




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THE
HISTORY OF GREECE.

VOL. VIII.

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THE
HISTORY OF GREECE.

BY
WILLIAM MITFORD, ESQ.

A New Edition,

WITH NUMEROUS ADDITIONS AND CORRECTIONS.

TO WHICH IS PREFIXED
A BRIEF MEMOIR OF THE AUTHOR,
BY HIS BROTHER, LORD REDESDALE.



IN TEN VOLUMES.

VOL. VIII.

LONDON:

T. CADELL, STRAND;
AND W. BLACKWOOD & SONS, EDINBURGH.

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THE
HISTORY OF GREECE.

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Persevering Ambition of the leading Grecian Republics. — Circumstances of the Council of Amphictyons. — Summary History of Phocis. — Ancient sacred Wars. — Regulation of the Council of Amphictyons by Solon. — Treasure deposited by Cræsus King of Lydia. — Subjection of Delphi to Lacedæmon, and Depression of the Amphictyonic Authority.

WHILE the Athenians were prosecuting schemes of ambition and avarice wherever, among the Grecian republics and beyond them, their naval strength might avail, neither the Thebans nor the Lacedæmonians had abandoned their pretensions to an imperial authority over the land force, and a supremacy in the general councils of all the states of the nation. Much as a superintending power, under just regulation, was wanted, and beneficial, even with very defective regulation, as it had sometimes been, yet the continued contest for it teemed with evil for almost every state, and could hardly fail, in the end, to ruin the independency of all. Hence, in the next year after that in which the Athenians made peace with their

B. C. 555. Ol.
106. 2. [See
Vol. VII.
p. 361.]

revolted allies, a new war, originating with a people hitherto of little name, quickly involved all the European continental republics, and led to consequences most momentous, not for Greece only, but for the whole civilised world.

Ch. 5. s. 3.
of this Hist. Among circumstances of very early Grecian history the council of Amphictyons has formerly occurred for notice; but from the Sacred war, in which the great Athenian legislator Solon commanded that Ch. 5. s. 5.
of this Hist. called the army of the god, to the period at which we are arrived, scarcely any mention of it is found among ancient writers. Occurrences now brought it forward to a new or revived importance; whence a view of its history, such as among the very deficient memorials remaining may be obtained, will be necessary for elucidation of the following general history of the nation.

The principal information extant on the subject is contained in an oration of Æschines, who, as representative of Athens, was a member of the council at the time of its revived eminence. The very detail however, which the orator thought necessary to lay before the assembled Athenian people concerning it, is among indications of the obscurity and disregard into which it had fallen. Its history, and even its constitution, though the Athenian people had always the right of representation in it, were at that time, in Athens, it appears, little generally known. The orator informs the assembly that the Amphictyonic people, whose cities participated in the right of representation in the council, were twelve nations or races. Of the twelve names, which he certainly proposed to give, one has been lost from the extant copies of his works. The eleven mentioned are, Thessalians, Bœotians, Dorians, Ionians, Perrhæbians, Magnetes, Locrians, Cætæans, Phthiots, Malians, Phocians. But two other differing lists are extant: one, from Pausanias, has twelve names; two of which, Dolopians and Ænians,

are not mentioned by Æschines: the other, from Harpocration, has only ten; and one of these, the Achæan, is found in neither of the others. The list of Æschines will carry most authority for things as they stood in his age. But it seems probable that instances of depriving an Amphictyonic people of its Amphictyonic rights, and giving them to others not of the Amphictyonic association, occurred in different ages, and warranted the example which occurs for our notice in the sequel. Possibly also, in the different catalogues, the same people may be designated under different names, or two races may be included under one name. Very anciently, we are assured, the Ionian name was very widely applied, if not even *as* extensively as afterward the Hellenic; and in Homer's time the Achæan had very wide prevalence. But far more important than any difference in these catalogues is their agreement in one remarkable point, the prevalence of Thessalian interest, indicated in all. Every name, in each catalogue, the Locrian and Phocian only excepted, is of people seated, or deriving their origin from those seated, on the Thessalian side of Thermopylæ. For the Ionians, Dorians, and Bœotians, though the celebrity of those names was acquired in settlements to the southward, were, according to the geographer, all emigrants from Thessaly; and the Achæan name always remained among the Thessalian people. Hence it appears that the distribution of the right to a seat in the council of Amphictyons had been originally accommodated to the extent only of that territory over which, according to tradition, thus not lightly confirmed, the sons of Deucalion, king of Thessaly, reigned; and that this distribution, whether always subsisting or at whatever time restored, was standing, little if at all altered, in the time of Æschines.

Ch. 3. s. 1.
of this Hist.

Ch. 5. s. 1.
of this Hist.

We inquire in vain what were the regulations made by Acrisius king of Argos, on which, accord-

Strab. l. 9.
p. 420.

ing to Strabo, the constitution of the assembly at one time rested. But a king of Argos, interfering with power enough to make essential regulations, would hardly have failed to provide that, during his time at least, or during the permanence of his power there, more of a balance against Thessaly should rest in the southern, and especially the Peloponnesian states. From Homer, as formerly observed, notice of the Amphictyons fails: whence it seems probable that the power of the council sunk, at least in southern Greece, with the expulsion of the princes of the Persian line; and that, under Pelops and his posterity, it was insignificant, or limited, as in its original constitution, to the affairs of the northern states, formerly members of the Thessalian kingdom. The Dorians however, who, under the Heraclidæ, expelled the Pelopidean princes, carried with them into their new settlements the claim to be an Amphictyonic people. But the wars, quickly ensuing among themselves, and rarely intermitted, left them little leisure or means for interfering with much effect in an assembly of states on the border of Thessaly; while the northern people, holding the principal sway in the Amphictyonic council, might equally be impotent, or careless, to interfere in quarrels which little disturbed any beyond the bounds of Peloponnesus. Thus, though all the Peloponnesian Dorians always maintained their claim to Amphictyonic rights, yet the patronage of the assembly would revert to the Thessalians the more readily as Iphitus

king of Elis, to supply its deficient means or deficient disposition to answer the purposes of its institution within the peninsula, established the Olympian meeting there.

Ch. 5. s. 4.
of this Hist.

It appears indeed enough, in the scanty documents of Thessalian history scattered among ancient writers, that the Amphictyonic council was far from equal to its office: even in the im-

Herod. l. 8.
c. 27, 30.
Xen. Anab.
l. 6. init.
Æsch. de Cor.
Pausan. l. 10.
c. 1.

mediate neighbourhood of its session, even among the Thesalians themselves, it could not prevent wars, nor humanise the virulent and destructive spirit of Grecian hostility. Nevertheless it will not follow that, because many and great evils escaped or overbore its preventing power, it therefore prevented none. Benefits to mankind, we have had occasion to observe, far less than troubles, engage the notice of recorders of events. What benefits, unnoticed by historians, may have resulted from the Amphictyonic institution, may perhaps best be conjectured from a view of the evils of which report has reached us, when no superintending power has interfered with the animosities arising among the unnumbered little self-governed states of Greece.

In the more powerful and eminent republics, even those called imperial, through deficient administration of law, frequent sedition, and danger almost unceasing from foreign enemies, we have seen the safety and quiet of private life always highly precarious; and yet, wherever we catch any light on the smaller and obscurer states, we discover only greater uncertainty, and generally an uneasier lot. The province of Phocis, bordering Bœotia on the west, was a mountainous country, comprising the southern part of the lofty and craggy range of Parnassus, with its rugged appendages; itself a branch from the vast mass of mountains, Cæta, Othrys, and of various other names, on the confines of Thesaly and Epirus. One small plain, called sometimes Crissæan, sometimes Cirrhæan, bordering on the bay, was of renowned fertility, but of extent scarcely six miles square. Through the rest of the country, cultivation and population were confined to narrow dales with each its torrent stream and each its town; so enclosed by mountain-craggs that the torrent's course alone afforded means for a practicable road. The people, divided thus into portions by natural barriers, all acknowledged a political connection,

Strab. l. 9.
Pausan. l. 10.

revered for its antiquity, and valued for its obvious advantages; every town sending its deputies to a general council, which, as a common arbiter, might compose injurious disputes, and, in common danger, might provide means of common defence. The municipal government of every town nevertheless ruled its valley with sovereign authority; and not unfrequently, in spite of the superintending council, made war on its neighbour. This inconvenient sovereignty entitled

Pausan.
l. 10. c. 3. each town to the appellation of POLIS, which we render commonly CITY; and so, in this small and little populous province, were twenty-two cities.

Among these the early and lasting importance of Delphi, arising from its oracle, has already required frequent mention. The population assembled there, and the great concourse of occasional visitants from other parts of Greece, occasioning demands which the rugged Delphian territory could not supply, gave new value to the rich Crissæan plain. Two

Strab. l. 9.
p. 418, 419. small seaports on the verge of that plain, Crissa and Cirrha, flourished, not only by the produce of their lands, but still more by the maritime commerce to which Delphi gave occasion. This commerce the circumstances of the adjoining shores enabled them to command. For the bottom of the bay, where stood those towns, alone afforded convenient landing; the sides being abrupt and rocky, and the mountainous coast of the Corinthian gulf far eastward and westward, denying a port for those arriving by sea, and a road for passing by land; so that, not only the maritime commerce of Delphi, but the approach of strangers, numerous from Peloponnesus, depended upon the people of Crissa and Cirrha.

These advantages, after a season of prosperity, produced the ruin of both towns. With increasing wealth the spirit of rivalry between them became violent; and, due restraint from the defective political system of Phocis failing, war

followed, as between independent states. Crissa used victory with the intemperance which we have seen common among the Grecian republics, and Cirrha was utterly destroyed.

The rivalry of these towns had been a common benefit to the Greek nation, interested in the oracle of Delphi. As soon as it was removed by the destruction of Cirrha, the Crissæans proceeded to use their advantages, with no more moderation toward all others than toward their vanquished enemy. The exorbitance of their exactions, both upon the commercial and the personal intercourse with the sacred city, at length excited extensive indignation through Greece. Accusation was formally preferred against them before the Amphictyons, then holding their session only at Thermopylæ. The council issued a proclamation for a sacred war, a kind of crusade, against Crissa, exhorting all Greece to arm, in the cause, as it was called, of the god. The Thesalians took the leading part; and their general, Eurylochus, commanding the sacred army, for such was the title it assumed, retaliated upon Crissa the destruction of Cirrha.*

[* " According to Strabo, ix. p. 418, 419. (whom Mr. Mitford follows) there were two wars: *Cirrha* was first destroyed by *Crissa*, and the Amphictyonic general, Eurylochus, retaliated upon *Crissa* the destruction of *Cirrha*: ἡ Κίρρα καὶ ἡ Κρῖσσα κατασπάσθησαν ἢ μὲν πρότερον ὑπὸ Κρῖσσαιῶν αὐτὴ δ' ἡ Κρῖσσα ὑστέρων ὑπ' Εὐρυλόχου τοῦ Θετταλοῦ κατὰ τὸν Κρῖσσαιῶν πόλεμον. Id. p. 421. μετὰ τὸν Κρῖσσαιῶν πόλεμον οἱ Ἀμφικτυόνες ἰππικὸν καὶ γυμνικὸν ἐπ' Εὐρυλόχου διέταξαν στυφαινίτην, καὶ Πύθια ἐκάλεσαν. But there is no mention of this war between Cirrha and Crissa in any other ancient writer; and the terms *Cirrha* and *Crissa* are often used indiscriminately to express the same place: Steph. Byz. v. Κρῖσσα: — τινὲς τὴν αὐτὴν [sic leg.] τῇ Κίρρα φασίν. Etymol. v. Κρῖσσα: — ἡ αὐτὴ Κρῖσσα καὶ Κίρρα. Eustath. ad Il. β. p. 273. Κόλπος Κρῖσσαιῶς. ὁ δὲ αὐτὸς καὶ Κίρραϊός. διὰ τὸ καὶ τὴν Κρῖσσαν διπλαζούσαν κατὰ τοὺς νεωτέρους τὸ σ Κίρραν λέγισθαι. — ὁ δὲ γεωγράφος [sc. Strab. ix. p. 418.] λέγει ὅτι Κρῖσσα τῆς Φωκίδος ἐπ' αὐτῆς ἰδρυμένη τῆς θαλάσσης, κ. τ. λ. ὥστε κατ' αὐτὸν ἕτερα ἡ Κρῖσσα καὶ ἕτερα ἡ Κίρρα. implying that the opinion of Strabo differed from that of others. Pausan. x. 37. 4. λέγεται δὲ ἐς τὴν Κίρραν [λόγος], καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς Κίρρας τὸ ὄνομα τὸ ἐφ' ἡμῶν τεθῆναι τῷ χωρίῳ φασίν. "Ὀμηρος μῆντοι Κρῖσσαν ἐν τῇ Ἰλιάδι ὁμοίως καὶ ὕμνῳ τῷ ἐς Ἀπόλλωνα ὀνόμασι τῷ ἐξ ἀρχῆς καλεῖ τὴν πόλιν. Callisthenes (apud Athen. l. c.) uses both the terms: and describes by the name of the *Crisæan* war that in which Cirrha was destroyed by the Amphictyons. Two scholiasts upon Pindar (Olymp. xii. 1. Pyth. iv. 1.) call the enemy *Cirrhaeans* :

It seems probable that the claims of the ancient Thessalian kings, whose power, according to all accounts of the early ages, was respected widely over Greece, were asserted by Eurylochus as his pretension for the chief command of the sacred army; and that he used the authority, acquired by his success, for committing the superintendency of the temple of Delphi and its treasury to the Amphictyons, whence their vernal session was thereafter held at Delphi. Pretences, that might appear plausible for a conqueror, were not wanting; for the Thessalians were always considered as in some degree fathers of the Greek nation, and the Amphictyons as from time immemorial its representatives. Nor can the restoration of the town of Cirrha, which we find was restored, be attributed to any other with such apparent probability as to Eurylochus. While then concord and good government enabled the Thessalian admi-

but a third has the name of *Crissa*: πολλὰ τῶν Κρῖσσιαίων ἐργαζομένων ἐπὶ τοὺς Ἕλληνας, καὶ ἀποσουλόντων τοὺς ἐπὶ τὸ χρηστήριον βαδίζοντας, οἱ Ἀμφικτύονες ἔλθόντες εἰς τὴν Κρῖσσαν μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων συμμάχων, κ. τ. λ. Æschines, Plutarch, the Parian Marble, and Polyænus have *Cirrhaeans*. The following facts are stated in the account which is given of the war by the son of Hippocrates: Thessali πρῆσβυτικ. pp. 937—942. tom. ii. ed. Linden. — that the *Crissæans* had formerly acquired great power: (ἦν γὰρ ὁ χρένος ὅτ' ἦν Κρῖσσιον ἔθνος) that, by their exactions, they excited an Amphictyonic war against them: that in the course of this war they stood a siege, and that after an obstinate resistance their town was taken: that Eurylochus commanded the Amphictyonic forces: that the Amphictyons, after they had captured the town, ἀγῶνα γυμνικὸν καὶ ἵππικὸν πρότερον οὐ τιθέντες νῦν τιθείασι τὴν τε τῶν Κρῖσσιῶν χώραν ἅπασαν καθιερώσαντο. The name of *Cirrha* does not occur in this narrative. Pausanias x. 37, 4. has *Cirrha*; where, speaking of the war, and of Clisthenes, he adds — πολέμειν πρὸς τοὺς Κιρραίους ἔδοξεν Ἀμφικτύοσι, καὶ Κλεισθένην τε Σικυωνίων τυραννοῦντα προεστήσαντο ἡγέμονα εἶναι, καὶ Σόλωνα ἐξ Ἀθηνῶν ἐπηγάγοντο συμβουλευεῖν. This is not to be understood of a former war, distinct from that which Eurylochus conducted (as some have understood it; cf. Tzschuck. ad Strab. tom. iii. p. 499.): there was only *one* Amphictyonic war, and only *one* in which Solon assisted. And the stratagem, which Pausanias ascribes to *Solon* on the occasion on which he assisted Clisthenes, is ascribed to *Eurylochus* by Polyænus (vi. 13.), and to Nebrus, in the war which was led by Eurylochus, by Thesalus, πρῆσβυτικ. p. 941. The same war therefore is spoken of; and Pausanias has inaccurately described Clisthenes as *general*, when (as it may be collected from Pausan. ii. 9. 6.) he only co-operated with, or served under, Eurylochus." Clinton, Fasti Hellen. pp. 195, 6. note f.]

nistration to exert the united strength of the country, Phocis would be in a great degree subject to Thessaly. But Herodotus, unconnected as his accounts are, shows divisions and weakness in the Thessalian political system, ample to account for its failure to maintain its superiority. The Cirrhæans therefore, flourishing in their restored city, and unrestrained in the now unrivalled enjoyment of the same advantages which formerly had given prosperity and insolence to Crissa, forgot the lessons of adversity, and abused those advantages. Arms being at length taken or threatened under authority of the Amphictyons against them, they carried their impious violence so far Æsch. de cor. as to attack the temple itself of Delphi.

Of the numerous states interested in the temple and its appendages, none at this time commanded so much respect as Athens, under the administration of its great legislator Solon. The ensuing interference of the Athenian government, and the success of Solon in the command Ch. 5. s. 3. of this Hist. of the sacred army, have been formerly noticed.

Arrangement, necessarily to follow, would of course be much in his power; and he is said to have settled the difficult business so as to give extensive satisfaction through the Greek nation.

Of Solon's legislation for the Amphictyonic assembly precise information has been transmitted only in regard to one matter, but that very important. The form Æsch. de cor. p. 502. of the Amphictyonic oath, as it remained in the time of Æschines, and as it has been given in Ch. 3. s. 3. of this Hist. treating of the origin and constitution of the council, was, according to that orator, settled by Solon. What has been altogether the tenor of his regulations, may then perhaps be gathered from circumstances. The Amphictyonic council being in so large a proportion composed of representatives of the states of Thessaly, a Thessalian

legislator would be likely to propose extension of its political authority, which, on the contrary, a member of any of the southern Grecian states would rather abridge. Athens and Sparta would not be disposed to commit their interests to the votes of Perrhæbians, Magnetes, Cætæans, Phthiots, Malians, and other obscure people, with names hardly known in Grecian history. Solon then, respected as he was for his legislative wisdom, and powerful at the head of the victorious sacred army, could little hope for such influence among the many republics of divided Greece as to procure their admission of a new authority, to have a direct control over all the political concerns of the nation, even under the best and most equitable constitution that could be devised. Aware of his deficiency, he seems to have legislated for the general good of Greece with the same wisdom and the same temper which are attributed to him in his legislation for his own commonwealth. Avoiding to grasp at that best which could not be attained, he earned the just gratitude of his country by doing the best that its circumstances would bear. After him the Amphictyonic council seems no longer to have claimed that direct political authority, apparently intended in its institution, but impossible, as Greece was politically constituted, to be carried advantageously into effect. He gave it however great power and importance, of a less invidious kind, and therefore, as circumstances stood, more really useful. By securing to it, with the general consent of the Grecian republics, the presidency of the temple of Delphi, he strengthened that bond of union, a common attachment to a common religion, which principally held the Greeks, in their several republics, in any degree together as one people. At the same time, by providing more certain protection for the Delphian treasury, he gave a security, far the best that the circumstances of the times would admit, and altogether

a wonderful security, to a national bank ; he gave firmer establishment to that quadrennial respite from war among the republics, the armistice for the Pythian games ; and he restored and extended respect for that beneficial law of nations, which was sanctioned by the Amphictyonic oath.

But a farther alteration, of considerable importance in the constitution of the Amphictyonic assembly, evidently not the measure of a Thessalian, may, apparently, with most probability, be referred to Solon. Originally every Amphictyonic city sent only one representative, whose title of Pylagoras, indicating no reference to religious affairs, marked simply that he was charged with the interests of his republic in the assembly held at Pylæ, otherwise Thermopylæ. Afterward an additional member was sent from every city, with the title of Hieromnemon ; marking that he was charged with the religious concerns of his republic and of the nation ; and he was honoured with priority of rank. We have formerly seen it of the temper of the republics of Solon's time, and after him, to be jealous of committing any important office to a single person ; an embassy scarcely ever, and even the command of an army seldom, was intrusted to one man. The innovation which doubled the number of the Amphictyons, and marked, by a new title, the special designation of the new members to the charge of sacred matters, giving them also priority of rank, seems to have been judiciously adapted to obviate jealousy of political designs, and to lead those republics, formerly careless of their Amphictyonic rights, or perhaps adverse to Amphictyonic pretensions, to concur in supporting an institution so little threatening any evil, and so much promising advantages.

The account given by Herodotus of the treasure deposited at Delphi by Cræsus king of Lydia, contemporary with Solon, however mingled with tales of superstition, and carrying otherwise, on first view, perhaps some appearance of extra-

vagance, may not be undeserving of attention here. When that prince became apprehensive of the result of the contest in which he was going to be engaged with the mighty conqueror of the Assyrian empire, he sent deputations to consult the more celebrated oracles known in that part of the world, Delphi, Dodona, and others in Greece, Branchidæ in Ionia, and the temple of Ammon in Africa. We have observed it difficult, and perhaps impossible, to gather from Xenophon's account of forebodings of sacrifices and consultations of oracles, by himself and by his master Socrates, what should be attributed to superstition, and what to policy. Not less difficulty will be expected in an account, from Herodotus, of the consultation of oracles by a king of Lydia of the age of Solon. But it seems nevertheless sufficiently evident that Cræsus had more in view than merely to obtain the guidance or assurance of prophecy. He gave a decided preference to the oracle of Delphi, the historian says, because he had proof of its prophetic powers, which entitled it to such preference. This was between himself and, at most, a very few others. But the matter public and notorious was that he sent a very great treasure to Delphi; thus decisively showing that, whatever he thought of the several oracles, he judged, from the accounts brought to him by his ministers, and perhaps from personal communication with Solon, who is said to have resided some time at his court, that the temple of Delphi was the safest bank.

Herodot. 1. 1. c. 50. His manner of proceeding also on the occasion, as it remains reported by the historian, may deserve notice. He made a most magnificent sacrifice; the number of cattle slain, great and small, being three thousand. At the same time, and with the same pretence of a pious offering to the gods, were committed to the flames, of his own and of the wealthy Lydians who were persuaded to

follow their king's example, furniture and utensils of gold and silver to a great amount, with much costly apparel, purple robes and rich habiliments of various kinds. But in this sumptuous oblation there seems to have been little, besides the apparel of luxury, lost to the use of men; and nothing done without a political and economical purpose. The feast of victims would conciliate the goodwill of the many, and the whole ceremony was calculated to infuse hope of divine protection, both much wanted for the coming trial. The gold and silver were so disposed among the flames that, as they melted, they were cast into the form most commodious for carriage and store, that of ingots, or, in the Greek phrase, bricks. Much of the common temptation of the age for invading armies was thus removed, perhaps with the least waste that easily might be. "The ingots," says the historian, "were some six palms long, some three, and all one palm in thickness. The whole number was a hundred and seventeen, of which four were pure gold, each weighing a talent and a half, the others of white gold (perhaps gold mixed with silver) each weighing two talents.¹ Cræsus made besides a figure of a lion, of pure gold, weighing ten talents, which was placed in the temple of Delphi upon the half ingots; whence it fell when the temple was burnt, and it now stands in the Corinthian treasury, reduced in weight by the fire to six talents and a half. Cræsus sent also to Delphi two very large vases, one of gold, the other of silver, which were also moved when the temple was burnt, and the golden, weighing eight talents and a half and twelve mines, now stands in the Clazomenian treasury; the silver, holding six hundred amphors, remains in the corner of the vestibule. In this the Delphians mix the wine at the feast of the Theophanies, or manifestations

¹ The talent was about fifty-seven pounds Troy.—Arbuthnot on Weights and Measures.

of the gods. It is said to have been made by the Samian Theodorus : and I believe it ; for it is of no ordinary workmanship. Cræsus sent moreover four silver barrels, which are in the Corinthian treasury. He dedicated also a golden and silver ewer, of which the golden bears an inscription attributing it to the Lacedæmonians. But this was done, with the desire of gratifying the Lacedæmonians, by a Delphian, whose name I know, but will not tell. The boy, through whose hand the water runs, is a dedication of the Lacedæmonians ; but neither of the ewers. He sent moreover a small figure of gold, three cubits high, and very many other things of smaller note, ornaments of his queen's person, necklaces, and various toys. Beside these deposits at Delphi he sent to the temple of Apollo Ismenius, at Thebes, a shield and a spear, with furniture, all of solid gold, and a golden tripod. All these things remained to my time, but many others have been lost. The golden oxen at Ephesus, and most of the columns, were also offerings of Cræsus ; and his dedications in the temple of Apollo at Branchidæ, in the Milesian territory, are said to be nearly equal in value, and nearly of the same kind, with those deposited at Delphi."

Herod. l. 1.
c. 92.

The transport of such treasure to Delphi must have been difficult and hazardous, and to draw thence, when occasion might require, not obviously easy. Accordingly little, if any, seems ever to have been withdrawn by the proper owner. The communication with Branchidæ was comparatively ready ; but, if the Lydian kingdom fell, the Milesian republic would not be likely to avoid the conqueror's power, and therefore the prudent king seems to have divided his wealth ; a policy in which we have seen Xenophon, in later times, following his example. Nevertheless it appears that the liberality of Cyrus, and the fidelity of those under him, left the treasury of Branchidæ

Ch. 28. s. 9.
of this Hist.

untouched, so that the deposits of Cræsus there were matter for question, as has been formerly remarked among the Asian Greeks, when they afterward revolted against Darius. Such a treasure as Cræsus sent to Delphi would not be committed to a place the object of a sacred war, or any place not supposed of rather peculiar security. The fame of a recent arrangement widely satisfactory, as that attributed to Solon, would on the contrary be most likely to recommend Delphi to the preference which it obtained.

How the power of voting in the Amphictyonic council was distributed, and in what way the business was managed, though some account remains from Æschines that might suffice for the Athenian people, is insufficiently explained for assurance to the modern inquirer. It appears however indicated that the representatives of each of the twelve nations or races of Amphictyonic people had its separate poll, where the majority of votes of individuals decided the vote of the race or nation, and that the decree of the council was decided by a majority of votes of races or nations, and not of individuals. Æschines says expressly that, for the Ionic name, the towns of Eretria in Eubœa, and Priene in Lesser Asia, the former rarely independent, the other often subject to a Persian satrap, were each equal to imperial Athens; and, for the Dorian, the obscure village-republics of Dorium and Cytnium, among the mountains of Doris, were each a balance to Lacedæmon, holding nearly half Peloponnesus as its own territory, and commanding all Greece besides.²

² Æschines, neglecting distinctions which for his auditors probably were needless, uses the word *ἔθνος* equally to describe nations or races, as Thes-salian, Ionian, Dorian, and cities, as Lacedæmon, Athens, Cytnium, Priene. But the manner in which he opposes the two inferior Ionic towns to Athens, and the two Doric to Lacedæmon, tends to indicate that it was a majority of the votes of the twelve races that decided the decree of the council; and this seems strongly confirmed by the substitution afterward of the one double vote of Macedonia for the vote of the twenty-two cities of Phocis. Learned com-

When the Lacedæmonians had established that ascendancy among the Greeks which already in Solon's time they were beginning to acquire, they found the matters over which the Amphictyonic council presided highly interesting to them, but the council itself, on account of the great preponderancy of the Thessalian and other northern votes in it, not readily within their influence. The silence of historians concerning what followed indicates the prudence which obviated such disturbance as would force their notice. It is to the geographer we owe the information, that the resource of the Lacedæmonians was to take the Delphians under their particular protection, declaring them a sacred people, dedicated to the god, and therefore independent of the general council of Phocis, and of all other human authority. Thus the temple and the treasury, of which the Delphians had the immediate charge, were brought effectually under the power of the Lacedæmonian government, and the authority of the Amphictyons was in a large degree superseded. Yet though the Phocians could scarcely but consider this as a great injury, the Lacedæmonians, in whatever way cultivating their favour, held them so far attached that, throughout the Peloponnesian war, they were among the allies of Lacedæmon; and, in the wars which followed between Lacedæmon and Thebes, they still maintained the connection till after the battle of Leuctra. Then Theban influence, or Theban power, pervading northern Greece, the force of the Phocian towns

Strab. l. 9.
p. 423.

Ch. 24. s. 4.
and
Ch. 25. s. 1.
of this Hist.

Ch. 27. s. 3.
of this Hist.

mentators too often, passing by more important matters, which really want explanation, have wasted their ingenuity upon little ones, and sometimes with a haste and negligence that must expose to error. Wolfius would correct the common reading of Æschines in this place, τὸν Ἐγεργεία: he says, τὸν Ἐγυθαῖον fortasse: nam Eretria Eubœa est: and this Reiske has carelessly enough thought worth inserting in a note of his edition. Eretria was in Eubœa true enough, but the Eretrians claimed to be Ionians, equally with the Erythræans of the Asiatic Ionia.

swelled the army with which Epaminondas invaded Laconia. The Phocians however, who had suffered from the enmity, and perhaps the injustice of Thebes, seem to have been, of all the Theban allies, least hearty in the cause. When called upon, nine years after*, for the expedition which ended with the fatal battle of Mantinea, they refused to march; boldly maintaining that the terms of their alliance with Thebes required their contingent only for defensive war. After the death of Epaminondas, as the patronage of Thebes was less inviting, so its enmity was less formidable, and thus Phocis became prepared for renewing its old connection with Lacedæmon.

Ch. 28. s. 7.
of this Hist.

SECTION II.

State of Thebes after the Death of Epaminondas. — Prosecution of Lacedæmon by the Thebans in the Court of Amphictyons. — Prosecution of Phocis.

THE event of the battle of Mantinea, the glory of which accrued principally to Thebes, was to no other republic of Greece perhaps so effectually disastrous. The loss of such a man as Epaminondas, great to any state at any time, was rendered singularly so to Thebes by the circumstances in which she stood; with a democratical government, recently become the head of a confederacy of numerous democratical governments. In him the Theban people, in him the allies of Thebes, had confided. Eminent men may have survived him: we read of Pammenes, his most confidential friend. But the influence of Epaminondas himself had been sometimes overborne by the adverse or

[* Not so long, if Mr. Mitford means the interval between the first invasion of Laconia, B. C. 369, and the battle of Mantinea, B. C. 362. His inconsistency, both in stating the date of that battle, and in speaking of time relatively to it, has been already shown in Vol. VI. p. 361.]

misguided will of the imperial many, even in his own city; and the means he possessed to command so extensively over Greece, the respect which had enabled him to hold so many little jealous republics in union and energy, could pass immediately to no talents. Thebes nevertheless retained a high situation among the Grecian states; regarded still, though with diminished attachment, as the head of a great and glorious confederacy. Nor did the popular pride, founded on the consciousness of admired actions and increased estimation, in any degree fail; and the popular ambition, which had maintained corresponding growth, and the popular hatred of Lacedæmon, which was of much elder birth, remained in full vigour.

The party ruling in Thebes, the same which had been the party of Epaminondas, maintained the friendly intercourse in Thessaly which had been formed or confirmed by Pello-

Ch. 27. s. 4.
and Ch. 28.
s. 4. of this
Hist.

pidas; and the Theban party in Thessaly was that with which the Macedonian reigning family had friendly connection, the party adverse to the tyrant tagus, Alexander of Pheræ, the ally of Athens. It was become almost habitual for Macedonia to be allied with Athens and Thebes alternately; so that, if the connection of Macedonia with Thebes was not already renewed, the breach with Athens would have cleared the way for its renewal. On this view of things the Theban leaders appear to have rested in a project for making the Amphictyonic council an instrument of their ambition and revenge; of power to obviate the decay of their political influence, and balance the failure of their military talents.

Injured as Thebes had formerly been by Lacedæmon, revenge had been so largely taken that it might have been just, not less than wise, to have forborne pressing it farther. One king, and a greater number of the Lacedæmonian people than in any war within tradition, had paid the forfeit

of their lives; empire, and the hope of empire, were overthrown, much territory lost, the rest plundered and wasted the capital itself insulted, the glory of the Lacedæmonian name tarnished. Unsatisfied with this splendid vengeance of their predecessors, and impotent to emulate it, the Theban government instituted a prosecution in the court of the Amphictyons against Lacedæmon, for the old crime, so already punished, of seizing the citadel of Thebes. That court, now little fit to be, as in its original institution, what the Theban leaders would assert for it, the great council of the Greek nation, that court pronounced against the Lacedæmonian people, in their humiliation, a sentence which too evidently it would not have ventured against them vigorous in uncurbed guilt; it condemned them in a fine, according to Diodorus, of five hundred talents, near a hundred thousand pounds sterling, to be paid to the god. Reduced as Lacedæmon was, yet neither the Amphictyons, nor the Thebans as their vicegerents, could enforce obedience to the sentence. The time was past when all northern Greece could be united under Theban banners, to march into Peloponnesus, and be joined by half the peninsula itself to invade Laconia. The fine therefore remaining unpaid was, according to the Amphictyonic law, after a limited time doubled, and equally remained unpaid.³

Diod. l. 16.
c. 23. & 29.
Pausan. l. 10.
c. 2.

In these measures the Theban leaders appear to have had no view to immediate contest in arms with Lacedæ-

³ The time, when this prosecution was instituted, is very loosely indicated by Diodorus, relating the fact twice, under different years, and by Pausanias not mentioned. The omission of all notice of it by Xenophon affords strong presumption that it was posterior to the term of his history, and of course not a measure of Epaminondas. It may have been among the circumstances of trouble and confusion which Xenophon lived to see, and with the mention of which, in general words, he concludes his historical work. Diodorus has in one place (c. 23. l. 16.) named five hundred talents as the amount of the fine assessed on Lacedæmon, in the other (c. 59.) a thousand, meaning, in the latter place, apparently the double fine.

mon; knowing its inability to attack them, and sensible also of the deficiency of their own means for carrying war to the farther end of Peloponnesus. But embarrassment for the Lacedæmonians and the animosity of other states against them, maintained and extended, would be useful and even necessary toward the success of an enterprise they had projected, less glorious, but safer, and teeming with great means for farther enterprise. The people of the little bordering province of Phocis, always ill-affected towards Thebes, were always for that, if for no other reason, disposed to maintain connection with Lacedæmon, and also with Athens, if at the time hostile to Thebes. Beyond the Phocians, westward, was the country of the Ozolian Locrians; always at variance with them, and therefore, if without other cause, friendly to Thebes. Northward was Doris, also of the Theban alliance; but Phocis stretched beyond Doris to Thermopylæ and the border of Thessaly.

Herod. 1. 8.
Xen. Hel.

Between the Phocians and neighbouring Thes-
salians, from the time of the old sacred wars, enmity had subsisted, such that not even by heralds was communication allowed between them. Hence it seems to have been that the Thessalian interest in the Amphictyonic council was given readily to Theban purposes. The Athenians then could not assist Phocis but across the Theban territory, nor without exposing Attica. Lacedæmon was yet more liable to have its support intercepted. The confederacy of the two might indeed be formidable, if their combined energies were exerted; but it was known that the party generally prevailing among the Athenians was utterly indisposed to any cordial co-operation with Lacedæmon. Phocis therefore, excluded by surrounding enemies from friendly succour, seemed, for the power of Thebes, an easy conquest. Delphi, with its oracle, perhaps no small advantage, but with its treasury too, certainly a

very great one, would thus be at the mercy of the Theban rulers. According to Diodorus, the value of the precious metals at this time lying in the several treasuries of Delphi (for every considerable republic had its separate treasury, or separate apartment in the treasury) exceeded a thousand talents, two millions sterling. Of this the riches deposited by Cræsus king of Lydia seem to have remained yet the largest portion, and the historian appears to have considered them as unimpaired. But the far more exact Herodotus assures us that, even in his time, there had been, beside loss by the burning of the temple, other losses. Nevertheless the treasure altogether at Delphi, according to all accounts, was such that we might perhaps more reasonably wonder it had lain so long inviolate, unless by small purloinings, than that at length it should become an object of appetency among the contending states of Greece. That it was now the object of the Theban rulers is asserted equally by Demosthenes, at the head of one party in Athens, and by Isocrates, at the head of the opposing party; and transactions, as far as they are made known to us, mostly by writers favouring the Theban cause, are generally of a tendency to confirm, and never to refute, the imputation.

Diod. l. 16.
c. 56.

Demosth. de
legat. p. 347.
Isocr. Or. ad
Philip.

With this then their great purpose, a pretence for war with Phocis, but especially a pretence to be sanctioned by a decree of the Amphictyons, with Amphictyonic law for its ground, was desirable. No violation of the common law, or law of nations of the Greeks, such as that notorious of the Lacedæmonians, in seizing the Theban citadel, could be imputed to the Phocians. Ingenious policy nevertheless discovered, in an obscure tradition, foundation for a charge which might possibly even better answer the purpose, a charge of offence against the common religion of Greece. Various instances are found of such consecration of land

to some deity that all disturbance of the soil afterward for tillage, or whatever purpose, was esteemed highly sacrilegious. In Attica we have observed consecrated olive-trees, whose fruit was legally brought to use, but to break the earth, as far as the roots might spread, utterly forbidden. Offence against the sacredness of the ground was there the concern only of the state in whose territory it lay. But often the bordering lands of neighbouring republics were made the nominal property of a deity, and in some consecrations of ground all Greece was reckoned interested. It seems probable that these consecrations did not originate from superstition, but rather from a wise and beneficent policy, calling superstition to its aid. The advantage of the consecration of olive-trees we have already noticed; and that of giving the estimation of holy land to the borders of jarring states is obvious; especially where no indelible features of nature marked the boundary. On the soil then whose sacredness was placed under the common protection of the whole nation, as great part of mount Parnassus, the unfortunate exile from any state might find security of person, when he could find it nowhere else. But, as often happens of human institutions, what was originally good became bad, by excess, by perversion, or by mere change of circumstances. Land was sometimes consecrated, not under a blessing, but under a curse; and then pasturage, and all use of any of its productions, was held impious.

A vague report, of uncertain foundation, seems to have obtained some extent of credit in Greece, that after one of the sacred wars, doubtful which, the Cirrhæan district of the rich vale of Crissa had been consecrated by the Amphictyons to the god of Delphi; under a heavy curse against any who should convert it to any human, or, as it was called, profane use. In all states the interest of power-

ful individuals will be too much interfering with the public interest, but most in the two congenial governments, as Aristotle calls them, simple or absolute monarchy, and simple or absolute democracy; and more in others as they more approach those extremes. It is to Aristotle also we owe report of a private quarrel, which gave immediate origin to a war involving the interests of all the republics of the Greek nation. A wealthy heiress in Phocis, of Theban extraction, sought in marriage by a Theban of an eminent family, was won by a Phocian. The disappointed Theban, unable to revenge himself by any measures against his individual rival, proposed to use the ready enmity of his fellow-citizens against the Phocian people as the instrument of his private passion. The purpose of oppressing Phocis, and, through the Delphian treasury and Amphictyonic decrees, commanding Greece, appears to have been already extensively cherished; but the decisive measure of prosecuting the Phocian people in the Amphictyonic court, for sacrilege committed by cultivation and pasturage on the accursed Cirrhæan land, is attributed to the disappointed lover.⁴

Aristot.
Polit. l. 5. c. 4.
Duris, ap.
Athen. l. 13.
c. 1. p. 560.

The fact asserted as the foundation of this prosecution, that the Cirrhæan land ever had been consecrated or accursed by the Amphictyons, or any other competent authority, appears to have been utterly doubtful. That diligent antiquarian Pausanias, whose curiosity the question engaged some ages after, assures us that those writers who insisted on it contradicted one another: some asserting that it followed the sacred war in which Solon commanded the sacred army, while others ascribed it to

Pausan. l. 10.
c. 37.

⁴ When we meet with such anecdotes as this, warranted by two unconnected contemporaries, such as Aristotle and Duris, they must be entitled to respect. We might better know how to form some opinion of many, some of them much stranger anecdotes, related by writers under the Roman empire, if they would all, like Athenæus, have informed us whence they had them.

the earlier age, when the Thessalian general Eurylochus destroyed Crissa. His honest conclusion then is that he was unable to satisfy himself, from any documents remaining in his time, whether the Phocians, in cultivating the Cirrhæan land, had committed any transgression. It remains however reasonably ascertained that this land had been used by the Phocians from time beyond certain memory, and was become necessary to the subsistence of the actual population; and that, though it was the right and the duty of every Amphictyon to demand the execution of the Amphictyonic law, most especially against all profanation, yet neither memory of man, nor record of the court, could be produced to show that any notice had ever before been taken of the use of the Cirrhæan land as a profanation. Nevertheless the Thessalian interest among the Amphictyons concurring with the Theban, a decree was made, declaring "that the Cirrhæan land had been devoted, that the Phocians must immediately cease to use it, and pay a fine," the amount of which the decree stated.⁵

In the long desuetude of all interference of the Amphictyonic council, and enforcement of the Amphictyonic law, in any momentous concerns of the Grecian republics, it seems to have fallen into doubt, if indeed it was ever clearly decided, whether fines decreed should be imposed on the state, whose government should then proceed to ascertain and assess the criminal individuals, or whether the council itself should not make the inquiry, and direct its vengeance only against those really implicated in the imputed guilt.

⁵ Accounts remaining in the time of Pausanias, it appears, so marked the preponderancy of the Thessalian interest among the Amphictyons, and the inveterate enmity of the Thessalian people toward the Phocians, that he doubted if the oppressive decree was not a Thessalian measure. But the train of history enough shows, even without the corroborating testimonies of Aristotle and Duris, that the Thebans, using the Thessalians, were the real leaders in the business.

The Amphictyonic oath may seem to imply the latter; but the council took the method in itself easier, and far most accommodated to the purpose of the Theban leaders, making the Phocian government responsible. Much uneasiness was excited, but the fine remained unpaid, and the land continued to be used. On the expiration of the appointed time, the fine, as before on Lacedæmon, was, by a new decree, doubled, and the increased severity of the law only excited a stronger disposition to evade or resist its execution.

SECTION III.

Decrees of the Amphictyons against Lacedæmon and Phocis. — Alarm of the Phocians. — Philomelus General of the Phocians. — Support from Lacedæmon to Phocis. — Expulsion of the Amphictyons from Delphi.

THE Theban leaders were disappointed in their hope of exciting a general readiness in their confederacy for their meditated war. The strength of Bœotia might have sufficed to overwhelm Phocis, but they feared the jealousy of their allies, should they move in the invidious business without them. Recurring therefore again to the Amphictyons, the hatred of the Thessalians toward the Phocians standing instead of zeal for the purpose of the Thebans, they obtained a decree declaring that all Amphictyonic states, guilty of so pertinacious a contempt of the law as, after the duplication of a fine imposed, to let the limited time pass without any measures for payment, forfeited all their lands to the god; and that accordingly all the lands of the Lacedæmonians and Phocians were forfeited. A proclamation followed, in the manner of those of the crusades of after-times, admonishing the Greek nation, "that it behoved every state and every

B. C. 355.
Ol. 106. 2.
[See p. 30.]
Diod. l. 16.
c. 23.
Pausan.

man, as they hoped for divine favour, or would avoid divine wrath, to do their utmost toward carrying the decree into strict execution."

The Phocians now apprehending the long-
Diod. l. 16. threatened storm ready to burst upon them, dismay pervaded their valleys. They had always maintained the reputation of brave and good soldiers. But to the might of Thebes and its confederacy, or even of Bœotia alone, their collected strength bore no proportion. Their government moreover had no practice in the conduct of a great contest; they had been accustomed to act only in the subordinate situation of auxiliaries; nor had Phocis ever given a splendid character to the list of Grecian warriors or politicians. In such circumstances, if there is not a man already eminent, ready to engage popular confidence, vigour in public measures is hardly possible. Such

a man however was fortunately ready in Philo-
Aristot. ut ant. melus, against whose family the private enmity, which gave immediate spring to the public measures of the

Thebans, had been directed. In the congress of
Diod. & Pausan. ut ant. the Phocian cities, assembled to deliberate on the critical circumstances of the country, Philomelus maintained that "a firm resistance to the oppressive decree of the Amphictyons was not less just than necessary, nor only just, but a religious duty; and, would the Phocian people confide in him, he had no doubt of making it successful. The mercy, to which some with ill-judging timidity proposed to trust, might readily be estimated. The very amount of the fine, utterly over-proportioned to the imputed crime, even were the imputed crime real, would sufficiently show it. But no such crime had been committed: the Cirrhæan land never had been devoted; their ambitious and implacable enemies, adding new to old injuries, proposed nothing less than their utter ruin: they would rob them

now of land necessary to their subsistence, while they required of them a fine not only unjustly imposed, but beyond their means to pay. Long ago they robbed them of the presidency of the temple and oracle of Delphi, always of right theirs, and never, of any right, committed to the Amphictyons. Possession, wrongful possession, was the only ground of claim the Amphictyons could show; whereas tradition, the most authoritative, recorded by the great poet, to whose works all Greece had always most referred for its ancient history, reckoned Delphi, by its well-known and unquestionable description, the rocky Pytho, among the Phocian towns.⁶ The Phocians then, and not their oppressors, had a holy cause to maintain. It behoved them to exert themselves, and they might most reasonably hope for the divine blessing upon their endeavours." The assembly accepted the argument; and the supreme direction of the military and political affairs of all the Phocian cities was committed to Philomelus, with the title of general-autocrator.

The fulmination of the Amphictyons, diligently spread over Greece, produced little of the effect the Thebans desired. Curiosity and conversation were extensively excited; as about old matter, nearly buried in oblivion, and now brought forward as of new interest. In some places warm public discussion ensued; but still as of facts questionable, with reasoning on them uncertain. Nevertheless the crisis for Phocis, were the contest to be only with the Amphictyons and with Thebes, was highly formidable. But Philomelus, in persuading his fellow-countrymen to resistance, had not relied solely on the narrow means of Phocis. The interest of Lacedæmon, of Athens, of all Greece, to pre-

⁶ Αὐτὰρ Φωκῶν Σχεδῖος καὶ Ἐπίστρεφος ἔρχον,

Οἱ Κυβάρισσον ἔχον, Πυθῶνά τε πιστήισσαν.

vent the Thebans from becoming masters of Delphi, was obvious. The great advantage however, which Philomelus saw, was what the imprudence of the Theban leaders gave, in making the cause of Phocis and of Lacedæmon so completely one. He resolved therefore to proceed immediately to communicate in person with the Lacedæmonian government, leaving the defence of Phocis, if in the interval it should be attacked, weak in troops, but strong by its rocks and mountains, to his brothers Onomarchus and Phaÿllus.

The king of Lacedæmon, Archidamus, son of Agesilaus, appears to have been, according to all ancient testimony, excepting what has come from sources evidently tainted with party malice, one of the most respectable characters of his age; not of shining talents, but of much courage and firmness, and, like Archidamus his grandfather, in the phrase of Thucydides, a wise and moderate man.⁷ Philomelus was well received by the Lacedæmonians generally, but especially by Archidamus. To prevent Phocis from becoming an accession to the dominion, and an instrument of the ambition and animosity of Thebes, was itself of important interest for Lacedæmon. Yet even this was little, compared with the obvious consequences, that, not the oracle only of Delphi, so interesting to Grecian superstition, would be in their power, but the treasury, the great national bank of Greece, would become the fund for means to destroy Lacedæmon and overbear the Greek nation. Whether through the difficulty of keeping the counsels of a democratical government secret this

Diod. l. 16.
c. 24.

Pausan. l. 10.

⁷ Ἄνη καὶ ξυνετὸς δοκῶν εἶναι καὶ σώφρων. Thucyd. l. 1. c. 79. & ch. 13. s. 5. of this Hist. Diodorus gives the grandson's character thus: Ἄρχίδαμος — ἀνή κατὰ μὲν τὴν στρατηγίαν καὶ τὸν ἄλλον βίον ἐπαινούμενος, κατὰ δὲ τὴν πρὸς Φωκεῖς συμμαχίαν μόνην βλασφημούμενος. Diod. l. 16. c. 63. It is much to say for him that, in the very difficult circumstances of his reign, with party raging as it did throughout Greece, he earned praise for all his conduct through life, excepting his alliance with the Phocians, the character of which it will be the business of the sequel to unfold.

purpose became demonstrated, or rumour, to which Demosthenes and Isocrates have equally given authority, arose and gained credit on probability only, the circumstances appear to have been such as to excite, on most reasonable ground, very alarming suspicion. Scarcely more than ten years before, the Olympian treasury, probably much less rich than the Delphian, but hardly held less sacred, had been plundered by the Arcadians, allies of Thebes. Epaminondas, so famed for virtue, was then at the head of the Theban government; yet the Arcadians neither lost the alliance of Thebes, nor, as far as appears, even incurred any censure from the Theban government for a sacrilege so extensively injurious. Were then the Theban government only as little scrupulous now, as when the virtuous Epaminondas presided in it, the Delphian treasury could not be considered but as in very great danger.

Demosth. de
legat. p. 347.
Isocr. Or.
ad Philip.

Ch. 28. s. 6.
of this Hist.

Whatever may have been at this time the state of parties or the influence of Archidamus in Lacedæmon, where often the kings had little political weight, it would apparently have been difficult for any not to concur in the resolution that Phocis should be supported against the oppression of Thebes. This being decided, what followed, however otherwise questionable, seems to have been urgently required by the necessity of the case; that the temple and treasury of Delphi, in danger from the subserviency of the Amphictyons to the Thebans and Thessalians, should be placed again, as of right, it was asserted, it ought to be, in charge of the common government of the Phocian people. But the Lacedæmonian government could not easily afford either men or money for those purposes. The treasury instituted by Lysander, to be filled from various tributary states, was no more; and men, on whom the government might depend, could ill be spared from the defence of the

remaining frontier, and the watch of the disaffected within it; nor could a Lacedæmonian force perhaps reach Phocis without fighting its way through adverse intermediate states. The resource therefore was to open, in the modern phrase, a subscription, for the support of the common cause, depending upon that pressing interest which wealthy individuals had in supplying the deficient means of government, for the preservation of private property and public order. Archidamus accordingly and Philomelus are said to have contributed, each from his private fortune, no less than fifteen talents, near three thousand pounds sterling.

Philomelus having succeeded, perhaps to the utmost of his hope or beyond it, in his negotiation at Lacedæmon, his next business was to use the means he had acquired for raising a mercenary force to assist the small strength of Phocis. Opportunity for this abounded; for, beside the common throng of exiles from various republics, the remission of hostilities, following the battle of Mantinea, had left numbers of practised soldiers restless in indigence and ready for adventure. Philomelus, by his emissaries, quickly engaged between two and three thousand. These reached the Corinthian gulf without exciting alarm. The strength of Phocis meanwhile was quietly prepared. The mercenaries were brought across the gulf at the critical moment; and Delphi, unfortified, was suddenly attacked by a force vainly resisted by the partisans of Thebes, described by the unexplained name of Thracidæ; possibly having some reference to the Thracian founders of Grecian religious ceremonies. Philomelus and his party became completely masters of the place. The property

[B. C. 357. *
Cl.]

* [* The Phocians seized Delphi, Ἀγαθοκλῆεως Ἀθήνησιν ἄρχοντος, τετάρτη δὲ εἴτι πέμπτης Ὀλυμπιάδος ἐπὶ ταῖς ἑκατόν. Pausan. x. 2. 2. — Diodorus xvi. 14. ἐντεῦθεν [sc. ἀπὸ ἄρχοντος Ἀγαθοκλῆεως] ἀπὸ τῆς καταλήψεως τοῦ ἐν Δελφοῖς

of the Thracidæ was declared forfeited for the benefit of the army which had delivered the temple: the other Delphians were assured of safety for themselves and their estates, under the just protection of the common government of Phocis, to the advantages of which they were restored.

It was apprehended that, upon intelligence of this violence against the sacred city, rapidly communicated every way, all the neighbouring people under Theban influence, but especially all Bœotia, would have been immediately in motion. The measure however had been so well concerted, and the Theban government was so little prepared for it, that only the Ozolian Locrians, in unadvised zeal, marched toward Delphi. Philomelus, informed of their approach, met and easily overcame them. Occupying then the principal passes of the frontier with detachments of his army, especially against Locris and Bœotia, he placed Phocis so far in security that he could proceed in some quiet to provide for its future government and future defence.

SECTION IV.

Measures of Philomelus for Defence of Delphi and Phocis. — Difficulties of the Phocians. — Violence of their Enemies. — Oracle. — Manifesto of Philomelus. — Disposition of Athens. — Disposition of other States. — Allies of Thebes. — Barbarity of the Thebans. — Retaliation. — Death of Philomelus.

PHILOMELUS and the governments in concert with which he acted asserting, as a principle of their conduct, that the authority exercised by the Amphictyons at Delphi was usurped and of no lega-

B. C. 355.
Ol. 106. 2.
[See preceding p.]
Diod. l. 16.
c. 24.

ἱεροῦ ἐπὶ Φιλομήλου. Clinton, Fasti Hellen. p. 124. This variation should be borne in mind in considering some of the subsequent dates of Mr. Mitford. Mr. Clinton and Mr. Mitford concur in dating the commencement of the siege of Methone in s. 8. of this chap. See the remarks on the duration and conclusion of the Phocian war in s. 8. of chap. xxxix.]

lity, it was among his first businesses to destroy, with public ceremony, their decrees against the Phocians and Lacedæmonians, and to deface the marble which, after the common manner of diplomatical publication among the Greeks, bore engraved copies of them for the public eye. A care more important was at the same time pressing, to obviate, as far as might be, the alarm his enterprise might cause among states not before hostile to Phocis. Accordingly he circulated a declaration, stating that "he came to Delphi under the just authority of the common government of Phocis, for no irreligious or unlawful purpose, but to assert the ancient indefeasible right of the Phocian people to the superintendency of the temple, and to maintain their laws against the usurpation and their property against the unjust decrees of the Amphictyons: that, under that superintendency therefore, the temple, and its ministers, and the treasures placed in sacred deposit there, should be most religiously and zealously protected."⁸

Delphi, strong by its situation, yet stronger hitherto by the sacred character of the place, and the deep interest of all Greece in its security, had remained unwall'd and open. But being gained now by arms, those who held it would of course have to apprehend the use of arms against them. It was therefore among the earliest cares of Philomelus to raise fortifications for its better safety. Meanwhile he was diligent in arming and training the Phocian people. Like the Greeks in general of the western highlands, less familiar with the panoply, they excelled in the use of light arms and

⁸ Justin, who, among much absurd matter, has some very good sentences, to which he has owed his reputation, describes the origin of the sacred war thus: "Causa et origo hujus mali Thebani fuere: qui, cum rerum potirentur, secundam fortunam imbecillo animo ferentes, victos armis Lacedæmonios et Phocenses, quasi parva supplicia cædibus et rapinis luissent, apud commune Græciæ concilium superbe accusaverunt: prorsus quasi post arma et bellum locum legibus reliquissent." l. 8. c. 1.

missile weapons. Philomelus, judiciously avoiding to thwart the popular propensity, directed his attention to improve their method in the kind of warfare to which they were habituated, and which was peculiarly accommodated to their mountainous country: he formed a body of middle-armed in the Iphicratean discipline. Nor did the temper of the people disappoint his hope, but, on the contrary, the general firmness in attachment to him, and readiness to act under his orders, seemed to warrant expectation of final success. Shortly, beside the force stationary in the towns and passes, he had a moving army of five thousand men.

Diod. 1. 16.
c. 24.
Ch. 25. s. 4.
of this Hist.

The inaction of the Thebans, whether owing to wisdom or weakness, appears to have disappointed and even distressed the Phocians. While the armies of the Grecian republics, as on various occasions we have seen, consisted of citizens, the soldier, in defensive war, subsisted on his own means, with assistance commonly from those public means only which were equally ready to relieve the wants or promote the enjoyments of the citizen in peace. In offensive war plunder was always looked for, as that in the failure of which offensive war could hardly be prosecuted. When afterward the practice of employing mercenary troops obtained, a revenue appropriated to the purpose became indispensable; but still, in offensive war, plunder was always calculated upon, at least to lessen the call upon the revenue. But the expense of a mercenary force, which might enable the people of the Phocian valleys to balance in arms the powerful confederacy of Thebes, was so over-proportioned to its revenue that, when once such a force was raised, to rest would not be in the choice of the general or the government. Hence, in the forbearance of the Thebans, Philomelus may have found offensive measures necessary. Hitherto Phocis had been actually attacked only by the Locrians. In the

delay of threatened enterprise from Thebes therefore he carried war into their country. Entering it with little resistance his troops made considerable booty. But as Diod. l. 16. c. 25. he was bearing it off, the irritated enemy hung upon his rear; and, choosing well their opportunity among defiles, killed about twenty of his men, whose bodies he was obliged to leave in their power. As usual, on such occasions, he sent a herald to request the restoration of the slain for burial; but he received for answer that "the common law of the Greeks denied burial to the sacrilegious." Indignation pervaded his army; but he had influence to check the dangerous effervescence, and prevailed that the just vengeance should be submitted to his direction. The enemy's little success increasing their confidence, he soon found opportunity for advantage over them; put many to the sword, compelled the rest to flight, and the dead remained in his power. Such was then the force of the common notions of the importance of burial that neither fear nor shame were powerful enough to prevent the Locrians from becoming solicitors to their enemy for what they had themselves so lately denied to his solicitation. Philomelus, on condition of receiving his own, did not refuse the Locrians their slain; but he proceeded to punish their former insults by prosecuting his new success. Advancing again into Locris, he extended plunder to parts before untouched; and conducting his retreat then with caution taught by experience, he led back his army highly gratified with the expedition.

The command which Philomelus now held of the temple and oracle and treasury of Delphi, all so interesting to the whole Greek nation, gave him great means, but requiring uncommon discretion in the use. The Thebans, and their party throughout Greece, were urging against him and all his supporters the charges of impiety, profanation, and sacrilege. To obtain from the oracle a response of a tendency

to justify his measures, probably not difficult, would be highly important, could credit be obtained for it. A response of a tenor very favourable to him did then so gain reception that even his enemies, hopeless to invalidate its authenticity, endeavoured only to obviate its force. They asserted that it came from the Pythoness in an Diod. l. 16. c. 22. effusion of anger, indignant at the violence of profane hands dragging her to the tripod; and they contended for an interpretation of her words as applied only to such profanation. But the Phocian cause being favoured by a large part of Greece, including the two powerful republics of Lacedæmon and Athens, an interpretation advantageous to that cause had more general acceptance. Reports moreover of omens and prodigies portending success to it obtained popular credit extensively, and assisted the reception of the oracle in the favourable sense.

Philomelus now, from a man hardly known but among his own people, who were low in consideration among the Grecian republics, had not only himself risen to be one of the leading characters of the age, but had raised his hitherto obscure country to be among the leading powers; and, what deserves notice among Grecian revolutions, the measures by which he rose had been mild and almost bloodless. With the better confidence therefore he addressed now a second declaration, in the name of the Phocian people, to all the Grecian states: "The Phocians," he said, "in repossessing themselves of c. 27. Delphi, their ancient right, neither intended, nor would allow, any violence to the temple or any of its appendages. The treasure should be preserved with the most religious care. An account of the number of offerings, with a specification of the weight of the precious metals in each, should be given on demand to any state which had offerings there, with free leave to examine their condition. With

regard to the presidency of the temple, the Phocian people not only held themselves justified in assuming it as their ancient indefeasible right, but reckoned upon a fair claim to the support of the whole Greek nation. If therefore from malice, or envy, or whatever bad motive, for no good one could be, any state should wage war against them, they were bold to request assistance from all others, as in a holy cause. Should that be denied by any, still they claimed peace with all, entitled to so much at least for their own peaceful principles and purposes.”

This declaration was communicated by ministers sent to every state, not omitting even Thebes. It would hardly be expected to find, in the ruling party there, a disposition to peace with Phocis on any moderate terms; but the hope would be reasonable that such demonstration of a disposition to conciliation in the Phocian government would tend to its credit. The measure indeed appears to have been, like those of Philomelus in general, judiciously conceived and ably executed. No particulars remain of discussions on the occasion at Athens, but preceding and following circumstances indicate the temper with which the application of the Phocians would be received by the contending parties there. Isocrates, and others who associated in politics with Timotheus and Chabrias, would be ready to concur with Lacedæmon in support of Phocis and in opposition to Thebes. Chares and his party would be ready to seize occasion for gaining the command of Phocis, and to prevent any others from gaining it; but they would oppose any advantage to Lacedæmon, not less than to Thebes. Animosity against Thebes however was a popular passion, and the partisans of Chares were courtiers of the sovereign people. Thus circumstances altogether were favourable for Philomelus, and the Athenian government avowed the support of Phocis against the Amphictyons supported by the

Thebans. Rarely as any measure of executive government escaped reprobation from some party at Athens, yet the Phocian alliance on this occasion, it appears from the orators, none would venture to blame.

Nevertheless it could not be denied that the expulsion of the Amphictyons from Delphi was a measure of extreme violence against an establishment for ages held sacred by the Greeks, and a principal bond of the several governments of the nation; a violence to be justified only, as civil war, by the last necessity. Accordingly the Thebans were sedulous to profit from the advantage so before them. In the name of the Amphictyons the call was sounded throughout Greece to arm against the sacrilegious Phocians, as in the common cause of the country and the god. But so prudent, in his critical and difficult circumstances, was the conduct of Philomelus, and so little popular the cause of the Amphictyons under Theban patronage, that, of the numberless republics of the nation, only that branch of the Locrian name, which was distinguished and degraded by the epithet of Ozolian, the stinking, would obey the call. The Thebans therefore ventured upon no offensive operations; the common season of warfare ended, and winter passed without farther hostilities.

But the season of repose seems to have produced no disposition to peace. The Phocians therefore could not safely reduce their mercenary force, which neither could they, with any ordinary means, maintain. But the abilities and popularity of Philomelus found extraordinary means, and apparently nevertheless unexceptionable. Among the Phocians were men of wealth, mostly ac-
Diod. l. 16.
c. 28.
 quired through the commerce of all Greece with Delphi; and whether by loan or how otherwise is not said, the sum wanted for the public exigency was raised, and no complaint appears to have been excited.

B. C. 554.
Ol. 106. 3.
[Cf. p. 30.]

Spring came, and the Thebans, still refusing peace, nevertheless forbore action. Their powerful native military was of no expense to their government; and, unable as they were to excite their former confederacy to energy, they might hope for the advantage of victory without risk and without effort. It was much for the Phocians to have maintained their mercenaries through the winter. When the season for action came, that predatory war, which circumstances probably made indispensable, Philomelus directed where, with the best justification, it might be directed, still against the Locrians, who had invaded Phocis.

The Ozolian Locrians, a little subordinate people, aware of their inferiority to Thebes, Athens, and Lacedæmon, but accustomed to reckon themselves more nearly equal to the Phocians, flew to arms, probably with more courage than good conduct, to defend their ravaged country; and

Diod. 1. 16.
c. 28.

venturing a battle with Philomelus, were again defeated. The slaughter was such that the survivors, far from hoping to protect their fields, doubted of their ability to defend their towns against an enemy to whose slain they had denied burial. In extreme alarm therefore they addressed supplication and remonstrance to Thebes, praying that relief and support to which, suffering in the common cause of the god and the Theban confederacy, such faithful allies were entitled.

The successful inroad of Philomelus, whether the wisest measure in his circumstances we are without information sufficient for any clear judgment, was however in its result not altogether fortunate. The cries of the Locrians produced a sensation in Greece which the decrees of the Amphictyons, supported by the influence of Thebes, could not excite; and exaggerated report of the successes and power of Philomelus increased the effect. The advantage thus

afforded to the Theban leaders, and their associates in the Amphictyonic assembly, was not neglected. If, when the Phocians first possessed themselves of Delphi, the Amphictyons took any of those measures which might have become their pretensions and their generally acknowledged dignity, the effect was so little as to have escaped the notice of the only extant historian of these transactions, their advocate Diodorus. But now the council met, apparently at Thermopylæ; and while the Theban government sent ministers to every state in which it could hope to excite an interest suited to its views, the Amphictyons issued decrees in the name of the Greek nation, invoking all to arm, in the cause of the god, against the sacrilegious Phocians. But even now the voice of that reverend council was, in the confession of the same his-
Diod. l. 16.
c. 28.
9

torian, but as the trumpet of discord through Greece.⁹ The violent measures of Philomelus on one side, the known ambition of Thebes on the other, the critical situation of the Delphian treasury, and the means it might afford, whichever party prevailed, for prosecuting purposes of ambition and violence, to the general injury of Greece, were subjects of anxious consideration for all informed and thinking men. Meanwhile among the many, while some were vehement in indignation against the Phocians, and eager that they should suffer all the severity of punishment decreed for the most abominable sacrilege, (a crime, to judge from remaining accounts, far more engaging their solicitude than the overthrow or weakening of a political institution of common importance to the Greek nation,) others contended no less ardently that they were an injured people, whom it behoved united Greece to protect against the cruellest oppression, wickedly, with the pretence of service to the god, attempted against them.

⁹ Πολλή ταραχή και διάστασις ἦν καθ' ὅλην τὴν Ἑλλάδα, κ. τ. λ.

[B. C. 354.
Ol. 106. 3.
Cf. p. 30.] The deficient merit, or credit, of the Theban leaders at this time, successors of the renowned Epaminondas and Pelopidas, is not weakly indicated by the ancient writers, advocates of their cause, in the failure to name a single man of them. In ambition nevertheless and arrogance they seem not to have been below their great predecessors. Yet, in measuring censure to them, the uneasy and difficult situation of party-leaders among the Grecian republics, and the impossibility of avoiding party, should be considered. It appears indeed a truly wonderful tendency to tyranny, in various shapes, and from various causes, that we find in every democratical government which has been at all laid open to us. All that remains from antiquity on this part of history tends to show, though no writer has so entered into detail of Theban and Bœotian affairs as to explain satisfactorily the cause, that the democratical party could not hope to maintain their power in Thebes without holding the other towns of Bœotia in a political subjection, such that civil freedom, if any were really left them, must be utterly precarious: with the restoration of freedom to the Bœotian towns, the supreme power in Thebes would surely revert to the aristocratical party, and the democratical chiefs must probably seek personal safety in exile. This we have seen a principal moving spring of Theban politics in the long contest with Lacedæmon, and it remained so in the contest now with Phocis.

When the Thebans, under Pelopidas and Epaminondas, proposed to establish their own power over all Greece on the ruin of that so long, with more or less plenitude, exercised by Lacedæmon, they could persuade almost all the northern republics, and half Peloponnesus itself, to zealous co-operation with them. But now, making common cause with the Amphictyons, the ancient representative council of the nation, violently driven from that by long custom

their place of meeting, and resisted in the execution of their offices, the list of allies they could obtain is of a very different description. The zeal of the Ozolian Locrians, already unfortunate enough, did not however abate. The Thessalians, apparently checked by domestic troubles, had assisted hitherto only by their influence to procure Amphictyonic decrees. The people now coming forward were the Perrhæbians, Dolopians, Athamans, Magnetes, Ænians, and Achæans; Thessalian names all, but so little familiar in Grecian history that it hardly appears what part those who bore them ever before took in any of the great concerns of the Greek nation. Lacedæmon and Athens, with all the states where their interest prevailed, avowed themselves the allies of Phocis. The rest, even the Arcadians of Megalopolis, who owed their actual political existence to Thebes, appear to have avoided stirring.

But neither from Lacedæmon nor Athens was any effectual assistance ready when the force of the Theban confederacy was assembling. Philomelus therefore found it necessary to increase his mercenaries, and, for their maintenance, to carry them again into the enemy's country.¹⁰ Again he chose the Locrian territory for invasion. A body of Bœotian horse hastened to assist in its protection. A battle, in the usual way of Grecian warfare, followed, and Philomelus was victorious. Soon after no less than six thousand Thessalians joined the unfortunate Locrians; another battle was fought, and still the victory was with Philomelus. Then at length the Thebans got the whole force of Bœotia to move, to the amount of thirteen thousand men; but fifteen hundred Achæans, from Pello-

Diod. l. 16.
c. 30.

¹⁰ Diodorus, apparently following some author of the Theban party, says that Philomelus now trespassed on the sacred treasury. Afterward we find him, with candid simplicity, stating evidence that this was unfounded slander. Farther notice of this will occur hereafter.

ponnesus, joining the Phocian army, Philomelus ventured to hold his ground.

Superior as the Thebans must have been in force, yet they did not hasten to a general action; but they inter-
Diod. l. 16.
c. 51.cepted the return of a foraging party of Phocian mercenaries, and made them prisoners. With the hope of superiority, the disposition to a barbarous severity in the execution of the law, of which they took upon themselves to be the judges, prevailed with the Theban leaders. They declared by proclamation that a sentence of the Amphictyons condemned the prisoners, as accomplices in sacrilege, to death; "and immediately," says the historian, "following up their words by deeds, they put all to the sword." Vengeance was indignantly demanded by the Phocian army, and the abilities of the general soon provided means for the necessary gratification. He found opportunity to make a considerable number of Bœotians prisoners, and, with the formality of retaliative justice, he delivered them to his incensed soldiers, who put all to death. "Thus," says the historian, "Philomelus checked the cruel arrogance of the Thebans." But when, in consequence of the enemy's superiority or equality, he could carry depredation no farther, as he had entered Locris principally to find subsistence for his troops, so, for subsistence, it would become necessary for him to withdraw again into Phocis; and, among the mountains, pressed in his retreat, he received a mortal wound.

c. 51. Occasion was taken by the Thebans, from the death of Philomelus, to boast of a great victory; but, whatever may have been their success in action, it is evident that they were unable to prosecute the advantage. Winter indeed was approaching, which in the stormy atmosphere of a mountainous country made a pause of military operations generally necessary for armies so unprovided as

those of the Grecian republics; yet, if the success of the Thebans had been clear, they would have endeavoured to penetrate to Delphi, the great object of the war. But without an effort they returned home, leaving their enemies to retreat unmolested, and take their measures at leisure for repairing their loss, whatever, beyond that of one most valuable life, it may have been. The Phocians thus retained the entire and undisturbed possession of their own country, including their new acquisition, or what they called their recovered and enfranchised dominion, of the sacred city.

SECTION V.

Negotiation for Peace between Thebes and Phocis unsuccessful. — Assistance from Thebes to the Satrap of Phrygia, otherwise Bithynia, against the King of Persia. — War of Invective among the Greeks. — Onomarchus Successor of Philomelus. — Invasion of Doris and Bœotia by Onomarchus.

THOSE who directed the administration of Thebes and Bœotia, whose names are to be found neither among historians nor orators, had expected, (so Demosthenes and Isocrates have concurred in observing,) that Phocis must yield to them, and would probably yield without resistance. The only hazard of their measures would arise, they supposed, from the alarm and indignation of Lacedæmon and Athens, and their confederates. But with these the Theban confederacy had been accustomed to contend, and would contend with better hope when Delphi should be in their power, and a clear majority of the Amphictyons subservient. Rarely we gain any direct information of the state of parties in Thebes. Events however imply that those who had hitherto directed its councils were, in consequence of the total failure of their projects, obliged to yield in some degree to wiser and more

B. C. 354.
Ol. 106. 3.
[Cf. p. 30.]†
Demosth. de
legat. p. 347. &
in Aristocr.
Isocr. Or.
ad Philip.

moderate men, but of the same party; at least so far that they were of the party of Pelopidas and Epaminondas. In the winter following the death of Philomelus, the Phocians, before represented as involving in the contamination of sacrilege, and subjecting to the high displeasure of the gods, all who should communicate with them, unfit even to be allowed burial when slain in battle, were looked upon with somewhat less severity. Negotiation was opened with them, and the propositions were such as to engage the serious consideration of the Phocian leaders, in consultation with their allies. But the liberal party in Thebes could not carry their measures through. The terms at last insisted on were too severe, or too obviously insidious, to be accepted by men with arms in their hands, and led by able advisers. If any remission of the utmost rigour of the sentence of the Amphictyons was proposed, it was only partial, and calculated, by dividing the Phocians, to reduce them to their enemy's mercy. The negotiation therefore produced nothing.¹¹

Diod. l. 16.
c. 32.

¹¹ Diodorus, compiling, abridging, and remarking, with his usual honesty of purpose and deficiency of judgment, has given a very inconsistent aspect to his narrative, which nevertheless affords, for the careful investigator, a store of materials in a great degree satisfactory, giving means at the same time to discover their general coherency, and to distinguish the sophisticated matter which party-writers have led the historian to mix with them. Speaking of the battle in which Philomelus fell as a great and nearly decisive victory won by the Thebans, and his death as his own act, the result of despair, he shows withal that it was really a small part only of the Phocian army, that was overpowered among the mountains by a superior force. *Οἱ Βοιωτοὶ, τῷ πλείθει πάλυ προέχοντες, ἐνίκησαν.* But if even over that small part it had been a clear victory, they would have possessed themselves of the body of the slain general, which, as it is not said they did, we may very safely conclude they did not. Diodorus however proceeds to say: "The Bœotians then returned home, because they thought the death of Philomelus sufficient for their purpose." This conclusion is too ridiculous. Their ultimate purpose avowedly was to carry into full effect the decrees of the Amphictyons, and their first object to recover possession of Delphi, and restore the Amphictyonic session there. Undoubtedly they would have marched thither without delay, had they gained a victory to open means for it. But on the contrary, as the historian proceeds to inform us, "The Phocians withdrew to Delphi, delivered, for the present,

Successful so far as to prevent peace, the turbulent were however unable to command so as to carry on the war with any vigour. The Thessalians declined furnishing troops, and the other allies were little more disposed to exertion. A remission of hostility with Phocis ensued, and the attention of the Thebans was drawn another way. Artabazus, satrap of lower Phrygia or Bithynia, still maintaining his rebellion against the great king, and again threatened by eastern multitudes under loyal satraps, desired again the experienced advantage of Grecian science and discipline to enable him to resist them. Whether less satisfied with the character of the Athenian general Chares than with the service of the troops under him, the satrap's commissioners now sent into Greece were instructed, it is said, to seek, in preference, men raised to fame under Epaminondas. It is not a little remarkable that, while not a name of a Theban officer who commanded against the Phocians, or a Theban politician who promoted the sacred war, not a name of an Amphictyon, or of any one engaged in council or in cause with the Amphictyons, has been preserved by the historian or by any other extant author, yet when, within the same period, the Theban arms were directed other ways, the names of generals immediately appear. Pammenes, the philosophical Pammenes, the friend of Epaminondas, said to have been also the host and protector of Philip king of Macedonia when a youth at Thebes, did not refuse to take the command of the auxiliaries for the satrap. From the time of the invasion of Xerxes the Persian connection had been the reproach of Thebes among the Greeks. War against the king's forces therefore, though in the cause of a

Diod. 1. 16.
c. 34.

Ibid.
Polyæn. strat.
1. 5. 16. et
Frontin. 1. 11.
3. 3.

Diod. 1. 16.
c. 34.
Plut. v. Pelop.
p. 292.
Demosth.
περι συμμαχ.

from all pressure of war ; and, holding council with their allies, deliberated concerning war and peace." The sequel amounts to proof that they had not been materially weakened by the events of the campaign.

rebellious satrap, might carry some credit with it, to the commander and to his country. At the same time Asia would be, both to general and army, a more inviting field than Phocis, for profit as well as for glory. Under such a man as Pammenes accordingly such was the zeal for this service that five thousand volunteers were presently

B. C. 355.
Ol. 106. 4.
[Cf. p. 30.]

raised; whether all Thebans, or men promiscuously collected, we are uninformed. Possibly the Thebans among them were such as the promoters of the Phocian war would willingly see emigrate; and Pammenes himself may have been not a warm approver of their measures. Contributing principally however toward two great victories obtained over the king's forces, with much profit to those engaged under him, he added not a little to the military renown of Thebes.¹²

In a war of the character of that called the sacred, which produced the deliberate massacre of prisoners as a measure of piety necessary to the justification of one of the parties in the sight of the deity, minds would be more than commonly heated, invective would of course abound, and the rancorous spirit would not cease with the contest in arms, but live with the survivors, and fade but gradually among their posterity. Of virulence then only second to that of a war for which perverted reason claims religion as its ground would be hostility so founded as that between the Lacedæmonians and Messenians. Bound to the Thebans, as the restorers and second founders of their nation, the Messenians had however yet taken no part in

Ch. 27. s. 3.
of this Hist.

¹² Diodorus remarks on this expedition of Pammenes, that "it appeared wonderful how the Bœotians, deserted by the Thessalians, and pressed by the Phocian war, could send an army beyond sea and be everywhere successful." He had just before shown that, in Greece, they were very generally unsuccessful. The inducement therefore to send such a force, if really a Theban force, or composed of Bœotians friendly to the Theban connection, would indeed appear mysterious. But the measure was more than probably that of a party adverse to the Phocian war, whether obtaining a temporary superiority, or only licence for the adventure.

the sacred war ; but they were adverse to the Phocians, not more because the Phocians were enemies to Thebes than because they were befriended by Lacedæmon. Popular prejudice therefore among the Messenians gave ready circulation to a story, wherever originating, that the kings, the ephors, and all the senate of Lacedæmon favoured the impious cause under the instigation of bribes from the Delphian treasury. Men of letters, then abounding in Greece, and even men of superior talents and acquirements, some excited by party-attachments, some allured by profit, addicted themselves to the compilation and perhaps often invention of anecdotes and secret history, and especially of the defamatory kind. Among these, the Chian Theopompus, a scholar of Isocrates, admired for the force and elegance of his style, was at this time eminent. From him a tale has been preserved, nearly to the same purpose as the Messenian, but throwing the mire with more ingenuity, and not with such undistinguishing boisterousness. Archidamus, according to Theopompus, was not himself disposed to favour the sacrilegious Phocians ; but the dispensers of Delphian gold at Lacedæmon, gaining his queen, Dinicha, her interest with the king at length overbore his probity.¹³ Such stories would be likely to have circulation. But with the clear and pressing interest of Lacedæmon to support the Phocians against Thebes, it is obvious that bribery could be little necessary to persuade to it ; and if, for any matter not of completely public notoriety, Diodorus is worthy of credit, his report

Pausan. l. 4.
c. 5.

M. T. Cic.
Orat.
Dion. Hal.
Ep. ad Amm.

¹³ Athenæus, quoting Heraclides Lembus, relates that a king of Lacedæmon, named Archidamus, was fined by the ephors for preferring a rich bride, with a person under the proper size for breeding successors of Hercules, to one of a finer person with less wealth. (Athen. l. 3. p. 280. vel 586.) Plutarch mentions the same story. (De lib. educ. init.) Some modern writers, to make so good a story more complete, give the name of Dinicha to the little lady, unnamed by either Athenæus or Plutarch, and make her husband, equally without authority from either, the son of Agesilaus.

that, instead of receiving money from the Phocians, Archidamus and perhaps others assisted them with money, will deserve it. The probity of Philomelus, and his abstinence from trespass on the sacred treasury, will be seen in the sequel by evidence beyond what is common in such cases, placed above just suspicion. If he was clear, the imputation against remoter hands, while he ruled at Delphi, must fall of course.

On the death of Philomelus, his next brother, B. C. 354.
Ol. 106.3. [Cf.
p. 30.] Diod.
l. 16. c. 31, 32. Onomarchus, who had been his principal assistant in council and in the field, was raised by election of the Phocian people to the arduous office which he had so ably held. In talents not inferior, Onomarchus seems to have had a more soaring ambition and less scrupulous probity. He is said to have begun his administration with trespass upon the sacred treasury. But the proof seems to rest wholly on the difficulty of otherwise accounting for the means he appears to have possessed for maintaining and considerably increasing the military force raised by his late Diod. l. 16.
c. 31. brother. According to the same historian, who relates that the Phocian army was completely defeated when Philomelus was killed, the Phocian force was, within a few months after, greater than Philomelus had ever commanded. The Thebans, to deter enemies and allure friends, would endeavour to profit from the death of the adverse general for spreading the belief of a great victory; while they circulated also new fulminations of the Amphictyons, threatening with divine as well as human vengeance all who should in any manner or degree favour their sacrilegious foes. Nevertheless the Phocian cause continued rather to gain ground among the Grecian states; the policy of Onomarchus, which was evidently able, being apparently assisted by the credit which the wise and honourable conduct of Philomelus had extensively conciliated. During the season

of rest from arms, according even to the historian's partial account, attributing all success of the Phocian cause to bribery, the turn in politics, where any occurred, was in favour of Phocis. The principal defection was of the Thesalians, who did not indeed join the Phocians, but no longer sent auxiliaries to Thebes. Open then as the treasury was to the examination at least of the states friendly to Phocis, if there was trespass to any considerable amount, it must have been managed either with extraordinary dexterity or extraordinary concert.

The continued inactivity of the Thebans, in a war of their own seeking, is unaccounted for by ancient writers any farther than as it is indicated that the leaders of the war-party were not superior men, and that an opposing party was powerful. Nevertheless the forbearance may have resulted in some degree from policy; for Onomarchus could not, any more than Philomelus, remain inactive, and he was probably not yet strong enough to invade Bœotia. Accordingly he led his army into the Epicnemidian

Locris, where he took Thronium, the principal town, and, if the historians followed trustworthy

B. C. 353.
Ol. 136.4.
[Cf. p. 30.]
Diod. l. 16.
c. 33.

authority, sold the inhabitants to slavery. Possibly he may have exercised such severity against some of them, obnoxious for violence, such as we have seen some of the enemies of Phocis disposed to; but the historian's own account of his general conduct and his political success forbid the belief that he would passionately, or for small profit, make himself odious and his cause unpopular in Greece. From Doris he turned back across Phocis into the Ozolian Locris. Amphissa, the principal town of that province, only threatened by his army, surrendered. Amphissa was but seven miles from Delphi. Probably the inactivity of the Thebans in support of their allies had excited disgust; and possibly a party adverse to the Theban connection, and holding communication

with Phocis, was powerful. But a capitulation, little common as it was among the Greeks, and especially considering all the circumstances of the sacred war, would imply confidence in the conqueror's faith. From Amphissa, Onomarchus turned upon Doris, and plundered great part of the country.

The remissness and unpopularity of the Theban government, together with the conciliating conduct of the Phocian general-autocrator, seem to have produced the opportunities which now occurred for attempts within Bœotia itself.

Ch. 28. s. 4.
of this Hist.

Orchomenus, so cruelly desolated by the Thebans about three years before the battle of Mantinea*, had been repeopled; under what circumstances we are uninformed, but certainly under Theban patronage; and probably the new population was mixed, of ancient Orchomenians, and new settlers from other parts of Greece. But whatever preventive care may have been taken, aversion to the Theban government grew: communication was held with the Phocians; Onomarchus, turning suddenly from Doris, arrived unexpectedly; and the Theban party was so surprised and awed that (whether any contest in arms intervened is not said) Orchomenus became a member of the Phocian alliance. Under similar encouragement apparently, Onomarchus then proceeded to Chæronea; but, the Thebans having hastily collected their forces, he was there disappointed. The historian's expression rather implies a defeat in battle. It could however be little important; for it appears he was presently after in circumstances for new and great enterprise.

But the contest between Phocis and Thebes in its progress more involving the other states of Greece, it will be necessary to advert to what had been passing among the principal of those states, and observe the circumstances in which at this time they stood.

[* See Vol. VI. pp. 259. and 361.]

SECTION VI.

Politics of Athens. — Circumstances of Macedonia. — Marriage of Philip. — Circumstances of the Kingdom of Epirus. — Disposition to Peace thwarted by a Party in Athens. — Confederacy against Macedonia. — Accumulated Successes of Philip.

THE sacred war, with the command of the temple and treasury of Delphi its object, was a concern of such magnitude for the Greek nation, and especially the two great republics of Athens and Lacedæmon, that the very permission of the contest, and the allowance for such an obscure people as the Phocians to take the leading part, strongly indicated decay and beginning decrepitude, the result of long and almost ceaseless divisions. Athens however, though weak in land force, slow to put forward armies of citizens, and having among her citizens few practised soldiers like those which had fought her battles under Miltiades and Aristides, was powerful still by sea, ambitious not less than formerly of command over other states, and, even more than formerly, active and deep in policy. Among those who contended for the lead in public affairs, from the great Cimon's time downward, there had always been some who held it for the republic's interest to maintain a constant friendly connection with Lacedæmon. But the party of Chares, which of late had been mostly the ruling party, admitted the Lacedæmonian alliance, even when most necessary, with reluctance; nor had they ever ceased to support the enemies of Lacedæmon, so as to frustrate her great purpose, the recovery of the dominion of Messenia. In joining such an ally, or any ally, for the critical purpose of defending the Delphian treasury, some jealous care might become every Athenian statesman. But the party of Chares, while they thwarted all separate interests of their ally, would

press any separate interest of their own, to the injury of their ally: not satisfied with obviating the preponderance of Lacedæmon, they would make Phocis their instrument for purposes adverse to the interest of Lacedæmon. Hence, though the two governments concurred in the general purpose of supporting the Phocians and opposing the Thebans, yet they co-operated little. The several distractions of each also prevented vigorous interference from either. Lacedæmon was perplexed by the necessity of constantly watching enemies on all her borders, and even within them; and Athens, after abandoning the contest with her confederates, was implicated still in war, maintained with purposes of ambition and revenge, against Macedonia.

The Macedonian kingdom meanwhile was become, at least in comparison of former times, settled within itself, powerful among states around, and secure in its increased possessions. Any considerable preponderancy it had not yet attained. Able administration was wanted, much for its improvement, but much also even for any permanence of its existing fortunate circumstances: the Thessalian connection, so advantageous for its power, the Olynthian, so necessary to its daily safety, might be in a moment lost. In this state of things the king, strongly inclined to literature, the fine arts, cultivated society, and perhaps in general to pleasure, seems, notwithstanding the consciousness of military talents, and the stimulation of military successes, to have proposed rather to emulate his great predecessor Archelaus in the enjoyment and improvement of what he possessed than hazard all in contest for farther acquisitions, and to place his farther glory in cultivating the arts of peace.

B. C. 354.
Ol. 106. 3.
[Cf. p. 30.]

Soon after his return from his successful expedition into Thessaly, a year or more before the beginning of the sacred war, Philip married Olympias;

daughter of Neoptolemus king of Epirus. That country, occupied, from earliest tradition, by a people of kindred blood with the Greeks, and speaking a dialect of the Greek language hardly differing from the Macedonian, had preserved also, as we have seen of the neighbouring country of Lyncestis, a form of government nearly resembling the Macedonian. Moreover the royal race, like the Macedonian and Lyncestian, boasted a Grecian origin; highly illustrious, but not, in remaining accounts, equally authenticated: they claimed however descent from Neoptolemus, called also Pyrrhus, son of Homer's great hero Achilles, who is said to have settled in Epirus on returning from the Trojan war. The country consisted of vales of considerable extent and great fertility, among mountains of uncommon height and roughness: as a land of husbandmen, it was well peopled, and wealthy. Altogether these kingdoms and principalities, held by people of Grecian race under mixed monarchal government, were perhaps in extent, and in free population, nearly equal to that held by the republics. Like their neighbours the Thessalians these people were fond of show, and the courts of the princes were not without some elegance of splendour. The magnificence with which the nuptials of Philip with the Epirot princess were solemnised has been celebrated by ancient writers. Thenceforward, even more than before under Archelaus, the Macedonian court became the principal seat of polite gaiety, and the greatest and safest resort of cultivated society perhaps then in the world.

Amid the deficiency of materials for the history of these times we find unequivocal indication that, after all Philip's successes against the Athenians, he not only was always ready to admit negotiation upon liberal terms, but used every opportunity to invite it; nor is it left doubtful that the greatest and most respectable

Strab. 1. 7.
p. 326, 327.

Ch. 34. s. 2.
of this Hist.

Plut. vit.
Alex. init.

Demosth.
Olynth. 1. p. 15.
De legat.
p. 358. 372.
& 442.

men of the republic were anxious to meet his purpose. But it was not least because peace and friendly connection with Macedonia were desired by one party in Athens, that the other opposed them; and they so opposed that though the esteem which the king of Macedonia had acquired did not cease, yet it became dangerous to own esteem for him. The party which had produced the unfortunate war of the republic with its republican confederates, excited revolt against its very beneficial ally the king of Macedonia, rewarded and honoured the assassination of another ally, its citizen, the king of Thrace, which avowed, as principles,

*Demosth. de
legat. p. 358.*

that to foment disturbance among neighbouring states, and to be itself always at war with some of them, was the just and necessary policy of every democracy, but especially the Athenian; that, though truces might, from momentary pressure, become necessary, yet to make a perpetual peace was treason against the people, inasmuch as it denied the use of future opportunities against other people; this party opposed every step toward peace with Macedonia: the endeavour to lead the people to allow negotiation appears to have been frequently repeated by the

*Æsch. de legat.
p. 198.*

most respectable citizens, but it was always ineffectual. At length, finally to check it, a moment of popular passion was taken for procuring a decree, by which communication from the Macedonian government, even by a herald, was forbidden. The policy of such a measure, unexplained by ancient writers, seems, with any view to any common interest of the Athenian people, the less readily imaginable as, since the loss of so many towns

*Demosth.
Olynth. 2. p. 22.*

on the Macedonian and Thracian shores, the means of Athens to injure Macedonia, farther than by depredation on its commerce, were greatly narrowed. But the particular interest of the war-party, the party of Chares, in such a decree is not obscure. Peace

with Macedonia not only must have produced arrangements adverse to the views of those of whose policy war and troubles were the very foundation, but would probably have replaced the administration of the republic in the hands of others who had always professed a peaceful policy. The two objects which especially engaged the ambition and cupidity of the party of Chares were perhaps objects of desire for the Athenians very generally, the sovereignty of the Thracian Chersonese, and the command of the passage into the Euxine sea by the Bosphorus; the former held by the king of Thrace, the ally of Athens, the latter surrendered to Byzantium by the treaty of peace which ended the confederate war. Both were great objects, for revenue and for commerce; for commerce especially in two principal articles of the Attic market, corn and slaves. If then, by peace concluded with Macedonia under management of the friends of Isocrates, allowance might have been gained for pursuing these objects, which seems not improbable¹⁴, the war-party would have so much the deeper interest in the decree which forbade even treaty with Macedonia.

Of either the opportunity for so violent a measure, or the time, we are uninformed; but it appears to have been nearly about the time when a formidable confederacy was raised against Macedonia, in which the king of Thrace, the king of Illyria, and a pretender to the Diod. 1. 16. c. 22. principality of Pæonia were engaged. How far the war-party in Athens had originally excited or afterward promoted this league is not indicated, but its coincidence with their views is obvious; and that their ingenuity and activity were great, and their communication extensive, is also evident. Nor is it left doubtful that, without instigation or almost compulsion from Athens, the king of Thrace,

¹⁴ Its probability is especially indicated in the oration of Isocrates to Philip, where he mentions his view of the business of Amphipolis.

Kersobleptes, would not have concurred in such a measure. The combination appears very well imagined; Macedonia was to be attacked at the same time on the eastern and western side, while rebellion was excited within.

But, according to the remarkable testimony of the great orator, sometimes in the midst of violent invective his eulogist, Philip, with all his disposition to pleasure, was never unready for business; neither labour nor danger stopped him when occasion called.¹⁵ Sending Parmenio, whom he esteemed the ablest of his generals, against the

B. C. 355. (16)
Ol. 106. 2.
[Cf. p. 30.]
Epist. Philipp.
ad Ath. ap.
Demosth.

Illyrians, he marched himself into Pæonia, and the pretensions of his opponent there were soon finally crushed. Turning then into Thrace, and

profiting ably from the discord which the Athenians themselves had fomented in that country, one of the princes, Teres, fighting by his side against the others, he brought all

to such submission that, as the great orator afterward indignantly expressed himself, he made and unmade there what kings he pleased. The successes of the

Demosth.
Olynth. 1. p. 12.

Thracian expedition were just completed when information was brought of a great victory obtained by Parmenio over the Illyrians; and, what has been

Plut. vit.
Alex. p. 666.

thought worthy of notice by ancient writers, presently after a messenger arrived with intelligence that his horse had won

the palm in the Olympian race.¹⁷ Occasion has heretofore occurred to observe the importance

Ol. 106.

which the Greeks attached to this kind of victory: likely to have been the more grateful to Philip as it would beyond anything, in the judgment of the many throughout Greece,

¹⁵ Καὶ ὄση δεινότης ἦν ἐν τῷ Φιλίππῳ διασασθε, κ. τ. λ.

Dem. de Cor. p. 275.

¹⁶ Diodorus assigns this war to the first year of the 106th Olympiad. Reason for supposing that, though it may have originated in the first year of the 106th Olympiad, it was not concluded in that year, will be stated in a following note.

¹⁷ Ὀλυμπιάσιν ἵππῳ κέλητι νενικηκέναι. Plut. v. Alex.

convict the adverse orators of impudent falsehood when, at a loss for other invective equal to their malignity, they called him in their public speeches a barbarian. But he had scarcely been congratulated on these successes, when a third messenger arrived with information that his queen had brought him a son and heir, afterward the great Alexander. Then, in consonance with the opinion, old among the Greeks, that accumulation of uninterrupted prosperity had in itself a tendency to bring signal calamity, through a disposition in the deity, as Herodotus expresses it, to envy human happiness, he is said to have exclaimed: "O fortune, send some little evil to temper all this good."¹⁸

Demosth.

Ch. 6. s. 5.
of this Hist.

Plut. vit. Alex.

Through these successes the Macedonian kingdom became truly great and formidable, extending from the Euxine sea to the Adriatic. Diodorus reckons both Thrace and Illyria completely reduced under the Macedonian dominion. We learn from following circumstances that it was not precisely so, yet from the great contemporary orator it appears that they were brought to no small degree of dependency. The Athenian fleets, commanding still the Ægean, could still interrupt the maritime commerce of the Macedonians and their allies; but the king applied himself diligently to obviate this evil through the opportunities which his conquests and alliances afforded for

Diod. 1. 16.
c. 42.
Demosth.
Ol. 1. p. 15.
& al.

¹⁸ Plutarch, to whom we owe this anecdote, has added that Philip was so delighted with the success of his racer, that he celebrated it by a representation of the animal and his rider on the reverse of the golden coins from his mines of Philippi. Perhaps the collection of coins was not equally an object of the curious in Plutarch's as in the present day, and possibly Plutarch never saw or never noticed a Macedonian coin older than Philip. It is now enough known that a horseman unarmed, a *κέλης*, was the common ornament of the reverse of the Macedonian coins many reigns before him. The story may deserve thus much notice as one among many proofs of the carelessness and ineptitude with which writers, even of eminence, under the Roman empire, adopted or imagined remarks and anecdotes concerning the republican age of Greece, and perhaps of Rome too.

raising a navy; and, with the advantages afforded by the Amphipolitan territory, and the zealous concurrence especially of the Thessalians, whose commercial towns were considerable, he made rapid progress.

SECTION VII.

Politics of Athens. — Orators. — Measures for acquiring Dominion in Thrace. — Areopagitic Oration of Isocrates.

MEANWHILE at Athens, notwithstanding the disadvantage and disgrace to the republic with which all the objects of the confederate war had been abandoned, the party of Chares maintained an ascendancy with the multitude; and, notwithstanding their disappointment in the complete defeat of the confederacy of kings against Macedonia, they persisted in their purpose of prosecuting war against that country. We have formerly observed Iphicrates, Chabrias, and Timotheus concurring in the policy of supporting the Thracian monarchy, as a balance to that growing preponderance of Macedonia which its vehement enemies, the war-party in Athens, had so much contributed to produce. Macedonia might now become a maritime power. That the Thracian monarchy would become such was not within reasonable view; and hence apparently the policy of Chabrias, in the treaty which confirmed to the king of Thrace the dominion of the Chersonese. Though the revenue of that country thus went to another, yet the advantages of its commerce might be, without expense or hazard, all for Athens. But no sooner had the partisans of Chares produced the disgrace of Timotheus and Iphicrates than they became sedulous to procure public disapprobation of the measure which Chabrias was no longer living to support. The management appears to have been very artful. Boldly asserting, what the many

were ready on any assertion to believe, that the sovereignty of the Chersonese of right was theirs, and affecting a just respect for the character of Chabrias, they said, Demosth. Aristocr. p. 678. "that able officer and statesman would never have so yielded to the unjust violence of Kersobleptes and Charidemus, but that he had been improvidently sent without a force to oppose them." The confederate war was yet going forward when they brought the matter before the assembled people. Glaucon moved, that ten commissioners be sent to Thrace, to demand of Kersobleptes his accession to the terms formerly required of him by Athenodorus, and, should he refuse, to provide means of compulsion; and the people decreed accordingly. But the interest of the party seems to have failed in the nomination of commissioners; a majority of whom, as the censure of Demosthenes shows, were not disposed to forward their views in Thrace. Troubles then breaking out in Eubœa, and the alarm of the king of Persia's threatened vengeance concurring, those most disposed to engage the republic in new wars feared at that time to press the purpose farther.

But peace being made with the confederates, the troubles of Eubœa appeased, and the alarm of invasion from Persia subsided, the orators began again to mention the Chersonese, and the people to listen with interest. The superior powers of oratory appear to have been on the side of Chares. The name of Lycurgus, from whom an oration remains, is eminent. An oration also is extant, attributed to Hegesippus.¹⁹ Of Timarchus, Clitomachus, Polyeuctus, and, more celebrated than all, Hyperides, the fame only has been transmitted.

Nevertheless it seems questionable whether the party of

¹⁹ The supposition that the oration on Halonnesus, among the works of Demosthenes, has been the work of Hegesippus, will require notice hereafter. Clitomachus and Polyeuctus are mentioned by Demosthenes in the third Philippic, p. 129. Hyperides has been highly celebrated by Dionysius and Cicero. Timarchus will occur for future notice.

Chares was indebted for its superiority on the bema more to the talents of the men or to their unscrupulousness in using the arbitrary powers of democratical government. Leosthenes, of the adverse party, had, at least with that party, the reputation of being the most eloquent man of his time, excepting only Callistratus. But Leosthenes was a sufferer from that common tyranny of democracy which Isocrates has mentioned as prevailing at Athens, the denial of freedom of speech. Though ostracism had fallen out of use, banishment remained for party purposes common, and Leosthenes was banished; apparently, like so many other illustrious Athenians, for his merit. Isocrates only wrote. Dionysius of Halicarnassus, among large and warm eulogy of that distinguished patriot, has expressed admiration especially at his boldness in venturing to publish that called the Areopagitic oration, which carries within itself evidence of its date of this time. The object was to produce a reformation of the government, such as to restore nearly the constitution of Solon, or at least of Clisthenes. To open such a purpose, not only for the safety of the orator, but for a chance of success, and even to obtain a hearing, great caution was necessary. In addressing therefore his irritable sovereign, venturing but to glance at the turpitude, speaking more directly to the folly, he dwells chiefly on the danger of past conduct and actual projects.²⁰

“The Athenians had now,” he observed, “within a short space of time, lost all their possessions on the northern shores of the Ægean, from the Thracian Chersonese to the

²⁰ Τίς δὲ τὸν Ἀρειοπαγιτικὸν ἀναγνοὺς οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο κοσμιώτερος; Ἡ τίς οὐκ ἂν θαυμάσει τὴν ἐπιβολὴν τοῦ ῥήτορος; ὃς ἐτόλμησε διαλεχθῆναι περὶ πολιτείας Ἀθηναίοις, ἀξιοῦν μεταθέσθαι μὲν τὴν τότε καθιστῶσαν δημοκρατίαν, ὡς μεγάλη βλάβη τὴν πόλιν, ὑπὲρ ἧς τῶν δημαγωγῶν οὐδεὶς ἐπεχείρει λέγειν. Dion. Hal. in Isocr.

The Areopagitic carries within itself clear indication of its own date, after the conclusion of peace with the confederates, and before the measures which quickly followed, pp. 96. 100. 102. t. 1. edit. Auger.

border of Thessaly, and all the islands on the Asiatic coast, with Byzantium, and the important pass of the Bosphorus: yet, in the course of these disasters, twice had the evangelical sacrifice been performed, as if thanks were due to the gods for signal victories. After all their great losses of dominion and revenue indeed they remained possessed of two hundred triremes, whence they were ready to exult in the idea of being still masters of the seas: and holding also yet many allied cities dependent and tributary, and having besides friendly connection with some independent states, bound to them by a common interest, they did not cease to extend their ambition to the dominion of all Greece.”²¹ How revolting these pretensions were to the Greeks in general, how unfit a government like the Athenian was to hold extensive dominion, how much, for the Athenians themselves, it wanted reformation, and what must be the danger of prosecuting their ambitious purposes and omitting the wanted reformation, he then proceeds to show. But, with that caution which democratical despotism required, he ventured to indicate the present state of things only by comparison with the past; showing the past perhaps less exactly as it really was, than as, in improved representation, it would form a completer contrast to the present. The picture however is clear, and exhibits far more fully than any other extant the state of Athens at the time.

Beginning with the subject of religion, “the divine worship,” says the venerable statesman, Isocr. Areop. p. 112. “was not, with our forefathers, a scene of riot and disorder: it was not sometimes, for wantonness, a sacrifice of a hundred oxen, and sometimes, through want, an omission of ancient rites. Magnificent feasts were not given to the people after foreign customs; nor did the proper ceremonies

²¹ Πᾶσαν ἐπιζῆσι τὴν Ἑλλάδα ταύτη τῇ δυνάμει κατασχήσει.

of the holy temples fail through penury of the treasury, being always regularly supplied from the proper sacred fund. Our forefathers conceived true worship to consist, not in extravagant expenditure, but in the careful observation of divine precepts, transmitted from their forefathers.

“ Congenial with those on the concerns of religion were their principles of communication among one another, as inheritors of a common country. The poor were so far from being hostile to the wealthy that they considered the fortunes of the few as the surest sources of competence for the many. The land-owners letting farms at moderate rents, the monied men employing the poor in manufactures, or lending what enabled them to manage business on their own account, all were bound together by mutual interest. Nor did lending involve the danger that either the whole sum lent would be lost, or that, with much trouble, only a small part could be recovered. For the juries then did not prostitute lenity, but decided according to law; they did not, by warranting the wrong of others, prepare the way for themselves to profit from wrong; but, on the contrary, they showed more indignation at such wrong than even those who suffered by it; for they reckoned encouragement for faithlessness in contracts injurious to the poor, even more than to the rich. None then feared to own their riches. The wealthy saw with more satisfaction those who came to borrow than those who came to pay: property was secure to its just owner; and a share in its advantages was diffused, in the course of things, among all ranks.

Isocr. Areop.
p. 118.

p. 130. “ Such then was the security of the Attic territory that better houses and better living in them²² were found about the country than within the fortified towns. Many Athenians did not come to the city even

²² Ἐπισκιάς, *festā*. Auger. *Ameublemens*. Mably, *Rech. sur les Grecs*, p. 17

at the principal festivals; satisfied with the enjoyment of their private fortunes, and not desirous to prey upon the public. But now what reasonable man can, without indignation, see citizens, uncertain whether they shall that day have common necessaries, casting lots for the office of jurymen, and decreeing subsistence for other Greeks who will pull the oar for them; or strutting in processions in golden robes, furnished by the public, and then passing whole seasons in a way that I am ashamed to describe.

“The result is that, among other states, we are hated by some, and by the rest despised; Isocr. Areop. p. 152. proof of which is open to you in the reports of your own generals, and in the king of Persia’s letter lately received. Among ourselves meanwhile we have such perpetual discord that the inconvenience is daily felt by almost all; and at the same time the public good and even the ordinary defence of the country are so neglected that none, without pay, will attend the muster for military service. Some indeed are so poor, or so shameless, as to disgrace the city by becoming common beggars.”

In his oration on peace, published during the confederate war, lamenting the changes in the constitution of the republic as the principal causes of its evil condition, he had proposed generally the restoration of the government as established by Solon. We find no intimation that any reform followed. He now offered a less extensive but more specific proposition; to restore to the court of Areopagus, formerly so much venerated, its ancient dignity and authority, and especially its censorial power. Thus, he said, best the malversation of magistrates might be restrained, frauds upon the revenue prevented, sober conduct enforced among the wealthy, industry revived among the poor, and relief duly administered to the want of those unable to maintain themselves. His object evidently was to establish a check upon

the wildness of popular despotism, to prevent the administration from falling into hands so unworthy as those which had too commonly directed it, and to provide a steadiness for the government altogether to which it had been long a stranger. But so much it would have been dangerous to declare. That the people in assembly should hold an uncontrolled despotism, was a maxim so instilled by the flattery of candidates for popular favour, and so maintained by demagogues in power, that he seems not to have known how to be cautious enough in proposing any balance to it, or mixture with it. He ventures hardly more than a hint, referring to the constitution of Solon, who of all legislators of any fame, he says, had most favoured democracy, and yet had established the Areopagus in all the power to which he himself proposed now to restore it. Fearing however this might not be accepted as sufficient apology, he concluded with what could not apparently but have the most direct tendency to overthrow his own work: "It was a maxim with him," he said, "equally as with their ancestors, who had instituted and supported the venerable court of Areopagus, that the PEOPLE, AS A TYRANT," for that precisely is his term, "should hold absolute sovereignty, the legislative power, the judicial, and the executive; and that nothing should be committed to others but offices merely ministerial."²³

In truth the censorial power, which Isocrates proposed to revive, was but a species of the very defective and very hazardous general resource of the ancient republican legislators: not a concurrent authority; nothing that could harmonise with the other powers; but, like the college of

²³ Δεῖ τὸν μὲν Δῆμον, ὡσπερ τύραννον, καθιστάναι τὰς ἀρχάς, κ. τ. λ., p. 112. The use of the word *τύραννος*, in this place, by so late a writer as Isocrates, will assist to indicate its just import when applied, by himself and others, to those who, according to our law-phrases, may be termed *tyrants sole*, in contradistinction to *tyrants aggregate*.

ephors at Lacedæmon, and the tribunate of Rome, merely another despotism, to war against that already existing rather than to temper and accord with it.

SECTION VIII.

Purpose of the War-party to carry War into Asia. — Opposition of Demosthenes. — Circumstances of Methone and of Thrace. — Chares General-Autocrator in Thrace. — Massacre of the Sesi- tians. — Conquest of the Thracian Chersonese; and Partition of the Thracian Monarchy.

THE arguments of Isocrates produced no reformation of the government. The party of Chares, though checked by repeated failure of public measures under their direction, maintained yet a general superiority. On the conclusion of peace with the revolted allies the mercenary army should have been disbanded, and the fleet at least reduced. But Chares would be unwilling to return from a lucrative command abroad, with princely power, to the situation of a simple citizen of Athens, most uneasy for those most distinguished; and numbers, at home as well as abroad, had a share of common interest with him. The disbanding accordingly was delayed; on what pretence we do not learn; but indication remains, that it was not without some oppression of the allies of the republic.

Demosth.
περὶ συμμα-
ριων.

Meanwhile the satrap of Bithynia, Artabazus, relieved for a time by Chares, being again pressed by royal armies, negotiated again among the Grecian republics for assistance; and it was now that he engaged the Theban Pammenes, whose service, formerly noticed, was also highly advantageous to him. But service in Asia, as Xenophon's account of himself shows, might

B. C. 354.
Ol. 106. 3.
[Cf. p. 30.]
Ch. 37. s. 5.
of this Hist.

offer allurements for an adventuring commander, even without a satrap's pay. Whether with any view to promote such a project, the rumour was revived at Athens that a large fleet was preparing in the ports of Phenicia, to bring a Persian army to Greece. The people were assembled to consider of measures to be taken, in circumstances asserted to be highly critical. The leading orators of the war-party evinced a feeling of a strong interest on the occasion. They warmly urged "that attack should not be waited for; that the best and safest way to obviate the threatened evil was to invade the enemy's country; that past experience showed encouragement for this abundant; the successes of the late king of Lacedæmon, Agesilaus, the return of the Greeks who had penetrated as far as Babylonia with Cyrus, and, above all, the heroic deeds of their own forefathers, in Greece and in Asia, against the same enemy when far more warlike than now, all invited."

The project, with any view of advantage to the Athenian commonwealth, especially when such an enemy as Macedonia was to be left behind, appears utterly preposterous; but for ambitious individuals, whose situation was uneasy or precarious at home, it may, with only a change of hazard, have offered lofty hopes. The peace-party however obtained on this occasion new assistance. Demosthenes, afterward so celebrated, made now the first of his speeches on political subjects that has

Demosth.
περὶ συμμα-
χιῶν.
[B. C. 354.
Cl.]

been transmitted, and probably the first ever published. When an oration, spoken from the bema, obtained applause, the orator, if decidedly connected with a party, would publish it to promote the purposes of his party; if of undecided connection, he would publish it to acquire fame and clients; which would give him importance with any party, and otherwise lead to wealth. Demosthenes spoke in opposition, and the opposition succeeded. The war-

party abandoned their measure, and no hostility being committed by Athens, none followed from Persia.

Disappointed of Asiatic plunder, the party turned their view to a field of far inferior, but still of considerable promise, and which they had long held in view, the Thracian Chersonese. But for reasonable hope of success there now, it would be necessary to provide some distraction for the Macedonian arms, which otherwise might too effectually interfere. The circumstances of the little republic of Methone, on the Macedonian shore, offered opportunity from which able politicians could profit. Methone was the place whence we have seen the Athenian arms directed against Philip amid the difficulties of his first contest for his paternal throne. Its situation, opportune beyond others for offensive war against Macedonia, would expose it of course more to the jealousy and to the coercion of the Macedonian government. In weakness therefore its leaders would be cautious of offence to Macedonia; and hence probably the forbearance of the Macedonian government, through which Methone remained a republic when other towns, less obnoxiously situated, had been reduced by the Macedonian arms. It was now become very populous and strong, having been probably the resort of the Athenian party flying from the conquered places, Pydna, Potidæa, Torone, Amphipolis, and others. Being then, from Attica to the Hellespont, or at least as far as Athos, the only seaport continuing to acknowledge the sovereignty of the Athenian people, it would be the only one whose commerce, more secure than others against smaller pirates, would also be little liable to depredation from Athenian commanders. Under such circumstances flourishing, its connection with Athens would be intimate, and its dependency unavoidable.

It is no light indication of great moderation in the Macedonian government that, under such circumstances, offensive

measures against Methone were so forborne that even the Athenian orators, with all their invective against Philip, have imputed none. On the other hand the historian bears direct testimony to aggression from Methone against Macedonia, and even actual war, concerted with Athens, previous to any hostility from Macedonia against Methone. The Methonæans then, having so taken their part with the Athenian government, which was engaged in a war with Macedonia of such rancour that all communication even by heralds was denied, vigorous exertion against them became indispensable. Their territory probably was small and of little value: the sea was the element to which they looked for wealth and plenty. On the approach of the Macedonian army therefore they shut themselves within their walls, which were so strong, and the defenders so numerous, that the siege was likely to be lasting, and the event uncertain.

While measures thus were taken for employing the Macedonian arms without expense or risk to the Athenian people, intrigue was managed with equal success in Thrace. Were the sovereign of that country, Kersobleptes, involved in no trouble which might prevent his interference with the purposed measures of his allies and fellow-citizens against him, (for we have seen he was a citizen of Athens, as well as an ally,) their purposes, if practicable, would have been difficult. The princes Berisades and Amadocus however, their instruments formerly, were still ready, for the reward in prospect, to become their instruments again. Rebellion was provided against Kersobleptes, and encouragement was held out for the discontented in every Grecian town of the Chersonese.

Demosth.
in Aristocr.
p. 678.
Diod. l. 16.
c. 34.
B. C. 355.
Ol. 106. 3-4.
[Cf. p. 30.]

Matters appear to have been thus prepared when at length Chares returned to Piræus with the fleet and mercenary troops which had been employed in the confederate war. The people

being then assembled, the question was put, "whether the ships should be laid up to decay uselessly, the seamen turned to idleness, and the troops dismissed, when all might be employed most advantageously for the republic?" The war-party prevailed; Chares was appointed general-autocrator for command in Thrace; and the fleet and army were again committed to his orders with the plenitude of power commonly attached to that title.

Arriving in the Hellespont, Chares summoned the city of Sestus. The people refusing to abandon their existing engagements, and become tributary subjects of the Athenian people, he laid siege to it. Far more known for ages past in history and in song, Sestus was not now defended like Methone. Whether its walls, or its population, or military discipline, were deficient, or able conduct, or concord among its people failed, it yielded after apparently little contest. Chares then added to the numerous instances of sanguinary cruelty in democratical government, and of disregard for the Grecian name among the Athenian people, by putting all the adult males of that ancient Grecian city to the sword, and selling the women and children to slavery. The terror of this example, the failure of support from the Thracian monarch, produced the submission of all the towns of the peninsula, Cardia alone excepted.

Diod. l. 16.
c. 34.

B. C. 353.
Ol. 106.3-4. (24)

The important conquest of the Chersonese being thus easily made, Chares proceeded to give law to its former sovereign, the king of Thrace, Kersobleptes. By the deficiency of his understanding, the decay of respect among his people, the opposition of the princes of his family, and the failure, however happening, of the assistance of his brother-

²⁴ Diodorus has related all the transactions of Chares in Thrace under the fourth year of the hundred and sixth Olympiad. Possibly, as well as the war of Methone, they were begun in the preceding year.

in-law Charidemus, that weak prince seems to have been almost helpless. No information of his attempting any opposition in the field is found. By treaty he surrendered to the Athenians the sovereignty of the Chersonese, and to his kinsmen, Berisades and Amadocus, portions of his remaining dominion so large that, equally with himself, thenceforward they bore the title of kings. Nor did this effectual humiliation of the unfortunate monarch satisfy democratical arrogance. The two kings, whom it had created, were required to be present as witnesses to the cession of dominion by the successor of their common ancestors Teres and Sitalces to the Athenian people; and, to complete the offensiveness of a ceremony in itself degrading enough, his former less successful oppressor, Athenodorus, as if to make him appear to admit the breach of a contract which he had publicly declared he never made, presided at the ceremony.

Demosth.
in Aristocr.
ut ant.

But history seems nowhere to show democracy more lenient to subjects than to princes. To provide security for the new acquisition, and opening for farther conquest, would be among the purposes in thus dividing the Thracian kingdom. But the Chersonese itself was not thought by that alone secure; nor was the ready submission of its people esteemed a sufficient pledge of their fidelity. Though the Athenians would not be persuaded either to serve in garrison or to pay garrisons, yet numbers among them, troublesome to the government at home by their poverty and their arrogance, would emigrate to a fine country in a fine climate, to take possession of houses and lands and slaves, and from the lowest of their old, become the first men of a new community. The succinct account of Diodorus indicates a violent and extensive seizure of property; justifiable by nothing but the democratical principle,

Diod. l. 16.
c. 34.

always asserted by Demosthenes, of right for whatever is profitable to the sovereign people. New colonists from Athens appear to have become the principal proprietors of the lands and houses, as well as rulers of the towns, of the Chersonese.²⁵

²⁵ Ἀπίστευεν ὁ δῆμος κληρούχους εἰς τὰς πόλεις. Diod. 1. 16. c. 34.

CHAPTER XXXVIII.

AFFAIRS OF GREECE DURING THE SECOND PERIOD OF THE SACRED WAR, WHEN MACEDONIA WAS IMPLICATED.

SECTION I.

New Views of the War-party in Athens. — Trespass on the Delphian Treasury. — Methone taken by Philip. — Invasion of Thessaly by the Phocians, assisted by Athens, opposed by Macedonia. — Victory of Onomarchus, and Distress of Philip. — Death of Onomarchus, and liberal Use of Victory by Philip.

THE conquest of the rich territory of the Chersonese, and the reduction of the once formidable monarchy of Thrace to receive law from the Athenian people, were, with whatever uncreditable circumstances accompanied, great and splendid advantages, balancing, in no small degree, the losses in the wars with the allies and with Macedonia, and powerfully promoting among the Athenian people the credit of the party which had put them forward. But war remained with Macedonia and with Phocis; in the former of which Athens was a principal party, and in the other had a deep interest. The difficulties and dangers hence arising, one party in Athens, had they had power, would easily have obviated. By negotiation with Macedonia, for which its king at every opportunity showed himself ready, they would have made peace for the republic; and by a sincere union with Lacedæmon for settling the affairs of Phocis, they would have given quiet to distracted Greece. But neither measure suited the professors of war

Demosth. de
legat. p. 442.
& al.

and trouble. The maintenance of the sacred war they considered as especially favourable to their views; and from the circumstances of Phocis and of Thessaly their ingenuity drew means for making others fight their battles.

*Demosth. de
legat. p. 367.*

In Thessaly there had long existed an Athenian interest in opposition to the Macedonian: the tagus Lycophon, commonly styled tyrant of Phæræ, or of Thessaly, successor of the tyrant Alexander, was the ally of the Athenian people. The Thessalian allies of Thebes, by inheritance inveterate enemies of the Phocians,

*Æschin. de
legat.*

were of the Macedonian interest. Lycophon therefore would of course concur with Athens in favouring the Phocian cause; and Phocis, as well as Athens, would desire to promote the cause of Lycophon. On this ground the Athenian leaders formed an extensive plan, for the execution of which however they wanted armies. The Athenian people would neither serve nor willingly pay; and armies of mercenaries were not so easily to be maintained by plunder and contributions in Greece as in Asia. To have armies therefore they must raise money, and to obtain it they hazarded their interest among the people in a very bold attempt. Nearly the whole of the ordinary revenue of the republic, as we have seen, was, under the sanction of most severe laws, appropriated to matters of gratification for the many; religious ceremonies, sacrifices, theatrical exhibitions, payment for attendance on the general assemblies and courts of justice, or distributions of money. The leaders of the war-party endeavoured to persuade the people to concede, for purposes of war, some part of their accustomed indulgences. Demosthenes on this occasion again came forward in opposition. "Instead of Athenian citizens," he said, "it was proposed to give the money to an army of foreign mercenaries, with

*Demosth.
περι συν-
ταξέως.*

which the generals might enrich themselves at the republic's expense." The prejudices of the people, more strongly perhaps than their reason, would favour his argument, and his opposition was again successful.¹

This measure failing, a resource hardly requiring more boldness in the Athenian leaders, who would not appear as principals in it, was to use the Delphian treasury. Circumstances at this time favoured. Lacedæmon, Diod. l. 16. c. 34. always troubled with hostile neighbours in Peloponnesus, was now at actual war with Argos; and, though carrying it with advantage into the enemy's country, would thus be less able to interfere in more distant concerns. Onomarchus, new yet in his arduous situation at the head of the affairs of Phocis, and, though hitherto successful, surrounded still with difficulties, could not hope to maintain himself without support from some of the principal republics. The connection of the Athenian government with the Phocian accordingly became of the closest kind. It is described by Demosthenes, "friendship, fellowship in arms, mutual support."² The connection with Lacedæmon of course slackened. But it seems probable that the Lacedæmonian government also had begun to give sanction to some drawing on the sacred treasury; nor does it appear easy to say where positive crime in such drawing would begin. Every considerable state of Greece had its separate treasury, or chamber in the treasury, at Delphi; and, little exact as remaining information is, it is clear that every state had some right over its own. A nice question might arise

¹ Dionysius of Halicarnassus has not noticed the time of delivery of the oration entitled *περὶ συντάξεως*. The most judicious modern critics have ascribed it to the time with which we are now engaged. It appears to me to carry very sufficient evidence in itself that they must be nearly right, and that it cannot belong to the latter period, after the delivery of all the Philippics, to which Leland, apparently to accommodate his own purpose in narration, would give it.

² *Φιλία, συμμαχία, βοήθεια*. Demosth. de legat. p. 360.

concerning those principal riches of the temple deposited ages ago by Cræsus king of Lydia, and the subject will recur in the sequel. What requires observation now is that the means afforded by the sacred treasury growing daily more necessary to supply the expenses of the war, the use of them appears to have been daily less scrupled. Nevertheless it seems doubtful if the Phocian government had ever yet ventured upon it without some sanction from the states of their alliance, especially Lacedæmon and Athens. But it was afterward the boast of Demosthenes that at this time “neither Greek nor barbarian gave any assistance to the Phocians, but the Athenians only;” and we find him avowing the importance of the pecuniary resources of Phocis for the measures of Athens in the war with Macedonia. That there was henceforward little confidential intercourse between Lacedæmon and Athens being evident in all accounts, the command of the Delphian treasury must have rested with the Phocian government and the Athenian.

Demosth. de
legat. p. 443.
Demosth.
Olynth. 3.
p. 30.

With such powerful means, and opportunity to use them so that the first danger and the first scandal would belong to the Phocians, the Athenian leaders resolved upon great attempts. The mercenary force which had recently conquered the Chersonese, and enabled the Athenian people to dispose of kingdoms, was not yet dismissed; and hence it seems to have been that, presently after what the historian has called the defeat of Onomarchus at Chæronea, the army under that general was so powerful that he could detach seven thousand men (should the same historian be trusted for numbers) to co-operate with Lycophron in Thessaly.³ Nor may this be exaggeration, the

Ch. 37. s. 5.
of this Hist.

³ Diodorus says that Onomarchus at this time bribed extensively among the Grecian republics. 1. 16. c. 33. Occasion has already occurred to remark on the uncertainty of this kind of imputation, and more will occur hereafter.

Athenian government zealously co-operating with the Phocian; for, on a following occasion, in circumstances very similar, we find the transfer of a still greater mercenary force, from the Athenian service to that of allies of the Athenian people, attested by the contemporary orators.

The obstinate defence of Methone afforded encouragement, and provided opportunity, for the great stroke proposed in Thessaly. The importance of that place, its critical situation, and its close connection with enemies so irreconcilable and so restless as the war-party in Athens, induced Philip to postpone some other interests to the prosecution of his measures against it. The employment of the Macedonian arms there had left the field open for Chares to make his highly valuable, yet easy, conquest of the Chersonese. The siege was protracted through the winter.⁴ In the course of it Philip, who superintended much in person, and often incurred the blame of an over-prodigious courage, received a wound which deprived him of the sight of an

Strab. 1. 8.
p. 374.
Diod. 1. 16.
c. 31.
Demosth.
Or. in ep.
Phil.

Whatever author Diodorus followed in his simplicity, he seems to have mistaken the fact, where he says (1. 16. c. 33.) that Onomarchus, by bribes among the Thessalians, produced a cessation of their exertions against Thebes. The sequel of his own narrative shows that, if money went, as is probable, from Delphi into Thessaly, it was not to enrich the party there hostile to Phocis by bribes, which could have but a very uncertain and temporary effect, but to subsidise the tagus, the ally of Phocis and Athens, and enable him to make those exertions against the other Thessalians, the common enemies of Phocis, Athens, and the tagus, which the historian proceeds to relate. So also levy-money for mercenary troops might probably go to some of the smaller republics, allies of Phocis.

⁴ Diodorus relates the taking of Methone among events of the third year of the hundred and sixth Olympiad, and then repeats the story, with added circumstances, among events of the following year. No other ancient writer has at all marked the year. All accounts however being compared, there seems no reason to doubt that the siege, or at least the war with Methone, begun in one year, was continued into the next; and the annalist intending, in his succinct way, only one mention of this little war, in which the beginning and the end should be related at once, has, through forgetfulness, left the same story, and it is not a singular instance in his work, twice told.

eye.⁵ The place at length became severely pressed; but, depending upon the promised relief of an Athenian fleet, the people persevered to extremity. A decree of the Athenian assembly directed that a fleet should go; but, as would be likely, and, according to Demosthenes, was common, where the whole people directed administration, what was decreed was not always executed; the equipment was dilatory, and the fleet sailed too late. The Methonæans, unable to withstand the pressure longer, capitulated. Their town and its independent sovereignty they would not expect to retain; but mercy for their persons was not denied, as by the general of the Athenian people to the wretched Sestians. To withdraw in safety was allowed for men, women, and children, carrying only the clothes they wore. The town was dismantled, and, with its territory, added to the Macedonian kingdom.

B. C. 355.
Ol. 106. 4. 3

Diod. l. 16.
c. 24.

Meanwhile Lycophron, apparently assisted by a subsidy from Delphi, had so increased his forces that the Larissæans, Pharsalians, and other Thessalians, allies of Macedonia and Thebes, unable to meet him in the field, and apprehensive of siege to their towns, applied to Philip for support. But that prince had scarcely entered Thessaly on one side when Phayllus, brother of Onomarchus, came with the great detachment, already mentioned, from the Phocian army, to assist the tagus on the other. Philip however, joined by the collected strength of his adherents in Thessaly, defeated the united forces of Lycophron and the Phocian general.

c. 35.

⁵ Thus simply the geographer and the annalist have related the fact, which Demosthenes also has noticed, and in a style of eulogy more creditable to him than his illiberal invective, which has had such warm admirers. The improvements of the story by writers later than the geographer and annalist, who themselves wrote three centuries after the event, improvements calculated for delighters in the marvellous, seem unworthy even of a note on history.

This blow, following that of the loss of Methone, placed both Onomarchus and the war-party at Athens in circumstances highly critical. If means were not found to repair them, Thessalian forces, and even Macedonian, might be expected to join the Theban. The war might then, with more effect than ever yet, be brought home to Phocis; and, instead of new means acquired to annoy Macedonia, the way might be opened for the Macedonians to invade Attica. Either the exertion then was extraordinary, or the previous preparations had been great; for, before even Philip's activity could draw any considerable advantage from his victory beyond the immediate relief to his allies, Onomarchus marched into Thessaly at the head of such a force that, on joining the defeated tagus, their united numbers exceeded those of the combined Macedonians and Thesalians. This force then he conducted with such skill that he defeated the king of Macedonia in two successive battles, and reduced him to such difficulty and danger that his

retreat, at length effected into his own country,

was reckoned among the most masterly military operations known to antiquity. All Thessaly, some of the strongest towns excepted, fell under the power of the tagus and the Phocian general.

Frontin.
Polyæn.

The exertion of the Thebans had not gone so far as to send assistance to their Thessalian allies, yet they did not wholly neglect the opportunity afforded by the absence of the army from Phocis. Onomarchus, amid the joy of victory in Thessaly, was alarmed with information that the force of Bœotia was collected, and Phocis threatened. The Thebans seem to have been slow; for, before they had passed the Bœotian frontier, Onomarchus was within it. Reduced thus to defend their own fields, venturing a battle, they were defeated; and the important acquisition of the Bœotian town

of Coronea to the Phocian alliance was among the fruits of this new success of the Phocian arms.

But the king of Macedonia was not of a temper to be dismayed by defeat, or slow in measures for repairing it. Every consideration indeed of his own welfare, and of his people's welfare, as well as of his own and his kingdom's honour, would require exertion to prevent the destruction, or subjection under the tagus, of that large proportion of the Thessalian people which was connected with him and with Macedonia by mutual and deep interest. While Onomarchus was on the other side of Thermopylæ he entered Thessaly again with fresh troops: the Thessalians rallied round his standard; and quickly his force amounted to twenty thousand foot, and three thousand horse.⁶ Lycophron, unable to keep the field against him, expected siege in Pheræ.

It was, according to the historian's arrange-
 ment of events and dates, in the autumn still of
 the same year that Onomarchus returned into Thessaly with
 more than twenty thousand foot: his horse are stated at
 only five hundred; but even that number, among the
 establishments of the southern republics, was considerable.
 The tagus would add to his cavalry proportionally more
 than to his infantry; in Thessaly, and there only within
 republican Greece, horses and horsemen abounding. Athens,
 now free from other engagements requiring any great pro-
 portion of her navy, could afford large co-operation of that
 kind which a fleet might afford to an army; and in the
 ancient system of war we have already seen often this very

B. C. 355.
 Ol. 106. 4.
 [See p. 80.]

⁶ The tenor of Diodorus's account, and especially his phrase *βοηθῶν τοῖς Θιτταλοῖς*, mark that he considered the body of the Thessalian nation as disposed to the Macedonian party; and this receives confirmation from the orators, even Demosthenes.

important. A powerful fleet accordingly, under the command of Chares, took its station in the Pagasæan bay.

Philip, with inferior numbers, did not fear to seek action again with the general from whom he had recently suffered defeat. Onomarchus probably was sensible that, with advantage of numbers, his army, a large part of which had been hastily collected, was inferior in discipline. He had to apprehend also the use which a skilful adversary would make of his superiority in cavalry. Unable perhaps, under all circumstances, to avoid, or much delay a battle, he chose his field near the shore of the Pagasæan bay, with the Athenian fleet at hand.⁷ The contest was severe : but the victory, (the Thessalian cavalry, it is said, largely contributing to it,) was at length complete on the Macedonian side. The routed Phocians mostly fled toward the friendly ships, and the refuge was important ; but, being pursued even into the sea by the best horse of Greece, their loss was very great. Onomarchus himself fell : those who perished by the sword or the water are said to have been together six thousand, and the prisoners full three thousand. Excepting those who reached the ships, hardly any unmounted could escape.⁸

Demosth.
de legat.
p. 441.
Diod. l. 16.
c. 35.

[B.C. 352.*
Cl.]

⁷ Diodorus says the Athenian fleet under Chares was accidentally sailing by. It is not unlikely that a bold orator, whom the compiler may have taken for his authority, would venture to tell such a story to the Athenian many. But it remains indicated by Demosthenes that an Athenian naval force, greater or less, had been constantly, or at least commonly, kept on the Thessalian coast, co-operating with the tagus.

⁸ The stories of the destruction of Onomarchus by his own people, and of the crucifixion of his dead body by Philip's order, could surely not have passed unnoticed by Demosthenes, had they had in his time the least credit, or even had they been invented so early.

[* B. c. 352. " Lycophron of Pheræ calls in Onomarchus, who is defeated and slain by Philip, ἐπὶ ἀρχοντος Εὐδύμου. Diod. xvi. 32. 35. Lycophron surrenders Pheræ, and joins Phayllus, ἐπὶ Ἀγιστοδύμου. Idem. xvi. 37. Phillip, after the liberation of Pheræ, and the defeat of Onomarchus, attempts to pass

Through this great victory Thessaly came entire into the power of the conquerors. Lycophron, flying from the field of battle to Pheræ, and despairing of means to maintain himself there, surrendered the city, under a capitulation, to the king of Macedonia. Pagasæ, the immediate seaport of Pheræ, and Magnesia, another principal emporium of Thessaly, dependent on the Pheræan government, presently followed the example of the capital.

Strab. 1. 9.
p. 436.
Diod. 1. 16.
c. 35.

Intelligence of these great events conveyed to Athens excited alarm there, among the war-party extreme, but perhaps not little even among those unconnected with that party. It was apprehended that the united army of Macedonia and Thessaly might penetrate through the strait of Thermopylæ, and being joined by the Thebans, nothing within Greece could resist. The people were hastily summoned. The command of the sea, it was observed, which Athens still possessed, gave facility for sending troops to guard the pass, by which the dreaded evil might yet be prevented, if measures were diligently taken. A force accordingly sailed under the orders of Diophantus, who took possession of the commanding posts, nothing being there to oppose.

Had it been Philip's own purpose to carry war into southern Greece, unquestionably he would have been rapid, and it seems hardly to be doubted but he might have occupied the strait before the Athenians could reach it. But the inveterate enmity among the Thessalians against the Phocians, sharpened by the invasion of their country with the purpose of reducing it under the power of a hated tyrant,

the Thermopylæ, but is prevented by the Athenians, ἐπὶ ἀρχοντος Ἀριστοδήμου. Diod. xvi. 38. It is plain that these transactions, distributed into the years of two archons, happened in one campaign; namely, the spring, summer, and autumn of B. C. 352." Clinton, Fasti Hellen. p. 132.]

would lead them to desire and urge the measure. Philip at length marched to Thermopylæ. A small movement of the Theban forces would have placed Diophantus as between two fires: his only safety would have been in retreat by sea. Nevertheless on his refusal to allow passage, Philip, without any attempt to force it, withdrew; and, staying in Thessaly no longer than to make some requisite arrangements, returned into Macedonia.

To those leading men among the Athenians, who were adverse to the system of war and trouble, circumstances appeared now altogether advantageous for renewing their instances to the people to allow negotiation for peace. War, it was observed, had been enough tried, and constantly to their disadvantage. Every measure yet, against Macedonia, had produced aggrandisement to the enemy and loss to themselves. At the same time the moderation of the king, and especially his disposition to peace with the Athenian people, had been largely shown in his recent conduct; when, to the dissatisfaction of some of his allies, he had yielded to the first remonstrance of an Athenian general, objecting to his passing in arms through the strait of Thermopylæ. But the ingenuity of the war-party was ready with an answer. "Not Philip's moderation," they said, "or desire of peace with Athens, but his fear, and the formidable aspect of their troops, and the patriotic firmness of the general Diophantus who commanded them, prevented Greece from being overrun by an army of Macedonians and Thessalians." They did not scruple the extravagance of imputing dismay to the king of Macedonia, and terming his retreat from Thermopylæ, at the head of an army flushed with victory, flight; and they proposed, and the people voted, honours and rewards to Diophantus, for his bloodless and uncontested success, equal to what had ever been given by the republic to any general for the greatest victory, under the severest trial. What failed

of real triumph over the king of Macedonia, and of fame for their general, which they would have equalled with that of Miltiades and Themistocles, was compensated for them in triumph over their fellow-citizens of the peaceful party, which, for the time, was complete.

This however was confined to Athens. Over the rest of Greece other sentiments, and over a great part directly contrary sentiments, prevailed. A worse opinion of the Phocian cause grew, as, under the direction of the war-party, Athens superseded Lacedæmon in its patronage, and at the same time trespass upon the Delphian treasury became more notorious, or stronger grounds were afforded for suspecting its large extent. The ingenuity of the Athenian politicians, and the advantage they possessed in the circumstance that their city was the capital of the literature of the world, were diligently used to divert outcry from themselves toward those whose protection they had undertaken; and the zeal, with which the historian Diodorus has inveighed against the unfortunate Phocians, indicates that they had considerable success. But to a large part of Greece their influence could not reach. Thebes and other states produced historians to transmit what was said against Athens; and a late ancient writer, who among much ineptitude has some good things, may apparently deserve credit for his report of it. “Absurdly the Athenians,” he says it was observed, “would compare their recent measure at Thermopylæ with the glorious exploit of Leonidas there formerly. Then indeed the freedom of Greece was to be vindicated, but now a sacrilegious injury to the nation; then the object was to defend the temples against the rapine of foreign enemies; now to defend the plunderers of those temples against their proper judges. If those who claim to have the best constitution, who certainly have a system of law universally admired, who lead the world

Diod. 1. 16.
c. 60.

Justin. 1. 8.
c. 1.

in philosophy and all learning, will admit and support such enormities, with what hereafter can we reasonably reproach barbarians?"

Nor was it in the power of the Athenian leaders to prevent great and extensive credit accruing to the king of Macedonia. On the contrary, their opposition and obloquy sharpened the zeal of his partisans, and contributed to excite panegyric and attachment, in Greece and beyond it, in some

parts even to excess. "It is incredible," says the same writer, still apparently reporting common

fame not unfaithfully, "what glory the victory over Onomarchus earned to Philip among all nations. 'He was the avenger of sacrilege,' it was said, 'he was the protector of the religion of Greece. For expiation of a crime, which ought to have called out the united strength of the world to oppose and punish, he alone was seen worthy to take the direction. Next to the immortal gods is he by whom the majesty of the gods is vindicated.'" ⁹ Diodorus,

less oratorical, and perhaps less exactly giving the popular expression of the day, is however more pointed and precise in his eulogy. "Philip," he says, "having abolished the tyranny in Pheræ, and given liberty to the city, returned into Macedonia with the credit of having advanced the power and estimation of his kingdom, by his achievements, and by his reverence for the deity." And indeed so his popularity was now established in Thessaly that, whether regularly elected to the situation of tagus, or under what other description vested with the power, he seems to have been henceforward considered, by the Thessalian nation, as the constitutional chief of their confederacy. ¹⁰

⁹ Wesseling has been struck enough with this passage to quote it at length in a note of the 60th chapter of the 16th book of Diodorus, introducing it with the phrase, "Pulchre Justinus."

¹⁰ Τὴν ἐν Φεραῖς τυραννίδα καθείλε, καὶ τῇ πόλει τὴν ἐλευθερίαν ἀποδοῦς ἔπαυ-
 ῆσθαι εἰς Μακεδονίαν, ἠύξηκώς τὴν βασιλείαν ταῖς πράξεσι, καὶ τῇ πρὸς τὸ θεῖον
 εὐσεβείᾳ. Diod. l. 16. c. 38.

SECTION II.

Phajllus Successor to Onomarchus. — Large Assistance to Phocis. — Bœotia invaded, and Epicnemidian Locris conquered. — Phalæcus Successor to Phajllus.

THE overthrow of the great army under Onomarchus, and the reduction of all Thessaly under the power of the party connected with Macedonia and Thebes, were blows requiring the utmost exertion of the supporters of the Phocian cause to repair, if by any exertions they could be repaired; and this, should Macedonia engage earnestly on the opposite side, might seem hardly possible. Hitherto however, notwithstanding provocation given, no symptom had appeared of a disposition in Macedonia to take any forward part. Nevertheless those blows were alarming, perhaps in some degree to the Athenian people generally, but highly to the party which had been directing the administration. The

We find even Demosthenes bearing testimony to Philip's merit with the Thessalians in assisting them against their tyrants, — ἐπὶ τὴν τυραννικὴν οἰκίαν ἐβόηθησι. Olynth. 2 p. 22. Yet in the same oration, a little before, he had spoken of the Thessalians as held in unworthy subjection, and sighing for liberty: οἱ παρὰ τὴν αὐτῶν ἄξίαν δεδουλωμένοι Θετταλοὶ νῦν οὐκ ἂν ἐλεύθεροι γένοιοντο ἄσμενοι; p. 20. Present impression being often, in the Athenian assembly, of great power, an orator might sometimes risk contradictions, to produce way-faring effects. But if he committed his speech to writing, with a view to publication, he would propose to do away what might not bear reflection. The apparent contradiction here however is perhaps nothing more than Demosthenes might deliberately risk, even in writing. It was the body of the Thessalian nation that Philip assisted against the τυραννικὴν οἰκίαν. If among his auditors many would believe that, while he promoted the interest of a party, the body of the Thessalian nation were held in unworthy subjection, and anxious for a change of government, his purpose would be best answered. But were the inconsistency objected to him, or to any of his more informed friends, it would be answered, "You misunderstood the orator: he did not say the Thessalians universally or generally were held in subjection; but that *those* Thessalians, who *were* reduced to unworthy subjection," (namely, the party which had befriended the tyrants, and were now deprived of their superiority of power and privileges,) "desired to recover their former advantages, and no longer to see the government of the country held by their adversaries."

opposition, before powerful, would of course be strengthened by them; yet the superiority still of the war-party had been proved in the extravagant reward procured for its general Diophantus. The sovereign assembly accordingly was persuaded not only to maintain the connection with Phocis, but also to pursue the hostile line taken against Macedonia. In Phocis Phajllus was raised to the dignity of general-autocrator, in the room of his deceased brother Onomarchus. The intimacy of the connection of the Athenian government with the Phocian appears not to have been slackened by the change, and Lacedæmon saw still its interest in supporting Phocis against Thebes.

Trespass upon the sacred treasury seems now to have been carried on with some degree of system by the Phocians in concert with their allies, and with no other reserve than their own views of their own interests dictated. The resource being yet good, to collect another great army would not be difficult. Not only professed mercenaries might be readily obtained, but citizens of allied states, if pay were ready, might be persuaded to take arms. Accordingly in the spring following the death of Onomarchus large succours from friendly states are noticed, for the first time since the death of Philomelus, as joining the Phocian army. Athens

Diod. l. 16.
c. 56.

furnished, according to the historian's report, no less than five thousand foot and five hundred horse, apparently all mercenaries; and yet, he says, the Athenian government received pay from the Delphian treasury for more. Lacedæmon sent one thousand men; Achaia, from various towns, two thousand; and the ejected tyrant of Pheræ himself joined with two thousand. Of these forces, serving in the name of states formerly so jealously arrogating military command, the new general-autocrator of the little province of Phocis was allowed to hold the command-in-chief.

With preparation so expensive considerable enterprise would be in view. It may have been disappointed by some failure in the projected combination; and some jealousy of the purposes of Athens, especially among the Lacedæmonians, might be not unreasonable. Bœotia however was invaded: but, according to the historian, Phaÿllus was twice defeated by the Thebans. It is however evident that he suffered little; the defeats having been perhaps little more than disappointment of attempts to take some towns through intelligence among the people. Failing however of his object, he turned into the Epicnemidian Locris; and the Thebans, whatever may have been their success in their own country, not following to protect their allies, every town yielded to him except Aryca. A party everywherē seems to have favoured the Phocian cause; even at Aryca a gate was opened for him, and some of his troops entered, but, for want of due previous concert, were driven out again.

Diod. l. 16.
c. 37.

The Thebans at length, excited by the loss which earlier exertion perhaps might have prevented, sent their forces into Locris. Phaÿllus, leaving a part of his army to blockade Aryca, led the rest to meet them. But so was the pride of the Theban prowess sunk that, even after advantage gained over a body of Phocians by night near Abæ, they avoided a battle, and, leaving Aryca to its fate, turned into Phocis for plunder. Phaÿllus followed, and put them to flight. Aryca soon after yielded, and thus all the Epicnemidian Locris was gained to the Phocian alliance.

Soon after this conquest, in the third year only yet of the war, the Phocians had the misfortune to lose the third of that extraordinary brotherhood, which had so supported their affairs and raised their fame. Phaÿllus fell, not, as his predecessors, by the sword, but by a consumptive disorder, which

B. C. 352.
Ol. 107. 1.
[Cf. p. 80.]

Diod. l. 16.
c. 37.
Pausan. l. 10.
c. 2.

destroyed him at an age when his faculties of body as well as mind should have been in their fullest vigour. Onomarchus only of the three brothers left a son, Phalæcus, and he was under age; yet such was the popular respect for his father and uncles that he was appointed to the first dignity, civil and military, with the continued title of general-autocrator. To provide assistance for his deficient experience being however indispensable, Mnaseas, one of the most confidential friends of the former generals, was appointed his colleague. In a state otherwise situated such appointments might mark only the ascendancy of family interest, or the power of a party, or the favour of the soldiery. All these probably concurred to produce the elevation of Phalæcus. Yet, in the circumstances of Phocis, all these would have been insufficient without high esteem for the family of those autocrators, not only among the Phocian people but also among all the allied republics of various constitutions; the continuance of whose support was essential to enable any general to hold command, or even existence, in Phocis.

To support that popular estimation which had raised Mnaseas and his youthful colleague to their arduous post, as well as to assist the maintenance of their mercenary force, early exertion in enterprise probably was necessary. Mnaseas, very soon after his elevation, lost his life in action.

Diod. l. 16.
c. 38. His young colleague nevertheless ventured an incursion into Bœotia with a body of horse, but near Chæronea he received a check, which the historian again calls a defeat. The consequences however appear to have been little important, except that the acquisition of Chæronea to the Phocian alliance, the apparent object of the expedition, was prevented. Little enterprises thus were engaging the Phocian arms, while the Thebans remained inert or on the defensive, when movements else-

where called the attention of both, together with that of all the principal states of Greece.

SECTION III.

State of Parties in Athens. — Isocrates; Phocion; Æschines; Demosthenes. — Grecian Settlements in Scythia. — Politics of Demosthenes before he acquired a Share in the Administration.

THE war of oratory at Athens, always of weight in Grecian affairs, had at this critical period more than common importance, when, fortunately for history, it becomes also more known to us through preserved orations. At this time that party of which Chares was the ostensible chief, and which for its measures may be entitled either the high democratical party or the war-party, held still a general ascendancy; yet wholly not unbalanced by the party of better men who, though compelled to profess great reverence for the purest democracy, may perhaps not improperly be named the aristocratical party: their opponents affected to call them the Macedonian.

This party had, for its leaders, all the men whom ancient writers, with remarkable concurrence, have described as the most respectable of their time, or, almost of any time. Isocrates, toward the age of ninety, without having ever held or sought political office, was as the father of the band. Timotheus, now in banishment, if yet living, had been the favourite scholar of Isocrates, and remained always his intimate friend. Iphicrates and Chabrias, (the latter we have seen losing his life in his country's service,) however differing about inferior political interests or private concerns, concurred nearly with Isocrates and Timotheus and each other in general political principles, and on the leading interests of the republic. Phocion, not ill selected by Plutarch, from among all the worthies of all

the republics of Greece, as a model of inflexible integrity in a corrupt age, the fittest parallel to the celebrated Utican Cato, had been coming forward under those three great men, but more particularly attached to Chabrias.

Plut. vit.
Phocion.

Phocion appears to have been of no family eminence, but of wealth that enabled him to attend the philosophical school of Academus, under Plato, and afterward under Xenocrates. His temper was particular; he is said to have been scarcely ever seen either to weep or laugh: with an aspect singularly sour, his manners were mild and pleasant. He chose the military line, and rose early to considerable command under Chabrias, who discerned his superior claim to confidence. Before the Confederate war, when so many synedrian allies paid tribute to Athens, Chabrias, being commander-in-chief, committed to Phocion the office of collecting the tribute, and placed under his orders for the purpose a squadron of twenty triremes. Phocion remonstrated: "To meet enemies," he said, "the force was insufficient; to visit friends, it was needlessly great."¹¹ At his own choice Chabrias allowed him to go with a single trireme. Probably he was contented with smaller presents for himself than the Athenian naval commanders were wont to exact from maritime states; and the appetites of those under him in one ship were of course more easily satisfied than those of the crews of twenty. He made his mission altogether so acceptable as to afford demonstration that, for that time at least, he had rightly estimated the necessary force. Numerous vessels of the allies voluntarily attended his return to Attica, bearing the full amount of the customary tribute.

¹¹ These words rest only on Plutarch's authority; but they relate to a public transaction, and are in consonance with it; whence they may perhaps derive somewhat a higher title to credit than accounts of words passing in private or confidential communication.

The circumstances of the times, the state of parties, and the perils of the republic, rather than his inclination, seem to have led Phocion to engage in civil contest, and become a public speaker ; for which however he had great and singular talents. Not a flowing orator, no speeches have been preserved from him ; but he excelled in quickness of perception and readiness of words for reply and debate. None equalled him in detecting the fallacy of specious argument, which would make the worse appear the better cause, or in the cutting sententiousness with which he exposed it ; whence Demosthenes, who feared him more than any other speaker, is said to have called him the Hatchet. Expectation was thus always kept alive by his speeches ; and hence, curiosity being a prevailing passion of the Athenian many, though he showed scorn, as no other dared, of the common flattery of the orators to them, yet, unless when an adverse party was violent enough and strong enough to overbear all contradiction, he was always well heard.

Opposed to these, in the high democratical cause, the name of most eminence is that of Chares ; whose early promise in military command, which earned him the good report of Xenophon, and whose abandonment of himself afterward to every vice, equally by which a corrupt people might be courted, and for which a corrupt people would allow indulgence, have been already noticed. His eloquence was of the kind for communicating with persons of all ranks and descriptions in conversation, but not for impressing attentive numbers from the bema. To hold high situation therefore, either political or military, under the Athenian government, it was necessary for him to have able orators for his associates ; and he was skilful and fortunate enough to gain support from most of those most eminent in his age. Lysias, Lycurgus, Hegesippus, Hyperides, and others of considerable note, spoke mostly in the high demo-

cratical cause, and were of his party. But of the numbers who contended for public favour, in the general assembly and in multitudinary courts of justice, two now became distinguished for a superiority of talent; whence one has been esteemed the greatest orator Greece, or perhaps the world, ever produced, and the other second only to him, — Demosthenes and Æschines.

It is remarkable, and proves a great change in the character of the Athenian government and the habits and prejudices of the people, that neither of these men, who so rose to the head of the republic, was regularly born an Athenian citizen. Æschines, by some years the elder, is said to have been the son of a slave, Tromes, the domestic of a schoolmaster of Athens. During

Demosth. de
cor. p. 313.

the tyranny of the Thirty, whether attending the flight of his master, or profiting from the confusion of the times to escape from slavery, Tromes passed into Asia, and there entered as a soldier into a band of Grecian mercenaries. It was perhaps then that

Æsch. de
legat. p. 313.
Demosth. ut
sup.

he took opportunity to change the servile appellation of Tromes, for a name of more respectable sound to Grecian ears, Atrometus. On the invitation held out by Thrasybulus for associates in war against the Thirty, he joined the standard of freedom; and, carrying probably some recommendation earned in service in Asia, was

Æsch. ut sup.

appointed, by that great and discerning man, to a situation of some command. In the restored commonwealth, in which by his service he had earned the rank of citizen, he took the profession of schoolmaster.¹² He had married a woman of proper Athenian birth, and sister of a man who rose to considerable military rank, but herself of an occupation highly dis-

Demosth. de
legat. p. 415.
& 431.
Æsch. de leg.
p. 256.
Demosth. de
cor.

¹² Demosthenes, in his oration on the embassy, speaks contemptuously of the father of Æschines as Atrometus the schoolmaster, but not as having

reputable, though required for what the Greeks called religion, a bacchanalian dancer and teacher of bacchanalian ceremonies.

Æschines was one of a numerous progeny from this match. An Athenian citizen, as the son of an Athenian citizen, he was, at the usual age, eighteen, enrolled of the ward into which his father had been admitted, the Pandionidean; and during the next two years he fulfilled the duty of military service within Attica, as required by law for all youths of that age; a duty however, in the growing licentiousness of the people and neglect of the old constitution, so commonly avoided that the performance appears to have been considered as ground for claiming merit. On reaching the age of military manhood, twenty, he joined the Athenian troops, auxiliaries to the Lacedæmonian, in Peloponnesus; and he earned the commendation of his general in the battle of the Nemean glen, defending a convoy going to Phlius, then suffering, as we have formerly seen, for its faithful attachment to Lacedæmon. He continued to serve with the Athenian troops through that war, and was engaged in the great concluding battle of Mantinea.

But military service in Greece rarely led to fortune, and carried no constant pay. After the peace therefore which followed the battle of Mantinea, Æschines took the place of clerk to the council of Five-hundred¹⁵, and at one time he was an actor on the

Æschin.
de legat.
p. 331, 2, 3.

Demosth. de
legat. p. 313.
and 403.
p. 449.

ever been a slave, nor does he mention his servile name Tromes. These circumstances are brought forward only in his oration on the crown, spoken twenty years after, and to which we find no reply from Æschines. Nevertheless the evident lameness of Æschines's account of his family, avoiding all notice of his father's origin and early age, leave us at least at full liberty to believe what Demosthenes would hardly have ventured to assert, could it have been convicted of falsehood. — *Tromes* bears analogy to the English word *Quaker*; *Atrometus* to *Unquaking, Unshaken, Steadfast, Fearless, Dreadnaught*.

¹⁵ The situation of Æschines in public offices is thus described by Demo-

public stage. He was there, as Demosthenes repeatedly mentions, remarked for his fine voice. When, and how introduced, he first began to avail himself of his talents as

Demosth.
in Aristocr.
p. 687.

an orator in the general assembly, we do not learn.

This however, now in Athens truly a trade, became at length the trade of Æschines.

Demosthenes had so far advantage of birth that his father was an Athenian born; but his mother was of half blood, being the produce of an illicit marriage with a Scythian woman. It is moreover remarkable that these two great orators, who became two of the most eminent men, not of Athens only, but of Greece and the civilised world, giving an account each of the other's family and of his own, have both avoided to own a grandfather. Of the maternal grandfather of Demosthenes only report remains, and that from his rival; but authenticated by his own omission of contradiction when occasion offered and required, if it might be done; and the story is interesting enough, with a view to public as well as to private history, to deserve some notice.

The thorny situation of wealthy and eminent men, in the actual state of the Athenian government, not only induced those who had means, as we are told of Iphicrates, Chabrias, and others, to provide foreign retreats, but would operate as temptation to betray the republic for the acquisition of an advantageous retreat. In the failure of Grecian harvests, through continual wars and the political circumstances of the country, to supply food for the population, the singularly productive peninsula, on the northern side of the Euxine

stheneis: Ἐπογραμματούων ὑμῶν (τῷ δήμῳ) καὶ ὑπηρετῶν τῇ βουλῇ, αὐτὸς ἐξηγεῖτο τὸν νόμον τοῦτον τῷ κήρυκι. Demosth. de legat. p. 363. The office seems nearly to have resembled that of the clerks of the houses of parliament with us, and to have been less creditable only because, as Demosthenes a little farther intimates, it was so ill paid that from eighteen-pence to half-a-crown was a bribe for those who held it: Ταῖς ἀρχαῖς ὑπογραμματούοντα, καὶ δυοῖν ἢ τριῶν δραχμῶν πονηρόν. Demosth. de legat. p. 403.

sea, called by the Greeks the Tauric Chersonese, and by us the Crimea, attracted the attention of Grecian merchants. The country was held by a Scythian horde, acknowledging a king, whose authority extended far on the northern shore of the Euxine. But, the Scythians caring little for land and less for trade, the Greeks proceeded from commerce to settlements; which seem to have been made nearly in the manner of the modern European settlements in India. The merchants obtained leave to establish factories, paying a tribute. They fortified the factory; and then, paying still the tribute for the sake of security for their trade, they would however defend their possession against any claim of the sovereign. In this country the Athenians had a settlement, called Nymphæum. The town was considerable, the harbour commodious, the adjacent territory highly fruitful. Gylon, an Athenian, was, under appointment of the Athenian people, governor of this colony when the sovereign of the country desired to recover possession of it. Powerful in the field, the prince was probably aware that, against Grecian fortification, Scythian science in the war of sieges might fail. He therefore entered into negotiation with the governor; who, for the town and territory of Kepi on the same shore as a lordship for himself, with a rich Scythian heiress in marriage, betrayed the trust committed to him by his country, and surrendered Nymphæum to the Scythian king. Cited then to take his trial at Athens, he of course avoided to appear; and, in consequence, according to the practice of the Athenian courts, in his absence he was condemned to death. As a feudatory lord, under a Scythian prince, he was probably secure enough against Athenian vengeance; his return to his native country only was precluded. But when two daughters, born of his irregular marriage, approached womanhood, whether less satisfied with the private

Strab. 1. 7.
p. 307.

Æsch. de
cor. p. 561.
Strab. 1. 7.
p. 309.

manners of the people among whom he was established, or with the existing political circumstances about him, he sent them to Athens. Having acquired wealth in his distant lordship, he offered fortunes with them, of an amount esteemed inviting; perhaps hoping, through the connections he might so make, to procure his own pardon from the people. We have seen some of the most illustrious Athenians marrying the daughters of Thracian princes, with no detriment to their progeny; but possibly those princes might have received the freedom of the city, which would obviate legal objection. One of Gylon's daughters obtained a man of eminence, Demochares; but the match seems to have been considered as derogatory to him. The other took for her husband Demosthenes, a citizen of the Pæanian ward, by trade a sword-cutler.¹⁴

The only child of the latter of these matches, born in the
Dion. Hal. ad Amm. [Cf. p. 99.] fourth year of the ninety-ninth Olympiad, and, from his father, named Demosthenes, was left an orphan of seven years old, with property which ranked him among the wealthy of Athens. Educated as became his fortune, and introduced into life advantageously through his connection with Demochares, he was of course to take his share of the combined evils and honours which the Athenian constitution made the lot of the wealthy.

Demosth. de cor.

¹⁴ Æschines, avoiding specific mention of Demochares, speaks of Gylon's daughters thus: "One married—let it be anybody, that I may not say what may be unpleasant to many: Demosthenes the Pæanian, in contempt of the laws of his country, took the other for his wife." We owe the name of Demochares to the son of the latter match, the celebrated orator, who seems to have been proud of the connection. (Demosth. de cor.) Demosthenes was no favourite character with Plutarch, who has yet shown himself unwilling to allow, though unable to deny, that the most renowned of Grecian orators was, as Æschines has called him, a semibarbarian. The care with which Demosthenes himself has avoided the subject where, in his reply to Æschines, he has strained to represent his birth and connections in the most advantageous light, amounts to an admission that the story of Gylon and his daughters was true beyond controversy.

In earliest manhood he was appointed to the expensive but honourable offices of choregus, or president of theatrical entertainments, and trierarch, or director of the equipment of a ship of war. To the burden of the latter office was annexed the honour of the command of the ship equipped. But while none of the wealthy were legally excusable from the one, many would be very unfit for the other, which therefore was not so rigorously imposed. Demosthenes, though apparently little of a seaman, acted however at one time as a naval captain in the Athenian service. He contributed also to the treasury, as we find him boasting, by gift; called free, but no more to be avoided than the office of trierarch. Nothing however beyond common pressure seems to have been put upon him; yet through his disposition to luxury and ostentation his fortune was quickly dissipated.¹⁵ Want thus drove him to apply his talents to business; and at the age of

Demosth. de cor. p. 312.
Æsch. de cor. p. 563.
vel 78.

Æsch. ut sup. & in Timarch. p. 167. vel 24.
Athen. l. 13. c. 7.

Dion. ad Amm. [Cf. p. 99.]

¹⁵ Plutarch, in his preface to his Life of Demosthenes, well observes that a village-life altogether cannot suit one whose purpose is to write general history, because such a purpose requires opportunity for extensive communication among books and among men, without which the work, whatever may be the writer's talents, will be very defective. For himself, he adds, it was his lot to pass the greater part of his life in a little town; preferring such residence through his attachment to the place, and desirous, through his services, to obviate its otherwise threatened decay. Thus the sad inaccuracy of the general history, which his Lives of great men necessarily involved, may be in large part accounted for; and yet there are some things that still we may wonder at. Few anecdotes of private life remain, from all antiquity, so authenticated as those which have come out in the controversy between Demosthenes and Æschines. If then Plutarch had any library at Chæronea, it might be supposed the works of Demosthenes would have been found in it. Were they not there, or in any library in the place, it might be thought, when he was writing the Life of Demosthenes, extracts the most necessary for his purpose might have been obtained from Athens, if not from some nearer source. But in his Life of Demosthenes he has utterly neglected the great orator's account of himself, given in the most celebrated of his orations, that on the crown. Demosthenes there boasts of his education: *Ἐμοὶ μὲν τοίνυν ὑπῆρξε, παιδὶ μὲν ὄντι, φοιτᾶν εἰς τὰ προσηκόντα διδασκαλεῖα, καὶ ἔχειν ὅσα χρῆ, κ. τ. λ.* Demosth. de cor. p. 312. But Plutarch has not scrupled to say he was absolutely without liberal education: — *τῶν ἐμμελῶν καὶ προσηκόντων ἰλιυθίῳ παιδὶ*

five-and-twenty he began with that employment which had raised Isocrates to fortune, consequence, and fame, composing speeches for suitors in the courts of justice.

Æschines, to balance the disadvantage of his birth, possessed, with great mental abilities, a superior figure, a voice uncommonly melodious and powerful, a reputation for courage repeatedly shown in his country's cause, a private character without stain, and manners that made him generally acceptable.¹⁶

Demosthenes had nothing of all these. A weak habit of body and an embarrassed manner seemed

to deny him, equally as Isocrates, the hope of becoming a speaker to win the attention of listening thousands, and he had the farther great disadvantage of a defective utterance. With this, a sour, irritable temper was repelling to friendship; and an extraordinary deficiency, not only of personal

Demosth.
de cor.
p. 320. &
329. & de
legat. 449.
& al.

Plut. vit.
Demosth.

μαθημάτων ἀπαιδευτὸς δοκεῖ γενέσθαι. Vit. Demosth. p. 847. Again we find Demosthenes proceeding to boast of the figure he made on coming of age, for which considerable wealth was necessary:—'Ἐξεληθόντι δὲ ἐκ παίδων, τὰ-κάλουθα τούτοις πράττειν, χορηγεῖν, τριηραρχεῖν, εἰσφέρειν, μηδεμίᾳς φιλοτιμίας μήτε ἰδίας μήτε δημοσίας ἀπολείπεισθαι. Ibid. Yet Plutarch represents him, on coming of age, as absolutely penniless: *ἐκπερᾶσαι μὲν οὐδὲ πολλοστὸν ἡδυίθη μέρος τῶν πατρῶων.* It seems probable that Plutarch made notes from books as he had opportunity, in his residence at Rome and elsewhere, whence, and from his small library at Chæronea, his occasional references to books for historical matters. In composing then his great work, in his little native city, when both his library and his notes failed him, he would recur to the uncertain store of his recollection; and when all these did not suffice to complete his picture to his mind, a striking effect being necessary in every one of his Lives, he seems (judging from other remaining accounts, and some of the highest authority) to have been very little scrupulous of adding from his own invention. It follows by no means that his assistance is to be wholly rejected; but, as observed heretofore in the text, that his word is not to be taken without considerable circumspection and caution.

¹⁶ Demosthenes has ingeniously attempted to make even the advantageous person of his rival an object of ridicule, calling him "that fine statue," *τὸν καλὸν ἀνδριάντα.* Demosth. de cor. p. 270. His uncommon power and melody of voice he repeatedly mentions for the purpose of cautioning the hearers against their effect. Against his manners, his military merit, or even his private character, he seems not to have had an insinuation to oppose. The charge, so often reciprocally made, by contending politicians among the Greeks, of corruption in public business, will come under notice hereafter.

courage, but of all that constitutes dignity of soul, made respect difficult and esteem apparently impossible. Nor were these defects shown only among familiar acquaintance; they were exhibited in public, and made extensively notorious. In the earliest youth he earned an opprobrious nickname by the effeminacy of his dress and manner. On emerging from minority, by the Athenian law, at five-and-twenty, he earned another opprobrious nickname by a prosecution of his guardians, which was considered as a dishonourable attempt to extort money from them.* Not long after, when

Æsch. de cor.
Plut. vit.
Demosth.
p. 847.
Æsch. de cor.
p. 441.
Plut. vit.
Demosth.
p. 851. &
v. dec. Or.
p. 844.

[* “ Mr. Mitford, who is not favourable to Demosthenes, asserts that this prosecution of his guardians ‘ was considered as a dishonourable attempt to extort money from them.’ He quotes Æschines, de Coron. and Plutarch, Vit. Demosth. as authorities for this charge. The passage of Æschines, which Mr. Mitford has in view, (for in the oration de Coronâ there is nothing to his purpose,) is probably the following: *Fals. Leg. p. 41. 15. ed. Steph. ἐκ παιδῶν ἀπαλλακτομένους καὶ δεκαταλάντους δίκας ἐκάστω τῶν ἐπιτρόπων λαγχάνων* Ἄεργας ἐκλήθη. Some deduction ought in reason to be made from the charges of an adversary, which are not to be considered as containing strict historical truth. But in reality the terms of Mr. Mitford much exceed the measure of what is expressed even by Æschines. The account which Plutarch gives has directly an opposite meaning: *ὡς γοῦν ἐν ἡλικίᾳ γενόμενος τοῖς ἐπιτρόποις ἤρξατο δικάζεσθαι, καὶ λογογραφεῖν ἐπ’ αὐτοὺς, πολλὰς διαδύσεις καὶ παλιδικίας εὐρίσκοντας — οὐκ ἀκινδύνως οὐδ’ ἀεργῶς κατευτυχήσας, ἐκπρᾶξαι μὲν οὐδὲ πολλοστὸν ἰδυνίθη μέρους τῶν πατρῶων.* Vit. Demosth. c. 6. Besides, it is utterly improbable that a boy of eighteen or nineteen (*puer admodum*, according to Quintilian, *μικροκώλλιον κομιδῆ*, according to Demosthenes himself, in *Mid. p. 539. ed. Reisk.*) should have acquired sufficient influence to be successful in an unfounded charge against his guardians. In Mr. Mitford’s narrative indeed this improbability does not appear, because he represents Demosthenes to be *twenty-five* at the time of the prosecution; *on emerging from minority, by the Athenian law, at five-and-twenty, he earned another opprobrious nickname by a prosecution of his guardians.* But the testimonies which I have collected in the preceding inquiry demonstrate that this was plainly impossible. Even the erroneous dates of the pseudo-Plutarch only make the orator twenty-two at the time: and Mr. Mitford could not profit by those dates, because he himself adopts the chronology of Dionysius; fixing, with that writer, the birth of Demosthenes at the fourth year of the ninety-ninth Olympiad. [p. 96.] It is probable that, by inadvertence, he applied to the prosecution of the guardians that date, twenty-five years, which his author Dionysius applied to the *first public cause*: *δημοσίους λόγους ἤρξατο γράφειν — εἰκοστὸν καὶ πέμπτον ἔχων ἔτος.* Dionys. ad Amm. p. 724.” Clinton, *Fasti Hellen.* pp. 353-4. The reader desirous of accurate information respecting the age of

in the office of choregus, which carried high dignity, he took blows publicly in the theatre from a petulant youth of rank, named Midias; brought his action for the assault, and compounded it for, it was said, thirty mines, about a hundred pounds. His cowardice in the field became afterward notorious. Even his admirers seem to have acknowledged that his temper was uncertain, his manners awkward; that he was extravagant in expense, and greedy of gain; an unpleasant companion, a faithless friend, a contemptible soldier, and of notorious dishonesty, even in his profession of an advocate. Yet so transcendent were the faculties of his mind and the powers of his eloquence that, after having, by great assiduity judiciously directed, overcome the defects of his utterance, he quickly made himself mighty among the multitude, terrible to his enemies, and necessary to his party.

Æsch. de
legat. p. 514.
de cor.
p. 440, 441.
Plut. vit.
Demosth.
p. 852.

extravagant in expense, and greedy of gain; an unpleasant companion, a faithless friend, a contemptible soldier, and of notorious dishonesty, even in his profession of an advocate. Yet so

In all governments, free enough to give opportunity for fortune to be made by speaking, the young adventurer finds the widest field for displaying talent and catching popular favour, and far least requiring care and circumspection and scruple, in opposing the existing administration; unless where, in a democracy, the opposition wants to restrain popular tyranny, while the administration finds an interest in supporting it. But any administration must want occasionally to moderate the extravagances of popular sovereignty; so that, in taking the side of opposition, the opportunity for invective, the easiest and readiest artillery of the orator, will always be surest. Of the political outset of Æschines no information remains. He was already, when first noticed as a public character, eminent in that party of which Chares, if not the principal director, was the most eminent person,

the man who had most filled high situations, and who bore the most extensive influence among the sovereign many.

Demosthenes was yet but a candidate for that party-connection which might lead to power, when, in the second year of the Phocian war, Chares and his partisans, after peace made with the revolted allies, wanting a field for military adventure, desired to lead the republic into a war with Persia. Then, at the age of nine-and-twenty, he delivered a speech, already noticed, in treating of the circumstances of the times, the first that seems to have attracted public attention enough to induce its publication; and he spoke in opposition. The orators of the war-party, who had spoken before him, had been endeavouring, by strained panegyric of the heroic deeds of their forefathers against the Persians, to incite the many to concurrence in their purposes. Demosthenes, in an opening of singular art, elegance, and conciseness, admitting the deeds of their forefathers to have been above all praise, turned their panegyric, and argument founded on it, most successfully into ridicule. He then proceeded to say, "that he considered the king" (for, as usual among the Greeks, he called the king of Persia simply THE KING) "as the common enemy of Greece; but then he wholly doubted any intention of the Persian court to proceed to actual war. It would therefore," he contended, "be rashness for Athens to provoke hostility from so mighty a foe. As for that union of the Greeks, proposed on the other side, it was obviously not to be effected. Many Grecian states, it was well enough known, were much more disposed to trust the king of Persia than one another. Nevertheless preparation was advisable, against hostility from Persia, and from all others." The whole speech is temperate in style, clear and powerful in argument, and apparently was successful in effect; for the project of carrying war into Asia failed.

B. C. 354.
Ol. 106. 5.
Ch. 37. s. 8.
of this Hist.

Demosth.
περι συμμα-
ριων.

Nevertheless the war-party, with unabated diligence looking around for opportunities, proceeded to engage the republic in projects of complex hostility; conquest in Thrace, conquest in Macedonia through support to Methone, conquest in Thessaly with the arms of Phocis, and conquest, or what would be equivalent to important conquest, in Greece itself, through the establishment of a commanding influence in Phocis. To avow these projects beforehand, to their sovereign the Athenian people, would be to proclaim them to all the world, which would be to prepare their defeat; yet from their sovereign the Athenian people they must obtain the means for carrying them into execution. Under this difficulty they ventured upon the bold attempt, formerly noticed, to persuade the people to surrender, for the purposes of war, some of those gratifications which, under the sanction of severe laws, consumed almost the whole of the public revenue.

Demosth.
περὶ συν-
ταξέως,
p. 169.

Demosthenes now again spoke in opposition. He had, as his speech indicates, already made himself conspicuous, so as to be confident of popular attention while he gave to invective against Chares and his associates a stronger tone. He objected to the proposed abolition of distributions from the treasury; the purpose being, he said, to raise a mercenary force for the generals of their party to command, more for their private interest than any public good. If war must be made, if troops were wanted, the citizens themselves should serve, as in good times of old. "Were your armies composed of citizens," he says, "your generals would not, as now, plunder allies without seeing enemies; on the contrary, they would do that by your enemies which they do now by your allies. But those whom you now support in the highest situations are carelessly employed in canvassing for those situations; slaves to the favour of the voter, sedulous to procure ad-

vancement to the dignity of general, and careless of every deed becoming a man. — Thus, in our assemblies, an orator is commander-in-chief, a general under him, and the wealthy in array under both: you, the citizens, are divided, some under one leader, some under another; and what you gain at last by your contention is, that one leading man is honoured with a brazen statue, another acquires wealth and consideration, one or two rule the republic, and you look on with habitual indifference, abandoning to them, to use for their own purposes, what should make a whole people respectable and happy.”

But, in thus opposing those who had risen as leaders of the democratical cause, and held their power by their credit as its supporters, Demosthenes had no view to concur with Isocrates and Phocion in imposing legal restraints upon popular despotism. He already saw his line. For the favourite of an individual sovereign to have the greatest means of wealth and power, the power of the sovereign himself must be unlimited; and so, for the favourite of a people to have the greatest means, the despotism of the people must be complete. After therefore representing the Athenian democracy such as every democracy must be, if it settles into any order, the many nominally, but one or two really ruling, he proceeds to recommend a jealous vindication of the most unbalanced democratical tyranny. “The cause,” he says, “of the superior condition of the republic in former times was, that then the people was despot and lord of all¹⁷: honour, authority, good of every kind, all depended upon the people.” While he asserted this, the impossibility that the people could hold and exercise such power, the necessity that they must employ some favourite who would be the real ruler, was no secret to him.

¹⁷ Τότε μὲν ὁ δῆμος ἦν διαπότῃς καὶ κύριος ἀπάντων. Demosth. περὶ συντάξεως, p. 175.

For preventing the abolition of the distributions, the passions and prejudices of the many would be ready assistants; and so far the orator seems to have succeeded. But he was not equally successful in persuading the people to take foreign service upon themselves, or in preventing new and cruel oppression, in the old course, with armies of foreign mercenaries. It was in the same summer that Chares, with a mercenary force, destroyed the Sestians, and, providing means for Athenian citizens to take possession of the best lands of the Thracian Chersonese, earned favour with the Athenian people.

SECTION IV.

Project of the Lacedæmonian Government for an extensive Arrangement of Interests in Greece. — Tract of Isocrates entitled Archidamus. — Constitution of the new Arcadian City of Megalopolis. — Oration of Demosthenes against the Project. — War in Peloponnesus. — Imperfect Accommodation. — Continuation of the Sacred War between Phocis and Thebes.

THE ambitious purposes of the war-party at Athens being defeated by the victory of the Pagasæan bay, with the ensuing expulsion of the tagus of Thessaly and subjection of his party in that country, the victorious king of Macedonia avoided interference in the disputes of the republics, not even pushing his advantages against Athens. Greece was thus left to its own discord. A chance of amended lot seemed offered in the very weakness to which the principal republics were reduced by the consequences of their ambition. The recent check to the means of the war-party in Athens was great. Thebes, beside the whole Epicnemidian Locris, and part of the Ozolian, had lost some considerable towns of Bœotia itself: but, what was perhaps more important, her failing energy in war and failing wisdom in politics were become notorious, whence followed a rapid

decay of the high estimation acquired under Epaminondas, so that she was verging toward her old condition of a subordinate power. Lacedæmon, risen somewhat from the brink of ruin, but not yet in circumstances to entertain extensive views of ambition, looked nevertheless unceasingly to the recovery of Messenia, for which the situation of Greece seemed to offer now some improved hope.

It was too ordinary, as we have seen, among the Grecian republics, and most among the most democratical, to avoid a liberal communion of interest with other Grecian states; and, in prosecuting purposes of ambition each for itself, to deny all share in advantages to all others. But, under the admonition which Lacedæmon had derived from sufferings, the king Archidamus being the principal mover, a plan was put forward not unworthy of his character for wisdom, moderation, and liberality. The recovery of the dominion of Messenia for Lacedæmon was of course the first object; but benefit was proposed to other commonwealths, as widely and equitably perhaps as the divided state of Greece, where some one generally must lose what another gained, would easily admit. Restitution was the principle: Athens was to regain her frontier town and territory of Oropus, Demosth. pro Megalop. p. 203. & 206. now under the dominion of Thebes. The unfortunate people of the Bœotian towns, desolated by the Thebans, Orchomenus, Thespiæ, and Platæa, were to be restored: Tricranum, unjustly withheld by the Argives, was to be recovered for the Phliasians: a part of Triphylia, apparently that conquered by the Arcadians, was to return under the dominion of the Eleans: "some of the Arcadians," such is the phrase of Demosthenes, "were to have again their own proper territories." The import of this cautious expression would be hardly now to be gathered, but for the account remaining from Xenophon, of the founding of the new Arcadian city of Megalopolis. From the tenor of the oration of Demosthenes,

compared with that account and with the narrative of Diodorus, it becomes evident that the Arcadians to be restored were those unfortunate men who had been forced, by democratical tyranny, from residence on their estates, and, with the destruction of their houses and villages, compelled to live, under the jealous eye of democratical rulers, in Megalopolis, as the capital of Arcadia.

For success in this extensive arrangement, which could not be carried into effect but by force or terror of arms, the concurrence of the Athenian government was especially necessary; and it seems probable that concert was early held on it with that party in Athens which desired that arms should be used only to procure justice to the injured, repression for the turbulent, and repose for Greece. There remains from Isocrates a political pamphlet, in the form of a speech of the king of Lacedæmon, Archidamus, which had been published with the evident purpose of preparing the Greeks generally for the measure, but especially the Athenian people.* The state of the Athenian government and Athenian parties required cautious expression about popular interest, and very delicate treatment of popular prejudices. Hence apparently Isocrates has referred so much to old and even fabulous times,

Isocr. Archid.

[* " *Isocratis* ' *Αρχίδαμος*. Written at the juncture of the peace, B. C. 366, to urge the Lacedæmonians *ύφίσθαι ούδέποτε, ήν παρὰ τών πατέρων παρέλαβον Μισσήνην, ταύτης στερηθῆναι*. Xen. Hel. vii. 4. 9. *Συνετάξατο 'Αρχιδάμω νέω μὲν ὄντι καὶ οὐπω βασιλεύοντι*. Dionys. Isocrat. p. 551. The oration itself attests that it was composed before the battle of Mantinea, and before the second invasion of Laconia: c. 24. p. 127. d. ed. Steph. *ἅπαξ ήττηθέντις καὶ μιᾶς εισβολῆς γενομένης* (referring to Leuctra and to the expedition in B. C. 369): and it is affirmed that Agesilaus is still living: c. 3. p. 117. d. *τοῦ πατρὸς βασιλεύαντος, αὐτὸς δ' ἐπίδοξος ἂν τυχεῖν ταύτης τῆς τιμῆς*. Nor is anything discussed beyond the single question of the recovery of Messenia. Mr. Mitford therefore is not quite accurate when he places this piece in B. C. 353, and considers it as an exposition by king Archidamus of future arrangements. He had already, in Vol. VI. p. 254., placed it at the true period, B. C. 366." Clinton, *Fasti Hellen.* p. 117. Mr. Mitford, in the volume referred to, has not only placed this oration at the true period, but more correctly termed it, "in the form of a speech of the prince Archidamus," &c.]

venturing little on the actual state of things. He has however enough indicated that he, and those who concurred on political subjects with him, reckoned the revival of the Messenian state, such as it was under Theban patronage, no way beneficial to Athens, no way tending to the general independency of Greece, no way an act of justice even to the persons put in possession of the country, unless perhaps to a very small proportion of them, but really a transfer only of the sovereignty of the country from the Lacedæmonians to the Thebans, whose purpose was to subdue Lacedæmon, Athens, and all Greece.¹⁸ Hopeless as was, what all true patriots would most desire, a political union of the whole Greek nation, they considered the proposed arrangement as the most extensively beneficial for the present, and affording the best hope of opportunity for an improved state of things in future, that, with the consideration necessary for them of the particular interest of the Athenian commonwealth, could in existing circumstances be reasonably attempted; an arrangement by which the numerous little states, anxious for independency, and unable severally to maintain it, might best avoid the tyranny of one republic, which they had learned from experience of all things to dread, and subjection under a monarch, of which alarm was now industriously circulated. Thebes being depressed, Athens would remain the unrivalled head of the democratical cause. Lacedæmon would be raised no more than might be necessary to hold the lead of the aristocratical. Northward of the isthmus democracy, within Peloponnesus aristocracy, would preponderate; and between the two, more than at any former time, would be established the balance which had always

¹⁸ This transfer of the dominion of Messenia from Lacedæmon to Thebes and the purpose of the Thebans, have been noticed by Dionysius Halicarnassus; who, though more an elegant scholar than a deep politician, saw farther than most other writers under the Roman empire into the real character of the republican times of Greece. *Dion. Hal. de Isocr.*

been found the best protection for the smaller republics, and altogether most beneficial for the nation.

But the party of Chares having, as the extant orations of Demosthenes show, and even not obscurely avow, the same view to the sovereignty of Greece for themselves in the name of the Athenian people, as the Theban leaders in the name of the Theban people, would, for no general advantage of Greece, or even separate advantage of Athens, allow an increase of power to Lacedæmon, which might be efficacious to obstruct that view. On the contrary, seeing in the circumstances of the moment opportunity for promoting their great purpose by contesting with Thebes the lead of the democratical interest in Peloponnesus, they resolved to use it at whatever risk of offence to Lacedæmon: whose alliance, should they succeed, they might perhaps despise.

In opposing the project of Lacedæmon, what they selected, as principal matter to contest in the assembly of the people, was the change proposed at Megalopolis. The founding of the new city had been a measure ingeniously conceived, and ably executed, (it is said by Epaminondas,) for a lasting curb upon Lacedæmon, and it had proved singularly efficacious for securing the new state of Messenia against the superiority of the Lacedæmonian arms. The site was chosen for the command it held of the principal pass from Arcadia into Laconia. The population was compounded with a view to make it always hostile to Lacedæmon, and necessarily dependent on Thebes. The greater part of the Arcadian land-owners, compelled to migrate thither, were warmly attached to aristocratical government and to the Lacedæmonian connection. The democratical party, under whose rule they were placed in Megalopolis, adverse of course to Lacedæmon, wanted the support of some powerful state the more, as their aristocratical fellow-citizens were always ready to join their enemies.

Argos was of their confederacy ; but Argos could not always protect itself, and of course could not be depended upon alone for protecting them. Thus Megalopolis was as an outpost for Thebes against Laconia, whence, if Messenia were attacked, inroad upon the Lacedæmonian lands was ready. But were the aristocratical land-owners allowed to return to their villages, and live, under their former constitution, with arms in their hands, as free members of the Arcadian nation, and no longer subjects of the Megalopolitan democracy, they would be a check upon the democratical population there, for prevention of inroad into Laconia, as Megalopolis itself was upon Lacedæmon for prevention of the employment of its force in Messenia. This therefore was what the Lacedæmonians desired ; and it was so just in itself, and so little obviously interfering with any just interest of Athens, that, when proposed in the Athenian assembly, as the desire equally of Lacedæmon, now so long the necessary and beneficial ally of Athens, and of the Arcadian land-owners themselves, accompanied with the offer of the strength of Lacedæmon to assist Athens in recovering Oropus from the Thebans, it might seem difficult to find arguments likely to be popular in support of the denial of it.

The purpose of Lacedæmon however no sooner became known than the democratical Megalopolitans carried their complaints to every state in Greece, where they could hope to interest a party ; and, though virtually at war with Athens, since Athens had quitted the Theban alliance for the Lacedæmonian, they did not scruple, as apparently they did not fail of encouragement, to solicit the favour of the Athenian people to their cause. Ministers being sent from Lacedæmon to negotiate the proposed arrangement with the Athenian government, ministers also attended from Megalopolis ; and both were equally allowed to address the assembly of the people which was to decide on the measure.

The superior talents of Demosthenes for public speaking had now raised him to importance, and he appears to have been already engaged in the party of Chares. Having always professed zeal for the most unlimited democracy, he was secure against any charge of inconsistency in taking, with that party, the patronage of the democratical Megalopolitans. His speech on the occasion, which has fortunately been preserved, is among the most striking examples, not of his fire, which he always knew how and when to suppress, but of his art, which the occasion especially required, and in which perhaps he not less excelled. What however principally gives it importance for history is the politics it unfolds. The existing alliance of Athens with Lacedæmon, and war with Thebes, made the business of the advocate for Megalopolis, the ally of Thebes, difficult and delicate before the Athenian people. His resource was in the popular disposition to that narrow and dishonest patriotism, which would scruple nothing to promote the interest of the Athenian people, at the expense of all the rest of Greece and the world. That profligate principle, which the party of Chares appears always to have asserted, Demosthenes is found directly avowing first, among his published works, in the oration for the Megalopolitans. There he urges, that the interest of the Athenian people required the depression of their allies the Lacedæmonians, not less than that of their enemies the Thebans. The interest of the democratical Megalopolitans then he most artfully puts forward by affecting contempt for them, and representing them as worthy any regard of the Athenian people only as, through any favour to them, the interest of the Athenian people might be promoted. The result of the contest is not reported ; but it remains among ancient writers to be gathered that, though the Athenian people were not prevailed upon directly and openly to oppose their allies the Lacedæmonians, yet the associates of Isocrates

could procure no concurrence in the arrangement proposed by Lacedæmon.

Failing thus at Athens, the Lacedæmonians resolved nevertheless to use the opportunities, otherwise favouring, for prosecuting their purpose. Their hope seems to have been founded, on one side, on the weakness which Thebes had shown in the Sacred war, and the decay of Theban influence over the extensive confederacy which Epaminondas had led ; on the other it rested much on the abhorrence in which the Arcadian land-owners held their democratical government, and the Theban patronage which supported it, and on their desire of the restoration of that Lacedæmonian patronage, under which they and their forefathers had been accustomed to hold their estates in better freedom and more security, and which they considered as an inherited right and privilege. To give encouragement and opportunity then for these men to declare themselves, a Lacedæmonian army marched into the Megalopolitan territory.

B. C. 352.
Ol. 107. 1.
Diod. l. 16.
c. 39.

This measure excited an interest through Greece such as to produce a kind of transfer of the Sacred war into Peloponnesus. The states of the Theban confederacy seem to have considered the support of the democratical cause in Peloponnesus as more their interest than the oppression of Phocis ; and those who would not hearken to the call of the Amphictyons, when they suspected the result might be to place the Delphian treasury at the mercy of Thebes, would march at the cry of the democratical Megalopolitans to defend them against the Lacedæmonians and aristocracy. The Theban general Cephision, for here again (what has never yet occurred in the war with Phocis) a Theban general is designated by his name, Cephision led four thousand foot with five hundred horse into Peloponnesus : the whole force of Sicyon, of Messenia, and of the democratical Arcadians,

presently arranged themselves under his orders, and the Argives were preparing to join him.

Soon after the death of Phajllus, or perhaps before it, the policy of the war-party in Athens towards Phocis was changed: the connection with the autocrator-general and the executive government of Phocis slackened, and some democratical party-leaders were encouraged in opposition to them. Hence to cultivate again the Lacedæmonian connection became highly important for the Phocian government, and on this the Lacedæmonian government seems to have had some reliance in taking its measures against Megalopolis. Under these circumstances, when the Theban army moved into Peloponnesus, the Phocians did not take any advantage of it for measures directly against Thebes, but sent three thousand foot, with a hundred and fifty horse, to join the Lacedæmonians.

The utmost force however that Archidamus could collect was so inferior to the united numbers of the Thebans and their Peloponnesian allies that the aspect of things was threatening for Lacedæmon. But the Argives were yet only moving to join their confederates, and had not passed the bounds of their own territory, when Archidamus, by an unexpected movement with the Lacedæmonian forces only, attacked and dispersed them. The town of Orneæ presently after yielded to his arms; and by that acquisition, he gave at the same time increased security to Laconia, and provided new means for checking the exertions of Argos. Proceeding then to join the Phocian army, their united force amounted still scarcely to half the numbers already under the Theban general's orders.

Nevertheless, aware of the difference since the ability of Epaminondas no longer directed the Theban arms, Archidamus did not fear to meet the ill-compounded mass. A battle ensued of doubtful issue, so that both sides claimed

the victory. But many of the Peloponnesian allies of Thebes, to enjoy the fruit of their claim, went directly home; a kind of desertion which even the influence of Epaminondas, we have formerly seen, could not always prevent. Archidamus meanwhile, being fortunately able to keep his army together, gained essential advantage by taking the Arcadian town of Elissus.

Ch. 27. s. 3.
of this Hist.

The Theban leaders however, after their Peloponnesian confederates had indulged themselves with a short visit to their families, found means to collect their strength again with added numbers; and, Cephision still commanding, they defeated the Lacedæmonian forces commanded by Anaxander, and made the general prisoner. They were superior also in two following actions, but apparently little important; for the Lacedæmonians afterward gained a complete victory.

What then led to negotiation we are not informed, nor why the Lacedæmonians, after their success, consented to the terms on which a partial peace was concluded. There is some ground for conjecture only that the king of Macedonia, solicited by the Thebans and Peloponnesians for assistance, interfered as mediator. Peace was made between the Lacedæmonians and Megalopolitans, leaving things nearly as they stood before the war, and the Theban forces withdrew from Peloponnesus.

Diod. l. 16.
c. 39.

The unfortunate country, the seat of the Sacred war, thus had but a short respite. Whether in the autumn of the same year, or in the following spring, Phalæcus invaded Bœotia. Encouraged apparently by a party in Chæronea, he made his way into that town, but was driven out again. The Thebans then collecting their forces revenged themselves by invading Phocis, and, finding no effectual opposition, carried off much booty. But both parties were now so exhausted that

B. C. 352—
351.
Ol. 107. 1.

Diod. ut sup.

Diod. 1. 16.
c. 40.

neither could prosecute offensive war longer than plunder would afford means and encouragement.

Incursion for plunder and waste was occasionally repeated on both ; and, with this destructive kind of warfare, the hostile spirit remained as when the war began.

Thus, though Athens had no share in the business of arms, all the advantage of this new Peloponnesian war was for the Athenian war-party, and for them complete. The result of the complex contest was precisely what Demosthenes stated, in his speech for the Megalopolitans, as what the Athenians should most desire : Lacedæmon was confined to a state of depression, Thebes nearly exhausted, and Greece more than ever divided.¹⁹

¹⁹ The French translator of the orators, Auger, has given a very different account of the result of the oration of Demosthenes for the Megalopolitans. "Ce discours," he says, "fut prononcé dans la quatrième année de la CVI. Olympiade Il fit sur les Athéniens l'impression qu'il devait faire: ils envoyèrent à Mégalopolis une armée, sous la conduite d'un de leurs généraux, qui remit les choses dans leur premier état, et y rappela les familles qui avaient commencé à retourner dans leurs anciennes patries." Where he found authority for this he has not said ; nor can I guess what may have led him to the imagination, unless some imperfect recollection of the account given by Diodorus of interference in the affairs of Megalopolis twelve years before, attributed, by an error apparently of the transcriber, to the Athenians instead of the Thebans. But Auger's reputation as an editor and translator may require that, on some convenient occasion, farther notice be taken of his boldness in assertion on historical subjects, and extreme negligence of investigation.

Meanwhile it may be allowed here to notice a matter hardly to be passed without observation. Modern writers of ancient history have mostly followed some of the later ancients in reporting an expedition of Philip into Peloponnesus. Among the contemporary orators no mention is found of it, nor in the annals of Diodorus. The modern learned, who have most studied the matter, have differed much in conjecture, having ground for no more than conjecture, concerning the time when it happened ; some thence have placed it before, others after, the war reported in the text. It seems to me difficult to assign for such war any time in which it might not be shown from the contemporary orators that it could not be ; and it is therefore principally for the support it may appear to derive from so early and so very respectable an historian as Polybius that I think it worthy of any discussion. With regard to Polybius then, it is to be observed that he does not, in his own person, at all mention the matter ; that he introduces two contending orators, an Acarnanian and an Ætolian, speaking of it. The expressions which he puts into the mouths of these orators may imply, and probably will at first impress the reader with the

SECTION V.

Sedition at Rhodes. — Speech of Demosthenes for the Rhodians. — Troubles of Eubœa. — Phocion Commander of the Athenian Forces in Eubœa. — Battle of Tamynæ. — Embassy from Thebes to the Court of Persia. — Treaties of Subsidy between the Persian Court and the Grecian Republics.

WHILE the democratical cause, fostered by the two hostile governments of Thebes and Athens, was thus gaining ground

idea, that Philip son of Amyntas in person made war in Peloponnesus; but they do not necessarily imply it. The modern phrase is familiar, that Louis XIV. made war in Spain, and Louis XV. made war in America; not meaning to say that those princes were ever in those countries. It is then to be observed that Philip's *speculating* in Peloponnesus is found repeatedly mentioned by Demosthenes. In the oration on the crown his first speculation there is noticed; ὅτι πρῶτον ἐκείνος εἰς Πελοπόννησον παρεδύετο, p. 252. In the second Philippic we are told that he required the Lacedæmonians to resign their claim to the dominion of Messenia, and threatened that otherwise a great force should march against them, p. 69. In the third Philippic his speculations in Peloponnesus are again mentioned, p. 115. In the oration on the letter, delivered after every assigned and imaginable time of the expedition, embassies from the Peloponnesians to Philip are mentioned, and alliances with him, but no war made by him. Finally then, in the oration on the crown again, delivered several years after Philip's death, the zeal with which many Peloponnesian states sought his alliance, and the civil war between the Macedonian and Anti-Macedonian parties in Elea are mentioned, but no war made by Philip. This seems to me conclusive against his having ever interfered either in person, or by any Macedonian force, in any war in Peloponnesus. But we find Æschines mentioning that the Megalopolitans, and other Peloponnesians, hostile to Lacedæmon, took offence at Athens for her connection with Lacedæmon; though the connection of Athens with Lacedæmon was never very friendly. The same Peloponnesian states were those so zealous in the Macedonian connection; and though we find no mention of Macedonia from Diodorus, in his account of the war under the Theban Cephision in Peloponnesus, yet, if Philip did at all interfere, it would be against Lacedæmon; nor does it seem improbable but that some threats, such as Demosthenes has mentioned without noticing the precise occasion, may have assisted to produce the final accommodation, on terms perhaps better so accounted for than under any other consideration. Possibly then such may have been the grounds on which the orators mentioned by Polybius, and Polybius himself, may have considered the king of Macedonia as principally contributing to the effects which the war produced.

Pausanias mentions a military station which he saw near Mantinea, called Philip's camp. The ignorance of the country people, in his age, would be likely enough to attribute this to the more celebrated, Philip, though it were

in Greece, the embers of its fire, nearly smothered by the event of the confederate war, broke out afresh on the eastern side of the Ægean. In Rhodes, renowned for the liberality of its aristocracy, and the prosperity of its people under a mixed constitution, the contention of adverse factions became violent. A common evil of civil contest ensued; foreign aid was sought by the weaker, and, in turn, by each party. Alliance had been ancient, and probably of mutual benefit, between the Rhodians, under their aristocratical government, and the people of the neighbouring continent of Caria, whose constitution was monarchical; being a kind of feudal principality under the Persian empire, whence the sovereign, or first magistrate, was called sometimes prince or king, sometimes satrap. In that principality Artemisia had recently succeeded to the authority of her deceased husband Mausolus. The aristocratical Rhodians, unable to withstand the democratical party, and fearing from its sovereignty worse oppression than from any foreign power, applied to that princess; and to prevent the evil they most dreaded, received a Carian garrison into their citadel. Their superiority being by this dangerous expedient ensured, what had been their fear became that of their adversaries, the chief of whom fled.²⁰

really, as it is likely to have been, the work of the later king of Macedonia of that name, who did command armies in Peloponnesus. As for such writers as Frontinus, whose books are but bundles of stories, when they have found a good one they must find good names for the principal personages; and all will not be so honest as Ælian, whom we find sometimes confessing that he cannot tell to which of two or three great men a remarkable deed or a pithy saying should be attributed.

²⁰ Such are the plain and probable facts to be gathered from Demosthenes. But some embellishing circumstances of apparently the same story have been given by the great teacher of ancient architecture, Vitruvius. The democratical leaders, he says, having obtained complete possession of the government of Rhodes, sent a fleet to Halicarnassus, the capital of Caria, with the purpose of extending the democratical interest by exciting revolt against Artemisia. The princess, apprised of the purpose, captured the whole, and

In the war of the allies against Athens, in which we have seen Rhodes taking a principal share, the Rhodian many had been forward and zealous; all parties concurring in aversion to the dominion of the Athenian people, of which experience was then recent. Whether encouragement from Athens had promoted the sedition which at length produced the flight of the democratical chiefs, does not appear, but there was a disposition ready in the war-party there to forgive former offences for the sake of advantage to be derived from future services. Not probably without some assurance of the existence of such a disposition, they addressed supplication to the Athenian people for assistance against their aristocratical fellow-citizens who now held Rhodes. Demosthenes undertook to be their advocate, and his speech on the occasion remains extant; interesting especially for its farther display of the great orator's political principles.

Demosth.
pro Rhod.

The business was of considerable nicety; for prejudice was strong in the minds of the Athenian many against the Rhodians, whom they had been taught, by those who now desired favour for them, to consider as rebellious subjects; and to reckon the democratical party, under those circumstances, more especially objects of indignation. Fearing directly to meet this prejudice, the orator's art to obviate its opposition to his purpose is remarkable. "It was not the cause of the Rhodians he was pleading," he said, "but the common cause of democracy. Such was the universal con-

putting her own seamen into the ships, sent them immediately back. The Rhodians, receiving their returning fleet without suspicion, were overpowered, and the Carians became masters of the city.

Possibly there may have been circumstances to afford some foundation for this report. Such a stratagem however, producing consequences so important, would hardly have escaped all notice from the contemporary orator, whose account they yet in no respect contradict. According to both authors, the democratical party, at first superior, were afterward overpowered through Carian assistance to their opponents.

nection of the democratical cause, so readily, if variance arose between democratical governments, they fell into concord again, that it would be better for Athens to be at war with all the states of Greece together, if all were under democratical government, than to have peace and alliance with all under oligarchy; for between men who desire to rule others and men anxious for universal equality no peace could be sincere." Those among his audience, who reflected at all, would wonder why the stone-quarries of Syracuse formerly had been the graves of so many Athenians, why the hatred was so rancorous now between Athens and Thebes, and how, in the confederate war, the democracy of Rhodes itself became so hostile. Such explanation the orator prudently avoided, and, proceeding to catch at the passions of his audience, he mentioned it as a lamentable state of things

Demosth.
pro Rhod.
p. 196.

that "not the Rhodians only, but the Chians, Lesbians, in short almost all mankind, were living under a form of government different from the Athenian. The danger ensuing to the Athenian democracy was alarming, and those who establish any other form of government ought to be esteemed the common enemies of freedom.²¹ The Athenians therefore, he contended, ought to lay aside all other considerations, and esteem it sufficient cause for assisting the suppliants that they were the democratical party.

But he was aware that notorious and celebrated facts, which had been repeatedly urged by more liberal politicians against the intolerance of the high democratical party, would be recollected as strongly contradicting this branch of his argument. In the extreme distress of Athens, at the conclusion of the Peloponnesian war, when completely at the

²¹ The orator's phrase is, "those who establish oligarchy;" but the tenor of his discourse shows that he uses that term to imply all governments other than democracy.

mercy of her enemies, and afterward, in the weakness of her first convalescency, when the republic was restored by Thrasybulus, the generosity of some aristocratical governments had saved and supported her when the rancour of democratical enemies would have doomed her to utter destruction. To obviate this he relates a story of democratical generosity. "I would not have you," he says, "holding as you do, the reputation of universal protectors of the unfortunate, appear inferior to the Argives. When the Lacedæmonians, after the Peloponnesian war, were lords of Greece, they sent a requisition, it is said, to Argos, for some Athenians, who had taken refuge there, to be surrendered. But the Argives, far from yielding to a power so formidable, persevered so in friendship to you that they ordered the Lacedæmonian ministers to leave the city before the sun should set."

Hence the orator proceeds to an avowal of political principles that will deserve notice. To subdue others, to grasp at dominion on all sides, he is found frequently urging to the Athenian people, in terms more or less direct, as their proper policy; but he constantly denies equal right to other people. Chalcedon on the Bosphorus, subjected in common with other Asian Greek cities to the first empire of Athens, had passed, after the battle of Ægospotami, under that of Lacedæmon, and, after the sea-fight of Cnidus, had yielded to Persia. The Byzantines had now conquered it from the Persians. This, it might seem, should be esteemed creditable and praiseworthy among those who reckoned the Persians, as we have seen Demosthenes declaring he reckoned them, common enemies of Greece. But now, on the contrary, he considers the conquest of Chalcedon by the Byzantines as a crime, a robbery; not against the Persians, from whom they took it, not against the Chalcedonians themselves, Greeks whom they held in subjection, but against the Athenians; as

if Athenians, and Athenians alone, had a right to hold all others in subjection.

Against him it appears to have been contended that Athens had now long held peace and friendly intercourse with Rhodes under treaty with its aristocratical government, and that to support rebellion against that government would be unjust, and contrary to the oaths which sanctioned the treaty. In answer to this we have again remarkable political

principles. "I reckon," says Demosthenes, "it would be just to restore the democratical govern-

ment in Rhodes: but even were it not just, still, observing what other states do, I should think it advisable for its expediency. If all indeed would be just, then it would be shameful for the Athenians to be otherwise. But when all others are providing themselves with means to injure, for us alone to abide by justice, and scruple to use advantages offered, I consider not as uprightness but weakness; and in fact I see all states regulating their rights by their power."²²

He proceeds then to confirm this curious argument by a remark, showing the miserably precarious state of the boasted liberties of the Greek nation. "Political rights, among the Grecian states," he says, "are decided for the smaller by the will of the more powerful." An analogous justice seems to

²² Very much, in such arguments, depending upon the force of particular words, I will give the original passage at large, that the learned reader, without the trouble of turning to another book, may judge whether I have rendered it to his mind. Ἐγὼ δὲ δίκαιον μὲν εἶναι νομίζω κατάγειν τὸν Ῥοδίον δῆμον· οὐ μὲν ἀλλὰ, καὶ εἰ μὴ δίκαιον ἦν, ὅταν εἰς ἃ ποιῶσιν οὗτοι (Byzantines and others) βλέψω, προσήκειν οἴομαι παραινεῖσαι κατάγειν. Διὰ τί; "Οτι πάντων μὲν, ὧ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τὰ δίκαια ποιεῖν ὀρημηκότων, αἰσχυρὸν ἡμᾶς μόνους μὴ εἶθελιν· ἀπάντων δὲ τῶν ἄλλων ὅπως ἀδικεῖν δυνήσονται παρασκευαζομένους, μόνους ἡμᾶς τὰ δίκαια προτείνεσθαι, μηδενὸς ἀντιλαμβανομένους, οὐ δικαιοσύνην, ἀλλ' ἀνανδρείαν ἡγοῦμαι· ὅρῳ γὰρ ἀπαντας πρὸς τὴν παροῦσαν δύναμιν καὶ τῶν δικαίων ἀξιουμένους. Demosth. pro Rhod. pp. 198, 199. The French translator Auger, though generally a warm admirer of Demosthenes's democratical politics, exclaims, in a note on this passage: "Voilà donc les principes d'équité de la politique! — Comme si la justice n'était pas toujours la justice, quand tous les hommes négligeraient la pratique!"

have pervaded the democracies. If persuasion failed, an orator, sufficiently powerful in popularity, would resort to threats and violence; nor did those endowed with the greatest powers of persuasion scruple to use a resource which their policy apparently, not less than their liberality and every consideration of public good, should have reprobated. But Demosthenes concludes this oration for the Rhodians in the way of the ordinary popular railers, endeavouring to intimidate those who differed from him by imputing all opposition to a spirit of disaffection to the government, and intended treason. What decree followed we are not informed, but no measures, or none effectual, were taken to support the Rhodian petitioners²⁵; perhaps because the attention of the Athenian government, as we shall see, was forcibly called another way.

Among the complicated circumstances of Greece in this eventful period some occurrences of no small importance remain indicated by the orators, of which not the smallest mention is made by our only historical guide; the failure of whose assistance for arrangement and dates, notwithstanding his frequent inaccuracy, is here felt as a loss. Nearly however to the time we are engaged with must be attributed some transactions in Eubœa, which may have assisted to prevent any effectual interference of the Athenian government in the affairs of Rhodes.

By the expulsion of Timotheus from Athens the connection

²⁵ Auger, at the conclusion of his summary of the oration for the Rhodians, ineptly enough observes, "Il y a toute apparence qu'Artemise étant morte cette même année, les Rhodiens furent remis en liberté. There is no appearance whatever that the democracy could be restored in Rhodes without the interference of Athens: and democracy restored by Athenian interference would have brought the Rhodian people again under subjection to Athens: they must have sworn, as Demosthenes shows in this very oration, to have the same friends and enemies as the Athenian people; they must have marched and sailed and paid tribute at the pleasure of the Athenian people or the Athenian tribute-gathering admiral, and thus they would have been "remis en liberté." There is no appearance that anything of this happened.

established by him, between the Athenian administration and the Eubœan towns, would of course be shaken: the confidence which the Eubœans had in his probity, liberality, and wisdom, would not be readily transferred to his oppressors, and they would not be disposed particularly to respect his arrangements. Nevertheless we have no information of oppression exercised against the Eubœans; on the contrary, the event of the confederate war seems to have been taken as a lesson, by Chares and his associates, for their conduct toward a subject country so nearly under the eye of every citizen, the importance of which was so highly rated by all: they did not here, as generally in more distant dependencies, establish democracy by violence: every town seems to have retained its constitution, as under the compact with Timotheus; and among proofs of ease and security in the island may perhaps be reckoned that Timotheus chose it for his exile. Probably he had ended a life neither short nor inglorious, when the Eubœan cities come presented to our view by the orators in circumstances that appear extraordinary. They were under the rule each of a chief, who bore the title of tyrant; if not regularly, and as a legal description, yet commonly, and as an accepted designation. Thus Charigenes was tyrant of Oreus, Mnesarchus of Chalcis, and Plutarchus had succeeded Themison in the tyranny of Eretria.²⁴ But neither do we learn that these tyrants excited complaint among the people under them; on the contrary, they appear to have been the most popular men of their respective cities. Their eminence among their fellow-citizens for property and popularity seems to have recommended them to the Athenian government; and, the favour

²⁴ The title of tyrant is given by Æschines to Mnesarchus, and by Plutarch to his own namesake the chief of Eretria. Charigenes is called by Æschines *dynast*, which is not exactly a convertible term; but, as titles, tyrant and *dynast* were often used indifferently. The constitution of Oreus was democratical, and, as such, indicated by Æschines to have differed from that of the other towns.

of that government confirming and increasing their importance among their fellow-citizens, they became in reality common agents, for the Athenian government equally and for their fellow-citizens, for the management of all their common concerns.²⁵ Supported thus by their personal interest among their fellow-citizens on one side, and by the patronage of the Athenian government on the other, they held that kind of princely sway which was commonly in the language of the times between Homer and Demosthenes designated by the term tyranny.

Probably the party which, before the intervention of Timotheus, had, with Theban assistance, nearly obtained complete command of the island, was not entirely crushed or converted by his arms or his policy. But among so many independent townships, of various constitutions, within one island, grounds of disagreement, such as had given occasion to the former wars, could hardly fail to abound. If then better or more favourite assistance was not immediately in view, all, of course, would vie for the support of Athens. But the Athenian government seems to have been disposed to its former policy of letting the Eubœans fight their own battles after their own way, so only that the interference of foreign powers was avoided.

In this neglect of the interests of the Eubœans, and of their just claim of protection as subjects and tributaries, the people of Chalcis, the most populous town of the island, under the lead of Callias and Taurosthenes, sons of the late tyrant Mnesarchus, proposed a general assembly of deputies from the several towns to be holden at Chalcis, for the purpose of composing the present differences, and regulating in future the general affairs of the whole

²⁵ The transaction of Demosthenes with Gnosidemus of Oreus, son of Charigenes, shows that this was their real character, and all that we farther learn of them is consonant to it. *Æsch. de cor.* p. 494.

island. Callias and Taurosthenes appear to have been able men, and not very scrupulous : they negotiated with the king of Macedonia, while they professed all fidelity to the old engagements of their city with Athens.

What those engagements were indeed we have no information ; and considering Callias and Taurosthenes simply as Eubœans, if their final object was not their own power rather than their country's good, their measure would seem truly patriotic. Their final purpose however certainly was to place themselves at the head of the affairs of the whole island. Plutarchus of Eretria therefore saw, in their success, the ruin of his own authority in his own city, with no small danger probably for his property, his liberty, and even his life. His resource therefore was to address solicitation and remonstrance to Athens.

Though the Macedonian interest was advancing rapidly in the island, and Philip had gone so far as to send his general Parmenio to assist in the regulation of its affairs, yet the party of Chares, as appears from both Demosthenes and Æschines, were backward in public measures for supporting the interest of Athens. The reason of this political phenomenon is however to be gathered from Demosthenes. Callias and Taurosthenes became afterward his confidential friends, and associates in the most important political business. Whether the connection was already in any degree formed, or how far circumstances were prepared or negotiation begun for it, does not appear, but the orator shows ground enough for the refusal of his party to interfere in favour of Plutarchus. As formerly in Rhodes, so now in Eubœa, the many were adverse to the Athenian democratical leaders ; in Eretria they banished those whom Demosthenes calls their best friends, the orators who pretended most zeal in the de-

Æsch. de cor.
p. 481.
Demosth. de
cor.

Demosth.
Phil. 3. p. 125.

p. 126.

mocratical cause²⁶; and it seems probable that the only opening which the Athenian democratical party saw for recovering their influence in Eubœa, was by forming connection with Callias and Taurosthenes. The other party in Athens would, on that very account, be the more earnest to support Plutarchus. An earnestness arose however among the Athenians, not unlike that formerly excited by Timotheus, for maintaining the republic's interest in the island. Not only for the navy, but for the army also, personal service was extensively offered; and now first, it is said, within memory or tradition, the expense of equipping ships of war was voluntarily undertaken by individuals. This arose from a general disposition of the higher ranks to the measure; and all the circumstances together indicate that on this occasion the aristocratical leaders carried the popular favour. Demosthenes alone, of the democratical orators, ventured to speak; and he, as he has himself confessed, was ill heard and roughly treated. The command of the armament, rapidly raised, was committed, not to Chares or any of his faction, but to Phocion, their stern opponent.

Meanwhile Callias and Taurosthenes had so gained favour to their project for a union of all the towns of the island under one liberal system of independent government that, except in Eretria, their party everywhere prevailed. They did not however rest their cause entirely upon the attachment of their fellow-islanders. They engaged a considerable body of mercenaries, which had been Æsch. de cor. p. 481. in the Phocian service, and was dismissed probably on account of the near failure of resources from the Delphian treasury. But they continued always to profess the purpose

²⁶ Demosthenes's hypocritical phrases on the occasion cannot be misunderstood: *Οἱ ταλαίπωροι καὶ δυστυχεῖς Ἐρετριεῖς τελευτῶντες ἐπέισθησαν τοὺς ἰπὲρ αὐτῶν λέγοντας ἐμβαλεῖν.* Philip. 3. p. 125.

of maintaining peace and friendship with Athens. Such was the involution of party interests, some avowed, some concealed, that when Phocion arrived with the Athenian armament at Eretria he seems hardly to have known what enemy he had to contend with. But, advancing into the country, and encamping near the town of Tamynæ in a deep valley, the heights about him were occupied by hostile troops in such force that he found himself in effect besieged, and in extreme danger. An express was hastened to Athens with information of the circumstances; and the result again marks the favour of the higher ranks of citizens to the cause of Phocion: all the remaining cavalry of the republic immediately embarked. Not however without a severe action

[B. C. 350.*
Cl.] the distressed army was relieved, and a victory of some splendour gained. The orator Æschines, serving in the cavalry, so distinguished himself that he was selected by the general to carry report of the victory to the council and people; and for his meritorious service was rewarded by a decree of the general assembly, with the honour of a crown. What however the consequence of the victory was, beyond the deliverance of the besieged army,

Demosth.
Phil. 2. does not appear. We find Demosthenes afterward imputing hostility and treachery toward Athens to Plutarchus, for whose support Phocion was sent; and, on the contrary, Æschines attributing the whole opposition against the Athenian interest in Eubœa to the measures of Callias and Taurosthenes. But it is remarkable that, much as we find Demosthenes complaining of Macedonian interference, and even Macedonian troops, in Eubœa,

[* B. C. 350. " Expedition of Phocion into Eubœa, and battle of *Tamynæ*. . . . This expedition was a little before the cause *πρὸς Βοιωτῶν περὶ τοῦ ὀνόματος*, and at the time of the *Lenæan Dionysia*. Demosth. in *Bœot.* p. 999 ed. Reisk. . . . as the cause *πρὸς Βοιωτῶν* was *κατὰ Θέσσαλον ἢ Ἀπολλόδαρον ἄρχοντα* (Dionys. Dinarch. p. 656.), these were the *Dionysia* of the archon Thessalus, or Anthesterion of B. C. 350." Clinton, *Fasti Hellen.* pp. 132—4.]

no mention is made of either on this occasion: when the party of Phocion directed measures, it appears the hostility of Macedonia instantly ceased. But the scrupulousness of that virtuous statesman seems to have denied effectual use of the advantages placed in his hands by his victory, and by the zealous attachment of his triumphant party. Whatever was the immediate arrangement, which seems indeed to have been but incomplete, sufficient opening was left for future intrigues of Callias and Taurosthenes.

About the time when these things, unnoticed by the historian, must have happened, a matter occurred, of extraordinary appearance in his account, for which we find no assistance from the orators. The Thebans, wearied and exhausted by the protraction of the Sacred war, found final success in it with their

B. C. 351.
Ol. 107. 2.
Diod. l. 16.
c. 40.
[See p. 126.]

own means hopeless. Distressed thus, they sent an embassy to Ochus king of Persia, with the sole purpose, according to the historian, of begging money. What claim to favour they had acquired since, only two years ago, their general Pammenes, in the service of a rebel satrap, Artabazus, had defeated the king's armies, is not said. Perhaps those actually ruling in Thebes disowned Pammenes. But it appears from the sequel that the court of Persia desired, at this time, to cultivate a good understanding generally with the Grecian republics. The recovery of Egypt had been, for half a century, its anxious purpose unsuccessfully pursued; Artabazus maintained still his rebellion in Bithynia; and Phenicia, forming close connection with Egypt, had recently shown itself in revolt. All these things together pressing, the Persian court was driven to that policy, which had been so successfully used by the leaders of revolt against it, employing mercenary Grecian troops. It was probably intelligence of such a purpose that encouraged the mission from the Theban government to Susa. Their am-

bassadors obtained, according to the historian, three hundred talents, about sixty thousand pounds, which were however not probably given for nothing. Agents were sent soon after to all the principal republics. Athens and Lacedæmon, professing a desire to hold friendship with the king, stated the necessity of their own affairs in excuse for not parting with any of their native military force; but the Thebans sent their general Lacrates, with a thousand heavy-armed. Argos furnished three thousand, under a general specially desired by the Persian court, Nicostratus; whose fame, which led to the distinction, probably had been acquired, not in Peloponnesus, but in previous service in the command of mercenaries among the warring powers of Asia.

But, whatever assistance the Thebans obtained for their treasury, from the liberality or the necessities of the Persian court, no considerable exertion followed in the war against Phocis. Predatory incursion only and small skirmishes are mentioned among the operations of the year, and no important result.

CHAPTER XXXIX.

AFFAIRS OF GREECE DURING THE THIRD PERIOD OF THE SACRED WAR, WHEN ATHENS AND MACEDONIA BECAME PRINCIPAL PARTIES.

SECTION I.

Chronology of the Times. — Naval Successes of Macedonia against Athens. — Opening for Negotiation alarming to the War-party at Athens. — Philip's Popularity alarming. — Measures of the War-party. — Olynthus gained from the Macedonian to the Athenian Alliance. — Embassy of Æschines to Peloponnesus. — Philippics of Demosthenes.

THE imperfection of ancient chronology makes continual difficulty for the investigator of ancient history. For supplying the deficiencies, and correcting the errors of Diodorus and the Arundel marbles, which alone offer any extent of chronological clue, it behoves him to seek assistance wherever it may be found; and, for the times with which we are now engaged, a very valuable subsidiary remains in the remarks of Dionysius of Halicarnassus upon the orations of Demosthenes. It is therefore very satisfactory to find these confirming Diodorus, so far as to show that his chronology does not probably err for these times more than for those for which we have opportunity to compare it with the higher authorities of Thucydides and Xenophon. The beginning of the Olympian year, about midsummer, long after the beginning of the common season for the action of Grecian armies, would be likely often to make confusion of two

military seasons for writers who did not, with the accuracy of Thucydides, divide the year into summer and winter, the season of military action, and the season of military rest; especially for compilers like Diodorus, unversed in either political or military business, and writing not till some centuries after the times in question. For perfect exactness his chronology cannot claim credit; but as a general guide it will require attention, and even respect.

After the battle of the Pagasæan bay and its immediate consequences, the abdication of the tagus Lycophron, the settlement of all Thessaly in the Macedonian interest, the march of the combined Macedonian and Thessalian forces to Thermopylæ, and contest declined with the Athenian army there, the annals of Diodorus exhibit a remarkable void in Grecian history. Of the republics for two years nothing is mentioned but the embassy of Thebes to Persia, and the faint prosecution of the Sacred war, already noticed. Of Macedonian affairs not a syllable appears. Nevertheless it may be gathered from the orators that in that interval occurred the contest of parties in Rhodes and the war in Eubœa.

For the business of the Eubœan war, as we have seen, or, at least, for the conduct of military operations, the party of Phocion prevailed in Athens. But they acquired no lasting lead in the general assembly. Through the abilities and the diligence of the opposing orators, and the means they found to attach the lower people to their system of war and trouble, all approaches to peace with Macedonia were checked, though Philip showed himself always ready and even forward to meet them. Meanwhile Macedonia, and the allies of Macedonia, not liable to injury by land from the power of Athens, were suffering continually in their maritime commerce. Not Athenian fleets only, or cruisers regularly commissioned by the Athenian government, but many

little piratical republics, paying the Athenian commanders for licence, annoyed the Grecian seas.

To obviate these evils Philip directed his attention to the establishment of a marine. The recovery of the sea-ports of Macedonia to his kingdom, the possession of the peculiar advantages of the Amphipolitan territory, and, perhaps more than both these, the close connection formed with Thessaly, and the consequent command of the means of its commercial towns Pagasæ and Magnesia, gave him altogether considerable means. His ensuing successes, though without decisive contest or splendid victory, appear Demosth. Phil. 1. p. 49. to have astonished, while they not a little troubled his enemies. The islands of Imbrus and Lemnus were invaded and plundered ; and, what made more impression than any other loss, some Athenian citizens were made prisoners. Nearer then to Athens, the port of Geræstus in Eubœa was forced, and a fleet of merchant-ships, richly laden, was carried off. But, what would still more perhaps affect the public mind, the coast of Attica itself was insulted, and the sacred ship Paralus was taken from the harbour of Marathon. It seems probable that the naval force of Olynthus assisted toward these successes ; though in remaining mention of them all is attributed to Macedonia.

But beyond the naval successes, or any other advantage, the growing popularity of the king of Macedonia among the Grecian republics disturbed the war-party. The state of Greece, always uneasy and threatening for men who, with or without ambition, desired domestic security, was now uncommonly alarming. For the smaller states, always, the best safety had arisen from a balance of power between the larger ; so that equally the democratical, under Athens or Thebes, and the oligarchal, under Lacedæmon, were most at ease, when the democratical interest and the oligarchal were most nearly balanced throughout the nation ; because then

the imperial states had the stronger and more obvious inducement to give protection and avoid oppression. But

Demosth.
Olynth. 3.
p. 36.

now, and Demosthenes himself furnishes the picture, Thebes could hardly support herself in a

contest perfidiously undertaken and ill conducted; and Lacedæmon, long ago depressed, had been lately checked in an effort to rise, while Athens, having repaired in large degree her great loss of valuable dominion in the confederate war and the war with Macedonia by recent conquest in Thrace, and maintaining still her empire of the sea, was in spirit and in circumstances the most aspiring among the republics, almost alone able to undertake protection and

Isocr. Areop.

to require submission.¹ Sober men everywhere trembled at the view of an imperial democracy.

The dominion of a multitude, even led by a Pericles, was an object of anxious fear: led by a Chares, it was an object of decided horror. In looking around the cheerless prospect then, the rising power of Macedonia, as a resource, if supposed offering but a choice of evils, could not fail to attract consideration.

A remark occurring in Sicilian history presents itself again here, that it may prove less disadvantageous to a great character, than on first view might be expected, to remain transmitted to posterity only by enemies. Of whatever has dropped from Demosthenes to Philip's advantage no question can be entertained; but whatever ill remains reported by others whose authority is not of itself high, unconfirmed by the ingenuity and earnest diligence of the great contemporary orator in seeking and spreading evil report, will be at least liable to just suspicion. The superior talents then, the indefatigable activity, and the personal courage of the king of Macedonia, are clearly and repeatedly attested by Demo-

¹ Περὶ τῶν πρώτων ἀντιτάξασθαι. Isocr. Areop.

sthenes : even his liberality and generosity are largely shown ; and his popularity throughout Greece, occurring for necessary mention, could hardly by words be more strongly painted than by the consummate speaker, using his utmost art to decry and bear it down. To obviate this popularity, and to substitute for it suspicion, fear, and, if possible, hatred, in Athens especially, but over Greece, as far as might be, was a primary object of the war-party ; and the task was assigned principally to the extraordinary abilities of Demosthenes. Hence those speeches, through whose celebrity their title of Philippic became at Rome, and thence through modern Europe, a common term for orations abounding with acrimonious invective.² Nor was the task light, nor was it little that Demosthenes did for his party. Foiled successively in the Confederate war, in the war of Amphipolis, in the war of Thessaly, and overborne, for a time, on occasion of the disturbances at Eubœa, by the party with which Phocion acted, they must have sunk but for the singular talents which he brought to their support. Democracy itself, as we have lately observed him complaining, had at this time a falling cause. Advantages however remained, of which talents like those of Demosthenes might avail themselves. In every Grecian state was a relic or a germ of a democratical party, which might be excited to vigorous growth, or effort to grow,

Demosth.
Philipp. 1.
p. 41, 42.
de cor. p. 245.
de legat. p. 424.
426.

² If the earlier date, the first year of the hundred and seventh Olympiad, were assigned to the first Philippic on less high authority than that of Dionysius of Halicarnassus, the third of the same Olympiad, or perhaps the spring, concluding the second year, might rather seem to have been the season of its delivery. Indeed it has been observed that facts are mentioned in it which appear to have been posterior to its assigned date ; whence it has been supposed not one, but two orations of different dates. But for my unwillingness, on any occasion, to controvert high authority, I should be inclined to propose a compromise, reckoning it a single oration, of the date already mentioned, toward the end of the second or beginning of the third year of the hundred and seventh Olympiad ; thus placing it between the date of Dionysius, and the later date, which some eminent modern critics would assign to the latter part of the speech.

by any prospect of that boundless field afforded by democracy for ambition, excluding no individual from any extravagance of hope. Through the same animating power, activity, boldness, and perseverance are common virtues of democratical parties. These it was the business of Demosthenes to excite to energy everywhere. But the favourable opportunity occurred at Olynthus, whither also the late naval successes of Macedonia would contribute to direct the view.

We have seen the revived Olynthian confederacy brought, by the combined arms of Athens and Macedonia, to the brink of ruin, and saved only through the treachery and injustice of the Athenian government, alienating its own beneficial ally. In the short period since the connection ensuing between Olynthus and Macedonia, the Olynthians had so prospered again that their military force is said to have been greater than when formerly it balanced for a time the united arms of Macedonia and Lacedæmon. The citizens capable of bearing arms, according to Demosthenes, exceeded ten thousand; the cavalry amounted to one thousand; and the fleet was of fifty triremes. But, political prosperity having commonly the evil tendency to produce and sharpen contest for power, those, who could not be first in Olynthus connected with Macedonia, were ready to break with Macedonia, at any risk to their country, for the chance of attaining the lead in it through connection with any other power. Whether intrigue began from Olynthus or from Athens, it is evident that communication was held between a party among the Olynthians and the war-party in Athens, and that, between them, a plan was concerted for producing a revolution in Olynthus. Peace was the plea of the Olynthian opposition. Considered by itself, without a view to circumstances and consequences, it was a plea that would of course weigh with a maritime and commercial people engaged

Demosth. de
legat.

Demosth.
Olynth. 3.
p. 30. & in
Aristocr.
p. 656.

in war with those whose fleets commanded the sea. The Athenian government, it would be observed, and repeated proof might be appealed to, would not make any peace with Macedonia: all approach to it was denied by the decree forbidding communication by heralds. But there was no such repugnancy to peace with Olynthus; and the Olynthian confederacy was not so bound to Macedonia that it should preclude itself for ever from a good so much to be desired. It might indeed be remembered that, in the last preceding communication of the Olynthian government with the Athenian, the Olynthian ministers, sent to treat of peace, had met with only insult. Now however the tone of the insulting party in Athens was altered; they were ready not only to meet but to invite friendly communication from Olynthus. So matters were managed that a majority was obtained in the Olynthian assembly for entering into engagements with Athens contrary to engagements with Macedonia; and a peace, accommodating the interests of the two republics exclusively, or rather of the leading party in each, was concluded.

B. C. 350.*
Ol. 107. 3.

Meanwhile the king of Macedonia, after settling the affairs of Thessaly advantageously, through the means offered by the victory over the Phocian army, had been called to new exertion by the motions of the restless barbarians, whose trade was war, by whom his kingdom was nearly surrounded. In arms and in negotiation he had been engaged with Illyrians, Thracians, Scythians, almost all the various hordes who occupied the country from the Adriatic sea to the Euxine, and from the Ægean to the Danube. Of any particulars of the achievements, either of his valour or his policy, no information remains from contemporary, and none of any value from later

Demosth.
Phillipp. 1.
p. 41, 42.
Olynth. 1.
p. 12.
Strab. 1. 7.
p. 307.
Justin.

[* See note 7. on s. 2. of this chapter.]

writers. The result only is so far attested, that he extended both dominion and influence, his authority and his popularity, gloriously for himself, and beneficially for his people. Especially he gave new security to the Macedonian frontier, which had been hitherto subject, like our Scottish and Welsh borders of old, to ceaseless war.³

Philip was yet in Thrace when information reached him of the prevalence acquired by the Athenian party in Olynthus, and the threatened defection of that state from the Macedonian alliance. Immediately he directed

Demosth.
Philipp. 3.
p. 113.

his earnest endeavours to have complaints explained and grievances removed, if any really existed, and to restore the shaken connection between the two governments,

Demosth.
Olynth. 1.
p. 10, 11. &
Philipp. 3.
p. 113.

without which peace would be impossible. "This therefore," says Demosthenes, "it was the business of Athens to prevent;" and the managers of that business succeeded. Hardly thirty years ago Olynthus having nearly overwhelmed the Macedonian kingdom, and afterward maintained a contest against Lacedæmon, then at the height of her power, assisted by all the remaining strength of Macedonia, the hope might not unreadily be entertained among the Olynthians, that, strong in themselves now as then, with the advantage of support from Athens, they might assuredly withstand, and perhaps overbear, Macedonia alone. One step gained by the Athenian party led to another, and from peace with Athens the progress was rapid to war with Macedonia.

³ Historians and biographers have spoken only of military expeditions, which some indeed have extended rather romantically; but the adverse orator shows there were advantages, apparently in not less proportion, procured for Macedonia in another way. It is of Thrace and the northern continent he is speaking, where he says, Πάντα κατέστραπται καὶ ἔχει, τὰ μὲν ὡς ἂν ἐλάν τις ἔχει πελέμου νόμῳ, τὰ δὲ σύμμαχα καὶ φίλα ποιησάμενος. With provident ingenuity then he endeavours to obviate the impression this might make on the Athenian many in favour of Philip or of peace: Καὶ γὰρ συμμαχεῖν καὶ προσέχειν τὸν νοῦν ταύτοις ἐθέλουσιν ἅπαντες, οὓς ἂν ἐβῶσι παρ᾽ ἐσπεύσαντες, καὶ πράττειν ἐθέλοντας ἂ χερῆ. Philipp. 1. pp. 41, 42.

The exultation of the Athenian war-party, on the arrival of intelligence of this result of their measures, appears to have been great. Demosthenes, speaking of it to the assembled people, told them it was the more gratifying, and of higher promise, as it was purely an Olynthian measure, not promoted by any interference from Athens. But another speech of the same orator remains in evidence that a party in Olynthus was previously pledged to the war-party in Athens for promoting a breach with Macedonia, and that expectation was already entertained of complete success to the intrigue. The real character and complexion of the measure are indeed largely shown among his extant orations. It was by carrying this measure in the general assembly of Olynthus that the party there, connected with the war-party of Athens, obtained possession of the administration. No cause of complaint against the Macedonian government gave ground for it. On the contrary, it was a direct breach of faith with the Macedonian government, attempted to be justified only on the pretence of expediency. The interest of the Olynthian people, it was contended, so required it as to overbear all other considerations. Macedonia, the orator says, was so advanced in power that she might choose how far she would respect her engagements, and therefore the Olynthians did well to begin with breaking theirs. But even this argument, if his assertion to the Athenian people should pass for his opinion, he has in another speech overthrown: "The power of Olynthus," he says, "might balance that of Macedonia, and Philip feared the Olynthians not less than they feared him."⁴

Demosth.
Olynth. 1.
& 2. init.

Demosth.
in Aristocr.
p. 656.

Ibid.

Demosth.
Olynth. 3.

⁴ A story told by Justin, of the rebellion of three natural brothers of Philip, and their connection with Olynthus, unmentioned by other ancient writers, and evidently unknown to Demosthenes, seems, like many other stories of that author, hardly requiring even this notice in a note.

But though, in the assembly of the Olynthian people, the Athenian party carried their measure for concurrence with Athens in war against Macedonia, yet most of the other cities of the confederacy were averse to it. Nor, in Olynthus itself, does the majority seem to have been such that decrees of banishment or any strong coercion could be ventured against opponents. They obtained however complete possession of the administration; and the stroke was great for the war-party at Athens: it gave them new credit with the Athenian many; new ground on which to found proposals of warlike measures; and they proceeded most diligently to use it. "Now was the favourable moment," they said, "to engage all Greece in a league against the threatening ambition of the Macedonian king." The utmost

Demosth.
Olynth. &
Philipp.
var. in loc.

ingenuity was exerted to excite, among the Athenian people especially, but generally over Greece,

apprehension of evils awaiting them from the falsest and cruellest of tyrants, if they neglected the existing opportunity, and to raise hope of incalculable advantage, if they exerted themselves to use it. Of the falsehood which might be ventured, in assertion to the Athenian many, to support such arguments, Demosthenes has left a curious example. Hardly anything in Grecian history is better authenticated

Ch. 26. s. 4.
of this Hist.

than the fate of Olynthus in its contest with Lacedæmon, the complete dissolution of the confederacy of which it had been the head, and its own complete

subjection under the Lacedæmonian empire. Demosthenes nevertheless, within thirty years of the

Demosth. de
legat. p. 425.

event, did not fear to aver to the Athenian multitude that, in that contest, the Olynthians were completely successful, that they lost no fortress, (meaning apparently to have it believed that they lost neither territory nor command,) and that at last they made peace on their own terms. The Athenians, stimulated thus at once by hopes and fears, gave

themselves now to the war-party; and ministers were sent throughout Greece, wherever it was supposed a favourable disposition might be found or excited.

*Demosth. de
legat. p. 341.*

The embassy to Peloponnesus was committed to Æschines. It was a great point to gain the democratical Arcadians. The apprehended obstacle was their alliance with Thebes; against which however it might be hoped that the liberal friendliness, shown by Athens among the late disturbances in Peloponnesus, at the risk of alienating Lacedæmon, its ally, would be considerably availing. The Arcadian general council, entitled the ten thousand or the numberless, was assembled at Megalopolis. Æschines, admitted to audience, inveighed strongly against the king of Macedonia as aiming at the tyranny of Greece, and did not scruple, with the usual arrogance of ministers of the imperial republics, and the common illiberality of democratical orators, to impute corruption to those who should not support the propositions he recommended. But his persuasion and his menaces, as we find in his own confession, were ineffectual. The Arcadians persevered in their alliance with Thebes; nor had any of the Athenian ministers, sent to other states on the same business, any better success.⁵

*Æsch. de
legat.
Demosth.
de legat.*

It was meanwhile committed to Demosthenes to excite the people at home; and his abilities shone with new splendour in the orations remaining to us, distinguished, among the Philippics, by the title of Olynthiac. In these orations he engaged in a very bold attempt which before his connection with Chares he had opposed; namely, to persuade the many to concede, for the purpose of war, that part of the public revenue, really the greatest part, which, with the title of theoric, was appropriated to the expenses

⁵ A note on the subject of this embassy is inserted at the end of the section.

of theatrical entertainments, or distributions that might enable the poorest to find leisure for such entertainments. Much art was necessary to bring such a proposition before the people, so as to elude the strangely extravagant law, which denounced death against any who should move for the diversion of any part of the theoric revenue to any other purpose than that to which it stood by law appropriated. But in such art, among other qualifications of a republican orator, Demosthenes excelled. Here however the question may occur, how it was that, while the party of the profligate Chares, courtiers of the multitude, were those to put forward such a measure, the party of the stern and virtuous Phocion were its opposers. For solution of this apparent prodigy assistance is furnished by the orator himself. Money, at any rate, was necessary to the purposes of the war-party. But, to those earnest for peace abroad and quiet at home, it was rather desirable that, while the professors of war and trouble could lead measures, they should want the means of war and trouble. These then, on the other hand, could they have money to maintain armaments, would raise tribute. With this they might gratify the people, and have credit for the gratification: whereas the credit of gratification from the theoric money had gone all to the spendthrift orators who had put forward the decrees for its appropriation, and thus deprived their successors of means for acquiring popularity.

Another thing remarkable occurs in those orations. If the spirit of domination, the purpose of governing Greece, of making neighbouring states tributary, should in prudence have been anywhere concealed among the great orator's speeches, in the Olynthiacs apparently it should especially have been so; yet it is prominent even there. Insult to the Macedonians, prince and people, might be expected from a democratical orator before a

Demosth.
Olynth. 3.
p. 36.

democratical audience. “The kings who formerly held Macedonia,” he said to the Athenian multitude, “obeyed our ancestors, as was becoming from a barbarian to Greeks.” But he has not scrupled to hold out to the Olynthians themselves, Greeks unquestioned, from enemies recently become allies of Athens, what they were to expect: “You,” he says to the Athenian people, “were formerly lords of Olynthus, with the country and cities around it.” Apparently the able orator and politician reckoned that the advantage of the instigation to the Athenian many would overbalance any inconvenience of disgust and offence to the Olynthians, who had placed themselves in circumstances so to want the support which Athens alone could give.

Demosth.
Olynth. p. 35.

p. 18.

Note 5, referred to this place from p. 139.—The French translator Auger, in a note [5] to Demosthenes’s oration on the embassy, has given an account of the mission of Æschines to Arcadia, and especially of his success, thus: “Le peuple d’Athènes nomma des députés pour soulever toute la Grèce contre Philippe. Eschine, entre autres, partit en Arcadie. Il assembla dix mille Arcadiens, et leur fit promettre de porter les armes contre le roi de Macédoine.” Where the learned translator found this promise reported I know not. Demosthenes says nothing of it, and the declaration of Æschines himself is explicit, that he had no success.

The assembling of the ten thousand Arcadians to make the promise however (for the reason mentioned in a former note, the reputation of the writer) may deserve some remark. Demosthenes, speaking of the mission of Æschines to Arcadia, has these words:—*τοὺς καλοὺς ἐκείνους καὶ μακροὺς λόγους, οὓς ἐν τοῖς ΜΤΡΥΟΙΣ, ἐν Μεγάλῃ Πόλει, — ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν ἔρη (ὁ Αἰσχίνης) διεδημηγορηκέναι*, p. 344., which Auger has translated thus:—“les longs et magnifiques discours qu’il disoit avoir débités pour vous à Megalopolis, dans une assemblée nombreuse.” What is here, in the text of his translation, *une assemblée nombreuse*, is what is rendered, in his note before mentioned, given for explanation of historical circumstances requisite for understanding the oration, the *dix mille Arcadiens*, who were made to promise to carry arms against the king of Macedonia. A writer more attentive to historical matter than Auger, if not intent upon the political institutions of the Grecian republics, when reading Xenophon’s Hellenics, might possibly have failed in recollection of what he would find there, that *οἱ μύριοι* was the title of the sovereign assembly of the Arcadian democracy, whose seat of government was Megalopolis. [See Vol. VI. p. 190.] But one, translating, and giving explanation in notes, like Auger, who could hardly be without recollection of many analogous titles occurring in Grecian history, the Ten, the Eleven, the Thirty, the Four-hundred, the Five-hundred,

SECTION II.

Olynthian War. — Macedonian Olympic Festival. — Apology for the Conduct of Chares. — Macedonian Bribes.

THE eloquence of Demosthenes and the influence of Chares, the blazoned importance of the acquisition of Olynthus to

and others, should apparently have gathered admonition from them to look about him a little for the import of *οἱ μύθοι*.

This however is far from being so important as some other errors of the same learned translator and commentator, resulting apparently from rash carelessness. In Æschines's oration on the embassy is a catalogue of principal events in Athenian history, from the battle of Salamis to the orator's time. On this Auger says, "Je voulais donner un récit abrégé des faits principaux, depuis la bataille de Salamine, jusqu' après la destruction de la tyrannie des Trente ; mais, en consultant l'histoire de ce temps-là, j'ai vu si peu de conformité entre ce que rapportent les historiens et ce que dit l'orateur, que j'ai renoncé à mon projet. Je n'ai pas entrepris de les concilier, ce qui serait peut-être impossible, et ce qui, d'ailleurs, est étranger à mon ouvrage." The learned critic often speaks of *l'histoire*, as if that single word was a specific description of something with which all his readers should be acquainted ; but I must own myself generally at a loss to know what he means by it. In the letter of Philip to the Athenians, preserved with the oration of Demosthenes entitled "On the letter," mention is made of the conquest of Amphipolis from the Persians by Alexander son of Amyntas king of Macedonia after the battle of Plataea. Auger, in his remarks on that letter, says very boldly to this, "Philippe avance un fait qui n'a point de vraisemblance. — Aucun historien ne parle de victoire remportée sur les Perses par cet ancien Alexandre. — Il paraît qu'il profite de l'éloignement des temps pour avancer un fait des plus douteux, pour ne pas dire des plus faux." Now it is remarkable enough that mention of that fact remains from Demosthenes in two several orations, that against Aristocrates and that entitled *περὶ συντάξεως*, with these differences indeed from the account of the prince, to whom Auger has so boldly attributed falsehood, that the orator gives the principal merit to Perdicas, son of Alexander, and does not mention the place or places where the Persians were defeated, whereas Philip ascribes the command of the Macedonian forces to Alexander himself, and adds, that the territory of Amphipolis then fell under that prince's power ; which is also in every view probable, though the name of Amphipolis was not yet in use. It is farther observable that translations of both these orations are found in Auger's publication, with passages relating the victory over the Persians fully and fairly rendered.

Auger indeed, with all his disposition to adventurous assertion, seems not pretender to learning that he had not. He makes light of the authority of Polybius, confessing that he never read Polybius. If he ever read Herodotus, Thucydides, or Xenophon, with any attention, he would there, I am confident, find no deficiency of conformity with the summary of Æschines. I think he

the Athenian alliance, and the promise of great advantages to ensue, riches and glory to those of higher rank, and incalculable indulgences to those of the lowest, appear to have produced an extraordinary zeal among the Athenian people for the prosecution of war against Macedonia. A force was decreed such as never since the fatal Sicilian expedition had been sent on foreign service. Demosthenes states the army at fourteen thousand men, of whom four thousand were to be Athenian citizens.

Demosth. de
leg. p. 426.

The amount of the naval force is not specified; but there seems to have been no limit proposed upon the utmost that the state could furnish and the service require. Some squadrons were already on foreign stations; one of thirty triremes, under the orders of Chares, lay in the ports of Athens. The equipment of many more was put forward, and to Chares was committed the command-in-chief by sea and land.

Such promise of vigorous exertion by Athens appears to

would have difficulty to find any in Diodorus. What then may have been the historians that deterred him from his projected abridgment of Grecian history, I must own myself at a loss to guess.

It has been a favourite fashion, among French historical writers, to paint the characters of eminent men without referring the reader to their actions. Opportunity is thus ready for saying smart things with little trouble. Whether the portrait resembles the prototype will be discovered only by those who will undertake laborious investigation. In this easy line Auger has shown himself ambitious of the reputation of fine writing. Among other characters, dispersed among his observations on the orators, he has given that of Archidamus son of Agesilaus in his summary of the oration of Demosthenes for the Megalopolitans thus: "Archidame, roi de Sparte, était d'un caractère sombre, fourbe, intrigant, et brouillon." The best authorities I am aware of to refer to for that prince's character are Xenophon, Isocrates, and Diodorus; who concur, the two former in strong indication, the latter in express assertion, that it was completely the reverse of what the learned translator has asserted.

Nevertheless, while I warn against the errors, I desire to do justice to the merits of Auger. His translation, in general, as far as my experience of it goes, has deserved its reputation: even in remark he often shows candour; and, where knowledge already acquired has qualified him, he often shows judgment. But he has been too careless, very much too careless, of historical investigation, and not less over bold in hazarding remark.

have led the Olynthians to hope that they should make the war, on their part, entirely offensive : invasion of the Macedonian provinces before Philip could be duly prepared to oppose it would, they trusted, secure their territory against the evils of becoming the seat of hostilities. The promptitude of Chares to sail with his ready squadron went to confirm that hope. But they were greatly disappointed, on his arrival, to find that the troops he brought were only middle-armed mercenaries, in number two thousand ; a force well enough suited to his usual purpose of plunder, but not to meet the Macedonian phalanx for the protection of the Olynthian territory. In just apprehension of the consequences they sent remonstrance to Athens. Promises of native Athenian troops, heavy-armed and cavalry, were repeated. Charidemus meanwhile with eighteen triremes and four thousand men joined Chares, but, excepting the small yet valuable force of a hundred and fifty horse, they were still only middle and light-armed foot.

The army thus collected however was ample for the kind of war which Chares desired to wage ; and if it was the purpose, through predatory expeditions, to provide pay or plunder which might make foreign service palatable to the four thousand citizens who voted for it, the plan seems to have been well concerted. The king of Macedonia was not prepared for this new war. His country was open on the side of the Olynthian territory ; and Chares overran and plundered the bordering province of Bottiæa with little or no opposition. It was late in the season before the Macedonian forces could be collected at a point whence operations might be advantageously begun. Chares was already withdrawn. Philip then entered the Olynthian territory. He advanced into the peninsula of Sithonia, where many of the towns, though of the Olynthian

Philoch. ap.
Dion. Hal.
in ep. ad
Amm.
B. C. 549.
Ol. 107. 4.
[See p. 147.]

Diod. 1. 16.

confederacy, were more disposed to the Macedonian alliance than the Athenian. As he proceeded through the country their ready allegiance was accepted. The fortress of Zeira, resisting, was taken by storm.

Chares meanwhile, with a fleet that commanded the sea, and a light land force, could choose his point of attack, and make his retreat sure. In the fruitful peninsula of Pallene, the richest territory of the Olynthian confederacy, the disposition prevailed, hardly less than in Sithonia, to prefer the Macedonian alliance. Not unskilfully then pursuing his plan, he landed where about eight hundred men in arms only could be collected to oppose him, and yet were rash enough, for the protection of their property, to stand an action. Overbearing them with superior force, killing some, putting the rest to flight, he erected his trophy in assertion of victory. Contributions were then raised or booty taken in considerable amount; and a large distribution to the armament made all highly satisfied with the success of the campaign.

*Philoch. ut
ant. & Theo-
pomp. ap.
Athen. l. 12.
p. 534.*

Chares returning to Athens, the people were assembled, as usual, to hear the general's report. He delivered an account of an expedition of uninterrupted success, and of a glorious battle, in which the troops had shown the greatest valour. Confirming testimony did not fail from those who had served and profited under him. But to make his interest with the many sure, he gave a feast to the whole people. The expense is said to have been sixty talents, about twelve thousand pounds sterling; not furnished from his private purse, or from the profits of his command, or from the Athenian treasury, but from the Delphian treasury; extorted from the Phocians, to whom the favour of men powerful among the sovereign many of Athens was at this time very important. But, if neither the cost of the feast, nor the manner of supplying it, have been exactly known to the con-

temporary author, from whom we have the account, yet he was in a situation to know what was reported on best authority; and all is consistent with the most authoritative remaining accounts, indeed all remaining, of the conduct and character of Chares.⁶

The armament was gratified, and the Athenian people cajoled, but the Olynthians remained very uneasy. The wintery season would afford a temporary relief, but the war had been hitherto not prosperous. A part of the enemy's country indeed had been plundered. Far however from succeeding in their hope of confining hostilities to the enemy's territory, far even from compelling the refractory members of their confederacy to join them in the Athenian alliance, many of those, before wavering, had been confirmed in the Macedonian cause by the ready protection of the Macedonian arms; and, with the return of spring, stronger exertion must be expected from the known activity and vigour of Philip. In much anxiety therefore they sent a third remonstrance and petition to Athens, urging the early supply of the better kind of auxiliary force which had been promised, and deprecating that neglect and tardiness through which those faithful allies of Athens, the Methonæans, had been ruined.

The war-party would not be wanting in disposition to support the Olynthians against Macedonia; but so to support them that, at the conclusion of the war, they should remain strong enough to refuse tribute and obedience to Athens, would have been against their principles of policy, which their great orator has clearly and repeatedly indicated.

⁶ The word of Theopompus alone is not very high authority. But the account of Philochorus has evidently been selected by Dionysius as that which he esteemed the most authentic and exact in his time extant; and, though the extract preserved from Philochorus by Dionysius does not give the particulars stated in the extract from Theopompus by Athenæus, yet the two harmonise.

Nevertheless, as the approaching exertion of Macedonia would probably far overmatch the unassisted strength of Olynthus, divided as it was within itself, the eloquence of Demosthenes and the influence of Chares were exerted to excite the Athenian people to energy. So they succeeded that two thousand heavy-armed, and three hundred horse, all Athenian citizens, or passing for such, embarked to re-enforce the army before employed, and Chares remained commander-in-chief.⁷

B. C. 348.*
Ol. 108. 1.

Meanwhile Philip had brought together on the Olynthian border an army that Chares, with perhaps no more than reasonable prudence, avoided to meet. A knowledge of the inclination toward the Macedonian connection and aversion to the Athenian, which we find Demosthenes himself avowing to have prevailed, among all ranks in the towns of the Olynthian confederacy, appears to have decided the king of Macedonia's course, which was again directed into Sithonia. Micyberna, within a few miles of Olynthus, opened its gates to him, and Torone, at the farther end of the peninsula, de-

Demosth. de
legat. p. 426.

Diod. l. 16.
c. 53.

⁷ This expedition is referred by Diodorus to the same archonship of Athens as that before reported; but probably the winter passed between them, the new archons entering on office about midsummer. [* Mr. Clinton thus briefly and clearly states the transactions in this archonship between the Olynthians and Athenians: "In the year of Callimachus three embassies were sent from Olynthus to Athens: upon the first embassy the Athenians sent a force under Chares composed of mercenaries: then, after *ὀλίγα τὰ μεταξὺ γινόμενα*, the people of Chalcidice, being pressed by the war, and sending an embassy to Athens, Charidemus is ordered there; and, in conjunction with the Olynthians, ravages Pallene and Bottiæa. Again, another embassy being sent for new succours, the Athenians send another force, composed of citizens: τῶν πολιτῶν ὀπίστας δισχιλίους καὶ ἰππεῖς τριακοσίους. — στρατηγὸν δὲ Χάρητα τοῦ στόλου παντός. Philochor. ap. Dionys. p. 735. — Diodorus, xvi. 52. ἐπ' ἀρχοντος Καλλιμάχου — Φίλιππος ἰσχυράτουςιν ἐπὶ τὰς Χαλκιδικὰς πόλεις.

"The Olynthian war therefore began after midsummer B. C. 349, and the transactions detailed by Philochorus and Diodorus happened partly in the latter part of B. C. 349, and partly in the beginning of B. C. 348. The first expedition under Chares seems to have been concluded in *Boedromion*: [Octob. B. C. 349.] Ulpian. ad Demosth. p. 26. 42. ed. Par. φασίν, ὅτι ἐπεμψε τὴν λείαν ὁ Χάρης, βοηδεόμια ἦν." Fasti Hellen. pp. 134—136.]

clared for his cause. Two principal places so situated being gained, the whole came easily under his power.

The Olynthians then, apprehending not only farther defection of their confederate towns, but the usual destruction of Grecian warfare to their own property, even to the walls of Olynthus, unless they took the field in its defence, resolved to risk a battle. Some re-enforcement of Athenian troops, perhaps all the heavy-armed and horse, had joined them; but Chares persevered in his usual employment with his fleet and large force of light troops. Nor indeed might this be wholly unnecessary toward the subsistence of all. Nevertheless a single defeat did not deter the Olynthians and their Athenian associates; they ventured upon a second battle; but, being again defeated, their walls became, of severe necessity, their refuge. The remaining towns of their confederacy then so hastened to make terms with the conqueror that, in the complaining phrase of Demosthenes, he was at a loss whither to give his first attention.⁸

The situation of those who held the lead in Olynthus, always dangerous from the strength of the adverse party among their fellow-citizens, became, through this rapid defection of the confederate towns, together with the successes of the foreign enemy, precarious in extreme. Philip, master of nearly their whole territory, approached the city with the purpose of laying siege to it, and encamped at the distance of five miles. Ruin now so nearly threatening, they sent to him, expressing their desire to enter into treaty. He gave for answer, "that it was too late: he had before abundantly and repeatedly expressed his earnestness to treat; but now it was become too evident that there was but one alternative; they must quit Olynthus, or he Macedonia."

Demosth.
Philip, 3.
p. 113.

⁸ Οὐδ' εἶχεν ὁ τι περῶτον λάβει. Demosth. de legat. p. 426.

According to Demosthenes, the whole force voted by the Athenian people for the Olynthian war, four thousand citizens and ten thousand hired troops, was now actually employed on that service. The Olynthians therefore, though venturing no more in the field, resolved to defend their walls. What proportion of the Athenian army was in the garrison we do not learn. The force however that might have sufficed to make the siege tedious or its issue doubtful, had there been unanimity among the Olynthians, did not suffice to restrain the disaffected, but possibly contributed to increase and sharpen the disaffection. Five hundred Olynthian horse, perhaps nearly the whole of the effective cavalry of the state, went off in a body with their arms, and surrendered themselves to the king of Macedonia.⁹ So far was the Athenian party, with all the assistance of the Athenian troops in the garrison, from being able to take measures for preventing farther desertion of the same kind, that Appollonides, who, for his zeal in the Athenian cause, had received the honour of the freedom of Athens, and for the same zeal had been raised to the chief command of the very cavalry that had deserted without him, was obliged to seek his own safety by flight from Olynthus. Euthyocrates and Lasthenes, men zealous in the Macedonian cause, were then raised by the popular vote to the chief command in military,

Demosth. de
legat. p. 426.

Ibid.

Demosth.
Or. in. Neer.
p. 1376.

⁹ Πεντακοσίους ἰσπίδας, προδοθέντας ὑπ' αὐτῶν τῶν ἡγεμόνων, ἔλαβεν αὐτοῖς ὄπλους ὁ Φίλιππος, ὅσους οὐδείς πώποτε ἄλλος ἄνθρωπος. Demosth. de legat. p. 426. That the interpretation of this, given in the text, is the truth, what follows in the text, let out by the same orator in another oration, clearly proves. The complex story which Leland, in his Life of Philip, has wound out of this short passage of Demosthenes, is a curious instance, whether of indulgence to his own ingenuity, or deference to his more ingenious French guide, having never met with Olivier's work, I cannot tell. Leland appears to have been a man of learning; and, where he would exercise his own judgment, he has sometimes shown judgment; but his deference to his French predecessor is extravagant. The name of Olivier, so frequently quoted by him as authority with Thucydides, Xenophon, and Demosthenes, is even ridiculous.

and chief direction in civil affairs; apparently for the very purpose of surrendering the place to the king of Macedonia. It was trusted that they would obtain terms more favourable for the numerous citizens always well disposed to the Macedonian connection, or little forward against it, than their predecessors were either able to obtain, or desirous that those citizens should receive.

[B. C. 347.
Cl.] The surrender of the place quickly following, the king of Macedonia proceeded immediately to the measure which the interest of his kingdom, not less than his own interest, imperiously required, the abolition of a republic on its coast, balancing between dependency upon Macedonia for protection against the claimed dominion of Athens, and subjection to Athens, which would involve extreme hazard for the independency of Macedonia. Support wholly fails, among the orators of the day, for the report of the annalist of three centuries after that he plundered the town, and sold the inhabitants for slaves. But if there were some condemnation to slavery, or confiscation of property, of persons who had made themselves obnoxious by treachery or violence toward the order of things existing before the connection with Athens, the contemporary orators may have omitted notice of it because it was so familiar among the Athenians, who would certainly have done as much or more against a town surrendered to their arms under similar circumstances. We find indeed Demosthenes endeavouring to persuade the Athenian many that the very persons, who, in the phrase of the party, betrayed the city to the king of Macedonia, were those whom he particularly ill-treated; nor is this said of Olynthus only, but Amphipolis also and other places. That some of those who had once served him well may afterward have grossly abused his confidence and merited his resentment, is

Diod. l. 16.
c. 53.

certainly possible, though no account of it remains. But to represent a prince as the deepest politician of his own or or any other age, gaining more by intrigue and bribery than any other ever gained, and yet commonly ill-using his agents, is an extravagance which Demosthenes has evidently feared to offer in direct terms even to the Athenian multitude. With consummate art he has indeed so thrown it out that, whether his words were taken for more or less, he could not be convicted of any positive falsehood; and whatever were his success at the time, with posterity it has been great; following writers have made the most of it.¹⁰

The acquisition of Olynthus, with all the towns of its confederacy and their territories, by which all the coast from Thessaly to Athos was restored or added to the Macedonian kingdom, long nearly excluded from the sea by numerous republican settlements, was thought an advantage, for prince and people, important enough to deserve peculiar celebration. Philip revived on the occasion, and celebrated with increased splendour, the Olympian festival, instituted or restored by his great predecessor Archelaus.¹¹ Theatrical performances seem to have been eminent among the entertainments, and for these he collected the most eminent actors and artists throughout Greece. His hospitality was magnificent; and amid this his

Diod. l. 16.
c. 55.

Ch. 54. s. 1.
of this Hist.

¹⁰ Possibly the story told by Diodorus may have been merely a licentious paraphrase of an expression of Demosthenes in his second Philippic, *προδοθέντες ὑπ' ἀλλήλων (οἱ Ὀλύθιοι) καὶ πραθέντες*. The orator has meant here to maintain no more than that the Olynthians sold one another; that is, betrayed the public cause for private interest. But if any of his hearers or readers might choose to take it that the Olynthians were sold to actual slavery by Philip, he would not probably have objected, provided he were not himself to answer for the falsehood.

¹¹ Diodorus has not expressly referred the festival now celebrated to the institution of Archelaus, but he calls it the Olympian festival, equally as that afterward celebrated by Alexander, which both he and Arrian (Diod. l. 17. c. 16. Arrian. l. 1. c. 11.) refer expressly to Archelaus. This festival has been noticed by Ulpian, Dio Chrysostom, and Philostratus, as observed by Wesseling in his note on the passage in Diodorus.

Demosth. de
leg. p. 401.
Diod. l. 16.
c. 55.

singular talent for conversation and behaviour, dignified at the same time and engaging, greatly extended his popularity.

Meanwhile, at Athens, it was the pressing business of Chares and his party to reconcile the people, if possible, to so disappointing and distressing a result of measures from which so much advantage had been promised. Chares was, in usual course, to report to the assembled people the circumstances of his command; and, with the assistance of friends, to represent them so that he might obtain the requisite vote of Euthyne, acquittal from blame, or, in our law-phrase, his quietus. His friends however could not venture to contend that there was no misconduct. Demo-

sthenes, in general terms, imputed the inefficiency of the great force under his command to nameless inferiors. Under such a commander-in-chief probably there would be misconduct among inferiors. Numerous and perhaps powerful families, thus interested in having those obnoxious to the imputation remain unnamed, would of course be interested in obviating such prosecution of the commander-in-chief as that to which so many of his betters, in various ages of the republic, had been victims. Possibly it was to this that another general, Cephisodotus, adverted, when, as Aristotle reports, he said: "Chares and his friends begin with putting the people in a state of suffocation, and then desire their votes."

Aristot. Rhet.
l. 3. c. 10.

The warmest partisans of Chares indeed must have found cause for much dissatisfaction with his conduct. But they appear to have seen all remaining hope of success for their ambition depending upon his support; and perhaps no small danger for their fortunes, and even their persons, involved with his fall. Their exertions for him therefore were neither faint, nor ill-imagined, nor ineffectual. To divert the public mind from the conduct of their own officers they sedulously

directed it to that of the Olynthians, concerning which fiction might be better ventured. Endeavouring to conceal that a large part of the Olynthian people was always adverse to the Athenian connection, they imputed mismanagement of the Olynthian affairs, and at length the surrender of the city, entirely to the treachery of the chiefs, and the effect of Macedonian bribes.¹² And such was the fascination of their eloquence, but eminently that of Demosthenes, which even in the dead letter has remained, not only the admiration of all posterity, but the persuasive of a large proportion, that Macedonian gold has become a kind of classical phrase for successful bribery. For, after the establishment of the Roman empire, when literature shone with the brightest midday lustre, while the sun of freedom sunk to lasting night, and discussion and animadversion on existing political interests were denied to the whole civilised world, men of letters, when they desired to interest the feelings of the prostrate nations in the political state of things, resorted to materials furnished by Greece; and the poets especially used the poetical licence for dressing these in a way to suit the purpose before them. If then bribery was the subject, gold was to be the material. But Demosthenes, though we find him sometimes venturing far, did not hope for success in such imposition, even upon the Athenian multitude. It was enough known that Macedonia, though greatly raised in power, and rapidly thriving in circumstances, was yet a poor country; and to talk of Macedonian gold as all-powerful would have been considered as irony. Necessarily speaking of things as they were in his day, his enumeration of bribes, to which the loss of Olynthus was to be attributed, can hardly fail now to excite wonder: cows, horses, sheep,

¹² Where the same object was not in view Demosthenes has acknowledged that, in Olynthus and throughout the confederacy, the body, even of the lower people, were suspicious of the Athenians, and inclined to confide in the Macedonians: *Οἱ πολλοὶ τούτους πιστοτέρους ἡγήσαντο.* De legat. p. 425.

timber! "Lasthenes," he says, "repaired his house with timber given from Macedonia; Euthycrates had a large herd of cattle for which he never paid anybody; another got sheep, another horses."¹³

It cannot be doubted but that, if it was an object for Philip to purchase good-will anywhere, it was singularly so at Olynthus, and there evidently he did think it an object. His cession of the city of Anthemus, when he first formed alliance with Olynthus, was in some sort a bribe to the whole Olynthian people, a mode of purchasing their good-will: but it differed from proper bribery; it was not a clan-

¹³ Λασθένης μὲν ἤρξατο τὴν οἰκίαν τοῖς ἐκ Μακεδονίας δοθεῖσι ξύλοις, Εὐθυκράτης δὲ βοῦς ἔτρεφε πολλὰς, τιμὴν οὐδενὶ δούς, ἕτερος δὲ τις ἦκεν ἔχων πρόβατα, ἄλλος δὲ τις ἵππους. Demosth. de legat. p. 426.

O that such bulky bribes as all might see,
 Still, as of old, encumber'd villany!
 Could France or Rome divert our brave designs
 With all their brandies or with all their wines?
 A statesman's slumber how this speech would spoil!
 Sir, Spain has sent a thousand jars of oil;
 Huge bales of British cloth blockade the door;
 A hundred oxen at your levee roar.

Pope's Moral Essays, Ep. 3.

It has been said that the poet and the romance-writer are, in one point, restricted within narrower bounds than the historian: he may relate any truth, however prodigious, but they must confine themselves to probability. Our moral bard might seem to have had this rule and Demosthenes's account of Macedonian bribes together in view; and so, timber appearing too extravagant for poetry in modern times, he has substituted oil and cloth. But then the romance-writer and the poet have a great advantage on the other side; for they may relate anything which, according to the ideas of their age, may pass for probable, putting truth wholly out of the question. Hence then it is that we have Horace's

. Diffidit urbium
 Portas vir Macedo, et subruit æmulos
 Reges muneribus. L. 3. Od. 16. v. 13.

And Juvenal's

. callidus emtor Olynthi. Sat 12. v. 47.

It is remarkable that all Dacier's learning could lead him to no older authority for his poet's assertion, of a kind to satisfy him, than Valerius Maximus. He drops then down to Plutarch, Justin, Orosius. Probably he did not, with his fellow-countryman Rollin, think the speeches of the advocate evidence quite conclusive in the cause.

destine transaction, but open and avowed; nor was it disgraceful on either side; on the contrary it was creditable to both. So it is possible that Lasthenes, Euthycrates, and other Olynthians may have received favours openly from Philip, and the very favours stated by Demosthenes. The Olynthian territory being probably cleared, like the country on the coast of North America, grants of timber from the Macedonian forests, nearest to Olynthus, may have been made to more than one person. But if bribery, in the stricter sense, was the common weapon of the Macedonian court, and a weapon that could be certainly effectual for any great purpose, apparently it should have been so to prevent the revolution in Olynthus; nor, had it been applied in the amount and with the skill and unscrupulousness indicated by later writers, does it appear what, but higher bribery, more skilfully or unscrupulously managed on the other side, should effectually have counterwrought it. Credit may then perhaps reasonably be given to Demosthenes for the bribery practised at Olynthus, as far as his statement of facts goes; we may allow that Lasthenes had a present of timber, and Euthycrates of cows, and that some other persons, too obscure to be named, or, for the value of the present, or whatever other reason, not suiting the orator's purpose to name, received sheep and horses. We may go farther; for all accounts indicate that Philip's liberality was universal, his generosity bordering upon extravagance; that he desired to found both his power and his fame upon his philanthropy and his talent for conciliating the minds of men. Taking this under the description of bribery, indeed his whole course was a system of bribery. Among those so corrupt as Demosthenes himself has described the people of the Grecian republics universally, that bribery would be occasionally practised on all sides may perhaps reasonably enough be supposed; but no remaining authority will

warrant the modern historian in imputing the fall of Olynthus to dishonourable conduct of Philip, or of his partisans.

SECTION III.

New Measures of the Athenian War-party. — Revolution in Phocis. — Licentiousness of Chares in military Command. — Uneasiness of the Public Mind at Athens. — Disposition of the War-party to treat for Peace. — Mission of the Player Aristodemus to Macedonia. — Counter-Revolution in Phocis. — Coalition of Parties at Athens. — Embassy of Ten from Athens to Macedonia.

THE annihilation of such a state as Olynthus with its confederacy on the Macedonian coast, and the annexation of its cultivated peninsulas and commercial towns to the Macedonian kingdom, under a wise prince and a free and beneficent constitution, made a great change in the relative weight of that kingdom, and in the balance of power among the states around the Ægean sea. The circumstances were of deep concern for all Greece; but the immediate blow was only to the war-party at Athens, and for them it was great and alarming. Not only the valued and boasted opportunity acquired by the alliance of Olynthus for offensive, perhaps destructive, purposes against Macedonia, was undone, but opportunity was greatly increased for Macedonia to attack all the Athenian dependencies in Thrace. The miserable pageant therefore of a successor to the once great monarchs of that country, Kersobleptes, holding his curtailed dominion in a kind of vassalage under the Athenian people, and compelled to join them in the war against Macedonia, trembled for the small share of sovereignty remaining to him. The Athenian colonists in the Chersonese, though promised effectual support, nevertheless saw the situation of things around them with much anxiety. What were the circumstances of that most interesting ap-

pendage of the ancient dominion of Athens, Eubœa, remains hardly at all indicated, farther than that its troubles, if ever composed through the expedition of Phocion, had broken out afresh. But when the party of Chares recovered a decisive preponderance in Athens, those adverse to it in Eubœa would of course endeavour again to obtain the patronage of Macedonia; for which the disposition was such that the Athenian interest was again overthrown. Philip however, it is evident, did not propose to use these advantages against Athens, if in Athens might be found a disposition to peace with him. On the contrary, not only he did not interfere to prevent the party friendly to him in the Eubœan cities from coming to an accommodation with Athens, but he authorised their deputies, going to Athens to negotiate for themselves, to declare Æsch. de legat. p. 196. his readiness also to make peace with the Athenian people. The Eubœan ministers executed their commission; but the war-party in Athens, still prevailing, were not yet so disposed that any treaty resulted.

Shortly after however a private interest produced what had been, on public considerations, or the pretence of them, denied. Phrynon, an Athenian of eminence, having been made prisoner by a Macedonian cruiser, had purchased his dismissal. Returning to Athens, he complained that, against the common law of the Greeks, he had been taken during the Olympian armistice. Were the insulting language of the war-party orators, and especially Ol. 108. Demosthenes, calling the Macedonians and Philip himself barbarians, warranted by the practice or avowed tenets of the Athenian government, the Athenians could have apparently little right to claim from them any respect for the Olympian armistice. The savage decree, forbidding the entrance of a herald from Macedonia upon the Athenian territory, remained in force; yet such was the confidence

of Phrynon in the liberality of the Macedonian government, that he desired to go himself to Pella to claim repayment of his ransom. But leave from his jealous sovereign, the people, must be solicited; and, to put forward with more authority and effect his private business, he desired to be vested with a public character. The people granted his request; but democratical jealousy rarely trusting a single minister to a foreign government, Ctesiphon, a friend of Demosthenes, was joined in the commission with him. Whether the party began to apprehend difficulties insuperable in their project of building their greatness on opposition to Macedonia, and already entertained the opposite project of supplanting the party of Phocion and Isocrates in favour with the Macedonian court, or whether their purpose was merely speculation and the acquisition of information for ground of farther measures, in any case to have a minister in whom they confided go to Macedonia, would be desirable for them. The embassy however was instructed to inquire concerning the king of Macedonia's disposition toward peace. On their return, Ctesiphon, reporting the transactions to the council and people, said that Philip declared it had been against his inclination that he had gone to war, and that he was ready immediately to treat of peace; and the ambassador strengthened this assurance by speaking largely of the king's liberal disposition and manners.¹⁴ Great satisfaction being manifested by the people, Philocrates, a man eminent and zealous in the peace-party, seized the opportunity for proposing a decree to rescind that which forbade the admission of heralds from Macedonia; and it was carried without a dissentient voice. What were the considerations

¹⁴ It has been a question among the critics whether Phrynon and Ctesiphon were commissioned together, or Ctesiphon alone was the ambassador. For the history it is very little important; but it appears to me that the combined phrases *πισθέντες δ' ἑμῶν* and *πρὸς ἐλπίσιν αὐτῶν* clearly indicate that they were joined in the commission.

which induced the war-party, almost immediately after, so to exert themselves for the prevention of all treaty that not a step was taken in consequence of the opening, so studiously procured, and without opposition voted, is nowhere said, but apparently may be gathered from the circumstances quickly following.

Peace with Macedonia, however necessary for the republic, however necessary for the war-party themselves, would bring ruin to their power, unless they might be the peace-makers, and afterward hold such consideration with the Macedonian government that its communication with the sovereign, the people, for the mutual concerns of the two states, should pass through them. But Philip was steady in his preference of the party of Phocion and Isocrates, and therefore the war-party persevered in obstructing all accommodation with him. Among the complicated politics of Greece then, their keen sight discovered opportunity, little discernible to the common eye. In Phocis, through the overbearing weight of the standing army, of which the autocrator-generals had now so long held the command, an effectual change had been wrought in the civil constitution of the country; whence those great officers have been sometimes qualified with the title of tyrant. When the change took place is not indicated, farther than as Onomarchus is found raising the mercenary force to an amount unknown either before or after him, and engaging in projects of ambition, far beyond the strength, and not very evidently adapted to promote the interest, of the Phocian people. The present youthful autocrator, Phalæcus, equal perhaps in courage, and perhaps in talents, wanted the authority of years and the advantage of experience which had enabled his father and uncles to hold their arduous situation so advantageously. Hence, rather than from any misconduct of which information has reached us, a party was

*Æsch. de
legat. p. 198.*

*Æsch. de
legat. p. 300.*

enabled to rear its head against him. That party then in Athens, the party of Chares, which had held intimate connection, and been deeply engaged in politics, with his father Onomarchus, gave encouragement and support now to the party adverse to the son. Apparently he declined engaging in their views to the extent they required : possibly he had connection with their adversaries, and preferred that connection : he had certainly connection with Lacedæmon, which would tend to render him less dependent than they desired upon themselves. If then they could raise his opponents to the supreme power in Phocis, that country being unable to maintain itself without foreign connections, those men, so raised, must afterward be dependent upon them for means to hold their power. Of particulars of the revolution we have no information ; but Phalæcus was deposed, the supreme authority in Phocis was committed to a triumvirate, and the new government immediately sent an embassy to Athens. The party of Chares and Demosthenes received the ambassadors favourably, and introduced them to the general assembly to declare the object of their mission ; which was to obtain the approbation of the Athenian people for a transfer to the new Phocian government of the friendship and alliance which had subsisted with that recently overthrown. The people were accustomed to hear, and very ready to believe, that, in political morality, the profitable was always becoming. A bribe therefore was ready : it was proposed that three Phocian towns, Nicæa, Thronium, and Alponus, small and of little value otherwise, but highly important for their critical situation, commanding the way from the pass of Thermopylæ into the country southward, should receive Athenian garrisons. This was of great moment for the purposes of the war-party leaders, but little inviting for the many ; as revenue to arise from this new dominion could not be pretended. Motives for desire

Æsch. de
legat. p. 301.

therefore being deficient, another passion was resorted to. Greece was represented in danger of subjugation from the arms of Macedonia, if Athens did not prevent. The result shows that arguments were ably adapted to the temper of those on whom it was proposed to work. The offer of the new Phocian government was accepted; and such was the zeal excited that fifty triremes were directed by a decree to be immediately manned, and all citizens under thirty to be ready in arms to march or embark, at the command of Proxenus, who was appointed general for the occasion. Some of the more intemperate then went so far as to institute a prosecution against Philocrates Æsch. de legat. p. 198. for the crime of proposing the decree which abrogated that forbidding the admission of heralds from Macedonia; and the penalty was set at a hundred talents, near twenty thousand pounds. It appears however to have been judged by the more discreet not to have been a season for such violent party-measures. Demosthenes himself undertook the defence of Philocrates; and the prosecutor, not obtaining a fifth of the voices of the court, became liable himself to the penalty decreed against frivolous and vexatious accusation. The account however rather implies that this was not insisted upon by Philocrates and his friends, so that, in fact, the matter was compromised; and some reason for this moderation of the war-party seems to appear in what followed.

The general-autocrator, Chares, was absent, with the fleet and mercenary army, supposed on the Thracian station; where it was particularly expected of him to protect the valuable colony of the Chersonese. But deputies arrived from that colony, charged to express the extreme uneasiness of the settlers at the defenceless state in which they were left, when it was understood a Macedonian army was approaching, and the great armament under

p. 251.

Chares, on which they had depended for protection, not only had not been seen, but could not be heard of. The terror, less perhaps of subjection to Macedonia than of the vengeance of the late proprietors of their lands and houses, for which the approach of a Macedonian army might give encouragement, had been such that some of them had already embarked, to seek, with the loss of their landed estates, some safety for their persons and portable property.

These circumstances excited indignation which the friends of Chares had difficulty to meet. The people assembled; and while, with much anger demonstrated, no specific proposition found any extensive concurrence, one of the intimates of Chares, Cephisophon, moved that a small squadron under the command of Antiochus, kept in the harbour of Piræus purposely for emergencies, should go in quest of the autocrator and his fleet, and bring an account of them. This was adopted as the fittest measure in the moment, and the public effervescence was thus suspended.

It appears extraordinary, in the deficiency of our information, that men so able, so daring, so indefatigable, and so unscrupulous as those who now principally directed the political business of Athens, should have judged it expedient to support, in so high a situation, one whose glaring misconduct was so continually thwarting their purposes. But Chares, with all his vices and extravagances, was evidently not without considerable talents, peculiarly adapted to hold that paramount influence which, according to all accounts, he did long hold, among such a military, and such a populace as the Athenian; whence he was necessary to those to whom the goodwill of the army and the multitude was necessary. But in addition to this we have the concurring testimonies of the two great rival orators, Demosthenes and Æschines, to other considerations. Contributions were collected by the officers of the fleet, regu-

larly assessed on the islanders, not with public authority or for public purposes; amounting, according to Æschines, to sixty talents, near twelve thousand pounds yearly; and the trade of all Greece was subjected to plunder, and the persons of Grecian navigators to violence, from those officers. There were those even who undertook to prove that, in the course of his various commands, Chares raised, in various ways, no less than fifteen hundred talents, near three hundred thousand pounds, not accounted for in the maintenance of the armament, but distributed among his favourite officers and supporting orators. Where or how Chares was employed when Antiochus was sent to seek him we have no information beyond what may be implied in these reports of the two great orators.

But circumstances were in too many points critical and threatening for the public mind to rest in the calm produced, for the moment, by the decree of Cephisophon. Æschines marks the trouble and indecision of the time by observing that the extraordinary Æsch. de leg. p. 251. assemblies convened were more numerous than the ordinary, required for the whole business of the commonwealth. Suddenly in the midst of this agitation a surprising disposition appeared among those hitherto most violent against Macedonia to relax in their opposition, and admit accommodation. Readily as this was met by the other party, difficulties occurred about the manner and means of opening a negotiation. The savage decree indeed forbidding all communication by heralds had been repealed: but the king of Macedonia's overtures, made through the Eubœan ministers, had been answered only with invective by the leading orators in the assembly, and with neglect by the administration; and the following mission of Phrynon and Ctesiphon had produced nothing. A direct proposal of peace therefore was avoided: but it was resolved to use opportunity,

accidentally offering, for learning the disposition of the Macedonian court. Among many Athenians, made prisoners at Olynthus, were two of eminence, Everatus and Stratocles. It was proposed to negotiate specially for their ransom: but for this the authority of the sovereign people must be obtained. Philocrates, the mover of the repeal of the decree forbidding communication with Macedonia, now moved a decree to authorise a mission for negotiating the ransom of the prisoners. Against all common expectation Demosthenes exerted his eloquence in support of the motion, which thus was readily successful.

The person chosen for the delicate office of sounding the king of Macedonia was a player, named Aristodemus. His profession, even in Athens, amid the singular passion there

for the entertainment it afforded, is indicated by Demosth. de cor. p. 288. & al.

Demosthenes to have been esteemed degrading. Aristodemus however was recommended, not simply by his talents, though above the common, but by having, through his talents, recommended himself to the notice and favour of the king of Macedonia, when exercising his profession formerly at Pella. He was not long absent on his mission; but his report to the council, which should have been made immediately on his return, was irregularly delayed. Mean-

while Stratocles, liberally dismissed without ransom, coming home, reported publicly that the king of Macedonia had freely assured him of his desire of peace, and that he was ready even to confirm peace by alliance. The council then, in some anger, sent for their loitering minister; who, after a lame apology for his delay, made his report of Philip's professions, perfectly coinciding with what had been related by Stratocles. He was afterward, according to the usual form, introduced by the council to the assembly of the people, to whom he gave the same account. Some

Æsch. de legat. p. 201.

ill-humour was manifested there also at the irregular delay of information for which the public mind had been so anxious; yet Demosthenes did not fear to move that the honour of a crown, to be presented by the people, should reward the able and successful execution of the important mission; and it was accordingly decreed to Aristodemus.

The disposition of the Macedonian king toward an accommodation being thus authenticated, a day was appointed for an assembly to take the matter into consideration.

On that very day despatches arrived from the general Proxenus, or not till that day were acknowledged, informing the council that "the Phocians refused to deliver the places of which he was sent to take possession; that Phalæcus and his party, again predominant in Phocis, had imprisoned the ambassadors of the new government of that country, who had conducted the treaty at Athens, and so resented the conduct of the Athenian government that they had gone to the extremity of denying hospitality to the heralds, sent from Athens according to ancient custom to proclaim the season of the Eleusinian mysteries, and even refused the truce, offered to all on that solemn occasion."

Æsch. de
legat. p. 303.

The cause of the new disposition of the party of Chares to peace was now explained. They had not been without information that the new government of Phocis would probably be unable to support itself; and yet they would not, while a chance of success remained, forego the advantages hoped for from the measures they had taken. The ill-excused delay of Aristodemus in reporting to the council, the zeal shown in his favour by Demosthenes, who was a member of the council, the critical arrival of the despatches from Proxenus, the general of their choice, combined with the unremitting vehemence of their former opposition to Macedonia, and the suddenness of the change, indicated enough that the party were temporising; nor could it be doubted

but, had the Phocian plot been finally successful, they would have opposed, not less than formerly, all proposal of peace. But when the failure of all advantage expected from their measures was complete, and moreover the great and threatening disadvantages accrued to Athens, that Phocis, from a steady and zealous ally, was become an incensed enemy, accommodation, if yet possible, with Macedonia seems to have been the only resource for either the party or the republic.¹⁵

Ordinary men might have been overwhelmed by the failure of a plot of such scandalous perfidy, involving such disaster and danger to the commonwealth. But the party of Chares, men certainly of no ordinary talents, were also fortunate in that their principal opponents were remarkable for moderation, as they for boldness in politics. To forward their anxious purpose of peace the friends of Phocion and Isocrates did not refuse a degree of coalition with the party of Chares; and treaty with Macedonia became the object of all.

Æsch. de
leg. ut ant.
& de cor.
p. 450.

Some degree of concert was evidently already established between the leaders of the contending parties when, on the motion of Philocrates, a decree was made for sending an embassy of ten to Macedonia. The commission comprised persons of both parties, and appears to have been altogether respectably filled. Six of the names have already occurred for notice, Ctesiphon, Philocrates, Phrynon, Aristodemus, Æschines, Demosthenes; the three former eminent by birth and fortune, the others by talents. To these were added Cimon, head of the illustrious house of Miltiades, with Iatrocles, Nausicles, and Dercyllus, who had held high situations.

¹⁵ The caution and shifts of Demosthenes afterward to avoid argument on such important transactions, so connected with his main argument, especially in the orations on the embassy and on the crown, strongly corroborate all that has been asserted by Æschines. A passage in the oration of Demosthenes on the embassy is particularly to the purpose. Demosth. de legat. p. 362.

But a difficulty arose with regard to Aristodemus: he was engaged, after the manner of theatrical management in modern Europe, under a penalty to perform at public festivals in different cities. Such however was the estimation of the man, notwithstanding the disrepute of his profession, that Demosthenes did not scruple to be the mover of a decree for a mission to the several states to which he had bound himself, to solicit, in the name of the Athenian people, a release from his engagements. An eleventh ambassador was added, Aglaocreon of Tenedos, for all the subject allies of Athens whose interests were to be implicated in the proposed negotiation; not chosen by themselves, but appointed by the imperial people.

Æsch. de
legat. p. 202.

p. 204.

SECTION IV.

Progress of the Embassy to Pella. — Audience. — Return and Report to the Council and People. — Policy of the War-party. — Condition of Synedrian or Subject-Allies. — Embassy of Three from Macedonia to Athens. — Decree for Peace and Alliance with Macedonia. — Treatment of the King of Thrace. — Departure of the Macedonian Ministers from Athens.

THE circumstances of the embassy being decreed, a herald was sent into Macedonia for a passport, for which however the ambassadors did not wait to begin their journey. In Thessaly a Macedonian army was blockading Halus; whose people, whether more through attachment to the party of the late tyrants, or incitement from Athens, or mere enmity to the Pharsalians, who asserted some claim of dominion over them, had rebelled against the common government of the country. Such however was the confidence of the Athenian ambassadors in the liberality and honour of the Macedonian government that they did not scruple to pass through the Mace-

B. C. 347.
Ol. 108. 2.
[B. C. 346.
Cl. Cf.
p. 183.]

Demosth.
de legat. . .

donian camp. Respected, as they had promised themselves, there, they proceeded to Larissa, a city zealous in the Macedonian alliance, where they met their herald, bearing the requisite authority, with which they proceeded to Pella.

Immediate deputies of a multitude, they appear to have received no precise instructions: under terror of their despotic and wayward sovereign they were to be careful to promote, at every opportunity, the interest of the Athenian

Æsch. de leg.
p. 207.
Isocr. Or. ad
Phil.

people. Among matters however which they seem to have considered as most particularly expected of them, was to use their endeavours for obtaining the cession of Amphipolis. To offer any advantage for Macedonia in return appears to have been out of question; only, as a supposed private gratification for the prince, they might engage for the restoration of Leosthenes, an illustrious Athenian exile, esteemed among the most eloquent men of the age, who had been kindly entertained at the Macedonian court. Altogether they were expected to demand so much and to concede so little that Cimon declared, among his colleagues, "he feared Philip would have the advantage of them in fair reasoning."¹⁶

Negotiation was yet managed in the manner of ancient times, much by conference, little in writing. Introduced to audience, the ambassadors all spoke in turn, the elder beginning. Demosthenes, as youngest, spoke last. He was apparently most depended upon by the war-party for watching its separate interests and maintaining its importance. But, whether through consciousness of the illiberality of his invectives in the Athenian assemblies against the prince he was addressing, or apprehension of his deficiency in a situation so new to him, or both together, with perhaps other feelings, his nerves failing, his voice and memory

¹⁶ — φοβοῖτο μὴ δικαιολογούμενος περιγένοιτο ἡμῶν ὁ Φίλιππος. Æsch. de legat. p. 205.

faltered. Philip, with ready politeness, endeavoured to encourage him; but, after two or three vain attempts, in which through his confusion he dropped some very awkward expressions, he concluded abruptly.

The ambassadors were then conducted into an adjoining apartment. After no long delay they were again introduced into the chamber of audience. They were seated, and the king addressing them replied severally to the arguments used by each, with a perspicuity and elegance which forced admiration from all. Stating strongly his sentiments of his own and his people's rights, he expressed, in terms the most obliging to the embassy, a disposition the most friendly toward the Athenian commonwealth. They were then invited to sup with him. Hilarity prevailed; and they found themselves compelled to acknowledge Philip's talent for conviviality equally as for business.

After a day or two proposals for a treaty were delivered to them in writing, in the form of a letter to the Athenian people. In this communication the king expressed his desire that the peace, which it was hoped would follow between Macedonia and Athens, might be assured by an alliance. In farther conference then with the ambassadors he frankly told them his purpose immediately to join his army in Thrace, where he was at war with some Thracian princes and some Grecian towns; but he gave them his word that, as long as might be necessary for deliberation in the Athenian assembly concerning the peace and alliance proposed, nothing hostile should be attempted against the Athenian possessions in the Chersonese. The business of the mission thus ended, and the ambassadors returned to Athens.

Immediately on their arrival, in regular course they reported their proceedings, and delivered the king of Mace-

Æsch. de leg.
p. 222, 225,
226.

p. 227.

Demosth. de
legat. p. 354.

Æsch. de leg.
p. 259.

donia's written proposals to the council of Fivehundred.

Æsch. de leg. p. 228. & seq. Demosthenes, who was a member of that council, spoke very favourably of his colleagues generally, and moved that, according to custom, when the conduct of an embassy was approved, they should be honoured for their able and faithful services with a public supper in the prytaneum; and, as the business of peace was so successfully begun, that they should wear on the occasion crowns of the sacred olive. The council approved, and the honour was paid.

In course they were then to be introduced by the council to make their report to the assembled people. Demosthenes, as youngest of the embassy, again spoke last, but he spoke with a tone considerably altered. "All that his colleagues had been relating," he said, "was little to the purpose. Let the decree of the people, directing the embassy, be read." It was read accordingly. "Let the king of Macedonia's letter, which we have delivered, be read." That also was recited. "Now," he said, "it is for the people to decide what is to be done." He paused, and a murmuring conversation arose among the people. "I then," he resumed, "will propose a decree: Let it be directed, 'that the herald expected from Philip be received; and that the ambassadors to follow him be received: that, within two days after the arrival of the ambassadors, the prytanes assemble the people, to consult on peace with Macedonia; and that we, your ambassadors, if we are thought worthy, receive the approbation of this assembly, and be treated in the prytaneum to-morrow.'" His motions were approved, and his decree passed.

The inflexible Phocion and his friends were not politicians to contend, in a government like the Athenian, with the time-serving party of Chares. These, compelled, after all their struggles against it, to allow and even press for peace,

and successful, through the co-operation of those, before their opponents, in putting the matter thus far in train, thought things sufficiently ripe now for separating themselves from their new associates, and making the administration of the republic again exclusively their own. They would begin with even making the business of the negotiation with Macedonia exclusively their own. To effect this they would go beyond what the strict principles of their opponents would permit, in demonstration of zeal for peace and of consideration for the king of Macedonia; trusting, for their verbal justification, in the declared will of the sovereign many, that peace with Macedonia should be negotiated, and, for their real security, in maintaining, through their policy, their command of a majority of votes.

Ministers had been despatched to all the allies of the Athenian people, inviting a general congress at Athens.

The purpose stated was, to consult on the terms of a general peace, which might provide for the interests of all, or on means for making common

Æsch. de leg.
p. 237. & 240.
& de cor.
p. 454. & 460.

war with Macedonia, if it should be found necessary for the defence of their common liberties. The peace-party could not readily conceive that this measure, in which all seem at the time to have concurred, would prove ungrateful to the war-party, who had admitted the necessity or expediency of negotiation. But, to their surprise, Demosthenes was the orator to assert the inconvenience of it: the discussion of so many various interests, he contended, would interfere with the desired conclusion of peace and alliance with Macedonia. He proposed therefore a decree for taking the alliance into consideration on the same early day which was already, on his motion, appointed for the debate on peace; and, for farther security against the delay that discussion might produce, his decree required that the votes should be taken on the following day, when no speaking should be

Æsch. de leg.
p. 243.

allowed. The party of Phocion remonstrated in vain, that it would be highly insulting as well as injurious to their allies not to allow them to participate in the negotiation, having been formally invited by Athenian ministers, who were not yet even themselves returned from their mission. The people however had caught the impatience, without knowing the motives, of those whose lead they had been accustomed to follow, and the decree proposed by Demosthenes was carried.

This measure had precisely the effect apparently proposed. Phocion and his friends, the original earnest promoters of peace, were thrown into a situation in which they found themselves under necessity of holding the language and conduct of opposition; and Chares and his friends were become the peace-makers, with the voice of the people supporting them. But the insult was gross to all the foreign connections of the republic. The Lacedæmonians, and other independent allies, if any others were independent,

Ch. 35. s. 1.
of this Hist.

could not but revolt at it. The Synedrians, resident deputies of the subject-states, in great uneasiness, met to take the matter into consideration. The result of their debate was a decree or resolution, to be offered to the Athenian people, in their first assembly appointed to consider of peace and alliance with Macedonia. It has been preserved by Æschines, and is indeed an interesting memorial; marking strongly the servile condition of the Synedrians, who imply in it a sense of injury which they dared not express, and apologise even for the implication by declaring, in a solemn act, the most unreserved resignation of themselves and their constituents to the will of the Athenians, as the sovereign people. It runs thus: "Since the Athenian people are taking into consideration a treaty of peace with Philip, though the ministers are not returned whom they sent through Greece to exhort the

cities concerning the liberty of the Greeks, it is resolved by the allies that, when the ministers return, and have made their report to the Athenians and their allies, and two assemblies appointed by the prytanes according to the laws shall have been held, in which the Athenians may declare their will about the peace, whatever the Athenian people may decree shall be binding, as a measure taken in common with the allies."

The expected Macedonian herald soon arrived, and shortly after the ambassadors, Parmenio, Antipater, and Eurylochus, men eminent then in their own country, and afterward over the civilised world.¹⁷ It was observed, not without surprise, that Demosthenes was singularly forward in civility toward them. He entertained them in his house¹⁸, and we have his own boast that he entertained them splendidly. He was forward to be the mover of a decree of the people, which apparently passed as matter of course unopposed, assigning them places of honour at the theatrical and other exhibitions of the Dionysian festival, or feast of Bacchus, of which it was then the season. Wherever they appeared in public, but especially in the theatres, where most eyes might be upon them, defying all the invidious observations of the wondering crowd, he was ostentatiously officious in his attention.

It was not probably the purpose of Chares and Demosthenes to injure or offend the Synedrian allies, or not to extend to them all the advantages of the treaty; but it was evidently now their great object to make the alliance of Macedonia exclusively their own, shutting out from it, as

¹⁷ Parmenio and Antipater are very respectfully mentioned by Demosthenes in his oration on the embassy, p. 362.

¹⁸ Ἐξέλιοντο. This has been generally interpreted to mean that he lodged them. I apprehend it does not necessarily mean so much.

Æsch. de leg.
p. 282.

Demosth. de
legat. p. 414.

much as possible, Lacedæmon and all other independent Grecian states. It appears also to have been their anxious desire to obviate all discussion of the late business in Phocis. Without regard therefore to speeches of the adverse orators, or decrees of the Synedrians, the assemblies were held according to the decree of Demosthenes; and peace and alliance with Macedonia, which had been years contended for by the party of Phocion and Isocrates, was in two days concluded by those hitherto bitter opponents of every thing tending to such a measure. The allies of both parties were comprised; but those to be considered as entitled to the benefit of the treaty were named; and among the allies of Athens neither Phocis was mentioned nor Lacedæmon.

Another omission, less important among the general interests of Greece, was noticed at the time as more extraordinary: the unfortunate king of Thrace, Kersobleptes, though not only an ally, but in the situation nearly of a Synedrian or vassal of Athens, was unnamed in the treaty, and of course excluded from its advantages. Within a day

Æsch. de
leg. p. 259.

or two a minister arrived from him, Critobulus, a Greek of Lampsacus, despatched purposely to attend the negotiation. Astonished to find all settled, Critobulus claimed nevertheless that his prince's name (ill omitted, he contended, as he was unquestionably an ally of the Athenian people) should be inserted in the treaty, and that himself, being duly authorised, should take the prescribed oath before the Macedonian ambassadors. This demand was urged in the assembly of the people, when Demosthenes, in his turn, as a member of the council of Fivehundred, was one of the presidents. The petition of the unfortunate prince found favour with the many, and Aleximachus moved that Critobulus should be admitted to take the oaths for him. But Demosthenes, rising from the seat of presidency, declared

“ that he would not put the motion for any such decree, as it would be a violation of the treaty already sanctioned by the people. If the requisition of the Thracian prince was to be taken into consideration, it could now be properly done only on a day to be named for the purpose.” Indeed regularity of proceeding, and a just respect both for the power they had been treating with, and for the consistency and faith of their own conduct, seem clearly to have required what Demosthenes insisted on. But he, who so often successfully excited, could not always stem, the popular passion: his own doctrine, the too common doctrine of popular orators, that all considerations should give way to popular utility, and even to the popular will, would tend to blind the many to the reasonableness of his zeal for order; his own frequent lessons of disregard for foreign powers would weigh against his arguments now for respect to them. The many were vociferous for the question. The presidents, far from able to enforce order in such an assembly once disposed to tumult, could not command respect for themselves. They were called upon by name to ascend the bema, and thence declare their reasons for refusing to put the question which the popular voice required. At length they yielded to the tumultuous manifestation of the sovereign will, and the decree passed.

The king of Macedonia however had already provided against any trouble which might be apprehended by his new friends in Athens from the contradiction in which the government was thus involved. Joining his army in Thrace, as he had told the Athenian embassy when at Pella was his intention, he marched immediately against Kersobleptes. That weak prince withdrew into the peninsula of Athos, and being followed thither was soon compelled to accede to the king of Macedonia's terms, and deliver his son as a hostage for

observance of them. The few remaining little Grecian cities westward of the Chersonese, of which Doriscus, a place of some note formerly in the Persian wars, appears to have been the most important, were then no difficult or tedious conquest for the Macedonian arms. The object of the expedition, as far as may be gathered from writers not having in view to give a regular account of it, was principally to obviate piracy. What were the measures ensuing we have no information; but, from what was common among the Greeks, it seems not improbable that the population of some conquered towns was removed; which may have afforded foundation for the assertion of Demosthenes, afterward to the Athenian people, that Philip cruelly destroyed thirty-two towns in Thrace. Chares commanded an armament which should have protected the allies of Athens in those parts.

Æsch. de leg. p. 259. Of what he did no account remains, farther than that he sent home intelligence of the Thracian prince's submission to the king of Macedonia. This having taken place before the conclusion of the peace between Macedonia and Athens, all farther question about his admission as a party to the treaty was of course obviated.

When, the business of the mission being completed, the Macedonian ambassadors were to return home, the p. 282. assiduity of Demosthenes in civility toward them was, if possible, increased. He took upon himself to hire carriages for their departure, he attended them on horseback in their way through Attica, and paid his last compliments to them not till they reached the Bœotian border.

Æsch. de cor.
Plut. vit.
Demosth.

SECTION V.

Judicial Inquiry into Dilapidation of the Delphian Treasury. — Continuation of War between Phocis and Thebes. — Distress of Thebes, and Solicitation for Support from Macedonia. — Alarm of Phocis and Lacedæmon. — Alarm of the War-party in Athens.

THE Grecian republics, now again without an external enemy, were left to their own always abounding grounds of discord. Among these the question, who should hold command in Delphi, stood yet foremost; and though the means of exertion of the Thebans and Phocians, between whom the contest began, were nearly exhausted, yet the Sacred war still held a very threatening aspect for the nation.

B. C. 347.
Ol. 108. 2.
[Cf. pp. 167.
183].

In the short interval between the deposition of the young autocrator-general, Phalæcus, and his restoration, a judicial inquiry had been instituted by the Phocian government concerning the dilapidation of the Delphian treasury, of which Diodorus has given a report, bearing appearance of being founded on authentic documents. The great objects of the new government in such an inquiry would of course be to justify the recent revolution; and not only to their own people but to all Greece, so as to obtain not only excuse, as widely as might be, but favour and support. Much then it would behove them to avoid offence to all, but especially to those who led the councils of Athens; formerly holding close alliance with the government of the autocrator-generals, and now the main stay of that which had risen by its fall. Accordingly the tribunal to which the inquiry was referred avoided to impute implication in the guilt to any foreign state. They moreover completely acquitted the memory of Philomelus, declaring that his adminis-

Diod. l. 16.
c. 56.

tration was found pure. This would amount to acknowledgment that the principles, on which Lacedæmon and Athens had originally concurred with the Phocians to secure the Delphian temple and treasury against the appropriation of them by the Thebans, were also pure. They stated the sacrilegious robbery to have been begun under Onomarchus and continued under his successors; till Phalæcus, (whom, being at direct variance with Athens, they were by no interest bound to respect,) unable to discover any more valuables to satisfy the demands of his followers in arms, allowed them even to break up the pavement of the sacred place, under a notion, excited by two lines of Homer, that, from very ancient times, it had been a practice to deposit treasure there.¹⁹ Philon, accused of being the principal agent in the sacrilegious business, was put to the torture; and, amid his sufferings, having acknowledged himself guilty (at least so his torturers said) and indicated others, was delivered over to an ignominious death. Many then for being concerned in it, or perhaps more really for attachment to the party of the autocrator-generals, were also sent to the executioner, and many more found safety only in flight.

The narrative of Diodorus is sometimes not least valuable when contradicting itself, because it so indicates that he reported faithfully from writers of different parties. After having stated the judgment on the sacrilege, as if he supposed it perfectly just, he has proceeded nevertheless to assert what involves some invalidation of its justice. The Athenians and Lacedæmonians, he says, did partake in the sacrilegious plunder, "inasmuch as they received pay for more troops than they actually furnished for the Sacred war." But, in looking to analogous circumstances mentioned

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Οὐδ' ὅσα λάϊνος οὐδὸς ἀφήτορος ἐντὸς ἔεργει
Φοίβου Ἀπόλλωνος Πυθοῖ ἐνι πετερίσση.

Hom. Il. l. 9. v. 404, 5.

in Grecian history, it appears not easy to decide what amount of criminality should be imputed to any taking and using of the treasure, called sacred, for important public purposes. So long ago as the revolt of the Asian Greeks against Darius, a man of high estimation among them, Hecatæus of Miletus, recommended the employment of the treasure deposited by Cræsus king of Lydia in the temple of Apollo at Branchidæ, the great bank of that side of the Ægean sea, in measures for public defence. His proposal was overruled; but the purpose is not marked by the historian with any reprobation, otherwise than as the measure was not thought fit for immediate adoption by those to whom it was proposed. In the preparation for the Peloponnesian war, Pericles reckoned the golden ornaments of the statue of Minerva, the most venerated in Athens, a resource placed there with a direct view to use in public need; being so formed that they could be readily removed and restored. And indeed, in the licentiousness of democracy, amid the frequent clamours of the many for distributions of public property, it may have been often a useful measure of policy to consecrate the precious metals, with the view to preserve them for public purposes. It is to be observed then that there was at Delphi an Athenian, a Corinthian, a Lacedæmonian treasury, or separate apartment in the treasury; and so for all the principal republics which had treasure there. The question then occurs: What right, in what circumstances, for what purposes, and with what formalities, had the several republics to draw treasure from their several treasuries? But that it was understood some such right existed seems fully indicated in the expression of Diodorus, that the Athenians and Lacedæmonians had partaken in the sacrilege, inasmuch as, not that they had received money for the pay of troops employed in supporting the Phocians, but that they had received beyond the proper pay of those actu-

Ch. 7. s. 2.
of this Hist.
Herod. l. 5.
c. 36.

ally employed²⁰; so that the guilt was incurred, not by opposing in arms the Amphictyons and others, pretended avengers of sacrilege, but for failing of due exertion against them. The same right then which the Athenians and Lacedæmonians might have for pay for troops employed in the Sacred war, the Phocians themselves might have; drawing treasure only belonging to the republics of their alliance, from which they might have regular authority. Possibly so far Philomelus might have received support from the Delphian treasury, and yet have been justly entitled to the honourable acquittal which his memory received; and this may have made the real distinction between his conduct and that of his successors. Perhaps Onomarchus began in the same creditable course; but, after engaging with the party of Chares at Athens in ambitious projects, of which the conquest of Thessaly was to be the leading step, neither the treasure of Cræsus nor the treasure of the Thebans and their allies was likely to be spared. But the Thebans and their allies, who insisted that the cause of the Phocians was impious in its origin, were only consistent when they insisted that all concurrence in it was impious; and so of course they would involve Philomelus in one charge of sacrilege with those who, after him, went to extremities which he had carefully avoided.

Diodorus reckons the whole treasure at Delphi, when the war broke out, not less than two millions sterling; of which that deposited by Cræsus king of Lydia was much the largest part. We find it afterward satisfactorily indicated by him that though, when Phalæcus and his principal associates found it necessary to retire from Delphi, they might probably search every recess before untried, even to the soil under the

²⁰ Μετίσχεον τῆς αἰρέσεως Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ Λακεδαιμόνιοι οἱ συμμαχῆσαντες τοῖς Φωκίῳσι, καὶ οὐ κατὰ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν ἐκπεμπομένων στρατιωτῶν τοὺς μισθοὺς λαβόντες. Diod. l. 16. c. 57.

sacred pavement, for more treasure, yet it was far from being through absolute want; for they carried away in their military chest no inconsiderable store, with which they were enabled to keep a powerful force still about them. This is what the new government of Phocis and their Athenian friends had certainly not intended to allow. They were disappointed by it, and the defeat of their project, on the success of which they seem to have intended to found far more extensive projects, quickly followed.

Without funds the new government of Phocis was weak, and little able to prosecute the war against Thebes. Of this the Thebans proposed to take advantage; but neither their councils nor their arms were ably directed. Apparently their first object should have been to recover those towns of Bœotia itself which had withdrawn themselves from the Theban alliance, or, in the phrase of the imperial republics, had rebelled against the Theban people. But the first measure of their arms was to invade Phocis for plunder. This was successfully executed, and, the Phocians under their new leaders venturing a battle near Hyampolis, were defeated. Thus the weakness of the government, and the want of union among themselves, and the need of a mercenary army such as that attached to Phalæcus, becoming manifest, that restoration of the general-autocrator, which occasion has occurred already to notice, quickly followed. The Thebans, then too late, proceeding against the revolted towns, were unable to do more than ravage the country, and, in withdrawing with the plunder, suffered a defeat.

B. C. 347.
Ol. 108. 2.
[Cf. pp. 167.
183.]

Diod. l. 16.
c. 56.

c. 58.

The Phocians then, strong with their restored mercenary force, and possessing advantageous opportunities through their alliance with the revolted Bœotians, proceeded to retaliate by carrying ravage extensively over the lands of the Theban alliance. Some

actions were undertaken in defence of them, but the Phocians were victorious. The cavalry of the Grecian republics, as formerly observed, was generally composed of persons wealthy enough each to maintain a horse and serve with it at his own expense, attended by at least one slave afoot. Its business on home-service was especially to watch the motions of an invading enemy, and protect the land against ravagers and plunderers. Thebes, with its command of Bœotia, was stronger in cavalry than any other Grecian state, southward of Thermopylæ. Nevertheless the Phocians, coming to action with the Theban cavalry near Hedylium, obtained a victory, which is mentioned by the contemporary orator as of much importance, both in itself and for the impression it made in Thebes, and extensively over Greece.

Demosth. de
legat.

Approaching winter gave the Thebans that relief which was common in Grecian warfare. But their treasury was exhausted. The pressure from the Bœotian towns connected with Phocis was severe; farther revolt was apprehended, and in Thebes itself much discontent was brooding. Remaining hope for those who held the administration rested on the support of allies interested in their cause. The Thessalians were principal; but so was Thessaly now connected with Macedonia that, to obtain their assistance, negotiation would probably best be directed to the court of Pella. Thither accordingly a Theban embassy was sent.

Diod. l. 16.
c. 59.

B. C. 346.
Ol. 108. 2-3.

Meanwhile at Athens, whether the established practice of former times, or only the proud and jealous temper of the democracy of the day required, though the treaty of peace and alliance with Macedonia had been sworn to before the Macedonian ambassadors by Athenian commissioners appointed by a decree of the people, yet it was held that the ratification was incomplete till commissioners from the

Athenian people had received an oath to the observance of the treaty from the king of Macedonia in person. An embassy of five therefore was appointed, Eubulus, [B. C. 346. *
Cl.] Cephisophon, Democrates, Cleon, and Æschines ; and to administer the oath seems to have been the only original object.

But information of the mission from Thebes to Pella excited interest deeply and extensively through Greece. The Phocians were first to show alarm. Always unequal alone to the maintenance of their own independency, they had recently lost the support of Athens. The Athenians indeed were divided, as the Phocians themselves were divided. The party of Phocion, friendly to the general-autocrator of the Phocians and his friends, were not so to the party which had deposed him, and against which he had again risen. But the powerful party of Chares, disposed to favour that party, could not be on good terms with Phalæcus and his supporters ; and, in negotiation with Macedonia, how far both parties concurring does not very clearly appear, the Athenians had abandoned the cause of Phocis. Lacedæmon therefore remained the only power to which, in the existing crisis, the Phocian government could look for any effectual assistance.

But the state of things was threatening for Lacedæmon itself. Should the Thebans obtain the support of Macedonia for the overthrow of Phocis, its support might follow for the overthrow of Lacedæmon, the supporter of Phocis, implicated in the same imputed crimes, condemned under the same judgment, and devoted under the same curses.

[* Mr. Clinton places in this year the first embassy *πρὸς εἰρήνην* (see above, p. 167.), the second *ἐπὶ τοὺς ὄρκους*, a third deputation 23 Scirophorion, and the occupation of Phocis by Philip a few days after. *Fasti Hellen.* pp. 138-140. See also the remarks on the duration and close of the Sacred war in s. 8. of this chapter.]

Isocr. Or. ad
Philip. p. 340.

On the other hand, should assistance from Macedonia be denied to Thebes, and, what appeared not impossible, should an accommodation follow between the Thebans and Phocians, extensive as was the hostile disposition in Peloponnesus toward Lacedæmon, another Theban invasion might be expected there. The sense, which the Lacedæmonian government had of the crisis,

Æsch.

is marked in the exertion which followed. While an embassy was sent to the Macedonian court, a body of a thousand Lacedæmonians, under the orders of the king, Archidamus, marched to Phocis. A thousand Lacedæmonians, if attended by the ancient proportion of inferior troops, would be no inconsiderable force among Grecian armies. Since the fatal battle of Leuctra, neither a Lacedæmonian king, nor such a Lacedæmonian force, had been seen beyond the isthmus.

Diod. l. 16.
c. 59.

Phalæcus, with an army of Phocians and mercenaries, said to amount together to eight thousand, occupied the important posts near Thermopylæ, which his Phocian adversaries had proposed to surrender to the Athenians.²¹ At the same time negotiation, such as opportunity might be obtained for, was attempted

Demosth. de
legat.
Diod. ut sup.

Isocr. ut ant.

by the Phocian government both with Macedonia and Thebes.

In this state of things, the turn that negotiation might take at Pella, important for all, was not least so for the Athenian people. But the favour of the Macedonian court was important severally to both the parties at Athens; to

²¹ The expression of Demosthenes is, that "the Phocians held the pass;" clearly marking that Phalæcus commanded the Phocians as their constitutional general, and that he was not reduced to be the mere leader of a band of mercenaries. When Æschines, in his defence of himself afterward, called Phalæcus tyrant of the Phocians, or included him with others of their leading men under the title of tyrants in the plural, he seems to have done it only in deference to the prejudices of the multitude, whom in his then circumstances it behoved him to sooth and court. De legat. pp. 300, 301. and 303.

the party of Chares especially, for whom peace and alliance with Macedonia would operate as a political overthrow, unless they could hold that favour eminently, if not even exclusively. In the new crisis, therefore, they were unsatisfied with the composition of the appointed embassy; and they appear to have been, not unreasonably, jealous especially of Æschines; who, having concurred in the coalition formed with Phocion's party for the important public purpose of making peace, would not afterward, for any separate interest of his former party, abandon his new connection. It appears however to have been judged inexpedient to risk alarm, either among the Athenian people, or in foreign states, by avowing any political object in adding to the number of the embassy, or to its instructions. But a resource was open: precedents were numerous of granting to eminent men, soliciting it from the sovereign many, a public commission for the professed purpose of putting forward a private business; whence benefit might accrue, perhaps sometimes to the commonwealth, but oftener only to a party; the private business serving as a veil, under which a political purpose might be prosecuted, either for public benefit or party advantage. The release of many Athenian citizens, prisoners of war in Macedonia, waited yet for the ratification of the treaty of peace, which was the object of the embassy. It was well known that Philip had never taken ransom for any Athenian prisoners of war; and, among the informed, no doubt was entertained but that all Athenian citizens, now prisoners in Macedonia, would be freely dismissed as soon as the ratification was completed. Nevertheless Demosthenes did not fear to make the pretence of the patriotic and charitable purpose of ransoming, at his own expense, some Athenian prisoners, the ground of a request to the people, that he might be added to the number of the em-

bassy then on its way to Macedonia. He was accordingly appointed, apparently with four others; for we find the number of this, as of the former embassy, was finally eleven; ten representatives of the Athenian people, and one of all their allies.

Æsch. de leg.
p. 272.

SECTION VI.

Congress of Grecian Embassies at the Macedonian Court. — Proceedings of the Athenian Embassy. — Report to the Council and People.

THE Macedonian court now became the focus of negotiation for the Grecian republics. The Athenian embassy arriving found the Theban already there, waiting for the king, who was not yet returned from Thrace.

p. 276.

p. 282.

The Lacedæmonian came soon after; and before Philip's arrival others, in the expression of Æschines, from almost all Greece.

In this numerous assemblage of missions from so many republics of one nation, all had different interests to prosecute. They had indeed mostly together in view to put an end to the Sacred war, and provide better security for the temple and treasury of Delphi. But even to this there were exceptions; for we find Demosthenes afterward not scrupling to declare, that the interest of Athens required interminable war in Greece, and especially the continuation of the Sacred war; that the permanency of such a contest among the Grecian republics was highly desirable for the Athenian people. But even where the missions agreed about the object, they differed widely concerning the means of attaining it, and the consequences to be desired. Thebes, Athens, and Lacedæmon, though unable to command, as sometimes formerly, remained yet leading republics, under which the

others, with more or less submission or attachment, arranged themselves. The Thebans, to provide for the future security of Delphi, and future peace of the Greek nation, insisted upon the full restoration of the authority of the Amphictyons, and the full execution of the utmost vengeance of the Amphictyonic law against the sacrilegious Phocians. On the contrary, the Lacedæmonians looked to such a result of the contest as big with ruin to their state and to Grecian independency. The Athenians, differing from both, yet differed hardly less among themselves.

The Athenian embassy was compounded from the adverse parties of the republic. Specially commissioned only for the ceremony of receiving the king's oath to the treaty already concluded, it was however required in general terms to act, as opportunity might occur, in every way for the benefit of the commonwealth. The field thus Æsch. de leg. p. 276. before it was large and abounding with objects; among which each member, according to his views of public, or party, or private interest, somewhat indeed at his peril, might select his object. Even forms for their proceedings were little settled, either by regulation or precedent. Demosthenes had early shown a disposition to disagree with his colleagues; but his first material difference was about a matter of form. He objected to the rule, which seems to have been general at Athens, in common with most or all of the republican governments, giving precedence according to age, and which had been followed by the former embassy. Why his colleagues would concede such a point to him, and why Æschines would omit to state their inducement, seems not easily imaginable; unless what might be more reasonable in itself than creditable in any declaration of it, a dread of the use to which an orator, powerful among the despotic many, might turn the clause in their instructions, commanding them to act, in all things, as the good of the people might re-

quire.²² We shall hereafter see Demosthenes, without alleging any breach of instructions, without specifying fact of any kind, stating, in general terms only, impediment to him in the prosecution, or rather only purpose, of public service as ground for capital crimination.

Audience was given to the Athenian in presence of all the other embassies, and Demosthenes, according to his own requisition, spoke first. He began with avowing a difference from his colleagues in political opinions; and he proceeded then to endeavour to show that it was not because he was ill-disposed toward the prince he was addressing, but very much the contrary. He related his services to the Macedonian interest in the Athenian assemblies; he mentioned his defence of Philocrates, when criminated for moving the repeal of the decree forbidding the admission of heralds from Macedonia; he specified the decrees moved by himself for facilitating and promoting the negotiation for peace and alliance with Macedonia, and he did not scruple to detail his attention to the Macedonian ambassadors, at Athens, and to mention the aspersions he had suffered in consequence. Aware then of the recollection, that could not fail among all who heard him, of the long course and extreme violence of his contrary conduct, he hazarded an attempt to extenuate the grossness of his frequent invectives, adding much flattery, and strong professions of attachment to Philip. In this, it is said, probably with truth, though the account, coming from his adversary; is likely to be highly charged, that he succeeded very ill. In an unusual situation, to which also his temper and habits were adverse, his extensive genius failed him. The awkwardness of his mixture of apology and flattery, the absurdity even of some of his compliments, and the

²² Περάττειν δὲ τοὺς πρέσβεις καὶ "ΑΛΛ' ὅτι ἂν δύνανται ἀγαθόν. Æsch. de legat. p. 276.

embarrassed and uncouth manner in which he delivered them, considered together with his fame as an orator, were so striking that (whether Philip himself smiled is not said) the bystanders could not refrain from laughing aloud.²³

Æschines following began his speech to the king with a reply to that part of the speech of Demosthenes which was directed against his colleagues. "He had not been sent," Æschines said, "nor had his colleagues, he apprehended, been sent, to apologise in Macedonia for their conduct in Athens, but they had been chosen to transact the business of the republic at the Macedonian court for their supposed fitness for the office, proved on former occasions." He proceeded then to what Demosthenes apparently had avoided, to plead the cause of the Phocians, in consonance with the sentiments maintained by the Lacedæmonians, and in opposition to the Thebans. "The first principle," he said, "of the Amphictyonic institution was beneficence: its object was not the destruction of men, still less the destruction of whole communities, but, on the contrary, the prevention of such destruction. The Amphictyonic law expressly declared that on no account should any Amphictyonic community be overthrown, or town destroyed; it forbade the implication of the innocent in punishment with the guilty; and to the benefit of this law the Bœotian townships, which had quitted the Theban for the Phocian alliance, were entitled equally with the Phocians themselves."

Where sentiments and interests differed so widely, as at this time among the hostile republics, and were maintained with so much heat, and, beside the differences between re-

²³ This was a transaction not in the dark, but so public that, had not the rival orator's report of it been largely founded on truth, the shame must have recoiled on him, with great injury to his cause, which evidently was not so injured. He has gone so far as to report some of the phrases which excited laughter, appealing to others who had been present for the exactness of his account.

public and republic, there was such contention of parties within each, with so much uncertainty which might next day preponderate, arrangement adapted to general satisfaction or general good would be, the former clearly impossible, the other of great difficulty. Among the allies of Macedonia the Thessalians, whether for antiquity of connection, steadiness of attachment, services rendered to his family, or power through wealth, strength, and situation to render farther services, had certainly the first claim to Philip's consideration.

Demosth. de
legat. p. 444.

But the mildness of the measures against the adherents of the late tyrants had left in Pheræ a party strong enough, and bold enough, to deny the contingent of troops of that city for a purpose for which a preponderant portion of the Thessalian people was perhaps more than moderately earnest, the war against Phocis. At the same time the town of Halus, which when Æschines and Demosthenes first passed in embassy to Macedonia was blockaded by a Macedonian army, persevered yet in its contumacy, and especially in its hostile disposition toward the people of Pharsalus, who were among the oldest and most zealous of the Thessalians in the Macedonian interest. This civil war, in a country whose alliance was so important to Macedonia, forcibly required Philip's attention. What he did then seems to have been what could be done most respectful to the embassies and the states they represented, and most consonant to the best principles of confederacy among the Grecian republics; he desired the assistance of their mediation to compose the differences between the Halians and Pharsalians; and for this purpose he proposed that the congress should move to Pheræ. He would then accompany them so far in their direct way home: all the embassies would be nearer the principal objects of negotiation, as well as nearer their constituents. No objection appearing to have been alleged, or indeed to have existed, Pheræ

p. 352.

became the seat of the congress, and of the Macedonian king.²⁴

What were the adverse claims of Halus and Pharsalus does not appear, but the mediation of the congress was unsuccessful. Halus persevered in opposition to the common government of Thessaly, and the army under Parmenio continued the blockade. Decision on this subject was necessary toward the conclusion of business with perhaps all, but particularly the Athenian embassy. Previously to the ratification of the treaty of peace and alliance between Athens and Macedonia by the king's oath, it was to be determined what states were to be included as allies of the contracting parties. It was agreed that Halus should be excluded. A decree of the Athenian people, at the instigation apparently of the war-party, hostile to the autocrator-general and his party, had already declared Phocis no longer the ally of Athens. Philip concurred with the party of Phocion in desiring to provide protection for that unfortunate people, and their Bœotian friends. At the violence of the Thebans against both he did not scruple to express dissatisfaction strongly, but he judged it expedient to

Æsch. de leg. p. 504.

²⁴ We find Demosthenes, in a speech of many years after, venturing to tell his sovereign, the Athenian many, that the king of Macedonia bribed the embassies to stay with him till his preparations for the expedition against Phocis were completed, adding this curious reason, "Lest," he says, "your ambassadors returning, and reporting his measures, you might have embarked, and, occupying the strait of Thermopylæ, stopped his passage." *De cor. p. 236.* Hardly, in modern times, could such an impudent imposition be attempted upon the many of London in Common Hall, or of Westminster in Palace-yard, or of the most uninformed part of England in county-meeting. Everywhere there would be those able to inform the more ignorant that nothing could so effectually check the hostile preparation of a power, desiring that its preparation should remain a secret, as the presence of the embassies from powers interested to oppose the purpose of the preparation. But, should it even be found difficult to penetrate the mass of ignorance with such information, yet the observation could not fail to be ready, and of easy conception for all understandings: "Were not you, Demosthenes, one of the embassy? And did you take the bribe? Or, if you did not, what prevented you from sending home information of proceedings adverse to the interest of your country?"

temporise with the prejudices of the Thessalians. The Athenian ministers of Phocion's party therefore rested on assurance from him that he would do his best in favour of both Phocians and Bœotians ; while, in conformity with the decree of the Athenian people, the Phocians not only were omitted in the catalogue of allies of Athens, but expressly declared excluded from participation in any benefit of the treaty between Athens and Macedonia.²⁵ The claims of the contracting parties in Thrace were next discussed and settled. The dominion of the Chersonese was confirmed to the Athenian people, with just exception of the brave Cardians, who were numbered among the allies of Macedonia. Over the rest of Thrace Athens asserted no claim of either dominion or alliance, leaving it thus open to the arms or the mercy of Philip. Matters being so agreed upon, Philip took the oaths, and the Athenian embassy returned home.

The omission of Isocrates, among his proposals for reforming the Athenian constitution, to speak with any respect of the council of Fivehundred, while he was urging the restoration of power to the almost abolished council of Areopagus, indicates no favourable opinion of the former. Indeed we find the appointment of the members by lot out of all the citizens considered, even among the ancients, as an absurd mode of constituting a body to direct executive government. But this election by lot seems to have been very commonly eluded ; so that some men of superior education and qualification always obtained seats. Demosthenes, according to the assertion made in his presence to the Athenian people by Æschines, became a member "not according to law, but through bribery." If one man such as Demosthenes succeeded in so obtaining a seat, it might best suit the

Æsch. de
legat.

qualification always obtained seats. Demosthenes, according to the assertion made in his presence to the

²⁵ The decree declared the Phocians *ἑκσπονδοί*. That this term implied exclusion from alliance and all benefit of the treaty concluded with Macedonia, there can be no doubt. What more it may have implied may be difficult to determine.

purposes of his party if his colleagues were of the lowest of the people. Of what description however, or what various descriptions of men, the council was actually constituted, we have no precise information, when Demosthenes, as a member of it, was to report the proceedings of the embassy. In doing this, he spoke very unfavourably of his colleagues; and the council, whether persuaded Demosth. de legat. by his speech, or before prepared, put a singular slight upon the embassy: the customary decree, which had never failed before on any such occasion within memory, for honouring it with a public supper in the Prytaneum, was omitted.

In the assembly of the people then, to which the proceedings of the embassy were in course next to be reported, Demosthenes also took the lead in speaking. He Ibid. now affected to be the advocate of the Phocians, and bewail their unhappy lot²⁶: the king of Macedonia, whom he had been grossly courting, he now again grossly reviled; and, as disposed to friendship with Macedonia, he reviled all his colleagues. But the Athenian many were not yet duly prepared for this change. A large proportion had been indulging in prospect of those advantages from peace and alliance with Macedonia which the orator himself had been before teaching them to look for; and accordingly, as we find himself confessing, he was heard with marked disapprobation.

Æschines following obtained favourable attention while he defended the embassy and the peace Ibid. concluded by it. With regard to the Phocians, he said, "it was notorious the king of Macedonia could not admit any stipulations for them in the treaty, without breaking with his

²⁶ We find him acknowledging that the interest of the Phocians was totally unprovided for in the treaty with Macedonia, and this he justifies so far as to avow that he imputed no ill even to Æschines on that account: *σιώπῃν καὶ ἰσῆν εἰκός ἦν*: "it was very well to be silent about it and let it alone." Demosth. de legat. p. 354.

old allies the Thessalians and Thebans. But he had given ample assurance that he would exert himself to avert, or soften, the severities proposed by their inveterate enemies, which no other could avert, or soften. That the treaty concluded with Macedonia was otherwise advantageous, could not be doubted; especially for the affairs of Eubœa, where the Athenian people were in danger of losing everything, had the war continued. Nevertheless it would depend upon themselves to draw the full benefits which were laid open to them. If the disposition became general to revile, with the orator who had preceded, the power with which they had just concluded peace and alliance, any very cordial friendship ought not to be expected in return.”²⁷

SECTION VII.

*New Measures of the War-party in Athens hostile to Macedonia. —
Oration of Isocrates to Philip.*

Demosth. de
legat. p. 356. AFTER the ratification of the peace with Macedonia a decree had been passed, on the motion of Philocrates, declaring that, “if the Phocians did not duly surrender the temple of Delphi to the Amphictyons, the Athenian people would join in arms against them, and against all who should support them in their contumacy.”^o Phocion’s party yet held the principal direction of the government when the king of Macedonia, who had been preparing for the Phocian war open and avowedly before all the Grecian embassies in Thessaly, addressed the Athenian people in the usual manner, by a letter in his own

²⁷ We have an account of the speech of Æschines only from his bitter adversary. That the text above is a fair representation of the tenor of his argument seems clearly enough to be gathered from Demosthenes, exerting his powers to give everything the most invidious appearance; and it receives strong confirmation from the first epistle of Isocrates to Philip, and the tract entitled his oration to Philip, which show that such was the approved tenor of argument among Phocion’s party.

name, by which he invited them as allies, and as Amphictyonic people, to join his other allies and the whole Amphictyonic confederacy, in a just community in arms and in council, for ending an evil so extensively destructive as that war had been, and still extensively threatening. The party of Phocion, in conformity with the decree already made, were anxious to concur in this measure for the common good of Greece; and they reckoned the opportunity not only particularly advantageous for asserting the dignity of the republic, and advancing its importance among the Grecian states, but also, if to soften the threatened lot of the Phocians and their Bœotian allies was desirable, that Athens could in no other way nor at any other time interfere so efficaciously. A powerful party in Thebes, arrogantly demanding support for the pretension of the Theban people to sovereignty over all the other people of Bœotia, and vehemently pressing for vengeance against the Phocians, had already notoriously disgusted Philip; and the disposition prevailing among the Thessalians to concur with the Thebans distressed him. The vote in the Amphictyonic assembly of a state hostile to Thebes, and the contingent of such a state in the Amphictyonic army, were particularly desirable for him. In such circumstances therefore the sentiments of the government of such a state must command respect.

But this was a measure which, in promoting at the same time the power of Athens and the good of Greece, would have tended to fix the superiority of the party of Phocion and Isocrates, and therefore was to be opposed by the party of Demosthenes and Chares. Nor did they want for arguments which might weigh with the many. "Where was the advantage," they said, "of peace with Macedonia, if it was to involve the republic in a new war? They did not approve the peace; but, peace being made,

Demosth. de
leg. p. 357.
Æsch. de
leg. p. 304.

Isocr. ep. ad
Philip. 1.
p. 418.
Æsch. de
leg. p. 305.

Æsch. de
leg. p. 305.

the people should rest in peace. What benefit was to result, either to the republic or individuals, from the service of Athenian citizens in the Amphictyonic army? Would it be more profitable than service under the orders of the people in Thrace, or in Asia? Was it certainly safe for Athenian troops to join overbearing numbers of Thessalians and Macedonians? Might they not be overpowered and detained as hostages, till conditions, disadvantageous to the republic, were obtained for their release?" Aversion to military service thus encouraged, and suspicion excited, produced a delay of answer, and Philip sent a second letter. But meanwhile the party of war and trouble, now for the moment advocates for peace and quiet, had gained farther hold on the popular mind: the party of Phocion, successful in stopping mischievous exertion, were unable to procure beneficial exertion, and the king of Macedonia's requisition was finally answered with a denial.

Thus was gained a necessary previous step, toward the execution of a project for leading the republic immediately again into war with Macedonia, and beginning with a blow which, if not at once even decisive, would place the party in circumstances of great advantage for farther measures.

Demosth. de leg. p. 379. They had observed that, through the ordinary waste of Grecian warfare, the country, to a wide extent southward of the strait of Thermopylæ, the seat of long hostilities, could afford little for an army coming into it.

p. 357. Whether the deficient interest, or the not uncommon extreme of scruple of the party of Phocion had prevented the recal of Proxenus, he remained, with a fleet of fifty triremes, in the neighbourhood of the strait. The nautic multitude was of course always ill pleased with peace, and ready for war; and of the officers, a large proportion, under influence of the same interests, were always disposed to the views of the war-party. If then the Lace-

dæmonians and Phocians could be kept firm and united, and the Athenians could be brought to co-operate with them, Philip's supplies by sea being intercepted, if he ventured southward of the strait, he might be ruined without the hazard of a battle. The great obstacle to this scheme of profound policy seems to have been what the war-party had made for themselves, by so alienating the autocrator-general of Phocis and his party, that they would hold no communication with them. Hence seems to have arisen a proposal, that Nicæa, Thronium, and Alponus, critical posts for commanding the pass, which the late new government of Phocis had promised, and the restored government refused, to surrender to Athens, should be committed to the custody of the Lacedæmonians. Archidamus gave into this project, so far as to declare himself ready to undertake the garrisoning of the three towns. But the Phocians, who had found large cause for mistrusting the Athenians, began to mistrust the Lacedæmonians when they found them connected in policy with the Athenians, and chose rather to depend upon the king of Macedonia's disposition to favour them. Refusing therefore to surrender the places, yet desirous of avoiding offence to the Lacedæmonians, they excused themselves, saying, "They feared Sparta had too much occasion to look to her own dangers."²⁸

This transaction could not be secret. The disposition of the war-party to produce a new breach with Macedonia had

²⁸ Τὰ τῆς Σπάρτης δεινὰ δεδιέναι, καὶ μὴ παρ' αὐτοῖς. Æsch. de legat. p. 502. All the critics seem to have seen difficulty, and to have supposed omission or corruption, in this passage, except Taylor, whose explanation is by a paraphrase only, and to me, I must own, not satisfactory. Reiske translates *δεινὰ fraudes*, and Auger *mauvaise foi*. Why they have chosen that uncommon sense of the word seems not obvious. If authority be desired for application of it in its ordinary sense, Isocrates furnishes abundance where, in his oration to Philip, he describes the troubles of Sparta and the dangers continually surrounding her. Considering it then as referring to them, Wolf's correction of the passage, according to the manuscript Cod. Reg. 3., καὶ μὴ τὰ παρ' αὐτοῖς, makes the whole of easy construction.

been amply manifested : the peace of Athens and of Greece, and especially the welfare of the party of Phocion in Athens and of that large part of the Grecian people concurring in political sentiments with them, were in danger. In these critical circumstances Isocrates published his much admired oration to Philip ; which, under the form indicated by the title, is really an appeal from himself and his party to the Athenian people, and to the whole Greek nation.²⁹ The war-party, when they found their power falling through the failure of their measures against Macedonia, it appears, would have allowed Philip the supreme situation in Greece, that command of armies and presidency of councils, for which Athens, Lacedæmon, and Thebes had been so long contending, provided they might hold the lead in Athens. This imputation of Æschines seems virtually admitted by Demosthenes, through his failure to meet it. How far they might have had in view to betray him afterward cannot be known. But no sooner had they ascertained that, though interfering no way in the interior of the republic, yet for all the common concerns of Athens and Macedonia, and all the common politics of Greece which interested both governments, he would still give his confidence to the party of Phocion, and would not be allured by any promises or any flattery, or driven by any alarms, to favour their opponents, then the orators of the war-party, disappointed in their measures, and vexed at their own work, applied their utmost diligence to make him, and the peace themselves had negotiated with him, suspicious and odious in Athens, and to disturb, as

²⁹ The oration to Philip marks its own date, after the conclusion of peace between Athens and Macedonia, and before the conclusion of the Sacred war. Between these two points then it farther marks its time, after symptoms of a disposition toward a new breach with Macedonia had been manifested by a party in Athens, and while the Lacedæmonians were apprehensive of an accommodation between the Thebans and Phocians ; thus fixing almost its moment.

extensively as might be, those arrangements and that plan of policy through which Phocion and Isocrates had hoped to provide tranquillity for Greece. In this they had now so succeeded that Isocrates, evidently in concurrence with his party, but with his party in a degree of despair, resorted to the bold and hazardous expedient of proposing to Philip to assume authority by which the disturbers of the general tranquillity might be repressed, and to persuade the Grecian people to approve the measure.

Isocrates was in the habit of epistolary correspondence with Philip; and, of his extant epistles to that prince, the first carries indication of having been written for the public eye, to try the popular mind upon the subject of the oration intended to follow. He could use, it appears, more freedom toward the prince than he thought prudent to venture toward his own sovereign, the Athenian people; and, in the very outset of his oration he has not scrupled to impute a faulty ambition to Philip in the beginning of the war; apparently alluding to his extensive and rapid conquests, made while the Athenians were implicated with their revolted allies, and reckoning them more than moderate reprisal for the injurious aggression at Pydna. Faults however he allows there were on both sides. To prevent the war then, he says, had been his anxious desire: from the moment it began he had been earnest to have peace restored; and now peace was made he was most anxious to provide that it should be lasting. But, for this, observing how eager, after short repose, some among the Athenian people already were for new hostilities, he feared nothing could be effectual but what he had recommended many years ago, to unite the whole nation in war against Asia. Hence he has taken occasion to address the king of Macedonia as the only person capable of holding the lead in so great a business. Already the ally of Athens,

Isocr. Or. ad
Phil. p. 308.

he says, Philip should bring all the Grecian states to concord with one another and alliance with himself, and then lead the armies of all against the barbarians.

Representing the king of Macedonia then in a way to recommend him to the confidence of the republics, and to obviate the ill opinions which the war-party were so diligent in impressing, he proceeds, after some ingenious turns adapted to his purpose of winning attention and obviating irritation and jealousy, to give a picture of Greece itself.

Isocr. Or. ad
Phil. p. 328.

“Without neglecting any of those great interests,” he says to Philip, “in managing which you have been already so successful, your endeavours should be directed to bring Argos, Lacedæmon, Thebes, and Athens to concord. That being effected, for the rest no difficulty will remain; because all are habituated, in any danger, to look to one of these for support; so that, bringing only those four states to harmony, you will deliver all the others from many evils.” Adverting then to the origin of the Macedonian royal family from Argos, to its reputed common descent with the Lacedæmonian kings from Hercules, to the particular veneration for that deity at Thebes, and to the traditions of the support given by the Athenians to his posterity, as arguments for a friendly disposition in Philip to all the four states, he proceeds to notice objections to his proposal: “I know,” he says, “it is reckoned by some a vain idea that I am offering; for they will not believe it possible to bring the Argives to concord with the Lacedæmonians, nor these with the Thebans: in short, they maintain that no republic, long habituated to the ambition of commanding others, will rest in equality. And while either Athens or Lacedæmon held their former power I am well aware that the objection would be complete: for the predominating state would have the disposition, with the means, to prevent

the desired concord. But now I know it is otherwise. The principal states are disabled by wars, Isocr. Or. ad Phil. p. 332. not unlike individuals long contending in single combat: their fury, while their strength holds, resists all attempts to part them; yet at length wounds and weariness effect it, without other mediators.

“ Let us observe then first the Lacedæmonians, who, not long ago, commanded Greece by land and sea. Such is now the alteration that the Peloponnesians, formerly all ready at their command to march anywhere, have been seen mostly joining the Thebans to invade their territory. Nor have the evils of the change ceased with that invasion. They are still troubled with the adverse disposition of their own people of the country towns, the Periœcians. At the same time all the other Peloponnesians mistrust them; most of the Greeks dislike them; and even from their own slaves they are daily and nightly suffering depredations, so that there is no relief for them from the necessity of watching in arms. But, what now presses beyond anything, they are apprehensive of an accommodation between the Thebans and Phocians; whence might follow a new invasion of their country, more destructive than what they have already suffered. In such circumstances how can they but gladly see a person ready, with power and with all qualifications, to undertake the mediation which may end the existing hostilities?

“ The Argives are in circumstances partly similar, and partly worse. From their first possession of their present country they have had, like the Lacedæmonians, continual wars with neighbouring states. But the contests of the Lacedæmonians have been generally with weaker powers, those of the Argives with stronger; whence it is habitual with them to expect yearly the destruction of their harvest. And, in every intermission of the evils of foreign war, civil

Isocr. Or.
and Phil.
p. 342.

strife has never failed among them ; so violent, that in Argos has been seen more exultation in the massacre of the best of the citizens than elsewhere commonly in the slaughter of enemies.

“ To come then to the Thebans ; they, by a splendid victory, acquired great reputation and high fortune ; yet, by an intemperate use of their advantages, they have brought themselves to the situation now of a people defeated in war, and worn by calamity. Instantly as they had obtained a superiority over their enemies, they began to excite troubles in Peloponnesus ; they proposed to conquer Thessaly ; they threatened Megara ; they deprived Attica of Oropus and its territory, wasted Eubœa, and sent triremes to Byzantium : as if they were taken with the extravagant ambition to command by sea as well as by land. At length they made war on Phocis ; expecting quickly to subdue its towns, to hold the country under their dominion, and to become masters of the Delphian treasury. In all these hopes they have been disappointed. They have killed a few Phocian mercenaries, fitter to die than live ; and they have lost many of the best of their own citizens. Proposing to bring all the Greeks under their dominion, they are now reduced to hope in you for their own safety.”

p. 344.

Thus far the able painter incurred no hazard in representing the truth. But a business remained of extreme difficulty and delicacy, to portray his own country ; to exhibit the odious features in its constitution and politics, so that they might be acknowledged, and excite attention, without exciting a dangerous irritation. He has therefore begun with feigning to consider notice of Athens as needless, because, he says, Athens had been wise enough already, and before any other state, to make peace. Taking a wide circuit then through matters apparently little to the purpose, unless as they might conciliate by amusing, and so prepare patient attention among

the many, he has proceeded at length, but with remarkable precaution, to describe the party of Chares without naming it: "I have omitted one matter," he says, "not forgetting it, but hesitating to open upon it; which yet I think ought to be done: for I reckon it will be advantageous to you to hear of it, and becoming me to proceed, in treating the subject before me with all my wonted freedom."

Isocr. Or.
ad Phil.
p. 354.

This apology, addressed to the prince, has evidently had for its purpose to draw the minds of the irritable multitude to an idea that his resentment at what was to follow might be expected, when only theirs was really apprehended. Isocrates proceeds then: "I know there are men who, envying your great fortune, practised in exciting trouble in their several republics, and reckoning the common peace of others war against themselves, speak ill of you. These men, passing by all other things to comment on your power, represent it as raised, and now growing, not for the benefit, but for the subjection of Greece; which they say has long been your secret purpose. You have promised to support the Messenians if you succeed in settling the affairs of Phocis; but your object, they contend, is to reduce Peloponnesus under your dominion. The Thessalians, Thebans, and all the states of the Amphictyonic confederacy are fully prepared to follow you in any measures, and the Argives, Messenians, Megalopolitans, and many others, are ready to place themselves under your orders for the conquest of Lacedæmon. This then being effected, the rest of Greece, they observe, will remain too weak for resistance." That this formidable picture was a true one seems unquestionable: the fate of Greece was in Philip's hands, and all depended upon his disposition to use his power well or ill.³⁰ Avoiding therefore any direct examination of it, the orator proceeds to tell the many

³⁰ Thus Æschines has observed of this crisis: Ἡ μὲν Τύχη καὶ Φίλιππος ἦσαν τῶν ἔργων κύριοι. De legat. p. 288.

Isocr. Or.
ad Phil.
p. 356. of what kind of men they should beware: all bold
p. 358. pretenders to knowledge of the secret counsels of
 other powers; all those, from highest to lowest, who were
 greedy of the profits of war and trouble; and not less those
 who, as we find Demosthenes continually, claimed the merit
 of a solicitude for the public good beyond what the public
 felt for itself. In regard to Philip's purposes then at last
 he adds: "What is reasonably to be apprehended from one
 power is not always reasonably to be apprehended from ano-
 ther, in different circumstances. Were the king of
 Asia to prepare war against Greece, the purpose
 might even do him honour: but for one of the progeny of
 Hercules, the benefactor of all Greece, to do so, cannot be
 equally for his interest, and, instead of honour, would involve
 him in the deepest infamy."

He proceeds then to the bold proposal for Philip to take
 upon himself to be the peacemaker of Greece, and its com-
 mander in war against the barbarians. The manner of
 introducing this proposal has been admirably studied for
 obviating surprise and indignation among the many, for
 softening adverse and engaging favourable prejudices. "Possi-
 bly," says the orator, still addressing Philip, "you may
 reckon it beneath you to regard the slanders and absurdities
 that are vented about you; satisfied with your own con-
 sciousness of integrity. But you ought not to despise the
 opinion of the many, nor reckon it a little matter to hold
 universal esteem. You may indeed reckon that you have
 attained a fair and great reputation, becoming yourself and
 your forefathers, and the deeds of both, if you bring all the
p. 360. Greeks to be so affected toward you as we see
 the Lacedæmonians toward their kings, and those
 in immediate familiarity with you toward yourself. Nor
 will this be difficult, if you will show yourself the common
 friend of all, and no longer distinguish some cities with

favour, and others with the reverse; and if moreover you will prosecute measures for gaining the confidence of the Greeks by being formidable to the barbarians.”

Hence he passes to animadvert upon the reasonableness of hope for success in war against Persia; founded on former successes of the Grecian arms, and the actually distracted state of the Persian empire: adding the remarkable assertion that, for troops, there could be no difficulty to have them in any number; because such Isocr. Or. ad
Phil. p. 370. was the state of Greece that a greater, and better army, might be more easily raised of exiles from the several republics than of those in actual enjoyment of the rights of citizens.

Hence again, under pretence of example and admonition to the prince, he passes to what might reconcile those among the Greeks, yet prejudiced against a Macedonian leader, and obviate the aversion and fear of those bred, whether in democratical or oligarchal principles, to look with horror upon royalty. “Three great examples to the point,” he says, “are before you: your father, your great ancestor, the founder of the Macedonian monarchy, and your greater ancestor, the god Hercules, founder of your race. If the two former could, and the latter would speak, they would surely advise as I do. Your father was the friend of all those states whose friendship I recommend to p. 378. you. The founder of the Macedonian monarchy sought command, not as many have done, by sedition, massacre, and tumult in their own cities: with a more liberal spirit, leaving Greece, he acquired a kingdom in Macedonia; knowing that the Greeks were unaccustomed to bear monarchy, while other nations could not be satisfied under any other form of government. As thus in principles and practice, so in the successful result, he differed widely from others. They, when they have sought empire, not only have perished mostly

themselves, but their race has been extirpated ; whereas he, after a fortunate life, has transmitted his honours to a late posterity." Much following about Hercules, adapted, no doubt, to the Greeks of the time, cannot be equally felt by the modern reader. From the traditionary deeds of that hero the orator takes occasion again to dwell on the consideration of war with Persia, on the allurements of which, for the very large unsettled part of the Greek nation, and the party of war and trouble everywhere, he appears much to have relied. He concludes then thus : " The sum of what I advise is this : That you act beneficially toward the Greeks ; that you reign constitutionally over the Macedonians ; that you extend your command as widely as may be over the barbarians. And thus you will earn the gratitude of all ; of the Greeks, for the good you will do them ; of the Macedonians, if you will preside over them constitutionally and not tyrannically ; and of all others, as far as you relieve them from barbaric despotism, and place them under the mildness of a Grecian administration. Others must have their opinions of what the times want, and will judge for themselves how far what is here written may be adapted to them ; but I am fully confident that no one will give you better advice, nor more accommodated to the existing state of things."

Isocr. Or. ad
Phil. p. 410.

SECTION VIII.

Effect of the Oration of Isocrates. — Measures of the King of Macedonia. — Measures of the Phocians. — Negotiation of all Parties with Macedonia. — End of the Sacred War. — Judgment on the Phocians committed to the Amphictyons. — Credit acquired by the King of Macedonia.

THE appeal of Isocrates, addressed to the reason of his fellow-countrymen, was weak against the measures of his

opponents, who engaged them by their passions. The temperance of style, in public speaking and writing, and the uniform moderation in political contest, of the party of Phocion, gave occasion for the saying, attributed to Philip, that "Isocrates contended with a foil against Demosthenes with a sword." Nevertheless the sober remonstrance, in the oration to Philip, seems not to have been wholly wasted, even in Athens; and where, over the greater part of Greece, neither similar passions, nor equal powers of eloquence opposed, it appears to have had still more efficacy. The disposition among the republics to co-operate with the king of Macedonia toward the establishment of peace throughout the country, and to place themselves under his lead for the purpose, was very extensive, and yet was put forward with nothing of the usual republican violence. His own conduct marked the completest respect for the venerable orator's admonition, and yet exhortation urging him to the undertaking seems not to have been unwanted. So little solicitous, as it is indicated by Demosthenes himself, was Philip to take the lead in settling the troublesome and invidious business of the Sacred war, that he invited the Lacedæmonian government to assume it, offering to leave the arrangement wholly to them. Why this was declined, both Macedonian and Lacedæmonian history failing, we are uninformed.³¹ But Philip still delayed moving, while the siege of Halus continuing might afford him excuse to his impatient allies. That town at length surrendered upon terms; what, we are not informed; but it is

Demosth. de
leg. p. 365.

³¹ Τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους μετεπέμπετο, πάντα τὰ πράγματα ἐκείνοις ὑποσχόμενος πράξειν. Demosth. de legat. p. 365. The orator proceeds to say that Philip deceived the Lacedæmonians, but he has totally avoided to say how; for which it is difficult to assign a reason, but that he was unable. On the contrary, what he and his rival together have made known, rather indicates that the snare or ambush, *ἐνιδρα*, of which he speaks, as deciding the final measure of Archidamus, was his own work, or that of his party, in the business of the Phocian garrisons.

evinced by the very invective of Demosthenes that nothing of ordinary republican cruelty followed. The population was removed. It appears to have been rumoured that, pretending to take the place for the Pharsalians, he would garrison it with his own troops for a check upon the Pharsalians; but he gave it up to them with a strict adherence to promise, or a liberality beyond promise, which still increased his popularity. The whole military force of Thessaly then, according to Diodorus, putting itself under his orders, he marched to Thermopylæ.

Diod. 1. 16.

Thus the Sacred war was at length brought to a crisis, when the treasury of Delphi, originally the great object, was no longer worth contention. Still however various and great concerns remained; the possession of the temple itself with its oracle and sacred precinct, the place of meeting of the Amphictyonic council, and the seat of the Pythian games. With the decision of this possession would be determined the fate of the Phocian people and the dominion of the Phocian territory; and, what was the sum of all, the supremacy among the states of Greece could scarcely fail to be theirs who should finally prevail in this great contest. But while the enemies of Phocis had obtained the advantage of the Macedonian alliance, the powerful confederacy which had so long enabled her to withstand, and often nearly overbear her opponents, was distracted and almost dissolved, through mutual mistrust produced by the measures of the war-party at Athens. Phalæcus and his partisans could have no confidence in the Athenian government while there was reason to apprehend that the party of Demosthenes and Chares might obtain a superiority in the general assembly. They were also become jealous of Archidamus and Lacedæmon, apparently in consequence of new connection, formed or apprehended, between the Athenian war-party and the Lacedæmonian

government.³² The Theban forces joined the army under Philip. Meanwhile more than three-fourths of Peloponnesus was ready, on any encouragement from him, to fall upon Laconia itself. In this state of things resistance to the confederacy of which Philip was the head could hardly, with any reasonable hope of success, be attempted.

Æsch. de legat. p. 307. Isocr. Or. ad Phil.

Nevertheless, even in this state of things, Philip did not cease to show a desire to bring the Grecian republics to conciliation, rather than proceed to the violences for which his allies were urgent. Of this disposition Phalæcus hastened to avail himself. It was not

Æsch. de leg. p. 307, 308.

to be hoped that, under any arrangement which the actual circumstances would allow, he and his principal partisans could continue to live in Phocis. They were therefore glad to stipulate for leave to emigrate in safety, carrying with them their portable effects. On these conditions the critical posts of Nicæa, Thronium, and Alponus were surrendered to the king of Macedonia, and Phalæcus marched toward Peloponnesus. Greece was now open to the king of Macedonia and the Thessalians. The most vehement alarm immediately seized the inhabitants of those

Æsch. ut ant.

Bœotian towns which had engaged in the Phocian cause. They feared, not Macedonian sovereignty, but Theban vengeance. Hastening therefore to address supplication to Philip, they prayed that they, like the adherents of Phalæcus, might have permission, abandoning their houses and lands, to seek safety for their lives by flight. Nor was the aspect of things much less unfavourable for the Phocians of the party adverse to Phalæcus: those who had fled on his restoration could not hope to return; and if any had remained, they could little hope longer to remain

³² This is indicated by Demosthenes in what he reports of the proposal for surrendering the Phocian garrisons, and also by Æschines.

in safety, obnoxious as they were to the Thebans for their connection with Athens. It is indeed indicated by Demosthenes that the principal Phocians very generally emigrated. Philip, interesting himself for all these, so differed with the Thebans and Thessalians, who were vehement for vengeance against them, that a coolness became apparent. Nevertheless he succeeded in procuring personal safety for all. The remaining Phocians, the larger part of the lower classes, participated in the common horror of subjection to the power of the Thessalians and the Thebans, but they declared their readiness to surrender themselves to the king of Macedonia. This was allowed them, and in his name exclusively possession was taken of all their towns. For what passed between Archidamus and Philip after the proposal to submit the Phocian business to the arbitration of Lacedæmon account fails. Demosthenes indeed says that Philip deceived the Lacedæmonians, but without adding the least intimation how; and had there been anything in any transaction really uncreditable to Philip, he would not have omitted mention of the facts, which should have supported the imputation. Nor is it likely that, had there been anything very uncreditable to Archidamus, notice of it would have wholly failed; unless either public negotiation or private intrigue from Athens were implicated. Complete arrangement between the two kings indeed seems not to have been effected; or not such as to obviate future misunderstanding. Archidamus however, clearly unable to interfere farther with any effect, withdrew, and was unmolested in his march homeward. Phalæcus and his principal followers found a temporary refuge in Peloponnesus. The mercenary force under him divided. A part, following his fortune, engaged in new adventure where, among the widely spread settlements of

Demosth. de
legat. p. 360.
& 366.

Æsch. de
legat.

p. 303, 304.
Demosth. de
legat. p. 360.
Diod. l. 16.
c. 59.

the Greeks, in Crete, it is said, and in Italy, a demand for such troops occurred. Some had found service among the troubles of Eubœa. All quitted the former scene of action, and thus, after so many bloody struggles, during more than ten years, the Sacred war quietly ended.

Diod. l. 16.
Æsch. de cor.
p. 481.

[B. C. 346. *
Cl.]

³³ Demosthenes, in his oration on the embassy, spoken within two years after the end of the Phocian war, says expressly that Philip took no Phocian town by siege or assault, but that all were surrendered to him by capitulation: Μηδεμίαν τῶν πόλεων τῶν ἐν Φωκεῦσι ἀλῶναι πολιορκία, μηδ' ἐκ προσβολῆς κατὰ κράτος· ἀλλ' ἐκ τοῦ στείσασθαι πάντας. Demosth. de legat. p. 360. In another part of the same oration, speaking of the demolition of the walls of the Phocian towns, he attributes that work expressly to the Thebans: τὰ τῶν Φωκίων τεῖχη κατεσκάπτιστο· Θηβαῖοι δ' ἦσαν οἱ κατασκάπτοντες. p. 445. What then are we to think when we find the same orator, in a speech of twenty years after, and with another purpose in view, producing from among the records of the republic a letter purporting to have been sent by Philip to the Athenian people, immediately after the surrender of Phocis, in these terms: "The king of the Macedonians, Philip, to the Athenian council and people, greeting: Know that we have passed Thermopylæ, and subdued Phocis: that we have placed garrisons in the towns that voluntarily submitted, and that, having taken by force those that resisted, we have destroyed them, and reduced the people to slavery." Demosth. de cor. pp. 238, 239. Did he, in the former speech, hazard falsehoods concerning public and notorious facts then recent, speaking then also in accusation, so that his adversary, in his reply, which is extant, might have brought forward the recorded letter, had it existed, and which, had it existed, must then have been generally in memory? or was the letter, or the part of it above quoted, one of those forgeries or falsifications of public records, said to have been not unknown at Athens, which the orator might venture in the latter speech, when he was himself speaking in reply, and perhaps could not be answered till after the decision of the cause? or how otherwise is the contradiction to be accounted for?

[* B. C. 346. ". . the Phocian war ended, ἐπ' ἀρχοντος Ἀρχίου, Diod. xvi. 59. at the time of the *Pythia*: Demosth. p. 380. ed. Reisk. After a duration of *ten years*: Æschin. Fals. Leg. p. 45. 24. ed. Steph. τὸν δεκάστῃ πόλεμον. In Ctes. p. 74. 37. δεκάστῃς γιγνοῦσας. Diod. xvi. 59. διαμείνας ἑτη δέκα. Diodorus has three variations in speaking of this war: 1st, xvi. 14. ἐπὶ Ἀγαθοκλείους [B. C. 357.] ἐγένετο ὁ πόλεμος οὗτος ἑτη ἑνδέκα. — 2d, xvi. 23. ἐπὶ Καλλιστράτου [B. C. 355.] ὁ πόλεμος συνέστη καὶ διέμεινεν ἑτη ἑννέα. — 3d, ἐπὶ Ἀρχίου (xvi. 59.), where he reckons it *ten years*. These variations are consistent with the termination of the war. There were eleven years from *Agathocles* to *Archias*, and nine from *Callistratus* to *Archias*. But the year of *Agathocles* was the true date for the seizure of the temple, because three historians all agree in the year of that archon. [See Mr. Clinton's remarks on the date of the seizure of Delphi, cited above, p. 30.] . . And, as the war ended in the very

By these events the fate of Greece was placed very much in the king of Macedonia's power. But, through all the invective of the adverse orator, it is evident that he proceeded to use the power with a moderation unexampled among the republics, and with a consideration for the general constitution of the country, and for the several constitutions of all its various states, as if he would teach every one how to respect itself, and all how to support the independency

and dignity of the nation. He came attended with

Demosth.
Philipp. 2.
p. 69. &
Philipp. 3.
p. 123.
Demosth.
de legat.

a very small body of Macedonian troops: the

Thessalians were in considerable force about him: the

whole strength of Bœotia was at hand. It

was expected, and demanded of him by his allies, that the Amphictyonic law should be carried into execution against the prostrate people: and it appears much implied by the orators that, if he would have assumed judgment to himself, little exception would have been taken; unless that the Thebans and Thessalians would have been dissatisfied with mild sentences. According to that constitution which all Greece had for centuries acknowledged in theory, though very little admitted in practice, the judgment should rest with the Amphictyons. But, apparently with a just consideration for equity, as well as a liberal deference to those states which had professed resistance to the decrees of the Amphictyons on the ground that they acted under control, Philip invited a congress of deputies from all the states of Greece.³⁴

first month of Archias, the actual duration was ten years, as all authorities make it to be. Pausanias (x. 3. 1.) was led into an opposite error, and placed the end of the war one year too high: δεκάτω δὲ ὑστερον ἔτι μετὰ τὴν τοῦ ἱεροῦ κατάληψιν ἐπέθηκεν ὁ Φίλιππος πέντας τῷ πολέμῳ, Θεοφίλου μὲν Ἀθήνησιν ἀρχοντας, ὀγδόης δὲ Ὀλυμπιάδος καὶ ἑκατοστῆς ἔτι πρώτου." Clinton, Fasti Hellen. p. 140.]

³⁴ Diodorus (l. 16. c. 59.), with his too ordinary deficiency, says that Philip consulted with the Bœotians and Thessalians. It is obvious that he could not avoid consulting with the Bœotians and Thessalians. But the assertion of Æschines, that ambassadors or deputies were invited from the republics generally, is corroborated by the account of Demosthenes, who says the Athe-

At Athens this appears to have been at the time generally acceptable, and the former ambassadors were mostly re-appointed by the people. Æschines and Demosthenes were of the number; but Æschines obtaining excuse for sickness testified by the oath of his physician before the council of Fivehundred, Demosthenes refused the office.³⁵ For Æschines, his brother was substituted.

Æsch. de
legat. p. 271.
Demosth.
de legat.
p. 378, 379.

As the breach widened between the parties of Phocion and Chares, the secession of Æschines from the latter, and addiction to the former, became decided and avowed. Being the most powerful speaker of his new party, he stood of course in the most direct opposition to the leading orator of the other party, Demosthenes; and hence the violence of political enmity between them, to which, of all the celebrated orations transmitted from antiquity, we owe four the most celebrated, and, with them, the fullest and best information of the transactions, and especially of the politics, of the times. Æschines's change of party furnished opportunity for invective, which Demosthenes did not fail to use. With the licentiousness of democratical oratory he continually imputed it to bribes from the Macedonian court. Æschines, less addicted to foul language, yet sometimes retorted with it in a way that the licentiousness of democracy only would allow. "Demosthenes," he says, "mind and body, and every limb, was continually up at auction." These mutual imputations, of the utmost familiarity in the political oratory of their day, prove nothing,

Ch. 39. s. 5.
of this Hist.

nian people named ambassadors for the occasion: 'Απιστίλλειτ' αὐθις αὐ το τρίτον τοὺς πρέσβεις ὡς τὸν Φίλιππον, — ἰχριστονήσατι καὶ τοῦτον, καὶ ἐμὶ, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τοὺς πλείστους τοὺς αὐτούς. Demosth. de legat. p. 378.

³⁵ The expression of Demosthenes, in giving his account of this refusal, is *ἰξωμοσάμην*, literally, "I swore off." On what ground he swore off is not indicated by either orator.

and have no tendency to prove anything. Æschines might have his views to private advantage in quitting, as Demosthenes in adhering to, the profligate party he was engaged with. But the secret ways of corruption are rarely open to the historian; nor is it necessary here to go beyond obvious and tangible matter for ground for the conduct of either orator. Envy at the superiority acquired by a younger, in the favour of Chares, in the favour of the multitude, and in consequent weight and importance, may have affected the mind of Æschines. But more creditable motives are also obvious; a foresight of the evils which the projects of Chares and Demosthenes, if unsuccessful, would bring upon Athens, and, if prosperous, upon all the rest of Greece; a dislike to continue in political society with those, however eminent for talents, who had already been disgraced by disappointment in numerous uncreditable projects; a preference of the ready friendship of such men as Isocrates, Phocion, and Niceratus, and those with whom Isocrates and Phocion and Niceratus held friendship. On the other hand, what would lead Demosthenes to decline the office, to which the popular voice had appointed him, was the fear of leaving the assemblies, in a critical moment, to the unbalanced eloquence of Æschines, supporting the wisdom and approved integrity of Niceratus, Isocrates, and Phocion.

Æsch. de
cor. p. 515.
& 517.

The business referred to the congress which met at Thermopylæ³⁶ was of extreme complication

³⁶ That the meeting was at Thermopylæ is marked by Æschines in his oration on the crown, p. 515. and 517. ed. Reiske. On what ground Auger has given "Delphes," for Πύλαι *, I cannot pretend to guess, nor how he could suppose Eubœa in the way from Delphi to Athens. From Thermopylæ the voyage by the Eubœan coast to the Attic was perhaps, at any time, the most commodious way of making the journey; and when Bœotia was hostile, and the season of the Pylæan or other truce did not give security, it would be almost the only way.

[* It is still more remarkable that he has rendered *πορεύεσθαι εἰς Πύλας καὶ εἰς Δελφοὺς* by "se rendent à Delphes" only. See vol. v. p. 127. of "Œuvres complètes de Démosthène et d'Eschine," &c. Paris, 1819—21.]

and difficulty. The first object presenting itself was judgment on the Phocians; and this abounded with embarrassment. The Thebans, Thessalians, and some others, it was well known, were disposed to press severity; on the other hand, that large part of Greece, which had more or less supported or approved the opposition to Thebes and the Amphictyons, would feel involved, in censure at least, by any sentence against them. The restoration of the credit of the Delphian treasury then was what all would desire; but on the important question how it should be managed there would be much doubt and little agreement. Indemnification, for the states interested in the treasure which had been wasted, was also called for; but how this should be provided would not be readily agreed.³⁷ The views of true Grecian patriots indeed would go still much farther; to provide for the future peace and union of Greece, without which the independency of each republic, and of all, must be utterly precarious. And here adverse prejudices, conflicting interests, difficulties of all kinds, presented themselves. But the matters on which early decision was most imperiously required were judgment on the Phocians, and arrangement of the business of the Delphian treasury. Perhaps it was no more than necessary, for the purpose of coming to any conclusion, and making any progress, that, after short deliberation, the congress resolved to refer these to the Amphictyons.

Regularity of proceeding, and respect for the ancient constitution of the nation, could hardly any other way be so well consulted as in committing the judgment to that formerly venerated national court of judicature. But to make it an impartial court, and to procure any general confidence in it, more than usual balance against the old pre-

³⁷ That these were objects is shown by Demosthenes, *de legat.* p. 347.

ponderance of Thessalian votes, and the recent acquisition of Theban influence, was necessary. Nor was this unprovided for. The ministers returned to their several homes, to report past, and obtain instructions for future proceedings. At Athens no objection seems to have been made to the resolution of the congress: but no where was the sanction of the sovereign assembly obtained. The same embassy was reappointed, as an embassy to the Amphictyons.³⁸ The means of the Amphictyonic body to enforce their decrees depended upon the support which the republics represented were able and willing to give. It was in the practice of the Amphictyons, in critical emergencies, to call all Greeks, at the time at Delphi on whatever authorised business, to assist with their advice; making them thus, in epitome, a kind of general assembly of the nation. But a congress of embassies would have more regular authority; it would be as a second house of national assembly; and would far more either control or add weight to the decrees of an assembly so partially constituted as that of the Amphictyons.

The contending orators, each giving an account of this interesting meeting, do not furnish the clear and full information which might be expected.³⁹ Whether in the coun-

³⁸ Æschines calls both the missions, appointed to consider of judgment on the Phocians, embassies to the Amphictyons. The former of them is called by Demosthenes an embassy to Philip.

³⁹ Demosthenes, ingeniously throwing out hints to his adversary's disadvantage, where he could venture nothing in plain terms that might not be in plain terms contradicted, describes things in half-sentences; and Æschines, always fearing to excite jealousy that his conduct had been directed by a disposition adverse to democratical despotism, (to which, in common with Phocion and Isocrates, and all the best men of Athens, he certainly was adverse,) often avoids to give any account, where much might be expected. It is remarkable, in the orations on the embassy and on the crown, that there is more eulogy of Philip from Demosthenes, his virulent enemy, than from Æschines his friend. In his oration on the crown, especially, Æschines seems to have feared that every syllable, which might be construed into justification of Philip, would operate toward his own ruin; and even the panegyric that he

cil, or rather in the congress, or perhaps between the council and the embassies composing the congress, questions, it appears, were warmly debated. According to Æschines, some of the Amphictyons, from some of the smaller republics, were very rude, uneducated men. The animosity even of the Thebans against the Phocians was exceeded by the barbarous fanaticism of the rough highlanders of Cæta; who contended that, to appease the anger of the gods against the Greek nation, nothing of the full punishment, directed by the Amphictyonic law for sacrilege, should be remitted; the whole Phocian people, they insisted, should be destroyed by precipitation from the cliffs of the sacred mountain. Against such extreme intemperance however the measures already taken would in a great degree provide. The most obnoxious of the Phocians were already out of easy reach; some, as we have seen, with Phalæcus in Peloponnesus, some in other parts. But in the council and among the embassies the more liberal appear to have been a clear majority. The decree finally given, as it remains reported by Diodorus, seemingly neither unfairly nor very defectively, in these times may appear severe, yet, placed by the side of republican judgments, will show rather moderation, humanity, and clemency. It began regularly with laying a foundation for what was to follow, by declaring all the Amphictyonic rights of the Phocians forfeited. It directed then that the three principal cities of Phocis be dismantled, and all the other towns destroyed; that the people live in villages, not less than a furlong one from the other, and none consisting of more than fifty houses; that they surrender all heavy armour and all

Æsch. de leg. p. 310.

Diod. 1. 16. c. 60.

has hazarded in his oration on the embassy, when he was supported by Phocion and all the principal men of his party, is not given as from himself, but put into the mouths of others. To such a degree was that true, which Isocrates ventured to declare, that democracy did not allow freedom of speech.

horses, and possess none till the debt to the god be paid ; for the liquidation of which a yearly rent of sixty talents, nearly twelve thousand pounds sterling, was assessed on the Phocian lands.

With as little severity thus as, considering the state of Greece, it seems easy to imagine possible, all the principal objects of the congress, those which most interested the Greek nation, were provided for. The most eminent of the Phocians, as we are informed by Demosthenes, including probably most of the principal landowners, had already emigrated. Exile, that frequent lot of Grecian freemen, was evidently for them unavoidable. Their country was in course to be held subordinate, and deprived of means to renew the former violences against the temple and treasury, and the dangers ensuing to the conquerors. For them therefore, unarmed, to live in their country, surrounded by Thebans, Locrians, and Cætæans with arms in their hands, could be little desirable. The deprivation of heavy armour and horses for those allowed to retain possession of the lands was then no more than an ordinary precaution among the republics against a defeated party even of their own fellow-citizens. To move the inhabitants of one town to another, we have seen also a common measure of policy ; and to move the Phocians, mostly of the lower ranks only, from towns to villages, would probably be less felt as a severity than the previous forced migration of the principal Arcadian landowners to a city, which the boasted vindicator of Grecian freedom Epaminondas is said to have commanded, and which the Athenian republic, claiming to be the great patroness of democracy, afterward supported. For the remaining population then to pay the rent required, holding lands not before their own, was a mode of restoring the credit of the Delphian treasury, and doing justice to those who had suffered from the contest for it, apparently as little

exceptionable as any which the circumstances of the times would have admitted. This remaining population must then necessarily live so far in dependency as it was without means to defend itself against foreign invasion. But then all the neighbouring states had an interest in defending it, while their jealousies would prevent any one from commanding it; so that the Phocian people, in their villages, possessed perhaps a better independency than the Bœotian towns under Theban rule, or the aristocratical Arcadians under their democratical sovereigns.

It remained still to dispose of the right of double vote in the Amphictyonic assembly, which had been held by the Phocian people. Among those then whose cause the king of Macedonia had assisted, among the large part of the Greek nation which reckoned that by him the national religion had been vindicated, the political as well as the religious constitution maintained, the rights of the great national council asserted, and themselves preserved from subjugation, it could appear no immoderate compliment to give that right to a prince, the acknowledged descendant of Hercules, who had done so much for them. It was accordingly decreed that the forfeited double vote of the Phocians should belong to the king of Macedonia and his posterity.

Diod. 1. 16.
c. 60. & 64.
Justin.

As soon as judgment was declared against the Phocians, Dercyllus, one of the Athenian embassy, a friend of Chares, hastened home, leaving the rest of the embassy to deliberate on measures farther to be taken for establishing the tranquillity of Greece. It happened that he arrived when an assembly of the people was, in regular course, held in Piræus, on the business of the naval arsenals. Alarm was infused among the multitude, as if the combined forces of Macedonia, Thessaly, and Thebes were on full march against Athens.

Demosth. de
legat. p. 359.
& 378.
Æsch. de
legat.

About 17
August.

Demosth.
de pace,
p. 62. &
Philip. 2.
p. 69. &
de cor.
p. 238.

The panic was such that a decree, proposed to the sovereign crowd, was instantly voted, commanding all free inhabitants of Attica, without delay, to move their families from the country into one of the fortified towns, Athens, Piræus, Eleusis, Phyle, Aphidna, Rhamnus, or Sunium: it directed farther, that all those places be put into the best state for defence; and, the more to impress the popular mind, it was proposed, and the decree directed, that the sacrifice to Hercules, according to the established ceremonial for the beginning of a war, be performed in the city.

These measures may appear, on first view, democratical extravagances, unfit even for any serious party purposes. But the explanation remains from Demosthenes himself, in his account of the measures of his party which have been already related: the negotiation for placing the towns commanding the pass of Thermopylæ in the hands of the Lacedæmonians, and the plan for starving the Amphyctyonic army by stopping its supplies. How far, and how timely, Philip may have had information of the extent of this hostile purpose, and of the preparation for its execution, we are not informed; but intelligence of transactions so public

Demosth. de
cor. p. 239.

as those which followed the return of Dercyllus would of course quickly reach him. It produced a communication from him, in the usual form of a letter, to the Athenian people, testifying his surprise at their proceedings, and complaining of them as measures indicating the purpose of hostility, the most unprovoked and unjustifiable.⁴⁰ What answer was given to this letter is nowhere found; but circumstances enough indicate that it was such as the party of Chares, and not the party of Phocion, would

⁴⁰ This is the letter mentioned in note 33. of this section. In the latter part of it, stating the complaint, there is no appearance of falsification, similar to that which Demosthenes himself has given reason to suppose in the former part.

suggest. Confidence between the Macedonian and Athenian governments must of course cease; and the Athenian embassy to the Amphictyons, (whether at Thermopylæ still, or rather removed to Delphi,) if before authorised, as Æschines indicates, to concur with Philip in lenient measures toward Phocis and the Bœotian allies of Phocis, and to support propositions of that tendency against the violence of the Thebans and Thessalians, would now be utterly uncertain what to expect from their own government; sure only that, if the party of Chares finally prevailed, they should be criminated for any concurrence in Macedonian counsels.

Nevertheless the congress, as the historian Diod. l. 16. assures us, proceeded in the line recommended by Isocrates, taking into consideration what was wanting for the general benefit of Greece, (toward which an extension of pacification would be a principal matter,) and passing decrees for the purpose. But Athenian support failing, (not perhaps what the Athenian embassy might be disposed to give, but what it could undertake that the government it represented would render effectual,) necessity followed for yielding much to the Thebans and Thessalians. Philip could not, without certain rupture with Thebes and injury to his interest in Thessaly, procure the restoration of Plataea and Thespiæ, the towns from of old connected with Athens; nor could he obviate the exile of the Orchomenians, and other Bœotians, who had taken part with the Phocians. It was even said, so small was the Demosth. Macedonian force for attending him, compared with the Theban and Thessalian, and so violent a powerful party in Thebes, that even his person might not have been safe, had he farther urged favour for those unfortunate people. On his part no violence was used or threatened. Bloodshed, even what law might have warranted, was completely obviated. Returning to his kingdom, he left

the decrees which had been constitutionally passed to be constitutionally executed, under the direction of the Amphictyons. What then his own generosity could do to make amends to the unfortunate outcasts it is acknowledged was done. As many as would take refuge in his kingdom were kindly relieved, and provided with settlements. Nor did the invective of the Athenian orators avail over the greater part of Greece. On the contrary, wherever the Athenian war-party interest did not predominate, its purposes were observed with aversion and apprehension, and its invective rather excited opposition in panegyric of Philip, even to extravagance. To this the

Demosth. de
cor. p. 238.

testimony of Demosthenes himself is so strong and so direct that it may perhaps outweigh all others. Even at Thebes, he says, the voice of those at the time prevailed, who joined the Thessalians, extolling Philip as their friend, benefactor, and preserver; and, throughout Greece, the people rejoiced in the peace, for which they readily acknowledged themselves indebted to him.⁴¹ Thus warranted, the historian's large yet sober

Diod. l. 16.
c. 60.

praise will command credit. "Philip," says Diodorus, "having concurred with the Amphictyons in their decrees for the common welfare of Greece, having provided means for carrying them into execution, and having conciliated good-will on all sides by his humanity and affability, returned into his kingdom, bearing with him the glory of piety added to that of military talents and bravery, and in possession of a popularity that gave him great advantage for future extension of his power."

⁴¹ The foul words with which the orator has studiously stained his eulogy sufficiently show that he meant no flattery: *Οἱ μὲν κατάπτυστοι Θετταλοὶ καὶ ἀναίσθητοι Θεβαῖοι φίλον, εὐεργέτην, σωτήρα τὸν Φίλιππον ἠγοῦντο πάντ' ἐκείνος ἦν αὐτοῖς. Οἱ ἄλλοι δὲ Ἕλληνας, ὁμοίως ὑμῖν πεφρακισμένοι καὶ διημαρτηχότες ὦν ἤλπισαν, ἦγον εἰρήνην ἄσμενοι.* Demosth. de cor. p. 240. The sense in which Demosthenes commonly uses the term *φρακίζω* seems most nearly to be represented in English by the cant phrase "to hum."

CHAPTER XL.

AFFAIRS OF GREECE FROM THE END OF THE SACRED WAR TO THE ACQUISITION OF THE LEAD OF THE WAR-PARTY OF ATHENS, AND THE AUTHORITY OF FIRST MINISTER OF THE REPUBLIC, BY DEMOSTHENES.

SECTION I.

Change in the political State of Greece produced by the Sacred War. — Policy of the Party of Chares at Athens. — Popular Interest favouring the Party. — Prosecution of hostile Purposes against Macedonia. — Oration of Demosthenes on the Peace

THAT contest among the Grecian republics commonly entitled the Sacred War, though terminated with far less calamity, far less subversion of the former state of things than might have been apprehended, had either Thebes or Phocis commanded the use of victory, nevertheless produced a revolution in the political circumstances of Greece very important and wholly unforeseen. The empire, as it was called, of Thebes, which had shone like a meteor under Epaminondas, but from the moment of his death had held only a sickly existence, was annihilated; except as the Theban people were confirmed in their command, truly imperial, over the people of all the other towns within the narrow bounds of Bœotia. Lacedæmon, after many struggles, had risen little from the low state to which Epaminondas had reduced her. On the depression of Thebes and Lacedæmon, Athens had exulted in hope of command over her sister republics, more unrivalled than in her former

greatest prosperity. But that hope was thwarted by the new power and still more by the spreading popularity of the Macedonian government ; forced, after much war with Athens alone, by the invasion of Thessaly, into contest and connection among other states south of Thermopylæ. It was comparatively little that on the Thracian shore Amphipolis and Methone had been lost, and with Olynthus and its dependencies added to a rival dominion. Macedonia was now the power to which, far more than to Thebes, Lacedæmon, and Athens together, the Grecian people were become extensively disposed to commit that protecting and combining supremacy, which had so long been the object of ambition and contest for all.

A large party in Athens, as we have seen, was disposed to rest under these circumstances, considering them as altogether even desirable ; affording the best prospect, for ages offered, of means for harmonising the jarring interests of the several republics, and establishing for their people, upon the broad basis of a liberal community in rights, a quiet and security hitherto unknown, and now more than ever wanted. But the obstacles in the political state of the country remained many and great. Every republic having views, not simply to its own good, but, through habitual jealousy, adverse to its neighbours, and every republic being divided within itself, so that fellow-citizens were more jealous of each other than of any foreigners, thus, in the very advantages of the Macedonian connection new sources of contention arose.

In such a state of things, to set civil discord again extensively in flame, it would suffice that a rival patronising power was ready. This the party of Chares saw, and on it rested the policy which, after so many failures, with unwearyed diligence and unabated ardour they persevered in pursuing. On a union of the democratical interest throughout

Greece under their patronage they hoped to found a power capable of balancing still, and even overwhelming, the Macedonian kingdom. That they had ever wholly abandoned this purpose, that they had ever intended to keep peace with Macedonia longer than the pressure of circumstances required, the whole tenor of the orations of Demosthenes shows highly doubtful, if indeed it does not rather absolutely disprove. But they had hoped that they might maintain their commanding influence in the sovereign assembly, even during peace, till their policy might bring them means for again resorting to war with advantage. Here however they had a new disappointment. All their flattery to the king of Macedonia, and all the ability with which, in the first negotiation for peace, they had outwitted their domestic opponents, could not induce him to give his confidence to them, or withdraw it from Phocion's party.

The form of the Athenian government afforded frequent opportunity for foreign powers to interfere in its concerns in a way highly dangerous. The jealousy of democracy would little allow a regular minister for foreign affairs with sufficient power; a jealousy perhaps not altogether unreasonable, because democracy, through the common mixture of impotence with tyranny, could hardly allow it with safety. The resource was to divide the authority among numbers: at Athens the council of Fivehundred was the regular board for communicating with foreign states. But that body was too unwieldy to be properly competent for the business. From one extreme then, as was not uncommon among the democracies, the transition was immediate to another. If matters pressed, and a decided favourite of the sovereign many was ready, all authority was committed to an autocrator-general. Thus a Pericles and a Cleon, an Alcibiades and a Chares, by turns, ruled with dictatorial powers. But, in the intervals of such decisive partiality for

one man, any orator who could gain the popular ear might be the effectual agent of any foreign state; as we have seen Demosthenes for Rhodes and for Megalopolis. Macedonia was now become the foreign power of most consideration, for Athens especially, but for every other Grecian republic also with which Athens had affairs to transact. If then one party in Athens could communicate with the Macedonian government readily and upon friendly terms, and the other not so, the former would have great advantage for holding the administration; and the other, while peace with Macedonia lasted, could not hold it but under great disadvantages.

Accordingly, after the conclusion of the peace, the party of Phocion, though much impeded, and sometimes interrupted, yet mostly directed the administration and disposed of the principal offices.¹ In these circumstances, for the party of Chares and Demosthenes to recover the lead, new troubles were necessary, and especially a breach with Macedonia.

Demosth.
Phil. 2. &
de Cherson.
Æsch. de
legat. sub
fin.

The actual state of the Athenian republic then afforded them invitation and even incitement. Not Chares only and the leading men of his party, orators and principal officers, but all who had acted in any favour under him, to the lowest juryman and the last rower of a trireme, together a large proportion of the Athenian citizens, were feeling, in peace, the loss of numerous advantages and larger hopes, to which in war they had been accustomed. In war every Athenian citizen on a foreign station was a great man. The consideration he held, the authority conceded to him, the profit ensuing, the prospect of adventure ever before him, with endless hope of new advantages, were through the peace ended, to the great regret of numbers. The orators also

¹ This is shown by the complaints of Demosthenes in the second Philippic, and on the Chersonese, and more expressly by the oration of Æschines on the embassy, toward the conclusion.

found their principal source of gain and of hope in war. No officer could long hold foreign command without an orator ready on all occasions to undertake the defence of his conduct. An orator, not yet eminent enough to be paid for defending a general, might hope to rise by attacking a general; and often he obtained pay for abstaining from attack, when for undertaking defence he could not get employment. To increase the foreign dependencies of Athens, to have disturbance arise in those dependencies, to have complaints come to the courts of Athens, whether from foreign republics against one another or against Athenian officers, all tended to the advantage of the orators. Nor did their cause, thus bad, stand unsupported; it rested on the broad basis of the interest of thousands of citizens, who lived by the pay for attending the assemblies and courts of justice, and the feasts or other bribes given to obtain their votes. The war-party then, beginning with the endeavour to procure a breach of the peace and alliance just concluded with Macedonia, proceeded in their purpose of acquiring power equal to their ambition by patronising throughout Greece the party opposite to that which, for the sake of peace external and internal, might form or desire connection with Macedonia.

The hostile purpose, already on many occasions shown, became soon more directly avowed. The right of representation in the council of Amphictyons being given to the reigning family of Macedonia, Philip, with just deference to his co-estates, sent them severally notice of it. A Thessalian embassy accompanied Philip's ministers, to announce it to the new ally of Thessaly, the Athenian people, and to desire the formal acknowledgment of him, as an Amphictyon, by a decree for the purpose. In the assembly held to give audience to those ministers, some violent speeches were made

B. C. 346.
Ol. 108. 3.

Demosth. de
legat. p. 374.
& de pac.
vel Philip. 5.

in opposition to the demand. Constitutional objection to it apparently was not to be found. The adverse orators therefore, passing over all consideration of the Amphictyonic decree, endeavoured to excite indignation among the proud and irritable multitude, by speaking of the king of Macedonia's message as a requisition, resting on his own authority: "It was unfit," they said, "that the Athenian people should receive commands from any king;" and some went so far as to assert that they should prefer war to an acknowledgment of the king of Macedonia as an Amphictyon.

The speech of Demosthenes on the occasion remaining to us abounds with art.² Pretending to reprove the violence of others, he effectually stimulates it. "He Demosth. de Pace, vel Philipp. 5. never," he said, "believed Philip's professions of friendship for the Athenian people." Calling his own party only, in the ordinary party-style, the Athenian people, he was perhaps right. "From that friendship," he proceeded, "he looked for none of the benefits which others so freely promised. He did not admire the treaty concluded: he did not think it such as the republic should have made. And yet he must caution the people against giving provocation for the states, now calling themselves Amphictyonic, to combine in war against the republic; of which there might be danger, if the Athenian people opposed what the Amphictyonic council had decreed. If indeed they would go to war again with Philip for Amphipolis, or whatever else, in which the Thessalians, Argives, and Thebans, had no

² The objections of Libanius and Photius to the authenticity of this oration, mischievous in the too common way of critics under the Roman empire, are yet almost too futile to deserve the formal refutation of the learned author of the note on the subject in the *Ancient Universal History*. For those curious on the subject, however, that note may deserve attention. But I would invert the added argument, ascribing the oration to Demosthenes, "because he is worthy of it," and rather say, I ascribe it to Demosthenes, "because it is worthy of him;" and to warrant this I would refer to the next following note in the same work.

common interest, the objection would not hold ; because he did not believe these would join Philip, and least of all the Thebans." Already, it may seem, the keen-sighted politician had discovered, in the popular passions and state of factions at Thebes, the rising opportunity for leading the republic of all Greece actually the most hostilely disposed toward Athens, to co-operate in the purposes of his party. But some stir and murmuring among the people admonished him that he must yet be cautious in speaking of Thebes. Proceeding therefore he said, " Let there not be tumult before I am heard : I repeat, least of all the Thebans. Not that they bear us any friendship ; not that they are not enough disposed to court Philip ; but because, however stupid any among you may suppose them, they know perfectly that their country lies between us and their allies ; whence, if they were to join with Macedonia in war against us, the pressure would fall upon them, while another, the principal director of measures, would profit most from any success." With consummate art then he directed the conclusion of his speech, through an argument professing the purpose of peace, to prepare among the people for ready use the fuel of war, ambition, cupidity, and resentment. " We allow the Thebans," he said, " to hold Oropus : we have, by the late treaty, surrendered Amphipolis to Philip ; we have consented that Cardia shall be separated from our dominion of the Chersonese ; that the prince of Caria shall be the protecting power of Chios, Cos, and Rhodes ; and that the Byzantines may stop our ships." The Byzantines, independent since the Confederate war, and holding the command of the Bosphorus, took that toll from all ships passing to and from the Black Sea, which the Athenian government had exacted while Byzantium was under its dominion. " Would it not then," he proceeded, " be absurd, conceding thus to these powers important advantages pro-

perly our own," (as if the people of Cardia, Chios, Cos, Rhodes, and Byzantium were born to live under the dominion of the people of Athens,) "to engage in war with all together for a shadow at Delphi?" The hostile mind is certainly enough exhibited in this speech for peace. What decision immediately followed we have no precise information; but, in the end, the advice of the more violent orators prevailed, and it was by a decree declared that the Athenian people did not admit the claim of the king of Macedonia to be an Amphictyon.

Demosth.
de legat.
p. 398.

SECTION II.

Short Cessation of Arms throughout Greece. — Contest of Factions at Megara. — Animosities in Peloponnesus. — Inconvenience of the Lacedæmonian political System. — Propensity to desire Patronage of Macedonia. — Invective at Athens against Macedonia. — Accusation of Philocrates. — Decree concerning Amphipolis. — Accusation of Æschines by Timarchus. — Second Philippic of Demosthenes. — Accusation of Æschines by Demosthenes.

FULL of the spirit of discord as all Greece at this time remained, every republic hostile to many others, and each divided within itself, yet the conclusion of the Sacred war brought repose to the country so far that contest in arms seems everywhere to have ceased. According to the avowal of Demosthenes himself the Greeks very generally rejoiced in the peace, and were disposed to maintain it. Conformably to this testimony of the contemporary orator, the next year, the fourth of the hundred and eighth Olympiad, is remarkable in the narrative of the annalist for a void in Grecian affairs; with exception only for, what little concerned Greece generally, the expedition, formerly related, of Timoleon from Corinth to Sicily: the very name of Macedonia is unmentioned.

Demosth.
de cor.
p. 240.

B. C. 545.
Ol. 108. 4.

[B. C. 344.
Cl.]

But the fire of faction did not long remain so smothered. In the little republic of Megara, formerly observed flourishing through industry in manufacture, the high democratical party, supported by the high democratical party in Athens, held the sway. As then that party in Athens was hostile to Macedonia, the party dependent on it in Megara would also be hostile to Macedonia; and thence the views of the adverse party would be the more directed to Macedonian patronage, which was becoming so extensively an object of desire. Accordingly Ptæodorus, head of the noblest and wealthiest family of that little state, went to Pella. Of course he would be civilly received; but whether he obtained assistance, or reason to hope for assistance, appears uncertain. His principal encouragement seems rather to have been derived from the circumstances of Athens; the party of Chares, patrons of his opponents, no longer holding their former commanding influence there. The danger of their interference thus being, though not removed, yet rendered less imminent, he ventured upon what had enabled Hermocrates to return to Sicily, and Dion to acquire command in Syracuse, and so many other chiefs of parties to obtain a superiority in their republics: he introduced into Megara a body of mercenary troops. But, whether the more respectable of those within or without his own state, otherwise disposed to support him, disapproved this measure, or pecuniary means failed him, or for whatever other cause, the mercenaries were soon dismissed; civil contest was renewed, and the democratical party appears to have recovered the ascendancy.³

Ch. 28. s. 9.
of this Hist.

Demosth.
de legat.
p. 436.

³ Leland seems to have thought himself warranted, by loose expressions of Demosthenes, unless he was rather led by his French conductor, to assert (what Demosthenes would not venture to assert, though he might desire it should be believed) that the mercenaries under Ptæodorus were secretly paid by the king of Macedonia. It were endless to notice all instances of this kind among modern writers of Macedonian history. The translator Auger's introductions and notes abound with them.

The troubles of Megara however seem little to have affected any state beyond the mountains which pressed upon its small territory on one side, and the sea on the other. But Peloponnesus meanwhile was disturbed with contention more extensively threatening. The Lacedæmonians persevered in their purpose of recovering the dominion of Messenia, while the Argives, a majority of the Arcadians, and a party among the Eleans were scarcely less zealous in opposition to it than the Messenians themselves. Unfortunately for Lacedæmon, its government, through extreme peculiarities, could associate intimately with none. The institutions of Lycurgus were scarcely less adverse to any close connection with a king of Macedonia than with the democracies of Athens, Argos, or Megalopolis; nor were the deviations from his system, the pretensions of the ephors, the extravagant privileges of the Spartans, or any others of which we are informed, of a kind to render it more accommodating. Inflexibility remained the inconvenient virtue of the Lacedæmonian government, as extreme pliability was the commodious vice of the Athenian. The Athenian democracy seems to have formed alliance with tyrannies as readily and intimately as with any other government, and adopted kings, and satraps, and tyrants, in Cyprus, in Thessaly, in Eubœa, in Sicily, of good character or bad, with apparent indifference, as its citizens.

The inferior Peloponnesian states then, accustomed for ages to look to some one powerful government for patronage, would be little likely now, wretched as they were through their divisions, to revolt at the idea of the patronage of a prince of the advantageous character of Philip, the renowned and beloved sovereign of a free people. It is then remarkable that a zeal for Macedonian patronage, an earnestness for Macedonian interference in the affairs of their peninsula, was particularly vehement among the people

most vehemently democratical; and the testimony to this comes from no suspicious quarter, but from the great leader of the democratical cause in Greece, Demosthenes. The Argives and Megalopolitans, spurning at the obtruded patronage of Athens, but feeling keenly the want of a superintending power, though they had received no favour from Philip, scarcely had had any intercourse with him, yet for the mere popularity of his reputation sent him golden crowns, erected brazen statues of him in their cities, and passed decrees, providing that, should Demosth. de legat. p. 424, 425. he come into Peloponnesus, hospitality should everywhere await him. In Elea, parties being more balanced, arms were taken, and much blood was shed; but the Macedonian party was finally victorious.

Far beyond the power of the Macedonian arms, this spreading popularity of Philip's conduct and character was alarming and distressing to the war-party at Athens; the extravagance of it, in some places, indeed appearing to have been what might perhaps justly excite apprehension in men of better purposes. This therefore it was their first object to obviate and bear down; and the extravagance itself would assist to furnish them with ground for exciting jealousy of it. If they could raise suspicion and jealousy of Macedonia, the progress would be ready to suspicion and jealousy of their opponents of the party of Phocion. They did not spare the common-place invective of the democratical orators, imputing, in the grossest terms, without care of proof, corruption against all their opponents. But Philip especially, and Philip's family, and all Macedonia together, they were sedulous to vilify. In a council of limited number, uncertainly composed even as that of the Fivehundred of Athens, more gravity and decency might be expected than in the assembly of the whole people. Nevertheless Demosthenes, not contented with gross invective against the

king of Macedonia, indulged himself there in scandalous insinuations against the boy Alexander his son. Æsch. in Timarch. Æschines, relating before the assembled people what he had witnessed in the council, of which he, as well as Demosthenes, was a member, justly admonished them that, if such injurious and base aspersion passed unreproved, the Athenian character would be estimated among foreigners by that of their calumnious orator.

But, notwithstanding the success of the war-party in procuring refusal to acknowledge the king of Macedonia as an Amphictyon, they could not yet drive the party of Phocion from the administration. Their next resource therefore was impeachment. They threatened all who had been colleagues of Demosthenes in that embassy to Macedonia which became distinguished by the title of the embassy for the oaths. But while they held out the alarm of imputed guilt to all, they selected one for their first attack, and their choice was evidently judicious. Philocrates, who had moved the repeal of the decree forbidding intercourse of heralds with Macedonia, and afterward became one of the most zealous promoters of the peace and alliance, appears to have been of some eminence by birth and wealth, and sometimes useful to the party of Phocion by his zeal, activity, and fearlessness, though without great talents, or dignity of character. When it was the object of the party of Chares to reconcile and recommend itself to the Macedonian court, Demosthenes appears to have considered Philocrates as a man whose friendship might be gained and would be useful; and hence apparently he became his advocate when prosecuted for moving the repeal of the decree forbidding communication by heralds. When afterward, on the failure of the Phocian plot, the party became anxious to hasten a separate peace and alliance between Athens and Macedonia,

the zeal of Philocrates was a ready instrument, which Demosthenes used with much dexterity. Æsch. de legat.

But when, shortly after, the purpose of the party with regard to Macedonia was wholly changed, and a breach with that power became again as a first principle of its policy, then the intimacy of Demosthenes with Philocrates of course would cease, and the change could hardly stop short of enmity. Not Demosthenes however, but Hyperides, an orator of considerable eminence, undertook the management of the prosecution. Whether Philocrates had implicated himself imprudently with Demosthenes, or for whatever other cause, there appears to have been no general disposition in the party of Phocion to give him effectual support. To avoid therefore the danger of a trial he withdrew from Attica; possibly, after the Ibid. p. 192. example of men of higher character, having provided a retreat, which might make banishment from the turbulence of Athens little a punishment. His flight being taken, after the manner of the Athenian courts, as a confession of guilt, sentence was pronounced against him.

This victory, through the ingenuity and diligence of the party in using it, was not a little important. Hegesippus, a coarse but popular orator, vehement in the cause of Chares and democracy, proposed a decree, declaring that the cession of the dominion of Amphipolis, by the treaty of peace lately concluded with Macedonia, was in- Demosth. de Halon. p. 82. jurious to the republic, and that the people, in giving sentence against Philocrates who proposed it, had effectually decided so; wherefore the right to that dominion remained still entire in the Athenian people. This receiving the sanction of the popular vote, the orator proceeded to state that in the treaty was an article providing that, with the consent of both parties, any alterations might be made. It

would therefore, he contended, be proper to announce to the Macedonian court the decree of the people, asserting their right to the dominion of Amphipolis, notwithstanding any thing now in the treaty to the contrary, and to require that the treaty should be rectified accordingly. This also being approved by a majority of votes, Hegesippus himself was appointed ambassador from the republic for the occasion.

Demosth. de
leg. p. 447.

Coming on so ungracious an errand, it appears indicated that, though received with Philip's usual civility, his conduct was offensive and even treacherous. Demosthenes, in a speech of two or three years after, mentions that Xenoclidides, a poet, who had been entertained at the Macedonian court, was ordered to leave the kingdom for his practices with the Athenian embassy. Demosthenes has enough shown that fearfulness and illiberality were no features in Philip's character; and desiring, on this occasion, to impress the people with an opinion that he had treated their ambassadors with incivility, he had nothing to impute but the dismissal of the poet Xenoclidides.⁴

B. C. 345.
Ol. 108. 4.

About the time of the mission of Hegesippus to Macedonia, the convulsed state of Peloponnesus produced a congress of delegates from all or many of its governments. Demosthenes, in what character or on what pretence does not clearly appear, attended this congress, and spoke in it. His purpose was to obviate the growing propensity to the Macedonian alliance, and to persuade the Peloponnesians, especially the Messenians and Argives, to accept in preference the patronage of the Athenian democracy. His eloquence was applauded, but his arguments, in his own confession, produced in no degree the effect he desired.

Demosth.
Phillip. 2.*
p. 70.

⁴ The conduct of ministers under the late French democracy, and the following empire, will afford, for future commentators on the Greek orators, illustration which the learned of former times very much wanted.

[* This Philippic is placed B. C. 344, by Mr. Clinton, *Fasti Hellen.* p. 360.]

Failing thus abroad, so the party nevertheless felt their strength at home that they resolved to proceed with impeachment, and to make Æschines, the most powerful speaker of the opposing party, their next object. But they were not judicious or not fortunate in committing the management to Timarchus, though an orator of considerable eminence; for his scandalous immorality afforded opportunity, under the old law, after the manner of all the old Grecian constitutions regulating the morals, for accusation against himself. This Æschines used so ably that all the influence of the party and all the eloquence of Demosthenes were unable to save him; he was obliged to follow Philochares in flight. Party interest, no doubt, operated powerfully to promote, as well as to oppose, this decision; for which nevertheless, in justice, some credit may be due to the Athenian character of this corrupt age; when the multitudinous tribunal so supported the principles and gave efficacy to the laws of elder times (for the law of the case was much and ably argued by the accuser) as to supply the place of the great censorial court of Areopagus, whose power Isocrates had been so anxious to restore.

The advantage gained by the war-party in the triumph over Philocrates was lost by this defeat. A sense of the failure of public favour, and a consequent uncertainty of preponderance in the general assembly, are strongly marked in that exquisite piece of oratory, soon after delivered by Demosthenes, commonly called the Second Philippic. The exordium, expressly complaining of that failure and that uncertainty, is singularly soothing and insinuating. With admirable art then, winding through a great variety of matter in short space, all proposed to conciliate the popular mind to himself and his friends, and to irritate it against the king of Macedonia and those who would maintain the treaty of peace with him, not till the conclusion at length the orator intimates

the purpose of his party, for the disclosure of which all that had preceded was preparation, to institute a prosecution for high treason against Æschines, now to be conducted by himself.

To the war of oratory that followed between Æschines and Demosthenes we owe not only the orations the most admired that have been transmitted from antiquity, but also the most copious and most authentic information of the political circumstances and transactions of this interesting era, and the best insight especially into the civil circumstances of Athens, the constitution, the administration, and the party contests ; with the advantage, uncommon for ancient history, of means often for verification by confronting the assertions of opposite interests. Demosthenes seems to have depended much upon the power of his party, and the influence of party interest in the multitudinous courts of Athens, for the success of his accusation ; which was such as otherwise there could hardly be a hope of supporting. It applied to the conduct of Æschines in the second embassy to Macedonia, called the embassy for the oaths ; stating “that he made a false report of the transactions of the embassy, and of various matters deeply interesting the republic, and that he prevented the people from hearing the true representation, which Demosthenes would have given ; that he persuaded the people in assembly to measures adverse to their interest ; that he disobeyed his instructions ; that he occasioned a waste of time for the embassy, whence great opportunities were lost ; and that the whole of his conduct was influenced by bribes, which he, together with Philocrates, took from the king of Macedonia.” The proof offered on all these heads was what, in an English court of justice, would excite indignation against the accuser rather than induce conviction of the accused. Nor will the political principles, occasionally declared, find general approbation, though they deserve

notice. "To make eternal peace," says Demosthenes, "with a mortal man, whose utmost greatness must be transient; to bind up all posterity from the right to use advantageous opportunities that Fortune might offer, is most heinous." In conformity to this principle he proceeds, "The Phocian war was a great source of security for Athens, and the conclusion of such lasting hostilities was among great advantages lost to the republic, for which Æschines is accountable." And again, "Had the war been successful, you would not have borne the name of peace." At the same time he acknowledges that Philip was always desirous of peace, which, he also intimates, was among reasons why peace should not have been made with him.

Demosth.
Philipp. 2.
p. 358.

p. 367.

p. 372. 412.

These principles Demosthenes seems never to have scrupled avowing. But in the accusation he appears to have felt that he had a bad cause to support. The disorder which critics have observed in his arrangement has been evidently the result, not of unskilfulness or negligence, but of design. It has been ingeniously imagined, to bewilder the judgment of his hearers, and draw away attention from the inconclusiveness of the arguments relating to the several points; while the object was to impress a general idea of disaffection to the popular cause, injury to the public interest, and corruption from the Macedonian court. But some of the arguments and some of the assertions of facts seem beneath a great orator and statesman, even in addressing a multitude, unless such as the Athenian, and putting forward a party cause.

In the reply of Æschines there is far more general dignity of manner, as well as more regularity of arrangement; mixed indeed with some very coarse personal abuse of the accuser, whose private life appears to have afforded opportunity, and the practice of republican courts furnished continual pre-

cedents. Every point of the accusation he seems to have so repelled that no conscientious jury could have given a verdict against him. Among the circumstances, not least remarkable, is the offer of his slaves to be examined under torture; and yet not less remarkable perhaps is the refusal of it by the accuser; with no motive of humanity alleged, but the consideration of his own dignity only, as unfit to be compromised by taking the evidence of slaves against his assertion; though he had himself brought forward a slave as a witness for the accusation. The confidence of the accused in the fidelity and fortitude of his slaves at the same time may excite our admiration; while the evident familiarity of the practice of putting them to torture will hardly excuse his proposal of it.⁵ To weaken the purpose of justice through influence of popular respect and pity, the father, at the great age of ninety-four years, and the brothers and children of the accused were, as usual in the Athenian courts, brought forward. For this measure however he has alleged a worthier object; to show the improbability that, bound to the commonwealth by such pledges, he could be false to its interest. Demosthenes, in his accusation, to excite indignation, at the same time against the accused and against the king of Macedonia, gave an affecting account of the miserable state of the Phocian people, and the desolation of their country, which, in traversing it lately, he had seen. To obviate the effect of this, some of the principal Phocian and Bœotian refugees, attending as witnesses, confirmed the account which remains in the speech of Æschines, of the exertions of the king of Macedonia, and of Æschines himself as a member of the Athenian embassy to the Amphictyons, in favour of both people. The speech of the accused being concluded, some of the most respectable

Æschin.
de legat.
p. 295.

Demosth.
de legat.

⁵ A similar offer and refusal of the evidence of slaves under torture has been noticed in the first section of the twenty-second chapter of this History.

men of the commonwealth, Eubulus, Nausicles, and, above all, Phocion, came forward and spoke in favour of his cause. So supported, he was acquitted.⁶

SECTION III.

Peace of Macedonia. — Illyrian War. — Troubles in Thessaly. — Confirmation of Macedonian Interest in Thessaly. — Extension of Macedonian Interest in Greece.

By the peace with Athens, and the ensuing conclusion of the Sacred war, with the settlement of the affairs of Phocis and Delphi to the general satisfaction of the Greek nation, Philip acquired a leisure which seems to have been wanted for arranging the affairs of his increased dominions, and for directing the attention of the Macedonian government toward preservation of quiet on its extensive border against the numerous warlike predatory tribes of the northern continent. Judging from the total failure of notice of Macedonian affairs among ancient writers for the first year after the Sacred war, it seems probable that the Macedonian

B. C. 345.
Ol. 108. 4.

⁶ From the licentiousness of the Greek historical writers of the later times of the republics in asserting without authority, whence Juvenal's "Græcia mendax," those under the Roman empire proceeded to licentiousness in denying, or in questioning, what had been largely authorised. An example from Juvenal himself has been formerly noticed. It may not be unnecessary here to remark an instance from Plutarch. Till his time it seems to have remained undoubted, through more than four enlightened centuries, that the prosecution of Æschines by Demosthenes was brought to issue, and that the celebrated speeches on the subject, by the two great orators, were actually spoken by them. Plutarch, admitting the authenticity of the orations, has asserted his doubt if they were really spoken, on the negative ground only, that no mention is found of them in two speeches of the same orators, delivered nearly twenty years after. The improbability that two such speeches would have been published, if the trial had not come to issue, might perhaps overbalance such an objection. But when the tradition and assent of more than four enlightened centuries had fixed the credit of their having been actually spoken, the question started by Plutarch seems as frivolous and presumptuous as the spirit of putting forward such questions, on ill-founded or weak surmise, is mischievous.

government, though not free from necessity for attending to the hostile disposition of all its northern neighbours, as well as to the avowed purposes of the war-party at Athens, was

B. C. 344.
Ol. 109. 1.

mostly intent upon its internal concerns. In the following year an army was marched into Illyria.

Between the people of that country and Macedonia enmity,

Diod. l. 16.
c. 69.

in the historian's words, was hereditary, and contest interminable.⁷ What now particularly excited

exertion we are not informed ; nor is more said of the consequences than that the Macedonians prevailed so far that many small towns were taken, and much booty was carried off.

While the Macedonian arms were thus engaged, the old party of the tyrants in Thessaly, allies of Athens, connected especially with the war-party, were encouraged to stir again. Philip hastened to the support of his friends there. The disturbances were soon suppressed : but, the former lenient conduct having been found ineffectual for the peace of the country, severer measures were taken. Still, however, they were far milder than those ordinary with the republican governments, whether against strangers or adverse fellow-citizens. The strength of the insurgent party lay in Pheræ, the seat of government of the late tyrants. To prevent future insurrection, without resorting to capital punishment, or even expulsion from the country, a part, and probably a

Demosth. de
Halon. p. 84.:

large part, of the Pheræan citizens was removed only to other towns ; and to obviate necessity for

carrying the severity to a greater number, less able to bear the expense of removal, a garrison was put in the citadel.

⁷ Φίλιππος, πατρικὴν ἔχθραν διαδεδεγμένος πρὸς Ἰλλυρίους, καὶ τὴν διαφορὰν ἀμετάθετον ἔχων. Diod. l. 16. c. 69. Rhodoman and Wesseling's translation of this passage exhibits remarkably the malice, already noticed as common among modern translators, commentators, and authors, on Macedonian history: *Philippus odii Illyriorum, quod quasi hereditarium a patre acceperat et controversiæ, quam pertinaciter fovebat, stimulis incitatus* — .

The Athenian orators, who could approve, not only the assassination of a king of Thrace, their adopted fellow-citizen, but the massacre of the Sestian people, were not ashamed to exclaim against these measures, however requisite for the quiet of the established free government of Thessaly, and of a large majority of the people. Yet we find Demosthenes, on one occasion, led by his argument to acknowledge Philip's popularity among the Thessalians, and to admit that it was the result of beneficial conduct towards them, especially in ejecting their tyrants; a title which, remarkably enough, he gives the Pheræan chiefs, patronised by the Athenian people. Diodorus, it may deserve to be observed in his own words, has described the measures thus briefly: "Philip ejected the tyrants, and gained completely the good-will of the Thessalians." Nor was the advantage resulting limited to Thessaly; for, the fame of his popular conduct spreading, "the neighbouring Grecian states," proceeds the historian, "concurring in the opinion of the Thessalians, became eager to be associated with them in the advantages of the Macedonian alliance." ⁸

De Halon.
p. 84. &
Philipp. 3.
p. 117. 119.

Demosth. de
Cherson. p.
105.

On the other hand, this disposition, so extensive in Greece, adverse to the ambition of Athens, is thus remarkably described by Demosthenes: "Philip had a great advantage; for there was, among the Greeks, not some but all alike, a flood of traitors, bribe-takers, men odious to the gods, such as none ever before knew, whom Philip took for his partisans and assistants. Civil discord and mutual malevolence prevailed enough before in Greece: but he inflamed them; cajoling some, making presents to others,

Demosth. de
cor. p. 245.

⁸ Τὸς τυράννους ἐκ τῶν πόλεων ἐκβαλὼν, ἰδίους ταῖς εὐνοίαις ἐποίησατο τοὺς Θειτταλοὺς· ἤλπιζε γὰρ, τοὺτους ἔχων συμμάχους, καὶ τοὺς Ἕλληνας βραδίας εἰς εὐνοίαν προτρέψασθαι· ὅπερ καὶ συνέβη γενέσθαι· εὐθὺς γὰρ οἱ πλησιόχωροι τῶν Ἑλλήνων, συνενεχθέντες τῇ τῶν Θειτταλῶν κρίσει, συμμαχίαν προθύμως πρὸς αὐτὸν ἐποίησαντο. Diod. l. 16. c. 69.

corrupting in all ways." A kind of magic in the arrangement of words, peculiar, even in the Greek language, to the powers of Demosthenes, and not to be transfused into a translation, has fixed the attention of ancients and moderns upon this passage. Diodorus, more candid than judicious or careful of consistency, taking it for historical matter, has copied it in his own work; unheeding that portrait, which should be the historian's object, is foreign to the orator's business; who, like the painter of the higher classes, takes his subject indeed from nature, but arranges, compounds, diversifies, places in light or in shadow, on foreground or in distance, adds or omits, as may suit the effect desired for the design in his mind. Philip's real bribery was the security which his patronage afforded against faction within every republic, and war from close neighbours without. How he received the various applications made to him, or what connection he really formed with any of the states, we have no trustworthy and scarcely any intelligible information.

Demosth.
Phil. 3. p. 120.
Phil. 4. p. 134.
de Halon.
p. 84. de
Cherson.
p. 119.

We may, however, believe Demosthenes that, in a dispute between the Ætolians and Achæans, about the town of Naupactus, once the refuge of the unfortunate Messenians, which seems to have been referred to his arbitration, he decided in favour of Ætolia; and that he favoured the claim of his kinsman, Alexander, king of Epirus, to a territory on the border of Acarnania, against the Acarnanian people. The Acarnanians, or a strong party of them, through some tissue of interests unexplained to us, were among the people of Greece most disposed to the Athenian cause. Demosthenes thought their alliance important enough to induce him to undertake himself embassy to them, and it seems to have been the mission in which he was most successful. A decision of Philip, therefore, with whatever justice, adverse to their interest, would earn his unfavourable animadversion.

Meanwhile in Athens, the failure in the prosecution of Æschines, disappointing to the immediate hopes of the party, and visibly, even in extant orations, checking to the great orator who conducted it, nevertheless little damped the ardour or abated the industry of those who acted with him: on the contrary, his ensuing reserve, leaving an opener career for the minor speakers, perhaps rather excited their zeal and industry. The little island of Halonnesus, near the Thessalian coast, formerly subject to Athens, whether through negligence or connivance of the Athenian naval commanders, had been occupied by Sostratus, a chief of pirates who acknowledged, or at least formally acknowledged, no sovereign. A Macedonian force expelled Sostratus, and reduced the island under the Macedonian dominion. The orators of the party of Chares, passive under the occupancy of the island by a pirate, urged the people to claim it from the king of Macedonia. The principle asserted by the party, that whatever, by right or wrong, the Athenian people had once possessed must ever thereafter of right be theirs, that a surrender by a formal decree of the sovereign assembly did not bind the people, if in another assembly they voted that they had been ill-advised by the orator who moved it, had so been sanctioned in the recent decree about Amphipolis that either to controvert the doctrine, or oppose the measure proposed as founded on it, might be hazardous. The party, however, so prevailed that an embassy was sent to Macedonia, specially to assert the claim.

B. C. 343.
Ol. 109. 2.

Demosth. de
Halon.
Epist.
Phil. ap.
Demosth.
or. in Epist.

Demosth. de
Halon. p. 77.

Philip answered the mission in the way esteemed most friendly and respectful on such occasions, sending an embassy to Athens, with a representation in writing from himself, in the form, then usual, of a letter to the Athenian people. The letter unfortunately remains

B. C. 342.
Ol. 109. 3.
[Cf. p. 248.]

known only by such extracts as an orator, of the fiercest and coarsest of the high democratical party, selected for the purpose of a speech in the general assembly; and yet, even in these, the liberality and moderation of the prince who wrote it are conspicuous. He has evidently proposed to use the opportunity of the question, so offensively made about the little island of Halonnesus, for endeavouring to settle upon equitable and liberal terms some far more important affairs, which required arrangement between the two governments, to prevent the threatened disturbance of the peace so lately concluded between them. "About Halonnesus," he said, "there should be no difficulty; he would give it to the Athenian people. Two other matters more pressed upon his consideration; to deliver the Grecian seas from the common pest of piracy, and to provide for the just settlement of disputes frequently occurring in commercial intercourse between Macedonian and Athenian subjects." For the former purpose he proposed the united exertion of the Athenian and Macedonian naval forces, and, for the latter, to enter upon a treaty of commerce. He complained then, in gentle terms, of the decree relating to Amphipolis; referring to the treaty of peace to evince its injustice, or, as, apparently to avoid irritation, he rather termed it, mistake. The Athenian government, in sending its notices about Amphipolis and Halonnesus, had added remonstrances on some other matters. Promises of measures for the benefit of the republic, perhaps relating to affairs in Eubœa, they said, had not been performed: some small towns on the Thracian coast, usually acknowledging the sovereignty of the Athenian people, they asserted, had been taken by the Macedonian arms after the conclusion of the peace; and, in some measures injurious to the ancient right of the Athenian people to the dominion of the Chersonese, the Cardians had been encouraged and supported by Mace-

donian officers. To these complaints Philip replied, "that he never made any such promises as those claimed of him for benefits to the Athenian people. With regard to the towns in Thrace, he did not desire to be judge in his own cause; he would refer the matter (a mode usual among the Grecian states) to the arbitration of neutral powers; and he would engage that the Cardians, who reckoned that, instead of injuring the Athenians, they had been injured by them, should also refer to similar arbitration the question of right to the lands claimed by Athenian settlers."⁹

The king's letter having been read to the assembled Athenian people, his ambassadors were allowed to address them in speech. Of these Python of Byzantium was of celebrated eloquence. He seems however to have added little to the written matter, except to remonstrate on the illiberal invective and scandalous calumny against the sovereign whom he represented, in which the Athenian orators were accustomed to find indulgence from their sovereign.

Demosthenes, after his recent failure against *Æschines*, would not be likely to remit that Æsch. de cor. caution which has been noticed in his oration commonly called the Second Philippic. Though he spoke on the occasion, yet the more violent declamation which the purposes of the party required, seems to have been committed to a secondary orator; and the speech, transmitted among the works of Demosthenes, entitled "The Oration on Halonnesus," has, by ancient and modern Liban. arg. Or. de Halon. critics,* on probable ground, been attributed to Hegesippus, already mentioned as mover of the decree about Amphipolis, and afterward ambassador to Macedonia. That oration differs widely in character, not only from

* ⁹ This explanation of the dispute with the Cardians is found in Philip's letter to the Athenians, preserved with the oration of Demosthenes on the letter.

the Second Philippic, but from everything remaining from Demosthenes. Not only it is inferior, as the critics have observed, in style, but wholly wants the neatness of delusive reasoning, the subtilty of insinuation avoiding assertion, the wonderfully ingenious texture of phrase, calculated to infuse falsehood into the hearer's belief without pledging the speaker, the whole art, in which Demosthenes has so singularly excelled, of making the worse appear the better cause, disguising with fair colours the foulest forms, and recommending monsters by the grace and splendour of the robes with which he could veil their hideousness.¹⁰ The oration on Halonnesus marks no purpose of even imitating Demosthenes. It carries every appearance of originality; plain and coarse in its violence, and careless of all decencies.

Or. de Halon.
p. 77.
[B. C. 343.
Cl.]

“I will answer the letter,” said the orator, “article by article. Philip will give you Halonnesus, he says, as if it was of any right his to give, being taken from pirates who had a right to nothing.

p. 78.

Why did not he say he would restore it? And he has proposed reference to the arbitration of neutral powers. This is ridiculous, but it is insulting too. Truly it becomes the Athenian people, deliverers of Greece, to contend juridically about islands with a man of Pella! Is not your own navy able to do you justice? If you commit decision about islands to the arbitration of neutral powers, will it be less than declaring that you abandon your

¹⁰ Ὁ Ἰσαῖος. *Ἦν δὲ περὶ αὐτοῦ δόξα, παρὰ τοῖς τότε, γοήτειας καὶ ἀπάτης, ὡς δεινὸς ἀνὴρ τεχνιτεῦσαι λόγους ἐπὶ τὰ πονηρότερα, καὶ εἰς τοῦτο διεβάλλετο. Δηλοῖ δὲ τοῦτο τῶν ἀρχαίων τις ῥητόρων, ἐν τῇ Δημοσθένους κατηγορίᾳ, Πυθίας, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ πονηρίαν γὰρ τῷ Δημοσθένει καὶ κακίαν τὴν ἐξ ἀνθρώπων πᾶσαν ἰνοικεῖν φῆσαι. Καὶ τότε τὸ μέρος ὅλον εἰς διαβολὴν ἐπιτίθησιν, ὅτι τὸν Ἰσαῖον ὅλον καὶ τὰς τῶν λόγων ἐκείνου τέχνας σισίτισται. Καὶ μὰ Δία οὐκ ἀπὸ σκοποῦ τὴν διαβολὴν ταύτην εἶχεν ἐκάτερος. Ἐμοὶ γοῦν οἱ μὲν Ἰσαίου τε καὶ Δημοσθένους λόγοι καὶ περὶ μὲν ἀληθείας καὶ δικαίας συντάξεως αἱ ὑποθέσεις ὑποκτοὶ δοκοῦσιν εἶναι, τῆς πολλῆς ἐπιτεχνήσεως ἕνεκα· οἱ δὲ Ἰσοκράτους καὶ Λυσίου παντὸς μάλιστα δίκαιοί τε καὶ ἀληθεῖς. Dion. Hal. in Isæo, pp. 104, 105. ed. Sylburg.

right to re-assert your dominion over so many continental territories, of which you have been deprived ?”

Having boldly thus warned the Grecian states of Asia and the islands what they must expect from the policy of his party, should they acquire power to follow up their policy, the orator proceeds to the consideration of the proposal for a treaty of commerce; a subject interesting enough to excite regret that the passage relating to it is not throughout clearly intelligible.¹¹ One part however, perfectly plain, will deserve notice: “Experience,” says the orator, “shows that the proposed new jurisdiction for commercial matters is needless. Under Amyntas, father of Philip, and former Macedonian kings, none such existed, when there was more communication than now between the Macedonian and Athenian people: for Macedonia was then subject to us, and paid us tribute.” It is not improbable that ground for this strong assertion may have existed, so far that Amyntas found it convenient, like so many other powers around the Ægean, to compound for free navigation for his subjects.

Philip’s proposal for combined energy of the Macedonian and Athenian navies to abolish piracy in the Grecian seas, appears to have put the orator to most difficulty. It was very much against the interest of the Athenian naval com-

¹¹ Leland has given up the passage as inexplicable; and Auger, after an attempt, far from satisfactory, to explain in translation what relates expressly to commerce, confesses himself unable to discover what the matter of Potidæa, brought in by the orator, has to do with the general question. Thus much however seems altogether clear, that Philip’s proposition was founded on his persuasion that commercial disputes, arising in the Macedonian territory, and so carried before Macedonian courts, were generally decided with liberal justice, but that, in Athenian courts, Macedonian subjects could obtain no better justice than Xenophon and Isocrates inform us was usually obtained by the subjects of other states in alliance with Athens. One object also in the introduction of the matter of Potidæa appears obvious; to excite among the people regret for the loss of former conquests, and appetite for the dangerous struggle to recover them which the orator was anxious to recommend.

manders that piracy should be abolished; and it was also against the interest of the orators; not only as they were connected with the naval commanders, but as piracy contributed to bring applications to the Athenian people for protection, and litigation to the Athenian tribunals, sources both of profit for the orators. Piracy was perhaps advantageous even to the Athenian merchants, to whom trade accrued through the superior security of the Athenian flag. But these grounds of objection could not prudently be stated. The orator therefore confined his reply to the vague assertion, "that the king of Macedonia's proposal was made only to obtain permission of the Athenian people for his ships to visit every island, and in short to have their assistance for making himself master of the sea."

This however was but the refusal of a matter open for choice, no claim of right being in question. To another orator, before a different assembly, the difficulty might have appeared greater to maintain the right of the Athenian people to the dominion of Amphipolis, after they had formally ceded it by the late treaty of peace; but of that difficulty Hegesippus made light, meeting it with arguments of a very remarkable character: "Philip," he said, "pretends that his right to Amphipolis is acknowledged by the late treaty. True it is that the Athenian people did, by that treaty, consent that each party should keep what at the time it held; but they did not so at all consent that Amphipolis should belong to Philip. He held it indeed, at the time, unquestionably: but a person may hold what belongs to another; and many do hold what belongs to others; so that this wise argument of his is mere folly.¹² Do you think then he has kept his word with you,

Or. de Halon.
p. 81. 83.

¹² "Ὡστε τοῦτό γε τὸ σοφὸν αὐτοῦ ἡλίθιον ἐστίν. p. 83. The description of the *status quo*, in the phrase of our diplomatists, is given with material difference in different parts of the orator's argument, as if with the purpose of puzzling and misleading the mob-sovereign he was addressing. In one place it is, *κα-*

professing strict attention in all he says and does to whatever is esteemed just among men? or does he not rather show that he utterly despises it? he who asserts that the country belongs to him which both the Greeks and the king of Persia have declared to belong to the Athenian people!" The reader will recollect that the country, if the meaning be confined to the territory of Amphipolis, first became Athenian property by forcible intrusion upon the Thracians; was lost again soon after by fair chance of war with the Lacedæmonians; was made free by the peace of Antalcidas through decrees of the Greeks and the king of Persia together; was associated afterward, apparently by the choice of its people, with the Olynthian confederacy; was reduced again under the power of Athens, not, seemingly, without treachery; shortly after was taken in open war by the united arms of Olynthus and Macedonia; and finally was ceded to Macedonia by that clause in the treaty of peace, recently concluded with Athens, which declared that both parties should hold what they at the time possessed.

A clause, according to the orator, had been added to the original treaty, declaring all Greeks Or. de Halon.
p. 84. not partaking in its benefits as allies of either party, free and independent, and binding the parties to protect them against all aggression. This clause is of a spirit very wide of what we find prevailing in the avowed politics of Demosthenes,

τίσους τὰ ἑαυτῶν ἔχειν — (p. 81. l. 4.) "for each party to have its own." This would rather imply restitution of all that had been taken, which most certainly was never meant on the part of Macedonia. Afterward he gives it, *ἔχειν αὐτὸν ἃ εἶχεν*, — p. 83. l. 12. "for him to have what he actually held," and this, no doubt the meaning of the treaty, he marks for nearly its expression too, — *ἐψηφίσθη ἔχειν αὐτὸν, κ. τ. λ.* The whole is worth the curious reader's attention, as a specimen of the kind of argument that might be ventured before the sovereign people of Athens, by an eminent orator, a leading man in the assembly, and who had been employed on the most important embassies; for so much is fully indicated, whether the oration be of Hegesippus, or Demosthenes, or any other.

but perfectly conformable to that which connected Phocion's party with the king of Macedonia. To appreciate the reproach of breach of this article by Philip, in measures against three towns of Ambracia, we want what was said by the Macedonian government on the other side; unless the light and little explicit mention of that matter by Demosthenes, and the obvious futility of the charge which the orator on Halonnesus has added of violence against the Pheræans, may be taken as sufficiently indicating that reproach to have been little founded. In the usual party style of the Greeks, the party of the tyrants of Pheræ are called exclusively the Pheræans; and the body of the Thessalian people enemies of Athens, and their satisfaction with the king of Macedonia's conduct, and the sanction which they appear in a constitutional way to have given it, are carefully kept out of sight.

p. 85. Philip, in the confession of the orator on

Halonnesus confirming all other accounts, had restored all his Athenian prisoners without ransom. This, as it did him great and extensive credit, was far from gratifying to the orator and his party; and their ingenuity found means to make a large proportion of the Athenian many unsatisfied with it. There remained yet in a Macedonian prison a man, not an Athenian, for he was of Carystus in Eubœa, but a public guest of the Athenian people.¹³ What crime made him obnoxious in Macedonia, and what merit procured him the zealous favour of the party of Chares, the orator has equally avoided to say; but the Athenian people were persuaded to urge the Macedonian court, by three successive embassies, for his liberation. It was thus evidently not a hasty measure to send him to the executioner. Whether just or necessary, may best be estimated from what we learn, on best authority, of the common conduct of the Macedonian

¹³ Περόξενον τῆς ἡμετέρας πόλεως.

and Athenian governments ; adding the consideration that it was clearly Philip's desire to maintain peace and alliance with Athens, and the earnest purpose of the party of Chares to lead the Athenian people to break them.¹⁴

On the border of the Cardian territory, against the Athenian dominion of the Thracian Chersonese, was some land, unoccupied by the Cardians, on which some Athenians, or persons under Athenian protection, had settled. The Cardians appear not absolutely to have objected to this use of land, to themselves useless, provided it were not turned to their political disadvantage : they desired only that their right to the sovereignty of the territory should be acknowledged. The question had been brought before the Athenian people in a favourable season, and, on the motion of Calippus, a decree passed acknowledging the right of the Cardians to the territory. This was evidently carried against the high democratical party ; for the orator who led their business in the question concerning Halonnesus, probably Hegesippus, afterward led a prosecution against Calippus for moving the decree, as against the interest of the commonwealth ; but the people a second time gave their voices in favour of the Cardian claim by acquitting him. If the Cardian people were not thus secured against any future claim of Athenian sovereignty over the land in question, apparently such security could not be. The orator on Halonnesus nevertheless, in a season more favourable to his purpose, did not scruple to tell the people that he had done right in accusing Calippus, and they had done wrong in acquitting him, and that their claim to the land in question, notwithstanding their formal renunciation of it, remained perfect, and ought still to be

Or. de Halon.
p. 86.

p. 87.

¹⁴ The translator Auger has been candid enough to remark, in a note, that " ce Caristien était probablement quelque criminel, pour qui les Athéniens s'étaient intéressés."

asserted. Among the extant works of the orators, instances abound of a very humble tone in addressing the sovereign people : some such remain, as we have observed, even from Demosthenes. Such a tone was used when the orator doubted the strength of his party, or the favour of the people toward himself. The oration on Halonnesus is not least remarkable among instances of an opposite kind. The speaker, evidently feeling himself strong, did not fear to be arrogant. In the conclusion of his speech he assumed something nearly approaching command of the assembly. " There are some," he said, " who contend that this letter of the king of Macedonia is reasonable and proper. They deserve your hatred much more than Philip himself. He acquires glory and great advantages by his measures against you. But those Athenians who show more good-will toward Philip than toward their country ought to be sent by you to the worst perdition, if you carry your brains within your temples, and not trodden upon at your heels.¹⁵ It remains for me to write the answer which I think just and advantageous for you to return to this reasonable and proper letter, and to the speeches of the ambassadors." It appears only probable that an answer of the same temper with the speech was approved by a majority of the assembly, and sent to the king of Macedonia.

¹⁵ Εἶπερ ὑμεῖς τὸν ἐγκέφαλον ἐν τοῖς κροτάφοις, καὶ μὴ ἐν ταῖς πτέρλαις καταπατημένον φορεῖτε. This phrase the French translator, it seems, could not venture to give in his own language. He has certainly not done justice to the character of the oration in his refinement of the expression, — " s'il vous reste encore quelque étincelle de raison."

SECTION IV.

War of Macedonia in Thrace and Scythia. — Athenian Interest declining in Greece. — Exertions of the War-party. — Colony sent to the Thracian Chersonese. — Diopithes Athenian Commander in Thrace. — Hostile Conduct against Macedonia.

IN this year, the third after the conclusion of the Phocian war, Philip carried his arms to the country which, if disturbance from Greece had not interfered, should have most invited the ambition of a king of Macedonia, and still, according to the historian, his measures were required by the ambition and injustice of others. The king of Thrace, Kersobleptes, having been compelled to surrender the Chersonese to the Athenians, and to divide the rest of his dominions with the princes of his family who had rebelled against him, his means, either to give protection to the Grecian towns on his shores, or to exact tribute from them, were greatly reduced. Whether their refusal provoked his arms, or he was unable to restrain the licentiousness of his Thracian subjects, or instigation from Athens was the principal moving spring, (for an Athenian fleet was at hand, and there was an Athenian party more or less powerful in every Grecian town of his coast,) the lands of some of those Grecian towns were plundered by Thracian freebooters. The Athenian commander, warm in the war-party interest, was ready to assume the patronage of any party anywhere; and, confident of support at home, ready also to take any measures adverse to Macedonia, for which convenient opportunity might offer. The people of the Hellespontine towns however, like those of so many republics of Proper Greece, shunning the Athenian connection, sought Macedonian patronage.

B. C. 343.
Ol. 109. 2.
[B. C. 342. Cl.]

Diod. l. 16.
c. 71.

Epist. Philipp.
ap. Demosth.

With solicitation then from those towns, many circumstances concurred at this time to induce Philip to put himself at the head of a powerful army, and cross the lofty mountains between his dominion and Eastern Thrace. If the desire of conquest instigated, no extension of his border could be so advantageous, whether for the opportunities of commerce which would increase his revenue, or of a frontier to give security to his kingdom, or of a point whence to extend conquest into the country, always the foremost object of Grecian appetency, the rich provinces of Lesser Asia. For so advantageous an acquisition the way had been largely prepared by the division of the Thracian monarchy, the work of the war-party of Athens, pursuing their own purposes of ambition. While then the unfortunate and weak Kersobleptes, consenting to hold his diminished kingdom in a kind of vassalage under the Athenian people, looked to them with ill-judging confidence for protection, Teres, another of the Thracian princes, joined Philip, and fought under his orders. The forces of Kersobleptes were overcome, and the Grecian townships of his shores, no longer subject to Thrace, acknowledged Macedonia as their protecting power.

Epist. Philipp.
ad Athen.

Diod. l. 16.

Whether this adverse event excited the activity of Athenian policy to penetrate into the wild country toward the Danube, and stir against Macedonia the warlike hordes that for ages had denied any certain quiet to its northern border, we are not informed, but Athens had opportunity for communication with those powers, through its commercial establishments on the Euxine shores formerly noticed. They were however apparently serious menaces, that induced Philip to lead his army next into that inhospitable and uninviting country; no purpose being obvious but to prevent a destructive invasion of his kingdom. Little distant from

Greece in latitude, but widely differing in seasons, winter overtook him there unexpectedly, coming perhaps with severity uncommonly early. His way back into Macedonia was so barred by snows that not even a messenger could pass. Much interest was excited in Greece by the various rumours circulated. Among the first authentic accounts was information of a severe illness that confined him; and report for some time prevailed that he was dead. On the other hand, if ever the extravagant fable of the conquest of Cappadocia, which no extant author earlier than Justin has noticed, was at all heard of in Philip's age, probably it was a rumour arising in this time of uncertainty. An authentic history of this war could not fail to be highly interesting. That great difficulties, hardships, and dangers were encountered, ably, firmly, and successfully, is nearly all to which we have any trustworthy testimony; though, with such defective information of most important public transactions, some ancient writers have not scrupled to give conversations, and witty sayings, and various matters the least likely to have been correctly reported. What remains therefore from the adverse orator, who would sometimes endeavour by flashes of eulogy amid his invective to excite among his fellow-countrymen emulation of the great character he slandered, is highly valuable. "In quest of glory," says Demosthenes, "Philip freely met all kinds of hardship, and danger in every shape: undismayed by wounds, unappalled by sickness, patient in confinement by snow, he was contented to pass the winter, living upon millet and rye, in a Thracian cellar." Apparently, the Thracian cellar, here spoken of, was the common winter dwelling of the country, sunk in the ground, for shelter against the extreme severity of the season, such as we have seen described by Xenophon among

Demosth. de
Cherson. p. 98.
& Philipp. 4.
p. 34.

Ch. 23. s. 4.
of this Hist.

the Armenian highlands, in a latitude where such severity would still less be expected.¹⁶

It is clearly indicated by Demosthenes that his party reckoned much upon the difficulties in which Philip was involved in this rough and hazardous enterprise, and were busy to profit from the opportunity. But, beside opposition, still strong, from the party of Phocion, circumstances among the surrounding republics assisted to disappoint them. As their influence had risen in Athens, the credit of Athens, it appears, had declined in Greece. In Eubœa their conduct had excited universal jealousy. Those most disposed to the Athenian connection, hitherto confident of Athenian support against Thebes, were alarmed at the new connection of

Æsch. de leg.
p. 290. Athens with Macedonia, the ally of Thebes; and especially at the zeal which the war-party of

Athens had so publicly demonstrated for that new connection. On the other hand their opponents, the Theban party, on the same view of things participated in the same alarm, though with opposite apprehensions. The general turn however was in favour of the Theban interest, now gaining the new and more favourite denomination of the Macedonian interest, and the Athenian became the waning cause. In Oreus it was completely overborne. In Chalcis

Demosth. de
Cherson.
p. 94. & 98. with difficulty it maintained a balance. Mean- while the little island of Sciathus, one of the

nearest to the Attic shore, dared to defy the Athenian navy; and the strife of faction again shook the small neighbouring republic of Megara, where the party patronised by the high democratical party in Athens had hitherto prevailed.

¹⁶ The reader, desirous of information about the countries which were the seat of this winter campaign, may find them interestingly described in a small volume printed at Naples. Mr. Raicewick, the author, by birth a Transylvanian, was, in 1788, counsellor of legation from the emperor of Germany at Naples. He had before been secretary to the imperial embassy at the Ottoman court, and for some time resided in Walachia, as secretary to the prince of Walachia, Ypselanti.

Opportunity was thus offered for the opponents of Chares and Demosthenes at home, which was not wholly neglected. It was urged, that the spreading disaffection of allies, and the ill state altogether of the republic's affairs, too glaring for denial, for it appears Demosthenes himself could not wholly deny it, arose from misconduct of the same leading men of whose mismanagement the effects were still so severely felt in the result of the Confederate war.¹⁷ The party replied by imputing all adversity abroad to the hostile conduct of the restored ally of the republic, the king of Macedonia, secluded as he was among the snows of the country toward the Danube; and all disorder at home to the corruption of traitors who promoted his purposes, meaning all who opposed their own. So far their imputations appear to have been well founded, that a preference of the king of Macedonia's patronage to theirs did prevail extensively over Greece; and a desire to meet the king of Macedonia's peaceful professions prevailed also among the best men of Athens.

Demosth. de
Cherson.
p. 97. 100.

But the ingenuity of the party found means to overbear or elude the influence of the better men. To relieve the idle, petulant, and craving multitude by sending out a colony, was a resource of former times; good or bad, according as it was carried into execution. Opportunity occurred now in the circumstances of the Thracian Chersonese, a country among the most inviting. The party of Chares, putting forward the measure, obtained the direction of it for one zealous in their interest, as formed for their purposes, Diopithes; and to the same person was committed the Thracian command by land and sea. A fleet then, to trans-

¹⁷ That the party of Chares and Demosthenes had latterly directed measures is fully implied in the charge of the adverse party against them and their reply to it, stated by Demosthenes in the oration on the Chersonese, p. 97., where also the ill state of the republic's affairs is explicitly acknowledged.

port settlers, awe opponents, and maintain respect for the Athenian dominion of the sea, was readily granted by the sovereign people, under lure of the advantages proposed. But, for the purposes of the party, a land force also was wanted, which was a matter of more difficulty to obtain; for the people would neither serve nor pay. Diopithes however, to have the command in chief by sea and land, did not scruple undertaking, at his own risk, to raise a sufficient body of mercenaries, and find pay for them. Such an offer, gratifying to the short-sighted many, was accepted. To raise the men was not difficult. To provide pay then, as soon as he arrived at his station he sent them to collect plunder from the lands, or contributions from the towns, of the
Demosth. de Cherson. Greeks; and the allies, not of Macedonia only, but even of Athens, suffered. His fleet at the same time was active in rapine against all Grecian ships within the range of his cruises.

In pursuing these violent measures evidently he confided in support from his party; whose disposition seems to have been as sincere as their promises could be warm for the purpose. But complaints, pouring into Athens, produced alarm among the people such as the party saw with much uneasiness; and public indignation was particularly pointed
Ibid. p. 97. at Chares, the person acting in the situation of what we should call war-minister. The people were summoned to assemble. The party of Phocion came forward; and, with their usual moderation, moved only to send out another general who might compose the affairs which Diopithes had embroiled, and to dismiss the mercenaries, to whose licentiousness they were willing to attribute the disorders which had given cause for complaint.

But the views of the war-party were not limited to the establishment of a colony, or the defence of the actual possessions of the republic. The peace, which ended the

Confederate war, having as little restored the friendship and confidence as the subjection of the revolted allies, Byzantium had engaged in the Macedonian alliance, and that alliance had been acknowledged by Athens, in the recent treaty of peace. Between Byzantium and the strait of the Hellespont the two principal towns on the European shore were Selymbria and Perinthus; whose people claimed a common Dorian origin with the Byzantines, and held intimate connection with them. By the loss of Byzantium the commerce of Athens with the Euxine, important especially for the essential articles of corn and slaves, was made difficult and hazardous. This difficulty would of course excite the ingenuity and diligence of the merchants, which seem to have been in a great degree successful. Friendly communication was restored with Perinthus and Selymbria; and, Perinthus becoming the principal key of communication for Athens with the Euxine, the interposit of the Athenian trade, its advances in wealth and population were rapid. The busy temper of Athenian democratical policy thus getting an advantageous establishment, quickly found means to work its way into Byzantium itself. No longer ago than when Demosthenes delivered his Oration on the peace, Byzantium was on no friendly terms with Athens, or however with the war-party there. Grievance from Macedonia meanwhile none is reported; and yet already now an Athenian party had so grown that Athenian support might produce a revolution in the government, whence would follow renewed alliance with Athens, and breach with Macedonia. This advantage it was evidently among the purposes of the mission of Diopithes to promote. But, were Diopithes superseded by a commander of Phocion's party, it would be lost. On the contrary, could he be supported in what he had already done, the progress would be

Demosth. de
cor. p. 254.

Demosth. de
Pace.

Ep. Philip
ap. Demosth.

great ; and the proof of the strength of the party would encourage their foreign friends, and make their interest at home secure.

These appear to have been the circumstances which gave occasion for one of the most studied orations remaining from Demosthenes, one in which evidently he felt his task most difficult. He was to persuade his audience that the conduct of Diopithes, violating treaties, committing extensive rapine, against friends as well as foes, by sea and land, were what the Athenian people ought to approve; and that the king of Macedonia, notwithstanding the numerous instances of his generous and forbearing conduct, not only was actually at war with them, but was the most injurious of possible enemies. Widely different from the tone of the orator on Halonnesus, as if feeling still his recent defeat in his accusation of Æschines, as well as the weakness of his cause now to be supported, he begins, and mostly proceeds, in the same complaining and insinuating strain as in the second Philippic; and yet, with wonderful ingenuity, in pressing the interests of his party and inveighing against their opponents, among the general gloom he throws in occasional flashes of a vehemence like lightning. He did not venture to deny the facts alleged against Diopithes; that he plundered the lands of Greeks at peace with the republic, and even allies of the republic, and that his ships were the pirates of the Grecian seas; nor did he deny that it was, in a general view, wrong to plunder Grecian lands and Grecian ships. But he undertook to justify all by the urgency of circumstances: "Philip," he said, "had broken the peace. It was evidently Philip's object (Philip being still engaged in the northern wilds) to destroy Athens, and especially to destroy the democracy. War against him was therefore necessary for the republic's welfare. To make war against him the

mercenary force must be maintained, and it was highly expedient that Diopithes should remain to command it: for he had deserved well of the republic by what he had done, however objectionable in itself; since in no other way could he have held together his army." After some complaint then, that the Athenian people would neither undertake military service themselves, nor allow taxes for paying mercenaries, there follows perhaps the most valuable passage remaining in any author for elucidating the Athenian history of the time, so defectively delivered by professed historians. "In this dilemma of the republic," says the orator, "I must speak Demosth. de Cherson. p. 96. openly; and, at all risk for the consequences, I will assure you that no naval commander ever sails from your harbours but he receives presents. They come from the Chians, the Erythræans, all the commercial states likely to be within reach of your fleets; I mean however the Asiatic only. If he has but one or two ships under his orders, he has something: if his force is greater, he has more in proportion. The pretence of these presents is good-will to the commander: under that title they are offered. But those states, you may be sure, none of them give this money for nothing: they pay for the safety of their commerce; that their ships may be, not plundered, but protected."

In these few sentences is discovered why so many leading men at Athens desired always war rather than peace for the republic, and how they found means to induce so many of the lower orders to concur with them. The remarkable fact, mentioned both by Xenophon and Isocrates, that the lowest of the Athenian people would often be ready for the service of the trireme when they refused themselves for that, in former estimation more honourable, of the phalanx, will no longer appear strange; and the

reason why the king of Macedonia's proposal for the suppression of piracy was so thwarted by the war-party becomes evident. Were the piracy of petty freebooters suppressed, presents from the pirate, on one side, for permission of it, from the mercantile towns, on the other, for protection against it, would have ceased together; and the greater piracy of the Athenian commanders themselves would have been too invidious, giving a clear and certain point for clamour and opposition.

In making this avowal, confirming only what we have formerly observed his rival orator Æschines, though less explicitly, asserting, Demosthenes seems to have depended upon two separate grounds for obviating danger to those, numerous of his party, who must have been implicated in the charge. Perhaps he possessed proof against some of the opposite party, such as might deter prosecution from them against his friends. But he was apparently aware that there was no extensive disposition among the people to favour prosecution for a public crime whence so many of them had been accustomed to profit. On the contrary, it seems evident that he touched a chord in harmony with the feelings of a large proportion of his audience; and he therefore proceeded to propose, instead of punishment for such peculation, to extend the system of plunder under public authority, so that the public might share in its advantages: "The same states," he said, "which thus paid tribute to the individual commanders of the republic, were the proposal properly made to them, would, no doubt, readily pay contributions to the republic itself, such as might well maintain the force now under Diopithes."

The turn of the speech, in its progress, appears to indicate that this proposal was received with marks of favour; for what the orator had just before stated as matter of complaint against the people, that they would

neither undertake military service themselves, nor pay others for it, he directly proceeded to treat as a needless burthen, which his adversaries, desirous of superseding Diopithes, would impose upon the people. Thus apparently encouraged, in conclusion he inveighed violently against the king of Macedonia; urging war against him as the necessary enemy of Athens, and especially of democratical government; and not scrupling to tell the people, to whom he had been justifying past and recommending future plunder of other people, that they were the natural friends and protectors of the freedom of all.

His speech seems to have been altogether too flattering to the passions of the Athenian many to be resisted. Diopithes retained his command; and neither the unfortunate Greeks who had been robbed appear to have received any redress, nor was any apology made to the king of Macedonia, who, by the very treaty of peace lately concluded with Athens, had bound himself to protect them.

Successful so far, the war-party yet could not obtain a decisive lead in the administration. What had passed however was encouragement for Diopithes to proceed in his course, and it became the business of orators at home to prepare the popular mind for reports of farther violences.

With this view Demosthenes spoke the oration called the Third Philippic; by some the most admired of the masterpieces of eloquence known

Ol. 109. 3.
B. C. 342.
[B. C. 341.
Cl.]

by that title. The complaint of the ill state of the republic's affairs, with which it begins, indicates fully the inability of the party yet to hold a decisive lead. They were evidently distressed by the king of Macedonia's forbearance; who, notwithstanding the insulting injuries he had received, avoided to return them, and professed himself still desirous of that accommodation in which the party of Phocion and Isocrates were ready to meet him.

Demosth.
Phil. 3. p. 112.

Against this conduct they could hardly carry their purpose, unless they could persuade the people that his professions were insincere, and intended only to lull them in a fatal security. To this point therefore Demosthenes directed all his art, combined with all his boldness in assertion. He went so far as to tell the people they were deceived if they supposed Philip was not even now at war with them; and he proceeded to proof, such as might be offered to such a sovereign as the Athenian many. To show the actual existence of war he was not
Demosth.
Philipp. 3.
p. 114.
ashamed to point five years back to that capture of some little piratical towns on the Thracian coast, the question concerning which Philip had repeatedly offered for the arbitration of neutral powers, and the party of Demosthenes had met by persuading the people to treat such a proposal with scorn, and take justice into their own hands. Of a later date the orator's ingenuity could find nothing specific but the support given to the brave Cardians; who had so hardly earned and creditably supported their emancipation from the dominion of the Athenian people, and whose cause also had met only insult in being offered for the decision of impartial arbitrators. The remainder of the argument is vague assertion; calculated however to impress the Athenian many, accustomed to hear from their orators that they had a right to interfere in all governments, and that it was grossly offensive for any power to interfere, not only in theirs, but in any
p. 115.
other in competition with them.¹⁸ "I maintain," says the orator, "Philip is now making war with you, by interposing in the affairs of Megara, by supporting a tyranny in Eubœa, by his speculations among the states of Peloponnesus." That in every republic of

¹⁸ For this the third Philippic, p. 121. of Reiske's edition, may be seen.

Greece a party was courting Macedonian patronage is, from Demosthenes himself, abundantly evident; but what were the measures of Macedonia to profit from this disposition remains in every instance utterly problematical. Had they been of a kind to be in any way either disgraceful to Philip, or fairly to be stated as hostile to Athens, farther account of them would doubtless have been afforded. In conclusion the orator recommended embassies to negotiate a confederacy against Macedonia, not only wherever there might be any favouring prospect among Grecian states, but even with the court of Persia.

Demosth.
Philipp. 3.
p. 129.

The third Philippic appears to have had success more proportioned to its rhetorical excellence than to the merit of the cause it recommended. As the party then advanced toward a more certain influence over a majority in the sovereign assembly, they sent positive and authoritative orders for their commander on the Thracian station to act against Macedonia, whenever convenient opportunity might be found. Accordingly Diopithes, zealous in the cause, marched from the Chersonese, took by storm two Grecian towns of the Macedonian alliance, Crobyle and Tiristasis, and sent those of the inhabitants who escaped the sword prisoners into the Athenian colony. A Macedonian of rank, Amphiloachus, commissioned to him to remonstrate on these hostile measures, with instruction to negotiate at least the ransom of the prisoners, was refused audience by the democratical general, thrown into prison, and released only on paying nine talents, near two thousand pounds sterling, for his ransom.¹⁹

Ep. Phil. ap.
Dem. & Or.
in ep. Phil.

¹⁹ This, with the preceding circumstances, stated by Philip in his letter to the Athenian people, and transmitted with the speech of Demosthenes upon it, being not in any degree denied in that speech, must be considered as among the most authenticated facts reported from antiquity.

The superior talents and indefatigable activity of Demosthenes had now raised him to a decisive lead in his party. Even Chares found it convenient to yield. Demosthenes was effective first minister of Athens; and under his superintending guidance an improved steadiness, as well as evident ability, infused confidence among dependents everywhere. The party had been able to name the commanders for a fleet on the Thessalian station, Aristodemus and Callias; whose conduct perfectly harmonised with that of Diopithes.

Ep. Phil.
ut ant. They carried direct hostilities against the towns of the Pagasæan bay, allies of Macedonia, entitled by treaty to peace and friendship with Athens; and finding them, through confidence in that treaty, unprepared for resistance, they took them all. They stopped all ships bound to Macedonia, and condemning all aboard as enemies to Athens, they sold all for slaves. And so the interest of the party now prevailed that, when complaint was made of these infractions of the treaty by ministers from the king of Macedonia, and the matter was brought before the assembled people, decrees were obtained approving and even applauding the conduct of the commanders who directed them.²⁰

While Philip still avoided all reprisals, the people of the little island of Peparethus, calling themselves free, but looking to the Athenian people for protection, and effectually their subjects, surprised the neighbouring little island of Halonnesus, and carried off the small Macedonian garrison. Even then redress was first

²⁰ Πόλεις ὑμῖν μὲν ἐνόηκους, ἔμοι δὲ συμμαχιδας οὔσας. Epist. Philipp. p. 159. In Philip's Epistle Callias is named as the commander. Æschines, in his Oration on the Crown (p. 478.), mentions Aristodemus as the commander principally engaged in unwarrantable hostilities on the Thessalian coast. Possibly Aristodemus was commander-in-chief, and as such obtained from the party the reward stated by Æschines; while Callias, acting under him, was the officer principally offering himself to Philip's notice.

sought by negotiation. This proving utterly ineffectual, a Macedonian force, sent to Peparethus, quickly compelled its people both to restore their prisoners and to surrender Halonnesus. It is not even pretended that any severity was used, beyond what was found necessary to accomplish those just purposes ; and yet the Athenian many were taught by their orators to commiserate and bewail the sufferings of the unfortunate and innocent Peparethians.

Demosth. de
cor. p. 248.

CHAPTER XLI.

AFFAIRS OF GREECE FROM THE ACQUISITION OF THE SITUATION OF FIRST MINISTER OF ATHENS BY DEMOSTHENES TILL THE ELECTION OF THE KING OF MACEDONIA TO THE OFFICE OF GENERAL OF THE AMPHICTYONIC CONFEDERACY.

SECTION I.

Character of the Office of first Minister of Athens. — Ability and Diligence of Demosthenes. — Negotiation with Persia. — New Coalition with Phocion's Party. — Embassy of Demosthenes to the Hellespontine Cities.

THE situation of first minister, or vicegerent of the sovereign assembly, for the direction of the executive government, was less connected with a particular office in Athens than in any other Grecian commonwealth whose constitution has been unfolded to us. In Lacedæmon the ephor of the year was the principal minister; at Thebes the polemarch or the Bæotarch. Under Solon's constitution the archon of the year seems to have been the proper first minister of Athens. But when the commonwealth became much implicated in wars, it was found convenient that the strategus, the first general, should have a discretionary power to call extraordinary assemblies of the people, which was analogous to demanding an audience of the sovereign. The general commonly acquired his situation by his abilities; the archon, at least in the constitution of Clisthenes, if the business was legally conducted, acquired it always by lot; the

communications of the general to the sovereign assembly were often most highly interesting ; those of the archon seldom. Men of the extraordinary characters then of Themistocles, Aristides, Cimon, and Pericles, holding successively the office of general through most critical periods of many years, gave it an importance far above that of any other. But still no political power was constitutionally attached to it, except that of convening the people ; and to avail himself of this the general must be an able speaker. The real character of first minister of Athens then seems best marked by Thucydides, in his account of the disgrace and restoration of Pericles, in the early part of the Peloponnesian war : “ None of the orators,” says the historian, “ could satisfy the people. After a short interval therefore they called for Pericles again, to mount the bema, and tell them his opinion of their affairs, and advise them what measures they should sanction with their decrees.” But when afterward the military and civil characters became more separated than they were in the times of Themistocles and Pericles, if the general was not himself an able orator, it was indispensable for him to seek the assistance of an able orator. Hence Iphicrates, though himself a speaker of not the lowest rank, chose an orator, not a military man, for his associate in military command ; and hence what Demosthenes in his political noviciate described, an orator commander-in-chief with the “ general under him ;” that is, an orator doing that part of the general’s business which he was unable to do for himself, speaking to the sovereign people for him, and so appearing the principal person. But Demosthenes himself seems to have been the first who ever acquired that leading situation which he held, of effective first minister of the commonwealth, wholly without military reputation, and without any military office. He became an eminent example of what he had formerly represented as a new portent, an absurd

anomaly in government, an orator commander-in-chief, with a general under him.

The Greeks, amid their deficiencies in the science of politics, held very generally, as well as justly, that the military should be subordinate to the civil power; that is, the military, as a branch of the executive, should be subordinate to the legislative. But it farther deserves remark that, in every Grecian republic where we find any steady constitution, the executive was modelled upon the plan of regal authority. The same person, (at least in times of war, which were almost continual,) the chief military man, held the chief civil command. Hence *Æschines*, on an occasion when it was of the utmost importance for him to avoid whatever might offend popular jealousy, did not scruple to arraign *Demosthenes* of unconstitutional conduct, as well as gross arrogance, in threatening that he would make the generals of the commonwealth feel the superior importance of an orator. But throughout the Grecian republics, the civil and military character were, in theory, never separated: both equally pervaded the whole people: every man was to be a soldier, and every man a member of the sovereign assembly. Citizens however more and more avoiding military service, it became necessary for the commonwealth to entertain an overbearing body of mercenaries, while nowhere, in the constitution, existed any proper provision for such a state of things. Hence the conduct of *Demosthenes*, in fact irregular, was in principle perhaps good; and the reproof of *Æschines*, justly founded, as the constitution had been, yet, in the altered state of things, was of pernicious tendency. But again still it deserves observation that, as far as the Grecian governments are laid open to us, nowhere was the civil power of the military chief magistrate more narrowly limited, nowhere so regularly, as in the Lacedæmonian constitution; where alone

*Æsch. de
cor.*

hereditary succession and the title of king were preserved, and where the sacredness of the royal person, as of the essence of the constitution, was most strictly sanctioned.

The situation in which Demosthenes now stood, arduous, yet offered, to a soaring ambition, great and inviting views. As first minister of Athens he was the leading man of the interest, throughout Greece, hardly to be properly distinguished as the Democratical, though some of the principal republics, warmest in the Macedonian alliance, were highly democratical, but of that which was opposed to the Macedonian; an interest existing, in greater or less amount, in every republic of the nation, and maintained by a disposition, not so much adverse to Macedonian patronage, as ready to oppose, in all circumstances, fellow-citizens of that party which enjoyed Macedonian patronage. This party, in every republic, wanted a patronising power; and of the Grecian states Athens alone was in a situation to afford encouragement. If then Athens could give a general prevalence to the anti-Macedonian party, Athens would be, what we find Demosthenes continually inciting her people to covet, the imperial republic, mistress of Greece, and himself at the head of the empire.

The numerous and great failures already and recently experienced, in the pursuit of this object, might have disconcerted the most ambitious politician, unless he possessed the penetration and power of combination of Demosthenes to find and form new ground of hope. Speculation on opportunities, some of them perhaps hardly then discernible to any other eye, is shown, by following events, to have engaged his attention; and the use he made of them marks him for one of the acutest statesmen that ever was at the head of a government. It has been well observed by a modern politician, of great acuteness and extensive experience, speculating on this part of history,

Lord Bolingbroke
on the
Spirit of
Patriotism.

that “haranguing was, at this time, the least part of the business of Demosthenes; and eloquence neither the sole, nor the principal talent, as the style of writers would induce us to believe, on which his success depended. He must have been master of other arts, subservient to which his eloquence was employed; and must have had a thorough knowledge of his own state, and of the other states of Greece; of their dispositions, and of their interests, relatively to one another and relatively to their neighbours; to the Persians particularly, with whom he had correspondence, not much to his honour. I say he must have been master of many other arts, and have possessed an immense fund of knowledge to make his eloquence in every case successful, and even pertinent and seasonable in some, as well as to direct it and furnish it with matter, whenever he thought fit to employ that weapon.” And we find Demosthenes speaking not very differently of himself.

Demosth. de
cor. p. 306.
& 308.

He has boasted that he was the only one who had ever undertaken singly to carry political business through all its stages: for instance, to show the people the public interest requiring that an embassy should be sent to such a state; to draw the decree, containing the instructions for the ministers to be employed; to defend it against the objections of opposing orators; and then himself to take the office, and execute all the functions of the embassy: “I applied myself,” he says, “to every kind of public business.”¹

From before the first Persian invasion, when the Athenians, pressed by the Lacedæmonians, solicited assistance from the satrap of Sardis, there had never been perhaps a time when some of the republics were not looking for advantage from connection with the Persian court or its officers. On the other hand, since the victories of Xanthippus and

¹ Ἐν ἅπασιν ἰμαυτὸν ἵστατον. Demosth. de cor. p. 302.

Cimon, but much more since the expedition of the younger Cyrus and the following successes of Agesilaus, even that distant court, but much more the western satraps, had been accustomed to watch Grecian politics with a jealous eye; to fear any political union of the numerous states of that little country, to interpose in its divisions, and assist the weaker against the stronger. The prospect therefore now appearing of union under such a prince as Philip, whose conquests already approached the Persian provinces, would be more than commonly alarming. It seems reasonable to suppose that a politician, generally so cautious as Isocrates, had knowledge of circumstances not reported by extant writers, which led him to that provocation to Persia, contained in his Oration on Peace, and repeated in the orations to Archidamus and to Philip. Demosthenes himself formerly, opposing, with apparent propriety, needless or interested provocation to Persia, had however declared that he considered the king of Persia as the common enemy of all the Greeks. With whatever good or ill judgment then Isocrates persevered in urging as the interest of Greece to carry war against Persia, Demosthenes did not scruple now to pursue the interest of his party in forming or improving connection with Persia. In the general assembly he contended that alliance with Persia should be cultivated, and pecuniary assistance, for war against Macedonia, solicited. An embassy to the Persian court on his motion was decreed, and, under his able direction, was successful. A considerable subsidy was obtained, and he became himself the agent of the Persian court for the disposal of the money.

Demosth.
pro Rhod.

Demosth.
Philipp. 4.
& Or. in
ep. Philipp.

Æsch. de cor.
Ol. 109. 3.
B. C. 342.
19 of Philipp.
17 Blair.
13 Diod.
of Ochus.
[B. C. 340.
Cl.]

The situation of the important island of Eubœa, distracted still violently by faction, but almost lost to Athens, then engaged his attention. Large experience had now taught

him that the haughtiness of democratical empire had been carried by the Athenian government to a pernicious extreme; not only in the violences of the former leaders of his party, which had produced the misfortunes of the Confederate war, but perhaps even in his own speeches and measures, which might have contributed to the loss of Amphipolis and Olynthus. If, in the present situation of Greece, the republic would hold subjects, or support its ambitious purposes by alliances, the tone must be altered. Yet the change could not be easy: for so were the Athenian people accustomed to be flattered with the idea of their absolute sovereignty, that to profess an adverse principle, to imitate the king of Macedonia's arts of equity, liberality, and scrupulous regard for the constitution of every little patronised republic, would require great circumspection, and able as well as careful management. To obviate this difficulty Demosthenes seems, a second time, to have used and abused the liberality of the party of Phocion. They had always recommended a liberal policy, both toward allies and toward enemies; and there were many among the Eubœans disposed to trust them, who would not trust the party of Chares. How any accommodation was brought about does not appear, but some degree of coalition was again formed.

During the late war between Athens and Macedonia, Callias, founder of the Eubœan general assembly, instituted to support the independency of the island, had passed to the Macedonian court. The distinction with which he was treated there is marked in the observation of the contemporary orator, that he was favoured with the title of "the king's companion²;" a principal honour of that court, revived under the Roman empire with the Latin appellation "comes;" whence the modern title "count,"

Æsch. de cor.
p. 482.

² Τῶν ἰταίρων εἰς ἀνομιάζετα. Æsch. de cor. p. 482.

so familiar now throughout Europe. Apparently the term "companions" of the orders of knighthood has been of the same origin. The peace quickly following between Macedonia and Athens could hardly fail to produce some disappointment to his hopes. What the circumstances were we are not informed; nor should we perhaps trust Æschines, any more than Demosthenes, for all that his words appear to imply, which he would not venture directly to assert. Callias however engaged in measures offensive to Philip, whence he was obliged to quit Macedonia. If then there remained a state of any considerable power, whence he could hope for support in his political purposes, it was Thebes, and he went thither.

Before this time, evidently, Demosthenes had opened that communication with a party in Thebes with which we find Æschines reproaching him, and which he afterward turned to great account. It was a bold idea to bring the people of all Greece the most inveterately hostile, equally hating the Athenians and hated by them, to close political union with Athens. But, as the party in Thebes which desired to maintain the connection with Macedonia would be indisposed to favour Callias, or to receive overtures from Demosthenes, the opposite party would, on that very account, be in some degree prepared for both. Callias however soon quitted Thebes without having carried any public purpose that has been made known to us; and returning to his own city, Chalcis, where his influence seems to have remained entire, he procured a deputation to be sent by the Chalcidian government to Athens to treat of a new alliance. Demosthenes not only gave his support to the liberal system, which Phocion and Isocrates had been continually recommending, but, as in making the peace with Macedonia, so now again in treating with Eubœa, he surprised them with going much farther than they would have ventured. Under

his management a treaty was concluded, by which all claim of dominion of the Athenian people over, not Chalcis only, but Eretria, Oreus, in effect all Eubœa, was surrendered: those cities were no longer to send deputies to the synedrium at Athens, and no more to pay tribute: they were made as completely independent, by this treaty, as Byzantium and the allied islands by the peace concluding the Confederate war.

This negotiation, managed by Demosthenes, Phocion so far approved that he took the military command requisite for carrying it into effect.

Under his orders a body of Athenian troops passed into Eubœa. Theban and Macedonian troops are spoken of, as in considerable force in the island. But among the contemporary orators, and not less among the later historical writers, such terms are found very loosely applied. It seems very unlikely that any Macedonian, or even Theban, men were among those troops: they seem rather to have been only Eubœans, who desired support from Macedonia and Thebes which they did not obtain: for Philip, hindered by his war with Thrace and Scythia, had besides no disposition to oppose Phocion; and Thebes was distracted by faction, heightened by the intrigue of Demosthenes. Philistides of Oreus, and Clitarchus of Eretria, principal men, called by their opponents tyrants of those cities, withdrew, and the whole island was brought under subjection (not nominally to Athens, but to the party of Callias, the friend of Demosthenes) with so little effort that no account of any contest remains.

For surrendering that sovereignty of Eubœa, with the

³ Plutarch, as it has been well observed by Wesseling, has omitted all notice of this expedition under Phocion; an expedition producing no brilliancy of military achievement, yet of great political importance. For a good account of it we might well have spared some of his strange tales of Phocion's deeds afterward in Thrace.

revenue attached to it, which the Athenian people had, now for ages, claimed and generally held, it might be expected that one day some opposing orator would propose to acquire profit, or credit and power, by calling the authors of the measure to a severe account. It was however most advantageous for Demosthenes that those generally his political opponents were, in this business, his colleagues. But, while he treated them yet as political friends, he used the opportunity to provide still farther. One of his own party, Aristonicus, moved in the general assembly, Æsch. de cor. that the thanks of the people be given him for his various services to the republic, and especially for restoring the liberty of the Eubœan cities; and that, as an acknowledgment of them, a crown of gold be presented to him in the theatre, at the festival of Bacchus. No opposition seems to have been made; the decree passed, and he received the honour.

Speculations in Thrace next engaged him. The great object was to gain the important town of Byzantium, commanding the commerce of the Euxine sea. Nor would the advantage be single; for thus Athens, already mistress of the Chersonese, would command the two readiest passes between Europe and Asia; and so the importance of her alliance to the Persian court, and especially to the satraps of Lesser Asia, would be greatly increased. Four or five years before, when he delivered the oration on the peace with Macedonia, the party then ruling in Byzantium being adverse to Athens, and especially to the war-party, he spoke of the Byzantine people generally in surly and threatening terms, adverting to the claim of the Athenian people to dominion over them, and tribute from them. He now used the opportunity, afforded by the implication of the king of Macedonia in war with Scythia, to correct the evil of this imprudence. The new connection with Persia could not but give

increased importance to Athens in the eyes of the Byzantines. Demosthenes knew the general indisposition of commercial communities to any implication of policy with a government in which the landed was the prevailing interest. An opening for political communication was ready, through the commercial communication already established; principally with Perinthus, but through that town with Byzantium, and all connected with Byzantium. The objects altogether appeared important enough to induce Demosthenes to leave the Athenian people, for a time, to the impression of the eloquence of others, while he undertook himself an embassy to Thrace. He visited Byzantium, Selymbria, Perinthus, and went on to the courts of the Thracian princes. In proposing his new system of liberal alliance he seems to have had the concurrence of the party of Phocion. His success evidently was great. In Perinthus, Selymbria, and Byzantium a preponderance was given to the Athenian party; who quickly carried things far beyond what Phocion is likely to have approved. With those towns, as with Olynthus formerly, the term was short between alliance with Athens and war with Macedonia.

Demosth.
de cor. ut ant.

SECTION II.

War of Macedonia with the Hellespontine Cities. — Athenian Decree. — Letter of Philip. — Fourth Philippic of Demosthenes.

WE are without information of the specific provocation which induced Philip, soon after his return from the Scythian war, to lay siege to Perinthus. The historian's expression is general, that Perinthus was hostile to Macedonia.⁴ But to Philip's common practice of employing sedulously and most patiently, against all Grecian towns, peaceful means

⁴ Πέριπλον, ἐναντιουμένην μὲν αὐτῶ. Diod. i. 16. c. 74.

before he would resort to arms, we have large testimony ; and for encouragement to the Athenian party in Perinthus to give provocation to Macedonia information is ample that it was invitation from Athens, and assurance of the powerful and profitable support of Persia. The force which Philip led against a little Grecian colony indicates that he was aware the contention would be with force beyond its own. The besieging army is said to have been of thirty thousand men. But the town, singularly strong by situation, covering a hill of conic form, nearly surrounded by the sea, was also well fortified. The art of the besiegers soon made a breach in the wall. But no sooner was a point threatened by their machines than the besieged raised a new defence within, connected, at its extremities, with the uninjured part of the old fortification. This new defence, then, though inferior in strength to the old wall, yet being on higher ground, and flanking the ground without it, possessed great advantage against assault. Meanwhile, the port being open, supplies of every kind were largely furnished to the besieged, and the satraps of all the maritime provinces of the Persian empire had received orders to support them ; so that not only provisions and ammunition were abundantly supplied, but a large body of those Grecian troops, always ready for hire in any service, was prepared to re-enforce the garrison.

Ol. 110. 1.
B. C. 340.
Diod. l. 16.
c. 75.
Pausan. l. 1.
Diod. l. 16.
c. 52.

Philip now perceived that a fleet, powerful enough to command the sea, was absolutely necessary to the success of his enterprise. Such a fleet accordingly he assembled. Meanwhile, observing that supplies reached Perinthus principally through the Selymbrians, whom he had not before treated as enemies, he sent a body of troops to blockade their town. These measures were efficacious and threatening enough to excite new and extraordinary exertion from Demosthenes. The war-party had long been imputing to

Macedonia hostile conduct against Athens: they had incited and committed hostile acts against Macedonia: yet war was not avowed between the two governments; and in the connection, which seems to have been yet maintained in some degree with the party of Phocion, it could not conveniently be proposed. But the naval commander on the Hellespontine station, Leodamas, being a man for their purpose, they sent him instructions, at their own risk, without authority from the sovereign assembly, to carry troops and provisions into Selymbria, conveying them in merchant-ships, under pretence of supplying the island of Lemnos. The commander of the Macedonian fleet, however, Amyntas, took all the ships, and sent them, with their commander Leodamas, into a port of Macedonia.

This event produced, as was likely, much agitation in Athens. The war-party were sedulous to excite indignation among the many against Philip. Demosthenes, as we learn from himself, took a leading part.⁵ A moderate decree, however, moved by Eubulus, one of the most eminent of Phocion's party, was adopted, which may deserve to be seen complete in a literal translation. It ran thus:—"In the archonship of Neocles, in the month Boedromion, the generals having called an extraordinary assembly, Eubulus, son of Mnesitheus, of the Cyprian ward, moved—'Whereas the generals have reported to the assembly, that the naval commander Leodamas, with twenty ships of burthen, passing under his orders to the Hellespont⁶ for corn, have been taken by Amyntas, commanding in the service of Philip, and carried into the ports of Macedonia

⁵ Ταῦτα τοίνυν ἐπολιτευόμενῃ τότε ἐγώ. — Ἦναντιούμενῃ, καὶ προλέγον, καὶ διδάσκων, μὴ προῖσθαι ταῦτα Φίλιππῳ διεπέλου. Demost. de cor. p. 249. The first phrase seems to contain an acknowledgment that the irregular orders to Leodamas were from himself.

⁶ Here and elsewhere the Hellespont includes evidently the Propontis. See also Philip's letter, p. 292.

and there detained under guard: therefore the prytanes and the generals shall provide that the council be assembled, and proceed to the appointment of ambassadors to Philip, who shall confer with him for the release of the admiral, the ships, and the soldiers; and if it shall appear that the proceedings of Amyntas have been the result of ignorance or mistake, the people will impute no blame to him; if Philip detected their officer exceeding his instructions, the Athenians will take cognizance of the matter, and reprove or punish, as the fault or inadvertency may deserve; if it be neither of these, but either he who gave or he who executed the commission has committed wilful outrage, be it reported, that the people, on just information, may consider what ought to be done.' " 7

An embassy was accordingly sent to the king of Macedonia, who returned by it a written answer, preserved also by the orator, apparently at length, thus:—“ The king of the Macedonians, Philip, to the Athenian council and people greeting: Your ambassadors have communicated with me concerning the capture of the ships commanded by Leodamas. ⁸ Altogether you seem very easy to be imposed upon, if you think I can be ignorant that those ships, under pretence of carrying corn from the Hellespont to Lemnos, were sent to succour the Selymbrians, besieged by me, and not entitled, under the provisions of the existing treaty, to be considered as your allies. The instructions moreover to the commander I know were not authorised by the Athenian people: they were but hazarded by some men in office, and

⁷ Demosthenes, in reporting this decree and that which followed it, appointing ambassadors, has shown his dissatisfaction with them in the language of ill temper. *Τούτο μὲν τοίνυν τὸ ψήφισμα*, he says, *Εὐβουλος ἔγραψεν, οὐκ ἐγώ. Τὸ δ' ἐφεξῆς Ἀριστοφῶν, εἰθ' Ἠγήσιππος, εἶτ' Ἀριστοφῶν πάλιν, εἶτα Φιλοκράτης, εἶτα Κηφισοφῶν, εἶτα πάντες οἱ ἄλλοι· ἐγὼ δ' οὐδὲν περὶ τούτων λέγει τὸ ψήφισμα.* The repetition of the name Aristophon, and the introduction of that of Philocrates, who was an exile, are rather curious characteristics of temper or artifice.

⁸ It seems not easy to account for the variation of names, in the copies extant of Demosthenes, between the decree and the letter.

some now in private station, who desire by any means to urge the people to prefer war with me to the friendship actually existing; men who have their private advantages much more in view than any benefit to the Selymbrians. I am however of opinion that this would be beneficial neither to you nor to me. I will therefore release the ships; and, for the future, if you will not allow those at the head of your affairs to manage them dishonestly and injuriously, but will duly reprove and restrain them, I also will endeavour to preserve the peace."

This letter, like all those preserved from Philip to the Athenians, bearing nothing of that character of cunning which has, more indeed by modern than ancient writers, been imputed to him, but on the contrary, dignified rather than conciliatory, yet indicates moderation in purpose as well as openness in conduct. The ship's crews were released: complaint of the indefensible measure of the commander was dropped: but the return was not of corresponding character. Wherever an opening could be found for negotiation, Demosthenes and the war-party were indefatigable in exciting hostility against Macedonia. Encouraged by them, the Byzantines were sedulous in furnishing support to the Perinthians: the best part of their military force was actually serving in Perinthus. When therefore the siege had already been continued through the autumn and winter, and no prospect of speedy success appeared, Philip, leaving a force sufficient only to blockade the place, marched suddenly with the greater part of his army against Byzantium itself. The Byzantines, unable to defend their lands, were distressed; but their town was too strong to be suddenly taken.

In these circumstances Demosthenes pronounced that called the fourth of his celebrated Philippic Orations.⁹ It

⁹ Φιλίππου — νῦν ἐπὶ Βυζάντιον πορείοντος. Phil. 4. p. 149.

has been observed by the literary critics that this oration is principally a repetition of former topics, but for the political observer it has important characteristics of its own. Throughout the orator shows an increased confidence in the power of his party, and in the revival of his own favour with a majority of the people : he resumes the discussion of the question of the theoric revenue, with again a change of sentiments professed on that subject ; apparently the price of his revived favour with the many, for whose gratification he now again vindicates the accustomed application of that revenue, which he had before demanded for public service. The purpose of alliance with Persia is openly avowed ; Phil. 4. p. 139. and in proof of a disposition in the Persian government favourable to Athens, it is mentioned that a Macedonian minister, apparently commissioned to the court, had been arrested on his way by one of the satraps. Among those great officers, however, we have already had occasion to observe conduct sometimes very adverse to the purposes of the court, and, while in some of them rays of the liberality of the great Cyrus and the first Darius, in others all the barbarism of the modern east. But, what will be not least important to remark, the orator, in consequence apparently of the improved prospect of the affairs of the war-party p. 143. altogether, again holds out the claim of the empire of Greece for the Athenian people, and indicates the probability of attaining it. Lacedæmon, he observes, was unable to raise her head ; and Argos, Thebes, Corinth, p. 145. and Arcadia, formerly accustomed to arrange themselves under the lead of either Lacedæmon or Athens, now concurred only in a general competition with them and with one another. This miserably divided and consequently weak state of the nation, he then asserts to be the fortunate crisis whence the Athenian people should profit to establish their authority over the whole.

SECTION III.

Philip's Letter to the Athenian People. — Oration of Demosthenes on the Letter.

THE threats in this celebrated oration, baffled as the Macedonian arms had been in Thrace, were alarming to Macedonia; but still more perhaps to every republic of Greece which desired to avoid subjection to the war-party of Athens. Toward Macedonia however the tenor was so hostile that, coming from one who possessed a commanding influence in the sovereign assembly to which it was addressed, and who was effectually first minister of the commonwealth, it might be considered as hardly short of a declaration of war. Nevertheless Philip, knowing that a party still of great weight, whose leaders he highly esteemed and respected, was very differently disposed, resolved once more to address remonstrance to the good sense and justice of the Athenian people. He sent it in the form, then usual, of a letter; which, though of considerable length, has been fortunately preserved with the works of Demosthenes. Apparently with reason it has been generally supposed Philip's own composition. Demosthenes informs us that, on important occasions, he was his own secretary, and Æschines that he was as capable of the business as Python of Byzantium, or any other of the ablest Greeks in his service; and the supposition receives confirmation from the striking conformity, in style and character, between this and two shorter letters from Philip to the Athenian people, preserved in the oration of Demosthenes on the Crown, which have already occurred for notice.

Demosth.
de cor.

In the original it has been universally admired as one of the most perfect models of a state paper ever published; singularly combining dignity with simplicity, perspicuity with

conciseness, civility of expression with force of representation, moderation of phrase with triumph of argument. As an historical document it is perhaps the most curious, and certainly among the most valuable, remaining from antiquity; its value in that view being greatly increased by the preservation of the oration of Demosthenes in reply to it. That oration, avoiding to contest, most effectually confirms, the exactness of its statements; insomuch that there is hardly such another series of important facts, throughout ancient history, established by evidence so unquestionable."¹⁰ In any translation it must suffer much; yet in justice to this part of the subject the reader should see it entire, in words the nearest to the original that may be, which I venture to offer thus:

“Philip to the Athenian council and people greeting: Having endeavoured repeatedly, by my ambassadors, to induce you to adhere to your engagements solemnly sworn to, and those endeavours having proved fruitless, I have thought it best now myself to lay before you the matters in which I reckon I am aggrieved. Be not surprised at the length of my letter: my complaints are numerous, and it appears necessary to explain all distinctly.

¹⁰ Some modern writers, in vehemence of attachment to the politics of Demosthenes, have not scrupled, what Demosthenes dared not venture, to impute falsehood to Philip's statements in this letter. Thus the translator Auger, in what he calls his “Summary” of the letter: “Dans cette lettre, mêlant adroitement le vrai avec le faux, il tire de l'un tout le parti possible, donne à l'autre l'air de la vérité, présente avec art des faits constants ou douteux, dont il deduit à son avantage les conséquences les plus justes et les plus précises,” &c. He has done himself and the writer credit then in noticing “le style simple, noble et précis de cette lettre, la marche facile et l'enchaînement naturel des idées qui la composent.” In his “Summary” afterward of the oration of Demosthenes in reply, he says, “Sans s'amuser à répondre à tous les articles de la lettre, il (Démosthène) prend le ton affirmatif.” — So equally Auger himself, and all other writers, admirers of the politics of Demosthenes, as far as my reading among them has gone, have avoided to “s'amuser” with answering any one of the articles of the letter; and all, after the great orator's example, have taken “le ton affirmatif.”

“ I will begin with mentioning that, when Nicias my herald was carried off by violence from my territory, you did not call the perpetrators of that outrage to account, but you imprisoned the injured person ten months ; and my letters, of which he was the bearer, you caused to be read in your general assembly.¹¹

“ That when the Thasians, your subjects, admitted into their port the ships of war of the Byzantines, my enemies, and all privateers and pirates, cruising against my subjects coming there, though the treaty between us declares such conduct an act of hostility, you would take no measures to prevent it.

“ It was about the same time that Diopithes invaded the country under my protection, carried off the free inhabitants of Crobyle and Tiristasis, and sold them to slavery, plundered and wasted the bordering lands of Thrace, and at length proceeded to that excess of lawless violence as to arrest my minister, Amphilochns, sent to negotiate the release of the prisoners, and, by treating him with extreme severity, forced him to pay nine talents” (near eighteen hundred pounds) “for his ransom. And this conduct received absolutely the approbation of the people in assembly ; though among all nations to violate heralds and ambassadors is held nefarious, and most among you. When your herald, Anthemocritus, was put to death by the Megareans, you marked your sense of the crime by excluding the Megarean people from participation in the mysteries, and by erecting a monumental statue before your city-gate. What then is to

¹¹ Later writers have eulogised the politeness of the Athenians, on this occasion, in returning the letters of the queen Olympias unopened. They have however avoided notice of the violation of the law of nations in stopping the herald ; and their eulogy is a little farther weakened by the failure of the authority of Demosthenes for the matter of politeness. It is indeed observable that Philip himself seems to have known nothing of the letters for the queen.

be said of a crime committed by yourselves, which you, when committed against you, have so resented ?

“ To proceed then ; your general, Callias, took possession of all the towns on the Pagasæan bay, connected by close alliance with me, and entitled by treaty to peace from you ; he seized all ships bound to Macedonia, and, condemning all found aboard as enemies, sold them to slavery. And for these violences your decrees rewarded him with applause. I am really not aware what you could do more contrary to habits of peace, if you were at declared war with me. When there was open war between us, you did so and no otherwise ; you sent out your ships, you sold those whom you took sailing to my kingdom, you assisted my enemies, you did all the ill you could to my people. But now you have proceeded to such an extreme of unjustifiable malevolence as to send an embassy to the Persian king to persuade him to make war against me. Surely this is conduct most extraordinary. Before that monarch had recovered Egypt and Phenicia, in apprehension of attack from him, you passed decrees proposing a confederacy against him, and inviting me, with all other Greeks, to accede to it. Now, on the contrary, such is the extravagance of your rancour toward me, you are treating with him for an alliance against me. Your forefathers, as I am informed, held it a foul reproach to the family of Pisistratus that they led the Persians against the Greeks ; yet you are not ashamed to do those very things which, in those you call tyrants, you condemn.

“ Among other extraordinary matters then in your decrees you require that I should allow Teres and Kersobleptes to command undisturbed in Thrace, because they are Athenian citizens. But I know they were not comprised in the treaty of peace made by me with you ; their names are not to be found in the engraved copies of the treaty, and they have been disowned by you as Athenian citizens : farther I

know that Teres has borne arms with me 'against you, and that Kersobleptes, desiring to take the oaths to the treaty before my ambassadors, was prevented by your generals, representing him as an enemy to the Athenian people. How then is this fair or just; to declare him an enemy to your state, if so your interest in the moment requires; yet to claim him as your citizen, if you want to institute a calumnious charge against me? Sitalces," (the prince already so often occurring for mention by the name of Cotys,) "it is known, was admitted to the rights of your city: yet when he was assassinated, his murderer immediately found favour with you: and nevertheless you would go to war with me in the cause of Kersobleptes; knowing perfectly that none of those foreigners, on whom you have bestowed the present of citizenship, care in the least for either your laws or your decrees. But, omitting much that might be said on this subject, to come to a point, you gave the rights of your city to Evagoras the Cyprian, and Dionysius the Syracusan, and their posterity. If you will persuade those who expelled these to restore them to the authority they held when you made them Athenian citizens, you shall command from me that part of Thrace over which Teres and Kersobleptes reigned. But if you take no measure of any kind in favour of those your fellow-citizens, and yet would give me trouble on a similar account, how am I not justified in resisting you?

"Much more which might be reasonably insisted upon occurs on these matters, but I will omit it, and proceed to speak of the Cardians. I must maintain then that I am bound to support them: having formed alliance with them before the peace made with you, while you have constantly refused the arbitration to which I over and over, and they not seldom, have earnestly urged a desire to have it referred. Should I not deserve to be esteemed even profligate, if I

deserted my allies, and showed more regard for you, who have been, with unremitting assiduity, exciting trouble for me, than for those who have been my good and steady friends?

“ With regard to the Thracian princes and the Cardians however, you have confined yourselves to remonstrances; but in a recent affair you have begun with serious violence; for, upon simple complaint of the Peparethians that they had been injuriously treated, you immediately commanded your general to make reprisals against me. Now the truth was, that my measures against that people were less severe than they deserved. In full peace they seized Halonnesus; and, on repeated application from me, refused to restore either the island or my troops whom they had made prisoners. Of the injury done me by the Peparethians you would take no account; you would look only to the measures I took, in justice to myself, against them. But you well know that I acquired the island by taking it, not from them, not from you, but from the pirate Sostratus. If then you say you gave it to Sostratus, you acknowledge yourselves patrons of pirates. If he established himself there by violence, against your consent, what injury have you suffered from my taking it, and making the navigation of that sea safe? Nevertheless, having taken it, I showed so much regard for your state as to offer to give it you. But your orators would not allow you to accept it as a gift; they insisted upon your reclaiming it as your right; that so, if I obeyed their requisition, I might incur the disgrace of acknowledging that I had taken what I had no right to take, or, by refusing to surrender the place, I might become obnoxious to the Athenian many. Aware of their purpose, I proposed to refer the matter to arbitration, upon the condition that, should the island be decided to be mine, it should pass to you as a gift from me; should it be decided to be yours,

then it should pass as a restitution. Frequently as I urged this, you would not consent; and meanwhile the Peparethians took the island. What became me then to do? Not to require justice of those who, in violation of their oaths, did me that wrong? Not to make reprisals against those who were so insultingly injurious? If the island belonged to the Peparethians, how can the Athenians reclaim it? If it belonged to you, how was it that you did not demand it of the Peparethians?

“ But so far has the hostile temper now carried you that, by your decree, passed on the motion of Polycrates, you have warranted your colonists in the Chersonese to consider themselves as in a state of war with me; and your general on that station has sent formal notice to the Byzantines, and others in those parts, that you have authorised him to commence hostilities against me whenever fair opportunity may offer, and that you require their co-operation. Hence, wanting to send a fleet into the Hellespont¹², I was obliged to order an army for its escort through the strait by the Chersonese.¹³

“ Nevertheless I have abstained from reprisals against your towns, your ships, and your territories, though it has been enough in my power to make myself master of all or most of them; and I have not ceased to solicit you to come to an amicable arbitration about all matters in question between us. And I still desire you to consider whether the trial of arms is preferable to the trial of reason, and whether it is really fittest that you should assume judgment in your own cause, or commit it to others; I desire you to reflect

¹² Εἰς Ἑλλήσποντον, p. 163., evidently meaning that afterward distinguished as the Propontis.

¹³ Ἡναγκάσθην αὐτὰς καταπέμψαι διὰ Χερσονήσου τῆ στρατιᾶς. Ep. Phil. p. 163. I am not wholly without doubt about the sense of this passage, which I submit to those who have given their attention to the naval and military affairs of the ancients.

how utterly unreasonable it must appear to all the world that the Athenians, who compelled the Thasians and Maronites to abstain from arms in their dispute for the possession of Smyrna, and commit the matter to arbitration, should themselves refuse a similar equitable discussion of their claims against me; with this addition to the inconsistency that, if judgment goes against you, no loss of what you now possess will ensue, and, if in your favour, you will gain what I now possess.

“ But there remains yet to mention what appears to me more extraordinary than all the rest. When I proposed last to treat with you of the common interests of Greece, with a view to an accommodation upon equitable terms, to obviate jealousy I procured embassies from all the Grecian states of my alliance to attend, as witnesses to all transactions; interested to oppose whatever might involve common danger, and able to convict me of being the unworthiest of mankind, if I proposed any deception. You refused my ministers audience. Nor is the ground of this conduct difficult to discover: for, whatever benefit might have resulted to the people, the proposed accommodation would not have suited the purposes of some of your orators; those traders in politics among you¹⁴, who hold that war is for them peace, and peace war. If generals are employed, employment for the orators also is certain; for either promoting measures or opposing them, defending and applauding conduct or arraigning it, their profits are sure. At the same time calumniating, from the bema, the most respectable of your citizens, those most known in other states and most esteemed, they acquire, among the many, the credit of being friends of the people.

“ It would be easy for me, at small expense, to stop their invective, and set them upon panegyric of us. But I should

¹⁴ Οἱ τῆς πολιτείας τῆς παρ' ὑμῖν ἔμποροι.

be ashamed of appearing to purchase from such men your goodwill ; men who have had the assurance to bring into question even my right to Amphipolis. I trust I can maintain that right on much juster grounds than any can dispute it with me. If first possession is to establish the claim, the evidence of the golden statue at Delphi, dedicated by my ancestor Alexander from the spoils, when he conquered the country from the Persians, what Grecian state can contest ? Should the right thus acquired be considered as invalidated by later possession, the latest claim that can be asserted also is mine ; for I took the place by siege in open war, against the colonists established there by the Lacedæmonians, who had taken it, in fair and open war, from you. We all hold our respective countries either by inheritance from our ancestors, or by conquest. Of Amphipolis then you neither were the first Grecian possessors, nor are the present possessors ; but, having held it for a very short time only, claim it from me against your own most solemn pledge of faith in treaty made with me. Frequently I have mentioned it to you ; and, on the other hand, your acknowledgment of my right has been fully confirmed by the treaty of peace between us, leaving me in possession, and it has been farther corroborated by the treaty of alliance which followed. How then can any right be more strongly established ? It was originally conquered by my ancestors : it became again mine by the acknowledged laws of war : and finally, my right has been solemnly admitted by you, who are so much accustomed to claim what you have no pretension to.

“ These are the matters of which I complain ; and my past forbearance, it is evident, has produced only encouragement for you to be more forward in such injurious conduct, and to pursue it unceasingly to the utmost of your power. You then being the aggressors, with justice on my side, and calling the gods to witness it, I will resist your ag-

gression, and put to the trial of arms the right you deny me.”

This letter having been read in accustomed form to the Athenian people, Demosthenes ascended the bema. His speech on the occasion, fortunately preserved, is, even among his speeches, of singular boldness and extraordinary ingenuity. Evidently he felt the letter a refutation of all his Philippics, not to be answered by reason and argument. He came therefore prepared with another kind of artillery. Beginning with a bold assertion, adapted to excite attention, he proceeded directly to the mention of transactions foreign to the purpose of the letter, but adapted to introduce the invective and instigation composing the rest of the speech, in which not the least notice is taken of any one of the king's complaints, or of any one of the facts stated by him as the ground of them. But the speech, though, like the letter, it must suffer in any change of language, will deserve to be seen entire, and in words following the original the nearest that may be.

“ Athenians,” said Demosthenes, “ that Philip made no peace with you, but only postponed the war, is evident to you all. For after he had given Halus to the Pharsalians, and disposed of the Phocians, and subdued all Thrace, feigning grounds which had no existence, and finding pretences founded on no justice, he immediately, in fact, made war against the republic, and now, in the letter which you have just heard, acknowledges it. That we ought not then either to fear his power, or set ourselves with any ordinary exertion to oppose it, but that with our bodies and our fortunes, with our ships, and in short with all we have, we should proceed unsparingly to vigorous war, I will endeavour to show.

“ In the first place then, Athenians, it may be trusted that the greatest of the gods will be our allies and assistants,

whom he has dishonoured, unjustly violating the peace sworn to in their names. Next it is to be observed, that the arts by which he has hitherto prospered, continually deceiving some people or other with promises of great benefits from his friendship, have now lost all their effect. The Perinthians, the Byzantines, and all connected with them, are aware that his purpose is to treat them as he has treated the Olynthians. Even the Thessalians now see that he means to hold authority among his allies, not at their choice, but by his own power. The Thebans are already highly jealous of him; his garrison in Nicæa, and his surreptitiously acquired seat among the Amphictyons, are enough to hold them in alarm. The Peloponnesians he requires to attend him by their embassies, and to make their alliance with him exclusive. Thus, of those formerly his confederates, some are now at open war with him, and others are lukewarm in alliance; all suspect and complain. But there is another thing, of great importance: the satraps of Asia have compelled him, by the force of mercenaries thrown into Perinthus, to raise the siege of that town. Hostility being thus actually begun, the consideration of the danger threatening the Persian provinces, should he possess himself of Byzantium, not only will make the satraps our ready allies, but will induce the king of Persia himself to supply us with money. His power so to supply us, it is well known, exceeds that of all others; and such altogether are his means to interfere in all the affairs of Greece that, formerly, in the wars between us and the Lacedæmonians, his alliance gave the superiority to either side at his pleasure. Becoming then now our ally, he will easily overbear Philip's power.

“ Nevertheless I will not say that Philip has not, during peace, possessed himself of many towns and harbours, and various advantages of no small importance for war. But

I observe that when power is founded on good will, and all the states combined for war have one interest, such power is lasting. On the contrary, when it is held by intrigue, and ambition, and deceit, and violence, as now by him, a little appearance of a turn of fortune, the smallest failure of success, will suffice to shake and overthrow it. And, considering often these matters, Athenians, I am persuaded that, not only among Philip's allies there is much mistrust and ill will toward him, but that, even within his own kingdom, there is not quite that harmony and that attachment to him which some suppose. The Macedonian power is become considerable by accretion. Of itself small, it is yet utterly unproportioned to support the authority which must ultimately rest on it. Philip, by his wars and his expeditions, and everything by which any might suppose he is become great, has made it only more precarious. For you must not imagine, Athenians, that the same things delight Philip and his subjects. You must recollect that he is ardent for glory; their wish is for safety: he cannot acquire glory without danger; and they do not desire, while they have children and parents and wives at home, to perish or meet daily dangers for him. From these considerations any one may gather how the greater part of the Macedonians are disposed toward him. Those then called his companions, and the principal officers of his mercenaries, enjoy indeed distinction in some proportion to their merit; but they live in more apprehension than those less distinguished. For those of lower degree fear only the enemy; but the man holding high rank has more to apprehend from flatterers and calumniators, than from battles. In the perils of war high and low partake; but the dread of the king's temper is peculiar to the great. Moreover, those of the lower ranks are punished only if they deserve punishment; but those of

the higher often incur mortification and humiliation by merit too conspicuous. Nor is this to be doubted by any man of sense and information; for Philip is so greedy of glory, as those who have lived with him affirm, that he shows more dissatisfaction with his generals when they do anything highly praiseworthy, than when they wholly fail in a business committed to them. How then is it, if things are so, that he has been so well served so long? Because, Athenians, prosperity throws a veil over such things. Success is powerful to overshadow and hide the faults of men. Should he once fail, then all will be brought into clear day-light. For, as in our bodies, while general health prevails, ailments in particular parts are little regarded, but in sickness every sore is disturbed, old fractures, old strains, and whatever is not perfectly sound; so in kingdoms and all governments, while they are successful in war defects are little observed; but, when failure begins, such as may be expected for him in projects beyond his strength, everything that has gone wrong will become evident to everybody.

“ Nevertheless, Athenians, if any of you, seeing Philip successful, reckon him therefore formidable, I think he judges well: for in all the affairs of men fortune is much, or rather everything. And yet, in a comparison of his fortune with ours, the advantage will be found, in many ways, with us. For we have inherited from our ancestors our superiority and command, transmitted from times, not only before this man, but before any reigned in Macedonia. They formerly paid tribute to the Athenians, but our commonwealth never to any. We have many reasons then to expect superior favour from the gods, inasmuch as our conduct has been more consonant to piety and justice. But why then was he so successful against us in the former war? Because, Athenians, for I must be open with you, he is always present

with his army, bears all fatigue and every privation, faces every danger, and, regardless of seasons throughout the year, never misses an opportunity. On the contrary we, for the truth must be spoken, sit here idling, procrastinating, decreeing, and inquiring for news. For news! what can be stranger news than that a Macedonian man, holding the Athenians in contempt, should dare to send them such a letter as you have just heard? But he has an army of mercenaries in his pay, — and, the gods know, some of our orators besides; who are not ashamed to live for Philip, and seem hardly aware that they are selling the commonwealth, and themselves with it, for a little pelf. But we neither stir to excite elsewhere opposition to his designs, nor will furnish the expense of a mercenary army, nor have courage to serve ourselves. It is not therefore wonderful that he obtained successes against us in the late war; but rather that we, doing nothing that in war ought to be done, expect to prevail against him who does everything that can promote his superiority.

“ These, Athenians, are the matters you have to consider; and so to consider as becomes those who cannot say they are enjoying peace; for now, after open acts of hostility, he has declared war. It becomes you therefore to spare neither public nor private wealth; it becomes all to dedicate their persons zealously to the service when occasion may be. Better generals than formerly should be appointed. For let it not be imagined that those through whom the affairs of the commonwealth from better have become worse, are those who from worse will make them better again. Nor have the weakness to suppose that, if you are yourselves inactive as formerly, others will be zealous to fight your battles for you. But, on the contrary, consider how disgraceful it is for you, whose fathers bore so many labours and such extraordinary dangers in war with Lacedæmon, to

refuse the exertion necessary for maintaining, what they, honourably and justly acquiring, have transmitted to you; that a man of Macedonia should be so ready for danger in his ambitious pursuits as to have been wounded in battle in battle in every part of his body, and Athenians, whose inheritance is independency and victory, should, through softness and idleness, surrender the acquisitions of their forefathers and the interests of their country.

“ Not however to make many words, I insist that we should all prepare for war; that we should animate the other Greeks to join in alliance with us, not with words but with deeds: for all argument, unsupported by actions, is vain, and so much the more from our government, as we are known to have readier means for acting against him than any other Greeks.”

SECTION IV.

Defeat of Philip's Measures against the Hellespontine Cities. — Difficulties remaining for Demosthenes. — Measures of Demosthenes for an extensive Confederacy against Macedonia. — Reversion of superior Influence to Phocion's Party, and Tranquillity ensuing.

B. C. 340. *
Ol. 110. 1. As it must have been assurance of a strong party among the many of Athens that encouraged Demosthenes to answer such a letter with such a speech, so it appears to have been good assurance of a strong combination against Macedonia, which was gathering on the eastern side of the Ægean, that encouraged him and his party in the line of politics which they followed. The D. iod. 1. 16.
c. 77. Chians, and Rhodians, and Coans, whose political connection with Byzantium had not ceased with the Confederate war, took a warm interest in the danger of

[* Mr. Clinton places the speech of Demosthenes on the Letter B. C. 339. *Fasti Hellen.* p. 360.]

their ally, and they were strong in marine. But, what was still more important, orders were sent from the Persian court for all the maritime satraps to use their utmost exertions for preventing the progress of the Macedonian arms, and the injury that might ensue to the Persian interest. Under direction then of the Athenian government, a powerful combined fleet was assembled in the Hellespont, and Chares took the command. Whether Demosthenes really considered him as the fittest instrument still of the purposes of the party, or, taking himself the lead in political business, he was unable to deny the first military situation to Chares, neither his own speeches nor any other memorials furnish satisfactory information. Chares, with the combined fleet under his orders, meeting the Macedonian fleet under the orders of Amyntas, was defeated. While [his insufficiency thus against the enemies of his country made him contemptible, his rapacity against his friends, of which experience was old, made him odious. It became necessary to recall him, and Phocion was sent to supersede him in the command.

Plut. v. Phoc.

Ibid.

It were highly desirable to elicit all possible light from the narrative of Plutarch, far more copious than any other extant of the transactions of this time, which were among the most critical of the age; but he has so painted his hero Phocion in glaring colours without comprehensible form, and so thrown Philip into smoke and darkness, also without distinguishable lines, and altogether so wants support from the historian, the orators, the Roman biographer, and probability, that, amid much obvious romance, it is hardly to be discovered to what, among all his tales, reason should allow belief. The issue however was that Philip, abandoning the hope of reducing any of the adverse towns of the Thracian shore, came to a composition with his enemies. The historian, writing near three hundred

Diod. l. 16.
c. 77.

years after, and willing that Greeks only should be believed the defenders of Grecian cities, imputes the principal effect to the interference of the Chians and Lesbians: but what Demosthenes indicates, in his speech at the time on the king of Macedonia's letter, was then probably too notorious to be concealed, and in his opinion perhaps matter rather for boast as the advantageous result of his negotiation, namely, that the wealth of Persia, paying and plentifully supplying Grecian troops, principally gave the strength from which Philip thought it prudent to withdraw. It is possible also, and not wholly improbable, that somewhat of that credit may have been due to Phocion which Plutarch gives, but of which Demosthenes would avoid an account. Phocion having the command of the Athenian armament on the Hellespontine station, Philip would respect him, and be ready for accommodation with him. But, in an oration of many years after, Demosthenes assumed the merit for the Athenian people; yet more particularly for himself, as the director of their measures. Thus flattering the Athenian people, he may have omitted what was owing to Phocion and others, and yet perhaps may have arrogated little more to himself than he might justly claim: the combination and direction of force, and the success ensuing, may have been principally owing to his able management.

The triumph thus might appear great for Demosthenes, as the disappointment certainly must have been great for Philip; who, since his defeat by Onomarchus, and ensuing distress and danger in Thessaly soon repaired by a splendid victory, had been accustomed to see all the measures of his enemies turn to their own confusion and his advantage: and, having earned the estimation of being the most fortunate, formidable, and glorious potentate of the age¹⁵, was now

¹⁵ Εὐδαίμων καὶ μέγας καὶ πολλῶν κέρσιος γέγονεν. Demosth. Philip. 4. p. 143. And again, p. 149. Εὐδαίμων καὶ μέγας καὶ φοβερὸς ἔστι πᾶσι τοῖς Ἕλλησι καὶ Βαρβάροις.

completely foiled in enterprise, successively against three little commercial states which had before solicited his protection. But the success of Demosthenes, though much had been done, was yet so far from complete, that he and his whole party remained as on the verge of a precipice. He had been, in his public speeches, continually and vehemently urging the republic to war against Macedonia, procuring measures of positive hostility to be taken, and, after great forbearance and repeated remonstrances from Philip, contemptuously asserting the falsehood of that prince's pretence to desire peace, and the actual existence of war. In these circumstances he and his party could not undertake conciliation with Macedonia. If conciliation were proper or necessary, they must yield the lead to their opponents of the party of Phocion, who had always desired peace, and with whom, it was well known, Philip was disposed to friendship. Nothing therefore remained for them, if they would even hold the lead in Athens, and more especially, if they would prosecute still those ambitious purposes of extensive empire which we have seen Demosthenes so frequently avowing, but to persevere in urging war against Macedonia, and in effort to form a confederacy able to support it. Of the terms of the treaty concluded when the Macedonian arms were withdrawn from Byzantium, we have no information: but it is evident that the pressure upon Macedonia was relieved; the hope of farther co-operation from the Chians and Rhodians in the views of the war-party was ended; and active hostility, even from the Persian satraps, apparently in necessary consequence ceased.

Such appear to have been the disadvantageous and discouraging circumstances remaining for Demosthenes after his success in procuring so important a check to the Macedonian arms, the first given since his acquisition of any share in the administration. He had however yet before him

advantages which talents like his might use, and ambition like his would not abandon. He retained still the agency for the Persian court, the means afforded by which are not to be calculated. In Eubœa his new system of liberality had been highly successful. The able conduct of the brothers, Callias and Taurosthenes, his agents, had made their party preponderant in all the towns of the island. In Western Greece the Acarnanians were much disposed to connection with the war-party of Athens, through enmity to the Epirots on their northern, and the Ætolians on their southern border, favoured against them by Macedonia. In Peloponnesus the Achæans, instigated like the Acarnanians by enmity to the Ætolians, desired Athenian patronage for their support against those who enjoyed Macedonian patronage. Corinth also remained under the lead of those who held friendly connection with the war-party in Athens. But the important speculation was in Thebes; and the interest there, adverse to Macedonia, not only maintained itself, but was advancing in weight.

Beyond Greece the Chersonese alone was now under the dominion of Athens; but the neighbouring cities of Byzantium, Selymbria, and Perinthus, commanding the coast nearly from the Chersonese to the Euxine, were restored to her alliance. Among arrangements made there by Phocion would be a restoration of some liberal participation in civil power to the party adverse to war with Macedonia. For Demosthenes then it would be an object, on the first opportunity, to reverse this, and restore complete preponderance to the other party; whose leaders, formerly connected with him, would not fail in zealous concurrence. How successful he was in this pursuit, following circumstances show.

In Byzantium, as in Athens, political measures were, in regular course, proposed in a select council, and, after dis-

cussion there, brought before the assembled people. A bill, regularly carried through the council, was transmitted to the general assembly, and there passed into a law, declaring the gratitude of the Byzantine to the Athenian people for their support in the recent war with Macedonia. It moreover directed that, in perpetual memory of the benefit, three statues, each sixteen cubits high, representing the Byzantine people and the Perinthian crowning the Athenian, should be placed in a public part of Byzantium. The decree for this purpose has been preserved as given by Demosthenes in its original Doric dialect. The temper and the policy of those who led in the business are clearly marked by the preamble, which contains a direct libel upon those Byzantine patriots who, through opportunity afforded by the Confederate war, had emancipated their commonwealth from its former oppressive and degrading subjection under the sovereignty of the Athenian people. It states, as the ground of the decree, that "the Athenian people, in former times, had been always friendly to the Byzantines, and to their allies and kinsmen the Perinthians; and that recently, when Philip the Macedonian made war with the purpose of exterminating them, they had done many and great services, assisting them with a hundred and twenty vessels, bringing corn and arms and heavy-armed troops, and thus delivered them from great dangers, and restored their ancient form of government, their laws, and the tombs of their forefathers." An extensive purpose is indicated in what follows: to the whole Athenian people are given freedom of both cities, right of marriage with citizens, right of holding lands and houses in the Byzantine and Perinthian territories, and, with these common rights of citizens, the extraordinary privileges of precedence at religious ceremonies and public spectacles, and immunity from those bur-

Demosth. de
cor. p. 255.

Demosth.
ut sup.

densome offices which, in all the republics, were connected with the rights of citizens. After this the statues are directed, and then follows the concluding clause, not the least remarkable, enacting that embassies shall be sent to all the great national meetings, the Isthmean, Nemean, Olympic, and Pythian, to make there solemn proclamation of the crowns, "with which," says the decree, "the Athenian people are crowned by us; that all the Greeks may be informed of the merit of the Athenians, and of the gratitude of the Byzantines and Perinthians."

The tenor of this decree fully shows that the high-spirited and successful assertors of independency, who had directed the measures of Byzantium and Perinthus in the Confederate war, no longer held the lead, and that the connection of those who had superseded them in power was not with the party of Phocion, to whom their cities owed recent relief from a ruinous war, but with the Athenian war-party, whose instruments they submitted to be, in offering such servile flattery to the Athenian people, and in promoting a new breach with Macedonia. The influence then of that party thus prevailing there, their authority would not be likely to fail among the subjects of Athens in the neighbouring territory of the Chersonese. Accordingly,

Demosth. de
cor. p. 256.

from that country a decree was procured in these remarkable terms: "The Chersonesites inhabiting Sestus, Eleus, Madytus, and Alopeconnesus crown the council and people of Athens with a golden crown of sixty talents: and they erect an altar to gratitude, and to the Athenian people, who have done the greatest of all benefits to the Chersonesites, rescuing them from Philip, and restoring their country, their laws, their freedom, and their religious rites: wherefore they will not cease henceforth for ever to be grateful, and to return the greatest good in their power. So it is in common council decreed." This extortion of sixty

talents from the Chersonesites, gratifying to the Athenian many, and therefore what Demosthenes would boast of before them, was not what would gain favour to the war-party cause among the other Greeks, and so was not proclaimed at the national meetings like the decree of the Byzantines.”¹⁶

The restoration of the war-party interest in Byzantium was an important step toward the completion of the political system of Demosthenes, which had two great points, to surround Attica with allies, and Macedonia with enemies. To prosecute this he devoted himself, according to his own boast, to every kind of business. He was elected an Amphictyon, or representative of Athens in the office of pylagore in the Amphictyonic assembly, and he went to Delphi. It seems to have been a principal advantage of that situation and office that together they gave great opportunity for communication with Thebes. He used moreover the opportunity of residence in Phocis for taking the duty of ambassador to the neighbouring people of Acarnania, and he went in the same capacity into Peloponnesus. But he would not allow himself long absence from the debates and intrigues of Athens. The prosecution therefore of negotiation, begun in Peloponnesus and Acarnania, he committed to Callias of Chalcis, whose abilities had been so advantageously proved in Eubœa.

Callias, returning to Athens, was introduced by Demosthenes to the assembled people, to report matters of important public concern. He had succeeded, he said, in negotiating a confederacy for war against Macedonia : the Achæans and Megareans had engaged to

Demosth.
de cor.

Æsch. de cor.

Ibid. p. 486.

¹⁶ Sixty talents, if talent was taken in its ordinary sense, denoting a sum of money, would be between eleven and twelve thousand pounds sterling ; if meaning weight of gold, it would be many times more.

supply sixty talents annually; the Eubœans would furnish forty, and many other Grecian republics would concur. He must however desire to be excused for withholding report of some very advantageous circumstances procured by his mission, as they required secrecy; but they were known to some Athenians who would vouch for them, and he named Demosthenes. To this Demosthenes assented, adding that, of his own knowledge, the force engaged for by the Peloponnesians and Acarnanians together was a hundred ships of war and ten thousand mercenary troops, besides native forces, two thousand from each country: that the command in chief, it was agreed, should be conceded to the Athenians, and that a congress of deputies from all the confederacy should meet at Athens, on a day not distant, which he named.¹⁷

Æschin. de cor. p. 488.

Possibly Callias was deceived by those he trusted as leading men of the democratical party in the governments with which he communicated; or possibly, deceiving themselves, they undertook for what they were unable to accomplish. There was however a general failure of the promises: neither fleet nor army was assembled, no congress met, and, whatever may have been agreed in secret, no confederacy for war with Macedonia was acknowledged. To prosecute war then, as Demosthenes had proposed, was impossible, and to maintain peace was what he least

*Demosth. de cor. p. 275.
Æsch. de cor.*

of anybody could undertake. Thence evidently arose the necessity for what, it appears, followed: he conceded the lead in public business to those who could consistently propose to maintain friendly connection with Macedonia, and with whom the Macedonian government might be not indisposed to friendly communi-

¹⁷ For all these particulars Æschines refers to a decree of the Athenian people, passed on the occasion, which [on his motion was read before the assembly.

cation. Under such circumstances, that he could quietly withdraw himself from the leading situation, and still hold the weight that enabled him to interfere as a speaker in the general assembly, marks either very extraordinary influence which he possessed among the many, or very extraordinary moderation in the opposite party, or rather both. The tranquillity ensuing from his retirement, during the year following that of the Hellespontine war, is marked by a complete omission of notice from the annalist historian of both Grecian affairs and Macedonian.

B. C. 339.
Ol. 110. 2.
Diod. l. 16.
c. 82, 83.

SECTION V.

New Importance of the Office of Amphictyon. — Sacrilege of the Amphissians. — Opposition of Æschines to the Measures of Demosthenes. — New Sacred War. — Second Epistle of Isocrates to Philip. — Election of Philip to the Office of General of the Amphictyons.

IN this season of comparative tranquillity, when nothing occurred strikingly affecting the principal republics, a political leaven was working in a corner of the country, which quickly produced a fermentation deeply interesting the whole. Formerly the office of Amphictyon was of so little importance that hardly, among all extant memorials, is to be found the name of any who held it as representative of any Amphictyonic state before Demosthenes. But the acceptance of it by one of his eminence, his character, and actually holding the power of first minister of the Athenian republic, not lightly indicates that it was become an office affording, in then existing circumstances, great opportunities. Accordingly, when his opponents acquired the administration, Æschines was elected to the office. Athens, it appears, now sent four representatives to the Amphictyonic

council; three pylagores, among whom was Æschines, but still only one hieromneimon. What had been foreseen of importance enough to detach a man of the powers of Æschines from the controversies of oratory at Athens does not appear, but matter requiring his talents and experience in business soon showed itself.

In the Sacred war, recently concluded, the Ozolian Locrians, the most zealous and active allies of Thebes, had been the greatest sufferers; and the final success of their friends had merely relieved them from injury and danger, without bringing any compensation. Their principal town, Amphissa, hardly seven miles from Delphi, overlooked, nearly as Delphi, the rich Cirrhæan plain; and its territory bordered on the devoted land, forbidden to the use of man. The Thebans, powerful among the Amphictyons, would be likely to desire gratification for the Locrians, if it might be had without expense to themselves; but allowance for what was coveted could be only by connivance. The Æsch. de cor. p. 505. Amphissians however not only used the devoted land, both for pasture and tillage, but ventured to occupy and even fortify the accursed port; and, encouraged by permission for so much, they advanced in assurance so far as to exact duties for goods and persons passing to and from Delphi.

Æsch. de cor. Æschines, in a speech of many years after, before the Athenian people, asserted that the Amphissians tampered with the Amphictyons, and especially with Demosthenes; who took from them a present of between sixty and seventy pounds sterling as a fee for his interest immediately in the Amphictyonic council, with a promise of a yearly sum nearly equal for his regular support to their cause at Athens: and this is not contradicted in the reply of Demosthenes. Indeed it appears unquestionable that the Athenian orators generally, not less than the naval commanders, to

whom we have seen Demosthenes himself imputing it, were in the habit of taking such fees or benevolences. It was so they made their fortunes ; as afterward the orators in the Roman republic ; so the great Cicero acquired his immense fortune. But the purpose of Æschines, in that speech, was not to explain freely and fully the politics of the times, but merely to inculcate Demosthenes. What he said of his rival might be true ; but the purpose of that extraordinary statesman certainly went far beyond a little private lucre. Nor will it appear wonderful, all the little that is laid open considered, that from Demosthenes, in his reply, scarcely any facts can be gathered : the splendid colouring, which he could give to anything, he has given with almost only vapour : the tangible matter that has reached us comes mostly from Æschines.

Soon after Æschines had taken his seat in the Amphictyonic council (for so Demosthenes has shown) he noticed the profanation of the Amphisians. Why this was not immediately followed by proceedings against them does not appear. The crisis at length arose thus. There was a temple newly built, probably to supply one destroyed in the late troubles ; and, before it was regularly consecrated, some golden shields, which had been dedicated by the Athenian people after the battle of Plataea, were placed in it, as if duly prepared to receive such oblations. The shields bore an inscription reproachful to Thebes, in these words : “ The Athenians, from the Medes and Thebans, when they fought against the Greeks.” This seems to have been done imprudently rather than with any purpose of offence ; for had there been any view to disturb by it the intrigue of Demosthenes for a connection between the Athenian and Theban governments, which following circumstances show to have been at this time prosecuting at Thebes, more care would probably have been taken to avoid objectionable

irregularity.¹⁸ Not the Thebans then, but the Amphissian members of the council came forward to notice the irregularity. They said it was impious; and they claimed damages against the Athenian people for the fault of their representatives, to the amount of fifty talents, near ten thousand pounds sterling. Æschines rose to speak in defence of himself and his colleagues and his constituents. An Amphissian member interrupted him, and went to the length of insisting that the Athenian people, as implicated in all the guilt of the Phocians by alliance with them in the Sacred war, ought to be excluded from the temple, and deprived of Amphictyonic rights. Æschines however, obtaining a hearing, defended the suspension of the shields, and then proceeded to urge against the Amphissians their sacrilegious profanation in using the devoted land and the accursed port.

Probably enough the Amphissian member, as Æschines says of him, and perhaps others of the Amphictyons, representatives of the smaller states, were men of no advantageous education. It is indeed evident that, for the new or revived importance to which the council was raised, there was a great deficiency of established and suitable forms of proceeding; necessary, in every assembly, for ensuring just deliberation and dignified conduct. The arguments of Æschines or the weight of the Athenian interest prevailing, the council came so rapidly to a decisive decree on so difficult and delicate a subject that, on the same evening, proclamation was made by the herald, for “all Delphians, of two years and upward above boyhood, free and slaves, to meet on the morrow at day-break,

Æsch. de cor.
p. 514.

¹⁸ Æschines has avoided to say whether the Athenian accusation against the Amphissians, or the Amphissian accusation against the Athenians, was first instituted, and of course credit will be due to the assertion of Demosthenes, in his reply, that no accusation had been brought against Athens by the Locrians when Æschines first brought their profanation into question.

at a place named, with hooks and spades ; the hieromnemons and pylagores to attend ; every state, whose representatives failed, to be excluded from the temple as implicated in the profanation."

This hasty communication produced its effect, so far that all met as the decree required. Under command of the Amphictyons the crowd descended into the plain, destroyed the port, burned the houses, and returned. But the Amphissians, admonished of course by their members in the council, had assembled in arms ; and, whether urged more by inconsiderate passion, or encouraged by promise of powerful support, though too late to prevent, would revenge the injury to their possessions. The unarmed Delphians fled from their menacing approach, but many were wounded, and some, even of the hieromnemons, were seized and stripped.

Æsch. de cor.
p. 515.

Demosth. de
cor. p. 277.
& 279.

Such disgraceful irregularities abundantly mark the deficiency and weakness of this national assembly. Nor were the following measures at all becoming the dignity which it ought to have maintained. Next day the president, Cottyphus¹⁹, summoned what was called a general assembly of the Amphictyons. In such a general assembly custom had established that all Greeks, at the time at Delphi, entitled to admission to the common sacrifices and to consultation of the god, should have votes with the hieromnemons and pylagores. The very resource of summoning such an assembly seems to mark deficiency in the Amphictyons ; and the result of its deliberations enough indicates that they felt their dignity committed by their former hasty measures. The necessary forms of justice, apparently not less than a just consideration of their own means, would have required notice to the Amphissians, with a formal requisition to

¹⁹ Κόττυφος, ὁ τὰς γνώμας ἐπιψηφίζων. Æsch.

quit the lands they had improperly occupied, before violence for ejection. Measures were now taken which should rather have preceded those through which their dignity and authority had been subjected to insult. It was decreed that the hieromnemons should meet on a day named, before the regular time for the next session of the Amphictyons, (which in course was to be held not at Delphi, but at Thermopylæ,) prepared with a bill for bringing the Amphisians to justice for their offences against the god, the consecrated land, and the Amphictyons.

With this decree the Amphictyons concluded their session. The Athenian members returning home, prepared a bill, as the decree required; which, whether as a matter of duty or only of supposed prudence and expediency, they offered for the approbation of their own government; presenting it first to the council of Fivehundred, and then, warranted by their sanction, to the assembled people. Demosthenes opposed in vain, and the decree of the people gave it the force of law.

But Demosthenes, superior to his opponents in diligence hardly less than in acuteness, talking over the members of the council of Fivehundred, procured a decree there, commanding that the hieromnemon and pylagores of Athens should go to Thermopylæ and to Delphi at the times appointed by their forefathers; thus virtually forbidding their going at the previous time appointed by the Amphictyons. Choosing then dexterously his moment in an assembly of the people, when the business appointed for the day was over, and Æschines with the other principal men of his party were gone, he brought this decree forward there; and, uncontrolled by the salutary forms which check insidious party-measures in the British parliament, he procured at once the complete ratification of it. Nor did he stop thus. Finding the sovereign assembly at his devotion, he added a clause,

commanding, “ that the hieromnemon and pylagores of Athens should not communicate with those of the other Grecian states, in words, or deeds, or votes, or act of any kind.”²⁰ The account of Æschines, imputing sinister management to Demosthenes in this business, does no credit to himself or his party for diligence or vigilance.

The decree, thus carried, seems to have been effectual for its purpose; which evidently was to render any attendance of the Athenian members of the council either nugatory or embarrassing. Had the Athenian Amphictyons been of the war-party, they would probably have attended purposely to embarrass. But they avoided to go. The Theban members also staid away. All the others however were present when the council resolved, that war be made against the Amphissians, and the command committed to Cottyphus. An army accordingly was collected; the Amphissians were brought to submission; and, as Æschines seems truly to say, all things considered, they were not severely treated. A fine was imposed on the Amphissian state, to be paid in a limited time to the god. Some of those who had taken a leading part in the late violence against the Amphictyons were banished, and

Æsch. de cor.
p. 518.

p. 519.

²⁰ Τὸν ἱερομνήμονα τῶν Ἀθηναίων, καὶ πυλαγόρας τοὺς αἰὶ πυλαγοροῦντας, μὴ μετίχιν τοῖς ἐπί συλλεγομένοις, μὴ λόγων, μὴτε ἔργων, μὴτε δογμάτων, μὴτε πράξεως μηδεμίαις. Æsch. de cor. p. 518. “ Sycophantice prætermittit quarum rerum non debeant esse participes, belli Phocensis scilicet.” There is something extremely curious in the disposition to democratical barking, so extensively shown among the critics of the continent, from the revival of letters onward to the French revolution; and more especially when compared with the greater moderation of those of our own country, where real freedom, and the constitution that should ensure it, was so much better understood. Taylor accordingly has said indignantly to this: Nihil prætermittitur.” In what he adds I cannot equally agree with him: “ Decrevit Demosthenes eos non participare cum consiliis vel actis senatus Amphictyonici, qui *extra ordinem cogebatur.*” The additional clause of Demosthenes had surely a farther purview; for the use of an enactment forbidding the Athenian members to concur in counsels and deeds with the previous meeting which, by the former part of the decree, they were forbidden to attend, is not obvious. _____

some Amphisian citizens, who had been condemned to exile for opposition to the little politics of their state, were restored. Thus what had been very irregular and highly disgraceful was put into as regular course as, according to all appearance, could be, and in a manner as little objectionable.

But no sooner was the force which had compelled submission withdrawn than the Amphisians returned to their former temper, and proceeded to corresponding measures. They refused payment of the fine, they recalled those whom the Amphictyons had banished, and drove into banishment again those whom they had recalled. War then again was decreed against them. But troops were not duly furnished by the states called upon, and the measures taken were of little effect.

Æsch. de cor.
p. 519.
Demosth. de cor. p. 277.

Such successful resistance of the people of the little town of Amphissa to the Amphictyons, the general council of the Greek nation, would appear strange indeed, were it not fully indicated in remaining accounts that their resistance was encouraged and supported by the party of Demosthenes and Chares at Athens, in concert with a powerful party in Thebes. Nor was the matter of light moment. It involved the question whether the party of Demosthenes and Chares at Athens should command the Greek nation. In the fourth Philippic oration of Demosthenes, Corinth, Arcadia, Argos, Thebes, and even Lacedæmon, are found threatened to be reduced under Athenian empire. Perhaps this boldness, otherwise apparently improvident, may have been necessary for instigation to the Athenian people. Could Demosthenes have carried his purposes more secretly, he might have succeeded in them.

At the next meeting of the Amphictyons, held at Thermopylæ, and thence called the Pylæan meeting, the circumstances of Greece were taken into serious consideration.

How the people of the little town of Amphissa should be reduced to order would have been even a ridiculous question for such a body, had not the Amphissians been already notoriously secure of that support which soon after was openly given them. It was evidently the notoriety of the divided state of Greece, which Demosthenes himself has described as so inviting for Athens, and the apprehension of being brought under the rule of the conqueror of Sestus and his party, that induced a majority of the members to turn their view to the king of Macedonia.

Demosth. de
cor. p. 279.

Demosthenes, in a speech many years after, told the Athenian people that the whole business of this little Amphissian war arose from the intrigue of Æschines; the ultimate object having been to procure the election of Philip to the command. Philip was then making war against that powerful Scythian horde, occupying the coast of the Euxine sea from the Borysthenes to the Danube or beyond it, and he was actually in their country. Agents indeed might nevertheless be busy for him in Greece. But, on the contrary, if Isocrates should be credited, Philip was as backward to interfere among the republics, even on their invitation, as Demosthenes desired to have him believed eager, indefatigable, and profuse. That however the little people of Amphissa would venture first to attack the Amphictyons, and afterward to resume and persevere in war against them, without assurance of support from some more powerful state, is evidently improbable; and the disposition of a powerful party in Thebes, and of the war-party in Athens, to favour them, is abundantly testified by Demosthenes himself. Toward an estimate of Philip's politics then, this may deserve consideration. At the conclusion of the Sacred war, a partnership in the presidency of the Pythian festival had been committed to him and his successors for ever. When that great politician, Jason of

p. 276.

Æsch. de cor.
p. 519.

Thessaly, had in view to make himself sovereign of Greece, it was with him a great point to preside in person at the Pythian festival; insomuch that he proposed to assume the situation by force, should it not quietly be conceded to him. But Philip, avoiding use of the invidious honour, already his own, sent his deputy. The ingenuity of Demosthenes converted this into matter of reproach for him. Philip would not condescend, the orator told the many of Athens, to attend himself, but sent his servant. Had Philip, on the contrary, used the opportunity open to him, as he was well capable of using it; had he displayed at Delphi the elegant magnificence which had been so admired at his Olympic festival in Macedonia; had he there, with advantageous opportunity for communicating personally with principal men, especially young men, from every city of Greece, exerted his singular talent for conviviality and pleasant conversation to extend personal attachment to him in all parts, the ingenuity of Demosthenes, though he might have feared the consequences, would not have wanted ground of invective to oppose them, or diligence in making the utmost use of it.

B. C. 339.
Ol. 110. 2.

The second of the extant epistles of Isocrates to Philip shows itself to have been written about this time; for it mentions Philip as recently returned from the war with the northern people, in whose country he yet was when the Amphictyons were deliberating about his election to the command in the Amphisian war. It marks a strong feeling in the old patriot for Philip's safety; it reproves him for risking his person improvidently in battle, exhorts him to friendship with the Athenians, admonishes him not to regard those who, informing him of all the invectives and calumnies vented against him by a party in Athens, would persuade him that the people generally were ill disposed toward him, and concludes with urging him "to connect his kingdom and his

Æsch. de cor.

good fortune with the happiness and concord of the Greek nation.”²¹ The Amphictyons then, concurring in sentiment with Isocrates and the party of Phocion, came to the resolution of inviting the king of Macedonia to take upon himself the office of their general, and decreed that Cottyphus, their president, should go to him, as their ambassador, to request his acceptance of the appointment.

Demosth. de
cor. p. 279.

²¹ Καλόν ἐστὶ τὴν βασιλείαν καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν τὴν ὑπέχουσαν ἡμῖν παρακατατίθεσθαι τῇ τῶν Ἑλλήνων εὐδαιμονίᾳ καὶ εὐνοίᾳ.

It may seem to have been in mere idleness that the editor Auger has assigned the same date to the oration to Philip and the three letters of Isocrates: probably desiring not to be understood to mean the same day, but only time within which was no material change of circumstances. The oration marks its own date very exactly. There seems little hazard in affirming that the first epistle was sent before it, because it would have been absurdly nugatory after it. Those who will take the trouble, which Auger apparently has desired to avoid, of adverting only to the matter stated in the second and third epistles, will find them clearly marking dates considerably differing.

CHAPTER XLII.

AFFAIRS OF GREECE FROM THE ELECTION OF PHILIP KING OF MACEDONIA TO BE GENERAL OF THE AMPHICTYONS TILL HIS DEATH.

SECTION I.

Extraordinary Policy of Demosthenes. — Confederacy of Grecian States under the Influence of the Athenian War-party. Hostilities against Macedonia without declared War. — Requisition of Forces for the renewed Sacred or Amphissian War. — Conclusion of the renewed Sacred War.

THE election of the king of Macedonia to the office of general of the Amphictyons, making him the constitutional head of a great confederacy of Grecian republics, almost in the moment of failure of the avowed project of the Athenian war-party for a great confederacy against him and his Grecian allies, placed that party in circumstances most discouraging. Opportunity thus was so opened for establishing the prevalence of the peaceful, and for consolidating the friendly connection of all Greece with Macedonia, that ground of hope for the war-party again to obtain the lead might seem hardly discernible. But, as quicksightedness, dexterity, and boldness were never yet so wanted in the cause, so never before were they equally shown. The very conception of what Demosthenes next carried into practice appears extraordinary. Having reached his actual eminence by vehement and persevering assertion of the most unlimited democratical despotism, yet unable now to command by the

democratical, he applied himself to cultivate, not an aristocratical party, but a depressed relic of the aristocratical branch of the constitution. Few years had passed since Isocrates proposed restoration of authority to the once powerful and venerable court of Areopagus, but proposed in vain. Demosthenes had now formed an interest in that court such that he might use it as his instrument for controlling the sovereign many; and under his direction it assumed power to be an efficacious instrument.

In the way which appears to have been, of late at least, usual, and esteemed regular, Æschines had been elected by the people to the office of syndic of the temple of Delos; an office of high honour, and apparently lucrative. The court of Areopagus, perhaps reviving some old claim to interfere in the appointment of offices connected with the religion of the state, not only annulled the election, but took upon itself to substitute Hyperides, an orator of eminence, zealous in the party of Chares and Demosthenes. Whether Phocion and his friends thought this might be a salutary precedent for checking popular despotism, or why otherwise they did not or could not excite the sovereign assembly, generally so jealous of its authority, to support its own act, information fails.

Demosth. de
cor. p. 271.

The appointment to the syndicism was however by itself of small consideration; its importance arose from its connection with other matters. A man of eminence, Antiphon, respected for his quality, formidable by his talents, adverse to the war-party, and as far as appears without other crime, had been banished by a decree of the people. Whether hoping for protection and a reversal of the decree from the recovered influence of his friends, or under whatever of the various inducements that might present themselves, he returned illegally, and was living in concealment in Piræus. The vigilance of Demosthenes obtaining

Demosth. de
cor. p. 271.

notice of this, he judged that, at any hazard, the utmost should be made of the opportunity. Unable to gain such information of Antiphon's residence that the officers of justice might be directed in regular course to apprehend him, he assumed to himself authority, with sufficient attendants, to search private houses ; and, having at length discovered the delinquent, took him into custody and carried him to the city.

The people then being assembled, the prisoner was brought before them. The notorious fact of his illegal return from banishment subjected him to capital punishment, but would not warrant the violation of private rights in apprehending him. It behoved Demosthenes therefore to be prepared with means to obviate accusation against himself, or his own ruin might take place of Antiphon's. The mention of a plot to overthrow the democracy would at any time fire the multitude. Of such a plot Demosthenes accused Antiphon; with the addition that it was concerted with the king of Macedonia. The first measure, he affirmed, was to have been to burn the naval arsenal, with all the shipping there, and for this purpose it was that the prisoner was lurking in Piræus. The peace-party came forward, anxious to defend Antiphon ; but, aware of the inflammable temper of the despotic sovereign, they seem to have rested less on the total deficiency of evidence to the charge than on the opportunity open for directing the popular passion to the notorious violation of the constitution and the rights of citizens in the act of apprehending the prisoner. Whether however argument or influence or passion availed most, the charge was voted groundless, and, as illegally arrested, Antiphon was set at liberty.

Defeat, in such a measure, could not but involve in great danger those engaged in it. Demosthenes therefore,

as little averse to aristocratical despotism, if it might serve his purpose, as to democratical, proceeded again to make the court of Areopagus his weapon for defence and offence. The security of an Englishman, in the immemorial rule of the common law, that no man shall be tried twice on the same charge, was not given by the principles of either democracy or aristocracy at Athens. Antiphon, dismissed in pursuance of the sentence of the sovereign people, was arrested again at the instigation of Demosthenes, by order of the court of Areopagus; and not convicted by evidence, but, under the pressure of torture, confessing or uttering what his tormentors asserted to amount to confession, of the purpose of burning the arsenal, he was, by that court, so renowned of old for the equity of its decisions, sent to the executioner. It might be difficult to give credit to report of these facts, had it come on authority less unsuspecting than that of the great orator, the principal agent. Still it may be presumed, it should seem, that proceedings so disgusting, even as he has related them, were not warranted by the celebrated constitution of Solon, nor would have been allowed under that court of Areopagus which Isocrates desired to restore. It were indeed difficult to say what just freedom, what security for individuals, could exist under a constitution that would tolerate the practice of Demosthenes.¹

But a measure of such violence, though carried by the authority of the court of Areopagus against the declared will of the sovereign multitude, could be supported only by a recovery of prevalence among that multitude; and this was evidently never out of the view of Demosthenes.

¹ Even Plutarch has observed of this affair that it was *σφόδρα ἀριστοκρατικὸν πολίτευμα* (v. Demosth. p. 852.). It is obvious that he used the word *ἀριστοκρατικὸν* widely otherwise than with the very creditable meaning which it bore in the age of Plato and Isocrates.

The ebb and flow of command among the assembled Athenian people was not always produced by any change of popular favour. At this very time, when the war-party failed of the votes wanted to carry one important purpose, the maritime department appears to have been decidedly under their influence: the fleets were employed actively, and probably lucratively, in preying on the Macedonian commerce; while the orators at home, and especially

Demosthenes, were asserting in the assembly that Athens maintained faithfully the peace which Philip, they exclaimed, had broken. While the nautic multitude were so employed, the strength of the party might sometimes fail in the general assembly for want of their voices; and yet, to hold their favour, it would be necessary to allow them so to be employed. The inconvenience then of a temporary defeat, resulting from their absence in an unforeseen crisis, would be to be repaired by their zeal for the patrons of their vocation when they returned; and it was apparently in reasonable confidence that he could call in sufficient support that Demosthenes ventured, in the absence of a large proportion of his friends, to use the authority of the court of Areopagus against the authority of the general assembly, and proceed to that extravagance of despotism and cruelty, in the case of Antiphon, which surprised even Plutarch.

Thus, under the conduct of Demosthenes, most ably adapted to his own purposes and those of his party, that party recovered ascendancy in the general assembly, and with it the administration of the affairs of the commonwealth. Their views then were directed, with not less ability or diligence, nor without large success, to establish and extend their influence in other parts of Greece. In Eubœa, divided through all its towns between factions long

Demosth. de
cor. p. 275,
276.

Demosth.
Philipp.

Plut. v.
Demosth.

vehemently hostile to one another, yet the war-party generally overborne, the business must have been of great nicety and difficulty. Nevertheless, attaching able agents to his interest by their interest, and favoured by the scrupulous moderation of the party of Phocion, Demosthenes succeeded so that nearly the whole island was brought under his command. In Megara equally he procured prevalence for the party under his patronage. Corinth, formerly the steady friend of Lacedæmon, the vehement enemy of Athens, had fallen much from her ancient eminence among the Grecian states. After a long series of good administration, that growth of violent faction, of which an account has been formerly given, produced alteration of the constitution and oppres-

Ch. 28. s. 9.
of this Hist.

sion of the people. In the following age Corinth has been noticed by Diodorus only for her connection with Sicilian affairs through the expedition of Timoleon. On account of her ancient fame her political state now would be matter of curiosity; but Demosthenes has simply shown that, when he was the minister, she was the ally of Athens. From a late writer, the jocular Lucian, the character of her government and people remains ludicrously exhibited: yet, being in consonance with the other more serious testimonies, the picture may be not wholly unfaithful.

The famous cynic philosopher Diogenes at this time, it is said, was inhabiting his tub at Corinth.

Lucian. de
conscrib. hist.

There, as at Athens, to infuse apprehension of attack from Macedonia, and to excite, if possible, passion enough among the people to lead them to approve and be active in offensive war, was the object of the leaders. All therefore was set in motion: fortifications were repaired, arms fabricated, provisions collected. The whole city thus being in a bustle of military preparation, the philosopher began to roll about his tub in various directions. Being asked

why? he answered, "he would avoid, for once, the imputation of affecting singularity, and so would not be the only person in Corinth not absurdly employed." Corinth however was no unimportant addition to the Athenian confederacy. Not only her situation was commanding, but her alliance carried with it, or assisted much toward obtaining, that of Corcyra and Leucadia, which accordingly were among the allies of Athens. Achaia and Acarnania were also in the same interest; decided to it much by their hostility to neighbouring states, allies of Macedonia. Lacedæmon, under treaty still subsisting, was an ally of Athens, and ill-disposed toward Macedonia for the support which Philip had given to the Argives and Messenians. But there was no friendship between the Lacedæmonian government and the war-party in Athens; and the great speculation of Demosthenes at this time, alliance with Thebes, was adverse to any friendly connection with Lacedæmon. The effectual confederacy of Athens then, under the administration of the war-party, consisted of Megara, Corinth, Achaia, Acarnania, Leucadia, and Corcyra.

The acquisition of Thebes, for which Demosthenes appears to have been perfectly willing to forego any advantage to be derived from the connection with Lacedæmon, might seem on a transient view so to abound with difficulty, and indeed so to be out of all ordinary course of policy, that the purpose might appear even preposterous; yet, in proceeding with the course of events, we find the keensighted politician had discovered no inconsiderable ground for it. However extensively aversion to Athens might be a popular passion, yet a party once formed in Thebes in direct opposition to the party desirous of maintaining the connection with Macedonia would be in the best manner prepared for connection with the war-party in Athens. According to the probable imputation of Æs-

chines, Demosthenes held communication with this party in Thebes when it might have subjected any man to the charge of high treason.

Æsch. de cor.
p. 532, 533.
Demosth. de
cor. p. 299.

Yet so ably the intrigue was managed that a powerful party there was prepared with zeal for connection with Athens, while not only the two republics were in a state of actual war, but the general prejudices among the people of both were very hostile toward each other.

Meanwhile nominal peace and nominal alliance remaining between Athens and Macedonia, the war-party orators continued their complaints that Philip had broken the peace; and the Athenian navy was busy in maritime depredation, as if war had been declared. Precisely of this time Demosthenes spoke where he

Demosth. de
legat. p. 275,
276.

has said, "Philip was without prospect of relief from the hostilities of Athens, unless he could excite the Thebans and Thessalians to be active in measures against us: for, notwithstanding the deficient exertion of our military commanders, he was suffering a thousand evils from the depredations on the maritime trade of his country. Nothing could be exported, nothing imported, for the activity of our cruisers."²

Such was the state of things when Philip, invited by the embassy of the Amphictyons, came to their meeting at Thermopylæ, where alone they appear to have held their sittings since Delphi, through the open hostility of the Locrians on one side, and the uncertain disposition of Thebes on the other, was become insecure. In pursuance then of the duties of the office to which he had been elected, he issued requisitions for the Amphictyonic states to send their contingents of troops for war to be waged under his command. The form of the

² *Ληστῶν*. This word appears to have been used by the Greeks equally to signify a pirate and a ship of war regularly commissioned; whence it is often difficult to know which has been intended.

requisition sent to the Peloponnesians is given by Demosthenes, thus :—“ The king of the Macedonians, Philip, to the magistrates of the Peloponnesians of the confederacy, and to all the confederates, greeting³ : Whereas the Locrians, called Ozolian, inhabiting Amphissa, are acting offensively against the temple, and, coming with arms, have plundered the sacred land ; it is my purpose, with your support, to assert the cause of the god, and oppose those who violate what is held sacred among men. I require you therefore to meet me in Phocis duly armed and bringing provision for forty days, within the present month, called by us Lous, by the Athenians Boedromion, by the Corinthians Panemus. Those who attend will be entitled to communication in council ; those who fail of conforming to the decrees of the confederacy will be fined. Farewell.”

It does not appear that any requisition was sent to Athens ; where acknowledgment of the election of Philip, not only to be commander-in-chief, but to be an Amphictyon, had been denied. To Thebes it was not omitted ; but so the Athenian party had advanced in power there that obedience to it was refused. Yet, among those fluctuations to which democratical government was so liable, the Macedonian party afterward preponderating, at least for that question, the Theban contingent under the command of Proxenus joined the Amphictyonic army.

Demosth. de
cor. p. 275.

Dinarch. or.
in Demosth.

Meanwhile in Athens, between parties of strength nearly balancing, stimulated, one by ambition, the other by fear of oppression, the contest of oratory was vehement. The war-party however prevailing, a measure followed of the most decided hostility toward all that part

Demosth. de
cor. p. 275.

³ Πελοποννησίαν τῶν ἐν τῇ συμμαχίᾳ τοῖς δημουεργαῖς καὶ τοῖς συνέδροις καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις συμμαχοῖς πᾶσι. What the distinctions were between these descriptions of people means for ascertaining seem to fail.

of the Greek nation which acknowledged the Amphictyonic authority, and was disposed to abide by the peace which had ended the Phocian war. The Athenian republic had now in its pay mercenary troops to the amount, according to *Æschines*, of ten thousand men. All, *Æsch. de cor.*
p. 536. including apparently those which had been serving in the Hellespont, were sent by a decree of the people to assist the Amphissians in their rebellion against the authority of the Amphictyons. What states, or what party among them, had encouraged the obnoxious conduct of the Amphissians could then no longer be doubtful.

Of the war which followed no particulars have been transmitted: remaining information shows only the general result. The Amphictyonic army, directed by the talents of Philip, quickly rendered all the support furnished to the Amphissians vain, and reduced them to unconditional submission. Power was then more in Philip's hands than when the Phocian war was concluded; yet, notwithstanding the imputation of sacrilege, severity against the vanquished was so avoided that even the adverse orator with all his talent has been at a loss for ground on which he could venture to specify any complaint.

SECTION II.

Critical Situation of the Athenian War-party. — Political State of Thebes. — Exertions of Demosthenes to gain the Alliance of Thebes. — Contest of Parties at Athens. — Hostile Decree against Macedonia. — Letters of Philip to the Athenians and Thebans. — Elatea garrisoned by Philip.

THIS new failure, in a cause so generally uncreditable throughout Greece as that of the Amphissians, brought the war-party at Athens, practised in critical situations, into a situation perhaps more critical than any wherein they had

before stood. Weakened by double defeat, military and political, yet to retreat or retract now would, more than in any former circumstances, involve surrender of all their importance, and give the government of the republic to their opponents. Nor could they hope to hold their ground without advancing: enterprise more than ever was necessary. Means were not yet wholly wrested from their hands, nor were opportunities, such as able and keen-sighted politicians might use, failing before them. On the contrary, the confederacy under their influence remained apparently undiminished. To the party which, through the dexterous management of Demosthenes and his agents, prevailed throughout Eubœa, the patronage of his party in Athens was necessary, perhaps not less than the command of the island was for them desirable. Similar party interests and local interests continued to hold Megara, Achaia, and Acarnania in their connection; and Corinth, carrying with her Corcyra and Leucadia, adhered to it. In Thebes principally their cause appears to have felt the shock of the defeat in the Amphissian war. The Theban people, indeed, had never yet been of their confederacy; but the progress toward the acquisition had been large. Without Thebes, then, the support of all the rest would hardly enable them to maintain their ground; but could Thebes yet be gained, hope might again soar high. The very name of Thebes, added to the catalogue of their allies, for the recent renown of that state, would be a great acquisition. But the military force also of Bœotia, for its numbers, as well as for its reputation, was very considerable in the scale of the Grecian republics. There was, moreover, another consideration of no small importance. Could Thebes be gained, the rampart of friendly states around Attica would be completed. The Athenian people would be relieved from apprehension of a powerful enemy on their border, under which they had been long

uneasy. Attica would be no longer to be approached by hostile armies but across the territories of allies, who must bear the first brunt of any war. This circumstance, blazoned by the glowing eloquence of Demosthenes, appears to have weighed much with a large portion of the Athenian people, little capable of estimating what might be, in existing circumstances, the probable efficacy of such a rampart. But perhaps the orator himself depended more on another view, which would have been disappointed by a premature declaration of it. Were Thebes gained, the force of the confederacy would be such that Philip might be blockaded in Phocis, or even attacked there with overbearing numbers, and compelled to seek personal safety, if so he could find it, by flight over the mountains.

The alliance of Thebes, thus a great object for the war-party in Athens to gain, was of course also a great object for Macedonia to preserve. In Thebes meanwhile, with a weak government, the opposition of parties was violent. The party generally ruling was that which, in pursuit of empire, had put forward the Phocian war. In distress produced by that war it had sought the Macedonian alliance. Relieved through the advantages of that alliance from immediate danger, it resumed its purposes of ambition: but upon these that alliance was a check. The same party then, which had been most forward to form that alliance, became most earnest to be relieved from the entanglement. But another party, less desiring empire than just government and domestic security, and fearing oppression to themselves from success in the ambitious purposes of their fellow-citizens, cherished the newly-formed connection with Macedonia, as the best stay of the peace, and even of the constitution, of the commonwealth.

Between these two parties the Theban many floated. But circumstances tended to turn the flood rather in favour of

the leaders adverse to the Macedonian connection. The many were very extensively disposed to participate in the ambition of that party, but especially in the ambition to command, as a sovereign people, the people of all the other towns of Bœotia. Indignation was thus ready among them when the king of Macedonia, with a policy liberal at least, though among the ancients he had extensive credit for a nobler motive, humanity, desired mercy for those whom the Thebans called their revolted subjects, the Orchomenians and others, who had engaged in confederacy with the Phocians. Even after he had consented to the expulsion of those unfortunate people from Bœotia, the charity he extended to them within his own dominions, where he provided many with settlements, was in the eyes of the Thebans suspicious and offensive. On the other hand that party in the Bœotian towns, consisting mostly of the wealthier, who desired emancipation from the sovereignty of the Theban people, or relief against its occasional pressure, looked to the king of Macedonia, in common with most other Greeks in uneasy circumstances, as a general protector; and this was a second, and a stronger cause of jealousy for the Theban many. But among the numerous states of Greece, where, for their smallness, alliances must be numerous, a kindness could hardly be done to one ally, such was the jealousy among them, without offence to some other. Had Philip's purpose been, like Jason's formerly, to hold Greece in subjection by force, Nicæa, placed in his hands by the Phocian general Phalæcus, would have been, for its commanding situation against the strait of Thermopylæ, a possession to be carefully held. Had he kept it by a Macedonian garrison, he would perhaps less have offended the

Æsch. de cor. Thebans; but he gave it to their old allies the Thessalians, and thus he excited much their envy and indignation.

These were all circumstances of advantage for Demosthenes in his purpose of detaching Thebes from the Macedonian alliance, and bringing it to close connection with Athens. Still, however, such was the inveterately hostile disposition of the Theban and Athenian people toward each other, and such the strength of the party in Thebes, not only in the highest degree adverse to such a connection, but earnest to maintain the existing connection with Thessaly and Macedonia, that the project abounded with difficulty. The necessities of the war-party however being urgent, and the object great, they were willing to hazard much for it, and bid high. The liberality of a system resembling the Olynthian, which had succeeded as a lure with the Eubœans and Byzantines, would not suit the Thebans, who affected, not equality, but sovereignty. To engage for support to the sovereignty of Thebes over the other Bœotian towns, of whose freedom it had been formerly the boast of Athens to be the patroness, would be indispensable toward any hope of success. But, beyond this, Demosthenes flattered the ambition of the Thebans, leaders and people, with the intimation that Athens would promote their decayed hopes of extensive empire, and consent to hold a second place, at least in military command, under Theban leaders.

That the promising success of secret negotiation in Thebes encouraged the war-party to persevere in vehement opposition to any accommodation with Macedonia, the contest of rival orators afterward gave to public knowledge. Meanwhile the party of Phocion, perhaps suspecting the intrigue, but little informed of it, and at any rate not desiring the Theban connection for the purposes proposed by their opponents, contended strenuously for abiding by existing treaties, and maintaining peace. A decree, first debated in the council and at the board of generals, and by them offered to the assembled people,

Æsch. de cor.
Demosth. de
cor. p. 285.

appears to mark by its inconsistent tenor the struggle with which it was carried. It runs thus : “ Whereas Philip has taken cities in our neighbourhood, some of which he has laid waste, and now, setting at naught the treaty, and proposing to violate faith publicly plighted, he is preparing to invade Attica ; it is therefore resolved by the council and the people, that a herald be sent with an embassy to confer with him, and especially exhort him to preserve the harmony established between us, and abide by the treaty ; or at least to allow time for the state to deliberate, and, for that purpose, agree to a truce till the month Thargelion.”

The preservation of this curious document we owe to Demosthenes ; but Philip’s answer to so strange a mixture of invective and solicitation the orator has evidently thought it not for his purpose to state to his audience. What however may have been the answer, at least in part, may be gathered. He had taken no cities of their neighbourhood, and laid waste none. The Phocians had preferred surrendering their cities to him rather than to Grecian republics, under whose power they would otherwise have fallen. Some of them indeed had been laid waste, not by him, but by the oldest and most venerable judicature known to the Greek nation. He was not preparing to invade Attica, nor had any such purpose ; but he was already prepared, and well resolved, to defend himself and his allies against a party in Athens, adverse to the peace and freedom of Greece.

But whether the decree passed with or against the consent of the war-party, or rather partly with and partly against their wishes, their negotiation with Thebes, as the concurring testimonies of the rival orators show, did not cease, but was rather prosecuted with increased sedulity. This could not be entirely concealed from Philip, and communication

was yet open for him with Thebes, formally still his ally. He therefore endeavoured to obviate the mischief by counter-negotiation. Nor was his success, it appears, inconsiderable; for the Thebans by a solemn act renewed their former peace and friendship with him.

*Ep. Phil. ad
Theb. ap.
Demosth. de
de cor. p. 283.*

Such proof of the prevalence of the party in Thebes adverse to connection with Athens alarmed Demosthenes and his friends; and, five weeks after the former decree for the embassy to Philip, another was brought forward for a second embassy, in these terms: “Whereas Philip endeavours to excite the Thebans against us, and is preparing to come with his whole army to the places nearest Attica, in breach of the treaty subsisting between us, it is resolved by the council and people that a herald and an embassy be sent to him to propose and solicit a truce, that the people may duly deliberate on the existing circumstances, not having yet taken on their part any hostile measure.”

End of June.

To this decree, and the representations of the embassy, Philip returned a written answer, which remains reported by Demosthenes, thus: “Philip king of the Macedonians to the Athenian council and people greeting: What your disposition toward us has been from the beginning I am not ignorant, nor with what earnestness you have endeavoured to gain the Thessalians, the Thebans, and the rest of the Bœotians to your party. But now you find them too wise to submit their interests to your direction, you change your course, and send ministers with a herald to me to admonish me of the treaty and demand a truce, having in truth been injured by us in nothing. Nevertheless I have heard your ambassadors, and I consent to all your desires, nor shall I take any step against you, if, dismissing those who advise

you ill, you consign them to their deserved ignominy. So may you prosper.”⁴

At the same time he judged it expedient to address the Thebans, in a letter reported also by Demosthenes, thus: “The king of the Macedonians, Philip, to the Theban council and people greeting: I received your letter by which you renew your friendship and peace with me. I understand however that the Athenians are urging everything that could induce you to concur in their purposes; and indeed I did apprehend that you had some disposition to yield to their hopes and follow their lead; but now I am assured that you prefer the preservation of peace with me to such submission of yourselves to the guidance of strangers, and I rejoice in it. I commend your conduct on many accounts; but especially as it places you in security, and as it evinces good-will toward me. I trust the advantage to you will be not small, if you persevere in it. May you prosper.”

Demosthenes, in the whole tenor of his orations of this period, shows, and all that has been transmitted by Isocrates, Æschines, and the historian confirms it, that he had no view to peace: his purpose, and that of his principal associates in politics, was only to gain time for establishing the superiority of their party in Thebes. Were that accomplished, Philip’s situation in Phocis might be highly critical. The force of Bœotia might blockade him among the mountains there. The Athenian navy commanded the sea; and his return into Macedonia might be precluded. In Phocis

⁴ “*Ἄν περ τοὺς οὐκ ἐρεθῶς συμβουλευόντας ὑμῖν παραπέμψαντες, τῆς προσηκούσης ἀτιμίας ἀξιώσητε.*” Ἐβρώσθη. This passage, and another similar to it in a former communication, seem the foundation on which has been built the story of Philip’s demanding ten orators; the ingenious authors of which would surely have us believe Demosthenes either so uninformed or so modest that he either did not know, or among his numerous published orations would not tell, such a fact: which certainly would have been often to his purpose, could he have obtained credit for it.

the critical situation of a principal town, Elatea, has been already noticed: it commanded the pass, almost the only way practicable for an army between Delphi and Bœotia, and also between Delphi and that part of Phocis itself toward Thermopylæ. These interesting circumstances of the place, not likely to escape so able a soldier and politician as Philip, had certainly not escaped the war-party in Athens, nor even public notice. Demosthenes, so long ago as when he delivered the oration called the Demosth. Phil. 2. p. 69. Second Philippic, told the Athenian people that, the disposition of the Thebans toward the Macedonian alliance being already become doubtful, public rumour went that Philip had in view to fortify Elatea. The orator added that he did not think the pressure then such that the measure would be immediately taken. But things were now altered. Phocis and the whole Amphictyonic confederacy were in danger from the growing connection of Thebes with Athens. Philip therefore occupied Elatea with a garrison from the Amphictyonic army, and began restoring the fortifications which had been demolished at the conclusion of the Phocian war. That this was at all beyond his constitutional power, or even his duty, as general of the Amphictyonic army, bound by many obligations to protect Phocis and give security to the Amphictyonic confederacy, seems no way to appear; yet whether his measures were more than just timely enough to prevent the Athenian party in Thebes from seizing, beyond all limit of any legal claim of theirs, the same important place, following events make utterly doubtful.

SECTION III.

Singular Decree of the Athenian People. — Embassy to Thebes. — Alliance of Thebes with Athens. — Power of Demosthenes. — Operations against the King of Macedonia and the Amphictyonic Army.

LITTLE as the occupying of Elatea with a garrison could be a surprise upon the war-party at Athens, who had so long not only foreseen but publicly spoken of it, and evidently as it appears to have been a measure of just precaution, injurious to none, their ingenuity nevertheless sufficed for use of it in argument among the Athenian people as if it was an actual beginning of hostilities, and to lead to public measures accordingly. The curious detail remains from Demosthenes himself. “It was evening,” he said, “when intelligence came to the prytanes, then at supper, that Elatea was occupied. Instantly rising from table, some of them went to the agora, dismissed the ware sellers, and burned their stalls: others sent to the generals and called the trumpeter: the whole city was filled with tumult.” Any purpose of these hasty and violent measures, but to excite tumult, is not in any degree indicated by the orator; and as Elatea, a Phocian town within the proper district of the Amphictyonic general’s command, was separated from the Attic border by the width of all Bœotia, by the whole of the orator’s brazen wall yet untouched, no other seems within the bounds of reasonable conjecture.

The following steps were consonant to this outset. Next morning the prytanes convened the council at daybreak. Meanwhile the people, alarmed by the proceedings of the past evening, and uncertain of the cause, hastened so to their usual place of assembly that the council had not had time to come to any resolution when among

Demosth.
de cor. p. 284.

Demosth. de
cor. p. 285.

the multitude much impatience was expressed for communication from it. Whatever then might be the impossibility of making regular and proper communication, the sovereign, it appears, was not to be irritated. The council, unprepared with propositions, attended the assembly. The herald proclaimed, in the usual form, that any who would advise the people might speak. Nobody offered himself, though all the generals and all the orators (so Demosthenes affirms) were present. Phocion and his friends of course would wait to learn, from those who could tell, whence the disturbance arose. Chares and his friends left the field open for Demosthenes, who at length gratified the universal impatience by mounting the speaker's stand.

The theatrical effect, as it remains described by the orator himself, must have been great. His speech, of which only a short abstract has been transmitted, appears to have been full of art, directed chiefly to reconcile the multitude to the hazardous proposal of a close political union with the Thebans, long feared and hated as their hereditary and most determined and injurious enemies. Invective against the king of Macedonia was a principal instrument. "Slavery," he told the people, "was the best lot they could hope for, if Philip succeeded in his ambitious purposes. But if they would form alliance with Thebes, there would no longer be anything to fear from Macedonia; and the Thebans, notwithstanding past differences, had now every disposition to meet them as in a common cause. To obtain so great an advantage however it was absolutely necessary that their ministers should be unfettered by limitations and instructions: they must have free scope for making such conditions with the Thebans as, under the actual urgency of circumstances, they might see most beneficial for the commonwealth."

A pause followed the conclusion of the speech. Councillors, generals, archons, all whose official situations most

entitled and required them to offer propositions for public measures, were unprepared. Information and time had been wanting, unless for those in the secret with Demosthenes, who came himself every way ready. He presently offered a decree, very remarkable both for tenor and style, reported by himself in a speech afterward made, and which, having been published, has been transmitted. It runs thus: “Whereas it appears that Philip king of Macedonia has heretofore transgressed the treaty of peace concluded with the Athenian people, disregarding the oaths and whatever else among all Grecian people is esteemed just, and has possessed himself of towns of no right belonging to him, and has even by force of arms taken some belonging to the Athenian people without any provocation of prior injury from them; and whereas he has recently proceeded to greater extremes in violence and cruelty, placing garrisons in some Grecian cities, overthrowing the constitutions of some, even destroying some to the foundation, and reducing their inhabitants to the condition of slaves, in some establishing barbarians in the room of Greeks, introducing them into the temples and among the tombs, thus doing nothing contrary to the character of his country and his own manners, but using extravagantly his present fortune, and forgetful that, from a small and low beginning, he has risen to an unhoped-for greatness: And whereas, while the Athenian people saw him possessing himself of towns belonging to them in the barbarian country, they judged it less necessary to proceed to extremities against him; but now they see states in Greece itself, some grossly injured, some annihilated, they think it unjustifiable, and unworthy of the glory of their forefathers to look on while Greece is enslaved:

“Therefore it is decreed by the Athenian council and people, praying and sacrificing to the gods and heroes protectors of the city and country, and bearing in mind the

Demosth. de
cor. p. 288.

virtue of their forefathers, who were more earnest for the defence of the freedom of Greece than for the separate welfare of their own state, That two hundred ships shall put to sea, and that the admiral's station shall extend to Thermopylæ; that the commander-in-chief and the commander of the cavalry shall lead the forces, foot and horse, to Eleusis; that ambassadors be sent to the other Greeks, and first of all to the Thebans, because Philip's present position is on the verge of their country, to exhort them not to be dismayed by Philip, but to defend their own and the common liberty of the Greeks; to assure them that the Athenian people, dismissing all consideration of past differences, will assist them with their strength, their wealth, and their weapons; esteeming it honourable for Greeks to contend for military and political supremacy among one another, but that to be commanded by a man of alien blood, and allow the supremacy to pass wholly away from themselves, would be unworthy of the glory of the Greeks and the virtue of their forefathers; that they do not esteem the Thebans alien either in blood or race; that they bear in mind the good deeds of their forefathers to the forefathers of the Thebans, in restoring the descendants of Hercules to their paternal dominion, of which the Peloponnesians had deprived them, and, conquering in the field those who opposed them, gave refuge to Œdipus and those expelled with him; and, in many other instances, enough known to fame, they have shown friendship towards the Thebans: Therefore the Athenian people will not now be wanting toward the Thebans and other Greeks, but will form connection with them, by alliance of the states, by allowance for intermarriage among individuals, and by the full admission of reciprocity of oaths for all purposes."⁵

⁵ In translating always I have adhered to my original purpose, of being as close to the letter as might be, and especially in this curious piece, in his ver-

The decree concludes with naming five ambassadors, Demosthenes, Hyperides, Mnesithides, Democrates, and Callæschrus.⁶

The proposal of such a Philippic, to be adopted as a decree of the sovereign assembly, seems to have been very contrary to the practice of former times, when simplicity and precision characterised their language, and argumentative and extraneous matter were utterly rejected. But the purpose being to overthrow the former system of Athenian policy, and in a great degree new-model the government, by associating the Theban people with the Athenian, carrying as it may to the modern eye the appearance of liberality, was so adverse to established and hereditary prejudices among the Athenian people that it would be likely to need the machinery with which it was introduced to excite popular passion suited to the occasion, and especially the impatience which had prevented the usual previous discussion in the council. The reference to fabulous antiquity, times before a republic was heard of, and the introduction of Hercules and Œdipus, might appear to the modern reader even ridiculous; yet the frequent occurrence of such references among the orators, and especially Isocrates, shows that they were found suiting the public taste of the age. The management of Demo-

sion of which Leland has outranted the original far more than Auger, whose translation is perhaps generally as close as his language or critics would readily allow. He has however here, as elsewhere, unwarrantably rendered ἀλλόφυλος *barbare*, which Leland has translated, as nearly perhaps as any modern language can, *foreigner*. Æolian Greeks and Ionian were to each other, in ordinary Grecian speech, ἀλλόφυλοι, and hence evidently the anxiety of Demosthenes to assure the Thebans that they were not considered by the Athenians as such.

⁶ The French, who, in their late revolutions, have been quick and ingenious imitators, but original scarcely in anything, have set an example which it is to be hoped will not be followed, of depraving the simplicity and decency and dignity, formerly characterising European state-writing, by adopting, and pushing to greater extravagance, the manner of this libellous decree of Demosthenes.

stheneſ accordingly was ſucceſſful : Phocion and *Æſchines* oppoſed in vain : the offered decree was carried, and the embaſſy haſtened to Thebes.

Plut. vit. Phocion. Æſch. de cor. p. 536.

Meanwhile Philip, having provided ſome ſecurity for himſelf and his allies by fortifying Elatea, neither took any hoſtile meaſures, nor made any preparation for offensive war. Informed of what had paſſed at Athens, he reſolved to ſend alſo his embaſſy to Thebes, to obviate the effect of the Athenian negotiation; and he employed again the miniſtry of the eloquent Byzantine, Python.⁷ The Theban people then were the ſovereign to be courted; and, in the agora of Thebes, Python on one ſide, Demotheſenes on the other (Python for his talents, as Demotheſenes himſelf has indicated, a rival worthy of Demotheſenes), exerted their utmoſt powers. The ready topics for Python were the advantages of peace, generally, and the eſpecial inducements to preſerve peace and alliance with a prince of the king of Macedonia's character, ſuch as it ſtood proved by his conduct from the beginning of his reign; the reſpect he had ſhown for the religion and the general conſtitution of Greece; his deference for the particular conſtitution of every ſtate among the many in which he had an intereſt; the fidelity and honour with which he had always obſerved his engagements; and the proof of all this in the zealous attachment of ſo many republics, his actual allies. On the other hand Demotheſenes, flattering the Theban war-party, and reproaching the peaceful, inveighed againſt the king of Macedonia, and all who adhered to him, with his uſual fire and his uſual art. His ſpeech appears to have been celebrated in its day, even among the ſpeeches of Demotheſenes;

⁷ The narrative of Diodorus (b. 16. c. 85.) implies that, before the meeting of the embaſſies at Thebes the Athenian army had already advanced as far as Chæronea, within a few miles of Elatea; but the orators ſhow completely that it was otherwiſe.

perhaps for its effect; for it seems not to have been extant in the time of Dionysius of Halicarnassus; and very likely it had passages adapted to the time and place, but not adapted to answer the orator's purpose in a more extensive publication, so that it probably never was edited.

But eloquence was not a weapon to which alone Demosthenes trusted; he came provided with authority from the Athenian people to offer, at his discretion, whatever Athens could give; and he was bold in his prodigal use of their confidence. If promises and treaties could bind states, Athens was bound to continue its old patronage and protection to the Bœotians generally, but especially to the Plataeans and Thespians, against the sovereignty over them claimed by the Theban people. If democracy, of which Athens boasted to be the patroness, and Demosthenes the most zealous advocate, meant equal rule for all under its influence, and not a most real tyranny in the hands of one set of people over another set of people, and if the recent liberality to the Eubœans and Hellespontines was not a mere time-serving policy, Athens, even unbound by treaties and special promises, should have contended for the equal freedom of all the Bœotians against the claimed sovereignty of the Thebans, and Demosthenes should have exerted his eloquence and his interest in support of it. But Demosthenes, as if a preliminary step in his continually pretended assertion of the freedom of Greece, now engaged that the Athenian people not only should allow the subjection of

*Æsch. de
cor. p. 533.*

the Plataeans and Thespians, together with all other Bœotians, to the Thebans, but that they should exert their utmost strength to assist the Thebans in establishing that subjection. This carried with it to Athens loss of honour only. But Demosthenes ventured

p. 534, 535.

upon concessions likely to be more felt. Allowing to Thebes an equal vote in directing, not the

military alone, but the naval measures of the confederacy, he engaged that Athens should furnish the whole expense of the fleet, and two thirds of that of the army, and yet that a Theban general should command in chief. Even for the political business he seemed to give a decisive advantage to Thebes; for he stipulated that all the measures of the confederacy should be concerted with the Bœotarchs in the Cadmea.⁸ In opposition to such liberality, recommended by the glowing eloquence of Demosthenes, the talents of Python were vain. The majority of votes of the Theban people was in favour of the proposed new alliance with Athens.

The importance, which in this negotiation Demosthenes yielded for the state he represented, he gained, and even more, for himself. His success, gratifying at least his own party, promoted and confirmed his power in Athens. But, what was perhaps more, through the intimacy of the connection formed with the leading Thebans, and their constant need of countenance from their new ally to support them against opposition at home, he became really prime minister of Thebes; and, through the greater irregularity of the democratical constitution there, he found scope for a bold and ingenious policy to exercise even a more despotic authority. Thenceforward accordingly measures in Thebes corresponded with, and were adapted to promote, his purposes in Athens; and through the means acquired for playing one state against the other, it was a wonderful authority he acquired in both.

The object of the moment was to lead both republics to open war with Macedonia, before the forces which Philip had about him for the little war with Amphissa should be increased, or while he retained only those deemed requisite

⁸ These matters, asserted by Æschines, being uncontradicted by Demosthenes in his reply, must be considered as admitted by him.

for securing the order established by his success against the Locrians. Thebes then was made to be the first mover in the business. Solicitation was addressed to the Athenian people, in the name of the Theban people, for an Athenian force to be sent into Bœotia, to support the Thebans in the war against the king of Macedonia; no war at that time having been acknowledged by either party. The Athenian citizens nevertheless were called to arms; the desired support was voted, and a body of horse and foot marched. Meanwhile zeal in the cause was so excited among the Thebans that, on the approach of the Athenian forces, a large body, horse and foot, marched out of the town and encamped, to leave commodious quarters in their houses for their new allies.

Demosth. de
cor. p. 209.

It was already late in autumn.* No troops were yet collected from Eubœa, Corinth, or other more distant members of the Athenian confederacy; but the force of Bœotia alone, added to that of Athens, would probably be much beyond what Philip had about him in Phocis. Moreover, on account of the strength and earnestness of the peace parties, both in Thebes and Athens, and the weight of their leading characters, at least in the latter city, and the necessary prevalence of their arguments with the sober part of both communities, it was much an object to have measures taken that should make war unavoidable. The united forces therefore of Athens and Thebes marched to the frontier of Bœotia against Phocis, and took their station at Chæronea, a few miles only from Elatea.

Of what followed we have information only from the orator's cursory notice of it. His very silence however enough indicates that offensive measures were not begun by the king of Macedonia. Nevertheless two battles were fought; the latter not till it was already winter.*

Demosth. de
cor. p. 300.

[* See extract from *Fasti Hellen.* at the end of sect. 7. of this chapter.]

Neither had any important consequences, or however none favourable to Athens; yet Demosthenes, unable to boast of a trophy, did not fail of the utmost use that united eloquence and policy could make of the incidents. The Bœotian troops held still considerable reputation in Greece, and were considered as formidable for their discipline as well as their valour: but Athenian citizens, accustomed for generations now to avoid actual service, and usually finding from party leaders, or commanding for themselves, indulgence for neglect of discipline and practice of arms, had lost much of their ancient estimation. To infuse therefore among them a confidence in themselves, and restore, if possible, somewhat of former opinion of them among others, he assured the assembled people, anxious for information, that their troops had gained high credit among their allies both for discipline and valour. The people were gratified with the flattery; and so the influence of the party prevailed, the meritorious deeds, which apparently would not bear a detailed report, were celebrated by public processions and thanksgiving sacrifices. Of this prostitution of honours the party of Phocion showed their opinion by avoiding to attend the ceremonies. The war-party revenged themselves by imputing such conduct to disaffection toward the commonwealth, and especially, where possibly the imputation might not be wholly ungrounded, toward the democracy.

SECTION IV.

Repetition of Proposal from the King of Macedonia for Peace. — Authority of Demosthenes at Athens and at Thebes. — Final Determination for War. — Preparations during Winter. — Battle of Charonea.

It does not appear that Demosthenes himself could state any preparation made even now by Philip for that offensive war against Athens on which he had been so long declaim-

ing as that prince's purpose. On the contrary, considering the open violence of the war-party, there may seem to have been forbearance even beyond prudence; unless Philip, really desirous of maintaining the peace of Greece, hoped to succeed through recovered prevalence of the party of Phocion and Isocrates at Athens. Had Isocrates been his adviser and principal minister, Philip's conduct could scarcely more have corresponded with that venerable patriot's published admonition. As general of the Amphictyonic confederacy it was his especial duty, in the spirit of the Amphictyonic institution, to be the peace-maker of Greece. Accordingly, notwithstanding all provocations received, he did not let the season of military rest pass without renewing assurances to the Athenian and Theban people of his desire still to avoid extremities. Nor did his proposals fail of exciting much interest among both. The contest of oratory ensuing at

Plut. vit.
Phoc. p. 748.

Athens was vehement. The principal opponent of Demosthenes, according to Plutarch, was Phocion. But every popular passion, desire of gain, desire of power, love of adventure, all was in favour of the war-party cause, except fear. To obviate fear therefore, and to excite desire, Demosthenes exerted all his powers. "Appre-

Demosth. de
cor. p. 301.

hension," he told the people, "on their part was groundless; for all Philip's peaceful professions only proved his fears. On the contrary, with them hope might reasonably soar high; for, while provision had been made for the security of Attica, such that any apprehension was even absurd, a combination of force had been prepared, sufficient to give promise of success the most beneficial and glorious.

The superiority obtained by Demosthenes in this contest placed him in a situation very flattering for an ambitious mind. With the eyes of all Greece upon him, he was at the head of one of the causes which divided that unhappy country; the

cause (whether properly of democracy, the sanction given to the bondage of the Bœotians under the Theban people should perhaps make doubtful, but) of democratical empire. In Athens, through the circumstances in which he had involved his party, his abilities were so necessary to the other chiefs that they hardly dared refuse him their support for anything. Æschines not unaptly called it “ a dynasty that he had formed for himself.” “ Such was his power,” said that orator, speaking some years after to the Athenian people, “ that here upon the bema he ventured to tell even you that he would go whither he pleased on embassy, though you should not appoint him ; and he threatened the generals that, if any of them opposed his measures, he would move a decree for giving rank and authority to the orators on the bema above the board of generals.” Demosthenes, in his reply, rather gloried in these imputations than denied them.

Æsch. de cor.
p. 536.

Demosth. de
cor. p. 301.

The Athenian many then, bold behind the brazen rampart of allies which Demosthenes boasted of having raised around Attica, refused all treaty with the king of Macedonia. But the Thebans, exposed to the first attack, and sore still from the evils of the Sacred war, so shrunk from a renewal of similar sufferings that a decree passed their assembly for taking the proposals into consideration. Demosthenes was alarmed ; if the Thebans yielded, all was lost, and he was reduced to the condition of a simple orator of Athens ; probably in opposition to those who would hold the government. He hastened therefore to Thebes. The recent compact authorising him to use his eloquence there nearly as at Athens, the Theban people were summoned, and he addressed them. Flattering the war-party, he did not scruple violently to threaten the pacific, swearing “ by Minerva, that if any should dare to say peace ought to be made with Philip, he would himself

Æsch. de cor.

Æsch. de cor.
p. 538.

seize him by the hair and drag him for a traitor to prison." Little as we know of the Theban constitution, the small addition to former information which may be gathered from the implication of its government in this crisis with the Athenian will certainly not tell in its favour. The violent arrogance of Demosthenés, forbidding freedom of speech to the Thebans in their own assembly, was successful: the Theban people voted as he required.

This was a great triumph, but not a decisive victory. To complete the immediate purpose of the party, in addition to the refusal of negotiation for peace, measures must be taken for actual war. It was already the season for military action, and the energy of Demosthenes had provided that a body of Athenian troops was at Thebes, or in the neighbourhood. Orders for its farther movements, while within Bœotia, should regularly come from the Bœotarchs, heads of the executive government of Bœotia, especially chiefs of the military department, and, by the compact with Athens managed under the direction of Demosthenes himself, to be consulted on all measures of the confederacy. Nevertheless Demosthenes, whether against their consent, or without communication with them, procured that the Athenians should march for the Phocian border. The Bœotarchs, surprised and offended, countermanded them. Consulting then at their own board, where neither popular eloquence dazzled, nor popular passion interrupted them, they concurred, or at least a majority of them concurred, in dissatisfaction with the present state of things. Whether indeed comparing the immediate evils and the final hazard of the war they were provoking with the advantages of the proposals for peace, to which the people had been persuaded to refuse consideration; whether the breach with their ancient allies of Thessaly, with any advantages reasonably to be expected from their new alliance with their old enemies of

Athens; whether the general moderation of the king of Macedonia, and the respect he had shown for the constitution and for the people of every state within his sphere of communication, with the arrogance of the Athenian orator, who assumed to himself to control their assemblies and supersede their own authority as first magistrates; there would appear much reason at least to pause, and look about them. Accordingly they came to a resolution, that the people should be again assembled, and the king of Macedonia's proposals again submitted to their consideration.

A very extraordinary contest ensued between the proper supreme magistrates of Thebes and the foreign orator. It was evidently apprehended that a majority among the Theban many, brought to a juster sense of their interest, and of what was due to the dignity of their government, would support their own first magistrates. Demosthenes was driven to extremity. Venturing so far as to call the Bœotarchs traitors to Greece, he concluded a most violent speech with declaring that, "if the Thebans, deceived by their leaders, so shrunk from the common cause, he would return immediately to Athens, and move for an embassy to Thebes, to demand a passage through Bœotia for the Athenian army, which would go alone against the common enemy." Whether the Bœotarchs were, as Æschines says, frightened with the charge, or in whatever way induced or overborne, they yielded, and the resolution was decidedly and finally taken for war.⁹

The war, thus now impending, was not properly of Macedonia against Greece, but of Greece divided within itself; nearly as in the Peloponnesian and Theban wars formerly, and recently the Phocian. The proper contingent of troops

⁹ The conduct of Demosthenes, as here related, having been stated by Æschines, in his presence, before the Athenian people, and not denied by him in his reply, stands on evidence far more certain than is often found for such matters in ancient history.

from Macedonia, as a Grecian state of the Amphictyonic league, it may be supposed had joined the Amphictyonic army; though so much is not said by any ancient writer. But it is strongly implied, among the orations of Demosthenes himself, that, beyond this, no Macedonian force had passed

Demosth.
Philipp. 3.
p. 125.

Thermopylæ. It was not Philip's way, the orator says, to bring his phalanx; he came attended with

an escort of horse, and perhaps some light-armed foot, and he found other troops as he wanted them. The greater part of Greece, averse to the dominion of the Athenian and

Diod. l. 16.
c. 84.

Theban people, or of Demosthenes, ruling in their name, had engaged in that alliance with Macedonia,

of which the Thessalians had given the first example; and

Demosth. de
cor. p. 295.

Philip was chosen general-autocrator of the confederacy.¹⁰ It was his business then during the

winter to assemble from the confederated states a force sufficient for the support of their common cause.*

Meanwhile the exertions of Demosthenes, as prime minister of Athens and of Thebes, and principal director of the measures of their confederacy, appear to have been very

Ibid. p. 306.

great and very able. From the Eubœans, Megareans, Corinthians, Achæans, Corcyræans, Leucadians, and Acarnanians, he collected a mercenary force of

fifteen thousand foot and two thousand horse, exclusively of their civic troops, whose number is not stated. From the same people he obtained subsidies, the amount unknown, but probably not great, toward the expenses of the war. In

†¹⁰ 'Ακούετε δὲ Φίλιππον, οὐχὶ τῷ φάλαγγας ὀπλιτῶν ἄγειν, βαδίζονθ' ὅπως βούλεται, ἀλλὰ τῷ ψίλους, ἰππίας, ταξότας, ξένους, τοιοῦτον ἐξηγετῆσθαι στρατιόπεδον. Demosth. Phil. 3. p. 123. 'Ηγεμὼν δὲ καὶ κύριος ἤρθη Φίλιππος ἀπάντων. Demosth. de cor. p. 295. Philip was elected commander-in-chief of the Greeks, but no mention is made of a Macedonian force. It seems to have sufficed him that he had, according to the historian, engaged the friendship of so large a proportion of the Greek nation; Φίλιππος ὁ βασιλεὺς τοὺς πλείστους τῶν Ἑλλήνων εἰς φιλίαν προηγμένος. Diod. l. 16. c. 84.

[* See extract from Fasti Hellen. at the end of section 7. of this chapter.]

addition to these were the Bœotian civic heavy-armed, commonly reckoned about fourteen thousand, and the Athenian. In what numbers the Athenians were prepared for the field, or whether, since the defeat of their mercenaries in the Amphisian war, they had maintained any force of that description, is not said. Gathering however as best may be from the contemporary writers, (for the round statements of those of later ages are little to be trusted,) the force at the disposal of Demosthenes, in the great contest for the empire of Greece, was of hardly less than fifty thousand men. According to Æschines, there was moreover a ^{ch. de cor.} ^{Æs. 33.} ^{p. 6.} large force of Arcadians ready under willing leaders, if only nine talents, less than eighteen hundred pounds, which they either demanded as a bounty, or wanted to enable them to take the field, might have been advanced to them out of the Persian subsidy. This Demosthenes refused, while he appropriated to himself not less than seventy talents. Possibly however Demosthenes doubted the influence of the Arcadian leaders to secure the services of the many, whom he might believe disposed rather to the Amphictyonic cause; and if the troops under Philip were only, as the historian says, thirty thousand foot and two thousand horse, he might think the forces of surer fidelity so ample for the occasion that an addition of troops of less certain disposition, at any expense, might not be desirable. ¹¹

Diod. l. 16.
c. 84.

¹¹ Æschines attributes the loss of another advantage also to the parsimony or corruption of Demosthenes: Οὐ δι' Ἰνδιαν μὲν χρημάτων, ἕνεκα πέντε ταλάντων, οἱ ξίνοι τοῖς Θεβαίοις τὴν ἄκραν οὐ παρέδωσαν. De cor. p. 633. The learned annotator Wolf says to this, τὴν Καδμείαν, ὡς οἶμας ὑπὸ Μακεδόνων κατεχομένην. (Note on Æsch. de cor. p. 633.) The learned annotator seems to have forgotten what he must have read in a preceding passage of this very oration, that the Cadmea, so far from being held by the Macedonians, was the very place in which Demosthenes himself principally held council with the Thebans, the place to which, in the phrase of his adversary, he had transferred the powers of the democracy of Athens: καὶ τὴν δημοκρατίαν ἀεθρὴν ἔλαθην ὑφελόμενος, καὶ μετήνεγκεν εἰς Θήβας εἰς τὴν Καδμείαν, κοινονίαν τῶν πράξεων

Demosthenes appears to have failed most in the choice of generals, to command the great army he had assembled. But very probably, with all the extravagance of power he sometimes assumed, he could not wholly put aside Chares, the patron who had principally opened the way for him to his actual eminence, the beneficial patron also of so many others, and, with all his vices and failings, perhaps yet the most popular man in Athens. It was however provided that the command in chief should not rest wholly with one whose unfitness had already produced so many misfortunes. In the preceding autumnal campaign Stratocles had commanded the Athenian troops.* Lysicles now was joined in

Diod. l. 16.
c. 85.

the command with Chares. But among the Theban officers, who had served through the long war with Phocis, it is likely there might be more experience of the warfare of heavy-armed in the field than among the Athenian; and it seems not improbable that a juster consideration of the great interests of the cause of his party than Æschines would suggest, a view of the general deficiency of the principal Athenian officers, and of the particular impossibility of denying high command to Chares, assisted at least to induce Demosthenes to desire that, if a Theban did not actually hold the situation of commander-in-chief, yet in the council of war the Theban scale should preponderate. The nine talents also, saved by the denial of them to the Arcadians, might not be unwanted for the purposes of the campaign.

Such a force as Demosthenes had now assembled the

ταῖς Βοιωτάρχοις συνθέμενος. Æsch. de cor. p. 535. To such mistakes the most learned may be liable, if they will undertake historical explanation without the previous trouble of historical investigation. I can hardly venture to say what ἀρχαὶ may not have been intended by the orator, except the Cadmea: but circumstances, as far as they have been transmitted, would rather lead conjecture to some fortified height of the Phocian border, the possession of which might have led to better success in the autumnal campaign under Stratocles.

[* See extract from Fasti Hellen. at the end of sect. 7. of this chapter.]

scanty funds of the Grecian republics could not long maintain : it must proceed to quick decision. Meanwhile Philip, persevering in his purpose of avoiding aggression, remained within Phocis till the Athenians and Thebans were already marching toward him. Then he advanced into the Bœotian plain, and took a station near the hostile garrison of Chæronea.¹²

Of the great and decisive battle that ensued 7 July, Ruald. vit. Plutarchi, c. 1. no account remains that can give any satisfaction to the military reader. If any was extant even in the time of Diodorus, it unfortunately escaped that writer. Equally the king of Macedonia and his son Alexander, then a youth of eighteen, whom no contemporary writer has mentioned to have been present¹³, are described by Diodorus and Plutarch like heroes of the Trojan times, whose personal prowess, rather than the mind of the consummate general, directing the great machine under his command, produced the complete victory which followed. We have formerly observed Thucydides and Xenophon cautious of answering for personal actions in the tumult of battle, and rarely undertaking to report words spoken among individuals. Even how one,

¹² The narrative of Diodorus seems to imply that before the contention of oratory between Python and Demosthenes at Thebes the army of the Athenian confederacy had taken that station, near Chæronea, which it occupied to the time of the decisive battle. * But Diodorus, abridging greatly, and perhaps often writing from memory, not unfrequently manages narration so that it is difficult to guess whether he intends the reader should take what precedes or what follows as prior in time ; and he still oftener omits, as here, to notice intervening transactions, necessary to connect the parts of his narrative. It is clearly indicated by both Æschines and Demosthenes that in the autumnal campaign the Athenian and Theban forces were at Chæronea, and as clearly that they were withdrawn before the meeting of Python and Demosthenes at Thebes. The Latin translator of Diodorus seems to have been aware of this, venturing to correct his author by giving, for *ἰξέσσεμυδον*, the preterpluperfect *miserat*.

¹³ Arrian represents Alexander speaking of himself as having been present. Exp. Alex. b. 7. c. 9.

[* See extract from *Fasti Hellen.* at the end of sect. 7. of this chapter.]

about whom universal curiosity would be so interested as Epaminondas, received his mortal wound, or what was his behaviour and conversation in the awful interval till his death, Xenophon, though he must have conversed with many present in the field of Mantinea, has not presumed to say. But public orders, marches previous to a battle, ground occupied, what part of a line was first engaged, what broken, what pursued, and what protected a retreat, we find them frequently reporting. On the contrary, concerning the battle of Chæronea writers of centuries after have undertaken to give, of the former sort much, of the latter almost nothing. It is only generally said, and seems probable, that the contest was sharp. But of the result we have full assurance so far, that the victory of the Amphictyonic army was most complete. The Athenians acknowledged to have lost more than a thousand slain and two thousand taken.

Demad. or.
frag. Diod.
l. 16. c. 83. Nevertheless the principal brunt of the action is said, and not improbably, to have been maintained by the Thebans. If then these, and the other allies, suffered only in equal proportion with the Athenians, the total loss must have been very great. What was not destroyed or taken was so dispersed that nothing remained to obstruct the conquerors, whichever way they might direct their march.

SECTION V.

Consternation at Athens. — Flight of Demosthenes. — Condemnation of Lysicles. — Generosity of Philip. — Arrangement for Bœotia. — Liberality to Athens.

INFORMATION of the total defeat of the allied forces at Chæronea produced at Athens consternation and tumult, such as might be expected where sovereignty rested with the multitude, and the uninformed and improvident were not to take

but to give orders ; and this in a moment when great hope among them was suddenly disappointed, security, which they had been taught to believe complete through the brazen wall of alliances of which Demosthenes had boasted, was wholly overthrown, and dangers, in kind and amount incalculable, were, as by the shifting of a scene, substituted in their view. Waste of Attica, siege of Athens, all the dreadful evils of ordinary Grecian warfare, would be in their apprehension but preludes of those unheard-of horrors which the speeches of the war-party orators had represented as to be expected from Macedonian barbarism and cruelty. This agitation of the popular mind was, for those who had been leading the public measures, far more dreadful than the approach of the victorious enemy. Demosthenes had borne arms at Chæronea ; whether, in confidence of success, smitten with ambition to claim military merit, or, after all his exhortations to others, ill able to excuse himself from that common duty of all citizens. Escaping in the general flight, he did not scruple, for safer haste, to disgrace himself by abandoning his shield. Under all circumstances he would not venture to show himself in Athens : he went Æsch. de cor. p. 545. to Piræus, went aboard a trireme, and, with the authority which he could assume, or from his friends in office obtain, he put to sea under pretence of going on duty necessary in the urgency of the republic's affairs, to collect, among the islands, tribute or loans to the treasury.

Chares remained, apparently the most obvious object for popular indignation. But the whole party were in danger ; and had the party of Phocion come forward with the common temper and common views of Grecian party, or of party in general, Chares and his associates could hardly have avoided ruin. But Phocion and his friends, with their usual regard for the general good, and perhaps over-scrupulous fear of appearing to press any separate interest, gave

their attention rather to remedy the evil situation of public affairs than to punish the authors. Yet that the popular anguish would be assuaged, and the resulting anger appeased, without some signal sacrifice, was hardly to be hoped. With admirable policy then the party of Chares resolved to profit from the apparently extravagant liberality of their adversaries, by hastening to take the invidious business of crimination into their own hands. Thus they gained at once two great points : they could choose the victim ; and they preserved the advantage, which otherwise for a time at least they must have wholly foregone, of appearing still to hold a lead in public measures, and even in popular measures.

Diod. 1. 16.
c. 88.
Plut. v. orat. Lycurgus, an orator of celebrated talents, was famed, according to Diodorus and Plutarch, for virtue generally, but especially for the integrity with which, during twelve years, he administered the business of the treasury. Possibly it was only some branch of the treasury-business ; or otherwise his fame must have rested upon his party ; for every older testimony shows the general business of the treasury to have been most scandalously mismanaged. Lycurgus however was certainly, as an oration remaining from him assists to prove, a most zealous advocate for the high democratical cause.¹⁴

Of Lysicles, the colleague of Chares in the momentous command at Chæronea, mention is found among ancient writers only in regard to that command, and his fate which

¹⁴ Wesseling, after the usual temper of the lettered of the continent, warm in zeal for the honour of so keen an asserter of democratical principles, would correct Diodorus from Plutarch ; who, in the lives of the orators, gives fifteen years to the ministry of Lycurgus ; and he would reckon a decree of the Athenian people, there quoted, complete proof of Lycurgus's high merit. Such a decree, the reader who has followed Grecian history will be well aware, proves the prevalence of the party with which Lycurgus was connected when the decree passed, and his eminence in that party, but nothing more.

followed. Probably he had earned reputation as an officer, but was little important to the party as a man versed in politics, or of any popular interest. It was resolved that Lysicles should be the victim, to be sacrificed for the safety of the rest of the party, and that Lycurgus should conduct the prosecution. Athenian justice, we have seen, was commonly quick, and not always very formal; of which the death of Lycidas, in what are called the virtuous times of the republic, and the massacre of his family, will, among other things, be remembered in proof. No crime appears to have been alleged against Lysicles, but that he had commanded unsuccessfully. Nevertheless, being told by the prosecutor that "he ought to be ashamed to live," (though why more than Chares, unless as far the less practised sinner, is not at all indicated,) the people condemned him to die, and he was executed. Whatever may be thought of the morality of the party of Chares and Demosthenes, whatever may be thought of their patriotism, their policy must be admired. The death of Lysicles had evidently all the effect proposed from it. The popular rage was quieted, and the way was kept open for the party to come forward still in the general assembly on public business as they might see convenient.

Ch. 9. s. 2.
of this Hist.

Diod. 1. 16.
c. 88.

Meanwhile the king of Macedonia's conduct, after his great victory, was consonant to that high spirit of generosity and humanity which had shone from the beginning of his reign. No pretence was taken, as by the Thebans, when they were at the head of the Amphictyonic confederacy, to mix the cause of religion with that of policy, for extending the purposes of either vengeance or ambition. Even that severity, constantly observed in the practice of the republics, to compel the defeated to the humiliation of a formal acknowledgment of their defeat by a herald soliciting the bodies of the slain, was studiously avoided. Information that the

bodies were at the disposal of their friends was forwarded before heralds could arrive. Demades, an orator of the

Demad. or. fragm. first eminence, was among the Athenian prisoners.

Fragments of orations only remain from him ; so that the style as well as the estimation of his eloquence may best be gathered from what we are told was said in his day, that Demosthenes was the orator made for the actual state of the Athenian republic, Demades was above it.

Demosth. de cor. p. 319, 320. The Athenian people, amid the severest anxiety and apprehension, deputed Æschines, as a person likely to be acceptable to the conqueror, to learn his purposes, and obviate, as far as might be, his just resentment. But, before Æschines could arrive, Demades had not only received his own freedom, but was authorised to assure the Athenian people that the king of Macedonia had all friendly disposition toward them. As soon after then as conveniently might be all the Athenian prisoners were released. Some, perhaps most, were deficient in common clothing ; for which the panoply would be an awkward substitute, and prisoners of war would of course be deprived of this, as appertaining to their arms, and a portion of them. Philip generously directed a supply of clothing for all.

From the field of battle the victorious army proceeded to Thebes. Bœotia was so powerful among the divisions of the Grecian people, and so critically situated for giving either protection or annoyance, readily and extensively, among other states, that to establish there a sure preponderance of the party friendly to the Amphictyonic confederacy and the peace of Greece was most especially necessary for the welfare of the whole alliance. The modern reader, especially the English reader, may have difficulty to imagine a worse constitution than that of Athens in this age, with all its advantages of Solon's laws, has been de-

scribed ; yet it seems probable that the constitution of Thebes was greatly worse. The government of Thebes had been changed, not gradually, as that of Athens, but by a rapid and violent revolution, and without any such intervening advantage as that of the legislation of Solon, from a mixed aristocracy, to nearly a pure democracy. The people of Thebes, under this ill-defined government of their own, claimed a democratical dominion over the people of the other towns of Bœotia, to which their previous aristocratical government had allowed a more equal participation of rights. Moreover many Theban citizens were in exile. Probably many had found it advisable to fly in consequence of the victory of Demosthenes in the contest of eloquence with their orator Python. Yet many less eminent men, with more or less zeal, friendly to their cause, remained, and many always adverse to the alliance with Athens, and many rendered so by the ill success of the measure. These were ready to receive the refugees, who would be not unprepared to profit from the event of the battle of Chæronea. Altogether the Athenian party in Thebes found themselves so weakened, and their opponents so strong, that no opposition to the reception of Philip was attempted. The government of course passed into the hands of the Macedonian party. Bœotia then was emancipated. The subjection of its people to the dominion of the Theban people, confirmed by the treaty of alliance with Athens managed by Demosthenes, was abolished, and the more liberal system of the Bœotian confederacy was restored. All the Theban, as well as all other prisoners, made in the battle of Chæronea, were released without ransom. The common expedient of the Grecian republics to provide tranquillity and safety for the victorious party, driving the disaffected into banishment, sometimes to the amount of nearly half the population, was avoided. That it might not be necessary, the Cadmea was

occupied by a garrison from the Amphictyonic army, probably mercenary or standing forces. That any Thebans were banished, that a single individual suffered in person or property, is not said by any writer of better authority than Justin: Plutarch evidently knew nothing of it; nor is anything found to the purpose among all that remains concerning this critical period from the hostile pen of Demosthenes.¹⁵

Bœotia being thus assured to the Amphictyonic confederacy, liberality might be more safely extended to Athens; and Philip proceeded to show a liberality which, in its day, excited the admiration of Greece, and became, apparently with reason, a lasting] theme of eulogy. Few princes have ever had opportunity to exhibit magnanimity and generosity like that now before Philip, and none known to history ever did equally show it. Punishment against his illiberal revilers, authors of so much trouble and so many dangers to himself, and of so many evils to others his friends, being at his command, he not only demonstrated to the world the falsehood of their continual assertions to his disadvantage, but disappointed even their own expectation, after all their experience, of his forbearance. When they were in power he had recommended to the Athenian people to dismiss them, and commit the direction of public affairs to better men, that so the awful crisis, now so alarming, might be prevented. Fallen as they were, he did not even mention them. As soon as it was known at Athens from the report of Demades that favour, beyond hope, might be expected, an embassy was appointed to wait upon him. Meanwhile he had caused the bodies of their slain to be burned with the accustomed ceremonies of respect for

¹⁵ Many, finding themselves uneasy under the government of those whom they had been accustomed to govern, might emigrate, or stirring commotion might be afterward banished, whose return Arrian mentions.

deceased friends, and the bones to be placed on carriages to be transported to Athens; and he committed the procession to the charge of his principal minister Antipater, whom he also appointed his ambassador to the Athenian people. So far then from proposing any harsh conditions, he freely offered renewal of peace and alliance upon the former terms: but farther, in manifestation of his disposition, as general of the Amphictyons, while he favoured Athens, to maintain the ancient order of things, and, as far as depended upon him, to do impartial justice between state and state, he procured the restoration to the Athenian republic of its town and territory of Oropus, which, in spite of the solicitude, and in contempt of the power of the Athenian people, had been so long held by the Thebans.

SECTION VI.

Persevering Scrupulousness of the Party of Phocion. — Return of Demosthenes. — Funeral Oration for the Slain at Chæroneæ. — Third Letter of Isocrates to Philip.

To suppose Philip without a political object in this liberal conduct were to suppose him unworthy to be king of Macedonia, and still more unworthy to be general-autocrator, supreme head of the Amphictyonic confederacy, or to have the illustrious Athenian patriots, Phocion and Isocrates, for his friends. What his expectations may have been is not at all indicated in remaining accounts. Among them however, no doubt, was to increase his popularity in Greece, and in this he did not fail: but if he hoped in any degree to gain the adverse party in Athens, who owed every thing to his liberality, he was most completely disappointed.

We are without information of any particulars of the conduct of Phocion and his friends; but it appears that their moderation and scrupulousness, emulating the king of Mace-

donia's liberality, were excessive. The party of Chares in consequence began presently to look about them with renewed hope. Their defeat at Chæronea, they saw, was not followed up, as they had expected, to the utter extinction of their former prospects: they were not compelled, as so many of their betters had been, in better times of the commonwealth, to seek their safety in flight: they were not reduced to a condition, ordinary in the contentions of party among the republics, below that of any other citizens; none of their former legal rights were denied them. Meanwhile the power of the republic not only remained unimpaired, except for the loss of a few lives which the course of a year or two bringing boys to manhood would recruit, but, beyond all hope, increased with the restoration of the town and territory of Oropus. Its comparative importance among the Grecian states was even greatly increased, by the depression of the power of Thebes through the emancipation of the Bœotian towns. But, what was to them far more important, the constitution stood untouched, with all its convenient vices by which they had risen to power; and nothing seemed to deny them hope, with diligent use of opportunities, again to rise.

A fortunate occurrence (so, without more explanation, *Æschines* has described it) afforded opportunity for *Demosthenes* to return to Athens without meeting popular indignation. It is evident that the large party with which he had been connected, though there were able and celebrated orators among them, felt now not less, but perhaps even more than before, the want of his various superior talents, to direct their measures and restore their fallen cause. Shortly after his return he was put forward as candidate to be elected one of the commissioners of a board for carrying into execution the terms of the peace.

Æsch. de cor.

In this he failed. But neither himself nor his party were so discouraged. They presently resolved upon a bold measure, singularly calculated to distress their opponents and give some new life to their own faded popularity. They proposed, in the general assembly, that those slain at Chæronea should be honoured with a public funeral, as ancient custom prescribed for citizens falling in battle for their country. The rigid scrupulousness of Phocion and his friends appears to have afforded such opportunity for encouragement to the multitude, formerly at the heels of Chares, and desiring still his profitable patronage, that they were obliged, or thought themselves obliged, to let this motion pass without opposition. An orator was then to be appointed to speak the funeral panegyric. It was not an office for Phocion or his friends, who had wholly disapproved the war. Thus Demosth. de cor. p. 320. Demosthenes was left to be chosen, according to his own boast, in preference to Æschines, Demades, Hegemon, Pythocles, and all others of their party.

An oration has been transmitted among his works as that which he spoke on the occasion. Doubts about it have been entertained by some eminent critics, not however agreeing in their objections; and whatever partial injuries it may have sustained in publication and transcription, the admirable ingenuity with which it has been adapted to the difficulties of the orator's actual situation, and to the necessities and purposes of his party in their depression and difficulties, marks strongly its general authenticity. In the outset he soars into fabulous antiquity; with the same view, apparently, as Isocrates has often resorted to the same artifice, to lead away the minds of his hearers from party-distinctions, which now it was as much his business to blend as formerly to widen. Winding then rapidly down through the Persian

wars to the immediate objects of his speech, he connects his subject by observing how those, whose fall he was to celebrate, resembled the heroes, so universally admired, of whom he had before been speaking. He then checks his course to remark that he was aware of difference of political sentiments among his auditory; and he would offend none; for no discourse, he observes, could have the desired effect without some harmonising disposition in the hearer's mind. Nevertheless he affected to consider the numerous citizens not of ancient Attic blood as those who alone could differ from him. Rushing then again into the midst of his subject, he proceeds, "It will be said we were defeated: but in defeat these departed heroes had no share. Those who fall, on either side, are conquerors: the honours of victory are equally due to both. But look to the effect of these men's deeds.

Demosth.
or. funebr.
p. 747.
ed. Lutet.
Morel.

We owe to them that our country was not invaded. The very circumstances of the peace prove this. The lord of our adversaries was aware that the kindred of such men would be like themselves; and he chose rather to become their friend than put all to hazard by farther contest." Having thus boldly asserted to the Athenian many that they owed nothing to his political opponents for procuring such advantageous terms of peace, and nothing to the conquering prince for granting them, he was aware that some softening was necessary. Eulogy of Philip, which he had not scrupled in some of his most adverse speeches, he would not scruple now; but he managed to put it rather into the mouths of others; and, while he gave praise due to the Macedonian king, he combined with it flattery and instigation to the Athenian people. "Let those who fought against us," he says, "be asked, and there is not one but will avow that not their superior military merit produced our defeat, but our incalculable hard fortune, and the

Demosth.
or. funebr.
p. 748.

skill, the daring courage, the superior mind of their commander.¹⁶ And this must be evident to all, that the liberty of Greece existed in the souls of these men : they preferred a glorious death to a life of shame ; and with them the dignity of the country has perished." What next follows, with extraordinary ingenuity imagined and wrought to win the attention and interest the fancy of the actual auditory, will be felt by the reader of aftertimes only in proportion as his imagination may place him in the circumstances of the lower classes of the Athenian citizens. It is a catalogue of the wards of Attica, and the heroes, their supposed founders, Erectheus, Cecrops, Ajax, and others : each name accompanied with a panegyric apostrophe on their merits, most ingeniously varied through the long roll ; with a reference to the congenial virtues and merits of those, their successors, in whose honour the actual ceremony was instituted. Hence is drawn, with great advantage, a consolatory exhortation to the parents and other relations of the deceased, with which the speech concludes.¹⁷

This funeral ceremony, under all its circumstances, appears to have been a triumphant measure for the party, and especially for Demosthenes. He no longer feared now to put himself forward again upon the bema. He proposed decrees to provide for the security of Demosth. de cor. p. 309, 310. the city, by repairs of the fortifications and arrangements for the garrison, and those decrees were passed. He offered himself for an office, which seems to have been important, that of providitor of the victualling of the city, and he was elected. The effects of the victory of Chæronea were, as far as the Athenian republic standing by itself was concerned, almost done away : the principal powers of

¹⁶ — Τοῦ προσεστηκότος αὐτῶν ἐμπειρία καὶ τόλμη καὶ ψυχή.

¹⁷ Some farther remarks on this oration are, for more convenience, placed at the end of the section.

government returned into the hands of the party of Demosthenes and Chares.

The disappointment and disturbance ensuing to the peace-party, from this reviviscency of the party of war and troubles, are indicated in the third and last of the extant letters of Isocrates to Philip. In that letter Isocrates says he had had much satisfaction in conversing with Antipater, who had been sent as minister to Athens after the battle of Chæronea ; but he proceeds to indicate that he thought the king had afterward rather neglected his friends in Greece. He reminds him that, through the event of that battle, all was in his power : he might, at his pleasure, carry into effect the great purposes of the Amphictyonic institution, compel any refractory republics to the maintenance of peace, and put an effectual check upon that mad ambition which had produced such destructive contentions among them. He professes to consider Philip still as the only person capable of saving the country ; and he urges the expedition to Asia, in which the restless might find employment to their mind, as necessary toward providing for the peace of Greece. So bent was he upon this, his favourite project now, he observes, for a great number of years, that, if extreme age did not absolutely disable him, he would not content himself with writing, but would wait on the king, to exhort him to the measure. The execution, he proceeds to observe, and justly, as events afterward showed, would be far easier with Philip's present means than the acquisition of his actual power and glory with the strength of the distressed kingdom inherited from his ancestors. He concludes with an observation, which may appear extravagant to the modern reader, unless much observant of the ways of antiquity, that nothing greater could then remain for Philip, unless to be made a god. But for those of his age, even for one of the general wisdom and moral rectitude of Isocrates, such a sen-

timent must not be estimated by the measure of the juster notions which Christianity, giving them to Mahometanism, has made the common feeling of men now so widely over the earth. The popular belief among the Greeks, that Hercules and others from mortal men had actually become immortal gods, may warrant the expression of Isocrates; which is modest in comparison of the vanity and flattery, not less absurd than immoral and impious, soon after beginning to prevail among the Greeks, and, after them, carried by the Romans to greater extravagance.¹⁸

¹⁸ I have had occasion formerly to observe that some critics, of very respectable learning, have taken the fancy to slight Xenophon's indication of his own age, and to prefer testimony to it, very indirect and everyway questionable, from writers living not till some centuries after him. It seems indispensable here to advert to the fancy of some other critics, also of respectable learning, to set aside the testimony of Isocrates to his own existence, and to reckon him dead at the time to which his letter, commonly entitled his third to Philip, is in the text attributed. In that epistle the name Chæronea indeed does not occur; but the battle commonly entitled of Chæronea seems as clearly indicated as if the name had been added. Referring to his oration, formerly sent to Philip, and professing adherence still to the opinions there professed, the writer adds that, what he then proposed and recommended, was now in large proportion accomplished, *through the recent battle, by which the state of Greece was greatly altered*. This could apply to no battle but that of Chæronea. After that battle then Philip sent Antipater (so Polybius assures us) as his minister to Athens. Isocrates accordingly, in his third epistle, expresses satisfaction at the large opportunity he had had for conferring with Antipater. It may then be added that, before that battle, the hyperbole, with which the epistle concludes, must have appeared extravagant, even to minds tintured as those of the Greeks mostly were; but, after the battle, it would harmonise with popular notions.

But in the zeal of the schools in following times, for the cause of Demosthenes and democracy, a story was propagated that Isocrates, oppressed with anguish at the view of the ruin brought upon the liberty of Athens and of Greece by Philip's victory at Chæronea, destroyed himself by a voluntary abstinence from nourishment. Dionysius of Halicarnassus has noticed the story as if he desired it should have credit, but in wayfaring phrase only, so little circumstantial that it might be difficult to report it after him without help from the more explicit account in Plutarch's lives of the orators. But it deserves observation that it was impossible to establish the credit of Demosthenes as a patriot without invalidating either the character of Isocrates or the authority of his written opinions, and especially of this letter. Against his character for honesty and true patriotism nothing has been ventured. His character for wisdom Rollin and some other moderns have questioned, on the modest supposition that they understood the interest of Athens and of Greece

Some remarks on the FUNERAL ORATION of Demosthenes, too long for convenient insertion where the subject occurs in the text, may perhaps best find a place here.

In the extant epistle of Dionysius of Halicarnassus to Ammaeus the funeral oration of Demosthenes is twice mentioned; in one

better than Isocrates and Phocion. But whatever may be thought of the judgment of Isocrates, nothing, among the politics of all antiquity, is clearer than the evidence in his extant writings that, for himself, his friends, his republic, and all Greece, what he most dreaded was the success of the party of Chares and Demosthenes in the battle of Chæronea. The story therefore of his destroying himself on account of the victory of his friend, the king of Macedonia, is evidently an absurd fable; and yet it must be allowed, seeing the success it has met with, its propagators calculated well, what might seem not easy to calculate, the reception it would obtain from the understandings of some and the disposition of others, altogether a large portion of what has been called the republic of letters, through many generations to late posterity.

The learned translator and editor Auger, in a note on the third epistle of Isocrates, makes this remarkable observation: "De quo prælio hic agatur, non satis liquet: non de illo certe quod ad Chæroneam fuit commissum, et post quod Isocrates statim e vitâ excessit. Forte loquitur orator de pugnâ illâ per quam bellum Phocicum confectum est." Where the learned critic found an account of any battle by which the Phocian war was ended, he has not said, and I must own I cannot tell.

Concerning the death of Isocrates there remains notice from writers of high authority. The oldest that has fallen within the scope of my observation is that of Cicero. That very eminent Roman lived near three hundred years after the illustrious Athenian. Writing a treatise upon old age, he mentions the death of Isocrates among instances of placid elderhood, quietly and desirably completed, in his ninety-ninth year: "Est etiam quiete et pure et eleganter actæ ætatis placida ac lenis senectus:—qualem Isocratis, qui eum librum, qui Panathenæicus inscribitur, quarto et nonagesimo anno scripsisse dicitur, vixitque quinquennium postea." Cicero evidently either was uninformed of the story of the fatal anguish of Isocrates, or thought it unworthy of attention.

Next is Dionysius of Halicarnassus, about half a century later, but within which half century a prodigious change had taken place in the situation of the civilised world, through the establishment of the Roman empire on the ruin of the Roman republic. Dionysius says that Isocrates died a few days after the battle of Chæronea, at the age of full ninety-eight, "having resolved that his life should end with the good days of the republic, while it was yet *uncertain how* Philip would use the fortune which placed him at the head of the Greeks." Γνώμη χρησάμενος ἄμα τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς τῆς πόλεως συγκαταλῦσαι τὸν ἑαυτοῦ βίον, ἀδήλου ἔτι ὄντος πῶς χρῆσεται τῇ τύχῃ Φίλιππος, παραλαβὼν τῆς τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἀρχῆς. The expression of Dionysius here may seem to imply a violent death. How far it necessarily implies so much I leave to the learned to determine.

place without any doubt expressed of its authenticity; but in the other place as what he desired to consider as spurious. On this

Philostratus wrote about a century after Dionysius, and he gives an account of the death of Isocrates thus: *Ἀπίθανοι μὲν οὖν Ἀθήνησιν, ἀμφὶ τὰ ἑκατὸν ἔτη. Ἔνα δὲ αὐτὸν ἠγάμηθα τῶν ἐν πολέμῳ ἀποθανόντων ἐπειδὴ μετὰ τὰ κατὰ Χαιρώνειαν ἐπιλείψατα, μὴ κατεστῆσας τὴν ἀκρόασιν τοῦ Ἀθηναίου πταίσματος.* Philostratus seems to have heard of no violence beyond the mere shock from intelligence of the event.

In the Life of Isocrates, attributed to Plutarch, but rather supposed of some other, not earlier, but rather later author, is found at length the story of the death of Isocrates grown into fuller size: the very words he spoke, of which there is no appearance that the earlier writers knew anything, are there reported; and yet the whole still bears an incongruous and uncertain shape. "Isocrates died," says that author, "in consequence of intelligence of the battle of Chæronea, which was communicated to him in the palæstra of Hippocrates. Exclaiming, in the words of three verses from three detached passages of Euripides,

*Δαναὸς ὁ πεντήκοντα θυγατέρας πατήρ,
Πέλοψ ὁ Ταυτάλειος εἰς Πίσαν μελὼν,
Σιδώνιον ποτ' ἄστυ Κάδμος ἰκλιπὼν,*

he abstained from food four days, and then expired; not bearing to see Greece a fourth time subjugated." Proceeding through various other matters, then the author comes again to his death: "Some say he died on the ninth day of his abstinence from food, others on the fourth, the day of the public funeral of those who fell at Chæronea."

On a view of this account, the questions occur: Did the learned writer mean to compare the aged orator's case to those of Danaus, Pelops, and Cadmus, as if he was to expect banishment from the tyranny of the conqueror? Or did he mean to compare Philip himself to those ancient heroes, who came from afar and acquired honour with dominion in Greece? Has the expression "Greece the fourth time subjugated," been intended to imply that, under the prior empire, successively of Lacedæmon, Athens, and Thebes, Greece was as effectually subjugated as now under Macedonia? Or what should we take to be the value of that expression?

After all these four writers comes Suidas, who, following some author differing from all, reports that Isocrates reached his hundred and sixth year.

With the revival of learning in Leo the tenth's age was revived, and with new violence, the passion of its cultivators for the political principles of Demosthenes, which involved a desire to represent the great orator himself as a model of the purest patriotism, and to scandalise his great opponent the king of Macedonia. But among denials to these purposes two were glaring, and might seem insuperable; the constant connection of Demosthenes with a person of character so universally reprobated as Chares; and the opposition to Demosthenes, and connection with Philip, of two persons of characters so universally allowed excellent as Isocrates and Phocion. Men of learning and ingenuity however had their resources; and among favouring circumstances may be reckoned, what has always been a great hindrance to the extension of Grecian literature, its inaccessibility but through the medium of another dead

the questions occur. Did Dionysius mean to speak of the oration which has been transmitted to us as the funeral oration of

language. In treating of the circumstances where the connection of Demosthenes with Chares would come in view, ancient authority has been shoved aside or veiled; in treating of those where the opposition of Isocrates and Phocion to Demosthenes is most manifested, a step farther has been ventured, and ancient authority has been boldly superseded by modern fancy. The probity and patriotism of Isocrates and Phocion have indeed not been questioned; but, as before observed, it has not been scrupled to impute to them ignorance of the interest of their country, the modern sages modestly undertaking to know it better than they.

Such extravagances, whether resulting from misjudgment or artifice, have not equally obtained among our own fellow-countrymen. A note of Taylor's on a proposed correction of Æschines by H. Stephens, both for the explanation it affords and the presumption it reproves, has so much merit that I would not risk injury to it by giving it otherwise than in his own words. The passage speaks of generals *συνεργούντες*, "acting in concert with," some of the orators. On the word *συνεργούντες* Taylor says: "*Συνηγοροῦντες* habes, mi lector, ex divinatione H. Stephani: quod nollem. Facilius enim fuisset et expeditius, immo levissimo clinamine a receptis deflexisset, proponendo *συνερούντες*. *Sed ille genium et statum istius reipublicæ parum intellexit cum ista scripserit*. In civitate administrandâ Atheniensium, *Par hominum*, rhetor scilicet et imperator, quorum hic auctoritate et rebus gestis, ille linguâ et ore, præcelluit, sibi invicem mutuas semper operas præstabant:

ἼΑλλ' ὁ μὲν ἄρ' μύθοισιν, ὁ δ' ἔγχεϊ πολλὸν ἐνίκα.

"Huic rei abunde favet, et receptam Æschinis lectionem tuetur, insignissimus Plutarchi locus, de fraterno amore, quem exscribo: Οἱ μὲν οὖν καθ' ἑτέρας ὁδοῦς βαδίζοντες οὐδὲν ἀλλήλους ἀφελούσιν· οἱ δὲ βίοις χρώμενοι διαφόροις, τὸν τε φθόνον ἐκτρέπονται, καὶ συνεργούσιν ἀλλήλοις μᾶλλον, ὡς Δημοσθένης καὶ Χάρες, καὶ Αἰσχίνης καὶ Εὐβουλος, καὶ Ἰππείδης καὶ Λεωσθένης, οἱ μὲν λέγοντες ἐν τῷ δήμῳ καὶ γράφοντες, οἱ δὲ στρατηγούντες καὶ πράττοντες."

Leland has shown that, when he would venture to think for himself, he could sometimes think well; but he has given himself up strangely to his French predecessor in the history of Philip, Olivier, whose authority, quoted in his margin, appears even ridiculous in company with the names of Thucydides, Xenophon, and the orators; and for the politics of Isocrates and Phocion he has not risked any opinion of his own, but has bowed to Rollin, whom he has quoted at great length. It should however be observed, for the credit of the fellow-countryman of Rollin, the learned translator and editor Auger, that, with his very abundant negligence and wildness, he has sometimes shown great fairness. With the earnest zeal of the continental lettered of his day for democratical principles, he will have Demosthenes a perfect patriot; yet at the same moment, with the spirit of a French gentleman of the old school, he has admitted, though with professed regret, in a phrase quoted in a former note, that the deficient probity of Demosthenes in his private character remained too clearly proved.

To return for a moment to Isocrates then, I will own myself satisfied with the testimony in his third epistle, that he outlived some time the battle of

Demosthenes, on the first occasion, or on the second, or on both, or on neither? I will venture to own my opinion that he meant it on both. On the first occasion he is considering the kinds, or genera, of orations, among which he reckons the funeral a distinct kind. Giving the names then of illustrious orators who had left examples of such, he mentions Demosthenes among them. It sufficed him, on that occasion, that a funeral oration was extant among the generally allowed works of that orator. But on the second occasion he is discussing the various merits of the extant works of Demosthenes. His particular opinion of the funeral oration would be then of course to be given. There, then, he says, not positively that the funeral oration is spurious, but that he was unwilling to believe it genuine; adding his reason in three epithets; he could not bring himself to think a composition so *φορτικὸς*, *κενὸς*, *παιδαριώδης*, as the funeral oration, could be the work of Demosthenes.

To appreciate this kind of criticism of such a work, so connected with, and necessarily to be influenced by, the politics of the moment, it may be expedient to consider what Dionysius was, and in what times he lived. Dionysius himself, and all other Greeks, and their fathers and grandfathers, had been living under Roman despotism. Possibly his youth might see the last convulsions of the Roman republic, when it most despotically commanded the civilised world; but no free government was ever within the scope of his conversation. Hence apparently that very limited direction of his mind to politics which is seen in his judgment on Thucydides, and, still more remarkably, on Polybius. A learned, discerning, and elegant literary critic, he looked on the funeral oration with the eye of a literary critic only, except as he shared in that theoretical zeal for liberty, and partiality for democracy, which were almost universal among the lettered under the Roman empire. Little allowing, therefore, for the extraordinarily difficult situation of Demosthenes when speaking the

Chæroneæ, and also with the testimony there, consonant to the whole tenour of his writings, that he rejoiced in the event, as favourable to what had been, for a long course of years, his views for the good of Athens and of Greece. For that then of which he could leave no account, I would give most credit to Cicero, and believe that, after a fortunate, and, as Cicero calls it, a placid elderhood, (not without anxiety, the lot of all, but without great misfortune,) he died in the course of nature. J

funeral oration, he was disappointed not to find the orator's usual torrent of eloquence, for which the subject might seem peculiarly to call. Hence his epithet *κενός* the torrent's channel appeared to him, comparatively at least, empty. Equally he would allow little consideration for the arts necessary to obviate jealousy, while the orator endeavoured to conciliate the attention, not of his distressed party only, but of his audience as widely as might be, and convey, as by a fable, the meaning which could not prudently be delivered in plainer terms. Thus that large portion of the composition, which runs into fabulous antiquity, might earn, with Dionysius, the epithet *παιδαριώδης*. It is true that in no other of the extant orations of Demosthenes episodic matter of that kind is found; though with his contemporary Isocrates it is very ordinary. But it may deserve observation that in a decree, formerly noticed in the text, a decree on a most momentous occasion, that which immediately led to the battle of Chæronea, this very artifice has been resorted to by Demosthenes himself. Such references to remote and fabulous times would be surely less generally congruous in a decree than in an oration. But the orator has evidently thought it for his purpose to give to that decree the style and effect of an oration; and with that view has introduced what would be there truly *παιδαριώδης*, were it not suited, through the circumstances of the times, to produce an important effect. One part of the oration thus appearing, to the critic of the court of Augustus, childish, and the rest empty, the whole would of course become, with him, entitled to the remaining epithet *φορτικός*.

Having ventured so far to declare my opinion of the criticism of Dionysius, on the supposition, which I think probable, that he had in view the oration in question, it will be the less necessary to add any thing upon the far less authoritative opinions of Libanius and Photius, because they seem to have been little considered by modern critics, who have generally avoided notice of any doubt about the authenticity of this oration. The learned John Taylor however is an exception to require some attention. And yet I must own the greater part of his objections, stated in his *Lectiones Lysiæ*, appear to me futile. For why was an orator, proposing, with a political purpose, to amuse the Athenian people with a panegyrical catalogue of the several wards of Attica,

to confine himself exactly to the order of the crier's roll? His intention evidently required a kind of poetical freedom. What then is that "authority of history" which denies to the daughters of a prince of the fabulous ages, Erechtheus, the title which the oration has given them, of Hyacinthides? And what is that other unspecified authority on which the critic would contest, with Homer, the name of the mother of one whose own name is not very familiar in Grecian history, Acamas? Any sophist between the times of Demosthenes and Dionysius, or even between Dionysius and Photius again, probably might have learnt the order observed by the crier in calling over the Attic wards, and the titles of the daughters of Erechtheus, and the name of the mother of Acamas, as well, perhaps, as Demosthenes himself, but surely as well as any modern critic; and a sophist, fabricating an oration, with the purpose of passing it for the work of Demosthenes, would be the more scrupulously attentive to such insignificant matters, clearly within his reach, as he must be conscious of his deficiency for many of more importance clearly beyond it. A sophist also of after-times would be likely to be less heedful of the art and caution so remarkable in the oration, and he would be especially desirous to give the torrent all the impetuosity, the failure of which so disappointed Dionysius. But hardly any sophist, of times when republics were no more, hardly Demosthenes himself in a later age, could have so adapted his choice and arrangement of matter, or even his choice and turn of phrase, to those very critical circumstances of the moment which Demosthenes himself, with Æschines and Isocrates and others, has laid open to us.

But Taylor has stated objections of another kind, in which I have found concurrence from some whose opinions, as well as Taylor's, on such subjects I respect highly. "*Multa præterea,*" says Taylor, "*contra puritatem Atticam dicta, multa invenuste opposita.*" *Lect. Lysiac. p. 236. ed. Reiske.* The first thing that strikes, in regard to these objections, is that they are not found among those of Dionysius: they are described by none of his three epithets. Nevertheless, not desiring that they should not carry all the authority that ought to be allowed to modern criticism on ancient language, I will venture to offer some suggestions.

Considering the extraordinary circumstances under which Demosthenes undertook to speak the funeral oration, which he certainly did speak, it seems likely that he would think it not prudent for himself to publish in writing what he did so venture to speak. But an oration on such a subject, delivered under such circumstances, by Demosthenes, would be, in its day, an object of the most extensive curiosity: it would hardly fail to be published by some person, more or less perfectly; nor could such a publication be indifferent to Demosthenes. He would desire that the matter and arrangement should be such as might produce all the effect of his spoken oration; but he might rather choose that the diction should be what he might deny. The Alexandrine library became afterward the great depository of the literature of antiquity. Possibly the learned men who superintended that library, in collecting the works of Demosthenes, finding the diction of the funeral oration less perfect than could be satisfactory to them, yet thinking it otherwise fit to be received as a work of the great orator, may have ventured to polish some parts, leaving others untouched; whence might arise ground for Taylor's two objections, the "contra puritatem Atticam dicta," and the "invenuste opposita." Nevertheless, let some phrases be less graceful, and some less purely Attic, and even none from the pen of Demosthenes, yet the whole oration may have come from the age of Demosthenes, differing scarcely in substance, scarcely in arrangement, and perhaps little even in diction, from what he spoke.

SECTION VII.

Congress of Grecian States at Corinth. — The King of Macedonia elected Autocrator-General of Greece for War against Persia. — Preparations for War against Persia. — Assassination of the King of Macedonia.

WHILE things were in this disturbed state at Athens, of what was passing elsewhere in Greece we have scarcely any information. Some contention of parties however there would be everywhere. Among those republics which had begun their connection with Macedonia by voting golden crowns and brazen statues to Philip, and inviting him to hospitality in their cities, and throughout the numerous states in whose forces he had trusted for opposing the armies of the confederacy managed by Demosthenes, there would still exist an anti-Macedonian party. But that party was so depressed by the result of the battle of Chæronea, and so wanted a head capable of showing itself and openly offering patronage, that the winter passed without any event* for the historian's notice.

B. C. 337.*
Ol. 110. 4.

In the next spring*, whether more stimulated by the instances of his Athenian friends, or by the ambition within his own mind, by views coinciding with those of Isocrates for the good of Greece, or of any interests of the Macedonian kingdom, or principally of his own power and fame, Philip resolved to give up the glorious ease which, by his able and successful, but laborious and hazardous exertions, during near four-and-twenty years, he had brought apparently within his command, and to postpone the improvement of the kingdom, which he had already so advanced in extent and power, to the purpose of

B. C. 336.*
Ol. 110.
Vincent.
p. 35.

[* See extract from *Fasti Hellen.* at the end of this section.]

conquest in Asia. From the orators, beyond what has been already stated from Isocrates, hardly any thing remains to indicate either his purposes or his measures. The historian's account then, resting as we must upon it, will perhaps best

Diod. l. 16.
c. 89.

be given as nearly as may be in his own words. "Philip the king," says Diodorus, "encouraged by his victory at Chæronea, by which the most renowned of the Grecian states had been checked and confounded, was ambitious of becoming military commander and head of the Greek nation. He declared therefore his intention of carrying war, in the common cause of the Greeks, against the Persians. A disposition to concur in his purpose, and to attach themselves to him as their chief, pervaded the Grecian people. Communicating then with all, individuals as well as communities, in a manner to conciliate favour, he expressed his desire of meeting the nation in congress, to concert measures for the great object in view. A congress accordingly was assembled at Corinth. His explanation of his intentions excited great hopes, and so produced the desired concurrence that at length the Greeks elected him general-autocrator of Greece. Great preparations for the Persian war were put forward, and the proportion of troops for every state to furnish was settled."

Successful as Philip thus was in engaging the Grecian republics to his purpose, it is nevertheless shown by the same historian that his power, acquired by the victory of Chæronea, if really sufficient, was not used to prevent free debate in the congress. The measures were not carried without opposition; in which some of the Arcadian members distinguished themselves by their warmth.¹⁹ But the majority of the Macedonian party

¹⁹ Diodorus says the Arcadians alone opposed the king of Macedonia's purposes. We learn however from much higher authority that the Arcadians were much divided, and that a large proportion of them was most zealous in

appears to have been great. All was finally settled to Philip's satisfaction, so far that, presently after his return into Macedonia, he took preliminary measures, which were a decisive beginning of war with Persia. He sent his generals Attalus and Parmenio into Asia, in the historian's phrase, "to give liberty to the Greeks;" the obvious meaning of which is, that the force was sent to encourage and support revolt against the Persian dominion.

Diod. l. 16.
c. 91.

Scarcely any thing remains on the very interesting subject of Philip's administration within his own kingdom. Numerous anecdotes of his private and domestic life have been transmitted; but mostly by writers ignorant or careless of public transactions, which, in their day, were open to the knowledge of all who would observe and inquire, yet bold to relate secret affairs, of which, whether real or not, few could tell, and rarely even the few who knew would tell any truth. It seems however too well ascertained that he was not fortunate in his nuptial connection. Tales of private vices, whether of the wife or of the husband, are less objects for the historian than for the anecdote-writer; a description of men beginning to abound in Philip's age, long continuing under the Roman empire, and who, in proportion to the grossness of their imputations against exalted characters, and the confidence with which they asserted what, if none could confirm, few could refute, excited extensive curiosity, and made their business lucrative. It may suffice here that the temper of the queen, Olympias, is, with probability, said to have been irascible, suspicious, and vindictive. After long disagree-

Plut. vit.
Alex. p. 669.

Plut. ut ant.

the Macedonian party. Diodorus seems to have followed, in this part of his narrative, an anti-Macedonian writer, who, according to what we have before noticed to have been the common practice of Grecian party-writers, would call the Arcadians of his party "the Arcadians," as eminently, and, in his politics, almost exclusively such.

ment, Philip repudiated her, and married Cleopatra, daughter of one of the most eminent men of his court and kingdom.²⁰

Olympias, beside one son, Alexander, had borne him one daughter, also named Cleopatra. After his return from Corinth his new queen brought him another son, and soon after that event he gave his daughter in marriage to her uncle, Alexander, king of Epirus, brother of Olympias. It was usual, as formerly has been observed, among the northern principalities, though not peculiar to them among the Greeks, wherever means were not wanting, to be splendid in festive ceremony on such occasions. Philip seems to have proposed to use the opportunity for advancing his already great popularity among the Grecian republics by uncommon splendour and a magnificent hospitality. He invited from every city some eminent men, omitting none who were personally known to him or to any principal persons of his court. Among the entertainments the theatrical, so especially the delight of the Greeks, were provided with care; the most celebrated actors and musicians being engaged from all parts. For the ceremony, not Pella, but Edessa, or *Ægæ*, the ancient capital of the kingdom, was chosen. The festivity was very numerously and most respectably attended; not only eminent individuals coming from all parts of Greece, but deputations from the principal cities, even from Athens, bringing congratulations in the

Diod. i. 16.

c. 91.

B. C. 336. *

Ol. 110.

Vincent, p. 35.

²⁰ Arrian (de Exp. Alex. i. 3. c. 6.) calls Philip's second wife Eurydice. Diodorus (i. 16. c. 93.) and Plutarch, and Athenæus and Justin, agree in giving her the name of Cleopatra.

[* B. C. 336. Ol. 111. "*Philip* is slain, ἐπὶ ἄρχοντος Πυθοδήμου. Arrian. Exp. i. 1. ἐπ' ἄρχοντος Ἀθήνησι Πυθόδωρου—ἰλυμπιάς δ' ἤχθη πρώτη πρὸς ταῖς ἑκατὸν καὶ δέκα. Diod. xvi. 91. Eratosthenes apud Clem. Strom., i. p. 336., having fixed the battle of Leuctra to Olymp. 102. 2., proceeds—μὲθ' ἦν ἐπὶ τὴν Φιλίππου τελευταίην ἔτη τριακονταπέντε· equivalent to Olymp. 111. 1. for the death of Philip. The death of *Philip* and accession of *Alexander* were in the beginning of the year of Pythodemus." Clinton, Fasti Hellen. p. 150.]

name of their communities, accompanied with the present, which was become common on great occasions, of a golden crown. In the midst of this joyful solemnity, as Philip was entering the theatre, Pausanias, a Macedonian youth of high rank and great connections, stabbed him, and he fell dead. The assassin, flying toward a horse prepared for him, was overtaken while mounting; and by a stroke, whether necessary to prevent his escape, or urged by the ill-judging vengeance of the pursuers, his life was instantly ended.

24th Sept. *
Usher.

The possibility of gathering anything from him who best could tell being thus precluded, various stories were circulated of the provocation to this atrocious deed; disgusting in their tenor, improbable in many of the asserted circumstances, and altogether confuting one another by their disagreement. In one assertion they mostly concurred, that it was simply the private revenge of the individual; but this was contradicted by the only account of any known authority, which ascribed it to the base policy of the Persian court. In uncertainty thus of the reality, public suspicion of course was busy, and several exalted characters were involved; the divorced queen Olympias especially; and the prince Alexander did not escape the horrid imputation, which he endeavoured to repel, by asserting he had proof against the agents of the king of Persia. What, in Aristotle's belief, prepared the youth's mind, not creditable to the manners and morals of the Macedonian court, which too much resembled those of the Greek and Roman republics, we have from him in very few words. Pausanias preferred complaint, whether public or private, to the king of gross contumely with which he had been treated by

Plut. vit.
Alex.
p. 669, 670.
D. Curt.
l. 4.
Arrian. l. 2.
c. 14.

Aristot. Polit.
l. 5. c. 10.
p. 539. E. ed.
Paris.

Attalus, a man of the highest rank, and said by some writers to have been uncle to the new queen. Philip, perhaps wisely reckoning that public investigation of such a complaint were best avoided, sent Attalus, as we are told by other writers, out of the way, by appointing him to a military command in Asia. The author of the injury being thus put beyond reach, revenge rankling in the youth's mind, whether instigated by others, which, though not improbable, is left quite uncertain, led him to vent it against the king.

The always-avowed principles of Demosthenes, combined with his political relations and his public conduct, seem to have afforded no light ground for supposing that he was,

Æsch. de cor.
p. 468. in some degree, privy to the plot. Persia was

still the ally of Athens, and Demosthenes was the orator principally employed, as agent of the Persian court, for public communication with the sovereign people, and for the management also, it is said, of the distribution

Plut. vit.
Demosth.
p. 855. of money. He had, at the Macedonian court,

apparently among the visitors at the celebrity, a confidential friend, Charidemus. From this man, by a special messenger, he received information of Philip's death some time before any others in Athens. The people being assembled, he ventured upon a measure adapted to raise his importance among that numerous description of men on whose favour his power rested; he told them that Jupiter and Minerva, appearing to him in a dream, had given him assurance that Philip was dead; and this assertion he corroborated by an oath. When information of an acknowledged authenticity afterward arrived the people were again

Plut. vit.
Demosth.
p. 855. &
v. Phoc.
p. 749. assembled. Demosthenes and the orators of his party then did not scruple to propose honour for the memory of the deceased assassin, such as, a

few years before, by a decree of the Athenian people, had

rewarded the living assassin of the king of Thrace; and they added a motion for performing the evangelian sacrifice, which, in better times of the republic, was the ceremony of thanksgiving on receiving news of a great victory. The people decreed both the measures; and, though he had recently lost his daughter, his only child, and custom, esteemed among the Athenians not only decent, but sacred, forbade persons under such circumstances to show themselves but in mourning, Demosthenes put on a festal robe of white, and, with a crown of flowers on his head, made himself conspicuous at the ceremony.²¹

Æschin. de
cor. p. 546.

p. 468.

OCCUPATION OF ELATEA AND BATTLE OF CHÆRONEA.

[From Mr. Clinton's *Fasti Hellenici*, pp. 293—295.]

Mr. Mitford supposes a winter to pass between the occupation of Elatea and the battle of Chæronea. His narrative supplies the following notes of time. After the occupation of Elatea (p. 337.), he notices the negotiation with Thebes (p. 343.); and then remarks, "It was already late in autumn B. C. 338. Ol. 110. 3." (p. 346.). — "Two battles were fought; the latter not till it was already winter" (*ibid.*). — "It was Philip's business during the winter to assemble from the confederated states a force sufficient for the support of their common cause" (p. 352.). — "In the preceding autumnal campaign Stratocles had commanded the Athenian troops" (p. 354.). — Then he mentions (p. 355.) "the great and decisive battle." After the battle of Chæronea, "the winter passed (B. C. 337. Ol. 110. 4.)

²¹ This story of the conduct of Demosthenes altogether might seem extravagant but that, in his reply to Æschines, he has avoided in any degree to contradict it. Even Plutarch's zeal for democracy and admiration of tyrannicide could not carry him so far as to give his entire approbation to the public measures. An idea of gratitude due from the Athenian people to Philip for his generosity after the battle of Chæronea has struck him. Otherwise he appears to have reckoned all as it should have been.

without any event" (p. 377.). — "In the next spring" (ibid.) (the spring of Ol. 110. 4.), Philip caused a congress to be assembled at Corinth. The result of these dates will be, that the battle of Chæronea happened in the archonship of *Phrynichus*, about fourteen months after the occupation of Elatea, and less than a year before the death of Philip.

A single word in Demosthenes* has probably led Mr. Mitford to this arrangement: *δὲς συμπαταταξάμενοι τὰς πρώτας μάχας, τὴν τ' ἐπὶ τοῦ ποταμοῦ καὶ τὴν ΧΕΙΜΕΡΙΝΗΝ, οὐκ ἀμέμπτους μόνον ὑμᾶς αὐτοὺς ἀλλὰ καὶ θάυμαστοὺς ἐδείξατε.* — ἐφ' οἷς παρὰ μὲν τῶν ἄλλων ὑμῖν ἐγίγνοντο ἔπαινοι, παρὰ δ' ὑμῶν θυσία καὶ πομπὰ τοῖς θεοῖς. And it must be confessed that the conclusion drawn from this passage derives support from the following passage of Plutarch †: *εἰσήχθη ἡ περὶ τοῦ στεφάνου γραφή κατὰ Κτησιφῶντος, γραφεῖσα μὲν ἐπὶ Χαιρώνδου ἄρχοντος μικρὸν ἐπάνω τῶν Χαιρωνικῶν.* That impeachment was instituted by Æschines in the ninth month of the archon *Chærondas* ‡: it would follow, then, that the battle, which was subsequent, occurred in the second month of the next archon, *Phrynichus*.

But, on the other hand, three writers, Dionysius of Halicarnassus §, the author of the *βίοι τῶν δέκα ῥητόρων* ||, and Diodorus ¶, all concur in the year of *Chærondas* as the date. And this is confirmed by the orator *Lycurgus*; who prosecuted *Leocrates* in the eighth year after his flight from Athens, which was subsequent to the battle of Chæronea. But that cause had already been determined at the time of the cause of the Crown, because the acquittal of *Leocrates* is noticed by Æschines **: *ἕτερος δ' ἰδιώτης ἐκπλεύσας εἰς Ῥόδον, ὅτι τὸν φόβον ἀνάνδρως ἤνεγκε, πρώην ποτὲ εἰσηγγέλθη, καὶ ἴσαι αὐτῷ αἱ ψῆφοι ἐγένοντο· εἰ δὲ μία μόνον μετέπεσεν, ὑπερώριστ' ἂν ἢ ἀπέθανεν.* The impeachment then of *Leocrates*, since it preceded the cause of the Crown, must be placed in the close of the year of *Aristophanes*, and of *Olymp.* 112. 2., which carries us back to the archonship of *Chærondas* for the date of the battle. ††

* De Coron. p. 300. ed. Reiske.

† Demosth. c. 24.

‡ Ἐπὶ Χαιρώνδου ἄρχοντος Ἐλαφηβολισῶνος ἕκτη ἰσταμίειου. Demosth. de Coron. p. 243.

§ In Isocrat. p. 537. ed. Steph.

|| p. 837. E.

¶ xvi. 84.

** In Ctesiph. p. 69. 84.

†† If the text of Dionysius ad Amm. p. 746. were genuine, — *Ἀριστοφῶντος*

In the next place, the transactions recorded of that war will not justify the supposition of fourteen months between the march to Elatea and the decisive battle. Æschines*, after mentioning the return of Philip from Scythia, and τὴν δευτέραν στρατείαν against the Amphissians, proceeds immediately to the circumstances of the battle as the next event: οὐ Δημοσθένης τὸ τελευταῖον ἀθύτων καὶ ἀκαλλιερήτων ὄντων τῶν ἱερῶν ἐξέπεμψε τοὺς στρατιώτας ἐπὶ τὸν πρόδηλον κίνδυνον; he calls the march of the Athenian forces (to which Demosthenes † refers, ἐξῆλθε, ἐβοηθεῖτε, κ. τ. λ.); their final expedition ‡, τὴν πανυστάτην ἐξοδον. Plutarch § describes the embassy to Thebes, and then speaks of the battle as the next occurrence. The biographer of the ten orators || places the decisive battle immediately after Elatea: Φιλίππου Ἐλάτειαν καταλαμβανομένου, καὶ αὐτὸς (ὁ Δημοσθένης) τοῖς ἐν Χαιρωνείᾳ μαχουμένοις συνεξῆλθε. Diodorus ¶ connects the two events in the same manner; placing both in the archonship of Chærondas. As it is frequently his practice to relate together transactions which made a part of the same campaign, although they did not fall within the same civil year, we may infer that Diodorus, in the author whom he followed, found the two events contiguous, and parts of the same campaign. And this is confirmed by his narrative. After mentioning the success of Demosthenes in the negotiation with Thebes, he proceeds** — ὁ δῆμος τῆ τῶν Βοιωτῶν συμμαχίᾳ διπλασιάσας τὴν προϋπάρχουσαν δύναμιν — εὐθὺς συρατηγὸς κατέστησε τοὺς περὶ Χάρητα καὶ Λυσικλέα ††, καὶ πανδημεὶ μετὰ τῶν

ἄρχοντος, ὁ γδοῶ μὲν ἰνιαυτῶ μετὰ τὴν ἐν Χαιρωνείᾳ μαχὴν, ἕκτω δὲ μετὰ τὴν Φιλίππου τελεύτην — it would be conclusive against the date of Mr. Mitford, which only leaves a year between Chæroneia and the death of Philip. But, as this reading of the passage is only a conjectural correction of Bentley, however probable (Diss. Phal. p. 528.), I forbear to produce it as evidence.

* In Ctesiph. p. 72. † De Cor. p. 299. ‡ In Ctesiph. p. 88. 40.

§ Demosth. c. 18, 19. || Vit. x or. p. 845. F. ¶ xvi. 84.

** C. 85.

†† *Stratocles* is mentioned as general by Æschin. in Ctes. p. 74. 8. Στρατοκλία τὸν ἡμίτερον στρατηγόν and by Polyænus, iv. 2. 2. Φιλίππου ἐν Χαιρωνείᾳ παρατασσόμενος Ἀθηναίους, εἶξας ἐνὶ κλίβῳ στρατηγὸς Στρατοκλῆς ἐκβοήσας, κ. τ. λ. Wesseling (ad Diod. xvi. 88.), when he pronounced Polyænus guilty of error, overlooked this testimony of Æschines. But the name of *Lysicles* is verified by the oration of Lycurgus against him. It is probable that both *Stratocles* and *Lysicles* were among the nine generals who were the colleagues of Chares. Mr. Mitford, in pursuance of his arrangement of this war, imagines

ὄπλων ἐξέπεμψε τοὺς στρατιώτας εἰς τὴν Βοιωτίαν. τῶν δὲ νέων ἀπάντων προθύμως εἰς τὸν ἀγῶνα καταπύοντων, οὗτοι μὲν κατὰ σπουδὴν ὁδοιπορήσαντες ἦκον εἰς Χαιρώνειαν τῆς Βοιωτίας· οἱ δὲ Βοιωτοὶ — ἀπήντησαν μετὰ τῶν ὄπλων, καὶ κοινῇ στρατοπεδεύσαντες ὑπέμενον τὴν τῶν πολεμίων ἔφοδον. Is it credible that Philip should remain with his army a whole year in Phocis, when nothing was transacted? * or that the republics, with their narrow revenues, would maintain their forces in the field through so long a period? Mr. Mitford indeed supposes that the auxiliaries to the number of seventeen thousand, whom Demosthenes collected (p. 352.), were not obtained till after the treaty with Thebes; and that the exertions of Demosthenes for this purpose were made during the ensuing winter. But this is not warranted by ancient writers. Plutarch † affirms the contrary: Βυζαντίοις ἐβοήθησε καὶ Περινηθίοις (ὁ Δημοσθένης.) — ἔπειτα πρεσβεύων καὶ διαλεγόμενος τοῖς Ἑλλησι καὶ παροξύνων συνέστησεν ἐπὶ τὸν Φίλιππον. — ἐπρημένης δὲ τῆς Ἑλλάδος πρὸς τὸ μέλλον, καὶ συνισταμένων κατ' ἔθνη καὶ πόλεις Εὐβοέων, Ἀχαιῶν, Κορινθίων, Μεγαρέων, Λευκαδίων, Κερκυραίων, ὁ μέγιστος ὑπελείπετο τῷ Δημοσθένει τῶν ἀγῶνων Ἐθθαίου προσαγαγέσθαι τῇ συμμαχίᾳ. ‡

(p. 354.) that Stratocles had commanded in the preceding autumnal campaign. But it is manifest, from Polyænus, that Stratocles was among the commanders on the day of Chæronea.

* Polyænus (iv. 2. 8.) mentions the occupation of Amphissa as a transaction of this war: Φίλιππος ἐπὶ τὴν Ἀμφισσίαν ἐστράτευεν· Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ Ἐθθαῖοι τὰ στενὰ προκατελάβοντο. — ἔξαπατᾷ τοὺς πολεμίους Φίλιππος, ἐπιστολὴν πεπλασμένην Ἀντιπάτρει πέμψας εἰς Μακεδονίαν, ὡς τὴν μὲν στρατείαν τὴν ἐπ' Ἀμφισσίῃς ἀναβάλλοιτο, σπειδοῖ δὲ εἰς Ἐθράκην. — ὁ γραμματοφόρος διήκει διὰ τῶν στενῶν. οἱ στρατηγοὶ, Χάρης καὶ Πρόξενος, αἰροῦσιν αὐτὸν, καὶ τὴν ἐπιστολὴν ἀναγνόντες πιστεύουσι τοῖς γεγραμμένοις, καὶ τὴν φυλακὴν τῶν στενῶν ἀπολείπουσι. Φίλιππος δὲ — τῆς Ἀμφίσσης ἐκράτησε. But this event happened when Chares commanded the Athenian troops, and consequently, by Mr. Mitford's chronology (p. 354.), a year would have already passed before the occupation of Amphissa.

† Demosth. c. 17.

‡ Diodorus, indeed (xvi. 84.), imagines that the Athenians were unprepared, and taken by surprise: Φίλιππος ἐφιλοτιμιεῖτο τοὺς Ἀθηναίους καταπληξάμενος ἀδύρητον ἔχειν τὴν ἡγεμονίαν τῆς Ἑλλάδος. διόπερ ἄφωρα καταλαβόμενος Ἑλλάτικαν πόλιν καὶ τὰς δυνάμεις εἰς ταύτην ἀθροίσας διέγνω πολεμεῖν τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις. ἀπαρασκεύων δ' ὄντων αὐτῶν διὰ τὴν συντεθειμένην εἰρήνην, ἤλαπιζε βραδίως περιποιήσασθαι τὴν νίκην. We know from the orators that this was not the fact. Four months before the occupation of Elatea the Athenians had refused to concur with the other Amphictyons in the election of Philip; and three

The auxiliaries then from these states were prepared before, and the alliance with Thebes was the last point accomplished.

I therefore conclude that the actions mentioned by Demosthenes were partial encounters, and preludes to the general action. The decisive battle was fought fifty days* after the news arrived at Athens of Philip's entrance into Phocis. Within this period occurred the capture of Amphissa, and the two engagements designated by Demosthenes as τὴν ἐν τῷ ποταμῷ and τὴν † χειμερινῇν. These two encounters would happen in the neighbourhood of Chæronea. Whether the date of Plutarch, in the passage already quoted, in which he makes the battle subsequent to the ninth month of Chæronidas, is to be imputed to negligence, or whether we are to conclude, with Corsini ‡, that *Chæronidas* there mentioned is an *archon pseudeponymus*, will occur for inquiry hereafter.

months before it is manifest from a decree (preserved by Demosthenes, p. 282.) that they already regarded him as an adversary.

* Let those, who incline to think that the space of fifty days between the 15th Scirophorion and the 7th Metagitnion is an interval too short for this war, call to mind the narrow limits of the field of action. *Elatea* was about 43 English miles from *Thebes*, 78 from *Athens*, and 23 from *Amphissa*. The road from Athens and Thebes to Elatea was through *Chæronea*; which was distant from Thebes about 27 English miles, from Elatea 16, and from Athens 62. Let the duration of the renewed French war, in 1815, be compared: a war of infinitely greater importance, in which far greater forces were collected from far more distant points: and yet that war was terminated in three months after its commencement.

† The word χειμερινῇν is probably corrupt; perhaps capable of another interpretation. Corsini (*Fast. Att.* tom. i. p. 146.) suspects the word; although his conjectural emendation is not fortunate. Reiske renders χειμερινῇν by *procellosam*.

‡ *Fast. Attic.* tom. i. pp. 310. 359.

SECTION VIII.

Anecdotes illustrating the moral and political Character of Philip King of Macedonia.

IF ever, after the early age of Agamemnon, there was any fair prospect that the Greeks might become a united and happy nation, secure in person and property against oppression and disturbance from one another, and powerful to resist assault from foreign nations, it seems to have been when Philip, the popular king of a free people, was, by the apparently free and even zealous choice of a large majority among the republics, vested with that supreme military command, and with that superintending civil patronage, which had formerly been conceded to those who had shown themselves abundantly unfit to hold it, the Lacedæmonian, and, successively, the Athenian, and the Theban people. What was his plan for managing the intricate business, (for such a mind as his would not be without a plan,) and equally, in the great undertaking, imposed with it, of war with Persia, what were his views, his premature death and the deficiency of history have deprived us even of foundation for conjecture.

But the very silence of ancient writers, on some topics, is not wholly without indication of the spirit of his government. It is remarkable that, among all the abundant remaining invective against him, injury to the civil rights of the Macedonian people, or the purpose of it, is never imputed. In the few instances then in which we find it asserted that he interfered, with a strong hand, in the government of Grecian states, as, according to the imputation of Demosthenes, among some of the Thessalian cities, on inquiry it becomes evident that the violence has been that of one party of the Thessalians against another, rather than of Philip

against any; for, to his lasting popularity among a large majority of the Thessalians, testimony is ample. In Macedonia, the frequent contentions for the crown, necessarily disturbing individual security at the time, and preventive of public prosperity, nevertheless probably contributed to the preservation and improvement of general freedom. For policy would require competitors to vie in ostentation of regard for the constitution. To Philip, on his accession, such policy would be especially necessary. His three opponents were supported each by a foreign power. His own cause rested wholly on the Macedonian people; and their attachment, which finally secured him the throne against a confederacy, otherwise apparently overbearing, appears to have attended him through life. Demosthenes has evidently been aware that it would be too much, even for his ingenious policy, to separate the interest of the Macedonian people from that of their king. Despairing of means to set them against him, he has reviled all together.

Demosth.
Or. in Epist.
Philip.

Once we find him telling the Athenian people that the Macedonians were not really so attached to their king as was generally supposed. By this very expression he conveys the most unsuspecting assurance that Philip's general reputation for popularity among his subjects was high. Nor could he, even on this occasion, assign a ground for the dissatisfaction of which he was desirous of impressing a belief, but the frequent calls of Philip upon his people for military service, which would interrupt their domestic enjoyments.

Violent as the spirit of party was among the Greeks, it was in the course of things that a prince highly, and perhaps in some instances extravagantly, the favourite of one party, was the object of the most rancorous libelling for its opponents. Demosthenes, in one of his early speeches, has endeavoured to obviate the extensively prevailing favourable opinions of Philip by describing him as even contemptible; a daily

Demosth.
Olynth. 2.
p. 23.
drunkard, abandoning himself to amusements the most frivolous at the same time and vicious, among companions the lowest and most unworthy; envious of superior merit, and driving it equally from his armies, from his councils, and from his society. But the orator seems to have found this bold experiment fail; for we find it in no instance repeated. He would afterward call Philip faithless, cruel, a barbarian; but never more a drunkard, or the companion of fools; he would represent him as an object of fear and hatred, but never again of contempt. Sometimes he would even propose him as an example for the Athenians to emulate, and sometimes, for his united advantages of regal rank and universal talent, an example beyond their reach. His abilities, he acknowledges, were extraordinary, and his activity wonderful. Philip alone, he has admitted, could unite in his own person the offices of king and minister, of treasurer and secretary, of general and soldier. Even in that oration where he ventured to represent him as an object of contempt he had before been holding

p. 22.
him out to admiration. "The love of glory," he said, "is Philip's ruling passion. For this he yields to no fatigue; for this he will face any danger; preferring a great reputation to all the gratifications of pleasure in quiet and security." What led the orator to such contradiction seems not readily imaginable. Whether then any occasional excess in the pleasures of the table, any less decorous amusements of the court, or any kind of extravagances of youth in power, may have afforded any degree

Athen. 1. 6.
c. 17. &
l. 14. c. 1.
of just ground for the scandal, following in the same speech, all remaining information seems too doubtful and imperfect to afford foundation even for any fair conjecture.

Among the extant obloquy of Philip, after that of Demosthenes, a story related by Diodorus may principally deserve

notice, and perhaps not the less because the honest historian speaks of it as of doubtful authority; for so it marks the fame and popularity, in his time, of tales at which even his judgment revolted; and the probability is the greater that he gives it, as appears to have been sometimes his way, much in the very words of some earlier author. After the battle of Chæronea, he says, Philip gave a feast, as was usual on occasion of a victory. Not rising from table till he had drunk to inebriety, his fancy led him then to go out among the prisoners, and joke with them insultingly on their misfortune. Among them was the Athenian orator Demades, who did not fear to reprove the victorious king, even while he was drunk. “The story goes,” says the historian, “that he said to him, ‘O king! fortune has put it in your power to be an Agamemnon: are you not then ashamed to act the part of a Thersites?’ Philip, struck with the justness and elegance of the reprimand, immediately changed his whole conduct. Throwing from his head the chaplet,” (usually worn by the ancients at their feasts,) “he put an end to the revel, applauded the man who had used such freedom, and received him ever after among the companions he most honoured. Becoming then, through communication with Demades, familiarised with Attic graces, he dismissed all the prisoners without ransom, and, wholly laying aside the pride of victory, sent ambassadors to Athens, to make peace and alliance.” It would hardly be supposed it could be a prince who, according to accredited report, was bred under Epaminondas, Pelopidas, and Plato, who certainly corresponded with Isocrates, entertained Leosthenes in his court and Aristotle in his family, and, having already attained the mature age of forty-six, was acknowledged the man of the most informed understanding and the politest manners of his times, whose acquisition of the Attic graces, and of the humanity which

Diod. l. 16.
c. 87.

produced (what does not appear to have been an Athenian practice) the free discharge of prisoners of war, is thus attributed to the accidental meeting with an Athenian orator. Had the historian himself been of less remarkable simplicity, it might seem with the purpose of exposing the preposterous vanity of the Attic schoolmen under the Roman empire, from whom the story apparently originated, that he proceeds immediately from this tale to a more authentic exemplification of the Attic graces by reporting the speech of the orator Lycurgus in accusation of Lysicles, and the condemnation and execution of that unfortunate general. But Demades, as formerly has been observed, was of the most eminent orators of the party of Phocion and Isocrates, and most decided in opposition to the political principles and projects of the party of Demosthenes and Chares. The same spirit then, which led to the fable making the victory of Chæronea produce the death of Isocrates, seems to have led also to that which put reproof of Philip into the mouth of Demades ; the purpose being to gain credit to the cause of Demosthenes and democracy, by infusing the opinion that men of the high characters of Isocrates and Demades were friendly to it.

A story is told on the other hand, exemplifying the arrogance and levity of the character of the Athenian many in that age. When it was announced to the prisoners made at Chæronea that they were all free without ransom, presuming upon Philip's celebrated generosity, they accompanied their thanks with a petition that he would give them clothes in which to go home. Philip said to those about him : " These people seem to think we have been fighting for joke : " but he nevertheless gave what they asked for. And whether the account of their presumption be strictly true or no, his generous supply of their wants is satisfactorily confirmed.

Plat. vit. Or.

Polyb. l. 9.
p. 593.

Testimony is ample that, under Philip, the Macedonian court became the greatest resort of the polite equally and of the learned in that age probably in the world. Aristotle did not refuse his invitation, as it is said Socrates did that of his great predecessor Archelaus. His letter to that celebrated philosopher has been preserved, in all appearance with fidelity, by Aulus Gellius, whose remarks on the occasion may also deserve notice. "Philip," says that writer, "though almost continually engaged in the business of wars and victories, yet never was inattentive to polite learning, and the studies that adorn human nature. Many of his letters have been published, replete with elegance, pleasantry, and sound sense. That which, on the birth of his son, he wrote to Aristotle, I think worth transcribing, because it is so adapted to excite parents to care and diligence in the education of their children." Reporting then the letter first in his own language, the Latin, he proceeds to say: "Philip's own words are these:" and he adds the original Greek, which may be rendered in English thus: "Philip to Aristotle greeting: I desire you should know I have a son born. Greatly I thank the gods for it; and yet less for the mere circumstance that I have a son than because it happens in the age wherein you are living. I trust that, being put under your care and instruction, he will become worthy of his birth, and of the inheritance awaiting him."²² It is here fully indicated that the king had not then to make his first acquaintance with the philosopher: they were already in habits of communication, and it seems that Aristotle had already engaged himself to undertake the office proposed for

Aul. Gel. .
l. 9. c. 3.
Ælian. l. 8.
p. 15.]

²² Aristotle's father, Nicomachus, is said to have been physician to king Amyntas, Philip's father. Suid. in Nicom. Ælian. Var. Hist. l. 5. c. 9. He was born a Macedonian, so far as he was of Stagira, a colony of republican Greeks on the Macedonian coast.

him of superintending the education of the child, who became afterward the great Alexander. Collateral evidence also is here afforded, tending to confirm the reports transmitted of Philip's correspondence with Plato, Theophrastus, and others, eminent in the philosophical schools of Athens. With Aristotle, as a native of Stagira, a Grecian colony on the Macedonian shore, he is likely to have had previous personal acquaintance. Aristotle however, it is certain, passed many years at the Macedonian court in the office of tutor to the prince Alexander.

The admiration which we find Cicero expressing of Philip's published letters must assist to increase the regret that, excepting the one preserved by Gellius, all have been lost.²³ But, in an age when anecdote was in vogue, the words of a prince of such singular talents and singular fortune, and so especially celebrated for quickness and pleasantry in conversation, would be likely to be observed and recorded. Numerous sayings ascribed to him have accordingly been transmitted. From Plutarch we have a collection of them among those entitled his *Morals*; where fortunately instigation to go beyond authentic documents did not equally press as in his *Lives*. Words spoken however must always be liable to be incorrectly reported, and to receive different colouring from the interest, the feeling, the fancy, or the recollection of reporters. But, of those attributed to Philip, it is observable that liberality, generosity, gratitude, benignity, good temper, in extraordinary amount, are prominent features. Some are too good, and too

²³ "Extant epistolæ, et Philippi ad Alexandrum, et Antipatri ad Cassandrum, et Antigonî ad Philippum filium, trium prudentissimorum (sic enim accepimus), quibus præcipiunt ut oratione benignâ multitudinis animos ad benevolentiam alliciant, militesque blande appellando deleniant." M. T. Cic. de Off. l. 2. c. 14.

"Præclare epistolâ quâdam Alexandrum filium Philippus accusat, quod largitione benevolentiam Macedonum consecetur," &c. Id. ibid. c. 15.

strongly indicate their origin from the occasion, to be, in any probability, wholly fictitious. Such are his celebrated compliments to his minister, Antipater, and his general, Parmenio. Having made his council wait one day for his coming, he apologised on entering: "I have overslept myself," he said, "this morning. But it is no matter; for Antipater was awake." At another time, conversation turning upon the election of generals at Athens, "The Athenians," said Philip, "are a fortunate people, who can find ten generals every year. For myself, in all my life, I could never find but one, Parmenio there."

Plutarch, from whom we have these anecdotes, has shown himself so inclined to the reverse of flattery to Philip that it can hardly be supposed he meant to report them favourably beyond the truth. But Athenæus, who has preserved some good and many curious things, among much ineptitude and much profligacy, wanting to swell a list of royal and noble drunkards, was fortunate enough, it seems, to find, in the historical memorials published by Carystius, one of Plutarch's anecdotes of Philip otherwise told, and in a way exactly to his purpose. We have already observed it asserted by Demosthenes, to the Athenian people, that Philip was daily drunk. When the hour of revelling came, according to Athenæus, he used to say, "Come, let us drink: it is enough that Antipater is sober."²⁴

Among the frequent calls of military business, and the increased variety and magnitude of the political affairs of the Macedonian kingdom during Philip's reign, it would almost as little be possible as, according to the better civil

²⁴ Diodorus (l. 16. c. 92.) has made report of Philip's absurd pomp and pretensions at his festival at Ægæ. Alexander is more likely to have given into such extravagance, and apparently did to a great degree; yet Arrian lets us know that the imputations went in his opinion beyond truth. See Arr. de Exp. Alex. l. 4. and l. 5. c. 2. and 3.

theory of modern times, it were little desirable, that the monarch should preside in the principal court of justice. Nevertheless, throughout antiquity, prejudice seems to have obtained in favour of the early system, and the execution of the judicial office by the prince in person. An old woman of Macedonia, it is said, having a cause in the king's court, urged Philip's personal attention to it; which he did not refuse, but excused delay by alleging want of leisure. The woman, who may have been of high rank and large fortune, for ancient language does not always distinguish such by title, nor ancient writers by description, provoked at length, replied, "If you cannot find leisure to do justice, cease to be king!" Again, it is said, an old woman pleading her own cause before him, he, with a mind always full, annoyed by the inanity of her lengthened narrative or inept arguments, engaged in conversation with some one near him; upon which the woman indignantly exclaimed, "I appeal!" Philip, surprised, said, "Appeal! to whom?" "From the king inattentive," she answered, "to the king giving just attention." But this story also has been otherwise told, after the taste of Athenæus. Philip, it is said, went to preside in his court of justice after hard drinking; and, obviously affected by it, decided the cause. The old woman, against whom the judgment was given, in such case more justly indignant, though in circumstances less likely to profit from her remonstrance, being asked to whom she would appeal, "From Philip drunk," she replied, "to Philip sober." But it is not said that the united stimulation of reproach and wine at all deranged Philip's temper: nor does there seem to be anywhere imputed to him the purpose of denying justice or stopping the course of law.

Among Plutarch's anecdotes, Philip's expression of gratitude to the memory of Hipparchus of Eubœa is of a kind not likely to have been invented. Discourse turning upon

the death of Hipparchus, some one observed that he died at a mature age. "Mature for himself," said Philip, "but too early for me; for it was before I could make him a just return for the kindnesses he had done me." Of similar character is the speech reported of him to Philon of Thebes, to whom he in his early youth had had obligations, for which, with the large means afterward within his power, he desired to make grateful recompence. Philon perseveringly refused every thing. Philip, vexed at his pertinacity, yet giving him credit for his generosity, exclaimed, "Why will you so mar my reputation for superiority in beneficence, by keeping me so much your inferior?" At the great Olympian meeting, amid the amusements, party would show itself; and, whether Philip had horses running, or whatever furnished the opportunity, aversion toward him, in some part of the numerous assembly, was expressed by hisses. The matter being afterward mentioned in his presence, some one observed, "that it was extraordinary behaviour for the Peloponnesians, who were beholden to him for important kindnesses." "O," said Philip, "we must not mind such things; for what would their behaviour have been if I had done them ill turns!" The malignant calumnies of the Athenian orators being mentioned before him, "I reckon," said Philip, "that I have great obligation to the Athenian orators, for so compelling me to be careful of all I do and say. It must be my business, by my whole conduct, to prove them scandalous liars." After the battle of Chæronea, when measures were to be taken for profiting from the victory, and giving secure repose to Greece, some of the more violent party-men suggested that garrisons might be put into the citadels of the adverse states, and so their quiet obedience would be insured. "Such harsh measures," said Philip, "might perhaps be most certainly effectual, but I prefer the reputation of being beneficent to that of being powerful."

Consonant to these from Plutarch is an anecdote related by Seneca, in his treatise on Anger. In the distress of Athens, after the battle of Chæronea, occasion requiring a mission to the king of Macedonia, Demochares, one of the coarse popular orators, was appointed with Demades and some others of a different character. What they were instructed to desire was readily granted; and when they were taking leave, Philip politely asked, "If there was any thing more he could do for the Athenian people." Demochares abruptly answered, "Yes, hang thyself." Indignation broke out among those around, and among his colleagues mixed with alarm. But Philip calmed them, saying, "Let him alone; and only assure your fellow-countrymen that those who use such petulance are far less disposed to peace and moderation than he who forgives it."

Seneca de
irá, c. 23.

The extreme profligacy, among the Grecian republics of his age, to which we have observed Demosthenes himself giving the most direct testimony, is very likely to have furnished occasion for a saying attributed to Philip which seems to have been a favourite among ancient and modern writers. Some fortress being spoken of as impregnable, "Could not an ass," said Philip, "laden with gold get into it?"

What he may himself have done by force of gold must ever remain, as formerly has been observed, utterly uncertain. On the other hand, that Demosthenes was the agent of Persia for the distribution of gold among the Grecian republics in the cause adverse to that of which Philip became the patron, seems fully ascertained by his own omission to answer Æschines on that subject; and it may seem likely that he would be occasionally met with his own weapons. But his assertion simply, obvious as the interest is which would urge him to it, cannot reasonably be allowed more

weight than the denial of Philip himself, with expressions of magnanimous scorn, in his celebrated letter to the Athenian people. As far indeed as may be gathered from documents bearing any appearance of impartiality and authenticity, Philip's passions and his policy would both be rather adverse to such a mode of succeeding in his projects. He who, with all his military power, all his military talents, all his personal courage, all his military successes, and all his desire of glory, still professed to prefer conquering by his talent for popularity and persuasion, could surely have no equal gratification in conquering by secret corruption. Nor does it seem easy to discover his want of it. On the contrary, if we should trust his own declaration of his sentiments, as they were expressed and urged, not only in his public letter to the Athenian people, where his own testimony in his own favour will of course be liable to exception, but in written advice to his son Alexander, (and it is to Cicero's M. T. Cic. de Off. 1. 2. c. 15. approving admiration of them we owe the account,) they were very adverse to such a policy.

Some modern writers, admitting, not only the liberal words but also the generous deeds ascribed to Philip, have not simply followed the adverse orator, but outgone him, in imputing all to sinister purposes. The policy, for the orator, is obvious; the fairness or the reasonableness, for his followers, not so; unless they would avow themselves careless of the praise of good, and the reproach of evil deeds, the credit of which such practice goes directly to confound, and indeed to make all virtue among men suspicious and doubtful. Its evil tendency, both in morality and in politics, is glaring.

It has been liberally observed by some French writers to the credit of the English character, that, though nowhere party contentions have been more continual, or civil wars more frequent, than in England, yet nowhere has the violence

of such contest been equally kept within the bounds of reason and humanity. Nevertheless, even in England, the violence of party divisions led the excellent Addison, not writing with party but with moral and philanthropical purposes, to some observations which, as applicable wherever party rages, and not least to Greece in Philip's age, may well deserve

Spectator,
No. 125.

notice here. "A furious party-spirit," he says, "even when under its greatest restraint, breaks out in falsehood, detraction, and calumny: it fills a nation with spleen and rancour, and extinguishes all seeds of good-nature, compassion, and humanity. — A man of merit, holding different political principles, is like an object seen in two different mediums, that appears crooked or broken, however straight and entire it may be in itself. For this reason there is scarcely a person of any figure in England who does not go by two contrary characters, as opposite to one another as light and darkness. — There is one piece of sophistry practised on both sides; and that is the taking any scandalous story, that has ever been whispered or invented, for a known and undoubted truth, and raising suitable speculations upon it. Calumnies, that have been never proved or often refuted, are the ordinary postulatum of these infamous scribblers, upon which they proceed as upon first principles, granted by all men; though in their hearts they know they are false, or at best very doubtful."

An exemplification occurs in a debate before a congress in

Polyb. 1. 9.
p. 591.

Greece, reported by Polybius, in which the character of Philip king of Macedonia is introduced.

One orator begins with stating, as a manifest truth, on which he might safely found his reasoning without danger of contradiction, that Philip, beginning with the Thessalians, reduced Greece to servile subjection. His opponent replies, as confidently, that Philip was notoriously the vindicator of the liberties, of Thessaly especially, but of all Greece. The

former, in proceeding with his argument, unable to deny Philip's magnanimous liberality to Athens after the battle of Chæronea, nevertheless, with the malignity of party-spirit, so justly reprobated by Addison, denies him all credit for virtuous purposes; the will, he asserts, was bad, though the deeds were all beneficent and praiseworthy. For better foundation however for invective, he hastens from Athens to seek evil deeds elsewhere; and in Laconia, he says, lands were wasted, houses demolished, and even towns and territories taken from Lacedæmon under Philip's direction. But even here the admission follows, that those towns and territories were not taken by Philip for himself, but given (or perhaps rather restored) to the Argives, Tegeans, Megalopolitans, and Messenians; and toward all these, it seems allowed, Philip's purposes, as well as his deeds, were beneficent. The other orator then replies triumphantly thus: "Granted; Philip did send an army into Laconia.²⁵ But it is enough known, the Lacedæmonians here present know²⁶, that it was not his desire to interfere: on the contrary, invited, and repeatedly urged, by his friends and allies in Peloponnesus, he with difficulty yielded in any degree to their solicitations and remonstrances. Nor, when at length he did take up the business, was it to use his power, though ample, to subdue or to injure any; but as a beneficent mediator, to repress the violence of his friends, while he struck awe into their enemies, and so brought both to submit their controversies to a peaceful arbitration. Even then he did not assume to himself the decision, but, he referred it to a congress of all Greece; and such was the conduct which it

²⁵ Παρεγγίνετο μετὰ τῆς δυνάμεως, p. 566. The import of this phrase has been considered in a note at the end of the fourth section of the thirty-eighth chapter of this History.

²⁶ Ὑμῶν ἴσται. The speech was especially addressed to the Lacedæmonian members of the congress.

has been proposed to stigmatise, as matter for complaint and reproach among the Greeks!"

There is a remarkable passage of Cicero, not in the torrent of an oration to the Roman people, but in the sober course of his great moral work, where wanting for illustration of his argument a character alike illustrious and worthy, he has chosen the prince who has been now so long here the subject of discourse. "Philip king of Macedonia," he says, "in magnitude of exploits and splendour of glory was excelled by his son; in affability and humanity he was far superior. Alexander's conduct was often most shameful, but Philip was always great." By this splendid eulogy, of few words, Cicero certainly meant to refer the recollection of his own son, whom he was addressing, to historical memorials then extant, though now unknown.

But the judgment of Polybius, for his double advantage of having lived among the dying republics of Greece, and conversed afterward in friendship with the greatest men of Rome, may be reckoned even above Cicero's. That, in his report of the controversy about Philip's conduct, his own sentiments went with the argument of the replying orator, seems sufficiently evident, but, might there be doubt, it is obviated in another passage of his history, where, like Cicero, wanting the example of a great and worthy character, he speaks in his own person of Philip, thus: "The victory over the Athenians at Chæroneia promoted Philip's greatness, and the power and splendour of his kingdom, less through the deed of arms than through the humanity and generosity which he displayed after it. By the former he overcame those arranged in the field against him: by the latter he conquered all the Athenians, so that their republic became in a manner his

M. T. Cic.
de Off. l. 1.
c. 26.

Polyb. 1. 5.
p. 359.

own. Not allowing resentment to influence his measures, he carried the work of war so far only as to command opportunity for using clemency and goodness. He released all his prisoners without ransom; he clothed most of them; he did honour to the slain, sending their bones in procession to Athens, with Antipater commanding. Altogether he so astonished and captivated the minds of the Athenians by his generous magnanimity that, from enemies, they became allies, devoted to his service." The experienced statesman-historian, it is evident, here uses the term "the Athenians" in the common manner of Grecian writers, calling those "the Athenians," and even "all the Athenians," whom he thought most deserving the title, without notice of the powerful opposition, under the lead of Chares, Lycurgus, and Demosthenes.

Under the shadow then of these splendid testimonies, of such high authority, the humbler word of the annalist, whose assistance, in the failure of others, it has been so often necessary to use, not always judicious, but always apparently to the best of his judgment just, may not ill conclude this part of the history. Having related the death of Philip, he proceeds, "Thus fell the greatest potentate of his time in Europe. With very small resources in Diod. l. 16. c. 95. his outset, he acquired the most powerful monarchy that had ever existed among the Greeks. His great success arose less from the force of his arms and the greatness of his victories than from the studious exercise of his extraordinary talent for communication among men, and his obliging disposition and conduct. He is said to have reckoned the valour of the fighting soldier, often as he had made it conspicuous in himself, not matter for the superior officer to glory in. Military science and the power of discourse, the general's skill and the statesman's talent

of discussion, persuasion and conciliation, he esteemed together princely. Upon the latter he chiefly valued himself; for he used to say, ‘The merit of success in battles he could only share with those who fought under him, but his victories by argument, affability, and beneficence were all his own.’ ”

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