CRISTO RAUL.ORG

THE FOUNDING OF THE GERMAN EMPIRE BY WILLIAM I.

BOOK X.

CHASTISEMENT BY THE CONFEDERATION.

CHAPTER I.

THE CHASTISEMENT DECIDED UPON.

To the German Powers the news of the Danish coup d'état, coming as it did in the midst of a general tension of European relations, was by no means agreeable. The Government at Vienna would have given a great deal, if Denmark had been willing to hold out the smallest respectable possibility of a peaceful settlement. To the gay imperial city these hyperborean troubles seemed to be enveloped in misty obscurity; and just as in 1850, Austria wished the integrity of Denmark to be maintained, since if that were destroyed, nothing was more probable than that Prussia’s power would receive an enlargement in one form or another — a misfortune which, according to all Austrian traditions since Kaunitz and Thugut and the days of Metternich and Schwarzenberg, was to be avoided at any cost. The proclamation of March 30th, however, was too brutal even for Aus­tria, and touched her honor too nearly. The popular feeling in Germany became daily more excited. It would not do to leave the guidance and the satisfaction of this feeling to the Prussian Court alone. Count Rechberg therefore said to the Prussian ambassador, Herr von Werther: “Denmark has broken the compacts of 1852. What is to be done ? I should be very thankful if your Government would communicate to me its views on the subject.”

In Berlin, King William, as was natural with his direct and decided temper and his high sense of military and national honor, had looked upon the endless dragging-on of the Schleswig-Holstein question with angry impatience. He had made up his mind to interfere so soon as there should be any prospect of a good result, and, if necessary, to interfere with the full force of the Prussian sword. His new Minister, Herr von Bismarck, was filled with a similar spirit; though with regard to the method of proceeding and the proper time to choose, he still persisted in the views he had expressed with so much foresight in 1856. A few days after his entrance into the Cabinet he put himself secretly in communication with men who could be relied on as well in Schleswig-Holstein as in Hesse- Cassel ; and he at once required from the Minister of War an opinion concerning the preparations necessary for a war with Denmark. The substance of the information he received was, that Denmark could within four weeks place 43,000 men in the extremely strong position of the Dannevirke; in the winter, in case of a severe frost, it would be possible to go round this position, but a force of 60,000 men would be required in order to do it; this force should be kept in readiness so that it could march at once on the day when war was declared.

In a confidential letter of December 22d, 1862, Bismarck wrote: “It is certain that the whole Danish question cannot be settled in a way satisfactory to us, except by war. A pretext for such a war can be found at any moment that is deemed favorable for carrying it on. In this connection, however, much more depends upon the view of the matter taken by the non-German Great Powers than upon the intrigues of the ‘Wurz­burg Governments’ and their influence on the feeling in Germany. We share with Austria the disadvantage of having signed the London Protocol, and we cannot declare ourselves free from the obligations involved in that signature without the risk of war. But should it come to a war, the result would decide the future territorial conditions of Denmark.

At that time, in December, 1862, Bismarck was of the opinion that a chastisement inflicted by the Confederation would not be desirable, since it would be burdensome to the people of Holstein and would have no application to Schleswig: the only thing that could help oppressed Schleswig was not a chastisement by the Confederation, but a national war. For the commencement of such a war, however, the Minister thought the state of Europe rather unpromising, and the condition of Germany wholly so. “It cannot be foreseen,” he wrote, “what course the development of German Confederate relations is destined to take in the future. But so long as they remain at all what they are at present, I cannot think it for the interest of Prussia to carry on a war that would result, in the most favorable event, in giving a new Grand Duke to Schleswig-Holstein. Such a prince, from fear of Prussia’s desire for annexation, would vote against us in the Confederate Diet, and his Government would become a willing subject for the machinations of Austria, in spite of any gratitude that he might owe Prussia for his elevation.”

Bismarck, therefore, thought that a watchful reserve accompanied by a complete state of preparation was the proper attitude to be adopted for the time. As the Prussian army, under the new arrangement, could furnish at any moment the 60,000 men desired by Von Roon, there was no mention of any preparations whatever. It was thought quite sufficient to send a few reliable officers into Denmark, in order to keep informed of any military measures taken by the enemy. Bismarck could only be confirmed in this expectant attitude by the outbreak of the Polish revolt and the complications resulting from the February convention.

But when the proclamation of March 80th appeared, it seemed to the Prussian Minister, as well as to Count Rechberg, impossible to allow so direct a challenge to pass entirely unnoticed. A Prussian war against Denmark was, indeed, even less to be thought of now than three months before; but independent of its close relation to the threatened incorporation of Schleswig, the proclamation offered points enough on which to base Confederate action in favor of the special interests of Holstein. For although the proclamation, in accord­ance with the demands of the Confederation, gave extended rights to the Holstein Estates, King Frederick in issuing it had once more acted entirely without consulting those Estates, thus treating with open contempt the promises of 1852. And further, in spite of the Confederate decree of March 80th, 1860, the new order of things involved the imposing upon Holstein of severe burdens of a financial nature.

Matter enough was thus afforded for deliberations at Frankfort concerning the final carrying out of the chastisement by the Confederation. This, indeed, would be but a half-measure, but it had at least one favorable side; namely, the very slowness in which the following of constitutional methods necessarily involved all action taken by the Confederate Diet. It could be easily foreseen that the year would come to an end before the chastisement could be actually resolved upon and the troops put in motion; up to that time diplomatic negotiations could keep the question alive, and in the interval much might happen, perhaps the entire condition of European affairs might undergo a radical change. Prussia therefore answered Rechberg’s question by agreeing that steps should be taken in the Confederate Diet.

At the same time, however, public opinion in Germany began to bestir itself with lively impatience. Everywhere the Liberal Press urged that active measures should be resorted to against the unjust doings of Denmark. It was declared that the standpoint hitherto adopted by the Confederation, the demand for the rights granted in the compacts of 1852, should be entirely abandoned, since those compacts themselves had imposed unworthy limitations upon the ancient rights of the Duchies. It was said to be a cause for thankfulness that Denmark had of her own accord destroyed these limitations, and Germany must not exert her strength in a laborious effort to restore them. At the same time, little confidence was expressed in any policy that the Great Powers might adopt in the important question, since in its earlier stages Austria had always shown herself friendly to the Danes, and Bismarck had called the struggles made in self-defence by Schleswig-Holstein an insolent rebellion.

This latter point was especially insisted upon by. the National Association. In a violent manifesto put forth by that body, the Prussian policy was condemned as illegal in internal affairs, as hostile to liberty in Poland, and as faint-hearted against Denmark; it was declared that Prussia, by pursuing such a policy, had lost all claim to the leadership of Germany. The manifesto went on to demand the assembling of a German parliament, which, acting in accordance with the will of the German people, should carry into effect the sacred right of the Duchies to common independence and to succes­sion in the line of agnates, in spite of the malice of their enemy.

The majority of the Governments of the Lesser and Petty States regarded the National Association in general with abhorrence, and felt grave anxiety whenever a German parliament was mentioned; but they also observed that the cry for the liberation of the Duchies found a lively echo, not only among the political parties, but in the hearts of the entire people, and several of them were ready, by taking action on their own account in behalf of Schleswig-Holstein, to snatch this means of agitation from the hands of the detested partisans of National Unity. On this occasion, as before, Hanover made very energetic declarations in the Diet. The Baden Minister, Roggenbach, expressed the opinion that by concurrence with the Western Powers in the Polish question their support might be obtained for Germany in the Danish. And Oldenburg proposed at Frankfort, that since Denmark had broken the compacts of 1852, Germany should declare them no longer binding, and demand for the Duchies the complete restoration of their ancient rights.

Such a proceeding seemed to the Prussian Minister in the highest degree questionable, since Germany, however good her cause, would be exposed to the same danger as in 1848, that of complete isolation in face of a general opposition on the part of the European Powers, whom Austria would again join as she had done before. Bismarck, therefore, on the 17th of April, emphatically rejected in the Lower House a motion to the above effect directed against the compacts of 1852; though when the deputy Twesten asserted that, in view of the complications at home, Prussia was unable to undertake a war against Denmark, the Minister uttered the caustic retort, that the Government would carry on war when it should appear necessary, with or without the approval of the House.

When, then, in the beginning of June, the committees of the Diet were bringing their proposals concerning the chastisement to completion, and the peace-loving Lord John Russell had sent urgent admonitions to Vienna and Berlin, Bismarck, on the 7th, addressed to the Grand Duke of Oldenburg a thorough exposition of the question in detail. “ The abandonment of the compacts of 1852,” he wrote, “would make the worst possible impression in England, and would drive that Power over to the Danish side. The same is true of France and of Russia also, at least if we should at the same time declare ourselves no longer bound by the London Protocol in what concerns the question of succession. If the Great Powers should adopt a hostile attitude, Germany's position in the future would become much worse, a result doubly undesirable in the existing tension of European relations. Moreover, Austria will stand firm on the basis of 1852, and nothing is more important for the Duchies than that the two German Great Powers should act in harmony. Both, however, are bound by the London treaty of 1852; I can, therefore, only beg your Grace most urgently not to disturb by your proposal that concord in the Confederation which is so eminently essential. It is extremely probable that Denmark will not accede to the demand now being discussed in Frankfort, that the proclamation of March 30th should be withdrawn, since that would presuppose a complete change of system in Copenhagen. Should the chastisement then take place, the Confederation will always have it in its power to fix the conditions for the cessation of the same; and should Denmark make armed opposition, this would be the best thing for the German cause that could possibly happen, since Denmark by so doing would assume in the eyes of Europe the rôle of an assailant without legal justification.”

This exposition had no effect whatever upon the Grand Duke. At the time, however, the attitude of Austria and Prussia decidedly influenced the sentiments of the deputies at Frankfort On the 18th of June, the committees made their report, rejecting the scheme of the Grand Duke of Oldenburg, and proposing that a demand should be addressed to the Danish Government to the following effect: that within six weeks it should revoke the proclamation of March 30th, and should take steps preliminary to the introduction of a general constitution based upon the agreements of 1852, or upon the English mediatory proposition of 1862. At the same time it was moved in the Diet that committees should be instructed to propose measures necessary to be taken in case of refusal.

Since no one believed that the Danish Government would yield at once, Bismarck had already opened communications with Vienna concerning military preparations. His proposal was, that out of consideration for Europe, the chastisement should be intrusted at first neither to Austrian nor to Prussian forces, but only to troops from the Lesser and Petty States, in order that the purely Confederate character of the penal measures might be emphasized. With this Count Rechberg entirely agreed. Since in spite of all Hall's fierce grimaces the Count did not believe that the Danes would make any armed resistance, he thought that four or five thousand men would be abundantly sufficient; at most, he said, the Great Powers could keep a reserve in readiness for the very improbable event that they might be needed.

A military opinion delivered on the 24th of June by General Moltke, on the ground of the reconnaissance undertaken in Denmark, supported this view. The report was to the following effect: “ Denmark is as yet making no direct preparations for war, but she is getting ready for a conflict with Germany. She has withdrawn the German element of her army to the island of Zealand, and has filled the Duchies with Danish troops on a semi-war-footing. The line of defence from Friedrichstadt to Eckernforde with the Dannevirke in the centre is completed, and numbers seventy different works. The outlay occasioned by this leaves room for no other idea than that the Danish army will make its stand in that place and there only. For since the military force is hardly sufficient to occupy this position, it is not to be supposed that that force will be weakened by being distributed throughout Holstein.”

Moltke then indicated as necessary for the cap­ture of the Dannevirke the method of operations which he made the plan of action for the allied army in the following year.

On the 9th of July, 1863, the Confederate Diet by a majority of thirteen to four accepted the proposal of the committees. The demand was at once sent to Copenhagen, that within six weeks a declaration should be made with regard to the March proclamation, and to the position of Holstein in the Danish State. The negotiations concerning the strength and the arrange­ment of the Confederate army were then continued. Austria persisted in her view, that there should be a Confederate commissioner, and 4,000, at most 5,000 men. She privately called upon the King of Hanover to furnish both the commissioner and the troops, thinking that so honorable a distinction would be instrumen­tal in making King George hold fast to her party in the German question. Bismarck, considering that no better occasion for war could be offered to Germany than if the Danes should expel the army of chastise­ment from Holstein, agreed to the small number of men suggested by Austria, only stipulating that an Austrian and Prussian reserve should be kept in readiness. He protested decidedly, however, against vesting the authority in Hanover alone, and desired that proposals should be made to Saxony as well as to Hanover to furnish a commissioner and a body of troops. Austria was willing to agree to this, if Hanover, to whom she esteemed herself bound, made no objections.

While this correspondence was going on, the European horizon without seemed to be clouding over.

In Denmark various proclamations were issued, one after another, all indicating an increasingly warlike tone of mind: there were proclamations con­cerning the arrangement of the burden of quartering the soldiers, concerning the clearing of the area within the military limits of the fortresses, and concerning an in­crease in the number of naval officers. Then the King of Sweden made the Danish Sovereign an unexpected visit at the Villa of Skodsborg, and the rumor immediately spread through Copenhagen that a Scandinavian alliance had been concluded, a rumor that increased the courage and the turbulence of the “ Eider-Danish” party.

Much more important, however, was the fact that on the 23d of July the head of the English Administration, in full Parliament, threw his word into the scale with all his energy in favor of Denmark. This time it was not the friendly mediator, Lord John Russell; it was the First Lord of the Treasury, Lord Palmerston himself, who now with hasty thoughtlessness shouted a threatening Quo ego to Germany, always so little beloved by him. He cared not much about the rights of the matter. He had, indeed, before declared that the Schleswig-Holstein affair was so complicated that only three men had ever understood it: the first was Prince Albert, who was dead; the second a Danish Statesman, who had gone mad; the third Lord Palmer­ston himself, and he had forgotten all about it.

Borne along by this fortunate ignorance, Palmerston now cried out to Parliament: “ The German Confed­eration may exert authority over Holstein: it has as little right to do so over Schleswig as over Spain or Morocco. Luckily Austria, considering her internal difficulties, stands so much in need of peace that she will certainly do anything to avoid a collision with Denmark. Should any attempt be made, however, to do what cannot be permitted, should Germany assail the integrity of Denmark, so important for Europe and above all for England, it will not be Denmark alone whom she will have to meet.” Lord John shook his head anxiously at this warlike utterance. When the Prussian ambassador remonstrated with the haughty orator, Palmerston, treating the matter lightly, answered: “We must encourage the Danes a little; they are the weaker party, maltreated by you.”

If this was the intention, the encouragement had a most fatal success. No doubt about English assistance was any longer felt at Copenhagen, and with the greatest enthusiasm it was urged that the Confederate chastisement should be looked upon as a casus belli. “ Nothing has yet been decided upon,” said the Minister Hall at that time to the Russian ambassador; “but my opinion is decidedly in favor of war, since the Confederation is determined to interfere, without any right to do so, in the affairs of Schleswig and of the king­dom as a whole.” King Frederick’s tone was the same. “I seek no conflict,” he said; “but I can yield no further. My army is ready; my iron-clad, Rolf Krake, will shortly pay a visit to the town of Danzig.” Especial satisfaction was shown in the Danish news­papers, when it was known that Hanover was to furnish troops for the chastisement. It was felt that they could assail this state on the sea-coast in a thorough fashion by water.

In Germany, in the beginning of August, the prepa­rations for the chastisement were brought to a standstill by the Frankfort Assembly of Princes, which came suddenly upon the country. While the deliberations and festivities attendant upon’ this were going on, the more particular business in the Eschenheim palace was allowed to rest. Indirectly, however, the Assembly of Princes had very important consequences even for Schleswig-Holstein. Although the august assembly did not carry out the wish of Minister von Beust, that, at the close of their deliberations, they should make a great demonstration in behalf of the Duchies, yet Austria had, by the course of affairs in the congress, arrived at a point at which the favor of the German Governments and people was doubly desirable for her. She therefore went on with increased zeal in the treatment of the Danish difficulty.

On the 26th of August the answer of Denmark to the Confederate decree of July 9th was received at Frankfort. In this the revocation of the March procla­mation was refused, and it was rather plainly indicated that the execution of the chastisement would be regarded as a casus belli, Rechberg then wrote to Bismarck, declaring the answer to be entirely insufficient, and expressing the hope that the Prussian, as well as the Austrian, deputy in the Diet had already been instructed to proceed with the necessary measures for the chastisement.

The committees accordingly set to work. But the carrying out of the chastisement proved to be less easy than had hitherto been supposed. Hanover and Oldenburg, in spite of all their bold language, were filled with grave anxiety now that the question became serious; and they were seconded by Hamburg, who sighed deeply at the blockade of the mouth of the Elbe which seemed possibly imminent Count Platen, the Minister of Hanover, groaned over the chances that the little body of Hanoverians, which was to march at the expense of the Confederation, might be cut to pieces by the Danes: “For,” he cried, “ we have no money to set on foot ourselves the reserves necessary to prevent this; we cannot help ourselves out of the misfortune, unless Prussia mobilizes a sufficient relief­corps.”

While the coast States were thus lukewarm, language all the more warlike was indulged in at Dresden, Stuttgart, and Munich, to which places their inland position gave a feeling of complete security. Austria, who had by no means abandoned her Confederate reform, praised this patriotic disposition, admonished Hanover to pluck up courage, and urged the Confederation to take energetic action. Yet Rechberg was not altogether inclined to begin a Confederate war; he lived rather in the hope that by the adoption of a threatening attitude the Danes would be shaken in their resolution, and so some concessions could be obtained for the Duchies without a breach of the peace.

A diplomatic attempt of Lord John to decrease the tension of relations was, therefore, although supported by France, rejected by Rechberg, on the ground that only matters belonging to the internal competence of the Confederation were concerned. He said that the authority of the Diet was sufficient even for the examination of the question whether Holstein had received in the General Constitution the consideration due to her by compact. As Prussia declared her concurrence in this view, in the month of September the committees of the Diet united on a motion that the Courts of Austria, Prussia, Saxony, and Hanover should be requested to undertake the chastisement in the following way: each of the two last-named Governments was to send a civil commissioner and 3,000 men to Holstein; and the two first-named were to hold ready the necessary support in case of resistance. This was to be signified to Denmark, and an interval of three weeks was to be allowed for the averting of these results by submission to the Confederate decree of July 9th.

In Copenhagen, where the confidence in the support of England still continued unshaken, the news that such a proposal was pending only produced a determination to proceed as quickly as possible along the path that had been irrevocably chosen. The March proclamation had been issued mainly with the object of preparing the way, by the exclusion of Holstein, for the incorporation of Schleswig. It was thought that if this incorporation were carried into effect as quickly as possible, the March proclamation, which would have become useless, might be sacrificed to the wrath of the Confederate Diet, and the Confederation then be told, with the approval of Europe, not to interfere further in the internal constitutional questions of Denmark.

Accordingly there followed, on the 28th of September, the opening of the special session of the General Council which had been formally announced in the summer. In the Speech from the Throne, King Frederick proclaimed a new Constitution for Denmark- Schleswig, “for dur Kingdom,” as he designated the two countries in contradistinction to Holstein-Lauenburg. “ The General Council,” it was declared, “ will be so strengthened that it will be sufficient alone to carry on the whole constitutional development of the monarchy.” No one could take this to mean anything but that in future the functions of both the Parliament of Denmark Proper and of the Schleswig Estates were to be limited to affairs of provincial administration with no control of the budget and no legislative power. Even if this last step was not actually proposed at that moment, the fact nevertheless remained for Germany: that ever since 1858 the Confederation had designated the existing provisional state of things as being a disguised incorporation of Schleswig, that is, contrary to the compacts, and that now the state of things that had hitherto been provisional was to be changed into a definitive incorporation.

The challenge thus given to the Confederation was even more insolent than that implied in the March proclamation. It was therefore natural that when the Confederate Diet, on the 1st of October, came to vote on the proposal of the committees, the announcement of the chastisement was almost unanimously approved. Just as the question was about to be put, the Austrian presiding deputy received a fresh despatch from England deprecating any such step as that proposed. Kübeck informed the assembly of this, but said at the same time that he saw no reason for postponing the vote. When this was taken, the only dissenting voices were Denmark and Luxemburg, opponents of the measure on principle, and with them Baden, for whom the proposal did not go far enough, and who held the demand for the actual union of Schleswig-Holstein that had obtained in 1848 to be the only one worthy of Germany. The proposal of the committees became a decree by a vote of fourteen to three.

The hostile determination of both sides had thus been expressed in full distinctness.

But at this moment Bismarck found it advisable to modify, not indeed the aim, but the attitude of Prussian policy. He was anxious, if it were possible without unfortunate results in other respects, to postpone the chastisement once more for a time, since the state of things in general seemed to him still unpropitious for an undertaking that might involve great European complications. Ever since Gortschakoff had broken off so categorically the negotiations concerning Poland, it was no secret that Napoleon was meditating a war against Russia. Moreover, since the Frankfort Assembly of Princes, the relations between Prussia and Austria had been extremely strained; and it was a matter of grave doubt, whether it was best to undertake with such an ally an armed expedition, the conse­quences of which were as yet beyond all calculation.

Of Russia’s friendship Prussia was for the time certain. Napoleon also had since August been manifesting a desire to maintain more intimate relations with her. Yet in the general uncertainty of affairs, it seemed desirable to keep on good terms with the third of the foreign Great Powers, England, as well; and there were no better means to this end than to show a conciliatory spirit in the Danish affair, and to make advances in the direction of the English plan of mediation which had hitherto been rejected. Even if Denmark should learn of this action, the German cause would hardly be likely to suffer. On the contrary, in view of the tone of feeling prevailing at Copenhagen, nothing was more likely than that Prussia’s adoption of such an attitude would provoke an ever-increasing insolence, and an ever-increasing violation of rights, thus making the chances more and more favorable to Germany in the war which was sure to come.

More than one opportunity soon followed for taking a stand in accordance with this view.

One of the most prominent personages in Denmark, Baron Blixen-Finecke, brother-in-law of the Heir-Apparent Prince Christian, a great land-holder in Jutland and Sweden, and formerly for a time Danish Minister, was now the representative of a Jutland district in the General Council. As such he had given his attention, with judicious enthusiasm, to the interests of the peasants, and by so doing had acquired great consideration among the people. He had recently, to the great indig­nation of the “ Eider-Danes,” declared to his Jutland peasants that they had no interest in the world in the March proclamation and the enslavement of Schleswig, but a very great interest in the preservation of peace. On the 3d of October he wrote to Bismarck, whom he had formerly known personally, inquiring whether Prussia would be inclined to avert the Confederate chastisement, if Denmark withdrew the March proclamation, arranged justly the condition of the Schleswig Germans, and at once inaugurated a new ministry as a guaranty for a change of system.

Bismarck had hardly received this communication, when, on the 7th of October, the English ambassador, Sir Andrew Buchanan, presented himself with instruc­tions from Lord John Russell to discuss with the Prussian Minister the same question, the prevention of the chastisement. “We turn this time,” wrote Lord John, “not to Austria, who seems much irritated,”—Rechberg had once more rejected English mediation,—“but only to Prussia, whose moderation we cannot doubt.”

Bismarck said that he must first of all consult the wishes of the King, who was then in Baden. “Personally,” the Minister added, “I consider the question a very difficult one, and it should properly be discussed only with the Confederation. In affairs affecting inter­nal Confederate rights, there can be no question of foreign interference. As to the international part of the matter (Schleswig), I will give my voice in the Confederation for the acceptance of English mediation, provided Denmark has previously accepted it and has offered no opposition to the chastisement.”

After he had obtained in Baden the consent of the King, he sent the following answer to Blixen on the 10th of October: “ If the proclamation of March 30th be revoked, if the situation be encumbered with no new difficulties by the arrangements which the Ministry will declare necessary that that proclamation may be dis­pensed with, if, moreover, the improvements suggested by you in the condition of the Schleswig Germans be carried into effect,—then I will give my voice against the carrying out of the chastisement, and I believe I shall be able to make my opinions prevail, however violently Austria and her friends may urge the contrary. Should the above conditions be wanting, my moderate views would lack a basis to work on, and the Confederation has already gone too far for any prospect of practical results to be left even to an English plan of mediation... I should be greatly pleased, should it so come about that I could negotiate with you officially concerning our mutual relations. Your present Ministers, owing to what is past, have not the freedom of movement necessary to bring about an understanding.”

To the same effect, the Minister sent to the English ambassador, on the 15th of October, a reply well-weighed in every word: “Let Denmark declare to the Confederate Diet her readiness to give the Confederation satisfaction in respect to the right of Holstein and Lauenburg to control their own legislation, as well as the expenditure of all sums of money raised in the Duchies; let Denmark further declare that she has accepted English mediation for the solution of the international difficulties: then Prussia will attempt to prevent the carrying out of the Confederate chastisement.”

The whole thing was so worded that England, in her position of an impartial mediator, could hardly raise any objection, yet at the same time in such a way that a full acceptance by Denmark of the various preliminary conditions was hardly to be expected. On the preceding day, indeed, the 14th of October, a council of the Prussian Ministry at which the King presided had declared that the Minister of Foreign Affairs was, so far as it might be consistent with Prussia’s honor, to make efforts for the preservation of peace; but that at the same time the Minister of Finance and the Minister of War were to make estimates of the expense requisite for the defence of the coasts and the equipment of troops, for which Prussia might be called upon, in case armed intervention should be deemed necessary.

Bismarck also explained his general view of the state of the question in instructions sent on the 16th of October to the Prussian representative in the Confederate Diet, Von Sydow: —

“The challenge contained in the Danish proclamation of March 80th imposed upon the German Confederation the necessity of taking some definite action in reply. If this action was to correspond entirely to the German claims, a Confederate war was the only suitable form for it to take. The proposal of Oldenburg, that the compacts of 1852 should be declared void, could only have afforded a satisfactory solution, if at the same time the decision had been adopted to restore practically and by force of arms the status quo ante, which would by such a step have been legitimately demanded. As, however, the general situation of Europe made it unadvisable to begin a Confederate war at that juncture, a way out of the difficulty was found by taking up once more the process of armed intervention begun in 1858.

“We have never concealed from ourselves the insufficiency of this measure nor the doubtfulness of its practical success for the cause of the Duchies, but have not held it expedient to make a single-handed opposition to it, so long as it was supported by the majority of the German Governments with a zeal arising from a partly real and partly feigned ignorance concerning the results to be expected from the chastisement. The difficulties that we should have encountered in openly opposing the chastisement, and the complications to which Prussia especially would have been exposed in consequence of the same, were well known to our enemies in Germany. For the sake of profiting by these disadvantages to Prussia, former opponents of the cause of the Duchies now gave that cause their liveliest sympathy. This, however, seems to have cooled off among the maritime states who are equally exposed with us to the consequences of a Danish war; while

Austria and the South German inland states are urging all the more determinedly summary proceedings against Denmark.

“While all this has been going on, the trusted security in the relations of the Confederate States to one another has been disturbed by the conditions which Austria’s efforts for reform have called into life. On account of this disturbance the present moment seems unpropitious for such common undertakings as might bring about European complications. In this state of affairs it is not our wisest course to push the chastisement for its own sake, if honorable means offer themselves, for avoiding it, or if, without any fault on our part, it encounters obstacles in the bosom of the Confederate assembly.”

Meanwhile the time was not far distant, at which the paths of German policy were to begin to grow smooth, even by reason of the very blindness of the enemy himself.

While Lord John Russell was wasting a vast amount of ink in sending incessant admonitions to Frankfort against executing the chastisement, and to Copenhagen against resisting it by force of arms, the Danish Ministry persisted in its programme of first completing the incorporation of Schleswig, and then, by the withdrawal of the March proclamation, of taking away from the Confederate Diet every pretext for interference. On the 15th of October King Frederick came from the Castle of Glucksburg to Copenhagen for the- purpose of being present at the consultation of his Ministers over the answer to be sent to the Confederate Diet. The tone of feeling in the capital was self-confident in the highest degree. It was not believed that the Confederate Diet would have the courage to carry out the federal execution in the face of England’s opposition; and the boldness of Denmark increased, as always, when Germany was supposed to be hesitating. Orla Lehmann, now Minister of the Interior, had recently declared to a Danish marksman’s guild: “ The Government has been fully aware of what it was doing in bringing on the present breach with Germany; it therefore finds itself not in the least embarrassed by the further progress and development of its plan of action.” Meanwhile Blixen informed first Minister Hall, and then, on the 18th of October, the King also, of Bismarck’s communication. The ever-indolent Sovereign, who had hitherto, to please the masses in Copenhagen, pursued the policy of the “ Eider-Danes,” was now filled with anxiety lest his comfortable quiet might be disturbed by the Confederate chastisement. He fell upon Blixen’s neck and called him his deliverer. He said that he would never sanction the new Constitution that was now being discussed by his Ministers, not even if it should be accepted by the General Council. More than this, however, Blixen did not obtain.1 In the presence of his Ministers the King did not venture to make any opposition. It was decided to send to Frankfort an answer negative in every respect. On the 19th, King Frederick returned to Glücksburg, and the “ Eider-Danes ” remained in undisturbed possession of the reins of government.

Hall then caused his newspapers to open a fierce pen- and-ink war against Blixen, who, it was said, was exchanging political counsels with the enemy, to the detriment of his own country; and the Minister took all possible measures otherwise to push the new Constitu­tion through the General Council as quickly as possible. In public, he caused Bismarck to be accused of seeking to interfere by means of the miserable Blixen in the constitution of the Danish Ministry; while in private, he tried to work upon the deputies, who were filled with many doubts, by pretending that he had information, from direct communication with Bismarck, of Prussia’s fixed determination never to allow things to go so far as a serious conflict with Denmark.

Yet, in spite of all this, it took some pains to keep together the necessary majority of two-thirds for the new Constitution. In the discussion in detail at the second reading, Hall did, indeed, obtain the rejection of all propositions of amendment, the minority against him consisting of only three or four votes. A motion of Blixen, that, after the General Council had arrived at a decision, the new Constitution should be then subjected to consideration by a new constitutive assembly, was likewise emphatically rejected; and at Hall’s desire, the 1st of January, 1864, was fixed as the date for the introduction of the Constitution.

But a sharp contest took place once more before the final decision. No less a person than the former Minister, Bluhme, the negotiator of the compacts of 1852, now came forward against the infringement of those compacts by the new Constitution. “The royal manifesto of January 28th, 1852,” he said, “formed at that time the legal basis both for the London compact and for the restoration of peace with Germany. The chief point in all these was the integrity of the Danish monarchy, as a necessary element of the European balance of power. Even as early as 1858 this integrity was infringed by the exclusion of Holstein; but hitherto this has been only provisional, and it has therefore been a measure for the time endurable. But with the March proclamation this provisional state of things became definitive; and thus the legal basis of 1852 was abandoned, and instead of the integrity of the monarchy being preserved, its dismemberment was undertaken. In the year 1852 it was promised that Schleswig should have a position similar to that of Holstein, that Schleswig should not be incorporated, that no effort should be made for its incorporation: in contradiction to this, this new law now appears, concerning which the Ministry do, indeed, assert that it neither implies in itself, nor prepares the way for, incorporation. For my part, I will not dispute this assertion; but which of the foreign Great Powers will believe it ? ”

The answer to this question was ready on all sides. The Swedish Minister, Manderstrom, declared that the new Constitution, if it did not directly alter the powers of the General Council, the Parliament, and the Provincial Estates, yet must necessarily lead to such alterations. When the Constitution was first confidentially communicated to him, he had at once, on the 5th of October, addressed a serious warning on the subject to Copenhagen.1 The English ambassador at Copenhagen, Sir Arthur Paget, whose sympathies were strongly with the Danes, spoke of the new Constitution as a direct declaration of war against Germany.2 Lord John Russell was, like Manderstrom, of the opinion that the new Constitution did not exactly contain the incorporation of Schleswig, but certainly prepared the way for it, and therefore involved a direct infringement of the compacts of 1852. This was the view of the merits of the case taken by the two Governments on whose help Denmark hoped first of all to be able to count

But the “ Eider-Danish ” leaders pushed on in blind zeal, forced forward as they were by the inevitable consequences of their former doings. They paid no attention to the fact that on the 5th of November the Emperor Napoleon, by a few short sentences in his Speech from the Throne, put out of gear the whole condition of things in which European political affairs had been running up to that time. They contented themselves with sending to Frankfort on the 8th of November the declaration, that if the Confederate Diet would ask in Copenhagen for certain very moderate extensions of the rights of the Holstein Estates in regard to the budget, the Danish Government would be disposed to grant this request, always providing that the Holsteiners continued to behave loyally. Under the existing circumstances this proposition could only be regarded as a fresh insult to Germany.

Finally, on the 13th of November, after Blixen had, by a bungling speech against the new Constitution, increased the bitterness of feeling, and after Hall had announced, with great emphasis, that the Cabinet would stand or fall with this question, the final decision was arrived at in the General Council. Thirty-seven votes were necessary for the required majority of two-thirds: Hall won by forty against sixteen. The Government had delayed the by-elections in two Schleswig districts, which had been long unrepresented, and which would certainly have fallen to the Opposition; the five Minis­ters voted with the majority: yet, in spite of all this, the transference of four votes would have been sufficient to throw out the bill. But at any rate, whether the majority was small or great, the blow had fallen, and the compacts of 1852 had been blown into the air by Danish hands.

On the day on which the decision was arrived at, Hall hastened to Glucksburg to conclude the whole matter by obtaining the royal signature. But on his arrival, he found the King mortally ill. A carbuncle on the nose had suppurated and brought on erysipelas in the head. Only during brief moments did the invalid show signs of consciousness or of mental clearness. It was at such a moment that Hall presented to him the document for signature. But the King, whether under a final impulse of a feeling of justice, or from a mis­chievous disposition toward his successor, who was but little loved by him, refused his signature, as he had told Blixen before that he would do. “ I will not sign,” he cried. “ Christian may do it.”

On the 15th of November, 1863, King Frederick died, at the age of fifty-five, the last of the royal male line. By his death an entirely new outlook was opened for the German-Danish quarrel.

CHAPTER II.

THE SUCCESSION AND THE CONSTITUTION.

Emperor Napoleon’s Speech from the Throne on the 5th of November, 1863, had burst upon the political world like a flash of lightning.

“ The compacts of 1815 have ceased to be in force. Can anything be wiser than to summon all the European Powers to a Congress which may act as a supreme tribunal concerning all the questions at issue ? ”

On the very same day an invitation was sent to all the sovereigns of Europe to be present in person at such a congress to be held in Paris.

This meant the announcement of a drama, beside which the Frankfort Assembly of Princes would have appeared like Tom Thumb beside the ogre.

The most powerful and the most ambitious of the monarchs of Europe, as Napoleon was then universally considered to be, solemnly declared that the legal basis on which the stability of the European states rested, no longer existed; and that it was therefore necessary to subject the general condition of the European world to a critical investigation by all the sovereigns. A con­ference of twenty crowned heads, with no definition nor limitation of the subjects of discussion, with no announcement of the results or objects to be aimed at, and with no previous understanding concerning the powers of the assembly, its methods of business, or the means of carrying out its decisions, gave little prospect of a peaceful conclusion. Such a project implied unmistakably only fresh revelations of a warlike purpose on the part of its originator.

“The Speech is impertinent!” cried Queen Victoria of England. “This is too much!” said the Emperor Alexander of Russia. No one was pleased at the invitation ; but, to say the truth, no one was anxious to draw upon himself by a refusal the anger of the dreaded Emperor. The smaller Courts, the Pope and Sultan first of all, vied with each other in the declaration of their readiness. Among the Great Powers, however, each one would have been glad to yield to the others the undesirable honor of drawing back. Russia hoped that England and Austria would take the initiative. But Lord John Russell was of the opinion that it belonged to Austria and Russia to decline first; and he confined himself for the time to laying stress in Paris upon the continuance in force of the compacts of 1815, and to asking for more explicit information as to the subjects that Napoleon proposed to bring before the Congress for discussion.

No one had any doubt as to the tendency of the French move. Napoleon had publicly and distinctly declared that he had no cause for complaint against Prussia and Russia, who had pursued their course openly and honorably in the Polish matter without any special hostility to France. But he had quite as little made a secret of the bitterness which he had felt at the conduct of Austria and England, who had first led him to break off a promising connection with Russia, and then, when national honor called for warlike action, had disgracefully left him in the lurch. The proposal of a congress, therefore, meant the covering up of the diplomatic defeat that he had suffered, at the expense of the faithless allies, of Austria especially.

Thus things took once more the course they had taken after the Crimean war: Napoleon was preparing to go over from the side of those who had been his allies hitherto to that of the enemy; and just as the Italian Question had then taken in his mind the place of the Eastern Question, so now it took the place of the Polish one.

The natural consequence of this sudden revolution in French policy was a general change in the mutual relations of the Great Powers. Hitherto England and Austria had stood at the side of France in opposition to Russia and Prussia. It now became the watchword, both at Vienna and at London, that nothing was more necessary for the quiet of the world than a close understanding, even if not a quadruple alliance, of the four Great Powers against the disturber of the peace at Paris.

In Russia, where the indignation was still fresh over Napoleon’s action in respect to Poland, this suggestion found a strong echo. Prussia, however, did not join in it so unreservedly. In Berlin there existed, indeed, in King William perhaps even more than in his Minister, a profound mistrust of the schemes of the French Emperor, and a doubt as to what reliance could be placed in him. But it was unquestionable that the latest turn of Napoleon’s policy was taking a course favorable, for the present at least, to Prussia.

So far as the project of a congress was concerned, Bismarck’s views differed little from those of Lord John Russell or Count Rechberg; but he was very far from being disposed to take upon himself the negative rôle that was assigned to him in London. On the contrary, when the first news of the plan arrived, he said in an informal conversation with the French ambassador that personally he had no objection to make. “If things were still as they were in January, I could most readily have given this assurance officially. But since that time the attitude of France on the Polish question has given the King cause for anxiety. Yet I hope that confidence will soon be restored. Prussia has just now no interest for her own part in the congress; but she has. also no reason whatever for objecting to its taking place.”

On the 14th of November the King received from the ambassador the imperial invitation. He at once replied by word of mouth that he had no objection to make to the congress on principle, and would only submit for consideration, whether it would not be advisable to have a previous understanding between the five Great Powers, and to let the principal ministers meet instead of the sovereigns. Meantime he said that for his part he regarded the compacts of 1815 as binding, except so far as they might have been altered by agreement.

This, as is easily seen, did not mean very much. Napoleon expressed especial regret at the proposition to give up the meeting of the sovereigns, and so to rob the opening of the congress of an unprecedented splendor. Count Goltz, however, succeeded in pacify­ing him by observing that the King was only in doubt as to the question whether the sovereigns were to appear at the beginning or at the conclusion of the deliberations, and that the first was clearly undesirable, since there could be no certainty that positive results would be obtained. This could not be disputed; and Napoleon therefore assumed the truth of what he desired: that Prussia had agreed to the congress. He consequently redoubled his friendly advances to the Court of Berlin, — a result which to that Court was by no means unsatisfactory.

In Vienna, on the other hand, no very cheerful feelings prevailed. As a matter of fact, Rechberg’s policy had everywhere produced an unfavorable yearly balance. The last attempt to carry out, at least partially, the Confederate reform of the Frankfort Assembly of Princes, had resulted at the Nuremberg conference in total failure. A threat addressed to Berlin of a Franco-Austrian alliance, in case Prussia did not accept the Confederate reforms, had been met by Bismarck with the laconic reply, that Prussia’s refusal was irrevocable. With Russia, on account of the attitude that the Austrian Government had chosen to adopt in the Polish matter, relations were as uncer­tain as after the Crimean War. And with things in this condition, Austria suddenly found the point of the French dagger directed against her own breast. If the congress actually met, the Italian question would once more be brought to the attention of Europe; and if Austria’s opposition interfered with the congress, she would have Napoleon’s active hostility to fear.

It was clear, then, that to England, protected by her ocean boundaries, must be left the charge of rendering abortive the Napoleonic project. Yet Napoleon’s dispo­sition toward Austria would still remain the same. It was probable that any help she might obtain from Eng­land would amount to no more than diplomatic despatches. A like result was certain, if she turned to Russia. The restoration of a good understanding with Prussia seemed, therefore, more desirable and more important than ever. As early as the 11th of November, the Prussian ambassador, Werther, was able to report to that effect from Vienna: “The English ambassador,” he wrote, “ remarked to Count Rechberg how important it was that there should be harmony between the two German Great Powers, in view of the superiority of France, and urged that Austria should therefore let the Confederate reform lie where it was. Count Rechberg at once replied: ‘ How gladly would we do it, if Prussia would only make it possible for us! ’”

Three days later Rechberg himself expressed to the ambassador his regret that Prussia had not yet communicated to Vienna her views concerning the congress. When Werther suggested that Austria’s attitude in regard to Confederate reform had disturbed the good­feeling of the past, Rechberg cried: “Today there are more important things than Confederate reform. Prussia, I think, has an equal interest with us in the maintenance of the compacts of 1815.”

A more thorough change of circumstances cannot be conceived, than had thus taken place within a few weeks for the two German Powers. Prussia, but a short time before hampered by Austria’s Confederate reform, opposed by a mighty coalition, completely isolated in Germany, now found herself treated with consideration by England, courted by France, and sought for by Austria as her only reliable ally. This was the well-merited result of a course of action as determined as it was farsighted, and a policy above all things clear as to its ends and fearless in the pursuit of them.

While this transformation of European relations was in progress, the news of the extinction of the male line went abroad, and new surprises were at hand for the Cabinet of Vienna.

On the 13th of November the Danish General Coun­cil had adopted the new Constitution for Denmark-Schleswig. On the 15th, Frederick VII. died at Glücksburg. On the 16th, Christian IX, the “ Protocol-Prince,” as the Germans called him, was proclaimed at Copenhagen ruler of the United Danish Kingdom, and he retained in office for the time the “Eider-Danish ” Ministry of Hall. But on the same day the heir-apparent to the title of Augustenburg announced, that, in virtue of the hereditary agnatic right which, after his revered father’s renunciation in his favor, had descended to him, he should enter upon his government as Frederick, eighth Duke of Schleswig-Holstein; that he called upon the German Confederation to protect the legitimate Order of Succession; and that in accordance with the fundamental law of 1848, he promised to uphold the Constitution of Schleswig-Holstein and the rights of his people. In spite of the promise paid for in ready money in 1852, in spite of the London Protocol, in spite of the Law of Succession of 1853, Augutenburg came forward with a demand for his hereditary possession of the Duchies.

We know the legal argument, following which the Prince considered himself not bound by the promise given by his father in 1852. He had, indeed, kept silence at the time; but when, some years later, the dispute began between Denmark and the German Confederation, he sent a protest, asserting his rights, to Copenhagen and to Berlin. This had, however, every­where been simply put away on file among the public documents as in itself of no importance. In it he had said, that, since his father had promised to maintain a passive attitude, it became his own duty to uphold the claim of his House: a statement which was open to the objection, that, so long as the father lived, the son had no legitimate right whatever to act as the head and representative of his House.

For this reason the form now chosen for the proclamation was, that Duke Christian had abdicated in his son's favor and ceded to him the legal right to the title of Augustenburg. This, however, placed the proceeding on an extremely uncertain basis, and the opponents of the new claimant did not fail to urge this against him with effective emphasis. “Frederick himself,” they said, “ may or may not be bound by his father’s promise; but there can be no question but that his father is bound. Now the latter’s pledge, made on his princely word and honor, had been given, 4 in his own name and in that of his family,’ and was to the effect that he would undertake nothing to disturb the succession and the new order of things to be established in Denmark. But what could he have undertaken more calculated to shake that succession to its very foundations than a cession of the claims, which in his hands could not be made use of, to an heir whose hands were free? The cession is, therefore, in formal contradiction to the promise of 1852, and its complete legal worth­lessness follows without further argument.”

And what was the feeling of the people in the Duchies ?

The reports lying before us give the following information on that subject.

Since 1852, years had passed, during which the name of Augustenburg had not been heard in Schleswig-Holstein. The family had received money from Copenhagen; they lived abroad; few knew anything at all about them. In the much-oppressed Schleswig they had never been beloved; no one placed any hope in them or in their German connections: certainly, if the German nation hesitated to take into itself the Confederate country of Holstein, had Schleswig anything whatever to look for from that direction ? The desires of all the patriots in that country were therefore centred upon the heir to the crown designated in the Law of 1858, Prince Christian of Glücksburg. However he may have conducted himself in the stormy times of 1848, he had an honest German heart; as King, he would put an end to the abuse of his German subjects and once more restore the old mutual relations of the Duchies and Denmark so advantageous to either side. Moreover, the strict supervision exercised by the Danish police prevented much news from abroad from penetrating into the country. The thoughts of all were therefore concentrated upon the hope attending the change of sovereigns.

In Holstein, things were different. The “Eider-Danes,” as we know, laid but little stress on the assertion of the oneness of that country with Denmark. Furthermore, there was the intervention of the German Confederation, which, in spite of its procrastination and incompetence, gave an ever-increasing impulse to the desire for complete liberation. So far as Duke Christian of Augustenburg was concerned, he had established, since 1856, new connections with some members of the Estates, while he also, by a close friend­ship with the Duke of Saxe-Coburg, whose restless activity had long found that little principality too narrow, bad secured for himself a new basis for futher operations.

When, by the Danish proclamation of March 30th, a rupture between Germany and Denmark was made much more probable, Duke Christian appeared at a great agricultural exhibition in Hamburg, where at the same time a consultation took place between a large number of members of the German and of the Holstein National parties. After that, a silent agitation began to spread through all parts of Holstein: a central committee, confidential agents in all the cities and official positions, a designation of those that sympathized with the cause, a careful watch kept upon every political opponent—these were the beginnings of a popular organization embracing the whole country. Soon these methods were extended in a similar way, even if with a smaller result, to Schleswig. Lawyers, teachers, merchants — in general, the men of the upper citizen-class—were the active representatives of the movement, which developed more and more with every step forward taken by the Confederate Diet.

In the midst of all this the news of King Frederick’s death suddenly burst upon the country. The leaders felt that the critical moment had come. They called an assembly at Kiel of men from both Duchies that could be relied on, in order to arrive at the final decision for the good of the country. The Holsteiners hastened thither, unanimous in the feeling that the desired separation from Denmark was to be obtained by acknowledging Augustenburg. The majority of the Schleswigers, on the other hand, were looking with beating hearts for the fulfilment of their hopes at the hands of King Christian IX.

How gladly would this well-disposed Prince have answered these expectations! How clearly lay the errors and the dangers of the “ Eider-Danish ” policy before his eyes! He was a plain, well-meaning man, who up to that time had lived wholly for his family, had brought up vigorous sons and amiable daughters, and had undertaken the perilous burden of the throne without ambition and without joy. When he received the news of King Frederick’s death, he uttered the melancholy words: “Now my days of happiness are over.”

The new Sovereign was at once visited by the Prus­sian ambassador Balan, who earnestly begged him to refuse his sanction to the new Constitution; the Austrian ambassador hastened to follow this example; and the representative of Russia urged the same thing. The King had often before expressed the opinion, that Frederick VII was going too far on the Danish side; Christian himself had an eager desire to offer justice and conciliation to his German subjects. But for this very reason he stood alone and unsupported in Copen­hagen. The passion of the Danes was aroused to the highest point. The newspapers spoke of the German movement in a contemptuous and irritating style, and threatening petitions signed by great numbers of people demanded from the King his immediate sanction of the Constitution. He was therefore obliged to make the fatal decision at the very beginning of his reign.

On the 18th of November he discussed the question with the Prime Minister in the presence of the gray­haired General de Meza, who in the war of 1849 had done his best for Denmark. After some balancing of the considerations on one side with those of the other, Hall said dryly: “Sire, if you do not sign, I cannot undertake to answer for your life and the lives of your family,” pointing while he said it to the throng of people which with shouts and tumult was surging back and forth under the windows of the palace. But the old De Meza cried out to the King: “Your Majesty, I will answer for you with my head. Do what is right without anxiety. With your brave Holstein battalions I will scatter all this rabble to the winds.” There could be no doubt as to what was right; but it is easily understood how the King wavered in cruel uncertainty. On the one hand he had before him the joyful enthusiasm of his grateful Schleswigers; on the other, the possibility of a rising in the capital, perhaps of a defeat of the troops, or, if they should conquer, the prospect of the curses of the Danish people upon the blood­stained German tyrant.

Christian’s mind was not bold enough, his heart not hard enough, to endure this trial. He left the room to seek counsel from his mother-in-law, and when the Princess Charlotte threw her voice on the Danish side, he gave the fatal signature. Hall announced the result to the Prussian ambassador with the incredible comment that of course the international negotiations were not affected by it. The Danish newspapers, however, were full of rejoicing that from this time on any return to the disgraceful United Kingdom of 1852 would be impossible.

Yes, this was henceforth impossible. In the assembly at Kiel the majority of the Schleswigers, relying upon King Christian, had rejected the candidacy of Augustenburg and the expulsion of all royal officials, which had been proposed by the representatives of Holstein. But then a despatch from Copenhagen announced the royal sanction of the November Constitution; and by that the decision at Kiel, also was determined. With burning indignation the Schleswigers now joined in the cry, “Separation from Denmark!” and consequently in the elevation of Augustenburg.

In a few days these sentiments prevailed over the whole country, from the Elbe to the Konigsau. The great majority of the officials, the clergy, the magis­trates, and the teachers, refused to take the oath of allegiance to the “Protocol-Prince.” The members of the Provincial Parliaments and the nobility met together to sign petitions to the German Confederation, begging for assistance. Everywhere where there were no Danish troops the Danish administration had practi­cally ceased to exist. “Separation from Denmark!” This had become the unanimous cry of Schleswig- Holstein. It did not, indeed, go so far as an armed insurrection: the people were unprepared, and there were 80,000 Danish troops in the country. But all glances, all expectations, were directed toward Germany.

In the great Fatherland, however, popular feeling had come to a decision even sooner, even more speedily, than in the Duchies. In Germany nothing either good or bad was known about Augustenburg, except that he had fought for the national cause in 1848, and that at that time the agnatic succession had been recognized by Germany. The impression made by his sudden appearance on the scene was all the greater, since it came just at the moment when the latest and most arbitrary breach of the compacts by the “ Eider-Danes ” had brought the bitter feeling between Germany and Den­mark to a head, and when at the same time the sudden death of King Frederick had seemed to bring the hand of Nemesis vividly before the eyes of the nations.

“It has been tried,” was the cry in all the organs of the German people—“it has been tried and found true that, no matter what may be the form of connection between Denmark and the Duchies, neither compact nor fundamental law can secure to the latter the sure protection of their rights. The sole means of saving German rights and German honor lies in the complete separation of the Duchies from the Danish Kingdom; so that in this matter, as in no other, the demands of princely legitimacy, of popular freedom, and of national dignity are one.”

The thought that there might be other means besides the Augustenburg succession, for overthrowing the Danish rule in Holstein, was present to only one man among all the millions in Germany, and that one concealed it for the time deep in his breast. To all the rest of the world the only choice possible for the Duchies seemed to lie between Augustenburg and the continuance of the Danish yoke — and how could there be any hesitation in such a choice as that ?

To the German Princes the London Protocol had always been hateful; for if in this case a conference of the Great Powers succeeded in exerting its authority to the extent of settling the succession in a sovereign dynasty, what German princely House was sure of its throne in the event of any future dispute ? The German people, on the other hand, had long been indignant at the hesitation of the Confederate Diet, at the half­heartedness of the Austrian policy, and at the domineer­ing arbitrariness of the Prussian: now was the time, it was felt, to drive ahead the unworthy leaders by the stormy and irresistible tide of the national will.

New developments followed each other day after day. The Baden Government permitted its deputy in the Diet, Herr von Mohl, to receive full powers from Duke Frederick VIII as well, and as his representative to address to the Confederation on the 16th of November a protest against every violation of his sovereign rights.

On the 17th of November Oldenburg made objections to the succession of Christian IX. in Schleswig-Holstein. On the 18th, the legislative body of the city of Frankfort proposed to the senate that Duke Frederick should be recognized. On the 19th, such a recognition was announced by Duke Ernest of Coburg. On the 20th, the representative Rechbauer put a question to the Austrian Government in regard to the liberation of Schleswig-Holstein. On the 28d, the liberal sections of the Prussian Lower House brought forward their pro­posals for the recognition of Duke Frederick. On the 24th, Minister Beust declared to the Saxon Second Chamber that the Government would move in the Diet that the representative of Denmark should not be received, and that Holstein should be occupied by a Confederate force of greater strength than had been intended, until the legitimate order of succession should have been decided upon by the Confederation. On the 25th, the Second Chamber expressed unanimous approv­al of these intentions of the Ministry. On the 26th, there followed a like unanimous declaration from the Darmstadt Second Chamber; and on the 27th, the Minister, Dalwigk, announced his approval of these desires. On the same day, in the Würtemberg Chamber, Minister von Hügel expressed himself to the same effect, though in a more cautious manner.

Beside all this, a cry went up from a vast chorus of associations, assemblies, city magistracies, and other corporate bodies. The committee of the National Association sent its greeting to Duke Frederick. Resolutions and contributions were everywhere rife. There was much talk of the formation of companies of armed volunteers for the defence of Schleswig-Holstein.

At last, then, the breast of mighty Germany was freed from the weight that had for ten years been stifling her; the national wrath that had been for so long accumulating burst forth in an overflowing tide; what foreign foe would dare to place himself in the path of this universal enthusiasm? For in this cause, not only all sections, but also all parties, of the Fatherland stood shoulder to shoulder, princes and subjects, Conservatives and Liberals, Democrats and Legitimists. Stormy as the outbreak of the movement was, it was all the less infected with the idea of material revolution, for the simple reason that there was a profound conviction that the moral weight of the question at issue would very quickly sweep along with it any doubt or contradiction that might arise within Germany itself. The small groups of the extreme Left, declared Republicans or Social Democrats, stood aloof in vexation, and ridiculed the noise about freedom with which the German people were trying to add a thirty-first to the thirty absolute petty princes they had already.

Considering the difficult state of things at that time, nothing more disagreeable could easily have happened to Count Rechberg than this general movement among the German Princes and people in favor of Augusten- burg, this eager desire to destroy the integrity of Denmark, this contemptuous disregard of old Austrian traditions concerning the German-Danish difficulty. How long was it since Francis Joseph had journeyed to Frankfort and been delighted at the jubilant homage of the German Princes? And now those same Princes hurled in his face the demand that he should abandon all the well-weighed principles of the Vienna policy, and that, if he would earn the German Imperial Crown, he must embark in an adventurous crusade to the far borders of the Baltic Sea.

And what would happen if he refused, and Prussia then put herself at the head of the movement,—Prussia, who rejoiced in the intimate friendship of Russia and the flattering friendliness of France, whose Minister was better known to Count Rechberg than to any one else through their old encounters in the Diet, whose King had for years been disgusted with Danish insolence and German long-suffering? In that case, where would be the end of misfortune for Austria? It was only too clear, that in the crisis that had so suddenly developed, everything depended upon Prussia’s attitude; and Rechberg repeatedly sent requests to Berlin, that, in accordance with the Confederate relations of the two Powers, information might be forwarded to him and some agreement arrived at for adopting modes of action that might be as similar as possible.

Bismarck, as we have seen, had never been in any hurry to enter into a Danish war, and had even on the 16th of November in no way objected to the accession of Christian IX, but had practically recognized the new King by his admonition that the royal sanction should be refused to the Constitution of the 13th. But when just the contrary took place and the Constitution was signed, a new outlook was opened. Denmark had nailed her flag to the mast, and flagrantly in violation of law and justice: it was now possible to aim at the complete liberation of the Duchies, and the King and his Minister were entirely agreed on this subject.

The Cabinet of Berlin, however, thought that this end was to be attained by very different means from those advocated by the petty Governments and the popular agitation. The King approved Bismarck's view that above all everything depended upon Prussia’s relations to the Great Powers, and in this connection again upon the co-operation of Austria. “We found out in 1849,” said Bismarck, “that it is a bad thing to be one against four; two against three is a more satis­factory relation.” But in this direction the first condition was that the London Compact regarding the succession should not be meddled with. For Austria and all the Foreign Powers agreed in declaring this to be absolutely binding.

Now fortunately Christian IX, by sanctioning the November Constitution, had furnished the German Courts with a casus belli independent of the question of succession, to the sufficiency of which no objection could possibly be made. This, therefore, was the point to be insisted on. By means of this, and of this alone, could it be hoped that Austria might be drawn into the path of the Prussian policy. In Vienna the desire was to uphold the succession of Christian IX and the integrity of Denmark: very well, Prussia was making no demand incompatible with these, when she sought to obtain the repeal of the November Constitution, if necessary, by force of arms. On this ground, and on this ground only, was there any prospect of remaining in league with the Austrian Government, while bringing on step by step an open war with Denmark. This was what was for the present necessary, what was abso­lutely indispensable. The war once begun, all former compacts with Denmark would fall to the ground of themselves. The effort might then be made also to make plausible to the Cabinet of Vienna the complete separation of Schleswig-Holstein from Denmark. At any rate this method of proceeding would afford the foreign Powers no ground for interference.

There was another consideration. If this course were taken, and only if this course were taken, could Prussia avoid pledging herself in advance to support the claims of some pretendant; and we know how little enthusiasm Bismarck had for the creation of a new sovereign Grand Duke and Confederate Prince under the protection of the principles of confederation as they had hitherto obtained. Above all, moreover, as the statesman who in 1852 had negotiated the settlement with Duke Christian and who consequently now felt himself to be per­sonally deceived and almost compromised before Europe by the action just taken by that family, the Prussian Minister would hear nothing whatever of the title of the Augustenburgs. In his view, the results of the war alone should decide the territorial arrangements; but in no case was the creation of a new Grand Duchy to be allowed without a previous reform of the Confederate Constitution.

In one word, then, in spite of the commotion in public opinion in Germany, Prussia decided to make, not the question of succession, but the constitutional one, the point of departure for proceedings against Denmark. Accordingly, the Hereditary Prince of Augustenburg, who appeared at Berlin on the 18th, received from Bismarck the curt answer that he could give him no advice, since Prussia was bound by the London Protocol.

It was soon afterwards seen how correctly the Court of Vienna had been judged at Berlin. The Austrian Government was so far from feeling any doubt as to Christian’s right, that, on the contrary, it expressed the opinion that it was only fair to leave the new King an opportunity for the examination of his position, and on that account to defer for the time the carrying out of the chastisement. Word was even sent to Berlin that Austria would be very grateful, if Prussia would set on foot alone the entire reserve for the chastisement, since the sending of so small a body of troops such a great distance could not but be attended with various military inconveniences. It was added, moreover, that the Augustenburg agitation must be energetically met, and the Confederate Diet compelled soon to recognize King Christian. The gist of the matter was: Austria would rather do nothing; something should be under­taken some time later; but if military measures were unavoidable, she would prefer to leave them to Prussia.

Bismarck replied to this by asking whether all the compacts of 1852 did not form an indivisible whole, any infringement of which by Denmark would leave the German Powers in every respect free to act. He declared, however, that Prussia would for the present make no use of this freedom, but would hold fast to the London Protocol; and that on account of this very fact she felt herself all the more driven to demand from Denmark the fulfilment of her constitutional promises, and must, therefore, above all things desire despatch in the carrying out of the chastisement that had been so long ago determined upon.

The Austrian Minister was destined soon to receive enlightenment concerning the tenableness of his position.

In Frankfort, among the diplomats of the Confederate Diet, opinions and propositions were bandied about, and it became clearer every day that the feeling of the great majority was strongly in favor of Augustenburg. The admission of the representative of Denmark was hotly opposed, because the Confederation had not yet come to a decision concerning the legality of the succession of Christian IX. to the throne of the Duchies. 

In accordance with instructions received beforehand, the representatives of the two Great Powers, Kübeck and Sydow, brought up for discussion the prosecution of the chastisement in Holstein and the entering of a protest, on the part of the Confederation, against the new Danish Constitution. But the Bavarian representative, Baron von der Pfordten, supported by many voices, declared that it was neither the proper time for chastisement nor for protest; for by the chastisement King Christian would be recognized as rightful Duke of Holstein, and by the protest as rightful Duke of Schleswig. “But since the succession is in dispute,” said Pfordten, “the Confederation ought to proceed not to the chastisement, but to the military occupation of Holstein, to ascertain who is the rightful duke and to recognize him, and finally to obtain for him, as a member of the Confederation, the possession of Schleswig, and that too, if it should be necessary, by force of arms. The Confederate Diet need pay no attention to the London Protocol, of which it has never had a sight.”

Considering the state of feeling in the whole of the “Third Germany,” there was no doubt that Austria alone would be unable to hinder Confederate decrees of this extravagant tendency, as it was termed in Vienna. Vigorous co-operation on the part of Prussia would be indispensable to that end. The news was therefore received in Vienna with keen satisfaction, that Prussia still stood by the London Protocol, and hence coincided with Austria on the essential principle. Although the former desired more speedy action in the constitutional question than did the Court of Vienna, yet if the two Courts held closely together, precisely this would put Austria in a position to exert a restraining and moderating influence, as circumstances might dictate.

It was therefore decided, in order to secure Prussia’s support in the question of succession, to proceed with her at once to the chastisement, even on the very ground of Pfordten’s declaration, that the chastisement would presuppose the legal right of the prince against whose administration it was directed, that is, in this case, Christian IX. Lord John Russell himself, whose agents were all the time preaching peace and mediation at all the Courts, had himself recognized the justice of this argument, and for the same reason urged that the chastisement should be carried out as soon as possible.

King William was no less anxious for this, though his anxiety was based rather on the simple calculation of sound common sense which told him that it would be much more advantageous in the further development of the matter to have German troops on the Eider than to have them stationed only on the Elbe. So on the 24th of November, the agreement was arrived at between Bismarck and the Austrian ambassador, Count Karolyi, that efforts should be made by both Powers in common in the Confederate Diet, to effect the execution of the chastisement as quickly as the Confederate laws would possibly permit. That Austria, in accordance with the previous Confederate decrees, should take part in the chastisement, went without saying.

Austria was thus gained over to the first step of a vigorous policy, and Bismarck had reason to hope that the natural consequences of this step would lead her onward in the new direction. The world was astounded to see Austria, after having stood for years at the head of the German Lesser States in bitter opposition to Prussia, now come forward and unite with Prussia in an action contrary to the wishes of the great majority of the “Third Germany.”

And yet this was natural enough. In view of her isolated and threatened position in Europe, Austria was anxious at any cost to avoid being left alone in Germany also. The Danish dispute was then the chief factor in the situation, and in that dispute she chose the party that for the time held most nearly to the standpoint favored at Vienna. Austria desired the integrity of the Danish Monarchy under King Christian; any understanding to this effect with the “Third Germany,” enthusiastic as that was for the Augustenburgs, was out of the question; the Government of Vienna therefore preferred to join with Prussia, who certainly left all courses open for the future, but for the time declared that she would remain firm upon the basis of the London Protocol

The news received by Bismarck at this time concern­ing the attitude of the other Great Powers was not less encouraging. England still continued to be the most doubtful, for the simple reason that no definite decisions were reached in her own councils. Queen Victoria, whose eldest daughter was Crown Princess of Prussia, and whose eldest son had married the daughter of Christian IX, sympathized with both sides. She complained of the obstinacy of Denmark, and at the same time considered Prussia bound by the London Compact. Her heart's desire was that peace might be maintained.

In this feeling she found the most zealous supporter possible in Lord John Russell, to whom any condition of peace, German or Danish, was entirely indifferent, provided it meant an escape from war, and who in this spirit was constantly sending off despatches, appeals, and admonitions in every direction. Lord Palmerston kept for the time in the background; but his hostility to Germany was unchanged, and the Press at his instigation often directed most violent attacks against her, especially against Prussia

All the more did Bismarck take pains to maintain a prudent caution in his relations with the English ambassador. Shortly before the death of Frederick VII, Lord John had lost his ardor in offering English mediation. Now, however, he made inquiries both at Berlin and Frankfort as to whether such a proposal would have any prospect of being accepted. In a con­versation with the English ambassador, Sir Andrew Buchanan, Bismarck expressed regret that Lord John had not been able to come to that point a fortnight before. “ At that time,” he said, “ the Confederation was ready for it. It is very doubtful whether it would be so today, owing to Denmark’s breach of her promises. Prussia’s position in regard to the London Protocol of 1852 has also been affected by this. Not without reason are we reminded that Denmark has not fulfilled her engagements made at that time, and that we there­fore are no longer bound by the Protocol. We are, indeed, far removed from proclaiming this as our own view; but we have no longer any means of influencing others to look at it as we do. So far as we ourselves are concerned, we are, nevertheless, very ready to give our voice in the Confederation for the acceptance of English mediation.”

Sir Andrew sought in vain to make it clear that Denmark's breach of the compacts in her dealings with Schleswig did not justify Prussia in declaring herself free from the compacts affecting the integrity of Den­mark and the succession, and that by these latter Prussia was obligated not only to Denmark, but also to the Great Powers. The refutation of these arguments was easy to deduce from a more careful consideration of what had happened in 1852. “Besides, what is the object of such a discussion?” asked Bismarck. “You admit that the new Danish Constitution contains a breach of the compacts which we are bound to resent. On our side, we have not declared ourselves free from the London Protocol, and are ready to give our voice for the acceptance of your mediation. Therefore why are we not already at one ? ”

But two days later English mediation had again disappeared from the horizon, and in its place came a proposal that the question in dispute be laid not before England alone, but before all the signers of the London Protocol. If this were not accepted, England might perhaps feel herself driven to support Denmark more actively. One week previously England had offered to mediate alone, expressly for the reason that the co-operation of other Powers might result in a revival of the French plan of a congress. It is easily understood that such a medley of concessions, threats, and vacillations as Lord John thus indulged in was not calculated to inspire a statesman of Bismarck’s capacity with fear nor with respect. However troublesome such a policy occasionally might be, it could hardly be a source of serious danger to a well-considered course of action judiciously pursued.

Important in a different way were the reports received at this time from Count Goltz in Paris. Goltz, a man of brilliant and vivacious temperament, occasionally self-willed, and always dependent upon external impressions, had greeted with great joy the growing estrangement between France on the one hand, and Austria and England on the other, and met with eagerness the friendly advances of the French statesmen. “I wish” said Napoleon to him on the 23d of November,— “I wish to come to an understanding with you at the congress concerning very important matters. I have nothing to ask of you; but you will not conceal from yourselves that you cannot remain in your present position. Prussia is surrounded by small states which embarrass her action and do not increase her strength. At the congress we could consider this and many other things in common.”

To the Minister, Drouyn de Lhuys, Goltz then recommended the cause of Schleswig-Holstein as affording an opportunity for France to manifest at once her sympathy for the principle of nationality and her respect for ancient rights. The Minister conceded this, but said that France was bound by the London Protocol: at the congress the matter could be discussed further. He thought there could be no objection to the Confederation’s occupying Holstein, in order to insure their rights to all parties concerned.

When Goltz threw out the suggestion that Schleswig might be divided according to the nationality of its population, so that South Schleswig should fall to Holstein, Drouyn de Lhuys answered: “If such a separation were to be effected, especially in view of the possibility of a Scandinavian union, it would be better even for the sake of strengthening the German naval power, if nothing more, to make Schleswig-Holstein a Prussian province and not an independent Duchy. I should therefore advise Prussia not to represent the claims of Augustenburg as indisputable.”

While making these declarations, Drouyn de Lhuys hinted at compensation; and when Goltz at once observed that Prussia had no provinces to give away, the Minister answered that he was not thinking of cessions of territory: the compensations might consist in a money payment to Denmark, in the bestowal of a high position in Prussia on Augustenburg, and in good offices to be rendered to friendly Powers in other matters.

It was easy to divine in what other matter France desired Prussia’s good offices, and for which she was willing to pay by permitting the acquisition of Schleswig-Holstein. Goltz shared the French aversion to Austria, but had no other thought concerning Schleswig-Holstein than to bring about, in spite of Austria, the independence of those countries under Augustenburg, in accordance with the popular wish in Germany. To this effect on the following day he spoke once more with Napoleon at Compiègne. They had a confidential talk over their cigarettes after dinner.

The Emperor said at first that he did not wish to take either side; the question was clearly suitable for discussion by the congress. “But,” he added, with a sudden turn, “after what the Great Powers have said, the plan of a congress does not seem to promise any great results. The only thing left for me to do is to consider the formation of a system of alliances for France, and I am anxious to enter into such an alliance with Prussia.” Goltz, highly delighted, answered that the agreement between the two Governments in almost every question (except the Polish) would of itself bring about this result. For it was a matter of time and of temperament: the one went quickly to the object to be attained, the other more carefully. He was pleased to find that Napoleon shared his view, that France could ally herself with England, Russia, or Prussia, but not with Austria.

The import of this news extended, as will be seen, far beyond the Holstein question. Doubtless it was more agreeable for Prussia to have friendly than strained relations with France. But as a whole, the French declarations rather repelled the King than attracted him. “How does Goltz,” he said, “come to speak of a French alliance without my authorization?”. In fact, such an alliance, openly framed against Austria, would have accorded but ill with the efforts then being made to induce Austria to take part in a Confederate war against Denmark.

Beside this, in spite of all the political complications that had occurred up to this time, the King had a warm feeling for his imperial nephew in Austria. He did not, indeed, feel at liberty to sacrifice to such a feeling any interest of the Prussian State, but it was a pleasure to him when duty and inclination were at one in this direction. On the other hand, the state of things was just the contrary with regard to Napoleon. With him the King was willing to act in harmony if the good of the State required it; but it would be a sacrifice always rendered more difficult by an incurable mistrust.

The hint of Drouyn de Lhuys at a Prussian annexa­tion of Schleswig-Holstein had no effect on the King whatever. For years his soul had been filled with a desire for the protection of German honor and for the liberation of those German countries. But a selfish thought had never entered his mind on the subject; and if, as he eagerly desired, the London Protocol were to be put aside, he was ready to come to an understanding with Augustenburg.

But all these were anxieties for the future. For the present it was clear that, in spite of England’s wavering dissatisfaction, Prussia, now acting in harmony with Austria, could, without fear of France or of Russia, begin active operations against Denmark.

On the 26th of November King William assembled his Ministers in the royal palace for a council. In a lengthy speech he called attention to the excitement in Germany, which, though patriotic, appeared to be mixed here and there with revolutionary elements, and therefore required to have a salutary direction given to it by energetic measures. “For the present,” he said, “Prussia continues bound by the London Protocol. It is true that the Hereditary Prince of Augustenburg did not take part in the renunciation made by his father; but Prussia and Austria recognized in London the succession of Christian IX, though with a reservation of the rights of the Duchies. In spite of the infringement of these rights by Denmark, things have not yet gone so far that Prussia can declare herself free from the London Compact.

“ This being the case, the rights of the Duchies must for the time be protected against the new King, as against his predecessor, by a Confederate chastisement. Many of the smaller states have objected to this, on the ground that it would involve a recognition of King Christian. Be that as it may, it is essential, in any event, that Holstein should come, as soon as possible, into the hands of German troops.

" Prussia has been called upon to set on foot a reserve for this purpose. But considering the imminent possibility of more serious complications, it is indispensable that preparations should be carried further than this. I shall, therefore, order the mobilization of the 6th (Brandenburg) and the 13th (Westphalian) divisions, and, as a further support, the corps of the Guards. One week after the passage of the Confederate decree, the troops must be ready to march. A statement concerning the expense must be brought before the Parliament; and the Parliament cannot refuse to approve it, since the Confederation will order a general contribution for the chastisement.”

The King then asked his Ministers to give their opinions. The result was an agreement practically unanimous. When Roon asked whether Austria’s co­operation was insured, Bismarck stated that the Vienna Cabinet apparently held more firmly than ever to the London treaty, but from that very standpoint now pressed urgently for the chastisement. “Although England,” he continued, “is hardly likely to oppose this, it may, nevertheless, easily result in a war with Denmark, who is no longer in any position to accede to the demands of Austria and Prussia; and a still further consequence may be a European war. It is therefore important to hasten the preparations as much as possible.”

On the same ground Bismarck objected to a proposal of the Minister of Finance, that the statement to the Parliament should be postponed until after the general contribution had been decreed by the Diet. In the end the King and council approved the draft of the document by means of which Bismarck proposed to lay the financial statement before the Parliament.

The three bodies of troops designated by the King amounted, in round numbers, to a force of 60,000 men, that is, just as many as Roon had indicated in the spring as necessary for a Danish war. No member of the council had any longer any doubt that such a war would break out. Denmark had already repeatedly referred to the chastisement as a casus belli; and, moreover, no one who understood the state of things at Copenhagen regarded the repeal of the new Constitution as possible. More than ever was felt the truth of Bismarck’s words of December 22d, 1862: “The Danish question can be settled in a way satisfactory to us only by war. An occasion for such a war can be found at any moment when our position with regard to the Great Powers is favorable for carrying it on.” Thanks to his judicious policy, this favorable moment had finally come, and the King, as well as his Ministers, was determined to take advantage of it at any risk. At any risk: for truly the path was even now not free from danger, however fair the prospect had opened in these latter days of November.

CHAPTER III.

THE CHASTISEMENT IN HOLSTEIN.

If Austria had entered into co-operation with Prussia with the silent resolution to exert a moderating in­fluence, the natural result of this was that the active, pushing, and therefore the leading rôle in the alliance, fell to Prussia from the very first. Austria had already acceded to Prussia’s wish for the hastening of the Confederate chastisement. A few days later she also gave up her opposition to Bismarck’s important theory, that Germany’s obligation to the London Protocol depended upon Denmark’s fidelity to the compacts in constitu­tional questions, and must stand or fall with this.

In this connection also the pressure exerted by the Lesser States had not been without effect. They kept laboring zealously for their object, which was, that on account of the insufficiency of King Christian’s claims to inherit in Holstein, his representative should not be admitted to the Diet. And Bismarck accordingly pointed out to Count Rechberg how little prospect there would be of preventing an irritating decree to this effect, unless some spirit of concession were shown and the recognition of Christian accompanied at least with the condition that Denmark should first fulfil in constitutional questions her obligations according to the compacts. Rechberg could not but admit the justice of this observation, since as a matter of fact the great majority of the Confederate assembly daily declared themselves more unequivocally on the side of the Augustenburg party. The Count, therefore, gave his assent to the Prussian proposal.

Moreover, though the Holstein chastisement was to be hastened, Bismarck declared himself willing, in the Schleswig constitutional question, to regard the past sins of Denmark simply as a non-fulfilment of her former promises, and to assume that the positive breach of those promises would be consummated only by the introduction of the new Constitution on the 1st of January, 1864. But against this he was determined to take emphatic action. Here, again, Rechberg could only answer by praising the moderate and conciliatory character of such a method of proceeding, by joyfully accepting the postponement until the 1st of January, and consequently by also indirectly pledging himself to vigorous action after that date.

The true significance of Bismarck’s proposal was understood at that time neither in Vienna nor else­where. Any one who, like Austria, earnestly desired a peaceful solution, would have had urgent reasons to take just that interval before the first of January for sending an ultimatum as speedily and energetically as possible, demanding the withdrawal of the new Constitution. For before that date, at the latest, there would be a General Council on the old basis, which could legally vote the withdrawal. From the 1st of January on, the withdrawal could be accomplished legally only by the General Council under the new Constitution; and the assembling of such a Council, quite as much as the continuance in force of the new Constitution, was designated by the German Powers as a casus belli. Only a coup d’état could then preserve peace, and how could poor Christian accomplish a coup d’état ?

The two German Courts therefore agreed to hold fast for the time to the London Protocol, and consequently to consent to the conditional admission of the Danish representative to the Confederate Diet, while at the same time they were determined to execute as speedily as possible the Confederate chastisement against Christian IX. as Duke of Holstein. The Emperor Francis Joseph expressed to the Prussian ambassador at once his con­tentment with the understanding that had been effected and his dissatisfaction at the improper proceedings and insubordinate attitude of the German Petty States, who were usually so correct in their behavior. An agent of Augustenburg arriving in Vienna at that time at once received a clear intimation that his mission would be unsuccessful.

In the session of the Confederate Diet that took place on the 28th of November, at which the admission of the Danish representative came under consideration, the two Great Powers gave their voices as mentioned above. Their position, they said, was determined by the London Protocol and by its preliminary conditions as accepted by Denmark. On their part they were ready to stand by the compact, if Denmark fulfilled these preliminary conditions. The representative of Christian IX, they added, should in any case be admitted for Lauenburg; for Holstein, however, only in case the King carried out the promises of 1852.

In opposition to this, Saxony proposed that the representative should not be admitted, and that Holstein should be occupied by a strengthened Confederate army until the Confederation should recognize the rightful heir. Whereupon Darmstadt suggested as a compro­mise that the measures taken for the execution of the chastisement should now be carried out for the protection of the rights and interests of all concerned. After a very animated debate, the result was a vote, passed by twelve against four, that the Holstein-Lauenburg votes should be disregarded for the present; that is to say, there was still no positive declaration against King Christian, but at the same time the Austro-Prussian point of view was definitely rejected. In spite of the union of the two Great Powers, Hesse-Cassel alone (beside Luxemburg, who always favored Denmark) had sided with them.

In complete accord with this attitude of the Confederate majority, the tide of the popular agitation throughout all Germany was rising higher and higher. A Swabian popular assembly presented to its Government an address, that spoke of the London Protocol, to which the Great Powers adhered, as infamous. An assembly, convened in Munich by the party favoring an entire Germany, declared that the Great Powers held to the London Protocol, but that public opinion was more powerful than the Great Powers. King Max of Bavaria had gone to Italy at the orders of his physicians for the restoration of his health, which was seriously affected. The City Council of Munich now sent him a peremptory summons to return, saying that his presence was needful to the Fatherland; and the King hastened to comply with the request.

The Minister Beust told the Prussian ambassador that he had no warmer desire than to go hand in hand with the Great Powers, but that if he changed his attitude in the matter of the Duchies, his position in Saxony would become untenable. Similar reports were received at Berlin from the ambassadors in Carlsruhe and Stuttgart.

In Frankfort, Pfordten earnestly besought the repre­sentatives of Prussia and Austria, if the Powers, as a matter of fact, did not intend the complete separation of the Duchies from Denmark, to say so openly, in order that the Confederation might then decide that for the time nothing was to be done. “For,” he said,  if under such circumstances any military measures are entered upon against Denmark, the end can only be such a wretched failure as occurred in 1850: Denmark will grant the desired concessions, so forcing us once more to deliver up Holstein; and then, after a short interval, she will recommence the faithless game of maltreatment.” The Baden Minister, Roggenbach, talked in the same strain: “A Confederate chastisement in Holstein directed against King Christian, who has no right to the possession of Holstein, is impossible. Germany’s duty toward the Duchies is to occupy them for the rightful heir.”

To all this tumult and disturbance, Bismarck, who felt sure, in any event, of Prussia’s freedom in military action, had little objection to make. Some details of it might be inconvenient; but as a whole it served his purpose by keeping Austria firmly at his side, by placing his own moderation in a favorable light before the Foreign Powers, and by calling the attention of Europe to the fact that the violent excitement of forty-five millions of people was always to be taken into account

An intimation of this nature was of weight not only with Napoleon, but also in England, where the appearance of Augustenburg on the scene had called forth great indignation among all parties. While Lord John Russell continued to speak rather mildly and yet very seriously and warningly, Sir Andrew Buchanan in Berlin and Sir Arthur Paget in Copenhagen rivalled each other in the use of threatening words, declaring that England would not suffer any German interference with the internal affairs of Denmark, and still less any deviation from the London compact. Natur­ally, this increased the obstinacy and the martial ardor of the Danes. And to this also Bismarck had no objec­tion whatever to make. At the same time, it seemed doubly necessary to leave to English zeal no point unguarded, and no pretext by means of which the hostile disposition of Lord Palmerston might succeed in drawing that really peace-loving nation into a war­policy.

While things were in this condition, Bismarck on the 1st of December presented to the Prussian Lower House the declaration which had been approved by the Ministerial Council concerning the Prussian policy in the matter of the Duchies. “Prussia’s position,” so the document began, “is regulated by the London Protocol: our fidelity to treaties must be open to no impeachment. But the same standard also applies to Denmark, whose promises made at that time form with the London compact an indivisible whole, and must stand and fall with that compact. Nor, did we abandon this basis, should we have any right that Europe would recognize to concern ourselves with Schleswig.

“ The Government must reserve to itself the decision of the question, whether and when the non-fulfilment of the Danish obligations will place us in a position to declare the London compact void. That decision can neither be left to the Confederate Diet nor be made the subject of explanations here. So long as we do not regard the London compact as void, we see in King Christian the heir, both of the rights and of the wrongs of his predecessor, and we have, therefore, in common with Austria, brought forward the necessary proposals for immediate chastisement Under all circumstances Prussia will with prudent determination stand firm for the rights of Germans in the Duchies and for her own dignity in the ranks of the Great Powers.” The speech closed with the announcement of the military preparations and of the financial statement to be laid before the Parliament in connection with them.

The delivery of this speech was immediately followed in the House by a stormy and tumultuous debate, which lasted for two days, and in which all the various watch­words of the foregoing popular agitation were most emphatically re-echoed: the legitimate hereditary right of Augustenburg, the non-recognition of the London Protocol by the German Confederation, and that the measures taken by Denmark in contradiction to the compacts had caused the London Protocol to become void also for Prussia and Austria.

Besides this, there was the general feeling of bitterness entertained by the majority against the Ministry on account of the still-continued constitutional difficulty. There was also a lack of information about the state of things in Copenhagen, which caused a fear lest the Government there should yield on the constitutional question, and the integrity of Denmark be once more recognized by the Great Powers. Finally, and above all, there was the deepest mistrust of Bismarck’s sincerity of purpose in the matter of Schleswig-Holstein, since he had at one time strongly condemned those countries. Fifteen years before this, the Prussian Government had been as ready as now with bold and patriotic language; yet in 1850 the Prussian troops had helped to reduce Holstein once more under the sway of its royal tyrant, and Herr von Bismarck-Schonhausen had openly approved this course. Who could answer for it, that the same man would not now behave in the same way?

Unfortunately, Herr von Bismarck could not as yet tell the august House what he intended to do; and therefore, on the 2d of December, 1863, a majority of two hundred and thirty-one against sixty-three voted as follows: “The honor and the interests of Germany require that the German States as a whole should recognize the Hereditary Prince Frederick as Duke of Schleswig-Holstein, and should render him effective assistance in the assertion of his rights”

It is unnecessary to observe that the vote of the House had not the slightest effect upon the further action of the Government. On the contrary, such perverse proceedings on the part of Augustenburg’s supporters were rather calculated to weaken what feeling the King did have in his heart for the Prince.

Everything now depended upon obtaining the Confederate decree for the immediate commencement of the chastisement; and Bismarck drew up, in accordance with Rechberg’s wishes, the joint note, by which the two Courts expected to gain an affirmative vote of the individual Governments and then to be able to point out to them the serious responsibility of conjuring up European complications.

As the committees of the Diet, acting according to the purport of the Darmstadt proposition, were anxious to substitute for the chastisement an occupation of the country for the protection of the rights of all parties, Bismarck, with the consent of Karolyi, at once sent to Frankfort the counter-proposition of the Great Powers. This was very simple, being merely the speedy carrying out of the chastisement. Only at the urgent request of Herr von Kübeck was the clause added, that a vote to this effect should not prejudice the validity of any decrees concerning the question of succession that might afterwards be passed by the Confederation within the proper limits of its authority. Bismarck did not consider it expedient for the time to announce in Frankfort that the Confederate assembly had in Prussia’s estimation no authority at all to give a decision about the question of succession.

Rechberg concurred in all this. Indeed, the irrita­tion at Vienna over the wilfulness of the Lesser States had, since the last Confederate decrees, increased to such an extent, that Rechberg communicated to Berlin his opinion that, if the Confederation rejected the chas­tisement, the Great Powers should go on with it alone, and should use every means to hinder any other action on the part of the Confederation. To the German ambassadors in Vienna he said with the greatest emphasis: “It must never be expected that Austria will allow herself to be put down by a majority of smaller states,”—weighty words, none of which Bismarck failed to note, and to which he listened with amusement, as he remembered the old battles at Frankfort against the attempts of a majority to put down Prussia.

All this, taken in connection with the identical notes sent on the 4th of December, did not fail to have an effect on a number of states of the second and third rank, so that on the 7th, the proposal of the Great Powers obtained a majority, although of only eight votes against seven. The chastisement was, then, to take place, directed against the King-Duke Christian IX. of Holstein, for the purpose of compelling him to carry out the Confederate decrees of 1860 and 1863, and to give the Duchies a satisfactory position in the Danish State: this was certainly a sharp contrast to the popular cry, “Separation from Denmark! ”

The decree was, however, passed, and the preparations for its execution were fully under way. Already a military commission, sitting at Frankfort, had recommended a great strengthening of the army of chastisement: 6,000 Saxons and the same number of Han­overians should at once occupy Holstein, and 5,000 Prussians and as many Austrians should be placed as a reserve on the frontiers; while, to provide for the meet­ing of armed resistance, a second reserve of 21,000 Austrians and 80,000 Prussians should be kept in readiness. The four Governments at once approved this, and Austria immediately announced her willingness to place her troops under the supreme command of Prussia. This was in part occasioned by the hope that so mag­nanimous an example would induce Saxony and Hanover to take the same course, and that thus in case of war the Augustenburg party might be deprived of the command. In fact, the two Lesser States (Hanover with rather a wry face) did signify their willingness to do as desired, if common action should prove to be necessary. For the time, however, as there was no question of war, but only of chastisement, the Saxon general, Von Hake, received the command of the troops appointed for that purpose.

Thus, one of the first essential objects of the Prussian policy had been attained, and that in the very headquarters of the opposite party, the Confederate Diet. Contemporary events abroad also confirmed the justness of the position hitherto adopted, and were favorable to the pursuit of the course determined by that position.

The English Cabinet had at length come to a decision about Napoleon’s great congress, and had on the 25th of November announced to the Emperor its refusal in a very detailed and very categorical explanation, an example which was followed immediately afterwards by the Court of Vienna. At this Napoleon felt himself most grievously insulted. He raged against Lord John, whom he declared to be his personal enemy, prophesied for Austria troubles of every sort through war and through revolution, and renewed to the Prussian ambas­sadors his proffers of most intimate friendship.

When, at this time, the Hereditary Prince of Augustenburg took the step, in his situation doubly unwise, of asking the Emperor in a humble letter for the support of France, Napoleon answered in vague phrases, saying that he was bound by the London Protocol and therefore prevented from favoring Augustenburg in any way, while at the same time he recognized the national efforts of the German people as justifiable.

He also, with the object of revenging himself upon England, sent to the great continental Courts an invitation to let their prime ministers meet, for the sake of arriving at some understanding about all questions then pending. It was clear that there was no immediate prospect of common action on the part of France and England, that Napoleon had for the time no intention of interfering in any way with Prussia, and that his hostile attitude toward Austria only made it the more desirable for that Power to cultivate good relations with Prussia and consequently to continue her support of the Prussian policy against Denmark.

In Berlin the importance of this situation of things was well understood. There was certainly no inclination to listen to Napoleon’s insinuations in the direction of intimate friendship; but there was quite as little wish to disturb at once by a cool rebuff the Emperor’s favorable disposition. The King, therefore, approved an answer to the proposal for a conference of ministers, to the effect that Prussia had no objection to make; the other Powers would not, of course, permit such a conference to discuss the Polish, Roumanian, or Venetian questions; the Danish question, therefore, was the only one left, and for the settlement of this the participation of England would be indispensable; and that with this condition, Prussia would be glad to enter into the conference.

In Paris it was felt that a conference on this basis would lose very much of the great and peculiar character originally intended; but once again the friendly spirit of Prussia was recognized, “who,” said Drouyn de Lhuys, “is always anxious to remove difficulties from the way, while the others have no greater pleasure than to invent them.” But from these others also, England, Russia, and Austria, Prussia received warm thanks for having, by her transformation of it, made the new Napoleonic idea harmless; and these Courts unanimously approved her proposition of bringing the^ Danish question before a conference of the Great Powers.

About this same time Prussia also received from another quarter proof of how well she had succeeded, even in the eyes of the non-German Powers, in showing Denmark to be in the wrong. Gortschakoff was, as ever, anxious to avoid a dismemberment of Denmark, that, as he said, the Baltic might not become a German nor a Swedish sea; but since he plainly saw what just cause for war Denmark had given the German Courts, he proposed that all the Great Powers should join in exerting pressure upon the Danish Government. It was now the time for all the Courts to send the customary envoys-extraordinary to Copenhagen for the purpose of congratulating the new King on his accession. Gortschakoff thought that by means of these envoys it should be made clear to the Danish Government that the German Powers had signed the London Protocol only with the understanding that the well-known promises concerning the Constitution were to be kept; and that by infringing these and incorporating Schleswig, Denmark would make it impossible for her friends to support her in a war waged on this ground.

Napoleon received this proposition very coolly; but it was taken up with all the more ardor by Austria and England. It was only suggested by Lord John, who for variety's sake had just now expressed himself once more in a way very friendly to Germany, that, in view of the great tension of relations unfortunately existing between Germany and Denmark, it would be better in the first place for the three neutral Powers alone to unite in the step proposed by Gortschakoff; He there­fore recommended that the envoys of these Powers should first go to Berlin and consult with Bismarck before betaking themselves to Copenhagen. In this Gortschakoff readily concurred. Denmark’s withdrawal in the mean time (on the 4th of December) of the March proclamation, when taken in connection with the illegal promulgation of the November Constitution, was not regarded by any of the Cabinets as a serious concession.

Under these circumstances it was not difficult for Bismarck to come to an understanding with the Russian envoy-extraordinary, Baron Ewers, who arrived in Berlin in the first part of December. Ewers was to point out to the Danes the serious dangers attending their behavior which was so contrary to the compacts. Should they remain obstinate, he was to announce that the Powers disclaimed all responsibility for the consequences. Should they, on the other hand, appear acquiescent, the Powers might also be able to influence the German Confederation.

Somewhat more animated was the interview which took place a few days after, on the 12th of December, between the English envoy, Lord Wodehouse, and Bismarck, before which the latter, at Rechberg’s request, had put himself in confidential communication with Count Karolyi. Wodehouse complained that Austria and Prussia had made the fulfilment of the London compact dependent on Denmark's attitude toward the constitutional question. Bismarck said: “Noone can be surprised, if we take arms to enforce the fulfilment of the Danish promises of 1852. With the outbreak of war the London Protocol will become void. That we have not done all this before, proves our peaceful disposition.” Wodehouse then expressed regret at the Confederate chastisement, which might lead, he said, to measures of revolt on the part of the Prince of Augustenburg and his followers. He expressed the hope that a preliminary proclamation of the Confederation would effectually repress such plans. Bismarck had nothing to say against the issuing of such a proclamation, but he would not undertake to answer for the effectiveness of it. “If the Prince,” he said, “should come to Holstein and raise the banner of revolt, it would be necessary, in order to quell the movement, to arrest him ; and it is very doubtful whether this could be done without bringing on an uncontrollable outburst throughout all Germany of the popular passion which is now so thoroughly aroused.”

“But consider,” cried Wodehouse, “to what dangers of war Germany will be exposed, if she adopts such an attitude, and if disorder and disturbance follow in the train of the Confederate chastisement!” — “No one,” replied Bismarck composedly, ‘can regret more than the possibility of war.”

The envoy then turned to a discussion of the constitutional questions in detail, and declared it practically impossible to carry out the arrangements promised in 1852. Bismarck would not allow this to be true in such general terms; but he was ready, if Denmark would replace the former promises by better propositions, to give these latter as favorable a consideration as possible. “And how about the Constitution sanctioned on the 18th of November?” asked Wodehouse. “On that point,” answered Bismarck at once, “ there can be no thought of a compromise. The Constitution mentioned must be annulled for Schleswig before the 1st of January. Otherwise the German Powers will regard themselves as freed from all those obligations toward Denmark in which the London Protocol may have involved them. If, however, between now and the New Year, the Constitution shall be repealed, Danish propositions concerning a new general constitution will be awaited.”

To this Wodehouse objected that it would be impos­sible before the 1st of January to bring about a decree of the Danish General Council concerning the repeal of the November Constitution, since the old Council had ended its sittings, and the royal patent from which it derived its authority had thus ceased to be in force, while the new Council could not meet till after the 1st of January. This was undeniable, but it did not make the least impression on the Prussian Minister. “It is the Danes’ own affair,” he said, “how to make good the wrong they have done. We must insist upon it, that by the 1st of January Schleswig be exempted from the workings of the new Constitution. The King” he added confidentially, will have to make up his mind to a coup d’état, at any rate to a change of Ministry: with a peace-loving and stable government we can keep on good terms, but a revolutionary and German-hating government under the control of the street-democracy is for us a dangerous and intolerable neighbor, with whom war must be unavoidable.

Wodehouse naturally saw in this language another proof that Germany was anxious to interfere in the internal affairs of Denmark. Yet Lord John in his inmost heart could not avoid recognizing the justice of the Prussian arguments, and accordingly instructed his envoy to urge with all possible emphasis at Copenhagen the repeal of the November Constitution as the indispensable condition of the continuance of peace.

After all this had taken place, Wodehouse, whose sympathies were with the Danes, did not exactly leave Berlin with a light heart. Nor was his tone of mind improved, when he sought from the English consul at Hamburg, Ward, information concerning the state of things in the Duchies. Ward told him that there was throughout the whole country only one idea, only one desire, complete separation from Denmark, and consequently the recognition of Frederick VIII, not at all out of love for him personally, but because that was the only means, as it was thought, for shaking off the Danish yoke. The consul said that even a simple per­sonal union with Denmark had now become impracticable.

When the envoy arrived at Copenhagen on the 16th of December, he received information of a corresponding nature from the other side. His Russian colleague. Ewers, immediately met him with the news that the Danish Government was indeed willing to give up opposing the Confederate chastisement in Holstein, but was all the firmer in holding to the November Constitution, and had just then, on the 13th, made public the new electoral law connected with it. The Danish Minister, Hall, whom Wodehouse visited without delay, confirmed Ewers’s statement: “ I,” he said, “ will not in any case be the Minister to advise that in accordance with England’s wishes the new Constitution be repealed.”

Wodehouse and Ewers then agreed upon an identical note, demanding the abandonment of the Constitution. Yet Hall persisted in his determination, although Lord Wodehouse, on the 21st of December, distinctly in­formed him that in that case England must leave it to Denmark to confront Germany on her own responsibility. “I know,” said Hall, “the danger of refusal; but the danger for us of internal dissension, in the event of yielding, is greater. For the dynasty and for the country, the best thing will be to take up a strong position in Schleswig and accept the challenge.”

Sir Arthur Paget then appeared, having instructions from King Christian to represent to Hall that His Majesty had a right to expect that the Minister who was the author of the Constitution and had obliged the King to sign it should take it upon himself to propose the repeal of the same. The consequence of this was an immediate request from Hall for dismissal.

The King then tried to form a ministry that should restore peace. He turned to men of the old “ Party of a United State” to conservative generals, and he thought of Blixen-Finecke. But, in view of the power of the “ Eider-Danish ” party, the Majority that had control of the General Council, and the hopeless complication of affairs, no one either wished or dared to take up the crushing burden. In a few days the King was forced to give way once more to the “Eider-Danes.” But at least he avoided calling upon Hall, who since the 18th of November had become intensely odious to him. At the head of the Cabinet was now placed the former Minister of Education, Bishop Monrad, who, however, fully shared the political opinions of his predecessor. Indeed, he was much less inclined than Hall to prudent deliberation, and more prone than he to inconsiderate action. The change of Ministers meant, therefore, not a more moderate tone, but a more lofty one. Monrad refused even more decidedly than Hall to repeal the November Constitution: Denmark was prepared for war.

Meanwhile in Germany things had advanced in the same direction. The Confederate decree of December 7th, which ordered the chastisement against the King- Duke Christian, had called forth far and wide a storm of indignation among the people. It now seemed to be clear that the two Great Powers were only seeking a reactionary object: that they wished to suppress all popular agitation, all activity on the part of Germany in favor of Schleswig-Holstein, and that then, after having, for shame's sake, obtained a few concessions on the constitutional questions, no matter whether they were apparent or false,—they would hand over the country in fetters to the usurper who had been exalted by strangers.

Everywhere the innumerable local societies for the assistance of Schleswig-Holstein began to organize into stronger bodies and into associations embracing the countries at large. In order that a controlling central point might be given to these, the leaders of the two great organizations, the National Association and the Reform Association, had already issued a summons to all the members of German Parliaments to meet in a great assembly at Frankfort on the 31st of December and come to a decision concerning the enforcement of the rights of Schleswig-Holstein.

A large popular assembly in Augsburg called on King Max of Bavaria to place himself at the head of the German people, to lead the grand Bavarian army to Schleswig-Holstein, and there, as the savior of the nation, to place Duke Frederick in the position that properly belonged to him. The Chambers of the indi­vidual states kept rivalling each other in issuing addresses and resolutions of the same or similar import: this was done in Frankfort, Oldenburg, Baden, Bruns­wick, Würtemberg, and Berlin. Several of the Governments openly joined the movement, in some cases taking steps of distinct practical significance. Baden asked and obtained from its Chambers a credit of 2,800,000 florins for the mobilization of its entire corps d'armée. Coburg allowed the Prince of Augustenburg to make a beginning on Saxon soil in the equipment of a Schleswig-Holstein army. In Weimar, the Govern­ment asked the Chambers for a credit of 500,000 thalers and the power to raise a war-tax for the next two years. In Oldenburg, the Minister declared to the Parliament that now or never was the time to secure the rights of Germany and of Schleswig-Holstein. Hesse-Darmstadt announced that she intended to propose formally to the Confederation, that for the protection of the rights of all parties, Schleswig, as well as Holstein, should be occupied by Confederate troops.

King Max answered the Augsburg address at once by a public letter to his Minister, in which he said that he was convinced of the validity of Augustenburg’s claims, and was ready both in the Confederation and with the aid of the Confederation to support with all his energy the carrying out of that policy which such a conviction involved. Various motives concurred to urge the King in this direction. Shortly before, the throne of Greece, from which the King’s brother, Otto, bad been driven, had been accepted by a son of Christian IX, and this had increased Bavaria’s ill-will towards Denmark. But above all, the idea seemed especially attractive at Munich, that Bavaria, now borne along on the swelling tide of popular favor, might by some great deed raise herself to the headship of the “ Third Germany,” and so realize the old and fondly-cherished plan of a German Triad.

In the midst of all this agitation the four Governments to whom the chastisement had been assigned sent on the 12th of December a formal summons to Denmark to withdraw her troops from Holstein within seven days. On the 14th, the Confederate Diet approved the instructions to be given to the civil commissioners, as they had been sketched out by Prussia. The chief provision of these instructions was, that during the continuance of the chastisement, the country should be governed according to the existing laws.

From all sides the troops were on the march. The Austrian reserve took up its position in Hamburg, the Prussian in Lubeck. On the 19th of December, General Hake entered upon his duties as Confederate commander-in-chief, and on the 24th, the Saxon and Hanoverian divisions crossed the frontier. They first took possession of Wandseck, and spreading their troops from there as a centre, they had occupied the whole Duchy even before the close of the year.

No occasion for a conflict of arms had offered itself, since, on the approach of the Confederate troops, the Danes abandoned to them every position, so that it was like relieving guard in the profoundest peace. The feeling in the country, however, at once burst forth. Everywhere, as the troops advanced, the people pro­claimed Duke Frederick sovereign with unanimous enthusiasm, and expelled the hated Danish officials and pastors who had taken the oath of allegiance to King Christian. The two Confederate commissioners could not but feel that both these acts were in contradiction to their instructions, and they consequently issued a prohibition of them. But when the people did not allow themselves to be influenced by this, and in every place that was abandoned by the Danes continued to shout for the Duke and to replace the unpopular officials, and when, at the end of the year, Prince Frederick arrived at Kiel and was greeted with overflowing enthusiasm by the inhabitants,—then the commissioners also were not dissatisfied, and gradually entered themselves into confidential relations with the young Duke.

This might almost have been expected in the case of the Saxon commissioner, Herr von Konneritz, considering the political tendencies of his Government. In Hanover the King and his Minister, Count Platen, were indeed, hostile to the Augustenburg agitation, but, in the face of the people and the representatives of the people, they did not venture to manifest this feeling openly; and therefore their commissioner in Holstein, Privy Councillor Nieper, offered no serious opposition to his Saxon colleague with his Augustenburg sympathies.

The Hereditary Prince not only established a court in his dwelling at Kiel, but even formed a cabinet and various ministries, the heads of which then constantly supplied the Confederate commissioners with good advice in the conduct of the administration of the country and especially in the filling of the numerous offices that had become vacant. At the head of the administration was placed a college with the title of Provincial Government, which was supposed to execute the orders of the Confederate commissioners, but which had at the same time a far-reaching authority for the independent transaction of business. Only reliable adherents of Augustenburg were called to be members of this commission or placed in the subordinate positions. Those in whom less confidence was felt were not appointed till they had signed a pledge of their allegiance to Augustenburg.

The hateful Danish laws against political associa­tions, though they were not repealed, yet fell into complete contempt; and the country was soon covered with a network of “Schleswig-Holstein” associations, or associations of “brothers-in-arms,” which suppressed by the methods of popular terrorism every shade of opinion unfavorable to the Hereditary Prince. To the Press, however, the Confederate commissioners by no means permitted so widespread or so polemical an unfolding of the Augustenburg banner, for the very natural reason that, considering the Confederate instructions of December 14th and the attitude of the Great Powers, complete publicity in the agitation could not be deemed wise. Nevertheless, so much was done in broad daylight, that Beust had good grounds for asserting later that the chastisement had been from the very first an occupation. The fears of Lord Wodehouse were therefore justified, and the feeling with which Germany’s policy was regarded both in England and in Russia was rendered more unfavorable.

But this new kind of Confederate chastisement met with all the more approval in Germany. The severity with which the decree of December 7th had been origin­ally condemned was equalled by the enthusiasm which greeted such a method of putting it in execution. In the great majority of the Lesser and Petty States both people and Government were busily occupied in doing their share to advance the cause of Augustenburg still further.

Herr von Beust had been at Munich from the 19th to the 22d of December, and had come to an agreement with the Bavarian Minister, Von Schrenck, as to what was to be done next. On his return, he had had an interview at Augsburg with the Würtemberg Minister, Von Hügel, and had then communicated to the Chambers in Dresden the complete accord of the three Governments. According to the reports of the Prussian and Russian charges d'affaires in Munich, this plan, as Beust had outlined it, was that Bavaria should at once propose in Frankfort an investigation of the Augustenburg claim; and it was hoped that within a week a majority might be obtained for the recognition of the same. Then the occupation of the Duchies was to be ordered by the Confederation, and if Austria and Prussia would take no part in it, it was to be undertaken by the forces of the Lesser States, which were amply sufficient to overcome Denmark. The Estates in Holstein were also to be summoned for the formal recognition of Frederick VIII.

At the same time that the conference of Ministers was held at Munich, the great assembly of representatives met at Frankfort on the 21st of December, an assembly consisting of four hundred and ninety-one members from all the German Chambers, but in which there were no more than forty-seven Prussians and only seven Austrians, a fact that was very significant for the future course of the agitation. The assembly voted unanimously and without debate to use every legally admissible means to compel the Confederation to recog­nize Duke Frederick, and to secure to him his rights without regard to foreign opposition. It was also voted to support every Government that favored this, and to oppose with every constitutional means any Government that worked against it The speedy convening of a general German parliament was also demanded. Finally the assembly (against the wishes of the leaders of the party favoring an entire Germany) appointed a central committee of thirty-six members as the central organ of the legitimate action to be taken by the German nation in behalf of Schleswig-Holstein and Frederick VIII.

The repeated emphasis put upon the legal and con­stitutional means to which the action thus designated was to be limited, was meant in all seriousness; and it was also founded on the consideration of the actual state of affairs. What would be the use of revolution­ary steps, when Beust, at that time the leader of the Governments of the Lesser States, openly declared that those Governments could not resist the popular agitation and must therefore place themselves at the head of it? That this feeling was general is shown by the fact, that the Committee of Thirty-Six no longer thought of the formation of companies of volunteers, but simply of assisting Duke Frederick in collecting recruits for his future Holstein division.

The prevailing idea of the matter was, that after the Duke should have been recognized by the Confederate Diet, King Max would put the Bavarian army in motion towards the north; that Würtemberg and Baden, and afterwards Darmstadt and Saxony, would join it; that the rolling avalanche would then urge on before it the North German Lesser and Petty States; and that the armed action of so mighty a people would fill the Great Powers with awe, and assert victoriously the ancient rights of Schleswig-Holstein and of Germany. Prussia, whose population shared the national enthusiasm, would then, it was thought, venture no opposition, nay, would perhaps even be herself hurried along by the patriotic stream.

It was not only well-intentioned, popular representatives, but even a number of the leading statesmen, that at this time cherished such ideas. It was soon to be seen that they were following mere pictures of their imagination, which had no foundation in prosaic reality.

The agitation thus carried on in common by the Lesser States and the people in general was certainly not without important results. But these were in exactly the opposite direction from what the originators of the scheme intended. We saw the Cabinet of Vienna at first opposing the chastisement, but after­wards, in order to hinder the Lesser States from the occupation of the country in behalf of Augustenburg, eagerly supporting Prussia’s proposal. Precisely the same thing now happened in regard to Schleswig. Hitherto, Austria had thought only of further negotiations in regard to the complaints of that province. But now that the Lesser States and the popular agitation were rivalling each other in urging the conquest of the country for its Hereditary Prince, the opinion began to prevail in Vienna that in order to draw the bolt upon this criminal folly of the Lesser States, as the Russians called it, Austria and Prussia must forestall the Augustenburgs by occupying Schleswig, and must take into their own hands the decision of the dangerous question, with the object of assuring, for Schleswig also, the integrity of the Danish monarchy.

Already, on the 19th of December, Rechberg had sent to Karolyi a despatch to the following effect: —

“Matters have been so managed that Europe makes no opposition to the advance into Holstein. But it will be no longer possible to hold to that standpoint from which the question in dispute is regarded as one belong­ing only to the internal affairs of Germany. The pressure of circumstances will oblige us to take the affairs of Schleswig into consideration. The Confederation cannot well send an army of chastisement into Holstein and at the same time remain a passive spectator of the incorporation of Schleswig. Austria and Prussia have declared that the validity of the London agreement depends for them upon the fulfilment of the Danish obligations towards Schleswig. In the present general complication of affairs it seems impossible to avoid the question whether the moment has not arrived for demanding from Denmark that those obligations be fulfilled.

“As this question is an international one, the participation of the foreign Powers cannot be overlooked. On the other hand, the interests of the Confederation and the state of feeling in Germany call for guaranties as positive as possible. Prussia appears to consider as the first step the fixing of a definite limit of time, with the understanding, that if this period elapses without fruitful results, we are to declare ourselves free from the London compact. But it appears to us, that, in the eyes of the other Powers, who regard the integrity of Denmark as essential to the European balance of power, this arrangement would be creating a casus belli, while the inhabitants of Schleswig would gain nothing. So far as we can see, the occupation of Schleswig, accompanied by a declaration of willingness to enter into a European conference such as has already been proposed, would involve the danger of a general European war to a much less degree than would a flat refusal to respect on principle the integrity of Denmark. If Lord Wode­house succeeds in bringing about before the 1st of January a suspension of the new Danish Constitution, we can content ourselves with urging a final settlement of the constitutional question, and can let the chastisement in Holstein be looked upon as a guaranty for Schleswig. If Lord Wodehouse fails, the Confederate troops must enter Schleswig itself.”

Austria also proposed in Berlin that the two Govern­ments should demand in common at Frankfort the giving up of the Committee of Thirty-Six. Bismarck consented to this without hesitation. The Vienna city authorities had sent a petition to the Emperor demand­ing the energetic support of Schleswig-Holstein; and they had been told in reply that they were not to trouble themselves about general politics, but only about the welfare of the city.

Meantime at Berlin Bismarck, whom neither the Confederate Diet, nor the Lesser States, nor Public Opinion inspired with any especial respect, had hitherto looked on during the agitation very calmly. So far as the King was concerned, his personal sympathy for the Prince of Augustenburg had not been diminished by all the outcry, but his enthusiasm for the Augustenburg cause had cooled down very much. He decidedly refused the Prince's request to be allowed to form companies of troops on Prussian soil. So much the greater was the satisfaction caused by the fact that Austria now appeared ready to take vigorous action according to the Prussian method in regard to Schleswig also.

Once more Bismarck weighed the chances of all possible courses. “We cannot,” he said, in a memorial laid before the King—“ we cannot remain passive, if the Danish Constitution goes into effect on the 1st of January. There are in this case three ways open to us. The first way would be, in accordance with the demands of public opinion, to declare ourselves no longer bound by the London compact, and to march into Schleswig with our whole force. That would be open war, more than that, a Confederate war, and the result of the con­test would alone decide the fate of the Duchies. At the same time we should without doubt get into serious difficulties with the Great Powers and especially with England.

“ The second way would be to give up the London Protocol without taking any warlike steps. In this case, the Confederation could come to a decision on the question of succession, and if it decided for Augusten- burg, the Prince could be given his rights in the Con­federate country of Holstein. But Schleswig would then remain defenceless; for we have no other right to interfere there than that derived from the compacts of 1852; and those would be broken on our side by the abandonment of the London Protocol. The Confedera­tion would be incompetent to examine the right of succession for Schleswig; and even were Augusten- burg’s claim indisputable, the Confederation would not be any the more bound to conquer for a German Prince a non-Germari country. If it were so bound, it would have to claim Neuchatel for Prussia, and Tuscany for Austria. This second course, therefore, would take us only to the Eider, unless we simply fell back upon a declaration of conquest, such as all the Powers would view as unlawful aggression. We should get Holstein from Denmark, which might perhaps be done by simple negotiations without any fighting; and we should forfeit Schleswig, which is the main object of Danish zeal. England would never participate in a conference on such a basis.

“ The third way remains. Austria and Prussia may say nothing whatever about the London compact, but may take action at once to compel Denmark to fulfil the promises of 1852. That is to say, an ultimatum can be sent on the 1st of January by the Confederation, or if the Confederation is unwilling, by the two Great Powers. Or no ultimatum need be sent, but the troops may march at once and snatch from the enemy the bone of contention which Denmark is just on the point of seizing. That would mean war with Denmark, which should be quickly and energetically carried on. The other Powers would then have no ground for interfer­ing. Sweden would be the only one that might come into the field. Our position in the conference would be none the worse for our being in possession of the object under dispute.”

This latter course was the one recommended by Bismarck to the King. Nothing could have been more agreeable to King William than to turn his back on the integrity of Denmark and the London Protocol; but he also well knew how important it was for his relations with the rest of Europe, to keep Austria at his side, and how little Austria as yet thought of destroying the unity of the Danish kingdom. The thing that was practically important was, that the German troops should now cross the Eider as they had formerly done the Elbe, — the troops of the whole Confederation if possible, but, in any event, the Prussian together with the Austrian. Therefore, after Rechberg had expressed his approval, instructions were sent on the 26th of December to Sydow at Frankfort, to the effect that in common with Kübeck he should urge upon the Confed­erate Diet a proposal that the Confederation should take Schleswig as a guaranty for the fulfilment of the Danish promises of 1851 and 1852. In this proposal the recognition by Germany of the London Protocol and the order of succession contained therein was not indeed an expressed, but an implied, presupposition.

The diplomats of the Confederate Diet were then still under the influence of the impression recently made upon them by the assembly of representatives. Sydow himself had reported in this connection on the 22d of December, that now that that assembly had taken place it would be impossible for the Confederation to pass decrees on any other basis than that of the abandon­ment of the London Protocol. The alternative, he thought, would be immediate revolution, or what was perhaps worse, a general feeling of deep political despair. The same tendency was manifested in the Bavarian proposal, on the 23d, that a speedy investigation of the question of succession should be entered upon, so that a report might be made on the subject within a week. Darmstadt also followed the same line by proposing, on the 28th, that Schleswig should be occupied for the protection of the rights of all parties. It was therefore only with grave anxiety that Kübeck and Sydow, also on the 28th, obeyed the orders they had received to move the taking of Schleswig as a guaranty, with the object of maintaining the hated compacts of 1852. By their doing so the two systems were brought into contrast with each other as sharply as possible.

At the same time, too, the outside world made its views known at Frankfort. An English note, which Sir Alexander Malet delivered to the presiding deputy, on the 27th of December, emphasized the fact, that if the Confederation by an over-hasty step entered upon any path in contradiction to a compact which, like that of London, had been signed by all the Great Powers, most serious complications might ensue. England, therefore, the note said, was ready to propose the assembling of a conference of the Powers that had signed the London Protocol and a representative of the Confederate Diet, for the discussion of the question. But the excitement at Frankfort was too great for this communication to have any other effect than that of increasing the passion already in full sway. Mohl expressed a wish that the document might be buried among the papers of the committee, if indeed the Diet was to receive at all a letter which appeared to have been written for New Zealanders. Pfordten said that after such a proceeding it was to be hoped that no voice would any longer be raised in the assembly in behalf of the London compact.

Disturbed and distracted by such passions did Germany enter upon the year 1864.

CHAPTER IV.

THE COMPACT OF JANUARY 16, 1864.

The outlook for the motion made by the Great Powers in the Confederate Diet was poor enough. On the 31st of December they made, at Rechberg’s instance, the further demand that the Confederation should call upon Prince Frederick to abandon Holstein. The vote taken on the 2d of January, 1864, showed them that the majority they had at the time of the decree of chas­tisement on the 7thof December had faded away: their demand was rejected by nine against seven.

In Hanover, up to this time, the King and his Minister of Foreign Affairs, Count Platen, had been decidedly opposed to all the claims of Augustenburg. Count Platen, however, was a man who considered that the highest political virtues centred in the determination to remain Minister, and consequently, flexibility in yielding in all directions. He now saw the country, the Chambers, his colleagues without exception, and finally even the man who was peculiarly in the King’s confidence, the Councillor of State, Zimmermann, carried away by the stream of public opinion. “If I separate myself from the Lesser States,” he said to the Prussian ambassador, “Windthorst [who was at that time Minister of Justice] will at once resign, and then a cabinet crisis will be at hand.”

Duke Adolphus of Nassau had quite as little inclination to place himself under Bavarian leadership as to join his Parliament in its enthusiasm for Augustenburg; but his feeling had no effect at Frankfort, since he was there joined with Brunswick in one curia, the vote of which was for the time controlled by Brunswick. Mecklenburg and Hesse-Cassel still held to Prussia; but it was known that the Courts of Schwerin and Strelitz only unwillingly yielded to the pressure of their powerful neighbor; and in Cassel Minister Able stood quite as much alone in his opinion as did Platen in Hanover. Able was this time a practical statesman. He held that the German nation with its cry for Augustenburg was once more perpetrating a great piece of folly, and that the only reasonable solution of the ques­tion was to be found in the annexation of the Duchies to Prussia. Nevertheless, he did not conceal from the Prussian ambassador at Cassel the fact, that he should hardly be in a position to give his voice for the main proposition of December 28th.

Meanwhile the committees of the Diet had for the time kept this proposition in the background, and had, instead, commissioned Baron von der Pfordten to prepare a report on the hereditary right of Augustenburg. In a few days the experienced jurist, who for the time by his bold attitude, his restless activity, and his ready dialectic controlled the majority of the assembly, presented a detailed exposition of the two points, that the Confederation was not bound by the London compact, and that in any case the carrying into effect of that compact had become impossible.

In reply to tills, Count Rechberg sent to the Bavarian Government on the 10th of January a no less detailed protest against the position taken by the Lesser States in the matter of the Duchies. “ When the Confederate Diet,” he said, “ passes decrees within the limits of its proper authority, Austria and Prussia will make no objection to them. But on the other hand, the two Powers will never allow themselves to be put down by a majority in the case of such decrees as may be framed at pleasure to suit political convenience without regard to law and constitution. The right of succession of Christian IX depends not on the London compact, but upon the Danish royal edict of 1853, which was issued with every proper legal form. By the decree of July 29th, 1852, the Confederation also expressed its concur­rence in the maintenance of the integrity of Denmark. By no law is the Confederation invested with the right to decide a disputed question of succession or to occupy a country not belonging to the Confederation on account of possible claims of inheritance asserted by a prince not yet recognized. The rejection of the motion of December 28th will mean the destruction of German solidarity. The Schleswig-Holstein question will be solved with honor and advantage to Germany, or with disgrace and loss, according as Germany does or does not respect the limits of legality.”

Bismarck’s communication to Sydow was in briefer terms. “Pfordten’s production,” he wrote, “seems to me partial and superficial. We cannot suffer such a method of dealing with international transactions, in which we ourselves had a part. We are as little dis­posed as Austria to give ourselves up in this important matter to the leadership of His Bavarian Majesty’s representative in the Diet. I desire you to take this view as a guide in your action in the committees and to defend the standpoint of the Great Powers with the energy which we are determined to use, if necessary, in holding to it.”

Sydow, who was characterized by unusual goodness of heart, replied, greatly troubled, that he and Kübeck had spoken quite in accordance with these directions. “But,” he said, “nothing can be accomplished in Frankfort. The representatives of the other side have binding instructions with which their own personal opinions for the most part coincide. Above all, King Max of Bavaria is firm in the course he has chosen, firstly, because he fears a general revolution if any other should be pursued, and secondly, because he is unwill­ing to concede to the European Powers the right to decide concerning the sovereign and hereditary rights of German princely Houses. The Confederate Diet could not now be brought to recognize even a personal union between the Duchies and Denmark.”

In Berlin, pressure was now being exerted on both sides. In the Lower House the Government had moved a loan of twelve million thalers for military equipments, and the Majority, in profound mistrust of the Bismarck of 1850, had refused to grant the money, unless the Government would bum its ships by recognizing Augustenburg. On the other hand, Sir Andrew Buchanan in the name of England demanded the withdrawal of the motion of December 28th, since any advance of German troops into Schleswig would seri­ously endanger the peace of Europe; and he therefore urged the bringing of the matter before a conference of the Powers, the status quo to be in the mean time maintained.

Bismarck told the representatives of the people that if they refused the money, the Government would take it where it could find it. To the English ambassador he said that Denmark had illegally altered the status quo by the proclamation of the Constitution, and must restore it by the repeal of the same; in case of refusal, the occupation of Schleswig was the proper means to use for compulsion. “To adhere to the London Protocol,” he said, “and at the same time to endure in silence Denmark’s infringement of the compacts, is quite out of the question for Prussia. If England hinders us from taking steps to enforce the fulfilment of the Danish obligations, Prussia must refuse to abide by the London compact, must have a change of ministry, and must then yield to the demands of the Lower House and join the Augustenburg party.” This put a stop to Sir Andrew’s threatening language.

It was very clear that if anything was to be done, not an hour was to be thrown away. On the very day on which he talked with the ambassador (the 5th of Jan­uary), Bismarck took the decisive step. He sent to Werther at Vienna a despatch which first asserted that both Courts, considering the attitude persistently adopted by Denmark, were justified in refusing to abide by the London compact, but went on to add that, the feeling of Europe being what it was, it was better for the time to make no use of this position, but to force Denmark to fulfil her obligations by a threat of armed intervention, whether in the name of the Confed­eration or in that of the two Powers themselves.

“It is probable,” said the despatch, “that the Diet will accept the Hessian proposition to occupy Schleswig on account of the invalidity of the London Protocol. Nevertheless, we will pursue the course we have adopted because in it we are resting on a basis recognized by Europe, while our right to assail the London compact is disputed by all the world outside of Germany. Everything we do, however, depends upon the presupposition that Austria stands wholly with us. In Prussia the orders for the mobilization of the necessary troops are already issued. The political and military grounds for all possible haste are evident enough. After such long and patient endurance, we are in a position to take rapid action against Denmark, to demand therefore the repeal of the November Constitution within forty-eight hours, and on receiving the refusal, which can be foreseen, to enter Schleswig at once. We therefore ask that an Austrian officer of high rank may be sent hither immediately to conclude the military arrangements. It is hoped that all this will coincide with the views of Austria.”

The Minister added a confidential observation: “Con­sidering the great importance and the incalculable consequences of the affair, it is indispensable that Aus­tria’s intentions should be expressed in a binding form and one that precludes any drawing back. Without some assurance of this sort it will be impossible for us to proceed. In Schleswig neither Danish nor Augustenburg demonstrations must be suffered. While the occupation continues, the country must be under military government.”

This invitation fell upon good ground in Vienna. The indignation at the arrogance of the Lesser States and the anxiety as to the results of their proceedings had increased all the more, when it was learned that the Emperor Napoleon gave these proceedings his open approval, and that his ambassador at Vienna, the Due de Gramont, kept daily encouraging his German col­leagues. Rechberg concluded from this very rightly that Napoleon was seeking allies against Austria; and the Count clung all the more closely to the support of Prussia which had been so unexpectedly obtained. He had but lately explained to Werther that the Duchies must be helped effectually, that their ancient connection with each other must be restored, and only a personal union with Denmark be allowed to continue.

There could naturally be no thought of Augustenburg, since his accession would not be permitted by Europe. In the midst of such conflicts Napoleon, who privately sought to establish Augustenburg, would indeed be fishing in troubled waters! It was necessary therefore to anticipate the instigations of the Confederate Diet and plainly demonstrate to it its inability to settle the question of the succession. Everything depended upon securing permanence to the harmonious action of Austria and Prussia.

Accordingly Rechberg was exceedingly well pleased, when Werther informed him of the proclamation of January 5th, and proposed to come to an understanding concerning its contents in some binding form. Inas­much as the Prussian Government for the present advocated no renunciation of the London Protocol nor violation of the integrity of the Danish monarchy, the proposed peremptory measures against the November Constitution were entirely acceptable to him. In a ses­sion of the Ministerial Council presided over by the Emperor, on the 10th of January, the outline of an agreement with Prussia was decided upon, together with the proper instructions to Karolyi. “ With sincere satisfaction,” said the latter, “have we learned that Prussia also has determined not to renounce the London Proto­col, but to continue the same course as hitherto: at one on this point, we are ready to assent to Prussia's further proposals.”

The document then went on to say that consistent with the desire of both Governments to insure harmonious action by Bome binding agreement, they had settled upon the following points: Firstly, requisition to be made of Denmark to withdraw the November Constitution within forty-eight hours; and in the event of a refusal, the recall of the ambassadors and occupation of Schleswig by Austrian and Prussian troops already equipped for the purpose. Secondly, independent action of both Powers, if the Confederate Diet refuse to accept the motion of the 28th of December. Thirdly, preparation of forces necessary to capture or pass around the Dannevirke. Fourthly, in the event of the occupation of Schleswig, the prevention of all Danish, Augustenburg, and Democratic demonstrations, and the administration of the country by civil commissioners under the supreme authority of the commander- in-chief of the troops. Fifthly, acceptance of the proposal for a European conference only on the presup­position of the withdrawal of the November Constitution or the occupation of Schleswig.

The outline then continued: “ In case hostilities in Schleswig ensue, and consequently the present obligations between the German Powers and Denmark become annulled, the Courts of Austria and Prussia reserve to themselves the right, with reference to the future rela­tions of the Duchies, of establishing in concert other conditions than those contained in the stipulations of 1851-52, and of then agreeing upon further measures. They will in no case without mutual consent swerve from the principle of preserving the Danish monarchy in its limits hitherto maintained, nor from their obligations assumed in the London Protocol to recognize the hereditary claims of King Christian.”

Sixthly, reservation of further consultation with each other in the event of actual interference on the part of other Powers.

“ The agreement contained in the foregoing articles shall have the same force as if they formed the contents of the formal instrument of a treaty.”

It will be seen that, after the fashion of a treaty, the first articles determined the course of action to be pursued, and the fifth, the purpose and aim of the same. The maximum requisition from Denmark in case of war was, then, the personal union of the Duchies and the Kingdom. Their complete liberation and a reduction of the Danish limits should be demanded only with the consent of Austria, that is, not at all. When Karolyi on the 12th of January delivered this outline to the Prussian Minister, he especially emphasized this article, namely, the renunciation of the London Protocol only after a mutual understanding; for this alone could insure mutual confidence, the confinement of the war to one locality, the prevention of a general European conflagration, and the success of the undertaking.

But, as we well know, the sentiments of King William and his Minister were fundamentally opposite to this. Out of consideration for Europe, they for the time limited their demands to the preservation of the stipulations of 1852; but their hopes were wholly set upon Danish persistence in the wrong, which would bring on war and the nullification of former treaties: and their determination was immovably fixed then to free the Duchies completely from every form of Danish rule.

Bismarck therefore proposed the following wording of the fifth article: “In case hostilities in Schleswig ensue, and the existing obligations between the German Powers and Denmark are consequently annulled, the Courts of Austria and Prussia reserve the right to decide only in concert with each other upon the future relations of the Duchies. To promote such harmonious action they will then agree upon further measures. They will in no case without mutual consent determine the question of the succession.

Here, as in Rechberg’s outline, any independent policy on the part of either country was excluded. But the agreement was limited to this negative statement There was no longer any positive standpoint defined, which was to remain mutual understanding allowed himself to be possibility of war all recommended to his Court the acceptance of the Prussian amendment.

Who can tell what might have happened, had not the high and mighty Confederate Diet taken upon itself again to drive Rechberg to a decision? The Lesser and Petty States had just been greatly exalted in their own presumptuous zeal by a circular from the French Government dated the 8th of January and addressed to them—to them alone and not to the Great Powers—in which the London Protocol was termed an impotent document, the participation of the German Confederation in the conference proposed by England was urged as desirable, and the decision of France with regard to the conference was deferred until the reply of the Ger­man States should be received.

The Lesser States did not exactly long for a renewal or the Confederation of the Rhine, but the possibility of friendly relations with France in case of an emergency seemed to comfort them. France appeared, moreover, to favor the cause of Augustenburg; and so the Confederate Diet felt that it might go forward with no misgivings.

It was announced that the vote upon the motion of the 28th of December would be taken on the 14th of January, the very day upon which Bismarck’s amend­ment was being considered in Vienna. Kübeck and Sydow had reported that they reckoned upon the sup­port of five or six votes at the most. They received by return-post instructions to announce in the name of the two Governments, immediately after the rejection of the motion, that as two European Great Powers they should proceed independently of the Confederation with the occupation of Schleswig.

And so it happened. The Great Powers were sup­ported only by Hesse-Cassel, Mecklenburg, and the Petty States of the sixteenth curia. The motion was accordingly lost, and the two ambassadors, Kübeck and Sydow, announced at once the decision of their Govern­ments. Great was the surprise, the confusion, and the indignation! Bavaria arose solemnly to the defence of all the rights of the Confederation,—although it would have been hard to say, what right of the Confederation would be threatened by Prussia’s occupation of a non­Confederate country, or violated by her insisting upon the fulfilment of duties pledged by a treaty and sol­emnly accepted by the Confederation. Bavaria’s action was seconded by a large number of the deputies, and Saxony descended so far as to protest against the passage of troops bound for Schleswig through Holstein, a country at present under Confederate control.

These sentiments were taken up and expressed more emphatically in the popular representative bodies, in clubs, and in assemblies of the people. The magistrate of Nuremberg protested against any passage of Aus­trian troops through Germany without a Confederate decree. A popular assembly in Munich besought King Max to throw Bavaria’s sword into the balance. The Würtemberg Chambers urged their Government to mobilize army and militia. The Committee of Thirty- Six declared that both Great Powers had forfeited their position as leaders in Germany. The Prussian Lower House refused the government loan because Prussia had become apostate and had misused her influence as a Great Power.

Everybody was penetrated with the conviction (which, to be sure, so far as Austria, was concerned, was not unfounded), that the object of the announcement of the occupation of Schleswig was none other than the abandonment of the Duchies to the Danish King and “Protocol Prince” Christian. Just for this reason the “ Eider-Danes ” felt encouraged. “The real enemies of the German Great Powers,” said they, “ are the Lesser States and the Revolution which now threatens alike Austria, Prussia, and Denmark. The whole matter will take its course just as in 1850.”

The events which had occurred in the Confederate Diet were already enough to decide Rechberg. His deputy in Frankfort had announced the occupation of Schleswig, and the louder the noise raised against it, the more rigidly did the Government see itself hound to its word so solemnly spoken. There was no further use in sinking back into disgraceful inaction on account of a difference with Prussia over a question which might never present itself. And even if Prussia would not positively bind herself to support the integrity of the Danish kingdom, yet she had promised not to take any steps without consulting Austria; so that the latter would still be in a position to nip in the bud every dis­agreeable notion of that audacious Prussian Minister. And more than all, in view of the French demonstra­tions a break with Prussia was unwise in the extreme.

Accordingly, Rechberg succeeded in persuading the Emperor to accept the Prussian amendment, and on the 16th of January the Agreement was officially signed. On the very same day the ambassadors Balan and Brenner received telegraphic orders to demand from the Danish Government the withdrawal of the Consti­tution within forty-eight hours. When the ambassadors carried out their instructions, Monrad offered to con­tinue negotiations, but they replied that the time for that was past. On the 18th, the Danish Minister sent his answer, refusing to comply.

It had been long understood that Schleswig would not, like Holstein, be evacuated by the Danes without any resistance, and this meant definitely war. In Prussia, as in Austria, military preparations were going on in full force. The Austrian troops, on account of the popular sentiment in Bavaria and Saxony, were to march to the north through Silesia; a passage to Holstein for the 18th Prussian division was sought through Hanover, but permission was not readily granted; so that Bismarck wrote to the ambassador that the passage would take place with or without permission, a remark which the ambassador, he said, was not to make use of as a threat, but only as a personal piece of information. Then it was decided in Hanover to allow the troops to pass, under a reservation of all Confederate rights.

Field-Marshal Wrangel took command of the united forces on the 20th. On this and the following days the allied troops entered Hamburg, Lubeck, Eutin, the Oldenburg capital, and Holstein, without any further announcement of their coming than the arrival of their quartermasters; so that these Petty States, as well as the two Confederate commissioners, raised a formal protest against such arbitrary doings. An inquiry from the Prussian Minister of War, asking the Confederate General Hake whether he would not place himself and his troops under the supreme command of Wrangel, was angrily answered in the negative. To the Saxon Government especially, which had seriously taken umbrage at these movements, Bismarck remarked with the calmest friendliness: “We should have been so glad to have had the valiant Confederate troops share in patriotic and glorious work! ”

Yet however much Prussia in all these points showed her indifference to the sentiments of the Confederate Diet, the Great Powers were very ready to declare in Frankfort on the 19th of January that the steps that they were now taking to confirm and make good the German claim to Schleswig were in no way to interfere with the decrees of the Confederation concerning the chastisement and the administration of Holstein; and they also said they expected that the Confederation and the Confederate countries lying adjacent to Hol­stein would not fail to second their efforts to secure the rights of Germany and of Schleswig.

This line of conduct, and, more than all, the rapid movement of such imposing bodies of troops towards the Eider, produced at once an effect upon the Confederate Diet and the Lesser States. The former replied to the declaration of the Great Powers by promising that, under the condition that rights of the Confedera­tion were respected, the allied troops should receive all possible support and assistance.

Beust, who had instructed his deputy at Frankfort to work for the prevention of the passage of the troops through Holstein, said a few days later to the representative of Prussia at Dresden that he hoped no one would take him for such a Don Quixote as to conceive the idea of armed resistance. In Stuttgart, the Minister Hügel had always thought with a shudder of the possi­bility of an open rupture with the Great Powers, and had talked in the Chamber so boldly only to quiet as much as he might the agitation among the people. The old King William of Würtemberg had even publicly proclaimed what he had long before said to the ambas­sadors at his court, namely, that he did not wish to have anything at all to do with the whole bad business.

King Max of Bavaria was exceedingly troubled, and his Minister Schrenck excited beyond measure, at seeing their beautiful dream of a Bavarian triad-hegemony vanish into mist; but that they should not and could not stand with dagger drawn in the path of the two Great Powers was at once evident to both. Beust, indeed, talked about a new conference of ministers, and Roggenbach, of a union of the Chambers of all the Lesser States to form the nucleus of a German Parliament : but the powers in Munich were suddenly and thoroughly convinced that talking and deliberating would do no more good now; for while their armies were not at all equipped, Prussia could be ready with an overwhelmingly superior force within fourteen days. Furthermore, King Max recoiled from the bottom of his heart at the thought of bloodshed between German and German.

And now, supposing that after all their noisy talking they had acted, when it was all at once evident that the time for action had come, according to the tenor of the agitation they had been keeping up,—what would have happened ? For the sake of getting a little more from the Danes than the Prussians for the time demanded, they would have fallen upon the Prussian troops while these were driving their bayonets into the sides of the Danes. In the forenoon the Lesser States would have fought side by side with Danes against the Prussians, and in the afternoon as allies of the Prussians against the Danes. A confusion worthy of world-wide fame would have enriched the annals of the German people. No! Since it was not possible for them to rouse themselves to take the one only sensible stand in the matter, and, as Roon proposed, place the Confederate troops under the supreme command of Wrangel, there was nothing left for the Lesser States to do but to submit to the fate of an obstinate minority, and in sullen inaction make way and leave the road open for those that were stronger.

Meanwhile, the behavior of the two Great Powers had aroused no less excitement in the rest of Europe than in Germany itself. Before all others in this regard stood Lord John Russell, who had already on the 31st of December sent to the Powers a formal invitation to a conference, and who was now by a double pressure driven to action, by the anti-German sentiments of Palmerston and the influence of the Princess of Wales. His zeal in writing articles on the subject became more inexhaustible, and his despatches and proposals' more numerous. He warned the non-German signers of the London Protocol to insist upon the integrity of Den­mark and the succession of Christian IX. He called upon them to send to Prussia and Austria identical notes as a means of hindering them from occupying Schleswig.

In Copenhagen he urged the speedy repeal of the unfortunate November Constitution, that thus the last excuse might be taken from the Germans for a breach of the peace. In Vienna and Berlin he proposed a definite declaration that the German Powers would hold firmly to the principle of Denmark’s continued integrity. To the German ambassadors he orally sug­gested that in the latter instance England would have no objections to make to the personal union of the Duchies with the Kingdom, but if the opposite were the case, she might be forced to send a fleet into the Baltic to protect Denmark.

On the 24th of January he wrote again to Paris beg­ging for some common action of all the Powers against the candidacy of Augustenburg, if necessary, by force of arms. He acknowledged, however, that Prussia and Austria were not rash in their movements, and that serious results were to be feared only if Denmark fulfilled her obligations in the matter of the Constitution, and the German Courts nevertheless increased their demands; yet in view of this, too, he considered the immediate concerted action of the European Powers as greatly to be desired.

At the same time, in compliance with a Danish pro­posal, he asserted in Vienna and Berlin that it was entirely unfair to require that Denmark should repeal the Constitution within forty-eight hours; for that could not be done without a coup d’état. He accordingly wished for a postponement of six weeks, in which time the Danish Government could summon the General Council and in a legal manner accomplish the desired result.

But at every point he was forced to see how impregnable was the position taken by Bismarck in his active policy, and how exactly it was fitted to the European situation at the time. In their inmost hearts all the Cabinets knew well that Denmark had with shameful audacity supported the wrong in her relations with Germany; and no one of them had any desire, for the sake of defending so rotten a cause, to commit itself to a war against entire Germany, bristling as she was with arms, while neither in Vienna nor in Berlin had any single word been spoken yet against the integrity of Denmark or the succession of Christian IX. Russia, to be sure, wished to see Denmark treated as tenderly as possible, but refused to entertain any thought of breaking with Prussia, her brave comrade in the confu­sion of the Polish tumults.

Napoleon held firmly to his idea of winning Prussia for an ally, and to his hope of seeing new complications arise out of the Danish war which might draw Prussia to his side. He had already in December remarked to the Italian ambassador, Nigra: “We shall finally bring it about that Prussia and Austria fire with their cannon pointed at each other.” On the 27th of January he asked the Prussian ambassador whether the rumors were true, which reported that Prussia had guaranteed to Austria her non-German possessions. And when he had re­ceived in reply a decided answer in the negative, he sent word to the English Government, on the 28th, that he should only with repugnance adopt any measure that might involve him in a war with Germany. Such a war, he said, would mean for England nothing more than the blockading of a few forts ana the capture of a few ships; but for France it would be the most unfortunate and most venturesome of all possible wars that the Empire could undertake, and so long as the balance of power in Europe was not disturbed, he should confine himself merely to retaining his full freedom to act as he saw fit.

The non-German Courts received favorably only the proposal to postpone military operations in order to allow to Denmark time for repealing in a legal manner the Constitution of November. France, Russia, and Sweden recommended this in Berlin. Meanwhile, in his first conversation with Count Goltz, Napoleon conceded to him that this was no question of a sudden ultimatum, but rather a final word after twelve years of patient waiting for the fulfilment of the treaties, during which protests had been made every three months against open violations of them; and every doubt dis­appeared when England submitted her proposal in a formal document.

“The German Powers”—so this document was worded—“ought to accept, instead of a material guar­anty in the form of an occupation of Schleswig, the diplomatic guaranty of a treaty to be signed by all the participants in the London Protocol, in which treaty Denmark should pledge herself to propose to her General Council the repeal of the Constitution for Schleswig and to urge with all her powers the acceptance of the proposition by the General Council.”

Lord Palmerston delivered the proposal to Count Bernstorff with warning threats in the event of a refusal. The Count inquired whether England would guarantee the repeal of the Constitution. Palmerston replied that that would not be necessary, since, if Denmark declined the proposition, all the Powers would recognize the correctness of Germany’s position, and would refuse to give any assistance to the Danes.

The value of the English proposal was at once placed in a glaring light by Denmark herself when Minister Monrad in his speech to the Upper House declared that “it would be hard to say what could be gained by negotiations with Germany about Schleswig; but it would be easier to define what would never be conceded, namely, a Schleswig-Holstein, an independent Schleswig as well as Holstein, or a division of Schleswig,”— that is, we may add, any single thing that might have in the least ameliorated the unlawful sub­jection of Schleswig.

When the news of this reached Berlin the King commanded at once the rejection of the English proposal, and held firmly to his decision, although Russia vigorously urged acceptance, and both Bernstorff and Rechberg expressed their serious alarm at the heavy clouds which were darkening the political horizon. Rechberg acknowledged that in the present state of excitement among the German people the march into Schleswig could not be delayed; but he was very anxious to pacify England by the desired declaration with regard to the preservation of the integrity of the Danish kingdom, and to show Germany’s love of peace by urging the speedy assembling of the European conference.

His first move was to instruct the imperial ambassadors in Paris and London to. explain that the postponement of the march into Schleswig after it had been publicly announced would compromise the German Powers; and that the first consequence of such a post­ponement would be that the Confederate Diet would decree the occupation of Schleswig in the name of Augustenburg, which would openly violate the integrity of Denmark, not yet molested by Austria and Prussia. Further, that Austria did not contemplate a dismemberment of Denmark; it did not lie in her interests nor among her wishes, but was, on the contrary, inconsistent with her principles and all her traditions; that, as ever, she did not care to play the rôle of a champion of races; and that she now crossed the Eider in order to anticipate more serious complications that would long since have ensued, had Austria held aloof and permitted Denmark to have suffered from an invasion by the German Confederation.

Bismarck spoke still more sharply in a circular which he sent to London, Paris, St. Petersburg, and Stockholm. “If we allow,” said he, “the General Council to convene, as recommended by the English proposal, then in doing so we shall be acknowledging the legality of the Constitution which we refuse to recognize. The only possibility of preserving peace depends upon Denmark’s making no resistance to our occupation of Schleswig as a guaranty: if she attempts to resist, such open hostilities will result as will the more deeply disturb the relations between Germany and Denmark, inasmuch as in that case all treaties existing between the two countries will be overthrown.” Rechberg, to Bismarck’s surprise, thought this language was somewhat too excited and dangerous, and urged some joint declaration of the two Powers with regard to their recognition of the integrity of Denmark.

In Berlin, the King and his Minister were very deter­mined not to bind their hands in this matter; and for three whole days, from the 81st of January until the 2d of February, the two Cabinets telegraphed back and forth to each other, until at last a wording was agreed upon which in accordance with Austria’s wishes recognized for the present the integrity of Denmark, yet satisfied Prussia by making no promises concerning the future.

Accordingly, the note, dated January 81st, read as follows: “Inasmuch as the Austrian Imperial and the Prussian Royal Governments base upon the stipulations of 1851-52 the rights which they strive to defend, they thereby recognize the principle of the integrity of the Danish monarchy: when they take steps preparatory to the occupation of Schleswig, they do not have in mind the abandonment of this principle: yet if, in consequence of complications resulting from the persistence of the Danish Government in its illegal course, or in consequence of the armed interference of other Powers, they shall find themselves compelled to renounce relations which could lead only to results no longer proportionate to the sacrifices thus laid upon the German Powers: then, no definite arrangements can be made without the co-operation of those Powers that signed the London Protocol.

These sentences were more long-winded and abstruse than Bismarck was wont to write, when he held his pen with no nervous coadjutor at his elbow. Nevertheless, they contained all that was necessary. It is true that the beginning contained a recognition of the principle of Danish integrity, and the end, a willingness to take part in a European conference; but in the middle stood the declaration that with the first cannon-shot the treaties were annulled, and the very decided assertion that foreign interference would make the fate of Denmark only the more severe. This was to be understood once for all in London.

Meanwhile, on the other side of the Eider hostilities had already begun.