

THE
HISTORY OF THE POPES

FROM THE CLOSE OF THE MIDDLE AGES

DRAWN FROM THE SECRET ARCHIVES OF THE VATICAN AND OTHER
ORIGINAL SOURCES

FROM THE GERMAN OF
LUDWIG, FREIHERR VON PASTOR

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
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CONTENTS OF VOLUME XVIII.¹

	PAGE
Table of Contents	vii-xviii
List of unpublished documents in Appendix	xix
Pius V. and Philip II.	1-26
The Pope's struggle against Spanish cesaropapalism	27-71
The beginning of the rebellion in the Low Countries -	72-104
Pius V. and the civil and religious wars in France—	
The beginnings of the Catholic reaction in France -	105-155
The state of Religion in Scotland—Mary Stuart and Elizabeth	156-194
Pius V. and Elizabeth—The Bull of Excommunication—Ireland	195-243
Pius V. and Maximilian II.—Catholic reform in Germany—The work of Canisius	244-299
Religious conditions in Poland and Switzerland—	
Foreign Missions	300-352
Pius V. and the League against the Turks	353-399
The Victory of Lepanto and afterwards—Death of Pius V.	400-460
Appendix of unpublished documents	461-474
Index of Names	475-486

¹ For Bibliography see Volume XVII

TABLE OF CONTENTS OF VOLUME XVIII.

CHAPTER I.

PIUS V. AND PHILIP II.

A.D.		PAGE
	Cesaropapistical aims of Spain	1
	Determination of Pius V. to ensure the complete independence of the Church	1
1565	The nuncio in Spain, Giovanni Castagna	2
1566	The questions at issue: the <i>recurso</i>	3
	Difficult position of Castagna; his tact and ability	4
	The case of the Archbishop of Toledo, Carranza	5
	The Pope demands his transference to Rome	5
	Interference with ecclesiastical jurisdiction in Spain and Naples	6
	The <i>Sussidio</i> and <i>Cruzada</i>	7
	The <i>Sussidio</i> granted for five years, but the <i>Cruzada</i> refused	8
	The Pope continues to insist on the transference of Carranza to Rome	9
	Iconoclastic atrocities in the Netherlands	10
	The Pope urges Philip II. to go in person to the Low Countries	10
	The mission of Camaiani to Spain	10
	Irritation of Philip II.	11
	The <i>Monarchia Sicula</i>	13
	Proposed league against the Turks	13
1567	Philip II. promises to go to the Netherlands	14
	But continues to delay; further causes of dispute	15
	The royal <i>placet</i>	16
	Controversy between Borromeo and the senate of Milan	17
	Severe action by the archbishop	19
	Indignation of the senate; the archbishop's officer arrested	20
	The archbishop excommunicates the offenders	20
	Pius V. summons the case to Rome; intervention of Philip II.	21
1568	Edict of the governor of Milan	23
	The chapter of S. Maria della Scala resists the archbishop's visitation	23
	They are supported by the senate	24
	Borromeo refused admission by the chapter	24
	Pius V. supports the archbishop	25
	Victory of Borromeo	26

CHAPTER II.

THE POPE'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPANISH CESAROPAPALISM

A.D.		PAGE
	Cardinal Granvelle Philip II.'s chief confidant in Rome	27
1568	The new Spanish ambassador, Juan de Zuñiga	28
	Attempts to obtain the <i>Cruzada</i> from the Pope	29
	This meets with no success	30
	Memorial from Castagna to Philip II., detailing the questions at issue	32
	The reply of Philip II.	33
	The Papal prohibition of bull-fights not published by the Spanish bishops	35
	The bull <i>In Coena Domini</i> issued with important additions	35
	The Spanish bishops refuse to publish it without the royal <i>placet</i>	36
	The <i>exaequatur</i> in Naples	39
	Imminent danger of a breach between Rome and Spain	41
	The mission of Requesens to Rome	41
	The imprisonment of Don Carlos	42
	Distress of the Pope	43
	Letter of Philip II. to the Pope on the subject	43
	The death of Don Carlos; solemn funeral offices in Rome	45
	Requesens in Rome; renewed disputes	46
	Philip II. adheres to his claims; abuses in Naples	48
	A congregation appointed to examine the questions at issue	49
	Detailed letter from the Pope to the king	49
	He sets forth the abuses and usurpations on the part of Spain	50
	The Pope's remonstrances without effect	53
	Obstinacy of the Viceroy of Naples	54
	Evasive replies of Philip II.	55
1569	Second memorial of Castagna, setting forth the abuses in Naples	56
	Heated discussions between Castagna and Philip II.	58
	The king refuses to give way	59
	Giustiniani sent to Spain	60
	But he is able to accomplish very little.	63
	The Turkish question leads to a rapprochement between Rome and Spain	63
1571	Pius V. grants the <i>Cruzada</i> for two years	64
	Cardinal Bonelli in Spain	66
	Philip II. still clings to all his claims	68
	The great services of Castagna, who had steadily shielded the king from personal blame	69
	Pius V.'s personal esteem for Philip II., and realization of the importance of the friendship of Spain	70

CHAPTER III.

THE BEGINNING OF THE REBELLION IN THE LOW COUNTRIES

A.D.		PAGE
	Philip II. had not the same personal ties with the Netherlands as his father, Charles V.	72
	Incapacity of Margaret of Parma, the Governess-General	73
	Unrest and discontent in the Low Countries	73
	Religion in the Low Countries; the influence of Erasmus	74
	William of Orange	75
	His religion entirely dictated by political considerations	76
	He becomes the centre of the disaffection	77
	The question of the Netherland bishoprics	77
	Fear of the Spanish Inquisition; hatred of Granvelle	79
1564	Philip II. dismisses Granvelle; a state of anarchy	81
1565	Conspiracy of the nobles under Orange	82
	They meet with general support	83
	Weakness of the regent; increased boldness of the Calvinists	84
1566	Outbreak of rebellion	85
	Iconoclasm and destruction	86
	Need for the personal presence of Philip II. in the Low Countries	87
	Pius V. urges the king to set out for the Netherlands	89
	Philip II. declares his readiness to undertake the journey	90
	But resolves to send Alba first	91
	The Pope insists that religious considerations must come first; the king political ones	92
1567	Philip II. finally abandons his journey	93
	The Pope declares that the king has deceived him	94
1568	Alba arrives with troops in the Low Countries; the programme sketched for him by Philip II.	95
	Wholesale confiscations and executions drive the people to desperation	96
	Alba's troops victorious, but he continues his campaign of terror and bloodshed	97
	Queen Elizabeth congratulates the king on his victory over the rebels	97
	Pius V. deceived by reports from Spanish sources into thinking that Alba was guided by zeal for religion	99
	Prayers and pilgrimages in Rome	100
	Pius V. urges an amnesty	101
	The question of the bishoprics	101
	The despotic government of Alba harmful to the cause of religion	103

CHAPTER IV.

PIUS V. AND THE CIVIL AND RELIGIOUS WARS IN FRANCE—THE
BEGINNINGS OF THE CATHOLIC REACTION IN FRANCE.

A.D.		PAGE
1562	Continued atrocities on the part of the <i>gueux</i>	104
	The policy of Pius V. in France	105
	The nuncio, della Torre	105
	Instructions for the nuncio; the enforcement of the decrees of Trent insisted upon	107
	Pius V.'s doubts of Catherine de' Medici	108
1566	Sentence pronounced upon the heretical bishops	108
	Aims of the Huguenots	109
1567	Outbreak of the second religious war	110
	The Pope sends financial help	112
	A general Jubilee proclaimed	114
	The Pope's mistrust of Catherine de' Medici	115
1568	His fears justified by the Peace of Longjumeau	116
	Hostilities recommenced	117
	The third religious war; cruelty and violence on both sides	118
1569	The Pope sends auxiliary troops	119
	The victory of Jarnac	119
	Captured Huguenot standards sent to Rome	120
	Congratulations of the Pope	121
	The decisive victory of Moncontour	123
	Thanksgiving in Rome	124
	The Pope warns Charles IX. against misplaced leniency	125
	Little use made of the victories	126
	Rumours of peace; the Pope's renewed warning	128
1570	All these warnings in vain; the Peace of St. Germain	130
	The Pope's indignation at "the shameful peace"	131
	Bramante sent to France to get the peace annulled	131
	But all remonstrances remain without effect	133
	Catherine's matrimonial plans for her children bring the danger visibly nearer	135
1571	Coligny returns to court	136
	His far-reaching plans; proposed marriage of the Princess Margaret to Henry of Navarre	137
	The mission of Salviati to France	138
1572	He is followed by Cardinal Bonelli	139
	Attempts to induce France to join the league against the Turks	140
	The marriage contract signed between Margaret and Henry of Navarre	143
	France enters into an alliance with England against Spain	143
	Beginnings of a Catholic revival	144
	Ecclesiastical abuses in France	145
	The injury inflicted on the Church in France by the attitude of the government	146
	The Huguenot persecution had led to a Catholic reaction	147

A.D.	PAGE
Renewed veneration for the Holy See and the person of the Pope	149
Work of the Jesuits : Auger, Possevino and Manaraeus	150
The lectures of Maldonatus	151
Frangipani's encouraging report concerning the development of Catholic life	153
Pius V. wishes strong action to be taken against the heretics, but not by wrongful means	154

CHAPTER V.

THE STATE OF RELIGION IN SCOTLAND—MARY STUART AND ELIZABETH.

1566	Religion in Scotland at the accession of Pius V.	156
	Mary attempts to place Catholicism on equal terms with Protestantism	157
	The conspiracy of Darnley	157
	The murder of Rizzio	158
	Bishop Chisholm sent to Rome ; the Pope's sympathy for Mary	159
	Proposal to send a nuncio to Scotland	161
	Vincenzo Laureo chosen ; he arrives in Paris	162
	Laureo demands the punishment of the rebels	163
	Serious illness of Mary	164
	Laureo's doubts of Mary's zeal for religion	164
	Mary's strange leniency towards her enemies	165
	She rejects the advice of the nuncio	166
	Disgraceful conduct of Darnley	167
	Bothwell's influence with Mary	168
	The plot against Darnley	169
1567	The murder of Darnley	170
	Bothwell accused of the crime	171
	The inquiry into the crime a farce	172
	Bothwell exonerated by the nobles	173
	Mary is married to Bothwell	174
	Difficult to account for this fatal step	175
	The calumnies of Mary's enemies	176
	The Casket Letters	177
	Mary had no complicity in the murder	178
	End of Laureo's mission ; he returns to Italy	179
	Mary's marriage to Bothwell had cost her the confidence of the Catholics	180
	And shaken the Pope's trust in her	181
	Mary falls into the hands of her enemies and is imprisoned at Lochleven	182
1568	She escapes and gathers together an army	183
	She is defeated at Langside and takes refuge in England	183
	End of Catholic worship in Scotland	183
	Mary imprisoned at Bolton Castle	184
	The Conference of Westminster	185

A.D.		PAGE
	Elizabeth's determination to blacken Mary's good name	186
	Mary's representatives duped by Elizabeth	187
	Mary denies her complicity in the murder and accuses her enemies	188
	Vain attempt to induce Mary to resign her crown	189
	Even as a prisoner, Mary is still a danger to Elizabeth	191
	She has many supporters in England	192
	Proposal that Mary should marry the Duke of Norfolk	193
	Norfolk thrown into the Tower	194

CHAPTER VI.

PIUS V. AND ELIZABETH—THE BULL OF EXCOMMUNICATION—IRELAND.

1568	The English Catholics fix their hopes upon Mary Stuart	195
	Pius V. at first entertains hopes of Elizabeth's conversion	196
	But soon comes to look upon her as a heretic and usurper	196
	Renewed confidence of the Pope in Mary Stuart	197
	Pius V. seeks to obtain help for her from Spain	199
	Catholic reaction in England	200
	Renewed persecution of the Catholics	201
	The English Catholics look for action on the part of the Holy See	202
	Plans for a Catholic rising	203
	Threatened war between England and Spain lends force to these plans	204
1569	But the hopes of Spanish help prove vain	205
	The Earls of Northumberland and Westmorland take up arms on behalf of Mary	206
	Ill-success of the insurgents	207
	Failure of the Northern Rising	208
	Terrible reprisals of Elizabeth	208
	The Catholics ask for definite guidance from Rome	210
	The Pope and the two Earls	211
	Pius V. opens an inquiry in Rome as to the state of affairs in England	212
1570	The Bull of Excommunication of Elizabeth	214
	The bull not published in the customary form but copies make their way to England	215
	The bull affixed to the doors of the Bishop of London's palace by John Felton	217
	No idea at first of enforcing the bull by force of arms	217
	Philip II. objects to the bull; remonstrances of Alba	218
	Effects of the bull in England	220
	Elizabeth and the bull of excommunication	221
	A series of new laws against the Catholics	222
	A new period of the persecution in England begun	223
	Mary Stuart derives no advantage from the bull	224

A.D.		PAGE
	The Treaty of Chatsworth ; its terms not observed .	225
	The schemes of Ridolfi ; Mary appeals to the Catholic powers	226
1571	Plans for an invasion of England	227
	Alba treats the proposals coldly ; Ridolfi in Rome .	229
	Ridolfi sent by the Pope to Spain	231
	He is supported by Castagna but not by Philip II. and Alba	232
	Philip II. insists that the enterprize shall be carried out in the name of the Pope	233
	Alba continues to object to the plan	234
	The English government discover the conspiracy ; the treachery of Hawkins	236
	End of the conspiracy ; execution of Norfolk	238
	Cecil uses the opportunity against the Pope	238
	The position of Mary Stuart made worse	239
	The triumph of Elizabeth	240
	Violent English rule in Ireland	241
	Philip II. supports the Irish rebels	242
	Thomas Stukely	242

CHAPTER VII.

PIUS V. AND MAXIMILIAN II.—CATHOLIC REFORM IN GERMANY—
THE WORK OF CANISIUS.

1566	Ambiguous religious attitude of Maximilian II.	244
	Cardinal Commendone appointed legate to the Diet of Augsburg	246
	Formation of the German Congregation	247
	Commendone at Augsburg	248
	The nuncio Melchior Biglia	249
	Instructions to Commendone	249
	The question of the religious peace of Augsburg	252
	Success of Commendone ; the Diet accepts the decrees of Trent	254
	The Emperor and the expedition against the Turks	255
	The siege and fall of Sziget ; peace concluded with the Turks at Adrianople	256
1567	Maximilian begins to cultivate more friendly relations with the Holy See	257
1568	Financial concessions made by Pius V.	258
	Maximilian suddenly makes concessions to the Protestants	259
	The Pope's surprise and distress ; he condemns the concessions	260
	And sends Commendone to the Emperor	261
	Obstinacy of Maximilian II.	261
	Commendone at Vienna	262
	He is supported by Albert V. and Philip II.	263
	Maximilian apparently gives way	264
	But succeeds in deceiving the legate	265
1569	Commendone sets out for Rome	267

A.D.		PAGE
	The relations of the Pope and the Emperor again disturbed by the question of Cosimo I.	268
	The ambitions of Cosimo I.	269
	The Duke had loyally supported Pius V. in all things.	270
	The Pope bestows upon him the title of Grand Duke	271
1570	Protest of the Emperor	272
	The coronation of Cosimo I. in Rome	273
	The motives which had led the Pope to the elevation of Cosimo	274
	The attitude of Philip II.	275
	The Cardinals discuss the reply to the Emperor's protest	276
	The question raised at the Diet of Spire	277
	The Pope's reply to the Emperor	278
1571	Death of Melchior Biglia	279
	The new nuncio Giovanni Delfino	280
	His instructions	281
	The Emperor and the new Protestant "liturgy"	282
	The Archduke Charles of Styria	283
	Illness of Maximilian II.	285
	Complete failure of Maximilian's religious policy	286
	The German bishops and the Tridentine profession of faith	287
	Half-hearted Catholics in Germany	288
	The report of Peter Canisius on affairs in Germany	290
	The memorial of Feliciano Ninguarda	291
	Diocesan synods held by Cardinals Truchsess and Mark Sittich	292
	Synods and visitations in Germany	293
	The Bishops of Cologne, Trêves, Mayence and Prague	294
	The visitations reveal a deplorable state of affairs	295
	Catholic restoration in Bavaria; the activity of Albert V.	296
	Reforms in the Tyrol, Lower Austria and other parts of the Empire	297
	The work of the Jesuits, especially of Canisius	298

CHAPTER VIII.

RELIGIOUS CONDITIONS IN POLAND AND SWITZERLAND—FOREIGN MISSIONS

1566	The state of religion in Poland at the accession of Pius V.	300
	The nuncio, Giulio Ruggieri; his instructions	301
	The stormy Diet of Lublin; Cardinal Hosius appointed legate	302
1568	Ruggieri's report on the state of Poland	303
	Influence of the Jesuits	306
	Vincenzo de Portico succeeds Ruggieri as nuncio	307
1569	Cardinal Hosius at the Diet of Lublin	308
	He returns to Rome; his continued interest in the affairs of Poland	309

A.D.		PAGE
	The question of the divorce of King Sigismund Augustus	310
	Weakness of Portico	311
1571	Commendone sent as legate	312
1572	Commendone and the king's divorce	312
	The question of the league against the Turks	313
	The state of religion in Switzerland; account of Borromeo	314
	Catholic leaders in Switzerland; Pfyffer and Lussy	315
	The Catholic and Protestant cantons	316
	Cardinal Borromeo Protector of the Catholic Cantons	318
	Visitation by Borromeo of the Swiss valleys	319
	And of German Switzerland	320
	His suggestions for reform	321
	The question of Geneva	323
	Visitation of the Grisons; the Catholic and Protestant leagues	324
	The mission in Brazil	326
	The work of Azevedo; he collects missionaries in Europe	327
	Tragic fate of the expedition	328
	Protestant opposition to the missions	330
	Pius V. and the missions; his instructions to the nuncio in Madrid	331
	He issues a whole series of briefs on the subject	332
	Far-reaching powers of the civil authorities over the missions	333
	These rested upon concessions made by the Holy See	335
	Upon the whole this was favourable to the Church	336
	The mission in Peru	337
	Cruelty of the conquerors	338
	The viceroy, Toledo, attempts to remedy the abuses	340
	On the whole the Spanish government administered the colonies well	342
	The influence of the Popes in this matter	343
	Pius V. and the Indian missions	344
	Louis Bertrand	345
	The mission to Abyssinia	346
	The East Indies	347
	Pius V. far in advance of his predecessors in regard to the missions	349
	His insistence on adequate instruction	350
	The instructions of Francis Borgia to his subjects as to this	351
	Pius V. and the Greek churches	352

CHAPTER IX.

PIUS V. AND THE LEAGUE AGAINST THE TURKS.

1566	The Pope's attention directed from the first to the Turkish peril	353
	He gives help to the Knights of Malta	354

A.D.	PAGE
	Successes of the Turkish fleets in the Mediterranean 355
	A jubilee proclaimed 356
	Venice averse to any breach with the Turks 356
	Philip II. and Maximilian II. also hold back 357
	The Pope's renewed efforts to form a league 357
1567	Steps for the defence of the Papal States and Rome 359
	The new Sultan, Selim II. 361
1569	Turkish designs on Cyprus and the possessions of Venice 362
	Venice, taken by surprise, forced to look for help outside 363
	Her strained relations with the Pope and Philip II. 364
	She is forced to agree to the league 365
	The Porte sends an ultimatum to Venice ; its rejection 366
	Spanish mistrust of Venice 367
1570	Luis de Torres sent to Spain 369
	His instructions 370
	Torres in Spain 372
	Philip II. appoints representatives for the negotiations 373
	Torres and the King of Portugal 374
	Attempt to draw France into the league ; Charles IX. definitely refuses his participation 375
	The Emperor also holds back 376
	Attempts to interest Poland and Russia in the league 376
	Pius V. and the Russian Czar 377
	Failure of these attempts 378
	Everything depends upon Venice and Spain 378
	Mutual distrust of the two powers ; selfish attitude of the Republic 379
	Marcantonio Colonna appointed to command the Papal fleet 380
	Displeasure of Spain at this appointment 381
	Eagerness of the Roman nobles to take part in the enterprise 382
	The negotiations between Spain and Venice begun in Rome 382
	The treaty of alliances drafted 383
	Self-interested behaviour of both powers 384
	Heated discussions ; the objective of the alliance 385
	The financial question 385
	The contributions of the contracting powers 386
	The question of the supreme command 387
	General agreement to the appointment of Don John of Austria 388
	Further differences of opinion 389
	The status of Ragusa 389
	A combined fleet puts to sea 390
	Complete failure of the expedition ; disgraceful conduct of Andrea Doria 391
	The fall of Nicosia 391
	Pius V. complains of Doria to Philip II. 392
	The negotiations resumed 393

A.D.	PAGE
Fresh controversies	394
It is found impossible to arrive at an agreement.	395
The division of conquered territory ; the question of censures	396
The lieutenancy of the supreme command	397
Self-seeking of Venice and Spain	398
General indignation at the conduct of Spain	399

CHAPTER X.

THE VICTORY OF LEPANTO AND AFTERWARDS—DEATH OF PIUS V.

The Pope alone disinterested	400
Fears of the withdrawal of Venice	401
The two parties in Venice	402
1571 Colonna sent to Venice	403
The treaty of alliance at last signed	404
The terms of the alliance	405
Joy of Pius V. ; public processions ; he urges speed	406
Venice still delays in publishing the league	407
Commendone sent as legate to the Emperor and Poland ; Bonelli to Spain and Portugal	408
The legation of Bonelli	409
Preparations in Rome	411
The Papal fleet leaves Civitavecchia for Messina	412
Arrival of the Venetians ; the Spaniards still delay	413
Don John reaches Genoa	414
Don John at Naples ; the sacred standard of the league	415
Philip II.'s jealousy of his brother	416
The fleet sails from Messina	417
The fall of Famagosta ; Turkish atrocities	417
The Turkish fleet sighted near Lepanto	418
The opposing forces	419
Disposition of the Christian fleet	419
The battle begun	420
Complete victory of the Christian fleet (October 7)	421
Prisoners and booty	421
The fallen ; the Roman nobility	422
Anxiety of Pius V. ; his prayers and penances ; the Rosary	423
Suspense in Rome	424
Pius V. receives the news ; jubilation in Rome	425
Letters announcing the victory sent to all the powers	426
The Pope's far-reaching hopes	427
The victory not followed up	427
Disagreements among the victors	428
The return of Colonna ; preparations for his reception	429
Triumphal entry of Colonna into Rome	431
He is received by the Pope and Cardinals	433
Complete absence of paganism in the celebrations	433
Discussion of plans for the carrying on of the campaign	435

A.D.		PAGE
	Divergent aims of Spain and Venice	436
	Disinterested aims of the Pope	437
	No help to be looked for from France and the Emperor	438
	Disgraceful quarrels of the representatives of Spain and Venice	439
	The Pope decides on continued action in the Levant	439
1572	Preparations for the resumption of the campaign	440
	Privileges granted to all who take part in the Crusade	441
	Practical value of the victory of Lepanto	442
	The Feast of the Rosary	444
	Commemorative orations and poems	444
	The victory of Lepanto in art	446
	The Pope's vision at the moment of victory	449
	State of the Pope's health	450
	His great vigour	451
	But his health begins to fail	452
	He is worn out by his anxieties	453
	His last pilgrimage to the Seven Churches	454
	Sudden collapse of Pius V.	454
	The dying Pope ; his last thought the league against the Turks	455
	The death of Pius V. (May 1)	456
	The great work that he had accomplished	457
	Provisional burial of the Pope	458
1588	Translation of the body to St. Mary Major's	459
1712	Canonization of Pius V.	459
	His shrine	460

LIST OF UNPUBLISHED DOCUMENTS IN APPENDIX.

	PAGE
I. Pius V. to King Charles IX. of France . . .	463
II.-III. The Bull " In Coena Domini " of 10 April, 1568	463
IV.-V. Negotiations of A. Rucellai concerning the assistance to be given to France by Pius V., 1568	466
VI. Pope Pius V. to Charles IX., King of France . .	466
VII. Nicolas Sanders to M. A. Graziani	468
VIII.-IX. Avvertimenti sopra li maneggi di Francia del Bramante [Autumn, 1570].	470
X. Bramante to Cardinal Rusticucci	472
XI. Report in cipher of Bramante to Cardinal Rusticucci	473
XII. The captain of the guard, Jost Segesser, to the Council of Lucerne	473

CHAPTER I.

PIUS V. AND PHILIP II.

EVEN in the time of Pius IV. the cesaropapistical aims which had become so prominent in Spain ever since the end of the Middle Ages, had reached such a height that Figueroa, the President of the Royal Council, had gone so far as to assert, at a public session, that there was no Pope in Spain.¹ It was inevitable that the relations between the Holy See and the Catholic King should become more and more strained. Philip II., and still more his advisers, looked upon their claims, founded as they were upon privileges and customs, to be supreme even in ecclesiastical matters, as the inalienable right of the crown, and as a thing to be yet further increased, while the Apostolic See saw in that same claim a grievous injury to the most sacred rights of the Church. The state of affairs was bound to be embittered when, with Pius V., a Pope ascended the throne of Peter who looked into and decided the questions which arose in this connexion much more conscientiously than many of his predecessors and "with marvellous effect."²

The strong determination of Pius V. of ensuring the complete independence of the Church everywhere, and above all of setting free her jurisdiction and liberties from any interference on the part of the civil power, led him into serious disputes with the Spanish government. If these disputes never reached the extreme point of a complete breach this was the result, on the one hand, of the political situation, which now more than ever threw the Pope and the Catholic King into each other's arms, and on the other, of the personality of the man

¹ Cf. *Corresp. dipl.*, I., 23 n. and 444.

² HERRE, *Europ. Politik*, I., 58.

who, during the whole of the reign of Pius V., filled the difficult and responsible post of nuncio in Spain ; this was the Archbishop of Rossano, Giovanni Battista Castagna, who by his disinterested zeal, his prudence, and his eminent diplomatic ability, was able to satisfy the demands of the Pope's zeal for the defence of the interests of the Church against the steps taken by Philip II., and yet at the same time remain in favour with the king, in spite of his frequent and heated disputes, both with him and with his ministers.¹

Castagna had reached Madrid on November 13th, 1565, with the Cardinal legate, Boncompagni, and at Perpignan, the first place they came to in Spain, he had been a witness of the honourable welcome accorded to the representative of the Pope, with whom he made his solemn entry into the Spanish capital.² Cardinal Crivelli, his predecessor in the nunciature, left on November 17th. Boncompagni's labours had scarcely begun when they were interrupted by the news of the illness and death of Pius IV., in consequence of which the Cardinal legate returned to Rome on December 29th.³ The news of

¹ From SERRANO, *Corresp. dipl.*, I., xxii, xxvi *seq.*, who in a very praiseworthy way published in their original text the letters of the years 1565-1568, we now have a clear account of the story of the reports of Castagna, which were first made use of by LÄMMER (*Zur Kirchengeschichte*, 161 *seq.*), and then by GACHARD (*Bibl. Corsini*, 43 *seq.*, and *Bibl. de Madrid*, vii *seq.*; 85 *seq.*, 435 *seq.*), and lastly by HINOJOSA (p. 173).

² See *Corresp. dipl.*, I., 23, 25 *seq.*, 44 *seq.* Interesting particulars of Boncompagni's stay in Spain are given by his companion, Venanzio da Camerino, in his *notes in the Boncompagni Archives, Rome D. 5 ; *cf. ibid.* D. 7 the *notes of Musotti.

³ On February 2, 1566, Cusano *reports that the Pope was annoyed with Boncompagni, first, because he had left Spain without orders from the Holy See (*cf. as to this Bull. Hispanique*, VII., 247, and *Corresp. dipl.*, I., liv, 116) ; secondly, because he had accepted from Philip II. a gift of 5,000 ducats " e più per una lettera haveva ottenuta da S.M.C.^{ca} ai card^{li} Farnese et Borromeo, ove lo nominava per speciale subietto suo e li pregava lo facessero Papa " ; lastly, because he was unwilling to return to Spain on the business for which he had been appointed legate. Bon-

the election of Pius V. reached Madrid on January 25th, 1566. In his letter of congratulation to the new Pope Castagna did not fail to speak in high terms of praise of the Catholic zeal of the king, and again, in his letter of thanks for being confirmed in his nunciature, addressed to Cardinal Reumano, he remarks that Philip II. had spoken highly in praise of the new Pope.¹

At the beginning of April Castagna asked for further instructions as to the tasks which Pius IV. had given him to perform in Spain. These specially concerned the unjust violation of Canon Law by means of the so-called *recurso de fuerza*, a custom corresponding to the French *appel comme d'abus*, by means of which, in conjunction with the exercise of the *placet*, the Spanish government exercised a control over all acts of ecclesiastical jurisdiction by the holding back (*retención*) of Papal bulls. As a result of this, anybody could, by means of the *recurso de fuerza*, obtain redress from the royal council for any sentence of an ecclesiastical judge, whether bishop or nuncio, which he imagined to be unjust; the only exception was the tribunal of the Inquisition. If the council accepted the *recurso* all proceedings to the contrary by the ecclesiastical judge were suspended, and any action which he might still take was declared null. Anyone who suffered, or feared to suffer an injury to his rights (*fuerza*) from a Papal bull could ask that it should be held back. Frequent use was made of the *recurso*; not only clerics and laymen had

compagni, however, was so well able to answer these accusations that, as Cusano *states on February 23, he was received by Pius V. in a very cordial way (State Archives, Vienna). In his *notes, Venanzio da Camerino says that the order given by Pius V. for his return was impracticable because it only arrived when the legate had already sent off all his belongings and his retinue. Boncompagni Archives, Rome.

¹ Philip II. had said "di tale pontefice haviamo bisogno adesso" (letter of Castagna of February 20, 1566, in Corresp. dipl., I., 124). Castagna's confirmation had already been made on January 24, 1566; see App. n. 68 in Vol. XVII. of this work, Archives of Briefs, Rome, and British Museum, London.

recourse to it, but even the bishops, against the ordinances of Papal bulls and Apostolic commissions, which were not to their liking.¹ Besides this many other violations of ecclesiastical jurisdiction occurred in the fact that the secular authorities laid hands upon clerics, and arrested them, even in the churches. Pius IV. had already made complaints about this.

These violations of the authority of the Holy See and of the liberties of the Church on the part of the Spanish government did not escape the notice of Castagna, who also clearly saw that it would only be with great difficulty that a complete remedy could be found ; they had to deal with long-established customs, to which the king and his ministers clung with great tenacity. On the other hand he built great hopes on the truly Catholic sentiments of the king, whom he tried as far as possible to excuse personally, laying the chief blame on his ministers.²

In spite of this Castagna very soon realized how thorny was the position of the Pope's representative at the court of Philip II. The difficulty of the questions themselves, which were often very complicated, was great enough, but that was not all. The nuncio, for example,³ repeatedly complains of the slowness of the procedure, of the impenetrable secrecy in which everything was hidden, and of the custom of dealing fully with everything in writing as well as by word of mouth. The great evil at the Spanish court, a conclusion which Cardinal Bonelli came to later on, was that everything was reduced to memorials, to which the ministers made what

¹ Cf. PHILLIPS, II., 569 seq.; FRIEDBERG, 546 seq.; PHILIPPSON, Philip II., 273 seq.; HINSCHIUS, VI., I, 216 seq.; ISTURIZ in *Annuaire de l'université de Louvain*, 1907, 384 seq., where further bibliography is given. In his "Practicarum quaestionum liber," written in 1558, and several times printed (e.g. at Antwerp, 1627) the Spanish canonist Diego de Covarruvias strongly defends the "recursus ad principem"; see EICHMANN, *Der Recursus ab abusu*, Berlin, 1903, 121 seq.

² See *Corresp. dipl.*, I., 179 seq., 181, 363.

³ See *Corresp. dipl.*, I., 289 seq., 372.

answer they pleased, but without giving their reasons, and without troubling about motives, so that it was never possible to grasp the difficulties and bring them out into the open.¹ To this was added the proverbial indecision of the king, who was a past master at dragging on every question interminably.

Yet there were many important questions which called for immediate settlement. In the first place there was the affair of the unfortunate Archbishop of Toledo, Bartolomé Carranza, who had been kept a prisoner by the Spanish Inquisition for seven years, while Philip II. enjoyed the rich revenues of the archdiocese. With regard to this question it was Castagna's first duty to press the demand of the Holy See that the prisoner should be transferred to Rome, so that his case might be finally decided there, with complete impartiality and with all due solemnity, far away from the influence of his enemies in Spain. To this demand Philip II. offered an obstinate resistance, while Pius V., like his predecessor, persisted in his contention that the trial of Carranza belonged to his own tribunal.

It called for labour and skill on the part of Castagna to find an amicable solution of this problem. He saw very clearly where the root of the opposition of the Spanish government lay; it was feared in Madrid that the authority of the Spanish Inquisition, by means of which the Catholic King kept his realm in subjection, would be weakened.² The nuncio sought to convince Philip II. that this would not be the case, in a personal interview on June 24th at which he presented to the king an autograph letter from Pius V. In eloquent words he explained that the Pope stood above the Spanish Inquisition, and that the latter tribunal drew its jurisdiction from the Pope, so much so that in many briefs the final decision was expressly reserved to Rome, and that respect for the

¹ See SENTIS, 121.

² See Corresp. dipl., I., liv seq., 174, 223 seq., 227 seq., 243 seq. II., vii seq., ix seq. Cf. also the *report of Cusano of January 26, 1566, which states that the affair of Carranza was the original cause of the distrust, which continued to increase between Pius V. and Philip II. (State Archives, Vienna). Cf. p. 344, Vol. XVII, of this work.

Papal rights was to the interest of the Spanish Inquisition itself. The king listened courteously and attentively to Castagna, but was of opinion that he could not come to any hasty decision in a matter of such great importance, and that he would have to discuss the reasons adduced with the Pope himself. Castagna replied that such a course was both useless and unnecessary; he again repeated that the Pope could not allow any further vacancy of the archbishopric of Toledo, and that he would have to declare before all the world that he was not responsible for the dragging on of the affair. The king contented himself with replying that he too was without blame on that score, and adhered to his contention that so important an affair could not be settled hastily.¹

The Pope was much displeased, not only by the attitude of Philip II. in the affair of Carranza, but also by the news which had in the meantime been received from Spain that the bishops there had refused to publish the bull *In coena Domini* without the permission of the royal council.² But above all the Pope was annoyed at the violation of ecclesiastical jurisdiction in Spain and its dependent kingdoms, especially in Naples, by means of the *exequatur*. At the beginning of July he expressed himself very strongly to Requesens on the subject, and on August 13th Castagna received instructions to complain to the king of the infringements of the rights of the Church which were constantly occurring on account of the sovereign privileges of the *Monarchia Sicula*, and to tell him that it seemed strange to the Pope that in the dominions of so pious a Catholic sovereign the salutary orders of the head of the Church were not carried out, and were even absolutely flouted by the royal authority.³ At a consistory held about the same time Pius V. made a pointed allusion to those Catholic princes who arrogated to

¹ See the report of Castagna of June 30, 1566, Corresp. dipl., I., 270 seq.

² See the *report of Arco of July 13, 1566, State Archives, Vienna.

³ See Corresp. dip., I., 285 seq. ; 318 seq. , cf 335 seq. See also SANTORI, Autobiografia, XII., 341.

themselves the authority of the Holy See, a remark which was understood by all as referring to Spain.¹

While these troublesome controversies were going on, Spain had sent to Rome extensive requests, by the granting of which the Pope was asked to come to the financial aid of Philip II. Above all he was asked to renew for another five years the tax levied upon the Spanish clergy known as the *Sussidio*.² At the same time the Spanish envoy, the Marquis d'Aguilar, who had been sent to offer the king's congratulations to Pius V., after he had paid homage on May 16th,³ sought to obtain as well the concession of the *Bula de la Cruzada*. The ordinary Spanish ambassador, Luis de Requesens, rightly looked upon such a proceeding as inopportune, thinking, in the light of his own political experience, that the first thing to do was to satisfy the Pope's just complaints as to the infringement of ecclesiastical rights by Spain; Requesens strongly warned his colleague against conducting his business with such "a holy Pope" as had been done with his predecessor, and still less as had been done in the time of the Popes of the Renaissance.⁴

Requesens preached to deaf ears. His warnings as to the strong ecclesiastical views of Pius V. were not listened to, nor was any attempt made to arrive at a speedy settlement of the

¹ See the *report of Cusano from Rome, August 17, 1566 State Archives, Vienna.

² See the *reports of Arco from Rome, January 12 and March 23, 1566, *ibid.*

³ See ZUÑIGA, in *Colecc. de docum inéd.*, XCVIII., 369; Vida de L. Requesens in *Bullet. Hispanique*, VII., 246 *seq.*; *Corresp. dipl.*, I., 127, 153, 166 *seq.*; 173, 175, 192 *seq.*, 214, 247 *seq.* For the making of the "obedientia" cf. CIBRARIO, *Lettere ined.*, Turin, 1861, 345, as well as the *report of Arco of May 18, 1566, State Archives, Vienna.

⁴ See the interesting letter from Requesens to Juan de Zuñiga in *Colecc. de docum. inéd.*, XCVII., 371 *seq.* The letter bears no date, but belongs to July, 1566, because the departure of Aguilar had taken place on the "18th of last month" i.e. in June (see *Corresp. dipl.*, I., 265, n. 1). Cf. also *Corresp. dipl.*, I., 253, n. 2.

case of Carranza. Even a modest wish expressed by the Pope in favour of his native place, Bosco, which, as Requesens pointed out, would have cost the Spanish government nothing to grant, was refused.¹ Requesens, however, was quite wrong in thinking that the Pope would have granted the *Cruzada* if Spain had met his wishes in this matter. Pius V. was not the man to let such considerations influence his decisions. His refusal to grant the *Cruzada* was founded solely upon the numerous abuses connected with it.² What he could he granted. Thus on March 16th, 1566, he allowed for another five years the levy of the *sussidio* on the clergy, which brought in to the Spanish government 400,000 gold scudi.³ The Pope did this against the advice of the Cardinals, and without asking for any corresponding gift to the Papal treasury in return for this important concession.⁴ In face of this how miserably mean it was to see Philip II., just at that moment, supporting the Spanish Carthusians in their refusal to make a contribution to the building of the church of S. Maria degli Angeli in Rome, when they were ordered to do so by Pius V.⁵ Philip II. also showed himself very unbending with regard

¹ See the above mentioned letter of Requesens. As to this affair see Corresp. dipl., I., 109, 148, 219. Cf. *ibid.*, IV., 41 *seq.*, for the behaviour of Philip II. to the Pope's majordomo, Fr. de Reinoso.

² See the *report of Arco of May 22, 1566, State Archives, Vienna. See also the memorial of 1565 in Corresp. dipl., I., 443 *seq.*

³ See * "Indice de las concesiones que han hecho los Papas de la Cruzada, Subsidio y Escusado" in the Archives of the Spanish Embassy, Rome. Text of the *bull for the "Prorogatio subsidii," dated March 16, 1566, in Fondo Borghese, I., 145-147, p. 54, Papal Secret Archives. Cf. also Corresp. dipl., I., 90, 114, 131, 149, 152, 193 *seq.*

⁴ SERRANO (I., xlvi) rightly puts this forward as a proof of how from the first Pius V. made every effort to maintain good relations with Philip II.

⁵ See the reports of Castagna of May 12 and August 11, 1566, Corresp. dipl., I., 235, 302. Cf. also Vol. XVI. of this work, p. 443. and Vol. XVII., p. 121.

to those sums which the Fabbrica of St. Peter's was still waiting to recover from the *Cruzada* of the previous year.¹ In the meantime the handing over of Carranza was put off from month to month.

All that Pius V. could do was to insist more and more strongly upon his right of conducting the trial of Carranza in Rome. On July 30th, 1566, he addressed a brief to Castagna to the following effect: If Carranza has been kept a prisoner for seven years, the Pope cannot see how he can be blamed for that; but he also sees that he is laid open to more serious accusations than that, and he is now driven to lay a command upon the members of the Spanish Inquisition, under pain of excommunication and suspension, to allow Carranza to start at once for Rome, and to send the acta of his trial.² Before this brief reached Spain, Philip II., as Castagna announces on August 23rd, 1566, had made up his mind to comply with the just demand of Pius V., and to send Carranza to Rome.³

For the rest, however, Castagna had nothing but bad news to give from Spain, especially concerning many of the bishops, who, for their own ends, made use of the royal powers against the lower clergy. He had had to take action against Diego de Simancas, Bishop of Badajoz, because he had thrown into prison the bearer of a Papal bull concerning some just pecuniary demand. On August 11th the nuncio wrote: Here I find the authority of the Holy See impugned on every point; all are opposed to it except the cathedral chapters, and even they are only actuated by self-interest⁴

The dissensions between Rome and Madrid were further

¹ Cf. Corresp. dipl., I., 180, 195, 233, 276, 352.

² See LADERCHI, 1566, n. 484; Corresp. dipl., I., 292 *seq.* The brief was prepared with such great secrecy that not even Cardinal Bonelli knew of it; see App. n. 68, Vol. XVII. of this work, and the autograph letter from the Pope to Castagna of August 3 (printed in Corresp. dipl., I., 298 *seq.*), in which he insists that the liberation of Carranza and the journey of Philip II. to the Low Countries must be energetically pushed forward.

³ See Corresp. dipl., I., 330.

⁴ *Ibid.* 303.

intensified in connexion with the dangerous disturbances which broke out in the Low Countries. Like all well-informed people Pius V. saw in the personal presence of Philip II. in the threatened provinces "a last resource against a conflagration which was gaining ground every day." But the King of Spain, who always found it so hard to make up his mind, could not decide upon this course. When, in September 1566, the news reached Rome of the horrors perpetrated by the Netherland iconoclasts, the Pope was so overcome that, even at the risk of seriously irritating Philip, he hastily determined on a startling step. On account of the sacrileges committed by the insurgents he thought it his sacred duty to lay before the king by means of an envoy-extraordinary the necessity of his going to the Low Countries. Pietro Camaiani, Bishop of Fiesole, who had been nuncio to Charles V. in the time of Julius III.,¹ was entrusted with this task.² In his instructions³ we read that he was to adjure the king by the Blood of Christ not to put off his journey any longer; if he delayed any further the Netherlands would be lost to the Church, as well as to the king, and that would entail the most serious consequences for the Catholic religion in England and

¹ See Vol. XIII. of this work, p. 135. For Camaiani, who during the time of his legation became Bishop of Ascoli (October 9, 1566, see GULIK-EUBEL, 133), see *Nuntiaturberichte*, XII., xxvi seq. Saggio di cose Ascolane, Teramo, 1766, App. cccxvi; *Rev. d'hist. ecclés.*, III., 413 seq.; CAPPONI, Mem. d. chiesa Ascolana, Ascoli-Piceno, 1898. By many, and recently by RACHFAHL (Oranien, II., 2, 839) the mission of Camaiani has been confused with that of Alessandro Casale. The latter, according to a *brief of September 12, 1566, to the Archduke Charles of Austria, was sent to their Spanish majesties to convey congratulations "de partu ipsius reginae": see Addit., 26, 865, p. 496, British Museum, London.

² See the *brief to Philip II. of September 27, 1566, accrediting Camaiani. Original minute in the British Museum, London (cf. App. 68, Vol. XVII. of this work).

³ See Corresp. dipl., I., 356 seq. The editor has missed the printed version of the instructions in *Compte rendu de la Commiss. d'hist. à Bruxelles*, III., 9, 276 seq.

France. His Majesty must not let himself be deterred by consideration for Spain, for even if Philip were to send a large army to the Low Countries it would be of no avail without his personal presence.

Camaiani was also to ask for the actual transfer to Rome of Carranza, and the Pope was prepared to allow that several members of the Spanish Inquisition should accompany him in order to give information to the Curia. Camaiani was further to bring up the question of the offences against ecclesiastical jurisdiction in the Kingdom of Naples, where the Bishop of Gravina and even the Archbishop of Naples had been interfered with in the exercise of their office by the Spanish authorities. Finally he was to call attention to the fact that the sovereign privileges, known as the *Monarchia Sicula*, had been made use of, as had never been the case in Sicily, "to make the Catholic King a Pope" and that this had entailed so much confusion in ecclesiastical affairs that the Pope, unless a remedy was found, would find himself obliged to withdraw all concessions and indulgences.

The mission of Camaiani, which caused a great sensation everywhere, and still more the tasks which had been assigned to him, were extremely distasteful to Philip II. When at the end of the last week in November, 1566, he appeared before the king, the unwelcome visitor met with a very cold reception. Philip made a grievance of the fact that doubts were felt in the Curia about the reality of his intention of undertaking the journey which was so necessary, and which he had so often promised to make. His anger at the tasks which had been entrusted to the envoy was increased when Camaiani laid his demands before him in ill-chosen terms, and in general adopted a brusque tone.¹ The irritation of the king found full expression in the instructions which he sent to his ambassador in Rome. He must give the Pope clearly to understand that his insistence, and his interference in the affairs of His Majesty,

¹ See Corresp. dipl., II., xlv. Pius V. disapproved (*ibid.* I., 430 *seq.*) of the over brusque attitude adopted by Camaiani, who was subsequently recalled. Cf. the letter of Bonelli of February 12, 1567, *ibid.* II., 37 *seq.*

whom God was making use of as His instrument, were ill-timed and ill-judged ; even if he had not made up his mind, as he actually had done, to go to the Low Countries and to send Carranza to Rome, the Holy Father had chosen but a sorry way of inducing him to do these things !¹

The hostility of Philip II. did not have the effect of daunting the courage of the Pope's representative in continuing to press the demands entrusted to him. Before long it was categorically reported that Philip would shortly set out upon his journey to the Low Countries.²

On December 17th, 1566,³ Pius V. addressed a letter to the king in his own hand, in which, by way of excuse, he pointed out that Camaiani had been sent, not because he, the Pope, had any doubts that Carranza would be released, but only in order that this affair, which had already been postponed on account of the press of business at the Spanish court, might not be allowed to drag on any longer, and that if Camaiani had been given the further task of insisting on the importance of the king's journey, this was not because the Pope thought that this duty was not already clear to His Majesty, but merely because he feared lest, as was the case with all good undertakings, the devil should put obstacles in the way of this one. In this letter Pius V. also touched upon the offences committed against the ecclesiastical jurisdiction by the Spanish authorities, adding the warning that such a course of action was the first step towards estrangement from the Church,⁴ and a request that the king would give orders that the bishops were not in future to be interfered with in the carrying out

¹ See the report of Castagna, translated in GACHARD, *Bibl. de Madrid*, 92 *seq.*, and the letter of Philip II. to Requesens of November 26, 1566, in GACHARD, *Don Carlos*, II., 373 *seq.* Cf. BÜDINGER, 73 *seq.* KERVYN DE LETTENHOVE, II., 225 *seq.* and *Corresp. dipl.*, I., 383 *seqq.*, 399 *seq.* where the reports of Castagna and Requesens are printed in full.

² See *Corresp. dipl.*, I., 405, 413 ; *cf.* 362, 376 *seq.*

³ *Ibid.* 422 *seq.*

⁴ "E questo è il primo passo et il primo scalino o sii grado d'alienarsi dalla s. chiesa cattolica."

of their duty against simonists, concubinists and other offenders.

Before this, on December 9th, 1566, Camaiani and Castagna had made representations against the interference of the Spanish authorities in ecclesiastical matters in the Kingdom of Naples, and the abuses in connexion with the *Monarchia Sicula*. Philip II. asked for a more detailed memorial as to these matters. At the same audience Camaiani delivered a Papal brief on the obstacles which the senate of Milan were putting in the way of the reforms of the archbishop, Borromeo. The king promised to inquire into this carefully.¹

At the end of 1566 and at the beginning of the new year, besides these ecclesiastical matters, the nuncios conferred with Alba and Philip II. concerning the formation of a league of Christian princes against the Turks, a matter which the Pope looked upon as supremely important. The Spanish government showed itself quite averse to this plan, principally because the German and French Protestants would look upon such a league as directed against themselves, and thus the situation in the Low Countries would be made more difficult.² Concerning the decision which was now made to send Alba, who was to be vested with unlimited powers, and who was to oppose the Netherland rebels with all rigour and without restraint, there now sprang up a difference of opinion, similar to that which had occurred between Paul III. and Charles V., at the time of the Schmalkaldic War.³ While at Madrid they wished it to appear to the rest of the world that the intervention in the Low Countries was directed solely against political

¹ See the report of Castagna of December 9, 1566, in Corresp. dipl., I., 414 *seq.* *Ibid.* 415 *seq.* the memorial. In an autograph letter to Philip II., dated Rome, January 8, 1567, Pius V. expresses the hope that the king has examined into the obstacles placed in the way of ecclesiastical jurisdiction in the kingdom of Naples. In this letter he further remarks that, as he already sent him word by Castagna, Philip II. had no reasonable cause for displeasure at the mission of Camaiani. Corresp. dipl., II., 7 *seq.*

² Cf. HERRE, *Europ. Politik*, I., 36, 41 *seq.*

³ Cf. Vol. XII. of this work, p. 303.

rebels, in Rome they wished, as the facts indeed warranted, that the religious aspect of the affair should be made clear.¹ In February, 1567, Castagna delivered to the king a letter from the Pope which continued to harp upon the necessity of his majesty's personal appearance in the Low Countries, and again alluded to the difficulties placed by the Spanish government in the way of the visitation in Naples. In the negotiations that followed, Philip admitted that his anger at the mission of Camaiani had been caused by the connecting of affairs in the Netherlands with the case of Carranza. He would certainly undertake the journey to the Low Countries, but it was necessary in the first place to hasten the mission of Alba. As to Naples he promised to give the necessary orders to satisfy the Pope's demands.²

In March, 1567, the departure of the king was announced in various proclamations,³ and Camaiani thought that he could return to Rome with an easy conscience.⁴ The embarkation of Carranza was at hand;⁵ Philip intended to enter into and to take steps to satisfy the complaints of the Pope as to the obstacles put in the way of the Neapolitan bishops in the exercise of the duties of their office, and especially their visitations,⁶ but he remained obdurate on the subject of the *placet*, the *exequatur*, the *recurso de fuerza*, the *Monarchia Sicula*, and other royal prerogatives.⁷ At the beginning of

¹ See the extracts from the reports of Castagna in GACHARD, *Bibl. de Madrid*, 93 *seqq.* Cf. *Corresp. dipl.*, II., xlvi *seq.*, 25 *seq.*, 43 *seq.*, 47 *seq.*, 52 *seq.*, 57 *seq.*, 65 *seq.*

² See the report of Castagna from Madrid, February 8, 1567, *Corresp. dipl.*, II., 33 *seq.*

³ See RANKE, *Hist.-biogr. Studien*, Leipzig, 1877, 521 *seq.*

⁴ He was recalled by a letter from Bonelli of February 12, 1567: he set out on March 22 and reached Rome on April 13. See *Corresp. dipl.*, II., 83, 88.

⁵ It finally took place on April 27, 1567. See LAUGWITZ, 91; *Corresp. dipl.*, II., 97; cf. Vol. XVII. of this work, 344.

⁶ Cf. the letters of Bonelli to Castagna from Rome, January 8 and March 6, 1567, *Corresp. dipl.*, II., 10 *seq.*, 63.

⁷ See the report of Castagna of March 22, 1567, *Corresp. dipl.*, II., 84; III., xlvi *seq.* Cf. LADERCHI, 1567 n. 66; HINOJOSA, 185.

May he tried once more to pacify Castagna about the affair in the Netherlands ; the interests of religion—so he maintained—would suffer no hurt if it were declared to the world that they were only taking action against political rebels, though he well knew that heresy was the origin and breeding ground of the revolt.¹

The attitude of Philip II., which led the Pope to grant him the *excusado*, but who in the end abandoned his journey to the Low Countries, which he had represented as being quite decided upon, caused fresh dissatisfaction in Rome, which, however, began to disappear when news came of the stern measures being adopted by Alba. The Pope now thought that he could be at rest about the cause of religion in the Netherlands, and, as Arco reports, he was so pleased that he almost entirely forgot his displeasure with the king.² But it was not long before fresh disagreements over ecclesiastical affairs sprang up, so that, instead of improving, relations between Rome and Madrid became more strained than ever. The responsibility for this did not rest with the Pope, who was always much more accommodating than Philip II.³ While the latter continued to press for the concession of the *Cruzada*, and sought to bring pressure to bear upon the Pope by means of opinions from the Spanish prelates,⁴ the Spanish government persisted with the utmost tenacity in the cesaropapistical claims which Pius V. considered it his sacred duty to resist.⁵ It is beyond all question that very often these claims

¹ See Corresp. dipl., II., 99.

² See the *letter of Arco of September 27, 1567, State Archives, Vienna.

³ See HERRE, Papsttum, 154.

⁴ For the resistance of Pius V. see the report of Granvelle of March 14, 1567, Corresp. de Philippe II., I., 519, and the letter of Requesens of September 16, 1567, in Corresp. dipl., II., 200. As to the opinions see Corresp. dipl., II., 137 ; some are to be found in the Simancas Archives, Pat. Real. leg. 20.

⁵ Requesens himself recognized the purity of Pius V.'s intentions. On December 25, 1566, he wrote to Philip II. : " Your Majesty may rest assured that what he has done was not due to

were quite unjustifiable. Even Requesens, Philip II.'s representative in Rome, did not, in his private correspondence, conceal his opinion that the Pope was fully justified in his complaints of the encroachment upon ecclesiastical jurisdiction. If, he said, an appeal had been made to Pius V. concerning the abuses in the Roman Curia of which Spain complained, the Pope would certainly have removed them, but in their case one-sided measures had been taken, and in so doing Spain had gone too far, so much so that it might be said that the Germans had thrown off their allegiance to the Holy See in word and deed, and the Spaniards had done so in deed.¹

Castagna had again and again to make complaints of the way in which the Papal decrees, even in purely spiritual matters, were made subject to the *placet* (*pase*) of a civil authority, such as the royal council of Castille, and were even rejected when they were thought to run counter to the privileges and laws of the kingdom. In the Kingdom of Naples, the outcome of these claims, the so-called *exequatur*, had led to so grave a dispute that Pius V. threatened to excommunicate the Viceroy.² Moved by the purest intentions, the Pope wished, by means of a visitation, to raise the Neapolitan clergy to a better moral state, a thing much to be desired in the interests of the kingdom itself, but he found himself hampered on all sides by the royal authority, while in Spain, laymen, on the pretext of the privileges of the *Monarchia Sicula*, allowed themselves to interfere in the most dangerous way in the internal affairs of the Church.³

Things came to an even graver crisis between the spiritual and the temporal powers, not from any ill-will, nor to any private intentions, but to holy zeal, though without any understanding of the proper way to apply it, especially in the case of princes so powerful as Your Majesty." See HERRE, *Papsttum*, 154, now published in *Corresp. dipl.*, II., 432.

¹ *Colecc. de docum. inéd.*, XCVII., 379-380.

² With *Corresp. dipl.*, II., 27 *cf.* the *report of Strozzi of January 25 and *that of Arco of February 22, 1567, *State Archives*, Vienna.

³ *Cf.* LADERCHI, 1566, n. 184 *seq.*; 1567, n. 63 *seq.*, 67 *seq.*; *Corresp. dipl.*, II., 251 *seq.*, 282 *seq.*

and the temporal powers in the Duchy of Milan.¹ The first temporary disagreement with the governor, the Duke of Albuquerque, who was a man of good-will, was of but small importance. The latter claimed certain prerogatives of precedence at ecclesiastical functions, which, in the opinion of Cardinal Borromeo, might be taken as symbolical of the predominance of the civil over the spiritual power. This matter was settled by Philip II. giving his governor orders to stay away from the religious functions in question.² Soon after, however, a long controversy arose with the senate of Milan, which had the widest powers in the government of the duchy, and guarded them most jealously. Borromeo very soon saw that he would never put an end to certain disorders merely by sermons and exhortations. He therefore had recourse to the civil courts, which hitherto had quite failed to punish such offences, or had only punished them lightly, and obtained from them the promise that they would visit them with imprisonment and even graver penalties. In a special brief³ the Pope quieted his scruples lest such an interference with the sentences of the civil courts might in some circumstances involve ecclesiastical irregularity. The archbishop

¹ Cf. BASCAPÉ, l. 2, c. I seq., 7 seq., p. 24 seq., 38 seq.; MUTINELLI, Storia d'Italia, I., 275 seq.; M. FORMENTINI, La dominazione spagnuola in Lombardia, Milan, 1881; BERTANI, La bolla "Coenae," la giurisdizione ecclesiastica in Lombardia, Milan, 1888; A. GALANTE, Il diritto di placitazione e l'economato dei benefici vacanti in Lombardia, Milan, 1884; HINOJOSA, 194 seq.; LAEMMER, Meletemata, 222 seq., 226; GINDELY, Rudolf II., I., 16; SERRANO in Corresp. dipl., III., v-xl.

² Corresp. dipl., I., 208, 262, 267, 289 (letters of April-June, 1566) III., x. Borromeo expressed himself in favourable terms of Albuquerque (SYLVAIN, I., 384).

³ Of May 22, 1566, in SALA, I., 178. According to SERRANO, Corresp. dipl., III., x, Pius V. gave faculties to the Cardinal "para proceder contra los delinquentes é imponerles *por si ó con ayudo del brazo secular ó de sus tribunales*, toda clase de penas, incluso la capital" (the italics are mine). But in the brief there is no mention of the *episcopal* tribunal, and no authority is given for the death sentence.

further took proceedings on his own account against these deep-rooted abuses. According to a long established custom it had been the right of the episcopal courts to punish certain offences, as for example those against the sanctity of the sacrament of matrimony, blasphemy, the breaking of the precepts of fasting and Sunday observance, the usury that was contrary to the Church's laws, etc.¹ Borromeo, in accordance with the ancient custom of the Archbishops of Milan, now set up a force of a small number of armed police for the arrest of offenders, and the carrying out of the sentences of his court.

The senate of Milan raised a strong protest against this step. The Cardinal, they maintained, could not use his armed force against the laity, since that would be an infringement of the king's prerogative; the police, too, were bound by the ordinance which forbade the use of certain arms. They also adduced other points of disagreement. When Borromeo wished to print the acta of his provincial council, the senate thought fit once more to uphold the rights of the king, claiming a right to alter the decrees of the council where they affected the laity. Even Papal decrees could only be acted upon in Milan with the consent of the senate.²

The question of the *placet* for the synod and for Papal briefs was soon adjusted by the conciliatory attitude of the governor, and the senate had to withdraw its claims. The question of the archbishop's armed police, however, was not settled during the life-time of Borromeo. As a matter of fact the rights of the matter were not altogether clear. Borromeo supported his action by the example of his predecessors in the archi-

¹ Cf. the enumeration in the letter of Borromeo of October 19, 1569, in SALA, III., 416.

² BASCAPÈ, I. 2, c. I, p. 24 *seqq.* SYLVAIN, I., 376 *seqq.* SER-RANO in Corresp. dipl., III., xi. Difficulties in the way of printing the provincial synod were also experienced at Genoa (SALA, II., 261, n. 135, 262, n. 137) as well as at Venice (*ibid.* 274, n. 14 *seqq.*); for which reason Pius V. sent briefs to Genoa (*ibid.*) and to Milan (Corresp. dipl., I., 414). Cf. *ibid.* I., 187, the decree of the Doge, Priuli, for the protection of the synod, dated October 3, 1567.

episcopal dignity. The senate, on the other hand, declared that such rights were obsolete for the reason that, owing to the continued absence of the archbishops of Milan from their see, they had not been exercised for the past ten years. Moreover, Milan had in the meantime come under the Spanish crown and the laws of Spain afforded no scope for such action on the part of the archbishop.¹ The senate certainly had a legal foundation for its action, but it availed itself of this with a zeal which, even in the opinion of Philip II., went too far.² The stern action taken by Borromeo against abuses and immorality had made him enemies, especially among the nobility and men of influence, who gladly seized this opportunity of putting an obstacle in the way of the unwelcome reformer.³

Philip II., to whom the senate submitted its grievances against the archbishop, referred the matter to the Pope for decision. Borromeo had already submitted the question of his rights to the Holy See, while the senate was represented in Rome by one of its members, the future Cardinal Chiesa. The latter returned to Milan before the summer of 1567; in the brief⁴ which he brought with him the Pope promised to hasten the settlement of this difficult legal question as much as possible. While the negotiations in Rome dragged on, Borromeo continued as before to make use of his police, which

¹ Serrano, *loc. cit.*

² "Il Re catholico cognosce l' errore del Senato et similmente tutti gli consiglieri che sono quì." (Castagna to Bonelli, September 8, 1567, Corresp. dipl., II., 189; *cf.* 215). Espinosa told the nuncio: "che il Re ha pavuto per male assai del Senato che habbia fatto quello che fece, maxime senza darne parte prima al Governatore; et gli ha scritto che adverta che non gli occorra mai più simil cosa." Castagna to Bonelli, February 14, 1568, *ibid.* 305.

³ "Alcuni del Senato ancora, quali essendo infetti di qualche vicio notabile, fanno più remori de li altri acciò che [non] siano per aventura castigati de i loro peccati." Bonelli to Castagna, July 25, 1567, Corresp. dipl., II., 172; BASCAPÈ, I. 2, c. 1, p. 24 *seqq.*

⁴ Printed in BASCAPÈ, I. 2, c. 2, p. 29; an Italian version in GIUSSANO, 117.

according to all legal principles, he had the full right to do. It occasioned great excitement and indignation when he took action against the immoral conduct of a noble Milanese who "had sold the honour of his house for money." The Cardinal had him arrested and thrown into prison.¹

At this the indignation of the senate burst out. Under the pretext that the archbishop's officer was carrying forbidden arms, the senate, breaking through ecclesiastical immunities, had him arrested at the doors of the cathedral of Milan, publicly tortured in the presence of a great number of people at the usual gibbet, and then banished from Milan under threat of the galleys.² The Cardinal demanded satisfaction, which the senate refused; Borromeo then excommunicated the authors of the outrage, but the senate had the sentence torn down from the doors of the church, and in offensive terms lodged an accusation against the archbishop in Rome.³ Thus the breach was complete; the attempts at conciliation on the part of the governor, without whose knowledge the senate had acted, were in vain, and the only hope of a solution

¹ Bonelli to Castagna, August 2 1567, in SYLVAIN, I., 380.

² Bonelli to Castagna, July 25, 1567, Corresp. dipl., II., 169 *eqq.* Brief of February 17, 1569, in SALA, I., 222 *seq.* Letter of the Senate, dated July 13, 1567, in SALA, III., 388. *Cf.* Corresp. dipl., III., xiii. According to Serrano (*ibid.* xiv) the officer had only suffered "un simulacro de vapulaci6n." Bonelli (*loc. cit.* 170) speaks, it is true of "tre tratti di corda," but this does not mean three blows with a rope, but that he was three times racked and three times released; *cf.* the brief already cited: "publice tribus ictibus eculei acriter plecti et affici, cum maxima ignominia . . . et cum gravi eius corporis tormento." Thus too the letter of the Senate, *loc. cit.*: "poena trium funis quassuum affectus." *Cf.* BASCAPÈ, l. 2, c. 2, p. 30: "Acerrime si quis unquam alius torquetur."

³ "Tanta fuit semper archiepiscopi duritia'; ,cum virum hunc [Borromeo] videremus nullis omnino rationibus moveri'; ,adeo impotenti ira exarsit; ,ne cum homine hoc, qui a sua voluntate nunquam decedit, in certamen descendamus etc." Letter of July 13, 1567, *loc. cit.*

of the complicated problem lay in the negotiations between Rome and Madrid.

Pius V. did not deign any reply to the letter of the senate. He had recourse to the governor, speaking to him of what had occurred in words of bitter reproach ; what had been done against the Cardinal must be annulled, and everything restored to the position in which it had been before the occurrence ; the question of further action against the offenders was reserved for further consideration.¹ At the end of August the president and two other members of the senate, together with several others involved in the affair, were summoned to Rome to give a personal account of their action.² All the remonstrances of the governor and the Spanish ambassador in Rome were unable to make the Pope go back upon this demand ;³ the utmost that could be wrung from him was the extension of the time originally fixed from thirty to forty-five days.⁴

Philip II. disapproved of the ill-advised action of the senate ;⁵ on the other hand he deemed it his duty to intervene once more on behalf of the authority of his government,⁶ and he was displeased that the Pope should have taken action without first consulting him.⁷

Philip sought before everything else to find a solution of the controversy by winning over Borromeo,⁸ because once that was done he hoped the Pope would not raise any further

¹ Brief of July 28, 1567, Corresp. dipl., II., 171 n.

² Bonelli to Castagna, August 22, 1567, *ibid.* 181 and 182 n. 1. The Papal summons is of August 19 ; *ibid.* 196, n. 1.

³ Bonelli to Castagna, September 24, 1567, *ibid.* 211.

⁴ Brief to Albuquerque of September 6, 1567, printed *ibid.* 197.

⁵ See *supra*, p. 19, n. 2.

⁶ "siendo este de tanta consideracion por lo que toca a la reputacion de la justicia en cuya estimacion consiste la principal fuerza de los estados y señorias temporales." Philip II. to Requesens, September 14, 1567, Corresp. dipl., II., 196.

⁷ Castagna to Bonelli, September 28, 1567, *ibid.* 215.

⁸ Letter of Philip II. to Borromeo of September 1, 1567, *ibid.* III., xvi n. (there is a printer's error here of 1568).

difficulties. But the governor's attempts in this direction were without result. Philip therefore, in October, 1567, sent to Rome to carry on the negotiations the Marquis de Cerralbo,¹ who was first to go to the Cardinal at Milan to try to come to an arrangement with him, which the Pope could then approve; if, however, Borromeo would not agree to this, Cerralbo was not to be afraid of threatening him, and to hold out to the archbishop the prospect of the king's publicly representing him as the disturber of the peace of the state.

Cerralbo only reached Milan in the middle of January, 1568, and there put forward his proposals, which were fundamentally little more than a renewal of the claims of the senate.² Before he succeeded in obtaining any satisfaction from Borromeo, the news arrived that the Papal decision of the case was imminent, so that Cerralbo set off hurriedly on his way to Rome, where with considerable difficulty he succeeded in inducing the Pope to defer his decision until he had first gone into the explanations brought by Cerralbo.³ The efforts of Cardinals Pacheco and Granvelle with the Pope, however, met with a certain amount of success; Pius withdrew the summons to the senate on condition that they should make satisfaction to the Archbishop of Milan, and beg for absolution from the ecclesiastical censures.⁴ The expected Papal decision as to the rights of the Archbishop of Milan did not appear, while Cerralbo rejected a compromise suggested by Pius V.⁵

Hitherto the governor of Milan, the Duke of Albuquerque, had shown himself the friend of the archbishop, but he gradually became estranged from him and began to treat him as an adversary, at any rate in his public acts. On the eve of

¹ The credentials dated October 12, 1567, *ibid.* II., 220; summary of the instructions for Cerralbo, *ibid.* n.

² Corresp. dipl., III., xvii *seq.*

³ Zuñiga to Albuquerque, February 14, 1568, *ibid.* II., 303, n. 2.

⁴ *Ibid.* xix *seq.* Avviso di Roma of March 20, 1568, *ibid.* xx.

⁵ Nor could the General of the Dominicans, Vincenzo Giustiniani, who went to Spain in the following year as Papal envoy, bring about an agreement on the subject. See Corresp. dipl., III., xxii, and *infra*, p. 60 *seq.*

Corpus Christi in 1568, he informed the vicar-general of the archbishop, who was away, that he could not take part in the procession on the following day if the armed guards of the archbishop had any part in it.¹ On August 25th he issued a strict edict against all who, directly or indirectly, violated the royal jurisdiction. This edict in all probability referred to the controversy with the archbishop, and was certainly understood in that sense in the archiepiscopal curia;² all Borromeo's officers of justice took to flight, and thus the archbishop's court was suddenly paralysed.³

Albuquerque's edict made its appearance just at the moment when the struggle between the civil and ecclesiastical powers in Milan had become more bitter than ever. The chapter of S. Maria della Scala, which was much in need of reform, resisted the archbishop's visitation on the ground that the church was under royal patronage and was independent of the archbishop. It was true that Clement VII. had granted rights of exemption to the Scala, but only on the condition that the Archbishop of Milan confirmed them, and the canons were unable to produce proof of such confirmation. Under these circumstances Borromeo asked in Rome what he was to do, and received the reply that he could make the visitation. The Cardinal, however, waited for another two months before acting.

It then happened that a cleric belonging to the Scala was imprisoned for some offence by the archiepiscopal courts, and this let loose the hatred that had so long been accumulating. Relying on their privileges the canons declared that two officers of the court were excommunicated, and demanded an explanation from the archbishop himself. The senate openly took the part of the chapter, whose claims the governor also supported, and it was just at that moment that he issued the

¹ Corresp. dipl., III., xxi.

² "Questo bando non si può dir che sia stà fatto per altro, che per la total ruina della giurisdittione et libertà ecclesiastica." Thus the *Considerationi* on the bando in SALA, II., 13.

³ Cf. the documents in SALA, II., 13 *seqq.*

edict threatening the severest penalties for every infringement of the royal jurisdiction.

Borromeo quickly made up his mind. He arranged for the visitation of the Scala to take place in a few days time, nor would he agree to the governor's request that he would, on account of the general uneasiness, wait for another three days. On August 31st, 1569, a priest notified the canons in the archbishop's name, of his immediate arrival, but he was driven out with violence by the chapter, who had taken refuge in the cemetery behind the church. Soon afterwards the Cardinal arrived in solemn procession, and this proved the signal for wild scenes. The leaders of the cavalcade had hardly arrived, one carrying the Cardinal's insignia, and another the archiepiscopal cross, when their horses were seized by the bridles and the procession forced to halt. Borromeo got down from his mule, took his cross, which in accordance with the ritual he had to hold in his hand when pronouncing the excommunication of the canons, and took several steps towards the gate of the cemetery. The canons drove him back; some armed men whom they had hired came in brandishing their swords,¹ and crying: Spain! Spain! and the gates were then closed in the archbishop's face. He then pronounced the excommunication of the chapter, and his vicar-general affixed to the walls a document to that effect, which, however, was at once torn down. Borromeo then returned to the cathedral, without having accomplished his purpose, and there again repeated the excommunication of the offenders. The canons, for their part, proclaimed to the sound of bells that the archbishop had incurred ecclesiastical

¹ According to a memorial defending the point of view of the Senate, which is also followed by SERRANO, *Corresp. dipl.*, III., xxv *seq.*, one of the armed servants of the archbishop was the first to draw his sword. In a letter to Castagna (summary in BASCAPÈ, l. 2, c. 9, p. 44) Borromeo declares this accusation of his enemies to be ridiculous, as he had not gone with armed attendants: "eosdem crimini sibi dedisse . . . rem indignissimam, sed tamen etiam *ridiculam*, gladios a Caroli parte, *prorsus semper inermi*, prius deductos."

penalties by what he had done against the Scala, and had a proclamation to that effect set up in large letters in various places.

The archbishop now found himself in an extremely difficult position. His own tribunal was paralysed; the senate and the governor did not raise a finger against the men who had drawn their swords on their archbishop. Albuquerque even wrote to the Pope that there would be no peace in Milan until the archbishop was removed.¹ For a moment even Pius V. seemed to be influenced by the unfavourable reports of Borromeo, to whom he wrote that if it were true that he had refused to postpone the visitation for three days, he could not approve of his action.² The Pope nevertheless vigorously undertook the defence of the archbishop, and warned the governor in strong terms of the consequences that must be entailed by acts of violence against the Cardinal.³

In spite of the apparently hopeless position Borromeo did not lose courage. He defended his cause, which he was convinced was the cause of the Church, in letters to Rome, to the Papal nuncio in Madrid, and to Philip II., and obtained what had seemed impossible, namely that the victory rested with him. A few days after the Cardinal had issued a detailed protest against the governor's edict on jurisdiction,⁴ the attempt of the Humiliati on his life took place, when he escaped unharmed in so marvellous a way.⁵ There then arose a fear of continuing to fight against a man in whose favour God had, in the opinion of everyone, worked a miracle,⁶ and neither the governor nor Philip II. could allow it to be said that their behaviour towards the representative of the eccle-

¹ Corresp. dipl., III., xxx. SYLVAIN, II., 9, 11.

² Brief of September 16, 1569, in LADERCHI, 1569, n. 6.

³ Briefs of September 10 and October 8, 1569, *ibid.* n. 6 and 7. The formula of salutation in the last brief runs: "Salutem et apostolicam benedictionem et salubriora in Domino consilia."

⁴ October 19, 1569, in SALA, II., 20 *seqq.*; III., 415 *seqq.*

⁵ See Vol. XVII. of this work, p. 246.

⁶ "Hizo Dios milagro que no le hiziesen otro daño, etc." Albuquerque to Zuñiga, October 26, 1569, Corresp. dipl., III., xxxv.

siastical power had encouraged the daring of the murderer.¹ On December 22nd, 1569, Borromeo received from the governor a letter from the king, in which Philip II. expressed his disapproval of the action of the Scala, and insisted on their submission to the archbishop.² A further declaration by the king put an end to the scruples of the senate, who were seeking to avoid a public act of submission to the archbishop by appealing to their status as representing the royal authority.³ On the vigil of Christmas, 1569, the procurator and the notary of the senate publicly and solemnly asked at the doors of the cathedral of Milan for absolution from their excommunication.⁴ The canons of the Scala did the same on February 5th, 1570.⁵ On December 12th, 1569, the governor had mitigated his edict on jurisdiction by a further declaration. When neither the Pope nor the archbishop was satisfied with this, on December 29th he agreed that the archbishop should use the officers of his tribunal as had been done in former years.⁶

It was true that this did not provide a solution of the greatest of the issues then at stake, but nobody except Borromeo himself could ever have thought that even so much could have been accomplished.

¹ On November 2, 1569, Bonelli gave Giustiniari instructions to tell the king: "che questi sono i frutti che finalmente sono nati dalla poca intelligenza, anzi più tosto, dalla quasi manifesta inimicitia et dai continui disfavori che gli hanno usati et mostrati i ministri di S.M." etc. Corresp. dipl., III., 184.

² SYLVAIN, II., 30. Castagna to Bonelli, November 26, 1569, Corresp. dipl., III., 192. BASCAPÈ, I. 2, c. 11, p. 48 *seq.*

³ BASCAPÈ, *ibid.* p. 49.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ *Ibid.* SYLVAIN, II., 38.

⁶ Corresp. dipl., III., xxxv *seq.* Briefs to Albuquerque of December 21, 1569 and January 15, 1570, in LADERCHI, 1569, n. 18; 1570, n. 153. A brief of August 11, 1570, to the Senate of Milan (*ibid.* 1570, n. 154) admits that the right of ecclesiastical sanctuary ought not to hold good in the case of great crimes, and that Borromeo ought to hand over an adulterer and an assassin to the civil courts.

CHAPTER II.

THE POPE'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPANISH CESAROPAPALISM.

AT the end of 1567 Requesens retired from his position as ambassador of Philip II. in Rome.¹ The Pope regretted his departure,² and entrusted to him a memorial embodying his wishes concerning the disputes at Milan and Naples, and the *Monarchia Sicula*.³ Cardinals Pacheco and Granvelle had worked with Requesens in the interests of Spain. Granvelle, who had been in the Curia since 1566, was looked upon as Philip's most trusted confidant, and he exercised a great influence over Requesens.⁴ He was a true product of the

¹ *Arco announces on December 27, 1567, that Requesens, who was surrounded by Cardinals seeking pensions, intended to start in two days. But according to the *report of Strozzi of January 4, 1568 (State Archives, Vienna), he was still in Rome on that date; his farewell audience had already taken place. See the brief of December 28, 1567, in which Pius V. praises him on the occasion of his departure, in *Corresp. dipl.*, II., 281 *seq.*

² See *ibid.* 281.

³ “ *Memoria al sig. commend. maggiore di Castiglia di quanto N.S^{re} desidera che si tratti con S.M.C^{ca} in suo nome,” in *Varia Polit.*, 81 (now 82), p. 426 *seq.*, without date, and p. 488-491, minute; on p. 489b, is to be seen the remark: “ Aggiunta al Memoria . . . a 29 di dicembre 1567,” and on p. 491b: “ Memoriale di N.S^{re} dato al sig. comm. magg. di Castiglia in qual partì di Roma a 30 di dicembre 1567. Papal Secret Archives.

⁴ See *Colecc. de docum. inéd.*, XCVII., 386. On November 15, 1566, Strozzi announced to Maximilian II.: “ *Alcuni dicono haver scoperto ch' el card^{le}. Granvella è quello che ha la mente del re Filippo e che tratti qui tutti i negocii d'importanza per esso in compagnia del commendator.” (State Archives, Vienna). Granvelle had been received in consistory on February 1, 1566: see *Corresp. dipl.*, I., 121 n. 3.

Renaissance, with much practical experience of the world but, like Pacheco, he had no influence with the Pope, who knew his complete dependence upon Spain.¹ One day Pius V. openly told him that he was more Spaniard than Cardinal. How true this estimate was is clear from the relations between Granvelle and his sovereign, whose conception of ecclesiastical policy coincided with his own. The Cardinal could not but recognize the holy life and pure intentions of Pius V., but the cold-blooded politician showed how little he understood the position of the Pope and his great delicacy of conscience. He only saw in him a profound ignorance of politics, and an inability to deal with princes. Since Pius V., so Granvelle once wrote to Philip II., wishes nothing for his relatives, he imagines that he can push forward boldly, but he soon draws back if you show your teeth.² Even Philip II., in face of the difficulties which Pius V. put in the way of his use of the Inquisition for political purposes, was of opinion that the Pope was injuring the cause of religion by his scruples of conscience!³

So long as there was such a want of grasp of the facts on the part of the counsellors of Philip II., there were bound to be conflicting views. Pius V., who clearly realized the importance of the Spanish king for the protection of Catholic interests in England and France, welcomed with all possible cordiality Juan de Zuñiga when he arrived in Rome on January 18th, 1568, as the successor of Requesens, and when France made objections he remarked that the King of

¹ See *Corresp. de Philippe II.*, I., 599; *cf.* HERRE, *Papsttum*, 145. An excellent character sketch of Granvelle in RACHFAHL, *Oranien*, II., 1, 137 *seq.* It would appear that his by no means blameless behaviour remained unknown to Pius V. (see *Renom de France*, éd. PIOT, I., 26, n. 1.

² Letter of December 23, 1566; see *Corresp. de Philippe II.*, II., xlvii. As complete a failure to understand the character of Pius V. is to be found in the *report of Cusano of February 2, 1566, *State Archives*, Vienna.

³ See *Colecc. de docum. inéd.*, 341; FORNERON, I., 189 *seq.*

Spain was the only Catholic sovereign who protected the Church.¹

The first relations of Zuñiga with the Pope were mutually satisfactory, but it was not long before difficulties arose. Zuñiga had been instructed to obtain the definite concession of the *Cruzada*, but he did not shut his eyes to the difficulty he would have in overcoming the scruples of Pius V. on the subject, and was careful to avoid bringing the matter forward before the settlement of the dispute about Milan² which Cerralbo, who had been sent to Rome by Philip II., was engaged in arranging.³ At the beginning of March 1568 it seemed as though a happy issue to this dispute was probable.⁴ The canonist, Gianpaolo della Chiesa, who was highly esteemed by Philip II., and had been sent to Rome by the senate, had rendered such good service in the matter that Pius V. conferred the red hat on him at the creation of Cardinals of March 24th, 1568; while France was only taken into consideration on this occasion by the nomination of Jérôme Souchier, Pius V. also conferred the purple on the President of the Spanish Council of State, Espinosa, and on Antonio Carafa, who was the devoted adherent of Philip II.⁵ The Spaniards therefore had every cause for satisfaction. In fact Zuñiga reported on March 29th: We have a holy Pope, and if he will give us the *Cruzada*, we shall have nothing left to desire; he would like

¹ See the report of Zuñiga in Corresp. dipl., II., 294 *seq.*, 296 *seq.* Cf. also the *report of Arco of January 24, 1568 (in Latin and Italian), State Archives, Vienna.

² See the reports of Zuñiga in Colecc. de docum. inéd., XCVII., 391 *seq.*, 396.

³ See *ibid.*, 395.

⁴ See the *report of Arco of March 13, 1568, State Archives Vienna.

⁵ Cf. CIACONIUS, III., 1031 *seq.*; CARDELLA, V., 114 *seq.*; HERRE, Papsttum, 156 *seq.* In his *letter to Castagna of March 24, 1568 (Nunziat. de Spagna, VI., Papal Secret Archives) Bonelli brings out the consideration shown by Pius V. for Philip II. in the promotion. For the gratitude of Philip II. see Corresp. de Philippe II., II., 375.

to reform Christendom at a single blow, but that is not possible.¹ The repeated complaints made by Zuñiga that Pius V. was so cautious in the matter of dispensations and favours, and remained fixed in his ideas without letting himself be influenced by political considerations,² show that he too was lacking in a full appreciation of the personality of this supremely conscientious head of the Church.

In spite of all his difference of opinion with him about ecclesiastical politics, Pius V. had a great personal regard for the king. Several times Zuñiga was able to report the Pope's great solicitude for Philip's health,³ and the French ambassador, on the occasion of the creation of Cardinals on March 24th, openly accused him of partiality for the Spanish king.⁴ Pius, however, could not see his way to grant all that monarch's wishes. When, at the beginning of April, he asked for the concession of the *Cruzada*, Zuñiga met with no success, and the Pope gave him clearly to understand how much he was disgusted that he should try and make him look with favour upon a request which he could not grant.⁵ In spite of this Zuñiga still held out hopes to the king of being able to obtain this important concession.⁶ In a confidential letter of April 26th to Cristobal de Moro, Zuñiga makes much of the holy zeal of Pius V. and of his personal liking for Philip II. : The king is in very good odour with the Pope ; if everything does not go in accordance with his wishes, the blame rests with those to whom the Holy Father has entrusted his affairs. On account of the disputes about jurisdiction, Zuñiga continues, we have a thousand difficulties every day,

¹ Colecc. de docum. inéd., XCVII., 413.

² See *ibid.* 405, 415, 417, 427, 439, 459.

³ See *ibid.* 400, 401.

⁴ See the *report of Arco of March 27, 1568, according to which among the Cardinals Mula had made opposition to the nomination, and received a sharp reply from the Pope. State Archives, Vienna.

⁵ See the report of Zuñiga of April 7, 1568, Colecc. de docum. inéd., XCVII., 420, 422 *seq.*

⁶ See Corresp. dipl., II., 341,

and these continue to increase in connexion with those things which the Pope wishes to reform. We have not yet settled the affair at Milan, and its decision is likely to be deferred for some time. As to the *Cruzada*, I am very doubtful, as I was when I came, but I have not told this to the king.¹ According to a report from Arco to Maximilian II. on May 1st, 1568, Pius V. declared to Cardinals Granvelle and Pacheco that he insisted on the point that Borromeo should be allowed to take proceedings with his "armed force" even against laymen, in matrimonial cases and the like, but that the Spaniards saw in this an infringement of the sovereign rights of their king.² The final settlement of the Milanese dispute also occupied the attention of the nuncio Castagna longer than he had expected from the tranquillizing assurances given by the government at the beginning of 1568.³ Castagna was afraid of a counter-stroke in Spain in the form of a prohibition to the bishops to inflict pecuniary or other penalties on the laity.⁴ He therefore felt it his duty all the more strongly to insist that in the Milanese controversy the obedience due to the Pope and the rights of the Church should be made quite clear.⁵

Castagna had also to fight again and again in connexion

¹ Colecc. de docum. inéd., XCVII., 451.

² * "A quelli del Ré cattolico pare questa cosa troppo dura perchè in questo modo l' arcivescovo sarebbe più padrone di quella città che l' istesso Rè." Arco, May 1, 1568, State Archives Vienna. Cf. the letter of Zuñiga of May 1, 1568, Colecc. de docum. inéd., XCVII., 464 seq.

³ See the reports of Castagna of January 16 and February 14, 1568, Corresp. dipl., II., 286, 305 seq.

⁴ *Ibid.* 322.

⁵ Cf. *ibid.* 276 seq., 278 seq., 286. On March 30, 1568, Castagna wrote to Bonelli, " *Delle cose di Milano si aspetta, come altre volte ho scritto, quello che avvisara il marchese di Ceralvo. In questo mezzo ho detto al Rè et ad altri che Sua Santità procederà con li debiti termini inanzi al giudicio, perche la cosa è in tal termine che non può fermarsi così in modo nissuno, ma è necessario che si renda a Sua Santità la debita ubbedienza et alla chiesa la dovuta giustitia." Borghese I., 606, p. 356b-357, Papal Secret Archives.

with the position of the nuncio at Naples,¹ against the constant infringement of ecclesiastical rights which took place in that kingdom, and against the obstacles which were placed in the way of the bishops in the carrying out of their duties. Since the liberty of the Church was attacked in various ways, both there and in Spain, he drew up his complaints in the form of a memorial which he sent at the beginning of March to the king, who was accustomed himself to read all such documents, no matter how long. It is dated March 2nd, 1568, and in it Castagna tries with much skill to induce the king to change his ways, touching, above all, a chord which could not fail to appeal to Philip II. In a long historical exposition, he shows how heresies, beginning with that of Hus, and going on to the present time, all aimed at destroying the authority and power of the Pope. This had been the case in Bohemia, Germany, France and England. Happily Spain was less infected by heresy than those countries, and it was hoped that it would remain so, not only by reason of the vigilance of the Inquisition, but because the country had a king who was as Catholic-minded as could be desired, a king who stood out above all his fellows as a shining example of unflinching hostility to all religious innovations. Yet even in Spain there was danger, because of the usurpation of the rights of the Church by the civil power. It was evident that such usurpations meant grave injury both to the state and to religion. The authority which has been withdrawn from the Church, the memorial goes on to state, has not been won by the king for himself, but he is destroying it altogether, and not only gains nothing for himself, but offends God without gaining any advantage, and acts in such a way as to injure his own good name, and even against his own interests. For this reason it is those princes who have conferred favours on the Church, and not those who have taken them away, those who have increased them and not those who have restricted them, who have enjoyed the greatest power and authority, and whose

¹ See the report of Castagna of March 2, 1568, *Corresp. dipl.*, II., 314; *cf.* III., liv. See as to this MEISTER, *Die Nuntiatur in Neapel*, in *Hist. Jahrb.*, XIV., 81.

praises are sung in history. Castagna then goes on to depict in vivid colours the oppression of the Church's liberties in Spain, the strict supervision of Apostolic bulls which is perpetually being exercised by the royal council and chancery, the obstacles which in so many ways are placed in the way of the enactments and sentences of the Roman court, the various forms of interference, under the pretext of justice, in ecclesiastical trials, the orders which are issued to the prelates, judges and other ecclesiastics to excommunicate or absolve according to the wishes of the royal council or the chancery. By means of these widespread usurpations of ecclesiastical jurisdiction, under various pretexts and with great cleverness, a kind of ecclesiastical power is given to the king and his ministers, and thus the two distinct jurisdictions are confused, to the disturbance of the order established by God, and with great danger of separation from the Holy See. Such violations of ecclesiastical liberty have always marked the first beginnings of heresy, as had been seen in the case of France.¹

Philip II. replied to these complaints² by saying that he must, before everything else, obtain more exact information before arriving at any decision. On May 1st, 1568, Castagna reported that the government had asked for information as to the use made of the *Monarchia Sicula*, so that it might decide whether any reform was called for in that connexion.³

To the perplexities which all these things occasioned for Castagna, fresh ones were soon added. By an edict of November 1st, 1567,⁴ Pius V. had issued a general prohibition of

¹ The memorial was first made known by Lämmer (Zur Kirchengesch., 134 and Melet. 220 *seqq.*) from the Cod. 33-E-3 of the Corsini Library, Rome. Lämmer wrongly attributes it to Acquaviva, which is impossible on the score of chronology alone. That it was presented by Castagna is clear from the latter's report of March 2, 1568; it is also to be found among his papers. See HINOJOSA, 186; Corresp. dipl., II., 315.

² Cf. Corresp. dipl., II., 350.

³ *Ibid.* 357 (with wrong date March 1).

⁴ See Bull. Rom., VII., 630 *seq.* Cf. Corresp. dipl., II., 247. See also Vol. XVII. of this work, p. 207.

bull-fights, which had already been forbidden¹ in the Papal States ; those who took part in them were excommunicated, and no one who lost his life in them might receive Christian burial. As the forbidden sport had also spread to Portugal, the nuncio was called upon to publish the prohibition there as well,² but, however justifiable it was, the ordinance met with the greatest opposition. The Spanish grandees, as soon as they heard of it, at once lodged a protest, and even the king undertook the defence of the threatened national sport. In this case once more, as was his custom, he sought for complaisant theologians, who did not fail to provide proofs that bull-fights were not sinful.³ On account of their dependence on the government, the Spanish bishops did not dare to publish the Papal prohibition, so that Castagna had to publish the bull himself.⁴ Unfortunately, the evil custom still found defenders, among them even a Franciscan, against whose written defence Pius V. took stern measures.⁵ The nuncio also met with opposition when he tried, in accordance with a request made by Pius V. in a letter of January 25th, 1568, to abolish the quite unchristian custom that existed in Spain of refusing viaticum to those condemned to death.⁶ Lastly, Castagna, acting on the express orders of the Pope,⁷

¹ See Corresp. dipl., II., 30, and the collection of the Editti, I., 191 in the Casanatense Library, Rome.

² See Corresp. dipl., II., 272.

³ See the reports of Castagna of January 27, and March 8, 1568, Corresp. dipl., II., 299, 322 *seq.* Cf. the letter of Zuñiga of April 21, 1568, Colecc. de docum. inéd., XCVII., 439. In letters of January 24 and April 21, 1568, Cardinal Bonelli insists on Castagna having the bull put into force. Corresp. dipl., II., 322, n. ; 350.

⁴ See the reports of Castagna of April 13 and May 14, 1568. Corresp. dipl., II., 349, 366.

⁵ See *ibid.* IV., lx. Castagna hoped (*report of June 17, 1568, Papal Secret Archives) to be able gradually to stamp out the bull-fights.

⁶ See LADERCHI, 1568, n. 200 ; Corresp. dipl., II., 321, 349. Cf. GAMS, III., 2, 197 *seq.*

⁷ *Da parte di N.S^{re} con mons. l' arcivescovo di Rossano nuntio in Ispagna, in *Varia Polit.*, 82, 431-434, Papal Secret Archives.

again and again called attention to the abuses which existed in the West Indian Colonies, not only by insisting on the respect due to ecclesiastical jurisdiction, but also on a more humane treatment of the natives, and their conversion to Christianity. Philip II. promised to issue the necessary orders to his officials, but neither he nor Cardinal Espinosa would hear of the appointment of a nuncio for the Colonies.¹

In the meantime Pius V. had taken an important step towards the re-establishment of the ecclesiastical liberties, jurisdiction and immunities which were in various ways infringed or resisted, both in and out of Spain. Hitherto the validity of the censures inflicted on certain determinate and grave crimes, which were reserved to the Pope, and were enumerated in the bull *In coena Domini*, had been dependent on the condition that the bull should be solemnly promulgated each year on Maundy Thursday. The form of the bull which was read on Maundy Thursday, 1568, April 15th, contained for the first time the clause that it was to remain in force until the promulgation of a new bull. Moreover, on this occasion the bull contained a number of additional clauses directly aimed against the abuses and usurpations of the civil authorities in ecclesiastical matters which were at that time to be found in many different countries.² For

¹ See Corresp. dipl., II., 350, 382, 390, 471 *seq.*

² For the additions of 1568 see App. nn. 2 and 3. The violent polemics of the Old Catholics raised by Döllinger on the occasion of the Vatican Council, against the bull *In coena Domini*, which is quite erroneously put forward as an *ex cathedra* decision, were tilting at a wind-mill, since the *In coena*, like the other disciplinary bulls of earlier times, entirely lost its binding force in virtue of the constitution *Apostolicae Sedis moderationi* issued by Pius IX. on October 12, 1869. In his edition of "Janus," Friedrich carried on the dispute unshaken. Concerning the effect of the bull, and the history of the cases reserved therein, an excellent account is given (p. 102 *seqq.*), in the work of HAUSMANN which was crowned in 1861 by the theological faculty of Munich, of which Döllinger was also a member. Cf. also PHILLIPS, *Ver-mischte Schriften*, II., 377 *seq.*

example, excommunication was now inflicted upon all those who, whatever their position, appealed from the Pope to an ecumenical council. The clause directed against those who ill-used ecclesiastical dignitaries also covered the banishment of Cardinals, bishops, legates and nuncios. The most important addition concerned laymen of all classes who took criminal proceedings against ecclesiastics, it being made clear that all contrary Papal privileges, even if granted to kings, princes or other authorities, were henceforth annulled and revoked. Lastly, the bull laid it down that every priest having the care of souls must have a copy and study it diligently, so that in the confessional he might well know what cases were reserved to the Pope for absolution.

On April 20th, 1568, the bull began to be sent out to all the bishops, with orders to make it known solemnly, because many people did not know that they were excommunicated by acting against the prohibitions contained in the bull.¹

It was evident that the bull, which rested entirely upon the medieval conception of canon law, was a condemnation of the cesaropapalism which had grown up, especially in Spain and Venice.² As early as 1566 it was made evident to what a pitch things had come in Spain when the bishops there refused to publish the bull *In coena Domini*, when it was issued in that year, without the permission of the royal council, although the Pope had definitely directed them to do so in a brief of April 20th.³ A quarrel was avoided on that

¹ See Arm. 44, t. 12, n. 66 : " Compluribus episcopis," of April 20, 1568, Papal Secret Archives. Cf. LAZZARESCHI, 13 ; Corresp. dipl., II., 409, n. 1 ; the brief of Pius V. to Charles Borromeo in BERTANI, 84 *seq.* bears the date April 28.

² For the state absolutism of the Venetians see Vol. IV. of this work, pp. 95 *seqq.* On April 24, 1568, Cusano *reports that Pius V. was specially complaining of Venice, which was not observing the bull and had imprisoned the abbot Lipomano. State Archives, Vienna.

³ The brief of April 20, 1566, is printed in Corresp. dipl., I., 196 *seq.* The Imperial ambassador Arco also deals repeatedly with the bull in his *reports, but he was insufficiently informed

occasion because Philip II. realized that the¹ bull was not substantially different from those which had gone before, and did not invalidate those "customs of Spain" which had hitherto been recognized by the Popes.¹ This time, however, principally because, in his kingdom of Naples, by appealing² to the bull *In coena Domini*, there had been several refusals to pay taxes, Philip adopted another attitude, although the Pope repeatedly pointed out to him and his government that he excluded any intention of limiting the royal authority and jurisdiction, or of revoking former privileges by the bull; all that he must avoid were unjust extensions and abuses of these privileges, and thus ensure the good of souls and the welfare of the people. Pius V. added a warning against putting his trust in those persons who sought to persuade the princes that he had any designs against the state in publishing the bull.³

In Rome the principal exponent of such ideas was the on the subject. On May 11, 1566, he announces that it is said that the Pope had sent the bull *In coena* to all the nuncios in order that they might communicate it to the princes "ma fino a hora ella dispiace a tutti;" opposition was to be feared from the princes, especially where it was taken literally. On June 8 Arco maintains that the Pope was putting off the publication of the bull out of consideration for the princes "perche senza il consenso loro i vescovi non ardirebbono publicarla ne in Spagna ne in Francia, il medesimo converrebbe che facessino gli vescovi di Germania essendo cosa di tanta consideratione." On June 22 Arco wrote that the bull had been "secretly" sent to the bishops in Spain and Portugal. Finally on July 6 he reports that it is not yet known whether the bull has been published in Spain or even in one single city in Italy. "Molti nondimeno dubitano che non venga un giorno fantasia al Papa di farla publicare." In 1567 Arco had to announce on March 29 that the Pope had published the bull as usual and ordered that all the archbishops, bishops and parish priests should have a copy. State Archives, Vienna.

¹ See *Corresp. dipl.*, I., 191.

² Cf. *ibid.* III., lvii seq.

³ See *ibid.* II., 373, 444, 451, 503.

Venetian ambassador, Paolo Tiepolo. He had promptly made a report to the Signoria making out that by his action the Pope intended to assume the decision, not only of spiritual and semi-spiritual matters, but also of those that were purely civil. Tiepolo entirely misunderstood the situation, for he even thought that the Pope's action was due to ill-disposed and unconscientious advisers who, in looking about for the necessary means to re-establish the authority of the Church, wished to embroil him in disputes with the civil authorities.¹ At first Zuñiga, the representative of Spain in Rome, adopted a more cautious attitude. It is true that he too held the erroneous view that the entourage of Pius V. were trying to distract the Pope's attention from reforms in Rome by involving him in quarrels with the princes ;² he wished, however, that Tiepolo should be the first to take steps in the matter. Zuñiga formed a truer estimate of Pius V. in another respect. He realized that it was no use to deal with him by the methods hitherto adopted, and he therefore advised the concession of the privileges for Bosco, and the pension for Ghislieri in such a way that the Pope should not see in them an attempt to win him over by such acts of concession, for in that case everything would be hopelessly ruined.³ The Spaniard chiefly had the *Cruzada* in view, though it did not escape him that under the existing circumstances it was becoming more and more difficult to obtain it, because to the angry disputes about the state of affairs at Milan, fresh quarrels had been added on the subject of the wide privileges granted to the Order of St. Lazarus.⁴ All this increased Zuñiga's great anxiety (*infinito cuidado*) about the bull *In coena Domini*, and at last he came to the conclusion that the discussion of this thorny question had better be put off until the winter.⁵

Other views prevailed in Madrid. On July 11th, 1568,

¹ P. Tiepolo, *Relazioni di 1569*, p. 179 *seq.*

² Zuñiga to Alba from Rome, May 8, 1568, *Colecc. de docum. inéd.*, XCVII., 467, 469.

³ Zuñiga to Requesens from Rome, May 8, 1568, *loc. cit.* 469.

⁴ *Cf. Corresp. dipl.*, II., 138 *seqq.*, 198 *seqq.* ; III., 41 *seq.*

⁵ Zuñiga to Requesens from Rome, May 19, 1568, *loc. cit.* 477.

Castagna was able to report that the Spanish government was putting every possible obstacle in the way of the publication of the new bull. The nuncio had received it on May 26th,¹ and had sent it to the Spanish bishops with the Papal brief and a covering letter, asking them to publish it and to give the necessary instructions to confessors. But not one of the Spanish bishops had so far dared solemnly to promulgate the bull, from fear of the government. Castagna consequently found himself obliged to arrange himself for the publication of the bull, by communicating its contents to the religious Orders and to confessors. He received information of the king's attitude from Cardinal Espinosa, according to whom Philip was afraid that the Pope wished to deprive him of rights to which he had a good title, a thing which annoyed him all the more because he had expressly promised to remove the abuses in the Kingdom of Naples. Espinosa said that though he was being at that time pressed on every side, His Majesty would not recognize such "novelties" as he intended to stand up for his sovereign rights and not be a "dummy king."² Nor did the Spanish ministers make any secret of the fact that the government would not tolerate the publication of the bull in the Kingdom of Naples without its *exequatur*, because it never had been published there, but only in Rome, and the additions made by Pius V. were directed, not only against the *exequatur*, but were directly aimed at the *Monarchia Sicula*, against which the appointment of the nuncio Odescalchi to the Two Sicilies was also directed. The ministers also made complaint of a number of other claims which the Pope made, both in Spain and Naples, and especially of the brief directed against all those persons in Naples who had stolen or otherwise wrongfully alienated ecclesiastical property; they also complained of the publication of the bull relating to physicians without its having received the *exequatur*,

¹ The original *letter from Bonelli to Castagna, dated Rome, April 28, 1568, has the note " Ric. 26 maggio 1568 " Nunziat di Spagna, VI., Papal Secret Archives.

² See the report of Castagna of July 11 1568, Corresp. dipi., II., 408 *seq.*

because this affected laymen, who were the subjects of His Majesty ; another complaint was made of the summons issued against Marcello Caracciolo concerning a castle which his family had held for 120 years as a fief of Naples, and not of Benevento ; lastly they complained of the bull dealing with the Knights of St. Lazarus. On all these matters, reports Castagna, there are heated discussions, and Requesens will certainly be sent to Rome to lodge a complaint.¹

Under these circumstances the nuncio thought it best to seek an audience of the king in person, and he frankly and strongly urged him not to let himself be led by his ministers to take any rash and dangerous action. He must not suppose that by giving his support to the infringements of ecclesiastical jurisdiction, he was in any way acting for the advantage of his kingdom, as at first sight he might appear to be doing ; such action on the contrary would be the ruin of his kingdom. It was for that very reason that the Pope was trying to keep the king from doing any such thing, because he loved and valued him as being almost the only one among the sovereigns who still defended the Catholic religion. Before allowing himself to be angry with the Pope, His Majesty ought to assure himself of the latter's real intentions, a subject on which his ministers imagined all manner of things, which had never even entered the mind of His Holiness.²

Philip excused himself from entering into the details of Castagna's explanation, but gave him clearly to understand that he did not think much of it. Never before, Castagna reported to Rome, had the king complained with such bitterness as on this occasion, especially concerning affairs at Naples. " He had tears in his eyes—whether from anger or grief I do not know—when he said that even if the Pope had not interfered, he would on his own account have defended and maintained the rights, privileges and customs handed down to him by his ancestors."³

¹ See the *report of Castagna of July 28, 1568, Papal Secret Archives.

² See Corresp. dipl., II., 424 *seq.*

³ See *ibid.* 425.

Castagna could only account for the excitement of the king by the intrigues of his ministers, who had persuaded him that the bull *In coena Domini* would cause a revolution in the Spanish dominions. It was with terror and anguish that he saw the imminent danger of a breach between the Pope and the king, a breach which could not fail to have disastrous consequences for the Church. My hopes at present, he wrote on July 28th, are centred in the Pope, rather than in the king, who relies too much upon his ministers.¹

How earnestly Pius V. tried to remove the distrust of Philip II., and aimed at an understanding is seen from the instructions which he sent to Castagna on August 17th, 1568. In these instructions it is stated that the Pope did not in the least intend any innovation by the bull, nor at doing away with the *exequatur*, nor at limiting the jurisdiction of the king, but only at safeguarding the authority of the Holy See in the interests of the Church. Although it was only right that a prince should have knowledge of the things being done in his territories, the Pope nevertheless could not approve of the high-handed way in which the royal authorities acted in this respect, not only preventing the execution of salutary Apostolic bulls, but not even vouchsafing to give their reasons. Pius V. further asked that Philip II. would send a special envoy empowered to discuss the *Monarchia Sicula*, because in that matter the abuses had reached such a pitch that something must certainly be done about it.²

When these lines were written, Philip II. had already decided to send Requesens to Rome ; he was a *persona grata* with Pius V., and he was instructed to lay the point of view of the Spanish government on the matters at issue before the Pope.³ Castagna, it is true, would rather have seen Cardinal Espinosa entrusted with this mission, as he was well versed in canon law, but he was not able to obtain this.⁴ How little fruit had been borne by his own explanation of the aims of

¹ See *ibid.* 425-426.

² *Ibid.* 445.

³ See *ibid.* 428 *seq.*

⁴ See the report of Castagna of October 1, 1568, *ibid.* 470.

the Pope in publishing his new version of the bull *In coena Domini* was shown by the prohibition to promulgate the bull, which was sent by Philip II. on July 16th, 1568, to the Spanish provincials of the religious Orders.¹

While the politico-ecclesiastical situation was thus in a state of obscurity, a tragedy occurred in the royal family of Spain which in spite of all research is not yet entirely cleared up.² On January 18th, 1568, Philip II. had given orders for the arrest of his son, Don Carlos. The unhappy young man was kept in strict imprisonment, and died on the morning of July 24th.

Philip II. preserved so mysterious a silence about the arrest and its reason that the most conflicting rumours sprang up concerning it. Don Carlos, it was said, had plotted to kill his father and had been in league with the rebels in the Netherlands. The idea also got about that the son of the Catholic King had embraced Protestant beliefs.³ When the nuncio in Madrid, Castagna, applied for information to the Grand Inquisitor, Espinosa, the latter answered him in the king's name that he had been forced to order the arrest solely and entirely "for the service of God, and for the safeguarding of religion, his realm, and his subjects." If he had not acted as he had done, and sacrificed his only son, he would have been unfaithful to God. When the nuncio alluded to the rumour that the Infante had even conspired against his father, he received the mysterious reply that "If that had been the only danger, it would have been easy to avoid it, but there had been an even worse reason than that, if such were possible." For two years past the king had made every effort to win Don Carlos from his "evil courses."⁴ Castagna, who reported these statements to Rome on January 24th, adds in a letter of February 4th that the Infante had

¹ See *ibid.* 451, n. 1.

² Not even the latest monograph by V. BIBL, *Der Tod des Don Carlos* (Vienna, 1918) in spite of all the research employed therein, has arrived at any definite conclusion.

³ Bibl, *loc. cit.* 265 seq., 271 seq.

⁴ See GACHARD, *Don Carlos*, 663 seq.

not received Communion at Christmas because the friars of the Hieronymite convent had refused to give him an unconsecrated host, and Castagna adds that he looked upon it as certain that the Infante would be excluded from the succession to the throne, and would never again be set at liberty¹.

The news of the Protestant leanings of Don Carlos, which had only been hinted at by the nuncio, reached Rome in a more definite form from other countries.² According to the report of Cardinal Delfino to Maximilian II. on March 6th, the Pope, when he received the news, lifted his arms to heaven, exclaiming, "My God! My God! There is but too good reason to believe it, for We knew that this prince had no love for priests or monks, and had shown no respect for any ecclesiastical dignity."³ The Mantuan envoy also tells us that the Pope was terribly distressed by what had happened at Madrid, and adds that a special messenger had been sent to Spain.⁴

In vain did Zuñiga, the Spanish ambassador in Rome, seek to satisfy Pius V. by describing the rumours as to the Protestant leanings of Don Carlos as an invention of the Huguenots, but as not even the ambassador could furnish more exact particulars, the Pope in his anxiety demanded to know the truth from the king himself.⁵ Philip II. could not refuse to comply with this demand, and did so in a letter of May 9th. "Often," this letter states, "I have looked upon

¹ See *ibid.* 665 *seq.*

² See BIBL, *loc. cit.* 273 *seq.*

³ See *ibid.* 274.

⁴ B. Pia to C. Luzzara from Rome, March 6, 1568: "Questo gran moto delle cose di Spagna et prigionia del prencipe hanno infinitamente travagliata S.S^{ta}, la quale questi dì è stata intenta a spedire corriere in Spagna. Fra l' altre cose questa occasions par che habbi sòpito ogni pensiero di promotione, parendo necessario che s' habbi da star a vedere a che parerà così gran moto, et che fine havranno molte conseguenze che s' attendono di tante revolutioni." Gonzaga Archives, Mantua.

⁵ See GACHARD, *loc. cit.* 551; BIBL, *loc. cit.* 274 *seq.*

the burden which God has laid upon my shoulders in the states and kingdoms, of which He has called upon me to undertake the government, as being laid upon me in order that I might keep safe therein the true faith and subjection to the Holy See, that I might maintain peace and justice there, and after the few years that I still have to pass in this world, might leave these states in good order, and in that security which would guarantee their continuance. All depends in the first place on the personality of my successor. But now, in punishment for my sins, God has been pleased to inflict the prince with so many and such grave defects, both of prudence and of character, as to render him unfit for the government, and to give reason to fear in the future the gravest dangers to the stability of the kingdom should he succeed to the throne." After watching him for a long time, experience had convinced the king that all remedies were useless, and that very little or no improvement was to be looked for in Don Carlos, nor was there much reason to hope that time would remove the evils he had every reason to fear, so that the imprisonment of the prince had seemed necessary in order that he, the king, might have time carefully to consider the situation, and obtain his purpose without exposing himself to any kind of blame. The Pope must preserve a complete silence as to these confidences of the king, no matter what rumours might get about concerning the imprisonment of the prince. Don Carlos was not guilty either of revolt or heresy, and the truth would be made clear in course of time. Every provision had been made for the temporal welfare of the prince; he had every comfort and amusement suitable to his state, and he was abundantly supplied with all that he required. At the same time nothing was left undone for the welfare of his soul, and his confessor would give him every spiritual assistance.¹

If we may believe Zuñiga's report of June 25th, this reply

¹ See GACHARD, *loc. cit.* 650; BIBL, *loc. cit.* 275 *seq.* On p. 285 *seq.* Bibl alludes to the singular circumstance that nothing is here said of his Easter communion, which the prince should have received a short time before.

eased the mind of Pius V. The Pope, the ambassador reported, has deeply sympathized with the difficult position in which the king finds himself, but admires his determination for the reason that the safety of Christendom makes it desirable that Philip's reign should be as long as possible, and that he should have a successor who will follow in his footsteps.¹

After the death of Don Carlos the nuncio at Madrid reported that the dead prince had himself asked for a confessor before his death, and had passed to the next life a Christian and a Catholic.² For this reason the Pope had no hesitation in giving orders for a solemn funeral service, which took place on September 5th. It is mentioned as a great innovation that he assisted in person at this function, since hitherto this had only been customary at the obsequies of princes who were kings.³ It would appear that at first the Spanish ambassador, Zuñiga, did not intend to assist at the function, and that he only decided to do so when he heard that the Pope would be present. From the reports of Niccolò Cusano, the secret agent of Maximilian II. in Rome, it would seem that the most sensational rumours were current concerning the tragedy at Madrid, among others one that the Spaniards had "brought about the death" of the Infante because he was in league with the insurgents in France and Flanders.⁴ It may be considered as an established fact that Giulio Aquaviva, who was sent to convey the Pope's condolences to Spain, was instructed to make further inquiries concerning the tragic event.⁵

¹ See GACHARD, *loc. cit.* 536.

² See Gachard, *loc. cit.* 695.

³ See the *reports of Arco of September 4 and 11, 1568, State Archives, Vienna. Cf. BÜDINGER, 109 *seq.* See Corresp. dipl., II., 354, n. 1.

⁴ See BIBL, *loc. cit.* 349, 353.

⁵ See the *letter of Bonelli to Castagna from Rome, September 18, 1568, Nunz. di Spagna, VI., Papal Secret Archives. So far the reports of Acquaviva have not been found. The *Lettere alla corte di Roma* contained under his name in the Cod. 33-E-3 of the Corsini Library, Rome, are only a poor copy of the register of Castagna. See GACHARD, *Bibl. Corsini*, 46; HINOJOSA, 186.

Aquaviva left Rome on September 19th, 1568, and reached Madrid on October 13th.¹ As Philip II. had also lost his wife on October 3rd, he was able to offer the Pope's condolences to the king for this second loss.² On December 10th the Archduke Charles, brother of Maximilian II., arrived in Madrid, and Aquaviva accordingly put off his departure until December 30th, because there was reason to fear that the Archduke wished to persuade the king to come to terms with the insurgents in the Netherlands.³ During his stay in Madrid Aquaviva displayed great prudence and tact, so that Castagna was able to send a very laudatory report of him to Rome.

In the meantime Requesens had presented to the Curia a note which gave rise to great anxiety there.⁴ In this note Philip II. complains especially of the innovations, according to which the bull *In coena Domini* had been published in his dominions, and especially in Naples, without the *exequatur* being asked for, the more so as the Pope had warned confessors not to give absolution for violations of its enactments. The bull, it was pointed out, contained many additions which were not to be found in the previous issues, either of Julius III., Paul IV. and Pius IV., and which were very burdensome and would cause confusion among the people, on account of the summary condemnations which they contained, and the very general terms in which they were expressed. Philip was very angry at the prohibition, which however had been included in previous issues of the bull, of the introduction of new taxes and imposts, a thing which he said was bound to disturb the public peace, because several cities would be

¹ See the *report of Castagna of October 13, 1568, Papal Secret Archives.

² See Castagna in GACHARD, *Bibliothèque de Madrid*, 114 *seq.*; *Corresp. dipl.*, II., 473 *seq.* The funeral service for the Spanish queen took place in Rome on November 15, 1568; see Firmanus, **Diarium* in *Miscell. Arm.*, XII., 31, Papal Secret Archives.

³ See GACHARD, *Bibl. de Madrid*, 116 *seq.*; HINOJOSA, 187.

⁴ See *Corresp. dipl.*, III., 2, n. Cf. CATENA, 87 *seq.* and LOPEZ, *Hist. de la bula In coena Domini*, Madrid, 1768, 94.

certain to refuse to pay such taxes. As to the question of jurisdiction, the king appealed to ancient Apostolic privileges, and to immemorial custom, and in the case of Sicily to the *Monarchia Sicula*. In connexion with the latter he renewed the complaint that when, in February, 1568, the Pope appointed Paolo Odescalchi in the place of the nuncio at Naples, Pallavicini, who had been sent to the Viceroy, he had appointed him for the Two Sicilies. Other complaints concerned the acts of Odescalchi in affairs relating to ecclesiastical property at Naples, the privileges of the Order of St. Lazarus, and the Milanese controversy.

Philip's words left no room for doubt that he, in common with the other Catholic governments, especially that of Venice,¹ intended to hold firmly to all his claims over ecclesiastical political affairs, without paying any attention to the bull *In coena Domini*. The things which the Spanish king called customs were, as Cardinal Bonelli shrewdly pointed out, nothing but abuses whereby the bishops and other ecclesiastical authorities were treated in a worse manner in the Spanish dominions than even in Germany.²

With regard to the Order of St. Lazarus, Bonelli had pointed out on August 17th, 1568, that its privileges had not been added to by Pius V., as the king supposed, but rather curtailed and reformed, and that there was good reason for the existence of a Papal military order in Spain, as well as the four royal ones; as to the settlement, so long deferred, of the affair at Milan, he had threatened to take action independently of the Pope.³ In a letter of September 1st, 1568, Bonelli brings out the fact that it was entirely alien to the Pope's intention to attack the king's authority and jurisdiction by the bull, and that all he aimed at was the removal of abuses. Alluding to the usurpations of ecclesiastical jurisdiction on the part of the king's ministers at Naples,

¹ For the opposition of Venice and the negotiations with Pius V., see CECCHETTI, I., 448 *seq.* Cf. also MUTINELLI, I., 81 *seq.* and REUSCH, I., 79.

² Letter of December 20, 1568, Corresp. dipl., II., 523.

³ See Corresp. dipl., II., 445.

and to the Milanese dispute, he remarks that the Pope's patience is nearly exhausted. The nuncio must implore the king in the name of His Holiness definitely to provide the necessary redress, for otherwise he would be obliged to make use of those means which the Church is wont to employ against her recalcitrant sons.¹

From a report of the nuncio, dated August 21st, 1568, according to which the Viceroy claimed that the permission of the government must be obtained, even for the printing of Papal briefs dealing with purely ecclesiastical matters, as for example, processions, it is clear how far-reaching the interference had become, especially in Naples.² Philip II. clung to the *exequatur* all the more tenaciously because he saw in it the best way of keeping in check the national aspirations of the clergy in Naples.³ On August 30th, 1568, a royal pragmatic forbade, under grave penalties, the publication of any Papal rescript, brief, or other ordinance without the customary royal *exequatur*.⁴ At the beginning of October Philip declared that he would rather renounce his crown than suffer himself to be stripped of anything which had been possessed by his predecessors.⁵ With regard to the abuses he did not cease to give assurances that he would give every consideration to the Pope's grievances as soon as he had sufficient information, but that the grievances were based upon the reports of the very people who were guilty of them!⁶ The king would have been delighted if the discussion of the disputes concerning ecclesiastical political affairs could have been entirely dropped, because he felt on the one hand the justice of the Pope's complaints, and on the other the harm which these controversies were doing to his purpose of providing for his financial difficulties by means of the much-desired concession of the *Cruzada* and

¹ Corresp. dipl., II., 451 *seq.*

² See *ibid.* 452, n. 1.

³ Cf. *ibid.* III., xlii.

⁴ *Lett. di principi, XLII., 167, Papal Secret Archives.

⁵ See Corresp. dipl., II., 470.

⁶ See *ibid.*

other ecclesiastical levies. Since Pius V. had not had time to consider the reply he should make to the petition presented to him by Requesens, Philip had high hopes of obtaining the desired concessions. His representative was instructed to be very careful to avoid touching upon the question of jurisdiction.¹ The Pope was strongly urged in many quarters, especially by the Spanish Cardinals and the Florentine ambassador, to treat the champion of the Catholic religion against the heretics with all possible consideration.²

On account of the important effect of the attitude of Spain upon the sorely pressed Catholics in France, England and Germany, Pius V. lent an ear to these exhortations. In order to show his good-will, at the beginning of November, 1568, he appointed a special congregation of Cardinals to examine the objections which had been raised to the bull.³ The outcome of this was a detailed note, which deals with all the claims of Philip II.⁴ In its introduction the Pope states that he has thought it his duty to reply, not because he considers himself bound to give reasons to the princes for what he does, but in order to show the king that he has been deceived in the reports of his informants, whose only object was to justify their own abuses. The things objected to are then dealt with one by one, and answered as follows: Even though the bull, which it had been customary, according to

¹ See *ibid.* 523.

² See Legaz. di Serristori, 456 *seq.* The matter is also looked upon as certain in the letter of Cardinal Correggio to Pius V., without date and printed in the 1712 edition of CATENA, p. 339, but is attributed to too late a date. The letter is in any case anterior to the mission of Giustiniani.

³ See the letter of Bonelli to Castagna from Rome, November 7, 1568, Corresp. dipl., II., 502. In his *report from Madrid, December 29, 1568, Castagna praises this decision of the Pope. Papal Secret Archives.

⁴ *Resposta alla instruzione data al signor commendatore maggiore ambasciatore al Re Cattolico (no date) in Varia Polit. 101 (now 102) p. 395-402, Papal Secret Archives, now printed from another copy in the same place, in Corresp. dipl., III., 1 *seqq.*

very ancient practice, to publish on Maundy Thursday, had been in the past issued only in Rome by several Popes, it had nevertheless, like all other universal constitutions, been binding upon the whole of Christendom. This is clear from its general tenor, and from its solemn publication on one of the most important festivals in the Church's year. Therefore, all conscientious Christians, great and small, who had acted in defiance of the prescriptions of the bull, had sought absolution from the Pope. In all the indulgences, jubilees, letters of confession, including the *Cruzada*, which had been at one time granted to the King of Spain, the bull had been spoken of as of obligation, not sometimes but always, and the bishops had received orders to publish it. Having learned that this had not been done in certain kingdoms, and that men had incurred the penalties laid down by the bull by acting in defiance of it, the Pope had considered it his duty, as a watchful shepherd, to insist on its publication, not only in Spain, but in every country, even Germany, and to insist that the clergy who had the care of souls should be made aware of it, in order that confessors should know how to act.

Additions to the bull had been made by Martin V., Clement VII., and Paul III., when such had been found to be necessary. Secular princes were accustomed to make new laws from time to time. If appeal is made to some royal privilege of assent to its publication, it can be replied that the same argument could be applied to the preaching of the Word of God, and that spiritual enactments cannot be hampered by any permission on the part of the temporal authority, and that to ask for such is as undignified as it is unlawful. The usual promulgation on Maundy Thursday could not be put off until the answer to the Pope's demands, sent to Madrid by Requesens, had arrived; four months had already elapsed without any reply having been received from the Spanish government.

The bull contained ordinances dealing with taxes and customs duties, because these had been contravened; they had been imposed by persons who had no right to do so, or had been demanded from those who were legally exempt, as for example

from ecclesiastics and persons in whose case there was no legal claim. This by no means prevented lawfully constituted princes from levying just and reasonable taxes from their subjects. If the bull contained a general prohibition of the raising of new taxes, the reason was that there was no need for further levies ; as a matter of fact, in the case of customs duties there was no call for any such levies, as the matter had long since been regulated by ecclesiastical law. There was no reason therefore to fear popular disturbances or revolt as the result of the constitution ; these were much more likely to be caused by excessive taxation on the part of the rulers. The Pope's intention was rather to point out the way in which the people could be kept in a state of tranquillity and subjection to their prince. If he should hear of any prelate misinterpreting or acting contrary to his intentions, the Pope would at once take steps to prevent it.

The warning given to confessors that they had no power to absolve from transgressions of the bull was but the duty of a true and lawful pastor, who was bound to see that they knew how to distinguish sin from sin, and to form a just judgment upon sins reserved to the Pope. The accusation that the Pope was abusing the sacrament of penance is answered in these severe words : Such language befits the new heretics. Let the king with his sound Catholic sense, beware of counsellors who put such ideas and such poisonous expressions into his mind.¹

¹ In spite of the opposition of Spain and Venice Pius V. did not change the form of the bull, which was published in exactly the same terms in 1569 and 1570 (see App. nn. 2 & 3). At Naples, where Philip II. forcibly prevented any further publication of the bull, the Pope caused it to be conveyed to regular confessors by means of their Generals ; in 1569 he allowed at Milan that Borromeo should only publish the bull in the presence of parish priests and confessors, for the reason that in the preceding year its publication had given occasion to all kinds of interpretations (see BERTANI, 88 *seq.*, and REUSCH, I., 78 *seq.*, where further information is given as to the fate of the bull in Catholic countries). It is clear from RAPICIO-SCARLICHIO, Documenti in onore di Enea Silvio

As to the controversy about jurisdiction, Pius V. asked to be shown the privileges to which Philip II. appealed. The abuses and scandals in this matter are so obvious that the Pope feels himself bound in conscience to provide against them. To issue spiritual ordinances is what is to be looked for from the Pope, as Vicar of Christ, and not from princes and their ministers, because it was not to them that the words "Feed my sheep" were addressed; nay, they too are sheep, and subject to the pastoral office of St. Peter, by whom they must be guided in all spiritual matters if they do not wish to be cut off from the flock, and to destroy the whole hierarchical organization of the Church under the pretext of privileges. This is all the more necessary since no authentic or definite privilege can be adduced by Spain. The Pope hopes of so Catholic a king as Philip II. that he will be the first to recognize this, especially in the case of the so-called *Monarchia Sicula*. Even granting the existence of this, such a privilege abounds in abuses. For the rest, no Pope could grant a privilege which would deprive future Popes of the power given them by God. That the legatine power of the Kings of Sicily does not exist is shown by the repeated mission of Apostolic legates to that country. Even granting that the *Monarchia Sicula* exists in the sense which Philip supposes, the Pope can always withdraw such a privilege, since it is only a case of a favour, which in practice has led to many abuses. The lawfulness of the appointment of Odescalchi as nuncio to the Two Sicilies was beyond dispute, for nuncios and collectors had been sent to the island several times in the days of Charles V.; if this had not been done since then, the Pope nevertheless has the right to do so when the exigencies of the care of souls make it necessary.

With regard to the Knights of St. Lazarus, who had been Piccolomini, Trieste, 1862, that in 1568 even the Archduke Charles, in other respects a good Catholic, wished for the suspension of the publication of the bull. Braunsberger has been the first (Pius V., 46 *seq.*) to throw light on the notable concession made by Pius V. for Germany in connexion with the bull *In coena Domini*.

granted privileges by Pius IV., Pius V. appealed, not only to the rights of the Holy See, but also to the need of providing, by means of that Order, the protection for the coasts of the Papal States which Philip II., in spite of his obligations, had so far failed to give. In the Milanese controversy the Pope took his stand purely on his rights.

At the end of this note Pius V. again repeats that he had had no end in view except the reform of the Church, and the removal of evident abuses, and he concludes by clearly emphasizing the distinction between the temporal and the spiritual powers: "Render therefore to Cæsar the things that are Cæsar's, and to God the things that are God's."

The Pope's remonstrances were without effect, principally because the Viceroy of Naples, the Duke of Alcalà, used all his influence to strengthen Philip II. in his opposition to the publication of the bull *In coena Domini*.¹ The Viceroy, like his advisers, Villani and Revertera, knew well that their tyranny in ecclesiastical matters would be broken if the bull should take effect in the Kingdom of Naples. All their efforts, therefore, were directed to the prevention of this. The bishops thus found their position very difficult in Naples.² Similar disputes were avoided in Spain because the canonists there were able by means of ingenious legal quibbles to reconcile the prohibition of the *placet* contained in the bull with its continued use in that country.³ Philip II. would gladly have seen the dispute at Naples brought to an end, and at the beginning of December, 1568, an agreement seemed probable,⁴ but the attitude taken up by the Duke of Alcalà very soon destroyed all prospect of it. In the middle of January, 1569, things had come to such a pitch that in Rome it was thought

¹ See GIANNONE, IV., 146 *seq.*

² See *ibid.* The "Relazione di pregiudizi che ha potuto recare il concilio di Trento alla giurisdizione temporale di S. M. Cattolica nel regno di Napoli per cui non fu dato il regio Exequatur," by Villani, in Cod. A. 6 of the Boncompagni Archives, Rome.

³ Cf. FRIEDBERG, 545, n. 2.

⁴ See the *reports of Cusano of December 2 and 6, 1568, State Archives, Vienna.

that the Pope would excommunicate the Viceroy,¹ but the latter did not let himself be dismayed by any such threat, and he continued to fight against the bull by every means in his power. He had all the copies of it which were in the bookshops suppressed, and confiscated the temporalities of those bishops who published it, punishing with the greatest severity all attempts to put its prescriptions into practice.²

The Viceroy also laboured unceasingly to prevent Philip II. from paying any attention to the Pope's complaints about the *exequatur* and the controversy about jurisdiction.³ Thus Castagna's fourth year as nuncio became extremely difficult. He never ceased, however, to defend the cause of ecclesiastical liberty, both in word and writing. At the beginning of February, 1569, he summarized in a memorial intended for the king the principal abuses which were going on in Naples,⁴ dwelling especially on the extension of the *exequatur*. This custom, which had originally been granted by the Popes in order to prevent unworthy persons from obtaining bishoprics and benefices at a time when the kingdom was split up by factions, had not only been continued after the coming of more settled times, though the reason for it had disappeared, but had even been extended, so as to apply to the visitation of convents, and to indulgences, and had become an intolerable burden, as the officials demanded large payments for granting it. The memorial also made complaint of other usurpations on the part of the civil power in the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies. The bishops there were summoned before lay judges for the smallest reason, and they were forbidden to oblige the people to the observance of Sunday, or to punish open concubinists. The nuncio was forbidden to take proceedings

¹ See the *report of Cusano of January 15, 1569, *ibid.*

² See GIANNONE, IV., 149 *seq.*; AMABILE, I., 293 *seq.*

³ See *ibid.* 166.

⁴ See the *Memoriale in Fondo Borghese I., 607, pp. 14-19. Papal Secret Archives, attached to the report of February 9, 1569, Corresp. dipl., III., 40 *seq.* Cf. *ibid.* 64 *seq.* another memorial "sobre abusos contra la jurisdiccion ecles.," composed by Odescalchi.

against traffickers in indulgences who were using forged Papal bulls. A new law had been issued ordering the bishops to submit their spiritual ordinances to the civil power for examination before they printed them, thus preventing them from exercising the power entrusted to them by God, and from holding provincial synods and punishing offenders. The more urgently the Pope pressed for the removal of the impediments placed in the way of spiritual jurisdiction in Naples, the more were they added to by the royal officials. At length Castagna declared that no notice had been taken of all his remonstrances, and that not even his proposal that an official commission should be sent to Rome to effect a settlement had been considered.

Even now Philip II. only made evasive replies, intended to put off a decision. It was still insisted that His Majesty must first receive detailed reports from the Viceroy, and that if there really should prove to be abuses, a remedy would be provided. But the Viceroy's reports denied the existence of any abuses. If the king at any moment showed himself disposed to meet the Pope's wishes, it was the Viceroy himself who dissuaded him. The Duke of Alcalà knew very well how to make official play with the *exequatur*, making his master believe that it was the very foundation of his royal jurisdiction, and the most important privilege which he possessed in the kingdom, and one which he must not give up on any account.¹ Philip II. believed in the fancied danger to the inalienable rights of the crown, the more so as there were not wanting servile canonists in Spain who made it appear that these controverted matters were quite lawful claims on his part.

In Rome the situation was perfectly clearly understood. In February, 1569, the nuncio Odescalchi was recalled, but even this act of condescension on the part of Pius V. did not bring about any improvement. Odescalchi's successor, Cesare Brumano, had to fight against the same difficulties.² On May

¹ Cf. GIANNONE, IV., 166.

² See CAPECE GALEOTA, Nunzii apost. di Napoli, 36. Cf. GIANNONE, IV., 172 *seq.*

28th, 1569, acting on special instructions from the Pope, Bonelli wrote to Castagna that the daily increasing abuses at Naples came rather from the local officials than from any ill-will on the part of the king; that the infringements of spiritual jurisdiction in that kingdom had reached such a pitch that one day the Pope would be obliged to take strong measures; violent hands were even laid upon the bishops, and their property had been confiscated merely because they carried out the Pope's orders, and had published the bull *In coena Domini* without an *exequatur*. Some officials had even gone so far as to destroy the copies of the bull which had been posted in the churches. The nuncio was urged to make strong remonstrances to Philip II., because in the end the Pope would have to place the Kingdom of Naples under an interdict.¹

So as not to leave anything untried, Castagna sent a second memorial to Philip II. on June 20th, concerning the way in which the affairs of the Church were being treated in Naples,² dwelling especially on three matters, for which he demanded immediate redress. The first was the unworthy treatment accorded to the prelates and even the bishops, whom the Viceroy received in bed, or with his head covered, or whom he placed after all the civil officials, and made to wait in the outer ante-camera among the common people. The second was the obstacles placed in the way of the bishops' jurisdiction. If a bishop wished to inflict a fine upon a layman for usury, concubinage and the like, he was forbidden to do so; no course remained open to him but the refusal of Christian burial and excommunication, but the latter penalty, according to the prescriptions of the Council of Trent, was only to be inflicted in extreme cases. Moreover, even the infliction of this form of punishment was made impossible for the bishops because any excommunicated layman could have recourse to the civil power, which, without going into the case, would order the cancellation of the penalty, and take the decision of the matter into its own hands. Bishops who refused to

¹ Corresp. dipl., III., 85 *seq.*

² In *Fondo Borghese, I., 607, p. 71-75b, Papal Secret Archives.

accept this were forced to do so by the confiscation of their property, and by other acts of violence. Castagna's third point dealt with the *exequatur*. This had formerly been exercised by the presentation of the Papal edicts to a competent official, the *cappellano maggiore*, who, having satisfied himself that the document contained nothing contrary to the royal prerogative, gave it his approval. But now the Pope's ordinances had to pass through the hands of a number of officials, a thing which not only added considerably to the cost, but often prevented the carrying out of the decree, by giving the guilty party time to escape. Formerly the *exequatur* had only applied to enactments which might be prejudicial to the royal prerogatives, or other rights of the government, but now it was made applicable to the smallest and most trivial orders of the Pope, and even to matters which were purely spiritual, such as indulgences. Even in the case of the nuncio himself, they were no longer satisfied with the mere presentation of his credentials, but he was prevented from exercising his office until the *exequatur* had been given.

When Philip II. returned to Madrid at the beginning of July, 1569, Castagna sought an audience. This time he only brought up the affairs of Naples, namely, the three matters spoken of above, adding a fourth complaint concerning the imprisonment of the vicar-general of a bishop, which had been ordered by the Viceroy because he had published the bull *In coena Domini*. With all frankness Castagna declared that if things went as far as that, His Holiness would be forced to place the whole of the Kingdom of Naples under an interdict, a thing which would have been done already if the Pope had not been convinced that these acts of violence did not come from His Majesty, but from his representatives. At this Philip broke out into lamentations that by means of these controversies about jurisdiction, and on other pretexts, the devil was sowing dissension between himself and His Holiness. But even now, as was his wont, he did not give a definite reply,¹ which was only sent to the nuncio on July 17th

¹ See the report of Castagna of July 13, 1569, Corresp. dipl., III., 110 seq.

by Cardinal Espinosa. This reply stated that the king had written to his Viceroy, telling him to satisfy the Pope's demands.

Castagna could not feel satisfied with so vague an answer to complaints which had been categorically stated, and he therefore tried to get from Espinosa a more definite statement. Espinosa assured him that as far as the position of the bishops was concerned the Pope's demands would be completely satisfied, and also that the exercise of their spiritual jurisdiction would be in some way guaranteed, but that it was quite useless to think of the *exequatur* being done away with; the most that could be done would be to remove the abuses connected with it. Full particulars would be sent to the Pope himself. The threat of an interdict had not alarmed the king. As far as Castagna could learn, Philip had declared that if the Pope took that extreme step, he, in defence of his ancient privileges, would do that which it was the right of Catholic princes to do, by which he undoubtedly meant an appeal to a general council. The nuncio was less anxious on the score of the imprisonment of the bishop's vicar-general, for he thought that, if it had not already been done, he would soon be set at liberty. As to the other matters he reported to Rome that Philip was obsessed by the fear that in consequence of the bull *In coena Domini* his subjects would resist the payment of taxes, and might even rise in rebellion. And since he was determined to resist any encroachment upon the privileges granted to his predecessors, Philip would never allow the formal promulgation of the bull.¹

Further heated discussions took place between Castagna and Philip II. at the beginning of August, 1569. News of the protest made by the Pope when he received the feudal homage of Naples on the feast of St. Peter and St. Paul,²

¹ See the report of Castagna from Madrid, July 17, 1569, Corresp. dipl., III., 114 *seq.* Cf. *ibid.* 115, n. 1, the instructions of Philip II., of July 17, to the Viceroy of Naples on the treatment of the bishops and the use of the *exequatur*, with which he hoped to satisfy the Pope.

² Cf. Corresp. dipl., III., 97 *seq.*, 102.

had thrown the king into an easily understood state of excitement. Castagna tried in vain to justify the head of the Church by suggesting the following ideas : The king must not let himself be led to think that the Holy Father had any temporal ends in view, or that bad counsellors were inciting him to these disputes with the princes ; he was acting solely in accordance with his duty as chief pastor. The reason for the dispute was the order which had been sent from Madrid to Naples to offer a strenuous resistance to all the ordinances of the Holy See which were directed against the Spanish "privileges and customs." This had inflamed passions at Naples, so that the abuses increased from day to day. The plain fact was that no longer was obedience paid to the Pope in Naples, while the whole discipline of the Church was set aside ; if the manifest abuses were continued, the difficulties could not fail to increase and become more serious. Lastly, Castagna once more strongly insisted that the Pope was not pursuing any temporal ends, but was aiming solely at maintaining the jurisdiction conferred by God upon His Church, and without which it was impossible that souls could be properly cared for.

The nuncio could say what he liked, but the king, who was in a very excited state, remained fixed in his contention that the Pope was to blame for the whole business, and that his exaggerated insistence on ecclesiastical jurisdiction was the cause of all these controversies. Castagna replied that the fault lay with whoever had allowed these usurpations, and not with him who was demanding what was his right. In the course of the conversation, which became more and more heated, Philip said that if the Pope persisted in his "extreme" views, he would know how to defend his own jurisdiction by the means which were at the disposal of Catholic princes. It was in vain for Castagna to remind him that they were not discussing temporal jurisdiction, but that which was spiritual. Philip, who could not deny this, broke off the audience saying that he had expressed his own point of view, and that was sufficient.¹

¹ See the report of Castagna of August 12, 1569, *ibid.* 132 *seq.*

In October the king gave way, at any rate on the question of the status of the nuncio at Naples, and ordered that he was to be treated like the nuncios in all his other dominions, namely, given the first place, but with the express proviso that this was not to involve any prejudice to his own jurisdiction.¹ In all the questions of principle, Philip, acting on the advice of his ambassadors and ministers,² continued to hold tenaciously to his cesaropapistical claims.

The questions at issue between Madrid and Rome, as well as the Milanese question, which was still unsettled, led Pius V., in October, 1569, to send to Spain the General of the Dominicans, Vincenzo Giustiniani.³ Before the latter could begin his negotiations, Philip II., in a royal pragmatic of November 30th, 1569, had declared in favour of retaining the *placet*.⁴ Cardinal Bonelli had charged Giustiniani to point out, in the case of the Milanese controversy, that civil jurisdiction would be destroyed together with the spiritual. The ultimate object of the Milanese, so he wrote to him from Rome, is undoubtedly to make themselves masters of all ecclesiastical affairs.⁵ In a memorial on the subject of the

¹ See MEISTER in *Histor. Jahrb.*, XIV., 82. Cf. *Corresp. dipl.*, III., 143.

² Cf. *Corresp. dipl.*, III., 182 *seq.*

³ The credential brief of October 11. 1569 in TEDESCHIS 264; eight other *briefs of October 11, relating to the mission of Giustiniani in Arm. 44, t. 14, p. 250b, Papal Secret Archives. Cf. *Corresp. dipl.*, III., 162 *seq.* So far the reports of Giustiniani have not been found. The documents in the Papal Secret Archives contain their equivalent, Borghese I., 632 (instructions from Bonelli to Giustiniani) and Spagna II. (see HINOJOSA, 193); in the former codex the letters of Castagna. Cf. *Corresp. dipl.*, III., xxxvii *seq.*, lxi, and MORTIER, *Hist. des Maîtres généraux de l'ordre de St. Dominique*, V., 490 *seq.*

⁴ See Tomo primero de las leyes de recopilación, Madrid, 1772, I. I, tit. 10, ley 12.

⁵ Bonelli to Giustiniani from Rome, November 2, 1569, in Borghese, I., 632, p. 66b, Papal Secret Archives. Cf. HINOJOSA, 195.

Milanese question,¹ Giustiniani demanded the formal withdrawal of the scandalous edict² of the governor of that city. He also presented memorials on the *Monarchia Sicula* and the abuses and acts of violence of the royal officials in the Two Sicilies.³

The memorial on the *Monarchia Sicula*⁴ showed that, in spite of careful inquiries, it had not been possible to produce a single lawful concession nor a single legal custom which could satisfy the conscience of the king and his ministers. The only thing that could be brought forward as an argument in its favour reduced itself to four words in a diploma attributed to Urban II., which was justly suspected of being a forgery, and which could more easily be shown to be an interpolation. The king, therefore, cannot rely upon that document, all the less so because no established custom can be proved which could run counter to the supreme pontifical power. The Holy Father too, now that he has been informed of the facts, thinks that he cannot with a clear conscience sacrifice ecclesiastical jurisdiction to the civil power, especially as it can be proved that the predecessors of the king themselves had scruples about putting forward any such claims. If he now brought forward the matter so strongly, the reason was that of late the abuses which had occurred on the score of the *Monarchia Sicula* had been incredibly numerous and intolerable in their scope, and had grown from day to day. In proof of this last assertion a list of the abuses and acts of violence was attached to the memorial.

Giustiniani, who arrived in Madrid in the last week of November, 1569, was not wanting in zeal,⁵ but he very soon discovered that the Spanish government had no real intention

¹ *Borghese I., 607, p. 148 *seq.*, *loc. cit.*

² *Bonelli to Giustiniani from Rome, January 10, 1570, *ibid.* p. 102 *seq.*

³ See HINOJOSA, 193, 196.

⁴ Printed in TEDESCHIS, 246 *seq.* Cf. SENTIS, 119 *seq.*

⁵ See the report of Castagna from Madrid, November 26, 1569, *Corresp. dipl.*, III., 191 *seq.*, which corrects HINOJOSA, 193-196.

of settling the disputes. His complaints about the *Monarchia Sicula* were submitted to the council of state for Italian affairs with a request for the reports of the governors. In the meantime he discovered that the government was secretly and assiduously engaged in examining all the ancient briefs and bulls, in the hope of finding support for its pretensions.¹ In the affair of Milan the declarations of Philip II. were such that the Pope's representatives believed, at the end of 1569, that it would be possible to arrive at a satisfactory solution.² When, in January, 1570, the king went to Cordova, Giustiniani followed him first, and then Castagna.³ Both of them remained in Andalusia until the summer, when they returned to Madrid.⁴ As they continued to work loyally to discharge the duties entrusted to them, they were met with the greatest difficulties. The king's journeys and the war against the Moors,⁵ which were occupying the attention of

¹ See the report of Castagna of January 8, 1570, Corresp. dipl., III., 215 *seq.* The king had already caused a search to be made in the archives in this connexion; see **Memoria para la busca y remision de todas la bulas y breves concedidos a Su M. en punto de patronato de materias consistoriales, el origen de estos y otros puntos*, dated Madrid, December 3, 1567, in Cod. 1. 9, of the Archives of the Spanish embassy in Rome.

² See Corresp. dipl., III., 210 *seq.*

³ On January 14, 1570, Castagna wrote from Madrid that Giustiniani had set out for Cordova and that he would follow him shortly (Corresp. dipl., III., 218). From February 5 onwards his reports are dated from Cordova. On March 2 he *announces that the negotiations about the affair of Milan are going well and that he hopes for a satisfactory result. The war against the Moors is going badly, and there is a great lack of funds. Papal Secret Archives.

⁴ On June 14, 1570, Castagna *announces that he is starting "to-day" on his return to Madrid; on July 6 he *writes that Giustiniani too had arrived there several days before. Papal Secret Archives.

⁵ Cf. PHILIPPSON, *Westeuropa*, 2, 159 *seq.*; LEA, *The Moriscos of Spain*, London, 1901; BORONAT Y BARRACHINA, *Los Moriscos españoles y su expulsión*, 2 vols. Valencia, 1901.

Philip in an increasing degree, were already the cause of anxiety to them, and still more the way in which the government managed to drag on the negotiations without giving any definite reply. It became more and more evident that no settlement was intended. When he left the Spanish capital on October 5th, Giustiniani, who had been made a Cardinal on May 17th, 1570, was bound to admit to himself that he had accomplished very little during his six months' legation.¹ In the affair of Milan he had only succeeded in getting the king to send a feeble request to the Duke of Albuquerque to arrange the matter amicably.² In the Neapolitan and Sicilian disputes Philip remained firm in his contention that he must first receive fuller information from his officials, to whom in the meantime he gave the advice, as he had done before, not to overstep the limits of their authority, recommending them to remove abuses in certain cases, which, however, only meant that his representatives in Italy, knowing that these general directions were only intended to free the king from the difficulties of the moment, continued their former mode of acting.³

At this critical moment, the attention of the Pope, who had been somewhat reassured by Giustiniani,⁴ was distracted from these political-ecclesiastical controversies by the need of doing all he could to meet the dangers which were threatening Christianity from the east at the hands of the Turks. As early as March, 1570, on learning of the great preparations being made by the Turks, he had attempted to arrange an alliance between Venice and Spain, and had sent Luis de Torres to the latter country for that purpose.⁵ The Turkish question led to a political rapprochement between Madrid

¹ See the *reports of Castagna of October 4, 1570, to Cardinal Borromeo and Cardinal Rusticucci, used by HINOJOSA, 197. The **Cifra* which is missing in Hinojosa shows that Castagna could not hide his disappointment. Papal Secret Archives.

² See the letter of September 28, 1570, in HINOJOSA, 197, n. 2.

³ See SENTIS, 120. Cf. GIANNONE, IV., 183.

⁴ See Corresp. dipl., IV., 20, n. 1.

⁵ Cf. *infra*, Chapter IX.

and Rome, and this in its turn exercised a favourable influence upon the settlement of the ecclesiastical differences. But however much he was occupied with the Crusade, Pius V. by no means lost sight of these important questions. On February 9th, 1571, Castagna delivered to the king a memorial¹ which was chiefly directed against the *exequatur* at Naples which had now been extended to the smallest Papal ordinances so much so that even the most needy beneficiary was not able to obtain his benefice without first paying the fees for the royal *placet*. At the end of June 1571 Cardinal Michele Bonelli was sent as legate to Spain. Besides the question of the Crusade, the marriage of the King of Portugal to Margaret of Valois and the question of the title of Cosimo de' Medici he was instructed to renew the negotiations about the *Monarchia Sicula* and the controversy about jurisdiction at Naples.²

Pius V. might have expected to meet at length with some satisfaction on these questions since, on May 21st, 1571, on account of the alliance which had lately been made with Venice and Spain against the Turks, he had not only extended for another five years the *sussidio* levied upon the *Spanish* clergy, but had also granted the *Cruzada* for two years, and the so-called *excusado* for five.³ This extraordinary generosity on the part of the Pope, who had hitherto been so reluctant, was brought about by the fact that Philip II., who was already engaged in fighting the Calvinists in the Low Countries, and the Moriscos in Spain, could only be

¹ See *Cod. 33-E-12 of the Corsini Library, Rome, whence is taken a passage in LÄMMER, *Zur Kirchengesch.*, 134 *seq.*

² See *Corresp. dipl.*, IV., 355 *seq.*; *cf.* *Carte Stroz.*, I., 1, 224 *seq.*

³ All these concessions were made on May 21, 1571: see *Indice de las concesiones que han hecho los Papas de la Cruzada, Subsidio y Escusado, Archives of the Spanish embassy in Rome. *Cf.* *Borghese I., 145-147, p. 35 *seq.* Papal Secret Archives. See also *Corresp. dipl.*, IV., 295-296. For the *excusado* (LADERCHI, 1571, n. 31, with a wrong date) see *Annuaire de l'univ. de Louvain*, 1909, 388 *seq.*

drawn into the Turkish war by opening out to him fresh and considerable sources of money. All the doubts which Pius V. had entertained, especially about the *Cruzada*, were silenced by the need of saving Christendom. How little the Pope's magnanimity was appreciated at the Spanish court was shown by a disrespectful remark of the king's confessor, the Bishop of Cuença, to Castagna,¹ and still more by the conduct of the king himself. As soon as the bulls concerning these great financial concessions had been happily secured, the representative of Spain at the Curia changed his tone. In the first week of June he appeared before the Pope, and stated that he had received orders to protest in the name of his king against the conferring of the title on Cosimo I. ! Pius V. was all the more amazed because hitherto Philip II. had adopted a waiting attitude in that matter. He taxed the ambassador with the deceitfulness with which Spain, on the strength of the league, had wrung great concessions from him, yet now was putting him into a great dilemma about the Duke's title. This protest, which had been in readiness for a long time in Madrid, was made on June 9th, but only in the presence of four Cardinals.² It was quite in keeping with this proceeding that Philip continued to pay no attention to all the complaints of the Holy See about Spanish cesaropapalism. Cardinal Bonelli gave expression to these complaints at his second audience on October 11th.³ They were not a few : In the first place there was the *Monarchia*

¹ According to L. Donato (ALBÈRI, I., 6, 380) the words of the bishop which directly referred to Pius V. were : " que los estiticos mueren de cameras ! "

² See Corresp. dipl., IV., 87, 131, 223 *seq.*, 328 *seq.* and BIBL., Erhebung, 118 *seq.* The text of the protest in PALANDRI, 240 *seq.* On June 16, 1571, Arco *reports on the strict secrecy about the protest ordered by the Pope. State Archives, Vienna.

³ Cf. the letter of Bonelli to Rusticucci of October 12, 1571 (in TEDESCHIS, 267 *seq.*, CARUSO, 88 *seq.*, and also in Corresp. dipl., IV., 480 *seq.*) and the summary report of November 17, 1571, used by SENTIS, 121 *seq.*, almost contemporaneously published by GACHARD, Bibl. Corsini, 152-161.

Sicula, then the *exequatur* in the Kingdom of Naples and all the abuses which had crept in there, then the dispute at Milan, which had not yet been decided as a matter of principle, and lastly the confiscation of the revenues of the archbishopric of Toledo. Castagna, who was present at the audience, bears witness that Bonelli set forth his case in the ablest way, and that he exposed, in a detailed and intensely illuminating memorial, the cesaropapistical Spanish rule as shown in the incurable abuses which were occurring in the Kingdoms of Naples and Sicily. With regard to the *Monarchia Sicula* he specially made it clear that, even granting the genuineness of the diploma of Urban II., the legation, according to the very terms of the privilege, could not extend further than the sons of Count Roger, as even the royal officials had admitted in 1512 and 1533. The memorial also complained that the Council of Trent had not been respected, and that the carrying out of the Pope's edicts had been prevented in every possible way, while in the *exequatur* there existed an abuse which the king was bound to remove in virtue of the oath which he had taken at the time of his investiture. The Pope had been waiting for an answer to the memorial delivered by Giustiniani for more than a year; the improvements which had in the meantime been made, but which were very small, did not touch the kernel of the question of jurisdiction, namely, the non-observance of the prescriptions of the Council of Trent. Lastly he reminded the king that it was a matter for his conscience to provide a remedy, and that to do so would also be to his own interest, since wherever ecclesiastical jurisdiction and the authority of the Pope were set at naught, and they were almost destroyed in Sicily and interfered with in various ways in Naples, heresies were sure to spring up sooner or later.¹

¹ The memorial, which was known to CATENA (p. 171) and of which TEDESCHIS (p. 264) gives a passage, was published in its entirety by LÄMMER, Melet. 226 *seqq.* from the Cod. 505 of the Corsini Library, Rome, though with the wrong date October 21; the "giovedì" in 1571 fell on October 11. It also escaped the notice of Lämmer that the document had already been published by Caruso (p. 86 *seq.*), though with the wrong date, October 12.

The king's reply was as before quite vague, and the decision now lay with the ministers. Bonelli therefore sought to bring pressure to bear on them through his friends, especially Francis Borgia. At first he hoped to be able to carry on the negotiations with Cardinal Espinosa and Ruy Gomez alone, but he very soon was forced to realize that the whole of the so-called Council of Italy, which looked upon it as its special duty to defend anything that affected the jurisdiction of the state, was involved.¹ The reply which he received on November 3rd still further damped Bonelli's hopes. This definitely rejected the contention that the *Monarchia Sicula* no longer existed as a matter of right, by an appeal, not only to the bull of Urban II., but also to immemorial possession. With regard to the various matters complained of, the reply was partly a denial, partly an evasion, and partly an admission, in so far that the removal of unfitting practices was at least promised.² That Philip himself looked upon the privileges of the *Monarchia Sicula* as excessive, and that he was troubled with scruples of conscience on the subject, was shown by the strange demand which was laid before Bonelli by Cardinal Espinosa: with regard to the *Monarchia Sicula* and the *exequatur* at Naples the Pope was asked to agree to them in such a way that his scruples of conscience might be entirely removed; in other words the Pope was asked to confirm the Spanish cesaropapalism!³

Under these circumstances Bonelli realized that further negotiations gave no grounds for hope, and that his further stay in Madrid was impossible without loss of his authority.

¹ See the report of Bonelli of November 17, 1571, in GACHARD, *Bibl. Corsini*, 155. Cf. SENTIS, 121, and *Corresp. dipl.*, IV., 522 *seq.*

² See *Cod. N. 2, p. 6a of the Vallicella Library, Rome. Cf. LADERCHI, 1571, n. 261 *seq.*, and SENTIS, 121. See also HINOJOSA, 203, where the date of the document in *Nunziat. di Spagna*, II., 150, is wanting; it belongs to October 30, 1571. Cf. also *Corresp. dipl.*, IV., 522, n. 1.

³ See the report of Bonelli of November 17, 1571, in GACHARD, *loc. cit.* 156. Cf. SENTIS, 29.

He held a consultation with Castagna, and then drew up a new memorial on the *Monarchia Sicula*, which he sent to the king on November 10th, 1571. In this memorial he very ably refuted the pretended existence of any legal title, by showing that not even the longest immemorial possession could give grounds for such a right, because, failing an express concession on the part of the Pope, the princes as laymen were incapable of possessing or exercising spiritual authority; the lack of this absolutely essential concession could not be supplied by any actual exercise of the right, no matter how long this might have been done, nor could any *right* to its exercise be grounded upon it. The privileges claimed by the king were such as to do away with the primatial power of the Popes, and it was therefore impossible that the Popes should ever have granted them.¹

Any lingering hopes which might have been based upon certain expressions used by Espinosa vanished with the final answer received by Bonelli on the morning of November 12th. On the following day he had his farewell audience, and in the course of it obtained something which neither Castagna nor Giustiniani had succeeded in getting, namely the promise of the king that he would at least resume the negotiations in Rome, especially with regard to the *Monarchia Sicula*.²

On November 18th Bonelli went to Portugal in connexion with the matrimonial question already mentioned, and he returned to Madrid on December 28th. On that day Philip II. issued rescripts to the authorities at Naples, with reference to certain special questions, in which he forbade them to mix themselves up in ecclesiastical matters. These orders, however, did not bring about any practical change, because the

¹ See the text of the *Replica in Cod. 505, p. 24 *seq.* of the Corsini Library, Rome, used by SENTIS, 121 *seq.*

² See the report of Bonelli of November 17, 1571, *loc. cit.* 156. P. Giannone (*Il tribunale della Monarchia di Sicilia*, ed. A. PIER-ANTONI, Rome, 1892, 124) is also obliged to recognize the importance of the promise.

authorities knew how to evade them,¹ while Philip himself clung firmly to his claims in all essentials, especially the royal *exequatur*, the *Monarchia Sicula*, and his opposition to the bull *In coena Domini*.² In January, 1572, the legate continued his journey to France. On the occasion of the birth of Prince Ferdinand, which took place on December 4th, 1571, he had conveyed the Pope's congratulations to Philip II., while Pius V. also sent a special envoy in the person of his chamberlain Casale, to present the Golden Rose to the queen. Casale was also charged to seek for a remedy for the disputes at Milan, where the president of the senate was trying to "befool the archbishop."³ He arrived in Madrid at the beginning of June, where news of the death of Pius V. had preceded him. Castagna was still occupying his difficult position, and he looked upon it as a release when, in the late autumn, Gregory XIII. at last yielded to his requests and recalled him. A great deal of the credit for the fact that a complete breach between Madrid and Rome had been avoided was due to this distinguished man. He clearly saw how necessary this was in the interests of the whole Church, and, with great ability, shielding as much as possible the king himself, had been able to throw most of the blame for the disputes⁴ of an ecclesiastical-political nature which were continually arising on the royal authorities.⁵

This idea, which was certainly not entirely justified, but which rested upon the undoubtedly sincere attachment of

¹ See TEDESCHIS, 269 *seq.*; CARUSO, 283 *seq.*; SENTIS, 122. Cf. HINOJOSA, 204. Sentis rightly remarks (*loc. cit.*) that those authors who speak of a "concordat" are altogether in error. Cf. LADERCHI, 1571, n. 279 *seq.*

² Cf. GIANNONE, IV., 185.

³ See HINOJOSA, 205 *seq.*

⁴ This was certainly the case in many ways, but to absolve the king from all complicity, as Laderchi does (1566, n. 495) is not possible.

⁵ Besides the more important differences mentioned there were several minor disputes. Giannone (IV., 175 *seq.*, 180 *seq.*) speaks of these in a very partisan spirit, as he does in other matters.

Philip II. to the Catholic faith, and his declared hostility to all religious innovators,¹ was also shared by Pius V. Both as a religious and as a Cardinal, Pius had taken up a favourable attitude towards the Spaniards. Consequently, in his sketch of the Sacred College in 1565, Requesens had described him as a desirable candidate for the tiara.² As an Italian Ghislieri would certainly rather have seen his country governed by Italians, but he preferred the Spanish rule to that of any other foreigners. No less a person than Philip's representative in Rome, Juan de Zuñiga, testifies that at the beginning of his pontificate Pius was firmly resolved to maintain the good relations which he had hitherto had with Spain. Zuñiga explained to the king the attitude adopted by the Pope, in an extremely important letter of February 23rd, 1571.³ At the beginning of his pontificate Pius V. had been entirely well-disposed towards Spain, though he had at once shown his strength of character, and had given proofs of his intention of maintaining his own authority. Zuñiga then describes the first disagreements, which had been specially occasioned by the conduct of Philip in the affair of Carranza, and he bears witness in favour of the Pope, that he had entered into the jurisdictional controversies with a holy and a good intention, and had always shown a great personal affection for the king himself,⁴ being convinced that it was his officials who were responsible for the controversies. His entourage had confirmed him in this view, and had painted the conduct of the Spanish officials in matters concerned with ecclesiastical jurisdiction in such dark colours that he had put forward very drastic demands. The reason why the negotiations had become so acrimonious was not only the strong character of Pius V., but also the fact that His Holiness was convinced that the ambassadors, in order to prove their zeal, had insisted

¹ How fully Pius V. appreciated this attitude of Philip is attested by Granvelle; see *Corresp. de Granvelle*, II., 169.

² See DÖLLINGER, *Beiträge*, I., 579. Cf. Vol. XVII. of this work, p. 13.

³ Published in *Docum. d. Arch. Alba*, 261-263.

⁴ This is also attested by P. TIEPOLO, *Relazione*, 188.

upon some of the matters at issue more strongly than they had been instructed to do. At the end of his account Zuñiga expresses his conviction that the Pope, who had always led an exemplary life, was actuated by the holiest intentions, and was so determined to uphold his principles, and to discharge his duty, that he would not have allowed any offence to be committed against God, even though the whole world were to fall in ruins. Perhaps, so Zuñiga thought, this led to even worse disturbances than those caused by other Popes, who pursued more worldly ends.

Although the grasp of the controversies concerning ecclesiastical politics which is revealed in these words may fall short of the truth, yet Zuñiga's statements are a splendid testimony to the purity of the zeal with which Pius V. was animated.

CHAPTER III.

THE BEGINNING OF THE REBELLION IN THE LOW COUNTRIES.

THE powerful movement which cut off from Spain the northern part of the Low Countries, and set up there the rule of Protestantism, bore at first a political and national character rather than a religious one. If at first Philip II. followed in the footsteps of his father in the Low Countries, and made no change in the ancient privileges of the 17 provinces, his accession to the throne nevertheless brought about a complete change in the situation. While Charles V. had been looked upon as half a Netherlander, Philip II. was purely a Spaniard, and showed as little liking for his subjects in the Netherlands as they did for him. Their ruler was no longer the diplomatic Emperor, who had conversed in a friendly way with the Netherlanders in their own language, had favoured them, and treated them with great discretion, but the stern, laconic and inaccessible King of Spain, whose personality as well as his method of government was of quite another kind. Philip II. looked upon the Low Countries, not as a separate state, but merely as one of his "possessions" which, like Milan and Naples in the south, were to minister to the Spanish rule as a starting point and base of operations in the north; his rigid absolutism was bound to be opposed to any aspirations on the part of the Netherland provinces to political individuality and national independence.¹ This critical state of affairs was made worse by Philip's habit of reflecting and taking counsel instead of acting at moments of crisis. Thomas Perrenot stigmatizes this habit of indecision in bitter words in a letter to Granvelle: "the only decision the king comes to is to be for ever undecided."² Aggravating circumstances were the

¹ See PIRENNE, III., 455 *seqq.*; BLOCK, II., 395 *seq.*

² See WEISS, *Papiers d'état du card. Granvelle*, IX., 568.

incapacity of Margaret of Parma, who had been appointed Governess-General by Philip II., and the wretched state of the finances. The Low Countries, into which, on account of their trade and their industries, wealth flowed from all parts of the world, had been made, more than any other country, to bear the expense of Charles V.'s wars in France, Italy and Germany; in like manner Philip II. waged his war against France in a special way with Netherland money. The consequences of this were shown in a complete financial exhaustion in that country which the Venetian Soriano had described as the Indies of Spain.¹ The material condition of this territory held by Spain on the North Sea was also far worse in other ways than is commonly recognized; the frontier provinces especially had suffered from the devastating effects of the war with France. But the gravest source of danger was the change that had taken place in social conditions. A new class of great industrial magnates and capitalists had come into being, side by side with a large body of workers, whose condition grew steadily worse on account of the continual rise of prices.²

This state of affairs, added to the feeling that they were being drained in favour of a policy which was foreign to their own interests, gave rise to a deep-seated unrest among all classes of the liberty loving population of the Netherlands.³ Philip II. was well aware of the danger of the situation when, on August 25th, 1559, he set out for Spain after a long stay in the Low Countries. He realized that he could not count with any certainty on the Governess and the all-powerful councillor, Granvelle. It was with great disquietude that he saw the revolutionary tendencies, which had begun to show themselves even in the time of Charles V., and he was made specially anxious by the efforts that were being made to secure a joint agreement of the members of the States

¹ Cf. GACHARD, *Relations des ambass. Vénitiens*, 102 *seq.*; MARX, *Studien*, 60 *seqq.*

² See PIRENNE, III., 345 *seqq.*

³ See MARX, *loc. cit.* 83 *seqq.*

General, and above all by the Protestant propaganda, to which the country was peculiarly exposed on account of its position and its commercial relations. He made what arrangements he could to meet the danger : above all, before he left, he urged the governess, the governors, the courts and the bishops to be very much on their guard. In taking his solemn farewell of the representatives of the provinces assembled at Ghent, he urged the strict enforcement of the severe edicts issued by the Emperor against the sectarians, since past experience had shown that no religious change could take place without a corresponding political revolution.¹

Philip's anxiety concerning the state of religion in the Low Countries was fully justified. Even though, as far as the great majority was concerned, in the very mixed population of those provinces, mixed both in nationality and customs, remaining firmly attached to the ancient religion, there was an undeniable weakening of religious feeling.² The lower classes were still filled with genuine piety, and continued to frequent the churches as before,³ but the fatal influence of the writings of Erasmus was making rapid strides both among the educated people and the clergy. Like Erasmus himself, those who had come under his influence sought indeed to avoid any external separation from the Church, but as far as their private opinions were concerned they had departed from her principles in more than one respect.⁴ Such a state of indecision, which left them free to enjoy life happily and without restraint, suited the easy-going character of the people of the Netherlands, although it was evident that it was

¹ See MARX, *loc. cit.* 41 *seq.* ; RACHFAHL, II., I, 19 *seq.*

² See PIRENNE, III., 414.

³ What A. de Beatis had written on this subject in 1517 (see PASTOR, *Reise des Kard. d'Aragona*, 73) was again stated by Badoero in 1557 ; see ALBÈRI, I., 3, 291.

⁴ See the excellent considerations put forward by RACHFAHL, I., 448 *seq.*, 464. The ideas of Erasmus had been popularized by G. Cassander, who was much esteemed in the Low Countries. For the latter *cf.* PASTOR, in *Kirchenlexikon* of Freiburg, II.² 2017 *seq.*

not calculated to their moral advantage, and a survey of the moral state of the country reveals a gloomy picture indeed. Unrestrained lust, drunkenness, and immorality were common, and not least among the numerous and powerful nobles. Unsettled and feeble in their religion, a large part of the aristocracy of the Netherlands led a luxurious and immoral life, and squandered their property in splendid banquets, extravagant gambling and wild orgies.¹

The first place among the nobility of the Netherlands in every sense was held by William, Prince of Orange. Gifted with great qualities of intellect, strong in will and firm of purpose, a master of the art of summing up men and winning their hearts, and full of ambition, this coldly calculating man had a keen eye for anything that could advance or interfere with his aims. Morally, Orange was a man of licentious life and made no secret of it; at the Diet of the princes at Frankfort in 1558 he openly declared that adultery was no sin.² He was so addicted to the national vice of drunkenness as even to endanger his vigorous constitution.³ Being filled with purely worldly ideas, he entirely ignored the supernatural; it is certain that very little remained in his mind of the Lutheran training which he received until his eleventh year. When, at that age, he had to become a Catholic in order to receive the rich inheritance of his cousin René, he was given an education in accordance with the views of Erasmus. It is no wonder then that he fell into the state of indifference that was prevalent among the aristocracy of the Netherlands.⁴ How much he looked upon religion as a mere

¹ Cf. MARX, *Studien*, 112 *seq.*; RACHFAHL, I., 273 *seq.* See also PIRENNE, III., 498 *seq.*

² See RITTER in *Histor. Zeitschrift*, LVIII., 410, n. 2.

³ See MARX, *loc. cit.* 116.

⁴ See RACHFAHL, I., 153 *seq.* PIRENNE (III., 495) well says that at that time Orange was "as much a Catholic as later he was a Lutheran, and later still a Calvinist, that is to say without any enthusiasm or deep convictions. . . . His attitude towards religion was nothing but the expression of the political position which he held for the moment."

political consideration was shown by the negotiations which took place in 1561 before his marriage to Anne, the daughter of the Protestant Elector Maurice of Saxony. While he was assuring Philip II. that he had made it a condition that his wife should profess the Catholic faith, and intended that she should live a good Catholic, he informed the Elector Augustus of Saxony of his own secret but strong leaning towards Protestantism, which, however, he was unable for the time being to profess publicly; his wife, however, should be free to live in her Lutheran faith, and his children should be brought up in that religion.¹ A letter from Orange to Pius IV. belongs to the same year, 1561; in this he assures the Pope that he desires the extirpation of the "pest of heresy" in his principality of Orange, and that he had given orders to that effect to his officials.² William retained this mask of Catholicism for five years longer, because it was useful to his purpose. Proof of this is to be found in the two letters which he addressed to Pius V. in 1566. In the first, dated May 13th, he declared: "It is my desire and intention to be all my life the very humble and obedient son of the Church and of the Holy See, and to persevere, as my ancestors did, in that intention, devotion, and obedience." In the second letter, dated June 8th, he promised that he would take every pains, as was his duty, for the preservation of the ancient Catholic religion in his principality of Orange, as in the past.³ All

¹ Cf. JANSSEN-PASTOR, IV. 15-16, 267. See also KOLLIGS, W. v. Oranien, Bonn, 1884, 8-20; RACHFAHL, II., I, 91 seq., 100 seq.

² See GROEN VAN PRINSTERER, Archives de la maison Orange-Nassau, I., 72. Cf. KOCH, Untersuchungen über die Empörung und den Abfall der Niederlande, Leipsic, 1860, 9 seq. Pius IV. was much comforted by the behaviour of Orange in his principality; see A. CAUCHIE and L. VAN DER ESSEN, Invent. des archives Farnésiennes, Brussels, 1911, xxi., and BROM, Archivalia, I., 191 seq.

³ Cf. ALLARD, Des zwijgers godsdiensten in *Studien op Godsdiensdig*, Wettenschappelijk en Letterkundig Gebied, ann 13., Utrecht, 1880, II., 65-90, where the original text of the letter preserved in the Barberini Library is given for the first time.

through the following summer he behaved as a Catholic, but in November, 1566, in a confidential letter to the Lutheran William of Hesse, he wrote that at heart he had "always held and professed" the Confession of Augsburg.¹

Such was the man who, though he was the vassal and councillor of state of Philip II., used all his abilities to thwart the policy, both at home and abroad, of his king. All the malcontents of the Spanish government gathered round him, while those who had Protestant leanings were in close league with him.² Philip II. himself assisted his plans by continuing to postpone the removal of the three thousand hated Spanish soldiers, as he had unwillingly promised to do before he left the Low Countries. When their withdrawal had at last been obtained fresh subject for discontent was at once found in the new delimitation and increased number of the Netherland bishoprics, which Paul IV., in accordance with the wishes of Philip II., had arranged shortly before his death.³

This arrangement, which had been called for by a very proper recognition of the insufficiency of mere measures of repression for the stamping out of religious innovations, in view of the manifest unsuitability of the old conditions, was altogether necessary and at the same time of great assistance to the spiritual needs of the population; it also had, however, a political bearing. The Pope was obliged to grant the Catholic King the right of nomination in the case of the fourteen new bishoprics, as with Utrecht, Tournai and Arras. Not satisfied with this increase in the power of the king, the commission which had been appointed by Philip II. in 1559 to put into effect the bull relating to the new bishoprics, in order to solve the difficult question of the endowment of the new dioceses,

¹ See GROEN VAN PRINSTERER, *loc. cit.* II., 997. Cf. also BLOK, *Willelm de eerste* (Amsterdam, 1919), who believes (p. 62) that Orange only really became a Calvinist after 1572.

² Cf. RITTER, I., 335 *seq.*

³ For this, besides what has been said in Vol. XIV. of this work, p. 321, see also MARX, *Studien*, 51 *seq.*, 194 *seq.*, and RACHFAHL, II., I, 20 *seq.* See also CLAESSENS, *Sur l'établissement des évêchés dans les Pays-Bas* in *Rev. cathol.*, 1859.

proposed to unite the abbeys situated in the neighbourhood to the new sees. By this expedient the government obtained possession of further docile votes, because in most of the provinces the clergy formed an important part of the assembly of the states.¹ Philip II. accordingly declared himself well satisfied with the proposal,² which, under the influence and advice of Granvelle, was decided upon.³ Since, however, this involved a departure from the original scope of the bull of Paul IV., it was necessary to ask for the consent of his successor, but for some reason or other the preparation of the bulls of erection of the new sees met with many difficulties. The blame for the sudden delay lay not only with the wretched question of money, the payment of the customary fees, and the cautious procedure of the Curia, but also in the strained relations between Pius IV. and the Spanish ambassador, Vargas, and the opposition of those prelates from whose dioceses important territories would be cut off. The Curia was literally flooded with protests. Like the Bishops of Cambrai, Liège, Tournai, and the chapter of Utrecht, so too the Archbishop of Cologne and Cardinal Guise as Archbishop of Rheims protested against the bull which defined the new boundaries of the dioceses in the Netherlands, on the ground that it injured their material and jurisdictional interests.⁴ In spite of the insistence of Philip II., the supreme authority of the Church could not refuse to make an investigation of these complaints. The king had every reason to be satisfied with the final decision; Pius IV. upheld the proposed arrangement, as being fully in accordance with the interests of religion. In a bull of March 7th, 1561, he approved the new scheme for the endowments, confirmed the bishops nominated by

¹ See MARX, Studien, 203; RACHFAHL, II., I, 131 seq.

² See WEISS, Papiers d'état du card. Granvelle, VI., 58 seq.

³ See RACHFAHL in *Westdeutsche Zeitschrift*, XXIX., 369.

⁴ Cf. DE RAM in *Annuaire de l'univ. de Louvain*, 1851, 302 seq.; *Archief van het aartsbisdom Utrecht*, XII., 434 seq.; BROM, *Archivalia*, I., 792; STEINHERZ, *Nuntiaturberichte*, I., 320 seq.; HOLZWARTH, I., 77 seq.; *Corresp. de Granvelle*, éd. PIOT, IV., 3 n.; MARX, Studien, 196 seq.; RACHFAHL, II., I, 132 seq.

Philip, and further took steps to see that those bishops who had suffered any loss were indemnified.¹

While the foreign prelates were thus forced to give up their opposition, this broke out with all the greater violence in the Low Countries themselves, starting principally with the nobility. To the long-standing secret dislike of the Netherland aristocracy for the whole scheme, and the arbitrary proceedings of Philip II., there was added a deep discontent with the solution of the problem of the endowments, which strengthened the royal power, and made it difficult for the sons of the nobility to obtain bishoprics and canonries.² Completely disregarding the true interests of the Church, and short-sightedly thinking only of their own advantage, even the abbeyes, where they were affected by the bull, allowed themselves to be drawn into the opposition raised by the nobility.³ By stating, which was altogether untrue, that it was intended by means of the erection of the new bishoprics to introduce the Spanish Inquisition, which was mortally hated by the Netherlanders, they succeeded at length in drawing the masses of the population into the movement. Not only those elements which were already inclined to the new religion, and which had every reason to fear an increased vigilance on the part of the bishops, but also those who were faithful to the Church were rendered anxious at the supposed attempt to subject them to a Spanish institution at the expense of their own local rights.⁴ The states of Brabant especially made violent resistance, declaring that the incorporation of the abbeyes was aimed at their principal privilege, the *joyeuse entrée*.⁵ The devils of Brabant, as Philip II. called them, soon found imitators in the other provinces, and in many

¹ See RAYNALDUS, 1561, n. 69; *Archief cit.*, IX., 314 *seq.*; XII., 444; STEINHERZ, *loc. cit.* I. 321; RACHFAHL, II., I, 135; BROM, *loc. cit.* 718 *seq.*

² See MARX, *Studien*, 207 *seqq.*; RACHFAHL, II., I, 147 *seq.*

³ Granvelle said that Douai like Brussels had as it were fallen into a trap. See HOLZWARTH, I., 80 *seq.*

⁴ See MARX, *Studien*, 218 *seqq.*

⁵ See RACHFAHL, II., I, 151 *seq.*, 155.

places they went to extremes. Granvelle himself had to behave with great circumspection before he could make his solemn entry into Malines as archbishop. Several of the new bishops were unable to take possession of their sees at all, while others could only do so after more or less prolonged disputes.¹

Granvelle, who had been made a Cardinal on February 25th, 1561, took a decisive part in the unfortunate solution of the question of the bishoprics.² This earned for him the hatred of the opposition party of the nobles headed by Orange, all the more so because the latter saw in him, quite rightly, the most sagacious representative of the monarchical tendencies, and Philip's principal supporter. The fall of Granvelle then became his chief aim, and the "lords" found in him a powerful ally in the Calvinistic movement which was spreading from France into the Low Countries. The people were stirred up in every possible way; works in French and Flemish mocked at the Cardinal as "the red devil" who wanted to destroy the liberty of the country by means of the Inquisition and the new bishoprics, and hand it over to the "Spanish swine." Orange and his supporters among the nobles kept up the war against the hated Cardinal by every means in their power, but only attained their object when even the regent deserted Granvelle.³

Philip II. had once said that he would rather risk his possessions in the Netherlands than sacrifice the Cardinal.⁴ There was only *one* way to save Granvelle, namely the personal appearance of the king in the Low Countries;⁵

¹ In more than one place their lives were hardly safe, says HAVENSIUS, *Comment. de erectione novorum in Belgio episcopatum*, Cologne, 1609, 26 *seq.* Cf. HOLZWARTH, I., 85 *seq.*; RACHFAHL, II., I, 235 *seq.*

² See RACHFAHL in *Westdeutschen Zeitschrift*, XXII., 87 *seqq.*; XXIX., 368 *seq.*

³ See PIRENNE, III., 506 *seq.*; RACHFAHL, II., I, 248 *seq.*, 252 *seqq.*, 288 *seqq.*

⁴ See WEISS, *Papiers d'état du card. Granvelle*, VII., 102.

⁵ See *Corresp. de Granvelle*, éd. POULLET, I., lxxvii.

indeed, the journey to Flanders was seriously urged upon him by all far-seeing men, but the irresolute monarch could not bring himself to the point, and instead, on January 22nd, 1564, gave his congé to his faithful servant, Granvelle. The regent then fell entirely into the hands of the opposition nobles, who made use of their triumph in the most disastrous way, so much so that a state of anarchy prevailed.¹

The struggle about the bishoprics grew even more furious when there was added to it the opposition to the acceptance of the Council of Trent, and the situation grew worse than ever.² While Philip II. showed a certain amount of conciliatoriness in these two matters, he remained all the more fixed in his resistance to two further demands of the opposition, namely, the assembly of the States General, and the alteration of the edicts in force against the religious innovators. It was the common opinion in the Low Countries that these edicts would be modified, and even the Bishops of Ypres, Namur, Ghent and St. Omer gave expression to this view in June, 1565,³ but Philip would not hear of it. Royal ordinances, issued at the park of Segovia in the second half of October, 1565, definitely rejected the demands of the opposition; the edicts were to be enforced even more rigorously, the Inquisition was to remain unchanged, and the States General were not to be summoned. At first the regent did not dare to publish this decision, and submitted the matter to the council of state, at which Orange obtained the publication of the royal decrees. He himself, on January 8th, 1566, issued a severe edict in favour of the

¹ See PIRENNE, III., 511; RACHFAHL, II., I, 421 *seq.*; II., 2, 517.

² Cf. RACHFAHL, II., I, 446 *seqq.*, 451 *seq.* See also HOLZWARTH, I., 215 *seq.* and DE RAM, De promulgatione concilii Tridentini in Belgio. In the Franche Comté the Archbishop of Besançon who had not yet received investiture, put off the publication of the decrees until 1571, for which reason Pius V. took proceedings against him: see *Revue Hist.*, CIII., 227 *seq.*, 238 *seq.*

³ See KERVYN DE LETTENHOVE, I., 264.

Inquisition to the provinces of Holland, Zeeland and Frisia which were subject to him.¹ Sure of his success he declared : " Now we shall see the beginning of a tremendous tragedy." And indeed he very soon saw what he had hoped for come to pass, the outburst of a storm of revolution, which was to clear the way for his own schemes.

As early as the summer of 1565, Count Louis of Nassau, the brother of Orange, who did not disapprove of his Protestant leanings, had started secret negotiations for the formation of a league of the nobles. At the beginning of December, 1565, there was drawn up in complete secrecy at Brussels the so-called compromise of twenty nobles, which was directed against the continuance of the edicts, and the introduction, which was stated to be intended, of the Spanish Inquisition. The draft of this compromise carefully avoided the use of any expression offensive to Catholics, and this explains the fact that, among the large number who joined the league, there were many Catholics, who had no idea of separating themselves from the ancient Church, and only wished to resist the system of government pursued by the crown.² The authors of the compromise, however, had from the first much more far-reaching aims ; they had conceived the idea of a revolt against the sovereign.³ Some of the conspirators wished to make their attack at once, but their leader, Orange, did not think that the fitting moment had yet arrived. In order to bring strong pressure to bear, he first drew up a mass petition ; on April 5th, 1566, under the leadership of his brother, Louis of Nassau, and Brederode, 400 nobles appeared at the castle of Brussels and presented to the regent a " petition " which, in order to prevent a revolution, demanded the suspension of the edicts and the Inquisition, until the States General, which the king must assemble, should make other arrangements.⁴ The governess gave way before

¹ Published in ALLARD, *Een Plakkaat des Zwijgers ten gunste der Inquisitie*, Utrecht, 1886, 5 *seq.*

² See PIRENNE, III., 557 ; RACHFAHL, II., 2, 547 *seqq.*, 560 *seq.*, 565.

³ See RITTER in *Histor. Zeitschrift*, LVIII., 426.

⁴ See BLOK, III., 341 *seq.*

this demonstration, and promised the modification of the edicts, a contributory cause of her decision being the fact that the demands of the nobles, or *gueux*, as they were called, were almost universally approved of. That almost the whole country took the part of the nobles was to a great extent the result of an agitation which was as skilful as it was unscrupulous, which by means of pamphlets and broad-sheets enormously exaggerated¹ the number of the victims of the Inquisition and, concealing the true facts, represented as certain—a thing which threatened the well-being and liberty of the country—the immediate forcible introduction of the Spanish Inquisition.² In order to understand the general state of excitement which this produced we must remember that even those who were loyal to the ancient Church, with very few exceptions, were altogether opposed to any violent punishment of the religious innovators, some because they were indifferent on religious questions, some because they had adopted the ideas of Erasmus and Cassander, some because they feared the injury that would be done to the commerce of the Netherlands, and all because in the Inquisition, in the form given to it by Charles V., and as it existed in Spain, they saw a grave threat to the liberties and local privileges which they clung to so jealousy. In this

¹ On the basis of the data given by William of Orange in his apologia, and a sentence used by Hugo Grotius the number of those executed by the Inquisition in the Low Countries was estimated at 50,000 or even 100,000. Modern researches have rectified this to the effect that at the highest estimate not more than 2,000 persons were put to death for obstinacy in heresy. See W. WILDE, *Merkwaardige cijfers betreffende de Geloofsvervolgingen in Nederland tijdens de 16^e eeuw*, Utrecht, 1893, 37 *seq.*; CLAESSENS, *L'inquisition dans les Pays-Bas*, Turnhout, 1886, 259 *seq.*; v. D. HAEGHEN, *Du nombre des protestants exécutés dans les Pays-Bas*, 1889; RUTGERS, *Calvyns invloed op de Reformatie in de Nederlanden*, 141 *seq.*; HOOG, *Onze Martelaars in Nederl. Arch. voo boekgesch.*, I., Leyden, 1889, 82 *seqq.*

² See RACHFAHL, II., 2, 554 *seq.*; *cf. ibid.* 560 concerning the statement that Philip II. did not wish to introduce anything new but only to enforce rigorously the existing edicts.

sense even the Catholics of the Netherlands were *gueux*, and these at that time formed the great majority of the population, but only political *gueux*, with political ends in view, as distinguished from the religious *gueux* or Calvinists, who aimed at absolute freedom in the practice of religion in itself, but at the same time at the complete suppression and extirpation of the Catholic religion, for which they felt a mortal hatred as being "Roman idolatry." If the regent had adopted a course of vigorous resistance, the leaders of this minority, the Calvinist preachers, would have been completely scattered,¹ but Margaret was so panic-stricken that she did not dare to offer any sort of resistance; she remained entirely passive before the movement, which every day became more dangerous.

The weak behaviour of the regent, who tried to win over the religious *gueux* by modifying the edicts, only spurred on the Calvinist preachers to bolder action. As the result of an assembly held at Antwerp a vigorous propaganda in favour of Protestantism was set on foot throughout the country. A favourable field for this had long been ready in those districts where the great merchants and traders were in the ascendant, namely Antwerp and other ports, and the industrial districts of west Flanders, where there was to be found a large body of workmen, who, together with a number of unemployed, vagabonds and idlers, partly from a love of opposition, and partly to obtain alms, joined the new movement.² At the same time the doctrines of Calvin had their supporters among the upper classes, especially among the rich merchants, lawyers, magistrates and nobles, who made up by their fanaticism and daring for what the movement lacked in numbers. What very shallow roots the new religion had was shown by the fact that in 1563 the mere arrival of troops was enough to restore the

¹ See BLOK, III., 46 *seq.*; PIRENNE, III., 542 *seq.*, 551, 558, 565. In the opinion of an Italian Catholic, the architect Marchi, there were not 20 persons in the whole country who really wished for the continuance of the Inquisition; see CAUCHIE in *Analectes pour servir à l'hist. ecclés. de la Belgique*, XXIII. (1892), 26.

² See PIRENNE, III., 530 *seq.*; RACHFAHL, II., 2, 525 *seq.*, 530 *seq.*

old order of things at Valenciennes, Tournai, and on the sea-coast of Flanders.¹ Those who were most deeply involved had then gone into exile, but now they returned in shoals, while many preachers came from Geneva, France, Germany and England in order systematically to win over the masses of the people. After the end of May, 1566, "savage sermons" against the "Roman idolatry" were preached in the open air in the presence of thousands of people, who were for the most part armed. At the same time endless pamphlets, libels and calumnies were distributed in the cities and villages against the Church and even against the king. The foreign preachers were joined by native ones, who were sometimes apostate Catholic priests, but also shoemakers and tailors, all banded together to stir up the people against the "imposture" of the ancient Church. The frightened authorities allowed this to go on, and even in Brussels Calvinist sermons were allowed in two places. Even the provinces of the north succumbed to the movement, the principal centres being Antwerp and the whole of Flanders. At Tournai the innovators tried to force the Catholics by threats to listen to their insulting sermons. Every means was made use of; in the villages of south Flanders demagogues displayed letters bearing the forged seal of the king, inciting people to sack the churches, and secret lists were drawn up containing the names of those who were ready to join in an open warfare on behalf of the new doctrines.²

In August, 1566, the inflammable matter that was everywhere to be found, burst into open flame. On August 10th, at the instigation and under the leadership of the preachers, all the horrors of iconoclasm broke loose in the industrial districts of west Flanders, where Calvinism had long had many supporters. Both in cities and villages infuriated bands broke into the churches in order to destroy the "idolatry" against which the preachers had so heatedly inveighed. The horror-stricken Catholics saw their churches sacked, and even

¹ See PIRENNE, III., 538.

² See PIRENNE, III., 559-570, and especially RACHFAHL, II., 2, 636 seq., 643 seq., 646 seq., 673 seq., 703 seq.

the Most Holy Sacrament trampled under foot. Thus was revealed for the first time in the district between Dunkirk, Ypres and Armentières, the true spirit in which the masses of the people had been led. The movement spread like an all-devouring conflagration through Flanders; only Bruges, Cambrai and Douai were spared in the destruction, and that because the Catholics had recourse to armed resistance. From Flanders the hurricane spread even as far as Zeeland, Holland and Frisia, everywhere with the same terrible scenes of destruction. Artistic treasures which could never be replaced fell victim to the storm; with cries of "Long live the gueux" the iconoclasts, among whom were to be seen educated persons, convinced that they were doing a work that was pleasing to God in destroying the "Roman idols," passed from church to church and from convent to convent. With mad fury they maltreated priests, monks and nuns, destroyed statues, pictures, stained glass, chalices, monstrances, and sacred vestments, burned books and manuscripts, and even profaned graves. Only a few among the confederated nobles, such as the journalist, Philippe de Marnix, approved of this work of destruction. Count Culemburg took part in it, and with his band of followers sat down to table in a church which had been "purified" at his orders, and to amuse them fed a parrot with consecrated hosts. Orange, who kept away with some anxiety from this mad exhibition of democratic Calvinism, with which he could not be in sympathy, but who secretly favoured the Lutherans, even though he still took part in Catholic worship, prudently kept in the background. Antwerp therefore remained quiet so long as he remained there; it was only when he went to Brussels on August 19th for a meeting of the Knights of the Golden Fleece, that the same horrors took place in Antwerp as had occurred elsewhere.¹

¹ J. KAUFMANN (Über die Anfänge des Bundes der Aderligen und des Bildersturmes, Bonn, 1889, 36 *seq.*) tries to prove that an assembly held at Antwerp in July, 1566, had decided upon the war against images, but that its execution was left to the people. RACHFAHL (II., 2, 713; cf. App. n. 74) rejects this view as not in accordance with the sources, but at the same time he quite

In all the large cities not a church, or chapel, or convent or hospital remained unharmed. The damage done to the cathedral, the most beautiful and sumptuous church in the country, was estimated at 400,000 gold florins. By August 27th the number of churches and convents devastated in Flanders alone was 400. In the greater part of the country Catholic worship had completely come to an end, the only provinces that were spared being Namur, Artois, Hainault and Luxemburg.¹

The news of these atrocities and sacrileges reached Rome long before the court of Spain. It confirmed Pius V. in his absolutely correct idea, shared by all who knew the true facts of the case, that the only efficacious remedy for the conflagration that had broken out in the Low Countries was the personal appearance of the Spanish king in the disturbed provinces.

He had scarcely been elected when he expressed this view

definitely makes it appear that " they were the fruits of the preaching against idolatry, which at that time was reaching its height, and thus the war against images was the result of Calvinism, and of the spirit which the teaching of the Geneva reformer planted with irresistible force in the hearts of his followers. It was not the result of a decision which had long been taken and was of universal application, but the idea was, as it were, in the air. The idea had been played with for a long time, but it was only at the meeting at St. Trond that it had been again discussed. Then it began to be put into practice seriously."

¹ See PIRENNE, III., 570 *seqq.* ; BLOK, III., 58 *seq.* ; RACHFAHL, II., 2, 709 ; KRONEN, Maria's Heerlijkheid in Nederland, VII., Amsterdam 1911, 78 *seq.* See also the full bibliography collected by PIOT in the notes to *Renom de France*, I., 131 *seq.* The sacrilege of the Count of Culemburg is attested by several witnesses (see *Corresp. de Philippe II.*, I., 471, 480) ; it is not therefore just to say with RACHFAHL (II., 2, 716) that the co-operation of individual members of the league of the nobles is not proved. A list of the churches and the incalculable treasures of art destroyed in RATHBERGER, *Annalen der niederlandischen Malerei*, Gotha, 1844, 196 *seqq.* In *Allgem. Zeitung*, 1900, Beil. n. 161 Weizsäcker brings out the loss inflicted on our knowledge of the beginnings of the art of Jan van Eyck,

to Philip II. in a letter of February 21st, 1566, and he repeated the same thing even more strongly to Requesens in March.¹ In April, 1566, the distinguished Archbishop of Sorrento, Stefano Pavesi, a Dominican, was sent to the Low Countries, in order to obtain definite tidings of the state of religious affairs there.² In accordance with his habitual temporizing and hesitation, Philip II. at first tried to prevent this mission, but gave way when it was decided in Rome to make it as unobtrusive as possible. Pavesi's prudence and caution satisfied the king. The archbishop gathered exact details of the religious state of affairs not only from the regent and her adviser, Viglius, but also from Morillon, the vicar-general of Granvelle, the theologians of Louvain, the bishops, and other leading ecclesiastics. He even had a conversation with Orange, which appeared to be quite satisfactory, because at that time that political trickster was still wearing his mask of Catholicism. While Pavesi was at Brussels (May 21st to June 16th) the followers of the new doctrines kept very quiet. The regent tried to prove to the envoy that under the circumstances she had done all that was possible for the cause of religion.³ Pavesi, however, was under no illusions as to the gravity of the situation, and from May onwards Pius V.,

¹ See *Corresp. dipl.*, I., 131, 157.

² The credentials of Pavesi to the regent, of Mar. 18, 1566, in LADERCHI, 1566, n. 465. Similar briefs to Charles of Lorraine and many bishops, in the original minutes, in the British Museum Addit. 26865. At first Pavesi was to have gone to Maximilian II.; see App. n. 68, Vol. XVII. the *briefs of March 1 and 21, 1566. The nuncio did not start till April. For his mission cf. *Corresp. de Philippe II.*, I., 422 n.; *Corresp. de Granvelle*, éd. POULLET, I., 245 n.; HOLZWARH, I., 328 *seq.*, 459; CAUCHIE, *Sources manuscrites de l'hist. belge à Rome*, Brussels, 1892, 43 *seq.*; BROM, *Archivalia*, I., 197, 827; RACHFAHL, II., 2, 630 *seq.*; *Corresp. dipl.*, I., 149, 156, 189, 194, 229, 246, 263 *seq.*, 280, 290, 302, 369; DENGEL, V., 94. For Pavesi see CAPECE, 30 *seq.* and MALDACCA, *Storia di Sorrento*, II., 188. In a *letter from Delfino to Maximilian II., Pavesi is praised as "huomo molto dotto e di buona vita." State Archives, Vienna, Hofkorresp., 6.

³ See RACHFAHL, II., 2, 630 *seq.*

through the nuncio in Spain, urged Philip to undertake the journey to the Netherlands,¹ and in every audience impressed upon Granvelle the necessity of that step.² Fired by the report from Pavesi, and the news he had received from other sources,³ in a conversation with Requesens in July, he declared in the strongest words and with all possible emphasis that the situation was far more dangerous than they imagined in Madrid, and that the delay in the king's departure would have the worst possible consequences for religion.⁴ On July 12th Pius V. wrote a strong letter to the king himself,⁵ and on August 3rd he wrote to the nuncio in Spain that Philip II. would one day have to render an account for the loss of so many souls, since nothing but his personal presence would be of any avail.⁶

By way of reply to this, Requesens was ordered on August 12th, 1566, to explain to the Pope that his master felt himself quite free from blame, that as far as the journey was concerned His Majesty's intentions coincided with the wishes of the Pope, but that if a real success was to be obtained, the king must go there with an army, not only for the protection of his person, but also in order that he might show a strong front before the Netherland insurgents, and their friends in France, Germany and England. Such an armed expedition required time, but above all there was the lack of the necessary funds, which the Pope could supply by granting ecclesiastical subsidies. As soon as all the necessary preparations had been made—so Philip told Requesens to assure the Pope most definitely—His Majesty would start for the Low Countries

¹ See *Corresp. dipl.*, I., 233.

² See *Corresp. de Granvelle*, éd. POULLET, I., 318.

³ See LADERCHI, 1566, n. 470.

⁴ See *Corresp. dipl.*, I., 279 *seq.*

⁵ In LADERCHI, 1566, n. 471. *Cf.* *Corresp. dipl.*, I., 279 n. for the date. From a comparison with the *briefs of Pius V. in the Papal Secret Archives, Arm. 44, t. 12, n. 96, it appears that in Laderchi after "illic" the words "in extremo discrimine versatur. Sed si religio catholica, etc.," have been omitted. Further instead of "perpressa" we find "oppressa."

⁶ *Corresp. dipl.*, I., 299. *Cf.* also BROM, *Archivalia*, I., 197.

without any thought of the dangers which might threaten him. The Spanish king expressed himself in the same sense to Castagna, who for his part urged him on in every way and reminded him of the proverb: "While they were taking counsel in Rome, Saguntum fell," but he could learn nothing as to the date of the king's departure.¹

There can be no possible doubt that Philip II. fell into a fatal error with regard to the Netherlands in not looking upon his personal presence there with the same urgency as did the Pope, who would have had him give this matter precedence over all others. After the news came of the iconoclastic horrors that had taken place, Pius V. could consider himself justified in declaring that he had sent his exhortations and his timely warning to no purpose.² While he was still feeling the effects of the terrible news he made up his mind to the mission of Pietro Camaiani to Spain, which occasioned such a stir.

Camaiani was instructed once more to urge the king to make the journey, and to say that the sending of an army, no matter how large, would be of no avail without the personal presence of the king. In the instructions for the nuncio it is stated that Philip II. was responsible for all the evil consequences that would result from any further delay, since not only would the Low Countries be lost to the Church and to Spain, but there would be even worse effects upon the state of religion in France and England.³

The quarrel which ensued between Philip II. and Pius V. was not caused only by the brusque behaviour of Camaiani, but, altogether apart from other disagreements between Rome and Spain, by the fact that the king was deeply hurt by the doubts expressed by the Pope as to the insincerity of his intentions to undertake the journey.⁴ This is proved from the emphatic way in which the king assured the Pope of his readiness to go in person to the Low Countries. The truth

¹ See *Corresp. dipl.*, I., 301, 318 *seq.*

² See LADERCHI, 1566, n. 474.] 28

³ See *Corresp. dipl.*, I., 357 *seq.*

⁴ See RACHFAHL, II., 2, 839.

was that he had no more idea of setting out than he had of paying any attention to the Pope's exhortations that he should once more try the effect of gentle methods with the Netherlanders before he had recourse to armed force. In December, 1566, a year full of great events, Philip came to the determination that Alba must wipe out the crimes of high treason against God and the king in the Netherlands with blood and iron, though he still kept up the pretence that he intended to go there himself and show mercy, and that Alba was merely being sent beforehand to prepare for the coming of the king.¹ On January 11th, 1567, Requesens received instructions to communicate the king's intentions in this sense officially to the Pope.²

In the meantime a fear had grown up in Rome that the Spanish council only intended to subdue the Low Countries politically, and that for the time being the religious changes would be tolerated. Pius V. made a strong protest against any such mode of procedure,³ pointing out the consequences which had followed upon similar action by Charles V. in Germany. The Pope who, from the first, had only had the religious aspect of the disturbances in the Netherlands in view, was of the opinion that this should take precedence of every other consideration, that the strongest measures must be taken, and that this must be done by the king in person. Nobody else could take his place since in such undertakings it often happened that the most important decisions had to be made at a moment's notice, and since the sovereign himself would have to be on the spot, in order to grant pardon or inflict punishment, there was nothing to be gained by sending a representative beforehand, because in that case people would no longer believe that the king was coming, and the boldness of the insurgents would be only increased.

The Pope clearly saw what an important effect a victory of the religious innovators would have upon the course of affairs in France, England and Germany. For this reason he never

¹ Cf. *ibid.*

² See *Corresp. dipl.*, II., 16.

³ Cf. *ibid.*, 25 *seq.*, 52 *seq.*

tired of urging Philip to go in person and at once to the threatened provinces, and above all, in order that he might crush the heretical movement, and restore Catholic worship everywhere. By so doing he would best serve the political interests of the Spanish rule in the Low Countries, since it was the religious changes which fed the flames of the rebellion.¹

Philip replied that this was his view as well. He entirely rejected all thought of tolerating Calvinism, but at the same time he did not wish the religious question to be set in the first place in the same way as did the Pope. He also remained firm in his intention to sending Alba before him. He therefore announced that his own journey to the Low Countries was decided upon, though he still evaded any definite naming of a date.² Thus the whole of May, 1567, passed by, and June found the king still in Spain, in spite of further pressure from the Pope in a brief of May 17th, 1567. The preparations for his journey were still going on. On June 23rd Philip II. wrote to Granvelle in Rome that people there who did not believe in his journey would soon see that they were wrong, in spite of the reports which had so maliciously been spread about. In July a courier left Madrid for Rome to announce the immediate departure of the king. When the nuncio asked whether he should remain at Madrid or accompany the king to the Low Countries, Philip replied that he would be very pleased to have him in his company.³ On July 15th the king renewed the orders to hasten the preparations for his departure, and six days later, in publishing the decrees of the Cortes, he declared that the conduct of the Netherlanders obliged him to go to that country.⁴

Nevertheless those people were right who from the first had

¹ See *ibid.* 47.

² Cf. *supra* p. 14.

³ Cf. GACHARD, *Corresp. de Philippe II.*, I., cliv, 550, 564, and *Bibl. de Madrid*, 100 *seq.*; HOLZWARTH, II., I, 31 *seq.* In Holzwarth there is also an explanation of the reasons why Philip II. did not wish to go to the Low Countries. Cf. on this subject *Corresp. dipl.*, II., lv. *seq.*

⁴ See RANKE, *Hist.-biogr. Studien*, 522.

doubted whether Philip would really go in person to the Low Countries. Even Castagna had to report on August 11th, 1567, that no one in Madrid now counted any longer on the king's journey, for which nevertheless all the preparations had been made down to the smallest detail. At the beginning of September the nuncio expressed to the king, though with all due respect, his great disappointment at this change of intention, and spoke of the sorrow felt by the Pope, and the unfavourable impression which would be made upon the world. On September 20th there came an official notification that the journey had been put off until the following spring, and instructions were sent by courier to Requesens to explain to the Pope the reasons which had led to this decision. Assurances were given in Madrid that the king adhered to his purpose of undertaking the journey, and Cardinal Espinosa told the nuncio that in the following March nothing but his death or the end of the world would prevent His Majesty from going.¹

The Pope who, even in August, 1567, had prayed daily at mass for the successful journey of the king, and had ordered the whole clergy of Rome to pray for the same purpose,² was cut to the heart by the abandonment of the expedition, in which he saw the only chance of saving the Low Countries, as well as the hope of an improvement in the position of the Catholic cause in France and England. He said quite openly to Requesens that the king, who had written to him with his own hand, had deceived him; face to face with the threat to religion the king ought to have put every other consideration on one side, because in the end it is God who guides all things. Requesens and Granvelle excused the king as best they could,

¹ See the reports of Castagna in GACHARD, *Bibl. de Madrid* 100-105 and *Corresp. dipl.*, II., 177 *seq.*, 184 *seq.*, 189 *seq.*, 203 *seq.*, 205 *seq.*

² See the *report of Arco of August 23, 1567, State Archives, Vienna. On August 2, Bonelli had written in cypher to Castagna that it was the wish of Pius V. that Philip should start as soon as possible, and he once again set forth the reasons. *Corresp. dipl.*, II., 175 *seq.*

but the Pope remained very angry.¹ On July 15th, on the strength of the king's promised action² in the Low Countries, he had granted him the so-called *excusado*.³ Was he not therefore justified in thinking that Philip's promises had only been made in order to wring this important concession from him?⁴ The friends of Spain in the Curia might say what they liked, but Pius V. continued to believe that he had been cheated by Philip. Nothing but Alba's strong action in the Low Countries was able to pacify him, and gave him cause to hope that Catholic interests had not been ruined by the putting off of the king's journey.⁵

Pius V. clearly recognized what a mistake Philip had made, first in postponing, and then in definitely giving up his personal appearance in the Low Countries, which was so dreaded by the adherents of the new religion,⁶ but he quite failed to see that the mission of Alba was a far worse one. The Duke, who was heart and soul a Spaniard, and had not the least understanding of foreign susceptibilities, was especially hated in the Low Countries, so much so that Philip II. himself at one time thought of revoking his appointment. If in the end he did not do so, this was to a great extent due to the party at court

¹ See the *reports of Arco of Sept. 6, 13, and 20, 1567, State Archives, Vienna, and the letter of Granvelle of Sept. 16, 1567, Corresp. de Philippe II., I., 577. Cf. Corresp. dipl., II., 198.

² The bull in Corresp. dipl., II., 524 seq. PHILIPPSON, 310, must therefore be amended, as must GAMS, III., 2, 519.

³ The "excusado" was an impost, by which in every parish the king received from every third house the tithe which otherwise those houses would have paid to the Church, and from which payment to the Church they were then held exempt (*excusado*). Cf. DESDEVICES DU DEZERT, L'Espagne de l'ancien régime: Les institutions, Paris, 1899, 370.

⁴ In 1566 Requesens was of opinion that the "excusado valdria un Peru" (Colecc. de decum. inéd., XCVII., 376). Cf. the report of Dietrichstein in KOCH, *Quellen zur Gesch. Maximilians II.*, Leipsic, 1857, 200.

⁵ See Corresp. dipl., II., lix seq., 191, 198, 200 seq., 204 seq., 212, 216 seq., 253. Cf. Corresp. de Philippe II., I., 580 seq.

⁶ See Corresp. dipl., II., xlviii.

that was opposed to Alba, and wanted to have him as far away as possible. At that time Ruy Gomez exercised a great influence over Philip II., a thing that made itself felt in Rome as well as in the attitude taken up by Cardinal Pacheco.¹

While the army of Alba was assembling in upper Italy, Pius V. expressed a wish that on their march towards the Low Countries they should make an attack on Geneva, the head-quarters of Calvinism, but Philip II. refused to make this side attack ;² nor would he hear of a second proposal made by the Pope. Pius wished to send with Alba a plenipotentiary to look after ecclesiastical matters,³ or else to send a nuncio to the Netherlands.⁴ Neither one plan nor the other was approved by the king, who did not wish for any interference from Rome in his own plans, which were aimed not only at the punishment of the heretics but also at the destruction of the tiresome privileges of the Low Countries, and at making that country into a Spanish dependency. The abolition of privileges, the substitution of royal officials for the civic authorities, the building of fortresses at Antwerp, Valenciennes, Flushing, Amsterdam and Maestricht, the confiscation of property, the imposition of taxes without the consent of the states, such was the programme which Philip, as far back as May 31st, 1567, had sketched out for the regent.⁵ Alba was the very man to carry it into effect.

In August, 1567, Alba appeared with the picked troops of his army in the Low Countries, where, after the attack on the images, the Catholic nobles, realizing their mistake, had withdrawn from the compromise, and where, in many of the cities,

¹ See *ibid.* xlvii. *seq.*

² Cf. CRAMER, I., 165 *seq.*; II., 208 *seq.* Later exhortations to an attack on Geneva on the part of Pius V. were equally unsuccessful. See *ibid.* II., 219 *seq.*, 223.

³ See the *report of Arco of July 19, 1567, State Archives, Vienna.

⁴ See *ibid.* the *report of Arco of August 23, 1567: the nuncio, with the powers of a legate, must discharge all his business gratuitously.

⁵ GACHARD, *Corresp. de Philippe II.*, I., 542.

a reaction against the religious innovators had set in.¹ It is true that even after the suppression of the Calvinist revolt which had broken out at the beginning of 1567, the peace of the country left a good deal to be desired, but a wise policy would have been content with the punishment of the ring-leaders, the granting of pardon to those who had been led astray, and an attempt to rally the elements that were loyal to the king. That was why Pius V. so insistently urged Philip to go there in person, and, before he had recourse to armed force, to make one more attempt to win back the offenders by kindness to a better frame of mind. Alba, on the contrary, was sent with the object, not only of suppressing the religious innovations, but also of introducing a system of government which would destroy political liberty, and was bound to make everybody, even the Catholics who remained loyal to the king, enemies of Spain. Alba's soldiers, who behaved as if in a conquered country, completed the work of driving the people to desperation, and filling them with hatred of Spain. At first, it is true, every other consideration gave way to terror of the captain-general of the Spanish king, and the regent took her departure at the end of 1567. But the Duke surpassed the worst expectations; on the imprisonment of Egmont and Hoorn there followed the setting up of an extraordinary tribunal, the "council of blood," and the opening of legal proceedings against Orange and his confederates who had fled to Germany and openly professed Lutheranism; in February, 1568, there were wholesale executions and confiscations; thousands of people took to flight.² Orange and his brother took up arms in defence of their cause, relying upon the help of the Lutheran princes of Germany, the leaders of the French Huguenots, and the Queen of England, with whom they had been in communication for a long time past. Alba retaliated on June 5th, 1568, by the execution of Counts Egmont and Hoorn. He then took the field against the rebels. He defeated Louis of Nassau on July 21st at Jemgum

¹ See RACHFAHL, II., 2, 769 *seq.*, 801 *seq.*

² See PIRENNE, IV., 10 *seq.*

on the lower Ems, and then turned against William of Orange, who in September, as the champion of "the liberty of his country" made an attempt to force his way with an army from Trêves along the Meuse into the Low Countries, but Alba manœuvred so skilfully that the enemy was forced to retreat in wild disorder.¹ Orange fled to Dillenburg, and only the *gueux* of the sea-coasts remained under arms. Alba's triumph seemed to be complete; even Elizabeth of England congratulated Philip II. on his victory over the rebels.² Alba reported to Madrid that peace reigned everywhere, but he nevertheless continued his campaign of terror and bloodshed, as though it were his purpose to infuriate even the loyal supporters of the king and the old religion. He set himself definitely "à tout réduire au pied d'Espagne."³ By imposing taxes that were both exorbitant and unjust in form and kind,⁴ he made even the Catholics his enemies, who were forced to realize by the confiscations of their property that "care for souls did not come into the matter at all."⁵ When some of the Jesuits protested against the imposition of the tithe as a manifest injustice, Alba wanted to banish them all from the Low Countries.⁶ He treated the bishops arrogantly when they took up the cause of the poor people.⁷ His whole system of government, a military dictatorship, weighed equally heavily upon all; so far from pacifying the country, he only exasperated it more and more.

It was of great importance to the Spanish government that the Roman court should see in the disturbances in the Nether-

¹ Cf. BOR, *Lodewijk v. Nassau*, 160 *seq.*; FRANZ, *Ostfriesland und die Niederlande*, Emden, 1875, 24 *seq.*; TEUBNER, *Der Feldzug Wilhelms von Oranien gegen Alba im Herbst 1568*, Halle, 1892.

² See BLOK, III., 96.

³ Morillon to Granvelle, April 28, 1572, *Corresp. de Granvelle*, éd. PIOT, IV., 207.

⁴ See PIRENNE, IV., 28 *seq.*; BLOK, III., 101 *seq.*

⁵ *Corresp. de Granvelle*, éd. PIOT, IV., 292.

⁶ See *ibid.* 155, 157.

⁷ See PIRENNE, IV., 9.

lands nothing but a demonstration on the part of the Calvinists. It was easy for it to promote this idea in Rome as it was extremely difficult to form a just appreciation abroad of the complicated state of affairs in the Netherlands, or to realize the political and national elements which from the first had exercised a decisive influence upon the whole movement. Even Alba's actions in the Low Countries were set forth by the Spanish ambassador in Rome in such a way as to make it appear that religious considerations were of greater weight than political ones. In this way the Spaniards hoped that the Pope would give his approval to yet further ecclesiastical imposts, a thing that they had sought in vain so far, for so praiseworthy a purpose as the destruction of the Calvinists.¹

Since Philip II. had refused the appointment of a nuncio for the Low Countries, Pius V., except for private information, could only rely upon the reports of the Spanish government; Requesens, as well as Zuñiga after him, kept him well supplied in this respect. Events in the Low Countries were treated by the Spaniards with so much secrecy that the wildest rumours were current.² The words of the official representatives of Philip II. were therefore listened to all the more eagerly in Rome, and their descriptions were so convincing that, in forming his judgment upon affairs in the Netherlands, Pius V. found himself entirely under the influence of Spanish ideas, and looked upon the expedition of Alba as a kind of crusade against the heretics, which would have the effect of keeping their co-religionists in France and Germany in check.³ More-

¹ See Corresp. dipl., II., 437.

² Thus a rumour was spread of a decree of Philip II., drawn up on the authority of the Spanish Inquisition, and condemning to death the greater part of the Netherlanders. PRESCOTT, Philip II., II. (1867), 105 had already expressed doubts as to this statement, which was taken without scruple from de Thou and Meier. More recently BLOK, in *Bijdragen van vaderlandsche Geschiedenis*, 4th series, VI., 3, has justly pronounced against the genuineness of this decree.

³ Cf. especially the report of Zuñiga to Philip II. from Rome on July 21, 1568, Corresp. dipl., II., 414.

over, from the reports of Johann Straetmann, a Dominican who was living in Brussels, and, who, on February 22nd, 1568, sent horrible particulars of the murder of twenty-five Catholic priests which had been committed by the Calvinists near Ypres, Pius V. was driven to the conclusion that it was a case of existence or non-existence for the Catholics in the Low Countries.¹

Alba's report to the Pope of the execution of Egmont and Hoorn was explained by Zuñiga and Pacheco in such a way that Pius V. could not but give it his entire approval.² He had no suspicions of the injustice of the punishment of Egmont ; in fact the sentence of death on the two counts, as reported to him by Alba, made it appear that they had been convicted of rebellion and high treason, in having supported the heretics and joined in the conspiracy of Orange. The Pope was further confirmed in this view, that they had justly paid the penalty of their crimes, by the fact that a sovereign who was so much under suspicion in religious matters as Maximilian II. disapproved of Alba's action.³ When, after this, Louis of Nassau, in alliance with the sea *gucux*, and William of Orange, who had now openly left the Church, took the field with his army of German Lutherans, French Huguenots, and Netherland Calvinists, Pius feared, in the event of Alba's forces being defeated, a butchery of the Catholics in the Low Countries. At their first appearance, indeed, the savage followers of Louis of Nassau had begun to sack the churches and kill the priests. News of these events, and of the composition of the army of Orange were bound to confirm the conviction of Pius V. that Alba was above all fighting against the enemies of God and the Church, and only secondarily against the rebels against his king, and that he was therefore fighting the

¹ See LADERCHI, 1568, n. 173. For the correspondence of Straetmann with Cardinal Bonelli see *Anal. p. s. a l'hist. ecclés. de la Belgique*, XXV. (1895), 55 *seq.*

² See *Corresp. dipl.*, II., 402, 403 *seq.* ; Legaz. di Serristori, 452.

³ See *Corresp. dipl.*, II., 414 *seq.* ; 498 ; Legaz. di Serristori, 452.

battles of Our Lord for the restoration of the Catholic religion.¹

The Pope followed the course of events with an anxiety that can easily be understood. In the evening of August 4th, 1568, Alba announced his victory over Louis of Nassau. The Pope ordered fire-works and processions,² to thank God and to implore His continued help, since the Church was still threatened with grave danger from Orange, whose troops were everywhere sacking churches and convents. On August 29th Pius made the pilgrimage to the Seven Churches in supplication for the protection of religion in the Low Countries.³ His anxiety was increased when news came that the German and French Protestants were helping Orange.⁴ On October 29th he repeated this pilgrimage to the Seven Churches, and prayed for Alba's success.⁵ On November 18th the faithful were summoned, by the publication of a jubilee, to pray for the destruction of the enemies of the Church in France and Flanders.⁶ At length December 7th set the Pope free from his great anxieties; Alba had put Orange to flight; the joy in Rome was all the greater as earlier rumours of the victory

¹ In the briefs to Alba (LADERCHI, 1568, n. 179; BROGNOLI, I., 266) the matter is stated very clearly.


² See, besides Firmanus, *Diarium* in BONANNI, I., 301, the *report of Arco of August 7, 1568, State Archives, Vienna, the letter of Zuñiga of August 13, 1568, in *Corresp. dipl.*, II., 437, and the *report of B. Pia from Rome on August 14, 1568 (prayers ordered everywhere in thanksgiving for "buoni successi di Fiandra contra Ugonotti) Gonzaga Archives, Mantua. The report of Alba to Pius V. on July 25, and the briefs of congratulation from the Pope, dated August 7 and 26, 1568, in LADERCHI, 1568, n. 178-179.

³ *Report of B. Pia of August 30, 1568. Gonzaga Archives, Mantua.

⁴ See *Corresp. dipl.* II., 457.

⁵ See FIRMANUS, **Diarium* in *Miscell.*, Arm. XII., 31, Papal Secret Archives. For the great anxiety of Pius V. as to the course of events in the Low Countries, see *report of B. Pia of November 6, 1568, Gonzaga Archives, Mantua.

⁶ See FIRMANUS, **Diarium*, *loc. cit.*



had not been confirmed.¹ In the following year the Duke was honoured with the bestowal of the blessed hat and sword, while his wife received the Golden Rose.²

After Alba's victory, Pius V. as well as many other persons had urged the granting of a general amnesty. He himself gave the necessary faculties to cut short all the formalities which might have delayed the re-admission to the Church of the Protestants who had repented.³ Philip II. also recognized the need for an amnesty, but with his customary dilatoriness it was only on November 16th, 1569, that he signed the document, which even then included several limitations. Alba still withheld the publication of this decree and of the Papal bull until July, 1570!⁴ He was not the man to show mercy.⁵

The assistance which the Duke afforded in carrying into effect the complete organization of the new dioceses helped to maintain the good opinion of Alba which was held in Rome. In this matter the Pope's wishes were in full accordance with those of the Spanish governor. In July, 1564, Philip II. had yielded to the opposition so far as to give up the erection of a bishopric at Antwerp, and the incorporation of the abbeys of

¹ See *ibid.* the *report of B. Pia of December 8, 1568, according to which Alba announced his victory in a letter of November 25, 1568. Pia says: "The Pope is full of joy, and does nothing but pray and make others pray to God" (Gonzaga Archives, Mantua). See also the brief to Alba of December 12, 1568, in *Documentos del Archivo Alba*, Madrid, 1891, 183 *seq.*

² With LADERCHI, 1569, n. 204, and BROGNOLI, I., 271, *cf.* also FIRMANUS, *Diarium, *loc. cit.* p. 78b, Papal Secret Archives, the *Avviso di Roma of March 21, 1569, Urb. 1041, p. 38, Vatican Library, and an *Avviso di Roma of March 26, 1569, in the State Archives, Vienna.

³ *Cf.* the *report of Cusano of February 19, 1569, State Archives, Vienna.

⁴ See GACHARD, *Corresp. de Philippe II.*, II., 68, 680; HOLZWARTH, II., I, 398 *seq.*; *Renom de France*, I., 392 *seq.* *Cf.* ALBERDINGK THIJM, in *Histor. Jahrb.*, VII., 284 *seq.* and GOSSART, *L'établissement du régime espagnol dans les Pays-Bas*, Brussels, 1905, 293.

⁵ *Cf.* his letter to Pius V. in *Corresp. dipl.*, III., 73 n.1.

Brabant, in consideration of the payment of a fixed and permanent revenue. The Holy See had never given its consent to this forced agreement, but the matter had been put on one side in consequence of the disturbances which had afterwards broken out. After the "restoration of order" this matter had to be definitely settled with Alba's help. Acting in agreement with Philip II. the Duke decided outwardly to support in Rome the petitions of the states of Brabant for the confirmation of the former agreement, but in secret he advised the Pope to the opposite effect.¹ Alba's secretary, Hernando Delgadillo, was entrusted with this task in October, 1568, and he met with all the less difficulty from Pius V. because the Pope, when he was a Cardinal, had belonged to the commission for the formation of the new dioceses, and was persuaded that it was necessary to carry into effect completely the arrangements which had then been made. Further delay occurred, however, when Alba, in consequence of the excitement caused by the taxes which he wished to levy, withheld for a time the bulls concerning the bishoprics. It was only after he had obtained the consent of the provincial states to the tenth and the twentieth, that he gave his *placet* to the bulls. The difficulties which still arose were of a secondary importance, and were overcome. At last, in December, 1570, the following arrangement was arrived at: the incorporation of the abbeys and the installation of the bishops was carried out in those cities where this had not hitherto been done.²

Great care had been taken in the choice of the new bishops. Their orthodoxy and manner of life left nothing to be desired, and all of them were ready to carry out the reform decrees of the Council of Trent. But most of them were men of learning rather than of action. Intimidated by the difficult situation in which they found themselves they did not dare to proceed

¹ See MARX, *Studien*, 405.

² See GACHARD, *Corresp. de Philippe II.*, II., 40 *seq.*, 50, 65, 73, 79, 84, 105 *seq.*, 122, 133, 150, 163, *seq.*; BROM, *Archivalia*, I., 721 *seq.*

with all the resoluteness that was called for,¹ so that on July 2nd, 1571, Pius V. addressed to them a letter of warning.² The only exception was Lindanus, who had been labouring with great zeal as Bishop of Ruremonde since 1569,³ but he was not in a position to fill the gap left by the departure of Granvelle, the natural leader of the Netherland episcopate. The despotic government of Alba, too, was harmful to the religious activity and reforming zeal of the bishops; the hatred felt for the Spanish government was also aimed at them, for men saw in them the instruments of Philip II. and the Duke.⁴ Yet it was the bishops especially who courageously urged Alba to proceed with greater leniency. The iron Duke paid no attention to their words, and said that the bishops understood nothing about the matter.

In ecclesiastical matters as well as political Alba was the uncompromising supporter of the system of Philip II., which made ecclesiastics the employés of the state rather than the servants of the Church. He made ruthless use of the *placet* for Papal bulls without paying any attention to the fact that he was thus putting obstacles in the way of the salutary efforts of Pius V. to reform the clergy of the Netherlands.⁵ A characteristic instance of Alba's cesaropapistical ideas was the demand which he made in 1570 that a member of the grand council should assist as royal commissary at the discussions of the first provincial synod held at Malines.⁶ Alba's open

¹ See PIRENNE, IV., 483; HOLZWARTH (II., I., 536 *seqq.*) gives minute particulars of each of the bishops and their reforming activity.

² See LADERCHI, 1571, n. 34. An earlier letter, of July 5, 1568, calling for reform, in GOUBAU 91 *seq.*

³ See A. HAVENSUS, *Vita Lindani*, Cologne, 1609; FOPPENS, *Bibl. Belgica*, I., 410 *seq.*; *Annuaire de l'univ. de Louvain*, 1871; *Katholik*, 1871, I., 702 *seq.*; II., 89 *seqq.*, 442 *seqq.*, 659 *seqq.*

⁴ See PIRENNE, IV., 33, 484.

⁵ See HOLZWARTH, II., I, 368.

⁶ Cf. DE RAM, *Synodicon Belg.*, I., Malines, 1828; HOLZWARTH, II., I, 368 *seqq.* When the Archbishop of Trêves wished to make a visitation of the archidiaconal district of Longuyon in 1570,

hostility for the Jesuits came from the same cesaropapistical system,¹ as did a decree of Philip II. in 1571, which inflicted the penalty of banishment for the publication of Papal bulls without the permission of the governor.²

Alba and his master were blind, not only to the injuries which their cesaropapalism was inflicting on the Catholic cause, but also to the fact that their system of government by violence was the best weapon they could put into the hands of Orange and all rebels. On April 1st, 1572, the sea *gueux*, who were in close touch with Orange, succeeded in obtaining an important base of operations, by the capture of the strong city of Brielle in south Holland. In accordance with true Calvinist principles, the churches of Brielle were sacked, and the priests murdered. The sea *gueux* committed similar crimes wherever they could.³

Nothing but Alba's armed forces afforded any protection against such atrocities. Without heeding the usurpations which he and his master allowed themselves in ecclesiastical matters, Pius V. found himself forced by stern necessity to rely upon Spanish arms. The ecclesiastical levy granted to Philip II. in May, 1571, was expressly given on account of the king's expenses for the maintenance of the Catholic religion in the Low Countries and "in other places"⁴ an expression which referred to France and England.

a representative of Alba intervened at a meeting of the visitation commission; see HEYDINGER, *Archidiaconatus tit. S. Agathes in Longuiono descriptio*, Trêves, 1884.

¹ See *Imag. primi saec. Soc. Iesu*, Antwerp, 1640, 745; PIRENNE, IV., 496. Cf. CAPPELLETTI, *I Gesuiti e Venezia*, Venice, 1873, 40. Alba was confirmed in this dislike by his confessor; see *Corresp. de Granvelle*, éd. PIOT, IV., 604.

² See VAN ESPEN, *Opera Omnia Canonica*, VI., 86.

³ See ALTMAYER, *Les Gueux de mer et la prise de la Brielle*, Brussels, 1863; HOLZWARTH, II., 1, 497, 505 *seq.*; JANSSEN-PASTOR, IV., 15-16, 337; GAUDENTIUS, 152; *Corresp. de Granvelle*, éd. PIOT, IV., 603.

⁴ See LADERCHI, 1571, n. 31 (in place of May 11 read May 21).

CHAPTER IV.

PIUS V. AND THE CIVIL AND RELIGIOUS WARS IN FRANCE.— THE BEGINNINGS OF THE CATHOLIC REACTION IN FRANCE.

PIUS V. saw the salvation of France in opposing heresy with the extremity of rigour, in the removal of the soil which nourished it by the reform of ecclesiastical abuses, and in giving renewed vigour to the Catholics. The objects of Catherine de' Medici were exactly the reverse. Indifferent herself to the religion which she professed, she endeavoured, according to her wont, to play off, one against the other, the interests of the bitterly opposed parties, and to use them both in turn in order to secure her own rule and that of her son, Charles IX.¹

Such a policy was bound to be most displeasing to a Pope like Pius V. who was all on fire with zeal for the preservation of the Catholic religion. His point of view appears clearly and concisely in the instructions which he drew up for the new nuncio to France, Count Michele della Torre, Bishop of Ceneda, on April 6th, 1566. In these he gives expression in heartfelt words to his anxiety concerning the turn of events in France. The nuncio must strongly urge the king and his mother to put aside all human considerations in order to safeguard the purity of their subjects' faith. He was especially charged to urge the publication and enforcement of the decrees of Trent, and to press for the removal of the scandal being given by Cardinal Odet de Châtillon, who had been deposed on account of heresy, but who, although he was married, still wore the purple. In doing this the Pope told him to intimate that he would not confer the dignity of Cardinal on any French prelate until this demand was satisfied. Della Torre was

¹ See BAUMGARTEN, Bartholomäusnacht, 25, and v. BEZOLD in *Histor.-Zeitschrift*, XLVII., 561 seq. Cf. Vol. XVI. of this work, p. 203.

further instructed to remind the king that before he could exercise his right of patronage in Provence and Brittany he must ask for a fresh privilege from the Holy See, and give up the abuses in the granting of offices and ecclesiastical benefices.¹ Special instructions contained injunctions with regard to Avignon, where the legate, Cardinal Bourbon, left a good deal to be desired in the matter of zeal in preventing the introduction of heresy; if things were not improved there, the nuncio must give the king to understand that the Pope would have to deprive the Cardinal of his legation.²

There is no doubt that the appointment of della Torre as nuncio in France was principally determined by the fact that he had already occupied that position under Paul III. and at the beginning of the reign of Julius III.,³ and was

¹ *Instruzione per il nuntio di Francia (the Bishop of Ceneda) in *Varia Polit.*, 81 (now 82), 319 *seq.*, p. 322, and again p. 510-513, Papal Secret Archives. Cf. CATENA, 58 *seq.* and BROGNOLI, II., 27 *seq.* The controversy about the right of nomination in Brittany was not yet settled in 1571; see the *report of A. Zibramonti from Rome, September 29, 1571. Gonzaga Archives, Mantua. Arco announces the appointment of a new nuncio in France as early as his *report of January 19, 1566. State Archives, Vienna; this took place on March 25, 1566; see BIAUDET, 119.

² See in *Varia Polit.*, 81 (now 82) in the Papal Secret Archives, p. 322b-327 and again p. 514-518; *Instruzione per il medesimo nuntio intorno alle cose d'Avignone. The danger was stated to be especially due to the "principato d'Orangeo" which was surrounded by the Papal territory. Moreover, the attention of Cardinals Bourbon and Armagnac was to be called to the fact that "alcuni ministri loro" favoured the heretics, special cases being mentioned. From his report of July 24, 1566, in *Mél. d'archéol.*, XXII., 116 *seq.*, it appears that Cardinal Armagnac, as co-legate with Bourbon, tried to meet the Pope's complaints. For Armagnac cf. *Revue des quest. hist.*, XVI., 566 *seq.* His letters in *Revue hist.*, II., 529 *seqq.*

³ See Vol. XIII. of this work, p. 85. Cf. the *brief to Charles IX. of March 25, 1566, in App. n. 68, Vol. XVII, Archives of Briefs, Rome.

therefore familiar with the state of affairs in that country. A further reason lay in his friendly relations with Catherine de' Medici.

The new nuncio was preceded by urgent letters of exhortation from the Pope ; others, addressed to Charles IX., Catherine, and the bishops, followed him. In these Pius V. above all pressed for the publication and enforcement of the decrees of the Council, especially the observance of the duty of residence, the erection of seminaries by the bishops, and the removal of the great abuses in the conferring of ecclesiastical benefices, which, owing to the unscrupulous behaviour of the government, had frequently fallen into the hands of women and Protestants. These exhortations were not without effect, and many of the bishops tried to put into force the reform decrees of the Council. The government, however, refused to accept the decrees officially, though it encouraged the publication of the Roman Catechism, which was translated into French, and also issued a circular on the observance of episcopal residence.¹ On the other hand further exhortations were necessary in order to remove the scandal given by Châtillon.²

Many other reasons for complaint were given to the Pope, especially by Catherine de' Medici. In a letter to the nuncio on August 17th, 1566, Pius complains that Catherine had surrounded herself almost entirely by heretics, that she even conferred ecclesiastical benefices upon them, and helped them in many other ways. In a brief which he addressed to her, he begged her no longer to justify herself by words alone, but by her Catholic behaviour.³ In spite of these disagreements, externally, at any rate, friendly relations were still maintained with the French court ; Cardinal Tournon, who was sent to Rome in the autumn to pacify the Pope and make the

¹ See CATENA, 59 *seq.* Spain too urged the acceptance of the decrees of the Council ; see *Corresp. dipl.*, I., 150, 181.

² See the *report of Arco from Rome, August 17, 1566, State Archives, Vienna.

³ Cf. PHILLIPPSON, *Die römische Kurie*, III.

obedientia, was received very courteously,¹ and at the end of November the Pope sent presents to the French royal family,² though his private conversations showed how greatly he doubted the orthodoxy of the queen-mother, whose council was three-quarter Huguenot. In the spring of 1567 great fear was felt in Rome lest the feeble Charles IX. should embrace Protestantism and marry a German Lutheran princess.³

Pius V. especially grieved at the attitude adopted by the French government in support of the bishops who had been proved guilty of heresy, against whom Pius IV. had already taken proceedings.⁴ Without paying any attention to the fact that in this matter the French court was aiming at upholding Gallican liberties, Pius V., at a consistory held on December 11th, 1566, pronounced the definite sentence which deprived of all their dignities as proved heretics six of the accused bishops: Jean de Chaumont of Aix, Jean de Montluc of Valence, Louis d'Albret of Lescar, Charles Guillart of Chartres, Jean de St-Gelais of Uzès, and Claude Regin of

¹ With the *Lettres de Cath. de Médicis*, II., 388, 392, *cf.* the *report of Fr. Strozzi to Maximilian II. from Rome, September 28, 1566, State Archives, Vienna. The *reply to the speech of Tournon for the "obedientia," composed by A. Fiordibello, dated October 10, 1566, in *Arm.* 44, t. 11, n. 118; *ibid.* n. 119, a *brief to Charles IX. of October 17, 1566, concerning the "obedientia." Papal Secret Archives.

² The presents consisted of splendid rosaries in lapis lazuli see the *report of Strozzi, November 29, 1566, State Archives, Vienna.

³ *Cf.* Legaz. di Serristori, 431; HERRE, *Papsttum* 148; PHILIPPSON, *loc. cit.* Cardinal Santa Croce, who returned to Rome on August 28, 1566, made a detailed report on the state of affairs in France (see *letter of C. Luzzara from Rome, August 28, 1566, Gonzaga Archives, Mantua). How displeased the Pope was from the first at the attitude of the French government towards religious matters, is clear from the reports of Requesens in *Corresp. dipl.*, I., 325, 370; II., 191.

⁴ *Cf.* Vol. XVI. of this work, p. 189 *seqq.*

Oloron.¹ Only the Bishop of Aix resigned his office ; in the case of the others the sentence remained without effect because the French government, and of course the Queen of Navarre, treated it as non-existent, so that there was no question of its being carried out. The deposed bishops showed by their subsequent conduct how fully justified the sentence of Pius V. had been.²

The great indulgence shown by the French government to the Huguenots was far from satisfying them. They complained of the non-observance of the edict of Amboise, which they did not themselves respect, and perfected their strong political-military organization.³ Their ultimate purpose aimed at something much more than toleration or equality. They intended that the royal power should become subject to them, and that thus their own supremacy should be definitely established. A favourable opportunity seemed to offer itself when the French government lent its assistance to the Huguenots in their precautionary measures on the occasion of the march of Alba towards the Low Countries. The Huguenots hoped that this time the supreme command of the army would fall into their hands, so that they could then declare

¹ See LADERCHI, 1566, n. 425 ; Corresp. dipl., I., 435 *seq.* ; DEGERT, 99 *seq.* Cf. the *report of Strozzi of November 30, 1566, State Archives, Vienna, and *that of Luzzara of December 11, 1566. Gonzaga Archives, Mantua. A draft of a brief bearing on this question, “ *Capitulis quibusdam Franciae : Deposito propter nefandum haereticæ pravitatis crimen eo, qui vester quidem episcopus dicebatur, sed commissi sibi gregis erat desertor et proditor ” we exhort you to devote yourselves at once to the administration of the diocese. Arm. 44, t. 12, n. 97, Papal Secret Archives.

² See DEGERT, 101 *seq.*, where there are fuller details of each of the deposed. Degert has failed to notice two briefs on this subject. The *first, to the Archbishop of Sens, July 30, 1567, asks him to take proceedings against the heretical Bishop of Chartres (Archives of Briefs, Rome,) the *second, of November 19, 1569, see in App. n. 6, Papal Secret Archives.

³ Cf. CORRERO, 183 *seq.*

war upon the King of Spain, even though Philip II. should not allow himself to be drawn into any act of hostility or interference with the domestic affairs of France.¹ But Catherine de' Medici, who did not intend to be dominated by anyone, thwarted their plans. Thereupon, seeing their hopes disappointed, and fearing an alliance between the government and Spain, the Huguenots tried to attain their end in another way, by joining with Orange and England. At the end of September, 1567, they formed the plan of taking the court by surprise at its place of residence at Monceaux near Meaux by means of a *coup de main*, such as had been attempted many years before against Francis II., of getting possession of the persons of the queen and the king, and of making their enemies, especially Cardinal Guise, powerless. The whole plan was carefully thought out, and was kept absolutely secret.² No one at the royal court had any suspicion that a rising of the Huguenots all over the country was imminent, least of all Catherine, who had spurned all warnings to that effect; she was completely taken by surprise. Not even the chancellor, L'Hôpital, would believe in a rising of the Huguenots. It was therefore almost a miracle that, at the last moment, the royal family succeeded in escaping to Meaux and, guarded by six thousand Swiss who had been summoned to their aid, in reaching Paris on September 29th, 1567.³

It was now that the religious and civil war in France broke out for the second time. The king was shut up in his capital, and the Huguenots rose in revolt throughout the provinces. The fate that awaited the Catholics was shown in the horrible occurrence at Nîmes, known as the *michelade*, when the Huguenots, on St. Michael's Day (September 29th, 1567)

¹ See SEGESSER, Pfyffer I., 420. Cf. MARCKS, Bayonne, 290.

² Cf. CORRERO, 183.

³ Cf. *ibid.* 182 seq.; Lettres de Cath. de Médicis, III., ix. seq., 61 seq.; SEGESSER, Pfyffer, I., 421 seq., 430 seq., 447 seq., 472 seq.; SOLDAN, II., 257 seq. Cf. MARCKS, Bayonne, 291 seq., 294; GEUER, M. de L'Hôpital, 49 seq.; H. DE LA FERRIÈRE, La seconde guerre civile, in *Rev. des quest. hist.*, XXXVII., 125 seq.; THOMPSON, 319 seq.

killed out of hand eighty of the most prominent Catholics there, and threw their bodies down a well.¹

Both parties sought allies and friends outside France. In its straits the court sent Annibale Rucellai to Rome to ask for immediate help. The tidings brought by Rucellai were received with horror by the Curia,² and in view of the grave danger of the French Catholics, Pius V., as can easily be understood, promptly offered his assistance, though he could not refrain from making strong remonstrances through the nuncio. He reminded him that he had foretold this action on the part of the rebels, and had pointed out that they must be met with unflinching courage. If now they were again to put any trust in men who had betrayed their God, they would soon witness the passing of the royal house and the ruin of the kingdom. In a letter to the queen he declared that the time was now come to remove from the court all the Huguenots, who were nothing but spies and rebels. She must not trust either the chancellor, L'Hôpital, nor the two Montmorency, and he said that those who had advised her to send away Cardinal Guise had advised her badly.³

But however frankly he condemned the policy hitherto followed by the French government, Pius V., now that open war had broken out, was very ready to give ample help himself, and obtain it from others. In his letters to the queen he

¹ A terrible model for the assassinations of September, 1792, says SOLDAN, (II., 275). Cf. POLENZ, III., 705 *seq.*; MESNARD, *Hist. de Nîmes*, vol. V.; ROUQUETTE, *Les Saint Barthélemy calvinistes*, Paris [1906]. See also GRATIANI *Epist.*, 309.

² According to Firmanus (**Diarium* p. 197, Papal Secret Archives) Rucellai reached Rome "die sabbati 11 dicti mensis" (October, not September, as states LÄMMER, *Zur Kirchengesch.*, 141) and made a report of the conspiracy of Amboise. "Ex isto malo novo maximus terror fuit incussus omnibus in curia." Prayers were at once ordered. According to GRATIANI *Epist.*, 312, Rucellai only arrived on the 13th; the remarks of BONELLI, *infra* p. 112, n. 2, agree with this, as does *Corresp. dipl.*, II., 226 *seq.*

³ Cf. PHILIPPSON, *Die römische Kurie*, III, *seq.*; *Corresp. dipl.*, II., 225; CATENA, 65 *seq.*

promised to place at once at her disposal 3,000 infantry, and on October 16th, 1567, he wrote to the nuncio that he was endeavouring to double that number.¹

The French government needed above all things financial help. Rucellai asked for no less than 300,000 scudi. The Pope was ready to give all possible help, but only on the condition that they should not at once come to terms with the insurgent heretics.² It was very difficult for him to get together the money, as his treasury was already greatly drained by the preparations for the Turkish war,³ and he was

¹ See the *letter quoted in following note, translated in PHILIPPSON, *loc. cit.* 112.

² In an *instruction from Bonelli to M. della Torre on October 16, 1567 ("per corriere espresso") we read: in letters which came from Lyons on the 11th, the Pope received news of the general plot against the Catholics and the king; he had been in a state of the greatest anxiety until the arrival of Rucellai on the 13th "con lettere di loro Maestà," announcing the safety of Charles IX. "A richiesta di esso A. Rucellai havemo concesso che si possino essigere la metà de frutti di tutti i benefici etiandio di cardinali; ne adimandava anchora di potere alienare parte de beni mobili delle chiese, ma ricordandosi che per l'altra resolutione furono alienati in notabile somma è parso di non concederlo se prima non vediamo che S. M. Christ^{ma} facci da dovero perchè in tale caso venderessimo anco la propria persona." Papal Secret Archives, *Nunciat, di Francia*, 282, p. 4 *seq.*; *ibid.* *letter of October 18, 1567, with which was sent the "bolla della metà de frutti di tutti i benefici ecc^{cl}," and with an addition made by the Pope himself: "*V. S. sia ben' avvertita d'intendere se vi fusse speranza d'accordo dico di S. M^{ta} con i ribelli et in tale caso ne espidirete un corriero a posta ne gli darete essa bolla; ma quando siate chiaro, che si facci da dovero non solo li darete la bolla, ma riscuoterete 25^m scudi." *Cf.* further *Corresp. dipl.*, II., 229 *seq.* Rucellai started back on October 19. He vainly sought for help from Venice (see *Corresp. dipl.*, II., 239 *seq.*). On October 25, 1567, Arco reported that the Pope had given Rucellai a letter of exchange for 50,000 scudi "per quanto s'intende."

³ *Cf.* the brief to L. Gonzaga of October 16, 1567, in GOUBAU, 54, and LADERCHI, 1567, n. 139.

most reluctant to impose taxes upon his subjects. He was, however, resolved to get together the necessary sum, and to do everything in his power to help. During October and November he sought to raise money by means of a special tax in the Papal States, and by contributions from the religious houses in Italy,¹ while at the same time he tried to get help elsewhere. He addressed pressing letters to Philip II., the Duke of Nevers, to Ludovico Gonzaga, who was in Piedmont, and to Duke Emanuele Filiberto of Savoy.² Piersanti was sent as special envoy to Lorraine to ask that the frontier should be closed against the troops of the Calvinist Elector Palatine, John Casimir, who was coming to the assistance of the Huguenots.³ Pietro Donato Cesi, Bishop of Narni, went by the Pope's orders to the governments of the Italian states to urge them strongly to give immediate and effective assistance. His instructions described the rebellion of the Huguenots, their sacrileges and ill-treatment of the Catholics, the dangerous position of Charles IX., and the peril which would be the consequence of a Calvinist victory in the kingdom of France. The very geographical position of France, surrounded by Spain, England, the Low Countries, Germany and Italy, showed that it was there that the fate of Europe would be decided, not only from the religious point of view, but also politically. Should the Calvinists with their revolutionary aims attain to the supreme power, then political

¹ See *Avvisi di Roma of October 19 and 25, Nov. 1 and 8, 1567, Urb. 1040, p. 452, 454, 458b. Vatican Library. Cf. the *report of Serristori of October 17, 1567, State Archives, Florence, Medic. 3287.

² See GOUBAU, 50 *seq.* Cf. Corresp. dipl., II., 243, 252.

³ Cf. the *Instructio data d. Petrosancto iur. utr. dr. a S.D.N. ad ill. princip. Carolum ducem Lotharingiae destinato, dated Rome, November 8, 1567, in *Varia Polit.*, 81 (now 82), p. 398-401, and again p. 564-567. Papal Secret Archives. On the back of p. 567 we read: *Instruttione consignata a m. Piersanti . . . a 10 di Novembre, 1567; on p. 568 an *Aggiunto: if the Cardinal of Lorraine is in the neighbourhood, he is to visit him and communicate the instructions to him. Cf. LADERCHI, 1567, n. 156.

subversion of the neighbouring states would follow. Even Italy was threatened, and therefore the Italian states were bound to lend their assistance in a matter of such great importance.¹

It was entirely characteristic of Pius V. that he sought refuge in prayer, and on October 16th, 1567, he ordered a universal jubilee,² which opened in Rome in the last week of October with three great processions in which he himself took part on foot. These processions started from St. Peter's, going on the first day to S. Maria sopra Minerva, on the second to S. Girolamo degli Spagnuoli, and on the third to S. Luigi de' Francesi.³ But that, side by side with this spiritual help, the Pope did not omit the temporal, is clear from the steps which he took at the same time. Thus, at a congregation of Cardinals he decided upon a general impost upon the Papal States.⁴ At the beginning of December the annual payment of 2,000 scudi which had hitherto been made to the poorer Cardinals was suspended, with the exception of five Cardinals who were absolutely poor.⁵ Of the money which was hastily collected 25,000 scudi were assigned to Ludovico Gonzaga

¹ See CATENA, 68 *seq.*; LADERCHI, 1567, n. 144; BROGNOLI, II., 39 *seq.*, 46 *seq.*, 49 *seq.*, 54 *seq.* The Venetian Correro (p. 193 *seq.*) and A. Contarini (p. 252) formed an exactly similar opinion of the dangers involved by the Calvinist victory in France. For Cesi see GARAMPI, 298.

² See the bull "In eminenti" in *Editti, Casanatense Library, Rome. p. 222. Cf. BONANNI, I., 301.

³ See the *reports of B. Pia from Rome, October 19 and 25, 1567, Gonzaga Archives, Mantua. In his *report of November 1 (*loc. cit.*) Pia speaks of the great concourse of people at these pious exercises. Cf. GRATIANI Epist., 313.

⁴ With the *report of B. Pia of November 1 (*loc. cit.*) see the *Avviso di Roma of the same date, Urb. 1040, p. 456b, Vatican Library, and the brief of October 28, 1567, to Barthol. Barrottus Thesaur., in *Editti, Casanatense Library, Rome, *loc. cit.* Cf. also GRATIANI Epist., 322 *seq.*; LADERCHI, 1567, n. 141.

⁵ See *Avviso di Roma of December 6, 1567, Urb. 1040, p. 457b, Vatican Library.

and 10,000 to the Duke of Savoy.¹ From the first the nuncio della Torre was ordered to pay over the subsidies to the French government only when he was sure that there was no underhand attempt being made to come to an arrangement with the Huguenots.² This anxiety, which haunted the Pope as early as October, increased to such an extent that on December 25th Pius wrote to the nuncio to be on his guard against any conciliatory move on the part of the French government, because Catherine never acted loyally to God and the Catholic religion, and put her trust rather in her own cleverness than in the divine help.³ The same view of the situation was also held in Madrid, as Castagna reported on December 21st.⁴

It was soon made clear how much justification there was for Pius V.'s hesitation⁵ about paying a subsidy to the French government, and his distrust of its policy.⁶ On March 23rd,

¹ See CATENA, 65 ; GOUBAU, 56.

² See *supra*, p. 111.

³ See the *instructions of Bonelli to M. della Torre of December 22, 1567, as well as those of October 18, 1567, *Nunziat. di Francia*, 282, p. 9. Papal Secret Archives. The instruction of December 25, 1567, is translated in PHILIPPSON, *Die römische Kurie*, 113.

⁴ See *Corresp. dipl.*, II., 279.

⁵ Cf. the *report of Arco from Rome, January 3, 1568, State Archives, Vienna, and *Corresp. dipl.*, II., 304. On November 10, 1567, Charles IX. had written from Paris to Cardinal Ricci : *" Vi prego di fare le più vive istanze presso il S. Padre afin che il soccorso promesso non sia solo in parole, ma in effetto." Catherine de' Medici also wrote on November 10, 1567, in similar terms to Cardinal Ricci ; both letters in Ricci Archives, Rome.

⁶ *" El Papa ha così poca buona opinione del governo delle cose di Francia ch'essendo entrato l'ambasciatore nelle due ultime audienze che ha havute in voler giustificare le actioni et il procedere del Re et della Regina con lunghe et spetiose parole S. St^a non gli ha dato mai altra risposta se non che ha sorriso sempre." The Pope refused a small favour to the king's sister. " L'ambasciatore sta mezzo disperato " (report of Cipriano Saracinello to Cardinal Farnese, Rome, March 6, 1567, State Archives, Naples, C. Farnese, 763). Cf. *Corresp. dipl.*, II., 309, 326.

1568, at Longjumeau, after a war that had been carried on very half-heartedly, for the second time a peace was concluded which sacrificed a situation which, from the military point of view, was far from unsatisfactory.¹ The truth was that Catherine did not wish for a decided victory of the Guise and the Catholic party. Short-sightedly seeking her own interests, she aimed at a balance of power between the parties. By the peace of Longjumeau, which she concluded in spite of the opposition of the nuncio and the Spanish ambassador, the Huguenots obtained the renewal of the edict of Amboise, which was so much in their favour, binding themselves in return to restore to the king the cities which they held, a condition which in the end was never complied with. The Huguenots had just as little intention of giving up their understanding with England and the rebels in the Low Countries. On the other side too the government infringed the treaty in various ways, and were able to do so because they were supported by popular opinion. The Huguenots indeed, by their rebellion and their continued acts of violence had so roused the masses of the people against themselves that at last the supporters of Protestantism became visibly less, while the Catholics roused themselves to a vigorous resistance. As had already happened in 1562-1563, and again in 1567, so now new confederations were formed by the nobles and the clergy for the preservation of the Catholic religion.²

¹ The *official* news of the peace, which was not yet to hand on April 11 (see GRATIANI Epist., 382), arrived on the following night see FIRMANUS, *Diarium in Miscell., Arm. XII., on April 12, 1567, Papal Secret Archives. For the sorrow and anxiety of the Pope at the possibility of a Huguenot invasion of Italy see Colecc. de docum. inéd., XCVII., 426; Corresp. dipl., II., 337 seq., 351.

² See 'Serment des associés de la ligue chrestienne et royale de la Champagne' of January 25, 1568, in Journal de Henry III., III. (1744), 31. Cf. CAPEFIGUE, Ligue, II., 374 seq.; PHILIPPSON in *Weltegeschichte* of Flathe, VII., 372; RANKE, Französ. Geschichte, I., 276 seq.; LAVISSE-MARIÉJOL, VI., I, 101 seq.; THOMPSON, 354 seq. (cf. 212 seq. and 352 seq. on earlier agreements of this kind, which were forerunners of the league).

A decisive factor was that both Catherine de' Medici and Charles IX., who had not forgotten the attempted surprise of 1567, henceforward showed themselves openly hostile to the Huguenots. Cardinal Guise regained his influence, while on the other hand the chancellor, L'Hôpital, who had always been the champion of compromise, was dismissed.¹ His fall was connected with the conditions which Pius V. had attached to the granting of permission for the sale of ecclesiastical property which the French government had obtained by means of Annibale Rucellai and Charles d' Angennes, Bishop of Le Mans, who had succeeded Tournon as French ambassador. When the Pope, by a bull of August 1st, 1568, gave his consent to such sales, to the annual amount of 150,000 francs, he laid it down that this money should only be used for the defence of the king and the Catholic religion, and until it was effectively applied to that purpose should remain in the hands of some trustworthy person.²

The recommencement of hostilities took place in August with the attempted capture of Condé and Coligny at Noyers, where they were trying to set up a headquarters of Protestantism in order to help Orange. They both fled to the safety of La Rochelle, where they gathered together a strong force; the Huguenots soon rose in their support in many parts of the country. The court retaliated with the edict of September, which enacted that since the Huguenots had not availed themselves of the favours granted to them, henceforth all worship except the Catholic was forbidden, under pain of death and confiscation; the Protestant preachers were given fourteen days in which to leave France.³

¹ Cf. ANQUETIL, 183 *seq.*; D'AUMALE, *Hist. des princes de Condé*, II., *Pièces et docum.*, 349 *seq.*; SEGESSER, *Pfyffer*, I., 499 *seq.*

² Cf. *Legaz. di Serristori*, 451 *seq.* and CHARRIÈRE, III., 34. The bull of August 1, 1568, in LADERCHI, 1568, n. 165. An **Avviso di Roma* of July 17, 1568, Urb. 1040, p. 459, Vatican Library, announces the departure of Rucellai from Rome. For his negotiations see the *documents in the Papal Secret Archives, in *App. nn.* 4 and 5.

³ See SERRANUS, IX., 222; THUANUS, I, 44; THOMPSON, 366.

The joy of Pius V. at this definite stand was all the greater since the weakness displayed by the French government at the Peace of Longjumeau had left little hopes of any such development.¹ The Bishop of Cajazzo, Fabio Mirto Frangi-pani, who was to succeed della Torre as nuncio, was entrusted with the delivery of the bull of August 1st, 1568.²

The third civil and religious war,³ which was carried on by *both* sides with the greatest cruelty and violence,⁴ was waged at first without any important engagement, because the opposing forces were of approximately equal strength, and each of them only wished to give battle in circumstances favourable to themselves. The position of the Huguenots was soon improved in consequence of the help that was sent to them. Elizabeth of England sent large sums of money as well as ships of war, while on the Rhine Duke Wolfgang of Deux-Ponts got together a strong auxiliary force. Under these circumstances it was highly characteristic of the French government and of its constant fear of the influence of Philip II., that, in spite of the difficulties in which it found itself, it was only willing to accept Spanish help in a very limited degree, and instead, besides the 10,000 Swiss who were in its pay, obtained the help of 5,000 German cavalry.⁵

After a short interval occasioned by the extraordinary cold of that winter, the war was recommenced at the end of January, 1569, by Henry of Anjou and the Marshal de Tavannes. Probably no one realized how much depended upon the result of the war as Pius V., but after his experiences

¹ Cf. Legaz. di Serristori, 448 *seq.*; TIEPOLO, 188.

² See LADERCHI, 1568, n. 166. *Brief recommending Frangi-pani to Cosimo I., whom he was to visit, dated August 2, 1568, in State Archives, Florence. The *brief recalling della Torre, August 12, 1568, in Arm. 44, t. 13, p. 247b, Papal Secret Archives.

³ See the detailed account in GIGON, *La troisième guerre de religion*, Paris, 1911. Cf. also *Mél. d'Archéol.*, XXXIII., 245 *seq.*

⁴ Cf. ANQUETIL, 223 *seq.*

⁵ See SEGESSER, *Pfyffer*, I., 529 *seq.*, 548 *seq.* Cf. JANSSEN-PASTOR, IV. 15-16, 292 *seq.*

with the French government, he was very cautious about giving his assistance. The money, which he had the greatest difficulty in collecting,¹ was to be actually used for the war,² and not, as had been the case before, devoted to other purposes. A body of auxiliary troops was also raised for service in France,³ and the Pope would not let himself be distracted from this task even when a courier brought news of the victory which had been won by the Catholics at Jarnac on March 13th.⁴ In his opinion these auxiliary troops should now be used against the Duke of Deux-Ponts.⁵ The young Count Sforza

¹ Cf. *Avviso di Roma of Sept. 4, 1568, Urb. 1040, p. 574, Vatican Library.

² See Legaz. di Serristori, 454, and CORRERO 208. An *Avviso di Roma of November 6, 1568, announces the sending of 100,000 scudi to France (Urb. 1040, p. 597b, Vatican Library). Another 50,000 were taken from the treasury in the Castle of St. Angelo at the end of Feb., 1569, of the pay for the auxiliary troops (*ibid.*). Cf. the facsimile of the Pope's order in LICHATSHEV, *Una lettera di papa Pio V. allo Zar Iwan il terribile*, St. Petersburg, 1906 (in Russian), tav. 5. For the continued distrust of Pius V. see CHARRIÈRE, III., 35, n.

³ Besides the *report of Cusano of January 22, 1569 (State Archives Vienna) see the *Avvisi di Roma of January 1 and 29, February 5 and 26, 1569, Urb. 1041, p. 1b, 11, 18b, 22, Vatican Library. See also the letter of Pius V. of January 30, 1569, in LICHATSHEV, *loc. cit.* tav. 12.

⁴ The news arrived in Rome on March 27, "hora 17"; see FIRMANUS, *Diarium in Miscell., Arm. XII., 32, p. 79b; *ibid.* p. 81, the "Orationes dictae pro gratiarum actione pro victoria regis Franciaë" (Papal Secret Archives). Cf. LADERCHI, 1569, n. 102; CHARRIÈRE, III., 43. See also the *report of B. Pia from Rome, Apr. 1, 1569 (Gonzaga Archives, Mantua). For the battle of Jarnac see WHITEHEAD, G. de Coligny, 204 *seq.* and the monograph by GIGON in *Bullet. de la Soc. hist. de la Charente*, 1896.

⁵ See *Avviso di Roma of April 2, 1569, Urb. 1041, p. 49b, Vatican Library, and *Lettres de Cath. de Médicis*, III., 232. See also the letter of M. Soriano of April 2, 1569, which mentions the rumour that Pius V. was meditating an expedition against Geneva (CRAMER, II., 223). In April, 1569, Anjou was sent a blessed hat by the Pope; see *Lettres de Cath. de Médicis*, X., 254.

di Santa Fiora was placed in command of them ; there were 4,000 infantry and 500 cavalry.¹ In the middle of April, after the Duke of Savoy had given permission for them to pass through his territory, Pius V. gave orders for their immediate departure ;² they were to be joined in Tuscany by another 1,000 infantry and 100 cavalry, furnished by Cosimo I. at the request of the Pope.³

In the meantime, on April 23rd, there arrived in Rome twelve Huguenot standards which had been captured at Jarnac, and among them the two white ones of Condé and Navarre. Pius V., surrounded by the whole College of Cardinals, received these trophies of victory in the Hall of Constantine, and weeping with joy declared that the gift of the Most Christian King was the most precious that he could have made to religion, the Holy See, and to himself ; he prayed to God that in a short time the remaining standards might be sent as well, and that all the enemies of His Majesty might be

¹ See Corresp. dipl., III., 38 (where 1568 should be 1569) and *Avviso di Roma of February 26, 1569, Urb. 1041, p. 22, Vatican Library. From a *letter "ex Urbe 5 martii" we learn the reason for the delay in sending the troops : "Expectatur adhuc responsio ducis Mantuae et gubernatoris Mediolanensis status circa concessionem loci in quo milites mittendi in Galliam congregari debeant, qua habita mox sonabunt timpanae." Archives at Wittingau, Hist. 4751.

² *Avviso di Roma of April 16, 1569, Urb. 1041, p. 54, Vatican Library. A brief of March 6, 1569, announced to Charles IX. the dispatch of an auxiliary force, and at the same time exhorting him to punish the Huguenots most severely (see GOUBAU, 148 seq.). On receipt of the news of the victory, further briefs to the same effect were sent on March 28 to Charles IX. and Catherine (in GOUBAU, 151 seq.) as well as *briefs "duci Andegav." and "duci Nivern." (Arm. 44, t. 14, p. 48b-49, Papal Secret Archives), followed on April 13 by briefs to Catherine, Henry of Anjou, the Cardinal of Lorraine, Charles IX. (in GOUBAU, 156 seq.) and various nobles who had taken part in the victory. These latter briefs, which are still unpublished, are in Arm. 44, t. 14, p. 60 seqq. Papal Secret Archives.

³ See ADRIANI, XX., 4 ; PALANDRI, 120.

brought back to their obedience and to the Catholic faith. The standards were then taken to St. Peter's, where the Patriarch of Jerusalem, after a service of thanksgiving, placed them in the chapel of the Kings of France.¹

Pius V. had already, on receiving the first news of the victory near Jarnac, sent his congratulations to the French king, urging him to seize the fortified places in the Kingdom of Navarre, and to carry on the war until the Huguenots were destroyed. It was his duty, so this letter stated, to destroy the roots, and even the offshoots of the roots of evil. Similar exhortations to fight boldly and freely against the enemy until he was destroyed were addressed to Catherine de' Medici, the two Guises, the Duke of Montpensier, and the Duke of Nevers.² When the nuncio had sent him further particulars of the victory,³ fresh letters were sent on April 13th to Charles IX., Catherine de' Medici, Henry of Anjou, the two Guises, and the Duke of Montpensier.⁴ They contained exhortations to execute strict justice on the rebels and heretics in prison, and to carry on the work until they were completely destroyed. Again and again these letters contain the warning that they must not follow the example of Saul who, despite the command of God, spared the Amalakites, and therefore was deprived by Samuel of his kingdom, and at last lost his life.⁵

It is clear with what bitterness the war was carried on ;

¹ Besides Firmanus in BONANNI, I., 302, and in LAMMER, *Zur Kirchengesch.*, 142, see the reports of the French ambassador in CHARRIÈRE, III., 44 *seq.*, ZUÑIGA in *Corresp. dipl.*, III., 61 *seq.*, the two *Avvisi of April 23, 1569 (Urb. 1041, p. 60b, 66b, Vatican Library, where there is a list of the "insegne" captured), and the *letter of Cusano, April 23, 1569, State Archives, Vienna.

² See GOUBAU, 151 *seq.*, 154 ; LADERCHI, 1569, n. 103 *seq.* Cf. as to this the description of TÜRKE, 17.

³ See the report of the nuncio in BROGNOLI, II., 60 *seq.*, where, however, the date is wrong.

⁴ See GOUBAU, 156 *seq.* ; LADERCHI, 1569, n. 110 *seq.*

⁵ See the *passages* in GOUBAU, 152 *seqq.*, 157 *seqq.*, 168.

on neither side was there any question of mercy.¹ In Rome it was seriously feared many times that the Huguenots would turn upon Italy,² and to this fear was added indignation at the sacrileges and atrocities which the followers of Calvin were guilty of everywhere, for wherever they could they destroyed the images, crucifixes, altars, churches and convents, they even dug up the bodies from the graves, and killed with all the refine-

¹ See CATENA, 75. Cf. RANKE, *Päpste*, II.², 43.

² The fear of a Huguenot invasion of Italy was specially great in the spring of 1568. On March 13 Arco reported: *since, in consequence of the recent peace with the Huguenots, the latter are in a position to turn against Rome, they are proposing to complete the fortifications of the Castle of St. Angelo and the Borgo (State Archives, Vienna). Cf. the report of Arco of March 20, 1568, in SCHWARZ, *Briefwechsel*, 105, the letter of Zúñiga of April 7, 1568, in *Corresp. dipl.*, II., 337, and the report of B. Concini from Rome, April 11, 1568, in PALANDRI, 117 *seqq.* Rome had been in a state of anxiety at an earlier date, in consequence of other designs on the part of the Huguenots. An **Avviso di Roma* of January 10, 1566, speaks of the imprisonment of two Huguenots who had confessed under torture that they had intended to kill the Pope (Urb. 1040, p. 167, Vatican Library). In March 1568, Pius V. was again on his guard against a plot of the Huguenots (see *Corresp. dipl.*, II., 316). An **Avviso di Roma* of January 1, 1569, announces that at the Casaletto, the villa of Pius V., a "fuoruscito" had been arrested with two "archibugi"; it was thought that this was connected with a Huguenot plot (Urb. 1041, p. 1, Vatican Library). It was also thought that the baker's boy, who had tried to make profit by declaring himself to be the son of Pius V., had been urged to this course by the Huguenots. The youth was convicted of calumny and condemned to the galleys for life (see CATENA, 139 *seqq.*, and the *Ricordi di Filippo Edoardo Fugger*, extract from *Archivio stor. Ital.*, 5 ser., XLII., 10). For the fears felt in Rome of Huguenot plots during the summer of 1568 see *Corresp. dipl.*, II., 367 *seq.*, 369, 374, 376, 379, 392, 411. Correro expressly states (p. 194) that the Huguenots themselves boasted of their friends in Italy. A. Zibramonti *reports on January 10, 1571, that the "ribelli di Montorio" were in league with the Huguenots. Gonzaga Archives, Mantua.

ments of cruelty, the priests, monks and even defenceless nuns.¹

The Papal auxiliary forces had, on May 14th, 1569, joined the Florentine troops in the neighbourhood of Massa, and marched by way of Turin to the Gulf of Lyons, which was reached on June 2nd. They pushed on on the 4th, but the troops made but slow progress owing to the scarcity of provisions in that war-stricken country; soon sickness relaxed their discipline, while no sight of the enemy was obtained.² After the auxiliary force had joined up with the royal army near Tours, it took part with success in the defence of Poitiers, and on October 3rd in the decisive battle near Moncontour. This great battle, in which the Papal-Florentine troops especially distinguished themselves, ended in the complete rout of the Huguenots, who left about 10,000 dead upon the field.³

Pius V., who had watched the course of the war in France with all the more anxiety⁴ because Avignon was threatened by

¹ In the briefs to Henry of Anjou, Cardinal Bourbon, and Charles IX. (GOUBAU, 160, 163, 166) Pius V. expressly mentions these atrocities, as to which *cf.* GRATIANI Epist., 314, 332, 357; PICOT, I., 15 *seqq.*; GAUDENTIUS, 108 *seqq.*, 119 *seqq.*

² The information contained in the letters from the Jesuits who accompanied the troops as military chaplains, in FOUQUERAY, I., 625 *seq.*, is substantially completed by the *Narratione della guerra di Francia 1569, in the Cod. Barber. 5040, p. 77 *seq.*, which has not hitherto been made use of; in this the march of the auxiliary troops is described in diary form. This codex contains, at p. 1. *seq.* and 15 *seq.*, two *Vite di Sforza conte di S. Fiora. Vatican Library,

³ See DAVILA, I, 5. THUANUS, I, 45; SEGESSER, Pfyffer, I., 580 *seq.*; 585 *seq.*; THOMPSON, 388 *seq.*; for the behaviour of the Italians, *see*, besides ADRIANI, XX., 4, Petrucci in DESJARDINS, III., 603, and Amodei in FOUQUERAY, I., 627; *see* also SERENO, 45. Guzzo di Guzzi of Faenza distinguished himself; *see* BERNARDINO AZZURINI, *Libro de fatti moderni occorsi nella città di Faenza dal 1546. Library at Faenza.

⁴ *Cf.* CHARRIÈRE, III., 48 *seq.*, 50 *seq.*; Corresp. dipl., III., 139.

the Huguenots,¹ and because he feared a fresh *volte face* on the part of the French court,² breathe more freely when the first news of this splendid victory reached Rome. At first he refused to believe the news, until it was confirmed by further reports, but on October 17th, 1569, a secretary of the nuncio arrived with circumstantial reports. The Pope went at once with the Cardinals to St. Peter's to give thanks to God. For three days he caused all the bells of Rome to be rung, the cannon resounded from the Castle of St. Angelo, and bonfires were lit everywhere. On October 22nd a great procession passed from S. Maria sopra Minerva to S. Maria Maggiore, on the 23rd from the Aracoeli to St. John Lateran, and on the 24th from St. Peter's to S. Luigi de' Francesi.³ As visible proofs of the effects of the Pope's

¹ The fears for Avignon, which had already caused the Pope great anxiety in the preceding year (see LADERCHI, 1568, n. 171), increased in 1569 (see *ibid.* 1569, n. 176 *seq.*). In his *instructions of March 9, 1569, Santa Fiora received the special charge to protect Avignon. A *brief "communitatibus comit. Venaissini" of May 2, 1569, exhorts them to persevere in the Catholic faith; their loyalty is being tested like gold in the furnace, but the dangers are great; let them take heed lest heresy enter. We think always of the salvation of your souls. and pray for you. Arm. 44, t. 14, p. 88, Papal Secret Archives.

² See the report of A. Medici from Rome, August 3, 1569, in PALANDRI, 121. This explains the briefs of August 1, in LADERCHI 1569, n. 145 *seq.* refusing further aid.

³ See the *letter of A. Medici from Rome, October 18, 1569, State Archives, Florence, and the *reports of B. Pia from Rome, October 17, 18, 22 and 29, 1569, Gonzaga Archives, Mantua. In the report of October 18 we read: *"L'allegrezza in che S.S.tà si trova è tale che confessa di non haverla mai più havuta simile et tutta questa corte giubila." Cf. also Firmanus in LADERCHI, 1569, n. 166; BONANNI, I., 302; Corresp. dipl., III., 175 *seq.* and the *Avvisi di Roma of October 19 and 22, 1569, Urb. 1041, p. 167 and 179, Vatican Library. The defeat of the Huguenots was also celebrated elsewhere, e.g. at Venice; see the letter in the congratulatory publication of the people of Breslau to the University of Basle (1866), p. 11.

prayers¹ and of the bravery of his soldiers there were 37 standards captured from the Huguenots ; these were sent to the Lateran and placed on the walls under a marble tablet with a commemorative inscription.²

In the letter of congratulation which he sent to Charles IX. on October 20th, 1569, Pius V. warned him that he must not again find place for misplaced compassion, or waver between the two sides, for nothing was more cruel than compassion for the wicked and for those who had deserved death. On November 5th the Pope sent congratulations to the king and sent him the necessary dispensation for his marriage with the daughter of the Emperor Maximilian II.³ He thought the occasion an opportune one for warning Charles IX. that he must no longer interest himself on behalf of the heretical bishops of Chartres, Valence and Lescar, but rather nominate to their sees men who were sound Catholics ; this exhortation, however, had no result.⁴

It had already been evident after the battle of Jarnac how

¹ The Pope, reports an **Avviso di Roma* of July 23, 1569, has for some days past, recited special prayers for France after Mass. Urb. 1041, p. 118, Vatican Library.

² See *Avviso di Roma* of January 7, 1570, in LANCIANI, IV., 28. Cf. *Firmanus* in LADERCHI, 1570, n. 165 *seq.* and BONANNI, I., 302 ; CATENA, 74 *seq.* ; FORCELLA, VIII., 37. The inscription, which is still preserved, in SPEZI, 78. One of the standards is still to be seen in the transept of the Lateran. Cf. C. MAES, *Le bandiere degli ugonotti a S. Giovanni in Laterano*, Rome, 1885.

³ See the text in GOUBAU, 240 *seqq.*, 247 *seq.* A **brief* of November 7 to the Duke of Anjou is the reply to the congratulations which he had sent on the victory. A **brief* of November 9 praises the Duke of Guise for his bravery against the Huguenots besieging Poitiers, and exhorting him to continue. A similar **exhortation* was sent on the same day to the Archbishop of Sens, Nicolas de Pellevé, whose zeal and prudence in advising the king during the war are praised. Arm. 44, t. 14, p. 283b-285, Papal Secret Archives.

⁴ See the **brief* of November 19, 1569, in App. n. 6, Papal Secret Archives,

little intention the French government had of making real use of the victories which it had gained, and now it allowed the great day of Moncontour to pass without making real use of it. When they made urgent representations to the queen-mother that she should profit by the favourable circumstances, the representatives of Pius V. received the reply that her son was old enough not to need the advice of foreign princes.¹

So what did Charles IX. do when some of his own advisers urged him after the victory of Moncontour to carry on the war vigorously? Jealous of his brother Anjou, who had held the chief command at Moncontour, instead of destroying the remains of Coligny's army, he decided on a policy of blockade, and on December 3rd he surrendered St.-Jean-d'Angely to him, and dispersed his own forces.² The Italian troops, which had had much to endure from the jealousy of the French from the first,³ and had been greatly reduced in numbers both in battle and from sickness, had been ordered to return at the end of October by Pius V., but they started back home before that date.⁴ Charles IX. could look for no further help.

¹ "Quando dopo la battaglia ultima di Moncontor essendo il tempo apparito proprio del venire a dar castigo a chi lo meritava, come ricordavano li ministri di N. S^{te} per parte sua che era tempo di fare et ne mostravano il modo, fu risposto loro dalla Reina propria con parole assai espresse, come il Re si ritrovava in età d' autorità et con forze et prudentia di sapere governare lo stato suo da se senza havere a pigliare consiglio ne legge da principi esterni, onde meritamente da quel tempo in qua è parso a S. S^{ta} di volere andare un poco più consideratamente non giudicando che se li convenisse di doversi ingerire in cosa di altri più oltre di quel che fosse grato alli padroni." Thus Frangipani in the memorial quoted *infra*, p. 135, n. 1.

² See SEGESSER, Pfyffer, I., 607.

³ See the report of Petrucci in DESJARDINS, III., 601.

⁴ The Count di Santa Fiora had sent a message to Charles IX. on October 6, asking to be allowed to let the troops go, now that the victory was won. The king wished still to retain them, but Santa Fiora personally pointed out to him that the auxiliary force was obliged to return by reason of its losses and disease. On this occasion Charles IX. expressed his hope of receiving

In his memorial the nuncio Frangipani states that after Catherine's reply the Pope could only adopt an attitude of

further help from the Pope, at the same time acknowledging that the auxiliary force had been of great assistance to him. Santa Fiora, who was himself suffering from fever, then took his leave "Malissimo sodisfatto della natura de' Francesi, onde dipoi diceva spesso che mai più tornerebbe in Francia con gente, perche il proceder de' Francesi è stravagante tanto in le osservationi militari, che conosceva che l' huomo che li serve corre del continuo grosso pericolo in la dignità et in l' honore, perche, se le cose succedono bene, vogliono esser stati loro li esecutori, et se male, ogni cosa buttano volentiere adosso al compagno, et in somma guerreggiano di maniera, almeno di presente, che del continuo si sta più per perdere che guadagnare ; et se l' ammiraglio fosse stato soldato di altra natione che francese, Dio sa come le cose fossero passate. . . . Quando il sig^r conte si cognobbe in stato col male che non posseva caminar con la gente, ordinò al vescovo di Fermo commissario generale che, condotta la gente a Lione, la pagasse del mese di novembre, et in tanto desse avviso al Papa per corrier proprio in diligenza [di] quanto che passava, et chiedesse ordine a Sua St^a di quel che s' havesse per l' inanzi da far con la gente, la qual si condurrebbe per il Delfinato alle spese del re. Ma inteso poi il sig^r conte dal detto suo segretario come il Papa intendeva pagar la gente sino fosse condotta in Italia, scrisse al vescovo non ispedisse più al Papa, et che lo attendesse in Lione et sollecitasse il far pagar la gente di già condotta in Lione, dove ne moriva assai et di dove ne partiva assai per la strada diritta della Savoia, non curando d' aspettar paga alcuna ; talmente a molti fra venuto a noia il tardar più in quelle bande, dove non si vedeva che mallatia e morte." On account of his illness Santa Fiora was not able to carry out the command to protect Avignon. On the last day of February, 1570, he informed Pius V. by word of mouth of all that he had witnessed. I gather all these particulars, hitherto unknown, from the *Narratione della guerra di Francia, in Cod. Barb., 5040, p. 167 *seqq.* Vatican Library. From the account in FOUQUERAY, I., 627 *seq.* it appears that the Pope looked after the troops on their return, and the Jesuits of the sick who remained at Lyons. According to ADRIANI, XX., 4, only a third part of the auxiliary force returned home.

great caution, and that many people had long since told him that the help which he had bestowed on France in money and troops had been thrown away.¹ While Guise and Tavannes retired from the court and the army, the influence fell back into the hands of the "cautious and cold politicians, who, devoid of either principle or conviction, lived only for the exigencies of the moment."² Thanks to them, proposals for peace were already being made at La Rochelle by the end of 1569. The Catholics once more found themselves in danger of seeing their interests sacrificed to the advantages of the moment, without any guarantee as to the future. In theory the court seemed to have the conditions of peace in its own hands because the battle of Moncontour had made a lasting impression, and at that time the Huguenots had not much hope of help from abroad. This was especially the case from Germany, where only the reformers were in favour of armed intervention, while the Lutherans held back. In more than one place, as for example Ernestine Saxony, the people were told from Lutheran pulpits that the Huguenots, like the *gueux*, were rebels, sacramentarians and iconoclasts, who deserved to be extirpated.³

When the rumours that a peace was at hand grew more and more insistent, the Pope had recourse to the king himself in a letter of January 29th, 1570, in which he says: Our duty and our paternal solicitude do not allow us to fail to give warning to Your Majesty; give heed to it then and think well concerning that which is about to be done. Whereas we see well that between Your Majesty and your enemies there can never be a peace which will be favourable to the cause of the Catholic religion, or which, however it be expressed, will secure tranquillity to your country which is so exhausted by long wars, we, for our part, shall certainly not forget the office which we hold, nor shall we be so blind to our duty as to fail to use

¹ Cf. the memorial already quoted.

² Opinion of BAUMGARTEN, Bartholomäusnacht, 26.

³ So reported William of Orange to Louis of Nassau on December 29, 1569. GROEN v. PRINSTERER, III., 334; SOLDAN, I., 380.

all our zeal and all our authority to bring it about that peace shall be concluded as soon as possible. But since we are well aware, and Your Majesty has experienced the same a thousand times, that there can be no harmony between light and darkness, and that in matters of this sort there can be no agreement but such as is illusory and full of dangers, we must of necessity tremble for your own person as well as for the general good of Christian society, and the preservation of the Catholic faith. Similar letters were sent to Catherine de' Medici and Henry of Anjou.¹

So as to leave no means untried, Pius V., in April, 1570, sent to Henry of Anjou, the favourite son of the French queen, the blessed sword and hat on *Laetare* Sunday, by the hands of Count Jerome de Rozdradow.² Rozdradow was instructed to express, either by himself or together with the nuncio, the Pope's sorrow at the continued negotiations for peace with persons who were in open rebellion against God and the French crown. If the king were to be willing to share his kingdom with rebels he would expose himself to ruin and personal contempt. Lastly Rozdradow was ordered to dissuade the king from any sort of agreement with the Turks, and to remind him of his duty in the matter of filling the vacant bishoprics.³

When it was reported at the end of April that peace had been concluded with the Huguenots, Pius V. addressed a

¹ See GOUBAU, 266 *seqq.*, 269 *seq.*, 272 *seq.*; LADERCHI, 1570, n. 168 *seq.* Cf. in *Lettres de Cath. de Médicis*, III., 306 *seq.* how Catherine sought to ease the Pope's mind.

² See the *brief to Henry of Anjou of March 30, 1570, Arm. 44, t. 15, p. 50, Papal Secret Archives; *ibid.* p. 48b-49b *briefs on this subject of the same date to Charles IX. and Catherine de' Medici. Cf. GRATIANI *Epist.*, 459. For G. Rozdradow (the same as the Rasdrakhoff in SCHWARZ, *Briefwechsel*, 77) see JUNGnitz, M. Gerstmann, Berlin, 1898, 41 *seqq.*, 60 *seq.*, 65; CANISI *Epist.*, IV., 367.

³ **Instruttione per Francia al conte Hieronimo Rosreshof* [sic] a 27 di Marzo, 1570, in *Varia polit.*, 81 (now 82), p. 463 *seqq.*, Papal Secret Archives.

severe letter to the king, putting him on his guard against evil counsellors.¹ Catherine de' Medici and Cardinals Guise and Bourbon also received briefs to the same effect.²

All these efforts were as ineffectual as those made by Philip II. for the same purpose. The French court persevered in the way upon which it had embarked, not only because financial straits and a military situation which had now become unfavourable pointed to peace, even on unworthy terms, but also because such an agreement was the only one suited to the policy of compromise which Catherine de' Medici continued to pursue, while an additional reason was her old fear of the King of Spain, who was interesting himself so much on behalf of the French Catholics, and to whom the continuation of the war would have been advantageous. If the actual conclusion of the peace was still delayed for some time, the reason was that the more impatient the court became, the more obstinately the Huguenots held out.³

On August 8th, 1570, Charles IX. laid down his arms before his enemies at St. Germain. The conditions of peace were more favourable than ever for the Huguenots, who obtained full amnesty and liberty of conscience, the free exercise of their religion in the territories of the nobles and a number of cities, with the exception of Paris and wherever the court happened to be from time to time; they further obtained the right to fill *all* the offices of state, as well as the right to object to six judges in each parliament; finally, they were given four places of safety for two years, La Rochelle, La Charité, Montauban and Cognac. In this way a veritable state within a state was formed.⁴ In a secret article Charles IX. promised compensation for the two million livres expended by

¹ Brief of April 23, 1570, in GOUBAU, 274 *seq.*, and LADERCHI, 1570, n. 177.

² All dated April 23. Arm. 44, t. 15, p. 94b, 96b, 98, Papal Secret Archives.

³ See BAUMGARTEN, Bartholomäusnacht, 16.

⁴ See SOLDAN, I., 396 *seqq.*

the Huguenots and Germany in the hire of their mercenaries !¹

Pius V. was convinced that this “ shameful peace which had been dictated to the French king by the conquered enemies of God ” would bring about in France even worse disturbances than those which had gone before.² His grief was all the greater because he at that time looked upon Avignon as being threatened.³ The nuncio was instructed to make strong remonstrances.⁴ Moreover, Pius V. resolved to send at once to France a special envoy in the person of the Papal notary, Francesco Bramante, to make an attempt to get the recent events annulled.⁵ The instructions for Bramante were dictated by the Pope himself on August 14th, while he was still under the impression created by the news of the peace ; they were afterwards recast on September 19th, and were only handed to the nuncio on the 25th. By these instructions Bramante was, with all proper moderation and prudence, to remind the king of the glorious age of his ancestors, who enjoyed the obedience of their subjects, the tranquillity of their country, and the glory and power of their realm so long as

¹ KERVYN DE LETTENHOVE, II., 209. A. Contarini well brings out the disgraceful side of the peace (p. 249 *seqq.*). Cf. the views of the French and German nuncios in *Corresp. dipl.*, IV., 4, n. 1.

² Besides the *instructions for Bramante (*infra* p. 132, n. 1) and *Lettres de Cath. de Médicis*, III., 330 n., cf. the briefs of complaint to Cardinals Guise and Bourbon of August 17 and September 23, 1570, in GOUBAU, 276 *seqq.*, 282 *seqq.* See also the *brief to Cardinal Guise of September 11, 1570, Arm. 44, t. 15, p. 212b, Papal Secret Archives ; *ibid.* similar *briefs of September 23, 1570, to Cardinals Strozzi, Pellevé and Armagnac. Cusano *reports on November 8, 1570, how the Pope deplored the peace as “ *damnosa et vituperosa* ” for Charles IX. State Archives, Vienna.

³ Cf. *Corresp. dipl.*, IV., 41.

⁴ Cf. the *notice in Cod. Barber. 4698, p. 205, Vatican Library.

⁵ The mission of Bramante has remained unknown to all historians until now. The *briefs accrediting him to Charles IX. and other personages in France in Arm. 44, t. 15, p. 230b, 237-251, Papal Secret Archives.

religious unity was unbroken. The arrangement arrived at at St. Germain, which bore the beautiful name of peace, had destroyed that unity, and would therefore soon bring about the ruin of France, because the treaty had no regard for religion, weakened the power of the king, and increased the boldness of his enemies, who, before long, would only return with greater zeal than ever to their former schemes. It was inconceivable that people who wished to deprive their king of his life and authority could ever be his friends, or that men who had hitherto always broken faith could keep it in the future. The Pope who on account of his youth did not wish to blame the king for what had happened, was still of opinion that he had only agreed to the peace in order to disarm the rebels, and in order that later on he might proceed against them at his discretion. If this should turn out to be Charles IX.'s plan Bramante was to encourage him in it, reminding him of the example of his father and his predecessors in their treatment of heretics who were a danger to the state, and assuring him of the help of the Pope. Everyone knew, so the instructions went on, that the Huguenots, who pretended to be the reformers of religion, had in view the ruin, not only of religion but of the state as well. At the present moment they were despoiling the churches of France in order to enrich their adherents. Since their object was the destruction of religion and the monarchy, they must be opposed in every way, in order that the king might still be king.¹

A special duty that was laid upon Bramante concerned the troops who had been sent in the previous spring under the

¹The *Instruttione prima a Mon^r Bramanti a 14 d' Agosto 1570 dettata da N. S^{re}, consegnata a 25 di Settembre 1570 in den Varia polit. 81 (now 82) p. 264 to 269. And p. 266 : *Instruttione seconda a Mons. Bramanti dettata da N. S^{re}, consignata a 25 di Settembre, and p. 267-268 *changes and additions to this ordinance ; p. 269 : *Instruttione terza a Mons. Bramanti a di 19 di Settembre, rescritta et consignata a 25 Settembre 1570 ; p. 269^b : *Aggiunta alla terza Instruttione. Papal Secret Archives.

command of Torquato Conti for the defence of Avignon.¹ He was to explain that, as the danger had been so pressing, it had not been possible to give the king warning of this, and that therefore the latter's desire that the troops, who had only been sent for purposes of defence, should now be withdrawn, was as impracticable as was the toleration of the religious innovations at Avignon. Lastly, the envoy was to express the hope that France would join the projected league against the Turks.²

The remonstrances of the Pope, his nuncio,³ and Bramante⁴ were absolutely without effect, principally because after the Peace of St. Germain the anti-Spanish attitude of the French court developed more and more. As early as July this frame of mind, which rested upon various causes, had almost led to an open breach, and Charles IX. and Catherine de' Medici had made the most violent attacks upon Philip II. The reasons for this attitude were dynastic ambition, hurt feelings and French hopes of splendid conquests.⁵ Estrangement from Spain inevitably led to a rapprochement with the leaders of the Huguenots, the rebels in the Netherlands, and Elizabeth

¹ Cf. as to this *Avviso di Roma of April 8, 1570, Urb. 1041, p. 257b, Vatican Library; LADERCHI, 1570, n. 195 seq.; CATENA, 64. See also *Arch. d. Soc. Rom.*, XXXI., 481; MAROCCO, XI., 35. For the Pope's anxiety see CHARRIÈRE, III., 54 seq. The *Instruzione al S. Torquato Conti, Aprile, 1570, in *Varia polit.*, 81 (now 82), p. 270 seq. Papal Secret Archives.

² See *Varia polit.*, 81 (now 82), p. 419 seq. Papal Secret Archives.

³ See the *Ultimi ragionamenti (undated) havuti con le MM^{ta} Crist^{me} in Cod. Barber., 4698, p. 205-212 (cf. PHILIPPSON, *loc. cit.* 113) and the **Cifra di Francia di 30 Agosto 1570, in *Nunziat. di Francia*, IV., 33, Papal Secret Archives. Cf. in DESJARDINS, III., 637, how Catherine deluded the nuncio into thinking that the Catholic religion could not fail to gain by the peace. See also the Venetian reports in *Histor. Zeitschrift*, L., 386 seq.

⁴ For the negotiations of Bramante see the *notices from the Papal Secret Archives in App. nn. 8 and 9.

⁵ See BAUMGARTEN, Bartholamäusnacht, 27 seqq.

of England. Scruples on this subject had no place in the mind of Catherine de' Medici, who even allowed herself to make disparaging remarks to the Papal nuncio. "What would you say," she said to the Pope's representative in October, "if you were soon to see Cardinal Châtillon here in his Cardinal's dress?" Such talk about an apostate, who had been deprived of his dignity by the Pope on account of his open apostasy, was bound to destroy all hopes of Catherine in the mind of the nuncio. This queen, he said, does not believe in God, nor do any of those who are her friends or those of the king.¹ It was about this time that Frangipani drew up a memorial on the state of affairs in France, which is noteworthy in several respects. He was of opinion that some attempt must be made to open at least the eyes of the king; the Huguenots would always be his enemies, because the offender never pardons. They were only trying to hoodwink the king, and at the first favourable opportunity would try to stir up a conspiracy or a revolt. There was still time to anticipate their action; the forces of the Catholics were larger than those of the Huguenots; the king could get as much military help as he liked from Switzerland and Italy. The first thing to be done, however, was to remove from his entourage the traitors who wished to involve him in a war with Catholic Spain. Should this take place the Pope would have to do his duty and form a league against Huguenot France. It was quite obvious that no confidence could be placed in Catherine de' Medici, who was a foreigner and a woman. Should the king prove a broken reed

¹ Report of the Spanish ambassador Alava of October 11, 1570, in BAUMGARTEN, *loc. cit.* 33 *seq.* Cf. the Cifra di Francia of September 30, 1570, which states: "Per mio giuditio excettuato solamente il re, che io lo ho per un buon giovane, se bene hoggi non ha ne discorso ne valore ne cuore di re, tutti li altri sono a un modo pieni di ogni sorte di passione et interesse del mondo et vacui di ogni religione, della quale io per me credo, che cosi li heretici, come quelli che si dicono cattolici, dico de nobili, se ne servano solamente per pretesto, ma che in verità non hanno religione." *Nunziat. d' Francia*, IV., 52, Secret Archives of the Vatican.

they would have to fall back on the Catholic nobles, who were in a position to force the king to see the error of his ways. The Catholic nobles could, just as the Huguenots had done, form a league among themselves, and alliances between the governors of the provinces, who would be controlled by some trustworthy leader, dependent upon the Pope. If this were not done, the Huguenots would certainly attract the whole kingdom of France to themselves.¹

The danger grew visibly nearer with the matrimonial projects which Catherine was forming at that time for her children. Her favourite son, Henry of Anjou, was to marry Elizabeth of England; her daughter Margaret, contrary to the Pope's wishes, was to marry, not the King of Portugal, but the Huguenot prince, Henry of Navarre.² The Protestants attached great importance to the marriage of Elizabeth with Anjou. The English minister, Cecil, already foresaw the fall of the Papacy, and the English ambassador in Paris was counting on the conversion of Charles IX. to Protestantism.³ In any case,

¹The memorial, at the end of which Frangipani suggests the sending of confidential agents to Charles IX. and to Philip II., bears the title "Discorso sopra gli humori di Francia di Monsignor Nazaret." RANKE (*Französ. Gesch.*, I.², 301 *seq.*) only extracted one passage from this dealing with the Catholic associations. He made use of a codex in the Barberini Library, and rightly gives 1570 as the date of its composition. The copy, however, must be later, since Frangipani only received the bishopric of Nazareth on November 5th, 1572. Ranke does not give, as is often the case, the designation of the codex; I at last found it after long research in Cod. Barber. 5269, p. 63 *seq.*, Vatican Library. There is another *copy in the Library at Karlsruhe, Cod. Durl. 44, p. 173 *seq.* I am aware that later on Thompson published the memorial in Appendix p. 548 *seq.* according to the Barberini codex, but without establishing its authorship more exactly; moreover, in his text he only makes use of the passage in Ranke already mentioned.

²*Cf.* SOLDAN, I., 408 *seq.*, 413 *seq.*; BAUMGARTEN, *loc. cit.* 41 *seq.*, 60 *seq.*; TANZIN, *Le mariage de Marguerite de Valois in Rev. des quest. histor.*, LXXX., 446 *seq.*

³See KERVYN DE LETTENHOVE, II., 270.

if this marriage should take place, Mary Stuart and the English Catholics would be at the mercy of their mortal enemies.

No less serious injury to Catholic interests was threatened by the mixed marriage with the son of the Queen of Navarre, who had distinguished herself by her violent persecution of the Catholics.¹ To all this was added the fact that on September 12th, 1571, Coligny, who a year before had been banished as guilty of high treason, and had been hanged upon the gallows in effigy,² made his appearance at the residence of the royal court at Blois, and very soon regained a greater influence than ever.³

It is no wonder that these events gave rise to the gravest anxiety. The Pope declared that so long as Henry of Navarre was a Huguenot he would under no circumstances grant him a dispensation from consanguinity for his marriage with the Princess Margaret. It now seemed that the fears he had long entertained, lest the young king, surrounded as he was by Huguenots, should be wavering in his faith, had become a certainty.⁴ It had been reported to the Pope that the man to whom Catherine wished to give her daughter had threatened with death all opposition to Protestant preaching,⁵ and had profaned the Most Holy Sacrament and the crucifix in the most opprobrious way.⁶ Of Coligny it was said that he had

¹ Cf. the remarks in DUBARAT, *Le protestantisme en Béarn*, Pau, 1893.

² See SOLDAN, I., 365. The strongly worded briefs of Pius V. of October 12, 1569, in GOUBAU, 231 *seqq.* refer to this.

³ Cf. SOLDAN, I., 420 *seq.*; BAUMGARTEN, *loc. cit.*, 87 *seqq.*; KERVYN DE LETTENHOVE, II., 331 *seq.*

⁴ See TIEPOLO, 188; CATENA, 176; PALANDRI, 153 *seq.*; *cf. Arch. d. miss. scientif.*, 2 series, II., 444 *seq.*

⁵ Cf. *Intermédiaire des chercheurs*, December 15, 1901; MERKI, *Coligny*, 390, n. 1.

⁶ * "E bene stato affermato per vero a S.S.^{ta} chel figlio della regina di Navarra ha fatto gettare per terra il santo sacramento dell'Eucharistia e ha fatto strascinare per terra un crocifisso con la corda all collo." *Report of Arco from Rome, May 1, 1568, State Archives, Vienna,

quite recently at Angoulême gone to the horrible lengths of copying the living torches of Nero.¹ Yet this man was loaded by the king with gifts, and even with ecclesiastical benefices, and taken back into the royal council. He had a great influence over the young king, who eagerly listened to his grandiose plans. These aims were an alliance with England and war with Spain. For this purpose he had emissaries in England, in Protestant Switzerland, and in Germany, as well as at Constantinople and among the leaders of the Moors in Spain. He not only planned to give help to the enemies of Philip II. in the Low Countries, but also to tap the sources of Spanish wealth in the West Indies. Charles IX. was already dreaming of great conquests ; it is no wonder then that under these circumstances the news of the great victory of Lepanto was but coldly received at the French court.²

For Pius V. his great success against the Turks was a fresh incentive to leave no stone unturned to save the Catholic cause in France from further loss. He redoubled the efforts which he had hitherto made to prevent the marriage with Navarre. For her part Catherine used every artifice to obtain the Papal dispensation for the marriage, but Pius V. remained firm even when he was threatened with the total apostasy of France from the Church. He would, he said, in some sense cease to be Pope if he were to show favour to an obstinate heretic. He would not grant the dispensation even though a French army were in Rome, and if in spite of everything the marriage took place, he would pronounce the children of it illegitimate. In spite of this, Catherine still flattered herself with the hope of being able to induce the Pope to change his mind by holding out the prospect of the accession of France to the league against the Turks if the Pope would grant the dispensation.³ In doing this she knew well how much at heart the noble Pope had the defence of Christendom.

¹ See *Corresp. dipl.*, II., 372.

² See SOLDAN, I., 423 ; KERVYN DE LETTENHOVE, II., 326, 331 *seq.* ; BAUMGARTEN, *loc. cit.* 96 *seqq.* ; BLOK, III., 116 *seq.* ; JANSSEN-PASTOR, IV. ¹⁵.¹⁶, 331 *seqq.*

³ See the reports of Petrucci in DESJARDINS, III., 695, 702 *seqq.*,

In the middle of December, 1571, Pius V. had sent to France as nuncio extraordinary¹ Antonio Maria Salviati, who was related to the French royal house on the side of Medici, and had already stayed at the French court in the spring of 1571 in connexion with the imprisonment of Giovan Galeazzo Sanseverino, who had been accused before the Inquisition.² Salviati was instructed in the first place to induce Charles IX. to join the league against the Turks.³ At the same time he was to express the great displeasure of the Pope at the fact that the king had just at that moment sent the Bishop of Aix, who had been disposed for heresy, to Constantinople, to the enemy of the Christian name, a thing which destroyed the hopes of the poor Christians in the Turkish Empire of being delivered from its insupportable tyranny as a consequence of the victory at Lepanto. The nuncio was also to make complaint of the continued attempts to marry Henry of Navarre to Margaret, on the plea that he might be brought back to the Church, which was certainly an empty hope. Lastly he

714 *seqq.*, 719 *seqq.*, 723 *seqq.*, 730, 735 *seqq.*, 740; BAUMGARTEN, *loc. cit.* 113 *seqq.*; PALANDRI, 162 *seqq.* Cf. also *Histor. Zeitschrift*, L., 389 *seq.* After the night of St. Bartholomew, Catherine joked about their having believed in Rome in her accession to the league against the Turks. See THEINER, *Annales, eccl.*, I., 332.

¹ See LADERCHI, 1571, n. 135; GARAMPI, *Osservaz.*, 315.

² See the **Instruttione per Mons. Salviati*, dated Rome, February 5, 1571, in *Varia polit.*, 81 (now 82), p. 117 *seq.*; cf. *ibid.* 277 *seq.*, 638 *seq.*, 640 *seq.*, Papal Secret Archives. For the successful efforts of Charles IX. and Cardinal Rambouillet (then Bishop of Le Mans and ambassador in Rome) to set free Count G. G. Sanseverino, who had been imprisoned by the Inquisition while in the service of France, see the **report of Arco*, February 17, 1571, State Archives, Vienna. Jean de Vivonne, who was sent at that time to Rome, played an essential part in this success; cf. GUY DE BREMOND, *J. de Vivonne*, Paris, 1884, 27 *aseq.*; Iso AMABILE, I., 303 *seq.*

³ F. Bramante had already negotiated about this; see his **Cifra of November 8, 1570, Nunziat. de Francia*, IV., 73, Papal Secret Archives.

was to say that the Pope was very much surprised that Coligny had been again given so much power, and that Charles IX. had allowed the Huguenots to propagate their errors in the Marquisate of Saluzzo, since this was contrary to the Peace of St. Germain.¹

On his way to France Salviati visited Florence, Lucca, Genoa, and the Duke of Savoy, in which places, by the Pope's orders, he treated of the holy league.² In January, 1572, he reached the French court, which was then at Blois; he was assisted in his mission by briefs of exhortation to Charles IX., which, in spite of all that had happened, were expressed in terms of paternal kindness.³ A little later, on February 7th,⁴ he was followed by the Cardinal legate, Bonelli, who in December had obtained in Lisbon promises from King Sebastian with regard to his entry into the league and his marriage to Margaret of Valois.⁵

¹ See the *instructions for Salviati, dated Rome, December 15, 1571, in *Varia polit.*, 33 (now 34), p. 49 *seq.* See *ibid.* 81 (now 82), p. 283 *seq.* the first draft *cf. ibid.* 116 (now 117), p. 49 *seq.* Papal Secret Archives. See also the letter from Pius V. to Catherine of December 15, 1571, in *CATENA*, 301 *seq.* and *Corresp. dipl.*, IV., 549 *seq.*, 551 *seq.* In his *report of November 3, 1571 (State Archives, Vienna) Arco mentions an earlier letter: *" Il Papa si duole grandemente della regina madre del rè come quella che principalmente favorisse l'ammiraglio et ha l'animo volto del continuo a diverse novità et perciò Sua Sanità gl'ha scritto un breve in colera."

² See the letter of the Doge of Genoa to Pius V. in *GOUBAU*, 436 *seqq.* *Cf.* the important remarks of *LADERCHI*, 1571, n. 135, as against *GRAZIANI* (*Epist.*, 465).

³ Brief of January 25, 1572, in *GOUBAU*, 439 *seq.* (*cf.* as to this *TURKE*, 22) and of February 6, 1572, in *CATENA*, 298 *seq.*

⁴ See the *letter of Bonelli to Cardinal Rusticucci, dated Blois, February 9, 1572, *Cod.* 33-G-24, p. 576. Corsini Library, Rome.

⁵ Cardinal Bonelli, who made his entry into Lisbon on December 3, 1571, reported thence on December 5 and 13, 1571, concerning the general promises made by the king as to the league (see the *letter of Bonelli in *Cod.* 33-G-24, p. 34 *seq.*, Corsini Library, Rome). In the *letter of December 13 he speaks of

The Cardinal, who, as he travelled across France, had everywhere seen the ruins of the churches which had been destroyed by the Huguenots, had no illusions as to the difficulties which lay in the way of his being able to arrange those matters with which he was charged to deal at the French court ; these were, to ask for the marriage of Margaret to the King of Portugal, the entry of France into the league against the Turks, and the prevention of the defensive alliance which Elizabeth of England had recently proposed to the French government. On February 9th there also arrived at Blois the General of the Jesuits, Francis Borgia, who, armed with special instructions from Philip II., was to support the legate. Neither the one nor the other left any room for doubt that the Pope would never grant the dispensation for the marriage with Navarre. They fought against that match just as strongly as they urged the Portuguese marriage, but all their efforts remained without any measure of success. With regard to the league against the Turks all that Bonelli could obtain was a promise that France would not hinder the crusade. With regard to the alliance with England he received the assurance that this was only aimed at the maintenance of friendly relations with that kingdom, and that there was no idea of any hostile action against Spain.¹

the "buona dispositione" of the king concerning the marriage with Margaret of Valois which Pius V. so much desired : "mi disse voler per dote dal Re di Francia ch'entri ancor esso in lega ! Bonelli, who presented a memorial to the king on December 11 (in LÄMMER, *Zur Kirchengesch.*, 135), left for Madrid on the 14th, and thence for France. At Miranda he received a letter from the Portuguese king for Pius V., dated December 20, 1571, containing the purely general promise that the king intended to fight against the Turks, Saracens and Lutherans (*Corpo dipl. Portug.*, X., 427).

¹ See the *letters of Bonelli addressed to Cardinal Rusticucci from Blois on February 9, 19 and 22, 1572, followed by one from Rome to Philip II., March 30, 1572, in Cod. 33-G-24, p. 57b, Corsini Library, Rome ; extracts given in GACHARD, *Bibl. Corsini*, 52 *seqq.* Cf. BAUMGARTEN, *Bartholomäusnacht*, 118

seqq., 126, and PHILIPPSON, Röm. Kurie, 116 *seqq.*, where use is also made of the statements of the Spanish, Florentine, and Venetian ambassadors, and of Francis Borgia. A long controversy arose out of a passage in the letter of Bonelli to Cardinal Rusticucci from Lyons on March 6, 1572, where he says that he has not been able to meet with any success with regard to the league or the marriage with Navarre, but "con alcuni particolari ch'io porto, dei quali ragguaglierò Nostro Signore a bocca, posso dire di non partirmi affatto mal expedito."

RANKE, who was the first to bring this passage to light, in his *Histor.-polit. Zeitschrift*, II., 598, very precipitately concludes from this that "even if it was not absolutely told him, at least hints were given" to the legate "of a secret scheme in favour of the Catholics." SOLDAN (*Histor. Taschenbuch*, 1854, 219) says on the other hand: "All that can be admitted is that this does not refer, as Ranke supposes, to the night of St. Bartholomew. What could be more natural than that as Gabutius states, the legate should have been led on by hopes of the conversion of the bridegroom? The Pope himself had already spoken in this sense." In spite of this Ranke maintained his view (*Französ. Geschichte*, I. 2 [1856] 320). On the Catholic side in 1856 GANDY in the *Revue des questions histor.* and again in the *Civiltà Cattolica* (6 series, vols. 8-11) made a definite protest against the assertion that the massacre of the Huguenots on St. Bartholomew's eve had been a long predetermined act, and that Pius V. had been informed of it in advance. Instead of refuting these solid and learned researches, an intimate friend of Döllinger, Lord Acton, when the controversy concerning the definition of Papal infallibility had become acute, revived the accusation which, a year earlier Michelet (*Hist. de la revolut. franc.* I. 36) had represented as being proved, and tried to bolster it up with full authorities (*North British Review*, October, 1869, n. 101, trans. by GAR, *La Strage di S. Bartolomeo*, Venice, 1870). In his vehement excitement Acton swept aside all the arguments on the other side. Another friend of Döllinger, Giov. Huber, did the same. HERGENRÖTHER (*Kirche und Staat*, 656) protested against both. Nor were contradictions on the part of learned Catholics wanting (see FUNK in *Literar. Rundschau*, 1880, 169) when WUTKE (*Vorgeschichte der Bartholomäusnacht* [1879], 177) tried to represent as "incontestable" the complicity of Pius V. in the massacre of St. Bartholomew. Two years later a strongly Pro-

testant scholar, BAUMGARTEN (*Bartholamäusnacht* 130 *seqq.*; *cf.* the supplement in *Hist. Zeitschrift*, L., 396 *seq.*), in a calm and objective account of the affair, showed the untenability of the case established by Acton and Wuttke; he was supported by v. BEZOLD (*Hist. Zeitschrift*, XLVII., 563), SCHOTT (*Allgem. Zeitung*, 1882, Beil. n. 67), PHILIPPSON (*Röm. Kurie*, 116 *seqq.*), and ALFRED STERN (*Der Ursprung der Bartholomäusnacht in Monatshefte of Westermann*, 5 series, vol. 4).

But Baumgarten, as well as Philippson and Stern, have completely overlooked the fact that at the end of 1880 another Protestant scholar, Karl Türke, in a dissertation published at Chemnitz, had gone into the questions under discussion in a way that was as thorough as it was accurate. The conclusion arrived at by Türke is that Pius V. "must in any case be acquitted of any direct participation in any treacherous plan for a massacre of the Huguenots, even supposing that any such thing had been planned in a definite form." (p. 15). The remarks of Türke, with which Schott in *Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte*, V., 114 *seq.*, agrees, retain their authority even by the side of those of Baumgarten, as for example the following conclusion: "even though the hatred which Pius V. felt for the heretics left nothing to be desired" his very character excludes "participation in intrigues which were entirely idealistic and pertaining to the realm of fiction." Equally pertinent is the remark that the strained relations between Pius V. and the French court, especially in the time that followed, are quite incompatible with so important a secret agreement between them (p. 15-22). As to the "alcuni particolari" of which Bonelli, according to his letter of March 6, 1572, intended to give fuller details by word of mouth, Türke thinks that these refer to the acceptance of the Tridentine decrees and similar matters; that they certainly do not refer to important secrets, and that the exceedingly leisurely return journey of the legate is quite inconsistent with any such theory (p. 23-25). Other considerations put forward by Türke (p. 26 *seq.*) concerning the mission of Bonelli, the letter from Cardinal d' Ossat of September 22, 1599, the codex 164 of the Marchese Capponi, used without any attempt at criticism by Acton, all complete and confirm the conclusions of Baumgarten against the supporters of the theory of premeditation. Concerning the things stated in the Capponi codex Alfred Maury remarked as early as 1871 (*Journal des Savants*, 422) that, even if they were the work of the man who

All this, however, was nothing but empty words, as were the assurances of devotion to the Pope contained in the letters sent to Pius V. by the king and the queen on February 22nd, 1572.¹ By April 19th the alliance between England and Charles IX. had been concluded; a little earlier the marriage contract between Margaret and Henry of Navarre had been signed without taking into consideration whether the Pope gave the dispensation or not. At the same time there were rumours of secret preparations which pointed to an enterprise against Philip II.² While he was trying to deceive the Spanish king by assurances of friendship, and to pacify the Papal nuncio when he showed signs of distrust, Charles IX. was writing on May 11th to his representative at the Porte: "All my thoughts are turned to resisting the might of Spain . . . I have fitted out in my ports a good number of ships with a force of from 12,000 to 15,000 men, which by the end of this month will be ready to take the offensive, nominally to protect my coasts against the pirates, but in reality to harass the Catholic King and to encourage the *guenx* in the Low Countries to advance, as indeed they have already done, and have seized the whole of Zeeland, and greatly shaken Holland. I have concluded an alliance with the Queen of England, and have sent thither

later on became Clement VIII., who accompanied Bonelli on his journey, it must be remembered that the French court was aiming by its promises and mysterious hints at winning over the Pope to the dispensation (*cf.* what we have said *supra* p. 136). In other ways too there are no safe grounds for the assertion put forward by Acton and his disciples. *Cf.* TÜRKE, 34 *seq.*, where the accounts of Catena and Gabutius are critically examined. It must be added that in 1884 KERVYN DE LETTENHOVE (*Huguenots*, II., 43) brought to light a dispatch from the Spanish ambassador in Rome, of May 19, 1568 (*cf. infra*, p. 154, n. 4), which shows how wrong was the estimate formed by Acton, and how true that of TÜRKE, of the Pope's character, and his attitude towards such projects as the massacre of St. Bartholomew.

¹ Printed in the second edition of CATENA, 1587, p. 343 *seq.*

² See KERVYN DE LETTENHOVE, II., 364, 366 *seq.*; BAUMGARTEN, *loc. cit.* 144 *seq.*, 146 *seq.*

my cousin the Duke of Montmorency, a thing which has filled the Spandiards with wonder and jealousy, as have my friendly relations with the princes of Germany."¹

The tendency of French policy towards the Huguenots and their allies involved serious danger to the Catholics of France. At the same time they had no cause for despair, since during the desperate struggle which they had had to carry on for their very existence, the foundations of their spiritual renewal had been laid.

Pius V. had intervened in this matter as well with apostolic zeal. Not only was he unceasingly careful for the maintenance of purity of faith in France,² but also for the renewal of Catholic life, and the removal of ecclesiastical abuses. From the beginning of his pontificate he had urged the carrying out of the Tridentine decrees, and the conscientious use of the right of nomination to episcopal sees granted to the French government by the concordat. At Avignon he himself gave an example of the way in which the reforms of the Council of Trent should be enforced.³ In common with all well-informed persons he recognized that in the end violence and bloodshed would be useless without the removal of the hopeless conditions which were above all the result of the abuse of the

¹ KERVYN DE LETTENHOVE, II., 354 *seq.* DE NOAILLES, Henri de Valois, I., Paris, 1867, 9.

² With regard to the action taken against the heretical bishops, of which we have spoken on p. 108, besides the briefs given by LADERCHI (see especially 1567, n. 160, 169), there must be taken into the consideration the *following unpublished briefs: Cardⁱ Crequy of July 17, 1566 (Arm. 44, t. 12, n. 96), Honorato de Sabaudia, comiti Tendae of August 7, 1566: against heresy in French Savoy (*ibid.* n. 99), Card. de Armeniaco of February 10, 1568 (*ibid.* t. 13, p. 147), Communit. comit. Venaissini of May 2, 1569, Episc. Vertudonesi of May 7, 1569 (*ibid.* t. 14, p. 107), Comiti Tendae of December 30, 1569 (*ibid.* p. 320), Papal Secret Archives. In February, 1572, A. Contarini gives the following summary of the spread of heresy in France (p. 242): "the most infected districts are Guienne, Gascony and Poitou, the least are Champagne and Ile de France."

³ See CIACONIUS, III., 1020.

powers granted by the concordat.¹ In order to extirpate heresy, the Pope wrote to Charles IX. and Catherine de' Medici on March 8th, 1566, it is above all necessary that the episcopal sees should be wisely filled, and that their holders as well as all others having the care of souls should observe the duty of residence in conformity with the decrees of the Council of Trent.² It seemed for the moment that Charles IX. had taken to heart the words of the Pope, but it soon became evident that, in spite of further exhortations, he was shortsightedly persevering in the old way which was so convenient and offered so many material advantages. In his report for June, 1569, the Venetian ambassador, Giovanni Correro, described with biting sarcasm how the offices and property of the Church were left at the disposal of the king's cupidity. It is very pleasant to His Majesty, he says, to be able to dispose of 106 bishoprics, 17 archbishoprics, from 600 to 700 abbeys and as many priories, and in this way, without opening his purse, to pay his debts, reward his grandees and dower his daughters. The abuse has become such and has reached such a pitch that at the French court they deal in bishoprics and abbeys as they do elsewhere in pepper and cinnamon. The evil is so obvious that everyone is writing about it and owns that here is the root of all the trouble. All the promises made by the queen to do away with the abuse are shown to be mere empty words.³

Similar promises were again made in 1572 to Cardinal Bonelli, but no change was effected. As he was bound by the concordat, and as the situation could hardly grow worse, the

¹ Cf. especially the views of G. Correro (p. 189 *seqq.*, 192), who makes it clear that in this respect things were as bad as ever (see Vol. XIII. of this work, p. 168). Correro rightly remarks that if they did not see to having good bishops, who would teach reform by word and example, everything would be useless, even though they were to proceed with fire and sword. See also A. CONTARINI, 243.

² See the *brief from the Papal Secret Archives in App. n. 1.

³ See CORRERO, 192 *seq.*

Pope could do nothing but wait.¹ When, however, he could make a protest with any prospect of success, he refused to confirm some nominee of the king.²

That no help was to be expected from the French court for the interior renewal of the Church of France, was shown even more clearly by the protection it afforded to the bishops who had been disposed for heresy, as well as the former Cardinal Châtillon, who had openly joined the Calvinists and taken a wife on December 1st, 1564.³ The Pope's action against these prelates who were so forgetful of their duty was so fully justified from the Catholic point of view that he had every right to expect the assistance of the eldest son of the Church.⁴ But to the king the so-called liberties of the Gallican Church and his own political aims were of far greater importance, and he ignored all the Pope's remonstrances. Pius V., however, did not relax his efforts. Again in a brief of October 14th, 1570, he deplored the "opprobrium" that Jean de Montluc, who had been deposed in 1566, should still be holding his bishopric of Valence.⁵ The nuncio Frangipani plainly told Charles IX., in reference to the part he played in favour of Châtillon, that he was running the risk of being known as the schismatic king.⁶

To the terrible injury inflicted on the Catholic Church in France by this attitude of the government were to be added the enormous material losses which it had incurred in the religious wars. In the opinion of an ambassador, it would not be possible to restore in ten years the great number of churches

¹ Cf. A. CONTARINI, 251, 267; TÜRKE, 24.

² An example in LADERCHI, 1569, n. 149.

³ Cf. MERKI, Coligny, 342.

⁴ Opinion of POLENZ (II., 301).

⁵ This **brief, which is in the Papal Secret Archives, escaped the notice of DEGERT (p. 105).

⁶ "In quel di Ciattiglione mi sono aperto a dirne amorevolmente al Re insino al pericolo che incorre di acquistarsi nome di Re scismatico in vece di quel che ha di Christianissimo." Letter from Paris, September 30, 1570, *Nunziat. di Francia*, IV., 48. Papal Secret Archives.

that had been destroyed, and which still excited wonder in their ruins. According to Correro the clergy were ruined, because, apart from the ecclesiastical property which had been sold by the order of the Pope, since 1561 they had had to pay more than twelve million scudi, and that this was nothing compared to the losses which had been inflicted on them by the soldiery, whether friends or enemies.¹

Nevertheless these terrible experiences had had their advantage for the French Catholics. Even during the first religious war the acts of violence and misdeeds of the Huguenots had brought about a change; the sight of the ruined churches and the dismantled altars, the spoliations and murders, carried out in the name of the new religion, of helpless priests, monks, and nuns, had driven many into resistance who had allowed themselves to be blinded by the appearance of greater strictness and piety in Calvinism, and had opened out to them the way of return to the Catholic Church. The second religious war had had the consequence that, in spite of the conventions of the Peace of Longjumeau, the more important cities would no longer tolerate the Calvinist preachers. The Catholics were beginning to take up their own defence vigorously.² Before this, says Correro, they had been full of fears, not

¹ See CORRERO, 186. Cf. H. FURGEOT, *L'aliénation des biens du clergé sous Charles IX.* in *Revue des quest. histor.*, XXIX., 448 seq.

² Cf. the memorial of Frangipani mentioned on p. 135, n. 1; A. CONTARINI, 244; BAUER, *Th. Beza*, II., Leipsic, 1851, 611; PICOT, I., 15 seq. 19. To this day traces may still be seen of the devastation, to which innumerable works of art fell victim. Among the libraries that were destroyed, the most valuable was undoubtedly that of Cluny. For the changed mood of the people cf. *Chanson populaire contre les Huguenots* (1566) in *Bullet. de la soc. d'hist. de France*, I., 2 (1834), 165 seqq. Of the Franciscan Order alone about 200 martyrs are mentioned by name in France for the years 1560 to 1580 (see GAUDENTIUS, 110). In reality the number was far greater, since whole convents were frequently destroyed--there were about 100--and their inmates put to death without their names being recorded (see HOLZAPFEL, 480).

because they were fewer in number, since of the common people only a thirtieth part at the outside were Huguenots, and a third part of the nobility, but because the Huguenots were splendidly organized and united, while the Catholics were divided and carelessly left everything to the government. Now that they had been disillusioned by the deplorable attitude of the court, they had begun, like men roused from sleep, to unite and show a bold front to the enemy. The conduct of the war itself had deprived the Huguenots of their moral preponderance, apart from their loss of Condé, Andelot, Wolfgang of Deux-Ponts, and other leaders.¹ The Huguenots, too, who even in civil matters were cut off from the national life, stood instinctively opposed to that tendency to unity which is so deeply rooted in the French character.² The change in public opinion, too, was profoundly affected by the fact that Pierre de Ronsard, the founder of French classicism, definitely took the part of the ancient Church, and in his writings openly opposed the Huguenots as the destroyers of Christianity and the enemies of the state.³

The shrewd Correro also made another observation with regard to the changed attitude of the French Catholics towards

¹ CORRERO, 186 *seq.* The numerical data of Correro naturally have only a relative importance. However, Frangipani also states (memorial quoted *supra* p. 135, n. 1): "Per due Ugonotti che siano nel regno si ode calcolare che si ha da contraporre più di otto cattolici."

² Cf. ELKAN Die Publizistik der Bartholomäusnacht, Heidelberg, 1905, 141 *seq.*, and PLATZHOFF in *Preuss. Jahrb.*, CL., 54 *seq.*

³ See specially his Rémonstrance au peuple de France, 1563. BAUMGARTNER, *Gesch. der Weltliteratur*, V. 265, ; PERDRIZET, *R. et la réforme*, Paris, 1903. There is a celebrated passage in which Ronsard makes Beza responsible for the terrible devastation asking him how he dares to preach:

Un Christ tout noiricy de fumée
Portant un morion en teste et dans la main
Un large coutelas rouge de sang humain.

See KERVYN DE LETTENHOVE, I., 79.

the Pope, who, he said, had gained more than he had lost during the recent disturbances, because, before the schism in religion, attachment to Rome was but weak among the French people, who looked upon the Pope rather as a great Italian prince than as the head of the Church and the universal pastor, but no sooner had the Huguenots come to the fore than the Catholics began again to venerate him and recognize him as the true Vicar of Christ, and this feeling had become stronger and stronger the more violently they were harassed and attacked by the Calvinists. Even that vast number who did not give much thought to religion, but only wished to be counted loyal servants of the king, now honoured the Pope much more than of old, in order to show their hostility to the Huguenots. The life and conduct of the reigning Pope, too, had contributed in an extraordinary way to the increased authority of the Holy See. The reforms which had been introduced in Rome gave more than ordinary satisfaction ; Pius V.'s reserve towards his relations was admired as something unheard of for many years, and men were delighted when he would not make them counts, or marquises or dukes, but left them in their lowly state. This alone was enough to make him appear to the people as a saint, who was not aiming at his private ends, but only at the common good, and whose thoughts were fixed exclusively on the extirpation of heresy, the removal of abuses from the Church, and at bringing back priests to a simple and praiseworthy manner of life. Even the Huguenots could find nothing to condemn in such a Pope, and were wont to say that His Holiness had a good conscience. The impression made by his purity of life was so great that he won the praises even of his enemies.¹

This revival of Papal authority, as well as the slow renewal of life in the Catholic Church in France, was closely linked with the quiet but efficacious labours of the new Orders.²

¹ CORRERO, 207.

² RANKE (Päpste II.², 95 *seq.*) and POLENZ (II., 287 *seq.*) have already called attention to this. Cf. also BAUDRILLART in *La France chrét.*, Paris, 1895, 363. Of the older Orders Pius

Together with the Capuchins, who were trying to get a footing in France in 1568,¹ this was true above all of the Jesuits, who had the great advantage of possessing in Edmond Auger, Antonio Possevino and Olivier Manaraeus men who devoted themselves with extraordinary success to missionary work. The accounts of their labours show that even many of those who had most strongly fallen under the influence of the religious innovations, flocked to their sermons and were easily led to place themselves under instruction. Auger was invited by the authorities to Toulouse in 1566; the most distinguished men of that city and about 1,000 students of the university, who all leaned in various degrees towards Calvinism, followed his conferences with rapt attention; the university wished to make him a doctor, and the civic authorities invited him to return for the following Lent.² He met with a similar success in Paris; the churches were crowded at his sermons; he was invited to preach before the court, and the most exalted personages in the country accepted the dedication of his works.³ By the help of English influence Protestantism had obtained the complete mastery of Dieppe. All the churches there had been ruined with the exception of one, in which the altars, crucifixes and images of the saints had been broken in pieces. In spite of this, as the result of the sermons of Possevino in 1570, 2,500 Huguenots within a few days pressed to be received into the ancient Church, while Possevino's successor, Manaraeus, was able to receive 4,000

V. specially sought to reform and renew the Dominicans; see his *brief to Charles IX., in which he begs him to give his assistance to the General of the Dominicans in his activities in France. Arm. 44, t. 16, p. 183, Papal Secret Archives.

¹ See Documents pour servir à l'hist. de l'établissement des Capucins en France, 1568-1858, Paris, 1894, I *seqq.* The Titre de fondation du couvent des Capucins de la rue St. Honoré de Paris, dated September 4, 1568, in *Bullet. de la Soc. d'hist. de Paris*, November-December, 1889.

² FOUQUERAY, I., 533 *seqq.*

³ *Ibid.* 535.

Calvinists; within a few months these two preachers had entirely changed the religious aspect of the city.¹

A thing which contributed a great deal to this success was the fact that Possevino and Auger not only possessed a profound theological training and a knowledge of the classical languages, which was so much appreciated at that time, but also that their whole conduct and their zeal for religion gave great edification, and especially that their care for the poor and sick and desolate showed that they were filled with the true spirit of Christianity. At Paris Auger preached for choice in the prisons and hospitals.² At Lyons, where he converted about 2,000 Huguenots, he founded a body of two hundred ladies who went twice a week to the hospitals to serve the poor.³ A little later he undertook the office of military chaplain with the troops of the Duke of Anjou.⁴ Possevino, who preached in the Cathedral at Marseilles in 1568, at the same time visited the orphanages and instructed the children in the elements of religion. It also gave special edification when he there took charge of those condemned to the galleys, who were entirely neglected.⁵ Auger rendered a lasting service to Catholic France by his two catechisms, which attained in his own country an importance similar to that of Canisius in Germany.⁶

The learned Maldonatus also left his chair in the Jesuit college in Paris in order to preach and catechize with five companions in Poitou, one of the principal centres of the Huguenots. We have special accounts of his labours,⁷ which

¹ *Ibid.* 545 *seqq.*

² *Ibid.* 535.

³ *Ibid.* 536.

⁴ *Ibid.* 537.

⁵ *Ibid.* 543 *seq.*

⁶ See F. J. BRAND, P. Edm. Augerius, Cleves, 1903; *Idem*, Die Katechismen des Edm. Augerius, S. J. Freiburg, 1917.

⁷ Maldonatus to Borgia, March 29, 1570, in PRAT, Maldonat, 577; to the college of Clermont, April 1, 1570, *ibid.* (582 *seqq.*); to the Cardinal of Lorraine, April 18, 1570, *ibid.* 585 *seqq.*; to Possevino (?), May 10, 1570, *ibid.* 588 *seqq.*

give a surprising insight into the spiritual state of the great Protestant organizations. In the opinion of Maldonatus Calvinism was so wide-spread in the capital of Poitou, simply because, owing to the neglect of the clergy, religious instruction was almost wanting; the people were Huguenots because they knew nothing about either religion.¹ It was looked upon as a proof of Catholicism to be present at mass, but while they were there they said the prayers which were taught them by a Calvinist preacher in the dress of a Catholic priest. The religious conferences which two of the Jesuits gave every morning and evening at Poitiers, as well as the two daily lectures of Maldonatus for the more learned and for the students, attracted great crowds, and produced an "incredible effect" on the opinion of the whole city. Often the preachers heard it said that the churches had not been so full for ten years past. In Holy Week so many people crowded to confession that the Jesuits could not have dealt with them even if there had been fifty of them. Many returned to the ancient Church, several of them with such good will that it was quite clear that they had only been heretics for lack of instruction.² The commandant at Poitiers helped the general good will by certain ordinances in favour of the ancient religion, but, in the opinion of Maldonatus, many of the Huguenots were so weary after the wars that, especially among the common people, many of them were only waiting to be forcibly commanded to become Catholics.³

Of even greater importance than the labours of the Jesuits to the revival of Catholic life in France would have been the carrying out of the reform decrees of Trent, but it was out of the question to think of this on account of the attitude of the

¹ "Son hugonotes porque no entienden la una religion, ni lo otra." To Borgia, *loc. cit.* 578.

² "que se vee claramente que eran herejes por falta de aver quien les enseñase." *Ibid.*

³ "ut omnes hæretici, præsertim populares, nihil aliud optare videantur, quam ut compellantur intrare," to the Card. of Lorraine, 18 April, 1870, *ibid.* 586.

government. Where Pius V. had only to issue his orders, as at Avignon and in the Venaissin, he set to work with all zeal to introduce the Tridentine decrees. By his wish the archbishop, Feliciano Capitone, held provincial councils at Avignon in 1567 and 1569,¹ and made a visitation of the whole district.² In order to reform ecclesiastical abuses the Pope even threw himself into the midst of the disturbances of war.³ The war had hardly ended in 1570 when the Papal nuncio demanded the summoning of provincial councils in accordance with the Council of Trent, pointing to the example of Italy and Spain.⁴ By the autumn of 1570 Frangipani could send encouraging reports to Rome from Paris concerning the development of Catholic life, and the much greater zeal of preachers and theologians for the defence of the Catholic religion and the repression of heresy;⁵ the people too attended the churches in much greater numbers, as had been clearly seen on the feast of St. Denis.⁶ When the jubilee was celebrated at Paris at the beginning of November, the churches had never been so full. The number of those who received the sacraments of penance and of the altar was so large as to make it seem like Easter. Parish priests declared that the people

¹ Copy of the *Atti in the municipal Library, Avignon.

² Cf. the *brief to the Archbishop of Avignon of July 17, 1569, Arm. 44, t. 14, p. 150, Papal Secret Archives.

³ Cf. the briefs in LADERCHI, 1567, n. 161 seq. ; 1569, n. 192.

⁴ Cf. the *report of Frangipani to Cardinal Rusticucci from Paris, August 16, 1570, *Nunziat. di Francia*, IV., 18, Papal Secret Archives.

⁵ " *Si vedde hoggidi nei nostri padri et predicatori et theologi tutti un zelo et un animo grande nella difesa della religione catholica et in detestatione di heretici, non solo della dottrina, ma della pace et commertio con essi, tanto che per esperienze, che n'ho fatto in alcuni contrarii, che vi son occorsi, che per gratia di Dio sin qui si son superati tutti, io vi ho trovato tanta constanza, che dico certo, che se il re istesso, volesse, non bastarebbe superarla che veramente si vede esser opra di Dio." Letter from Paris, October 3, 1570, *loc. cit.* 54.

⁶ See the *letter of Frangipani of October 8, 1570, *loc. cit.*

had never shown so great piety in the memory of man.¹ The same was seen in other places as well, as for example at Soissons. On a journey which he made in November from Paris to Mézières, Francesco Bramante observed everywhere the reduction in the number of the Huguenots; for every thousand Catholics there were at that time, he thought, only four heretics.² Bramante's hopes increased when Cardinal Pellevé told him in secret that Charles IX. was thinking of putting to death Coligny and certain other Huguenot leaders, and that the consequence of this would be the disappearance of all their followers within three days! This remark, he wrote on November 28th, pleases me much, but I shall not rest until the shameful Peace of St. Germain is revoked, and the heretics have been burned as was done in the days of the ancient kings of France.³

Pius V. too wished that the strongest action should be taken against the heretics, but he did not desire the removal of their leaders by wrongful means. The Spanish ambassador Zuñiga reported in May, 1568, that he had heard from the Pope that the rulers of France were proposing the perfidious assassination of Condé and Coligny, and that the Pope had made no secret of the fact that he could neither approve nor advise this, nor find it in his conscience to do so.⁴

¹ " *Et per fare un poco di più dolce fine, non voglio di mancare di dire a N.S. per sua consolatione che nell' altra settimana, che si è fatto qui il giubileo, si è visto una devotione et una frequenza di popolo così grande in tutte le chiese in processione et oratione et confessarsi et comunicarsi che è parso veramente la settimana santa e il dì di Pasqua, et i preti parochiali mi han detto di non haver di cento anni memoria di una frequenza et divotione così grande di popolo." Letter from Paris, November 6, 1570, *loc. cit.* 72.

² See in App. n. 11, Papal Secret Archives.

³ See the *report in cypher in App. n. 11, Papal Secret Archives.

⁴ " Una cosa que él no podia aprovar ni aconsejar, ni aun le parecia que en consciencia se podia hacer." Report of Zuñiga from Rome, May 19, 1568. Corresp. dipl., II., 372 (in KERVYN DE LETTENHOVE, II., 43, and in Lettres de Cath. de Médicis,

IV., xxvi., wrongly assigned to 1567). Without paying any attention to the evidence of Zuñiga printed in 1884, and completely ignoring the bibliography given *supra* p. 140, n. 1, the ex-Jesuit HOENSBROECH in his book *Das Papsttum* (I., Leipsic, 1901, 204), writes: "Pius V., who had included assassination among the proper instruments of the Papacy, had already taken a great part in the preparations for the Paris massacre [St. Bartholomew]." By way of proof Hoensbroech refers to the letters which we have mentioned in describing the third religious war, from Pius V. to Charles IX. and Catherine de' Medici, on March 6, April 3, and October 20, 1569, concerning the destruction of the French heretics. But to these letters there also belongs one to Catherine of March 28, 1569, in which Pius V. exhorts her to an open and free opposition to the Huguenots ("apertei et libere"; GOUBAU, 155), so that all idea of a plot is excluded. The Protestant TÜRKE had already called attention to this in his dissertation which was naturally quite ignored by Hoensbroech, saying very rightly: "finesse and diplomatic subterfuges were evidently not his [Pius V.'s] bent; he was wont to attain his ends by direct means." (p. 17). It is a consolation to know that Hoensbroech met with no support among *serious* Protestant scholars. G. KRÜGER, for example, speaking of the dissertation by VACANDARD, *Les papes et la Saint-Barthélemy* (printed in *Etudes de critique et d'hist. relig.*, Paris, 1905, 217-292) in the *Theolog. Literaturzeitung* of Harnack, 1906, 382) writes: "I do not know if it is necessary once more to refute the accusation that the Popes had anything to do with the preparations for the massacre of St. Bartholomew. Vacandard himself adduces the view of Soldan, that the sources show that the events of August 24 took place quite independently of the influence of the Curia, and it will be difficult for him to ignore an historian who must be reckoned with so seriously, and who is in a position to contradict him."

CHAPTER V.

THE STATE OF RELIGION IN SCOTLAND. MARY STUART AND ELIZABETH.

A VIVID light is thrown upon the state of oppression under which the Catholics of Scotland were living by an event that occurred at the last Easter before Pius V. ascended the throne. A priest was seized at Edinburgh while he was saying mass ; dressed in the sacred vestments, and with the chalice in his hands, he was fastened to the cross in the public market place, and pelted by the people with mud and other " Easter eggs." It was not until the following day that he was interrogated and sentenced. The prisoner was then made to stand again at the market cross for four hours ; again he " was given ten thousand eggs " and when at last he was taken to prison, a band of three or four hundred men would have killed him with cudgels had not the provost interfered by force. The infuriated populace were filled with indignation when Mary ordered that the two Catholics who had assisted at the mass should be pardoned, and they were in consequence condemned to the forfeiture of their property.¹

After her victory over the insurgents Mary had resolved to put an end to this state of things, and to restore to the old religion its former position, at anyrate to the extent of giving it equal rights with Protestantism. When Pius V. ascended the throne he thought that she had already restored the Catholic religion throughout the kingdom, and in the letter in which he announced his election to the Scottish royal couple,

¹ Alexander Clerk to Randolph, April 22, and Bedford to Cecil, April 28, 1565, in STEVENSON, VII., n. 1111, 1 ; n. 1123, 2 ; FLEMING, 350 *seq.* " There is now greater rage amongst the faithful than ever the writer has seen since her Grace came into Scotland." Clerk, *loc. cit.* p. 341. Cf. BAIN, n. 169, 171.

he exhorted them to carry on the work they had begun.¹ Before this letter reached Mary's hands, an envoy from the Cardinal of Lorraine arrived on January 27th, 1566, who advised her to confiscate the property of the rebels and once more to have recourse to the Pope with a request for financial help.² The queen then charged her former envoy, Chisholm, Bishop of Dunblane, to go to the Eternal City. In the credentials which were given to Chisholm³ it was stated that the conditions in Scotland were not desperate, but very dangerous, and that the queen's enemies were in exile or in her power, though anger and poverty were driving them to extremes.

Chisholm had gone but a little way upon his journey when news reached him of further terrible events in Scotland. On March 7th, Mary had opened the Parliament, and had laid before it two proposals; the one to permit the bishops and parish priests the full exercise of the old religion, and the other demanding the punishment of the rebels.⁴ The rebel lords sought to prevent the threatened loss of their possessions by a fresh conspiracy to overthrow the queen, and they found a ready tool among those nearest to Mary. The youthful, incapable and quite inexperienced Darnley had been severely touched in his pride because Mary had not bestowed upon him the so-called matrimonial crown, which would have made him the equal of his wife in the exercise of the royal power.⁵ This headstrong youth allowed himself to be induced by a promise of the conspirators to make him their hereditary king, to ally himself with the very men who had recently taken up

¹ Letter of January 10, 1566, in PHILIPPSON, *Règne de Marie Stuart*, III., 483; *cf.* POLLEN, 232 *seq.*

² POLLEN, *ci.*

³ Of January 30, 1566, in LADERCHI, 1566, n. 366; LABANOFF, VII., 8.

⁴ "One allowing the bishops and rectors of churches the full exercise of their ancient religion, and the other punishing the leaders of conspiracy." Leslie in FORBES-LEITH, 108.

⁵ For the importance of the matrimonial crown see BROSCHE, VI., 508.

arms against him. The first step in the crime they had planned was the murder of the queen's secretary, David Rizzio, to whom they attributed the queen's friendly attitude towards the Catholics.¹ Without thought for his wife or the son whom she had borne in her womb for six months, the unnatural father and husband on the evening of March 9th, 1566, introduced the conspirators into the queen's chamber, where she was sitting at table with Rizzio and several friends. There the conspirators seized the secretary, who had taken refuge behind his sovereign, and struck at him with their swords over Mary's shoulder, while one of the ruffians levelled his pistol at the breast of the queen herself. Rizzio was carried outside and killed, and Mary was made a prisoner in her own apartments. The exiled lords returned to court.

As was her custom in moments of danger, the queen now displayed great courage and sagacity. Immediately after this bloody crime Darnley found himself in danger from his savage accomplices, and returned to the queen whom he had betrayed, and she, with his help, succeeded in evading the guards and escaping. Once free her cause was saved, and the conspirators again took to flight.

What had really happened was sufficiently terrible, but it was inevitable that the rumours which got abroad should be far worse. It was said that Darnley had killed the queen

¹ It has not been proved and it is very improbable that Rizzio was an "agent of the Pope" (BEKKER, *Maria*, 12); the Vatican Archives contain no letter from him or to him (POLLEN, *ciii*). Certainly "it is unquestionable that . . . the Protestant lords longed for Rizzio's murder as Mary's zealous adviser in her efforts to restore the old religion" (BAIN, *II.*, xv.). Among the accomplices in the murder there appear Knox and the preacher Craig (BAIN, *loc. cit.* and n. 363, p. 270). One cannot speak of "the fine singer Rizzio." According to all the accounts he was ugly, and according to almost all—the single exception, LABANOFF, *VII.*, 86, may be attributed to a copyist's error—was already well advanced in years. Particulars of the conspiracy in CARDAUNS, 5-19.

and had become a Protestant.¹ Therefore Bishop Chisholm stopped for some days on his way to Rome at Lyons, until he received authentic news of the safety of the queen. He reached Rome at the end of April, and in a long interview informed Pius V. of the dangers in which his sovereign was placed, begging him to send her substantial help.²

In Rome Chisholm found the ground prepared for his mission by the recent events.³ Pius V. shed tears when he heard of the queen's pitiful position, which he himself had not the means to relieve.⁴ Yet he did all he could; he cut down the expenses of his own household, and even his table, in order that he might have the consolation of helping Mary by his personal sacrifice.⁵ On May 2nd and 5th he wrote to the kings of Spain and France to obtain assistance for Mary.⁶

¹ Alava to Philip II., dated from Moulins, March 26, 1566, in POLLEN 473. Requesens to Philip II., April 18, 1566, Corresp. dipl., I., 188. C. Luzzara also reports from Rome to Mantua concerning the apostasy of Darnley, April 17, 1566, Gonzaga Archives, Mantua.

² POLLEN, civ. The speech in BELLESHEIM, II., 448 *seqq.* (with wrong date April 11). Cf. also Corresp. dipl., I., 253 and the *report of Arco (with Avviso attached) dated Rome, April 27, 1566, State Archives, Vienna.

³ According to a *report of Arco of May 18, 1566, his efforts were supported by the Cardinal of Lorraine. State Archives, Vienna.

⁴ “. . . dicen que suspiraba y le salian las lagrimas de los ojos, y diciendole alguno que Su Santidad no se fatigase tanto, respondiolo, como quereis que no me fatigue viendo en tal estado aquel reyno y no teniendo la manera que querria para poderle ayudar.” Polanco from Rome, April 30, 1566, in *Anal. Bolland.*, VII. (1888), 55; cf. Requesens to Philip II., May 31 and July 4, 1566, Corresp. dipl., I., 254, 281.

⁵ Polanco, June 17, 1566, in *Anal. Bolland.*, VII., 59.

⁶ LADERCHI, 1566, n. 369. The letter to Philip II. has the wrong date in the reprint of Laderchi (POLLEN, 236). On April 18, 1566, Pius V. had caused the Spanish ambassador Requesens to write to Philip II. in the same sense. The brief of May 2 was sent to the nuncio Castagna at Madrid with a covering letter from Bonelli (*ibid.* 228). It arrived there on May 24

If they had complied with his wishes the two great Catholic powers would have joined together against Elizabeth, or at least have forbidden their subjects to trade with England, and thus struck at the life of the northern kingdom.¹ In a brief of May 12th, 1566, he told Mary of what he had done with regard to Charles IX. and Philip II., adding that he would shortly follow this up with financial assistance, which, however, could not be so large as he would like because, since the Turks were about to attack the Emperor by land, and Malta by sea during the coming summer, he had been obliged to utilize his financial resources to meet these dangers.²

(*ibid.* 258) and as he announces on that day (*ibid.* 261) was delivered by Castagna on June 7. Philip promised to do all that he could (*ibid.*).

¹ Tiepolo to the Doge, May 4, 1566, in POLLEN, 236. Already for a long time past there had been spread "by general report in all Europe" rumours of the existence of a league of the Catholic powers against Protestantism (ŠUSTA, I., 255). The only truth in this was that both Pius IV. and Pius V. had wished for such a league. Under Pius IV. it fell to the French nuncio Gualterio to propose on September 8, 1561, a league for the defence of the Catholic religion in France (*ibid.* 252, 255 *seq.*). Pius IV. also at one time spoke of holding out the hope of the crowns of both kingdoms to the Spanish king in the event of the excommunication and deposition of the sovereigns of France and England becoming necessary (*ibid.* 280). For the attempt of Pius V. to unite the Catholic princes against the French Protestants, *cf.* CATENA, 68 *seq.* Anything more than such desires and suggestions, however, is not to be found in the political correspondence of that time, and since this correspondence is now published so extensively it may be looked upon as certain that at that time they never arrived at any definite conclusion of a Catholic league, and that the acceptance of any such thing on the part of several recent historians is based upon an error. *Cf.* POLLEN, xxxviii.-xliii., and *The Month*, XCVII. (1898), 258 *seqq.*; RACHFAHL, II., I, 190. There is no trace existing of the accession of Mary to any such league. HOSACK, I., 124-129; PHILIPPSON, *loc. cit.*, III., 117; *cf.* FLEMING, 124, 379.

² LADERCHI, 1506, n. 370.

It was soon seen, however, that the danger from the Turks was not so great as had been thought, whereupon Pius V. at once promised to send to Mary the whole sum that had been destined for Maximilian II. and the Knights of St. John.¹

At the end of May Chisholm returned to Paris.² In the expectation that a great dignitary of the Church would be more likely to receive considerable sums of money, he had suggested the sending of a nuncio to Scotland, and Pius V. had held out hopes of this to the queen in his letter of May 12th.³ In her reply⁴ Mary expressed her joy at the Pope's decision, but it is permissible to doubt whether, in view of the disturbed condition of Scotland, a Papal envoy would have been quite pleasing to her. Even Manaraeus, the provincial of the Jesuits, whose subjects, Edmund Hay and Thomas Darbishire, were destined to accompany the nuncio, ventured to send his doubts to Rome.⁵ In his opinion Mary had great need of wise and deeply religious men as her advisers, but they must be men of Scottish birth and not foreigners, and least of all men sent from the Holy See, which was hated like the devil in Scotland. He thought that it would be well to send back to Scotland Mary's ambassador in Paris, Beaton, Archbishop of Glasgow, who would be able

¹ The Emperor complained of this: *cf.* LADERCHI, 1566, n. 275 *seqq.*; SCHWARZ, Briefwechsel, 23, 30. The reply of the Pope, July 12, 1566, *ibid.* 33.

² POLLEN, 239.

³ LADERCHI, 1566, n. 370. Arco *wrote to Vienna on June 15, 1566, that Laureo would start for Scotland on the 17th "più per mostrare chel Papa tien conto di quella Regina, che per aiutarla con effetti contra gli ribelli." Another reason for his mission was the news that the queen had pardoned a great number of the rebels. State Archives, Vienna.

⁴ From Edinburgh, July 17, 1566, in LABANOFF, I., 356. On July 21, 1566, Darnley and Mary wrote together to the Pope to propose Alexander Campbell for the bishopric of Brechin. BAIN, II., n. 414. POLLEN, 262.

⁵ MANARAEUS to Francis Borgia from Paris, June 26, 1566, in POLLEN, 497 *seq.*

to exhort the bishops and Catholic nobles to loyalty to God, the Church and the queen ; some Jesuits could be sent with him as companions and counsellors until the time came for wider activities. About the same time¹ Hay too expressed his fear that the Papal intervention would cause but little satisfaction in Scotland on account of the discouragement and weakness of the Catholic party ; it was to be feared that the money would fall into wrong hands and that the nuncio would be kept in France or would return to Rome without having accomplished anything.

The promised nuncio, Vincenzo Laureo, Bishop of Mondovi, arrived in Paris on August 10th, 1566, where a letter from the Queen of Scotland was awaiting him. In this letter Mary expressed her desire that the nuncio should not come until after the baptism of her son, who had been born on June 19th. It was her intention that the sacrament should be administered to the future successor to the throne solemnly and with the full Catholic ritual, and if the nobles and people agreed to this, then the coming of the nuncio could hardly meet with further opposition. At the same time the queen urgently asked that either the whole or part of the Pope's subsidy should be sent : Beaton and Chisholm proposed that part of the sum should be paid, but Laureo replied that according to the instructions which he had received, he could only hand over the whole sum in a case of necessity, but that otherwise the payment was to be made in five monthly sums. The necessity was already in existence, he was told, but Laureo thought it best first to ask the advice of the Cardinal of Lorraine before he gave a definite promise.²

In a note attached to the account which he gave the Secretary of State of his conference with Beaton and Chisholm, Laureo describes the difficult position of the queen.³ Elizabeth of England, he says, is more suspicious of her than ever since the birth of an heir to the throne, and will in future give her

¹ Hay to Borgia from Paris, July 2, 1566, in POLLEN, 499.

² Laureo to Cardinal Bonelli, August 21, 1566, in POLLEN, 269.

³ *Ibid.* 270 *seq.*

assistance to the Scottish rebels more willingly than ever ; the queen is at variance with Darnley, who is aiming at the independent possession of the crown, and this forces her to seek for support from the Protestants. An improvement in the situation might be brought about if Philip II. were to go to Flanders with a large military force, and if Mary were to proceed with stern justice against the leaders of the insurgents ; if six of these were to be condemned to the death which they had deserved, the Catholic religion would very soon and without difficulty be re-established. It would seem that Laureo had been led to this view by the Scottish exiles in Paris, who were not sufficiently acquainted with the true state of affairs in their native land.¹ The six whose punishment Laureo demanded were Murray, Argyll, Morton, Lethington and the influential government officials, Bellenden and MacGill ; not one of the preachers is included, not even Knox.

Since the Cardinal of Lorraine favoured the payment of part of the money which the Pope had sent to the assistance of Scotland, Laureo gave the Scottish ambassador 4000 ducats, with which his brother left Paris on September 9th, reaching Stirling on the 21st.² The departure of the nuncio himself for Scotland, however, was continually delayed. The baptism of the young prince, for the added solemnity of which it was thought desirable to await the arrival of the foreign ambassadors, had not yet taken place. On October 6th the Privy Council of Scotland voted the necessary sum for its being celebrated with all possible solemnity ; the the same time the nobles declared their willingness that the nuncio should come,³ and shortly after this the queen ordered Stephen

¹ Cf. *ibid.* cx.

² Laureo to Cardinal Bonelli from Paris, September 9, 1566, in POLLEN, 279. On the same date *the Pope recommended his nuncio to Charles IX. " Vincentium Montisregalis episcopum negotiis reginae Scotiae deputatum, quem et secum de eiusdem reginae angustiis fortiter sublevandis oretenus acturum fore indicat et orat sub faveat," British Museum, Additional 26865, p. 421.

³ Instructions for Wilson n. 2, in POLLEN, 327 ; cf. *ibid.* 324.

Wilson, who had accompanied Chisholm on his journey to Rome, to go to Paris and Rome, to invite the nuncio to Scotland, to thank the Pope, and to make apologies to him for the delay in announcing the birth of the heir to the throne,¹ but Wilson's departure was delayed, and towards the end of the month the queen fell seriously ill at Jedburgh, which made everything once more uncertain.²

Faced with death, Mary received the sacraments of the Catholic Church, expressed her inviolable attachment to the faith of her youth, and her regret that she had not done more for the service of God and religion. Laureo's belief in Mary's good intentions then revived, whereas before this, on account of the long delays in his journey, it had been not a little shaken. The nuncio too had entertained the suspicion that the advice to invite him to Scotland had been given to the queen with the purpose of supplying the great penury in the royal treasury.³ In order to obtain further light upon the true state of affairs, as soon as news had arrived of Mary's recovery, Bishop Chisholm and the Jesuit Hay were sent to her, the latter being instructed to return as soon as possible and make a report as to the real sentiments of the queen.⁴

The idea had also gained ground in Rome that Mary's religious zeal had been rated too high. On September 16th, 1566, Pius V. had had a letter written to the nuncio to say that if his departure was delayed any longer, he was not to go on paying the subsidy, and if, on his arrival in Scotland he should learn that the money that had already been sent had not been employed for the service of religion, Laureo was to stop the payments altogether.⁵ Later, on September 30th, he wrote to him that if his departure was put off indefinitely he was to return in the meantime to his diocese of Mondovi.⁶

¹ *Ibid.* A letter from Mary to Morone of October 9, 1566, *ibid.* 324 seq.

² POLLEN, 328. FLEMING, 539.

³ Laureo, November 12, 1566, in POLLEN, 311.

⁴ *Ibid.* 313.

⁵ *Ibid.* 284.

⁶ *Ibid.* 286.

Before these last instructions reached the nuncio, Laureo had an interview with the Cardinal of Lorraine.¹ He submitted that the favourable moment had now come to undertake something on a large scale for the betterment of religion in Scotland, and that Pius V. could do a great deal with Philip II., while the help which the Pope had given of itself afforded in the opinion of Beaton and Chisholm, sufficient grounds for taking more decisive action. The Cardinal at length agreed with Laureo, and the two decided that a noble, chosen from among those who were most in the Cardinal's confidence, should be sent to the Queen of Scotland to try and persuade her to re-establish the Catholic Church.² In the opinion of the Cardinal himself, of Bishop Chisholm and of Edmund Hay, the best course to pursue would be to take rigorous steps against the leaders of the rebels, as the nuncio had already advised. The noble who was to be sent, would arrive in Scotland before Wilson started; if then the queen summoned the nuncio to Scotland for other motives than real for religion, there would still be reason to hope that his arrival and the recollection of the illness from which she had just recovered, would make her more ready to listen to the salutary and prudent advice of the Cardinal.

There was indeed something strange in Mary's leniency, which gave so much scandal to Laureo and the Scots who were living in Paris. While she was still in the hands of the murderers of Rizzio, Mary skilfully evaded the demand for an immediate pardon of the guilty parties.³ On March 19th, 1566, Morton, Ruth of Lindsay, and 67 others were summoned to appear within six days before the king and queen, to answer for the murder of Rizzio and the imprisonment of the queen.⁴ But one by one all the guilty parties received a pardon. By the end of April Murray and Argyll were already back at court, while decrees in the case of other rebels were issued on May 11th

¹ Laureo, November 12, 1566, in POLLEN, 312.

² Nothing further is known about this mission.

³ NAU, 25 *seqq.* FLEMING, 392 *seqq.*, 403 *seq.*

⁴ FLEMING, 131.

and June 8th. During June, July, September and October further pardons were granted,¹ followed on Christmas Eve, 1566, by a general pardon for Morton and 75 others.² By the end of the year half the queen's Privy Council was composed of pardoned conspirators, and it was easy to foresee that at the first opportunity these people would use the power she had given them against herself. However strange this may seem, the position is to some extent explained by the insistence of Elizabeth on the pardon of those who were guilty of high treason,³ by Mary's purpose of working for peace and conciliation above all things, and of putting an end to the disturbances which were so sorely wounding the country.⁴ Moreover, Mary had no one among those about her who combined political experience with loyalty to the sovereign. She therefore was obliged as best she could to manage the conspirators so that they might not turn their schemes against their sovereign.

It was therefore natural that Mary should have rejected the advice of the nuncio, which was also impracticable for other reasons;⁵ she declared that she would not stain her hands with the blood of her subjects.⁶ The nuncio for his part remained all the more firmly fixed in his ideas because it seemed to him that the terrible events of the last few months lent weight to his contention. As a result of her too great goodness and kindness, he wrote, the queen is in the greatest danger of becoming the slave and prey of the heretics, and of losing her life.⁷

¹ Pollen in the *Month*, XCVI. (1900), 243. FLEMING, 406, n. 19.

² Printed in FLEMING, 502-504.

³ FLEMING, 131, 403.

⁴ "I hear she seeks now all means to quiet her country and will 'imbrace' such as are fitted for her council. It is thought she will not deal so hardly 'with these noblemen' as she was minded." Randolph, April 2, 1566, in BAIN, II., n. 368. Thus she reconciled Murray with Bothwell, Murray with Huntly, Atholl with Argyll. HOSACK, I., 147.

⁵ Laureo, December 3, 1566, in POLLEN, 321.

⁶ G. Thomson, in POLLEN, 406.

⁷ Laureo, March 12, 1567, in POLLEN, 363.

The men in power, whose punishment Laureo was demanding, were not only at heart filled with hostility towards the queen, but they were also highly incensed against her husband, the discredited Darnley, to whom they attributed the fact that after the murder of Rizzio the attempt on Mary had failed. It had been he who after that bloody deed had prevented the pardon of the assassins which Mary had at once suggested, and he had continued to oppose it. He had again incurred the hatred of the murderers in exile when with inconceivable short-sightedness he had taken the mad risk of solemnly disclaiming before the Privy Council any responsibility for the murder of Rizzio, a statement which was publicly promulgated at the market-cross of Edinburgh on March 21st, 1566. In view of the savage and unrestrained habits of the Scottish nobles it was only to be expected that the allied lords would take a bloody vengeance upon him at the first opportunity. In the meantime they replied to Darnley's declaration of his innocence by sending the queen the document in which her husband had allied himself with the conspirators, and which he had signed with his own hand. Mary was quick to realize the vile treachery of the man to whom she had so short a time before given her love.¹

Even at the time of their escape from the murderers of Rizzio Darnley had behaved most disgracefully and unchivalrously towards the queen,² and the information now furnished by the conspirators was not calculated to dispel her distrust of him.³ It was true that she had forgiven him, and reconciliations between the two had been of frequent occurrence,⁴ but Darnley had never given up his hopes of possessing the crown independently of her, and when this ambition had not been satisfied the discontent of the foolish young man had shown itself in a way that recalls the sulks of a spoilt boy. He did not attend the opening of Parlia-

¹ HOSACK, I., 145. FLEMING, 128.

² NAU, 29.

³ Examples of her distrust in FLEMING, 132.

⁴ *Ibid.* 132, 134, 135, 137.

ment in 1566, he even kept away from the baptism of his son, and at last he declared that he would leave Scotland altogether. Mary then, on September 30th, 1566, in the presence of the French ambassador, Ducroc, and her Privy Council, asked Darnley to give an account of his conduct. Ducroc describes what happened: she took him by the hand and implored him in God's name to say whether she had given him any cause for acting as he proposed to do; let him speak openly and not spare her feelings. Darnley replied that she had given him no cause whatever, but nevertheless took his leave with the following words: "Farewell, Madam, you shall not see my face again for a long time to come." He did not, however, for all that, leave Scotland.¹

Darnley's confession that he had no fault to find with the conduct of his wife throws some light upon Mary's relations at that time with a man² who had already attained to great influence at the royal court, and was soon to take a most unhappy part in the destinies of the queen. James Hepburn, Earl of Bothwell, had left Scotland in 1562 under an accusation of the attempted assassination of Murray,³ but after the rebellion of the nobles in 1565 he had obtained permission to return,⁴ and had taken a leading part in the suppression of the revolt.⁵ Since he was the only Scottish noble who, in spite of his profession of Protestantism, had always been loyal to the king, it is easy to understand Mary's partiality for a

¹ HOSACK, I., 153. FLEMING, 138. On the same day, September 30, the lords of the Privy Council exhorted Darnley to thank God for having given him so wise and virtuous a wife (FLEMING, 137 *seq.*). On October 15, 1566, Ducroc wrote that he had never seen Mary so much loved, valued and honoured as now, and that thanks to her wise attitude there was complete harmony among her subjects. HOSACK, I., 157.

² Fleming too (*loc. cit.*) recognizes that the Lords of the Privy Council at that time knew and believed nothing of certain scandalous stories of the Book of Articles.

³ HOSACK, I., 82.

⁴ *Ibid.* 104, 120, 143.

⁵ LABANOFF, II., 35. FLEMING, 115, 118, 369.

man, who, however rough, headstrong, violent and immoral, was at anyrate not a hypocrite or a traitor.¹ In a short time Bothwell's influence had become so great that he was the most hated man in Scotland, and a conspiracy had been formed for his destruction.²

The plot was not carried out at that time ; on the contrary a fresh conspiracy was formed, this time, to all appearances, in Bothwell's favour. By the invitation of Huntly, Argyll and Lethington, hitherto his enemies, Bothwell allied himself with them for the destruction of " that young coxcomb and haughty tyrant " Darnley, who was to be removed at all costs.³ Bothwell had allowed himself to be drawn into this alliance with his enemies by the promise that he himself should take the place of Darnley and become the husband of the queen.⁴ It would seem that Bothwell did not perceive the trap that was being laid for him, since, as the murderer of the king, he could not hope long to retain his place on the throne he had usurped. It was easy to foresee that he must involve the queen in his own ruin, and that thus the attempt already twice made to dethrone Mary would at last be crowned with success.

While the net was thus being spread for Darnley, that " young coxcomb and haughty tyrant " under the influence of his ambitious and imprudent father, Lennox, was forming

¹ HOSACK, I., 152.

² Bedford, August 12, 1566, *ibid.*

³ This conspiracy was only known from the memorial of the queen of June, 1568 (LABANOFF, VII., 315 *seqq.*) and by the confession made by Lord Ormiston on December 13, 1573, before he was executed ; he had been invited to take part in it. HOSACK, 162 *seq.* ; FLEMING, 423, n. 90.

⁴ They (the repatriated exiles) retained the strongest resentment against Darnley for having betrayed their plans to the Queen, and they anxiously sought an opportunity of vengeance. In a short time they disclosed their design to Bothwell, urging him to murder the King, and promising that if he consented they would persuade or compel the Queen to give her hand to him. Leslie to Forbes-Leith 117. Cf. BEKKER, 28, 99 *seq.*

fresh plans for obtaining that matrimonial crown which he had so long aspired to.¹ At the end of December he left his wife, and soon afterwards news reached Edinburgh that he was lying sick of small-pox at Glasgow. At the end of January, 1567, Mary visited him, and persuaded her sick husband to return with her to Edinburgh, where he was removed from the influence of the Earl of Lennox. Contrary to the original plan of the queen he took up his abode in a private house, situated in a healthy district outside the city, but adjoining the southern part of the city walls.²

It was not long before the nuncio received terrible news from Scotland. The French ambassador in Edinburgh, Ducroc, had arrived in the capital of France on February 19th, 1567; before he embarked at Dover a courier from the French ambassador in London sent him the terrible news that on the morning of Quinquagesima Sunday Darnley and his father Lennox had been found dead and stripped in the public street.³ This first communication was soon amended and amplified by further news. Messages from the Scottish queen reached Beaton and the French court, and lastly one for Laureo himself. According to the later reports the queen had visited her husband incognito in the evening of Quinquagesima Sunday, and had bidden him farewell a little before midnight in order to attend the wedding of one of her courtiers. Two hours later the sound of an explosion had brought the citizens of Edinburgh who lived near the city walls from their beds. Darnley's house had been blown up; the body of the king was found in a garden near the house; one of his ribs was broken and his body torn and crushed by the violence of the fall. At the same time an unsuccessful attempt was made on Darnley's father at Glasgow.⁴

¹ RIESS in *Hist. Zeitschrift*, 3rd series, XIV. (1913), 272 *seq.*

² Description of the house in BEKKER, 377-380.

³ Letter of February 22, 1567, in POLLEN, 348 *seq.*

⁴ Letters of Laureo of Feb. 23 and 27, Mar. 8, 12 and 27, 1567, in POLLEN, 352-371. These reports of the nuncio are among the earliest notices of the murder. Some of the particulars given in the text are to be found only in Laureo. Cf. POLLEN, CXX. *seqq.*

Scotland was accustomed to regicide ; of 105 Scottish kings, according to a contemporary estimate,¹ 56 had been killed. But this last crime, carried out as it had been in so horrible and disgraceful a way, and which became the universal subject of talk throughout Europe,² was looked upon as an outrage by the whole country. At the same time the authors and instruments of the terrible deed were hidden in absolute darkness. It was little guessed that all the most powerful officers of state, the chief justice Argyll, the secretary of state, Lethington, and the chancellor of the kingdom, Huntly, were all concerned in it. It was therefore natural that suspicion, especially abroad, should fall upon the ill-fated queen,³ and that she should bear the blame if the inquiry into and the discussion of the affair became the merest farce.

On February 12th, 1567, the Privy Council announced that the queen had offered a reward of two thousand pounds sterling and other great inducements to anyone who would reveal the name of the author of the crime.⁴ In spite of this no public denunciation was made, but on the 16th papers were found affixed to the principal buildings of Edinburgh naming Bothwell and three others as the murderers and accusing the queen of connivance in the crime ; during the night angry cries resounded through the streets accusing Bothwell. Pictures of Bothwell were circulated bearing the inscription : This is the murderer of the king.⁵ Darnley's father, Lennox, took up the matter, and in a letter of March 17th, he declared that Bothwell and three others were the authors of the crime.⁶

The case could hardly have been placed in less suitable hands. On March 28th, after Lennox's accusation, April 12th was fixed by the Privy Council for the inquiry into Bothwell's guilt, but instead of any inquiry being held into the crime

¹ Diary of Birrel, in HOSACK, I., 280 n.

² Beaton to Mary, March 11, 1567, in HOSACK, I., 280 *seq.* ; FLEMING, 151.

³ Beaton, *loc. cit.*

⁴ FLEMING, 439.

⁵ FLEMING, 153.

⁶ HOSACK, I., 283.

at the place where it had been committed, Lennox gathered together 3000 armed men in lieu of proof, and set out with them towards Edinburgh. At Stirling, however, his courage failed him, and on April 11th he wrote to the queen that he was ill, and requested that the guilty men should be imprisoned until his arrival, and that he should be given a free hand to arrest suspects. At the request of Lennox Elizabeth supported these strange demands, which, however, were not granted.¹

On the following day the comedy of the inquiry was begun. The foreman of the jury was a close relation of the accused, and the president of the court was Argyll, Bothwell's fellow conspirator; accompanied by another accomplice, the secretary of state, Lethington, and many of his adherents, the accused man repaired in great pomp to the place of the inquiry, which, however, in spite of everything, he faced with considerable qualms. As not even one witness was produced by the unskilful prosecutor, it seemed clear that the inquiry must end in his acquittal. The suggestion put forward by the other side that the inquiry should be put off was negatived, on the ground that Lennox himself had wished that the trial should be made as short as possible.² Four days later Parliament was opened; "on account of his great and various services" the representatives of the country confirmed Bothwell in his office of commandant of the castle of Dunbar, thus indirectly acknowledging his innocence.³ Moreover, the same Parliament took active steps to secure to the members of the great nobility, such as Huntly, Morton and Murray, their possession of the rich properties which the queen had already bestowed upon them. It must be remembered that in the coming December Mary was to complete her twenty-fifth year, and that before she reached that age she had the power to revoke such gifts, unless a parliamentary decree had confirmed them. The lengthy documents in which this

¹ *Ibid.* 283, 285, 288.

² *Ibid.* 291 *seq.*

³ FLEMING, 155.

confirmation was given throw much light upon the motives for the murder of the king, since Darnley, if he had still been alive, would certainly not have given his consent to the granting of such rich possessions to those nobles, who were his mortal enemies.¹ The same Parliament also abolished all those legal disabilities which were still in existence against the Protestants, and secured to every Scotsman the freedom to live according to his own religion.² In order that the Catholics might not draw any profit from this "liberty," all the royal permits in favour of any particular form of religion were annulled on May 23rd, when Bothwell was already married to the queen.³

The evening after the closing of the Parliament, April 19th, 1567, Bothwell gave a banquet to the great nobles at the inn of Ainslie, and there induced nine earls and twelve barons to sign a document in which these nobles declared that they considered Bothwell innocent of the murder of the king, and their readiness to defend him against all such calumnies. If Mary, it went on to state, should choose him for her husband, they were resolved to defend him against anyone who sought to prevent or impede his marriage.⁴ On the very next day Bothwell made the queen an offer of marriage, which, however, was definitely rejected.⁵

Then the events which were to drag down Mary to her ruin followed fast upon each other. On April 21st the queen went to Stirling to visit her son ; on her return, on April 24th, she was carried off by Bothwell and pressed by him until she consented to marry him, although he was already married. Thereupon the first marriage of the future king had to be hurriedly dissolved. His first wife, who was a Catholic, pressed her case before the Protestant assembly, while the Protestant Bothwell did the same with the Catholic archbishop. The marriage was dissolved by the Protestant

¹ HOSACK, I., 294 *seq.*

² BELLESHEIM, II., 73.

³ *Ibid.* 83. *Pollen* 395 n.

⁴ BAIN, II., n. 492. *Cf.* FLEMING, 155 ; BEKKER, 97 *seq.*

⁵ LABANOFF, II., 37. *NAU*, 45 *seq.* *BEKKER*, 101.

consistory on the ground of the adultery of Bothwell, while it was declared invalid by the archbishop's court on the ground of the close relationship of the parties, although the archbishop himself had granted the dispensation from any such impediment.¹ On May 15th, three months after the assassination of Darnley, Mary gave her hand to her violent suitor in that unhappy union, which was contracted before the apostate bishop of the Orkneys.² The better part of the

¹ The document of the dispensation of February 17, 1566, was discovered by John Stuart (A lost chapter in the history of Mary Queen of Scots recovered, Edinburgh, 1874). The question may be raised whether at the process of the divorce it was presented or suppressed, and if the suppression took place with the knowledge of the archbishop, whether the dispensation was valid, if Mary knew of its existence. In the brief by which Pius V. ordered a fresh trial of the case (July 15, 1571), it is stated that the dispensation was suppressed; that Bothwell dared "violenter aggredi" his sovereign "eamque rapere invitam et nihil minus cogitantem et captivam . . . in arcem de Dumbar in carcerem detrudere, eamque ibi ac deinde in arce Edimburgensi per aliquod temporis spatium invitam similiter ac *reluctantem* retinere, donec processum quendam praetensi divortii inter ipsum comitem Iacobum eiusque uxorem praedictam instituit, ac *subtracta furtive dispensatione* apostolica supra narrata iniquissimam desuper sententiam dicti matrimonii rescissoriam omni iuris ordine ac dictamine postposito praecipitanter fulminare curavit . . . et in continenti omni mora postposita praedictam Mariam reginam *lugentem ac renitentem* ad comparendum coram schismatico, ut dicitur, episcopo Orchadensi et apostata ad consensum praetenso matrimonio cum eo tunc de facto contrahendo praestandum per vim et metum iniuriose compulit." (*Hist. Jahrbuch*, VI. [1885], 157). The statements in the brief are naturally founded upon the account sent by Mary. But if the brief is valid, the substantial account of the facts must be based upon the truth. The distinguished canonist Bellesheim in his history of the Catholic Church in Scotland, II. (1883), 127 *seq.*, speaks in favour of, and in *Hist.-polit. Blätter*, CXII. (1893), 579, against the validity of the marriage of Bothwell with Jane Gordon.

² BELLESHEIM, II., 80.

kingdom, that is to say, all the great nobles, approved the marriage, either by acclamation, or at least by silence.¹

How Mary was led to take this fatal step will perhaps always remain an unsolved mystery for history. According to the declaration of her enemies, Mary had had adulterous relations with Bothwell, while her second husband was still living, and it was she who was principally responsible for the death of Darnley. However, not only was Mary's youth stainless, but from the very first years of her sojourn in Scotland not even the hate-sharpened eyes of Knox and his followers had been able to find any fault with her on the score of morals. Moreover, she was of high and noble character; this was shown by her courage in danger, her fortitude in sorrow, and the loyalty with which she clung to her religion, even when to do so was opposed to all her own interests. It seems quite impossible to explain the psychology of her sudden fall to the very depths of moral turpitude. The Dominican, Roch Mamerot, her confessor, assured the Spanish ambassador in London in July, 1567, that, until the events which led to her marriage with Bothwell, he had never seen a lady of greater virtue, courage and honour, and that he was prepared to affirm this on his solemn oath.²

On the other hand it cannot be denied that at anyrate appearances were against Mary. Her quarrel with Darnley was known to all, as well as the favour enjoyed by Bothwell, and in marrying him she seemed to give grounds for the gravest suspicions. Still, not even this justified the gravest of those suspicions. Her quarrel with Darnley had been very far removed from mortal hatred, she always remembered that she was his wife, and continually held out the hand of reconciliation to him, while there is no certain proof that she had any erotic passion for Bothwell. Her marriage with the latter was certainly a tremendous mistake, but her act, even though it cannot be justified, can nevertheless to some

¹ Words of the preacher Craig, who openly disapproved of the marriage. *Ibid.* 81.

² Guzmán de Silva to Philip II., July 26, 1567, *Corresp. de Felipe II.*, II., 518; *cf.* POLLEN, 520.

extent be understood in a woman who found herself completely in the hands of a violent man, and who saw no chance of help anywhere, to say nothing of the fact that she was broken in body and spirit by her troubles.¹

A judgment is made all the more difficult by the campaign of calumny which was ruthlessly carried on against Mary by her enemies; it is beyond dispute that they fought against her, so to speak systematically, with lies and falsehoods.²

¹ HOSACK, I., 275 *seq.* On March 15, 1567, Alava, the Spanish ambassador in Paris, wrote to Philip II. that Mary was thinking of leaving Scotland and taking up her residence in France. *Ibid.* 276. POLLEN, 477.

² The accusatory document brought forward against Mary at the Conference of Westminster in 1568, the *Book of Articles* (in HOSACK, I., 522-548) is full of the grossest calumnies (*ibid.* 426 *seqq.*; *cf.* also FLEMING, 137), to which the *Detectio* of Buchanan gave the widest publicity. At Westminster there were also brought forward the depositions of Nelson, the only one of Darnley's servants who saved his life in the explosion, and that of Crawford. Nelson tried to create the impression that in his last illness Darnley was badly looked after, but he is confuted by the inventory of his house which is still preserved (HOSACK, I., 253 *seq.*; an insufficient observation to the contrary in Fleming 434) and Darnley himself attests the good treatment he received from his wife (in RIESS in *Histor. Zeitschrift*, 3rd series, XIV., [1913] 283). The deposition of Crawford on the interview between Darnley and Mary at Glasgow is in such close agreement with one of the Casket Letters, that one of the two documents must have been copied from the other (BEKKER, 360 *seq.*). Some, who look upon the Casket Letter as the original, *cf.* as to this B. SEPP, *Tagebuch der unglücklichen Schottenkönigin Maria Stuart*, II., Munich, 1883, 19 *seqq.*; RIESS, *loc. cit.* 258 *seq.*—think to excuse Crawford by saying that he saw the letter "in order to refresh his memory" (RIESS, *loc. cit.* 256). But any such "refreshment" would obviously be a dishonest act, and Crawford did not refresh his memory but copied. Among the depositions made in the years 1568 and 1569 at the inquiry into the death of Darnley, the evidence of Hay, Hepburn and Paris is falsified at anyrate in the matter that they are made to agree in saying that the powder, by which the king was to be blown

This fact gives ground for thinking that they were unable to do her much harm by telling the simple truth, so that it is necessary to accept with a great deal of caution all that her enemies adduced in the way of proof or of documentary evidence. This applies to the so-called casket letters, or letters without address or signature which Mary is supposed to have sent to Bothwell from Glasgow before the murder of Darnley, and from Stirling before she was carried off. If they are genuine these letters would put Mary's guilt beyond doubt, but there are such good reasons for doubting their genuineness and authenticity, and the people who adduced them are proved so guilty of falsehood, that the conscientious historian cannot take them by themselves as proof of her guilt,¹ in spite

into the air, was stored immediately under his room, in the queen's room, whereas none was found except in the cellar. This falsification was necessary in the first place in order to blacken Mary's name, and also in order to put the responsibility for the explosion and the murder of Darnley upon Bothwell, by making it out that Bothwell directed the explosion *inside* the wall of the city by a door leading through the wall in the cellar, but the body of Darnley was found *outside* the city (BEKKER, 54 *seqq.*). For the deposition of Paris, which was not used even by Buchanan, *cf.* HOSACK, I., 246 *seqq.*; II., 82.—Forgeries too are the two contracts (HOSACK, I., 555 *seqq.*) in which Mary, a few weeks after the death of Darnley, promised Bothwell marriage (*ibid.* 278).—The consprators had already transferred the assault on Rizzio to Mary's room in order to spread the lie that Darnley had surprised Rizzio in adultery and had therefore killed him (memorial to Cosimo de' Medici, in LABANOFF, VII., 72). After the fact Cecil spread the calumny in the foreign courts (letter of the French ambassador Paul de Foix to Cecil, of March 23, 1565, in HOSACK, II., 79), although he very well knew the true motives (*ibid.* Preface p. ix. *seqq.*). For the evidence offered by Murray *cf.* BELLESHEIM, II., 108.

¹ Fleming too, who is a declared enemy of the Scottish queen, and of the "Mariolater," in his book which we have frequently cited, completely leaves on one side the Casket Letters. A second volume on Mary Stuart which is promised by him, and in which he may have made up his mind as to those letters,

of all the attempts made to show the genuineness of the casket letters.¹

Probably the question of her guilt may be answered by saying that Mary can be acquitted of all connivance in the murder of Darnley, but that the marriage with Bothwell must be looked upon not only as a blunder, but as a false and blame-worthy step. Apart from her deadly enemies, the party of the nobles, this was the opinion of Catholics of the time, who certainly were well acquainted with the facts. Her confessor, Mamerot, who explicitly acquitted her of any share in the murder of Darnley, left her, after having vainly protested against the marriage with Bothwell.² Similar unfavourable judgments of her third marriage came from Moretta, the ambassador of Savoy, from Ducroc, the French ambassador, and from others.³ It must, however, in fairness be remembered that the marriage which was condemned by Mary's confessor, was approved by three bishops.⁴ At Pentecost, May 18th, a few days after the marriage, the queen, in order to remove the scandal which had been given by her Protestant marriage, publicly received the sacraments according to the Catholic rites.⁵ If she had looked upon her marriage with Bothwell as invalid, such an act would have been an open outrage to all Catholic ideas.

Knowledge of all the terrible events in Scotland was not

has not yet appeared. Morton's declaration on December 9, 1568, on the discovery of the Casket Letters (published by Henderson in 1889, and reproduced in *Histor. Jahrbuch*, XX. [1891] 778 *seqq.*) does not decide the question and is also itself liable to suspicion of being a forgery. Cf. B. SEPP, *Die Lösung der Kassettenbrieffrage* (against Riess), Ratisbon, 1914, 8 *seq.*— Reprint of the Casket Letters in BAIN, *App. II.*, p. 722 *seqq.*, and of Morton's declaration, *ibid.* p. 730 *seqq.*

¹ The last attempt to prove the complete genuineness of the Casket Letters was made by RIESS, *loc. cit.* 237 *seqq.*

² Pollen 519, 521.

³ *Ibid.* cxxix. *seqq.*

⁴ BELLESHEIM, II., 81.

⁵ Leslie in FORBES-LEITH, 123.

needed in order to settle the fate of Laureo's nunciature. At the first news of Darnley's death, the nuncio had still thought it possible that Mary would at least now follow his advice, and hand over the leaders of the Protestant party to justice.¹ But it was soon evident that it was not even worth his while to await the return of the envoys he had sent to Scotland, Bishop Chisholm and the Jesuit Hay. Four days after Easter he thought it best in any case to obey the Pope's orders to return home.² A little while after he had announced this intention to Rome, however, Hay returned to Paris with the Savoyard ambassador, Moretta, bearing conflicting tidings. Both were of opinion that, in view of the power exercised by the Protestants, and the terrible state of excitement in Scotland, the nuncio could do no good there. The queen, however, had the idea of sending the Catholic Lord Seton with three ships to fetch the nuncio, and had promised the bishops that she would be guided by the advice of Laureo; the bishops were ready to bear the expense of the voyage and the reception of the nuncio, but for all that the journey was by no means advisable.³

In Rome the nuncio's mission was looked upon as doomed after the death of Darnley.⁴ In deference to Beaton's insistence that he should at least await the return of Chisholm, Laureo again postponed his departure, but the reports of fresh arrivals from Scotland dissipated his last hopes. In the middle of April he set out for Italy, but not before he had once more, before he started, put in a word with the Pope in favour of Mary, saying that she was a woman and had allowed herself to be guided by political considerations, but that she was a Catholic and wished to be considered as such, and that perhaps at some future time she might be able to restore the Catholic religion in Scotland.⁵

¹ Laureo, March 8, 1567, in POLLEN, 360.

² Laureo, March 12, 1567, *ibid.* 362. Laureo received the Pope's orders of February 17 on March 10; *ibid.* 348.

³ Laureo, March 16, 1567, *ibid.* 367 *seq.*

⁴ Letter of Bonelli to Laureo of March 17, 1567, which reached Paris on April 7, *ibid.* 372.

⁵ Laureo, April 8, 1567, in POLLEN, 378.

In her difficulties after the death of Darnley Mary showed much greater anxiety to have Laureo by her side, than ever she had done in the days of her greatest power. Upon her plan of summoning the nuncio to Scotland, there followed, after he had gone, a request, sent by the hands of Ducroc, that Laureo would send her someone who was in his confidence, who could advise her.¹ After her unhappy marriage with Bothwell she complained to the Cardinal of Lorraine that the nuncio had gone back to Italy too soon; if only he had come to Scotland she would have been saved from many disasters.²

It was natural, seeing how slowly news travelled in those days, that the marriage with Bothwell should only have been known in Italy long after the event. Hay received the sad tidings in Paris on June 5th, and at once sent it on to Laureo at Mondovi,³ and the latter in his turn immediately reported to Rome on July 1st that the queen in the end had not been able to refrain from showing her undue affection for Bothwell, and that thus things had come to this pass, which was so contrary to God's honour and her own.⁴ On June 18th, when Laureo thought it well to satisfy Mary's request for an adviser, he had no less characteristically written to her that though he was sending Edmund Hay, if the queen found herself spurned by the Pope, she should bear in mind that she had married Bothwell, a thing which it seemed implied apostasy from the Catholic faith, since Bothwell was a married man.⁵

¹ Laureo, June 18, 1567, *ibid.* 387.

² Instructions of Chisholm for his mission to Lorraine, *ibid.* 399.

³ *Ibid.* 394.

⁴ "La Regina finalmente non s'è potuta contenere di mostrare la troppa affettione che porta al conte di Boduel con questo ultimo atto contrario al honor di Dio et di Sua Maiestà." Laureo, July 1, 1567, *ibid.* 392.

⁵ "S'aggionge a questo ch'ella per molti rispetti potria dubitare di non essere in buona opinione di Nostro Signore, talche entrando forse in sospetto d'essere disprezzata et abbandonata da Sua Santità pigliasse qualche strana deliberatione, verbi gratia, in

Although Laureo sent at the same time an autograph letter from the queen, which ended with the assurance that she wished to die in the Catholic faith, and for the good of the Church, the Pope's reply to Laureo was extremely short. So far, he caused the Secretary of State to write, His Holiness has not shut his eyes to the truth, and thinks it well at present not to mix himself up in so important a religious question. As far as the Queen of Scotland herself is concerned, his wish is to have no relations with her at all, unless in the future she gives more satisfactory evidence than she has done in the past of her conduct and religion.¹ Thus all relations between Rome and Scotland were broken off. Even after Mary's fall, Pius V. did not wish to charge his nuncio at Madrid with taking any steps on her behalf, as he was not clear in his mind which of the two queens was the better, Mary or Elizabeth.² Some time elapsed before Mary recovered the confidence of Catholics. On January 21st, 1569, Edmund Hay wrote to Francis Borgia to order prayers for Mary, in order that the circumstances of that sinful woman might change for the better, so that she might in the end accomplish a good work, even though she had not so far listened to good advisers.³

maritarsi con il Conte di Boduel ; et massime che questo stimolo può troppo nelle donne giovani et libere, il qual matrimonio non si potria eseguire senza dispreggio et forse abbandono (quod absit) della Santa Religione Cattolica etc." POLLEN, 387.

¹ Bonelli to Laureo, July 2, 1567, in POLLEN, 396. "Toda la buena voluntad que el Papa tenia à la Reyna de Scocia se le ha pasado, y está della muy mal satisfecho, pareciendole que despues de la muerte de su marido ha contemporizado mucho con los herejes." Requesens to Philip II., May 31, 1567. Corresp. dipl., II., 122; cf. 192; "La tiene agora aborresçida." Cf. also Tiepolo in ALBÈRI, II., 4, 188.

² Bonelli to Castagna, August 17, 1568, Corresp. dipl., II., 444. Moreover, Pius at that time hoped for the conversion of Elizabeth. POLLEN, English Catholics, 125.

³ "Fieri enim protest, ut illi peccatrici omnia in bonum aliquando cooperentur, et fiat postea magnorum operum effectrix, quae olim noluit sanis consillis acquiescere." In POLLEN 507.

Though she had erred, Mary Stuart was soon given the opportunity for a bitter atonement. The least part of this was that from the very day of her marriage,¹ and during the whole time that that marriage endured, she was profoundly unhappy.² The nobles who had so long plotted her ruin, now thought that their time was come. Under the pretext of rescuing their queen from the hands of Bothwell, they got together an army and met the troops of Bothwell and Mary near Carberry Hill. No battle was fought. Probably because she considered her own army too weak, and wished to avoid bloodshed, Mary decided to disband her troops on condition of their being allowed to withdraw unmolested, and to come to terms with the rebels.³ Bothwell was allowed to escape unharmed; the leaders of the nobles, Hume and Morton, were in fact his accomplices, and their pretended motive for the campaign, the punishment of the murderer of the King, was nothing but a pretence.

Once in the hands of her enemies, the queen was nothing but a prisoner, and cut off from all help. On her arrival, she was met with the cry, as though from a single voice, of the angry army: "Burn the adulteress!"⁴ She was then taken to Edinburgh; on a banner, carried before her, was shown her murdered husband, and with him her son, with the prayer on his lips: "Judge and avenge my cause, O Lord!"⁵ In her capital Mary was again met by the crowds with savage cries, demanding her death at the stake or by drowning.⁶ During the night between June 16th and 17th, 1567, she was transferred to the castle of Lochleven, strongly built in the middle of a lake, and on July 24th she was made to resign

¹ This is attested by Ducroc, to whom she said on that day that she only wished to die (in HOSACK, I., 322), and by the memoirs of Melvil (*ibid.*) and Leslie, who on the day of the marriage found her weeping bitterly (FORBES-LEITH, 123).

² FLEMING, 463, n. 21.

³ HOSACK, I., 331.

⁴ "Burn the whore!" FLEMING, 164.

⁵ *Ibid.* BAIN, II., n. 519.

⁶ FLEMING, 466, n. 37.

her throne in favour of her thirteen months old son, who was crowned on the 29th. In the sermon which he preached on this occasion Knox demanded Mary's execution for adultery and the murder of her husband.¹

The enemies of the unhappy queen had won a sweeping victory. During the minority of James V. and his daughter Mary the nobles had been able greatly to increase their power, and now the reign of an infant opened before them the alluring prospect of two decades of undisturbed development of that power.

In spite of the strict watch kept over her at Lochleven, Mary, with the help of good friends, was successful in escaping on May 2nd, 1568, and in getting together an army. But on May 16th, the fortune of war was against her at Langside. While Mary was in prison, Elizabeth of England had wholeheartedly and with surprising decision embraced her cause.² Trusting in the help of her "good sister" Mary crossed the Solway Firth on May 16th, and set foot on English soil; she thus entered upon a new phase of her life of sorrow.

With the imprisonment of Mary at Lochleven, Catholic worship in Scotland lost the last place where it could be publicly carried on. Accompanied by armed retainers Lord Glencairn burst into the chapel of Holyrood Castle and broke to pieces everything he found; not even the furniture, dresses and jewellery of the queen were spared.³ Murray had not been regent for three weeks before he began to persecute the Catholics. On September 8th, 1567, Chisholm, the Bishop of Dunblane, was put on trial for having administered the

¹ Calendar of State Papers, Foreign Ser., 1566-1568, p. 291, 293.

² BROSCHE, VI., 516-522. Lethington understood this zeal so little as to give expression to the suspicion that by her exhortations and threats Elizabeth was aiming at nothing else than to irritate the Scottish nobles to such a degree that they would relieve her of all further trouble by killing Mary (*ibid.* 521). But perhaps Elizabeth's aversion for all rebellious behaviour is sufficient to explain her conduct.

³ BELLESHEIM, II., 86. HOSACK, I., 348.

sacraments and for his relations with the Pope, and on November 22nd he was deposed and his revenues were forfeited.¹ Moreover the Privy Council summoned before itself all the leading Catholic ecclesiastics on the charge of having celebrated mass or assisted thereat ; those who could not purchase their liberty or find a place of refuge, had to leave the country.² In 1569 four priests who had said mass were condemned to death ; the regent commuted the death sentence to exile, but all four had to stand at the market-cross in their vestments and with the chalice in their hands, where they were pelted with filth by the people for an hour. Similar scenes were enacted in other cities of Scotland.³

At first Elizabeth made a pretence of intending to intervene on behalf of the fugitive queen,⁴ but about a month after Mary's arrival in England a decision was arrived at by the Privy Council,⁵ according to which the Scottish queen was to be removed from Carlisle, which had so far been her place of residence, to Bolton Castle, that is to say, much further into England : Elizabeth was to go more fully into the matters at issue between the Scots and their queen. Until her cause had been thoroughly gone into there must be no question of assistance, restoration, personal interview with the English queen, or of departure from England. Mary for her part must submit to a kind of judicial inquiry, and it was but an apparent withdrawal of this strange demand when at length the object of the proposed inquiry was stated to be, not that the Queen of Scotland, but that her enemies should justify their proceedings, since even in that case, the regicide and the complicity therein of Mary were bound to be the principal points at issue.⁶

¹ BELLESHEIM, II., 92, 94.

² *Ibid.* 92 *seq.*

³ *Ibid.* 121 *seq.* HOSACK, I., 477.

⁴ HOSACK (I. 383 *seq.*) believes in the loyalty of Elizabeth, but *cf.* BEKKER, Maria, 194.

⁵ Of June 20, 1568 ; see HOSACK, I., 384 ; LINGARD, VIII., 20 ; *cf.* BAIN, II., 708, 709.

⁶ LINGARD, VIII., 21.

After her removal to Bolton Mary could no longer flatter herself with any illusions as to the hostile intentions of Elizabeth.¹ In spite of this, however, she yielded to the force of circumstances and agreed to the proposed conferences, which were begun at York on October 8th, 1568, and transferred to Westminster at the end of November.²

From the purely legal point of view Mary's position before her accusers was a favourable one. The matter adduced as proof by her enemies, such as the two pretended matrimonial pacts with Bothwell, the so-called book of the articles, and the casket letters, to a great extent, at anyrate, rested upon false statements, or lay under the grave suspicion of being forgeries.³ She could, moreover, turn the charge of regicide against her accusers, who beyond all doubt had been deeply involved in the murder of Darnley. Although Murray was himself present in York, he was in no hurry to present his proofs. Before the discussion began, he sent a copy of the casket letters to the English government, and asked in confidence whether they were of any value as a proof of Mary's guilt.⁴ When, at the beginning of October, the conference at York was opened with the charge brought by Mary against her half-brother and his party of having imprisoned their sovereign and usurped the government, Murray replied evasively, defending his conduct, not upon Mary's share in the murder, but upon her obstinate attachment to Bothwell, and

¹ BEKKER, 211. Already in a letter which she sent to the Spanish ambassador in London on June 4, 1568, she says: "No dubdo que si ellos me meten adentro en este reyno contra mi voluntad, me podran quidar la vita." In KERVYN DE LETTENHOVE, Relations, V., 725.

² In the interval between the two conferences an attempt was made to induce Mary to renounce her throne voluntarily. BEKKER, 246.

³ Cf. *supra*, p. 177. Two other documents were presented at York only, but afterwards they disappeared altogether. HOSACK, I., 401 *seq.*, 413.

⁴ June 22, 1568; see BAIN, II., n. 711; HOSACK, I., 389; BEKKER, 205, 244.

endeavouring surreptitiously to learn the opinion of the judges as to the probable value of the casket letters.¹ Since Mary's guilt would have been proved beyond doubt if these letters had really been written by her and addressed to Bothwell, by this secret inquiry he was admitting that the genuineness of the letters was not above suspicion. As for her attachment to Bothwell, the queen could easily justify herself, since it was her accusers themselves who had urged the marriage upon her.

If Murray at that time was not averse to coming to a friendly arrangement with his royal half-sister, Elizabeth held quite other views. The representatives of the captive queen might it is true have got the impression that in this conference she had nothing in view but Mary's restoration,² but in reality the inquiry was intended to blacken the good name of Mary, and to furnish the Queen of England with a weapon against her hated rival.³ For a time Mary behaved towards Elizabeth as though she was unaware of her ill-will, but at the same time she was secretly exposing the manœuvres of Murray to the foreign princes,⁴ and trying to secure their intervention on her own behalf.⁵ It was only when, after the conference had been transferred to Westminster,⁶ Murray was publicly received by Elizabeth, while the Scottish queen was not allowed to come near the capital, that she changed her attitude. She at once wrote to her representatives that she wished to have

¹ HOSACK, I., 394 *seqq.* Later on Murray himself admitted that his reply had not been serious (LINGARD, VIII., 23 n.). For the conference of York *cf.* BAIN, II., n. 839 *seqq.*

² Instructions to the ambassadors of Elizabeth, in HOSACK, I., 404.

³ "Pensaba [Elizabeth] en lo de la justificación hacer de manera que aquello quedase en dubio." De Silva, August 9, 1568, in BEKKER, 207.

⁴ Memorial to all the Christian princes, in LABANOFF, VII., 315-328.

⁵ Mary to Charles IX., July 27, to Elizabeth of Spain, September 24, 1568, in LABANOFF, II., 138, BEKKER, 212 *seq.*

⁶ BAIN, II., n. 895 *seqq.*

the opportunity of justifying herself in public in the presence of the queen, the whole of the nobility, and the foreign ambassadors. If Elizabeth would not accede to this request, it was her intention that all negotiations should be at once broken off.¹

But at this point Mary's representatives, Bishop Leslie and Lord Herries, made a grave mistake. Instead of insisting upon an immediate and clear reply from the English government, and, in the event of a refusal, of at once and with all possible publicity declaring the conference at an end, they allowed themselves to be kept in suspense by the equivocal statements of Elizabeth,² and discussed with Cecil and Leicester proposals for settling the matter amicably,³ although, only a short time before, on November 26th, Murray had finally and explicitly accused his sister of the assassination of her husband, as well as of the attempted murder of her only son.⁴ On December 6th they made a protest against the discussions, but Cecil rejected this on the ground of some pretended error in its form,⁵ and when, on December 9th, Leslie and Herries returned with the protest in an amended form, the crafty secretary of state had had time to persuade Murray to present his proofs, namely, the book of the articles, the deposition of Mary by the Scottish Parliament, the casket letters, and the various depositions of the witnesses.⁶ Then Mary's representatives withdrew from the discussions, which, however, were continued in their absence, just as though nothing had happened.

The final sentence was reserved to a meeting of six of the greatest nobles at Hampton Court.⁷ The proofs were again

¹ Letter of November 22, 1568, to Leslie, Boyd, Herries and the Abbot of Killwinning, in LABANOFF, II., 232-237; HOSACK, I., 415; BEKKER, 239.

² HOSACK, I., 416 *seq.*

³ *Ibid.* 419. BEKKER, 242.

⁴ BAIN, II., n. 913. HOSACK, I., 418.

⁵ HOSACK, I., 420 *seq.*

⁶ HOSACK, I., 422-443.

⁷ *Ibid.* 447 *seqq.* BAIN, II., n. 921,

subjected to examination for two days, but on this occasion not in that careful manner which is absolutely necessary in order to detect skilful forgeries.¹ The final sentence of the judges did not concern itself with Mary's guilt or innocence, but merely stated that as things stood at present it could not be considered fitting that Elizabeth should allow the Queen of Scots to appear in her presence.² It would seem that the judges were not aware that Mary had claimed to present herself solemnly before the queen, the nobles and the ambassadors.

Although, at Bolton Castle, she was far away from the place of the conference, and cut off from all her friends, Mary was nevertheless able to hit upon the proper reply to the behaviour of her enemies. From the defensive she took the offensive. A reply to the accusations of Murray and his associates which Mary sent to her representatives on December 19th,³ not only denies in the clearest terms all knowledge of the murder of Darnley or any complicity therein, but makes the same terrible charge against her accusers.⁴ In consequence of this Murray and Morton were publicly accused of regicide before the queen's council on December 24th, 1568. In a further letter⁵ Mary approved this step on the part of her defenders, whom she charged to obtain copies of the documents adduced against their sovereign, so as to be able to refute them in detail. Elizabeth declared that she thought this request

¹ Description of the examination held by Cecil, in HOSACK, I., 448; BEKKER, 253 *seqq.*

² BAIN, II., n. 921, p. 581 *seq.*

³ LABANOFF, II., 257-261.

⁴ "They have falselie, traitourouslie, and meschantlie lyed; imputing unto us maliciouslie the cryme quhairof thameselfis ar authouris, inventeris, doaris, and sum of thame proper executeris" (LABANOFF II., 258; HOSACK, I., 928). To the charge that she had intended her son to follow his father Mary replied that such an accusation was sufficient in itself to pass judgment on all the other accusations made against her, since the natural love of a mother for her son refuted it (*ibid.*).

⁵ LABANOFF II., 262-264.

“very reasonable” and expressed her joy that her “dear sister” was willing to defend herself, but at the same time she took very good care not to accede to this very reasonable request.

Mary’s case, however, had to be settled in some way, and Elizabeth tried to do this by means of a compromise.¹ Sir Francis Knollys, to whom the custody of the royal prisoner had been entrusted, had, together with Lord Scrope, won her confidence. A plan was formed according to which Knollys, as a friend who wished her well, was to induce her to recognize Murray as regent, whereupon all the accusations which had been brought against her were to be buried in perpetual oblivion. Should she ask for further advice Lord Scrope was to speak in the same sense, and in the third place Bishop Leslie, who had allowed himself to be won over, was to throw all the weight of his authority into the balance in favour of the proposal,² which was then to be further recommended in an autograph letter from Elizabeth. But Mary’s clear judgment saw through the wicked subterfuge which was intended to inveigle her, oppressed and deserted by all her friends as she was, into the sacrifice of her good name. The last words she would ever speak in this life, she wrote after two days’ reflection, would be as Queen of Scotland,³ and a renewed attempt to induce her to resign the crown was definitely rejected by Leslie, since Mary had spoken her last word on the subject.⁴

The embarrassment of the English politicians thus became very considerable, as Mary still had many friends even in England, who were very resentful of the violence which had been offered to her. Thus the conferences came to a quite unexpected end. On January 10th, 1569, Murray was

¹ HOSACK, I., 454 *seqq.* BEKKER, 260 *seqq.*

² It had already been said to Leslie that Mary would be found guilty, whether she were or not (BEKKER, 244). This perhaps explains why he allowed himself to be won over.

³ “La dernière parole que je ferai en ma vie sera d’un Royne d’Ecosse.” January 9, 1569, HOSACK, I., 460; BAIN, II., n. 946.

⁴ HOSACK, I., 463.

summoned to Hampton Court, and was there told that no charge had been proved against him which was prejudicial to his honour, but that on the other hand there was no charge against Mary which could lead Elizabeth to form an unfavourable opinion of her good sister ; Murray therefore could retire in peace to Scotland.¹ On the following day Mary's representatives were also summoned, and asked whether they wished to accuse the opposing party of the murder of Darnley. They replied in the affirmative, because they had an express command to that effect from their sovereign, and they further declared that they were charged to reply to the calumnies of Murray ; this reply was hardly likely to lead to their being given copies of his documentary evidence.²

On January 12th, 1569, Murray received formal permission to depart ; 5,000 pounds sterling were assigned to him as a reward.³ Mary's representatives, for their part, made various other attempts to obtain a sight of the casket letters and the other documentary proofs. They worked for this end until January 7th,⁴ and renewed their demand on the 11th of the same month, the day after Murray's departure, com-

¹ " On the other part, there had been nothing sufficiently produced nor shown by them against the queen their sovereign, whereby the queen of England should conceive or take any evil opinion of the queen her good sister for anything yet seen." HOSACK, I., 465.

² *Ibid.* 467 *seq.*—Already in the instructions of September 29, 1568, which Mary gave to her representatives who went to York, it is stated (n. VII) : " If they maintain that they have writings of mine, which contain things harmful to me, you must ask to have the original produced, and that I myself may see them, and be able to justify myself. You must therefore in my name give the assurance that I have never written anything to anyone on this subject ; and that if there be any such writings they are false and forged, contrived and invented by themselves in order to disgrace and calumniate me. There are many persons in Scotland, men and women, who can imitate my hand." LABANOFF, II., 202 *seq.*

³ HOSACK, I., 467, 468.

⁴ *Ibid.* 462.

plaining at the same time that the Scottish regent had been allowed to go at the very moment when he was accused of regicide.¹ Cecil replied with evasions, whereupon Mary, on January 20th, made a fresh and final attempt with Elizabeth herself, through the French ambassador, de la Mothe Fénelon. In reply to the latter's remonstrances Elizabeth actually promised that she would send the wished for papers on the following day, but when on the 30th of the month Fénelon reminded her of her promise, Elizabeth replied by expressing her anger at the fact that Mary, in a letter written to Scotland, had accused the English queen of partisanship.² The English government itself, however, had justified for all time the suspicions entertained of the genuineness of these documents.

After the conferences at York and Westminster, Cecil and his sovereign could feel a sense of triumph in the consciousness of having carried out a masterly move. Elizabeth's rival, whom she feared so much, and had so long fought against, was a prisoner in an English fortress, and in the conferences which had just come to an end she had ready to her hand plentiful materials for destroying everywhere and for ever Mary's authority and influence. But it soon became clear that even as a prisoner Mary was a very dangerous enemy. In Scotland there was a powerful party devoted to her cause,³ and this party gained strength more and more⁴ in proportion as the government of the regent Murray made itself hated.⁵ As for England, Mary's presence was a constantly recurring danger. Among the great masses of the people there was still too strong a sense of justice to make it possible for them to put up with the ill-treatment of an anointed and crowned queen without a feeling of irritation. The nobles were still in varying degrees animated by the chivalrous feelings of the Middle Ages, to which it was natural to hazard both life and property on behalf of a queen and a defenceless woman.

¹ *Ibid.* 468.

² *Ibid.* 469 *seq.*

³ *Ibid.* 382 *seq.*

⁴ *Ibid.* 479 *seqq.*

⁵ *Ibid.* 379 *seq.*

Moreover, besides the fact that, in the opinion of many people, Mary should have been wearing the crown instead of Elizabeth, in any case she was, after Elizabeth, the lawful heir to the English throne, and far-seeing patriots looked to her for the union of the two kingdoms of Great Britain, a thing long seen to be necessary and ardently desired, while the many who were discontented on the score of religion looked to her for the restoration of the old religion. Mary's hereditary rights, as well as her attachment to the ancient faith were the very reasons why her return to Scotland was being prevented by force,¹ but this tyranny proved itself to be by its consequences a grave political error. For nineteen years conspiracy after conspiracy, and revolt after revolt on behalf of Mary followed in quick succession, for nineteen years the original act of injustice against a helpless princess constrained the authorities to further acts of violence, until at last no other way out of an intolerable state of affairs could be found than the murder of the defenceless prisoner.

It was especially in the northern counties of England, which were still for the most part Catholic, that Mary could count upon many supporters. There her escape from Lochleven was celebrated with bon-fires ; after she had set foot on English soil the nobles flocked to Carlisle to offer her their homage.² After the conference at Westminster, Mary's chief enemy, Murray, judged it to be dangerous to his life to dare to pass through northern England on his way back to Scotland.³ He knew, however, where to look for help. Towards the end of the conferences at York, Lethington had put forward a proposal for the marriage of the Queen of Scotland to the greatest of the English nobles, the Duke of Norfolk.⁴ The Duke, who was one of Elizabeth's representatives at the York conferences, eagerly welcomed the proposal, and through him Murray obtained a letter from Mary warning her friends

¹ POLLEN, *English Catholics*, 120 *seq.*

² BEKKER, 195. BAIN, II., n. 668, 670.

³ HOSACK, I., 473.

⁴ *Ibid.* 410.

in the north of England to allow Murray to pass unmolested.¹ Murray had hardly reached the border when he informed Cecil that his sister was in no sense his friend, and that it was never so necessary as now to take care that she was kept safely in prison.²

But if Murray did not seriously entertain thoughts of the fresh marriage of his sister, the project was all the more ardently put forward by the other side.³ Cecil's behaviour towards the Queen of Scotland, which was so little in keeping with all ideas of honour, had caused much scandal among many of the greater nobles, by whom the Secretary of State was regarded with much dislike as an upstart. Now the Duke of Norfolk and the Earls of Arundel, Pembroke, and Leicester joined together to withstand him and to arrive at a final settlement of the burning question of the succession to the English throne; they aimed at seeing Queen Mary restored to her own throne, and at having her hereditary right of succession to that of England assured to her; since, however, the marriage of the exiled queen to a foreign prince would have meant danger to England, she was to be betrothed to Norfolk. The preparations for this marriage were already well advanced. A decision of the Privy Council had urged the marriage of the Queen of Scotland "with an English noble," the Earls of Bedford and Shrewsbury, as well as the two Catholic Earls of Northumberland and Westmoreland, had agreed to the plan, and not even Cecil dared openly to oppose it. For her part, Mary had replied in a dignified but satisfactory sense to the proposal; the breaking off of her ties to Bothwell did not appear to offer any serious difficulties, and only awaited the assent of the Scottish Parliament and the approval of the English queen; it was hoped that this would be obtained by the influence of the crafty Lethington,

¹ So Murray himself relates. HOSACK, I., 473 *seq.*; *cf.* LINGARD, VIII., 35.

² Leslie in HOSACK, I., 475.

³ *Cf.* for what follows HOSACK, I., 479 *seqq.*; LINGARD, VIII., 35 *seqq.*; POLLEN in *The Month*, IC (1902), 135 *seqq.*

who had already begun to identify himself with the party of Queen Mary.

But the plan met with a skilful adversary in Murray. By his influence the Scottish Parliament rejected the English proposals, and the very men who, a short time, before, had taken up arms to separate Mary from Bothwell, now would not hear of the breaking off of the marriage with Bothwell when Mary asked the opinion of the Parliament on the subject. The regent prevented his enemy Lethington from taking action on behalf of Mary by accusing him of the murder of Darnley, and Lethington was obliged to withdraw for the time being; the commandant of Edinburgh Castle, the Laird of Grange, who had also joined Mary's party, saved him by force from imprisonment.

In the meantime the whole plan had been made known to Elizabeth. Norfolk had to submit to a sharp reprimand from the English queen, and when, a little time afterwards, his conduct appeared to be suspicious, and Murray who, a short time before, had offered his assistance to the duke in favour of the marriage, furnished the English government with materials for a charge against him, Norfolk was thrown into the Tower on October 9th, and his three friends, among them the Earl of Leicester, were forbidden to appear at court, while the Bishop of Ross was thrown into prison. The inquiry into the case, however, showed no grounds for accusing Norfolk of high treason.

Even before the imprisonment of Norfolk a further movement on behalf of the captive queen had been set on foot, which was fraught with all the more danger because it rested to a great extent upon the religious discontent which was so widely spread in England.

CHAPTER VI.

PIUS V. AND ELIZABETH.—THE BULL OF EXCOMMUNICATION.— IRELAND.

IT was perfectly natural that the oppressed English Catholics should turn their eyes with hope to Mary, as their fellow-Catholic and the lawful heir of Elizabeth. It was true that it was not very likely that the rights of a Catholic to the throne would meet with much consideration,¹ but in March, 1563, de la Quadra was of opinion that the Catholic party, which wished for Mary's succession, was stronger than the Protestant party opposed to it; her marriage to Darnley, who had so direct an hereditary right to the English throne, could not but increase the probability of her accession. The enthusiasm for the Scottish queen was, it is true, damped after the murder of Darnley and her marriage to Bothwell, but it revived again when, in spite of several apparent defections, Mary did not change her religious convictions,² and when in the opinion of her friends, the conferences at York and Westminster had ended in her acquittal.

Before long the attitude of Pius V. towards the English question threw new weight into the scales in Mary's favour.

¹ When in October, 1562, it was feared that Elizabeth would die, the name of Mary was not mentioned among the heirs to the throne who were seriously considered (KERVYN DE LETTENHOVE, *Relations*, III., xxiv.; cf. Quadra to Margaret of Parma, October 17, 1562, *ibid.* 167). For the attitude of the English Catholics towards Mary up to the time of her flight to England, cf. POLLEN in *The Month* IC. (1902), 54-57; *English Catholics*, III *seqq.*

² BEKKER, 212, 215. Cf. the letters of Mary to Queen Elizabeth of Spain, of September 24, 1568 (LABANOFF, II., 185) and to Philip II., of November 30, 1568 (*ibid.* 239 *seq.*).

Like his predecessor,¹ it would seem that at first Pius V. had cherished some hopes of Elizabeth's conversion; he gave his full encouragement to the plans and proposals made to him for that end,² but it was not long before he found himself unable to pursue any longer this hopeless quest. Moreover, as a consequence of her continued attacks upon the liberty of conscience of her subjects, and upon the peace of other countries, Elizabeth had become in his eyes nothing better than a crowned criminal, who had usurped the throne. On May 2nd, 1566, he spoke of her in a public brief as one "who pretended to be Queen of England,"³ and a little later he described her in the plainest terms as the author of the wicked conspiracies against the life and throne of the Queen of Scotland.⁴ Moreover, it was notorious that the English queen could no longer be looked upon as a member of the Catholic Church; according to the medieval idea none but a member of the Church of Christ could rule over a Christian people, and in those days of transition medieval ideas still swayed many people even in England. Under these circumstances Pius V. was more and more inclined to follow that course which had long been feared in London, and long expected by the Catholics, and to declare by a public bull that Elizabeth had incurred excommunication and had forfeited the throne.⁵ Alba, whose genius as a soldier was held in great admiration by the Pope, seemed to be the very man to carry out the Papal sentence.

But the condemnation of Elizabeth was very far from implying in the eyes of Pius V. that the cause of her rival of Scotland was worthy of his support, especially after the marriage with

¹ Cf. Vol. XVI. of this work, p. 218.

² POLLEN, *English Catholics*, 143 *seq.*

³ "quae se pro regina Angliae gerit." Letter to Philip II., in LADERCHI, 1566, n. 369.

⁴ To Mary Stuart, May 12, 1566, *ibid.* n. 370.

⁵ What sort of things the Pope looked for from Elizabeth is shown by the fact that he imprisoned the colonel, Megliorino Ubaldini, on the ground that the queen had sent him to oppose the Catholic religion. *Avviso di Roma of October 2, 1568, Urb. 1040, p. 590, Vatican Library.

Bothwell, and even after Mary had set foot as a fugitive on English soil, the Pope, in spite of her influential advocates,¹ maintained at first a very cold and reserved attitude in her regard.² Her firm adherence to the Catholic faith, however, gradually won back for her her former good repute, even in Rome. In December, 1568, Pius V. still expressed himself rather doubtfully about her; Mary's ambassador in Paris was urged to strengthen his sovereign in the faith, as the Pope was at times haunted by the idea that under the pressure of acts of violence she might become weakened in her former attachment to the Apostolic See.³ But on May 9th, 1569, a letter was sent from Rome to Archbishop Beaton saying that Mary was in as high favour with the Pope as she herself could have wished.⁴ Her good relations with Rome were completely restored when, in a brief of January 9th, 1570, the Pope replied to a letter from the Scottish queen, dated October 15th, 1569, holding out hopes of his being able to work on her behalf with the kings of Spain and France, and of affording her help in other ways as well. He stated that he was convinced that her misfortunes had come upon the queen simply because she maintained and protected the Catholic faith; let her then take comfort, because Christ says that they are blessed who suffer persecution for justice sake.⁵

¹ Queen Elizabeth of Spain, Mary's playfellow in her childhood, when she heard of the latter's escape from Lochleven, assured the nuncio in Madrid that Mary "aveva riconosciuto il suo errore ed era diventata pia e cattolica" (Castagna to Bonelli, June 5, 1568, *Corresp. dipl.*, II., 383). Already, on February 6, 1568, Archbishop Beaton had written to Lorraine that (at Lochleven) Mary had begun to serve God better, with more devotion and greater diligence than she had been wont to do for some time previously, which is a great joy to me." In POLLEN, *Negotiations cxxxiii.* and *The Month*, XCI. (1898), 588 *seq.*

² Cf. *supra* p. 181.

³ Bonelli to Beaton, December 4 (?) 1568, in LADERCHI, 1569, n. 284. The letter certainly belongs to 1568.

⁴ POLLEN, *Negotiations*, cxxxiii. *seq.*

⁵ GOUBAU, 203 *seq.*

In the meantime Mary had again written to the Pope on November 30th, 1569, professing herself once more to be the devoted and obedient daughter of the Catholic Church, and again asking for his intervention with the Christian princes, so that by their means the Queen of England might be induced to restore to her her liberty, and allow the free exercise of the Catholic religion. There was no truth, Mary remarks, in the report that had been written to Philip II. that she was wavering in the Catholic religion.¹ It was true, since she was not allowed to attend Catholic worship, that she had, thinking it no wrong, listened to the prayers said by a Protestant preacher; if she had sinned in so doing, she was ready to receive the penance assigned to her by the Pope.² Even though, immediately after the marriage with Bothwell, such protestations no longer met with full credence in Rome, now every reason for distrust had disappeared. On July 13th, 1570, Pius V. wrote to Mary that he was certain that no threats or inducements would be able to detach her from the communion and obedience of the Catholic Church.³ In his last letter to her, dated May 8th, 1571, he expressed himself in the same sense.⁴

Now that the Pope's confidence in Mary's Catholic sentiments was restored, his plans for bringing back England into the bosom of the Church could take a tangible form. When, on March 21st, 1569, he sent Alba the blessed hat, together with a brief, he at the same time consulted him as to whether, with the help of an alliance between France and Spain, it would not be possible to effect an invasion of England. Alba replied that it was no use to hope for the co-operation of France, and that the only way would be for Philip II. either to conquer

¹ Knollys, for example, had on July 28 and September 21, 1568, expressed to Cecil the hope that Mary had changed her faith. BAIN, II., n. 743, p. 466; n. 821, p. 510. Cf. POLLEN, *English Catholics*, 122 *seq.*

² LABANOFF, VII., 16 *seq.*

³ GOUBAU, 366. Here Pius V. was replying to a letter from Mary of April 30, 1570.

⁴ POLLEN in *The Month* XCI. (1898), 576.

England for himself, or else to confer that kingdom upon a Catholic noble, who should marry Mary Stuart.¹ Pius V. expressed to the Spanish ambassador the opinion that the campaign could be carried out in the name of the Pope, who had ancient feudal rights over England.²

Pius V.'s enthusiasm received a fresh incentive when, at the beginning of November, vague rumours reached the Eternal City concerning the attempts of the Duke of Norfolk to secure for the captive Queen of Scotland the succession to the English throne. This movement was taken as meaning a revival of activity on the part of the Catholic party, and on the strength of Venetian reports it was supposed that the whole of England would rise against Elizabeth.³ Thereupon Pius V. at once wrote to Alba (November 3rd) that he ought to protect the Catholic religion in England with all his might, and if possible help the captive Queen of Scotland to recover her throne; the Duke could do nothing more pleasing to God than to free Mary from the hands of the heretics.⁴ On the same date the nuncio in Madrid received instructions to obtain from Philip II. assistance for England,⁵ and the Spanish ambassador in Rome was also ordered to have recourse to his royal master in the same sense. It was incumbent on them, the Pope pointed out, to help with both money and troops a noble English Catholic who might perhaps marry Mary Stuart, and then receive England as a fief from the hands of the Pope.⁶

Philip, who at first was angry that Pius should have written to Alba without mention of the king, was appeased by the diplomatic skill of the nuncio,⁷ and replied in a friendly way,

¹ Zuñiga to Philip II., June 13, 1569, *Corresp. dipl.*, III., 91.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Ibid.* November 4, 1569, III., 188.

⁴ In LADERCHI, 1569, n. 285; *Colecc. de docum. inéd.*, IV., 514; KERVYN DE LETTENHOVE, *Huguenots*, II., 386.

⁵ Bonelli to Castagna, November 3, 1569, *Corresp. dipl.*, III., 186.

⁶ Zuñiga to Philip II., November 4, 1569, *ibid.* 188.

⁷ Castagna to Bonelli, January 14, 1570, *ibid.* 218. Bonelli (to Castagna, March 8 1570 *ibid.* 258 *seq.*) justifies the brief to Alba.

but his letter contained nothing more than a decision to leave the whole affair to the judgment of Alba.¹ The latter had already in a letter sent to Rome excused himself on the ground of the alleged want of money, and his consideration for France.² Pius V. comforted himself for this reply by saying that in such matters he must trust to the judgment of Alba, and that he had confidence in the Christian feeling and prudence of the Duke that he would not let this opportunity slip of winning back England.³

It is difficult to attribute much importance to the activities of Norfolk's party in estimating the efforts of the English Catholics; already for some time past a really Catholic movement, which had taken its origin in nothing but religious motives had been in preparation. The adherents of the ancient faith in England were beginning, not without the help of the Pope, to rouse themselves from the inactivity which they had hitherto preserved. While he was still Inquisitor General, Pius V. had in the time of his predecessor armed four priests, among them Sanders and Harding, with faculties to readmit the English schismatics to the Church,⁴ and thereafter the care of souls among the Catholics of England had been carried on with greater effect and care. Before this, no other condition had been demanded for the admission of laymen to the sacraments of the Church than that they should abstain

¹ Philip II. to the Pope, January 20, 1570, *ibid.* 226. Cf. Philip II. to Zuñiga December 18, 1569, and Castagna to Bonelli, December 22, 1569, *ibid.* 205, 208.

² Alba to Zuñiga, December 5, 1569, in MIGNET, II., 508 *seq.*

³ Zuñiga to Alba, January 7, 1570, Corresp. dipl., III., 214.

⁴ Harding and Sanders to Morone, June 11, 1567, in MEYER, 412 *seqq.* Similar faculties were granted by a *brief of May, 18, 1570, to William Allen, John Marshall and Nicholas Sanders for England and Scotland (Archives of Briefs, Rome). On June 9, 1568, Bonelli wrote to Castagna that except for the faculties to absolve granted at the request of certain Jesuits and the alms which were sent each year to Louvain for the English Catholics, there were no relations between the Pope and the English. Corresp. dipl., II., 387.

from the Protestant Eucharist ; now it was further required of them that they should not attend heretical worship at all. The effects of this greater strictness were very good. On June 11th, 1567, Harding and Sanders wrote from Louvain to Morone¹ that the confusion and wavering had been put a stop to, that men refused to attend the Anglican services more than before, that the faith was openly professed even before the judges, and that men endured imprisonment and chains with joy. It was true that certain Catholics still maintained that so long as the aforesaid four priests appealed to faculties which had only been orally given, they were not obliged to believe them on that point, and might therefore continue with the usage which they had formerly adopted,² but Harding and Sanders obtained a Papal brief of August 14th, 1567, which put an end to all such doubts.³

Disquieting news soon reached the Protestant commissioners for the visitation of churches. Many members of the lesser nobility, so men wrote from Chester in Dec., 1567, have bound themselves by oath not to receive the Protestant communion any more so long as Elizabeth reigns.⁴ In January, 1568, a number of letters drew the attention of the Protestant commissioners for the visitation of churches to attempts to alienate the people "from loyalty to the queen and from unity of worship" ; a month later an order was issued for the imprisonment of certain deprived priests who still carried on their ministrations in private house, among them being Vaux and Allen.⁵ At the end of 1567 private houses were searched and those who dwelt there were called upon to give an account of their religion and of their participation in Anglican worship, while those who had heard mass at the Spanish embassy were

¹ In MEYER, *loc. cit.*

² *Ibid.*

³ FRERE, 140. At that time Laurence Vaux was especially active in England itself in the interests of the Pope ; Dictionary of National Biography, LVIII., 191.

⁴ FRERE, 141.

⁵ *Ibid.* 142.

forced to take the oath of supremacy.¹ From that time the number of those imprisoned for hearing mass continued to increase; in February, 1569, the prisons were filled with Catholics,² and at the end of May the persecution was more violent than ever.³

If under these circumstances the Catholics of the older generation could flatter themselves that as far as they themselves were concerned they would always remain true to the faith of their fathers, no one could fail to see that, granted the suppression of regular Catholic instruction, their children must little by little fall under the influence of the heretical teaching. Moreover, after May, 1568, they could not fail to see how unjustly the lawful heir to the throne was being treated, and that a principal motive for this was her firm attachment to the Catholic faith. They did not dare to rebel openly, after the example of the French and Scottish insurgents, but little by little the grievous evils under which they lay brought them face to face with the question whether in conscience and before God they were bound to remain silent spectators of such acts of oppression, which called to heaven for vengeance, and whether further passive inaction was altogether compatible with their ideas of honour and chivalry. "We can bear witness," later on wrote Nicholas Sanders from Louvain,⁴ "how eagerly the English nobles turned to us to know whether the Apostolic See had not yet issued

¹ Thus wrote de Silva to Philip II., *Corresp. de Felipe II.*, II., 564; MEYER, 104.

² "Sicel . . . afflige bravamente á los católicos, encarcelando á muchos, y casi tiene todas les cárceles llenas." Guerau de Spes to Alba, February 29, 1569 (according to KERVYN DE LETTENHOVE, *Relations*, VI., 301, February 20), *Corresp. de Felipe II.*, III., 191; *cf.* 232.

³ Spes to Philip II., May 23, 1569, *ibid.* 239. The increased severity of the persecution was anterior to the rising of 1569, and cannot be looked upon as its consequence, as it is by MEYER (105).

⁴ *A. M. A. Graziani, 15 Cal. martii 1570, Graziani Archives, Città di Castello, *Instrutt.*, I., 26.

some decree against the queen, and further whether, even in the absence of any such decree, they might not with a clear conscience dare to take steps to free themselves from such tyranny. To the first question we made answer that, as far as we here were aware, nothing of the kind had been made public, while as to the other question the best theologians were not of one mind. Some had no doubt whatever that, even without any authority from the Roman See, it was lawful to defend the Catholic religion in those doctrines which are the common Christian inheritance, while others thought it necessary, or at any rate safer, to wait for a Papal decision."

Recent times had shown plenty of instances of religious risings in France and Scotland which had been crowned with success. The English Catholics certainly did not lack the necessary number of malcontents for success, even though they had not the unscrupulous determination of their Scottish neighbours. The carrying into effect of a rising was much discussed, but they could not arrive at any working plan. In the course of 1568 Ridolfi, a Florentine banker resident in London, conferred with the Spanish ambassador, Guerau de Spes, on the subject of obtaining help from Philip II. The ambassador was favourably disposed towards the Florentine's request, but Alba did not agree with him and the negotiations came to nothing.¹ In the spring of 1569, Nicholas Morton, a former prebendary of York, and at that time penitentiary of St. Peter's in Rome, who had been sent by the Pope, arrived in England ;² he was charged to find out what sort of reception the excommunication of Elizabeth would be likely to meet with in England. From him the malcontents learned Pius V.'s views of the queen, but he was not able to inform them of any Papal decision which would have removed the objections to an armed rising, though his report of the state of feeling

¹ LEE in Dictionary of National Biography, XLVIII., 290. LADERCHI, 1569, n. 270.

² The brief recommending him to Alba, February 13, 1569, in LADERCHI, 1569, n. 270.

in England on his return confirmed Pius V. in his determination to take proceedings against Elizabeth.¹

There can be no doubt that at the beginning of 1569 the circumstances were very favourable for a rising, in that since December, 1568, Elizabeth had been involved in a serious quarrel with Spain. Spanish ships, carrying a rich cargo of gold for Alba's troops in the Low Countries, had taken refuge in the harbour of Southampton, in order to escape from pirates, and the English vice-admiral, Arthur Champernowne, had at once informed the secretary of state that the treasure amounted to no less than 400,000 pounds sterling, and was therefore "very convenient for His Majesty."² It meant nothing to the queen that she was in the eyes of the world incurring the stigma of theft: anything that could be stolen from the cursed Spaniards was to the advantage of England.³ It seemed therefore that war with Philip II. was imminent, and in the opinion of the Spanish ambassador in London its result could hardly be doubted. Now, he thought, Elizabeth could be driven from her throne by making use of the adherents of Mary Stuart,⁴ and the favourable moment had come for restoring the Catholic religion in England, and thus bringing about peace in Flanders.⁵ Many anonymous letters expressed

¹ LINGARD, VIII., 44. Pollen in *The Month*, IC. (1902), 140, and English Catholics, 143 *seqq.* Sanders in SPILMANN, II., 94. For the relations of Morton with Northumberland *cf.* the interrogatory of the latter in GREEN, Addenda, 1560-1579, p. 408, and F. Norton to Leicester and Burghley, April 2, 1572 *ibid.* 390.

² "therefore most fytt for Her Majestie" (letter of December 19, 1568; *cf.* KERVYN DE LETTENHOVE, Relations, V., 197). The amount of the money is variously estimated. BROSCHE, VI., 535.

³ KERVYN DE LETTENHOVE, Relations, V., x. The vice-admiral wrote on January 1, 1569, to the Privy Council that the money had been sent by the Pope for the war against the Protestants; *ibid.* 205.

⁴ To Alba, December 30, 1568; *ibid.*

⁵ "Agora ay muy buen forma de reduzir este reyno a la fee católica." To Alba, January 9, 1569, KERVYN DE LETTENHOVE, Relations, V., 228.

the conviction that as soon as the standard of Spain was raised all the Catholics would rise in rebellion.¹

Mary Stuart herself at the end of 1568 thought she could safely say that if Philip II. would lend his aid, she could at the end of three months be Queen of England ;² in July, 1569, the enthusiasm for her as the lawful heir to the throne had grown to such an extent that Elizabeth jealously complained that it reminded her of the revolt of Absalom against David.³ In the north of England some parts of the community had already begun to drive out the Protestant preachers.⁴

Very soon, however, all these high hopes were shattered. The forces of Spain were entirely occupied with the revolts of the Moors and of the Low Countries, and although English privateers, with the secret approval of Elizabeth, were harrassing the Spanish trading vessels, and the correspondence of the Spanish ambassador was confiscated and his house in London kept under surveillance,⁵ Spain did not dare to draw the sword against England. In the Low Countries Alba, to whom Philip II. had left the decision, was definitely opposed to a war with England, and refused to hear of any encouragement being given to Elizabeth's Catholic subjects.⁶ Guerau de Spes, moreover, had counted too highly on the feelings of the English Catholics ; many of them openly said that they had no intention of taking up arms in order to conquer England for the King of Spain, nor, speaking generally, did they wish to have anything to do with that country.⁷

¹ To Alba, April 2, 1569, *ibid.* 536. Cf. Spes to Philip II., April 2, 1569, *ibid.* 358 : " Muchos católicos me escriben cartas secretamente, que, en viendo banderas de V. M. en este reyno, se lebantaran todos."

² Spes to Philip II., January 8, 1569, Corresp. de Felipe II., III., 171 ; cf. 280.

³ Spes to Philip II., July 25, 1569, *ibid.* 266.

⁴ Spes to Philip II., July 14, 1569, *ibid.* 259.

⁵ Spes to Alba, January 9, 1569, in KERVYN DE LETTENHOVE, *Relations*, V., 227 *seq.*

⁶ Cf. *ibid.* xv. *seq.*

⁷ " Car ne veulent, à ce qu'ils disent, combattre pour conquérir ce royaume au roy d'Espagne, ny rien avoir à faire avec ceste nation la." De la Mothe Fénelon, August 17, 1569, *ibid.* xxi.

In spite of this, however, during the summer of 1569 Mary Stuart received many offers from the English nobles who were ready to sacrifice their property and their lives to regain for her her freedom. By the advice of Norfolk she refused these offers, but when the Duke had been thrown into the Tower, and she herself feared for her life, Mary secretly sent word to the Earl of Westmoreland, whose wife was Norfolk's sister, and the Earl of Northumberland, and through these two to all those who had already placed themselves at her disposal.¹

If, instead of submitting to the queen, Norfolk had called them to arms, the nobles would certainly have obeyed his summons, and thus strengthened the band of his adherents. But the summons did not come, and very soon, before the preparations for a rising had been made, the leading Catholic nobles, the Earls of Northumberland and Westmoreland, found themselves suddenly faced with the necessity of coming to a definite decision.² The Earl of Sussex was actually ordered by the government to summon them to York, to imprison them and to send them to the court. Thus Northumberland and Westmoreland had to decide whether they intended to share the fate of Norfolk or to take up arms. On November 7th they turned to the Pope for assistance, and on the 14th they once more unfurled the ancient standard bearing the cross and five wounds which had already been displayed in 1536 under Henry VIII. in the so-called Pilgrimage of Grace, and on the following day an appeal to the people was issued. Northumberland, who was highly respected and a man of deep religious feeling, a typical noble of the olden times and ideas, who had hitherto spent his life far from the court among his vassals and tenants, and who was not in the least fitted to be an agitator or political intriguer,³ had from the first discouraged the idea of open hostilities.

¹ LINGARD, VIII., 43 *seq.*

² For the Northern Rising see CUTHBERT SHARPE, *Memorials of the Rebellion of 1569*, London, 1840; GREEN, *Addenda 1566-1579*, *passim*; LINGARD, VIII., 44 *seqq.*; POLLEN in *The Month*, IC. (1902), 136 *seqq.*, and *English Catholics*, 118-141.

³ For a character sketch of him see HOSACK, II., 124 *seq.*

The real leader of the rising was Richard Norton, named by the people the father of the revolt. It would seem that it was to a great extent due to a woman and a Protestant, the Countess of Westmoreland, that the inflammable material of discontent which had been so long smouldering at last broke into flame.¹

On November 15th the Earls issued an appeal to the people, in which they began by asserting their loyalty to Elizabeth, and declaring that they had taken up arms for the honour and safety of the queen, the nobles and the kingdom, and that their undertaking was aimed only against the queen's counsellors, who were plotting the destruction of the ancient nobility, were urging the queen to a false policy, and had introduced a new made religion which was contrary to the word of God.² This appeal, however, produced the desired effect as little as did several others which followed it, and many of the Catholic nobles even joined the royal army under the command of the Earl of Sussex.³ In other ways too the insurgents were dogged by ill-success. It would have been a great advantage to them if they could have set Mary Stuart free and taken her to their head-quarters; her liberation was the principal object of the rising, yet the Earls could not make mention of this in their appeal, nor refer to it without endangering Mary's life. When, on their march southwards, they sent eight hundred horsemen to Tutbury, where Mary was at that time imprisoned, they learned on the way that the Queen of Scots had been removed to Coventry.

Everything pointed to the necessity of the quick delivery of a master stroke, the success of which would have brought many supporters to the standard of the insurgents; it was probably for that reason that Sussex avoided a pitched battle. When, however, the rising had failed to spread during the first

¹ Pollen in *The Month*, IC., 136 seq.

² LINGARD, VIII., 45 seq. GREEN, III. Cf. the proclamation of November 19, 1569, to the same effect, in SPILLMANN, II., 97 seq.; GONZALEZ, 343.

³ Sadler, November 26, 1569, in GREEN, 123; LINGARD, VIII., 47.

eight days, and the hope of receiving the expected assistance from Alba had almost disappeared, while the Earl of Warwick was advancing from the south with an army, Northumberland and Westmoreland fell back to their fortresses and territory in the north. In the new appeals which they then issued they no longer spoke of restoring the old religion, but dwelt only on the need of settling the succession to the throne; they declared that the efforts of the old nobility were directed to this end, and that their efforts were being opposed by certain upstarts in the queen's Council; therefore they were obliged to take forcible measures.¹ The studied inaction of the Earl of Sussex made it possible for the two Earls to win some small successes. But when Warwick and his army were not more than a day's march away, Sussex also pushed forward, whereupon the insurgents began to disperse. Disagreement between the two leaders completed the breaking up of the whole force, and Northumberland and Westmoreland sought safety over the Scottish border. Sussex had reinforced his army in the Catholic north, so that the Catholics were scattered by their own co-religionists. Cecil could boast that the queen had found supporters among all classes of her subjects, without any distinction of religion.²

The suppression of the rising had cost no bloodshed, but all the greater was the toll of human life taken by Elizabeth in revenge after her victory. In order to strike terror into the people the queen proceeded with the extremity of rigour. All those of the insurgents who were possessors of property were brought to judgment, while the poorer folk were hanged wholesale. About 900 persons were thus put to death during the course of the judicial proceedings; in the county of Durham alone Sussex condemned three hundred and fourteen persons to the gallows. Elizabeth wished to employ the ordinary tribunals against others who had shared in the rising, but she gave way before the objection raised by the crown lawyers that if she did so there were some places which would be depleted of the whole of their population. Those who were

¹ LINGARD, VIII., 48.

² HOSACK, I., 494.

spared, however, were forced to take, not only the oath of loyalty, but also that of supremacy.¹ In spite of this terrorism, however, the rising still had an after effect. In February, 1570, Leonard Dacre, a scion of a noble family, called to arms the wild inhabitants of the Border, but his three thousand followers were defeated in a bloody battle; Dacre fled to Scotland, and afterwards to Flanders.²

Dacre's attempt was on the point of being crushed, the rising of 1569 had long been suppressed, and yet it would seem that the news of events of the last few months had not even reached Flanders, so that on February 14th, 1570, Nicholas Sanders had recourse to Rome from Louvain for help for the insurgents.³ Two Catholic Earls, he wrote,⁴ together with a number of the nobility, have taken up arms in the Catholic cause, in the expectation that Rome will not abandon them. The help

¹ LINGARD, VIII., 51. SPILLMANN, II., 99 *seqq.* On February 9, 1570, Spes wrote to Philip II. that the number of those who had been hanged was certainly more than 700; on the 25th of the same month he reported that the executions were still going on (*Corresp. de Felipe II.*, III., 333, 337). On December 28, 1569, the Earl of Sussex wrote to Cecil: "I guess the number will be 600 or 700 that shall be executed of the common sort, besides the prisoners taken in the field. I trust to use such discretion as that no sort shall escape from example, and that the example shall be very great." (GREEN, *Addenda*, 1566-1579, p. 169). BROSCHE, (VI., 554) gives the following opinion: this "act of repression, carried out by the express orders of the queen" must "be considered as the darkest stain upon her character, and the most shameful of all her acts." On March 31, 1570, in pardoning some of the more prominent insurgents, Elizabeth wrote that she was only sparing four of them because their lives might be useful to her. GREEN, 266; *cf.* 183, 188.

² LINGARD, VIII., 52 *seq.*

³ At that time "the English ports were so strictly watched that the English Catholics in the Low Countries for a time were quite out of touch with their country." MEYER, 105.

⁴ *A. M. A. Graziani, *Lovanii* 15 Cal. mart. 1570, Graziani Archives, Città di Castello, Istrutt. I. 26. See the text in App. n. 7.

that they look for to Rome consists only in this, that they may be released from their obedience to the queen, and may thus be able to convince everyone that they have taken up arms, not as rebels, but as loyal sons of the Church. No reply had come from Rome as to this, and in consequence many questions had reached Louvain as to the lawfulness of armed resistance.¹ In this state of doubt 4,000 had gone to Scotland, and were there awaiting the Pope's decision; for three months they had been waiting there for the Pope to take action against Elizabeth. Many of the English were prepared to follow their example. If the Pope would allow them to retain possession of the Church property which they had obtained unlawfully, then the whole of the nobility, with very few exceptions, would take up the Catholic cause, because nothing was holding them back but the fear that the restoration of the Papal authority would involve the loss of their possessions; otherwise they were almost all Catholics. Six or seven of the great earls and barons could be safely counted upon, and more than a thousand of the gentry. Heresy had only infected five or six of the earls, and for the rest, the heretical party was made up of a few effeminate courtiers and of artisans; the peasants, by far the greater part of the populations, were all Catholics. Two things then had to be done in Rome; the Pope must openly take part against Elizabeth, and encourage the English nobility to stand up for the faith, promising them that they would not have to restore the Church property. Then, in the opinion of the far-seeing, not only all the Catholics to a man, but also all those who were wavering, and even some of the schismatics themselves, would take up arms. The Pope had made a good beginning by sending Nicholas Morton to England, but he must not desert the Catholics now. A letter had arrived from Spain, from the Duchess of Feria, stating that Philip II. intended to help the English Catholics.

Sanders' letter reached Rome on March 21st; Graziani's reply, dated March 29th,² shows that there too they were not fully informed as to recent events in England. As a

¹ See *supra* p. 203.

² In *MAI*, *Spicel. Rom.*, VIII. 456 *seq.*

matter of fact, the appeal for help sent to Rome on November 7th, 1569, by Northumberland and Westmoreland, a week before the rising, only arrived there on February 16th, 1570, and had not been answered until February 22nd.¹ In his letter the Pope exhorted the two earls to be constant and loyal, because it might be that God had chosen them to restore unity between England and the Apostolic See. If they were called upon to shed their blood for the defence of the faith and the authority of the Pope, it would be better for them to pass to eternal life by means of a glorious death, than to continue to serve in a shameful life the caprices of a woman who was the slave of her passions, and forfeit the salvation of their souls.² Pius V. had already made an attempt to support the English rising. On February 3rd, 1570, he had recommended to the Duke of Alba those English nobles who, for the restoration of the Catholic religion, had taken up arms in a war which was as religious as it was just, and were prepared to sacrifice both property and life for the cause of God.³ He had recourse to Philip II, in the same sense before he issued the bull of excommunication.⁴ He further gave orders to Ridolfi to assist the earls with money.⁵

¹ LADERCHI, 1570, n. 384. GOUBAU, 590 (with date February 20). News reached Rome in the middle of January of a rising of the Catholics, and fervent prayers were made to God for the success of the insurgents: **“ Per l’aviso della sollevatione delli catholici in Inghilterra so fanno qui di continuo orationi acciò Iddio augmenti le forze a quelli buoni spiriti.”* Avviso di Roma of January 14, 1570, Urb. 1041, p. 217b, Vatican Library.

² LADERCHI, 1570, n. 384.

³ LADERCHI, 1570, n. 383. GOUBAU, 373 *seq.* (with date February 4).

⁴ February 21, 1570, LADERCHI, 1570, n. 316.

⁵ Letter to the two earls of February 20, 1570, in GOUBAU, 293. Pius V. had promised the English Catholics a sum of 100,000 ducats (Zuñiga to Philip II., March 7, 1570, *Corresp. dipl.*, III., 249): he sent them 12,000 scudi as an instalment by Ridolfi (Zuñiga to Philip II., February 28, 1570, *ibid.* 246). On May 13, 1570, Ridolfi inquired of Spes how he could send the Pope’s money to the two earls (KERVYN DE LETTENHOVE, *Relations*,

As had been the case with Sanders, the Pope also received advice as to the best way to bring back England to the Church from other English exiles,¹ some of whom, like Goldwell, Bishop of St. Asaph, and Richard Shelley, Prior of the Knights of St. John, were resident in the Eternal City, and were asked for their advice on English affairs.² But all these had been out of touch with their country for over ten years, and Pius V. would not let himself be decided by their advice alone to take steps against Elizabeth. When, however, Morton, whom he had himself sent to England, declared on his return that the moment for action had come, and when letters received from England stated that the Catholics there were only refraining from taking up arms against Elizabeth because she had not as yet been declared a heretic and deposed by the sentence of the Apostolic See,³ Pius no longer delayed in opening the proceedings in due form against the "pretended" Queen of England (February 5th, 1570).⁴ Twelve refugees who were

V., 653 *seq.*; *cf.* Spes to Philip II., on the same date, *Corresp. de Felipe II.*, III., 352). Alba replied to the question of Spes (KERVYN DE LETTENHOVE, *loc. cit.*, 655), that he was writing on the subject to Philip II. and that in the meantime the ambassador must not mix himself up in the affair (*ibid.* 657).

¹ Thus *Caligari wrote to Commendone from Pieve on December 6, 1567, that a young Englishman had sent him a document in which he had explained what the Pope could do for England. Someone must be sent quite secretly to England (Papal Secret Archives). *Cf.* *Discorso fatto a Pio V. dal priore d'Inghilterra Cav. Hierosolymitano [Shelley] sopra la riduzione di quel regno in Cod. Ottob., 2432, p. 160-178, Vatican Library, Shelley's discourse is also in Cod. 6820, p. 199 *seq.*, Court Library, Vienna.

² Graziani to Sanders, March 29, 1569, in MAI, Spicil., VIII., 457 *seq.* A Scottish noble who had been exiled on account of the faith was also in Rome in 1569, and received 300 scudi from the Pope as well as recommendations. *Avviso di Roma of June 29, 1569, Urb. 1041, p. 102, Vatican Library.

³ On several occasions Pius V. stated that he had been led to issue his bull of excommunication by the insistence of the English Catholics. *Cf. infra* p. 214.

⁴ In LADERCHI, 1570, n. 332-345.

living in Rome were summoned and questioned as to whether they could testify that Elizabeth had assumed the position of head of the Church of England,¹ that she had deposed and imprisoned Catholic bishops and given their office to schismatics and laymen, exercised the right of making the visitation of churches, and introduced an oath and laws directed against the Apostolic See ; further, whether by her authority heresy was preached, and she herself lived as a heretic, and had it in her power to suppress heresy. These questions related to things which were known to all, but the obtaining of proofs

¹ "Utrum regina Angliae usurpaverit auctoritatem capitis ecclesiae Anglicanae" In the acta of the inquiry it is maintained that Elizabeth had taken upon herself the *title* of "head of the church." In the deposition of Shelley it is stated that the oath of supremacy insisted on the recognition of Elizabeth as "principem et gubernatricem rerum tam ecclesiasticarum quam profanarum" (LADERCHI, 1570, n. 329). Bishop Goldwell was only asked whether Elizabeth had assumed the "authority" of head of the church and he testified that the Catholic bishops would not agree to her being called "gubernatricem summam ecclesiae particularis" and that they had accordingly been deposed (*ibid.* n. 332). In the Pope's final sentence it was stated that the oath of supremacy insisted that no one should be accepted except the queen as "supremam gubernatricem tam in spiritualibus et ecclesiasticis quam in temporalibus," and this is the exact expression of the title claimed by Elizabeth (*cf.* Vol. XIV. of this work, p. 407). It cannot therefore be said (with MEYER, 68) that they did not know in Rome what ecclesiastical title was borne by the Queen of England, and Protestant polemics go too far (MEYER, 69) when they take as a usurpation of the *title* of "head of the church" the passage in the bull of excommunication: "supremi Ecclesiae capitis *locum* in omni Anglia eiusque praecipuam auctoritatem atque *iurisdictionem* monstruose sibi usurpans." They had the formula of the oath of supremacy in Rome (LADERCHI, 1570, n. 325). Elsewhere, in a letter to Philip II. of March 8, 1570 (in GOUBAU, 305) it is stated of Elizabeth: "Ipsa se . . . Anglicanae ecclesiae *caput* appellavit." It was maintained at that time (June, 1571) even by the Protestant party, that Elizabeth had the same power as the Pope; see GREEN, *Addenda*, 1566-1579, p. 353.

was carried out in full accordance with the requirements of the law. On February 12th the inquiry came to an end, and on the 25th a bull solemnly pronounced sentence on Elizabeth. In this bull, on the ground of his duty of preserving from corruption all those who belonged to the one true Church and of punishing apostates, and in virtue of the supreme powers conferred upon him, the Pope declared Elizabeth to be guilty of heresy, and of encouraging heresy, to have incurred excommunication, and therefore to have forfeited her "pretended right" to the English crown; her subjects were no longer bound by any oath of loyalty to her, and under pain of excommunication could no longer yield her obedience.¹

Pius V. frequently assured the Spanish ambassador that he had issued the bull of excommunication in response to the requests of the English Catholics, who had scrupled about taking up arms against Elizabeth so long as she was not declared to be a heretic and deposed by the Pope; that his intention had been to encourage them, and that since the English Catholics had asked for sentence against Elizabeth, he could not in conscience refuse it.²

¹ Bull. Rom., VII., 810 *seq.* A photograph of the bull in POLLEN, English Catholics, p. 150.

² Thus in many letters from Zuñiga to Philip II.: "Dixome que ellos mismos se lo pedian porque estaban en escrupulo de no tomar las armas contra ella hasta que S.S. la huviesse declarado y privado de su reyno." (April 10, 1570, Corresp. dipl. III., 291). "Està confiado de que los catholicos de Inglaterra han de hazer grande levantamiento este verano; y para darles animo ha ya declarado a la Reyna de Inglaterra y pribadola del reyno, aunque no lo ha publicado aqui. . . . No le pareció que podria dexar de hazer [the declarations against Elizabeth] por la instancia que los catholicos de aquel reyno le hazian, afirmandole que havia muchos que tenian escrupulo de levantarse contra la reyna no estando declarada por S.S." (April 28, 1570, *ibid.* 307 *seq.*). "Asseguróme mucho . . . que solamente se havia movido por *una carta firmada de muchos catholicos de Inglaterra*, los quales le prometian, etc." (June 10, 1570, *ibid.* 397). . . . "que havia hecho esta declaracion a instancia de muchos catholicos de Inglaterra . . . y que no le pareçia que con su consçiençia

This makes it easy to understand why the Pope did not publish the bull in the customary form, but only took steps to have it made known in England. By a brief of March 30th, 1570, copies of the bull were sent to Alba, in order that he might have it displayed in Flanders, especially in the sea-ports ;¹ on account of the great trade carried on by English merchants in the Flemish ports the news of the Papal sentence would be bound very soon to make its way across the channel. For the same reason the bull was also sent to France ;² other reasons led to the fact that the nuncio in Poland also received orders to publish it on April 29th.³ In order to make the bull known in England the banker Ridolfi was used as an intermediary, and about eighty copies of the bull were sent to him to distribute.⁴ In Rome itself, on the other hand, the bull

podia dexar de hacer justicia pidiendosela los catholicos . . .” (August 11, 1570, *ibid.* 499). Cf. Arco to Maximilian II., May 6, 1570, in SCHWARZ, Briefwechsel, 160.

¹ LADERCHI, 1570, n. 377. BROM (Archiv., I., 207) dated the brief March 3.

² Zuñiga to Philip II., June 10, 1570, Corresp. dipl., III., 396. From Ridolfi Spes received a copy sent by the French nuncio (Spes to Alba, May 10, 1570, in KERVYN DE LETTENHOVE, Relations, V., 652). Alba gave Spes instructions to deny, if necessary, all knowledge of the bull (May 25, 1570, *ibid.* 657).

³ *Nunziatura di Polonia, I., 64, Papal Secret Archives.

⁴ “*Affine che li catholici con maggior fervor dessino aiuto all’impresa di detto duca [Norfolk] e Regina di Scotia ; e a questo effetto spedì corriero a me Ridolfi con forse ottanta di dette bolle parte in stampa e parte in penna, con ordine espresso che per quanto desiderano il servitio suo e della Sede Apostolica e di tutta la cristianità facessi opera che subito le dette bolle si spargessino e publicassino in Inghilterra senza haver rispetto a quasi fussi mio interesse, perchè mi prometteva che la Sede Apostolica mi ricompensarebbe, e che del continuo tutta la cristianità, come diceva, faceva orazione per me, accioche conducessi a perfettione cotanta impresa ; il che da me [sic !] con quel zelo maggiore che fusse possibile, fu eseguito, havendone di notte appicata una alla porta del vescovo di Londra et altra lassata a casa di un gentilhommo Inglese, quali la mattina riempierono

of excommunication was kept almost entirely secret. As late as April the Pope spoke of proceedings against Elizabeth as being only imminent,¹ and on April 15th the Imperial ambassador, Arco, reported it as being a matter of hearsay.² It was only in May that the bull appeared in Rome in printed form, but was at once withdrawn from sale.³ The usual formalities which in other cases were looked upon as essential for the promulgation of pontifical enactments, were never complied with in the case of the bull of excommunication.⁴

la detta città et tutta la corte con le copie che ne furono fatte di tanto spavento e romore, che con le altre appresso che havevo che furono lassate cadere in diversi luoghi del Regno, che poco mancò che non seguisse de fatto una gran sollevazione. Il che intesosi per detto duca di Northfolch e Regina di Scotia solleci-torno per mezzo mio la conclusione de le pratiche, e cosi in pochi giorni convennono e del parentado infra di loro e de la lega, della quale desiderandone per li aiuti che si promettevano la confer-matione, e dal Papa e dal Re catholico, parve a detta Regina di Scotia e al duca di spedire me medesimo a S. St^a e Maestà cattolica." Ridolfi to the Pope (Gregory XIII.) s.d. Chigi Library, Rome, Miscell., t. 48, p. 39 *seqq.*

¹ Zuñiga to Philip II., April 10, 1570, Corresp. dipl., III., 291.

² *State Archives, Vienna.

³ SCHWARZ, Briefwechsel, 160.

⁴ A document containing questions and answers concerning doubts of conscience felt by English Catholics, drawn up in Rome in the time of Gregory XIII., mentions in the first place that several maintained, against the validity of the bull, the difficulty: "quod non fuerit hic [in Rome] more aliarum in Campo Florae et alibi promulgata." (*English Historical Review*, VII., 1892, 84). Objections to the legal validity of the bull were raised by Protestants like Camden, and by de Thou (see LADERCHI, 1570, n. 366 *seqq.*), by Gallicans, like Noel Alexander, and recently by Meyer (p. 66 *seqq.*). But there is no force in the objection that according to canon law a prince can only be excommunicated after previous warning, and that between the excommunication and the deposition a year must elapse, and that consequently the bull against Elizabeth was contrary to law, since in no case would the omission of such formalities render the excommunication *invalid*. According to Catholic principles the Pope can

The means chosen by Pius V. for the promulgation of the bull did not serve their intended purpose. Through the Spanish ambassador in Rome Alba protested strongly against its publication,¹ and the King of France as well could not be induced to publish it.² In spite of this, however, the bull found its way to England.³ On the morning of May 25th, 1570, it was found affixed to the doors of the Bishop of London's palace. Suspicion for this bold act fell upon John Felton, a respected and wealthy gentleman of Southwark, who at once confessed to it, and until his terrible death at the hands of the hangman he continued to recognize the validity of the Papal sentence.⁴

That the bull was intended merely to enlighten the English Catholics, and that there was at first no thought of enforcing it by the arms of a foreign power is especially proved by the fact that the King of Spain, to whom the execution of the sentence would obviously fall, was not informed of the Papal sentence. It is true that Arco wrote on April 15th, 1570, to Vienna that, according to the common report, the Pope had sent the bull only to Spain,⁵ but even on July 17th the

either completely annul and change the law prescribing or recommending such formalities, or dispense them in any particular case. Moreover, any such law refers to an excommunication which is to be inflicted in the future, whereas Elizabeth had for a long time past, and quite manifestly, incurred excommunication. How, for that matter, could a warning be given to her if a Papal nuncio was not to be received in England? Cf. against N. Alexander DOM. BERNINO, *Historia di tutte l'heresie*, VII., Venice, 1724, 524 *seq.*

¹ Alba to Zuñiga, May 18, 1570, in GONZALEZ, 415-419; cf. MIGNET, II., 509 *seq.*; Corresp. dipl., III., 396.

² Rusticucci to Castagna, August 11, 1570, Corresp. dipl., III., 509.

³ An Irish bishop and abbot who came to Rome had copies (Spes to Philip II., May 13, 1570, Corresp. de Felipe II., III., 352). A month after the issue of the bull Mary Stuart had a printed copy. LABANOFF, IV., 52; cf. SPILLMANN, II., 109.

⁴ SPILLMANN, II., 109 *seqq.*

⁵ *State Archives, Vienna.

nuncio at Madrid only knew by hearsay that a decree against Elizabeth was in existence, and that a copy had reached Spain from England.¹ The Spanish ambassador, whom the Pope informed of his plans against Elizabeth in April, at once raised serious difficulties: they must not dare to attempt any such thing until everything was in readiness for the carrying into effect of the Papal sentence, since otherwise all that they would obtain would be the stirring up of the queen to the destruction of her Catholic subjects. He repeated the same thing on a subsequent occasion.² Philip himself was very angry that he, who knew more about English affairs than anyone else, had not first been asked for his advice, and he remarked: It would seem that the Pope thinks that his own zeal is a guarantee of success, but it is to be feared that this hasty step will make the position of the Catholics in England very much worse.³ On July 15th Zuñiga was told to protest to the Pope; the fact that no mention was made in the bull of Philip's name would be taken as a sign of favouritism for France, but the King of Spain would never allow France to set foot in England.⁴ Philip wrote to Elizabeth that no act of the Pope had caused him so much displeasure as the bull of excommunication;⁵ and he did not even recall his ambassador from London, though the latter was soon afterwards forcibly driven out by Elizabeth.

¹ Castagna to Bonelli, July 17, 1570, Corresp. dipl., III., 465. MEYER, 415.

² Zuñiga to Philip II., Apr. 10 and 24, 1570, Corresp. dipl., III., 291, 308.

³ Philip II. to Spes, June 30, 1570, Corresp. de Felipe II., III., 367. The copies sent to him by Spes of the bull and of the brief to Northumberland and Westmoreland, are, as he states, the first which he has seen "porque, en efecto, Su Santidad ha tomado esta deliberacion sin decirme ni comunicarme cosa alguna." Philip attributed the bull to the influence of the Cardinal of Lorraine. KRETZSCHMAR, *Invasionsprojekte*, 27.

⁴ Zuñiga to Philip II., August 11, 1570, Corresp. dipl., III., 499; *cf. ibid.* 493, the report of Castagna to Bonelli of August 4, 1570, concerning his audience with Philip II.

⁵ MEYER, 64.

In June, 1570, Zuñiga began to try and get the Pope to mitigate or withdraw the bull of excommunication. Pius V. went so far as to approve of Alba's withholding its publication and in view of the reluctance shown by Alba and France, he seemed to be not altogether sorry if the Papal sentence did not come to the knowledge of Elizabeth. The Pope, however, would not agree to Zuñiga's other proposals, the suspension of the bull, and merely releasing Elizabeth's subjects from their oath of allegiance to her by means of a brief, saying that at the utmost they might omit the words in the bull which inflicted excommunication upon those who obeyed the English queen.¹

Alba's remonstrances in August, 1570, were just as ineffectual. Experience had shown, so the Duke wrote, that the excommunication of the queen had not had the desired result, but had even brought grave injuries upon the Catholics. A solid reason had been given for the persecution, and since loyalty to Elizabeth was threatened with excommunication the Catholics had no other course open to them than to abandon their country, which of itself implied the end of the Catholic religion in England. It seemed to the Pope, however, that not even these reasons justified him in withdrawing the bull once it had been issued. Nor could he approve of Alba's other proposal of at least suspending the penalties inflicted on the Catholics by means of a brief, it being sufficient, in his opinion, that Alba should make it known to the English Catholics that if they remained in their own country they would not be held to be excommunicated by the Pope. Alba retorted that he did not consider this expedient satisfactory, since he could not get into touch with the whole of the English Catholics and that no one in England would be bound to believe his statement.²

About this time a proposal was put forward by an Italian merchant as to how the bull of excommunication could be put

¹ Zuñiga to Philip II., June 10, 1570, *Corresp. dipl.*, III., 396 *seq.*

² Zuñiga to Philip II., August 11, 1570, *ibid.* 500.

into force without having recourse to arms. Let it be published in Spain, Flanders and France, and then, on the strength of the Papal sentence, let the kings of France and Spain be forbidden all trade with England; this maritime blockade would force Elizabeth to give way. It would seem that this suggestion recommended itself to Pius V., and he ordered the Spanish ambassador to write to Philip II. Zuñiga considered the plan quite impracticable,¹ and Philip II., to whom it was submitted by Castagna, was of the same opinion.²

The bull was not without its dangers for the English government. Even though, politically speaking, it had hardly any effect, yet, after the rising of the previous year, there was still much unrest among the people. It is true that externally but little resistance was offered to an order issued to the magistrates obliging them to the rigorous enforcement of the law compelling attendance at worship, but the Protestant Bishop of Durham, after his visitation of the summer of 1570, had to report that the greater part of the people was secretly and eagerly seeking an opportunity for fresh disturbances.³ Grindal of York made the same complaint: in his opinion the greater part of the nobility did not entertain friendly feelings towards the true (Protestant) religion.⁴ In Lancashire the people were very hostile towards Protestantism, and as a result of the bull, the leading men of the county had abandoned the Anglican divine worship and had openly welcomed priests from Louvain.⁵ Henceforward the bull awakened among the

¹ *Ibid.* 500 *seq.* Cf. *Avviso di Roma of July 1, 1570, *Varia polit.*, 100, p. 175-177, Papal Secret Archives.

² MEYER, 72, 417.

³ FRERE, 151.

⁴ "The greatest part of our gentlemen are not well affected to godly religion." (FRERE, 151). Cf. the opinion of Sadler of December 6, 1569 (in GREEN, 139; LINGARD, VIII., 46): in northern England there are not ten nobles "that do favour and allow of her majesty's proceeding in the cause of religion."

⁵ "All things in Lancashire savoured of open rebellion . . . in most places the people fell from their obedience and utterly refused to attend divine service in the English tongue. . . . Since

Catholics the consciousness that they could not be excused for attendance at Protestant worship on the plea of obedience to the queen.

Although she pretended to despise the Papal sentence, Elizabeth nevertheless brought pressure to bear on the Pope through the Emperor Maximilian II. for the withdrawal of the bull.¹ But not even now would Pius V. agree to this. If, he replied, the queen attributes any importance to the bull, why does she not return to the Church? If she attaches no importance to it, why does she make an uproar about it? Elizabeth's threats could do him no harm: if he could extinguish her hatred by shedding his own blood, he would find greater joy in so doing than he found in the possession of the Papal dignity.² Elizabeth therefore was forced to reply in some other way to the Papal sentence. Above all, she tried to win over public opinion; pamphlets, to a great extent "in the coarsest and most vulgar tone," did their best to drag the Pope and his sentence through the mire of ridicule.³ Next there came from the Parliament, which had

Felton set up the bull, etc., the greatest there never came to any service, nor suffered any to be said in their houses, but openly entertained Louvanists massers with their bulls." (Bishop Barnes of Carlisle to the Earl of Sussex, October 16, 1570, in GREEN, 321; *cf.* FRERE, 152). *Cf.* the letter of the Countess of Northumberland to Alba (end of October, 1570?), in KERVYN DE LETTENHOVE, Relations, VI., 8; especially in Lancashire some "après qu'ils ont eu congnoissance de l'excommunication faicte contre la personne de la Royne d'Angleterre" have restored the Catholic worship in their houses and parishes.

¹ Maximilian II. to Pius V., September 28, 1570, in SCHWARZ, Briefwechsel, 159 *seq.*

² January 5, 1571, in LADERCHI, 1570, n. 381; SPILLMANN, II., 132-134.

³ MEYER, 69 *seqq.* On June 12, 1570, Spes wrote to Philip II. that the Protestants were providing themselves with arms against their enemies and with books against the bull. (Corresp. de Felipe II., III., 353). Bullinger's confutation. A Confutation of the Pope's Bull, London, 1572, which Burghley, Parker, Grindal and Cox caused to be printed, deals in part with the

assembled on April 2nd, 1571, a series of laws, which were partly aimed against the risings of recent years, but partly also against Catholics as such.¹ Henceforward he must be held guilty of high treason who, while the queen lived, claimed any right to the crown, or who asserted that the crown belonged to anyone but the queen, or that she was a heretic, schismatic, tyrant or infidel, or that she had usurped the throne; the same thing applied to those who denied that the succession to the throne was settled by the decision of Parliament. One year's imprisonment was to be the punishment for the first offence, and the penalties of the statute of *præmunire* for the second, for anyone who in writing or in print spoke of any definite person as the heir to the throne, even though he should be the natural successor of the queen. The penalties of high treason applied to anyone who obtained or made use of a Papal bull or the like, or who on the strength of such documents gave or asked for absolution, with the penalties of *præmunire* for his accomplices and for anyone who introduced into the country or received objects blessed by the Pope. A further projected law, making it obligatory to receive the Protestant communion, was allowed to drop.

Seventy years later, when the Spaniards demanded of Urban VIII. that he should inflict excommunication on Riche-

question whether the deposed Catholic bishops were treated kindly or cruelly by Elizabeth (*cf.* Vol. XVI. of this work, p. 235 *seq.*). On p. 60 of Bullinger we actually read: "Moreover it is impudently and untruthfully asserted that the Catholic bishops were worn out by their sufferings in prison and ended their days in misery. . . . On the contrary the papist bishops were treated kindly and far better than they deserved." On p. 47 on the other hand it is admitted that the bishops "ended their days miserably in prison," though this was entirely owing to their perversity. In the first-named passage (p. 60) the printed version is due to the fact that Bullinger's manuscript was altered in England, whereas they forgot or omitted to alter the second passage on p. 47 in the same sense. *Cf.* BELLESHEIM in *Histor polit. Blätter*, CXXXVI., (1905), 894.

¹ LINGARD, VIII., 69 *seq.*

lieu and Louis XIII. on account of their alliance with the Protestants, the Pope rejected the demand by pointing to the uselessness of such proceedings in the case of Henry VIII. and Elizabeth.¹ Since then the Holy See has never again pronounced a sentence of deposition against a reigning prince.

While Catholic writers defended the bull as being in accordance with ancient law,² Protestants waged a violent war against it. These polemical writers did much to sharpen and embitter for many centuries to come the religious differences between the members of the same nation ; it was only too easy to represent as a claim, the renewal of which even under the totally different conditions of later times was a thing to be feared, and as importing a continued menace to the safety of princes, a right which the Pope possessed in the Middle Ages with the full consent of the nations, and which he thought it his duty to exercise once more in the transition period of the XVIth century. For more than a century the struggle against the bull of excommunication formed a stock part of Protestant polemics, and an excuse by which to justify any violation of justice at the expense of Catholic subjects and fellow-countrymen.³

As far as the English Catholics were concerned, the bull, with its prohibition of obedience to the queen, led to doubts and scruples, and consequently to various interpretations of the Papal prescriptions, as well as to divisions and disagreements.⁴ Even worse was the fact that with the bull of excommunication and the laws which followed it there opened a new period in the story of the persecution of the English Catholics. Felton and Storey, who was especially hated by

¹ PIEPER in *Histor. polit. Blätter*, XCIV. (1884), 481. CAUCHIE ET MAERE, 237.

² See HERGENRÖTHER, *Staat und Kirche*, 679.

³ Cf. MEYER, 70 seq.

⁴ Cf. *English Historical Review*, VII. (1892), 84 seqq., for the questions and answers published by "Petriburg." (i.e. Creighton, Bishop of Peterborough).

Cecil, had already become its victims.¹ Several left their country and thus forfeited all their property, which was either given or sold for a large sum to the queen's adherents. Of those who stayed, the so-called "recusants," that is to say those who refused to take part in Protestant worship, were in daily and hourly expectation of the moment when the denunciation of some ill-wisher would drag them before the courts, with the inevitable consequence of large fines and imprisonment, or, in the case of converts, with the loss of their property and imprisonment for life. During the reign of Elizabeth, both secret and public ordinances, often repeated, and urging their strict enforcement, ensured that the laws should not fall into abeyance.² A proclamation of July 1st, 1570, had made the profession of priest-hunter and spy a profitable undertaking.³ In England as elsewhere the XVIth century stands out as a time of the worst possible religious tyranny. The watchful care of the Pope and the fear of his punishments were things of the past, while on the other hand the excessive tyranny had not yet taught the oppressed to unite together to defend themselves by legal methods, and thus bring pressure to bear on the caprice of the oppressor. Looked at from this point of view the bull of excommunication of Pius V. throws a strong light upon the religious conditions of the XVIth century.

Mary Stuart, for whose sake the nobles had risen, and on whose behalf to some extent the Pope had issued the bull, did not derive the smallest advantage from it. John Knox, who as early as August, 1569, had accused "mad Scotland" of not

¹ SPILLMANN, II., 109. On July 31, 1570, Antonio de Guaras wrote from London that many persons were persecuted on account of the excommunication (Corresp. de Felipe II., III., 381). On August 12 he describes the zeal with which those who had received notice of the excommunication were being proceeded against as marvellous: many were in prison and some in danger of sharing the fate of Felton (*ibid.* 393).

² LINGARD, VIII., 138 *seq.*

³ MEYER, 74 *seq.*

obeying the "mouth of God," and of having failed to punish as she deserved the "wicked adulteress and cruel murderess of her husband,"¹ after the victory over the two Catholic earls exhorted the secretary of state to strike a blow "at the roots," for otherwise "the branches" would very soon and very vigorously begin to shoot again.² On the same day Murray also wrote to the English secretary of state concerning "the dangerous branches of the rebellion": since Elizabeth had the origin of all the disturbances in her power, it would be her own fault if she now failed to deal with the evil.³ As a matter of fact negotiations for the handing over of Mary to her half-brother in Scotland were already being carried on,⁴ when Murray himself fell a victim to the private revenge of a noble whom he had offended.⁵

After the death of the regent Mary's party in Scotland was once more in the ascendant. Elizabeth therefore sent troops across the Border on the pretext of punishing the wild inhabitants of that district for their crimes, but in reality to hamper and paralyse Mary's supporters; once again fire and sword were let loose over the unhappy country; 500 villages were burned in the valley of the Teviot and the countryside was laid waste. Further military expeditions against Scotland followed, until at length the strong protests made by Mary in France and Spain caused Elizabeth to abandon the enterprise.⁶ Moreover, when the negotiations for the marriage of the English queen to the Duke of Anjou were in progress in 1570, Cecil, at a personal interview with Mary, concluded with her on October 16th, 1570, the Treaty of Chatsworth, by the terms of which the Queen of Scotland was to be restored to her throne. Naturally, hard terms were imposed: among others she had to agree that her son should be educated in England

¹ HOSACK, I., 503.

² Knox to Cecil, January 2, 1570, *ibid.* 500.

³ Murray to Cecil, January 2, 1570, *ibid.* 501.

⁴ *Ibid.* 502.

⁵ January 23, 1570. Cf. LINGARD, VIII., 53.

⁶ HOSACK, II., 3 *seqq.* LINGARD, VIII., 54.

until his fifteenth year.¹ In a letter to Pius V.² Mary excused herself by saying that owing to the pressure of necessity she could not act otherwise, and that in spite of everything James would receive a Catholic education.

The agreement with Mary Stuart was not kept ; even before all hopes of its being observed had vanished Mary informed Elizabeth through Leslie that she intended to ask for the help of the foreign princes to effect her restoration.³

Probably at this time Mary had already lent an ear to the proposals of the Florentine banker, Ridolfo Ridolfi, who even before this time, when the Catholic rising was in preparation, had taken a hand in the affair⁴ and who, in the autumn of 1569, had fallen under suspicion of having assisted the rising, but had been taken back into the favour of Cecil and Walsingham after a short term of imprisonment. When the negotiations about the Treaty of Chatsworth had disappeared in smoke, he persuaded Mary no longer to put any confidence in Elizabeth, and to turn for help to the Catholic princes.⁵ By the advice of her trusted minister, Leslie, Bishop of Ross, and the Spanish ambassador, Guerau de Spes, Mary accepted this suggestion and tried to win over to its support Norfolk, who had been released from the Tower in the previous autumn. The duke had then been made to promise that he would no longer think of a marriage with Mary without the consent of Elizabeth, but in spite of this he eventually consented to a secret meeting with Ridolfi. The Florentine told him that Spanish troops

¹ HOSACK, II., 17 *seqq.*

² Of October 31, 1570, in LADERCHI, 1570, n. 403 ; *cf.* LABANOFF, VII., 19-23.

³ " Quherfor our said good sister must aperdone ws, if we se na furtheraunce to be had at her hand, nether for our restitution nor for the relief of our saidis good subjects, that we solicit and ayde thame to procure thair support at other princes our frendis allyes " (Mary to Leslie, February 6, 1571, in LABANOFF, III., 175). Mary was already thinking of sending Leslie to the Pope in 1570 ; her instructions in LABANOFF, III., 57 *seq.*

⁴ See *supra*, pp. 203, 215.

⁵ HOSACK, II., 34.

under the command of Federigo di Toledo, Alba's son, were to be landed in England, and that with their help Mary was to be set at liberty. Norfolk did not give a formal consent to the plan, but Ridolfi left him with the impression that the duke intended to put himself at the head of the troops in order to set Mary free.

It was probably Leslie and the Spanish ambassador who gave currency to a detailed document,¹ in which Norfolk charged the Florentine to get into touch with Philip II., the Pope and Alba. They were to send from six to ten thousand men to England, whereupon Norfolk would furnish 20,000 infantry and 3,000 cavalry. If Mary were still kept in captivity, the duke would offer battle, and make an attempt to liberate Mary by force, and at the same time get possession of the person of the English queen, so as to have in her a hostage for the Queen of Scotland.² In this document the duke avowed himself a secret Catholic who had been obliged to conceal his real convictions solely in order that he might the better serve his country and the whole of Christendom. He declared that his principal object was not so much his marriage to the captive queen as the union of the whole island under one ruler, and the restoration of the old religion; for the rest, he had always been the defender of the Catholics, and his servants and the tutors of his children were Catholics.³ A list of the English nobles was

¹ March, 1571, in LABANOFF, III., 234-239; a short epitome in GONZALES, 463.

² "Sono risoluto di voler tentare la fortuna di una battaglia, et far forza di cavarla di qua per forza, et insignorirmi a un tempo della propria persona della Regina d'Inghilterra per assicurarmi di quella della Regina di Scotia." LABANOFF, III., 245.

³ "E. dove N.S^o et il Re Catholico fino a hora havessino havuto alcun dubbio di me per non mi essere dichiarato, anzi più presto mostromi protestante, gli significhere, che non è stato per mala volontà che io habbia havuto verso quella S.Sede, ma per potere quando il tempo et la occasione si appresentassi . . . fare quel relevato servitio a tutta questa isola et generalmente a tutta la christianità che lo effetto stesso dimostrerà." *Ibid.* 238.

attached, with a description of each one's opinions ;¹ according to this list forty of the nobles were ready to unsheathe their swords with Norfolk. Mary Stuart also gave the Florentine special instructions for his visit to the foreign courts.² In these Mary explains the difficult position of the English Catholics, whose only hope lay in her ascending the throne, and she goes on to describe her own situation, which compelled her to appeal for help to the foreign princes, especially the Pope and Philip II. No fears need be entertained about Norfolk on account of the attitude which he had hitherto adopted with regard to religion ; this had been inevitable in the face of his wicked adversaries ; when the Protestants had advised her to change her religion he had urged her to stand firm ; Norfolk enjoyed the confidence of the Catholics, but in the meantime he could not disclose his real sentiments. Finally she begged the Pope to examine and to annul her marriage with Bothwell.³

Armed with these instructions, Ridolfi, in the spring of 1571, first repaired to Brussels to the Duke of Alba.

Mary had for a long time past been in treaty with Alba in order to obtain his help against her enemies in Scotland.⁴ On November 3rd, 1569, when the *gueux* in Flanders seemed to be permanently broken up, when the Huguenots in France had been defeated, and after the seizure of the Spanish treasure⁵ had afforded just cause for a war with England, a call to intervene in English affairs had also reached him from the Pope.⁶ But Alba remained inactive. He sent the Scottish queen some subsidies in money, but for the rest his reply to Mary's entreaties took the form of a warning not to trust too

¹ *Ibid.* 251-253.

² *Ibid.* 222-233 ; GONZALES, 463-467 (Spanish translation).

³ *Cf. supra*, p. 173 *seq.*

⁴ *Cf.* her letters to Alba of April 23 and 30, May 16 and July 8, 1569, in KERVYN DE LETTENHOVE, *Relations*, V., 371, 377, 385, 426.

⁵ See *supra*, p. 204.

⁶ See *supra* pp. 211, 219.

much in her advisers.¹ Mary replied that she hoped soon to be able to submit to Alba definite proposals, the carrying out of which would involve in everlasting gratitude to the King of Spain and the duke, not only herself, but the whole island, and that she was making these proposals not in her own name alone.² Thus was heralded the mission of Ridolfi, whom Norfolk as well provided with a letter for the King of Spain of the same date.³

A short time afterwards the Italian presented himself in person to the duke at Brussels; Alba received him and his proposals somewhat coldly. The Florentine banker, with his lack of experience of military matters seemed to the expert soldier "a great babler"⁴ and his plan for conquering England a castle in the air.

From Brussels Ridolfi went to Rome. His name was not unknown in the Curia; he had already laid the designs of Norfolk before the Holy See,⁵ and had rendered important

¹ Letter of February 11, 1571, in KERVYN DE LETTENHOVE, *loc. cit.*, VI., 55. Cf. Alba to Spes, July 14, 1569, *ibid.* V., 429: "De Francia me han hoy avisado que se destruye enteramente la Reina de Escocia con las platicas que sus criados tienen con Vuestra Merced, los quales jamas entran en su posada que no sea espiandolos, y podriale costar a la Reina la vida. . . ."

² Mary to Alba, March 20, 1571, *ibid.* 90; LABANOFF, III., 216.

³ Letter of Norfolk in KERVYN DE LETTENHOVE, *loc. cit.*, 90 *seq.* Kervyn doubts its authenticity (*ibid.* p. iv.) and looks upon Ridolfi in general as a charlatan (Huguenots, II., 387, n. 5). LINGARD (VIII., 81) has the same opinion of him. POLLEN (*The Month*, IC., 1902, 147 n.) looks upon this view as exaggerated, and thinks that Ridolfi was *substantially honest*, and his papers *reliable on the whole*.

⁴ "un gran parlanchin (GONZALEZ, 359); un hombre muy vacio" who did not know how to keep a secret, is what Alba calls him, September 5, 1571 (GACHARD, *Corresp. de Felipe II.*, II., 198).

⁵ Three letters from Ridolfi (of April 18, 1569, July 1, and September 1, 1570) are preserved in the Papal Secret Archives; their contents are in POLLEN, *loc. cit.* 144. A memorial of Ridolfi, of February 6, 1571, concerning the Pope's inclination to help Mary, in HOSACK, II., 502 *seq.*

services to the Pope. A letter from Alba to Zuñiga, the Spanish ambassador in Rome, had put the latter very much on his guard against the Florentine, and had also wrung from the Pope the declaration that nothing could be done in the matter against the opinion of Alba, but Zuñiga rightly thought that the letters from Mary and Norfolk might win the Pope over to their point of view.¹

Pius V., who flattered himself that he might now see the bull of deposition carried into effect, gave the intermediary a letter of recommendation to Philip II. ; in this letter it was stated that Ridolfi wished to lay before the king certain matters which were closely connected with the honour of God and the good of the Church : he urgently begged the king to trust him, and to lend him his assistance for the carrying out of his plans in every possible way.² As he wrote on the same day to Mary, the Pope had received Ridolfi with joy, and his mission with even greater joy ; he must, however, leave the rest to the prudent judgment of the Spanish king and his greater experience of such matters. For his part he would support the plan with all his power. He exhorted the queen to patience

¹ Zuñiga to Philip II., April 30, 1571, Corresp. dipl., IV., 258 seq. The letter of Alba was of April 8 (*ibid.* 259 n.). In a conversation with Zuñiga on April 30 Ridolfi represented the enterprise as being easy " como suelen hazer los que vienon con semejantes invenciones " (*ibid.* 258).

² Letter of May 5, 1571, in LADERCHI, 1571, n. 6 ; cf. Bonelli to the nuncio in Madrid, Castagna, May 11, 1571, Corresp. dipl., IV., 274 seq. " Il Sommo Pontifice ha gradito ed accettato tutto ciò che è stato concluso tra V.M. e l'Illustrissimo signor Duca di Norfolk ed altri nobili del regno, ha lodato le istruzioni che gli ho mostrate, e comprovato il loro disegno ; e siccome sa che ogni grazia e bene procede da Dio, non si può dire con quanta calde orazioni questo Santo Pastore favorisce i loro desideri ed il buon fine dell'impresa, ed è meraviglia con quanta inclinazione e veramente paterno animo, abbraccia e desidera il bene e il comando di V. M. e dei suoi amici confederati." Ridolfi to Mary, in FRANCESCO FABERI, S. Pio V. Studio storico, Siena, 1893, 107.

if during the summer it should still be necessary to wait before any steps were taken.¹

At the end of June Ridolfi reached Madrid, and on the 28th he presented to the king the Pope's brief, together with the letters of recommendation from Mary, Norfolk, and the Spanish ambassador in London.²

Ridolfi found a zealous supporter of his plans in the Spanish nuncio, Castagna, who had already sought Philip's intervention in English affairs. In Castagna's opinion, Ridolfi had come at exactly the right moment; he at once spoke to the king on the subject, and through his influence the Florentine was able to lay his proposals before the sovereign on July 3rd, 1571, and to all appearances met with a favourable reception.³ It seemed indeed that at that moment Philip was willing to strike a blow at England. He spoke at greater length on the subject with the nuncio, and with more warmth than was usual with him, declaring that it seemed to him that the moment had come to bring back England to the true faith for the second time, that the Pope had promised all possible help, and that the hesitation of France would be removed once the enterprise was embarked upon in the Pope's name, and on the ground of the bull of excommunication against Elizabeth. Ridolfi assured him that the Pope would agree to this, and accordingly Philip even took the preliminary steps. On July 12th a courier set out to Alba and to the Spanish ambassador in London, to convey the news to Norfolk and the Queen of Scots, while the king repeatedly sent for Ridolfi in order to learn fuller details.⁴ On August 23rd

¹ LADERCHI, 1571, n. 9. Ridolfi also presented a letter from Norfolk; *ibid.*

² Philip II. to Spes, July 13, 1571, *Corresp. de Felipe II.*, III., 477. The recommendations from Spes for Ridolfi to Philip II. and Zayas, of March 25, 1571, *ibid.* 444 *seq.* Ridolfi left Rome on May 20. *Corresp. dipl.*, IV., 338 n.

³ Castagna to Ruseticucci, July 3, 1571, *Corresp. dipl.*, IV., 380.

⁴ Castagna to Rusticucci, July 9, 1571, *ibid.* 381 *seq.* Zayas to Zufiga, July 17, 1571, *ibid.* 389.

Castagna wrote: all are in favour of the English enterprise, with one exception¹—but this one exception has much of importance to say. The nuncio had already hinted at this when he wrote that the affair would certainly have been carried out if Alba had not held the king back.²

Long before Ridolfi's arrival in Madrid a detailed statement of his plan had been received from Alba.³ The experienced commander looked upon the proposals of the amateur soldier as impracticable in their present form. Spain could not land troops in England without bringing both France and Germany into the field against herself. The Florentine's plans were only practicable supposing *one* condition were fulfilled. At that time Elizabeth was suffering from an ulcer in the leg, which was thought to be cancer.⁴ Alba wrote that if the Queen of England were to die "by a natural death or in some other way," or if she were to fall into the hands of the Duke of Norfolk,⁵ the jealousy of the other nations would not be aroused if Mary Stuart's claims to the English throne were supported by armed force.

At the bottom of his heart Philip II. himself did not attach great weight to Ridolfi's original proposals, and on July 7th a conference was held on the suggestions of Alba, and especially on the question whether an attempt ought to be made "to kill" the queen, "or to capture her."⁶ The outcome of this

¹ To Rusticucci, *ibid.* 413.

² Corresp. dipl., IV., 390 n. : "Se de la parte del Duca d'Alba non viene raffredato, io tengo per certo che la impresa serà posta in opera."

³ Of May 7, 1571 (reached Madrid May 22), in A. TEULET, *Relations politiques de la France et de l'Espagne avec l'Ecosse*, V., Paris, 1862, 74-87; MIGNET, II., 510-518.

⁴ POLLEN in *The Month*, XCIX. (1902), 145.

⁵ "Pero en caso que la reina de Inglaterra huviesse muerta o de muerte natural o de otra, o que ellos se apoderassen de su persona, sin que V. M^d se huviesse entremetido en esto, entonces no hallaria yo dificultad." In MIGNET, II., 516.

⁶ We only have meagre accounts of this consultation, in MIGNET, II., 518-521, which for the most part are so difficult to understand

discussion is furnished in a memorial drawn up by Ridolfi : the whole enterprise is left in the hands of the Duke of Alba ; he will decide the favourable moment for putting it into execution, and he will come to an arrangement with Norfolk and Spes for simultaneously obtaining possession of the queen, the Tower of London and the English fleet at Rochester.¹

The condition which the king asked for, and which Ridolfi had declared to be satisfactory to the Pope, namely that the campaign against England should be carried on in the name of the Pope, and on the ground of the bull of excommunication, had in the meantime spontaneously been suggested to the king by Pius V. The entire direction of the enterprise, however, was to remain in the hands of the king, but if it were thought to be desirable the Pope was ready to confer upon the com-

that, e.g., the purpose of Velasco is understood by MIGNET (II., 162) and KERVYN DE LETTENHOVE (Relations, VI., 5) in quite a contrary sense. The accounts begin with the proposition : " Que convenia comenzar por ellos y matar ó prender la reina. Que de otra manera luego se casaria y mataria á la de Escocia." GONZALEZ (p. 361) understands " matar ó prender " as capture *and* kill. Several later historians followed him. But according to the sources published so far, more cannot be stated as to the Spanish plan than is stated by HERGENRÖTHER (Kirche und Staat, 680) : " there was an intention of obtaining possession, in any case, of her person, and only in the case of extreme emergency of killing her." Cf. POLLEN, English Catholics, 176. If it was intended to capture Elizabeth by a *coup de main* the possibility of her losing her life must have been taken into consideration.

¹ KERVYN DE LETTENHOVE, Relations, VI., v. On June 12, 1571, Spes had written to Philip II. : " if on the landing of 12,000 to 15,000 soldiers, with a corresponding force of cavalry, the English should obtain possession of the queen, the enterprise would have half succeeded. It would also be well at once to capture Cecil, Leicester and Bedford, as well as the fleet at Rochester." This bold but visionary undertaking seemed to the ambassador quite easy : " todo lo qual es harto fácil." Corresp. de Felipe II., III., 354.

mander appointed by Philip the title of pontifical general.¹ At the same time Pius V. regretted the fact that the actual help which the Pope could give would be but small ; the undertaking was of the greatest importance for the service of God and the welfare of the Church ; in spite of his poverty he would do all that he could, and if necessary would not grudge even the chalices from the altars and the pontifical vestments.² The Pope would allow him to employ against England a part of the ecclesiastical revenues which had been set aside for the enterprise against the Turks.³

The royal council, however, rejected the proposal to undertake the expedition in the name of the Pope, from a reluctance to acquiesce in the slightest degree in the claims of the Apostolic See over the crowns of England and Ireland.⁴

The Duke of Alba showed himself but little pleased with the fresh task laid upon him by his sovereign, and made serious objections.⁵ In the event of ill-success, he remarked, Philip's intervention would make enemies of England, France and Germany, would perhaps lead to a war with France, and inflict serious injury in the Low Countries on the very religion he was trying to protect in England ; the Venetians too might lose confidence in the king and withdraw from the league against the Turks.⁶ The undertaking, moreover, was in very untrustworthy hands. Norfolk had neither resolution nor courage,⁷ Guerau de Spes was blinded by his enmity for

¹ Rusticucci to Castagna, August 12, 1571, *ibid.* 409. Philip II. to Alba, July 14, 1571, in Gachard, *Corresp. de Felipe II.*, II., 187.

² *Ibid.* 185.

³ Rusticucci to Castagna, September 24, 1571, *Corresp. dipl.*, IV., 441.

⁴ Philip II. to Alba, July 14, 1571, in GACHARD, *loc. cit.*, 187. The Grand Inquisitor spoke at the council on July 7. in favour of the Pope's proposal, and Feria against it. MIGNET, II., 162.

⁵ KRETZSCHMAR, *Invasionsprojekte*, 37 *seqq.*

⁶ August 3, 1571, in GACHARD, *loc. cit.* 188.

⁷ "Tengole por flaco y de poco animo" ; *ibid.* 189.

Elizabeth,¹ Ridolfi was a frivolous man, who knew so little how to keep a secret that the merchants at Antwerp were openly discussing his plans,² and lastly, the national pride of the English would not easily put up with succour which came from abroad.³ Alba scoffed at Ridolfi's idea that it would be possible to launch an expedition to capture Elizabeth, and another at the same time to seize the Tower and burn the English ships in the Thames ; even if Elizabeth herself were in alliance with Philip all this could not be carried out as Ridolfi suggested.⁴ For these reasons Alba was of the opinion that help could only be given to the conspirators after they had secured possession of the person of the queen.⁵ The king, for his part, adhered to his view that Alba should declare himself for the conspirators, and go to their assistance as soon as the force which he was to raise should be sufficiently large.⁶ He took the view that for higher motives, especially those of religion, it was possible to make light of these difficulties,⁷ and he remained of the same opinion even when he learned that Elizabeth had received information of Ridolfi's plans,⁸ and news had come of Norfolk's imprisonment.⁹ In his letter of September 14th, however, he at last left the decision of the whole question to the judgment of Alba. The Spanish ambassador in London had received, on August 4th, and again on the 30th, instructions to act in the matter only in accordance with the orders of Alba.¹⁰

At length orders did come from Alba, but they were to the effect that the Spanish ambassador was not to let the world

¹ August 27, 1571 ; *ibid.* 193.

² September 5, 1571 ; *ibid.* 198.

³ August 27, 1571 ; *ibid.* 193.

⁴ *Ibid.* 194.

⁵ August 3, 1571, *ibid.* 188 ; August 27, *ibid.* 194.

⁶ To Alba, August 4, and 30, and September 14, 1571, *ibid.* 191, 196, 200.

⁷ To Alba, September 14, 1571, *ibid.* 198 *seqq.*

⁸ To Alba, August 4, 1571, *ibid.* 191.

⁹ To Alba, October 17, 1571, *ibid.* 205.

¹⁰ *Corresp. de Felipe II.*, III., 482, 494.

know in any way, either directly or indirectly, that he was in possession of letters to Mary, Norfolk and Leslie.¹ A few weeks later Alba urgently recommended him to burn everything he possessed bearing on Ridolfi's mission.² Towards the end of the year he wrote that he must leave the English Catholics and their sufferings to God.³

While Alba was hesitating, the English government had gathered all the threads of the conspiracy into its hands. The story of its discovery⁴ affords a characteristic picture in miniature of the low morality of political life at that time. First of all there fell into the hands of the government a packet of letters from Ridolfi to Leslie with the address in cypher, but by means of his agents Leslie was able to substitute innocent letters for the incriminating ones. Torture, however, wrung from the bearer the confession that a landing in England was intended, and that Alba had approved of the plan. Soon afterwards Philip II., who was generally so cautious, betrayed himself. One of the founders of England's maritime power, the buccaneer John Hawkins, who has won for himself an ill name as being the first Englishman who, with the connivance and help of Elizabeth, carried on the slave-trade,⁵ had lost some of his men as prisoners of war to the Spaniards. In order to liberate them from their prison in Seville, he hit upon a cunning scheme. With Cecil's approval, he went to the Spanish ambassador in London, declaring himself to be a Catholic⁶ and a partisan of Mary Stuart, and that he was ready

¹ Alba to Spes, July 30, 1571, in KERVYN DE LETTENHOVE, *Relations*, VI., 157.

² August 19, 1571, *ibid.* 163.

³ Alba to Spes, November 12 and 15, 1571, *ibid.* 216, 218. In the meantime Ridolfi had by Alba's wish started for Flanders on September 9 (Castagna to Rusticucci, September 9, 1571, *Corresp. dipl.*, IV., 435). On November 19 he reappeared in Rome (Zuñiga to Philip II., November 27, 1571, *ibid.* 542).

⁴ HOSACK, II., 55-56; BROSCHE, VI., 565-568; LINGARD, VIII., 78 *seq.*

⁵ LINGARD, VIII., 259.

⁶ KERVYN DE LETTENHOVE, *loc. cit.*, 434.

to hand over the ships he commanded to the Spaniards. In return for this he demanded a sum of money and the liberation of his imprisoned comrades. The Spanish ambassador referred Hawkins to Alba, but when the latter refused to have anything to do with the matter, Hawkins sent one of his officers, Fitzwilliams, direct to the King of Spain, with a letter from the Spanish ambassador. Philip received the envoy kindly, but before he would enter into any negotiations he wished for a letter of recommendation from Mary Stuart. Thereupon Fitzwilliams obtained from the Duke of Feria, whose wife was an Englishwoman, a letter to Mary, and on the strength of Feria's letter the queen, who suspected no treachery, was induced to write to the King of Spain begging him to release the English prisoners. Philip's doubts were thus dispelled and he informed Fitzwilliams that it was intended to effect a landing in England in the autumn, and that Hawkins would assist in this enterprise with his ships. An agreement to this effect was signed on August 10th by Feria and Fitzwilliams as the representatives of Philip and Hawkins. Fitzwilliams returned to England bearing the title of Grandee of Spain for Hawkins and 50,000 pounds sterling.

The Spanish plan was thus for the most part disclosed to the English government, and the only thing that was still uncertain was the identity of the Englishmen who were prepared to assist the Spaniards in their undertaking ; and as to this an imprudent act served to put the secretary of state on their track. Mary Stuart wished to assign part of her allowance as a widow of France to the garrison of Edinburgh Castle, which had always remained loyal to her, and she sent the sum by the hands of a retainer of Norfolk named Higford to Bannister, who was in touch with Norfolk as his administrator. The messenger, who had been told that he was carrying silver, surprised at the weight of his package, opened it, found gold and a letter in cypher, and at once reported the matter to Burghley. Higford was made to interpret the cypher, and Bannister and Barker, Norfolk's secretary, were arrested and confessed all they knew ; Barker knew a great

deal, because it was he who had been the intermediary between Leslie, Ridolfi and Norfolk.

Thus the conspiracy was brought to an end ; Ridolfi took good care not to set foot again in England ; Norfolk was again thrown into the Tower on September 7th, 1571, and ended his days on the scaffold on June 2nd in the following year. In vain did Leslie appeal to the privileges of an ambassador in order to escape imprisonment, and he only escaped torture by making a full confession. The Spanish ambassador was driven out of the country, and Burghley in mockery caused him, while still quite unsuspecting, to be escorted to Calais by Hawkins.¹ During the whole journey the crafty buccaneer took a cruel pleasure in amusing himself at the expense of the victim of his schemes by assuring him of his boundless devotion to the Spanish king.²

It was natural that the man who directed English political affairs should not let slip the opportunity of dragging the good name of the Pope in the dust. Cecil, on whom at the beginning of the year the title of Lord Burghley had been conferred, saw to it that the news of what had happened should be spread as widely as possible, with all the needful embellishments. On October 13th the news was communicated to the Lord Mayor and aldermen of London, who then assembled the masters of the city corporations, and they in their turn spread the news among the citizens. In order to excite the populace still more the whole affair was published in printed sheets, so that the streets rang³ with the story of the schemes of Alba and the Pope against the city of London and the queen.

¹ Documents relating to this in KERVYN DE LETTENHOVE, Relations, VI., 226 *seqq.*, 242, 258, 260, 275, 283, 288, 294, 298, 337.

² HOSACK, II., 88.

³ " de sorte que les rues ne résonnent ici autre matière " (M. de Sweveghem to Alba, October 16, 1571, in KERVYN DE LETTENHOVE, VI., 187). It has recently been maintained that Pius V. also knew of " the proposals to murder Queen Elizabeth " and the conspiracy of Ridolfi (DÖLLINGER-REUSCH, Die Selbstbiographie des Kardinals Bellarmin, Bonn, 1887, 307 ; *cf. ibid.* in the summary on p. vi. : " The plan to murder Elizabeth of Eng-

It was probably Mary Stuart who suffered most bitterly from the consequences of the failure of the conspiracy.¹ Her very life was in extreme danger. All her servants, at first with the exception of sixteen, and then of ten, had to leave her service, and the princess, who had been accustomed to ride abroad freely and continually, found herself confined to her own apartment, and when she was ill was not even allowed to see a doctor. She herself looked upon this treatment as foreshadowing her execution and asked for a priest, which request, however, was refused.

For the moment, however, Burghley was content with dis-

land, approved by Pius V." LORD ACTON, letter to the *Times*, November 24, 1874, in GLADSTONE, *The Vatican Decrees*, 1875). But there is no proof that Ridolfi spoke to the Pope about any plan to kill Elizabeth. The instructions for Ridolfi (*supra* p. 227 *seq.*) contain no mention of this. To Norfolk and Mary Ridolfi proposed that Elizabeth be left on the throne (HOSACK, II., 53 *seq.*). See *supra* p. 154, how Pius V. rejected political assassination as unlawful. MEYER (p. 228) says: "there is nothing to show that he [Pius V.] approved of or even spoke of the assassination [of Elizabeth] as a praiseworthy act." The passage in GACHARD, *Corresp. de Philippe II.*, II., 185 (from the letter of Philip to Alba of July 14, 1571): "the progress of Elizabeth to her cities in August and September *serait une occasion de se saisir de sa personne ET de la tuer*" (DÖLLINGER-REUSCH, p. 310) proves no more against Philip than the passage quoted *supra* p. 232, n. 6, because the progress actually offered an *occasion* for either. Cf. in the same letter (*loc. cit.* 186): "*de tuer OU de prendre.*" An ambiguous passage in the life of Pius V. by GABUTIUS (*Acta Sanct.*, Maii I., 661), to which Acton appeals, is taken from Catena, and is in his opinion quite harmless (POLLEN, *English Catholics*, 125). The French ambassador at Brussels, Mondoucet, reports on December 26, 1571, that two Italians had been sent to poison Elizabeth or otherwise take per life (*Bulletin de la Commission d'hist.*, 3rd ser., XIV., 341). Kervyn de Lettenhove, who seems to attach importance to this in *Les Huguenots*, II., 388, speaks quite otherwise in *Relations*, VI., vi.

¹ HOSACK, II., 66 *seqq.*

gracing his enemy in the eyes of the world. At the end of 1571 Mary received, as a birthday gift, a little book, the book which later on became celebrated under the title of the *Detectio*, by the humanist Buchanan, who had once been in Mary's service, and had sung her virtues.¹ In this book there appeared, clothed in classical Latin, the calumnies contained in the Book of the Articles, which had been presented at Westminster. Burghley saw to it that the book was translated and spread abroad. For centuries to come, and down to our own days, Buchanan's calumnies have coloured men's judgment of the unhappy Queen of Scots.²

Just a year before Elizabeth too had received a precious gift from her favourite, Leicester. This was a small picture showing Elizabeth seated in sadness upon a lofty throne, with Mary Stuart in chains before her, and begging for pardon, while the neighbouring kingdoms of Spain and France were covered by the waves of the sea, and Neptune and other gods paid homage to the Queen of England.³ It was true that so far Elizabeth had defeated her rival both in power and in cunning; the future was to decide with which of them the moral victory would lie.

Although, in spite of the bull of excommunication of 1570, no military expedition was launched against the Queen of

¹ *Ibid.* 80 *seq.* Six months before Leslie had published a defence of Mary in which, as HOSACK (II., 82) remarks, two statements are specially worthy of attention: in the first place that the casket letters are false, and in the second place that Paris, who had conveyed the letters to Bothwell and is the only witness who directly accuses Mary of the murder of her husband, declared to the people immediately before his execution that he had never carried any such letters and that Mary was innocent: "that he never carried such letters, nor that the queen was participant." Buchanan made no reply to these two statements.

² BEKKER, 276 *seqq.*

³ Spes to Zayas, January 9, 1571, Corresp. de Felipe II., III., 428. Spes did not fail to add that it was thus they flattered a princess "que fuera dello vive en harta mos soltura que las Jonás de Napoles, ni otras tales."

England, either from Rome or Madrid, attempts to withdraw the neighbouring island of Ireland from Elizabeth's yoke were not laid aside during the pontificate of Pius V.¹

The violence of the English rule in Ireland had gradually brought about there an intolerable state of affairs. In 1569 the southern Irish had sent to Philip II. the Archbishop of Cashel, Maurice O'Gibbon, with a memorial signed by four archbishops, eight bishops, and twenty-five Irish nobles, in the name of the bishops, gentry and cities, showing how for more than a thousand years the Irish had been devotedly loyal to the Apostolic See, and filled with the deepest hatred of their English rulers, who, ever since the time of Henry VIII., had sacked the churches and convents, banished the bishops and religious, and thrown everything into confusion. They begged the King of Spain to send them a sovereign of his own house.² On March 1st, 1570, O'Gibbon also wrote to the Pope, who did not show himself averse to the plan, but at once insisted on the view, which became a fundamental part of the Papal policy with regard to Irish affairs, that Ireland was a Papal fief, and that the Irish could only therefore obtain a new feudal lord with the previous consent of the Holy See.³

So far Philip's policy had been friendly towards Elizabeth and rather the reverse towards her rival, Mary Stuart, because the accession of the francophile Queen of Scots seemed to him to mean an increase in the power of France, and consequently

¹ POLLEN in *The Month*, CI. (1905), 69-85. BELLESHEIM, *Ireland*, II., 161 *seqq.*, 697 *seqq.* KRETZSCHMAR, *Invasionsprojekte*, 52 *seq.*; report of Segá *ibid.* 194-212.

² MORAN, *Spicil.*, I., 59 *seq.* BELLESHEIM, II., 158.

³ BELLESHEIM, II., 160. Both Philip II. and Mary had recognized the rights of the Holy See over Ireland, since they had accepted the bull of Paul IV. of June 7, 1555, in which the Pope says of Ireland: ". . . illius dominium per Sedem praedictam [the Apostolic See] adepti sunt reges Angliae" and then raises Ireland to be a kingdom "sine praeiudicio iurium ipsius Romanae ecclesiae." Bull. Rom., VI., 489 *seq.*

a danger to Spain.¹ But now France was weakened by internal wars ; England had roused Philip to fury with her buccaneers and her seizure of Spanish gold,² and his policy was gradually taking another direction. He did not fall in with the proposals of O'Gibbon, although the archbishop on July 26th, 1570, urged him to haste, pointing out to the king that later on he would not be able to accomplish with 100,000 men what he could now easily do with 10,000,³ but at the same time a sign of his changed attitude was to be seen in the favour shown by Philip to an adventurer at the Spanish court, with whom O'Gibbon as well had relations, but whose fantastic schemes proved fatal, not indeed in the time of Pius V., but later on, to Ireland, and indirectly to the Catholics in England.

Thomas Stukely, the son of a Devonshire knight, a man without morals or religious principles, had up to this time wandered about the world, travelling and seeking adventures ; he had placed his services at the disposal of almost all the Christian princes, he had accommodated himself to all the changes of religion in England, and had always been able in the cleverest way to obtain money for his extravagances and excesses, for Stukely was a man who had the gift of winning people over at sight. For a time he carried on the profitable business of a pirate on the coasts of America ; he was captured, but escaped the hanging he had deserved by the intercession of Shane O'Neill, and, backed by recommendations from Cecil, Leicester and Pembroke, resumed his former manner of life in Ireland. At first Elizabeth showed him favour, but when she ceased to patronize him, Stukely at once made up his mind to set sail for Spain in order to devote his sword to the liberation of Catholic Ireland in the service of Philip.

Philip had no idea of conquering Ireland, but Elizabeth's continued outrages were like so many pin-pricks to him, and he was therefore much inclined by way of retaliation to kindle a small or a great conflagration in Ireland. He therefore

¹ Cf. Vol. XVI. of this work, p. 223.

² Cf. *supra*, p. 204.

³ BELLESHEM, II., 159.

summoned Stukely to Madrid and loaded him with money and favours. It was not long before they began to feel the effects of this in London, so much so that Philip thought it well to pacify the queen by a letter from his secretary Zayas, and to send Stukely with Don Juan against the Turks. There the hot-headed adventurer was in his element; he distinguished himself at the battle of Lepanto, and thus won himself a good name in ecclesiastical circles. Thereupon Rome seemed to him to be a place where he could turn his talents to advantage; he there made a pilgrimage bare-footed to all the principal sanctuaries, and whereas before he had vainly attempted to obtain from Pius V. absolution from the excommunication which he had richly deserved for his earlier life, he now soon found himself in as high favour as he had previously been with Elizabeth and Philip. On December 1st, 1571, the Cardinal Secretary of State wrote to Bonelli at Madrid that the Pope had looked with favour upon Stukely's schemes, but that the responsibility for the undertaking must be left entirely to the King of Spain; that the Pope would raise no objections if anyone should undertake it in his name, if the king did not wish to be called its author.¹ Philip rejected the proposal. As previously, in the reassuring letter from Zayas to Elizabeth, he had questioned the capacity and the knowledge of the adventurer for the Irish undertaking,² so he now described the schemes of Stukely as impracticable.³ For the rest of the life of Pius V. the Irish undertaking lay dormant, only to be renewed seven years later in a most unfortunate way.

¹ POLLEN, *loc. cit.*, 74, and *English Catholics*, 192 *seqq.*

² POLLEN in *The Month*, 1905, 72 *seq.*

³ Castagna, January 11, 1572, *ibid.* 74.

CHAPTER VII.

PIUS V. AND MAXIMILIAN II.—CATHOLIC REFORM IN GERMANY.—THE WORK OF CANISIUS.

PIUS V.'s attitude towards religion, as well as his whole character, were radically opposed to those of the Emperor, Maximilian II. A man of clear and definite views, the sworn enemy of all pretence and disloyalty, and profoundly convinced of the truth of the Catholic religion, the Pope looked for salvation solely from that faith, and he therefore watched with unbending sternness over the preservation in all its purity of that supreme good. A convinced Catholic, any kind of compromise in matters of dogma was impossible in his eyes. The Emperor on the other hand, a skilled politician and experienced in all the arts of a shifty diplomacy, had very confused ideas on religious matters, and was vacillating and undecided.¹ In his anxiety for the pacification of his dominions he completely lost sight of the fact that a man who rejects even *one* single doctrine of the Church ceases to be a Catholic. It was true that Maximilian assisted at mass, and for a time retained the good Catholic Martin Eisengrein as the court preacher, but when the latter ended a sermon with an invocation of the Mother of God and the Saints the Emperor rebuked him, saying that such things were not in keeping with the spirit of the times.² It is certain that Maximilian had as little respect for the binding force of the dogmas defined at Trent as he had for the consequences of the oath which he had taken at his coronation. He entirely departed from the Catholic stand-point when he dreamed of being able to reconcile

¹ Cf. JANSSEN-PASTOR, IV. 15-16, 210 *seq.*, where the recent bibliography concerning the religious attitude of Maximilian II. is collected and criticized.

² See PFLEGER, Eisenfrein, 63.

opposing doctrines, in the vain hope of wearing down and at last putting an end to religious strife by such expedients. If in political questions affecting the Empire he made more than one concession to the Catholic states, this was merely a matter of policy. This monarch, who was not greatly gifted intellectually,¹ had no grasp of dogmatic truth; to him all religious questions seemed to be useless. Strict Catholics were as unwelcome to him as the most rigid Calvinists. His ideal continued to be a "religion" built up of Lutheran and Catholic principles, the acceptance of which would put an end to the disputes which were so harmful to the welfare of the various states. But the times in which he lived were particularly unsuited for any such schemes of reunion after the promulgation of the decrees of Trent, while equally hopeless was the Emperor's other plan of satisfying the Protestants in his dominions without openly offending the Catholics by granting them under certain conditions the freedom to profess the Confession of Augsburg of 1530. According to his own statements, in so doing he was only aiming at reunion in the same way as Charles V. had done a generation earlier. But what had been in some ways comprehensible then, was now doomed from the first to be ineffectual, when the Council had definitely stamped as Catholic the controverted doctrines, and the schism had taken permanent root among the Protestants.

It was evident that a man like the new Pope could never be won over to the confused and fantastic schemes of the Emperor, for Pius V. had ever fought in the most uncompromising way for the purity and inviolability of the Catholic faith.² Maximilian, therefore, was far from pleased at the

¹ See Götz in *Histor. Zeitschrift*, LXXVII., 198, who very rightly rejects the name of "Catholicism by compromise," and passes as severe a judgment as Janssen on the hypocrisy of Maximilian.

² How different Pius V.'s point of view was from that of Maximilian appears clearly among other things from the discussions in the consistory of June 81, 1571, concerning Madruzzo's proposal to invite the Protestants to join the league against the

election of Pius,¹ but realizing how important the Pope's good-will was for obtaining help against the Turks, he sought to keep on good terms with him. In his first letter to Pius V., dated January 24th, 1566, and sent to Rome by a special messenger, Maximilian makes the following protestation: "There shall never be wanting on our part filial obedience towards Your Holiness, nor those services which are to be looked for from the protector and defender of the Church; we shall omit none of those things which are due from us in virtue of our imperial office, or which can be done for the advantage and welfare of Christendom."²

Such words could only be of practical value when backed up by corresponding acts. There was already good ground for suspicion in the fact that Maximilian up to the last moment tried to prevent the mission of Cardinal Commendone, who had already been appointed legate for the Diet of Augsburg in 1566.³

Commendone was a distinguished personality in every respect. All contemporaries agree in praising his great qualities of intellect and character. He had a full knowledge, from his own personal experience, of the ecclesiastical and political conditions of Germany, he was a personal friend of the house of Hapsburg, and he was deeply convinced of the

Turks, a thing against which Pius V. definitely declared: "et quantum ad eos qui sunt Confessionis Augustanae, Sanctitas Sua credit cum b. Augustino esse magis vitandos et periculosos, qui in aliquibus nobiscum conveniunt, ut in fide Trinitatis et similibus, et in ceteris dissentiunt, quam qui in omnibus dissentiunt veluti infideles seu haeretici perditissimi, ut est Palatinus, sacramentarii, impii trinitarii et anabaptistae. Nam isti non tantum nocere possunt, cum ab omnibus vitentur veluti qui impii et manifeste infideles existimantur; sed illi, qui in aliquibus sunt haeretici, plus nocere possunt, ex eo quod nobiscum in pluribus ritibus conveniant." *Studi e docum.* XXIII., 339.

¹ See SCHWARZ, *Briefwechsel*, 2-3; HILLIGER, 151; BIBL, *Erhebung*, 21; DENGEL, V., 33, 34, 35.

² See SCHWARZ, *loc. cit.* 41.

³ See *ibid.* vii.; HOPFEN, 131, 232 *seq.*; DENGEL, V., 413.

necessity of the maintenance of good relations between the Emperor and the Pope ; at the same time he was a man of strict ecclesiastical views, and moreover was not one of those ambitious men who might set their own ends before those of the Church.¹

From the very beginning of his pontificate Pius V. had turned his attention to German affairs, and on January 12th, 1566, had charged Cardinals Morone, Farnese, Borromeo and Delfino to examine them. On the 19th he decided to form a special congregation, composed of these Cardinals, together with Galli, Mark Sittich, Madruzzo and Reumano, as well as Truchsess, who had arrived in Rome on the 16th. This congregation decided upon the renewed appointment of Commendone as legate for the Diet of Augsburg, and Pius confirmed this at the consistory of January 23rd.² A brief to Maximilian two days later pointed out as Commendone's special duty that of seeing that in the Diet nothing should be done concerning matters the decision of which belonged to the Apostolic See alone, and that moreover no steps should be taken with regard to the decrees of the Council of Trent, which were binding upon all Catholics. On the other hand he was to negotiate concerning a league against the Turks, which the Pope promised to promote and help in every possible way.³

On January 25th Pius V. sent urgent letters to the Archbishops of Mayence and Trêves, inviting them to go in person to the Diet, and to prevent ecclesiastical matters being dis-

¹ A biography of Commendone would be a very valuable work. Plentiful materials for this are to be found in the Papal Secret Archives, and especially in the Graziani Archives at Città di Castello. It is upon the material there that is based the *Vita Commendoni* of A. M. GRATIANI, Paris, 1569 (translated into French by FLÉCHIER, Paris, 1694, and Lyons, 1702), which, though a noteworthy publication for the time, is not sufficient for modern requirements. A *version of the *Vita Commendoni* of Gratianus, which is different from the printed edition, is in the Graziani Archives.

² See SCHWARZ, *loc. cit.*, 4 ; DENGEL, V., 40 *seq.*

³ See SCHWARZ, *loc. cit.* 6 *seqq.* ; DENGEL, V., 36 *seq.*

cussed there, or any other attack being made upon the rights of the Pope or the bishops. Similar letters were sent to the whole of the German episcopate.¹

Though he had but little liking for the difficult and responsible mission assigned to him, Commendone at once obeyed the Pope's command, which was awaiting him on his return from his legation in Poland. On February 17th, 1566, he reached Augsburg, where the Emperor had been since January 20th, and was awaiting the arrival of the States of the Empire, who only arrived by slow degrees.² On February 20th he had an audience with Maximilian II., and the latter gave him satisfactory assurances as to the religious questions. It was very useful to the legate that the Emperor desired as much help as possible for the Turkish war, a matter of which Johann Khevenhüller, who had been sent to Rome to convey the Emperor's congratulations, was to treat.³ Commendone at once realized how useful this question of assistance against the Turks would be for gaining influence over the Emperor in religious matters.⁴ Even more than the exhortations of the legate, and the indifference of the Protestant princes, did this consideration cause Maximilian to abstain from any discussion of a religious compromise when this was put forward as a subject for consideration at the assembly of the Diet. The tenor of the proposals laid before the Diet on March 23rd shows that Maximilian had let this matter drop; nothing further was asked for than the discussion of the detestable

¹ See LADERCHI, 1566, n. 222 and 223.

² Cf. RÜBSAM, N. Mameranus über den Reichstag von 1566 in *Histor. Jahrbuch*, X., 356. The *original register of the reports of Commendone of his legation of 1566 was found in the Graziani Archives at Città di Castello by Professor Dengel, who has begun its publication with a full commentary in the Vth vol. of the *Nuntiaturberichte* of Pius V. To Dengel belongs the credit of having opened to historical examination the hitherto inaccessible Graziani Archives.

³ See SCHWARZ, Briefwechsel, p. xii., 14, 20; DENGEL, V., 53 *seq.*

⁴ See DENGEL, V., 74.

sects which were opposed both to the Catholic and the Lutheran religion, which everybody understood to refer to Calvinism, which the Emperor hated.

In the meantime Commendone had received detailed instructions as to his mission on March 13th, 1566. The bearer of these was Scipione Lancellotti, who was to assist him as his canonist. Count Melchior Biglia, whom Pius IV. had appointed nuncio to the Imperial court on August 31st, 1565, and whom Pius V. had confirmed in that office,¹ also now appeared at Augsburg. The Pope had also seen to it that the legate should have experienced theologians to help him as his advisers in ecclesiastical questions, such as the Jesuits Nadal, Ledesma, and Peter Canisius, and the Englishman Sanders.²

The instructions for Commendone, which had been decided upon in the cardinalitial congregation appointed by Pius V., had been drawn up by the man in Rome who was best acquainted with German conditions, Cardinal Morone, who had availed himself of an opinion drawn up by Truchsess.³ These instructions laid down as his principal duties the exclusion of all religious discussion at the Diet, the publication and carrying out of the decrees of Trent, a radical reform of ecclesiastical conditions in Germany, and finally the promotion of a league against the Turks.

As to the first point the Pope's instructions were very clear. Commendone was fearlessly to oppose any attempt at the Diet to treat of religious questions, either directly or indirectly; it was not the province of the laity to do so, and experience had shown that such discussions did not lead to unity, and thus things were made worse than before. The legate was to be equally zealous in obtaining the assistance of the Emperor for the publication and observance of the Tridentine decrees. If he should not be able to secure this for the

¹ See *ibid.* I seq., 50 seq.

² See BRAUNSBERGER, Pius V., 6.

³ See SCHWARZ, *loc. cit.* 6. The instructions, dated February 27, 1566, in DENGEL, V., 56 seq. For the faculties of Commendone see *ibid.* 42 seq. Cf. CANISII *Epist.*, V., 576.

whole of the Empire, Commendone was to insist that the decrees should at any rate be published in the dioceses of Salzburg, Constance, Eichstätt, Augsburg, Freising, Passau, Brixen and Trent, and to induce all the ecclesiastical princes to observe them.

Further instructions were added to the effect that he must obtain from Frederick von Wied, the archbishop-elect of Cologne, the oath and profession of faith prescribed at Trent. Commendone was further charged to see that if, as was expected, a vacancy occurred in the episcopal sees of Magdeburg and Strasbourg, these should not fall into the hands of the Lutherans.

The remainder of the instructions show what far-reaching plans Pius V. had in mind for the renewal of ecclesiastical life in Germany. All the bishops were to be urged to the reform of the clergy, both secular and regular; those who were not yet consecrated must repair this defect. The bishops were to be asked to make a personal visitation at least once a year of their dioceses, to prevent the introduction of heretical books, to promote in every way the spread of Catholic literature, and to establish seminaries for the clergy.

In order to carry out these tasks, which formed, as it were, the Pope's programme for dealing with the ecclesiastical situation in Germany, the legate was advised to win over the Emperor's advisers, and to enter into close relations with the Catholic Duke of Bavaria and the Spanish ambassador.

Commendone accordingly treated the Catholic princes and the bishops with the greatest courtesy; this he did especially in the case of Albert V. of Bavaria, who was a fervent Catholic.¹ In other ways, too, the legate let no opportunity slip of carrying out the Pope's commands. It was natural that his principal care should, before everything else, be devoted to the discussions at the Diet.

In consequence of the latest form of the proposals laid before the Diet useless discussions of the Catholic faith and a mixture of religions had been, it is true, excluded, but even

¹ See BRAUNSBERGER, Pius V., 8.

so the danger had not been entirely removed. It did not escape Commendone that this time too the Protestants were seeking to obtain concessions in religious matters on the strength of the help which they were asked to give against the Turks. Vigilance and circumspection, qualities in which the legate was not lacking, were called for, and he entered into close relations with the Catholics, especially the Archbishop of Tréves and the Duke of Bavaria.¹

In spite of the great differences which existed between the Lutherans and the Calvinists, in the memorial, at once a petition and a complaint, which was presented by the Protestants to the Emperor, they made a pretence of being united in faith ; in their territories those sects which the Emperor wished to see abolished had no weight ; all such sects were the work of the devil and the Papists. In order to do away with the " abominations and idolatries of the Papacy " they demanded the convocation of a national council under the presidency of the Emperor ; until such a council was held Maximilian should grant to those subjects of Catholic states who were willing to accept the Confession of Augsburg the free exercise of their religion and the abolition of the ecclesiastical *reservatum*.² If this latter, by which an ecclesiastical prince who should pass from the Catholic religion to Lutheranism forfeited his office and his revenues, were to be removed, the followers of the new doctrines might reasonably hope to be able to take further steps for the complete extermination of the " abominations and idolatries of the Papacy " in the Empire.³

¹ Commendone showed prudent foresight in abstaining from delivering the brief of February 13, 1566, addressed to the Emperor and all the states of the Empire, including the Protestant ones, which exhorted them to unity of faith on the basis of the Tridentine decrees (see SCHWARZ, Briefwechsel, 7-9 ; HOPFEN, 241). The legate was also successful in averting the danger of the affair of the oath of the Archbishop of Cologne being brought before the Diet. Cf. POGIANI Epist., IV., 301.

² See JANSSEN-PASTOR, IV., 16-16, 224 seqq.

³ Cf. KLUCKHORN, Briefs, I., 520, 529 seq.

In the meantime such disquieting news of the Emperor's religious attitude had reached Rome that it was feared there that he would adopt the Confession of Augsburg. For this reason on April 6th orders were sent to Commendone that, should this occur, he was to leave the Diet after making a protest. Commendone did not share these fears of Maximilian's apostasy, but he had from the first clearly foreseen the likelihood of a general confirmation of the so-called religious peace of Augsburg of 1555 which, being rejected by the Calvinist states, was for that reason all the more ardently supported by the Emperor, as well as by the ecclesiastical princes, who feared fresh spoliations if the agreement were broken.¹ Commendone's position was thus extremely difficult, and he asked for further instructions as to the course which he should follow. When these instructions arrived at the end of April he found himself in a position of even greater embarrassment, for the Pope ordered him to lodge a protest and leave the city if in the Diet any decision of any kind were arrived at which was contrary to the dogmatic decrees of the Council of Trent.²

Pius V. condemned the religious peace of Augsburg as decisively as Paul IV., his predecessor, and a man of close spiritual affinity with himself,³ but under the existing circumstances it was inevitable that that peace should be confirmed, since even the Catholics at Augsburg supported it in order to save themselves from fresh dangers. A protest on the part of the legate would have led, to the great joy of his enemies, not only to a quarrel with the Emperor, but also with the Catholic states.

In this difficult situation Commendone had recourse to his ecclesiastical advisers, especially Canisius. To the principal question which he addressed to them, whether the peace of 1555 and its confirmation was in contradiction to the dogmatic

¹ See the *report of Commendone of April 22, 1566, Graziani Archives, Città di Castello.

² Cf. NADAL, III., 99; CANISIUS Epist., V., 252; BROGNOLI, II., 190.

³ Cf. Vol. XIV. of this work, p. 343.

decrees of the Council of Trent, the Jesuits answered that it was not, as it was a peace that was concerned with political affairs and not with dogma ; it had been nothing but an expedient and a provisional armistice. The Holy See it was true could not openly approve it, but it could tolerate it until better times should come. The legate therefore was not obliged to lodge a protest. Since, however desirable it might be, it was not to be expected that at the present Diet the Catholic states would make a profession of the Council and its decrees, the said states should at least, in some way or other, declare their acceptance of the Tridentine decrees.¹ Sanders agreed with the views expressed by the Jesuits. Lancellotti on the other hand declared that the religious peace of Augsburg and its renewed confirmation were irreconcilable with the Council, and insisted on a protest being made by the legate.² Cardinal Truchsess and the Spanish ambassador, as well as Biglia, feared that in that case the Diet would be dissolved and a war begun, which would destroy all that still remained of Catholicism in Germany.³

Under these circumstances Commendone, who realized Pius V.'s strictness in all that concerned the faith, resolved to do nothing without making further inquiries in Rome,⁴ and he sent thither his auditor, Caligari, to make a verbal report and obtain further instructions.⁵ If in the end these took the

¹ See LADERCHI, 1566, n. 233-235 ; NADAL, III., 88-104 ; CANISII Epist., V., 229 and 253 ; DUHR, I., 828, n. 1.

² See LADERCHI, 1566, n. 232, 233 ; BRAUNSBERGER, Pius V., 10.

³ See LADERCHI, 1566, n. 230. Truchsess had gone, with financial help from Pius V. from Rome to Augsburg on February 23, 1566 ; see *Avviso di Roma of March 2, 1566, Urb. 1040, p. 188, Vatican Library.

⁴ See the *letter of Commendone to Pius V. of May 1, 1566, and the report of Biglia of May 3, 1566, which are to be printed by Dengel in his Vth volume. A letter addressed by H. Corboli to Sirleto, dated Augsburg, April 27, 1566, describes the dangerous state of affairs on all sides ; see LAEMMER, *Analecta*, 57, 125 *seq.*

⁵ See BROGNOLI, II., 191 *seq.*

form of the Pope's leaving everything to the judgment of the legate, who was thus able to avoid making a protest, much of the credit for this belongs to the General of the Jesuits, Francis Borgia, whom the Jesuits at Augsburg had begged to intervene.¹

In the meantime at Augsburg the Catholic states had calmly but definitely rejected the memorial presented by the Protestants, declaring with regard to the demand for the abolition of the *reservatum*, and for freedom in religious matters, that they intended to adhere literally to the terms of the religious peace of 1555.²

Commendone then proceeded to devote his attention to the other two tasks laid upon him by Pius V., the one that the Catholic states should bind themselves expressly and openly to the decrees of Trent, and the other the removal of ecclesiastical abuses. On May 23rd he held a conference at his lodgings, at which there assisted Cardinals Truchsess and Mark Sittich, the three ecclesiastical Electors, the Dukes of Bavaria, Cleves and Brunswick, and the representatives of the Catholic states. In accordance with the instructions which he had received, Commendone urged in eloquent terms the publication of the decrees of the Council and the carrying out of the necessary reforms. The answer made in the name of those present by Daniel von Brendel, Archbishop of Mayence and arch-chancellor of the Empire, was to the following effect: the Catholic states accept the decrees of the Council of Trent in all that concerns dogma and divine worship; as to disciplinary matters they would like certain facilities suited to their peculiar circumstances, especially with regard to provincial synods.³

Commendone had every reason to be pleased with his success. Even if this declaration did not comply with all he had asked for, both with regard to its limitation and its form,

¹ Cf. NADAL, III., 96 *seqq.*, 130 *seqq.*; BROGNOLI, II., 197 *seqq.*; BRAUNSBERGER, Pius V., 10 *seq.*

² See JANSSEN-PASTOR, IV. 11-56, 228 *seqq.*

³ See GRATIANUS, III., 2. Cf. NADAL, III., 147, 152. See also SCHWARZ, Visitation, p. xxxiii.

it was nevertheless a distinct advance upon the state of affairs in the time of Pius IV., who had never been able to obtain a satisfactory answer from the ecclesiastical princes in this matter.¹ It was a further triumph that at the dissolution of the Diet on May 30th no mention was made of further conferences, of a national council, or of religious freedom. Thus for the first time for many years a Diet came to an end without any loss to the Catholics, who on this occasion left Augsburg with renewed courage and hopes. The Pope was especially gratified at the acceptance of the Council on the part of the Catholic states of Germany, and declared that his expectations had been surpassed.²

By the advice of Commendone, who did not trust the Emperor, the subsidy granted by the Pope against the Turks in April, to the amount of 50,000 scudi, was not paid until after the close of the Diet, whereupon, on July 10th, 1566, the legate started back for Rome.³

The Diet had granted to the Emperor 24 Roman "mesi," that is about 1,700,000 florins, and eight "mesi" for each of the following three years. Philip II. contributed 200,000 crowns.⁴ Under these circumstances Pius V., whose finances were already deeply involved in other directions, did not comply with the request made to him by the Emperor for further sums.⁵ As a matter of fact Maximilian had a sufficient sum in hand to enrol 14,000 infantry and 10,000 cavalry in Germany. Help also reached him from other sources, especially from the Italian princes; moreover, he had 12,000 men from Lower Austria and Croatia, 6,000 from Hungary, 5,000 from the commander-in-chief Schwendi, so that altogether there were more than 60,000 men under arms. It was only after all these troops had been gathered together that Maximilian joined the expedition in the middle of August.⁶ In September there

¹ Cf. RITTER, I., 289.

² Cf. NADAL, III., 159; BRAUNSBERGER, Pius V., II.

³ See GRATIANUS, III., 3; SCHWARZ, Briefwechsel, 20, 23 *seqq.*

⁴ HUBER, IV., 256.

⁵ SCHWARZ, *loc. cit.* 23 *seqq.*, 30, 33 *seqq.*

⁶ See HUBER, IV., 256 *seqq.*; TURBA, III., 334 *seq.*

also arrived at the head-quarters of the Emperor the nuncio, Biglia, who, during the Diet at Augsburg, had been quite thrust into the background by the personality of Commendone, who overshadowed everybody else.¹

The aged Sultan Suleiman who, accompanied by the prayers of his court poets, assuring him that "cypress-branches would wave him on to victory,"² had in the meantime advanced as far as Sziget, which was bravely defended by Nicholas Zriny. In spite of this the fortress, which was indeed little more than a mass of smoking ruins, fell into the hands of the Turks on September 7th, Zriny himself meeting with an heroic death.³

During the siege of Sziget the Imperial army had remained completely inactive. Like his brother, the Archduke Ferdinand, Maximilian was no soldier; he was full of good intentions, but committed fatal blunders. The fear felt for the Turks was so great that any serious engagement was avoided. While the army was maintaining a mere policy of observation, Hungarian marsh fever broke out among the troops to which thousands succumbed. Bad food, want of money, and desertions completed the work, and when the Turks retired the Imperial army also broke up at the end of October.⁴ Fortunately the spirit of the Turks was completely paralysed by the death of the Sultan, which occurred on September 4th, and the beginning of winter interrupted the war, which was continued in the following year with varied success. As early as the end of June, 1567, the Emperor had begun negotiations for peace, which, however, did not reach a formal conclusion until February 17th, 1568. On that date a peace of eight years was concluded at Adrianople, on the basis of the *status quo* and the continuation of a payment of a "present of honour" by the Emperor to the amount of 30,000 ducats.⁵

¹ Reports of Biglia in THEINER, *Monum. Slavor. merid.*, vol. II.

² See HAMMER, III., 751.

³ See *ibid.* 447; HUBER, IV., 260 *seqq.*; TURBA, III., 350 *seq.*

⁴ See WERTHEIMER in *Archiv für österr. Gesch.*, LIII., 84 *seqq.*; HIRN, II., 291 *seqq.*

⁵ See HUBER, IV., 263 *seq.*

After the Diet of Augsburg, in addition to the Turkish war, the Emperor keenly interested himself in religious questions, both in the Empire and in his hereditary territories. The Pope's representative, Melchior Biglia, did not cease to address exhortations to him, so that he might, in his conduct, take into consideration the wishes of the Catholics,¹ and it was of great advantage to the nuncio that political considerations, especially the hope of obtaining great help from the Pope in securing his country against the Turks, showed the Emperor the desirability of cultivating friendly relations with the Holy See. Consequently the nuncio was able to report not only fair words on the part of the Emperor, but also reassuring acts: for example, in March and July, 1567, action was taken against the heretical preachers, and in September there was an edict against the Calvinists in Hungary. Biglia was also quite satisfied with the behaviour of Maximilian in the affair of Cologne. He was also rejoiced at the efforts made by the Emperor to prevent the rebels in the Netherlands from receiving help from German troops. The hopeful reports which Biglia sent to Rome, where Morone and Commendone were endeavouring to cultivate friendly relations between the Emperor and the Pope, aroused the highest hopes there, which were shared by Pius V.,² who could not fail to be filled with joy at the fact that, on December 5th, 1567, Maximilian warmly

¹ In the Papal Secret Archives there is preserved only a small part of the *reports of Biglia (Nunziat. di Germania, 66 and 67). For the full reports of the nuncio search must therefore be made elsewhere. In 1847 SCARABELLI showed in *Arch. stor. Ital.*, App. IV., n. 17, p. 61 *seq.*, that the Alfieri Archives at Asti contained reports of the nunciature of Biglia for the years 1568 and 1569. Mgr. Ratti [now Pope Pius XI.] and Prof. Dengel found those of 1565 and 1567 in the Trotti Archives, Milan (now in the Ambrosiana), so that the greater part are in readiness for Dengel's edition.

² See the *instructions of the secretariate of State for Biglia, dated Rome, February 8, March 1, 8, and 22, April 5, June 14, July 19, 26, September 6, 12, December 6, Nunziat. di Germania 67, Papal Secret Archives.

supported a request made by the Jesuits in Vienna.¹ For the Emperor's sake he forgave Cardinal Delfino, who had been deprived of his right to vote on account of grave disobedience,² and he overlooked the arbitrary action taken by the Emperor in the reform of the monasteries and chapters of Austria which had fallen into a very bad state.³

The Pope, however, was not disposed to satisfy all Maximilian's demands, because, in his eyes, ecclesiastical principles always came before all political considerations.⁴ But in that matter which was Maximilian's chief preoccupation, namely, help against the Turks, he showed himself willing to do all that lay in his power. He did not adhere to the arrangement originally made of setting aside for this purpose large sums of money only in the case of actual war; in April, 1568, in spite of his many other expenses, he promised a contribution for the fortification of the border territory, though he insisted that the money should be used for that purpose alone. In July he allowed the Emperor to levy a subsidy of 45,000 florins from the abbots and priors of Lower Austria, and in August he gave his consent to the payment in Venice during the following month of 20,000 scudi for the fortification of the border territories which were threatened by the Turks. In September he increased this sum to 30,000 scudi and promised to do even more in the future.⁵ He also complied with the Emperor's request that he would help his brother, the

¹ See LADERCHI, 1566, n. 205; SCHWARZ, *Briefwechsel*, 77 *seq.*; BRAUNSBERGER, Pius V., 37.

² See SCHWARZ, *loc. cit.* 45, 56. *Cf. ibid.* 176 for the subsequent quarrel of Delfino with Pius V.

³ *Cf.* WIEDEMANN, I., 187-202; SCHWARZ, *loc. cit.* 96-99.

⁴ *Cf.* SCHWARZ, *loc. cit.* 63-73, 88; BRAUNSBERGER, Pius V., 42 *seq.*

⁵ See SCARABELLI, *loc. cit.* 65; SCHWARZ, *loc. cit.*, 101, 104, 107 *seq.*; TURBA, III., 403, 458, n.; HOPFEN, 266 *seq.* In Arm. 64, t. 6, p. 84 *seq.*, the Papal Secret Archives contain a memorial of 1568 with the title *Nonnulla media quibus Germania hoc tempore invari possit, with proposals for the protection of Hungary against the Turks.

Archduke Charles, in assuring the safety of the boundary of Styria. The Archduke received permission to levy for five years a half of all the ecclesiastical revenues of his territory, with the promise that this permission would later on be extended for another five years.¹

After all this condescension on the part of the Pope, and the news received in Rome in July, 1568, of the steps which had been taken by Maximilian against the heretics in his dominions,² an absolutely paralysing effect was produced by the receipt from the Imperial ambassador Arco on September 13th of a letter dated September 3rd from Maximilian to Pius V., authorizing the ambassador to disclose the great concession of August 18th which allowed the Protestant nobles and gentry of Lower Austria the free exercise of their religious beliefs in accordance with the Confession of Augsburg of 1530.³ The validity of this religious concession was, it is true, limited by certain conditions: in the first place the Catholics were no longer to be attacked or interfered with, and in the second place a commission which was to be appointed, half by the Emperor and half by the States of the Empire, was to draw up for the adherents of the Confession of Augsburg fixed rules concerning divine worship, ecclesiastical organization and teaching.⁴

This surprising step on the part of Maximilian came entirely from his own initiative immediately after the opening of the Diet at Vienna, which was asked to deal in a favourable way with the Emperor's heavy debts. Besides Maximilian's own confused ideas on religion, a decisive contributory cause was his consideration for and his fear of Protestant opposition. To the nuncio Biglia, who made a strong protest, Maximilian appealed expressly to his own constrained position, saying

¹ SCHWARZ, Briefwechsel, 113-115.

² See the letter of Cardinal Mula of July 24, 1568, in HOPFEN, 267.

³ SCHWARZ, Briefwechsel, 116 *seqq.* Cf. SUDENDORF, Registrum, III., 297.

⁴ Cf. HOPFEN, 144; OTTO, 23 *seq.*, 43 *seq.*; BIBL, Organisation, 123 *seqq.*, 125 *seqq.*

that in his dominions there were so many sects that the only remedy was to tolerate the Confession of Augsburg ; that if a revolution should break out, as had been the case in the Low Countries, he would find himself without any means of defence against the States ; that he had six sons, and how were they to live if the hereditary provinces were ruined ?¹

When, on September 13th, 1568, the information was received from the Imperial ambassador that Maximilian was on the point of giving way to his Protestant nobles, and of granting them a territorial church system within their own provinces, Pius V. was deeply stirred. His grief was so great that he could not restrain his tears. In his complaints to the ambassador he said that he saw clearly that God intended to punish Christendom, and that religion was falling into ruin because the Emperor was so light-heartedly giving way before the claims of the Protestants, and setting the worst possible example to France and the Low Countries ; he did not know how, under these circumstances, he could maintain his friendly relations with the Emperor. At a second audience on September 15th Arco tried to persuade him to give a less uncompromising reply, but, as was only to be expected, the Pope persisted in his condemnation of the concession that had been made. In a brief which was drawn up on the same day he adjured Maximilian to give up his purpose, which was the cause of so great scandal. Cardinals Morone, Truchsess and Colonna, who were all adherents of the Emperor, and the Spanish ambassador, expressed themselves in similar terms. It was thought in the Curia that Biglia would be recalled, because he had not been able to prevent this step on the part of Maximilian.²

When the Imperial courier who had brought Maximilian's

¹ Venez, *Depeschen*, III., 459 *seq.* Bibl (p. 141) is wrong in saying that the Emperor laid his ideas before Commendone.

² See the report of Arco of September 17, 1568, in HOPFEN 276 *seqq.* Cf. *Corresp. dipl.*, II., 462 *seq.* The brief of September 15, 1568, in SCHWARZ, *Briefwechsel*, 119 *seqq.* Cf. also SCHWARZ in *Festschrift zum Jubiläum des Camposanto* of Ehses, Freiburg, 1897, 238 *seqq.*

letter of September 3rd left on the 17th, he took with him the Pope's reply and a detailed report from Arco on the situation. The courier had hardly started when the Pope took definite action. In a suddenly assembled consistory on September 17th he appointed Commendone, who, with Morone, was the best acquainted with German affairs, as legate extraordinary to Maximilian, with instructions to induce him to turn back from the extremely dangerous course upon which he had embarked.¹

The mission of the very man who had proved his power at the Diet of Augsburg was extremely unwelcome to the Emperor. If a Cardinal was to be sent, a thing which he would most gladly have avoided, he would have been far better pleased with an ambitious and accommodating man like Delfino.² His indignation was so great that he spoke of this sudden and determined action on the part of the Pope as "mad monkish zeal"; he was resolved, he told the Venetian ambassador, that as far as he was concerned, he would make no change; he then broke out into those expressions which have ever been used by those who have known themselves to be unmasked by Rome: the Pope is ill-informed; he would inform him better and show him that what had been done had been done with the intention of bringing back the Protestants to the Church.³

The Emperor was gravely deluding himself in thinking that they were not well informed in Rome and perfectly aware of the gravity of the situation; what had been granted to the nobility of Lower Austria could not be for long refused to the cities and marts; in a word, the final result must be the destruction of the Catholic religion. All efforts therefore to prevent the mission of Commendone were in vain.⁴

¹ See the report of Arco of September 18, 1568, in HOFFEN, 282 *seq.* and *Corresp. dipl.*, II., 463.

² See the report of Eisengrein of October 9, 1568, in HOFFEN, 291.

³ See Venez. *Depeschen*, III., 461, n. 1.

⁴ See SCHWARZ, *Briefwechsel*, 123. *Corresp. dipl.*, II., 464. 482.

When Commendone received the Pope's commands he was at his abbey of S. Zeno at Verona. Accompanied by his secretary, Anton Maria Graziani, and by Giovanni Delfino, Bishop of Torcello, he at once set out for the north. On the Brenner pass, the legate, who was not properly equipped, was overtaken by a snowstorm which lasted three days; in spite of this, Innsbruck was reached as early as October 13th. There Commendone met Albert V. of Bavaria, who was staying with the Archduke Ferdinand, and went carefully into the situation with him.¹ The remainder of the journey, which was carried out on the river Inn, could not be undertaken until the 16th, through want of boats, and took him by Passau and Linz to Vienna, which the legate reached in the evening of October 28th. The nuncio Biglia, who had been made ill by the excitement of the discussions, had not been able to carry out his plan of going as far as Passau to meet the Cardinal.²

Commendone had a first audience with the Emperor on October 31st and a second on November 3rd.³ Maximilian sought to justify as far as possible the concession made to the nobles of the free exercise of their religion in accordance with the Confession of Augsburg, by pleading his good intention of preventing on the one hand the spread of the Protestant sects, and on the other of bringing back the Lutherans to the Church, as Charles V. and Ferdinand I. had already aimed at doing, adding that it seemed to him that the Confession of Augsburg, which was in many points in accordance with Catholic doctrine, was the best means to this end.

Commendone replied that the Emperor's intentions were

¹ Cf. GRATIANI Epist., 390 *seqq.*; CANISII Epist., VI., 223 *seq.*, 588 *seq.* Schwarz has published in the Festschrift mentioned on p. 260 the advice of the Bavarian chancellor, S. Eck, against the official toleration of Protestantism in Austria, which took its origin in the conferences held at Innsbruck.

² Cf. GRATIANI, Epist., 390 *seqq.*, Colecc. de docum. inéd., CIII., 23, and the letters of Biglia in the account given by MAYR, p. 391, quoted *infra* p. 268, n. 1.

³ See Venez. Depeschen, III., 461. Cf. GRATIANUS, III., 4.

no doubt very praiseworthy, but that it was certain that he would not gain his end because the means he was using were unlawful and harmful. The profession of the Catholic faith must be maintained in all its purity and integrity; the experiments of Charles V. and Ferdinand I. with the adherents of the Confession of Augsburg had shown how vain were all hopes of reconciling them with the Church. Moreover, they had been dealing with powerful princes, whereas now the Emperor proposed to allow his subjects to impose upon him shameful conditions. Further, it was never lawful to do evil that good might come. The followers of the new doctrines would never be led back to the Church by the way of concessions, but only confirmed in their opinions. Commendone frankly pointed out how dangerous to the good name of the Emperor was the statement which the Lutherans were making that they had bought religious liberty for money, but worst of all was the fact that in making a concession in a matter of religion the Emperor was taking upon himself a power which belonged to the Pope alone; such audacity was bound to draw down upon him the punishments of God.¹

The lengthy and weighty remarks of Commendone were backed up by a strong letter from Albert V. to Maximilian, which the legate had brought with him from Innsbruck. A decisive factor was the intervention, brought about by Pius V., of the Spanish king, who, in an autograph letter of October 17th, and again later on, adjured the Emperor to give up the course he had entered upon in defiance of God and religion. The remonstrances of Philip II. made all the greater impression upon Maximilian because he was proposing to marry his eldest daughter to the King of Spain. Philip insisted, as a preliminary step towards such an arrangement that there should be a cessation of all signs of favour towards the Netherland insurgents and the Austrian Protestants.

¹ See GRATIANI Epist., 390 *seqq.* The *reports of Commendone on his legation of 1568-1569 are in the Graziani Archives, Città di Castello. Dengel is to publish these in his edition of the *Nuntiaturberichte*.

Commendone at once realized the importance of this dynastic question. By his advice the Spanish ambassador warned the Emperor that a Papal dispensation in the matter of relationship would be necessary for the proposed marriage, and that Pius V. certainly would not grant this so long as Maximilian remained at the beck and call of the Austrian Protestants.¹

The Emperor could not resist the united attack of the Pope, Spain, and Bavaria, the more so as he, in whose eyes Protestants and Catholics were of equal importance,² had no idea of exposing the interests of his house to serious dangers for the sake of religion. He very quickly gave way, and in a most undignified manner, in reality as far as the Netherland rebels were concerned, but only in appearance in the case of the Austrian Protestants.³

After the long and heated discussions which had taken place⁴ Commendone was as surprised as he was rejoiced when, at an audience lasting two hours on November 18th he received from the Emperor a completely satisfactory declaration, which he at once reported to Rome and Munich. My intention, so Maximilian declared, has always been to further the Catholic religion, and especially after the urgent and paternal exhortations of the Pope have I prayed God to enlighten me, and the day before yesterday I decided to give up all further meetings of the religious commission, and not allow any religious discussion at the Diet at Linz. In support of this declaration he informed the legate that he had communicated this decision to the members of the commission, that he had dismissed them, and had sent word to those who had been summoned from other places not to come, because there would be no further negotiations. He then said that he wished Commendone to be made aware of all this in order that he might send the news to Rome, and bear witness there

¹ See RITTER, I., 402 *seq.*; HOPFEN, 289; Venez. Depeschen, III., 464, n. I. Colecc. de docum. inéd., CIII., 28 *seq.*; Corresp. dipl., II., 464 *seq.*, 492.

² The opinion of Huber (IV., 229).

³ See RITTER, I., 403.

⁴ Cf. GRATIANI Epist., 396.

that as a loyal son he wished to comply absolutely with the wishes of so good a Pope, whom he sincerely loved. When Commendone asked whether it would now be necessary for him to go to Linz, Maximilian replied that it was not necessary, since there would certainly be no discussion of religious matters there; he could assure the Pope that the Emperor was resolved to serve God and the Catholic religion wholeheartedly.¹

One who was well acquainted with the court of Vienna, Martin Eisengrein, had, a short time after the arrival of Commendone, expressed the fear that an attempt would be made to deceive the eminent diplomatist "with fair words, until they succeeded in sending him away."² Eisengrein's view was fully justified; the Emperor had no real intention of meeting the wishes of the Pope, and adhered firmly to his resolve to abide by the promise which he had made on August 18th to the adherents of the Confession of Augsburg, though he did not intend to make any concessions beyond that. He deceived the legate in that he concealed from him the fact that before he dissolved the Diet he had promised the nobles that until the conclusion of the religious discussions they should not be disturbed in their profession of the Confession of Augsburg within their dominions. The Diet of Upper Austria next received from the Emperor on December 7th information that they as well were entitled to the religious liberty allowed in Lower Austria, and that in the meantime they were not to be disturbed so long as they did not go beyond the limits of the Confession of Augsburg. The meetings of the commission for drawing up a new ecclesiastical liturgy and constitution were not entirely suspended, as the Emperor

¹ So much does Commendone announce in a *letter of November 18, 1568, to Cardinal Bonelli (Graziani Archives). Cf. further the *report of Biglia of November 18, 1568 (Alfieri Library, Asti, now in the State Archives, Turin). Prof. Dengel will publish both accounts. The letter to Albert V. of November 20, 1568, in HOFFEN, 300 *seq.* See also that to Hosius in CYPRIANUS, 485 *seq.* Cf. also Venez. Depeschen, III., 461 *seq.*

² Letter of November 5, 1568, in HOFFEN, 296.

led the legate to suppose, for Maximilian had merely dismissed Camerarius, who was not to the liking of the States, and had summoned in his place from Mecklenburg the Lutheran theologian David Chytreus. When the latter arrived in January, 1569, Maximilian was careful to keep his presence hidden from the legate, and in the retirement of the little city of Spitz on the Danube Chytreus was able to devote himself quietly to the drawing up of the new ecclesiastical programme and constitution.¹

In a brief to the Emperor on December 1st, 1568, Pius V. had expressed his joy at the fact that Maximilian, according to the statements of Arco and Commendone's reports, was willing to make no further concessions as far as the Confession of Augsburg was concerned, and had forbidden the religious discussions which had been begun, to which steps he was indeed bound in virtue of his Imperial office and the oath which he had taken.² On January 20th, 1569, at the very moment when he was keeping the Protestant theologian Cytreus concealed at Spitz, Maximilian replied to this brief in an obsequious letter saying how glad he was that the Pope had so cordially welcomed the prohibition of the religious discussions arranged for St. Martin's Day, upon which the whole of his policy of agreement with the nobility had rested; he said that he had never wanted to offend the paternal heart of the Pope, that he felt the greatest filial affection for him, and that in conformity with his duty as Emperor he would leave nothing undone "for the maintenance of the Catholic faith, and the defence of the dignity of the Church."³

The presence of Commendone was very inconvenient for the dishonest double game which the shifty Emperor was

¹ See RITTER, I., 404; OTTO, 22 *seq.*; WIEDEMANN, I., 361. Cf. Colecc. de docum. inéd., CIII., 33, 64; Venez. Depeschen, III., 465.

² See LADERCHI, 1568, n. 86. For the discussion on the oath of Maximilian cf. the report of Arco of October 2, 1568, in HOPFEN, 290.

³ See SCHWARZ, Briefwechsel, 130 *seq.*

playing at that time;¹ he breathed more freely when, at the end of January, 1569, the legate started on his journey for Rome.² As the Venetian ambassador bore witness, Commendone left a splendid reputation behind him in Vienna, and had left nothing undone which could contribute to the edification of the people.³ His departure had been delayed because he had received from the Pope the further charge of taking advantage of his presence to make a visitation of the churches and convents of Austria. When the necessary faculties for this had arrived at the beginning of January, and the Emperor had given his consent, the legate began his visitation with the city and dioceses of Vienna. On his return journey he continued his work in spite of the inclement weather. In addition to the churches and convents on the great military road, he also visited others lying at a consider-

¹ It would appear from his *report to the Pope of November 24, 1568, for which I am indebted to the courtesy of Prof. Dengel, that Commendone was not quite free from anxiety as to the carrying out of the Emperor's decisions. He mentions that while the Catholics at Augsburg were rejoicing over the part played by the Emperor, the Protestants looked upon it as a mere postponement, and remained fixed in their hopes of attaining their end in time. Before he set out for Linz the Emperor had definitely promised that the religious question should not be treated of there. Under the actual circumstances they must be content with what had been accomplished. His mission had been to prevent the actual concessions of religious freedom, or the discussion of the question by the commission. This much had been granted. If for greater security a written promise, signed by the Emperor, should be desired in Rome, namely that he would not in future grant any similar demands by his subjects, they must wait for a suitable moment, namely, when the dispensation for the marriage of the Emperor's daughter to Philip II. was asked for. Graziani Archives, Città di Castello.

² See GRATIANI *Epist.*, 434 *seq.*; Venez. *Depeschen*, III., 465. Cf. HOPFEN, 146 *seq.* for an opinion as to the double game being played by Maximilian. Ritter too (I., 406) says that Maximilian was "playing with" the Catholic powers.

³ See Venez. *Depeschen*, III., 465.

able distance, such as Gaming and Kremsmünster. Commendone devoted particular care to the visitation of Upper Austria. In the last week of February he was at Passau, and then visited several convents in the district of Salzburg. Everywhere he laboured to enforce and inculcate the decrees of the Council of Trent. If he did not obtain more lasting results, this was principally because of the short time at his disposal. It could only have been by long and continued labours that the abuses which had crept in in the course of centuries could have been removed.¹

With the departure of Commendone, the relations with the Holy See were once more in the hands of the ordinary nuncio, Biglia. The efforts of this diplomatist to maintain reasonably good relations between the Emperor and the Pope were rendered all the more difficult because the attitude of Maximilian towards the States of Lower Austria was in direct contradiction to the declarations made on November 18th, 1568, to Commendone. Pius V.'s annoyance at this was so great that he regretted the help he had given Maximilian against the Turks.²

The relations between the Emperor and the Pope were again seriously disturbed when, in August, 1569, Pius V. suffered himself to be persuaded to make Cosimo I. Grand Duke of Tuscany. At first the Medici prince, with the help of Pius IV., who was under great obligations to him, had tried in 1560 to obtain the title of king, but, as at that time Philip II.

¹ For the visitation of the monasteries and churches made by Commendone in Lower Austria see STARZER in *Blätter des Verein für Landeskunde für Niederösterreich*, XXVI. (1892), 156 seq.; for the visitation in the dioceses of Passau and Salzburg see MAYR in *Studien und Mitteil. aus dem Benediktiner-und Zisterzienserorden*, 1893, 385 seq. Cf. also HOPFEN, 312 seq.

² Cf. TIEPOLO, 187. From his report of July 2, 1569, in HOPFEN, 323 seq., it may be seen how Arco sought to pacify the Curia. Cf. *ibid.* 152, 154 seq. for the deceit practised by the Emperor on the Catholic princes and the Pope. From the report of Zuniga of July 28, 1569, *Corresp. dipl.*, III., 118, it is clear what judgment Pius V. had formed of Maximilian.

had resolutely opposed this, the plan had been abandoned.¹ A second attempt to obtain the title of Archduke or Grand Duke had been made five years later, and this time the circumstances had seemed to be more favourable. The negotiations, which had been carried on with the greatest secrecy on account of Spain, had already made great progress when the death of Pius IV. had brought the whole affair to a standstill.²

This second shipwreck of his plans did not discourage Cosimo from further attempts, to which he was urged, not only by ambition, but also by the wish to end in his own favour the controversy about precedence which had long been pending between himself and the Duke of Ferrara.³ When at length, after many difficult negotiations, the Medici prince realized that he could look for no favourable decision of this controversy from the Emperor, he transferred the negotiations to Rome in June, 1569. The task of carrying out this task in favour of Cosimo was entrusted to the lawyer, Domenico Bonsi, who at once got into touch with Onofrio Camaiani, Cosimo's trusted agent. There did not seem to be any likelihood of a decision in Cosimo's favour because in the College of Cardinals Ferrara had as strong a following as Florence.⁴

As far as the Pope was concerned, however, things were very different. Ferrara's relations with Pius V. were very strained, both on account of quarrels of a temporal nature, such as the importation of salt, and on account of Ferrara's attitude towards religious questions. In this respect it would seem that Alfonso had inherited some of the opinions of his mother, Rénée, the friend of Calvin; he had absolutely refused to admit the Inquisition in his territories, or to comply with

¹ See MAFFEI, 11 *seq.* Cf. Vol. XV. of this work, p. 100.

² Cf. MAFFEI, 29 *seq.*; BIBL, Erhebung Cosimos, 11 *seq.*

³ BIBL, *loc. cit.*, 15, rightly brings this out. For the controversy about precedence cf. *Arch. stor., Ital.*, 2nd ser., VII., 2, 93 *seq.*; *Atti d. deput. Ferrarese di storia patria*, IX., Ferrara, 1897; MONDANI, La questione di precedenza fra il d. Cosimo I. e Alfonso, II., Florence, 1898; GRIBANDI in *Riv. di scienze stor.*, 1904-1905; PALANDRI, 122 *seq.*

⁴ See BIBL, *loc. cit.* 43 *seq.*

the Pope's request that he should help the French Catholics. The Duke's uncle, moreover, Cardinal Este, was especially in bad odour with Pius V. on account of his schemes to obtain the tiara. In the spring of 1569 the Venetian ambassador, Paolo Tiepolo, considered the relations between the House of Este and the Vatican as being so strained, that he feared a complete breach.¹

Cosimo I., on the other hand, had in every possible way shown his loyalty to the Pope during the whole period of the latter's reign. He had carried into effect all the promises he had made at the beginning of the pontificate concerning the support of the Inquisition and ecclesiastical reform.² The handing over of Carnesecci to the Roman Inquisition, the assistance he had given the Emperor in the Turkish War of 1566 and the great help he had recently given to the French Catholics in the third Huguenot War, were all things calculated to win for the Medici prince in a high degree the confidence and love of Pius V.³ Camaiani and Cardinal Ferdinand de' Medici, who was working with him, therefore met with no great difficulties when they proposed that, as a reward, the question of precedence, which had now been pending for a generation, should be settled in favour of Cosimo by his elevation to the rank of Grand Duke, as had already been the intention of Pius IV. Such a proposal was all the more pleasing to Pius V. since, saturated as he was with medieval ideas, he could thus argue with himself: if a Pope could confer on Charlemagne the title of Emperor, all the more fittingly can

¹ TIEPOLO, 189. Cf. E. Manolesso in ALBÈRI, II., 2, 415; BIBL, *loc. cit.* 26.

² Cf. Legaz. di Serristori, 419.

³ See TIEPOLO, 189; GALLUZZI, 66 *seq.*, 95 *seq.*; MAFFEI, 60 *seq.*; HERRE, Papstwahlen 159, *seq.*; PALANDRI, 124 *seq.* In 1568 Pius V. had undertaken the office of god-father at the birth of the daughter of Cosimo; cf. the *brief to "Johanna principessa Florentiae" of Jan. 28, 1568 (mission of Cardinal Ricci), State Archives, Florence. A little later the wife of Cosimo was honoured with the Golden Rose; see LADERCHI, 1568, n. 59.

I bestow the title of Grand Duke on a prince who has deserved so well of the Church.¹

On August 27th, 1569 a bull was drawn up in the following terms :² the Pope, who has been placed by God over the nations of the kingdoms, and invested with the supreme power in the Church militant, is in duty bound to turn his eyes upon those who, more than others, have rendered faithful service to the Holy See and the Catholic faith. In this respect the sovereign prince of Tuscany has especially distinguished himself. But recently he has magnanimously assisted the Catholics of France and has founded the Order of the Knights of St. Stephen for the honour of God and the propagation of the true religion. Since these services call for some recognition the Pope, in virtue of his Apostolic power, declares him hereditary Grand Duke of Tuscany in so far as that country is subject to him as sovereign, without thereby infringing the rights of the Emperor or other kings. As a precedent for this grant of a title the bull appeals to similar acts by Popes Alexander III., Innocent III. and Paul IV., in the case of the rulers of Portugal, Bulgaria and Walachia, as well as of Ireland.³ As an external mark of the title now conferred upon him Cosimo was given the right to bear the royal crown heraldically described in the bull. Thus was his right of precedence over Este assured to him. The arrival of the news of the victory over the French Huguenots to which Cosimo had so materially contributed,⁴ seemed to Pius V. to afford a favourable opportunity for promulgating the bull which had hitherto been kept secret. On December 7th, 1569, he sent his nephew Michele Bonelli to Florence, where

¹ See GALLUZZI, 89 *seq.* ; BIBL, *loc. cit.* 45 *seq.* For the work by Laurentius Belus, *De summa pontificia potestate creandi et destruendi saeculares potestates, etc., see Vol. XVII., p. 131, n. 1.

² Bull. Rom., VII., 763 *seq.*

³ In his negotiations with Maximilian II. Commendone also adduced other examples drawn from the medieval ideas, but which to some extent will not stand the light of historical criticism ; see GRATIANUS, Vita Commendonis.

⁴ Cf. Corresp. dipl., III., 228, n. 1.

five days later the delivery and reading of the bull took place with great solemnity in the Palazzo Vecchio.¹

While Florence was keeping high festival, Cosimo set all the devices of his diplomatic skill to work, gradually to reconcile the powers, and especially the Emperor, to this occurrence, and prevent them from taking any steps to oppose it. In flagrant contradiction to the truth he assured them that he had never taken any steps to obtain the dignity which the Pope had conferred upon him of his own initiative, and added that he intended to go to Rome at the beginning of the following year in order to express his gratitude in person. He carefully concealed from the Emperor that the real object of this journey was that he might be crowned by the Pope. When, however, as the result of rumours which reached him, Maximilian learned the truth, he abandoned the attitude of reserve which he had hitherto maintained, and demanded to be informed in the first place of the terms of the bull.²

On February 13th, 1570, Arco received by special courier from the Emperor orders to make in the first place private remonstrances to the Pope against the proposed solemn coronation of Cosimo, and if this was not sufficient, to make formal protest against such a step, as being injurious to the rights of the Emperor. Arco had an audience on February 14th. When, in the course of the discussion, Pius V. remarked that the Duke of Florence was free and acknowledged no overlord, and that moreover on many occasions the Popes had appointed men as kings, as for example the Kings of Portugal and Navarre, Arco replied that those cases had not affected the Empire. This touched the real point at issue: the Emperor looked upon Florence as a fief of the Empire, and even though this might be open to question, it was certain that Siena had been received as a fief from the Spanish king, and was indirectly a fief of the Empire. It would seem that the Pope already realized that Cosimo had put him in a false

¹ See GALLUZZI, 103 *seq.*; LAPINI, *Diario Fiorentino*, ed. Corazzini, Florence, 1900.

² See BIBL, *loc. cit.* 47 *seq.*

position. In spite of this, he did not consider himself justified, for the sake of his own authority, in withdrawing the distinction as Arco demanded,¹ and as a matter of fact the question had already gone too far.² On February 15th, 1570, Cosimo arrived at the gates of Rome with a splendid retinue, and dismounted at the villa of Julius III. On the 18th he made his entry with great pomp and was received in the consistory. Even Arco was present at this ceremony, which took place in the Sala Regia. When the consistorial advocate proclaimed the new title of Cosimo, Arco declared to the Pope that he protested against this infringement of the rights of the Emperor, and that he reserved a more formal protest. Then, when Cosimo was introduced with great pomp, he left the Sala in an ostentatious way. All the attempts of both the Pope and Cosimo to induce the Imperial ambassador to change his attitude failed.³

On March 5th, Laetare Sunday, Arco renewed his solemn protest in the Pope's private apartments, in the presence of Cardinals Morone, Chiesa and Bonelli. While he was leaving the Vatican Pius V. repaired to the Sistine Chapel for the coronation mass. Cosimo took his place between the two junior Cardinal-Priests. He was attired in a long robe embroidered with gold, and over it a red mantle, trimmed with ermine, and he wore the ducal cap. After the epistle he took

¹ See *ibid.* 53 *seqq.*

² For the preparations in Rome for the arrival of Cosimo, see *Avvisi di Roma of January 25, February 8 and 11, 1570; mention is there made of a present from Cosimo to Pius V., "un calamaro d'argento dorato con un horiolo dentro" of the value of 250 scudi. Urb. 1041, p. 223, 223b, 224b, Vatican Library.

³ See SCHWARZ, Briefwechsel, 156; BIBL, *loc. cit.* 55 *seq.* Cf. also MUTINELLI, I., 88 *seq.*; DE MAGISTRIS, 13 *seq.*; Corresp. dipl., III., 234 *seqq.* Interesting particulars on the arrival and entry of the new Grand Duke in the *Avvisi di Roma of February 15 and 18, 1570 (Cosimo was lodged in the apartments of Cardinal Bonelli "parate di velluto cremesino con broccato d'oro"). Urb. 1041, p. 226b, 229b, Vatican Library.

the oath of fealty, and then the Pope placed on his head the precious gold crown which had been made in Florence, and handed him the silver sceptre. At the conclusion of the ceremony the new Grand Duke offered as gifts a golden chalice, and rich vessels and liturgical vestments; when the Pope returned to his apartment he carried his train. Lastly, Cosimo was honoured with the golden rose which had been blessed on that day.¹

It is quite certain that it was very far from the wishes of Pius V. to do anything prejudicial to the rights of any prince by the extraordinary honour which he had conferred on Cosimo; his declaration that it was merely his intention to reward the great services of the Medici prince to the Holy See may be taken quite literally.² All the more painful then was his surprise when he saw what wrong motives were attributed to him and what strong opposition his action had aroused among almost all the powers.³ The only exception was the French government, which hailed Cosimo's elevation with joy, knowing well that the Hapsburgs had done all they

¹ There are various accounts of the events of March 5, that of Arco, with his protest, in SCHWARZ, Briefwechsel, 156 *seq.*, BIBL, 60 *seq.* the report of the Venetian ambassador in MUTINELLI, I., 89 *seq.*, that of the French ambassador in DE MAGISTRIS, 15 *seq.*, that of the ambassador of Savoy in SAGGIATORE, IV. (1845), 33 *seq.* Firmanus gives a very detailed account of the ceremony of the coronation, in MORENI, Della solenne incoronazione del duca Cosimo Medici in granduca, Florence, 1819. Cf. also the *Avviso di Roma of March 5, 1570, where, among the presents, special mention is made of a gold "bacile" weighing 9 pounds, with 7 figures "con miracolosa arte; fede, speranza e carità" supporting the vase at the foot of which are the four Evangelists with the arms of Pius V. and Cosimo. Urb. 1041, p. 242b, Vatican Library.

² HERRE (I., 59) rightly brings this out.

³ Besides Ferrara, Savoy, Mantua and Venice, among the Italian states, refused to recognize the title. See BIBL, 70, Cf. *Arch. stor. Ital.*, App. III., 158 *seq.*; Venez. Depeschen, III., 498 n.

could to prevent it taking place.¹ It was indeed true that they had been continually urged to do so by the Duke of Ferrara.²

From the first Philip II. of Spain had maintained an attitude of reserve. From the point of view of principle his view was the same as that of the Emperor; he saw in this act of the Pope an extremely serious and dangerous interference in temporal affairs, and he looked upon it as an insult that he, Cosimo's feudal lord as far as Siena was concerned, had not been informed of it beforehand. An additional motive for indignation lay in the fact that the King of Spain could not willingly allow the Duke of Florence to become more powerful than he already was. At the same time, for various reasons Philip was not at first inclined to adopt so brusque an attitude towards the Pope as was done by Maximilian, who, under the influence of Arco, had become the close friend of the Este.³

On March 29th, 1570, the Emperor once again solemnly repeated his protest, and sent for this purpose his three councillors, Gabriel Strein, Baron von Schwarzenau and Dr. Andreas Gail, who arrived in Rome on April 10th, and had a private audience on the 16th, followed by a public one on the 24th. On the latter occasion the protest was read, and a copy of it delivered. The Pope promised to give his reply after he had maturely considered the matter.⁴

¹ See DE MAGISTRIS, II *seq.*; HERRE, I., 60. Cf. PALANDRI, 126.

² Cf. BIBL, 79 *seq.*, 89 *seqq.*

³ See HERRE, I., 60, 77; MAFFEI, 81 *seq.*, 89 *seq.*; BIBL, 70, 78, 87 *seq.* Philip II. only made his protest against Cosimo's new title after the conclusion of the league against the Turks, which brought Spain the *Cruzada* (see *infra*, Cap. IX., and *supra* p. 64). In consequence of the Spanish protest the Pope gave way so far as to give Cosimo secret powers to enter upon negotiations for a compromise upon the basis proposed by the Emperor, which the Medici prince at once did. BIBL, 119.

⁴ See the *report of B. Pia of April 25, 1570, Gonzaga Archives, Mantua; Avvisi di Roma of April 19 and 26, 1570, Urb. 1041, p. 265b, 267, Vatican Library; LADERCHI, 1570, n. 115; Corresp.

That in the face of this unexpected opposition, and in view of the doubly unfortunate consequences to the much desired league against the Turks of the conferring of the title, Pius V. to some extent repented of having satisfied the desires of the crafty Cosimo, and that he would like to have acted otherwise, is shown by the fact that at the great creation of Cardinals on May 17th, 1570, he passed over Camaiani, though he was warmly recommended by Florence. Such an attitude was also urged upon him by the fact that Cosimo did not hesitate to throw the responsibility for the whole affair upon the Pope.¹

In Rome a special congregation of Cardinals discussed from the end of April the reply that should be made to the Emperor's protest. Opinions were very divided. Some thought that a reply of any kind was undesirable, because an exchange of letters would only add fuel to the flames. On the other hand it was rightly urged that to refuse to reply at all would be taken as an insult by the Emperor.² A decision was made all the more difficult by the fact that there was reason to look forward with some anxiety to the Diet which had been summoned to Spire for May 22nd.³ It seemed certain that the question would be raised there,⁴ since, in spite of the attempts

dipl., III., 311 *seq.*; GRATIANI Epist., 466 *seq.* Cf. Venez. Depeschen, III., 497; SCHWARZ, Briefwechsel, 157; BIBL, 63 *seq.*; DE MAGISTRIS, 17 *seq.*, 20 *seq.* Cf. also CARCERERI, Cosimo dei Medici e il titolo di Granduca di Toscana, Venice, 1906, 12 *seq.* The *Oratio habita in consistorio Sanct^{mi} coram 19 cardinalibus ab oratore Caesaris et copia instrumenti protestatinis S. Caes. M^{tis}, in *Varia polit.*, 85 (now 86), 99 *seq.*; *ibid.* 112 *seq.*; *Responsio S. D. N. ad oratores Caesaris, Papal Secret Archives.

¹ See BIBL, 76 *seq.*

² See *ibid.* 85.

³ The *Imperial convocation, dated Prague, February 1, 1570 (not at the beginning of the year, as in HABERLIN, VII., 145), in *Reichstagshandlung de anno 1570*, II., 181 *seq.*, City Archives, Frankfort a/M.

⁴ For this reason Biglia had advised the sending of a legate even before the opening of the Diet (see BIBL, 80). It was

of the nuncio to dissuade him, Maximilian had submitted all the business of the grand-ducal title to the Electors, and had asked an opinion from them for the safe-guarding of the sovereignty of the Empire.¹ In view of the opinions of the greater part of the Lutherans and Calvinists of Germany, it was beyond doubt that they would support the Emperor in his quarrel with the Pope, and that they would be ready "to give the *coup de grace* to Antichrist" even in open war.² Under these circumstances a middle course was adopted in Rome, by withholding the reply at least until the proposal had been laid before the Diet. Pius V.'s reply, which was dated July 24th, reached Spires in the middle of August, and aimed at keeping the question open and gaining time so that Cosimo might in the meantime come to an understanding with the Emperor.³

The state of affairs at Spires remained for a long time very threatening. A breach with Rome on the part of the Emperor seemed to be imminent, and many of the Protestants would have joyfully joined in this. The Pope therefore in August sent the knight, Jost Segesser, the captain of his Swiss guard, to the Catholic cantons, in order to obtain from them the promise of the assistance of four or five thousand men in the event of attack being made upon the Holy See.⁴ On September 17th, 1570, the English ambassador reported from Spires that Maximilian had spoken to him of the rash interference

already being said in Rome that either Commendone or Orsini had been chosen for this purpose (see the *report of B. Pia from Rome, April 5, 1570, Gonzaga Archives, Mantua). On June 24, 1570, B. Pia says: *"*Madruzzo partì due dì sono per la dieta di Spira, qualche effetto potrà fare nelle cose che bollono essendo prudentissimo et destrissimo.*" The Emperor was opposed to the sending of a legate, because it would give rise to too much talk in Germany; see Venez. Depeschen, III., 496 n. 1.

¹ See Venez. Depeschen, III., 498, n. 1.; BIBL, 80.

² See JANSEN-PASTOR, IV. ¹⁵⁻¹⁶, 316 *seq.*; BIBL, 98 *seq.*

³ See BIBL, 84 *seq.*, 86 *seq.*

⁴ See *Schweizer Abschiede*, IV., 2, n. 364, p. 454; LÜTOLF, *Schweizergarde*, 76, For the fear in Rome, *cf.* SERENO, 52 *seq.*

of the Bishop of Rome, and had also said that things would never be any better with the clergy until they made up their minds to live as the Apostles had done ; that if he decided to march against Rome he knew of many who would go with him, and that the German princes had told him that Rome was the lawful and original capital of the Emperor, and that they wished to take him there.¹ Under these circumstances it was very difficult for the nuncio Biglia to discharge his office, but fortunately he had the Spanish ambassador to stand by him in his efforts to moderate the Emperor's conduct, and to prevent the Electors from interfering in the controversy. In Florence they were of opinion that Biglia did not take a strong enough line of action, and that he was better fitted to inspire love than respect.²

At length in the middle of December Biglia was set free from his perplexities ; he was able to report to Rome that the matter would remain in the hands of the Electors, and that the Emperor would make known his claims to the Pope.³ In the Curia they were congratulating themselves that the worst had been averted when the Emperor, after the close of the Diet, resumed his attack. On December 26th he forbade the Cardinals and German princes, as well as those Italian states which were subject to the Empire to give Cosimo I. his new title. At the same time he sent his reply to the Pope's last communication, and in a letter to Pius V. demanded a settlement of the controversy which would satisfy his own rights and those of the Empire. Arco made it quite plain that what his master demanded was the withdrawal of the title.⁴ On February 24th, 1571, Pius V. made his reply ; this was very restrained in its form, while in its matter it was in no way derogatory to his dignity ; he said that his conscience told him that he had in no way intentionally in-

¹ See Calendar of State Papers. Foreign. Elizabeth. 1569-1571, ed. by A. J. Crosby, London, 1874, n. 1267.

² See BIBL, 88 *seq.*, 91 *seq.*, 93 *seq.*

³ See *ibid.* 96.

⁴ See SCHWARZ, Briefwechsel, 163 *seq.* ; BIBL, 100 *seq.*

fringed upon the rights of the Empire and the Emperor in conferring this title upon Cosimo, but that he intended to submit the question to a thorough and impartial examination in the light of Maximilian's remarks, and to settle the dispute in a way that would be acceptable to the Emperor. In order to lead Maximilian to a conciliatory frame of mind he pointed out to him that the attack of the Turks which was at that moment threatening Venice might become dangerous to him as well; all disunion and discord was therefore to be avoided. Biglia was warned to speak in the same sense,¹ but the action taken by the nuncio satisfied neither party. In Rome they found fault with him because he had made too favourable a report in December, while in Florence they thought he had not been sufficiently resolute, and, since in the matter of the Turkish war as well, with regard to which the Pope had held out hopes to the Emperor of a monthly subsidy of 40,000 ducats so long as Italy itself was left undisturbed, he was unable to obtain any success, his position was looked upon as being considerably undermined.² It was generally thought that his recall had been decided upon when, at the end of April, 1571, he succumbed to a malignant disease, the spotted fever which was at that time raging at Prague.³

In Florence they would have been glad to have seen Archbishop Verallo appointed as his successor, whereas the Emperor's chief care was that no partisan of Cosimo's should be

¹ See SCHWARZ, *loc. cit.* 169 *seq.*; BIBL 105 *seq.* How deeply anxious the Curia was about the controversy is shown among other things by the letters and views sent to the Pope on the conferring of the title in *Varia polit.* 79 (now 80), p. 7 *seqq.* Papal Secret Archives. Very full is the manuscript entitled: *Discorso sopra l'autorità del Papa fatto in tempo che P. Pio insignì col titolo de Granduca di Toscana Cosimo de Medici, in *Cod. Urb.*, 852, p. 219 of the Vatican Library, and *Inf. polit.*, XII., p. 244 *seq.* of the Berlin Library. In *Carte Stroz.*, I., 1, 250 *seq.* there is a list of the writings on the subject in the State Archives, Florence.

² See BIBL., 106 *seq.*

³ See SCHWARZ, *Briefwechsel*, 171.

sent.¹ The Pope's choice fell upon the Bishop of Torcello, Giovanni Delfino, who had accompanied Cardinal Commendone upon his legation to the Emperor in 1568, and who was now recommended by that Cardinal. Before Delfino started for his new duties, Pius wished to see him personally in order to explain to him by word of mouth the task that lay before him.² The written instructions, which are dated June 5th, 1571, command Delfino above all to persuade the Emperor of the importance and value of his coming to a decision to favour the Catholic religion frankly and openly, and to protect the churches and convents, with special reference to the question at issue between the Archduke Ferdinand and the chapter of Trent concerning temporalities.³ With regard to

¹ See BIBL, II4, n. 5; SCHWARZ, *loc. cit.* 177.

² See SCHWARZ, *loc. cit.* 177; *ibid.* the credential briefs to Maximilian II., the Archdukes Ferdinand and Charles, and Duke Albert of Bavaria, dated May 24, 1571. The *credentials to Johann Jakob Khuen, Archbishop of Salzburg, Rome, June 1, 1571, recommend Delfino as "virum ab egregiam suam probitatem doctrinamque suam valde nobis probatum." Original in the Consistorial Archives, Salzburg.

³ Cf. the detailed account of HIRN: *Der Temporalienstreit des Erzherzogs Ferdinand von Tirol mit dem Stift Trient*, Vienna, 1882, and *Erzherzog Ferdinand I.*, 292 *seq.* On account of his encroachments in ecclesiastical matters, Pius V., on December 31, 1568, threatened the Archduke with excommunication (LADERCHI, 1568, n. 77), which caused a great stir; see CANISII *Epist.*, VI., 245. The only reason why they remained calm in the Curia was that a settlement was shortly expected through the mediation of the Emperor (*cf.* the brief in GOUBAU, 122 *seq.*); see HIRN, 124. A counterpart to this was the dispute about temporalities with the monastery of Neustift; see HIRN, I., 316 *seq.* In a *brief of May 11, 1570, to the "Praeposit. S. Mariae de Novacella O.S.A." Pius V. praises the resistance and the defence of their rights and ecclesiastical liberties offered by the monastery to the officers of the Archduke Ferdinand, and exhorts them to persevere (*Arm.* 44, t. 15, p. 107, Papal Secret Archives). In this controversy the civil power was victorious, but in the end had to give way over its plans for secularization as far as Trent was concerned.

the two burning questions of the moment, Cosimo's title and the league against the Turks, the instructions gave detailed directions. With regard to the Florentine question Delfino was to act in agreement with the Tuscan ambassador, Lodovico Antinori, Bishop of Volterra, and to urge a policy of conciliation by calling attention to Cosimo's services to religion, and to his relationship with and loyalty to the Emperor. If the absence of any reply to the Emperor's demands was raised, the nuncio was to say that after carefully examining the statements drawn up by the theologians and lawyers the Pope had refrained from making any written reply because this could not have been satisfactory to Maximilian, and would only have led to a further exchange of correspondence, and that this would only have afforded pleasure to those who would be glad to see discord between the two heads of Christendom. The Pope hoped that a settlement of the dispute would result from the sending of a legate, which was intended as soon as possible. With regard to the league against the Turks the nuncio was instructed formally to invite the Emperor to join the league which had been formed with Spain and Venice.¹

Delfino, who had started from his episcopal see for Rome on May 17th, 1571, left the Eternal City on June 5th, travelling slowly and stopping at Florence, and for a few days with Commendone at Verona in order to get further particulars concerning the mission with which he had been entrusted; he did not reach Vienna until July 22nd.² His first audience with the Emperor passed in an exchange of compliments. At the second, on July 30th, the nuncio brought forward a definite request, by granting which the Emperor would be

¹ See SCHWARZ, *Briefwechsel*, 177 *seq*; *Ibid.* 180 *seq.* the letter of Pius V. to Maximilian of June 17, 1571, saying that Delfino would communicate to the Emperor the reply to his complaints about the Papal brief to the Duke of Ferrara of April 9 (maintaining that he, as a feudatory of the Holy See could never call upon the Emperor to settle the dispute about precedence; LADERCHI, 1571, n. 64) as well as the reply to the proposal of Arco.

² See SCHWARZ, *loc. cit.* 179.

bound to show that he took his office of protector of the Church seriously; Delfino asked him to prohibit a certain Protestant liturgy, in the German language, which was being sold to the nobility in Vienna, on the understanding that Maximilian had approved of it. Since it was also being maintained that the Emperor had granted the nobles the use of the Confession of Augsburg, Delfino was of opinion that His Majesty could not better prove his real sentiments than by a prohibition of the said liturgy.¹

The Emperor, who had listened very calmly to the nuncio, first praised in the highest terms the Holy Father's zeal for religion, and then went on to deplore the sad religious state of Germany, assuring him that in the future, as in the past, he would leave nothing undone to remedy this state of affairs. The evil, however, was so deeply rooted that it was necessary to proceed with the greatest circumspection, and to implore the assistance of God. As to the liturgy in question Maximilian declared that he had already prohibited it, and that it would no longer be sold; for the rest it was out of the question in that country to have recourse to punishment so easily as was desirable, but that he would nevertheless take other steps to prevent the sale of prohibited books in Vienna.²

At first Delfino had no suspicion that that very programme had been approved by the Emperor after long negotiations which had carefully been kept secret, and had been printed with his permission;³ nor had he had the least idea that on January 14th, 1571, Maximilian had given the nobles and knights of Lower Austria a *written* "assurance" concerning the religious freedom promised to them in 1568.⁴ Delfino

¹ See the *report of Delfino from Vienna, July 30, 1571, Nunziat. di Germania, 64, Papal Secret Archives.

² " *Circa al libro dell' Agenda mi ha detto havendo prohibito et che più non si venderà, ma che in questi luochi non si poteva procedere così facilmente al castigo, come sarebbe conveniente, et di più promise di far provisione, che in Vienna non si venderanno libri prohibiti." Nunziat. di Germania 64, Papal Secret Archives.

³ See BIBL, Organisation, 143 *seqq.*, 149 *seqq.*, 180.

⁴ See *ibid.* 161 *seqq.*

must also have been confirmed in his belief in the Emperor's good faith by the fact that he found confirmation of another assurance which he had given at the beginning of August ;¹ at the Diet of Bohemia, Maximilian, appealing to his coronation oath, had rejected the demand of the Protestant states for the free use of the Confession of Augsburg, to which the archbishop, the cathedral chapter, and the Utraquist consistory were opposed.²

When, at the end of August, 1571, Delfino learned the true state of affairs with regard to the liturgy, he tried to bring pressure to bear on the Emperor by means of the Duke of Bavaria, Albert V., who had come to Vienna for the marriage of his daughter Mary to the Archduke Charles, at the same time taking the opportunity of begging Albert to make sure that his son-in-law should remain true to the Catholic party.³ To the Archduke Charles himself Delfino delivered two briefs from the Pope, and in giving them to him set him on his guard against allowing to the Protestants those concessions which the Emperor had made in the case of the archduchy of Austria. The Archduke gave him the fullest assurances,⁴ but Delfino did not conceal from himself the fact that the

¹ " *Circa le cose di Boemia S. M^{ta} mi discorse lungamente della petitione che le fu fatta della confessione Augustana et della negativa data con parole molto vehementi et piene di religione, dicendo che non era per conceder mai cosa alcuna con gl'Hussiti, ma bene per i capitoli giurati, quando fu eletto re di Boemia, era astretto a lasciarli vivere nella sua vecchia heresia. Ho parlato poi con molti di questa corte et Giesuiti et altri, quali tutti m'hanno affermato, che in Praga S. M^{ta} nelle cose della religione s'ha portato tanto bene, quanto si può desiderare." Report from Vienna, August 6, 1571, *loc. cit.*

² Cf. HUBER, IV., 240.

³ See the *report of Delfino from Vienna, September 3, 1571, in *Nunziat. di Germania*, 64, Papal Secret Archives. For the marriage of the Archduke Charles see HURTER, I., 174 *seqq.*

⁴ See the *reports of Delfino of September 3 and 7, 1571, *loc. cit.* For the briefs to the Archduke Charles see LADERCHI, 1571, n. 55-57.

danger was not thereby entirely removed.¹ It was true that the Archduke Charles loyally entertained true Catholic opinions,² as had been shown among other things by his behaviour when, in 1568, Pius V. had withdrawn the concession of the chalice to the laity, because it had entirely failed to have the desired effect,³ while in other ways as well Charles had supported the Pope's efforts for reform,⁴ but on account of his financial straits he was bound to take the states into consideration, and these, in Styria, as well as in Carniola and Carinthia, were for the most part inclined to Protestantism. When he was faced, therefore, with their request for the free exercise of their religion, the Archduke found himself in a difficult position. It did not satisfy the Protestant majority in the Styrian states that he was prepared not to interfere with the nobles in questions of religion, and in November, 1571, they asked the Archduke to allow the preachers of the new doctrine into the cities and marts, for the abolition of "idolatry," for otherwise he would have done nothing for them. In the end the Protestants had to remain content with the vague assurance of the Archduke that he would

¹ On November 1, 1571, Delfino reported from Vienna: *" In Gratz ho dato ordine alle Giesuiti at alli padri di S. Domenico che intendendo essi alcuna novità nella religione me ne debbano dare immediate avviso anco per huomo a posta." Nunziat. di Germania, 64, Papal Secret Archives.

² See the report of Girol. Lippomano of 1567 (Relaz. al Senato Veneto, published by V. JOPPI, Udine, 1882, *Nozze* publication), *Steiermärkische Geschichtsblätter* of ZAHN, III. (1882), 194.

³ See the brief to the Patriarch of Aquileia in RUBEIS, *Monum. eccl. Aquil.*, 1091. Cf. HURTER, I., 66 *seqq.* The expressions he used to the Venetian ambassador (in TURBA, III., 443 *seq.*) show Maximilian's annoyance at this withdrawal.

⁴ On August 9, 1568, Pius V. thanked the Archduke Charles for his readiness to help in the reform of the clergy in his part of the diocese of Aquileia, and recommended to him Bartolomeo a Porzia, who had been appointed visitor; see *Steiermärkische Geschichtsblätter* of ZAHN, I, (1880), 69 *seq.* Cf. LADERCHI, 1568, n. 82 *seq.*; 1569, n. 222.

leave religious matters as they were and promote Christian mildness and gentleness.¹

In the meantime, on September 16th, 1571, Commendone had come to Vienna on the business of the league against the Turks. He was also charged to come to some arrangement concerning the title conferred on Cosimo I.² During his stay of two months at the Imperial court Commendone showed no want of zeal, but he was not destined to meet with success in either matter. He did not however give up all hopes of accomplishing something on his return from Poland, for which country he set out on November 22nd.³

Soon after the departure of Commendone the Emperor was seized with a grave attack of his former illness, gout and heart-disease. In a report of December 12th, 1571, Delfino expressed the view that God had sent this illness to Maximilian in order to lead him to live, as far as his religion was concerned, in a manner befitting a Christian Emperor ;⁴ he also expressed the hope that this would be the case, though the future had quite another tale to tell ; the Emperor continued to the end very vacillating in religious matters, so that no one really knew for certain whether he was a Catholic or a Protestant.⁵

In the meantime the state of the Catholic Church in Austria,

¹ See HURTER, I., 127 *seqq.* ; LOSERTH, Reformation, 158 *seq.* The *briefs of Pius V. to the Bishop of Gurk, and the Archbishop of Salzburg of September 15, 1571, are directed against the demands of the Styrian states. Archives of Briefs, Rome.

² The instructions for Commendone, of June 15, 1571, in SCHWARZ, Briefwechsel, 184.

³ See BIBL, Erhebung Cosimos, 123 *seqq.*, 126. Cf. TÖRNE, Gallio, 102.

⁴ See *Cifra del Nuntio di Germania di 12 di Dicembre, 1571, in Nunziat. di Germania, 64, Papal Secret Archives.

⁵ See JANSSEN-PASTOR, IV. 15-16, 496. The discussion of the Grand Duke's title continued. Again on March 15, 1572, Maximilian charged his ambassador in Rome to demand satisfaction in the matter in accordance with the rights of the Emperor and Empire. SUDENDORF, Registrum, III., 351.

which Delfino endeavoured to help to the best of his ability by promoting reform in accordance with the prescriptions of the Council of Trent,¹ was going from bad to worse, because the Protestant nobles, without the least restraint, went far beyond the limits fixed for them by the Emperor's "assurance." Not content with the free exercise of their religion granted to them and their subjects, they also tried in every way, even by violence, to extirpate "papistical idolatry" and did not shrink from revolting acts of cruelty. The Catholics were so intimidated that many of them no longer dared to express their opinions.² How far the truculence of the Protestants at the expense of the Catholic minority went may still be gathered to-day from the caricatures which they caused to be executed in 1571 in the palace of the States of Lower Austria, where there may still be seen a hog with a rosary in its mouth!³

Not even the Protestants, however, were quite satisfied with the Emperor's ecclesiastical policy. Many preachers drew up memorials and polemical writings against the new ritual, and every preacher exercised his talents in this way. Maximilian's religious policy was therefore a complete failure; all that he had obtained was the incurable disturbance of his dominions.⁴

While, in the Emperor's hereditary possessions, to use his own expression, everything threatened to go to rack and ruin, in the Empire the efforts on behalf of reform and a Catholic restoration were making slow but steady progress. These efforts were inspired and supported in every way by Pius V.

A short time after he had assumed the reins of government, the Pope had exhorted the German bishops to carry out the reform decrees of Trent, and above all to see to the establish-

¹ Information on this subject is given in the *reports of Delfino in the Papal Secret Archives, which will be published in the *Nuntiaturberichte* of Prof. Dengel.

² See HUBER, IV., 238.

³ MAYER, *Niederösterr. Ständehaus*, 38.

⁴ See HUBER, IV., 240; JANSSEN-PASTOR, IV. 15-16, 452 *seqq.*

ment of seminaries,¹ urging them in June, 1566, to undertake a far-reaching reform of morals among the clergy by means of visitations of their dioceses.² Cardinal Commendone had also received special instructions to this effect. It was this distinguished representative of the Holy See who, at the Diet of Augsburg in 1566, had organized the Catholic party for the purpose of the acceptance of the decrees of the Council by the Catholic states of the Empire,³ and had thus laid the solid foundations of the reform of Germany in the Catholic sense, though it was soon seen how far removed the acceptance of the decrees in principle was from their being carried into effect.

One of the first difficulties was connected with the making of the Tridentine profession of faith, which the Pope demanded of the new bishops. On account of the unhappy financial straits in which they found themselves Pius V. at once made concessions in the matter of the annates ; subordinating all temporal considerations to the spiritual, he contented himself in the case of Trêves with a fifth, while it would seem that he was willing to condone them entirely in the case of the church of Cologne. But it was Frederick von Wied, the archbishop-elect of Cologne, who refused to take the oath, even after the Archbishop of Trêves, Jakob von Eltz, and Frederick's suffragans, Johann von Hoya, Bishop of Osnabrück and Münster, and Gerard Groesbeck of Liège, had taken

¹ See LADERCHI 1566, n. 222. In Laderchi the brief to the Bishop of Würzburg is dated January 23, 1566, but in Arm. 44, t. 12, n. 14 of the Papal Secret Archives, it is dated January 22, and this fits in with the fact that the original of the corresponding brief to the Bishop of Bamberg is also dated January 22. On February 11, 1566, a similar brief was also sent to the primate of Hungary ; see GOUBAU, 6 *seq.*

² See LADERCHI, 1566, n. 252 ; REMLING, *Urkunden der Speirer Bischöfe*, Mayence, 1853, 615 *seq.* ; KELLER, 359 *seq.* ; SCHWARZ, *Visitation*, p. xxix. The *original of the letter to the Bishop of Strasbourg is in the Departmental archives at Strasbourg, G. 149.

³ See *supra* p. 254.

it. In the end Frederick preferred to resign his see.¹ At the election of his successor, Count Salentin of Isenburg, the cathedral chapter of Cologne included in the election capitulation a resolution that the archbishop must make the profession of faith of the Council of Trent if the Pope required it. When, in spite of this, Salentin refused to comply, the Holy See withheld its confirmation.²

Pius V. was equally determined in insisting that, in conformity with the decree of his predecessor, the Tridentine profession of faith should also be made by Catholic professors.³ The severity with which the Pope acted in this matter shows how well he understood German conditions. There the Church was threatened with the gravest danger on the part of those waverers who, although they retained a certain attachment for old Catholic practices, were nevertheless alienated from the true spirit of the Church and from many of her doctrines. It was from these feeble half-Catholics that arose those complaints of the imprudence and excessive zeal of the Pope, of which Maximilian II. made himself the spokesman, when he said that this Pope was starting something fresh every day, and turning everything upside down.⁴ Catholics of this kind were specially numerous at Cleves, at the court of Duke William. They watched Pius V. in a spirit of criticism and ill-will, saying that his reforms were not suited to Germany. With the good intention of saving the Church in Germany, they went to extremes in yielding Catholic principles and institutions to the innovators. "If these men had succeeded in getting the direction of affairs into their own hands, German Catholics would have remained for a long time what they had already been for ten years as far as the majority of them was concerned: united by the slenderest of ties to the centre of Catholic unity, and therefore weak and without energy."⁵

¹ See *Forschungen zur deutschen Geschichte*, XIII., 358 seq.; LOSSEN, 4 seq.

² See LOSSEN, 27 seq.; SCHWARZ, Briefwechsel, 143 seq.

³ See BRAUNSBERGER, Pius V., 13 seq.

⁴ See Venez. Depeschen, III., 443.

⁵ See BRAUNSBERGER, *loc. cit.*, 105 seq.

How wide-spread discouragement was among the German bishops, and what difficulties were met with in the attempt to enforce the Tridentine reforms, has been related in a striking way by Peter Canisius. In a letter of July 23rd, 1567, the second apostle of Germany describes the state of affairs in that country to the General of his Order. This letter was occasioned by a visit paid by him to Erasmus von Limburg, Bishop of Strasbourg, an infirm prelate, very anxious about his own health, who indeed recognized the necessity of at once nominating a capable co-adjutor, but was unable to make up his mind to act. It was in vain that Canisius told him of many of the canons of Strasbourg who were inclined to the new doctrines, and who could not be entrusted with so important an affair, and promised him help from Rome. It was in vain that he reminded him of the fate of the bishoprics in Saxony, and called his attention to his avaricious neighbours who were only waiting for his death in order to take possession of the diocese.

As the same conditions prevailed in other cathedral chapters besides Strasbourg, Canisius drafted a number of reform proposals. He was quite right in seeing the principal reason for the great increase in the number of heretical and suspected canons in the education of the German nobles, who formed the greater part of the chapters, which was adapted for the profession of arms rather than for ecclesiastical office, while what this man who was so filled with the zeal for the faith has to say in his letter on the subject of the monasteries and the secular clergy is equally distressing. At the end of the letter he deals with the reasons on the strength of which the German bishops excused themselves for their failure to carry out the decrees of Trent. It is fear, he says, which they display: "our pastors lack confidence and firmness because they consider the fate of the Catholic Church in Germany to be hopeless, and they can see hardly any, or perhaps no single prince upon whom they can rely." He concludes his gloomy account with these words: "we are in a state of sore distress, and we cannot bear our sorrows any longer; yet we shrink from the remedy."¹

¹ See CANISIUS Epist., V., 515 *seq.*

It is clear that such a state of affairs could not be remedied in the course of a single pontificate, but it is beyond question that Pius V. did all that he could to evoke and further among the Catholics a movement of reform and self-defence, so as to remove the worst evils, and above all to set up a barrier against the further intrusion of the followers of the new religion into the great offices of the Church. It was he who charged the Jesuits Hoffaeus and Canisius to translate the Roman catechism into German, and who urged Canisius to combat the centuriators of Magdeburg.¹ In 1568, being seriously anxious to work for the welfare of Germany, he ordered the formation of a special congregation of Cardinals to deal with German affairs; this was bound to put an end to such mistaken ideas as had been current at the beginning of the pontificate with regard to the religious attitude of Duke William of Cleves.²

The most recent research has shown how baseless is the accusation that Pius V. interfered in German affairs with excessive severity. It is true that in certain matters, as for example, the celibacy of the clergy and the chalice for the laity,³ he was quite inflexible, and rightly so, but with regard to several other ecclesiastical duties he showed a wise moderation. Even with regard to the bull *In coena Domini* he made a great concession orally, which seemed to be called for by the

¹ See BRAUNSBERGER, Pius V., 20 seq., 57, 62 seq. On August 24, 1570, the nuncio Biglia received *orders to see that the cathedral chapters were purged of evil members: see Nunziat. di Germania, 67, p. 148, Papal Secret Archives.

² See SCHWARZ, Briefwechsel, p. xii.; *Hist. Jahrbuch*, XVIII., 404 seq. BRAUNSBERGER, Pius V., 27 seq.; CANISII Epist., VI., 582.

³ Cf. the letter of Pius V. to the Bishop of Passau, Urban von Trennbach, May 26, 1568; in no case were those who asked for the chalice for the laity given what they wanted (see GOUBAU, 83 seq.; cf. App. Vol. XVII., n. 68). Cf. WIEDEMANN, I., 316 seq. and WIDMANN, Gesch. Salzburgs, III., 97, for the consequences of this controversy. The experience of the granting of the chalice to the laity so far was all in favour of the decision of Pius V. See also BRAUNSBERGER, Pius V., 53 seq.

desperate position of the Catholics in Germany.¹ Moreover, taking into consideration the special conditions of that country, he in some cases departed from the strict letter of the Tridentine decrees. The Council had forbidden the accumulation of benefices, but now, in order to prevent the spread of Protestantism among the chapters of northern Germany, Pius V. allowed the holding of several capitular benefices.² In consideration of the assistance which Albert V. of Bavaria had given to the Church he allowed the appointment of his not yet twelve year old son Ernest as administrator of Freising; he would not, however, entertain the proposal that Ernest should be appointed co-adjutor of Hildesheim in order to make that chapter safe against the Protestants.³

But, gloomy though the general religious situation in Germany was, there were not wanting gleams of light nor the seeds of better things in the future. As early as 1567 Pius V. had the satisfaction of seeing two provincial synods held in Germany as the result of his efforts. His attention had especially been called to the need of these by the Dominican, Feliciano Ninguarda, who, having been summoned to Rome by the Pope, had passed the winter between 1566 and 1567 there, and had drawn up a memorial upon the conditions of the Church in Germany, and the steps that must be taken to improve them. In this memorial, besides the importance of provincial synods, he had pointed out that capable theologians and commissaries should be attached to the weak bishops in order to enforce the Tridentine decrees as soon as possible.⁴ In 1567 Ninguarda was sent by the Pope to act as commissary at Salzburg in order that the decrees of Trent might be accepted in that important ecclesiastical centre by means of a pro-

¹ See BRAUNSBERGER, *loc. cit.*, 41 *seq.*, 46 *seq.*, 53 *seq.* Cf. KRATZ in *Hist. Jahrbuch*, XXXIV., 360.

² See BRAUNSBERGER, *loc. cit.*, 45 *seq.*

³ See LOSSEN, 69 *seq.*, 124, 130 *seq.*; GOETZ, *Beiträge zur Gesch. Albrechts V.*, 621, n. 1. TIEPOLO (p. 187) brings out the importance of the concession made as to Freising.

⁴ See *Istruzione per la Germania, in *Miscell., Arm. I.*, t. 2, p. 60-74, with supplement p. 55-58, Papal Secret Archives.

vincial synod. In the meantime two German bishops who were Cardinals had already in that same year held diocesan synods, at which it was decided to adopt the decrees of the Council, both as to dogma and reform; these were Otto von Truchsess at Dillingen,¹ and Mark Sittich von Hohenems at Constance.²

But what was this when compared with the many other bishops and archbishops, who continued to delay? Canisius, who deplored the fact in a report to his General on April 5th, 1568, further states that those bishops who were filled with good intentions, such as those of Augsburg and Eichstätt, met with difficulties instead of help, from the chapters when they tried to set their hands to the much needed establishment of seminaries.³ A typical example of the canons who were thus animated by worldly ideas was Gebhard, the nephew of Otto Truchsess, the zealous reforming Cardinal, who, in spite of all exhortations, attended neither church nor chapter, and gave serious scandal by his drunkenness and immorality.⁴

The metropolitan of the great ecclesiastical province of Salzburg, Johann Jakob von Khuen-Belasy, had in 1566 suggested to Commendone the idea of promulgating the decrees of Trent in a provincial synod, and the suggestion had been approved by the Pope.⁵ It was not however until

¹ See *Decreta synodalia dioecesis Augustanae Dilingae mense Iunii A° 1567 promulgata*, Dillingen, s.a. Cf. *Kirchenlexikon of Freiburg I.*², 1653 seq.; CANISII, *Epist.*, V., 635 seq.; SPECHT, 63 seq.

² Cf. HARTZHEIM, *Conc. Germ.*, VII., 419 seq.; *Freib. Diözesan-Archiv*, XXI. (1890), 49 seqq.; *Zeitschrift für Gesch des Ober-rheins*, N.S. XXIV., 553 seq.; WYMANN, 74 seq.

³ See CANISII *Epist.*, VI., 181.

⁴ See *ibid.* 365 seq., 379 seq.

⁵ In the *brief of May 24, 1560, we read: "Quamvis autem non admodum necessarium existimemus sponte currentem incitare, nostri tamen officii partes esse duximus, te ita egregie animatum ad ipsum adeo eximium omnipotentique Deo acceptabile opus primo quoque tempore aggrediendum atque percipiendum accendere, prout te omni nostri animi affectu ut id quamprimum

March 1569 that a synod was held at Salzburg, which afforded a solid basis for ecclesiastical reform in accordance with the decrees of Trent.¹ Pius V. gave high praise to the Archbishop of Salzburg, and also addressed himself to his suffragan bishops, of Brixen, Chiemsee, Freising, Gurk, Lavant, Passau, Ratisbon and Seckau, and to many of the chapters urging them all to the carrying into effect of the salutary decrees. At the same time he implored the secular princes in whose territories these bishoprics were situated, to afford all the help they could to this work, which was as necessary as it was useful.² At the beginning of 1572 he exhorted Daniel Brendel, Archbishop of Mayence, to hold a synod of his huge ecclesiastical province.³

Besides this revival of synodal activity, the carrying out of visitations in the parishes was also due to the exhortations of Pius V., who, in his ardent zeal for reform, left no means untried in order to remove the great evils that existed by bringing strong pressure to bear upon the prelates who were responsible.⁴ In June 1568 the Archbishop of Salzburg and all his suffragans were asked to make a visitation of their dioceses, and in July the Archbishop of Prague was urged to give effect to the decrees of Trent by means of a provincial synod and visitations.⁵ When, in the autumn of the same

divino fretus auxilio efficias, etiam atque etiam suademus ac studiose adhortamur." Original in the Consistorial Archives, Salzburg, where there is also much correspondence on the subject of the synod of 1569. The brief exhorting to a reform of morals, dated June 17, 1566, which was read at the synod, is in Arm. 44, t. 12, n. 76, Papal Secret Archives.

¹ See HARTZHEIM, *Conc. Germ.*, VII., 290 *seq.* Cf. WIEDEMANN, I., 258 *seq.* SCHWARZ, *Briefwechsel*, 169; HÜBNER in *Deutsche Geschichtsblätter*, XII., 112 *seq.* For the examination and confirmation of the decrees on the part of the Holy See see SCHELLHASS, *Nuntiaturberichte*, sect. 3, Vol. III., xv.

² See LADERCHI, 1571, n. 66 *seq.*

³ See THEINER, *Annales eccl.*, I., 1572, n. 6.

⁴ See SCHWARZ, *Akten der Visitation*, xxxiii.

⁵ See LADERCHI, 1568, n. 92, 95.

year, he asked for the help of the Spanish king to hold Maximilian II. back from capitulating to the Protestant nobles, the Pope also had recourse to the three ecclesiastical Electors. In briefs addressed to them he not only urged the erection of seminaries according to the prescriptions of the Council of Trent, but also the carrying out of a visitation of the parishes.¹ In the visitations which he had himself made in Austria, Passau and Salzburg,² Commendone had shown the procedure to be adopted in such matters. The first of the bishops of western Germany to reply to the Pope's request was the Elector of Cologne in 1569 ;³ he probably wished in so doing to placate the Pope, who was thinking of taking stern measures because Salentin was refusing to make the Tridentine profession of faith or to receive priest's orders.⁴ At the same time Jakob von Eltz, Archbishop of Trêves, held a visitation of all the parishes in his principality ;⁵ like the Archbishops of Mayence and Prague,⁶ he earned high praise both from the Pope and the nuncio Biglia on account of his strictly ecclesiastical

¹ See SCHWARZ, *loc. cit.*, xxxiv.

² *Cf. supra*, p. 268.

³ See SCHWARZ, Die Kirchliche Visitation des Westes Recklinghausen in *Westfäl. Zeitschrift*, XX., Münster, 1911.

⁴ See LOSSEN, 53 *seq.* ; SCHWARZ, Briefwechsel, 166 *seq.*

⁵ See HÜLLEN, Erste tridentin. Visitation im Erzstift Trier in *Trierer Archiv* 9 and 10. The protocols of the visitation in the archdeaconry of Longuyon (1570) in HEYDINGER, Archidiaconatus tit. S. Agathes in Longuion, Trêves, 1884. Briefs of praise and encouragement to Eltz, September 23, 1569, in LADERCHI, 1569, n. 226.

⁶ See the *letter from the Secretary of State to Biglia of August 16, 1570, Nunziat. di Germania, 67, p. 129, Papal Secret Archives ; the Pope's joy at the action taken by the Archbishops of Trêves and Mayence ; *ibid.* *report of Biglia from Spire on August 17, 1570, concerning the intention of the Archbishop of Prague to reform the convents. In a *brief of June 24, 1570, Pius V. praised the pastoral zeal of the Archbishop of Prague and exhorted him to persevere (Arm. 44, t. 15, p. 157b, Papal Secret Archives). The Pope had urged action in Prague as early as 1568 ; see LADERCHI, 1568, n. 95.

conduct in the matter of the Tridentine reforms.¹ His example soon found imitators in the north-west of Germany; on July 1st, 1571, Johann von Hoya, Prince-Bishop of Münster, who was loyally attached to the Church, arranged for the visitation of all the clergy in his diocese.² It was about the same time that the visitation of the diocese of Constance which had been ordered by Cardinal Mark Sittich was begun.³

All this was undoubtedly a beginning of great promise, but how much hard work still remained to be done is best shown by the deplorable state of affairs which these visitations revealed. A whole ten years was to elapse, and a new generation had to spring up before the ideals which Pius V. had before his eyes could be realized. Knowing well that everything depended upon the formation of a good clergy, the Pope never ceased to urge the establishment of seminaries, a necessity which was particularly well understood by Otto Truchsess and William Russinowsky, Bishop of Olmütz; Russinowsky placed the seminaries which he set up in Olmütz and Brünn under the cares of the Jesuits.⁴ In some places the colleges of that Order served as preparatory schools, and in others, under certain conditions, were equivalent to seminaries.

The Jesuits were supported and recommended by the Pope in every possible way.⁵ On many occasions he praised the

¹ See *Nunziat di Germania, 67, p. 129, 179, 233, Papal Secret Archives. For the reforming activity of the archbishop and his action against Protestantism in his archdiocese see MARX, *Gesch. des Erzstift Trier*, I., Trêves, 1858, 388 *seq.*

² See SCHWARZ, p. xxxvi. *seq.* of the introduction to his excellent edition of the *acta* of the visitation of the diocese of Münster in 1571-1573. For Hoya see SCHWARZ in *Westfäl. Zeitschrift*, LXIX., 16 *seq.*

³ See *Zeitschrift für Gesch. des Oberrheins*, N.S. XXV., 129 *seq.*

⁴ See THEINER, *Bildungsanstalten*, 146.

⁵ See BRAUNSBERGER, Pius V., 35 *seq.*, 82 *seq.* For the spread and activity of the Order of the Jesuits in Germany see JANNSEN-PASTOR, IV.¹⁵⁻¹⁶, 414 *seq.* and DUHR, I. When we treat of Gregory XIII. we shall return to the revival of Catholic life in

services which they were rendering to the Church in those stormy times, not only by their educational work, but also by their piety, their charity and their blameless lives.¹

The Society of Jesus found its greatest development in Bavaria, upon the Duke of which country the Pope had every reason to look with special love.² Even in the time of Pius IV. Albert V. of Bavaria had slowly entered upon the ways of Catholic reform, and he proceeded more and more definitely along the same way during the pontificate of Pius V., and in so doing he found great help in the concessions which had been made by the Holy See to the Bavarian government in the XVth century, by means of which the civil power was able to exercise great influence even in ecclesiastical matters, especially in the matter of particular visitations. Such visitations, as well as special missions and mandates were now employed in order to purge the duchy of all religious suspects. Anyone who proved obstinate was forced to go into banishment; this was actually in conformity with the religious peace of Augsburg, from which hitherto hardly any but the Protestant princes had profited. The penalty of banishment also fell upon ecclesiastical concubinists, a thing which the Catholic reforming activity of Albert V. made to serve a double purpose; not only was Protestantism to be stamped out in Bavaria, but at the same time abuses within the Church were to be removed, and new life infused into the almost exhausted Catholic spirit. Since experience had shown that the concession of the chalice to the laity had brought various difficulties in its train, it was abolished in 1571. The efforts of the government to bring back unity of faith and to reform the clergy were crowned by a rigorous censorship of books

south Germany, a subject as to which plentiful material is to be found in the correspondence of Peter Canisius, so splendidly edited by Braunsberger.

¹ See LADERCHI, 1568 n. 106.

² Pius V. praised Albert V. as early as 1566; see PFLEGER, Eisengrein, 50. The powerful chancellor of the Duke received a brief of praise in 1567; see GOUBAU, 24 *seq.*

and zealous care for ensuring sound Catholic instruction. At the head of this great system of Catholic restoration there was placed a special vigilance committee, a commission of ecclesiastics, to which many theological advisers were attached.¹ The victory of Catholic restoration in Bavaria was practically ensured even in the life time of Pius V.

The Archduke Ferdinand II. in the Tyrol² and Lower Austria³ acted in a similar way to Albert V., as did several bishops of south Germany such as Otto Truchsess of Augsburg,⁴ Urban of Passau,⁵ Martin of Eichstätt,⁶ and Frederick of Würzburg.⁷ At the beginning of the seventh decade of the century a change in favour of Catholicism was also to be seen at the court of Cleves.⁸ It was of great importance when, stirred by the example of Albert V., the Prince-Abbot of Fulda, Balthasar von Dernbach, immediately after his election on January 25th, 1570, resolutely proclaimed himself a champion of Catholic reform.⁹ About the same time, with the

¹ See RITTER, I., 300 *seq.*; RIEZLER, IV., 544 *seq.*; JANNSEN-PASTOR, IV.¹⁵⁻¹⁶, 464 *seq.*

² Cf. HIRN. Erzherzog Ferdinand I., 159 *seq.*, 210 *seq.*, 262 *seq.* Additions in Vol. VI. of Canisii Epist. In 1568 Pius V. honoured Ferdinand by sending him the blessed hat still preserved in the Court Museum, Vienna; see BÖHEIM, Album der Waffensammlung des Kaiserhauses, Vienna, 1894, 7, tav. 27, 1.

³ Cf. GFRÖRER, Die kathol. Kirche im östereich. Elsass unter Erzeherzog Ferdinand II., in *Zeitschrift für Gesch. des Oberrheins*, N.S. X., 481 *seqq.*

⁴ Cf. BRAUN, Gesch. der Bischöfe von Augsburg, III., 469 *seq.*; SPECHT, 63 *seq.*, 68 *seq.*; Allgem. deutsche Biographie, XXIV., 634 *seq.* By a *bull of July 9, 1560, Otto was appointed "legatus in ecclesia et dioec. August.": Cod. Vatic. 7160, p. 230 *seq.*; Vatican Library.

⁵ See SCHMIDLIN, 191 *seq.*

⁶ See *ibid.* 263 *seq.*

⁷ See BRAUN, Gesch. der Heranbildung des Klerus in Würzburg I., Mayence, 1897, 124 *seq.*, 151 *seq.*

⁸ See KELLER, 36 *seq.*

⁹ For B. von Dernbach see a future volume of this work.

direct co-operation of the Duke of Bavaria,¹ the restoration of the Catholic Church in the margravate of Baden was also brought about.²

As had been the case in Bavaria, so in Fulda and Baden as well, an essential part in the work of carrying out Catholic reform fell to the Society of Jesus, the members of which displayed a truly Catholic activity in every way, especially in the pastoral office and in giving instruction.³ They had a great share in restoring the authority of the Papacy which had been so seriously shaken in Germany; as the archduchesses Magdalen, Margaret and Helena reported to Pius V. from Innsbrück, the Jesuits were entirely devoted to the Holy See.⁴ In this respect no one did more than the humble religious, Canisius, who had firmly established the Society of Jesus at Prague and Ingolstadt in 1556, at Munich in 1559, at Innsbruck in 1562, at Würzburg in 1567, at Halle in 1569, and had also arranged in 1563 that the university at Dillingen should be entrusted to it. His catechism was in itself a bulwark against all the enemies of the Papacy. The letters, discourses and sermons of this holy priest, who, fully conscious of the gravity of the situation, devoted all his strength to unwearied apostolic labours, all breathe the deepest love and reverence for the Holy See. "That power," Canisius wrote, "which, Christ in unmistakable words conferred on the Apostle Peter is the greatest that can be given to anyone on earth. It is our intention to recognize this, and to hold this power in great honour. He who does not take his stand upon this rock, may be a reed, but he is not a true Christian."⁵

¹ See the *brief of Pius V. to the Bishop of Spires, dated February 2, 1572, Archives of Briefs, Rome.

² Cf. SCHÖPFLIN, *Hist. Zahringo-Badensis*, III., 53 *seq.*; THEINER, *Annales eccles.*, I., 1572, n. 5; VIERORDT, *Gesch. der evangel. Kirche in Baden*, II. (1856), 45 *seq.*; DUHR, I., 402 *seq.*

³ Cf. especially DUHR, I. See also RIEZLER, IV., 561 *seq.*; VI., 254, 285 *seq.*

⁴ See LADERCHI, 1566, n. 317.

⁵ See CANISIUS *Epist.*, III., 331. For the sermons of Canisius about the Pope see BRAUNSBERGER, Pius V., 54 *seq.*

In 1568 Pius V. had the intention of rewarding the loyalty and self-denial with which Canisius had worked for so many years, by conferring upon him the purple, but he abandoned the idea at the request of the humble religious. From a record found later on it is clear that if he had been granted longer life the Pope would certainly have obliged "the apostle of Germany" to accept the high dignity.¹ In many documents Pius V. gave recognition to the services which the Society of Jesus had rendered by its unwearied zeal to the salvation of souls. In a brief of May 21st, 1568 he declares that in those stormy times he looked upon the Order as a work of the special providence of God.²

¹ See BRAUNSBERGER, *loc. cit.* 100 *seq.* Cf. CANISII Epist., VI., 73¹ *seq.*

² See LADERCHI, 1568, n. 74. Cf. DUHR, I., 843 *seq.*

CHAPTER VIII.

RELIGIOUS CONDITIONS IN POLAND AND SWITZERLAND.— FOREIGN MISSIONS.

HOWEVER much the state of religion in Germany and France occupied the attention of Pius V., he did not, in his pastoral care, lose sight of the dangers threatening the Church in the eastern part of Europe.

In the great kingdom of Poland separation from the Church and the establishment of a national Polish church had been averted by the acceptance by the king of the decrees of the Council and the temporary prevention of the divorce of Sigismund Augustus, but the religious crisis had by no means been averted. While the followers of the new beliefs were stirring up a strong agitation, many of the bishops and priests continued in their policy of inaction, and many of them were leading lives that were not only unspiritual, but also unecclesiastical. In many places there was a scarcity of priests. The possibility of the king's divorce still hung like a threatening cloud over the Polish Catholics, who, owing to the weakness of the government, found themselves as much exposed as ever to every kind of insult and attack.¹ Thus the task

¹ Cf. EICHHORN, II., 237 *seqq.*, 337 *seqq.*; BERGA, Skarga, 141. For M. Cromer cf. EICHHORN in *Zeitschrift für Gesch. Ermlands*, IV. (1868), 1 *seqq.* and THIEL in *Kirchenlex. of Freiburg*, III., 1195 *seqq.* The Polish envoy for the *obedientia* (cf. GRATIANI Epist., 254, 259) did not dare to bring forward the question of the divorce. Pius V. mentioned this circumstance to Arco, saying that otherwise he would have given him an answer "che mai più il Re havrebbe avuto ardire di muoverne parola." (*letter of Arco of February 22, 1567, State Archives, Vienna). M. A. Mureti Oratio ad Pium V. nomine Sigismundi Augusti Poloniae regis, made on January 15, 1567, was printed in Rome in 1567.

which fell to the lot of the distinguished Giulio Ruggieri,¹ who had been appointed nuncio in Poland by Pius IV., and immediately confirmed by Pius V., was no light one. Ruggieri had first to go to Augsburg to consult with the Cardinal legate, Commendone, who was so well informed in Polish affairs, concerning the questions at issue, especially the king's divorce.²

The instructions given to Ruggieri in March, 1566, warned him to bear in mind always how many enemies the Pope had in Poland; his representative must therefore be very careful to behave very prudently himself, and to see to the exemplary conduct of his suite. The principal duties entrusted to the nuncio by Pius V. were: to remind the king of the promise he had made to Commendone to take action against the heretics at the end of the war, and to revoke the decree of 1563 restricting the liberties of the Church; to see to the carrying out of the decrees of Trent, and lastly to undertake a reform of the monasteries. In everything Ruggieri was to take counsel, not only with Commendone, but also with Cardinal Hosius and the learned Martin Cromer. Pius V.'s zeal for ecclesiastical reform runs through the whole of the instructions. The nuncio was ordered very particularly to urge the bishops to adopt the reform decrees of Trent, and to induce them personally to visit their dioceses, and to take action against heretical books; with regard to the duty of residence they must not overstep the two years' limit which had been allowed by Pius IV. Ruggieri must always bear in mind that, sent as he was to help the Catholic religion, he was bound to see that the decrees of Trent were carried out, and not to allow the introduction of the least change in religion, or in ritual and ceremonial. Pius V. expressly declared that he would never allow communion under both kinds or the marriage of

¹ Cardinal Madruzzo praises him as "virtuoso et buono" in a letter to Commendone of March 25, 1566, *Lett. di princ.*, XXV. 67, Papal Secret Archives. Confirmation of his appointment followed on March 2, 1568; see Vol. XVII. App., n. 68.

² Cf. EICHHORN, II., 247; BIAUDET, 112.

priests. The nuncio was further exhorted to get into touch with all personages of distinction and with learned Catholics, whom the Pope would gladly recompense.¹

Ruggieri, who reached Poland in the middle of June, 1566, was a witness of the deplorable want of unity among the Polish episcopate at the stormy Diet of Lublin. It was not to be wondered at that no advantage was taken of the divisions among the Protestants, and that the Diet came to an end without any gain to the Catholic cause.² In consequence of this Ruggieri and Hosius first devoted themselves to healing the acrimonious dispute between Archbishop Uchanski of Gnesen and Bishop Wolski of Cujavia, as well as to the holding of a provincial synod for the carrying out of the reform decrees of Trent.

Both these questions were matters of great concern to Pius V. Since, in view of the shifty character of Uchanski, there was reason to fear that the provincial synod might develop into a national council, the Pope, in December, 1566, appointed Hosius his *legatus de latere* for that assembly and for the whole kingdom of Poland.³ The dispute between the two prelates was eventually settled, but the holding of the synod had to be postponed.⁴

In the summer of 1567 an event occurred which caused much harm to the Catholic cause in Poland. The Bishop of Fünfkirchen, Andreas Dudith, who had been appointed Imperial ambassador at the court of Sigismund Augustus, and had already drawn attention to himself at the Council of Trent

¹ The terms of the *instructions in the Papal Secret Archives, *Varia polit.*, 81 (now 82), p. 295-301, and in the Graziani Archives at Città di Castello.

² See EICHHORN, II., 241 *seqq.*, 247, 249, 251. The briefs of Pius V. to the Polish bishops in relation to the Diet in THEINER, *Mon. Pol.*, II., 723 *seq.*

³ See LADERCHI, 1566, n. 342; EHRENBERG, 231 *seq.*; EICHHORN, II., 279 *seq.*; *cf.* 289 *seq.* for the plenary powers of Hosius, and the difficulties he met with.

⁴ *Cf.* LADERCHI, 1566, n. 342; THEINER, *Mon. Pol.*, II., 726 *seq.*; EICHHORN, II., 251, 254.

by his great eloquence, and his unecclesiastical views, broke his vows, married one of the court ladies of the Queen of Poland, and embraced Protestantism. Pius V. did not delay in taking action: he issued a monitorium, pronounced excommunication on the apostate, and demanded his recall from Poland.¹

The nuncio Ruggieri, whose duty it was to present and press this just demand of the Pope, found himself involved thereby in many difficulties and anxieties. When he was recalled at the beginning of 1568, he drew up for the Pope's information a full report, which, after the manner of the Venetian reports, contains a detailed description of the kingdom of Poland, and an interesting account of its political, economic and religious condition.²

¹ Cf. the *instructions for Ruggieri of August 23 and 30, 1567, *Nunziat. di Polonia*, I., 31, 34 *seqq.*, Papal Secret Archives; POGIANI, *Epist.*, IV., 199 *seqq.*, 249 *seqq.*; EICHHORN, II., 255 *seqq.* See also STIEFF, *Versuch einer Geschichte vom Leben und den Glaubensmeinungen A. Dudiths*, Breslau, 1756.

² **Relatione data al S.S.N.P. Pio V. da Mons. Giulio Ruggieri prot. apost. etc. 1568*, Corsini Library, Rome, 35 B. 9, p. 165b-225 (*cf.* LÄMMER, *Zur Kirchengeschichte*, 145); the manuscript is also to be found fairly frequently elsewhere, as in the Vatican Library, Vatic. 5914, p. 275 *seq.*, Ottob. 2433, p. 178 *seq.*, and 3184, p. 40 *seq.*, Urb. 823, p. 247 *seq.* and 855, p. 326 *seq.*; Casanatense Library, Rome (see FABISZA, 161); National Library, Florence, Bibl. Magliabecchiana (see CIAMPI, II., 37); Ambrosiana Library, Milan, Q. 120, p. 1 *seq.*; National Library, Naples, X.G. 15, p. 1 *seq.*; Court Library, Vienna, 6519, p. 110 *seq.* (extract); Bibliothèque Nationale, Paris (see MARSAND, I., 664 *seq.*); *ibid.* (St. Germain, 280) a **Discorso di Msgr. G. Ruggieri intorno agli aiuti di Polonia a favore della s. lega contro il Turco*, addressed to Pius V. The Polish translation of Ruggieri's report in *Relacye*, I., 165 *seq.* is incomplete: the clause is missing in which Ruggieri says that he will report other matters to Pius V. orally, which shows that Pierling's statement (*Rome et Moscou*, 64), that the report was written in Rome after his return, is erroneous. There is also an extract from the report in JORGA, *Actes relat. à l'hist. des Roumains*, I., Bucarest, 1895, 14. Cf. also GRATIANUS, *De scriptis invita Minerva*, II., 172.

Ruggieri's opinion of the king's attitude towards religion is anything but favourable. It was true that Sigismund Augustus had not departed in any single point from the Church, but at the same time he left a good deal to be desired in the matter of his reception of the sacraments, and his attendance at sermons and mass ; a greater zeal on his part for the honour of God and the salvation of his subjects would have been well in his case.

In his minute account of the religious conditions in the Polish kingdom Ruggieri shows that only one province, that of Masowien, had been kept free from heresy, and was indeed as Catholic as Italy. In all the other provinces the new religion had made headway, although, especially in the case of the common people, the number of the Catholics was greater than that of the Protestants. Nor were there wanting among the Catholics many who remained firmly attached to the old faith with the loyalty for which at one time Poland had been distinguished. Ruggieri compared the varied conglomeration of sects in Poland to the confusion of tongues in Babel. Every error in the world was being preached there, the fugitives from Italy, Germany and Geneva all found refuge there. Lutheranism was specially rife in Greater Poland and Prussia, but was now beginning to wane ; Calvinism had always been most widely spread in Little Poland and Lithuania, although both Lutherans and Calvinists were being driven out by other sects, especially the Antitrinitarians and Anabaptists.

In accounting for the reasons for the religious changes Ruggieri puts in the first place those which had also opened the way to Protestantism in other countries. Besides the greed of the laity for Church property, he names above all the negligence and bad example of the higher clergy, and the decline of monastic discipline. Ruggieri refuses to accept the excuse offered by the king that he had not sufficient authority to deal with the powerful nobles, because, in Lithuania, where this was certainly not the case, things were even worse than in Poland. The nuncio rightly attaches the greatest importance to the habitual inobservance throughout the kingdom of the existing laws, so much so that there was a proverb to the effect

that they only lasted for three days. To this were to be added the continual wars with Russia, which completely absorbed the king's energies, his political consideration for the nobles who had adopted the new religion, and his natural disinclination for any kind of severity.

Ruggieri's suggestions as to the means to be adopted to restore the Catholic Church in Poland are very interesting. In the first place he shows how necessary it was that there should always be at the court a representative of the Pope, who should exhort the king to do his duty for his own advantage. It was because this had not been the case that the religious innovations had made such rapid strides. When Paul IV. had remedied this by sending Lippomano, the movement towards apostasy had gradually come to a standstill. It was therefore very necessary that there should always be a nuncio in Poland, and to fill that office only the best men should be chosen, men who, themselves completely disinterested and upright, could stand forth as solid walls of the house of God, reminding the king and the prelates of their duty, and promoting the Catholic religion in every way. With regard to benefices, Ruggieri warns the Pope to be very careful only to give them in future to worthy and deserving men : this applied especially to the canonries of Cracow, since the greater number of the bishops were drawn from that chapter. In this connection Ruggieri urged that the greater number of the sons of the nobles should be taken to Rome to be educated, so that they might afterwards become a leaven in their own country.

Ruggieri did not fail to realize how much the restoration of the Catholic Church depended upon the king. It was therefore necessary, he thought, to insist that Sigismund Augustus should nominate as candidates for the episcopal sees men who were not only Catholics, but also zealous Catholics, and in every way suitable for the office, and that he should bestow all the great offices of the kingdom on men of proved Catholic views, and at the same time remove from among his entourage all the adherents of the reformed religion. The bishops, moreover, must in quite a special degree be a light to their flocks

by their good example ; it was in their power to exercise an infinitely great influence by the formation of a new generation of young and worthy ecclesiastics,¹ and by giving their help to zealous pastors, preachers, teachers and writers.

Ruggieri was convinced that in this way a complete revival of the Catholic Church was possible, and that this would lead to the complete suppression of heresy, since the movement towards apostasy had passed its zenith, even though it had not as yet come to an end. During the period of his nunciature, which had only lasted a year and six months, at least ten thousand persons had returned to the Catholic faith,² while the breaking up of the Protestants into sects, all quarrelling with each other, was increasing from day to day. It was with satisfaction that Ruggieri could point to the restoration of the Catholic religion at Elbing and Dantzig which had been effected during his nunciature with the king's help. The sermons of the Dominicans were in great request at Dantzig, while the Jesuits were very active at Elbing. In other places as well the Jesuits were exercising a useful influence, as for example at Braunsberg, where the first Jesuit college in the kingdom of Poland had been established in 1565, which had been followed, besides that at Elbing, by those at Pultusk (1566), Jaroslaw (1568) and Wilna (1570).³ The activities of so extraordinarily vigorous an Order filled the nuncio with joyful expectations. He mentioned the fact, which is also confirmed from other sources, that even Protestant parents entrusted their sons to the educational establishments of the Jesuits, and he very rightly built great hopes for the future on the youth who were there being educated in a strictly

¹ Hosius had already established a seminary at Braunsberg in 1567 ; see EICHHORN, II., 297.

² Among those who were rescued for the Church were the four sons of Nicholas Radziwill, in which conversion the famous preacher Peter Skarga had a great part ; the latter entered the Jesuit Order in 1568. See *Kirchenlexikon of Freiburg*, XI.², 388, and *Röm. Quartalschrift*, XXV., 57* seq. ; cf. BERGA, Skarga, 163 seq.

³ See ZALESKI, I., I, 150 seq., 169 seq., 175 seq., 212 seq.

Catholic spirit. Negotiations were even going on, he adds, for the establishment of another college at Posen, and it was to be hoped that other cities would follow this example, to the salvation of the kingdom and the Catholic faith, which would certainly have a brighter future, if only the necessary steps were taken.¹

Ruggieri's suggestions entirely coincided with the ideas of Pius V., who never wearied of encouraging the Polish bishops to the observance of the decrees of Trent, and especially to the reform of the clergy, the holding of provincial synods, and the establishment of ecclesiastical seminaries.²

Vincenzo de Portico was appointed nuncio to Poland in succession to Ruggieri.³ This diplomatist, who reached Cracow at the beginning of July, 1568, had been specially instructed to press for the assembly of a provincial synod in accordance with the prescriptions of Trent; he soon, however, found himself obliged to desist from his efforts owing to the shifty behaviour of Uchanski.⁴ As representative of the Pope,

¹ *Relatione etc., see *supra* p. 303, n. 2. For the activity of the Jesuits see SACCHINI, P. III., I, I, n. 106 *seqq.*, I. 4, in 176 *seq.*, I, 6, n. 101 *seqq.*; DUHR, I., 179 *seqq.*, 434 *seqq.*; ZIVIER, I., 770 *seq.*; ZALESKI, I., I, 375 *seq.*

² See the briefs in GOUBAU, 123 *seq.*, 214 *seq.* and THEINER, Mon. Pol. II., 725, 726, 730, 735. The letter of Stanislaus Carnovius, Bishop of Cujavia, to Pius V. concerning the acceptance of the Tridentine decrees by his clergy, and the erection of a diocesan seminary, in LADERCHI, 1568, n. 19. On June 12, 1570 *instructions were sent to the nuncio in Poland to take care that the bishops of the kingdom observed the decrees of the Council of Trent; see *Nunziat. di Polonia*, I., 72, Papal Secret Archives.

³ Cf. LADERCHI, 1568, n. 148; THEINER, Mon. Pol., II., 728 *seq.*; EICHORN, II., 343. Ruggieri had already asked for his recall in April 1567; see *Relacye*, I., 216 *seq.* Reports of Portico in THEINER *loc. cit.* 770 *seqq.* He too drew up a report of his nunciature; see PIERLING, Rome et Moscou, 64. *Ibid.* his instructions. A letter from Pius V. to Hosius, of February 18, 1568, says that he had told Portico to trust the advice of Hosius; see EHRENBERG, Ostpreussen, 39 *seq.*

⁴ See LADERCHI, 1568, n. 148.

Portico was present at the Diet of Lublin, which was opened in December, 1568, and at which, by the request of the Pope,¹ Hosius also was present in February, 1569. The Pope had spared no efforts in seriously exhorting the king and the bishops not to make any concessions to the Protestants, and to defend the cause of the Church.² Cardinal Hosius took a leading part in the discussions of the Diet, and as long as he was present the Protestants did not dare to make any move. It was only after his departure that they put forward their demands, but even then they did not meet with any success.³ On August 18th, 1569, Portico was able to report to Morone the results of the Diet, at which the union of Lithuania to the crown of Poland had been brought about.⁴ Nothing had been said about ecclesiastical matters at the Diet, so that no decision had been come to, either by way of concession to the innovators, or with regard to the holding of a national council.⁵

Cardinal Hosius left the Diet before its close, in order to go once more to Rome. After placing the administration of his diocese in the hands of his learned and energetic friend Cromer, in August, 1569, he began his journey to the Eternal City, where he arrived on November 8th.⁶ The Cardinal was

¹ THEINER, *Mon. Pol.*, II., 735.

² See LADERCHI, 1569, n. 235 *seq.*, 245 *seq.*; THEINER, *Mon. Pol.*, II., 732, 735 *seq.*

³ See EICHHORN, II., 343 *seq.*, 347.

⁴ Pius V.'s congratulatory letter on this event, of July 22, 1569, in LADERCHI, 1569, n. 264; *ibid.* 266 *seq.* briefs concerning the conversion of two eminent Poles. The protest made by the nuncio by command of Pius V. against the investiture of Prussia which had been conferred on the son of Albert of Brandenburg, in THEINER, *loc. cit.* 470; *cf.* CATENA, 110.

⁵ *Relayce*, I., 218-219.

⁶ See EICHHORN, II., 360 *seq.*, 366. On November 15, 1569, Hosius was received in the consistory; *cf.* KORZENIOWSKI, 115. The unaccustomed climate of Rome did not suit the Cardinal; in the summer of 1570 he suffered much from fever. *Cf.* the *letters from Hosius to Commendone, dated Rome, July 12, August 12 and 24, and September 23, 1570. Graziani Archives, Città di Castello.

not destined to see his diocese again, but even at a distance he had every care for its welfare. The principal object of his journey to Rome had been to arrange, at the request of King Sigismund Augustus, the disputes of the latter with Philip II. concerning the rich inheritance in south Italy of his mother, Bona Sforza, a matter which had already engaged the attention of Pius V.¹ Hosius was no diplomatist, and so it is not surprising that he did not meet with much success in that difficult business.²

His letters show what a lively interest Hosius took in the religious condition of the Polish kingdom while he was in Rome. As the Lutherans, Calvinists and Bohemian Brothers had joined together in a federal union at Sandomir in April, 1570, the Catholic party were awaiting with the greatest anxiety the coming Diet at Warsaw, and indeed that assembly resulted in stormy discussions.³ The Protestants claimed religious liberty for all, but were met by the strong opposition of the senate, which was for the most part Catholic. No decision was therefore arrived at.⁴ The danger, however, was not removed, since the dissolution of the Diet, after arriving at an ambiguous resolution, left the way open for further demands. Hosius bitterly condemned this ambiguity in a letter to Uchanski. Why not openly declare, he said, that they intended to remain true to the faith of their fathers, and that they were ready to sacrifice their blood and their lives, rather than deviate by a finger's breadth from it? Such language on the part of the king and the Catholic senators would stifle all disturbances in a moment. Instead of that they preferred to talk about religious concord, as though it were possible to come to an agreement with men who were quarrelling among themselves like the heroes of Homer. Uchanski should therefore advise the king openly to profess

¹ See *Corresp. dipl.*, II., 30, 146 *seq.*, 466. For the Sforza inheritance *cf.* BIAUDET, *Le Saint-Siège et la Suède*, I., Paris, 1907, 511 *seq.*; EICHHORN, I., 315.

² *Cf.* EICHHORN, II., 369 *seq.*, 403 *seq.*, 407 *seq.*

³ See ZIVIER, I., 766 *seq.*; BERGA, *Skarga*, 175.

⁴ ZIVIER, I., 767 *seq.*

the faith of his fathers, and give his representatives at the Diet instructions to allow no discussion of religious questions, since the decision of such matters belonged to the Pope alone.¹

Hosius also had recourse on this subject to the magnates of the Kingdom of Poland and to the king himself, adjuring them to defend the Catholic religion. His letter to Sigismund Augustus is certainly not wanting in courage. In it he comments on the king's inclination to hold a national council, and tries to dissuade him from this by pointing to events in France. Then he goes on to urge the king again and again to entrust the great offices of state to none but tried Catholics. On September 9th, 1571, in grave words, he calls the king's attention to the harm which a policy of concession to the religious innovators had done in France, and points out how signs of a similar revolt against the royal authority had already made their appearance in Poland.²

The anxiety and fears for the future of the kingdom which comes out in these letters were more than justified in the event. Affairs in Poland were visibly taking a more and more dangerous direction. From the spring of 1571 onwards increasingly definite rumours were spread in Italy to the effect that King Sigismund Augustus had again taken up his former design of breaking off his marriage with Queen Catherine, who was said to be suffering from epilepsy. Later it was stated that the king intended to have his marriage declared null by the coming Diet, and then, in order to give his declaration the appearance of legality, to change his religion. According to other accounts the King of Poland flattered himself with the vain hope that the Pope would dissolve his marriage. Whereas hitherto the Catholic Poles had maintained an attitude of hostility towards the project of a divorce, they now dared make no opposition. The nobility, however, who were adherents of the new religion, in the hope of obtaining religious liberty, promised the king not only their own support but also that of the Protestant princes of Germany. It was

¹ See EICHHORN, II., 411 *seq.*, 414.

² *Ibid.* 418 *seq.*

uncertain how far the king had already compromised in this matter. In any case there was the greatest possible danger that, thanks to the divorce, he would rush headlong into Protestantism.¹

The state of affairs was made even worse by the conduct of Portico, who was by no means fit for his difficult office, and sought to cover up his own weakness by sending optimistic reports. By his easy-going courtiership he had succeeded in winning the favour of the king to such an extent that the latter on several occasions endeavoured to obtain the purple for his favourite. The same thing was aimed at in Portico's accounts of the improved state of affairs in Poland, accounts which were by no means in accordance with the truth. The king's interposition was of no use to Portico; their information was good in Rome and they were well aware how dangerous the state of the kingdom was, and that the king was leading an immoral life, and was pressing forward his divorce plans more than ever.²

Under these circumstances it was fortunate that the Pope should have been able to entrust the care of matters in Poland to a man of such experience and with such a knowledge of

¹ Nicholas Cromer had already pointed out grave causes for anxiety on April 20 and May 27 in letters to Martin Cromer (EICHHORN, II., 420). These were confirmed in a *letter from M. A. Graziani to Commendone, dated Padua, May 21, 1571, Graziani Archives, Città di Castello. Other and more definite information in the *Venez. Depeschen*, III., 519 *seq.*, where there are also particulars of the mission of the Jesuit L. Maggio, who prudently kept back the brief published in CATENA, 309 *seq.* See further the *reports of Commendone to the Bishop of Torcello and to Cardinal Rusticucci, both dated November 27, 1571, Graziani Archives, Città di Castello.

² Cf. EICHHORN, II., 421 *seq.* Portico had on his own initiative entered into negotiations with Sweden, where Queen Catherine was a Catholic. A Jesuit was to have been sent there; cf. LADERCHI, 1570, n. 273 *seq.* But Pius V., knowing that the queen communicated "sub utraque," ordered Portico to break off all relations; see BIAUDET, 27.

conditions in that country as Commendone.¹ On November 27th, 1571, the legate crossed the Polish frontier. Travelling through districts that were plague stricken, and by frozen roads, he hastened at once to Warsaw, which he reached on January 7th, 1572.² The king, who was suffering from gout, received him honourably and graciously. The legate at once brought forward the question, not only of the league against the Turks, but also of the rumours that were current about the divorce. In eloquent words he set before Sigismund Augustus the sanctity of the marriage bond, and told him how impossible it was that the Pope should agree to the divorce. The author of the whole business, as Commendone quickly realized, was the faithless Archbishop of Gnesen, Uchanski, who had not changed his character.³

At Commendone's request Portico, who had great influence with the king, endeavoured to move the sovereign from his fatal purpose, but in vain. On March 3rd, 1572, Commendone reported to Rome that, although he had several times spoken with all possible frankness to the king about the divorce, the latter adhered to his plan, and that as the time of the Diet was now at hand, when the matter would in all probability be discussed, he had renewed his remonstrances and had endeavoured especially to deprive the king of any excuse for saying that he did not know that the Pope could not grant the divorce. In clear words he told the king to his face that his marriage was a true sacrament and was quite indissoluble, and that neither the Pope nor anyone else could alter that fact. He must give up the idea of the divorce as something unattainable, and must not plunge his kingdom into incalculable difficulties. In his interview Commendone reminded the king of the case of Henry VIII. of England, who after his divorce had never had an hour's peace, nor children in

¹ Cf. BERGA, *Skarga*, 177.

² See *Venez. Depeschen*, III., 501, n. 2; GRATIANUS, III., 9.

³ See the *reports of Commendone to Cardinal Rusticucci, dated Warsaw, January 16 and 24, 1572 (the latter in cypher). Graziani Archives, Città di Castello. For the conduct of Uchanski cf. also ZIVIER, I., 781 *seq.*

spite of all his wives. Sigismund Augustus replied that he did not wish to become a Henry VIII., and still less a heretic, and that in all probability the matter would not be brought up for discussion at the Diet ; to this Commendone objected that it was not in His Majesty's power to prevent it.¹ The nuncio united his remonstrances to those of the legate. Suddenly and unexpectedly the whole state of affairs was changed by the news that Queen Catherine had died at Linz on February 29th, 1572.² Even more surprising than the grief shown by Sigismund Augustus at this news was the fact that henceforward he said no more about his second marriage, which had now become possible. It still remains uncertain whether this change of view was due to his own inconstancy, or to his attachment for a young lady of the court.³

The negotiations concerning the league against the Turks, which at first Commendone pressed forward with the greatest zeal, were referred by the king to the Diet, where opinion was most unfavourable to it. Commendone, however, still hoped for success. He employed all his eloquence in personal interviews with the members of the senate, but received the reply that so long as neither the Emperor nor the Empire were disturbed, Poland could not declare herself against the Turks without exposing herself to the greatest possible danger.⁴ During the discussions at the Diet, anti-Catholic views came to the front again, and if things did not come to a crisis, this was principally due to the prudent conduct of Commendone.⁵

In the meantime the condition of the king, who was suffering from a wasting fever and arthritis, became steadily worse. This unhappy man was himself shortening his life by riotous living. All true patriots, and Commendone with them, looked

¹ See the cypher *report of Cardinal Commendone to Rusticucci of March 3, 1572, Graziani Archives, Città di Castello.

² See Colecc. de docum, inéd., CX., 418 seq.

³ See *Venez. Depeschen*, III., 520, n. ; GRATIANUS, III., 9.

⁴ See *Venez. Depeschen*, III., 501, n. 2 ; GRATIANUS, III., 10 ; cf. THEINER, *Mon. Pol.*, II., 763 seq.

⁵ Cf. the draft referring to May, 1572, *Negotii di Polonia, *Miscell.*, Arm. II., 117, p. 384, Papal Secret Archives.

with anxiety to the future, for since Sigismund Augustus was the last of the Jagellon stock, it was to be feared that the various parties which had already for many years past threatened the peace of the kingdom, would come to open hostilities over the election of the new king.¹

Just as in Poland, in spite of all the defects of the clergy, the great mass of the population remained firmly attached to the Catholic faith, so also was this the case, according to the testimony of Borromeo,² in those parts of Switzerland which had remained Catholic. It is true that the Cardinal has many faults to find with the laity ; that they are obstinate in their feuds, that the administration of justice is venal, that ecclesiastical jurisdiction is almost ignored, that usury is common, that the frequentation of the sacraments is neglected, that people eat all day and drink at all hours, but that nevertheless the majority of the people are good and worthy. The Swiss are honest in business and moral in conduct, and are loyal and easy to lead if they are treated in a friendly spirit. It is safe to pass through the streets without danger of being robbed ; blasphemy is visited with severe punishments ; the people do not give themselves up to gaming, but on festival days amuse themselves with shooting matches. The feasts of the Church are carefully observed ; no matter how much money is offered no one will be found on those days to carry a traveller's baggage ; great importance is attached to divine worship ; if anyone has missed mass once, he is looked upon as lost and no longer a Christian. The people assist at the sacred offices with great devotion, the men separate from the women, while their devotion to the dead is unparalleled ; sacred images may be seen everywhere about the streets ; they are so much attached to the Catholic religion that they would gladly embark upon a new war against the Protestant Cantons in order to purge them of heresy. No one who has failed to receive the sacraments at Easter, or is living in open concubin-

¹ See EICHHORN, II., 425. For the king's concubinage see ZIVIER, I., 781 *seq.*

² Report of September 30, 1570, in REINHARDT-STEFFENS, Nuntiatur von Bonhomini, Dokumente, I., 6-17.

age, is tolerated among them, while the modesty and decorum of the dress of the women is specially worthy of praise.¹

It was also a great advantage to the Catholics of Switzerland in their resistance to the Protestant party that many men of tried capacity both in political and military matters, men, too, who were endowed with wealth and were of weight both at home and abroad, had devoted themselves to the Catholic cause with a devotion and zeal that seemed miraculous when compared with bye-gone times.² At their head was a man who must be considered the organizer of Catholic Switzerland, Ludwig Pfyffer, the syndic and chief magistrate of Lucerne, who in 1567 had had the good fortune to rescue the French king when he was on the point of being taken prisoner, and had taken him to Paris through the midst of the Huguenot forces, and who, in several of the battles of the religious wars that followed, had greatly distinguished himself, and had even dealt the decisive blow. From 1569 he had devoted the whole weight of "his great energies to the cause of his country, and to the Catholic party in the Swiss Confederation."³ Another who also contributed in a marked degree to the revival of Catholic Switzerland, was Melchior Lussy of Unterwalden,⁴

¹ Cf. Borromeo to Ormaneto, November 5, 1567; "Non voglio lasciar di dire, d'haver ricevuto grandissima consolatione in trovar li popolo tanto catholici divoti et semplici, che se in proportione fussero tali li sacerdoti, ce ne potremmo contentare." In WYMANN 161, n. 3.

² Opinion of DÄNDLIKER (II.³ 647). "It was the obvious and great advantage of this party, that they had at their disposal men who, while they in every way made the Catholic reaction a powerful factor, had military experience, personal influence, and experience in dealing with worldly matters." DIERAUER, III., 330.

³ DIERAUER, III., 330. Cf. HÜRBIN, II., 225, 261; DÄNDLIKER, II.³, 649, and especially SEGESSER, Ludwig Pfyffer, two vols, 1880-1883. See also MEYER VON KRONAU in *Allg. Deutsche Biographie*, XXV., 727 *seqq.*

⁴ DIERAUER, III., 330. G. V. WYSS in *Allg. Deutsche Biographie*, XIX., 637 *seqq.* Cf. RICHARD FELLER, Ritter Melchior von Lussy von Unterwalden. Seine Beziehungen zu Italien un sein Anteil an der Gegenreformation, two vols, Stans, 1906 and 1909.

who, as his country's representative at the Council of Trent,¹ as her ambassador in Rome, Venice, Milan, Turin and Madrid, and as provincial landammann of his own canton, devoted his energies for forty-eight years to the affairs of state, and stood out as the confidant of the Holy See. Love for the Church and deep piety were the principal motives of all his thoughts and actions.² Other men of a similar stamp were the prudent Walter Roll of Uri, who had relations with almost all the courts of Italy,³ Hans Zumbrunnen of Altdorf, a man "of strong character and the most noble sentiments"⁴ Christopher Schorno of Schwyz, and others.

In virtue of the permanent constitution of December 17th, 1533, the Catholic cantons were closely bound to each other, to the Bishop of Sion, and to the Confederation of the Valais, while there was no such bond of union among the Protestants.⁵ Moreover, the Swiss Catholics commanded a majority of the votes in the Confederation, since, when Soleure had joined them, there were seven Catholic cantons against the two mixed ones and the four entirely Protestant ones. On the other hand, however, the reformed cantons had a larger population; Berne alone was able to place 32,000 armed men in the field, or more than the Four Cantons together.⁶

The Bernese made use of their preponderant strength in order to spread the new beliefs, and the success of the religious changes in western Switzerland was due to them. Without the support of the Bernese, William Farel would never have been able to introduce the new religion into the cantons of Vaud and Neuchâtel.⁷ It was the intervention of Berne in the struggle between Savoy and Geneva which made possible the establishment of Calvinism, and those far-reaching consequences for the whole of Europe which followed upon the

¹ See Vol. XV. of this work, p. 271; XVI., p. 206.

² Cf. DÄNDLIKER, II., 648.

³ WYMANN, BORRAMEO, 174.

⁴ DIERAUER, III., 333.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 205 *seq.*

⁶ *Ibid.*, 278.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 219, 220 *seq.*

rise of Calvin.¹ In the territory of the upper Saane, which Freiburg and Berne had bought from the creditors of the Count of Greyerz, who was overwhelmed with debt, the Protestant republic had at once obliged the reluctant population to embrace the new religion.² The same thing occurred in the Canton of Vaud; in 1536 the republic on the Aar had made an attack on Vaud and annexed it; at the treaty of Lausanne in 1564, Savoy had been obliged to accept an arrangement, in spite of the peace of Cateau-Cambrésis, abandoning the territory to the Bernese, and therefore to the new doctrines.³

Although the Catholic cantons were very far from acting with the same decision as the followers of the new religion, they were nevertheless able, on account of their close unity, to exercise a great influence upon the new religious movement in Switzerland. After the success of the Catholic arms at the battle of Kappel in 1532 a restoration of the old religion took place at Bremgarten and Mellingen in Aargau, in certain districts on the Linth, and in the prefecture of Sargans,⁴ while in the lordship of Rheintal in Thurgau, at St. Gall and Toggenburg the Protestants only partly returned to the old Church.⁵ The Protestant community at Locarno, alone of the Ticino, was broken up by the pressure of the Catholic cantons in 1555, and the 116 who remained obdurate departed for Zurich.⁶ The rights of the old religion were also safeguarded at Glarus by a treaty which was confirmed in 1564.⁷ The independent

¹ *Ibid.*, 228 *seqq.*

² *Ibid.*, 296 *seq.*

³ *Ibid.*, 236 *seqq.*, 315 *seqq.*, 322.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 189 *seqq.*

⁵ *Ibid.*, 193 *seqq.*

⁶ *Ibid.*, 298 *seqq.* Cf. FERD. MEYER, *Die evangel. Gemeinde in Locarno, Zurich*, 1836.

⁷ DIERAUER, III., 309. MAYER, *Konzil*, I., 6, 126. If things did not come to armed intervention on the part of the Catholic cantons over the affair of Glarus, this was due to the Pope, who was ready to help them if they acted in self-defence, but not if they were attacking. FELLER, I., 42.

magistracy in the canton of Aargau was forced by a treaty in 1568 to obey the five cantons and never again to abandon the faith.¹ The resolute attitude of the historian Gilg Tschudi had especially contributed to the success won at Sargans, Locarno and Glarus.² "if we only had in the confederation another two or three Tschudis" wrote his master Glareanus, "its cancer, heresy, would be healed."³

After the affair at Glarus Tschudi retired from political life in order to give himself up entirely to study. A greater man than he then took upon himself the office of adviser and promoter of the Catholic confederation, Cardinal Borromeo, though the activities of this champion were not directed so much to politics as to the real religious revival of Catholic Switzerland.⁴ By his appointment to the archbishopric of Milan Borromeo had become not only the near neighbour of Switzerland, but bishop of three of the Swiss valleys, Livina, Riviera and Blenio. Moreover the Catholic cantons had, in their first embassy to the newly-elected Pius IV., asked for the new secretary of state and powerful nephew of the Pope as their Cardinal Protector.⁵ It fell to Melchior Lussy, as the representative of his country, to make this request, and he might well feel sure of its being accepted, for the Swiss, in spite of the smallness of their country, were looked upon as people of importance as the guardian of the Alpine passes, and on account of their acknowledged skill in war.⁶ Moreover, the

¹ DIERAUER, III., 313. What is said, *ibid.*, 312, concerning the Valais, is incorrect; cf. MAYER, I., 105-117.

² DIERAUER, III., 193, 301, 309.

³ *Ibid.*, 301.

⁴ Cf. DIERAUER, III., 332 *seq.*; ED. WYMANN, Kardinal Karl Borromeo in seinen Beziehungen zur alten Eidgenossenschaft, Stans, 1910; PAOLO D'ALESSANDRI, Atti di S. Carlo riguardanti la Svizzera e suoi territori, Locarno, 1909; ROSETTI in *Bollett. stor. della Svizzera ital.*, 1882 (acta of the Swiss visitation by BOITOMEIO in 1567-1571); cf. *ibid.*, 1895 (acta of 1571-1580); SALA, Docum. II., 306 *seqq.*

⁵ REINHARDT-STEFFENS, Einleitung xxvii.; WYMANN, *loc. cit.*, 77 *seqq.*

⁶ WYMANN, *loc. cit.*, 81.

friendship of the new Pope for the Swiss was so well known that even some of the Protestant cantons joined in the letter of congratulation on his election.¹

On the occasion of his first pastoral visitation of the three valleys Borromeo found things in a very bad state, especially among the clergy.² There was no educational establishment for the young clerics, and therefore the priests combined a great lack of learning with considerable moral laxity.³ The benefices in the mountain districts were very poor, while in addition in many cases half the first year's revenues had to be paid over to the civil governor, and the whole of it at Locarno. The result of this state of affairs was that ecclesiastics gladly accepted invitations to banquets, joined in the hunt, and tried to make money by means of trading or by acting as inn-keepers.⁴ The conferring of ecclesiastical offices belonged, in accordance with an old custom, not directly to the archbishop, but to four canons of Milan; as time went on ecclesiastical jurisdiction had been reduced to a mere shadow, and had been almost entirely usurped by the civil authorities.⁵

In view of the great importance of the civil power, the Cardinal had asked for its co-operation in his pastoral visitation. Uri accordingly sent its treasurer, Hans Zumbrunnen, Nidwalden, Melchior Lussy, and Schwyz a certain Johann Gasser.⁶ Accompanied by these men, Borromeo travelled through the three valleys during the month of October making inquiries, issuing exhortations and inflicting punishments. After the visitation was finished, he called the whole of the clergy together at Cresciano and strongly reminded them of their duties; then Hans Zumbrunnen also made a powerful speech, and assured him that no one would get any support from the civil power against the ordinances of the archbishop. Then there followed the acceptance of the decrees of Trent

¹ REINHARDT-STEFFENS, *Einleitung* xxvii.

² WYMAN, *loc. cit.*, 155-173. BASCAPÉ, I. 2, c. 3, 32-34.

³ WYMAN, *loc. cit.*, 166.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 162 *seqq.*

⁵ *Ibid.*, 155 *seqq.*

⁶ *Ibid.*, 170.

and of the profession of faith laid down by the Council.¹ So as clearly to separate the ecclesiastical and civil powers, Borromeo later on sent a scheme for an agreement, which was discussed at Brunnen on December 29th, 1567. The Cardinal, however, did not accomplish very much by this scheme ; on account of his holy life, and his paternal regard for them, they were prepared to agree to his demands so long as he lived, but the Cardinal was not satisfied with this.² He had more reason to be satisfied with his success in another matter. As early as September 8th, 1568, Bartholomew Bedra, the bishop's vicar-general at Chiggiogna, was able to boast that the people of the Livina were at one in saying that for two hundred years past they had never had so excellent a body of clergy as they now had.³

Borromeo visited the Ticino at least ten times altogether.⁴ He combined his second visit, in August, 1570, with a visitation of German Switzerland.⁵ His protectorate extended to the whole of the Swiss nation, and he thought that he might be able to arrange a solution of the question of jurisdiction in the three valleys by means of personal interviews with those who were responsible for the government of the Catholic cantons. In order that his journey might attract less attention, he combined it with a visit to his sister Hortensia at the castle of Hohenems in the Vorarlberg. On August 21st, 1570, Borromeo stopped at the home of Walter Roll at Altdorf, and on the following day with Melchior Lussy at Stans ; the room which he occupied is still shown in the so-called house of Winkelreid. After a visit to the tomb of the venerated hermit, Nicholas of Flüe, he visited Lucerne, Zug, Einsiedeln and St.

¹ *Ibid.*, 190. BASCAPÉ, I. 2, c. 3, p. 33.

² WYMANN, *loc. cit.*, 171 ; *cf.* 185.

³ WYMANN, *loc. cit.*, 170. "Omnino spatio mensis adeo profecit, ut eius ecclesiae tota pene facies immutaretur." (BASCAPÉ, I, 2, c. 3, p. 33). Another favourable account in WYMANN, *loc. cit.*, 170, n.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 169.

⁵ REINHARDT-STEFFENS, Einl. cccx *seqq.* ; WYMANN, *loc. cit.* 174-243.

Gall, where he delivered a discourse to the abbot, Othmar Kunz, and his monks. On his way back from Hohenems he visited Schwyz, and at the invitation of Egidius Tschudi, went to Altdorf. On September 6th the Cardinal returned to Milan.

Borromeo sent a detailed report to Rome, by Cardinal Burali, of his journey,¹ which can best be described as a reconnaissance of the country,² in which he gives an account of the conditions in Switzerland, and of the best means of remedying the evils in the Church there. In the first place, he says, the Pope should send a nuncio to Switzerland, who should not occupy himself with political matters, but devote himself entirely to spiritual affairs. He ought skilfully to remind the Swiss nobility that, in spite of their reiterated expressions of respect for the Council they were not observing its decrees as far as benefices were concerned; perhaps he might be able to bring it about that they should content themselves with the right of nomination to benefices and recognize that the right of conferring them belonged to the ecclesiastical authorities. As far as the clergy was concerned it was only from the younger ecclesiastics that any radical change could be looked for though it should be easy to put an end to such disorders as were externally manifest.³ A uniform method of procedure in all parts of Switzerland was absolutely essential, since, so long as a reform was only introduced in individual districts, incorrigibles could always escape it by taking refuge in some other part of the country. It was, however, necessary to take strong action, even at the risk of some going over in desperation to the heretics, because it was best in the end for the sake of the common good to be quit of such people. Another means of paving the way for a better state of affairs

¹ Of September 30, 1570, in REINHARDT-STEFFENS, *Dokumente*, 6-17; cf. Einl. cccxxiii. *seqq.*

² HÜRBIN, II., 228.

³ A year before Borromeo's visitation the council of Lucerne had sent to the Franciscans of that place a *reproof for their scandalous life; see *Ratsprotokolle*, xxvii., 493b, State Archives, Lucerne.

would be the establishment of a seminary for Switzerland which could easily be maintained by the rich abbeys, and should be entrusted to the Jesuits: the best place for this would be Lucerne. Lastly, a college under the direction of the Jesuits should be set up at Constance.

These proposals were proved in the future to be of the greatest importance, but for the time being there were insuperable difficulties in the way of their being carried into effect.¹ In the first place the Pope could not find anyone suited for the post of nuncio in Switzerland. In April, 1571, Lussy proposed to Cardinal Borromeo that Pius V. should address a brief to the seven Catholic cantons on the subject of the sending of a nuncio, in order to learn their views. The brief was sent,² but the seven Catholic cantons made no reply, though in November, 1571, they sent an envoy to Rome, in consequence of whose statements Pius V. gave up the idea of sending a nuncio.³ In the same way the negotiations for the establishment of an institute for German Switzerland were very protracted.⁴ The Pope had to be satisfied for the moment in having a certain number of young Swiss educated in Italian seminaries at the request of the Catholic cantons.⁵

Bishop Laureo of Mondovì was interesting himself at the same time as Borromeo in the question of a nuncio for Switzer-

¹ REINHARDT-STEFFENS, Einl. cccxxx. *seqq.*

² Of June 9, 1571, *ibid.*, Dokum. 49.

³ Alciati to Borromeo, February 9, 1572, in REINHARDT-STEFFENS, *ibid.*, 53; "S.S^ta essendosi avveduto molto bene della loro intrinseca volontà et del fine, al quale tendono, m'ha detto essersi risoluta di non mandarli per hora Nuntio alcuno" because if there were a nuncio in Switzerland, it would no longer be possible to pass over the usurpations of the Swiss.

⁴ REINHARDT-STEFFENS, Einl. cccxxxvii.

⁵ Cf. the briefs to Borromeo of May 9, 1566, to the five cantons of July 12, to the Swiss bishops of June 12, to Cardinal Mark Sittich of May 18, 1566, in LADERCHI, 1566, n. 204-208; brief of August 23, 1566, in WIRZ, 386, of May 17 and June 12, 1566, to Borromeo, in SALA, Docum. I., 175, 180; *Abschiede*, IV., 2, 348, 350; REINHARDT-STEFFENS, Einl. clxxix.

land, whose mission, however, on this occasion, was to be primarily for political purposes ; above all, he was to prevent the admission of the Genevese into the confederation. Geneva, after it had shaken off the authority of its bishop and of the Duke of Savoy, was inevitably bound to seek union with the Swiss cantons for purposes of defence against Savoy. But since the city of Calvin had become more and more the centre of a wide-spread religious movement, the Popes had been driven to support the cause of Savoy with all their power, and to seek to alienate Switzerland from Geneva. Paul IV. promised his assistance to Duke Emanuele Filiberto, the victor of St. Quentin, when the latter, in accordance with the terms of the peace of Cateau-Cambrésis, sought to get back the territory occupied by the French and Bernese, and at the same time his rights over Geneva.¹ Pius IV. made every effort to induce the Kings of France and Spain to support the Duke.² There was nothing more to be hoped for from France after the outbreak of the Huguenot wars, but the Pope repeatedly urged Philip II. to order Alba, after he had subdued the Low Countries, to march against Geneva, the place of refuge of all the rebels in the dominions of the Catholic King, as well as from France, Savoy, and Germany.³ Savoy obtained from Pius V. money concessions levied upon ecclesiastical property,⁴ while the nuncio in Savoy worked for the

¹ DIERAUER, III., 317.

² Briefs of June 14, 1560 (to Francis II.) in Raynaldus, 1560, n. 29, WIRZ, 376 (with date June 11) and of June 13, 1561 (to Philip II.) in WIRZ, 377. Brief to the Swiss nuncio of June 14, 1560, in RAYNALDUS, 1560, n. 29, WIRZ, 379 (with date July 13). In the brief of June 14, Geneva is held responsible for the conspiracy of Amboise : " id est fons, unde perditissima haud dubie consilia superioribus diebus manarunt, ad tumultus et seditiones in regno tuo excitandas."

³ Bonelli to Castagna, April 29, 1567, Corresp. dipl., II., 95 seq., cf. 132 n., 133, 166 ; Zuñiga to Philip II., August 17, 1568, *ibid.*, 444.

⁴ The ambassador of Savoy in Rome, Vincenzo Parpaglia, to the Duke, June 17, 1569, in CRAMER, 229.

formation of a league between the Duke and the Swiss Catholics.¹ The Pope could not expressly declare himself against an agreement with Geneva on the part of the Swiss who remained firm in the ancient faith, because this was rejected by the Catholic cantons, but in 1571 the news of a *rapprochement* between Geneva and Savoy was received with much anxiety in Rome.²

The friendly offices of Borromeo proved far more effective than these fruitless negotiations, even in the case of those parts of Switzerland which he did not visit in person. This was the case in the Grisons. On his journey to Hohenems, as well as on his way back, Borromeo had an interview with the most zealous champion of the old religion in the Grisons, Christian von Castelberg, the abbot of Disentis.³ Castelberg had brought back new life to his monastery, when it had fallen into complete decay, by admitting young and worthy monks, and had also restored it from an economic point of view, by his energetic administration. Castelberg also worked with great zeal for the consolidation of the old religion: "with unwearied zeal, he preached missions in the various villages of the region, passing from one mountain district to another, celebrating mass and exhorting the people to persevere in the faith of their fathers."⁴

The religious state of the Catholics in the Grisons was lamentable. Even before the appearance of the reform there had been difficulties with the Bishop of Chur, whose civil rights they wished to restrict. For this reason the Grisons had proved a favourable soil for the new doctrines; this was especially the case in the episcopal city, which aimed at becoming the bishop's heir. On the other hand, in spite of having been stripped of its exterior splendour, the episcopal residence

¹ Lauro to Rome on April 21, 1571, *ibid.*, 264.

² Rusticucci to Lauro, July 16, 1571, *ibid.*, 269. For the proposals made by Geneva *cf.* the discussions of March 25, June 24, and September 30, 1571, in *Abschiede*, IV., 2, 467, 476, 483.

³ *Cf.* IOH. CAHANNES in *Studien und Mitteilungen aus dem Benediktiner- und Zisterzienserorden*, XX. (1899), 89-101; 212-234.

⁴ REINHARDT-STEFFENS, Einl. p. cccix.

of Chur remained a desirable possession for the ambitions of the nobles of the district, many of whom for this reason wished for the preservation of the bishopric. At the moment of the election of Pius V. the party of the arch-priest of Sondrio, Bartholomeo Salis, was engaged in a struggle with the canonically-elected bishop, Beato a Porta, and after he had been obliged to evacuate the episcopal residence by the intervention of the Pope, the Emperor, and the Catholic cantons, he harassed his bishop by putting every possible obstacle in his way, so that at length the latter might resign.¹ On the other hand the exceedingly democratic constitution of the Grisons had a favourable side for the Catholics. Whereas at Zurich and Berne all subjects were forced, whether they liked it or no, to adopt the religion prescribed by the government, in the Grisons the decision was left to each community. It thus came about that there belief varied from one district to another, and that of the three leagues of the territory, the principal league, or Grey League, was still to a great extent Catholic, while the League of God's House and the League of the Ten Jurisdictions followed the new doctrines.²

Bishop Beato a Porta and the judge of the Grey League also took part in the second meeting between Borromeo and Christian von Castelberg. The Cardinal found in Bishop Beato plenty of good-will, but even more of fear and hesitation. He endeavoured to encourage him to make a tour of visitations, and to reform the clergy, all the more so as the judge of the province promised him the help of the secular power; he did not, however, succeed in accomplishing very much, or in dispelling the bishop's fear of a popular rising, and the loss of his revenues and his episcopal see.³

How easily the Protestants in the Grisons were stirred up against the Catholics was shown in these very times by the

¹ Detailed account, *ibid.*, lxxxvii-xcviii, cclxxvii-cccix. Cf. LADERCHI, 1566, n. 261 *seq.*

² For the constitution of the Grisons and its influence upon religious conditions cf. SCHLISS, xlii *seq.*

³ Cf. the information sent by Borromeo on September 30, 1570, in REINHARDT-STEFFENS, *Dokumente* 15 *seq.*

sad fate of the most powerful of the lay representatives of the ancient Church, Giovanni Planta. In two briefs of September 9th and 15th, 1570, Pius V. had authorized him to recover for the Church two provostships in the Valtellina belonging to the suppressed Order of the Humiliati : a bull of February 28th, 1571, extended this faculty to all the unlawfully alienated benefices in the dioceses of Chur and Como. In one solitary instance Planta made use of this authorization in favour of one of his sons. But the preachers at once stirred up the people to such an extent that Planta was dragged before the courts and executed in 1572.¹

A mortal hatred for the ancient Church, and above all for those who tried to defend and propagate its doctrines was the special mark of Calvinism in the days of Pius V. Even in the case of the missionaries, who left the comforts of their native land in order to carry the first rudiments of Christianity to degraded savages in the countries beyond the seas, their undertaking was looked upon as a crime deserving of death.

A promising field of labour for the missions lay among the Indians of the forests of Brazil, who were, it is true, a degraded race, but docile and receptive of instruction ; this field had been cultivated with much success by the Jesuits since 1549.² When in 1566 the General of the Order, Francis Borgia, appointed visitors for the various provinces of his Order,³ he sent to South America the zealous Portuguese, Ignazio di Azevedo, who was definitely to introduce among the missionaries the constitutions and laws of the Order, hitherto unknown out there, and to report to Rome concerning the progress of their labours.

In his reports to Borgia⁴ Azevedo points out in the first place

¹ M. VALAER, Johann von Planta, Zurich, 1888 ; SCHIESS, xcvi-cxii. Excuses for the preachers and for the capital sentence, *ibid.*, cx seq.

² Cf. Vol. XIII. of this work, p. 184.

³ SACCHINI P. III., I. 2, n. 18. Cf. G. CORDARA, Istoria della vita e della Gloriosa morte del b. Ignazio de Azevedo, Rome, 1854.

⁴ Of November 9, 1566, and March 2, 1569, S. FRANCISCUS BORGIA, IV., 341 seqq. ; V., 27 seqq.

that the principal need of the mission, which was very flourishing and promising, was that they should have greater working power, and that the small number of the Jesuits in Brazil, and their isolated and scattered condition, involved danger to the missionaries themselves. It was, however, impossible to supply this need from the Indians and Mestizos, for it was a proved fact that the latter were not suited to the ecclesiastical and religious state. In the same way little could be hoped for from the Portuguese immigrants, whose thoughts were entirely occupied with their plantations and commercial interests. Several of the missionaries, moreover, who had been sent from Portugal had not fulfilled expectations. There was, therefore, only one remedy: to enlist young men in Europe and train them in Brazil itself in knowledge of the Indian tongue and the work of the missionary. Artisans, too, such as sculptors and carpenters, would be very welcome in a country which was extremely lacking in workers of that kind.

At the same time Azevedo had confidence in the enthusiasm of the Portuguese youth for the missions, nor was he disappointed. At the beginning of 1569 he returned to Europe and went to Rome, where Pius V. at once issued briefs in favour of the Brazilian mission to the Bishop of Bahia, and to the viceroy-elect, Fernan de Vasconcellos.¹ When, after that, Azevedo, armed with a letter of recommendation from Borgia,² visited the Jesuit colleges in the Iberian peninsula, his burning words stirred up a storm of enthusiasm.³ From the number who placed themselves at his disposal for the Brazilian mission he was able to recommend about thirty

¹ Both of July 6, 1569, in LADERCHI, 1569, n. 340 *seq.* The bishop was "revocare (the Indians) a ferino victu atque cultu ad mitiores mores civilemque vitæ rationem." They must specially be urged to dress decently, and for this purpose the bishop must get into touch with the civil authorities.

² To the Spanish provincials, July 4, 1569, S. FRANCISCUS BORGIA, V., 115.

³ SACCHINI P. III., I. 6, n. 295 *seq.*

for reception into the Jesuit Order ; thirteen Jesuits from the Spanish colleges, and twenty-seven from the Portuguese province obtained permission to join him, while many artisans offered to accompany him, from whom Azevedo chose sixteen.¹ Embarking in three ships, they weighed anchor on June 7th together with the small fleet which was taking to his destination the new governor of Brazil, Fernan de Vasconcellos.²

Until now the Jesuit Order had never sent out so imposing a body of missionaries.³ But of the sixty or so Jesuits only one reached Brazil, and he merely because he fell sick on the way and was forced to remain behind for the time being.⁴ Near Madeira the fleet was forced to make a long stay in order to wait for favourable winds. The ship in which Azevedo and about forty of his companions were, made a detour for trading purposes to one of the Canary Islands, and there fell into the hands of the Huguenot vice-admiral, Jean Sore.⁵ The crew of the captured vessel, even those who had just been fighting against the enemy, were spared by Sore, but he condemned the Jesuits to death as heralds of Papist superstitions. After being ill-treated in various ways they were thrown into the sea alive or dead. Only one was spared, and he it would seem, had volunteered to act as cook ; the son of the Portuguese captain voluntarily took his place, put on the habit of

¹ Azevedo to Borgia, March 16, 1570, S. FRANCISCUS, BORGIA V., 319; *cf.* 155, 188, 191, 236.

² SACCHINI P. III., I. 6, n. 220. Azevedo to Borgia, Belem, June 2, 1570, S. FRANCISCUS BORGIA, V., 410.

³ SACCHINI P. III., I. 6, n. 219.

⁴ *Ibid.*, I. 7, n. 201.

⁵ *Ibid.*, I. 6, n. 222 *seqq.* IAC. AUG. THUANI *Historiarum sui temporis*, I. 47, Leyden, 1626, II., 659. Sacchini calls the Huguenot "Iacobus Soria, perduellium ex factione Admirali [Coligny] vicarius;" in de Thou he is called "Ioannes Sora, praefecti maris legatus," which in the register (*Nominum propriorum . . . index, Coloniae Allobrogum, 1634, s.v.*) is reproduced as "Sore, Viceamiral." In de Thou Coligny is "praefectus maris."

one of the murdered Jesuits, and joyfully underwent death for the Catholic faith with the rest.¹

The remaining ships failed to reach Brazil owing to contrary winds. After an Odyssey of fifteen months the fleet was so reduced by death or desertion, that one ship was sufficient for their return to Europe ; of the thirty companions of Azevedo still remaining, half were released to return home. Near Terceira, one of the Azores, this last ship was captured on September 12th, 1571, by the Huguenot, Cadaville. Vasconcellos fell in the battle, while of the fifteen Jesuits three were killed immediately, and the eleven others thrown into the sea. Owing to a lack of provisions the corsairs also threw into the sea some of the captured crew, and among them the last of the Jesuits, who had taken off his habit in order to escape notice.²

Not all of the Huguenots approved of the conduct of Sore and Cadaville in the case of the unfortunate priests and youths, many of whom were not more than sixteen or seventeen years of age, and some only fourteen or fifteen. On the arrival of Sore at La Rochelle, the Queen of Navarre caused the crew of the captured Portuguese ship to be set at liberty, including the one Jesuit still surviving, though without giving them any money for their journey.³ Of the victims of Cadaville, two of the Jesuits, thanks to a calm that befell, were able to make their way by swimming to the ships of their enemies, and under cover of the darkness were even at length taken on

¹ SACCHINI P. III., I. 6, n. 235 *seqq.* DESJARDINS, III., 605. Two of the Jesuits who had remained at Madeira wrote a report of the occurrence from information they had received : Pedro Diaz on August 18, and Miguel Aragones on August 19, 1570 ; *cf.* SOMMERVOGEL, Bibliothèque de la Comp. de Jésus, I., 495 ; III., 40. AUG. CARAYON gives a list of the other writings about Azevedo, Bibliographie historique de la Comp. de Jésus, Paris, 1864, 212, n. 1492-1500.

² SACCHINI P. III., I. 7, n. 187 *seqq.* The earliest report of these events is that of Fr. Henriquez, of December 5, 1571 ; see SOMMERVOGEL, IV., 273.

³ SACCHINI P. III., I. 6, n. 203.

board and concealed by compassionate foes.¹ Such events as the death of Azevedo bring out in the clearest way how, after the rise of Luther and Calvin, there were to be found in Europe, two fundamentally different and bitterly opposed ideas of Christianity, and that not only from the doctrinal point of view. That it was the duty of Christianity to take the gospel to the pagan world was for the time being an idea completely foreign to the scheme of the followers of the new religion, and the attempt to do so in Brazil could not be taken seriously by them. In the old Church, on the other hand, this idea still lived on, and spurred men again and again to new and greater sacrifices. In all his efforts and schemes for obtaining new missionaries for Brazil, the fear that none would offer themselves for a purpose involving such great sacrifices, was the least of Azevedo's anxieties. Many, he wrote to Borgia,² would gladly get together, by their own efforts, the cost of the long sea voyage, so long as they had the prospect of admission to the Order beyond the seas. In the then growing city of Rio de Janeiro Azevedo was able in 1567 to lay the foundations of a great Jesuit college at the expense of King Sebastian,³ since the rulers of the Spanish and Portuguese possessions watched over the missions with zealous care, and looked upon the spread of the gospel in the pagan world as the duty of a king, and one to which they were constantly being urged by the Popes.

In this connexion Pius V., not long after his elevation to the throne, had sent to his nuncio in Madrid instructions concerning the treatment of the Indians of America.⁴ In these

¹ *Ibid.*, I. 7, n. 200.

² On October 19, 1566, S. FRANCISCUS BORGIA, IV., 342.

³ SACCHINI, P. III., I. 3, n. 263. Cf. Azevedo to Borgia, February 20, 1567, S. FRANCISCUS BORGIA, IV., 411.

⁴ Corresp. dipl., I., 437 *seqq.*; cf. CATENA, 93. Serrano places these instructions in 1566, but they contain mention and praise of the missionary work in Florida, concerning which nothing could have been known in Rome in 1566. Most probably the document is identical with the instructions, concerning which Castagna wrote to Mula on November 20, 1568: "Ha dado la

he says that the Spanish kings had been granted the right to conquer the lands beyond the seas, on the condition of their planting the Christian faith there. It was therefore the duty of the king to see that there were good preachers and priests in those countries, and that the civil authorities supported them by means of taxes. Baptism must only be conferred on the natives after they had received sufficient instruction in the Christian religion. For those who had already been baptized, and especially the children, teachers must be provided, who should form them into good Christians and citizens, and not undo by their example what they were teaching them in word. The centres of instruction must be spread about in such a way as to be convenient for the Indians. Where the natives lived scattered about in the mountains, they should be united in villages for that purpose. In this way, moreover, justice would be more easily administered, and crimes could be punished with that gentleness which the weakness of the new converts demanded.

In cases where Christians and pagans dwelt together, the pagan sanctuaries should be destroyed on account of the danger to the former, and so as not to allow anything which should be a hindrance to Christian worship. The older Christians should be exhorted to give a good example to the neophytes and live in peace with them, and for the sake of peace all feasting where the drinking of wine was concerned should be prudently done away with. Even the pagan Indians should at least be taught to reverence the sanctity of marriage so far as to give up polyandry. The Indians were not slaves, and must not be oppressed by excessive taxation; even the officials and gentry must show respect to the priests and missionaries; the Spaniards in the New World must set a good example, and visitors should be sent from time to time to inspect the judges and officials. Wars against the pagans

instruccion sobre Indias al Rey " (Corresp. dipl., II., 472 n.). A review of the decrees of Pius V. concerning the missions (according to CYRIACUS MOREL S.J., *Fasti novi orbis* Venice, 1776) in STREIT, 505, n. 113-136.

must not be lightly undertaken, and must never be carried on in a cruel way. The way in which an attempt was being made to introduce the gospel into Florida, might be taken as an example by other countries.

All that was thus detailed in these instructions Pius V. also repeated from time to time in letters to the Spanish and Portuguese governments. When in 1567 and 1568 Kings Sebastian and Philip II. sent out new officials to the colonies, a whole series of briefs was issued in this sense, in order to remind the kings and their officials of their duty.¹ King Sebastian, so the Pope wrote to Cardinal Henry of Portugal,² should instruct the viceroy and the council of the Indies to protect the neophytes from the tyranny of the soldiers, and to remove scandals which might stand in the way of their conversion. The honour of Portugal and the consolidation of their dominion in the Indies was involved, he told the council of the Indies.³ He therefore exhorted the Portuguese viceroy to protect the missionaries, to deal in a friendly spirit with the new converts, and to admit them to public office and status.⁴ The letters to the King of Spain and his officials are to the same effect. The Pope desires the avoidance of all violence; with a good government, and good example on the part of the priests, the yoke of Christ can be rendered light to those Indians who have already been converted, while the tribes that are still pagan can be attracted to the faith in a loving and skilful way.⁵ The exhortation to admit

¹ To Cardinal Henry of Portugal, October 9, 1567, in LADERCHI, 1567, n. 252; to the Council of the Indies, October 11, 1567, *ibid.*, n. 253; to the Portuguese viceroy, December 25, 1567, *ibid.*, n. 254; to the viceroy of Mexico, Marchese de Falces, October 8, 1567, to Philip II., August 17, 1568, *ibid.*, 1568, n. 206; three briefs to Cardinal Espinosa, the viceroy of Peru, Francisco di Toledo, and the Spanish council of the Indies, all of August 18, 1568, *ibid.*, n. 206. Cf. MARGRAF, Kirche und Sklaverei, Tübingen, 1865, 146 seq.

² LADERCHI, 1567, n. 252.

³ *Ibid.*, n. 253.

⁴ *Ibid.*, n. 254.

⁵ To Philip II., *ibid.*, 1568, n. 206.

the natives into public employment occurs again in 1571 in a brief to the King of Portugal, in which the Pope, far in advance of his times, recommends the taking of steps for the formation of a native priesthood, since Europe could not for long provide the necessary supply for the missions.¹

It is not surprising that the Papal letters on behalf of the missionary territories were specially directed to the civil authorities. The Church of the Indies had been placed entirely in their hands by the bull of Julius II. of July 28th, 1508.² "It is difficult to imagine," says of Mexico one who is well acquainted with the ecclesiastical history of that country,³ "a system of control more absolute than

1 " * . . non enim fieri potest, ut aliunde semper illuc mittantur, qui populis illis spiritualia ministrent; sed sicut nascentis ecclesiae temporibus apostoli ex eorum numero, qui fidem christianam receperant, aptiores et magis idoneos ministros eligebant, sic etiam nunc dare operam oportet, ut fides ipsa christiana apud eas nationes sic radices agat ac propagetur, ut recedentibus vel decedentibus eius auctoribus non continuo exarescat, sed habeat illic nativos cultores, quorum piis laboribus atque industria niti atque augescere possit. Non enim tantum est in hominibus ad Christum convertendis lucri, quantum in eisdem, postquam christiani facti sunt, negligendis detrimenti." To King Sebastian, January 4, 1571, Arm. 44, t. 15, p. 280b, Papal Secret Archives.

² Printed from Colecc. de docum. inéd. de Indias, XXXV., 25, in G. BERCHET, *Fonti italiane per la storia della scoperta del nuovo mondo*, I., Rome, 1892, 24 seq. For the pontifical documents concerning the two Indies cf. J. PEREIRA DE SOLORZANO, *De Indiarum iure*, Madrid, 1629 (STREIT, n. 443). Cf. also Vol. VI. of this work, p. 441.

³ C. CRIVELLI in *The Catholic Encyclopedia*, X., New York, s.a. (1911), 260 seq. Cf. A. FREYTAG in *Zeitschrift für Missionswissenschaft*, III. (1913), 11 seqq. "Probably in no European state was the *Placetum regium* used so widely, or so strictly and for so long a time, as in Portugal and its colonies. . . . Without the *exequatur* of the cabinet, neither ordinance of bishop nor decree of Pope, whether dogmatic or disciplinary, had any validity in law which was recognized by the state within the Portuguese dominions. The publication of any act which was not pleasing

that which the kings of Spain, either in person, or through the council of the Indies, and the viceroy or governor, exercised in all ecclesiastical matters," and what is true of Mexico applied even more fully to the Indies. No church could be built, no religious Order could be set up, no religious foundation take place, without the consent of the king. He had the right of nomination to all the bishoprics. Ten days after the king's wishes had been made known to the bishops, they were bound to see to the conferring of ecclesiastical benefices: if they refused without some lawful reason, some other bishop, chosen by the candidate, was to see to the benefice being conferred. The right of presentation to all abbacies and regular prelacies as well as to every ecclesiastical benefice belonged to the king.¹ He fixed the boundaries of all the new bishoprics, sent the religious where he liked, and decided when they were to be transferred from one province to another. Religious establishments were under the superintendence of the Council of the Indies, and in order that this superintendence might be properly carried out, the office of commissary-general was established. The religious provincials were nominated by the General of the Order, but they had then to inform the commissary-general of his choice, and until the council of the Indies had given its approval, the appointment remained in suspense. All decrees by which religious provinces were abolished, or new ones founded, as well as the sending of visitors, etc., had to be submitted to the council of the Indies. All Papal bulls and briefs, and all instructions from Generals of Orders or other superiors, passed through the hands of the council of the Indies, without whose seal they could not be put into force; the same thing applied to the decrees of provincial councils in the colonies, and the decrees of the chapters of religious orders. If there were a question of the foundation of new missions, or of religious

to the authorities became physically impossible." A. JANN, *Die katholischen Missionen in Indien, Cina und Japan*, Paderborn, 1915, 112 *seq.*

¹ Julius II. had already granted all this. BERCHET, *loc. cit.*, I., 24.

provinces or seminaries, a commissary had first of all to be appointed, who had to submit the matter to the viceroy or governor, to the *audiencia* of the district, and to the bishop. Armed with their opinions the commissary then set out for Spain and laid his petition before the commissary-general of the Indies. The latter then took the matter, together with all the opinions, before the council of the Indies, whereupon the council or the commissary-general decided upon the provinces from which the necessary religious were to be drawn. Accompanied by these he could then return to the Indies where, after further reports to the officials who had sent him, the matter was at length brought to a conclusion. If he wished to leave the Indies again, a regular could not, according to a royal decree of July 29th, 1564, even appeal to permission from the Pope ; he must obtain permission from the council of the Indies, though, in certain definite cases, the approval of the bishop was enough.

The Spanish government had assumed some of these rights on its own authority, but most of them rested upon concessions granted by the Holy See. The kings had endowed almost all the churches of the New World with revenues : they bore the travelling expenses of the missionaries and bishops, and they provided the churches with wax, oil, and all the things necessary for divine worship. The building of new churches and the foundation of new missions depended to a great extent upon the support of the king ; if repairs were necessary in any church, they had to be made at the charge of the royal taxes. Alexander VI. had granted the king the right of receiving tithes in the Indies on condition of his equipping the churches and bearing the expenses of divine worship.¹ The kings, however, but rarely made use of this right, but made over the tithes to the bishops, the clergy, the churches or the hospitals. For the most part the bishops

¹ By a bull of September 25, 1493, printed from SOLORZANO, I., 613, in BERCHET, I., 15 *seq.* Cf. the brief of Julius II. of April 8, 1510 (published by F. FITA in the *Boletín de la R. Academia de la historia*, 1892, 261 *seqq.*) *ibid.* 230 *seq.*

nominated by the king, such as Giuliano Garcés of Tlaxcala, Zumárraga of Mexico, or Vasco de Quirás of Michoacán, were learned and capable men. In spite of the endless delays in setting up monasteries, there was a large number of them, while the hospitals and the churches could hardly be counted. On the whole, therefore, owing to the deep religious feeling of the Spanish people, the royal right of superintendence was favourable to the Church.

In the time of Pius V., however, it once happened that in the Mexican diocese of Oaxaca the seminary, which had already been established, had to be closed, because the revenues had been withheld from the bishop; the Pope made complaint of this to the King of Spain.¹ For the rest, however, even at that time the colonies and missions were liberally assisted by the Spanish government. An example of this occurred during the reign of Pius V. in the foundation of the religious province of the Jesuits in Peru. Philip II. had himself in 1567 asked for missionaries for the Indians of that country, and Francis Borgia had allowed him two from each of the four Spanish provinces of the Order, who were so abundantly provided by the king with all that was necessary that they were able to refuse many generous offers made to them privately.² The royal instructions concerning the provision made for the Jesuits who were sent to Mexico to found a province of the Order in 1571 are still preserved,³ and give details of what was to be given to each one.

King Sebastian of Portugal did not fall behind the Spanish sovereign in this respect. In accordance with his proposal for establishing several seminaries for the training of missionaries, Pius V. allowed him to make over monasteries which had fallen into a state of decay to the mendicant Orders, as for

¹ Three letters, to Castagna, Philip II., and the Bishop of Oaxaca (Antequera), all of April 2, 1570, in LADERCHI, 1570, n. 424, 426, 427.

² ASTRAIN, II., 307. SACCHINI P. III., I. 3, n. 280. For the call of the Jesuits to Peru *cf.* S. FRANCISCUS BORGIA, IV., 619, 631, 641, 658, 678 *seqq.*; ASTRAIN, II., 304 *seqq.*

³ Of August 6, 1571, in ASTRAIN, II., 300 *seq.*

example the Dominicans and the Jesuits, on the condition that they should every year send some missionaries to the Indies.¹ The king further wished that houses should be established in the Indies for the catechumens, where those pagans who wished to embrace Christianity could be instructed for a time before their baptism.² Pius V. gave his support to this plan by granting indulgences to those who contributed to such foundations, and those who gave themselves to the service of the catechumens in these houses.³

The Pope's exhortations to the King of Spain had immediate results in the Spanish part of South America, the viceroyalty of Peru. When in 1568 Philip II. sent Francisco Toledo there as his new viceroy, he specially recommended him to look after the spiritual well-being of the Indians,⁴ and the matters in which Toledo brought about an improvement were almost identical with those which Pius V. had insisted upon in his instructions to Castagna.

At the time of the conquest of Peru the country had been divided up into a number of small districts, and in each district the duty of seeing to the conversion of the Indians had been entrusted to a Spaniard, together with that of the civil administration. It was the function of this so-called commendatory to appoint a parish priest from among the secular or regular clergy, whose maintenance was provided for by an annual payment in money from the commendatory, together

¹ Brief of October 27, 1567, in LADERCHI, 1567, n. 248.

² Brief of October 4, 1567, *ibid.* n. 251.

³ Cf. a report from Toledo immediately after his arrival in Peru, from which a *Relación sumaria* is printed in Colecc. de docum. inéd. para la historia de Espana, XCIV., 255-298 and the *Memorial* which he drew up thirteen years later on his return to Europe, *ibid.*, XXVI., 122-161. A short review of the state of affairs in SACCHINI P. III., I. 8, n. 315 *seqq.*

⁴ "Una de las casas que principalmente por V.M. me fué manda y dada instruxion para ello cuando V.M. me mandó que fuese al gobierno de aquella tierra, fué la doctrina y conversion de los naturales della y su gobierno y sustentacion." Toledo in the *Memorial*, *loc. cit.*, 134.

with gifts in kind and service from the natives. If on the one hand the commendatory was often unwilling to pay the parish priest his stipend, on the other it was not infrequently the case that the Indians could only be induced by force to make their contributions. Relations were rendered more strained owing to the fact that the parish priest also had judicial authority over the Indians even in civil matters, with the result that he himself, as well as the commendatory and Christianity itself became objects of hatred.¹

The cruelty with which the conquerors repressed all revolts on the part of the Indians, and the harshness with which they employed their power, were by no means calculated to induce the natives to accept the situation. The Dominican, Gil González, himself an eye-witness, in a memorial drawn up in defence of the Indies, expressed the view that they were treated far worse than slaves, because, loaded as they were with regulations and other burdens, they had to make a road of twenty or thirty leagues in length before they arrived at the place where they were to work: from their youth they were burdened with toil, so that from the time of their birth to that of their death they never knew a happy hour.² Another monk, Rodrigo de Loaisa, who had been a witness of the state of affairs in Peru for thirty years, wrote in 1586 that many of the Indians took their own lives in order to escape their troubles, and that if the priests told them that suicide was a sin that would take them to hell, they replied that they did not wish to go to heaven if there were any Spaniards there, because even there they would torment them worse than the devils in hell.³ There was but one feeble excuse for the op-

¹ SACCHINI, P. III., I. 8, n. 315.

² "Relación de los agravios que los Indios de las provincias de Chile padecen," in Colecc. de docum. inéd., XCIV., 77.

³ "Memorial de las cosas del Pirú tocantes á los Indios" c. 48, in Colecc. de docum. inéd., XCIV., 589. It would seem that the author was an Augustinian, since, according to p. 571 *seq.* the Order to which he belonged was "la más moderna en aquellas partes" and of the four earliest Orders in Peru, the Franciscans, Dominicans, Mercedarii, and Augustinians (*Memorial*, c. 21,

pressors, that the Indians were possibly even worse treated by their own caciques than by the foreigners.¹

The instructions in Christianity which the Peruvians received were in many ways quite insufficient. There was a great scarcity of priests, and where they had any they had no knowledge of the language of the Indians, or looked upon their office principally as a means of enriching themselves. Of the stations which the viceroy, Toledo, visited in his first tour of inspection, seventeen were without a priest at all ;² in the diocese of Quito, in a district forty-two miles in length, there was only one priest.³ In the archdiocese of Lima forty Indian parishes were vacant.⁴ Several Indians complained with tears to the viceroy that they could not understand their masters, and were not understood by them ;⁵ they knew the Christian prayers, but only so as to say them like parrots without understanding them ;⁶ the interpreters of whom the parish priests of the Indians made use, were very inaccurate.⁷ The reasons why the Pope had insisted so strongly with the Spanish government upon the necessity of instructing the Indians were only too clearly illustrated by statements such as these ; the Indians in Peru were Christians in name, but not at heart ; often it happened that even those who had been baptized fell back into the secret practice of their former worship of idols.⁸

To the honour of the Spanish government in the colonies it must be said that it set itself seriously to remove or reduce the abuses. Toledo ordered that from that time forward no

p. 569) the three former had already sent missionaries to Peru with the first conquerors. Cf. the *Relación* of Pedro Ruiz Naharro in the Colecc. de docum. inéd., XXVI., 248, 255.

¹ LOAISA, Memorial, c. 47, *loc. cit.*, 587.

² TOLEDO, *Relación sumaria*, n. 9, p. 256.

³ *Ibid.*, n. 10, p. 256.

⁴ *Ibid.*, n. 30, p. 263.

⁵ TOLEDO, Memorial, n. 3, *loc. cit.*, XXVI., 126.

⁶ TOLEDO, *Relación* n. 15, p. 258.

⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸ *Ibid.* and Memorial, n. 4, p. 127.

monk or priest should be appointed to an Indian parish unless he knew the language of his future flock ; those priests who were already in office were not to receive their full stipend until they had given proofs of their knowledge in this respect. A special chair was set up in the University of Lima for the study of the language most widely used in the Indies, and those who sought appointments to Indian parishes had to pass an examination before this faculty.¹ Toledo could also boast that during the time of his government the number of those in charge of souls among the Indians had been increased by more than four hundred, whose maintenance was provided from the taxes.² Toledo saw in a measure which had already been recommended by Pius V. the principal means of providing organized spiritual care of the Indians : this was to gather together into settlements those natives who were scattered far and wide in the mountain districts, and who were often quite inaccessible, and to assign a priest to each group of four or five hundred natives. These settlements were to be placed in the best situations in the territory, and provided with public buildings, such as hospitals, prisons and municipal offices ; the Indians themselves were to have a seat on the council of each colony, and to have a voice in the decision of their own affairs.³ Before the Peruvians who were not yet baptized were made Christians, care must be taken that they should first become men of good behaviour, and for this purpose he began at Cuzco and Lima the erection of two colleges, where the sons of the caciques and curaques could be instructed and educated, with the idea that the other Indians would be guided in all things by the example of their chiefs.⁴ Toledo took special credit to himself for his reorganization of justice among the natives ;⁵ he boasted that now every Indian had the courage to ask for justice against the Spaniards, against the priests

¹ TOLEDO, Memorial, n. 3, p. 126.

² *Ibid.*, n. 18, p. 142.

³ *Ibid.*, n. 18-19, p. 141 *seqq.*

⁴ *Ibid.*, n. 4, p. 127.

⁵ *Ibid.*, n. 8 and 20, p. 129 and 143 *seqq.*

and the commendatories, and even against their own caciques.¹ He also boasted that by his orders the Indians had been repaid a million and a half of goods of which they had been defrauded,² that hospitals had been erected and endowed for them at Guamanga, Cuzco, La Paz, Chuquisaca, Potosi and Arequipa,³ and steps taken to protect them from the pillaging and ravaging of their territories.⁴

Fray Loaisa says in forcible terms that the viceroy and the great officials of Peru had done all they could to heal the many evils, but that the same thing had happened in their case as in that of the tinker who, in stopping up one hole had made four new ones.⁵ Loaisa also passes an unfavourable judgment in many ways upon the steps which had been taken by Toledo. Thus, it was quite proper that on account of the abuses involved, the parish priests among the Indians should no longer have the right of inflicting whippings and similar punishments, but in several places the *corregidor* did not perhaps put in an appearance for more than two days in a whole year, so that if the priest was unable to take any action against drunkenness or concubinage, these offences could prevail unpunished and unrestrained.⁶ Many evil results also flowed from the fact that the priests in charge of the natives could no longer obtain their maintenance, as far as contributions in kind were concerned.⁷ Above all, the taxes which Toledo imposed upon the Indians were too heavy: they had to work all through the year, or go to Potosi to work in the mines in order to earn no more than the money which they had to pay in taxes.⁸

In spite of all his complaints Loaisa had to admit that some of the priests among the Indians were capable and conscien-

¹ *Ibid.*, n. 8, p. 130.

² *Ibid.*, n. 17, p. 140.

³ *Ibid.*, n. 14, p. 138.

⁴ *Ibid.*, n. 21-22, p. 146 *seqq.*

⁵ Memorial, c. 27, p. 573 *seq.*

⁶ *Ibid.*, c. 20, p. 658.

⁷ *Ibid.*, c. 13, p. 564 *seq.*

⁸ *Ibid.*, c. 49 *seqq.*, p. 500 *seqq.*

tious men, who did not impose arbitrary taxes upon their subjects, and did much good.¹ At Quito the Franciscans distinguished themselves by their missionary labours, and among their number the founder of that mission, Josse Ricke of Marselaer died in 1570 in the odour of sanctity.² In spite of this, however, there was a danger of the Indian settlements being taken away from the Franciscans;³ in other districts the regulars themselves were anxious, an account of the many inconveniences involved, to be allowed to hand over their work to secular priests;⁴ the Jesuits, who arrived in Peru in 1568 and 1569, hesitated for a long time before they would undertake parishes among the Indians, and their refusal at first was a constant source of trouble to them.⁵

Although the Spanish conquerors and their immediate successors cannot escape the blame of harshness and cruelty towards the natives, it would nevertheless be unjust to make the Spanish government responsible for their excesses, or to speak of the abuses of those early days as typical of the whole Spanish administration of the colonies. On the contrary, no European nation has shown on the whole greater care and anxiety for the welfare of the native populations than the Spaniards. Whereas under English rule the Indians of North America were left in their savagery, and attempts were even made to drive them out and destroy them, in the Spanish possessions in America the principle had been accepted, even in the time of Isabella of Castille, of treating the Indians as

¹ "Otros hay de gran virtud y verdad entre los Indios que tienen gran cuenta con sus conciencias y con no agraviar á estos miserables" (Memorial c. 13, p. 565). "Es verdad que hay grandes siervos entre ellos [among the curates who came from the monastic orders], y hacen gran provecho entre aquellos (*ibid.*, c. 24, p. 571).

² MARCELLINO DA CIVEZZA, *Storia universale delle Missioni Francescane.*, VII., 2 Prato, 1891, 87 *seqq.*

³ *Ibid.*, 89.

⁴ E.g. the Augustinians and the Franciscans. LOAISA, *Memorial*, c. 24, p. 571 *seq.*

⁵ ASTRAIN, II., 313 *seqq.*

free subjects, enjoying the same rights as Europeans.¹ "A system of legislation for the Indians was in force, the profound humanity and penetrating foresight of which far surpassed the treatment accorded to the Indians by France, to say nothing of that of England ; and it was a significant fact that, at the end of the eighteenth century the Creoles complained that the government did everything for the Indians, but very little for them."² Moreover, there were Las Casas and the religious already mentioned to make grave remonstrances in the case of various abuses, and the very fact that they were able to speak in words of such bitter blame is a striking proof of the goodwill of the government, and of the state of public opinion in Spain. What the viceroy Toledo did for the Indians of Peru was certainly deserving of all praise, but he was by no means alone in his efforts, and it may be said that the whole of the Spanish legislation for the colonies was animated by the same spirit.

That matters did not turn out differently was due in large measure to the Papacy. The Popes had consented to the subjection of the Indians on the condition that they should be brought to a knowledge of Christianity, and again and again they reminded the rulers of Spain of the obligation which they had undertaken in conquering the New World. But the conversion of the nomadic Indians was impossible unless they were gathered together in permanent settlements, and raised to a higher degree of civilization. The exhorta-

¹ DAENELL, 73.

² DAENELL, 75. "If the colonial administration of Spain is looked at from the point of view of its laws, these display in every sense an extraordinary degree of prudence and care. Some of them, such as the special legislation for the Indians, have never so far been equalled by any other nation which possesses colonies. Everywhere we find deep moral motives, which have given rise to the laws." (*ibid.*, 78). "The singular fact of the rapid expansion and the secure government shown in the case of the Spanish colonial empire, proves in a high degree the capacity of the Spanish race, and the sagacity and humanity of the Spanish rule." (*ibid.*, 81).

tions of Pius V. to Philip II. are an example of the way in which the efforts of the Popes for the civilization of America were not without success, and if, even after several centuries, all that was to be desired had not yet been attained, the difficulties of the undertaking must not be lost sight of.¹

The Pope himself was certainly not satisfied with the progress made with the work which he had encouraged in Peru, but consoling reports reached him from several other missions. On March 21st, 1569, the Bishop of Michoacán in Mexico wrote that the Indians there had embraced the faith, and that moreover some of them were preaching to their fellow-countrymen in their native tongue ;² about the same time the archbishop of the capital³ announced that he had baptized five thousand pagans with his own hands. Pius V. replied to the archbishop expressing his joy and urging him to instruct the Indians well in the faith before baptizing them.⁴ The necessary precautions with regard to this matter were taken in the provincial council of Mexico in 1570.⁵ Pius V. had previously recommended to the Archbishop of Mexico the protection of the Indians against the violence of the soldiers.⁶

The territory adjoining Mexico, Florida, at that time pos-

¹ " If the progress which they [the Indians] made under Spanish influence in a work of civilization extending over three centuries, seems to be but small in the end, we must not forget that it was a case of lifting up hundreds of thousands from the deepest paganism, the most primitive organization, from sloth and the civilization of the stone age to Christianity, autonomy, thrift and individualism based upon a pecuniary economic system. The task was in itself an enormous one, and the spiritual and bodily feebleness of the race helped to make the task more difficult." DAENELL, 78.

² Cf. the brief to the bishop, April 2, 1570, in LADERCHI, 1570, n. 428.

³ March 30, 1569 ; cf. the brief to the archbishop, April 2, 1570 ; *ibid.*, n. 416.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ *Ibid.*, n. 420.

⁶ Brief of October 7, 1567, in LADERCHI, 1567, n. 262.

sessed in Menéndez de Avilés a governor after Pius V.'s own heart. Menéndez looked upon his office, not as an opportunity for enriching himself, but as a definite call to look after the well-being of the Indians, by making them good Christians. In March, 1565, he applied to Francis Borgia for missionaries.¹ The labours of the Jesuits among the rude Indians, however, were almost fruitless. Believing that the harshness and bad example of the Spaniards were the causes of their ill-success, eight missionaries tried to found a settlement in the midst of the savages and far away from all Europeans, but they were all killed in February, 1571, and in consequence gave up their fruitless work in Florida.² The Jesuits founded instead a province of the Order in Mexico in 1571.³

In New Granada the Dominican Louis Bertrand (Beltran) preached the gospel to the Indians with extraordinary success from 1562 to 1569.⁴ He, too, was much hampered in his good work by the bad example of the whites, and their cruelty to the natives. He was able, however, to win a great name for himself, above all by his almost incredible austerity of life.

¹ S. FRANCISCUS BORGIA, III., 762 *seq.* The letter also shows how very imperfect the geographical ideas of America still were, almost half a century after the discovery of the Pacific Ocean. Avilés thought that Florida was joined on to China, or was only separated from it by an arm of the sea. A letter of Avilés of August 6, 1568, *loc. cit.*, IV., 697; a letter to him of March 7, 1568, *ibid.*, 577. For Menéndez *cf.* DAENELL, 47 *seq.*

² ASTRAIN, II., 284-298.

³ *Ibid.*, 298-303.

⁴ The Dominican, Vincenzo Giustiniani, Antist., described the life of Bertrand, partly from personal knowledge, in 1581, and the Dominican, Bartolomeo Aviñones, in 1623, on the basis of the acta of his canonization; both are printed in *Acta Sanct.*, October 5, 292 *seqq.*, 366 *seqq.* BERTRAND WILBERFORCE wrote a new life, London, 1882, which was translated into German by M. v. WIDEK, Graz, 1888. Bertrand (died 1581) was canonized on April 12, 1671. For the missionary labours of the Franciscans in New Granada at that time, *cf.* MARCELLINO DA CIVEZZA, *loc. cit.* 27. The Franciscans made an attempt to establish themselves permanently in the island of Trinidad in 1571; *ibid.*, 36.

Armed with nothing but the Holy Scriptures and his breviary, bare-footed and without provisions, sometimes even without guides, who would not stay with him, he made his long missionary journeys through impassable forests or under a burning sun, adding to the scarcely bearable hardships of this life voluntary fasts and hard penances. It was the belief of all that he had the gift of miracles ; he must have won for the Church more than twenty thousand Indians, all well instructed in Christianity.

A more detailed description of the labours and successes of this great missionary is rendered impossible by that same difficulty which so often confronts the historian of the propagation of the faith. While Ignatius of Loyola laid upon his subjects the duty of making regular reports of their labours, because he saw in this a means of exciting fervour and advancing the work,¹ the opposite was the case with the other Orders. The earliest biographer of Louis Bertrand² relates that he highly praised the zeal of the Jesuits in this respect and blamed the neglect of his own brethren, but that he was nevertheless unwilling to follow the example of the Jesuits, and made evasive replies when he was asked about his own work. The result is that we have not even one letter belonging to the time of his missionary labours.

In Africa all the hopes of the mission to Abyssinia which had been undertaken with such high expectations seemed to have vanished in the time of Pius V. The patriarch,

¹ Constitutiones, P. VIII., c. 1, n. 9 (Inst. S. J., II., Florence, 1893, 115, 117).

² " Utque laudabat ille plurimum diligentiam patrum Iesuitarum, qui memoriae prodiderunt labores, quos sui subierunt in Japonia, China, aliisque oris, in quibus Evangelium praedicarunt, ita improbat negligentiam nostrorum, qui cum sui in Indiis occidentalibus et orientalibus, Taprobana multisque aliis in regnis tantopere laboraverint hactenus a Pontificatu Alexandri VI., ac in multis oris Guineae iam inde a tempore Innocentii VII . . . , vix ullus repertus fuerit, qui curaverit litteris consignare afflictiones ac martyrium nostrorum patrum." *ANTIST, Vita* n. 81 : *Acta Sanct.* V., 324 ; *cf.* n. 62, p. 320,

Nuñez Barreto, had died at Goa in 1562 without having ever set foot in his diocese. Pius V. hoped to make better use in Japan of Oviedo, who had been hitherto his coadjutor, and of whose presence in Abyssinia Pius IV. had made use in 1561 to invite the Negus Minas to the Council of Trent.¹ Oviedo, however, begged to be allowed to remain with the few Catholics of Abyssinia.² Pius V. also gave orders to the second coadjutor of the patriarch Barreto to go to Japan and China,³ but he never reached those countries and died at Macao in 1595.⁴ Other attempts by the Jesuits to penetrate into Africa in 1560 also remained without result, both on the west coast in Angola, and on the east coast among the negroes south of the Zambesi.⁵ No renewal of these attempts took place in the time of Pius V. In order to protect the Abyssinian mission the Pope tried to obtain the armed intervention of Portugal against the Turks, whose fleet in the Red Sea was devastating that country.⁶

The Pope received more consoling news from the East Indies. From King Sebastian he received tidings that the Franciscans, Dominicans and Jesuits were preaching the gospel to the Indians, both courageously and successfully.⁷

¹ Brief of August 20, 1561, in BECCARI, X., 125; covering letter of August 23, *ibid.*, 130.

² Brief to Oviedo, February 2, 1566 (Portuguese translation), *ibid.*, V., 424; Oviedo's reply, June 15, 1567, *ibid.*, X., 215.

³ Brief to Melchoir Carneiro, February 3, 1566, *ibid.*, 187.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 331, n. 1.

⁵ L. KILGER, *Die erste Mission unter den Bantustämmen Ostafrikas*, Münster, 1917. For Angola (1560) *cf.* SACCHINI, P. II., I. 4, n. 203; for the expedition on the Zambesi, *ibid.*, 210 *seqq.*, I. 5, n. 219 *seqq.*, I. 6, n. 158. What Sacchini reports concerning the principal rivers of Africa (I. 4, n. 224) is not without interest. He knew that the White Nile flowed out of a lake and that the Congo (Zaires) flowed first to the north, and then turned to the west.

⁶ Briefs to King Sebastian and Cardinal Henry, both of December 17, 1569, in LADERCHI, 1569, n. 337 *seq.*

⁷ Brief to the Archbishop of Goa, January 1, 1570, *ibid.*, 1570, n. 429.

All the neighbourhood of Goa had gradually become Christian, and in 1560 the Jesuits alone counted 12,967 baptisms.¹ Among the bishops, the Dominican, Enrico Tavera of Cochin, distinguished himself especially by his zeal in instructing and converting the natives ; Pius V. praised him in a special brief.² The native priest too, Andrea Vaz, who was the son of a Brahmin, worked with great success among his fellow-country-men.³ The viceroys, Constantino di Braganza and Antonio di Noronha, supported the missionaries with all their power.⁴ The council which met at Goa in 1567 in order to promulgate the decrees of Trent, also made regulations concerning the Indian missions.⁵ On October 7th, 1567, the Pope addressed to the Archbishop of Goa, Gaspare de Leão Pereira, who had held this council, a brief of encouragement, in which he dissuaded him from his plan of laying down the burden of the episcopate, and gave him faculties to dispense from matrimonial impediments of a merely ecclesiastical nature in the case of the neophytes. Leão nevertheless resigned after the council.⁶ In those districts where access to a bishop was difficult, the Jesuits were given in December, 1567, the same faculties to dispense, and at the same time received a splendid tribute to their missionary activity.⁷

¹ MÜLLBAUER, 82. SACCHINI, P., II., I. 4, n. 255.

² Of January 7, 1570, in LADERCHI, 1570, n. 430.

³ MÜLLBAUER, 81.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 79, 86.

⁵ Cf. Bullarium Patronatus Portugalliae in ecclesiis Africae, Asiae atque Oceaniae curante Levi Maria Jordão de Pavia Manso, Lisbon, 1868 *seqq.*, App. I. ; SACCHINI, P., III., I. 3, n. 225.

⁶ LADERCHI, 1567, n. 247.

⁷ "Cum gratiarum omnium largitor Altissimus vestris cordibus tantum honoris sui amorem tantumque salutis animarum studii impresserit, ut ex Societate vestra plurimi propagandae religionis christianae et homines gentiles idolorumque cultores ad sui Creatoris ac Salvatoris cognitionem adducendi cupiditate flagrantes, non itinerum, non navigationum laboribus aut periculis territi ex his Europae partibus in Aethiopiam, Persidem, Indiam, usque ad Moluccas et Japoniam ac alias Orientis insulas et regiones

Christianity also made satisfactory progress in Japan, as was shown in the pontificates of the successors of Pius V.¹

As may be seen from the facts here mentioned, Pius V. devoted incomparably greater activity to the missions than his immediate predecessors. Whereas, for example, Paul IV. or Pius IV. had occasionally addressed a brief of exhortation or instruction to the heralds of the faith or sent briefs in their favour to the kings and bishops, their successor hardly ever let an opportunity pass of doing so. Pius V., moreover, aimed at bringing the missions into more immediate relations with the Holy See, and at making them more independent of the influence of the secular princes. At first he thought of sending to the Indies some suitable person, who should be dependent upon the Holy See alone, and could intervene with all the authority of a nuncio.² This plan, however, was allowed to lapse, because Philip II. did not wish for a nuncio overseas.³ On the other hand, a second plan was carried into effect, with happy results: at the end of July, 1568, the Pope set up two congregations of Cardinals in order to promote and propagate the faith; one was to take for its sphere of activity the countries inhabited by heretics, the other the countries overseas and the missions;⁴ the first beginnings of

alias a nobis remotissimas et in extremo orbe terrarum positas adire non debent, etc." (Litterae apost., quibus institutio, confirmatio et varia privilegia continentur Societatis Iesu, Romae, 1606, 13).

¹ A more detailed account in volume xix. of this work.

² Bonelli to Castagna, April 21, 1568, Corresp. dipl., II., 350 *seqq.*

³ Castagna to Bonelli, June 11, 1568, *ibid.*, 390; *cf.* 392. On October 1, 1568, Castagna reported to Bonelli, that the king had caused a discussion to be held as to the best way to prevent cruelty to the Indians and as to whether a hereditary viceroy should be appointed and a patriarch (once more) nominated for the Indies. This latter question was decided in the negative as the patriarch might be tempted to rebel against the king and the Roman Church. *Ibid.*, 472.

⁴ CANISHI Epist., VI., 581 *seqq.* Borgia to Nadal, August 2, 1568, NADAL, III., 625. SACCHINI, P., III., 1. 4. n. 129, whence is drawn LADERCHI, 1568, n. 206.

the Congregation of Propaganda, which afterwards developed activities of such extraordinary usefulness, may thus be traced back to Pius V. It was Francis Borgia who, at an audience of May 20th, 1568, suggested the congregation for the conversion of the infidels.¹ The Pope appointed as its first members the four Cardinals, Mula, Crivelli, Sirleto and Carafa ; several of the papal briefs mentioned above were the result of their zeal.

It is very significant that in all these briefs it is insisted again and again that the missionaries must labour to give as full an instruction as possible to the converts. Hitherto it had been thought sufficient to have only wandering missionaries. The few heralds of the faith who, for example, found themselves faced in South America by a population like the sands of the sea, directed their efforts to bringing no more than the most essential Christian ideas to the knowledge of the greatest possible number of persons ; thus we often hear of thousands and tens of thousands of baptisms, but, except in certain exceptional cases, such as Mexico, there is no mention of real Christian communities under the care of permanent pastors of souls. Moreover, in their great zeal, several of the missionaries looked upon their office too much from the point of view of their own sanctification. According to the maxims of the gospel there could be no greater work of charity towards our fellow men and God than to care for the spiritual salvation of one's neighbour, especially if this was accomplished at the cost of heroic personal sacrifice. But for souls of a generous nature there was a danger of the missions being looked upon principally as an opportunity for self-sacrifice, and for extraordinary sufferings and even martyrdom, as the supreme proof of the love of God ; the self-sacrificing activity of the wandering missionary was more attractive to such souls than the quiet work of a permanent priest in a small community of converts. These facts must be kept in mind if we would form a true judgment of the insistence of Pius V. upon making the work as solid as possible.

¹ Testimony of Polanco, who was present at the audience. NADAL, III., 626 n. ; cf. SACCHINI, *loc. cit.*

It was of great importance for the future that one of the recently established Orders which had from the first included the propagation of the faith in the pagan world among its objects, put the maxims of Pius V. into practice in every respect. The instructions of Francis Borgia to his subjects are drawn up entirely in this sense. Wherever our members go, he wrote in March, 1567,¹ their first care must be for the Christians who have already been converted, and they must use every means to preserve them in the faith, and to further the salvation of their souls. Only when that is done should they turn their attention to the conversation of others who are not yet baptized, but even then let them proceed prudently and not take upon themselves more than they can accomplish. They must not think it a gain to wander about here and there in order to convert pagans whom they cannot afterwards watch over; let them rather proceed by degrees, and consolidating their gains, since it is the wish of His Holiness, as he has told our people, that more should not be baptized than can be maintained in the faith.² They should not expose themselves to great risk of life among peoples not yet won over, since, although it may be for themselves an advantage to give up their lives in the service of God, this is not serving the common good, when we have so few labourers in the vineyard, and the Company can with difficulty send others to take their place. The same exhortation to maintain in the first place what had already been won, and only then to proceed further, is again repeated to the visitor of the Indies, with a further appeal to the wishes of Pius V. "This is the will of the Pope: it does not seem to him to be any good to make Christians who cannot be preserved in the faith; in his opinion what has been gained must be consolidated, and only then a further advance made."³

¹ To P. Ruiz del Portillo and his companions, S. FRANCISCUS BORGIA, IV., 420.

² "La intención de S. S., como á nosotros lo ha dicho, es que no se bapticen más de los que se puedan sostener en la fe." *Ibid.*

³ "Y. esta es la mente del Papa, al qual no parece se hagan xpianos los que no se pueden conservar, y aconseja fortificar lo

The same breadth of view which is expressed in these instructions for the welfare of the pagan world, was shown by the great Pope no less in his relations with the eastern peoples nearer home. He knew what deep roots had been taken there by attachment to those forms of worship which had been retained from time immemorial as a sacred heritage from antiquity, and that nothing would prevent reunion with Rome so much as the suspicion that the Popes were endeavouring to abolish those rites. Pius V. therefore expressly forbade what in certain cases some of his predecessors, Papal legates, or Grand Penitentiaries had allowed: namely that Greek priests should celebrate according to the Latin rite, or Latin priests in the Greek rite,¹ since this was contrary to the ancient constitutions of the Church and the decrees of the Fathers.² Proof of his love for the Slav peoples was given by his order that twelve youths of Illyrian stock should be sent to Rome, to be educated there for the priesthood.³

ganado, y despues pasar adelante." Indiarum inspectori, on January 10, 1567, S. Franciscus Borgia, IV., 386.

¹ "ne deinceps presbyteri graeci, praecipue uxorati, latino more, vel latini graeco ritu . . . missas et alia divina officia celebrare vel celebrari facere praesumant." Brief of August 20, 1566, Bull. Rom. VII 473, Collectio Lacensis, II 450.

² "hoc ab antiquo catholicae Ecclesiae instituto et SS. Patrum decretis deviare considerantes" (Coll. Lac., *loc. cit.*). Cf. Gregory the Great to Augustine (Ep. 64, n. 3, MIGNE, Patr. Lat., LXXVII., 1187-can. 10 dist. 12); Leo IX. to the patriarch Michael (Ep. 100, n. 29, *ibid.*, CXLIII., 764).

³ *Avviso di Roma of June 14, 1567, Urb. 1040, p. 406, Vatican Library.

CHAPTER IX.

PIUS V. AND THE LEAGUE AGAINST THE TURKS.

PIUS V. shrank from nothing so much as taking up arms, yet strangely enough, it fell to his lot to be frequently engaged in wars. This was forced upon him in the first place by the unsettled conditions of the Papal States, secondly by the oppression of the French Catholics by the Huguenots, and lastly by the pressing danger from the Turks. To meet this danger became for Pius V. a principal object of his anxieties and efforts during the whole of his pontificate, and in this question he was from the first guided by the true principle that a decisive success was to be obtained, not by means of attacks delivered by individual powers, but only at their being united together in a common league.

At the very beginning of his reign Pius V. wrote to Philip II. to this effect, while to the Imperial ambassador he spoke of his intention of forming a league of the Christian princes against the Turks.¹ His idea that the Ottoman power could only be broken by means of a common crusade was shared by the Grand-Master of the Knights of St. John, La Valette, who had so heroically defended Malta in the time of Pius IV.² Pius V. at once took in hand the safe-guarding of this advance-post of the Christian world in the Mediterranean, which was of the utmost strategic importance.³ In February and March, 1566, he exhorted the King of Spain and the governess of the Low Countries to assist in the rebuilding of the fortifications which had been destroyed during the siege of 1565, and to

¹ See HERRE, *Europ. Politik*, I., 36; SCHWARZ, *Briefwechsel*, 38.

² See Vol. XVI. of this work, p. 367. *Cf.* JURIEU DE LA GRAVIÈRE, *La guerre de Chypre et la bataille de Lépante*, Paris, 1888, 4.

³ *Cf.* SERRANO, *Liga*, I., 29 *seq.*

help the Knights with money and troops.¹ A bull describing in clear terms the Turkish peril, which had become doubly dangerous in view of the religious dissensions of Christendom, is dated March 9th, 1566. It was only, he said, by the faithful doing penance that the anger of God could be appeased, and His strong help looked for. For this end the Pope had published a jubilee indulgence, for the gaining of which, in addition to prayer and fasting, the reception of the sacraments was enjoined and the giving of alms for the purposes of the war against the Turks.²

The Pope was not a little dismayed by the news that the Grand Master of the Knights of St. John, on account of the imminent danger of an attack by the Turks, intended to take refuge in Sicily and to leave Malta, which did not seem to him sufficiently secure. In a letter of March 22nd, 1566, he adjured La Valette to give up this idea. Pointing out the danger of southern Italy being laid open to the deprivations of the enemy, and of his own Order being destroyed if he were to carry out his design, he exhorted him to go on courageously, and promised him his own support.³ In accordance with this promise he sent 15,000 ducats to Malta, as well as some troops to assist the Knights, and begged Philip II. and the viceroy of Sicily to give them help.⁴ At a consistory on April 2nd,

¹ The *brief to the "gubernatrix Flandriae" of February 11, 1566, in Arm. 44, t. 12, n. 27, Papal Secret Archives; *ibid.*, n. 44 the brief to Philip II. of March 22, 1566, printed in LADERCHI, 1566, n. 176, and n. 58 the *brief to the same of March 27, 1566; this last concerns the plan of employing floating capital for Malta from the Papal monopoly on lights, for which purpose Ces. Fontana was sent to the Low Countries.

² The bull "Cum gravissima" in Arm. 44, t. 12, n. 33, Papal Secret Archives, printed in LADERCHI, 1566, n. 171 (with the wrong date, March 8), and in Bull. Rom., 431 *seq.*

³ See GOUBAU, 8 *seq.*

⁴ See CATENA, 44. Mention is made by C. Luzzara of the 3,000 men whom Pius V. wished to enlist for Malta, in his *report of March 30, 1566, Gonzaga Archives, Mantua. See also the *letter of Carlo Stuerdo to the Duke of Parma from Rome, April 20,

1566, he spoke strongly of his desire to employ all his powers for the protection of Christendom.¹ How much this thought filled his mind is also shown by the fact that it is mentioned even in briefs dealing with the reform of morals among the clergy. "I am taking up arms against the Turks," he says, "but the only thing that can help me in that is the prayers of priests of pure life."²

The failure of the attack by the Turks on Malta in 1565, led the Sultan to attempt in the following year to conquer the Greek archipelago. Since not only Venice, which was directly threatened, but Spain as well,³ had made evasive replies to the Pope's exhortations, the enemy found this an easy task. On April 15th, 1566, the Turkish admiral, Piali, captured the island of Chios, bringing the rule of the Giustiniani to a bloody end. In the same year the duchies of Naxos, Andros and Ceos also fell into the hands of the insatiable enemy.⁴ In May, 1566, Turkish ships made their appearance in the Adriatic, and threatened Ancona, to which place Pius V. at once sent troops and artillery.⁵ Later on he not only undertook the strengthening of the fortifications there, but in the short space of twenty days formed a mobile force of four thousand men for the defence of the coast.⁶

Besides such temporal measures Pius V. never ceased to implore the aid of heaven for the protection of Christendom.

1566, State Archives, Naples, C. Farnes. 763, and the *Avviso di Roma of April 27, 1566, Urb. 1040, p. 217b, Vatican Library. See also POLANCI Epist. in *Anal. Bolland.*, VII., 49, 54.

¹ See the *report of C. Luzzara from Rome, April 3, 1566, Gonzaga Archives, Mantua.

² See LADERCHI, 1566, n. 251.

³ See SERRANO, Liga, I., 34.

⁴ Cf. *ibid.*, 159 *seq.*; HOPF in *Enzyklopädie* of Ersch, I.³, sect. 86, p. 171 *seq.* JORGA, III., 109; *Byzant. Zeitschrift*, VIII., 365 *seq.*

⁵ See *Avvisi di Roma of May 11 and 18, 1566, Urb. 1040, p. 225, 229, Vatican Library.

⁶ See the *report of Firmanus (under August 3, 1566), Papal Secret Archives, Miscell., Arm. XII., 31; CATENA, 46.

On July 21st, 1566, the jubilee for the success of the war against the Turks was published.¹ Eight days later, on July 28th, the Pope was seen taking part in person in the first procession which was made in Rome to avert the Turkish peril. He had tears in his eyes as he walked along, praying fervently all the while. A second procession was made on July 31st, and a third on August 2nd, in which four thousand people took part.² Pius V. was successful in dissuading La Valette from his purpose of abandoning Malta, and in obtaining abundant means for the Knights for the fortifications of the island.³ On the other hand insurmountable difficulties stood in the way of his plans for the formation of an anti-Turkish league. Venice, which was so strong at sea, had adhered strictly to a policy of armed neutrality after the unfortunate peace of 1540,⁴ On account of her commerce in the Levant and her distrust of the Hapsburgs, the Signoria had held firmly to this policy, which was so costly and so embarrassing, even at the time of the threat to Malta in 1565. Even now she nervously avoided any disturbance of her relations with the Turks. When their fleet appeared near Ragusa during the summer of 1566, she withdrew her ships in all haste.⁵ Nor did the King of Spain at that time show himself at all inclined to the league suggested by the Pope.

¹ *Bando of July 21, 1566, Bandi, V., 1, p. 159, Papal Secret Archives.

² See FIRMANUS, *Diarium, *loc. cit.*, p. 107b, Papal Secret Archives. Cf. LADERCHI, 1566, n. 291 (with wrong date, July 14).

³ The King of Portugal sent a fairly large sum of money (*satis magnam pecuniam*), as Pius V. mentions with words of praise in a *brief sent to him on August 17, 1566, pointing out that with the erection of the new fort on the heights of S. Elmo there would be "Oportunuissimum adversus Turcos et predones Afros totius Christiani populi propugnaculum;" Arm. 42, t. 12, n. 98, Papal Secret Archives. There also is a brief of August 19 to La Valette, which allows work for that purpose on Sundays and festival days (printed in LADERCHI, 1566, n. 178).

⁴ See Vol. XI. of this work, p. 296.

⁵ See HERRE, *Europ. Politik*, I., 37.

In this Philip II. was guided by consideration for the Low Countries and his fear of the German Protestants.¹ In Germany the religious disputes in the Empire stood in the way of the plan for a great international league, towards which Maximilian II. seemed to be seriously inclined in the spring of 1566.² The Papal legate, Commendone, was forced to realize at the Diet of Augsburg that Maximilian thought before all else of obtaining assistance for the protection of Hungary, for which purpose the Diet voted a large sum of money, while the Pope gave 50,000 scudi and obtained military help for the Emperor from the small Italian states.³

At the end of autumn, 1566, the Pope, who had been seriously perturbed by the fall of Sziget,⁴ made fresh efforts to form a great anti-Turkish league. In order to bring this about he appointed a commission, of which Cardinals Morone, Farnese, Granvelle, Commendone and Mula were members. On November 4th he recommended the matter in a pressing letter to the Emperor, the Spanish sovereigns, Charles IX. and the regent of France.⁵ But the state of political affairs was then even less favourable than at the time of the first attempt. Very little was to be hoped for from the Emperor, or from the intriguing woman who was controlling the destinies of France. The renewed outbreak of religious wars in France then completely paralysed the resources of that kingdom. At the same time Philip II. saw all his strength absorbed by the disturbances in the Low Countries and by his war against the

¹ See *ibid.*, 37 *seq.*; SERRANO, *Liga*, I., 36 *seq.*

² Cf. BIBL, *Korrespondenz Maximilians II.*, I., 448 *seq.*

³ Cf. *supra* pp. 247, 255.

⁴ " *Il Papa ha sentito tanto dispiacere della perdita di Seghetto che subito havuto la nuova si retirò in Araceli et per tutto quel giorno non attese ad altro che a deplorare la mala fortuna de' christiani alla quale se potesse col sangue suo remediare la faria volentieri," thus reports an Avviso di Roma of September 28, 1566, Urb. 1040, p. 291, Vatican Library. Cf. the *report of Strozzi of September 29, 1566, State Archives, Vienna.

⁵ See SCHWARZ, *Briefwechsel*, 37 *seq.*; HERRE, *loc. cit.*, I., 38 *seq.* The briefs in LADERCHI, 1566, n. 309 *seq.*

Moors, and it was not without some bitterness that the King of Spain pointed out at what an inopportune moment the Pope's suggestion had come. It was quite true that Philip II. could not think of any foreign expedition while there was an understanding between the rebels in the Low Countries and the Huguenots, and his finances were completely exhausted.¹

Although the plans for the league had to remain in almost complete abeyance for two years,² the Pope nevertheless did all that he could to support the Emperor while the war in Hungary lasted,³ to help the Knights of Malta,⁴ and to protect the coasts of the States of the Church from attacks by the Turks and by pirates.

¹ See HERRE, *loc. cit.*, 40 *seq.*

² Cf. SERRANO, *loc. cit.*, 38 *seq.*

³ Cf. *supra*, p. 255.

⁴ On October 12, 1566, *Strozzi reports that the Cardinals had been summoned to take counsel to obtain help for Malta (State Archives, Vienna). In February, 1567, Pius V. enlisted 3,000 men who were intended for Malta under the command of Pompeo Colonna and Ascanio della Corgna (*report of B. Pia, dated Rome, February 15, 1567, Gonzaga Archives, Mantua). At the end of 1567 the island was again threatened by the Turks. La Valette then sought help from the Duke of Anjou (see his letter of November 3, 1567, in FILLON, n. 2499); France did nothing, but Pius V. ordered a jubilee on October 28, 1567 (Bandi, V., 1, p. 160, Papal Secret Archives), and even before the messenger from the Knights reached Rome on December 19 (*report of B. Pia of December 20, 1567, *loc. cit.*) provided for their help in various ways (see the *report of B. Pia, dated Rome, November 29, 1567, Gonzaga Archives, Mantua, and the *bull of December 18, 1567, Arm. 44, t. 13, p. 111b, *cf.* p. 113 *seq.*, Papal Secret Archives; also the briefs to Philip II., Charles IX. and the Doge of Venice, of December 8, 12, and 19, 1567, in GOUBAU, 59 *seq.*, 61 *seq.*, 63 *seq.*). An *Avviso di Roma of February 28, 1568, announces that the Pope has authorized the enrolment of 1,500 men in the States of the Church, and is providing part of their pay (Urb. 1040, p. 483b, Vatican Library). For the new fortification of S. Elmo in Malta Pius V. gave 3,000 scudi in the following year (*Avviso di Roma of July 30, 1569, Urb. 1041, p. 125b, *loc. cit.*).

Special provisions in the latter respect were all the more necessary since the Papal fleet had been destroyed in the time of Pius IV. at the battle of Jerbeh. As early as August, 1566, steps had been taken for the protection of the coasts of the Marches and Paolo Giordano Orsini had been placed in command of four thousand men.¹ The then imminent danger from the Turkish fleet once again decreased, but Pius V. did not discontinue his precautions. In June, 1567, he acquired three galleys from Andrea Doria, as the one that remained was obviously not enough to defend the coast.² Besides this the Pope planned to strengthen the fortresses of Ancona³ and Civitavecchia,⁴ and to hurry forward the construction of watch towers along the coast,⁵ which had already been begun under

¹ See Corresp. dipl., I., 321, and GNOLI, Vitt. Accoramboni, 54.

² See the *report of B. Pia, dated Rome, June 4, 1567, Gonzaga Archives, Mantua.

³ *" Si da ordine di fortificare Ancona e Civitavecchia " (Avviso di Roma of April 3, 1568, Urb. 1040, p. 499, Vatican Library). M. A. Colonna inspected the fortifications of Ancona and gave a good report of them (*Avviso di Roma of April 23, 1568, *ibid.*, 511). *Assignment of 50,000 scudi for the fortification of Ancona (*ibid.*, 526b). Cf. also MAROCCO, XII., 77; LEONI, Ancona ill., 296 *seq.* Payments to Giacomo della Porta for fortification works at Ancona and Camerino in *Deposit., a. 1570, State Archives, Rome.

⁴ Cf. ANNOVAZZI, 280 *seq.*, 298 *seq.*; CALISSE, Storia di Civitavecchia, Florence, 1898, 422 *seq.* The arms of Pius V. are still to be seen on the gate.

⁵ Cf. GUGLIELMOTTI, Fortificazioni, 433, 441 *seq.*, 472 *seq.*; SCHRADER, Campagna, Leipzig, 1910, 148 *seq.*; TOMASSETTI, Campagna, I., Rome, 1910, 181 *seq.*; the same, Le torri della spiaggia romana nel a 1567, in *Scritti di storia, di fil. e d'arte*, Naples, 1908. The plan for building the tower at Porto is mentioned in the *Avviso di Roma of October 11, 1567, Urb. 1040, p. 448b; *ibid.*, 1041, p. 66, an *Avviso of April 23, 1569: " La torre che S.S^là fa fabbricare alla foce del Tevere sopra le ruine della Mole Traiana è reduta a buon termine per difender la spiaggia da Corsari dove presto se manderà artiglieria." In Vatic. 6533, p. 145 *seq.*: *Offerta a Pio V. per la fabrica della torre a Ostia. Vatican Library.

Pius IV. These served to watch for the Turks and pirates and to give the alarm to the inhabitants in the neighbourhood of a threatened attack. The largest of these buildings, the tower of S. Michele at the mouth of the Tiber at Ostia, the design for which had been sketched by Michelangelo, still bears the inscription of Pius V.¹ The part which the Pope took in all these works may be seen from the fact that he visited them in person.²

The building of these towers, which to-day form so picturesque a feature of the shores of the Roman coast, involved considerable expense, and the provision of the necessary funds led to no small difficulties. How dangerous the situation was was shown by an attack by pirates on Nettuno, which took place in May, 1568.³ On several occasions it was feared that the enemy would appear before Rome itself, where, especially in the Borgo, Pius V. undertook considerable fortification works. Here too the Pope assured himself of the progress of the works by making personal inspections.⁴

The Ottoman Empire had reached the height of its splendour and power under Suleiman the Magnificent; the death of the sultan, which occurred in September, 1566, during the siege of Sziget, was the beginning of its decline. Christendom and its supreme head breathed again.⁵ As is often the case in history, so now it was seen how limits are set to the triumphs of every conquering state by the fact that great capacity for rule is

¹ See GUGLIELMOTTI, *Colonna*, 153 *seq.*

² See the *report of C. Luzzara of November 19, 1566, Gonzaga Archives, Mantua, and *that of Strozzi of November 23, 1568, State Archives, Vienna.

³ As to this *cf.* the *Avviso di Roma of May 22, 1568, in the "Romana" of the State Archives, Vienna. An *Avviso of July 6, 1569, reports the capture by corsairs of several vessels on their way to Rome. Urb. 1041, p. 105b, Vatican Library.

⁴ The inspection of the works in the Borgo and at the Castle of St. Angelo (*cf. supra* Vol. XVII., p. 126) is announced in an *Avviso di Roma of May 8, 1568, Urb. 1040, p. 514b, Vatican Library.

⁵ See the *report of Strozzi of October 26, 1566, State Archives, Vienna.

not always hereditary. The decline of the Turkish power would have been even more evident if the capable grand vizier, Mohammed Sokolli, had not acted as a counter-poise to the unworthy and foolish sovereign who now ascended the throne.

Contemporaries draw a repulsive picture of the coarse, undersized and corpulent Sultan, Selim II., whose red face betrayed the drunkard.¹ Long before his accession to the throne a Jew named José Miquez, who had come from Portugal, and had become very wealthy by means of financial speculations, had succeeded in getting great influence over Selim by encouraging the debauchery of the prince in every way, and his fondness for choice wines and food. Immediately after his succession to the throne the Sultan conferred on his favourite the duchy of Naxos, in return for a small tribute.² Hoping to get Cyprus into his hands in the same way, the avaricious Jew urged the Sultan to make an expedition against that island, which, on account of its natural riches and its important strategic position, was one of the most treasured possessions of the Republic of St. Mark.³ After the conclusion of peace with the Emperor and the conquest of Arabia nothing stood in the way of this plan except the grand vizier Sokolli, who was opposed to any breaking off of relations with Venice, and who would have preferred to give support to his co-religionists in Spain, the Moorish rebels.⁴ José Miquez, or, as the Turks called him, Josef Nassi, found powerful support for his designs in the admiral, Piali-Pasha, and the vizier

¹ See A. BADOERO in Albèri, I., 360 *seq.*; ZINKEISEN, III., 55 *seq.*; JORGA, III., 163.

² Cf. BADOERO, *loc. cit.*; CHARRIÈRE, III., 86, 88 n., 646 n.; ROMANIN, VI., 270 *seq.*; ZINKEISEN, III., 56 *seq.*, 373 *seq.*; BALAN, VI., 530; HERRE, *Europ. Politik*, I., 12 *seq.*; *Rev. hist.*, LXXVII., 310 *seq.*; see also LEVY, *Don Josef Nasi, Herzog von Naxos*, Breslau, 1859.

³ See the report of Bernardo Sagredo in MAS LATRIE, III., 540 *seq.*, 555 *seq.* Cf. HAMMER, II., 405; HERRE, I., 10.

⁴ Cf. BROSCHE, *Geschichten aus dem Leben dreier Grosswesire*, Gotha, 1889, 7 *seq.*; HERRE, I., 14 *seq.*

Lala Mustafà, Selim's tutor. The Mufti associated himself with them, and told the Sultan that he would be able to recover from the Venetians the money required for the great mosque at Adrianople, which was being built, and that Selim, as the heir of the rulers of Egypt, had a right to the possession of Cyprus. Venice, so he said in the hearing of the Sultan, had been guilty of a breach of faith by favouring the piracies of the brigands of Usocchi, on the borders of Dalmatia, and by offering shelter to the Maltese corsairs in the harbours of Cyprus.¹

The party which had raised the standard of war against Venice had everything its own way when news reached Constantinople that the arsenal of Venice had been destroyed by fire on September 13th, 1569,² and that Italy was threatened with famine in consequence of a bad harvest. Rumour exaggerated the damage done to the Republic, and Selim II., thinking that Venice had lost her fleet,³ resolved to break the peace which had been concluded with the Republic in 1540. Knowing full well that the great Christian powers were hampered by internal difficulties and were in a state of discord among themselves, he only waited for the most favourable moment to launch his attack and rob the Venetians of their "jewel, Cyprus, the last bulwark of Christendom in the Levant."⁴ On February 1st, 1570, a Turkish plenipotentiary, named Cubat, was sent from Constantinople to Venice, to deliver the ultimatum to the Signoria: the surrender of Cyprus or war. The Porte had already on January 13th, on

¹ See HAMMER, II., 401 *seq.*; BROSCHE, *loc. cit.*, 17 *seq.*; HERRE, I., 12 *seq.*

² Cf. ROMANIN, VI., 267 *seq.*; BALAN, VI., 531; HERRE, I., 15 *seq.*; TOSI, *Dell'incendio dell'arsenale di Venezia*, Florence, 1906.

³ In a *Lettera di Roma of December 23, 1569, it is stated: it is reported from Venice that the Turk, who is harassed by the "Tartari" and the "Sofi," cannot send any fleet against us. Doria-Pamfili Archives, Rome.

⁴ HERRE, *Mittlemeerpolitik im 16. Jahrhundert*, in *Deutsche Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft*, IX. (1906), 358. For the importance of Cyprus to Venice see also SERRANO, *Liga*, I., 42 *seq.*

flimsy pretexts, confiscated all Venetian property, together with the merchant vessels of the Republic which were in the harbour of Constantinople.¹

The Republic of St. Mark, which for a generation had maintained friendly relations with the Porte with the greatest self-restraint and caution, and even at the expense of its political good name,² and which had schooled itself, for the sake of its commercial interests, to cling to the hem of the Sultan's garment,³ restricting itself to a defensive attitude, was not a little taken by surprise by the attack which was now suddenly threatened. Trusting to the benevolent attitude of the grand vizier, it had too long brushed aside the warnings of its ambassadors.⁴ Since they were all aware in Venice of the strength of their enemy and his almost inexhaustible resources, they were under no illusion as to the gravity of the danger, and took precautions on a grand scale. It was but natural that they should turn their thoughts towards help from outside. As France and Germany were completely occupied with internal disturbances, they could for the moment only turn to Spain and the Pope; with these two powers, however, Venice was not on very good terms. Spain, the greatest power in Europe, had such great influence in Italy that the States of the Church and the Republic of Venice could only with difficulty maintain their independence. Spanish viceroys ruled at Naples, in Sicily, in Sardinia, at Milan and in Lombardy. Savoy, Genoa and Tuscany were dependent upon Madrid. It had been made evident in many ways that in Spain they looked with a jealous eye on the freedom and power of the Republic of St. Mark, as well as upon that of the Holy See. The arbitrary way in which Venice had been accustomed to act in ecclesiastical questions, and the scant courtesy she had shown in matters of ecclesiastical politics in connexion with the Roman Inquisition, a thing which was very near to the heart of Pius V.,

¹ Cf. BROSC, *loc. cit.*, 14; CHARRIÈRE, III., 102.

² The Venetian diplomatists themselves recognized this; see ALBÈRI, III., I, 83, 160.

³ See ALBÈRI, XIII., 95; cf. JORGA, III., 248.

⁴ See HERRE, I., 19.

had led to various misunderstandings,¹ but the common danger which threatened Christendom caused the noble-hearted Pope to put all such considerations into the background, since from the moment of his election he had never lost sight of the dangers hanging over Christendom on the part of Islam.

Far more difficult was it for Venice to find common ground with Spain, whose interest in the Turkish question centred rather in the north of Africa than in the east. How great was the jealousy between Venice and Spain was made clear when the Papal nuncio in Venice, Antonio Facchinetti, who, in accordance with the wishes of the Pope, had always pressed for a Christian coalition against the Turks, urged the Signoria to form an alliance with Philip II. On February 22nd, 1570, Facchinetti had to report to Rome that he plainly saw that the Signoria still shrank from the idea of the league, because they did not wish to bind themselves to protect the property of Spain when the Turkish fleet was attacking, not the possessions of Venice, but those of Philip II.² The Venetians there-

¹With regard to the Inquisition see Vol. XVII., p. 316, and GRATIANUS, *De bello Cyprio*, 51 *seq.*, and especially TIEPOLO, 191 *seq.*, and GOTHEIN, 526 *seq.* See also *Corresp. dipl.*, I., 128. For the opposition of Venice to the bull "In coena Domini" see CECCHETTI, I., 448; *cf.* GOTHEIN, 538 *seq.*; *Corresp. dipl.*, III., 242. The disgraceful disputes occasioned by the brief of June 27, 1566, on the union of the parish of Desenzano with the monastery of S. Salvatore at Brescia, to which Venice refused its 'exequatur,' are described in detail, but in a partisan spirit, by U. PAPA (*Un dissidio tra Venezia e Pio V.*, Venice, 1895). *Cf.* also *Corresp. dipl.*, II., 161. For the mistrust felt by Venice for Pius V. see ALBÈRI, II., 4, 239. For Pius V.'s opinion of the Venetians and their pride see the note of the Papal Secretary of State in 1572, in *Varia polit.*, 117, p. 385 *seq.*; ***Negotii di Venezia*, Papal Secret Archives.

²Facchinetti's letter is published in VALENSISE, 40-41. This edition, made in 1898, of the important and interesting reports from the nuncio at Venice concerning the league escaped the notice of HERRE (*Europ. politik im Cyprischen Krieg*, I., 1902), who in other respects had made very complete use of the vast amount of literature on the subject.

fore sought to obtain from the Pope, not a league, but money, provisions and troops, because they still deluded themselves with the hope that the news of their extensive military preparations would at the last moment prevent the Turks from attacking their possessions in the Levant.¹ The Signoria was quite prepared, indeed, that the Pope should give military assistance to Venice with the help of the other Catholic powers, and especially of Spain, but it would very much rather have had that help without being bound by any strict alliance with its rival, Spain, and thus finding itself committed to undertakings which could not serve any directly useful purpose for itself.²

Pius V. was very ready to give direct help to the Republic, but at the same time he insisted that the Signoria must ally itself with Philip II. and the small Italian states against the Turks. Thus, after her first hesitation, Venice found herself at length obliged to agree to the league urged by the Pope and his nuncio, since she could not in other ways count upon the help of the other Christian states.³

On March 8th, 1570, the nuncio Facchinetti sent to Rome the following significant report: in view of the apparent inevitability of war the Venetians are now desirous of joining the league, but if the Turks should leave them in peace they would not be displeased; His Holiness, therefore, must try and bind them as closely as possible to the league. He, the nuncio, would work for the same end, in such a way that the Signoria would find itself so tied that it would be unable to withdraw without incurring the deepest disgrace.⁴

In the meantime Cubat, the bearer of the ultimatum, was nearing the city of the lagoons, where lively discussions were

¹ See the report of Facchinetti, dated Venice, February 25, 1570, in VALENSISE, 43 *seq.*

² See the excellent account by HERRE, I., 49 *seq.* Cf. SERRANO, *Liga*, I., 48 *seq.*

³ See HERRE, I., 50. As early as March 13, 1568, Facchinetti, in a letter to the Secretary of State of Pius V. had expressed the hope that Venice would in the end seek safety in the league. VALENSISE, 38.

⁴ See VALENSISE, 46.

being held as to the attitude they should take up. At the council of the Pregadi three views had been put forward: the first, that Cubat should be received in secret, was negatived; the second, that he should not be allowed to enter Venice at all, but should be at once sent back, also failed to secure a majority; it was resolved in the end to accord the envoy a public reception, but to refuse his ultimatum unconditionally.¹ In conformity with this decision, instructions were also drawn up and sent to Ragusa, to the Venetian representative, Aloisio Bonrizzo, who was accompanying Cubat.²

When the Turkish ambassador arrived in the harbour of Venice on March 27th, 1570, he was forbidden to land in the city. Guards accompanied him on the following morning to a full assembly of the Signoria, which was held with closed doors, and lasted only a quarter of an hour. Cubat there delivered his ultimatum; the reply which had been already prepared was a definite rejection "in cold and dignified terms." It pointed out that without any reasonable excuse the Porte wished to break the peace which had been ratified by oath only a short time before. The Republic would defend itself against the attack which was now to be expected, trusting in the justice of God, and would defend Cyprus, its lawful possession, by force of arms.³

Although at that moment Venice seemed to be firmly resolved to engage in a struggle with the Turks, trusting in

¹ See the report of Facchinetti of March 17, 1570, in VALENSISE, 48.

² See YRIARTE, *La vie d'un patricien de Venise au 16^e siècle*, Paris, 1874, 171.

³ The above is in accordance with the report of Facchinetti of March 29, 1570, in VALENSISE, 50 *seq.* The later historians, PARUTA (*Hist-Venet.*, II. ; *Guerra di Cipro*, I., 50 *seq.*), FOLIETA (*De sacro foedere*, I., 1), and GRATIANUS (*De bello Cyprio*, 40 *seq.*) have described in detail the events of those days, but as HERRE, I., 22, n. 1, points out, in some cases embellishing their accounts with legendary matter. For the reply that was prepared see LONGO, *Guerra*, 13 *seq.*, 14, and YRIARTE, 152.

its sea power, nevertheless doubts were freely entertained as to the sincerity of the Signoria, and it was thought that the skilful diplomatists of the Republic were only trying to frighten the enemy, and to come to an understanding with the Porte favourable to themselves, by which the allied Christian powers would be left empty handed. It is easy to understand this mistrust in the light of previous events ; above all, the representatives of Philip II. in the Curia, Zuñiga and Granvelle, were led by it to hold back, as well as by political considerations. In order to enhance as much as possible the value of the accession of the power of Spain, these diplomatists made it appear that the king had no idea of joining the league.¹ That the Spaniards were dealing in subterfuges had already been made clear when the Pope in his enthusiasm for the protection of Christendom spoke of the Turkish peril at a consistory of February 27th, 1570, and in burning words urged Venice to rise in all her might. Among the Cardinals there was but one opinion as to the reality and imminence of the danger, and no one was blind to the fact that Cyprus must fall into the hands of the Sultan before the princes of Europe could respond to the Pope's appeal for help. The best way to prevent such a disaster seemed to be the immediate intervention of Philip II.

It was true that the King of Spain was in a position at once to send from his Sicilian harbours sufficient help to hold back the first attack of the Turks, but Cardinal Granvelle declared himself so strongly against any such course that he adjured the Pope and the College of Cardinals not to precipitate his king and the Church into so dangerous and hazardous an undertaking. Granvelle did not hesitate to declare openly that the faithless Republic of St. Mark was not deserving of immediate help, that for the time being it could be left to its fate, and that it would be time enough to come to its assistance when disaster had forced it to realize that it could

¹ See the fully justified remarks of HERRE, I., 67 *seq.*, who was the first to make use of the reports of Granvelle and Zuñiga in the Archives at Simancas.

not do without its neighbours ; he, the Cardinal, believed that God had exposed that proud state to the attack of the infidels for the purpose of punishing its selfishness, and forcing it to realize that even the Signoria might find itself in the position of having to beg for protection and help.

Cardinal Commendone, who was held in great esteem by Pius V., vigorously opposed this declaration of Granvelle.¹ He recalled the services of Venice to Christendom and the Holy See, and sought to defend the Signoria from the charges of faithlessness and selfishness as far as he could. With bitter reference to the Spaniards he remarked that he marvelled at mention being made of the late war, and the peace that had then been concluded with the Turks, since the Venetians had then been treated by their allies in such a way that they preferred not to speak of it. Commendone called attention to the proposal which the Pope had had in his mind from the first, namely that they should send help as quickly as possible, since it was not only Venice, but the whole of Italy that was involved, as well as the good name and well-being of Christendom. The majority of the Cardinals then decided in the sense suggested.²

While the Pope, after this consistory, made provision for a large subsidy in money by granting a tenth upon the Venetian clergy up to 100,000 gold scudi, which was intended to be used only for the defence of Cyprus,³ he at the same time took

¹ Cf. Vol. XVII. of this work, p. 81.

² For the consistory of February 27, 1570, which strangely enough is not mentioned in the *Acta concistorialia in the Consistorial Archives at the Vatican (now included in the Papal Secret Archives), see the report of Facchinetti of March 1, 1570 (VALENSISE. 44) the letters of Granvelle and Zuñiga to Philip II. of February 28, 1570 (State Archives, Simancas), used by HERRE, I., 48, as well as FOLIETA, I., 996 *seq.*, and GRATIANUS, De bello Cyprio, 52 *seq.*, which, for purposes of criticism, should be compared with LADERCHI, 1570, n. 11.

³ The money was therefore " venire in mano dei ministri di S.Stá ;" see VALENSISE, 44. Cf. for the concession the *report of B. Pia, dated Rome, March, 4, 1570, Gonzaga Archives Mantua.

definite steps to induce Philip II. to come to the assistance of Venice, and to enter into an alliance with the Republic.

When the Venetian government placed in his hands the carrying out of the negotiations,¹ Pius V. entrusted the conduct of this most difficult business to one of his most skilful and capable officials in political affairs, and one who by his Spanish descent was bound to be in sympathy with Philip II. ; this was Luis de Torres, a cleric of the Apostolic Camera.²

The *bull concerning the Venetian tithe (the effective value of the 100,000 gold scudi was 180,000 ; see CECCHETTI, II., 74), dated Rome, April 10, 1570, is in Archives of Briefs, Rome. On the same date Pius V. published a "iubilaeum ad divinum auxilium implorandum contra infideles" ; BANDI, V., I, p. 162, Papal Secret Archives.

¹ "A 27 di Febraro del 1570 rendendo conto alla St^a di Pio V. il cl. Michele Suriano, ambasciatore de Venetiani appresso S.St^a degli apparati di guerra che faveva il Turco" the Pope begged the ambassador to write home to stipulate for a league with Philip II. Soriano sent a messenger to Venice the same day. The reply of the Signoria to this placed the matter in the hands of the Pope, "accio che con l'autorità sua si trattasse et concludesse et data questa risposta sabbato 4 di Marzo lunedì a sei mandò a chiamare me D. Luis de Torres, chierico di sua Camera Apostolica et mi disse di volermi mandar in Spagna per tal effetto raggionandomi nella forma seguente : Monsignore, vi havemo mandato a chiamare per dirvi che siamo risoluti mandarvi in Ispagna et la causa vi diremo : " league between Venice and Spain, refer to instructions. There is further another business to be treated of, which the nuncio had already opened with Philip II., "che abbracci le cose d'Inghilterra aiutando li sollevati" (cf. *supra*, p. 209 seq.). Torres declared his readiness to accept the mission. Thus the *Giornale de' trattati segreti et pubblici di diversi ministri con il S. P. Papa Pio V. (ex bibl. card. Ios. Renati card^{lis}, Imperialis), Add. Ms. 20052, p. 2, British Museum, London. Cf. also the accounts drawn from the Spanish reports in HERRE, I., 70.

² For L. de Torres, who was Archbishop of Monreale from 1573, and died December 31, 1584, see LELLO, Hist. d. chiesa di Monreale, Rome, 1596, 122 seq. ; SERENO, 383 seq. ; GARAMPI, Osservaz., 304 ; FORCELLA, IV., 335. The Archives of the Marchese de Torres (Dragonetti) at Aquila contain important documents

The two duties imposed upon him are clearly and definitely expressed both in his instructions and in the brief accrediting him to Philip II., dated March 8th, 1570. After a vivid description of the danger to Christendom, and the expression of his own sorrow, the Pope said that he was convinced that no monarch in Christendom could by his own power resist that of the Turks, but that the Christian princes united together could do so. It was however absolutely necessary that they should ally themselves together in order to fight the common enemy, and the first place in this glorious undertaking belonged to the King of Spain, both on account of his great piety, and of the might of his empire. The Pope would joyfully support his efforts and was prepared to drain the resources of his own dominions. At the same time the letter pointed out the necessity for immediate military help. The King of Spain was adjured in the name of God's mercy at once to send a strong fleet to Sicily in order to protect Malta, should the Turks launch an attack there, as well as to keep the seas free for the Christian troops which were to be sent to the assistance of Cyprus. In this way the plans of the Turks would be completely foiled.¹

In the three instructions which were given to Torres his duties were detailed and explained even more fully.² The alliance between Venice and Spain must be both defensive and offensive, and should be concluded either permanently or for a definite period as should appear most advisable.

from those left by Torres. I went to Aquila in October, 1903, to see them, but could not do so owing to the absence of the proprietor.

¹ See GOUBAU, 202 *seq.* ; LADERCHI, 1570, n. 21.

² The three instructions taken from the Archives of the Marchese de Torres (Dragonetti) at Aquila by SERENO, 427-431, have the dates March 12, 5, 12, 1570, while the copies in the Papal Secret Archives and in the Chigi Library, Rome (see HINOJOSA, 188 ; HERRE, I., 89) as well as Cod. 6334, p. 342 *seq.* of the Court Library, Vienna, have March 15 instead of 5. In the codex in the British Museum, London, cited on p. 369 n. 1, the instructions are dated (p. 5b, 7 and 10) as in Sereno.

Above all, the king should be induced, as Venice already had done, to entrust the negotiation of the question to the Pope, and at once to send full powers for this purpose to Rome, where everything would be done with the fullest justice, and in such a way that no one could feel injured. Torres was specially instructed to point out that Venice was quite unable by herself to withstand an attack by the Turks,¹ while the two powers together would be quite strong enough at sea both for the defensive and the offensive. Torres was moreover to explain more fully the manifest advantages of the alliance, and to insist that it should be both definite and firm. The King of Spain must therefore entertain no suspicions of Venice, nor Venice of the king. All the suspicions which had hitherto existed must disappear before the common danger. It was obvious that neither power without the help of the other could withstand the Turks, and therefore in their own interests they must not break the alliance. Granted good-will, it ought not to be difficult to arrange the terms of the league, especially as the Pope was an impartial mediator and arbitrator. But before there could be any question of the division of the funds contributed and the territory conquered, or of the admission of other powers, it was the duty of the King of Spain, in view of the pressing nature of the danger, to send help at once by immediately ordering his fleet to Sicily to help the Venetians, as the Pope requested.

After Torres had also been given letters of recommendation

¹The correspondence of Torres has not been lost, as Herre supposed (I., 93, n. 7), but is preserved in *Add. Ms. 20052, p. 20b, of the British Museum, London; the first letter to Cardinal Bonelli is dated from Siena, March 18, 1570, the second from Barcelona, April 8. There also are to be found the replies of Cardinal Bonelli, the letter of Torres to the "segretario" of Pius V., Girol. Rusticucci, and his replies, as well as the correspondence of Torres with other Cardinals, and finally his reports from Portugal. The study of these documents must be kept for a special publication. SERRANO (Corresp. dipl., I., xxv.) does not know of them, but quotes instead the *copy of the letters of Torres in Cod. Urb. 841 of the Vatican Library.

to Cardinal Espinosa, the chief minister of Spain, to Ruy Gomez and other Spanish grandees and nobles, as well as to Don John of Austria,¹ further instructions were given to him orally by the Pope at a farewell audience on March 15th, 1570. He set out on the following day.² With the means of transport then available a whole month elapsed before he reached the Spanish court at Cordova. His reception by Philip II. left nothing to be desired as far as marks of honour were concerned, but on account of the strained relations between Madrid and Rome the negotiations were carried on with difficulty. Torres understood very well how to justify the attitude of the Pope towards Philip II. ; as he was a Spaniard by birth, certain outspoken expressions were accepted from him, which the haughty grandees would never have taken from a foreigner. Any definite reply on the subject of the league was at first, in keeping with the Spanish habit of mind, postponed. On the other hand, the king promised, when Torres pressed him, to order Doria to sail at once for Sicily, and there await further orders ; in the meantime the Spanish authorities in Naples were to assist the Venetians with provisions and munitions. Torres next followed the court to Seville, but there too, at an audience on May 4th, the only reply that he could get concerning the league was framed in the vaguest possible terms.³

¹ The brief to Cardinal Espinosa in LADERCHI, 1570, n. 24 the date March 2, in Laderchi is wrong ; it should be 12 ; see *Brevia Pii V. in Arm 44, t. 15, p. 36b, Papal Secret Archives. *Ibid.*, p. 37b *seqq.*, similar *letters to " Gomez princ. Ebuli," to " Johanna principessa Portugaliae " (see LADERCHI, 1570, n. 25), to the " dux Feriae," to the " episc. Conchensis, Ant. de Toledo." According to *Varia Polit., 100, p. 8 *seq.*, these letters were sent on March 8 ; Don John is also named in them. According to the above mentioned (p. 369, n. 1) *codex in the British Museum the briefs were dated March 12.

² See *Giornale de' trattati segreti, *loc. cit.*, British Museum. Cf. Facchinetti in VALENSISE, 57.

³ See the report of Torres to Cardinal Bonelli, dated from Seville, May 16, 1570, Lettere dei princ., III., 260-264 (on p. 260, 4 lines from the bottom read 26 instead of 16 ; on p. 264, 10 lines

Nevertheless the Spanish council of state weighed the pros and cons of the matter in no less than eleven meetings.

What greatly influenced Philip II. and his advisers in deciding to enter into the negotiations for a league, in spite of their deep distrust of Venice, and to appoint Granvelle, Pacheco and Zuñiga as their representatives, was the hope of at last obtaining what Spanish diplomacy had hitherto vainly tried to extort from the strict Pope: the concession of the *cruzada* and *excusado*, and the continuance of the *sussidio*.¹ Besides appointing his representatives for the negotiations concerning the league in Rome, Philip II. renewed the promise which he had made at Cordova, to assist Venice with provisions and munitions, so that if the league were decided upon, the fleet could immediately set sail.² On May 16th, 1570, the full powers for Granvelle, Pacheco and Zuñiga were drawn up.³

With this a notable step forward had been taken. Luis de Torres was able to leave the Spanish court and proceed to Portugal, where he was to urge King Sebastian to a marriage with Margaret of Valois, and to work for the accession to the league of that kingdom, which was small indeed, but of great importance on account of its colonial empire. A Papal letter

from the bottom read 1570 instead of 1571). Cf. HERRE, I., 101. See also Corresp. dipl., III., 295 *seqq.*, where, on p. 297 *seq.* two reports from Torres to Rome, of April 24, 1570, are published, and on p. 324 *seq.* his memorial addressed to Philip II. about the league against the Turks, of May 4, 1570.

¹ See the letters of Philip II. to Zuñiga and his plenipotentiaries, May 16, 1570, Corresp. dipl., II., 335 *seq.*, 350 *seq.* Cf. SERRANO, Liga, I., 58 *seq.*

² See the report of Torres of May 16, 1570, *loc. cit.*, 263 *seq.* Cf. HERRE, I., 105 *seq.* See also HÄBLER in *Histor. Zeitschrift*, XCII., 496. For the efforts of Spain to obtain the concession of the "Cruzada" see *supra*, pp. 8, 29. FOLIETA also states that this question was at that time very acute (I., 967).

³ Philip II. announced this to the Pope on the same day; see GOUBAU, 312 *seq.* The Spanish original of the authority in Corresp. dipl., III., 330 *seq.*; *ibid.*, 339, 346 *seq.*, the secret instructions of the king concerning the negotiations of the league.

of March 13th, which had been entrusted to Torres, urgently begged the King of Portugal to attach his ten galleys to the Spanish fleet. The king declared that any immediate assistance was out of the question, but promised it for the following year.¹ Torres was even less successful in the matter of the king's marriage, which was all the more painful to Pius V. because he was growing more and more anxious about the danger of the marriage of Margaret with the Protestant Henry of Navarre.² How much he had this danger in his mind was shown by the fact that on August 6th he again had recourse to the Portuguese king, and sent back Torres once more to Portugal after he had returned to Madrid ; but on this occasion the Pope's representative was even less successful than before. The king not only absolutely declined, though in the most courteous terms, to marry Margaret, but also declared that it was impossible for him just then to give any assistance at sea against the Turks, as he had to protect the coasts of his own kingdom against the Huguenot corsairs, and defend himself from the threatened attack of the King of Morocco ; in the following year, however, he would attack the Turkish empire from India.³

Pius V. was anxious to draw, not only Spain and Portugal, but also France, into the war against the Turks, concerning which matter he held discussions lasting many hours with the Capuchin, Girolamo da Pistoia, whom he held in the highest esteem.⁴ In view of the state of affairs in the kingdom of France, and the long standing friendly relations between that country and the Porte, there was, it is true, very little likeli-

¹ See GOUBAU, 337 *seq.*, 339 *seq.* ; LADERCHI, 1570, n. 45 *seq.* ; Corho dipl. Portug., X., 364 *seq.*, 370 *seq.* ; HERRE, I., 132 *seq.* Pius V. had already in 1567 sent the King of Portugal the blessed hat and sword ; see MACSWINEY, *Le Portugal et le St. Siège*, I., Paris, 1898, 46 *seq.*

² See *supra*, p. 135.

³ See GOUBAU, 342 *seq.* ; LADERCHI, 1570, n. 50 *seq.* ; Corpo dipl. Portug., X., 391 *seq.* ; HERRE, I., 134 *seq.*

⁴ *Cf.* the report of Tiepolo in MUTINELLI, I., 92 *seq.* For G. da Pistoia see ROCCO DA CESINALE, I., 76 *seq.*

hood of success. Nevertheless Pius V. made an attempt to enter upon the subject personally with the young king, Charles IX., employing all authority, and sending him on March 13th, 1570, a letter expressed in burning words. In this letter he deplored in touching terms the sorrows of Christendom which were now coming to a climax with the danger from the Turks. The king was therefore implored to join the league against the common enemy. To the cold and terse refusal of Charles IX. the Pope replied on June 18th by another and very serious letter. If the king, this letter says, will not give up his old friendly relations with the Porte, in order that he may be able to render services to Constantinople in other ways, he will find himself upon an entirely false road, as it is not lawful to do evil that good may come. Besides this, the king is deceiving himself if he thinks that he will be able alone to maintain his friendship with the enemy of all Christian princes, whom he ought rather to avoid like the plague. But lately, Venice has experienced the true value of the Sultan's friendship. The letter ended with an exhortation to follow the example which France had given in the former days of her glory and greatness.¹ But the words of Pius V. fell on deaf ears. French diplomacy did not even shrink from directly opposing the league by attempting to bring about an agreement between Venice and the Porte.²

Truly those days were far distant, when zeal for the Crusades filled the whole of Christendom! This was also shown in the fact that Pius V., though he was urged to do so from many quarters, did not dare to have recourse by letter to the man, to whom at one time the eyes of the Popes had turned first of all in similar circumstances; this was the Emperor. The latter had no idea of withdrawing from the peace which his ambassadors had purchased for him in 1568 for a period of eight years.³

¹ GOUBAU, 295 *seq.*, 298 *seq.* LADERCHI, 1570, n. 61-62. The date "Mar. 14" in Laderchi is wrong; see *Brevia Pii V. in Arm. 44, t. 15, p. 44b, Papal Secret Archives.

² See HERRE, I., 161.

³ Cf. *supra*, p. 256.

Besides this, the relations of the Pope with the holder of the supreme secular dignity in Christendom had been seriously impaired, not only by the attitude of Maximilian II. towards religious questions, but also by the elevation of Cosimo to the grand dukedom of Tuscany.¹ At the same time the relations between Philip II. and the Emperor were very strained.² To the Venetian ambassador, when news first arrived of the threat to Cyprus by the Turks, Maximilian had, it is true, declared that a league could easily be formed, not only between himself, the German Empire, the King of Spain and Venice, but also with the Muscovites and the Persians, but it very soon became known that the grandiloquent monarch had made up his mind to go on paying his tribute to the Sultan, and all the efforts of the Venetian ambassador to prevent the sending of his "gift of honour" were in vain.³

The same fate befell the attempts of the Pope and Venice to interest Poland and Russia in the common struggle against the Turks. The rivalry existing between these two powers of itself stood in the way of any such plan, and this became apparent at the first attempt of the Venetians to win them over to the league.⁴ Pius V., however, did not give up all hopes of attaining his end. The optimism which he felt with regard to Russia is explained on the one hand by the ignorance which prevailed throughout the whole of the west of conditions in that immense empire, which was still sunk in the deepest barbarism, and of its cruel and despotic ruler, and on the other by the hope which still lingered on the Curia, that the Muscovite empire would accept the Catholic faith, and join with the other nations in the common struggle against the Turks. Pius V. was still so strongly under the impression made by the negotiations which had been carried on in the

¹ Cf. *supra*, p. 271 *seq.* *B. Pia reported from Rome on August 5, 1570, that the Emperor would only be drawn into the league after the disputes about the question of Tuscany had been settled. Gonzaga Archives, Mantua.

² See HERRE, I., 141, 149 *seq.*

³ See TURBA, III., 490, n. 2. Cf. *supra* p. 256.

⁴ See HERRE, I., 155 *seq.*

time of Julius III., and by the hopes held out by Ruggieri, at that time nuncio in Poland, that Ivan IV., as the enemy of the Lutherans, would not be averse to reunion with Rome, that the participation of the Muscovite empire in the war against the Turks seemed to him to be quite practicable.¹ He was also encouraged in his hopes of being able to draw the powers of eastern Europe into the struggle against the infidels by the nuncio in Venice.²

In August, 1570, Portico, the nuncio in Poland, received orders to go to Moscow to make an attempt to bring this about. The instructions which he received are characteristic of the Pope's idealism and energy. Pius V. refers to the negotiations which Ivan IV. had entered into with Julius III. in order to obtain the title of king, in return for the promise to submit to Rome as far as the Church was concerned. The nuncio was instructed to find out how far these negotiations, which had then been interrupted, had been meant seriously. If a favourable disposition still prevailed, the Pope was ready to send priests and bishops to Moscow. Portico was advised only to enter into religious controversy if Ivan himself touched upon the subject. He was to point out in the first place the danger from the Turks, and to urge the Czar to oppose them together with the Emperor and the King of Poland, and by this attack by land to support that of the Christian fleet in the Mediterranean. In an appendix in cypher, the title of king, which Ivan so much desired, is expressly dealt with.³ A letter from the Pope to Ivan which was sent to the nuncio,

¹ See CATENA, 183 *seq.* and PIERLING, *Russie*, I., 383 *seq.* For the negotiations in the time of Julius III. see Vol. XIII. of this work, p. 236, n. 1.

² See VALENSISE, 71 *seq.* In an *Avviso di Roma of June 2, 1571, it is said that the Jesuits stated that the Muscovites had asked for some "patres" from them (Urb. 1042, p. 71, Vatican Library). An *Avviso of June 8, 1571, in the State Archives, Vienna, makes the same announcement, but with the addition "which, if it is true, is of great importance."

³ See the text of the instructions of September, 1570, in PIERLING, *Rome et Moscou*, 140 *seq.*

and dated from Rome, August 9th, 1570, contained, in addition to a vivid description of the danger from the Turks which threatened all the princes, a fervent appeal to join in the war against the infidels. If the Czar, he says at the end, will put into practice his ideas of reunion, the Pope will prove his gratitude in every possible way.¹

Ivan was not blind to the dangers which threatened the Russian empire from the Turks, but he hoped to avert them, not by any warlike enterprise, but rather by peaceful means ; but Portico never obtained an inkling of this. It was taken for granted from the fact of his mission that the King of Poland had already given his consent, whereas the latter had made conditions which ill concealed his dislike for the Pope's proposals.²

The more hopeless the efforts of the Pope to organize a grand crusade became, the more warmly did he insist upon an alliance between Venice and Spain. But even in this he was met by almost insuperable difficulties. As had often been the case before, so now it seemed that it was only the Holy See which fully realized the danger which threatened Christendom and the whole civilization of the west, and was really pursuing a disinterested policy in promoting the league with all its power, whereas those in whose interests it was being formed, allowed themselves to be guided by nothing but their own individual interests, and haggled over the conditions of their common undertaking like traders bargaining about their merchandize.³

To the selfishness which was paramount on both sides was

¹ See GOUBAU, 360 *seq.* ; LADERCHI, 1570, n. 64 ; THEINER, Mon. Pol., II., 748 *seq.* A reprint of the Papal letter from the original in N. LICHATSHEV, *Una lettera di Papa Pio V. allo zar Iwan il terribile : Studio sulla diplomazia pontificia.* Petersburg, 1906 (in Russian), p. 2-5 and Tav. I. ; *cf.* as to this R. G. SALOMON in *Archiv für ältere deutsche Geschichte*, XXXII. (1907), 461 *seq.*

² See PIERLING, *Russie*, I., 389 *seq.*

³ See the opinion of Cardinal Rambouillet in his letter of November 5, 1570, in CHARRIÈRE, III., 126 ; *cf.* HERRE, I., 69, 71.

added a mutual distrust. It was above all Philip II. who feared that Venice had a secret understanding with the Porte, and that Spain would be left alone to face a Turkish attack. He was strengthened in his mistrust, which at times attacked even the Pope, by the obstinacy with which Venice tried to draw advantages for itself from the situation. Not satisfied with Pius V. having granted the Republic a tithe, and other help in money, troops and provisions,¹ she wanted the Pope further to take part in the naval expedition by placing a certain number of galleys at her disposal. The Spanish ambassador not unreasonably concluded from this that they wished to prevent the supreme command of the fleet from being given to a Spanish admiral.² So as not to offend the Spaniards, Cardinals Morone, Farnese, Orsini and Madruzzo, when they were consulted by the Pope, advised the formation of an independent Papal fleet, and recommended further money subsidies. Since Venice in the meantime had declared that she would only agree to a common expedition if it contained Papal ships and a Papal admiral, the Pope had to agree to this, although it was very difficult for him to raise the money and the troops for the promised fleet of twenty-four galleys.³ Encouraged by this success the Signoria then sought to have the supreme command entrusted to a man who was wholly

¹ See the *report of B. Pia, dated Rome, April 5, 1570, Gonzaga Archives, Mantua, Cf. *Avviso di Roma of April 5, 1570, Urb. 1041, p. 255b, Vatican Library.

² See the report of Zuñiga of April 10, 1570, in HERRE, I., 75. According to Granvelle (*ibid.* 78, n. 2) Venice had at first asked for 30 galleys; they then contented themselves with sending 24 empty ones to Ancona, where the Pope was to arm and equip them; see the *report of B. Pia of April 25, 1570, Gonzaga Archives, Mantua, and the *Avviso di Roma of May 3, 1570. Urb. 1041, p. 269, Vatican Library. Cf. also Corresp. dipl., III., 288 *seq.*, 376, n. 2.

³ See FOLIETA, I., 969 *seq.*; HERRE, I., 78; cf. also POMETTI, 67 *seq.* BIBL, Erhebung, 69 *seq.*, 72 *seq.* shows how Cosimo I. made use of the prosecution of the Turkish war to further his schemes for obtaining a higher dignity.

devoted to their interests, Cardinal Cornaro. Pius V. skilfully evaded this proposal on the ground that an ecclesiastic was not suited to such a position.¹ If attention were only paid to the number of ships the supreme command would fall to the Venetians, but it was certain that the powerful master of Spain would never place himself under their orders. As the Papal ships formed a link between the two rivals, Pius V. thought of solving the problem of the supreme command by appointing for them an admiral who would be above all suspicion.² With great cleverness he chose for this office a man whose capacity for war was beyond question and who would be acceptable, not only to Venice but also to the Spanish king; this was Marcantonio Colonna. He was the most prominent among the Roman barons, and though barely thirty-five years of age, had already fought with three galleys of his own on the coasts of Africa, and had helped in the capture of Peñón de Velez.³

At the end of May, 1570, a courier sent by Torres arrived in Rome with the news that Philip II. was prepared to go at once to the assistance of Venice, as well as to begin negotiations for an alliance. The Pope was filled with delight.⁴ On June 3rd he made public the appointment of Colonna as generalissimo of the Papal auxiliary fleet.⁵ On Sunday, June 11th, Marcantonio Colonna, clad in splendid armour, and surrounded by Roman nobles, went on horseback to the Vatican, where he took his oath in the Papal chapel after a Mass of the Holy

¹ See VALENSISE, 59. It is clear from the *Avviso di Roma of April 29, 1570, Urb. 1041, p. 269b, Vatican Library, that Commendone was suggested as well as Cornaro.

² See the important report of Fachinetti of March 29, 1570, in VALENSISE, 51 *seq.*

³ See GUGLIELMOTTI, M. A. Colonna, 11 *seq.* Additions to the biography by Guglielmotti are given in L. VICCHI, M. A. Colonna: Appunti biografici con doc. rari. Faenza, 1890, and TOMASSETTI, Su M. A. Colonna il Grande, Rome, 1909.

⁴ See the report of F. Gondola in VOINOVICH, 560.

⁵ See *Avviso di Roma of June 3, 1570, Urb. 1041, p. 283, Vatican Library. Cf. Corresp. dipl., III., 376.

Ghost. Conducted by Paolo Giordano Orsini and Michele Bonelli, he then approached the steps of the Pope's throne in order to receive from the hands of Pius V. the bâton of command and the standard of red silk, on which was to be seen the Crucified between the Princes of the Apostles, the arms of Pius V., and the motto: *In hoc signo vinces*.¹

In Rome as well as in Venice there was general satisfaction at the appointment of Colonna. Only the Spaniards were displeased, although they had every reason for satisfaction, since Colonna had always been loyally devoted to the cause of Spain. He had proved this by his conduct in the time of Paul IV. The noble-hearted Pius V. had completely passed over the part played at that time by Colonna in the war of Spain against the Holy See. How deeply hurt he must then have been to learn that such a man did not seem to be acceptable to the representatives of Philip II. in the Curia! Zuñiga told Colonna to his face that he need not suppose himself to be generalissimo, and that there was no such thing as a league. Granvelle openly blamed him for having accepted the command of the Papal galleys without having first consulted Philip II.²

That Pius V. had chosen the right man in Marcantonio Colonna was shown by the energy with which he took in hand the preparation of the galleys, the number of which, owing to the impossibility of providing any more, had been reduced

¹ See Firmanus in GENNARI 61 *seq.*; *Avvisi di Roma of June 14 and 17, 1570, Urb. 1041, p. 290b, 293b, Vatican Library. The date (May 11) in SERENO, 46 and CATENA, 153, is wrong. The brief to Colonna, of June 11, 1570, in GUGLIELMOTTI, Colonna, 8 *seq.* The standard given by Pius V. to M. A. Colonna was made over by him to the cathedral of Gaeta; there it serves as the picture of the High Altar, and is still well preserved; see P. FEDELE, *Lo stendardo di M. A. Colonna a Lepanto* (*Nozze Hermanin-Haussmann*), Perugia, 1903; S. FERRARO, *Mem. religiose e civili di Gaeta*, Naples, 1903, 193, and the pictures in *Cosmos illustr.*, 1904, 80.

² See the reports of Zuñiga and Granvelle in HERRE, I., 82.

to twelve. Colonna found among the Roman nobles the greatest eagerness to take part in the glorious enterprise. The first under whose command galleys were fitted out were Fabio Santacroce and Domenico de' Massimi; he appointed Pompeo Colonna, the Duke of Zagarolo, as his lieutenant. Paolo Francesco Baglioni was named commissary general, while the artillery was placed under the care of the architect, Jacopo Fontana.¹ Special chaplains were also appointed to look after the soldiers.² The camerlengo at once paid over to Colonna 10,000 scudi, and he was to receive 12,000 more from Venice, for which place he set out on June 16th.³ At Loreto Colonna recommended himself and his fleet to the protection of the Madonna, and then went on to Ancona and Venice for the fitting out of the twelve Papal galleys, a task in which he had to overcome serious obstacles.⁴

In the meantime the negotiations for the alliance between Spain and Venice had been begun in Rome, after a courier sent on June 14th had brought to the representative of the Republic in Rome, Michele Soriano, the authority from the Signoria.⁵ After several preliminary conferences⁶ the real negotiations were begun on July 1st, 1570, by an allocution

¹ See GUGLIELMOTTI, Colonna, 13 *seq.*, 16 *seq.* In a *brief of August 3, 1570, Pius V. recommended Pompeo Colonna to the "Generali classis Venetae," Arm. 44, t. 15, p. 184b, Papal Secret Archives.

² Venice had proposed for this purpose from 8 to 10 Jesuits: the Pope wished that there should be an ecclesiastic in every galley (see VALENSISE, 52, 57); at length he chose the Capuchins; see *Avvisi di Roma of June 17 and 24, 1570, Urb. 1041, p. 293b, 298b, Vatican Library. Cf. ROCCO DA CESENALE, I., 77 *seq.*, 475 *seq.*

³ See *Avviso di Roma of June 17, 1570, *loc. cit.* The *brief to the Doge, accrediting M. A. Colonna, is dated June 8, 1570; Arm. 44, t. 15, p. 136b, Papal Secret Archives.

⁴ See GUGLIELMOTTI, Colonna, 22.

⁵ See HERRE, I., 164; cf. VALENSISE, 61.

⁶ See Corresp. dipl., III., 404 *seq.*

from the Pope, which was full of burning zeal for the crusade.¹ Among the replies made by the ambassadors that of Soriano was noteworthy, as dwelling upon the necessity of at once taking the offensive against the Turks. When the ambassadors left the Vatican Soriano proposed that they should act as had been done in 1538, and immediately, at the first meeting, declare the league formed and begin to put it into force, afterwards proceeding to discuss the various points. Granvelle on the other hand declared that he wished first to hear the various proposals.²

On July 2nd the representatives of Spain and Venice received from the Pope the draft of a treaty of alliance, modelled upon that of the league of 1538,³ so that they might discuss it with Cardinals Bonelli, Morone, Cesi, Grassi and Aldobrandini, who had been appointed for that purpose. On July 4th the representatives met for the first conference at the Papal secretariate of State. The discussions, which after

¹ See CATENA, 155 *seq.*; FOLIETA, II., 1000; PARUTA, 122 *seq.*; LADERCHI, 1570, n. 90 *seq.*, where, however, the date is wrong.

² Cf. the protocol of the negotiations drafted by M. Soriano, first in *Tesoro Politico*, I., Milan, 1600, 510 *seq.*, and then in an "old copy" in DU MONT, V., 1, 184 *seq.*, and in LÜNIG, Cod. Ital. dipl., VI., 262 *seqq.* and incompletely in the appendix to SERENO, 393 *seq.* The dates and figures are very faulty in these editions, therefore two copies in the Papal Secret Archives have been consulted, *Leghe contro il Turco and Varia polit.* 115, n. 16 (*cf.* POMETTI, 70, n. 1). Copies of this protocol are also frequently to be found elsewhere, as in the Court and State Library, Munich, Ital. 6, p. 24 *seq.*; in the Library at Berlin, Inf. polit. 17, p. 1. *seq.*; in the Vatican, cod. 7484, p. 132 *seq.*, and Barb. lat. 5367, n. 15; in the Classense Library, Ravenna; in the Library at Siena; and in the Addit. Ms. 18173, British Museum, London. The reports of the representatives of Philip II., which complete Soriano's work, are in *Corresp. dipl.*, III., 404 *seq.*, 417 *seq.*, 421 *seq.*, 435 *seq.*, 439 *seq.*, 444 *seq.*, 466 *seq.*, 474 *seq.*, 486 *seq.*, 495 *seq.*; *ibid.* 501 *seq.* the comprehensive report of Rusticucci to Castagna of August 11, 1570.

³ See *Corresp. dipl.*, III., 414 *seq.*

that were held almost every day, and at which Cardinal Rusticucci represented Bonelli, who was ill, were by the Pope's command, kept absolutely secret.¹ As a matter of fact the negotiations were from the first rendered very difficult by the mutual mistrust and the divergent interests of the Spaniards and Venetians.² That they did not altogether fail was due to Pius V., who never wearied of calming their passions and smoothing over their differences, and curbing with much strength of will his own ardent disposition.³

Both the Spaniards and the Venetians were determined to look after their own interests and to gain as much advantage for themselves from the alliance as possible. The greatest determination in this respect was shown by the representatives of Spain, and especially by Granvelle, who, paying no attention to the reduced resources of Venice, insisted upon demands which a great and powerful empire like that of Spain could easily have foregone.⁴ It was therefore supposed in Venice that Philip II. did not so much wish to deal a decisive blow at the Turks, as to obtain a lasting defensive alliance in order to find support in the good opinion of his allies, to bind the

¹ See *Avvisi di Roma of July 8 and 15, 1570, Urb. 1041, p. 307, 309, Vatican Library, and *ibid.* 294 and 296 the *Avvisi of June 17 and 28, 1570. For the Cardinals chosen and the removal of Santa Croce from the commission by the influence of the Spaniards, see Corresp. dipl., III., 401 *seq.* Cf. also the *report of B. Pia, dated Rome, July 1, 1570, Gonzaga Archives, Mantua. Morone took the place of Santa Croce (Corresp. dipl., III., 404 *seq.*), and Rusticucci acted as substitute for Bonelli (*cf.* CHARRIÈRE, III., 115). After della Chiesa's death his place was taken by Grassi (see FOLIETA, II., 1001). For the secrecy *cf.* Gondola in VOINOVICH, 569 and CHARRIÈRE, III., 116.

² As early as July 15, 1570, an *Avviso di Roma announces that a happy issue of the negotiations is earnestly hoped for; another of July 26 says that the "lega" must come to "buonissimo termine" (Urb. 1041, p. 309, 312, Vatican Library). B. Pia *announced from Rome on August 5, 1570: "La lega s'ha per conclusa." (Gonzaga Archives, Mantua).

³ This is rightly brought out by HAVEMANN (p. 123).

⁴ See SERRANO, Liga, I., 93.

Republic of St. Mark to himself, and make it dependent upon him, and lastly to tap a permanent source of revenue from the Pope by means of the *cruzada* and tithes.¹ In Madrid, however, they feared that the peace party in the city of the lagoons would be ultimately victorious and would enter into an agreement with the Porte. Such mutual mistrust was bound to render the negotiations in Rome for a league against the Turks very difficult.

At the very first meeting on July 4th Cardinal Granvelle raised a number of objections to the proposals for an alliance put forward by the Pope. At the discussion of the objective, towards which the alliance was to be directed, he maintained the view of Philip II., that the league should not be aimed at the Turks alone, but at all infidels. Soriano replied: "We have been summoned hither and authorized to treat of nothing but a league against the Turks; anyone who wishes to include other infidels is departing from our main purpose; instead of quarrelling with them, we should rather seek to attach them to ourselves in our struggle with the Turks." Morone agreed with him, mentioning in particular Persia. Granville, however, held firmly to his opinion, maintaining that the Persians and the Moors were but tools in the hands of the Turks. The league must also be directed against the Moorish rebels in Spain, and the occupation of Tunis, and not made to serve only the interests of Venice. The discussion became very heated and protracted, as Soriano defended his opinion with much energy. Morone then proposed, by way of compromise, that neither the Persians nor the Moors should be mentioned, nor Algiers, Tunis and Tripoli, so as to avoid the appearance of Venice being unwilling to help Spain. But Soriano would not agree to this, so that the decision of this question had to be postponed.

The meeting on July 5th was devoted to the division of the expenses; Granvelle regretted the financial exhaustion of his king, but said that Philip II. was nevertheless willing to bear half the cost; Soriano spoke to the same effect; his declara-

¹ Cf. PARUTA, 126 *seq.*; LE BRET, *Geschichte Venedigs*, III., 1380 *seq.*

tion that the Signoria could only bear a fourth part of the cost caused general dismay. Morone refused to accept this statement of the financial exhaustion of the Republic, saying that financially speaking it was in a better condition than the other states. The outcome of the long discussion that followed was that Soriano declared that Venice would bear a third part of the cost. Further difficulties arose with regard to the share to be taken by the Holy See, which in 1538 had undertaken a sixth part of the expenditure, which, however, was now out of the question since the revenues of the Church were now less by 400,000 scudi. Cardinal Aldobrandini estimated that, of the 600,000 monthly cost of the war the Pope could only make himself responsible for 30,000 or 35,000 at the utmost, and that the rest would have to be shared by Spain and Venice. Soriano refused to accept this, while Granvelle made his consent dependent on the condition that the Pope should grant to Spain the *cruzada* and other taxes upon the clergy, without which his king would be unable to make any contribution towards the league.

Soriano was not present at the meeting on July 7th, as he had a private audience with the Pope in order to justify the attitude which he had so far taken up, and was successful in so doing. In the meantime the Pope's representatives treated with the Spaniards concerning the *cruzada* and the other demands of Philip II. Pius V. still resisted the concession of the *cruzada*, but was inclined to grant the *excusado* and the continuance of the *sussidio*. The Venetians accordingly put forward further demands concerning the taxation of their own clergy. They would have liked to have made this a permanent arrangement, but the nuncio in Venice would not hear of this, maintaining that the concession should only be made for a year, so that its removal might be made dependent upon the energy with which they carried on the war.¹

The rivalry between Spain and Venice came to a head at the meeting on July 8th, when the question of how many ships Venice and Philip II. should respectively contribute to the enterprise was discussed. As no agreement could be reached,

¹ See VALENSISE, 62, 68.

the decision of this matter had to be postponed. The same fate befell the discussion on July 10th. The Spaniards proposed that the league should at any rate be directed against Algiers, Tunis and Tripoli; Soriano, however, was of opinion that it should be merely stated to be against the Turks and their tributary states, as otherwise it would be necessary to draw up a list of all the Turkish possessions. The Spaniards on the other hand pointed out that by their instructions they had been expressly told to insist that their king should be helped by the league in his undertakings against Algiers and other places in Barbary. If this was not agreed to Spain could not take part in the league.

At the meeting on July 11th, the difficult question was raised of the supreme command, which Spain claimed for herself. Soriano argued against this that in eastern waters the Venetian fleet would have a greater influence, especially in inducing the Christians in those parts to revolt against the Turks. It was decided to refer the matter to the Pope, and in the meantime to postpone any decision. Morone remarked on this occasion to Soriano that Don John of Austria, the half brother of Philip II.,¹ who had made a name for himself in the war against the Moors, was likely to be appointed generalissimo. It was also unanimously decided at this meeting that the Pope should invite the other princes to join the league, especially the Emperor, and that none of the allies should make peace or come to any arrangement with the Turks without the consent of the others, and lastly that the Pope, as supreme arbiter, should decide all questions connected with the league.

On July 13th it was first discussed what share should be taken by Spain and Venice of the contribution which had been asked for from the Pope. Opinions were so violently opposed as to this that the negotiations almost came to an end. Gran-

¹ Cf. for him, besides the monographs by HAVEMANN (1865) and STIRLING-MAXWELL (2 vols., London, 1883) the older work, only recently edited by PORREÑO: *Hist. del ser. S. Don Juan d'Austria*, Madrid, 1899.

velle permitted himself to speak in such a way as to provoke even so moderate a man as Morone to a bitter retort. Then a fresh dispute arose, as to whether the conquest of Algiers, Tunis and Tripoli was to be counted as one of the objects of the league. Soriano insisted that the proposed league was not only for the advantage of Venice, but for the protection of the whole Christian world. The Spaniards on the contrary contended that what they were doing was principally for the advantage of the Republic, and demanded something by way of compensation. At length Soriano declared his readiness to make greater concessions than were authorized by his instructions. All seemed to agree to the appointment of Don John of Austria as generalissimo, though they insisted that he should act in connection with the commanders of the Venetian and Papal forces.

On July 17th the Pope's representatives laid before them a detailed draft of the terms of the alliance, with regard to which Morone pointed out that these were definitely what the Pope desired. The Spaniards wished first to send the scheme to their king in order to receive his instructions, and when Soriano objected that in view of the Turkish preparations any further delay was dangerous, and that the whole world was expecting from them a definite decision, they replied to him that they had only been meeting for fourteen days, whereas the negotiations concerning the league in the time of Paul III. had lasted from October, 1537, to February, 1538.

During the course of the negotiations Soriano had several times insisted on the junction of the Spanish fleet with those of the Pope and Venice. The Spaniards replied that as to that they must await the orders of Philip II., which, however, would have arrived before the feast of St. James. The negotiations were therefore postponed until that date. On July 22nd it was learned that the Venetians had consented to the appointment of Don John of Austria as generalissimo of the armada,¹ and on the 26th they were able to lay before the

¹ See the *report of Arco of July 22, 1570, State Archives, Vienna,

Pope his scheme for the league modified in several respects. Pius V. had not given up hopes of a successful issue, although even now a number of difficulties still remained unsolved. For example the Spaniards insisted that in the following years they should meet in the autumn and decide whether the war was to be continued in the coming spring, and what forces were to be employed. The Republic opposed this because it was suspected that in this Philip II. was aiming at keeping an eye upon Venetian policy. Moreover an agreement had not been reached as to the sum to be contributed by the Pope, nor as to how much of this sum was to be taken by Venice and Spain respectively. Another question which still remained undecided was whether the league was to be merely an offensive one, or whether the allies were to count in general upon the help of the others in each one's undertakings. The Spaniards too were still awaiting definite orders from their king as to who was to represent the generalissimo at sea in his absence. For the land forces Soriano had suggested Sforza Pallavicini as commander in chief, but the Spaniards were also waiting for definite instructions as to this. They also asked for time to consider how conquered territory should be divided. Lastly, there was a difference of opinion as to whether ecclesiastical censures were to be incurred by those who betrayed the league. Soriano wished first to discuss this matter with the Pope, remarking that the man who had no sense of honour and deserted the league would certainly not be afraid of censures. By his opposition in this matter he encouraged the distrust felt by the Spaniards. The nuncio was of opinion that in the end the Signoria would give way on the question of censures; at the same time he reported how firmly it was believed at Venice that Philip II. was opposed to any attack upon the Turks.¹

The status of Ragusa caused special difficulties with regard to the league. This little republic, which was much in favour with Pius V. on account of its strong Catholicism, had suffered a great deal in the war of the league in the days of Paul III., because the allies had not bound themselves to guarantee the

¹ See VALENSIS, 71.

neutrality of Ragusa by the terms of the treaty. The republic therefore now wished for a guarantee of its neutrality and the integrity of its territory. Venice, which was jealous of the commerce of Ragusa, sought to avoid this; the republic, she said, must be forced to join the league so that it could be occupied by troops on the pretext of protecting it against the Turks. In the diplomatic contest as to this matter which ensued between Venice and Ragusa, not only the Pope, but the representative of Spain as well, were on the side of the little republic.¹

On July 27th a Spanish courier at last arrived with the decision of Philip II. that Doria's fleet should be united to that of Venice and placed under the command of Colonna.² Great was the joy of the Pope, who at once held out definite hopes of the concession of the *cruzada*, the *excusado*, and the continuance of the *sussidio*,³ since he could now hope that his unceasing prayers for the success of the expedition would be realized.⁴

But what a bitter disillusionment the Pope was now to experience! The Venetian fleet under the command of Girolamo Zane numbered 137 galleys, to which were added the 49 of Gian Andrea Doria and the 12 of the Pope under Marcantonio Colonna. The artillery amounted to 1,300

¹ Cf. VOINOVICH, 504 *seq.*, 514 *seq.*, 535 *seq.* The "Confirmatio litt. praedecess. vigore quarum Ragusei possint libere et licite mercari cum infidelibus," issued on December 17, 1566, by Pius V., in MAKUSCEV, *Mon. Slav. merid.*, I., Warsaw, 1874, 501 *seq.*

² See Šoriano in DU MONT, V., I, 192; cf. CHARRIÈRE, 118; VALENSISE, 69 *seq.*

³ See *Corresp. dipl.*, III., 479.

⁴ See CATENA, 154. The jubilee bull, dated April 6 (in LADERCH, 1570, n. 15) did not at first seem to the Pope to have been expressed in sufficiently clear terms: it was corrected; see **Avvisi di Roma* of April 15 and 22, 1570, Urb. 1041, p. 263b, 267b, Vatican Library. *Ibid.* 273b **Avviso* of May 13 on the extraordinary part taken by the people in the jubilee. Cf. also *Firmanus*, **Diarium* in *Miscell. Arm.*, XII., 32, p. 124 *seq.*

cannon, and the soldiers were as many as 16,000. This large military force, however, succeeded in accomplishing nothing. The reason for the complete failure of this first attempt at concerted action by Venice, Spain and the Holy See, must undoubtedly be found, in addition to a lack of preparation, in the inexcusable behaviour of Andrea Doria, who had been appointed by Philip II. to the command of his forces. Displeased from the first at the appointment of Colonna and the formation of a separate Papal fleet, and anxious to spare his own ships, Doria could not be induced to take any decisive action. His procrastination was doubly disastrous: not only was no advantage taken of a favourable position of affairs, but the capital of Cyprus, which had been besieged by the Turks since July 22nd, was not relieved. Doria would not hear of making any attack.¹

While Doria was holding back the Venetians and Colonna on various pretexts, the heroic defenders of Nicosia had been obliged to capitulate on September 9th. The Turks broke the terms of the capitulation and twenty thousand men fell victims to their lust for blood.² The defenders of Famagosta may well have been dismayed at this orgy of bloodshed. The place was commanded by the noble Marcantonio Bragadino, who was determined to defend it to the last. There were none found to come to his assistance, as the Venetians, at first hindered by Doria, and then disgracefully deserted by him,

¹ See SERRANO, *Liga*, I., 68-84. Cf. MANFRONI, *Marina*, 462 *seq.*; POMETTI, 71.

² See *Nestore Martinengo, *Relazione della perdita di Nicosia, 1570*, Capilupi Library, Mantua. Cf. *Particolare ragguaglio della perdita di Nicosia, in *Varia polit.*, 62 (now 63), p. 199 *seq.* Papal Secret Archives. Cf. *Cod. F. 18 of the Boncompagni Archives, Rome, and the *reports in the State Archives, Florence, which FULIN quotes (*Una visita all'Archivio di Stato in Firenze*, Venice, 1865, 10). Of recent authors see HAMMER, II., 412 *seq.*; ZINKEISEN, II., 926, 929; BIANCONI, *Piccolo Archivio storico-artistico Umbro*, a. 1866-1867, Perugia, 1867. See also G. CASTELLANI, *Una lettera di Franc. Palazzo, colonello dei Veneziani a Nicosia*, Venice, 1916 (*nozze* publication).

did not dare to launch an attack. Marcantonio Colonna also retired with them to Corfù. Storms destroyed some of the ships and Colonna reached Ancona with but four galleys.¹ He sent Pompeo Colonna to Rome to break the news to the Pope.

The sorrow and anger of Pius V. at the ineffectual return of so great a fleet were beyond words.² Cyprus was abandoned to its own resources until the spring of 1571, and it was very doubtful whether Famagosta could hold out till then.³

Although the Spaniards did all they could to justify the action of Doria,⁴ the true state of affairs was soon realized in Rome. While Pompeo Colonna received an honourable welcome, Marcello Doria, who had been sent to justify Andrea Doria, did not succeed in obtaining an audience.⁵ The facts of the case were too obvious. Even the moderate Cardinal Morone publicly complained, saying that it would have been better if Doria had never joined the Venetians, since he had hindered them far more than he had helped them.⁶ At the end of October the Pope sent Pompeo Colonna to Madrid to make complaint to Philip II., and at the same time to urge him to conclude the alliance.⁷ Pius V. had laboured for four hours, together with Cardinal Rusticucci, on the letter which Colonna took with him.⁸

It was inevitable that the behaviour of Doria should

¹ See GUGLIEMOTTI, 101 *seq.*, 104 *seq.* Cf. BALAN, VI., 540.

² Cf. Gondola in VOINOVICH, 583; VALENSISE, 86 *seq.*

³ See the report of the French ambassador of November 5, 1570, in CHARRIÈRE, III., 124 *seq.*

⁴ See Corresp. dipl., IV., 63 *seq.*

⁵ See the *Avvisi di Roma of November 4 and 11, 1570, Urb. 1041, p. 365b, 368b, Vatican Library. In the latter Avviso it is stated that the audience was refused "per il sdegno che ha S.S.^{ta} che una tanta armata sia ritornata senza haver fatto alcun profitto." Cf. Gondola, *loc. cit.*

⁶ FR. LONGO, Guerra, 20.

⁷ See Corresp. dipl., IV., 66 *seq.*; cf. Gondola, *loc. cit.* 584.

⁸ See *Avviso di Roma of October 28, 1570, Urb. 1041, p. 363b, Vatican Library. Cf. the *report of Cusano of November 4, 1570, State Archives, Vienna.

have the worst possible effect on the negotiations about the league in Rome.¹ These were resumed on July 26th, but were suspended on August 4th, it having been decided to wait for further instructions from Venice and Madrid.²

While Pius V. was redoubling his prayers and on several occasions making processions in Rome,³ his nuncio in Venice was making every effort to break down the opposition being made by the Signoria to the imposition of ecclesiastical censures on those who should violate the alliance, but all the remonstrances of Facchinetti were in vain.⁴ The Signoria refused even to hear such a thing spoken of. As the attitude of Soriano in this and other questions did not seem to them to be sufficiently firm, his recall was discussed. Facchinetti strongly defended Soriano, but was unable to prevent Giovanni Soranzo being associated with him as second ambassador, and orders being given that neither could decide anything without the other. Fearing lest the Signoria should withdraw entirely from the negotiations, Pius V. promised the Venetians to use his influence with Philip II. to persuade him not to insist any longer on the infliction of censures.⁵

¹ See the report in CHARRIÈRE, III., 125 *seq.*

² See Tiepolo in MUTINELLI, I., 93; *cf.* Corresp. dipl., III., 474 *seq.*, 486 *seq.*, 495.

³ Firmanus gives an account of the processions on August 15 and September 13-16 (*Diarium in Miscell., Arm. XII., 32, p. 125b, Papal Secret Archives). *Cf.* the *report of Arco of September 16, 1570 (State Archives, Vienna) and the *Avviso di Roma of the same date for the great concourse of people at the processions: "orando S.S.^{td} quando disse quelle parole: Ne tradas bestiis animas confitentes Tibi, venne in tanta devotione et compuntione di cuore che due volte coram populo lacrimava" (Urb. 1041, p. 346b, Vatican Library). According to an *Avviso di Roma of September 2, 1570, Michele Bonelli started on the Wednesday to inspect all the fortifications near Rome (*ibid.* 333b).

⁴ See his reports in VALENSISE, 73 *seq.*

⁵ See VALENSISE, 80 *seq.* The mandate for Soriano and Soranzo, of September 8, 1570, in LADERCHI, 1571, n. 230. The charge laid on Soranzo in *Arch. Veneto*, 1901, 376.

Soranzo had arrived in Rome on September 20th. Nothing was now wanting but the arrival of the Spanish courier, who brought the instructions of Philip II. to his representatives on October 17th,¹ in order to resume the discussions, which was done on October 20th, though without Soriano, who was absent through ill-health. Both parties protested their willingness to conclude the alliance, but this was not borne out by the opening scenes of the conference. Soranzo begged the Spaniards to inform them of the king's decision in his own words, but Granvelle replied that it was rather the duty of the Venetians to put forward their difficulties and doubts. To this Soranzo made answer that as they had awaited for three months the king's reply, they had the right to know the terms of that document now that it had arrived. Granvelle then rebuked the Venetians for having in the meantime treated directly with Philip II. and complained of some of the terms arranged. After a stormy discussion the Spaniards read the memorandum which the Republic had sent to its ambassador at the court of Philip.² In this memorandum complaint was made of the proposal that the campaign for the following spring should only be decided upon every autumn, of the article dealing with the help to be given to a Spanish expedition to north Africa, of the ecclesiastical censures, of the status of Ragusa, and of the contribution of the Pope towards the expenditure. Further the Republic expressed a wish to appoint the generalissimo for the land forces. Granvelle then declared that the Spanish representatives had sufficient authority to settle all these matters; let the Venetians then obtain similar powers.

Then there came, on November 2nd, the news of the fall of Nicosia and of the strange behaviour of Doria. The blow at

¹ According to the *report of B. Pia from Rome, October 21, 1570 (Gonzaga Archives, Mantua) the Spanish messenger had arrived four days earlier, i.e. on the 17. The date in the report of Soriano in DU MONT, V., 1, 194 (October 28), must therefore be altered. The instructions of Philip II. of September 24, 1570, in *Corresp. dipl.*, IV., 21 *seq.*

² Now published in *Corresp. dipl.*, IV., 22 *seq.*

once had its effect upon the attitude of the Venetian envoys. Soranzo reminded the meeting of the disloyal conduct of Spain in the year 1538.¹ Fortunately there came on November 4th the instructions from the Signoria to press forward the negotiations, which had at last been obtained owing to the remonstrances of Facchinetti,² and were dated October 28th. Without any further difficulties an agreement was arrived at concerning the military force that was to be prepared. It was definitely decided that by March they were to have ready 200 galleys, 100 transports, 50,000 infantry, and 4,500 cavalry, together with artillery and munitions. A long discussion followed on the article providing that every autumn the campaign for the following spring was to be decided upon in Rome in the presence of the Pope. The discussion of this matter was continued on the following day, Granvelle declaring that he had express orders from the king to uphold this proposal. The Venetians asked for another ten days to make up their minds, and in the meantime to go on to the other articles. Their offer to fit out 24 galleys, of which the Pope was to bear the expense of eight, and Spain of sixteen, was accepted, as was the decision that each of the allies who should do something over and above what he was bound to do should receive compensation in some form from the other side. Such violent altercations arose over the question of the supply of grain from Naples for Sicily and Venice that it was feared that the negotiations would have to be broken off. The Spaniards at first demanded a sum considerably greater than was usual in years of an average harvest, but at last agreed to accept a lower price; as, however, no agreement could be come to it was decided to abandon it.

At the meeting on November 8th the Pope's representatives made large concessions in order to obtain Sicilian grain. The Spaniards asked for twice or three times the Papal price, and once again the discussions were without result. At length the Spaniards said that they would ask for further information from the viceroy of Naples as to this. In the meantime they

¹ Cf. Vol. XI. of this work, p. 295.

² See VALENSISE, 88 *seq.*

discussed a future expedition against Algiers, Tunis and Tripoli, for which the Spaniards demanded fifty Venetian galleys to assist them. Soriano and Soranzo demanded similar help for their own future enterprises. After a long discussion this was agreed to, with the condition that the Venetians should first help the king, and then Philip the the Venetians. The proposal to appoint Don John of Austria as generalissimo met with general approval. But there was a difference of opinion as to the proposal that the Papal commander was to take his place in his absence. The Venetians made no objections to this, but the Spaniards thought that Don John ought to appoint his own lieutenant. Sforza Pallavicini was again proposed by the Venetians as commander of the land forces. Entry into the league was always to be open to the Emperor and the other princes; it was to be the Pope's duty to urge them to do so. With regard to conquered territory an agreement was arrived at: Spain was to have Algiers, Tunis and Tripoli, as well as anything that had previously belonged to her; Venice in the same way was to have her own former possessions, as well as Castelnuovo, Valona and Durazzo. Captured artillery and munitions were to be divided among the three allies in proportion to their contribution to the expenditure. With regard to the decision to prohibit under pain of censure all negotiations for peace or any agreement with the Turks without the knowledge and consent of the other allies, the Pope's representatives declared that they would agree to whatever should be decided by the others. The Spaniards still insisted upon their demand for the censures, while the Venetians wished this to be entirely omitted. From what was said by Soriano, however, it was still thought possible to induce the Spaniards not to persist in their demand. And this was actually the case; at the request of the Venetian ambassador in Madrid Philip II. consented to withdraw the demand for censures.¹

When the expected reply from Naples had arrived on November 20th Morone was able to arrange an agreement concerning the supply of grain by means of mutual conces-

¹ Cf. the letter of Morone in *Corresp. dipl.*, IV., 314.

sions. On the following day the price to be paid for the grain from Naples was definitely fixed.¹ In Rome it was now hoped that an end of the negotiations for the league would soon be reached,² and the Pope pushed them forward energetically.³ The Venetians had, at the Pope's request, given way to the Spaniards on so many points, that the Pope felt sure of a happy issue to the negotiations. But the question of who was to supply the place of the generalissimo in his absence led, on account of the attitude of the Spaniards, to so many complications and differences of opinion that the attainment of the wished for end was once more postponed.⁴

The Venetians, on account of the great position of Philip II. and the great reputation of the Emperor's son, Don John, had agreed that the latter should have the supreme command of the forces of the league; but with regard to the question who was to take his place, it did not seem right to them that in the absence of Don John, the Venetian and Papal leaders should be placed under the orders of the Spaniards. At last they decided that in such a case the Papal commander, Marcantonio Colonna, should assume the supreme command. Pius V. had with difficulty induced the Venetians to agree to this

¹ Here the notes of Soriano come to an end. We have in their place for the negotiations that followed not only the reports of the Spanish representatives (Corresp. dipl., IV., 76 *seqq.*, 83 *seq.*, 88 *seq.*, 121 *seq.*, 125 *seq.*), but also the very important letter of Morone to Ruy Gomez of December 15, 1570 (*ibid.* 134 *seq.*).

² Cf. the *reports of B. Pia of November 18 and 22, 1570, Gonzaga Archives, Mantua. See also the *Avvisi di Roma of November 11 and 25, 1570, Urb. 1041, pp. 368b, 369b, Vatican Library.

³ See *Avviso di Roma of November 22, 1570, *ibid.* 374.

⁴ Cf. the letter of Morone cited above, n. 1. An *Avviso di Roma of December 5, 1570, Urb. 1041, p. 377, Vatican Library, states that the negotiations were being kept strictly secret. On December 6, 1570, B. Pia *reports that "La lega è sul fine." (Gonzaga Archives, Mantua). An *Avviso of December 9, 1570, announces that on the day before there had been a great dispute on the question whether Colonna or Doria should be Don John's lieutenant. (Urb. 1041, p. 380, *loc. cit.*).

proposal when suddenly, just when it was thought that the negotiations were completed, the Spaniards entered a protest.¹ At Venice they now thought that the faithless Doria might be appointed as lieutenant, but the Pope took up the cause of the Venetians, and many distinguished Cardinals declared that Marcantonio Colonna was the man best suited for the office.²

The disputes on this matter became more and more embittered, and many harsh things were said. Cardinals Granvelle and Pacheco thought that the Venetians were behaving as though it was the Spaniards who were being besieged at Famagosta. The French ambassador, on the other hand, declared openly that the representatives of Philip II. were trying to make as much profit as possible out of the difficulties of the Republic of St. Mark, and were therefore keeping everything in suspense.³ Pius V., who followed the negotiations with infinite patience, and had frequently intervened with success, was deeply grieved. On December 9th he addressed an autograph letter to Philip II.⁴ In this he made bitter complaints: scarcely had the more serious difficulties with the Venetians been overcome, when lo! the Spanish representatives declared that they could not come to any decision until they received instructions as to the lieutenancy of the supreme command. The Pope characterized such procedure as both strange and suspicious. Threatening to break off the negotiations he asked for an immediate decision from the king, leaving no room for doubt as to his own firm

¹ Besides the reports of Facchinetti of November 27 and December 6, 1570, in VALENSISE, 95 *seq.*, see the letter of Morone of December 15, 1570, cited *supra* 397, n. 1. Cosimo I. would have been very glad to have obtained the command for his son, and had recourse for that purpose to Cardinals Morone and Pacheco; see *Medic. 616, fasc. 33, State Archives, Florence.

² See Corresp. de Granvelle, éd. POULLET, IV., 51; *Avviso di Roma of December 20, 1570, Urb. 1041, p. 385, Vatican Library. Cf. FOLIETA, II., 1001 *seq.*; Corresp. dipl., IV., 127.

³ See CHARRIÈRE, III., 128.

⁴ See the letter of Bonelli to Facchinetti on December 9, 1570, in VALENSISE, 97 *seq.* Cf. Gondola in VOINOVICH, 587 *seq.*

determination to help Venice against the Turks with all his power.¹

The nuncio in Madrid, who was to deliver this letter, received instructions to make the following declaration in the event of Philip still hesitating: the king, in consequence of the concession of the *sussidio*, was bound to place sixteen galleys at the Pope's disposal, and any attempt to evade this obligation would constrain the Pope to withdraw the concession.² It was in vain that Zuñiga tried to pacify the Pope, who complained bitterly of the conduct of the Spanish representatives, and who was specially indignant with Granvelle.³

Indignation at the behaviour of the representatives of Philip II. was very great in other quarters as well. Facchinetti feared that the negotiations about the league would break down altogether, and that the Venetians would come to terms with the Turks.⁴ Fears of the same sort also took possession of Pius V., and even when the Spanish representatives showed themselves more accommodating, he no longer trusted them. The general view of Philip II. was that he really cared for nothing⁵ but to obtain the *cruzada*.⁵

While the negotiations were thus suspended, they were anxiously awaiting in Rome the reply of the King of Spain,⁶ and thus the year came to an end with but gloomy prospects. after the negotiations had been going on for six whole months.

¹ Corresp. dipl., IV., 118 seq. Cf. VALENSISE, 97 seq.; Gondola, *loc. cit.*

² See Corresp. dipl., IV., 119 seq.

³ See *ibid.* 138 seq. Cf. SERRANO, Liga, I., 94.

⁴ Cf. his reports in VALENSISE, 99 seq.

⁵ See the report of the Spanish representatives of December 29, 1570, Corresp. dipl., IV., 153. *Arco also gives similar information on the same date. (State Archives, Vienna).

⁶ The decision of Philip II., which was expected on December 29 (*Avviso di Roma of December 29, 1570, Urb. 1041, p. 385, Vatican Library), had not arrived even on December 30; see the *report of B. Pia of December 30 1570, Gonzaga Archives, Mantua, Cf. Corresp. de Granvelle, éd. POULLET, IV., 59.

CHAPTER X.

THE VICTORY OF LEPANTO AND AFTERWARDS.—DEATH OF PIUS V.

IT was Pius V. who had begun the negotiations for a league ; he alone had pushed them forward in a disinterested spirit,¹ and he had carried them on in spite of all the difficulties arising from the selfishness and distrust of the Spaniards and Venetians. Keeping his eyes steadily fixed upon the great end he had in view, he had displayed the most admirable patience.

While the Pope was awaiting month after month the decision of Philip II.,² the Turks were besieging Famagosta, and threatening Corfù and Ragusa.³ If the alliance is not soon concluded, the Papal nuncio Facchinetti reported from Venice on February 21st, 1571, there is a danger of the Signoria making peace with the Porte, even at the cost of losing Cyprus.⁴

In the meantime Philip II.'s reply, which they had been waiting for ever since the December of the previous year, had at last arrived in Rome on March 2nd, 1571,⁵ where the whole extent of the danger threatening the whole of Europe from Islam was alone fully understood.⁶ It seemed likely to

¹ Cf. the opinion of Gondola in VOINOVICH, 527. See also ADRIANI, XXI., 2, 3.

² See Corresp. dipl., IV., 172 seq., 194. Cf. the *report of Cusano of February 23, 1571, State Archives, Vienna.

³ See the reports in VOINOVICH, 589.

⁴ See VALENSISE, 107. The troubles of Facchinetti coincided with the mission of Giacomo Ragazzoni, for whose work cf. DALLA SANTA in *Archivio Veneto*, 1901, 376.

⁵ Corresp. dipl., IV., 213.

⁶ * "Ingens enim ingruit bellum atque is hostis quocum nobis non de dignitate contentio, sed pro communi salute, pro libertate,

facilitate the successful conclusion of the negotiations. On March 7th Cardinal Bonelli wrote to the nuncio at Venice that the discussions which had been held on that day, the feast of St. Thomas Aquinas, after a High Mass in the Church of the Minerva, in the monastery adjoining, and under the presidency of the Pope, had gone so smoothly that there was reason to believe that in three or four days it would be possible to conclude the business and proceed to the solemn promulgation of the league.¹ On March 16th Cardinal Bonelli ordered the nuncio at Madrid to ask the king to make ready his galleys and troops, as the Pope looked upon the league as settled, and was only waiting for the decision of Venice. This arrived two days later. What its tenor was could plainly be seen from the sad and indignant look of the Pope when he appeared at the consistory on March 19th.²

The fact was that such serious disagreements had arisen between Venice and Spain concerning the help they were to give each other as to cause Facchinetti to fear that the Republic of St. Mark would agree to a peace with the enemy of Christendom. The Pope's representative employed all the resources of his eloquence to prevent that. From the vague and involved reply which was handed to him on March 15th he felt that he could only conclude that Venice had already made up her mind to come to terms with the Porte, and that she wished to force Philip to concur in this. Venice could not, so the Signoria declared, put any trust in the promises of Spain for an offensive and defensive war, nor, since Crete was being threatened by the Turks, could she furnish the ships asked for by Philip.³

At a meeting held in the presence of the Pope on March 20th an attempt was made to find a way out of the difficulty.⁴

pro religione, pro incolumitate omnium dimicatio est" wrote M. A. Graziani to Nic. Tomicio, dated Romae 1571, xiii. Cal. febr. Graziani Archives, Città di Castello.

¹ See Corresp. dipl. IV. 219, n. 1.

² See *ibid.* 224.

³ See VALENSISE, 117 *seq.*

⁴ See the letter of Bonelli to Facchinetti of March 20, 1571, in VALENSISE, 120 *seq.* Cf. CHARRIÈRE, III., 145.

Facchinetti at once and with great urgency laid before the Signoria the suggestions made at this meeting, which he had received on March 23rd. The attitude of the Venetian government on this occasion showed only too clearly how they wished to put off coming to a decision. Every day there were fresh difficulties and fresh excuses. One day there would be a festival which prevented any meeting being held, on the next day perhaps the doge would be ill. There could be no doubt about it that there was a strong party, guided principally by commercial considerations, which was working with all its might against the league, and urging the government to accept the proposals for peace which had been put forward by a French agent in the sultan's name.¹ The same party also made quite baseless complaints against the Pope. Under these circumstances, thought Facchinetti on March 28th, he could do nothing but to continue to insist, exhort and accuse. He advised that the Republic should be won over by means of further concessions. When on March 30th he asked the doge firmly for a definite reply, the latter answered that since the Spaniards had discussed the matter at such length, it was only right that Venice too should maturely consider so important a question. In the course of the conversation Facchinetti frankly remarked that the behaviour of Venice was bound to give rise to the suspicion that they were trying to profit by the negotiations in order to bring pressure to bear on the Turks to obtain more favourable terms.²

There were two parties in Venice; one aimed at an agreement with the Porte, the other at the conclusion of the alliance, but without the conditions demanded by Spain. Facchinetti reported to Rome on April 4th, 1571, that if Spain would not give way there was reason to fear that the Signoria would come to terms with the Turks, to the great harm of Christendom, as well as to that of the Republic itself.³

¹ Cf. SERRANO, *Liga*, I., 95.

² See the reports of Facchinetti of March 24 and 28, 1571, in VALENSISE, 122 *seq.*, 128 *seq.*

³ See *ibid.* 134; Corresp. dipl., IV., 244.

Great despondency took possession of the Pope at this state of affairs.¹ But he did not lose heart, nor did Morone, who now became the guiding spirit of the negotiations.² In order to back up the remonstrances of Facchinetti, on April 6th, by the advice of Commendone, he sent a special envoy to the city of the lagoons in the person of Marcantonio Colonna, who was much loved in Venice.³ Colonna reached Venice on April 11th,⁴ and set to work with all his energy, but he met with the same difficulties as the nuncio.⁵ Both were unwearied in their efforts, while the Pope in Rome was exercising all his authority, and threatened the Republic with the recall of Colonna if the Signoria did not make up its mind before May 8th.⁶

An attempt on the part of the French ambassador in Venice to bring about a further delay was frustrated.⁷ On the other hand, the remonstrances of Colonna and Facchinetti, supported by Paolo Tiepolo, at length proved effectual. Their efforts were successful in removing the principal difficulties, and Venice was to receive guarantees of the indemnification of her expenses.⁸ On May 11th Colonna returned to Rome,

¹ See the *report of A. Zibramonti, dated Rome, April 14, 1571, Gonzaga Archives, Mantua.

² See CHARRIÈRE, III., 147; *cf.* Corresp. dipl., IV., 256.

³ See *Avviso di Roma of April 7, 1571, Urb. 1042, p. 46, Vatican Library. *Cf.* GRATIANUS, 118; PARUTA, 147 *seq.*; LADERCHI, 1571, n. 221; CHARRIÈRE, III., 147; Corresp. dipl., IV., 240, 244. For the reputation of Colonna see the report in VOINOVICH, 589.

⁴ See the report of Facchinetti in VALENSISE, 141.

⁵ See the reports of Facchinetti, *ibid.* 141 *seqq.*, and Corresp. dipl., IV., 250. *Cf.* GRATIANUS, 118 *seq.*; SERENO, 93 *seq.*; GUGLIELMOTTI, Colonna, 134 *seq.*

⁶ Thus *reports Arco from Rome, May 5, 1571, State Archives, Vienna.

⁷ See VALENSISE, 147 *seq.*

⁸ See GUGLIELMOTTI, Colonna, 144 *seq.* *Cf.* GRATIANUS, 123 *seq.*; BRÖSCH, *Gesch. aus dem Leben dreier Grosswesire* (1899), 15.

where he was at once received by the Pope.¹ The subsequent negotiations² were, like those that had gone before, kept absolutely secret, but in spite of that the rumour spread through the city that the 19th of May had been decided upon for the definite conclusion of the alliance; particulars were even known as to the names of those who were to command the Papal galleys.³

This rumour had a basis of truth. The evening of the day mentioned actually witnessed the coming into existence of the triple alliance, after, even to the last moment, the whole thing had been in danger of shipwreck because the Venetians, to the great anger of Pius V., insisted upon the quite secondary condition of the league being obliged to pay the increased garrisons in Venetian territory, a thing which the Spaniards refused to accept, though an agreement was eventually come to, that this and all other questions which might unexpectedly arise, should be referred to the decision of the Pope. After that, on the following morning, the ambassadors of Spain and Venice signed the treaty.⁴ The price which Pius V. had to pay took the form of large financial concessions to Philip II.; on May 21st, 1571, Spain obtained the continuance of the *sussidio* levied on the clergy for another five

¹ See *Avviso di Roma of May 12, 1571, Urb. 1042, p. 61b, Vatican Library.

² Cf. the reports of the Spanish representatives of May 17 and 21, 1571, Corresp. dipl., IV., 277 seq., 285 seq.

³ *"Dicono che sabbato fu conclusa la pratica della lega, la quale conclusione non è successa senza voler divino et molta consolazione di S.S. et di tutta la corte." The terms nevertheless are kept secret. Then are enumerated the "ministri dell'armati ecclesiastici" (Avviso di Roma of May 23, 1571, Urb. 1042, p. 64b-65 Vatican Library). Cf. the *report of A. Zibramonti of May 19, 1571, Gonzaga Archives, Mantua.

⁴ See LADERCHI, 1571, n. 232 seq.; GENNARI, 65; BROSCHE, *loc. cit.* 16; VOINOVICH, 531, 591; CHARRIÈRE, III., 149 seq.; VALENSISE, 150, 152; POMETTI, 69 seq.; Corresp. dipl., IV., 283 seq. Severe expressions used by Pius V. about Venice, May 18, 1571, in *Carte Stroz.*, I., 1, 159.

years, the so-called *excusado* for a like period, and lastly, the long desired *cruzada* for six years.¹

At a consistory on May 25th the articles of the treaty were read, approved by all the Cardinals, and then sworn to by the Pope and the ambassadors of Spain and Venice.² On Sunday, May 27th, the solemn announcement of the happy event was made in St. Peter's.³ After a High Mass celebrated by Cardinal Truchsess, Monsignor Aragonia preached a sermon and published the details of the league.⁴ This, which had been formed between the Pope, the King of Spain and the Republic of Venice, was to be lasting, was to be both offensive and defensive, and was to be directed, not only against the sultan, but also against the states of Algiers, Tunis and Tripoli, his vassals. The triple alliance was to furnish 200 galleys, 100 transports, 50,000 Spanish, Italian and German infantry, and 4,500 cavalry, as well as the necessary number of cannon. The fighting forces were to be ready each year at the latest in March and April. Every year an agreement was to be come to in Rome as to the campaign for the following year. If nothing were then decided each power was to be free to act as it chose, but in that case Venice must help the King of Spain with 50 galleys against Tunis, Algiers and Tripoli, unless they were prevented from doing so by a strong Turkish fleet; Philip II. was bound to give similar help in the event of Venice being attacked in the Adriatic. The

¹ Cf. *supra*, p. 64. From the Corresp. de Granvelle, éd. Pior, IV., 40, it is clear how much the Spaniards made their entry into the league dependent upon financial concessions.

² See Firmanus and Acta consist. card. S. Severinae in LADERCHI, 1571, n. 225-226 (see also *Studi e docum.*, XXIII., 334 *seq.*). Cf. GENNARI, 65 *seq.*; SERENO, 417 *seq.*, and the *report of Arco of May 26, 1571, State Archives, Vienna.

³ See *Avviso di Roma of May 31, 1571, Urb. 1042, p. 68b, Vatican Library. Cf. LADERCHI, 1571, n. 236, and the *report of A. Zibramonti of June 28, 1571, Gonzaga Archives, Mantua.

⁴ See LADERCHI, 1571, n. 227 *seq.* Cf. DU MONT, V., I, 203 *seq.*; LÜNIG, Cod. dipl., IV., 305 *seq.*; POMELLI, 69 *seq.*; Corresp. dipl., IV., 299 *seq.*

Pope made himself responsible for a sixth, Spain for three sixths, and Venice for two sixths, of the cost of the war. If the Pope should find himself unable to fulfil in their entirety the obligations which he had taken upon himself, Spain and Venice were to make up that which was wanting. Venice was to supply the 12 galleys which the Pope was to fit out with their equipment and provisions. If the Turks attacked one of the allies, the others were bound to come to his assistance. The generalissimo Don John was to take counsel with the captains of the Venetian and Papal ships, and the majority of their votes was to be decisive. Don John's lieutenant was to be Marcantonio Colonna. Entry into the league was open to the Emperor and the other Christian princes, and the Pope was to invite them to do so. The division of conquered territory, with the exception of the African possessions of Philip II., was to proportionate to the expenses borne by each of the allies, and the Pope was to adjust their differences; none of them might of himself conclude a peace or armistice with the Turks. In a special article the allies guaranteed the neutrality and integrity of the republic of Ragusa.¹

The joy of Pius V. at the final realization of the triple alliance was very great. He caused a medal to be struck to commemorate the important event,² and published a universal jubilee in order to draw down the blessing of the God of battles on the Christian armies.³ He took part in person in the processions, the first of which was made in Rome on May 28th, the second on May 30th, and the third on June 1st.⁴

On May 23rd and 24th Pius V. had expressed to the King of Spain and Don John his satisfaction at the conclusion of

¹ Its neutrality was afterwards placed under the control of the Holy See; *cf.* VOINOVICH, 497 *seq.*

² See BONANNI, I., 295; VENUTI, 124 *seq.*

³ *Cf.* LADERCHI, 1571, n. 237; *Avviso di Roma of May 23, 1571, Urb. 1042, p. 64b, Vatican Library.

⁴ *Cf.* *Avvisi di Roma of May 30 and June 2, 1571, *ibid.* 68, 70b, and the *report of A. Zibramonti, June 2, 1571, Gonzaga Archives,

the alliance, exhorting them to carry it into effect as soon as possible. Three days later they both received from the Pope further letters begging them to send the auxiliary Spanish fleet with all possible speed.¹

Since it was impossible to make the preparations to the extent agreed upon in the treaty during the current year, it had been arranged on May 20th that Spain should furnish only 80 galleys and 20 other troop ships, and that the Venetians should be indemnified by Philip II. for the additional expense which they would incur ; at the same time a definite arrangement had been come to as to the powers to be exercised by Marcantonio Colonna as Don John's lieutenant, powers which he was only to have as the Pope's commander. These decisions were ratified in the room of Pius V., on June 11th, whereupon the Pope urged them to carry their decisions into effect quickly.²

Yet once more Venice put the patience of Pius V. to a hard test by needlessly postponing the solemn publication of the league. The nuncio Facchinetti insisted in every possible way, but they put him off week after week. He very soon saw that the Signoria did not trust Spain and wished to make use of the favourable opportunity in order to extort further financial concessions. It was only after the Pope had granted the Republic an annual contribution of 100,000 gold scudi from the revenues of the clergy for five years and the duration of the war, that the solemn publication of the league took place in Venice on July 2nd.³

¹ See Corresp. dipl., IV., 297 seq. ; LADERCHI, 1571, n. 240.

² Corresp. dipl., IV., 281 seq., 312, 343. Cf. POMETTI, 70 n. 1. ; *Libri commemoriali*, VI., 325 ; JORGA, III., 150.

³ Cf. VALENSISE, 153 seq., 155, 157, 159, 160, 162, 163 ; LONGO, Guerra, 24. The brief concerning the financial concessions to Venice is dated June 7, 1571 ; see Miscell. di Clemente XI., t. 213, p. 227, Papal Secret Archives ; *Libri commem.*, VI., 324. In consequence of the delay of Venice the instrument of the league was only sent at this time by the ambassadors ; see the *letter of A. Zibramonti from Rome, July 7, 1571, Gonzaga Archives, Mantua. On June 9, 1571, Cusano *reports concerning

Very characteristic of Pius V.'s zeal for the crusade were his efforts for the extension and strengthening of the barely concluded league between Spain and Venice by obtaining the accession thereto of other great powers. For this end the Pope had recourse on May 31st by means of special letters, to the Emperor and the Kings of France and Poland.¹ At a secret consistory on June 18th he appointed Cardinal Comendone as legate to the Emperor, the Catholic princes of Germany and the King of Poland, with the object of winning them over to the league; at the same time Cardinal Bonelli was sent as legate to Spain and Portugal.² As far as Philip II. was concerned, Bonelli, in addition to the settlement of political and ecclesiastical controversies, was to press for the opening of the league's campaign for the following year, and to seek the assistance of Spanish diplomacy to induce the Emperor and the King of France to join the league. His mission to Portugal had as its object, besides the question of the league, the marriage of King Sebastian to Margaret of Valois.³

a disgraceful incident with Cardinal Cornaro. There had come into the hands of the Pope a letter from this Cardinal, in which Cornaro urged the Venetians to make peace with the Turks and abandon the league. Pius V. was very indignant "et gli ha detto che non è degno di esser cardinale" (State Archives, Vienna). The ratification of the league, which was completed by Philip II. on August 25, 1571, did not take place at Venice until October 15, and the exchange of ratifications at Rome on November 19; see *Corresp. dipl.*, IV., 309, 311, 313; *Libri commem.*, VI., 327.

¹ See LADERCHI, 1571, n. 245 *seq.*; SCHWARZ, Briefwechsel, 179 *seq.*; the legations had been decided on May 25, 1571; see *Corresp. dipl.*, IV., 315.

² See *Acta consist. card. S. Severinae* in LADERCHI, 1571, n. 251, and better in *Studi e docum.*, XXIII., 338 *seq.*, with characteristic expressions used by Pius V. concerning negotiations with the German Protestant princes. Cf. also SCHWARZ, *loc. cit.* 183 *seq.* For the consistory see also the *report of A. Zibramonti of June 23, 1571, Gonzaga Archives, Mantua.

³ The instructions for Bonelli, of June 25, in *Corresp. dipl.*, IV., 355 *seqq.* Cf. *supra*, p. 64 for the duties entrusted to Bonelli.

The two Cardinal legates set out at the end of June ; Commendone from Verona,¹ and Bonelli from Rome.² As the nephew of the Pope and until now head of the secretariate of state, Bonelli had a suite in keeping with his dignity, to which, however, Pius V. attached strict religious and ecclesiastics drawn from the entourage of Borromeo.³ The in-

The credential briefs of June 20 and 21, 1571, in LADERCHI, 1571, n. 254, and TEDESCHIS, 263 *seq.* Cf. also HINOJOSA, 198 *seq.* ; Corresp. dipl., IV., 357 n.

¹ In a *letter dated Verona, June 27, 1571, Commendone announces his legation to the Doge, saying that he is ready to go much further and to sacrifice his life for the Church and for his country (Letter de' card. n. 5, State Archives, Venice). For the proposal that Gropper should accompany the legate see SCHWARZ, Briefwechsel, 183. According to an *Avviso di Roma of July 7, 1571, it was said that P. Toledo was also to accompany the legate (State Archives, Naples, Carte Farnes, 763).

² See the *letter of A. Zibramonti from Rome, June 30, 1571, Gonzaga Archives, Mantua. Cf. *Avviso di Roma of June 30, 1571, Urb. 10, 1042, p. 82, Vatican Library, and Firmanus, *Diarium in Miscell. Arm. XII., 32, Papal Secret Archives.

³ See *Avviso di Roma of June 22, 1571, Urb. 1042, p. 77, Vatican Library, and Corresp. dipl., IV., 373 *seq.* For the part taken by Francis Borgia in the embassy see S. FRANCISCUS BORGIA, V., 581 *seqq.*, 665 *seqq.*, 684 *seq.*, 691. Cardinal Rusticucci was charged with the direction of the secretariate of state ; besides TÖRNE, 50 *seq.* see the *Avvisi di Roma of July 20 (" Nel card. Rusticucci si riposa hora summa rerum del Pontificato nel quale con maniera incredibile satisfa al universale et monstra di non far cosa alcuna facendo il tutto "), August 8 (Rusticucci is very slow to make any change in the arrangements of Bonelli), and October 6, 1571 (the Pope had ordered Rusticucci to assist at all the audiences of the ambassadors ; Urb. 1042, p. 87b, 96b, 129, *loc. cit.*) a thing which displeased them (see Corresp. dipl., IV., 465 *seq.*). Rusticucci had previously taken Bonelli's place during the latter's absence in June, and also during the illness of the nephew from August to December, 1570 ; see *Avvisi di Roma of June 21, July 12, August 16, September 6, and December 9 and 20, 1570, Urb. 1041, p. 292b, 304, 327, 337, 380, 385b, *loc. cit.* Cusano, who reports all the gossip of

structions given to Bonelli with regard to his behaviour on the journey and at foreign courts are very characteristic of the ideas of Pius V. Neither the Cardinal himself nor the members of his suite were to accept any presents; they were to limit their visits to what was strictly necessary, they were to have no part in banquets, hunting parties or plays, they were to dress simply and eat simply, they were to ask for nothing for themselves, and were to grant freely the favours that were granted freely in Rome. So as to edify men by his example, the Cardinal was to say mass every day, and his suite were to communicate.¹

Bonelli left Rome on the last day of June; after passing through Savoy he went by Barcelona and Valencia to Madrid, where his solemn entry took place on September 30th, and the negotiations concerning the war against the Turks were at once begun.²

Rome, repeatedly (July 7 and 15, 1570, June 23, 1571) reports that Bonelli was leading an immoral life. It is extremely doubtful whether there is any justification for this, as in the first place Bonelli was much hated by the Imperialists on account of his partisanship for Cosimo I; (see the *report of Arco of June 2, 1571, State Archives, Vienna) and in the second place Bonelli left behind him in Spain, where he had been removed from the strict supervision of Pius V., a very good name on account of his "sainte vie" (see DOUVAIS, *Dépêches de M. de Fourquevaux*, II., 413).

¹ See the text of the "Ricordo" for Bonelli in *Corresp. dipl.*, IV., 357 *seq.*; *cf.* **Avvisi di Roma* of June 20 and 30, 1571, Urb. 1042, p. 73, 82. Vatican Library.

² **Lettere et negotiati del sig. card. Alessandrino, legato in Spagna, in Portogallo et in Francia scritte al card. Rusticucci et ad altri negli anni 1571 et 1572*, in Cod. 33—G—24 of the Corsini Library, Rome, used by LÄMMER, *Zur Kirchengesch.*, 164 *seq.* in GACHARD, *Bibl. Corsini*, 46 *seq.*, 152 *seq.*, and HINOJOSA, 199 *seq.* The **Viaggio del card. Alessandrino in Spagna*, mentioned by the latter, in Cod. 33—B—16 of the Corsini Library, is, as GACHARD (*loc. cit.* 55 *seq.*) shows, a later compilation. Hinojosa has completely overlooked the *contemporary description, which is of great interest for the history of culture, of the

Even before the departure of the legate the Pope had done all he could to hasten his own preparations for the coming war at sea, in which task he was effectually assisted by Cosimo I.¹ Although he met with the greatest difficulties when the time came to get together the necessary money and to find and fit out the galleys, his energy enabled him to overcome them. A special congregation dealt with the provisions that were necessary.² A report from Rome on May 30th, 1571, tells us that the Pope had taken 40,000 scudi from the treasury of the Castle of St. Angelo for the war, and that in the city there was nothing to be seen but soldiers.³ Other sums were raised by taxing the benefices of the Cardinals and by the formation of the *Mons religionis* on June 12th.⁴ Cosimo de'

journey of Cardinal Bonelli, composed by his secretary G. B. Venturino of Fabriano, in Cod. F. 128, p. 299 *seq.*, of the Library at Dresden, of which use has been made in Corpus Inscr. lat., II., Suppl. lxxxii. *seq.*, in NUNZIANTE, Spigolature sopra una relazione inedita di G. B. V. da Fabriano, Florence, 1884, and in Vol. V. of the Panorama Portuguez (see *Rev. Hisp.*, III. [1896], 31). This *Narrazione del viaggio fatto dal card. Alessandrino is also in Cod. Urb. 1697 of the Vatican Library. Cf. also, FARINELLI in *Rivista critica de historia y literatura españolas*, III., Madrid, 1898, 174; D. SANTAMBROGIO, Di un'epigrafe poco nota della Certosa di Pavia, in *Boll. d. Soc. Pavese*, I., 2 (1901); SERRANO, Liga, I., 165. For the departure of Bonelli from Rome and his arrival at Madrid see also Corresp. dipl., IV., 372 *seq.*, 447 *seq.*

¹ See MANFRONI, Marina, 471 *seq.*

² See *Avviso di Roma of June 16, 1571, Urb. 1042, p. 75, 76b, Vatican Library. Cf. Acta consist. card. S. Severinae, in Studi e docum. XXIII. 323, 324, 330.

³ See *Avviso di Roma of May 30, 1571, *loc. cit.* 69.

⁴ For the imposition of taxes on the Cardinals see the article by HEWELL in the *English Hist. Review*, 1915, July. The decree on the "Mons religionis" (see Vol. XVII., p. 196) was printed by A. Bladus in 1571. An *Avviso di Roma of July 7, 1571, announces that every day meetings were held at the house of Cardinal Ricci for the purpose of raising more money; as it is difficult to obtain this without laying a heavy burden on the people, it

Medici and Marcantonio Colonna gave effectual assistance in the equipment of the twelve galleys.¹ On June 13th Colonna went to Civitavecchia to make the final preparations, and on June 21st the Papal fleet was able to weigh anchor.² It sailed first to Naples, where it was to await the arrival of the Spanish ships under Don John. As early as May 27th, 1571, Pius V. had, in a letter written in his own hand, impressed upon Philip II. the necessity of Don John's coming as soon as possible, as otherwise a favourable opportunity would be lost, and there would inevitably be complaints from the Venetians.³ The Spanish ambassador in Rome, Zuñiga, sent similar advice.⁴ It was all the more unfortunate, therefore, that Don John's arrival was long deferred, and Pius V. ordered Colonna to sail alone to Messina, which was the appointed place of assembly for the whole of the fighting forces of the league.⁵ He arrived there on July 20th.⁶

The Papal fleet was thus the first to arrive at the rendezvous: it had reached Naples on June 23rd, and had proceeded

is possible that the Pope might "ad tempus" set his hand to "regressi" (Urb. 1042, p. 85, Vatican Library). See also the *Avviso di Roma of July 7, 1571, in Carte Farnes., 763 of the State Archives, Naples. The *Avviso di Roma of August 8, 1571, Urb. 1042, p. 96, *loc. cit.*, mentions further consultations for the purpose of raising money. Cf. also ADRIANI, XXI., 4.

¹ Cf. LE BRET, VIII., 237; GUGLIELMOTTI, Colonna, 148 *seq.*, 151 *seq.* The *pact with Cosimo I. concerning galleys for the Turkish war, of March, 1571, in *Varia polit.*, 81 (now 82), p. 642 *seq.*, Papal Secret Archives.

² See *Avvisi di Roma of June 16 and 22, 1571, Urb. 1042, p. 75, 77b, Vatican Library, Cf. CARINCI, 17 *seq.*

³ Corresp. dipl., IV., 320.

⁴ *Ibid.* 315 *seq.*, 317.

⁵ See *ibid.* 349. The Grand Master of the Knights of St. John, who had already, in a *brief of March 16, 1571, been urged to lend his galleys, received, in a *brief of May 24, 1571, orders to take them to Messina by June 20. *Arm.* 44, t. 16, pp. 36b, 104, Papal Secret Archives.

⁶ SERENO, 117. The date in MOLMENTI, Veniero, 81 (July 30) is wrong.

thence to Messina. On July 23rd the Venetian fleet arrived under the command of the aged Sebastiano Venier. But the Spaniards were still being waited for, when there was no time to be lost in attacking the Turks, who were besieging Famagosta, and menacing Crete, Cythera, Zante and Cephalonia.¹

Pius V., greatly alarmed at the news of efforts being made by the Turks,² and suspicious of the delay on the part of the Spaniards, did all he could to induce Don John to sail at once for Messina. After having, on June 29th, 1571, even before he had received a reply to his letter of May 27th,³ sent a pressing summons by means of a special envoy,⁴ he sent another messenger to the same effect on July 7th.⁵ A consistory on July 20th was occupied solely with the question of what was to be done⁶ in view of the delay of the Spaniards, which was universally deplored.⁷ On July 26th a pressing brief was sent to Don John,⁸ and this was followed on August 4th by a courier bearing yet another brief.⁹

¹ See SERENO, 122 *seq.*, 125 *seq.*; GUGLIELMOTTI, Colonna, 163; BALAN, VI., 551; MANFRONI, Marina, 472.

² Cf. the *report of A. Zibramonti from Rome, July 7, 1571, Gonzaga Archives, Mantua.

³ In his reply of June 18, 1571, Don John tried to excuse his delay; see Corresp. dipl., IV., 345 *seq.*

⁴ See LADERCHI, 1571, n. 358.

⁵ *"La S^{ta} di N S^{re} hoggi ha spedito un corriere a Genova, credesi per sollecitare il passaggio di D. Giovanni ch'aspetta d'ora in hora a Genova acciò che con l'armata sua vadi a trovare la Venetiana." The Papal fleet was waiting at Naples (letter of Stuerdo to G. B. Pia from Rome, July 7, 1571, Carte Farnes. 763, State Archives, Naples). Cf. also the brief to Don John in LADERCHI, 1571, n. 363. See also Corresp. dipl., IV., 384 *seq.*

⁶ See Corresp. dipl. IV., 395.

⁷ *"Luni nel concistoro non si fece altro che parlare della Tardanza del S^{or} Don Giovanni." Avviso di Roma of July 20, 1571, Doria-Pamfilii Archives, Rome.

⁸ *Brief to "Joh. ab Austria," Rome, July 26, 1571, Archives of Briefs, Rome.

⁹ See *Avviso di Roma of August 4, 1571, Urb. 1042, p. 93b, Vatican Library. The *brief for Don John of August 1, 1571,

Don John had left Madrid for Barcelona on June 6th, arriving there on the 16th. As had been the case with the nobles of Rome, so the greatest enthusiasm for the crusade prevailed among the grandees of Spain, and many of the Spanish nobles had taken ship at the beginning of June.¹ Don John was detained for a longer period by the preparations which he had to make; in consequence of the war against the Moors, added to the proverbial dilatoriness of the Spaniards, he had great difficulty in getting together the required squadron.² It was only on July 16th that he set sail with 46 galleys for Genoa, where he stayed at the palace of Gian Andrea Doria, and received a visit from Cosimo I., who thus assured himself of the baselessness of the report spread abroad by the French that the Spanish force was really directed against Tuscany.³

From Genoa Don John sent Moncada to Venice and Hernando de Carillo to Rome; the former was to assure the Venetians that he would very soon be at Messina, while Carillo was to convey to the Pope his thanks for his appointment, and his excuses for the delay in his coming.⁴ When, on August 7th, Carillo took his leave of the Pope, the latter charged him to tell Don John that he was setting out upon a war for the Catholic faith, and that God would give him victory. At the same time Pius V. gave to the envoy the sacred standard of the league.⁵

in the Archives of Briefs, Rome. *Ibid.* *briefs for Granvelle, the Viceroy of Sicily, Marcantonio Colonna, and others, all of August 1 "ut curent omnia parata ad instruendam classem."

¹ See CHARRIÈRE, III., 158, n.

² SERENO, 131. Corresp. dipl., IV., 384 *seq.* Cf. ADRIANI, XXI., 4. In the Library at Basle, Cod. AA. VI., 30, there is a **Relazione fatta alla M^{ta} Catt^{ca} in Madrid alli 15 di luglio, 1571, di tutta la spesa ordinaria che occorria per la lega.* For this detailed reckoning, which is also preserved in vol. 62, p. 9, of the Collect. Faure in the Library at Geneva, cf. POMETTI, 72, n. 7.

³ See ADRIANI, XXI., 5.

⁴ See HAVEMANN, Don. Juan, 129; GUGLIELMOTTI, 171.

⁵ See **Avviso di Roma of August 7, 1571, Urb. 1042, p. 96, Vatican Library.* Cf. the *report of A. Zibramonti from Rome,

Don John, who remained at Genoa until the end of July,¹ reached Naples on August 8th, where the viceroy, Cardinal Granvelle, gave him a solemn reception on the following day.² On August 14th there took place in the church of S. Chiara the delivery to Don John of his commander's bâton and the sacred standard. The latter was of blue silk damask, having embroidered at the top in the centre a large representation of the crucified Saviour, at whose feet were the arms of Pius V., with those of Spain and Venice on the right and left. These shields were linked by gold chains, from which hung the arms of Don John. In the presence of a large number of nobles, and the princes of Parma and Urbino, Granvelle delivered it to Don John before the high altar. The people, who were deeply moved, answered: Amen, Amen.³

While Don John was thus tarrying at Naples, the impatience of the Pope, who was deeply troubled by the news of the advance of the Turkish fleet, became greater and greater. On August 17th he sent Paolo Odescalchi to Don John with

August 11, 1571, which describes the banner minutely (Gonzaga Archives, Mantua). Cf. also Corresp. dipl., IV., 402, n. 2.

¹ From thence he again wrote on July 30, and on August 1 from Portofino; see *Lettere di D. Juan d'Austria a Giovan A. Doria*, Rome, 1896, 18 seq.

² See CHARRIÈRE, III., 159; HAVEMANN, *Don Juan*, 130.

³ See Colecc. de docum. inéd., XXXIII., 237; CARACCILO, *I comment. d. guerre fatte co' Turchi da D. Giovanni d'Austria*, Florence, 1581, 11. The Latin *report of Granvelle to Pius V., dated Naples August 14, 1571, which Guglielmotti (p. 173 seq.) saw in the Gaetani Archives, Rome, and published in an Italian translation, must have been removed from thence, because in 1900 the firm of dealers in antiquities, Gilhofer-Ranschburg of Vienna, put just such a document on the market. The great standard of the league, which is often confused with the banner of Colonna (see *supra*, p. 381), which is equally important in itself and because of its historical interest, is now in the cathedral of Toledo; see F. DURO, *L'étendard de la Sainte-Ligue à la bataille de Lépante*, in *Revue de l'art chrét.*, 1889, 411 seq. (with picture) and FEDELE in *Arch. stor. Napolit.*, XXXIV., 547 seq. The standard was evidently copied from an ancient model.

a letter in his own hand, in which he again implored him to set out at once,¹ which he at length did on August 23rd. On the following day he arrived in the straits of Messina, where he had been so long eagerly expected by the admirals of the Pope and Venice, Colonna and Venier. Messina gave a splendid welcome to the son of the Emperor, who was then scarcely 24 years of age. A type of manly beauty, Don John, with his blue eyes and fair hair, won the hearts of the excitable Sicilians.²

At the first council Don John excused his delay, which had been caused by the necessary preparations, at the same time giving proofs of his warlike spirit and his confidence of success. Philip II., in his caution and jealousy, had from the first viewed with ill-will the youthful ardour of his young and ambitious brother, and had therefore sent with him in Requesens a man who was instructed to curb his zeal as much as possible, and in the event Requesens proved himself a master at raising captious difficulties with the object of preventing a bold attack.³ To the opposing interests and the old mistrust between the Spaniards and Venetians, were now added the inadequate equipment of the Venetians,⁴ the very varied composition of the forces, and the deeply

¹ See *Lettera di Roma of August 17, 1571, in the Doria-Pamfili Archives, Rome. Cf. also LADERCHI, 1571, n. 370, and Corresp. dipl., IV., 410, 420. The *instructions for Odescalchi in Miscell. Clemente XI., t. 211, p. 15, Papal Secret Archives; cf. POMETTI, 71. The characteristic head of Odescalchi on his tomb in S. Girolamo della Carità is reproduced in *Cosmos illustr.*, 1904, 87. The "istruzione data dal card. Farnese ad un suo mandato a Civita Vecchia a visitare il sig. D. Giov. d'Austria quando passò con l'armata" was printed in Rome in 1888 *per nozze Ferrata-Faiella*.

² See CARINCI, 43 *seq.*; HAVEMANN, 130 *seq.*; GUGLIELMOTTI, 174 *seq.*

³ See BALAN, VI., 556 *seq.*; HAVEMANN, 133; GUGLIELMOTTI, 176 *seq.*

⁴ Cf. Colecc. de docum. inéd., III., 15 *seq.*; Corresp. dipl., IV., 420, n. SERRANO, Liga, I., 113.

rooted fear of the invincible Turkish navy. All this for a long time quite paralysed any decisive action. Even when, on September 2nd, the fleet was reinforced by 60 Venetian ships and the twelve galleys of Doria,¹ the disputes still continued. At a review of the three fleets which was held on September 8th, it was clearly seen that the Venetian ships were not sufficiently equipped with sailors and rowers. This defect had to be made good from the Spanish fleet ; Venier objected to this, but Colonna was successful in making him give way.²

After the discussions had been carried on for more than three weeks, the departure of the fleet from Messina at last took place on September 16th. Divergent opinions and quarrels still made themselves felt among the commanders, but all felt that a decisive battle was at hand, and the fleet prepared itself by receiving the sacraments from the Capuchins and Jesuits who were attached to the expedition.³

Divided into four squadrons, the fleet sailed towards Corfù, and then reassembled in the harbour of Gomenitsa on the coast of Albania. There, as the result of the arbitrary action taken by Venier against one of the Spaniards, a quarrel broke out with Don John, which, but for the wise intervention of Colonna might have had the most serious consequences. It was settled that Agostino Barbarigo should take the place of Venier. In the meantime scouts had brought information that the Turkish fleet was in the harbour of Lepanto, the ancient Naupacto, and the following days were spent in watchfulness. Then there came the news of the fall of Famagosta, which had taken place on August 1st, of the shameful breach of their promises by the Turks, and their cruel murder of the heroic Bragadino. The Turks had flayed the unfortunate man alive, stuffed his skin, and dressing it in the

¹ Doria had left Civitavecchia on August 24 ; see the *letter of A. Zibramonti from Rome, August 25, 1571, Gonzaga Archives, Mantua.

² See GUGLIEMOTTI, 179 *seq.*, 185 *seq.* ; BALAN, VI., 557 *seq.* ; MOLMENTI, Veniero, 150 *seq.*

³ See SERENO, 191 ; HAVEMANN, 134 ; GUGLIEMOTTI, 190.

Venetian uniform of his office, dragged it through the city!¹ The news of these atrocities spread quickly, and the whole fleet thirsted for revenge.

Having made all ready for battle, the fleet set sail in the night of October 6th, in spite of an unfavourable wind, and hugging the rocky shores of the islands of the Curzolari, known to the ancients as the Echinades, made towards the open gulf of Patras. When, on the following morning, it had entered the gulf by way of the narrow straits between the island of Oxia and Cape Scrofa, Don John, after a hurried consultation with Venier,² gave the signal to prepare to attack by firing a cannon, at the same time hoisting to the mast-head of his own ship the standard of the Holy League.³ The

¹ Cf. SERENO, 250 *seq.*; HAMMER, II., 414 *seq.*; BALAN, VI., 555 *seq.*; GUGLIEMOTTI, 195 *seq.*; A. PODOCATARO, *Relazione de' successi di Famagosta* p.p. A. Tessier, Venice, 1876; AGOSTINO, *La perdita di Famagosta*, Venice, 1891; CATIZZANI, *Narrazione del terribile assedio e della resa di Famagosta da un ms. del capitano Angelo Gatto da Orvieto*, Florence, 1887. See also the monograph on the life of Bragadino by RIO translated by K. Zell, 2nd ed. Freiburg, 1874. His country erected a monument in its Pantheon of great men, SS. Giovanni e Paolo, to the hero, who had borne his martyrdom with Christian fortitude. For the siege money coined by Bragadino to pay the defenders of Famagosta see LAZARI, *Monete de' possedimenti Veneziani di ultramare e di terraferma*, Venice, 1851.

² Cf. MOLMENTI, Veniero, 311.

³ There is for the battle of Lepanto plentiful material in original documents, pamphlets and various narratives; *cf.* the bibliography in CICOGNA, *Bibl. Venez.*, Venice, 1847, 118 *seqq.*; SORANZO, *Bibl. Venez.*, *ibid.* 1885 *seq.*, 81 *seq.*; MANFRONI, *Marina*, 438 *seq.*; MOLMENTI, Veniero, 163 *seq.*; D'AYALA, *Bibl. milit.*, 312; DURO, *Tradiciones infundadas*, Madrid, 1888, 633 *seq.*; STIRLING-MAXWELL, *Don Juan II.*, App. n. 6, sec. 3a, completed in *Zeitschrift für Bücherfreunde*, IV. (1900-1901), 191 *seqq.* Concerning a hitherto unknown pamphlet on Lepanto see *Katalog 500*, 2nd and 3rd part, Frankfurt, 1907-08, by J. BÄR. The richest collection of contemporary writings on Lepanto is to be found in the Library of the Museo Correr at Venice; *cf.*

priests attached to the fleet gave the general absolution ; there followed a short and fervent prayer, and then the cry was heard from thousands of voices : *Vittoria ! Vittoria ! Viva Christo !*¹

The opposing forces were very considerable, and approximately equal. The Turks had 222 galleys, 60 other vessels, 750 cannon, 34,000 soldiers, 13,000 sailors, and 41,000 slaves as rowers ; the Christians had 207 galleys (105 Venetian, 81 Spanish, 12 Papal, and 3 each from Malta, Genoa and Savoy), 30 other vessels, 6 great galleys or galleons which "seemed like castles," 1,800 cannon, 30,000 soldiers, 12,900 sailors and 43,000 rowers.²

In accordance with the tactics of the time Don John had divided his fleet into four squadrons, approximately equal, and distinguished by the colour of their standards. The six Venetian galleons, which were commanded by Francesco

Serapeum., 1858, 275. Among recent works the following are outstanding : HAMMER, II., 420 *seq.* ; ROSELL, *Hist. del combate naval de Lepanto*, Madrid, 1853 ; GUGLIELMOTTI, 213 *seq.* ; JURIEN DE LA GRAVIÈRE, *La guerre de Chypre et la bataille de Lépante*, II., Paris, 1888 (*cf.* GOTTLOB in *Liter. Rundschau*, 1889, 49 *seq.*) ; MANFRONI, *Marina* (1897), 487 *seq.* (*cf.* *Riv. stor.*, 1898, 346 *seq.*) ; DURO, *Armada española desde la union de los reinos de Castilla y Aragón*, II., Madrid, 1898 ; MOLMENTI, *Veniero*, and in *Riv. Marittima*, 1898 and 1899 ; JÄHNS, *Handb. der Gesch. des Kriegswesen*, Leipsic, 1880, 1281 *seq.* ; SERRANO, *Liga*, I., 133 *seq.* *Cf.* also GAVOTTI, *La tattica nelle grandi battaglie navali*, I., Rome, 1898, 182 *seq.*, and NORMANN-FRIEDENFELS in *Mitteilungen aus dem Gebiet bes Seewesens*, XXX., Pola, 1902, 1 *seq.* Among the curiosities in the State Archives at Simancas is a chart with a plan of the battle from the hand of Don John.

¹ See SERENO, 191 ; *Lettera mandata dall'armata christ. sotto di 8 di ottobre 1571, Doria-Pamfili Archives, Rome ; CARINCI, 52.

² Just as the estimates of contemporaries were very various, so are the statements of later writers ; see GUGLIEMOTTI, *Colonna*, 211 *seqq.* ; MANFRONI, *Marina*, 478 *seq.* ; SERRANO, *Liga*, I., 119 *seq.*, 130 *seq.*

Duodo, formed the advance guard, and were intended, with their superior artillery to frighten the Turks and throw them into disorder.¹ Behind them in line abreast came the three first squadrons, the left wing under the command of the Venetian admiral Agostino Barbarigo, the right under the Spanish admiral Doria, and the centre under Don John. On either side of his flagship came Colonna and Venier. The fourth squadron, under Alvaro de Bazan, Marquis of Santa Cruz,² formed the rear-guard.

The left wing of the Turkish fleet was under the command of the Calabrian renegade Uluds Ali (Occhiali),³ Pasha of Algiers, the right wing was commanded by Mohammed Saulak, governor of Alexandria, and the centre by the commander-in-chief, the Grand Admiral, Muesinsade Ali.

About noon the wind, which had been favourable to the Turks, dropped. While the sun shone out of a cloudless sky, the two fleets met, the one under the standard of the Crucified, the other under the purple standard of the sultan, with the name of Allah embroidered in letters of gold. The Turks endeavoured to outflank the enemy at both ends of the line. In order to prevent this, Doria extended his line in such a way as to leave a gap between the right wing and the centre, through which the enemy could easily pass. While at this point the battle took a dangerous turn, and Doria, by the skilful seamanship of the Turks, was driven with 50 galleys towards the open sea, on the left wing it was developing more successfully. There the Venetians were fighting against a superior force with equal bravery and success, although their leader, Barbarigo, was struck in the eye by an arrow, and fell mortally wounded.

In the centre the fight was more evenly contested. There Don John, who had on board his ship 300 veteran Spanish

¹ Each galleon had 36 large cannon and 64 smaller pieces to throw balls of stone ; see G. MOLLI, *Le navi di Lepanto*, in *Cosmos illust.* 1904, 179.

² For de Bazan cf. MARTIN FERNANDEZ DE NAVARETTE in *Revista general de la Marina*, special number, Madrid, 1888.

³ For Occhiali cf. JORGA, III., 226, and POMETTI, 19, n. 1.

soldiers,¹ made straight for the flagship of Ali, which carried 400 janissaries. Close to him the galleys of Colonna, Requesens, Venier, and the Princes of Parma and Urbino, took a vigorous part in the bloody struggle, which for a long time hung in the balance. The death of the Turkish Grand Admiral Ali, whose rich galley was carried by storm by the soldiers of Don John and Colonna, decided the battle at about four in the afternoon. When the Turks realized that their centre was broken, their left wing also gave way, and in consequence Uluds had to break off his struggle with Doria, and think of his own safety, managing to retire, though with heavy losses, towards Santa Maura and Lepanto with 40 galleys.²

Although the exhaustion of the rowers, and the springing up of a violent storm, prevented a protracted pursuit of the enemy, the victory of the Christians was nevertheless complete. Debris of ships and dead bodies covered the sea far and wide. About 8,000 Turks were killed and 10,000 taken prisoners; 117 of their galleys fell into the hands of the Christians, and 50 were sunk or burned. The victors lost 12 galleys and had 7,500 killed, and as many more wounded. Numerous trophies, such as purple standards with inscriptions in gold and silver, and stars and the moon, and a great

¹ For the galley of Don John at Lepanto see BEER in *Jahrbuch der kunsthistor. Samml. des österr. Kaiserhauses*, XV., 1 seq.

² In the Christian fleet the right wing had suffered the most, a thing which the Venetians attributed to the leadership of Doria, nor would they accept his justification of himself, seeing in him a traitor. Among modern writers GUGLIELMOTTI (p. 228 seq.) and BALAN (VI., 561 seq.) pass judgment on Doria with great, and excessive, harshness. Nevertheless, the apologia for Doria made by B. VEROGGIO (*Gianandrea Doria alla battaglia di Lepanto*, Genoa, 1886) is not convincing (cf. NERI in *Arch. stor. Ital.* 5th Series, L., 273 seq.; see also MANFRONI, *Lega*, 355 seq. and *Marina*, 494 seq.); the same holds good of the defence (see MANFRONI in *Rassegna naz.*, CXX. [1901], July 1) attempted by GAVOTTI (*Le battaglie navali della republ. di Genova*, Rome, 1900). Even though Doria's conduct was not actually traitorous, it nevertheless did great harm to the Christian armada.

part of the enemy's artillery, fell into the hands of the Christians: 42 of the prisoners belonged to the most distinguished Turkish families, among them the governor of Negropont and two sons of the Grand Admiral Ali. The most valuable prize was 12,000 Christian slaves who had been forced to serve in the galleys, among the number 2,000 Spaniards, who owed their freedom to the victory.¹

Much noble blood had been spilt. While the Spaniards had to grieve the loss of Juan de Córdova, Alfonso de Cárdena, and Juan Ponce de León, the Venetians had lost twenty members of the first families of the Republic. Fabiano Graziani, the brother of the historian of the war, had fallen by Colonna's side on one of the Papal galleys. Among the wounded were Venier, and a genius as yet unknown to the world, the poet, Cervantes.²

As was the case with Spain and Venice, the nobles of Naples, Calabria, Sicily, and above all, the Papal States, had covered themselves with glory. Together with Alessandro Farnese, Prince of Parma, and Francesco Maria della Rovere, Prince of Urbino, there were among the combatants Sforza, Count of Santa Fiora, Ascanio della Corgna, Paolo Giordano Orsini of Bracciano, Virginio Orsini of Vicovaro, Orazio Orsini of Bomarzo, Pompeo Colonna, Gabrio Serbelloni, Troilo Savelli, Onorato Caetani, Lelio de' Massimi, Michele Bonelli, and the Frangipani, Santa Croce, Capizuchi, Ruspoli, Gabrielli, Malvezzi, Oddi, and Berardi.³ It is with justifiable pride that Italian history recalls the glorious part taken by repre-

¹ When certain avaricious men wished to treat these Christian prisoners as slaves, Pius V. forbade it under pain of excommunication; see BERTOLOTTI, *La schiavitù in Roma*, 42 *seq.*; *cf.* MARGRAF, 209.

² See HAVEMANN, 139; GUGLIELMOTTI, 253, 255; MANFRONI, *Marina*, 498 *seq.* The names of the more distinguished prisoners in THEINER, *Annal. eccl.*, I., 462. *Cf.* ROSI in *Arch. d. Soc. Rom.*, XXI., 141 *seq.*

³ The account of Guglielmotti (*loc. cit.*) has been completed in various respects by recent researches: see MONTECHIARO, *La Sicilia nella battaglia di Lepanto*, Pisa, 1886; MULAS, *I Sardi*

sentatives of every part of the Appenine peninsula in that naval battle which was the greatest in the memory of man.¹

Pius V. had kept his eyes fixed on the east with indescribable anxiety. His thoughts were ever with the Christian fleet, while his hopes far outstripped it. Day and night he recommended it to the protection of the Almighty in fervent prayer. As soon as he had received news of the arrival of Don John at Messina, the Pope redoubled his penances and alms. He had a firm belief in the power of prayer, and especially of the Rosary.² At a consistory on August 27th the Pope asked the Cardinals to fast one day in the week, and to give extraordinary alms, as it was only by penance that they could hope to obtain the mercy of God in such a time of anxiety.³ His Holiness, so the Spanish

a Lepanto, Cagliari, 1887; FOSSATI, *La Riviera e la battaglia di Lepanto*, Salò, 1890; CONFORTI, *I Napolitani a Lepanto*, Naples, 1880; ARENAPRIMO, *La Sicilia nella battaglia di Lepanto*, Messina, 1892 (*cf. Arch. stor. Sicil.*, XVIII., 157 *seq.*); DE LORENZO, *Monografie Regione e Calabresi*, Siena, 1896; TOMASSETTI, *I Romani a Lepanto*, in *Cosmos illustr.*, II., Bergamo, 1908, 78 *seq.*; MOLMENTI, *I Veneziani a Lepanto*, *ibid.* 93 *seq.*; CONFORTI, *I Napolitani a Lepanto*, *ibid.* 109 *seq.*; POMETTI, *I Calabresi a Lepanto*, *ibid.* 133 *seq.*; for the part taken by Lucca see LAZZARESCHI, 14 *seq.*; for that of A. Fainese see TOSI in *Arte e Storia*, XXIX., Florence, 1910, and CAPELLI in *Arch. Parm.*, II., 1-2; *cf. Quellen und Forsch.*, XVI., 182. For O. Caetani, besides CARINCI, *Lettere*, *cf. GIANNELLI in Rassegnaz.*, 1913, June. A new weapon, a kind of Greek fire invented by Gabrio Serbelloni, did good service in the battle; see the *report of C. Capilupi concerning the fleet of the league, which he sent to his brother Alessandro on October 3, 1571, in Cod. 105 of the Capilupi Library, Mantua.

¹ See Adriani XXI., 5.

² *Cf. GRATIANUS*, 230; CATENA, 34; *Corresp. dipl.*, IV., 415; FALLOUX, *Pie V.*, chapt. 22.

³ See *Acta consist. card. S. Severinae* in LADERCHI, 1571, n. 379, and in *Studi e docum.*, XXIV., 87 *seq.* *Cf.* the *report of A. Zibramonti from Rome, September 1, 1571, according to which the Pope desired the Cardinals to say at least two masses a week for victory. Gonzaga Archives, Mantua.

ambassador reported on September 26th, 1571, fasts three days a week, and spends many hours every day in prayer; he has also ordered prayers in all the churches.¹ In order to make Rome safe from an unexpected attack by Turkish corsairs, the Pope had ordered, at the beginning of September, that the fortifications of the Borgo should be completed.²

It was but rarely that any news was received of the Christian armada, and the Curia all the time remained in painful suspense. It came, therefore, as a relief when they heard at last at the beginning of October of the arrival of the fleet of the league at Corfù.³ When the news came, on October 13th, that the Turkish fleet was at Lepanto, and that that of the league had sailed on September 30th,⁴ there could be no doubt that the encounter was at hand. The Pope, although he had the strongest confidence in the victory of the Christian arms,⁵ ordered that extraordinary prayer should be made day and night in all the monasteries of Rome, and himself set the example to all by doing so himself.⁶ His prayer was at last to be heard. In the night between October 21st and 22nd, there arrived a courier who had been sent by the nuncio in Venice, Facchinetti, who brought to Cardinal Rusticucci, who was in charge of the secretariate of state, a letter from the nuncio containing the news brought to Venice on October 19th by Giofrè Giustiniani of the great victory that had been

¹ Corresp. dipl., IV., 442.

² * "S.^{ta} ha dato ordine che sia finita la fortificazione di Borgo." Report of A. Zibramonti from Rome, September 5, 1571, Gonzaga Archives, Mantua. Cf. Vol. XVII., p. 126.

³ See *Avviso di Roma of October 6, 1571, Urb. 1042, p. 128b, Vatican Library. Cf. Corresp. dipl., IV., 450.

⁴ See *Avviso di Roma of October 13, 1571, Urb. 1042, p. 132b, Vatican Library.

⁵ See the report of Gondola in VOINOVICH, 598.

⁶ See I. A. GUARNERIUS, De bello Cyprio, in LADERCHI, 1571, n. 420; WERRO in *Zeitschrift für schweiz. Kirchengesch.*, 1907, 219.

won at Lepanto under the skilful command of Don John.¹ The Cardinal had the Pope woken at once, who broke out into tears of joy, saying the words of the aged Simeon : *Nunc dimittis servum tuum in pace*. He at once got up to thank God on his knees, and then returned to bed, but could not sleep from excitement and joy.² On the following morning he went to St. Peter's for renewed prayers of gratitude, and then received the ambassadors and Cardinals, to whom he said that they must now strain every nerve during the coming year to carry on the war against the Turks.³ On this occasion, in allusion to the name of Don John, he cited the words of Holy Scripture : *Fuit homo missus a Deo, cui nomen erat Ioannes*.

All Rome shared the jubilation of Pius V. The holy Pope was in a state of exaltation.⁴ The Romans were not slow to celebrate the victory with salvos of artillery and fire-works, even though Pius V. thought that the expenditure might have been better employed in having masses said for the souls of the fallen ; instead he granted a special indulgence. On October 23rd a courier from the Venetian government brought detailed reports of the great battle.⁵ " The Turks " Cardinal Mula wrote in jubilation, " will not get

¹ See the *report of Vinc. Matuliani of October 24, 1571, State Archives, Bologna, the *report of Arco of October 27, 1571, State Archives, Vienna, the letter of Facchinetti in VALENSISE, 171, and that of Zuñiga in Corresp. dipl., IV., 488.

² See the *Avvisi di Roma of October 24 and 27, 1571, Urb. 1042, p. 137, 137b, Vatican Library. Cf. Tiepolo in MUTINELLI, I., 98 seq.

³ Corresp. dipl., IV., 489.

⁴ See GRATIANUS, 230.

⁵ See *Avvisi di Roma of October 24 and 27, 1571, *loc. cit.* *" To-morrow morning the Pope will celebrate a mass of thanksgiving," A. Zibramonti announces on October 27, 1571, Gonzaga Archives, Mantua. An *Avviso dated Venice, October 22, 1571, which deals solely with Lepanto, is in the Doria-Pamfili Archives, Rome, together with a full collection of Avvisi dealing with the Turkish war, 1560-1571 (Cod. 76, 21).

over this blow, and the Christian fleet is mistress of the seas."¹ On October 28th Pius V. celebrated a solemn High Mass of thanksgiving in St. Peter's. He had intended also to pontificate at a requiem for the fallen on the following day, but was so exhausted that he had to leave it to Cardinal Otto Truchsess.²

On October 22nd the Papal chancery had begun to send news to all parts of the world of the great event. The three admirals of the Christian fleet received enthusiastic letters of congratulation, while, by the express command of Pius V.,³ the Catholic powers were urgently implored to profit in every way from "the greatest victory ever won against the infidels"; all must have a share in it. Letters in this sense were sent to the Emperor, the Kings of Spain, France, and Poland, to the Italian states, and to the ecclesiastical and secular princes of the German Empire.⁴ The Emperor received

¹ * "Si può dire che il Turco non restaurerà mai più armata marittima et ha perduti li migliori soldati . . . L'armata christiana è padrona di tutto il mare." Mula to Maximilian II., from Rome, October 27, 1571, State Archives, Vienna, Hofkorresp., fasc. 7.

² See the *letter of a Jesuit in Rome to one of his colleagues in Germany, December 11, 1571, in Cod. 1237, p. 105, of the Municipal Library, Trêves, which says: "Sequenti vero die illustrissimus cardinalis Augustanus cecinit missam pro defunctis classis christianae cum magna solemnitate, eamque cantaturus fuisset Pontifex, sed forte senio et fatigatione praepeditus facere non potuit, ut et alias Pontifex, quandocunque impeditur, sacri cantandi munus illustrissimo cardinali Augustano committere solet, indicium certe amoris ac benevolentiae singulari illustr. cardinalis pietati ac religioni debitae."

³ See Tiepolo in MUTINELLI, I., 100.

⁴ The *briefs to Philip II. and Charles IX. in vol. 26 of the Archives of Briefs, Rome, are dated October 22, 1571, and those to the Italian states October 23; *ibid.* the *brief to Venice of October 24. The original of the brief to Philip II. in the Archives at Simancas bears the date October 25; see Corresp. dipl., IV., 492; *ibid.* 493 *seq.* another, autograph, brief to Philip II., in Italian, dated October 28. The brief to the King of Portugal,

three; the first dated October 24th, and the second and third November 1st and 10th. In these letters Maximilian was directly invited to join the league, a matter which Fernando Mendoza was sent to discuss with him in a special mission.¹ What far-reaching plans filled the mind of Pius V. may be seen from the fact that on November 17th he sent to the King of Portugal letters to be forwarded to the Shah of Persia, the King of Ethiopia, and the sheik Mutahat, prince of Arabia Felix.² If he could but succeed in winning over these rivals of the Ottoman Empire, there seemed to be a possibility, not only of entirely driving the hereditary enemy of Christendom out of Europe, but even of winning back the Holy Sepulchre.

A necessary preliminary to such action on the part of the eastern nations, however, was the complete unity of the Christian west, and especially of the nations which had entered the league. After all that had gone before, it was easy to foresee serious difficulties in this respect.

While fresh particulars of the battle continued to arrive,³ the Pope was waiting, with an impatience that can well be understood, for exact details of the fruits of the victory won by the fleets of the league on October 7th. At first it was reported that the fleet would go on to the Morea, where it was said that the Christian population was ripe for rebellion. Others thought that an attack would be made on the fortresses near Lepanto, or on the important island of Negroponte, which was not well defended. On November 5th, it was learned that none of these things had been done. Letters

of October 26, 1571, in LADERCHI, 1571, n. 459. According to t. 26 of the Archives of Briefs, Rome, on the same date *letters were sent to Don John, Venier, M. A. Colonna, and Genoa, and on the 27 to the German princes. For the brief to Albert V. of Bavaria see JANNSEN-PASTOR, IV.¹⁵⁻¹⁶, 327.

¹ See SCHWARZ, Briefwechsel, 187 *seq.*, 189 *seq.*

² See GOUBAU, 414-426; LADERCHI, 1571, n. 462 *seq.*; Corpo dipl. Portug., X., 424.

³ Cf. the *report of A. Zibramonti of November 3, 1571, Gonzaga Archives, Mantua.

dated October 27th from Corfù announced that the fleet of the league was on the point of dispersing ; Don John was going to Sicily, the Venetians, partly home and partly to Crete, and Colonna to Rome, where the allies intended to make their plans for the campaign of the following year. This, it was said, was due to the fact that it had been found impossible to come to an agreement about the division of the future spoils of war, and especially of the Morea. The French ambassador in Rome spoke scoffingly of the division of the bear's skin which had not yet been won.¹

Soon afterwards it was learned in Rome that Don John and the Venetians had not been able to come to terms even about the Turkish nobles captured at Lepanto, a question which involved the payment of large ransoms, and that they had decided to refer the matter to the Pope for arbitration ; Marcantonio Colonna would shortly arrive in the Eternal City.²

The arrival of the Papal admiral was still delayed for a time. He had first sent to the Pope, in order to give him a full report, Pompeo Colonna and the knight, Romegasso, who were received at a long audience on November 1st.³ On the 14th there arrived Alessandro Farnese and Santa Fiora, and on the following day many others who had taken part in the battle ; Michele Bonelli arrived on the 20th.⁴

¹ See CHARRIÈRE, III., 191 *seq.*, 193. Later on Marcantonio Colonna described to the Venetian ambassador in Rome the disgraceful quarrels after the victory ; see the latter's report of November 26, 1571, in MUTINELLI, I., 103. *Cf.* BROSCHE, *Drei Grosswesire*, 22 *seq.* ; SERRANO, *Liga*, I., 139 *seq.*

² See CHARRIÈRE, III., 194. The more distinguished Turkish prisoners came to Rome on March 8, 1572 ; see ROSI in *Arch. d. Soc. Rom.*, XXI., 141 *seq.* ; XXIV., 7. For the plans made by Venice to kill the prisoners and the Sultan see LAMANSKY, *Secrets d'état de Venise*, Petersburg, 1884, 83 *seq.*, 90. *Cf.* GRATIANUS, 226.

³ See **Avviso di Roma* of November 7, 1571, Urb. 1042, p. 146b, Vatican Library.

⁴ *Cf.* **Avvisi di Roma* of November 14, 17 and 24, 1571, *ibid.* 143b, 149, 154b. Michele Bonelli had been appointed "capitaneus generalis omnium legionar. status eccles." by a **brief* of September 15, 1570 (Editti in the Casanatense Library, Rome).

The coming of Colonna, which was definitely expected on the 17th was put off, principally because, in spite of his refusal,¹ the Romans insisted upon according him a solemn triumph, to prepare for which time was required.² This desire of the Romans was very understandable, for the noblest youth of the city had taken a glorious part in the battle, and a scion of one of its most famous families had commanded the Papal fleet at Lepanto, and had contributed materially to the victory;³ such things brought strongly to their minds the glories of ancient Rome. It was suggested that Colonna should make his entry in the guise of an Emperor of ancient times, in a gilt chariot, and crowned with laurel, but this roused the jealousy of certain persons who pointed out that such an honour could only belong to the commander-in-chief, Don John. At the same time it did not commend itself to a Pope like Pius V. and to others of similar views that there should be this revival of an ancient triumph, and this led to the alteration of the original programme,⁴ which nevertheless remained a very splendid affair, as Pius V. hoped that the honour paid to Colonna would incite his other feudatories to equally loyal and chivalrous service of the Church.⁵

¹ See *Avviso di Roma of November 21, 1571, *loc. cit.* 145, and the *report of Arco of November 24, 1571, State Archives, Vienna.

² For the consultations and deliberations see the *acta* in the Historical Archives of the Capitol, used by GNOLI in *Cosmos illustr.*, 1904, 147 *seq.* See also RODOCANACHI, *Capitole* II 5.

³ In a *letter to Pius V. of November 3, 1571, Don John praised the bravery of Colonna. *Varia polit.*, 89 (now 90), p. 107, Papal Secret Archives.

⁴ Cf. GRATIANUS, 231; SERENO, 229 *seq.*; CHARRIÈRE, III., 195; LADERCHI, 1571, n. 449; GNOLI, *loc. cit.* See also the *Avvisi di Roma of November 22 and 24, 1571, Urb. 1042, p. 155b *seq.*, 160, Vatican Library, the *Avviso of November 30, 1571, in the Doria-Pamfili Archives, Rome, and the *reports of Arco of November 24 and December 1, 1571, State Archives, Vienna.

⁵ See *Avviso di Roma of November 22, 1571, *loc. cit.*

Since, on account of the necessary preparations, Colonna's entry had been postponed until December 4th, on November 22nd the Pope caused his commander to come from Marino to Rome, where he took up his abode in the Vatican until the next day.¹ There was much excitement and stir in the Eternal City at that time ; every day more of those who had fought in the battle of Lepanto were arriving with prisoners and booty, especially Turkish standards, pieces of which were exposed as relics.²

¹ See *Avviso di Roma of November 24, 1571, *loc. cit.*, and the *report of Arco of the same date, State Archives, Vienna.

² See the *Avvisi di Roma of November 3 and 22, 1571, Urb. 1042, p. 146, 159b, Vatican Library. In several places in Rome there are still preserved Turkish standards captured at the battle of Lepanto, e.g. in the choir of S. Maria Maggiore, the choir of S. M. Araceli, and near the High Altar of S. M. della Vittoria (the latter has since the restorations of 1888 been enclosed with five Christian standards in a case) ; *cf. Mem. stor. d. mirac. imag. d. Mad. d. Vittoria*, Rome, 1881. One of the captured standards was sent by Pius V. to Sutri to the church of S. Tolomeo (at one time the church of the Dominicans, but now that of the seminary). Standards captured by the Venetians adorn the " Sala delle armi " at the Arsenal in Venice (*cf. G. DE LUCIA, La sala d'armi nel Museo dell' arsenale di Venezia*, in *Riv. Maritt.*, 1908). The banner of the contingent of the Duke of Savoy at Lepanto is to be found in the church of the convent of S. Domenico at Turin (see *dell' Acqua*, 82), that of the " archibugieri " of Sardinia at Cagliari (see *Arch. stor. Napolit.*, XXXIV., 544.) For the standard of M.A. Colonna at Gaeta see *supra*, p. 381. According to GREGOROVIVS (*Wanderjahre*, IV., 362) M. A. Colonna placed trophies of the Turkish war in the castle of the Orsini at Avezzano. The beautiful cross given by Pius V. to Don John when he set out for the war is now in the sacristy of S. Severino at Naples. The church of S. Pietro a Maiella at Naples has the picture " S. Maria succurre miseris " to which Don John had recourse during the battle. This picture is to be seen in the sky in the interesting representation of the battle which is there, and shows the moment when Don John sank the ship of Ali Pasha (see the illustrations in *Cosmos illustr.*, 1904, 125-130). The Knights of St. Stephen (whose archives are now in the State Archives, Pisa) adorned with

All Rome was in a stir when the bright and sunny day of December 4th dawned.¹ Thousands of people had gathered

Turkish trophies and a painting of the battle of Lepanto, the roof of their church of S. Stefano ai Cavalieri, which was built at Pisa, 1565-1596. The battle of Lepanto in the convent of the Dominicans at Mondovì is reproduced in LAZZARESCHI, 17. In the Court Museum, Vienna, may be seen the state sword of Don John and the cuirass of A. Barbarigo, and in the naval arsenal at Pola several Turkish banners captured at Lepanto. The best relics of the great naval battle are to be found in Spain; *cf.* ROSELL, *Combate (passim)* and DURO, *Tradiciones infundadas*, Madrid, 1888. The standard of the league at Toledo has been described on p. 415; until 1616 it was at the Escorial, where in the church is still shown the private door, by means of which according to tradition a messenger announced the victory to Philip II. while he was assisting at vespers. Among the relics of Don John preserved in the palace of the Escorial, some representations of the battle which are important both from the point of view of naval matters and of costume, are specially noteworthy. Of the same kind is the picture which came from the Dominican convent at Malaga, and is now in the Sala de la marina histórica of the Museo Naval at Madrid. Other relics are preserved in the Santa Cruz palace at Madrid. In the principal hall of the armoury at Madrid may be seen several Spanish standards from the battle of Lepanto, together with the arms and garments of the Turkish Grand Admiral, Ali Pasha, with a Turkish banner and other trophies. A Turkish banner captured at Lepanto is still in the church of the monastery at Montserrat. An ancient fresco representing the battle is on the great staircase of the archbishop's palace at Alcalà (now the archivium). Six standards from the galleys of Don John came to the Czartoryski Museum at Cracow, from the possessions of the Duke of Osuna. For the Turkish banners at Lucerne see App. n. 12 (January 10, 1572).

¹ For the triumphal entry of Colonna *cf.* FRANC. ALBERTONIO, *L'entrata che fece l'ecc. sig. M. A. Colonna in Roma, Viterbo, s.a. [1571]*, with variants and an addition in CANCELLIERI, *Possessi*, 112 *seq.* See also Tiepolo in MUTINELLI, I., 104, and the full **Avviso di Roma* of December 5, 1571, Urb. 1042, p. 157b-158, Vatican Library, with the remark, which can be accounted for by the cartailment of the original programme: "Questo spetta-

along the Via Appia, where, near the basilica of St. Sebastian, Girolamo Bonelli and the Swiss Guard, the Senator and the Conservatori, awaited the arrival of Colonna, who was to come from Marino. Unarmed, and with no decoration but the Golden Fleece, Marcantonio rode upon a white horse given him by the Pope; a black silk mantle lined with fur covered his tunic of cloth of gold, and on his head he wore a black velvet cap, with a white plume fastened with a pearl clasp.

Amid scenes of extraordinary rejoicing, the clash of trumpets, and the firing of guns, the cortége was formed, in which were to be seen the gaily coloured banners of all the city corporations, and the 13 Rioni of Rome. As can easily be understood, the chief interest was excited by the 170 Turkish prisoners, dressed in red and yellow, in chains, and guarded by halbardiers. In front of them rode a Roman in Turkish dress dragging the standard of the sultan in the dust. At the side of the prisoners walked a hermit, who had taken part in the battle, and whom the people, by whom he was greatly loved, called *Fate bene per voi*, from the words which he was always saying.¹ The standard of the Church was borne by Romegasso, and that of the city of Rome by Giovan Giorgio Cesarini, with whom rode Pompeo Colonna and Onorato Caetani, and the two nephews of the Pope, Michele and Girolamo Bonelli; then came Marcantonio Colonna, who was rapturously acclaimed by all, and was followed by the Senator of Rome and the Conservatori, and a large number of his friends and comrades. The Papal light cavalry brought the procession to an end.

As Charles V. had done 35 years before, so Marcantonio Colonna, entering the city by the Porta S. Sebastiano, and

colo era più in opinione che non è riuscito infatti." Cf. BERTOLLOTTI, *La schiavitù*, 7. Among recent writers see GUGLIELMOTTI, *Colonna*, 265 seq.; RODOCANACHI, *Capitole*, 115 seq.

¹ An *Avviso di Roma of December 1, 1571, *loc. cit.*, p. 154, informs us that on the previous day "il fate bene per voi" with a turban on his head, had taken to the Pope some "pezzi delli stendardi" taken at Lepanto.

passing the Baths of Caracalla, and under the triumphal arches of Constantine and Titus, climbed the hill of the Capitol, and came to S. Marco, passing thence along the Via Papale to the Bridge of St. Angelo. On the way he came to the statue of Pasquino, which was gaily decorated; in the left hand was the head of a Turk, with blood pouring from the mouth, and in the right a drawn sword.¹

After praying in St. Peter's at the tomb of the Prince of the Apostles, and offering, in allusion to his own name, a column of silver, Colonna proceeded to the Vatican, where the Pope received him, accompanied by 25 Cardinals, with the greatest honour. He exhorted the victor of Lepanto to give the glory to God, Who, despite our sins, had been so kind and merciful.²

When in the evening Colonna returned to his palace near SS. Apostoli, the streets of the city, which were illuminated as for a festa, were thronged with exultant crowds. During the day the Romans had read with pride and hope the highly significant inscriptions which had been placed on the Arches of Constantine and Titus, those ancient memorials of the subjection of the east by the west. The inscription on the Arch of Titus, the monument of the subjection of Palestine, called Jerusalem to rejoice because a Roman Pope had freed the city which a Roman Emperor had placed in fetters. Of the three inscriptions at the Arch of Constantine, that on the right recorded the victory at Ponte Milvio, that on the left the victory won at Lepanto by the Pope in conjunction with Philip II. and Venice, while that in the centre expressed the hope that now the way lay open to the conquest of Constantinople.

On this occasion there was a complete absence of all traces of pagan antiquity, such as had been used on similar occasions in Rome throughout the period of the Renaissance down to the time of Julius III. How different was the spirit which now prevailed in the Eternal City was also shown on the

¹ See *Avviso di Roma of December 5, 1571, *loc. cit.*, pp. 157b-158, Vatican Library.

² See *ibid.*

occasion of the reception which was given to the victor of Lepanto by the senate at the Capitol nine days later. This was entirely confined to the church of S. Maria Araceli, on the great door of which, all decorated with Turkish standards, could be seen the following inscription, composed entirely in accordance with the spirit of the Catholic restoration: "The thanksgiving for their successes which of old the pagan sages offered in their madness on the Capitol to the idols, the Christian hero who to-day comes to the Araceli, now gives with pious devotion in return for his splendid victory, to the true God, to Christ the Redeemer, and to His most glorious Mother."¹ The one trace of Renaissance days were the magnificent tapestries of Cardinal Este in the church, representing the victory of Scipio over Hannibal. At the mass of thanksgiving Colonna offered as an *ex voto Christo victori* a silver rostral column about four feet in height. At the close of the celebrations dowries were given to 75 poor girls. This had been asked for by Colonna in accordance with the wishes of the Pope. The money which would have been expended on the customary banquet was to be devoted to works of Christian charity.²

The celebrated latinist Marc Antoine Muret, in the sermon which he preached in S. Maria Araceli on December 13th, described the victory of Lepanto as the result of the tears and prayers of the Pope, adding that while the Holy Father like Moses had been imploring the assistance of heaven, another Josue had overcome the Amalakites. Muret called

¹ "Quas olim gentiles doctores idolis pro re bene gesta in Capitolio stulte agebant, eas nunc ad Coeli aram Christianus victor ascendens vero Deo Christo Redemptori eiusque gloriosissimae matri pro gloriosa religiose et pie agit haberque gratias."

² See *Avvisi di Roma of December 12 and 15, 1571, Urb. 1042, pp. 162, 162b, 436, Vatican Library. A picture of the rostral column in CASIMIRO, Aracoeli, 329, and MAES, Il primo trofeo della croce eretto da Costantino nel Foro Romano, Rome, 1901, 58. Cf. L. CENTURIONI, Columna rostrata seu plausus triumphales M. A. Columnae, Rome, 1633. For the Este tapestries see *Kunsthistor. Jahrbuch des österreich Kaiserhauses*, XXII., 195.

upon Colonna to liberate Greece, Constantinople and Jerusalem from the yoke of the Turks, so that Rome, the centre of the empire of the world and of the faith, might under the pontificate of Pius V., and by the help of a Roman hero, add new laurels to its standards.¹

Both Colonna and the Pope were well aware how far off they were as yet from the attainment of their grand purpose of the destruction of the Ottoman power, and both of them were so closely in agreement as to the steps to be undertaken, that Pius V. associated his experienced admiral with the Cardinals who had been appointed to deal with the question of the league, who, from December 10th onwards almost every day held two meetings² with the representatives of Spain, Requesens and Pacheco, and the envoys of Venice, often lasting five hours.³ Under pain of excommunication reserved to the Pope everything was kept absolutely secret, as the sultan had sent Italian speaking spies to Rome.⁴

In the course of the consultations held by the Pope's orders during the months of October and November, the problem of providing the necessary funds had been all-important;⁵

¹ The discourse was often reprinted ; e.g. it is in MAFFEI, *Vita di Pio V.*, Rome, 1712, 360 *seq.*

² Cf. the *Avvisi di Roma of December 12, 15, 22 and 29, 1571 (*loc. cit.* p. 162, 162b, 164b, 169, 462b), which bring out the secrecy of the discussions. See also POMETTI, 73.

³ See *Avvisi di Roma of December 17, 1571, and January 30, 1572, Urb. 1042, p. 437b ; 1043, p. 17, Vatican Library.

⁴ See the *report of A. Zibramonti from Rome, January 27, 1572, Gonzaga Archives, Mantua. Cf. the *Avviso di Roma of January 30, 1572, *loc. cit.*

⁵ These conferences as well were kept as secret as possible ; sometimes the Pope presided at them ; they were held very frequently, for the most part at the house of Morone. Cf. *Avvisi di Roma of October 20, November 10, December 1 and 8, 1571, Urb. 1042, pp. 135b, 140, 151, 153b, *loc. cit.* ; *report of Arco of December 1, 1571, State Archives Vienna. The outcome of the conferences was the bull of December 3 1571 (in LADERCHI, 1571, n. 469), and the mission of Odescalchi to the Italian princes (see CATENA, 210), who, in *briefs dated December 27, 1571,

but now they were concerned principally with the extent of the campaign to be undertaken in the following spring ; and with regard to this the representatives, both of Spain and Venice, made little attempt to conceal the jealousy and dislike which they entertained for each other. The private interests of the two allies came out so strongly that almost any concerted action became problematical. The Venetians wished to make use of the league, not only to recover Cyprus, but also to make fresh conquests in the Levant. Philip II., on the other hand, who was averse to any strengthening of the Republic of St. Mark, ordered Requesens to declare that the first duty of the league was to take action against the Berber states of Africa, in order that these might come into the possession of Spain. The Venetians saw in this proposal a trap to prevent them from recovering Cyprus, as well as to expose them to the risk of losing Corfù as well, while their fleet was engaged in fighting against the Berber states on behalf of the King of Spain.¹ At Venice it was looked upon as certain that Philip II. intended to get as much use as possible out of the league for his own ends. It cannot be decided with any certainty how far the complaints which they made to this effect were justified. In order to pass a just judgment on the King of Spain we must not lose sight of the attitude of France, whose government had been shameless enough, immediately after the battle of Lepanto, to propose to the sultan a direct alliance against Spain. Philip II. was well informed of the negotiations which France was carrying on, not only with the sultan, but also with the

were invited to give their assistance against the Turks ; see Arm. 49, t. 19, p. 583 *seq.*, Papal Secret Archives. A *Brief to Lucca, of December 3, 1571, in the Archives of Briefs, Rome ; another, of December 16, 1571, is mentioned by LAZZARESCHI, 19.

¹ See GRATIANUS, 243 *seq.*, who is very well informed on this point. Cf. Tiepolo in ALBÈRI, II., 4, 234 ; GUGLIELMOTTI, 297 *seq.* ; MANFRONI, Lega, 356 *seq.* The " Commissione data dal doge A. Mocenigo a P. Tiepolo, ambasc. straord. a Roma li 15 November, 1571, in proposito della lega " was published by Cicogna at Venice in 1845.

Huguenots, the leaders of the revolt in the Netherlands, and Elizabeth of England. He had therefore to take into account the possibility of a simultaneous attack on the part of a French, Netherland, English and Turkish alliance. It certainly was not only jealousy of Venice which influenced the Catholic King.¹ At the same time Don John admitted that it was contrary to the terms of the league that they should give up the war against the sultan in favour of an expedition in Africa.²

In contrast to the opposing interests of the Spaniards and Venetians, Pius V. continued to keep before himself a grand and absolutely disinterested plan; he dreamed of the liberation of Jerusalem, which was to be preceded by the capture of Constantinople.³ But, as Zuñiga wrote to Alba on November 10th, 1571, an effective blow at the heart of the Ottoman power would only be possible by the delivery

¹ Cf. JANSSEN-PASTOR, IV. ¹⁵⁻¹⁶, 328; MANFRONI, Marina, 507; ROSI in *Arch. d. Soc. Rom.*, XXI., 146, n. 2. GOTTLÖB (in *Histor. Jahrbuch*, XVI., 394) is of opinion that the least straightforward policy in connexion with the Turkish question is to be found on the part of Philip II., but refers by way of proof to the *apologia against the attacks of the Venetians issued in 1573 after the Venetian treaty, from a pen in the close confidence of the King of Spain; the two documents, the attack and the defence, are in Cod. Vatic. lat. 5299, p. 1 *seqq.*, 45 *seqq.*, Vatican Library. The documents which have recently been brought to light by the learned Spanish Benedictine Serrano in *Corresp. dipl.*, IV., 554 *seq.*, 562 *seq.*, 593 *seq.*, 606 *seq.*, 615 *seq.*, 626 *seq.*, 636 *seq.*, 644 *seq.*, 647 *seq.*, tell in various ways in favour of Philip II., whose conduct Serrano has also endeavoured to justify in many respects in his work, *La liga di Lepanto*, I., Madrid, 1918. Moreover, in February, 1571, Pius V. assured the Spanish king of his support in the event of a French attack on North Italy.

² See GUGLIELMOTTI, 299, n. 8.

³ On December 22 1571, *Arco reports that on the previous Saturday the Pope had written to Philip II. to dissuade him from the enterprise against Algiers, and that Pius V. wished Don John to move as soon as possible with all his forces against the Dardanelles. State Archives, Vienna.

of a simultaneous and unexpected attack by land and sea.¹ Hence came the continued efforts of Pius V. to arrange a European coalition against the Turks. Although nothing was to be hoped for from France,² which had sent an ambassador to Turkey in July,³ he nevertheless still hoped to win over to his purpose certain other powers, first the Emperor, and then Poland and Portugal. In spite of all the disappointments he had met with hitherto, he continued to try and effect his purpose by means of his legates and nuncios.⁴ Pius V. tried to turn even the smallest sign of good will to advantage in this matter. Thus, he took the opportunity of some general expressions made use of by Maximilian II. in assuring the Pope of his readiness to assist the Christian cause, to hold out to him hopes of the allies being ready to help him with 20,000 infantry and 2,000 cavalry. On January 15th, 1572, the Emperor thanked him for his offer, but regretted that he could not at once make up his mind on so important a matter.⁵ The Duke of Urbino made it clear

¹ See ROSELL, *Combate*, 220 ; HAVEMANN, 148. In December, 1571, Marcantonio Colonna advised Don John first to capture Rhodes and Negroponte and then advance on Constantinople ; see MOLMENTI, in *Rassegna naz.*, 184 (1912), 289 *seq.*

² The imploring requests of Pius V. to Charles IX., Catherine de' Medici, and the nobles of France to join the league against the Turks are dated December 12, 1571 ; see GOUBAU, 401 *seq.* ; LADERCHI, 1571, n. 466 *seq.* Cf. *supra*, p. 138 *seq.*, the efforts made by Salviati and Bonelli. On January 26, 1572, Pius V. wrote to Charles IX. that it would earn him eternal infamy if he remained out of the league ; see GOUBAU, 439 *seq.*

³ Cf. *Rev. d'hist. diplom.*, XVI., 620 *seq.*

⁴ For the work done by the envoys of Pius V. in Poland see *supra*, p. 312 *seq.*

⁵ See SCHWARZ, *Briefwechsel* 192 *seq.*, 196. An *Avviso di Roma of December 12, 1571, says that the rumour was current that Marcantonio Colonna would be sent to the Emperor on the business of the league, and an *Avviso of December 15 announces that this mission would be entrusted to P. Odescalchi (Urb. 1042, pp. 162, 163, Vatican Library). Cf. the *report of Arco of December 8, 1571, for his own conversations with Pius V. with regard to the entry of the Emperor into the league (State Archives, Vienna).

in Rome that very little was to be expected from Maximilian, and nothing at all from the German princes, especially from the Protestants. In a memorial submitted to the Pope in January, 1572, he maintained with good reason the view that the war would have to be carried on where the army and the fleet could work in conjunction, and where "we are masters of the situation," that is to say principally by means of the fleet in the Levant. If the Turks could be attacked in Europe by the Emperor and Poland, so much the better, but the great thing was to attack at once, because simply to stand on the defensive was not to fight, and he who wished to make conquests must push forward resolutely. The fleet should therefore be sent against Gallipoli, and thus force the Dardanelles.¹

But for any such undertaking as this an understanding between Spain and Venice was absolutely essential, whereas their representatives had been quarrelling in Rome for months in the most disgraceful manner. When at last the Venetians made the proposal that, in conformity with the terms of the treaty of the league in May, 1571, the Pope should decide the points at issue, even Spain did not dare to object. Pius V. accordingly decided that the war of the league must be carried on in the Levant, that in March the Papal fleet was to join the Spanish fleet at Messina, and rendezvous with the Venetians at Corfù, whence the three were to proceed together under the orders of their admirals; the allies were to increase

¹ *Discorso del duca di Urbino 1572 gennaio in Cod. Otto., 2510, p. 205 *seq.*, Vatican Library. Cf. JANSSEN-PASTOR, IV. 15-16, 327. Cf. also in this connexion the *Letter of Camillo Capilupi from Rome, September 28, 1571, "al sig. duca d'Urbino sopra il modo del continuare la s. lega l'a^o. 1571," in Cod. K. 19, p. 56 *seq.* in the Library at Siena (which is also frequently to be found elsewhere, e.g. in Cod. Barb. lat. 5367, n. 16, and Perugia Library, A. 42). Other *memorials on the subject in the Papal Secret Archives and the Corsini Library, Rome, are pointed out by POMETTI (p. 73) and SERRANO (Liga, I., 178 *seq.*). A ** Discorso per l'acquisto di Costantinopoli dalli collegati" in Cod. 675, Corsini Library, Rome.

the number of their galleys, when they could, to 250, and provide, in the proportion laid down in the treaty, 32,000 soldiers and 500 cavalry, besides the necessary artillery and munitions, and at the end of June there were to be 11,000 soldiers assembled at Otranto (1,000 Papal troops, 6,000 Spanish and 4,000 Venetian). Each of the allies was to provide provisions for seven months.¹ These agreements were signed on February 10th, 1572.² On the 16th Pius V. warned the Grand Master of the Knights of St. John to have his galleys ready at Messina.³ The preparations in the Papal States, the money for which was obtained principally by means of the *Monte della Lega*,⁴ were hurried forward so fast that on the same date it was possible to send 1,800 men to Otranto.⁵ Three galleys were in readiness at Civitavecchia and others were expected there from Leghorn.⁶

¹ Besides *Corresp. dipl.*, IV., 656 *seq.* see GRATIANUS, 249; Tiepolo in ALBÈRI, II., 4, 234; SERENO, 266; ROSELL, *Combate*, 241; GUGLIELMOTTI, 300 *seq.*; MANFRONI, *Lega*, I., 151 *seq.* Pius V. asked even more eagerly than the Spaniards for the removal of Venier, who was at length replaced by Iacopo Foscarini; see ROSELL, *loc. cit.*, 215; *Corresp. dipl.*, IV., 586, 631 *seq.* Since he wished for the continuation of the war, Pius V. deplored the fact that the allies freed and sold their prisoners and made possible for them their return to their own country, as they would thus reinforce the ranks of the enemy with their experience and tried courage; see GUGLIELMOTTI, 263, and *A ch. d. Soc. Rom.*, XXI., 146. Cf. BRANDI, *Il Papato e la schiavitù*, Rome, 1903, 32 *seq.* Pius V. absolutely disapproved of the killing of the prisoners which was suggested by the Venetians (*cf. supra*, p. 428, n. 2); see *Corresp. dipl.*, IV., 571.

² See *Corresp. dipl.*, IV., 659 *seq.*, 667 *seq.*, 670.

³ See *Arm.* 44, t. 16, p. 215b, Papal Secret Archives.

⁴ Cf. **Avviso di Roma* of February 2, 1572, Urb. 1043, p. 24, Vatican Library, and the **letter of A. Zibramonti* of February 2, 1572, Gonzaga Archives, Mantua.

⁵ See **Avviso di Roma* of February 16, 1572, *loc. cit.*, p. 39. At the end of 1571 the enrolment of 5,000 men had been ordered; see **Avviso* of December 29, 1571, Urb. 1042, p. 170b, Vatican Library.

⁶ See **Avvisi di Roma* of January 5 and 12, and March 5, 1572, Urb. 1043, pp. 2b, 8, 48, *ibid.*; MANFRONI, *Marina*, 132 *seq.*

The Pope's mind was full of the thought of the crusade ; he lived and moved in the plan, of which he alone had from the first been the moving spirit. For ten years, so he said to Cardinal Santori, it would be necessary to make war on the Turks by land and sea.¹ The bull of jubilee, dated March 12th, 1572, granted to all those who themselves took up arms, or fitted out another to do so, or provided the funds for that purpose, the same indulgences as had been granted to the Crusaders of old ; the property of those who were taking part in the war was to be under the protection of the Church, and was not to be injured by anyone ; all their lawsuits were to be held over until their return, or until their death had been ascertained, and they were to be exempt from every kind of taxation.² From a report of March 15th, 1572, it is clear how much the matter occupied the Pope's attention ; in that week no less than three meetings were held concerning it at the Vatican.³ In order to rouse the enthusiasm of Don John, the sword and hat blessed at Christmas were sent to him at the end of March, with special marks of honour.⁴

Pius V. looked to the future with renewed hopes ; fortunately for his peace of mind he was spared the realization that the glorious victory of Lepanto had been deprived of any immediate strategic or political results by the jealousy and selfishness of the Spaniards and Venetians, who, ever since February, 1572, had been quarrelling about the cost of the

¹ See Vol. XVII, App. 67, the *" Audientiae " of Cardinal Santori, under February 5, 1572, Papal Secret Archives.

² *Bandi V., I, p. 165, Papal Secret Archives. Cf. BRAUNSBERGER, Pius V., 113.

³ See *Avviso di Roma of March 15, 1572, Urb. 1043, p. 54, Vatican Library.

⁴ Cf. *Avviso di Roma of December 29, 1571, Urb. 1042, p. 168b, *ibid.*, and THEINER, *Annal. eccles.*, 1572, n. 2. The sword, with the inscription : " Christus vincit, Christus regnat, Christus imperat " (cf. LACROIX, *Vie milit. et relig. au moyen-âge et à l'époque de la Renaissance*, Paris, 1873, 294), is now in the Museo Naval at Madrid ; see *Gaz. des Beaux Arts*, 1895, 493.

expedition of the previous year.⁵ All the greater, however, were the indirect effects of the victory. How greatly shaken the power of the Sultan had been may be seen from the unrest among his Christian subjects. The hopes of a rebellion, of which the back-bone would have been the Christian population of Constantinople and Pera, amounting to 40,000 men, were not altogether without foundation.² To this had to be added the actual loss of the great fleet, which at a single blow had been destroyed, together with all the artillery and equipment which would be very difficult to replace. Even though, as the result of the elaborate organization of the empire, and the extraordinary energy of Occhiali, another equally large fleet was actually formed, the future was to prove that from the battle of Lepanto must be dated the slow but total decline of the naval power of Turkey; a barrier had been set up against its further advance, and the nightmare of its invincibility had been for the first time destroyed.³ The Christian world instinctively realized this and breathed more freely, and to this may be traced the boundless joy which ran through every nation.⁴ "It was like a dream to us all," wrote Luis de Alzamara from Madrid to Don John on November 11th, 1571, "and we seemed to see in it the direct interposition of God."⁵

⁵ See Corresp. dipl., IV., 678 seq., 684 seq., 687 seq., 691 seq., 720.

² See CHARRIÈRE, III., 211 seqq.; JORGA, III., 271, cf. 278. See also LONGO, Guerra, 27 seq.

³ See LONGO, Guerra, 29; RANKE, Osmanen², 53 seq.; ZINKEISEN, III., 288, 322; PHILIPPSON, Philip II., 165; JORGA, III., 154, 225 seq. *Histor.-pol. Blätter*, XCI., 719; CIPOLLA in *Riv. stor. Ital.*, XXIV., 184; NORMANN-FRIEDENFELS in *Seetechn. Mitteilungen*, XXX., 77.

⁴ For the joy of the Venetians at the victory see the report in YRIARTE, *Vie d'un patricien de Venise*, Paris, 1874, 208 seq. For the celebrations at Madrid see Corresp. dipl., IV., 509 seq., and for those at Innsbruck-Wilten CANISII Epist., VI., 629 seq., 637 seq.

⁵ See ROSELL, Combate 207. Marcantonio Colonna expresses the same idea in his *letter to Philip II. of October 28, 1571; see *Inf. polit.* XIX., 259, Library, Berlin.

The churches of every Catholic country resounded with the *Te Deum*, the hymn of thanksgiving.¹ Above all others did Pius V. raise his mind to heaven ; on the commemorative medals which he had struck, he placed the words of the Psalmist : " The right hand of the Lord hath wrought strength; this is the Lord's doing."² Since the battle had been won on the first Sunday in October, the day on which in Rome the Rosary confraternities held their processions, Pius V. saw the source of the victory in the mighty advocate, the merciful mother of Christendom, and ordered that every year on the anniversary of the battle a feast should be kept in thanksgiving, " as a commemoration of Our Lady of Victory."³ On April 1st, 1573, his successor, Gregory XIII., ordered that in future the feast should be kept as the Feast of the Rosary on the first Sunday of October.⁴

In Spain and Italy, the countries most threatened by the Turks, there soon arose churches and chapels dedicated to " Our Lady of Victory."⁵ The Venetian senate placed under

¹ Cf. VERANCHI Epist., 315 seq., 322 seq., 327 seq.

² " Dextera Domini fecit virtutem " (Ps. 117, 16) ; " A Domino factum est istud " (*ibid.*, 23). BONANNI, I., 297 ; VENUTI, 125.

³ The consistorial decision of March 17, 1572, in CARINCI, Att. concist. dal 20 maggio 1570 al 18 dicembre 1604, Rome, 1893, 9. Cf. LADERCHI, 1571, n. 447 ; LAZZARESCHI, 16. The statement in the Roman Breviary (on May 24) that Pius V. added the title " Auxilium Christianorum," to the Litany of Loreto cannot be maintained ; cf. A. DE SANTI, Les Litanies de la S. Vierge, Paris, 1900, 224. In all probability the addition was due to the soldiers returning from the victorious war against the Turks, many of whom on their way home passed through Loreto. The invocation was therefore a " vox populi," an expression of gratitude for the assistance of Mary in the struggle ; see KATHOLIK, 1898, I., 370.

⁴ See Bull. Rom., VIII., 44 seq.

⁵ See HAVEMANN, 146 ; *Cosmos illustr.*, 1904, 131. The last of these churches is that of the Madonna recently erected at Patras. In various places foundations for masses were also made, e.g. in the cathedral at Toledo ; see CARINI, Spagna, I., 205.

the representation of the battle in the Palace of the Doges the words: "Not our power and arms, nor our leaders, but the Madonna of the Rosary helped us to victory."¹ Many cities, as for example Genoa,² painted the Madonna of the Rosary over their gates, while others introduced the image of Mary standing on the crescent moon into their coats of arms.

The great impression made upon contemporaries by "the greatest victory ever won by Christian arms"³ is also shown by the fact that very few victories have been so widely extolled and described as that of October 7th, 1571. Pamphlets in every tongue spread through every country the news of the great event.⁴ Historians and orators, poets, musicians⁵ and artists, vied with each other in celebrating the day, which Cervantes called the most beautiful of the century. Among the descriptions by Italian historians⁶ the most notable are

For an inscription upon a cross in the cathedral at Tarento see G. BLANDAMURA, *Un cimelio del sec. vii esist. nel duomo di Taranto*, Lecce, 1917, 46.

¹ See *dell' Acqua*, 80.

² See *ibid.*, 82.

³ Thus does G. B. Campeggi, "episc. Maioricensis," style the day of Lepanto, in his *letter of congratulation to Pius V., dated Bologna, "sexto cal. nov." in Cod. L. III., 66, Chigi Library, Rome. Alba expressed himself in similar terms; see GACHARD, *Bibl. de Madrid*, 126.

⁴ For the German pamphlets see the article spoken of *supra*, p. 418, n. 3, in the *Zeitschrift für Bücherfreunde and Nagl-Zeidler, Deutsch-österr. Literaturgeschichte*, Vienna, 1899, 548 n. Many of these pamphlets, especially the Italian ones (*cf.* catalogue 87 of ROSENTHAL, n. 360-372) give pictures of the arrangement of the fleet and of the battle, others give allegorical pictures. One of the latter is a beautiful engraving of 1572 by Niccolò Nelli: in a galley are seen the Pope with the Doge of Venice, Don John, St. Mark, St. Peter and St. John, who are dragging the whole Turkish fleet behind them in a great net. *Cf.* NORMANN-FRIEDENFELS in *Seetechn. Mitteilungen*, XXX., 36, 48, 52, 63.

⁵ *Cf.* AMBROS, III., 533; URSPRUNG, *Jacobus de Kerle*, Munich, 1913, 80.

⁶ *Cf.* MOLMENTI in *Riv. Maritt.*, XXX. (1898), 233 *seq.*

those of Folieta and Paruta.¹ Among the commemorative orations, side by side with that of Muret must be placed that delivered by Silvio Antoniano in the presence of the Pope and Cardinals.² At the thanksgiving service held by the Archduke Ferdinand at Innsbruck, the sermon was preached by Canisius, who in noble words reminded his hearers that the victor of Lepanto was a Hapsburg, who, cross in hand, had spurred on his heroic followers in the battle.³ The sermon preached by the Tyrolese Franciscan, Johann Nas, was also a splendid discourse of its kind.⁴

The number of the poems which the day of Lepanto called forth was very great. In this respect the Spaniards surpassed the Italians. We looked in vain among Italian poems for a hymn of victory as enthusiastic as that composed by Fernando de Herrera, or so classic a description as that written by Alonso de Ercilla in his "Araucana."⁵ Among the many long and short poems by Italian authors which Pietro Gherardi published at Venice in 1572, in a volume of 500 pages,⁶ there

¹ Cf. FOLIETA, III., 1060 *seq.*; PARUTA, 244 *seq.*

² Printed in "Silvii Antoniani card. vita a Josepho Castalione eiusdemque Silvii Orationes XIII.," Rome, 1610, 119 *seq.* To their number also belong IOH. VOLLARI, Oratio Romae pro insigni victoria c. Turcas obtenta, Naples, 1571; SEB. QUIRINUS, Oratio pro felic. victoria navali, Cesena, 1572; LUIGI GROTO, Orazione per l'allegrezza d. vittoria, etc., Venice, 1571. For the discourses of Giambattista Rosario and Paolo Paruta at the requiems in Venice see *Arch. stor. Ital.*, 5 Ser., XXIII., 424, and LISIO, Orazioni scelte del sec. xvi., Florence, 1897, 285 *seq.*

³ See BRAUNSBERGER, Pius V., 112 *seq.* Cf. *supra*, p. 442, n. 4.

⁴ Cf. HIRN, Erzherzog Ferdinand II., I., 254 n. Attention should also be given in this connexion to AUG. NESER, Eine neue Catholische Predig auf der Türken Niederlag, Munich, 1572.

⁵ See TICKNOR, *Gesch. der schönen Literatur in Spanien*, translated into German by N. H. Julius, new ed. Leipsic, 1867, II., 104 *seq.*, 140 *seq.*; F. DE HERRERA, L'hymne sur Lépante, publ. et commenté par A. Morel Fatio, Bordeaux, 1894.

⁶ The collection dedicated to Cardinal Sirleto bears the title: "In foedus et victoriam contra Turcas iuxta sinum Corinthiacum nonis octobris partam poemata varia," Venice, 1572. Before

is not one that is worthy of the event ; in the Latin ones one is wearied by the strange mixture of Christian and pagan ideas, while all of them display an empty rhetoric and a bad taste which foreshadows the seicento. The prolixity of some of these poets, one of whom, Giambattista Arcuzio, produced 20,000 lines, is intolerable. The best are the poems in dialect.¹

Italian art was far more successful than poetry in celebrating the great event.² In this respect Venice takes the lead. The Republic adorned the entrance to the arsenal, from which had sailed the fleet which had defeated the Turks on the feast of St. Justina, with a statue of that saint, executed by Girolamo Campagna. Domenico da Salò modelled a

this there had been published at Venice the " Raccolta di parii poemi latini e volgari fatti da diversi bellissimoi ingegni nella felice vittoria riportata da Christiani contra Turchi. In Venezia appresso Giorgio Angelieri, 1571." A similar collection, preceded by a description of the battle, bears the title : " Trofeo della vittoria sacra ottenuta contra Turchi nell'a. 1571 rizzato da i più dotti spiriti de nostri tempi . . . raccolte da Luigi Groto, In Venezia, 1572."

¹ See MASI, I cento poeti della battaglia di Lepanto in *Nuovi studi e ritratti*, Bologna, 1894, I., 494 seq. ; MAZZONI, La battaglia di Lepanto e la poesia politica nel sec. xvi, in *La vita ital. del Seicento*, II., Milan, 1895, 191-207 ; D. CIAMPOLI, I poeti della vittoria in *Cosmos illustr.*, 1904, 157-174. Cf. also GENNARI, 76 seq. *Giorn. stor. d. lett. Ital.*, XIX., 450 ; XXXIV., 434 seq. ; *Arch. stor. Ital.*, 5 Ser., XXIII., 425 seq. ; BAUMGARTNER, VI., 444 seq. ; BELLONI, Seicento, 137 seq., 483 ; INTRA, Capilupi, Milan, 1893, 12 ; REINHARDSTÖTTNER in *Zeitschrift für rom. Phil.*, XI., 3 ; SOLERTI, Vita di T. Tasso, I., Turin, 1895, 156 seq. ; MANGO, Una miscell. sconosciuta del sec. xvi., Palermo, 1894 ; A. TENNERANI, Canzone di G. A. dell' Anguillara, Rome, 1894 ; VACCALLUZZO in *Arch. stor. per la Sicilia orient.*, VI., 2-3 ; PETRIS, Di un cantore della battaglia di Lepanto in *Pagine Istriane*, VI., 11-12 ; SECEGNI, Le lettere a Vicenza a tempo della reazione catt., Vicenza, 1903, 51 seq.

² Cf. G. SECRETANT, L'anniversario della battaglia di Lepanto, in *Emporium*, 1913, n° 214, with numerous illustrations.

beautiful relief of the Holy Family for the church of St. Joseph. The Confraternity of the Rosary built a special commemorative chapel at SS. Giovanni e Paolo, which was adorned with many works of art, among others two statues of St. Justina and St. Dominic by Vittoria. When this chapel was destroyed by fire in 1867, the picture of the battle painted by Iacopo Tintoretto and his son Domenico also perished. The same fate also befell another picture of the battle painted by Iacopo Tintoretto in the palace of the Doges, and was replaced by the great painting by Andrea Vicentino. Paolo Veronese also devoted two paintings, magnificent in their colouring, to the battle of Lepanto: one, representing Venier received into heaven as the reward for his victory, is now to be found in the Accademia at Venice; the other, which is in the palace of the Doges, is a votive picture: above is Christ in glory, and at His feet are Venier, Barbarigo, St. Mark and St. Justina, with allegorical figures representing Faith and Venice.¹ The greatest of the Venetian painters, the ninety-five year old Titian, executed for Philip II. a splendidly-coloured allegorical painting, which now adorns the Gallery at Madrid.² The city of Messina honoured Don John by a statue, which was recently much damaged in the great earthquake.³ The autho-

¹ Cf. SORAVIA, *Le chiese di Venezia*, Venice, 1822, 111 seq.; F. LANOTTO, *Il palazzo ducale di Venezia*, III., Venice, 1860, tav. 175; HAMMER, II., 424; MOLMENTI, *Veniero*, 135 seq.; *Cosmos illustr.*, 1904, 100 seq.; BETTILOLO, *Un altare votivo della chiesa di S. Giuseppe di Castello a Venezia*, in *Arte crist.*, I., Milan, 1913, 10.

² See CROWE-CAVALCASELLE, *Tizian*, II., Leipsic, 1877, 677 seq. A votive picture relating to Lepanto which is in the Museum at Osnabrück, and comes from the neighbouring house of the Knights of St. John, has not yet been reproduced. In this may be seen Religion dressed in red, with an azure corslet and a helmet on her head. In her right hand she holds a rosary, she is scattering golden coins, and in her left hand she holds a red banner with a white cross and a streamer bearing the motto: "Pro fide." At her feet are Turkish prisoners, and in the background galleys at sea.

³ Cf. the article by ARENAPRIMO in *Arch. stor. Sicil.*, XXVIII, 1-2 (1903). CRINO treats in *Arch. stor. Messinese*, VI., 1-2 (1905)

rities in Rome added to the consular *fasti* in the Capitol an inscription in perpetual memorial of the triumph of Colonna on December 4th, 1571. They also placed in the church of S. Maria Araceli a wooden coffered ceiling, decorated with trophies and adornments, with suitable inscriptions: the gold employed in this work came from the booty captured in the war. In 1590 the city also placed in the church, over the main door, a large inscription in marble, and five years later erected a marble statue of Colonna in the Palazzo de' Conservatori.¹ The huge pine-tree which tradition says stood for three centuries in the Colonna Gardens, on the Quirinal, in memory of Lepanto, has disappeared. The throne room in the adjoining palace contains a naval chart belonging to Marcantonio Colonna, and the diploma of honour conferred upon him by the Senate. In the great gallery of the palace the paintings on the ceiling by Coli and Gherardi represent Lepanto. Far more valuable than the last-named are the contemporary paintings at Paliano, the castle belonging to the Colonna. There on the ceiling may be seen two paintings of the battle and of the consistories held by Pius V. about the league. The frieze shows the triumph of Colonna on December 4th, 1571, and the wall the visit which he made to St. Peter's on that day, with an interesting view of the old church and the Vatican.² An interesting counterpart to

of the "Mappe geograf. della battaglia di Lepanto a Messina nei prospetti del basamento della statua di Don Giovan d'Austria." In the Pope's native place, Bosco, the church of the convent of S. Croce has a picture of the battle of Lepanto by G. Cossal; see *Il Rosario, Mem. Domenicane*, XXII., 433 seq.

¹ See GNOLI in *Cosmos illustr.*, 1904, 149, 150 seq.; cf. the illustrations 84 and 85.

² The well preserved frescoes are mentioned by MAROCCO (IX., 151 seq.), and TOMASSETTI (Campagna, III., 556); they are not easy of access as the castle is now a penitentiary; they are in every way worthy of being reproduced. In the collegiate church at Paliano is the simple tomb of M. A. Colonna. The fountain erected at Marino in 1642, with four chained Moors, records the part taken by M. A. Colonna in the victory of Lepanto.

these is afforded by the precious tapestries, also contemporary, in the Doria Palace, which represent the different stages of the battle more systematically.¹ The great deeds of the Holy League and the famous victory are also immortalized in great frescoes in the Sala Regia of the Vatican ;² Pius V. entrusted these to Giorgio Vasari in February, 1572.³

The earliest biographers of the Pope, Catena and Gabuzzi, relate that at the moment when the decisive battle between the Cross and the Crescent off the Greek coast ended, Pius V., who was engaged in transacting important business with his treasurer-general, Bartolomeo Busotti, suddenly rose to his feet, opened the window, and for a short time stood looking up to heaven, rapt in deep contemplation, and then turned round saying : " This is not the moment for business ; make haste to thank God, because our fleet this moment has won a victory over the Turks."⁴ The Imperial ambassador Arco, in his report on October 6th, 1571, speaks of a vision which a Roman Franciscan had had concerning a victory on September 29th, but he does not say anything of the same thing having occurred in the case of Pius V.⁵ On the other hand

¹ Published for the first time in *Cosmos illustr.*, 1904, 107, 123, 146, 155.

² Vasari himself described them in his letter of February 23, 1572, in GAYE, III., 307. The inscriptions in CHATTARD, 23 *seq.* Cf. LANCIANI, IV., 36 ; PLATTNER, II., 241 *seq.* A small representation of the battle is also to be seen in the Gallery of Maps in the Vatican.

³ " S.St^a ha ordinato che sia finita la pittura della Sala dei Re et che nell' altra sala [sic] sia dipinta la vittoria del anno passato." Letter of A. Zibramonti from Rome, February 16, 1572, Gonzaga Archives, Mantua. Cf. the *report of Arco of February 16, 1572, State Archives, Vienna.

⁴ CATENA, 195. Gabutius, 179. Cf. Lord Bacon of Verulam, *Opera*, Hafniae, 1694, 962.

⁵ See the *letter of Arco from Rome, October 6, 1571, State Archives, Vienna. Pius V. also spoke of this vision on December 4, 1571, to Cardinal Santori (see Vol. XVII., App. 67). If he said nothing about his own vision, this may have been due only to his own modesty.

the Imperial envoy, Cusano, on May 6th, 1570, that is to say about a year and a half before the battle, reports a conversation between Cardinal Cornaro and the Pope, and says that Pius V. had told the Cardinal of the inspiration he had had about a victory of the Venetians over the Turks, remarking at the same time that he had frequently had such experiences when he was praying to God about some very important matter.¹ According to this report there can be no doubt that Pius V. had long foreseen the victory of Lepanto. Once it had been accomplished, he had not long to live ; his mission was completed.

Although he never took any care of himself, Pius V. enjoyed to the end of his life great vigour both of mind and body. When at the beginning of 1569 men spoke despondently of his state of health, he laughed at them and said he never felt better.² A year afterwards it was learned that his health had not been so good as it had been since, by the advice of the doctors, and because of his chronic tendency to stone, he had altered the arrangement of his meals which he had hitherto adopted,³ but that directly he reverted to his former

¹ * " . . . ch' è solito suo quando prega Dio con tutta quella sincerità suol' far' quando gli occorrono cose importantissime " (letter of Cusano from Rome, May 6, 1570, State Archives, Vienna, Fabrizio de' Massimi, a disciple of Philip Neri, attested on oath that Pius V. foresaw the victory, not on the day of the battle, but long before ; see the Processus canoniz. Pii V. in LADERCHI, 1571, n. 419. What great prudence must be employed in using the *argumentum ex silentio* is shown by HERRE (I., 190), who considers the prediction of the victory a legend " perchè le corrispondenze diplomatiche tacciono completamente in proposito."

² According to the *report of Arco, of January 22, 1569 (State Archives, Vienna) the expression made use of to the Cardinals was " che quei tali sono pazzi et che sta meglio che sia stato ancora."

³ " *S. S. per quanto s' intende non gode la buona sanità di prima che solea godere, et con questa mutatione de usanza de vivere, mangiando hora la mattina, alle 12 hore et la sera a 1 hora et meza di notte, non avanza ne migliora della infermità sua di non ritenere l' urina, la qual è molta consideratione, ancora che S. S. s' affatica al solito." Avviso di Roma of January 21, 1570, Urb. 1041, p. 221, Vatican Library.

custom in the spring of 1570, he felt as lively as ever, and said that he did not intend to seek the advice of doctors any more.¹

The great historical events, the war and the victory over the Turks, which had been accomplished, thanks to his vigorous action, then contributed not a little to bring about an almost youthful revival of his bodily strength.² All the reports concur in saying how active and vigorous the Pope was in the years 1570 and 1571, which were so full of anxieties and disturbances.³ Even in the spring of 1571 he was able to continue to devote himself to business without making any change in spite of the cure of asses' milk which he was undergoing.⁴ In July, without heeding the great heat, he went to his little villa. In the September Zuñiga reports the good state of the Pope's health.⁵ On Sunday, October 28th, the Pope celebrated the mass of thanksgiving in St. Peter's for the victory of Lepanto, on the Monday he was present at the requiem for the fallen, and on the Wednesday made the pilgrimage to the seven basilicas of Rome.⁶

¹ See *Avvisi di Roma of April 1 and 8, 1570, *ibid.*, 251, 258.

² HERRE rightly brings this out (Papstwahlen, 150, 187). Cf. the *reports of A. Zibramonti of January 13 and February 10, 1571, Gonzaga Archives, Mantua. His tendency to stone, however, continued to make itself felt: see the *report of Ces. Speciano to Charles Borromeo of January 27, 1571, Ambrosian Library, Milan, F. 44 Inf.

³ Cf. the *Avvisi di Roma, one of which for July 22, 1570 (Urb. 1041, p. 316, Vatican Library) brings out how well the Pope was. On April 27, 1571, Zuñiga wrote to Philip II.: "S.S. ha estado todo este invierno con tanta salud che me parecia que era demasciado de temprano hablar en sede vacante": for two days only the reappearance of the stone caused the Cardinals a little anxiety; Corresp. dipl., IV., 253.

⁴ See *Avvisi di Roma of May 11 and 19, 1571, Urb. 1042, p. 56b, 62b, Vatican Library. By the advice of the physicians Pius V. did not say mass on *Corpus Domini* in 1571, because he would be very tired carrying the Blessed Sacrament on foot; see *ibid.*, p. 75.

⁵ See Corresp. dipl., IV., 431.

⁶ See the *Avvisi di Roma of July 18 and October 31, 1571, Urb. 1042, pp. 90, 141, *loc. cit.*

The winter between 1571 and 1572 also passed at first in a satisfactory manner. At Christmas Pius V. assisted at the midnight mass, said two low masses, gave Holy Communion to his household, and finally pontificated in St. Peter's.¹ On January 8th, 1572, there was a recurrence of his former malady, the stone,² but the danger passed. In the middle of March it suddenly returned very violently.³ The Pope sought relief in a treatment of asses' milk, and this remedy, which had often helped him in the past, brought about a slight improvement, but so injured his stomach that he was not able thenceforward to digest any food. It must be added that the Pope fasted too strictly in view of his age and wore himself out too much in the discharge of the duties of his office.⁴ This naturally resulted in great weakness. At the end of March most of the physicians were of opinion that the Pope could at the outside only live for a few months.⁵ Only his most intimate friends, especially Rusticucci and Bonelli, who had returned from his legation on April 4th, now had access to the sick

¹ See the *Avvisi di Roma of December 29, 1571, Urb. 1042, p. 168b, *ibid.*

² See Corresp. dipl., IV., 609.

³ In my account of his illness and death I have left out of account all subsequent embellishments and have confined myself to the reports of contemporaries, and especially of the ambassadors. From one of these is drawn the *Relatione* written on May 3, immediately after his death, "sull' infermità et morte di Pio V.," published by VAN ORTROY in *Anal. Bolland.*, XXXIII., 200 *seq.*, from the *Varia polit.* of the Papal Secret Archives. Other copies of this "Relatione," *ibid.* in *Cod. Bolognetti*, 107, and in *Cod. Vat. lat.* 7484, p. 142 *seq.*, Vatican Library, in the Library, Berlin, *Inf. polit.* 26, in *Cod. ital.* 203 of the *Bibliothèque Nationale*, Paris, in *Cod.* 507, p. 2 *seq.* of the Library, Toulouse, and in *Cod.* 6325 of the Court Library, Vienna. The many *reports of the Bolognese envoy, Vincenzo Matuliani, in the State Archives, Bologna, are very full.

⁴ See the *report of V. Matuliani of March 26, 1572, State Archives, Bologna.

⁵ See the reports of Zuñiga of March 29 and 30, 1572, Corresp. dipl., IV., 711, 718.

man,¹ who was quite unable to assist at the Pontifical mass at Easter (April 6th). He wished, however, though he was in great pain, to give the solemn blessing to the Roman people. On hearing this an innumerable crowd assembled in the piazza of St. Peter's, wishing once more to see the face of the holy pontiff, and great was the wonder of all when he pronounced the words of the blessing in tones that were clear and audible by everyone. Many wept with joy, and began to hope that his precious life would be spared.² After this the Pope felt better for several days.³

But it was impossible to say that there was any real improvement in his state of health.⁴ His stomach absolutely failed him, and at the same time there was a steady increase in the pain of his malady, which the Pope bore with the greatest patience. An operation which was suggested by the physicians was refused by the Pope, probably from motives of modesty.⁵

To his bodily pains were added those of the mind. Above all the conduct of the great Catholic powers weighed heavily upon him. Philip II. bore him malice on account of his attitude in the affair of Archbishop Carranza, and the am-

¹ Cf. the *report of Arco of April 5, 1572 (State Archives, Vienna), who tells of all the lotions with which they sought to relieve the sick man. See also the *letter of Zibramonti of March 29, 1572, Gonzaga Archives, Mantua. For the anxiety at the court of Florence see PALANDRI, 165 seq.

² See the *report of A. Zibramonti of April 12, 1572, Gonzaga Archives, Mantua.

³ See the *report of V. Matuliani of April 5, 1572, State Archives, Bologna, and the brief to William of Bavaria of April 8, 1572, in THEINER, *Annal. eccles.*, I., 5.

⁴ See the report of Zuñiga of April 10, 1572, *Corresp. dipl.*, IV., 723.

⁵ See the *report of Arco of April 12, 1572, State Archives, Vienna. Cf. the *letter of Zibramonti of April 30, 1572, Gonzaga Archives, Mantua, and *Corresp. dipl.*, IV., 731, n. 1. His physician relates that on one occasion he had let himself be examined while he was a Cardinal, but that he would not allow this when he was Pope; see MARINI, II., 321.

bassador of the Catholic King was also threatening a breach of diplomatic relations should the Pope grant the marriage dispensation for Henry of Navarre, which the French ambassador was trying to obtain by threats of the withdrawal of the obedience of France. To all this had to be added the quarrel with the Emperor on account of the elevation of Cosimo de' Medici to the grand duchy of Tuscany.¹ It was the ardent wish of the Pope to be able to make once more the pilgrimage to the seven basilicas of Rome which was so dear to him; vainly did the physicians and his most intimate friends try to dissuade him from it, but on April 21st, although a strong wind was blowing off the sea, he undertook the long pilgrimage, during the course of which he went more than an Italian mile on foot. On the way to St. Paul's he met a shepherd, who gave him a lamb, while another person offered him some quails. At the Scala Santa he met some English exiles, whose names he caused to be taken, in order that he might send them some help, and looking up to heaven cried out: "My God! Thou knowest that I am ready to shed my blood to save that nation." He gave his blessing kindly to the crowd which thronged about him in thousands, and they were filled with renewed hopes at seeing how vigorously the sick man moved about.²

This was the last time that the Pope's strong will was able to make his feeble body obey him. During the days that followed he was no longer able to deal with current business.³ On the evening of April 26th he was seized by a sudden collapse, from which, however, he quickly recovered, and was able on the following morning to give an audience to the Prince of Urbino; in the evening there was a second, but less serious

¹ See the *report of Cusano of May 24, 1572, State Archives, Vienna. Cf. Vol. XVII., 365, and *infra*, p. 456, n. 4.

² See the *report of A. Zibramonti of April 26, 1572, Gonzaga Archives, Mantua. Cf. also the *letter of Arco of April 26, 1572, State Archives, Vienna. The episode of the English in CATENA, 215.

³ See the report of Zuñiga of April 24, 1572, Corresp. dipl., IV., 729.

collapse. On the following morning Pius V. attempted to say mass, but his weakness prevented him from having this consolation, though he managed to assist at mass and to receive communion. Towards mid-day he had a further collapse which was so serious that his attendants thought him dead. All the gates in the Vatican were closed, all precautions were taken and the Cardinals were summoned, though soon this order was countermanded, as the Pope had rallied, though his condition was now hopeless.¹

Pius looked forward to his dissolution with joy. While his attendants were sobbing and weeping, he was quite calm, and even tried to comfort them, saying that if it were necessary the Lord God could raise up from the stones the man of whom the Church had need in those difficult times. Of the prayers which he had read uninterruptedly even during the night, Pius loved best the seven penitential psalms and the history of Our Lord's Passion. Every time the name of Jesus occurred, he reverently uncovered his head, or at least made the attempt when his hands no longer permitted him to do so.² The defence of Christendom against Islam occupied his mind to the end; he repeatedly urged those about him to carry on the crusade against the Turks. His last act of government was to make over to his treasurer a casket containing 13,000 scudi, from which he had been accustomed to take what he needed for his private alms, saying that it had done good service for the league.³

On April 30th the Pope felt that his end was near. So that

¹ With the *Relatione* 201 quoted on p. 452, n. 3, see also the *report of Cusano of April 28, 1572, State Archives, Vienna. Cf. also the *letter of A. Zibramonti of April 30, 1572, Gonzaga Archives, Mantua, and the *reports of V. Matuliani of April 27 and 30, and May 1, 1572, State Archives, Bologna.

² See CATENA, 216. Cf. also the report of A. Zibramonti of May 1, 1572, in *Anal. Bolland.*, XXXIII., 202, n. 4.

³ See the *Relatione*, *ibid.*, 203. One of the last *briefs relates to the Turkish war; it is dated April 27, 1572, and decrees the appointment of Michele Bonelli as "capit. generalis classis S.S.^{tlis}," Archives of Briefs, Rome.

he might die a simple religious he had himself clothed in the habit of St. Dominic. In the evening the sacristan administered Extreme Unction. As he was suffering from a violent cough, he had to forego the consolation of receiving Viaticum.¹ "The Pope," Aurelio Zibramonti, reported on April 30th, "lies motionless with his hands joined; none but a few penitentiaries are kneeling by him, and he is continually racked by violent pain."² When he came to himself for a moment, he was heard to say in a low voice: "Lord, increase my pains, but increase my patience too."³ It was amid such heroic acts that Pius V. gave up his holy soul to God in the evening of May 1st, 1572.⁴ He had reached the age of sixty-eight years, and had occupied the chair of Peter for six years, seven months, and twenty-three days.

From the first day of his reign to the last every effort of Pius V. had been devoted to the protection of the Church against the enemies of the Catholic faith, to her purification from every abuse, to her spread in the lands beyond the seas,

¹ See Anal. Bolland., XXXIII., 201 *seq.*

² *Letter in Gonzaga Archives, Mantua. Arco as well, in his *report of April 19, 1572 (State Archives, Vienna) speaks of the great pain which the Pope was constantly enduring.

³ This expression, which is recorded by CATENA (p. 212) is also attested in the letter of A. Zibramonti of May 1, 1572 (Anal. Bolland., XXXIII., 202, n. 4) and by other reports (see Corresp. dipl., IV., 731, n. 1).

⁴ See FIRMANUS in Anal. Bolland., *loc. cit.*, n. 2; *cf. ibid.*, n. 4, the letter of A. Zibramonti, as well as the two *reports of Arco and Cusano of May 1, 1572, State Archives, Vienna. See also the letter of Gerini in GROTANELLI, Fra Geremia da Udine, Florence 1893, 25 *seq.* At the autopsy the physicians found three black stones; see the report of Giov. Franc. Marengo d'Alba in MARINI, II., 321; *cf. Corresp. dipl.*, IV., 731. It is beyond question that Pius V. succumbed to stone. In his *report of May 24, 1572 (State Archives, Vienna; *cf. supra*, p. 454, n. 1) Cusano compares the three stones found in his bladder to the "tre ultre pietre" which had troubled him more than these, namely, his dislike for the affair of Carranza, the marriage dispensation of Navarre, and the disputes over the nomination of Cosimo as Grand Duke.

and to the defence of European Christendom against the attacks of Islam. It was only because of the shortness of his pontificate that he had been unable to attain full success in all these things, but nevertheless the holy Pope had accomplished wonders. His successors reaped, in many ways, what he had sown. During the period which immediately followed men realized more and more clearly the importance of his unwearied and far-reaching activity, not only in the cause of Catholic reform, but also of Catholic restoration. His contemporaries were quick to realize the grave loss that had come to the Church with his death, and it was the common opinion that a saint had left this world. In Rome above all was it seen what a great impression the life of the Pope had made. The inhabitants of the Eternal City, where perfect peace prevailed,¹ flocked in thousands round his body when it lay in state in St. Peter's. Everyone wished to possess as a precious relic something that had belonged to the dead Pope, so that at last the guards had to check the exaggerated eagerness of his devotees. Those who could not obtain a relic at least tried to touch the bier with their rosaries and other objects of piety.²

¹ See the *reports of V. Matuliani of May 1 and 3, 1572, State Archives, Bologna.

² See the *Relatione* in *Anal. Bolland.*, XXXIII., 204. Cf. CIACONIUS, III., 194; LANCIANI, IV., 45; *Zeitschrift für schweiz. Kirchengesch.*, 1907, 220. Payments for the catafalque of Pius V., in *Mandata, 1572, p. 22b, State Archives, Rome. A detailed description of the relics of Pius V. at St. Mary Major's (among others the red 'camauro,' the breviary, etc.), is given by G. B. NASALLI ROCCA, *S. Pio V. e le sue reliquie nella Basilica Liberiana*³, Rome, 1904. The original wooden coffin is preserved in the underground chapel of the "praeseptium," the silk mozetta of Pius V. at S. Maria in Vallicella, and other relics in the Saint's cell at S. Sabina. The "sedia gestatoria" used by him is now in the so-called *octagon* of St. Gregory in St. Peter's. For the relics of Pius V. in the chapel of the Collegio Ghislieri at Pavia see DELL'ACQUA, 101. An Agnus Dei blessed by the holy Pope (very large, with the Saviour and the instruments of the Passion on the reverse) is in the Schnütgen Museum at Cologne.

One who was intimately acquainted with the Curia was of opinion that with the death of Pius V. the Church had lost a shepherd who was indeed pious and holy, a strong defender of religion, a stern punisher of vice, and a priest who was unsurpassed in his vigilance and unwearied in his labours, and who had devoted all his powers to the glory of God and the exaltation of the holy faith.¹ What so ascetic and strict a man as Charles Borromeo had said in 1568, namely that for a long time past the Church had had no better head,² had indeed been verified.³

The provisional burial of the mortal remains of Pius V. took place in the chapel of St. Andrew in St. Peter's,⁴ whence

¹ See the *Relatione* in *Anal. Bolland.*, XXXIII., 202. In a contemporary note at the head of the *litterae sede vacante post obitum Pii V. (Papal Secret Archives) the Pope is extolled as "vir singulari vitae sanctitate, vitiorum omnium, sed praecipue haereticæ pravitatis vindex acerrimus, ecclesiasticæ disciplinae restituendæ audiosissimus." Poems in praise of the Pope, among them one by Sirleto, in CATENA, 219 *seq.* One by Commendone in MAI, *Spicil.*, VIII., 487. It can be no matter for surprise that the strictness of Pius V. should also have given occasion for pasquinades which are full of venom; see MASIUS, *Briefe*, 483 *seq.*

² The undated *letter addressed to Lod. Antinori, Ambrosian Library, Milan, F. 40 Inf. p. 27.

³ "He was the holiest of the Popes," says Camaiani in his *letter from Rome, May 1, 1572, State Archives, Florence, Medic. 656, p. 501. See also the opinions of Folieta and Mureto in CIACONIUS, III., 1000, 1009 *seq.*; WERRO in *Zeitschrift für schweiz. Kirchengesch.*, 1907, 219, and the opinion of the physician of Pius V. in MARINI, II., 321-323. Cf. also SANTORI, *Autobiografia*, XII., 352, and the *Vita di Pio V.* in *Anal. Bolland.*, XXXIII., 215. Moreover, Lord Bacon of Verulam in his *Dialogus de bello sacro*, after speaking of the victory of Lepanto, "quæ hamum inseruit naribus Ottomanni usque ad diem hodiernum," makes one of the characters say: "Quod opus præcipue instructum et animatum fuit ab eximio illo Principe Papa Pio V., quem miror successores inter sanctos non retulisse." (*Opera*, Hafniae, 1694, 1299).

⁴ The original inscription in *Mandata, 1572, p. 219, State Archives, Rome.

they were to be removed to Bosco, his humble birthplace, to the church of the Dominicans, which he had built there; such in his humility, had been the wish of the dead Pope.¹ But Sixtus V. wished to retain in the Eternal City the earthly remains of the man whom he had so much venerated, and he erected for the purpose a magnificent monument of the chapel of the Presepio, which he had built in St. Mary Major's.² The translation of the body from the chapel of St. Andrew to the Liberian basilica took place on January 9th, 1588, with great solemnity, and in the presence of great crowds; and as Marc Antoine Muret had done on the occasion of his funeral, so this time did Antonio Boccapaduli deliver a discourse which won universal admiration.³

It was also Sixtus V. who introduced the process for the canonization of Pius V. On account of the great care and caution with which Rome is wont to proceed in such matters, it was not brought to a conclusion until the latter part of the seventeenth century; on May 10th, 1672, Clement X. pronounced the beatification of Pius V., and on May 22nd, 1712, he was placed among the number of the saints by

¹ See the *Relatione*, 204, cited *supra*, p. 457, n. 2.

² Cf. CATENA, *Lettere*, Rome, 1589, 8 *seq.*; DE ANGELIS, *Basilica S. Mariae Mai.*, Rome, 1621, 173; KRAUS-SAUER, II., 2, 622; ESCHER, *Barock und Klassizismus*, Leipsic, 1910, 106 *seq.*; ORBAAN, *Sixtine*, Rome, 47.

³ See the report of P. Galesino in THEINER, *Annales eccles.*, I., 7 *seq.*, *Acta Sanct. Maii* 1, 697 *seq.*, and GATTICUS, 480. In 1904 the 400th anniversary of the birth of Pius V. was specially celebrated in Rome and Pavia. On March 10 in that year, in the presence of Cardinal V. Vannutelli, Archpriest of the basilica, and of the chapter, the sarcophagus of Pius V. was opened. The skeleton, which was in a perfect state of preservation (reproduction in the work of Nasalli Rocca mentioned on p. 457, n. 2), was then clothed in new vestments and the head enclosed with a silver mask made from the original cast preserved in the Manzia family, a change that can hardly be considered an improvement by anyone who knew it in its former state.

Clement XI., who also assigned his feast to May 5th.⁴

Every year on that day an altar is erected before the tomb of Pius V., the last of the Popes to be canonized so far, at which priests offer the holy sacrifice of the Mass. Then the tablet of gilt bronze, which encloses the front of the sarcophagus, is removed, and behind the glass may be seen the body of the fifth Pius in his Pope's robes; lit up by the rays of many lamps, and surrounded by the many-coloured glory of May flowers, and amid clouds of fragrant incense, there is nothing about it of the terrors of death. All day long Romans and foreigners, priests and laymen, rich and poor, gather there to venerate in fervent prayer the man to whom the Church owes so much.

⁴ See THEINER, *loc. cit.* 9; Acta Sanct. Maii I, 621, 715 *seq.* The beautiful "Officium Pii V." in JOYAU, Pie V., 371 *seq.* Cf. Acta canoniz. Pii V., etc., Rome, 1720.