CHAPTER XV .

THE HERITAGE OF ALEXANDER

I.

THE QUESTION OF THE SUCCESSION

 

ALEXANDER left no heir to his empire, but Roxane was shortly expecting a child. He had made no arrangement for carrying on the government if he died. Perdiccas, who was senior hipparch and probably acting chiliarch (vizier), called a council of generals; he proposed that they should await Roxane’s confinement, and if the child were a boy make him king. Peithon supported him; the others acquiesced, and Meleager, as senior phalanx-leader, was sent to carry the proposal to the infantry. The generals had no constitutional power in the matter; for, as the throne was vacant, the crown was in the hands of the whole Macedonian army, which would include Antipater’s army in Europe and Craterus’ 10,000 veterans. Meleager was the only survivor of Alexander’s original phalanx-leaders who had never received promotion; probably he had a grievance. He stirred up the infantry to revolt; they would have a national Macedonian king and not the child of a barbarian woman. They chose as king Arrhidaeus, an illegitimate son of Philip II, who was a half­witted epileptic, renamed him Philip, and made Meleager his guardian. It came to a struggle between cavalry and infantry; Meleager tried to murder Perdiccas; Perdiccas with the cavalry and elephants left Babylon and blockaded the approaches. The infantry however shrank from open war, and Eumenes effected a compromise. Philip (III) and Roxane’s child, if a boy, were to be joint kings. Craterus was to be executive of Philip’s kingship (not ‘kingdom’), i.e. his guardian in lunacy, with the custody of his person and seal. Who was to be guardian of the infant is uncertain; possibly Perdiccas and Leonnatus jointly. Antipater was to remain general in Europe. Perdiccas was to be formally appointed vizier, and command the army in Asia, with Meleager as second in command. No regent of the Empire was appointed, and the effect of the arrangement was to put the regency in commission; Perdiccas had the effective power in Asia, but could only lawfully act on the counter-signature of Craterus, as representing Philip. Weak points about the scheme were, that the relation of Perdiccas’ authority to that of Antipater, who had not been consulted, was left undefined, and that Perdiccas and not Craterus actually obtained possession of Philip’s person. The Lamian war, which called Craterus to Europe, prevented the arrangement from ever coming into force, and left Perdiccas in unfettered control of Philip and of Asia. Soon after, Roxane gave birth to a son, Alexander IV, who was hailed by the army as king; but as orders naturally went out, and coins were struck, in Philip’s name alone, contemporaries, as the inscriptions show, were frankly puzzled as to whether there was one king or two.

The story of the Successors, in the tradition, is the story of a struggle for power among the generals. War went on almost without intermission from 321 to 301 BC; and, except for the brief episode of Antipater’s regency, the conflict was one between the centrifugal forces within the empire, represented by the satraps (territorial dynasts), and whatever central power stood for unity. The conflict falls into two divisions; in the first the central power represents the kings, but after 316 it means Antigonus, who claimed personally to stand in Alexander’s place. But though the actors changed, the issues were the same throughout; the end was complete victory for the dynasts. But the protracted war, which caused much loss and misery, was in reality the birth-pangs of a new order of civilization; the period was essentially one of construction, though we see little of the process, only the result later. It is worth trying to realize the men who were to be the chief actors in the struggle.

The principal generals at Babylon were Perdiccas, Ptolemy, and Leonnatus. Perdiccas, of the princely line of Orestis, was brave and a good soldier; he was probably loyal to Alexander’s house, and meant to keep the empire together; but he saw that someone must exercise the actual power, and he meant it to be himself. He was, however, unconciliatory and inordinately proud, and probably difficult to work with. Ptolemy, deep-eyed and eagle-nosed, wiser and more popular than Perdiccas, knew exactly what he meant to do, and did it; he believed that the empire must break to pieces, and for twenty years he did his best to make his belief come true; he meant to be independent ruler of a definite fraction. Leonnatus was, like Ptolemy, related to the royal house; showy and unstable, he wanted to be a king and could not wait. The other Bodyguards were Peithon, able, overbearing, and ambitious of power; Lysimachus, a man of long views, content to go slowly till he felt solid ground under his feet; Aristonous, loyal to the royal house; and Peucestas, satrap of Persis and Susiana, very popular with the Persians, but too small-minded for a leading part. Beside the Bodyguards, there were in Babylon three men of the first importance: Seleucus, commander of the hypaspists, who could hold a bull by the horns, perhaps less cruel than most of his contemporaries; the Greek Eumenes of Cardia, Alexander’s chief secretary, absolutely loyal and a fine general; and, undistinguished as yet, Antipater’s son Cassander, ruthless and devoid of sentiment in politics, but with the makings of a statesman. Nearchus, strangely enough, played no further part in affairs; he was apparently content to serve Antigonus. But several of the most important men were not at Babylon. Antipater in Macedonia, the last of Philip’s men, had high claims. Craterus, Alexander’s second in command, handsome, experienced, reason­able, and popular with the army, had reached Cilicia with his 10,000 veterans; with him was the former phalanx-leader Poly- perchon, of the princely line of Tymphaea, a good soldier but nothing more. Antigonus the One-eyed, an older man than any­one except Antipater, was in his satrapy of Phrygia. His ambition was limitless, and his capabilities almost sufficient for his ambition; harsh, cruel, and overweening on occasion, magnanimous and conciliatory when he chose, he was to be a considerable states­man and the first general of the time; he could get almost as much out of his men as Alexander. With him was a boy of thirteen, of extraordinary personal beauty, his son Demetrius, who, had his character been adequate to his gifts, might have been Alexander’s truest successor.

There were already certain definite groupings among the generals. Antipater and Antigonus were good friends, while Antipater’s irreconcilable hostility to Olympias had made him the enemy of Eumenes, whom he probably suspected of influencing Alexander against him; and as Eumenes was friendly, and Antigonus unfriendly, to Perdiccas, this tended to throw Perdiccas and Antipater into opposition. Ptolemy would oppose whoever held the central power; but the firmest friendship of the time, that between Lysimachus and Cassander, was hardly yet formed. Both Perdiccas and Antipater stood for the kings; but the fact that Perdiccas opened negotiations with Olympias, who was governing Epirus as regent for the young Neoptolemus, accen­tuated the rift between Antipater and himself. Beside Olympias, there were two women of the royal house to be reckoned with. One was Alexander’s sister Cleopatra, widow of Alexander of Epirus; she had selected Leonnatus for her hand, and with her aid he hoped to become king of Macedonia. The other was a girl of fourteen, Adeia (afterwards called Eurydice), betrothed to Philip. Her father Amyntas, a son of Perdiccas III of Macedonia, had been executed by Alexander for conspiracy; her mother Cynane was an illegitimate daughter of Philip II. She had thus a claim to the crown in her own right, and no love for Alexander’s.

 

II.

 PERDICCAS

 

Perdiccas at the first opportunity put Meleager to death. He then, alleging Philip’s orders, called a council of generals, at which he allotted the satrapies. There must of course have been a good deal of bargaining. Ptolemy’s price for recognizing Perdiccas’ authority was Egypt, which he obtained, Cleomenes, who was virtually in control, being subordinated to him. Leonnatus, with an eye on Macedonia, took the vacant Hellespontine Phrygia. Lycia and Pamphylia were added to Antigonus’ satrapy, if indeed they were not his already; Asander’s successor Menander retained Lydia; Caria was given to another Asander, Syria to Laomedon, and Babylon to an unknown man, Archon; Perdiccas possibly meant Babylon to be his own seat. The eastern satraps were retained unchanged, as were Taxiles and Porus in India; but the fiction of an Armenian satrapy was abandoned, the hereditary Persian dynast Orontes, formerly Darius’ satrap, being really independent. There remained the two men who had helped Perdiccas after Alexander’s death. Peithon desired and obtained Media. As however Atropates was Perdiccas’ father-in-law, Media was divided, and Atropates acquiesced in his restriction to an undefined and unconquered district to the north, where later he founded the kingdom of Atropatene (Azerbaijan). Eumenes received Cappadocia, with Paphlagonia and Pontus, a large territory, which had however first to be conquered from Ariarathes, who had been in possession since Gaugamela. In Europe, Thrace (where Seuthes, the powerful king of the Odrysae, had regained his independence after Zopyrion’s disaster) was withdrawn from Antipater and given to Lysimachus. Seleucus accepted the command of the hipparchy which comprised what remained of the original Companion cavalry; it must however have soon broken up, for from its ranks must have come many of the ‘Friends’ who began to gather round the leading satraps. Harpalus’ office was abolished, and though apparently Alexander’s financial superintendents were retained, they were made subordinate to the satraps, whose increased authority is shown by the fact that Archon at Babylon and some of the eastern satraps began to strike coins.

Alexander had left 13,000 Greek mercenaries in Bactria, who were homesick and simmering with mutiny even before his death; on the news they rose, and were joined by their compatriots from the other far-eastern provinces; together they formed a veteran army of 20,000 foot and 3000 horse, whose purpose was to go home and rejoin their own people. The possible connection of this movement with the Lamian war has already been noticed. The danger was vigorously met; while Craterus supported Antipater, Perdiccas sent Peithon eastward with 3800 Macedonians and an order on the eastern satraps for 10,000 foot and 8000 horse; his army thus included the native cavalry which had fought for Alexander in India. Peithon’s orders were to destroy the mutineers. But he had his own plans; he hoped to win them and by their aid make himself master of all the eastern satrapies; and when treachery and his overwhelming cavalry compelled them to surrender, he merely disarmed and took an oath from them and dismissed them to their settlements till required. But his Macedonians had 110 mind to lose their plunder; they surrounded and massacred the Greeks, a severe blow for Alex­ander’s eastern cities. Peithon returned to Perdiccas, to whom he was henceforth a source of weakness, both from his reputation and his double-dealing.

Perdiccas had had perforce to abandon Alexander’s Arabian expedition and many of his public works; but he was properly anxious to complete Alexander’s half-finished task in Asia Minor, and he ordered Leonnatus and Antigonus to furnish troops for the conquest of Eumenes’ satrapy of Cappadocia. Antigonus took no notice; Leonnatus sent for Eumenes and attempted to win his support for his project of marrying Cleopatra; Eumenes refused, and Leonnatus then tried to murder him. Leonnatus’ death in the Lamian war ended Perdiccas’ difficulties in that quarter; but as it was vital to him to secure a strong position for Eumenes, the one man on whom he could absolutely rely, he invaded Cappadocia himself in the spring of 322 with Philip and the Imperial army, defeated and hanged Ariarathes, and gave his satrapy to Eumenes, who in this campaign had probably revealed his quality as a general. Perdiccas then detached Alexander’s armour-bearer Neoptolemus, of the Epirote house, to attempt the conquest of Armenia, and himself invaded eastern Pisidia, where Balacrus of Cilicia had met his death. He took Laranda and Isaura, after a horrible struggle; for the Isaurians refused to survive their freedom, and at the end fired their town and died in the flames. He then sent his brother Alcetas, the phalanx-leader, to occupy western Pisidia; Alcetas for his own purposes worked, on different lines, and secured for himself the strong friendship of the tribes, especially the unconquered Termessians.

Perdiccas had achieved notable success, and he began to reconsider his position; he secured from his army his appointment as executive of the kingship of both kings, a function he was actually exercising; it was virtually the regency. That he was aiming at the throne is unlikely, as it would have involved a breach with his ally Olympias; but in fact, under the primitive customs of Macedonia, a regent in command of the army was virtually king. Antipater, who naturally did not recognize a position conferred by Perdiccas’ army alone, became alarmed. He had from the first tried to strengthen himself by the aid of his numerous daughters; he had married Eurydice to Ptolemy, and Phila, a noble and capable woman who helped him with affairs and whose judgment he greatly valued, to Craterus, and had offered another daughter to Leonnatus. He now sought to safeguard himself by inviting Perdiccas to marry his daughter Nicaea; at the same time Olympias proposed that he should marry Cleopatra, who left Macedonia and came to Sardes. Eumenes, who saw what must come, advised Perdiccas to take Cleopatra; but he chose Nicaea. Soon after, Cynane set out from Macedonia to bring her daughter Eurydice to Philip and combine their claims to the throne; she successfully defied Antipater, who was occupied in Greece, and reached Asia. Perdiccas then sent Alcetas to stop her; his men would not fight against Philip’s daughter, but in some way he procured her death. Then his Macedonians mutinied and took Eurydice under their protection, and Perdiccas had to consent to her marriage with Philip. In spite of this set-back, however, he now felt himself strong enough to call Antigonus to account for his disobedience. Antigonus fled to Antipater and Craterus and sought their help; he accused Perdiccas of murdering Cynane, and told them that he was aiming at the throne and meant to turn Antipater out of Macedonia. Antipater believed him, while Craterus felt that Perdiccas had usurped his office. The two were attempting to conquer Aetolia; they broke off the invasion, prepared to cross to Asia, and applied to Ptolemy for help.

Ptolemy had taken possession of Egypt without incident, and had attracted to himself, by his reputation for generosity and fair dealing, a considerable number of Macedonians; he had a moderate force of mercenaries. In 323 civil war had broken out in Cyrene, and the vanquished oligarchs sought Ptolemy’s aid; in 322 his general Ophelias conquered Cyrene, and Ptolemy added it to his satrapy. More important to Perdiccas was the matter of Alexander’s corpse. The meeting of the generals at Babylon had decreed the provision of a magnificent bier, and Ptolemy had been strong enough to secure the nomination of his partisan Arrhidaeus to superintend the funeral arrangements. The army doubtless expected the body to be taken home to Macedonia; and whatever Perdiccas’ earlier views may have been, this now suited his ambition, for a new ruler in Macedonia was expected to confirm his title by burying his predecessor. Ptolemy however meant to confirm his own position by burying the body himself. He made sure of Arrhidaeus. and he spread or adopted a plausible report that Alexander had desired to be buried at Ammon. Late in 322 the funeral procession left Babylon, and took the road, not to Macedonia, but by Damascus to Egypt. Perdiccas sent his general Attalus after Arrhidaeus, but failed to stop him; and Ptolemy received the body and buried it at Memphis, pending the provision of a fitting tomb at Alexandria.

Ptolemy had now annexed a free ally of the empire, and stolen Alexander’s body; Perdiccas must take up the challenge or abdicate. Ptolemy of course hastened to accept Antipater’s proffered alliance; and Perdiccas was faced by war on two fronts. The spring of 321 saw the opening of a struggle which, though its nature altered after 301, was not closed for forty years, and engaged the entire military strength of the empire, both Macedonian and Asiatic, as well as large forces of Greeks. The cavalry employed in Asia were largely Asiatic, and the infantry mercen­aries of every nationality, European and Asiatic, who easily changed sides; but every general tried to secure a nucleus of Macedonian infantry. With the Macedonian troops the war was unpopular; they would have held to the royal house if they could, but as between the contending generals they cared little, and their apparent ficklenesses and desertions were really attempts to end the struggle in favour of the side which for the moment seemed victorious.

Perdiccas spent the winter of 322 in preparation; he allied himself with the Aetolians, still in arms against Antipater, and replaced Archon of Babylon, who was disaffected, by Docimus. He also decided to repudiate Nicaea and marry Cleopatra, which meant that he openly claimed Macedonia, and early in 321 he sent Eumenes to Cleopatra at Sardes with presents. Soon after, Antigonus started with part of Antipater’s fleet for Cyprus, where Nicocreon of Salamis, Nicocles of Paphos, and other kings had joined Ptolemy; thither too Perdiccas sent part of his fleet under Aristonous. On his way Antigonus landed in Caria; both Asander and Menander of Lydia were his partisans, and in a raid on Sardes he nearly caught Eumenes, who was only saved by Cleopatra’s warning. Perdiccas had decided to stand on the defensive against Antipater and attack Ptolemy; but he had lost valuable time by sending Eumenes, who was to conduct the defensive, to Sardes, for Eumenes’ army was not ready. He now gave Eumenes a battalion of Macedonians, and purported to give him the satrapies of Leonnatus, Antigonus, Asander, and Menander, i.e. nearly all Asia Minor, together with the supreme command in that country. Eumenes hurried to his own satrapy and raised some native infantry and 5000 excellent Cappadocian horse, but he was too late at the Dardanelles; Antipater and Craterus, with Lysimachus’ aid, had corrupted the troops on guard and crossed with 32,500 men, chiefly Macedonians. Perdiccas had ordered Neoptolemus from Armenia and Alcetas from Pisidia to join Eumenes; both had some Macedonians. Alcetas refused; Neoptolemus came, but meditated treachery. Eumenes discovered this, attacked and defeated him, and took over his troops; Neoptolemus with 300 horse escaped to Craterus.

Eumenes now had 20,000 foot beside his 5000 horse; among his generals were Pharnabazus, once Darius’ admiral; Phoenix, who was one day to betray Antigonus; and his fellow-countryman Hieronymus of Cardia, the great historian to whom we ultimately owe most of our knowledge of this period. Antipater after crossing divided his force; he himself pushed on south with 10,000 men to help Ptolemy, leaving Craterus with 20,000 foot and 2800 horse to crush Eumenes, who could hardly, he thought, face Macedonians. In the opening cavalry engagement, however, Eumenes' Cappadocians were victorious on both wings, and Craterus and Neoptolemus were killed; Eumenes, who was wounded, then negotiated with the 20,000 Macedonian foot, whom he dared not attack with his mixed infantry, and received their surrender. In the night, however, they marched off to rejoin Antipater, and he got little from his victory but a great name.

Meanwhile Perdiccas, accompanied by the kings and the rest of his fleet under Attains, had invaded Egypt. Ptolemy had secured 8000 talents by putting Cleomenes to a not undeserved death, nominally for favouring Perdiccas, and was prepared; Perdiccas failed to force the river line, and the two armies raced upstream to Memphis, where Perdiccas again failed to cross, losing many men drowned in the Nile. Thereon his Macedonians mutinied, for they thought he had no further chance of success, and under the lead of Peithon, Seleucus, and Antigenes, Alexander’s former phalanx-leader who now commanded the hypaspists, they killed him in his tent. Next day they offered Ptolemy the regency; but that was not at all what he desired, and on his advice they made Peithon and Arrhidaeus joint-regents (one representing each army), pending Antipater’s arrival. The day after came the news of Eumenes’ victory; had it come two days sooner it might have saved Perdiccas. Its only result now was that the army condemned Eumenes and Alcetas to death. Attalus with the fleet retired to Tyre.

 

III. 

ANTIPATER’S REGENCY

 

The regents brought the army and the kings back to Triparadeisus in Syria, perhaps near Riblah, where Attalus, professing submission, joined them. Eurydice was seeking with considerable success to win the Macedonians and the actual power for Philip, i.e. herself, and the position became threatening. At last Antipater and Antigonus arrived; Peithon and Arrhidaeus laid down their office; and the Macedonian army, united for the last time, elected Antipater regent of the Empire. But Eurydice, with Attalus’ support, merely turned her agitation, which aimed at abolishing the regency, against Antipater, and at her instigation the army of Asia, led by the hypaspists, demanded certain rewards promised them by Alexander. Antipater tried to temporize, and was nearly stoned; he was saved by Antigonus and Seleucus, and escaped to his own troops. But he had not fought half his life with Olympias for nothing; he finally mastered the situation, and persuaded Eurydice to keep quiet. Having established his authority, he distributed certain satrapies afresh. Ptolemy was confirmed in possession of Egypt and of all conquests westward, i.e. Cyrene. It was a dangerous step; it condoned disobedience, and definitely reversed Alexander’s policy, for as yet no Greek city had been subjected to a satrap. But it accorded with Antipater’s policy in Greece; and henceforth till 315 the satraps garrison Greek cities where they can. The others who had helped to pull down Perdiccas were well rewarded. Seleucus received Babylon, Arrhidaeus Hellespontine Phrygia, Antigenes Susiana, and Antigonus’ partisan Nicanor Cappadocia, while Peithon obtained his desire, the general command over the eastern satrapies. In the east Philippus was transferred from Bactria to Parthia, and the competent Stasanor from Aria to Bactria. Stasanor’s compatriot Stasander received Aria; probably he was his brother, as similarly formed pairs of brothers’ names occur elsewhere. Antigenes was ordered to bring the royal treasure from Susa to Kyinda in Cilicia, to be nearer Europe; as escort he was to take his 3000 hypaspists, henceforth called the Argyraspids (Silver Shields), which removed these turbulent troops from the army. Antigonus was made general of the royal army in Asia, with Menander as second in command, and commissioned to subdue Eumenes and Alcetas; the vacant Lydia was given to Antipater’s admiral Cleitus, the victor of Amorgos. Antipater gave Antigonus 8500 Macedonians and 70 of Alexander’s elephants, and also gave him his daughter Phila, Craterus’ widow, as a wife for Demetrius, now fifteen; but as some check on Antigonus he made his own son Cassander chiliarch. He then, with the kings and the rest of the Macedonians and elephants, set out for Europe; he thus again reversed Alexander’s policy, broke up the joint empire, and made Asia a dependency of Macedonia.

The events of Antipater’s regency are largely lost. Attalus again had to fly, and joined Alcetas in Pisidia; they successfully invaded Caria, but their fleet was defeated in an attempt on Rhodes, and again off Cyprus by Cleitus and the Athenian Thymochares. Finally, Alcetas and Attalus lost everything but Pisidia, where they were joined by Docimus, whom Seleucus drove from Babylon. In Pisidia they had nearly 17,000 men, and the goodwill of the tribes; but their cause was ruined by Alcetas’ refusal to co-operate with Eumenes.

Eumenes after his victory entered Lydia, hoping that Cleopatra might pronounce in his favour; but her attitude was studiously correct, and Eumenes, who had meant to intercept Aristonoiis, who next appears in Macedonia, must have joined Antipater.

Antipater as he returned, yielded to her request not to make her appear to the Macedonians as an author of civil war, and retired to Celaenae in Phrygia, where he wintered. He was now an out­law, trying to keep together an army which he could not even pay; but he devised a scheme which tided him over the winter. Phrygia was Antigonus’ country, and was still in the hands of its Iranian barons. Eumenes, as representing their overlord (the kings), sold their estates to different companies of his troops, to whom he lent siege-machines to reduce the barons’ strongholds; the troops repaid themselves from the plunder, while their officers replaced the Persian landowners. Antigonus meanwhile recruited troops, and in the spring of 320 crossed the Taurus, detached a force to watch Alcetas, and invaded Cappadocia with 10,000 infantry, 2000 cavalry, and 30 elephants. Eumenes had double his numbers; but his men had small desire to fight against authority and elephants for a lost cause and an outlawed leader. He was defeated at the Orcynian fields, most of his army going over to Antigonus; but he and Hieronymus escaped to the impregnable fortress of Nora on the Cappadocian border. Antigonus recovered Cappadocia and Phrygia, but failed to win over Eumenes, and invested Nora. He then reunited his forces, preparatory to reducing Alcetas; with the troops taken from Eumenes he now had 40,000 foot, 7000 horse, and 65 elephants. After a wonderful march he surprised and defeated Alcetas; Attalus and Docimus were taken, and Docimus presently entered Antigonus’ service, to betray him seventeen years later. Alcetas escaped to Termessus, where he committed suicide; Antigonus brutally refused him burial, but his body was buried by the Termessians. So ended the house of Perdiccas. Antigonus incorporated Alcetas’ troops; he had now a very large and victorious army, and had become the strongest force in the empire. No enemy of Antipater’s remained except Eumenes.

Then, in the spring of 319, Antipater died. With him died all legitimately constituted authority. The kings,—an infant and an idiot,—were powerless of themselves; the Macedonian army could never again be united for the election of a legitimate regent. During his two years of rule he had held the empire together for the kings; but this had depended solely on the personal respect felt for him by the various satraps. And, even so, he had only achieved it by abandoning Alexander’s joint empire of Europe and Asia, and by permitting the aggrandizement of the chief dis­ruptive forces in the state, Antigonus and Ptolemy. The moment he was dead the forces of disruption burst their barriers. Ptolemy, since his defeat of Perdiccas, had treated Egypt as ‘spear-won’ territory, which means that he regarded the King’s land, with its taxes, as his personal possession; he must have ceased to remit those taxes to the Treasury, if indeed he ever did so. He now invaded Syria, captured the satrap Laomedon, and annexed the whole country. Antigonus set about conquering the remainder of Asia Minor; he expelled Cleitus from Lydia and took Ephesus, and tried to eject Arrhidaeus from Hellespontine Phrygia on the ground that he had attacked Cyzicus, a free ally of the kings.

 

IV. 

POLYPERCHON AND GREECE

 

Antipater’s army, on his recommendation, had elected Polyperchon regent, thanks to the prestige of his reconquest of Thessaly. The election, not being that of the whole army, was not valid and was not recognized by the satraps, but it was recognized in Macedonia and of course gave Polyperchon many advantages; he secured Antipater’s army, 65 elephants, all the fleet not with Antigonus, and the power to issue orders over Philip’s seal, which were sometimes obeyed even by the Macedonians in Asia. He meant to do his best for the kings—probably the reason why Antipater recommended him; but he was not a wise or strong character. Antigonus however knew that he would fight, and again tried to win Eumenes; he asked that Hieronymus might be sent to him, and through him he proposed to Eumenes friendship and alliance. Eumenes welcomed the chance of escaping from Nora. He accepted the proposed truce which Hieronymus brought; but he did not take the oath as Antigonus tendered it. Antigonus had sent a form of oath which indeed named the kings, but would have bound Eumenes to himself personally. Eumenes amended the oath into one which bound him to be the ally of Olympias and the kings, as well as of An­tigonus, and submitted this form to the Macedonians of the investing force for their opinion. They saw no harm in an oath to the kings, whose general Antigonus professedly was; they allowed Eumenes to take the amended oath and go free. It was very sharp practice on Eumenes’ part; he had accepted Antigonus’ truce, and was bound therefore to submit the amended form to him. Anti­gonus was furious when he heard, but it was too late; Eumenes was again at large, and bound by oath, not to the man Antigonus, but only to the kings’ general. Polyperchon’s immediate preoccupation, however, was not Antigonus. Antipater’s death had unchained many forces; among the greatest of them was his son Cassander. Cassander, left with Antigonus in 321, had quarrelled with him and returned to Macedonia. He had expected the army to give him the regency on his father’s death, and he had no intention of acquiescing in Polyperchon’s rule in Macedonia; he returned to Antigonus and asked for assistance, representing that he could help him by keeping Polyperchon busy. Antigonus agreed, and gave him 35 ships and 4000 men; Ptolemy also joined their alliance. Polyperchon realized that a struggle with Cassander would be no small matter; Cassander, for his father’s sake, had many partisans, and Antipater’s garrisons controlled many Greek cities. But Greece was in a ferment with the news of Antipater’s death, and Polyperchon’s camp was full of envoys praying him to deliver their cities from Antipater’s garrisons. He saw that capital might be made of this, and in Philip’s name he issued a proclamation which reversed Antipater’s policy. It asserted that Philip III had been anxious to carry out the policy of Philip II and Alexander, and that Antipater was solely to blame for the troubles of Greece since the Lamian war; it then restored the constitutions of the cities as they had existed under Philip II and Alexander, recalled all those exiled by Antipater, and fixed a date in March 318 for their return; all who opposed Philip (i.e. Polyperchon) were to be banished. With this proclamation Polyperchon made himself a party in Greece. It did not resemble Alexander’s recall of the exiles; that aimed at promoting peace and unity, this was a preparation for war. In one case it threw over Alexander’s policy altogether; it gave Samos back as a sop to Athens, though this was never carried out. It was not a proclamation of freedom; Philip frankly gave orders as master. But it gave Polyperchon what he wanted, a weapon against Cassander; the democrats in many cities were henceforth his, and he encouraged them to attack Cassander’s friends the oligarchs. But he did not withdraw the garrison from Corinth.

Having taken measures against Cassander, Polyperchon sent Eumenes letters from the royal family praying for his help against Antigonus; he himself offered Eumenes the choice of returning to Macedonia to share the regency or remaining as supreme commander in Asia, and put at his disposal the royal treasure at Kyinda and the Silver Shields. Eumenes decided that his oath only bound him to Antigonus so long as Antigonus supported the kings, and that the royal family’s appeal justified him in treating Antigonus as a traitor; he declared his loyalty to the kings and accepted the command in Asia. Some have condemned his action; but any unfavourable verdict on this remarkable man’s character must be based on the transaction at Nora, and on that alone, for by the terms of his oath, once that oath was taken, his action was undoubtedly justified. Antigonus, though he still posed before his army as the duly-appointed general of the kings, and though Polyperchon had no legal power to revoke his commission, was in fact as much a rebel as Ptolemy, and no longer concealed from his friends that he was following his own ambition. Polyperchon now made two mistakes. He neglected to procure from his own Macedonians (and it would have carried weight) a reversal of the death-sentence on Eumenes; and he invited Olympias to return to Macedonia as guardian of her grandson. The old queen showed more sense than the regent; she asked Eumenes’ advice, and Eumenes, who knew her, replied in haste, begging her to remain in Epirus and let her generals manage matters. For the moment she complied; but she began to give orders as though regent, and threw herself heartily into the propaganda war. This war had been going on for years; Theophrastus’ pamphlet Callisthenes was directed against Alexander, and the earliest version of Alexander’s ‘Testament’ is a scarcely veiled attack on Antipater. But it was now intensified; Olympias and the royalists attacked Cassander, while his friends the Peripatetics, embittered against Alexander’s house because of Callisthenes’ death, cham­pioned his cause. Both sides fought with poisoned weapons. Olympias revived the story, perhaps originally her own, that Antipater and Cassander, with Aristotle’s help, had murdered Alexander, and gave circumstantial details; the opposition retorted that she had procured the death of her husband Philip, and gave details no less circumstantial. This propaganda war, nourished by forged or doctored letters of Alexander’s, set its mark on history; we ultimately owe to it, among other things, the caricature of Alexander as the spoilt child of fortune, and doubtless parts of the traditional portrait of Cassander.

As soon as Eumenes’ decision was known, Antigonus sent Menander against him. Eumenes, who had raised only 2500 men, retired across the Taurus to Kyinda, where he found Antigenes and the Silver Shields; the ‘gold of Kyinda’ was put at his disposal and he soon recruited an army, and though Ptolemy and Antigonus both attempted to win over the Silver Shields, he managed to secure Antigenes and his men. They were the last body of Alexander’s veterans who had kept together as a unit; popular opinion regarded them as invincible. But they had joined in condemning Eumenes to death, and could feel no personal loyalty to him; and to meet the difficulty he declared that it had been revealed to him in a dream that the deified Alexander was still present with them in spirit as their real leader. He had a royal tent prepared, in which on a golden throne lay Alexander’s sceptre, diadem, and arms; there he and the other generals sacrificed to Alexander as their divine leader, and held their councils as though in his presence, Eumenes claiming no superiority over the others. The device held the Macedonians to Eumenes for two years; but it somewhat impaired the efficiency of his force by substituting a council for a commander-in-chief, and threw on Eumenes the burden of perpetual diplomacy to get his own plans carried out. His first step, as Antigonus held Asia Minor, was to invade Phoenicia and attempt to secure a fleet to keep open his-communica­tions with Polyperchon. Polyperchon on his side had part of the imperial fleet, again commanded by Cleitus, who had fled to him when driven from Lydia.

We must return to the affairs of Athens. In 319, during Antipater’s last illness, Demades went to Macedonia to petition for the removal of the garrison of Munychia. But his letter to Perdiccas in 322 had been found in the royal archives; and Cassander, who received him in Antipater’s stead, arrested him and sent him to Athens to be tried for treason. The Athenian oligarchy obediently condemned him to death, and Cassander executed the sentence. Worthless as Demades was, he had rendered some service to Athens; but men only saw in his death a just retribution on one who had moved the death-sentence upon Demosthenes. Phocion met his fate soon after. Cassander understood the importance of Munychia, and, alleging Antipater’s orders, secured its transfer from Menyllus to his own partisan Nicanor (not Aristotle’s son-in-law). The Athenian populace believed that Nicanor next meditated attacking the Piraeus, and the Assembly ordered Phocion as general to take the necessary steps for its defence; but Phocion, who trusted Nicanor, refused or neglected to do so, and Nicanor captured the Piraeus. Then the day for the return of the exiles arrived; led by Hagnonides, they poured into Athens, mastered the Assembly, and called the government to account. Demetrius of Phalerum and other oli­garchs took refuge with Nicanor in the Piraeus; Phocion escaped to Polyperchon. But Polyperchon was determined to get rid of all who might support Cassander, and sent Phocion to Athens under Cleitus’ escort to be tried for treason. The trial of Antipater’s friend before men half-mad from their past sufferings at Antipater’s hands was a farce, though Cleitus’ disapproval saved Phocion from torture; Hagnonides moved the death-penalty on the man who had once saved his life, and Phocion was executed (May 318). He had pursued a policy of hopelessness and resignation, and had definitely betrayed his trust in the matter of the Piraeus; he was condemned as Antipater’s tool by men who, whatever their faults, had not like him despaired of the State.

Hardly was Phocion dead when Cassander returned from Anti-gonus to the Piraeus, and prepared to attack Athens, now again democratic and friendly to Polyperchon. Polyperchon, with 24,000 men and 65 elephants, attempted to recover the Piraeus but failed. He then entered the Peloponnese, expelled some of Antipater’s partisans, and made sure of Corinth, henceforth his stronghold. Megalopolis however resisted, and he tried to storm it; but the people raised a general levy, armed the slaves, and fought so heroically that they beat him off with much loss of reputation. In autumn, threatened by Cassander’s success, he returned to Macedonia.

 

V. 

EUMENES AND ANTIGONUS

 

With this summer (318) the new war was well under way; on the one side were Eumenes in Asia and Polyperchon in Europe, who stood for the kings; on the other Antigonus in Asia and Cassander in Europe, who, supported by Ptolemy and others, were attempting to pull down the new central power as Perdiccas had been pulled down. Contemporaries regarded it as the con­tinuation of the war against Perdiccas, interrupted by the episode of Antipater’s regency. The war lasted for nearly two years; we may first follow events in Asia to their conclusion and then return to Europe.

Antigonus had mastered most of Hellespontine Phrygia, but Arrhidaeus still held some cities. He might, if supported, prevent Antigonus crossing to Europe, and Polyperchon sent his fleet under Cleitus to aid him. Nicanor with Cassander’s squadron followed and took over Antigonus’ ships, bringing his fleet up to 130 vessels. The two fleets met in the Bosporus; Nicanor was badly defeated, and lost some 60 ships. But Antigonus, with the friendly help of Byzantium, got part of his army across in the night; he then shipped good troops on Nicanor’s remaining vessels, and at dawn surprised Cleitus’ fleet when drawn ashore and caught it between two fires. It was Aegospotami repeated. Nicanor captured nearly the whole fleet; Cleitus, who escaped, was killed by Lysimachus’ people; Arrhidaeus vanishes from history. By this bold stroke Antigonus really decided the war; it gave his side command of the sea, and cut communication between Polyperchon and Eumenes. He at once hurried south to drive Eumenes out of Phoenicia before he could create a new fleet. Eumenes could not face him; nothing was left him but to strike eastward and raise the upper satrapies.

The position there was favourable for him. Peithon of Media had attempted to enforce his command over the eastern satraps and had killed Philippus of Parthia; the rest, under the lead of Peucestas of Persis and Susiana, had combined against him, defeated him, and driven him back into Media, where he was seeking help from Seleucus. Polyperchon had already written in Philip’s name to the eastern satraps, ordering them to support Eumenes. With 15,000 foot and 2500 horse Eumenes reached Babylonia and summoned Seleucus and Peithon to aid the kings against Antigonus. Seleucus asserted his loyalty, but refused to treat with an outlaw; whereupon Eumenes captured and gar­risoned the citadel of Babylon (October 318), and apparently secured the alliance of the eastern satraps. Next spring he ad­vanced to the Tigris; there Seleucus and Peithon flooded his camp by cutting a dyke, but he cleverly extricated himself. They then called for help upon Antigonus, who had followed Eumenes and reached Mesopotamia, while Eumenes, who had crossed into Antigenes’ satrapy of Susiana, was joined by Peucestas and the eastern satraps, who had kept together their victorious army; the only satrap who was not either present or represented was Peithon of Sind. They brought 18,700 foot and 4000 horse, practically all Asiatics; the small amount of cavalry they could raise beyond that requisitioned by Perdiccas throws much light on Darius’ armies. Half the force was supplied by Peucestas; but Eudamus from the Punjab, who had assassinated Porus, brought 114 of Porus’ elephants. Elephants were highly valued as an arm; and as Antigonus had part of Alexander’s elephants, Eudamus’ help meant much to Eumenes. He now had a larger army than Antigonus, who had left part of his troops in Asia Minor; but he suffered from the unwieldy council in the Alexander-tent and the jealousy of Peucestas. Peucestas was at variance with Antigenes, to whom he naturally had no wish to surrender Susiana; also he desired the supreme command.

Before Eumenes could compose these differences, Antigonus, who had with him Peithon, Seleucus, and Nearchus, settled the question of Susiana by crossing the Tigris and occupying Susa, where he installed Seleucus as satrap; when Seleucus recaptured Babylon is unknown. Eumenes retired behind the line of the Pasitigris (Kuren); but he had talked Peucestas round, and when in summer Antigonus attempted to cross the Koprates (Ab-i-Diz) he out-generalled and smartly defeated him. Antigonus, whose troops had suffered from the heat, decided to retire into Media and refit. Disdaining Peithon’s advice to buy a passage according to Achaemenid custom, he fought his way through the Cossaeans and suffered terrible loss, a fact which illustrates Alexander’s skill in handling mountaineers. The disaster affected his army, and he nearly met the fate of Perdiccas; but conciliation and lavish presents, aided by the plentiful supplies which he energetically collected in Media, averted the danger. Eumenes saw a great chance; he proposed to turn westward, secure Asia Minor and communication with Polyperchon, and cut off Antigonus from his allies and bases. Antigenes supported him, but the other satraps refused to follow; they had no mind to leave Antigonus at large among their satrapies. Eumenes had to yield, and withdrew into Persis; there Peucestas lavishly entertained the army, seeking to win its favour for himself. But by unwearied tact Eumenes kept the troops to their allegiance and even for the time won over Peucestas and reconciled him to Antigenes; they had a joint guard (agema), and shared the command during Eumenes’ illness. But more than tact was needed, and Eumenes took the bold step of bringing Sibyrtius of Arachosia, who secretly favoured Antigonus, to trial before the Macedonians. Sibyrtius only avoided a death­sentence by flight, and for a time Eumenes had no more trouble.

In the autumn of 317 Antigonus threatened to invade Persis; Eumenes advanced to meet him and took up a strong position. For four days the armies lay watching each other; then Antigonus broke camp and started for Gabiene, a district full of supplies where both generals desired to winter; Eumenes followed, and in Paraetacene, near Ispahan, it came to a battle. Eumenes had 35,000 foot, barely half of them heavy-armed and only the 3000 Silver Shields Macedonians, 6100 horse, and 114 elephants. Antigonus had 28,000 foot (chiefly heavy-armed, including 8000 Macedonians), 8500 horse, and 65 elephants; his ‘Companions’ were commanded by his son Demetrius, fighting his first battle. Each had his cavalry on either flank of the infantry, the usual formation of the time, with his elephants in detachments before the line; each meant to strike with his right, where he commanded in person; Eumenes also had some cavalry in reserve. Diodorus however has transcribed his source very imperfectly, for the battle proceeds as though no elephants were there. Eumenes’ right and centre were successful; but their advance opened a gap in his line, into which Antigonus flung his cavalry, threatening Eumenes’ left so seriously that he had to recall his men from pur­suit. The armies reformed, and manoeuvred for position till mid­night, when both halted from weariness. Antigonus returned to the battlefield, but dawn revealed the fact that his loss was far the greater; he dared not wait, while Eumenes was across his road to Gabiene; he withdrew into Media, and Eumenes buried the dead, the sign of victory, and took up winter-quarters in Gabiene.

In midwinter Antigonus boldly attempted to surprise Eumenes by a nine days march across desert country. But the cold compelled his men to disregard his orders to light no fires; this gave Eumenes warning, and he was able to assemble his army for the final battle of Gabiene. Antigonus had now only 22,000 foot, but had 9000 horse against 6000 of Eumenes. Again the Silver Shields were victorious; but Eumenes’ left was defeated, Peucestas treacherously leaving the line, and Antigonus’ cavalry captured his camp, together with the wives, families, and treasure of the Silver Shields. The defeat was far from conclusive, and Eumenes desired to renew the battle; but the Silver Shields mutinied, seized him, and handed him over to Antigonus in exchange for their wives and children. Antigonus executed Eudamus, for which his murder of Porus would provide excuse, and burnt Antigenes alive, a piece of savagery for which no reason is apparent; the other satraps escaped. Finally, after some hesitation, he put Eumenes to death, though Demetrius and Nearchus tried to save him. Eumenes had tricked Antigonus at Nora; but he had been a gallant foe, and Antigonus’ execution of the old partisan death-sentence was one of his worst acts. But he did justice on the Silver Shields; he divided them among Sibyrtius and other satraps, with orders to use them up in frontier warfare so that none should set eyes again upon the home-sea. Among the wounded was Hieronymus, who subsequently served Antigonus’ house during three generations.

Eumenes stands out sharply from his Macedonian rivals. Doubtless, as a Greek, his only choice had been loyalty or self­effacement; but, his choice once made, he had stood firm in a shifting world, and his loyalty had never faltered. Given a fair chance, his power of handling men and his fertility in resource might perhaps have pulled Alexander’s house through, even against Antigonus; but after Perdiccas’ death, with little personal following, he had to work amid the perpetual plottings and jealousies of allies who demanded of him victory even while they made victory impossible. Any man’s courage might have given way, but for four whole years, through sheer determination and military talent, he had faithfully upheld a losing cause with tools which he knew might at any moment break in his hand.

 

VI. 

CASSANDER AND THE COALITION

 

Polyperchon’s defeat at Megalopolis had brought many Greek cities over to Cassander; and late in 318 Cassander seized Panactum. Discouraged by the loss, and unable to recover the Piraeus, which meant starvation, the Athenians sought peace; they opened negotiations with the oligarchs in the Piraeus, and Demetrius of Phalerum undertook to approach Cassander. Cassander’s price for the Piraeus was high. Athens was to be his ally, all who possessed less than 1000 drachmae were to be disfranchised, and he was to garrison Munychia till the war was ended and keep a governor in Athens, an Athenian nominated by himself. He nominated Demetrius of Phalerum (January 317). That the franchise was more liberal than Antipater’s mattered little, for Demetrius really governed Athens as a tyrant with Cassander’s support; but apparently the only reprisal was the execution of Hagnonides for Phocion’s death. The possession of the great city quite altered Cassander’s position, especially as he procured from his army a death-sentence on Nicanor, whom he suspected of treachery, and garrisoned Munychia with his own men. By spring 317 he was strong enough, with the aid of Antipater’s friends, to invade Macedonia and drive out Polyperchon, capturing some elephants. Polyperchon sent Roxane and her son to Olympias, but Eurydice and Philip escaped and joined Cassander. Eurydice in Philip’s name now purported to abolish the regency, depose Polyperchon, and make Cassander Philip’s minister; Cassander had found some one he could work with, and is said to have thought highly of her. He left her, supported by his brother Nicanor, to govern Macedonia, and again invaded Greece; he won Thessaly and much of central Greece, attacked Polyperchon’s stronghold the Peloponnese, and took Epidaurus; but he was held up by the resistance of Tegea.

Then Polyperchon played his last card; he called on Olympias for help in good earnest, and she came. Supported by him and by her cousin Aeacides of Epirus she invaded Macedonia; Eurydice met her with the Macedonians, but they refused to fight against her, and she mastered the whole kingdom without striking a blow. Then what Eumenes had feared came to pass. Olympias abandoned all restraint. She murdered Nicanor and a hundred of Cassander’s friends, and imprisoned Philip and Eurydice; she made her grandson sole king, with his title on the coinage; then in his interest she murdered Philip, and sent Eurydice a rope, a dagger, and a bowl of poison. Eurydice made no useless lament; she composed Philip’s limbs, prayed that Olympias might receive the like gifts, and hanged herself in her girdle. A tribute of admiration may be permitted for the courage with which this girl, left alone at fifteen, had thrown her throw for Alexander’s empire.

Cassander at once broke off the siege of Tegea and hurried north. Polyperchon’s allies the Aetolians barred his path at Thermopylae; he shipped his army to Thessaly on rafts. He raised a revolution in Epirus, turned out Aeacides, brought the country over to his side, and made his general Lyciscus governor; he corrupted Polyperchon’s men and left him helpless. Then he entered Macedonia. Olympias’ savagery had produced a revulsion of feeling; the Macedonians again went over to Cassander, and Aristonous, who commanded for her, could only save Amphipolis. Olympias with the elephants and some mercenaries threw herself into Pydna; with her were Roxane and her son, Thessalonice an illegitimate daughter of Philip II, and the child Deidameia, Aeacides’ daughter and Pyrrhus’ sister, betrothed to the young Alexander. Olympias at the end showed herself Alexander’s mother. Cassander blockaded Pydna, which was ill provisioned; but she held out till the elephants, fed on sawdust, all died, and the mercenaries took to cannibalism, and only surrendered (spring 316) on terms that her life should be spared. She also ordered Aristonous, who had had some success, to surrender Amphipolis; Cassander promptly procured his assassination. Then he put Olympias on trial for treason before his army. She did not appear. Perhaps Cassander saw to this, for he dreaded the effect on the Macedonians of an appeal from her; but it seems also that she disputed the competence of the tribunal and claimed a trial before the whole Macedonian army, now scattered far and wide. Whether her absence were voluntary or otherwise, Cassander’s army condemned her to death unheard. The difficulty was to execute the sentence, for the troops he sent dared not touch her; finally she was killed by relatives of the men she had murdered. She died with the same defiant courage she had shown throughout her stormy life.

Master of Macedonia, Cassander at once declared his future policy, while he allowed full scope to his enmity to Alexander and his works. He gave Philip and Eurydice a royal funeral at Aegae, that is, he claimed to be the successor of the old national kings, Perdiccas III and Philip II, whose types he revived on his copper coinage, while his royal style after he became king was ‘King of the Macedonians’; in effect he treated Alexander as an illegitimate interloper, though he continued for utility’s sake to strike his silver coinage. He married Thessalonice, Philip’s daughter, and imprisoned Roxane and her son. He founded himself a new capital, Cassandreia, on the site of Potidaea; the name shows that he treated Alexander IV as formally deposed. Alexander had refused to rebuild Olynthus, so Cassander settled the surviving Olynthians (amongst others) in Cassandreia; possibly he was worshipped there, and the peninsula still bears his name. He also by a comprehensive synoecism founded Thessalonica (Salonica), his greatest monument; his wife perhaps was honorary ‘founder’. Both cities were organized in tribes and demes on the Greek model; and Cassandreia at least was a purely Greek, not Macedonian, foundation. Cassander governed his foreign possessions, such as Epirus and the Peloponnese, through generals, and the Greek towns which he controlled were practically subjects, not allies. Like most of the great Macedonians, he was a cultivated man; he knew Homer by heart and patronized the rationalist Euhemerus, who said that the gods were only men, while Aristotle’s successor Theophrastus perhaps wrote for him a treatise on the art of government. It was possibly from Euhemerus that Cassander’s crazy brother Alexarchus got the idea that he was the Sun; Alexarchus refounded Sane as Uranopolis, ‘Heaven-town,’ invented a new speech for the citizens, his ‘children of heaven,’ and obtained permission for them to strike coins. Having settled Macedonia Cassander turned to Greece, and with the consent of the Boeotians refounded Thebes, which Alexander had destroyed. He collected the scattered Thebans; the Athenians built most of the wall, but the city was not finished for years, and subscriptions continued to be sent from many countries and dynasts. Then he turned Corinth by shipping his army and elephants to Epidaurus, took Argos and other places, and at the end of 316 returned to Macedonia to winter.

The death of Eumenes left Antigonus in virtual control of Asia, with overwhelming power; his armies amounted to over 60,000 men, he had secured 25,000 talents in bullion, and had an annual revenue of 11,000 talents. His aim was to obtain the whole empire for himself without reference to the royal house; and Alexander’s lion-gryphon now vanishes from Athena’s helmet on the Alexander coinage. But he kept up appearances; Babylonian documents date by him as general only, not as king; he claimed to act for Alexander’s son, and his army made him regent. He spent the summer of 316 in disposing of possible adversaries. Peucestas was turned out of Persis; possibly he entered Demetrius’ service. Peithon saw, too late, that he had been Antigonus’ tool; he meditated revolt, but Antigonus anticipated and killed him. He could not displace the satraps of Bactria, Carmania, and Paropamisadae without difficult campaigns, while Sibyrtius and Peithon of Sind were his partisans; but he removed Stasander from Aria. Then he entered Babylonia, and called on Seleucus for an account of his revenues. Seleucus protested that he owed no account to anyone; Antigonus insisted, and Seleucus saw Peithon’s fate before him; he left Babylon by night and rode for his life to Egypt. Antigonus made Peithon of Sind satrap of Babylonia, and brought Nicanor from Cappadocia to be general of the upper satrapies. Then he gave his first intimation that he stood in Alexander’s place and meant to imitate his measures; he appointed Persians to the satrapies of Media and Susiana, of course without the military command. In the autumn of 316 he returned to Cilicia, where he secured 10,000 talents at Kyinda, and wintered.

The old central power was dead; but it had merely been replaced by another, far more energetic, ambitious, and business-like, and controlled by a single brain. The opposition between Antigonus’ and Cassander’s policies was becoming patent; and Seleucus persuaded Ptolemy, Lysimachus, and Cassander, that Antigonus’ ambition threatened their very existence, and the three rulers formed a definite alliance. Cassander, in possession of Macedonia, Epirus, Thessaly, Athens, and much of Greece, was far the strongest of the three. Ptolemy had in Egypt an impregnable fortress, but he depended on mercenaries from Greece and ship­timber from Syria and Cyprus. Lysimachus had only a small army, and had so far failed to conquer Seuthes, though some of the Greek cities on the Thracian Black Sea coast had accepted his garrisons; but he held the Dardanelles crossings, which gave him importance. He had married Cassander’s sister Nicaea, Perdiccas’ widow, and he and Cassander were now united in an unwavering friendship and confidence. The history of the next four years, 315-312, is that of the first war between Antigonus and the coalition.

 

VII. 

ANTIGONUS’ FIRST STRUGGLE FOR THE EMPIRE

 

Early in 315 the coalition sent Antigonus an ultimatum, claiming a division of the spoil taken from the central power: Syria for Ptolemy, Hellespontine Phrygia for Lysimachus, the restoration of Babylonia to Seleucus, and for Cassander Cappadocia (which included Paphlagonia) and Cilicia. Antigonus would thus have been completely cut off both from inner Asia and the Black Sea, and restricted to part of Asia Minor. Cassander, whose territory would have joined Lysimachus’ at one end and Ptolemy’s at the other, had undertaken to hold the barrier against him, and followed up the ultimatum by sending a force, with Lysimachus’ aid, to Cappadocia. Antigonus saw that his real struggle was with Cassander, the man he had made; and his objective throughout the war was Macedonia. But he could not invade Macedonia with Ptolemy in his rear; his plan therefore was to stand on the defensive in the north till he had crushed Ptolemy, meanwhile keeping Cassander and Lysimachus busy at home. His far-reaching combinations doubtless embraced Glaucias of Illyria and Seuthes, as well as Epirus.

In the spring of 315 Antigonus opened his attack. He sent his nephew Polemaeus to Cappadocia, and Aristodemus to Greece; detached a force to guard the Dardanelles; and himself with his main army invaded Syria. He was too strong to resist; Ptolemy garrisoned Tyre, took all the Phoenician warships, and retired into Egypt; Antigonus occupied the whole country, including Gaza, and began the siege of Tyre. Meanwhile both his diver­sions had been successful. Polemaeus drove Cassander’s troops out of Cappadocia and advanced along the coast, bringing Heraclea, Bithynia, and Chalcedon into Antigonus’ alliance; Aristodemus won over Polyperchon and his son Alexander, and Antigonus took over Polyperchon’s elephants and made him his general in the Peloponnese. Polyperchon’s base was the all­important Corinth, which he held with his own mercenaries. Cassander indeed invaded Greece, added part of Arcadia to his possessions, and in autumn brought Alexander over to his side and made him his general in the Peloponnese; but he could not gain Polyperchon or take Corinth, for though Alexander’s defection detached Polyperchon from Antigonus, he did not join Cassander.

Antigonus now took two steps of the first importance. He began shipbuilding in Phoenicia on a considerable scale, with a view to commanding the sea and severing Cassander from Ptolemy; and he issued a proclamation against Cassander, the effects of which were not exhausted for many years. It enumerated Cassander’s crimes against Alexander’s house and policy, and declared him a public enemy unless he released Roxane and her son, razed Thebes and Cassandreia (as representing Olynthus), and obeyed Antigonus as regent and general of the Empire; and it declared that all Greek cities everywhere should be free, ungarrisoned, and self-governing. That is, Antigonus asserted that he was fighting for the legitimate king, a pretence useful for his own army and for Macedonian opinion; and he revived Alexander’s policy of treating the Greek cities as free allies. He cared nothing for Greek freedom; but he was among the first to realize the power of public opinion, and he desired enormously to have Greek opinion on his side; and to win this he did for years carry out his proclamation with honesty and thoroughness. He did win it; the whole Greek world, except the Cassandrean oligarchs, regarded him as its champion. The policies of Alexander and Antipater had thus come to an open conflict; Antigonus stood for Alexander’s, while Cassander, with his oligarchies and garrisons, represented Antipater’s, and drove the Greeks to give to Antigonus the confidence they had denied to Alexander. Asander of Caria, who had been garrisoning Greek cities, now naturally joined the coalition, while Delos and Lemnos seemingly took advantage of the proclamation to revolt from Athens.

It took Antigonus thirteen months to reduce Tyre, against Alexander’s seven. Meanwhile he secured the alliance and fleet of Rhodes, and with his new ships he had by autumn 314 a fleet of 240, including several great heptereis (probably galleys of seven men to an oar), a new invention. He was not ready in time to prevent Ptolemy’s fleet, commanded by Seleucus, from reducing some of the Cyprian kings; but he secured the Cyclades. All Greek cities, as they became ‘free’, were expected to join him as his independent allies, bound however to furnish ‘contributions’ for the common war against Cassander, exactly as they had done for Alexander. In Greece, Aristodemus secured the alliance of the Aetolians, natural enemies of Antipater’s son, and campaigned against Polyperchon’s son Alexander, who was murdered that summer, while Cassander was kept busy by Glaucias. Here, however, Cassander was successful; he took from Glaucias Apollonia and Epidamnus, and part of southern Illyria, where he founded Antipatreia; he also collected the Acarnanians along the border into strongholds, notably Stratus, for defence against Aetolia. In the autumn, to prevent Antigonus crossing to Europe, he sent a force to Caria; but Polemaeus, who had come right round the Ionian coast freeing the cities and establishing Antigonus’ alliance, defeated it completely. Once Tyre had fallen, Antigonus left his son Demetrius at Gaza, with Nearchus and Peithon as his generals, to watch Ptolemy, and returned to Celaenae to winter; he had hit Ptolemy hard, and proposed in 313 to stand on the defensive at Gaza and begin his real offensive against Macedonia.

Ptolemy had sought to counter Antigonus with a proclamation of his own that the Greeks should be free; but this obvious imitation merely embarrassed the coalition, seeing that Cassander was carrying out its exact antithesis. Cyrene, however, took the proclamation seriously and revolted against Ptolemy’s governor Ophelias. Ptolemy quelled the revolt; but he lost most of the critical season of 313, though his fleet conquered Antigonus’ partisans in Cyprus, where he made Nicocreon of Salamis his governor. Antigonus himself, before attempting to cross to Europe, desired to draw off Lysimachus from the Dardanelles by creating trouble in his rear, and to ensure that Cassander should not again attack his flank in Caria. He therefore in 313 sent out three expeditions. One went to support the Thracian Black Sea cities, which, led by Callatis, and possibly united in a League, expelled Lysimachus’ garrisons, and were joined by Seuthes. The second, under Docimus, once satrap of Babylon, and Antigonus’ admiral Medius of Larissa the historian, freed Miletus and other cities, and reduced Caria; Asander vanishes, and Miletus celebrated the restoration of democratic government. The third, under Antigonus’ nephew Telesphorus, attacked Cassander in Greece and freed the whole Peloponnese, except Corinth and Sicyon, which were held by Polyperchon; Epirus, too, revolted against Cassander and recalled Aeacides, while Glaucias, with Corcyra’s help, recovered Apollonia and Epidamnus.

Cassander was alarmed, and made overtures for peace; but Ptolemy, very naturally, interfered. Negotiations having failed, Cassander displayed his usual energy; he sent an army to Epirus which killed Aeacides and recovered the country, and he himself invaded Greece and besieged Histiaea in Euboea, which had revolted. Antigonus thereon sent 5500 men to Greece under Polemaeus and his fleet under Medius; Polemaeus was joined by the Boeotians and attacked Cassander’s principal stronghold, Chalcis. Possibly Cassander believed that this was the main attack; he quitted Histiaea and hurried to Chalcis in force. As soon as Antigonus thought that he was fully involved, he attempted his real offensive; he recalled his fleet to the Dardanelles, marched his army to the Bosporus (autumn 313), and sought from Byzantium, where he had many friends, alliance and a crossing. But he had delayed too long. Lysimachus had had a successful summer, defeating Antigonus’ expeditionary force, conquering Seuthes, and recovering all the Greek cities except Callatis; he was back at the Dardanelles with greatly increased prestige. He sent envoys to Byzantium in Cassander’s name and his own; they overawed the city, whose lands were at Lysimachus’ mercy, and it declared strict neutrality. Faced by Lysimachus and Byzantium Antigonus could not cross; he retired foiled, the decisive event of the war. He had, however, compelled Cassander to leave Chalcis and fly back to Macedonia, and Polemaeus in an autumn cam­paign swept central Greece; he took Chaicis, and left this vital point free and ungarrisoned,—an extraordinary proof of Antigonus’ honesty,—freed most of Euboea and of Phocis, took the Cadmea and brought Thebes over to Antigonus, restored Oropus to the Boeotian League, and finally invaded Attica and compelled Demetrius of Phalerum to ask Antigonus for an alliance, which was, however, never concluded.

Thus by the end of 313, if Antigonus was foiled, Cassander was badly shaken; he had lost most of Greece south of Thessaly, even Athens was threatened, and Lysimachus might not hold Antigonus a second time. He represented to Ptolemy that he must do something to take off the pressure from him. Seleucus was urgent in the same sense, for his own purposes; and in the spring of 312 Ptolemy with his full force attacked Demetrius at Gaza. His combatant army was 18,000 foot and 4000 horse, Macedonians and mercenaries; his auxiliary services were manned by Egyptians. Demetrius was outnumbered; he had 12,500 foot, of whom only 2000 were Macedonians, 4600 Asiatic cavalry, and 43 elephants. Ptolemy used a moveable barrier made of iron stakes and chains to hold up the elephants, and won a complete victory; Peithon and probably Nearchus were killed, 8000 mercenaries surrendered, and Demetrius fled with a few horse to Cilicia. Ptolemy took Gaza, recovered all Syria and Phoenicia, and settled the surrendered mercenaries in Egypt and some Jews in Alexandria. The battle, however, did more than relieve Cassander; it opened the road eastward, and Seleucus with 1000 men made a dash for Babylon, where he had been popular. He collected 2000 more men on the way, occupied Babylon, and stormed the citadel; and when Nicanor attacked him with 17,000 men, he ambushed him in the marshes, surprised and defeated him by night, and enlisted most of his troops. The Seleucid era, beginning (in Syria) October 312, from which the Seleucid kings reckoned, dates from Seleucus’ return to Babylon. He presently reduced Media, and also Susiana, where Antigonus’ Persian satrap Aspeisas had claimed independence and put his name on the Alexander coinage; and Antigonus had now a new enemy in his rear.

The rest of the year 312 advanced matters little. Antigonus recovered Syria and Phoenicia, Demetrius retrieving his reputa­tion by smartly capturing 7000 Ptolemaic troops at Myus; but the price was the abandonment for the season of his attack on Europe, where otherwise matters had promised well; for Cassander was fully occupied with a revolt of Epirus under its new king Alcetas, and it took Lyciscus three battles before Alcetas was beaten and Epirus reduced. Meanwhile Ophelias in Cyrene had made himself independent, perhaps with Antigonus’ aid; and Antigonus spent the rest of the season in attempts to damage Ptolemy’s position in Egypt itself. He sent two expeditions against Petra of the Nabataeans, the second under Demetrius, with a view to denying to Egypt the great Petra-Gaza caravan route; but both failed. He sent another under Hieronymus to the Dead Sea, to corner the bitumen which Egypt required for embalming; but the local Arabs, who drew great profit from the bitumen­fishery, defeated him in a battle on the lake. Lastly he sent Demetrius, with a strict time-limit, to raid Babylon and attempt to capture Seleucus; Demetrius temporarily occupied Babylon, but Seleucus was in Media, and nothing came of this extraordinary raid.

By 311 it was clear that, as things were, neither side could defeat the other, and peace was made between Cassander, Lysimachus, and Antigonus; subsequently Ptolemy also made peace. Possibly he tried to obtain terms for Seleucus; but Seleucus was not included, as Antigonus refused to relinquish his claim to Babylon. Antigonus made excellent propaganda for Greek opinion out of the negotiations: it was only, he said, through his anxiety to give rest to the Greek cities, worn out with the war, that he had first accepted Cassander’s onerous proposals and then refrained from crushing Ptolemy when isolated. The terms of peace were, that Cassander was to be general of Europe till Alexander IV was old enough to rule; Lysimachus was to rule Thrace, Ptolemy Egypt, and Antigonus Asia; all Greek cities were to be free and ungarrisoned. The first term was a direct invitation to Cassander to murder Alexander’s son; the second marked the break-up of the Empire; the third secured Antigonus’ position with public opinion, and gave him an excuse to begin war again when he chose. The results of the war were, that Cassander had lost much of Greece, but had retained Epirus and consolidated his position in Macedonia, while his friendship with Lysimachus had stood the test. Lysimachus had greatly improved his position. Ptolemy had lost Syria and Cyrene; but he had restored Seleucus and secured Cyprus, and Egypt was untouched. Antigonus had in effect lost the eastern satrapies, but had obtained Syria, Phoe­nicia, and Caria instead; his realm, if not so extensive, was more compact and probably stronger. At sea there had been only minor actions, and the command of the sea was left undecided; and as Antigonus’ main army had never been engaged, the question whether he could achieve his ambition was merely postponed.

 

VIII. 

ANTIGONUS’ KINGDOM

 

Antigonus’ realm, with its capital at Celaenae, comprised Asia Minor up to Armenia (except Bithynia and part of western Pisidia, which were independent), the whole of Syria, and probably Mesopotamia. He had governed the provinces beyond the Euphrates, while he held them, by satraps, nominally those of Alexander IV; but there are no traces of satraps in his kingdom after 311, only extensive generalships; his method of government is really unknown, but his subjects, it is said, found his rule unexpectedly mild. He had an informal council of ‘Friends,’ which became usual in all Macedonian kingdoms, and a secretarial department to draft his decrees. Like Alexander, he retained in power various dependent dynasts, e.g. the Phoenician kings, and Mithridates of Cius; in 302 he executed Mithridates for treason, but his son escaped to be the ancestor of the kings of Pontus. He continued the process of eliminating the Persian landowners from the King’s Land, doubtless a boon to the peasantry, and made grants to Macedonians; but he apparently preserved Alexander’s financial officials and arrangements, and continued to strike Alexander’s money; Ake dated a new era from his conquest of Phoenicia in 315, but in 307 he restored Tyre as a central mint, and Ake’s brief prosperity ended.

The Greek cities began by being his free allies, as they had been Alexander’s, though he too never freed Cius, or Heraclea, still ruled by the tyrant Dionysius. As free allies, the cities signed the peace of 311 (p. 488); as such, Cnidus attempted to mediate between Antigonus and Rhodes in 304, and Colophon voted help to Athens in 307; like Alexander, Antigonus allowed Eresus freely to enforce its law against tyrants. But though in much Antigonus copied Alexander, he made one innovation. He could not re-form the League of Corinth while Cassander dominated Greece; he therefore saw to the creation of sectional Leagues. The Ionian League was revived; a League of the Aeolian cities was formed, with its centre at Alexander’s favoured Ilium; and the Ionian Cyclades were grouped into the League of the Islanders, with its centre at Delos, seat of Apollo the god of the home-sea, which none might rule save in his name. Antigonus desired sea-power; and this League, dependent on himself, was his solution of the problem of leaving Delos free while preventing Ptolemy from gaining control of Apollo. Here again, however, as elsewhere, freedom was at first a reality: Delos in 310 received offerings from Ptolemy’s admiral Leonidas without Antigonus objecting. These peculiar Leagues were not full sovereign States. They had no civil head, no assembly, no military or judicial powers, and apparently no coinage; business was transacted by a council of delegates from the constituent cities. Their chief business was the administration of the federal festivals, though probably they had some economic functions; their revenues were small, and extraordinary expenses were thrown on the several cities. The Ionian League possessed its own federal temple, the Panionion; but the federal festival of the Ilian League was the festival of Athena at Ilium, re-named the Panathenaea, jointly managed by the League and Ilium. The Island League held its federal festival, the Antigoneia, at Delos, and, like the later Thessalian League, possessed the extraordinary power of granting citizenship in its constituent cities. Antigonus was worshipped as a god by the Islanders, and probably by the other Leagues also (though after Ipsus the Ionians worshipped Alexander); for Scepsis in the Ilian League was worshipping him by 310. By this means he obtained a footing in free cities, just as Alexander had done.

Antigonus also founded a number of cities. Carrying out Alexander’s plan, he refounded and rebuilt, though he did not complete, Smyrna, his most enduring work; he founded Antigoneia Troas, another Antigoneia on the Ascanian lake, famous later as Nicaea, and a third, which received many Athenian settlers, on the Orontes. He may have founded Pella (later Apamea), Gadara, and other cities in Syria; his general Docimus founded Docimeum as a centre for the export of the famous marble; and his general Nicanor founded Doura, afterwards called Europos, in the Euphrates valley. Doura was presumably a mixed city of Alex­ander’s type, as its land remained King’s Land; but in the west, as was natural, Smyrna and Troas certainly, and Antigoneia- Nicaea apparently, were fully autonomous Greek cities.

Antigonus exacted heavy war ‘contributions’ from the Greek cities, though he never taxed them as Demetrius was to do. But with the assumption of divinity he began to interpret ‘freedom’ as entitling him to interference. In the Ionian cities he laid down much-needed rules for judicial procedure; and he simplified the import and export arrangements of various Asiatic Greek cities, to promote trade and prosperity. This was very well. But many of the Asiatic Greek cities could not feed themselves; and Antigonus forbade the oversea import of corn on the ground that this ran them into debt, and, as the taxes he drew in kind from the King’s Land made him a great corn merchant, made them buy corn from himself, though he declared that he gave them the corn at cost price. Then he began to synoecize two or more towns into one; seven went to form Antigoneia Troas (about 308). He did not indeed order if he could avoid it; he let his wishes be known, and left the cities to carry them out, as Teos and Lebedus did when they united in 302; probably the Leagues had been thus formed. But his wishes were law, as the Scepsians found, even if a good law; for he ended the secular warfare between Scepsians and Cebrenians by moving both to Troas. These synoecisms, however, involved in turn a mass of minute regulations as to law­suits, property, and building; and Antigonus took power to prevent the passing of new laws against his interests, and to punish their proposers, just as he prevented the cities from borrowing money if he thought it inexpedient, or sent judicial commissions from one city to another. And though he desired to promote prosperity, his continual wars and war contributions had the opposite effect; many cities were in debt; at Ephesus, when he died, mortgages on land had become so heavy and purchasers so scarce that a special law had to be passed compelling mortgagors and mortgagees to value and divide the land, to prevent innumerable foreclosures and complete disorganization. Finally, after he took the royal title, he reached the last inevitable stage; he tried to compel Rhodes by force to become his ‘free’ ally, and he garrisoned cities on the ground of military necessity, just like Cassander; thus he garrisoned some Dardanelles towns, in spite of the petitions of the Ilian League, and in 302 Lysimachus solemnly ‘freed’ Lampsacus from the champion of Greek freedom, and ‘liberation’ became a mere counter in the political game.

 

IX. 

CASSANDER AND PTOLEMY

 

The peace of 311, though only an uneasy truce, marked the beginning of the dissolution of the Empire into independent states, a process completed ten years later. The dynasts did not yet call themselves kings, and continued to strike Alexander’s money; but they emphasized their independence by founding capitals in their own names, though all but Cassander waited till Alexander IV was dead. Seleucus built Seleuceia on the Tigris, replacing Opis; Lysimachus in 309 founded Lysimacheia near Gallipoli, of which Cardia became a village. Antigonus did not found his new capital, Antigoneia on the Orontes, till he became king in 306. Ptolemy already had Alexandria, where Alexander was worshipped; but subsequently he built Ptolemais as capital of Upper Egypt.

The events of the years 310—308 are obscure. Cassander was probably somewhat exhausted by the war, and also knew that Macedonia’s crying need was recuperation after the efforts of the last twenty-three years; he was loth to fight again, and was concerned with methods of restoration. He secured the friendship of Audoleon of Paeonia, which had become independent, by defeating the Autariatae of Serbia, after which he settled 20,000 of them on his Thracian frontier to replace the men Macedonia had lost; and he fostered trade with his northern neighbours, who disliked Alexander’s money, by reissuing Philip’s tetradrachms. He also achieved the feat of effecting a permanent reconciliation, based on territorial adjustments, between Thebes and Plataea, Thespiae, and Orchomenus; and Thebes, though with diminished territory, resumed her place as head of the Boeotian League. There could, however, be no real reconciliation between himself and Antigonus, and, although they did not fight, each was willing to damage the other if opportunity served; thus in 310, when Polemaeus, who now governed Hellespontine Phrygia, thinking himself slighted, revolted from Antigonus, Cassander accepted him as an ally.

Cassander, however, had a domestic problem: Alexander IV was now nearly thirteen, and some Macedonians were saying it was time he began to rule. Cassander thereon murdered Roxane and the boy (31 o or early 309). He reaped the odium; but all the dynasts except Seleucus (who was not party to the treaty of 311) were in fact equally guilty, and all shared the benefit; for the fiction that they were the king’s satraps was now at an end. But it gave Antigonus an opening. Polyperchon, though now only a soldier of fortune, was still holding Corinth and Sicyon; and Antigonus showed him a chance of recovering his position, supplied money to raise an army to attack Cassander, and sent him a youth from Pergamum to play the part of pretender; under the name of Heracles he was to figure as a son of Alexander by one of his captives after Issus. No one had heard of such a son, and the boy was five years too young; but the Macedonian people were content to take Polyperchon’s word, and welcome a scion of Alexander. Between mercenaries, Macedonian royalists, and Antigonus’ allies the Aetolians, Polyperchon raised 21,000 men and in 309 invaded Macedonia. Cassander was threatened with wholesale defection; but he obtained an interview with Polyperchon, convinced him that, if he succeeded, he would merely become Antigonus’ servant, and bribed him with the generalship of the Peloponnese and a share of power in return for the pretender’s death. Polyperchon killed Heracles, and entered Cassander’s service. But, as Cassander foresaw, he could not confess that he had raised the Macedonians on false pretences; thus he could never again be a rival, for he had, it seemed, murdered a son of Alexander who trusted him.

Antigonus had attacked Cassander by deputy, because since the summer of 311 he himself had been engaged in an attempt to recover Babylon from Seleucus, who seemingly had the support of some eastern satraps and perhaps of the Cossaeans; Antigonus ravaged Babylonia in 310 and 309, and half ruined Babylon, but failed to subdue Seleucus. In 310 Ptolemy, as in honour bound, declared war again on Antigonus on Seleucus’ behalf, but with an ulterior object also, the acquisition of a share of influence over the Greek world. His fleet attempted Cilicia, and was repulsed by Demetrius, commanding for his father in Asia Minor; it then sailed to Cyprus. Nicocreon was dead, and Nicocles intriguing with Antigonus; he had fortified Paphos, and put his name on the Alexander-coinage. Ptolemy’s generals besieged Paphos, and compelled Nicocles and his family to commit suicide; and Cyprus became an Egyptian possession, governed by Ptolemy’s brother Menelaus. Next year Ptolemy himself seized some bases in Caria and Lycia. But late that year, 309, Demetrius made peace with him; perhaps Ptolemy represented that his real enemy, like Antigonus’, was now Cassander. This peace implies that Anti­gonus also made peace with Seleucus; he could only use part of his strength, and Seleucus and his allies had ultimately defeated him. Seleucus kept Babylon, but Antigonus did not give up his claim to Alexander’s destined capital. For nearly two years Antigonus remained at peace.

Ptolemy spent the winter of 309 in Cos, where in spring 308 his mistress Berenice bore him a son, the future Ptolemy II; and Polemaeus left Cassander and joined him, only to be executed for alleged treason. Ptolemy now aimed at controlling Greece. This involved challenging Cassander; but the two had drifted apart. Cassander must have resented seeing his sister Eurydice neglected for Berenice, which would estrange him from Ptolemy, while Berenice’s influence with Ptolemy would be thrown against Cassander; perhaps too Ptolemy felt that Cassander had deserted him in 311. To strengthen himself Ptolemy proposed to marry Cleopatra, which meant definitely repudiating Eurydice. Cleo­patra, weary of her virtual captivity at Sardes, agreed; Antigonus promptly had her murdered by her women, whom he then executed for the crime. But Ptolemy persevered; in the spring of 308 he crossed the Aegean, freed Andros from Polemaeus’ garrison, landed at the Isthmus, and announced that he had come in the cause of Greek freedom. Polyperchon was absent, and his daughter-in-law Cratesipolis handed over Corinth and Sicyon to Ptolemy, who in the cause of Greek freedom garrisoned them. He then himself issued the usual religious invitations to the Isthmian festival; he may have thought of restoring the League of Corinth under his own presidency. But the Greek states took no notice of him; Antigonus had been first, and they were satisfied of his good faith; of Ptolemy’s they were not. Ptolemy could do nothing, and as an opportunity offered of recovering Cyrene, where Ophelias had fallen a victim to Agathocles, he made peace with Cassander; the two might quarrel, but they were necessary to each other while Antigonus lived. Ptolemy did recover Cyrene, and made Berenice’s son Magas governor.

 

X. 

ANTIGONUS’ SECOND STRUGGLE FOR THE EMPIRE

 

Antigonus was roused by Ptolemy’s attempt to steal his thunder. The story of the next six years is that of his second struggle to secure the empire for himself. Had he been younger, the story might have had another ending; but he was nearly eighty and becoming unwieldy, and he left much of the actual conduct of operations to Demetrius. Demetrius was now twenty-nine, and his extraordinary powers had ripened. His energy was hardly inferior to Alexander’s; his majesty and attraction were unrivalled; he was great alike as leader, mechanician, and admiral. Also he had ideas, and was as yet chivalrous and full of generous impulses; unlike Antigonus, he really believed in Greek freedom and a union of hearts. The complete affection and confidence between his father and himself were about the best things the time could show. But with his brilliance was conjoined a character fundamentally impossible. Vanity and ostentation, a licentiousness which scandalized even that age,—these were not necessarily fatal; but he had no sense of duty, and was to be ruined by his instability. Antigonus gave out that he intended to free Greece, enslaved by Cassander and Ptolemy. But he abandoned the idea of crossing the Dardanelles. His new plan was first to raise Greece; then, while Cassander’s hands were full, crush Ptolemy and gain command of the sea; then invade Macedonia in force from Greece. Given Macedonia and Greece, everything else would follow. Naturally he began with Athens.

For ten years now Athens had been ruled for Cassander byDemetrius of Phalerum, with the vague title of ‘governor’. He had acted entirely in the interests of the wealthy; from their point of view Athens had never been governed so well, for there was peace and prosperity, though maintained by foreign spears. Demetrius, a man of learning and ability, was a Peripatetic; under him Aristotle’s school was all-powerful, and he obtained for the alien Theophrastus the right to purchase land and form the school, like Plato’s, into a legally constituted association. He translated into law many of the ideas of Aristotle and Theophrastus; the basis of his legislation was the dogma that citizens cannot make themselves but must be moulded by the lawgiver, the source of all the trouble between the idealist philosophies and the democracy. His code of laws caused him to be ranked as the third lawgiver of Athens. Of loose and luxurious life himself, he favoured moderation and decency in others; he passed a body of sumptuary laws which cut down expenditure on marriages, feasts, and funerals, possibly prohibited the formation of new clubs, and regulated women’s dress and their deportment in public, and in Aristotle’s spirit appointed a board to see that these provisions were observed; concurrently he revived the censorial powers of the Areopagus. He did something toward clarifying titles to real property and mortgages, and reformed the jury-courts in the interest of the well-to-do. He transferred the guardianship of the laws to a committee of seven ‘guardians of the laws’, whose business was to see that existing laws were enforced and that no new ones illegal or objectionable to the government were proposed; they recall the guardians of Plato’s Republic. This committee really controlled the Assembly, which for ten years hardly passed a decree. As a counterpoise he reduced the obligation to military service, which pleased the poor; but he also neglected the fleet and abolished the trierarchy, a measure which relieved the rich. He himself regularly held the office of general till 309, when he took the archonship for the sake of reforming the public festivals; again in the interest of the wealthy he abolished the private provision of choruses and threw the expense on the State, and appointed an annual official (agonothetes) to conduct public festivals out of the public funds. He took a census of Athens, which showed a total of 21,000 citizens and 10,000 metics, say perhaps 120,000 souls, with an unknown number of slaves; the reduced number of citizens had brought Athens back to where she stood in 403. It was to his credit that he observed the general amnesty with which he began his rule, and under him extreme democrats like Stratocles and Demosthenes’ nephew Demochares lived in Athens undisturbed. But the outstanding event of his ten years was the arrival in Athens of an obscure Phoenician from Cyprus named Zeno, who was to found the Stoic philosophy.

In June 307 Antigonus’ son Demetrius sailed to Athens with 250 warships and transports, found the booms up at the Piraeus, entered the harbour, and from his flagship proclaimed to the people that he came to give them back their freedom and their ancestral constitution, the usual phrase for the overthrow of a tyrant. The garrison withdrew to Munychia; Demetrius of Phalerum surrendered Athens and retired with a safe-conduct to Thebes, and afterwards to Egypt, where he helped to found the Museum and perhaps made laws for Ptolemy. Demetrius then stormed and razed Munychia, and made his entry into a free Athens. Save for a brief moment in 318 the people had not tasted liberty for fifteen years; and the sudden revulsion brought out all that was worst in the Athenian character. A shameless demagogue, Stratocles, came into power, and some of the men who had fought the Lamian war, and whose sons were to fight the Chremonidean, lost their heads and gave themselves to slavish adulation of their liberator. They hailed Antigonus and Demetrius as kings; they worshipped them as ‘Saviour gods,’ with altars and religious festivals, and set up their gilded statues on the forbidden site beside those of Harmodius and Aristogeiton; they decreed that their portraits should be woven on Athena’s mantle, and that they should be approached only by religious envoys, like the gods of Olympus; on the spot where Demetrius alighted from his chariot an altar was raised to Demetrius the Descender, and he was asked to give oracles like a god. Two new tribes, Antigonis and Demetrias, were created, and an Antigonis and a Demetrias were added to the sacred triremes.

There was fortunately another side. The laws of the Phalerian were treated on their merits; the ‘guardians of the laws’ and the gynaeconomi were abolished, but the liturgies were not restored and the agonothetes was retained; the changes entailed by two new tribes were quietly carried out; above all, Demetrius saw to it that the revolution was unstained by bloodshed, though Cas- sander’s principal supporters were exiled. Stratocles, who had once impeached Demosthenes, nevertheless posed as the successor of Lycurgus’ policy, and passed a long decree in his honour; it was probably now that the office of Superintendent of the Ad­ministration, modelled on Lycurgus, was created. The super­intendent had a wide control of the state finances; the firstoccupant of the post, appointed in 307, was Lycurgus’ son Habron. At the same time the judicial examination of the claims of candidates for citizenship was abolished, though it was re­imposed in 303 in consequence of indiscriminate grants of citizenship to Demetrius’ followers. Measures were, however, taken against the Peripatetics; with Demetrius’ approval one Sophocles carried a law that no philosopher should teach in Athens without permission of the Council and Assembly, and Theophrastus was exiled. He was Cassander’s friend; but he was also the most learned man living. Fortunately for Athens’ repute, Sophocles’ law was declared illegal next year, as contravening the law as to associations, and Theophrastus was recalled; Epicurus also came from Lampsacus to Athens and set up his school. Meanwhile Lemnos rejoined Athens, and Antigonus sent the city 150,000 bushels of corn and timber to build 100 warships. Demetrius ordered all ‘free’ cities in Greece to support Athens, and having thus equipped the city for its destined war with Cassander returned to Asia to attack Ptolemy.

In the spring of 306 he sailed to Cyprus with 118 warships, many transports, and 15,400 men; he believed that Ptolemy must fight for Cyprus. He summoned Antigonus’ former ally Rhodes to join him with her fleet; but the Egyptian trade was too important to the Rhodians, and they declared neutrality. Menelaus in Cyprus had sixty warships and 12,800 men; Demetrius landed, defeated him, and shut him up in Salamis. As he anticipated, Ptolemy put to sea with his whole remaining fleet, 140 warships and transports carrying 10,000 mercenaries, to relieve Salamis. Demetrius blockaded Menelaus in the bottle­necked harbour with ten warships, and stood down the coast with 108 warships and 57 armed transports to meet Ptolemy, who, though superior in number of warships, had nothing larger than quinqueremes. Demetrius’ right was inshore; he therefore massed his best ships,—the Phoenician, including seven heptereis, and 30 Athenian quadriremes,—on the left wing, where he commanded in person on his hepteres. In the ensuing battle he crushed Ptolemy’s right and then successfully turned on his centre, driving his fleet ashore; Ptolemy lost 120 warships, while transports carrying 8000 mercenaries were captured; Salamis and the 60 ships there surrendered, and the question of the command of the sea was settled for twenty years. Aristodemus with the flagship carried the news to Antigonus, and hailed him king; Antigonus thereon assumed the royal title,—a frank usurpation, though confirmed by his army,—and conferred the like title on Demetrius. It meant, not that Antigonus was king of his section of Asia, but that he claimed to be monarch, jointly with Demetrius, of Alexander’s empire; their dated Tyrian didrachms show that they claimed the empire as from Alexander’s death. Demetrius’ coins also show that he commemorated his success by a statue of Victory standing on the prow of his flagship; he became a god of the Island League, and a tribe Demetrias appears at Samos, where he and his father were also worshipped. Ptolemy lost Cyprus and his bases in Asia Minor, and ceded Corinth, which he could no longer reach, to Cassander. He could now no longer get ship-timber except through the merchants of Rhodes.

Antigonus thought that Ptolemy might now be finished off; he invaded Egypt with 88,000 men and 83 elephants, the largest army in Greek history commanded by one of Greek speech, while Demetrius with the fleet kept pace with him. But it was November, and too late for galleys. Many ships were wrecked in a storm off Raphia; and the army, too huge to be easily provisioned, suffered in crossing the desert south of Gaza, and was already discouraged when it reached the Nile. The river line could not be forced; the fleet, scattered by a second storm, could give no assistance; Ptolemy began seducing Antigonus’ troops, provisions ran out, and Antigonus had to lead his army back to Syria. Again Egypt had proved impregnable from the north. Ptolemy after his victory also took the title of king (305), and was followed by Cassander, Lysimachus, and Seleucus. The title affirmed their independent rule in their respective territories; Antigonus of course did not recognize this, and Demetrius’ friends professed to treat them as officials of Demetrius’ empire. Ptolemy dated his reign as from Alexander’s death, and instituted in Egypt an official State-worship of Alexander.

Antigonus had suffered a severe set-back; he was to suffer another in 305, when an attempt to bring Rhodes into his alliance failed. Why he stultified all his professions and wasted an invaluable year over the siege of Rhodes is incomprehensible; for, even if the Rhodians did carry ship-timber to Egypt, the loss of Cyprus had deprived Ptolemy of his last reserve of good seamen, a far more important matter. In the spring of 305 Demetrius sailed to Rhodes with 200 warships and 170 transports, carrying 40,000 troops and 30,000 navvies; he was aided by the irregular Aegean sea-power, the pirates, who hated Rhodes for her attempts to suppress piracy. The Rhodians raised a general levy, armed the slaves, and the whole city set to work. Demetrius first attacked the harbour with warships behind a floating ironclad boom, and seized the mole; but two assaults were beaten off, and the Rho­dians destroyed his boom and recaptured the mole. Demetrius then levelled the ground up to the wall, and brought up his ‘Taker of Cities’ (Helepolis), a huge armoured tower built in nine stages, greater than any yet known, with mechanically controlled ports to shoot through, and full of stone-throwers and catapults; it was supported by eight enormous ‘tortoises’ or shields to protect sappers, reached through covered galleries, and by four armoured rams 180 feet long, worked under penthouses. But the grand assault failed; the Rhodians had built two inner walls, and managed to set fire to the Helepolis. They fired 2300 great missiles the final night. Lastly, Demetrius tried a silent surprise, which also failed; then he sat down to a blockade. But his galleys, with their limited blockading powers, could not prevent Rhodian cruisers from destroying his supply-ships, or Ptolemy from running in provisions and mercenaries. Cnidus and Athens each tried to mediate; finally Antigonus told Demetrius to make peace, and an Aetolian embassy, arriving at the right moment, had the honour of settling the matter (spring 304); the terms, that Rhodes should be free and be Antigonus’ ally except against Ptolemy, could have been reached without fighting. Demetrius gained nothing but much enjoyment, a showy repu­tation, and the name of Besieger. The famous siege was remarkable for its chivalry; there was a convention between the belligerents for ransoming all prisoners on either side at fixed rates; the Rhodians refused to destroy Antigonus’ statues, and Demetrius spared works of art. Demetrius later gave a tenth of his spoil as a contribution to Thebes; the Rhodians sold his abandoned machines and with the money erected the Colossus, the heroic statue of the Sun which towered over their harbour. They also honoured Ptolemy as a saviour god.

Athens meanwhile had been fighting the Four Years War (307—4) against Cassander, who was hampered by the loss of Epirus (where Glaucias had in 307 restored Aeacides’ young son Pyrrhus as king), and by the necessity of safeguarding Macedonia. At first Athens did well; Antigonus sent 150 talents, Demochares energetically armed the city and secured help from Aetolia and Boeotia, and in 305 the Athenian Olympiodorus defeated Cassander at Elatea. But after Antigonus’ failure in Egypt Cassander could use his strength; in 304 he secured Boeotia, and, the Aetolians having gone home, invaded Attica, took Panactum, Phyle, and Salamis, and besieged Athens, while Polyperchon was reconquering the Peloponnese for him. The danger to Athens compelled Antigonus to make peace with Rhodes; and Deme­trius hurried across the Aegean with 330 warships and transports. His energy soon retrieved the position. He landed at Aulis in Cassander’s rear, compelled him to raise the siege and retire northward, followed and defeated him at Thermopylae, freed Euboea, regained Boeotia, renewed the Aetolian alliance, and retook Panactum and Phyle and restored them to Athens.

He spent that winter in Athens, a winter long remembered, in a round of feasting and debauchery; he took up his quarters in the Parthenon, saying that as a god he was Athena’s younger brother; the Maiden’s temple became a brothel, and one of his mistresses, the notorious Lamia, was worshipped as Aphrodite. Stratocles was now nothing but Demetrius’ instrument, and the better elements among the democrats began to form an opposition. From this time Demetrius’ own character seems to deteriorate. He had expected too much, and was disillusioned. He began to despise the very men who worshipped him; he ultimately ceased to believe in a union of hearts. He started interfering in the affairs of Athens, first with the course of justice, presently with the government; in 303 he suppressed a democratic revolt against Stratocles, and Demochares was exiled. The servility of Stratocles’ party then culminated in a decree that whatsoever Demetrius ordered should be right for men and well-pleasing to the gods. But it is darkest before dawn; and in two years’ time Zeno was to begin to teach in Athens.

In the spring of 303 Demetrius, having liberated practically all Central Greece, started to reconquer the Peloponnese. He freed Sicyon, where he was worshipped, drove Cassander’s general Prepelaus out of Corinth, and recovered Achaea, the Argolid, and all Arcadia except Mantinea, districts which he was to hold permanently. At Argos he married Pyrrhus’ sister Deidameia, which meant that he claimed to stand in the place of Alexander’s son, to whom she had been betrothed, and then proceeded to carry out his father’s great plan: he called a conference of the Greek states at the Isthmus, and renewed the League of Corinth on Panhellenic lines, its congress being designed to meet at the four Panhellenic festivals; the chief absentees were Thessaly, Sparta, and Messenia. Unlike Philip’s League it was based on democratic governments in the constituent states. The League elected Demetrius general in Alexander’s seat, but for a war against Cassander’s Macedonia; and the Corinthians requested him to garrison Acrocorinthus till the war was ended—a garrison which was to remain for sixty years. Demetrius put his father’s name and his own, each with the royal title, on the Alexander coinage.

 

XI.

DEFEAT AND DEATH OF ANTIGONUS

 

The loss of Greece, added to that of Epirus, rendered Cassander’s position serious, and he made overtures to Antigonus; Antigonus demanded unconditional surrender. In this emergency Cassander displayed real greatness. He called Lysimachus to a conference; they decided on a plan of campaign and on a request to Ptolemy and Seleucus for help, explaining precisely what would happen to them if Cassander fell. Ptolemy was convinced; the difficulty was to communicate with Seleucus, as Antigonus held all the routes. Ptolemy undertook the task, and sent men on swift camels across the Arabian desert to Jauf, whence they reached Babylon. The four kings renewed the coalition of 315, but this time not to bridle Antigonus but to destroy him. Cassander probably knew, though the world did not, that in Lysimachus they now possessed a general who might be Antigonus’ match. Lysimachus had conquered Callatis, solidified his power in Thrace, and acquired an important recruiting ground; his military strength was now very different from that of 315.

In spring 302 Demetrius invaded Thessaly with 57,000 men, —8000 Macedonians, 15,000 mercenaries, 25,000 League troops, 8000 pirates, and 1500 horse; it was the main attack to which Antigonus had been working up. In face of the danger, Cassander, risking everything on his judgment, sent part of his army under Prepelaus to Lysimachus and allowed Lysimachus to recruit Autariatae; no other king would have so trusted an ally. He himself met Demetrius with 31,000 men, took up a strong position, and left the rest to lysimachus. Demetrius camped in face of his army, and looked for an opening. Given time, he must have conquered Macedonia; but he could not regain the year lost at Rhodes. Before an opening came, there came the news from Asia on which Cassander had counted. Antigonus sent to recall his son; for Seleucus was moving westward with 500 elephants, and Lysimachus had crossed the Dardanelles.

Seleucus since 308 had acquired the eastern satrapies, partly by persuasion, partly by force, Stasanor of Bactria having to be conquered, and had finally crossed the Indus. There he became involved in war with Chandragupta, an illegitimate scion of the house of Magadha, who with the help of the Brahmans had consolidated all India north of the Deccan into the Mauryan empire; his capital was Pataliputra (Patna) on the Ganges, re­cently excavated. He was too strong for Seleucus, who made peace, ceding the Cabul valley and the governments west of the Indus which Alexander had formed out of the Indian districts. In return he obtained 500 war-elephants, a lasting friendship with the powerful Mauryas, and possibly commercial advantages. He was back at Babylon when Cassander’s message reached him.

Antigonus was holding a festival at Antigoneia on the Orontes when the news came that Lysimachus had crossed. How he crossed is unknown; probably through treachery. Antigonus had garrisoned some Dardanelles cities, and there was disaffection; Lampsacus and Parium went over to Lysimachus. But, beside this, two of Antigonus’ generals in Asia Minor, Docimus of Phrygia, once the friend of Perdiccas and Alcetas, and Phoenix of Lydia, once Eumenes’ lieutenant, were traitors; after many years Antigonus’ severities recoiled on his head. The strange fact that Docimeum was named after Docimus attests his importance; very possibly both Phrygias and the Dardanelles were in his charge. A comet which appeared when Lysimachus crossed helped to unsettle Antigonus’ subjects, already rendered superstitious by the earthquake which had shaken Ionia the year before. Lysimachus sent Prepelaus along the coast to Ionia; he took the Ionian cities one after another, including Ephesus, and Phoenix handed over Sardes. Lysimachus himself invaded Phrygia, where Docimus and his lieutenant Philetaerus, who afterwards founded the Pergamene kingdom, handed over Synnada and other fortresses, and the treasure there. Antigonus sent a small force to occupy Babylon behind Seleucus’ back, on the chance of making Seleucus turn, and with his main army hurried to Phrygia, hoping to crush Lysimachus while isolated. Lysimachus played for time. He took a strong position and kept Antigonus before it till his supplies were cut off; then he slipped away by night and stood in Dorylaeum (Eshkisher), impregnable and well provisioned. Antigonus drew lines round the town; when they were almost complete Lysimachus again slipped away in a storm, and took winter quarters near Heraclea, ruled by Dionysius’ widow, the Achaemenid Amestris; he married her and thus secured a fine base. He had kept Antigonus employed throughout the season; and Seleucus was wintering in Cappadocia.

Demetrius, on his father’s summons, made a truce with Cassander; both knew that the decision must now fall elsewhere. He left Deidameia and part of his fleet at Athens, and sailed to Asia with Pyrrhus, whom a revolution had again driven out of Epirus; he recovered Ephesus and the Dardanelles cities, secured Byzantium’s friendship, and held the straits in force when it was too late. Cassander sent his brother Pleistarchus with 12,000 men to reinforce Lysimachus, but Demetrius’ fleet caught him crossing the Black Sea and sank part of his transports. Demetrius wintered at Ephesus, where he received many honours. In spring 301 Ptolemy invaded Syria, but returned to Egypt on a false report of Lysimachus’ defeat; but Lysimachus, his army now swollen to at least 40,000 men, moved out from Heraclea, and in north Phrygia effected his junction with Seleucus. Demetrius too joined his father, and at Ipsus near Synnada the two great armies met in the ‘battle of the kings’. Antigonus had 70,000 foot, 10,000 horse, and 75 elephants; the allies had 64,000 foot, 10,500 horse, 120 chariots, and 480 elephants. Demetrius opened the battle with a cavalry charge which scattered Seleucus’ horse, but he pursued too far; the elephants cut him off from return, and Antigonus was defeated and killed, with the pathetic cry on his lips ‘Demetrius will come and save me.’ The struggle between the central power and the dynasts was ended, and with Antigonus’ death the dismemberment of the Graeco-Macedonian world became inevitable. Demetrius fled to Ephesus, while Lysimachus and Seleucus divided Antigonus’ kingdom. Cassander was recognized as king of Macedonia; he desired nothing in Asia himself, but (as in 315) he claimed Cilicia and (instead of Cappadocia) Caria, with Lycia and Pamphylia to connect them, which were made into a kingdom for Pleistarchus. The victors gave Antigonus a royal funeral. But later, under Lysimachus’ harsher rule, a Phrygian peasant paid him a finer tribute; he was found digging a pit on his farm, and, when asked what he did, replied sadly ‘I seek Antigonus.’

 

CHAPTER XVI

GREEK POLITICAL THOUGHT AND THEORY IN THE FOURTH CENTURY