POPE LEO X

CHAPTER II.

The Medici and the Policy of Leo X, 1513-1515.

All Italians are warmly attached to their home and family. This characteristic, beautiful and noble in itself, but so harmful to many Popes, reached such proportions in Leo X that, throughout his pontificate, the history of Florence and of the Medici was closely bound up with that of Rome.

Two out of his many relatives, Giuliano, his brother, and Giulio his cousin, betook themselves to the Eternal City soon after the termination of the Conclave. The former, youngest son of Lorenzo the Magnificent, born in 1479, had always been intended for the secular state, as also was Lorenzo, the son of Leo’s eldest brother Piero. As soon as these two arrived, on the 13th of September, 1513, the Roman patriciate was conferred on them with great pomp in the Capitol.

Giuliano, with his weak health, did not seem to possess the qualifications necessary for the management of Florentine affairs; therefore Leo X decided that he should remain in Rome, with the honourable title of General of the Church. The difficult task of governing the Florentine Republic fell, by command of the Pope, to the lot of Lorenzo, who, though only twenty-one years of age, represented the elder branch of the family. He returned to Florence from Rome on the 10th of August, 1513.

The form of government in that city was in essentials exactly what it had been under Lorenzo the Magnificent. Two councils legislated for everything. One consisted of seventy members, elected for life, and the other of a hundred, who were changed every six months. The council of a hundred, to which all late Gonfalonieri might belong, had the sole right of levying supplies and imposing taxes. The adherents of the Medici were in a large majority in both councils, and it was therefore un necessary to give to Lorenzo a special position above that of the other citizens. The eyes of all were turned on the palace of the Pope’s nephew in the Via Larga, Giulio de' Medici having advised him to make friends by his courtesy and prudent hospitality. The independence of Florence was a mere form, and the house of Medici practically governed supremely. Significant of this was the fact that in September, 1513, the Feast of SS. Cosmas and Damian, the patron saints of the Medici, was made into a state holiday. On the Feast of St. John, in 1514, Lorenzo celebrated with great pomp the anniversary of the return of his family to Florence, Cardinals Cibo, Este, Aragona, Cornaro, Bibbiena, and Sauli being present incognito. In May of the following year, the Pope’s nephew having been elected Captain-General of the Florentine levies, he found himself in an unusually prominent position, though the Florentine government was in all essentials dependent on Rome.

The Pope’s cousin, Giulio de' Medici, who had lived chiefly in Lombardy as an inmate of the Capuan Priory of St. John, was made Archbishop of Florence on the 9th of May, 1513. Public opinion considered Giulio, who was born on the 26th of May, 1478, after the murder of his father by the Pazzi, to be branded with the stain of illegitimate birth, and from this disability he had already received a dispensation. When, in the autumn, there was a question of his being made Cardinal, it was attested by witnesses that a valid marriage had taken place secretly between his father and mother, Floreta, a special deed to that effect being drawn up; and, on the 23d of September, 1513, he was, at the age of thirty-five, raised to the much-coveted purple. Giulio received as his title S. Maria in Domenica, which had been that of Leo X before he was elected Pope.

In this his first creation of Cardinals, three others, closely connected with the new Pope, also received the red hat. These were Innocenzo Cibo, Lorenzo Pucci, and Bernardo Bibbiena. Innocenzo Cibo, born in 1491, was the eldest son of Franceschetto Cibo and Maddalena de' Medici, the sister of Leo X. Beyond this relationship he had no particular claims or merits. The Pope in nominating him is reported to have said, in reference to his own elevation through his grandfather: “What I received from an Innocent, that do I give now to an Innocent”. Certainly this did not justify the reception of a youth of twenty-two into the Senate of the Church. As, moreover, he made a very worldly use of his rich benefices, and gave himself over to a life of immorality, nothing but blame can be attached to his elevation to the purple.

Lorenzo Pucci, whose beautiful features are reproduced in the portrait by the master-hand of Sebastiano del Piombo (now in the Hofmuseum at Vienna), was not only a member of one of the most respected branches of the Medici family, but had given proof of his ability and skill under the pontificate of Julius II. Besides this he had been for a long time teacher of law at Pisa, and had a profound knowledge of canon law and theology. Unfortunately, these excellent qualities were marred by the most execrable avarice, which he sought to satisfy by an unscrupulous traffic in the matter of indulgences. It must, however, be admitted that when it was a question of the promotion of art, Pucci did not spare himself. As an instance of this may be cited the fact that he had his chapel in the Trinità de' Monti painted by Perino del Vaga. He was also on terms of intimacy with Raphael, and it was through an arrangement made by him on behalf of his nephew Antonio that the picture of St. Cecilia was painted. Michael Angelo also did work for the Cardinal of the Quattro Coronati, by which name Pucci was known, after his titular church. If he could say, when speaking of that master, that he was true to him as a brother, such a relationship speaks for itself of the Cardinal's intellectual greatness.

The third to be raised to the purple was, no doubt, a very distinguished and intellectual man; but he was so worldly-minded that his elevation also must be reprehended. Bernardo Dovizi, usually known as Bibbiena from the place of his birth, a small town in the upper Casentino, had been closely connected with the Medici from his early youth. In Florence he had superintended the studies of the young Giovanni, had then become his private secretary, had accompanied him into exile, had defended his interests with Julius II, and had, finally, been invaluable to him by his services as conclavist during the business of the election. As a reward for these services he was first named chief treasurer, and soon after raised to the purple. He was not, however, fitted for such a dignity, being essentially a man of the world, who, besides being devoted to literary and artistic enjoyments, by no means despised those of a grosser description. He was much valued by Leo X on account of his faithful services, his ready pen, his warm interest in literature and art, and his invariable gaiety and overflowing spirits. As an organizer of festivities he had no equal.  In political matters he was the Pope’s principal and most influential adviser during the first years of Leo’s pontificate. At that time, out of opposition to Giuliano, he took up a line against the French; and this was probably the cause of the great fluctuations in the Papal policy.

The political influence exercised by Bibbiena was illustrated by the alterations effected by Leo in the office of the Papal secretaries. Innocent VIII, in reorganizing this department, had placed at its head a confidential secretary, called indifferently segretario domestico, secreto, or intimo, who almost filled the place of a Secretary of State. He was given an apartment in the Vatican, and had free admission to the Pope at all hours; and to him alone were his master’s secrets confided. To him were given over the reports of the Nuncios, to be answered in accordance with the verbal directions of the Pope. Naturally this extraordinary office became ere long the object of envy of the other secretaries, and led, moreover, to many abuses. In order to put an end to all complaints, Leo X appointed special secretaries for the secret Briefs.

The post of “segretario intimo” held under Leo X by Pietro Ardinghello, was considerably reduced in importance by the fact that a Cardinal intervened between him and the Pope, and that all business passed through him. At first this Cardinal was Bibbiena; later it was Giulio de' Medici. It is a mistake to say that at that time the latter was the right hand of the Pope ; on the contrary, he had to resign himself for a long time to the Pope’s carrying on the most important business independently of him with Cardinal Bibbiena. The situation became more and more complicated. Bibbiena had been the confidential secretary of Cardinal Giovanni de' Medici, and still retained the same post under the Pope during the first years of Leo’s pontificate; even after he had been made a Cardinal, while, by reason of the dignity of the purple, he held a position incalculably superior to that held by Ardinghello, who was more of a private secretary to Leo, for a long time—certainly till the autumn of 1515—he played a part, through his favour with the Pope, far more important than did Cardinal Giulio. Not until 1516 or 1517 did the latter rise to being the principal adviser of the Pope. Previously, Bibbiena’s position had been so confidential that state secrets were confided to him alone, to the exclusion of even Cardinal Giulio. “Bibbiena is all and everything”, declares a Venetian, immediately after the election. Even in the years 1514 and 1515 diplomatists called him the “alter ego” of the Pope.

Bibbiena was a novice in the higher matters of diplomacy, and it was often difficult for him to feel his way. His position was made still more difficult by the intrigues of the friends and adherents of the Medici. These had come in crowds to Rome, where they played an important part. In Leo’s signs of favour towards his relatives they saw only the beginning of much greater things. They entertained the most extravagant hopes, and confidently expected that both Giuliano and Lorenzo de' Medici would be at once made princes, and given independent territories to the north and south of the States of the Church. It seemed obvious to them that with such a change in Leo’s position the dependents of the fortunate house should receive honourable and lucrative emoluments. It is important to establish the fact that these inordinate schemes for the exaltation of the house of Medici emanated neither from Leo nor from Giuliano or Lorenzo, but from the dependents of the family. Jacopo Nardi expressly states that it was the Medicean courtiers, when discussing matters in the Orsini palace soon after Leo's election, who set abroad the rumour that Giuliano was to be made King of Naples and Lorenzo Duke of Milan. Plans of this sort might have led to the worst complications. The question was what line Leo would take about them.

Contemporaries are almost unanimous in declaring that Leo X allowed himself to be influenced by family considerations in his political actions. But since then the opposite view has been taken, and maintained with success. Probably the truth lies between the two. There is no doubt that the policy of Leo X was influenced more or less by family interests; but as far as we can form any judgment from the sources and materials that are at present at our command, private interests were not in reality so prominent in his mind as those of a higher and more general nature. Such was at one time the traditional policy of the Popes not to allow Naples and Milan to be in the power of one and the same prince. Such also was the security and increase of the States of the Church. National interests also, such as were summed up in the cry for the “freedom for Italy”, played no unimportant part in Leo's policy. Along with these there naturally ran an undercurrent of family interests. Which of these various motives was the strongest in the mind of Leo X cannot be decided with any certainty in the light of the materials which are at present available. In interpreting the secret processes of the human mind, the most extreme reserve is necessary.

As to such a policy of nepotism as was pursued by Alexander VI, the same conditions were entirely wanting in the relatives of Leo X. This applies more immediately to Giuliano, and with certain reservations to Lorenzo de' Medici. Both these princes, famous for a time, live in the memory of the world in the idealized forms which the genius of Michael Angelo has given them in the statues on the tombs of the Medici. But in reality they were not personalities of any importance. Giuliano, thirty-four years of age, was by nature kindly, gentle, and weak, somewhat melancholy and superstitious, but withal intellectual and refined. Like all the Medici, he was the friend of men of letters and artists. He was closely connected with Castiglione and Bembo. Raphael painted his portrait, and his name is connected with Fra Giocondo and Leonardo da Vinci. But Giuliano represented also the darker side of his family's characteristics, by his extravagant generosity, his boundless love of display, his desire for enjoyment, and his debauchery. Licentiousness had exhausted his feeble body, and weakened his ambition and mental activity. A man to whom the granting of frequent audiences was too great an exertion, and who desired above all things to lead a quiet, undisturbed, and pleasant life, was not fitted for high political aspirations.

The young Lorenzo was quite different. Comely in person, a bold rider, an indefatigable sportsman, a good manager, though generous withal, a skilful diplomatist, he was considered by many of his contemporaries to be possessed of all the qualities which would enable him to play a great part as the nephew of the Pope. But more were necessary to obtain a crown, and of these Lorenzo possessed but few. His ambition, as far as we can judge, was moderate; a rich wife, a small, secure, productive estate, beyond these his aspirations did not at first soar. Further desires were not natural to him, but were fostered by the constant instigation of his mother, Alfonsina Orsini. That ambitious, highly-gifted woman burned with the desire to see a shining crown on the head of her son. She conceived lofty plans; at the most, Lorenzo agreed to them unwillingly. Thus the project of gaining the principality of Piombino by supplanting the Appiani, undoubtedly emanated from Lorenzo’s mother, and not from Lorenzo himself; though the plan came to nothing through the determined resistance of Leo X.

Lorenzo returned reluctantly to Florence in August, 1513. He would much rather have taken up his abode permanently in Rome, which was so brilliant and rich in enjoyments. But Leo was well acquainted with his nephew, in whom was to be seen the beginning of the decline of the Medici race. Having given the command of the Papal troops to Giuliano and that of the Florentines to Lorenzo, the Pope said to Giovanni da Poppi : “I have appointed two Captains who have next to no experience. Were some great enterprise to turn up, I know not how they would be able to carry it out!”. Both Giuliano and Lorenzo might have succumbed to the temptation of mixing themselves with the high-flown, extravagant projects of the Florentines; nevertheless, they lacked the moral and warlike qualities necessary for carrying them out. It is therefore unsafe to allege from existing sources of information that the policy of Leo X was based primarily on any such nepotistic projects. Nevertheless, the rumour that the crown of Naples was destined for Giuliano, spread further and further, till it reached the Court of Ferdinand of Spain. That King believed that the ambition of the Medici, in conjunction with France, was threatening his position in Italy.

Leo hastened to make assurances that the rumour was without any foundation. Never, he asseverated, had such a plan existed. How could he be believed capable of making enemies at one and the same time of France, the Emperor, and Spain? A kingdom could not be taken possession of by words, and was it not his sole endeavour to restore universal peace, especially in Italy? Ferdinand did not believe the assertions of the Pope; for both he and the Emperor had been filled with the deepest distrust of Leo ever since the ecclesiastical reconciliation of France. This distrust was justified so far that, from December, 1513, to July, 1514, the policy of the Pope seemed to be friendly to France.

This must be looked at in connection with a change which was coming over the European situation. Louis XII, after his reconciliation with Rome, had made desperate efforts to win over Spain to his side. With this object, in December, 1513, while the war was in abeyance owing to the winter season and other circumstances, he made the most enticing offers to King Ferdinand. As the price of an alliance he offered the hand of his daughter Renee to either of Ferdinand's two grandsons, with Milan and Genoa, accompanied by the renunciation of all claims to Naples, as her marriage dowry. Not one of these proposals was ever carried out. On the other hand, a year’s truce was concluded between Spain and France on the 13th of March, 1514.

The news of this change in the aspect of affairs was a paralysing shock to the Pope. Every possible effort had to be made on his part to prevent either France or Spain from obtaining supremacy in Italy. By the proposed plan of marriage the prospect of Spanish supremacy rose up before him like a nightmare. As an Italian as well as Pope, he felt himself to be most gravely menaced. As an Italian he was, like most of his fellow-countrymen, imbued with the determination that no power, whether foreign or other, should have such supremacy on the Italian peninsula as to destroy the balance of power, and injure what went by the name of the “freedom of Italy”. As Pope, Leo adhered to what had been the traditional policy of Rome, namely, the guarding of the independence, both temporal and spiritual, of the Holy See. With this in view, he directed his efforts against any step which would lead to Naples and Milan being under the same sovereign.

But that the intention of making use of the rivalry between France and Spain to his own advantage had a place in influencing Leo’s political attitude, can scarcely be disputed. Where injustice is done to the Medici Pope is in attributing everything he did to nepotism. The one predominant aim all through Leo’s ever-changing policy—his care for the independence of the Church and Holy See, and the maintenance of the so-called freedom of Italy—is apparent to all. The confidential letters which were sent to the Papal Nuncios, show that Leo's chief reason for opposing the projected Franco-Spanish marriage lay in the well-founded fear lest the power of Spain, being in possession of Naples, Milan, Genoa, and a portion of Venetian territory, should enslave the other Italian princes, the States of the Church, and even the Holy See itself.

Fully aware of this danger, Leo X overcame his natural irresolution and roused himself to take prompt and decisive measures. The Papal diplomacy was in a state of feverish activity. The most urgent messages were sent to the representatives in France and Switzerland to try to put obstacles in the way of this very dangerous marriage project. On the 4th of March a letter was sent to the Swiss Nuncio, Goro Ghersio, stating that the decision of Louis XII had reached Rome in the preceding night, to the effect that he had rather lose throne and life than renounce Milan; that this determination sprang from the marriage negotiations of France with Spain and the Emperor; that the Pope considered this projected marriage as the greatest of dangers; that as it had emanated originally from Louis’ fear of the Swiss, the Pope hoped that the latter might lay down conditions somewhat less hard, so as to make peace with France possible, which, under all circumstances, would be better than the carrying out of this family alliance, which was a menace to all Europe. The Florentine Ambassador, Roberto Acciaiuoli, was sent, so as to influence the King more directly. He was told to represent to Louis XII that the marriage project was an act of desperation which must ruin France, if not at once, at any rate later. The fear of Spanish supremacy now induced Leo to incline strongly towards France. As early as April, 1514, the Florentine Ambassador in Rome stated that the Pope, who had hitherto been unwilling even to grant an audience to the representative of Louis XII, now often transacted business with him. The same fear of Spain influenced his relations with the Swiss. Later on, the animosity of the Pope, who believed himself to have been betrayed by Ferdinand, rose to a still higher point. Obviously this reacted on his relations with Maximilian.

This was experienced by Cardinal Lang, the representative of the Emperor, who was trying to effect a reconciliation between Maximilian and Venice. The negotiations dragged on for months. The Emperor's Envoy complained bitterly of the delays and hesitation caused by the indecision of the Pope, skilfully fostered by France. Nevertheless, he was quite ready to acknowledge the good will of the Pope. At last, on the 4th of March, a compromise was arrived at, although, thanks to the obstinacy of the Venetians, it was never carried out. In other ways also, the mission of Lang was unproductive of peaceful results. The covetous and ambitious Cardinal, not content with the many emoluments which he had already secured, now imperiously demanded the important as well as lucrative post of permanent Legate in Germany. The experiences of Rome, consequent on conferring a similar dignity on the French Cardinal, d'Amboise, did not conduce to the repetition of the experiment in Germany; for such permanent Legates depended more on their temporal sovereign than on the Pope. Moreover, the considerable reduction in the revenues of the Curia which would result from such a concession had to be weighed in the balance. As the Emperor himself urged his representative’s request in a pressing letter, it seemed expedient to Leo not to refuse explicitly ; and in a Consistory held on the 10th of May, he professed his willingness to grant the German legation to Lang for at any rate six months. But the Cardinals, instructed beforehand by the Pope as to the inexpediency of the concession, rejected even this com promise. Thereon Lang had one more farewell audience with Leo, in which he used “great words”. On the 11th of May he travelled in a very bad humour to Loreto, where Bibbiena and Bembo were staying at the time.

Louis XII tried to foster Leo’s favourable dispositions towards himself by assuring him that he would sacrifice life and property in defence of the Church. The Nuncio, Ludovico di Canossa. sent to France and England in May, on a mission which was at first kept strictly secret, might be sure of a very good reception. His immediate task was the reconciliation of Louis XII and Henry VIII, and thus to remove all necessity for the support of the Spanish claims by France.

The anti-Spanish feeling which was openly expressed in Rome is put before us in a very interesting report of the Venetian Envoy. According to this, Cardinal Lang tried to arrange a league between the Pope, Maximilian, and  Ferdinand of Spain; but it is self-evident that Leo X would be opposed to any such plan. He trusted the fickle-minded Emperor, to whom he ascribed the intention of seizing the States of the Church, quite as little as he trusted the overbearing Aragonese. The greatest exasperation against the Spaniards was felt by the Romans, who expressed the wish to drive “those barbarians” out of Italy. It is a fact that in May and June the Pope entered into secret negotiations with Venice hostile to Spain while all the time the secret treaty with France was being carried on. Of this last only those most in the Pope’s confidence, Cardinals Medici and Bibbiena, as well as Giuliano de’ Medici, knew anything. It was the general though vain expectation that a league between Leo X, France, Venice, Florence, and Ferrara would be proclaimed on the Feast of Corpus Christi, though a report was current in the city of the lagoons that France and the Pope had come to an understanding that Giuliano de’ Medici was to receive the crown of Naples, and Louis XII that of Milan. After this the Spaniards were to be driven out of Italy by the help of the Venetians.

That Leo X contemplated something of the kind is undoubted; but he remained undecided, and carried on negotiations on every side, without making up his mind. Observant onlookers had for some time been of the opinion that he would wait to see which side was likely to get the best of it. One thing, however, is certain, and that is that Leo did everything he possibly could to bring to naught the Franco-Spanish marriage. With this object in view, Ludovico di Canossa, one of the cleverest and most gifted diplomatists of the time, worked so effectually on both Louis XII and Henry VIII that he brought about not only a reconciliation but an alliance between them. The Anglo-French treaty was to be sealed by the marriage of the King of France, a widower since the beginning of the year, and Mary, the sister of the English King. The Papal Envoy was well supported by Henry’s all-powerful minister, Wolsey, Archbishop of York, who aspired to the purple. On the 7th of August the Anglo-French alliance and the marriage contract were signed; and in October the marriage of the elderly French King with the youthful Mary Tudor took place.

Leo X was not to enjoy his diplomatic triumph for long. The danger of the Spanish supremacy had scarcely been removed when another terror, the French supremacy, arose in its place. The treaty of London contained, as Bembo remarks, a very dangerous clause which safeguarded the claims of Louis XII to Milan, Asti, and Genoa. The reports of the Florentine Ambassador in Paris are full of fears lest Louis should now set forth on his expedition to conquer Italy. Consequently, the Pope retreated further and further from his friendship with France, and was inclined to form an alliance with the Emperor and Spain, while he sought to draw Venice over to his side by holding out a hope of obtaining for the Republic favourable terms of peace from Maximilian.

Guicciardini, drawing from good sources, gives us a picture of the shifting relations and secret negotiations between Leo X and France which took place in the year 1514, which shows us how much the Pope delighted in the two-faced diplomacy of the age. The well-known historian declares that Leo X was set against the conquest of Milan by Louis XII, but that, on the other hand, he thought it expedient to restrain the King by the use of diplomatic arts alone. Through Cardinal Sanseverino, the Protector of France, he made the following suggestion to King Louis :—Seeing that the exigencies of the time did not allow of an open alliance between Rome and France, it would at any rate be expedient to lay the foundations of a firm alliance in the future. A draft of this was sent to France; Louis XII accepted the offer gratefully, but hesitated before closing with it. His brief hesitation decided Leo X to listen to the proposals on the other side, and he concluded a treaty for one year with Spain and the Emperor, which mutually guaranteed the safety of their possessions. Scarcely had this arrangement been made before the answer of Louis XII. reached Rome, by which he agreed to all the Pope's proposals, with one proviso, namely, that as one of the clauses pledged him to defend Florence for Giuliano and Lorenzo, it was necessary that those two should be included in the negotiations. There upon Leo excused himself for having made his agreement with Spain and the Emperor on the plea that he had been forced to make it by Louis’s delay in answering ; except for this, there was nothing to prevent him from concluding an alliance with France. Louis XII considered it advisable to accept the excuses of the Pope. On this Leo X and the French King signed a contract, with, however, the stipulation that this should not be done formally, and that the draft alone should be signed. In this way the most complete secrecy seemed to be assured.

The alliance with England was of the greatest value to Louis, as he could now undisturbedly resume his plans for the conquest of Italy. The question was whether France would at once take the initiative or postpone the under taking till another year. The latter course seemed the more probable, as there were no visible preparations for war. This being so, the Pope, who was still in his inmost heart as averse as ever from the thought of the conquest of Milan, thought it advisable not to oppose Louis openly. Soon he even went a step further, and expressly encouraged the King to carry out his plans. There can be no doubt that Leo X did not act honourably in this. Guicciardini tries to explain his unusual conduct in the following way : — Either, he says, the Pope, being convinced that, with or without his consent, Louis XII would attack Milan, wished to secure favourable terms in the event of the success of France, or else he knew that what the Emperor and Ferdinand maintained, but what Louis denied, namely, that in the interim of the truce the King of France was bound to refrain from hostilities, was an actual fact. The Pope therefore hoped that the French King would not at once accept the challenge and attack Milan. This hope was justified by the event, for the French King did put off his project till the following year, trusting to the assistance of the Pope, whom he tried to bind to his interests by the prospect of the conquest of Naples, either for the Church or for Giuliano de' Medici.

There were many things which made Louis XII distrust the Pope. In June the Emperor had quite secretly sold to Leo X the Imperial fief of Modena, for 40,000 ducats; and in November this transaction was made known. At once Louis XII suspected a still closer alliance between the Pope and the Emperor. His suspicions increased when, in November, Leo X demanded a conclusion of peace between the Christian powers, so that they might turn their arms against the Turks. But what disconcerted the French King most was the fresh attempt of the Pope to reconcile Venice and the Emperor, thus threatening to deprive him of an important ally.

The distrust of Louis XII was well founded; for Leo X, and still more his trusted adviser Cardinal Bibbiena, were set against the conquest of Milan by the French. The most indubitable proof of this remained unknown to Louis XII, namely, a secret agreement, signed in Rome on the 21st of September, between Leo X and Ferdinand of Spain. By this treaty both parties guaranteed the security of their Italian possessions during their lifetime, and explicitly pledged themselves to make no agreement with any other State, least of all with France, relating to the reconquest of Milan, Genoa, and Asti, without the knowledge of the other.

Even if Louis XII knew nothing about this treaty, his distrust of Leo X was fully justified by the other matters mentioned above, whatever protestations the Pope might make of his good-will towards France. In order to frighten Leo, France entered into negotiations with Spain, which, however, failed in the desired effect, as was in evitable, considering the agreement already spoken of. At length the French King proffered to the Pope the formal request to give his support to the expedition against Milan, which was now decided on. The French agents laid before the Papal diplomatists the advantages—painted in the brightest colours—which the Church, the liberty of Italy, and the house of Medici would reap from a treaty between Leo X and France. The Most Christian Kings had in all ages afforded the greatest services to the Holy See, whereas the Emperor and the King of Spain had no other object in view except to reduce the whole of Italy, including the Pope himself, to a state of servitude. But these representations did not make the desired impression on Leo X. At length, driven by this increasing pressure on the part of the French, he declared that the condition of affairs had changed, that a victory for France was very doubtful, and could be bought only at the cost of much bloodshed. In face of the increasing danger from the Turks, he, as Pope, could not tolerate a war among Christian princes, and advised the King to defer his expedition. Thus was a final decision put off by Leo; although there is no doubt that, at the end of November, he was very much set against the French. But at that moment the time was approaching, which would necessitate a decision on the part of him, whose desire it was to preserve at all costs a free hand on every side.

It was with terror that the Medici Pope, like nearly all the other princes at that time, found himself “sailing to meet this crisis with two compasses”. We are assured that the Pope at that time passed many a sleepless night. In Rome the chances were being constantly weighed. Through Vettori, those associated with the Pope put questions to Machiavelli, the most acute politician of the age. It was his opinion that neutrality would be the Pope's worst policy, for it would hand him over to the will of the conqueror. As the victory of the French was almost a certainty, an alliance with Louis XII was to be recommended. It was only in the event of Venice breaking away from France that a contrary policy was pointed out by Machiavelli. But just at that time the Signoria had declared to the Papal Envoy its adhesion to France, and had tried to draw Leo into the Franco-Venetian alliance, by putting before him a plan for the conquest of Naples to be given to Giuliano.

While matters were still undecided in Rome, Louis XII died, being succeeded by Francis I, a man more gifted by nature than his predecessor. This young and ambitious prince was very much under the influence of his power­loving mother, Louisa of Savoy. Even in the lifetime of the late King, Louisa’s sister, Filiberta, had been chosen as the bride of Giuliano, the Pope’s brother. It was a purely political union, for Filiberta was neither young nor beautiful. As her marriage portion Giuliano—who had been named Captain-General of the Church, on the 10th of January, 1515—was to receive Parma, Piacenza, and Reggio, as well as Modena. But both the Duke of Milan and the French King laid claim to Parma and Piacenza. The renunciation of his claim by either depended on the side taken by the Pope in the coming war; and the dilatory Pontiff was urged by both parties, by every means in their power, to come to a decision. Still more urgent was the necessity of a decision when the marriage between Giuliano and Filiberta became an accomplished fact on the 25th of June, 1515. But, however warmly Giuliano, who was always the friend of France, might recommend an open alliance with Francis I, the Pope still put off a decision. Not even his intimates were in a position to guess to which party he inclined.

It was intended to form a great coalition between the Pope, the Emperor, the King of Spain, Milan, Genoa, and the Swiss, to prevent the reconquest of Milan by the French. A preliminary draft of this agreement was made out, which was to be ratified within two months, should the Swiss accept its terms. This contract, which secured to the States of the Church Parma and Piacenza as well as Modena and Reggio, with the reservation of their rights of government, was made with the ulterior object of protecting Christendom against the Turks, but, primarily, with the view of protecting Italy against France's lust of conquest. Cardinal Bibbiena, who was its author, was quite convinced that the League would prove to be a powerful check on the French King. “It will be a lesson to Francis I”, he wrote to the Spanish Nuncio on the 5th of February 1515, “and will teach him to be moderate in this as well as in all other matters”.

Meanwhile great difficulties beset this skilfully-devised diplomatic scheme. The clause about Parma and Piacenza pleased neither the Duke of Milan nor the Swiss. Further obstacles were raised by the mistrust between Milan and Genoa, which finally led to the defection to France of the latter. Nor could the terms of the League be pleasing to the Pope, seeing that the protection of Italy was to be effected by the preponderance of Spain and the Emperor. Nevertheless, it was clear to Leo X that the League might do very good service by obtaining important concessions from France. He regulated his actions by this ; he delayed the ratification of the terms, and, during the carrying on of the negotiations with Francis I, followed a waiting policy.

These negotiations were being carried on by Ludovico di Canossa, who was still in France. An order reached that astute diplomatist at the end of March, bidding him offer the alliance of Rome to Francis I, on the condition that he would waive his claim on Naples. But the French King rejected the proposal in an abrupt and offensive manner. In the Pope’s condition he read his intention to secure the crown of Naples for his brother. Later historians also have interpreted Leo's policy at that time as actuated solely by ambition and nepotism. It is only the latest researches which have paved the way for a more just interpretation of his actions. That Leo X would have gladly seen his brother on the throne of Naples cannot be doubted. But the terms of his proposed agreement with Francis I did not proceed immediately from nepotistic considerations, being rather the result of the policy he had always followed. As the attack of the French could be no longer averted, and as there was much to be said in favour of its success, the Pope had no alternative but to do what he could to persuade France to give up her further designs on Naples, if he wished to prevent Milan and Naples being in the possession of the same power. The Pope’s old fear of a union between the north and south of Italy was the real cause of the demand which he had made through Canossa from the new ruler of France.

In spite of the rebuff received by Canossa, Leo X renewed the same offer to Francis I in June through the French Ambassador, Montmaur, though with no better result. The French King showed the same disinclination to consider the demands of the Pope relating to the independence of Genoa and the giving of Parma and Piacenza to Giuliano. Thereupon Leo X began at once to make military preparations. But the French Ambassador declared that these did not frighten him at all, for his King could produce an overpowering force. As regarded these boasts of the French, Bibbiena declared that such armies were no more difficult to raise than was the breath of rumour in respect to them.

The procuring of sufficient money for the expenses of the war presented most difficulty to the Pope. He now realized the confused state of his financial accounts. Nevertheless, he promised to contribute 60,000 ducats monthly. But further obstacles came from the want of unity and hair-splitting among those whom a common danger ought to have drawn together. The negotiations in the hands of the Swiss Nuncio, Filonardi, who was armed with full powers, prolonged themselves beyond all due bounds. It was only at the last moment that the ratification of the terms of the League, signed by the Swiss and Duke Maximilian, arrived in Rome. But Leo X even then still hesitated to give a final decision, and in spite of having armed his troops, his position remained ambiguous. Consignments of money were constantly sent from Rome for the payment of the Spanish and Swiss soldiers, and there was no doubt in the mind of anybody that the Pope was ready to do anything to prevent the invasion of the French; yet the official confirmation and publication of the League in Rome was postponed in the most unaccountable manner. At the end of July the Venetian Ambassador asked His Holiness openly whether it were true, as was said in Rome, that he had given his signature to it. “It is true”, replied Leo; “we have signed it, and Bulls and Briefs relating to our adhesion to the League are sealed. But before publishing them, we wish to await the answer of Francis I”.

This reply is highly characteristic of the Papal policy at that critical time. While the troops destined to oppose the French, who were on their way south, were paid chiefly with Roman money, the Pope up to the very last moment was contemplating a friendly arrangement with the enemy. He did not give up hope even after the French had entered Italy. It was only the first blow, ineffective though it was, dealt by the young Duke of Guise, which at last compelled the Pope to act in concert with the Emperor and the Swiss.

Giuliano de’ Medici had been entrusted with the supreme command of the Papal troops as far back as the 29th of June, 1515. As, however, he fell seriously ill, Lorenzo de’ Medici, the Captain of the Florentines, had to take his place on the 8th of August. Cardinal Giulio de' Medici was appointed Legate with the Papal troops.

The Duke of Savoy, who was related to Leo X as well as to Francis I, contemplated making a compromise, as the French had already crossed his frontier. He inquired through Giuliano as to the furthest concessions which the Pope would be ready to make. Giuliano explained in a secret instruction that the price of his joining with France would be (1) the renunciation of the French claims on Parma and Piacenza; (2) the conclusion of a permanent peace between France and Spain, so that a general Christian League against the Turks might be brought about ; (3) the renunciation of Naples in favour of the Holy See or of a third party agreeable to the Pope and King. Furthermore, he would agree that under no consideration the north and south of the Italian peninsula (il capo e la coda d'ltalia) should be governed by one and the same sovereign, even were that one to be his own brother. This instruction affords a weighty proof that nepotistic designs were not what turned the balance in the position taken up by the Pope, but rather his care for the political and spiritual independence of the Holy See.

CHAPTER III.

The Conquest of Milan by the French. —The Meeting between Leo X and Francis I at Bologna.