CRISTO RAUL.ORG

THE FOUNDING OF THE GERMAN EMPIRE BY WILLIAM I.

BOOK IX.

ORIGIN OF THE GERMAN-DANISH WAR.

CHAPTER I.

THE OLD CONSTITUTION OF 8CHLESWIG-HOL8TEIN.

Since 1836 the matter of Schleswig-Holstein had drawn to itself the attention of Europe and the activity of the Great Powers; and the opinion soon spread far and wide, that no man could unravel the complicated web of the legal question there at issue. This was by no means to be wondered at. It was a question whose historical antecedents ran far back into the fifteenth century, and whose solution turned upon doubtful statements of feudal rights, of the rights of independent princes, of the rights of medieval and of modern states. It was a question which, for a generation, had been subjected to the profoundest investigation by contentious governments and popular assemblies, by a dozen learned Faculties, by crafty demagogues at Copenhagen, and by the scholars of the Confederate Diet. Under these circumstances it is easy to see how such dust-clouds of scientific disquisition had enveloped it as soon blinded the eyes of erudite Parisian journalists and of wise Parliamentary orators in London.

The sole fact which these critics could still discern in the confusion was, to put it shortly, that Germany was big and Denmark was little, and that consequently Germany’s hostility to her weaker neighbor was as unjust as it was unchivalrous; and some reflected upon the consideration that a Democratic Constitution existed at Copenhagen, while Holstein was controlled by the upper nobility, and Germany by reactionary governments. Therefore, in the opinion of these critics, magnanimity and the love of freedom demanded with equal emphasis that Europe should not stand by and see the liberal dwarf crushed by the brutal giant.

In our day every grain of that dust of learned dissertation has settled, and the very simple state of the case has become clear. Two disputed questions, each wholly independent of the other, had arisen between Denmark and the Duchies—one a question concerning the Constitution, the other concerning the inheritance of the throne. Only in regard to the latter had all the doubts and controversies arisen. In regard to the former the violent action of Denmark against Schleswig-Holstein lacked the faintest shadow of a reasonable excuse, unless, indeed, the argument that Schleswig had been a Danish province from the ninth to the fourteenth century be regarded as such. But since that time the country had become filled with a German population, and had formed an intimate union with Holstein; and when, in 1460, the two together had called the Danish King to reign over them, it had not been as King of Denmark, but, according to the express wording of the

Act of Election, as liege lord of the countries themselves. So that, from this point of view, there was no other political connection between Denmark and the Duchies than that of a personal union, and every attempt of Denmark to alter this relation without the consent of the Duchies involved an arbitrary attack of the strong upon the weak in all its ugliness by no means on the part of Germany, but on the part of Denmark. This was precisely the case with the dispute as it stood in the nineteenth century; and it was the misfortune of the Duchies, so far as Europe was concerned, that this simple relation had at that time become entangled in a wholly uncertain question of succession, and had by this means been drawn into the labyrinthine discussion over the rights of independent princes.

For several centuries, then, there had been in force in the Duchies a constitution which assured to them a common Chamber of Peers, a common Diet, a common supreme administration, a common system of justice, and a common citizenship. Ab opposed to the royal authority, the Diet had the right of refusing supplies and of giving its concurrence in a declaration of war; the King had but a limited control over military service; strangers were excluded from all the offices, and the native government of the country was endowed with the full powers of a regency, in the absence of the King’s Duke.

It is comprehensible enough that such an unconditioned independence of the Duchies should be anything but agreeable to the Government at Copenhagen. More than one aspiring and ambitious King made every effort to gain a more complete control over the country; but all these attempts were wrecked on the obstinate resistance of the people,—a resistance which found a further support in the fact that Holstein was a portion of the German Empire, and could claim the protection of that Empire, not only for its own rights, but for those of Schleswig also.

At the same time the long continuance of the monarchical connection brought about various changes in the system of personal union, which took place naturally and in accordance with the requirements of an undeniable fitness of things. The Sovereign could not have one foreign policy as Duke of Schleswig-Holstein and another as King of Denmark. It would have been very disadvantageous to the Duchies themselves, if the navy of the Crown had not formed a united whole. In the army the Duchies kept their own regiments, with national colors and a national corps of officers, both the soldiers of the line and of the garrisons being always natives of the country; but the supreme authority and the highest posts were reserved for the common Government at Copenhagen.

A similar arrangement obtained in the management of the finances; and that this should be the case with everything connected with providing for the expenses of the institutions mentioned above was a natural result of the circumstances themselves. Added to this was the fact that, since 1712, the Government had not convened the Schleswig-Holstein Diet; but as no new taxes were levied, the people made no complaint. Since that time there had been no control whatever of the finances by the Estates; the Government had united the revenues and the expenses of all parts of the country in one common exchequer. Yet this method, though originally unjustifiable, was, at least, intended to be equitable in practice; and even in 1846 the Estates of Holstein recognized that the financial burden of the Duchies was on the whole fairly proportioned to that of the rest of the Kingdom.

In all other respects the mutual union and the inde­pendence of the Duchies remained unquestioned.

This was essentially the state of things up to the end of the eighteenth century. The Danish Kings, ruling since 1660 with absolute power in Denmark Proper, occasionally allowed themselves in the same way to be led into arbitrary acts in the management of Schleswig-Holstein; the Danish people lay in political torpor, without troubling themselves about the Duchies which were strangers to them; or thinking of them at most only to be annoyed at seeing so many of the German nobility fill the highest Danish offices of court and state.

In Schleswig-Holstein also there was a profound political calm. The arbitrary acts above alluded to were transitory matters, not of sufficient consequence to cause serious disturbance. In general, in spite of the absoluteness of the King, there was very little interference or control by the central power: nearly everything was left to the local officials, seigniorial lords, and communes, a state of things highly conducive to the love of independence, but by no means so much so to progress in reforms. The leading nobles were well satisfied with the connection with Denmark, which offered them so often a brilliant theatre for their political activity. The largest part of the population lived after the manner of their forefathers in the simple ruggedness of their farms and pastures; on the coast flourished a race of sea-farers and sailors unsurpassed in hardiness by any in the world; while the insignificance of the cities prevented the growth of great industries with their contrasts of poverty and wealth and their influence constantly working in the direction of change.

The fact that there were three different languages in the country was hardly felt. By far the majority of the people belonged to the Low-Saxon branch, a race of men serious and not easily aroused, but when once aroused not easily turned from their purposes; the West coast was mainly inhabited by Frisians, the northern part of Schleswig by Danish peasants, with Germans in the towns. In these towns Danish was spoken in the churches and schools, but the language of business and of the courts was, as in all other parts of the country, German. The people of the towns, like the rest of their compatriots, had no other idea than that they were Holsteiners; they read only German newspapers, they resorted for their higher education to the German university at Kiel, and all their interests were connected with the German countries to the south of them. On the other hand, the feeling of a political oneness with Germany existed in Holstein only among a small minority of people of liberal edu­cation; the mass of the inhabitants felt a patriotic satisfaction in forming a part of the glorious Kingdom of Denmark. In short, the internal peace was nowhere disturbed.

Then came the storm of the great French Revolution, and in its train the military empire of the first Napoleon, which convulsed all Europe. In Copenhagen reigned at this time the eldest son of the imbecile Christian VII, first as Crown-Prince-Regent, and later as King Frederick VI. He was a man of limited cultivation and of moderate intelligence, but zealous for the prosperity of his government and for the welfare of his people, though he thought the latter would be best promoted by the removal of every restraint that could offer a hinderance to his good intentions. In Denmark he was accustomed to absolute sway; he regarded it as a blessing for the Duchies themselves, that he should provide there also a free course for his activity as sovereign, and, as a matter of fact, he accomplished much which was both useful and valuable, and gained for himself lasting renown by the abolition of the vassalage of the peasants.

On this account, he had the less hesitation in attacking ancient privileges where they interfered with * his sovereign purposes. When in 1806 the Holy Roman Empire was dissolved, and Holstein, in consequence, lost its connection with Germany, he ordered his Council of State to enact the incorporation of Holstein into Denmark. But this was energetically opposed in the Council of State itself by the head of a younger branch of the Royal Family, Duke Frederick of Sonderburg-Augustenburg, who so openly threat­ened an appeal to his powerful relations upon foreign thrones that the King thought best, for the time, to abandon his plan. From this time on, he cherished an unrelenting grudge against Augustenburg. In the Duchies he carried things, in practice, exactly as he pleased; he increased the taxes, not only for the citizens and peasants, but also for the clergy and the nobility—who had hitherto, as a last remnant of the otherwise effete Constitution of the Estates, retained and exercised the privilege of assent in the matter of taxation—and put down all opposition with a rough hand.

When, later, the fates of Europe were changed, he could not prevent the loss of Norway, and in return he received only the little Duchy of Lauenburg, nay, he was even obliged, as the representative of Holstein and Lauenburg, to enter the German Confederation of 1815, and so to renew the disagreeable relation with his great neighbor. Nevertheless, in this connection he found some compensation; for when in 1823, the nobility of the Duchies made a complaint to the Confederate Diet of the violation of their ancient rights, the Diet refused to listen, because, as they said, the complainants brought no proof that up to that time * the old rights had been recognized as valid. It urged them, therefore, to await with confidence the decree establishing a new Constitution on the basis of Estates, which had been promised by the King. Truly, this meant waiting for a good many years.

The patriarchal absolutism thus confirmed was, however, destined to be subjected to a severe test from another quarter. In the year 1830 the influence of the French July Revolution acted so strongly upon the hitherto sluggish temper of the German and still more of the Danish inhabitants of the Duchies, that the Crown found itself driven to make some concession to the tumultuous outcry for freedom. But the apathetic population returned so quickly to its wonted quiet that the King could soon restrict these concessions within very moderate limits. Above all things, he was anxious to prevent any restoration of the old common Estates of Schleswig-Holstein, since he feared that such a body would not only resolutely oppose his arbitrary authority, but even perhaps strive to bring about a complete sep­aration from Denmark.

In May, 1831, therefore, the Estates were created, but for each Duchy by itself. That this division might not seem to imply a separation of the two countries, a similar method was adopted in Denmark Proper: instead of a general popular representation, a special provincial assembly for the islands as well as one for Jutland. These provincial Estates were empowered to decide finally in their own local affairs, and were entitled . to be consulted in the passing of all laws concerning taxes and the rights of person and property; they were granted unlimited rights to make petitions and complaints; and the assurance was given them that no change should be made in their privileges without their having been previously consulted. It was certainly not possible for the Crown to have given more meagre alma or to have protected its own possessions more carefully; but on the other hand, the main object of the measure, the appeasing of excited spirits, was very incompletely attained. On the contrary, after that time not a session of the provincial assemblies took place in which the Estates of the Duchies did not discuss their union; and those of Denmark, the extension of their rights and a national parliament.

Besides this, the King was oppressed with other and more serious anxieties. Neither he himself, nor his presumptive successor, nor the latter's son or brother, had male heirs; in all human probability, therefore, the extinction of the royal male line was at hand. In this case it was the opinion of most Holsteiners that a different law of succession obtained for the Duchies from that of the Danish Crown. Schleswig-Holstein was a male fief with succession only in the male line; but in Denmark Proper the so-named Law of 1660 had, in the absence of sons, given daughters a title to the throne. In consequence of this, on the death of the royal male heir, a Danish Princess or her son would succeed in Copenhagen; while in Schleswig-Holstein the inheritance would fall to the younger branch of the Royal House, the Sonderburgs, and among these to the elder, the Augustenburgs, whose heirs would be again the younger branch of the Sonderburg family, the Glucksburgs. By this the Danish Crown would lose more than a third of all its territory.

And this was not all. In still earlier times the line of the Dukes of Gottorp had branched off from the Royal House, and during many generations had held territorial supremacy over certain parts of Schleswig-Holstein in common with the Royal Line, and over other parts in its own name and right. After much contention, in 1720 King Frederick IV had driven out the Gottorp faction by force of arms, and had united their portion with his own.

The protest of the Gottorp party against this usurpation acquired enormous emphasis by the accession of the eldest branch of the family to the throne of Russia; and the matter was finally arranged in two compacts of 1767 and 1773, whereby Russia resigned all claims to Schleswig-Holstein in favor of King Christian VII, and received in return the Counties of Oldenburg and Delmenhorst for the younger branch of the House of Gottorp. How, then, would it be, if, after the extinction of the royal male line, the present Head of the House of Gottorp, the mighty Emperor Nicholas of Russia, should declare those compacts void, and should stretch forth his hand toward Kiel and half of the Duchies? Whether the claim were well or ill founded, Russia’s military power was overwhelming enough to cover very considerable weaknesses in her interpretation of law.

It is easily understood that all these threatening possibilities weighed heavily on the mind of the Danish King, and drove him to seek every means of protection against them. For what King or what Government would willingly endure the loss of half the power intrusted to it, merely on account of laws of succession made two centuries before ?

The danger from Russia seemed the remoter of the two, since in this direction the jealousy of the European Great Powers could be looked upon as a safeguard.

But the question of the claims of the Augustenburgs upon the Duchies was much more pressing and urgent; for Christian of Augustenburg had followed his father Friedrich’s footsteps in taking every occasion to defend the rights of the country, and had by this means acquired considerable power among the Estates of the Duchies. Under any circumstances it would be difficult to bring the Duchies to recognize any other claim than his, and this difficulty might become an impossibility if Schleswig-Holstein should again possess an invincible organ of its will in the form of a common Diet. To the formation of such a Diet, therefore, the King was strenuously opposed.

Under these circumstances the following question naturally suggested itself: if the introduction of the female line into the Duchies met with such serious obstacles, why not keep the State entire by the opposite measure, and, by altering the Law of 1660, place Augustenburg upon the Danish throne? The King had no prejudice in favor of the Princess Charlotte who would be excluded by such an arrangement; nor had the Princess any party in Copenhagen that would have supported her claim in opposition to an act passed in favor of Augustenburg.

Why, then, did this not take place? Why was a course adopted which from that time on led inevitably to the destruction of the common State?

It may have been partly owing to the personal feelings of the King: even if the Princess was indifferent to him, he still retained his old hatred of Augustenburg. But above all he was opposed to any change in the Law of 1660, which had proclaimed for Denmark at once the succession in the female line and the absoluteness of the monarchy; for the repeal of the first of these might seriously endanger the second, and, more than this, nothing of the sort could be accomplished without a re-establishment and a convocation of the Danish Parliament.

Therefore the King clung to his intention of extending the principle of succession in the female line to the Duchies also, and, in case they proved refractory, of bending or breaking their stubborn will: with this in view he determined at once to begin by destroying piece by piece all that was peculiar and independent in their government, in order that when the decisive moment came, the Princess Charlotte, or her heir, might enter peacefully upon the possession of a united country that had been reduced to complete subjection.

This meant not merely raising a doubtful question of succession; it meant the total alienation of the affections of Schleswig-Holstein from the Danish name; it meant perhaps, also, bringing a powerful German intervention across the path of Denmark. But Frederick VI had no belief in this last danger. Since 1823 he had ac­quired an utter contempt for the German Confederation.

In his own country he soon found for his efforts an auxiliary that was vigorous, hot-headed, and by no means always agreeable to deal with.

Since 1660 the Danish People under its absolute monarchy had, politically speaking, slumbered. At that time all the rights of the nobility were abolished, and an omnipotent bureaucratic system of government was set over the country. Under its rule the people had lost all respect for the firm reign of law, but their love for democratic equality had constantly increased a frame of mind which made it probable that here as elsewhere, when once the thought of freedom found a place beside that of equality, absolute monarchy would be replaced by a far more absolute rule of the masses. Besides this, there was the inborn character of the people to be considered: lofty contempt of danger, no mean intellectual capacity, under an outward calm passions easily excited, a self-satisfaction strongly inclined to vanity. No two things could be more different than the disposition of the Danes and that of the Schleswig-Holsteiners. To the Danes their German neighbors appeared sluggish, narrow-hearted, pedantic people, born to be submissive subjects, and only estranged from loyalty to the common Government by the carelessness of that Government itself.

With such a disposition of the population, the impression made by the July Revolution was much deeper and more effective in Denmark than in the Duchies. At one blow, ever-widening circles of thinkers were aroused to political activity, and at the same time to a sense of national pride; and the small beginning of constitutional institutions conceded by King Frederick formed the starting-point for a passionate agitation which soon spread over the whole country.

In Copenhagen a number of young and talented men from all walks of life joined together in a political Association: the barrister Orla Lehmann, the theologians Clausen and Monrad, the philologist Madvig, and Captain Tscheming, with numerous other sympathetic spirits; their first object was to bring about a vigorous development of the Danish Press. It was their opinion that Denmark must acquire for herself a full share of the Democratic Freedom which was flooding the world.

At first these men kept up a good understanding with those of like convictions in Schleswig-Holstein, without paying much attention to national differences; just as in Germany the national idea gave way before liberal ideas in general. But soon the younger Danish party began to think of the glorious past in which their country had once ruled a considerable part of the Baltic coast; to bring that past back was now, indeed, impossible, but there was at least one place where they thought a national revival might be practicable. This place was Schleswig, the country which in gray antiquity had been a Danish province; and into which only since the fifteenth century had the Germans made their way, thus gradually bringing about an unnatural union with Holstein, to the detriment of the Danish population in the north of the province, and to the disgraceful diminution of the power of the Danish Nation as a whole. All this must be changed: first, in North Schleswig the Danish national feeling of the people must be revivified; then, in the more distant South, the preponderance of the German element must be broken, and the Danish element strengthened; and above all, the atrocious connection of Schleswig with Holstein must be wholly abolished. If the cry was raised in Kiel: “Schleswig-Holstein to the Konigsau!” this must be met from Copenhagen with the thundering answer: “Denmark to the Eider! ”

Thus the historical rights of the fifteenth century stood opposed to those of the ninth. It was expected that the Schleswigers would be easily won over, if they were offered as a dowry, when they should be united to Denmark, that most valuable of all possessions, Demo­cratic Freedom; and it was regarded as a sign of the stultification of the Schleswig people by German influ­ence, that from the outset they remained entirely indifferent to this temptation, and persisted unalterably in their demand for the ancient national rights of Schleswig-Holstein.

As far as Holstein was concerned, the young Danes of the “Eider-Danish ” party thought they had better leave it alone. So long as the German Confederation allowed it, the future “Eider-Danish” State might treat the country as a subject province, and get what it could out of it; but if ever the Confederation or the country itself should make a decided protest against this method of treatment, it would be better to abandon Holstein altogether, than by means of this foreign member to allow to the German race outside any influence in the national affairs of Denmark. They saw clearly, moreover, and soon announced openly, in what quarter the fullest compensation for the loss of Holstein could be found. Here, again, the Radical party availed itself of a historical memory, the union of the three northern kingdoms attempted in the fourteenth century. If this should be renewed, Denmark might come forward with the liberated Schleswig as a bridal gift

The fact that this programme was wholly inconsist­ent with the existing rights of the Crown and of the Duchies did not disturb the party in the least. For from the very beginning, they felt themselves borne onward by the universal tendencies that were soon destined to acquire a circulation and an influence decisive for the future of Europe—the ideas of popular sovereignty and of the principle of nationality. By this feeling they justified to their consciences the agitation they aroused, which with fanatical satisfaction they accustomed themselves to regard as nothing but the battle of modern ideals against the decayed abuses of a feudal past.

We can see at once how far this agitation of the younger Danish party could serve the wishes of the old King. The King had no idea of giving up Holstein under any circumstances, and hated from the bottom of his heart the Democratic principles of the Copenhagen Association; what he wanted was the firm establishment of the unity of the entire State under a monarchy practically unlimited. But from the point of view of his final decision about the succession, there was one critical matter in which the agitation of the Democrats was useful to him: this was their common opposition to the close union of the two Duchies. Whether German or Danish was spoken in Schleswig, was to him a matter of small consequence; but that the independence of the country, which rested upon its connection with Holstein, should be assailed, was an essential part of his system.

Therefore he allowed the “Eider-Danish” party to grow and prosper, in spite of its political Radicalism; he felt himself strong enough to control it, if it ever attacked the prerogatives of the Crown, and thought that its doctrinaire extravagances about the language of Schleswig and the relinquishment of Holstein could be kept within bounds by being taken hold of at the proper time and with a statesman’s skill. He caused Professor Paulsen to publish in 1886 a treatise on the legal question from a historical point of view quite in accordance with the ideas of the “Eider-Danish” party, and which asserted that the principle of succession in the female line, in accordance with the Law of 1660, applied directly to Schleswig. In the Duchies the surprise and indignation was great, and an agent of the Augustenburgs, Barth, published in 1837 a forcible refutation of the theory.

The old King cared little for this; but at St. Peters­burg in 1838 he made an effort to secure by diplomatic means the support of Russia for his plan of preserving the unity of the government. The Emperor Nicholas, however, thought there was no great hurry about the matter, and turned it off with a few friendly but non­committal words.

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CHAPTER II.

THE QUESTION OF THE SUCCESSION.

In the year 1889 the long reign of Frederick VI came to an end. He was succeeded by Christian VIII, a man who preferred to approach things in a spirit of trickery rather than with open courage. In personal intercourse his manner was engaging, but in the attainment of his political ends he was characterized by boundless cunning and by invincible tenacity; he sought to ingratiate himself with all parties, in order to turn one against another, and so in the end to deceive and to control them all. His aim was, however, the same as that of his predecessor, the confirmation of the succession in the female line for all parts of the common State, with the maintenance of the Law of 1660 and of the absolute power of the Crown. He clung to this programme with even more heart-felt devotion than Frederick VI, because by this arrangement the crown would fall to his beloved sister, the Princess Charlotte, whose influence over him was great; he was by no means willing that she and her son, the Hessian Prince, Frederick, should sacrifice for the sake of the pretended claims of Augustenburg, half or perhaps the whole of their inheritance.

That the Duchies would neither now nor at any future time agree to this programme was certain; it was, then, necessary to continue what King Frederick had begun; that is, by a succession of administrative measures to assimilate more and more the internal conditions of Schleswig to those of Denmark, and by this means to forestall all resistance. So that in 1842 the Danish currency was introduced into the Duchies, and a branch of the Danish National Bank was established in Flensburg. What was still more important, the contingents of the Duchies, which had hitherto been entirely distinct, were abolished, and a united army of the whole Danish Monarchy was founded; many of the new Schleswig battalions were removed to Danish garrisons, and a number of dispositions were made that must necessarily result, within a few years, in making five-sixths of all the officers Danish Nationalists.

The King did not, however, aim at destroying the connection between Schleswig and Holstein; on the contrary, he was very desirous to keep up a strong feeling of this connection in the Duchies themselves. For he believed that he could prove positively the right of succession in the female line for Schleswig; and whereas Frederick VI had feared that Holstein might, under certain circumstances, draw Schleswig over to Germany, Christian hoped just the opposite, that Holstein, by means of its connection with the Schleswig, might be retained as a part of Denmark. With this in view he did not place the new Schleswig regiments under the General who commanded in Jutland, but established a common supreme command for the Schleswig and Holstein garrisons; he even gave this position, as well as that of Royal Governor in Schleswig-Holstein, to the brother of the Duke of Augustenburg, Prince Frederick of Noer.

Great joy followed this in the Duchies, and greater wrath in Copenhagen; there was even a ministerial crisis, which the King settled in favor of the Holstein party. In December, 1842, he declared expressly to the Schleswig Diet that he had, indeed, no intention of bringing Schleswig into the German Confederation, but quite as little of incorporating it into Denmark; it should be Schleswig still, and should retain its old connection with Holstein.

It will now be clear in what way Christian placed himself between, or rather above, both parties. By countenancing the connection of Schleswig and Holstein, he expected to retain the favor of the Duchies; and by gradually infusing a Danish element into the Schleswig-Holstein government, he hoped to gain the support of the party of the “ Eider-Danes.” Meanwhile he allowed the agitation of the latter even wider scope than had been granted by his predecessor. For as it was his plan that the succession in the female line should first be proclaimed for Schleswig, it seemed to him highly desirable that Orla Lehmann and his friends should, for the present, keep up there as much as possible their Danish propaganda. If Schleswig were once won, he, the King, would make it his business to prevent the loss of Holstein.

So the “Eider-Danes” strove with redoubled energy to transform Schleswig into a Danish country. One association after another was formed for this purpose in Copenhagen; contributions of money were taken; emissaries were despatched to the province itself; Schleswigers who favored the cause were boisterously welcomed; popular festivities were arranged which were accompanied with a parade of Scandinavian sentiment; and Danish patriotism was electrified in all its nerves. “If any one,” cried Orla Lehmann, “should dare advise the Danish People to abandon the idea of a nation extending to the Eider, we would inscribe upon his back in the bloody letters of the sword: Denmark will not.”

By such means the party gradually succeeded in making their efforts popular on the Danish Islands, and even in winning numerous followers in Jutland. But the main end was not attained. The object of all these benevolent plans, the people of Schleswig, or even the Danish-speaking people of the North, could by no means be roused to any enthusiasm for the “Eider-Danish” programme. Only a diminutive minority occupying official positions in the northern region showed itself well disposed; in the greater part of the country the agitation had precisely the opposite effect. People asked angrily, what right had the Provincial Diet of Viborg, or the Popular Assembly of Copenhagen, to trouble itself about the affairs of Schleswig; and they watched with anxiety the way in which the politicians of Copen­hagen threatened with ever-increasing hostility the entire framework of law in the Duchies. Ever wider spread the feeling that their incorporation into the Danish Monarchy might become a source of terrible danger to their laws, their manners, and their language; and soon the suggestion became rife, whether it would not be advantageous, if Schleswig should become, like Holstein, a member of the German Confederation, and should in that way have a share in German protection against Danish tyranny.

In view of this unpleasant state of things, King Christian took occasion to repress the “ Eider-Danes,” caused Orla Lehmann to be legally prosecuted, and complained that the Press was sowing dissension among his subjects. Yet the old state of things essen­tially remained, and the suspicion of the Duchies, once aroused, took deeper and deeper root. Under Frederick VI they had complained of the personal arbitrariness of the King; the growth of the party of the “Eider-Danes” now extended this ill-will to the entire Danish Nation.

Meanwhile King Christian had approached nearer to his most important object, the settlement of the question of the succession. In the summer of 1842, in a personal interview at the Castle of Sorgenfrei, he had tried in vain to gain over the Duke of Augustenburg to his wishes; and after this he determined to seek their fulfilment by means of foreign support. He therefore resumed the negotiation with Russia, which had been dropped since 1838, and managed it, it would seem, more skilfully than his predecessor; at any rate, with a more satisfactory result.

In July, 1843, the country was astounded by the news of the betrothal of the third daughter of the Emperor Nicholas, the Grand-Duchess Alexandra, to the Hessian Prince Frederick, the nephew of Christian, and his favored candidate for the throne. The marriage followed in January, 1844; no one doubted that the condition of this marriage had been that Russia should agree to recognize the succession in the female line for the whole Danish State.

The young Princess was saved by a premature death from the party-struggles which her nuptials had re­kindled,—she died in August of the same year,—yet the political relation to which her marriage gave expression was not thus severed. In Denmark a firm support at St. Petersburg was now thought to be assured; and in October, 1844, the Burgomaster of Copenhagen, Algreen-Ussing, made the following motion in the Diet at Rothschild: that the King should solemnly declare that the Danish Monarchy forms one indivisible State, which is inherited as a whole, accord­ing to the Law of 1660, and that he will employ every means to hinder any effort on the part of his subjects directed toward the severance of this connection in any of the component parts of this State

The news of this motion flew like lightning through the Duchies, and caused a violent excitement. First, there was just anger at the idea that a Danish Diet should presume to decide about the law of succession for the Duchies; and then there was a deeper indigna­tion at the pretension of applying the Law of 1660,

which had never had force in these countries, to independent Schleswig-Holstein. All parts of the country and all classes of people called upon the Holstein Diet, which was then sitting, to vindicate the freedom of Schleswig-Holstein; and the result was a vigorous declaration, in which the Diet opposed to these proceeding, on the part of Denmark, the following three principles: that the Duchies were independent, that they were intimately connected with each other, and that they were inherited in the male line.

To the King this was all very annoying. For a moment he thought it would be necessary to begin the great work with the fundamental separation of Schleswig from Holstein. He wrote to the Prince of Noer to know what all this outcry meant; he had no intention of incorporating Schleswig into Denmark Proper; all that Algreen-Ussing intended by his, in other respects bungling, motion, was the maintenance of the existing State, and every patriot must desire this as ardently as did he himself, the King.

Meanwhile, at Rothschild, although the enthusiasm had been somewhat dampened by the outburst on the part of the Duchies, the motion of Algreen-Ussing was passed with the consent of the Royal Commissioner. The first important step towards the carrying out of the King’s system had been taken.

The next thing to do was to win over the public opinion of Europe and gain the approval of the Great Powers. The King was very active in both directions. A great number of treatises were published in Danish, in German, and in French, with the purpose of showing that the principle of succession established by the Law of 1660 had been accepted by the Estates of Schleswig in 1721, that a considerable part of Holstein had long been the private property of the House now on the throne and therefore would be transmitted in the female line, and that the Augustenburg family by failure to secure the investiture, by relinquishments on the part of consorts, and by misalliances, had long ago forfeited whatever rights it might have at any time possessed. It goes without saying, that every one of these positions was disputed by the other side with an equal display of erudition on the subject of feudal and seigniorial rights.

The decision of these questions depended then on complicated discussions in history and feudal law; and these turned upon the interpretation of documents of the fourteenth and fifteenth, of the sixteenth and seventeenth, centuries, often ambiguous, and in the criti­cism of which as well practical jurists as the authorities of the learned world had come to very different conclusions. Up to the seventeenth century the Imperial legal authorities had held that failure to fulfil the conditions of a fief involved the loss of the right of inheritance; but after that time they had gradually allowed a laxer practice to gain ground: Putter, K. F. Eichhorn, and their followers, regarded this latter course as merely having applied to certain exceptions which could not affect the general rule; while other German scholars supported the opposite view. Whether the precedents of 1721 had established the Danish law of succession for Schleswig or not, depended partly upon the decision of the question, whether by the Lex Regia, mentioned in the formula of homage of the Estates, was meant the well-known Danish Law of 1660, or a somewhat older Law which had been promulgated for the Duchies also,—either interpretation being allowed by the wording,—and it depended partly also upon another question, whether the Estates had promised the King and his successors due obedience according to the Lex Regia, or had promised due obedience to the King and to his successors according to the Lex Regia, which again depended upon the place in which a comma lacking in the original document was to be supplied, etc. The historian can hardly be expected to give a legal decision in these learned disputes: the effort to arrive at such a decision would be the more useless, since in the final judgment the ancient claim of Augustenburg was recognized to the exclusion of all the Danish pretensions, and then this claim itself was disposed of by two facts belonging wholly to modern times.

What is essential at this point is the emphasizing of the fact, that up to the year 1836 the right of succession in the male line in the Duchies had hardly ever been disputed, and that the Estates of the same had acted in perfect good faith when they protested against the violation of this right. Nor did any personal consideration for the Duke of Augustenburg cause them to take this attitude. On the contrary, Duke Christian had made himself so little beloved as a proprietor on his own great estates that the disposition of the people throughout Schleswig was rather unfriendly than favorable to him. Even his sympathy with Opposition in the Diet had altered in no way this feeling; after it, as before, he remained without respect and without influence among the mass of the people.

Indeed, the sympathy of the population with this political movement, as one might expect from their cautious disposition, was very slowly aroused; they had, as has been said, no wish for any change in their actual condition, no desire for a completer separation from Denmark; with all their cry for the succession in the male line, they would probably have submitted to a change in this respect, if it had been accompanied by no attack upon the independence and the union of the Duchies. But what now excited the public opinion of the country to a more and more active support of Augustenburg, what led directly to the union of the questions of the succession and of the constitution, in the feelings of the Schleswig-Holsteiners, was the noisy onslaught of the “Eider-Danes” upon the German element in Schleswig and upon the actual union of the Duchies. In the face of this hostility of the entire Danish people, there seemed to be no other salvation for their freedom and nationality than the complete separa­tion from Denmark, which by means of the difference of the laws of succession seemed fortunately close at hand. In this way Augustenburg became an object of interest, because his name betokened the speedy shaking off of a foreign yoke.

Unfortunately for Schleswig-Holstein, the European Powers looked at the matter from a different point of view. The requirement that was most important to them was in direct contradiction to the wishes of the Duchies: the maintenance of the Danish monarchy in exactly the limits it had had hitherto, for the sake of preserving it as what it has been the fashion to call since that time, a necessary element of the European Balance of Power. This view of the Emperor Nicholas and of Prince Metternich was shared by the English and to a certain extent by the Prussian Governments, so that, from the very first, King Christian’s wishes were looked upon much more favorably in Europe than the claims of the Duchies.

It seems strange enough to find all the great Courts laying such stress upon the integrity of Denmark, as if the question whether a little state of two million inhabitants served one sovereign or another could be placed in the balance and affect the peace of a continent. But as a matter of fact, all this talk about “integrity” had a merely negative importance: the Powers desired a maintenance of the status quo, because each of them feared unpleasant consequences from a change. England was afraid that after the loss of the Duchies, Denmark, so crippled, would sink into a state of complete dependence upon Russia; Russia, on the other hand, thought that, under the same circumstances, Jutland and the islands would throw themselves into the arms of a Scandinavian Union, and that in that way she would lose all her influence at Copenhagen. To the Court at Vienna a sovereign State of Schleswig- Holstein seemed to mean a strengthening of the Prussian hegemony in North Germany; while in Prussia, as in Russia, every step toward a Scandinavian Union was regarded with mistrust, and plans were cherished of drawing, not the Duchies alone, but the whole of Den­mark, into the Tariff-Union. Of these in part self-contradictory ideas, one-half were, certainly incorrect; but as no one could tell which these were, the Cabinets thought the safest way would be to leave things in their old condition; that is, to keep the Danish State entire.

All the different relations considered, none of the Great Powers were so much affected by the development of the Schleswig-Holstein question as Prussia. According as the outcome of the complications was injurious or advantageous to her, it would be accom­panied with a gain or loss of the utmost consequence in her trade and traffic, and in the security of her commerce and of her borders. So that in Berlin every phase of the struggle was watched with anxious attention. Moreover, Duke Christian of Augustenburg had turned to Frederick William IV with an exposition of his rights and an appeal for the protection of the same, and the motion of Algreen-Ussing showed that the crisis was at hand.

While in the decision of the other Courts their own interest outweighed every other consideration, the legitimistic leanings of Frederick William and his lofty conception of the dignity of a German Prince made him regard the question of the justice of these two contending claims as of paramount importance. First of all, therefore, he caused a number of distinguished men, the experienced Minister, Eichhorn, once so well known as a diplomatist, the learned Professor Lancizolle, and others, to make a legal investigation into the matter of the succession in the Duchies.

The result was a memorial prepared in 1845 by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Von Bulow. In this was embodied the opinion of the Ministry on the legal question, to the following effect: that Holstein with the exception of the County of Rantzau should go to Augustenburg, that Rantzau and the part of Schleswig that had formerly belonged to the Gottorps was subject to the succession in the female line, but that the part of Schleswig that had formerly belonged to the Royal House should probably, according to the soundest views, fall also to Augustenburg. The memorial explained fur­ther that this legal decision fortunately accorded entirely with Prussian interests. The establishment of the greater part of Schleswig-Holstein as a sovereign State could not but be desirable for Germany, and in every effort toward such an object Prussia would find herself supported by the public opinion of the whole German nation. At the same time it could not be concealed that Russia and England would oppose any diminution of Denmark’s territory, and that Austria would consider any strengthening of the German national interest as an indirect increase of the influence of Prussia, and would therefore not regard any such strengthening with favor.

The King, however, as we shall soon see, viewed the question in another light than did his Ministers, and suffered it to lie undisturbed for a time, without making any decision about his own action in the matter. He was the more fixed in this course of inaction by learning toward the close of the year 1845 that the third of the non-German Great Powers, France, had finally ranged itself in the doubtful question on the side of Denmark.

Up to this time neither Louis Philippe nor his Min­ister, Guizot, abundantly occupied as they were with affairs at home and in Africa and Spain, had troubled themselves at all about the complications in Denmark. Now, however, the French Ambassador at the Danish Court, Baron Billing, a young and enterprising diplomatist, laid before the Ministry at home a memorial, in which he urgently recommended that France should oppose the Russian and Prussian thirst for territorial aggrandizement, which was ensnaring unfortunate Den­mark on all sides. Above all things the integrity of the Danish State was to be maintained (though with the reservation of the privileges of Schleswig-Holstein), and the introduction of a uniform law of succession in all parts of the country was to be brought about, no matter whether this law worked in favor of the Hessian or of the Augustenburg Line; it would be well to despatch a French fleet to the Baltic forthwith, and to show the tricolored flag on the Danish coasts. Such a fleet might be stationed at the convenient island of Bornholm, and France might openly appear before Europe as the protector of Denmark.

The rôle thus indicated was very seductive to the mobile ambition of Louis Philippe. He gave the Ambassador a high Order, and sent him over to London to make a preliminary investigation of the attitude of the English Cabinet on the Danish question; while at the same time a written communication was sent with the same object to Prince Metternich.

In the mean time, the Danish Government had got wind, if not of the details of Billing’s memorial, at least of its general purport; and as Denmark was by no means disposed just now to endanger her friendly rela­tions with Berlin and St. Petersburg, she sent to the Earl of Aberdeen an urgent warning against Billing as a meddlesome intriguer. Aberdeen, therefore, gave him a polite but evasive answer to the effect that the ques­tion of the Danish succession was an affair of the future, with which England did not care to concern herself at present; when the time came, it belonged to the King of Denmark alone to take the initiative; England would then gladly do what she could for the maintenance of the Danish Monarchy.

Austria gave a similar negative answer to the invitation of France. When, soon after, the Russian Chancellor, Count Nesselrode, stopped at Vienna on a journey, he took pains to come to an understanding with Metternich in regard to the attitude of expectancy recommended by Lord Aberdeen. Metternich then explained in his didactic fashion, that in every political question, there were to be considered, on one side the rights of the case, and on the other what was expedient from a statesman’s point of view; in the first connection, it was here necessary to examine carefully the legal foundation of the claims of the different parties; in the second, there arose the question of the integrity of Denmark as an important element of. the European Balance of Power; in conclusion, it would be necessary to deduce the proper result from a com­bination of the legal and political considerations. Nesselrode declared his complete acquiescence in so admirable a theory, and the two communicated with entire satisfaction this understanding to Berlin. Dur­ing the next few years, there was the less thought of giving France a share in this matter, as the Court of the Tuileries soon after became engaged in a sharp controversy with the Eastern Powers on the subject of Cracow, and with England in regard to the Spanish marriage.

For King Christian these proceedings had, at least, the advantage of having led four Powers to pronounce the integrity of Denmark a matter of European neces­sity. As they had all left to him, and to him alone, the initiative in the settlement of the question, he now decided to satisfy their desire in this respect, and to begin at once by an announcement of his views and purposes. He had appointed a commission for the final examination of the question of succession; the opinion of this commission was then laid before the Council of State, and on the 8th of July, 1846, the conclusions of the Council were laid before the world in the form of an open letter from the King to his subjects.

The judgment thus given differed as widely as possible from the decision of the Prussian jurists. The letter declared that the historical investigation had confirmed the King in his conviction that the principle of succession established by the Law of 1660 applied to Schleswig and to Lauenburg; this could certainly not be asserted so absolutely with regard to some parts of Holstein, but the King promised his faithful subjects that he would be careful to preserve in every way the inviolability of the Monarchy as a whole.

The declaration of war against the Duchies was thus founded. The unconditional rejection of the principle of agnatic succession for Schleswig carried with it the natural consequence that the connection of Holstein with its sister State would be severed, unless Holstein also submitted to the rule of the female line. Every­thing that up to that time had been regarded in Schleswig-Holstein as ancient and undoubted right was thus assailed; the principles of the whole political existence of the Duchies were shaken, and the public excitement was enormous. The two Diets entered an emphatic legal protest, the Estates of Holstein appealed to the German Confederate Diet; and popular assem­blies of many thousand people confirmed these measures. Besides this, there were protests from the various male heirs, from the Grand Duke of Oldenburg, from the Augustenburgs, and with a single exception from all the Glucksburg Princes.

At the same time the popular excitement spread from Holstein across the Elbe into every corner of Germany; in innumerable assemblies, resolutions, addresses, and pamphlets, the entire German People raised its voice in behalf of its threatened brethren on either side of the Eider; almost all the German Chambers re-echoed with declarations in favor of the independence of Schleswig-Holstein; and even among the German Princes, there were several who by similar manifestations knew how to win enthusiastic applause. The saqje kindling of the national consciousness that six years before had been directed against the French threatening of the Rhine-Provinces, now burst forth in fresh flames when Denmark prepared to wage war upon ancient rights and the German tongue in Schleswig-Holstein. The cry of the “Eider-Danes” for the conversion of Schleswig into a thoroughly Danish country, for its separation from Holstein, and for its incorporation into Denmark Proper, had pushed things so far, that in Germany, as in the Duchies, the people refused all credence to the King’s statement that he thought only of maintaining the state as it had hitherto been, and not of altering the existing Constitution. It might rather be said that in Germany also the succession of Augustenburg in the Duchies was desired, because only in a complete separation from Denmark did there seem to be any safety from the attack of the “Eider-Danes.”

The next question was, what position the then existing organ of Germany as a whole, the German Confederate Diet, would take in the contest; and here almost everything depended on the decisions of the two Great Powers.

In Berlin many considerations were weighed on both sides. That the crisis was difficult and serious was clear enough, in view of the hatred, now become irreconcilable, between the two contending races, and the no less conflicting interests of the different European Powers. A communication was therefore set on foot with the nearest ally, Austria. The aged Prince Metternich was extremely vexed and angry at the disagreeable affair which the perversity of the Danish King had brought into prominence so long before there was any need of it. He felt that now the party of confusion and the whole tribe of Liberals had unfurled the banner of Schleswig-Holstein, and had thus set all the crazy heads of Germany in an uproar. In his opinion, the King of Denmark had decided nothing, but had only forced the settlement of a difficult ques­tion, and now there would be hullabaloo through the whole country, and Burgomasters and village-politicians, poets and professors, would give judgment on a matter that should have been left wholly and solely to the management of statesmen. He proposed imme­diately that the two Great Powers should take part in every way against the revolutionary disturbances, and should by means of the Confederate Diet enjoin the same course upon the other Courts.

Meantime there came a report sent by General von Radowitz, at that time Prussian Ambassador at Carlsruhe, concerning the state of affairs in Baden. There the second Chamber had passed an energetic address urging upon the Grand Duke the defence of Schleswig- Holstein, the Grand Ducal Commissioner had given his assent, and the approval of the first Chamber was assured. Radowitz emphasized the fact that Radicals and Conservatives, nobles and peasants, all joined in this enthusiasm; in Baden, as elsewhere, it was a question, not of any intrigue of the revolutionary party, but of a stirring of the national feeling in its profoundest depths. Now, he said, was the time when one more opportunity, the last, was offered to the Confederate Diet, that had fallen so low, to snatch from the Radical party the leadership of the German People—if only this time it would place itself at the head of the national movement, and not ruin a great cause with formalities, delays, and protestations of incompetence, but choose its course promptly, proudly, and decisively, and stand forth as the competent representative of the German Nation!

The King, who had hitherto believed that, for the present, a completely passive attitude was the fitting one for Prussia, could not resist the impression produced by this report, but ordered that it should be at once communicated to Prince Metternich. One can easily imagine that the Prince was by no means edified by the enthusiasm of the brilliant officer, who had long passed for a dreamer in well-ordered official circles. Even Metternich, however, could not at last help perceiving that in the actual condition of things, differ­ent as it was from what he would have liked to see, the Confederate Diet, which was already involved in the affair by the petition of complaint from Holstein and by the protest of Oldenburg, could not well remain wholly inactive. But at any rate, such a decisive method of proceeding as Radowitz had in mind seemed to him in every respect, and above all in the existing state of affairs, wholly impracticable; it would be amply sufficient if the Confederation should manifest disapproval of the Danish proceedings and leave its course for the future undecided.

In this spirit, then, the Confederate Diet set to work. The unanimity of the members was this time very marked. For all the petty Courts felt strongly that a prince’s right of succession must not be put aside for state reasons, nor in any such method as King Christian was now seeking to employ with the Augustenburgs. And thus, under combined pressure from the sovereigns and from the excitement of the nation at large, the Confederate Diet worked more quickly than ever be­fore, so that the Danish King found himself obliged, at least in regard to the constitutional question, to do what he could towards quieting the public mind. His Ambassador to the Diet, Herr von Pechlin, made the following official declaration: —

The principle of succession announced in the open letter was by no means to be understood as referring to a state in which one part was subordinated to another, or in which one country was regarded as a province incorporated into a governing nation. The Danish Monarchy was composed rather of countries independent of one another, each in the possession of its own constitution, and legislative and administrative system, at the same time that they were more or less closely connected by relations founded on their histori­cal development and on expediency.

And then further: the King had no idea of altering the relation between Schleswig and Holstein. This relation consisted in the fact, that, leaving aside Holstein’s individual connection with the German Confederation and the separate Assemblies of Estates, the two Duchies, with a common system of legislation and administration, shared with each other public privileges and rights

It was not possible to portray the existing state of things more exactly, nor to recognize more explicitly its claim to continuance. A separation of Schleswig from Holstein, an incorporation of the former into the Danish Monarchy in the more limited sense, would have been, according to the admission of the Danish King himself, an exercise of arbitrary power wholly contrary to the Constitution.

This declaration, then, had such an effect that the Confederate Diet contented itself with expressing its opinion in the most courteous way, at the same time indicating very clearly its conviction as to the right of the matter. On the 17th of September, 1846, it passed a resolution to the effect, that, after the declaration of the King, it found itself confirmed in the confident expectation, that, in the final settlement of the succes­sion, his Majesty would consider the rights of all and each, of the German Confederation, of the agnates, and of the Representative Assembly of Holstein.

In Germany the mild form of this Resolution called forth a storm of indignation; and in fact, necessary as are usually the forms of courtesy in international intercourse, in this case a more decided indication of the consequences dependent on Denmark’s action would have been by no means out of place. At the same time, the Resolution could leave the Danish King no doubt but that the Confederation was determined to support the rights of the agnates and also of the Estates. If at that time the wildly-excited German Public did not appreciate this, King Christian himself understood it perfectly. In the summer of 1847, he sent Baron Lowenstein to Berlin and Vienna, with the object of again emphasizing his standpoint His great object was, he said, the maintenance of the Danish Monarchy in its existing limits; in regard to the rights of the agnates, which stood in the way of this, some under­standing might be reached, though questions of individual right must certainly be subordinated to the higher question of the integrity of the State; the treatment of the matter from this point of view should be begun so soon as public feeling became a little calmer.

Lowenstein, however, succeeded no better than Pechlin. Both Courts announced in reply that they were fully agreed in desiring the maintenance of the integrity of Denmark, but that they could not assent to the complete subordination of all legal claims to the question of that integrity. The Prussian King now declared his opinion with great energy, to the effect that he desired the permanence of the existing Danish State quite as much as did the King of Denmark, but that he considered the only possible and permissible means to this end to be, not the exclusion of Augustenburg but of the Hessian Line, and consequently the summoning of Augustenburg to the throne in Copen­hagen as well as in the Duchies. He thought that the Emperor Nicholas, himself a member of the Oldenburg family, would prefer the retaining of that family on the Danish throne to the intrusion of the Hessian Line; and he expected the eager thanks of Denmark, if his proposition averted the loss of the Duchies without further trouble.

This was a mediating idea, which, had it been adopted, would, as we remarked above, have obviated all the difficulties raised by the lawyers. But unfor­tunately, the Prussian policy of that decade had more than once the ill-luck to devise systems of mediation, which, though they were really honest and admirable, had the single weakness, that all parties concerned refused to have anything to do with them. King Christian was enthusiastic for the integrity of Denmark, but desired it only for the benefit of his sister, who governed him, and of her heirs; the Danish People hated the Duke of Augustenburg as if he were the Evil One; they could, at best, only have been induced to accept him, if that acceptance had meant the incorporation of Schleswig; but the Duke was wholly opposed to this, and was firmly determined to reject a crown of thorns offered under such conditions.

Meantime Russia had declared to King Christian her readiness to support his programme, and her conviction, in consequence of the proofs adduced by Denmark, that Augustenburg had long ago forfeited all claim to the Duchies. This was natural enough. For the greater the number of the male heirs of the reigning Branch who were pronounced incompetent to succeed, the greater grew the chance, that, at a fitting opportu­nity, the claims of the House of Gottorp, that is, of Russia, to Kiel and other portions of the Duchies, might be resuscitated.

To the Danish King, under all these circumstances, the approval of Russia was invaluable. For his position became daily more difficult. The firm and unanimous determination of the Duchies to adhere to their ancient rights, and the violent attacks made upon these rights by the “ Eider-Danes,” roused the passions of the peo­ple on either side. By the favorable declarations of the German Governments and by the sympathetic outcry of the German people the defensive attitude of Schles­wig-Holstein was confirmed, while from the same cause the impetuous zeal of the insular Danes was augmented in an equal degree. There was an ever-increasing probability of a violent outbreak on both sides. At the same time the King’s health had long been uncertain; in every corner of the capital it was openly pro­claimed that at a change of rulers this time the freedom of the People would be secured, that the new sovereign would ascend the throne only under a free constitution, and that then the Danish People would settle with the turbulent Duchies.

The Crown Prince Frederick had little opposition to offer to these tendencies. He was not unendowed by nature, but during the wild life of his youth he had degenerated in bad company. Twice married, he had each time brought on a divorce after a few years by his brutality, and had then fallen into the snares of a disreputable seamstress, who entangled him so successfully that he had married her morganatically as Countess Danner, and afterwards allowed her unlimited influence even in political matters. At the time when King Chris­tian’s health began to fail the Crown Prince was thirty- nine years old; but he had no higher wish than to retain complete freedom from restraint in his private life. He had no objection to leaving responsibility, and with it power, to constitutional Ministers; and the more he felt himself isolated among his former princely asso­ciates by his manner of life, the more he strove to gain favor among the masses who surrounded him in the capital. He therefore proclaimed at every opportunity his allegiance to liberal watchwords and to “Eider- Danish ” principles, and made an open show of his hatred for Germany.

Under these circumstances King Christian saw that the hour of absolute monarchy in Denmark had struck, and that if he would carry out his purposes, he must obtain popular support for them. In the last months of 1847 he ordered a draft of a constitution for the united monarchy, as he conceived it, to be drawn up; but he died on the 20th of January, 1848, before he had been able to make the document public.

He had sown the wind, his successor was to reap the whirlwind.

The new Monarch, still surrounded at first by the old Ministers, allowed himself to be persuaded to issue on the 28th of January his father’s draft of a constitution, or more exactly, decree for the preparation of a constitution. According to this a common Assembly of Estates for the Kingdom and the Duchies was to be established, with a deciding voice in the levying of taxes and in legislation on matters of common concern. In the arrangements of the provincial Estates, in the connection of Schleswig with Holstein, in the connec­tion of Holstein with the German Confederation, and in the constitution of Lauenburg, there was to be no change whatever. The provisions to be adopted in this constitution were first to be laid for criticism before experienced men, and for this purpose eighteen were to be elected by Denmark and eighteen by the Duchies, while eight were to be chosen from Denmark by the King, and from the Duchies eight also. Thus the Danish King had once more recognized the indissoluble connection of the Duchies, and by making the number of their representatives equal to that of the Danish, he had also recognized indirectly their independence.

In spite of this, the decree caused a great deal of dissatisfaction in the Duchies. By the sixteen members of the Assembly who were chosen by himself, the King was sure of the majority in any contention between the two parties; and with his well-known tendencies, whom could the Duchies rely on for impartial judgments in regard to what were “matters of common concern,” or to the composition of the future royal Estates? Nevertheless, in spite of these well-grounded fears, it was decided to proceed with the election of the “experienced men.”

Things were different in Copenhagen. As early as the 22d of January Professors Clausen and Schouw had published a treatise declaring that the proclamation of a constitution was now a necessity, and that that con­stitution must unite Schleswig with Denmark; Holstein, they said, might keep its own constitution with its own administration of finance and war-establishment, and a sharp and distinct boundary should be drawn between the two Duchies. All Copenhagen greeted the “ Eider-Danish ” demand with joy; Press and Popular Assembly cried out stormily for the dismissal of the Ministry, protested against the decree in regard to the constitution on the basis of a common State, and sent deputation after deputation to the royal palace. The public irritation against everything German burst forth in unbridled demonstrations.

Such was the state of things, when in the last week of February the announcement of the revolution at Paris and of the French republic set the mass of the people on fire throughout half Europe, made the thrones tremble in helpless impotence, and hastened the crisis on the already thoroughly-prepared soil of Denmark.

First of all, in Schleswig-Holstein, the royal officials lost the courage to continue employing against every trace of German-national feeling the petty police-methods which had been in vogue up to that time. Everywhere citizens’ associations and citizens’ bands were organized; everywhere the Press raised its voice anew, and on the 18th of March seventy well-known men came together in Rendsburg and decided to send a deputation to Copenhagen, who should be charged to lay before the King the petition of the country for a com­mon Assembly of Estates, for freedom of the Press and the right of holding meetings, for the formation of a militia, and for the entrance of Schleswig into the German Confederation. There was not a word of insurrection or of recalcitrancy; every proposition aiming at more than was contained in the petition was rejected: hated as the existing Ministry was, and suspicious as their draft of a constitution had been, there seemed, in the present outbreak of the “ Eider-Danes,” to be no other barrier against a far worse abuse of power.

A justification for this feeling was soon afforded. On the 11th of March a great meeting had been held in the Casino at Copenhagen, in which Tscherning cried out amid enthusiastic applause, that there would he terrible danger if Schleswig were not incorporated into Denmark; whether Schleswig wished it or not was not the question at all; if it made any opposition, that would be rebellion, which must be brought to reason by force of arms. One stormy speech of this nature followed another; it was falsely alleged that the Duchies were in open rebellion; the students, artists, and members of the polytechnic schools armed themselves under the leadership of officers of the line; the city officials besought the King to change his Ministry, and a great popular assembly added the request that the King would not oblige his faithful people out of mere despair to take things into their own hands.

Frederick VII. had no desire to oppose these tendencies ; he had already quietly made military preparations and had ordered the contents of the Schleswig-Holstein treasury to be transferred to Copenhagen. On the 21st of March he announced to the Council of State that circumstances necessitated the adoption of a new sys­tem based on the incorporation of Schleswig. The Ministry resigned; and on the 22d of March four “ Eider-Danish ” leaders, Monrad, Tscherning, Hvidt, and Orla Lehmann, entered the new Cabinet.

Just at this time the deputation from Rendsburg arrived; its members saw clearly from the first that the appointment of this Ministry meant the frustration of their wishes and an immediate war upon Schleswig. Even on the 22d, orders were issued for the mobiliza­tion of the Danish regiments, for the marshalling of five thousand men upon the frontier of Jutland, and for the embarkation of ten thousand men destined for Eckernforde and Rendsburg.

On the 23d the King received the deputation in a gracious audience, but immediately afterwards declared to a high dignitary of Holstein, that as a constitutional King he had no responsibility. It was thus made clear to the deputation in the beginning, that their fate lay solely in the hands of the Ministry. They were next informed, on the 24th of March, that they could no longer be protected from the rage of the populace, and must therefore embark for home as quickly as possible. Just as they were leaving, Orla Lehmann appeared on board their vessel to deliver to them the royal answer to their petition. It was a declaration that Holstein should retain its own free constitution; but that Schleswig should not enter the German Confederation, but be incorporated into Denmark under a common constitution, though with provincial institutions of its own. This was an official proclamation of the illegal act, kept back doubtless till the very last instant in the hope that before the deputation could arrive at Kiel, the troops which had been assembled would have crossed the frontier and with a sudden attack would have prostrated the defenceless Duchies under their feet.

The audacious assault was not destined to succeed so easily. Up to the 23d of March the Duchies had, indeed, awaited in breathless suspense the result of the deputation; and though since the first meeting in the Casino the country had been in a state at once of daily­increasing anxiety and of daily-increasing bitterness, no plan had been adopted, no preparation made. But on the afternoon of that day there came to Kiel in haste from Schleswig the President of the Schleswig Diet, William Beseler, a dignified personage of calm courage and of prudent firmness, who was always ready to risk his person and his life, for Right and for Freedom. He had news from Copenhagen, that, in consequence of the “ Eider-Danish ” agitation, the Ministry had resigned, and the establishment of an “ Eider-Danish ” rule was assured. He declared to his friends in Kiel that disaster would certainly ensue, and that nothing was left but the choice between slavery and battle. They all agreed with him; and it was decided at once to summon to Kiel the other most prominent patriots after Beseler, Count Reventlow- Preez and the former Deputy-Governor, Prince Freder­ick of Noer. These two also regarded an armed attack as hourly imminent, and were disposed to resist to the last the violence threatened by Denmark against Schleswig and its national rights.

No time was to be lost: about midnight these men constituted themselves a Provisional Government for the purpose of defending in the name of the King, who was deprived of his free action at Copenhagen, the ancient national rights against an “ Eider-Danish ” Ministry. On the very next day, the 24th, the Prince with a handful of men hastened to Rendsburg, where the soldiers went over to him on the spot. The country as far as the Konigsau rose as one man; untiring efforts were spent in preparations. Denmark found on its hands, instead of the expected surprise and submission, a difficult and bloody war.

In this struggle the question of right was as clear as possible. There was no discussion about a doubtful and complicated law of succession; for the throne was still occupied by a King of the royal male line, and the disputed inheritance was not yet an inheritance at all. The simple cause of quarrel, disguised by no pretext or excuse, was the ancient constitutional right of the Duchies, the traditional connection of Schleswig with Holstein, the legitimateness of which had been only lately solemnly recognized by the Danish King Christian VIII before the Confederate Diet in 1846, and by Frederick VII himself in the draft of a constitution of January 28th, 1848. It was nothing but the thirst of conquest of the “ Eider-Danes,” who in the name of the principle of nationality, disregarding all rights and the promises of Kings, wished to force a country, two-thirds of which were thoroughly German, to become an integral part of Denmark. How could these fanatics be surprised, if German national feeling now awoke at such a deed of violence, and rushed with armed wrath to stay their hands so greedily outstretched?

As early as the 18th of March, the Duke of Augustenburg, foreseeing clearly what would happen, had hastened to Berlin to seek the protection of the friendly King of Prussia. He found the city in the full excitement of the revolution just accomplished, the population enthusiastic, as everywhere else in Germany, for the cause of Schleswig-Holstein, and the new Ministers inspired with the idea once expressed by Radowitz, that whoever interfered energetically in that quarrel, would place himself by so doing at the head of Germany. It was the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Heinrich von Arnim, who, on the 24th of March, induced the King to identify himself openly with the three principles: that the Duchies were independent States, that they were indissolubly united, and that they were inherited in the male line. The necessary consequence of this declaration was the war with Den­mark. When the Danish troops soon after entered Schleswig, General Wrangel led the Prussian Guards to the storming of the “ Dannevirke,” and pursued the flying Danes far into Jutland, while the Frankfort Confederate and Imperial Government recognized the Provisional Government of the Duchies, and sent North German regiments across the Elbe to the support of the Prussians.

CHAPTER III.

THE COMPACTS OF 1852.

We have already had occasion to relate in former sections of this book the unfortunate course of the war so enthusiastically begun, since the varying fortunes of the same had often a decisive influence upon the fate of the Parliament at Frankfort and of the Prussian Union. It will be sufficient here to recapitulate the main points:

The important influence of Russia, France, and Austria working for Denmark and against Prussia, by which Prussia's energy for the struggle was weakened.—

The truce of 1849, in which Prussia recognized the admissibility of a separation of Schleswig from Holstein. —

The Peace with Denmark of the 2d of July, 1850, by which, with a reservation of all existing rights, Prussia, in the name of the German Confederation, discontinued hostilities, and left it to the King of Denmark, on con­dition of his communicating his plans for a constitution, to require the assistance of the Confederation in restoring his sovereign authority in Holstein. —

The recognition of the integrity of the Danish Monarchy by the first London Protocol. —

The proclamation of the Danish King containing the agreement not to incorporate Schleswig into Denmark Proper. —

The seizure of Schleswig after the unfortunate day of Idstedt —

Finally, in accordance with the conditions of the Olmütz agreement the marching of Austrian troops for the purpose of restoring order in Holstein in the name of the Confederation.

The prostration of Germany at the end of the war was none the less humiliating because it had been brought about by internal dissensions. On the contrary, exactly by reason of this an indelible brand was placed upon the general condition of things which had lingered along since 1815. The nation had reason indeed to bow its head in profound sorrow. And the bitter grief which was felt in Germany was fully equalled by the vain and haughty arrogance which pre­vailed in Denmark. “The Prussian dogs bark, but they do not bite,” said the people in Copenhagen; or, “If four Prussians stand up against one Dane, the Dane has the advantage.”

When in December, 1850, the German Confederate troops under the Austrian General, Count Mensdorf-Pouilly, and the Prussian, Von Thümen, approached the frontier of Holstein, the Government of the Duchies, after serious deliberation, came to the bitter conclusion that they would yield to the requirements of the Confederate Powers, disband their troops, and so make the forcible execution of the Confederate decree unnecessary. This decision was recognized by the two Commissioners; but the military occupation of the country was still indispensable on account of its relations to Denmark. For by Article IV of the Peace of July 2d, the latter was called upon, after the abolition of the administration which had been organized during the revolution, to communicate its plans of a constitution for the Duchies to the representatives of the Confedwration. We must examine rather carefully the negotiations entered into on this subject, as their results formed the point of departure for all the later complications.

In Copenhagen the sway of the “Eider-Danish” democracy continued. The Ministry, with the exception of the more moderate Herr von Reedtz, who controlled the Foreign Affairs, and of the Minister of War, Hansen, whose political opinions were unpronounced, was thoroughly imbued with “ Eider-Danish ” sentiments; and the draft of a constitution elaborated at that time by the Minister of Finance, Sponneck, embodied the views of that party, in spite of the royal promise of July 14, 1850: in this draft Schleswig was entirely separated from Holstein and incorporated into Denmark Proper. It was intended to lay the diet at once before an assembly of notables from both Duchies, to be convened at Flensburg, and of which a favorably disposed majority was carefully chosen by the Government.

At the same time the Danish Government proceeded to consider the question of succession. By the events of the past year the matter had been simplified in more than one respect. Denmark Proper had received a Democratic Constitution, the Law of 1660 no longer existed, and the difficulties that had hindered former Kings in attempting any alteration of the same were thereby removed. For the succession of Prince Frederick of Hesse neither King Frederick nor any portion of the Danish people had any enthusiasm whatever. Every claim of the Augustenburgs had been disputed even before the war; and now that they had encouraged the rebellion against their lawful King, every one in Copenhagen eagerly concurred in the opinion of Russia, that a rebel should never be rewarded with a crown. The Princes of the House of Glucksburg were also, with a single exception, subject to the same objections.

There was, therefore, open ground for an entirely new structure; and to form a valid decision in regard to this, fell, according to Danish ideas, only to the Heads of the two great Branches, the Royal Branch and that of Gottorp, that is, to King Frederick of Denmark and to the Czar Nicholas as chief of the three Gottorp Lines: Russia, Wasa, and Oldenburg. These two Princes turned first of all to the Heir-Apparent of Oldenburg, whose father, however, showed little desire for the precarious honor; against another Prince of that House the Emperor Nicholas made objections: finally the following combination was adopted.

The young Prince Christian of Glucksburg was the son-in-law of the Princess Charlotte, and had married Louise, the sister of Prince Frederick of Hesse. In consequence of this connection he alone of all his House

had held aloof from all share in the protest against the “Open Letter,” and in the ensuing years, when the Duchies were in revolt, he had remained faithful to his military allegiance, and had followed the service of the King. By this he had won a certain consideration in Copenhagen, and in a still higher degree the regard of the Sovereign of Russia. Frederick and Nicholas now decided to pass over the Hessian Prince Frederick and to confer the crown directly upon the Princess Louise, on condition that she would transfer the right to her husband and to his male heirs. They then sought to obtain a recognition of this from all the other Powers.

It happened favorably for this design, that just at that time, at the end of May, 1851, there took place at Warsaw a personal interview of the three Sovereigns of Austria, Prussia, and Russia, for the purpose of announcing and confirming the restoration of concord between them. Naturally the whole of Europe was anxious as to what great political matter was being discussed; but the Russian Chancellor, Count Nesselrode, wrote: “Incredible as it may seem, we had no political object in view; our sole occupation would have been excursions in the morning and balls in the evening, had not Heaven produced the Danish Minister Reedtz with his arrangement of the succession.”

This interruption of their brilliant leisure brought, after all, to the assembled Potentates neither great trouble nor any very, serious differences of opinion. Like his royal allies, the King of Prussia looked upon egrity of the Danish Kingdom as a European necessity, and saw that the acceptance of one principle of succession for the whole country was therefore unavoidable; he only insisted that in the consummation of the new arrangement all the formalities required by the rights of German Princes should be observed, and any difficulties about conflicting legal points should be examined and removed. No one made any objection to this; and the King promised, on his side, that if these stipulations were conscientiously attended to, he would use his whole influence with the Duke of Augustenburg to induce him to subordinate his personal claims to the higher interests of Europe. On the 5th of June, therefore, Reedtz, together with the Russian statesmen, signed a protocol concerning the candidacy of Prince Christian and his male heirs. The agreement was, that the renun­ciation on the part of the female line should be obtained in Copenhagen, and that Russia should transfer the Gottorp rights to the Prince; the King of Prussia was to obtain the consent of Augustenburg; and after the settlement of all these questions of form in regard to different rights and claims, the matter was to be laid before the London Conference, for recognition by all the European Powers.

Pleasant as all this was for the Danish Minister, he soon learned, in the prosecution of his journey to Vienna and Berlin, that there was still more than one obstacle to be overcome before he could succeed in his object. In Vienna, Prince Schwarzenberg made an energetic protest against the tyrannical treatment of Schleswig, which had inflamed anew in Holstein also the hatred of the German population for Denmark and its King. Reedtz promised that immediately after his return there should be an improvement in this respect, that in Schleswig and Holstein a uniform plan of administration should be adopted, and a system established that should at once appease the German population of the Duchies and afford the Powers assurance against attempts to incorporate Schleswig into Denmark, either politically or socially. Schwarzenberg required the Russian Ambassador, Meyendorff, to take what amounted to a formal cognizance of these statements.

From the Prussian Minister, Manteuffel, Reedtz had to learn further, that he made a great mistake if he thought the King regarded Augustenburg's claims as either void or abrogated; it was his intention neither to affirm nor to deny them. He wished, acting on the basis of the rights of German Princes, to hold a family council of all the members of the Oldenburg Line, and hence with the sympathy of the Augustenburgs themselves; and only after the meeting of such a council, would he exert his influence upon Augustenburg in the way he had promised.

As both England and Russia sent messages to Copenhagen urging conciliatory advances, it became clear at once that European recognition of the new succession could not be obtained before some arrangement with Augustenburg, and still more, some settlement of the constitutional difficulties, was brought about.

By this time the Danes were beginning to see, to their great disgust, that their general cosseting at the hands of all Europe was over. Russia, England, and Austria had defended them, so long as the danger of a dismem­berment of Denmark and an extension of the Prussian hegemony was thought to exist. After this more serious danger was completely averted, the Governments of St. Petersburg and of Vienna recollected once more that the “ Eider-Danes ” who ruled in Copenhagen were an ultraRadical body; that therefore, if Schleswig became Danish, it would become Democratic; and that, in spite of the rebellion of 1848, there was much more conservatism among the Estates and the people of the Duchies than in the Danish Provinces. While, for the sake of maintaining European equilibrium, the separa­ion of the Duchies from Denmark was certainly to be prevented, the solidarity of conservative interests demanded quite as much the preservation of Schleswig’s independence and of its German sympathies. The part of wisdom, then, was to favor neither Schleswig-Holsteinism nor “ Eider-Danism,” but a united State organized in some harmonious way.

The result of these considerations was a mild pressure exerted by Russia in July, 1851, upon the Danish Cabinet, as a consequence of which two men of German origin, Count Carl Moltke and Herr von Scheel, entered the Ministry. The political position of these two is pretty well indicated by the fact that Moltke was a fanatical opponent of all free action on the part of the people, no matter whether it sprang from “Eider-Danes ” or Schleswig-Holsteiners, while Scheel was a self-seeking and time-serving intriguer. But the main point was, that they were ready to devote all their energy to realizing the idea of a “united State;” and by their admission a broader ground seemed to be gained for an understanding with the lowers.

Meanwhile King Frederick had obtained the required renunciation on the part of the members of the female line, and every effort was being made to lay the law concerning the succession in a definite form before the Powers. The question of a constitution had also advanced a stage: the notables at Flensburg had considered the draft of Sponneck, though with a somewhat doubtful result. The majority of the notables, under the powerful influence of the state of siege and of the “ Eider-Danish ” fanatics who had been sent to Flensburg, had intensified the tendencies of the draft, and had made the connection of Schleswig with Denmark still closer, and the separation from Holstein more radical; while the Holstein faction, in two minority votes, had rejected the draft in its entirety, and demanded the restoration of the state of things that existed before the war.

In the Danish Cabinet, for the time, no decision was arrived at in regard to these differences, one party favoring the draft of Sponneck, another the majority of the notables, and a third desiring a modification of the draft in the spirit of the minority. So far as the reform of the administration desired by Austria was concerned, the Ministers were unanimously of the opinion that such a reform could not be introduced, until the authority of the legitimate rulers was in force in Holstein also; that is, only after the Confederate Commissioner and the Confederate troops had been wholly withdrawn from the country. Austria and Prussia, on the contrary, made it the essential condition of evacuation, that a conciliatory settlement of the con­stitution and of the administration should be first brought about.

Under these circumstances it was impossible to lay before the German Powers any definite proposals; there was nothing to be done but to remain within the bounds of well-sounding generalities. Herr von Reedtz accordingly charged the Danish embassies in Vienna and Berlin with the statement, that only after the withdrawal of the Confederate troops from Holstein could definite measures of organization be adopted; when this had taken place, the proposals made at Flensburg would be rejected, and a final settlement in the spirit of the draft of Sponneck would be adopted; Holstein would be governed according to its existing laws and privileges, and changes in the Constitution would be attempted only in a constitutional way. At the same time, in a second note, was sent the new Order of Succession and a proposal for the European recognition of the same by the London Conference; and this was confirmed and supported by an autograph letter of the same date, written by King Frederick to the two Monarchs. In this communication the utter worthlessness of the Augustenburg claims was once more emphatically reiterated.

But the Danish Cabinet found this proceeding a total failure. Prince Schwarzenberg had been irritated to the highest degree by the behavior of Denmark at the Dresden Conferences; he considered it impertinent that such a petty Government should venture to set up “ Eider-Danish ” obstinacy against the formal programme of all the Great Powers, to which even the mighty Prussia had given way. In two despatches, marked by a highly categorical tone even in their wording, he blamed the indefinite generality of the Danish statements, pointed out how many ancient institutions were common to both the Duchies, stigmatized “ Eider-Danism ” as incompatible with the most important principle, the integrity of the Danish Mon­archy, and demanded a positive promise that Schleswig should never be incorporated in Denmark Proper, as a preliminary to the evacuation of Holstein by the Confederate troops, and as a formal condition of the recognition of the new Order of Succession by the London Conference.

In all essentials the Prussian reply of September 14th was the same. The style of it was certainly not so undiplomatically rude as that of Schwarzenberg’s message, but, on the other hand, it contained what Schwarzenberg had omitted, an allusion to the rights of Augustenburg. The King renewed his promise to use his influence with the Duke, but made it distinctly understood that until a renunciation on Augustenburg’s part had been obtained, Prussia would not sign the protocol in favor of Glucksburg.

The Danish Minister Reedtz was discouraged by these declarations. A sitting of the Danish Diet was about to take place immediately; he knew that he had long been regarded by the “ Eider-Danish ” Majority as a lukewarm patriot, and that after such failures he had a bad outlook before him. The result was entirely as he had expected. The fanatical wrath of the Assembly raged high; so that Reedtz, Hansen, and Carl Moltke, in the face of an immense vote of want of confidence, hastened to resign their places. In their stead, “ Eider- Danes” of the purest water were appointed, and the management of Foreign Affairs fell to the Counsellor Bluhme, who had been a member of that first Casino-Ministry, which in 1848 had begun the attack on the connection of Schleswig with Holstein. The Hall of the Diet once more re-echoed with the cry, that Denmark would sooner perish honorably than allow the fruits of victory at Fredericia and Idstedt to wither and fade.

The new Minister of Foreign Affairs, however, was neither a savage Chauvinist, nor a Democratic hobby­rider, but a cool and collected practical man. He immediately intimated by a third party to the two German Ambassadors, that he would be found as conservative and as ready to make advances as his predecessor, and the very fact that, as an “ Eider-Dane ” of long standing, he enjoyed the full confidence of the party, would enable him to persuade them to greater concessions than Herr von Reedtz had been able to procure. At the same time he made it a point to find out the disposition of the non-German Great Powers, and what he learned in this direction removed every doubt about the course to be adopted. France spoke warmly of its sympathy for Denmark, but expressed a determination to stand by England in the treatment of the matter. England distinctly advised the fulfilment of the wishes of the German Powers, considering them entirely rea­sonable. Finally the attitude of Russia was decisive. The Emperor Nicholas was angry at the change of Ministry; he would, indeed, have nothing to say to the claims of a man branded with felony, as was Augustenburg; but in regard to the question of a constitution, he simply informed his representative in Copenhagen that he should energetically support any steps taken by his German colleagues. Thus deprived of all hope abroad, Bluhme resolved to yield to the inevitable, to bring about the adoption, first by his fellow Ministers and then by the King, of a programme that would be acceptable to Austria, to arrange the matter on that basis with the two Powers, and then to surprise the Diet with the accomplished fact.

This was no easy task, considering the “ Eider-Danish ” tendencies of the other Ministers, the unfortunate personal character of the King, and the practical difficul­ties surrounding this question in which so many things must be considered. It would lead us too far to follow all the turns and devices of the wily statesman. In November, after the arrival of Russia’s communication, he won over the Minister of Finance, Sponneck, — “for,” wrote the Austrian Ambassador, “ this little man always goes with the strongest side; ” and when, on the 13th of November, the Ministry-rejected Bluhme’s proposal, the two decided to induce the King to form a new Cabinet, a project that had already been often mooted by the ambassadors of Russia, Prussia, and Austria, and mentioned by them as a necessary guaranty for the accomplishment of the new system.

But meanwhile Bluhme continued his negotiations with his colleagues, made some modifications in his first propositions, and above all emphasized the fact that he had no thought of any binding compact in regard to the Constitution, but that, in order to secure the evacu­ation of Holstein, he wished to communicate in a conciliatory manner to the Governments of Vienna and Berlin the paternal intentions of His Majesty, by doing which he would in no way interfere with any disposi­tions that it might be necessary to make in the future. In this way he finally succeeded in gaining the assent of the Cabinet and of the King to his programme, and on the 6th of December Chamberlain von Bille was sent to Berlin and Vienna with the following proposals.

It was announced in the beginning that King Frederick could give foreign Powers no legal guaranties concerning the internal condition of his kingdom, but that he was prepared to give moral guaranties to the following effect. Out of the plenitude of his power the King had determined to rule Schleswig, for the present, as an absolute monarch, with the co-operation

Qi the Provincial Estates acting as a consultative body. He would, however, keep before his eyes as a definite object, the union of all the different elements of the State by an organic and homogeneous bond in one common kingdom; and this object he would seek to attain by legal and constitutional means; that is, by the advice and assistance of the Provincial Estates, dealing with each of the Duchies by itself, consulting the Diet as far as the Kingdom Proper was concerned, and in Lauenburg co-operating with the Nobility and the Commons. In regard to Schleswig it was further added, that while the King had already declared, and now declared again, that neither should any incorpora­tion of Schleswig into the Kingdom Proper take place, nor should any steps be taken in that direction, yet he could not look with approval on anything that either then or in the future would lead to a union of Schleswig and Holstein or would bring about a different or closer connection between those Duchies than existed between them and the remainder of the Kingdom. This, however, did not mean that he would oppose the continuance of such bonds of union as would naturally exist between countries bordering on one another, or such as were based on common institutions not of a political nature or on community of private relations.

When these royal intentions were laid before the two German Courts, the impression in Vienna and in Berlin was the same. From the standpoint that had unfortunately been adopted, there was nothing to be said against the content of the Danish proposals; on the contrary, both Courts accepted them at once. But for this very reason they desired a reliable guaranty for their literal performance. Royal intentions had been known to change; moral guaranties existed no longer than suited the will of their author. All this amounts to nothing, was the feeling at Berlin: Denmark has, as much as ever, the liberty to give her policy every day any new direction she pleases.

Prince Schwarzenberg hastened to state the question clearly. While he gave his approval to the Danish propositions, he wrote on the 26th of December to the imperial ambassador at Copenhagen, to the effect that his Court could consider intentions of King Frederick only on the condition of having an explicit declaration which should be regarded by the King as binding, and thus be certain of being fulfilled. If the Danish Government recognize this view of their programme as their own, if the actual execution of the royal intentions, which had hitherto been officially communicated only as a possibility, should be confirmed in the binding form of a declaration drawn up at the command of His Majesty the King, and if the Government should be guided by this: then all chances of misunderstanding could be looked upon as avoided, Holstein could be evacuated, a pledge for the settlement agreed upon could be given to the Confederate Diet, and the founding of the new union of the whole country under one ruler could be regarded as far enough advanced to cause the Powers to interest themselves in an international guaranty of the integrity of Denmark by means of the recognition of one principle of succession for the country as a whole.

Thus, before Holstein could be evacuated or the new succession recognized, there was required, not the mere announcement of agreeable but possibly doubtful inten­tions, but a formal compact that should be binding on both sides. With an accurate judgment of the Danish statesmen, Schwarzenberg added confidentially the observation, that the essential preliminary of success would be a change of Ministry in Copenhagen, a replacement of the “ Eider-Danish ” Ministers by men who favored the idea of a united State. Prussia expressed herself to exactly the same effect on the 30th of December. In St. Petersburg Count Nesselrode grumbled at this arbitrary fashion of making the fulfil­ment of the wishes of Germany the condition of the London protocol; but he desired before all things an early settlement, and therefore urged the Danes to unqualified acquiescence.

So, then, it happened Bluhme had as little inclination to lose his place as Sponneck, and conducted, himself, the negotiations with Counts Carl Moltke and Reventlow-Criminil, as well as with Herr. Bang and Herr Steen Bille, with the object of bringing them into the Ministry. In the last week of January, 1852, the new Cabinet was formed; and on the 28th of January appeared a royal manifesto, which arranged the future organization of the Monarchy, with some still further concessions to the German view of the matter. In the spirit of maintaining and improving relations that had already a legitimate existence, it was declared in the beginning, that the union of different portions of the Monarchy into a well-ordered whole should first of all be confirmed by the administration of matters of common importance by authorities common to the kingdom as a whole, and that afterwards attention should be given as soon as possible to the introduction of a common constitution that should apply to the management of these matters of common importance.

The matters of common importance were then carefully specified: Foreign Affairs, War, Marine, and a portion of the Finances.

The remaining financial matters, as well as whatever had hitherto been under the control of the Schleswig-Holstein Government, were to be administered by a special Minister in each Duchy. Such institutions, not political, as were common to both Duchies, the Univer­sity at Kiel, the Order of Nobility, the Canal, the Fire- Insurance, the Institutions for criminals, for the deaf and dumb, and for the insane, were to be managed by both Ministers acting together. Each of the Duchies was to have a representative Assembly with full power in matters within the sphere hitherto appertaining to the consultative Provincial Estates, and drafts of laws relating to such matters were to be laid before these Assemblies; the draft for Schleswig would contain special provisions to insure both the Danish and the German nationalities equal privileges and equal protec­tion. The Ministers for Schleswig and for Holstein were to be responsible only to the King; the remaining Ministers to the Danish Diet, but only in matters that concerned Denmark Proper.

On the 20th of January a Note was sent to Vienna and Berlin, which communicated this Manifesto to the two German Courts, and at the same time declared, “ with the authorization of the Crown,” that the King recognized as agreeing with his own the interpretation which the Austrian despatches of December 26th had given to the intentions he had proclaimed; and while this agreement held good in every particular, he emphasized it especially in what concerned the non-incorporation of Schleswig into the Kingdom Proper. It was added, that there could therefore be no longer any doubt that, after this confirmation of the agreement of the Danish views with those of Prussia and of the Imperial Court, the form which had been selected for the expression of the King’s intentions could not fail to satisfy the two Courts, so that they would no longer delay the meas­ures that had been promised on their side. Finally, the hope was expressed that the two Governments would be moved to become surety in the Confederate Diet for the settlement which had been agreed upon.

The requirement of the two German Great Powers was thus complied with to its fullest extent. The formal character of the Danish promises was not only recognized as a fact, but the decisive word itself was expressly spoken. In spite of the complaints of Russia, Schwarzenberg had carried his point, that the non­incorporation of Schleswig should be a formal condition of the London protocol. To the same effect, we may here add, in July, 1852, Austria and Prussia reported to the Confederate Diet concerning the new arrangement of the united Danish State: “ In its recognition of the independent and equal position of the different components of the Monarchy, of which no one is subordinated to or incorporated in another, the Manifesto of January 28th accords exactly with the former Royal Proclamation of July 16th, 1850, by which the promise was renewed that no incorporation of Schleswig with the Kingdom of Denmark should take place.” The Danish representative in the Confederate Diet con. firmed the whole statement in the name of his Govern­ment, and supported the two Powers in their proposals founded upon it.

By the Manifesto of January 28th, then, the constitutional difficulties were, or appeared to be, got rid of. During February the Confederate troops withdrew from Holstein, and in Copenhagen and St. Petersburg there were hopes of bringing the question of the Order of Succession before the London Conference at the beginning of March. But unless one obstacle was removed, Prussia was unwilling to take any further steps, and that obstacle was the consideration of the hereditary right of the Augustenburgs. We must here briefly review the negotiations in regard to this matter.

Immediately after the first Danish advances at the end of August, 1851, and the rejection of these by Austria and Prussia, the Minister, Manteuffel, had taken steps for the settlement of this difficult matter. The King, as we have seen, would not support the claim for the Augustenburgs, but could not, in consideration of his own attitude in 1848 and 1849, concur in the Russian view, that the Duke had forfeited his rights by rebellion and felony; nor could he accept at once the Danish assertion that the Sonderburg Line had long before 1844 ceased to have any well-founded right to the Duchies or to any part of the same. He desired, therefore, as has been mentioned above, that all the connections of the ruling House of Oldenburg should meet in a family council, in order to arrive at an authorized family decision in regard to the succession in the United Danish Kingdom; and he promised, on these conditions, to use his influence to procure a renunciation of all claims on the part of the Duke of Augustenburg. Manteuffel, well knowing the high value that the King placed on “Teutonic Princely Rights,” and sure, on the other hand, that Nicholas and Frederick would never meet in a family council with the Duke, held it essential to place the question at once in a different light before the King; and for this purpose he found in Professor Pemice of Halle the aid he desired. The Professor’s legal opinion, delivered with great erudition, was to the effect that Augustenburg, by failure to fulfil the conditions of the fief, by misalliances, and by repeated renunciations, possessed no longer any claim, and that therefore a family council composed only of the royal Danish and the Gottorp Lines was quite competent to give a binding family decision.

In well-founded anticipation of this opinion given by a legal authority, recognized by the King as well as by the Public, the Minister had already, on the 11th of September, 1851, commissioned the representative in the Confederate Diet, Herr von Bismarck, to begin negotiations with the Duke of Augustenburg, who was at that time living in Wiesbaden. This was to be done on the basis of the offer of a considerable indemni­fication in money to be made by the Danish Govern­ment, if the Duke would recognize for himself and for his family the Order of Succession arranged in Warsaw, and would give up all claim on his own account to the Duchies.

The object that Prussia and the other Powers sought in this negotiation is clear in itself, and was repeatedly stated by the Powers themselves. King Frederick William IV., after the bitter experiences he had passed through in the Danish War, felt, as did the others, an anxious wish to settle once for all the dangerous question, and to cut off forever the possibility of such complications in the future; mainly from this motive he strove to obtain the Duke’s absolute renunciation, not only in his own name, but in that of his whole family. “ If the Duke,” wrote Manteuffel on the 9th of September, “accepts a fitting indemnification, it is clear, that by that act he withdraws definitively from the number of those who have a claim on the succes­sion.”

With the same view, Lord Palmerston, on the 25th of September, recommended such an arrangement to the Danish Court, at the same time remarking that the stipulations might be made in such a form that Denmark need not expressly recognize the claims of Augustenburg, nor Augustenburg expressly renounce those claims. At any rate, let the forms of the renunciation be what they would—so wrote Palmerston—the object of the indemnification was and remained, that the succession of Glucksburg should at no time be liable to attack from the Augustenburgs. Palmerston’s successor, Lord Granville, wrote, on the 9th of January, 1852, to Copenhagen, that the London Protocol could be drawn up in favor of Christian and his descendants only when the matter had been rendered easy by the projected indemnification of the Duke of Augustenburg, and by the distinct assurance at the same time that the German Confederation also would raise no further difficulties. His main point was the same as that of the others: that the contents of the London Protocol must be assured for all time against every claim of the Augustenburgs. The indemnification was not to be offered for a merely personal renunciation on the part of Augustenburg himself, but for one binding on the entire family.

Nor is there any possible doubt that this intention of the other contracting parties was made clear to the Duke at the very beginning. When Herr von Bismarck had the first conversation with him, on the 16th of September, some points regarding his legal claim were discussed; and the Duke then observed, that he granted the existence of political considerations that rendered the realization of the claims of his House im­possible, and might make another solution of the matter appear desirable; but he declared that it was impossible to make an immediate decision in the matter, inasmuch as such a decision would not have the desired legal result, unless his sons also took part in it. It was then explained to him that the Powers desired a settlement that would bind his sons as well as himself. He rejoined that he expected the Princes in a few days, and would then communicate further with Herr von Bismarck in regard to his decision.

The Princes came; and the Duke announced on the 26th of September that he accepted the King’s counsel with thanks, and wished it at any rate to be understood that he was willing to enter into negotiations. Bismarck then explained to him, on the 1st of October, that the King of Prussia, in the interests of the general peace, had declared himself satisfied with the new Order of Succession, in the hope that it would be possible to obtain such guaranties of the same as would protect it from the action of hostile and perhaps doubtful claims. The Duke appeared surprised that the affair had gone so far; they might go on then, he said, without treating with him, and sacrifice justice wholly to expediency. He soon recovered himself, however, and declared himself ready to continue the negotia­tion, having recourse to Prussian mediation as far as possible. The next thing, then, was to await an offer from the Danish Government. At the same time he expressed the earnest wish, that, at least, the eventual succession might be assured to his House, after the failure of the Glucksburg male Line, a wish which naturally involved the recognition of the Glucksburg succession by the entire House of Augustenburg.

On the 11th of October, Bismarck gave him preliminary notice that Denmark thought of allowing him a yearly pension of 70,000 to 80,000 thalers, provided he would relinquish his Schleswig estates, and agree to live out of the country. He agreed that this was a legitimate demand, so long as he had not reuounced his claims; but he considered it unreasonable after he should have once bound himself and have recognized the new Order of Succession; for in that case his presence could not disturb the peace of the land. This observation, also, had no meaning except on the supposition that a renunciation on the part of all the Augus­tenburg Princes was intended.

The negotiation thus begun continued for some months. In the beginning of November, King Frederick William called the Duke’s attention to the fact that everything depended on a speedy decision; considering the hostility of Russia toward the “ Eider-Danish ” Ministry, the opportunity was more favorable for the interests of the Duke than ever before, if he would without reserve and without condition recognize the succession of Prince Christian, and leave the settlement entirely in the hands of Prussia. The Duke, on this, expressed his thanks to the King for having graciously undertaken to mediate in the matter of the succession, “that important question,” he wrote on the 20th of November, 1851, “ which affects my own claims and those of my heirs, not only to the Duchies, but to the Danish Throne.” But he hesitated; there was discussion over questions of form and over minor points; the Duke thought the indemnification insufficient, and had a suspicion that the Danes would defraud him entirely in the end.

Meanwhile in Copenhagen there was constant fear of taking some step that might be construed as a recogni­tion of Augustenburg’s claims. It was not till the new Ministry, formed in the interests of the United Kingdom of Denmark, were driven by Prussia’s and England’s misgivings in regard to the Protocol to take the decisive step, that Bismarck, on the 31st of March, was able to make an official proposal. It consisted of an offer of two and three-quarters millions of thalers1 for the estates of the Augustenburgs in Schleswig. In return for this payment, the Duke and his family were to reside outside of the Danish Kingdom, and in his own name and in that of all his family, he was to promise that nothing should be attempted whereby the peace of the Monarchy might anywhere be disturbed, and that he would at no time oppose the royal decisions in regard to the settlement of the succession for all the countries then united under His Majesty’s sceptre, or in regard to the future organization of the Kingdom. Bismarck was able to add the information, that, from the Danish point of view as well as from the Duke’s, the recognition of the proposed succession applied only to Prince Christian and his heirs, and that, in case that Line should at any time become extinct, all previously existing rights of other claimants would again come into force; the Danish King was also disposed to agree that the money to be paid to Augustenburg should be held free from all claims of entail that related to the estates, and also from the reversionary rights to which a part of the estates were subject. But in all these respects the King regarded the proposal as an ultimatum, by which he would be bound only up to the 80th of April.

The Duke informed Herr von Bismarck that he would send him his reply in writing.

In Copenhagen, meanwhile, it was thought that by this ultimatum the Augustenburg question was settled, since the Duke would either accept, or by an obstinate refusal would throw away every chance of further consideration from the Powers: consequently about this same time the Danish draft for the London Protocol was laid before the Courts on the 29th of March, 1852. It was Russia most of all, who urged with the greatest zeal, that the struggle which had endured for years should at last be brought to an unalterable settle­ment. Just at this juncture a final obstacle arose from an unexpected quarter.

Immediately after the dismissal of the Whig Ministry, which had occurred in February, 1852, Queen Victoria had confessed to the new Premier, Lord Derby, that, in spite of the events of 1850, she had serious doubts in regard to the proposed arrangement, partly conscientious ones as to whether the rights of the heirs ought to be set aside in such a way, and partly political, as to whether the interests of Germany, the best ally of England, ought to be allowed to be so decidedly prejudiced. Lord Derby argued for the arrangement, advocating it less zealously than Palmerston, but regarding it as a necessity, after the steps that had been taken; whereupon the Queen proposed to him to lay the matters at issue before the lawyers of the Crown for their opinion. But this also seemed to the Cabinet Council out of the question.

They said that they themselves, the Ministers, were unable even to state the question, so great was the obscurity and confusion of opinion among the foremost legal authorities in Germany itself. But the King of Prussia had expressed himself as clearly as possible in regard to the necessity of maintaining the integrity of the Danish Monarchy, so that this principle could be regarded as generally recognized. There was no ques­tion of prejudicing the interests of Germany; for a special Article of the Protocol would protect the rights of the German Confederation.

“Well, then,” answered the Queen, “I will approve the signing of such a compact, if the German Confed­eration has first given its assent to the same.” When the Ministers opposed this also, because such a decree of the Confederation could not be obtained, or, at any rate, only after endless delay, and further, because, according to all former usage, the Confederation was represented virtualiter by Austria and Prussia, the Queen concluded by saying: “Then, since Austria’s consent is assured, I will give mine, so soon as Prussia shall have given hers, and no sooner.”

These discussions continued into March; and it is by no means probable that they remained unknown to the King of Prussia, who, in spite of Pernice, was as little convinced as Queen Victoria of the invalidity of Augustenburg’s claims. However that may be, when the Danish Protocol arrived at Berlin, on the 29th of March, the King announced, on the spot, that he had long ago become satisfied with the arrangement, but that he must require that the German Confederation as such should be represented at the Conference and should give its assent; he thought that it concerned Denmark, first of all, to be secured in that direction against any future attacks.

Immediately after this, on the 4th of April, a request was sent to Bismarck to give his opinion upon the prospects which such a proposal would have in the Diet; and on the 6th he answered in a private letter to Manteuffel, which was followed on the 17th, after further information had been obtained, by an official communi­cation to substantially the same effect. The main idea was, that any acceptance of the London Protocol by the Diet was out of the question, even though it were strongly supported by Austria and Prussia. The real reason for this was the fear the Petty Courts had of public opinion and of their Chambers. The more these Courts were driven to reactionary measures in their own internal affairs, the more they felt themselves inclined in measures of general importance to shift the odium of unpopularity upon the action of the Great Bowel's, and then to approve the accomplished fact under the appearance of a gentle pressure on the part of those Powers. “You see,” wrote Bismarck, “His Majesty thinks better of us than we deserve, and makes demands upon us that are not commensurable with the heads and hearts of the Diet politicians.” He remarked, besides, that Austria, for her part, would gladly see the Confederation brought as a unit into international affairs, in order that, under this form, the foreign policy of Prussia might be entirely absorbed.

In spite of this verdict, Manteuffel was obliged to communicate the royal wishes to the ambassadors of the other Courts, but found the same reception everywhere. In view of the universal excitement throughout Germany and of the well-known condition of things in the Confederate Diet, the proposal was regarded by every one as an attempt, at the last minute, to blow the European recognition of the integrity of Denmark into the air. “ If Prussia persists in this,” cried Bluhme, “ the Protocol will not be carried through, and the Ministry which is aiming at a united Denmark is lost.” The English Minister complained of the cumbrousness of negotiations with the Confederate Diet and of the “one-sidedly German sentiment” of the German Courts. Nesselrode, especially wrote on the 13th of April three despatches in place of one, in which he read the Prussian Government, in haughty language, a lecture on a demand so utterly and in every respect inadmissible. “We showed in 1850,” he wrote, “what a value we place on the German Confederation” — “this sounds almost  like mockery” wrote the Prussian Minister on the margin— “but it has no shadow of a right to any participation in this matter.” King Frederick William, more angered than persuaded by this, sent to Vienna, on the 22d of April, the proposal for common action in the Confederation.

Meanwhile, in London the Cabinet met in order to place before the Queen the question of a change of Ministry: except on the basis of signing the Protocol, they did not feel themselves in a position to carry on the government any longer. Thus, a very serious crisis seemed to threaten the condition of all Europe. Then, on the 23d of April, a telegram from Bismarck arrived in Berlin, announcing that the Duke of Augustenburg had accepted the Danish offer. Every one breathed more freely. What object was there now any longer in disturbing the German Confederation, if the Augustenburg Family itself recognized the substance of the Protocol ?

In fact, the Duke had made his decision a week before the time allowed by Denmark had elapsed. In his statement on the subject he first criticised the pettiness of the sum offered to him. “But as,” he continued, “the circumstances being what they are, no other choice is left me but to accept or to refuse; and as, in the latter case, I should run the risk of forfeiting all the property and possessions of my family, I find myself obliged to accept the propositions of the Danish Government.”

He added, that he awaited the coming of a Danish Commissioner, in order to settle the details of the agreement. These stipulations about the form and manner and times of payment, about the personal prop­erty appertaining to the estates, about the removal of the entail, consumed many months; the single point to be noticed here is the assent of the Duke’s two sons to the settlement of what concerned the entail. The promise of the Duke made in his own name and in that of his family, to undertake nothing against the new Danish Order of Succession, stood in the final document textually as it had been laid before the Duke by Bismarck on the 81st of March; no particular documentary statement by his sons was added.

The news of the Duke’s acceptance reached London on the 27th of April, and Lord Malmesbury immedi­ately invited the representatives of the other Great Powers to a conference, for the purpose of formally drawing up the Protocol. The Prussian ambassador, Bunsen, as yet without instructions, and personally disinclined to the whole matter, came, but with the distinct understanding that he would take no part in the business. Upon this, Malmesbury announced, that, in case Prussia held aloof, the other Powers would draw up the Protocol without her. The text of the document was then agreed upon: recognition of the integrity of the United Danish Kingdom as a European necessity, and therefore recognition of the succession of Prince Christian and of his heirs in the male line. If, at any time, the extinction of this Line should appear imminent, Denmark was to invite the Powers to further consideration of the matter. The relations of Holstein and of Lauenburg to the German Confederation were to continue unchanged. The remaining Courts of Europe were to be asked to concur. The word guaranty was everywhere avoided, because the English Parliament had never undertaken such an obligation. The signing was delayed for a few days, that Prussia might have time for a decision.

The Russian member of the conference, Baron Brunnow, a man imperturbably suave and sympathetic, and at the same time extremely clever, then proposed to his colleagues a special means for influencing the King; this was, the general recognition of his claim upon Neuchâtel. The other Powers agreed to this. As we know, what the Protocol promised on this subject was not much; but nevertheless, it rejoiced the King’s heart, and it would certainly have been very difficult for him to have made up his mind, by a further rejection of the Danish Protocol, to endanger that which concerned Neuchâtel.

He was spared this trial, however. He had, as we have seen, invited Austria to common action on the part of the Confederation; but on the 29th of April he received the news, that Austria would gladly have seen the Confederate Diet take action in the matter, but that, under existing circumstances, she must regard the measure as undesirable. By this announcement every hope of obtaining any result at Frankfort was cut off, and leave was telegraphed to Bunsen to take part in the Protocol, accompanied with the charge of sounding his colleagues confidentially on the subject of consulting the German Confederation — a charge which came to nothing, as may be easily understood.

On the 5th of May, then, the Neuchâtel Document was signed by the five Great Powers; and after Queen Victoria’s consent had been obtained, the completion of the Danish Protocol followed, on the 8th. So far as the ratifications were concerned, Manteuffel assumed that all the contracting parties were mutually to pledge themselves, and therefore he sent to Bunsen six copies of the instrument. But, meanwhile, Herr von Brunnow had asserted, with great decision, that this was not an agreement between seven Courts, each with all the others, but between six Powers on one side, and Denmark on the other; the other Cabinets supported this view, and hence the ratifications of each of the six Powers were exchanged with Denmark alone. Each one, therefore, remained bound to Denmark alone and not to the other Courts.

In the evening Bunsen wrote to Berlin: “The fact that the German Confederation was not consulted is, perhaps, an advantage for the future; but for the pres­ent it amounts to a declaration of bankruptcy. To my mind, it is equally certain that the present settlement is a European necessity, and that it is a humiliation of Germany.”

So it was. With all the enthusiasm of thirty millions of people for the freedom of Schleswig-Holstein, with all the sympathy of thirty sovereign Princes for the legitimate rights of Augustenburg, such a result! But of what use to a giant is his strength when his limbs are bound, or strike convulsively against one another? Prussia had yielded to the pressure of a European Coalition, at the head of which Austria her­self, as chief Power in the German Confederation, had taken her place. The Kings of the Lesser States had helped according to their power, those very Kings who now in wrath and anxiety beheld the hereditary right of a German sovereign House decreed away by the Great Powers of Europe.

Austria asserted that she had only wished to restore the legitimate authority of the Crown in the Duchies, and at the same time also to place the legitimate rights of the people under the protection of herself and of the German Confederation. But for the attainment of these ends the most indisputable of all the rights of the people, the intimate union of Schleswig and Hostein, had been violated, a firm basis of constitutional principles had been temporarily renounced; in place of this, vague promises of allowing equal importance to the different portions of the country, of uniformity of administration and of the non-incorporation of Schleswig had been accepted; and then the Duchies had been handed over to the absolute control of a King who, by a legal fiction, was impartial.

Now it was well known, that this impartial King was an “ Eider-Dane,” like the omnipotent Majority of the Diet. One had no need to be a prophet to foresee that very soon in Copenhagen the Compacts of 1852 would be interpreted in a contrary sense, that the independence and German character of the Duchies would be threatened, and that then the dispute would burst forth again with redoubled bitterness. Under the most favorable circumstances the constitution sketched out in the Manifesto of January 28th, 1852, would have been extremely complicated and difficult in its application : three independent Provincial Diets for something more than two millions of people, beside these a Royal Danish Diet, and at the head of all a Parliamentary Royal Council for the entire United Kingdom. And with such an apparatus as this it was intended to cany­on a just and beneficent government over two peoples hating each other to the death, one of which had its foot on the neck of the other, while this other nourished no dearer wish in its heart, than to shake off the hateful yoke! Whether Prince Schwarzenberg had blinded himself to these things from ignorance or from inconsiderateness, whether the Government at Berlin had agreed with him from forced submission or in conscience-stricken atonement for 1848, the Austro-German political system could not have written for itself a clearer certificate of incompetency than these Compacts of 1852!

But in order to appreciate fully the wisdom of such a policy, it must be remembered that it not only filled humiliated Germany with bitterness, but filled triumphant Denmark with a bitterness that was deeper still.

Not perhaps the majority in numbers, but all the active and vigorous elements of the Danish People were at that time “ Eider-Danish ” in their sentiments, and felt that their own political programme had been quite as decidedly rejected by the Powers as that of the Duchies. What was it to them that the intimate union of Schleswig and Holstein was severed, when they were forbidden to strive for the highest aim of their patriotism, that of making Schleswig a part of Denmark in government and in national character? And this prohibition was not only laid upon them by their own Government, which could be made to bow to the will of the People by the means furnished by the Danish Constitution, but the precious Ministry of Bluhme had guaranteed it to the German Powers by a binding contract, and had thereby given the despised German Nation a humiliating right of supervision to be exercised for an indefinite period over the internal policy of Denmark!

The London Protocol, also, was quite as unacceptable to the “ Eider-Danes ” as the Compacts in regard to the common Constitution. While it was their dearest wish, after the death of Frederick VII, to bring Schleswig as a dowry to their longed-for Scandinavian Union, and to make Copenhagen the Capital of the United North, the London Protocol had now sanctioned anew the United Kingdom of Denmark-Holstein, and, what was worst of all, it had decided that this same Kingdom was again to fall to a King who was of German descent and who spoke the German language. Their vexation was boundless; and not until a year had elapsed did the Government venture to propose the contents of the Protocol for acceptance by the Diet as a new Act of Succession.

In spite of all indignation, however, the impossibility of rejecting the proposal was evident; and after the Diet had assented, the proclamation of the Act through­out the whole Kingdom followed. The Estates of the Duchies were not heard on the subject, because, by the Decrees of 1831 and 1834, their concern was only with laws affecting taxes and the rights of person and property or with changes in their own privileges as Estates, none of which matters were dealt with in any way by the Act of Succession. When, then, in the autumn of 1853, the Government laid before these Estates the draft of a Provincial Constitution affecting matters that particularly concerned the Duchies, but excluded from consideration the first paragraphs of this draft, as referring to matters of common importance to the whole Kingdom, the Estates of Schleswig and Lauenburg made no objection; those of Holstein, however, presented to the Crown a memorial protesting against every restriction of their freedom of discussion.

Now, Section 1 of the draft mentioned the new Law of Succession; and it has been often asserted since that the Estates of Holstein by this action protested against the legality of the Act, and that inasmuch as, in 1860, the Schleswig Estates also refused to recognize those paragraphs, as not having been approved by them, the Law of Succession had never become valid for the Duchies. But the Act possessed validity from the day of its proclamation, that is to say, long before the proposal of the drafts, because, as has been said, the privileges of the Estates were in no way affected by it; there would, therefore, have been no need of making any reference to it in the constitutional drafts. The German Confederation later obliged the Danish Gov­ernment to strike out those paragraphs of the Holstein Constitution that had not been approved, and after that time they no longer stood in the document; but neither the German Confederation, nor any one else, ever supposed that by this the Act of Succession had lost its validity for Holstein. At the same time that Section 1 was struck out, Section 2, which declared the contin­uance of the rights of the German Confederation in Holstein, was also removed: consequently, if, by the removal of Section 1, the Act of Succession lost its force, by that of Section 2 the Confederation would have forfeited its rights in Holstein. In short, the memorial above-mentioned could have no meaning, except that without the advice of the Estates no provision should be admitted into the Constitution that involved any change in the privileges of those Estates. But it was impossible that an already proclaimed and valid Act, which changed nothing in the privileges of the Estates, could lose its validity by that memorial, or by not being admitted into the Provincial Constitution. And then, moreover, so long as Frederick VII lived, neither the Estates of Holstein, nor those of Schleswig, ever made any express protest against the principle of succession contained in the Act.

So, in spite of everything, the reconciliation of 1852 remained equally unsatisfactory to both parties. If ever diplomatic mediation had fallen between two stools, the combined wisdom of Schwarzenbeig and Manteuffel, of Palmerston and Brunnow, had done so in this case — if it is permitted to apply so trivial a figure to such great statesmen.

Besides all this, these edifying agreements of 1852 had one more weak point, of whose existence certainly none of the great men of that time had any idea. The Duke of Augustenburg, in exchange for the Danish payment, had promised, for himself and his family, to attempt nothing against the Order of Succession to be established by the Danish King, and his sons had signed an agreement that the money received from Denmark should be held under a new entail. As the object of the whole negotiation had been known to both father and sons from the very beginning, no one doubted that, on the reception of the money, the whole family had, as Manteuffel said, withdrawn once for all from the rank of pretendants; and no man was more convinced of this than the Frankfort agent in the settlement, the Prus­sian representative in the Diet, Herr von Bismarck.

But there were others who felt very serious doubts on the subject. The foolish anxiety of the Danes to avoid every shadow of recognition of the Duke’s rights had led them to require the consent of the Duke, not to a renunciation of his right of inheritance, but to a promise that he would undertake nothing against the succession of Prince Christian of Glucksburg. Consequently he still retained his right after the agreement, as well as before, and was only bound not to assert it against Christian and his heirs. How was it now in regard to his sons ? Their father had, indeed, made the agreement in their name, but authorities, learned in the rights of German Princes, declared that such a promise on the part of the father of sons that had attained their majority was not binding on the sons without their express consent, and that such a consent had not followed and never could follow merely from their assent to the new arrangement of the entail. Therefore, even if the father was restrained from the assertion of his rights, the sons were quite as free to act in the matter, after the agreement as before, so soon as, by the death or abdication of their father, they became the bearers of the title of Augustenburg.

As has been said, no statesman in Europe had at that time any suspicion of these legal consequences. In Schleswig-Holstein, also, the view generally prevailed, that the Duke had irrevocably bartered his rights and those of the country for good gold. The Duke himself was silent and bided his time. He had been, in a certain way, starved into an acceptance of the Compact: the thought soon suggested itself, that a promise so extracted lacked all binding force.

CHAPTER IV.

DENMARK BREAKS THE COMPACTS.

The realization of the Constitution promised by Denmark may have involved great and perhaps insuperable difficulties; but from the very beginning a decided disposition was manifested in Copenhagen not to keep the agreement that had been made with the German Powers.

Immediately after the Danish troops in the autumn of 1850 had reoccupied the Duchy of Schleswig, a reign of terror had been inaugurated in that country, of such a nature that, as we have seen, even Prince Schwarzenberg pronounced it to be insupportable, and therefore impolitic, tyranny. The Minister, Reedtz, readily held out the prospect of more moderate measures. He had, however, so little success in inducing his colleagues to favor this policy, that on the 29th of November, 1851, King Frederick William IV took occasion to complain of “the outrageous course pursued in Schleswig by the existing revolutionary Govern­ment of Denmark;” and this was passing on that Government the severest judgment that could possibly be formulated in the mind of the King.

Nevertheless, when the final settlement of the sub­ject was arrived at, the general promise was accepted as sufficient, that the two nationalities in Schleswig should receive equal consideration, and that all parts of the country should be placed on an equal basis, and no one subordinated to any other; on this understanding Holstein was delivered over to the Danish administration.

It was at once seen what was understood in Copenhagen by the placing of the German and the Danish sections of the country upon an equal basis. It was not the constitutional freedom and security of rights enjoyed in Denmark that was extended to Holstein, but the arbitrary tyranny which was oppressing Schleswig. Every one who had taken part in the administration of the preceding years was threatened, maltreated, and persecuted. The officials that had been appointed by the German Government lost, for the most part, their positions and their incomes; even the supreme judiciary was purified by the arbitrary dismissal of counsellors of German sympathies ; and the Schleswig-Holstein paper currency, which had been in circulation since 1848, was declared worthless, without any compensation being given to the holders of it; while on the other hand, the Duchies were obliged to bear a large portion of the expenses of the war that had been waged by Denmark against them.

In Denmark the Constitution guaranteed an almost unlimited freedom of the Press, an undisputed right of forming associations and of holding assemblies, and security against police machinations not supported by proper legal orders. In the Duchies every movement of an independent Press was visited with severe penalties; associations and assemblies were forbidden to such an extent that three or four persons were not permitted to meet even for the signing of a petition to the King, and there was no end of petty and odious commands and prohibitions on the part of the police authorities. A swarm of Danish officials spread over the country, all filled with insolence and hatred towards everything that bore the name of German. In Schleswig, in the districts where the population was mixed, the German pastors and teachers were expelled, and were replaced by Danes, whose zeal, both as propagandists and police, soon earned for them among the people the nickname of “ the black gendarmes.”

Under this frightful oppression the people retained their unshaken courage. The apostates, who were few in number, found themselves excluded from all communion with their countrymen, by whom they were despised; and the great majority of the population clung together in silent resolution awaiting an oppor­tunity to manifest their feeling in a vigorous way.

A tone of mind similar to this prevailed among the people in all parts of Germany. The majority of the German Cabinets disapproved of the abominable fanaticism of Denmark; but they were quite sufficiently occupied with the sudden development of the tariff policy of Prussia and with Austria’s active hostility to the same. Moreover, it was generally felt, that, after all, this was the natural course of things after the suppression of a dangerous revolution; the Danish Government must take such measures as were necessary for its own security and authority. The actual condition of Schleswig-Holstein was regarded as a transition state, and the proclamation of the constitu­tions promised in the Manifesto of January 28th, 1852, was daily expected.

It could not be said that Denmark was in any hurry to fulfil this expectation. Two years passed before the Danish Government took any steps in that direction, and then it appeared that there had been a most edifying reason for the delay. As we have seen, in 1851 the King had declared to the German Powers that before the new Constitution of the entire Kingdom was proclaimed, it should be subjected to the criticism of the Danish Parliament, and the Provincial Estates of the Duchies should be consulted in regard to it. This latter provision seemed inconvenient to the powers in Copenhagen. In the final proclamation, therefore, made on the 28th of January, 1852, the assent to the co-operation of the Estates in the framing of the general Constitution was silently omitted; the new provincial Constitution for each of the three Duchies was then announced; and by these Constitutions, a deciding voice in regard to provincial laws was granted to the Estates, but all deliberation in regard to affairs common to the whole kingdom was forbidden them. In spite of the promise of 1851 it was thus made illegal for the future to listen to the provincial Estates in regard to the projected Constitution for the entire kingdom.

On the 81st of July, 1854, such a Constitution was imposed upon the Duchies by the simple act of the King’s will. Though a decree of this sort was contrary to the compacts, the substance of what was proposed proved to be tolerable enough. The originator of the Constitution, the Minister Orated, had not, in fact, wished to permit the German Minority to be oppressed by the Danish Majority, and had therefore limited, so far as possible, the powers of the General Council. But in Copenhagen the “ Eider-Danish ” party attacked him with such violence in the Parliament and in the Press, that the Ministry, already undermined by the intrigues of Countess Danner, was driven to resign its position. Upon this a worthy friend of the Countess, Herr von Scheele, took it upon himself to carry out the commands of the sovereign Danish People. The Constitution of 1854 was abolished; and on the 2d of October, 1855, another was proclaimed with the approval of the Danish Parliament. Naturally, once more no hearing was given to the Duchies.

By this the royal promise of 1852, that the different portions of the monarchy should be equally considered, and no one subordinated to any other, was unreservedly altered into its contrary. The entire State received under the name of a General Council an assembly with an overwhelming majority of Danish votes, as compared with the German, and with full power to legislate and to control the finances in matters affecting the whole kingdom. If any doubts should arise as to whether a thing fell under the head of matters of provincial or of common importance, the decision was to rest with the Council of State; and in this the Danish Ministers had quite as decided a majority as had the Danish representatives in the General Council. Denmark thus became legally competent to contract at her pleasure, step by step, the sphere of the functions of the provin­cial Estates in the Duchies, and thus at length to put an end to the independence of the same.

So far as the finances of the entire State were concerned, a normal budget was established—a measure in itself very appropriate, considering the complicated state of existing relations—so that any necessary additions to the same could be made only with the common approval of the popular representations in the different divisions of the country. But in this arrangement also infringements of laws and of the compacts were not lacking. The normal budget was established in 1856, at first provisionally, after consultation with the Danish Parliament, but without any hearing being given to the Estates in the Duchies. The revenues of those domains which, according to the compact of 1852, belonged to the provinces, were assigned to the common treasury, and in addition to this, a long list of disproportionate burdens was imposed upon the Duchies.

The establishment of a Ministry of the Interior for the common State was then arranged, although, according to the compact of 1852, the internal administration of each Duchy was to be managed exclusively by a minister appointed for the purpose. Finally, even after the proclamation of the Constitution, the contrast that had prevailed hitherto between the unlimited popular freedom in Denmark and the boundless power exercised by the police in the Duchies still remained. In spite of the provisions of 1852, Schleswig-Holstein was, and continued to be, subjected to the rule of the revengeful and greedy democracy of Copenhagen.

How happened it that neither the German Confederation nor the two German Great Powers took steps to prevent so crying a disregard of the compacts ?

The reason for this inactivity was as simple as it was cogent. It lay this time, not alone in the wretched constitution of the German Confederate organization, nor alone in the reactionary tendencies of the Ministers at Vienna and Berlin. Little as Count Buol in Vienna or Herr von Manteuffel in Berlin felt disposed to pro­tect the rights of Estates against royal supremacy, they nevertheless felt the insult, when a small state like Denmark trod under foot with impunity a compact that had been entered into by Austria and Prussia. But Denmark had chosen her time well. Those were the days of the Crimean War, of increasing bitterness between the German Powers, and of deep anxiety lest in the west of Germany French troops should cross the Rhine as allies of Austria. Under such circumstances it would have been madness, in addition to all these dangers, to kindle a conflict between Germany and Denmark, especially as it was certain, that, in such a case, all the Powers then contending in the Orient would be on the side of the enemy. For Lord Palm­erston, without having examined the new Constitution of 1855, declared it a glorious advance in the path of liberal parliamentary principles, because it enlarged the powers of the General Council. Neither in Vienna, nor in Berlin, nor in Frankfort, could a thought be given to Schleswig-Holstein.

In the Duchies themselves this was perfectly well understood, and the inevitable was borne with silent determination. Hardly, however, had the Crimean War come to an end, in the spring of 1856, when the Holstein Estates thought of presenting a complaint to the Confederate Diet. Minister Manteuffel instructed the Prussian representative at Frankfort, Herr von Bismarck, to report what the prospects would be for such an appeal to the august assembly.

Bismarck's answer went far beyond the question that had been addressed to him. In it he discussed the affair of the Duchies in its entire German and European relations; and he now expressed himself in regard to Schleswig-Holstein no longer from the point of view of the leader of the Conservative party, but from that of the Prussian statesman. He, however, advised circumspection. “That Denmark,” he said, “has infringed both rights and treaties is indisputable. The majority of the German Courts would, indeed, warmly approve any action taken in accordance with the principles of the Confederation, in order that they might meet the wishes of their own people ; but the decision which would be adopted by Austria under the circumstances would never be left out of consideration. The Court of Vienna, always well disposed towards Denmark, will not go a step further, out of deference to public opin­ion, than is absolutely necessary; it will constantly thrust the initiative and the responsibility for action upon Prussia, and will then be always ready, if she takes any steps, to accuse her in Germany of lukewarmness, and abroad of impetuosity. The event would depend entirely upon the decisions of the foreign Great Powers; every measure is therefore to be avoided which could give these Powers occasion for hostile interfer­ence. Even with the most favorable turn of affairs the result would probably remain far behind the demands of popular zeal in Germany. Whether Prussia in such a case would gain for herself any definite advantage is very doubtful. We have at any rate no reason for desiring that the Holsteiners should live very content­edly under their Duke; for if they did so, they would no longer take any interest in Prussia, and their taking such an interest may on occasion be very useful to us. For this reason it is very important that Prussia, how­ever just the cause may be, should act with great prudence and circumspection. We must not neglect anything that is imperatively demanded by our obligation to protect Germany from a foreign foe; but no step of a nature calculated to irritate Europe must be taken without the participation of Austria. It therefore seems advisable to postpone any motion of our own in the Confederate Diet until the complaint of the Holsteiners has been presented; nevertheless, there is nothing to prevent our taking even now, in common with Austria, some diplomatic action at Copenhagen in behalf of the sorely oppressed provinces?*

This was the opinion of the boldest statesman of our century as to Prussia’s attitude in the justest of causes, considering the constitution of the German Confederation at that time. He was only too much in the right. For this very reason, however, such a confederate constitution cannot escape fatal condemnation.

The course which Bismarck had advised was taken: in June, 1856, Prussia and Austria made confidential representations at Copenhagen, calling the attention of Denmark to the agreements of 1852. The Danish Government, after having delayed till September, gave an evasive answer, and meanwhile made efforts to stir up the non-German Powers against the German demands. But the English and Russian Governments were well enough acquainted with the ill-treatment of the Duchies, and in Paris the Emperor Napoleon decided that the much-talked-of integrity of Denmark was a matter of indifference to France. Prussia, therefore, saw no obstacle to taking further action.

Unfortunately the two German Powers now abandoned the method of direct negotiation with Copenhagen that had been employed in June. Instead of this, they prepared a common motion to be brought forward in the Confederate Diet, in case Denmark persistently refused to lay the Constitution of 1855 before the Estates of the Duchies for their consideration. The turning over of the question to the Confederation had the ostensible advantage, that by it the foreign Powers were deprived of the right to interfere in a matter that belonged to the internal affairs of Germany; but what would happen if the Powers interfered without any right on the ground of their own interests? The apparent advantage thus obtained was much more doubtful than the positively disadvantageous circum­stance, that the Confederation was justified in concerning itself only with the Confederate territory of Holstein-Lauenburg, and had no right whatever to interfere with Schleswig. While, therefore, the chief ground of complaint of the Duchies was the separation of Schleswig from Holstein, the activity of the Confederation could only tend to widen the gulf between the two, and not to fill it. This result was only too soon to make itself practically felt.

The entire year 1857 was consumed in endless writing back and forth between Frankfort and Copenhagen, and in investigations, as thorough as they were circumstantial, carried on by the committees of the Confederate Diet. Finally, on the 11th of February, 1858, a Confederate decree was passed, that the General Constitution of 1855 could not be recognized as legally in effect for Holstein and Lauenburg, and that a definite statement must be awaited from Denmark as to how she expected to carry out the promises of 1852.

Some time was taken for consideration. The foreign Powers strongly urged the adoption of a conciliatory attitude; and on the 15th of July the Danish Ministry made answer that the authority of the Confederation in matters especially concerning Holstein was unques­tioned. “ But,” they said, “ the General Constitution of the Danish monarchy, and consequently also the position of Holstein in that monarchy, belongs to the internal affairs of Denmark: any criticism of the same that the Confederation may permit itself is an unjustifiable attack upon the independence of the Danish State as a whole, which has been recognized by Europe. Moved by her love of peace, however, Denmark is willing for the time to regard the General Constitution as suspended, and declares herself ready to enter into negotiations concerning arrangements of a different nature.”

Austria, Bavaria, Saxony, and Würtemberg were inclined to enter into such negotiations; but we have already related in what way the energy of the Prince of Prussia tore in pieces the diplomatic web thus spun by the Diet, and at his direction Bismarck on the 29th of July brought about the passage of a Confederate decree containing a threat of armed chastisement by the Confederation.

In Copenhagen there was by no means an unwillingness to meet force with force, when the Confederate troops should appear on the Elbe. But the foreign Powers, and especially Russia, strongly urged that so serious a complication should be avoided by submission; and the Danish Government therefore adopted another position which was offered to them by the form of the German proceedings, and which was in the highest degree agreeable to the “ Eider-Danes.”

“ The Confederation,” it was said, “ which can only pronounce in regard to Holstein-Lauenburg, declares that the Constitution of 1855 is illegal. Very well! Let this be literally carried out; let the Constitution be abolished for Holstein and Lauenburg, and for these only, while it remains in force for Denmark and Schleswig. Denmark cannot ask for anything better than this. For Holstein will then continue under the supremacy of the King, who will once more have be­come absolute there in all matters affecting the king­dom as a whole. The laws and the budget, so far as such matters are concerned, will be settled as heretofore in consultation with the Danish General Council without any participation of the Holsteiners, and will then be carried out in Holstein by royal order. As to Schleswig, the Danish people will have the satisfaction of feeling that the mandate of the Confederate Diet itself has confirmed the separation of the country from Holstein and its union with Denmark. The forbidden word ‘ incorporation ’ need not be used, but the fact will be undeniable”

Acting on this view, King Frederick VII, in a proclamation of November 6, 1858, announced the abolition of the General Constitution so far as Holstein and Lauenburg were concerned, as well as the continuance of the same in force for Denmark and Schleswig.

As may be easily imagined, the affair was viewed in a very different light on the German side. The Confederate Diet was, however, obliged to pause in its military preparations; this could not be avoided, since the letter of the Confederate decree was to be exactly followed. The next thing to do was to await the deliberations of the Holstein Parliament, which had just been summoned. The Danish Government had employed on the elections to this Parliament every means that was at the disposal of either their temporal or their spiritual police; but all attempts to influence or to intimidate that rugged people were rendered abortive by their unalterable firmness. On the 11th of March, 1859, the Parliament voted as follows: “The Constitution is law for the monarchy as a whole, and for what concerns questions of common importance. Since the monarchy is to continue to exist as a whole, that law cannot, on general principles of law, cease to be in effect for one portion of that whole and remain in force for another. Rather, it is the duty of the Govern­ment at once to give its attention to the establishment of another general constitution that shall be in accord­ance with the promises of 1851 and 1852. Equal con­sideration with Denmark has been promised to the Duchies. Therefore, if the present Constitution re­main in force in Denmark and Schleswig, then so long as it so remains the Holstein Estates must at least be allowed rights similar to those of the General Council at Copenhagen: that is to say, no law concerning matters of common importance must be promulgated without the assent as well of the Holstein Estates as of the General Council”

This statement was as direct and free from ambi­guity as the statement of the Danish Government to which it was opposed. Posterity will not remain in doubt on which side was to be found good faith and substantial right, and on which legal pettifoggery and a spirit of arbitrary tyranny.

In these positions, between which no compromise was possible, the two parties persisted for several years. Denmark held out the prospect of fresh negotiations with the Holstein Parliament. On the 8th of March, , 1860, the Confederation decided again to postpone military action during the continuance of the present provisional state of things, so long as Denmark passed no law or budget affecting the kingdom as a whole without the approval of the Holstein Parliament. Denmark, however, made public the new budget on the 3d of July, without having given a hearing to the Holsteiners. Military measures were once more talked of in Frankfort, and were once more postponed until after another meeting of the Holstein Parliament. This ended in the spring of 1861 in an open breach between the Government and the Estates; and now finally the punishment of Denmark was to be seriously taken in hand.

Meanwhile the increasing complication of affairs had caused growing anxiety among the foreign Great Powers also, and England exerted all her influence at Copenhagen to avert the threatening storm. The President of the Danish Ministry was now Hall, who in 1857 had taken Scheele’s place. Hall was an experienced and prudent official, of a clear and keen intellect, and a vigorous nature kept well under control. He was convinced of Denmark’s just right not to allow her sovereignty to be subjected to the constant supervision of the German Confederation, and consequently to refuse to be bound by the promises of 1852. At the same time, it was manifest to him that without the protection of Europe, Denmark ought not to venture on war with a neighbor whose power so far exceeded her own; and therefore, at the end of October, 1861, he listened to the urgent advice of England that an attempt should be made at bringing about a direct diplomatic understanding with the Courts of Vienna and Berlin, independently of the Confederate Diet.

On the German side this move was hailed with joy. It had been found by experience that the action of the Confederation, limited as it was to Holstein, had simply worked in favor of the “ Eider-Danish “ plans against Schleswig. The two Great Powers to which in 1852 Denmark had plighted her word concerning Schleswig as well as concerning Holstein, could now take the whole affair into their own hands.

On the 30th of November and the 5th of December, 1861, the answers of the two German Courts were sent to Copenhagen. In these the standing complaint in respect to the treatment of Schleswig-Holstein was first renewed. Then the demand was made that the agreement of 1852 should be carried out in all its provisions: that is to say, that the Danes should fulfil their promise to give an equal position to all provinces in the entire State, subordinating no one to any other, to abandon the incorporation of Schleswig and every measure tending to that end, and in Schleswig to bring about and to secure equal rights for both nationalities. In his reply of December 26th, Hall declined to discuss some of the points of the negotiations of 1851; especially those concerning Schleswig, inasmuch as he held it to be more than doubtful whether the Powers had by the compacts acquired a right to interfere in the internal constitutional questions of the Danish Monarchy.

Upon this, the two Courts asked the definite question, whether Denmark did or did not recognize the binding character of the agreement of 1852. In his reply of March 12th, 1862, the Danish Minister did not exactly show a disposition to make up his mind to a simple yes or no, but he did not leave the slightest doubt concerning his real feeling. “Denmark,” he said, “fulfils every obligation undertaken by her; but with the Danish Duchy of Schleswig the German Confederation has nothing whatever to do. It is to be regretted that the Confederation has not hitherto said positively what it desires for Holstein. Germany must not set up, as the only valid one, any interpretation of the correspondence of 1851 that pleases her, nor must she draw, from single statements in the same, conclusions as to the validity of the whole, regarded as a formal compact. Germany ought to explain what obligations Denmark has left unfulfilled, and ought not to make Denmark responsible for Confederate decrees by which the opposition of the Holstein Estates to every general constitution has been strengthened. The question of nationality in Schleswig was never touched upon in the diplomatic negotiations: the clause referring to this subject in the manifesto of 1852 only sanc­tions the existing state of things as established, after the suppression of the rebellion, by the Danish decrees concerning the language to be used in the churches and schools.”

In all this there was no sign of yielding in any point, no trace of recognition of the rights of Germany, no shadow of anxiety lest the sorely-tried neighbor should rise up in her strength. Certainly, at this moment much-divided Germany seemed even less imposing than she had in the past. The secret hostility which had long been increasing between the two German Great Powers had, since the change of Government in Prussia, and by reason of the question of Confederate reform, once more developed into an open enmity. The Lesser States were seeking to throw off the influence of Prussia, and in addition to this the struggle between the Crown and the Parliament in Berlin concerning the Constitution was already approaching.

In Copenhagen there was good reason for doubting whether there was any occasion for fear or for weakness in the face of an opponent inwardly so feeble. It was also not unknown, that although the Prussian Minister at Vienna, Count Bernstorff, acting in accordance with the view of his Sovereign, seriously and warmly urged the support of Schleswig-Holstein, yet the head of Austrian affairs, Count Rechberg, was reluctant to act in the dangerous affair, and did nothing more than he could possibly help.

But on the other hand, the very fact of its quarrel with Prussia was a strong inducement to the Court of Vienna to make an effort to gain the favor of the small States and of the German people, and for this purpose there could be no better means than the furtherance of the Schleswig-Holstein matter. Austria, therefore, on the 26th of August, 1862, sent an answer even sharper than Prussia’s to the declaration of Hall. Her memorial unreservedly declared the retention of the Constitution for Schleswig after it had been repealed for Holstein, to be an open infringement of the agreements of 1852. “For according to these agreements all the divisions of the country were to be affected alike by the general Constitution. Schleswig, therefore, must not be placed in a different light from Holstein in this respect: a General Council for Denmark and Schleswig in which Holstein should not be represented, will at once be seen to be legally inadmissible, and to mean the beginning of an incorporation of Schleswig. A provisional arrangement of such a nature can consequently only be prolonged with the consent of all parties concerned, that is, of the Holstein Estates and of the German Confederation.”

Austria accordingly expressed a desire that the Danish Parliament and the Estates of the three Duchies should simultaneously and with equal consideration be heard concerning a new general constitution, which should above all things afford security against the continued wronging of the German minority by the Danish majority; at the same time, the severe laws of 1850 in regard to language should be repealed, and in this respect the state of things in 1847 should be revived. “But to sum up,” said the despatch, “why will Denmark now, when the question of succession is settled, and consequently the possession of the Duchies assured to the monarchy—why will she not restore the old union of Schleswig-Holstein, and so make an end of all internal strife ? ”

This touched the heart of the question; and the Danes were all the more deeply affected by it, when, soon after, two non-German Great Powers (and those the very two that bad once been most friendly to Denmark; namely, Russia and England) recognized without reserve the fairness of the German demands.

In general, the European public had up to this time rather favored Denmark than Germany. In the beginning, Germany was injured by the unfortunate catastrophe of 1850: without an accurate knowledge or judgment of the circumstances, the idea had remained fixed in the world’s memory, that a malicious attack made by great Germany had been miserably brought to grief by the determined courage of little Denmark. As to how Denmark managed in the Duchies afterwards, how many people outside of the Cabinets knew anything about it? The Press in Schleswig-Holstein was completely gagged; even the Hamburg newspapers did not dare to speak of the ill-treatment of the country. On the other hand the Danish organs daily presented their arguments to the whole civilized world, and the Government was indefatigable in finding a reception for “ Eider-Danish ” articles in the English and French newspapers.

In addition to this, there was the ever-increasing complication of the legal rights of the case, in the confusing and obscuring of which the Danish Government worked wonders. In this connection things were very much as they had been ten years before in respect to the question of the succession: no one in Paris and London wished to hear anything more about these hairsplitting distinctions. The only thing that seemed clear was the ostensible fact that Denmark was granting every sort of freedom to the German Confederate country of Holstein, while Germany was anxious to prescribe to Denmark in her internal constitutional affairs. This view took all the firmer hold, since the Courts of Berlin and Vienna were not credited with much honest enthusiasm for parliamentary rights and popular liberty, whether at home or in the Duchies.

Great surprise was therefore felt, when on the 24th of September the English Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Lord John Russell, circulated among the contending parties a proposal of mediation, which was at least half conceived from the German standpoint. So far as we know, it was the merit of Prussian diplomacy to have thoroughly enlightened the English statesman concerning the true state of affairs; and once accurately informed, the little, energetic, and conscientious man, who wished well to every one and was anxious that every one should have his own, betook himself zealously to his pen.

He began by stating what was indisputable in the question in hand. “It is clear,” he said, “that, in view of the decision of the Confederation, no laws can be promulgated nor taxes imposed in Holstein without the consent of the Estates. It is clear that the Constitution of 1855 has no force in Schleswig and Holstein because it was proclaimed without the consent of the Estates. Finally, it is clear that Denmark Proper may decide upon laws and taxes for itself without the consent of the Duchies.

“Two great questions, however, remain unsettled. The first concerns Schleswig. The obligations that Denmark has undertaken in regard to Schleswig are.: the royal promise that Schleswig shall not be incorporated, and the further agreement that in Schleswig the Germans shall be considered as on an equal footing with the Danes. Now Prussia, in her latest despatch, complains that all the natural ties between Schleswig and Holstein have been torn asunder, that the rights of the University of Kiel have been treated with contempt, that Schleswig has been flooded with Danish officials and pastors, and that all the family relations have been affected by the edicts on the subject of language. Here, then, something must be done. But a perpetual supervision exercised by the Confederation over the administration of Schleswig is evidently impracticable; and consequently the necessary guaranty must be furnished by the Constitution of the country itself. Complete autonomy ought therefore to be granted to the country, and the provincial Estates ought to have the management of whatever concerns the University, the Church, the. schools, and the language. In that case, the Duchy would no longer be represented in the Danish General Council.

“The second question,” continued Lord John, “is that of the General Constitution. It would be practically impossible to carry out the provision that every law or budget must be deliberated upon and agreed to by four parliaments independent of each other and meeting in different places. This could be avoided by having the four assemblies agree every ten years upon a normal budget for the standing common expenses (the civil list, the army, the marine, and diplomatic relations), and then letting any additions to this be granted yearly by each assembly according to its proper propor­tion. The expenditure of these sums should be decided upon by a council of State, two-thirds of winch should be Danes and the remaining third Germans.”

As will be seen, this proposition demanded that Denmark should recognize the complete independence of Schleswig, and that Holstein should renounce the ancient union of the Duchies. It required also the equal consideration of all parts of the country in the granting of supplies for common expenses.

The news of this despatch had hardly arrived in St. Petersburg, when the Russian Government hastened to recognize on the 29th of September the appropriateness of the English propositions and to recommend urgently at Copenhagen the acceptance of the same. As to the German Powers, Austria announced that she recognized in Lord John’s despatch a suitable basis for peace: and the Prussian statesman, who had entered upon his ministry on the very day the English despatch was signed, expressed even more unreservedly his approval of this plan of mediation. At one stroke Denmark saw herself opposed to the united will of four Great Powers and the German Confederation.

There was at first in Copenhagen great astonishment, dismay, and indignation. But if the insolent “ Eider-Danes” were lacking in a sense of justice, it must surely be admitted that they possessed determination and boldness, and unlimited confidence in the strength of their cause. The course of reasoning pursued by them was something as follows: “When the state of things is carefully examined, does it prove to be so dangerously changed? Will Austria’s love of peace be greatly transformed by a friendly word from London, in spite of Hungary and the deficit, into zeal for war? Will the new Prussian Minister, who once condemned so sharply the rebellion of Schleswig-Holstein, now take arms in their behalf against Denmark? Russia, too, crippled and hampered like Austria internally, seems to have had no other than peaceful wishes at heart.”

Finally, the “ Eider-Danes ” thought that they understood thoroughly the chief sinner in the whole affair, namely, England. The Queen might even now still sympathize with Germany; but the final decision, they felt, would depend upon public opinion, upon parliament, and upon its leaders. Now, the great majority of the newspapers overflowed with sympathy for Denmark; the head of the Government, Lord Palmerston, had been the prime mover in the London Protocol; the majority in the Lower House seemed devoted to him; and the Tory Opposition was almost more anti­German than the Minister himself.

“And as for Lord John Russell,” said the “Eider-Danes,” “what does he care, after all, about the Holstein Estates, or the Schleswig schools ? What he, as well as Austria and Russia, really care about, is to avert a European war; and to this end to get rid of the inter­minable German-Danish difficulty, no matter on what conditions. His now going so far to meet the wishes of Germany proves nothing more than that he regards Denmark as the weaker party, who can be more easily influenced by diplomatic pressure than the more power­ful Germany. Denmark’s main object must therefore be to convert him entirely from this view. The material strength of the German Confederation is indeed ten times greater than Denmark’s; but Denmark must show the world that she excels to an even greater degree her indolent opponent in determined energy, and that she is resolved under any circumstances to battle for her national rights to the last drop of her blood. If England is only convinced of this fact, Lord John will at once, for the sake of peace, urge Christian submission no longer at Copenhagen, but at Berlin and Vienna.”

This Danish calculation was accurate in almost every respect, as the following months were quite sufficiently to prove. On one point only it turned out to be as erroneous as possible; though it must be said in excuse for the Danes, that their mistaken judgment concerning Bismarck was shared at that time everywhere, and especially in Germany—with the exception of Bome ten or twelve persons. The fates of Denmark had so arranged it. Everything, even this underestimating of her only dangerous enemy, was to work together to hold Denmark firm in her mistaken course, the outcome of which was to be the complete liberation of Schleswig-Holstein.

On the 15th of October, 1862, Hall sent to England a negative answer, assuming a tone which left nothing to be desired in the way of haughty decisiveness. “The carrying out of the English propositions,” he said, “would mean the dismemberment of the Danish monarchy, to protect the integrity of which was the object of the London Protocol. That the General Constitution shall remain in force for the Kingdom and Schleswig is a question of life and death for Denmark; and the Government will never depart from the line prescribed to it by this conviction.”

This diplomatic declaration had been preceded by warlike speeches in the General Council, and by energetic motions made in the same for the union of Schleswig with Denmark. The King confirmed the "whole by a toast given at a parliamentary banquet, announcing that he hoped soon to see his whole State settled, and that he was convinced that if circumstances should render it necessary, his faithful people would boldly gather round him.

On the 6th of November, Hall sent his answer to the German Powers. He emphatically rejected Austria’s proposal that the union of Schleswig and Holstein should be restored, on the ground that this would not tend to pacification, but only to fresh efforts to separate the Duchies from Denmark. But rather, if Denmark, in accordance with the demands of the Confederate Diet, granted enlarged independence to the Holsteiners, she would be obliged to associate Schleswig so much the more closely with the Kingdom.

Hall then reiterated the old proposition, that Schleswig was a Danish country with whose affairs Germany had not the smallest right to interfere. He now positively denied that the agreements of 1851 and 1852 were binding. “Austria,” he said, “declared that the King's sovereign rights should not suffer by his making a statement to the Powers of his intentions. After the King had stated what his intentions were at that time, he might, indeed, feel himself to a certain extent morally bound; but there can be no question of an international obligation. At any rate, the question is too large to be settled by the interpretation of isolated despatches: it involves the right of the Danish Monarchy to arrange its own internal affairs in complete independence. Germany is seeking to bring about a closer union of her Confederate States under a national constitution; so much the more does it behoove us to be careful to preserve the independence of all the countries beside Holstein that belong to our monarchy.”

Let any one consider how formally Denmark In 1852 had recognized as a binding compact the agreements made at that time, and how violently at the end of 1862 the domestic quarrel over Confederate reform was blazing in Germany; and it will be easily understood that the German Powers saw in the Danish despatch only an open expression of contempt, and did not feel themselves called upon to continue such a correspondence. Lord John Russell, indeed, was not so easily to be convinced that his admonitions, at once so humane and so reasonable, could be entirely ineffectual at Copenhagen. Yet once more he sent a despatch thither; and the natural result was that he again received on the 5th of January, 1863, a more decided rejection of his well-meant suggestions.

On the 16th of January, Hall then sent a despatch of a similar nature to St. Petersburg. In this he prophesied the most difficult and serious complications, if the German Confederation did not refrain from continuing its interference in the question of the Holstein Constitution. In connection with Schleswig he expressed regret that he could not count upon the entire approval of Prince Gortschakoff. “Denmark,” he said, “remembering the former important services rendered her by Russia, is extremely anxious to meet the wishes of the Emperor so far as possible. There exist, however, questions of so great weight and significance that a Government cannot give up its own judgment on them to that of its friends, not even of its sincerest friends. The question of Schleswig is to Denmark a question of that sort.”

Five days later, the Upper Chamber of the Danish Parliament resolved upon an address to the King, in which a definitive constitution for the Kingdom and Schleswig—and hence the incorporation of the latter—was asked for, with the declaration that the Danish people were ready to make any sacrifice for the carrying out of such a policy.

The waves of national self-consciousness were rolling high in Denmark at that time. Hall’s calculations seemed to have been brilliantly verified: Denmark had spoken, and the world and the Great Powers were struck dumb. There was a fixed determination to carry the “ Eider-Danish ” programme completely into effect. The separation of Holstein and the incorporation of Schleswig had been practical facts since 1858; this provisional state of things was now to be formally stamped with legality. Naturally, this did not mean that Holstein was to be entirely withdrawn from Danish rule and to be relinquished to Germany: it was only to be completely cut off from constitutional existence in common with Denmark-Schleswig, and then as a subject province to be all the more thoroughly spoliated for Danish ends.

Fortune seemed to smile more and more benignly upon these patriotic resolves. For immediately after the above-mentioned propositions of annexation made by the Upper House, came crowding upon one another the news of the Polish revolt, which crippled Russia, then of Prussia’s being threatened by a French attack, and finally of the diplomatic campaign carried on by the Western Powers and Austria against Russia, a campaign which certainly was not in itself equivalent to war, but which might kindle war at any moment In such a fortunate conjuncture not an hour was to be lost The Holstein Estates had recently exhibited afresh their old repugnance to all royal favor, nay, they had even complained of the Danish Government to the Confederate Diet: now they should be made to feel what their revered Confederate Diet and especially what their adored Prussia, could effect against Den­mark’s energy, in the actual condition of European affairs.

On the 80th of March, 1863, appeared the royal proclamation, which was to open the new epoch of “ Eider-Danish ” rule. In the very beginning it was announced that the legal basis of 1852 was to be abandoned. “The concessions made at that time,” said the proclamation, “were granted with the necessary presupposition that the German Confederation would not abuse its rights in Holstein for the purpose of interfering in the internal arrangements of the Danish Monarchy, and that the Estates of the Duchies would meet the efforts of the Government with a loyal disposition. Unfortunately, neither of these expectations has been fulfilled; and since a definitive settlement of the affairs of the Monarchy can no longer be postponed, the King is obliged to take the steps necessary for this end, ‘ so far as possible in harmony with the demands of the German Confederation.”

That is to say, a new constitution was to be proclaimed for Holstein, — so far as form was concerned, without the previous consent of the Estates; and so far as substance was concerned, with no regard whatever for the agreement of 1852: “so far as possible,” therefore, in contradiction to the decrees of the Confederate Diet.

The legislation for the Duchy was in future, both in questions affecting Holstein only and in those of common importance to the whole monarchy, to be carried on by the King and the Estates. If in any affair of common importance the Holstein Estates and the Danish General Council came to opposite decisions, the matter in hand was at once to be taken out of the list of such affairs—by which arrangement Schleswig would be left completely at the mercy of the Danish majority.

As for the finances, the provisional normal budget of 1856 was declared definitive; and the public domains with their revenues were thus permanently taken away from the Duchy.

Beside this, it was decided, in further contradiction to the principles of 1852, that the outlay of the Minis­try of War, which had nearly doubled since 1856, should, with the exception of the expenses connected with the highest offices of the central administration in Copenhagen, be taken away from the general exchequer and be divided among the exchequers of the different provinces, while the general exchequer should retain all the revenues it had hitherto received. This meant an increase of about two and a quarter million thalers (national currency) in the burden of the Duchies, all imposed without the consent of the Estates, while the Danish General Council had previously had the opportunity to vote upon the subject. There was no mention of any participation of the Holstein Estates in determining how the money should be laid out, nor in the control of the expenditure. In a word, by this document Holstein was unconditionally shut out from the General Council, and Schleswig was left to take its fate there alone; the former was granted Estates having a deciding voice in its own legislation, and in gratitude for this was to continue to pay Denmark “ interest and taxes.”

The logical conclusion to these proceedings was not far to seek: it lay in a correspondingly definitive settlement of the Constitution for Denmark and Schleswig, in other words, in the final incorporation of Schleswig into the Kingdom. As a matter of fact, a royal message, addressed three weeks later to the Parliament in special session, expressed the intention of proposing to the assembly at the next regular session, that is to say, in the course of the summer, a revision of the Constitution for Denmark-Schleswig. The King concluded by expressing his confidence that he would be supported by the patriotism of the General Council in his determination to assert the independence of the Fatherland in the midst of these trying and dangerous circumstances.

Thus everything was well under way. That the indignation in the Duchies was general, was well known in Copenhagen; but reliance was placed upon the police, the clergy, and the army. The stiff-necked obstinacy of the German subjects was held to be only another reason for cutting them off from every prospect of relaxing or breaking the yoke. From Germany it was learned that the Confederate Diet had referred to its committees the complaint of Holstein, and that Austria and Prussia had prepared a provisional protest against the proclamation of March 80th. But these things had become habitual after ten years, and it was thought that Germany, on her side, would gradually become accustomed to the Danish method of procedure.

The “ Eider-Danes ” fixed their brightest hopes, however, upon the idea of a European war soon to break out, in which Austria would attack Prussia, and the Western Powers, Russia, while Denmark, by an active alliance with Paris and London, would arrive at the goal of all her wishes. The friendship with Russia, which had once, in Nicholas’ time, been so fruitful, had long before become a source of vexation—ever since it had given opportunity for such troublesome pieces of advice. On the other hand, the Danish democracy had an inborn enthusiasm for the struggles for liberty in Poland; and though the Minister Hall acted prudently in this connection, yet newspapers, associations, and assemblies openly proclaimed their Polish sympathies. No proof is necessary, that this did not contribute to improve the Emperor Alexander's disposition toward Denmark. But the fact that the “ Eider-Danish ” liberalism was favorable to the Poles, won for it all the more approval in England.