To imagine that a petty republic or any independent community may altogether escape from internal dissension would be an idea equally unsupported by facts, history, or the conditions of human nature; the path to greatness is much too confined and crowded for impatient and self-interested ambition; and the absence of super incumbent pressure leaves the social mass in a state of continual ebullition. Nor is this necessarily mischievous; both good and evil spring from one source, the same sun hardens clay and softens wax; it corrupts, preserves, destroys, and vivifies; the nature of the recipient alone marking the character of the influence; yet through every obstacle truth and intelligence win their way and something publicly useful is ever stricken out by the shock of conflicting interests; general prosperity though often obstructed preserves its course; and even parties and individuals must ultimately submit their motives to that public opinion, which judges, slowly and insensibly, but seldom incorrectly. It is only when commotions are roused by faction, and when universal selfishness makes the public good a mere handmaid to individual interest that these struggles are fatal to the commonwealth; places are then changed, and faction becomes the idol, public good the victim of private cupidity. In such times if a citizen gain respect by his honesty, he may  have nominal followers but neither sincere adherents nor reckless partisans, and rarely an extensive influence; for a character based on integrity will only find support amongst the scattered masses of patriotism and national sincerity; it may have the hollow plaudits of many but the zealous aid of few because few have a disinterested love of virtue and true glory. But when power is acquired by cheap acts of private service at the public cost, by corruption of justice, unmerited promotion, the creation of useless places for undeserving men, an audacious advancement of party objects and a general prostration of the public weal; it imparts a noxious energy to party leaders which being founded on selfishness can only be maintained by dishonesty. And if along with this there exist a widespread hypocrisy, if cant ape piety and cloak ambition; if forms supersede religion, and virtue dwindle to a name; if honest sentiments be openly derided as visions of an inexperienced or distempered mind; if public principle and character be deemed mere articles of trade, and the unwary expression of a chivalrous sentiment softly smiled to scorn amidst the refinement of selfish grandeur; if such things exist, corruption is too widely spread and the country is nodding to its fall.

Florence had not yet arrived at this; there was a fierce sincerity in the character of her sons that refinement had not beaten down to the surface of more polished vice, nor had civilisation smoothed the rougher virtues; but revenge, ambition, and restlessness of spirit were common to the age, and Buondelmonte’s death gave occasion for the exercise of all; a spirit was then raised that shivered every social relation, aggravated the struggle for power, and lighted up a flame that after enduring for ages was only extinguished with Florentine liberty.

Although long independent, Florence was yet but in the infancy of freedom: frugal, industrious, and commercial, she was also from her own ambition and the state of society essentially warlike if not military: the aristocratic power was imposing; the nobles were able and willing leaders of their fellow citizens both to foreign conquest and domestic strife; they had arms, castles, and retainers, were once the enemies but now the masters of the state  war was their “art’ ’and conquest was popular, perhaps necessary to the incipient republic. Their position gave them an influence in the community that discreetly used might have enabled the ancient aristocratical government to rival Venice in duration, but its abuse ruined them, and their power declined from the moment that an indignant people became strong enough to repel their insolence and usurpations.

Nevertheless these dissensions pained the more generous-minded, who unable to stop their fury sought an honourable excuse for withdrawing from such scenes of domestic insanity; this and the militant religion of the age induced several gentlemen to join the bands of Italian crusaders then moving eastward; amongst these one of the most conspicuous was Bonaguisa de’ Galigari as the first to scale the walls and plant the standard of Florence on the towers of Damietta; nor did the rage of faction prevent his fellow-citizens at home from gaining both reputation and territory in external war, or from compelling the whole ancient Contado to acknowledge the supremacy and feel the growing power of the commonwealth.

Otho’s death in 1218 removed every pretence for delaying Frederic the Second's coronation; the politics of Rome were no longer directed by the sagacious Innocent, and Honorius III, who succeeded him in 1216 consented in 1220 to perform that ceremony. In despite of ecclesiastical rancour and German enthusiasm Frederic has been described by less prejudiced writers as a man of active, refined, and vigorous intellect; prudent, brave and generous; of great bodily strength and personal beauty: capable of any fatigue and eager for fame in war politics and literature: he was courteous in disposition, witty, and unusually accomplished in all the knowledge and acquirements of the time: he was conspicuous as a poet and philosopher, was master of the Greek, Latin, German, French, Italian and Arabic tongues, and distinguished his long reign by wise laws and useful regulations, yet was by no means exempt from the fierceness and cruelty of the age. Although brought up from infancy by one of the ablest men that ever filled the popedom expressly as its child and champion and even owing his exaltation to pontifical support, he became one of its bitterest opponents: too early and too long behind the scenes, and much too sagacious not to detect the subservience of religion to temporal ambition; he spurned the superstition of his cotemporaries, despised the maledictions as he defied the power of the church, and incurred its anathemas because he endeavoured to diminish its riches and authority. Learning, justice, and magnificence, are said to have been strongly conspicuous in him, but his Italian biographers having been for the most pail Guelphs and churchmen, the stories related of him may be received as aspersions of sectarian malice against an excommunicated enemy; even Matthew Paris changed his tone when he was told of the emperor’s talking of the necessity of reducing the church to its primitive poverty.

The fate of his friend and minister Piero delle Vigne of Capua, if truly told, would nevertheless impress us with an unfavourable idea of his mercy and magnanimity. Piero was sent with Taddeo di Sessa as Frederic’s advocate and representative to the council of Lyon which was assembled by his friend Innocent the Fourth, nominally to reform the church, but really to impart more force and solemnity to a fresh sentence of excommunication and deposition. There Taddeo spoke with force and boldness for his master; but Piero was silent; and hence he was accused of being, like several others, bribed by the pope not only to desert the emperor but to attempt his life, and whether he were really culpable or the victim of court intrigue is still doubtful; Frederic on apparently good evidence condemned him to have his eyes burned out and the sentence was executed at San Miniato al Tedesco: being afterwards sent on horseback to Pisa, where he was hated, as an object for popular derision he died as is conjectured from the effects of a fall while thus cruelly exposed and not by his own hand as Dante believed and sung .

At his coronation ambassadors were present, with magnificent retinues of distinguished gentlemen and their retainers, from all the Italian states, and amongst these the Florentine and Pisan embassies were conspicuous. The two republics were then at peace, but a silly misunderstanding at a private entertainment is said to have caused those wars which after centuries of mischief only ended by the second and final subjugation of Pisa when Florence, herself exhausted, was almost at the termination of her race as an independent city.

It happened that a certain Roman cardinal invited the Florentine ambassadors to his house where one of them struck with the beauty of a little dog belonging to their host begged it as a present, next day the Pisan embassy was feasted and the dog, already promised to the Florentine, attracted equal admiration; a similar request followed and the cardinal forgetting his previous engagement answered it as graciously. Scarcely had the guests departed when the animal was sent for by the Florentine ambassador; then came the Pisan messenger but all too late: the two dignitaries met, restitution of the dog was immediately demanded and as decidedly refused; sharp altercation ensued, swords were soon drawn and an affray succeeded in which the Pisans overcame by their superior numbers. The manners of the age however did not admit of such a termination, both Florentine factions united against the Pisans and even volunteers from the capital came to the aid of the former; the affair had now become serious, almost national, and the Florentines took ample revenge. The Pisan ambassadors complained to their government and their haughty countrymen trusting to great naval power and consequent influence on the trade of Florence seized all the merchandise of that state which was within their grasp and refused any satisfaction, while the latter carried its forbearance to a point of humiliation that proves the great importance of its commercial relations with Pisa. The Florentines offered to take an equal number of bales of tow, or any other rubbish however vile, in lieu of the goods, and afterwards indemnify their own merchants, so that some shadow of satisfaction might be exhibited to the world for the sake of national reputation; adding that if this also failed their ancient friendship must cease and war be the only alternative. “If the Florentines march we trill endeavour to meet them half way”, was the contemptuous answer of Pisa. War was therefore declared and in July the armies met at Castel del Bosco in the Pisan territory, Florence being probably assisted by Lucca as the Lucchese historians assert; for it may be doubted whether the former at that early period could have ventured alone to war with so powerful an adversary. A long and bloody battle ending in the total defeat of Pisa satisfied the honour and soothed the pride of Florence, while thirteen hundred prisoners including the greater part of the Pisan nobility convinced the people that this victory was a palpable instance of divine retribution for the arrogance and injustice of their adversaries.

This sudden brawl about a lap-dog would scarcely have occasioned war had not other materials been already prepared; the growing jealousy of Pisa as may be seen from her implacability, proved a source of infinite evil not only to herself and Tuscany but to the whole Italian nation.

And here we have a striking example of the facility with which a mere local or even private squabble may be changed by force of circumstances into a national question; more especially in free states where partial excitement is apt to lead to overt acts, and which by provoking an ill-balanced retaliation may force governments to the alternative of compromising the honour of their country, or making that a grave subject of quarrel which neither policy, inclination, nor its intrinsic merits would otherwise have justified.

The next military operation was an unsuccessful attempt on the revolted town of Figline in the upper Val d' Arno, and the erection town and castle of Ancisa to hold it in check while the Masnadieri (hired soldiers) continued the investment: wherefore it appears that internal divisions did not paralyse the external movements of Florence, and that the executive government supported by the ignoble citizens continued to extend its outward dominion while the nobles of either faction zealously co-operated in every public enterprise beyond the walls. Thus at the battle of Cortenuova and the siege of Brescia in 1237 and of Faenza in 1240 both Florentine factions were amicably serving in the imperial ranks.

Under the Podestà Anchea of Perugia the Pistoians were defeated, the defences of Montefiore demolished, the walled town of Carmignano reduced and its insulting tower levelled to the ground; Siena which had attacked Montepulciano was next invaded and ravaged up to the very gates of the capital. The Podestà Otto da Mandello of Milan took the field with the Carroccio, passed by Siena and laid waste all the country as far as San Quirico and Radicofani, made an inroad on the Perugians for assisting her and demanded the sovereignty of their lake as belonging to the abbey of Florence. The Perugians asked assistance of the Romans but the Florentine general retired and fell upon Siena with such vigour as to carry one of the suburbs and lead twelve hundred of the inhabitants away as prisoners.

This predatory warfare recommenced in 1232 under Jacopo di Perugia to retaliate for a second investment and destruction of Montepulciano, and so far differed in its result from previous inroads as to gain a new ally and dependent in Count Hubert of the Maremma who annoyed by the power of Siena wisely selected a more distant master and agreed to do homage to the republic by the annual tribute of a hind covered with scarlet cloth; Florence was to succeed to his domains and shortly after in consequence of his death became possessed of Port Ercole and several other important places in the Maremma.

The next year’s campaign was conducted with equal energy, and Siena invested on three sides, the besiegers insulting it by throwing dead asses and other offensive matter into the town from their mangonels according to the custom of the time; Giovanni del Giudice of Rome being Podestà renewed these forays for fifty-three days in 1234 until the enemy wearied out by continual alarms sued for peace at the moment when another army was ready to take the field under Compagnone del Poltrone; a treaty was therefore concluded that secured indemnification and independence to Montepulciano with some stipulations in favour of Florence, which thus in despite of domestic jars had maintained offensive war for six years against a powerful enemy and finally accomplished her object, a thing that seldom happens.

Civil discords which had relaxed during the first ardour of the crusaders or were absorbed in the more generous enthusiasm of external war, revived at the approach of peace and for several years dim the lustre of Florentine history: parties and families were nearly balanced and private feuds were frequently suspended or finished by regular truces, treaties of peace being drawn up with all the technical forms of public diplomacy and witnessed by public notaries in presence of the magistrates.

The disputes between church and empire for temporal possessions, religion being the rallying-cry, still continued in all their violence, and added fresh venom to the Guelph and Ghibelline factions which rose or fell according to the talents of their two great chieftains. Frederic returned excommunicated but successful from Palestine, and suddenly descending on Puglia soon regained the kingdom of Naples which the pope had treacherously occupied in his absence. Tuscany was divided, but the imperialists always maintained an ascendency in Pisa both from ancient obligations and against the insidious intrigues of Rome: missionaries had been dispatched into many parts of Italy ostensibly to preach peace but really to exact an oath of allegiance to the pope, in the accomplishment of which the bishops were ordered to assist. The emperor had prohibited these inconvenient messengers, but one of them penetrating as pope’s legate into Sardinia, then a province of Pisa, persuaded the four principal vassals of that republic to surrender their fiefs and receive them again at his hands as feudatories of the church. This enraged the Pisan government which accordingly drew closer to Frederic, but as the pope had many blind adherents there, even in purely temporal affairs, both factions flared up with new spirit and threw the city into confusion.

Frederic repaired to Pisa for the purpose of concerting a vigorous opposition to the Church whose anathemas were still rolling in successive volleys over him; a council was summoned at Rome for more solemn cursing; but the emperor treated it with scorn, arrested all the ecclesiastics that came within his reach on their way to the Lateran and hearing that a bevy of prelates was proceeding from Genoa to Rome he persuaded the Pisans to unite their galleys with his Sicilian squadron and captured them. But although at war with Genoa, Pisa had too much respect for the clergy not to give them timely notice of what was preparing; yet confident in the skill and bravery of Genoese mariners the prelates sailed and fell in with the combined squadrons off the island of Giglio: after a bloody battle the Genoese were defeated on Ord May 1240 with the loss of twenty-five galleys and 4000 prisoners; prelates and all being conducted in triumph to Pisa where these dignitaries were honoured by silver instead of iron chains.

Frederic hailed this victory as the judgment of Heaven in a rightful cause, and Piero delle Vigne exerted all his eloquence to prove it; meanwhile this prince advanced to Rome and Pope Gregory IX bowed down by extreme age and mortification soon after expired. Celestine IV succeeded, but lived only a few days and made room for Sinebaldo Fieschi the intimate friend of Frederic who however knew both him and the Church too well not to feel that he had lost a friend in the cardinal and acquired a new and bitter enemy in the pope.

Feeling himself insecure from the emperor’s great power in Italy Innocent IV sent secretly to Genoa for a squadron of galleys and escaping Frederic’s vigilance proceeded by stealth to Civita Vecchia where he embarked and arrived safely at Genoa, then departing for Lyon he immediately prepared to call a council for the emperor’s deposition.

Meanwhile Frederic employed himself in strengthening his own authority by depressing the Guelphs; he took hostages from both factions in Florence with apparent impartiality but soon exposed his real views by releasing the Ghibelines while their unfortunate rivals were allowed to pine away in the fortress of San Miniato as objects of public charity. The preservation of a strong party in that city was essential, and he therefore maintained an active correspondence with the potent family of Uberti. the acknowledged chiefs of his faction, promising them ample support in expelling their adversaries and establishing a purely Ghibelline government.

Frederic was then paramount in Italy, and had in fact sheltered himself against the sudden blasts of priestly anathemas by retaining a disciplined body of Saracens in his service to whom he gave the ancient city of Nocera as a possession; thus securing a strong fortress and twenty thousand faithful soldiers depending entirely on himself and invulnerable to the sharpest maledictions of the Lateran. The Ghibelines now felt the full strength of their position, while the recent flight of Innocent, in despite of his formal excommunication and deposition of Frederic in 1245, depressed the spirits and unnerved the strength of their adversaries. Arms, friends, money, and intrigues were all diligently employed by the emperor to increase his influence in the Italian cities, and aware that parties were nearly balanced at Florence he hoped by a bold and vigorous effort to drive every Guelph from the town, and reduce it to his own devotion. He called on the Uberti to smite strongly and demolish their adversaries, and the rising passions of either faction gave awful note of a bloody and tremendous struggle.

There was no need of a second word; peace had disappeared at Buondelmonte’s death; both parties now flew to arms; even the middle classes, who had hitherto preserved some union and principally upheld the state, now joined the general cry, and the year 1247 was marked by slaughter, rapine, outrage and conflagration. Every occupation ceased but that of arms; the plebeians, even the lowest classes of the town, were soon affected; and pride and hatred and faction, and ambition, raged equally in the lordly tower and the humblest dwelling. Each district of the city was a separate camp, each battled with its neighbour in promiscuous fury; but in four of them were as many strong positions of the Ghibelines where the struggle was peculiarly severe : thus in San Piero Scheraggio; round the Duomo and the Torro di Sancia; about Porta San Piero; and beneath the lofty tower of Scarafaggio de’ Soldanieri; not only citizen with citizen but persons of the same name and lineage stabbed at each others’ breast with indiscriminate rage; and thus the Buondelmonti and Scolari; the Buonaguisi and Brunelleschi, disregarded the ties of consanguinity in this general frenzy. Tower fought with tower; house with house; and every span of earth was wet with blood: no nuptials, no feasts, no pastimes; but in their stead funerals and wounds and homicides, now of this citizen, now of that, with short and weeping intervals.

The centre of Ghibeline strength was at the Uberti palace where they were opposed by the Bagnesi, Pulci, and Guidalotti backed by some Oltr’ Arno Guelphs who had crossed the river on the upper wear: at Porta San Piero the Tedaldini were strong in towers, and along with the Lisci, Abati, Giuochi, Galigai, Caponsachi and some of the Buonaguisi, opposed the Donati Bisdomini and Pazzi, while the remainder of the Buonaguisi stood firm in the Guelphic ranks. At the Porta del Duomo, Sancia de’ Cattani chief of the Ghibelines headed the Agolanti and a strong body of citizens : they were met by the Tosinghi and Arrigucci, but the Brunelleschi like the Buonaguisi divided on either side. In San Pancrazio the Lamberti, Toschi, Arnieri and Miglorelli with a crowd of Ghibelline burghers closed round the Scarafaggio; they were checked by the Vechetti and Tomaquinci, but the Pigli sided with both factions: in Borgo Sant’ Apostolo, the Soldanieri, Scolari and Guidi encountered the Scali, Bostichi, Giandonati, and Buondelmonti. Beyond Arno the Obriacchi and Mannelli were the only nobles for the imperial cause, in opposition to the Guelphic Rossi and Nerli.

These were the principal heads of battle, and its fury was still raging when Frederic, watching the crisis, sent his son Frederic of Antioch with 1600 German horse towards the capital and gave fresh spirit to the Ghibelines. The Podestà Jacopo di Rota had battled stoutly for the Guelphs whom the intelligence of this reinforcement urged to closer work and a speedy termination of the struggle ere the enemy could form a junction within the town. The Ghibelines on the contrary studiously avoided a combat until they could pounce with augmented vigour on their adversaries. Cautiously abandoning all weaker positions they concentrated in great force round the palace and towers of the Uberti, believing that if they succeeded in gaining the open places of Florence they could afterwards more easily reduce the towers and houses which only admitted of a few defenders: uniting therefore with the King of Antioch’s men-at-arms and issuing from their barricades in powerful sections they brought an overwhelming force to bear on every Guelphic position, successively carrying each, until the whole mass of their enemies was driven upon the Serragli of the Bagnesi and Guadalotti where they stood at bay. But they were all too weak; their numbers diminished, the enemy was reinforced, and the struggle became hopeless.

A retreat was determined on, when they suddenly heard that Rustico Mangonelli one of their principal leaders had expired; this gallant knight after many valorous deeds had fallen mortally wounded by an arrow from the tower of the Soldanieri, and his fellows were too high-spirited to leave the body as an object of insult from a haughty faction, who according to the then barbarous custom would have dragged it ignominiously through the streets and plunged it in the Arno. Thoughtless of every danger, eager for the honour of their dead chief and animated by one spirit, they marched tired as they were, to where the body lay and carried it off to the temple of San Lorenzo with a military pomp to which their dented shields gave more effect than all the misplaced trappings of a funeral train. These iron obsequies moved on in grim array; the bier was borne by six knights besmeared with blood and dust, each with a lance or crossbow on the outward arm : no funeral torch was seen in flank or front; but in their stead, the grey gleam of battered arms with a flash from the spear, or the partizan; it was more the triumph of a conqueror than a funeral, the torn and trailing banners and the bloody corpse alone proclaiming its mournful character. Not a countenance betrayed any emotion of fear or softness: grief was dimly seen, but ire and vengeance were predominant. None pitied the fallen knight; each envied his renown and honourable death, but felt himself disgraced in still existing for future shame and long enduring sorrow.

Such thoughts, first muttered then audibly expressed suddenly roused up the Guelphic youth who would have again begun the battle and fallen, and lie festering in their fathers’ sepulchres rather than wander as fugitives with their wives and children to exist on a stranger’s bounty. Age and prudence prevailed; Rustico Mangonelli was interred in gloomy silence and the defeated remnant of these Guelphic bands slowly and sullenly retired.

Thus fell for a season the Guelphic faction, but still unbroken; they retreated to neighbouring towns and castles, principally to Monte Varchi and Capraja whence a predatory and annoying warfare was maintained against the capital: to this the Ghibelines opposed taxation and German auxiliaries, but the foreigners were beaten at Monte Varchi with great slaughter so that Frederic, after an unsuccessful encounter with the people of Parma, passed into Tuscany where joining the Florentines he attacked and took Capraja making prisoners many Guelphic chiefs whom, it is said, were carried to Puglia and put to death, Rinieri Buondelmonte alone escaping but with the loss of his eyes, and he too afterwards died a hermit in the island of Monte Christo,

The Ghibelines also abused their victory and soon lost all popularity in Florence by the destruction of towers, palaces, and even churches, merely because they belonged to or were frequented by the rival faction: amongst these was the magnificent dwelling of the Tosinghi in the old market-place, an edifice celebrated for its size and beauty and distinctively called “the Palace”. A lofty tower called the Guardamorto at the entrance of the Corso de’ Adimari was undermined and tumbled headlong down, but swerving in its fall cleared the baptistry of Saint John which the rage of party had doomed to destruction only because it was the usual place of Guelphic assemblies. The escape of this ancient and revered edifice was hailed as a miracle and its intended ruin execrated by the majority of citizens; nor was this rabid vengeance against inanimate things a forgotten, or neglected precedent when their adversaries returned to power.

These were Frederic’s last exploits in Tuscany: after the capture of Capraja he retired into Puglia, while the administration of his party in Florence became universally odious, their private deportment insolent, and their taxation grievous: the private citizens, whom common vexation bound in closer bands, began to feel their strength; they became impatient of wrong, saw plainly that the church would prove the only real support for national independence, and the best nurse of that liberty which then was and must ever be in danger under the wolfish protection of unrestricted royalty.

The emperor’s absence together with the defeat and capture of a natural son by the Bolognese also depressed the spirits of his adherents in the north; and the discomfiture and nearly total destruction of the Florentine army by the Guelphs in the upper Val d’Arno left these a fair occasion to reestablish themselves which they were too sagacious to neglect. Tired of continual alarms, of repeated tumults, and the everlasting disorder with which Florence was filled by the insolent insubordination of the Ghibelline nobles especially the Uberti; galled too by the pressure of increased taxation ostensibly levied to oppose the Guelphs; the citizens deemed it a far wiser act to recall the exiles than ruin the commonwealth by eternal divisions and intestine war.

As early therefore as the twentieth of October the people guided by some principal citizens assembled together in arms, first at the church of San Firenze, and then through fear of the Uberti at that of Santa Croce: here all their grievances were enumerated in short, pointed, and exciting harangues, the conduct of their oppressors was sharply arraigned, the distinction of Guelph and Ghibelline denounced, and a resolution passed no longer to submit to the vexatious insolence of the nobles. Amongst these a more intense hate attached to the Uberti who glorying in their German ancestry treated the Italians like mere slaves and trampled upon them as if they were not composed of the same materials as themselves. A resolution to assume the government was carried by acclamation, but much caution was necessary to give full effect to so bold and uncompromising a decision, wherefore they determined neither to separate nor quit their arms until this purpose should be completed. Marching in a body to the towers of the Ancioni in San Lorenzo and establishing themselves in that position was the work of a moment; the Ghibelline Podestà was then driven from power and replaced by a man of their own; a provisional government of thirty-six citizens was organised, and a complete revolution accomplished. The nobles depressed by their recent overthrow made no resistance, and the Guelphs’ restoration becoming every hour more popular was finally urged so homo on their adversaries that even one of the distrusted Uberti became an advocate for the emperor’s acquiescence: but Frederic was already dead and the despondency of his faction augmented, where­fore the people assuming new courage easily compelled their opponents to consent to the exiles’ recall and a general pacification.

A reconstruction of the whole machine of government was loudly and universally demanded, as well as an efficient organisation of all external means of defence ere a new emperor should have leisure to strengthen himself and disturb the national tranquillity. Florence was accordingly divided into six parts called “Sestos” with two magistrates to each, chosen by the citizens of every division so as to make a governing body of twelve “Anziani” or elders, whose official authority lasted for one year: along with these, but of superior rank, a new magistrate charged with the administration of civil and criminal justice was substituted for the Podestà whose office was now abolished, but restored the following year with more limited authority. The new officer was denominated “Captain of the People” in order to mark more distinctly the spirit of his duty, which was to protect inferior citizens against aristocratic power by a prompt and uncompromising execution of justice: and to avoid all local attachments it was decreed, as in the case of a Podestà, that so high a dignity could only be held by a foreigner, Uberto di Lucca being the first on whom that honour was conferred.

As authority, however strong in theory, requires wherewithal to give it vitality, for like a statue of the human figure it cannot be sustained without extraneous support, the military strength of the republic was remodelled in a more effective form both for internal police and national protection: all the Urban population capable of bearing arms was divided into twenty companies and that of the Contado into ninety-six “Pivieri” or unions of several parishes, each union being connected with a certain number of others and forming what was denominated a “League.”

Every civic company served under its own banner or “Gonfalon” round which it rallied at the sound of the great city bell, called the “Campan” or at the command of the “Capitano del Popolo.” Each Piviere laid also its Gonfalon, and a body of horse was attached to every “Sexto” besides the regular companies. Their arms were as various as their ensigns but all distinctly organised and suited to each other; cavalry, heavy-armed infantry, archers, cross-bowmen, baggage train, and some bands of irregulars denominated “Ribaldi”, each under its respective standard, composed the military force of the community, which could assemble in great strength and with wonderful celerity.

The commander of each company had charge of the colours and thence was denominated“ Gonfaloniere”, the office being renewed every Whitsuntide with great pomp and the several standards delivered in the square of the “Mercato Nuovo” to the respective chiefs of companies. These regulations were of singular importance inasmuch as they employed the armed hand of the people to enforce the execution of their own laws against a haughty and potent nobility who rarely deigned to submit to the voice of unsupported justice.

As a further security the strong palace of the Podestá, now called the “Bargello”, was erected for the permanent seat of government which before this having no fixed place of meeting used to assemble wherever circumstances made it most convenient. They also took this occasion for reducing the height of private towers, to about ninety-six feet or something more than a third of their usual altitude; and almost all belonging to between eighty and ninety noble families, of whom few possessed less than two; and their massiveness may be more easily conceived from the circumstance of the materials having been nearly sufficient to erect the city walls beyond the Arno.

The people in this revolutionary movement conducted themselves with great moderation and carefully avoided the example set them by their oppressors; no one was molested and nothing was destroyed; the inhabitants were free in action and opinion and as long as peace was preserved no inquiry was made whether a citizen were Guelph or Ghibelline; he only being held an enemy who attempted to disturb public tranquillity : even the Uberti submitted with grace, and by such measures the more opulent citizens and great mass of the community, forming what Villani calls “Il Primo Popolo” were inspired with new spirit and felt confident in their own united strength, as well against the power of individual chiefs as the general insolence and injustice of the great.

By this arrangement every Sesto of the city was a military as well as a civil division; each with its own separate powers, interests, and resources; each in close union with the neighbouring compartment, and all vigilant over public interests. The twenty companies were distributed according to the size and population of the Sesto, those of San Piero Scheraggio and Oltr' Arno having four, the others but three each: their equipment varied much in the same manner as in other Italian states of the period where it was customary to select from amongst the wealthy citizens, and from the nobles too, when they became citizens, one or two squadrons of horsemen in complete armour: in Florence it would appear as if there were one company of men-at-arms to each sesto, and the same quarter also sent forth two other chosen bodies each of which was double the number of the cavalry; one of cross-bowmen the other of heavy-armed infantry, the latter being equipped with a palvese or great shield, a helmet and a long lance; the rest were lighter armed, and all between the ages of seventeen and seventy were enrolled. The only officers were the sectional chief, his ensign and the captain of each company; the whole body being commanded by the Captain of the People or the Podesta.

In order to give more dignity to the national army and form a rallying point for the troops, there had been established a great car called the Carroccio drawn by two beautiful oxen which carrying the Florentine standard generally accompanied them to the field. This car was painted vermilion, the bullocks were covered with scarlet cloth, and the driver, a man of some consequence, was dressed in crimson, was exempt from taxation, and served without pay: these oxen were maintained at the public charge in a public hospital and the white and red banner of the city was spread above the car between two lofty spars. Those taken at the battle of Monteaperto are still exhibited in Siena Cathedral as trophies of that fatal day.

Macchiavelli erroneously places the adoption of the Carroccio by the Florentines at this epoch, but it was long before in use and probably was copied from the Milanese as soon as Florence became strong and independent enough to equip a national army. Eribert Archbishop of Milan seems to have been its author, for in the war between Conrad the first and that city, besides other arrangements for military organisation, he is said to have finished by the invention of the Carroccio: it was a pious and not impolitic imitation of the ark as it was carried before the Israelites. This vehicle is described, and also represented in ancient paintings as a four-wheeled oblong car drawn by two, four, or six bullocks: the car was always red, and the bullocks, even to their hoofs, covered as above described, but with red or white according to the faction; the ensign staff was red, lofty, and tapering, and surmounted by a cross or golden ball: on this between two white fringed veils hung the national standard, and half way down the mast a crucifix. A platform run out in front of the car spacious enough for a few chosen men to defend it, while behind on a corresponding space the musicians with their military instruments gave spirit to the combat : mass was said on the Carroccio ere it quitted the city, the surgeons were stationed near it, and not unfrequently a chaplain also attended it to the field. The loss of the Carroccio was a great disgrace and betokened utter discomfiture; it was given to the most distinguished knight who had a public salary and wore conspicuous armour and a golden belt: the best troops were stationed round it, and there was frequently the hottest of the fight.

The Carroccio seems to have been admirably adapted to preserve the incipient discipline of those early times when the Italian republics were only commencing their military career, by preventing inexperienced troops from tumultuously breaking their ranks either in advancing or retiring with undue precipitation; the station of each company depended on that of the car which was generally placed in the rear as a rallying point from whence a new and more determined attack could be made. It served well to connect the troops, to give Tho civic infantry a degree of confidence in themselves, and spirit enough to withstand the heavy charges of the men-at-arms who were all gentlemen, and formed the great strength of armies at that period. It perhaps first showed that steady infantry would deprive both knights and barbed steeds of a portion of their terror; but they never dreamed in those chivalrous days of the great superiority that more recent tactics have imparted to infantry over the cavalry of later times, a secret which Gonsalvo di Cordova first revealed to modem horsemen.

Although the Italian bullocks walk more rapidly than the northern race yet the movements of these armies were necessarily slow, but the troops were kept well in hand and the whole force concentrated on one point; which, when we consider that victory then depended less on tactics than individual strength and courage, was a considerable advance in discipline.

The colours belonged to the whole army not to any particular column or company; they were the banners of their city and all the troops were citizens; to support the point on which they waved was the object, the duty, and the safety of all; no smoke prevented the standard from being seen ; the mast that carried it was thirty feet in height, and all the physical and moral force of the army was directed towards it. Where the movement of the Carroccio was to be followed, rapid evolutions of infantry could not be expected, but neither was there more celerity on the enemy’s part, and the troops once ranged, the battle was commonly decided by hard fighting: the Feditori who began the onslaught, if unsuccessful, generally fell back on the second line for support, or retreated through it and rallied on the third, and the battles before the time of the Condottieri were often obstinate and bloody. Besides the Carroccio the Florentine army was accompanied by a great bell called “Martinella” or “Campana degli Asini” which for thirty days before hostilities began, tolled continually day and night from the arch of “Porta Santa Maria” as a public declaration of war and as the ancient chronicle hath it “for greatness of mind that the enemy might have full time to prepare himself”. At the same time also the Carroccio was drawn from its place in the offices of San Giovanni by the most distinguished knights and noble vassals of the republic, and conducted in state to the “Mercato Nuovo” where it was placed upon the circular stone still existing, and remained there until the army took the field. Then also the Martinella was removed from its station to a wooden tower placed on another car, and with the Carroccio served to guide the troops by night and day. “And with these two pomps, of the Carroccio and Campana” says Malespini, “the pride of the old citizens our ancestors was ruled. ”

The death of Frederic liberated many Florentine prisoners and hostages, and determined the Anziani, after a solemn pacification between hostile factions, to recall the Guelphs who were on several accounts less unpopular than their rivals; for independent of their carriage being less haughty and over­bearing both politics and religion united in making the cause of the Church most agreeable to the majority. They were restored in the beginning of 1251 after two years of exile but found their power abridged and their influence diminished; for the late revolution had annihilated the exclusive government of an aristocracy; the democratic rule now commenced, the city was at once calmed and united and the republic increased in dominion riches and grandeur. It is says Macchiavelli, impossible to conceive the extent of force and authority acquired by Florence in a very short period after this revolution when she rapidly mounted up not only to be the first city of Tuscany but one of the first class in Italy itself.

An expedition against Pistoia in favour of the exiled Guelphs of that city was strongly opposed by the Ghibelines who refused to take the field against their friends in an aggressive and unjust war which, however veiled in plausibility, was a manifest breach of the peace by a direct attack on the Highline faction. The Guelphs on the contrary maintained that they meant no harm to the imperialists, but merely to unite parties in Pistoia as they were at Florence: the Ghibelines maintained their opposition, but the expedition proceeded; the Pistoians were defeated at Monte Robolini but preserved their town, and the Florentines returned unsuccessful though victo­rious. The government bent on union and the due assertion of its authority drove the refractory Ghibelines into exile and made a closer union with the Guelphic party who in the triumph of the moment resolved to change the standard of Florence from a white lily in a red field to the red lily in a field of white; a flag which there seems some reason for supposing they had previously adopted in their civil conflicts with the Ghibelines who still retained the ancient banner,

These new exiles joined the Ubaldini and maintained a predatory but unsuccessful warfare in the Mugello; then shifting to the Val d’ Arno and uniting with some German remnants of Frederic’s army they defeated the Florentine Guelphs and took the town of Montaia; treaties were afterwards concluded by the captain of the people and podestà of Florence, with Lucca Genoa, San Miniato, and Orvieto; and the Anziani prepared for a vigorous campaign. Alarmed at the vicinity of a purely Ghibelline town a restoration of the Pistoian Guelphs was their principal object; the recent success of their own exiles touched their pride, and the loss of Montaia was a disgrace to their arms. In the depth of a severe winter they took the field, regained Montaia in face of the united armies of Pisa and Siena, marched on Pistoia, besieged Tizana, and while still before it, heard of the defeat of the Lucchese army by the Pisans at Monopoli; terms were instantly made with the besieged, and a sudden march brought them on the victor’s flank at Pontadera where encumbered by prisoners and spoil the Pisans were totally defeated with great slaughter. Many of them were delivered over to the Lucchese as an indemnification for their recent loss, and the podesta with 3000 of his beaten troops was carried in triumph to Florence.

This battle presents a curious example of the mutability of fortune, for at one moment the Lucchese soldiers were dragged away in bonds amidst the scoffs of the victorious Pisans; the next saw them leading their captors captive and returning their unmanly insults as they moved in chains to the capital. Without a halt the victorious army marched against Count-Guido Novello and the exiled Ghibelines in Fighine which surrendered on condition that they were to be restored and the Count set free; these conditions were observed but the town was destroyed.

In this manner the popular government of Florence moved steadily forward for ten years gathering honour and riches and spreading its influence over the greater part of Tuscany; Count Guido Novello who had joined the Ghibelines and excited the people of Figlini to revolt was attacked and beaten and the town recaptured; Pistoia, after repeated failures was finally reduced to subjection; the Guelphs were restored, and the Florence gate of that city turned into a citadel and placed in the hands of the Anziani.

The dominions of Volterra where the Ghibelines were paramount was next assailed, and the country laid waste up to the very walls of the city: this proved too much for the inhabitants to bear; they sallied with a great force of infantry and were nearly victorious when the Florentine horse dashed gallantly over the rocky and uneven ground and with a terrible shock drove back their army in confusion to the town, but so closely pursued that victors and vanquished rolled in together, and the strongest city in Tuscany was taken in an instant. Here bloodshed ceased; no robbery, no violence, not an insult was allowed; the vanquished submitted without a blow and Volterra became ever after a vassal of the Florentine republic. The army then marched on Pisa, passed the river Era and devastated the surrounding country while the Pisans weak from domestic jars became alarmed and disheartened; they sued for peace on any conditions, and the victors accepting every preliminary returned home to dictate the definitive treaty. It was settled, without much appearance of moderation, that all Florentine merchandise should be free while in Pisan territories; that several towns should be surrendered to the Genoese, Lucchese, and Florentines, and others emancipated; besides several articles of less importance all too severe not to be infringed on the first favourable occasion.

The success of Florence had been constant since democracy first gained the ascendant there, and the unusual good fortune of the year 1254 had procured for it the emphatic denomination of “Anno Vittorioso”, yet it was darkened by the permanent institution of the Inquisition, an act supported by the government more perhaps from political than religious motives because all heretics were naturally attached to the emperor’s party, and under Innocent IV for the first time the stake and the faggot were seen in Florence.

Conrad, son of the late emperor, arrived in Puglia the year after his father’s death and immediately attempted a reconciliation with the pope; this was rejected by Innocent, at whose instigation the country rose in arms against him; war and its usual cruelties succeeded, until the death of Conrad in the spring left the whole kingdom at his mercy and depressed the Ghibelline spirit throughout Italy.

Except Pisa and Siena all Tuscany was either sincerely or politically Guelph; even the Counts Pepo de’ Visconti of Campiglia and Guglielmo Aldobrandeschi, though Ghibelines themselves, had found it necessary to join the Guelphic republic. Pisa was therefore forced into an ignominious peace and Siena principally in consequence of this state of things submitted to terms scarcely less humiliating: these last were hastened by a vigorous and successful campaign on the part of Florence who at the pontiff’s death expected some unwelcome changes in the south of Italy: the negotiations with Siena were carried on principally by the celebrated Brunetto di Buonaccorso Latini, the friend and master of Dante, and included the relinquishment of all rights asserted by Siena over the petty republics of Montalcino and Montepulciano with the guarantee of their independence by Florence: these were the most difficult and important articles of this treaty which in addition to another with Arezzo concluded the transactions of this triumphant year.

Florence was now rich powerful and quiet, wherefore Count Guido Novello finding the difficulty of retaining his feudal authority in the immediate vicinity of so ambitious a republic, wisely disposed of his rights in the towns of Empoli, Monterapoli, Vinci, Cerreto, Collegonzi and others, to the Florentines for ten thousand Pisan lire.

The rising influence of Manfred, natural son of Frederic II, now first affected Viterbo which making war on Orvieto involved Florence in the cause of her ally, and a body of five hundred men-at-arms were dispatched under Count Guido Guerra to the latter s assistance; these necessarily passed by Arezzo, which like the rest of Italy was divided by the two contending factions but not so violently as to cause any open rupture. Tempted by such a favourable occasion the Aretine Guelphs demanded assistance of Count Guido to expel their rivals, and he, seduced by a promise of the citadel as a reward, disregarded the existing alliance of both parties with Florence and lent himself without hesitation to the former.

When the rumour of this event arrived at Florence the people, although hating the Ghibelines, honestly expressed their indignation at so flagrant a breach of faith and were not without fears of its consequences on Pistoia and other cities where the Ghibelines were powerful, and whose obedience depended in a great measure on their security. The citizens therefore armed at once and with a contingent from Siena moved on Arezzo; but Count Guido an independent chieftain, would not tamely resign such a prize as the citadel and therefore prepared to defend it; the Arretine Guelphs had no other reward in their power, and were unwilling to forfeit their word to him, upon which Florence from a sense of justice and policy immediately lent them 12,000 lire, and restored the Ghibelines.

The Ghibelline power, which Frederic’s death and the inferior capacity of Conrad had materially reduced, began to acquire new life under Manfred, Prince of Tarento, natural son of the late emperor: this prince inherited the talents courage and energy of his father as well as his personal graces and amiability; and he has equally though perhaps with even less reason shared the unmeasured abuse of Guelphs and church­men. Left regent of the two Sicilies, his talents soon began to attract sufficient attention to raise his brother Conrad’s jealousy, from the last effects of which it is probable that nothing but extreme prudence saved him: at the latter’s death he re-assumed the government, became tutor to his infant nephew Conradine, tried in vain to conciliate the pope; who hiking advantage of existing circumstances overran the kingdom; and after much hard fighting and a succession of romantic adventures reestablished the royal authority so fully and fairly that when a false report of Conradine’s death reached Naples, of which he is accused of being the author, he was elected king by the clergy, the great barons, and inferior gentlemen; for the people in our modern sense were unheard of except as tools for war or objects of especial rapacity. On the t ruth about Conradine being announced by his messengers Manfred’s reply was that the Sicilian kingdom had been lost to his nephew, and that he had recovered it by his own exertions alone; that German rule and German troops were alike hateful to the people who were determined not to suffer the one or the other; that consequently a boy like Conradine could never hold the sceptre a moment, and finally that having once mounted, he, Manfred, could not now descend from the Sicilian throne; but that his nephew should succeed him and if he would come to Naples, should be treated as his own child, and instantly acknowledged as his heir. This offer being refused Manfred continued to reign, and a primary object of policy was to strengthen his connexion with all Ghibelline cities and become the head of that faction in Tuscany. The firm and prosperous administration of the Guelphs excluded him from Florence; he therefore it is said incited Pisa, still smarting with the hard conditions of her recent peace, to try the chance of war; and under his powerful protection it was an easy task. Not daring a direct attack on Florence the Pisans invaded Lucca but were met by the Guelphic army near Ponte a Serchio and defeated with such slaughter as to force an instant submission and request for peace, which they obtained on harder conditions than before.

Several towns of consequence were ceded to the victors and amongst them Mutrone which as a sea-port might in the hands of a commercial people like the Florentines become a dangerous rival to that of Pisa not only in commerce but naval warfare, and hence its loss was one of the hardest conditions of this peace.

A council having met at Florence to arrange the definitive treaty, Aldobrandino Ottobuoni, an old, poor, and respectable citizen, voted strongly in favour of the destruction of Mutrone as a place of no utility to the republic, and this decision (which by the preliminary articles was left to the will of the Florentines), was precisely what Pisa was most anxious for, as quieting her apprehensions on the score of commerce. Otobuoni had nearly persuaded all his colleagues to adopt his view and the question was to be decided on the following day; meanwhile the Pisan envoy with less discretion than zeal, in order to make all sure sent through a friend to offer Aldobrandino four thousand golden florins for the successful termination of his measure. The old man immediately perceiving his mistake dismissed the messenger with civil words and next day, without mentioning what had happened, asked pardon for his sodden change of sentiments and spoke so strongly on the ither side as to bring his colleagues round, but with considerable difficulty to his new opinion. Mutrone was therefore saved, much to the annoyance of Pisa. Ottobuoni’s disinterestedness transpired in despite of his own silence and gained him such applause that at his death, which happened shortly after, a magnificent public funeral was decreed and a monument erected to his memory in the church of Santa Reparata. Ottobuoni acted like an honest man and his silence proved him to be an unpretending one; but such fame, and such honours paid to one of the chief magistrates of the republic for a common act of public honesty argue either the rarity of this virtue or a very different notion of it amongst the Florentines from that of the present day.

Manfred’s successful campaigns and recovery of his kingdom from the Church had revived the imperial spirit in Tuscany, some slight indications of which awakened Guelphic jealousy lest the Ghibelline towns should be excited in tumult; wherefore Florence knowing the political bias of Poggibonzi and fearing that with the aid of Siena public tranquillity might be disturbed, determined to destroy its defences both for present security and future example; and although the principal citizens begged with ropes round their necks for a remission of this sentence the Florentine government remained inexorable.

Hitherto by a sagacious policy supported by great military vigour the Florentine government through fear or inclination had managed to avail themselves of the services of both factions in Tuscany and we have already shown how the Ghibelines for refusing to join in the expedition against Pistoia were driven from Florence and subsequently restored by the capitulation of Fighine; nevertheless the Guelphic ascendancy had taken such deep root that although nominally there was no party distinction, their rivals were in fact practically excluded from any share in the government and watched with the utmost jealousy. The Uberti an able proud and ambitious race, descended as they boasted, from Cataline, were still the acknowledged leaders of the Ghibelline party but jealous and discontented that eight long years of national triumph should have been achieved not only by a government of tradesmen but principally at the expense and even shame of themselves and their Tuscan allies; the success of Manfred against the church inspired them with better hopes, and accordingly Giovanni degli Uberti was dispatched to implore his assistance in changing the government of Florence. Whether the king gave them any promises does not exactly appeal; it is probable that he was too clear-sighted not to perceive the little prospect of success that would attend the efforts of an unpopular faction against a strong and popularly elected government; but he is accused by all the Florentine historians of fomenting the Uberti plot.

This conspiracy could not long escape democratic vigilance, and accordingly that family was cited before the Podestà Jacopo Bernardi of Lucca; the mandate was disregarded, the Podestàs force opposed and repulsed; an attempt was even made to seize the government, when the populace, ever ready on the side of liberty, seeing the authorities defied and the defiance come from a family they detested, immediately flew to arms and attacking the quarters of the Uberti killed their chief Schiatuzzo with many of his followers, then seizing Caini degli Abati and Mangia degli Infangati forced what confessions they wanted from them by torture and chopped their heads off in the Place of Orsanmichele; nor would popular hatred have rested here if the remaining Ghibelines had not saved themselves by a timely retreat.

Seventeen of the principal families escaped from Florence besides many others not named, and the Abbot of Vallombrosa being accused as accessory was in despite of the pope and his own sacred office first tortured to confess and then beheaded on that confession; but in the opinion of many perfectly innocent of the crime.

Pope Alexander IV placed the whole city, all Guelphic as it was, under an interdict for this audacious violation of ecclesiastical rights, directing his censures especially against the official authors of the sacrilege; but a bold and severe spirit at this time animated Florence, a determination in the government to vindicate its authority at any cost, and a minute and rigid attention to the appearance at least, of scrupulous honesty in public officers which set all danger at defiance. For an instance of the latter it may be mentioned that one of the Anziani or ministers of state was this year fined one thousand lire as a public peculator for sending to his villa an old broken door which once belonged to the cage of the public lions of Florence, but useless and neglected had been long tossing about in the streets: the property was public and therefore considered inviolable; yet from the loud and long-continued applause showered on Aldobrandino Ottobuoni, who was called the Florentine Fabricius, this extreme nicety would not appear to have extended itself to the exterior relations of the commonwealth. In this revolution the Guelphs failed not to take a lesson from the defeated faction, and palace and tower went to the ground under their destructive fury; some amends were however made by employing the materials to complete the city walls beyond Arno to the southward an object of vast importance in the approaching conflict with Siena.

That Ghibelline republic had received the fugitives with open arms, for its hopes began to revive with the growing power of Manfred; but as Florence considered their reception a breach of the treaty of 1255 by which no exiles from either state could be protected an embassy was immediately sent to demand their expulsion; this had no effect, for the Senese fairly insisted that their league was with the whole Florentine nation of which these were a principal part, and until some crime were proved that might bring them directly within the meaning of the treaty it would be an absolute breach of hospitality to refuse them shelter. The Florentines would not admit such reasoning, but being aware of Siena’s communications with the Sicilian prince at once declared war and marched troops to the frontier. Nothing however occurred during the following year, partly because the army was opposed to the Bishop of Arezzo, under whose auspices the Aretines had surprised Cortona an ally of Florence of which he claimed both temporal and spiritual sovereignty; and partly because it was held in readiness to keep the Pisans in check who were prepared to assist Venice against the Genoese in consequence of a quarrel in the Levant, which was subsequently arranged by the pontiff.

There is an interesting anecdote related by Malespini as having occurred this year in Florence. One of the lions which were maintained at the public charge escaped from his cage and ranged over the whole city; everybody was in alarm, which was not diminished when in Orto San Michele he seized a child, the only son of its mother who had given birth to it after its father’s death; the father had been stabbed in a private feud and this child was her only consolation. On seeing him in this situation she with a loud shriek darted at the lion and snatched her infant from his claws. The noble beast made no resistance nor did he harm the child, only stood and stared at the mother as she carried off her babe in triumph. It became a question says Malespini (who lived at the time) whether this arose from the noble nature of the animal or because fate had preserved the infant to revenge his father’s death, which he afterwards did, and was named Orlanduccio del Leone.

It however became necessary for Florence to push on this war with vigour in consequence of Manfred’s increasing influence and if possible match the latter by some prince whose own interest should attach him to her cause.

The imperial throne being still vacant a principal stay of the Italian Ghibelines was wanting; Manfred followed fast in his father’s steps, but still in the actual state of Italy the imperial countenance became indispensable. Pisa felt this, for even the want of Manfred’s aid had already compelled her to receive the dictation of Florence and Lucca while Genoa harassed her on the other side; wherefore it was resolved to promote as she best could the election of an emperor.

Although Innocent the Fourth at the deposition of Frederic, wishing probably to weaken the ties of Germany and Italy, had invested seven German princes under the name of “Electors” with the power of nominating a king of Italy and the Romans, it does not appear that the Italian cities had ever renounced this privilege; therefore in 1256 Pisa by a bold and decided act named Alphonso the Wise, King of Castile, to these high dignities and sent a solemn embassy to inform him of this decision. Four German electors supported Alphonso’s cause, the rest voted for Richard Earl of Cornwall brother of Henry III of England; Alexander IV remaining neuter until Richard’s death when he opposed Alphonso’s pretensions.

While this matter was in suspense the Florentines from different motives followed the example of Pisa; they wanted a counterpoise for Manfred and believed the pontiff not indisposed to Alphonso; Brunette Latini was again employed, but ere he could fulfil his mission the battle of Monteaperto put an end to all diplomacy and drove him an exile into France where he published his “Tesoro” in the language of that country.

Trusting to the talents of their envoy in Spain, the Florentines resolved to make vigorous war in the Senese states; the Carroccio was drawn out, the forces mustered, and in the month of May marched under the chief command of the Podestá Jacopino Rangoni, assisted by twelve captains of the republic besides the gonfaloniers of Sestos: six Anziani accompanied the troops but had no military command, and it does not appear that the Captain of the People stirred from the metropolis. Siena soon felt the scourge; town and castle fell before them, village and hamlet were trodden under their feet as they advanced towards the Maremma, where Grosseto city and the strong fortress of Montemassi were in a state of open insurrection. At Colle of the Val d'Elsa the Carroccio was deposited with the real or feigned intention of marching more rapidly to the Maremma; the Senese, fearful of this, reinforced their army in that quarter retaining only what was sufficient to defend the capital, and even withdrew Count Guido Novello’s force from the Valdichiana for the same purpose. Probably expecting such a movement the Podestà, accompanied by the Carroccio, turned short to his left and after securing his communications by the capture of Menzano and Casole, suddenly appeared and encamped before the Camullia gate of Siena itself.

On the Florentine declaration of hostilities in 1258 the Sienese prepared for active war, and in consequence of Manfred’s friendly disposition as announced by his two ambassadors Ser Niccolò Mustaglia of Cremona and Ser Paulo Usa, they dispatched orators in return to secure a still closer alliance. Manfred anxious to strengthen his party in Tuscany promised everything, but required an oath of fealty to himself which the envoys were instantly desired to offer in the public name. An instrument was accordingly drawn up in May 1259, by which Manfred promises to take the city under his particular protection; and early in the following December Count Giordano d ’Anglona, Manfred’s vicar-general, arrived at Siena with eight hundred German horse and a body of infantry; he was honourably received by the rulers who for the convenience of his men ordered that the l’ Ounce, (a coin of which the name alone remains at Naples) should pass current for six lire or golden florins, but the troops as appears from public documents, were paid entirely by Manfred, his interest and that of Siena being identical. Count Giordano fearing that the revolt of Grosseto, Monteano and Montemassi might produce serious mischief if assisted by Florence, proposed their immediate reduction with a powerful force and this was formally decreed in public council, Giordano being invested with the chief command. On the nineteenth of January the army marched from Siena: Grosseto soon capitulated, Monteano and Montemassi were invested, and everything appeared promising when the formidable preparations of Florence alarmed them. Provenzano Salvani and other ambassadors were instantly dispatched to implore a reinforcement from Manfred; the siege of Monteano was to be relaxed, or if necessary abandoned; and the count taking hostages and seeming Grosseto was ordered back with most of his troops to the defence of the capital. The delay of the Florentines before Menzano and Casole afforded time for this movement which by forced marches was successfully completed, so that with other neighbouring detachments and the naturally strong position of Siena no anxiety remained.

As a sudden capture was impossible and a regular siege might Have unexpectedly brought down the army of Montemassi at a critical and inconvenient moment, the Florentines contented themselves with a widespread devastation and a harassing of the citizens by continual alarms in order to force them to terms.

A lamentable want of dates and the discrepant accounts of authors render all movements previous to the battle of Monteaperto extremely uncertain. Malespini, the only source of all the Florentine authorities, relates that Farinata degli Uberti with a deputation of Ghibelines repaired to Naples and implored the aid of Manfred but after considerable hesitation and delay on the king’s part were about to leave him in disgust, when he promised them a hundred men-at-arms; affronted at this mockery they were on the point of refusing when Farinata exclaimed “Be not cast down, nor reject his assistance however small, let us only persuade him to give the royal banner along with them and at Siena we will put both in such a situation that for his own honour he will be compelled to send us more”. This advice was followed, the German cavalry were gratefully accepted, the banner accorded, and they returned to Siena with their petty escort amidst the jeers of the Sienese and the regrets of their exiled countrymen.

Manfred having much on his hands; with a large force already in Siena, and probably drawing a wide distinction between a powerful republic and a small and desperate body of refugees whose sanguine promises were seldom justified by facts, naturally hesitated, and unwillingly granted even this assistance to an irresponsible body of private individuals independent of Sienese government.

Malespini goes on to say, that one day Farinata invited these hundred knights to a repast where good wine and the promise of double pay increased their eagerness for action; in this conjuncture an alarm was given and these excited cavaliers rushed impetuously forward; the enemy, despising the Sienese, were negligent, and the Germans breaking through all obstacles drove everything before them in confusion. The Florentines seeing their small and unsupported number soon rallied and closing round the devoted squadron put every man to the sword: Manfred’s banner was taken and after haring been trailed insultingly through the dirt was borne in triumph to Florence.

Farinata lost no time in giving the king notice of this disaster with the insult offered to his flag and by means of 20,000 florins borrowed from the Salimbeni (rich bankers of Siena) he succeeded on condition of paying half their expenses for three months, in having a body of 800 horse dispatched to his assistance under Count Giordano d'Anglona.

It is very probable that most of the above story is true and that the sally might have been made as narrated, but it would be difficult to fix the exact time; that the part relating to Count Giordano and the 800 men-at-arms is an error seems clearly proved by Malavolti from public documents: and a second reinforcement which arrived after the retreat of the Florentines appears to have been the effect of Provenzano Salvani’s negotiations; they were commanded by Agnolo da Sepontino and probably made up the number of 1800 horse in the Senese army, the greater part of which says Malespini were Germans.

We may believe that this sally could easily have taken place in the interval between the investment of Siena and the junction of Count Giordano with the Maremma force if any such interval occurred; or even in some of the numerous skirmishes after that event, and that this and the more serious affair of the eighteenth of May have been confused: it will appear that in both accounts the German horse were most conspicuous and even in the great attack these hundred cavaliers might have pushed rashly on, and been cut to pieces by the enemy. The account most relied on by Malavolti who must have had access to more cotemporary documents than he has quoted, is that the Florentines being resolved to bring their enemy to a battle or else a peace on their own terms, maintained a war of fire and sword in the circumjacent country, destroyed the small towns of Sugara, Montarrenti, Rosia, Sovicille, Marignano, Montecchio, and several others, and kept the capital itself in continual alarms until the eighteenth of May; the Sienese then finding that their enemy, fatigued by such devastating service and with an utter contempt of themselves kept a negligent guard, determined to try their fortune in a general sally. Uniting therefore a part of their own cavalry and a strong land of Germans under Count Giordano’s camp-marshal, they suddenly fell upon the Florentine intrenchments broke through every obstacle and completely surprised the enemy, driving everything before them in terror and confusion. The Germans in particular charged with such impetuosity that few of their immediate opponents were able even to arm themselves, and had they not been supported in time an immense carnage would have followed with little loss to the victors; but as it was, cotemporary authors according to Malavolti, assert that about thirteen hundred of the Florentines were killed, and only two hundred and sixty of the Sienese army; and all historians agree in describing the terror and confusion of the day, which could hardly have been produced by a hundred unsupported Germans. Villani says that Florentine knights and citizens made but a poor figure; and Leonardo Aretino asserts that the camp was in great confusion and in some parts the soldiers fled shamefully: but however caused, this affair was afterwards cited in the stormy debates at Florence about a second expedition. as a strong argument against the measure. “Some others have said,” says Malavolti, “that the Sienese who were with the army round Montemassi having received more particular notice of the quantity of people who were in the camp of the Florentines and of their allies where (as it is said) were assembled Lucchesi, Pistolesi, Aretini, Orvietani, Pratesi, San Gimignanesi, Colligiani, the Count Aldobrandino of Pitigliano, Pepo Visconte of Campiglia and others their adherents; considering in what great peril and difficulty their city was placed; and moved not solely by the general interest, but each individual also by his particular welfare; having before their eyes the apprehension and terror that this must have caused in the minds of their children, of their wives, of their mothers and of every other person connected with them, all remaining abandoned in such a horrible and frightful peril. Leaving therefore some of their captains with the local troops and 200 horse, as well as some companies of infantry which Count Giordano had sent them, and having persuaded the Podestà, who was general of the army, to agree, they departed with him from that siege to go and succour their own people. Having arrived at Siena and an occasion offering, several squadrons of Germans made a sally from the Porta a Ovile to attack the head of the enemy on one side, and the Sienese issuing at the Camullia gate assailed them at the same moment on the other with such spirit and rigour that after great slaughter that army was put into so much fear and disorder that they began to fly and the Sienese followed a part of them as far as Castel Fiorentino, as Messer Agostino Patritij also relates. Others say not that day but the day after, that army broke up and fled, and retired with their Carroccio into the Florentine territory.

This sortie was made on the 18th of May the day on which Farinata’s German knights are supposed to have fallen so bravely: but as on the 19th the Senese council decreed that the German soldiers and their marshal should have their wounded in the last day’s action cared for at the public expense, and that they should be presented with 500 lire for their gallant bearing in the fight, it may be supposed that they were not all killed in this engagement and that the affair of the hundred horse must have been a distinct and previous thing.

The consequences of a battle are commonly the best proof of victory where both sides claim it, and the results of this attack were a sudden retreat of the Florentine army without having gained the object of the war, a separation of the auxiliary troops, an immediate devastation of the Colli territory by detachments of the Seinese army, and the simultaneous relief of Montelatrone which the Orvietani aided by Counts Aldobrandini and Visconti had attacked in their homeward retreat, after separating from the Florentines. Besides these results there were the reduction of Staggia and Poggibonzi to obedience, a reinforcement of the besieging army before Montemassi, a ravaging of the Montalcino country; the unsuc­cessful attempt of Counts Aldobrandino and Ugolino Visconte to reconcile themselves with Siena and the investment of Montepulciano. Montemassi soon after fell, and Count Giordano even made an inroad on the Florentine territory; but as all these events occurred within twenty-five days after the above combat it seems evident notwithstanding the silence of their historians that the Florentines were completely discomfited.

The Orvietani exerted themselves to make peace between Montepulciano and Siena and demanded a safe conduct for their ambassadors; passports were accordingly given but from a mutual want of sincerity the mediation failed: the besieging army marched on the twelfth of June from Siena; but altered their plan by investing Montalcino, and the necessity of relieving this city, a place under the immediate protection of Florence, was subsequently put forth as the ostensible object of that great Florentine armament which terminated so disastrously in September 1260.

We now come to an important and interesting portion of Florentine or rather Tuscan history, for the shock of Monteaperto was felt throughout that country by Guelph and Ghibelline; it vibrated even to the Sicilian shores and influenced to a considerable extent the general fate of Italy. All summer was spent by the Senese in ravaging the district of Montepulciano, making inroads on the Florentine territory, and cutting off succours from Montalcino which was kept closely blockaded: this town since its rejection of the Senese yoke in 1234 had remained under Florentine protection and became a conspicuous party in every subsequent treaty between those republics whose early wars were mainly occasioned by contentions about that town and Montepulciano. The Florentines therefore considered themselves bound to raise the siege of Montalcino, but the manner of doing it became a subject of warm dispute and finally led to the memorable battle of Monteaperto.

In tracing the principal causes that led to this conflict we cannot trust implicitly to the Senese historian Malavolti who on all occasions seems as little inclined to allow any credit to Florentine exiles as to place confidence in Florentine writers: he does not even mention the name of Farinata degli Uberti to whom every other author gives the credit of what was done; and blinded by national prejudice reasons weakly where he attempts to conceal part of the truth because it raises the diplomatic reputation of the exiles: Malavolti claims all the honour for Siena, while the Florentine writers, unable to avoid acknowledging their failure, endeavour to bestow the credit of it exclusively upon their own banished countrymen. But Malavolti wrote when the recent subjugation and existing misery of Siena still fretted the hearts of his compatriots; when ancient hatred was sharpened by the conscious impotency of rage, when the feelings of the conquered added new bitterness to the present, new honour to the past, and the impassioned mourner hung in melancholy fondness over the departed glories of his country.

It was of paramount consequence to the exiles that a decisive blow should be immediately struck; a war of incursions they argued would only waste time and money without advancing their cause, and they saw that the Senese government, naturally intent on recovering their own revolted towns, was not disposed to risk a bold invasion of the Florentine territory. Under this impression they determined if possible to draw the enemy with a large force into that of Siena and finish by one decisive battle. Montalcino was under a close siege and although Florence became desirous of relieving it the government hesitated ere they ventured to march an army across the heart of an enemy’s country, and commence operations with a city like Siena in their rear, and a necessarily long line of communication exposed to all the garrisons between that capital arid the Florentine territory. It was however the object of Farinata that they should do this, and to accomplish it he and Guardaccia de’ Lamberti by means of two friars commenced a false negotiation with that government, apparently with the knowledge of the Sienese authorities, in which their enemies were assured that the Florentine exiles disgusted with the domineering manners of Provensano Salvani who governed the republic, and also wearied out by misfortune, were ready to make their peace; that they had the means and were willing to deliver into Florentine hands the gate of San Vito leading towards Arezzo, if they would only send ten thousand florins and march a powerful army to the Arbia, a stream about six miles from Siena, under pretence of raising the siege of Montalcino. The friar’s who were themselves deceived, immediately proceeded to Florence, declaring their secret mission without divulging its nature, and two of the Anziani were directly chosen to receive this communication with full powers to act on behalf of the government. The commissioners, Spedito di Por San Piero, a bold ignorant and presumptuous man of mean extraction, and Giovanni Grancalcagni, a doctor of laws, after having heard the friars, prepared the money and with their colleagues’ consent assembled the great council at which people of every rank assisted, and proposed to victual Montalcino under the escort of an army even more numerous than that of the preceding spring. Their plan was to invest Siena and relieve the besieged town while the enemy was occupied in self-defence: it was easy to persuade a people flushed with so many triumphs, that their armies had only to march and conquer; but Count Guido Guerra and the military nobles had not forgotten the combat of the preceding May; German valour was still fresh in their memory, and the dastardly conduct of the people on that occasion made them apprehensive for the future. The Anziani boasted of ten years of victory; the nobles replied that the community was then strong and united but now divided; the Ghibelline families, composing almost half the city, were then with them, but now on the side of their enemy; Siena was in those days comparatively weak; she was now powerful from concord and aided by a formidable body of brave and disciplined strangers whose prowess they had already experienced to their cost; but the nobles were not in the secret and therefore spoke loudly against the imprudence and uselessness of this enterprise. Count Guido first, and then Tegghiaio Aldobrandi, an experienced chief and eloquent debater, insisted on the danger of marching into the heart of a hostile country and risking their troops for an object that might be more easily and cheaply accomplished by their allies of Orvieto who had offered to perform it quietly at a trifling cost: by this they said there would be no risk and time would be gained, an object of vital importance because the German auxiliaries being only paid for three months as they erroneously believed, and half that time having already elapsed, they would soon return into Puglia leaving their allies in a weaker condition than before! Aldobrandi was instantly answered by Spedito who opposed only coarse and vulgar invective to his reasoning, taunted him with cowardice and insulted him by repeating a beastly expression of the day, to which he replied with great dignity, and not long afterwards had the sad opportunity of retorting when they met as fugitives under the portico of San Triano of Lucca.

Cecci di Gherardini undaunted by power or the unpopularity of his cause followed up the same argument with such vehemence of rhetoric that the Anziani commanded him to be silent under the penalty of a hundred florins ; heedless of this, the penalty was doubled and he then offered to pay three hundred for the privilege of freely expressing his opinion; obstinately continuing his discourse the penalty at last reached four hundred florins when the Anziani perceiving that he would submit to any fine rather than discontinue, peremptorily commanded him to be silent on pain of death; and thus the discussion terminated. The people supported their magistrates against the military experience of the nobles whom they were ever ready to mortify; the decree was passed, and an impatient shout of popular ignorance brought down ruin on the country.

As there were however many disaffected Ghibellines in Florence it was decided to make them serve with the army as a safer course lest they should take the opportunity to foment disturbances: their allies of Arezzo more prudently expelled all the adverse faction from the town and .closed every gate but one until their return from Siena.

A summons to meet in arms went forth to all the Guelphic league and every allied city bristled with war: the power of Lucca was quickly in the field; Prato, Pistoia, and San Miniate poured out their troops; San Gimignano and Colle of the Vale of Elsa armed their battalions ; Genoa and Bologna united their Guelphic banners on the banks of the Arno; Modena was not lukewarm in the cause, and the more distant plains of Lombardy sent their squadrons across the Apennines to enrol themselves under the standard of Florence. Besides these, Arezzo and Orvieto were in full movement; and even Perugia is said to have joined in this formidable armament. Visconte of Campiglia and Aldobrandino of Santa Fiore mustered their vassals and lent a willing hand to destroy the power that curbed their greatness; and Count Guido Guerra, although against the war, had already assembled his followers, not indisposed to break a lance with his Ghibelline kinsman the chief of the Florentine exiles. This was the auxiliary force. In Florence eight hundred men-at-arms, all nobles or rich citizens, pranced through her streets and arrayed themselves under the republican standard, while six hundred foreign veterans were already in their saddles quietly awaiting the orders of their chief. Heavy-armed infantry with ponderous bucklers slender lances and helmets of burnished steel; archers cross-bowmen and irregulars, poured in successive streams from the six divisions of the capital, each under its fanner and peculiar chief; nor was there a single family in Florence whether noble, popular, or plebeian, but sent forth one or two of its sons to try their spirit in the coming war, on foot or horseback according to its power and opulence. The Martinella was still tolling when the Red Carroccio, the military Palladium, rolled heavily from the precincts of the Baptistry to its war-station in the centre of the Mercato-nuovo. The last hours of August witnessed these two “pomps” of the Florentines move slowly over the Arno amidst the shouting of a multitude that gazed with pride, but for the last time, on that veteran banner which for ten successive years had led them on to victory. The rear-guard soon cleared the town, and all the army was then seen winding amongst the hills in full march to the enemy’s capital: near this the bands of Arezzo Orvieto and Perugia were expected to join them and move forward to the Arbia as a convenient position for the meditated capture of Siena.

But while these measures were in progress the banished Ghibelines had been actively arranging through the means of two friars a secret plan of treason by which, when a favourable occasion presented itself, their friends in the hostile camp were to join the Senese banners: these malcontents led by the families of Abati and Della Pressa having been suspected by the Anziani were forced to march and therefore in the true spirit of faction did not feel themselves bound by the common ties of national fidelity.

The Florentines encamped on and about the hill of Monteaperto near the left bank of the Arbia, a small river which falls into the Ombrone at Buonconvento: here they mustered and reviewed the troops, which by the lowest accounts even of the Florentine waiters amounted to 30,000 infantry and 3000 men-at-arms, but which some authors run up to 40,000 combatants. This army however was drawn from different states, with independent chiefs, and many disaffected men; and although all under the supreme command of the Anziani and Podestà assisted by twelve experienced captains, there was not that unity amongst them which is commonly the handmaid of victory.

The allied camp was inclosed by palisades fixed upon a range of elevated land overlooking a triangular valley from the north-east, the other sides of this valley being confined by similar ranges inclining to each other in a point towards the south-west, through which the road from Siena led to the castle of Monteaperto on the right wing of the confederates.

Here they impatiently waited for the promised possession of the San Vito gate and trusting to their good intelligence within, never dreamed of being attacked where they were: numerous messengers passed and repassed, ostensibly on account of this treason but really in concert with the Ghibellines of the army, to settle the moment of open rupture. Many taunting messages and insulting propositions were sent to the council of Siena, who merely replied that they would maintain their country’s honour to the death with equal valour and they hoped with the same good fortune as before, but they would give them a final answer on the field.

Siena (ever after this called “Civitas Virginis”) was then bestowed by a solemn act on the Virgin Mary accompanied by some curious ceremonies that show the religious extravagance of the age.

The secret expectations of the Anziani then in camp now began to transpire, and the supposed betrayal of the city came to the knowledge of the Ghibelline chiefs who instantly dispatched Razzanti of Porto San Piero, to give secret notice of this treason, to represent the formidable power of the confederate army, and advise their friends against the hazard of a battle. Farinato and Gherardo Lamberti who first received him immediately perceived his mistake and the great danger of his mission transpiring; they accordingly undeceived him, with injunctions to keep the enemy’s real state a profound secret and even to give a totally different complexion to his tale. Razzanti willingly complied, and crowned with garlands cheerfully accompanied these chiefs to the public palace where the citizens were assembled, and told them that the allies were badly commanded, disunited, and all ready to disperse, and that if suddenly and vigorously attacked they would be easily defeated. His address was answered by cheers and loud cries of “Battle—Battle”.—The whole assembly flew to arms and all their military strength was quickly marshalled : the people were then harangued ; they were reminded that their honour, their lives, and their liberty, depended on that day’s conduct; that wives and daughters implored their protection from all the brutal violence of war; and finally, they were bid to stand firm and never doubt of victory. Ruffredo da Isola, the captain of the people, was posted on the walls with the few old men and boys that could be spared, and every man, of whatever age, that remained in the city, cheerfully took his post on the ramparts if his shrunk limbs could bear the weight of arms. The nuns, matrons, and daughters of the citizens, all robed in white, moved softly through the streets in long procession filling the air and temples with their song as they tremblingly implored the protection of that Virgin on whom they had so lately bestowed themselves.

As Florence into “Sesti” so was Siena divided into “Terzi”, each with its Gonfalonier and band of armed men, united under the Podestà Francesco Troghiso: five thousand citizens thus served without pay, and three thousand Contadini from the surrounding country. The rest of the army was composed of about 3000 mercenaries; amongst these were the Florentine exiles led on by Count Guido Novello, besides fifteen hundred German horse with two thousand veteran infantry under Giordano d’ Anglone Count of San Severino; in all about 14,500 men.

Malavolti denies that any assistance came from Pisa although the historians of that state speak confidently of a contingent of three thousand men.

The troops were high in spirit and the whole city echoed to the sounds of war; at length the moment arrived when the gate of San Vito was to be opened, but instead of treason an army of well-appointed soldiers issued to the war. After a few miles’ march they crossed the Arbia and halted near Monteselvoli to examine the allies’ position; Count Giordano then detached his marshal with four hundred cavalry and eight hundred Senese infantry under Niccolò da Bigozzo, by a circuitous route to lurk unseen behind some bare hillocks in rear of their left wing, and there await the events of the day. The main body leaving Monselvoli to the right resumed their march by the left-hand road leading to the Valdibiena and Monteaperto, and immediately formed their line in the valley beneath the Florentine camp. At the first glimmering of their spears the confederates believed them to be only a body of skirmishers sent from the city; but when they beheld column after column in firm and silent march covering the adjacent plain a sudden apprehension overcame them: none had believed they would be attacked; the chiefs found themselves overreached, some of them were known to be disaffected, and the rest were too confident. They immediately quitted their camp and formed in order of battle about half way down the southern slope of the hill, their right wing resting on the castle of Monteaperto which appears to have been unoccupied: the men-at-arms were posted in the centre of either army, and the Carroccio of Siena halted opposite to that of Florence, both being surrounded by a chosen guard of gallant gentlemen armed to the teeth and proud of the high distinction. There was a dead silence. The champing of bits or the jar of a cuirass as the troops closed up in the still fluctuating line were the only interruptions; all was then steady; and immediately the Senese right wing was seen in forward movement, while a low murmur of mutual encouragement passed from man to man as the word was given to advance, and rose gradually to a shout, when they neared the opposing height where the adverse legions like a wall of iron stood ready to receive them. The whole line was now in motion, when a pause, a steady cheer and a rapid charge brought the infantry of the left wing half way up the acclivity; nor were they tamely welcomed; a shout as long and loud, and a shock as rough, soon bore them back, and left the hill as yet unconquered: the Senese rallied on the plain, where they were pressed by the enemy, and there the sword and the spear were plied with equal spirit and equal advantage. Meantime the Florentine general endeavoured to avail himself of superior numbers by bringing up a strong body of troops on his right, and pushing them along a line of rising ground near the castle, which trended towards the rear of die enemy’s left, and thus turn their flank; but this manoeuvre was not unperceived by the German who quickly crowned the hill with fresh troops, and a severe repulse of the enemy succeeded in foiling him after an obstinate resistance, which long maintained the balance in that quarter.

During these events the centre of neither host was idle; Jacopo de’ Pazzi with the Guelphic banner and three thousand men-at-arms impatiently waited to charge: at a signal given three thousand lances were in their rests, three thousand visors shut, and three thousand hardy knights ready to strike into the heart of the enemy, when a sudden lowering of the banner and a slight commotion round the Pazzi betokened some mischance: Bocca degli Abad had severed the leader’s arm with a single blow as he waved the flag aloft, and then followed by all his Ghibelines galloped over to the enemy. The treason was manifest, but its extent concealed, and confidence was entirely lost; no man felt sure of his comrade, fear and suspicion unsettled them, and the charge was feeble. At this crisis Giordano’s horse came up at a rapid pace and completed the disaster; everything went down before their sounding charge as they fell like a cataract on the disheartened Florentines: but when yielding in disorder and about to fly, a band of gallant gentlemen who had kept steadily together now couched their lances and with spear and spur bore rudely on the Germans: their staves were soon in splinters, but horse to horse and man to man they contested every inch with swords and maces, and so roughly did they handle Manfred’s soldiers as to allow full time for their friends to rally and renew the combat. Along the whole line the struggle was again maintained with fresh vigour; the Florentine cavalry could now distinguish between friends and foes and battled well and bravely, while the Germans supported their ancient reputation.

The Sienese right wing was still in stubborn conflict with the confederates’ left, while at the extreme left the struggle continued bloody and obstinate. The day was yet doubtful, when the German marshal and Niccolò da Bigozzo who had been watching all the current of the fight; seeing the rear of the allies without a reserve of horse exposed by their descent to the plain broke suddenly from their concealment and charged with such speed that the shock was felt, even before they were seen, and Bigozzo’s infantry following after them carried terror and confusion through the field. The cavalry believing themselves betrayed soon gave way and fled; the infantry still fought courageously; but all broken and disordered, every soldier trusted to himself alone, resolved at least that national honour should not suffer from his individual conduct. A desperate band of devoted warriors under old Giovanni Tornaquinci, gathered around the sacred Carroccio, the yet unconquered standard of Florence which still waved over the gentle animals that carried it unconscious of the passions that surrounded them. Here in compact circle an iron barrier was opposed to every attempt of the victors; with determined eyes they glared fiercely upon each other; no dust arose, for the soil was wet with blood; but the bow twanged and the arrow flew, and soldiers fell; and the cut and the stab were given and returned with equal fury: the shouts of the victors, the silent resolution of their opponents, the groan of the stricken, the rattling of staves, the frosh of the battle-axe and the heavier clang of the cuirass as horse or knight went to the ground, betokened the mortal struggle about the bloody Carroccio. Tired out, wounded, dying; but still unconquered; man after man sank under the coming blows, until this remnant of gallant spirits was finally overpowered by the victorious assailants.

Yet for more than an hour did this defence of the Carroccio continue: at last, every hope being gone, the veteran Tornaquinci, whose natural force was not abated by the action of seventy years, thus addressed his son and three young kinsmen who fought by his side. “What are we to do my sons? To fly? But where? Perhaps to Florence:—where we shall find the victorious enemy before us! There were those that of yore envied the death of Rustico Marignelli who fell in his native city when we were driven the first time from our homes: let us now make others envy our fate by dying in harness on the Arbia sooner than allow the banner committed to our charge to fall, as it never yet has done, into the hands of the enemy: and as I was born before you, so will I, as I ought, show you the way to a most honourable death.” Thus saying he spurred his horse onward and with his four companions died bravely fighting in the midst of the enemy.

The Carroccio and Martinella were led away in triumph but the day was not yet won; the battle still raged upon the hills and the right of the confederates held together although their first line was driven from its position, and the Seinese legions pushed forward with a spirit well worthy of their comrades on the plain: the success of these infused new vigour into those that battled on the heights; one more shout and a determined charge bore down the now dispirited and yielding foe; retreat soon hurried into flight, and one wild storm of tumult slaughter and confusion, swept madly across the plain.

The battle was won: a small body of troops threw themselves into the castle but were soon cut to pieces; and had not the victors remained to plunder, scarcely a soldier of that vast armament, which only four days before had quitted their homes in all the confidence of success, would have escaped to tell the tale to his countrymen! Florence alone by the most moderate computation left 2500 dead on the field besides the wounded and prisoners, and there was scarcely one of her numerous families that had not reason to bewail that day, when ten thousand bloody victims to civil discord made the next year’s harvest wave greenly on the banks of the Arbia.

Nothing in those times was perhaps more doubtful than the returns of killed and wounded, and the conflicting accounts of authors about this battle take a wide range; it was certainly one of the most sanguinary encounters of the age and the most important in its consequences. It was the Cannae of Florence!

The loss of the victorious army is said to have been from six hundred to a thousand men in killed and wounded, and fifteen thousand captives crowded the joyous streets of Siena; while in Florence nothing was heard but the wailing of wives and mothers demanding sons and husbands; consternation pervaded the town, an indistinct sense of annihilation was impressed on the public mind; the gates were closed, the shops and houses shut, and men looked sad and silent at each other: fugitives flocked in hourly but brought no hope: despair in their heart and death in their aspect, a downward glance on their bloody garments was the only reply to loud and frantic inquiries: the widow, the orphan, the sister, and the promised bride had no other comfort; but to the graver questions and ill-repressed tears of bearded men they sorrowfully answered. “It is not for them who have bravely died in battle for their country’s cause you should weep, but for us who have survived the conflict: they have fallen with glory as soldiers ought, but we are spared only to become the objects of scorn and mockery to our bitterest foes.”—Thus ended the battle of Monteaperto.

 

Cotemporary Monarchs.—England: John (1216), Henry III.—Scotland Alexander II and III (1249).—France: Louis VIII, Louis IX. (1226).— Castile and Leon: Henry I, Ferdinand III, Alphonso X. (1252).—Aragon: James I.—Germany: Frederic II, Conrad IV (interregnum from 1254).— Popes, Honorius III (1216), Gregory IX (1227), Celestine IV (1241), Innocent IV (1243), Alexander IV (1254).—Portugal: Alphonso II, Sancho II, Alphonso III. (1248).— Latin Emperors of Constantinople: Peter (1216), Robert (1221), John of Brienne (1229), Baldwin II (1237.)

 

BOOK THE FIRST. CHAPTER XI. FROM A.D. 1260 TO A.D. 1282.