web counter

READING HALL

THE DOORS OF WISDOM

 

THE ASSYRIAN EMPIRE. TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER III.

SENNACHERIB AND ESARHADDON

I.

THE BABYLONIAN POLICY OF SENNACHERIB

 

SENNACHERIB was a tried soldier and governor when he succeeded his father in 705. His letters, dealing with affairs n the northern borders, show that his duties as crown-prince entailed a share in the cares of government; and various indications would seem to prove that in the main he adopted the lines of policy followed by his father. It is fortunate that a nearly complete series of the cylinders inscribed with the annals of his reign in different editions are extant, and that the campaigns which were waged over the wide dominions of Assyria can be followed in the vivid language of the Assyrians themselves; fortunate especially because the cause of error, where error there is in these documents, is shown to be neither deliberate falsification nor complete ignorance, but a desire to secure a maximum of brevity while preserving the actual language of the original text. Such a compression in the text has led to the unfortunate misconception that Sennacherib’s accession was the signal for rebellion in the provinces. In truth, the Assyrian army rested from its almost unceasing labours for two years, while Sennacherib was engaged on his most magnificent achievement, the rebuilding of Nineveh. Such a period of peace shows how well the foundations of the Assyrian empire were laid, and how stable the administration under Sargon had become.

This period of two years is, however, still more significant in another respect. Sargon had been the Shakkanaku of Babylon, the king in all save name, by virtue of having ‘taken the hands of Bel’ in 709. To secure that same position Sennacherib had but to march to Babylon in 705—704, and none could have prevented him. He did not do so. The position resulting in Babylon itself was a curious one, as is shown by the two different treatments of this period by the Babylonian annalists. The Babylonian king-list gives Sennacherib as king of Babylon for the years 705—703; and doubtless he was, in the sense that the administrative officials in the city still regarded the king of Assyria as their suzerain.

But legally Sennacherib can have had no standing whatever, for he had not ‘taken the hands of Bel’. Ptolemy’s Canon, accordingly, marks the years 705—703 as ‘kingless’; and as an interregnum the period is best considered. The motives which actuated Sen­nacherib to so unusual a course will be considered when all his dealings with Babylonia have been recounted.

Sargon had left Merodach-Baladan of Bit Yakin at the head of his clan when he expelled him from Babylon; and in return for this clemency the Chaldean prince remained faithful to his Assyrian liege during the remainder of his reign. He does not, however, seem to have considered himself under any obligation to Sennacherib, for he commenced the greatest intrigue of his life immediately after the death of Sargon. Merodach-Baladan’s position was indeed quite as strong, if not stronger in 705 than it was in 721, when he had successfully seated himself on the throne in Babylon in despite of Sargon. He could now reckon on the complete support of all the Chaldee clans, and also of the Aramaeans. The Aramaeans east of the Tigris had indeed in 710 been reduced to a province by Sargon; but a small Assyrian garrison would cause no difficulty, once the tribesmen were secure of support in their revolt. The old Sumerian cities, Ur, Erech, Nippur, would perforce open their gates to the rebels and join in the revolt. In the north, Kish, Cuthah and Borsippa would almost certainly favour the side on which the Aramaean tribesmen ranged themselves; in Babylon alone, where bitter memories of Merodach-Baladan’s reign appear to have lingered, was opposition to be expected. In addition, the time was especially favourable for arranging alliances with foreign powers which would be able to lend invaluable military support. The most important of these was of course Elam, still ruled by Shutur-Nakhundu, who had not failed to note the results of his peaceful policy in 710. The increasing strength of Assyria in districts adjoining Elamite lands, and in some cases, as in Ellipi, Assyrian interference in princedoms the kings of Susa regarded as tributary, must have been extremely distasteful to Shutur-Nakhundu and he would probably have joined Merodach-Baladan in his fresh effort even without the large bribe the latter was able to give him. Thus assured of a military strength which had been sufficient to bring success in 721, Merodach-Baladan might well have thought it reasonable to march to Babylon in 704, but he appears to have waited, in an attempt to secure further help.

Sargon had exercised a more drastic control over the Arabs than was agreeable to the nomad tribes of the desert. The northern Aribi were now ruled by a queen, Iati’e, who presumably succeeded the queen Samsi who had paid tribute to Sargon. Though the military importance of any contingent they might send was small, the Aribi were important allies, and Merodach-Baladan succeeded in gaining their adherence to his cause. Under the safe conduct of the Aribi, along caravan-routes unwatched by Assyrian soldiers, there travelled an embassy from Babylon of which there is no mention in the cuneiform records. Fortunately we know from biblical references that Merodach-Baladan sent envoys to Hezekiah, king of Judah; and their proposal, obviously of an attack on Assyria by the princes of Palestine, was received with such favour that Isaiah, who, with a rare sagacity, never counselled opposition to Assyria, was moved to anger with his sovereign. It is scarcely to be supposed that Hezekiah was the only prince visited by these envoys; several others must have been approached, and it seems most probable that the war which followed in the west was really intended to begin when Merodach-Baladan marched to Babylon.

That the plan was a failure in this respect seems to have been due to events in Babylon. Aware possibly of the intention of the Chaldee prince again to seize the throne, the Babylonians, to forestall his attempt, appointed one of their own number, a certain Marduk-Zakir-Shum, as king, and he probably officiated in that office at the New Year’s festival of Nisan, 703. A prompt reply to this was necessary. Merodach-Baladan raised his troops, possibly long before the date originally intended, and, disposing of Marduk-Zakir-Shum after a reign of one month, once again ruled in the capital city, making Borsippa his residence, while military dispositions were prepared to meet the attack which Sennacherib might be expected to make. For these military dispositions little credit can be given to Merodach-Baladan himself, for it is fairly obvious that they were actually ordered by Imbappa, the commander-in-chief of the large Elamite army sent by Shutur-Nakhundu. The dispositions themselves were interesting; the cavalry and light-armed troops were sent to Cuthah, and placed under Elamite officers, while the main body stayed in quarters at Kish, under the command of Tannanu, an Elamite general. The Assyrians, if they intended to attack Babylon, must necessarily take Cuthah first, since such a considerable body of light troops could not safely be left in the rear; and the attack of the main allied army on the Assyrians while they were engaged in siege operations would have every chance of success.

Curiously enough, the account which Sennacherib’s scribes compiled of these events in Babylon makes no mention of Marduk-Zakir-Shum, but concentrates on the ‘evil villain’, Merodach-Baladan; and it was not until the latter’s intentions were known to be deliberately hostile, that Sennacherib, ‘in wrath of heart’, set out from the city of Ashur on the 20th of Shebat, the eleventh month of the year (February). It would appear that information had been obtained of the enemy’s dispositions, for while the main body of the Assyrian army marched on Cuthah, a strong advance guard was sent on to Kish, to keep the allied army there in check. On this advance guard much depended, for if it failed to hold the enemy for a sufficient time, the Assyrians would be in difficulties; but it fulfilled its object. When night fell on the first day of the battle the advance guard still held its ground, though it was sore pressed, and couriers were despatched to Sennacherib at Cuthah for reinforcements. Pressed for time, the Assyrians delivered a direct assault on Cuthah the next morning, and took the place at the first onslaught, a remarkable feat of arms. Hurrying on to the field of battle at Kish, the Assyrian army for the second time met the Elamite army on Babylonian ground. The contingents of the allied army other than the Elamites proved of little account. The Arab levies commanded by the brother of queen Iati’e were taken prisoners, as also was the body commanded by Merodach-Baladan’s step-son. Merodach-Baladan himself fled to the nearest Chaldee district. We read, however, of no Elamite prisoners; indeed the Elamites, situated as they were, could do nothing but stand and fight, and being hampered by the loss of their cavalry and bow­men, who had been sent to Cuthah, they must have been at a considerable disadvantage.

The Assyrian victory was decisive. Sennacherib hurried on to Babylon, where, it is to be noted, his reception was friendly. The inhabitants did not suffer at all, the only booty that was taken was from Merodach-Baladan’s palace; so that it is obvious that no blame was attached to the citizens for recent events. The Assyrian then proceeded to reduce Chaldea more thoroughly than any of his predecessors had done. In all eighty-eight fortified towns belonging to the Chaldean clans were captured; in addition to these all the great cities of Babylonia, save Ur of the Chaldees, were besieged and taken. It is unfortunate that there are variant accounts of Sennacherib’s arrangements for the government of the country at the conclusion of the campaign in Chaldea. Undoubtedly the earlier account states that Sennacherib set up a Babylonian, Bel-Ibni, who had been educated at the Assyrian court, as king of Sumer and Akkad. The variant account says that he made Bel-Ibni king of Akkad and set his own officers as governors over the Chaldean districts. It is, of course, possible that the two accounts are not so opposed as they seem; perhaps Sennacherib left his own officers in Chaldea to serve under the new Babylonian king. However this may be, Bel-Ibni, set on the throne of Babylon in the most favourable circumstances, was left in complete and independent control of Babylonia; Sen­nacherib might well expect him to be as good an ally as Nabonassar had been to Tiglath-Pileser III.

The campaign concluded with a raid on the Aramaean tribes east of the Tigris, but no attempt was made to reconstitute the province of Gambulu founded by Sargon. Marching round the western and north-western borders of Elam, obviously as a demonstration, Sennacherib exacted tribute from the people of Khararati and Khirimme, two districts which had been won for Assyria over a century and a half before by Ashur-Nasir-Pal. Khararati was left under its own princeling, but Khirimme was reorganized as an Assyrian province. Sennacherib’s army returned to Assyria loaded with booty, after an expedition which revealed the military abilities of the king, although resulting in a definite contraction of the imperial territory. Unfortunately for the peace of Babylonia, Merodach-Baladan had escaped and was now lurking in the marshes at the head of the Persian Gulf, ready to return to Bit Yakin so soon as might be possible.

Bel-Ibni, left to govern Babylonia for three years, proved an incompetent monarch, entirely incapable of maintaining the order the Assyrian army established. Merodach-Baladan returned once again to Bit Yakin and was still in negotiation with Elam; southern Babylonia would most naturally turn to the old King of the Sea Lands, and probably Bel-Ibni’s edicts were treated with scant attention. Even outside the gates of Borsippa, the head of the tribe Bit-Dakkuri, named Marduk-Ushezib, maintained an entirely independent attitude. There would seem to have been no effort at concerted rebellion; lax government alone produced an intolerable disturbance of which Sennacherib was bound to take notice. A campaign in 700 was not commanded by the king; it was indeed a minor operation, probably conducted by Ashur-Nadin-Shum, a younger son of the king. Marching rapidly through Akkad and plundering by the way, the army first turned towards Bit-Dakkuri, and routed Marduk-Ushezib at Bittutu, without, however, capturing that prince. Pushing on to Bit Yakin, the Assyrians found that land, even to the shores of the Persian Gulf, at their mercy, for Merodach-Baladan had prepared no resistance, but had fled across the Gulf into Elamite territory at Nagiterakki. Wholesale deportation of the inhabitants of Bit Yakin was resorted to, and a demonstration made against the nearest Elamite border. At the close of the campaign a new order was introduced in Babylon. By Sennacherib’s command Bel-Ibni was carried away to Assyria, and Ashur-Nadin-Shum was installed in his place. Thus one more effort was made to preserve for Babylon an independent and effective kingship; for Ashur-Nadin-Shum was not the heir to the Assyrian throne, and his proved ability and his birth might perhaps unite Babylonia under a rule which should ensure peace with Assyria.

Ashur-Nadin-Shum does actually appear as the most successful ruler, during this disturbed period, in a country torn by tribal faction, and weakened by the tortuous diplomacy long practised by Merodach-Baladan. The essential weakness of his position lay in the character of the Babylonian nobles themselves. Unable themselves to maintain supremacy over the Chadean and Aramaean tribesmen, they were unwilling faithfully to support in the kingship one who was not of their own number. The position was further complicated by the attitude of Elam; the refugees from Bit Yakin were still safe under Elamite protection, and it was clear that a decisive struggle must ensue. The most natural method of provoking this struggle was by attacking the Chaldean refugees, a difficult operation which Sennacherib, possibly at his son’s request, carried out in 694. Ships were brought across from the Mediterranean, and the expedition safely went down the Tigris to Opis, crossed to the Euphrates, proceeded to the mud banks at the head of the Gulf, and there overpowered the remnants of Bit Yakin and also the adjoining districts of Elam.

Though Merodach-Baladan was dead, the campaign in this difficult country lasted a long time, while events of importance were taking place in Babylon. Khallushu had succeeded to the throne of Elam by deposing his brother Shutur-Nakhundu in 699. Directly the Assyrian army had passed down the Tigris he made a raid on the city of Sippar, where, apparently, he took Ashur-Nadin-Shum by surprise, and carried him away to Elam, to meet the usual fate. In his place Khallushu set Nergal-Ushezib, probably a Babylonian noble by birth, and then returned to his own country, leaving Nergal-Ushezib a difficult task. The only cities in which he was established were Babylon, including probably Borsippa, and Sippar. After executing some Assyrian officers, he attacked Nippur, and effected a junction with some fresh Elamite troops; but the Assyrian army was returning, and after entering Erech, from which city they carried away the gods and some captives, advanced to meet the combined force of Nergal-Ushezib and the Elamites. In a preliminary skirmish the Assyrians lost the baggage lines; but a battle was fought outside Nippur, and the Assyrians were completely victorious, carrying Nergal-Ushezib off to Assyria. Nergal-Ushezib’s reign lasted eighteen months, so that the battle of Nippur must have been fought about the middle of 693. The long campaign had apparently exhausted the Assyrian army, for no attempt was made to restore order in Babylon. A certain Mushezib-Marduk made himself ruler, with whom Sennacherib’s governors were left to deal.

Elam was a land of constant internal strife, generally conducted by junior members of a royal family infected apparently by hereditary disease and insanity. Khallushu, who had deposed his brother in 699, was himself deposed by his subjects in 693, the deposition, of course, involving death. Kutir-Nakhkhunte, called by the Babylonians Kudurru, became king in his stead. His accession was the opportunity for Sennacherib to deliver a direct attack on Rashi (the Arab Rahshan, a village subsequently included in Kazirun) and Bit Purnaki. Territories which the Elamites had conquered centuries before were restored to Assyria and added to the province of Der, and thirty-four Elamite cities were sacked. Weather of extreme severity drove the Assyrian army back before it met the Elamites in set battle in their own country. On this account the campaign can scarcely be reckoned a success, but it seems to have led to a rebellion in Elam, which ended in the assassination of Kutir-Nakhkhunte after a reign of ten months, and the accession of Umman-Menanu, called by the Babylonians Menanu. The direct result of the rebellion was the immediate undertaking of an offensive against Assyria, a peculiarly favourable moment in view of events in Babylon.

Mushezib-Marduk had pursued a pro-Chaldean policy in Babylon, and had succeeded in obtaining unity in that city of divided counsels. The violent vituperation of Mushezib-Marduk in the annals of Sennacherib testifies to the extreme hatred felt for him, a hatred even greater than that shown for Merodach-Baladan; and it may well be that this hatred was due to a wholesale massacre of the pro-Assyrian party in Babylon. It is difficult otherwise to explain the sudden change in the sympathies of the Babylonian populace. Overt acts of hostility against the Assyrian district governors were indulged in, and apparently the gates were shut against Assyrian traders. In reply the Assyrian governors resorted to a blockade of the city, for in this year (692 B.C.) not enough troops were available for an assault. Mushezib-Marduk escaped through the blockade to Elam, and there arranged with Menanu for the organization of a general rising in Akkad and those Assyrian provinces which were known to be discontented, and for support by Elamite troops. On his return to Babylon he was acclaimed as king at the New Year’s Festival of 691 and raised an army in Babylonia with which he joined the Elamites under Umman-Menanu. The allied forces included contingents from Assyria’s eastern provinces, Parsua and Ellipi, from all the dependent princedoms of Elam, such as Anzan, from the Ara­maeans east of the Tigris, and from all the Chaldaean clans, even from the remnant of Bit-Yakin now ruled by Merodach-Baladan’s son Samuna. The Chaldaean Mushezib-Marduk had in fact displayed much of his predecessor’s talent in raising a powerful combination.

The Assyrian army met these forces at Khalule, which is thought to be on the left bank of the river Diyala; there the bloodiest battle of the reign was fought. Though claimed as a victory for both sides, it is fairly clear that the struggle was indecisive. In the vivid account of the battle in Sennacherib’s annals, the dramatic intervention of the now ageing king in the melée would seem to show that the Assyrians at one point wavered, but finally succeeded in maintaining their ground. Their losses, however, were so great that no advance could be undertaken, and the war was allowed to languish throughout the year 690. Events in Elam in the early part of 689, however, gave the Assyrians their opportunity. Umman-Menanu, characterized by the Assyrian scribe as ‘witless’, shared to the full the physical debility of his house, and was smitten by paralysis. In the subsequent confusion in Elam, foreign affairs were temporarily forgotten, and Mushezib-Marduk was left without his most valuable ally. Not attempting to face the Assyrians in the field, the Chaldean defied his enemies from behind the walls of Babylon; but the siege was so rigorously conducted that famine and pestilence broke out, and in the ninth month of the same year, 689, Sennacherib’s army entered the city to loot and sack it. Mushezib-Marduk was carried away into captivity in Assyria, and Sennacherib for the first time assumed the title of ‘King of Sumer and Akkad’. Ptolemy’s Canon again records this period as an interregnum, for Sennacherib did not ‘take the hands of Bel’, but removed the image of Bel-Marduk from Babylon to Assyria. The veneration in which Marduk was always held by the Assyrians forbids the thought that on this occasion he was treated as a captive-god, in the way Ashurbanipal subsequently treated the gods of Elam. It is better to suppose that the great sanctuary of Esagila had been defiled during the siege, and damaged during the sack of the city, and that for this reason the god was conducted to the city of Ashur.

The sack of Babylon marks a turning point in Sennacherib’s policy. For some sixteen years he had endeavoured to refound a separate kingdom in Babylonia, and his endeavours had ended in complete failure. The capital city itself, always previously well disposed to Assyria, had finally become a stronghold of the Chaldean party. The force of circumstances alone was sufficient to cause any man of ability to take severe measures. The sack of Babylon was inevitable, and should not, properly, be considered a mere act of barbarism so much as a cruel revenge. The folk who were slaughtered had themselves probably slaughtered the pro­Assyrian party shortly before. The damage to the city during the siege and the sack was reparable, and it is known that Sennacherib himself commenced the work of rebuilding the city. The new policy was justified from the Assyrian point of view by results. For eight years there was no trouble in Babylonia. Elam remained passive under the rule of Khummakhaldash, who had succeeded Menanu in 689. It was during these eight years that Sennacherib gave his son Esarhaddon the supreme authority over the southern provinces which he had himself once exercised in the north; and Esarhaddon’s mother, the queen Nakia, was probably installed in Babylon at this time too, to guide her son, and to act as his representative in his absence. From these facts some have inferred that Nakia was herself of Babylonian birth. This act, which probably took place at the end of the reign, was, in fact, a recognition of Esarhaddon as Sennacherib’s successor; and since Esarhaddon was a younger son, as is implied by his name (‘Ashur hath given a brother’), his older brother may naturally have become desperate. The event was solemnized by a ceremony in Babylon, and Esarhaddon was renamed Ashur-Etil-Ilani-Mukin-Apli (‘Ashur, the hero of the gods, who hath established the son’).

What were the motives which led Sennacherib at the beginning of his reign definitely to abstain from assuming kingship in Babylonia, and induced him to persevere in that abstention for so long a period? The answer to such a query in our present state of knowledge must necessarily be speculative; yet it is hard to resist the conclusion that it was definitely his desire to restrict the commitments of Assyria. His experience of the northern frontiers, and his knowledge of the great danger in meeting which Sargon had lost his life, may well have caused him to believe that an independent Babylonian kingdom, friendly to Assyria, would save Assyria from waste of effort, and indeed actually strengthen it in time of need. Tiglath-Pileser III had established relations of this kind with Nabonassar; and such a policy had much to be said for it. The Assyrians had only one object in the south; to repress and keep in subjection their avowed enemies, the Chaldeans. Sennacherib’s mistake lay in overestimating the strength of the city of Babylon, a city as effete and rotten with intrigue as Baghdad in the days of the later Abbasids. When the change in his policy came the northern danger had passed away, and faded from memory. But it is important to remember this feature of Sennacherib’s early policy—the definite contraction of the limits of the immediate territories of the Assyrian king—since it serves to explain his actions elsewhere.

 

II.

SENNACHERIB IN SYRIA AND PALESTINE

 

The eastern and northern frontiers gave little cause for anxiety during Sennacherib’s long reign, a fact which testifies to the ability of the provincial governors of the time, as well as to the complete ascendancy established in these regions by Sargon. Immediately after the Babylonian campaign of 703—702 Sen­nacherib led his army into the land of the Iasubigallai and the Kashshu, the folk who had once held Babylonia subject. The cities which were captured were added to the province of Arrapkha, which had been constituted by Tiglath-Pileser III. Marching farther east he entered Ellipi, conquered the district of Bit-Barrua and renamed the city Elenzash Kar-Sin-Akhkhe-Eribaz i.e. the fortress of Sennacherib. The object of the expedition was clearly to strengthen the provinces on the Elamite border; and that the expedition was successful in this respect is certain from the fact that the Elamites never attacked these provinces. In 698 or 697 the hill country, now known as the Judi Dagh, called by the Assyrians Nipur, to the east of the Tigris, was attacked, and several towns perched on the hillside sacked. No attempt whatever was made to intervene in the districts immediately south and south-west of Lake Van, and the letters seem to show that the princes of Shupria were actually independent during this reign. Here again it is best to assume that Sennacherib definitely withdrew from the Assyrian borders, in accordance with his cautious policy.

It was in 696 that the first occasion for a campaign in the north-west arose. Kirua, the Assyrian governor of Illubri, a city near the Cilician Gates, revolted, and raised his standard in Cilicia. The citizens of Ingira (possibly the Greek Anchiale) and Tarsus joined him. The governor of the province of Kue, reinforced by troops from the regular army, successfully dealt with Kirua, who was captured after the siege of Illubri, and sent to Assyria to meet with a rebel’s fate. Ingira and Tarsus were taken and resettled. It is certain from Greek sources that the main body of Kirua’s adherents were Ionians, already settled in the district in great numbers: it is the only known occasion on which the Assyrians during the days of their independent power met the Greeks. That there must have been many such incidents in which the governors of the north-western provinces came into contact with the western peoples is highly probable. Another province won by Sargon in the north-west was definitely lost in 695. A remnant, possibly, of the horde which had fought Sargon in 706 seized the important town Tilgarimmu in the province of Tabal in that year. An Assyrian general carried the place by assault, but seems to have reported that the district could not be held, for, after sacking the city, the Assyrians withdrew.

As regards the west-lands, the disorder which arose in the Assyrian provinces in Palestine early in Sennacherib’s reign was probably instigated by the embassy of Merodach-Baladan. The most powerful monarch in Palestine on Sennacherib’s accession was Hezekiah of Judah, who had embarked on a bold and independent though hazardous attempt to improve his military position. After defeating the Philistines and making himself in some sort their suzerain, he had made Jerusalem more easily defensible by constructing an underground conduit which secured the water-supply in case of siege. Probably the fact that Merodach-Baladan was forced to anticipate events in Babylonia, and was decisively defeated, prevented an open attack on the Assyrians by Hezekiah, but he nevertheless was implicated in acts of rebellion in other states, owing to an intrigue with Egypt. This intrigue (alluded to in Is. XXX, 1—5) must belong to the year 702—701, when the failure of the Chaldean rising was known. The Egyptians concerned were Delta kings who acted with the consent of Shabaka, the reigning Pharaoh of the time. The new plot, in which most of the cities of southern Palestine were implicated, was adhered to by Tyre and Sidon, the two principal Phoenician cities. For the first time the kings of Phoenicia engaged in direct resistance to Assyria, deserting the former habit of acknowledging any power which happened to be supreme. The reason for this new attitude is not known, but it may be assumed that the Assyrian provincial governors were exercising their powers at the expense of Phoenician trade and traders. It is clear, however, from the account of the Assyrian campaign that Hezekiah and Luli (Elulaios), ‘king of Sidon’, were equally afraid of the enterprise on which they were engaged, and the Egyptian plot was destined to fail almost before Sennacherib appeared.

The rebellion commenced with the ejection of kings and princes appointed by the Assyrians in the southern cities. The king of Askalon, Sharruludari, who had succeeded Rukibtu, appointed by Sargon, was driven out by a certain Sidka. In Ashdod, Mitinti ejected the Assyrian provincial governor. In Amkaruna (Ekron) a popular rising overthrew Padi, who remained faithful to his Assyrian overlord, and he was handed over to Hezekiah of Judah in chains. This act, perhaps inspired by the desire to implicate the wavering Hezekiah openly, brought Sennacherib into the field early in 700. He first marched, through the territory of Tyre, against Sidon. Luli did not await his attack, but fled to an island in the Mediterranean, and Sennacherib appointed Tubalu (Ithobaal) in his place as a tributary, giving several important cities, including Ahku (Acre), into his charge. The appearance of the Assyrian army led several members of the confederacy to submit immediately, and a body of princes came to pay tribute at Lachish, including Menahem of Samsimurun, Abdilliti of Arvad, Urumilki of Byblus, Mitinti of Asdudu (Ashdod), Puduil of Beth-Ammon, Kammusu-Nadbi of Moab and Airammu of Edom. Sidka of Askalon was besieged and captured and the fortresses about Askalon quickly reduced before Sennacherib marched towards Ekron. The speed with which the campaign had been conducted had rendered the arrangements of the rebels futile; Hezekiah was completely unprepared, the Egyptians were too late to reach Ekron. The princes of the Delta had secured reinforcements from Nubia, sent by the Pharaoh, but even so they cannot have been in a position to face the Assyrians without their allies, as they were forced to do at Altaku (Eltekeh). The battle was neither long nor fierce; large numbers of the Egyptians surrendered, including the leader of the Egyptian chariotry, some of the Egyptian princelings, and the commander of Shabaka’s chariotry. Sennacherib then proceeded to capture Ekron, punished the leaders of the rebellion there with severity, and strengthened the position of the pro-Assyrian party, re­appointing Padi, who was soon afterwards released from Jerusalem. He then turned against Judah.

The long account of Hezekiah’s relations with Sennacherib given in 2 Kings XVIII seems to have been compiled from three different sources. There is no reason, however, to doubt the historical truth of the facts stated, though it is necessary to distinguish between the two different campaigns which are confused in the narrative. The following seems to be the most probable course of events. While Sennacherib was at Lachish he sent his chief officers, the turtan, or commander-in-chief, the rab saris (in Assyrian rab shutrishi), and the rab shake with a detachment of the army to Jerusalem to secure the submission of that city, hoping, no doubt, that Hezekiah would submit as other members of the confederacy submitted to him there. Hezekiah sent three of his own officials out to parley with the Assyrians, who employed the Hebrew language, and spoke so loudly that the garrison could hear. The rab shake’s message was to the point. Hezekiah had rebelled against Sennacherib in the hope of receiving support from Egypt; that hope was vain, and Hezekiah’s forces were insufficient to meet Sennacherib. The Hebrew envoys requested that the parley might be continued in Aramaic, so that their soldiery might not understand, but the rab shake, evidently convinced that Hezekiah did not intend to submit, devoted himself to an effort to arouse disaffection in the garrison, an effort which proved futile. There was no Assyrian party in Jerusalem. The method of the rab shake must have been often practised with success in the case of other cities. The officers then departed to rejoin Sennacherib, and during this respite the Assyrian annals state that Hezekiah hired mercenaries, chiefly Arabs, to reinforce the troops in the city. That the king of Judah felt uneasy is shown by his recourse to Isaiah, who remained calm in the confidence that the city would not be captured, while denouncing the policy which was to bring destruction on the countryside. Hezekiah received yet a further summons from Sennacherib to submit, just before the battle of Altaku, and he again had recourse to Isaiah, whose firmness was unshaken. And so when Sennacherib at last arrived in Judah he found Hezekiah prepared to stand a siege in Jerusalem, while abandoning the remainder of his land to the enemy.

The Assyrian army captured forty-six fortified cities, and in all 200,150 people surrendered to Sennacherib. The cities were divided between Mitinti of Ashdod, Padi of Ekron and Silbel of Gaza. As the biblical version says, ‘Sennacherib king of Assyria came up against all the fenced cities of Judah and took them.’ Jerusalem itself was too strong to be carried by assault, and the Assyrian king—for some reason—wished to return with all speed to Nineveh. He accordingly invested and blockaded Jerusalem, and left a detachment of his army there to reduce the city. The prospect of a long siege caused Hezekiah to submit, and he sent his ambassadors with his formal surrender to Sennacherib, then in camp at Lachish. The Assyrian appointed the tribute which Judah was to pay, and this was subsequently sent, as the annals record, to Nineveh itself. The campaign had been absolutely successful, and Palestine remained at peace and faithful to Assyria for the remainder of Sennacherib’s reign.

It has generally been concluded from 2 Kings XIX, 19—35, and a story told by Herodotus, that Sennacherib in his later years fought a campaign against Tirhakah. Certainly it is impossible to reconcile the two stories, which are narratives of a pest befalling Sennacherib’s army at Libnah or Pelusium, if historical, with the Assyrian account of the campaign of 700. A second and unsuccessful Assyrian campaign is thus assumed to have taken place at the end of Sennacherib’s reign. There is, however, no mention of another western campaign in the Assyrian records, Herodotus’ story requires many corrections in detail, and the mention of Tirhakah in 2 Kings seems to show great confusion in the narrative. It seems possible that Esarhaddon’s unsuccessful campaign of 675 was confused in 2 Kings XIX with Sennacherib’s successful campaign in 700, and that subsequent authors repeated the error. Herodotus’ story of the mice, which may refer to a pestilence, would also be explained by the campaign of 675. As to whether there was or was not a campaign in Sennacherib’s last years, there is no evidence available. In any case the Assyrian army did not reach Pelusium.

The Assyrian suzerainty, though it imposed heavy burdens, must have been in certain respects a great benefit to the people of Judah. We may infer from the prophecies of Isaiah that Edom and Moab, the two kingdoms on Judah’s eastern border, had been specially active in raids on the fair settled lands of the Hebrews, and Hezekiah seems to have been unable to restrain them effectively. Now, Esarhaddon records a campaign through Aribi and Adumu conducted in his father’s time, probably in the year 690. The district of Adumu is almost certainly the biblical Edom, though some identify it with the classical Dumaetha, the modern Dummat el-Jandal. A reference in the Talmud to the captivity of the Ammonites and Moabites under Sennacherib shows that the Assyrian treatment of these plun­dering peoples was severe, and they remained tributary to Assyria in Esarhaddon’s time. Their subjection must have been a great benefit to the farmers of Judah. Khazailu (Hazael) of the Aribi also suffered a severe defeat in the same campaign.

 

III.

INTERNAL CONDITIONS

 

Everywhere outside Babylonia Sennacherib’s government was successful. Quick to suppress rebellion and exact tribute, powerful enough to overcome foreign interference, whether in Tabal or Palestine, the king held nearly all that his predecessors had won, an achievement quite as difficult as theirs. The fact that rebellion was rare is very remarkable; the Assyrian provinces enjoyed a protracted period of peace rare in the history of the East at this time, and there can be little doubt that the prosperity of Syria and the adjoining lands was very considerable at this period. Unquestionably this security in the empire was due to the extreme caution of Sennacherib, a quality in which he would seem to have equalled Ashur-Nasir-Pal himself. Nowhere did he attempt to win new provinces, nor did the weakness of his enemies lead him to undertake campaigns which, though bringing military glory, would surely exhaust his army and his treasury. This caution cannot fairly be ascribed to lack of wit, for where ingenuity and resource were required, as in the campaign across the Persian Gulf, Sennacherib showed that he possessed them. The curious temperament of the man is further exemplified by the neglect of religious duties which there is reason to ascribe to him. Owing to the peculiarly impersonal nature of the Assyrian annals and other documents, it is unlikely that Sennacherib’s personality will ever be clearly understood. Nevertheless, enough facts are available to allow of a statement of his real interests.

The Assyrian kings had always devoted a great part of their energies to the restoration and the building of their cities. But Sennacherib had, in addition to this passion for building, an interest in engineering new in Assyria. On a celebrated frieze in the British Museum he is depicted as superintending the carriage of one of the great stone colossi which adorned the gateways of his palace; and the inscriptions themselves show that this was characteristic. Probably the real reason for the apparent inertia of Sennacherib during the years 705—703 was the fact that he was absorbed then in the greatest task of his life, the reconstruction of Nineveh. While his father still lived, he had chosen the ancient city as his future capital, and immediately on his accession commenced the great work which was to change the aspect of the place entirely. The site, standing as it did at the junction of the rivers Khusur and Tebiltu with the Tigris, presented many difficulties, in the overcoming of which the king showed considerable pride. The Tebiltu was dammed, its course directed outside the city as newly planned, and a considerable area recovered from the marshlands covered by the Khusur. On this a platform was raised to the level of the palace foundations, and a great palace, ‘the incomparable’, erected, the description of which shows that the architecture of the period was far more advanced than was once thought. Light-holes were provided in the roof, and the supporting pillars were covered with bands of silver and copper, the better to light the dark recesses of the halls. A more careful examination of the hills was undertaken with a view to discovering fresh supplies of stone, with welcome success. Alabaster was found in Mt Amnana, breccia in the district of Til-Barsip (Tell-Ahmar), and white limestone in great quantities at Balatai, seven leagues from Nineveh, later known as Eski Mosul; and great slabs and colossi cut from these new quarries were transported to complete the new buildings. Above all, the art of the metal worker was represented in the new palace by a masterpiece. Twelve lions and twelve bulls of a colossal size were cast in copper; the achievement appears to have consisted in the great size of these works of art, for casting had long been practised. Sennacherib compares the casting of these bulls with the casting of half-shekel pieces, a comparison which shows that a regular issue of weights used as currency was at this time well known in Assyria.

The supply of water from the wells was also made easier by the introduction of a better method of irrigation and drainage; a metal and wood construction replaced the old well-head. A park, including an orchard, was planted beside the new palace. The area of the city itself was more than doubled, the foundations of the outer wall being actually laid in the river bed, and large open spaces added to its crowded streets. A new supply of water for the city, found in some springs in the eastern hills, was led by canals to Nineveh, and this supply was of use in irrigating the cultivated lands round the city in cold weather. A great plantation was formed to the north of the city, and allotted to the citizens of Nineveh; in it were introduced many novelties, including the cotton plant1. Few Oriental monarchs have displayed more interest in the welfare of their citizens than Sennacherib, as testified by his reconstruction of Nineveh.

A mere enumeration of Sennacherib’s buildings would be tedious. It must suffice to mention the well-appointed stables and armoury called the bit kutalli, ‘the house in the rear’, which now lies below the mound called Nabi Yunis, and the metal gates put up at Tarbisi with an elaborate design representing a divine being setting forth to overcome a demon. There is no reason to doubt Sennacherib’s claim that the directing intelligence in the restoration of Nineveh was his own. Above all, the glory of the city was due, not merely to riches gained by conquest and plunder, but to a wise investigation and employment of natural resources, such as would not be instigated by any but an exceptionally gifted mind.

It is a misfortune that the friezes of Sennacherib’s time which have been recovered are badly damaged, but it is still possible to see in the artistic work of the period that the stone-masons had already acquired the exquisite command of detail and the ability in composition best studied in later work. The finest examples of these pictures in stone—for so they may most properly be considered—are the scenes showing Sennacherib’s camp at Lachish, and the removal of the stone colossi. The effect of the vigour of the individual figures and of the naturalness of their depiction is still lessened, as in the Ashur-Nasir-Pal sculptures, by a tendency to endless repetition of attitudes, and an inability to distinguish individuals save by the most obvious means, but in their original setting, with the aid of colour, which they once had, these slabs represent a very highly advanced art —an art which was entirely indigenous, and had developed without noticeable influence from foreign sources. It is indeed curious that at this period foreign influence should not be more marked in Assyria. In architecture the porch or colonnade was admittedly introduced into Assyria from the west; and perhaps many another detail was borrowed from mat Khatti, the land of the Hittites. In the minor arts there is evidence of Egyptian influence at this period; a glass vase which bears the name of Sargon, and an aragonite pot with an inscription of Sennacherib are both of a shape common in Egypt at the time. The Assyrian frieze was, however, and remained, purely Assyrian; and to the time of Sennacherib the beginning of the best period of the art must be ascribed.

One other feature of the time must be mentioned, the development of the language. Terse as is the account of the royal campaigns given in the so-called ‘Taylor’ cylinder, that document contains the most vivid description of a battle in the ‘Akkadian’ language. Recent discoveries have shown that this cylinder contains a mere résumé of original accounts of individual campaigns; but this need not be taken into account here. The description of the battle of Khalule is in itself arresting; it shows a mastery of the use of words and a style not paralleled in the earlier in­scriptions. In addition, the language employed seems to have been allusive; it is difficult to resist the conclusion that there was a definite intention to remind the reader of the well-known account of Marduk’s (or Ashur’s) fight with Tiamat, in the Creation Epic. Other inscriptions bear out the conclusion to be drawn from this: the best period of literary work in Assyria began in the reign of Sennacherib. It would perhaps be bold, and yet it is not altogether improbable, to ascribe the improvement in ease and style to the study of languages. Aramaic inscriptions on tablets show that that language was commonly used in Assyria at this time, not unnaturally, in view of the close relationship with Syria, and of the fact that Ashur-Nasir-Pal introduced a great number of Aramaeans into Assyria. The biblical sources show that the rab shake could speak Hebrew. In Sennacherib’s reign, too, the study of the ancient Sumerian language was prosecuted with great zeal; to this interest the Sumerian names given to the palace and the gates of Nineveh testify. Sennacherib himself was probably intensely interested in the art of which his scribes have provided the best example, the art called tupsharruti, the knowledge of tablet-writing.

The facts which partially reveal the real interests of Sennacherib have now been recounted. That he was an unusual and striking personality is probable, but not susceptible of proof. Were it not for the calamitous end of his reign, in, apparently, a palace intrigue of the usual Oriental kind, his achievements in holding his predecessors’ conquests abroad, and especially his administration at home, would rank him first in the dynasty to which he belonged. Until further evidence is forthcoming, he must be accounted as able a general as his father, a cautious ruler, the best administrator that the Assyrian records tell of, and a man who evinced an interest in art and literature only equalled by that of his grandson, Ashurbanipal.

 

IV.

ESARHADDON’S POLICY OF EXPANSION

 

The end of Sennacherib, like that of his great predecessors Tukulti-Ninurta I and Shalmaneser III, was a dismal one. On the 20th Tebet (January), 681, his son, according to the Chronicle, murdered Sennacherib. From the annals of Ashurbanipal it is certain that Babylonians were implicated in the conspiracy, which probably represents an attempt by an elder son to win the throne already promised to Esarhaddon. The murder occurred in Nineveh, and the biblical account (2 Kings XIX, 37) states that Sennacherib was slain in the house of Nisroch, his god, by Adram-Melech and Sharezer, his sons, after he returned to Nineveh from the campaign against Judah. The names given cannot be satisfactorily identified with any of the known sons of Sennacherib, and ‘Nisroch’ is a corruption, perhaps, of Ninurta. However this may be, the murder was the signal for an outbreak of civil war in Assyria itself, where the murderer placed himself at the head of a part of the Assyrian army.

Esarhaddon had no difficulty in quelling the rebellion. At the beginning of Shebat (February) he set out from an unknown locality, for Nineveh, and met the rebels in Hanigalbat. The parricide was routed with loss, but the biblical account states that the two sons escaped to Ararat, that is, Urartu. The civil war in Assyria ceased in Adar (the twelfth month, March) of 681, and 680 is reckoned as the first year of Esarhaddon.

The situation in Babylonia was curious. The Chaldean tribes had acted for many years with remarkable accord; but their cohesion now temporarily ceased. From the nature of the case, however, it was likely that two tribes, Bit Dakkuri and Bit Yakin, would cause the new Assyrian king trouble. Bit Dakkuri, the tribe whose domain proper lay immediately south of Borsippa, had profited very considerably at the expense of the Babylonians, most probably in the time of Mushezib-Marduk. The Assyrians were now repatriating the Babylonians, and there was some difficulty in expelling Bit Dakkuri from the estates claimed by their lawful owners. Bit Yakin on the other hand, or rather the remnant of that tribe under Nabu-Zer-Kinu-Lishir, a son of Merodach-Baladan, was once again seeking domination in the great southern cities. The situation was also complicated by the fact that Khummakhaldash I had died in 681 as the result of a sun­stroke, and been succeeded by Khummakhaldash II; neither Chaldeans nor Assyrians knew what policy the Elamite king would adopt. Esarhaddon’s officers in Babylonia marched south in 680 to deal with Nabu-Zer-Linu-Lishir, who had camped round the important city of Ur, but on their approach the sheikh of Bit Yakin fled with his family to Elam, trusting, no doubt, in his hereditary connections with that country for a favourable reception. Khummakhaldash II, however, broke away completely from the policy of his predecessors, and Nabu-Zer-Linu-Lishir was murdered by his orders, while his brother, Na’id-Marduk, fled from Elam to throw himself at Esarhaddon’s feet. The Assyrian king accepted his homage, and made him supreme in ‘the Sea Land’, that is the district round the head of the Persian Gulf, an act of mercy which had unusually good results. Naid-Marduk remained a faithful vassal throughout the reign, and came to Nineveh every year to render homage and pay tribute; this loyalty must have caused acute dissensions between the Chaldeans of the south and the tribes farther north. Bit Dakkuri, under its sheikh Shamash-Ibni, was not dealt with until the year 678; and by this time some acts of Shamash-Ibni, connected with the land settlements, called for condign punishment. He was taken prisoner, and Nabu-Ushallim, the heir of that Balasu who was a contemporary of Tiglath-Pileser III, was set up in his stead, as a tributary. Bel-Ikisha of Gambulu, east of the Tigris, also became a tributary, and his fortress, Sapi-bel, was strengthened as an outpost against Elam.

In 675 there occurred a strange incident. Khummakhaldash II of Elam, apparently without incitement from Babylonia, but very probably knowing that the Assyrian army was already setting out for Egypt, made a sudden raid into Babylonia, and entered Sippar, before the citizens were aware of the need of defence. A bloody street-fight led to the retirement of the Elamites, and the god Shamash remained safe in the great temple of E-babbar. The ancient city of Agade seems to have been raided to better purpose, for Ishtar and other gods were carried off to Elam. Immediately on his return to Elam, Khummakhaldash died ‘without falling ill’, another victim of the physical debility of his house. It may seem fanciful to suppose that this raid was inspired from Egypt, and yet it is not altogether impossible, seeing that the Pharaoh of this period was especially active in intrigues against the Assyrians; and a connection is certainly suggested in the Babylonian chronicle. Urtaku succeeded to the Elamite throne, and another of those sudden changes in policy, which show the confusion prevalent in Elam, resulted; the gods of Agade were returned without a struggle in 674, possibly as a result of a successful Assyrian campaign against Bit Parnaki, a district in the north of Elam already attacked by Sennacherib in 694. It may safely be assumed that the quiescence of the Chaldeans led Elam to abandon interference in Babylonia for the time being.

The twelve years of Esarhaddon’s reign were, in effect, a period of peace in Babylonia; and during that time considerable works of restoration were effected, especially in Babylon. It is interesting to notice that Esarhaddon, in his account of the restoration of the capital city, ascribed its ruin to the year 691, that is, to the time when Mushezib-Marduk seized the rule in Babylon after the battle of Khalule. Much of the Assyrian work in Babylon remained in the glorious time of Nebuchadnezzar II; perhaps not sufficient tribute has been paid to the governing qualities of a people who were capable of expending thought and treasure on such work in a foreign land. All was put in readiness for the return of Bel-Marduk to his city. The administration of Babylonia was also conducted with equity at this time; returned exiles who could duly prove their claim to estates were heard, and their claims adjusted, as is shown by a boundary-stone in­scription dated in Shamash-Shum-Ukin’s reign. In the course of settling these land questions the Assyrian authorities in Babylon more than once had to take severe action with regard to certain native officials and the heads of the Bit Dakkuri clan. The credit for the good order of the southern kingdom must, at any rate in part, be ascribed to the queen-mother, Nakia, whose position was exceptional, recalling in some respects that of Sammuramat.

Assyrian authority in the eastern provinces remained supreme throughout the reign. In 676 a very successful campaign was undertaken against the tribes whose districts lie along the border of the modern province of Fars, by troops probably raised from the Assyrian garrisons in Babylonia, and directed from the southern capital. The army marched far into the salt deserts of modern Persia, the actual distance covered amounting to about 1200 miles. The expedition was completely successful in im­posing Assyrian authority on the land of Bazu; eight kings were slain, and the booty and captured gods were carried back to Nineveh. Lailie, a king of the district, subsequently came to Esarhaddon, paid homage, and was assigned complete control of this eastern territory; his gods, with suitable inscriptions to remind the new subjects of Assyrian power, were returned to him.

In Media only one important campaign was necessary, conducted by Assyrian officers against a princeling in the district of Demavend who did not acknowledge the Assyrian supremacy. The most striking event of all was that three Median princes who had been ejected from their cities by ‘town governors’ came to Nineveh to implore Esarhaddon’s aid, and were restored to their domains by Assyrian provincial governors. When the events in the eastern provinces from the accession of Tiglath-Pileser III (745) to the death of Esarhaddon (669) are considered, it is not surprising that Assyrian culture made a very definite impress on the peoples of this land, and that Assyrian influence is traceable long after the fall of the empire. Nevertheless, the fact that both Sennacherib and Esarhaddon adopted a purely defensive attitude in these districts is obvious, and of importance. Where provinces remained secure, the Assyrians were satisfied to leave their borders as they stood.

Matters were more complicated in the north. The reduction of Shupria, the district round Tushkhan, was effected in 673. Of events in Urartu at this period we have no information; but it is certain that the adjacent lands once ruled from the city of Van were now for the most part in other hands, namely, of a people called Ashguzai, the biblical Ashkenaz, the Scythians. One leader of these hordes pushed as far south as Lake Urmia, and formed an alliance with the chief of the Mannai. Of this alliance Ishpaka (the ‘Spaka’ of Herodotus), and a certain Kashtariti, chief of the Kashkashshi, were members, but Mamitiarsu of Mannai failed to bring a well-considered plan to successful execution. The coalition caused considerable anxiety at Nineveh, but the Assyrian provincial governors would appear to have been equal to the situation. Mannai remained under Assyrian control, either because of an overwhelming defeat of the allies, or, more probably, because the allies failed to hold together. The Scythians later became Assyrian allies, for one of their kings, Bartatua (the Protothyes of Herodotus), wished to marry a daughter of Esarhaddon, and possibly did so. In any case, Esarhaddon did not pursue a wise policy on his northern frontier. Though the date of these events is uncertain, Esarhaddon was clearly engaged elsewhere with his main army; and no attempt was made to inflict a crushing defeat on the northern hordes, who were to reappear in Assyrian history. Sargon had shown a truer appreciation of the military situation.

Indeed the Gimirrai with whom Sargon had fought reappear in the north-west provinces in Esarhaddon’s reign, stirred to activity perhaps by the Scythian hordes behind them. This danger also was averted by the activity of Assyrian governors, who met and defeated Teushpa, the leader of the Gimirrai and Daae, at Khubishna in Tabal, in 679. Immediately after the defeat of Teushpa, a regular reduction of some of the principal cities of Cilicia (Khilakku) and Tabal was necessary. Esarhaddon remarks that certain cities had not joined in the rebellion, but that he ‘laid the heavy yoke’ of his suzerainty on them. Towards the end of Esarhaddon’s reign, the provinces of Khilakku and Tabal fell away from Assyria, and Mugallu of Tabal actually defeated the Assyrians in the field, and annexed the territory of Milid. Esarhaddon’s lack of policy in the north-west, as in the north, was by no means in accord with the importance assigned to events in the north-west by his predecessors.

The year 678 was a year of unrest in the west, for in that year Sanduarri, king of the cities of Kundu (on the Gulf of Antioch) and Sizu (the modern Sis), concluded an alliance with Abdi-Milkutti, who had succeeded Ithobal in Sidon. The two cities named as belonging to Sanduarri show that he was a prince with a considerable domain; whether he had established himself with the aid of, or in spite of, the Assyrians is not known. His communications with Abdi-Milkutti were probably conducted by sea, and it is possible to see in the revolt arranged between them the result of Egyptian intrigue; unless these princes had promise of support from that quarter, it is difficult to divine their motives. Esarhaddon himself conducted the campaign against Sidon in 677; perhaps his general dealt with the unfortunate Sanduarri, who faced the Assyrian army with inadequate resources, and was taken prisoner. Sidon fell in the same year, and the city was very thoroughly sacked. Abdi-Milkutti, who had escaped to Cyprus, was taken prisoner and brought back to Sidon, opposite which Esarhaddon founded a new city, in the presence of the tributary princelings of the west, ‘the fortress of Esarhaddon.’ Abdi-Milkutti and Sanduarri figured in the king’s triumphal entry into Nineveh in 676, and were then beheaded.

Like his father, Esarhaddon found it necessary to conduct a campaign in Arabia (676), in order to secure peace on the boundaries of his western provinces. The city of Adumu was raided and its gods carried into captivity, and thence the Assyrians marched into the heart of the Aribi country. Their errand there was peaceful. Hazailu, the actual governor of the country, had paid tribute and homage to Esarhaddon at Nineveh, and begged for the return of the national gods, which Sennacherib had carried away along with the priestess Teelkhunu, who had a private quarrel with Hazailu. These the Assyrian army had conducted back, as well as an Assyrian nominee to the queenship of Aribi, Tabua. It may be inferred from this incident that the royal office among the Aribi was, in its religious aspect, confined to women. Tabua, doubtless of Arabian birth, was the priestess who tended the Arabian gods during their sojourn in Assyria; she now returned to hold the ceremonial office of queen. Hazailu, the actual ruler, shortly afterwards died, and was succeeded by Ia’lu, and the opportunity was seized greatly to increase the tribute due from the Aribi. Of course, no strict hold on Arabia was possible; but the Sargonid monarchs were very successful in introducing some sort of order among the most important tribes, a fact which must have greatly increased the trade, not only of Assyria, but of the provinces.

Affairs in the west had become serious for Egypt. The impressive parade of twenty-two kings of western lands at the foundation of ‘the fortress of Esarhaddon’ had included sovereigns of all the cities and lands whose relations with Egypt had been closest. All the ports of the Gulf of Antioch, and of the Phoenician coast, were in Assyrian hands, save one, Tyre; and Ba’alu, the king of Tyre, acknowledged his dependence also by his presence at Kar-Ashur-Akh-Iddin. Manasseh of Jerusalem and the Philistine princes were presumably there, with Greeks and Phoenicians from Cyprus. That the Assyrian predominance in Cyprus, established in the time of Sargon, is not to be underestimated, is shown by the quick surrender of Abdi-Milkutti; and Assyrian predominance in that island must have meant great loss to the traders in the Delta. Nor was the fomentation of rebellion so easy as it once was; in nearly every city there were Assyrian detachments, quick to detect Egyptian emissaries, and to prevent concerted risings. Sidon was helpless in the hands of a provincial governor. Only Ba’alu of Tyre, whose territories had been increased by Esarhaddon, was sufficiently free to engage in intrigue, and Tarku (Tirhakah), the Egyptian Pharaoh, accordingly approached him, probably in 676—675. The exact nature of the inducements which led Ba’alu to accept Tarku’s advances we do not know, but the confidence of the Phoenician prince in his own strength was justified by events. The Assyrian king, well informed, as always, of the course of affairs, directed his main effort against Egypt, and crossed the Egyptian border in 675. His army was compelled to retreat owing to a storm, so that this campaign may be referred to in 1 Kings XIX, 7, 35; but in 674 the Assyrians were engaged in reducing the fortresses in the Delta, of which the principal is called ‘Sha amelie’, possibly Andropolis. These two campaigns were the basis of Esarhaddon’s subsequent reduction of Egypt. The siege of Tyre, commenced early in the year 673, was obviously considered a subordinate operation. It proved, however, very difficult: the Assyrians were unable to carry the place by assault, and there was no hope of instituting a blockade. Incommoded by the presence of the Assyrian army without the walls, Ba’alu offered a conditional submission, but Esarhaddon’s arrangements to take possession of the fortifications on the mainland, and install Assyrian governors there, were not acceptable to him. He continued to defy the Assyrian king with success, but was unable to interfere with the passage of the Assyrian armies towards Egypt.

The Egyptian enterprise, once undertaken, occupied the whole of Esarhaddon’s energies; Assyrian prestige in the west urgently demanded this, for the past glories of Egypt were ever present in the minds of the peoples of Palestine and Syria. Failure on the part of the Assyrians would be a sure signal for revolt in the provinces. When the Assyrian army withdrew from Egypt, therefore, it was merely to reorganize and prepare for a greater effort. The year 672 was spent thus, and in 671, in a campaign conducted with remarkable speed, the Assyrian army proved itself immensely superior to any troops that Egypt could put in the field. After crossing the border, a set battle at Iskhupri ended in the complete rout of Tarku’s army; fifteen days later, Memphis was besieged, and shortly after fell. Tarku himself had escaped southward, but his family was captured, and Memphis was plundered. This signal victory led to the surrender of Upper Egypt, and Esarhaddon immediately proceeded to organize the government of the whole country. A native ruler was set over each home, Assyrian officers appointed after the usual manner, and Assyrian names given to the chief cities. Necho of Sai’s was recognized as the liege lord of Egypt, and he seems to have accepted Esarhaddon’s suzerainty with considerable good will. Home affairs recalled Esarhaddon at this time, and on his way back he set up monuments in the valley of the Nahr el-Kelb and in Samal (Zenjirli) recording his victories. The monument from Zenjirli shows Esarhaddon standing above the kneeling figures of Ushanakhuru and Ba’alu of Tyre, holding in his hand cords attached to rings in their lips. This symbolic repre­sentation of his victory accorded rather with the wishes of the Assyrian king than with the facts. Ba’alu rejected his terms, and Tarku was still master of his native land, Kush.

Upper Egypt, though it had surrendered in 671, must have been extremely unwilling to acquiesce in Esarhaddon’s arrangements, which had benefited a Delta prince, and subsequent events seem to show that it was to deal with Upper Egypt that Esarhaddon marched towards Egypt in 669. The campaign, however, was arrested before it was well begun; before reaching the Egyptian border, Esarhaddon fell sick and died in the eighth month of the year. The Assyrian army returned home, its mission unaccomplished.

Esarhaddon’s Egyptian enterprise stands isolated in the history of the Sargonid period. It has already been pointed out that in general all the campaigns conducted from Sargon’s time onward are best regarded as defensive efforts: the military achievements of both Sargon and Sennacherib were directed to the final establishment of Assyrian rule within the wide territories which had acknowledged Tiglath-Pileser III. Esarhaddon deliberately engaged on the conquest and absorption of a land his immediate predecessors had never entered. The explanation of his conduct was not far to seek. For twenty years or more Egypt had been concerned in abetting or initiating movements against the Assyrians. Not improbably concerned in the intrigues of Merodach-Baladan, certainly an ally of Hezekiah, and now the instigator of revolt in Phoenicia, the Pharaoh must have appeared to the ruling monarch at Nineveh his chief enemy; and the most natural way of suppressing his activities for good was to invade and conquer Egypt. Nevertheless the attempt to absorb that country into the Assyrian empire, though temporarily successful, was unwise. Assyria’s principal danger at all times lay on the northern and eastern borders; and had Esarhaddon paid more personal attention to affairs in Media and Asia Minor, he would not have engaged so whole-heartedly in the easy conquest of a land his successor would soon find it impossible to hold. The reign of Esarhaddon was, however, a very glorious one, and the addition to his hereditary titles of ‘King of the Kings of Egypt’ was not an empty boast.

The conduct of affairs at home was made difficult during his reign by dissensions in the court concerning the succession. Esarhaddon’s eldest son was Shamash-Shum-Ukin. For some reason there was powerful opposition to his nomination to the position of heir-apparent, and Esarhaddon’s original intention was to appoint another son, Sin-Iddina-Aplu, but this intention was never executed, either because this prince died, or because the oracle, when consulted, returned an unfavourable answer. By 670, when the king returned from Egypt, Assyria was threatened with civil strife, the nobles being apparently divided in support of Shamash-Shum-Ukin and Ashurbanipal, the latter enjoying the greater favour. Esarhaddon solved the matter, but not without difficulty. Ashurbanipal was appointed mar sharri, the heir-apparent, in Assyria, and inducted into the bit riduti the ‘house of inheritance’, there to exercise the authority associated with his office. Shamash-Shum-Ukin was to have no standing in Assyria; but he was given an official position in Babylon, for he was nominated as Esarhaddon’s mar sharri in that city, with the distinct understanding that he should recognize Ashurbanipal as his liege lord. This arrangement was not an entirely novel procedure, and would seem to have been a reasonable compromise. Certain discontented nobles nevertheless attempted a revolt, but this Esarhaddon easily suppressed, and executed the leaders. His arrangements held good, for on his death the succession caused no trouble.

The art of the period shows no distinctive features. Building proceeded apace in Babylon and Nineveh. One remarkable act of vandalism, unique in Assyria so far as we know, was committed at Kalakh, where the slabs on which Tiglath-Pileser III’s annals had been inscribed were torn from their place and partly rubbed down, to be re-inscribed and put up in a new palace the king was building there. The reverential treatment of the monuments of their predecessors was a marked characteristic of both Assyrian and Babylonian kings, and it would be interesting to know the cause of the hate thus evinced towards a monarch who had served Assyria well. The interest of the reign is, however, essentially political; on every side, save the north-west, Assyria, threatened by great and increasing forces previously unknown, held firm; and in one direction the empire was actually extended. For this the credit should be given to the Assyrian provincial governors; but Esarhaddon must have possessed his father’s and grand­father’s gift for selecting worthy men for the responsible posts in the administration.

 

 

CHAPTER IV

THE AGE OF ASHURBANIPAL

 

CAMBRIDGE ANCIENT HISTORY. EDITED BY J. B. BURY - S. A. COOK - F. E. ADCOCK : VOLUME III

THE ASSYRIAN EMPIRE. TABLE OF CONTENTS