Once, however, he had given his consent, nothing would move him. Even the representations of his brother made no impression on him. In vain did Giuliano remind him that, in the years of their exile, the Medici had always found hospitality at the court of Urbino. Intercession was useless, and before Leo had left Florence at the end of January, 15 16, proceedings had been begun against the Duke of Urbino. On the 1st of March Francesco Maria was summoned to Rome, under the severest penalties if he disobeyed. If he did not put in an appearance under eighteen days, he would have to give an account of a number of grievous misdeeds. A considerable array of accusations were raised against him. These included his refusal to join Lorenzo de' Medici in his expedition against the French, although he had received the necessary pay for his troops; his understanding with the enemy; and his participation in the murder of Cardinal Alidosi, and other incidents in the pontificate of Julius II. The accusation about the murder of Alidosi was undeniably a mere pretext, because Francesco Maria had been fully acquitted of all participation in it by Cardinal Giovanni de' Medici himself. The same thing cannot, however, be said of the other counts. The refused fealty and the understanding with France were offences which called for punishment from a legal point of view. Nevertheless, the whole action of the Pope, especially when we consider the hospitality shown by the Duke of Urbino to the exiled Medici, has something repulsive about it. The impression left on the mind is that he cared less that justice should take its course, than that the Duchy should become available for his nephew.

Francesco Maria did not dream of obeying the summons to Rome, and set his hopes on mollifying the Pope through a third party. With this object he sent to Rome the noble Duchess Elisabetta Gonzaga, the widow of his predecessor. But her prayers and tears were of no avail; Leo was not to be moved, and the only point gained by her intercession was the suspension of his citation to Rome, during her absence in the Eternal City. But on the nth of March the document was printed and published. The Duke might have profited by the intercession of Giuliano de' Medici, had he not been too grievously ill to take any active measures. Therefore things took their course in Rome. The time given to the Duke for his personal vindication expired without his putting in an appearance. On the 14th of March, a Papal Bull was published which declared that Francesco Maria, on account of his repeated breaches of fealty, was deprived of all his possessions in the States of the Church.

A few days later, on the 17th of March 1516, the consumptive Giuliano de Medici breathed his last at Fiesole, at the age of thirty-seven. His widow Filiberta returned shortly after to her sister Louisa, the mother of Francis I, taking back with her her costly trousseau. Her brief marriage had been childless. Not only did the Pope grieve for Giuliano, but he was mourned sincerely throughout Florence; for, says Vettori, he was a truly good man, without strength, but with no evil in him; he was, however, too generous. In him Francesco Maria lost his most powerful intercessor, and his last hope now rested in Francis I. The Duke had every hope that the French King would at last take up his cause, for the friendship between Francis and the Pope, which had seemed to be so firmly established, now showed signs of waning. The advantages which the victor had wrung from the defenceless Leo under the cloak of great friendship, had been so great that it was impossible that the amicable footing of the contracting parties should continue for long. To the Pope the dominion of the French in Milan was in itself hateful ; but the loss of Parma and Piacenza never ceased from galling him in an especial manner. Had Francis I acted as a wise statesman, he would have avoided the mortification connected with the sequestration of those cities. Leo X had, however, to put up for a while with what he could not prevent. The other arrangement, no less unpalatable to the Holy See, which related to the cession to the Duke of Ferrara of Modena and Reggio, was, however, so worded, that it was easy for an adroit diplomatist like Leo X not particular in the means he employed, to prevent its being carried out, on some pretext or other. Francis learned to his dismay how little dependence could be placed on the Pope, when, in March, 1516, Maximilian crossed the Alps and declared war on the French and Venetians. In presence of this danger, the French King, relying on the Pope’s promise at Bologna, asked for the assistance of 500 men for the defence of Milan, or the alternative of payment for 3000 Swiss mercenaries. Leo, always in want of money, rejected the last alternative; but the troops which he promised instead were raised so slowly that Francis suspected a secret understanding between the Pope and the Emperor. His distrust was considerably increased by the mission to Maximilian of Cardinal Bibbiena, well known for his hatred of France, and by the liberation from prison of Marc Antonio Colonna, who, with a body of troops raised in the States of the Church, had hastened to help the Imperial party against the Venetians.

But Francis did the Pope a wrong. There is no doubt at all that the appearance south of the Alps of the Emperor with a considerable force, was an event not at all desired by Rome. The Pope knew how dangerous to the States of the Church were his far-reaching projects. What is more, he knew that not long before this, Maximilian had in no measured terms threatened Egidio Canisio, who had been appointed on an extraordinary mission to him, with a sweeping reform of the Curia. The Pope’s position as regarded the campaign of Maximilian, was the more difficult because he had to reckon with both parties, with each of whom he had made engagements. In order to keep on the safe side he tried, as he had often done before, to avoid taking any decided step until the fortune of war had declared itself for either side. It was fear, and his inveterate habit of veering from one side to the other, which governed his ambiguous course of action. He rejected all offers made to him by the enemies of France, but would not throw in his lot with Francis I; he neither dared recall Colonna nor send the desired help to the French King. When the Emperor’s expedition met with reverses, Bibbiena was directed to stay at Rubiera, on the plea of illness, to watch the development of affairs. As these turned out very favourably to the French, the Pope sent through Lorenzo one month’s payment for the Swiss mercenaries, which had been asked for some time before. Francis took the money, but, in spite of the Pope’s excuses and professions of friendship conveyed to him by Canossa, remained in the very worst of humours. Ever since May he had been in a frame of mind hostile to the Papacy, giving evidence of designs on Naples, and of intervention about the Duke of Urbino. Consequently Leo, on his side, took up a less friendly attitude towards France.

Francis was soon to feel the effect of this in a variety of ways; especially in Switzerland, where the Papal Nuncios ventured to promote the Anglo-Imperial machinations. The Pope forbade any open union with the enemies of France, yet he held out the possibility of such a measure as a threat. This was sufficient to decide Francis I to leave the Duke of Urbino to his fate.

At first Francesco Maria contemplated resistance; but as soon as he understood that Lorenzo de’ Medici was advancing on Urbino on three sides, at the head of an army of combined Papal and Florentine troops, he fled to Pesaro, and thence to Mantua, to his father-in-law, Francesco Gonzaga, to whom he had already sent his family. Urbino and Pesaro surrendered at once, and Sinigaglia offered very slight resistance. Before long the fortresses of Pesaro and Maiuolo fell also, and only the fortress of San Leo held out. In a few days nearly the whole Duchy had succumbed. Leo received the news of this on the 4th and 5th of June, 1516. Even if there were not wanting those who celebrated the event in Rome with rejoicings, there were many who justly reproached the Pope for his ingratitude towards the fallen dynasty. The excuses which Leo alleged were the outrages which he had suffered at the hands of the Duke, and the justice of the punishment inflicted on him as an unfaithful vassal and a soldier who had detained troops for whom he had received pay. Above all, the Pope pleaded the impossibility of retaining in his States so unfaithful a feudatory, who was certain at the very first opportunity to have dealings with his enemies. Even Francesco Vettori, by no means a Papal partisan, is of opinion that Leo could not by any means have left the Duke's offence unpunished. But, on the other hand, the severity shown on the occasion by the Pope cannot be overlooked, for it was not in keeping with his great position of Supreme Head of the Church. To most contemporaries the conduct of Leo X seemed hard and unjust, and as though actuated solely by regard for the private interests of the house of Medici as was proved by the fact of the crown of the dispossessed prince being at once given to the nephew of the Pope.

Leo X had scarcely recovered from a serious illness, when he learned the course events had taken. On the 18th of August, 1516, Lorenzo was invested with the title of Duke of Urbino, the revenues of which, including Pesaro and Sinigaglia, amounted then to only 25,000 ducats. He was at the same time declared Lord of Pesaro. All the Cardinals signed the deed of investiture except Domenico Grimani, who left Rome in a state of indignation.

The conquest of Urbino aggravated the already strained relations between Leo X and Francis I. The French King had been quite as unwilling as the Emperor to see Francesco Maria driven out of his Duchy. Francis I’s dearest wish was not only to prevent any increase of a the Pope’s power, but rather to see it weakened; yet now he had to look on and see Leo putting difficulties in the way which threatened the foreign policy of France. The fact was that the Pope was trying to keep the Catholic King from forming an alliance with France, while at the same time the Papal Nuncio was seeking to prejudice Switzerland against the same country. Prospero and Muzio Colonna, as well as Girolamo Morone, from whom an attempt against Milan might be feared, considered it safer to remain on Papal territory. Francis went so far as to believe that Leo was mixed up in the negotiations which were being carried on between the Emperor, England, and Switzerland, with the object of seizing Milan. On this account he endeavoured to regain the friendship of the Medici Pope. In August he sent a force to help him against the corsairs of Tunis, who were molesting the coasts of the States of the Church, and who, at the end of April, had almost captured the Pope, while he was hunting near the mouth of the Tiber.

In other ways also the French King sought to curry favour with the Pope. But Leo detested the dominion of the French in Italy for itself, and still more bitterly resented having been compelled to give up Parma and Piacenza. No attentions on the part of Francis I could compensate for this. Thus the relations remained strained on both sides. Leo would not accede to the expressed desire of the French King for the recall of Filonardi; and the French Ambassador made no secret of his displeasure. “I know not”, said he in September, “what more the Pope will do. He controls Florence and Siena, and now he has taken possession of Urbino. He had better not think of Ferrara, for I have orders from my King to demand of him the cession to the Duke of Reggio and Modena. This is not the right moment to speak of Naples”. The Neapolitan question was just then occupying the minds of the Ambassadors both of France and Spain, who had met at Noyon, where the following agreement was come , to on the 13th of August, 1516. Francis I and Charles V concluded a peace in perpetuity, and a treaty for the mutual protection of their states against all comers. The French King renounced his claims on Naples in favour of his one-year-old daughter, Louise, whom Charles promised to marry as soon as she was twelve years old. Till the accomplishment of the marriage, Charles undertook the annual payment of 100,000 crowns, and after that the payment of half that sum until a child should be born of the marriage. A further stipulation which concerned the kingdom of Navarre was left so vague that it could easily be broken; Francis I wished to keep such a way open whereby to escape from the pledges he had made, for his object in signing this agreement was to prevent Charles from joining the anti-French coalition proposed by England. But neither did Charles give his definite adherence to that upon which his Dutch advisers at Noyon had agreed, when the only thing they considered was peace at any price with France. A six weeks’ limit had been allowed for the ratification, which Charles had extended by another month, so as to find time in the interim to negotiate with England. Henry VIII, who regarded the treaty of Noyon as a serious check, left no means untried to win Charles over. This he succeeded in doing, for the Noyon articles were not favourable to the King of Spain. In London, whither Cardinal Schinner went in person, a new treaty, of decidedly anti-French tendency, was prepared on the 29th of October. The contracting parties were Henry VIII and the Emperor Maximilian. The ostensible object of their alliance was the mutual protection of their states, the furtherance of universal peace, and the promotion of a general war against the Turks. They bound themselves in perpetuity to guarantee the safety of their actual and future possessions. The treaty was presented for approbation to Charles of Spain as well as to the Pope, who, through his Nuncio, had declared himself to be neutral. As regards the Pope, the deed ran thus: “Under the conviction that this treaty, being a guarantee of universal peace and the promotion of war against the Turks, must have the consent of the Holy Father, he is included in it as its head and as the participator in all its benefits, if he sanctions the articles and puts them in force by a contribution pro rata; and if, moreover, he pronounces the ban of excommunication against any aggressor, without absolution, except with the consent of all contracting parties. He must come to a decision and ratify these terms within six months”.

But this agreement, which was to be ratified within two months, remained only on paper. The Emperor Maximilian at the Brussels Convention gave his adherence to the Noyon Treaty on the 3rd of December, 1516, and promised to evacuate Verona, which he did in January of the following year. The Swiss, who had been expressly invited to accede to the London Convention, made a peace in perpetuity with France on the 29th of November, 1516.

To all appearances the alliance between Francis I and the Emperor was cemented in the spring of the following year. On the 11th of March, at a conference held at Cambrai, a League was made between Maximilian and the Kings of France and Spain. In May and July not only was this treaty ratified, but some secret clauses were added, the object of which was nothing less than the division of Northern and Central Italy into kingdoms, to be made into Imperial fiefs—Venice, west of Vicenza, with Modena, Milan, Mantua, Montferrat, Piedmont, Asti, and Genoa, were to constitute the kingdom of Lombardy, and to belong to Francis I; the eastern part of Venice, with Padua, Treviso, Florence, Pisa, Leghorn, and Siena were to form the Italian kingdom, and to be given either to King Charles or his brother Ferdinand.  There is no doubt whatever that by the atrocious Treaty of Cambrai, Francis I had no object but to entrap the Emperor, and reduce Venice as well as the Pope to a state of pliancy and servitude.

Probably no one knew better than the French King how much depended on the attitude taken by the Pope. On the 17th of May, Bulls from Rome were prepared which, in accordance with the agreement of Bologna, permitted Francis I to raise a crusade-tithe in his kingdom, including Brittany. But it was only in August, after the negotiations about the Concordat were concluded, that these Bulls were issued, having been rewritten at the King’s request. Francis returned thanks to the Pope in a letter to which he added a couple of autograph lines. In this letter he announced the conclusion of the Treaty of Noyon. Leo did not allow the anxiety he felt at the alliance between the French King and the young Hapsburg to be perceived, and sent his good wishes to Francis I. Going on to remind him of the covenant between them, he professed his readiness to recall his Swiss Nuncio. On the 6th of September he thanked the King for his letter, assured him of his good wishes, and for everything else referred him to his Nuncio, Canossa.

The Nuncios in Switzerland were at the same time admonished to behave in such a way that the French King could in no way take exception. Soon after this, Francis I received a privilege in respect of Milan, in accordance with which no consistorial benefice should be conferred on anyone obnoxious to the Crown. The imminence of the Turkish peril gave Leo the opportunity, in October, of once more appealing urgently for help in that quarter. The King in return professed his zeal in the cause of a Crusade, though it must be confessed that he expressed himself in a somewhat ambiguous manner. This annoyed the Pope; all the more because Francis expressed suspicion that the Pope was not acting honestly by him. On the top of this came the pressure put on him by Francis to hand over Modena and Reggio to the Duke of Ferrara. The report that Leo wished to make Lorenzo Duke of Romagna did not facilitate an agreement. “The Pope”, declared the French Ambassador, “is making himself the master of the whole of Italy, and we shall have to go back across the mountains”. Friction was increased by the complaint raised by Francis I that Schinner had gone, by the consent of the Pope, to London to conclude the treaty of October. At the same time the French King urged the Pope, through the Nuncio, to beware of Charles and Maximilian, who, said he, wished to combine to rob the Holy See of its temporal power. This warning had the effect of making Leo X formally disavow Cardinal Schinner. On the 19th there was sent to the Swiss an exhortation to make peace, which had an influence on the ratification of the arrangement of the 24th of November. On the 25th the Papal chamberlain Latino Benassao was sent on an extraordinary mission to France, as the Pope could not agree with the representative of Francis at Rome. Gossip was rife as to the object of this mission; though it really treated of the cementing of a closer friendship with France by the marriage of Lorenzo. Although the money collected in his country for a Crusade was now, as he had long desired, at the free disposal of the King, an agreement was as far off as ever. At the end of December, Leo X complained to the Venetian Ambassador that the French King suspected him of desiring the possession of Ferrara, and that this was the reason why the agreement was delayed. The Ambassador observed on this occasion how anxious the idea of the Treaty of Cambrai made the Pope. On the top of this came disturbing news about the Turks.  Thus did the year 1516 come to a close, full of grave anxiety for the Pope; the new year brought with it the alarming tidings of a menace to the scarcely won Duchy of Urbino.

Francesco Maria had not remained inactive during his exile at Mantua, and had been turning in every direction for help. It was easy for him to gain the friendship of Federigo Gonzaga, Lord of Bozzoli, who was as jealous as he of Lorenzo de' Medici; but what was more important was that he could count on the assistance of the French viceroy of Milan, Odet de Foix, Lord of Lautrec, who hated the Pope both as an Italian and as a priest. One very favourable feature in the undertaking of Francesco Maria, was that just then a number of Spanish and German soldiers had been thrown out of employment by the peace, and were seeking everywhere for a fresh engagement. Five thousand of these now declared themselves ready to follow the discrowned Duke into his former Duchy, the inhabitants of which desired his return, being dissatisfied with the rule of Lorenzo and his exorbitant taxation. Francesco Maria left Mantua on the 16th of January with his small but enterprising army, and marched on Urbino. It was a bold venture, for he had neither money, ordnance, nor provisions of war; however, it was soon to be seen that fortune favoured him.

The news of the rising in Urbino was to Rome like a flash of lightning in a cloudless sky. At the time the Pope was deeply engaged in discussing the Turkish question with the Cardinals, and did not dream of such a thing as a menace to Urbino. All were taken completely by surprise; and the Duke was in the Romagna before it was known that he had moved. The Pope was quite unprepared for war, because, owing to his lavish generosity, added to his bad management, money, the one thing necessary, was wanting to him. The Papal officers were discontented, because they did not receive sufficient pay; they were, moreover, deeply in debt, for all men followed the Pope’s example in lavishness. Therefore the war had to be J started with borrowed money— a doubtful proceeding for any prince.

From the first the Pope had no doubt whatever that France and Venice had a hand in the Duke’s attempt. Neither of them, said he, on the 26th of January, 1517, to the Venetian Ambassador, had any reason to support Francesco Maria against him. Two days later, however, the Ambassador of the Republic was able to give him the assurance that his Government would not assist any enemy of the Pope. The French also loudly protested their innocence, but the Pope believed them so little that he had no hesitation in expressing his distrust of Francis I, even in the letters in which he begged for the help of Germany and Spain. Even in a letter to Francis himself he expressed his distrust of his intentions.

The Pope’s position was desperate, for, thanks to his habitual tactics, he was in a state of dangerous isolation. Not only Francis, but Maximilian also owed him a grudge. Still angry at what he considered the too friendly terms of Leo with France in the spring of 1516, the Emperor wrote a very bitter letter to the Pope on the 20th of February, 1517. Internal difficulties were added to those from outside. The Romagna was discontented with the bad government of the Papal representative, Florence was in a state of disturbance, and the troops were clamouring for pay. To all this was added the anxiety about the Cambrai Congress, to prevent which Nicholas von Schonberg was sent at the beginning of January. “The union of the three sovereigns”, said the Pope to the Venetian Ambassador, “portends the division of Italy, to your injury and our own”.

Lorenzo de' Medici, who left Rome on the 18th of January, was given the supreme command of the Papal troops; being inexperienced in warfare, the Pope sent with him as advisers Renzo Orsini, Giulio Vitelli, and Guido Rangoni. The Pope appealed on all sides for assistance. At Forli, Faenza, and Ravenna the troops were in want of the necessaries of life.

On the 4th of February it was stated in Rome that Francesco Maria had reoccupied Urbino. The news was premature, but on the 8th of February there was no longer room to doubt the loss of the capital of the Duchy. In spite of the Papal prohibition, Alfonso of Ferrara had given Francesco Maria a free passage through his state, which greatly incensed the Pope, who had just pronounced an interdict on the dispossessed Duke. An Ambassador to whom we owe this adds these words : “There is no money; Leo is displeased with Renzo Orsini, and Renzo with him; the Romans are rejoicing over the bad turn affairs have taken”. The whole Duchy of Urbino, with the exception of the fortress of San Leo, followed the example of the capital. Only the towns of Pesaro, Sinigaglia, Gradara, and Mondaino, which did not belong to the Duchy, remained to Lorenzo. On the 26th of March, 1517, he was wounded at the siege of Mondolfo. He left the theatre of war, and remained at a distance, even after his recovery, in spite of the express command to return sent to him by the Pope. Cardinal Bibbiena, who was sent to the army, vainly tried to reduce to order the quarrelsome mercenaries. The Pope was beside himself; he dreaded the idea of a revolution, and it seemed to him a disgrace for the Church that a “petty duke” could dare so much. His anxiety was increased by the growing danger from the Turks, as well as by the Treaty of Cambrai. He knew well that a partition of Italy was contemplated by the parties to that treaty, and that Maximilian coveted Florence. But on the top of all this there came an event which might have frightened a less timid man—namely, the discovery of a plot of Cardinal Petrucci against the Pope’s life.

Alfonso Petrucci was one of those very worldly princes of the Church, whose only desire was to accumulate riches and indulge in the enjoyment of life. He and the younger Cardinals, after they had secured the election of Leo X, put forward such exorbitant claims that the granting of them was an impossibility. Even later in his pontificate, impoverished as he was by his lavish generosity, the Pope was not in a position to satisfy the countless demands of those who had elected him Pope. Additional cause of discontent was given to these Cardinals (many of whom regarded themselves as sharers in the Papal power) by the setting aside of the election capitulation, by the severity of Leo X to Cardinal Sanseverino, and by the unfortunate war in Urbino.

Alfonso Petrucci had, moreover, a special cause of anger with the Pope. In March, 1516, his brother, Borghese Petrucci, was, with the co-operation of Leo, banished from the government of Siena, being replaced by the Castellan of St. Angelo, Raffaello Petrucci; it was in vain that at the last moment Cardinal Petrucci tried by force of arms to put a stop to this revolution, which was gravely detrimental to his interests. Henceforward, his only thought was how to take vengeance on the “ungrateful Pope”. Consumed by an insane hatred, he meditated an attack on Leo, either when he was out hunting, or at some other convenient opportunity, when he intended to murder him with his own hand. It was the difficulty and danger of such a deed, says Guicciardini, which kept him from carrying out the project, rather than the scandal which would have filled all Christendom with horror, had a Cardinal stained his hands with the Pope’s blood.

During the war of Urbino, Petrucci bethought him of another plan for the attainment of his object. He planned a conspiracy, which was to break out as soon as he had succeeded in getting rid of the Pope by means of poison. To obtain this immediate end he bribed Battista da Vercelli to help him in his crime. This man, a doctor of some renown, was to come from Florence to Rome, ostensibly to treat the Pope for fistula, and was then to take his opportunity of administering poison. The plot, however, failed; for, however highly the skill of Battista might be recommended, the Pope was unwilling to trust himself to the hands of a perfect stranger. But this check did not make Petrucci relinquish his plan, though the unexpected obstruction made the hot-headed young man neglect all caution. He wished—so he was heard to declare—to become the liberator of the despised and enslaved College of Cardinals, and to be instrumental in raising to the supreme pontificate one of the older Cardinals, who would be grateful to his electors. These rash words caused Petrucci to fall under suspicion. He therefore left Rome, where he was not safe, and retired to a place belonging to the Colonna in Latium, without first taking leave of the Pope. He conspired so openly with his brother, who was living in Naples, that the Pope thought it best to write to him with his own hand, in March, 1517, warning him against trying to stir up a revolution in Siena; otherwise his action might be construed into a conspiracy against the Pope himself. In spite of this very distinct warning, Petrucci continued his machinations, and through Lattanzio Petrucci indulged in very doubtful dealings with Francesco Maria della Rovere. This added to the suspicion in which the Cardinal was held, and still more did the frequent correspondence which he carried on with his secretary and steward, Marc Antonio Nino, who had remained in Rome. In these letters the subject was revived of calling in Battista da Vercelli to attend to the Pope's open wound.

Petrucci was staying then at Genazzano, and while he was there Nino wrote to him in cipher, saying that Battista was as ready as ever to serve him, and hoped to gain access to His Holiness by means of Serapica and Giulio de' Bianchi, two of the Pope's confidential attendants. In order not to arouse suspicion, Battista did not think it wise to visit the Cardinal in person, but would as to that do exactly what Petrucci wished. This letter was intercepted, and led to the discovery of the plot.

Prompt and decisive measures were taken against the offenders. Petrucci’s confidant, Marc Antonio Nino, was torture. But nothing was made known publicly, and even the best-informed diplomatists knew nothing more than that Cardinal Petrucci was gravely implicated by Nino’s admissions. Some suspected that the offence under consideration was an attempt against Siena; while others suspected an understanding with Francesco Maria della Rovere, with whom Borghese Petrucci was staying. Battista da Vercelli’s movements in Florence were constantly watched. Cardinal Petrucci was promised the restoration of his rights in Siena, on condition that he came in person to Rome. The Cardinal hesitated to do this, though he had no suspicion that his correspondence with Nino had been discovered. All his fear was on account of his intrigues with Francesco Maria della Rovere. But so far as those intrigues were concerned, Leo gave him a free safe-conduct, assuring the Spanish Ambassador at the same time that he would keep his word. Therefore Petrucci came to Rome on the 1 8th of May. On the following day, hardly had he, in the company of his intimate friend, Cardinal Sauli, entered the Pope’s antechamber, before both of them were arrested and taken to the Castle of St. Angelo.

In a Consistory called without delay, the Pope informed the Cardinals of what had occurred, and of the introduction of proceedings against Petrucci and Sauli. It was at the same time decided that the minutes of the trial should be submitted for judgment to a special commission composed of Cardinals Remolino, Accolti and Farnese, and that the final sentence should be pronounced by the Cardinals. On the same day special Briefs were sent to the more important princes, telling them that Cardinals Petrucci and Sauli had been arrested on the charge of a secret conspiracy against the life of the Pope, and that on account of this crime a judicial process would be instituted against them.

In Rome this event, which gives us a deeper insight than can anything else into the intense corruption of the highest ecclesiastical body, caused a great sensation. The wildest rumours floated about the city, and it was said that other Cardinals had also been arrested. The excitement increased when it was seen that the Vatican was closely guarded and that troops had been brought into Rome.

Among the Ambassadors who had been informed of the proceedings, the representative of Spain openly protested against the arrest of Petrucci. He had, said he, gone surety for him, and this was the same thing as if the King had done so. But Leo X replied that even the most comprehensive safe-conduct could be no protection for one who had intended to take his sovereign’s life by poison, unless this horrible crime had been expressly mentioned. As Petrucci's safe-conduct only referred to his dealings with Francesco Maria della Rovere, the Spanish Ambassador soon withdrew his protest. But even among the Cardinals there were several who were indignant with the Pope for confining Petrucci and Sauli in the lowest dungeon of St. Angelo, which went by the name of “Marocco”. Leo tried to conceal his alarm, and insisted on no one visiting the prisoners ; nevertheless, at the express request of the College of Cardinals, he allowed a servant to each of them.

The management of the judicial process against the prisoners was confided to the procurator-fiscal, Mario de Perusco, a native of Rome, and auditor to the Governor of the city. In the first instance the inquiry was confined to proving whether the murder of the Pope had been actually intended. Word was sent to Florence to arrest Battista da Vercelli and bring him to Rome ; other suspected persons, including a servant of Petrucci’s named Pocointesta, were also arrested. All these were put to the torture, but whether the rack was applied to the Cardinals is uncertain.

Another Consistory was called on the 29th of May. At this was made known the report of Cardinals Remolino, Accolti, and Farnese, to whom had been confided the supervision of the proceedings. The sentence of these was that the accused Cardinals should be kept under arrest as long as they were not cleared of the accusations brought against them. When the Cardinals were assembled in the Vatican, Paris de Grassis says that Leo sent for Cardinal Accolti. “He remained for over an hour in the Pope’s room”, says the Master of Ceremonies. “As we could not understand what such a long interview portended, I looked through the key-hole, and saw that there was a military guard in the Pope’s room. I suspected at once that some thing terrible was about to occur, but I held my tongue. As I saw Cardinals Riario and Farnese enter the Pope’s room with cheerful countenances, I concluded that he had sent for them, probably to consult with them about the nomination of new Cardinals, about which he had been speaking some days before. Hardly, however, had Cardinal Riario entered the room, than the Pope, who usually walked about between two attendants, taking slow, steady steps, hurried out of the room quite swiftly, and seemingly in a state of confusion, shutting the door behind him, so that the Cardinal was left alone with the guard. Astonished at this, and at his apparent haste, I asked the Pope what it meant, and whether he was going into the Consistory without his stole. He then asked for his stole. He was pale and very much excited, and in a harsh tone told me to dismiss the Consistory. I obeyed, but had no doubt left that Cardinal Riario had been arrested”.

The reason of Riario’s arrest soon transpired. Petrucci and Sauli had confessed that he was their fellow-conspirator. Like many others, Paris de Grassis would not believe this, and came to the conclusion that Leo was allowing himself to be influenced by feelings of personal revenge connected with the memory of the Pazzi conspiracy; but this surmise of the Master of Ceremonies, who was always prepossessed in favour of Riario, was not confirmed by after events.

On the 4th of June Riario, who till that date had been detained in honourable captivity in the Vatican, was transferred to the Castle of St. Angelo. When the un fortunate man was told that this was to be done, he became paralysed with fear, and had to be carried to his prison. As the reason for this measure, Leo X explained in Consistory that Riario would confess nothing. But in the dark dungeon of St. Angelo he soon made a full confession. Another Consistory was held on the 8th of June: and then the Pope disclosed to the agitated assembly that, by the admission of the incarcerated Cardinals, two other members of the Sacred College, present at the Consistory at that moment, were involved in the conspiracy. Bitterly did Leo complain that those from whom he could have least suspected such a thing, those into whose hands he trusted his life, could be guilty of such a crime. But however pained he might be by the ingratitude of those whom he had loaded with honours and benefactions, he declared himself willing to forgive them, after the example of Him whose place he filled on earth, provided they would confess their misdeed and ask for pardon. But as, in spite of what he said, not one came forward, the Cardinals in Consistory decided that each of them in turn should go up to the Pope and make their avowal into his private ear. When it came to the turn of Cardinal Soderini to do this, he tried to avoid the occasion of avowing his guilt. This obstinacy incensed Leo X, and he told him to his face that he was one of the two culprits. Had he confessed his guilt, the Pope went on, his words would have been those of mercy, but now justice must take its course. On hearing this, Soderini, as well as Adriano Castellesi, threw themselves at the feet of the Pope, and confessing their complicity in the plot, implored his mercy. This was at once granted. The Consistory, however, imposed a fine on each of 12,500 ducats, and commanded the culprits to keep secret what had occurred. Nevertheless, the rumour of what had taken place spread like wildfire throughout Rome, taking many a distorted form as it went about. After the long and painful Consistory, the Pope received the Ambassadors of Germany, France, England, Spain, Portugal, and Venice, and informed them that the Cardinals who had been mixed up in the affair had been, with the exception of Petrucci, Sauli and Riario, pardoned. When the English Ambassador asked him if he would not pardon all, he replied : “Those Cardinals whose guilt has since become known, we have pardoned; but against those who are now confined in the Castle, proceedings will be carried out in due accordance with the criminal law”.

On the 1 6th of June Petrucci's servant, Pocointesta, was hanged in the prison of Tordi Nona, on the charge of attempting to stir up a revolt in Siena. At first an attempt was made to keep secret the alarming discoveries that came to light in the course of the examination of the prisoners, and even the best informed of the Ambassadors could learn nothing for certain. According to a cipher report of the Ferrarese Ambassador written on the 10th of June, there was a rumour that either Farnese or Paris de Grassis was equally guilty. It was only on the 18th of June that it was learned that the later accusations were limited to Soderini and Adriano Castelles. These last were indeed allowed to remain free, but, as mentioned already, each had to pay 12,500 ducats as the price of his liberty. When, however, this fine was doubled, they feared that they would no longer be safe in Rome. In the night of the 20th of June, Soderini sought refuge with the Colonna at Palestrina, while at the same time Cardinal Adriano Castellesi, who was by nature very timid, fled disguised to Tivoli, passing thence, as was reported, to Naples.

Meanwhile the greatest anxiety was felt by their friends concerning the incarcerated Cardinals, for the trial dragged on week after week, and each day brought with it fresh surmises as to the result. True to his nature, the Pope seemed for one moment inclined to allow justice to give place to mercy. But Lorenzo de' Medici and his adherents urged that the severest punishment should be inflicted, not only on the Cardinals, but on all the other offenders. To gain this object Lorenzo arrived in Rome quite unexpectedly on the 1 8th of June. Thirteen Cardinals present at that time in the Curia were summoned to a Consistory on the 22nd of June. All those called came, with the exception of Riario’s relative, Leonardo Grosso della Rovere. In a long speech Leo X informed the Cardinals of the result of the trial held on Petrucci, Sauli, and Riario. The accusation was one of fourfold treason. First, as the Pope pointed out, was that of binding themselves by oath, as Petrucci and Sauli had done, during the lifetime of the lawful Supreme Pontiff, to make Riario Pope; to which arrangement Riario had consented. In order to remove Leo X and secure his death, Petrucci and Sauli had suborned Battista da Vercelli to poison the Pope, under the pretext of treating him for fistula. In this plot also Riario was involved. Lastly, Petrucci as well as Sauli had held treasonable communication with Francesco Maria della Rovere, and had thus incurred the penalties imposed by the last Bull issued. Then the minutes of the process instituted against the accused were read, as also were the confessions of the imprisoned Cardinals. It had now to be decided whether the charge of high-treason were proved, the penalty of such a crime being the loss of all possessions as well as sentence of death. The Cardinals proceeded to put the matter to the vote. All, with the exception of Grimani, admitted that Petrucci, Sauli, and Riario were without doubt guilty of fourfold treason; nevertheless, they begged the Pope to show mercy towards their brother Cardinals. Then the fiscal-advocate, Justino de Carosis, and after him the fiscal­procurator, Mario de Perusco, brought forward their motion, which was read by Pietro Bembo. Their judgment was that all three of the accused should be condemned to the loss of all their benefices and possessions, then be degraded from their dignity of the cardinalate, and finally handed over to the secular arm. At the conclusion of the Consistory the Pope spoke about the flight of Adriano Castellesi, which, he said, he had known about but would not prevent.

Only such well-weighed entries, characterized by a truly diplomatic brevity and reserve, do we find in the Vice­Chancellor’s Consistorial Acts. But from other impartial sources we learn that the Consistory was long and stormy. According to the Venetian Ambassador it lasted for ten, and, according to Paris de Grassis, thirteen hours. It was not only the reading of the minutes of the trial, filling several hundred pages, which took so much time; but there were also loud and long discussions, of such a nature that those outside could overhear the Pope disputing with the Cardinals, and they with one another. There was one especially violent encounter of words between Leo X and Cardinal Grimani.

The passing of the sentence took the Curia by surprise. To many the clause which gave the offenders over to the secular arm seemed too hard; for in this case it was equivalent to a sentence of death. Nevertheless it was, according to the laws of that time, the usual sentence passed on traitors, even when no attempt had been made by them against the life of their sovereign.

On the 25th of June all the Ambassadors then in Rome were invited to come before the Pope to hear the minutes of the trial read. “This is what we understood”, reports the Venetian Ambassador, “by the letters found on Petrucci’s secretary, the Cardinal’s schemes with Battista da Vercelli for poisoning the Pope were discovered. Petrucci himself admitted later that, in desperation at Siena being taken out of the hands of his family, he desired to take the Pope’s life, and confided his plan to Cardinals Sauli and Riario”. To this the Venetian Ambassador adds: “There is no doubt as to this; yet in conducting the trial it was wrong that the accused should have been put into a position to hear the testimony of others. When this was done in the case of Riario, who would not admit the truth of any of the accusations against him, he said, on hearing the evidence of Petrucci and Sauli, that as they affirmed his connivance in the plot, this statement must be retained in the minutes. Soderini affirmed that he had promised Riario the tiara." Unfortunately this is all that the Ambassador says about the reading of the minutes of the process, which took eight hours and a half. At the end of the conference the Pope asked for Petrucci's red biretta, which was on the table in front of him. “This”, said he,  “is what he staked. He was determined to go to all lengths”.

There is no doubt that Leo X believed in the existence of a real conspiracy against his life. For some time he would not venture to leave his well-guarded palace: and when at last, contrary to all expectation, he attended Vespers in the Vatican Basilica on the vigil of SS. Peter and Paul, he was surrounded by an armed guard; and all the streets round St. Peter’s were held by troops. On the 27th of June Battista da Vercelli and Marc Antonio Nino were hanged, drawn, and quartered. In accordance with the horrible criminal custom of the day, they were both severely tortured on the way to the place of execution, which was on this occasion the Piazza in front of the bridge of St. Angelo. This barbarity was generally condemned.

The whole of Rome was waiting with anxiety to learn the sentence passed on the incarcerated Cardinals. That Petrucci’s fate was sealed was inferred by the division among others of his benefices; but there seemed to be a prospect of pardon for the other two Cardinals. As, unfortunately, the short epitome of the trial, given by the Venetian Ambassador, is all that remains to us of the acts of the process, it is difficult, and for the most part impossible, to form an estimate of the measure of guilt or of the motives of each individual. There is, however, no doubt whatever as to the existence of treasonable dealings with Francesco Maria della Rovere, or of the plot to poison Leo X.

There is no doubt that Petrucci was the most guilty of the conspirators, and indeed the head of the whole plot; for there is incontrovertible proof of his criminal machinations with Battista da Vercelli. The sentence of death pronounced against him was carried out at once, though the statements vary as to the mode of his execution, and whether he was strangled or beheaded. There is also great uncertainty whether this young man, twenty-seven years of age, who had cared for nothing but the frivolous enjoyment of life, reconciled his soul to God before he died.

As regards Sauli, Riario, Soderini, and Adriano Castellesi, there seems no doubt that they gave ear more or less to Petrucci's criminal schemes, though how far each was individually involved cannot be ascertained by the material at our disposal. The historian Paolo Giovio, who is as a rule well-informed, says as follows : “Even if those above named did not actually confide the execution of the criminal scheme to the unstable and frivolous Petrucci, there is no doubt that they incited him to it by their jests and jibes. In their inmost hearts these men were devoured by hatred and ambition, and wished that Petrucci might succeed in his project of removing the Pope, either by open violence or by subtle poison”. From other sources also it seems undeniable that at least Sauli and Riario had a more intimate knowledge of the murderous plot. Their crime, therefore, consisted in not revealing, as they were bound to do, the vengeful machinations of Petrucci, of which they were aware.

As to Adriano Castellesi, he was unlike the others, and Giovio declares that he did not wish for the Pope’s death from any feelings of hatred or ill-will, but solely because his ambition led him to wish for the tiara for himself. Ambition, as well as hatred of the Florentine who was so all-powerful in the Curia, was an essential motive with Riario. Soderini could not forget the banishment from Florence of his brother Pietro, although Leo X had at once invited him to Rome and had restored to him his possessions. Next to Petrucci, there is no doubt, from the incriminating character of the letters which were seized, that Sauli was very deeply involved. No satisfactory explanation can be given why he allowed himself to be mixed up in the treasonable intrigue. Few of the Cardinals had received so many benefits and favours from the Pope as he. The black ingratitude with which Sauli repaid his generosity pained the Pope deeply. “Even during the last three months”, said Leo to the Venetian Ambassador, “we have conferred benefices on Sauli to the value of 6000 ducats”. In court circles the opinion was held that it was these very marks of favour, and the Pope’s partiality for Sauli, which had developed in him an intolerable pride, and resentment because the Pope had given the see of Marseilles to Giulio de' Medici instead of to himself.

Urgent appeals were sent in to the Pope from many quarters on behalf of Sauli as well as of Riario. Genoa pleaded for Sauli, as also did Cardinal Cibo, and, above all, the French King. Many also interceded for Riario, among others the Venetian Ambassador. His relatives wrote in his favour even to Henry VIII of England. In his justification it was pleaded that his worst crime was keeping back the incriminating confidences of Petrucci. It is, however, undeniable that he had set his hopes on obtaining the tiara, and that his confidential relations with Francesco Maria della Rovere had led him to join the mortal enemy of the Pope.

In spite of all this, there were special reasons which induced the Pope to pardon and restore Riario. There were, however, the strictest conditions laid down for his pardon. The first of these was that he should expressly acknowledge that he had been lawfully deposed, and that he owed his restoration solely to the mercy of His Holiness. He had, moreover, to promise solemnly that he would be henceforward the true servant of the Pope; that he would refrain from all hostility towards him and his family, and have no dealings with any prince or Cardinal except about his own private concerns. As a punishment he was to pay, in three instalments, the enormous fine of 150,000 ducats. The first instalment of 50,000 ducats was to be advanced by Agostino Chigi, and the necessary security must be offered either by bankers or friendly officials of the Curia for the punctual payment at Christmas and Easter of the remaining instalments. Furthermore, caution money of 1 50,000 ducats was demanded for the observance of all matters connected with obedience and fidelity, especially that which forbade him to ever leave his appointed dwelling without the written permission of the Pope. As a further precaution, the twelve Cardinals who had taken part in Riario’s deposition, as well as Cardinal Leonardo Grosso della Rovere, were bound to pledge themselves to see that Riario kept his promises; failing which he was to be regarded as deposed in perpetuity. The same security was to be given by the Ambassadors of Germany, England, France, Spain, Portugal, and Venice. Their security was to be ratified within four months, and besides this they were to pledge themselves to make no further appeals to the Pope in favour of Riario.

On the 17th of July, in the great hall of St. Angelo, before the fiscal-procurator, Mario de Perusco, Riario promised to faithfully observe all these conditions. On the 23rd, his nearest relatives promised to pay a fine of 75,000 ducats, should Riario leave the Vatican without the express permission of the Pope. On the same day Agostino Chigi promised to pay the Pope 150,000 ducats on his behalf. On receiving this promise, the Pope decreed thus in a Consistory held on July the 24th: “Riario shall be restored to his dignities, with the exception of the title of S. Lorenzo in Damaso, and without either active or passive right of voting”.

The news of the approaching liberation of Riario, who was universally respected and beloved, spread rapidly through Rome. As the Master of Ceremonies, Paris de Grassis, made his way to St. Angelo to announce the good news to the prisoner, the streets were filled with a jubilant crowd. Riario was conducted to the Vatican by the covered way, in which he was met by Cardinal Giulio de' Medici. Having taken the oath required of him in the apartment of Cardinal Trivulzio, Paris de Grassis conducted him to the Pope, around whom all the Cardinals were assembled. Riario kissed Leo’s foot, but the latter put out his hand in a friendly manner and embraced him. Riario began to speak, but apologized for not having been able to prepare his words. Then breaking out into vehement expressions, he acknowledged his guilt, by which, he said, he deserved not only degradation but death. He praised the mercy of the Pope, which removed all fear of future punishment, and enabled him to live in peace. “I have sinned”, said he; “I have sinned far more than I admitted in my judicial confession”. “Honoured Lord”, replied the Pope, “what we have done by you is in accordance with our duty, and for the honour of the Apostolic See. We pardon you now for the sake of Christ, and restore you to your former state. Let all that has passed be forgotten between us”.

It is not difficult to understand what it was that moved Leo X to pardon and restore Riario. For many years the Cardinal had held the dignity of Camerlengo of the Roman Church and Dean of the Sacred College, a member of which he had been for forty years. His riches and generosity had made him one of the most influential personalities in Rome. Had the Pope refused pardon to such a man, he would have drawn down hatred on himself from high and low. He would have also laid himself open to the suspicion of being actuated by motives of private revenge; for Riario had been a witness of the Pazzi conspiracy, in which Leo’s father had been wounded and his uncle Giuliano killed. Though innocent, the Medici had arrested Riario, and only set him at liberty thanks to the energetic measures taken by Sixtus IV on his behalf. These measures were still so fresh in the memory of all concerned, that when Leo took proceedings against Riario for his complicity in Petrucci’s attempt, even the Pope’s adherents suspected that a desire for revenge for the old offence was at the bottom of the action taken by him. However, the joy with which his pardon was greeted by his many adherents, the friendliness of the Pope towards him then and afterwards, and even his full restoration which followed, when the right, active and passive, of voting was restored to him, could not blind him to the fact that his part in the Curia was played out. At the latter end of 1520 he asked leave to retire to Naples. This was granted. However, the bewitching beauty of his new abode could not make up to Riario for the loss of his position in the capital of the world. He who had been so full of the enjoyment of life, who had always lived in regal splendour in the most beautiful palace in Rome, fell into a state of melancholy, and died on the 7th of July, 1521, at the age of sixty-one. His body was brought to Rome and laid to rest in a very simple tomb in the Church of the Santi Apostoli. He required no special monument, for his magnificent palace of the Cancelleria, which he had to leave to the Apostolic Chamber, will keep the memory of this unfortunate man alive till the most remote ages.

A few days after the restoration of Riario there followed, with unexpected rapidity, that of Sauli, who was condemned to pay a fine of 25,000 ducats. When the Pope went into Consistory on the 31st of July, he sent Paris de Grassis to fetch Sauli from the Castle of St. Angelo. As a sign that his mission was genuine, he gave the Master of Ceremonies his diamond ring to show to the gaoler. “When I received this”, says Paris de Grassis, “I was astonished, because only a few days before the Pope had told me that he meant to treat and punish Sauli as his enemy”. Sauli, however, was not allowed to appear before the Pope with his cappa, but clad as a simple priest. He also had to pledge himself to remain in the Vatican, and to confess his offence publicly in Consistory. In obedience to this command, he accused himself of conspiring with Francesco Maria della Rovere against the Pope, and of sharing in Petrucci's scheme for poisoning Leo X. He humbly prayed for pardon and absolution for this crime, and promised to be for the future the most faithful servant of His Holiness. Leo X replied shortly and irritably that he hoped that his thoughts agreed with his words, but that he feared greatly that he would fall back into his old sins. After Sauli had again prayed for mercy and had promised fidelity to the Pope, lie was reinstated in his dignity as Cardinal, though without the right, active or passive, of voting. His benefices, so far as they had not been already given away, were restored to him. The deeply humiliated Sauli enjoyed his life as little as did Riario. He lived a retired life, and died on the 29th of March in the following year. Leo had him buried with all honours in the Church of Santa Sabina.

Meanwhile Soderini, for whom Francis I had interceded, had, by the Pope’s permission, gone from Palestrina to Forli, where he possessed an estate; though he had to promise not to leave the kingdom of Naples. The Pope was quite right not to trust him, and it was not till after Leo’s death that he was able to return to Rome.

Cardinal Adriano Castellesi found a refuge in Venice, where he arrived on the 13th of July. His flight was over­hasty, for it gave Wolsey the opportunity of ruining him. Intercession was made for him from many quarters, and probably an understanding might have been arrived at, had it not been that Wolsey was bent on obtaining possession of the unfortunate man’s benefices. For a long time Leo resisted the pressure put on him by England. Castellesi was sent for to Rome; but in spite of the safe-conduct offered, he would not go. This sealed his fate, and on the 5th of July, 1518, he was deprived of his dignities, the reason assigned being his complicity in Petrucci’s plot, as also his refusal to obey the summons to Rome. The primary cause of these strong measures was the pressure from England, but they were also attributable to the Pope’s fear of an alliance between Adriano and Soderini, and ensuing intrigues. Such an idea was, however, far from Adriano’s thoughts. He lived quietly and devoted to study in the Palazzo Ca Bernardo, near the Grand Canal, belonging to his friend Giacomo da Pesaro. There he remained until the death of Leo X compelled him to go to Rome to attend the Conclave. But on his way thither the unfortunate man disappeared, leaving no trace behind him. It was supposed that he had been murdered by his servant.

After the proceedings consequent on Petrucci’s conspiracy were ended, an unusual spirit of excitement continued to prevail. It cannot be surprising that the names of other Cardinals, such for instance as Luigi d'Aragona and Cornaro, were mentioned as being connected with the plot; though, as it was proved, such a surmise was quite incorrect.

Early in May the news spread about Rome that it was Leo’s intention to create as many as twelve new Cardinals. On the 15th of June he announced this officially in Consistory. In fact the Pope contemplated a complete renewal of the Sacred College. The recent occurrences had shown the necessary consequences of the secularization of the Supreme Senate of the Church, which had been initiated by Sixtus IV. The moment had come for a radical reform of the College of Cardinals; but that Leo X did not even yet fully grasp the gravity of the situation, is shown by the manner in which he proceeded. Instead of raising quite blameless men to the purple by the process of a severe selection, he chose several for the dignity solely because they were rich, and would be able to help to defray the enormous and daily growing expenses of the Urbino war.

When the news of all the horrible things that had been occurring in Rome reached Germany, the strongest imaginable spirit of hostility sprang up. The punishment of the criminals was condemned as unjust, and the whole procedure against them construed into a scheme for making money. Nor was it only in Germany that the Pope’s conduct was censured. In Siena, Milan, Venice, and even in Rome, there were not wanting those who were severe in their judgments. The canon, Sigismondo Tizio, who was bitterly hostile to the Medici for other reasons also, wrote thus : “What is the use of canonical laws, established by holy Popes, forbidding priests to stain their hands with blood? for now Popes and Cardinals have become antichrists and tyrants”.

Regardless of all these inimical opinions, Leo X profited by the past occurrences to create a large number of Cardinals, both as a means of subjecting the Sacred College to himself, and at the same time of procuring money for the Urbino war. He forestalled the opposition of the secular powers by paying the fullest attention to their wishes. Though the College of Cardinals had been not little intimidated by all that had taken place, it was not an easy matter to obtain their consent to the nominations on the gigantic scale which was proposed. The proceeding was indeed unparalleled, and gave great umbrage to many.

On the 26th of June there was held a stormy Consistory. Those present refused to consent to the proposed nomination of twenty-seven new Cardinals, except on the condition that the names of no more than fifteen should be published at once. When, however, it came to making a selection among the candidates, there was such a difference of opinion that the settlement of the affair had to be postponed to another Consistory. But when it came to the point the Cardinals yielded to the strong will of the Pope more readily than could have been expected. On the 1st of July the great nomination took place; only, instead of twenty-seven, thirty-one Cardinals were made. The Sacred College gave its consent, not freely, but constrained by fear.

The unprecedented number of those nominated, the publication of whom followed in open Consistory on the 3rd of July made it necessary to create new titles for the Cardinals. On the 10th of July, the Pope was in a position to announce that all the older Cardinals had agreed to the abrogation of the decree of the election capitulation which limited the total number of the members of the Sacred College to twenty-four.

The new Cardinals were men of very different types, by the choice of whom Leo X wished to attain various objects. In the case of some, such as Louis de Bourbon, brother of the Constable, of the Portuguese Infant Alfonso, the Spaniard, Raymond de Vich, and the Venetian, Francesco Pisani, politics were the sole reason of their elevation. In the case of others the motive was to be found in their relationship to the house of Medici, and their readiness to advance large sums of money to the Pope. This was how it came about that men like Ponzetti, Armellini, and Passerini received the purple.

Ferdinando Ponzetti was born in Naples, though his family came from Florence. His portrait is known to students of art in the altar-piece in the Chapel of St. Brigit in S. Maria della Pace, where Baldassare Peruzzi has represented him kneeling before the Madonna. Ponzetti had made his fortune as physician to Innocent VIII, and subsequently received distinguished offices in the Curia. On the 23rd of October Leo appointed him his treasurer; and now, at the age of eighty, he was raised to the purple. Not only was Ponzetti a physician of mark, but he was also versed in classical literature, philosophy and theology, was very ready of speech, and was well known as an author. But all his good qualities were marred by the vilest avarice. He paid 30,000 ducats for his nomination.

Francesco Armellini’s reputation was even worse than his. His father was a poor merchant of Perugia, but by his own shrewdness and financial talent in discovering new sources of revenue, he made himself indispensable to the Pope; but at the same time he made himself universally hated. Silvio Passerini was not much better. This learned though self-opinionated man had been Datary since January, 1514,1 and had served the Medici with the greatest fidelity on many occasions. It was therefore easy for him to find favour with others. The list of benefices bestowed on Silvio Passerini, as is shown by the “Regest Leonis X”, is really shocking. Among all the benefice-hunters of the court of Leo X, certainly Passerini took the first place.

Their kinship to the Pope was the sole reason of the nominations of Giovanni Salviati, Niccolò Ridolfi, and Luigi de' Rossi. The young and highly-gifted musician Ercole Rangoni, Bonifacio Ferreri, and Raffaello Petrucci owed their elevation to personal considerations. The last mentioned, who had formerly held the post of Governor of Siena, led an entirely secular life. His covetousness made him hated ; but the two first named had the reputation of being excellent men.

A most rare event in the history of the Sacred College was the elevation to the purple on the same day of two members of one family. These were Scaramuccia Trivulzoo to whom the success of the Lateran Council owed so much, and his highly-gifted nephew Agostino. Still greater astonishment was caused by the nomination of seven members of prominent Roman families with no regard to party. By doing this Leo carried on the prudent policy of his predecessors, who wished to remove all party feeling from the Court. Whatever the motive, the Romans rejoiced and held high festival because of the honour paid to their fellow-citizens. But Franciotto Orsini and Pompeo Colonna were totally unfitted for their high dignity, being rather condottieri than princes of the Church. Francesco Conti also lived a thoroughly worldly life. But of the four remaining nothing but good can be said. Alessandro Cesarini was remarkable for his culture, Andrea della Valle for his great prudence, while Paolo Cesi and Domenico Jacobazzi were distinguished for their great learning.

The Roman, Domenico de Cupis, the Florentine, Niccolò Pandolfini, the Sienese, Giovanni Piccolomini, the Genoese, Giambattista Pallavicini, and Lorenzo Campeggio, who belonged to a Bolognese family, were all excellent men. Finally, there was the Dutchman, Adrian of Utrecht, who was a man of sound learning, and a model of the priestly life, who had been recommended by Charles V. With him are worthy to be ranked the Generals of the Dominicans, the Franciscan Observantines, and the hermits of St. Augustine, who received the cardinalate together on the 1st of July, 1517. It is hard to say which of these religious holds the first place.

More will be said later about the learned General of the Dominicans, Thomas de Vio (Cajetan). Cristoforo Numai, a native of Forli, had taken the Franciscan habit early in life, and had then received the doctorate of theology in Paris. Only a few days before the 1st of July, the confidence of his brethren had placed him at the head of the most widespread of all religious orders. He was completely taken by surprise by his elevation to the purple. The Master of Ceremonies relates how the humble religious refused at first to believe the news of his elevation, and would not believe it until several successive messengers had been despatched to take him to the Vatican. When Numai at length appeared at the palace in his well-worn habit, his complete ignorance of courtly etiquette aroused astonishment in the ante-camera. “At last”, relates Paris de Grassis, “I conducted him to the Pope, who had already left the Consistory”. His Holiness embraced him and greeted him as Cardinal.

The General of the Augustinians, Egidio Canisio, known under the name of Egidius of Viterbo, was taken by surprise by the conferring of the dignity as completely as was Numai. If ever a man deserved the red hat it was this distinguished man, who combined a classical education and general learning with a great capacity for business and a profound piety.

Egidio Canisio's versatility and mental activity were truly astounding. Not only had he made his mark as a poet, orator, philosopher, and theologian, but also as an historian and a student of oriental languages. It is a mystery how, with all this intellectual work, he found the time to effect what he did by preaching and in reforming his Order. On the top of all these occupations there came the various and difficult diplomatic missions which were confided to him by both Julius II. and Leo X. Ever since the classical discourse at the opening of the Lateran Council, urging the reformation of the Church, his name has been famous. The calling of such a man to the Supreme Senate of the Church does great credit to Leo X; in this way he promoted the principle of true reform as well as its execution.

If we consider the nominations of the 1st of July, 1517, it must be admitted that many, if by no means all, the new Cardinals were excellent and worthy men, who deserved well of the Church, and by means of whom the Sacred College was for the first time, after long years, restored to its regenerating influence. In this respect as also in the number of nationalities represented, that creation of Cardinals showed a most decided advance on any other  in many ways it was an important event. Not only was the secularization of the Sacred College to a great extent checked, but the supremacy of the Papal authority over that of the Cardinals was finally confirmed. Ever since the middle of the 14th Century, the one endeavour of the Cardinals had been to cramp and circumscribe the power of the Pope; though, in spite of all the election capitulations, the Papacy had preserved its lawfully absolute power. All attempts to fetter the Pope by the vote of the Sacred College had failed. The last great attempt made by the Cardinals to oppose him—the Council of Pisa—had had just the contrary effect to that which had been intended. The schismatic Cardinals had been compelled to repudiate the Council; and, at the eleventh session of the Lateran Council, held on the 19th of December, 1516, the Bull about the abolition of the Pragmatic Sanction declared that to the Pope alone belonged the right and authority to summon, prorogue, or dismiss a Council. The conspiracy of Petrucci led to a nomination of Cardinals on a scale greater than any mentioned in the annals of the Church. Ever after, the absolute supremacy of the Pope was so firmly established that the Cardinals under Leo’s next successor but one, “even in the days of the greatest misfortune, when party spirit prevailed most violently”, ventured on no opposition to it.

Meanwhile the war in Urbino was going on, and sympathy with Francesco Maria was growing in Tuscany and even in some of the States of the Church. Fear and hope alternated at the Vatican; but the various projects that were made vanished, as says an Ambassador, into smoke. There was scarcely a town in the States of the Church which did not show dangerous signs of excitement; at one time Siena, Perugia, and Citta di Castello were threatened with revolution. In June the Pope feared lest the enemy might appear before the very gates of Rome. In all haste troops were raised in the city, and the Vatican and its immediate surroundings were provided with special guards. Urgent appeals for assistance were sent out by the Pope on all sides, especially to Switzerland.

That the war, with its enormous expenses, dragged on so long, was largely due to the attitude of the great powers, to whose interest it was that the Pope should be kept in a state of embarrassment, and compelled to seek for help. After his cause was lost, Francesco Maria disclosed the true state of affairs by making it known that Francis I and Charles V had not only sympathized with him, but had even persuaded him to persevere with his undertaking. Quite in accordance with this policy were the constant offers of assistance to Leo X, which those powers vied with each other in making. But the troops promised, though always coming, never came, in spite of moving remonstrances on the part of the Pope. The leaders of the mercenary troops behaved in the same way ; in order to prolong their service and extort from the Pope as much money as possible, they made it their chief duty to spare the enemy and defer a settlement.

As early as February, 1517, Leo X had turned to England to obtain from Henry VIII the money for his enormous war expenses; but the English King refused to help until the Pope had joined his League. Then Leo turned to France; but Francis I demanded security for his protégé, the Duke of Ferrara, and the cession to him of Modena and Reggio. After long negotiations, the Pope acceded to this demand, but his Brief contained provisos which Francis would not accept.

Meanwhile the want of money in Rome increased to such an extent that Leo declared his readiness to join the English League; whereupon Henry VIII sent a subsidy of 50,000 ducats. The Papal plenipotentiary in London prepared a deed of alliance in the beginning of July, but Leo X, actuated by fear of France, still hesitated to take the decisive step. However, he yielded at last, and on the 11th of August he published a Brief which ratified the League between England, Spain, and the Emperor. He now received a subsidy of 100,000 ducats, to raise which he consented to the levying of a tithe on the English clergy.

Leo was told from so many quarters of the French King’s secret support of Francesco Maria, that he could no longer doubt the truth. The difference between him and Francis widened every day. Canossa, who had for many years been Nuncio at the French court, was sacrificed to the situation, for Leo X no longer trusted him, on account of the great favour in which he was held by Francis I. His successor was the Bishop of Sebenico, Giovanni Staffileo, who arrived at the French court in the middle of September, 1517.

At this moment the war of Urbino came to an end after a duration of over eight months. Spain and France, the rival powers in Italy, and very jealous of each other, undertook the office of mediation and arrangement of terms. Leo X, who with good reason distrusted them both, found himself pledged to pay all arrears to the soldiers of Francesco Maria, which amounted to more than 100,000 ducats, as well as to the granting of a full amnesty. The ex-Duke, who was absolved from all the ecclesiastical penalties which hung over him, received permission to retire to Mantua, with all his artillery, as well as with the famous library collected by Federigo of Montefeltro. When he took his departure, he held out hopes to his subjects that he would come back in better days; for Francis I had promised to help him to regain his Duchy, either when there was a vacancy in the Holy See, or whenever he had come to a rupture with Leo X. It was therefore an essentially insecure crown which Lorenzo de' Medici received with the Duchy of Urbino. The only, thing gained was a suspension of arms, which would no doubt last till the Pope’s death. This much was gained, but at what a cost!

Guicciardini reckons that Leo’s war expenses up to that time had reached the appalling sum of 800,000 ducats. The statement made by Leo X to the Venetian and Swiss Ambassadors agrees with this. If, as it may be, this calculation is placed at too high a figure, there is no doubt that from that time dates the complete ruin of the Papal finances.

Not less disastrous was the war in its effect of promoting the spread of bandits in the States of the Church. But worst of all was the injury to its moral power which the Holy See had sustained, in that its occupant had again entered upon the disastrous policy of Alexander VI, in spite of the noble example set by Julius II, and regard less of the crying needs of both the Church and the world, which called for something very different from the prosecution of such a war. The struggle for the possession of the Duchy had a peculiarly injurious effect on the endeavour made by the Pope to promote a Crusade, which by reason of it came to an almost complete standstill.

CHAPTER V.

The Pope's endeavours to promote a Crusade, 1517-1518.