CAESAR,

THE ALEXANDRIAN WAR

 

 

When the Alexandrian war flared up, Caesar summoned every fleet from Rhodes and Syria and Cilicia: from Crete he raised archers, and cavalry from Malchus, king of the Nabataeans, and ordered artillery to be procured, corn despatched, and auxiliary troops mustered from every quarter. Meanwhile the entrenchments were daily extended by additional works, and all those sectors of the town which appeared to be not strong enough were provided with shelters and mantlets; battering-rams, moreover, were introduced from one building into the next through holes, and the entrenchments were extended to cover all the ground laid bare by demolitions or gained by force of arms. For Alexandria is well-nigh fire-proof, because its buildings contain no wooden joinery and are held together by an arched construction and are roofed with rough-cast or tiling. Caesar was particularly anxious that, by bringing to bear his siege-works and pent-houses, he should isolate from the rest of the city that narrowest part of the town which was most constricted by the barrier of marshland lying to the south ; his object being first that, since his army was divided between two sectors of the city, it should be controlled by a single strategy and command; secondly, that if they got into difficulties in one sector of the town, assistance and support could be brought from the other sector. But above all his object was to secure himself abundance of water and fodder; of which, as regards the former, he had but a scanty supply, and, as regards the latter, no stocks whatever ; and the marshland could afford him bountiful supplies of both.

Not indeed that this occasioned any hesitation or delay on the part of the Alexandrians in concerting their measures. They had in fact despatched emissaries and recruiting officers throughout the entire length and breadth of the territory and kingdom of Egypt for the purpose of holding a levy, and had conveyed into the town a large quantity of weapons and artillery and mustered a countless host. In the city too, no less, vast arms factories had been established. They had, moreover, armed the adult slaves, and these the wealthier owners furnished with their daily food and pay. This numerous force they deployed to guard the fortifications of' outlying areas; while they kept their veteran cohorts unemployed in the most frequented quarters of the city so that, no matter in what district fighting occurred, they could be thrown in as fresh and lusty reinforcements. All the streets and alleys were walled off by a triple barricade, built of rectangular stone blocks and not less than forty feet high; while as for the lower quarters of the city, these were fortified with very lofty towers, each ten stories high. Besides these there were other towers which they had contrived—mobile ones of the like number of stories ; and these, being mounted on wheels with ropes and draught animals attached, they moved along the level streets to any area they saw fit.

Highly productive and abundantly supplied as it was, the city furnished equipment of all kinds. The people themselves were clever and very shrewd, and no sooner had they seen what was being done by us than they would reproduce it with such cunning that it seemed it was our men who had copied their works. Much also they invented on their own account, and kept assailing our entrenchments while simultaneously defending their own. In their councils and public meetings the arguments which their leaders kept driving home were as follows: ‘the Roman people were gradually acquiring a habit of seizing that kingdom; a few years earlier Aldus Gabinius had been in Egypt with an army; Pompeius too had resorted thither in his Hight; Caesar had now come with his forces, and the death of Pompeius had had no effect in dissuading Caesar from staying on among them. If they failed to drive him out, their kingdom would become a Roman province : and this driving out they must do betimes; for cut off as he now was by storms owing to the season of the year, he could not receive reinforcements from overseas.’

Meanwhile a quarrel had arisen—as related above —between Achillas, who commanded the veteran army, and Arsinoe, the younger daughter of king Ptolemaeus; and with each party plotting against the other and anxious to obtain the supreme power for himself, Arsinoe, acting through the eunuch Ganymedes, her tutor, struck the first blow and killed Achillas. After his murder she herself exercised complete control without any consort or guardian, while the army was entrusted to Ganymedes. On undertaking this duty the latter increased the soldiers’ bounty and performed the rest of his functions with consistent thoroughness.

Practically the whole of Alexandria is undermined with subterranean conduits running from the Nile, by which water is conducted into private houses; which water in course of time gradually settles down and becomes clear. This is what is normally used by the owners of mansions and their households; for what the Nile brings down is so muddy and turbid that it gives rise to many different diseases: yet the rank and file of the common sort are perforce content with the latter, inasmuch as there is not one natural spring in the whole city. The main stream in question, however, was in that quarter of the city which was held by the Alexandrians. This circumstance suggested to Ganymedes the possibility that the water supply could be cut off from our troops; who, posted as they were in various quarters of the town to guard our entrenchments, were using water drawn from conduits and cisterns in private buildings.

This plan being once approved, Ganymedes embarked upon a serious and difficult task. Having first blocked up the conduits and sealed off all quarters of the city occupied by himself, he then made haste to draw off a vast quantity of water out of the sea by means of mechanical water-wheels; and this he steadily poured from higher ground into Caesar’s area. For which reason the water drawn from the nearest buildings was a little more brackish than usual, and occasioned no little- wonder among men as to why this had come about. Nor could they quite believe the evidence of their own ears when their neighbours lower down said that the water they were using was of the same kind and taste as they had previously been accustomed to; and they were openly discussing the matter amongst themselves and, by tasting samples, learning how markedly the waters differed. However, in a short space of time the water nearer the contamination was entirely undrinkable, while that lower down was found to be relatively impure and brackish.

This circumstance dispelled their doubts, and so great was the panic that took hold upon them that it seemed that they were all reduced to a most hazardous plight, and some asserted that Caesar was being slow in giving orders to embark. Others were much more seriously alarmed, on the ground that, in making their preparations for a withdrawal, it was impossible to keep the Alexandrians in the dark, being as they were so short a distance away from them ; and with their foes on top of them and pursuing them, no chance was afforded them of retreating to their ships. There was, however, a large number of townsfolk in Caesar’s sector, whom Caesar had not evacuated from their homes, because they openly affected loyalty to our side and appeared to have deserted their own folk. Yet. as far as I am concerned, had I now the task of championing the Alexandrians and proving them to be neither deceitful nor foolhardy, it would be a case of many words spent to no purpose : indeed when one gets to know both the breed and its breeding there can be no doubt whatever that as a race they are extremely prone to treachery.

By encouragement and reasoning Caesar allayed his men’s alarm, declaring that sweet water could be found in wells and trenches, inasmuch as all seashores naturally possessed veins of sweet water. But if the nature of the sea-shore of Egypt was different from all others, none the less, since they held unfettered command of the sea, while their enemies had no fleet, they could not be prevented from seeking water daily in their ships, either from Paratonium on their left, or the island on their right —voyages which, being in opposite directions, would never be prevented by contrary winds at one and the same time. As for retreating, there was no sound policy in that, not merely for those who held the chief responsibility, but not even for those whose sole concern was for their own lives. They were hard put to it to contain the enemies’ frontal attacks from their entrenchments: once abandon those and they could be no match for them either in vantage ground or numbers. Moreover, boarding ships, especially from pinnaces, involved considerable delay and difficulty; while set against this the Alexandrians had the greatest mobility and knowledge of the ground and buildings. These people above all, overweening as they became in victory, would dash ahead and seize the higher ground and the buildings and thus prevent our men from retreating and gaining their ships. Accordingly, they should put that policy out of their minds and reflect that, at all costs, they must win the day.

Having harangued his men to this effect and put fresh heart into them all, he briefed his centurions as follows: they were to interrupt their other tasks and turn their attention to digging wells, continuing without any cessation all through the night. Whereupon, the business being once undertaken with unanimous enthusiasm for the task, in the course of that one night a great quantity of sweet water was discovered. Thus the laborious machinations and supreme efforts of the Alexandrians were countered by a few hours’ work. In the course of the following day the Thirty-Seventh legion, part of the surrendered remnants of Pompeius’ troops, after being embarked by Domitius Calvinus with corn, arms, weapons and artillery, made the coast of Africa a little beyond Alexandria. An East wind, which blew continuously for many days, prevented this fleet from gaining harbour; but the ground throughout all that area gives excellent hold for anchors. And as they were weather-bound for a long time, and hard put to it for lack of water, they informed Caesar by means of a fast boat.

In order to take some personal decision as to what he thought ought to be done, Caesar boarded a ship and ordered his whole fleet to follow him. He did not embark any of our troops, since, as he was going somewhat too far afield, he was loth to leave our entrenchments unmanned. On their arriving at that place which is called Chersonesus, and putting the rowers ashore to fetch water, some of their number, bent on plunder, advanced rather too far from the ships and were picked up by enemy cavalry. From them the enemy learned that Caesar himself had arrived with his fleet, without any troops on board. This intelligence prompted the belief among them that fortune had put in their way a great opportunity for scoring a success. Accordingly, they manned with combat troops all the ships tiny had. got in readiness for sailing, and encountered Caesar as he was returning with his fleet. Now there were two reasons why Caesar was loth to fight an action that day: he had no troops on board; and it was now after the tenth hour as the matter now stood, and on the other hand nightfall would, he thought, inspire greater confidence in the enemy, who were relying on their local knowledge. In his own case, also, he would be denied the advantage of encouraging his men, since no encouragement was quite to the point where it was impossible to single out for comment either bravery or slackness. For these reasons Caesar withdrew to land what ship, he could, at a point where he supposed that the enemy would not follow them.

There was one Rhodian ship on Caesar’s right wing stationed far apart from the rest. As soon as the enemy caught sight of it the y could not restrain themselves, and four decked ships and several open ones dashed madly towards it. This vessel Caesar was obliged to succour, to prevent the disgrace of sustaining rough treatment in full view of the enemy; though, if any serious mischance should overtake its crew, he reckoned they would deserve it. Battle was joined, with hard fighting on the part of the Rhodians; and though in every fray they had excelled both in seamanship and valour, on this present occasion above all they bore the whole brunt unflinchingly, lest it should seem their fault if any defeat were sustained. And so a highly successful action was fought. One enemy quadrireme was captured, a second was sunk, and two stripped of all their marines; in addition, a large number of combat troops was killed aboard the other vessels. If night had not put an end to the action, Caesar would have become master of the entire enemy fleet. This catastrophe utterly demoralised the enemy, and Caesar returned to Alexandria with his victorious fleet, towing the merchant-ships against a gentle head wind.

So shattered were the Alexandrians by this reverse—for they saw that now it was not the bravery of combat troops but the seamanship of sailors that had caused their defeat—that they scarcely trusted their ability to defend themselves from the buildings, from which, as well as from their higher positions, they derived support, and used all their timber in building barricades, fearing as they did that our fleet would attack them even ashore. Nevertheless, after Ganymedes had declared in the council that he would not only make good the losses they had sustained but also increase the number of their ships, their hopes and confidence ran high and they began to repair their old ships and to devote greater care and more earnest attention to this matter. And though they had lost more than a hundred and ten warships in the harbour and docks, yet they did not abandon the idea of re-equipping their fleet. They saw in fact that neither troop reinforcements nor supplies could be conveyed to Caesar if they themselves had a strong fleet; apart from which, the men of the city and the coastal district, seamen as they were and trained as such from boyhood by daily practice, were anxious to resort to this their natural and native gift, and were aware how successful they had been with their humble little vessels. Consequently they threw themselves whole-heartedly into the task of equipping a fleet.

There were guardships posted at all the mouths of the Nile to levy customs dues, and in secret royal dockyards there were old ships which had not seen service afloat for many years. These last they proceeded to repair, while the guardships they recalled to Alexandria. There was a shortage of oars : the roofs of colonnades, gymnasia and public buildings were dismantled, and their beams made to serve as oars. In one case it was natural ingenuity that helped to bridge the gap, in another the city’s resources. In fine it was no lengthy voyaging for which they were preparing; but perceiving that the conflict must take place in the harbour itself they obeyed the dictates of the moment. In a few days, therefore, they surprised everyone by completing 22 quadriremes and 5 quinqueremes, to which they added a considerable number of smaller, open craff; and then, after trying out in the harbour by rowing what each of them could do, they manned them with suitable troops and prepared themselves at all points for the conflict. Caesar had 9 Rhodian ships (10 had been sent, but one had been lost during a voyage, on the coast of Egypt), 8 Pontic, 5 Lycian and 12 from Asia. These included 10 quinqueremes and quadriremes, while the rest were smaller craft and most of them un-decked. None the less, though informed of the enemies’ forces, Caesar proceeded with his preparations for an action, confident in the valour of his troops.

Now that the stage was reached when each side was self-confident, Caesar sailed round Pharos with his fleet and drew up his ships facing the enemy. On his right wing he posted the Rhodian ships, on his left the Pontic ones, leaving a gap of 400 paces between them—a distance which he regarded as adequate for deploying his vessels. Behind this line he arranged his remaining ships in reserve, deciding which should follow each of the former vessels and which ship each should support, and giving orders accordingly. Nor were the Alexandrians hesitant, to bring up and array their fleet; posting 22 ships in front, and the remainder in a second line in reserve. Besides these they brought up a large number of smaller craft and pinnaces, equipped with incendiary missiles and combustibles, in the hope that sheer numbers and the shouts and flames might have some effect in intimidating our men. Between the two fleets lay shoals with a narrow intersecting channel (these shoals belong to the region of Africa—in fact they say that half Alexandria is part of Africa); and for quite a long time there was a pause among the actual combatants as they waited to see which side was to begin the passage, inasmuch as it seemed that those who once entered the channel would be more restricted both in deploying their fleet and, if things fared badly, in withdrawing.

The commander of the Rhodian squadron was Euphranor, a man who in point of personality and bravery deserved comparison with our people rather than with the Greeks. Thanks to the great fame which his professional skill and forceful personality enjoyed, the Rhodians chose him to command their fleet. When he perceived Caesar’s hesitation, he said : ‘It seems to me, Caesar, that you are afraid that, if you once sail into these shoals with your leading flotilla, you may be forced to fight before you can deploy the rest of your fleet. Leave it to us : we shall bear the brunt of the fighting—we won’t let you down—until the others can come up with us. Certainly for these fellows to go on boasting yonder in our sight is a sore disgrace and mortification to us’, Caesar offered him encouragement and paid him every tribute of praise, and then gave the signal for battle. Four Rhodian ships advanced beyond the shoals to be at once surrounded and attacked by the Alexandrians, The Rhodians bore up and by skill and dexterity deployed their line; and of such powerful effect was their training that despite the odds not one of them exposed its broadside to the enemy, not one had its oars swept, away, but they always met the oncoming foe head-on, Meanwhile the remaining ships came up with them. Then through lack of sea room skill had perforce to be sacrificed and the whole struggle devolved on courage. And indeed there was not one man in Alexandria, either of our troops or of the townsfolk, whose attention was bespoken with either work or fighting, but he made for the loftiest roof-tops and from out of all the vantage points chose one from which to view that spectacle, and besought the immortal gods with prayers and vows to grant victory to his side.

The issues involved in the struggle were by no means equal, On our side no chance of escape either by land or sea was presented in the event of repulse and defeat, while victory would in no way settle the question; whereas in their case, if their fleet should gain the upper hand, they would hold all the cards, while if they were beaten, it would still be left to them to try their luck again. At the same time it seemed a grievous shame that the supreme issue and the salvation of all should be decided by the rival exertions of so few; and if any on. of these wavered, in purpose or courage, the others too. who had had no chance of fighting to defend themselves, would have to look out for themselves. These considerations Caesar had repeatedly explained to them in recent days, that they might fight with the greater resolution because they saw that the safety of all was entrusted to themselves. It was by these same arguments too that every man, as he escorted his messmate, friend or acquaintance, implored him not to prove false to the estimate which not only he himself had formed of him, but all those others likewise, to whose decision he owed it that he was now going forth as one of the chosen combatants. Consequently such was the resolute spirit with which the battle was contested that the Alexandrians, albeit a maritime and seafaring folk, derived no assistance from their dexterity and skill, nor did they benefit from their superiority in number of ships, nor could their men, though chosen for their bravery from so vast a multitude, match the bravery of our men. In this battle one quinquereme and a bireme were captured with their combat crews and rowers, and three were sunk, all our ships being unharmed. The rest of their ships fled to the nearby town, where the townsmen, from stations on the moles and adjacent buildings, protected them and prevented our men from approaching at all close.

To prevent the possibility of this kind of thing occurring to him too frequently, Caesar thought that he ought at all costs to make an effort to gain control of the island and the mole extending to it. For as his entrenchments in the town were in the main completed, he was confident that a simultaneous attempt could be made against both island and city. Having formed this plan, he embarked in smaller craft and pinnaces ten cohorts, some picked light-armed troops and such of his Gallic cavalry as he deemed suitable; and, to distract the enemy garrison, he launched an attack with decked ships upon the other side of the island, offering large rewards to the first, to capture it. At first the islanders held off our troops' attack, simultaneously fighting back from the roofs of buildings, and with equal success defending the beaches with armed parties—and there the roughness of the ground did not afford our troops an easy approach—and guarding the narrow waters with pinnaces and five warships displaying both speed and skill. But as soon as our men had become acquainted with the ground and tried out the shallows, a few got a footing on the beach, others followed in their wake, and a determined attack was launched upon those of the enemy who were drawn up against us on the level foreshore ; whereupon the men of Pharos all turned tail. Following their rout the enemy abandoned their defence of the harbour, brought their ships to the built-up area by the water-front, and hastily disembarked to defend the buildings.

They could not, however, hold on so very long with the defences these afforded, though the buildings were of a type not unlike those of Alexandria—to employ a flattering comparison—with a continuous line of lofty towers taking the place of a wall; and our troops had not come equipped with ladders or wicker screens or any other equipment for assault. But panic robs men of their sense and reason and palsies their limbs; and so it happened then. The very men who on level and unbroken ground were confident they were a match for us, none the less, utterly demoralised now by the flight of their fellows and the slaughter of a few, did not venture to take up a position on buildings thirty feet high, but at various points along the mole dived into the sea and swam die intervening 800 paces to the safety of the town. Many of these, notwithstanding, were captured or killed; indeed, the number of captives amounted all told to six thousand.

After granting his soldiers leave to plunder, Caesar ordered the buildings to be demolished. Near the bridge—the one closer to Pharos—he fortified a redoubt, and posted a garrison there.. This bridge the inhabitants of Pharos had abandoned in their flight; while the other one, which was narrower and closer to the town, was guarded by the Alexandrians. However, on the next day he attacked it from a similar motive, because the possession of these two bridges seemed likely to do away with all the sallies and sudden forays of the enemies' ships. And by now he had dislodged the members of its garrison with artillery and arrows shot from his ships, had driven them back into the town, and put ashore approximately three cohorts—the confined space would not afford a footing for more—while the rest of his forces remained at their posts aboard the ships.

At this stage he ordered the bridge to be screened be a rampart on the side facing the enemy, and the opening for the passage of ships—formed by an arch which supported the bridge—to be filled up and blocked with stones. The latter task being completed, so that not a single pinnace could come out, and the former one being under way, all the Alexandrians’ forces burst out of the town and took post in a fairly open position over against our fortifications of the bridge; while at the same time they drew up near the mole the vessels which they had been in the habit of sending out under the bridges to set fire to our transports. And so the battle proceeded, with us fighting from the bridge and the mole, and with them from the area facing the bridge and from their ships opposite the mole.

While Caesar was occupied with this situation, and as he was encouraging the troops, a large number of rowers and seamen left our warships and suddenly landed on the mole. Some were inspired by their anxiety to watch the fray, others also by the desire to take part in it. They began by driving back the enemy vessels from the mole with stones and slings, and it seemed that their heavy volleys of missiles were having great effect. But when a few Alexandrians ventured to disembark beyond that point, on the side of their unprotected flank, then, just as they had advanced in no set order or formation and without any particular tactics, so now they began to retire haphazardly to the ships. Encouraged by their retreat, more of the Alexandrians disembarked and pursued our flustered men more hotly. At the same time those who had stayed aboard the warships made haste to seize the gang-planks and ease the ships away from land, to prevent the enemy from gaining possession of them. All this thoroughly alarmed our troops of the three cohorts which had taken post on the bridge and the tip of the mole; and as they heard the clamour behind them, and saw the retreat of their comrades, and sustained a heavy frontal barrage of missiles, they feared they might be surrounded in rear and have their retreat entirely cut off by the departure of their ships ; and so they abandoned the entrenchment they had begun at the bridge, and doubled frantically to the ships. Some of them gained the nearest ships, only to be capsized by the weight of so many men; some were killed by the Alexandrians as they put up a forlorn and bewildered resistance; some proved luckier in reaching ships at anchor cleared for action, and so got away safely; and a few, holding their shields above them and steeling their resolution to the task, swam off to ships nearby.

So long as by words of encouragement Caesar was able to keep his men at the bridge and its emplacements, he too was involved in the same danger; but when he perceived that they were all retreating, he withdrew to his own vessel. As a large number of men followed him and kept forcing their way aboard it, and as no opportunity was afforded either of navigating it or easing it offshore, anticipating what actually happened he dived from the vessel and swam to those ships which were hove to farther off. From them he sent pinnaces to the help of his men who were in difficulties, and saved not a few. His vessel was in fact capsized by the large number of troops amounted with the men on board. In this battle the losses among the legionary troops amounted to approximately 400, with a slightly larger number of seamen and rowers. The Alexandrians reinforced the redoubt there with strong entrenchments and many pieces of artillery and removed the stones from the sea, subsequently making free use of the opening to despatch their vessels.

This reverse, so far from dismaying our troops, fired and stimulated them to carry out large-scale sallies in the course of storming the enemy’s defenceworks. Every day encounters took place, and whenever a chance off-red itself and the- Alexandrians burst out in a frontal sally and gave Caesar an opportunity of engaging battle, he achieved considerable success, thanks to the excellent morale and ardent enthusiasm of his troops; nor could his widespread words of encouragement keep pace with the legions’ exertions or their eagerness for fighting, so that they had to be deterred and held back from the most hazardous encounters rather than be spurred on to fight.

The Alexandrians saw that the Romans were heartened by successes and stimulated by reverses, nor were they aware of any third vicissitude of war which could make them yet more steadfast. And so, whether it was they were warned by the king’s friends who were in Caesar’s camp, or whether they were acting on some previous plan of their own made known to the king by secret despatches and approved by him, —we can only guess at their motive—they sent envoys to Caesar requesting him to release the king and allow him to go over to his own side. ‘The whole population , they said, ‘being tired and wearied of the girl, of the delegation of the kingship, and of the utterly remorseless tyranny of Ganymedes, were ready to do the king’s bidding; and if, at his instance, they were to enter into a loyal friendship with Caesar, then no danger would intimidate or prevent the population from submitting.’

Though Caesar was well aware that they were a deceitful race, always pretending something different from their real intentions, yet he decided that it was expedient to satisfy their plea for clemency, since, if their demands in any way reflected their feelings, then he believed the king would remain loyal when released; but if, on the other hand, they wanted to have the king to lead them with a view to waging the war—and that was more in keeping with their character—then he thought there would be greater honour and distinction tor him in waging war against a king than against a motley collection of refugees. Accordingly, he urged the king to take thought for the kingdom of his fathers, to have pity on his most illustrious country, shamefully scarred as it was by fire and desolation, to recall his citizens to sanity first and then to preserve them therein, and to prove his loyalty to the Roman people and to Caesar, inasmuch as Caesar himself had such, faith in him that he was sending him to join an enemy under arms. Then, grasping his right hand in his own, Caesar made to take leave of the boy—already grown to manhood. But the royal mind, schooled in all the lessons of utter deceit, was loth to fall short of the customary standards of his race; and so with tears he proceeded to beseech Caesar to the opposite effect not to send him away his very kingdom, he declared, was not more pleasing to him than the sight of Caesar. Checking the lad’s tears, albeit not unmoved himself, Caesar declared that, if that was the way he felt, they would speedily be reunited, and so sent him back to his people. Like a horse released from the starting-gate and given his head, the king proceeded to wage war against Caesar so energetically that the tears he had shed at their conference seemed to have been tears of joy. Not a few of Caesar’s officers and friends and many of the centurions and soldiers were delighted at this turn of events, inasmuch as Caesar’s over-generosity had, they felt, been made fun of by the deceitful tricks of a boy. As if indeed it was merely generosity and not the most far-sighted strategy which had led him to do it!

Having got themselves a leader, the Alexandrians observed no greater degree of resolution in themselves or of listlessness in the Romans; in addition, the fun which the soldiers made of the king’s youthfulness and irresolution caused great resentment, and they saw they were making no headway. As, moreover, rumours were current that large reinforcements for Caesar were on their way overland from Syria and Cilicia—intelligence which had not yet come to Caesar’s ears—they decided to intercept a convoy of supplies which was being conveyed to our troops by sea. Accordingly they stationed some lightly armed vessels on guard at suitable points near Canopus, and lay in wait for our ships and supplies. When Caesar was informed of this he ordered his entire fleet to be got ready and equipped, putting Tiberius Nero 1 in command. Included in this fleet when it set out were the Rhodian ships, and aboard them Euphranor, without whom no naval action had ever been fought, and none even that was not a resounding victory. Fortune, however, very often reserves for a harsher fate those upon whom she has showered her most prolific blessings; and so too the fortune that now attended Euphranor was different from that of former times. For when they reached Canopus and each side had drawn up its fleet and entered the conflict, Euphranor, following his normal custom, was the first to join battle; but when he had holed and sunk one enemy quadrireme, he pursued the next one too far; and as the other ships were not quick enough in following his lead, he was surrounded by the Alexandrians. No one brought him assistance, either because they thought that, considering his courage and his good luck, he was quite able to take care of himself, or because they were afraid for their own sakes. And so the one and only man who was successful in that battle perished alone along with his victorious quadrireme.

Round about the same time Mithridates of Pergamum approached Pelusium. A man of high standing in his own country and of great experience and valour in war, as well as a very loyal and valued friend of Caesar, he had been sent into Syria and Cilicia at the outbreak of the Alexandrian war to fetch reinforcements; and now, accompanied by large forces which he had speedily raised, thanks both to the very helpful attitude adopted by the states and to his own conscientious efforts, he arrived at Pelusium by the overland route which links Egypt with Syria. This town had been occupied by a strong garrison of Achillas on account of the tactical importance of the place; for Pharos and Pelusium are regarded as the keys, as it were, to the defence of the whole of Egypt, Pelusium guarding the overland approach, as Pharos defends the seaward one. Mithridates now suddenly surrounded it with large forces; and, despite the obstinate defence put up by its numerous garrison, thanks both to the large number of fresh troops which he kept throwing in to replace the wounded and exhausted and to the stubborn and unremitting nature of his assault, he reduced it to submission on the same day he started to attack it, and then posted a garrison of his own in it. Whereupon. having achieved this success. he marched to join Caesar in Alexandria, peacefully subduing, meanwhile. and winning over to friendship with Caesar. by that authority which normally belongs to the victor, all those districts along his line of march.

Not so very far from Alexandria lies what is perhaps the best known spot in those parts. It is called Delta, and took its name from its resemblance to the letter; for a certain section of the river Nile splits up into two channels which diverge gradually but are separated by a very wide interval at the coast, where the river joins the sea. When the king learned that Mithridates was approaching this spot, and knew that he must cross the river, he despatched large forces against him, by which he believed Mithridates could either be beaten and destroyed, or else undoubtedly held in check. However, desirous as he was for his defeat, he was quite as content to cut him off from Caesar and hold him in cheek. The first of his forces to succeed in crossing the river from Delta and meeting Mithridates joined battle in eager haste to forestall those following up behind, and so rob them of the chance to participate in victory. Mithridates contained their attack with great discretion, fortifying his camp after our regular fashion; but when he saw them coming up to the entrenchments with a contemptuous recklessness, he made a general sally and killed a large number of them. And had not the remainder employed their knowledge of the district to find cover for themselves, and some retired to the ships in which they had crossed the river, they would have been completely wiped out. When they had recovered a little from the resulting panic, they joined forces with their comrades following up behind, and proceeded to a new attack on Mithridates.

A messenger was despatched by Mithridates to Caesar to bring him tidings of the action. The king learned of these same events from his own people. Accordingly at practically the same time the king set forth to crush Mithridates, and Caesar to relieve him. The king had recourse to the quicker method of transport, namely sailing up the river Nile, in which he had a large fleet in readiness. Caesar was unwilling to use the same route, so as not to fight a naval action in the river. Instead, he sailed round by that sea which is said to belong to part of Africa, as I have explained earlier. Yet in spite of this he came up with the king's forces before the latter could attack Mithridates, and so rescued the victorious Mithridates with his army intact. The king had encamped with his forces in a naturally strong position, since in itself the position was higher than the plateau which lay beneath it on all sides;; moreover, on three sides it was covered by defences of diverse types: one side abutted the river Nile; a second ran along very high ground and formed one face of his camp; while the third was encircled by a marsh.

Between the camp and Caesar’s line of march ran a narrow river with very high banks, which flowed into the Nile and was some seven miles distant from the king’s camp. When the king learned that Caesar was coming by this route, he despatched all his cavalry and a picked force of light-armed infantry to this river to prevent Caesar from crossing it and to engage at long range from its banks—an unfair engagement, for the spot could neither afford scope for valour nor involve cowardice in any risk. These tactics filled our infantry and cavalry with burning resentment at the thought that for so long their struggle with the Alexandrians should prove a drawn battle. And so, at the same time as scattered groups of German cavalry, looking for places to ford the river, swam across it at some points where the banks were lower, simultaneously the legionary troops, having felled lofty trees tall enough to reach from bank to bank, hurled them forward and crossed the river on a causeway hastily thrown on top. So terrified were the enemy by their attack, that they pinned their hopes of deliverance to flight: in vain, however; for few survived that rout to take refuge with the king, and practically all the remainder were killed.

After this most notable success Caesar forthwith pushed forward triumphantly to the king’s camp, holding the view that his sudden approach would strike great terror into the hearts of the Alexandrians. But when he observed that this camp was strongly entrenched as well as protected by its natural position, and saw the serried mass of armed men posted at the rampart, he was unwilling to let his soldiers, weary as they were with marching and fighting advance to attack the camp. Accordingly he pitched camp at no great distance from the enemy. In a nearby hamlet, not far distant from the king's camp. there was a. fort which the king had built and linked with bastions to the main detenus of his camp so as to hold the hamlet. This fort Caesar attacked and took by storm on the following day with all his forces; not that he thought it would be difficult, to gain that objective by using a smaller number of soldiers, but in order that, with the Alexandrians thoroughly unnerved as a result, he might go straight on from that victory to attack the king’s camp. And so, having chased the retreating Alexandrians from the fort, into their camp, our troops carried on their charge right up to the fortifications, where they proceeded to fight at long range very briskly. On two sides our men were afforded an opening for assault: the first was the one which, as I have explained, allowed unimpeded approach; the second comprised the moderate-sized space between the camp and the river Nile. The largest and most carefully picked contingent of the Alexandrians was defending that side which afforded the easiest approach; but the defenders in the area of the river Nile were the most successful in repelling and wounding our men: for the latter were being hit by missiles coming from opposite directions—from the rampart of the camp ahead of them, and from the river behind them, where many ship, manned with slingers and archers were engaging our men.

Now Caesar saw that, while it was impossible for his soldiers to fight with any greater gallantry, yet little headway was being made on account of the difficulty of the ground; he also noted that the highest sector of their camp had been abandoned by the Alexandrians, not only because of its natural strength, but also because, in their eagerness in some cases to flight, in others to look on, its defenders had rushed down to the sector where the flighting was going on; consequently he ordered some cohorts to proceed thither, skirting the camp, and storm the height, putting in command of them Carfulenus, a man of exceptional personality and experience in the field. When they arrived there our men fought with the greatest gallantry against those few of the enemy who were defending the entrenchment; whereupon the Alexandrians, panic-stricken by the shouting and fighting on both sides of them, began to rush about in confusion hither and thither throughout the camp. This utter bewilderment of theirs fired the spirits of our troops to such a pitch that they captured the camp almost simultaneously in all sectors, though its highest point was the first to capitulate; and from that point our men rushed down and killed a vast multitude of the enemy in the camp. In their efforts to escape this danger most of the Alexandrians hurled themselves en masse from the rampart into the area adjoining the river; the first of these were crushed by their heavy fall in the actual trench of the fortification, but the rest found it easier to escape. It is established that the king himself fled from the camp and then, after being taken aboard a ship along with a large number of his men who were swimming to the nearest ships, perished when as a result of the numbers the vessel capsized.

This signal victory, the outcome of a most speedy and successful action, filled Caesar with such confidence that he hastened with his cavalry to Alexandria by the nearest overland route, and entered it triumphantly by that quarter of the town which was held by the enemy garrison. Nor was he mistaken in his own conclusion that, as soon as they heard of that battle, the enemy would cease to think any longer in terms of war. On his arrival he reaped the well-earned fruits of valour and magnanimity : for the entire population of townsfolk threw down their arms, abandoned their fortifications, assumed that garb in which suppliants are used to placate tyrants with earnest prayers, and brought forth all the sacred emblems by the sanctity of which they had been wont to conjure the embittered and wrathful hearts of their kings : even so did they hasten to meet Caesar on his arrival and surrendered themselves to him. Caesar took them formally under his protection and consoled them: then, passing through the enemy fortifications, he came to his own quarter of the town amid loud cheers of congratulation from his own troops, who rejoiced at the happy issue, not only of the war itself and the fighting, but also of his arrival under such circumstances.

Having made himself master of Egypt and Alexandria, Caesar appointed as kings those whose names Ptolemaeus had written down in his will with an earnest appeal to the Roman people that they should not be altered. The elder of the two boys— he late king—being now no more, Caesar assigned the kingdom to the younger one and to Cleopatra, the elder of the two daughters, who had remained his loyal adherent: whereas Arsinoe, the younger daughter, in whose name, as we have shown, Ganymedes had long been exercising an unbridled sway, he determined to remove from the realm, to prevent any renewed dissensions coming into being among factious folk before the dominion of the royal pair could be consolidated by the passage of time. The veteran Sixth legion he took away with him : all the others he left there, the more to bolster up the dominion of the said rulers, who could enjoy neither the affection of their people, inasmuch as they had remained throughout staunch friends of Caesar, nor the authority of a long-established reign, it being but a few days since they came to the throne. At the same time he deemed it conducive to the dignity of our empire and to public expediency that, if the rulers remained loyal, they should be protected by our troops: whereas if they proved ungrateful, those same troops could hold them in check. Having thus completed all his dispositions, he set out in person for Syria.

While these events were taking place in Egypt, king Deiotarus came to Domitius Calvinus, to whom Caesar had assigned the government of Asia and the neighbouring provinces, to beg him not to allow Lesser Armenia, his own kingdom, or Cappadocia, the kingdom of Ariobarzanes, to be occupied and over-run by Pharnaces: for unless they were liberated from this scourge, he could not carry out his instructions and pay out the money he had promised to Caesar. As Domitius not only considered the money to be indispensable for defraying military expenses, but also decided it was a shameful affront to the Roman people and to the triumphant C. Caesar as well as a slight to himself that the kingdoms of their allies and. friend- should be seized by a foreign king, he forthwith sent a deputation to Pharnaees, bidding him withdraw from Armenia and Cappadocia and not assail the rights and majesty of the Roman people by resorting to civil war. In the belief that this warning would have greater force if he approached closer to that area with an army, he set out for his legions; then, taking with him one of the three, the Thirty-Sixth, he sent to Caesar in Egypt the two which the latter had called for in his despatch. One of these two did not arrive in time for the Alexandrian war, as it was sent by the overland route through Syria. Cn. Domitius reinforced the Thirty-Sixth legion with two from Deiotarus, which the latter had had for several years, having built them up on our system of discipline and armament; he also added to it 100 horsemen, and took a like number from Ariobarzanes. He sent P. Sestius to C. Plaetorius, the quaestor, with instruction to bring the legion which had been formed from the hastily improvised forces in Pontus ; and Quintus Patisius to Cilicia to muster auxiliary troops. All these forces speedily assembled at Comana according to the orders of Domitius.

Meantime the envoys brought back this reply from Pharnaces: ‘he had withdrawn from Cappadocia, but had recovered Lesser Armenia, which he ought to possess by due right of inheritance from his father. In short, the issue touching that kingdom should be kept open for Caesar’s decision; for he was ready to do what Caesar should decide. Now Cn. Domitius observed that he had withdrawn from Cappadocia not from free choice but of necessity, since he could defend Armenia next door to his own kingdom more easily than the more distant Cappadocia, and also because he had supposed that Domitius would bring up all three legions; and that when he heard that two of those legions had been sent to Caesar, this had heightened his rash resolve to stay on in Armenia. Consequently Domitius proceeded to insist that Pharnaces should withdraw from that kingdom also: ‘as far as legal right went, there was no difference between Cappadocia and Armenia, nor had he any right to demand that the question should be left open pending Caesar’s arrival; a matter was ‘open’ when it remained just as it had been.’ Having given him this reply Domitius set out for Armenia with the forces I have recorded above., and began by marching along the higher ground. From Comana in Pontus there is, in fact, a lofty, wooded ridge which extends into Lesser Armenia and forms the boundary between Cappadocia and Armenia. This route, as he saw, offered definite advantages, namely that on the higher ground no sudden enemy attack could develop, and that, as Cappadocia adjoined this ridge, it was likely to assist him by affording an abundance of supplies.

Meanwhile Pharnaces sent several embassies to Domitius to discuss peace and to take princely gifts for Domitius. All these he firmly rejected and replied to the envoys that as far as he was concerned nothing should take precedence over the prestige of the Roman people and the recovery of the kingdoms of its allies. Then, after completing an uninterrupted succession of long marches, he began to approach Nicopolis. a town in Lesser Armenia which is actually situated in the plain, though it is hemmed in on two sides by high mountains at a fairish distance. Here he pitched camp roughly seven miles from Nicopolis. From this camp he had to traverse a narrow and confined defile; and for this reason Pharnaces arrayed the pick of his infantry and practically all his cavalry in an ambush, giving orders, moreover, that a large number of cattle should, be pastured at various 'points within this gorge, and that the peasants and burghers should go about openly in that area. His object in so doing was that, if Domitius should pass through that defile as a friend, he might have no suspicions of an ambush, as he would observe both men and beasts moving about the countryside, as if friends were in the offing; while if he should come in no friendly spirit, treating it as enemy territory, his troops might become scattered in the process of plundering and so be cut down piecemeal.

While making these dispositions he still constantly continued sending delegations to Domitius to talk of peace and friendship, as he believed that by these self-same tactics Domitius could the more readily be duped. But on the other hand Domitius’ hopes of peace afforded him. a motive for tarrying in the camp, where he was. Consequently, as Pharnaces had now lost his immediate opportunity and was afraid that his ambush might be discovered, he recalled his troops to camp. On the morrow Domitius advanced nearer Nicopolis and pitched his camp over against the town. While our troops were fortifying it, Pharnaces drew up his line of battle according to his own established custom. This, in fact, was formed with its front as a single straight line, with each of the wings reinforced by three supporting lines; and on the same principle support lines were also posted in the centre, while in the two spaces, on the right hand and the left, single ranks were drawn up. Having once begun the task of fortifying his camp, Domitius completed it, with part of his forces posted in front of the rampart.

The following night Pharnaces intercepted some couriers who were carrying despatches to Domitius concerning the situation at Alexandria. From them he learned that Caesar was in a very dangerous position, and that an urgent request was being made to Domitius that he should send Caesar reinforcements as soon as possible and himself advance through Syria closer to Alexandria. On learning this, Pharnaces saw himself virtually victorious if he could spin out the time, as he thought that Domitius must speedily withdraw. Accordingly, from that side of the town which he saw offered our men the easiest and most favourable line of approach to do battle, he carried two straight trenches, four feet deep and spaced not so very far apart, as far as the point beyond which he had decided not to advance his own battle line. Between these trenches he consistently drew up his line, while posting all his cavalry on the flanks outside the trench; for otherwise they could not be of any use, and they far outnumbered our cavalry.

Domitius, however, was more disturbed by Caesar’s peril than by his own; and as he thought that he would not be safe in withdrawing, if he made a fresh attempt to secure the terms he had rejected or if he withdrew for no good reason, he deployed his army from its nearby camp into battle formation. He posted the Thirty-Sixth legion on the right wing and the Pontic one on the left, while the legions of Deiotarus he concentrated in the centre, leaving them, however, a very narrow frontage and posting his remaining cohorts behind them in support. The lines being thus arrayed on either side, they proceeded to battle .

The signal to attack was given almost simultaneously on both sides: then came the charge, with hotly contested and fluctuating fighting. Thus the Thirty-Sixth legion launched an attack on the king’s cavalry outside the trench and fought so successful an action that it advanced up to the walls of the town, crossed the trench, and attacked the enemy in rear. The Pontic legion, however, on the other flank, drew back a little from the enemy, and attempted, moreover, to go round or cross the trench, so as to attack the enemy’s exposed flank ; but in the actual crossing of the trench it was pinned down and overwhelmed. The legions of Deiotarus, indeed, offered scarcely any resistance to the attack. Consequently the king’s forces, victorious on their own right wing and in the centre of the line, now turned upon the Thirty-Sixth legion. The latter, nevertheless, bore up bravely under the victors’ attack and, though surrounded by large enemy forces, yet with consummate presence of mind formed a circle and so made a fighting withdrawal to the foothills, where Pharnaces was loth to pursue it owing to the hilly nature of the ground. And so, with the Pontic legion an almost total loss and a large proportion of the troops of Deiotarus killed, the Thirty Sixth legion retired to higher ground with losses not exceeding 250 men. There fell in that battle not a few Roman knights—brilliant and distinguished men. After sustaining this defeat Domitius none the less collected the remnants of his scattered army and withdrew by safe routes through Cappadocia into Asia.

Elated by this success and confident that his wishes for Caesar’s defeat would be granted, Pharnaces seized Pontus with all his forces. There he played the role of victor and utterly ruthless tyrant and, promising himself his father’s fortune though with a happier ending, he took many towns by storm, plundered the property of Roman and Pontic citizens, and decreed for those who in respect of youth and beauty had anything to commend them such punishments as proved more pitiful than death. Thus he held unchallenged sway over Pontus, boasting that he had recovered the kingdom of his father.

Round about the same time a set-back was sustained in Illyricum, a province which during the previous months had been tirm.lv held not merely without incurring disgrace but even with distinction. To this province there had been sent out in the summer a quaestor of Caesar’s, Q. Cornificius, as pro-praetor 48 BC; and although the province was not at all abundantly stocked for supporting armies and was exhausted and wasted by war upon its borders and by rebellions, yet by his far-sighted and careful policy, taking great pains not to make an ill-considered advance in any quarter, he recovered and defended it. For example, he successfully stormed several mountain stronghold, the commanding position of which prompted their occupants to carry on a predatory warfare, and presented his troops with the resulting booty; which, paltry though it was, was none the less welcome—considering the very meagre prospects of the province—especially since it was the prize of valour. Again, when in the course of his flight from the battle of Pharsalia Octavius took refuge with a large fleet, upon that coast, Cornificius, with the aid of a few ships of the men of Iadera—those devoted supporters of the commonwealth, who were unsurpassed in their constant loyalty—made himself master of Octavius’ scattered ships, and was accordingly enabled by the addition of these vessels to those of his allies to go into action with something like a fleet. And when in quite a different quarter of the globe Caesar was victoriously pursuing Cn. Pompeius, and heard that several of his opponents had collected the remnants of the fugitives and taken refuge in Illyricum on account of its proximity to Macedonia, he sent despatches to Gabinius, bidding him set out for Illyricum with the legions of recruits which had recently been raised: there he was to join forces with Q. Cornificius and repulse any dangerous move that might be made against the province : if on the other hand no large forces were needed to ensure the safety of the province, he was to lead his legions into .Macedonia. It was in fact his belief that the whole of that neighbourhood and area would revive the war. so long as Cn. Pompeius was alive.

When Gabinius came to Illyricum in the difficult winter season,—whether it was he thought the province was more abundantly supplied, or whether he set great store by Caesar’s winning luck, or whether he trusted in his own courage and skill, which had many a time enabled him, when surrounded by the hazards of war, to score great successes by his personal leadership and initiative—anyway he derived no support from the resources of the province, bled white as if partly was, and partly disloyal, nor could supplies be conveyed to him by ship, since stormy weather had interrupted navigation. As a result of these considerable difficulties he was forced to conduct the campaign, not as he wished, but as necessity dictated. And so, as lack of supplies forced him to storm towns or strongholds in very adverse weather, he frequently sustained reverses, and was held, by the natives in such contempt that, while retreating on Salona, a coastal town occupied by very gallant and loyal Roman citizens, he was forced to fight an action on the march. In this battle he lost more than two thousand, soldiers, thirty-eight, centurions and four tribunes : with what was left of his forces he retired to Salona, where, under the stress of overwhelming difficulties of every kind, he fell sick and died within a few months. His chequered fortune while alive and his sudden death inspired Octavius with high hopes of securing possession of the province ; luck, however, which is a very potent factor in war, as well as the carefulness of Cornificius and the courage of Vatinius, did not allow Octavius to pursue his successful career much longer.

When Vatinius was at Brundisium he learned of what had been going on in Illyricum; moreover, frequent despatches from Cornificius kept summoning him to bring aid to the province, and he heard that M. Octavius had concluded treaties with the natives and in several places was attacking the garrisons of our troops, in some cases in person with his fleet, in others with land forces, employing native troops. So, although he was afflicted by a serious illness and his bodily strength barely enabled him to obey his will, yet by courage he overcame his physical handicap, as well as the difficulties both of winter and the sudden mobilisation. Thus, as he himself had few warships in harbour, he sent despatches to Q. Calenus in Achaia, requesting him to send him a fleet; but as this proved too slow a business—our troops were in no position to withstand Octavius’ attack, and their critical situation urgently demanded something speedier—he fitted beaks to some fast boats, of which he had a sufficient number, though their size was by no means adequate for fighting purposes. With these added to his warships, and his fleet thereby numerically increased, he put on board some veteran troops, of which he had an abundant supply from all the legions—they had been on the sick list and had been left behind at Brundisium when the army was being shipped to Greece and so set out for Illyricum. Now there were not a few coastal communities there which had revolted and surrendered to Octavius: some of these he recovered, others he by-passed when they remained steadfast to their policy; nor would he allow anything, however pressing, to embarrass or delay him from pursuing Octavius himself with all the speed of which he was capable. While the latter was assaulting Epidaurus by land and sea, where then was a garrison of ours, Vatinius forced him by his approach, to abandon his assault, and so relieved our garrison.

When Octavius learned that Vatinius had a fleet which was in the main made up of small, fast boats, having full confidence in his own fleet he hove to off the island of Tauris. In this area Vatinius was cruising in pursuit, not from any knowledge that Octavius had hove to there, but because the latter had gained a fairly good start, and he had resolved to pursue him. On approaching closer to Tauris with his ships strung out, since the weather was rough and he had no suspicion of the enemy, he suddenly observed a ship bearing down upon him, its yardarms lowered to mid-mast, and manned with combat troops. When he saw this, he promptly ordered the sails to be reefed, the yard-arms lowered, and the troops to stand to; and then, by hoisting the pennant, which was his method of giving the signal for action, he signalled the leading ships astern of him to do the same. The Vatinians being thus suddenly taken unawares proceeded to man ship : the Octavians, their ships already manned, came sailing out of the harbour one after another. Line of battle was formed on either side, that of Octavius being superior in formation, that of Vatinius in the morale of the troops.

When Vatinius observed that neither in the size nor the number of his ships was he a match for a chance engagement, he chose rather to trust to luck. And so he attacked first, charging with his own quinquereme the quadrireme which was the flagship of Octavius. The latter rowed forward against him with the utmost speed and bravery, and the two ships ran together with their beaks head-on so violently that Octavius’ ship had its beak smashed away and was locked to the other by its timbers. Elsewhere a fierce engagement took place, with particularly sharp fighting near the leaders ; for with each individual captain trying to support his own leader, a great battle developed at close range in the narrow sea. The more closely interlocked the ships—whenever the opportunity was afforded for such fighting—the more marked was the superiority of the Vatinians; for they displayed admirable courage in leaping without hesitation from their own ships on to those of the enemy, and where the fighting was on equal terms their markedly superior courage brought them success. Octavius’ own quadrireme was sunk, and many besides were either captured or else rammed, holed and sunk: some of his combat troops were cut down on the ships, others dived overboard. Octavius himself took refuge in a pinnace; and when too many others sought safety in it and it capsized, wounded as he was he swam to his own light galley. There he was taken safely aboard and, when night put an end to the action, took to flight, sailing in a stiff squall. He was followed by not a few of his own ship-, which chance had delivered from that hazard.

Vatinius, on the other hand, rounded off this success by sounding the retreat and withdrew triumphantly with his entire force intact to the harbour from which Octavius’ fleet had advanced to do battle. As a result of that action he captured one quinquereme, two triremes, eight two-banked galleys and a large number of Octavius’ rowers. The next day he spent there in refitting his own and the captured vessels; and on the day following he hastened to the island of Issa, in the belief that Octavius had taken refuge there in the course of his flight. In it there was a town—the best known one in those parts, and one which was on the most friendly terms with Octavius. On the arrival of Vatinius there the townsfolk threw themselves upon his mercy, and he learned that Octavius himself with a few small vessels had set course with a following wind in the direction of Greece, intending to make for Sicily next and then Africa. Thus in a short space of time Vatinius had achieved a most notable success, recovering the province and restoring it to Cornificius, and driving his opponents’ fleet away from the whole of that coast. Whereupon he withdrew in triumph to Brundisium with his army and fleet unharmed.

Now during the period when Caesar was besieging Pompeius at Dyrrachium, and achieving success at Old Pharsalus, and was engaged at Alexandria in operations which involved great risk, though rumour made it out to be still greater, Q. Cassius Longinus had been left behind in Spain as propraetor to govern the further province. Whether it was due to his own natural disposition, or because he had formed a hatred for that province from having as quaestor been treacherously wounded there, he had greatly added to his unpopularity; which fact he was in a position to observe equally from his own intuition—believing as he did that the province reciprocated his own sentiments—and from the manifold signs and indications afforded by those who found difficulty in concealing their feelings of hate; and now he was anxious to offset the dislike felt by the province with the affection of his army. Consequently, as soon as he had mustered the army all together, he promised the soldiers one hundred sesterces apiece; and not long afterwards in Lusitania, after successfully storming the town of Medobrega and then Mount Herminius, on which the townsfolk had taken refuge, and being hailed there as Imperator, he presented the soldiers each with 100 sesterces. In addition he granted many large reward to individuals; and though these gifts inspired in the army a semblance of affection for the moment, yet they gradually and insidiously undermined strict military discipline.

Having settled his legions in winter quarters. Cassius proceeded to Corduba to administer justice and resolved to hay a very heavy impost on the province and so defray the debts he had incurred in it. And so, as the habit of bribery necessitates, openhandedness was the plausible excuse for seeking yet further contributions to the source of bribery. Wealthy men were ordered to furnish sums of money, and these Longinus not merely allowed but even compelled to be debited to his own account : poor men were precipitated into conflict with the wealthy class to promote dissensions; and no kind of profit, either large and obvious, or quite insignificant and mean, was overlooked, none with which the commander-in-chief was not involved privately and officially. There was not one man—provided only he had something to lose—but he was either held on bail or duly entered in the lists of the accused. Thus there was also a very uneasy presentiment of danger in addition to the sacrifices and losses of personal possessions.

For these reasons it so fell out that, since Longinus as commander-in-chief was employing the same tactics he had used as quaestor, the provincials once again embarked upon similar plans for his assassination. Their hatred was intensified by some of his friends who, although they were employed in that plundering partnership, none the less hated the man in whose name they did wrong, and so, while putting down to their own credit whatever they had gained by their plundering, attributed to Cassius whatever came to nothing or was foiled. He enrolled a new legion—the Fifth. Hatred increased as a result of the actual levy and the expense of the extra legion. The cavalry were brought up to a strength of three thousand and equipped at the greatest expense. No respite was given to the province.

Meanwhile he received despatches from Caesar bidding him bring an army across to Africa and, passing through Mauretania, come to the territory of Numidia; for Juba had sent large reinforcements for Cn. Pompeius and would, it was thought, send larger ones. When Cassius received these despatches he was in transports of immoderate delight at the thought of his being offered so magnificent a chance of mw provinces and a highly fertile kingdom. And so he set out in person for Lusitania to summon the legions and fetch auxiliaries, allotting certain men the task of organising in advance supplies of corn and 100 ships, as well as assessing and levying contributions of money, so as to avoid any delay on his return. His return proved more expeditious than anyone expected : for there was no lack of energy or vigilance in Cassius, especially when he coveted something.

He then assembled his army at a single rendezvous and pitched camp near Corduba. There at a parade he explained to his troops the scheme it was his duty to carry out on Caesar's instructions, and promised to give them 100 sesterces apiece when he had crossed over into Mauretania. The Fifth legion, he explained, would be in Spain. Then, after the parade, he returned to Corduba. That same afternoon, when he was entering the judgment hall, a certain Minucius Silo, who was a client of L. Racilius and was dressed as a soldier, handed him a note, as if he had some petition to make of him; then, following behind Racilius—who was walking beside Cassius—as though he were waiting for an answer, he quickly wormed his way in between them when the chance offered, seized Longinus from behind with his left hand and with his right stabbed him twice with a dagger. No sooner was the alarm raised than all the conspirators joined in the attack. Munatius Flaccus ran the nearest lictor through with his sword, killed him and then wounded Q. Cassius, Longinus' deputy. Thereupon T. Vasius and M. Mercello displayed a like audacity in going to the help of Flaccus, their fellow-townsman; for they all hailed from Italica. L. Licinius Squillus rushed up to Longinus himself and inflicted minor wounds upon him as he lay prostrate.

On all sides there was a rush to defend Cassius; for it was his constant habit to have with him a numerous armed bodyguard of Beronians and exsoldiers. These intercepted all the other would-be assassins who were following up behind, and among them Calpurnius Salvianus and Manilius Tusculus. Minucius was caught as he sought to escape through the stones which were lying in the street, and was escorted to Cassius, who had now been carried home. Racilius took refuge in a friend’s house nearby, until he should learn for certain whether Cassius was done for. L. Laterensis had no doubt about it, and so hastened joyfully into the camp and congratulated the native troops and those of the Second legion, who, as he knew, cherished a particular hatred for Cassius; and there the mob hoisted him on to the platform and hailed him as praetor. There was in fact no man, either born in the province, like the troops of the native legion, or else by this time qualified as a provincial by virtue of long residence—and the Second legion came into this category—who had not shared in the hatred which the entire province felt towards Cassius; for the Thirtieth and Twenty-First legions, which Caesar had allotted to Longinus, had been enrolled in Italy within the last few months, while the Fifth legion had been raised in the province but recently.

Meanwhile the tidings reached Laterensis that Cassius was alive. Not so much disconcerted as grievously disappointed by these tidings, he quickly recovered himself and set out to visit Cassius. On learning of the facts the Thirtieth legion advanced to Corduba to bring aid to their commander-in-chief: the Twenty-First did likewise; and the Fifth followed their lead. Now that there were but two remaining legions in camp, the men of the Second were afraid that they might be the only ones left behind, and that the nature of their sentiments might be inferred from this circumstance: consequently they followed the example of the previous legions. The native legion remained steadfast in its attitude, and nothing could intimidate it or make it budge.

Cassius ordered the arrest of those who had been named as privy to the murderous plot and, retaining five cohorts of the Thirtieth legion, sent the rest back to camp. From the evidence of Minucius he learned that L. Racilius and L. Laterensis and Annius Scapula—the last a provincial of the highest standing and influence, with whom he was on as intimate a footing as with Racilius and Laterensis—had all been involved in that same conspiracy; and it was not long before he gave expression to his indignation by ordering their execution. Minucius he handed over to his freedmen for torture; likewise Calpurnius Salvianus, who made a formal deposition in which he named a larger number of conspirators—truthfully, according to the belief of certain people; under duress, as some complain. Similar torture was applied to L. Mercello: Squillus mentioned more names. Cassius ordered their execution, except for those who bought themselves off. For example, he openly made a bargain in fad with Calpurnius for sixty thousand sesterces, and with Q. Sestius for fifty thousand. And if their extreme guilt earned them a corresponding fine, yet the fact that the peril of death and the pain of torture was remitted for cash showed how in Cassius cruelty had vied with greed.

Several days later he received despatches sent by Caesar, from which he learned that Pompeius had been beaten in the field, lost his forces, and fled. This intelligence inspired in him mixed feelings—of disappointment and pleasure: the news of victory could not but make him happy: the completion of the war put an end to the present licence. Consequently he could not make up his mind whether he would rather have nothing to fear or nothing barred. When his wounds were healed he summoned all those who had booked sums of money as debited to his account and ordered the said sums to be entered up as repaid; and where he seemed to have imposed too light a burden, he ordered the man to pay a greater sum. Moreover, lie held a levy of Roman knights. These were conscripted from all the corporations and colonies and, as they were thoroughly scared of military service overseas, he invited them to purchase their discharge. This proved a great source of profit, but the hatred it produced was still greater. This done, he reviewed his entire army and then despatched to the point of embarkation the legions he intended to take into Africa, with their auxiliary troops. He himself proceeded to Hispalis to inspect the fleet he was building up; and there he tarried awhile, since he had published a decree throughout the province that those who had been ordered to contribute, but had not yet contributed sums of money, must come before him. This summons disturbed them all profoundly.

Meanwhile L. Titius brought tidings of the native legion, in which he had been at the time a military tribune: his report ran that while it was encamped near the town of Ilipa a mutiny had broken out, and several centurions who had refused to let them strike camp had been killed; the legion had then parted company with the Thirtieth legion—this was also under command of Q. Cassius, the governor’s deputy—and made haste to join the Second legion, which was being taken to the straits by another route. On learning of the matter Longinus left by night with five cohorts of the Twenty-First legion, and early in the morning arrived at Naeva. There he waited that day, in order to get a clear view of what was taking place: then he marched to Carmo. Here he was joined by the Thirtieth legion and the Twenty-First, with four cohorts of the Fifth and his entire cavalry force, and then heard that four cohorts had been overpowered by the native troops, and in company with the latter had made contact with the second legion near Obucula, where they had all joined forces and chosen T. Thorius, a native of Italica, as their leader. He promptly held a consultation and despatched the quaestor, M. Marcellus, to Corduba, to retain control of it, and Q. Cassius, his deputy, to Hispalis. Within a few days news was brought to him that the corporation of Corduba had revolted from him, and that Marcellus, either of his own free will, or under compulsion— reports varied on this point—was hand in glove with the men of Corduba ; and that the two cohort of the Fifth legion which had formed the garrison force of Corduba were taking a similar line. Incensed by these reports Cassius struck camp, and on the morrow came to Segovia on the river Singilis. There he held a parade and sounded the temper of his troops, learning thereby that it was not for his own sake, but for the sake of the absent Caesar that they were entirely loyal to himself, and that there was no hazard they would not face without a murmur, so be they were the means of restoring the province to Caesar.

Meanwhile Thorius led his veteran legions towards Corduba. To avoid the impression that the quarrel had originally arisen from any natural tendency to mutiny on his own part or on that of his troops, and at the same time to counter Q. Cassius—who, as it appeared, was operating in the name of Caesar with forces more powerful than his own—with no less weighty an authority, he kept openly asserting that it was for Cn. Pompeius that he wished to recover the province. And it may even be that he did so wish, owing to his hatred for Caesar and affection for Pompey, the latter’s name carrying great weight with those legions which M. Varro had held. But what his motive was in this was a matter for general conjecture. At any rate that was what Thorius gave out; and his troops acknowledged it to the extent that they had the name of Cn. Pompeius carved on their shields. A vast concourse of citizens came forth to meet the legions, not only of men but also of matrons and youths, beseeching them not to approach Corduba as enemies and plunder it: they themselves in fact shared in the universal antagonism against Cassius; and they prayed they might not be compelled to act against Caesar.

The tears and entreaties of this vast multitude had no little effect upon the army; it saw too that to punish Cassius it had no need of the name and memory of Cn. Pompeius; that Longinus was equally hateful to all the adherents of Caesar as he was to those of Pompey; and that it could induce neither the citizen corporation of Corduba nor Marcellus to act contrary to Caesar’s interest. Accordingly they removed Pompey’s name from their shields, adopted Marcellus, who professed his intention to champion Caesar’s cause, as their leader and hailed him as praetor, made common cause with the citizen corporation, and pitched their camp near Corduba. Within two days Cassius pitched camp on his side of the river Baetis some four miles distant from Corduba, in a lofty position in sight of the town. He sent despatches to king Bogud in Mauretania and to M. Lepidus, the proconsul, in Hither Spain, urging each to come as soon as possible to the aid of himself and the province, in the interest of Caesar. He himself laid waste in hostile fashion the territory of Corduba and set, buildings ablaze.

The hideous and outrageous character of this action led the legions which had taken Marcellus for their leader to rush to him in a body and beg him that they might be led out to battle and granted an opportunity of engaging the enemy before those most illustrious and beloved possessions of the people of Corduba should suffer the grievous ignominy of being consumed before their very eyes by plunder, fire and sword. Though Marcellus thought it a thousand pities to engage, since the loss sustained by victor and vanquished alike would in either case have repercussions on Caesar, and it lay outside his power to control it, yet he took his legions across the Baetis and drew up his line. On seeing that Cassius had drawn up his line facing him on higher ground in front of his own camp, Marcellus prevailed upon his troops to withdraw to their camp, putting them off with the excuse that the enemy refused to come down into the plain. And so he proceeded to withdraw his forces. Cassius employed his excellent cavalry— in which arm he was strong, and knew Marcellus to be weak—to attack the retreating legionaries, and killed quite a number of their rearguard on the banks of the river. Made aware by this loss of the drawback and difficulty involved in crossing the river. Marcellus transferred his camp to the other side of the Baetis. Now both commanders frequently led out their legions to battle; there was, however, no engagement owing to the difficult nature of the ground.

Marcellus was much stronger in infantry forces; for the legions he had were veteran ones, tested in many campaigns. Cassius relied on the loyalty rather than the valour of his legions. Consequently when the two camps had been pitched over against one another and Marcellus had selected a position suitable for a stronghold which might enable him to prevent the enemy troops from getting water, Longinus was afraid of being shut up by a virtual blockade in territory controlled by others and hostile to himself; and so he silently set out from his camp by night and marched swiftly to Ulia, a town which he believed io be loyal to him. There he pitched his camp so close to the walls of the town that not only its natural position—for Ulia is situated on a lofty mountain—but also the actual fortification of the city made him safe on all sides from assault. Marcellus pursued him and pitched his camp over against the enemy camp as close to Ulia as he could. When he had appreciated the nature of the ground, he had inevitably to resort to the very tactics to which above all he wanted to resort, namely refraining from an engagement—and had there been an opportunity for engaging he could not have held in cheek his excited troops—and at the same time not allowing Cassius to roam too far afield, to prevent more communities from suffering the fate of the inhabitants of Corduba. By siting strongholds at suitable points and carrying his field-works in a continuous ring round the town, he hemmed in Ulia and Cassius with entrenchments. But before these could be completed, Longinus sent out his entire cavalry force, in the belief that it would stand him in very good, stead if it stopped Marcellus from collecting fodder and corn, whereas it would prove a great handicap if, shut up by blockade and rendered useless, it used up precious corn.

Within a few days king Bogud, having received Q. Cassius’ despatches, arrived with his forces; he had brought one legion with him, and to this he now added several auxiliary cohorts of Spanish troops. For, as usually happens in civil wars, some states in Spain at that time were supporters of Cassius, though a larger number warmly espoused the cause of Marcellus. Bogud and his forces came up to the outer entrenchments of Marcellus: sharp fighting broke out between the two sides, and this recurred at frequent intervals., with the tide of fortune often turning from one side to the other. Marcellus, however, was never dislodged from his field-works.

Meanwhile Lepidus came to Ulia from the nearer province with thirty-five legionary cohorts, and a large number of cavalry and other auxiliary troops, his object being to resolve, quite impartially, the dispute between Cassius and Marcellus. On his arrival Marcellus without hesitation put himself confidently into Lepidus’ hands. Cassius, on the other hand, remained within his own defences, either because he thought that a greater measure of justice was due to himself than to Marcellus, or else because he was afraid that Lepidus’ attitude might have been biased by the deference shewn him by his opponent. Lepidus pitched his camp near Ulia, in complete accord with Marcellus. He refused to allow any fighting, invited Cassius to come out, and pledged his word to every offer he made. For a long time Cassius was in doubt as to what he should do or what confidence he should place in Lepidus; but as he could find no solution to his policy if he remained steadfast in his decision, he demanded that the entrenchments should be demolished and that he himself should be granted leave to depart unmolested. Not only had a truce been made, but by now a peaceful settlement had been all but arranged, and they were dismantling the fieldworks and the sentries manning the entrenchments had been withdrawn, when, though nobody expected it—if indeed nobody included Cassius, for there was some doubt as to his complicity—the king’s auxiliary forces launched an attack upon the stronghold of Marcellus nearest the king’s camp, and overpowered a number of troops in it. And had not Lepidus in righteous anger promptly lent his assistance to break up that fray, a greater disaster would have been sustained.

Now that the way lay open to Cassius, Marcellus joined his camp to that of Lepidus. Lepidus and Marcellus then set out with their forces simultaneously for Corduba, Cassius for Carmo. (Feb. 47). Round about the same time Trebonius came to govern the province as pro-consul. When Cassius learned of his coming he posted the legions under his command and the cavalry to their various winter-quarters; as for himself, he hurriedly grabbed all his belongings and hastened to Malaca, where he embarked, although the season was unfavourable for navigation. His object, as he personally averred, was to avoid committing himself to Lepidus, Trebonius and Marcellus: as his friends asserted, to avoid the relative humiliation of travelling through a province a great part of which had revolted from him : as everyone else believed, to avoid letting that money of his—the proceeds of innumerable robberies—fall into the hands of anyone else. At first he made some headway in weather which, considering it was winter, was favourable ; but after he had taken shelter in the river Ebro to avoid sailing by night, the weather then became somewhat stormier; believing, however, that he would run no greater risk if he sailed, he set forth : but what with the swell rolling in head on against the river mouth, and the strong current preventing him from putting about just as the huge waves made it impossible to hold on straight ahead, his ship sank in the very mouth of the river, and so he perished.

On his arrival in Syria from Egypt Caesar learned from those who had joined him there from Rome, as well as from information contained in despatches from the city, that there was much that was bad and unprofitable in the administration at Rome, and that no department of the government was being really efficiently conducted; for rivalries among the tribunes, it was said, were producing dangerous rifts, and the flattering indulgence shown to their troops by the military tribunes and legionary commanders was giving rise to many' practices opposed to military custom and usage which tended to undermine strict discipline. All this, as he saw, urgently demanded his presence : yet, for all that, he thought it more important to leave all the provinces and districts he visited organised in such a way that they would be immune from internal disagreements, would accept a legal constitution, and lay aside their fears of aggression from without. This he was confident he would speedily achieve in Syria, Cilicia and Asia, as these provinces had no war afflicting them: in Bithynia and Pontus he had, as he saw, a heavier task impending. For he heard that Pharnaces had not evacuated Pontus, and he did not expect him to do so, exceedingly puffed up as he was by the successful battle he had fought against Domitius Calvinus. He spent some time in practically all the more important states of Syria, bestowing rewards both upon individuals and communities where they deserved them, and holding official inquiries and giving his ruling in questions of long-standing dispute; while as for the kings, sovereigns and rulers who, as neighbours of the province, had one and all flocked to him, he formally took them under his protection and then, on condition that they undertook to watch over and guard the province, he dismissed them as very loyal friends both to himself and the Roman people.

After spending a few days in that province he posted Sextus Caesar, his friend and kinsman, to command the legions and govern Syria: he himself set out1 for Cilicia in the same fleet in which he had arrived. He then summoned all the states of this latter province to forgather at Tarsus—perhaps the most famous and strongest township in the whole of Cilicia. There he settled all the affairs of the province and its neighbouring states; but when he had done so, his eagerness to set out and prosecute the war admitted no further delay; and so, after traversing Cappadocia by forced marches and staying two days at. Mazaca, he reached Comana, where is the shrine of Bellona—the most ancient and holiest in Cappadocia. This shrine is worshipped with such reverence that the priest of that goddess is held by common consent of the nation to rank next to the king in majesty, dominion and influence. This priesthood he awarded to Lycomedes, a Bithynian of very noble descent, who sought it by right of inheritance; for he was sprung from the royal Cappadocian house, his claim in this respect being, in point of legal right, by no means in doubt, though, in long passing of time, because of the chequered fortunes of his ancestors and changes in the royal line of descent, continuity had been broken. As for Ariobarzanes and his brother Ariarathes, both of them had deserved well of the Republic; and so, to prevent Ariarathes from being tempted to claim his inheritance to the kingdom, or, as heir to it, from intimidating Ariobarzanes, Caesar granted him part of Lesser Armenia and allowed Ariobarzanes to treat him as his vassal. Whereupon Caesar himself proceeded to complete the remainder of his journey with similar dispatch.

When Caesar approached closer to Pontus and the boundaries of Gallograecia, he was met by Deiotarus. Although the latter’s position at that time as tetrarch of practically the whole of Gallograecia was disputed by all his fellow tetrarchs as inadmissible both by law and by tradition, he was, however, indisputably hailed as king of Lesser Armenia by the Senate; and now he laid aside his royal insignia and, dressed not merely as a private person but actually in the garb of defendants in the courts, he came to Caesar as a suppliant, to beg his pardon for having been on the side of Cn. Pompeius. He explained that, situated as he was in a part of the world which had had no garrisons of Caesar’s to protect it, he had been compelled to do so by orders backed by armed force for it had been no business of his to act as judge in the disputes of the Roman people, but only to obey the commands of the moment.

In his reply Caesar reminded him of all the many loyal services he himself as consul had rendered to him by official decrees, and went on to point out that his apology could not be accepted as any excuse for his unwisdom a man, in fact, as wise and careful as he was could have known who was master of Rome and Italy, what was the attitude of the Senate and the Roman people and the position taken up by the government, who in short was consul after L. Lentulus and C. Marcellus. ‘Nevertheless,’ he continued, ‘I make allowance for that action of yours in view of your past generosity towards myself, our long-standing ties of hospitality and friendship, your rank and age, and the entreaties of all those guests and friends of yours who have flocked in crowds to entreat for your pardon. As for the matters in dispute between the tetrarchs, I shall examine into them later.’ He then bade Deiotarus resume his royal garb, but ordered him to bring that legion of his, which was raised from the ranks of his own countrymen but in equipment and training organised on our pattern, together with all his cavalry, for the prosecution of the war.

On his arrival in Pontus Caesar mustered his whole force at a single rendezvous. It was but a modest force both numerically and in practical experience in the field; for apart from the Sixth legion, which he had brought with him from Alexandria—and this, being a veteran one with a long record of hazardous and strenuous achievements, had lost so many men, due partly to the difficulties of transit both by land and sea, partly to the frequency of its campaigns, and was now so much below strength as to comprise less than one thousand troops—apart from the Sixth, the remainder of the force consisted of three legions—one belonging to Deiotarus, and the two which had taken part in that engagement which Cn. Domitius fought with Pharnaces, as I have related. Whereupon envoys sent by Pharnaces approached Caesar and first and foremost entreated him not to approach their country in any hostile spirit, since Pharnaces would carry out all his instructions. In particular they reminded Caesar that Pharnaces had refused to provide Pompeius with any auxiliary troops for use against Caesar; whereas Deiotarus. who had provided them, had none the less given him satisfaction.

Caesar replied that he would be scrupulously fair to Pharnaces if the latter intended to carry out his promises. He warned the envoys, however, in his usual tactful language, not to tax him with the case of Deiotarus or pride themselves unduly on their good services in having refused to send Pompeius auxiliary troops. For whereas nothing gave him greater pleasure than granting pardon when it was humbly entreated, yet it was impossible for him to condone public outrages against the provinces in the case of those who had been loyal towards himself. ‘In point of fact,’ he went on, ‘ that very act of loyalty which you call to mind proved more expedient to Pharnaces, who thereby had the foresight to avoid defeat, than to myself, for whose victory the immortal gods were responsible. As for the great and serious outrages perpetrated against Roman citizens engaged in trade in Pontus, since it is not in my power to set them to rights, I accordingly forgive Pharnaces. I cannot, in fact, restore to murdered men the life they have lost, nor to the mutilated their manhood; and such indeed is the punishment—worse than death—that Roman citizens have undergone. Pharnaces, however, must withdraw forthwith from Pontus, release the household slaves of the tax-gatherers, and make all other such restitution as lies in his power to the allies and Roman citizens. If he does this, then—and not before—shall he send me the tributes and gifts which triumphant commanders are in the habit of receiving from their friends. (Pharnaces had, in fact, sent him a golden crown.) Such was the reply with which the envoys were sent back.

All this Pharnaces graciously promised to do. However, as he hoped that Caesar’s impetuous haste would lead him to trust his own assurances still more readily than the circumstances justified, so that he might tackle more urgent matters with the greater expedition and propriety—for everyone was aware that there were many reasons demanding Caesar’s return to Rome—in this hope, then, he began to take a more leisurely line, to demand a later date for his withdrawal, to propose agreements by way of causing delay —in fine, he proceeded to cheat. Realising the fellow’s cunning, Caesar was now of necessity constrained to adopt the very tactics which on other occasions it had been his natural habit to employ—namely to come to grips more promptly than anyone expected.

Zela is a town situated in Pontus, with adequate natural defences, considering its position in a plain : for its battlements are reared upon a hillock—a natural one for all its artificial appearance—whose summit is loftier than all the terrain surrounding it. Encircling this town are many considerable hills, intersected by valleys; and one of these—a very lofty one—which enjoys no little fame in those parts thanks to the victory of Mithridates, and the misfortune of Triarius and defeat of our army,1 is all but linked to the town by tracks along the higher ground, and is little more than three miles distant from Zela. Here Pharnaces repaired the ancient works of his father’s once prosperous camp, and occupied the position with his entire forces.

Caesar pitched his camp five miles distant from the enemy; and as he now saw that that valley by which the king’s camp was protected would, if Its width separated them, equally afford protection to a camp of his own, provided only that the enemy did not anticipate him in capturing the ground in question, which was much nearer the king’s camp, he ordered materials for a rampart to be carted within the entrenchments. This was speedily collected. The following night he left camp at the fourth watch with all his legions in light order and the heavy baggage left behind in camp, and surprised the enemy at dawn by capturing that very position where Mithridates once fought his successful action against Triarius To this spot he ordered the slaves to bring from the camp all the accumulated material for the rampart, so that none of his troops should quit their work of fortification, since the intervening valley which separated the enemy’s camp from the emplacements which Caesar had begun was not more than a mile wide.

On suddenly observing this situation at dawn, Pharnaces drew up all his forces in front of his camp. In view of the highly uneven character of the intervening ground Caesar supposed that it was the king’s normal military practice more than anything that occasioned this deployment; or else his object was to delay Caesar’s own work of fortification, through the necessity of keeping more men standing to arms ; or again it might be intended as a display of confidence on the king’s part, to shew that it was not on fortification so much as on armed force that Pharnaces relied to defend his position. Accordingly, Caesar was not deterred from keeping the remainder of his army engaged on the work of fortification, deploying only the front line in front of the palisade. Pharnaces, however, took it into his head to engage. Whether it was the lucky associations of the spot that drove him to take this course, or whether it was his scrupulous observance of omens, to which, as we afterwards heard, he gave careful heed, that so prompted him; or maybe it was the small number of our troops which, according to his information, were standing to arms (for he had supposed that that vast gang of slaves which transported the material for the rampart, as though it was their daily employment, was in fact composed of troops) ; or maybe even it was his confidence in that veteran army of his, which, as his envoys boasted, had fought, and conquered upon two and twenty battle-fields, coupled with a contempt for our army, which he knew had been routed by himself when Domitius led if: anyway, having decided to engage, he began the descent down the steep ravine. For some little time Caesar laughed contemptuously at this empty bravado on the part of the king, and at his troops packed closely on ground which no man in his senses would be likely to set foot on; while in the meantime Pharnaces with his forces in battle array proceeded to climb the steep hill-side confronting him at the same steady pace at which he had descended the sheer ravine.

This incredible foolhardiness or confidence on the part of the king disconcerted Caesar, who was not expecting it and was caught unprepared. Simultaneously he recalled the troops from their work of fortification, ordered them to stand to arms, deplored his legions to meet the attack, and formed line of battle; and the sudden excitement to which all this gave rise occasioned considerable panic among our troops. Disorganised as our men were, and as yet in no regular formation, the king’s chariots armed with scythes threw them into confusion; but these chariots were speedily overwhelmed by a mass of missiles. In their wake came the enemy line: the battle cry was raised and the conflict joined, our men being greatly helped by the nature of the ground but above, all by the blessing of the immortal gods. For just as the gods play a part in all the chance vicissitudes of war, so above all do they do so in those where human strategy has proved quite powerless to avail.

Heavy and bitter hand-to-hand fighting took place; and it was on the right wing, where the veteran Sixth legion was posted that the first seeds of victory were sown. As the enemy were being thrust back down the slope on this wing, so too on the left wing and in the centre—much more slowly, but thanks nevertheless to the same divine assistance—the entire forces of the king were being crushed. The ease with which they had climbed the uneven ground was now matched by the speed with which, once dislodged from their footing, the unevenness of the ground enabled them to be driven back. Consequently, after sustaining many casualties—some killed, some knocked out by their comrades’ falling on top of them—those whose nimbleness did enable them to escape none the less threw away their arms; and so, after crossing the valley, they could not make any effective stand from the higher ground, unarmed as they now were. Our men, on the contrary, elated by their victory, did not hesitate to climb the uneven ground and storm the entrenchments. Moreover, despite the resistance of those enemy cohorts which Pharnaces had left guard hi- camp, they promptly won possession of it. With his entire forces either killed or captured Pharnaces took to flight with a few horsemen; and had not our storming of his camp afforded him a freer opportunity for flight, he would have been brought alive into Caesar’s hands.

Such a victory transported Caesar—for all the many past victories to his credit—with incredible delight, inasmuch as he had brought a very serious war to so speedy a conclusion, and because an easy victory, which delighted him the more when he recalled the sudden risk it had involved, had transpired out of a very difficult situation. Having thus recovered Pontus and made a present to his troops of all the royal plunder, he himself set out on the following day with his cavalry in light order; instructing the Sixth legion to leave for Italy to receive its rewards and honours, sending home the auxiliary troops of Deiotarus, and leaving two legions in Pontus with Caelius Vinicianus.

Thus he marched through Gallograecia and Bithynia into Asia, holding investigations and giving his formal ruling on matters of dispute in all those provinces, and assigning due prerogatives to tetrarchs, kings and states. Now Mithridates of Pergamum, whose speedy and successful action in Egypt I have described above, was not merely of royal birth but also of royal training and upbringing; for Mithridates, king of all Asia, had carried him off to camp with him from Pergamum on the score of his noble birth when he was quite young, and had kept him there for many years; for which reasons Caesar now appointed him king of Bosphorus, which had formerly been under control of Pharnaces, and, by thus creating a buffer state ruled by a most friendly king, he secured the provinces of the Roman people from barbarian and unfriendly kings. To the same Mithridates he awarded, by right of racial affinity and kinship, the tetrarchy of Gallograecia which had been seized and occupied a few years earlier by Deiotarus. Nowhere, however, did he delay any longer than the urgency of unsettled conditions at Rome appeared to warrant; and when he had accomplished his tasks with the greatest success and expedition, he arrived in Italy more quickly than anyone expected.