BOOK XII.

ALSEN AND THE PEACE.

CHAPTER I.

CLOSE OF THE LONDON CONFERENCE

 

Immediately after receiving the detailed reports concerning the session of May 17th, King William approved, on the 21st, a despatch of Bismarck’s to Werther, in which Germany’s further plans were submitted to Austria’s consideration and assent.

Bismarck began by saying that, after Denmark’s categorical refusal of the personal union, any yielding on the part of the German Powers was out of the question, from regard for their own honor and public opinion. “Nothing remains,” he said, “but to demand the complete separation from Denmark of both Duchies as far as the Konigsau. Very likely, from considera­tions of moment to Europe as a whole, there will be a dispute about the northern part of Schleswig; there would be no talk about such a measure in case of the preservation of a personal union, for the sake of not increasing Denmark’s preponderance over the Duchies; but in the event of a complete separation, we can the more readily allow it, since the two nationalities would be thereby wholly set apart from each other, and there would be no room for mutual complaints on the score of oppression.

“The dynastic question, the question of who shall rule over the Duchies in the future, may be postponed for a while in the conference. In its settlement, not only questions of rights, but also of compromise and of expediency, must be considered; and about them we are ready to consult with Austria.

“Count Rechberg,” the despatch continued, “will recognize with us that the most important point to be kept in mind is, that for both Powers such a measure of success is necessary, as not only can be defended and justified, but may actually prove that German interests will be most fully protected so soon as the foreign policy of the Confederation shall be controlled by the two Great Powers acting in concert. With reference to our future mutual relations, their satisfactory condition at present will thereby gain in strength and permanence; and we must consider it of the highest importance to see to it, that to the minds of the people throughout Germany a brilliant victory in the national cause shall be looked upon as the result of our present harmonious action and as an earnest of the fruits prom­ised by a further and firm continuance of these relations?’

After these general observations, Bismarck turned to the dynastic question, which, as we have seen, he wished to have postponed until later in the Conference, but about which he wished already to come to some under­standing with Austria. We must give this part of the despatch entire.

“ After putting aside the consideration of Christian IX., the claims of Augustenburg are doubtless the ones that could under the present conditions be most easily realized, and with the least danger of European complications. There would be nothing to fear in the way of opposition from the Duchies themselves; and any tendency towards suffrage universal could also be avoided. We are therefore not disinclined to favor this solution of the problem, if we may hope for the co-operation of the Imperial Government.

“ In the first place, however, it would be imperatively necessary to obtain guaranties for a conservative admin­istration, and some security that the Duchies shall not become the home of democratic agitations. The Hereditary Prince would be obliged to sever his present connections, and to lay his cause wholly in the hands of Austria and Prussia. He must, above all, abjure his unwise promise to recognize the Constitution of 1848, and must take, with proper modifications, the old Constitution with its Estates as the basis of his future position.

“But although his claims (which are consistent with a wide-spread conviction, and which can be supported on legal though not perhaps incontestable grounds) may be acknowledged by us as the most easily satisfied under the existing circumstances, yet we do not intend by saying this to exclude other arrangements, provided they meet with the approval of the Vienna Cabinet.

“The Grand Duke of Oldenburg has raised claims for himself, which he pretends precede those of Augustenburg, and which he has kept until now in the background, either because of regard for the Hereditary Prince or because he has been waiting for a propitious moment. We should have no real reason for refusing on principle to see these claims recognized; and we wish to know the opinion of Count Rechberg concerning them, as indeed we shall be glad to consider any other proposition offered by Austria, which has for its object the protection of the Duchies.

“ Of course, there can be no doubt but that it is well known in Vienna that there are those, even in the most influential and distinguished circles in Prussia, who believe that a connection of the Duchies with Prussia would be not only a proper indemnification for the efforts and sacrifices made by the allies, but would also afford the surest guaranty for the prosperity of the Duchies themselves, and the best security against any possibility of their again falling a prey to the danger threatening them from Denmark.

“We will not deny that such opinions, held by our own countrymen, must be allowed to have some weight, nor that we should not decline such an arrangement if it should be the natural outcome of circumstances. Yet we are very far from being willing by ambitious plans in this direction to call forth European complications, or to endanger the harmony of our relations with Austria. Although addresses and petitions to this effect have been presented to His Majesty by a portion of his subjects without any solicitation from the Government, the King will take no step towards the realization of these projects without the full consent of his Imperial Confederate ally.”

These last words, as indeed the whole despatch, were meant in full earnest. For, however unyielding the mighty Minister was in the execution of a great design, he was quite as versatile and pliant in choosing the proper means; and Prussia's annexation of the Duchies was only one of the possible means of solving the question at issue. The essential objects in view, the military protection of North Germany and the creation of a German maritime power, could be attained without annexation, if the parties concerned would permit the Schleswig-Holstein military forces to be connected permanently with the army of Prussia. This involved, it is true, a limiting of the sovereignty of Schleswig- Holstein, and consequently a modification of the German Confederate rights: the question was, what would be the attitude of Austria and of Augustenburg to this scheme?

Personally, Bismarck was not merely indifferent to the Hereditary Prince of Augustenburg; it must rather be said that the Minister disliked him. The King, however, continued to sympathize with him. The Crown Prince always desired with great interest and warmth to see his friend, the young Prince of Augustenburg, raised to the throne. He also hoped that the Prince would acquiesce in the really well-founded requirements made by Prussia, which had been enumerated as follows in a memorial of the 26th of February: namely, the establishment of Rendsburg as a Confederate fortress, and of Kiel as a Prussian marine station; entrance into the Tariff-Union; the building of a great canal; and the arrangement of a permanent connection of the army and navy with the forces of Prussia.

So far as Austria was concerned, it was the ardent wish of the King, as well as of his Minister, to gain the free and sincere consent of the Vienna Court to some such settlement as was indispensable for the welfare of all Germany, and not to see, as so often in the past, plans for the good of Germany as a whole either rejected or hindered simply because they meant at the same time some increase in Prussia’s individual strength. However often during the last decade Bismarck had opposed Austria, and however determined he was, if worst should come to worst, to carry through by force of arms what he felt was best for Prussia and for Germany: he nevertheless was equally imbued with the conviction that in the very nature of things there could be no more desirable alliance for Prussia than an Austrian one, so soon as this same standpoint should also be reached in Vienna. It is very certain that some arrangement which only meagrely satisfied the requirements of the main object, provided that Austria would co-operate in it, would be preferred by him to a more fruitful and more brilliant result that would have to be wrung from the Vienna Court by waging a bloody war.

Thus, after the session of May 17th in the Conference had made an immediate decision of the fate of the Duchies imperative, he laid before the Imperial Cabinet, with that open frankness which has more than once astounded the world, the question whether Austria in the Schleswig-Holstein affair intended to act in keep­ing with the new alliance, or in the spirit of the old jealousy ?

The answer to this question had already been matured in the minds of the Austrian statesmen, and when Denmark rejected the plan of a personal union, it was at once decided.

We have noticed in how many places throughout Europe the idea of Prussian annexation had been for several months discussed; and, as Arnim very properly remarked to King Max of Bavaria, it lay quite in the nature of things. This proved to be exceedingly irri­tating to the Austrians. Rechberg had already, on the 27th of April, said to Werther most confidentially that he very well understood how the thought should become prevalent in Berlin, that the future position of Schleswig-Holstein must be made to be as advantageous as possible for Prussia; and that Austria would very gladly offer her hand to assist in the scheme, were not extreme caution necessary. “But,” he added, “English and Russian friendship must be preserved as a shield against the inevitable struggle with France and the Revolution. If this is done, victory, which would be in that case certain, would bring an increase of territory to Prussia also, whereas the present conjuncture is ill- suited to the obtaining of such a result?*

Rechberg held the more firmly, then, to the hope of saving Schleswig-Holstein for Christian IX by means of the personal-union plan, and of preventing Prussia from being led into the temptation of selfish covetousness. When, nevertheless, Denmark so unconditionally rejected the personal union, a great crisis was felt to be at hand in Vienna, as well as in Berlin. The ducal throne of King Christian IX. had through Denmark’s refusal become vacant; and it seemed to the Austrians all-important to find some one to fill it, before this vacancy should arouse ambitious hopes in the minds of the Prussians.

It was uncertain how Prussia would regard the matter. But the candidate of the “ Third Germany ” was right at hand, not only of the Lesser States, but also of the Holstein people and of the whole German nation. So that if the Court of Vienna proclaimed Augustenburg for its candidate, then all that stream of national enthusiasm which had hitherto so vexatiously opposed Austria’s dearest wishes would be turned in the channel of Austria’s influence, and could with her support fearlessly await Prussia’s movements.

Then came the most unexpected of surprises: Prussia herself moved in the Conference to claim Schleswig-Holstein for Augustenburg. To be sure, the despatch mentioned other possibilities; but, never mind! those things would all settle themselves, after His Grace, Duke Frederick, should be once installed in Kiel and recognized as a Confederate Prince.

When Werther on the 23d of May waited upon Rechberg and read the famous despatch, the Minister cried: “ Just look at this message of mine which I was about to send to Berlin. It, too, proposes the raising of the Hereditary Prince of Augustenburg to the ducal throne of Schleswig-Holstein. Of the various expedi­ents which have been mentioned by Herr von Bismarck, I had already chosen the same one that he puts before all others. Our agreement could not, I am happy to say, be more complete. I go, however, one step further, and would propose the Hereditary Prince at once to the Conference. That the Prince must maintain a conservative policy, goes without saying.

“So far as the other possibilities hinted at by Herr von Bismarck are concerned,” continued Rechberg, “ Oldenburg’s claims could hardly be carried through the Confederate Diet; and as for a Prussian annexation, although we should gladly agree with Berlin on the subject, it is not practicable at present, on account of the situation of things in Europe.” The Minister closed his observations with the request that Bismarck’s despatch might be left in his hands, in order that, for the sake of the very favorable impression its form and contents would make upon the Emperor, he might lay the document itself before him.

Such friendship! such good-heartedness! To Karolyi and Apponyi, Rechberg wrote somewhat more definitely on the very next day, the 24th of May. “The hereditary right of Augustenburg,” he said, “has never appeared doubtful; but now that Denmark has made the continuance of a bond between herself and the Duchies impossible, it seems as if the German Powers, following out the wishes of Germany, ought by their rights as victors, to make good what perhaps may have been lacking in the claim of the Duke of Augustenburg. This will begin a new chapter in our politics. The peace of Europe would be endangered by any solution of the question that should change the existing balance of power among the Great Nations. So that Augustenburg’S advancement to the position has the advantage, that the application of the principle of nationality, advocated by France, and so utterly inadmissible for us, would become superfluous”

Rechberg’s words were only too true: “This will begin a new chapter in our politics.” Hitherto, in confronting Denmark, Austria had declared Augustenburg’s claims to be unjustifiable; and now, in alliance with the German States, she was to try to make good in their eyes the flaws in the rights of the Prince. Hitherto, she had held with Prussia against the Lesser States: now she thought again of siding with the Lesser States against Prussia.

Rechberg still hoped and wished, by fine predictions about the future or by compliance in this or that detail, to avoid any open rupture with Prussia. But there were other men besides Count Rechberg in Vienna, enemies of the Prussian alliance from the very beginning, who were now determined to nip in the bud Prussia’s wishes and to bring out as distinctly as possible the actual contrast between the two Courts. At their head was Herr von Schmerling, filled ever since 1848 with hatred to Prussia, and now holding the position of Minister of the Interior and Superintendent of the Press Bureau.

Even as early as the 25th of May, the two news­papers, Der Botechafter and Die Wiener Abendpost, contained triumphant articles proclaiming that the integrity of the Danish kingdom, that empty chimera of European diplomacy, had been as good as abandoned by the Powers; that Prussia had given up her ideas of annexation, and had joined Austria on the side of Augustenburg; that the question alone remained, whether she would perhaps demand from the latter certain concessions, such as, for instance, a promise to make the Schles­wig-Holstein army and navy dependent upon Prussia; and that it would be Austria's task to preserve the full sovereignty of the Duke intact. The question, it was said, might then arise, in what way and by what formali­ties should the Duke be installed in his position, and to whom should Denmark formally cede the Duchies; it seemed most natural, that, as was the case with Lombardy in 1859, they should be ceded to the victors; Austria would then urge an opposite course in behalf of Augustenburg, and even bring the matter before a Euro­pean court of arbitration; yet perhaps the accession of the Duke might take place without any legal proceedings, by a simple Act of the European Powers. More­over, it was said, Austria would not fail, after the Schleswig-Holstein matter should have been settled, to return to her grand undertaking, a reform of the German Confederation.

The programme was clearly as complete as possible. Beust and Pfordten themselves could not have written differently. Before Prussia had said a single word about a military arrangement or anything of the kind, she received notice that her only reward for her efforts and Germany's only gain from the dangerous. war would be an addition to the number of the Lesser States, and the prospect of the convention of another Frankfort Assembly of Princes, from which Prussia, after having had such a lecture read to her, would hardly be likely again to hold aloof. Only that sentence in the programme sounded very strange which said that Denmark was to cede the Duchies to the two victors, in which case it would seem as if the Prussian victor would have a word to say about the disposal of her new possessions.

Quite in the same tone as these declarations in Vienna, was the news which Bernstorff on the 27th of May telegraphed from London: “ Since we are to bring forward Augustenburg’s claims tomorrow, Beust considers it in order for the Confederate Diet to settle this question in the same way as soon as possible, perhaps by next week.”

Bismarck, after the hostile reception of his despatch in Vienna, had made up his mind to preserve silence toward Austria with regard to future plans; but to the Confederate Diet he had a very decided word to say. He sent word to Bernstorff to notify Herr von Beust and Count Apponyi, that Prussia would feel herself obliged to oppose most obstinately such a motion in the Confederate Diet as had been suggested, for the simple and irrefutable reason that such an anticipation of the subject in hand by a Confederate decree would be a very serious insult to the Powers deliberating in the London Conference,—an assertion which even Rechberg could not contradict.

To his telegram Bismarck added the following obser­vations as instructions to Bernstorff: “ Austria is endeavoring to establish irrevocably the candidacy of Augustenburg, in order by this means to render more difficult Prussia’s imposing special requisitions. We are not in a position to put up with this conduct. The dynastic question is to be discussed with special consideration for Prussian interests; and consequently, other possibilities cannot be ruled out until we have negotiated with Augustenburg and ascertained in what relation to Prussia he intends to place himself and his country. If the person of Augustenburg meets with more opposition in the Conference than the project of a division, then let the former drop.”

In conformity with these instructions, Bernstorff and Balan prepared very carefully the exact wording of their motion. It read as follows: “The German Powers desire the establishment of Schleswig-Holstein as an independent state under the sovereignty of the Hereditary Prince of Augustenburg, inasmuch as this Prince not only possesses in the eyes of Germany the best-grounded claims to that throne, thus insuring his recognition by the Confederate Diet, but also would have without doubt the vote of a tremendous majority of the population in those countries themselves.” In this way an acknowledgment of Augustenburg’s claims by Prussia herself was cautiously avoided. The only reason given for bringing forward the motion was the feeling of the people in the Duchies and the opinion of the Confederate Diet: that is to say, the candidacy of Augustenburg was advocated not on account of its justness, but of its practicability.

Meanwhile the Earls Russell and Clarendon had talked over their plan of a division with the neutrals. Inasmuch as neither France nor Russia was willing, for the sake of maintaining the integrity of Denmark, to begin a war against Germany, and even Palmerston comprehended the advisability of compromising in the event of their withholding their assistance, the English proposition, to save for Christian IX. at least the Danish and the mixed portions of Schleswig, met with general approval. According to this, the Schley and the Dannevirke were fixed as marking the future boundary; in the German portion neither fortresses nor fortified harbors were to be established; no measure was to be introduced in the future into this portion of the countries without the consent of the inhabitants; Germany was to renounce every thought of interference in the internal affairs of Denmark; and finally, to the Danish King the remainder of his possessions were to be guaranteed by the Great Powers of Europe.

Bernstorff, likewise taken into the confidence of Russell, did not conceal from him that the line of the Schley would not answer the purpose in the matter, and that the prohibition of fortified places would not be consonant with Germany’s honor. Nevertheless, the neutrals kept to their text. It was agreed that in the Conference session Bernstorff should first declare Germany’s demands, and then Russell should set forth the English proposition.

This then was done on the 28th of May. Brunnow immediately arose, and with his usual sentimental pathos expressed his painful surprise at Germany's desire to divide in sunder the Danish monarchy, rejected the motion with much regret, and reserved the rights of all Augustenburg’s rivals, particularly those of the Grand Duke of Oldenburg. Count Wachtmeister declared that his instructions would not permit him to enter into any discussion of the German motion, much less to vote for it. Quite as decidedly did Quaade say that although he had declared the German motion of the 17th of May acceptable, that made him only the more unable to discuss the present one. And since Prince Latour also supported the English proposition to its full extent, the elevation of Augustenburg was thus in the councils of Europe rejected by all voices except the German ones.

The German plenipotentiaries then took up the discussion of the English proposition. Count Bernstorff said that the German Powers could not help seeing in any division of Schleswig whatsoever a great reduction of their just demands, but that they would probably, in the interests of peace, suffer such a concession in principle; they nevertheless made the reservations of a more correct determination of the boundaries and of full liberty to establish fortifications in the German portion of the country.

Lord Clarendon in vain requested the Danes to express their opinion about the principle involved in a division. They said they could do so only after the Germans should have exactly declared their position upon every particular point of the English proposition. There was nothing to do but to adjourn the session until the 2d of June, in the hope that before that time the contending parties would come to definite decisions.

Although the neutrals were little inclined to oppose with arms the German demands, they now sought the more eagerly a reduction of the same by diplomatic means. On the 81st of May the Germans had a confi­dential talk with the neutrals, which was unusually exciting. Earl Russell announced that Denmark had accepted the plan of a division, so that the Germans might express themselves about the proposed boundary. Thereupon, Bernstorff, supported by Beust and Apponyi, explained that the aim of a division was the complete separation of the two nationalities; that the proposed line along the Schley, however, would leave thousands of German inhabitants under Danish rule; and that consequently Germany must demand a more northern boundary, the line connecting Apenrade and Tondem.

These words were scarcely spoken, before the neutrals broke out in a storm of indignation. Germany, they said, was demanding the whole of the mixed district; about such requisitions there was no use in talking; the Conference might as well in that case close its sessions at once. Bernstorff replied that there was simply no other way: after the past experiences Germany could not trust the King of Denmark with one single German subject.

In the greatest excitement Lord John cried, with a voice trembling from emotion, that such an insulting remark could not even be repeated to the Danes. “Well, then/' said Bernstorff and Beust, “ask the population, and you will see how much Danish senti­ment is to be found north of the Schley.” Apponyi hastened to observe that he had no objection to make against asking the provincial Estates of Schleswig, but that he must very decidedly protest against an exercise of universal suffrage among the people. Prince Latour remarked that a vote of the people could not have any­thing to do with determining the amount of land to be ceded, but only with choosing the ruler, and at any rate Denmark must have for a boundary some strong military position assured to them, such as the Schley and the Dannevirke.

To appease the neutrals a little, Bernstorff came over to this view of the question, and observed that the German troops had taken the Dannevirke in two days, but Düppel only after several weeks; therefore from a military point of view the Schley afforded a much less secure boundary for Denmark than some line further to the north, for instance, the one connecting Flensburg and Tondem. He said that he had, to be sure, no powers permitting him to propose the latter; and that he must the more decidedly reject the desired prohibi­tion of fortifications in the German section of the country.

In the midst of these discussions came then, to the astonishment of all, an announcement of Brunnow, to the effect that through the overthrow of the London treaty fif 1852, the reservations made in the Warsaw Protocol were again revived, which concerned the hereditary rights of the House of Gottorp; but that the Emperor Alexander, in order to show to the world his supreme unselfishness, and at the same time to promote the work of peace, had conveyed his whole right and title to the Grand Duke of Oldenburg. This was again a new protest against Augustenburg. The Emperor had already on the 28th of May declared to the Prussian plenipotentiary, Von Loen, that in the elevation of the Hereditary Prince he could see only a victory for Revolution.

In the official session of the 2d of June these doings were repeated, and were equally fruitless. The Danes would not even consent to the line of the Schley, but demanded as boundary a line further south: that con­necting Eckerforde and Friedrichstadt; that is to say, they wanted to keep just about five-sixths of the whole Duchy. Bernstorff, on the other hand, held up the prospect of a further concession on the part of Germany, by announcing that both he and Balan were ready to recommend to their Government, instead of the Apenrade line, the one connecting Flensburg and Tondern. With no hesitation the Danes declared that this was as unsatisfactory as any of the others pro­posed.

Bernstorff then introduced the subject of a prolongation of the trace which was to terminate on the 12th of June, by saying that he could guarantee Prussia’s willingness to agree to a formal armistice that should continue as long as possible. But the Danes, fearing to lose the auspicious summer season for blockades and repri­sals, showed themselves in this matter, also, to the disap­pointment of the neutrals, most determinedly unwilling to yield, by declaring that they could not favor a further trace unless there were a sure prospect of the conclusion of a just peace.

The Danes evidently still believed that, inasmuch as England would not allow the Austrian fleet to ran into the Baltic, they were secure upon their islands and could watch with composure for a long while yet the German invasion of Jutland. Not until the following session on the 6th of June did they graciously condescend to offer an extension of the trace until the 26th, to which the German Powers, unwillingly enough, assented on the 9th.

Meanwhile, in Prussia negotiations had already been begun with the Hereditary Prince. The young Prince had hastened to Berlin; but in an interview with Bis­marck late one evening, he proved to be very little in a hurry to fulfil Prussia’s wishes. After the motion of May 28th, and perhaps, too, since reports had reached him of the latest developments in the feelings at Vienna, he appeared to himself to be already a sovereign Confederate Prince, in duty bound not to betray the rights of his House and of his State.

The conversation with Bismarck turned in general upon the same points that had been specified by the Crown Prince in his memorial of February 25th. The Pretendant remarked that without the consent of the Schleswig-Holstein popular representatives he could not bind himself to any cession of land nor limitation of his sovereignty. The more of Schleswig that was left to the Danes, the less could he, on the other hand, give up to Prussia. As to a common military arrangement, something might be effected; but the conditions agreed upon in the compact with Coburg would not be admissible in the case of Schleswig-Holstein.

“The attempt must not be made,” he said,  to bind me with paragraphs; they must seek to win my heart.” “We hoped,” replied Bismarck, “ that we had already won your heart by driving back the Danes.” The Prince hastened to dispel this misconception. “The Duchies,” he said, “did not call upon Prussia. Without Prussia the Confederation would have accomplished their liberation more easily and without disagreeable stipulations.” Bismarck answered by reminding him of the fear of the Hanoverians to cross the Elbe until Prussians were stationed in reserve, and by hinting that Prussia’s enthusiasm in supporting the claims of the Prince would in some measure depend upon the attitude of His Highness towards Prussia. “In that regard,” said the Prince, “I am not at all anxious. The matter has already advanced so far, that there is no longer any danger of its being unsuccessful.”

Further conversations between him and his personal friend, the Crown Prince, led to no very much better result, and certainly to no more definite decision. For Bismarck, the motion of the 28th of May was from the very beginning nothing more than a proposal of peace to the Conference, as good or as bad, according to circumstances, as any other; and under all circumstances it existed no longer for Prussia after it had been rejected by the Conference, any more than did the proposal of a personal union.

Immediately after the conversation with the Prince, Bismarck wrote to his commissioner in St. Petersburg, Baron Pirch, that Prussia had no objection to the candi­dacy of Oldenburg, but had proposed that of Augustenburg, because it seemed to be more practicable; and that she did not consider herself bound to the latter, if any other combinations would more readily lead to the attainment of the main object, or would offer better conditions. Likewise he wrote to Goltz: “The personal question is not the important feature of our programme. Since talking with the Hereditary Prince, 1 can only wish in the interests of Prussia that, after an acceptable arrangement of the frontiers, the question of the dynasty might for a while remain open”. And lastly to Bernstorff: “ After having had explicit negotiations with the Hereditary Prince, it seems to me to be for Prussia’s interest, not to go at present any further than we have already done in advocating his candidacy; and to declare, if opposition arises, that the settlement of the dynasty is by no means the chief aim of our programme.

Also Werther received, on the 8th of June, similar instructions with regard to talking with Rechberg on the matter. “ Even if Austria hitherto has not favored Oldenburg’s claims, and, indeed, has finally decided for Augustenburg, the situation has now been materially changed by the Russian abdication of the hereditary title of the Gottorps in favor of the Grand Duke. There has now come out of those foreign and almost forgotten rights the direct claim of a German Confederate Prince; and this has already been laid before the Conference and will certainly be brought forward in Frankfort. To demonstrate to the Confederate Diet the legal basis of the claim, is the business of the Grand Duke. From political considerations, it seems to me, we have no reason to put ourselves in the way of the Grand Duke. Both of the German Powers need as great a victory as possible; it may very possibly be true that this is to be obtained by the candidacy of Oldenburg, since to this cause Russia’s patronage is certain, and the Western Powers would hardly be hostile. It may be seen beforehand, that the Grand Duke will extend his claims to the whole of Schleswig-Holstein; and the division of Schleswig would be for him not a cession by Denmark, but to Denmark, and Russia could not very well oppose a boundary-line that is favorable to the Grand Duke. We have, moreover, never wished to regard the candidacy of Augustenburg as the only possible one, to the exclusion of all others. That was simply presented as a motion; and since it was not accepted by the other side, it is consequently no longer binding upon the original mover.”

Rechberg listened to all that without raising any objections; yet he remarked coolly: “We should hardly better our situation in the eyes of the neutrals, if we changed our position again so soon.”

On the 9th of June, the Emperor Alexander of Russia, accompanied by Prince Gortschakoff, arrived in Berlin on his way to the baths at Kissingen. Bis­marck, on the evening of the 10th, had the honor of a long audience with the Monarch, and saw no reason for regretting his having inclined toward the candidacy of Oldenburg. He found the Emperor filled with a strong desire for the preservation of peace. “If the effort to continue the truce be unsuccessful” said the Czar, “then let Prussia endure the blockade, and not cross over to Fünen, lest this step might rouse the anger of England to an open rupture.”

Bismarck confessed the great dangers which such a turn as this would bring. “But,” said he, “ there are evils that are worse than war, and among them I must reckon such a conclusion of the Danish strife as would still leave the Germans in Schleswig unprotected, and in this way bring a great humiliation upon His Majesty the King, upon his brave army, and upon the Prussian people, as well as”— here he struck a chord that echoed loudly in Alexanders heart — “place a dangerous weapon in the hands of the Revolution, against which it is still the chief task of the Government to use its powers.”

The Emperor warmly seconded these words. “May Prussia always hold fast to these principles!”  he exclaimed. “In that case,” observed Bismarck, “it will be necessary to prevent our foreign difficulties from changing into internal ones. We certainly cannot be expected to lay upon Germany the burden of the embarrassments which the English Cabinet has artificially brought upon itself by its Danish policy, nor to settle questions for the English Cabinet at the expense of our own internal security”

The conversation then turned upon what should be done with the Duchies in the future. The Emperor expressed his great satisfaction at the friendly recep­tion accorded in Berlin to Oldenburg’s candidacy. He appeared, on the other hand, to be very much preju­diced in this connection against the possibility of a Prussian annexation. Bismarck observed: “We would not for the sake of that stir up a European war; but if the annexation should be offered to us, we should hardly find ourselves in a position to refuse it.” — “Very well,” said the Emperor, “it will hardly come to that. I am sure, I do not know who would be likely to make you such an offer.”

The passage was easily made from this point to an urgent request to hold together firmly with Austria, and to make no separate compact with France. Bismarck replied that Prussia would resolve upon the latter only in case Austria or Russia formed a third party in the alliance. Again the Emperor admonished the Minister not to irritate England too much, and thereby drive her over to the side of France; for Napoleon was brooding over very dangerous schemes.

Bismarck held firmly to his assertion that England would scarcely resolve upon war alone, and that Napoleon could not shut his eyes to his conviction that a fight along the Rhine, over a question of German nationality, would not only find Germany united and determined, but would unavoidably call into existence a coalition of the three Eastern Powers. For neither of these could suffer the defeat of the others; and if French armies should stand victorious on German soil, Russia would, out of consideration for Poland, be forced to take part, whether she felt like doing so or not.

The Emperor closed the audience by a repeated warning not to endanger the peace of Europe. He expressed his opinion that Schleswig should be divided by a line joining the Schley and Flensburg, and spoke, himself, of the London treaty of 1852 as an antiquated standpoint.

At least so much had been learned from this inter­view, that no serious danger threatened from the side of Russia, if the Duchies should be separated from Denmark. Whether this would also be true in the case of a Prussian annexation, was another question.

What great anxiety the Russian Government felt lest a Scandinavian Union should be formed, and how desirous it was for that reason to save Denmark from such great losses, was shown by a despatch sent to King Christian by the Russian ambassador Nicolai, on the 16th of June. It was received by the King while presiding at a session of the Cabinet, and contained a most urgent admonition to the King, even at the last moment to avoid a sacrifice of the integrity of Denmark, by accepting the plan of a personal union between Denmark and Schleswig-Holstein.

The King, who was no “ Eider-Dane,” and who placed no more reliance upon foreign aid (Napoleon had just refused emphatically a repeated summons from Palmer­ston to interfere), was ready, as was also the Crown Prince, to take this step. But the Ministers, still con­scious of their insular security, most vehemently declared themselves opposed to such a measure, which to them and their party seemed to be the very worst thing possible, and in reality the actual loss of the whole of Schleswig. For, of what use was it to the Danish people that Christian IX. should, in addition to the Danish crown, wear that of Schleswig-Holstein, if Schleswig’s finances, military matters, and diplomacy were to be entirely taken out of the hands of the Danish patriots ? It certainly would be better to give up Holstein entirely to the Germans, and if necessary even a strip of the southern part of Schleswig, and then victoriously proclaim the incorporation of Schleswig into the Danish State.

The discussion grew so heated that the observation was let fall by some one, that the acceptance of the personal union would drive the Danish people to the declaration of a republic. Inasmuch as the King persisted in his standpoint, all the Ministers resigned. The King closed the session, and in the course of the afternoon summoned various men of the old “ United Kingdom ” party, to consult with him about the formation of a new cabinet.

But he found no support from any direction. The feelings of the Parliament, the Press, and the population of the capital were extremely bitter. No one among them would hear of any independence of Schleswig. An attempt to act conformably to the Russian despatch might cost the King his throne. So the unhappy Monarch again yielded, called back to the ministerial chairs Monrad and his associates, and approved instructions to Quaade, to the effect that he should, as a final concession, accept the English motion of the 28th of May as an indivisible whole with all its clauses, but in every case to refuse further admissions. This meant the tearing down of all bridges, and the determination to depend entirely upon the protection of the waves of the sea. Yet other unpleasant expe­riences in the Conference were now in store for the Danes.

Bismarck, who was unwilling to lose the opportunity of employing practical means on account of theoretical scruples, had returned, after the Conference had rejected the Augustenburg motion, to the idea of consulting the population,—the idea originally introduced by the French. To be sure, the French would no longer hear of this as a means of fixing the boundary, but only of expressing the people’s choice of their ruler in the German portion of the country. In sharp contrast to them, Austria repudiated every form of plebiscitum, and would suffer no other expression of the national will than a vote of the provincial Estates confirmed by the reigning sovereign; whereas England and Russia wished for the plebiscitum for the same object as France, to help in the choice of a sovereign, and they would not recognize any vote of the provincial Estates before the installation of that sovereign.

In the midst of this confusion, Bismarck kept tena­ciously and unmoved to his own course. “Nor will I,” said he to the Austrians, “lay in the hands of popular assemblies the decision of either the question of the boundary or of the sovereign.” In very truth, this was meant with all earnestness by him who was determined under no circumstances to pay any attention to any wishes of the inhabitants in favor of Augustenburg. “But England,” he said, “has made the very laudable proposition of dividing Schleswig precisely in order, by a separation of the two nationalities, to put an end to their interminable quarrelling. Unfortunately, however, it is difficult to determine where one nationality ceases and the other begins. The Danes say at Eckernförde; we say at Apenrade. Now, what can be sim­pler, and what can be more necessary for an intelligent decision by the Conference, than to ask the people themselves whether they are Germans or Danes,— whether they are German at heart or Danish patriots? The result of such inquiry will not be the only factor in the minds of the Conference; but without this the Conference can never form a judgment adequate to the situation. In any case, the decision will not be given by the people, but by the Conference.”

In Vienna this speech, concise as it was, produced no effect. Rechberg would not even allow such a motion in the Conference to be passed over in silence. Yet, however much Bernstorff tried to dissuade Bismarck from the undertaking, so hopeless under these circumstances, the latter persisted in his intention. In the session of the 18th of June, Bernstorff was obliged to bring forward in due form a Prussian motion, drawn up by the Minister himself, and of the above-mentioned nature.

Immediately Bismarck’s anticipations were realized. It was evident that the Danes and their friends could permit no official inquiry whatever concerning the actual situation of things in Schleswig, concerning the language and the sentiments of the inhabitants, without seriously injuring the Danish claims. Scarcely had Bernstorff read the motion, before the Danes raised a vigorous protest; only in the future German portion of the country, and not upon that which was to remain Danish, might the wishes of the inhabitants be listened to. With intense conservative unction Brunnow seconded them.

The Russian representative loudly regretted his being obliged to oppose the representatives of a Government so closely related to his own; but above all his feelings of friendship stood his duty to his own Court. “Now,” continued he, “it is against all the principles of Russian Government to ask of subjects, whether they are will­ing to remain true to their sovereign. Should the peasants of Schleswig then decide a question which is being discussed by the Powers of Europe in this Conference? Never can I favor a view which will subordinate the judgment of the European Governments to that of the Schleswig populace.” Bernstorff interrupted him with the observation that “the people of Schleswig, who by the way are not all peasants, are, of course, not to decide the matter, but only to contribute to the Conference necessary material by way of information.”—“This motion,” cried Brunnow, “be­rays the intention to rob the King of Denmark of his possessions. I am exceedingly sorry that it has been possible for the motion to be made by the plenipoten­tiary of His Majesty the King of Prussia.”

Lord Clarendon confirmed this by saying, “The proposition aims eventually at the dethronement of the King of Denmark. That is what those are driving at who would ask his subjects whether they wish to remain his subjects or not.” Prince Latour thought it might be well to follow the course proposed by Prussia, at least in the districts where the population was mixed; but he found no supporters. Austria and Sweden seconded Brunnow’s remarks. Beust, in his own peculiar fashion, gave his vote for Prussia.

Thus the motion was utterly lost; but at the same time it was proclaimed to the world, and confirmed by Brunnow and Clarendon, that the continuance of the Danish rule was incompatible with any regard for the will of the people. The Danes again had every reason to pray, “Heaven save us from our friends.”

English statesmen had felt beforehand what the moral effect would be, if the Prussian proposition should be rejected, and how emphatically it would disclose the untenableness of the Danish rule over the Germans in Schleswig, and also of England’s own proposal of the line of the Schley. They were therefore ready with a new attempt at a solution.

The Peace of Paris of 1856 had at Clarendon’s request included the recommendation that in future contests both parties, before they took up arms, should request the valuable services of some friendly Power. Lord John accordingly now proposed that Germany and Denmark should in this way call upon some friendly Power to mark out a boundary-line, neither farther northward than the line designated by Germany nor to the south of the one insisted upon by Denmark. Clarendon added the observation that England’s idea in making this proposal was that the settlement determined upon by this Power should be final and at once have binding force. To this Bernstorff replied that that would not be mediation but arbitration, and would consequently transgress the paragraph of the Peace of Paris, which nowhere mentioned anything more than “ a mediating Power,” whose “valuable services” and by no means final decision was desired, and which expressly spoke of preserving the “ independent action of the contending Governments.”

The Danes deeply regretted that England, by making this last proposition, would very likely be led to give up the line of the Schley, which had been designated by herself, and that she no longer seemed to lay any weight upon the other clauses of the former proposal. Both parties took occasion to report to their Governments upon the new English proposition. Balan then declared that a prolongation of the truce could be granted only if the length of the same be fixed at six months; while Biegeleben was of the opinion that one might be contented with two or three months. The Danes peremptorily refused to discuss this question.

In the following session of June 22d, Bernstorff was able to announce that the German Powers were ready to accept the last English proposition exactly in the spirit of the Peace of Paris, according to which a mediator should be chosen who would proffer “ valuable services’* in effecting a peace, but without passing any binding decrees. We shall soon return to this point, and explain how it was brought about. Quaade, in opposi­tion to the announcement, explained in the name of the Danish Government that that clause in the Peace of Paris could not be applied to the present situation, and that consequently Lord John’s proposition could not be accepted. King Christian had been inclined at first to approve it, and Hall, who had been requested to give his advice, urged its acceptance; but Monrad, strengthened in his sentiments by encouraging hints from the Court of the Prince of Wales, stood immovably fixed in his determination to reject it.

This was again a move that was unfavorable for Danish interests. Denmark had again been less com­pliant than the German Powers. Clarendon sought in vain to smooth over this naked fact by an artificial explanation to the effect that under the term “valuable services” in the Peace of Paris had also been understood the office of an arbitrator, and that therefore the Germans had shown themselves quite as obstinate and unyielding as the Danes. The exact wording of the Parisian document favored, however, too clearly the interpretation placed upon it by the Germans.

The same result occurred when Prince Latour, this time in the name of his Government, repeated his motion to allow, for the sake of the information needed by the Conference, a general vote of the inhabitants to be taken by parishes in the mixed districts lying between Apenrade and Eckernförde, with the understanding that the German troops were to be removed during the voting. Bernstorff and Beust both declared themselves ready to report to their Governments upon this motion; but Quaade, in consequence of the minis­terial crisis in Copenhagen, was obliged to decline it shortly and definitively.

Inasmuch as the armistice was to last only four days longer, Balan again expressed Prussia's willingness to negotiate about a prolongation of the same. Quaade replied that he could now only say as before, that his Government would consent to such a prolongation only in case a peaceful termination should be seriously in prospect; and that, inasmuch as this unfortunately was not the case, there could be no thought of a longer truce.

Thus the work of the diplomats was at an end. The closing session of the Conference on the 25th of June was uneventful, and witnessed, outside of some further mutual recriminations, nothing other than the usual formalities and polite assurances. On the following day Clarendon said to Bernstorff: “So far you have won your game. You came into the Conference as masters of the situation, and as masters of the situation you now leave it. — Have a care how long that will last.” In the first place, arms were to decide whether the hopes which the Danes had staked upon the security of their islands were well founded.

 

 

CHAPTER II.

ALSEN.—PRELIMINARIES OF PEACE.

 

Since the 18th of June, King William had been staying, in company with Bismarck, at Carlsbad, for the sake of the baths. The Emperor Francis Joseph, anxious to be on good terms with everybody and to leave himself in no way exposed, had visited the Russian Monarch in Kissingen, and now, after having sent his Minister thither before him, appeared in Carlsbad.

Bismarck, on the 20th and 21st of June, explained to his Austrian colleague the same principles that he had shortly before in Berlin advocated to the Russians: namely, the necessity of not being frightened by any threatening danger before the accomplishment of the desired end; the certainty that England would not take up arms alone against Germany; the improba­bility of Napoleon’s favoring such a venture himself; and the assurance that in such an event not only all Germany, but Russia too, must join the alliance.

At first, Rechberg opposed this in every point The question was still, whether it would be best to yield to England’s demand for arbitration or to limit their assent to simple mediation; and Rechberg in his distaste for a war was ready to promise beforehand com­pliance with the decision of the mediator. “Otherwise,” he said, “a declaration of war is to be expected from England. In that case, Palmerston could arouse incalculable sources of danger to the Vienna Court along the Dalmatian coast, in Venetia, and also in Hungary and in Galicia; and a serious financial crisis in Austria would be the result of a rupture with England. Then, too, England would not fail to come to an under­standing with France, and the calamities of Germany would be doubled.”

Bismarck’s observation, that it would be no easier for England than for the German Powers together to make an alliance with Napoleon, was not enough to change the attitude of the Imperial Minister. Nor was any greater impression produced by Bismarck’s warning, that the effect upon the German people, of yielding in this matter, would be that they would see in revolution alone the means of obtaining for the German Nation a place of importance in European affairs. These disadvantages, which were to be borne in common with Prussia, who would also be yielding, seemed to the Count to be much more endurable than the prospect of war, which his colleagues in the Vienna Ministerial Council looked upon as the worst of all possible evils.

Over and over again he preached compliance with England’s wishes. Then Bismarck announced to him Prussia’s fixed resolve not to yield under any circumstances. “Austria,” said Bismarck, “may in that case leave to us the continuance of the war, and withdraw herself from the whole affair, with the understanding that our mutual friendship shall be preserved, and that she will certainly offer her heartiest support, if Germany should be attacked by land.” This carried the day; if things came to that pass, Austria’s influence in Germany would be entirely lost, and Prussia would without contradiction be the leader of the German nation. This would be a still worse evil than an English declaration of war. Rechberg decided to approve Bismarck’s wish to reject the plan of arbitration.

On the other hand, the Count held to his conviction that in the now certain event of the renewal of the Danish war, England ought not to be further irritated by an attack upon Fünen, and that, furthermore, such a step should be taken only after it should be agreed upon later by both Powers. Instead of this, then, it was decided to effect a landing upon Alsen, as well as also to occupy North Jutland on the other side of the Lijmfjord, and to subject the country to German civil administration and taxation. The German Confederation was to be requested to consent at last to the common administration of both Duchies; and the declaration was to be made to the European Powers, that after the recommencement of the war, the consent to a division of Schleswig, which had been formally given, would no longer be considered binding. The aim of the war should be rather the separation of the Duchies from Denmark under the most favorable conditions possible in the circumstances. All these points were then comprehended on the 24th of June in a formal treaty between the two Cabinets.

Meanwhile, in the allied army everything had been prepared most expeditiously and most carefully, so that the unsuccessful close of the Conference might be followed on the spot by a decisive blow. The period of rest from active war had been passed by no means pleasantly by the troops in Jutland. The inhabitants were so hostilely disposed, that the support of the troops (for cash payments) by those with whom they were quartered could not be carried out as had been agreed in London. The necessaries of life had to be transported in large quantities from Hamburg, and upon this importation the Danish authorities tried to levy an import duty, and detained the ships, until the chief officers of the army interfered and, instead of the ships, had the customs officials arrested. Trusting to the liberty promised in the civil administration, Denmark ordered a general levying of recruits in Jutland; where­upon the military authorities, inasmuch as the treaty of truce forbade any increase of forces or improvement in the military position of either side, captured the recruits and carried off to Rendsburg the officials engaged in the levying.

Consequently, although Bismarck and Monrad en­joined upon the authorities of both sides the duty of making as little disturbance as possible, there were constantly instances of friction at all points. The sessions of the Conference resounded continually with complaints from both sides; and the troops of either army grew more and more impatient over this anoma­lous condition of things. The Danish officers longed for the termination of the hopeless struggle, and cursed the Copenhagen demagogues, who in their secure retreat proclaimed war to the knife. The Germans, on the other hand, wished for nothing more than for the end of this lazy standstill and a new opportunity for feats in arms.

Field Marshal Wrangel, weary of the whole business, had at the very beginning of the truce besought the King for his dismissal from the post of Commander-in- Chief; and on the 18th of May he received the same, being at the same time honorably raised to the rank of Count. His place was taken, at first provisionally and then definitively, by Prince Frederick Charles, as the general who of those present had been the longest in the service. The Prince took hold of the work with all the youthful fire of his vigorous nature.

All the news that was received concerning the enemy was favorable. The force of the Danes that still remained had been reduced by fighting, by disease, and by desertion, to about 24,000 men. The islands had not been able to supply more than 8,000 recruits as re­enforcement. The courage of the troops as well as of the officers had sunk very low. On the island of Alsen were somewhat over 10,000 men under General Steinmann.

Both the Prince and Moltke had now abandoned all their former misgivings about making an attempt to land upon the island. The Prince even had, shortly before the fall of Düppel, caused a new plan of crossing to be elaborated; and Moltke would now have proposed a simultaneous landing upon Fünen and upon Alsen, had this been consistent with the Carlsbad agreements. The attack upon Alsen alone was therefore undertaken.

The first army corps, formerly commanded by the Prince and now by General Herwarth, was appointed for the task, which was to be carried out at that point where the southern, smallest half of the Straits of Alsen begin, where strong oarsmen can cross and re-cross the distance of eight hundred feet inside of half an hour. With all possible secrecy as many pon­toons and boats were brought together as could transport about 2,500 men to the island in one passage; and these would every half-hour receive a re-enforcement of the same number. To the right and left of the place chosen for the crossing, numerous batteries were thrown up, that their heavy guns might frighten the Danish ships of war from offering any hindrance to the transportation. So soon as the 21st of June, the Prince was able to send word to Carlsbad that all preparations were made and in order, — “only for Heaven’s sake let there be no prolongation of the truce!” The announcement that on the morning of the 26th, the war should be renewed, was hailed with joy by the whole army.

Meanwhile the Danes had everywhere lined the western coast of the island with redoubts, batteries, and trenches, but had scattered their troops among these so much, that at no single point was any consid­erable force collected; and moreover, the common re­serve, not consisting of more than 3,000 men, remained in the remotest southern part of the island, in the vicinity of Sonderborg, more than two hours march from Amkiel, the point of the Prussian attack.

Late in the evening of the 28th of June, General Herwarth assembled his twenty-five battalions opposite Amkiel in the Satrup woods. As soon as darkness came on, the boats and pontoons were taken to the shore and put into the water. At one o'clock on the morning of the 29th, the embarkation began; and at half-past one the crafts were all in motion. The troops, most of them being Brandenburgers of the 24th regiment, Roder's brigade, entered into the undertaking eagerly, although they were somewhat anxious at the thought that the ocean has no floor, and still more oppressed, like true Berliners, by the order to preserve strict silence in order to elude so long as possible the observation of the Danes.

But no more than half of the distance had been traversed before they were discovered by the Danish sentinels, and at once met with a shower of cartridges. This was a relief to their smothered breasts, and a thundering “ Hurrah! ” broke from the line of boats. That here and there a ball struck its mark, or a boat was smashed, did not affect them. Their swimming com­rades were fished out of the water as successfully as possible under the circumstances, and the exertions of the rowers redoubled. In ten minutes they were on the beach; and in another ten minutes the enemy’s batteries had been stormed, the Danish regiment driven from its position, and a firm footing won upon the island.

Without delay they pressed onward, and the Ronhoff forest was captured from the Danes. There soon followed a second and a third transportation. The troops which were landed were still stronger than the small companies of the enemy that came up to resist them. Meanwhile, the Danish ships-of-war that were lying at anchor in the Augustenburg Fjord had waked up: Rolf Krake and four gunboats. The latter, not being ironclads, could not venture to come within reach of the Prussian batteries. Rolf Krake advanced; but instead of rushing as a matter of life and death into the midst of the Prussian fleet of boats, it got involved in a useless artillery engagement with the first battery, and then, after retreating, withdrew with the gunboats to the eastern coast of the island to pick up the fugi­tives from Danish battalions that had been defeated or cut off in their retreat.

Thus the landing of the Prussians continued without any interruption. Roder’s Brandenburgers were followed by Goben’s Westphalian brigade. The former at six o’clock in the morning captured the enemy’s position at Kjar; the latter at the same hour drove the Danes out of Sonderborg. Then Wintzingerode’s brigade landed and took Ulkebull by storm. At nine o’clock the contest was already decided, and everybody on the Danish side that was not dead or taken prisoner was making a hasty retreat to the southernmost point of the island, that small peninsula of Kekenas, joined to Alsen only by a narrow, strongly-fortified neck of land, in order to seek safety in the transport vessels which were stationed at this point. An attack upon this position would have probably cost much blood; and therefore the embarkation of the Danes at this place during the next two days was not molested.

On the 1st of July there was not a single Dane upon Alsen. This brilliant victory had cost the conquerors scarcely 200 dead and severely wounded, and the same number slightly wounded. The Danes had lost 700 dead and wounded, and about 2,500 prisoners; that is to say, nearly half of their whole army, and besides this, two gunboats, 108 cannon, 2,000 guns, and a large amount of other implements of war.

The effect of this catastrophe in Copenhagen was decisive. Three days after the Danes, as masters of the Baltic with its Belts and Sounds, had defiantly refused Prussia’s offer of a truce, the crushing blow had fallen: the attack which, like a stroke of light­ning, gave no chance for resistance, the conquest, accom­plished in a few hours, of that island so long looked upon and boasted of as impregnable. Denmark had succeeded in accustoming herself to the thought that the mainland might not be able to hold out for an extended length of time against German superiority in numbers; but now the, waves had proved to be no longer an impassable bulwark. Where would there be a barrier to this misfortune? The passage from Fridericia to Fünen across the Little Belt would be scarcely more difficult than the landing upon Alsen; and many a frightened soul began to consider whether the Great Belt would offer any more effective protection to Zealand and Copenhagen, especially if the Austrian fleet should appear in the Baltic and thus make the forces equal on the water as well as on the land.

Until now, this latter danger had been regarded as an impossible one, since Lord Palmerston had characterized it expressly as a signal for a declaration of war. But this hope had begun to fade away. After the close of the Conference, the English Ministry had to endure in both Houses of Parliament a great storm of words, in which from the 4th to the 9th of July they were taken to task for their conduct in regard to the German-Danish question. Lords Granville and Clarendon had from the very beginning, with the vigorous support of the Queen, carried through, at first in the Cabinet itself and in opposition to Palmerston, the declaration of a thoroughly peaceful policy: henceforth all that was required from Prussia was that she should not utterly wipe out the Danish Monarchy from the map of Europe.

Palmerston, who had again without success in Paris and St. Petersburg hinted at the sending of a com­mon fleet into the Baltic Sea, would have liked only too well to make, at least, a warlike speech against Germany; but his colleagues opposed him so energeti­cally that nothing was left of the speech but the por­trayal of the possible horrors of a German bombardment of the peaceful city of Copenhagen.

In the Upper House, Clarendon declared that “ Eng­land had in January called upon France and Russia to

 

 

 

 

DISCOURAGEMENT IN COPENHAGEN 415 grant some material aid to Denmark; but both Powers declined the proposal. England alone could then have only destroyed German commerce, and not even that without injuring her own much more. Thereupon England repeatedly told the Danes that they could not count upon any armed assistance; but the Danes exhib­ited at the Conference a blind and stiff-necked obsti­nacy, which can only harm themselves, for they are now .sure of losing North Schleswig also/’

That in the beginning of the debate the victory of the Ministry was exceedingly doubtful, brought no encouragement to the Danes, since even the leader of the Opposition, Lord Derby, had said very decidedly that although he sharply censured the flagrant mistakes of the Government, yet, should he himself be called to the head of affairs, he most certainly would not wage war against Germany. The Ministry finally won the day by a small majority, through the acceptance of a motion expressing thanks to the Queen for the preser­vation of peace.

Thus the last hope for aid was taken from the Danes, and their haughtiness and thirst for war effectually brought low. The defeated army threatened to turn its arms in their own country against the “Eider-Danish ” originators of the war: General Hegermann-Lindencrone sent a friend of his, a landed proprietor, from Jutland to Copenhagen, to offer to the King the services of his battalions in the execution of a coup diktat against the democratic enemies of the State.

But this was no longer necessary. The population of the capital saw in their mind already the Prussians upon the island of Zealand and the black and yellow flag floating over the Sound. They were eager to col­lect all the forces around Copenhagen for its defence, and cried for peace. The chief newspapers of the “ Eider-Danish ” party, Dagbladet and Ftidrelandet, no longer ventured to swim against the current. On the 7 th of July the Dagblad, after recounting all the men* acing factors in the situation, announced: “Whether we are to pursue the war at the risk of our life, or whether we shall submit to a humiliating peace, the Government alone can decide. But let it decide quickly, before the sword of the victor shall weigh more heavily in the balance. The nation will follow any decision.”

In the same tone Fddrelandet expressed in its issue of the 7th of July the following sentiments: “If no change of the Ministry in England brings us salvation, then we must seek for peace. Discouragement is everywhere prevalent, and with good reason, in view of the shameful conduct of the army, and the thought that 10,000 men behind an arm of the sea a thousand yards broad, on a coast bristling with batteries, and for three days exactly informed of every preparation and move of the enemy, should in spite of all that give up Alsen to 16,000 Prussians within four hours’ time!” It is evident, that between the party in power and the army the dislike was in every way mutual.

A few days later Dagbladet made further confessions: “Dangers threaten us from all sides; and the sentiments of the nation, which have at no time been propor­tionate to the importance of the struggle, have now sunk to a minimum of power and enthusiasm. Between the King and the Ministry there has never been perfect harmony. This has played an important rôle in the political discord which has been manifest in the nation and in the army.”

The confession could not have been more frank, that it was not the Danish nation that had attempted to make Schleswig over into a Danish country, and that it was not the Danish army that had been wishing to wage war against Germany; but that it was the “ Eider-Danish ” minority, who, supported by the rest­less portion of the population of the capital, had been making the King (and through him the whole country) serve their own selfish ends, and in this way were to blame for the loss of the Duchies.

King Christian felt this more deeply than any other person. It was against his will that he had followed 'the domineering counsels of Hall and Monrad. Their vain presumption now lay low in the dust; but the misery, too, which he had continually feared, had broken over the whole country. Immediately after the fall of Alsen, he ordered his ambassador at Paris to ask the Emperor categorically whether Denmark could hope for any assistance; and he also sent his brother John to Brussels to King Leopold, to beg for his help in opening direct negotiations of peace with both of the German Powers, and to suggest the admission of the whole of Denmark into the German Confederation, as a means of saving the integrity of the monarchy.

A decisive turn of things was not long in coming. Early on the morning of the 8th of July came a tele­gram from Paris: “Everything lost. The Emperor will do nothing for us.” At noon a session of the Min­isterial Council was to be held; but Christian had not the patience to wait so long, and summoned Monrad at once. “ To this point you have brought us,” cried the King excitedly. “ Everything will be lost, if I do not at once change my Ministry.” Monrad, pale as death, but with composure, answered, “ Precisely my opinion. Your .Majesty. I could not conclude a peace on the terms upon which it could now be secured. Your Maj­esty will do what you consider necessary for the welfare of the country, which, too, has always been the aim of my endeavors. We shall retire.” Thereupon the King broke out in a storm of indignation: “ True! you will retire now that you have completed the ruin of the monarchy. And you still dare to pose as the saviors of the State. That is too much! ” With a low bow Mon- rad replied, “ History shall some day be my judge. I have done my duty,” and left the room.1

The King intrusted the formation of the new Cabinet to the creator of the treaties of 1852, Bluhme, who then without delay, on the 12th, sent off to Berlin and Vienna propositions for a truce, and for negotiations of peace.

Meanwhile, the allied armies had in all places moved forward. On the 10th of July, the Prussians crossed the Lijmfjord at Aalborg. On the 13th, the Austrians occupied the island of Mors; and on the same day, Falckenstein’s headquarters were moved to Frederikshaven, where General Hegermann had just before, without making any attempt at resistance, embarked his forces for Zealand. On the 14th of July, Falckenstein and Prince Albrecht with their staffs rode around the northernmost point of Jutland by the Skaw, at the foot of which the waves of the North Sea and the Baltic intermingle. The view out over the broad, boundless surface of the sea disclosed to them a Danish war­steamer and several transport-ships. Before the eyes of these the Austrian and the Prussian banners were raised upon the very extremity of the land.

During these same few days, there appeared on the west coast of Schleswig a squadron, consisting of three large and two small Austrian ships of war beside two Prussian gunboats, which had the intention of freeing the Frisian islands, Sylt, Fohr, Amrom, and Pellworm, from the oppressive control of Naval Commander Hammer. An Austrian battalion of jäger assisted by land; and, after many clever manoeuvres among the shallows and flats of the islands, whither the larger ships of war could not follow, Hammer was at last forced to give himself up as a prisoner of war to the Prussian gunboat Blitz. This put the whole of Schleswig and Jutland into the possession of the allied forces. On the day after Hammer’s capitulation, on the 20th of July, the new truce began, which, to start with, was to last until the end of the month, and was based upon the maintenance of the military positions as they were, and, of course, the cessation of the blockades. This time Jutland was to be, so long as the armistice lasted, exclusively under German control and German taxation.

Immediately after the receipt of the above-intimated, news from Brussels, Bismarck communicated with Austria concerning the conditions of peace. “In my opinion,” he wrote to Rechberg on the 11th of July, “ the conditions ought to involve Christian's renuncia­tion, in favor of the allied Powers, of all those rights which he has had, or claimed to have, south of the Konigsau, and Denmark's recognition and assent to whatever final disposition the two allied Powers may make of the three Duchies, and of territory belonging to Jutland, lying in Schleswig. A proper share of the whole public debt, besides the costs of the war, would fall heavily upon the Duchies, unless the expenses of the war, as really belonging to Denmark, can be added to a part of the old State debt.”

Bismarck regarded as impracticable the idea of admitting Denmark into the German Confederation. For, if it were presupposed that Denmark was to remain united with the Duchies, then the quarrelling between the nationalities would not be at all obviated, and the Confederation might find itself soon in the situation of being obliged to give assistance to the King against his German subjects; and, in the other case, there would be the unprecedented example of the admittance into the Confederation of an entirely un-German State, which seemed to be in no way desirable. The objection of France to this was also well known. In fact, Napoleon had within the last few days remarked in so many words to Count Goltz, that such a measure would drive him into a policy exactly contrary to the one he had hitherto pursued.

Bismarck urged speedy action in any case, in order to bring the Danish negotiations to a quick conclusion, inasmuch as the present attitude of the Powers was favorable, and no one could tell how soon the situation might change. He advised, accordingly, that during the armistice preparations should be made, as conspicu­ously as possible, for crossing over to Fiinen; because, he said, the Danish desire for peace was only the child of fear, and this feeling must be kept alive in them until the conclusion of a treaty. The Vienna Cabinet agreed to all this; but it once for all refused to hear to any threatening of Fünen, which might arouse anew the anger of England, and forbade all demonstrations in that direction. Bismarck shrugged his shoulders at this timidity; and, as the strongest pressure that could be brought to bear in securing a speedy peace, had. a great quantity of heavy artillery, pontoons, and other craft conveyed to Fridericia with all possible ado.

To make his course as safe as possible, he begged of Prince Gortschakoff another short visit to Carlsbad, and had there the satisfaction of finding the Prince entirely satisfied with such a German basis of peace as was naturally expected by everybody after the recent occur­rences. King William thereupon betook himself to Gastein. Bismarck, however, went to Vienna, in order there to determine upon the preliminaries of peace per­sonally with Rechberg and Quaade. But beforehand instructions were sent to Prince Frederick Charles, to give once again to the German Lesser States a strong hint concerning the stem realities of the situation and of the relations of power.

What led to this step was the following: Beust had sent, immediately after the close of the Conference, on the 27th and the 29th of June, two reports to the Confederate Diet, in which, in the first place, he represented in the brightest light his own services for the great Fatherland, and what they had accomplished in London, and then urged the speedy recognition of Augustenburg as Duke of Schleswig-Holstein, inasmuch as now, after the motion of the 28th of May, no opposition was to be feared from the Great Powers, and the same would make an end to the very pernicious talk heard everywhere, especially in England, about the selfish aims of the German Great Powers. The Grand Duke of Oldenburg was then to be referred with his claims to an arbitration. Moreover, Beust demanded an immediate declaration of war on the part of the Confederation against the Danish Government, in order to insure to the former a proper amount of influence in the future peace-negotiations. He observed finally, how much easier his task in London would have been, if some common German central organs existed, so that the German demands and concessions could have been backed by a national parliament.

Upon his return from London, he stopped at Frank­fort, where he had appointed a confidential interview with Hugel, Roggenbach, and Dalwigk. Here, however, he met with very moderate applause; the committees, at the instigation of Kübeck and Savigny, refused him the privilege of making a public speech, or of publishing his reports, on the ground that the Confederate Diet was not a parliament Roggenbach too was very much disturbed, however monstrous he regarded the proposition that Christian IX, who indeed had no claims to the Duchies, should cede them to the Great Powers. The majority of the Confederate Diet also were willing, in accordance with the wish of the Great Powers, and in spite of Pfordten’s former representations, to call upon the Hereditary Prince Frederick, as well as the Grand Duke of Oldenburg, to establish legally their claims.

Bismarck considered it still advisable to put another heavy damper upon the agitation aroused by Beust; and when at that time a great brawl occurred at Rendsburg between the Saxon and the Prussian soldiers, and to the mind of the Prussians the Confederate authorities failed to display the necessary energy, General Hake received, on the 21st of July, a letter from Prince Frederick Charles, in which the writer said that he had orders to take command of Rendsburg. As a Prussian division of six thousand men already stood before the gates and Hake had at hand scarcely the tenth part of that number, the General left the city under protest. A week later, Prussia offered in the Confederate Diet conciliatory explanations, and said that the Saxon garrison nevertheless might return; in reply to which Saxony declared that, in view of all former experiences, she should refrain from making any further proposals: and the Prussian commandant remained for the time master in Rendsburg.

When Bismarck spoke of this small affair in Vienna, the Austrians shook their heads at such summary pro­ceedings; whereupon Bismarck remarked that, as in social intercourse so also in politics, it was not wise to have a reputation for extreme leniency. Moreover, the Vienna Court looked upon the matter with divided feelings. With all their new preference for Augusten- burg, they found themselves temporarily constrained to reserve on this point, in order not to run counter to Russia, the mighty patron of Oldenburg. Beust’s proposition for the Confederation to declare war had no longer any application, since the war was at an end. Austria was very anxious to grant to the Confederation some share in the control of the Duchies after the settlement of peace; but she felt that allowing it to take part in the peace-negotiations would be decidedly incon­venient.

Moreover, Beust had completely gained the personal ill-will of Rechberg by his recommendation, at this moment, of a German parliament, and by his highly colored portrayal of his own doings in London. “Beust’s reports,” cried Rechberg, “are insulting to the Great Powers. They are presumptuous and danger­ous to us all.” At Rechberg’s recommendation, very courteous but also very sharp protests were sent to Dresden by the two Powers; and Bismarck was all the more determined to encounter Beust’s ambitious endeavor openly and with unrelenting firmness, on account of the last manoeuvre, at this very time, of the Saxon Confederate Commissioner in Holstein, Herr von Konneritz, which had excited great dissatisfaction in Berlin.

This action of Konneritz consisted in having con­cluded, on his own responsibility (his Hanoverian colleagues subsequently expressed their assent), on the 22d of July, in behalf of the Duchy of Holstein, two treaties with the Hanse Towns Hamburg and Lubeck concerning the establishment and control of new telegraph-lines,— the treaties to be binding for ten years. The contents of the treaties ’seemed to the Prussian Minister of Commerce to be inconsistent with the interests of his State. Bismarck declared on the spot that the commissioners of the chastisement had no authority whatever to conclude such treaties as would bind beyond the duration of the chastisement the state intrusted temporarily to their guidance. He accordingly had a notification published in all countries concerned, that Prussia considered these treaties as null and void and protested against their execution. Rechberg, too, acknowledged that the commissioners had certainly overstepped the limits of their authority in this matter, but urged that, in order to spare the sovereign Confederate States, Hamburg and Lubeck, the treaties be not cancelled, but rather that their insufficiency should be made good by a subsequent decree of the Confederation, — an expedient which Bismarck again in full seriousness rejected.

When the Ministers then turned their attention to the main business in hand, a Danish treaty of peace, Bismarck at once spoke again of the policy, in case the enemy proved to be stubbornly obstinate, of landing upon the island of Fünen; but he found his Austrian colleague as disinclined to this step as ever. In fact, this time it was Rechberg that suggested the question, whether Prussia would be willing, if it should be found advisable, to undertake this step alone. Bismarck expressed her readiness to do so, if Austria’s support could be counted upon in other respects. Then the question of the expenses of the war was taken up, and Bismarck sounded the Count with regard to Austria’s giving her consent that Prussia should, in return for a portion of her disbursements, receive Lauenburg. After some hesitation, Rechbeig answered that he had personally no objections to raise, but that before making any official declaration, he must consult the wishes of the Emperor. To a question of Bismarck’s, whether Austria would not in a similar manner be glad to receive the Danish islands in the West Indies, Rechberg immediately replied by rejecting unconditionally any offer of such insecure and fruitless possessions.

Hereupon the Peace Conference with Quaade and his military counsellor, Colonel Kaufmann, was opened on the 25th of July. Very naturally Quaade declared the cession of the three Duchies, which would be two-fifths of the whole monarchy, to be too hard a requisi­tion. Bismarck replied that the feeling of severity would disappear, if Denmark would look at the matter from the standpoint prevalent among the German people, in accordance with which, aside from the now repudiated London compact, different persons should have succeeded, at the death of Frederick VII, to the thrones of Denmark and of the Duchies, so that the separation of the two parts of the kingdom would have taken place of itself.

The Danes thereupon wished to bring forward legal proofs of the identity of the succession; but Bismarck interrupted them by saying that he had mentioned the matter only for the sake of calling the attention of the Danes to an easier way of comprehending the situation. “As a matter of fact,” he said, “it is of no consequence whether the separation of the Duchies from Denmark shall ensue on account of the division in the inheritance or in virtue of our conquest. The question depends no longer at all upon legal arguments pro and con, but, in view of the limited duration of the truce, upon the actual progress made toward a settlement, and accordingly upon a declaration by the Danes, what concessions they are ready to make.” Quaade hesitated a moment longer; but the situation was only too evident; he therefore entered without further protests or reservations into the negotiations. It is not necessary for us now to follow the course of these day by day. It will be enough to enumerate the chief points upon which everything turned.

The cession of the three Duchies was in principle no further disputed. “ The King of Denmark,” it was said in the final document,“ renounces all his rights to these Duchies in favor of the Emperor of Austria and the King of Prussia, and pledges himself to recognize the dis­positions that these Sovereigns shall make concerning them.” But the more eagerly did the Danes labor to obtain from the victors by some means or other a piece of North Schleswig. It was argued that for Lauenburg, to which the claim of the Danish crown was con­fessedly undisputed, a corresponding portion of Schles­wig land might be left to Denmark; and again, that that part of Schleswig to which there were proofs of a Danish hereditary right might be given back to the Danes. Both of these demands were at once and decisively rejected.

On the other hand, another proposal was listened to more favorably. Southwards from the Konigsau, in the western part of Schleswig, there were a number of enclaves, or lands belonging from time immemorial legally to Jutland and under her administration, and which were entirely enclosed in foreign territory. These districts Quaade earnestly wished either to save for Denmark or to give up only in return for some indemnification. After numerous discussions and tele­graphic communications with Gastein and Copenhagen, it was decided that the Danes should retain the district of Ripen, and in return for the remaining enclaves be given the island of Arid and a small strip of land to the south of Holding. More detailed determination of the boundaries was referred to the final peace-negotiations.

Also definite fundamental principles with regard to the money questions were temporarily fixed, which were afterwards to be regulated in minor points at the later negotiations. It was decided that the debts specially contracted by any of the countries, by the Kingdom of Denmark, or by one of the three Duchies, should be assumed by that country itself; and the debts contracted on the account of the Danish State as a whole should be divided among Denmark and the Duchies in proportion to the population. Excepted from this was, on the one hand, the Danish war-loan negotiated towards the end of 1868, which Denmark should assume, and on the other hand, the war expenses of the allies, which should fall to the lot of the Duchies. To this last point Quaade had continually asserted the physical impossibility for Denmark to make this payment, and declared that she would not sign a peace with this burden, but rather wait to see what the allies would then do. In fact, it did seem cruel to burden a State, from whom one had already taken almost one-half of her former possessions, still further with a heavy war­debt, however much a portion of the German people complained at such one-sided leniency towards the originators of the war.

At the very last a sharp dispute arose over the treat­ment of Jutland during the truce, which was to be extended. At first the Danes had demanded the evac­uation of the Province immediately after the signing of the Preliminaries; but the Germans had no idea of giving up this means of pressure for securing a speedy conclusion of definite terms. Rechberg, who did not care much about the conditions one way or the other, but was anxious to come to some settlement quickly, announced that if the Danes insisted upon the evacuation, the war would be renewed on the 1st of August.

Thereupon a telegram from Copenhagen on the 30th of July brought to Quaade instructions to abandon the demand for the evacuation, but yet to ask for the main­tenance of the Danish civil administration in Jutland. This point gave rise to an unusually heated debate on the 31st of July, in which Bismarck was obliged to threaten again the discontinuance of negotiations, before Quaade made up his mind to send a final telegram to Copenhagen, which succeeded in procuring also in this point submission to the will of the German Powers.

Thus, on the 1st of August, 1864, the Preliminaries of Peace were signed. Schleswig-Holstein was free from Denmark. The German brothers north of the Elbe were delivered from foreign oppression; the German language, German churches, and German schools were again to have free course from the Elbe to the Konigsau. After a generation of insupportable injury and empty words, the honor of the German name had in this vital question been at last brilliantly restored.

According to the unanimous testimony of Europe, which was partial towards our adversary, the credit of having secured this salvation was due in the foremost place to the Prussian Government, to the patriotic determination of King William, who, in spite of all obstacles and dangers, constantly held the great goal before his eyes, and to the far-seeing energy of his Minister, who from the very first day with his quick foresight discovered and held fast to the only possible course that could afford a prosperous passage through the seas so filled with dangerous rocks. The course decided upon owed its selection to Bismarck's conviction that the solution of the question depended less upon the popular enthusiasm of the German people than upon the favorable attitude of the foreign Great Powers.

The Prussian Government had succeeded, up to the very moment when the crisis appeared, in shaping the European relations of Prussia most satisfactorily: by interfering against the Polish insurrection she secured the true friendship of Russia; by resisting the Frankfort assembly of Princes she gained the good-will of France, and then increased this to warm sympathy by a clever treatment of Napoleon’s idea of holding a congress, while at the same time she aroused in Vienna the urgent desire to become more closely connected with Prussia. Not to have improved the advantages of such a position, but to have compromised it, would have been a sin, not only against the rules of politics, but against sound common-sense.

Now, Prussia had, like all the other Great Powers, recognized in the London Protocol of 1852 the integrity of the Danish Kingdom and the succession of Prince Christian. It was well known that in 1868 almost all of these other Powers had eagerly desired to consider this compact valid. If, then, Prussia had at that time in flagrant violation of the treaty suddenly declared against Christian and in favor of Augustenburg as the rightful heir, she would have stood again, as in 1848, in open opposition to the whole of Europe; she would have been certain of the mortal enmity of Austria, and would have been a prey to Palmerston’s thirst for war and to Gortschakoff’s hatred. Bismarck had, moreover, still less thought of exposing Prussia to such dangers, since he, who had in 1852 conducted those negotiations with the Duke of Augustenburg, was firmly and sincerely convinced, that by the latter’s promises the hereditary right of his House was rendered ineffective until the extinction of the Glücksburg line. Conse­quently, at the death of Frederick VII, Prussia unreservedly declared that she considered herself then as before bound by the London Protocol, and accordingly would raise no objections to the succession of Christian IX, even in the Duchies.

But on this account the deliverance of Schleswig- Holstein from Danish foreign rule was not to be given up. Denmark, too, had in 1852 taken upon herself obligations towards Germany with regard to the consti­tution of the Duchies; but these she had never ful­filled, and she had finally been openly false to them by the November Constitution. This was acknowledged by all the Great Powers to be illegal, while they declined absolutely to entertain any doubts about Christian’s claims to the succession. They consequently were unable to make any objections, when Prussia, after many and useless negotiations, at last, on account of this quarrel over the Constitution, declared war upon the King-Duke. Austria, who thanked Heaven that Prussia was not putting herself at the head of a move­ment supported by the enthusiasm of the German people, joined her Confederate ally in the undertaking. In face of this strong alliance, no one of the Continental Powers felt further tempted to interfere with hostile intentions. At the outbreak of the war, in accordance with the first principles of international law, all former treaties between the belligerent parties were nullified; so that also Prussia and Austria were no longer bound to the London Protocol further than they might find to their own advantage.

In Bismarck's judgment the integrity of the Danish kingdom was most certainly not to be respected, but Christian’s right of succession not to be interfered with. Once, at the time of the London Conference, when all the other Great Powers were emphasizing more and more vigorously the continued validity of the Protocol of 1852, Bismarck threw out the suggestion that, legally considered, Christian’s claim to the throne was by no means such that it could not be called into question; and Bernstorff elaborated this observation in the Conference. Immediately afterwards, however, Bismarck returned to the old standpoint, avoided any recognition whatever of the Augustenburg claims, and declared the motion of May 28th, by its rejection by the Conference as settled for all time. By no means the smallest proof of the stability of his standpoint was the fact that all the efforts of the adversaries only served to insure and extend his success. The great agitation for Augustenburg in Germany constantly resulted in attaching Austria so much the more firmly to the policy of Prussia; and on the other side, Palmerston’s bloodthirsty inciting of Denmark against Prussia caused an increase of the Danes’ persistent obstinacy, and therewith the continuance of the war, until this led to complete overthrow.

Thus the old dream of the German nation, the liberation of Schleswig-Holstein, was successfully fulfilled. Bismarck had good reason to say, as he did often afterwards, that of all his undertakings, he considered the diplomatic task of 1864 to be at once the hardest and the most fortunate. By the Treaty of August 1st the Duchies were delivered from Denmark, and the determination of their political future placed in the hands of the two German Great Powers.

But at this final moment the Austro-Prussian alliance itself took on a new phase. For Austria had entered into it, not in order to help build up Prussia by the ruin of the united Danish State, but to prevent any increase of Prussia’s power; not to separate the Duchies from Denmark, but to procure for them a somewhat better constitution under Danish supremacy. Only by the force of circumstances and not by its own will was the Vienna Cabinet brought finally to the Treaty of August 1st. And if one had asked for the ultimate reason why Schleswig-Holstein ought to remain connected with Denmark, the answer, scarcely concealed in Vienna, and yet irrefutable, would have been: that it may not become Prussian. At present, the country had been ceded to the two Powers as a common possession, and the two had mutually promised each other not to decide about its future, except in common agreement; and now, in view of such opposing desires, would it be possible to make any such agreement?

 

 

CHAPTER III.

THE PEACE OF VIENNA.

 

Immediately after the signing of the preliminaries of peace, Bismarck left Vienna to have an interview with the King at Gastein. Preparatory arrangements for the final compact, which was also to be settled at Vienna, were at once entered upon by the Cabinet of Berlin. Herren von Balan and von Werther drew up general outlines of such a document. In the department of trade the indemnity due the merchants and ship-owners was calculated. Special commissioners for the more exact settlement of the boundaries, as well as for the difficult proportionate adjustment of the Danish and the Schleswig-Holstein state-debt, were selected: for the former the Prussian Colonel Stiehle with the Austrian Colonel Schönfeld, and for the latter the former president of the Holstein Estates, Baron Carl von Scheet-Plessen, an official who had gained experience in the Danish service, and who was now a zealous supporter of the Prussian annexation of the Duchies.

The management of the negotiations as a whole was intrusted to Count Rechberg on the part of Austria, and to Baron von Werther on that of Prussia; and the former ambassadors in Copenhagen, Brenner and Balan,  were appointed to assist them. The two Powers were agreed that in these negotiations, as in those of the preliminaries, the German Confederation was not to partici­pate, not being allowed a voice in the peace, since it had taken no part in the war. On this point, however, there was a difference in the attitude of the two Cabinets, Rechberg being anxious to act with all possible mildness so far as the Lesser States were concerned, while Bismarck was disposed to be peremptory.

Rechberg, for instance, thought it would be desirable to communicate the preliminaries of peace officially to the august assembly; but Bismarck answered at once that this could not be allowed, in view of the passions then prevailing at Frankfort, because the discussion that would ensue there would have a disturbing effect upon the speedy settlement of a definitive peace. “ If,” he added, “we cannot prevent questions from being asked in the Diet, we must shift, in the eyes of the public, upon those who ask them the responsibility for the encouragement which Denmark, before the conclu­sion of the peace, may draw from such wrangling within the Confederation.”

That anxiety of this sort was not altogether fanciful, was shown by a proposition from Saxony, which Beust announced the second week in August; namely, that the Confederate Diet should ask the two Powers for tranquillizing information as to Article I. of the preliminaries, especially for the assurance that Denmark’s renunciation of her rights to Schleswig-Holstein was understood to cover the claims of Denmark only, and did not bring in question the right of the Confederation to participate in the settlement of the succession. Rechberg, as we know, had been pursuing since May the very object that was then aimed at by Saxony; but he shared Bismarck’s view that no discussion of the sort was to be entered into before the final conclusion of peace. He therefore sent a very concise telegram to this effect to Dresden; and as Beust received advices of the same nature from his friends in the Lesser States, he hastened to withdraw the unacceptable proposal.

In Hanover, Platen expressed himself to the Prussian ambassador as being completely disgusted with Beust’s assumption of importance and his inclination to stir up trouble. Able in Cassel disclaimed entirely any sympathy with Beust’s conception of the rights involved in the Schleswig-Holstein question.

The tone taken in the South German Courts was somewhat different. Schrenck admitted to the Prussian ambassador that Bavaria had been in no way injured by the two Powers; but he said that the imperious tone of the Austrian Government and the contemptuous polemic of the Prussian newspapers was intolerable. “For a time,” he said, “we were especially provoked with Austria; but now our mistrust is again directed toward Prussia, who, by the delay in the settlement of the question of succession, has aroused the suspicion that her aims are selfish, while Austria, with no consideration of her own advantage, desires that a decision may soon be reached as to who shall be the sovereign of the Duchies.”

Arnim thought it best to answer plainly that that suspicion was well-founded. “It would be childish” he said, “to think that we can abandon the Duchies without any security for our position in the future; but still more childish is the cry raised in South Germany, that our acting in accordance with this view will be a misfortune to the Fatherland. We could, if neces­sary, get along without the Duchies; but they could not get along without us. Within a few days after our departure, they would become Danish again”. Schrenck replied: “The annexation might perhaps be advan­tageous to Germany, but it could never be consistent with what is right. Herr von Bismarck once said that ‘ Prussia’s armor was too big for her body;  so every one suspects that her body is now to become somewhat stouter.”

A conversation which was even more frank, if possible, took place about this time between the Würtemberg Minister, Von Hügel, and the representative of Prussia, Von Zschock. Hügel had disapproved of Beust’s proposal, and had also secured for this disapproval the support of King Charles, who had been on the throne two months, and who was then at Ostend. The Minis­ter showed Von Zschock a letter from the King, saying that Würtemberg must persist with firmness, but with moderation, in the course followed hitherto. Von Hügel added in explanation that the Lesser States would for the time take no steps in the question of the Duchies, since Count Rechberg at Vienna had repeatedly promised the ambassador of Würtemberg that Austria would suffer no delay in the decision of the Schleswig-Holstein succession, but rather would urge a speedy investigation of the various claims, and would then bring about a recognition by the Confederation of that candidate that had relatively the best right to become the sovereign of the three indivisible Duchies. With this promise in view, Hügel thought the Lesser States could spare themselves the trouble of making such proposals as Beust's, and could without concern leave the initiative in the affair to the Imperial Cabinet.

These arguments were only too well-founded. Rechberg had distinctly promised a number of the ambassa­dors of the Lesser States that in the final settlement of the Schleswig-Holstein matter the German Confederation should neither be ignored nor excluded. That the Cabinet of Vienna was inclined to this course, had long been known in Berlin; but there was no suspicion that the thing had taken a definite form, and that binding declarations had been made to the Lesser States; and for the moment, Bismarck entirely rejected the idea that Austria could have decided on so open a breach of the compact of January 16th. It was now agreed that the King, accompanied by Bismarck, should, on the 22d of August at Vienna, return Francis Joseph’s visit at Carlsbad, when an occasion would be afforded for clearing up matters thoroughly.

In fact, during the three days of the King's stay at Schönbrunn, confidential conversations on all the questions then pending took place between the Sovereigns and their Ministers. When the general condition of Europe was discussed, it soon appeared how much the minds of the Austrian statesmen were exercised with anxiety in regard to French machinations, and the Emperor also expressed with special emphasis his dislike and mistrust of Napoleon. “No one can rely on him,” said Francis Joseph; “since in every undertaking he has always several objects in view at the same time.

In German matters, the Emperor dwelt on the great importance that he attached to the continuance of the Prussian alliance. When Bismarck enlarged upon the necessity that the two Great Powers should guide firmly and in common the entire German policy, Rechberg concurred with sincere warmth; though, indeed, as to the nature of this guidance the difference between the two Ministers became unmistakably manifest—Bismarck being disposed to act decidedly and vigorously, and Rechberg to conciliate and to make advances. These tendencies were evident in regard to the dispute about Rendsburg, which was still pending in the Confederate councils. Rechberg warmly recommended that a little courtesy should be shown the Saxons, which Bismarck considered entirely unnecessary, but at length con­sented to. It was the same with reference to the Ham­burg telegraph agreements; Rechberg renewed his recognition of the justice of the Prussian view, but strove to soften things, defended the wishes of the Hanse Towns, and finally met Bismarck’s urgent representations with evasive encouragement, saying that formal right was certainly on Prussia’s side, but that an amicable way out of the difficulty might yet be found.

These were minor matters. But in the main ques­tions, too, the difference between the wishes of the two Ministers made itself felt

Naturally the most important and most pressing subject of discussion was the future of the Duchies. Rechberg wished that the temporary administration of them should be intrusted to a college in which, in addition to the Austrian and Prussian commissioners, a place with equal rights should be given to a representative of the Confederation. Bismarck, however, could see no reason in the world for making such a concession to the Lesser States, which the circumstances did not require. All the more eagerly did Rechberg speak of his hope of a speedy decision about the right of succession, and with it of the establishment of the future sovereign in Schleswig-Holstein. Bismarck very coolly insisted upon the necessity of a thorough investigation of all the existing claims, towards which the Confederate Diet had as yet hardly taken the first step.

Rechberg, as in his former interview with Werther, emphasized the fact that even considering only the general state of things in Europe, a union of the Duchies with Prussia would afford matter for grave anxiety, and the Emperor also expressed himself to his royal Confederate ally in the same tone. King William maintained a good deal of reserve on this subject. It was repugnant to him to appear, in so many words, a Conqueror. Nor had he by any means decided about his own attitude towards the Hereditary Prince of Augustenburg. The remark was then made on the Austrian side, that the annexation could be permitted only on condition that Austria should also in turn gain something, either by a cession of Prussian territory, or in the form of a Prussian guaranty for the protection of all Austria's dominions. To this the King replied by distinctly rejecting a plan of annexation with such conditions attached to it. He would neither give up to Austria any part of the Prussian population, nor would he undertake in regard to the non-German possessions of Austria any general and indefinite guaranties, which indeed would have made his whole European policy dependent upon any unforeseen action that might be taken by the Court of Vienna.

No positive result, therefore, was arrived at on any point in the matter of the Duchies.

A second question of the utmost importance, which was discussed at Schönbrunn, was the subject, just then coming up again, of a great tariff treaty between Austria and the States of the German Tariff-Union. In order to make the crisis now under consideration intelligible, it is indispensable to cast a brief glance backward over the negotiations that had immediately preceded.

We have seen how energetically Count Rechberg, in the years 1862 and 1868, had fought against the Prusso-French tariff-treaty, and what efforts he had made in the Confederation among the Lesser States to secure the admission of Austria into the Tariff-Union; but his zeal in this direction had cooled with astonishing rapidity, when in November, 1863, Napoleon’s plan of a congress and the anti-Danish enthusiasm in Germany made the Cabinet of Vienna desire as intimate a relation with Prussia as was possible. When in Febru­ary, 1864, the Tariff-Union States met again at Berlin to discuss once more the old points of dispute with the old arguments, Austria held back in perfect silence. In March, at her instance, a conference was held between an imperial and a Prussian commissioner. This, however, ended in a few days without result, and rather disturbed the Lesser States than improved their disposition toward Austria, since it made the latter seem more inclined to come to a separate understanding with Prussia than to co-operate with her old associates.

In fact, in the ranks of the Munich Opposition all the signs of an imminent dissolution were beginning to appear. Bavaria and Würtemberg alone persisted in holding firmly and unconditionally to the programme established two years before, even though, as their Ministers, Schrenk and Hügel, said, the Tariff-Union should go to pieces on it. The other Governments kept up negotiations, as a matter of truth, only in the hope that Prussia would at last prove pliable. But, on the other hand, it was well known in Berlin that these Govern­ments would on no consideration leave the Tariff-Union, and would, if there was nothing else to be done, approve the French commercial treaty and give up Austria.

Already Prussia had come to an understanding with Saxony, the Thuringian States, Brunswick, Frankfort, and Baden. In June, by a secret negotiation carried on personally with the Elector by a Frankfort banker, the consent of Hesse-Cassel was obtained, which was a surprise to every one. Then, on the 28th of June, the new Tariff-Union treaty between the above-named Governments was signed in Berlin; and it was left open to the States that for the time held aloof, to enter on the same conditions, though only until the 1st of October. Hanover took advantage of this as early as the 11th of July, and Oldenburg also soon after, when Prussia had conceded at least a portion of the revenue drawn from the imposts.

The States that held aloof had now lost every pros­pect of succeeding in their opposition. The people in Nassau and Darmstadt with one voice urged their Governments to come to terms with Prussia; and even in the States that favored protection, many voices were heard declaring it impossible to remain outside of the Tariff-Union. A conference opened at Munich on the 7th of July, at which plenipotentiaries of Austria, Bavaria, Würtemberg, Darmstadt, and Nassau were present, could not conceal from itself the force of the accom­plished fact, especially as Austria left no doubt in the minds of her friends that she had no intention of oppos­ing Prussia with the same determination as in 1853.

The Conference contented itself with drawing up on the 12th of July a declaration that the conclusion of compacts between Austria and the Tariff-Union was to be brought about on the basis of the agreement of 1853, with the idea of the preparation of a general tariff union in the future, and that consequently commercial intercourse should be facilitated on both sides as much as possible. The new Tariff-Union and its tariff as established according to the commercial treaty with France were thus actually recognized, and so far as the entrance of the Lesser States into that Union was concerned, an arrangement with Austria was no longer made a condition of this, but was simply indicated as something to be desired.

In a communication of July 28th, Count Rechberg then presented this declaration to the Prussian Government, at the same time proposing that negotiations on the subject should be opened, and that, too, between Austria and Prussia alone. “ Should the Royal Cabinet,” observed Count Rechberg in this connection, “ contrary to our expectations, refuse to enter into the negotiations thus proposed, we should, to our great regret, be obliged to see in that refusal a disregard of the obligations implied in the existing compacts. And in that case we should not fall in any degree into the illusion that such an attitude would be incompatible with the relations of Confederate friendliness now so happily established between the two Governments.”

These threatening words did not truly correspond to the personal feelings of the Austrian Minister. For he had learned to prize the Prussian alliance, and, like his Emperor, he heartily desired to see it continue. But to make this popular in Austria itself was not an easy task. The great results of the Danish war had not made that war any the more popular among the Austrians, a clear indication of the fact that many of the vital interests of Germany were viewed with indifference on the Lower Danube.

The old rivalry with Prussia had stronger root among all classes of the population than at the Imperial Court. If Francis Joseph rejoiced in the Prussian alliance as a support for his conservative principles, the parliamentary Minister Schmerling saw in it the source of a threatening reaction, while the German officials of the administration, with Herr von Biegeleben at their head, feared lest the influence of Austria among the beloved Lesser States should be entirely eclipsed by that of Prussia. This party thought that the open abandon­ment of the plan of a great tariff*union would be the signal for a complete exclusion of Austria from the German Confederation; and every one who for any reason was hostile to the Prussian alliance chimed in eagerly with this view. If, for the time, no progress could be made in the path opened in 1853, at least, not one inch of the position then won must be given up.

At Schönbrunn, therefore, Rechberg expressed to King William and his Minister an ardent wish that the commercial treaty now under consideration might again, like that of 1853, be considered as preparatory to a future tariff-treaty, and accordingly that, as in Article XXV. of the old compact, so in this one, it might be specified that within twelve years negotiations should be held about a tariff-union. Bismarck saw no particular danger in agreeing to this, since a simple promise to negotiate in the future involved no obligation as to the result of the negotiations. At the same time, he expressed to the Austrian Minister his surprise at such eager anxiety in a matter which amounted to nothing but empty phrases, since Rechbeig himself confessed that the cherished tariff-union was then out of the question, and would very probably be quite as much so twelve years hence.

King William expressed grave misgivings on this subject, and was little disposed to consent to the holding of any conferences at all upon it Rechberg, however, persisted in his statement that Austria could never permit herself to be treated by Germany as a foreign nation. He alluded distinctly to the possibility that a purely negative result in this question might make it impossible for him, the defender of the Prussian alliance, to keep his position as Minister. This decided the King to approve at least the opening of a conference. So far as the Prussian instructions for the same were concerned, Bismarck promised the Austrian states­man that he would do what he could to bring about a favorable disposition on the part of those ministers to whom the matter especially belonged. He therefore, on the 25th of August, signed a despatch in which he announced Prussia’s readiness to negotiate a commercial treaty, and without making any further promises, agreed to meet Austria’s wishes so far as possible.

So ended the meeting at Schonbrunn, in all harmony so far as outwardly appeared. From there the King went to Baden-Baden, and Bismarck at first to Berlin, in order to discuss with his colleagues Rechberg’s requests.

Meantime, on that same 25th of August, the German plenipotentiaries with the Danish Minister, Von Quaade, and his military associate, Colonel Kaufmann, met at Vienna for the first sitting of the peace-conference. England, France, and Russia had sent urgent recom­mendations both to Berlin and to Vienna that the Danes should be dealt with in a generous spirit. This naturally strengthened the desire of the German Powers for a speedy conclusion, though this desire for the most part manifested itself in the two Courts with the difference well known to us, that Austria was very ready to make concessions to the Danes, while Bismarck preferred to influence his opponents rather by intimida­tion than by compliance.

It was soon evident, however, that in spite of all the efforts on the German side to hurry things, a long and complicated affair had been begun, especially as the Danes everywhere manifested an inclination to settle every detail definitively in the actual treaty, and to leave nothing to be arranged later by commissions. First of all, the three officers were charged with the fixing of the boundaries, and the sitting was adjourned until they should bring in their report. Before this was ready, however, Quaade, on the 6th of September, brought forward Danish proposals about the postal arrangements, the customs, and the telegraph, the tendency of which Werther concisely described in the phrase: “Circumstantial and impracticable.”

The postal question gave rise to an important difference of opinion between the Great Powers themselves. For centuries Denmark had had post-offices of her own at Hamburg and Lubeck. Prussia now demanded that these should be transferred as appurtenances connected with the Duchies. Rechberg replied to this, that the Hanse Towns were anxious to abolish these offices entirely, and to exercise, themselves, the control of all the postal arrangements in their own territory, a wish which, he said, was entirely consistent with Confederate rights. There could, therefore, in his view, be no talk of a transference of these offices to Prussia and Austria. After long discussion the result was, that the offices were not mentioned in the treaty at all. This was, as we see, an exact counterpart to the question of the Konneritz telegraph-compacts, a fresh instance of Austria’s striving to acquire the favor of the Lesser and Petty States.

The former Danish Minister of Finance, Fenger, had now arrived in Vienna as special commissioner in the settlement of the State debts; and he at once began with Scheel-Plessen this extremely complicated task. Apart from a number of doubtful particulars, the main point in dispute was the question whether the assets were to be divided as well as the liabilities, — the State funds as well as the State debts. As the assets had not been mentioned in the preliminaries, the Danes here at last prevailed in their determined refusal, though they were forced to admit that certain funds unquestionably belonging to the Duchies must be accounted for to them. As to the debts, Fenger estimated the share of Schleswig-Holstein at forty-four, Plessen at twenty-two millions.

Thereupon, Rechberg declared on the 1st of October that there was only one way of arranging the difficulty: to agree upon a satisfactory compromise. He proposed, with this view, the sum of twenty-nine millions. The Danes were horrified at such severity; but as Prussia agreed to the proposition, and at the same time hinted at increasing the number of troops in Jutland, Denmark made up her mind on the 11th of October to consent. In regard to the fixing of the boundaries, too, a settlement was arrived at. In return for the cession of the Jutland enclaves, Denmark received, in addition to the district of Kibe, about one hundred and thirty-two square miles in the south of Holding.

The chief points were thus disposed of. There then remained a number of minor details to be settled: the compensation to be made to the German merchants and traders, which involved a dispute as to whether they were to be indemnified for direct losses only or for indirect as well, and also for the profits of which they had been deprived; then the division of the archives, Denmark not wishing to surrender all such documents as owed their origin to the Duchies, but only such as were connected with the administration of them; and then the assumption of the appanages and pensions, in which either party strove to reduce its obligations as much as possible.

Several weeks were spent in tedious haggling over these points. Complaint was made by Werther, that since the territorial and financial questions had been settled, Rechberg showed great signs of weakening: he urged a speedy conclusion by the concession of what the Danes asked, and gave the Prussian demands only a feeble and reluctant support. This was the actual fact, and Werther was soon to learn on what weighty grounds such conduct was based. We are now brought back to the question of the Austro-German commercial treaty.

Bismarck had not been able to obtain all he sought from the Prussian Ministers that were the authorities in these matters. The official representatives of the customs service were the Minister of Commerce, Count Itzenplitz, and the Minister of Finance, Von Bodelschwingh. In reality, however, in consequence of the manifest lack of technical knowledge, of the two gentlemen bearing these titles, the deciding word was generally given by the ministerial superintendent of commerce, Delbrück. Delbrück, trained by industrious and widely extended study, had rapidly and brilliantly passed through all the grades of the Prussian government-service. His was a character that was extraor­dinarily reliable, strong of will, yet free from violent passions, never idly quiescent, but always evenly balanced. His mind was thoroughly filled and possessed with a thirst for clear understanding, for clear ideas, clear purposes, clear and definite data. Thus he took hold of everything with exhaustive thoroughness, resting always on scientific principles, and always having an eye to practical adaptability,—a theorist, who was never a doctrinaire; a practical man, who never fell into routine; one learned in technical details, who confined himself to the sphere in which he was a master, and in this sphere cared for nothing but the most satisfactory performance possible of the one duty in hand.

As a political economist, he was a free-trader by scientifically-trained conviction, not in the modem sense of thinking that for both State and society there are no higher laws than those of economic individual­ism, but with the simpler view that in the economic world freedom of trade and of labor give the best results. He had therefore warmly greeted and de­fended the turn in Prussia's tariff policy, which had begun in 1852, and become victorious ten years later; and he was filled with a desire to save the Tariff-Union, which had just been renewed on this basis, from a repetition of such crises as that recently passed through.

It can easily be conceived how repugnant to such a man was the demand once more brought forward by Austria, that a definite limit of time should again be set for negotiations about the entrance of Austria into the Tariff-Union, her admission having been once for all recognized as out of the question. Delbrück saw in this desire on the part of Austria a diplomatic snare, in the satisfaction of this desire a deceitful phrase, and in both an intentional obscurity which was foreign to his whole nature, and which promised nothing but new difficulties for the future.

That the preamble of the commercial treaty should allude to a great tariff-union as something desirable, thus much had been conceded to the President of the Ministry by the Superintendent Delbrück; but he declared with the strongest emphasis that it was impossible to go further than this, and especially that Article XXV. must not be renewed. “For in this article,” he said, “the opposition of the Lesser States in the Tariff-Union crisis has hitherto had its origin and its pretext. To renew that article would, therefore, be a very substantial concession, which would involve similar dangers for the Tariff-Union in the future.”

Bismarck replied that this was mistrusting their own firmness. Delbrück, however, pointed to the Austrian despatch of May 7, 1862, and the assertion contained in it, that the treaty of 1853 forbade Prussia to reform her tariff in a direction different from that followed by Austria. As Bismarck, in the interests of a good understanding with Austria, persisted in his own view, the King had to be called in to decide. He had already been in doubt at Schönbrunn, as we have mentioned above; and when Delbrück said that he should resign his position if the article were admitted, the King rejected it. Bismarck regarded this as a political mistake. He yielded, however, and at once left Berlin to go to the King at Baden-Baden.

With instructions to the above effect, Privy Councillor Hasselbach then met at Prague the Austrian plenipotentiary, Baron von Hock, for a consultation about the commercial treaty. In the beginning Hock believed the result would be favorable, but found only too soon that there was no use in thinking any more of Article XXV. Rechberg was deeply affected when he learned this, and decided to make yet one more trial of a personal interview with Bismarck. Ever since their service together at Frankfort, there had been a friendly feeling between the two, in spite of all official differences. Bismarck considered Rechberg to be passionate and easily irritated, but honorable, and at bottom good-hearted; and Rechberg, though he was daily angry with Prussia and with Bismarck too, could not give up the desire of maintaining a good understanding.

A couple of incidents of the Frankfort days may serve to characterize the relation between these men. Once in Rechberg’s rooms, they got into so violent a dispute that the Count cried, “I shall send you my seconds.” — “What is the use of so much red tape?” answered Bismarck. “ You certainly have pistols here. We will settle the matter at once in your garden. While you are getting the weapons ready, I will write a report on the affair, which I desire to have sent to Berlin, if anything happens.” This was agreed to. When the report was written, Bismarck requested the Count to examine its accuracy. Rechberg read it, and, his blood being now cooler, said, “ It is all correct, — but,” he then cried, “ to break our necks over this would be foolish beyond all measure.” — “I agree with you entirely,” said Bismarck.

Somewhat later, Rechberg came to Bismarck, and showed him despatches from Vienna, in which the Count was instructed to give his vote on an important question at the next session, on the same side as Prussia. Bismarck glanced over the document, and returned it with the words: “ There has been probably some mistake here.” Rechberg looked at the paper, was horrified, and turned pale: it was a confidential letter which had accompanied the other, with instructions to vote indeed on the side of Prussia, but to make every effort to have their common vote defeated by the representatives of the remaining States. He had ex­changed one paper for the other. “Do not be disturbed,” said Bismarck. “ You did not intend to give me the letter, therefore you did not give it to me; and therefore its contents are entirely unknown to me.” And, as a matter of fact, he never reported it to Berlin, thereby winning Rechberg’s confidence forever.

The Count, consequently, undertook in the present complications a private correspondence with Bismarck, some parts of which shall be given here, since it is at once remarkable as the last attempt to conciliate the old and the new Germany, and instructive in showing the views of the two statesmen at that time.

“It is our task,” wrote Rechberg, on the 6th of September, “to consign the differences and struggles of many years to oblivion, to obliterate the results of the same in the minds of the people, and to awaken an appreciation of the mutual advantages of an Austro-Prussian alliance.” He accordingly urged that nothing should be allowed to prevent an amicable solution of the commercial question, and that in the matter of the Holstein telegraph compacts, the invalidity of form should be amended by a supplementary Confederate decree, and so the sovereignty of the Hanse Towns acknowledged.

In his answer of September 8th, Bismarck first expressed his hearty thanks to Rechberg for having taken the initiative in a confidential discussion of the pending questions. He then mentioned the anxiety of his colleagues, to whom belonged the consideration of technical details in the proposed commercial treaty. “I cannot see,” he said, “what magic lies in the word tariff-union, that the mere mention of it affects our statesmen unpleasantly and yours agreeably, when we are all agreed that the thing itself is neither possible nor desirable. It is to be hoped that our two commissioners will employ themselves with good results on the question, what shape our commercial relations shall take so long as we do not have a tariff-union. Let us not, in the pursuit of such a will-of-the-wisp as that, neglect the practical benefits of the commercial treaty.”

He then said that his colleagues kept holding up to him Austria’s unaccommodating spirit in other questions, the provisional government of the Duchies, the occupation of Rendsburg, and the telegraph compacts; and he admitted frankly that Austria’s attitude towards this last outrageous disregard of formal Confederate rights had been a surprise to himself. “ If,” he remarked, “we cannot agree to interpose against so flagrant a violation of Confederate rights by our own commissioners, how shall we agree about the guidance of the entire Confederate policy within the utmost allowable limits?

“ Permit me, honored friend, to .express my opinion openly. In all these matters the attitude of the Imperial Cabinet is conditioned by a slight, but I fear increasing, tendency to let the small States look upon Austria as a bulwark against Prussia. It seems to me impossible that the most prominent officials of the Austrian administration [Biegeleben, Meysenberg, Gagern] who have come to Vienna, having had more or less connection with the Lesser States, should have already entirely broken with the traditions of their earlier years. I consider it natural that men who feel themselves to be good swimmers in the parliamentary stream [Schmerling] should seek to keep open the springs which flow into that stream from the Lesser States that have parliamentary governments, and from public opinion in those States.

“ But the more influence the elements thus indicated have upon the course of Austria’s policy, the nearer are we brought to the old ruts in which Austria and Prussia were held fast for more than ten years, to the injury of both. We shall succeed in the task you pro­pose for us, only if we keep our connection animated with the fresh life of an active common policy such as we have pursued hitherto during this year. A policy of that nature, consistently followed out, will doubtless lead to the desired results: Germany will be united against all foes within and without, the foundations of monarchical government will be restored, and revolution will be deprived of its power to do harm.”

“The contrary of all this will happen, however,” Bismarck added in conclusion, “ if we go only half-way and each then turns again to his old path. For no one would any longer believe in the firmness of our connection : it would be said that the sympathy of the Senate of Hamburg was valued more by the Court of Vienna than the friendship of Prussia.”

On the 17th of September, Rechberg answered with equal frankness.

“You know,” he wrote, “that I give myself with my whole soul to the task of maintaining in the future the harmony that has once more been brought about be­tween Austria and Prussia. ... You will grant to me, most honored friend, that a sincere and loyal recog­nition of Austria’s oneness with Germany is one of those essential conditions without which Austria cannot feel at home in the Prussian alliance. This fact gives the answer to the question, what inexplicable magic is contained for us in the simple word tariff­union? The value of this word is, I admit, one of those things that are imponderable, but the value of our posi­tion as a German Power is also imponderable. [Margi­nal note by Bismarck: More Power than German."]

“ The opinion that a tariff-union is impracticable has often been expressed. But nevertheless it cannot be disproved that sooner or later a tariff-union will inevitably be concluded.

“ The present question, whether Austria shall with­draw from her right to be included in a tariff-union, and thus acknowledge that in a politico-commercial connection she does not belong to Germany [Bismarck : To the Tariff-Union], I must, as an Austrian Minister, answer in the negative. What would have been said in 1815 to the exclusion of Austria from a German tariff system, what to the theory that in such a system Austria was to have no preference over foreigners? If we persist in our claim to a tariff-union, it is not because Prussia signed Article XXV. of the commercial treaty,—although it is not setting a very good example to make one’s plighted word depend on the value of a form of speech,—but because Austria is a German Power, and cannot allow a common German institution to be closed to her on principle, nor permit herself to be treated as a foreign nation by her own associates in the Confederation. . .

“ When conferring with a man of your keenness of insight and of your determination, I cannot forbear expressing the wish that it might for once be seriously and carefully considered in Berlin whether it is nowa­days still desirable to pursue that course of policy which may be designated as the crippling of the Con­federation and the making of petty acquisitions. This course was originally pursued on the presupposition of the voluntary separation of Austria from Germany. I doubt whether Prussia would today gain anything by this.

“If your colleagues, who look at the matter from a professional point of view, ask what equivalents are offered for their concessions in commercial matters, I can only conclude from their question that they do not stand on the same high ground of politics that you do. Were it my business to answer them, I should beg them to remember how Prussia stood in Europe and in Germany before she accepted the hand held out by us, and how she stands now, thanks to the course pursued by you. I should ask them whether whole volumes of petty military, postal, and telegraph compacts could have to Prussia the value of the friendship of Austria and of the confidence of the other German States. I should point out to them that, on account of great European necessities, the united action of the two Powers can move only in a conservative course, that is, with severe respect for Confederate rights, and the independence of the associate States. [Bismarck: Up to what point? ]

“You yourself called my attention to the period before 1848, during which Germany willingly followed the leadership of Austria and Prussia. Well, with what care did the two Great Courts then treat the independent feeling of their Confederate associates and respect their rights! The consequence was, that for a generation there was no thought of mistrusting the two Powers, nor did any one mention a Confederation of the Rhine.

“If their independence is respected, the small States are now also ready to lean on Austria and Prussia. Their accession to the Austro-Prussian alliance would give it the strongest position in Europe. But if they are suspicious, if they fear for their independence or for their Confederate rights, if they are anxious about being absorbed by the two Courts, and give their attention to maintaining their own individuality, then a secret and dangerous disquietude will prevail in Germany, which Europe at once will perceive and profit by, and which will alter the relations of power not a little to the disadvantage of Austria and Prussia.

“Do what you can therefore—it is my urgent request—to keep your neighbors from thinking that they stand in need of a bulwark. I shall then no longer be open to the suspicion of scheming to make Austria appear to the small States a bulwark against Prussia. You will then have friends everywhere, and find everywhere a willingness to fulfil your wishes. No one will any longer doubt the firmness of our connection. If the German Governments no longer feel any anxiety, they will also cease coquetting with the elements of popular agitation.”

Rechberg urged that the Hamburg telegraph-compacts should be treated in this spirit

Bismarck’s answer to all this was delayed by various accidental circumstances until the 29th of September. As it was not advisable to say roundly to his friend in Vienna what he thought of the relative Germanic character of the Empire on the Danube, he took occasion to declare that he regarded progress in their common path to be more certain if both parties took their stand on the practical ground of state policy, without letting the situation be obscured by the mists that arose from the doctrines of German sentimental politicians. It would then be seen that if the German character of Austria was to be of advantage to her position as a Power, this would be effected not by a commercial treaty with problematical phrases, but by an intimate association with Prussia. As to Rech- berg’s comment, that a plighted word ought not to be transformed into a mere form of speech, Bismarck pointed out that he had always disputed the possibility of a tariff-union with Austria, and that recently at Schönbrunn he had promised to recommend at Berlin the mention of the same in the new commercial treaty, only upon Rechberg’s express assurance that such mention was to be looked upon merely as a form of speech.

But on the same day, the 29th, Rechberg wrote his letter of complaint about the negative course things were taking in the conference at Prague. “ The impres­sion it makes,” he said, u is painful to me and to the Ministers whose departments are especially concerned. According to the agreement between us two, the new treaty was to involve no departure from the position represented in the February treaty; this, however, would not be the case, if the phrase in question remains only in the preamble and Article XXV. is omitted. This would make my position in the matter untenable. Prussia might the more easily give a promise to nego­tiate with us within a given time, since we have already recognized the fact that by so doing she would not be giving up her autonomy in questions of tariff.”

In his answer of October 4th, Bismarck explained his colleagues’ grounds for refusal, and then continued: “Do not lay too much stress on these tariff matters, my honored friend. More or less favorably worded promises for the future cannot settle these things. Either it will be seen in both countries that a tariff-union is desirable, and then it will be made, independent of all promises; or the conviction of its usefulness will not be felt, and then nothing will be any more likely to come of it in 1877, no matter whether in the mean time a date for opening negotiations has been fixed upon or not.

“ It seems to me that the future of Europe contains the possibility of too serious crises, for it to be worth our while to stir up public opinion about forms of words that are to apply to an event which is to remain for twelve years problematic, and which practically is not dependent upon these forms of words at all. Personally, I would gladly yield to you in regard to Article XXV, if I could carry it through without a sort of coup d'état or a cabinet crisis at home. The determination with which the thing is insisted on, on your side, causes the suspicion here, that it is a question, not merely of the theoretical position established in 1853, and of the momentary impression on public opinion in Austria, but of the serious and practical realization of a tariff-union. For this, as I have often said, I am by no means ready to hold out my hand, so long as it would be only the artificial product of political compacts, and not the natural result of a harmony of real interests.”

The letter then turned to Rechberg’s former utter­ances about German politics in general: “The King has certainly given many proofs that he is not hungering for the property of his neighbors nor for the sup­pression of the German Princes. We have put no German state in a position to require a bulwark against us. We stand on the defensive against the encroachments and the arrogance of Confederate majorities and their individual members. Was not the position, which Herr von Beust and others with him in league with the Revolution took up against us both, entirely an aggressive one ? They needed only a little more power to make an actual attack on us. Otherwise they would have tried it. A confederation in which the European policy of Prussia and Austria is to be directed by the majority of the small states is worse than no confederation at all. If I must choose between subjection to such claims, and the open hostility of the Lesser States, I prefer the latter.

“ The Beust policy went far beyond the bounds of what was required by ‘the maintenance of individuality : it was the thirst for power. We do nothing to endanger the independence of our neighbors as assured by the principles of the Confederation; but our own independence cannot yield to the ambition of the Lesser States. If we allow such proceedings as the juggling to which Prussia and Austria were sacrificed in the Federal chastisement in Holstein to take place often, we shall accustom the Lesser States to the assumption of a tone which in the long run we shall not be able to put up with. If the rein by suddenly tightened, it will be said that we are putting them down by force, and they will threaten us with a Confederation of the Rhine. If we let ourselves be frightened by this threat, it will become dangerous and will finally be carried out. If we are not frightened, and let them feel that we are not, it will never even be mentioned.

“ At Schönbrunn we set before us the task of guiding German politics in common. We can do that only if we keep the other members of the Confederation accus­tomed to the idea that Prussia and Austria will come forward unitedly and determinedly against all excesses, such as was the whole policy of the Federal chastisement in Holstein from the beginning up to the telegraph­compacts. No German Prince need therefore be anxious about his independence, nor forego suck participa­tion in the general decisions as he is entitled to in proportion to his power.

“ The folly of those members of the Confederation who have hitherto taken the lead shows itself most of all, to my thinking, in the fact that the harmony between Vienna and Berlin is unwelcome to them, and that they hope to disturb that harmony. Should they succeed in this, Germany as a political unit and the Confederation itself could continue only with the continuance of peace. With the first war in which a German state was concerned, the whole structure would fall to pieces, and the weaker ones would certainly be more deeply buried under the ruins than the stronger. Therefore the small states should thank Heaven for the harmony between us, under the protection of which they exist—whereas, on the contrary, I do not think that our safety is dependent on the three heterogeneous Confederate corps.

“Let us, then, cherish our mutual relations at any price. By maintaining and strengthening them, we shall serve Germany at the same time that we shall control it in common, not by force, as did the Protector the Confederation of the Rhine, but by friendly Confederate relations, as the first among equals. I look upon our alliance as existing for this object. Should we, however, lose this object from sight, should we cease to show our active interest in it, we should diminish the vitality of our alliance. The simple desire to be on our guard against attacks from without is strong enough neither with you nor with us to keep up permanently between us that close community of policy, which has been so fortunately established by our common action in the Danish affair.”

To this exposition of a system of double rule in Germany, which Austria might have listened to, if at that time, instead of Bismarck another Ancillon had been at the helm of the Prussian State, Rechberg returned no further answer. Meanwhile, at Berlin, the last seal was being put upon the triumph that had been won in the crisis of the Tariff-Union, and the final submission of the South German recalcitrants was about to be received. Since the last conference at Munich, the South German Governments had come to perceive that they could not escape entering the Union; and the Bavarian Minister, Schrenck, was only consid­ering how he could give an honorable color to his surrender. Since for him also the most important element in the struggle against the French commercial treaty had been the relations with Austria, he was anxious to present to the country some result, though even a small one, in this direction. He therefore first proposed at Berlin that nominal stipulation which had been urged also by Rechberg: that at some time in the future, negotiations were to be carried on with Austria concerning a great tariff-union.

When this very naturally was refused, he asked for a postponement of the time for entrance into the Tariff- Union, from the 1st to perhaps the 15th of October, that is, until the probable conclusion of the Hasselbach conference at Prague. His object in this was to be able to say that the essential condition imposed by him for entrance, namely, a previous negotiation with Austria (although for the present unfortunately with no result), had been fulfilled, and that he could therefore join the Union without inconsistency. Bismarck now, as in the negotiations with Austria, advocated a conciliatory attitude, but the Ministers of the Departments, in the full consciousness of victory, held obstinately to the limit of October 1st, and rejected the Bavarian proposal all the more decidedly because Hesse-Darmstadt had already signified her unconditional submission.

Hereupon, Schrenck announced to King Louis, that consideration for his personal and his political reputation obliged him to give up his office; and on the 21^st of September he presented his resignation. The young King, who had been for some weeks annoyed with his Minister, had the harshness not to answer the request at once, but ordered Schrenck to give notice at Berlin of Bavaria's entrance into the Tariff-Union.

At the same time, also, Minister von Hügel at Stutt­gart was wrecked on the same rock, and was replaced on the 24th of September by Baron von Varnbüler.

On the 30th of September, then, all the states of the old Union were represented at the Berlin tariff conference, and on the 4th of October Schrenck was dismissed. The Prussian ambassador, Arnim, expressed regret at the fall of the Minister; for he had always hoped that the latter might retain his position. “Schrenck,” he said, “ is at bottom neither Prussian nor Austrian, but Bavarian, in his sympathies, the characteristic representative of a Lesser State that has no great rôle to play and yet desires to remain perfectly independent. Pfordten, on the other hand [who had been immediately designated as Schrenck’s probable successor], is much more inclined to a restless policy on a large scale, after the fashion of Beust.” This confirmed Bismarck in the view developed above, that by pursuing such a course in her tariff policy, Prussia would injure her other external interests.

But this event was immediately afterwards thrown into the background by one of far more importance. On the 9th of October, Bismarck, who was then taking the sea-baths at Biarritz, received the following telegram from Baden-Baden: —

“Werther telegraphed yesterday that the Austrian Ministerial Council had decided to break off negotiations on account of the refusal to admit Article XXV. Rechberg can reverse this, if the Article be approved. Otherwise he will resign, because he is unwilling to act upon that decision. He begs that Herr von Bismarck be informed, and requests a speedy answer. The King has asked for an immediate report from Berlin as to whether a form can be found which, without involving compliance in the matter, will render it possible to continue negotiations. He would regard Rechberg’s resignation as a great misfortune, and hopes that the Emperor will not, for the sake of a stipulation about uncertain things in the future, endanger the present political concord.”

Bismarck answered at once, on the 10th of October, urging that everything compatible with the French treaty should be conceded. “There is no danger,” he said, “in agreeing to a limit of time for a future negotiation, the result of which continues to depend entirely upon ourselves. The whole matter is either an intrigue against Rechberg, or an experiment to see whether we still value the Austrian alliance. Except on one of these suppositions, the importance of Article XXV is too slight to afford sufficient cause for Rechberg’s retirement.” This opinion was expressed again in a telegram of October 15th: “My advice is strongly against rejecting Austria’s request, and I cannot undertake to be responsible for a foreign policy conducted in that fashion.”

On the 16th, in a report sent to Berlin, whither the King had returned, Bismarck developed these views in giving more specific arguments: “A promise to enter into negotiations that cannot result in anything without our voluntary consent involves no danger. If we give such a promise, it will no longer appear to be a price paid for the Tariff-Union, but a proof, entirely gratuitous on our part, of our friendly disposition towards a Confederate associate. It cannot be shown that the promise will be attended with any disadvantage. In our refusal Austria will seem to see a proof of our readiness to give up our alliance with her. Schmerling would then induce the Emperor to pursue a course unfavorable to Prussia, and accordingly to make advances to the Lesser States and to France. To be sure, such a turn may perhaps be taken by Austrian policy in any case sooner or later, and we must be ready to meet it when it comes; but it would be very inconvenient to have it come before the Danish affair is settled.

“ In the effort to deprive Prussia of all, even of the indirect, fruits of our victories in that contest, Austria would find willing ears at almost all the Courts of Europe. She is prevented from taking this course even now only by the consideration that in foreign complications she may need the help which the alliance with us offers her. If we show her that that alliance is a very unstable one, by letting Rechberg retire, who is the chief defender of it, it is probable that the Imperial Cabinet will prefer to avoid danger by yielding to France, rather than to face it relying on our support.

“If the Emperor entirely loses his confidence in Prussia, Schmerling will get the upper hand. One of the main points of Schmerling’s system is a connection of Austria with the Western Powers, such as existed for a time in 1863. Even now Schmerling is seeking, by means of agents of the Paris Press, to bring about a connection with France, implying a good understanding between the latter and England. The next step in such a course of policy would be the recognition by Austria of the Kingdom of Italy; and this also Schmer­ling has already in view. Then the exclusion of Prussia as completely as possible from all gain accru­ing from the Schleswig-Holstein affair would follow, with the approval of the Lesser States and the majority in the Confederate Diet. All this is, indeed, only a matter of probability, and the effect such a policy would have in France is doubtful; but the magnitude of the danger contrasts glaringly with the insignificance of the concessions demanded from us.”

The King did not deny the force of this reasoning; but he was not yet wholly convinced, especially as the Ministers of the Departments persisted unwaveringly in their opposition. He held that Article XXV. was not so harmless as Bismarck thought: it would cause twelve more years of uncertainty about what would finally happen, and that was surely a great disadvantage; if it was really of no significance, then certainly the Austrian threat of removing Rechberg proved that in Vienna there was a great readiness to dispense with the alliance of Prussia. The probability of the dangers portrayed by Bismarck would, in the King’s opinion, unfortunately continue, even if the wished-for concessions were made, since the whole thing was what Schmerling desired, and he would use every occasion to overthrow Rechbeig.

This feeling, that in the end all concessions would prove useless, was all the stronger, since on the very morn­ing of October 17th an Austrian despatch was received, in which Rechberg suggested to the King that after the Duchies had been abandoned to the two Powers, a portion of the Confederate troops should be left there. This proposal unmistakably betrayed an intention of using the Confederation, that is, the Lesser States, to interfere with Prussia’s wishes.

Wertber, therefore, at Vienna received orders to hold back, if possible, until the Danish peace had been concluded; and when, immediately after, urgent messages were received from the Austrian capital, to the effect that the crisis was there growing more imminent, and haste was necessary, the King sent word in reply that he would meet all Austria’s wishes so far as possible, but that he must reserve his answer till Bismarck should have returned from France. On the 22d of October, he discussed the situation with a cousin of the Emperor Francis Joseph, the Archduke Leopold, who conveyed to King William the Emperor’s desire for the unaltered continuance of the alliance. The King pointed out that at that very same time Schmerling, in the organs of the Press controlled by him, was carrying on the most active warfare against the Prussian alliance, and against Rechberg as the defender of it. “This,” said the King, “has driven Rechberg to persist in the de­mand for a general tariff-union, which everybody admits to be out of the question. If Schmerling gets the upper hand, all the conditions of the past will once more be revived: the opposition of the Lesser States, the rivalry of Prussia and Austria for the favor of those States, and the delight of the rest of Europe at such an exhibition of internal impotence and distraction.”

But meantime the matter had been already settled at Vienna. Rechberg found himself absolutely alone in the Cabinet. His colleagues reproached him with the barrenness of the policy he had hitherto pursued, and with the fact that Austria stood isolated in Europe, while Bismarck was even then occupied at Biarritz and Paris with a Franco-Prussian alliance. No decision was reported from Berlin about Article XXV. The newspaper storm let loose by Schmerling against his unfortunate colleague continued to rage; and the Liberal party accused Rechberg of negotiating secretly with Bismarck for the overthrow of all constitutional insti­tutions. The Emperor therefore received at the same time, from Schmerling and from Rechberg, the declaration that it was no longer possible for them to serve together: the Emperor must choose between them.

The internal condition of the Empire being what it was, the presence of Schmerling seemed to Francis Joseph indispensable for the conduct of parliamentary business. It therefore became necessary for Rechberg to withdraw. Schmerling would gladly have assigned the Count’s place to some adherent who would be completely subordinate to himself; but this was by no means in accordance with the intentions of the Emperor, who, in spite of Schmerling’s usefulness, had no great fondness for him, on account of his liberalism and his hatred of Prussia. On the contrary, Francis Joseph was filled with a desire to persist in the course he had hitherto followed in his foreign policy, and to maintain the alliance with Prussia. Therefore, at Rechberg’s suggestion, he invited the Governor of Galicia, the strongly conservative Count Mensdorff-Pouilly, an officer who was highly esteemed by the King of Prussia also, to fill the vacant position.

Meanwhile Werther and Balan had done what they could to bring the Danish peace to a conclusion, by making numerous concessions on minor points. On the same day on which Rechberg received his dismissal, the 27th of October, the treaty was formally drawn up, and it was signed on the 30th. This most pressing complication, at least, was thus removed.

On the 26th of October, Francis Joseph sent a confi­dential letter to King William, in which he explained that Rechberg’s retirement meant nothing more than that a personal change in the Ministry had become necessary. “Mensdorffs name alone,” wrote the Emperor, “would convince you that I myself, Francis Joseph, am firmly determined to suffer no change in the course of my policy. The fact that we have acted in common, has been owing to me personally; and my most anxious care will constantly be directed to the maintenance of our alliance unweakened, and to confirming it still further.”

The same warm friendship showed itself in the King’s answer of November 2d. “Your words,” he wrote, “are so entirely reassuring to me, that I cannot thank you enough for taking the view of the matter that you do. I have long valued Count Mensdorff; I esteem and trust him, and place therefore full reliance on his character, and on his determination to continue the policy you have lately been pursuing toward Prussia.” The King, however, did not conceal some anxiety lest Mensdorff, new as he was to the business, should be led away against his will by Schmerling.

In regard to Mensdorff, Count Biome, who was inti­mate with him, declared at Munich to Herr von Arnim, that the new Minister was determined to hold to the Prussian alliance: the only question was, whether he could carry out that determination in opposition to his colleagues and the imperial councillors. On the other side, we have seen before with what emphasis Bismarck, both before and at the time of the ministerial crisis at Vienna, spoke in favor of maintaining the alliance with Austria; how both by word of mouth, by telegram, and by letter, he pressed the acceptance of Article XXV and consideration for the Bavarian Minister; and how urgently he pointed out to the King the serious consequences of taking the contrary course.

We may here add, that at Biarritz and at Paris, in his communications with Napoleon and with Drouyn de Lhuys, Bismarck in no way departed from the line of conduct hitherto adopted, and neither made nor received any more intimate advances of any nature whatever.

The French Government persisted in their opinion, that Prussia should annex the Duchies by a plebiscitum, and then on the ground of the principle of nationality surrender North Schleswig to Denmark. The accept­ance of this proposal would have meant a definite and open breach with Austria. Bismarck therefore contented himself with the certainty that France now, as before, was not to be numbered among the distinct opponents of the annexation.

Even after Rechberg’s retirement, the Prussian Minister remained firm in his resolution to protect, indeed, under all circumstances, Prussia’s and Germany’s interests in Schleswig-Holstein—but, if possible, to do this not in opposition to, but in harmony with, Austria. He still continued to look upon an alliance between Prussia and Austria as at once the most influential and the least dangerous connection that could be entered into by either State.

The Sovereigns and their principal Ministers were, therefore, at one in the sincere wish to keep the newly knit bond of friendship intact, and to draw it ever closer. But once more it was to be demonstrated that the force of circumstances is stronger than the best intentions of men. According to the historical position of the two Powers, the hopes which each of them placed in the alliance were in irreconcilable contradiction. Prussia saw in the connection a means of inducing Austria to recognize her rising and growing interests: Austria expected to use it for the purpose of keeping down Prussia, of bridling her ambition, and of restraining her within the limits of the old Confederate principles. The mutual attitude was that in which the two Powers had stood with regard to one another from the beginning to the end of the Danish war, and in which they now became more and more confirmed when the question was to be settled of who should profit by the victory. Napoleon had rightly foreseen that an understanding between the two Powers about Schleswig-Holstein was out of the question.

Bismarck, in speaking of the matter later, expressed the state of the case very justly: “It was perfect folly, by not agreeing to Article XXV, to drive Rechberg out of his position; Rechberg would have sacrificed anything to have prevented war.” “Yet, after all,” he added, “war was bound to come some time, and it was perhaps fortunate that it came then, when the constellations were tolerably propitious.”