THE real strength of Assyria at all times lay in the character of the population, and that population remained unimpaired in number and vigour. Under a king who could re-unite the people in a personal allegiance to the ‘priest of Ashur,’ Assyria would rapidly recover from the blows delivered by the unstable power of Urartu. Tiglath-Pileser III, who took his seat on the vacant throne in 745, was to restore, and more than restore to the Assyrians, the dominions held by Shalmaneser III and Adad-Nirari III.

The revolt in Kalakh which caused Ashur-Nirari’s death resulted in the accession of Tiglath-Pileser III to the throne, but further knowledge of events in Assyria is not obtainable from the historical records of the time. It is indeed remarkable that Tiglath-Pileser never refers to the circumstances of his accession, and it has always been justly thought that this shows that he had no right to the throne other than that given by force. Certain other interesting facts have led to plausible explanations; thus it is certain from the Babylonian dynastic lists that Tiglath-Pileser and Pul are the same person, and that Pulu was the name used by the Assyrian when he ‘took the hands’ of Bel-Marduk. Some authorities have concluded that Tiglath-Pileser was an Assyrian general named Pul, who assumed the name used by him in Assyria as preserving a memory of the great rulers of the dynasty he had overthrown. This may or may not be the truth, for two other cases are known where Assyrian kings used different names in the two countries, namely Shalmaneser V and Esarhaddon. It has further been noted that the annals of Tiglath-Pileser’s reign were mutilated by Esarhaddon, and there can be little doubt that the Sargonid dynasty must have held Tiglath-Pileser in peculiar hatred to commit a desecration apparently rare in their land. Esarhaddon claimed for his family a remote connection with an early ruler of Assyria, and quite possibly the hatred felt for Tiglath-Pileser represents the last phase of a struggle between two powerful families. Finally, the Babylonian scribes who compiled the king’s list which gives the names of Tiglath-Pileser and his successor Shalmaneser as Pulu and Ululai, note against the latter name that this was the dynasty of Ashur. It would therefore appear that Ashur was the political capital, but it is quite clear that Kalakh remained the kingly residence during these reigns.

The order of campaigns given in the eponym-lists for the reign of Tiglath-Pileser (745—727 B.C.) once more shows the purpose and persistence marked in the campaigns of Ashur-Nasir-Pal and Shalmaneser III. The military tasks before him were three: the establishment of order in Babylonia in such manner as to secure the southern border, the restoration of Assyrian control over Syria, and the guarding of the northern border of the kingdom against Urartu. To the south the situation had become increasingly dangerous to Assyria owing to the collapse of any organized control by the city of Babylon. In the marshes about the mouth of the Tigris the Kaldu recognized no authority but that of the heads of the three great tribes, the Bit Yakin, Bit Dakkuri and Bit Amukkani, and the Aramaean tribes settled on the eastern bank of the Tigris were equally unrestrained by the central authority. As a consequence of this the Aramaean tribes settled about Cuthah and Sippar, and the Itu’a, in territory now recognized as Assyrian, seem to have aimed at a similar freedom. The first campaign was therefore directed against the Aramaean tribes in Babylonia, apparently one after the other, before concerted resistance could be offered. The extant records of the reign offer a very confused account of the expedition, and the following order of events can be considered only provisional.

The first attack fell upon the Aramaean tribes on the Assyrian border, and then the army turned east from Sippar and crossed the Tigris on rafts. The Rasani, a tribe which appears to have occupied the district known to Arab geographers as Radhan, intimidated by the treatment of their Aramaean neighbours, surrendered and did homage to Tiglath-Pileser. While he was in this district, the king was visited by priests representing the chief temples of Babylon, and probably some sort of ceremony was performed to signify that the gods of Babylon, Bel, Nabu and Nergal, welcomed their deliverer. The king then pushed on down the eastern bank of the Tigris, while a detached force of his army subdued the central districts about Nippur. The march was not stayed until the river Uknu, the modern Karkhah, was reached. The main effort of the king throughout was directed towards establishing an effective control over these disordered lands. To control the Aramaean Damunu, Ru’a, Li’tau and other tribes the army was set to build a fortress, named Kar-Ashur, the land was annexed to Assyria and officers appointed for its administration. The Pukudu (the biblical Pekod), whose land was more to the north-east, were assigned to the province of Arrapkha. Finally Tiglath-Pileser, determined to extend his power according to the sound principles of Ashur-Nasir-Pal, transported people from these districts to provinces administered by his chief officers: ‘I reckoned them with the people of Assyria.’ Though no direct mention of the reigning king in Babylon, Nabunasir (Nabonassar), is to be found in the annals, the facts show that Tiglath-PPileser left him in authority over Karduniash proper, and was able to rely on the good faith of the Babylonian monarch until his death in 734. The first campaign was a striking success; the Assyrian army could now safely engage in the task of recovering lost ground to east and west without danger threatening on the southern border.

In the year 744 Tiglath-Pileser commenced a series of campaigns which disclose a well-planned scheme for driving back the forces of Urartu to their own borders. The intention appears to have been to deal decisive blows to east and west, in districts where the enemy would be far from their base and so at a disadvantage, should Sarduris attempt to meet the Assyrians. These were to be followed by a direct onslaught on Urartu. This plan, so far as circumstances permitted, was executed with all the ability the king had already shown in Babylonia. In Namri no Urartian force was met, and the king, after thoroughly pillaging the lands east of the Tigris and south of Lake Urmia as far as the northern borders of Elam, constituted a new Assyrian province on his own borders and laid heavy tribute on the chief cities. Certain places actually occupied by Median tribes seem to have been fortified to preserve order, and officers appointed to obtain a regular payment of tribute. The general Ashur-Danani was sent against the Medes farther east, and apparently led a column towards the Caspian, skirting the western edge of the great desert.

In the next year the king was able to throw the whole force of Assyria against the west; perhaps his object was to draw Sarduris into Syria, for that king could not well allow the princes who had allied themselves with him to be attacked without marching to their assistance. The ground was chosen by the Assyrian, and the battle was fought between Khalpi and Kishtan (the modern Khalfati and Kushtan), districts of Kumukh, the classical Commagene. The forces of Sarduris were augmented by those of the independent princes of northern Syria, Mati’-ilu of Agusi, Sulumal of Melid, Tarkhulara of Gurgum and Kushtashpi of Kumukh, but the Assyrians routed their united forces, and pursued Sarduris as far as ‘the bridge of the Euphrates, the border of his land.’ After this defeat Sarduris ceased to exert influence in Syria; not only had he failed to gain the victory under the most favourable circumstances possible for himself, but he must have become an object of ridicule owing to his flight on a mare when his camp-lines were seized by the Assyrians. At this point the campaign seems to have concluded abruptly; very possibly the year was advanced and Tiglath-Pileser, realizing that his immediate task must be a thorough reduction of northern Syria, was anxious to avoid the difficulty of keeping the Assyrian levy in the field.

The years 742—740 were devoted by Tiglath-Pileser to this task. The resistance offered by Arpad must have been as stout as that formerly offered by Bit-Adini, for the siege of the city lasted three years. The reward of final victory was the submission of the lands which had fought against the Assyrians—Damascus, Tyre, Kumukh, Kue, Carchemish and Gurgum sending their kings to pay tribute to Tiglath-Pileser in Arpad itself. Assyrian authority was at least temporarily re-established, and attention could now be paid to the northern border.

The first object in the north was to regain the control of the mountain passes of the Nairi country, and this seems to have been achieved in the campaign of 739. The lands of Ulluba (round Bitlis) and the northern Kirkhu were annexed, and a new fortress called Ashur-Ikisha was made the centre of administration. From this period of the reign little certainty is possible on many details, and the course of events in Syria and the west is still a subject of dispute. It is generally agreed that the absence of the Assyrian army was seized upon as an occasion for the formation of some sort of confederacy to oppose Tiglath-Pileser, and that the leader of the confederacy was a certain Azriau of Yaudi. As to the identity of this person there are two views. According to one, Azriau is the Azariah or Uzziah king of Judah whose reign is recorded in 2 Kings XV. The Aramaic inscriptions found at Zenjirli, however, which record certain events in Samal at this time, show that there was a small inde­pendent kingdom of Y’di (pronunciation unknown) which at one time was ruled by the same king as Sam’al, and the second view mentioned is that Azriau was concerned in certain events in this neighbourhood, and that Y’di is the Yaudi mentioned. The his­torical facts given by the Zenjirli inscription are important for an understanding of the policy of Assyria, and are therefore sum­marily given here.

The dynasty of Y’di was apparently founded in the first half of the eighth century by K-r-l, who was succeeded by Panammu I, who has left us an inscription to his god Hadad. The important facts under discussion are given on two monuments, one of which was erected in the year after the capture of Damascus by Tiglath-Pileser III, that is 731, by a descendant of K-r-l, Bar-Rekub, king of Samal, over the grave of his father, Panammu II, king of Samal. The inscription states that in the time of Bar-Sur, king of Y’di, a palace revolution broke out, in which Bar-Sur with seventy members of the royal family perished. Panammu alone escaped, the remainder of the royal family being left to die in prison. The conspiracy brought evil days to the land, and a general anarchy caused a rise in the price of food. Tiglath-Pileser set Panammu on the throne of his fathers, removed the ‘stone of destruction’ from the house of his father, and freed the prisoners in Y’di. Since Panammu was a faithful vassal, who in his wisdom and righteousness trusted in his lord, the king of Assyria, Tiglath-Pileser made the governor of Y’di subordinate (?) to Panammu, showed the latter greater favour than other vassals, and increased his land by adding part of the territories of Gurgum to it.

Mention of Panammu in the inscriptions of Tiglath-Pileser himself makes it certain that the restoration of Panammu to the kingdom of his father should be dated in the year 738, so that the revolution in Y’di occurred in all probability in 739, while the Assyrian army was engaged in Nairi. Those who believe that Y’di and Samal are really the Yaudi of which Azriau was king conclude that Azriau caused the revolution in which Bar-Sur perished, and proceeded to enlist the aid of other states to support him.

These troubles in Syria, however they be explained, diverted Tiglath-Pileser’s efforts from the north to the west once more. The eponym-list names as the chief objective of the campaign the city Kullani, which must be the biblical Calneh or Calno, the modern Kullanhu, 6 miles from Arpad. According to the Annals, the first attack fell on Tutammu of Unki, who ‘forgot my covenant,’ but is not named as being allied with Azriau. The capital city of Tutammu was captured, and turned into the headquarters of the Assyrian governor who was appointed over the land of Unki, now to be treated as a province of Assyria. The army was next turned against Azriau, and in the course of the march certain unknown kings paid tribute. Azriau and his allies deserted the open country, which the Assyrians plundered, and fortified a position not now known owing to the mutilation of the inscription. There is every reason to suppose that the hill-district in the Lebanon, now called Jebel Makhmel, was the scene of a conflict, in which the Assyrians gained a complete victory. The whole land as far south as the nineteen districts of Hamath, particularly distinguished for their rebellious support of Azriau, fell into Tiglath-Pileser’s hands, and yet another province was formed out of districts which had formerly been dependencies or, at most, spheres of influence. With Tiglath-Pileser such an annexation generally entailed the sending of an expedition to overawe imme­diate neighbours, and it is probable that a demonstration at least was made against Damascus and Israel, for the writer of 2 Kings xv, 19 states that Pul, king of Assyria ‘came against the land,’ and that Menahem gave him a thousand talents of silver to secure his kingdom. The tribute list given by the Assyrian scribe is a very long one, and includes, besides Rasun (Rezon) of Damascus and Minihim (Menahem) of Samirina (Samaria), every prince of importance from Kue in the north to the Phoenician cities in the south and the Arab queen Zabibi. The policy of transplantation was applied very thoroughly in the conquered provinces, no less than 30,300 inhabitants being removed from the Hamath district, some to the distant land of Ulluba in Nairi. The words of Bar-Rekub’s inscriptions show that the government imposed on Syria by Tiglath-Pileser was firm, and salutary for that disordered land; and the Assyrian army was now free to attack Urartu as its leader might dispose.

It will be seen from the facts stated above that there is not sufficient evidence to prove the identity of Azriau of Yaudi. There are difficulties to be found in either of the views given, and plausible hypotheses to justify them are not wanting. In Shalmaneser III’s time Y’di seems to have been known to the Assyrians as Yaeti, which militates against the identification of Yaudi and Y’di. The question must be considered an open one until more documentary evidence is available.

Before Tiglath-Pileser undertook his campaign against Urartu he found it necessary to repeat in part the blows already struck to prevent the restless peoples in Media and Nairi creating a diversion. In 737 therefore he traversed a wide stretch of territory from the borders of Elam up to Lake Urmia, and in 736 added to the province he had formed in the Nairi country. This was followed by the main attack on Urartu, but the extant accounts of this are very scanty. Sarduris was besieged in his capital city of Van, called Turushpa by the Assyrians, after a defeat in the field; but the strong citadel was not taken, presumably because its position rendered the use of the usual siege machines impossible, and the garrison obtained supplies by water. An Assyrian column marched northwards through Urartu, but no substantial success can have been achieved. Consequently Tiglath-Pileser set up a monument before the gates of Van, and retired. Urartu had not been conquered, but had suffered a severe blow from which the country did not recover for some years.

Although Syria was now under his control, the events of 738 must have shown Tiglath-Pileser that further measures were necessary for the protection of the new provinces. Damascus and Samaria were now acting together as allies, and the growth of Rezon’s power would inevitably lead to further troubles in the Hamath district. The Assyrian seems to have decided already on a reduction of Damascus which should be even more complete than that by Adad-Nirari, but his first blow was indirect. Urartu had not been assisted by allies in 735, because they had previously been attacked and put under restraint. Similarly Philistia was the objective of the campaign in 734, to ensure a position in that southern land which would make it impossible for Rezon to look in that direction for aid. The route open to the Assyrian army without the prospect of resistance by the way lay through Phoenicia, and during his march the king appointed officers to represent him in Phoenician towns. The attack upon Gaza was the principal event in the campaign. Hanunu (Hanno), the ruler of Gaza, fled to Musri (Egypt), to return at a later date. The city was plundered, but the district was not turned into an Assyrian province.

The presence of an Assyrian army in Philistia had an immediate effect on the politics of Israel and Judah. Pekah of Israel and his ally Rezon of Damascus had joined in an attack on the youthful Ahaz of Judah, and though they gained no great victory, Ahaz eagerly turned to the Assyrian king for an alliance which should save him from kings who possessed greater resources than he. The aid lent was very prompt; in 733 Samaria and Damascus were in turn reduced. Pekah fled from Samaria, without any following, so that the city was spared a siege. The narrative in 2 Kings XV, 29 tells of the reduction of various strong points, and Israel must have been unable to offer any further opposition. The bold policy of attack from the south was fully justified; Rezon had to meet the Assyrian without an ally, and was defeated and besieged in Damascus. The eponym-list shows that the city did not fall till 732, when the punishment administered to the whole district was severe. No less than 591 townships were levelled to the ground, and 800 inhabitants were deported to Assyria. Samsi, an Arabian queen, was also reduced to submission in this year, and the desert tribes hastened to pay tribute and homage to a king whose power seemed to encircle them. One Arabian prince, Idibi’-Ilu, was given special powers, for he was made the Assyrian representative who should be responsible for the safety of the Egyptian border.

While Tiglath-Pileser was engaged in the further reduction of Syria, events to the south and to the north all served to make him completely master of the west. Pekah appears to have returned to Samaria; later, he was murdered, and the new king Ausi’ (Hoshea) recognized the overlordship of Assyria by the payment of tribute. Mitinti of Askalon, who had refused to pay tribute, on hearing of the defeat of Rezon, went mad, and his son Rukibtu hastened to submit as a vassal. Metenna of Tyre, who had also refused to pay tribute, submitted on the appearance of an Assyrian officer. In Tabal in the north, an Assyrian officer appears to have deposed the king U-Ashshur-Me and set an Assyrian nominee on the throne. Tiglath-Pileser finished the long struggle which Shalmaneser had begun with Damascus, for that city never again appears as an independent power.

The good order in Babylonia established by the campaign of 745 was disturbed by the death of Nabu-Nasir (Nabonassar) in 734. His son Nabu-Nadin-Zer was murdered in a revolt, and finally Nabu-Mukin-Zer, called by the Assyrians Ukin-Zer, the chief of the Kaldu tribe of Bit-Amukkani, seized the throne. This meant again general confusion, and the Assyrian king in 731 marched against the usurper, and besieged him in Sapia, the capital city of Bit-Amukkani, without success. Neighbouring tribes were treated with the utmost severity. From Bit-Shilani 55,000 people, and from Bit-Sa’alli 50,400 were deported, and the capital cities of these tribes were reduced to ruins. The two most powerful princes of the Kaldu, Balasu of Bit-Dakkuri and Merodach-Baladan of Bit-Yakin, came to pay homage and a rich tribute to Tiglath-Pileser as he sat before Sapia. The submission of Merodach-Baladan was especially significant, for he was ‘the king of the sea-land, of whom none in the time of the kings my fathers had come into the presence, they had not kissed their feet.’ Assyrian officers were appointed in the devastated lands, and the king returned to Assyria from his last campaign. The year 730 passed without event; but Babylon could not be left without a king, and in 729 and 728 Tiglath-Pileser himself ‘took the hands of Bel,’ and thus became king of Babylon in name as well as in deed. He was the first Assyrian monarch to hold the title since Tukulti-Ninurta I. An insurrection broke out in 728, but the name of the district has been broken away on the tablet. Shortly afterwards Tiglath-Pileser died, and was succeeded by Shalmaneser V (727—722 B.C.)

Of the artistic work of Tiglath-Pileser’s time little is known. The few slabs on which his inscriptions are to be found depict the usual war scenes, and are of little interest. A very brief account of building operations at Kalakh, however, shows that important experiments were conducted by the architects of the period. In order to enlarge the site of his palace, ground was obtained by constructing stone foundations in the river bed itself, which skirted the palace grounds. The entrance to the palace also was entirely rebuilt, and a Hittite style imitated by the introduction of a colonnade. The Amorites had long been familiar with these colonnades or gateways with portals, which they called ‘bit-khilani’, but there seems no reasonable doubt that the style had originated in the distant north, in the homeland of the Hittites. Tiglath-Pileser’s palace must have been the most magnificent abode any Mesopotamian king had yet built, and it received later the tribute of imitation from the greatest of Assyrian builders, Sennacherib, when he rebuilt the palace at Nineveh.

When it is remembered that the achievements of Tiglath-Pileser were all crowded into the short space of eighteen years, and that by the year 728 he was able to say that he ‘ruled the lands and exercised kingship from the salt waters of Bit-Yakin to Mt Bikni (Demavend) in the east, from the western sea as far as Egypt, from the horizon of heaven to its zenith,’ he may justly be considered the most remarkable figure in Assyrian history. Certain salient facts, however, must be noted in order that the continuity and growth of Assyrian power from the time of Ashur-Nasir-Pal may be appreciated. The reduction of northern Syria in three years was only possible because the basis of Assyrian power there had been firmly laid by his predecessors. The provinces of Kue and Tabal fell into his hands without a struggle because Shalmaneser had very thoroughly reduced them in five campaigns. His recognition in Babylon itself should be attributed to his adherence to the policy of Shalmaneser III and Adad-Nirari III in aiding the central authority in Babylon against the unruly Aramaeans and Kaldu. His assumption of sovereignty and the performance of its duties in Babylon, caused by the necessities of the situation, seems to have been an unwilling departure from that policy. The greatest advance made by Tiglath-Pileser was undoubtedly in the west, and there he followed faithfully the methods of his predecessors. On the other hand, his perception of the fact that Syria could only be held by a power which had full control over the Phoenician cities and Palestine caused him to extend Assyrian territories in a manner which was to dictate the policy of future kings. Suzerainty over Phoenicia and Israel as a protection for the Syrian provinces would shortly be turned into direct control of those states. In short, Tiglath-Pileser, in fulfilling the aims of Ashur-Nasir-Pal and Shalmaneser, adopted a course which could only lead to the campaigns of Esarhaddon and Ashurbanipal.

Modern writers have expressed varying views on the system of wholesale deportation as practised by this monarch. While some have considered that it was the only means by which the Assyrians could govern lands to which they were entitled by force alone, others have seen the seed of future weakness in the disruption of the ties of patriotism and religion. However this may be, it should be noted that these sudden transferences of population would not appear so strange in the ancient east, where tribes would of their own free-will leave their lands to seek fresh homes, and also that Tiglath-Pileser, who merely extended the practice of his predecessors, was guided by a political object of some importance for the administration of the new territories. The Aramaean inhabitants of Damascus were settled amongst the Aramaean tribes on the borders of Elam, the Kaldu were deported to the Orontes valley, the Israelites to Assyria, so that in no case would the new inhabitants differ entirely in speech and customs from the peoples amongst whom they were planted. The local governors were thus spared the difficulties that would have arisen from the presence of foreigners amongst their own people, while being enabled to supply an appreciably larger con­tingent for forced labour and military service. Whether the empire gained by a greater uniformity of speech and a freer commercial intercourse there is no evidence to show.

A monument of a high court-official of Tiglath-Pileser gives further interesting information as to the results of these deporta­tions. The palace official in question, Bel-Kharran-Bel-Usur, in words which echo those of royal inscriptions, speaks of his foundation of a city in the desert, that is, probably, in the district between the Euphrates and Tadmur, and his construction of a temple there. It seems safe to infer that the population of this city would consist of deported prisoners; and such reclaiming of waste land may well have been a feature of the administration of the period. It is well known that in all this portion of the desert there are to be seen numerous tells which prove that a settled population once dwelt there; and many of these ancient cities must have been founded at this epoch.

Of the short reign of Shalmaneser V no historical record is extant. The Babylonian king-lists show that he followed Tiglath-Pileser’s example in ruling Babylonia personally under the name of Ululai, and the fact that the two kings are called the dynasty of Tinu seems to point to a blood relationship. The chief events of his reign were connected with Palestine. Hoshea after paying tribute as a dutiful vassal of Assyria engaged, as 2 Kings XVII relates, in an intrigue with Egypt, and rebelled against his over­lord. The Assyrian king attacked him and besieged him in Samaria for three years. The chronology of the reign of Hoshea is perplexing, and the figures given in 2 Kings XVIII, 9— 11 must be corrupt. The Babylonian chronicle states that Shalmaneser sacked Shabara’in, which is probably the biblical Sibraim (Ez. XLVII, 16), and this event may possibly belong to the period of the siege. Josephus, on the authority of Menander of Tyre, speaks of a siege of Tyre by Shalmaneser and of his over­running the whole of Phoenicia. It is clear that Shalmaneser died before Samaria actually fell, so that the siege commenced in 724. The king died in the month of Tebet, 722, and a new dynasty came to the throne.

 

II.

THE CONSOLIDATION OF THE EMPIRE UNDER SARGON II

 

With the accession of Sargon II to the throne, the interest of Assyrian history begins to change in character. The material available for the outline of the social and political developments of the time must be considered in addition to the chronological lists and military records on which reliance has to be placed for previous reigns. But the fact that the period from about 720 until 640 B.C. is as well documented as any period of ancient history should not of itself be allowed to differentiate the days of the ‘Sargonid’ dynasty from those of the preceding kings; the change in interest really arises from another cause. Up to this point, the history of Assyria has been the story of a tribal people welded into a state which, to be secure and prosperous, must be a dominant military power. The obscure movements of peoples in the eleventh century had led to the collapse of an effort to establish rapidly a dominion over too wide a territory. From the ninth century to the end of the eighth, the slow process of recovery from that collapse, and the establishment of an imperial system has been traced. In Tiglath-Pileser III the long line of Assyrian conquerors and rulers was succeeded by an administrator of great abilities, who cemented the Assyrian state as firmly as would seem humanly possible.

A perusal of the annals of the kings shows that from the time of Sargon II onwards the position of affairs in Assyria changed not a little. The Assyrian kingdom faced and overcame in every direction independent kingdoms similar to itself. The Assyrian empire to which Sargon succeeded was to come into collision with nations and powers of a might equal to its own. To the east of the Tigris, the newly-immigrated Iranian tribes were to present a more powerful opposition and finally a more united front than the original tribes living in Media had been able to do, so that Assyrian governors on the eastern borders were in constant danger of being overwhelmed by mere numbers. To the north the old, well understood danger from the Urartu district was to turn, quite suddenly, into the terror of barbarian hordes on the move. In the north-west, new states and new peoples appear in the historical records which show that Cilicia, the province on which Assyria principally depended for the all-important metal trade, was coveted by other peoples, not inferior in military ability to the Assyrians themselves. In the west, conflict with Egyptian interests in Palestine was inevitably leading to armed invasion of or by Egypt. And to the south the growing ascendancy of the Chaldaean tribes in Babylonia, directed by princes whose subtle policy aimed at uniting Elam in the south-east with the peoples of Palestine in the south-west in resistance to Assyrian rule, resulted in fiercer battles than the Assyrian army had ever been called upon to fight. In reality, every campaign fought by Assyria during the last century of her dominion in western Asia (say, 720—620 B.C.) was a defensive effort, even though the immediate intention might be aggressive. The position is in some respects curiously parallel to that of Rome from the time of Tiberius onwards, and in not a few cases the same purposes and policies may be deduced from the acts of a Sennacherib or Ashurbanipal as were announced by Caesars.

It has been usual in considering the decline and fall of Assyria to remark on the rapidity with which the empire fell, and to point to causes of inherent weakness in the apparently magnificent structure. Such criticism is just, but does not convey the whole truth. Assyria was engaged in a political effort which, so far as our present knowledge extends, was unprecedented. It has already been pointed out that the system of annexation and provincial government so thoroughly carried out over western Asia distinguishes the Assyrian dominion in its character from any previously exercised by Babylonians, Hittites, or Egyptians. It is a testimony to the political ability of the Assyrian people that this dominion, attacked from several different quarters, by powerful enemies within the sphere of influence and by strange nations on the move, endured for a century, not only unimpaired, but actually further extended than ever; and that in the last thirty years of its existence enemy after enemy was beaten off, until Assyria fell, and then fell before a nation which had gained most of its knowledge of war and politics from Assyria itself. From Assyria sprang directly one of the most widespread and most enduring forms of polity known, the Oriental Monarchy; and many of the general objections urged against Oriental Monarchy can be used against the Assyrian government with equal force. It is, however, more useful to discover in early works of art the promise of future development than to point out their obvious faults; similarly, it will be more fruitful to note the qualities in the Assyrian regime which gave it a strength and stability no power had previously possessed, than to inquire into the causes of the decay of an empire in lands where empires have throughout history quickly passed away.

Of the origin of Sargon, the founder of the dynasty which ruled Assyria until its fall, nothing certain is known. For various reasons he is supposed to have been a usurper, but this does not preclude the possibility of his belonging to a family descended from kings, as Esarhaddon actually claims. Indeed, the king-list itself may be said to point unmistakably to such a view; for it is certain that the Assyrian people were more faithful to their royal house than any other people in ancient times. The constant revolts against and usurpations of the Babylonian monarchy by men of low birth rarely occurred in the northern kingdom. The fact, then, that there were two cases of irregular succession in so short a space as that intervening between the accession of Tiglath-Pileser III and Sargon II may well point to a return to power of a junior branch of the royal family, whose genealogy rested on very remote ancestors. A fanciful genealogy of the Sargonid house dating from the reign of Sennacherib, in which the gods themselves appear as the royal ancestors, need not be thought to discredit Esarhaddon’s statements, for on the divine origin of the royal blood was based the monarchical principle. A strong argument for believing Sargon to have had a legitimate claim to the throne is the apparent unanimity with which he was accepted on Shalmaneser’s death. Civil war, such as sometimes occurred in Assyria, there was none, though such might be expected were Sargon the representative of one great party in the state as against the other.

It is necessary to dwell upon this point, because a statement in a historical inscription has been employed to construct a theory as to the political parties in Assyria which is at once plausible and easily applied to explain other events. Sargon states that Shalmaneser imposed taxes and forced labour on the city of Ashur, which had from time immemorial been free of impost; and that the word of the gods deposed him for that reason, and called Sargon to the throne. From this it has been argued that Sargon’s accession represents the successful rebellion of a priestly party against the military party which had prevailed under Tiglath-Pileser III and continued to rule under Shalmaneser. This theory is merely speculation, and must be accepted or rejected on the ground of its inherent probability. To the present writer, at least, it is extremely doubtful, for instance, whether the opposition of ‘military’ and ‘priestly’ offices is at all established; it is certain that priests accompanied the armies, and that high military officers had religious functions, as when they acted as limmu. That, even if ‘priestly’ and ‘military’ classes had quite different interests, there was a distinct, conscious conflict between the two seems improbable. It is much more natural to see in the taxation of the city of Ashur a definite attempt by Shalmaneser (who reigned, as we have seen, at that city) to oppress the ancient capital, perhaps as a punishment for recalcitrancy1; whereas Sargon always showed a preference for that city. The cause, then, of Sargon’s accession to the throne is unknown.

The name ‘Sargon,’ i.e. ‘the true king,’ may well have been chosen by the newly-made king on his accession, just as, perhaps, Tiglath-Pileser III may have altered his name; otherwise it is curious that two men who succeeded to the throne, presumably as usurpers, should have recalled by their names two of the most successful and renowned among the Assyrian kings. Tiglath-Pileser, we may suppose, had named himself after the great conqueror who lived at the end of the twelfth century; Sargon named himself after a king Sharrukin who ruled Assyria in the twentieth century. A typical characteristic of the period is pointed to by this deliberate reminder of ancient times, namely, the growth of an intelligent study of, and interest in, history. That Sargon was recognized as ‘Sargon the Second’ is certain from an inscription, and is the more remarkable since he is the only monarch known to have been thus distinguished; ‘Sargon the First’ is probably the early Assyrian king of that name, though it has usually been supposed that the reference was to Sargon of Agade. Curiously enough, it would appear that ‘Sargon the Second’ finally became known merely as ‘the Second,’ so that he is called in Ptolemy’s Canon’ Akreanos, a Graecized form of arku, ‘Second.’ If the name was chosen for an omen, Sargon’s intention on his accession was to conquer far and wide.

Although his succession in Assyria itself was not disputed, difficulties in various provinces immediately confronted him; and throughout his reign so many campaigns were conducted in various parts of the empire, some simultaneously, that it is best to deal with them geographically.

It has already been stated that the opposition which Assyria had to meet from this time on arose from four quarters: (a) from a union of Chaldea and Elam in the south, (b) from a medley of peoples in the north and north-east, (c) from the rising power of Phrygia in the north-west, and (d) from Syria, Palestine and Egypt in the south-west. In this order the events of Sargon’s reign will be considered.

(a) The severe treatment of the Chaldeans of Bit Sa’alli and Bit Shilani by Tiglath-Pileser III was imitated by Shalmaneser V, for an Aramaean letter discovered in the excavation of Ashur speaks of the plundering of Bit-Adini by Ululai. The Assyrians, however, had never met with a serious reverse at the hands of the Chaldeans, and may well have come to consider the suppression of revolt in Babylonia as among the easiest of their tasks. The tribal divisions of the Chaldeans assisted an enemy. They were divided into five main clans, Bit Dakkuri, Bit Sa’alli, Bit Shilani, Bit Amukkani and Bit Yakin, each clan having its own sheikh; of these clans Bit Dakkuri and Bit Amukkani were far larger than the others. Within these large clans were smaller divisions; thus Bit Adini was a sub-tribe of Bit Dakkuri. Again, individual towns, especially old Sumerian cities, maintained their own civic existence within the boundaries of these tribes, so that such a city as Larak was governed by an independent princeling. The geographical positions of these tribes are now fairly accurately known. The territory of Bit Dakkuri lay immediately south of Borsippa, and stretched along the bank of the Euphrates, where it bordered on the small and compact Bit Sa’alli. Bit Shilani, to the south again, had at the time of Sargon been absorbed by Bit Amukkani; this latter tribe stretched right across the southern portion of the country, and its chief occupied much the position of the old-time King of the Sea Lands. On the bank of the Tigris, bordered to the north and east by Aramaean tribes, lay Bit-Yakin, in which small district there can scarcely have been, originally, more than three towns of any size. Before the time of Sargon, there was no cohesion among these various tribes; indeed, when Tiglath-Pileser III was engaged in his punitive expedition against Ukin-zer of Bit Amukkani, the young Marduk-Apal-Iddinna (Merodach-Baladan) of Bit Yakin submitted to the Assyrian king with such haste that he would seem to have rejoiced in the downfall of his own countryman. Merodach-Baladan, who claimed royal descent from Eriba-Marduk, a king of the VIIIth Babylonian Dynasty, himself drew the right conclusions from the events of 731. The first necessity for any Chaldean prince whose ambition aimed at rule in Babylon itself was that all the Chaldeans should be firmly united in his support. To this end he must therefore have devoted himself in the interval before the accession of Sargon, with complete success; for many years, in victory and in defeat, Merodach-Baladan represented the Chaldaean people, and was as supreme in Bit Dakkuri as in Bit Yakin. By what means he achieved this wonderful result is not known; the mere fact is a signal proof of the subtle genius of the man. His next step was perhaps the easiest and least fruitful in his policy. Just as southern Babylonia consisted of the tribal Chaldee districts, with certain ancient independent cities isolated in their midst, so northern Babylonia consisted of Aramaean tribes, and great civic communities. Merodach-Baladan secured the united support of all the Aramaean tribes without difficulty; but the value of their support in the military sense was not great, while the threat to their independence roused the hostility of the civic communities. In this way Merodach-baladan was likely, it is true, to be the most powerful man in Babylonia, but he would still be no match for the Assyrian; and in looking for a strong ally he seems to have laid down the lines of all future Chaldean policy, a policy which had a remarkable influence in history.

For centuries Babylonia and Elam had scarcely come into contact with one another, despite the close ties which had once brought the two lands into continual conflict. On the reason for the cessation of the attempts at conquest and reconquest which fill the early pages of Babylonian history it would be idle to speculate; many causes must have been at work. By the eighth century the Elamite army had become an almost forgotten bogey; but Merodach-Baladan was aware that it was the one army in western Asia at the time likely to be able to fight with the Assyrians on equal terms. Using, as did the Urartians, an equipment not at all inferior in deadly effect to that of the Assyrians, the Elamites were reinforced by the tribes moving into their territory from north and east, while this same movement of peoples handicapped and weakened the Urartians. Trained in the hard school of mountain warfare, yet experienced in fighting in mass, the Elamite soldier was a very different opponent from the Chaldee or Aramaean tribesman of Babylonia. It was the supreme accomplishment of Merodach-Baladan to secure an alliance with Elam for a war against Assyria and thus show how an apparently irresistible power might best be met. In the confidence his alliance with Khumbanigash of Elam gave him, Merodach-Baladan threw off the Assyrian yoke immediately on Sargon’s accession, entered Babylon, and ‘took the hands of Bel’ at the New Year Festival of 721.

The Assyrian army took the field under Sargon in 720, to meet the Elamites outside the city of Der. The Elamites themselves expected to be joined there by the Babylonian forces under Merodach-Baladan; but that very able diplomatist throughout his long life proved a wretched soldier, and now at the outset of his adventures made the greatest mistake of all. He failed to arrive in time, and the battle was fought out between the Elamites and the Assyrians. In view of the conflicting accounts of the battle from the Assyrian and Babylonian sources, it seems probable that neither side had gained an advantage, when the As­syrians retreated to avoid facing a new onslaught by the fresh Babylonian troops. The Elamites, indeed, had won the Babylonian throne for their ally. It was many years before Sargon was again able to turn to the south, for he was busily engaged else­where; and the Elamite army, after ravaging the southern borders of Assyria, returned home.

Left in peace to rule in Babylon, the Chaldean monarch was probably able to subvert completely the social life of the country. Naturally the pro-Assyrian party lost their lands and their goods to Chaldeans; and naturally the tribes, which had been allied to him, expected to gain plunder from the towns. Otherwise, the change can scarcely have been noticeable; for the Chaldeans had, so far as is at present known, always worshipped Marduk and Nabu just as the Babylonians did, and their tongue and civiliza­tion differed as little as their religion. It is, however, fairly certain that the great cities suffered considerably from oppression at his hands during his twelve years of power, and that to this cause may be traced their enthusiasm for Sargon of Assyria, whose interest it was to foster trade rather than to plunder. In any case, Merodach-Baladan’s reign did not strengthen his position as against the Assyrians.

In Elam events led to a temporary neglect of affairs in Babylonia. In 717 Khumbanigash died and was succeeded by Shutur-Nakhkhunte, or Shutur-Nakhundu as the Assyrians pronounced his name. It is very probable that internal disorders in his own kingdom occupied the new ruler’s energies, for when Sargon at last devoted his attention to the south, he was allowed to pursue his plans without interference from Elam. The Assyrian plan was a sound one. The Aramaean tribes to the east of the Tigris held the shortest road between Assyria and Bit-Yakin, and at the same time formed the means of communication between Susa and Babylon. Sargon accordingly directed a twofold attack on these tribes, the one expedition having as its objective the Aramaean tribes lying along the northern border of Elam, and the other those in the district lying between Susa and the mouth of the Tigris. In these campaigns Elamite towns were captured and Elamite soldiery was involved in the fighting; but Shutur-Nakhundu made no move.

When, then, Sargon prepared in 710 to deliver his grand attack on the rebel, Merodach-Baladan had good cause for alarm. His effort to rouse the Elamite king by a great bribe was a complete failure, and the Chaldaean army which had marched to the Tigris to join the Elamites retreated south towards their own territory. This was a signal for a general surrender of the northern towns to Sargon. That monarch, after a forced march from Elam, had quartered his tired troops in Dur-Ladinna, a fortress of Bit Dakkuri, not far from Babylon; and thither the civil envoys of Babylon went to hail the conqueror. In Babylon, Sargon followed the example of his immediate predecessors, with a slight variation. He ‘took the hands of Bel’ with due ceremony, but did not adopt the title of ‘King of Babylon,’ preferring to use the older ‘Shakkanaku.’ It is highly probable that he acted thus merely to avoid the necessity of being present year after year on New Year’s Day in Babylon. The same year Merodach-Baladan’s principal fortress in his own territory of Bit Yakin fell into the hands of the Assyrian army. Unfortunately the annals at this point are badly broken, but it would seem that the Chaldean prince achieved a most remarkable personal ascendancy over the Assyrian king, for he was forgiven for the breach of the oaths of fidelity he must have taken to Tiglath-Pileser III, and actually reinstated in his princedom of Bit-Yakin. That an enemy, and especially a Chaldean, should receive such mercy from an Assyrian monarch is surprising; and it may be that Sargon by a clement policy hoped to secure the allegiance of the Chaldee tribesmen to the Assyrian domination. In any case, the ability which secured so fortunate a result for Merodach-Baladan must be remembered in the consideration of subsequent events in Babylonia.

There was no further trouble in the south during the life of Sargon. His policy had been wise and successful: recoiling before an unexpectedly powerful enemy, without being routed, he had waited until the alliance between Chaldea and Elam had broken down, then, in a cleverly conceived campaign, he had reduced Chaldea to subjection, thus gaining Babylon for a prize, and had surrounded the Elamite territory to north and west with Assyrian garrisons and provinces.

 

III.

CAMPAIGNS IN URARTU AND SYRIA

 

(b) The problem of the north-eastern and eastern borders remained throughout Sargon’s reign the most important military question. Urartu was governed by an energetic prince, Rusas, son of Sarduris, from the year 733 onwards, and he had, probably in the early years of his reign, extended his suzerainty much farther to the north and east than former kings had done. The force of events in the district south of Lake Urmia compelled Rusas to adopt a somewhat different policy there. The tribes in these districts had changed: a new and hardier folk, the Medes, continually pushing westward, could not be harried and subdued in a single campaign, as had the former inhabitants. Rusas therefore developed extensive intrigues against Assyria with tribal chiefs, and Sargon’s principal task was the maintenance of the Assyrian domination in this region.

In the year 719, the third year after his accession, trouble arose in the district of Mannai, which lay to the south-east of Lake Urmia. The king of the Mannai, Iranzu, was a loyal tributary of Assyria, whose policy had led to discontent among the governors of the eastern provinces of his kingdom, the leaders of the anti-Assyrian party being Mitatti of Zikirtu, and Bagdatti of Uishdish. Both had probably revolted before the year 719; and two of Iranzu’s fortresses surrendered to Mitatti in that year. Sargon promptly sent Assyrian troops to reduce the rebel cities, and three other cities actually in negotiation with Urartu were captured and the inhabitants transplanted to the west. Two years later, Aza, the son and successor of Iranzu, was threatened by an even more serious danger. Rusas of Urartu, Bagdatti of Uishdish and Mitatti of Zikirtu defeated the troops of Aza at the foot of Mt Uaush immediately east of Lake Urmia, and left the corpse of Aza unburied there. Sargon’s vengeance was as prompt as his help had previously been. He marched straight to Mt Uaush, and flayed Bagdatti alive there. Aza’s brother, Ullusunu, had set himself on the throne of the Mannai, and on Sargon’s approach he appears to have marched north to join forces with Rusas of Urartu, inducing Ashur-li’ of Karallu and Itti of Allabria to join the revolt. Sargon turned back from Uishdish against the Mannai and reduced the country once more to subjection. Towards Ullusunu he showed as remarkable a clemency as he adopted later towards Merodach-Baladan, for he accepted him as the legal king; the other rebels, Ashur-li’ and Itti, received a more summary treatment. Sargon’s object then would seem to have been the personal conciliation of Ullusunu, in which he was successful, for in 715 Rusas developed a conspiracy against Ullusunu with the aid of Daiukku, a high official of the Mannai. As the result of a direct attack, the army of Urartu took twenty-two fortified cities from Ullusunu, but Sargon’s prompt aid once again saved the situation, Daiukku was transported with all his family to Hamath, districts bordering on Urartu were plundered and sacked, and tribute exacted from chiefs of surrounding cities, including the ‘yanzu’ of Nairi, The Assyrians then appear to have attacked the southern provinces of Urartu, and so prepared for the great onslaught of the next year.

Few campaigns in ancient history have been more fully described than that conducted by Sargon in 714 B.C. The record is still extant in the form of a large clay tablet, containing the text of a letter, addressed as follows:

“To Ashur, the father of the gods, the great lord who dwelleth in Ekhar-sagkurkurra, his great temple, very heartily peace!

To the gods of destinies, to the goddesses who dwell in Ekharsagkurkurra, their great temple, very heartily peace!

To the gods of destinies, to the goddesses who dwell in the city of Ashur, their great temple, very heartily peace!

To the town and to its people, peace! To the palace that is therein, peace!

With Sargon, the holy priest, the slave who adoreth thy great divinity, and with his camp all goes well, exceedingly well”.

Ullusunu came to meet Sargon in Surikash, a southern province of the Mannai, whence the Assyrian marched to Parsua(sh), at the south-western extremity of Lake Urmia, and then to Ullusunu’s fortress in Mannai itself, where Sargon pledged himself to overthrow Urartu. The first assault fell upon Zikirtu, a district east of Lake Urmia, but news arrived that Rusas had arrived in Uishdish, the district between Mt Sahend and the lake, and that Mitatti of Zikirtu had joined him there; thereupon Sargon made a forced march with his cavalry to the west and fell upon his enemy with unexpected rapidity. The Urartians were completely routed, and the Assyrians followed them northwards, along the route from Tabriz to Van, thus entering Urartu from the east. Turning north, without attacking the capital city, Turushpa, Sargon marched round the north of Lake Van, then turned south past Bitlis, to the Nairi hills, and received the tribute of the ‘yanzu’ of Nairi at Khubushkia. From here the cavalry, chariotry and camp followers were sent back to Assyria, while Sargon led the infantry and a thousand horse against the king of Musasir, Urzana. Musasir lay south-east of the Upper Zab, and was a mountainous district; the king, Urzana, escaped, but rich booty and many prisoners fell into Assyrian hands. So concluded a campaign conducted with remarkable rapidity through most difficult country, which secured the political object in view. A severe defeat had been inflicted on Rusas; and those who were allied with him in the districts reckoned as Assyrian dependencies had been severely punished.

When the letter of Sargon to the city of Ashur, written perhaps from Musasir, was composed, it was already known that Rusas was sick. At a later date, the scribe who composed the annals records that Rusas committed suicide when the fall of Musasir was reported to him. This, however, does not agree with the facts recorded in an inscription of Rusas found near Topsaneh, in which that king claims to have marched against Assyria and restored Musasir. It is quite clear that Rusas died shortly after sending Urzana back to Musasir, and was succeeded by his son Argistis. It is also probable that in the main Sargon’s settlement of these districts remained in force during the rest of his reign. Only one minor campaign was subsequently conducted in the eastern country, that of 707, which affected the dependent princedom of Ellipi, a land that bordered on Elamite territory. Dalta of Ellipi, who had been reduced in the campaign of 715 to a tributary, died, and in the struggle for the succession one son, Nibe, appealed to the Elamites, while the other, Ishpabara, had recourse to Sargon. The Assyrian army, sent to help Ishppabara, duly captured the capital city Marubishti, and took Nibe prisoner.

The collection of letters preserved in Ashurbanipal’s library serves to inform us of events in the years 707—706 which are of great interest. From a report of the Assyrian officer Ashurrisua we learn that Argistis was engaged in 708 in collecting a con­siderable army, which it was supposed he intended to use against Assyria. The next spring, however, saw him otherwise engaged. The people called Gimirrai by the Assyrians, Cimmerii; by the Greeks, the biblical Gomer, were beginning to move into Asia Minor, and to meet their attack Argistis marched northward. All that we know is that Argistis suffered a great defeat in battle, apparently delivered in territory acknowledged to belong to the Cimmerians; but he seems to have been able to preserve his own borders, for Urartu continued under his rule for many years. The barbarian horde continued its march westward. So much may be gathered from the letters sent by the crown-prince Sennacherib to his father, with a summary of the information gained from the intelligence officers.

In these letters may be found a partial explanation of the supremacy of Assyria at this period. From the earliest times Oriental monarchs had been surrounded by officials—priestly, military and civil; but the Assyrian kings, at any rate of the Sargonid period, secured men of such energy, intelligence and efficiency for important provincial governorships, that the characteristic evils of eastern officialdom, lethargy and incompetence, must have been almost unknown. The Assyrians had a natural gift for accuracy in detail, which appears in many ways—in the meticulous care and neatness of the scribes, the patient accumulation of phenomena in long series of omens, the taste for elaborate decoration in the friezes—and such a gift is invaluable in administration. Add to this the fact that each of these governors could depend on the support of a strong central government, which would send him sufficient troops to reinforce his own detachment when danger really threatened, and the contrast the letters of this period present to those written by the governors in Palestine to Amenhotep IV in the fourteenth century will not appear surprising.

(c) In the north-west the lands about the Gulf of Issus occupied much of Sargon’s attention. It seems probable from the events of Sargon’s reign that Shalmaneser V had conquered Tabal and Khilakku (Cilicia), and constituted them Assyrian dependencies. At the beginning of Sargon’s reign Khilakku had no governor, and it was assigned to Ambaris, the son of Khulli. On the western border of the province of Khilakku lived the Mushki, the Assyrian appellation, in these later records, of the Phrygians; and it was perhaps at the instigation of the Mushki that Kiakki of Shinukhtu, a district which lay south of Khilakku, in the Taurus, stopped the payment of tribute in 718. Once again a dependent prince was enriched, for Shinukhtu was given to Matti of Atuna (the Tynna of Ptolemy), a state which bordered on Khilakku. By these additions to the territories of tributaries a series of ‘buffer’ states was brought into existence which should be strong enough, with Assyrian aid, to resist any encroachment of the Mushki. The position was not, however, satisfactory, for to the east of these states Gurgum, Kumukh and Carchemish held a semi­independent position. Pisiri(s) of Carchemish actually formed an alliance with Mita (Midas), chief of the Mushki, and revolted in 717, which led to the reduction of the ancient city and the forma­tion of a new province. In 715 a demonstration against Mita of Mushki was undertaken from the province of Kue, constituted perhaps in the time of Tiglath-Pileser III. Mita had captured long ago twenty-two cities which once belonged to Kue, and these Sargon recaptured and reincorporated in the sea-coast provinces. Then came an unexpected revolt. Ambaris, the son of Khulli, owed much to the Assyrians. His father had been set upon the throne of Tabal by Tiglath-Pileser’s general in 733, when he was sent to crush the revolt of U-Ashshur-Me; Ambaris himself had been given the province of Khilakku, and had married Sargon’s daughter, Akhat-Abishu. All these attempts to secure his loyalty were, however, vain. He allied himself with Mita of Mushki and Rusas of Urartu, which led to a campaign in 713 against Tabal. Sargon now abandoned the effort to maintain tributary princes, and converted this important district into an Assyrian province.

Khilakku was bordered on the north and east by the lands of the Kashkai; to the east of Tabal lay Melid. Dadilu of the Kashkai, and Sulumal of Melid had recognized the suzerainty of Tiglath-Pileser III by paying tribute. Dadilu was succeeded by Gunzinanu of Kammanu (i.e. Comana), as the southern portion of the land of the Kashkai was named, and Sulumal by Tarkhunazi of Melid. In the early years of his reign, perhaps in 718, Sargon had cause to expel Gunzinanu from Kammanu, probably because he refused tribute, and, in pursuance of his earlier policy of maintaining tributary princes, handed Kammanu over to Tarkhunazi of Meliddu. This prince followed exactly the same line of conduct as Ambaris of Tabal, and in the campaign of 712 his capital city, Melid, and the fortress of Tilgarimmu (the biblical Togarmah), the modern Gorlin, was captured. Kammanu was constituted an Assyrian province, with Tilgarimmu as capital, while Meliddu was entrusted to Muttallu of Kumukh. It was after this campaign that a series of fortresses was built on the eastern boundary of Kammanu against Urartu, on the northern boundary of Kammanu and Khilakku against the Kashkai, and on the western border of Khilakku against the Mushki.

In 711 internal trouble arose in the tributary princedom of Gurgum. The prince Tarkhulara was murdered by his son Muttallu. This opportunity for interference was eagerly seized by Assyria; the country was invaded, the inhabitants deported and an Assyrian governor installed in Markasi, the modern Marash. It was perhaps in consequence of these constant troubles in the north-west that Sargon decided on active measures against the Mushki, to whose intrigues he obviously assigned the cause. In 709 he ordered the governor of the province of Kue to march against Mita, and a very successful campaign resulted. The general marched up the Calycadnus, and into Mita’s land past Isaura, to the fortresses on Lake Karalis. After defeating Mita’s army, he marched through three of the provinces of the Mushki, and carried back 2400 prisoners. Mita recognized Sargon as his suzerain by paying tribute, and the border provinces might now be considered secure. The seven kings of Cyprus also sent tribute, thus acknowledging a dependence on Assyria by no means illusory. All the ports through which they conducted a prosperous trade with the mainland were now under Assyrian rule, and it is even possible that Assyrian troops were quartered in the island. The stele of Sargon found at Citium is an interesting reminder of this Assyrian supremacy.

In 708 the last of the tributary princes fell. Muttallu of Kumukh, encouraged by Argistis, son of Rusas, of Urartu, refused to pay tribute. His capital was besieged and captured, but he himself es­aped. Kumukh was turned into a province, and the ‘turtan of the left’ was appointed governor, in command of a rather considerable force, numbering 150 chariots, 1500 cavalry, 20,000 bowmen, 10,000 infantry. Whether the new province included both Kumukh and Melid, is not known; the two were in any case divided at a later date, each having a governor, so that it is most probable that the division was reinstituted on the fall of Muttallu.

The principal interest in these affairs of the north-west provinces is the complete change in Sargon’s policy which has been noted, dating from 713, and almost certainly caused by the defection of Ambaris. The policy of maintaining tributary princelings on the borders has always played a large part in Oriental diplomacy, most often with indifferent results. Throughout Assyrian history it was a complete failure, but nowhere more so than in these districts in which the rebel princes might well count on the support of the Mushki or the Urartians. Sargon’s apprehension of this failure, and his persistent efforts after 713 to reduce all the independent princes, show the importance he attached to these districts; and the fact that neither Mita of Mushki nor Argistis of Urartu actually despatched armies to aid the rebels, shows the military ascendancy of Assyria in lands where the army was operating at a great distance from its base. As to the reason of this supremacy there can be little doubt. The important campaign of 709 was certainly conducted by the governor of Kue; and most probably some other campaigns ascribed to the king by the scribes were actually conducted by the district governors. Here, then, as on the Urartian border, Assyria was well served by its officials.

In Syria and Palestine an event of the first importance immediately followed Sargon’s accession. Shalmaneser V died before the siege of Samaria was brought to a successful conclusion in 722. Whether a deportation of the inhabitants and the settlement of captives of various nationalities, including Arabs, in Samaria, took place in 722—1 or subsequently, is not definitely known. This procedure, the preliminary to the establishment of Samaria as an Assyrian province, may not have been enforced until after the remnant of Israel joined in a remarkable coalition directed against Sargon in 720. The instigator of this coalition was the king of Hamath, Iaubi’di (also called Ilu-iau-bi’di). It will be remembered that Hamath had succumbed to Shalmaneser III, and it seems to have remained a tributary princedom from that time onwards. It may be that Iaubi’di was led to hope for success by the example of Merodach-baladan; or it may even be that Merodach-Baladan had intrigued with him to secure this rising in the west, a policy which we know he subsequently pursued. The coalition formed by Iaubi’di was of a peculiar kind; besides himself, there was only one other tributary prince, Hanunu (Hanno) of Gaza. The other members were Assyrian provinces, Arpad, Simirra, Damascus, and Samirina. The inscriptions give us no information as to the circumstances under which these provinces joined in the rebellion; but if the Assyrian governors had actually been guilty of conspiracy, their summary punishment would almost certainly have been recorded, so that it is natural to suppose that the rebellion was confined to the subject population, and that risings occurred in all the places implicated. This was certainly the origin of the trouble of Hamath, for Iaubi’di either murdered or otherwise removed Eni-el, the ruling prince of Hamath, and then raised the standard of revolt. He was able with his allies to place a considerable army in the field, and met Sargon’s army at Karkar. An overwhelming Assyrian victory led to the capture of Iaubi’di and the subjection of Hamath, which was turned into a province, greatly to the advantage of Assyria, since by this means the only remaining land in Syria with an independent prince was now included in the solid block of western provinces.

Sargon then marched on to meet Hanunu, whose army had for some reason been delayed, possibly because it awaited reinforcements from Egypt. The prince of Gaza had maintained a close relationship with Egypt, to which country he had fled from Tiglath-Pileser III, and at this crisis Sibe, ‘the turtan of Egypt,’ came to his assistance. Concerning this Sibe there has been much discussion. Many have identified him with the king of Egypt, Seve (So, 2 Kings XVII, 4) and consequently with Sabaka, the first Pharaoh of the XXVth Dynasty. It is, however, quite clear from the Assyrian account that Sibe was not the Pharaoh, and the identifications are doubtful; the matter can only be settled by a consideration of the Egyptian evidence. Sargon met the allies at Rapikhu (Raphia), and inflicted a crushing defeat on them, capturing Hanunu and driving Sibe from the field in a hasty flight to Egypt.

This presage of a collision between Assyria and Egypt was followed by other events in the reign, which show that a final struggle was inevitable. In 715 Sargon dealt with certain tribes of the Arabian Peninsula which refused tribute. Most probably the real object of the expedition was to restore order along the great trade-route which must have led to Yemen and Hadramaut. The tribes named are the Khaiapa, the Tamud, the Ibadidi and the Marsimani; of these the Tamud were to remain a great tribal organization until Roman times, and mention is made of them in the Kuran. The effect of the demonstration was curious. Not only did Samsi, the queen of the Aribi of the northern desert, who had long been tributary, send gifts, but so also did Itamar of Saba, in the far distant south, and, most strangely, the Pharaoh of Egypt. The exact object of such a friendly, and almost humilia­ting, act at this time it is not easy to see, unless it was intended to secure freedom of trade in Arabia, possibly threatened by Assyria; at all events the desire to remain, at least in appearance, on good terms with Sargon is obvious.

Sargon’s conquests over the Arabs did not, however, prevent the Egyptians from carrying on intrigues in southern Palestine, especially with Ashdod. The ruling prince in that city was Akhimiti, who had been placed on the throne by Sargon because his brother Azuri, the former prince, had refused tribute. A man of Cyprian origin who came to Ashdod headed a rebellion in which Akhimiti was murdered. It would appear that an ambitious plan was conceived, at the instigation of Egyptian agents, in which the Philistines, Moab, Edom and Judah were to join Ashdod in a simultaneous attack on the Assyrians; but before the plan could mature the Assyrian army had entered Ashdod, Gath and Ash-Dudimmu (the port of Ashdod?) and no further attempt was made by the plotters. Egypt was indeed a ‘broken reed’; the princes of Palestine could not rely on its support in face of the prompt action of the Assyrian governors.

Sargon, then, had little trouble in the west, as compared with what he experienced on his troublesome northern and eastern borders; nor was the holding of Syria and Palestine ever to cause his successors much effort. The collisions with Egypt were, however, significant, and the constant effort to deal with the source of opposition rather than its manifestations, so often apparent in the actions of Assyrian kings, was to lead to serious developments in this direction.

Sargon’s last campaign was fought in the north-west, and its conception and issue give us his measure as a statesman and a soldier. The great defeat suffered by Argistis of Urartu in 707 warned the Assyrian king of the danger of the hordes of Cimmerians on his northern border. He decided to face the barbarians immediately at the point of his borders towards which they were pressing. In 706 he marched to Tabal, and met them in 705 under a leader called Eshpai. (Another view is that Eshpai of Kullum was a prince of a tribe in the eastern hills.) Though he himself fell in the battle, his policy was more than justified by the result, for we hear of no important aggression of the Cimmerians during the reign of Sennacherib. It is not easy to overestimate the value of Sargon’s action. Certainly Syria, possibly all western Asia, owed their immunity from invasion at this time to the campaign in which he lost his life. For many years to come the Cimmerians were forgotten, left to wander in the unknown lands of the interior of Asia Minor. The body of the king was recovered and sent back to Assyria.

By his policy in the east and north Sargon’s ability may best be judged. Quick to support his own governors, and dependent princes, he was able to defeat Urartu, but was not misled into an attempt unduly to extend his power; providing for an efficient protection of his northern frontier, he at once met the principal danger which threatened his empire with sufficient force to avert it. Clement and cruel by turn, his reign left Assyria more secure in the north than it had ever been.

From this account of Sargon’s reign in the various regions of his empire, it will be seen that we have ample evidence of his energy and ability; yet it would seem that he made a great mistake in his choice of a capital. At the beginning of his reign he commenced the building of a new city, north of Nineveh, on a small stream which runs into the Tigris from the east, the city called Dur-Sharrukin in his honour, and now known as Khorsabad. It is not surprising that his successors abandoned the site and that it remained in use only as a fortress; but it is interesting to note that the cause of Sargon’s choice is most probably to be found in his absorption in the problems of his northern and eastern frontiers. From Dur-Sharrukin he could more easily collect information and send orders to his governors on those frontiers. The magnificence of Dur-Sharrukin, the first site from which modern explorers learnt of the Sargonid period, was, however, a waste of effort, and, in this respect, may be compared to Kar-Tukulti-Ninurta. Both sites, chosen to please an individual whim, were abandoned as royal residences on the death of their builders. Shalmaneser III and Sennacherib had a surer sense of realities, since they expended their labours and treasure on the cities of Ashur, Kalakh and Nineveh, the natural capitals of the kingdom.

The sculptures dating from Sargon’s reign are distinguished by breadth and majesty of treatment, especially in dealing with the human figure. There is, however, no great advance to be noted in art; and in literature the knowledge that Sargon collected texts serves rather to arouse our curiosity than to supply information as to the developments that occurred during the period. It is possible that the king himself directed the edition of various texts concerned with the exploits of Sargon of Agade, and that the attention devoted in them to geographical details was actually due to the later Sargon’s personal interest in military routes. However this may be, Sargon was not only a great king but an enlightened man, and in him is to be found the same taste for artistic and literary effort that distinguishes his successors.

 

CHAPTER III

SENNACHERIB AND ESARHADDON