






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
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THE
HISTORY OF GREECE.

VOL. IV.

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THE
HISTORY OF GREECE.

BY
WILLIAM MITFORD, ESQ.

A *New* Edition,
WITH NUMEROUS ADDITIONS AND CORRECTIONS.

TO WHICH IS PREFIXED
A BRIEF MEMOIR OF THE AUTHOR,
BY HIS BROTHER, LORD REDESDALE.



IN TEN VOLUMES.
VOL. IV.

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THE
HISTORY OF GREECE.

CHAPTER XVIII.

OF THE AFFAIRS OF SICILY, AND OF THE ATHENIAN EXPEDITION INTO SICILY.

SECTION I.

Affairs of Sicily. — Hieron King of Syracuse. — Expulsion of the Family of Gelon, and Establishment of independent Democracies in the Sicilian Cities. — Agrarian Law. — Ducetius King of the Sicels. — Syracuse the sovereign City of Sicily. — Accession of Syracuse to the Lacedæmonian Confederacy. — War between the Dorian and Ionian Sicilians. — First Interference of Athens in the Affairs of Sicily. — Peace through Sicily procured by Hermocrates of Syracuse.

THE Athenian people, whose numbers were far below the name of a nation, being indeed a very small portion of the Greek nation, but whose men were all soldiers and seamen, possessing a fleet that no one state then on earth could resist, high discipline, military as well as naval, officers of extensive experience, a civil and political system upon the whole admirably arranged, with large revenue from mines and from tributary states; there is no foreseeing how far their tyrannous dominion might not have been extended over Greeks and among foreign nations, but that the folly of democracy unrestrained would of course work its own ruin. The evident weakness in the political conduct of the

only rival power, Lacedæmon, operated to the encouragement of chiefs and people; and, in the same winter in which the inhabitants of the little island of Melos were cut off from the face of the earth, the wild ambition of the people of Athens became eager in project for the conquest of another island, many times larger, not only than Melos, but than Attica; ignorant at the same time, almost all of them, of its magnitude, its population, its value if conquered, and its means to resist conquest.

In the succinct history of Sicily formerly given, we have seen Gelon, from a private citizen of Gela, become king of that city and of Syracuse, and head of the Grecian interest in the island. His dominion comprehended all the Grecian settlements on the eastern coast, the greatest part of those on the southern, with some on the northern, and extensive command over the inland

barbarians. After an illustrious reign of only seven years, dying at no very advanced age, in the next year, if we can understand and may trust Diodorus, after the glorious battle of Himera, he was succeeded by his brother Hieron. The only other considerable power in Sicily was that of Theron prince of Agrigentum; who, like Gelon, had raised himself from a private station, and had also merited his advancement. He outlived Gelon, according to Diodorus, seven years, dying

in the first of the seventy-seventh Olympiad, after a reign of only ten. His son Thrasydæus, who succeeded him, was of a different character: arrogant abroad, as tyrannical at home, he engaged in war with Hieron. Being defeated, he lost the respect of his own people; and flying, for refuge from their animosity, to the Nisæan Megarians, was by them put to death. His opponents made peace with the Syracusan prince, and a republican form of government was restored.

Thucyd. l. 6.
c. 1. Plut. vit.
Nic.

Ch. 10. of this
Hist.

Arist. de Rep.
l. 5. c. 12.
Diod. l. 11.
c. 38. B.C. 479.
[B.C. 478. Cl.]

B. C. 472.

Gelon's reign was too short for completing a work of such complex difficulty as that of moulding into one regular government, and well fixing in their several places, the many parts, little disposed to coalesce, of which his dominion consisted. His policy had made Syracuse a very large city. Probably before his accession its population was become too great to be contained within the limits of Ortygia, the original site. The narrow channel, separating that island from the northern shore of the bay, was in part filled, and the town was extended upon the main land. The increase of inhabitants under Gelon however required a very great addition of buildings. Among the advantages of the situation was an inexhaustible store of freestone under the soil, of a kind easily wrought, yet, after exposure to the weather, sufficiently hard. On the northern side of the harbour a hill, composed entirely of such stone, was, in extent and form, commodious for the site of the new town. Rising precipitous from the sea and from the plain, so that slight fortifications would be strong defences, its height was moderate, and its summit level; the western end only rising into lofty crags. The level part, near ten miles in circuit, became entirely covered by the new town; which was divided by fortifications into two parts, with the names of Achradina and Tyche; the former eastward against the sea, the other reaching westward toward the craggy height; so that Syracuse consisted now of three towns, Achradina, Tyche, and Ortygia, capable of separate defence against a common enemy, or against each other. Whether the fourth, with the name of Neapolis, Newtown, stretching along the shore of the great port, below Tyche, toward the river Anapus, had its beginning under Hieron, seems uncertain. The extraordinary extent and population however, which Syracuse finally acquired, will be matter for future notice.

Hieron, as well as Gelon, was a man of superior character, but of a character less exactly fitted for the difficult situation to which, on his brother's death, he succeeded. Learned and a munificent encourager of learning; splendid and of elegant taste; humane and of fine feelings; he was rather qualified to preside beneficially and with dignity over an established government, than to direct the affairs of a state so compounded as that of which Syracuse was the capital. He had talents for war, which he had displayed under his brother's reign. After he came himself to the throne, no dispute with foreign powers required his personal exertion in military command; but his fleet relieved the Cumæans of Italy by a victory over the Tuscan fleet. In peace therefore his wealth enabled him, as his taste disposed him, to shine in the costly race of chariots on the Olympian course, and liberally to reward those who had talents for mixing his fame with the achievements of his coursers there. Accordingly the poetical abilities of Pindar have been peculiarly dedicated to promote the renown of Hieron. At the same time men of genius from various parts of Greece were entertained in his court; among whom the poets Æschylus, Simonides, and Bacchylides, are principally mentioned. Yet, if we may trust that elegant dialogue remaining from Xenophon, in which Hieron and Simonides are the supposed speakers, he was utterly unable to accomplish his anxious wish for changing the nature of his government, and converting his tyranny into a constitutional monarchy. He there pathetically laments that, while his subjects could pass, as business or amusement led them, wherever they pleased, without fear, he could be free from apprehension nowhere: he must go, as tyrants it seems usually did, himself constantly armed, as well as surrounded by armed attendants; and he particularly regrets

Demetr. de
Eloc. s. 312.

Xenoph.
Hieron.

Diod. 1. 11.
c. 51. Ol. 76. 3.

that his subjects (not all, nor in any probability, a majority, but a party) were more to be dreaded by him than any foreign enemy. Apparently Hieron had not the art, like Gelon, to mediate between the higher and lower ranks of citizens, and compose their jarring pretensions. His disposition led him to be more attentive to the splendour of his court, the conversation of men of genius and science, and perhaps the great business of fleets, armies, and foreign connections, than to the detail of interior government, and the secret workings of political fermentation. It is not unlikely that, disgusted with petulance and illiberality, he might show himself indisposed to the democratical interest, more than political prudence would allow. For the lower people of the Greeks, unlike those of the freest and most high-spirited nations of modern Europe, who are generally the most orderly as well as the most industrious, were, on the contrary, disdainful of labour, as the office of slaves, and, unless in military employment, busy only in faction. Of particulars we are not informed, but we learn that to hold his high station, and support those who supported him, Hieron was reduced, against his nature, to use severities. He died nevertheless in peace, in the eleventh year of his reign, and was succeeded in his authority by his younger brother Thrasybulus.

Xen. Hier.
Aristot. de
Rep. l. 5. c. 12.
Diod. l. 11.
c. 66.

Ol. 78. 2.
B. C. 467.

The circumstances of the revolution, which quickly followed, are very deficiently reported. Thrasybulus is accused of cruel severity, and a conduct generally despotic. The democratical party were certainly strong throughout the cities of his dominion: they engaged in their cause those who held the principal sway in Agrigentum, Himera, Selinus, and some other towns, and then openly revolted. The people of higher rank however generally adhered to Thrasybulus; and the two parties divided the

Diod. l. 11.
c. 67, 68.

city itself of Syracuse between them; Thrasybulus maintaining himself in Ortygia and Achradina, while the rest was occupied by the insurgents. War was thus carried on for some time: but at length Thrasybulus, finding his force insufficient for any hope of final success, retired to Locri in Italy, where he passed the remainder of his days in private life.

Diodorus is, unfortunately, the only author from whom we have any account, with any attempt at connection, of these and the ensuing events; which could not but abound in political matter, at the same time curious and instructive. His concise narrative of the demolition of Gelon's fabric of empire is little consistent with what we learn, from the more authentic pen of Herodotus, concerning its establishment, and as little consistent with the account given, even by himself, of Gelon's uncommon popularity while he lived, and of the high respect in which his memory continued for ages to be held. It is a confused mass, injudiciously compounded of the contradictory reports evidently of contending factions. Nevertheless, comparing that narrative, such as it is, with the purer though more scanty sources of Herodotus and Thucydides, we may acquire some general idea, not wholly unsatisfactory, of the train and of the character of political events in Sicily.

Diod. c. 72.
Ol. 79. 2.
B. C. 465.
[B. C. 466.
Cl. *]

On the expulsion of Thrasybulus, the democratical party everywhere predominating, and the democracy of Syracuse not being yet strong or settled enough to assert command, every town of the dominion of the tyrants assumed its separate independency. But as the acquisition had been effected through communication among all, it was proposed still to secure it by friendly

[* " Thrasybulus of Syracuse ἤρξε Συρακουσίων ἐνιαυτὸν ἕνα. Diod. xi. 66.
ἐξέπαισε τῆς ἀρχῆς ἐπὶ Λυσανίου. Diod. xi. 67." Fasti Hellen.
p. 38.]

political intercourse; and for this purpose a congress was held, of deputies from the several towns. The principal measures of this meeting, reported by Diodorus, strongly mark the democratical principle by which it was animated. A festival was established, to be called the Eleutheria or Feast of Freedom, common for all the Sicilian cities, at whose common expense a colossal statue of the Eleutherian Jupiter was to be erected; and, on every return of the festival, four hundred and fifty oxen were to be sacrificed, whose carcasses should regale the citizens entitled to partake in the rites. At the same time it was resolved that no less than seven thousand citizens, (if we may trust our copies of Diodorus,) including most of the principal families, should no longer be competent for the honours of magistracy in the commonwealth. The historian, with much apparent reason, ascribes to this source the long troubles that followed. Those injured men, refusing to acquiesce under the tyrannous decree, possessed themselves of two divisions of the city, Achradina and Ortygia, and waged war by land and sea against their opponents. About the same time, and from similar causes, troubles nearly similar arose in Agrigentum, Gela, Himera, Messena, and Catana. Everywhere the parties were nearly balanced; cultivation was interrupted; produce was destroyed; and the acquisition of freedom, as it was called, involved one of the most productive countries upon earth, after much ineffectual bloodshed, in universal want. This at length produced a general composition; retreat was provided for those who could not accommodate matters with the prevailing party in their respective towns, by allotting a portion of the Messenian territory for their possession, and thus it was hoped tranquillity might have been restored to the island.

But in every little state lands thus were left to become public property, or to be assigned to new individual owners.

Everywhere then that favourite measure of democracy, the equal division of all the lands of the state, was resolved upon; a measure impossible to be perfectly executed; impossible to be maintained as executed; and of very doubtful advantage, if it could be perfectly executed and perfectly maintained. The attempt produced neither the proposed quiet, nor any other public benefit, in Sicily. Private interest and party interest were everywhere busy and everywhere powerful. In the inscription of citizens, many, through favour of leading men, were admitted hastily and with little examination; others were arbitrarily rejected: many, even of those benefited by acquisition of land, envied those who had portions more fruitful or better situated; while many others, deprived of former property and former municipal rights, were reduced to the condition of vagabonds and beggars. New and violent dissensions followed. In many towns the government, with the favourite name of democracy, was so unsteady that, through the discontent of the lower people, sometimes arising from caprice, sometimes from oppression, temptation arose for men, who, through either talents or wealth, or both, could acquire a powerful popularity, to aspire to tyranny. In Syracuse especially this occurred; but of many adventurers none succeeded: Tyndarion lost his life in the attempt. It was however among the Greeks so common to impute the purpose of tyranny, and even to give the title of tyrant, to the leader of an adverse party, that the value of the terms, as we find them used by ancient authors, is often very uncertain.

Diod. l. 11.
c. 85.

c. 86.

Ol. 81. 3.
B. C. 454.

After the death of Tyndarion, Syracuse seems to have enjoyed a short season of rest under democratical government; and in this period an exertion was made against a foreign foe, which proved, that amid all the troubles, foreign com-

merce had not ceased, and the marine of Syracuse was not wholly decayed. The Tuscans, long powerful pirates in the western parts of the Mediterranean, but repressed by the able and vigorous exertions of Gelon and Hieron, took advantage of the dissensions among the Sicilian commonwealths to renew their depredations on the Grecian commerce and coasts. The Syracusans fitted a fleet of sixty triremes, which, under the command of Apelles, spread terror through the Tuscan seas; and, a debarkation being made in Corsica, then chiefly under the Tuscan dominion, the coast was plundered, the town of Æthalia taken, and the fleet returned to Sicily laden with booty, particularly prisoners, who were made valuable as slaves.

B. C. 453.
Ol. 81. 4.
Diod. l. 11.
c. 67.

Meanwhile the ancient possessors of Sicily, called by the Greeks barbarians, who still held the inland parts, gained, from the long distraction of the Grecian interest, a respite from oppression. This was so ably used by a Sicel prince, Ducetius, that he became the principal potentate of the island. The Sicels, long confined to strong holds among the hills, carrying thither from the vales whatever of their harvests they could save from the rapacity of the Greeks, and cultivating the vales only as they could snatch opportunity, at the risk of being carried off for slaves, had maintained little connection among themselves; every village had its separate and independent polity.

c. 78.

Ducetius united all, except the Hyblæans, under one dominion; and then he ventured to move his residence and the seat of his government from Neæ, among the mountains, to a new town which he founded, with the name of Palice, in the vale beneath. Thus he would of course acquire more complete command of that vale, and more effectually vindicate its produce. Whether ambition or political necessity produced the measures which followed we are

c. 87.

Diod. l. 2.
c. 90. Ol. 82.1.
B. C. 452.

without means to know. Ducetius, becoming engaged in war with the Agrigentines, took Motya, then held by an Agrigentine garrison; and, the Syracusans sending assistance to the Agrigentines, he defeated their united forces. Popular rage, at Syracuse, wreaked its illiberal vengeance against the unfortunate general who had commanded; he was condemned to suffer death as a traitor, and executed. But, when popular passion subsiding gave room for reflection, wiser measures were adopted. The power, the proved abilities, and the various successes of Ducetius, excited general apprehension among the Sicilian Greeks, unaccustomed to such a potentate within their island. The Syracusans and Agrigentines taking together the lead, a large force was in the next summer collected; a battle was fought, and after a very obstinate resistance, the Sicels were routed. The Agrigentines quickly retook Motya, and then rejoining the Syracusans, their united forces followed the motions of the Sikel prince.

Ducetius had not the resources of a settled government, or of the command of a civilised nation. Deserted by some of the troops who had attended his first flight, and upon the point of being betrayed by some of those who still accompanied him, he took a measure which the completest despair only could dictate. Mounting his horse by night, he rode alone into Syracuse, and placed himself at an altar in the agora. Early in the morning the circumstance becoming known, the magistrates assembled the people, to receive their orders for measures to be taken with a suppliant of such importance. Diodorus, the warm advocate of the Sicilian Greeks, acknowledges that some among the Syracusans thought only of revenge against the unhappy prince, for what they had suffered from his able conduct in war against them. A majority however was decided by more generous sentiments, and probably a better policy. To per-

Diod. l. 11.
c. 91.

mit him to remain in Sicily being judged inexpedient, he was conducted to Corinth, where he was liberally maintained at the public expense of the Syracusan commonwealth.

The government of Syracuse, after a long course of troubles, appears at this time to have been settled into some consistency; and the city, large, populous, and wealthy, began to feel its weight in the scale of Sicilian politics. The people of the smaller towns were become sensible that they had been making themselves miserable for an independency which they could not maintain, that they were equally unable to coalesce in federal union, and that they must unavoidably lean upon a superior. The only competitor with Syracuse for superiority among the Sicilian towns was Agrigentum; and while the competition remained, peace could not easily hold between them. The Syracusan chiefs brought back Ducetius from Corinth, apparently to make him instrumental to their own views for advancing the power of their commonwealth. They permitted or rather encouraged him to establish a colony of mixed people, Greeks and Sicels, at *Cale Acte*, on the northern coast of the island. This by the Agrigentines was considered as a measure inimical to them: war followed; the Agrigentines, defeated, were compelled to receive terms of peace from Syracuse, and thus the Syracusan democracy became decidedly the leading power among the Greeks of Sicily.

One Sicel town, *Trinacia*, among all the troubles of the island, had always preserved independency; and its people, of those within Sicily, excepting the Carthaginian garrisons and perhaps the Elymian towns, now alone refused to acknowledge the sovereignty of the people of Syracuse. This was deemed by the Syracusans a sufficient cause for war; and, after a most gallant resistance, the wretched barbarians were compelled to yield. All the principal men of vigorous age had first fallen in action;

Diod. 1. 12.
c. 9. Ol. 83. 3.
B.C. 446.

Diod. 1. 12.
c. 26. c. 29.

Ol. 84. 4.
B. C. 441.

the elder, to avoid the ignominy and misery of servitude or of massacre from the hands of their implacable enemies, put themselves to death; the surviving inhabitants were made slaves, and the town was destroyed.

Diod. 1. 12.
c. 30.

The Syracusans, having thus overborne opposition, proceeded to take measures for securing the dominion they had acquired. They exacted tribute, and from time to time augmented the exaction, from all the cities of the island. With the revenue thus arising they increased

Thucyd.

their navy and their establishment of cavalry; and, when the Peloponnesian war broke out, Syracuse, by its extent of dominion, and its naval force, was among the most powerful of the Grecian republics. Its alliance was therefore a great object for both the contending powers. As a Dorian people the Syracusans were disposed to favour the Peloponnesians, and actually engaged in their confederacy; but, as democratical, they were not zealous in a cause which was in so great a degree the cause of oligarchy. Circumstances moreover quickly arose, within their island, to prevent them from giving that assistance which the Peloponnesians hoped, and which, strong as Syracuse was in marine, had its force been exerted while Athens was weak from pestilence and revolt, might have given a very different turn to the war.

Thucyd. 1. 3.

c. 86. Diod.

1. 12. c. 53.

B. C. 428.¹

Ol. 87.4—88.1.

But the empire of democracy being of course oppressive, opportunity only was wanting for revolt against that of Syracuse. The Leontines, whether suffering more than others, or encouraged by better hope of foreign assistance, were the first to resist. They were of Ionian origin, from Chalcis in Eubœa, and their revolt was a signal for all the Ionian states in Sicily to take

¹ This date is gathered from the circumstances. Thucydides has not specified the time when the war began, and Diodorus is inaccurate.

arms against Syracuse. The powerful city of Rhegium in Italy, whose people were also partly of Chalcidian race, joined them. Camarina moreover, originally a Dorian city, (how repeopled, after the removal of its inhabitants to Syracuse under Gelon, we are uninformed,) having however particular quarrel with Syracuse, joined the Ionian confederacy. But all the other Dorian cities, more numerous and powerful than the Ionian, adhered to the Syracusans; and the Epizephyrian Locrians of Italy concurred in their alliance.

In the fifth year of the Peloponnesian war, B. C. 427. during the revolt of Lesbos and the sedition of Corcyra, the Syracusans, already undisputed masters of the field, blockaded Leontini by land and sea. The Ionian towns then all trembled for their fate: subjection, still more severe than that which had excited the revolt, would be the certain consequence of the fall of Leontini, which they were unable to relieve. In these circumstances, and under these apprehensions, they turned their thoughts to Athens, as the mother-state of the Ionian blood; and a deputation was sent thither to request assistance, urging the claim, not only of consanguinity, but also of ancient treaties of alliance.

The factions of Sicily, and the general prevalence of democracy, had promoted the cultivation of oratory. Gorgias of Leontini is reported to have been the first rhetorician who reduced his profession to an art, which he taught for pay; and he was at this time in high reputation. Gorgias, according to Diodorus, was placed at the head of the embassy to Athens; and the novelty of his artificial and flowery eloquence, though afterward justly reprobated by maturer Attic taste, is said to have then wonderfully captivated the Athenian people. The season however was favourable for the effect of his talents: the rebellious Mitylenæans had recently yielded to the arms of Paches; and the Athenian interest triumphed in Corcyra, under the auspices of the

Athenian admiral Eurymedon, through the horrid massacre of the oligarchal party there. Nor were inducements wanting for the interference of the Athenian government in the affairs of Sicily. The Peloponnesians derived thence supplies of corn, which, by a squadron in the Sicilian seas, or rather, according to the manner of cruising among the ancients, on the Sicilian coast, it was proposed to stop. Hopes moreover were entertained that, under the name of alliance, the Athenian dominion might be extended in Sicily; which would bring, at the same time, increase of income to the state, increase of office and emolument for powerful men, and increase of importance, with opportunities for profit, regular and irregular, to every Athenian citizen. Thus incited, in opposition to the salutary advice left them as a legacy by their great minister Pericles, the Athenians engaged in the affairs of Sicily. A squadron of twenty ships of war, under Laches son of Melanopus, and Charœades son of Euphiletus, sent in the autumn to assist the Leontines, took its station in the friendly port of Rhegium.

The immediate effect of this re-enforcement, as appears from the tenor of the narrative of Thucydides, was, that the blockade of Leontini by sea was abandoned or became ineffectual, and supplies could be introduced. In the winter an expedition was undertaken by the Athenian commanders against the Liparæan, called also the Æolian islands, inhabited by a colony of Greeks from Cnidos. The Liparæans held alliance with the Syracusans, and probably were troublesome to the Rhegians and their allies by maritime depredation. The measures of the Athenians against them however failed.

In the following summer the relief of Leontini from the land blockade being attempted, Charœades fell in action. Laches nevertheless, con-

Thucyd. 1. 3.
c. 86.

B. C. 427.
Ol. 88. ½.
P. W. 5.

Thucyd. 1. 3.
c. 115. & 1. 4.
c. 25.

1. 3. c. 88.

B. C. 426.
Ol. 88. 2-3.
P. W. 6.
Thucyd. 1. 3.
c. 90.

ducting the allied forces against Messena, took that city by capitulation, and then sailing to the Epizephyrian Locrian coast, ravaged the country, defeated the Locrians, who came out to protect it, and took the small town of Peripolium. Thucyd. l. 3. c. 90.

In the next winter an attempt was made against the citadel of Nessa in Sicily, held by a Syracusan garrison; but the allies were compelled to retire with loss. c. 105. The Syracusans then, decidedly superior by land, but excluded by a squadron of only twenty triremes from their own seas, where they had long been accustomed to command, resolved to restore their marine, of late neglected, and give battle to the enemy's fleet. Intelligence of this was forwarded to Athens, with a request for re-enforcement; and, the success already obtained encouraging the Athenian government, it was determined to send such a fleet as should at once give superiority beyond competition at sea, and, it was hoped, command speedy success in the final object of the war. Pythodorus son of Isolochus was forwarded immediately with a small squadron to supersede Laches in the command in chief, while triremes were preparing, in the port of Piræus, to follow in spring under Eurymedon son of Theocles and Sophocles son of Sostratidas, which should make the number of the relieving fleet sixty.

This change in the command seems not to have been advantageous. The conduct of Laches in Italy and Sicily, apparently judicious and vigorous, had been, for the force he commanded, successful; and the situations in which we afterward find him prove that his estimation was not mean in Athens or in Greece. He was the person to whom, together with Nicias, the Lacedæmonian government always applied, when business was to be transacted with the government of Athens. When the truce for fifty years was

made with Lacedæmon, he was the person appointed to the dignified office of pronouncing the prayer, that the event might be fortunate for the commonwealth: when the war between Argos and Lacedæmon broke out, he commanded the Athenian auxiliary forces in the army of the Argive confederacy; and he lost his life, as we have seen, in conducting the gallant, and, for the circumstances, successful retreat of those troops, from the unfortunate field of Mantinea. His successor in the Sicilian command began his operations inauspiciously: debarking his forces on the Locrrian coast, near the town of Peripolium, which Laches had taken, he was attacked by the Locrians, and compelled to retire with loss.

Thucyd. 1. 3.
c. 103.

c. 106.

The following spring was rendered remarkable by an eruption of Mount Ætna, the third remembered among the Greeks, from their first establishment in Sicily. The boiling matter overflowed a part of the Catanian territory, but did not affect the town. In the beginning of summer, faction disabling the Rhegian government, and the Athenian general being either weak or remiss in his command, the Syracusans, through intelligence in Messena, recovered that important place. It was about this time that Demosthenes engaged in his extraordinary attempt at Pylus, which ended so advantageously for Athens. Intelligence arrived at Syracuse, that the fleet under Eurymedon and Sophocles, destined to re-enforce Pythodorus, instead of advancing from Corcyra, had returned to the Peloponnesian coast, and was likely to be detained there. The opportunity seemed favourable for the Syracusans to try a naval action; but they could assemble, in the harbour of Messena, no more than thirty triremes. Pythodorus however had only sixteen Athenian and eight Rhegian. Coming to action nevertheless in that strait so celebrated for the

B. C. 426.

P. W. 6.

Thucyd. 1. 4.

c. 1.

1. 5. c. 25.

poetical terrors of Charybdis and Scylla, he gained the advantage, but it was not decisive.

The circumstances of Camarina then, sedition raging, and the Syracusan party nearly prevailing, induced him to lead his whole fleet thither. He saved Camarina; but the opportunity of his absence was taken by the enemy for marching against Naxos, a Chalcidian city of the Ionian confederacy, not far from Messena. The Naxians however were fortunate in alliance with the Sicel barbarians of their neighbourhood. These no sooner heard of the distress of their friends than they came, in large force, to their relief. They attacked the besieging army: the Naxians sallied opportunely: of the Messenians and others, of the Dorian forces, more than a thousand were killed upon the spot, and, of the rest, only a small proportion escaped the hands of the pursuing barbarians. The Syracusan fleet, deprived thus of a land force on which it could depend for protection, such was the ancient marine, dared no longer await the return of the Athenian fleet to Messena. The Leontines, the blockade of their town by land having been already abandoned, then marched to co-operate with the Athenian fleet in an attack upon Messena. The attempt however failed; and, the Athenian armament remaining inactive during the rest of the summer and all the following winter, though hostilities were continued among the Sicilian Greeks, nothing important resulted.

Meanwhile the fame of the various successes of Athens, and of the general turn in the fortune of Thucyd. l. 5. c. 58. & seq. the war, contrary to the expectation of all Greece, in favour of that ambitious and restless republic, raised alarm among thinking men; and this was increased by the arrival of the fleet under Eurymedon and Sophocles in the Sicilian seas. During the winter, Camarina and Gela, neighbour cities of Sicily, not actuated by any extensive view, but merely con-

sidering the separate convenience of their own communities, concluded a peace between themselves, for themselves only; each city bound to the conditions of its former confederacy for all purposes of war against other states. But the superior political importance of Syracuse gave larger views to its leaders; among whom Hermocrates son of Hermon was rising to eminence, for abilities, courage, activity, and, above all, for a disposition truly patriotic. The small beginning of peaceful measures, made by the Camarinæans and Geloans, appeared to Hermocrates a favourable opening for proposals for a general peace. He first prevailed with his own city, and then procured a congress of ministers, at Gela, from all the cities of the island. A variety of clashing interests, among so many little states, made accommodation difficult; but the eloquence of Hermocrates displayed so forcibly the danger of foreign interference, and particularly of Athenian interference, and urged so plausibly the evident disinterestedness of Syracuse, decidedly superior in the war, and no way pressed to promote peace but by the desire of benefits and the apprehension of evils which would involve all Sicily, that he finally prevailed. A general peace was concluded, by the conditions of which every city retained what it held at the time, except that, for a stipulated sum, the Syracusans restored Morgantina to the Camarinæans.

The success of Hermocrates in this negotiation effectually checked the ambitious views of the Athenians upon Sicily. The commanders of the fleet, seeing no opportunity for farther service to their country, sailed home. Indignation however met them from their sovereign the people, for permitting their allies to make peace: Pythodorus and Sophocles were punished with banishment. It may seem to have been the services of Eurymedon at Corcyra and at Pylus that saved him from so severe a sentence, but he was condemned to a fine.

SECTION II.

New Troubles in Sicily. — New Interference of Athens ; stopped by the Peace between Athens and Lacedæmon. — Assistance solicited from Athens by Egesta against Selinus. — Contention of Parties at Athens. — Banishment of Hyperbolus. — Assistance to Egesta voted by the Athenian Assembly. — Nicias, Alcibiades, and Lamachus appointed to command. — Mutilation of the Terms of Mercury, and Consequences. — Completion of the Preparations for the Sicilian Expedition, and Departure of the Fleet.

HERMOCRATES, it appears, had no idea, and, indeed, Thucydides seems to have had no idea, of ^{Thucyd. 1. 5. c. 4.} the possibility of moulding all the Sicilian Greek municipal governments into one commonwealth, or even of establishing among them an effective federal union. The Sicilian patriot is represented, by the statesman-historian, admonishing the congress only to exclude foreign interference, and such wars as might arise among themselves would have no very important ill consequences. Through such extreme deficiency in Grecian politics new troubles quickly arose in Sicily. Time and various circumstances had greatly altered the state of property in all the Sicilian commonwealths, since that incomplete and iniquitous partition of lands which had been made, on the general establishment of democratical government, after the expulsion of the family of Gelon. In other cities the poor rested under their lot ; but in Leontini, probably more landholders having been dispossessed, they were warm in project for a fresh and equal partition ; and, to strengthen themselves against the party of the wealthy, they carried, in the general assembly, a decree for associating a number of new citizens. The landowners, thus, not only upon the point of being deprived of their patrimonies, but exposed to every kind and degree of oppression from the despotic power acquired by

their adversaries, applied to Syracuse for protection ; and, with assistance thence, expelled their opponents. Whether it might have been possible, by any milder expedient, to have obtained any reasonable security for themselves, considering all we learn of the common temper of faction among the Greeks, must appear at least doubtful. It was however hardly possible that the violent measure adopted could place them at ease. Having only their slaves to divide offices with them, the business and the burden of arms must be exclusively their own, in circumstances requiring the most watchful attention of a garrison. For not only the worst evils that man can inflict on man were constantly to be apprehended from the vengeance of the expelled, but the produce of their fields could not be vindicated, and their subsistence insured, without constant exertion against plunderers, or constant readiness for exertion. The Syracusans therefore carrying their liberal kindness so far as to offer all the Leontine landowners admission into the number of Syracusan citizens, all migrated to Syracuse, and Leontini was totally deserted.

What, in their new situation, offended or alarmed these men, apparently so generously relieved, we are not informed ; but there seems ground for conjecture that it was some violence, committed or threatened, by the democratical party in Syracuse. A number of them quitted that city in disgust, and seizing a part of the town of Leontini, called Phoceæ, and a fort in the Leontine territory named Bricinnia, they invited their own expelled lower people to join them. Many of these, who had been wandering about Sicily, mostly in sufficient distress, accepted the invitation ; and predatory war upon the Leontine and Syracusan territories became the resource of all for subsistence.

Intelligence of the expulsion of all the commonalty from the principal Ionic city of Sicily would not be received with

satisfaction at Athens. It was quickly followed by information of the partial revival of the democracy of Leontini, through the establishments made in Phoceæ and Bricinnæ. The resolution was then taken to send ministers to Sicily, to discover the strength of the Athenian interest throughout the island, and to promote a league hostile to Syracuse. Phæax son of Erasistratus was sent, with two others, to manage this business; and he seems to have conducted it ably. Urging, both in public harangue and in colloquial communication, the notorious oppression of the Leontine people, and the evident disposition of Syracuse to assume tyrannical sovereignty over all Sicily, he succeeded with the powerful states of Agrigentum and Camarina. At Gela he failed; and finding no promising prospect in any other city, he passed through the country of the Sicels to Bricinnæ. The garrison there was greatly encouraged by his information of the alliances he had procured for them in Sicily, and by his assurances of assistance from Athens. Returning then homeward by sea in the usual course, by the Italian coast, in his way he increased the Athenian interest in those parts by an advantageous treaty which he concluded with the Epizephyrian Locrians.

This prosperous beginning toward a restoration of Athenian influence in Sicily through a revival of troubles among the Grecian colonies there, was early checked by the event of the battle of Amphipolis, which happened in the summer of the same year. The negotiations for peace between Athens and Lacedæmon, begun in the succeeding autumn, were brought to a conclusion in the following spring. The party of Nicias then predominated: the maxims of Pericles again swayed the Athenian councils; views of farther acquisition to the dominion of the commonwealth were rejected, and all interference in the affairs of Sicily dropped.

The interest of the principal states of Greece in Sicilian

affairs thus ceasing, information concerning them for nearly six following years is little. But in that interval war arose between two small republics, toward the western end of the island, Selinus and Egesta. This, according to the political

Thucyd. 1. 6.
c. 6.

doctrine maintained by Hermocrates, in his speeches to the Sicilian congress, could have no important ill consequences, provided foreign interference were excluded. The Selinuntines accordingly obtained assistance from Syracuse. But the Egestians, unable to obtain any balancing support within Sicily, found themselves thus effectually deprived of their portion of safety and happiness among the Sicilian people; for they were presently blockaded by sea and land. Pressed therefore by the apprehension of what usually befel a captured town from a Grecian enemy, they determined to seek foreign aid; and none appeared so likely to be obtained and to be effectual as that of

B. C. 422.
Ol. 90. 4.—91. 1.
P. W. 16.

Athens. Ministers were accordingly sent, who urged arguments which might not unreasonably have weight with the Athenian people. "The Syracusans," they observed, "had already exterminated the Leontines, a people connected with the Athenians, not only by ancient alliance, but by blood. If this passed with impunity, and not this only, but that domineering people were permitted to go on oppressing all the allies of Athens in Sicily, let it be considered what a force might accrue to the Peloponnesian confederacy, in a future, nay, a now impending war." To these arguments assurances were added, that the Egestians wanted only troops, their wealth being ample.

Athens was at this time more than usually agitated by faction. Alcibiades, checked in his ambitious views by the event of the sedition of Argos, which had nearly annihilated his extraordinary influence in Peloponnesus, was looking around for new opportunity of enterprise, and his purpose to engage the commonwealth in war again was noto-

rious. The party of Nicias dreaded war on its own account, but still more on account of the increase of influence and authority which would ensue to Alcibiades; and they vigilantly opposed all his measures. This contest was favourable to Hyperbolus, who had still great weight, through the support of that body of the citizens which had raised Cleon to greatness. Hyperbolus had nearly overborne Nicias by vehemence of railing and by threatening prosecutions; but he could not so overbear Alcibiades. Against him therefore he directed another kind of policy. The vast ambition of Alcibiades, his splendid manner of living, and the superiority he affected in every thing, gave occasion for the suggestion, which was sedulously circulated among the people, that his power and influence were greater than could be safe in a democracy, and that the ostracism was necessary to bring men to a just level. Alcibiades and his friends were alarmed at this idea, and at the readiness with which the people appeared to receive it. They endeavoured at first to counterwork it by urging, that not Alcibiades, whose power rested entirely on the favour of the people, but Nicias and the aristocratical party were the persons really to be feared: and the banishment of the head of that party would best restore a just equilibrium in the commonwealth. Hyperbolus used all his art to inflame the dispute, and at the same time to set the people equally against both the leaders. His influence was such that it was evidently in his power to decide which of the two should be banished. But he had a politician to encounter, such as Cleon never met with. Alcibiades communicated with Nicias; an assembly of the people was held; both collected their strength; and Hyperbolus was named as a person, by his weight, influence, and seditious designs, dangerous to the commonwealth. The people were surprised; for no man of his mean condition was ever before proposed as a subject

Plut. vit. Nic.
& Alcib.

for the ostracism. But the Athenian people loved a joke; and this appeared a good one: they would honour him by ranking him with Miltiades, Aristides, Themistocles, and Cimon. To the whim of a thoughtless multitude was added all the weight of interest of Alcibiades and Nicias, and the banishment of Hyperbolus was decided.

The coalition of parties however lasted no longer than to strike this blow against a man whom both feared. One was still as earnest for war as the other anxious to maintain peace. The embassy from Egesta afforded an opportunity such as Alcibiades wished. As general of the commonwealth, for he still held that office, he received the ministers in the most favourable manner, and warmly recommended their cause to the people. None of his measures seem to have been opposed with more effort by the party of Nicias. For a time they prevented any decision in favour of the Egestans. But at length the various arguments and repeated supplications, which the authority and influence of the general gave opportunity to urge, in some degree prevailed with the people. In the autumn of the sixteenth year of the war, while the Melians were still resisting the Athenian forces, and about the time that the Lacedæmonians were so inefficiently employed in establishing their Argive friends in Orneæ, commissioners were sent into Sicily to gain information of the state of things, and particularly to inquire whether the Egestans really possessed those funds, for supporting a large armament, which their ministers pretended.

B. C. 415.
Ol. 91. 1.
P. W. 17.
Thucyd. 1. 6.
c. 8.

In the following spring, the commissioners returned, accompanied by new ministers from Egesta; who brought with them sixty talents in silver, about fifteen thousand pounds sterling, as a month's pay in advance for sixty triremes, which they were directed to request. With this specious voucher in their hands, they were introduced into the Athenian assembly. The com-

missioners, devoted to the party of Alcibiades, concurred with them in every representation, true or false, that might induce the people to vote the assistance desired; not scrupling to add their testimony to the assertion, that the sum produced bore but a small proportion to the resources of the treasury of Eggesta and the wealth of its temples. This was found afterward to be a gross imposition; but the assembly was persuaded, and the decree passed for sending the sixty triremes.

The policy of Alcibiades upon this occasion, unnoticed by Plutarch and all the later writers, is however not very defectively unfolded in the simple and concise statement of facts by Thucydides. Though Nicias so vehemently opposed the favourite measure of Alcibiades, yet Alcibiades would not appear the opponent of Nicias: on the contrary, he would use the weight and influence of Nicias against Nicias himself. The decree for sending a force to Sicily being carried, the commanders were to be named. The partisans of Alcibiades were still the proposers of all measures, yet Nicias was named first in command; Alcibiades second; and, for a third, Lamachus was chosen, a man of birth, who, though yet in the prime of life, had seen much service, but a soldier of fortune, of a dissipated turn, and of no great weight, either by abilities or property. Instructions were then voted, that the generals should use the force committed to them, first, to give security to Eggesta against the Selinuntines; then to restore the commonwealth of Leontini; and afterward to take any measures they might judge proper for promoting the Athenian interest in Sicily. For carrying into effect these purposes, it was decreed that they should have discretionary powers.

Aristoph.
Acharn. v.
597. 601. 615.
et Pax, v. 604.

Such rapid decision could not but be hazardous, where the measures of executive government were directed by a

whole people. But it was the object of Alcibiades and his party not to let popular passion cool. Four days only were allowed before a second assembly was held, to decide upon the detail of the armament, and to grant any requisition of the generals, for which a vote of the people might be necessary. Nicias, unprepared before to oppose a decree which had appointed him to a great command unsought, now stepped forward to admonish the multitude his sovereign.

Thucyd. l. 6.
c. 9. “To urge to Athenian tempers,” he said, “that in reason they should rather take measures to secure what they already possess, than engage in wild projects for farther acquisition, I fear will be vain; yet I think it my duty to endeavour to show you how rash and unadvised your present purpose is. Within Greece you seem to imagine yourselves at peace: yet some of the most powerful states, of the confederacy with which you have been at war, have not yet acceded to the treaty, and some of the articles are still controverted by all. In short, it is not a peace, but merely a doubtful suspension of hostilities, prolonged by ten-day truces, which will hold only till some misfortune befall us, or till Lacedæmon give the word for war. At the same time your ancient subjects, the Chalcidians of Thrace, have been years in a rebellion which they are still maintaining; and some others, whom you esteem dependent states, pay you but a precarious obedience. Is it not then extreme impolicy to incur needlessly new and great dangers, with the view to increase a dominion already so insecure?”

“As to the dominion which Syracuse may acquire in Sicily, which some desire to represent as highly alarming, far from an object of apprehension, it would rather give us security. For while Sicily is divided, each state will court the favour of the Lacedæmonians, who profess themselves

the protectors of independency; but when once the Syracusans are masters of all, they will be less forward in connection with Lacedæmon, and more cautious of opposing the Athenians; whose cause, that of democracy, is similar to theirs, and whose interest congenial.

“ For myself,” continued Nicias, “ at my years, and after the long course of services in which my fellow-citizens have been witnesses of my conduct, I may venture to say that no man is less anxious for his personal safety. I have large property, through which my welfare is intimately connected with that of the commonwealth. But we owe both life and fortune to our country; and I hold that man to be a good citizen who is duly careful of both. If then there is among you a young man, born to great wealth and splendid situation, whose passion for distinction has nevertheless led him far to exceed, in magnificence, both what suited his means and what became his situation; if he is now appointed to a command above his years, but with which, at his years especially, a man is likely to be delighted; above all, if repairs are wanting to a wasted fortune, which may make such a command desirable to him, though ruinous to his country; it behoves you to beware how you accede to the advice of such a counsellor. I dread indeed the warm passions of that crowd of youths, the followers and supporters of the person of whom I speak: and, notwithstanding the decree of the last assembly, all men of sober judgment ought yet to interfere, and prevent rash undertakings, of a magnitude that may involve, with their failure, the downfall of the commonwealth. If therefore, honoured as I am by the voice of my country with appointment to the chief command of the intended expedition, I may presume to advise, it shall be, that the expedition be not undertaken; that the Sicilians be left still divided by their seas from Athens; that the Egestans, as without communication with Athens they en-

gaged in war with the Selinuntines, so without our interference they accommodate their differences; and that, in future, the Athenians engage in no alliances with states which in their own distress will claim assistance, but in the distress of Athens could afford none."

Alcibiades, thus particularly called upon, mounted the bema to reply. He began with insisting upon his just pretension to the high command to which he was raised, and with glorying in the extravagances of which he was accused.

Thucyd. l. 6.
c. 16. "My forefathers," he said, "have been honoured for that very conduct which is now imputed to me as criminal. I own, and it is my boast, that I have exceeded them all in magnificence, and I claim merit with my country for it. The supposition had gained, throughout Greece, that Athens was ruined by the war. I have shown that an individual of Athens could yet outdo what any prince or state had ever done. I sent seven chariots to the Olympian festival, and gained the first, the second, and the fourth prizes: and the figure I maintained throughout, at that meeting of the whole Greek nation, did not disparage the splendour of my victory. Is this a crime? On the contrary, it is held honourable by the customs of Greece, and reflects honour and renown even on the country of those who exhibit such magnificence. With regard then to my extravagance, as it has been called, at home, whether in public entertainments or in whatever else, perhaps I may have drawn on me the envy of some of our own citizens: but strangers are more just; and in my liberality and hospitality they admire the greatness of the commonwealth.

"If then even in these things, comparatively mere private concerns, I have deserved well of my country, let it be inquired what my public conduct has been. Glory, I will own, I ardently desire; but how have I sought to acquire it, and what has been my success? Have I promoted rash

enterprise? Have I been forward, as it is said youth is apt to be, to engage the commonwealth, wildly and without foresight, in hazardous war? or was it I who, by negotiation, without either danger or expense to yourselves, brought all Peloponnesus to fight your battles for you against Lacedæmon, and reduce that long-dreaded rival state to risk its existence at Mantinea in arms against its own ancient allies? If such have been my services, on first entering upon public business, you need not, I hope, fear but my greater experience will now be advantageous to you.

“ With regard then to Nicias, who has long and honourably served you in the high situation of general of the commonwealth, though he has been expressing himself acrimoniously against me, I readily acknowledge his merit, and have no objection to serve with him: on the contrary, I think it would become your wisdom to employ us together. Nicias has the reputation of cautious prudence, and singular good fortune; I am said to be more than prudently enterprising. For want of enterprise his wisdom, and the good fortune with which the gods have been accustomed to bless it, will be unavailing to the commonwealth: checked by his prudence, my disposition to enterprise cannot be dangerous.

“ To come then to the question more immediately before the assembly, the opportunity now offered to the commonwealth for acquisition in Sicily ought not to be neglected. The power of the Sicilians, which some would teach you to fear, has been much exaggerated. They are a mixed people, little attached to one another, little attached to a country which they consider as hardly theirs, and little disposed to risk either person or fortune for it; but always ready for any change, whether of political connection, or of local establishment, that may offer any advantage, or relieve from any distress. Nor is their military force such as some

have pretended: several Grecian states, and all the barbarians of the island, will be immediately in your interest. Distracted then by faction, as it is well known the rest are, negotiation, well managed, may soon bring more to your party.

“ But it is endeavoured to alarm you with apprehension of invasion from Peloponnesus. With regard to this, late experience has demonstrated what may suffice us to know. The Peloponnesians are always able to overrun the open country of Attica even when none of our force is absent on foreign service; and, should the expedition now proposed take place, they can do no more. Ought we then to abandon allies, whom treaties ratified by oath bind us to protect? Is it a just reason for so failing in our engagements, that those allies are unable to afford us mutual protection? It was surely not to obtain Egestan forces for the defence of Attica that the treaty was made; but to prevent our enemies in Sicily from injuring Attica, by finding them employment within their own island. It has been by readiness to ASSIST ALL, whether Greeks or barbarians, that OUR empire, and ALL empire, has been acquired. Nor, let me add, is it now in our choice how far we will stretch our command; for, possessing empire, we must maintain it, and rather extend than permit any diminution of it; or we shall, more even than weaker states, risk our own subjection to a foreign dominion. I will then detain you no longer than to observe, that the command which we possess of the sea, and the party of which we are assured in Sicily, will sufficiently enable us to keep what we may acquire, and sufficiently insure means of retreat if we should fail of our purpose; so that, with much to hope, we have, from any event of the proposed expedition, little to fear. I am therefore firmly of opinion that your decree for it ought not to be rescinded.”

This speech of Alcibiades was received with loud and extensive applause. It was followed by speeches of the Egestan and Leontine ministers, imploring pity and urging the faith of treaties, which also had their effect; and at length the disposition of a large majority of the people to favour the purpose of Alcibiades became so evident that Nicias would not any longer directly oppose it. But, as first of the generals elect, it was his privilege to name the force that he judged requisite for the enterprise; and he thought to damp the present ardour, and excite a little reflection, by naming what, he expected, for the Athenian commonwealth to send on distant service, would be deemed extravagantly great. While therefore he appeared to accede to the general wish, he endeavoured to divert it from its object by reciting the difficulties that would oppose its accomplishment. "We have, at present," he said, "for allies in Sicily, the Egestans, semibarbarians, and the Leontines, who scarcely exist as a people. It is to be hoped that Naxus and Catana, on account of their connection by blood with the Leontines and with Athens, may be induced to join us: but there are, besides these, seven independent Grecian cities in Sicily, on whose opposition we may rely²; all of them possessing regular forces of land and sea, with funds to maintain them; and especially Selinus and Syracuse, the first objects of the war. The Syracusans, in addition to considerable wealth of their own, command tribute from the barbarians of the island. But the two points in which they will principally have advantage over us are the possession of a numerous cavalry, and of the stores which a plentiful country affords; while we must depend upon precarious supplies by sea. In addition therefore to a powerful fleet, an army, such as we

Thucyd. l. 6.
c. 19.

c. 20.

² Syracuse, Selinus, Camarina, Gela, Agrigentum, Himera, Messena.

have been accustomed to send on foreign service, will be very unequal to the object. Unless we obtain other allies than the Egestans, such a force could not stir, in Sicily, for the cavalry alone of the enemy. It must then be considered that we shall not only be far from home, but far also from any territory under our command. Supplies will therefore reach us, not without risk and difficulty at all times; but during the four winter months hardly an advice-boat can pass to us. These things considered, it appears that, beside a large force of regular heavy-armed of our allies and subjects, in addition to what it may be advisable to send of our own, if we can obtain any for hire in Peloponnesus, it should be done. Since moreover to transport so far a body of cavalry capable of opposing the cavalry of the country is impossible, we must add a large force of bowmen and slingers, who may at least relieve our heavy-armed against the annoyance of the enemy's horse. Our fleet must be superior beyond competition; otherwise we can have no certainty even of subsistence; and it will be proper to provide abundantly beforehand for so numerous an armament, to prevent the distress that might otherwise arise from accidents of winds and seas. Beyond all things however we must be amply supplied with money, because what the Egestans talk of, I am confident they only talk of. In a word, to begin our business with any prospect of success, we must, from the moment we land, be in every point superior to the enemy. This is what the welfare of the commonwealth, I am fully persuaded, requires. If any man can convince you that my opinion is unfounded, I am ready to resign my command to him."

The simple prudence of the experienced Nicias was no match for the versatile sagacity of the young politician with whom he had to contend. The friends of Alcibiades received this speech with the highest appro-

Thucyd. l. 6.
c. 22.

c. 24.

bation; affecting to consider it not at all as dissuading or discouraging the undertaking, but, on the contrary, wisely and providently recommending what would insure success. The whole people were infatuated with the spirit of enterprise. Love of novelty and change, with certainty of present pay, and hope of they knew not what future acquisition, influenced the more thoughtless of all ranks; while the past successes of Athens, and the evident weakness and inefficiency of the Lacedæmonian administration, encouraged even the more experienced and prudent; insomuch that if any deeper thinkers disapproved, a declaration of their sentiments might have subjected them to the danger of being deemed disaffected to the commonwealth, and fined, banished, or even capitally condemned, according to the momentary caprice of the despotic sovereign.

Such being the disposition of the people, Nicias ^{Thucyd. 1. 6. c. 25.} was called upon to declare what precisely was the force that he thought necessary. He would have declined in the moment, urging that he wished to consult his colleagues; but popular impatience would admit no delay, and, overcome with importunity, he at length said, that less than a hundred triremes and five thousand heavy-armed, with a due proportion of bowmen and slingers, (making, in the whole, at least thirty thousand men, those in the sea-service included,) would be insufficient; and that stores and all necessaries should be plentifully provided to accompany the fleet; which ought not to be left dependent upon precarious supplies. Popular zeal did not confine itself to the mere grant of what was thus demanded: but a vote was immediately passed, empowering the generals to command, for the expedition, whatever they should judge expedient for the prosperity and glory of the commonwealth. The ravage made by the pestilence, at the beginning of the war, was now in a great degree repaired: the loss in battle

had never been great ; and the revenue, far exceeding the ordinary expenses of the commonwealth, which in peace were trifling, encouraged ambition. Preparation therefore, thus amply supplied, was made with a celerity proportioned to the zeal of the people.

During the equipment, and while the popular mind was bent with a singular degree of passion upon the proposed conquest, enjoying already in idea large acquisition of sovereignty whence tribute would accrue, such as might give every Athenian citizen to be for ever exempt from labour and from poverty, without occupation or profession but that of arms, every thing was suddenly disturbed by a strange circumstance, to which Grecian superstition alone gave any importance. It was a custom among the Athenians, derived from very early times, when art was rude, to place an imperfect statue of Mercury, the head completely carved, the rest generally a block merely squared, in front of every residence, whether of gods or men : this custom was still held sacred, and neither temple nor house at Athens was without one of those formless guardians. In one night the greatest part of them had the face mutilated by persons unknown. Alarm and indignation immediately filled the city : the matter was taken up most seriously by magistrates and people : however the act of ill-designing men, it was very generally considered as an omen foreboding ill to the proposed expedition ; and great rewards were publicly offered to any, free or slave, who would discover the perpetrators. With regard to the offence in question, inquiry and temptation were equally ineffectual ; not the least discovery was made ; but information was given of the mutilation of some statues, some time before, by young men heated with wine, and also of a profanation of the sacred mysteries, by a mock celebration of them in private houses ; and in this accusation Alcibiades was involved.

Thucyd. l. 6.
c. 27.

Andoc. de
myst. p. 20.
Thucyd. l. 6.
c. 28.

Of the party in opposition to Alcibiades were all who leaned to oligarchy, and most of the most powerful men of the commonwealth; who indignantly bore the superiority assumed by that young man, by whose abilities, assisted by the splendour of his birth, and the greatness of his pecuniary means, and supported by the favour of the people, they found themselves so overwhelmed that they had for some time past submitted in silence. But the opportunity was now open which they judged not to be neglected: instantly they set themselves to use the opportunity for ruining him in the favour of the people, that foundation of sand on which all power in Athens must rest, and then the reins of the commonwealth would of course pass into their own hands. The report was sedulously propagated, that Alcibiades was the principal author of all the late outrages. Facts known, it was said, afforded sufficient presumption of what could not be directly proved; and his style of living, so unbecoming the citizen of a commonwealth, and notorious to all, for it was displayed ostentatiously, might suffice for proof that he had no moderate purposes, and that nothing less than the tyranny of Athens was the ultimate object of his ambition.

Thucyd.
Isocrat. pro
Alcib. vel de
bigis, p. 138.
t. 3.

Comparing the cautious account of Thucydides with the known circumstances of the times, the temper of party at Athens, and events preceding and following, there may seem strong reason to suspect, though certainty is unattainable, that not Alcibiades, but the enemies of Alcibiades, were the authors of the profanation whence the disturbance arose. Alcibiades was known, in his revels, to have committed irregularities which would give colour to suspicion against him. But the mutilation of the Mercuries was no affair of a revel; it was evidently a concerted business, conducted with the most cautious secrecy. Nothing could be more injurious,

nothing more necessarily ruinous in its consequences to all the warmest wishes of Alcibiades, than such an event at such a time, and nothing could equally favour the purposes of his opponents ; nothing therefore more without temptation for him, while the strongest motives might urge them to provide for the commission of the deed in secret, with the hope of fixing suspicion upon him. Accordingly, in no one circumstance of his public life does Alcibiades seem to have conducted himself more unexceptionably than under this accusation. He neither avoided inquiry, nor attempted to overbear it ; but coming forward with the decent confidence of innocence, he earnestly desired immediate trial, and deprecated only accusation in his absence. " If guilty," he said, " he was ready to submit to the death which he should deserve : if innocent, he ought to be cleared of the shocking imputation ; and as it would be unjust, so would it be in the highest degree imprudent to keep such a charge hanging over a man vested with so great a command." But, as usual with all factions, what prudence would dictate for the benefit of the commonwealth was, with his opponents, an inferior consideration ; what would advance the power of their party was the first. Dreading therefore his popularity with the army, fearing particularly the alienation of the Argive and Mantinean auxiliaries, whom his influence principally had obtained for the expedition, and apprehensive that blame thus might fall upon themselves, they determined neither immediately to accuse, nor wholly to give up accusation ; and they prevailed with the people to decree simply, that Alcibiades should hold his command, and proceed on the expedition. ³

³ This is Thucydides's account. According to an oration remaining from Isocrates, the accusers of Alcibiades were punished, which would imply an acquittal of himself. But apparently the orator has taken occasion, from a later transaction, to assert so much thus generally, leaving to his hearers to refer it to the time to which it belonged. *Isocrat. de bigis*, p. 133, 134. v. 3.

This being determined, popular zeal returned to its former object, and by midsummer the preparations were completed. So great and so splendid an armament was never before sent by any Grecian state on foreign service. The importance of the armament itself, the importance and distance of its object, and the popular predilection with which it was favoured, occasioned extraordinary allowance for the equipment. Private zeal contended with public; the commanders of triremes not sparing their own purses, every one to have both his crew and his vessel completest, equally for show and for service. The daily pay of a drachma, tenpence sterling, was given by the public to every private sailor; and the captains added extraordinary pay to able seamen, and to all the rowers of the upper bench, distinguished by the name of *Thranites*, whose situation was more exposed, and whose office both required more skill and was more laborious than that of the rowers of the lower benches. The heavy infantry, all chosen men, who, as usual in the Greek service, provided their own arms and appointments, vied with each other in the excellence and good appearance of both.

On the day named for embarkation, the Athenian citizens enrolled for the expedition appeared on the parade at daybreak, together with those of the allied forces which were then at Athens. The whole city accompanied their march to *Piræus*; the natives, says the contemporary historian, divided between hope and fear, on seeing so great a proportion of the strength of the commonwealth, with some relations or friends of every family in it, committed to the rage of elements and the chance of war, at a distance which, for ancient navigation, was so great⁴; while the numerous foreigners more calmly

Thucyd. l. 6.
c. 30.

c. 31.

c. 30.
B. C. 415.
Ol. 91. 2.
P. W. 17.
After 8 June.

⁴ Thucydides calls it the most distant as well as the greatest expedition ever

gratified their curiosity with so splendid and interesting a spectacle. As soon as the embarkation was completed, and everything prepared for getting under way, trumpets sounded for signal of silence, and prayers for success were put up to the gods with more than usual formality, heralds directing, and the whole armament uniting their voices. Goblets of wine were then produced in every ship, and officers and privates together, out of gold and silver cups, poured libations and drank to the prosperity of the armament and of the commonwealth, the citizens and strangers on the beach joining in the ejaculation. This ceremony being performed, the pæan was sung, and the whole fleet moved for Ægina, thence to take its departure for Corcyra.

SECTION III.

Defects of the Syracusan Constitution. — Force of the Athenian Armament. — Measures of the Athenian Armament. — Able Conduct of Alcibiades. — Intrigues, Tumult, popular Panic, and their Consequences, at Athens.

Thucyd. 1. 6.
c. 32. INTELLIGENCE of the extraordinary magnitude of the Athenian preparations passed from various quarters to Syracuse; and the destination, in a democratical government, could not remain a secret. Nevertheless it was long before the news gained such credit among the Syracusan people as to produce any measure for obviating the threatened evil. It is not specified by historians, but the account of Thucydides makes it evident, that there had been a revolution in the government of Syracuse, or at least a great change in the administration, since the oligarchal Leontines were admitted to the rights of Syracusan citizens. The democratical party now bore the sway; and some jea-

made by any Grecian state. The coasting navigation of the ancients therefore made Sicily, in his opinion, more distant than Egypt.

lousy toward the nobles, lest preparation for war should throw an increase of power into their hands, appears to have influenced the leaders of the day. At the same time the circumstances of Syracuse, considerably altered since the former interference of Athens in the affairs of Sicily, were such as would inflame the usual presumption of a democratical government. The Ionian interest formerly, with the assistance of Camarina, nearly balancing the Dorian, was now suppressed; Syracuse was the acknowledged head of the Grecian name in Sicily; and the Syracusan people trusted that, excepting the semibarbarian Egestans and the Leontine freebooters, the Athenians would not find a friend in the island who would dare to own himself.

At length however, accumulated accounts arriving, each more alarming than the former, it was thought proper to convene the general assembly. The patriotic and able Hermocrates, the peace-maker of Sicily when harassed by internal war, was among the foremost to propose vigorous measures against foreign attack. Representing Thucyd. 1. 6. c. 33. the Athenian armament as really great and formidable, but dangerous to Syracuse only in proportion as Syracuse might fail in exertion, he proposed to strengthen the Syracusan confederacy by conciliating the barbarians of the island, and by extending alliance among the Italian Greeks: he would even make overtures to Carthage, the richest commonwealth upon earth, and therefore ablest to give that kind of assistance which was most desirable, as being most efficacious with least danger; and it was reasonable to suppose, he said, that apprehension of the growing power and extravagant ambition of Athens would dispose the Carthaginians to the connection. Application ought also to be made to Corinth and Lacedæmon, whose favourable disposition could not be doubted. Such in general was the negotiation which, in his opinion, their circumstances

required. With regard then to military operation, he was clear that they ought to meet invasion before it reached them: and, high as the reputation of the Athenian navy was, yet local circumstances gave them such advantages that a proper exertion of the naval force which the Sicilian states were able to raise, might make it impossible for the Athenians ever even to reach the Sicilian shore. This idea was founded on the deficiencies of the ancient marine; of which the words put into the mouth of Hermocrates, by the able contemporary historian, give the clearest as well as the most authentic information. "The Tarentines," said Hermocrates, "are our allies; and the Athenian fleet, to go from Corcyra, their known place of assembling, to Sicily, must first make the Iapygian coast, and cannot avoid passing Tarentum. The harbour of Tarentum therefore should be the station for the greatest naval force that can be collected. So numerous a fleet as that of the enemy cannot keep exact order in the long passage (for so, in Thucydides's narrative, Hermocrates terms it) across the Ionian gulf. From the harbour of Tarentum therefore we may choose our moment of attack with certain advantage. We shall go into action with our crews refreshed in a friendly port, and our galleys light; the Athenians fatigued with rowing and encumbered with stores: or, should they, at the expense of these, prepare for action, we may, if prudence require it, retire into our port, and wait for fresh advantages. Nor can these fail to offer: for the enemy must then again encumber his galleys with stores, or risk to suffer from want, in the passage along a hostile coast. Such being the inconveniences and the hazards which he must have to encounter, I think, if the measure I propose were taken, he would scarcely venture at all to cross the gulf."

Thucyd. l. 6.
c. 35.

This able advice, to a whole people in assembly directing executive government, did not find the

attention it merited. Many would not yet believe that the Athenians meant to invade Sicily with views of conquest: some even ridiculed the idea: various contradictory opinions were warmly maintained; and Athenagoras, chief of the democratical party, endeavoured to use the opportunity for carrying a point against the nobles. "It was rather to be wished than feared," he said, "that the Athenians would be so mad as to invade Sicily. For himself, he thought them wiser. Peloponnesus itself was not better able to resist them; and the force of Syracuse alone was superior to double the armament whose approach was represented as so alarming. No cavalry, he well knew, was embarked: within Sicily the Athenians could obtain none, except an inconsiderable force from Egesta; and even their heavy-armed were inferior in number to the Syracusan. Such being their deficiency, if, instead of commencing operations, as they must, from their naval camp, with scarcely a friend within the island, they possessed a neighbouring city equal to Syracuse, even so their army, instead of making conquest, would hardly escape destruction." Having declared his sentiments against the measures proposed by Thucyd. l. 6. c. 38, 39, 40. Hermocrates, he proceeded to inveigh against him and the whole body of the nobles. "The ambition of young men," he said, "panted for military command; but the city would not so impose a yoke upon itself. On the contrary, prosecution should prevent the seditious purposes of those who would spread alarm; and punishment should not fail for such offences against the common welfare." He c. 41. was proceeding thus in the endeavour to excite popular passion, when one of the generals (for the Syracusan constitution at this time divided the chief military command between a board of fifteen) interfered with the authority of office. He strongly reprobated the attempt to check the freedom of debate, and deter individuals from

declaring their opinion on public affairs: "When hostilities were threatened," he said, "the welfare of the commonwealth unquestionably required preparation in due proportion to the danger. It should therefore be the care of the generals to acquire more certain intelligence than seemed yet to have been obtained, and in the mean time to communicate with the allies of the commonwealth, and take all other proper precaution." Without putting any question to the vote, he then dismissed the assembly.

While such, through the defects in the constitution of the government, was the unprepared state of Syracuse, the whole of the Athenian forces was already assembled at Corcyra. The fleet consisted of a hundred and thirty-four triremes, and two Rhodian penteconters. Of the triremes, a hundred were Athenian; and of these, sixty were light for action, forty carried soldiers. The other thirty-four triremes were of the allied states, principally Chian. The heavy-armed were, in all, five thousand one hundred; of whom two thousand two hundred were Athenian citizens; and of these only seven hundred, appointed to the inferior service of marines⁵, were of the Thetes, the other fifteen hundred being of the higher orders. The Argive auxiliary heavy-armed were five hundred; the Mantinean, including a few Peloponnesian mercenaries, two hundred and fifty; the remainder of the heavy-armed were from the subject states. The regular light-armed were four hundred Athenian and eighty Cretan bowmen, seven hundred Rhodian slingers, and a hundred and twenty Megarian refugees. A single horse-transport carried thirty horse. The storeships provided by the Athenian government, which carried also both sutlers and artificers, were thirty of large burden, of the kind

¹ Thucyd. l. 6.
c. 42.

c. 43.

⁵ *Ἐπιβάται τῶν νιῶν.*

called holcads, and a hundred smaller⁶; but many other vessels, belonging to individuals, followed, for the sake of profit from the market of so large an armament.

Through the rash precipitancy of one party in the Athenian administration, and the opposition by which the other was perplexed, so deficient had been the preparatory measures that it was yet unknown to the generals what Italian or Sicilian cities would receive them. Three Thucyd. 1. 6. c. 42. triremes were therefore dispatched to inquire and to negotiate, with orders to meet the fleet as soon as possible with information. The whole then moved from Corcyra, in three divisions; each of which separately might more readily find, in the Italian ports, those supplies which the ancient ships of war could so scantily carry, and that shelter which they were so extremely liable to want. All however together crossed the gulf, and made the Iapygian promontory, without misfortune. Then they dispersed to seek supplies around the bay of Tarentum; but not a single town would admit them within its walls, or even make a market for them. Tarentum and Locri denied them water and the shelter of their ports. At length the whole fleet re-assembled, without disaster, at Rhegium, the first allied city in their course. But even the Rhegians cautiously refused to admit them within their walls; allotting them however commodious ground for encampment, and providing for them a plentiful market.

The Syracusans, at length, in universal alarm, aware of the necessity of giving up private ease for public service, and no longer hesitating between party interest and general welfare, permitted their leaders, by the votes of a majority in their assembly, to make serious preparation for meeting the coming evil. Ministers were sent to conciliate some of

⁶ Πλοῖα.

the Sicel tribes; garrisons were placed in situations to control others; arms and horses were examined; and troops marched to occupy some of the most critical posts for defending the Syracusan territory.

Meanwhile the three Athenian ships dispatched from Corcyra had been as far as the Egestan territory, and did not rejoin the fleet till it was arrived in the harbour of Rhegium. They brought information that the representations made by the Egestan ministers at Athens, of the wealth of their state, had been utterly false, and that the commissioners, sent by the Athenian government to inquire concerning it, had been grossly deceived. The richest temple of the Egestan territory was that of Venus at Eryx; where indeed the collection of cups, flagons, censers, and other vessels of silver, was considerable. After having been conducted to a display of these sacred riches, the commissioners were variously invited and entertained by the principal Egestans; and, wherever they went, not only all the gold and silver plate of the place was studiously collected, but whatever besides could be borrowed from neighbouring towns, Phœnician as well as Greek. These commissioners had been appointed by the influence of Alcibiades and his party. Whether they were chosen for their ability or their folly may be difficult to guess; but they had either believed, or affected to believe, and reported to the Athenian people accordingly, that they could not sufficiently admire the wealth of Egesta. The commissioners sent from Corcyra were, on the contrary, such as Nicias, the first in command, would approve; and their purpose being, not to procure partial evidence to promote a decree for the expedition, but to find means for (what would now be a principal object of Alcibiades himself) the prosecution of its purpose, they made strict scrutiny. On their return they reported, that the Egestans could only show thirty talents, between seven and eight thousand pounds sterling, in their

treasury, and that for any thing more their wealth was quite problematical. Probably none of the generals had relied much upon the wealth of Egesta ; yet, as it had been seriously proposed as the fund which was to afford means for the first conquests, they were distressed by its deficiency ; for the Athenian people were not likely to receive very favourably an immediate application for a supply. The disappointment however did not come single. The Rhegians had been upon the point of yielding to the solicitations and remonstrances of the Athenian generals, who urged them to join their arms to those of their ancient allies, for the purpose of restoring their common kinsmen the oppressed Leontines ; but they now gave for their decisive answer, that “ they would do every office of friendship to the Athenians, within the limits of an exact neutrality ; but they would engage in no hostilities, unless in concurrence with the Italian states of their alliance.”

This determination of the Rhegians was a disappointment, less on account of the force of land and sea, though not inconsiderable, which they could have furnished, than for the check it would give to negotiation among the Sicilian towns, where the example of Rhegium would be of weight. The Athenian generals found themselves in consequence much at a loss. In many places a disposition adverse to the Syracusan supremacy afforded advantageous opportunities : but, through the divisions among the leading men of Athens, and the haste of those who promoted the Sicilian expedition to profit from popular favour, it had been so neglected that the semibarbarian Egestans, upon the verge of ruin through their war with Selinus, and the miserable Leontines, ejected from their city and territory, were the only confederates of Athens beyond the Ionian sea. When therefore it came to be debated what should be the first measures of the armament, the three

generals differed nearly as might be expected from their difference of character; and each had plausible ground for his opinion. Nicias, experienced, prudent, from the first little satisfied with his command, and now in ill health, proposed to relieve Egesta, which was the primary object of their instructions; and unless the Egestans could fulfil their engagement to furnish pay for the whole armament, or readier means than yet appeared should occur for restoring the Leontines, not farther to risk the forces or waste the treasures of the commonwealth. The disposition to assist its allies would be shown in the relief of Egesta; its power would be manifested by the mere circumstance of sending so great an armament to such a distance; and, satisfied with this, he would return immediately home.

Thucyd. l. 6.
c. 47.

Alcibiades, whose temper was impetuous, but his mind capacious, and his abilities universal, elated with the extraordinary effects which his first essay in political intrigue had produced in Peloponnesus, and not dejected by disappointments for which he was more prepared than his colleagues, had formed his own plan for laying the foundation of extensive conquest, and persevered in it. "Such a force," he said, "as they commanded, ought not to return home without achievement, and without honour. Yet he would not disapprove prudent, or even cautious measures. He would therefore propose that negotiation should be tried with all the Grecian cities, except Syracuse and Selinus, and with every barbarian tribe of the island. In some places perhaps zeal in the Syracusan interest might be merely slackened; in others defection from it might be procured: in some supplies of provisions only might be obtained; in others auxiliary troops. The beginning should be made with Messena, the most commodious city and port of the island for their principal station, whence to carry on the war. When trial had been duly made what might be done by negotiation, when

they were fully assured who were determined enemies, and who were, or might probably be made friends, then they should have a clearer view of the business before them, and Selinus and Syracuse must, undoubtedly, be the first objects of their arms."

Lamachus, much a soldier and little a politician, but experienced in the captious and greedy temper of the people his sovereign, differed from both his colleagues: Thucyd. l. 6. c. 49. "Their whole force," he said, "ought immediately to be directed against Syracuse, while yet in a state of unreadiness and surprise. If the city could not be taken by a brisk effort, which he thought not impossible, the other towns of the territory would however fall into their hands, before the effects in them could be removed; and the produce of the country would of course be theirs. Thus they should acquire means to prosecute the war, without the invidious measure of applying to Athens for money. But possibly, what of all things was most desirable, the Syracusans might thus be provoked to risk a battle; and the victory would instantly do more toward procuring alliance among the Sicilian cities than negotiation for twenty years. Should the enemy, on the contrary, yield their country without an effort, beside the profit from plunder, so decisive an acknowledgment of the superiority of the Athenian forces would be highly favourable to any negotiation that might be deemed expedient. With regard to Messena, he thought it not of so much consequence. The deserted port of Megara, commodiously near to Syracuse, and their own whenever they would take possession of it, would be far preferable for their naval station."

It appears, from what follows from Thucydides, that the opinion of Lamachus, if conquest was to be sought, and the displeasure of the Athenian people avoided, was not the least judicious; but, being over-ruled, that general chose

Thucyd. l. 6.
c. 50. to concur with the opinion of Alcibiades, to which Nicias was thus compelled to yield. Alcibiades then undertook himself the business of negotiation with Messena. He could not however prevail so far as to bring the Messenians to join in the war against Syracuse; but he obtained, what was of some importance, permission for the Athenian armament to contract for provisions throughout their territory. He then went with sixty triremes, Lamachus accompanying, to Naxus; and he found the people of that city, who were purely Ionian, and from old adverse to Syracuse, so much more favourable to his views that he engaged them to join in league, defensive and offensive, with Athens. Thence he proceeded to Catana; but the prevalence of the Syracusan party there procured a refusal even to treat. Still therefore coasting southward, he sent forward ten triremes to Syracuse. Approaching the mouth of the port, a herald from the deck of one of them proclaimed the intention of the Athenian commonwealth, "to restore the oppressed Leontines to their just rights, a measure to which it was bound both by ties of blood and terms of alliance;" adding, "that any Leontines would be received as friends by the Athenian armament." This ceremony being performed, and as far as circumstances permitted, observation made on the ports, the city, and the circumjacent ground, the detached squadron rejoined the fleet, and all together went once more to Catana.

Meanwhile apprehension, either of the Athenian armament, or of a party among their own people, had so far wrought a change in the minds of the Catanian leaders, that

c. 51. they consented to admit the Athenian generals to declare their proposals to the assembled people.

The forces, landed, were stationed without the walls, while the generals went into the town; and Alcibiades undertook to address the Catanian people. While he was speaking,

and the Catanians, collected in the agora, were universally intent upon the harangue, some of the Athenian soldiers observed a small ill-constructed gateway unguarded, through which, in mere wantonness, according to the historian, though perhaps concert with a party may be suspected, they made their way into the town; and, finding no opposition, quietly joined the assembly. The sight struck instant alarm into the Syracusan party, who imagined the city betrayed by their opponents. Some of them hastily, but silently, withdrew; and the rest, awed by apprehension of the dreadful calamities usually brought on the weaker party by sedition in Grecian cities, concurred in a decree, which was presently proposed, for an alliance defensive and offensive with Athens. Shortly after, the whole fleet moved from Rhegium to Catana, which it was resolved to make the principal naval station.

It soon appeared that the project of Alcibiades to strengthen the Athenian interest by negotiation, and proportionally, of course, to weaken the Syracusan, had been extensively founded. A party in Camarina, encouraged by what had passed at Naxus and Catana, as well as by the reported strength of the Athenian armament, sent to request support in attempting a revolution. The fleet moved thither; but it was found that the innovators had been overhasty in their measures, and the project could not be carried immediately into execution; yet an Athenian party still subsisted in Camarina. In returning, the Athenian commanders debarked a body of forces near Syracuse, and collected considerable booty; but the Syracusan cavalry quickly checked this mode of warfare, cut off some stragglers, and compelled the rest of the marauding troops to seek their ships. The fleet proceeding then to Catana, found there the Salaminian, the ship appropriated to purposes of sacred and solemn office, bearing an order from the Athenian people for the immediate return of Alcibiades and some other officers

Thucyd. 1. 6.
c. 52.

to Athens, to answer accusations preferred against them for mutilating the statues and profaning the mysteries.

Since the armament sailed for Sicily, Athens had been experiencing the worst evils of democratical frenzy. The oligarchal party, unequal to open contention with the democratical, had resolved upon the bold project of making democracy itself their instrument for exciting popular passion, with the hope of directing it to the promotion of their own

interest. Instantly after the departure of the fleet, they became sedulous in diffusing rumours and observations that might excite suspicion and alarm.

The power and influence of Alcibiades, his magnificence, his ambition, his unprincipled conduct, and his various extravagances were made constant subjects of public conversation. His abilities, at the same time, and even his virtues, were compared to those by which the Pisistratidæ had acquired the tyranny. The severities which had occasioned the expulsion of those celebrated tyrants were then magnified tenfold; the execration to which their memory had been condemned, by the party which had overborne them, was alleged in proof of their enormities; and the circumstance that the Athenians, unable to effect their own deliverance, had owed it to the Lacedæmonians, was pressed upon public recollection. Shortly every occurrence was made, by some construction, to import a plot for estab-

lishing tyranny. Fear, suspicion, and their certain concomitant, a disposition to severity, thus gained complete possession of the public mind. Every one was bent to discover, by any means, the plot and its authors. Officers were appointed, entitled Examiners⁷, with full authority for every search and inquiry; and great rewards were offered for any who would indicate anything. The

Isocrat. pro
Alcib. p. 138.
t. 3.

Thucyd. l. 6.
c. 53.

Thucyd. ut
ant. & Andoc.
de myst.

most suspicious and incoherent evidence only was obtained, from slaves and men of the vilest characters. But public alarm, once so excited, was not to be readily quieted. It was deemed better, says Thucydides, that just men should suffer, than that the constitution should be endangered. Many of principal rank and most respectable character were in consequence imprisoned. It appears indeed difficult to discover for whose benefit the Athenian constitution, as it now stood, was calculated. The lower people at least should have had some confidence in protection for innocence from that government for which they were so anxious, and in which they were, nominally at least, supreme. But, on the contrary, when Pisander and Charicles, two of the examiners, appointed to that office by popular favour, declared their opinion that a plot for overthrowing the democracy was in agitation, and farther inquiry therefore necessary, all the people, upon the usual signal for assembling the council, fled from the agora, every one fearful of accusation and imprisonment. Nor was this indiscriminating jealousy a humour that had its hour and passed: it held, and grew daily more severe. Suspicion extended; more persons were imprisoned; and there was no foreseeing where the popular rage, which party purposes might excite, would stop.

It happened that while suspicion was most rife, yet what or whom to suspect was most uncertain, some movements in Bœotia occasioned the march of a small body of Lacedæmonians to the Corinthian isthmus. This circumstance increased suspicion into imagined certainty, and redoubled every former fear: the business of Bœotia was thought a feint; intrigue with the obnoxious party in Athens, it was supposed, must be the real cause of the movement: and for one night the whole people watched in arms. The panic spread to Argos: designs against the de-

Andoc. de
myst. p. 19.

Thucyd. ut
ant.

Thucyd. l. 6.
c. 61.

mocracy were suspected. The principal Argives, favourers of oligarchy, had been placed among the islands under the Athenian dominion by Alcibiades, commissioned for the purpose by the democratical party actually ruling. The Athenian people now gave up those unfortunate men to be put to death by the democratical party in Argos, as if connected in plot with the friends of Alcibiades.

Alarm and the severities of an alarmed despot were still continuing to extend, when one of the most obnoxious of the imprisoned, (Thucydides has avoided to name him, but we learn from his own extant oration, as well as from Plutarch's account, that it was Andocides,) in conversation with one of his fellow-prisoners on their present suffering and farther danger, yielded to the argument that, guilty or not guilty, it were better to confess something: "The popular mind," it was urged to Andocides, "would evidently not otherwise be appeased; and a confession would not only be more likely than perseverance in asserting innocence, to procure his own safety, but would restore quiet to the city; and though some must be sacrificed, yet numbers might so be saved from that mad vengeance, excited by fear, which now threatens so indiscriminately and unboundedly." Information, thus extorted by the pains of a prison and the fear of death, against several persons as concerned in the mutilation of the Mercuries, was received among the people with a childish joy. The dark plot was supposed completely discovered: the informers were set at liberty, with all whom they did not accuse; of those whom they did accuse, though proof of the facts alleged was utterly defective, yet none escaped capital condemnation: all who were in prison, or could be taken, suffered death immediately, and public rewards were offered for killing those who fled from this democratical justice.

Thucyd.
l. 6. c. 60.
Andoc. de
myst. Plut.
vit. Alcib.

To carry the business thus far, little or no de-
 liberation was thought necessary. The difficulty <sup>Thucyd. 1. 6.
c. 61.</sup>
 was to bring within reach of the democratical dagger those
 of the accused who were with the army in Sicily; and espe-
 cially Alcibiades himself, now become supremely the object
 of terror, as he had before been of favour with the people.
 His death, as Thucydides assures, was determined; but it
 was feared to apprehend, in the army, the favourite still of
 the army. It was farther feared lest the whole armament
 might be endangered by any tumult which should come to
 the knowledge of the enemy and encourage attack; and the
 defection of the Argive and Mantinean auxiliaries, whom the
 influence of Alcibiades had obtained for the service, was
 looked upon as a certain consequence of any severity against
 him. It was therefore resolved to send heralds in the sacred
 trireme called the Salaminian, not to arrest him or any other
 accused persons in the army, but simply, in the name of the
 people, to command their return to Athens. Immediate
 obedience was paid to this order: Alcibiades followed the
 Salaminian in his own trireme. In the usual course of the
 ancient navigation, making the Italian coast, they stopped at
 the friendly town of Thurium, and there Alcibiades and all
 the other accused absconded together. The heralds and
 officers of the Salaminian, having made search and inquiry
 for some time to no purpose, returned without their pri-
 soners; and the Athenian people pronounced sentence of
 death against them, in what was called a deserted judg-
 ment.⁸

⁸ Ἐξήμην δίκαη.

SECTION IV.

Feeble Conduct of Nicias. — Oppression of the Sicels. — First Measures against Syracuse. — Preparations on both Sides in Winter. — Intrigues among the Sicilian Cities. — Transactions of the Winter in Greece. — Reception of Alcibiades at Sparta. — Resolution to renew the War with Athens.

Thucyd. l. 6.
c. 62.

THE soul of political intrigue and extensive enterprise being thus taken from the armament destined for the conquest of Sicily, it remained for Nicias, with Lamachus, to decide on measures. The plans of Alcibiades were immediately abandoned; probably nobody remained capable of prosecuting them; and, according to the original proposal of Nicias, not likely nor indeed intended to lead to extensive conquest, it was determined to conduct the armament immediately toward Egesta and Selinus. In proceeding westward, negotiation was in vain attempted with Himera, the only Grecian city on the northern coast of the island; but an assault upon Hyccara, a Sicilian town, succeeded: the inhabitants were made the property of the army, to employ or to sell as slaves, and the place was given to the Egestans. Little zealous for the objects of his command, and thence apparently wavering about measures, Nicias went with a small escort only to Egesta, to demand the supplies promised, or such supplies as the Egestan people were able to furnish; and all he could obtain was thirty talents, between seven and eight thousand pounds sterling. The concluding measures of the campaign do him no honour: the prisoners, already acquired, were distributed aboard the fleet, which returned by the straits of Messena to its former station at Catana. The army marched for the same place by an inland road, through the country of the Sicels; and the unhappy barbarians suffered for the

false promises of the Egestans. They were seized in such numbers that, a market being opened for the sale of them at Catana, they produced a hundred and twenty talents, about thirty thousand pounds sterling. The celebrated courtesan *Lais* is said to have been a Sicel girl, Plut. vit. Nic. sold on this occasion to a Corinthian merchant. An unsuccessful attempt upon the Geloan *Hybla* was the last operation of the campaign.

Perhaps some peevishness, in a command which he originally disliked, in the course of which he met with little but disappointment, and which nevertheless he could not resign, had co-operated with the necessity of his situation, in dictating a measure, to which the mild temper of *Nicias*, and his generally scrupulous regard for justice, would otherwise have been averse; though, among the ancients, even the philosophers, to drag barbarians, wherever met with, into slavery, was not commonly deemed a breach of either justice or humanity. But apparently *Nicias* found himself compelled to follow the opinions and gratify the wishes of others in still prosecuting the scheme of conquest. Money was absolutely necessary: the expectations of the Athenian people had met with the disappointment at *Egesta*, which he had always foreseen and foretold; and yet probably dared not ask to have it made good by remittances from *Athens*.

It was however determined, now after a cam- Thucyd. l. 6. c. 63. paign nearly wasted, to carry war next against *Syracuse*; and with the beginning of winter preparation was begun for the purpose. Notwithstanding the vaunts of the democratical leaders there, the first certain news that the Athenian armament had crossed the Ionian gulf, it was found, had excited alarm that went far to justify the advice given by *Lamachus*. With every day's delay afterward terror abated and confidence grew. When after the recall

of Alcibiades the armament moved away to the farther corner of Sicily, it began to be held even in contempt and derision; and when, on its return, still no movement was made towards Syracuse, the lower people, according to the manner of the multitude, as Thucydides remarks, growing in boldness, as danger appears less threatening, demanded of their chiefs to lead them to Catana. The chiefs were wiser than to comply; but the parties of horse, sent out to observe, would sometimes approach the Athenian camp, give ill language, and ask if, "instead of restoring the Leontines, the Athenians intended to settle themselves in Sicily."

Thucyd. 1. 6.
c. 64. The Athenian army was so deficient in cavalry, that it would have been hazardous, or however troublesome, to have marched through the open country towards Syracuse, in face of the Syracusan horse. The generals therefore proposed to profit from the present temper of the Syracusan people; which, in spite of any prudence in their leaders, would be likely to lead them to indiscretion. As in most of the Sicilian towns in the Syracusan interest there was an Athenian party, so in Catana there was still a Syracusan party. A Catanian was gained, who had usually communicated with Syracuse. Through him the Syracusans were told that the Athenian camp was negligently guarded; that many, both officers and private soldiers, commonly slept in the town; that, if the Syracusans would attack with their whole force at daybreak, their friends in Catana would rise, and they could not fail of success. A day was appointed for the attempt, which was accordingly made. Nicias and Lamachus meanwhile, accurately informed of every circumstance, embarking in the night all their Grecian forces, with some auxiliary Sicels, sailed for Syracuse; and, debarking totally unopposed, they seized a situation, opportune for operation against the city, and for communication with their fleet, and

November.
Thucyd. 1. 6.
c. 65.

at the same time secure against the Syracusan horse ; on one side defended by walls, houses, trees, and a pool of water ; on the other by precipices. Felled trees, arranged from the camp to the sea and to the village of Dascon, gave security to the naval station ; works were hastily thrown up where the ground was less strong by nature or accident, and the bridge over the Anapus was broken.

The first intelligence of this movement filled the Syracusans with surprise and alarm. They hastily returned to Syracuse, looked at the Athenian camp, and finding it too strong to be attacked, encamped themselves for the night. Next morning, the generals little experienced, and the people little practised, in military discipline, all imagined that to assault, not to be assaulted, would be theirs, and many went into the town, which was near. Meanwhile the Athenian generals, having ground now before them on which the enemy's horse would not be formidable, drew out of their camp in order of battle. The Syracusans then also hastily formed ; and, however deficient in discipline and skill, Thucydides bears them testimony that they were not deficient in courage or in patriotic zeal. A sharp action ensued : but a thunderstorm, with heavy rain, alarmed and disturbed the more inexperienced soldiers, and the Syracusan infantry at length everywhere gave way. Their horse however, though unable to take any considerable part in the battle, protected their flight, so that little execution was done in pursuit, and they retired within the city walls.

This expedition appears to have been in itself very ably conducted by the Athenian generals ; but it was little connected with any extensive plan of operation. On the morrow after the battle, having, in consequence of the usual application from the vanquished, re-
Thucyd. l. 6. c. 71.
stored the enemy's dead, to the number of only two hundred.

and sixty, they re-embarked the whole of their forces, and returned to Catana. This flash of victory however had its advantageous consequences. It restored the sullied reputation of the Athenian arms, confirmed the allies, and opened means for farther negotiation within Sicily. It assisted moreover to save, if not to gain credit at home, and tended to prepare the Athenian people for receiving more favourably any application for supplies and re-enforcement. The want of cavalry had been experienced as the great deficiency of the armament. It was therefore determined to collect, during the winter, the greatest force of horse that could by any means be obtained within the island, and also to apply for a body from home. A large supply of money was moreover indispensable; and it behoved the generals to exert themselves, in solicitation among allies, in rapine against enemies, that they might spare the Athenian treasury; upon which nevertheless some demand was unavoidable. The siege of Syracuse was resolved upon for the first object of the ensuing campaign. For the interval, the fleet was laid up, and the army disposed in quarters, at Naxus and Catana.

Meanwhile among the Syracusans, though much uneasiness arose from the late event, which so disappointed the opinion fondly entertained of their superiority to the Athenians, yet the misfortune was not without salutary consequences. The depression of the public mind imposed silence upon faction, repressed forward ignorance, and gave scope for abilities and patriotism to come forward. The general assembly met, and the people listened with anxious attention, while Hermocrates son of Hermon spoke. "Their late defeat," he said, "was no cause for dejection such as he saw prevailing. Mere people, as they comparatively were, and not formed soldiers, it was much for them to have shown themselves so nearly equal to select troops of the first reputation

in Greece. Besides, the very circumstances of the action pointed out the means of future success. It was not in strength, but in order and discipline, not in bravery, but in system of command and subordination, that they were inferior. The alteration necessary was obvious; the chief commanders should be few, but they should be experienced; they should be trust-worthy, and they should be trusted. The winter should then be diligently employed in improving discipline: the force of heavy-armed should be increased, by giving arms at the public expense to the poor but able-bodied citizens. Courage and confidence," he continued, "will of course revive, with improved system, improved skill, and increased force; and in spring I doubt not but we may meet the enemy upon equal terms."

It were indeed difficult to imagine anything more inconvenient, or more adverse to effectual exertion, than the system of military command which democratical jealousy, enforced by frequent sedition, had established at Syracuse. The supreme military authority was divided among no less than fifteen officers; and even this numerous board, if the term may be allowed, was, upon all momentous occasions, to take its orders from the people. But the present alarm; and the pressure of evident necessity, gave force to the advice of Hermocrates. The command in chief was committed to Hermocrates himself, with only two colleagues, and they were vested with discretionary powers. Measures equally vigorous and judicious immediately followed. The great object, for a town expecting a siege, was to obviate contravallation. On the side therefore of the quarters called Temenites, and Epipolæ, the new Thucyd. l. 6. c. 75. generals extended the fortifications of the city; and they occupied with garrisons two critical posts in the neighbourhood, the precinct of the temple of Olympieum, to the southward of the city on the farther bank of the river

Anapus, and a fort named Megara. Having thus provided for immediate security, they extended their views. A watchful eye was kept upon the negotiations of the Athenians among the Sicilian states; and, information being received that the whole Athenian armament was assembled, for the remainder of the winter, at Naxus, an expedition was made, apparently more with a view to revive the drooping spirits of the people than with the expectation of any other important advantage, to destroy the huts which the Athenians had left standing on the ground they had quitted near Catana.

Among the cities in alliance with Syracuse the fidelity of Camarina, not the least powerful among them, was the most doubted. Though accounted a Dorian people, the Camarinæans had been from of old adverse: they were the only Sicilian Dorians who had constantly refused to put themselves under the degrading and oppressive protection of the Syracusan commonwealth. To strengthen themselves in independency, while Laches commanded the Athenian forces in Sicily, they had engaged in alliance with Athens; but by the general peace among the Sicilian cities, which Hermocrates had procured, without renouncing the Athenian alliance, they became allies also of Syracuse. When the armament under Nicias arrived in Sicily, the Syracusan government required assistance from Camarina; and, the dilatory conduct of the Athenian generals bringing their force into contempt, the Camarinæans, fearful of the resentment of a powerful neighbour, sent a body of auxiliary horse. The late demonstration of the superiority of the Athenian arms would be likely to make a change in sentiment at Camarina not favourable to the Syracusan interest; and it was known that the Athenian generals were carrying on negotiation there. To counterwork this, and win the Camarinæans to the Syracusan cause, Hermocrates thought

^c Thucyd. i. 6.
c. 75.

important enough to require that he should go himself at the head of an embassy to Camarina.

As far as the connection with Athens only was to be dissuaded, the business undertaken by Hermocrates was easy. The notorious conduct, and even the avowed principles of the Athenian government were such as could not but give alarm wherever the Athenian power could be extended. Being admitted to audience by the Camarinæan people, Hermocrates justly urged, “That the restoration of the Leontines, which the Athenians held out as their object in the invasion of Sicily, was a shallow pretence. The Leontines indeed were Ionians, kinsmen of the Athenians; but what were the Euboic Chalcidians, the very people from whom the Leontines derived their immediate origin? Equally kinsmen of the Athenians, they were held in strict subjection, and denied the use of arms.⁹ Protection to the semibarbarian Egestans could, still less than the restoration of the Leontines, be the real motive for sending so expensive an armament so far. It was in short not doubtful that the subjugation equally of all the Sicilians was the object of Athenian ambition.” So far the arguments of Hermocrates were unanswerable. But when he was to justify the past conduct of Syracuse, and persuade the Camarinæans to assist the Syracusan cause, whatever fear the power of Athens might excite, the consideration of the nearer and more obvious danger preponderated, of servitude to a people of their own island, their fellow-colonists; a servitude likely to be more severe, and certainly more grating. All therefore that could be obtained, by solicitation or remonstrance, urged with all the ability, and supported by the respectable character of Hermocrates, was a declaration that, “being engaged in alliance with both Athens and Syracuse, the

Thucyd. i. 6.
c. 76. et seq.

⁹ So Smith translates ἀπαράσκευος, and I believe properly.

Camarinæans could take no part, consistently with their oaths, but that of an exact neutrality.”

While the Syracusan leaders were thus sedulous, though not always successful, in negotiation within Sicily, they directed their attention also to those states in Greece itself, in which they might reasonably expect a disposition friendly to themselves, and were sure of a disposition hostile to Athens. An embassy was sent first to Corinth, the parent state of Syracuse. There was found, if not the purest kindness to Syracuse, yet the utmost readiness to oppose Athens. Ministers were appointed to accompany the Syracusan ministers to Lacedæmon, and assist in rousing the usual sluggish counsels of that state. The ephors, and others of prevailing power there, were free to encourage by words, and willing even to assist by negotiation, but backward to give more efficacious assistance.

Thucyd. ut
ant. Isocr.
pro Alcib.
p. 140. t. 3.
Ch. 17. s. 3.
of this Hist.

But an Athenian was now become the most formidable foe to Athens. Alcibiades had passed in a merchant-ship from the Thurian territory to the Elean port of Cyllene, whence he proceeded to Argos, where his interest, as we have seen, had been powerful. The establishment of his credit now with the democratical party there would afford the fairest ground for its restoration with the democratical party in Athens; but the diligence of his opponents disappointed him. They procured a decree of the Athenian people for his banishment from Greece, and the mission of ministers to Argos to demand his person. He had hitherto hesitated to accept an invitation from Lacedæmon. A party there favoured him: his connection by the claim of hereditary hospitality with the republic, and his services to many individuals, when prisoners in Athens, would recommend him. But he feared the body of the people, who might be apt to recollect, with no friendly mind, the evils which had

Thucyd. l. 6.
c. 89.

been suffered, and the greater evils apprehended and risked, from the war excited in Peloponnesus by his ambition, his talents, and his influence; and he feared not less the prejudice, which could scarcely fail to be entertained against him, on account of his constant connection with the democratical, and opposition to the oligarchal interest, in his own country. The leading men however in general, even those otherwise less well disposed to him, aware that he was capable of being no less a useful friend than a pernicious enemy, were in the moment willing to forget every objection to him. He judged it unsafe to remain longer in Argos; he was therefore ready to go wherever circumstances might afford any prospect of advantage; and, a safe-conduct being sent to him, he went to Sparta.

On his arrival he found a general disposition in his favour, rather such as he might have wished, than such as could reasonably be expected. The senate assembled, and the people being summoned to give him audience, all listened with anxious attention, while he communicated information and advice. “The views of conquest entertained at Athens,” he said, “were extensive. It was Thucyd. l. 6. c. 90. proposed first to reduce all Sicily; then the Grecian possessions in Italy. With the inexhaustible supply of ship-timber which Italy afforded, it was intended so to increase the fleet that the conquest of Carthage might be undertaken. Spain and all the western shores of the Mediterranean would then be open; whence mercenary troops might be obtained, in any numbers, and the best of their kind. These would be employed against Peloponnesus by land, while the fleet should blockade it by sea; and thus it was proposed to complete the subjugation of Greece. The conquered countries, it was expected, each as it was reduced, would furnish supplies for farther conquest, without burthening Athens.

<sup>Thucyd. 1. 6.
c. 91.</sup> “And however wild and visionary,” continued Alcibiades, “these vast projects may on first view appear, I, who have long meditated upon them, who know the resources of Athens, who have seen the deficiencies of the ill-constituted and unconnected commonwealths against which its arms are now directed, am confident that success is not impossible. The Sicilian Greeks have little military discipline or skill. Syracuse, having already suffered a defeat by land, will presently be blockaded by land and sea; and, unassisted, must unavoidably fall. Sicily may then be considered as conquered, and Italy will not hold long. Thus not Sicily only, but Peloponnesus itself, is deeply interested in the event.”

Having by this representation alarmed the Lacedæmonians, he proceeded to inform them how the threatened danger might be averted. “A fleet,” he said, “you have not, equal to oppose the Athenian; but troops may be sent to Sicily, making them work their own passage, in sufficient number to form, with the Sicilians, a competent force of regular heavy-armed. But, what I hold of more importance than any troops you can send, let a Spartan general go to Sicily; who may establish discipline among the Sicilians already firm in the cause, and whose authority may bring over, and hold united under one command, those not disposed to obey the Syracusans. Thus, more than by any other measure, your decided friends will be encouraged, and those doubtfully affected will be confirmed in your interest.

“But it will be necessary for the encouragement of the Syracusans and the distraction of the Athenians, without reserve to begin hostilities in Greece. Nothing can be so efficacious, and nothing the Athenians so much dread, as your occupying and fortifying a post within Attica; and for this purpose the town of Decelea is to be preferred. Thus their country will no longer be theirs but yours; no revenue

will accrue to them from it ; even that from the silver mines of Laurium may be stopped : but what is still more important, nothing will equally superinduce the revolt of those distant possessions, whence their principal revenue is derived, as the knowledge that they are pressed at home."

After having thus indicated and advised whatever would most contribute to his country's downfall, Alcibiades thought, for his character's sake, however persecuted by that country, some apology necessary for such conduct. " I hold that," he said, " no longer my country, ^{Thucyd. l. 6. c. 92.} which is governed by a set of men who have so injuriously driven me from it. Nor ought I to be considered as persuading war against my country ; but rather as endeavouring to restore myself to the country which was once mine, and to restore that country to its due government within itself, and its just situation among the Grecian republics. I account him a true patriot, not who, being unjustly expelled, rests in banishment, but who, still animated by love of his country, does his utmost to restore himself. Upon you, Lacedæmonians, I depend for the greatest benefits, to my country not less than to myself. You may trust me therefore that there is no danger, no hardship, which I am not ready to undergo in your service, and that I shall have every satisfaction in co-operating with you, to pull down the tyrannical power, now usurped by Athens, and restoring Greece to that happy situation, in which you, by common consent, and not by violence, presided over it."

The eloquence of Alcibiades, his advice, but still more the expectation of advantage from the ^{c. 93.} important information which he was unquestionably able to give concerning every circumstance of Athenian affairs, decided the Lacedæmonians, and it was resolved to assist Syracuse, renewing, of course, the war with Athens.

SECTION V.

Measures of the Peloponnesians to relieve Syracuse. — Measures of the Athenian Armament in Sicily. — Re-enforcement to the Athenian Armament in Sicily. — Siege of Syracuse. — Capitulation proposed. — Arrival of Gylippus and Pythen to the Relief of Syracuse. — Official Letter of Nicias to the Athenian People.

THE resolution for war being taken at Lacedæmon, the business of Sicily required the first attention. To command the force to be employed there, Gylippus was appointed, son of Cleandridas, who had been banished, when tutor to the young king Plistoanax, for misconduct in a former war with Athens, and on suspicion of taking bribes from Pericles. Gylippus was directed to consult, with the leading men of Corinth and Syracuse, about the readiest and best means of transporting troops to Sicily ; but those troops were to be collected as they might among the allied states, Lacedæmon furnishing none. A man however more qualified than Gylippus for the business committed to him could hardly have been selected, and, sparing as Lacedæmon was of troops and treasure, the authority and influence, with which he was largely vested, were, as we find by their effects, of extraordinary power. Ordering two Corinthian triremes to attend him immediately at Asine, he urged the diligent preparation of the rest of the force to be employed under his command.

Thucyd. l. 6.
c. 95.
Ch. 15. s. 5.
of this Hist.

The resolution taken, for renewing war with Athens, might give to expect some restored vigour in the Lacedæmonian councils ; but the first operations of the Lacedæmonian arms indicated none. In spring the force of Laconia was assembled, and marched against the Argive territory. On its arrival at Cleonæ, an earthquake, a common circumstance in most parts of Greece, and especially in Laconia, without doing any considerable

B. C. 414.
Ol. 91. 2.
P. W. 18.
Thucyd. l. 6.
c. 95.

mischief, threw all into consternation: superstition saw in it the anger of the gods declared; the army immediately retreated, and the expedition was abandoned. Such conduct encouraged and invited the Argives to revenge. Entering the Lacedæmonian territory of Thyreatis, they collected plunder that sold for twenty-five talents, about six thousand pounds sterling; which was esteemed a large booty, well rewarding the enterprise.

A conspiracy, which about the same time broke out in the little city of Thespiæ in Bœotia, requires mention, as it tends to illustrate the state of Greece. The democratical party rose against their oligarchal magistrates; the Athenians marched a body of troops to support them. The insurgents were nevertheless overpowered; some were apprehended, (what they suffered we are not informed,) and the rest fled to Athens. Thucyd. 1. 6.
c. 95.

During winter the Athenian generals in Sicily had not neglected such measures for promoting their business as the season would permit. Soon after disposing their troops in quarters they marched with their whole force to Messena, in hope of gaining that city through intelligence long maintained with a party there: but Alcibiades, who before his flight had been privy to the negotiation, gave warning of the danger. The Athenian armament therefore, after suffering in a winter camp thirteen days, was obliged to return, without effecting anything but the destruction of some of the principal Messenians of their own party, who were seized by their opponents, condemned as traitors, and executed. c. 74.

Some negotiations among the Sicel tribes had a more fortunate issue. Of those of the plains habituated to subjection under the Syracusan government, and ready objects of Syracusan resentment, few could be persuaded to revolt: but the midland mountaineers, who had always preserved independency, and considered the c. 88.

Syracusans as their natural enemies, were predisposed to the Athenian cause. Most of them readily furnished provisions, and some even paid contributions in money. A small force brought to terms a few who were found adverse, and relieved some others, more favourably inclined, from the restraint in which they had been held by Syracusan garrisons.

Thucyd. 1. 6.
c. 88.

Toward the approach of spring the whole Athenian armament moved from Naxos to Catana, to be nearer its principal object: and negotiation was extended as far as Tuscany and Carthage. Overtures had been received from Tuscany, yet the result seems to have been little important, and it does not appear that the negotiation with Carthage produced anything. The generals however succeeded in collecting, within Sicily, horses for a body of cavalry. Iron, bricks, and other materials, necessary for the proposed contravallation, were prepared, and every disposition was made for undertaking the siege of Syracuse.

B. C. 414.
P. W. 18
Thucyd. 1. 6.
c. 94.

Early in spring the army marched. The lands of Megara, which, since the depopulation of the city by Gelon, had been Syracusan property, were ravaged. An attempt upon a fort held by a Syracusan garrison failed; but the vale of the river Tereas was plundered unopposed, the standing corn burnt, and a small body of Syracusans interfering to check the ravage, some were killed, the rest fled. For this little success a trophy was erected, and the army returned to Catana. After a short time for refreshment, the generals moved again, gained the Sicel town of Centoripa by capitulation, and burnt the corn of the adverse Sicel tribes of Inessa and Hybla. Returning then to Catana, they found the supplies and re-enforcements from Athens arrived. The passion of the Athenian people for conquest in Sicily had not abated: the application of the generals had met with favour far

beyond their expectation; and all their requests were granted without demur. No addition of infantry had been desired: there were sent two hundred and fifty horse soldiers, with complete accoutrements, but without horses, three hundred talents in silver, amounting to about seventy-five thousand pounds sterling, and stores of all necessary kinds in abundance.

The generals resolved then immediately to lay Thucyd. l. 6. c. 96. siege to Syracuse. Nature, art, and a numerous population concurred to make Syracuse strong: and to reduce a place, of but moderate strength, we have seen, in the art of attack of that age, a contravallation always was necessary. Here two difficulties opposed; the extent of the town, and the form of a hill, over the skirt of which a suburb extended. The hill, sloping toward the town, was precipitous toward the country; and the suburb, from its situation, overlooking the town, was called Epipolæ.¹⁰ The Syracusan generals were apprised of the intention of the enemy; they were not uninformed of the usual mode of conducting sieges; and they were aware how important it would be to occupy the hill of Epipolæ. But they were new in command: discipline remained yet to be established among their troops; and, till danger became pressing, notwithstanding the vote conferring on them discretionary power, the attempt would be hazardous to enforce discipline among those who by a simple vote might take away the power they had given. Not therefore till it was known that the Athenians had collected a considerable body of cavalry, and were already prepared to march for Syracuse, Hermocrates and his colleagues ventured to take measures for appointing guards and distributing duty. At day-break they led all the Syracusan citizens, within the age for service,

¹⁰ Nearly synonymous with the English name OVERTON.

into a meadow on the bank of the Anapus. After a review of arms, they appointed a select body of seven hundred men to be stationed in Epipolæ, as a kind of picket-guard to give assistance wherever danger might press, but to be particularly a protection for that very important post. An Andrian refugee, named Diomilus, versed, as a subject of Athens, in the Athenian discipline, was appointed to the command of the body selected for so critical a service; a circumstance strongly indicating how conscious the Syracusan generals were of the inferior skill and experience of their own officers.

Thucyd. l. 6.
c. 97. On the very night preceding these measures of the Syracusans, the Athenian generals, embarking their whole army, had passed, undiscovered, to a place near Syracuse, called Leon, where a body of infantry was hastily debarked, which proceeded immediately to Epipolæ, less than a mile distant, and by a pass called Euryelus, mounted the hill unopposed. Information of this surprise being next morning carried to the Syracusans, occupied in the meadow of the Anapus at the distance of three miles, excited great consternation. Courage however did not fail them. With much zeal, but much disorder, all hastened to repel the invaders. A fierce conflict ensued; but tumultuous valour was little efficacious against steady discipline. The Syracusans were compelled to retreat, with the loss of three hundred heavy-armed, among whom fell Diomilus, the newly appointed commander of the select band. The near refuge of their walls prevented greater slaughter.

Next morning the Athenians drew out into the plain to offer battle: but the temper of the Syracusan people, chastised by the event of the preceding day, no longer disposed them to put violence upon the prudence of their generals, and they did not stir. The Athenians, returning to Epipolæ, applied themselves to construct a fort at Labdalum, among

the highest precipices, as a citadel, in which to deposit their military chest and other valuables.¹¹ While thus employed they were joined by three hundred Egestans, and one hundred Naxian and Sicel cavalry; and, the Athenian troopers being mounted, the cavalry of the army all together, exclusive of the horse-bowmen, were now six hundred and fifty. The fort being quickly completed, the army descended into the plain, and the work of contravallation was immediately begun.

Syracuse was built between two inlets of the sea, called the Great port, and the Trogilian port; and it nearly inclosed a third, called the Little, or the Ortygian port, which was separated from the great port only by the little island of Ortygia, the site of the original town. On the inland side rose the hill of Epipolæ.¹² It was the business of the Athe-

¹¹ Τοῖς τε σκεύεσι καὶ τοῖς χρήμασιν ἀποθήκη.

¹² The site of Syracuse is thus described by a modern traveller: "The ancient city of Syracuse was of a triangular form, and consisted of five parts or towns; Ortygia, or the island; Achradina, that faced the sea; Tyche, joined to Achradina on the east; Neapolis, which lay along the side of the great port; and, at the western extremity, Epipolæ. Some lofty rocks, crowned with ramparts, formed a strong defence all around, except in Neapolis, where the walls crossed the low grounds. The circuit, according to Strabo, amounted to a hundred and eighty stadia, twenty-two English miles and a half; an account I once suspected of exaggeration; but, after spending two days in tracing the ruins, and making reasonable allowances for encroachments of the sea, I was convinced of the exactness of the measurement." Swinburne's Travels in the Two Sicilies, p. 327. v. 2.

- It will be observed that this writer speaks of Syracuse when it had acquired its greatest extent, some time after the age of the Peloponnesian war, and he reckons only eight stadia to an English mile, according to the computation formerly generally admitted; whereas, through diligent inquiry since, though the exact measure of the stadion is not yet agreed upon, it has been shown to have been, in general acceptation among the Greeks, considerably less than half an English furlong. The account of the extensive circle of prospect from the summit of Euryelus, given by the same traveller, may deserve notice here:

"Toward the north," he says, "the eye wanders over vast plains along a line of coast to the foot of Ætna, whose mighty cone shuts up the horizon with unspeakable majesty. The mountains of Italy rise like clouds, on each side of it. Southward the city of Syracuse, now reduced to its original spot, Ortygia, once an island, but now a peninsula, still containing eighteen thousand inhabitants, seems to float on the bosom of the waters, guarding the entrance of its

nians to carry their works of contravallation from Epipolæ to the sea on each side ; to the Trogilian port on the north, to the great port on the south. They began on the northern side, and, through their superior practice and skill, preparation having been made during winter, the business advanced so rapidly as to astonish not less than it alarmed the Syracusans. At a loss for measures to oppose to it, their generals resolved to venture a battle, rather than quietly permit the prosecution of works which threatened, in their completion, the inevitable capture of the city. They accordingly led out their forces ; but, in approaching the enemy, their order became deranged, and deficient discipline among the troops baffled endeavours to restore it. They had the prudence immediately to command hasty retreat, and were fortunate enough, under the protection of their horse, to get within their walls again with little loss.

This check was salutary to the Syracusans, as it tended to repress that intemperate ardour which very inconveniently interfered with the authority of the generals ; and the genius of Hermocrates soon led him to the measures most proper in the existing circumstances. The Athenian works would be effectual only if the contravallation were completed. They were yet confined to the northern side of the town : on the southern side therefore, between Epipolæ and the great port, Hermocrates carried out a work from the town-wall, cutting the proposed line of the enemy's contravallation. He expected that his work would be interrupted, and perhaps destroyed ; but even thus he foresaw considerable advantage from it. If the

Thucyd. l. 6.
c. 99.

noble harbour. The Plemmyrian peninsula locks it on the opposite shore, beyond which an expanse of sea is seen, stretching away to cape Passaro. The hills of Noto bound the view to the southward, and the foreground is every where an expanse of rich level plain, thickly planted, and watered by the winding stream of the Anapus." p. 336.

enemy assailed it with the whole of their forces, he would retire, and he had his end in the interruption of their works; if with a part, he would oppose with his whole force, and so would probably be superior. The Athenian generals however knew their business: they permitted him to complete his work without disturbance: a guard Thucyd. l. 6. c. 100. was placed in it, and the rest of the forces withdrew into the city. Though circumstances had occurred powerfully to repress forward rashness among the Syracusans, Hermocrates had not yet been able to establish due subordination among those who, having chosen him their commander, retained nevertheless, by the constitution of Syracuse, legal power still to command him. The Athenians, from the heights of Epipolæ, observed the disorderly negligence of the Syracusan guard; and, in the heat of mid-day, when part were strayed into the city, and the rest mostly reposing in their huts, a chosen detachment, supported by a strong body, assaulted the fort, while the rest of the army distracted the enemy's attention by a false attack in another quarter. The guard of the fort immediately fled. The Athenians and Argives pursuing entered that quarter of Syracuse called Temenites. They were however quickly overpowered, and compelled to retire out of the city with some loss; but they demolished the counterwork, carried off many of the piles, and, in claim of victory, erected their trophy.

On the next morning they began the contravallation on the southern side, from Epipolæ toward c. 101. the great port. The Syracusans, urged by their evidently growing danger, notwithstanding their late ill success, began a fresh counterwork, across a marsh lying between the town and the river Anapus, and nearer the sea than their former work. The Athenian generals, upon this, ordered their fleet from Thapsos, where it had hitherto lain, into the great harbour. Nicias was at this time confined by illness. Under

the command of Lamachus therefore the Athenian forces issued at day-break from Epipolæ, and, making their way across the soft ground of the marsh upon planks, stormed the new work of the Syracusans, and routed the forces which came out of the town for its protection. The right of those forces easily reached the town again; but the left made for a bridge over the Anapus. The Athenians endeavoured to intercept them; but the Syracusan horse, of which the greater part was in that wing, facing about unexpectedly, charged the more advanced of the Athenian troops, repulsed them, and spread confusion through their right wing. Lamachus, who was in the left, hastening with a small body of bowmen, to restore order in the right, and imprudently passing a deep ditch, by which ready assistance was prevented, he was overpowered and killed, with five or six of those about him. The Athenian left however advancing, the Syracusans retreated again hastily, but carried off with them the body of the Athenian general, and crossing the river were there secure. The momentary success of their comrades meanwhile encouraging the Syracusans who had fled into the city, their leaders conceived the bold idea of assaulting Epipolæ, which they rightly judged would, upon the present occasion, be left with a small guard. Accordingly they took and demolished an outwork, and might have taken the whole, so weak was it left, but for the orders, judiciously given by Nicias, to the numerous slaves attending the army, to set fire to the wood, not sparing the machines which lay before the wall. A flame was thus quickly raised which checked the assailants; and, the Athenian army hastening to the relief of their principal post, while their fleet was seen entering the great harbour, the Syracusans retreated within their walls.

Thucyd. 1. 6.
c. 102.

c. 103.

All hope of intercepting the contravallation, or by any means preventing its completion, was now

given up by the besieged ; and despondency, and its consequence, discord, began to gain among them. This became quickly known among the neighbouring states ; and a general disposition to abandon the Syracusans, and to fear and flatter the Athenians, followed. This temper spread as far as the Italian cities : apprehensions arose that their refusal to furnish a market might draw on them the vengeance of the conquering commonwealth ; and supplies flowed to the Athenian armament from all quarters. Those of the Sicel tribes also, who before had superciliously rejected invitation from the Athenians, now solicited their alliance ; and from Tuscany three penteconters joined the fleet.

Meanwhile the Syracusan multitude, impotent against their enemies, vented their discontent against their generals, and Hermocrates and his colleagues were removed from their office. One of them however, Heraclides, (unless it was another person of the same name,) was restored, and Eucles and Tellias were associated with him in the command. At the same time suspicion of treachery between party and party, the universal bane of the Grecian commonwealths, especially in adverse circumstances, gained ground. The lower people were far from being equally apprehensive with their superiors of the consequences of yielding to the Athenians ; capitulation became the subject of frequent debate in the general assembly, and even messages passed to Nicias on the subject : but the terms proposed were not such as that cautious servant of the Athenian people could suppose would satisfy his greedy masters. Thus nearly however was a great point, and perhaps the most important, carried toward realising the magnificent visions of the ambition of Alcibiades ; and so near was Nicias to gaining, almost against his will, the glory of conqueror of Syracuse and of Sicily, and adding to the dominion of Athens the greatest acquisition ever yet made by Grecian arms.

Gylippus was arrived at Leucas with only two Lacedæmonian and two Corinthian ships, the rest of the squadron to be furnished by Corinth being not yet ready, when intelligence reached him of the ill situation of Syracuse; so exaggerated, that he gave up Sicily for lost, and thought he should do much if he could save the Italian states to the Peloponnesian confederacy. To this object therefore he determined to direct his efforts. Taking with him Pythen, the Corinthian admiral, in his small squadron, he went first to Tarentum; where, as a Lacedæmonian colony, he was

Thucyd. ut
ant. Diod.
l. 13. c. 93.
Plut. vit.
Peric. & Nic.

well received. He had some hope of gaining

Thurium, through family interest there; his father,

Cleandridas, having passed his exile at that place,

where he was admitted to the rights of citizenship. Means were thus open for attempting negotiation; but the Athenian interest, supported by the present reputation of the Athenian arms, was not to be overborne, and he could obtain nothing. In proceeding along the coast, to try negotiation with other towns, a violent storm interrupted his course, and, narrowly escaping shipwreck, he returned to Tarentum.

Thucyd. l. 7.
c. 1.

Some days were necessary for refitting his shattered galleys, and then he proceeded with Pythen to Locri; from whose people, through local interest always adverse to the Athenians, they found a favourable reception. There they gained the first authentic intelligence of the real state of things at Syracuse. They learnt that, though the circumvallation was really extended from Epipolæ to the sea on each side, and so far completed that any attempt upon it, without a very superior force, would be rash, yet over the crags themselves of Epipolæ it might be possible to introduce troops into the city. Learning farther that the strait of Messena was unguarded, they proceeded by sea, along the northern coast of Sicily, to Himera; and the

people of that place were brought to friendly association. Gylippus then immediately determined to lay up his triremes in the port of Himera, and march across the country to Syracuse, with such force as he could collect. He engaged the Himeræans to send with him a thousand foot, heavy and light, and a hundred horse; and obtaining from them moreover regular armour for those of his crews who were unprovided, he thus made his Peloponnesian heavy-armed seven hundred. He depended upon zealous assistance from the Selinuntines, in whose cause the Syracusans had drawn on themselves the arms of Athens; he had promises from Gela; and an opening offered for negotiation with some of the Sicels, through the recent death of a chief named Archonidas, whose influence principally had decided them to the Athenian interest. In all these negotiations the very name of Lacedæmon, as Thucydides assures us, powerfully seconded the activity and abilities of Gylippus. The Selinuntines indeed, who beyond others owed zeal to the cause, deceived his just expectation, sending only a small body of light-armed: the Geloans also sent only a small body, but it was cavalry; the Sicels joined him with a thousand men. His force altogether, with attending slaves, might be about five thousand.

During these transactions in Sicily the squadron assembled at Leucas sailed for the Italian coast, Thucyd. 1. 7. c. 2. leaving behind Gongylus, one of the Corinthian commanders, who happened not to be ready. This accidental circumstance had most important consequences. Gongylus, as soon as himself and his trireme were prepared, venturing across the gulf, without making the usual circuit of the Italian shore, arrived on the Sicilian coast before the squadron, and entered the harbour of Syracuse unopposed. For Nicias, thinking success now assured, and holding in contempt the force which he heard was ap-

proaching, kept little watch; insomuch that though he sent four triremes to prevent the passage of Gylippus through the strait of Messena, yet he sent them too late. The arrival of Gongylus was most critical. Summons had been issued for a general assembly to meet for the declared purpose of debating concerning terms of capitulation. Uncertain hope, raised by the arrival of the Corinthian admiral, gave strength to the party adverse to the surrender: the question of capitulation was postponed; Gongylus was allowed to address the people; and the warm assurances he gave of speedy and effectual succour, not from Corinth only, but from Lacedæmon, (for the authority of the Lacedæmonian name, says again Thucydides, was of principal weight,) wrought such a turn in the popular mind that the chiefs ventured to propose to march out and meet Gylippus, who, from communication which had passed, was known to be approaching.

It could not be without gross neglect in Nicias that, with a force of scarcely two thousand heavy-armed, and those for the most part but inferior troops, Gylippus shortly after ascended Epipolæ unopposed, by the same way of Euryelus, by which the Athenians had first obtained possession of that important post. The Syracusan forces actually went out to meet him; and to the astonishment of the Athenian general and army, busied in the works on the south of the city, the combined forces made their appearance as if offering battle. Gylippus however had the precaution to halt while retreat was still at his option, and he sent forward a herald with the proposal that "if the Athenians would quit Sicily in five days with their arms and baggage, he was willing to make a truce for the purpose." The message was of course received with disdain, amid their astonishment, by those who thought themselves on the point of becoming conquerors of Syracuse and of Sicily. Nicias

Thucyd. 1. 7.
c. 3.

however continued motionless, while the herald was simply ordered to withdraw. Meantime the able Gylippus had sufficient opportunity to observe that the Syracusan forces were deficient in discipline to a degree beyond what he had imagined; that they were utterly unable to form on uneven and confined ground; and that the first thing necessary for him was to retreat for more space. Nicias made no attempt to profit from any of these circumstances, but remained behind his works. Gylippus, thus allowed to retire at leisure, chose his camp for the night on the high ground of Tementes.

Next morning the combined forces appeared again in order of battle, in front of the Athenian works, and by their position intercluded the communication of the Athenian general with his fort of Labdalum, and with his northern lines. Nicias continued still unaccountably motionless, while Gylippus sent a strong detachment which stormed the fort, and put the garrison to the sword. A smaller occurrence on the same day contributed to raise the spirits of the Syracusans; an Athenian trireme was taken at the harbour's mouth.

Gylippus having, by this succession of daring Thucyd. l. 7. c. 4. but well concerted measures, in his outset, wholly changed the face of affairs, insomuch that not only the city was very effectually relieved, but the Athenian army was now rather in a situation of some danger, prudently checked the spirit of enterprise, that he might give stability to the advantage obtained. Master of Epipolæ through his success against Labdalum, he began immediately to carry out works to intersect the Athenian works, using the materials which the Athenians themselves had collected. Meanwhile Nicias, aware that the moment of opportunity for that great success with which lately he had had reason to flatter himself, was gone by, and that, however he might still be superior in

the field, to take Syracuse was beyond his present strength, continued nevertheless to prosecute his southern work toward the sea. In a country where all was inimical, to keep his communication open with his fleet would be necessary to the subsistence of his army, and might become necessary even to its safety. Occupying therefore the headland of Plemmyrium, on the southern side of the entrance of the great harbour, he raised there three redoubts, in which he placed the greater part of the baggage and stores of his army, and near them he stationed his ships of burden and small craft. This measure, well conceived in regard to the objects particularly in view, was however attended with great inconveniences. The soil was swampy and unwholesome; the water brackish; the Syracusan fort of Olympieum was near, and a body of horse, stationed there by Gylippus, gave unceasing annoyance; watching the wood and water parties, cutting off stragglers, and making it dangerous to stir from the camp but in powerful bodies.

Thucyd. 1. 7.
c. 5.

It was not long before Gylippus again drew out his forces and offered battle; and Nicias now at length did not refuse to meet him. The field was very narrow, confined between the contravallation and the city-wall. The Syracusan horse had not space for action, and the infantry, pressed by the superior discipline of the Athenians, soon retreated within their fortifications. It seems to have been the purpose of Gylippus to give practice to the Syracusans, with the least possible risk, to make them experience the necessity of submitting to the severity of Spartan discipline, if they would hope for the success for which the Spartan arms were renowned. Addressing them in assembly, he took all the blame of the late failure to himself; condemned his misapplication of their cavalry, praised the valour shown by their infantry, and flattered them with remarking that, being of the same Dorian origin with the Lacedæ-

monians, they ought to hold themselves superior to Ionians and islanders of the Ægean; and he doubted not but they would quickly show it, by driving those intruding adventurers out of their country.

He soon gave them opportunity for trial. Nicias would rather have avoided action, but that ^{Thucyd. 1. 7. c. 6.} the Syracusan counterwork from Epipolæ alarmed him. Already it barely did not intersect the line of the Athenian contravallation; and if completed would, according to Thucydides, not only prevent the completion of the contravallation, but give to the Syracusans both the choice when they would engage, and certain advantage in action. Gylippus so chose his ground that his cavalry could attack the Athenian left in flank. The wing was thus thrown into a confusion, which spread in some degree through the line, and Nicias hastily withdrew behind his works. Having thus established, in his own army, the opinion that they were superior in the field, Gylippus prosecuted assiduously his projecting work, and it was quickly carried beyond the Athenian line. This being effected, says Thucydides, if the Syracusans should now have the misfortune to be defeated in battle, and reduced to confine themselves within their walls, it would nevertheless be scarcely possible for the Athenians to complete their contravallation.

But adversity began to pour upon the Athenians. Nicias had sent twenty triremes to the ^{c. 4.} Italian coast to intercept the squadron from Leucas. His army had scarcely recovered from the consternation of their late defeat, when they saw the ^{c. 7.} enemy's squadron, consisting of twelve triremes, enter the little harbour of Syracuse. The strength, thus added, gave the city, for the present, complete security. It was therefore resolved to act upon the offensive against the Athenians; and with this view it was proposed to collect a still

greater strength, for which the credit of prosperous circumstances and recent success would afford advantage. Ministers were sent to Lacedæmon and Corinth; and the active Gylippus went himself around the Sicilian cities, to excite the lukewarm, and win the adverse, to exert themselves in the cause of Lacedæmon and of Syracuse, which, he contended, was the cause of liberty, of justice, and of the general interest of Sicily.

What opinion the Athenian general now held of his own situation, we learn from his own account, transmitted by Thucydides. Writing was but beginning to come into common use for ordinary purposes. The dispatches of generals were mostly, or, it rather appears, universally, committed to trusty messengers, who delivered them verbally. Thucy-

Thucyd. 1. 7.
c. 8. dides speaks of Nicias as the first general who made it his practice to transmit his reports home constantly in writing. He had observed, says the historian, that messengers, in delivering verbally to the sovereign people in assembly the reports committed to them, sometimes through inability to express themselves clearly, sometimes through fear of relating the whole of unpleasant truths, sometimes through hope of conciliating favour by exaggerating agreeable circumstances, generally gave an impression wide of the reality. From his first appointment therefore to a command with which he had always been little satisfied, and in which complex operations were to be conducted at a greater distance from home than had been usual for the Athenian arms, he had used the precaution of frequently sending dispatches in writing, with an exact account of every transaction; and these were always formally read to the assembled people by the secretary of the commonwealth.¹³ He had now determined, in consequence of his

¹³ Ὁ γραμματεὺς τῆς πόλεως.—c. 10.

ill success in the late battle, to remain upon the defensive for the rest of the summer. For this he thought it necessary to apologise very particularly in his dispatches to Athens. These he committed to officers whom he selected as most competent to answer any questions that might be put to them, yet he scrupulously protested that his written dispatches only should be considered as having his authority.

In them he represented that, “after having ^{Thucyd. l. 7. c. 11.} nearly attained the object of the expedition, when Syracuse was already reduced to extremity, the arrival of Gylippus with a considerable re-enforcement, partly Peloponnesian and partly collected in Sicily, had changed the face of affairs: that he had nevertheless been victorious in the first action, but the superiority of the enemy in cavalry and troops of missile weapons was, under able conduct, too much for him to resist; and, in a second action, he had been constrained to retreat: that it was in consequence now become necessary to confine himself within his lines, to forego offensive operations, and to consult principally how he might best insure the safety of his army against superior numbers; for, instead of besieging, it was rather reduced to the condition of a camp besieged: that the superiority of the Syracusan cavalry rendered any communication with the country highly dangerous: that, for increase of evil, he not only apprehended a strong alliance within Sicily ^{c. 12.} against the Athenian interest, but was assured that additional forces would arrive from Peloponnesus; and that, finally, he was threatened with attack, not by land only, but by sea. The fleet,” he proceeded to observe, “had unavoidably gone fast to decay; the ships were become leaky; the crews diminished; the enemy not only had more ships, but, secure against attack, they could choose when they would attack him: it was therefore necessary for his fleet

Thucyd. 1. 7. to be unremittingly watchful: the guard of the
 c. 13. naval camp, and convoys for the introduction of provisions and stores, kept the whole on constant duty: the crews, forced to go far for wood and water, were continually suffering from the Syracusan horse. Meanwhile not only the slaves deserted in numbers to the enemy, but the auxiliaries and mercenaries, who had hoped that plunder more than fighting would be their business in Sicily, now they saw the Athenian armament declining, and the enemy growing in vigour, went home without leave. Sicily," continued the unfortunate general, "is wide; and wholly to prevent these desertions, is impossible; even to check them is difficult; and of all losses to an armament that
 c. 14. of able seamen is least easily repaired. Nor are these the only evils that press us: what is to me most distressing, both to feel and to complain of, remains yet to be mentioned. Your temper, Athenians, is adverse to subordination. The army is a part of you; a part of that sovereign people on whom my power wholly depends; and I find my authority insufficient to control the perverse disposition, and restrain the pernicious conduct of some under my command. Meanwhile the enemy abound in resources, and we are destitute; for Naxus and Catana, our only allies in this part of the world, are little able to assist us. If then, in addition to existing evils, the Italian cities, whence our supplies of provisions have been principally drawn, should be induced, by the ill state of our affairs and your neglect of us, to refuse farther assistance, we shall be at once undone, and the enemy would have a complete triumph without the risk of a blow.

"I could have sent a more pleasing account, but I could not send intelligence which it more imports you to receive. I know your disposition to be gratified by favourable reports of your affairs; but then I know too the change that follows

in your temper, when the event disappoints expectation; and I have therefore thought it best to explain to you, without reserve, the real state of things.

“ Since then I can affirm that neither your ^{Thucyd. l. 7. c. 15.} generals nor your army have deserved blame for their conduct in your service here, since Sicily is now united against us, and re-enforcements are expected from Peloponnesus, I will venture to declare that it is become absolutely necessary for you to determine on one of two measures: either your forces now here must be immediately recalled, or an additional armament, not inferior in either land or naval force to the former, must be sent hither: it must be here early in spring, and a large sum of money for its use will be indispensable. For myself, I request that I may be superseded in the command, for which ill health disqualifies me; and I hope I may be allowed to claim this as an honourable indulgence due for my past services.”

The Athenians were not yet practised enough in misfortune to listen to wise advice thwarting a favourite purpose. Ambition was a popular passion, not resting on incitement from Alcibiades. The pertinacity indeed and the vehemence with which its objects were pursued, considered together with the near prospect of success, even under the disadvantage of his removal from the execution of the vast projects which had owed their conception to him, may indeed afford no small amount of apology for his conduct in directing the effervescence, which apparently none could still. The Athenian people would not, on the ^{c. 16.} remonstrances of Nicias, give up their views of conquest in Sicily: they would not even allow their infirm and deserving general to retire. An additional force was immediately voted; Nicias was required to remain with the command-in-chief; Menander and Euthydemus, officers now in Sicily, were appointed his present assistants in the

duty; Demosthenes, son of Alcisthenes, who had already so much distinguished himself by important services, and Eurymedon son of Theocles, who had commanded at Corcyra, at Pylus, and in Sicily, were named to lead the re-enforcement. As an earnest of the resolution of the Athenian people to give the utmost support to their friends in Sicily, Eurymedon was sent forward about midwinter, with ten triremes and twenty talents of silver, while Demosthenes remained to superintend the equipment of the rest of the armament.

SECTION VI.

Decelea in Attica occupied by the Lacedæmonians. — Fresh Re-enforcements for the Athenian Armament in Sicily. — Naval Action in the Harbour of Syracuse. — Distress of Athens. — Tax upon the States subject to Athens. — Massacre by Thracians in Bœotia. — Naval Action in the Corinthian Gulf.

WHILE the Athenians were thus madly intent upon distant conquest, a more serious attack than they had yet experienced was preparing against their own country. The success of Gylippus, the prospect of assistance from the whole force of Sicily, the evident embarrassment of Athens, the exhortations of Corinth, the advice of Alcibiades, and the important information and assistance which he was ca-

pable of giving, now all together determined the

Lacedæmonians to recommence hostilities immediately against Athens. They were farther encouraged, says the historian, by the consideration that justice, not simple justice, or a due consideration of the rights of men, which Grecian religion little taught to regard, but justice ratified by a solemn appeal to the gods, was now on their side. Their misfortunes, in the latter years of hostility, had led them to reflect that the beginning of the war had, on

Thucyd. 1. 7.
c. 18.

their part, teemed with injustice, and breach of faith solemnly plighted. Such were the refusal to submit their disputes with Athens to a judicial determination; the support of the violence committed by the Thebans against Plataea; and the first invasion of Attica. On the contrary, since the truce, the Athenians had always refused to submit matters in dispute to judicial inquiry, which the Lacedæmonians had frequently demanded. The same transgression therefore, which they thought had already brought the vengeance of the gods on themselves, they concluded would bring it now on the Athenians. The war thus became popular, and to prosecute hostilities with vigour was determined with alacrity. It was resolved to carry into execution the long-meditated purpose of occupying a post in Attica; and, in pursuance of the advice of Alcibiades, Decelea was the place chosen. During winter the necessary materials for fortifying it were collected, especially iron, and preparation was also made for giving effectual assistance to Sicily.

In the beginning of next spring, at a very early season for military operations, the Lacedæmonians with their allies, under Agis son of Archidamus, entered Attica; and after extending ravage over the plain, which had been abandoned to them, applied themselves to fortify Decelea: a town in sight of Athens, at the distance of about fifteen miles, nearly equally distant from the border of Bœotia, and critically situated for commanding the richest part of Attica. About the same time some small reinforcements were sent to Sicily; six hundred enfranchised Helots, under Eccritus, a Spartan; three hundred Bœotians; and Corinthians, Sicyonians, and Arcadians, all together seven hundred. A squadron of twenty triremes had been sent from Athens to intercept succours, but failed of meeting the transports from Laconia. To favour the passage of those from the Corinthian gulf, the Corin-

Thucyd. 1. 7.
c. 19. Ol. 91. 3.
B.C. 413. P.W.
19. About 18
March.

Thucyd. 1. 7.
c. 17.

thians had prepared a squadron of twenty-five triremes, which took a station over against the Attic squadron at Naupactus, consisting of only twenty.

Thucyd. 1. 7.
c. 20.

Summer was already begun, and the works at Decelea were advancing, without any attempt at opposition from Athens, when Demosthenes sailed for Sicily; having under his command sixty Athenian and five Chian triremes, twelve hundred heavy-armed Athenians, and a greater force of infantry collected from the subject states. At Ægina he met a squadron of thirty Attic triremes, under Charicles, who, in the circumnavigation of Peloponnesus, was to co-operate with him in descents on the coast.

c. 21.

Meantime Gylippus was using his wonted activity and skill against the infirm and desponding Nicias. From the several Sicilian cities, who were inclined, or whom he had persuaded, to favour the Syracusan cause, he had collected a considerable force, with which, about the time that Demosthenes sailed from Athens, he entered Syracuse. The Athenians kept their land-force within their fortifications, which he thought himself not strong enough to attack, unless he could divide their strength. He proposed therefore another measure, which, to some, might appear still bolder; he would man the ships, and attack the enemy's fleet. The reputation of the Athenians for naval superiority was so established by their various successes against the Peloponnesians, in the beginning of the war, that the Syracusans were startled with the first idea of engaging them on water. But the influence of Hermocrates powerfully seconded the authority of Gylippus. Together they encouraged the Syracusans, by representing to them, that nothing so daunted an enterprising people as daring and unexpected enterprise against them. "The Athenians themselves," they added, "had not always been a seafaring people: the invading

Persians had first forced them to become such; nor was there any reason why the Syracusans, more prepared for it now than the Athenians then, should not quickly even excel them." Recent good fortune had prepared the Syracusans for encouragement. Having already, under the conduct of Gylippus, succeeded so much beyond their hopes, they were disposed now to carry their hopes high. Accord-^{Thucyd. 1. 7. c. 22.} ingly they submitted to his command: thirty-five triremes fit for service lay in the great port, and forty-five in the little port: all were manned by night, while Gylippus led the whole force of infantry toward the Athenian forts at Plemmyrium.

At day-break the stir in the Syracusan fleet became visible to the Athenians, who hastily manned sixty triremes; of which twenty-five were opposed to the thirty-five of the enemy already within the great port, and thirty-five to the forty-five which were advancing to enter it. On the land side the watch was so negligent, that the approach of an enemy was neither observed nor looked for, but the whole army made toward the shore to assist the fleet. Gylippus meanwhile, hastening his march, carried the largest of the three forts at the first assault; upon which the other two were immediately abandoned by their garrisons. By this time the fleets were engaged. Within the great port the Syracusans had at first the advantage; but their larger division breaking their order in advancing to the attack, were defeated; and then the conquering Athenians, hastening to the relief of their pressed ships, quickly compelled the other division of the Syracusan fleet to fly. Eleven Syracusan ships were sunk; the crews of three were made prisoners; those of the others mostly perished. Three Athenian ships were destroyed. The Athenians erected a trophy for their naval victory: the Syracusans erected three trophies for the three forts taken.

Thucyd. l. 7.
c. 24. More important tokens of success however than any trophies remained to the Syracusans. The killed and prisoners in the forts, notwithstanding the numbers that fled, were many: the military chest, all the most valuable effects of the principal officers, large magazines of provisions, most of the stores of both army and fleet, masts for forty triremes, and three complete triremes laid up ashore, were taken. One of the forts was immediately demolished: garrisons were placed in the other two, and a squadron of triremes was stationed under their protection, to intercept supplies by sea to the Athenian camp; whither thenceforward no vessel could arrive, but by stealth, or by fighting its way. Notwithstanding therefore their naval victory, the consequences of the late complex action were very seriously disadvantageous to the Athenians; and while their general, never remarkable for activity, was oppressed with sickness, alarm and despondency began to pervade the armament.

Meanwhile the conduct of the Syracusans, under the able direction of Gylippus and Hermocrates, was all energy.

c. 25. Twelve triremes, under Agatharchus, a Syracusan, pushing to sea, one went to Peloponnesus with dispatches. Agatharchus, with the remaining eleven, made the Italian coast, to intercept a fleet of Athenian transports and storeships, of which intelligence had been received, and most of them fell into his hands. He proceeded then to Caulonia on the Bruttian shore, where he burnt a quantity of navy timber which had been collected for the Athenians. In his return, meeting at Locri the Thespian auxiliaries destined for Syracuse, he took them aboard his squadron, and made homeward. One of his triremes was taken by an Athenian squadron stationed at Megara; the rest arrived safe in the harbour of Syracuse.

Notwithstanding their late naval defeat, Gylippus and Hermocrates resolved not to give up their purpose of dis-

puting with the Athenians the command of the sea. Accordingly, to secure their station in the great port, whence they might best annoy the Athenian fleet, they formed before it a kind of rampart of piles. To prevent the completion of this, and to destroy what was already done, became an important object for the Athenians. The merchant-ships of the ancients, capacious, deep, and firm in the water, like modern vessels for ocean navigation, were much fitter for some purposes of stationary fight than their galleys of war. A merchant-ship therefore, of the largest size¹⁴, being fitted with turrets and parapets, was conducted close to the Syracusan rampart; a body of troops aboard annoyed the Syracusan workmen, and drew the attention of the troops appointed to protect them; meanwhile a party in boats fastened ropes about the piles, divers went down and sawed them at the bottom, and thus most of them were hauled up or broken. To fortify and defend their naval station on one side, and to destroy it on the other, was then for some time the principal object of the two adverse parties; in which, on the side of the Athenians, the skill, activity, and boldness of the people were more observable than the science or vigour of the general. The Syracusans continued to drive piles, and some in such a manner that, not appearing above water, they were very dangerous to the Athenian boats; yet divers were found for large rewards to saw and fasten ropes even to these, so that the labour of the enemy was continually to be renewed; and as the present view of the Athenian general was defence, and to gain time for the arrival of the re-enforcement which he expected, his purpose was in a great degree accomplished.

While the Athenian affairs were thus waning in Sicily, Athens itself began to feel severely the consequence of having a Peloponnesian garrison established

Thucyd. i. 7.
c. 27.

¹⁴ *Ναῦς μεγιστότης.*

in the heart of its territory. In the former invasions a considerable part of the harvest had been consumed or carried off, and the vineyards, orchards, and olive plantations had been destroyed or greatly damaged. The injury however had not extended over the whole country. The Lacedæmonian army, for want of magazines, could not stay long; and when it was gone, no apprehension remained, during the rest of the year, for what had escaped its ravages: the herds and flocks returned to their pastures, and the owners of the lands might make any use of them that the interval till the next summer would admit. But the garrison of Decelea kept the whole country, and the city itself, in constant alarm. Its very wants compelled it to exertion; for the troops, little supplied by their cities, were to subsist chiefly by plunder; and the assistance, which they received occasionally from home, was less in money or stores, than in re-enforcements to assist in rapine. The Spartan king Agis, who had led the expedition, and superintended the construction of the works, remained, after the departure of the rest of the army, as governor of the garrison, and assiduously and ably directed its measures. Not only all produce and revenue from the lands of Attica, with all the herds and flocks which they had maintained, were lost to the Athenians, but more than twenty thousand slaves deserted, the greater part mechanics and manufacturers. The Athenian cavalry were to little purpose employed in the endeavour to check the ravage and desertion. Many of the horses, the art of shoeing that animal being yet unknown, were lamed by unremitted service on rough and rocky ground, some were disabled by wounds, and the rest soon worn down.

Thucyd. l. 7.
c. 28.

Among the inconveniences issuing from the establishment of the enemy in Decelea, one is mentioned by Thucydides which marks to a surprising degree the imperfection of ancient navigation. The large and

fruitful island of Eubœa was at all times the principal resource to the Athenians for supplying the deficiencies of the scanty and arid soil of Attica. The produce was mostly brought to the port of Oropus, and thence conveyed by land, along a hilly road of about forty-four miles, to Athens. The nearest, the least hilly, and almost the only practicable road for heavy burdens, passed through Decelea. The occupying of that post by the enemy therefore made it necessary to carry everything by sea. With the advantages of modern navigation, this would be incomparably the preferable method; but the contemporary author assures us that, in that age, the expenses of the transport all the way by sea far exceeded that of the old practice.¹⁵ For the rest, we may readily conceive the force and the truth of the concise phrase which Thucydides has used to express the distress of a great city. Instead of a commonwealth, he says, Athens was reduced to the condition of a garrison. Without a territory, it depended upon supplies by sea for subsistence. The whole people were harassed with military duty, so incessant as to admit little other employment. By day they mounted guard by reliefs; but for the night, excepting the higher orders who composed the cavalry, none were at any time excused; those, not immediately wanted for the duty of the ramparts, being required to be in constant readiness with their arms¹⁶: and

Chandler's
Journey in
Greece, and
Antonin. Itin.

¹⁵ Those less acquainted with the advantages which the arts of modern navigation give to transport by sea may form some estimate of them from the following circumstances. Much of the trade between London and Canterbury is carried on by water; and Whitstable, six miles from Canterbury, is the port of that city for its communication with the Thames. The passage from London to Whitstable is perhaps eighty miles: but the general charge of carriage is the same for the six miles by land, between Whitstable and Canterbury, as for the eighty by water, between Whitstable and London. Allowance must however be made for the benefit of tides in our narrow seas, which in the Mediterranean is little known.

¹⁶ Οἱ μὲν ἐφ' ὅπλοις ποιούμενοι, οἱ δ' ἐπὶ τοῦ τείχους. The exact value of the phrase ἐφ' ὅπλοις ποιούμενοι, apparently a military phrase of the day, is scarcely

this continued through all seasons, during the remainder of the war.

Pressed thus by every inconvenience of a siege at home, such continued to be the zeal of the Athenian people for foreign conquest, such the ardour with which they insisted on the prosecution of the siege of Syracuse, a city scarcely inferior to Athens in size or population, that unless it was seen, says the historian, nobody would believe it. Thus indeed, he continues, the expectation of all Greece was strangely disappointed, and the opinion generally entertained both of the power and of the perseverance of Athens, proved mistaken. The pressure of new evils served but to bring forward new resources. All revenue from Attica, public and private, ceasing, it was necessary to look abroad for augmentation of supplies. A total change was made in the collection of revenue from the subject-states; the ancient tribute was abolished, and, instead of it, a tax was imposed, resembling the modern customs; being a twentieth of the value of all imports and exports.¹⁷ Thus light, in compar-

now to be ascertained. The explanations attempted by the commentators and translators are very unsatisfactory. For discovering the meaning of Thucydides upon this occasion, the curious reader may however consult another passage of Thucydides, nearly to the same purpose, in the 69th chapter of his eighth book; and some similar phrases occurring in Xenophon may assist him.

¹⁷ Thucydides, not in the moment aware of the explanation necessary to make this interesting passage clearly intelligible to posterity, for whom professedly he wrote, has expressed himself in his usual close manner, with no other words than these: Τὴν εἰκοστὴν ὑπὸ τοῦτον τὸν χρόνον τῶν κατὰ θάλασσαν ἀντὶ τοῦ φόρου τοῖς ὑπηκόοις ἐποίησαν, πλείω νομίζοντες ἢν σφίσι χρέματα οὕτω προσείναι. In Duker's edition the passage is cautiously pointed as it is here given, and neither scholiast nor annotators take any notice of it, farther than to inform of some different readings, which are evidently and grossly bad. The Latin translation runs thus: *Per id tempus tributi loco vicesimam mercium, quæ mari vehabantur, populis imperio suo subjectis imperârunt, sperantes se majorem pecuniæ vim hac ratione confecturos.* Smith, with whom it is by no means a common fault to be over bold, has ventured, upon this occasion, I think successfully; and though his authority is not very great, I have been glad to find his support.

ison of what we have laid upon ourselves, was the heaviest tax, as far as we learn from history, at that time known in the world. Yet it caused much discontent among the dependent commonwealths; the arbitrary power by which it was imposed being indeed reasonably execrated.

While the Athenians were suffering from the Peloponnesians established in Decelea, a cruel stroke fell upon their neighbour enemies of Bœotia. The circumstances, little materially connected with the great events of the war, assist however considerably toward a portraiture of the times. Thirteen hundred middle-armed Thracians, hired for the Sicilian expedition, did not arrive till after the fleet under Demosthenes was gone. Means to forward them were not ready, and their pay was burdensome, being an Attic drachma, nearly tenpence sterling a head, daily; this being however not merely for subsistence, but for arms and clothing also. It was resolved therefore to send them home, and discharge them; but, by the way, to make any use of them against the enemies of the commonwealth, for which opportunity might offer. The command was committed to Diitrephes, an Athenian, who, passing through the Euripus, debarked his barbarians on the first hostile shore in his course, that of the Tanagræan territory. Having collected some booty, he hastened to deposit it in the neighbouring friendly town of Chalcis in Eubœa, and in the evening again crossed the Euripus for farther plunder. During the night he directed his march toward Mycalessus, a large and populous Bœotian town, in perfect amity with Thebes, and at such a distance from the Attic border and from the sea that the inhabitants, unaccustomed to fear surprises, spared themselves the expense and fatigue both of maintaining complete fortifications, and keeping a regular watch. Diitrephes, halting toward midnight under the shelter of a temple of Mercury, recommenced

Thucyd. 1. 7.
c. 29.

his march so as to reach Mycalessus, only two miles off, about daybreak. Finding a gate open and unguarded, his barbarians rushed instantly to pillage, and massacred as they went, sparing neither sex nor age: for the Thracians, like most barbarians, says Thucydides, who knew them from living among them, are commonly bloody-minded in success; insomuch that for sport they would kill even the beasts that fell in their way. There was a very large school, in which the boys were just assembled, when the Thracians broke in, and put every one to death. Destruction so unexpected and so complete, continues the contemporary historian, scarcely ever fell upon any town.

Thucyd. l. 7.
c. 30. News of this scene of bloodshed being quickly carried to Thebes, a body of forces instantly marched: too late to give any relief to the Mycalessians, but in time to overtake the Thracians. Those barbarians, who in courage were inferior to none, and in discipline not despicable, frequently turning in their retreat repulsed the Theban cavalry; and Skirphondas, one of the Bœotarchs, was killed. They were however compelled to abandon all their booty; and when they arrived on the beach, in the confusion of embarkation, they suffered greatly; those unpractised in swimming being indeed without resource; for the Athenian seamen, little solicitous about such allies, carefully kept themselves and their vessels out of the reach of the justly enraged enemy. About two hundred and fifty Thracians were killed: the rest were conducted by Diitrephes to their own country.

c. 26. Meanwhile Demosthenes, having joined Charicles, was meditating measures for revenging against Lacedæmon the evils suffered by Athens from the garrison of Decelea. At Nauplia he took aboard a body of Argive infantry. Turning back then upon the Epidaurian coast, he made a descent and collected some booty. Having

thus engaged the enemy's attention toward the northern parts of Peloponnesus, he re-embarked his forces, and proceeding to the Laconian coast debarked again overagainst Cythera, as the historian marks the place, where the temple of Apollo stands. The first business was still plunder, as far as it could be conveniently extended. A neck of land was then occupied on which to erect a fort. It was proposed that this should be, on the eastern side of the country, like Pylus on the western, a place of refuge for runaway Helots, or any others who might be disposed to live by rapine on the Laconian lands. Matters being so far settled, Demosthenes proceeded on his voyage. Charicles remained till works were raised adequate to the protection of a garrison, and then, with the Argive auxiliaries, returned home.

Demosthenes, arriving at Corcyra, added his personal influence to the public authority with which he was vested, for collecting re-enforcements among the allies of Athens in Western Greece. Naupactus, Cephallenia, Zacynthus, Alyzia, Anactorium contributed to strengthen the armament. At Anactorium he found Eurymedon collecting provisions for Sicily¹⁸, and from him he learnt the unwelcome news that Plemmyrium was in the hands of the enemy. Nearly at the same time arrived Conon, now for the first time mentioned in history, who had the command at Naupactus, and came to request a re-enforcement to his squadron of eighteen triremes, to enable him to oppose the Corinthian squadron of twenty-five. The service was thought so important that ten of the swiftest triremes of the fleet were selected for it, to make his superiority decisive. Such a

¹⁸ Τὰ χρέματα ἄγων τῇ στρατιᾷ. Thucyd. l. 7. c. 31. "Ἦτοι τὰ πρὸς τροφὴν χρέσιμα, καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ τὰ συντίνοντα αὐταῖς. Schol. This is not the only occasion on which Thucydides uses the term *χρέματα* for necessaries in general. Smith has translated accordingly; but the Latin has *pecuniam*, which does not express the sense intended here.

request, made by such an officer as Conon, and granted by such a commander as Demosthenes, shows that the Athenians had already continued the war too long. Both those officers were certainly aware that the enemy had improved their naval practice, and that the superiority of the Athenians, experienced in the actions under Phormion, in the same seas, would be experienced no more.

Thucyd. l. 7.
c. 33. Demosthenes and Eurymedon, having prepared every thing for the prosecution of their voyage, crossed the Ionian gulf to the Iapygian promontory. There they stopped to renew the ancient alliance of Athens with Artas, a powerful chief of the Iapygian barbarians, through whom they obtained a small re-enforcement of dartmen of the Messapian tribe. From Metapontium, a Grecian town in the neighbourhood, three hundred dartmen and two triremes joined them. Proceeding then to Thurium, they found a revolution had taken place there, favourable to their cause: the party friendly to Athens were in possession of the government, and those of their opponents, who had escaped with life, were in banishment. After making such arrangements as they judged most advantageous for the Athenian interest, and obtaining a re-enforcement of seven hundred heavy-armed and three hundred dartmen, they proceeded to the Rhegian port of Petra.

c. 34. As soon as the Athenian fleet under Demosthenes had clearly quitted the Grecian coast, the Corinthian admiral, Polyantes, resolved upon the bold measure of offering battle, though with inferior numbers, to the Athenian squadron at Naupactus. He chose his station for the purpose judiciously. It was opposite to Naupactus, in a small bay, on each point of which a body of Peloponnesian infantry was encamped. Thus, in case of being overpowered, his retreat would be short, and protection ready.

Nor was this all : experience had led the Corinthians to improve the construction of their galleys, by strengthening the bows with an addition of timber and metal which might enable them to resist the destructive shock of the enemy's beak. In the accidental absence, apparently, of Conon, Diphilus commanded the Athenian squadron ; and, confident in superior numbers, accepted, perhaps imprudently, the offer of battle thus made by the enemy, on their own coast. After a sharp contest, three Corinthian ships were sunk, but seven Athenian were disabled, through the superior strength of the Corinthian bows. The Corinthians retired, but the Athenians were not in a condition for effectual pursuit. The Corinthians therefore erected a trophy ; thinking it much, says the historian, not to have been more decisively defeated. The Athenians, on the contrary, though they remained masters of the wreck, the common criterion of victory, would erect no trophy ; dejected, as by a defeat, not to have been, with superior numbers, more completely victorious. The enemy's fleet however retiring soon after into the harbour of Erineum, and the army also withdrawing, the Athenians then landed on the Peloponnesian shore, near the place of action, and erected their trophy.

SECTION VII.

Affairs in Sicily. — Second naval Action in the Harbour of Syracuse. — Third naval Action. — Arrival of Re-enforcement under Demosthenes and Eurymedon. — Attack of Epipolæ. — Retreat proposed by Demosthenes, opposed by Nicias. — Secret Negotiation in Syracuse. — Retreat resolved. — Consequences of an Eclipse of the Moon. — Fourth naval Action. — Distress of the Athenians. — Fifth naval Action.

DURING these transactions in Greece and on the Grecian shores, the natural consequences of recovered prosperity

attended the negotiations which Gylippus and Hermocrates were prosecuting in Sicily. Of the Grecian cities Thucyd. 1. 7. c. 32, 33. none remained attached to Athens: Agrigentum alone persevered in neutrality: even Camarina sent a considerable auxiliary force to the Syracusans, five hundred heavy-armed, three hundred dartmen, and three hundred bowmen: Gela at the same time furnished two hundred horse, four hundred dartmen, and two triremes. Nothing impeded the march of troops from Camarina and Gela to Syracuse: but, from the other friendly cities, either the Agrigentine territory must be traversed, or that of the hostile Sicels; sufferers, or likely to suffer, on all hands, but readiest in enmity to those with whose disposition to tyrannise they were most acquainted. The Agrigentines resisted all solicitation to allow the passage through their territory. It being then thought unadvisable to exasperate so powerful a people by any attempt to force the way, the road through the Sicel country was taken. Nicias, informed of what was going forward, and roused by misfortune and danger, took, upon this occasion, the measures which policy would dictate. At his instance the Sicels, forming an ambuscade, attacked the auxiliaries on their march, and killed eight hundred: fifteen hundred nevertheless reached Syracuse.

Intelligence arriving of the formidable re-enforcement coming from Athens, under an experienced, enterprising, and successful general, Gylippus and Hermocrates determined to use the opportunity yet remaining, for attempting a decisive blow against the decayed, dispirited, and already half-conquered armament of Nicias. They like the Corinthians, had learned, from experience, the deficiencies of their triremes, and of their manner of naval action, and they adopted nearly the same improvement. The Athenians, confined within the great port, five or six English miles only in cir-

cuit¹⁹, could profit little from the swiftness of their galleys, and their skill in evolution. They could not easily find room to attack with the transverse or oblique stroke, with which they had heretofore been so formidable²⁰: under necessity of meeting prow to prow, the strengthened bows of the Syracusan vessels would have the advantage. They could not press out to sea, through the narrow mouth of the harbour, without exposing a part of their fleet to certain destruction: and the shore would afford them but scanty refuge, being mostly occupied by the enemy. The Syracusans, encouraged by these considerations, which were explained by their able commanders, prepared with new confidence for action. All being ready, before the fleet moved, Gylippus drew out the land forces.

After 16 July.
Thucyd. l. 7.
c. 37.

Those in the city, and those in Olympieum, marched at the same time toward opposite sides of the Athenian camp, and engaged the whole attention of the commanders with a false attack. This feint taking full effect, the fleet, consisting of eighty triremes, advanced toward the Athenian naval station. The Athenians, in alarm and confusion, hastily manned seventy-five triremes and met them. The contest was long: two Athenian triremes were sunk; but the fleets parted without any great advantage gained on either side.

Next day the Syracusans did not move. But no encouragement arose hence to the Athenians.

c. 38.

They felt that they had lost the superiority by sea, as well as by land; and they concluded that the enemy would not long rest satisfied with the progress already made. Nicias

¹⁹ Strabo, according to our copies, makes it eighty stadia. Swinburne calls it rather more than five miles. Trav. in Sic. p. 343. v. 2. And another English and a Swiss traveller, both habituated to accurate observation, being separately asked, told me they reckoned it, by recollection, between four and six English miles.

²⁰ — Λεπτὰ τὰ πρῶταθεν ἰχούσας (τὰς τῶν Ἀθηναίων ναῦς) διὰ τὸ μὴ ἀντιπρῶτοι μᾶλλον αὐτοὺς ἢ ἐκ περιήλου ταῖς ἰμβολαῖς χρῆσθαι. Thucyd. l. 7. c. 36.

therefore directed his principal attention to the security of his fleet. He had already formed a stockade in the water, for the defence of his naval station. In front of this, at convenient distances, he now moored large merchant ships, of the kind called holcades, much loftier as well as deeper than the galleys of war. In these were placed machines bearing weighty instruments, called dolphins; so suspended, over the sea, that they might be dropped on any vessel passing near, and with power to sink it. Behind these floating fortresses, any of his ships, pressed in action, might find shelter, with means to return with advantage against an enemy bold enough to pursue so far.

Thucyd. l. 7.
c. 39, 40, 41. The Syracusans did not disappoint the expectation of the Athenian general. The very next morning their land and sea forces moved at once toward his camp and naval station; but the serious attack, as before, was on the fleet. As before also much of the day was consumed in fruitless contest. At length Ariston, a Corinthian, esteemed the best seaman²¹ in the Syracusan fleet, conferring with his colleagues in command, advised a measure, judicious in their circumstances, though, in the authentic description of Thucydides, it marks great deficiency, both in the ships of war of the Greeks, and in their military and Ch. 13. sect. 5.
of this Hist. naval economy. We have heretofore observed a Corinthian fleet, when going to seek an enemy, taking three days' provision aboard. But it appears that when immediate action was expected, as on the present occasion, the general practice was to leave every thing but their arms in their naval camp; not encumbering themselves ashore with a single meal. Toward mid-day, in pursuance of the advice of Ariston, the Syracusans retreated, but in perfect order, toward their naval station. The Athenians,

²¹ "Αριστος ὄν κυβερνήτης.

fatigued with unavailing contest, did not pursue. The Syracusans, on reaching the shore, found a market of eatables provided. The magistrates, in consequence of notice from the naval commanders, had compelled all persons in the city to send whatever provisions they had ready, and the crews debarking took hasty refreshment.

Meanwhile the Athenians, retreating to their naval camp, had dispersed, expecting no interruption of leisure for their meal; when suddenly they perceived the Syracusan fleet approaching again in order of battle. With much tumult, and mostly without refreshment, they hastened aboard, and the action was renewed. But it was no longer equally maintained as before. The strengthened bows of the Syracusan galleys, through management improved by experience, damaged several of the Athenian: the numerous dartmen on the Syracusan decks plied their weapons efficaciously; and practice in that manner of naval engagement, which the confinement of the port required, had given the Syracusan leaders to imagine a new mode of annoying an enemy, who, like the Athenians, depended chiefly on the skill of their rowers, and the shock of the beak. Dartmen in boats, venturing under the quarters, and even ^{Thucyd. 1. 7. c. 40.} under the lateral galleries of the Athenian galleys, gave more annoyance to the seamen than even the dartmen on the decks.²² Seven Athenian ships being sunk, several

²² Πολὺ δ' ἔτι μείζω οἱ ἐν ταῖς λεπτοῖς πλοίοις περιπλέοντες τῶν Συρακουσίων, καὶ ἔς τε τοὺς ταρσοὺς ὑποπίπτοντες τῶν πολεμιῶν νεῶν, καὶ ἔς τὰ πλάγια παραπλέοντες, καὶ ἐξ αὐτῶν ἔς τοὺς ναύτας ἀκοντίζοντες. This is a passage for which little assistance is to be expected from translators and commentators. An attentive examination of an antique piece of sculpture in the Vatican museum at Rome, mentioned in a former note, assisting the idea furnished by general Melvill, first gave me to imagine I understood it. I doubt however if the version given in the text may carry with it sufficiently its own explanation. I suppose the lateral galleries of the galleys to have been open at bottom, or at most to have had only gratings; their purpose having been, as I imagine, only to give projection and purchase to the upper oars. A parapet raised on them protected the rowers in a great degree against missile weapons from the decks of the

others much damaged, and the crews of all weakened with fasting, fatigue, and wounds, the whole fleet sought the shelter of their floating fortresses. So far the Syracusans pursued, and three of their ships, elate with success, pushed within them. Two of these were sunk, and the other was taken with her whole crew; but the rest retired, satisfied with the success of the day, and confirmed in opinion that they were now superior, by sea as well as by land, to that enemy from whom they had so lately apprehended subjugation. It was therefore unanimously resolved, at the earliest opportunity, to renew the attack on both elements.

Thucyd. l. 7.
c. 42. End of
July.

In the short and critical interval, between the resolution taken and the proposed execution, Demosthenes and Eurymedon arrived, with a fleet of seventy-three triremes, five thousand regular heavy-armed infantry, and a greater number of bowmen, dartmen, and slingers; so that, including the attending slaves, the land force alone would approach twenty thousand men. Alarm and astonishment now returned with double force upon the Syracusans. They were assured that Attica itself was in the possession of an enemy; and it appeared an unaccountable paradox, that, so pressed at home, the Athenians should send out such a force to make foreign conquest; a force in all points equal to that which Nicias had first led to Sicily. The power of Athens, says the historian, thus appeared stupen-

enemy's galleys, but the open or grated bottom gave passage for weapons from boats underneath.

I am sorry to have to say that Winkelman's description of the piece of sculpture in question, and the engraving he has given of it, are both very erroneous. Equally the antiquarian and the artist have been evidently ignorant of what a ship or a boat should be or could be. Yet Winkelman flattered himself with the imagination that he had discovered, in this monument, or perhaps in the incorrect drawing of it, which he contemplated in his closet, a solution of that difficulty, which the ancients, in all their accounts, have left for us, how their ships of war were rowed. A man who never himself pulled an oar will in such an attempt hardly avoid absurdity.

dous, its resources beyond calculation, and their own danger consequently endless.

Demosthenes, having landed his forces, viewed his ground, and received the information that Nicias and his officers could give, formed his opinion of the business before him, and decided on the measures proper to be taken, with that cool and just judgment which might be expected from an officer who to considerable talents joined his extensive experience. Powerful as the junction with Nicias made the armament under their command, and much as it struck sudden terror into the enemy, Demosthenes did not flatter himself with certain success. In his younger days he had been enterprising even to rashness. Now, in mature age, undazzled by the near view of glorious conquest, unawed by the apprehension of popular rage, neither the hope of profit, nor the prospect of fame, nor the fear of a tyrannical multitude could move him from what he thought the welfare of his country required. The safety of the Sicilian army was not to be staked against any hope of conquest: the gain would be a precarious advantage to the commonwealth, the loss almost certain ruin. His first resolution therefore was to avoid the error of Nicias, losing opportunity by delay; his next, to fix upon some one undertaking, in which success might be in some degree decisive, and failure not fatal: and finally he determined that, should such a first attempt be defeated, it would be improper to risk farther so large a portion of the strength of the commonwealth, and, whatever indignation he might incur from the Athenian people, he would lead the armament home.

Upon this occasion Thucydides sufficiently declares his opinion, that, with able and spirited conduct in the outset, the conquest of Syracuse might have been effected by the Athenian arms. Had Nicias, he says, instead of wasting almost a year in little enterprise, gone at once against that

city, he might have completed his contravallation. The Syracusans, at first, confident in their own numbers, did not even think of desiring assistance from Peloponnesus; and they might have been put beyond means of relief, before any effectual assistance could arrive. Circumstances were now very different; but to accomplish the purpose of the expedition seemed not yet beyond hope. The Athenian force was clearly superior in the field. The principal obstacles to the progress of the siege were the enemy's counterwork intersecting the line of the contravallation, and their possession of Epipolæ. Demosthenes observed that the counterwork was only a single wall, without defence behind; so that possession of Epipolæ would give him possession of the counterwork. He therefore judged that the assault of Epipolæ would be the best criterion; its success or its failure would best determine, whether the siege of Syracuse should be vigorously prosecuted, or abandoned without delay.

The account of Thucydides may give to suppose, though it does not directly express, that the ideas of Demosthenes did not exactly meet those of Nicias. The consideration that the re-enforcement had restored superiority in the field seems to have led to the first measure taken, which was to ravage the country beyond the Anapus. In this apparently a double object was proposed. Possibly the enemy might be provoked to risk a battle; of all things, perhaps, for the Athenians, the most desirable. Should they avoid it, the Athenian army, beside being gratified with booty, would derive encouragement from the experienced acknowledgment of their superiority. Nothing opposed them: the cavalry and light troops from Olympieum only attempted some desultory annoyance, with little effect. The next attempt, which

Thucyd. l. 7.
c. 43.

was against the counterwork, was unfortunate. The machines were burnt by the enemy, and every attack repelled. Demosthenes then insisted that his

proposed assault of Epipolæ should be no longer delayed; and Nicias and the other principal officers acceded to the measure.

Apparently Nicias was at this time too infirm to take any active part in a business which might require great exertion. Under the command therefore of Demosthenes, Eurymedon, and Menander, the whole army, except a small guard for the works, was ordered for the duty: provisions for five days were carried, and the engineers and artificers attended, to form defences in the instant of getting possession of the ground. To attack, however, otherwise than by surprise, so great a force, in a post so strong by nature and by art, was deemed unadvisable. Night was therefore chosen for the purpose: the army moved, as Thucydides describes the hour, about the first sleep. Ascending by the way of Euryelus, they passed the first Syracusan post unperceived. Surprising then a small outwork, they put part of the guard to the sword: but the greater part escaping alarmed the camps in Epipolæ. These were three: the Sicilian allies formed one; the allies from Greece another; and a third was composed of Syracusans: Gylippus commanding all was present, and all were quickly in motion. But the Athenian van, led by Demosthenes, repulsed the first troops they met, and continued mounting the hill, while those who followed demolished the fort taken. Attacks were renewed by Gylippus, but still unsuccessfully: the Athenians pushed forward, but, in confidence now of success, hastening to complete the acquisition of the enemy's works, they grew more careless of that close order, shield touching shield, so important in the discipline of the phalanx. With loosened ranks and files, being met by the Bæotians of the Syracusan army, they received a check. Among a large body of men, confined within narrow space, on rough ground, and by night, confusion once arising, spread rapidly. To commu-

nicate commands was difficult ; and, though the moon shone bright, yet when established arrangements were once disturbed, it was no longer easy to distinguish friends from foes. The repulsed Athenians, meeting those yet advancing, were received with pointed spears. This occasioned frequent and clamorous passing of the word ; which thus became known to the enemy, and of course useless, or even prejudicial to themselves. But beyond all things, the pæanism, the song or shout of battle, which the Greeks always used in the moment previous to attack, increased the confusion : for that of the allies of Athens of Doric race, Argives, Corcyræans, and others, being the same with the Syracusan, alarmed the Athenians wherever they heard it ; and as disorder extended, the troops of the Athenian army, in several parts, fought one another. At length all took to flight. The only road for retreat was narrow ; the fugitives were numerous ; and hastening to avoid the pursuers' swords, many perished by falling down precipices. Of the more fortunate, who gained the plain, those who had served under Nicias, acquainted with the country, easily reached their camp or lines ; but some of the newly arrived, missing their way, were next day cut off by the Syracusan horse.

The morrow was a day of mourning to the Athenians, as of triumph to the Syracusans. The dead were restored to the defeated, through the usual ceremonies. Thucydides does not specify the number²³ ; he says it was considerable, but not so great as the number of shields taken would have given to suppose ; because those who fled over the precipices disencumbered themselves of their armour ; and, though many perished, some escaped. The Syracusans erected two

²³ Plutarch states it at the round sum of two thousand. Diodorus, always struggling to give celebrity to the deeds of his fellow-countrymen, calls it two thousand five hundred. Later writers however are not likely to have had information which Thucydides could not obtain.

trophies ; one at the beginning of the ascent of Epipolæ ; the other on the spot where the Bœotians made the first effectual resistance.

Every circumstance appeared now to require that the Athenian generals should quickly enter Thucyd. 1. 7. c. 47. upon some new plan. The armament was sickly, partly from the season, partly from the marshy and unwholesome ground on which it was encamped ; and the hope of soon reducing Syracuse, or indeed of at all reducing it, seemed frustrated. Demosthenes therefore warmly urged his opinion, before given, that due experiment having been made and having failed, all purpose of conquest in Sicily should be at once abandoned, and the armament conducted home. Not the necessities of their own situation, he said, more than the wants and distresses of the commonwealth, required the measure ; insomuch that it would be inexcusable farther to risk so great a portion of the public strength, and continue such waste of the public revenue, on what was comparatively an unimportant object. Thucydides very seldom declares, in direct terms, an opinion by which the character of his contemporary might be affected. It is however easy to perceive that he approved, upon the whole, both the advice and the conduct of Demosthenes, as for his country's welfare judicious, for himself disinterested and manly. It is not equally easy to discover his opinion of the conduct of Nicias : perhaps he was unable to determine his own judgment of it. Nicias positively refused to lead the c. 48. armament home. " The temper of the Athenian people," he said, " is well known to me : warm in expectation, and jealous of their authority, they will highly resent a measure so disappointing to their hopes, unauthorised by their decree. Our conduct then, let it be recollected, must be submitted to the judgment, and our fate must be decided by the vote, not of those who have seen and who know what

we know, but of those who will be persuaded of anything by any eloquent accuser. Even of those now under our command, of those now loudest in complaint of the evils they are suffering, some, nay many, will unsay their assertions, blame the abandoning of the expedition, impute corruption to their generals, and perhaps become our accusers, or at least join in the vote for our condemnation. I therefore, if I am brought to the alternative, will not risk a shameful death from the injustice of my fellow-citizens, to avoid an honourable death from the valour of the enemy. But I think we are not yet so straitened. Unpromising as our affairs appear, I well know the condition of the Syracusans is worse. In some points, they are under great difficulties; in others, reduced to absolute inability. They are ruined by their expenses. Two thousand talents, already consumed upon their auxiliary forces and their fleet, have not sufficed: they have besides incurred a large debt. Their fleet therefore they cannot long maintain; and on the least failure of payment their auxiliaries will abandon them. We are under no equal difficulty; and on these considerations I hold it utterly improper to abandon the enterprise."

Such were the sentiments of Nicias, delivered in the council of war. But, beside his extreme horror of the prospect of living under the Athenian democracy, with credit impaired as it must have been by yielding to the proposal of Demosthenes, he had reasons for his perseverance which he did not communicate. There were among the Syracusans some who, as their fellow-citizens of the opposite party were to them the most odious and most dreadful of enemies,

Thucyd. 1. 7.
c. 48. & 49.

wished well to the Athenian arms. These communicated secretly with Nicias; they informed him accurately of the state of things in the city; they urged him to persevere in the siege; and they encouraged him to hope, that the very distress of the enemy and the zeal of his

secret friends, with little exertion on his part, would give him still to return home conqueror of Syracuse.

Demosthenes, uninformed of this negotiation, was unable to comprehend the conduct of Nicias; Thucyd. l. 7. c. 49. and he strenuously insisted that, if they must wait for a decree of the people to authorise their return home, yet the army ought immediately to move from ground so unhealthy, and still more the fleet from that confined situation, in which it could not come to action but under the grossest disadvantage. Eurymedon concurred with him; but Nicias still opposing, deference to his rank, together with the supposition, and perhaps intimation, that he might have intelligence unknown to them, occasioned a suspension of measures, and the armament remained in its station.

Unexpected success had now prepared the Syracusans for any exertion. But Gylippus and Hermocrates, circumspect as active, would not neglect opportunity to profit from that credit which grows with prosperity. Information c. 46. arrived that factions were violent in Agrigentum; and it was hoped that assistance, critically given, might put the party friendly to Syracuse in possession of the government. Accordingly Sicanus was sent thither with fifteen triremes; but, on his arrival, he found matters c. 50. accommodated between the contending parties, and the moment of opportunity lost. Gylippus himself was in the mean time more successful in a journey which he undertook into the Sicel country. Beside collecting a considerable force among the barbarians, he was joined by a body of Peloponnesians, who, to avoid the Athenian fleet, had made the coast of Africa, and thence crossed to Selinus; and he led the whole, without opposition, into Syracuse.

Meanwhile the Athenian armament, dispirited by disappointment, was also weakening daily by sickness. Intelli-

gence, that Gylippus had introduced a powerful re-enforcement within the Syracusan lines, excited new apprehension, and Demosthenes and Eurymedon regretted their concession to their elder colleague. Nicias at length was persuaded, yet scarcely persuaded, to give the sanction of his consent to the retreat of the armament. He deprecated any public decision of such a measure by that open manner of voting, which, in pursuance of the democratical principle, was the general practice of the Athenian military²⁴; and orders were given, with cautious privacy, for the fleet and army to

27 Aug.

prepare for quitting their station. All was accordingly ready, when the full moon was suddenly darkened. None had then science to foresee the regular return of that phenomenon; few could be persuaded that the cause was in the order of nature. It struck the armament with terror, as a portent boding ill to their purpose; application was made to the generals, deprecating the intended march; the augurs and soothsayers declared that, to bring the heavenly powers again to a friendly aspect, required a delay of thrice nine days; and Nicias, more superstitious than the rest, affirmed that, till that period was completed, he would not even consult about removal.

There seems to have been nothing in this omen to persuade the Athenians, more than the Syracusans, that the ill boding regarded them. On the contrary, Plutarch gravely imputes to the augurs ignorance in their profession; they ought, he says, to have known that an eclipse portended rather the favour of the gods to those whose purpose was retreat. Plutarch apparently must have had a low opinion of the power or of the goodness of the

Plutarch. vit.
Nic.

²⁴ Μὴ φανερώς γε ἀξιῶν ψηφίζεσθαι. We want explanation of this phrase, which the commentators and translators do not give. Thucydides has written for those who knew the common forms of proceeding on such occasions in his age, without thinking of the explanation that posterity might need.

gods, which did not make a signal of favour intelligible, or did not dispose the favoured to a just confidence in such a signal. But omens of undecided import, such is the nature of superstitious fear, commonly were taken as unfavourable by those in adverse circumstances. On the other hand, the knowledge that the Athenians held themselves to be the objects of the divine displeasure portended, sufficed for the Syracusans to derive encouragement from the portent. They were confident of superiority by land; they considered the intention of secret retreat as proof ^{Thucyd. l. 7. c. 51.} of fear to stand a battle. They resolved therefore not to allow the enemy to establish themselves anywhere in Sicily, by which the war might be drawn into length, but to attack them by sea and land in their present situation, and by their total destruction to deter future invasion.

Such being the purpose, the able leaders directed their attention, for some days, to exercise their people in whatever they judged most necessary to success in naval action. Giving then the seamen a day of rest, they led out the infantry, and they gained some small advantage over a body of Athenians, horse and foot, who advanced against them.²⁵ On the next day they proposed their great attack. Accordingly seventy-six triremes moved from the naval station, and the whole land force advanced toward ^{c. 52.} the Athenian lines. The Athenians, superior by ten triremes, met their fleet. Eurymedon, who commanded the right, to use that advantage which superiority of numbers gave, stretched away with a view to surround the left of the

²⁵ Dodwell has been, I think, not successful in the calculation of days from the eclipse forward, and the endeavour to assign to each its circumstances. He has given either not due attention, or not due credit, to the narrative of Thucydides, which, without such minute accuracy, is consistent and clear. With regard to the delay required by the augurs, whether there has or has not been the corruption of the text of Thucydides supposed by Dodwell, is little important, but Plutarch's account agrees with the common reading.

enemy. The centre spreading, to obviate the danger of too great an interval between the divisions, weakened itself by making the intervals too great between ship and ship. In this state it was attacked by the enemy in close order, and presently defeated. The Syracusans then directing their principal effort against the division of Eurymedon, now cut off from the rest of the fleet, took, destroyed, or drove aground every ship, and Eurymedon himself was killed. The left wing, thus wholly without support, fled, pursued to the shore. Such is the brief account which Thucydides gives of this important action; as if feeling too much to relate in detail a defeat for its consequences so deplorable, and the first, of any importance, which his country ever suffered at sea from an inferior force. With his usual tenderness for characters, he names neither Nicias nor Demosthenes; and expresses no opinion, nor imputes any blame, otherwise than by omission.

Thucyd. l. 7.
c. 53.

Gylippus, while no part of the land forces were yet engaged, observed from the shore the distress of the Athenian fleet, and many of the ships forced aground beyond the protection of their stockade and their camp. Immediately he detached a body of infantry to intercept any of the crews that might fly, and to overpower those who might attempt to defend their stranded vessels against the victorious Syracusans. The Tuscan allies were the nearest troops of the Athenian line. The Syracusan detachment, elate with the success of their fleet, approached in disorderly haste. The Tuscans, by a vigorous assault, conducted with regularity, put them to flight. Gylippus sent re-enforcement; but assistance coming also from the Athenian camp, the Athenians finally prevailed, with some slaughter of the enemy's heavy-armed, and they saved most of the stranded ships. The Syracusans however took eighteen, and of these the whole crews perished. An at-

tempt was made to destroy the Athenian fleet, within its stockade, by a fire-ship. The wind favoured the design, but the practised skill of the Athenian seamen rendered it ineffectual. The Syracusan fleet then retired, and each party erected its trophy: the Syracusans for their naval victory, the Athenians for their success by land.

But the event of the naval action, so contrary to all hope founded on former experience, was a disaster so momentous, and so little balanced by the better fortune of the land forces, that the deepest dejection pervaded the Athenian armament. On the other hand the Syracusans began to consider themselves no longer as an oppressed people, struggling in the almost hopeless defence of everything dear to them; they looked forward to success that might entitle them vanquishers of Athens, and vindicators of the liberties of Greece. Accordingly they applied themselves immediately to blockade the port; desirous now to prevent the departure of that force, from which they had expected the worst evils of subjugation; and proposing no less than to destroy, or reduce to the dreadful condition of prisoners at discretion, the whole of that formidable fleet and army.

Meanwhile not dejection only, from a sense of disgrace, and apprehension of the swords of their enemies, but the most urgent of wants pressed the Athenians. In consequence of the resolution taken to raise the siege (no suspicion being entertained that the enemy could prevent their departure by sea) they had forbidden farther supplies of provisions from Catana. Naval superiority lost, the means of intercourse with Catana were gone; and thus the desire to depart was enforced, as the means were rendered precarious. A council of war was called to consider of these untoward circumstances; and the taxiarchs, officers nearly of the rank of colonels in our service, were summoned

to assist the generals with their advice. The result of the deliberation was a resolution to withdraw the whole armament by sea. This being determined, the subordinate resolutions followed, to use all possible means for strengthening the fleet; and, with this view, to abandon immediately their extensive line of contravallation, and reduce their works to a single fort near the naval station, large enough to contain the baggage and sick, with a competent garrison. But naval action now, far different from that in open sea, where they had been long accustomed to a decisive superiority, must be unavoidably similar to that in which they had already yielded

to inferior numbers. Thus late therefore, taught Thucyd. l. 7. c. 62. by severe experience, they proposed to prepare accordingly. Upon this subject the advice of the masters²⁶ of the triremes was required. The lightness of the vessel, a quality necessary to swift-rowing, and, in open sea, of inestimable advantage, would, within the harbour of Syracuse, little avail. On the contrary, to be able to maintain a stationary fight, as between infantry ashore, was of principal importance. It was therefore resolved that every man capable of bearing arms, beyond the necessary garrison of the fort, should be taken aboard; that numerous bowmen, with the ablest dartmen, particularly the Acarnanian, should be stationed on the decks; and that on the prows grappling-irons should be fixed, which might at once obviate the shock of the enemy's stronger bows, and, preventing their retreat, give opportunity for their own numerous heavy-armed to act.

c. 65. Pursuant to these resolutions, about a hundred and ten triremes were equipped and manned.

The bustle of preparation in the Athenian naval camp was observed by the Syracusans, and intelligence reached them of the grappling-irons with which the Athenian prows were armed. Gylippus and Hermocrates, though they could not

²⁶ Κυβερνήταις.

equip eighty triremes, nevertheless determined to pursue the contest, so far successful, for naval superiority. Against the new mode of action proposed by the Athenians they thought it necessary to prepare; but for this it was held sufficient to cover the forecastles of their triremes with bull hides, on which the grappling-irons would not readily take any firm hold.

While the animation of the Syracusans and their confederates seconded the spirit of their ^{Thucyd. 1. 7.} _{c. 69.} leaders, among the Athenians, notwithstanding the great superiority of their naval force, a general dejection prevailed. The discouragement, arising from the late naval defeats, was proportioned to the former confidence in the opinion, supported by long experience, of their decided superiority. But as the spirits of those under his command sunk, the animation and indeed the whole character of Nicias seemed to rise. His behaviour on the occasion was truly great. Little ambitious, on the contrary under favouring fortune rather deficient in exertion, and sometimes culpably remiss in his command, his activity and animation increased as evils pressed and dangers threatened. None was now so warm in exhortation, that might restore the drooping courage of the soldiers and seamen. The state of his health did not permit him to take the command ashboard: but he was sedulous in attending the necessary preparation, and directing every arrangement. When all was ready for the proposed attempt, thinking, says the historian, he had not yet said so much for the encouragement of his officers and people as the singular importance of the occasion demanded, he went around the whole armament; and speaking to each trierarch separately, after mentioning their superiority in numbers, and the measures taken for resisting the enemy's novel mode of attack, he exhorted every one, by his own glory, and by that inherited from his ancestors, to exert himself in the battle

to ensue. Leading then the whole to the shore, he there committed them to Demosthenes, Menander, and Euthydemus, under whose orders they embarked, and moved immediately to the harbour's mouth to force the egress.

Thucyd. l. 7.
c. 70. The enemy, who carefully watched their motions, quickly made toward them, under the Corinthian Pythen, and Sicamus and Agatharcus, Syracusans; the Corinthian commanding the centre, the Syracusans the wings. With the first shock the Athenians made themselves masters of the vessels that blockaded the mouth of the port, and were hastening to unmoor them and clear the passage, when the Syracusans approached, and a most obstinate battle ensued.

Meanwhile the Athenian army stood on the shore, observing with the most anxious attention what passed, within such a distance that they could see and hear almost everything. When therefore after a long contest, with various fortune at times in various parts, the advantage of the Syracusans became decisive, and the whole Athenian fleet fled pursued, then grief, indignation, and dismay (says the eloquent historian, at a loss for words equal to the description) rose to the utmost pitch that any circumstances could produce in the human mind, since none could be more hopeless.

c. 73. Entering little into detail, and not at all accounting for the event of this disastrous battle, Thucydides proceeds to describe the consequences. The dejection that pervaded the defeated armament was so extreme, and the danger impending so urgent, that the sacred dues of the dead, objects commonly of such anxious attention, were totally neglected; no herald was sent to request the restitution of the bodies, no care was taken about their burial, but every thought was absorbed in the evils that pressed and the perils that threatened the living. Amid the general despair however Demosthenes did not lose his

usual energy of mind. Going to Nicias, he proposed what might still have saved the greater part of the forces. Sixty triremes remained to the Athenians: those of the enemy, though victorious, were reduced to fifty. He thought it therefore very possible still to force the passage out to sea, if, embarking that very night, they made the attempt at day-break. Nicias approved, but the crews absolutely refused. "To retreat," they peevishly remonstrated, "was all the generals wanted; they would go anywhere by land, and fight their way, if necessary; but by sea the experience of the past sufficiently proved that they could expect nothing but destruction." The execution of the salutary measure was thus prevented by excess of discouragement.

SECTION VIII.

Retreat of the Athenians from Syracuse.

GYLIPPUS and the Syracusan chiefs, on considering the advantages which their last success gave Thucyd.ut ant. them, became more than ever desirous to prevent the departure of the enemy: the Syracusans desired, by the complete destruction of the invading armament, to deter future invasion; and Gylippus hoped, in effect, to conquer Athens itself in Sicily. The opinion was general in Syracuse, and it justified the proposal of Demosthenes, that the Athenians would now think only of retreat by land, and it was supposed they would move that very night. But the Syracusan people, wearied with the labour of the day, and exhilarated with its success, were more eager to enjoy the leisure, which they had so well earned, than solicitous about any future events. It happened too that the morrow was the festival of Hercules. Among such an assemblage of people of Dorian race, and on such an occasion, the desire of duly celebrating the day of a hero-god, with whom they esteemed themselves so con-

nected, became irresistible ; and nothing could persuade them to quit the religious revel for nocturnal military enterprise. Hermocrates, who had been at first most urgent for marching immediately to intercept the Athenians, knew his fellow-citizens and mankind too well to attempt, in such circumstances, to force inclination : but his fruitful genius provided still a resource for the attainment of his purpose. In the evening some persons under his direction went on horseback to the Athenian camp ; and approaching enough to be heard, when they could be little distinctly seen, pretended they were of the party which had been accustomed to communicate with Nicias. Finding credit so far, they charged those whom they had engaged in conversation, to go and tell the general, “ that the passes were already occupied by the Syracusans, and that he would therefore do well not to move that night, but wait and concert his measures.”

Thucyd. l. 7.
c. 74. The fatal bait was taken, and the next day was spent by the Athenians in various preparation for the march.

But Gylippus and Hermocrates, having yielded in the moment to the wishes of their people, found means, before the morrow ended, to engage them in their own views. Their victorious fleet went to the Athenian naval station, and, no opposition being attempted, they carried off, or burnt on the spot, every ship there. The army at the same time marched out, under the conduct of Gylippus, and occupied all the principal passes around the Athenian camp, and in that line of country which the Athenians would probably propose to traverse.

c. 75. On the next day²⁷, everything being prepared, as far as circumstances would permit, orders were

²⁷ The third from the naval action, according to the phrase of Thucydides, and the usual manner of reckoning of the Greeks ; who counted the day itself of an action first, the next day as second, and so forth.

issued by the Athenian generals for marching. The pen of Thucydides and the language of Athens are wanting, to describe adequately the scene presenting itself upon that occasion; when, in the bitterness of ancient warfare, every horror offered itself to expectation, that the human body can suffer or the human mind conceive. No light distress arose from the reflection, that, instead of fulfilling the lofty hopes of their enterprise, the whole of so powerful a fleet was destroyed; that, through their failure, ruin threatened their country; and that, instead of returning as they had so lately with reason expected, conquerors of Sicily, an ignominious flight was their only, and that almost a hopeless resource, for avoiding slavery or death. But, in the circumstances of that flight many dreadful considerations, many lamentable objects, presented themselves, striking home to the feelings of every individual. The dead lay yet unburied; and the recollection, or, in many instances, the sight, of a relation or a friend so neglected, struck not only with grief but with horror. Yet the voices and the actions of the many living, whom wounds or sickness disabled for the march, their complaints, their expostulations, their prayers, their embraces, and the painful, yet fruitless endeavours of some to follow their friends, were still more distressing than the compunction which arose from the neglect, impious as it was deemed, but so far excusable as it was unavoidable, of the still and silent dead. Mutual reproach, then, and self-reproach, for that share which any had had in superinducing or enhancing the public calamity, whether by promoting the enterprise, or by obstructing the retreat, occasionally aggravated the business of woe. Such, in short, says the historian, was the accumulated weight of present misery that it threw the whole multitude into tears; and, absorbing the apprehension of farther danger, took away almost the desire, and even the power to move.

At length the march commencing resembled that of a whole city flying from a besieging army. This is the remark of the contemporary historian, drawing a comparison from among those circumstances which distinguish ancient from modern times. For the numbers, he continues, including attendants, were not less than forty thousand; an amount largely marking the multitude of attendants on the armies of Greek republics, of which very rarely any notice is found from ancient historians. These however now were of little importance: mostly slaves, they deserted openly: and in the instant of the army's moving, the greater part disappeared. Thus even the cavalry and the heavy-armed were reduced to carry their own provisions and necessaries; some being without attendants, some mistrusting those who remained to them: and the small portion of provisions they possessed demanded every care, since it was far from being equal to their probable need.

Amid the extreme dejection and anguish, not without reason pervading the armament, Nicias wonderfully supported the dignity of his character and situation. Individually the distress of the existing circumstances appeared not to affect him; his only anxiety seemed to be to relieve that of others, and to diffuse encouragement among all. The historian's authority for the remarkable words he attributes to him on the occasion, though not stated, certainly might be good: but whether we consider them as conveying the sentiments of Nicias or of Thucydides, they are highly interesting, as they mark the opinion entertained of the Divine Providence, by a man of exalted rank, of extensive information and experience, just and religiously disposed, but never taught to consider this life as a state of probation, and to expect, in futurity, the reward of good or the punishment of evil deeds. From the head of the line, according to Thucydides,

Thucyd. l. 7.
c. 76.

c. 77.

exerting his voice to the utmost, that he might be heard as extensively as possible, Nicias, with an unruffled countenance, desired the troops to advert to his own case: "I," he said, "am in body (you may see indeed the state to which sickness has reduced me) very far from being the strongest among you. In the blessings of high fortune I was once inferior to none; but now I must bear every present evil, I have to apprehend every threatened danger, in common with the lowest under my command. Such is my lot, who have always been regular and zealous in every duty to the gods, and not only, as far as depended simply on myself, scrupulously just, but liberally charitable among men. Hence I have hope and confidence that our fortune will change for the better. The affliction we now suffer is surely beyond our desert; the enemy have already been sufficiently fortunate; and if our enterprise against this country has offended any of the gods, it cannot be but our present evils are adequate punishment. For we are not the first who have drawn our swords in the attempt, unjustifiable be it confessed, to subjugate and reduce to slavery our fellow-creatures, and seize to ourselves their possessions. In doing thus, doing only what is ordinary among men, others have suffered for it only what men may bear. We therefore have surely reason to hope, that the gods will at length moderate their apparent excess of vengeance against us; objects, as we are already become, of pity rather than of indignation.

"Confiding thus far then in the divine mercy, let us look to what, mere human things considered, our circumstances are, and surely we ought not to despond. Such a force as we possess, with so large a proportion of regular troops, wherever we establish our abode, we are not only a formidable army, we are a commonwealth. Certainly no Sicilian state, Syracuse excepted, will easily drive us from any situation we may occupy; or even prevent us from oc-

cupying any we may desire. To be safe indeed we have only to reach the Sicel territory; for their fear of the Syracusans insures to us the friendship of the barbarians. Firm minds and orderly conduct then are principally necessary to your welfare; and not to yours only, but that of the Athenian commonwealth; which, however lamentably fallen through our misfortune, it may not be beyond our ability to restore; since the strength of a state consists, not in towns, not in territory, not in ships, but in men.”

Thucyd. l. 7.
c. 78.

Having thus spoken, Nicias led the march, the army being disposed in two divisions, with the baggage between them; himself commanding the van, Demosthenes the rear. The road chosen was not toward their Grecian friends of Naxos and Catana, but that by which they hoped most readily to reach the Sicel country; where soonest they might find food and safety, with leisure to concert farther measures. At the ford of the Anapus, very little distant from their camp, they found a body of Syracusans posted to oppose the passage. These they soon forced to retire; but the enemy's horse and light infantry, hanging on their flanks and rear, gave such continued annoyance that, after a march of only five miles, finding a rising ground commodious for the purpose, they encamped for the night. On the next day they made still less progress. Want of provisions induced them to halt, after a march of only two miles and a half, in a plain where, beside collecting cattle among the farms and villages, they could supply themselves with water, for their progress over the hilly and dry country, which lay next in their way. But, on the third day, the Syracusan horse and light-armed, in larger force than before, gave so much greater annoyance that, after many hours wasted in unavailing attempts to repress them, the distressed Athenians returned to the camp they had last occupied. Nor could they profit, as on the preceding day,

from their situation: even to obtain water, such was the enemy's superiority in cavalry, was difficult and hazardous.

Errors in conduct, evidently in the opinion of Thucydides, had occurred; though he has avoided, as usual, the express declaration of any opinion. Either change of plan, or some greater effort than had yet been made, was clearly indispensible. On the next morning therefore they moved earlier than usual, and pressed their march, with the view to occupy the Acræon-lepas, the first narrow at the entrance of the high lands. But the opportunity lost was not so easy recoverable: their slowness had given the enemy time, both to discover their intended course, and to profit from the knowledge; and on their arrival at the Acræon-lepas they found not only an armed force to oppose them, but the natural difficulties of the pass increased by a fortification. An assault was immediately attempted, which was not in the moment successful. Meanwhile a storm came on; such, says the historian, as in the autumnal season is common; but, in the present wane of the Athenian affairs, and the despondency its consequence, everything was construed as an ill omen, and the generals could not persuade their troops to renew the attack. As constant exertion tends to maintain the animation which success has raised, so new and unexpected opposition commonly enhances the depression of the unfortunate. Gylippus, attentive to every opportunity, and observing the hesitation of the Athenians after their repulse, sent a body of men to raise a fort in their rear, so as to intercept their retreat. The Athenian generals however found no difficulty in checking this purpose. Their force was indeed yet such as to deter the enemy from giving them battle; and accordingly they again chose their camp for the night within the plain.

Thucyd. l. 7.
c. 79.

4 Sept. acc. to
Chron. Thu.
but rather,
about 12 or 14
Sept.

But on the morrow, when they moved again, still with the

view to force the passage of the mountains, they had no sooner quitted their camp than the Syracusan horse and light-armed were upon their flanks and rear. If they halted to repel the annoyance, the enemy instantly retreated; but the moment they resumed their march, the attack was renewed; and this so repeatedly and efficaciously, that after advancing only one mile through the plain they encamped again. Then the Syracusans also retired to their camp.

^{Thucyd. l. 7.}
c. 80.

The distress of the Athenians was now become very great: while numbers were suffering from wounds received in the many skirmishes, all were in almost total want of provisions and of all necessaries. The generals therefore came to a sudden resolution to break up their camp by night, and take the road toward the sea, the direct contrary to that which they had hitherto been following, and on which the enemy waited to intercept them. For, pursuing along the coast the way to Camarina and Gela, they might still reach the Sicel territory, by a more circuitous course indeed, but through a more level and open country. The usual fires were lighted, to obviate suspicion in the enemy, and then the army was silently assembled and the march begun. Nicias led, with a hasty pace, yet preserving due regularity. Through some unknown fatality, alarm and tumult arose in the division commanded by Demosthenes. Order was after some time restored; but the two divisions were completely separated.

c. 81.

The Syracusans, as soon as day broke, perceiving the Athenian camp deserted, in the usual temper of democratical jealousy, began to criminate Gylippus as if he had traitorously permitted the enemy to escape. To discover which way so large a body had directed its march was however not difficult, and shortly all joined in zealous pursuit. Demosthenes, notwithstanding the misfortune

which had retarded him, had before day-break reached the road leading from Syracuse to Elorus. A little farther he found a body of Syracusans raising works to obstruct his passage across the gully, through which flows the brook Cacyparis. These he soon dispersed. According to the plan concerted with Nicias, he should then have turned up the course of the Cacyparis, to gain the interior country; but, by the advice of his guides, he proceeded, still near the coast, to the brook Erineus; and there the cavalry of the Syracusan army overtook him.

From the first there seems to have been some difference of opinion between the Athenian generals concerning the manner of conducting the retreat. Nicias thought the safety of the army depended, beyond all things, upon the rapidity of its march: the insult of assault should therefore be borne, and halts made, to repel attacks, only when they threatened very important injury. This evidently was what Thucydides approved. But Demosthenes was more disposed, on every occasion, to revenge with the view to deter annoyance. No sooner therefore were the Syracusan horse now pressing upon his rear than he changed that line of march by which he could best gain ground, to form his troops so as to act most efficaciously against the enemy. The Syracusans saw their opportunity, and pushed by him while he halted. Their infantry quickly came up, and Demosthenes was surrounded. Too late discovering his error, he took the best measures that circumstances would then admit, occupying a walled inclosure near at hand, where the enemy's horse could not reach him, and where he could defy even their heavy-armed infantry. But repeated sufferings, in the course of this long war, and especially the affair of Pylus, had taught the Lacedæmonians the value of light troops and missile weapons. Gylippus, employing the heavy-armed only in false or in desultory attacks, made prin-

Thucyd. l. 7. c. 82. cipal use of his bowmen, darters, and slingers: and from these, through the remainder of the day, the Athenians had no rest. In the evening, when many were thus wounded, and all worn with hunger, thirst, and fatigue, he sent a herald with a proclamation, promising liberty to any of the islanders who would come to the Syracusan camp and surrender their arms. Not many, even in so hopeless a situation, when all the evils, that the barbarity of ancient warfare could inflict, were impending, would forsake their general and their comrades; an instance of fidelity deserving notice the more, as the common conduct of the Athenians would not seem to merit such attachment from their subjects; and while it does honour to themselves and to Demosthenes, it certainly reflects some credit on the government of Athens. So desperate indeed were the circumstances that, in the same evening, Demosthenes capitulated for the rest of his troops, surrendering himself and them prisoners of war, with no other stipulation than that none should suffer death, either through violence or for want of sustenance. With their arms they gave up all their money, throwing it into the hollow of shields held to receive it, and four shields were thus filled with silver. The prisoners, in number about six thousand, were immediately conducted to Syracuse.

Meanwhile Nicias, having ascended some way by the course of the Cacyparis, crossed to the Erineus²⁸, passed that stream, considerably above the scene of Demosthenes's fate, and encamped on some high ground near the farther bank. Early next morning the Syracusan army hastened in pursuit, and the horse quickly overtaking him, gave information of the capitulation made by Demosthenes, and summoned him to surrender him-

²⁸ This appears from a comparison of the 80th chapter of Thucydides with the 83d.

c. 83. 7 Sept.
Chron. Thu-
but rather, a
week later.

self and the forces under his command. Refusing credit to such intelligence so transmitted, he asked a safe conduct for a horseman of his own to make the inquiry, which was granted. The return of his messenger assuring him of the fact, he then sent to propose, in the name of the Athenian commonwealth, reimbursement to Syracuse of all the expenses of the war, upon condition only that the troops under his command might depart in safety; and for security he would leave Athenian citizens as hostages, one for every talent that would thus become due. The proposal was rejected, and the Athenian army was quickly surrounded by the multitude of the enemy; who would however neither make nor sustain any regular attack, but continued, till evening, unceasing annoyance with missile weapons.

Among the distresses of the Athenians not the least was the want of provisions. Could they have supported the enemy's assaults on their present ground, they could not have subsisted there. Nicias therefore, about midnight, called to arms as silently as possible, with intention to pursue his march: but the watchful enemy perceived his motions, and immediately sang the pæan. Upon this he gave up the design, and remained in his camp; but a body of about three hundred, without his orders, made a successful push at the enemy's line, broke through, and, under favour of the obscurity, quickly got beyond immediate pursuit. Nicias waited for the dawn, and then continued his march. Even then the enemy, under the able conduct of Gy-

Thucyd. l. 7.
c. 84. Sept. 8.
or rather about
15.

lippus and Hermocrates, would come to no regular action, but only infested, as before, with missile weapons and desultory charges of cavalry. Sicily, through the greatest part of its extent, is high land, intersected with numerous valleys, whose sides are commonly steep, and the banks of the streams, flowing through them, often craggy

At no great distance from the camp, which the Athenians had quitted, the river Assinarus has a deep and rocky channel. While extreme thirst urged their steps to its stream, they hoped that, if they could once reach its farther bank, they should gain some respite from the annoyance of the enemy's cavalry; and the light-armed would be less formidable, when unsupported by the heavy-armed and horse. But, notwithstanding all the exertion which such motives enforced, when they reached the bank the enemy's heavy-armed were close upon them. Discipline then yielded to the pressure of evil felt and danger threatening. Without any order they hurried down the steep, pushing and trampling on one another; and, in the tumult, some were destroyed by the spears of their comrades. The first object of most was to assuage intolerable thirst. Meanwhile the enemy's light-armed, acquainted with all the ways, reached the opposite bank before them, and the whole Athenian army, inclosed in the hollow, was exposed, helpless, to missile weapons on both sides. The Peloponnesians at length led the way for the Syracusans, down into the bottom, to complete the slaughter; while the Athenians, still resisting to the utmost, were so pressed by extreme thirst that, in the midst of action, many of them would drink the turbid and bloody water, and even fight for it.

Thucyd. 1. 7.
c. 85.

Already they were lying dead in heaps in the river, while the horse pursued and cut off any who could escape up the banks, when Nicias, whom nothing could induce to submit to the Syracusans, found opportunity to surrender himself to Gylippus. That general then commanded to give quarter, and was obeyed. Among the rocks, and in the windings of the stream, a large number of the Athenians found opportunity for either concealment or flight: the rest were made prisoners. No capitulation was made, as for the

division under Demosthenes: and, prisoners being valuable as slaves, the Syracusan soldiers were diligent in embezzling them as their private property. In this they were so successful that the prisoners of the Syracusan state remained comparatively few. A detachment was sent after the three hundred who broke through the Syracusan line in the night and took them all. The public prisoners, with what spoil could be collected, were conducted ^{Thucyd. 1. 7. c. 86.} to Syracuse.

It would have been a glorious and a singular triumph, for Gylippus, to have carried the Athenian generals, the two most illustrious men of their time, prisoners to Sparta; one distinguished for his friendly disposition towards the Lacedæmonian people, the other for his successes against them. But the jealous, cruel, and faithless temper of democratical despotism disappointed his just expectation. A decree of the Syracusan people condemned both to death, and they were executed. In the ancient democracies the most worthless individual, touching at any time a chord in consonance with popular passion, could procure the sanction of sovereign authority for any villany. For where neither one person nor a select body was responsible, but the whole people, truly despotic, were the common authors of every public act, the shame of flagitious measures was so divided that it was disregarded. For any one to own himself author of the black decree against Nicias and Demosthenes, the one entitled to the protection of the Spartan general, the other under that of a capitulation solemnly granted in the name of the Syracusan people, appears, for a time at least, to have been avoided. Thucydides says the circumstances immediately leading to the measure were not, in his time, with any certainty known at Athens. It seems likely to have been in the desire of those concerned, to shift the black imputation upon others, that it was by some thrown on

Diod. l. 13.
c. 19. Plut.
vit. Nic.

Gylippus. The party politics of after-times led the Sicilian historian Timæus to calumniate Hermocrates. But Diodorus, who may have had sources of information not open to Thucydides, and who, though a zealot for democracy, and of little judgment, was of much candour, attributes the motion for the flagitious decree positively to Diocles, then a leader of the democratical party, afterward, as we shall see, ruler of the republic, and always the opponent of Hermocrates. And this well agrees with those circumstances connected with the measure which Thucydides proceeds to relate, as all he could obtain toward elucidation of it. The fears, he says, of those who had carried on treasonable correspondence with Nicias induced them, if not to promote, yet to concur in the vote for putting him to death; and the Corinthians had particular enmity to him, apprehensive, for some cause not explained to us, that his restoration to power in Athens would be injurious to their interest. All authorities however agree that it was a public and solemn decree of the Syracusan people which consigned the Athenian generals to execution.²⁹

Meanwhile the miserable remnant of their once flourishing army, the greatest ever sent out by any one Grecian state, was reserved for a still severer lot. A vast quarry in the hill of Epipolæ, whence principally the stone had been taken for building the city, was judged the most secure and commodious place for the confinement of such a multitude of men, so versed in the use of arms. Into this the freemen were conducted, to the number of about seven thousand: the slaves were sold by public auction. But the faith of the Syracusan people, so shamefully broken with the ge-

²⁹ Plutarch, in his Life of Nicias, professes to have taken particular pains to collect and collate whatever remained to his time concerning the expedition against Syracuse; but his account is satisfactory chiefly as it tends to confirm that of Thucydides, without adding anything of any importance.

nerals, was not very religiously kept with those of inferior rank. On the contrary, their whole conduct was marked with a spirit of deliberate cruelty, the general vice, it must be confessed, of the fairest days of Greece; which yet ought not to be attributed to the disposition of the people, since it was the unavoidable result of the political state of the country. The Syracusans saw, in the Athenian prisoners, not generous enemies, but oppressors, who would have reduced them to the deepest misery. Though food therefore was not denied, yet it was given in quantity barely sufficient to support life; and cruelty was still more shown in the scanty allowance of water. No shelter was afforded from the inclemency of the sky; and while the reflected heat of the mid-day sun, in the open and capacious dungeon, was scarcely tolerable, the chill of autumnal night made an alternacy very injurious to health. No means were given to avoid their own filth; no care was taken of those who sickened; and, when any died, as many did, some of unattended wounds, some of disorder caused by various hardship, the bodies remained to putrefy among their living companions; and the eloquent historian, here as on a former occasion, failing of words to his mind to describe the extreme misery, sums up all with saying, that no suffering could possibly result from so wretched a situation which was not experienced by the Athenian prisoners. Toward the end of November, after a confinement of about seventy days, the islanders, and others who were not citizens of Athens, or of some Grecian town of Sicily or Italy, were taken out for the milder lot of being sold to slavery. The Athenians, with the Sicilian and Italian Greeks, remained; and we are not informed that they were ever released. Had we Syracusan histories of these times, provocation for such barbarity would probably be found alleged. Thucydides, though not to be suspected of positive untruth,

would probably not be extreme to mark what his fellow-citizens had done amiss.

Thucyd. 1. 7.
c. 85.

Meanwhile those, of the army under Nicias, who, instead of public prisoners of the Syracusan state, had been made the private property of individuals, suffered variously, according to the condition or temper of the masters, under whom they fell; and, of those who had escaped by flight, few fared better; for, unable to find subsistence, they were mostly reduced to the hard resource of offering themselves, in any town they could reach, to voluntary slavery. Thus, says the historian, all the towns of Sicily abounded with Grecian slaves. A few only had the good fortune to make their way, immediately from the field of action, to the friendly city of Catana, whence they got their passage to Athens; but afterwards others found means to fly from bondage to the same asylum.

Plut. vit. Nic.

In the miserable state of servile dependency, to which such numbers of Athenians were reduced, the science, literature, fine taste, and polite manners of Athens are said to have been beneficial to many. Some, who were fortunate enough to meet with masters of liberal disposition, were treated with the respect due to superior accomplishments; some were even presented with their freedom. Since the days of Hieron, the literature of Greece or Ionia had little made its way to Sicily; and, through defect of materials, copies of books were not yet readily multiplied. But many of the Athenians retained, by memory, much of the works of Euripides, whose moral and pathetic strains, which they used to sing as the solace of their bondage, singularly touched the Sicilians. Euripides lived to receive the grateful acknowledgments of some who returned to Athens, and related what kindness they had received in servitude, or what relief in beggary, for the pleasure they gave by speaking, singing, or teaching his verses.

CHAPTER XIX.

AFFAIRS OF GREECE FROM THE CONCLUSION OF THE SICILIAN EXPEDITION TILL THE RETURN OF ALCI-BIADES TO ATHENS, IN THE TWENTY-FOURTH YEAR OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR.

SECTION I.

Effects at Athens of the News of the Overthrow in Sicily. — Effects through Greece of the Overthrow of the Athenians in Sicily. — Change in the Political System of Lacedæmon. — Measures of the Peloponnesian Confederacy for raising a Fleet. — Proposals from Eubœa and Lesbos to revolt from the Athenian to the Peloponnesian Confederacy.

THE news of the total destruction of the most powerful armament ever sent out by any Grecian state, supposed so far from the danger of such a catastrophe that it was capable of accomplishing almost any conquest, being first brought to Athens by no official messenger, but communicated accidentally in the uncertain way of reports, did not immediately find credit. Plutarch relates that a foreigner, landing at Piræus, went into a barber's shop, which, like the modern coffee-house, was the usual resort of idle news-mongers in the Grecian cities, (as, we find, afterward in Rome,) and spoke of the event as what he supposed would of course be well known there. The barber, with more zeal than discretion, went immediately into the city, and communicated the intelligence to the archons; who, with the natural anxiety of magistrates under the tyranny of a despotic multitude, sum-

Thucyd. 1. 8.
c. 1.

Plut. vit. Nic

moned an assembly of the people, and produced the barber to declare his news. The people, in extreme agitation, demanded his authority. The incautious man could produce none: he had no previous acquaintance with the person from whom he received the information, and knew not where to find him. The indignant multitude immediately ordered the barber to the torture of the wheel, (a mode of punishment nowhere exactly described to us, but which it seems might be borne long¹,) and he was not released till some of the more fortunate few, who had escaped from the scene of woe, arriving, confirmed the uncertain intelligence.

Thucyd. l. 8.
c. 1.

But even these were not at first credited for the full extent of the misfortune. Multiplied concurring testimonies at length removing every doubt of the magnitude of the calamity, then public anguish became extreme. Popular rage began with venting contumely against the orators who had advised the expedition; as if, says the historian, the people themselves had not directed it; and, in fact, the people, in assembly, holding the executive as well as the legislative government, every one being free to propose, and sometimes a majority with tumultuous clamour commanding measures, there could be no duly responsible minister. From the orators then the public anger extended to the soothsayers, augurs, interpreters, any who had contributed to establish the belief that the gods would favour the project of conquest in Sicily. But in this excessive irritation of the public mind, fear soon became the prevailing passion. Private losses of friends or relations, which stimulated the first movements, gave way to the consideration, that the commonwealth had not such another body of citizens, in the prime of life, as that which had been so rashly committed to destruction, nor such a

B. C. 413.
Ol. 91. 4.
P. W. 19.
October.

¹ Ἐς τὸν τριτόχον καταδεδεῖς ἰστρεῖλαῦτο πολλὸν χρόνον, κ. τ. λ. Plut. vit. Nic. 1

fleet, nor naval stores to fit such another, nor funds to supply the accumulated wants which the conjuncture created: and then it followed, that nothing less was to be expected than the appearance of the enemy's victorious navy before Piræus, and the blockade of Athens by land and sea.

In this general consternation however there were not wanting either able heads or magnanimous minds among the Athenians, and the crisis itself gave them the power to take the lead. Wise measures, and the most vigorous that circumstances admitted, were accordingly resolved on; to restore the navy, to collect stores, to raise money, and to save it, by abridging, not private luxury, which, unless in rare instances, was yet moderate, but public luxury, which was already immoderate in Athens², and, above all things, to obviate the defection of the allied and subject states, particularly of Eubœa, the most valuable dependency of the commonwealth, and without which the population of Athens could not easily subsist. But the depth of misfortune, into which their own folly had precipitated them, induced, thus over late, among the Athenian people, a consciousness that a multitude is unfit to direct executive government. To obviate therefore the extravagances of unbalanced democracy, a new council of elders was created, whose office was to deliberate on all public measures, previously to their being proposed to the general assembly. This indeed was providing for the prudence of executive government, but not for vigour, not for secrecy, not for dispatch; qualities which could meet in the Athenian administration only when a Themistocles or a Pericles, general at the same time and demagogue, controlled by no council, could first resolve on measures,

² Duker has a judicious note upon the passage of Thucydides, which I have thus paraphrased. The schollast has undertaken to explain what, for want of better inquiry into the state of Athens at the time, he evidently did not understand.

and then command the approbation of the general assembly. Never however were the Athenian people so disposed to moderation, order, and attention to wise advice, as in the present crisis. "It was so resolved therefore," says the contemporary historian emphatically, "and it was done; and the summer ended."

Thucyd. 1. 8.
c. 2. Meanwhile the attention of all Greece was excited, and the politics of every republic put in motion by the blow which Athens had received in Sicily. Apprehension of the consequence of so great an addition to the power of that ambitious and restless republic, as the conquest of Sicily might have given, had been very general and very serious. No evil that could befall the aristocracies, which composed the Lacedæmonian confederacy, was so dreadful and so odious as subjugation under the tyrannous rule of the Athenian multitude. Nor was Lacedæmon itself without alarm; for though the conquest of Sparta was not likely soon to be accomplished by the Athenian arms, yet there was no inferior evil which might not be expected, and quickly. Already the Lacedæmonians beheld, not only many of their dependencies wrested from them, but two garrisons established within their own country, infesting a large part of it with devastation, to which they could neither prescribe bounds nor foresee an end. At the same time the Athenian fleets so decidedly commanded the seas, that no prospect appeared of means for competition with them on that element; insomuch that not only the Lacedæmonians were unable to extend protection to any allies beyond the ready reach of their land force, but the extensive line of the Læconian coast must be continually open to insult. In all these things the catastrophe at Syracuse made a change that nothing but the mad ambition, or madder jealousy, of a despotic multitude could have produced; and that change was immediate and almost total. The navy of Athens was no longer

formidable; the Peloponnesian fleets now commanded the seas. The allies of Lacedæmon therefore, no longer fearing anything from the enemy, became only anxious for exertion, that they might speedily, as they trusted they could easily, complete the purpose of the war, and relieve themselves from burdens under which they had been long uneasy. The neutral republics, at the same time, thought the moment come for deciding their party, before it was yet too late to claim merit for the decision. But the principal effect was seen among the subject states of Athens; who, with unadvised eagerness, pressed forward in revolt, taking it for certain that the Athenians would be unable to maintain the war through the ensuing summer. Meanwhile the Lacedæmonians, with the characteristical coolness of their government, enjoyed the view of this various fermentation, and prepared to profit from it to the establishment of their own permanent superiority over all Greece, to which they now looked as an acquisition completely within their power.

Among the circumstances of these times a change in the Lacedæmonian system, which considerably affected the general politics of Greece, will require notice. The Lacedæmonian kings, who in Lacedæmon, except when presiding at some religious ceremony, were scarcely distinguished from the mass of citizens, being obliged, in all political business, to yield to the tyrannical authority of the ephors, enjoyed, in the command of armies abroad, a more truly royal state as well as a more efficacious royal authority. The interest which they thus had in leading their country into long and distant wars had been restrained by the law of Lycurgus, forbidding such wars; and that law, enforced sometimes by the opposite interest of the ephors, had been much more effectually and constantly enforced by the poverty of the Lacedæmonian commonwealth. Nevertheless, before the Persian war, Cleomenes, by engaging the

state in frequent hostilities, appears to have acquired extraordinary power; and, afterward, in the new and vast scene of action which the Persian war opened, Pausanias, though not king but merely regent and general of the republic, was able to prosecute ambitious views to a great length. His own imprudence indeed, more than any other obstacle, seems to have ruined his purpose; and the ensuing downfall of the power of Sparta checked, for a time, the ambition of its generals and kings. When the Peloponnesian war broke out, Archidamus, a prince advanced in years, and of a character singularly amiable, prudent at the same time and philanthropic, seems to have had no object, in command, but the good of his country and of all Greece. His son Agis, a man of moderate talents, would perhaps not have attempted innovation, if circumstances had not led to it. He succeeded to the throne in an early stage of a most complicated and lasting war. Error in conduct, apparently the consequence of error in judgment, produced, as we have

Ch. 17. s. 5.
of this Hist. seen, very severe censure upon him from those who, in Lacedæmon, had legal authority to censure and even to punish kings. Afterward, by his success at Mantinea, he acquired some reputation. He was still in the vigour of his age, but of large experience, when the establishment of a standing force in Decelea gave him, what none of his predecessors ever enjoyed, a perennial military command. Here he found himself really king: here he was

Thucyd. 1. 8.
c. 5. free from the vexatious and degrading control of the ephors: here he might not only use at discretion the troops immediately under his orders, but he had authority to levy forces, raise contributions, exercise command among the allies of the commonwealth, and treat with foreign states. Thus vested with independent power, he was of course respected, and could make himself feared; so that much more deference was paid by the states of the con-

federacy to Agis, in his garrison at Decelea, than to any Spartan king at home, or even to the Spartan government itself. The residence of his garrison therefore was not unlikely to be preferred to that of his capital. These were consequences apparently not in the view of the Lacedæmonian administration when the advice of the Athenian refugee was taken for the permanent occupying of a post in Attica; yet the circumstances of the Lacedæmonian government prevented any effectual effort to check them.

The establishment of a public revenue at Lacedæmon seems to have been a departure from the spirit, at least, of Lycurgus's system. When such an establishment was first made, we are not informed; but we find Archidamus, in the debates preceding the Peloponnesian war, speaking of it as not a new thing. The length of that war, and the extent of the scene of action, would make attention to the revenue more than ever necessary; and thus again a new interest was created, intimately connected with that which led the kings to desire war always rather than peace, and any residence rather than that of Sparta. Through the business of the revenue, the leading men at home might have an interest in yielding to the king's wish for foreign command; and hence the influence of the king, though at a distance, might keep together a party in Lacedæmon. Agis in his command at Decelea did not neglect this policy.

Thucyd. l. 8.
c. 3.

The Lacedæmonian government now, with serious earnestness, applied themselves to what had been their professed purpose at the beginning of the war, the acquisition of a fleet to rival that of Athens. The project, then wild, was become at length practicable. Instead of five hundred triremes, originally proposed, one hundred were now required of the confederacy. The Lacedæmonians themselves undertook for twenty-five. An equal

Ibid.

number was appointed to Bœotia, fifteen only to Corinth, fifteen to Locris and Phocis, ten to Arcadia with Pallene and Sicyon, and ten to Megara, Trœzen, Epidaurus, and Hermione. Agis was directed to collect the contributions for the purpose from the northern states. Accordingly, with such an escort as he judged sufficient, he marched from Decelea about the beginning of November; and after receiving what had been assessed upon the friendly, he proceeded to increase the sum by taking from the hostile. Turning toward the Malian bay, he carried off considerable booty from the Cœtæan valleys; and then, advancing still northward, he compelled the Phthiot Achæans, with some other tribes subject to the Thessalians, in defiance of the Thucyd. 1. 8.
c. 4. resentment of that people, to deliver hostages and pay contributions.

Meanwhile the Athenians, recovered in some degree from the first emotions of grief and alarm, and submitting themselves to able guidance, were taking measures, suited to their reduced circumstances, for resisting the impending storm. Their first diligence was directed to the collection of naval stores and the building of ships; for on the possession of a powerful fleet everything depended. Their next care was to increase the security of vessels passing between Eubœa and Athens; for without free communication with Eubœa, Attica being effectually commanded by the enemy, the city could not easily be subsisted. With this view therefore a fort was erected on the promontory of Sunium. Thus, but especially in the renovation of the fleet, a large but indispensable expense would be incurred, which would enforce the necessity of parsimony in matters of inferior moment. The garrison was therefore withdrawn from that post in Laconia which had been occupied by Demosthenes in his way to Sicily, and measures were taken to reduce unnecessary expenses, and establish exact economy

in public affairs. Thus, says the contemporary Thucyd. l. 8. c. 5. historian, in the close of the nineteenth year of the war, preparations were making on both sides, as if war was just then beginning.

But it was not possible for any prudence, among the Athenians, to prevent that consequence of their late misfortune which they most apprehended and their enemies most hoped, the defection of their allies, and the revolt of their subjects. The Eubœans, whose country was so important to Athens that a better government would never have left it in the situation of a subject state, but would have given its people one interest with themselves, were foremost to take measures for breaking their dependency. The residence of the Lacedæmonian king in their neighbourhood offered new opportunity for the intrigues of the discontented: the consideration of the force that he could command from the surrounding states, in addition to that constantly under his orders, gave large encouragement; and, soon after the arrival of the news of the Sicilian defeat, a proposal was communicated to Agis from a strong party in Eubœa, to bring over the whole island to the Lacedæmonian confederacy. Agis gave assurances that the forces under his command should be employed in their favour, and in communicating the project to the Lacedæmonian administration, he used his interest to promote their cause. But the cautious government of Lacedæmon, though unwilling to reject so advantageous a proposal, was nevertheless little disposed to any spirited exertion for assisting it. Three hundred only of those called *neodamodes*, newly-admitted citizens, were granted for the service, who, under the command of Alcámenes, marched into Attica.

Agis was taking measures for transporting this body into Eubœa, when a deputation from Lesbos, also proposing revolt, reduced him to difficulty. His desire coincided with

the wishes both of the Eubœans and the Lesbians; but neither people could effect their purpose without assistance, and he was unable to give it at the same time to both. He was already engaged to the Eubœans; and their extensive country, almost adjoining to the coast of Bœotia, whether as loss to Athens, or gain to the Peloponnesian confederacy, was far more important than the smaller island of Lesbos, on the other side of the Ægean. But the Bœotians, the most powerful of the allies of Lacedæmon, had a strong partiality for the Lesbians, whom, as of Æolian race, they considered as kinsmen; while the Lesbians, though connected by no political interest, but by a reciprocal feeling, revered the Bœotians as the chiefs of their blood. Agis, whether considering the interest of Lacedæmon, or his own interest, desirous of gratifying the Bœotians, resolved to postpone the business of Eubœa to that of Lesbos. Accordingly, without any communication with Lacedæmon, he ordered Alcamenes to conduct to Lesbos that very force which had been sent by the Lacedæmonian government for the express purpose of assisting the revolt in Eubœa.

SECTION II.

New Implication of Grecian and Persian Interests. — Death of Artaxerxes, and Succession of Darius II. to the Persian Throne. — Effect of the Terrors of an Earthquake. — Congress of the Peloponnesian Confederacy at Corinth. — Isthmian Games. — Naval Success of the Athenians in the Saronic Gulf. — Influence of Alcibiades in the Spartan Councils. — A Peloponnesian Fleet sent under Chalcideus, accompanied by Alcibiades, to co-operate with the Satrap of Caria and the revolted Ionians. — Increased Distress of Athens. — Treaty of Alliance between Lacedæmon and Persia.

NOR all the sounding vaunts and ingenious panegyrics of later writers mark so strongly the ascendancy which the little

commonwealth of Athens had acquired in the politics of the civilised world, and the degree to which it had repressed the force, or at least the spirit, of the vast empire of the east, or display so clearly the superiority which a few consenting thousands, ably directed, may acquire over ill-governed millions, as the contemporary historian's simple narrative of the consequences of the Athenian defeat in Sicily. That event in the west presently set the east in motion, and the affairs of Greece became in a new way implicated with those of Persia. Darius had succeeded his father Artaxerxes on the throne. Artaxerxes, though an able prince, and interrupted by no considerable foreign wars, had exerted himself, through a long reign, with very incomplete success, to restore vigour to the unwieldy mass of the empire. While his cares were employed in composing the disorders which troubles, preceding his accession, had produced in the central parts, the connection with the distant provinces remained loose and imperfect; insomuch that, independently of any effort of the satraps for the purpose, a more independent power accrued to them than could consist with the good government of the whole. Thus, upon the appointment of Tissaphernes to the satrapy of Caria, Amorges, natural son of the late satrap Pissuthnes, was encouraged to revolt; not perhaps in professed opposition to the sovereign of the empire, but to the new satrap only. Regardless however of the mandates of the prince, and in defiance of the arms of his officers, he maintained himself in the Carian mountains.

But the wants of the Persian government pressed upon those to whom its powers were delegated, in proportion as its weakness encouraged opposition to them. The satraps were required to remit from their provinces, not only the accruing tributes, but the arrears. From the time of the victories of Cimon, most of the Grecian towns in Asia had been tributary to Athens, and many of them since those of

Xanthippus and Leotychidas. The jealousy of the Athenian government allowed few to remain fortified; yet the Athenian naval predominancy appears to have kept them generally secure against attempts from the Persians. Two exceptions only we find acknowledged in Grecian history: sedition at Colophon afforded opportunity, the advantage of which however, as we have formerly seen, was of short duration, and a Persian satrap commanded an important part of the coast of Æolia, as we have also seen, when the Athenian maritime power was greatest. Nevertheless the Persian court affected to consider all those towns as still appendages of the empire, and a tribute assessed upon them was required from the satraps.³ The wretched policy of Athens, in the government of its dependencies, so far promoted the views of the Persians, that there was in every Asiatic city a party, composed mostly of the higher ranks, who were ready to prefer the more liberal supremacy of a Persian satrap to the oppressive and insulting tyranny of the Athenian people. Under these circumstances it appears difficult to say which was most wonderful, the strength of the little commonwealth of Athens, which could hold such a command, or the weakness of the vast empire of Persia, which could not recover its dominion.

The plea of inability, urged by the satraps, had at length been allowed at the Persian court, so far that the arrears of tribute due from Tissaphernes, for the Grecian towns within his satrapy, were no longer demanded.⁴

Ch. 15. s. 3.
of this Hist. A

Ch. 16. s. 5.
of this Hist.

Thucyd. 1. 8.
c. 5.

³ What we find from Thucydides upon this subject, in the fifth and sixth chapters of his eighth book, implies the strongest contradiction of the report, transmitted by later writers, of a treaty of peace, by which the court of Persia gave up all claim upon the Grecian towns in Asia, and engaged that no Persian troops should come within three days' march of the western coast. See note 11. sec. 3. ch. 11. of this History.

⁴ We are little exactly informed of the extent of the several satrapies, or of the powers, privileges, and duties of the satraps. We learn however from Xenophon (Hel. 1. 3. c. 1. s. 5, & seq. & c. 2. s. 10.), that Caria was the proper

But at the same time that this indulgence was granted, it was with reason required that a Persian subject should not be allowed to maintain himself in rebellion: Tissaphernes was commanded to send Amorges, alive or dead, to Susa. To effect even this however, either means were deficient, or conduct, and Amorges continued to defy the Persian power.

It was very generally supposed that, by the defeat in Sicily, the command of the sea was completely lost to Athens; and throughout the Asiatic Grecian cities the aristocratical party were immediately looking out for means of mending their condition by revolt. The Lesbians had begun: the Chians and Erythræans followed: but, diffident of their own strength, their first measure was to communicate with Tissaphernes. The satrap however did not think himself able, with his own force, to give them protection; but he gladly united his interest with theirs, and together they sent ministers to Lacedæmon. At the same time Pharnabazus, satrap of the provinces bordering on the Hellespont and the Euxine, with the same view Thucyd. l. 8. c. 6. of acquiring revenue from the Grecian cities within his satrapy, was also desirous of forming an alliance with the Lacedæmonians; who would probably rather see those cities tributary to Persia than sources of revenue to Athens. He employed for his ministers on this occasion two refugee Greeks, Calligetus, a Megarian, and Timagoras, a Cyzicene, who arrived at Lacedæmon about the same time with the ministers from Tissaphernes and those from Chios and Erythræ. The Lesbian ministers, who had been negotiating with Agis at Decelea, also met them there.

satrapy of Tissaphernes, and (Anab. l. 1. c. 1. s. 6.) that Ionia was added to his command by the king's particular favour; but his authority, at least in the absence of other officers, was often extended over Sardis and great part of Lydia.

The contest which ensued, for preference in the Lacedæmonian alliance, gave opportunity for intrigue, in which Alcibiades was likely to enter and likely to be successful. Endius, ephor of the year, was of that Spartan family with which principally his family had had ancient hospitality, and Endius was now his particular friend. With Agis he was not upon good terms : it was therefore his purpose to make Endius also the enemy of Agis ; and the opposition of interests among those who were contending for the Lacedæmonian alliance afforded means. Agis favoured the pretensions of the Lesbians, whose cause he had already adopted. Alcibiades persuaded Endius to favour the Chians ; and grounds were not wanting for giving them the preference : they possessed no less than sixty ships of war ; in every circumstance of military strength they were superior to any among the Asian Greeks ; and, what was perhaps a still more important consideration, their alliance would carry with it that of the powerful satrap who commanded the south-western provinces of Lesser Asia. These motives, urged by the ability of Alcibiades, persuaded Endius, and, with him, a majority of those who directed the councils of Lacedæmon. A treaty was accordingly concluded with the Chians and Erythræans, and forty ships of war were voted, to support them in their proposed revolt. Ten, under Melanchridas, were ordered to sail while it was yet winter ; but the superstitious terror which an earthquake inspired gave some check to the measure. The earthquake apparently was supposed to portend that the command of Melanchridas would be inauspicious ; for the Lacedæmonian government immediately appointed Chalcideus to supersede him, and reduced the squadron to five ships.

Thucyd. 1. 8.
c. 7.

The part of Sparta being thus taken, and, almost in the same instant, the usual want of

energy in her councils demonstrated, the Chians became apprehensive that intelligence of their negotiation would reach Athens, and they might be attacked before succour, sufficient for their protection, would arrive. Toward B. C. 412.
Ol. 91.4-92.1.
P. W. 20. spring therefore they sent again to Lacedæmon, urging the necessity of early assistance; and, the ability of Alcibiades and the power of Endius being united to promote their cause, it was resolved that the whole fleet in the Corinthian gulf, including the squadron prepared by Agis for the expedition to Lesbos, should be dragged across the isthmus, and proceed for Chios.

Before this was carried into execution however it was thought proper to hold a congress of the confederacy; and Corinth was appointed for the place of meeting. Thucyd. l. 8.
c. 8. Agis attended from Decelea. He had the prudence not to mark any resentment at the interference with his command, or any way to irritate an administration ill disposed to him, by opposing measures on which they had a constitutional right to decide; and yielding thus in part, he carried also a part of his purpose. In conformity to the proposition from Lacedæmon, the congress resolved, that the whole fleet should go first to Chios, under the command of Chalcideus, who was then superintending the equipment of a squadron on the Laconic coast; that, when the Chians were put in a state of security, Alcamenes, the officer named by Agis, should take the command and proceed to Lesbos; that, when the business there also was completed, the command should pass to Clearchus, who should conduct the fleet to the Hellespont, and act with Pharnabazus.

The fleet in the gulf consisted of thirty-nine triremes. Twenty-one were in all haste hauled across the isthmus; and it was the wish of the congress that these should sail without delay. Thus, it was hoped, the Athenians, having their attention divided between the fleet sailing and that remaining

Thucyd. 1. 8.
c. 9.

to sail, would act effectually against neither. But it happened that the season of the Isthmian games was at hand ; and such was the respected sanctity of the attending armistice, that even the Athenians might come and go and stay in safety. The preparations therefore would become unavoidably notorious ; and even the negotiations, in which so many persons, with various interests, had communicated, would probably not remain long secret. But the very circumstance of the games, which increased the anxiety of the other confederates for the instant departure of the squadron, determined the Corinthians not to stir. The force of Athens, they said, was already broken ; and nothing to be apprehended from any discovery of the purposes of the confederacy, nor any obstacle that could arise from a little delay, was of importance enough to prevent a large portion of their citizens from partaking in that magnificent and sacred festival, whose period would recur only in the revolution of four years.

The negotiation had indeed been conducted with such care that nothing transpired. But the movements of the fleet excited suspicion ; the persons discovered to be coming and going directed suspicion to its object ; and Aristocrates, one of the generals of Athens, was sent to Chios. His instructions directed him to inform himself of the state of things in the island, and, as a precaution, to require that the ships, which, according to the terms of the confederacy, the Chians were bound to furnish for the Athenian fleet, should be immediately sent to Piræus. The proposed revolt was a measure entirely of the aristocratical party, and not yet communicated to the general assembly, or to any in the democratical interest. The leaders therefore, thus taken unprepared, denied any intention to break their ancient connection with Athens, and, in conformity to the requisition, they sent seven ships to join the Athenian fleet.

The festival was no sooner concluded than the twenty-one triremes, already transported across the isthmus, sailed under the command of Alcamenes. But at the celebration of the Isthmian games many Athenians ^{Thucyd. 1. 8. c. 10.} having attended, the preparations were seen, the purpose suspected, and measures were taken at Athens accordingly. Alcamenes, attacked by a superior force, was defeated, and himself killed: one trireme was taken; the others reached a desert port of the Corinthian territory on the confines of Epidauria, called Piræus. The Athenians ^{c. 11.} followed, but did not think proper to attack them there. According to the usual mode of naval operation in that age, leaving a few triremes to watch them, they withdrew with the rest to a small island near the coast, where they encamped.

Intelligence of this action occasioned much alarm in Corinth. The neighbouring allies were summoned, and, with such force as could be hastily assembled, the Corinthians marched to protect the defeated armament. Where soldiers were citizens, not under any regular military command, but having every one a vote in the decision of all public measures, it was often more difficult for the administration to get a service of tedious inconvenience performed, than one of great momentary danger. Accordingly the first proposal, concerning the ships in the desert harbour of Piræus, was to burn, rather than undertake a lasting guard upon them, in such a situation. After some deliberation however the consideration of the expense and difficulty of repairing the loss induced the resolution not to submit to it without a struggle. The ships were therefore hauled ashore, and a considerable body of infantry encamped for their protection. Information of the defeat and death of Alcamenes being in the meantime carried to Lacedæmon, not only the departure of the squadron under Chalcideus was

stopped, but it was proposed at once to give up all the great views of advantage that had been opened on the other side of the Ægean.

The ascendancy of Athenian genius showed itself even in those circumstances which contributed most to the downfall of the Athenian empire. What the Lacedæmonian administration had neither foresight to plan nor spirit to execute, the illustrious but unprincipled Athenian refugee, participating, through the ephor his friend, in their closest councils, Thucyd. 1. 8. c. 12. planned and executed for them. He urged that, if the small squadron under Chalcideus hastened to Chios, before the news of the disaster on the coast of Peloponnesus arrived there, the acquisition of that island might yet be effected. He would himself accompany the squadron; he would represent, in proper terms, the weakness of Athens, and the power and zeal of Lacedæmon; and he doubted not of accomplishing the revolt, not only of Chios, but of all Ionia. Such were the inducements which he held out generally. In private he farther stimulated Endius with a display of the credit, which such an acquisition to the Lacedæmonian confederacy would bring to his administration, and of the still more important advantages of an alliance between Lacedæmon and the court of Persia, which would be the ready consequence; adding that, in the circumstances of the moment, all was in his own power: if he neglected the opportunity, every thing would pass from him to his rival Agis.

Thus incited, Endius became earnest in prosecution of the plans of Alcibiades: they were adopted by the Lacedæmonian administration, and Chalcideus, accompanied by c. 14. Alcibiades, sailed for Ionia. In their passage, to prevent communication of intelligence, they stopped all merchant ships they fell in with, compelled them to follow as far as Corycus on the Asiatic coast, and there

dismissed them. Deputies from the leaders of the Chian revolt shortly came to Corycus, and the fleet then proceeded for Chios. Its arrival occasioned universal astonishment and alarm, except among the aristocratical leaders, who were completely prepared. The council, according to previous concert, was sitting; and Alcibiades and Chalcideus were received by it to make their proposals. They boldly asserted that a large fleet was on its way from Peloponnesus: fortunately for them not a rumour of the defeat on the Corinthian coast had reached Chios: a decree was proposed for renouncing the Athenian and engaging in the Peloponnesian confederacy, and without any material opposition from the democratical party it was carried. The Erythræans immediately followed the example; and, three ships only being sent to Clazomenæ, that city also joined in the measure. Thus, with the small force of only five triremes, Alcibiades struck a greater blow against his country than the Lacedæmonians and their confederates, after all the great advantage gained in Sicily, had almost dared to meditate.

The affairs of Athens were now in such a situation that it was judged lawful and necessary Thucyd. 1. 8. c. 15. to recur to the deposit of a thousand talents, set apart in the beginning of the war for cases of extremest necessity. No enemy's fleet yet blockaded the harbour of Piræus, (the emergency specified as the requisite justification,) yet, on the arrival of intelligence of the revolt of Chios, the danger was thought scarcely less pressing than if Athens were actually invested. For, the most powerful ally of the commonwealth having set the example of revolt, it was concluded that the other allies and subjects would follow; and thus there would be an end of those resources without which the war could not be supported. The prohibitory decree therefore was repealed, and a kind of confidential vote passed, directing that every effort should be made for raising

a fleet, the most powerful that circumstances would allow, and that the speediest exertion should be used, for saving the dependencies yet remaining to the commonwealth, and recovering, if opportunity should be, those which had already revolted.

The directors of executive government, thus vested with discretionary powers, sent instant orders for arresting the crews of the Chian ships acting with the fleet on the Corinthian coast. This was successfully executed: the free were imprisoned, the slaves declared free, and the ships were replaced by an equal number of Athenian ships. Eight triremes remained equipped in the harbour of Piræus: they were dispatched for Asia under the command of Strombichides: twelve, nearly ready, were ordered to follow under Thrasycles; and thirty were put in preparation to be sent after them as soon as possible.

Strombichides, hastening to Samos, obtained
Thucyd. 1. 8.
c. 16. one Samian ship only to re-enforce his small squadron. Receiving then intelligence of a revolt proposed at Teos, on the Asiatic main, he proceeded thither, and arrived just in time to prevent the immediate effect of a negotiation with Tissaphernes and the revolted cities of Clazomenæ and Erythræ, supported by a body of troops from each. He had however scarcely composed matters, when information reached him that Chalcideus was approaching with his squadron, now increased, by re-enforcement from Chios, to twenty-three triremes. Totally unequal to resist such a force, which would be assisted by co-operation of the combined army, he withdrew hastily to Samos. The Clazomenians and Erythræans were then admitted into Teos, which became a member of the Peloponnesian confederacy; but, the Athenian interest being supposed still prevalent among the lower people, the fortifications on the inland side of the town were demolished.

Alcibiades had old and hereditary interest in Miletus, and he proposed next to engage that, ^{Thucyd. 1. 8. c. 17.} the richest and most important of the Asiatic Grecian cities, in revolt against Athens. In thus promoting the Peloponnesian cause however, it was not possible that he should have the Peloponnesian interest at heart. The success of the operations, which had been carried on under his direction, had been so rapid, so uninterrupted, so important, and so little expected that he could not but have great present credit for it. But one powerful party in Lacedæmon was already hostile to him, and the moment his services ceased to be necessary, he would have to apprehend more jealousy than gratitude among the other. Moreover, with the ensuing annual change of magistrates there, the ephor his friend would go out of office, and a new commander-in-chief would supersede Chalcideus; whom his friend's interest, and perhaps his own recommendation, had raised to the command, and who seems to have acted in it constantly under his influence. His next measure accordingly seems to show a purpose adverse to the interest of those in whose service he had engaged himself. Having, together with Chalcideus, pursued Strombichides as far as Samos, they proceeded to Chios, where they completely changed the crews, putting the Peloponnesians ashore, to act as heavy-armed infantry in the guard of the island, and taking Chian seamen in their room. The pretended purpose was to give security to the aristocratical party in Chios, against the democratical, who were less satisfied with the late change. But Alcibiades had evidently other views. In persuading the Ionian cities to revolt from Athens, it was his purpose to attach them as much as possible to himself, and as little as possible to Lacedæmon: an Ionian force would be more manageable in his hands than a Peloponnesian; and with an Ionian force he might accomplish what a Peloponnesian

would prevent. Ostensibly however he was still the most zealous as well as the ablest promoter of the Lacedæmonian interest. Thrasycles, with his squadron of twelve triremes from Attica, had joined Strombichides at Samos. Apprehensive for Miletus, they hastened their course thither. But Alcibiades was so secret and so rapid in his measures that, when they anchored off the island of Lade, at the mouth of the harbour, he was already received into the city, and his friends were in possession of the government.

A new event in Grecian politics followed; a treaty of alliance between Tissaphernes, in the name of the Persian monarch, and Chalcideus, in that of the Lacedæmonian republic. The terms of this treaty were perfectly accommodated to promote the purposes of Alcibiades, but not at all honourable to Lacedæmon or to Chalcideus. By the first article a most dangerous concession was made to Persia; for it was declared in general terms, “that all the country and all the cities, which had belonged to the predecessors of the king, should belong to the king.” It was then added, “that the king, with the Lacedæmonians and their allies, should in common prevent the accruing of any revenue, and of any advantage whatsoever, from those cities to the Athenians; that the king, with the Lacedæmonians and their allies, should carry on war against the Athenians in common; that neither party should make peace without the other; that if any subjects of the king should revolt, they should be held as enemies by the Lacedæmonians; and that equally if any allies of the Lacedæmonians should revolt,” (for by that term the renunciation of alliance with the leading state was described,) “they should be held as enemies by the king.”

Thucyd. l. 8.
c. 18.

SECTION III.

Progress of Revolt against Athens. — Exertions of Athens. — Siege of Chios. — Battle of Miletus. — Service of the Peloponnesian Armament to the Satrap of Caria. — Spartan Officers, with the Title of Harmost, placed in the Cities of the Confederacy. — Dissatisfaction of the Peloponnesians with the Satrap. — Operations of the adverse Armaments, and Intrigues among the Asiatic Cities. — Change in the Administration of Sparta. — Commissioners, sent from Sparta to Ionia, refuse to confirm the Treaty with the Satrap. — Revolt of Rhodes to the Peloponnesian Confederacy.

THE riches of Persia being thus by treaty engaged to assist the military force of the Peloponnesian confederacy, the power collected against the tottering dominion of Athens might seem more than sufficient to insure its almost instant downfall. But party divisions and constitutional sluggishness prevailed in Lacedæmon, and the opposite interests of different commonwealths impeded every measure of the confederacy; while, the pressure of extreme danger enforcing unanimity in the Athenian councils, such was the energy of the administration, and such still the resources of the commonwealth, that Athens was already again approaching toward a superiority at sea.

Diomedon, conducting from Attica a re-enforcement of sixteen ships to the fleet on the Asiatic station, took four Chian triremes; the crews however escaping. The Peloponnesians and their allies meanwhile obtained the more important advantage of engaging in revolt the towns of Lebedus and Eræ on the continent, and afterward the city of Methymne in Lesbos, the only one of the island remaining to Athens. But that wretched system of Grecian policy, which, equally under Lacedæmonian as under Athenian supremacy, kept the

Ol. 91.4—92.1.
B. C. 412.
P. W. 20.

Thucyd. l. 8.
c. 19.

c. 22.

higher and the lower people everywhere at perpetual enmity, afforded opportunity for the Athenians, the moment they could show a force at sea, to give a turn, in all maritime cities, in favour of the democratical interest. That interest was strong in Teos, and Diomedon, proceeding thither, recovered it to the Athenian alliance. Meanwhile the body of the higher people of Samos, more depressed by Athenian tyranny than all others since their reduction after their revolt, were proposing to seize the opportunity seeming now offered, by the prevalence of the Peloponnesian arms, for mending their condition. But before this project was ripe for execution, their design becoming known to the leaders of the many, intelligence was sent to the commander of three Athenian triremes then at Samos. Supported by the crews of these, they overpowered their opponents, put to death two hundred, and, driving about four hundred more to seek personal safety by flight, shared among themselves the property of all. Such was the common character of the measures by which the imperial republics held command over subject states. The frequency of the occurrence cannot but be in some degree revolting in narrative, yet must be hazarded, or important political features would be left very imperfectly portrayed. Since the last rebellion, as it was called, the island had been held under the immediate control of the Athenian people; but the massacre and robbery now committed were so grateful to them that the perpetrators were now rewarded with allowance to hold themselves the internal administration of the affairs of their island, ready only to obey the command of the imperial republic for tribute and military service.

While success was thus beginning to shine again upon the Athenians, on the eastern side of the Ægean, they met with an unexpected reverse nearer home. The Peloponnesian ships in the Corinthian Piræus,

Thucyd. l. 8.
c. 20.

Ibid.

to the number of twenty, making a sudden attack upon an Athenian squadron of equal force watching them, gained the victory and took four ships. Astyochus was then sent from Lacedæmon to conduct the victorious squadron to Asia, there to assume the command-in-chief of the fleet.

The exertions of the Athenian government nevertheless continued to be efficacious. Leon, bringing from Attica a fresh re-enforcement of ten ships, proceeded with Diomedon to Lesbos; and though Astyochus arrived in time to interfere, yet by their able management, with Thucyd. 1. 8. c. 24. the co-operation of the democratical party, they recovered the whole of that important island. They proceeded to Clazomenæ on the continent, and that city also renewed its connection with Athens. Such, in short, had been the energy of the Athenian administration, and such the supineness of the Peloponnesians, that the Athenian fleet in the Asiatic seas could now be divided and yet everywhere superior. The squadron of twenty triremes under Thrasycles and Strobichides had not moved from Lade, but watched there for an opportunity of advantage. Making a descent on the Milesian lands, they defeated the troops which, under Chalcideus, the Lacedæmonian commander-in-chief, marched out against them, and Chalcideus himself was killed; but their force was insufficient for any attempt against the town of Miletus.

Naval superiority however being recovered, it was determined to carry on operations against Chios with a view to the reduction of the island; and the Chians had the mortification to find, contrary not only to their own expectation but that of all Greece, that their revolt had been determined on without due precaution and just foresight. Till the present conjuncture, the affairs of Chios had long been managed with a steady prudence, uncommon among the Grecian cities. Moderate in prosperity, blameless

toward their neighbours, and using their increasing wealth and power for no purpose of ambition, but directing their politics merely to secure the happiness they enjoyed, their island, from the time of the Persian war, had never seen an enemy within its bounds. The Athenians now prepared to attack it on all sides. They occupied the forts of Sidussa and Pteleus, in the Erythræan territory, and the little islands Cænussæ, between Chios and the main, as naval stations whence to infest the Chian coasts. Debarking troops then in three several places, they defeated at each the forces which opposed them; and with such slaughter that the Chians attempted action in the field no more; but, abandoning their rich territory for ravage, they shut themselves within their walls. Under such circumstances it was likely that the democratical party would be looking for means of accommodation with the Athenians. The leading men, aware of this, sent information of their apprehensions to Astyochus, who in consequence came from Erythræ with four ships.

It was now toward the end of summer when a fresh and powerful re-enforcement arrived at Samos from Attica; fifteen hundred Athenian heavy-armed, a thousand Argive, and a thousand of the various other allies of Athens, Phrynichus, Onomacles, and Scironidas commanding. From Samos they presently crossed to the Milesian territory, and landed there. Eight hundred heavy-armed Milesians under Alcibiades, with the Peloponnesians who had been under the orders of Chalcideus, and a force of Asiatic infantry and cavalry, led by the satrap Tissaphernes in person, proceeded to meet them. Both sides being prepared for battle, the Argives in the Athenian army holding in contempt the Ionians, advanced before their main body hastily and with no good order, as against an enemy who would avoid their

B.C. 412.
Ol. 92. 1.
P. W. 20.
After 3 Sept.
Thucyd. l. 8.
c. 25.

onset. But the Milesians, led by Alcibiades, presently routed them, and killed near three hundred. On the other side the Athenians themselves, opposed to the Peloponnesians and Asiatics, attacking the former first, defeated them, and the others immediately fled. Alcibiades upon this drew off the Milesians; and the Athenians, holding the field of battle, erected their trophy. The event altogether remarkably disappointed common opinion among the Greeks, and somewhat lowered the superior estimation in which those of Dorian race had been long accustomed to hold themselves; for on each side the Ionian troops were victorious over the Dorian.

The Athenians, elate with their success, proceeded then immediately to take measures for an assault upon Miletus; but, in the evening of the same day on which the battle was fought, intelligence arrived of the ^{Thucyd. l. 8. c. 26.} approach of a fleet from Peloponnesus, of fifty-five triremes. Onomacles and Scironidas, anxious to restore the naval reputation of Athens, and perhaps too fearful of the temper of the people, their sovereign, to use their judgment with due calmness, proposed to await the enemy's attack. But Phrynichus declared that he would neither be allured by a false opinion of glory, nor yield to unmanly shame: whatever his country's welfare most required, was in his opinion most honourable; and, in the present state of the commonwealth, it would ill become them to risk unnecessarily its naval force. Either his arguments or his authority prevailed, and the fleet returned to Samos. The Argives, fretted, Thucydides says, with the disgrace of their own share in the late battle, sailed home.

Peloponnesus had not alone sent out the formidable fleet which thus relieved Miletus. At the instigation principally of Hermocrates son of Hermon, the Dorian Sicilians had generally agreed to take an active part in the war. Syra-

cuse accordingly sent twenty triremes under his command, but from the other cities he had yet obtained only two, furnished by Selinus. The Lacedæmonian Theramenes commanded the fleet in chief. On its reaching the coast of Asia, the Athenian armament being gone, it was to be considered what should be undertaken; and the commanders

Thucyd. I. 8.
c. 23. resolved to gratify their new ally the satrap by directing their first measures against Iasus, the residence of the rebel Persian chief Amorges. The fleet, in its approach to that place, was mistaken for an Attic fleet; the first assault in consequence succeeded, and Amorges, being made prisoner, was a grateful present to Tissaphernes, who was thus enabled to obey his sovereign's command, requiring him to send the rebel, or at least his head, to Susa. Some Grecian troops, which Amorges had entertained in his service, being mostly Peloponnesian, was taken as a re-enforcement to the army. The other prisoners, being made over to Tissaphernes, equally free and slaves, at a certain price a head⁵, the capture altogether was among the richest made in the war. Possession of Iasus was committed to the satrap's officers, and the Grecian armament returned, for winter quarters, to Miletus.

In confederacies composed of so many little republics, claiming independency, as those under the lead of Athens and Lacedæmon, to insure any just regularity in business, either military or political, would be hardly possible, without powers to be exercised by the superior, hazardous for the liberties of the inferior people. But the internal divisions of every little state, far more than any consideration for the confederacy at large, induced the subordinate governments not only to admit readily, but often to desire, the controlling interference of the imperial people. The Lacedæmonian go-

⁵ The price mentioned by the historian is a Doric stater, the value of which, at the time of the Peloponnesian war, is very uncertainly known.

vernment now sent superintending officers of their own, with the title of Harmost, regulator, to reside in all the cities of their confederacy beyond Proper Greece. The authority of these officers would depend much upon the power of the superintending, and the weakness of the subordinate, state at the time, whether the weakness of scanty numbers and property, or weakness superinduced by internal divisions. The harmost however generally seems to have been but another name for a governor. Philippus, a Lacedæmonian, was appointed harmost of Miletus. Pædaritus, sent from Sparta to hold the same office at Chios, could not so readily and safely reach his destination. Landing however at Miletus, he was escorted by land to Erythræ, and thence found opportunity to make the short passage to Chios, without interruption from the Athenian cruizers.

Early in the winter Tissaphernes visited the Peloponnesian fleet, and, according to agreement with the Lacedæmonians, distributed a month's pay to it, at the rate of an Attic drachma, about tenpence sterling, daily, for each man. He then apologised for proposing to give in future only half a drachma, till he had consulted the king's pleasure; declaring himself desirous, if he could obtain authority for it, to continue the full pay before given. Theramenes, having only a temporary command, for the purpose of conducting the fleet to Astyochnus, under whose orders it was to remain, was little disposed to exert himself about its pecuniary interests; but the Syracusan Hermocrates remonstrated warmly; and Tissaphernes thought it so far of importance to keep his new allies in good humour that, though he would not allow the whole, he at length made an addition to the half drachma.

In the course of the winter an additional force of thirty-five triremes under Charminus, Strombichides, and Euctemon, joined the Athenian fleet at Samos,

Thucyd. 1. 8.
c. 29.
After 2 Oct.

Thucyd. 1. 8.
c. 30.

which thus, so little did the power of Persia assist the naval armament, acquired again a clear superiority in the Asiatic seas. It was in consequence resolved to push the siege of Chios, and at the same time to blockade the port of Miletus. For the former purpose the greatest part of the land force was assigned, with a squadron of thirty triremes; for the other, the rest of the fleet, consisting of seventy-four. The commanders drew lots for the services. It fell to Strombichides, Onomacles, and Euctemon, with thirty triremes and a part of the heavy-armed, to act against Chios: the others, with seventy-four, commanded the seas about Samos, and prepared for an expedition against Miletus.

Thucyd. 1. 8.
c. 31. Meanwhile Astyochus, who had gone to Chios to obviate expected revolt, hearing of the re-enforcement brought by Theramenes from Peloponnesus, but uninformed of the great addition arrived to the enemy's fleet, thought the Peloponnesian interest in the island sufficiently secure, and crossed to the opposite continent, where opportunity of farther acquisition appeared to invite him. Having however in vain attempted Pteleum and Clazomenæ, he was compelled by tempestuous weather to take refuge in the port of Cuma.

But in all the Grecian towns, through the opposition of interests, and the almost universal attachment of the democratical party to the Athenian cause, and the aristocratical to the Lacedæmonian, intrigues were endless. While Astyochus lay with his fleet at Cuma, the aristocratical party in Lesbos sent proposals for bringing that island again to the Lacedæmonian alliance. Astyochus favoured the measure, but the Corinthians were disinclined to it; and the Chians, more apprehensive of their fellow-citizens of the Athenian party than of any other enemy, were extremely averse to any diminution of the friendly force within their own island. Pædaritus, the Lacedæmonian

governor, concurring with them, refused to let any Chian vessels go on the service. Astyochus, highly displeased with this opposition to his purpose, declared that the Chians should in vain solicit from him that assistance which they might soon want; and with this threat he departed, to assume his naval command at Miletus.

The Peloponnesian cause had continued to gain among the Sicilian and Italian Greeks, and a fresh re-enforcement of ten Thurian triremes, with one Syracusan, had passed to Peloponnesus. The Lacedæmonians, adding one of their own, appointed Hippocrates, a Lacedæmonian, to command the squadron, which they sent to join the fleet at Miletus. Cnidus having lately revolted from Tissaphernes, Hippocrates was sent thither, with orders to watch the town with six of his ships, while the other six took their station at Triopium, a promontory of the island, for the purpose of intercepting the enemy's merchant-ships from Egypt. Information of this disposition being communicated to the Athenian fleet, a squadron was detached, which took the six ships at Triopium, whose crews however escaped ashore.

The loss of six ships to the Peloponnesian confederacy, supported only by its own means, might have been important, but, with the advantage of the Persian alliance, it was little regarded. Astyochus, on his arrival at Miletus, found the Milesians zealous in the cause, and the armament in high spirits, notwithstanding the reduction of pay, and the murmurs it had occasioned. The pay still given by Tissaphernes was more than the Peloponnesian governments ever had given, or were able to give, and the booty acquired at Iasus was a great gratification. Nevertheless the principal officers could not rest satisfied with the terms of a treaty, which they could so little justify to their people at home, as that made by Chalcideus; and, at length, Tissaphernes was persuaded to allow the objec-

tionable articles to be reconsidered. Theramenes had now the conduct of the business on the part of Lacedæmon, and a new treaty was concluded, in which the sovereignty of the Persian king over the Grecian cities in Asia was rather less explicitly acknowledged, but yet was acknowledged.

The use at this time, made by the Peloponnesians, of the advantages of Persian pay and Asiatic plunder, seems to have been to indulge themselves in the large and wealthy city of Miletus, under the fine sky of Ionia; while their new allies, the Chians, were pressed with danger of the united evils, which faction within, and an enemy without, might bring. Before the winter ended, the Athenians occupied the port and town of Delphinium, not far from the city. The democratical party among the Chians, itself strong, seeing the Athenian fleets again superior in the Asiatic seas, showed its disposition to the Athenian cause so openly, that Pædaritus and the oligarchal party were in great alarm. They applied to Astyochus at Miletus for succour; but, in conformity to his threat, he refused to give any. Pædaritus sent complaints against him to Lacedæmon; but distress and danger meanwhile continued to press the Chians.

When, among the various applications for the Lacedæmonian alliance, the preference had been given to Tissaphernes and the Ionians, it had not been intended, even by Endius and Alcibiades, to slight the overtures of Pharnabazus. Twenty-seven ships were therefore prepared expressly for the service in which that satrap desired assistance. But, in the beginning of winter, the year of magistracy of Endius had expired, and with it nearly expired the influence of Alcibiades in the Lacedæmonian administration. A considerable change of counsels ensued. The men in command, and the measures pursuing, on the Asiatic coast, were looked upon with a jealous eye. The newly-prepared squadron, placed under the command of Antis-

Thucyd. 1. 8.
c. 38.

c. 39.

thenes, was ordered, not to the Hellespont or any port of the satrapy of Pharnabazus, but to Miletus, to join the fleet already there; and eleven commissioners were embarked in it, to inquire concerning men and things, and, as a council, to assume the principal direction of affairs on the Asiatic station. They were particularly authorised to appoint, if they should see proper, Antisthenes to supersede Astyochus in the command in chief; and also, at their discretion, to send any number of ships, with Clearchus for the commander, or not to send any, to co-operate with Pharnabazus.

Antisthenes, with the eleven commissioners, making Melos in their way to the Ionian coast, fell in with ten Athenian triremes. They took three, but the crews escaping, and the other seven getting clear away, the adventure gave them more alarm than satisfaction; for they feared information to the Athenians at Samos of their approach, and consequent attack from a superior force. Instead therefore of proceeding in the direct course for Ionia, they bore away southward for Crete, and so on to Caunus in Caria, whence they sent to Miletus intelligence of their arrival.

Meanwhile Astyochus, notwithstanding his anger against the Chians, was preparing to attempt their relief, before it should be too late to save allies so valuable to the confederacy. They were already severely pressed: a contravallation was nearly completed against the city: their lands were totally at the enemy's mercy; and their numerous slaves were deserting fast; the ordinary misery of the ancient republics, depending on slaves even for subsistence, and too little generally adverted to in modern notices of ancient history. Astyochus however, upon receiving the advice from Antisthenes, thought it his first duty to give convoy to the council, and his first interest to take care of the re-enforcement; and he accordingly moved with his whole fleet to Caunus. The Athenian

Thucyd. 1. 8.
c. 41.

c. 40.

admiral meanwhile had actually sent a squadron under Charminus, but of twenty ships only, to watch the squadron coming from Peloponnesus. Missing this, Charminus fell in with the grand fleet under Astyochus, dispersed in a fog, and took three ships; but, when the fog cleared, the fleet collecting, he found it necessary to fly for Halicarnassus, and reached that place, not without losing six ships. Intelligence of this being carried to the Athenian admirals, they went with their whole force to offer battle to the Peloponnesians, who had put into the port of Cnidus; but, these showing no disposition to stir, the Athenians returned to Samos.

As soon as the Athenian fleet was gone, the eleven commissioners from Sparta began the more peculiar business of their mission, the consideration of the Persian treaty; and Tissaphernes thought the occasion important enough to require his presence at Cnidus. The commissioners, of whom Lichas was the chief, appear to have been friends of Agis; but, whatever party views they may have had, they conducted themselves with a stern dignity, and with the appearance at least of an inflexible integrity, becoming the ancient reputation of Sparta. The treaties were certainly very exceptionable. The words of the first, yielding to the king of Persia the sovereignty of all the countries his predecessors had ever commanded, those of the other, forbidding the Lacedæmonians and their allies from carrying arms against any of those countries, were an acknowledgment, on the part of Lacedæmon, of the claim of Persia, not only to all the Asiatic and Thracian cities, and all the islands of the Ægean, but to Macedonia, Thessaly, Locris, and almost the whole north of Greece, including Attica: so that the Lacedæmonians, instead of supporting their pretensions to be vindicators of Grecian liberty, thus admitted the subjection of more than half the nation to the Persian dominion. The

Thucyd. 1. 8.
c. 42.

c. 43.

Lacedæmonians did not indeed bind themselves to put Persia in possession of the countries so in general terms ceded; and, had their leaders been wily politicians, they might perhaps, after profiting from Persian assistance to serve their own purposes against Athens, have easily prevented Persia from making any advantage of those articles, which seemed so to militate with the common cause of Greece. But Lichas and his colleagues would not, for any temporary interest of their country, surrender its honour. They condemned the treaties, both that concluded by Chalcideus, and that by Theramenes, in the strongest manner; they declared that they would on no account ratify them; and they insisted that the troops should receive no more pay from the satrap, unless he would enter into a new treaty upon other terms. Tissaphernes, disgusted with their authoritative tone and unbending manner, went away without concluding anything.

How far the conduct of the commissioners would be approved by the troops, to whom Persian pay had been no small gratification, may be doubted; but a circumstance occurred of a nature to obviate present dissatisfaction. Overtures came to the Peloponnesian commanders from some leading men of the wealthy island of Rhodes.

*Thucyd. l. 8.
c. 44.*

The fleet, consisting of ninety-four triremes, went thither; Camirus, one of the principal towns, but unfortified, was taken without resistance: the chief men of the island were summoned to an assembly, and all the towns were peaceably brought over to the Peloponnesian interest. Intelligence of the motion of the Peloponnesian fleet being conveyed to the Athenian commanders at Samos, they sailed in all haste for Rhodes, but arrived too late for any effectual interposition. The Peloponnesians obtained thirty-two

*B. C. 411.
January.*

talents toward the expenses of the war from the Rhodians, wealthy through commerce, and, the winter being already advanced, they laid up their fleet in the harbours of the island.

SECTION IV.

Alcibiades persecuted by the new Spartan Administration. — Favoured by the Satrap of Caria. — Communicates with the Athenian Armament at Samos. — Plot for changing the Constitution of Athens. — Synomosies, or political Clubs at Athens. — Breach between Alcibiades and the Managers of the Plot. — New Treaty between Lacedæmon and Persia. — Continuation of the Siege of Chios, and Transactions of the Fleets.

WHILE an important acquisition was thus made to the Peloponnesian confederacy, intrigue had been prosecuting with no inconsiderable effect, in opposition to it. Since the expiration of the magistracy of Endius, the party of Agis had been gaining strength in Lacedæmon; and not only Alcibiades could no longer lead measures, as before, on the coast of Asia, but his designs became more and more suspected in Peloponnesus. In thwarting Alcibiades however the Lacedæmonian administration feared him. What precisely to expect they knew not; but they apprehended some great stroke in politics to their disadvantage; and, according to the concurrent testimony of historians, too unquestionable when Thucydides is in the list, private instructions were sent to Astyochus to have Alcibiades assassinated. This measure has been attributed by some to the vengeance of Agis; whose bed, it is said, Alcibiades had dishonoured, and whose queen is reported to have been so shameless, as to have boasted of her connection with the greatest and handsomest man of the age. Others have ascribed it to the revenge of the queen herself, for a silly declaration of Alcibiades, if he really made it, that no inclination for her person, but merely the vanity of giving a king to Sparta and an heir to the race of Hercules, induced him to pay her any attention. The contemporary historian mentions upon the occasion neither Agis nor the queen: his

Thucyd. l. 8.
c. 45.

expression rather goes to fix the crime upon the Spartan administration; and, though the other stories possibly may have originated in that age, they bear much more the character of the taste of following times. Alcibiades however, whether informed of the design, or only suspicious of the Lacedæmonians, from acquaintance with their principles, together with a consciousness of deserving their enmity, withdrew from their armament and took his residence with Tissaphernes.

He was not unprepared for the change. Uneasy, notwithstanding the favour he found and the attention paid him, in the dependent character of a stranger and a fugitive, it was his object to restore himself to his country, before that country was reduced so low as to be not worth returning to. With this view he had courted the satrap assiduously and successfully. Neither the interest of the Persian empire nor the satrap's interest were, any more than his own, the same with that of Lacedæmon or the Peloponnesian confederacy. An opening therefore was not wanting, first for insinuations, and then for advice, that might set the satrap at variance with the Peloponnesians, and render Alcibiades not only agreeable but necessary to him. Tissaphernes, pressed for money, both by his court and by the expenses of his government, and at the same time desirous of amassing for himself, listened with ready attention to any suggestion of means to spare his treasury. Alcibiades told him, "that the allowance of pay to the Peloponnesian forces was extravagant. The Athenians," he said, "long versed in naval affairs, and highly attentive to them, gave no more than half a drachma for daily pay to their seamen; not," as he pretended, "from economical motives, or from any inability to afford more, but because they esteemed a larger pay disadvantageous to their service." Tissaphernes approved the proposal for a reduction,

but dreaded the discontent that would ensue. Alcibiades assured him, "that he need not apprehend it: a sum of money, judiciously distributed among the commanders, would quiet all outcry; or, if there was a man among them not to be bought, it was only the Syracusan Hermocrates. Representations and remonstrances would probably be made: but they might easily be refuted; nor need the satrap give himself any trouble about them; he would undertake to answer every argument and silence every clamour. The pretensions indeed of most of the Grecian states were extravagant: that of the Chians, he would not scruple to tell them, was even impudent. The richest people of Greece, they were not contented with gaining independency at the expense of the blood and treasure of others, but expected to be paid for defending it. Nor were the less wealthy states, which had been tributary to Athens, more reasonable. Delivered from the burden of tribute, they now grudged an unbought service, to preserve the independency and immunity which had been freely given them." Having thus persuaded the satrap that he could obviate clamour, Alcibiades undertook to conciliate favour to him, and excite zeal in his service: "He would assert," he said, "that the pay hitherto given was from the private income of the satrapy; that Tissaphernes was labouring to obtain an allowance from the royal revenue; and should it be granted, whatever it might be, the whole should be distributed to the forces without reserve." Tissaphernes approved the proposal.

Ch. 19. s. 3.
of this Hist.

That reduction of pay followed which has been already noticed, and the ensuing discontent, and at length, through the dexterity of Alcibiades, the compromise.

Having thus gained the satrap's ear, and recommended himself to his confidence, Alcibiades proceeded to promote his own views at the expense of the most important interests

of the Peloponnesian confederacy. "He urged, Thucyd. l. 8. c. 46. that both the public interest of the Persian empire, and the private interest of the satrap, required, not speedy nor complete success to the Peloponnesian cause, but a protraction of the war: that the Phenician squadron, which had been promised, ought not to be allowed to join the Peloponnesian fleet: that, for the same reason, to encourage re-enforcement from Greece, by holding out the lure of Persian pay, was impolitic: that the king's interest clearly required a partition of power among the Greeks: the same state should not preponderate by land at the same time and by sea; but rather the Athenians should be supported in their wonted superiority on one element, and the Lacedæmonians on the other. Thus it would always be in the king's power to hold the balance between them, or to employ one against the other, as he pleased. These being the principles that should regulate the politics of Persia towards Greece, it followed that the Athenians were the more commodious allies for the king: they had no land force capable of coping with his land force; they were powerful and rich only by holding other states in subjection; and, through their fear of revolts and of foreign interference, they might be kept always in some degree dependent. At any rate, they would always be glad to share with the king and his satraps the tributary cities of Asia. But, on the contrary, it was the professed purpose, and the known policy, of the Lacedæmonians, to emancipate all Grecian states from subjection to other Greeks; and they would certainly not rest long, while any remained under a foreign dominion. It was therefore the obvious interest of Tissaphernes, after having taken from the Athenians whatever he could readily acquire, to break with the Lacedæmonians and drive them out of Asia."

The conduct of the Lacedæmonian commissioners, in

the congress of Cnidus, contributed not a little to give force to these plausible suggestions; for it went far toward verifying the prediction of Alcibiades, that when once the Lacedæmonians had obtained a superiority at sea, they would not be contented to leave any Grecian cities subject to Persia. Their disposition having been thus manifested, what followed, on the part of the satrap, was to be expected; the pay to the armament was, not indeed immediately stopped, but irregularly issued; and when the Peloponnesian commanders proposed any exertion with the fleet, Tissaphernes always objected, "that the Phœnician squadron," which he never intended should arrive, "ought in prudence to be waited for." Astyochus, whether through weakness or corruption, appears to have deferred to him upon all occasions; and thus, as the historian remarks, the most powerful fleet ever sent from Peloponnesus wasted in inaction.

Alcibiades, having thus far wrought upon the satrap, saw the crisis approaching that might probably enable him, not only to return to his country, but to acquire the glory of restoring his country to safety, and perhaps even to splendour. The Athenians, in their distress, had been making great and even wonderful exertions; but those very exertions had nearly exhausted them; and it was evident to all the more informed among them, that, though they might still maintain themselves, and perhaps even prosper, against the mere force of the Peloponnesian confederacy, which they knew could not with its own means support its late exertions at sea, yet against that confederacy, supplied by the wealth of Persia, it would be impossible for them long to hold. Alcibiades, well aware both of the weakness of the commonwealth, and of the opinions and dispositions of the people, knew that nothing would give him so much importance as the notoriety of his favour with Tissa-

[Thucyd. l. 8.
c. 47.]

phernes. But though he had risen by the populace, yet as he had also been condemned to death by the populace, he was unwilling again to trust himself under its unlimited authority; and he thought things so much in his power that he resolved to require a change of government and the establishment of oligarchy, as the condition upon which he would restore his own services to his country, and at the same time bring to it the advantage, in its present circumstances the inestimable advantage, of the alliance of Tissaphernes.

The idea appears bold, even to extravagance; but it was in character for Alcibiades, and the times were singularly favourable. Most of the better sort of people, worn with the capricious tyranny of the multitude and dreading such other dictators as Cleon and Hyperbolus, desired the change. There were few trierarchs in the fleet who did not desire it, and with these Alcibiades found ready means to communicate. His overtures excited attention: Theramenes, Eratosthenes, Aristocrates, names which will recur to notice, are mentioned among those who went from Samos to confer with him; and the assurances he gave that he would engage Tissaphernes in the Athenian interest, and through him lead the king himself to an alliance with Athens, were very gladly received by the more powerful and richer men, who suffered most from the war, who were most pressed in consequence of the late public misfortunes, and whose property was principally called upon to supply the increased exigencies of an exhausted treasury. The proposal held out to them the prospect, at the same time, of an advantageous conclusion of the war, and of a change of government, favourable both to the power of those who were ambitious of power, and to the ease of those who only desired ease. Immediately therefore on their return to Samos, communicating with their friends, and finding those disposed to the

Thucyd. 1. 8.
c. 48. Lys. Or.
con. Eratosth.

cause numerous and zealous, they settled the form of an oath for all who should be admitted to their councils (a precaution common among the factions of the ancient republics), by which they bound themselves to mutual support and protection.

Body and system being thus given to the party, the leaders ventured to declare openly their knowledge, that the king would become the ally of Athens, and furnish money for the expenses of the war, provided Alcibiades were restored, and the government changed to an oligarchy. Some alarm and indignation at first arose; but the hope of profiting from Persian pay softened the murmur, and the multitude acquiesced under the idea of loss of power, when the recompense was to be increase of both security and profit. Phrynichus however, the commander-in-chief, known to be vehemently adverse to Alcibiades, was supposed also zealous in the democratical interest, and the innovators had therefore avoided communication with him. But their measures could not be entirely concealed from him, and, with such power as he possessed, he warmly opposed them. Calling together the Athenian citizens of the armament, he urged the falsehood or futility of the arguments which had been used to promote the projected change. "Alcibiades," he said, (and Thucydides affirms that he said truly,) "cared no more for oligarchy than democracy, or for anything but for means of his own restoration to his country and to power. Nor was it to be believed that the Persian king would prefer the Athenian alliance to the Peloponnesian; since the Athenians claimed command over so many cities within his country, while the Peloponnesians, whose naval strength now balanced that of Athens, formed no such invidious pretension. It was equally vain to suppose the promise of oligarchal government would allure either the subject-cities which had revolted, or those which still remained in obe-

dience. The purpose of those cities was, not to be enslaved with an oligarchal rather than a democratical constitution, but, under whatsoever government, to be independent of foreign dominion. Neither was the supposition less unfounded, that person and property would be more secure under the rule of those called the better people; for those better people, in the exercise of power, commonly sought their own in preference to the public benefit. Nowhere indeed were men in public service so liable to oppression of every kind, even to capital punishment without trial, as where the power of the people, the refuge of the innocent, and the moderator of the excesses of the great, was done away. That such was the opinion, the well-founded opinion, prevailing in most of the allied states, he well knew; and, for himself, he could not be satisfied with any of the measures now proposed, whether for the return of Alcibiades, or whatever besides."

But in a business of this kind, a political and not a military affair, the authority of the commander-in-chief availed little. The associated party, having a decided majority in the army, resolved immediately to Thucyd. l. 8. c. 49. send a deputation to Athens, to push their purpose there. Pisander was appointed first of the deputation, and, notwithstanding any opposition from the commander-in-chief, they sailed for Attica.

Though all thus far had been conducted peaceably, yet Phrynichus stood in the situation of a c. 50. man who, in a rebellion or civil war, has taken his party. However he might be inclined to sheath the sword, he apprehended his opponents would not; he expected they would prevail at Athens; he feared the consequences to himself, and, to obviate them, he had recourse to a measure highly hazardous, but still more unjustifiable. Thucydides, on occasion of the retreat from Miletus, gives Phrynichus

the character of an able and prudent man. We can hardly give him credit for prudence upon this occasion. He informed the Lacedæmonian commander, Astyochus, of the divisions in the armament under his command. Astyochus, who seems to have been a weak man, went to Magnesia, and communicated both to the satrap and to Alcibiades the intelligence he had received. Alcibiades immediately sent information to the principal Athenians in Samos of the treachery of their general; insisting that the punishment which ought to be inflicted for such a crime was death. Phrynichus, in high alarm, and indeed in great peril, wrote again to Astyochus, complaining, "that due secrecy had not been observed about what he had before communicated: that the danger ensuing to himself was most pressing; the danger of what he most abhorred and deprecated, perishing by the hands of his detested domestic foes: that to avoid this there was nothing he was not ready to undertake, even to the betraying of the whole armament under his command to destruction." Nor was this a difficult undertaking, for Samos was without fortifications; and to give means of executing it, he added every necessary description and direction. Astyochus communicated this also to Alcibiades.

Thucyd. 1. 8.
c. 52.

From the dangerous situation in which Phrynichus was thus involved he extricated himself with singular boldness and dexterity. Having taken his measures so as to know that Astyochus was still betraying him, and that fresh communication was upon the point of arriving from Alcibiades, he called together the army, and told them he had learnt, by private intelligence, the intention of the enemy to attack them. The consideration that Samos was unfortified, and the observation that part of the fleet was stationed without the port, he said, induced them to the measure; and he therefore issued immediate orders for works to be, in all haste, thrown up around the city, and

for every other precaution to be used against the expected attack. It had before been intended to fortify Samos; preparations had been made in consequence; and the business, so as to serve the present need, was quickly accomplished. Meanwhile the expected letters arrived from Alcibiades, indicating that the armament was betrayed by its general, and that the enemy were preparing to attack it. The intelligence now only appeared to confirm that communicated by Phrynichus, and to justify his measures; so that the accusation accompanying it was wholly ineffectual, being considered merely as the scheme of a man, enough known to be little scrupulous, to ruin a political enemy.

It was a bold undertaking in which meanwhile Pisander and his colleagues were engaged at Athens, to propose to a sovereign people to surrender their power, and submit to be governed by the men of superior birth and wealth, over whom they had so long been accustomed to tyrannise. But apprehension of the prevalence of the Peloponnesian arms, supported by the riches of Persia, and of the dreadful vengeance commonly to be expected in that age from a conquering enemy, lowered their haughtiness, and, instead of power and wealth, made them anxiously look for means of secure existence in humbler freedom. Pisander Thucyd. 1. 8. c. 53. therefore, encouraged by the visible effect of popular fear, declared his purpose without reserve: he told the assembled people, "that they might have the assistance of the king, and thus be not only delivered from their apprehensions, but assured of regaining a decisive superiority over their enemies, upon two conditions; the restoration of Alcibiades, and a change in the form of government." Indignant clamour from some, sullen murmurs from others, were excited by this proposal. The particular enemies of Alcibiades were vociferous: and they were supported by the sacred families of the Eumolpidæ and Ceryces, who urged

religion and divine wrath as obstacles to his return. Those who feared no personal ill from the restoration of Alcibiades were less violent. Pisander bore patiently the reproaches of all ; and when opportunity was at length given for him to resume his speech, addressing himself to the most angry, he observed, “ that the Peloponnesians, always more powerful by land, now equal at sea, and superior in the number and strength of their allies, were supported in the expenses of the war by the wealth of Persia :” and he then put the question, “ What were the means of the commonwealth to resist such a combination, or what the hope to escape impending destruction ?” To this question no answer, or none in any degree satisfactory to the assembly, was or could be given. “ In such circumstances then,” continued Pisander, “ the object for consideration must be, not what form of government you would prefer, but under what form the commonwealth can exist. And here no choice remains : it must be a government placed in such hands, armed with such authority, that the king may confide in it, so as to be induced to become your ally.” To soften the zealous partisans of democracy, he then added, “ Some among you, I know, think this a great evil. But can you hesitate to choose between certain ruin, and what will at worst be a passing evil ? since, when peace and safety are restored, nothing can prevent the people from restoring, whenever they please, the ancient form of government.”

Thucyd. 1. 8.
c. 54.

Thus exciting at the same time fear and hope, and indeed proving to the people that they had scarcely another chance for safety, notwithstanding the aversion which had so long obtained among them, almost to an abhorrence, of oligarchy, Pisander prevailed. By a decree of the general assembly, eleven commissioners were appointed, himself the first, to treat with Tissaphernes and Alcibiades ; with full power to conclude whatever they

should judge expedient for the commonwealth. Orders were then issued for the recall of Phrynichus and his colleague Scironidas; in whose room Diomedon and Leon were appointed to command the armament.

There were at Athens societies called Synomoses, which bore considerable resemblance to our political clubs; with this difference principally, that as property, liberty, and life itself were incomparably less secure there than under the mild firmness of our mixed government, the interests of individuals, which bound them to those societies, were much more pressing than what commonly lead to any similar establishments among us. The sanction of a solemn oath to their engagements was therefore always required of the members; whence the societies obtained their name, signifying sworn brotherhoods.⁶ The objects proposed were principally two; private security, and political power; and for the sake of one or both of these most men of rank or substance in Athens were members of some Synomosis. Against the oppression of democratical despotism, which was often, as we shall see more particularly hereafter, very severely exercised against the rich, the collected influence of a body of noble and wealthy citizens might give protection, when the most respectable individual, standing single on his merits, would be overwhelmed: and the same union of

⁶ *Ἐνωμοσίας, αἵτινες ἐτύγγανον πρότερον ἐν τῇ πόλει οὖσαι ἐπὶ δίκαις καὶ ἀρχαῖς. Societates & collegia, quæ prius in urbe erant, & quæ judiciis & magistratibus præerant.* Vers. Duker. — *Juntos of the accomplices already formed in the city, with the view to thrust themselves into the seats of judicature and the great offices of state.* Smith's Transl. If the word *accomplices*, for which there is no sufficient authority in the original, were omitted, I should prefer the English translation to the Latin, which is indeed clearly bad. The other however is far from satisfactory, and I know not that this interesting passage, in which Thucydides speaks of what was familiar in his time, without sufficiently explaining himself for posterity, has been anywhere duly discussed. The explanation which I have ventured to give is founded on a comparison of that passage with whatever has occurred to my notice, anyway bearing a relation to the subject, in the various authors whom I have had occasion to consult, and in whose authority I have confidence.

influence which could provide security against oppression, with a little increase of force, would dispose of the principal officers of the state. Pisander addressed himself severally to all these societies, and he seems to have had considerable success in persuading them to concur in his measures. Everything being thus prepared, as well as time and circumstances would permit, (for very important interests required his presence on the other side of the Ægean,) he hastened his departure with his ten colleagues.

Thucyd. l. 8.
c. 56.

Arriving at Samos, they found their cause so prospering that any stay there appeared needless. They proceeded therefore to the Asiatic main, to negotiate with Alcibiades and Tissaphernes; and they were admitted to a conference, at which the satrap attended in person, but which was managed for him by Alcibiades. The conduct of that wily politician, upon this occasion, is not completely accounted for by the contemporary historian, but the ground of it may be gathered. It could never be his intention to establish at Athens an unbalanced oligarchy; the most adverse of all constitutions to that supremacy of one person, which he had, like many others before him, enjoyed under the democracy, and which it was certainly his purpose to regain. Neither he, nor probably any other, had supposed that the democracy could have been overthrown, and such a government established on its ruin, by so sudden and so quiet a revolution as that managed by Pisander. As he then would be disappointed, so Pisander and his principal associates would be elated; and those terms which he expected to have commanded from the oligarchal and democratical parties balanced, would not be conceded to him by the established oligarchy. Hence apparently it became his purpose now to render the conference abortive, by making demands for the satrap, to which the Athenian commissioners could not consent. Finding them however disposed

to yield much, he required the cession of all Ionia, with the adjacent islands, to the Persian monarch : and, fearing the urgency of their situation would induce them to admit this, he raised new difficulties ; a second and third conference were held, and at length he added the requisition, that, along all the coasts of the Athenian dominion, navigation should be free for the king's ships, at all times and in any number. Such a demand convincing the commissioners that Alcibiades meant nothing friendly to them or their party, they broke up the conference in some anger, and returned to Samos.

Pisander and his colleagues were no sooner gone, than Tissaphernes went to Caunus, in ^{Thucyd. l. 8. c. 57.} Caria, a situation commodious for communicating with the Peloponnesian commanders, with whom he renewed negotiation. He was now in alarm for the consequences of his refusal of pay to their fleet, which, of three disagreeable things, he foresaw would probably produce one : either the Peloponnesians must fight the Athenians, and would be defeated ; or their crews would desert, and thus the Athenians, without obligation to him and without risk to themselves, would become decisively superior ; or, what he dreaded more than either of these, to supply their pressing necessities they would plunder the territories under his command, and thus weaken the sources of his revenue. In pursuance therefore of his original purpose, to keep the Greeks balanced against one another, he invited the Peloponnesian chiefs to a conference at Miletus, which was not refused ; and having then directed the issue of pay as formerly, a new treaty was quickly concluded, which ran thus :

“ In the thirteenth year of the reign of Darius, and in the ephoralty of Alexippidas in Lacedæmon, a treaty was concluded in the plain of the Mæander, between the Lacedæ-

monians and their allies on one part, and Tissaphernes and Hieramenes and the sons of Pharnaces on the other part, concerning the affairs of the king and those of the Lacedæmonians and their allies.

“ Whatever the king possesses in Asia shall be the king’s, and the king shall direct the affairs of his own country according to his will and pleasure. The Lacedæmonians and their allies shall not injure any place within the king’s dominion; and if any among the Lacedæmonians or their allies shall attempt such injury, the Lacedæmonians and their allies in common shall prevent it. So also, if any of the king’s subjects shall attempt any injury to the Lacedæmonians or their allies, the king shall prevent it.

“ Tissaphernes shall continue to pay the fleet in the manner heretofore agreed, until the king’s fleet shall arrive. After that it shall be at the option of the Lacedæmonians and their allies to pay their own fleet, or to receive the pay still from Tissaphernes, upon condition of repaying him when the war shall be concluded. The fleets, when combined, shall carry on operations under the joint direction of Tissaphernes, and of the Lacedæmonians and their allies.

“ No treaty shall be entered into with the Athenians but by mutual consent of the contracting parties.”

Thus the alliance of Lacedæmon with Persia, or at least with the satrap, was apparently confirmed.

During these negotiations, Leon and Diomedon having taken the command of the Athenian armament from Phrynichus and Scironidas, had moved to Rhodes, with intention to offer battle; but on their arrival they found the Peloponnesian fleet laid up for the winter. After gratifying their crews therefore, with some revenge against the Rhodians and some profit to themselves, by ravage of a part of the island, they took their station

B. C. 411.
End of Jan.
Thucyd. i. 8.
c. 55.

at the neighbouring island of Cos, to watch the enemy's motions.

While the Peloponnesians were thus inactive, Thucyd. l. 8. c. 61. their allies of Chios were reduced nearly to extremity. In an unsuccessful sally, Pædaritus, the Lacedæmonian harmost of Chios, had been killed; the blockade was completed, and famine began to press the inhabitants and garrison. In this situation of things opportunity was found to send an officer to Rhodes, who urged to the Peloponnesian commanders there, that, as the city was effectually blockaded, its distress was become pressing, and nothing less than a strong effort with the whole fleet could save it.

Twelve triremes had been left as guard-ships at Miletus, four of which were Syracusan, five Thurian, and only one Lacedæmonian; but the Lacedæmonian commander, Leon, was a man of enterprise. While Astyochus hesitated, Leon, taking advantage of the absence of the Athenian fleet from the neighbourhood, conducted his squadron to Chios. The Chians, informed of his approach, manned twenty-four triremes and went out to meet him, while their infantry made a diversion by an attack upon the Athenian works. Thirty-two Athenian ships had been left as a guard upon Chios. With these an obstinate action ensued, in which the Chians were so far successful as to conduct the twelve Peloponnesian ships into their harbour, and Leon was received as the person charged with the care of the interests, and with the administration of the authority, of the Lacedæmonian state, in the room of Pædaritus.

The re-enforcement thus acquired was important: it enabled the Chians to obtain some supplies by sea; and occurrences soon after afforded farther opportunity. The renewal of connection with the satrap of Caria did not prevent the Peloponnesians from prosecuting their purpose of extending their alliance to Pharnabazus satrap of the

Hellespont. Early in spring, the twenty-first of the war, Dercyllidas, a Spartan, was sent to him. He went by land, with only a small escort; yet, on his arrival before Abydus, the efficacy of the Spartan name sufficed to induce that city immediately to revolt from the Athenians; and, two days after, Lampsacus followed the example. Strombichides, who commanded the Athenian squadron at Chios, being informed of these circumstances, hastened to the Hellespont with twenty-four triremes, and thus the sea was left open for the Chians to receive any relief.

The cautious Astyochus, receiving intelligence that so strong a squadron of the enemy was called far from the Ionian coast, thought the opportunity favourable for seeking an action with their principal fleet. Upon his moving from Rhodes, Leon and Diomedon quitted Cos, and resumed their station at Samos. Astyochus led his fleet first to Chios, and strengthening himself with the whole naval force there, went to Samos, and offered battle. The Athenians however would not stir; and indeed their affairs were in a state, both at Samos and at home, that might have afforded, to a more able and active commander than Astyochus, other advantage than that from which he had proposed to profit.

SECTION V.

Progress of the Plot for a Revolution at Athens. — Violences of the oligarchal Party. — Proposed new Form of Government. — Establishment of the new Council of Administration. — Negotiation of the new Government for Peace with Lacedæmon.

PISANDER and his colleagues, returning to Samos from their unsuccessful negotiation with Tissaphernes and Alcibiades, had the gratification to find, not only that their cause had been gaining in the army,

B. C. 411.
Ol. 92. 4.
P. W. 21.
Mar. 28.
Thucyd. 1. 8.
c. 62.

End of April.

Thucyd. 1. 8.
c. 63.

B. C. 411.
February.
Thucyd. 1. 8.
c. 63.

but that the oligarchal party among the Samians themselves were both disposed and able to effect a change in the government of their island. Thus encouraged they determined to pay no more attention to Alcibiades, but, in prosecuting their original purpose of a change in the Athenian constitution, to rely upon their own strength for the conduct, both of the domestic affairs of the commonwealth, and of the business of the war. A large subscription was raised by the party, for supporting measures upon which now depended, not only their interest, but their personal safety.

Having established this groundwork for future proceedings, it was then determined that Pisander, Thucyd. l. 8. c. 64. with five of the other commissioners, should return to Athens to manage the concerns of the party there, and that the other five should go through the allied and subject states, and endeavour to bring all under an oligarchal form of government. Diotrophes was appointed to the superintendency of the affairs of Thrace. In his way thither he stopped at Thasos, and succeeded in at once abolishing the sovereignty of the people there. The consequence however was not what Pisander and his colleagues intended. Some principal Thasians of the oligarchal party, who had been banished by the Athenians, had taken refuge with the Peloponnesian armament on the Asiatic coast. They maintained a correspondence with their friends remaining in the island, and had been importunately urging revolt. Diotrophes did for them the most difficult part of their business, much better than they could have done it for themselves. Oligarchy being established, the Thasians in possession made no longer any difficulty of preferring the Lacedæmonian to the Athenian connection; the exiles were restored, and Thasos became a member of the Peloponnesian confederacy. Meanwhile Pisander and the five c. 65. who accompanied him, wherever they touched in

their way to Athens, seem to have found as little difficulty in effecting the change of government they desired, as Diotrephes at Thasos : but the consequence in most of the towns (so Thucydides says, without naming them) Thucyd. l. 8. c. 64. was the same; they revolted to Lacedæmon, as the more certain patron of oligarchy.

Thus is shown the ground of what otherwise might appear an inexplicable phenomenon, how a few citizens of Athens, with self-assumed authority, could almost instantaneously overturn the constitutions of so many Grecian republics. Democracy having long principally depended, throughout Greece, upon the patronage of Athens, when the Athenian democracy was overthrown, and oligarchy substituted, immediately the prevalence of the oligarchal or aristocratical party was prepared. But the means by which the oligarchal party at Athens had advanced far in its purpose, do no honour either to the Athenian government or the Athenian character. Assassination was largely used : and it seems to have been chiefly managed by youths of the best families. Androcles, a man of mean origin, whose influence among the lower people had contributed much to the condemnation of Alcibiades, and who had ever since been the most forward champion of democracy, was among the first taken off. Others, of the most obnoxious to the friends of Alcibiades and of oligarchy, shared the same fate; for, at Athens, the causes of Alcibiades and of oligarchy were not yet distinguished. Inquiry concerning these q. 66. murders was smothered or deterred, and the friends of democracy became afraid to show themselves.

c. 65. The oligarchal party thus finding themselves strong, ventured to declare openly the kind of change which they proposed to make in the constitution; in which some consideration was had for established prejudices, as well as for an appearance of public virtue. There

was to be still an assembly of the people, but in some degree select: it was to be confined to a body of five thousand, to be chosen among those most qualified by property and personal ability to serve the commonwealth: and public pay was to be allowed to none but those actually serving in the fleet or army. This, says the contemporary historian, was something specious and alluring; being not only congenial to the spirit of the ancient constitution, but even to modern practice; since so large a number as five thousand citizens rarely met in one assembly; and at the same time it held out to every one the hope that, if he would concur in the measures proposed, he might be a member of the sovereign body.

Thucyd. l. 3.
c. 66.

Meanwhile the general assemblies were regularly held according to ancient form, and the council of Fivehundred retained its functions. But assassination was continued; and with so little reserve, and such impossibility of obtaining justice against the perpetrators, that political opposition was deterred. None spoke, either in the assembly or council, but those of the party, and they not without previous communication with the chiefs. For among those hitherto partisans of democracy not only equal union had not been prepared, but some, even of those farthest from previous suspicion, had joined the oligarchal party. Hence, no one knowing any longer in whom he might confide, hardly any dared complain of enormities practised; every one thinking himself fortunate, if, with the utmost caution to avoid offending, he avoided suffering. Thus assassinations continued to pass without inquiry; and, even where proof could be obtained against the perpetrator, nobody ventured to prosecute.

Already things were in this situation when Pisander returned to Athens. Before his departure a decree had been made, declaring, in general terms, that

c. 67.

the government should be changed : it remained yet to be decided how. An assembly of the people was convened to determine that important question. The oligarchal party had such a superiority that they might propose, with a certainty of carrying, in the moment, almost anything : but it was not what might be in the moment carried in the assembly at Athens, that would decide the future constitution of the commonwealth, or their own future fate. Not only turns in the popular mind must be provided against, but great consideration must be had for that large portion of the commonwealth, serving in the armament, on the other side of the Ægean. It was therefore moved and decreed, that the consideration of the business should be referred to a committee of ten men, who should make their report on an appointed day.

The day being come, the people were summoned to assemble on the hill of Colonus, a little more than a mile from the city. The ten then came forward with the simple proposal of a law, whose aim was nothing more than to obviate illegality in the future measures of the party. It stated, that every Athenian should be free to declare any opinion, in the assembly, upon political topics ; and it inflicted heavy penalties upon those who should endeavour to abridge this liberty, whether by legal prosecution, according to the ancient law, or in any other manner. This being carried, and what before would have been treason thus made legal, some of the party declared their opinion, that the form of the administration of the commonwealth ought to be changed, and that pay and remuneration should no more be issued from the treasury, for any but those employed for the commonwealth on foreign service. This also being patiently heard, Pisander then ventured to propose the form of government to be established : “ That five presidents should be chosen by the people ; that these should

elect a hundred, and that each of the hundred should elect three: that the council of Fourhundred thus formed should be vested with full power to direct the executive government⁷: that the supreme authority in last resort should reside in a body of five thousand citizens, to be assembled at the discretion of the council.”⁸

In this manner it was endeavoured, by the ablest politician, in the judgment of Thucydides, at that time in Greece, to remedy the evils of the Athenian democracy: for Pisander, though himself able, was but an instrument in the hands of Antiphon; a man, says the historian, in virtue inferior to no Athenian of his age, and in abilities, whether for the closet or the assembly, superior to all. This very superiority, exciting jealousy among the people, had prevented the exertion of his talents for the public benefit; a circumstance not uncommon among the ancient democracies; and which probably contributed to enhance the aversion of Antiphon to that form of government, but in any private cause, whether in the inferior courts of judicature, or before the assembled people, no man was equally capable of serving his friends, either by his advice or by his eloquence. The second place among the opponents of democracy seems to have been held by Theramenes, son of Agnon; a man also of superior powers, both of thought and elocution, and moreover of considerable military experience. But, beside those originally of the oligarchal party, there were some eminent men who had passed over to it from the democratical; and, of these, Phrynichus, the late commander on the Asiatic coast, was the chief. Of a fearless temper, but an unprincipled mind, Phrynichus dreaded,

Thucyd. l. 8.
c. 68.

⁷ Ἀρχὴν ὅση ἂν ἄριστα γιγνώσκωσιν αὐτοκράτορας. Thucyd. l. 8. c. 67.

⁸ The distinction of the legislative and executive powers appears in some degree implied, but is not expressed by the historian; nor indeed does it seem to have been fully and clearly conceived by any of the ancient politicians.

beyond any personal danger, the restoration of Alcibiades to the commonwealth and to power. As soon therefore as the oligarchal party broke with Alcibiades, Phrynichus joined the oligarchal party; and, after the common manner of renegades, exceeded in zeal the most zealous of the original members. A number of superior men, says the contemporary historian, being thus united in the conduct of the business, it is no great wonder that it succeeded; "though to deprive the Athenian people of liberty," for that is his expression, "a hundred years after the recovery of it by the expulsion of the tyrants, during above fifty of which they had been accustomed, not only to obey none, but to command many, was indeed an arduous undertaking."

Thucyd. l. 8.
c. 69.

The decree, directing the new constitution, having passed the assembly of the people, the party managed among themselves the appointment of the new council. But the council of Fivehundred, in whom the old constitution vested the executive power, had not been consulted concerning any of the measures taken or proposed: they were still in possession of the prytaneum or state-house, in which a part of them, the prytanes, usually resided; and it was apprehended they might not peaceably resign it. When therefore the new council was to be introduced, measures were taken, with much forethought, to obviate opposition, which might produce tumult. Since the establishment of a hostile garrison in Decelea, constant readiness for military duty had been required of the whole people. Daily all appeared in the morning in arms; and the magistrates and officers distributed the duty of the day among them; some to the guard of the works, others to hold themselves in readiness for the field. All who could be spared were then dismissed, with directions only to repair to the general parade at a certain signal. On the day fixed

for ejecting the old council, it was provided that the citizens of the democratical interest should be dismissed, and those only retained in arms for the duty of the day in whom the party could best confide. Among these were a number of Andrian, Tenian, and Carystian auxiliaries, with some colonists from Ægina, all brought to Athens for the purpose.

Matters being thus prepared, the Fourhundred went to the prytaneum, armed each with a concealed dagger, and attended by a hundred and twenty youths, who had been accustomed to perform for them the business equally of guards and assassins.⁹ They carried with them the arrear of salary due to the counsellors of the bean, as the Fivehundred were called, and, making a tender of it, required all to withdraw. The old council, quietly taking their pay, obeyed the requisition, and no stir was made in the city on the occasion. The Fourhundred then proceeded to elect prytanes from their own body by lot; and, with the same ceremonies of prayer and sacrifice, which were prescribed by custom for the ancient council, they commenced the execution of their office.

Thus was apparently completed this extraordinary revolution. Athens, and whatever of Attica was not held by the enemy, yielded obedience to the new council, become the supreme power of the commonwealth, through a law made, with all due form, by the assembly of the people, which before held that power. In the general conduct of the business we see something very different from the tumultuous revolutions so numerous among the inferior Gre-

⁹ This seems to be the import of the historian's phrase, οἷς ἐχρηῶντο εἴ τί που δέοι χερσουργεῖν. Thucydides calls them Ἕλληνας νεανίσκοι, thus marking that they were different people from the ordinary armed attendants of the Athenian magistracy, who were always barbarians, generally Scythians. [The word Ἕλληνας is omitted in some MSS. of Thucydides.]

cian republics. Nowhere else, in the accounts remaining to us, can we discover such a regard for all the forms of an established constitution; yet, even in this revolution at Athens, we find strong relics of barbarism, I must risk the expression, and very defective notions of policy. None of those public massacres took place, which were so usual in Grecian revolutions: public executions, with the pretence of law or popular judgment, were also avoided: some persons were imprisoned, some banished; and, were this all, the duty of the ruling powers to preserve public tranquillity perhaps might have justified it: but many, in the apprehension of being obnoxious, sought their safety by flight; for the horrid and base practice of secret assassination was continued against those whom the prevailing party supposed most adverse and most formidable.

Of the many actually living in banishment, under condemnation from the assembled people, or the popular tribunals, some the leaders of the revolution would gladly have restored; and probably they would have refused the favour to few, so that, among the number, the historian Thucydides might have returned to his country. But the restoration of Alcibiades, though he had been the first mover of the revolution, was looked to by most of the party with no friendly eye. Some, as Phrynichus, were essentially interested in his exclusion; and all would be jealous of the talents, the fame, the popularity of one who had so long been the active and successful opponent of the oligarchal interest. Confident that they no longer needed his assistance, they were no longer willing to admit that superiority, which must have been yielded to him; and therefore, to obviate opportunity for any measures in his favour, making a merit of supporting the decrees and judgments of the people, they resolved that none should be restored who had been banished by the people.

In other points they did not preserve the same respect for the decrees of the people, or the forms of the ancient constitution, or even for their own declarations concerning the new one. The appointment of a supreme as-
Thucyd. 1. 8. c. 92.
 sembly of five thousand had been held out only as a lure, to engage readier acquiescence under the other changes; for such a body would have been perhaps even more difficult to manage, by the Few, who proposed to hold all power in their own hands, than the assembly open to every citizen. But they declared, and they found no small advantage in so doing, not only that the supreme power in last resort was to be vested in such a select, yet numerous body of citizens, but that the selection, though not published, was already made; for thus they kept every man in hopes for himself, and in fear of his neighbour.

The party, being thus completely masters within the city, turned their attention to things without. It was a most important object for them to make peace with Lacedæmon, and they had warm hope of success. Accord-
After 27th Feb.
 ingly they sent to Agis, then in Decelea, representing to him, that he would no longer have a fickle, faithless, and arrogant multitude to deal with, but a government more resembling that of Sparta, and which might deserve his confidence. But Agis, considering the probable ferment of men's minds immediately after such a revolution, thought he might possibly find means to command terms instead of treating for them. Declining therefore any negotiation, he sent for a large force from Peloponnesus, with which, added to his troops in Decelea, he marched to the walls of Athens. The Athenian people, he concluded, would not yet be disposed to pay regular and quiet obedience to their new leaders: the sudden appearance of a
Thucyd. 1. 7. c. 78.
 hostile army would excite alarm; difference of opinion would probably arise; contention would follow, and

perhaps mutiny; and, in the confusion, possibly a well-timed assault might carry the city.

The event justifies the character of ability, which Thucydides gives to the leaders of the oligarchal party in Athens. Nothing happened of what Agis expected. The whole of the Athenian cavalry went out of the city, in good order, accompanied by some light-armed and bowmen, with a body of heavy-armed following to support them. The Peloponnesian army had not a force of cavalry equal to oppose the Athenian. A detachment, advancing very near the walls, was attacked and overpowered, and the Athenians carried off the dead. Agis, finding himself thus disappointed, prudently withdrew to Decelea, and sent back the troops lately arrived from Peloponnesus. The Athenian leaders were thus encouraged to try again a negotiation, and, fresh overtures to Agis being now favourably received, they made no delay in sending ministers to Lacedæmon.

End of March.

SECTION VI.

Opposition of the Fleet and Army at Samos to the new Government of Athens. — Thrasybulus. — Dissatisfaction of the Peloponnesian Armament with its General. — Assistance sent from the Peloponnesian Armament to Pharnabazus Satrap of the Hellespont. — The Restoration of Alcibiades decreed by the Athenian Armament. — Alcibiades elected General by the Armament. — Fresh Discontent of the Peloponnesian Armament. — Astyochus succeeded in the Command by Mindarus. — Commissioners from the new Government of Athens to the Armament at Samos. — Able and beneficial Conduct of Alcibiades.

THUS successful in their administration at home, and in train to put an end to war within Greece, difficulties were arising which no human wisdom perhaps could have prevented. Pisander, before he left

B. C. 411.
P. W. 21.
March.
Thucyd. i. 8.
c. 75.

Samos, had exerted himself among the people of that island, so as to persuade many of the democratical party to join the oligarchal; and a society was formed of three hundred friends of oligarchy, who, according to usual practice, bound themselves to one another by solemn oaths to support their common measures. Thus he thought the oligarchal interest secure among the Samian people, as he hoped it was in the armament. But, after his departure, tumults arose among the Samians: the Athenians of course interfered; and Charminus, one of the generals, was, with some others, unfortunately killed. In these contests the oligarchal party had the advantage; they depended upon support from the Athenians, among whom they supposed the oligarchal to be now the prevailing interest; and they were proceeding to take farther measures against the supporters of democracy.

But in Athens itself there had always been, among the patrons of democracy, some of the first families of the commonwealth: there being always some who could more readily rise to power through the democratical than the oligarchal interest; and indeed some were considered in a manner hereditary chiefs of the democratical cause. The present generals, Leon and Diomedon, connected as they were with the leaders of the oligarchal party, yet having themselves great interest among the people, were averse to the proposed change of government; and, the democratical Samians soliciting their protection against the oppression of the oligarchal, they readily gave it.

Leon and Diomedon however appear to have been moderate in party, and not men of commanding characters. There were two younger men, of inferior military rank, Thrasybulus son of Lycus, captain of a trireme, and Thrasyllus, an officer of the heavy-armed, who by their reputation for ability, courage, activity, and integrity were of principal consideration. These were zealous in the demo-

cratical cause : they instigated the generals, by whom they were well received ; they were sedulous in argument and persuasion among the soldiers and seamen, by whom they were beloved and respected ; and thus, while the revolution took place at Athens in favour of oligarchy, the preponderance of the democratical cause was restored in the armament at Samos. The democratical Samians then, obtaining support from the Athenians, prevailed against their opponents. Thirty of the society of Threehundred were put to death : three were banished ; and the rest, with a humanity not common in Greek sedition, on submitting to democracy, received a free pardon, retaining all the ordinary rights of members of a democracy.¹⁰

Thucyd. 1. 8.
c. 74. The revolution at Athens being unknown yet at Samos, Chæreas son of Archestratus, a man of eminence in the Athenian armament, was dispatched in the herald-ship *Paralus* to report these transactions ; not without expectation that he would be the messenger of grateful news to the ruling powers. Information of the extraordinary change that had taken place meeting him on his arrival, he instantly secreted himself ; and the event justified the suspicion which directed that conduct. Two or three of his officers were thrown into prison : his crew were moved into an ordinary trireme on the Eubœan station ; and the sacred ship was committed to persons more devoted to the ruling party. Chæreas, waiting only to acquire information of the circumstances of the revolution, returned in haste to Samos, and reported there, with the usual, or even more than usual, exaggeration of party-spirit, the violences of those who held the powers of government at home. Regardless of truth, he dwelt upon whatever would be likely

¹⁰ The phrase of Thucydides, singularly concise and singularly expressive, is scarcely to be translated : *Τοῖς δ' ἄλλοις οὐ μνησικακοῦντες, δημοκρατούμενοι τολοιπὸν ξυνεπολίτευσον.*

most to irritate the passions of those serving in the armament. A few assassinations, if we may judge from the omission of all mention of them upon this occasion by the historian, seem not to have been considered as what would make much impression: the sufferers were probably little connected with the armament, or little esteemed in it: but “that the Fourhundred inflicted stripes without reserve; that despotic restriction was put upon discourse; that complaint was held criminal, and that it was dangerous to open the lip against the ruling powers; that even the wives and children of those on foreign service were not secure from insult; that it was proposed to confine, as hostages, the nearest friends of all those in the armament at Samos, who were supposed friends of democracy:” these were the topics on which Chæreas principally insisted.

Such information, from a man of rank, just arrived from Athens, when the armament was already in a ferment, raised an instant flame. In the first moment of alarm and passion the zealots for democracy were going to turn their swords against those of their comrades who had shown a disposition to favour oligarchy; and nothing prevented so rash a measure, but the consideration, warmly urged by some of the more prudent among them, that the Peloponnesian armament was near enough to take advantage of such a circumstance, for the destruction of both parties.

Bloodshed being thus prevented, and the commanders-in-chief, as far as appears, passive, Thrasybulus and Thrasyllus took the lead: for it was not now a military business, but the civil interest of the commonwealth, which it behoved the armament, a large and almost a preponderant portion of the commonwealth, to take into consideration. The first measure was to require an oath from all, with particular attention to those supposed to favour oligarchy, binding them, in the most solemn manner, to support democracy, to perse-

vere in the war against the Peloponnesians, to maintain concord among themselves, to hold the Fourhundred for enemies, and to admit no treaty with them. This oath, having been universally taken by the Athenians, was tendered to the Samians, who also took it universally. Henceforward the Samians were admitted to all councils, as men engaged in the same cause with the Athenians, and bound by the same interest, whose assistance was necessary to their welfare, and whose welfare depended upon their success.

Thucyd. l. 8.
c. 76.

Matters being thus far settled, the armament would no longer consider the commonwealth as existing at Athens, but took upon themselves to be the commonwealth. The regular commanders, Leon and Diomedon, notwithstanding the degree of concurrence they had thus far given, were esteemed not sufficiently zealous in the cause. The armament therefore, assuming the sovereign authority, as a proper general assembly of Athenian citizens, deposed them, and with them every commander of a trireme whom they thought adverse to democracy. By the same authority then the command-in-chief was committed to Thrasybulus and Thrasyllus.

These measures, in fact declaring a civil war, put equally the armament and the city, while both were watched by a foreign enemy already too powerful, in a most perilous situation. The armament however, says the historian, comforted themselves with the considerations, that they were the strength of the commonwealth; that the oligarchal party, though in possession of the city, were comparatively weak: that, the whole fleet being theirs, the subject-states must also be theirs, together with the revenue thence arising; and the collection of this they possessed means to enforce, which the oligarchal party totally wanted: that, even for subsistence, those who held Athens were more dependent upon them than they upon those who were masters of

Athens; for not only they could more command the sea, but they could even more command the entrance of the harbour of Piræus. With regard to a home, Samos, a fine island, with a considerable city, was no contemptible home. Such then being their means, not only for subsistence and security, but even for wealth and power, it was little to be doubted but Alcibiades, ill-treated as he had been by the oligarchal party, would gladly join his interest with theirs; and thus, the king of Persia becoming their ally, there was no kind or degree of success which they might not reasonably hope. But should they finally be deceived, in any or in all their views against their domestic enemies, still, while such a fleet was theirs, retreats would not be wanting, where they might find, not only lands of which to possess themselves, but also cities in which to settle.

The oligarchal party at Athens had always been apprehensive that the nautic multitude, as Thucydides calls them, would not readily acquiesce under the change of government. Immediately therefore after the appointment of the council of Fourhundred, ten commissioners had been dispatched for Samos, with instructions, in giving information of the change, to apologise, sooth, and persuade. The commissioners however, meeting intelligence at Delos of the violent measures of the democratical party in the armament, the deposition of the generals, and the appointment of Thrasybulus and Thrasyllus to the command, feared to proceed.

Fortunately for Athens at this time there was neither able conduct at the head of the Peloponnesian armament, nor union among its members. Discontent grew so as to threaten mutiny or defection; and in this the Syracusans took the lead. "It was evident," they said, "that the

Thucyd. l. 8.
c. 72.

B. C. 411.
Soon after
27 Feb.

Thucyd. l. 8.
c. 77.

c. 75.

Beginning of
March. Ann.
Thu. But
rather, begin-
ning of April.

satrap meant no good to their cause. Not only the pay which he had engaged to furnish was reduced, but the reduced pay was irregularly and deficiently issued. Under pretence of waiting for the Phenician fleet, which he did not intend should ever join them, he had prevented action with the enemy when weak in numbers. He now continued to prevent it, when they were perhaps yet weaker through sedition; and their own commander-in-chief, either overreached or bought, yielded to him in every thing."

Thucyd. 1. 8.
c. 79.

Astyochus, urged thus by fear of sedition among his own people, and at the same time invited by intelligence of sedition among the Athenians, determined to lead the fleet against the enemy. But, when he arrived off Samos, things were already composed in the Athenian armament under Thrasybulus and Thrasyllus, who were equal to their new command. All was order and vigilance within the harbour: an express was sent to the Hellespont, to require the return of Strombichides, who arrived quickly; and then the Athenian fleet, consisting of a hundred and eight triremes, moved toward the Peloponnesians, who declined the offered battle, and retired into the port of Miletus.

Such, after all the great loss in Sicily, and with faction so raging as to render it doubtful where the government existed, was still the naval power of Athens; while the Peloponnesians were so far from being able, with their own strength, to support the contest in naval war, that a diminution only of pecuniary assistance from Persia reduced them immediately to distress. But while Persian policy was successfully employed in fomenting the divisions of Greece, the weakness of the Persian government, and the militating interests of its officers commanding provinces, afforded the Greeks reciprocal advantages. Pharnabazus proposed to profit from the growing dissatisfaction of the

Peloponnesians with Tissaphernes. He sent to inform them, "that if they would bring their fleet to the Hellespont, and connect their interests with his, he would furnish faithfully and regularly that pay and those supplies, which Tissaphernes was evidently no longer disposed to give." At the same time there arrived from the Byzantines a proposal to revolt, if support could be obtained from the Peloponnesian fleet. These overtures were deemed by the Peloponnesian commanders to require immediate attention. But to make their way to the Hellespont, they must probably fight the Athenian fleet, which the commander-in-chief desired to avoid. Forty ships therefore were sent under Clearchus son of Rhamphias, with direction to take a circuitous course through the open sea, that he might escape observation from the Athenian scouts. His passage was interrupted by a storm. Ten of his triremes only, under Helixus the Megarian commander, made their way good to the Hellespont; the rest, being dispersed, sought again the port of Miletus, which they were fortunate enough to reach. Clearchus prosecuted his journey by land to take the Hellespontine command, and on his arrival he found Byzantium, through the exertions of Helixus, in concert with the Peloponnesian party there, already a member of the Peloponnesian confederacy.

April.

With this disposition among the dependencies of Athens to revolt, Thrasybulus and Thrasyllus were aware that they had undertaken what, with their own strength, they should scarcely be able to bring to a good conclusion. Whether they had previously held any intelligence with Alcibiades, is not said by the historian, but appears probable. An assembly of the Athenian citizens of the armament was summoned, as if the legal general assembly of the commonwealth. Thrasybulus undertook to explain the advantages to be expected from the restoration of Alcibiades: the

assembly assented; and a resolution, in the form of a decree of the Athenian people, declared him restored to the privileges of an Athenian citizen, and no longer liable, for any past transaction, to either punishment or trial.

This being carried, Thrasybulus, whose measure principally it was, went himself to communicate information of it to Alcibiades, then residing with Tissaphernes. They returned together to Samos: the assembly was again convened, and Alcibiades spoke. After shortly lamenting the calamity of his exile, the injury that had ensued to his country, and the misery to himself, he adverted to present circumstances, and dwelt largely on the fair prospect that appeared of future prosperity to Athens, through the benefits which his restoration would bring. "Nothing," he said, "was wanting to induce the satrap to take an active part in their favour, but sufficient assurance of steadiness in the government, and due adherence to engagements made. Nor was it any secret what he would require; for he had repeatedly declared, that he would freely treat with Alcibiades were the affairs of the commonwealth again committed to him. In that case, not only his revenue should supply the wants of Athens, but the Phœnician fleet, now at Aspendus, instead of re-enforcing the Peloponnesian, should join the Athenian against the

Thucyd. l. 8.
c. 82.

Peloponnesians." The assembly were ready to believe what they wished to be true, and the speech of Alcibiades made such impression, that he was upon the spot elected general: those before appointed were continued as his colleagues; but the chief direction of affairs, with the approbation apparently of Thrasybulus and Thrasylus, passed immediately into his hands.

Things being so far settled, immoderate joy and thoughtless confidence pervaded the armament. Already they held the Peloponnesians in contempt. Revenge against the Fourhundred was their favourite object; they considered

the means as in their hands, and they would sail directly to Piræus. Alcibiades however had influence, and he did not want prudence, to check the rash design. "The nearer enemy," he said, "must not be so left, to act unopposed against the most valuable possessions of the commonwealth. With regard to himself moreover it would be utterly improper to run to distant enterprise, without going first to communicate personally with the satrap. Their interest required that he should show himself in the rank in which they had placed him; and, armed with the importance which that rank gave, consult concerning the arrangements to be made." They yielded to these arguments; the assembly was dismissed, and he set off immediately: anxious, says the historian, both to show Tissaphernes his power among the Athenians, and to impress the Athenians with an opinion of his influence with Tissaphernes; and, as he could now be, to either, a valuable friend or a formidable foe, he awed the Athenians with the name of Tissaphernes, and Tissaphernes with that of the Athenians.

Intelligence of these transactions in Samos, Thucyd. l. 8. c. 83. being conveyed to the Peloponnesian armament at Miletus, occasioned a violent ferment there. The irregularity and deficiency of the issues of pay, before complained of, had increased since the appearance of the Athenian fleet on the coast, and the refusal of battle by the Lacedæmonian commander. Alcibiades, lately their counsellor, and still the man of most influence with the satrap, was now become commander-in-chief of the enemy. Not only the soldiers and sailors, but the principal officers, openly accused Astyochus of compliance adverse to their interests and that of their country. Weak and mean, they declared, they had always thought it, but they now pronounced it treacherous; and unless a successful battle was fought, or new measures were taken to procure supplies, the crews,

they said, would, and indeed must, desert to find subsistence.

The Sicilian force was now no longer guided by the wisdom, the energy, and the influence of Hermocrates, who, in consequence of a change in the Syracusan administration, Thucyd. l. 8. c. 84. had been superseded in his command. While then the rest of the armament canvassed matters among themselves, the Syracusan and Thurian seamen, with the licentiousness and arrogance nourished under a democratical government, and either allowed, or not duly controlled, by a democratical commander, went in a body to Astyochus, and, in a tumultuous manner, demanded the pay due to them. Astyochus, who appears to have had no talent for holding authority, reproved them with Spartan haughtiness; and not only threatened Dorieus, the Thurian commander¹¹, (who, improperly enough, accompanied his people, and even spoke for them,) but lifted his stick as if to strike him. It is from Thucydides that we have this testimony to the rough manners of a Spartan general; to which the democratical Thurians made the rough return that might be expected. With a nautic shout, they rushed forward to protect and revenge their commanding officer. Fortunately for Astyochus, an altar was near, and he fled to it: the rioters respected the sanctuary, and presently dispersed.

¹¹ The scholiast, hastily and carelessly, considering Dorieus as a gentilitious name, interprets it to mean Hermocrates. In recollecting that the Syracusans were a Dorian people, he seems to have forgotten that the Lacedæmonians were so. A Spartan general would scarcely distinguish a Syracusan as *the* Dorian, by way of eminence. In a preceding passage (c. 35. l. 8.) Thucydides particularises Dorieus son of Diagoras as the commander of the Thurian squadron in the Peloponnesian fleet. Within a few following sentences he mentions Hermocrates as already superseded by an order from Syracuse, and adds circumstances hardly allowing the supposition that he had at all encouraged the offensive conduct of the Sicilians. It may be observed farther that Dorieus son of Diagoras, apparently the same man spoken of by Thucydides, is mentioned by Xenophon (Hellen. l. 1. c. 1. s. 2.). Nor is this the only instance in which we find Dorieus, like other gentilitious names among the Greeks, taken as the proper name of an individual.

This was not the only wound which the Lacedæmonian command suffered. Tissaphernes had taken a strong measure to secure his authority in Miletus; he had built a fort within the walls of the city, and placed a garrison there. In the necessity of the Milesians, on first revolting from Athens, to procure protection, on any terms, against Athenian vengeance, it does not appear that this had occasioned any opposition or complaint. But, when they thought themselves established members of the Peloponnesian confederacy, they began to consider such a badge of foreign servitude with uneasiness; and at length, the spreading discontent against Tissaphernes encouraging, they entered the fort by surprise, with a superior armed force, and compelled the garrison to withdraw. The Lacedæmonian commissioner, Lichas, condemned this violence. Apparently he and his colleagues had learned to be more complaisant to the satrap than when they arrived from Sparta. "Miletus," he said, "being situated in Asia, was within the king of Persia's proper dominion. It became its people therefore to submit to Tissaphernes as his officer; and the interest of the confederacy required that it should be so." A majority however of the allies in the armament, and, above the rest, the Syracusans, declared openly and vehemently their dissent to the doctrine of Lichas, and their approbation of the conduct of the Milesians. Accordingly the Milesians persisted in excluding the Persian garrison, and asserting their independency, and they manifested, upon all occasions, without scruple or reserve, a warm animosity against the Lacedæmonian commissioner.

Things were in this state at Miletus, when Mindarus arrived from Lacedæmon to supersede Astyochus in the command-in-chief. Meanwhile the wary Tissaphernes, adhering to the former advice, would not change his policy for the present persuasion of Alcibiades. He

Thucyd. l. 8.
c. 85.

would hold the balance between the contending parties in Greece: and he could no more be induced now to break with the Lacedæmonians, than he had desired before to give them a decisive superiority. On the contrary Astyochus remained in favour; for the same conduct, which had rendered that general obnoxious to many of those under his command, had been gratifying to the satrap. When therefore Astyochus returned home, Tissaphernes sent with him Gaulites, a Carian, who spoke both the Greek and Persian languages, in quality of his minister to Sparta. Gaulites was instructed to apologise for any apparent slackness in Tissaphernes toward the interest of the Peloponnesian confederacy, and to prefer complaints against the Milesians; particularly insisting upon their affronting and injurious conduct in expelling the Persian garrison. The Milesians, informed of this, sent ministers to vindicate themselves; and Hermocrates, reduced to the situation of an individual without office, accompanied them to Sparta.

B. C. 411.

Such, fortunately for Athens, was the distraction of interests among its enemies, while there was an Athenian commonwealth in Attica and another in Samos, more virulently inimical to each other than to any foreign foe. Meanwhile the Fourhundred, through a strange incautiousness, met with a check in their proposed negotiation for peace with Lacedæmon. Their ambassadors embarked in a trireme, manned with those who had been removed from the herald-ship *Paralus*, for their devotion to the democratical party at Samos. In passing the Argolic coast, the crew mutinied, carried the vessel into Nauplia, and delivered the ambassadors prisoners to the Argive administration. No independent Grecian state was so interested in the schism of the Athenian commonwealth as Argos. The revolution had excited great alarm. It was apprehended that the abolition of democracy at Athens

Thucyd. l. 8.
c. 86.

would be followed by the downfall of the democratical interest throughout Greece. Intelligence of the turn which things had taken at Samos was proportionally gratifying : the opportunity to serve the democratical party, by checking the negotiation of their adversaries, was seized with zeal ; and, as it was the purpose of the Athenian crew to join the fleet at Samos, the Argives sent with them ministers, commissioned to assure the democratical party there of their friendship and support.

The commissioners, appointed by the Four-^{Thucyd. 1. 8. c. 86.} hundred to negotiate with the fleet and army, meanwhile had ventured to proceed from Delos, and arrived at Samos about the same time with the ministers from Argos. Alcibiades was already returned : an assembly of the Athenian citizens in the armament was summoned, and the commissioners from Athens, and the Argive ministers, were together admitted to audience. Tumult immediately began among the soldiers. “ Those who had subverted the democracy,” it was exclaimed, “ should receive capital punishment.” The generals used their endeavours to restore order, and with some difficulty succeeded. The commissioners from the Fourhundred then addressed the assembly. Their first solicitude was to discredit the charges, really replete with falsehood, which had been alleged by Chæreas. They assured the soldiers and seamen, “ that their friends and relations at Athens had never received the least injury or molestation from the present government,” and so far they were heard with patience. But when they proceeded to vindicate the change made in the constitution, calling it “ still a democracy, modified only in such a manner as the present circumstances rendered necessary,” they were interrupted with fresh tumult. Quiet was restored, but still the commissioners could not gain attention : others would speak ; various opinions were given, various proposals offered ; and

at length it appeared the prevailing disposition, and even the decided resolution, to sail immediately for Piræus, and at once restore the former constitution, and punish those who had overthrown it.

Then, says Thucydides, for the first time, Alcibiades did his country a real service, and such a service that perhaps no man ever did a greater. The assembly was on the point of passing the rash decree, and, in the zeal of the moment, it would have been carried into instant execution. Athens thus would have been plunged into the horrors of civil war, and every remaining dependency of the commonwealth in Ionia and on the Hellespont would have passed almost instantaneously into the hands of the enemy. No man certainly, continues the historian, but Alcibiades was able to prevent this; and he did prevent it. He reprovèd the passion that had been shown in the proceedings; and the people, the armed people, bore his reproof: he demonstrated the destructive tendency of what was proposed, and they were alarmed with their own measure: he procured acknowledgment that what had been advised by others was wrong; and, taking upon himself to dictate the answer which should be returned to Athens, they yielded to his authority. "He did not object," he said, "to limiting the votes in the general assembly to five thousand: but he would require the immediate abolition of the council of Fourhundred, and the restoration of the ancient council of Fivehundred. If the new government had retrenched any superfluous expense, so that the forces serving abroad might be more certainly and plentifully subsisted, they should have his applause for it. He trusted they would not separately make any treaty with the enemy. With the present strength of the commonwealth entire, there was good hope that the enemy might be brought to a reasonable accommodation; but, were so large a portion as either the party now prevailing in Samos, or the

party now prevailing in Athens, to be cut off, there would soon be no commonwealth left for an enemy to treat with." Alcibiades, having thus answered the commissioners, then addressed the Argive ministers; thanking them in the name of the assembly for the zeal their commonwealth had manifested, and desiring they would only hold themselves in readiness to give that assistance, which might become important, though in the moment it was not wanted.

This highly hazardous business being thus fortunately accommodated, it became necessary for Alcibiades to attend to the motions of Tissaphernes, who was gone to Aspendus to visit the Phœnician fleet there, and had taken with him the Lacedæmonian commissioner Lichas, with two Peloponnesian triremes, under the command of Philippus, a Lacedæmonian harmost of Miletus. No less than a hundred and forty-seven ships of war were actually assembled; a force ample to give the superiority to whichever of the belligerent powers the satrap might choose to favour. Alcibiades followed him; probably too well acquainted with both his character and his designs, either to fear that he would afford any very effectual support to the Peloponnesians, or to expect that he would be diverted from a policy, so congenial to his nature, as that of wearing out both parties, while he gave hopes to both. Alcibiades knew also that it was much an object, with the satrap, to gratify his court, by doing its business with the least possible expense. But he had nevertheless his end in his journey. He gained the credit, with the Athenians, of preventing the junction of the Phœnician fleet with the Peloponnesians, and he disturbed the councils and measures of the Peloponnesians, by giving new force to the jealousy and mistrust they had for some time entertained of Tissaphernes.

B. C. 411.
P. W. 21.
April.
Thucyd. 1. 8.
c. 87.

c. 88.

SECTION VII.

Schism in the new Government of Athens. — Theramenes. — A second Revolution.

B. C. 411.
Ol. 92. 3.
P. W. 21.
April.
Thucyd. l. 8.
c. 89. WHILE, at Samos, the democratical party were held together, and concert was maintained in their proceedings, through the decided superiority of one man at their head, division was growing among the many men of great abilities, but of various tempers, views, and interests, who directed the affairs of the oligarchal party at Athens. Aristocrates son of Sicelius, Theramenes one of the generals of the establishment, and some others in high offices, had been for some time dissatisfied with the prospect of their affairs; insomuch that they wanted only opportunity to disengage themselves from their party. On the contrary, Antiphon and Pisander, whose strong measures left no means of retreating, Phrynichus, who dreaded nothing equally with the return of Alcibiades, and Aristarchus, upon principle the most inveterate and vehement of all the enemies of the democracy, together with many other men of considerable weight, remained firm in their purpose of maintaining the oligarchy.

The answer from Alcibiades, and the account, brought by their commissioners, of the state of things in Samos, together with their knowledge of the inclination to secession within their own party, gave much uneasiness, but produced no disposition to yield. Their proposed resource was to make peace with Lacedæmon; and upon any terms, rather than not make peace. With an oligarchal government they trusted they might easily obtain, not peace only, but alliance and certain protection; and indeed they considered the means of connection with Lacedæmon as their only ground

of hope, even for personal safety. Their former embassy having been stopped, by the mutiny of the crew of the vessel in which it sailed, Antiphon and Phrynichus now undertook the negotiation. Those who directed the government at home were in the mean time to take measures for obviating domestic opposition. With this view it was judged of much importance to forward the completion of a fort, some time since begun, on a spot called Eetionea, commanding the entrance of the harbour of Piræus. It was already so far advanced that they established the public magazine of corn there: and they not only caused all corn imported to be there deposited, but compelled all individuals in the city, who possessed any quantity, to send it thither.

Meanwhile the same answer from Samos, which Thucyd. l. 8. c. 89. urged the determinate supporters of oligarchy to these strong measures, encouraged the dissentients in their proposed secession. That answer offered them a clear overture for an accommodation. Even in Athens the body of the people was still inclined to democracy; and, to restore superiority to the democratical party, leaders only were wanting, in whom the body of the people might confide. To obtain their confidence therefore became the object of Theramenes and Aristocrates. This would give them importance with the chiefs of the armament at Samos, and ground on which to open a treaty.

Other circumstances followed, still to encourage and incite them. Antiphon and Phrynichus returned from Lacedæmon, without effecting in any degree the purpose of their mission, or however without effecting any purpose that they dared declare. Presently after, intelligence arrived End of April. of a fleet assembling in the Laconian ports, to favour the revolt of Eubœa. Appearances gave the seceders to suspect that, instead of Eubœa, the fleet was intended for the Attic coast; and that the fort of Eetionea was not

more intended to prevent the entrance of the fleet from Samos into the harbour of Piræus, than to insure the reception of a Peloponnesian fleet there. Nor was this suspicion, in the opinion of Thucydides, unfounded. The first wish of the oligarchal party, says the historian, was undoubtedly to have the command of the Athenian empire entire. But, if this could not be, they would have been glad to hold the independent dominion of Attica, deprived of the subject states, yet preserving the fleet and the walls of the city. Rather however than submit to the restoration of democracy, which would involve their certain ruin, they would have consented to the demolition of the fortifications

Thucyd. 1. 8. c. 91. of Athens and the surrender of the whole fleet, that their persons and estates only might be secure, under Lacedæmonian protection. The construction of the fort was therefore prosecuted with the utmost diligence; and, as it arose, the disposition of the gates and sally-ports, says the historian, sufficiently indicated its purpose.

Against these measures, which Thucydides, no friend in general to democracy, reprobates, and which ought to have united, in opposition, every honest hand and heart in Athens, the first signal blow was by assassination; an act in its nature too opposite to all justice, and too subversive of all order, to produce any lasting good, in whatever cause it may be practised. A few days after the return of the ambassadors from Lacedæmon, toward midday, in the full

e. 92. agora, and not far from the state-house, Phrynichus was stabbed by one of the city-guard, and died soon after of the wound. The murderer escaped; but an accomplice, an Argive, was taken, and being put to the torture by the Fourhundred, indicated no name, nor declared anything, but that there had been frequent and numerous meetings in different houses, particularly in that of

the commander of the city-guard. No information was obtained, on which any prosecution could be founded: inquiry concerning the murder dropped, the deed being evidently popular; and Theramenes and Aristocrates, whether conscious of the crime or not, were encouraged by the event to proceed in their design.¹² Those of their party who were of the Fourhundred meanwhile kept their seats in that council, and Theramenes his office as a general of the establishment.

Lys. con.
Agorat. p. 136.
vel 491.
Lycurg. con.
Leocr. p. 217.
t. 4. Or. Gr.
ed. Reiske.

Things were in this situation when the alarming intelligence arrived, that the Peloponnesian armament, instead of going to Eubœa, had overrun the island of Ægina, and was now at anchor in the harbour of Epidaurus, as if threatening Athens itself. Theramenes had foretold that this would happen. From the event, thus confirming his prediction, he took occasion farther to animate his party against the party of Antiphon. "If preventive measures," he said, "were not quickly taken, the Peloponnesian troops would be admitted into the fortress of Eetionea, and a Lacedæmonian would command in Piræus." It was accordingly resolved to strike the decisive stroke: a large proportion of the heavy-armed were already gained, the taxis commanded by Aristocrates, a body nearly correspondent to our battalion, was on duty at the works of Eetionea, and Hermon, an officer warm in their interest, commanded in Munychia. Under these favouring circumstances, when measures were not yet completely concerted, the soldiers, in their zeal for the cause, arrested Alexicles, the general commanding in Piræus, a man zealous in the oligarchal interest, put him in

¹² The orator Lycurgus, in his accusation of Leocrates, relates the murder of Phrynichus differently, in regard to some facts. According to him it was committed by night without the city, at a fountain near some willow-beds: but he remarkably confirms, what is more important in the account of Thucydides, the popularity of the deed, and the popularity of the principle, that assassination, in the cause of the people, was meritorious.

close confinement, and then set themselves to demolish the fort of Eetionea.

Intelligence of this violence passed to Athens while the council was sitting, and Theramenes present. The members of the opposite party, alarmed and indignant, accused Theramenes and his immediate friends, as instigators of sedition. Theramenes, with ready coolness, replied to the charge, and proposed to go himself and release his colleague. This being incautiously approved, he went instantly, taking with him one of his colleagues present, whose political sentiments he knew to agree with his own. Meanwhile alarm spread rapidly, from the state-house, through the city: it was generally supposed that Alexicles was put to death, and that the democratical party had taken possession of Piræus, with intention to maintain themselves there, in opposition to the existing government. While therefore Aristarchus, with a small body of the equestrian order, whom he could collect in the instant, hastened after Theramenes, all the younger and more zealous of the oligarchal party ran to arms. The elder interfered to check the indiscretion of zeal on both sides; and Thucydides of Pharsalus in Thessaly, a public guest of the commonwealth, particularly distinguished himself in appeasing the commotion. Quiet thus was so far restored that, excepting the few who accompanied Aristarchus, none marched in arms to Piræus.

Aristarchus and Theramenes arrived nearly together. The latter immediately addressed the soldiers with the authority of general, and reproved their conduct. It was however known, by many, that his words did not perfectly express his sentiments; and, while some attended to his speech, others continued the demolition of the fort. Aristarchus, with those of the oligarchal party about him, with much indignation interfered in vain. The soldiers, addressing Theramenes, asked, "If he really thought it for the public

good that the fort should be completed, or if the interest of the commonwealth did not rather require that it should be destroyed." Looking then for some time about him, and seeing that he should have sufficient support, he answered, "If they were of opinion that it ought to be demolished, he could not dissent." This sufficed for the soldiers: the whole body set immediately to work; and the word was passed, or rather a kind of short proclamation was made through Piræus, evidently not a momentary thought of the soldiers themselves, but either preconcerted among them, or communicated by the leaders of the party; "Whoever is for the government of the Fivethousand, instead of the tyranny of the Fourhundred, let him assist in demolishing the fort." To have named democracy, or the government of the people at large, as treason against the existing government, would have rendered the delinquents obnoxious to capital punishment: but an appeal to the Fivethousand was legal, by the constitution of the Fourhundred themselves. Numbers of the inhabitants of Piræus obeyed the call, and the demolition of the fort proceeded rapidly.

Next day, the fort being completely destroyed, Thucyd. 1. 8. c. 93. the soldiers released their general Alexicles; and then going to the theatre of Bacchus, adjoining to Munychia, there held a regular assembly. The result of the debate was a resolution to march into Athens, and take possession of the Anaceum, the precinct of a temple of Castor and Pollux, as place of arms. The regularity of their proceedings, the appeal to the Fivethousand, and the care taken to do nothing that a majority among any five thousand of the citizens might not perhaps approve, alarmed and distressed the oligarchal leaders, more than if greater violences had been committed. The Fourhundred however, assembling at their usual hour, sent a committee to confer with the troops. Addressing themselves more to individuals, and to

small parties, than to the assembled body, the committee endeavoured to conciliate the more moderate, and to persuade them to use their endeavours to pacify the more violent: "The Fivethousand," they said, "should be immediately declared; the Fourhundred now in office should lay down their authority in due time; and it should be for the Fivethousand to decide the kind of rotation, and the mode of election, by which their successors should be appointed. Meanwhile every dearest interest ought to warn the soldiers not, by any violences, to afford those opportunities to an enemy at their gates, which might superinduce the destruction of the commonwealth." These arguments, urged in a conciliating manner, had their effect: and it was at length agreed that, on a day named, a general assembly should be held, in the precinct of the temple of Bacchus, to consider of means for effecting a permanent reconciliation of parties.

Thucyd. l. 8.
c. 94. The day appointed being come, the people were already moving toward the temple of Bacchus, when intelligence was communicated, that the Peloponnesian fleet under Hegesandridas, consisting of forty-two triremes, having crossed the gulf from Epidaurus, and touched at Megara, was actually off Salamis. Immediately the whole force of Athens, of both parties, united for the moment by the fear of a common enemy, ran down to Piræus as by consent; and, without waiting, or most of them caring, for orders from the existing government, each did what the exigency of the moment appeared to him to require: some went aboard the triremes afloat; others launched those ashore; some took post upon the walls, and
c. 95. some at the mouth of the harbour. The Peloponnesians however made no attempt upon the Attic coast, but, doubling the headland of Sunium, proceeded to Oropus.

New alarm then seized the Athenians. The disposition in Eubœa to revolt was known. Already deprived of the produce of Attica by the garrison of Decelea, the added loss of Eubœa would nearly deprive them of means to subsist. Corn, meat, every article of food came principally from Eubœa. Hastily therefore, and under no regular direction, as in a dissolution of government, they manned some triremes with such crews as in the moment offered, and under the command of Thymocharès, the squadron moved immediately for Eretria: some triremes stationed there made their number thirty-six. Among the numerous proofs, in history, of the great defects in the ancient system of naval war, what followed is not the least remarkable. Thymocharès landed his crews to get refreshment. The Eretrians, prepared for revolt, had concerted measures with Hegesandridas. No provisions were to be found in the public market; the Athenians could supply themselves only from private houses far from the port, and the crews in consequence dispersed over the town. A signal was given by the Eretrians; the Spartan admiral made across the channel, and the Athenian fleet was attacked while the crews were in confusion, and before all could be got aboard. After some resistance therefore it was compelled to fly. Some of the ships escaped into the harbour of Chalcis; the rest mostly ran upon the Eretrian coast, and the crews fled by land. Those who reached a fort occupied by an Athenian garrison, adjoining to Eretria, were safe; but others, who, confiding in the friendship of the Eretrians, entered the city, were all put to death. Two-and-twenty triremes fell into the hands of the Peloponnesians; and presently all Eubœa, except Oreus, revolted to them.

The consternation at Athens, on receiving the news of the event, was greater than even from the defeat in Sicily. Attica itself was less valuable to Athens

than Eubœa: not only as the soil was less fertile, but as the appropriation of the produce was less certain, to a power hitherto the first upon earth by sea, but inferior to its enemies by land. Nor was this the only distressing consideration; for, had the enemy pushed with their victorious fleet immediately for Piræus, they might have possessed themselves of the harbour. What precisely might have been the consequence was beyond human foresight; but this, says the contemporary historian, may be esteemed certain, that nothing less than the return of the fleet from Samos, which would have superinduced the loss of Ionia, the Hellespont, and in short the whole foreign dominion, could have saved Athens. It was not however upon this occasion only, he continues, that the Lacedæmonians showed themselves most accommodating enemies to the Athenians; and thus the misfortune, which threatened the ruin of the commonwealth, proved the prelude to its restoration.

Before
24 June. Twenty triremes remained still in the port of Piræus, and they were immediately manned. But, in the present state of fermentation, who should undertake the direction of public measures, or who could undertake it with effect, was not easy to determine. Probably nothing could prevent the people from assembling wherever public affairs were to be debated. A proposal hazarded for summoning them to the Pnyx, where, under the democracy, the general assemblies had been most commonly held, met with general approbation and no avowed opposition. In the Pnyx accordingly the people met; the democratical chiefs found the power in their hands; and a decree proposed was passed, with all the ancient forms, declaring, "that the council of Fourhundred should be dissolved; that the supreme authority should be immediately vested in Fivethousand; that all, at the time in Athens, upon the roll of the heavy-armed, should be of the Fivethousand; that no man

in any office under the commonwealth should receive any pay."

This change was no sooner decided, and the party of Theramenes in consequence possessed of ^{Thucyd. l. 8. c. 98.} a clear superiority, than Pisander, Alexicles, Aristarchus, and many others of the principal supporters of oligarchy, quitted Athens, and most of them went to Decelea. Aristarchus used the means which his office of general afforded, in abandoning his country, to strike a blow against it. Œnoe, that town on the Attic border against Bœotia, the ineffectual siege of which, by the army under Archidamus, had, twenty-one years before, been the first object of the Peloponnesian arms in the war, was still held by an Athenian garrison. The troops passing between Decelea and Peloponnesus were frequently annoyed from it, and a party of Corinthians had been lately cut off. The Corinthian government, thus instigated, had invited the Bœotians to join them in reducing the place; and the siege was formed. When Aristarchus determined to fly, he commanded the attendance of some of the barbarian bowmen in the Athenian service; and selecting for the purpose, according to the historian's phrase, the most barbarian, he went to Œnoe. Having quickly concerted matters with the besiegers, he told the garrison that a treaty was made with Lacedæmon, according to which Œnoe must be immediately surrendered to the Bœotians. The garrison, excluded from other information, gave credit to a man known to be in the office of general of the commonwealth; and, obtaining from the besieging army a safe conduct, evacuated the place.

Antiphon, with a few oligarchal leaders of less note than himself, ventured to remain in Athens; Antiphon apparently trusting in his policy, his eloquence, his personal influence, and the quiet conduct he had observed; directing the secret

councils of the party, but leaving others to be the ostensible conductors of every measure. Upon the flight however of the more active leaders, opposition to Theramenes and his associates had ceased. Many assemblies of the people were successively held, according to the ancient forms of the commonwealth, in the Pynx: the restoration of Alcibiades, and of all who, for the same cause, had absented themselves from their country, was decreed; and the constitution was settled, says the contemporary historian, upon a better footing than at any time within my memory¹³; a mixed government being established, with the same authority judiciously divided between the few and the many.

In this concise eulogy is contained the whole of the account, given by Thucydides, of the form of government established by Theramenes; and upon no occasion does he leave us so much to regret the want of explanation and detail. Upon no occasion however do we see the historian more strongly marked as the true patriot. Frequently we find him reprobating the extravagances of an unbalanced democracy so strongly that we might suspect him of some partiality for oligarchy. But here, as indeed throughout his account of the oligarchy established by Pisander, he shows himself a decided enemy to tyranny in every shape, and the warm partisan only of whatever government might best secure universal freedom, through equal and well-supported law.

¹³ Ἐπί γε ἐμοῦ. *In my opinion*, Smith. — *Meo judicio*, Duker. But Duker adds, in a note, “Acacius ἐπί γε ἐμοῦ non male vertit, *meâ quidem memoriâ*.” I have no doubt in preferring the version of Acacius.

SECTION VIII.

Transactions of the Peloponnesian Fleet under Mindarus, and the Athenian under Thrasyllus and Thrasybulus. — Naval Action near Abydus. — Wily and treacherous Policy of Tissaphernes. — Naval Action near the Trojan Shore. — Critical Arrival of Alcibiades. — Naval Action near Cyzicus, and Capture of the Peloponnesian Fleet. — Laconic official Letter. — Liberality of Pharnabazus to the Peloponnesians. — Able Conduct and Popularity of Hermocrates, the Syracusan General.

DURING these transactions at Athens, the Peloponnesian armament, on the Asiatic coast, had been wholly occupied with the distresses to which the want of an adequate revenue of their own, and the failure of the satrap Tissaphernes in his engagements, had reduced them. One of the Lacedæmonian commissioners, Philippus, had attended the satrap to Aspendus; another, Hippocrates, was stationed at Phaselis. All intelligence, from both, confirmed the opinion, long entertained, of the satrap's faithlessness, and of his determined purpose to deceive them. Meanwhile fresh overtures arrived from the satrap, sometimes entitled of Lower Phrygia, sometimes of Bithynia, Pharnabazus; who, having observed the advantage which Tissaphernes derived from his Grecian connection, namely the recovery of dominion over the Grecian towns within his satrapy, and of the tribute from them, which for a long time had passed to Athens, showed himself disposed to treat upon terms which, with his more honourable character, might be inviting. These united motives induced Mindarus, the new commander-in-chief, to resolve upon moving with the fleet to the Hellespont, for the sake of readier and surer communication with the Phrygian satrap. But the Athenian fleet at Samos was in the most favourable situation to intercept his passage; and though his numbers were superior, he

B. C. 411.
P. W. 21.
Thucyd.
I. 8. c. 99.

desired to avoid a general action. Secrecy and caution however he hoped might prevent interruption; but a storm coming upon him in the passage, compelled him to take shelter in the harbour of Icarus, and remain there five or six days.

Thucyd. l. 8. c. 100. Beginning of July. During this interval, intelligence passed to Samos, that the Peloponnesian fleet had quitted the port of Miletus for the northward. Thrasyllus, with whom, in the absence of Alcibiades and Thrasybulus, the chief command rested, in all haste moved with fifty-five triremes for the Hellespont, anxious to arrive before the Peloponnesians; but, in his passage, learning that Mindarus, from Icarus, had gone with his fleet to Chios, and remained there, he put into Methymne in Lesbos. Beside that Methymne was a commodious station for watching the Peloponnesian fleet, the affairs of that valuable island required his attention. Some men of the first families of Methymne, exiles on account of their aversion to democracy and the Athenian interest, had proposed to profit from present circumstances for restoring themselves to their country; the Peloponnesian armament being at hand, the two satraps friendly, and Athens distracted by sedition. Having accordingly collected a small force on the continent, they put themselves, in pursuance of the common prejudice in favour of a leader from the mother-country, under the conduct of Anaxarchus, a Theban: the Bœotians being esteemed the parent people of the Æolian race, and particularly of the Lesbians.¹⁴ Their first attempt was a surprise upon Me-

¹⁴ Ἀναξάρχου Θεβαίου, κατὰ τὸ ξυγγένες, ἡγουμένου. "Hoc Thucydides, iii. 86. vi. 88. & alibi, de populis ejusdem originis et consanguineis dicit. Quænam autem sit Thebanorum et Methymnæorum, vel Cymæorum, si quis hoc ad eos pertinere putabit, συγγένεια, nunc non scio, nec vacat quærere." Duker. — I own I am better pleased with such direct confession, than when those, who undertake to be commentators, pass by difficult passages, often of much more historical importance, as if no difficulty were in them. One cannot however

thymne itself; but the vigilance of the Athenian commander in Mitylene disappointing them, they hastened across the heights which divide the island, and by a sudden assault took Eresus. Intelligence of these circumstances had called Thrasybulus with five triremes to Lesbos; he found there two Athenian triremes and five Methymnæan, and Thrasyllus now joined him with fifty-five. The heavy-armed were debarked, and preparation was made to attack Eresus by sea and land.

Meanwhile Mindarus, still desirous to avoid action with the Athenian fleet, and considering ^{Thucyd. 1. 8. c. 101.} the business of Eresus as a small concern, left his Methymnæan friends to their fate, and made his course along the Asiatic shore for the Hellespont. Thucydides has thought important enough for notice what would now appear utterly trifling, except as it marks, more strongly than anything that has yet occurred, the imperfection of the marine of that age. Speed was the object of Mindarus, both for avoiding the Athenians in the passage, and for being before them in the Hellespont; but, as oars were his instruments of motion,

but wonder at Duker's difficulty here, because the consanguinity of the Lesbians and Bœotians not only is mentioned by Thucydides in his account of the Mitylenæan revolt, (b. 3. c. 2.) but the scholiast, commenting upon the passage, explains it well and clearly thus:—*Καὶ παρασκευάζονται (οἱ Λέσβιοι) ὥστε ἀποστῆναι, συλλαμβανόντων αὐτοῖς Λακεδαιμονίαν καὶ Βοιωτῶν. Τὸ δὲ ΣΤΡΑΒΟΝΟΝΤΩΝ ἐπὶ μόνους τοὺς Βοιωτοὺς ἐνεκτίον· οὗτοι γὰρ κατὰ τὸ Αἰολικὸν συγγενεῖς τῶν Λεσβίων.* The reader, who may desire higher authority than the scholiast, will find Strabo large on the subject. I have been induced to say thus much on this little matter, principally for the testimony which we here find from Thucydides in confirmation of Strabo's account of the origin of the Æolian Greeks of Asia; which has been followed in the account given of the Æolic migration, in the second section of the fifth chapter of this History. It is indeed not without attention to such little detached scraps of information, wherever they can be found among the works of the most authoritative ancient writers, that we are enabled to collect the scattered members of early Grecian history; to detect the supposititious and doubtful among what is related by inferior or later authors; to ascertain and arrange the genuine; and, without the assistance of invention, to form, of parts so broken and dispersed, something of a harmonising whole.

intervals of rest were necessary for his crews; and, as we have already had occasion to observe, the construction of a trireme was such, and the crews so numerous for the space, that refreshment could not conveniently be taken aboard. Mindarus therefore landed his crews to dine, at a port of the Phocæan territory, and to sup, at Arginusæ in the Cummæan territory, over-against Lesbos, where lay the Athenian fleet, which he was so anxious to avoid. Moving again however in the night, he dined next day at Harmatous, and, proceeding in the afternoon with the utmost haste, part of his fleet arrived before midnight at Rhœteum, within the Hellespont, and the rest in the harbour of Sigeum at its mouth. Eighteen Athenian triremes were lying at Sestos. Fire-signals from the Asiatic shore announced to them their danger, and they hastened to get out of the narrow sea. Of four intercepted¹⁵, one, forced ashore near a temple dedicated to Homer's hero Protesilaus, was taken with its crew; the crews of the other three escaped.

Thucyd. 1. 8.
c. 102.

The Athenian commanders had trusted that the Peloponnesian fleet could not pass Lesbos without being discovered by their scouts. Receiving intelligence that it was already in the Hellespont, they followed immediately, and in their passage took two Peloponnesian triremes, which had incautiously pushed too far, in pursuing the Athenian squadron from Sestos. On the second day they arrived at Elæus, upon which place Mindarus had been making an unsuc-

¹⁵ Smith gives to suppose, by his translation, that eight were taken; the Latin version more happily imitates all that is dubious in the original. I think Thucydides meant to speak of only four taken. The matter is not important; but it may be observed that, as Thucydides never completed his History, the latter chapters, indeed much of the last book, bear marks of undigested compilation, and in some places of uncorrected phrase. I should however rather suppose the whole his own unfinished work, than that the concluding part was written by another, it has been said his daughter, from his materials.

cessful attempt. His fleet, re-enforced with a squadron which he found at Abydus, consisted of eighty-six triremes. Thrasybulus and Thrasyllus, with only sixty-eight, resolved to offer him battle.¹⁶ Five days they employed in preparation in the harbour of Elæus, and then moved into the strait, with their line of battle formed ahead. The Peloponnesians came out of the harbour of Abydus, and formed for action. The Athenians extending their line, to prevent being taken in flank by the more numerous enemy, weakened their centre, which the Peloponnesians in consequence broke; and, driving fifteen triremes ashore, debarked and destroyed them. This advantage however produced disorder in the Peloponnesian line, from which Thrasybulus, who commanded the right of the Athenian fleet, instantly profited; and, being quickly well seconded by Thrasyllus, they put the whole Peloponnesian fleet to flight, and took twenty-one ships: the rest found refuge in the neighbouring port of Abydus. The Peloponnesians acknowledged their defeat, by the usual application, through heralds, for the restoration of the dead, and the Athenians erected their trophy on the headland of Cynos-sema.

This victory, gained with inferior numbers, was very opportune for the Athenians. The depression of the spirits of the seamen, produced by the defeats at Syracuse, was done away, and they no longer feared the Peloponnesians as their equals in naval action. A trireme, sent to Athens with the news, diffused more than common joy. It was as the first symptom of recovery from a mortal disease; the more welcome as the more unexpected. Leaders and people were

¹⁶ There can be no doubt but Acacius and Hudson are right in their correction of the statement of the numbers of the two fleets in this place. It does not rest on conjecture, or on the authority of Diodorus, but is supported by the clear testimony of Thucydides himself.

equally encouraged to bear present evils, and exert themselves with good hope, giving their attention especially, as the urgency of the moment required, to the revolt of Eubœa, and the disorders occasioned by the late sedition.

Thucyd. l. 8.
c. 107. The advantages, to be expected from a successful battle, followed the victory of Cynos-sema: the allies and dependants, remaining to Athens, were confirmed in their fidelity; those who had revolted were less satisfied with the part they had taken; and means were opened for new enterprise. The fleet sailed for Cyzicus; eight Peloponnesian triremes, returning from Byzantium, were taken by the way; and Cyzicus, unfortified, surrendering without a blow, paid for its change of politics by a heavy contribution. Meanwhile the Peloponnesian commanders, afraid to keep the sea, and apprehensive of losing all they had gained on the Asiatic and Hellespontine shores, sent for

c. 108. their fleet from Eubœa to re-enforce them. Alcibiades soon after rejoined the Athenian fleet with thirteen ships, bringing with him the encouraging assurance that he had completely diverted Tissaphernes from his purpose of permitting the Phenician fleet to join the Peloponnesian, and that he had finally conciliated him to the Athenian interest. He seems however not to have obtained any pecuniary supply. To procure means therefore for subsisting the armament, for which little or no remittance could be expected from home, he went southward again with a squadron of twenty-two triremes; levied large contributions at Halicarnassus, and in the neighbouring country; and fixing upon the island of Cos as a convenient station, whence to command the Carian seas and shores, he raised a fort and left a garrison there.

Tissaphernes meanwhile, more wily than wise, and true to nothing but his ever-varying opinion of his own interest, was very uneasy at the departure of the Peloponnesian

fleet from Miletus. He not only apprehended the loss of advantages derived from his Grecian alliance, but he envied the probable accession of those advantages to Pharnabazus. From Aspendus therefore he hastened back into Ionia, and on his arrival found fresh cause of dissatisfaction. The Cnidians, after the example of the Milesians, had expelled his garrison from their citadel. Nor did the evil rest there. The Greeks under the Persian dominion, in general perhaps less rigorously treated than under the Athenian, would yet be more liable, especially in the decay of the empire, to occasional oppression from the temper of individuals in command. Arsaces, an officer under Tissaphernes, of a cruel and faithless disposition, had made himself particularly odious by treacherously assassinating some of the Delians, whom, on their expulsion from their island by the Athenians, the kindness of the satrap Pharnaces had established in Atramyttium. The Antandrians, oppressed by this man, and fearing farther oppression, had applied to the Peloponnesians at Abydus; and a body of Peloponnesian heavy-armed, whom they conducted over the heights of Ida, assisted in expelling the Persian garrison from their citadel.

Thucyd. l. 8.
c. 109.

c. 108.

Ch. 16. s. 5.
of this Hist.

Alarmed by all these circumstances, Tissaphernes resolved to go himself to the Hellespont, to confer and remonstrate with the Peloponnesian commanders. Stopping in his way at Ephesus, he performed a sacrifice to Diana. Such a compliment to such a religion as the Greek, from a Persian, though a weak man, in the high situation of Tissaphernes, and whether superstition or policy produced it, appears strong proof that decay, in various ways, had been making rapid progress in the Persian empire. With the mention of this very remarkable fact the narrative of Thucydides ends abruptly. But testimony to matter confirming the fact, and marking policy,

Thucyd. l. 8.
c. 109.
Beginning of
August.

overbearing all regard for Persian religious belief, to have been the motive, will be found in the sequel.

Fortunately for Grecian history and for literature, another contemporary author, little inferior in abilities, at least equal in acquirements, and even of more extensive communication among men, has left us a continuation. But the narrative of Xenophon begins as abruptly as that of Thucydides ends; and, though there appears no material chasm, nothing important omitted, yet the connection is not complete.¹⁷ The

Xen. Hel. l. 1.
c. 1. s. 1.

first fact mentioned by Xenophon, in his Grecian Annals, is, that Thymochares, the Athenian commander in the unfortunate action near Eretria, arriving with a few ships from Athens, had a second action with the Peloponnesian squadron under Hegesandridas, and was again defeated. Where this action happened, whether still on the Eubæan coast, or whether Hegesandridas obeyed the summons of Mindarus, and Thymochares followed him toward the Hellespont, we are not informed.

¹⁷ It has been disputed, among the learned, whether the account of Xenophon begins precisely where that of Thucydides breaks off. Unquestionably Xenophon has intended a complete continuation; and Dodwell, in his Xenophontean Chronology, appears to me to have proved satisfactorily that there is no chasm, or next to none, in the narrative. But there is a circumstance, unnoticed, I believe, by the commentators, which very strongly contradicts the notion of a chasm: it is the mention made by Xenophon of the completion of the journey of Tissaphernes, (the beginning of which is related by Thucydides,) stating the time of his arrival at the Hellespont. The Hellenics, or Grecian Annals, are however, evidently enough, a work which has not received the finishing touches of the author: in the very beginning of it he seems rather to have taken some short notes of Thucydides, or to have made some of his own, and left them for future correction, which was never given; and thus, though all the principal facts intended for mention are recorded, yet they are neither separately so clearly related, nor is the connection so perspicuous as might be expected from such a writer. The first paragraph, *Μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα οὐ πολλαῖς ἡμέραις ὕστερον, κ. τ. λ.*, bears all the appearance of an undigested note. *Μετὰ ταῦτα* has scarcely been intended to relate to the sacrifice of Tissaphernes at Ephesus, with the mention of which the History of Thucydides ends, but rather to something in the course of relating which, had the work received the finishing touches of the author, the place of the ensuing action, between the Athenian squadron under Thymochares and the Lacedæmonian under Hegesandridas, would have been stated.

Soon after this, and a little after the autumnal equinox, the Thurian commander, Dorieus, son of Diagoras, coming from Rhodes to the Hellespont with fourteen triremes, notice of his approach was communicated by signals to the Athenian commanders in Sestos, and twenty triremes were sent to intercept them. The Peloponnesian fleet still lay at Abydus: the commander-in-chief, Mindarus, was at the time in the neighbouring town of Ilium, on or near the site of ancient Troy, performing a sacrifice to Minerva. The situation commanded a view of the strait, and of the adjacent sea; and he saw the movement of the Athenians, and the danger of Dorieus. Hastening to Abydus, he led his whole fleet out of the harbour. The whole Athenian fleet upon this moved, and a general action ensued. Through the greatest part of the day it was maintained with various success in different parts of the line; but toward evening eighteen Athenian triremes were seen coming into the strait from the southward. They were the squadron of Alcibiades returning from the Carian coast. Then the Peloponnesians fled towards Abydus. But Abydus had no harbour that could protect them: that dubious kind of action between land and water, of which we have already observed many examples, could alone defend their stranded galleys. Fortunately for them, the satrap Pharnabazus was at hand with a considerable land force. Of widely different character from the deceitful and timid Tissaphernes, Pharnabazus rode at the head of his cavalry, as far as his horse would carry him, into the sea, to relieve his distressed allies. Through the protection thus afforded, the crews mostly escaped; but the Athenians carried off thirty triremes. Thrasyllus was dispatched to Athens to announce the victory, and desire re-enforcement; and Alcibiades, judging forty ships now sufficient for the

B. C. 411.
P. W. 21.
End of Sept.
Xen. Hel. 1. 1.
c. 1. s. 2.

s. 3.

s. 4.

s. 5.

station at Sestos, sent the rest of the fleet various ways, to collect contributions which might supply immediate need.

Xen. Hel. 1. 1.
c. 1. s. 6. Nothing farther of importance had occurred, when Tissaphernes arrived at the Hellespont.¹⁸

Alcibiades went to wait upon him, expecting a reception more favourable than formerly, in proportion as his own circumstances were improved, as he had less need of personal assistance, and more power to serve or injure. He did not however neglect to carry presents, both such as Grecian hospitality prescribed, and such as the eastern great were wont to expect, or be gratified with¹⁹; but he found himself greatly deceived. The faithless satrap, alleging orders from the king to consider the Athenians as enemies, caused him to be arrested and sent prisoner to Sardis. After

B. C. 410.
Ol. 92. 2.
P. W. 42.
March. a confinement of about a month however he escaped to Clazomenæ, a city of the Athenian alliance; whence with six ships²⁰, which he found there, he returned to his fleet in the Hellespont.

While Alcibiades was thus absent, and the Athenian fleet scattered, Mindarus having received re-enforcements which made his fleet sixty triremes, proposed to attack the forty which lay at Sestos; but timely intelligence of his intention coming to the commanders, they withdrew by night to Cardia, at the bottom of the gulf on the other side of the Chersonese. Alcibiades joined them there; but with other hopes than he had given both the armament and the people at home to entertain. All the expectations, which he had

¹⁸ Ἐς Ἑλλάσποντον.

¹⁹ Thus I suppose the *ξενία τι καὶ δῶρα* of Xenophon may be interpreted, the former word relating to Grecian customs, the latter to Persian.

²⁰ *Σὺν πέντε τριήρεσι καὶ ἑπακτεῖδι. Cum quinque triremibus et una navi actuariâ.* Xenophon seems afterward to reckon the *ἑπακτεῖς* among the *ναῦς*. I do not recollect that Thucydides ever gives the title of *ναῦς* to any but ships of war, except once to a merchant-ship of very large size, *ναῦς μυριοφόρος*, in the harbour of Syracuse, 1. 7. c. 25.

raised so high, of assistance from the great king through the satrap, the co-operation of the Phenician fleet, and, what was still more important to the commonwealth, and what would be incomparably more felt by the armament, the pay which would never fail, were at an end. Deprived of Ionia, of the Hellespontine cities, of the Thracian colonies, of Attica itself, and retaining but a precarious dominion over a part of Eubœa, the sources of that revenue, by which the commonwealth had hitherto been powerful, were gone; and the pay of Persia, promised by Alcibiades, was what both the armament abroad and the people at home had depended upon, for means to recover their losses, and to support even a defensive war.

In these circumstances Alcibiades saw that daring measures, and quick decision, were necessary both for himself and for the commonwealth. Mindarus, disappointed of his purpose against the fleet at Sestos, Xen. Hel. 1. 1. c. 1. s. 9. by its retreat to Cardia, had moved to Cyzicus; and, Pharnabazus meeting him with his land forces, that defenceless town was compelled again to receive its law from the enemies of Athens. Alcibiades resolved, though with a force considerably inferior, to seek them there. From Cardia he moved to Sestos; and every preparation being made that circumstances admitted, orders were already issued for proceeding up the Propontis, when Theramenes arrived from Macedonia, and Thrasybulus from Thasos, each with twenty triremes. This fortunate re-enforcement made s. 8. & 10. new consideration necessary: it was important to conceal from the enemy the increased strength of the fleet. On arriving therefore at the island of Prœconnesus, a proclamation was issued, denouncing capital punishment against any who should be taken in the attempt to cross to the Asiatic shore. The soldiers and seamen were then summoned, as to a popular assembly; and Alcibiades, addressing

them, ventured to declare, without reserve, the necessities of their situation. "Supplies," he said, "to the amount that the prosecution of the war would require, were not within their present power to obtain, or within the means of the commonwealth to afford: the enemy, on the contrary, supported by the wealth of Persia, knew no want. Vigorous exertion and quick decision were therefore indispensable: they must prepare for action both by sea and land; and by land both in the field and in the attack of fortifications." Past success, superiority of present strength, and an opinion of their general's ability, gave confidence, and the speech of Alcibiades was received with applause; the assembly was dismissed, all were ordered aboard, and the fleet, consisting of eighty-six ships, got under way.

Xen. Hel. l. 1.
c. 1. s. 11.

A heavy rain presently came on, which favoured the purpose of surprising the enemy. As the fleet approached Cyzicus, the weather cleared, and the enemy's fleet of sixty triremes was seen exercising at such a distance from the port that its return was already intercepted. The Peloponnesians, discovering the Athenian fleet so much stronger than they had expected, were in great consternation. They had no hope of success in naval action, and the enemy was between them and their port. The resource, which the nature of the ancient marine afforded, was to make for the nearest shore, and depend upon the assistance of their land force for the protection of their stranded ships.

s. 12.

Alcibiades, aware of their intention, passing with twenty ships beyond their line, debarked his people. Mindarus, seeing this, also debarked, met Alcibiades, was defeated, and himself slain. The crews of the whole Peloponnesian fleet then fled; and, except the Syracusan squadron, burnt by its own people, every ship was carried off by the Athenians. Cyzicus was abandoned, both by the Peloponnesians and by the satrap; and next day, the

s. 13.

Athenian fleet approaching, the inhabitants immediately surrendered.

This important success, which left the enemy in a moment without a fleet, would of course go far to restore the animation of the armament, and the popularity of the commander. But the situation of Alcibiades was still of extreme difficulty. The government at home could not yet the more for his victory supply his armament. Instead therefore of prosecuting operations against the enemy, his first attention was necessarily still to be given to providing subsistence for his own people. Remaining twenty days at Cyzicus, he raised large contributions there. The historian remarks that the Cyzicenes experienced no other severity; Xen. Hel. 1. 1. c. 1. s. 13. as if he thought another general might not have been so indulgent; though in the defenceless state of their town, to have avoided contending with the united force of the Peloponnesians and the satrap, it should seem, could not very reasonably be imputed to them as a crime. s. 14.

The fleet then went to Perinthus and Selymbria, where contributions were also raised. Proceeding thence to Chrysopolis in the Chalcedonian territory, near the entrance of the Euxine, Alcibiades caused that place to be fortified, and established there a custom-house for levying a duty of a tenth in value of all cargoes passing the strait. This mode of collecting a revenue requiring force, he left, beside a garrison, thirty ships there, with Theramenes and Eubulus to command. With the rest of the fleet he returned to the Hellespont.

While Alcibiades was thus profiting from victory, the Peloponnesians were suffering distress, of s. 15. which a very remarkable picture remains, in the letter written to the Spartan government by Hippocrates, to whom the command-in-chief devolved on the death of Mindarus. It was intercepted by the Athenians, and, being reported in

the original dialect by Xenophon, is among the most curious and authentic specimens of Laconic writing. In any change of language it must suffer, but it ran nearly thus: "Success hath turned against us: Mindarus is slain: the men hunger: what to do we know not." These four short sentences made the whole of the dispatch.

Xen. Hel. 1. 1.
c. 1. s. 16.

The Peloponnesians however found an able and generous friend in the satrap Pharnabazus, who not only relieved their wants, but soothed their feelings: "Their loss in men," he said, "had not been great, and the mere loss of ships ought not to dispirit them: the king's dominions abounded with materials; and they should soon have another fleet." Distributing then to every man

s. 17.

of the armament a garment, and subsistence for two months, he sent the generals²¹ and commanders of triremes to Antandrus, at the southern foot of Mount Ida, where timber abounded, to superintend the construction of a fleet; directing that as many vessels should be built, for every state of the confederacy, as each had lost in the late action. That the seamen might not in the mean time be totally idle or useless, furnishing them with heavy armour, which was a gratification, inasmuch as an idea of superior honour was attached to the service of the heavy-armed, he appointed them to the guard of the maritime territory.

While the Peloponnesians were employed in building a fleet at Antandrus, the Antandrians themselves were busied in raising walls for the defence of their town. But among

²¹ Military and naval command were constantly, among the ancients, united in the same person; whence they had but one title for the commanders-in-chief in the two services. The complete separation of the two commands, with us, has produced distinct titles; and hence we are without a word to express the office which united the two, as the ancient languages are without terms to express the distinction. The term General here is not accurate, but we have none more so.

the numbers of the Peloponnesian armament, in this unavoidable intermission of military enterprise, some would have times of total leisure; and some, notwithstanding the endeavours of Pharnabazus to obviate the evil, would be likely to abuse that leisure. In these circumstances none, among the various people who composed the armament, behaved so unexceptionably toward the inhabitants as the Syracusans: and this was the more remarkable, as discipline was much less enforced by law among them than among any of the Peloponnesian forces, or even the Athenian; the Syracusan democracy being a constitution far less well regulated than the Athenian. But Hermocrates had

Xen. Hel. l. 1.
c. 1. s. 21.
B. C. 410.

been restored to the command of the Syracusan squadron; and he not only himself possessed the confidence of all under him, but he taught the superior officers to acquire the confidence of the inferior, and these that of the multitude. Thus a gradation of influence supplied the place of subordination enforced by penalty, and a strict discipline was founded upon reverence and affection. To effect this requires the most capacious mind united with the most refined temper, and is indeed among the most exalted efforts of human genius. The benevolence of Hermocrates led the way for those under his command to be benevolent, and the leisure of the Syracusans was employed in assisting the Antandrians in the construction of their fortifications. In gratitude for this kindness, a decree of the Antandrian people gave the freedom of their city to all the people of Syracuse.

Meanwhile Syracuse, led by faction, was preparing a most ungrateful return for its meritorious officers. Hermocrates and his colleagues, for he had not been intrusted alone with the chief command, were not only superseded, but, without a trial, without an opportunity to speak for themselves, and while they were ignorant even that they were accused, banishment was decreed against all.

The news of their being deprived of the rights of citizens, in their own country, reached them just as their good deeds had procured an extension of the rights of citizenship to every one of their fellow-countrymen; a privilege indeed little likely to be very advantageous to many individuals, but honourable to the commonwealth, as well as to the generals and army for whose sake it was given. The troops and seamen were called together, and Hermocrates spoke, for himself and his colleagues. "Irregular as the proceedings against them," he said, "had been, and unjust as the condemnation, they should nevertheless submit to the voice of their country; and, as their legal authority was abrogated, and their appointed successors not arrived, it would be proper for the armament to elect their own commanders for the interval."

Xen. Hel. 1. 1.
c. 1. s. 19.

His speech was answered with shouts from the soldiers and seamen, declaring their approbation of the conduct of their present generals, and their indignation at the illegal sentence against them. The principal officers not only declined to offer themselves for the command, but, in the name of the whole armament, desired that Hermocrates and his colleagues would hold it till the new generals should arrive. These, in reply, admonished to avoid whatever might bear any appearance of sedition. "The time will come," they said, "when, in a constitutional manner, we shall desire your honest support to us against a malicious prosecution. You will then declare how many battles you have fought, how many ships you have taken, what general success has attended you under our command; and you will relate the testimony of the whole confederate armament to your merit and ours, manifested in the post of honour which has been constantly assigned to us, upon all occasions, by sea and land." The admonition had the full effect proposed from it. Nothing disorderly en-

sued. A unanimous declaration only was made, that the generals were without blame, and the request was persisted in, that they would hold the command till their appointed successors arrived. Soon afterward Demarchus, Myscon, and Potames came from Syracuse, and the command passed into their hands without any commotion. The armament however showed that they would not have suffered any violence to the persons of their former generals; and most of the trierarchs entered into an agreement, upon oath, to exert themselves, on returning to Syracuse, for procuring their restoration to their country.

History affords few examples of so warm an attachment, in an armament, to the persons of their generals, united with so just a consideration of the welfare of the country, and of the constitutional authority of those to whose party principles they were adverse, and with whose measures they were highly and justly dissatisfied. Hermocrates, dismissed from his command, was still capable of serving the common cause, and of promoting those measures for ruining the power of Athens, for which he had long been zealous. He went to Lacedæmon, where he was honourably received, and he explained to the government Xen. Hel. 1. 1. c. 1. s. 22. there the state of things in Asia; particularly the conduct, the character, and the designs of the Persian satraps, the frank generosity of Pharnabazus, and the crafty interestedness of Tissaphernes.²² Having thus confirmed the resolution to carry on the war, and opened views to the means, and at the same time strengthened his own interest among the principal men of Lacedæmon, which might be important toward the promotion of his views at Syracuse, he returned

²² In consequence of the defective connection, already noticed, of the beginning of the narrative of Xenophon with the end of that of Thucydides, it seems not perfectly clear whether a second journey of Hermocrates to Lacedæmon is here intended, or the account relates only to that before noticed from Thucydides.

to Asia, where Pharnabazus received him with distinguished friendship. Not waiting for solicitation, the generous Persian was forward to relieve his wants and promote his wishes; especially giving money unasked. Hermocrates, thus furnished with means, prepared triremes and hired seamen, to assist the common cause in which already he had shown so much zeal and ability; and to assist afterward, if occasion should be, the party with which he was connected in his own country, and promote his restoration.

SECTION IX.

Effects of the naval Successes of the Athenians. — Re-enforcement under Thrasyllus. — His Transactions on the Ionian Coast. — Winter Campaign of Alcibiades. — Defeat of Pharnabazus. — Weakness of the Lacedæmonian Administration.

B. C. 410—409. THE affairs of Lacedæmon were at this time ill administered; while Athens, so lately supposed ruined in Sicily, and since upon the point of bringing destruction upon herself, was again raised toward a superiority over the Peloponnesian confederacy, though the Peloponnesian confederacy was supported by the wealth of Persia.

Xen. Hel. 1. 1. The effects of returning prosperity spread: a party in Thasos, in the Athenian interest, rose upon the Lacedæmonian harmost, and expelled him, together with those citizens who principally favoured the Peloponnesian cause. Pasippidas, who had been sent from Lacedæmon to take the command-in-chief on the Asiatic station, and had collected a small squadron at Chios, was accused of being privy to the revolt induced by bribes from Tissaphernes. What interest of Tissaphernes this measure was to promote, does not appear; but the accusation so far had credit at Sparta that Pasippidas was recalled and banished, and Cratesippidas was sent to succeed him in the command.

About the same time an occurrence within Attica itself, otherwise little important, contributed to raise the spirits of the Athenian people, and to confirm the hope which had begun to revive among them, that they should be finally superior in the war. Agis, marching out of Decelea for plunder, approached Athens. Thrasyllus, taking the command as a general of the establishment, led out the whole force of the city, and formed for battle near the gymnasium of the Lyceum. Agis had apparently not expected such a measure, only because in the whole course of the war the Athenians had hitherto avoided it. Being probably now not strong enough prudently to meet their numbers, he withdrew hastily; and the Athenian light-armed, following his retreat, made some slaughter of his rear. Great credit was given to Thrasyllus for his conduct on this occasion. The re-enforcement for the armament in the Hellespont, which it was his principal business in Athens to request, was voted with alacrity; a thousand heavy-armed, a hundred horse, and fifty triremes; and he was authorised to select the heavy-armed from among the citizens enrolled for that service. To give more security then to the communication by sea from Athens eastward, particularly with Eubœa, and perhaps to afford some protection to the silver mines of Laurium, Thoricum, near the Suniad promontory, was fortified, and a garrison established there.

Agis, not a prince of shining abilities, had however the merit of diligence in his command. On his first appointment he seems to have been highly satisfied with it; but the late turn in the fortune of war, in favour of Athens, was likely to render it less agreeable. Hitherto he had had a decided superiority; all Attica was either under his orders, or liable to the terror of his arms; and even the glory of conqueror of Athens seemed within his hope. But should the Athenians acquire a decided superiority in the Helles-

pont and on the Asiatic coast, should Alcibiades then return with his powerful fleet and troops flushed with conquest, and should the Persian satrap not furnish money to enable the Lacedæmonians to maintain, together with a powerful fleet, such a force through the year in Decelea, as the supplies to be obtained from their own confederacy certainly would not enable them to maintain; he might be reduced to act on the defensive, and risk even to be without means

to defend himself. Urged by these considerations,
Xen. Hel. 1. 1.
c. 1. s. 25. he sent a remonstrance to the government at

home. It was to little purpose, he observed, that he and the army with him had been so long using their diligence, by land, to deprive Athens of the produce of Attica, if the sea could furnish the city with that plenty, which, before his eyes, was continually passing into the harbour of Piræus. He therefore proposed that a squadron should be stationed at Byzantium and Chalcedon, to intercept the vessels from the Euxine, (for it was from the fertile shores of that sea

that Greece had long been accustomed to supply
Herodot. 1. 7.
c. 147. the deficiency of its produce in corn,) and he recommended Clearchus son of Rhamphias, a public guest of the Byzantines, for the command. The proposal was approved; fifteen ships were collected from the allied states, mostly from Megara, for there were none in the ports of Laconia; and, under the Spartan Clearchus, they sailed for their destination. In passing the Hellespont, three were taken by the nine Athenian guardships always stationed there: Clearchus was fortunate enough to reach Byzantium with the remaining twelve.

In spring the armament under Thrasyllus sailed
Xen. Hel. 1. 1.
c. 2. s. 1, 2.
B. C. 409.
Ol. 95. 3. * from Piræus. It was resolved that, before it
P. W. 23. joined the fleet under Alcibiades, something should

* This date is Dodwell's. Xenophon is far from being equally accurate with Thucydides in marking times and seasons; but, in the copies of his work

be undertaken in Ionia. Possibly, while Alcibiades occupied the attention of Pharnabazus and the Peloponnesian commanders, some part of that rich country might be recovered to the Athenian dominion. But if no lasting acquisition could be made, contributions might be levied; and, by hostile incursions, those supplies might be forced from the territories acknowledging the authority of Tissaphernes, which were no longer to be expected from that satrap's friendship. Thrasyllus, to give more efficacy to the armament he commanded, proposed to make more than former use of his rowers acting ashore. Usually they carried only the arms, offensive and defensive, of the light-armed: he provided them with those of the middle-armed or targeteers. Having then touched at Samos, he proceeded to the Milesian coast, and, debarking near Pygela, ravaged the country. A body of Milesians, coming to assist the Pygelians in the protection of their property, fell upon the Athenian light-armed, scattered in quest of booty, and put them to flight. But the Athenian targeteers, now numerous, were at hand; and supported by only two lochi of heavy-armed, they attacked the pursuing Milesians, and routed them with considerable slaughter. Two hundred shields were taken, and the success was thought important enough to warrant the erection of a trophy.²⁴

which have reached us, the year is specified as that of the ninety-third Olympiad; which, according to the chronologers, was the year 408 before the Christian era. Dodwell, unsatisfied with this, has preferred the date of Diodorus, and I will own myself without doubt that the date by the Olympiad has been an interpolation of transcribers, perhaps originally a marginal note. Nevertheless I must also confess myself unable to divide the years of the Peloponnesian war, from the time when the narrative of Thucydides ends, so that Xenophon and Thucydides may agree. Dodwell's boast may perhaps suffice for my apology: "Intelliget autem operis a nobis suscepti difficultatem, qui expenderit quid viri maximi tentarint in primis Xenophontis annis, Petavius et Petitus, nec tamen operam nostram supervacuum fecerint." Dodw. Ann. Xen. in ann. Bel. Pel. 21.

²⁴ The SHIELD, ἄσπις, always implies a heavy-armed soldier. Two hundred

Thrasyllus however did not follow the blow; whether he found the strength of Miletus too great, or any intelligence induced him to turn his arms another way. On the day following the action, re-embarking his forces, he proceeded to Notium, an Athenian colony; and marching thence to the neighbouring city of Colophon, where a strong party favoured the Athenian interest, he gained admission, and Colophon was restored to the Athenian alliance. On the next night he entered Lydia, burnt many villages, and collected much booty, chiefly money and slaves. Stages, a Persian who commanded in the neighbourhood, interfered with a body of horse, but with little effect.

Thus far successful, Thrasyllus resolved next upon a more important enterprise; but he seems to have been too long and too open in preparation. It became evident that he had a design upon Ephesus; and against Grecian arms Tissaphernes invoked efficaciously the aid of Grecian superstition; to which, as we have seen, he had been paying compliments, that, from a Persian of his high rank, appear extraordinary. He sent through the towns of his satrapy, urging that Diana was threatened, and it behoved all Greeks to exert themselves in her defence. It was not till the seventeenth day after the invasion of Lydia that Thrasyllus arrived off Ephesus. He debarked his forces in two divisions; the heavy-armed near mount Coressus; the horse, who would be but few, with the targeteers and light-armed, on the other side of the city, near the marsh.

Tissaphernes had already collected a large army at Ephesus. The Asian Greeks were nu-

targets, *πίλται*, taken would by no means have been of equal consequence, and two hundred light-armed slain would scarcely have been thought worth mention.

merous. The Syracusans, from the twenty ships destroyed near Cyzicus, and from five lately arrived from Syracuse, with the Selinuntines from two ships, were together perhaps five thousand men. The satrap himself headed a body of horse; and to all this were added the numerous population of the city. Such a force would not wait to be besieged by the small army of Thrasyllus. Taking advantage of his apparently faulty arrangement, in dividing his strength, they quickly overpowered his heavy-armed, pursued to the ships, and killed about a hundred. They proceeded then against the other division, less likely ^{Xen. Hel. 1. 1. c. 2. s. 7.} to make effectual resistance, and killed three hundred. For this double success they erected two trophies, and they decreed the Aristeia to the Syracusans and Selinuntines. The sum given upon the occasion was considerable, and presents were besides made to individuals who had distinguished themselves.

The spirit of Hermocrates seemed still to animate the Sicilian forces. Their conduct altogether was so acceptable to the Ephesians, that a perpetual immunity from taxes (probably those assessed upon strangers) was granted to all Syracusans of the armament, who might at any time reside in Ephesus: and the Selinuntines, having lately lost their home, (for Selinus had been taken by the Carthaginians,) were presented universally with the freedom of the city.

Thrasyllus after his defeat proceeded toward ^{s. 8.} the Hellespont. While he stopped at Methymne in Lesbos, the Syracusan squadron of twenty-five triremes (the munificence of Pharnabazus, seconded by the diligence of the Syracusan officers, having already repaired the loss at Cyzicus) was seen passing from Ephesus. Thrasyllus took four with their crews: the rest escaped back to the port whence they came. Among the prisoners one was remarkable: he was the first cousin of the general Alcibiades, and

of the same name. He had accompanied his kinsman in his flight when persecuted for the business of the Mercuries: but, instead of the Lacedæmonian, had engaged in the Syracusan service; and, apparently satisfied with it, under the admirable regularity which Hermocrates had established, he continued to fight against his country. Thrasyllus nevertheless gave him his liberty. The other prisoners, being sent to Athens, were put into the stone-quarries of Piræus, in retaliation for the confinement of the Athenian prisoners in the quarries of Syracuse. They were however less carefully guarded, or the prison was less secure; for, in the following winter, digging a passage through the rock, and flying by night, all escaped, some finding their way to Decelea, and the rest to Megara.

The successes of Thrasyllus seem to have been very inferior to the expectation formed of his expedition; and the delay in the junction with Alcibiades appears to have prevented that active general from undertaking anything of consequence against the enemy. Thirty triremes being stationed at the entrance of the Euxine, on the indispensable duty of collecting revenue, his force remaining in the Hellespont was unequal to great enterprise; and the occupation to which he was himself obliged principally to direct his attention was the maintenance of his forces. The summer was far advanced when he was joined by Thrasyllus at Sestos. He appears however to have had, then ready, a

s. 10. End
of Sept.

plan for winter operations. He conducted the whole fleet to Lampsacus on the Asiatic shore.

There the ships were as usual laid up. The town being without defence, he employed the troops in raising fortifications. But a point of honour occasioned some disturbance: those who had been serving under Alcibiades refused to rank with those newly arrived under Thrasyllus: they had been always conquerors; those under Thrasyllus were

tainted with the disgrace of defeat. Alcibiades seems not to have opposed a prejudice, dangerous only under weak command, and from which, on the contrary, abilities might derive advantage. He quartered them separately, and employed them separately on the fortifications.

From Lampsacus an extent of territory, subject to Persia, was open to inroad; but, in the neighbouring city of Abydus, Pharnabazus had his winter residence, attended by a large force of cavalry. Alcibiades led his army toward Abydus, purposely to invite a battle. The satrap unadvisedly met him; was defeated, and, being pursued by the small body of Athenian cavalry, led by Alcibiades, was saved only by the swiftness of his horse and the darkness of supervening night. After this action, in which the soldiers under Thrasyllus had their equal share, the rest of the army saluted them as cleared from dishonour, and no longer refused to join them in arms in the field, or associate with them in quarters. The victory deterring opposition from the enemy, several incursions were made into the country during the winter, with some profit to the Athenians, and extensive injury to those whom the power of the Persian empire ought to have protected.

Meanwhile the Lacedæmonian government was distracted by domestic disturbance. A rebellion Xen. Hel. 1. 1. c. 2. s. 12. had taken place among the Helots; a large body of whom, getting possession of some strong posts among the mountains, towards the Malean promontory, defended themselves with such successful obstinacy, that a capitulation was at length granted, allowing them to go and settle themselves anywhere out of the Lacedæmonian territory. While such was the derangement at home, able attention to distant concerns could hardly be. The pride of command however, and the jealousy of their prerogative over the republics of their confederacy, did not cease among the Lacedæmonians.

Little as they were able to support their colony of the Trachinian Heraclea, they were dissatisfied with that interference of the Thebans, which had probably saved it from utter ruin. They sent thither a new governor, who, in conjunction with the Thessalian Achæans, led the whole force of the colony against the Cœtæans, its perpetual enemies. The Achæans betrayed their allies, the governor was killed with seven hundred of his people, and the colony was thus reduced to a weaker state than when the Thebans interfered for its preservation.

SECTION X.

Important Successes of Alcibiades. — Friendly Communication opened with the Satrap Pharnabazus. — Embassies to the King of Persia. — Return of Alcibiades to Athens.

THE successes of Thrasybulus and Alcibiades having restored superiority to the Athenian arms, the next, and a most important object, was to restore to the commonwealth a revenue equal to the expenses of a war, which, long as it had lasted, was not yet likely to be soon concluded. Through the measures already taken, something accrued from the trade of the Euxine: but, to secure this, a large force must be constantly employed at great expense, and yet the enemy, from Byzantium and Chalcedon, could interrupt the collectors and share the profit. Alcibiades therefore resolved to direct his next measures against those two towns. They being recovered, the whole revenue from the trade of the Euxine would accrue to Athens, and her dominion, on the shores of the Propontis and Hellespont, would be restored to nearly its former extent. A decisive superiority on the Hellespontine coasts might induce Pharnabazus to treat; Tissaphernes would become alarmed for his Ionian towns, naturally the next objects for the Athe-

nian arms: and thus an opening might be gained for counterworking the negotiations of Lacedæmon, and stopping those supplies from Persia, which alone enabled the Peloponnesian confederacy to maintain its fleet.

With these views, in the twenty-fourth spring of the war²⁵, Alcibiades led his whole force to the island of Præconnesus. The Chalcedonians had suspected that attack would soon approach them, and this movement confirmed the suspicion. Immediately they stripped their country of every moveable of value; which however they would not trust within their city, but committed all to the care of their neighbours the Bithynians, a Thracian horde. Intelligence of this being carried to Alcibiades, he put himself immediately at the head of his cavalry, directed a select body of heavy-armed infantry to follow, and the fleet at the same time to attend his motions; and, going to the Bithynian frontier, he threatened fire and sword to the country, if all the Chalcedonian property was not surrendered to him, together with hostages and pledges to insure peaceful conduct from the Bithynians themselves. His demands were complied with, and he then directly formed the siege of Chalcedon.

Hippocrates, a Lacedæmonian, commanded in that city. He had sent information of his danger to Pharnabazus, who hastened to his relief with an army strong in cavalry; but the Athenians were so rapid with their works that they completed a contravallation, from sea to sea, except where a river interfered. Nevertheless Hippocrates, aware of the satrap's approach, sallied with the whole garrison, while the Persians endeavoured to force a passage through the works, by the bed of the river. Thra-

B. C. 408.
Ol. 92.4—93.1
P. W. 24.
After 25th
March.
Xen. Hel. 1. 1.
c. 3. s. 1.

Xen. Hel. 1. 1.
c. 3. s. 4, 5, 6.

²⁵ Or the twenty-fifth, as observed in a marginal reading of Leunclavius, in the Paris edition of 1625, which seems founded on the matter noticed in the twenty-third note of this chapter.

syllus opposed Hippocrates, and a fierce conflict was long equally maintained between them. Alcibiades in the mean time compelled Pharnabazus to retire, and then led his cavalry, with a small body of heavy-armed, to the assistance of Thrasyllus. Hippocrates was thus overpowered, himself killed, and his surviving troops fled into the town.

Xen. Hel. 1. 1.
c. 3. s. 7. After this successful action, Alcibiades committed the conduct of the siege to the generals under him, and passed himself to the Hellespont, to prepare for other enterprise, and at the same time to promote that business which was unceasingly requiring his attention, often to the interruption of enterprise, the collection of supplies. Meanwhile Pharnabazus, finding himself unable to relieve Chalcedon, sent proposals to the generals commanding the siege. His connection with the Peloponnesians had not answered his expectation: they had been defeated in every action they had attempted; several of the Grecian towns which acknowledged his dominion and their alliance, were already taken; the fate of Chalcedon was sure, if not prevented by a treaty; if the maritime towns of Æolis should next, be attacked, he was unable to protect them; and to judge of the future by the past, the Lacedæmonians were equally unable. His overtures were accepted by the Athenian generals, and an accommodation was shortly concluded on the following terms: "That Pharnabazus should pay twenty talents, about four thousand pounds, as ransom for Chalcedon: that the Chalcedonians should in future pay tribute to Athens as formerly, and should also pay all the arrears of tribute: that Pharnabazus should conduct ambassadors from Athens to the king: that till the return of the ambassadors the Athenians should commit no hostilities against the Chalcedonians." Apparently Chalcedon was to be considered still within the satrapy and under the protection of Pharnabazus; as formerly we have seen Potidæa

tributary to Athens, while under the sovereignty of Corinth.

Meanwhile Alcibiades having assembled the whole Grecian military force of the Chersonese, and a body of Thracian foot, with between three and four hundred horse, (for he had property in the Chersonese, and great personal interest among both Greeks and Thracians there,) he made himself master of Selymbria, on the northern coast of the Propontis, and was taking measures to form the siege of Byzantium. Pharnabazus, informed of his approach, sent to require his ratification of the agreement concerning Chalcedon. That agreement seems to have corresponded with the views of Alcibiades; but he nevertheless refused to confirm it by his oath, unless the satrap would enter into reciprocal obligation with the same ceremony; meaning, apparently, to assert his claim to equal rank. Pharnabazus however consenting, he crossed to Chrysopolis; where two Persians, Metrobates and Arnapes, attended to receive the oath from him, while Euryptolemus and Diotimus waited upon the satrap for the same purpose in Chalcedon. This public ceremony being concluded, private compliments and mutual assurances passed, that might form the foundation of an intercourse of friendship.

The next business to be arranged was that of the embassy to the Persian court. Euryptolemus and four other Athenians were appointed, together with two Argives. Intelligence of this being communicated to the Lacedæmonian generals at the Hellespont, excited considerable jealousy there. An embassy from Sparta was already at Susa; but application was nevertheless made to Pharnabazus, that other ministers might go at the same time with the Athenian and Argive, which he readily granted. Of no great abilities, but of an open generous disposition, averse to wily policy, the satrap seems to have meant equal friend-

ship to both parties, and to have proposed no advantage to himself but what might arise from general esteem. Pasippidas, the commander-in-chief, put himself at the head of the Lacedæmonian embassy; Hermocrates, the Syracusan, and his brother, Proxenus, still exiles from their country, accompanied him. Cyzicus was the appointed place of meeting for all, and Pharnabazus in person undertook to be their common conductor.

Matters being thus settled for the country on the Asiatic side of the Hellespont, so that his satrapy was in peace, Pharnabazus appears not to have concerned himself about Byzantium. The Lacedæmonian Clearchus commanded Xen. Hel. 1. 1. c. 3. s. 10, 11, 12. there. In addition to the inhabitants, he had some troops from old Greece, a small body of Lacedæmonians of those called Pericæcians and Neodamodes, some Megarians under Helixus, and some Bœotians under Cyratadas. The Athenians attempted all the modes of assault, known in that age, without success; but they completed a contravallation, and the place was soon pressed by famine.

Thus reduced to distress, while the Peloponnesian commanders, who should have endeavoured to relieve them, were passive, Clearchus formed the bold project of going himself to infuse vigour into their counsels, and collect a fleet with which to make a diversion, such as might compel the Athenians to raise the siege. He depended upon money from Pharnabazus. There were some triremes in the Hellespont, which Pasippidas had stationed for the protection of the maritime towns: some were just completed at Antandrus; Hegisippidas commanded a squadron on the Thracian coast. All these he proposed to assemble, and to promote the building of more. But Clearchus, though an able man, wanted the policy of Brasidas. The fame of the conciliating and liberal conduct of Brasidas, as Thucydides

assures us, continued, long after his death, to be extensively serviceable to the Lacedæmonian cause. Brasidas was considered as an example of the Lacedæmonian character, generally to the grievous disappointment of the people who allied themselves with Lacedæmon; for the governors or superintendents, placed in every city with the modest title of Harmostes, Regulator, assumed almost universally a despotic authority. Clearchus was not less despotic than the rest. When provisions began to fail in Byzantium, his soldiers from old Greece were still supplied; the Byzantine people were disregarded. General discontent ensued: an Athenian party had always existed in Xen. Hel. 1. 1. c. 3. & 13. the city; it now gained strength, and the absence of Clearchus added encouragement. While famine grew more and more pressing, communication was managed with Alcibiades; a gate was opened for him by night; the Athenian troops entered; and Helixus and Cyratadas, to whom the command had been committed by Clearchus, after some resistance, were compelled to surrender themselves prisoners.

The services which, by the reduction of Byzantium, Alcibiades had completed for his country, less brilliant than some, were yet perhaps, in importance, equal, and, by the union of ability and vigour displayed in an extensive and complicated command, in most difficult circumstances, even superior to what any Athenian or any Greek had ever before performed. When the forces first placed him at their head, Athens scarcely commanded more territory than its walls enclosed; revenue was gone, and the commonwealth depended for existence upon its fleet, which was at the same time dispirited and mutinous. He had restored loyalty to the fleet; he had restored dominion to the commonwealth; he had destroyed the enemy's fleet; and, under his conduct, the navy of Athens again commanded the seas: and, what was not least among the services, his successes and his

reputation, without solicitation or intrigue, had conciliated the adverse satrap Pharnabazus, and opened probable means for checking those sources of supply to the enemy, the failure of which would restore to Athens certain superiority

Xen. Hel. l. 1. c. 4. s. 4. in the war. In this state of things he thought he might with advantage revisit his country, whence he had been absent six years; and he proposed at the same time, as winter was approaching, to gratify the greater part of his forces with means of seeing their friends, and attending to their domestic concerns.

These being his purposes, after he had settled the affairs of Byzantium, and the other dependencies of the commonwealth on the Propontis and the Hellespont, he led the armament to Samos. Thence he sent Thrasybulus with thirty ships to the Thracian coast; and, the restored reputation of the Athenian arms seconding the measures of that active and able officer and statesman, all the cities which had lately revolted were quickly recovered. Alcibiades went himself with twenty ships to the Carian coast; and, in tribute or contribution, collected a hundred talents, about twenty thousand pounds, for the public treasury.

s. 5. On his return to Samos, reserving twenty ships, he sent the rest, under the conduct of Thrasyllus, to Attica. There was yet a strong party in Athens so inveterately inimical to him, though since the last revolution it had less dared to show itself, that he would not venture thither till the temper of the people should be more completely manifested, in the reception of the returning fleet. Meanwhile he went with his squadron to the coast of Laconia, under pretence of gaining intelligence of the enemy's designs, and of observing what was going forward in the port of Gythium.

s. 4. Information from his confidential friends reached him at sea, that he had been elected general of

the commonwealth, and that Thrasybulus, who was also absent, and Conon, alone of officers present, were appointed his colleagues. Upon this he made immediately Xen. Hel. l. 1. c. 4. s. 5. 25 Sept. for Attica. It happened that he entered the harbour of Piræus on the day of the Plynteria, a kind of mourning religious ceremony, when the statue of Minerva was veiled; and, though to any other Greek, such was Grecian superstition, not esteemed unlucky, on that day no Athenian dared transact any important business. Many people, as the contemporary historian tells us, considered this as an ill omen, both to Alcibiades and to the commonwealth.

Nevertheless, the approach of Alcibiades being a. 6. announced, a vast crowd attracted by curiosity, both from Piræus and from the city, assembled about the port. The general language was, “that Alcibiades was the most meritorious of citizens: that his condemnation had been the wicked measure of a conspiracy of men, who scrupled nothing to promote their own interest: that his abilities were transcendent; his liberality unbounded: his opposition to his country had been forced; his eagerness to return to its service proved his patriotic inclination. As for danger to the democracy, men like him had no temptation to innovate; the favour of the people gave him all the power and pre-eminence he could wish for. Accordingly he had never oppressed any: whereas his opponents had destroyed by assassination the most deserving citizens; and, if ever they appeared to possess any popular confidence, it was only when the death or exile of all better men left them without competitors for the leading situations in the commonwealth.”²⁶ While these were the sentiments sounded

²⁶ Αὐτοὺς δὲ μόνους λιφθέντας, δι' αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἀγαπᾶσθαι ὑπὸ τῶν πολιτῶν, ὅτι ἐτίσεις βελτίοισιν οὐκ εἶχον χρεῖσθαι. This expression of Xenophon strongly marks the distinction of ranks, yet existing in public opinion, among the Athenian people, when legal distinction was most exploded.

by the general voice, a few were heard to say less loudly "that Alcibiades had alone been the cause of all the past misfortunes, and it was to be feared he would still be the promoter of measures dangerous to the commonwealth." He was not yet so assured of the prevalence of sentiments in his favour, but that he approached the shore with apprehension. He even hesitated to quit his galley, till from the deck he saw his cousin-german Euryptolemus son of Pisanax, with others of his relations and confidential friends. Nor did even they trust entirely in the protection which the established government, hardly indeed yet established, could or would afford. They came prepared to resist any attempt that might be made against his person; and, surrounded by them, he proceeded to the city.

Xen. Hel. 1. 1.
c. 4. s. 8.

His first business, in regular course, was to attend the council of Fivehundred; his next, to address the general assembly. Before both, he took occasion to assert his innocence of the sacrilegious profanations, of which he had been accused, to apologise for his conduct during his banishment, and to criminate his prosecutors. Many after him spoke strongly to the same purposes; and the current of popular favour became so evident that not a word was heard in opposition to him, for the people, says Xenophon, would not have borne it. He was chosen, with a title apparently new, governor-general, or commander-in-chief with supreme authority²⁷, as the only person capable of

²⁷ Ἀπάντων ἡγεμῶν αὐτοκράτης. The title of the generals of the Athenian ordinary establishment was not Ἠγεμῶν, but Στρατηγός. Αὐτοκράτης was the term by which the Greeks afterward rendered the Roman title *Dictator*. What was the kind and degree of power committed to Alcibiades, with the title of Ἠγεμῶν αὐτοκράτης, does not clearly appear; but, as the Στρατηγός, the chief of the board of general officers, had, through his privilege of summoning at pleasure the general assembly, and of acting as representative of the commonwealth in communication with foreign states, large civil authority in addition to his military command, the Ἠγεμῶν ἀπάντων αὐτοκράτης would of course have all those powers, and some besides which the Στρατηγός did not possess.

restoring the former power and splendour of the commonwealth. So nearly allied we commonly find democracy with absolute monarchy; and not in effect only, but often in form also.

Soon after he was vested with this high dignity, opportunity offered for Alcibiades to gratify Xen. Hel. 1. 1. c. 4. s. 8. the people who conferred it, and to acquire at the same time, at an easy rate, no small addition to his renown through Greece. Since Decelea had been occupied by a Lacedæmonian garrison, the Athenians had never dared to make the mysterious procession of Ceres to Eleusis, according to the customary forms, along that called the Sacred Way: they had always passed by sea, and many of the prescribed ceremonies were necessarily omitted, or imperfectly executed. Alcibiades, with the forces from Asia, added to the former strength of the city, undertook to conduct the procession by land, and protect it in the fullest performance of every accustomed rite. He was completely successful; the train went and returned, escorted by the army, without an attempt from the enemy to give any disturbance.

With the new glory and new favour, acquired s. 9. in this mixture of military and religious pageantry, Alcibiades proceeded to direct the enrolment of the forces and the equipment of the fleet, with which he proposed again to cross the Ægean.

CHAPTER XX.

AFFAIRS OF GREECE FROM THE RETURN OF ALCIBIADES TO ATHENS TILL THE CONCLUSION OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR.

SECTION I.

State of the Persian Empire. — Cyrus, younger Son of Darius II. appointed Viceroy of the Provinces west of the River Halys. — Lysander Commander-in-chief of the Peloponnesian Fleet. — Sea-fight of Notium; and its Consequences.

WHILE prosperity was restored to the Athenian arms, under the conduct of Thrasybulus and Alcibiades, the Lacedæmonians had succeeded in negotiation, which might overbalance many victories. We have little authentic information of the detail of transactions in the interior of the Persian empire; but we learn that troubles there, frequently recurring, principally caused that weakness of the government, and failure of the extension of its energy to the distant provinces, whence, among other inconveniences, the satraps of Asia Minor were reduced to the necessity of so courting the Greeks that, by assistance from one party among them, they might be enabled to withstand oppression from another. The rich kingdom of Media, we find, had revolted; but in the year preceding the return of Alcibiades, through the exertions of Darius in person, it had been reduced to submission. Apparently, in the idea that his empire was too extensive and unwieldy to be duly and securely administered under a single government,

Xen. Hel. l. 1.
c. 2. s. 12.

Darius seems then to have had in view to divide it. Detaching a portion, as an appanage for Cyrus, his younger son, which, under able conduct, might form a very powerful kingdom, he could still leave for his eldest son, Artaxerxes, an empire scarcely less powerful, inasmuch as it would be more compact and manageable than what himself commanded. After the recovery of Media, the provinces bordering on the Grecian seas principally demanded his attention. But, growing infirm as he advanced in years, he found repugnance to undertake the troublesome task of regulating matters duly in regard to that nation of little military republics, by which, for near a century, himself and his predecessors had been constantly troubled, and sometimes materially injured. He therefore resolved to commit the business to Cyrus, a youth of great hopes, who seems to have wanted only a better education to have made him a great prince; but whose active and ambitious temper, never duly either restrained or directed, gave disturbance and excited jealousy in the seat of government.

Such nearly was the state of things in the Persian court, when a Lacedæmonian embassy, having Xen. Hel. 1. 1. c. 2. s. 1. made the journey apparently through the assistance of Tissaphernes, arrived there. The political circumstances of the empire had prepared a good reception for them. Being then uncontradicted probably in their assertions, as without competition in their solicitation, and paying their court ably and successfully to the young prince who was going to assume the command of the western provinces, they obtained the declared favour of the monarch to their confederacy; and particularly to Lacedæmon, in opposition to Athens. This important point being gained, they set out on their return to the coast of Lesser Asia.

Meanwhile Pharnabazus, with those ambassadors, Athenian and Peloponnesian, whom he had

B. C. 408.
P. W. 24.

undertaken to conduct to Susa, had proceeded in autumn as far as Gordium in Phrygia, where he passed the winter. In spring he was proposing to prosecute the journey, when the other ambassadors arrived on their return, accompanied by Persian officers commissioned to announce the approach of Cyrus, to take the command of the western provinces. This stopped Pharnabazus. Cyrus arriving soon after, the Athenian ministers applied themselves to win the favour of that prince, and engage him to their country's cause; but finding him immoveably attached to the Peloponnesians, they desired to prosecute their journey to the Persian court. Pharnabazus would still have assisted them, but Cyrus interfered: refusing them permission either to proceed on their embassy, or to return, he required that they should be delivered to him. The upright satrap, considering himself as their sworn protector, would not give them up; but it was long before he could obtain leave to send them home.¹

Xen. Hel. 1. 1.
c. 2. s. 5.

It was a rule, jealously observed by the Lacedæmonian government, (perhaps the treason of Pausanias might have given occasion for it,) that none should hold the command-in-chief of the fleet beyond a year; and perhaps it was from a congenial principle that the command of the fleet was not committed to the kings. After a long dearth of eminent men in Lacedæmon, some were now coming forward likely to give new vigour to her councils and new energy to her arms. Lysander, who succeeded Cratesippidas in the important command of the Asiatic station, was little of the ancient Spartan; but he was formed to advance himself and his country in a polished and corrupt age, when the simplicity of ancient manners had no longer its former esteem, and the simplicity of ancient policy no

¹ Our copies of Xenophon say three years; but archbishop Usher has supposed years to have been put for months by the carelessness of transcribers.

longer its former efficacy. Receiving his appointment early in winter, he passed to Rhodes; and, taking the command of a squadron which lay there, he proceeded to Cos and Miletus, and thence to Ephesus; where, with the ships he had collected by the way, he found himself at the head of a fleet of seventy triremes.

B. C. 408.
P. W. 24.
Xen. Hel. 1. 1.
c. 5. s. 1.

As soon as he heard that Cyrus was arrived at Sardis, he hastened, in company with the ambassadors newly returned from Susa, to pay his court there; and he found a most favourable reception. The prince told him, "that it was equally his father's command and his own inclination, to join the Lacedæmonians in zealous prosecution of the war against Athens; that he had brought with him five hundred talents (about a hundred and twenty-five thousand pounds sterling) for the particular purpose; and he would not spare his own revenue in the same cause;" adding, in the warmth of youthful zeal, and in the hyperbolical manner of the east, that he would "cut up the throne on which he sat," (which was of solid silver and gold,) "rather than means for prosecuting the war should fail." In the treaty concluded with the Persian court, it was stipulated, that the king should allow thirty Attic mines for the monthly pay of every trireme; which made three oboli, about fourpence sterling, for each man daily.² Encouraged by the prince's free promise, and not yet accustomed to the extravagance of oriental diction, Lysander proposed, that an Attic drachma, which was eight oboli, about tenpence sterling, should be allowed for daily pay to every seaman. "The increase of expense," he said, "though it might on a hasty view appear

B. C. 407.
P. W. 25.

Xen. Hel. 1. 1.
c. 5. s. 2.

s. 3. & 4.

² This, if all were paid alike, would give two hundred and sixty-six men to every trireme. Commonly we find, in the Grecian service, the pay of inferior officers and privates the same, and that of superior officers only double.

profuse, would in the end be found economical ; inasmuch as the desertion that would ensue among the enemy's seamen would, beyond all things, accelerate a happy conclusion of the war." Cyrus, who had not expected that such advantage would be taken of his warmth of expression, answered nevertheless, with much politeness, " that he doubted not the proposal was founded on a just view of things, but he could not exceed the king's command." Lysander, with the complacency of a courtier already formed, implicitly assented ; and the prince, satisfied altogether with his behaviour, invited him to supper. Wine usually circulated freely at a Persian entertainment, and Cyrus did not always stint himself to moderation. Lysander's manner and conversation were insinuating ; the prince's spirits were elevated ; and, drinking to Lysander after the Persian manner, he asked " what he could do for him that would give him most satisfaction." Lysander answered, " that nothing would gratify him equally with the addition of a single obolus to the seamen's daily wages." Pleased with the apparent disinterestedness and generosity of the Spartan general, the prince consented, and the pay was augmented accordingly. The armament was of course highly gratified ; and, whether his influence with the prince was considered, or his generous preference of the common welfare to his private emolument, for which such an opportunity seemed offered, very great credit accrued to Lysander.

The people of Athens were not apprised of the acquisition of the alliance of Persia by the Peloponnesian confederacy, when Alcibiades, in the third month after his return, sailed again from Piræus. His armament consisted of fifteen hundred heavy-armed foot, a hundred and fifty horse, and a hundred triremes. Aristocrates and Adimantus were appointed generals of the land forces under him.

Xen. Anab.

Xen. Hel. ut
ant.

Xen. Hel. 1. 1.
c. 4. s. 9.

He directed his course first to Andros, which had revolted. The islanders, assisted by a small body of Lacedæmonians, were rash enough to meet him in the field. They were defeated with some loss; but Alcibiades, finding their walls too strong to be readily forced, satisfied himself for the present with erecting a trophy for the little success obtained, and proceeded with his armament to Samos.

The intelligence which met him on his arrival, of the treaty concluded by Lacedæmon with Persia, the treatment of the Athenian ministers, and the favour of the young prince toward the Lacedæmonians, was highly unwelcome, and threw a damp on the spirits of the whole armament. It was not the military force, but the wealth of Persia that was dreaded, as it would give efficacy to the military force of the Peloponnesian confederacy; and a greater portion than before of that wealth was now likely to be ready for purposes of hostility to Athens. The active mind of Alcibiades was immediately turned to counterwork the effect of the Lacedæmonian negotiation, and circumstances affording hope occurred. According to the ancient policy of the Persian empire, the satraps, within the extensive country which was put under the command of the prince, retained still a share of independent authority in their respective satrapies. Nevertheless Tissaphernes, in a manner eclipsed by the prince's superior rank and power, and the greater splendour of his court, fell comparatively into neglect and contempt, particularly with the Lacedæmonians. Hence, notwithstanding his late injurious treatment of Alcibiades, it was thought interest might now possibly re-unite him with the Athenians, and through him means might be obtained for negotiation, from which some advantage might be drawn. Tissaphernes was actually gained; but he was in no favour with Cyrus, and all his endeavours to procure a reception for Athenian ministers were ineffectual.

This turn of things greatly injured Alcibiades both with the armament at Samos and with the people at home. His promises of Persian assistance, which he, and he only could procure, had first and principally led to his restoration. That assistance alone, he had said, and his confidential friends had always maintained, could save the commonwealth. Not only these promises had totally failed, but that important assistance had accrued to the enemy; and in a greater degree than he could ever promise it to Athens. He felt these circumstances, and was hurt by the temper of the armament which followed. His naval force was yet superior to that of the enemy; but quick decision alone probably could either secure his own situation in command, or avert

Xen. Hel. 1. 1.
c. 5. s. 6, 7.

impending ruin from the commonwealth. He led his fleet therefore to Notium, on the Asiatic shore, within view of Ephesus, where Lysander lay. Information came to him that Thrasybulus, who had wintered with his squadron in the Hellespont, was employed in fortifying Phocæa on the Æolian coast. Possibly Alcibiades thought it might be advantageous to withdraw himself till the moment offered for important action. He left his fleet however to go and concert measures with Thrasybulus, intrusting the command to Antiochus, but with strict orders to avoid a general engagement.

During his absence Antiochus, whether actuated by honest but injudicious zeal, or coveting a glory to which he could not honestly aspire, went with a few triremes to the harbour of Ephesus, as if to explore; but passed by the very prows of some of the enemy's fleet, as if to provoke pursuit. Lysander, who had now ninety triremes, was yet employed in improving the strength and condition of his fleet, without meaning to seek an action. The conduct of Antiochus induced him to order a few galleys to be hastily launched and manned, and to pursue. Notium was so near that this

movement could be seen there, and a superior force presently advanced to relieve Antiochus. Lysander being prepared, led out his whole fleet. The Athenians, not equally prepared, hastily, and as they could, in the exigency of the moment, put all their ships in motion. Lysander began the action with his fleet regularly formed. The Athenians, one after another endeavouring to get into the line, maintained the fight for some time, in a confused and scattered manner, but at length fled for Samos. Fifteen of their ships were taken, but most of the men escaped: Antiochus was among the killed. Lysander erected his trophy upon the headland of Notium, and carried his prizes to Ephesus.

This was a most mortifying event for Alcibiades. Xen. Hel. 1. 1. c. 5. s. 9. He hastened back to his fleet, and, highly anxious to repair its disgrace, he went to the mouth of the harbour of Ephesus, and offered battle. Lysander however, being considerably inferior in force, would not move, and Alcibiades returned to Samos.

The policy of the Lacedæmonian government Plut. vit. Alcib. seems to have met the vanity of Lysander in the endeavour to give more than its due splendour to the victory of Notium. Nine statues were dedicated Pausan. 1. 10. c. 9. s. 18. at Delphi on the occasion, the effigies of Lysander himself, of Hermon the master of his ship, and of Abas his soothsayer, with those of Castor, Pollux, Juno, Apollo, Diana, and Neptune. That victory, little in itself, became important, as Plutarch justly observes, by its political consequences. The credit of Alcibiades had already received injury among the ill-judging multitude of Athens. They held that he ought not to have left the revolted island of Andros unsubdued: yet there can be no doubt but he would have been inexcusable in wasting the time of his powerful armament upon that little object, when concerns of importance, so beyond comparison greater to the com-

monwealth, called him to the Asiatic coast. His commission excused him from that constant communication with the people, usually required of Athenian generals: but it might nevertheless be not difficult to persuade the people that the neglect of such communication was disrespectful, and marked an unbecoming arrogance: nor is it indeed improbable that Alcibiades may sometimes have used the ample powers committed to him in a more lordly style than prudence would justify. But, as Plutarch continues to observe, his very glory injured him: the people expected that nothing should resist the man to whom, whether serving or opposing his country, all had seemed hitherto to yield.

*Xen. Hel. 1. 1.
c. 5. s. 10.*

When information came that he had quitted Andros without subduing it, they bore the immediate disappointment; but it was with the daily expectation of intelligence that Chios and all Ionia were conquered. When therefore the news arrived that the fleet had fled before an inferior force, with the loss of fifteen ships, Athens was in uproar. Intelligence of a much more threatening misfortune, the alliance of Persia with Lacedæmon, communicated at the same time, made no comparable impression. The enemies of Alcibiades took immediate advantage of the popular temper; and those in the city were assisted by some who came from the fleet for the purpose.

Plut. vit. Alcib.

Of these Thrasybulus son of Thrason, mentioned on this occasion only in history, principally distinguished himself. An assembly of the people being convened, and curiosity eager for the detail of an unexpected and alarming event, Thrasybulus mounted the bema, and exclaimed vehemently against the commander-in-chief: "His pride," he said, "was intolerable, and his negligence of the public service shameful. His abilities indeed were great, but he was continually quitting the fleet, and while he pretended to be employed in raising contributions for public service, his

time was spent among Ionian courtezans, in the indulgence of the most extravagant luxury. In a station in view of the enemy's fleet, he had intrusted a command, involving the being of the commonwealth, to men who had no merit, but that of flattering his pride and ministering to his desires. The late ignominious disaster had had no other source. As for any regard for Athens or the Athenian people, it was evident he had none; and if, in consequence of a better knowledge of him, their partiality toward him should cease, he was prepared to do without them. While vested with so great a command, his attention had been more given to his estate in the Thracian Chersonese than to their service. A castle, which he had built there, was already prepared to receive him, in that second banishment which he so well deserved, and which he evidently expected."

Some mixture of known truths with the falsehood and malignity of this accusation probably assisted to give it efficacy. There seems to have been no ground for the imputation of negligence. Indeed some of those points in the character of Alcibiades, which were most exceptionable in his youth, appear to have been improved with increasing years and increasing experience; and, as passion cooled, and reason strengthened, and adversity instructed, the lessons of Socrates were remembered and had their effect. In his conduct since his restoration, whether in military or political business, neither rashness shows itself, nor dishonesty. On the contrary, all his projects appear to have been formed with singular prudence, as they were executed with singular vigour. However he may have failed in regard to the person to whom he intrusted the command of the fleet, during that short absence which proved so unfortunate, in every other instance his choice of assistants and deputies in command was judicious, liberal, and happy. The confidence which he continued always to give to Thra-

sybulus son of Lycus, and to Thrasyllus, at the same time conferred and reflected honour. But these considerations escaped the Athenian people; called upon, in a moment of indignation and anxiety, to decide upon a matter of the utmost consequence, and plied by the eloquence of interested men, while the information necessary for due discussion of the question was not before them. Without waiting to know how their general might apologise for his conduct, or what necessity, or what view of public service might have directed it, the multitude, whose momentary will decided, without control, the most important measures of executive government, passed the fatal decree. Thrasybulus was involved with Alcibiades; and thus the two men who were by experience, added to singular gifts of nature, beyond all others perhaps then in the world, qualified to relieve the commonwealth, in its almost desperate circumstances, were dismissed from their employments. Ten generals were appointed in their room, and the long list requires notice: they were Conon, Diomedon, Leon, Pericles, Erasinides, Aristocrates, Archestratus, Protomachus, Thrasyllus, Aristogenes.

How that balance in the powers of government at Athens, which Thucydides mentions to have been so judiciously established when the council of Fourhundred was abolished, had been already completely deranged, Xenophon gives no direct information; but, in the circumstances related by both writers, it remains suggested. Alcibiades, disappointed in his first great political purpose, of leading the aristocratical interest in Athens, and, through his ancient family connection with Lacedæmon, extending his influence over Greece, threw himself at once on the democratical interest; with the extraordinary success, followed by the rapid reverse, which we have seen. When his country, through

the evils which he principally brought on it, was prepared to make terms with him, he preferred an aristocratical or oligarchal party for his future support. But, finding himself presently deceived by the persons actually leading those interests in Athens, so that democracy was his only resource, it was an unbalanced democracy only that could answer his purpose; because an unbalanced democracy only would give him that plenitude of authority which could enable him to overbear the aristocratical and oligarchal parties, so determined in opposition to him. Re-established then through the democratical interest, yet in the necessity of absenting himself on command abroad, his power failed for controlling the movements of faction at home. How parties were at the time divided, and how little, notwithstanding the rash vote for the deposition of Alcibiades and Thrasybulus, any one held a clear superiority, is indicated in the composition of the new board of generals. Pericles was a near kinsman of Alcibiades; Aristocrates had been his general of infantry in his last command; Thrasyllus, one of his most active partisans, and among those whom, as an officer, he had most favoured and trusted. But Conon, the first of the ten, a man of superior qualifications, appears to have been not his friend. Meanwhile Epigenes, Diophanes, and Clisthenes, men of high birth, but in no office, led the mob, and led it to the most despotic measures. On the vague accusation of being unfriendly to the multitude³, some, who had taken part with the Fourhundred, were condemned without trial, by a single vote of the general assembly, and executed; many suffered confiscation of their property, some were banished, some incapacitated for honours and public employments; some were compelled to purchase their safety.

Lys. Δημ.
καταλυσ.
ἀπολογ.
p. 74. 1. vel.
178.

³ Οὐκ εὐνοῦς τῷ πλῆθει.

Xen. Hel. 1. 1.
c. 5. s. 10.

In this state of things, not indeed actually summoned, but if he appeared, of course to give an account of his conduct, and probably to defend himself against impeachment, Alcibiades not unreasonably avoided to trust his fate to such a judicature as the assembled Athenian people. Thrasybulus, less obnoxious to the jealousy of party, seems to have remained with the fleet, retaining the command of his trireme. Alcibiades retired to his estate in the Thracian Chersonese.

SECTION II.

Conon Commander-in-chief of the Athenian Fleet; Callicratidas, of the Peloponnesian. — Mitylene besieged by Callicratidas. — Sea-fight of Arginussæ.

B.C. 407 .P.W.
25. Xen. Hel.
1. 1. c. 5. s. 11.

CONON, at the time of his appointment to be one of the new generals-in-chief, was absent, being employed in the siege of Andros, where he commanded. A decree of the people directed him to go immediately, with the squadron of twenty ships under his orders, and take the command of the fleet at Samos. It was already late in the year, and on his arrival at Samos he found a dejection in the armament not inviting to great undertakings. Fortunately the enemy's fleet was not yet so strong as to encourage enterprise. His first measure then, and apparently a measure of absolute necessity, was precisely that which had been so objected to Alcibiades, as to be made a ground of his impeachment. Selecting seventy triremes, and strengthening the crews by drafts from above thirty more, Conon divided them into squadrons, which were sent various ways; and they were successful in executing his orders to collect contributions and plunder, in those parts of the coast of Asia and the neighbouring islands which

acknowledged the dominion of Persia or the alliance of Lacedæmon.

In the ensuing winter, Callicratidas was sent from Sparta to take the command-in-chief of the Peloponnesian fleet. Callicratidas, widely different from Lysander, was one of the purest models of the old Spartan character; a zealous and sincere disciple of the school of Lycurgus.⁴ On his arrival at Ephesus, Lysander told him, that he resigned to him a victorious fleet which commanded the seas. Callicratidas replied, "Pass then with your fleet to the westward of Samos, and deliver up the command to me in the harbour of Miletus." The Athenian fleet lay at Samos, and passing to the westward of that island would put a general action in the choice of the Athenian admiral. Lysander excused himself by alleging, that in so doing he should go beyond his duty, since the officer appointed to supersede him was arrived. Callicratidas, gratified with the implied acknowledgment that the fleet was not strong enough to meet the enemy, made it his first business to increase its force. He sent to Chios, Rhodes, and other states of the confederacy; and, having thus collected fifty triremes, which made his number altogether a hundred and forty, he then proposed without delay to seek a battle.

⁴ Barthelemi has not scrupled (c. 42. p. 103. vol. 4. ed. 8vo) on the authority of so late a writer as Ælian, given also in not the clearest terms, to affirm that Callicratidas, Lysander, and Gylippus were all born in that class of freemen of Lacedæmon, which was of acknowledged servile origin; and he adds, "that they obtained the full rights of citizens only as the reward of signal exploits," for which he seems to have had no warrant whatever. He appears to have forgotten that Gylippus was son of Cleandridas, who held the high station of regent during the minority of Plistoanax son of Pausanias, and that it was the clear dignity of a Spartan, which, according to Thucydides, made him a fit person for the Sicilian command. If we may trust Plutarch, whose authority is at least as good as Ælian's, and whose assertion incomparably more probable, Lysander was of the Heraclidean family, esteemed the first in Greece. But Herodotus, Thucydides, and Xenophon all make it sufficiently evident that, in their time, no men of servile, or any other neodamodæ families, as they were called, could reach those high situations, under the Spartan government, which Gylippus, Lysander, and Callicratidas held.

The condescending politeness of Lysander, so different from what was usually experienced in Spartan commanders, his apparent disinterestedness, and his attention to the welfare of those under him, together with the ability he had shown in every kind of business, had rendered him highly acceptable to the armament and to the allied cities. Callicratidas had not been long in his command, before he discovered that some of the principal officers, devoted to his predecessor, were forming a party against him. They not only obeyed negligently and reluctantly, but endeavoured to excite discontent in the armament, and especially among the allies. "The system of the Lacedæmonian administration," they said, "was most impolitic. Such continual change of the person at the head of things must produce immoderate inconvenience. A most important naval command thus fell into the hands of men unversed in naval affairs; and those, who had had no communication among the allies, were to preside over the interests of the allies. The consequences would be ruinous, both to the allies and to the fleet."

The measure taken by Callicratidas to obviate this dangerous cabal, as it stands reported by the contemporary historian, strongly marks his character. Calling together Xen. Hel. 1. 1. c. 6. s. 5. the Lacedæmonians of the armament, he spoke to them in the following style of laconic eloquence: "I could be very well contented to stay at home; and if either Lysander, or any other, pretends to more skill in naval command, I shall not gainsay it. Being however, by the appointment of the Lacedæmonian government, admiral of the fleet, it is my business to act in that situation to the best of my ability. I therefore now require your advice. You know, as well as I, what the purpose of the government is, which I am anxious to have duly performed. Will it then be better for me to remain here; in which case you

will give me your zealous co-operation ; or shall I go home and relate the state of things ?” This speech had in a great degree the desired effect. All were anxious to obviate accusation at Sparta ; and all were in consequence forward to demonstrate, both by word and deed, that they meant no resistance to the legal commands of the Lacedæmonian admiral, and no backwardness in the service of the confederacy.

Xen. Hel. 1. 1.
c. 6. s. 6.

The difficulties of Callicratidas however did not end here. His rough manners, ill accommodated to relieve, on the contrary irritated the regret of his predecessor for the loss of a very high situation ; and his simple and unsuspecting honesty did not conceive any political necessity for condescending communication with the man whom he came to supersede, not for any pleasure of his own, but for the service of his country. Lysander had a large sum of money remaining, of what had been committed to him by Cyrus for the pay of the fleet. No way desirous of gratifying Callicratidas, he would not make it over to him, but, to earn credit with the prince by a display of his economy, returned the whole into the Persian treasury. Callicratidas immediately found himself in want. He made however no difficulty of going to the court of Sardis, to ask for a supply, which he supposed was to be issued of course : but to provide for a favourable reception by any previous intrigue or any ceremonious compliment, or to obviate any ill impression that Lysander or the friends of Lysander might have made, did not come within his imagination. On arriving at Sardis, he applied for an audience. He was answered that he must wait two days. Patience was a Spartan virtue, and he did not immediately feel the affront. But, on going according to the appointment, he met still with procrastination ; and as he repeated his fruitless attendance in the antichambers, everything he saw, the pomp, the

insolence, the servility, which struck his first notice, and the faithlessness and venality, which soon became evident, all excited his indignation. At length, in complete disgust, he departed without having seen the prince, and with his business in no part done, exclaiming “that the Greeks were indeed wretched who would so truckle to barbarians for money! He saw,” he said, “what would be the consequence of their quarrels among one another; and if he lived to return home, he would do his utmost to reconcile Lacedæmon with Athens.”

On arriving at Ephesus, his first care was to move his fleet from a place so near Sardis, and so immediately under the control of Persia. Conducting it to Miletus, whose people preserved more independency, he sent a small squadron home for a supply of money. For interme-

Xen. Hel. 1. 1.
c. 6. s. 7, 8.

mediate need he obtained a loan from the Milesians and Chians, and he then proceeded to employ the force he had collected, his fleet consisting of a hundred and seventy triremes. Methymne in Lesbos was his first object, and he took that city by assault. All the effects were given up for plunder, and the slaves were collected in the market-place, to be sold for the benefit of the

s. 9.

armament. The allies proposed the sale of the Methymnean citizens; but Callicratidas, with a spirit of liberal patriotism, of which instances are rare in Grecian history, declared that, “where he commanded, no Greek should be made a slave.”

While Callicratidas had been so increasing his fleet, Conon adhered to the different system which, on first taking the command, he had adopted, reducing the number of his triremes, to have more select crews. If we may guess at the purpose, of which we are not positively informed, he was urged by the same deficiency of supplies from home, which had not a little interrupted the operations even of

Alcibiades, and, beside a strict parsimony, made every attention to the collection of contributions necessary. With select ships, and select crews, he could be quicker in his motions, make sudden attacks upon defenceless places, pursue merchant-ships or small squadrons, and avoid an enemy too strong to be opposed: and hence apparently Xen. Hel. l. 1. c. 6. s. 10. the expression which Xenophon reports of Calli-
 cratidas, that he would stop “Conon’s adultery with sea ⁵ ;” implying, that it was not by a fair superiority, but through a furtive kind of success, that Conon had appeared in some degree to command that element.

The Peloponnesian fleet was lying at Methymne, when Conon’s fleet of seventy triremes was seen passing. Calli-
 cratidas pursuing endeavoured to intercept its retreat to Samos. Conon fled for Mitylene; but the Peloponnesian rowers exerted themselves with such s. 11, 12.
 vigour that Callicratidas entered the harbour with him. Compelled thus to fight against numbers so superior, the Athenians lost thirty triremes, the men however escaping. The other forty triremes they secured by hauling them under the town wall, so as to be protected from the battlements. Callicratidas, stationing his fleet in the harbour, and sending for infantry from Methymne and Chios, formed the siege of Mitylene by sea and land. After these successes, unasked supplies came to him from Cyrus.

The situation of Conon meanwhile was highly s. 13.
 distressing. The city was populous and unprovided; and not only he was without means to procure supplies, but he was at a loss for means even to send information of his distress. To attempt this however was necessary. For the defence of his triremes, lying on the beach, a guard from his land forces was placed in each. From two of them

⁵ Κόνωνι δὲ εἶπεν, ὅτι παύσει αὐτὸν μοιχῶντα τὴν θάλασσαν.

of known swiftness he moved the soldiers ⁶ before day, and put, in their stead, crews of his best rowers, who gave place again to the soldiers after dark. This was repeated four days. On the fifth, at noon, the apparent inattention of the enemy, while their crews were ashore at their dinner, seemed to afford the wished-for opportunity: the two triremes pushed out of the port; and, according to orders, one directed its course westward, immediately for Athens, the other northward toward the Hellespont. This however could not be done unseen by the enemy. In some confusion, cutting the cables ⁷ of some of their ships, they were quickly in pursuit; and one of the Athenian triremes was taken about sunset the same day: the other reached Athens.

The exertion which the Athenian commonwealth was still able to make, after all its losses and all its internal troubles, shows extraordinary vigour in the system which owed its origin to the daring genius of Themistocles, and its improvement and permanence to the wisdom of Pericles; yet which perhaps could never have existed, or could not have lasted, but for the well-constructed foundation which the wisdom of Solon had prepared. The circumstances required every effort. A hundred and ten triremes were equipped and manned: but, for this, not only every Athenian citizen, of the two lower orders, within age for foreign service, but many of the order of knights, who on all common occasions were exempt from naval service, embarked; and, all being insufficient, numerous slaves were added to complete the crews. The whole number wanted would not be so few as twenty thousand. In thirty days however this numerous fleet was ready for sea: the ge-

⁶ Τοὺς ἐπιβάτας. Xen. Hel. 1, 1. c. 6. s. 14.

⁷ Τὰς ἀγκύρας ἀποκόπτοντες.

nerals, before appointed, were directed, as admirals, to take the command, (for, in speaking of the Greek naval service, we have continual difficulty to choose between these titles,) and under the orders of those who were at the time in Athens it proceeded to Samos. Ten Samian triremes re-enforced it there; and, requisition ^{Xen. Hel. 1. 1. c. 6. s. 18.} being sent to the other allied and subject states for the utmost naval force that they could furnish, allowing no able-bodied citizens to avoid the service⁸, an addition was thus collected which made the whole upward of a hundred and fifty: its course was then directed towards Lesbos.

At the time of Conon's defeat, Diomedon, ^{s. 16.} another of the ten generals, was cruising with a separate squadron of twelve ships. Receiving information of his colleague's distress, he made an effort, apparently with more zeal than judgment, to relieve it. Callicratidas took ten of his ships: Diomedon himself escaped with the other two.

The Spartan admiral was yet with his whole ^{s. 19.} force at Mitylene, when intelligence reached him that a powerful fleet from Attica was arrived at Samos. Leaving then fifty triremes, under Eteonicus, to continue the blockade, he went with a hundred and twenty to meet the enemy. The same evening putting his people ashore, according to the usual practice, upon the head- ^{s. 20.} land of Malea in Lesbos for their supper, as night came on he discovered the fires of a naval camp on the little island of Arginussæ, between Lesbos and the main: and, soon after, information was brought him that the Athenian fleet was there. About midnight he weighed, proposing a surprise; but a thunder-storm compelled him to wait for day.

⁸ Ἐσθλῶν ἀναγκάσαντις ἄπαντας.

Early in the morning the approach of the enemy became known to the Athenian commanders, who immediately embarked their crews, steered southward for the open sea, and formed their order of battle. Eight of the ten generals of the commonwealth were aboard the fleet. Xenophon informs us, but without accounting for it, that the Peloponnesian ships were at this time generally swifter than the Athenian; so that, since the first years of the war, the circumstances of naval action were inverted, the Lacedæmonians proposing to profit from rapid evolution, while the Athenians directed their principal care to guard against it. The Lacedæmonian fleet therefore was formed in a single line. The Athenian order of battle was remarkable: each of the eight generals commanded a squadron of fifteen ships; and the eight squadrons, in two lines, formed the wings of the fleet. The allies held the centre, in a single line; and with them were posted thirteen Athenian captains. Of these Thrasybulus, Theramenes, and another, not named, had formerly commanded as admirals; the other ten held the rank of taxiarch in the land service, which seems to have been superior to that of trierarch in the navy. The attention to rank, here marked by Xenophon, deserves notice, as it was less to be expected in a democracy, and as it accounts for the regularity with which the Athenian military service was conducted, while, in some of the Grecian democracies, subordination was very defective.

[* “ The battle of Arginussæ was fought in the year of *Callias*: Athenæus (v. p. 218.) confirms Diodor. xiii. 97—100. in assigning the battle to that year, not long before the *Apaturia* (Xenoph. Hell. i. 7, 8.), which were in the month *Pyaneption*: Theophrast. Char. 3. Harpocr. v. Ἀπατούργια. Schol. Aristoph. Acharn. 146. This action may therefore be fixed to the third month of *Callias*, Boëdromion of B. C. 406. It is placed in the year of *Antigenes* by Schol. Ran. 33. τῶν προτέρων ἔστι (the year before the *Ranæ*), ἐπὶ Ἀντιγένοῦ (l. Ἀντιγένους); ὅτε περὶ Ἀλκιβιάδου ἐνίκησαν ναυμαχίᾳ. But that this is erroneous is manifest from the times of Alcibiades; who in Boëdromion of that archon was yet at Athens.” Clinton, *Fasti Hellen.* p. 271.]

Xenophon seems to have thought the disposition of the Athenian fleet judicious, and the master of the Spartan admiral's ship, Hermon, a Megarian, apparently saw that it was. More experienced probably in naval affairs than his commander, he augured ill of the approaching battle, and advised retreat from superior numbers. Callicratidas answered with the spirit of a disciple of Lycurgus, but not with the judgment which the great command intrusted to him required, "that his death would be a small loss to Sparta, but flight would be disgraceful."

Xen. Hel. 1. 1.
c. 6. s. 23.

The fleets met, and the action was long disputed in line. Various exertions then broke the regularity of order, and still the fight was maintained for some time with much equality. At length Callicratidas, who commanded in the right wing of his fleet, in the shock of his galley striking an enemy with the beak, fell overboard and perished. About the same time the Athenian right, commanded by Protomachus, made an impression upon the Peloponnesian left: confusion spread to the right, no longer directed by the orders or animated by the exertion of the commander-in-chief, and shortly the whole fled. Above seventy triremes were either destroyed or taken; of the Lacedæmonian squadron, consisting of ten, only one escaped. Twenty-five⁹ Athenian ships were sunk or disabled.

s. 24.

When pursuit ended, the Athenian admirals held a council of war, to consider of measures next to be taken. To collect the wreck and the dead, but more especially to relieve the living who might be floating on the ruins of galleys, or endeavouring to save themselves

s. 25. & c. 7.
s. 3. & 10.

⁹ In Xenophon's account of the battle, twenty-five is the number of ships mentioned as lost, together with their crews. In a following passage (c. 7. s. 10.) twelve only are stated to have been lost; and the context proves that in the latter passage there has been no error in transcription. Unable more satisfactorily to reconcile the contradiction, I have stated the twenty-five as sunk or disabled.

by swimming, was commonly an important business after naval action. Diomedon proposed that this should be the first concern of the whole fleet. Erasinides, on the contrary, was for proceeding immediately with the whole fleet to the relief of Conon, the primary object of their instructions. The enemy's fleet under Eteonicus, he said, were due diligence used, might be taken entire; the destruction of their navy would thus be nearly complete; and the exigencies of the commonwealth required that such an opportunity should not be lost in the endeavour to save the wrecked, which the growing roughness of the weather would render utterly unavailing. Thrasyllus differed from both: he insisted that, as the fleet was equal to both services, neither the relief of the wrecked should be neglected, nor assistance to Conon delayed. His opinion prevailed; and it was resolved that forty-six ships should remain to collect the wreck, while the rest of the fleet proceeded to Mitylene.

In this affair, which had important consequences, there appears some mystery, of which, whether party-spirit or private friendship, or whatever may have caused the reserve, it may be suspected that Xenophon knew more than he has

Xen. Hel. 1. 1.
c. 6. s. 25.

chosen to unfold. None of the generals took the command of the large squadron appointed to the relief of the wrecked; it was committed to Theramenes and Thrasybulus, who both had held high naval commands, but were then in the situation only of captains of triremes. To make the appointment more respectable, some of the taxiarchs were ordered upon the duty with them. All the generals were meanwhile to go, with the main body of the fleet, to Mitylene. Neither measure however could be

s. 24, 25, 26.

executed. The increasing violence of the storm compelled all to seek the shelter which the Arginussan islands afforded; and the unfortunate crews

of twelve ships, wrecked in the battle, were thus left to perish.

In the night nevertheless one of those small light vessels called keletes, which had attended the Peloponnesian fleet for the purpose of carrying intelligence or orders, reached Mitylene with news of its disaster. Eteonicus, who commanded the blockade, ordered the captain to go to sea again immediately, observing the most careful secrecy, and to return into the harbour by broad daylight, with his crew wearing chaplets, as was usual for the messengers of victory, and proclaiming that Callicratidas had destroyed the Athenian fleet. This was punctually executed. Eteonicus then, assembling his troops in sight of the Mitylenæan ramparts, performed the evangelian sacrifice, the thanks-offering for good news, and, at the conclusion of the ceremony, ordered that all should immediately take their supper. Meanwhile he caused his principal stores to be embarked in the vessels of burden attending his fleet: the crews of the triremes were then hastened aboard: and, the wind being favourable, all sailed for Chios, while, after setting fire to his camp, he led the infantry to Methymne.

These unexpected motions of the besieging armament, which were so ably conducted as to give no opportunity for advantage against it, first intimated to Conon the defeat of Callicratidas. Hastening to launch his triremes, he met the victorious fleet already approaching from Arginussæ, and himself communicated the information that his deliverance was already complete. The fleet then went to Chios; but, no opportunity offering for any blow against the enemy, it proceeded to Samos, the usual station.

Xen. Hel. 1. 1.
c. 6. s. 27.

s. 28.

SECTION III.

Impeachment of the Generals who commanded at the Battle of Arginussæ.

THE victory of Arginussæ, the greatest obtained by the Athenians during the war, above seventy ships, with probably more than ten thousand men, having been lost by the enemy, might have gone far to procure final success to Athens, had Athens had a government capable of any steadiness, or even secure against acts of madness. Fruitful of superior men, she never had more citizens equal to the conduct of the greatest affairs than at this time. At least three, Alcibiades, Thrasybulus, and Conon, already of large experience in great commands, and yet in the prime of life, were scarcely inferior to any known in her annals. But, since the restoration of democracy, the people, frantic with the wild joy of recovered power, and not less mad with jealousy of superior men, were more than ever dupes to the arts of designing orators: and, like a weak and fickle tyrant, whose passion is his only law, though no single tyrant can really be so lawless, were led as the flattery, or the stimulation, most in consonance with the passion of the moment, pointed the way.

Hence followed one of the most extraordinary, most disgraceful, and most fatal strokes of faction recorded in history. Of the eight generals who commanded at the battle of Arginussæ, only Protomachus and Aristogenes remained with Conon at Samos: Diomedon, Pericles, Lysias, Aristocrates, Erasinides, and Thrasyllus went home; little expecting what was to meet them there. Matters had been prepared by intrigues, which remain known only by their effects. A decree of the people had deprived all the generals of their command, Conon only excepted,

Xen. Hel. 1. 1.
c. 7. s. 1.

to whom Adimantus and Philocles were given for new colleagues. As soon as the six arrived, Erasinides was arrested. Archedemus, then the popular orator, and considered as head of the democratical interest, had preferred an accusation against him for embezzling public effects out of ships in their passage from the Hellespont, and for other misconduct in his command; and the court¹⁰, before which the charge was exhibited, ordered the victorious general to prison. It remained then for the other five to give, before the council, an account of transactions under their orders. At the conclusion it was moved by Timocrates, that all should be put in safe custody, to answer before the people for their conduct. The council accordingly ordered all the five into confinement.

When the assembly of the people met, Theramenes came forward as the principal accuser; Theramenes, to whom, with Thrasybulus, when in the situation of simple trierarchs, the accused generals had intrusted the command of a fleet of forty-six triremes, with the charge of saving those wrecked in the battle of Arginussæ; yet the crime now alleged against the generals was the neglect of that very duty. Xenophon has not accounted for this apparent contradiction.¹¹ The council however proceeded to the grossest and most tyrannical oppression. The accused were not allowed to conduct their defence in the usual form: advantages which the law positively prescribed were denied them: and each was permitted only to make a short speech to the people.

Thus restricted, all made nearly the same apology.

¹⁰ Τὸ δικαστήριον.

¹¹ The account of Diodorus, differing in some small circumstances from Xenophon's, agrees in the result. It assists indeed little to explain; but it tends to establish the fairness of Xenophon, who, as a contemporary, acquainted with some of the persons concerned, and interested in the event, might otherwise be supposed liable to some partiality.

“After a most glorious victory,” they said, “they had taken upon themselves a very important and urgent duty, the pursuit of the enemy, and the relief of the besieged armament. In the mean time the care of the wrecked, as far as depended on them, had not been omitted or slighted: it had been intrusted to officers whom none would deny to be competent for such a duty, to officers who had distinguished themselves in great commands and arduous enterprises. If then there had been failure, those alone were fairly accountable to whom the execution had been committed. It was however not their purpose to accuse: injurious treatment should not provoke them to be unjust: they imputed to none any failure in duty; well knowing that the violence of the supervening storm rendered the saving of the wrecked impossible. For this there was no want of respectable witnesses: every master of the fleet would bear testimony to it: and many persons actually saved from the wrecked ships knew it; among whom was one of the generals included in the present accusation.”

Xen. Hel. 1. 1.
c. 7. s. 4.

A short speech to this purpose having been made severally by each of the generals, the question was put. It was evident that the majority of the assembly was for the acquittal of the accused. But the party, which had resolved on their destruction, had on their side the presidents and a majority of the council. Their resource therefore was to procure a declaration from the presidents, “That in the dusk of evening, then advanced, the number of hands could not be distinguished, and that the decision must be referred to the next assembly.” Acquiescence under this determination seems to have encouraged them to push their point, and they proceeded to move, “That in the interval the council should consider and determine, in what manner, in the next assembly, the trial should be conducted.” To move any question, when it had been already decided

that the assembly could not proceed to a division, seems a strange incongruity; but the motion made shows that they depended upon the passions, and not upon the reason of the people. It was no less than a proposal for authorising the council to dispense with the forms, established by the constitution, for the security of the subject in cases of criminal accusation. But the party was strong, and the body of the people thoughtless and impatient: the friends of the accused were apparently surprised, and perhaps fearful of irritating the hasty and unwary: the question was carried without a division, and the assembly was dismissed.

Having thus obviated the acquittal of the unfortunate generals, which, according to Xenophon, a majority of the assembly had actually pronounced, and which wanted only the declaration of the presidents to give it effect; having procured authority for the council to substitute, at their pleasure, any mode of trial instead of that prescribed by law, the party were still apprehensive that they might fail of their purpose; and the consequence of failure, in so violent an effort of faction, would probably be ruin to themselves. Recourse was therefore had to a kind of oratory, Xen. Hel. 1. 1. c. 7. s. 5. suited to excite that popular passion which would favour their views. It was the season of the Apaturia, a festival derived from patriarchal times, in which families assembled, and the chief of each received a kind of homage from its members. A number of persons, clothed in black, and with their heads and beards close shaven, as was customary in mourning, were procured to show themselves about the city, as relations of those lost in the storm, after the battle of Arginussæ. This artifice was not without effect among the lower people. Meanwhile, in the council, the business was managed by Callixenus, a member, who succeeded to the utmost wish of his party.

When the assembly was held to decide the fate of the

generals, Callixenus came forward to report the resolution of the council, which was to guide the proceedings. The resolution, as it stands reported by Xenophon, ran thus: "The accusation of the generals having been heard in the assembly, together with their defence, the council hath decreed, 'That the people shall proceed immediately to ballot by wards: that there shall be for each ward two vases: that proclamation shall be made by the herald, informing the people, That whoever deems the generals criminal, in neglecting to save from the waves those who were conquerors in the battle, must put his die into the first vase; whoever deems them innocent, into the second: that the punishment, in case of condemnation, shall be death, to be inflicted by the Eleven,' (magistrates whose office bore some analogy to that of our sheriff,) 'with confiscation of all property, a tenth to the goddess, the rest to the commonwealth.'"

In the whole of these proceedings the oppression of the individuals accused was so flagrant, and the violation of the constitution of so dangerous a kind, that the party thought something might be still wanting to inflame passion among the people, and stifle just consideration. Their resources however seem to have been, according to the account of

Xen. Hel. 1. 1.
c. 7. s. 7.

Xenophon, such that their success appears matter for wonder. A man was produced, who declared before the assembly, "that, having been in one of the wrecked ships, he had saved himself on a flour-barrel; and that his drowning comrades had conjured him, if he should escape that fate which for them was inevitable, not to let it pass unknown to the Athenian people, how the generals had abandoned those who had deserved so well of their country."

Athens was not yet without a constitution, and laws, as well for the security of the constitution itself, as for the assurance of justice to individuals; though faction, supported

by a majority in the assembly, might sometimes Xen. Hel. 1. 1. c. 7. s. 8. violate both. The friends of the generals therefore did not yet give up their defence, in which Euryptolemus son of Pisianax took the leading part. Nor was there wanting a considerable body among the people disposed to support him, when he remonstrated against the violation of the constitution, attempted by the decree of the council, and declared that he would cite Callixenus to answer, according to law, as the proposer. The resource of the opposite party was still in popular passion. They directed their rhetoric to the jealous temper of democracy: "It was intolerable," they said, "for an individual to presume to set limits to the authority of the people;" and immediately an angry multitude vociferated, "that it was intolerable for an individual to prescribe bounds to the will of the people." Thus encouraged, Lyciscus, one of the leading men, declared, "that whoever should presume to check the authority of the assembly, he would move that his fate should be decided by the same ballot with that of the generals." The assembly upon this was again in uproar. Euryptolemus feared, by irritating the multitude, to injure the cause he meant to defend, and, retracting his proposed citation of Callixenus, declared his submission to the will of the people.

This legal impediment being thus violently over- s. 9. borne, still opposition occurred to the purpose of the prosecutors. The prytanes had the virtue to declare, that they would not put the question for a decree subversive of the constitution, and which the law forbade. Callixenus, emboldened by the support he had already found, and dreading the consequences of defeat in his measure, again mounted the bema, and, addressing the people, accused the prytanes of refusing their duty. The multitude, with renewed jealousy of their ill-conceived and undefined rights, indignantly called for those to appear who resisted the orders of the

people. The virtue which had incited to oppose a measure so destructive of the constitution, and so iniquitous toward individuals, then yielded to fear; and the prytanes, with only one very remarkable exception, obeyed the tyrannical command. The son of Sophroniscus, Xen. Hel. 1. 1. c. 7. s. 9. and Mem. Socr. 1. 1. c. 1. s. 18. Plat. apol. Socr. p. 32. Socrates, who was of their number, persisted in declaring, that nothing should move him to act otherwise than according to law. But his colleagues consenting to propose the question, the ballot was taken according to the resolution of the council.

Xen. Hel. 1. 1. c. 7. s. 10. This point being thus decided, Euryptolemus ventured again to ascend the bema; no longer to oppose the resolution of the council, but, as far as the law authorised, to say, in favour of the accused, what the people might yet bear to hear. Fearful however of exciting outcry, he began with cautiously declaring, "That his intention was partly to accuse, as well as partly to defend, Pericles his near kinsman, and Diomedon his intimate friend; and at the same time to advise the assembly, what, in his opinion, the public good required." Observing then no disinclination to hear him, he proceeded: "I accuse them of a misdemeanor in their command, inasmuch as they dissuaded what ought to have been done, and what their colleagues otherwise would have done, sending information in their dispatches to the council and to you, that the duty of relieving the wrecked had been committed to Theramenes and Thrasybulus, and had not been performed. This was their crime only, yet their colleagues are involved in the accusation: a crime against the public it must be confessed, though not of a very heinous nature; it was an act of benevolence toward those very officers who are now requiring the charity by a capital prosecution, conducted in a new and unheard-of form of severity against their benefactors."

Having stated his accusation and his defence, he pro-

ceeded to his advice, which marks strongly the state of the Athenian government at the time. Frequent experience of being misled by designing men into measures which they found occasion severely to repent, made the ancient democracies generally jealous of advice given by their orators, unless it flattered some passion which in the moment swayed the popular mind. "In what I have to recommend," said therefore Euryptolemus, "neither I nor any man can lead you into any dangerous error. For it must always be in your power to enforce against offenders, equally whether many be involved in one common judgment, or each be allowed a separate trial, any punishment at your pleasure. I therefore most earnestly wish and recommend that you would allow each of the accused generals at least one day for his separate defence; and I most anxiously deprecate your giving confidence to those who would persuade you that it can be dangerous to take time for such deliberation as may produce a reasonable conviction in your own minds, and that it is safer to trust others than yourselves.

"The decree of Canonus, that powerful sanction of the democratical authority, is well known to you all.¹² It declares, 'That if any one shall injure the Athenian people, he shall answer before the people in bonds: if he is found guilty, he shall be punished with death; his body shall be thrown into the Barathrum; and all his property shall be forfeited; a tenth to the goddess, the rest to the commonwealth.' I desire no other, Athenians, than that the generals be tried according to the provisions of that severe law; and, if you think proper, let Pericles, my near kinsman, be the first to abide your sentence.

"The crimes held most atrocious are sacrilege and high

¹² Τὸ Κανώνου Νόμισμα. If there is anywhere any farther account of this remarkable law than what we have here from Xenophon, it has escaped me. I think it is not noticed by either Petit or Potter.

treason. The generals before you are accused of none such. But if the decree of Canonus is, in your opinion, too mild for them, let the law against sacrilege and treason be your guide. Even so each will have his separate trial: a day for each will be divided into three parts: in the first you will inquire and determine whether there is cause for putting the accused upon trial; the second will be allotted to the accusation; the third to the defence. Let it be recollected how lately Aristarchus, the most obnoxious of those who overthrew the democracy, and who afterward, in his flight from Athens, performed the signal treachery of betraying Cœnoë to the Thebans, even Aristarchus was allowed his day, and even to choose his day, for his defence. Will you then, Athenians, who were so scrupulously just to one whose treason was so notorious, and whose conduct so grossly injurious, will you deny the common benefit of the laws to those who have so signally served their country? Will you break down the barriers of that constitution by which hitherto individuals have been safe, and by which the commonwealth has become great, for the purpose of delivering to the executioner your meritorious generals, covered with the recent glory of the most important victory that has been gained in a war of twenty-six years? If you would consult the justice, the honour, or the safety of the commonwealth, you will rather reward them with crowns, their due as conquerors, than, yielding to the malicious arguments of wicked men, condemn them to an ignominious death. To what therefore I have at present to propose I trust you cannot but assent: it is, ‘That each of the generals be separately tried, according to the provisions of the decree of Canonus.’ ”

Xen. Hel. 1. 1.
c. 7. s. 11.

According to the forms of the Athenian assembly, the question was at the same time put upon the motion of Euryptolemus and that of Callixenus. The majority was

declared for the motion of Euryptolemus ; but, at the requisition of Menecles, the holding up of hands being repeated¹³, it was declared for that of Callixenus. The resolution of the council being thus confirmed, in conformity to that resolution the people proceeded to ballot. The fatal vase pronounced sentence of death against the eight generals, and the six present were executed.¹⁴

Plutarch relates of Alcibiades that when, on his recall from Sicily, he avoided returning to Athens, being asked, “ if he could not trust his country ;” he replied, “ Yes ; for every thing else : but in a trial for life, not my mother ; lest by mistake she put a black ball for a white one.” Whatever authority there may have been for this anecdote, it contains a very just reproof of the Athenian mode of giving judgment on life and death by a secret ballot, which, without preventing corruption, admits mistake, excludes responsibility, and hides shame.

But while, under the security of our own admirable constitution, we wonder at the defective polity of a people whom we find so many causes to admire, it is not a little advantageous, for the writer of Grecian history, that circumstances have been occurring, in a nation calling itself the most polished of the most polished age of the world, which not only render all the atrocious and before scarcely credible violences of faction among the Greeks probable, but almost make them appear moderate. At the same time it may not be improperly digressing to remark, that, as what has been passing in France may tend to illustrate Grecian history, and to exculpate the Grecian character from any innate atrocity beyond what may be among other nations, there occurs also, in Grecian history, what may enable to

¹³ Ἐπομοσαμένου δὲ Μενεκλείου, καὶ πάλιν διαχειροτονίας γενομένης.

¹⁴ Lysias mentions this transaction in his oration against Eratosthenes (p. 123. vel 406.), and his account, as far as it goes, confirms that of Xenophon.

form a juster estimate of the French character than a view of the late enormities, compared only with what has at any time passed in our own country, might lead us to conceive : and, if the inability of wise and worthy men, such as undoubtedly must have existed in France, to hold their just influence among the people, and prevent those disgraceful proceedings, appears itself a disgrace both to themselves and to the nation, Grecian history, and the extant writings of the ablest Grecian politicians, will perhaps furnish their fairest apology.

For so many men of the brightest talents and highest acquirements, as in Greece turned their thoughts, with the closest attention, to a subject so universally and deeply interesting, not one seems to have been able even to imagine a form of government which might, in a great nation, reconcile the jarring pretensions arising from that variety of rank among men, without which even small societies cannot subsist. Our own writers, through mere familiarity with the object, as foreigners from unacquaintance with it, have very much overlooked what, in importance, is perhaps not inferior to any one circumstance in the singular constitution of our government. It was not till after the troubles in France began, that a refugee, who had been in situations enabling him to see and compelling him to observe, discovered what, Lettre au Roi
par M. de
Calonne. but for those troubles, would perhaps never have occurred for his notice ; that “ nowhere else in the world such harmony subsists between the several ranks of citizens as in England.”

This harmony is indeed the foundation, the firm foundation, on which the proud superstructure of the British constitution rests. Ranks vary as much, or perhaps more than elsewhere. But no one rank has that gigantic pre-eminence which can enable it to trample upon its next inferior. In the scale of subordination, the distance from top to bottom is great ; but

the gradation is scarcely perceptible, and the connection intimate. Each rank moreover is interested in the support of its next superior : none are excluded from the hope of rising ; and, of all the various ranks, the highest is most interested in the support of all. We cannot consider without wonder, that an order of things, apparently the most natural, as well as the most beneficial, never subsisted in any country but our own.

It has not always perhaps been duly recollected by speculative politicians that, among the ancient republics, no such order of citizens existed as that which, in Paris, after the first revolution, assumed, or, for nefarious purposes, was complimented with, despotic power ; and, while the representatives of the nation were deliberating on the rights of man, trampled under foot all rights. The functions of that order of citizens were, in Athens, performed by slaves ; and, without keeping this circumstance constantly in mind, we cannot but be liable to the grossest error in applying the rules of ancient policy to modern times. Those writers who would infer that formerly the lower people in England were not free, because the lowest rank were actually slaves, attempt a fallacy upon their readers ; but still an infinitely more mischievous fallacy those who, putting out of sight the whole labouring population, which was in a state of bondage, assert what they call the right of universal suffrage, which never existed. In treating of Athens, Lacedæmon, or Rome, they would have distinguished, as they ought, slaves from citizens. It is unquestionable that, from the Anglo-saxon conquest downward, the constitution of this country has been always free ; and though, in unsettled times, and especially under the first Norman kings, law might be overborne by the violence of accidental power, yet both the law and the established mode of administering the law never were otherwise than highly, and even singularly, favourable

to the freedom and property of even the lowest citizen.¹⁵

Montesquieu has undertaken to foretell the fall of the English Constitution; and a credit has been given him, proportioned rather to the merit of the prophet than of the prophecy. Montesquieu evidently had not duly adverted to that peculiar amalgamation of ranks in England through which all coalesce; or, if it may be so expressed, to that concatenation, by which the lowest end of a long chain is as firmly connected with the highest, as the intermediate links with one another. Through this advantageous constitution England has always avoided, and it may well be hoped will continue to avoid, that violence of internal fermentation which continually disordered, and at length destroyed, the governments of Athens and Rome; and hence she has been enabled to resist the contagion of French politics, so alluring in distant prospect, so hideous in near approach, which perhaps no other European government, whose mildness would allow it equal admission, could, without foreign assistance, have withstood.

Nor is it, I apprehend, as some political writers have asserted, of no importance to trace the freedom of the constitution of this country beyond the civil war in the reign of Charles the first. For the purpose indeed of establishing

¹⁵ It seems to deserve more notice than I think it has yet met with, that the monarchs to whom our constitution is most indebted, Alfred, Henry II., and Edward I., were conquerors. It is certainly a most unworthy slander upon those uncommonly great men, as well as upon the parliaments, from Edward the first till the time when Fortescue wrote under Henry the sixth, to assert, as often has been done, that England had no valuable constitution, and no true freedom, till the opposition to the Stuarts, or the expulsion of the Stuarts, procured them. The debates on occasion of the King's illness in 1788 brought forward records of parliament, not only proving that the constitution was as well understood in the reigns of Henry the fourth and Henry the sixth, as at any time since, but affording precedents for most difficult and delicate circumstances, such as the wisest of any age might rejoice to find established by the wisdom of their forefathers. These records, and most of the important historical matter they relate to, had escaped the notice of all our historians.

the right of the British people to freedom, it is utterly unnecessary. But toward a clear comprehension of the constitution itself, toward a certain knowledge of the broad and deep foundation on which it rests, toward a ready and just perception of the manner in which it may be affected through the various changes to which all human things are liable, and through some which we have already seen, extension of dominion, influx of riches, increase of population, increase of revenue, immoderate debt, and the possible reduction of that debt; toward a just judgment how far any of these changes are beneficial, and how far injurious, and when alteration or remedy may be wanting, and what, in any given circumstances, will be the probable effect of any alteration or remedy proposed; toward all these an acquaintance with the history of our constitution, from earliest times, is of great importance.

If then it is to ourselves important to know the history of our constitution from earliest times, it will also be not a little important to other nations, if any such there are, who would form a constitution on the model of ours, or who would improve the constitution they possess after our example. Nor will it be less important to those who, without any good foundation to build on, and without any valuable experience within their own country, would raise, with the airy materials of theory, a constitution more perfect than the most perfect that has yet existed upon earth. For want of attention to the breadth and antique firmness of the basis on which our envied and truly enviable government rests, the singular manner in which the materials of the superstructure are adapted to each other, and how they are held together by their natural fitness to coalesce, the complexion of Europe seems to threaten many new and memorable lessons in politics; lessons for every order that can exist in a state separately, and lessons for nations united. Happy then

those, who, gathering wisdom from the sufferings and dangers of others, can avoid the miseries which many will probably feel.

Such were the sentiments occurring on what appeared the readiest probable consequences of the state of things, in Europe, when this part of the History was first offered to the Public. The extraordinary revolution, which has ensued, was, rather for the wonderful rapidity of its progress, than for its character, then less within reasonable expectation. And, in digressing thus far, I trust I have not overstepped the limits within which the writer of Grecian history may claim, not an exclusive, but a common right. A Grecian history, and indeed any history perfectly written (which, though not at all the claim, should however be the aim of the writer), but especially a Grecian history perfectly written, should be a political institute for all nations.¹⁶

¹⁶ As M. de Calonne's letter, referred to in the text, though printed, was, I believe, never published, it may be not superfluous to give here, in its original language, the passage where the observation noticed occurs.

J'ignorois, lorsque j'ai commencé cette lettre, à quel point la division éclatoit déjà entre la Noblesse et le Tiers Etat, dans les différentes provinces de votre royaume: depuis que je l'ai appris, j'en frémis. Vu la situation où les choses ont été amenées, il n'y a pas lieu d'espérer que la concorde puisse se rétablir d'elle-même, et sans qu'on ait extirpé les germes de dissension qu'on n'a que trop fomentés. Il faut donc y pourvoir par quelque moyen nouveau, puissant, et efficace. Celui que je propose est éprouvé. C'est par lui qu'il existe en Angleterre, entre les Grands et le Peuple, plus d'accord qu'il n'y en a, je pense, dans aucune autre nation; nulle part ailleurs l'esprit public n'est aussi marqué; nulle part l'intérêt n'a plus d'empire pour réunir tous les Etats.

Or il est constant que rien n'y contribue davantage que l'institution d'une Chambre Haute et d'une Chambre Basse dans le Parlement; ainsi que leur composition respective, les distinctions qui les séparent, et les rapports qui les unissent. Plus on étudie cet ensemble, plus on trouve à l'admirer. Les Lords qui forment la Chambre Haute, et qui tous sont titrés, (ce sont les seuls qui le soient en Angleterre,) partagent dans une même association, sans préjudice néanmoins à leurs qualifications distinctives, l'honneur de la Pairie; et c'est, sans contredit, le premier corps de l'Etat. Leur prérogative n'est jamais contestée ni enviée par les Communes, qui ont parmi leurs Membres les fils, les frères, les parens de ces mêmes Lords, et des plus grandes maisons du royaume. C'est ce mélange, cette transfusion, si je le puis dire, de la plus haute Noblesse dans le corps représentatif du peuple, qui entretient l'harmonie entre l'un et l'autre, et qui resserre le nœud de leur union; c'est ce qui fait que les deux

SECTION IV.

Sedition at Chios. — Lysander re-appointed Commander-in-chief of the Peloponnesian Fleet ; in favour with Cyrus. — Unsteadiness of the Athenian Government. — Measures of the Fleets. — Battle of Ægospotami.

WHILE Athens, by a violent exertion of power in the sovereign assembly, overthrowing the bar-

B. C. 407.*
P. W. 25.

Chambres fraternisent sans se confondre, qu'elles se contrebalancent sans se rivaliser, que l'une empêche l'autre d'empiéter, et que toutes deux concourent également au maintien de la prérogative royale et à la conservation des droits nationaux. Lettre adressée au Roi, par M. de Calonne, le 9 Février, 1789. p. 67, 68.

The very great advantage, to a free constitution, of having a hereditary first magistrate, the depository of the supreme executive power, so distinguished by superior rank as to exclude all idea of competition, has been very well explained by De Lolme ; but the benefit of that singular amalgamation of various rank among the people, which prevails in England, has, I think, nowhere been duly noticed. In no court of Europe, I believe, is rank so exactly regulated, among the highest orders, as in England ; and yet there is no rank perfectly insulated ; all are in some way implicated with those about them. To begin even with the heir-apparent ; as a subject, he communicates in rank with all other subjects. The king's younger sons rank next to the elder, but their rank is liable to reduction : their elder brother's younger sons, if he succeeds to the crown, will rank before them. The Archbishops and the Chancellor, and the great officers of state, rank above Dukes not of royal blood ; but their rank is that of office only ; the Dukes, in family rank, are commonly much above the Archbishops and Chancellor. Thus far our rule, I believe, differs little from that of other European courts. What follows is peculiar to ourselves. The peers, all equal in legal, differ in ceremonial rank. The sons of peers of the higher orders rank above the peers themselves of the lower orders ; but, superior thus in ceremonial rank, they are in legal rank inferior. For the sons of all peers, even of the royal blood, being commoners, while in ceremonial rank they may be above many of the peers, in legal rank they are only peers with the commoners. This implication of the peerage with the body of the people is the advantageous circumstance which has particularly struck M. de Calonne. But there is another matter which perhaps not less strongly marks the wise moderation of our ancestors, to whom we owe the present order of things. No distinction, between subjects, can be really more essential than the being or not being members of the legislative body ; yet the rank of a member of parliament is known neither to the law, nor to the ceremonial of the country. Among untitled commoners there is no distinction of rank that can be very

[* See p. 278.]

riers of the constitution, and trampling on law and justice, was preparing her own downfall, there occurred, on the Peloponnesian side, what will deserve notice, as it affords additional proof how little all Greece was prepared to receive a constitution, that could establish peace throughout her confines, and give security to all, or to any, of her people. After the defeat of the Peloponnesian fleet, in the battle of Arginussæ, the Peloponnesian cause seems to have been neglected by Cyrus. The squadron, which Xen. Hel. 1. 2.
c. 1. s. 1. had escaped from Mitylene, remained at Chios; where its commander Eteonicus joined it from Methymne, but without money to pay it. Accustomed as the Greeks were to subsist on military service by their own means, this gave at first no great uneasiness. In so rich an island the industrious found opportunity to earn something, by working for hire; and wild fruits, or those cheaply bought, were resources for the less handy or more idle; so that, in the joy of recent escape, and with the hope of speedy relief, the wants that occurred, during summer, were patiently borne. But when, in advancing autumn, clothes became ragged, shoes worn out, wants of all kinds increased, while means of earning lessened, and, as the stormy season approached, the hope of relief grew fainter, reflection began then to excite the most serious apprehensions. In this state of things the comparison of their own circumstances with those of the wealthy Chians was obvious to remark; and the transition was ready to the observation, that, having arms in their hands, it depended only upon themselves to change situations. A conspiracy was in consequence formed, for

exactly defined; and yet a distinction always subsists in public opinion; decided partly, and perhaps sometimes too much, by wealth, partly by consideration given to birth, connections, or character; which, upon the whole, perhaps more than under any other government, preserves the subordination necessary to the well-being of large societies.

making themselves masters of the island; and it was agreed that, for distinction, every associate should carry a reed.

Intelligence of this plot did not reach Eteonicus till the number of associates was so great that to ^{Xen. Hel. 1. 2. c. 1. s. 2.} oppose it by open force would have been highly hazardous. If we may judge from the expression of Xenophon, upon the occasion, compared with so many of Thucydides, Plato, and other writers, which show how widely it was held, among the Greeks, that might made right, and that the useful was the measure of the honest, Eteonicus would not much have regarded the robbery of his allies, even with the massacre that must probably have attended, if disadvantageous consequences had not been to be apprehended to his commonwealth, and blame on that account to himself. The fear of a general alienation from the Lacedæmonian cause, according to Xenophon, determined his opposition to the conspiracy; and rather an arbitrary power, conceded on the necessity of the case to military commanders, than any defined and constitutional authority, enabled him to oppose it with effect. Selecting fifteen confidential persons, and arming ^{s. 3.} them with daggers, he went through the streets of Chios. The first person observed, bearing a reed, was a man with disordered eyes, coming out of a surgeon's shop, and he was instantly put to death. A crowd presently assembled about the body: and, inquiry being anxiously made, answer was, in pursuance of direction from Eteonicus, freely given, "that the man was killed for carrying a reed." Information of these circumstances was communicated quickly through the city. The conspirators, themselves unprepared, were ignorant what preparation might have been made against them; and every one, as the report reached him, hastened to put away his reed. Ete- ^{s. 4.} onicus, who watched the event, without giving time for recovery from surprise, ordered all aboard. The

mark of distinction was gone ; none of the conspirators any longer knew whom to trust ; all became anxious to avoid crimination ; ready obedience would be the first proof of innocence : and presently not a man, of either land or sea forces, remained ashore.

Eteonicus then assembled the Chian magistrates, informed them what a danger they had escaped, and represented the necessity of providing for the present wants of the armament. A supply was instantly given him, with which he repaired to the fleet, and distributed a month's pay for each man. In doing this he passed through every ship, and spoke to all the soldiers and seamen of their several duties, and particularly of the probable business of the ensuing campaign, as if he had known nothing of the conspiracy. All were happy to receive this tacit assurance that they were free from danger ; all became anxious to show themselves zealous in the public cause : and thus, with only the death of one man, not the most guilty perhaps, but certainly connected with the guilty, a mutiny was completely smothered, which, under a hesitating commander, might not have been quelled without shedding many times more blood, and, not being quelled, would have spread havoc over the richest and most populous island of the Ægean.

Xen. Hel. 1. 2.
c. 1. s. 5.

It was about the time when this dangerous business was so fortunately settled, that a congress of the Peloponnesian confederacy was held at Ephesus. The Chians, and probably all the Asian Greeks of the confederacy, sent their deputies particularly commissioned for the purpose. For the European states, the principal officers of their respective forces mostly acted as representatives. What had been passing in Athens was unknown, or imperfectly known ; and the same wisdom and spirit in council at home, the same ability and energy in operation abroad, which had so wonderfully restored the Athenian common-

wealth from agony to vigour and victory, were expected still to continue. It was therefore a question of most serious concern, not only how the war should be conducted, but who should direct operations. Much would depend on the good-will and ready assistance of the Persian prince, and with him it was therefore deemed proper to communicate. The result of the deliberation was a resolution to send ministers to Lacedæmon, in the joint names of the prince, the armament, and the allies, with information of the state of things, and a request that Lysander might be re-appointed to the command-in-chief.

No Spartan, Brasidas alone excepted, had ever so conciliated the allied cities as Lysander; no Spartan knew equally how to render himself agreeable to a Persian prince: his military as well as his political conduct had been able, and his success against the Athenian fleet at Notium had gained him fame. At another season nevertheless the Lacedæmonian government might perhaps not have been persuaded to contravene a rule, esteemed important, never to commit the command-in-chief of the fleet twice to the same person. But the consideration of the great defeat they had received, and of their utter inability to support their Asiatic allies, or to dispute the command of the seas with the Athenians, without the aid of Persian money, disposed them to relax a little. Nominally however they still adhered to their principle, while, by a subterfuge, they gratified the Persian prince and their Grecian confederates: Aracus was appointed navarch, admiral of the fleet, for the year: but Lysander was sent to command in Asia, with the title of *epistoleus*¹⁷, vice-admiral.

¹⁷ The word seems to have meant originally an officer *sent* by a superior officer to command for him; but it appears to have become the usual title for the second in command in the Lacedæmonian service. See Xen. Hel. l. 1. c. 1. s. 15. It is pretty exactly rendered by the Roman title *Legatus*.

Lysander, arriving at Ephesus when winter was not far advanced, made it his first concern to provide that, in spring, he might have a fleet able to meet that of Athens. The squadron under Eteonicus at Chios, and all other detached ships, were sent for to Ephesus, examined, and the necessary repairs directed. Measures were at the same time taken to hasten the completion of the triremes building at Antandrus; and when this business was duly put forward, Lysander hastened to pay his compliments personally to the Persian prince at Sardis. He had the satisfaction to find his interest there not diminished by absence: he was received with distinguished attention, and treated as a confidential friend. Cyrus showed him a particular account of the sums issued for the pay of the fleet; remarked that they much exceeded what the king had given him for the purpose; but added, "that as the country, which the king had put under his command, afforded a great revenue, and his good inclination to Lysander and the Lacedæmonians remained perfect, money should not be wanting for the prosecution of the war." Lysander, returning to Ephesus with an ample supply, paid the armament all the arrears due, according to the rate before established: and, with good-will thus conciliated toward himself, and zeal for the service apparent among all ranks, he was proceeding to make arrangements for opening the campaign, when a message arrived from Cyrus, desiring his presence again at Sardis.

B. C. 405.
P. W. 26.

s. 8.

Condescendingly as the Persian prince conducted himself toward the Greeks, his haughtiness among his own people was extravagant. Assuming the tone of sovereign, he required those marks of servile respect which custom had

appropriated to the monarch of the empire. The court-dress of Persia had sleeves so long that, Xen. Hel. 1. 2. c. 1. s. 6. when unfolded, they covered the hand; and the ceremonial required, of those who approached the royal presence, to enwrap the hands, so as to render them helpless.¹⁸ Two youths, nearly related to the royal family, refusing this mark of extreme subordination to Cyrus, were, in pursuance of an arbitrary command from that prince, put to death. Complaint was made at Susa, by their unhappy parents, and indignation was loud and general against the cruel and dangerous pride of Cyrus. Darius, an indulgent father, desirous of repressing the evil, but tender about the means, sent a message, mentioning only, that he was labouring under a severe illness, and therefore wished to see his son. Cyrus did not refuse obedience to the paternal summons; but, before he would leave Sardis, he sent for Lysander. The Spartan general, hastening to the call, was received with distinction, even more flattering than s. 9. before. Cyrus expressed the warmest interest in the Lacedæmonian cause; anxiously dissuaded risking a general action at sea, without a decided superiority; remarked that, with the wealth of Persia, such a superiority might certainly be acquired; showed an account of the revenue, arising from the countries under his own command; and, directing a very large sum to be put into the hands of the Spartan general, for the expenses of the war, parted with this kind exhortation, "Be mindful of my friendship for Lacedæmon and for yourself."

Lysander, returning to Ephesus thus abundantly supplied,

¹⁸ In the East fashions change little, and the strange one here mentioned, it seems, is retained to this day. "The beneesh," says one of the most intelligent and exact of modern travellers, "is the ceremonial dress of the Mamelukes. It covers very completely the whole body, even the fingers' ends, which it is held very indecent to show before the great." Volney's Travels in Egypt.

gave a new flow to the already high spirits of his forces by another issue of pay. In the mean time, such had been the effect of his well-directed attention, seconded by an unfailing treasury, that the fleet was already equal in strength to the Athenian. He proposed therefore to proceed upon offensive operation; but not to risk the uncertain event of a general engagement, which no necessity of his circumstances required. His view was directed less immediately against the fleet than against the subject dependencies of Athens, the sources of the revenue by which the fleet was supported. Accordingly he led his armament first to the Carian coast, where he took the town of Cedrea by assault. His troops shared the plunder; among which were reckoned the inhabitants, a mixed race, Greek and barbarian, who were sold for slaves.

In every one of the towns on the Hellespont and Propontis, which the successes of Alcibiades and Thrasybulus had restored to the dominion of Athens, a Lacedæmonian party remained. In giving efficacy to the efforts which such a party might be able to make, two very important objects might be at once accomplished, the checking of the revenue which supported the Athenian fleet, and the recovery of the trade with the Euxine, which furnished the best supplies of corn. The Hellespont was therefore the point to which Lysander proposed to direct his principal attention; having apparently no immediate view beyond the objects above mentioned. Desirous to avoid the Athenian fleet in the passage, he made his way close along the friendly shore of Asia, and, without interruption, reached Abydus. Of all the towns on the shores of the Hellespont and Propontis, which the defeat in Sicily had given to the Lacedæmonian confederacy, Abydus alone had not been retaken. The harbour of Abydus therefore was made the station of the fleet. The city was populous; its force of

Xen. Hel. 1. 2.
c. 1. s. 11, 12.

infantry was added to the infantry of the armament, and all put under the command of Thorax, a Lacedæmonian. The neighbouring city of Lampsacus, being then attacked by land and sea, was taken by assault. The plunder, which was considerable, (for Lampsacus was rich, and large store of provisions had been collected there,) was given to the troops and seamen, but the free inhabitants were not molested in their persons.

The government of Athens, after that violent struggle of faction which produced the condemnation of the generals, appears not to have recovered its former consistency. It was not long after (so Xenophon says, without mentioning how long) that the Athenian people, Xen. Hel. l. 1. c. 7. s. 12. repenting, directed their anger against those who had misled them to the atrocious deed; and Callixenus and four others were compelled to find sureties for their appearance before the same tremendous tribunal which had consigned the victorious generals to the executioner. At the same time opportunity was taken to procure the recall Lys. Δημ. καταλ. ἀπολ. of the banished, and the restoration of the dishonoured; while the people, brought to their senses, (such is the expression even of the democratical Lysias, confirming the account of Xenophon,) more gladly directed their vengeance against those who had promoted prosecutions, for interest or malice, under the democracy, than against those who had ruled in the oligarchy. Xenophon proceeds, with evident satisfaction, to relate, that Callixenus, who found opportunity to fly, and afterward found means to make his peace and return, lived nevertheless universally hated and avoided, and, among those public distresses which will hereafter occur to notice, was starved to death.

It was however vainly attempted, by an oath of concord, taken by the whole people, to put an end to the ferment of party. Administration was weak, and Xen. & Lys. ut sup.

democratical jealousy interfered in every measure. The command-in-chief of the fleet was already divided between three officers, Conon, Adimantus, and Philocles. Three more were now added, with equal powers, Menander, Tydeus, and Cephisodotus. For subsistence, the armament depended upon itself. It was indeed able to collect the tribute, assessed upon the subject-states of Asia and Thrace, and it could sometimes raise contributions from the enemy's country: but this business unavoidably engaged the attention of the generals, to the hindrance of that enterprise, which was necessary toward final success in the war; while the Peloponnesian commanders, having all their pecuniary wants supplied by the wealth of Persia, could choose their measures.

The fleet, which the Peloponnesians were thus enabled to raise and maintain in energy, far greater than had ever formerly been seen in wars between the Greeks, made it necessary for the Athenians to assemble their whole naval force in one point; and that decisive action, which it was the obvious policy of the Peloponnesians to avoid, was possibly to the Athenians necessary. In ability for command perhaps Conon did not yield to Lysander; and his fleet, at least equal in number, for it consisted of a hundred and eighty triremes, and probably superior in the proportion of practised seamen among the crews, was inferior only by the division of the supreme authority. Confident therefore in strength, and elate with recent victory, the Athenians passed from Samos to the Asiatic coast, and plundered the country acknowledging the sovereignty of Persia. They moved then for Ephesus, to offer battle to the enemy; but, in their way, they received intelligence that Lysander had already passed northward. In alarm for the dependencies of the commonwealth on the Hellespont, they

Xen. Hel. 1. 2.
c. 1. s. 11.

s. 13.

s. 11.

s. 13.

hastened after him. Arriving at Eleus, they were informed that Lampsacus was already taken, and the enemy's fleet there. Stopping therefore only while they took refreshment, they proceeded to Sestos, where they procured provisions for the night, and arrived the same evening at Ægospotami, directly over-against Lampsacus. The historian, describing their progress, particularises, what deserves notice, as it marks the manner of ancient naval operations, that they dined at Eleus and supped at Ægospotami, where they formed their naval camp.

The strait between Lampsacus and Ægospotami being scarcely two miles wide, the arrival of the Athenian fleet was instantly known to Lysander, and his plan almost as instantly formed. On the same night his orders were issued. By daybreak next morning his crews had taken their meal, and went immediately aboard. All was completely prepared for action, but no movement made. By sunrise the Athenian fleet was off the harbour of Lampsacus in order of battle. The Peloponnesians remained motionless: the Athenians waited till evening, and then returned to Ægospotami. As the Athenian fleet withdrew, Ly-
Xen. Hel. 1. 2.
c. 1. s. 15.
sander ordered some of his swiftest galleys to follow them, with instruction to the commanders to approach the opposite shore enough to see the enemy debark, and form some judgment of their immediate intentions, and then hasten back with the information. This was punctually executed. Lysander meanwhile kept his fleet in readiness for action; and, not till he was assured that the enemy's motions indicated no enterprise, he dismissed his crews for their refreshment. On the morrow these movements were exactly repeated, and so for the two following days.

Since the battle of Notium, Alcibiades had
1. 1. c. 5.
s. 10. l. 2.
c. 1. s. 16.
resided in his castle in the Thracian Chersonese.

The two fleets in his neighbourhood of course attracted his

attention, and he was at least so far sensible to the welfare of his country as to be uneasy at what he saw. Ægospotami had neither town nor defensible harbour, but only a beach on which the galleys might be hauled, or near which, in the shelter of the strait, they might safely ride at anchor. The ground was commodious for encamping; but, in the defective military system of that age, the seamen and soldiers went to Sestos, two miles off, for a market. The enemy meanwhile, at Lampsacus, had the security of a harbour for their fleet, with a town for their people, where, always in readiness for every duty, they could procure necessaries.

*Xen. ut sup.
Plut. vit. Alcib.
et Lysand.*

Alcibiades went to the Athenian camp, and communicated with the generals on these circumstances; observing that, if they moved only to Sestos, they, equally with the enemy, would have the benefit of a town with a harbour, and equally, as from their present situation, might fight when they pleased; with the advantage, which in their present situation they could not command, of fighting only when they pleased. This admonition, slighted by the other generals, was treated by Tydeus and Menander with unmannerly disdain; and Alcibiades withdrew.

*Xen. Hel. 1. 2.
c. 1. s. 17.*

Lysander meanwhile had observed that every day's experience of his inaction increased the confidence and negligence of the Athenians. Not confining themselves to the market of Sestos, they wandered wide about the country, to seek provisions, or on pretence of seeking them. Still they continued in the morning to offer battle, returning in the afternoon to their camp. On the fifth day, he directed the commanders of his exploring ships, if the Athenians debarked and dispersed as usual, to hasten their return, and communicate notice to him, by elevating a shield. The whole armament was kept in readiness, the land forces under Thorax were aboard,

the expected signal was made, and the fleet moved across the strait.

Conon alone, of the Athenian generals, was Xen. Hel. 1. 2. c. 1. s. 18. [B.C. 405. Cl.] in any state of preparation. As soon as he saw the enemy in motion, he ordered the call to arms, and the signal for all to go aboard: but soldiers and seamen were equally dispersed; some of the triremes were wholly without hands; and the distance was so small that the Peloponnesians were upon them long before any effectual measures for defence could be taken. Conon's trireme, with seven others of his division, and the sacred ship *Paralus*, had their complete crews aboard; and these pushed off from the shore. All the rest were seized by the enemy, at anchor or upon the beach. No effort, within the power of nine ships, could have any other effect than adding the loss of those nine to that of the rest of the fleet. While therefore the enemy were intent upon their great capture, made without a blow, but still to be Xen. Hel. 1. 2. c. 1. s. 19. secured against the Athenian land force, Conon fled unpursued; not unmindful however of such service as his strength might accomplish. Sails were an encumbrance to the ancient galleys in action. Within so narrow a strait therefore, and with his port at hand, Lysander had left those of his fleet ashore. Conon had intelligence that the store was not within the walls of *Lampsacus*, but at the point of *Abarmis*. Accordingly, landing there, he carried off all the mainsails ¹⁹, and then hastening to the mouth of the *Hellespont* escaped to sea.

Meanwhile Lysander, having secured possession of the Athenian ships, to the number of a hundred and seventy, directed his attention to the scattered crews and troops. Some of these found refuge in the neighbouring towns and

¹⁹ Τὰ μεγάλα ιστία.

fortresses ²⁰; but the greater part, together with all the generals ²¹, were made prisoners. In the evening of the same day on which the fleet was taken, Lysander sent away an account of his extraordinary success. A Milesian privateer ²² was chosen to convey it; and the captain, Theopompus, used such diligence that on the third day he reached Lacedæmon.

s. 21. The prisoners in the mean time being conveyed to Lampsacus, it became matter of very serious consideration how to dispose of numbers so beyond all common example of battles among the Greeks. The allies were assembled for consultation; and that animosity appeared among them which the ancient manner of warfare was likely to excite. Many accusations were urged against the Athenians, of what they had done, and what they had proposed to do. Of two triremes, a Corinthian and an Andrian, lately taken, the crews, by order of the Athenian general Philocles, had been put to death by being thrown down a precipice. It was averred, and Xenophon seems to acknowledge it as a truth, that the Athenians, in a council of war, had determined to cut off the right hand of every prisoner to be made in the action which they were seeking. Adimantus alone, of the generals, is said to have opposed

s. 22. this inhuman resolution. Many other enormities were alleged; and the council resolved that all the prisoners who were Athenian citizens, except Adimantus, should be put to death. Lysander reproached Philocles with setting the first example, among the Greeks, of a most cruel violation of the law of war, (which however, as in the

²⁰ Τὰ τευχύδρια, al. χείδρια.

²¹ So I think Xenophon must be understood; and the expression of Plutarch, in his Life of Lysander, though rather loose, tends to confirm the interpretation.

²² Μιλήσιον ληστήν.

course of this History we have had too much occasion to observe, was neither the first nor peculiar to the Athenians,) and then began the execution, for so much the expression of Xenophon seems to assert, by killing that general with his own hand. The Athenian citizens, who fell victims to the vengeance of the allies, and perhaps in some measure to the convenience of the Spartan general, were, according to Plutarch, three thousand. Plut. vit. Lys.

Adimantus, alone saved from this bloody execution, did not escape with his character clear: Xen. Hel. ut ant. it was asserted that, being corrupted by Lysander with Persian gold, he had betrayed the fleet. The charge however was never proved; nor does it appear how Adimantus could have commanded the circumstances which put the fleet into the enemy's hands²³; and the execution of the other generals, who seem never to have been accused, appears proof of his innocence. Not that the narrative of Xenophon gives all the information we might desire. The conduct of the Athenian commanders altogether seems indeed to have been totally inexcusable; but in what degree any one was separately blameworthy does not appear. While the command of gold, which Lysander possessed, excites one kind of suspicion, the haste and the extent of the execution, together with the little scrupulousness usual among the Greeks, may excite another. At the same time it is possible that the misconduct, in the Athenian armament, may have arisen from division of command and violence of party. To carry any steady authority may have been impossible; and, while none could confide in the government at home, all would fear it; not for

²³ We find, in the Grecian services, where a command was committed to many, it was common for each to take his day in turn (Herod. l. 6. c. 110. et Thucyd. l. 6. c. 91.); but the historian does not say that the day of the action was the day of Adimantus's command, or that, till the attack made by Lysander, (except in the negligence of the Athenians, which had increased gradually,) the circumstances of that day differed from those of the four preceding.

their misdeeds, but for the prevalence of a faction adverse to the faction with which they were connected.

Athens, the trap and grave of her victorious generals, would not be the place where, in the present disastrous circumstances, Conon would expect refuge for himself, or where
Xen. Hel. 1. 2.
c. 1. s. 19.
Diod. l. 13.
c. 106.
 nine ships could probably be of any important service to the public. As soon therefore as he was beyond danger of pursuit, he dispatched the sacred ship *Paralus* alone to bear the news of a defeat, which could be scarcely less than a death-blow to the commonwealth. For himself, fortunately having friendship with Evagoras, who ruled the Grecian city of Salamis in Cyprus, he directed his course thither with his remaining squadron, and was kindly received.

SECTION V.

Consequences of the Battle of Ægospotami. — Siege of Athens. — Conclusion of the Peloponnesian War.

THE ruin of the Athenian marine, effected at Ægospotami, put all the dependencies of the commonwealth at once into the power of the enemy: Lysander had only to direct the course of his victorious fleet, and take possession. The command of the strait, communicating with the Euxine sea, was his first object. As soon as he appeared
Xen. Hel. 1. 2.
c. 2. s. 1.
 between Byzantium and Chalcedon, both those important places desired to capitulate. The Athenian garrisons were allowed to depart in safety; policy prompting this apparent lenity. Lysander already looked forward to the conquest of Athens; and, against the uncommon strength of the fortifications of that city, famine would be the only weapon of certain efficacy. As therefore any augmentation of the numbers within would promote his purpose, he permitted all Athenian citizens to go to Athens, but to Athens

only. Those Byzantines who had taken a leading part in delivering their city to Alcibiades, apprehensive perhaps more of their fellow-citizens than of Lysander, retired into Pontus.

Meanwhile the *Paralus*, arriving by night at Piræus, communicated intelligence, such as no crew perhaps of the unfortunate fleet, not protected by the sacred character of the ship, would have dared to carry. Alarm and lamentation, beginning immediately about the harbour, were rapidly communicated through the town of Piræus, and then passing from mouth to mouth, by the long walls, up to the city, the consternation became universal; and that night, says the contemporary historian, no person slept in Athens. Grief for the numerous slain, the best part of the Athenian youth, among whom every one had some relation or friend to mourn, was not the prevailing passion; it was overborne by the dread, which pervaded all, of that fate to themselves, which, however individuals might be innocent, the Athenian people as a body were conscious of deserving, for the many bloody massacres perpetrated at their command. The treatment of the Histiaëans, Scionæans, Toronæans, Æginetans, and many other Grecian people, (it is still the contemporary Attic historian who speaks,) but, above all, the massacre of the Melians, a Lacedæmonian colony, recurred to every memory, and haunted every imagination.

Athens was not even now without able men, capable of directing public affairs in any ordinary storm. But, beside that the remaining strength of the commonwealth was utterly unequal to the force that would be brought against it, the lasting strife of faction and the violence of intestine tumult had nearly destroyed all coherence in the constituent parts of the government. Nothing remained of that public confidence which, after the Sicilian overthrow, had enabled those

Xen. Hel. 1. 2.
c. 2. s. 2.
B. C. 405.
P. W. 26.

who took the lead to surprise all Greece with new exertion, and even to recover superiority in the war. The leader of the sovereign many was Cleophon, by trade a musical-instrument-maker, who, treading in the steps of Cleon and Hyperbolus, had acquired power even superior to what they had formerly held. Such was his confidence in his ascendancy that he did not scruple, in scorn of democratical equality, to assume the distinctions and pomp of command. To have a residence suited to his new dignity, he used opportunity, offered by the banishment of Andocides, chief of one of the most ancient and eminent families, to occupy his house. But public agony and fear enforced, for the moment, sober conduct and a disposition to listen to those fittest to advise. On the morrow after the arrival of the fatal news, a general assembly being held, such measures were resolved on as the exigency of the moment most required. Immediate siege by land and sea was expected. To raise a fleet able to oppose that of the enemy was no longer possible. It was therefore determined to block up all the ports except one, to repair the walls, to appoint guards, and prepare every way to sustain a siege.

Meanwhile Lysander, after receiving the submission of the Hellespontine cities, sailed to Lesbos, where Mitylene immediately surrendered to him. He sent Eteonicus, with only ten ships, to the Thracian coast, and all the Athenian dependencies there acceded to the Lacedæmonian terms. All the islands hastened to follow the example, Samos alone excepted. The Samians, in the savage fury of democracy, answered the summons by a massacre of the men of rank²⁴ among their citizens, and prepared for defence.

Means to punish this insulting barbarity were not likely

²⁴ Τῶν γναρίμων.

Isocr. de Pace,
p. 218. t. 2.
Æsch. de
Legat. p. 254.

Andoc. de
Myst.

Xen. Hel. 1. 2.
c. 2. s. 3.

to be wanting : at present a greater object called Lysander. He sent information at the same time to Lacedæ-^{Xen. Hel. l. 2.}mon and Decelea that he was ready to sail for ^{c. 2. s. 4.} Piræus with two hundred triremes. The Lacedæmonian government determined upon a strong exertion to put a speedy end to a war which had lasted, with scarcely any perfect intermission, twenty-six years. The Peloponnesian allies were summoned to arms, consisting now of all the states of the peninsula, except Argos. The whole force of Laconia was at the same time ordered to march : the king, Pausanias, son of the regent who won the battle of Plataæ, commanded in chief. With the powerful army thus assembled Pausanias entered Attica : Agis joined him with his troops from Decelea ; and they fixed their head-quarters together in the celebrated gymnasium of Academia, close to Athens.

The interval of leisure for the fleet, during the preparation for the march of the army, was employed by Lysander in an act of justice and charity, likely to bring great credit to himself, and popularity to the Lacedæmonian name. There were, wandering about Greece, some Melians and ^{s. 5.} Æginetans, who, by accidental absence, or some other lucky chance, had escaped the general massacre of their people by the Athenians. These Lysander collected and reinstated in their islands. From Ægina he proceeded to Salamis, which he plundered ; and then, with a hundred and fifty triremes, took his station at the mouth of the harbour of Piræus, to prevent supplies to Athens by sea.

Without an ally, without a fleet, without stores, ^{Xen. Hel. l. 2.} and blockaded by sea and land, the Athenians ^{c. 2. s. 6.} made no proposal to their victorious enemies : in sullen despondency they prepared, to the best of their ability, for defence, without a reasonable view but to procrastinate their final doom, and certain to suffer in the interval. But

the consideration, for the contemporary historian dwells upon that point, that, without even revenge for a pretence, in mere wantonness of power²⁵, they had doomed to massacre and extirpation so many Grecian states, whose only crime was alliance with those who had now obtained such a superiority in arms, incited to stubborn resistance, and deterred entreaty. Not that there was unanimity on this subject within the walls of Athens. On the contrary, the party which had established the government of the Fourhundred, of which a relic was still considerable, far from viewing the approach of the Lacedæmonians with the same apprehensions as the democratical chiefs, looked to it rather as what might afford them relief, and even be turned to their advantage. But hence the democratical party had only the more jealousy, not wholly an unreasonable jealousy, of any treaty to be managed under their direction; and, between the two, the moderate and worthy had difficulty to interfere at all in public affairs.

Meanwhile the operations of the besiegers tended merely to blockade: no assault was attempted: the purpose was to make the effect of famine sure; and before long it was severely felt by the Athenians. Not however till many had died of hunger did they even talk of capitulation.

Xen. Hel. 1. 2.
c. 2. s. 7.

At length a deputation was sent to king Agis, for he appears to have remained alone to command the blockade, offering alliance offensive and defensive with Lacedæmon, which, in the language of Grecian politics, implied political subjection, but stipulating for the preservation of their fortifications and their harbour. Agis gave for answer, "that he had no power to treat; proposals must be addressed to the administration at Lacedæmon." Ministers were then sent into Peloponnesus; but at Selasia, on the border of Laconia, a haughty message

s. 8.

²⁵ Οὐ τιμωρούμενοι — ἀλλὰ διὰ τὴν ὕβριν ἠδίκησαν. ↓

from the ephors commanded their immediate return, informing them, "that the terms they brought were known at Lacedæmon; and, if they desired peace, they must come better instructed."

This answer, communicated at Athens, filled the city with despair. Condemnation of the Athenian people to slavery was the least evil now expected from the revenge of a conquering enemy; and, before even another deputation could bring an answer from Lacedæmon, many must perish of hunger. In this nearly threatening wreck of the commonwealth, the council of Areopagus, still holding a dignified existence, though with curtailed authority, endeavoured to mediate between the contending factions, and proposed to undertake that negotiation for preserving the ruins of the fallen state which the enemy refused to enter into with one party, and the people pertinaciously refused to commit to the other. But popular jealousy prevented the salutary measure. The many were taught to fear that the Areopagus would join the oligarchal party, and make terms for their exclusive advantage. It was understood that the Lacedæmonians, among other things, required the demolition of the long walls for the space of ten furlongs. Arcestratus, a member of the council, only declaring his opinion, in his place, that such a requisition ought not to prevent a treaty, which might save the wretched remains of the commonwealth, was imprisoned; and a decree of the people passed, forbidding even to consult about such an article.

But, in holding out the requisition to demolish the walls, no assurance having been given that slavery should not be the common doom, the dread of this made the people so untractable that the leading men seem to have been at a loss to know what they might even propose, with safety to

Lys. adv.
Eratosth.
p. 428.

Xen. Hel. 1. 2.
c. 2. s. 9.
Lys. adv.
Eratosth.
p. 412. & adv
Agor. p. 451.
453. Xen. ut
sup.

themselves, in so pressing an exigency. Cleophon himself could no longer either command or appease the popular mind. His opponents used the opportunity for preferring a capital accusation against him. Examples of what might be done, by ably using critical emergencies, abounded in the annals of the Athenian government. Cleon, when nearly the despotic tyrant of Athens, had been fined; Hyperbolus banished by ostracism: Cleophon was condemned to death and executed. If Lysias, speaking as a pleader, should be trusted, a fraud, of most dangerous tendency, was used by his opponents: the real law not warranting a capital sentence, they made an interpolation in the code of Solon, in pursuance of which condemnation was pronounced. That some of the party adverse to Cleophon were not very scrupulous we have sufficient assurance; but what credit may be due to the story told by Lysias, no information on the subject remaining from the contemporary historian, seems not easy now to judge.

Lys. in Nicom.
p. 849. ed.
Reiske.

The execution of Cleophon however was evidently the removal of a principal obstacle to accommodation. Theramenes, becoming more a leading man, ventured to undertake that, if he might be commissioned to go to Lysander, as well as to Lacedæmon, he would bring certain information whether there was a serious intention to reduce the Athenian people to slavery, or whether the demolition of the walls was required only to ensure political subjection. The people in assembly gave their approbation, and Theramenes went; but it seems implied by Xenophon that he did not execute his commission with perfect good faith. He remained with Lysander more than three months. What his difficulties really were is nowhere clearly indicated; but the appearance rather is that he waited for the time when the total failure of provisions among the Athenian people would enforce patient

Xen. ut ant.
& *Lys. adv.*
Agor. p. 451.

attention to any advice by which their immediate destruction might be obviated.

How the Athenians were enabled to support themselves so long, after mortality from famine had begun among them, the historian has omitted to mention : but some incidental information remaining from Isocrates, together with Xenophon's account of the circumstances of the siege, in some degree explains it. The Peloponnesians, masters of Attica, and commanding the seas, trusted that they could starve the city into submission, without the great labour and expense of a contravallation, such as the circuit of Athens and Piræus, and the walls connecting them, would require ; and, more completely to deter the introduction of provisions, they denounced, by proclamation, immediate death against any who should be taken in the attempt. But the pressure of want, and the dread of captivity, coinciding with the passion for distinction, strong in Athenian minds, excited to daring action ; and the Peloponnesian army could not completely guard the extensive circuit of the walls, nor the fleet, in all weathers, perfectly block the harbours. In these circumstances the captain of the *Paralus* (the same who had been sent by Conon with the news of the defeat at *Ægospotami*) distinguished himself by successful adventure. His name is unknown to us ; but, through the incident that Isocrates afterward pleaded a cause for him, we learn that he, together with his brother, found means, not only to introduce provisions into the harbour of Piræus, but sometimes even to intercept vessels bringing provisions for the Peloponnesian fleet ; and that they were rewarded with crowns, and with the public thanks of the Athenian people, solemnly pronounced before the statues of the heroes, styled the eponymian, as those from whom the wards of Attica were named.

Isocrat. adv.
Callim. p. 264.
t. 3.

But, notwithstanding these occasional supplies, want, and the apprehension of want, grew more and more pressing in Athens. Theramenes therefore, in the fourth month after his departure, trusting that the ferocity of the democratical spirit might be sufficiently tamed, ventured to return, without having performed what he had undertaken. To the anxious multitude, assembled in haste to learn the result of his tedious negotiation, he excused himself by imputing his detention to Lysander; who dismissed him, he said, at last with a declaration, "that he had no authority, either to grant terms, or to say what the Lacedæmonian government would require; and that application to any purpose could only be made to the ephors." It was no longer time for hesitation. An embassy, consisting of ten persons, with Theramenes at the head, was immediately appointed to go to Lacedæmon, with the fullest authority to treat concerning the fate of Athens, and save the miserable remains of the commonwealth, if they could.

The sacred character of ambassadors procured free passage for Theramenes and his colleagues as far as Sellasia. There, as the former embassy, they were met by an officer from the ephors, who would not permit them to proceed until they had given satisfactory assurance of the fulness of their powers. On their arrival at Lacedæmon an assembly of the deputies of the Lacedæmonian confederacy was held, in which the fate of Athens was to be decided. The Corinthian and Theban deputies contended vehemently, "that no terms should be granted: the Athenian commonwealth, the enemy of the common liberties of Greece, so nearly successful in the horrid attempt to enslave or exterminate the whole nation, ought to be annihilated: the people should be sold for slaves, and the site of the city should be made a sheepwalk, like the Crisæan plain." Many of the other

Xen. *ibid.*
 Isocr. *de Pace*,
 p. 220. t. 2. &
 Plataic. p. 44.
 t. 3. *Arrian.*
de Exped.
 Alex. 1., 1. c. 9.

s. 12.

deputies supported these opinions : but the Lacedæmonians, whose administration was little subject to passionate counsels or hasty decisions, seem to have pre-determined otherwise. Deprived of its navy, and of the revenue and power derived from transmarine dependencies, Athens, under oligarchal government, they thought might be a valuable dependency of Lacedæmon; and perhaps the recollection of what had happened but a few years before, when almost all Peloponnesus had been united in war against them, might give reason to apprehend that, at some future period, they might want a balancing power against Corinth, Thebes, or Argos. They declared therefore, with ostentation of regard for the common welfare and glory of Greece, that it would not become the Peloponnesian confederacy, and least of all the Lacedæmonians, to reduce to slavery a Grecian people, to whom the nation was beholden for the most important services, in the greatest danger that ever threatened it. Accordingly, they proposed, and it was resolved, that the conditions, upon which the Athenians should be permitted to exist in civil freedom, should be these : “ That all ships of war should be surrendered, except twelve; that the long walls, and the fortifications of Piræus, should be destroyed; that all exiles and fugitives should be restored to the rights of the city; that the Athenians should hold for friends and enemies all other people, as they were friends or enemies to Lacedæmon; that the Athenian forces should go wherever Lacedæmon might command, by land and sea.”

With these terms Theramenes and his colleagues hastened back to Athens. Already such numbers had perished for want that to hold many days longer was impossible. The arrival of the ambassadors therefore was no sooner announced than the people from all parts of the city crowded about them, in the most painful anxiety, apprehensive that an irresistible enemy might have

Xen. Hel. 1. 2.
c. 2. s. 13.

refused to treat, so that no choice would remain but to die of hunger, or surrender to the mercy of those from whom they had scarcely a pretence to ask mercy. Information that a treaty was concluded gave, for the night, general relief. On the morrow an assembly of the people was held. Theramenes declared the terms, which, he said, were the best that himself and his colleagues had been able to obtain, and such as, in his opinion, the people, in the present most unfortunate state of things, would do well to accept. A considerable body nevertheless, even now, affirmed pertinaciously, that they would not consent to the demolition of the walls. A large majority however, yielding to the pressure of extreme want, carried a decree ratifying the treaty concluded by their ambassadors.

Xen. Hel. 1. 2.
c. 2. s. 14.

The acceptance of the offered terms being notified to the besieging armament, Agis took possession of the walls, and Lysander entered the harbour of Piræus with his fleet. The demolition of the walls was a principal circumstance of triumph for the Peloponnesians.

5 May. B. C.
405. Ol. 93. 3.
Ann. Thu.
[B. C. 404.
Cl.*]

It was begun by the army with much parade, to the sound of military music, and with an alacrity, says the contemporary Athenian historian, natural to those who considered that day as the era of restored freedom to Greece. Notices were then sent to the exiles and fugitives, mostly men of the best families of Athens, to whom this sad reverse in the fortune of their country would alone give the means of returning to it, and recovering their property. Their presence was necessary toward the probable permanence of the next measure, the change of the government to an

[* Mr. Clinton thus fixes the date of the surrender of Athens to B. C. 404. "Thucyd. v. 26. ἔτη τὰ ζύμπαντα ἐγένετο τῷ πολέμῳ ἑπτὰ καὶ εἴκοσι.— εὐρήσαι τις τοσαῦτα ἔτη, λογιζόμενος κατὰ τοὺς χρόνους, καὶ ἡμέρας οὐ πολλὰς παρενεγκούσας. The war began in Munychion of the archon Pythodorus (Spring, B. C. 431). It therefore ended in Munychion of the archon Alexias (Spring, B. C. 404)." Fast. Hellen. p. 82.]

oligarchy. The popular assembly was abolished, and the supreme authority was committed, for the present, to a council of thirty, among whom Theramenes found a place. These were directed to consider of a new form of political administration, such as Lacedæmon should approve, preserving the ancient laws and civil government of the commonwealth, as far as might consist with oligarchy.

Xen. Hel. 1. 2.
c. 3. s. 1, 2.

1.5.

Things being so far settled in Athens, Agis led away the Peloponnesian army, including the garrison of Decelea; and all Attica, but Attica only, became once more the quiet possession of the Athenians. Lysander conducted the fleet to Samos. The people of that island, after sustaining a siege for some time, capitulated; and the terms granted were milder than their conduct had entitled them to expect: they were permitted to depart in safety, whither they pleased, carrying however only the clothes they wore. The lands, houses, slaves, cattle, the whole island, with all it contained, were given to their fellow-citizens of the aristocratical party. After having settled this business, Lysander dismissed the ships of the allies, and with the Lacedæmonian squadron sailed for Laconia.

So ended the Peloponnesian war in its twenty-seventh year; so Lacedæmon, actually in alliance with Persia, became again decidedly the leading power of Greece; and the aristocratical, or rather the oligarchal, triumphed over the democratical interest in almost all the little commonwealths which composed the Greek nation.

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