

THE  
HISTORY OF GREECE.

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**BOOK THE FIFTH.**  
**SPARTA SUPREME IN GREECE.**

**FROM OL. xciv. 1 (B. C. 404) TO OL. c. 2 (B. C. 379).**





# THE HISTORY OF GREECE.

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## CHAPTER I.

### ATHENS UNDER THE THIRTY.

THE struggle between the two leading states of Greece was at an end. This was not the result of mutual exhaustion, nor of a treaty defining anew the limits of dominion on either side; but of complete victory on the one, and absolute submission on the other. A victory more brilliant than the expectations of the most ambitious Spartan had been able to imagine during the long series of years of war had been gained suddenly, without danger or difficulty, without sacrifice of money or effusion of citizens' blood; it had fallen like a ripe fruit into the laps of the conquerors. Theirs was the gain of the whole of this unmeasurable success, although it was foreign money which had enabled them to assemble their naval force; their own resources were unimpaired, and the means of support upon which the enemy had so long relied for resisting them were now at their disposal. Sparta was now the single state powerful by land or sea; she was on terms of intimate friendship with the Persians, who attached to their auxiliary services no conditions in any wise oppressive to her. Sparta's former foibles, mistakes, and defeats were forgotten; once more she was regarded with reverence by the Hellenes, who offered her a deep confidence, and

Supremacy  
of Sparta af-  
ter her vic-  
tory.

hopefully hailed the triumph at last achieved by her over Athens as the beginning of a new and happy era. From Cythera to Thrace there existed no Greek community where any cavil against Sparta's hegemony over Hellenic affairs made itself heard. Neither Sparta nor any other state in Greece had ever possessed such a power as this. For it was one resting upon ancient tradition, and firmly supported anew by material and moral bases.

But to this authority there also attached momentous claims and demands. Sparta might fairly be expected to have prepared herself for her new task. She was the most ancient state which had held the hegemony, and her exclusive right to this position of honor had never been renounced by herself and her adherents; since the expedition of Brasidas she had come forth from her narrower sphere of action; she had become a naval power, had acquired a familiarity with all European and Asiatic relations, and an experience of the widest variety. She could not be blind to the necessity of creating a new order of things in Hellas. Therefore, all eyes were turned towards Sparta; and upon the way in which she would use her power, so as to fulfil the demands of the epoch, would necessarily depend the further course of Greek history.

The first measures were left to the man to whom Sparta owed her victory. For hardly ever has a decisive victory been gained in which the victorious state itself and its citizens had so small a share, as on the day of *Ægospotami*. Lysander alone had made this victory possible, and had alone gained it; in his hands lay the means, without which it seemed impossible to gather in the fruits of the victory; for he alone held the threads by which he directed the action of the political parties, and in the name of Sparta regulated the affairs of Greece. In his conduct of these matters he followed the traditional principles of Lacedæmonian policy.

Expectations  
founded upon  
her position.

Lysander.

The chief source of danger to the authority of Sparta in Greece had always lain in the fact that other principles of constitutional life than those prevailing in Sparta had asserted and developed themselves. Accordingly, wherever she could proceed as she desired, Sparta endeavored to remove political institutions contrary to her own, and, by the introduction of a constitution homogeneous with the Spartan, to recover her influence over the communities which had become estranged from her. Such had been her course of action at Argos, at Sicyon, in Achaia (vol. iii. p. 316); and, indeed, the contest against Tyrannical government, wherein Sparta had of old developed her best forces, was at bottom nothing but a struggle against democracy.

Policy of  
Sparta in Pe-  
loponnesus.

This policy Sparta had only partially succeeded in carrying through within Peloponnesus; while beyond the Peloponnesian boundaries she had never been able to apply it except in isolated instances. The peculiar development of Athens had thoroughly established the ancient opposition between constitutional systems as an opposition of state against state; and, in proportion as the Attic community shook off all restrictions upon its free-will, and without pausing for repose continued its advance, Sparta had straitened and restrained her own development; the guidance of her public affairs had been given over to circles which became more and more narrow; and she had become more and more a polity of warriors and officials, which recognized as its sole task that of averting all innovations. Accordingly, this contrast in home policy could not but more and more decisively assert itself as the cardinal point in foreign policy: the constitutional question inevitably rose into one of authority abroad. Every victory obtained in a Greek city by the democratic party removed that city out of the sphere of Sparta's influence, and caused it to leave the

The victory  
of Sparta the  
defeat of de-  
mocracy.

ranks of her allies for those of her adversaries. For the Athenians had also pursued the same policy. In the spread of democratic constitutions they had perceived the most effective means for closely attaching to themselves the island- and coast-states; and Sparta had repeatedly been obliged to recognize this group of states, to which the principles of democracy gave union amongst themselves, as a power legally established in Greece (vol. ii. pp. 420, 432; vol. iii. p. 208.)

This recognition had been cancelled by the war; the entire power of the state which had forced Sparta to grant it had been destroyed; and she was free to act according to her own will. Under such circumstances, how could her statesmen have any other intention than that of at last thoroughly carrying out her ancient policy, of utterly sweeping away the anti-Spartan constitutions, and of removing, if possible for ever, the difference which had perpetually obstructed the power of Sparta, and thus putting an end to the division which had split Greece into two hostile camps?

Herein, then, Lysander merely followed the traditional principles of his native city, when he availed himself of his strength to dissolve the popular system of government in all the towns which had belonged to the Attic confederation, and to commit the government to a fixed body of men enjoying his confidence. As at Athens the Thirty, so elsewhere Commissions of Ten were established; and in order to give security and strength to those governing bodies, detachments of Spartan troops were placed by their side, under the command of a *Harmost*. This measure again was by no means a novel invention. From an early period the Lacedæmonians had been in the habit of despatching *Harmostæ* (i. e. military governors) into the rural districts, to hold sway over the Periæci (vol. i. p. 203), and to keep the latter in strict subjection to the capital. Such Harmosts were sub-

sequently also sent abroad ; and this, of itself, showed how the Spartans had no intention of recognizing various kinds of subjection, and how they at bottom designed to make no essential difference between subject rural communities in Laconia, and the foreign towns which had of their own accord, or otherwise, submitted to the power of Sparta. The duration of the Harmosts' tenure of office was not defined ; it was thought well, in places of importance, to allow them to remain long enough to become thoroughly domesticated there—so in the case of Clearchus at Byzantium (vol. iii. p. 507.) Nor was their sphere of duties accurately marked out ; they held both a military and a civil authority, and were accordingly not dependent upon the Kings as commanders-in-chief, but upon the Ephors directly ; and it was to the latter that they were responsible. The Harmosts were, in short, confidential servants of the government, and were allowed to form an independent judgment of affairs in their several localities. For this reason these commissioners of Sparta abroad were selected among men of advanced age, from whom sound judgment and a prudent exercise of their official authority might be expected. To Amphipolis had at first, in Ol. lxxxix. 1 (B. C. 424), been sent a man of youthful years ; and this is expressly mentioned by Thucydides as a violation of ordinary usage. Twelve years later two commissioners of war were sent to Eubœa with a detachment of three hundred men.\*

\* There was nothing *per se* offensive in the term ἀρμοστής, which is even contrasted, as one of less severity, with those of the Attic federal inspectors (ἐπίσκοποι φύλακες). Theophr. ap. Harp. ἐπίσκοποι: cf. Diod. xiv. 3 (ἀρμόζοντες μὲν τῷ λόγῳ, τύραννοι δὲ τοῖς πράγμασιν). The name was not a new one ; it was not, however, derived from the Peloponnesian federal system, but was the official appellation of the governors sent by Sparta into the districts of the Perioeci (Schol. Pind. Ol. 6, 154. Schömann, *Gr. Alt.* vol. I. P. 2, p. 212). Since, then, it was again Harmosts who were sent into the subjected federated towns (οἱ παρ' αὐτοῖς καλούμενοι ἄρμ. ; Diod. xiv. 10), it may assuredly be hence concluded that the federated towns were regarded as balliwicks or governments abroad, with which moreover, they had in common the payment of tribute. The term is used in a more general sense by Thuc. viii. 5

Personal influence of Lysander upon Spartan policy.

What had formerly occurred in isolated instances was now carried out on a large scale; and thus a net-work of Spartan garrisons was spread over Greece, in order to bind down all elements of resistance, all the forces of the revolution—for it was in this light that the entire democratic movement appeared from the old Spartan point of view. But, if the policy of Sparta was to be thus comprehensively realized, a man was needed such as Lysander was. Without Lysander, the scheme would never have succeeded; for, while at Sparta no thought was taken of what lay beyond the immediate future, he alone had long provided for what had now occurred, and had prepared the measures to be taken after the overthrow of Athens. He was acquainted with the relations of parties in all the towns of Greece; he knew the party-leaders who were the right men for introduction into the oligarchical governing commissions; he had incited them to enter into closer combinations with one another, and had accustomed them to look to him for their instructions, and to him for their advancement to power and honors. Lysander acted in the name of his native city, in the spirit of her policy, and, as we are expressly informed, under orders from the Ephors; but all measures bore the character impressed upon them by himself; and his influence was of so personal a nature, that it could not be shared with any other man. Upon the person of Lysander depended the absolute dominion which Sparta for the moment possessed; but herein also lay the germ of its weakness.

Isolated cases of rewarded loyalty to Sparta.

For it was only in isolated cases that the proceedings were taken which the true friends of Sparta were bound to expect, viz. that those communities to whom their devotion to

where it is applied to such a position as that held by Gylippus at Syracuse. As to the exceptional case with regard to age, see Thuc. iv. 132; τῶν ἡβώοντων παρανόμως ἀνδρας ἐξήγον ἐκ Σπάρτης. This happened B. C. 423, and was perhaps intended as an annoyance to Brasidas; cf. vol. iii. p. 199.

Sparta had brought misfortune were, as far as possible rewarded by compensation and restoration. Thus, indeed, the Æginetans and Melians, or as many of them as survived, recovered their native country; in Histiaæ, too, and in Scione and Torone, the wrongs inflicted by the Athenians were in some degree repaired; the Attic *cleruchs* on the islands were forced to quit their holdings; the Messenians had to evacuate Cephallenia and Naupactus, and the latter city was restored to the Locrians.\*

Thus the Spartans endeavored, at isolated points, where the Athenians had proceeded with exceptional violence, to exercise justice and to expiate wrong; and, in truth, these endeavors were also dictated by political interests. In general, however, the Spartans themselves displayed an extreme degree of violence; nor could any one have been less adapted than Lysander for appearing in the character of the champion of order and legality. Instead of being elevated above the political parties, he stood in the midst of them. He was the leader of those who, by means of their secret combinations, had undermined the tranquillity of the communities; and the most violent members of the political clubs were his associates and his tools. When, therefore, it was to such men as these that he gave full liberty of action, he was well aware that they would employ it for appeasing the lust of vengeance upon their fellow-citizens, which they had so long been forced to restrain; and this accorded with the real intentions of Lysander. Far from desiring to establish tranquillity and peace, in which the cities might recover from the miseries

General despotism of Sparta.

\* Concerning Lysander acting as *Nomarchus* by orders of the state, see Diod. xiv. 10. As to the restoration of Ægina and Melos: Xen. *Hellen.* ii. 2, 9; Plut. *Lys.* 14; Scione (vol. iii. p. 186), *ib.* As to the expulsion of the Messenians from Naupactus and the islands: Diod. xiv. 34 (from Cephallenia), and 78 (from Zacynthus); Paus. x. 38, 10; Lyeon *ὑποβίης Ναυρακτος* 'Homeros' of Metagenes; Meineke, *Fragm. Com. Gr.* ii. 755; Bergk, *Rel. Com. Att.* 423.

of the war, he was well content to see the civic communities destroying themselves by internal feuds and seditions. It was not a cruel whim, but politic design, which caused him to favor the exhaustion of those communities which still appeared capable of resistance; the ends of his policy demanded that the unhappy land of Greece should yet be further weakened and unnerved by loss of blood. It will be remembered how three thousand Athenians were, by his orders, slaughtered on the Hellespont; how at Miletus, where the contending parties were on the point of arriving at a reconciliation, he had insidiously instigated a sanguinary massacre, in order to make a clean sweep of his opponents in this quarter (vol. iii. p. 548.) The same course was pursued in Thasos, where the civic community, after it had been tranquillized by means of solemn promises, was fallen upon, and the greater part of it put to death. And, in the end, no distinction was any longer observed between the communities which had sided against, and those which had sided with, Sparta in the war. Inasmuch as there were none to fear, neither were there any to be considered. The ruthless severity of Spartan policy was allowed to assert itself unrestrictedly; and any notion of being bound by the principles of a Brasidas or a Callicratidas was cast to the winds. And yet the former of these had, in the name of Sparta, solemnly vowed conscientiously to respect the autonomy of every community, and to favor no party whatever; while Callicratidas had openly declared that he desired no other supremacy for his state than such as free Hellenes would voluntarily grant to it.

Its oppres-  
siveness.

Principles directly contrary to these being now officially approved, and the just expectations of the Hellenes most bitterly disappointed, it was impossible that Greece should be tranquillized; it was impossible that anything should result but a new agitation. Public opinion, brutally disregarded, imme-



diately turned against Sparta. The states formerly oppressed by Athens, instead of drawing new breath in the atmosphere of liberty, as they had hoped, were terrified to find themselves delivered up to a far heavier oppression than the Athenian. For, however harsh and severe the sway of Athens had been, yet it was no arbitrary terrorism; it had been founded in a spirit of justice, regulated by legal statutes, and organized with intelligence; it treated the individual life of each community with as much tenderness as the interests of the leading state permitted; it offered a strong protection against foreign enemies, under which trade and industry might flourish; and it possessed a national significance which no candid judge could fail to perceive. The Spartans, on the other hand, had already in three treaties sacrificed the towns of Asia Minor; and although, after their victory on the Hellespont, they were loth to deliver up certain towns of special importance, as *e. g.* Abydus, where they had placed a Harmost of their own, yet even in this quarter they lacked courage to withstand the claims of their powerfully ally; and the Persian viceroys ruled in the name of the Great King more absolutely than ever before, along the whole coast-line of the Archipelago and the routes of the sea, which were of so high an importance for the liberty of the Greeks and for their commerce; although the tributes originally introduced for the protection of the Greek sea were levied as heretofore. A further grievance lay in the brutality of the men whom Sparta deputed into the Hellenic cities; for the large number required of itself put a special selection of men of proved competence out of the question. On the contrary, they were, for the most part, men taken from inferior walks of life, servile towards Lysander and his friends, and brutal towards the unprotected citizens. Thus, the best element which had survived in the Greeks, their communal sentiment, was everywhere exposed to

the cruellest insult; and no man of clear judgment could fail to perceive that the much-abused maritime dominion of Athens could not have been followed by any more striking justification than that offered by the system of the Spartan Commissions of Ten and military governors.\*

Its weak  
points.

This reaction in public opinion and growing excitement against Sparta, of course, from the first contained the germ of the weakness of her dominion. In the same direction tended the discord which necessarily made its appearance between the

Jealousy  
against Ly-  
sander at  
Sparta.

authorities of the Spartan state. A growth of jealousy was here inevitable, for the commissions of Ten, or *Decarchies* of Lysander, were the mainstays of his personal power. It was, therefore, easy to perceive how dangerous this power was to the state, and how much it was against the interest of Sparta to charge herself with the hatred of all Greece, in order to maintain the authority of Lysander. But those who perceived this proposed no other course of action by which they were resolved to abide. Thus, the divergence between Lysander on the one hand, and the Kings and Ephors on the other, undoubtedly crippled his authority, but at the same time it impaired that of Sparta; and it hereby became possible to the conquered cities to withdraw themselves from the crushing oppression of the overwhelmingly powerful state.

Sparta and  
the states of  
secondary  
rank.

Finally, a third circumstance operated upon the further progress of Greek affairs—viz. the relations of Sparta to the states of secondary rank. These states had been her most zealous allies against Athens, but all their exertions during the war remained disregarded; they found themselves deceived in all their expectations, and saw their clearest

\* As to Thasos; Corn. Nep. *Lys.* 2; Polyæn. i. 46, 4. Helots employed as Harbours: Xen. *Hellen.* iii. 5, 13. Tributes rising to the amount of 1,000 talents: Dio-l. xiv. 10; Plut. *Lys.* 17.

claims for a share in the spoils of victory and for a voice in the resettlement of affairs in Hellas coldly rejected. Hence arose a vehement opposition; the feeling of independence in the secondary states was aroused to new energy, and occasioned a series of attempts to shake off the odious supremacy of Sparta. Thus we see by the side of the latter new centres of independent political life forming themselves;—and these contain at the same time the germs of fresh struggles for the hegemony over Greece.

These three points of view determine the events of the next few decades. They explain why, after the battle of *Ægospotami*, Greek history, instead of becoming a history of Sparta and of Spartan dominion over Greece, as *Lysander* intended, recovers its ancient manifold variety of independent city histories. The first and most instructive example is furnished by Athens.

In the violent changes which after the victory of Sparta took place in the cities of Greece, the native parties in each were everywhere concerned. But this was most effectively the case in that city in whose busy life all political tendencies had found their most vigorous and characteristic development, —at Athens.

Here the friends of the existing constitution had severed themselves most decisively from its adversaries. The former thought that upon it depended absolutely the salvation of the state; the latter regarded it as the source of all evil, as a system contradicting every consideration of reason. Between these two parties stood a third, that of the Moderates, who could not of course point to principles of action as definite as those of the unconditional friends or foes of the constitution, but who agreed with the latter in acknowledging the abuses of the democracy and in strongly desiring certain restrictions upon the popular will, and with the former in

Political parties at Athens.

The Moderates.

being loyal adherents of the constitution, in abhorring any violation of it as high treason, and in equally abhorring any intervention of a foreign state brought about for party purposes. In these patriotic sentiments, therefore, they stood by the side of the Democrats proper, against the Oligarchs. The latter, never supported by any considerable number of adherents among the citizens, had always found themselves obliged to rely upon foreign aid, and contrived to excuse their good understanding with the enemies of the city to themselves and others by all kinds of sophistic arguments.

The Oligarchs. We have become sufficiently acquainted with the proceedings of this party, with its constant endeavor to provoke confusion in the state, in order to impair the respect paid to its laws, and eagerly to turn every disturbance and every public calamity to the account of their own ends. It was the party of those who despised the common people; who esteemed virtue and capacity for political action inalienable privileges of men of rank; who regarded the renunciation of maritime dominion as the first step indispensable for returning to a rational course of action;—the same party, whose political creed remains to us in the essay on the Athenian polity preserved under the name of Xenophon. The objects which this party had during the last century pursued in repeated attempts, and at the time of the Four Hundred had already in part realized, had now been consummated; with the establishment of the Thirty the Oligarchs had arrived at the goal of their desires. The destruction of the fleet and the levelling of the walls had disarmed the city and severed it from the sea; Athens was no longer either a Democracy or a great Power; she was reduced to one of the many country-towns of Greece which, without having any policy of their own, obeyed a foreign guidance, and placed their armed men under the supreme command of Sparta. For Sparta was once more

the sole head ; a single will was omnipotent in Hellas. Liberation from the troubles of war after they had lasted for seven-and-twenty years, reconciliation between tribes akin to one another, peace and harmony among the Hellenes, guaranteed by homogeneous constitutions,—in short, a return to the good old times, with their wise ordinances of law which democratic insolence had overthrown—such was the bright sign hung out for the new order of things which the partisans of Sparta lauded as alone beneficent, and as alone in accordance with Right.

Not one of these partisans, however, can The Thirty. have been short-sighted enough to believe the work of a reaction, which reversed the progress of Athenian history since Themistocles, or indeed since Clisthenes and Solon, to have succeeded on the spot. It was to be foreseen, that the civic community, though broken by war and famine, and weakened in consequence of unexpected calamities, would again recover its self-confidence. Accordingly, everything depended upon the measures whereby the Thirty would secure their sway and carry out their principles ; in other words, their party had arrived not at the close, but at the beginning, of their task. They had been established, on the motion of Dracontidas, amidst open contradiction which only the authoritative orders of Lysander had been able to remove ; and they consisted throughout of men who, although they possessed adherents among the upper classes in the city, were odious, or in a high degree suspicious, to the community as a whole. In part they were the same men who by their treason had occasioned the defeat of *Ægospotami* ; and, as was universally known, they had not merely accepted what circumstances had rendered inevitable, and abstained from availing themselves of their relations to Sparta for bringing about the peace, desired on all sides, under as favorable conditions as possible ; but they had made Sparta serve their party

purposes, had taken refuge behind the authority of Ly-sander, had arrived at a secret understanding with him, and had required him to make such demands as best corresponded to their selfish interests. Yet they were notwithstanding not established as an official government proper, but merely as a commission instructed to review afresh the fundamental laws of the state, which in recent years had been so frequently shaken, and to bring them into harmony with the altered condition of affairs. For this purpose only they had been entrusted, under the supreme authority of Sparta, with the extraordinary powers which after the close of their legislative activity were again to expire.

Their first  
measures. In spite of this, the Thirty were anything but intent upon legislation; their sole object was completely to subject to themselves all surviving factors of political life, and to disarm all possible opposition. The civic community remained dissolved; the republican offices retained a mere semblance of existence, and were, notwithstanding their absolute insignificance, filled by members of the ruling party. Thus Pythodorus became First Archon, and gave his name to the year which began under the Thirty. The Council too was left standing, although perhaps without its full numbers; but it was throughout composed of persons who already at the time of the Four Hundred had proved themselves adherents of the oligarchy. To this Council was at the same time, after the abolition of the popular tribunals and of the Areopagus, committed the penal jurisdiction; and, in order that even in so dependent a body no free and impartial decisions might take place, it was ordained that the members of the Council should vote openly and in the presence of the Thirty. The Piræus, from of old the focus of democratic movements, was placed under a special official Board of Ten, who were made responsible for the maintenance of tranquillity in

that quarter. These Ten were undoubtedly, like the Thirty, named by Lysander and subordinated to him. Neither in the Upper nor in the Lower town were any official authorities tolerated which did not offer themselves as ready instruments of the new government.\*

After a preliminary political system had been thus established, the despots began by introducing the new era to which they desired to advance Athens, by a few shrewdly calculated measures. For it was not difficult in those days to charge the abuses of the democracy with every calamity of which the consequences weighed upon the city. When, therefore, the Thirty employed their authority in removing such evils in civic society as were offensive to all right-minded citizens; when they made short work of certain contemptible individuals who had plied the trade of sycophants with shameless effrontery, and expelled them from the city, these measures were approved by a considerable part of the population. A vigorous government was welcome after a protracted absence of all counsel and means of protection; the want of confidence in the constitution which had spread further and further since the Sicilian calamity, the longing for tranquillity which could only be expected to be satisfied if popular liberties were restricted and the good-

\*As to the rule of the Thirty, see Xen. *Hellen.* ii. 3 ff.; the speeches of Lysias against Eratosthenes, Agoratus, and Nicomachus, &c.; and Isocrates and other orators *passim*. For modern accounts: Lachmann, *Gesch. Gr. vom Ende des pol. Kr. bis Alex.* (1839); Sievers, *Gesch. Gr. vom Ende des polop. Kr. bis zur Schl. bei Mantinea* (1840); Scheibe, *Orig. Umwälzung zu Athen am Ende des polop. Kr. und das Archontat des Eukleides* (1841); Weissenborn, *Hellen.* (1844), p. 197 f. Xenophon, in his first two books, follows the chronological order of Thuc.; but the negligence of his narrative, and the very corrupt state of its text, force the reader to resort to combinations in order to arrive at a settled chronology. As to the institutions of the Thirty: Scheibe, 66. The abolition of the Heliastic tribunals is to be assumed as a matter of course; that of the Areopagus is to be gathered from the correct interpretation of Lysias, l. 30 (Ranckenstein, *Philol.* x. 606). The Areopagus had fallen into disfavor, Lys. xii. 69. As to Pythodorus as a member of the Four Hundred (whose corporation was the seminary of the Thirty), Plut. *Alex.* l. p. 119; *Diog. Laert.* ix. 54; he was trained in philosophy, like his colleague Aristoteles: Bergk, *Ed. Com.* 100; cf. vol. iii. p. 523.

will of Sparta courted, operated in favor of the new government; and if the latter acted with ordinary shrewdness, it might succeed in gradually attracting to its side many of the Middle party.

But this moderation only lasted for a brief space of time. The members of the government were too decidedly partisans to be able to rest satisfied long with a cautious adoption of a rational political system; too much wrath had accumulated in them during the protracted period in which the minority of men of property had been subjected to the sway of the hated multitude; and they desired to vent for the bitter hatred which they had restrained, to take vengeance for the oppression which they had so long endured. But if they pursued such ends as these, they obviously could not enter upon an endeavor gradually to bring about a change in the sentiments of the citizens, and to secure the support of the Moderate party. The following of the Knights, the one corporation at Athens which adhered on principle to the oligarchs, was insufficient for their purposes; nor could they find the guarantee desired in Sparta, so long as she merely stood in the background as a protecting power. They therefore despatched two confidential emissaries, *Æschines* and *Aristoteles*, with orders to convince the authorities at Sparta that armed assistance was required, if the new political system was to be established permanently, and after a fashion agreeable to Sparta herself. As they undertook to maintain the troops at their own cost, and as *Lysander* zealously supported their request, 700 Lacedæmonian garrison-troops under the command of *Callibius* entered Attica, and occupied the citadel. It may have been *Lysander* himself who, after he had taken *Samos*, and had carried out his measures of force on the coasts of *Thrace*, conducted the march of these men and established the *Harmost*.

Spartan  
garrison under  
*Callibius*  
in the Acro-  
polis.



This event was productive of many important results. For now all doubt was inevitably taken away even from those who had been simple enough to believe in the moderation of the Thirty; and indignation necessarily filled every patriot, when Spartan sentinels challenged him on the way to the sanctuary of the City Goddess, that very goddess who had rejected the homage even of Lacedæmonian kings (vol. i. p. 413). It was now clear that the government was careless of gaining respect and content, and that it was determined to pursue paths in which it needed the assistance of foreign arms; it was evident, that this government esteemed more highly the gratification of its lust of vengeance than even its own honor and independence. For henceforth Callibius, a rough-spoken and overbearing Spartan, was the foremost man at Athens; and the heads of the Thirty deemed it no condescension on their part to court his favor and to secure his good-will in every possible way: they were not ashamed to offer up as a sacrifice to his craving for vengeance the young and beautiful Autolycus, famed as a victor in several competitive games. Callibius, annoyed by the loss of a lawsuit, had struck Autolycus in the public street, and then, when he had defended himself, had brought him as a criminal before Lysander. The latter disapproved of the conduct of the Harmost; but when he had departed, Autolycus had to suffer the penalty of death.\*

As a compensation for so humiliating a position, the Thirty were naturally anxious to reap a proportionately thorough harvest out of the accession of power which had accrued to them by means of the garrison. They became more reckless and despotic in all points; moreover, their undertaking to maintain the troops at their own expense obliged them to procure

\* As to Callibius, Xen. *Hell.* ii. 3, 13; Diod. xiv. 4; Paus. i. 18, ix. 32; Plut. *Lys.* 15; Cobet, *Prosop. Xenoph.* p. 54.

money in every possible way, and for this purpose to make inroads upon both public and private property. In short, the admission of these foreign troops converted the party sway of the oligarchs into a Tyrannis far worse than any Tyrannis of earlier times, because it was designed to chastise the people like a hated foe who at last lay at their mercy. All civic liberties having been abolished, together with the laws of Solon, it became possible to extend the persecution to every person who had incurred the ill-will of those in power; and this category included every one who might possibly become dangerous. The system of sycophancy, which it was intended to abolish, flourished to an extent which it had never heretofore reached; it was partly in the hands of men who had formerly already plied this trade, and who now merely changed sides in order to keep up their lucrative occupation, while others of the new sycophants were men who were now, under the Thirty, first apprenticed to a service all the more lucrative because an accusation might now be confidently expected to succeed. The most notorious among these bloodhounds and informers were Batrachus of Oreus in Eubœa, and Æschylides. Under a government of this description of course a special importance attached to that authority, whose proper business was only the execution of penal sentences, the so-called *Eleven*. For not only were their hands now always full of work; but their posts were always held by the most zealous adherents of the Thirty; they were men who took a personal delight in securing their victims, and in gratifying the despots' lust of vengeance; they were themselves an organ of a party, and the most important weapon in the hands of the government. The most daring and influential of their number was Satyrus.

Executions  
and banish-  
ments.

One of the first acts of violence, which laid bare the real character of the government, was the execution of the unfortunate men against

whom Agoratus had informed as disturbers of the public peace (vol. iii. p. 573), and who were still in durance; according to a popular vote they were to be judged by a jury of 2,000 members. Instead of this, they were sentenced by the council and put to death in prison: among them Strombichides, Calliades, and Dionysodorus. Nor was this all. It seems that, with the co-operation of Lysander, a list had been drawn up of all those whom it was designed to remove; and this included all who had already formerly proved themselves champions of popular rights; above all Thrasybulus, the son of Lycus, the man who had, next to Alcibiades, been chiefly instrumental in obtaining for free Athens, after the fall of the Four Hundred, a new period of fame and prosperity, and Anytus, the son of Anthemion, an individual of low rank, but of considerable property, who was accounted a democrat of the old school. Both were sentenced to banishments. But even those at a distance were feared, particularly Alcibiades, whom neither his friends nor his foes had forgotten. It was known that as long as Alcibiades lived, he was also busy in the formation of plans and in the pursuit of momentous ends. He was now about forty-five years of age, and, notwithstanding his dissipated habits, full of vigor and eager to do great deeds. Reflecting upon the hapless situation of his native city, he could not bring himself to relinquish the idea that he might be permitted to come forward once more as her saviour; and now, as before, he hoped to reach the goal by means of Persia.\*

At Susa Artaxerxes II., Mnemon, had sat on the throne since the close of the year B. C. 405 (Ol. xciii. 4).

\* Βάρβαρος ὁ πάρεδρος ὁ ἐξ Ὀρεοῦ, Archippus *op. Athen.* 329\*. K. Fr. Hermann, *Staatsalt.* § 13v, and Meier, *de bon. damn.* 188, argue against the identity of the ἄνθεκα under the Thirty and during the Democracy. Yet it is surely impossible to assume two boards of Eleven with the same functions. The old board was officered anew and acquired a totally new significance (Scheibe, 68). As to the ἀνάλογος (ὁ μετὰ Ἀναλόγων κ.): Rauchenstein, *Philol.* xv. 338, and *ad Lys.* xxv. 16.

His relations  
with Pharna-  
basus.

The occasion seemed to be exceptionally favorable for forming a connexion with him. For, inasmuch as Cyrus, whose treasonable schemes were becoming more and more manifest (vol. iii. p. 516), had completely attached himself to Sparta, nothing remained for the Great King but to seek his allies at Athens. This was perceived by Alcibiades. Accordingly, after he had for a time maintained an attitude of quiet observation on the Hellespont, he recommenced negotiations with Pharnabazus. (After the appointment of Cyrus as governor-general in the maritime provinces, Pharnabazus had retained his satrapy, while Tissaphernes had been dismissed from his offices). Pharnabazus' seat of government was at Dascylium on the shores of the Propontis; here, following the traditions of ancient Persian policy, he gave a most hospitable reception to his former adversary, and gave up to him the city of Gryneum in Æolis, which produced for him an ample yearly income. In these relations Alcibiades took advantage of his former sojourn at the court of Tissaphernes, easily accustomed himself to Persian ways, and prepared himself for a personal visit to Susa, where he hoped after all to realize his old plans (vol. iii. p. 514); thinking, in accordance with his disposition, to intervene anew in the course of affairs as negotiator and as general.

Proceed-  
ings against  
Alcibiades.

Meanwhile his proceedings were watched by his enemies. They remembered how already once before the dominion of their party had been overthrown by him; and they therefore perceived the necessity of taking early measures to prevent his second return. To Critias no man was more odious than Alcibiades, his former friend, in whom he recognized a living test of the vacillation of his own political career; and moreover, he was well aware that, if the people were looking out for any one man as capable of becoming its saviour, that one man was Alcibiades, who at

tracted the attention of all. So long as such a man remained alive, the Thirty could not hope to see the community quietly submit to the yoke of their despotism. Here were sufficient reasons for persecuting Alcibiades even in his absence. His lands in Attica were confiscated; his son was expelled; and he was himself, like Themistocles of old, declared an outlaw, so that he was prevented from sojourning in any part of Hellas. But it was his death which was desired; and accordingly the government applied to Lysander, who was at this time in Asia, for his co-operation. As Lysander (so it is said) showed no inclination to assent to this request, the enemies of Alcibiades at Sparta were stirred up, above all Agis and his following; and thus it came to pass that definite instructions reached Lysander from Sparta, to make away with Alcibiades. Probably he applied for this purpose to the authority of Cyrus; and thus Pharnabazus saw no means of escaping the necessity, and was forced to lend his hand for the destruction of the man who was enjoying his hospitality.

Alcibiades had started on his journey to the Great King, from whom he might expect a favorable reception; he had just taken up his quarters for the night in the Phrygian hamlet Melissa, when the men sent out by the satrap came up with him. His dwelling was surrounded at night-time, like the lair of a wild beast, and then timber and bushes were piled around it. Awakened by the flames flaring up on all sides, he springs from his bed. He searches for his sword; it had been stolen away. Treason then must have had a hand in the plot. With rapid presence of mind he casts robes and coverlets into the flames, and thus proceeds through them, followed by his mistress Timandra and by a faithful Arcadian. Already he has passed beyond the reach of the fiery sea which was to have destroyed him, when, the flames lighting up

His death.  
Ol. xci. 4  
(a. c. 404).  
Autumn.

his position, a shower of missiles falls upon him from a distance, so that he falls to the ground, without being able to see a single one of his foes. When all is over, the barbarians issue forth from their darkness, and cut off the hero's head, in order to carry it to the satrap in token of the accomplishment of their orders. His body is buried by the faithful Timandra.\*

The death of Alcibiades was in any case to be regarded as an important gain by the rulers of Athens, if they considered what complications might have resulted from his negotiations with the Great King. Yet the difficulties of their situation could not be removed by means of isolated acts of violence. Its weakness lay particularly in the fact, that it was not a single Tyrant, but a board of Thirty, which held sway. This number had originally been intended to serve the purpose of diminishing the evil semblance of a Tyranny; it was a kind of senate placed at the head of the state; and it was doubtless not accidental that the number of its members corresponded to that of the Council of the Old at Sparta (since in the establishment of Ephors too, vol. iii. p. 578, it is impossible not to recognize an adherence to Spartan political institutions). No permanent union could prevail among so many official colleagues of equal powers, least of all in the case of a government which ruled without laws and conducted affairs after an arbitrary fashion, devoid of any fixed standard or limit. It was inevitable that discord should arise among the colleagues as to the measures to be taken, and that party divisions should form themselves within the government.

\* As to Alcibiades' perception of the plans of Cyrus: Ephorus *op. Diod.* xiv. 10; Nepos, *Alc.* 10. As to his death: Plut. *Alc.* 39. Timandra in Athen. 574 is called Theodote. According to Ephorus, Pharnabazus was anxious that the news should not be carried by any one else from Cyrus to the court; but this falls to account for the deed of blood. This makes it probable that Cyrus co-operated; who had the most cause for fearing Alcibiades. Cf. Grote, vol. viii. p. 427.

Moreover, among the citizens also, after they had recovered from their first terror, movements of incalculable significance became perceptible. Men began to see clearly as to the situation of the state, and the question suggested itself with increasing distinctness: "What is to be the end of all this?" For so long as only those who had given open cause of offence were touched, all whose consciences were easy remained tranquil. But now things had changed. Batrachus and Æschylides were always at hand, to prefer accusations on the expression or hint of a wish on the part of any one of the Thirty; and the accused were judged by their enemies. All security of life and property was now at an end, and any honest citizen might suddenly become the victim of an insidious informer. There was no longer any question of the party-standpoint; the victims of the Tyrants were found to include men belonging to the noblest houses of the city, and averse, both by family tradition and by personal conviction, from the excesses of the democracy. Thus the worthy Niceratus, the son of the general Nicias, fell; Eucrates, the brother of the general, who had refused to become a member of the Board of the Thirty, having already at an earlier date been removed. Leon of Salamis, and Lycurgus, the grandfather of the orator Lycurgus, were likewise after a short mock trial delivered up to the Eleven. The citizens were dragged away from the market-place and from the temples; the relatives of the murdered men were hindered from giving them the rites of burial; to display sympathy was accounted criminal. In most cases of sentence a variety of motives co-operated—the desire of removing dangerous individuals, and that of satisfying personal appetites of vengeance and at the same time of obtaining money by the confiscation of property.

The last-named motive, which had already dictated the proceedings against the heirs of <sup>Persecution</sup> ~~of the Metoect~~

Nicias, came more and more into the foreground; and, from this point of view, the persecution was extended to the numerous class of Attic resident aliens, or *Meteci*, who lived under the protection of the state. Their possessions consisted chiefly in money and moveable property, which being hard to survey and apt to be over-estimated, accordingly all the more tempted the greed of the Tyrants. In this case, as that of non-citizens, they thought to stand in proportionately small need of hesitation; indeed, there was a certain specious pretence in their favor, when they represented this class in general as hankering after innovations and unworthy of trust. Hence two of the Thirty, Pison and Theognis, made a special motion with reference to the resident aliens; the several members of the council were called upon to mention individual members of this class suspected by them; and in order that the real motive of this persecution might not too palpably display itself, the subterfuge was adopted of including among the first ten selected as victims two persons without means.\*

Reaction  
among the  
Thirty.

No wonder, then, that in view of this progress of affairs even certain of the Thirty began to hesitate, and that the opinion gained ground that it was assuredly impossible to proceed blindly in the path hitherto pursued, and that the security of the government itself demanded a consideration of means, whereby a support might be gained among the citizens, and a polity established containing something like a warrant of permanence. This tendency found its representative in Theramenes. Involuntarily he

Therame-  
nes.

\* As to Encrates and Niceratus: Lys. xviii. 4, 6. As to Leon: Andoc. *Myst.* 94; Scheibe, 83. As to Lycurgus: *Vit.* X. Orat. 841; Clinton, *Fest. Hell. ad ann.* 337 (not the father Lycophron, according to Scheibe, 101). As to Pison and Theognis: Lys. xii. 6; Xen. *Hell.* ii. 3, 21. The oppression of the mercantile class accorded with the political principles of the oligarchs, who wished to divert the state from its commercial tendency. Cf. "Xenophon," *de rep. Ath.*



again fell into the same direction which he had pursued under the government of the Four Hundred (vol. iii. p. 486).

His whole conduct at the time when the city was befallen by its great calamity, forbids our assuming it to have been a moral sense of shame which restrained him from participating in the progress of arbitrary violence. On the contrary, as Critias afterwards told him to his face, he had at first been among the most zealous, and had incited his colleagues to a sanguinary persecution of the opposite party. But when he found himself outvied by others in this course of action, and felt his vanity offended by the predominating influence of Critias, who became *de facto* the head of the government, Theramenes hoped by opportunely adopting a more moderate policy to provide best for himself individually. For he was too sagacious not to perceive the necessary consequences of such a system of terror; he was therefore anxious in time to quit the ship whose sinking he foresaw. In this way he might also hope to rise to the position of a party-leader by the side of Critias, and, after the latter should have been brought to a fall by his abuse of his power, to gain by his own sagacious pliability an authority corresponding to his ambition. Moreover, a certain aversion from everything unmeasured and wild had survived in him as a remnant of his better self (vol. iii. p. 486), and this may now have co-operated as a motive. And, since he had already once before carried a clever change of characters to a prosperous issue, so at the present time, while the rest without any will of their own followed the bidding of Critias, he with growing boldness put forth a voice of warning and of free contradiction.

He had begun by disapproving of individual measures, *e. g.* of the occupation of the citadel by Lacedæmonian troops, and of the execution of blameless men, such as Leon and Niceratus. Then, without allowing himself to be diverted by the bait of a rich share of profits, he deci-

sively opposed himself to the entire procedure of the government. He declared it folly to exercise a despotic sway, and yet remain in a minority; to drive brave men into exile, and thus create a hostile power abroad; to put individuals to death, and thus provoke the enmity of whole classes of the population, whose power was, in reality, increasing at the very time when it was attempted to impair it. He averred that regard should be paid to public opinion, and a support sought for in the civic community. He therefore demanded that full civic rights should be restored to the kernel of the population—in other words, to those who were able to furnish arms for themselves. Critias, on the other hand, held that any modification of the existing system was a sign of weakness, and dangerous; he bade his associates beware of surrendering themselves to simple-minded illusions; for the state must, once for all, be thoroughly purified from all corrupt elements, for which purpose the present was the right moment, such as would never hereafter return. The Thirty ought, therefore, to hold firmly together, and act in unison, like a single Tyrant surrounded on all sides by insidious foes.

Meanwhile, the tension increased; the two rivals mutually forced one another in opposite directions; and, at last, Critias perceived the necessity of apparently giving way, in order that Theramenes might not become the head of a counter party.

It was, therefore, determined to summon a <sup>The Three Thousand.</sup> civic body, in order, according to the view of Theramenes, to rest the oligarchic government on a broader bottom. A list was drawn up of citizens upon whom dependence could be placed; and, in addition to the Knights (who were regarded as a separate class), 3,000 was fixed upon as the normal number—which again may have intentionally corresponded to the tripartite mode of division peculiar to the Dorians. Theram

menes protested against this proposal. He urged that the number was too small; for it excluded many to whom the testimony of their being efficient citizens could not be denied. On the other hand, it was too large, inasmuch as it afforded no guarantee of those included in it being trustworthy adherents of the oligarchy. Measures of this kind, he said, could not possibly lead to the establishment of an enduring polity.

Hereupon Critias and his associates found themselves forced to pursue their own course, <sup>The people</sup> ~~disarmed.~~ and to proceed with measures of a thorough character. One day, they caused all the citizens to be assembled for a general muster. The Three Thousand met in the market-place; the rest, in smaller bodies, in different localities of the city. These places of meeting were surrounded by troops; and the citizens, taken unawares, were obliged to deliver up their arms to the Lacedæmonian mercenaries, who carried them away to the citadel. Thus, after the precedent of earlier arbitrary governments (vol. i. p. 377), the people had been successfully disarmed; upon the Three Thousand, who were left in possession of their arms, as secure a reliance was placed as upon any ordinary band of partisans. To the Three Thousand, therefore, were granted certain civic rights; and, in particular, the privilege was secured to them that no member of their body should be punished without a judicial procedure. This arrangement was, in truth, not so much a protection for the Three Thousand, as a weapon of offence against the rest of the citizens. For the abolition of the most absolutely inalienable rights of Athenian freedom was explicitly declared, when only a fixed number of citizens was specially excepted from the general forfeiture of these rights. And now further steps continued to be taken with increasing fearlessness. To be involved in a penal prosecution, it sufficed to be personally on unfriendly terms with one of those in power, or even to be in possession of

a tempting amount of property; and the more frequently the thirst after vengeance and booty was gratified, the more ardent it became. Houses and work-shops were searched, money-chests broken open, consecrated gifts and deposits attacked. Several members of the government selected their victims according to a mutual agreement; they hereby attained to a more intimate connexion amongst themselves, but, at the same time, marked themselves off from those whose sentiments were more conciliatory. Thus a division formed itself between Ultras and Moderates, which, from day to day, became more manifest. Theramenes, who recklessly attacked the bloody sway of the so-called "best citizens," became intolerable, and his overthrow a necessity.

Accordingly, Critias, after secretly arming  
Critias v.  
Theramenes. a band of his most faithful followers, summoned the council, and there preferred against Theramenes a charge on life and death. This indictment of Theramenes was, at the same time, a justification of the policy of Critias himself. "In political revolutions," he said, "it is absolutely unavoidable that blood should flow; this every one must perceive, who feels it his mission to perform such tasks; and he should, therefore, have manliness enough to command his personal feelings. Athens is the focus of democracy, against which we struggle as against the root of all social evils. Athens is, unfortunately for herself, a populous city, which has been trained in all the follies of popular liberty. After much labor, we have destroyed the popular government, and founded an oligarchy, which is alone capable of maintaining a lasting concord between Athens and Sparta. We must, therefore, stand firm, and not allow any opposition in the state, and least of all in our own body. Now Theramenes never ceases to vituperate us, and find fault with us; he is our foe; and, inasmuch as at first he went hand in hand with us, nay, was more than any other

man instrumental in bringing about the existing order of things, and yet now deserts us, with the intent, in view of the undeniable dangers of our position, of keeping a retreat open for himself: he is not merely our opponent, but also a traitor, and the most dangerous traitor of whom it is possible for us to conceive. True, his conduct cannot surprise us, for it accords with his character; he is, as his well-known nickname testifies, an untrustworthy turn-coat. As member of the Four Hundred, as accuser of the naval commanders, he betrayed his own friends, and brought upon them their doom. Are we, then, now to wait until he succeeds in repeating this course of conduct? Assuredly, all of us who are here assembled honor the city of Sparta, as a seat of wise political institutions. Is it your belief that the Spartans would tolerate such a case as that one of the Ephors should unceasingly slander the constitution, and counteract the authorities? Consider, then, whether ye will uphold this self-seeking traitor, and allow him to gain authority over you, or whether, with him, the hope of success shall, once for all, be cut off from all whose desires are like unto his?"\*

Theramenes defended himself with unshaken courage. He represented his indictment of the Arginusæ generals in the light of an act of self-defence; and, in order to retort upon the personal charges of his adversary, referred to the earlier career of Critias, which, he suggested, was assuredly equally little likely to conciliate confidence; and, in particular, to his guidance of the peasant-revolts in Thessaly (vol. iii. p. 576). Doubtless, he continued, the man who undermined the existing constitution was deserving of death; but, let him ask every impartial judge upon whom

Thera-  
menes v.  
Critias.

\* The Three Thousand were a new edition of the committee of the citizens. Theramenes *κόθορος*, "Hellen. ii. 3, 35. Schol. Aristoph. *Ran.* 47; the shoe fitting either foot symbolizes *ἀμφοτερισμός* in politics. Poll. vii. 90 91; *Echin. Mus.* xx. 390.

this blame should fall? Whether upon him who had loyally adhered to his colleagues, who had merely raised his warning voice against their excesses, and urged a secure establishment of the government; or upon him who made it his task to incite the rest to deeds of more and more reckless violence, and to cast deeper and deeper odium upon the government, while swelling the multitude of its foes? Thus, Theramenes attempted to turn the charges inculcating himself against their author. "Already," he proceeded, "a band of fugitive citizens has established itself at Phyle, in order to attract increasing accessions of malcontents. Nothing can be more warmly desired by these in their own interest, than that the state of things in Athens should become more and more unendurable; accordingly, he who contributes most to this result is their best ally. Even as I opposed the Four Hundred, when they built the fortress in the Piræus, in order to deliver it up to the Lacedæmonians, so I am now, as heretofore, the enemy of all those who wish to annihilate the political existence of Athens. So much even the Spartans had no intention of effecting, although the fate of the city lay in their hands. I am charged with being friendly to both parties; but what is to be said of him who is the foe of both, and who, after the overthrow of popular government, is busily undermining the rule of those who regard themselves as the best of the citizens? My view of the state has ever been consistently the same. I am the declared enemy of every democracy which places the decisive authority in the hands of such citizens as those who, for the sake of turning a drachm, force themselves into the public service, and who will not rest content until they have given to the slaves equality of rights with the citizens. But I am no less decidedly the enemy of those who, in their savage partisan fury, are not satisfied until they have subjected the state to the despotic sway of a handful of men."

So powerful was the impression made by this speech, that, in spite of the lowering glances of Critias, a loud assent involuntarily ensued from the benches of the councilmen. Some had already, for a considerable period, favored the view of Theramenes, among them especially Eratosthenes and Phidon; indeed, a third of the body had been named by Theramenes himself. Many a one was becoming more and more clearly conscious of the fact that, in his own interest, nothing could be more desirable than that greater moderation and caution should be resorted to, before it was too late. Critias perceived that nothing was to be effected by means of further speeches; a vote, regularly taken, would have resulted in the acquittal of Theramenes and in the victory of the Moderates. He, therefore, as he had long ago resolved, resorted to measures of force even against his own colleagues. After exchanging a few words, in a low tone, with his friends, he caused the armed men to approach the bar of the place of assembly, declared it to be the duty of a conscientious ruler of the state not to permit those who shared his sentiments to be seduced by specious orations, and avowed the determination of himself and his friends not to become guilty of any craven concessions. The new laws, he said, ordained that no member of the Three Thousand should be sentenced without the assent of the council; but Theramenes, as a traitor and enemy of the constitution, had forfeited his membership of this body; he therefore hereby struck his name off the list of citizens enjoying full civic rights, and sentenced him to death.

Theramenes sprang to the altar, before the advancing catchpolls could seize his person. He implored the council not to suffer such an act of arbitrary violence. The name of any other man might as easily as his own be expunged from the list of

Execution  
of Therame-  
nes.

the citizens by Critias; no member of the council, or of the Thirty, could feel secure of his life. True, even the altar would be no protection to himself; but at least all should clearly perceive that to men such as Critias neither divine nor human ordinances were sacred. He was dragged away by the Eleven, out of the council-house, straight across the market-place, where a few friends were about to make a last attempt to save him. But Theramenes himself prevented them, and took the hemlock-cup into his hands with an equanimity which in the last hours of his life gained for this man, devoid as he was of any true strength of character, the glory of a hero. He pledged "the dear Critias" in his death-draught, thereby prophesying him a speedy sequence.\*

Effects of his death. The death of Theramenes exercised a very definite influence upon the attitude of the Thirty. An opposition had been removed which hampered and crippled the government; the formation of a Moderate party within the governing body and the council had been frustrated; in order to rid itself of Theramenes, the victorious party had been obliged to violate its own laws, and to deprive an associate in the government of the narrow measure of security which they afforded. Henceforth it became necessary for the purpose of self-preservation to apply all the means of a relentless terrorism. The act of violence which had been committed, and which no sophistry was capable of glossing over, blunted the consciences of the Tyrants, and impelled them onwards in their career with a dæmonic force.

Further changes in civic affairs. They proceeded to more comprehensive measures than they had hitherto put in force, particularly with the intention of diminishing the masses of the city populace, which had always seemed

\* For the defence of Theramenes: *Hellen.* ii. 3, 35. Xenophon is favorable to him; *Lysias*, xii. 77, supplements Xenophon's account. Scheiba, 93. The Liberals positively refused to acknowledge Theramenes as a martyr of their cause.



to the adherents of aristocratic principles the root of all evil. In order therefore to carry out a radical cure, the new list of citizens was made use of. All those whose names were absent from it, were deprived not only of the full civic franchise, but also of the right of dwelling in Athens. Thus, after a fashion far ruder than that, *e. g.* adopted by Periander, who desired to force his urban subjects to resume a peasant life (vol. i. p. 298), the majority of the Athenians were expelled from their paternal abodes, and until further orders prohibited from entering the city, or visiting the market-place and temples. The tranquillity of a desert was to prevail in Athens; and any conspiracy, nay any common discussion concerning the situation of affairs, was to be rendered impossible. Nor were the fugitives permitted to rest quiet in the country districts. In many cases lands were confiscated and given over to members of the government, out of whom it was designed to create a new class of great landed proprietors. For it was contrived to give a specious appearance to this criminal system of robbery by representing the misfortune of Athens to lie in the excessive subdivision of land. The more real and personal property the Tyrants accumulated in their hands, the more enduring the foundations of their dominion seemed to become. Everything connected with the splendor of the democratic era was destroyed according to a fixed plan. The grand public works of the city which ruled the sea, especially the ship-sheds, were pulled down, and the materials sold to the government treasury. The place of the popular assembly was transformed; for it was held undesirable that the citizens should sit as heretofore on the rows of seats, rising like the tiers of a theatre, of the Pnyx; indeed, it was intended not to have any civic assembly which remained together for meetings of considerable duration; the ancient Pnyx was therefore closed, by the tribune of the

orators being turned round, so that henceforth a speaker stood with his face towards the citadel, as had been the case in the primitive times, before the Pnyx had been arranged for the meetings of a consultative civic body. Henceforth the citizens had to listen standing to the edicts of the government which it was thought fit to communicate to them from the orators' tribune, so that after a short stay they might again go about their business. This change of front in the tribune was therefore a genuinely aristocratic measure, and designed to put an end by a single blow to the turbulence of the assemblies; nor was it more than a witty gloss upon this ordinance, when it was suggested that its intention was to prevent the orators from pointing as heretofore towards the sea, and thereby hinting at the lost greatness of Athens. For other and more effective provisions had been made to hinder the Athenians from taking thought any longer of sea or navy.

**Education.** Again, in order to put an end to the whole perversity of the people, and to that false culture on the strength of which any and every man thought himself called upon to contribute his opinion on public affairs, rhetorical instruction was placed under the strict control of the authorities. Nothing was to be taught except what seemed to accord with the principles of the despots; and most especially the lower strata of the population were to be left untouched by any superior culture; and the power inseparable from this was to remain a privilege of the higher classes.\*

**False security of the Thirty.** Thus the heads of the Thirty desired to transform the whole of Athens. In their fanaticism they thought to be working for a distant future, while the ground on which they had erected their artificial edifice was already beginning to quake be-

\* As to the changes in the Pnyx, cf. the author's *Att. Studien*, I. 56. As to the prohibition of free instruction, Xen. *Mem.* I. 2, 31.

neath their feet. For, in the first place, the germ of opposition had not been destroyed in the heart of the government itself; but continued to reappear, since Critias and Charides with increasing audacity demeaned themselves as the real masters, and since it was manifest that the unmeasured ambition of the former pursued in addition very special objects of its own. Moreover, the Thirty seemed to give themselves up to the fixed illusion, that it was only in the market-place of Athens that dangerous movements could originate. As to the city populace outside the walls, they relied upon the uncontroverted authority of Sparta, and in the worst event upon the foreign troops in their pay, to such a degree that they, in a feeling of absolute security, occupied themselves solely with internal affairs. It never even occurred to them to watch the proceedings of the fugitives, or to garrison the frontier fortresses which these fugitives might use as bases of military operations.

Thus it came to pass that it was not in the depopulated city, lying under the ban of the The exiles Tyrannical government, but outside Athens, that a revolution in the state of affairs prepared itself. For, inasmuch as the news of the rule of the Thirty had provoked a deep indignation throughout Greece, Athens, only a short time before universally hated, now became an object of universal sympathy. Sparta had indeed issued strict orders that the exiles should be nowhere received; her heralds impressed upon all Greek cities their duty of obeying this ordinance and delivering up those whom they had admitted; and the recalcitrants were threatened with a pecuniary fine of five talents.

But this was a matter wherein, according to a noble Greek usage, the city communities were least of all ready to permit their autonomy to be restricted; and, moreover, it was probably known that these threatening orders were not meant very seriously. Although therefore several of

the lesser states submitted to the odious demand, in others the bands of fugitives, seeking shelter in their helplessness, were not only hospitably received by individual citizens, as *e. g.* in Chalcis, Megara, and Elis, but also actually placed under the public protection. This was done at Argos and at Thebes. The Argives were generous and spirited enough to bid the Spartan heralds depart from the city before sunset, unless they wished to be regarded as enemies; and Thebes pronounced a penalty upon those citizens who allowed fugitives to be borne away without affording them succor.

Thebes became the most important gathering place, because here those Athenians assembled who from the first kept an armed return in view, and who here found a centre in proved generals and champions of popular rights. Among these Thrasybulus, Anytus, and Archinus were prominent. Anytus, the son of Anthemion, was the proprietor of a tan-yard, like Cleon, and like him a plain-spoken man of the people, with a rough exterior, and rather proud of having remained a stranger to all modern refinement and aristocratic culture. He had already filled a series of important offices, and had recently been involved in a judicial prosecution, because his negligence was said to have caused the loss of Pylus to Sparta (Ol. xcii. 4; B. C. 409). But he had been acquitted—as his enemies said, with the aid of bribery, for he was a rich man. The united fugitives had agreed to acknowledge Thrasybulus and Anytus as their leaders; and Thrasybulus found himself for the second time at the head of a body of men, who, though far away from Athens, regarded themselves as the true Athens, as the core of her free citizens (vol. iii. p. 470). On the former occasion he had been surrounded by the fleet; now he had around him nothing but a small band of fugitive citizens in a foreign land. Archinus, who had likewise seen service as a general, stood as a zealous associate

by Thrasybulus' side, and was prepared to devise and execute in conjunction with him the plans intended to lead to the liberation of their native city.\*

The Thirty had in the interest of Sparta not only deprived Athens of its strong walls, but also pulled down or dismantled the frontier fortresses. The whole district of Attica was to be a defenceless country, which was precisely what the Spartans had demanded after the Persian wars. Yet after all, the Thirty had in these proceedings failed to do their work thoroughly; and thus the exiles succeeded in discovering in the frontier range between Attica and Bœotia, on Mount Parnes, a spot whence they might commence operations under specially favorable circumstances. On the strait footpath from Athens to Thebes, beneath vertical walls of rock, which are visible from Athens, lay the fort of Phyle, a small castle with a circumference of about 900 feet, completely shutting off the narrow mountain-path, and from its elevation (2,000 feet above the sea) offering an open view over the whole plain of Athens and over the Saronic gulf, as far as the coasts of Peloponnesus. The castle-hill itself has a precipitous declivity, and is only on the east side accessible by a small path; further down wooded gorges descend, permeated by rivulets which in the winter render the locality still more difficult of access; while at the base of the mountain-range is spread out the broad district of Acharnæ, whose peasants were the most vigorous and liberty-loving among the inhabitants of Attica. The fortress was

\* Οἱ περὶ Χαρκιλίᾳ, the Ultras and leaders of the Thirty, like the associates of Phrynichus among the Four Hundred (Arist. Pol. 205, 2). As to foreign participation: Plut. *Lys.* 27; Diod. xiv. 6; Demosth. xv. 22. Anytus (πλοῦσιος ἐκ σκντοδεφικῆς, Schol. Plat. *Apol.* 18) detained by a storm with his squadron at Mælea, and indicted after the loss of Pylus (Diod. xiii. 64), offers the first instance of the corruption of the judicial tribunal (κατέβριζε τὸ δικάζον, Aristot. *op. Harp. δικάζων*). Archinus, perhaps a son of Myronides (vol. ii. p. 436), μετὰ γὰρ τοῦς θεοῦς αἰτιώτατος τῆς καθόδου τῆ δῆμῃ, Dem. xxiv. 135; Sievers, p. 107.

admirably situated for obtaining forage from Bœotia, and men from the surrounding localities.\*

Skirmishes  
near Phyle.  
Ol. xclv. 1.  
(a. c. 403).  
January.

In the winter season the exiles, seventy in number, crossed the frontier unobserved. They occupied the empty castle, the walls of which either were quite intact, or might be easily put in repair. When the news reached Athens, this expedition of adventurers was at first deemed utterly unworthy of consideration; but when it was announced that the band had been increased, a vigorous intervention was determined upon, in order to put an end to the nuisance. The Three Thousand, accompanied by the Knights, marched upon the fortress, which was about eleven miles distant from the city. A few eager spirits among the youthful chivalry attempted to storm the walls; but this attempt having ended very lamentably, it became necessary to resort to a siege. A heavy fall of snow, which rapidly accumulates in those gorges, happened to take place in the ensuing night. The besieging force was fain to look out for protection and shelter, and was brought into so much confusion by the stress of weather, that in the end a retreat took place which resembled a flight, and which was accompanied by considerable losses.

Hereupon it was no longer possible to mistake the danger. The Thirty found themselves of a sudden involved in a serious war; and inasmuch as they had no prospect of taking Phyle, they resolved to pitch a camp between Phyle and Acharnæ, in order to observe the enemy, to cut off his supplies, and to prevent the extension of the revolt. But in this too they utterly failed; for Thrasybulus, the numbers of whose force had increased to 700, made a night sally, and towards daybreak surprised the camp, where the troops lay asleep and the grooms were still occupied with rubbing down the horses. One hun-

\* For the destruction of the Attic fortresses, see *Lysias*, xii. 40. But Phyle had remained a *χαμίων ισχυρόν*, *Hell.* ii. 4, 2. Eleusis likewise.

dred and twenty heavy-armed soldiers were slain; the rest made their way home in desperate flight.

This rout of the Knights and garrison troops <sup>Eleusis purified.</sup> created so strong an impression, that the Thirty, who a few days before had not condescended to take any notice of the whole *coup de main*, now, their sense of security having been thoroughly shaken, endeavored to devise means for preserving themselves. They submitted to making proposals to Thrasybulus; they offered him a share in the government, and the right of return to a proportion of the exiles. But such proposals as these Thrasybulus, who had returned to Phyle laden with rich spoils of victory, could not think of accepting; it was impossible that he should demand less than the complete restoration of the constitution and the return of the confiscated property. Thus nothing remained for the Tyrants, but to take up a position in the country as well secured as possible against any attack. For this purpose Athens seemed to them ill-adapted, because there, and still more in the Piræus, the population was at all times unsafe; they therefore sought for a fortified place hard by the sea, and from this point of view the situation of Eleusis appeared pre-eminently advantageous. Here Lacedæmonian troops could more easily come to the rescue by land and sea; and here they had Salamis close at hand as a last resort. But, before they set up their head-quarters at Eleusis, they resolved thoroughly to clear the ground and purify the population; a resolution which was actually carried out with a display of violence, proving that Critias adhered with fanatical obstinacy to his bloody course. The Tyrants summoned all men capable of bearing arms to a muster at Eleusis, in order, as they pretended, to arrive at an accurate knowledge of the military forces of the city, and of the island lying in front of it; and on the appointed day came across with their cavalry from Athens. Hereupon, all who were liable to military service had succes-

them of the justice of their cause, and of the aid of the gods, who during this short campaign had already so manifestly proved themselves their auxiliaries and allies. Thereupon ensued a solemn pause; for the soothsayer who accompanied the band directed that, in order to remain guiltless of the approaching civil conflict, they should not commence the attack until one of their number had been wounded or slain. And then he declared that he believed himself to be appointed by the gods as the first victim, and, as if carried away by his destiny, stepped into the front rank and fell. Thereupon the fray commenced in hot earnest for the possession of the soothsayer's corpse. Both sides fought with resolute bravery; for both parties felt that all was at stake. In the end the troops of the Tyrants, in spite of all the exertions of Critias, were forced to give way, and were driven down the precipitous ground. After their ranks had been dissolved, they

Death of Critias. were pursued down into the plain. Critias himself fell in the *mêlée*; seventy citizens lay

slain on the ground. Their arms were taken from them; but in all other respects the dead bodies were given up intact by the victors; for Thrasybulus had enjoined upon them as a most sacred duty to spare what could be spared, and to avoid all superfluous bloodshed. Indeed, while the last offices were being performed for the dead, there ensued a harmless approximation between the two parties; and this state of feeling was taken advantage of by Cleocritus, who held the office of herald at the Mysteries, and belonged to the patriot party, and who now, raising his powerful voice, exhorted the citizens on either side to

Speech of Cleocritus. concord. He reminded them how all who had on this day stood opposed to one another as enemies, were in truth mutually connected by the holiest of bonds. It was the impious Tyrants who were alone guilty of the whole calamity—they who had visited their native city with robbery and murder; who had, within



eight months, put more citizens to death than the Peloponnesians in the ten troublous years of the Decelean war. These men, therefore, he bade the citizens renounce, and the sooner the better.

This speech had well-nigh induced the civic populace to declare its readiness for a reconciliation, when the members of the government still succeeded in conducting their troops in time back into the city, where they now endeavored to settle themselves anew as best they might. They endeavored, but in vain, to restore the previous government. They had completely lost ground in Athens; and while a desire for the constitution increased, the party of the Ultras was without a head; those who still remained of the Thirty were at discord amongst themselves, and the Three Thousand likewise. For the latter, too, included not a few who would not listen to any suggestion of giving way: these were the men who had most participated in the acts of violence perpetrated, and whose evil conscience made them most afraid of a thorough revolution in the state of affairs. Finally a compromise was agreed upon. For, while the number of those preponderated who desired a gradual return to a constitutional state of things, on the other hand there was still sufficient fear of Sparta to cause an unwillingness against casting to the winds the institutions introduced by Lysander; and, moreover, the existing civic body was to a large extent composed of adversaries of popular government. Therefore, although the citizens decreed the dismissal of the Thirty, and established a new Board of Ten, who were, in the absence of a constitution, to govern the city in conjunction with the civic body, yet a mode of transition was adopted which mitigated the change; *i. e.* the members of the new government were selected from the Thirty, of whom the more moderate, such as Phidon and Eratosthenes, had

The Ten  
at Athens.

Ol. xclv. 1  
(a. c. 403).  
March.

remained in Athens, from the oligarchic senate, and from the number of those who generally shared their political views. Of the Thirty, Phidon was chosen, who was known to have, next to Theramenes, most vigorously opposed Critias and Charides. Hippocles, Epichares, and Rhinon were of the same shade of party. These men were the moderate oligarchs, who had been driven into the background by the death of Theramenes, and whom it was now intended to place at the helm of the state.\*

These measures only increased the confusion and haplessness in Attic affairs. For the State of parties at Athens and in the country. land was now split up into three parties. Those of the Thirty who adhered to the views of Critias, established themselves with their following at Eleusis; and their partisans formed a separate civic community around them. The Ten, surrounded by those who by remaining in the city had renounced the cause of the Tyrants, kept watch over the capital, and had their headquarters in the Odeum; while the Democrats maintained theirs in Munychia. There was no prospect of any reconciliation. For it soon became evident that the Ten had no intention of acting as Theramenes might have acted, and as the majority of the citizens desired, and of endeavoring to bring about an understanding with Thrasylulus; on the contrary, they very clearly displayed their resolution of maintaining the oligarchical constitution; they wished to preserve for themselves as much as possible of the authority which the Thirty had possessed; and the fears entertained at Athens of a complete restoration of the democracy, of new quarrels with Sparta and new troubles of war, procured them adherents and supporters among the citizens.

\* For the fight at Munychia see *Hell.* ii. 4, 10. Cleocritus, δ τῶν μισθῶν κέρως, § 20. Justinus, v. 10, attributes a similar speech to Theramenes. For the establishment of the δέκα ἄνδρες ἀνοικτάτορες, see *Diod.* xiv. 33; δέκα δούλους, *Harp. Suidas* v. δέκα; *Lys.* xii. 55.

Meanwhile the strength of the constitutional party was continuously on the increase. Its nucleus was swelled by a crowd of persons of less trustworthy character; adventurers, who were anxious to take an early advantage of the expected change of things, in order to obtain a position of public consideration, and to bury in oblivion their former lives. The leaders of the party could not as yet dare to make difficulties with regard to the admission of associates; they received non-citizens as well as citizens into their camp, and even issued a proclamation, wherein they promised to all who should take part in the contest, *isotely*, i. e. the position of those privileged resident aliens who as such could transact business directly with the civic community, and who paid no higher taxes than the actual citizens. But considerable accessions also arrived from the better elements of the rural population, in particular from Acharnæ; support was also given by such friends of the constitution as could not take a personal part in the conflict: thus the patriotic Lysias, the son of Cephalus, sent 2,000 drachms and 200 shields; levied at his own expense a band of more than 300 men and negotiated a loan of two talents from Elis. Foreigners, too, afforded aid to the enterprise, *e. g.* the wealthy Theban Ismenias; and thus Thrasybulus was enabled continuously to improve the equipment of his troops, and to render them more dangerous to the foe. They hovered round the city, where confidence sank from day to day, and a want of the provisions of life became perceptible. The houses were too full of inhabitants, and the Knights suffered from the fatigues of guard-duty; they were already terrified by preparations for storming the city from the north-east; and it was only by rendering impervious the roadway leading in from the Lyceum (vol. ii. p. 615), that the threatened attack was for the nonce averted.

But even now the Ten would not hear of any com-

The Ten  
apply for aid  
to Sparta.

promise. They would not agree to negotiations with Thrasybulus, which the community desired and ordered; on the contrary, they turned to Sparta, where they announced the revolt of the city, and asked for aid. Phidon went in person to Sparta, and made use of all his eloquence, in order to induce the authorities there to despatch a military expedition against the democrats; he particularly pointed to the dangerous connexion between Thrasybulus and Bœotia, and hinted at the possibility of the Thebans making themselves, in this way, masters of Attica, and forming a menacing power against Sparta. The government at Athens accordingly pursued precisely the same course which was taken by the Thirty at Eleusis, who likewise claimed the assistance of Sparta.\*

Lysander  
takes the  
field against  
Thrasybulus.  
Ol. xciv. 1  
(a. c. 403).  
April.

Lysander hereupon exerted his whole influence in support of these requests for aid. He had been deeply agitated by the fall of the Thirty; he saw his chief work in ruins, his honor offended, and all his schemes in peril. He hastened in person to Sparta, in order to save his system of policy; and, at last, obtained so much as this: that Phidon succeeded in effecting a loan of a hundred talents at Sparta for the hire of troops against Thrasybulus; and that Lysander was himself, in accordance with the proposition of Phidon, sent to Athens as commander of the troops, in order to restore order there in the capacity of Harmost. At the same time he brought about the appointment of his brother Libys, who was to support his undertaking as admiral, with forty ships. He used his utmost exertions in carrying the whole matter to the speediest

\* The Tyrants retained the official name of "the Thirty" even at Eleusis after the death of Critias, Hippomachus, and Theramenes, and after the secession of Eratosthenes and Phidon. As to the accession of men from Acharnæ, Lys. xxxi. 15. As to Lysias, *Vit. X. Orat.* 835 (and Ismenias); *Justin.* v. 9. As to the *Isotely*, *Hellen.* ii. 4, 25. As to the suffering state of Athens *Xen. Mem.* ii. 7, 2.

issue possible. In a short space of time Thrasybulus was blockaded from the sea, and Lysander stood near Eleusis with a thousand men. Of a sudden the cause of liberty seemed to be once more lost; and on no side was there any prospect of salvation.

And yet one opened at this very moment, and in a quarter where it was least to be looked for—viz. at Sparta. Lysander was odious to the kings. They knew that his proceedings were directed to a revolution in the political system, and more particularly to an alteration in the order of the succession to the throne. This suspicion was aided by the indignation in which the more high-minded of the citizens shared, that the name of Sparta should have been dishonored by the criminal cruelties of Lysander and his followers; and was further fostered by the jealousy against his still overweening authority, and by the wrath against his arbitrary proceedings. For it must be remembered, that the measures adopted at Athens had not been taken in pursuance of official orders; that the entire change of the Athenian constitution, the consequence of which had aroused the indignation of all Hellas, was based solely on a personal agreement between the Attic party-chiefs and Lysander. If therefore he were to succeed, at the head of an army of mercenaries, in establishing his party for a second time at the helm in Athens, and in regulating Attic affairs by virtue of his personal authority, the consequence would be an intolerable aggrandizement of his power. And, inasmuch as at his side stood his brother, holding the office of admiral, which was in itself regarded as an authority hostile to the royal, there were, in truth, very reasonable grounds for the fear: that Lysander was thinking of establishing himself, by the aid of his party, at Athens, and of there founding a power independent of Sparta.

In this view of the political situation the two kings

were at one, because they saw themselves menaced in the interests common to both. They had availed themselves of the long absence of Lysander to arrive at an understanding with one another, and with others who shared their sentiments; and, in the autumn of the year 404, the Ephorate also had come to include men holding the same opinion. Hardly, therefore, had Lysander, by the exertion of all his influence, once more in the main carried his plans, and started with his army on the road to Athens, when the kings made a desperate attempt to frustrate his intentions.

Interven-  
tion of Pau-  
sanias. Ol.  
xciv. 1 (A. C.  
403). May.

Of the two kings, the really active one was Pausanias, the son of Plistoanax of the house of the Agiadæ. In this house a standpoint is undeniably perceptible, which was opposed on principle to the spirit of Lysander, and which was utterly averse from any acts of heartless violence against Hellenes, and from a military despotism of Sparta. It was only a small body of Spartans which shared these sentiments; and for this reason the pacific Agiadæ were exposed to repeated cavils and attacks, and were only rarely able to exercise a decisive influence upon Spartan foreign policy.\*

But, on the present occasion, they were successful; and the occasion was of critical importance for the entire history of the Greek people. Pausanias gained over to his views three out of the five Ephors. They amounted to this: that the conduct of Attic affairs ought not to be left in the hands of Lysander, who pursued no ends but those of his personal ambition; and that he, the king, must be

\* Phidon at Sparta, *Lys.* xii. 58; *Hellen.* ii. 4, 23; *Plut. Lys.* 21. Pausanias, *ἔθνη* Δυσίδηρον—*πίστιας τῶν ἐφόρων τρεῖς, ἐξέγει φρουράν, Hell.* § 29. With reference to the Agiadæ, we find decidedly Hellenistic sentiments in Leonidas; Plistoanax (vol. ii. p. 450) avoids war with Athens; Pausanias likewise. His successor, Agesipolis, is the most decisive adversary of a despotic and specifically Spartan line of policy, and so again Cleombrotus. For this reason we also generally meet with Proclidæ as generals in Attica: Siewers, p. 382.

dispatched after Lysander, to settle those affairs in the interest of the state. Pausanias accordingly entered Attica with a Peloponnesian army; and, before anything had been done by Lysander, he was forced to subordinate himself to the king, and, at the very moment when he was about to display the fulness of his power before friends and foes, was reduced to utter insignificance. Pausanias was the sole authority; it was from him that the solution of the existing troubles must come; and his tent was visited by those who thought themselves able to assert an influence upon the settlement. Thus Diognetus, the brother of Nicias, made use of the ancient relations of his house with Sparta, to make representations to the king, and to instruct him with regard to the proceedings of the Tyrants, as well as to the sentiments of the population. From the first, Pausanias had no other intention than that of putting an end to the quarrels by pacific means. He accordingly drew up his army in a position within sight from the city, so as to divide the hostile parties, himself commanding the right wing in the neighborhood of the port; and, after having first brought about a cessation of hostilities, soon let it be seen that his intentions were by no means to act in the interests of the Thirty, and to carry out a bloody reaction in their sense. He had also refused the gifts of hospitality proffered to him from Eleusis.

Then, however, he turned to the Athenians in the Piræus, whom, from the Spartan point of view, he could not but regard as rebels; and demanded that they should disband, and place in his hands the destiny of their native city. When his demand was rejected, he prepared to surround the entire peninsula. For this purpose he examined the localities, and, while thus engaged, was, against his will, involved in a skirmish, and even forced to pursue the adversaries who had attacked him, as far as the height of Mu-

Fight near  
the Piræus.  
Ol. xciv. 1  
(a. c. 403).  
June.

nychia. Here a more serious conflict ensued, in which a number of his soldiers were slain. The Peloponnesians were driven back, until they serried their ranks anew on a neighboring elevation, and from it, after receiving considerable reinforcements, began a fresh attack, which completely secured the desired result, and vindicated the honor of the Spartan arms. One hundred and fifty men of the troops of Thrasybulus fell.

Yet this result of the conflict was, notwithstanding, fortunate for the patriots; for otherwise, Pausanias might have been forced to develop his whole military strength. He now thought that he had done enough to prove to the democrats that he was in earnest, and that he might now come forward in the character of a mediator. Accordingly, he secretly made known to both parties, (thereby acknowledging the following of Thrasybulus as a portion of the people entitled no less than their opponents to a voice in the decision), in what sense he desired to receive proposals from them for the re-establishment of public peace. Both sides were weary of the civil war; and, in the city, the state of things had already become so doubtful, that the citizens, on their own authority, expressed their desire for a reconciliation with the democrats, and their hope of being able to preserve peace with the Lacedæmonians, even after this reconciliation had taken place; while their government, the Ten, continued to assert that they alone were the true friends of Sparta, and that, in order to prove this by their deeds, they were ready immediately to deliver up the city to the Spartans—a proceeding to which, as they suggested, the democrats could hardly be expected to agree with reference to the Piræus. There were accordingly now, without Eleusis being taken into account, three parties opposed to one another in Attica; and, by direction of the king, three embassies went to Sparta—one from the Piræus, a second from the citizens within the walls,

Negotiation  
between the  
parties.

(July and  
August).



and a third from the Ten. Pausanias was fully aware of the responsibility of the position which he had assumed, and of the many misrepresentations and cavils which every one of his steps might provoke; he therefore committed the decision of everything to the authorities at Sparta. And yet, in the main, he thoroughly accomplished his object; for from Sparta, where these strange relations could not possibly be clearly judged, fifteen plenipotentiaries were despatched, who were, in conjunction with himself, to effect a settlement.\*

The negotiations were protracted for months; and there was this advantage, at all events, in <sup>Their result.</sup> the delay, that during it the recommencement of hostilities became more and more out of the question, and likewise any despotic treatment of Athens in opposition to the sentiments of the people, which had time to develop themselves with increasing clearness and precision. Inasmuch, then, as Pausanias was himself elevated above all the parties, and pursued no other object than that of making peace, and of atoning, so far as lay in his power, for such acts of injustice as had been perpetrated, to the dishonor of his native city, in her name: the treaty, which was at last, under his influence, concluded between the Athenians in the Piræus and those of the upper city, was likewise exactly of the character desired by the common consent of both parties. The exiles were re-established in possession of their property; no vengeance was to be taken upon those who had remained behind the city; the past was to be forgiven and forgotten. But no general amnesty was proclaimed; and it was doubtless in full accordance with the wishes of Pausanias, that pre-

\* Diogenetius: *Lysias*, xviii. 22. Pausanias institutes observations by the *σπεῖρος λιμῆν*, *Hell.* § 32. This may be the innermost part of the Piræus (called *Ἰλλαι* by Ulrichs), cut off by the walls from the Emporium; as the author has conjectured *de port. Ath.* p. 34. For it was necessary to build a wall starting from here over towards the Phalerum, so as to cut off the peninsula of the Piræus.

cisely those officials who had been established under the authority of Lysander were excepted from the amnesty: to wit, the Thirty themselves, their most zealous instruments the Eleven, and, thirdly, the Ten who had administered the Piræus as a subordinate magistracy. In other words, the entire oligarchy, which had rested upon the support of Sparta, was acknowledged by Sparta herself to have been an unauthorized interruption of the public reign of law. A certain mitigation was to be found in the appended clause, according to which even those excluded from the amnesty should have the right of remaining, if they were ready to give an account of their official conduct before the community. After this agreement had been ratified by oath, the hired troops were dismissed, and Pausanias led his army and the Lacedæmonian garrison home across the Isthmus.

Departure  
of Pausanias,  
and the Lacedæmonian  
garrison.

He had completely achieved his own main purpose; for the second triumph which Lysander had intended to celebrate at Athens, and which he had already thought to have secured, had been frustrated, together with all the schemes dependent upon it. On the other hand, what the king had himself effected and arranged, was an utterly incomplete and half-done piece of work. For he had, after all, not dared simply to depose the Tyrants and expel them by force of arms. Such a proceeding would have constituted too dangerous a precedent for the other states placed under similar authorities. He had merely prevented their being forced back upon the city: he had then put an end to the discord existing in the Athenian plain between the Upper and Lower Towns, but had left the Thirty undisturbed at Eleusis; nay, he had so far recognized this place as a second centre of Attica, that a clause had been expressly inserted in the agreement, permitting any citizen who on account of his previous conduct might feel insecure at Athens, or object to the entire com-

fact, to proceed to Eleusis. Thus the public peace of the district was not even externally restored; on the contrary, the final settlement of affairs remained in the hands of the Athenians themselves.

The Athenians for the present disregarded the fastness of the Tyrants; and, in accordance with the treaty, hastened to consummate the reconciliation between the two main divisions of the population. On the 12th of Boëdromion (Sept. 21st) the associates of Thrasybulus celebrated the day of their return to Athens, the well-won day of honor, on which they reaped the reward of their bravery and patriotism. They halted before the great entrance-gate, the Dipylum. Here Thrasybulus came forward for the last time in his character of general; he held a muster, and availed himself of it to eject as impure from the ranks such fellows as were unanimously held unworthy to enter the city in the ranks of the liberating army—in particular Agoratus, who, as will be remembered, had served as aider and abetter in the most shameful intrigues (vol. iii. p. 573). Thereupon the men disposed themselves as a festive procession, which was conducted by a certain Æsimus. It passed across the market-place up to the Acropolis, which was now for the first time again trodden by free citizens; and from the temples of the City-Goddess it descended to the Pnyx, which was on the same day re-consecrated as the place of popular assembly. The Attic community was still composed of two halves,—the Three Thousand and the returning democrats. Thrasybulus addressed the former in the name of his party, in order frankly to expound to them the situation of affairs. The so-called rule of the best citizens had, he said, proved itself a delusive phantom and a lie; for the scions of the noble families, ever boastful of possessing by inheritance what the rest were obliged laboriously to acquire, had now shown themselves to be more subject to all moral infirmities and defects, particu-

Restoration  
of the Consti-  
tution.

larly to avarice and the vilest love of self, than all other mortals. Nor could they any longer appeal even to the Lacedæmonians, after the latter had renounced them, and chained down the Tyrannis like a snappish cur, in order thus to hand over to the people those who had inflicted so many sufferings upon it. The Athenians were therefore now free to act as they desired, and ought, under the full teaching of recent experience, unanimously to proceed to establish a new constitution.

On this head opinions were less harmonious than might have been expected after what had occurred. It was thought that in the settlement of the new institutions a certain consideration must still be paid to the Lacedæmonians, with whom any further conflict ought at any cost to be avoided; it may be that secret promises had been made, tending in this direction. But, above all, the old suspicion against the thorough democracy was still widely spread among the citizens, and consequently likewise the opinion, that it would be prudent to restrict the measure of civic rights, so as to exclude the multitude of those engaged in industrial pursuits, of the traders and seamen (who, it was argued, were after all not in the full sense of the word domesticated in Attica), from the assembly whose majority was to decide the common weal. Hereby it was hoped to ensure a more quiet character to the civic assemblies, to prevent rash popular decrees, and to obtain fuller guarantees for a reign of law and order in the affairs of the state.

Proposition  
of Phormi-  
sius.

Those Athenians who held these views put forward as their spokesman one who could not possibly be accounted an adherent of the reaction; for he had been outlawed by the oligarchs, and had fought under Thrasybulus for the cause of liberty. He was a man well esteemed among the citizens, Phormisius by name. He advocated neither the introduction of any census, nor that of any fixed property qualification

for the acquirement of full civic rights; but he proposed that no man should be a full citizen of Athens who owned no landed property in Attica. His motion therefore implied a return to the principles of Solon; he demanded the exclusion of the industrial classes, who only possessed personal property in the land; and, had this proposal been carried, about 5,000 of the civic population would have found themselves excluded.

The motion of Phormisius provoked very eager opposition. Let not the citizens, it was said, be again deluded by the old pretences; sufficient experience had, assuredly, been gained to leave no doubt as to the nature of the guarantee offered by landed property for the sentiments of the citizens. Moreover, the present was not the season for weakening Athens and depriving her of her men. Was it for this they had returned with victorious arms and under the manifest protection of the Gods,—to give up of their own accord the civic rights they had acquired after so hard a struggle? Neither let them allow themselves to be intimidated by considerations for Sparta. For if absolute submission to her was recommended, it was better to perish in the struggle, than to remain in such a condition of dependence. But in truth the Spartans had no intention of involving themselves anew in perilous conflicts for the sake of the Athenian constitution; were there not states less in size and much nearer to Sparta in local situation, who notwithstanding retained a thoroughly independent position and a free constitution? Why, then, were the Athenians, from poverty of spirit and blind fear, to abase and sacrifice themselves? It was in this sense that Lysias composed an oration against the changes in the Attic constitution proposed by Phormisius.

The motion was rejected; and the old civic community was restored, together with its magistrates. Euclides was (probably before the month of Boëdromion was at an end),

Euclides  
Archon.  
Ol. xciv. 2  
(a. c. 403-2).

chosen by lot as First Archon; and inasmuch as his predecessor Pythodorus (p. 22) was not acknowledged as a legal magistrate, his name was struck off out of the lists of Archons, and his year (Ol. xciv. 1), as one spent under an illegal government, termed the Year of Anarchy. It may be mentioned that the period devoid of offices extended beyond the close of the year; inasmuch as the dominion of the Thirty lasted *circ.* from June 404 into the beginning of the ensuing year; for they had been in power eight months, when the conflict in Munychia occurred. And then the dominion of the Ten, the approach of Ly-sander, the intervention of Pausanias, and the negotiations with the latter, occupied about another eight months, from February to September 403, when the return of the champions of the constitution took place. Of the eight months of the Tyrants, three were generally distinguished as a pre-eminently evil time; this was probably the period after the arrival of the Spartan troops, which would accordingly have to be dated October 404.\*

The Tyrants  
remain at  
Eleusis.

The parties of the capital and of the Pi-ræus had been mutually reconciled; but At-tica still remained disunited. Eleusis was the gathering-place of all adversaries of the constitution, and the fastness of the still unsubdued Tyrants. Pecuniary resources still remained to them out of their extortions; they had hired troops, and made expeditions of plunder through the district. They still deemed it possible to maintain themselves; and cherished hopes of their friends

\* According to Plut. *de glor. Ath.* c. 7, the exiles (*οἱ ἐκ Πειραιῶς*) make their entry into Athens on the 12th of Boëdromion (Sept. 21st, according to Boeckh); this was the day of the *χαριστήρια ἐλευθερίας*, A. Mommsen, *Heortol.* 217. *Διόμοτος* (*quærens*, was he the same as in Schol. Arist. *Ecol.* 208?) *omnibus causis* conducts the *νομική*, Lys. xiii. 30. For the speech of Thrasybulus, see *Hellen.* § 40. Phormistius (Dion. Hal.; Lys. 32) was not an oligarch, as Grote thinks: see Schömann, *Verfassungsgesch. Athens*, p. 93. The expression *ἀναρχία*, the "period devoid of offices," designates the office of Pythodorus as illegal. 'Οκτὸς μῆνες, *Hellen.* § 21. The democrats seize, *δράμα*, § 25; accordingly the feud lasted as late as the close of the summer. The three months in Isoc. iv. 113, according to the interpretation of Benseler.

in Sparta, and of a change in the college of the Ephora. Yet their obstinate hostility could not but provoke the bitterest indignation at Athens; and, since this state of things became intolerable, the entire civic body took the field before Eleusis, in order to make an end of disunion in Attica.

The further events which hereupon occurred are only very imperfectly known; and they were doubtless of a kind to give the Athenians good reasons for preserving as complete a silence as possible concerning them. The besieging force entered into negotiations, in consequence of which some of the Tyrants, induced by false pretences, are said to have come into the camp, and there been put to death. Probably, the leaders were unable to restrain the popular fury, which had been further inflamed by the remembrance of the horrors recently perpetrated at the same city-gates (p. 47). It is however certain, that not all of the Thirty became victims of this act of vengeance. Some of them never accompanied the rest to Eleusis. Others succeeded in escaping thence across the Attic frontiers; and these continued for a long time to lie in wait abroad for an opportunity to return. The victory of the constitutional party was now complete; and, if it is remembered how much of suffering abroad and at home the city had gone through since the Sicilian calamity, it becomes intelligible how now at last, after the removal of all its enemies, the population of Athens again drew a free breath. No rational man desired anything but peace, in order that the wounds might be healed, and the citizens might again accustom themselves to live in peace with one another.\*

The situation was, however, still full of difficulties; and the Moderates had to exert <sup>The</sup> all possible energy to prevent an abuse of the victory. It <sup>Amnesty.</sup>

\* As to the end of the Thirty: Rauchenstein, *Philol.* x. 506; Trohberger, *Jahrb. f. Philol.* lxxxii. 408. Ἐκκλησίαι ἐκ τῶν πόλεων, *Lys.* xii. 35.

was necessary to avoid any step which might again bring a reproach upon the democracy, and arm the hands of its adversaries inside and outside Sparta. The old constitution was benefited by the form in which its antitype had appeared, and by the opportunity now given to its friends, of asserting themselves as the advocates of order and legality. It now became their task to prove themselves the really better citizens; and, with this goal before them, Thrasybulus and his friends were unceasingly intent upon avoiding any bloody reaction. It was therefore agreed loyally to adhere to the compact arrived at with King Pausanias, and to regard as public enemies only the surviving members of the Thirty, the blood-stained Eleven, and the Commission of Ten in the Piræus. Every one else, even the children of the Tyrants, and likewise the Ten at Athens, (although the latter had so shamefully deceived the confidence reposed in them), and among them even Phidon, (although he too had been one of the Thirty), and Eratosthenes (who had not accompanied the rest to Eleusis), were one and all permitted to remain at Athens; they were not to be called upon to give any account of their proceedings; all the past was to be forgiven and forgotten.

The Restoration period and its difficulties.

*Ol. xciv. 2*  
(a.c. 403).

So widespread an amnesty as this implied more than one contravention of a natural sense of equity. For the men to whose bravery and self-sacrifice the restoration of the constitution was due, had now not the slightest advantage over those who had quietly remained in the city. Yet the losses of those who had returned home were incalculable; and although a great part of their landed property could be made up to them by a confiscation of the spoils of the Tyrants, yet much which had changed hands could not be restored to its rightful owners. Furthermore, a few indeed of those whose reputation was eminently bad, preferred, notwithstanding the



amnesty, to take up their abode outside the walls of Athens, as *e. g.* Batrachus (p. 26); but others, who had likewise been abettors of the Tyrants, ventured to remain at Athens; indeed, an actual member of the Thirty, viz. Phidon, contrived to retain a certain degree of consideration in the city itself; and this before the eyes of those citizens who had suffered the most terrible wrongs at his hands and those of his fellows. So again the Knights, who had after a fashion constituted the body-guard of the Tyrants, for the present continued to enjoy their civic honors undiminished. And since, finally, the Ten, who had followed the Thirty, were acknowledged as a rightful official authority, it became necessary, as a logical consequence, to take over as a national debt the loan contracted by them, although it had been designed for the suppression of the constitutional party, and to decree a tax upon the citizens, for paying off this very loan, devised in a spirit of hostility against them.

This attitude was, however, imposed by the necessities of the situation. Consideration had to be paid to Sparta, which through its king had saved Athens, lest the upper hand should once more be given to the party of Lysander, and the old constitutional policy of Sparta be once more set in motion. Hence, of the three parties at Athens, it was necessary to blend the two which could go hand in hand, viz. the Democrats and the Moderates. And what would have become of the city, had it been desired to examine the past conduct of every individual, and to reward or punish each according to his deserts! The Three Thousand, who had formed the civic community under the Thirty, could only be secured by tender treatment; nor could the entire state be saved on any condition but this: that those who had returned exhibited sufficient self-restraint, to renounce even fair claims for the sake of the whole community. And the glory of having displayed this prudent and self-denying

moderation was earned in the highest degree by the liberators of Athens.\*

Among them, besides Thrasybulus, Archinus was specially active. In intellectual capacity and in the spirit of his opinions he was the foremost man of the Restoration; and he was above the rest seriously intent upon firmly establishing the recovered unity, and putting a stop to the petty conflicts among the citizens. In the year after the restoration of the constitution he brought about a law, whereby in all judicial suits instituted against the operations of the amnesty the privilege of a demurrer (*paragraphe*) was secured to the accused; who had the right of speaking first: so that, in case he had good grounds for appealing against the amnesty, the case itself never came to trial, and a fine had to be paid by the prosecutor. The regulation of the occupation of the soil likewise demanded exceptional measures. Conflicts occurred between the citizens, who desired compensation for their losses, and the officials, who endeavored to retain as large a proportion as possible of the confiscated lands of the oligarchs for the state. Two boards of public officers were therefore instituted: firstly that of the *Syllogeis*, whose business it was to register the whole of the lands to be confiscated; and secondly that of the *Syndici*, who as solicitors for the state had to guard the interests of the public treasury.

Such were the measures of transition. But it now became indispensable to regulate upon a permanent system the internal relations of the state; and, after the ancient popular community, the popular tribunals, the Council, and the constitutional magistracies,

\* As to the oath of amnesty, see *Hellen.* § 43; *Andoc. Myst.* § 90 (καὶ τῶν δέκα ἢ τῶν ἐν Πειραιεὶ ἀρχόντων δέκα, according to Valesius), to be distinguished from the ἕκκοι περὶ ἀμνηστίας, *Lys.* xxv. 27. As to the loan, see *Demosth.* xx. 11. According to Thirlwall this is referred to in *Arist. Pol.* iii., 1. p. 58.

had been restored, again to lay bare, to strengthen and to renovate, as the times demanded, the foundations of public law to which it had been resolved to recur. The ancient sources of law were once more sought out. But their writing and language had gradually become unintelligible to the people; so that the orators, when citing the precise words of laws of Solon, or, still more, of Draco, found in every sentence expressions requiring explanation, because they had disappeared from common parlance. Moreover, much had become obsolete in meaning as well as terms, and had been altered by usage; the ancient laws seemed, as it were, buried under the accumulation of later statutes, which were in many points contradictory to the earlier; and it was by no means an easy task to separate from later additions what was of genuine Solonic origin.

These evils had already long become perceptible. Remedies had been attempted; and Nicomachus (vol. iii. p. 555) had continued his malpractices up to the establishment of the Thirty. Now, the old plan of a thorough revision of the law was with great energy resumed. The motion on the subject in the civic assembly was made by a certain Tisamenus, the son of Mechanion. According to his proposition, the ancient laws of the Athenians were again to have full validity, *i. e.* the laws of Solon and the weights and measures introduced by his legislation, as well as all those ordinances of Draco which had been observed in former times. These documents were to be written out anew, and supplemented by such laws as were demanded by the circumstances of the present times. To perform this task, a college of 500 *Nomothetae*, The Nomothetae. or legislators, was appointed, and sworn in by the civic community; and out of these again the Council was to nominate a select committee, to which was to be entrusted the drawing up of the supplementary laws. With the aid of the law-scribes, upon whom fell the ac-

tual work of drafting the laws, this select committee was to cause them to be written out on boards, to lay them before the Council and the whole body of the 500 *Nomothetæ*, and then to make them public, so as to afford an opportunity to every citizen of presenting to the council any comments, observations, and objections, which might occur to him with regard to them. After having been examined and approved, they were in the end to be engraved on stone, and committed to the care of the *Areopagus*. But, until the new legislation had been accomplished on the basis of a thorough revision and supplementation of the sources of the law, an official board of *Twenty* was to be established, for giving the necessary decisions, while the public law was still imperfectly regulated.

In the select committee of the *Nomothetæ*, for the duration of whose labors very definite and very brief terms had been fixed, we find, besides the name of the proposer of the original motion, *Tisamenus*, that of *Nicomachus* recurring. It was thought, that his business talents and legal knowledge could not be spared; although it was known after how unwarrantable a fashion he had formerly served the designs of the enemies of the constitution. It was in his favor, that he had subsequently also incurred the displeasure of the *Thirty*; he had taken flight, and joined himself to the exiles, with whom he returned to Athens. Of these circumstances he contrived to take full advantage; and, by means of his cunning and his high oratorical gifts, had recovered a position of consideration at Athens. He was now entrusted, in particular, with the revision of the laws concerning public worship, which stood on the three-faced pillars of wood (vol. i. p. 363): in these, the changes which had taken place had been slighter than elsewhere, and *Solon* himself had, on this head, most closely adhered to earlier usage.

In consequence of the want of trustworthy and honest men, competent for the performance of tasks of this description, the work of legislation, on this occasion also, protracted itself. Yet a portion of it must have been completed before the year was out; for the introductory law proposed by Diocles ordained, that the laws drawn up under the authority of Euclides were to have immediate validity.

Other important ordinances, belonging to the same year, further attest the zeal devoted to the entire transaction of this political reform. Among these was the law of Aristophon (of the district of Hazenia), designed to purify the civic body, by its ordinance that none but children sprung from the marriage of citizens with daughters of citizens should possess full civic rights. This law was beyond a doubt occasioned by the circumstance that many of the Athenians, who had dwelt for a long time abroad, and who had subsequently been brought home by the measures of Lysander, had contracted a union with foreign women. This had filled the city with a multitude of non-Athenians; and of these foreign elements it was designed to cleanse the city, so that the state might rise with superior vigor upon genuinely national foundations. Inasmuch as this law deeply affected all domestic relations, and provoked much disquietude, it soon afterwards underwent a mitigation, by being deprived of *ex post facto* application; the exclusion being confined to those born of foreign mothers after the year of office of Euclides. The entire proposition of Aristophon was merely a resumption of the law of Pericles.\* That, in order to assure a

\* Παράγραφη, "demurrer of inadmissibility" against all suits contradictory to the Amnesty, according to the law of Archinus (Isocr. xviii. 2). Rauchenstein, *Étal.* = *Lys.* 25. Συλλογείς and σύνδικος (Harp.), *Lys.* xvi. 7. Tisamennus, *Lys.* xxx. 28; *Andoc. Myst.* 82; Schömann, *Verfassungsgesch.* p. 90. As long as the Twenty conducted affairs, it is impossible to suppose the an-

fixed political organism, even the period before Pericles was recurred to, is, however, specially manifest from the importance which was once more given to the Areopagus, —that venerable authority of ancient Athens, to which her citizens ever and again returned, when, in troublous times, they sought for guarantees of the common weal (vol. iii. p. 564). The Areopagus had behaved honorably in the days of the surrender of the city; it had shown no complicity with the oligarchic intrigues; and hardly had the oligarchs attained to power, when they deprived the Areopagus of the solitary function which even the democracy in the fulness of its dominion had not dared to take from it—viz. the jurisdiction in cases of life and death. Thus, by acknowledging the action of the Areopagus to be irreconcilable with their arbitrary system, the Tyrants had contributed to re-invest the former with a popular character; so that it now with new dignity took its place at the head of the state, and was entrusted with the duty of superintending the accurate observance of the newly-arranged laws, as well as their unimpaired preservation. The institutions of Solon being, therefore, on this head also restored, it is probable that those offices were abolished to which the rights taken from the Areopagus had been transferred.\* Changes were likewise made, corresponding to existing circumstances, in the offices of finance. The office of the Hellenotamæ or federal treasurers (vol. ii. p. 379) had lost its meaning, since the maritime dominion of Athens had come to an end. In its place

New financial offices.

Economical reforms.

element magistracy to have exercised its functions; the restoration of the Council came before that of the offices, although the post of the First Archon was filled up at once. Cf. Frohberger, *Lysias*, i. 177. Supplementary law of Diocles, Demosth. xxiv. 42; Meier, *de bon. damn.* 71. Aristophon: Carystius *op. Athen.* 577 b; Schäfer, Demosth. i. 123.

\* As to the seven νομοφύλακες (vol. ii. p. 385) and their conjectured abolition, see Scheibe, p. 152; C. F. Hermann, *de vest. inst. vol. per Plat. de leg.* i. p. 83. Andoc. *Myst.* 84.

two new annual treasury-offices were instituted, one for the treasury of war, the other for the *Theoricum*, i. e. for the fund out of which the expenditure for the state festivals was provided. Both funds were to be fed from the surplus of the annual revenues, and to be managed for the common weal by persons appointed by election; so that a due balance might prevail between the requirements of the necessary defensive strength, and those of peaceful civic life. A wise economy was once more (vol. ii. p. 504) proclaimed as one of the leading principles of political conduct; and there can accordingly be no doubt, that neither was the pay for attendance at the judicial tribunals, Council and popular assembly (vol. iii. p. 120), at this time re-introduced. This gave a totally new aspect to the civic assemblies of Athens. The multitude of common folk who supported themselves by their daily wages, remained away, and quietly pursued their own avocations. Moreover, the agitation of dishonest popular orators was hindered by the growing intelligibility and perspicuity of the laws. The authorities took strict care that, when laws were recited, not a syllable was misquoted, and no arbitrary interpretation admitted. And one of the most important rules now established was the following:—"Henceforth, no unwritten laws were to have any validity; isolated ordinances of the Council or of the civic assembly were in no case to override the laws; and, lastly, the laws to be newly proclaimed were without exception to apply equally to all Athenians, and to require the sanction of at least 6,000 citizens entitled to vote. For, while it had formerly been customary to mention in the preamble of laws only that one of the ten civic tribes which happened to hold presidency (vol. i. p. 408), besides the scribe in office during the Prytany in question, and the chairman of the day and the author of the motion; it now became the practice, in order to facilitate regularity, to commence with the name

Changes in  
the form of  
public documents,

of the First Archon, which henceforth marked all the documents belonging to the same year. Such were the beginnings of a new Attic documentary style, which subsequently underwent several alterations; in particular it was sought to elaborate the formulæ of the preamble with more and more precision and fulness, so that the proper number of the Prytany, the day and month of the year, and the day of the current Prytany, were inserted.\*

and in the  
mode of  
writing.

Still more important effects resulted from the reform in the mode of writing. Two alphabets were used in those days, a more ancient, consisting of eighteen letters, and a more recent, further removed from the Phœnician prototype as having been perfected and changed by the inventive spirit peculiar to the Greeks. In particular, special symbols had been introduced for the long vowels, and likewise for the double consonants, hitherto expressed by two symbols. These changes had been made by the Ionic Greeks. Samos was specially distinguished for the elaboration of literary inventions of the kind; and individuals of high authority, such as Epicharmus and Simonides, had contributed to obtain a general acceptance of these innovations. Thus more especially in Attica the enlarged alphabet of twenty-four letters was already used in the times of Pericles; moreover, since the eighty-sixth Olympiad (B. C. 436) the earlier form of the letter S (Ϛ) had been relinquished for the more recent (Σ); but in other respects the older "Attic" alphabet had been retained with remarkable conservatism in the public docu-

\* After Euclides there were no Hellenotamias; before his year no *ραμίας τῶν στρατηγικῶν*, and no official *ἐπι τῷ δημοσίῳ*. See Boeckh, *Publ. Ec. of A.G.*, vol. I. p. 237 (Eng. Tr.). As to the abolition of the *ἀγραφοὶ νόμοι*, and subordination of the *ψηφίσματα* to the *νόμοι*, *Andoc. Myst.* 86. Concerning the earlier and later form of public documents, see Schömann, *Gr. A.G.* vol. II. p. 400. Cf. Boeckh, *u. s.* vol. II. p. 15. In the case of treaties the name of the Archon occurs already in earlier documents, e. g. *Corp. Inscr. Gr.* No. 74. We have no certain information as to the date of the change.



ments. But now, when changes such as the times demanded were being made, and when the obsolete was being rejected in every department of public life, Archinus proposed that the new or "Ionic" character should be officially also acknowledged and introduced. The ancient laws were re-written in this character; and although the scribes of documents could not at once accustom themselves to the innovation, yet in the whole number of Athenian public inscriptions in stone we may distinguish between two main divisions, the pre-Euclidic and the post-Euclidic documents. The newly-written laws were set up in the market-place, which had been their locality since the time of Ephialtes,—in the royal hall. This was the identical hall where the Areopagus was wont to sit, so that this body was now doubly called upon to watch over the archives of their special importance, set up in a place of their own. Among these was the law of high treason, which was solemnly confirmed by oath immediately after the re-establishment of the constitution, in order to prevent in the most impressive manner possible any new attempt in the direction of a *coup d'état*. This law assured impunity to the slayer of any Athenian who endeavored to obtain Tyrannical power, or who betrayed the city, or designed the overthrow of the constitution. It was set up on a pillar in front of the Council-house, so that it might meet the eyes of all who entered there. Thus the laws were written, arranged, and set up afresh; and the ancient three and four-faced wooden pillars of Solon were henceforth merely preserved as a relic of antiquity.

Besides these, we observe a series of other institutions, concerning which it is not stated that they belonged precisely to the year of Euclides, but the existence of which from that period is to be demonstrated in the public documents. Thus, one mark by which the

Other reforms in the public documents in the year of Euclides.

Ὁλ. xciv. 2  
(a. c. 403-2).

post-Euclidic popular decrees may be recognized is this: that in them the Scribes no longer go out with the Prytanes of the Council; they were therefore now appointed for the whole year, a reform probably likewise intended to bring about a greater security in the control of the public documents. Among the minor reforms of this period may be mentioned the introduction of the name of the goddess *Athens* in place of the earlier form *Athenæa*.\*

In the true Attic spirit thought was taken of maintaining the glory of the city as a nurse of arts and sciences; and of advancing popular education,—in direct opposition to the oppressive ordinances of the Tyrants (p. 40). Before the year of Euclides had ended, a collection of literary works was begun; perhaps what had formerly existed of this description had perished through the fault of the Tyrants. Again, it was endeavored to animate a spirit of friendly rivalry among the citizens with reference to the city feasts; the several civic tribes decreeing, that from the date of the year of Euclides those who had by means of pecuniary sacrifices and personal performances deserved well of the feasts of the state deities, should be honored by commemorative inscriptions.

\* Concerning the twofold kinds of writing, ἡ παλαιὰ (τὰ Ἀττικὰ γράμματα) and ἡ μετ' Εὐκλείδων γραμματικὴ, see Franz, *Elem. Epigr. Gr.* pp. 24, 148. As to Callistratus of Samos, see Ephorus *op. Schol. Ven. Il.* viii. 186. As to the intermixture of the earlier and later character, see Boeckh, *Staatsk.* vol. II. p. 764 [Germ.]. As to the setting-up of the revised laws in the Ceramicus, Andoc. *Myst.* 96; Lys. *in Leocr.* 126; Bergk, *ad Andoc. ed. Schiller*, p. 129; Curtius, *Alt. Studien*, II. 66. As to the scribe appointed for a year in the case of the post-Euclidic documents, see Boeckh, *Epigr. Chronol. Studien*, p. 40; Sauppe, *Philol.* xix. 249. Ἀθηναῖ: Boeckh, *Staatsk.* vol. II. p. 51 [Germ.]. The law of the Distetes, according to Meier, belonged to the time of Euclides; contra Schömann, *Verfassungsgesch.*, 44 f. The transmission of the Epipsephis to the Proëdri is to be dated after Ol. c. 3. See Boeckh, *Monoykien*, 46. The year of Euclides was an epochal year; hence the proverb, τὰ πρὸ Εὐκλείδων ἰφεράζων in Lucian. *Contapl.* 5.

Lastly, neither was the duty of gratitude towards the gods and towards friends abroad forgotten. It was from Thebes that the liberators of Athens had issued forth; and Thrasybulus, who adhered to the principle that the two neighbor-cities ought to continue in close union, together with his associates dedicated a work of art to Thebes as a token of gratitude and symbol of alliance. It represented the guardian divinities of the two cities, Athene and Heracles, and was set up in the Heracleum at Thebes. And altogether, on the motion of Archinus, 1000 drachms had been granted for distribution among the liberators of the city, to enable them to offer sacrifices and consecrated gifts. But no share in these was given to any besides the hundred who had been besieged in Phyle by the Tyrants. By this grant and by the bestowal of olive-wreaths they were acknowledged as the saviours of the city.\*

Dedicatory  
gifts of the  
Liberators.

\* Euclides, known among the *ἐπι συναγωγῇ τεθραυσμένοι*, Athen. 3. Here the groups of collectors are distinguished: those who could command public resources, and secondly private individuals, who are designated according to their station in life. The former group was doubtless composed of personages historically known; accordingly, as I conjecture, we should, by the side of Polycrates and Pisistratus and the kings of Pergamus, read, not *Νικοκράτης*, but *Νικοκλῆς ὁ Κύριος* (cf. *Arch. F.* 1844, 347), in which case the Euclides mentioned must be the famous Archon. Perhaps, too, we may read instead of *Εὐκλείδην τὸν καὶ αὐτὸν Ἀθηναίων—τὸν ἄρχοντα* (or *ἄρχαντα*) καὶ ἁ. Ἀ. But see the objections of M. H. E. Meier, *Opusc.* i. 86. Becker, *Charicles*, II. 119 (Eng. Tr.), also considers a private library to be spoken of. For the decree of the tribe Pandionis on the motion of Callicrates, see *Corp. Inscr. Gr.* No. 213; Athene and Heracles, Paus. ix. 11, 4. As to the motion of Archinus in honor of the *καταγαγόντες τὸν δῆμον*: *Æsch.* III. 187.

## CHAPTER II.

### ATHENS AFTER HER RESTORATION.

General  
condition of  
society at  
Athens after  
the Restora-  
tion.

THUS was it attempted to re-settle the Attic state, after the constitutional life of Athens had been interrupted by a government, which in the course of a few months had passed through every stage of a ruthless terrorism (wherefore already in antiquity it was called the dominion of the Thirty Tyrants). The minds of men could the more easily become reconciled with one another, inasmuch as of the three parties one had absolutely annihilated itself during its period of victory. This party had sealed its own condemnation, when behind the pretence of peculiar political theories the vilest selfishness had nakedly displayed itself, while the moral worthlessness of its leaders had not been in any way compensated or made good. At home they had been ruthless despots, but neither had they in the foreign relations of the state obtained for it anything but shame and disgrace; besides which they had at the critical moments proved themselves weak, ruthless, and short-sighted. The common hatred against the oligarchs having united the remaining parties, the praiseworthy institutions of the year of liberation had been successfully called into being, and the year of Euclides had become an epochal year in Attic history. We cannot but acknowledge and admire the manliness of the leading personages, and the spirit of moderation and prudence, as well as the earnest zeal for the truly good, which prevailed in the community. For assuredly the Athenians displayed their native generosity when they desired not

only to triumph over insidious foes, but also to improve and restrain themselves; when they with wise intelligence made use of the experience which accrued to them, partly tasting off what had become obsolete, partly recurring to earlier institutions of their public life. For without a genuine loftiness of spirit they would not at the present moment, when they had hardly realized their liberation, have combined with measures for the restoration of peace and prosperity, a care for scientific institutions and for the cultivation of the arts.\*

But mere outward institutions could not suffice to renovate the commonwealth as it was desired; if this was to be accomplished, it must result from the internal condition of civil society, which could not be altered by means of particular laws and constitutional enactments.

The healthiness of Hellenic civic life was above all based upon the fidelity with which the existing generation adhered to the traditions of the past, upon its belief in the gods of its fathers, upon its attachment to the commonwealth and its veneration for the rules of public and social life established by usage and legislation. But this basis of public prosperity had been seriously shaken long ago, and in particular by recent events. Within a few years not less than four thorough changes of the constitution had taken place; and, instead of recurring with double determination after these violent interruptions of the continuity of public law to the original rules of life, the existing generation continued to exhibit a vacillation and an uncertainty, such as are displayed in the motion of Phormisius (p. 62).

Moreover, the spirit of the age had always tended to weaken the authority of tradition, to loosen the cohesion of the community, and to direct the individual towards

\* "Thirty Tyrants," Aristot. *Rhet.* II. pp. 24, 106. Again in Diod. xiv. 2; Corn. Nep. *Thersites*, 3; Justin. 5, 10.

reliance upon his personal judgment in all critical questions. The outward vigor of social life had likewise become impaired. Land and people were exhausted by the results of the long war, which had annihilated public prosperity and destroyed that mutual confidence which it was harder to make good than any mere losses. Trade both great and small lay low. The soil was neglected and had lost its value; husbandry could only be restored to its former condition by means of great sacrifices and exertions. No task was more pressing than this; but there was a want of money; for in consequence of the prevailing insecurity many of the wealthy had invested their money abroad, and of the resident aliens who managed the money business a large proportion had emigrated, and the remainder had been mostly ruined or put to death. But, above all, there was wanting a love of agriculture, which could alone have conquered the existing difficulties; men had been spoilt by the cheapness and abundance of imports by sea, and preferred buying their daily necessaries in the market to growing them on ground of their own. War and revolution had driven the small proprietors out of their customary ways of life, they had become estranged from their calling, addicted to idle habits, and averse to continuous labor. This rendered impossible a thorough improvement of the economical condition of the country, and there was wanting the beneficent influence of a tranquillized state of feeling, such as would have been obtained by a return to rural avocations and to the solid foundations of former prosperity. And yet the people had never stood in so sore a need of a calming influence of the kind. For the bitter hatred between the parties, which had up to the last been more and more intensified, and which opposed not only the different classes of the population, but also the members of the same families, as adversaries to one another;—the rapid alternation of victory and defeat, of arrogant exultation

and utter hopelessness;—the terrible diminution in the numbers of the citizens, resulting from the bloody war;—the extinction of the ancient families;—the influx of new men, Athenians neither by birth nor by education;—and finally the entire series of extraordinary experiences crowding together at the close of the war:—all these causes had contributed utterly to unsettle the firm bearing of the civic community. Life had become more and more full of mysterious dangers and devoid of tranquillity; and the inborn vivacity and excitability of the Attic people had degenerated into a passionate restlessness, which had been only temporarily suppressed in consequence of the general exhaustion. A constant fluctuation in the daily state of public feeling possessed the city; and, says the comic poet Plato, he who had been absent from Athens during the space of three months was unable to recognize it on his return.\*

How was it possible, in the midst of this restless agitation, to find firm ground whereon the people might unite to carry out the re-settlement of the state? The strongest of all bonds—religion—had lost its power; for its basis was a simple-minded devotion to the traditions of the past. In its place, protests against tradition, audacious contempt for the simplicity of past generations, doubt and mockery, constituted the tendency of the spirit of the age, which found its expression in Sophistry. Moreover, the minds of men had been brutalized during the years of war, and the ordinances of their fathers had lost their authority. It was already rare to find an asylum respected, or an enemy taking refuge in a temple spared.†

The calamities suffered by the state likewise contributed to weaken religious feeling. For it must be remembered that the Hellenic religion was not of a suprasensual kind, trans-

Native  
religiosity  
ousted by  
foreign su-  
perstition.

\* Investments of money abroad: Athen. 532; *στέλες ἀγροῦν*, Lys. xix. 11; *Platon. Com. Fr.* ap. Meineke, ii. 692.

† Thus Agesilaus is held entitled to special praise for sparing those who had taken refuge in the temple of Athene Itonia, *Hellen.* iv. 3, 20.

ending space and time, and pointing to the consolations of a world beyond. On the contrary, it was most intimately interwoven with existing circumstances; it was a national and state-religion, the maintenance of which constituted at once the condition and the guarantee of public prosperity. The state divinities were so organically connected with the states themselves, as to be held responsible for the commonwealth, and accordingly to forfeit the confidence reposed in them, if the commonwealth placed under their protection was seen to decay. Thus after the Sicilian campaign prophecy came to be despised, because men thought themselves to have been deceived by the voices and signs of the gods, and, not unfairly, recognized in Nicias' orthodox fear of the gods a cause of the utter loss of army and fleet. With this feeling co-operated the general tendency of the democratic populace, directed towards an escape from authority of all kinds; thus an insurrection ensued against the gods not less than against other powers, and the former were renounced as having abandoned the state. But, inasmuch as men could, after all, not live without religion, the renunciation of the faith of their fathers was accompanied by an inclination towards the worship of foreign countries; and, by the side of infidelity, a wild growth of superstitious conceptions and usages sprang up. For this the sea-trade of the city and the multitude of foreign settlers offered every facility. Just as already towards the close of the war the common parlance of the Athenians was alloyed by a variety of non-Greek words, so an increasing welcome was likewise offered to foreign divinities, to the Phrygian Sabazius, the Thracian Cotytto, the Syrian Adonis; in the place of a healthy fear of the gods manifesting itself in a pious attendance upon public worship, men's minds were seized by a morbid terror of the superhuman powers (*Deisidæmonia*), which sought to satisfy itself in secret rites of all kinds; and this continued to



intensify the confusion of the minds of the citizens, and their alienation from ancient discipline and order. Dirty beggar-priests passed from house to house, to collect offerings for the "Great Mother," in return for which they promised expiation from sin and guilt. A large quantity of sayings and writings, ascribed to Orpheus, were carried about by adventurers, the so-called *Orpheotelestæ*, and, in accordance with these, secret associations were formed, designed to purify the terrified souls of men in place of the mysteries acknowledged by the state. Ventriloquists attracted the gaping crowd, by pretending that a dæmon dwelt in them and prophesied by their lips. A fellow of this kind, Eurycles by name, was a famous personage at Athens already in the former half of the Peloponnesian war; and such was the success obtained there by his tasteless jugglery, that an entire school of ventriloquizing prophets took its name from him.\*

Thus it is manifest how utter a want of order and discipline resulted from the spread of infidelity; and a hebetation of moral judgment directly connected itself with these sad aberrations of religious feeling. Together with the Hellenic gods, the human and civic virtues which they demanded fell into disrepute. While it was attempted to calm the conscience by means of external usages and charms, no value was attached to an inner purification; the promptings of selfish interest were unhesitatingly obeyed; and gradually all sense was lost of the truth, that a state cannot exist except by the virtues of its citizens. Some of the citizens may, in the secrecy of their homes, have still preserved an attachment to the ancient faith, but it was precisely those who set the fashion among the

\* As to the unsettlement of things human and divine, see Eurip. *Ip̄s*. *Tour.* 560, Kirchh. As to foreign religions: Bergk, *Rel. Osm. Alt.* 75. The language of the Athenians, *κεκραμένη ἐξ πάντων τῶν Ἑλλήνων καὶ Βαρβάρων*, "Xen." *Resp. Ath.* 8. Eurycles *ἑγγαστρίμυθος* (*ἑγγαστρίται* Εὐρυκλεΐδαι); Arist. *Resp.* 1019; Schömann, *Gr. Alt.* ii. 294.

rest who, together with the culture of the age, had also imbibed its poison.

Material-  
ism and  
Atheism.

The ancient religion itself was defenceless against the hostile spirit of the times, and could not of its own strength withstand the rationalizing tendency towards making everything an open question. For such a resistance it lacked the essence of objective truth, which might have commanded respect and aroused conviction. Was it not undeniable, that already in the Homeric poems, which were regarded as the sources and documents of popular belief, the substance of religious belief was freely treated according to poetic inspiration? And, since inquiring thought had found its expression in philosophy, all its tendencies, however widely they diverged in other respects, met in this one point, that they contested the popular views concerning the nature of the gods. Doubtless the ways of conducting these attacks differed greatly. Some, as *e. g.* Anaxagoras, in the true spirit of philosophy sought to rise out of the popular religion to a loftier and purer conception of God. Others refused altogether to acknowledge any dependence of man on divine powers. In addition, new tendencies of philosophy made their appearance, and, together with them, new elements of opposition against the ancient religion. Thus the teaching of Democritus developed itself, starting from a connexion with the philosophy of Nature. Democritus was younger by a generation than Anaxagoras, and during the earlier half of the Peloponnesian war attained to a great influence. He drew the conclusion from previous inquiries, that there is no other being than a corporeal one, and no motive power besides the force of gravity. In the mechanical world of Democritus there was no place for the God of Anaxagoras, for an Intelligence acting according to purposes of its own. He granted to the gods of the people nothing but a scarcely honorable existence as dæmons, and declared the

ordinary ideas of religion to have resulted from impressions of terrible phenomena of nature.

This doctrine also found acceptance at Athens, and, in company with Sophistic teaching, disturbed many an otherwise believing soul. The best-known instance is that of Diagoras of Melos, a lyric poet and a man of a serious disposition of mind. He had been the confidential friend of the legislator Nicodorus of Mantinea, at the time when that Arcadian town withdrew from its dependence upon Sparta and established its autonomy. Diagoras afterwards came to Athens; and, although he had formerly been a pious singer, he was now seized by the power of doubt; he became (as is said, under the personal influence of Democritus) an audacious freethinker, derided the gods whom he had celebrated, and hurled a wooden Heracles into the flames, in order that he might there undergo a thirteenth trial of his strength. But most of all he offended the feelings of the Athenians by his contempt for their Mysteries, the doctrines of which he gave up to publicity and to derision.\*

Thus the attacks upon the religion handed down to the Athenians by their fathers were intensified and multiplied; the great mass of the people being incapable of perceiving the distinction between philosophy and sophistry. For them the final result of the intellectual movements referred to was utter insecurity; and with the exception of those who, guided by the impulse of inner piety, held fast to what was old, and knew how to secure for them-

\* Democritus of Abdera, according to Diog. L. xix. 41, was junior by forty years to Anaxagoras; he was therefore born Ol. lxxx. cēvo. His εἰδῶλα resembling human beings, τὰ μὲν ἀγαθοποιά, τὰ δὲ κακοποιά (Sext. Emp. ix. 19), correspond in certain respects to the dæmons of the popular belief (Zeller, *Gesch. d. Gr. Ph.* i. 643). Diagoras, ὁ ἄθεος, ὁ Μήλιος, outlawed as a violator of the Mysteries (v. Suidas), and pursued in Peloponnesus as well as at Athens (Schol. Arist. *Aves*, 1073; *Rosca*, 320). Clem. Alex. *Protrept.* p. 7, Sylb., emended by Cobet, *Nov. Lect. Præf.* p. 14 (Διαγόρας τοῦ ψῶν παρασκευάσαι). Athenagoras, *Προσβαίει π. Χρ.* c. 5, ἵνα τὰς γογγύλας ἐπιψῶ, κατακόπτων τὸ τοῦ Ἡρ. ξέρον.

selves the noble elements of religious and moral truth in the mythology of gods and heroes, the generality rejected everything, and swam with the stream of the ideas of the age, unsupported by any remaining prop, and unable to find a compensation for what they had lost.

In the priests religion found no protectors. Occasionally, indeed, a feeling of holy indignation caused them to take courage and fight for their gods; they were unwilling to allow the operation of blind natural laws to be substituted for the living action of personal beings. By means of a sagacious utilization of the existing relations of parties (vol. iii. p. 91), priestly authority in the person of Diopithes once more raised itself to a power in the state. Anaxagoras fell a victim to it; and whoever chanced to have been in any way connected with him was, as *e. g.* Thucydides the historian, suspected as a freethinker. Diagoras, too, was outlawed (Ol. xci. 2; B. C. 411); a price was placed on his head, and it was even attempted to render the hue and cry against him a common Hellenic matter. Protagoras and others were persecuted as men who denied the gods; but what advantage could the cause itself derive from a fanaticism which merely blazed out on isolated occasions and effected the condemnation of individual heretics? There existed no priestly class capable of guiding the moral consciousness of the people, of coming forward as the champion of its belief, and of cherishing the treasure of true insight into the divine nature which that belief contained. Delphi was powerless, and its wisdom utterly obsolete. Nowhere existed any authority in things spiritual; there remained no fixed rule, no sure basis of the national faith; hence neither was any distinction possible which might have impressed its essential features upon the young; the antique wisdom, taught to them from the maxims of Hesiod, was unable to prevail against the attacks of the modern age; and, notwithstanding its recent discovery,

the state was threatened with an inevitable decay, when religion and morality were falling.\*

If any remedy was to be obtained for these evils, it must come from another quarter—viz. from that of Philosophy and Art. Philosophy must retrieve the damages inflicted by Sophistry, by <sup>The tragic</sup> ~~stage.~~ deeper reflection restore authority to the moral laws which had come to be contemned, and strengthen the forces of civil society whereby the life of a community is preserved. Art, and above all Poetry, must prove herself the teacher and guide of the people; must, in the midst of the busy selfishness of ordinary life, represent ideal tendencies, maintain the honors paid to the national traditions, and offer a salutary counterbalance to the disintegrating tendency of the spirit of the age. Ancient art, it must be remembered, was no mere outward ornament of life, to be assumed or laid aside according to circumstances; no mere luxury to rejoice men in their days of prosperity, and absent as a matter of course in evil times. Rather, it was a necessary element in public life, especially at Athens; it was a power in the state which supplied what religion left wanting; it gave expression to the feelings common to the whole community. And, inasmuch as Athens could not exist without public dramatic performances, very much depended upon the nature of the poets who composed the plays. Good poets were an essential public need; and it was for this reason that comedy, in so far as it had a serious and patriotic character, in this age repeatedly recurred to the need in question, and declared it to be a well-grounded desire on the part of the community, that it should possess tragic poets whose art was generous and whose sentiments were loyal.

\* Thucydides accounted an atheist on account of his relations with Anaxagoras, according to Antyllus ap. Marcellin.; Krüger, *Erk. Anal.* i. 36. Outlawry of Diagoras: Diod. xiii. 6. The statement is doubtful; in any case Aristoph. *Aves*, 1073, already assumes both prosecution and outlawry. Cf. Kock, *ad loc.*

For the serious drama was undoubtedly, above all other kinds of art, called upon to exercise a momentous influence. This form of art was the wealthiest in resources, and at the same time the most public, and that which pre-eminently addressed itself to the entire civic body; and again, it was the most Attic; it specially contributed to mark out Athens as the intellectual capital of Greece. The Attic stage was at the same time the stage of Hellas; and whoever desired to acquaint himself with the artistic performances of which no description could furnish a conception, or whoever believed himself possessed of gifts which he wished to develop or assert, made his way to Athens, where no obstacles were allowed to impede a free competition.

Thus we have already become acquainted with Ion of Chios, who, endowed with all the many-sidedness of a true Ionian, shone among the Athenians both as a poet and a prose-writer, both in elegy and in drama (vol. ii. p. 555). From Eretria came Achæus, a younger contemporary of Sophocles. He gained a dramatic victory at Athens, and in particular contrived, by means of his inventive genius, to invest the satyr-drama with new attraction. From Tegea in Arcadia came Aristarchus, who became so thoroughly domesticated at Athens, that he is said to have acquired a decisive influence upon the usage of the Attic stage with regard to the extent of individual dramas. Lastly, from Sicyon came Neophron, an uncommonly fertile dramatist, whose happy tact introduced new subjects into the sphere of dramatic poetry, *e.g.* the myth of Medea. This lively intellectual intercourse with other cities was of course rendered difficult and obstructed by the war; particularly in its concluding years Athens could not remain as heretofore a gathering-place of the competing talents of Greece; and the calamity which at its close destroyed the political power of Athens likewise became a fatal epoch for the history of her stage, inasmuch

as a year before the siege and capitulation Sophocles died (Ol. xciii. 3; B. C. 405). Rightly did Phrynichus in his *Muses* (performed at the same time as the *Frogs* of Aristophanes) honor Sophocles as one highly favored by the gods, in that after a long life of beneficent labors he had passed away without having seen the evil day. As the poetry of Sophocles is the mirror, wherein the glory of Athens shines upon us in its fullest lustre, so his life is the plainest measure of its brief endurance. He sang the pæan of victory, when the sun of prosperity rose, and he died before it sank under the horizon. Nor was the war allowed to abate the honors of his burial; undisturbed by the hostile skirmishes, the funeral rites were performed in Colonus, and a charming legend added that Dionysus himself, the god of the Attic stage, had taken thought for his favorite by appearing to the hostile general in a vision and bidding him honor the great poet.\*

His poetry survived even after his death. For his last work, the *Œdipus Coloneus*, a poetic conception of peculiar loftiness, which represents the end of the king as the harmonizing close of a human life laden with suffering and guilt, was brought on the stage by his grandson, the younger Sophocles, in Ol. xciv. 3 (B. C. 401, March). Æschylus, too, not only survived like a demigod in the memory of the Athenians, but his art also remained an inheritance unto the fourth generation. His son Euphorion, his nephew Philocles, as well as the son of the latter Morsimus, and the grandson of Æschylus, Astydamos by name, were dramatic poets;

The successors of the great Masters.

\* The hostile general in the autumn of 406 can only have been a commander of the troops in Decelea (not Lysander, as the Biographer of Sophocles, and Plin. viii. 100, assert); and it is quite conceivable that after the battle of the Arginusæ the Lacedæmonians pressed more closely upon the city, in order to take vengeance by land for the destruction of their fleet and to render the Athenians inclined to peace (vol. iii. p. 536). The tomb of the poet lay on the road to Decelea, doubtless in the district of Colonus. Cf. v. Leutsch, *Philol.* i. 129. As to the descendants of Sophocles, see Sauppe, *Sophokleische Inschriften*, in *Götting. Nachr.* 1865, p. 244.

and it is indeed a remarkable testimony to the firm and continuous cohesion in single families, which notwithstanding the innovating and restless spirit of the age was still to be met with at Athens, that the rivalry between the two masters was continued in several generations of their descendants. Philocles had competed with Sophocles himself for the prize, and had been able to gain a victory over the *Edipus Rex*; and Astydamas and the younger Sophocles contended in the period after the war as the most fertile dramatic poets. The families of artists became schools of art, in which the style of the great masters was piously retained and cherished. The old plays, too, were revived: in the case of *Æschylus* a special popular decree had ordained that no poet, who should desire to bring any *Æschylean* play upon the stage, should be refused the chorus; and it would doubtless have been an advantage to Athens, had the classical works been more frequently recurred to and afforded means of edification. But the public demanded change, and the great annual festivals of Dionysus required new plays. And thus it came to pass, that, as the management of language and versification grew in dexterity, a continually increasing number of persons from all quarters forced their way in, and that the number swelled of those who, without being born poets, tried their hand at the drama, and more or less successfully composed in the style of the old masters.

Thus a large number of poets of the second rank gathered at Athens, and contrived to obtain a certain consideration, although it was only by outward resources of art and by a certain degree of general culture that they supplemented the lack of original genius. Comedy, far from preserving silence as to their defects, vigilantly observed the progress of tragic art; and many a straggler belonging to this aftergrowth of dilettantism was made to suffer under her bitter mockery; *e. g.* *Theognis*, a member of the Thirty, whom Attic wit named the



“snow-man,” because his was an artificial and frosty poetry. “All Thrace,” announces an envoy in the *Acharnians* of Aristophanes, “was snowed up, and all rivers were rigid with ice; it was about the same time when, at Athens, Theognis was competing for the dramatic prize,” as if the character of his plays had some connexion with the extraordinary cold of that year’s winter. So, again, Aristophanes celebrates the charms of spring, on condition that Morsimus, the son of Philocles, produces no play during its course. Sthenelus is blamed for adorning himself with strange feathers; Carcinus, together with his whole poetic clan, is derided on account of his rhythms, the artificial prettiness of which provoked mockery; nor was Meletus more tenderly treated, a personage much talked about at Athens ever since Ol. lxxxviii. 4 (B. C. 425). This Meletus was a restless being, gifted with intellectual vivacity and full of talent, but devoid of character, and dissolute in his habits of life; as a poet he sought to attain to consideration, first by means of lyrical efforts, and then upon the stage, by zealously imitating *Æschylus*, and venturing to compose an *Œdipus-trilogy*. But his plays likewise lacked that inner warmth which genius alone can bestow; and accordingly Aristophanes in his *Gerytades* (produced as early as Ol. xcvi.) makes Meletus descend into Hades, where, on account of his own poverty of intellect, he wishes to ask aid from the deceased great masters;—in other words, true poetry has perished with *Æschylus* and *Sophocles*, and the poets of the age merely support their existence by the crumbs which they pick up under the abundant tables of the old masters. Similarly Aristophanes says of one of the later poets, that he licks the lips of *Sophocles* “like unto a jar overflowing with honey.”\*

\* As to the continuance of the tragedies of *Æschylus* on the Attic stage; Schol. Ar. *Eam.* 892; *Æsch. Agam.*, Schneidewin, vl. Theognis: Arist. *Acharn.* 140; *Theom.* 170. Morsimus: Ar. *Paz.* 800. Concerning Morsimus,

The poet Agathon. A poet of infinitely higher originality was Agathon, the son of Tisamenus. He was the model of an Athenian *bel esprit*. Handsome of person, wealthy, open-handed, amiable in manner, he was a centre of the higher society, which loved to assemble at his hospitable board, and by virtue of not absolutely unselfish friendship shared in his triumphs. Already previously to the Sicilian expedition he had gained his first poetic victories; and he had a well-founded claim on such successes, in so far as an exquisite culture, a vivacious intellect, and the full command of all resources of art gave a title to them. He contrived with exceeding skill to turn Sophistic training to account for the stage, and, after a fashion well adapted to the taste of the times, to combine the arts of rhetoric (wherein he was a scholar of Gorgias) and poetry. In his case, then, an attempt was made to give a new development to the drama. Agathon was anxious to be no mere member of a school; he was conscious that dramatic art must not remain stereotyped in its forms, if it was to exercise a living influence upon the existing generation. His independence in the choice of his subjects is already evident from the names of his pieces; for whilst the ordinary titles of tragedies as a rule make it easy to guess their contents, the name *Anthos* (the Flower), given to one of the plays of Agathon, is thoroughly mysterious, and shows how far he had removed himself from the traditions of the Attic stage. He was skilful in construction, and fresh in ideas; but on the other hand, his plays exhibited more brilliancy than warmth, more wit than depth of thought and feeling; and rhetoric was perceptibly obliged to supplement the want of creative power. Agathon's character lacked manliness; he was effeminate, spoilt, and vain; instead of being subject, like the true

Sthenelus and Melanthis: Cobet, *Plat. Com. Ed.* 184. Gerytades: Meineke, *Fragm. Com.* II. 1,006. 'Ο δ' αὖ Σοφοκλέους τοῦ μέλανι κεχρισμένου ἄσπερ καθίσκον περιέλειχε τὸ στόμα, II. 1176.

poet, to the force of higher powers, so as to forget himself in his works, they were a mirror of his individuality ; and this delight in himself was everywhere transparent. Aristophanes describes Agathon sitting down to write poetry, while his servant offers up a sacrifice of myrrh and fumigates his dwelling. The whole choir of the Muses is invoked in a pompous prelude, and to this bombast the emptiness and tameness of the work itself stands in a doubly notable contrast. For Agathon's forte lay in an artificial technical skill, which was unable to cheer the soul ; his eager search after small sensations, which were in particular to be excited by means of surprising figures of speech and plays upon words, became tiresome ; there was wanting the total effect, which is based upon the inner cohesion of a drama thoroughly thought out ; and the poet himself acknowledged his weakness as a dramatist, when he attempted to furbish up his plays by means of inserted songs, the so-called *Embolima*, which had no connexion with the action of the piece.\*

Such was the condition of dramatic art at Athens. Either it exhibited an absolute dependence upon the classic models, such as notably preserved itself in the family schools of the two great masters, or innovations were attempted, wherein homage was paid to the spirit of the age. We are unable to form a judgment in detail concerning the performances in either direction, because the works produced are lost, and hardly any traces have remained of a remembrance of them. But the reason of this is that in the times when a critical judgment was definitely established concerning the dramatic literature of Athens, the innovations in question were regarded as nothing but a decay of true art ; wherefore the works of Agathon, as well as those of the mere imitators of Æschylus and Sophocles, were given up to oblivion.

\* Agathon "ὁ καλός," Ritschl, *Opusc.* 1. 411. As early as the year 405 he had gone to Pella, εἰς μακρὰν εὐωχίαν, Arist. *Rom.* 85. Ἐμβόλιμα, Aristot. *Poet.* 18. Ἄρθον, c. 9.

But *one* poet asserted his title to permanence. The fertile power of his genius raised him above the multitude of mediocre associates in his art, and acquired for him so high a fame, that, instead of being obscured by his great predecessors, he obtained a place as a third by their side. Doubtless each of the three represents a new epoch in Attic history; yet *Æschylus* the soldier of Marathon, and *Sophocles* the witness of the Periclean age, had their footing on one and the same ground: the age of the one was the older, that of the other the younger, and a mighty progress is observable from the former to the latter—but no rupture. Just as *Cimon* and *Pericles* were able to arrive at a mutual understanding, so the poetic representatives of their time could also be conscious of a spiritual community. *Sophocles* survived to see the whole of the revolution produced by the war; he lived in the same atmosphere as *Agathon* and *Euripides*, and under the same influences; but in his poetic grandeur he stood forth from the nebular exhalations below, and never allowed the fermenting agitation of a collapsing world to disturb the harmony of his mind. *Euripides*, on the other hand, stood in the midst of the movement of his age, and was fully exposed to its influence. His greatness lies in the fact, that he was possessed of sufficient power and courage, in such an age and for such an age, further to develop dramatic art. But the mighty nature of the change undergone by Athens during the years of war is most clearly manifest from a comparison of these two poets. Is it not as if a long human generation lay between them?—and yet *Euripides* was only sixteen years junior to *Sophocles*, and died even before him.

*Euripides*;  
born in Salamis.  
Ol. lxxv. 1  
(B. C. 480);

*Euripides*, the son of *Mnesarchus*, was sprung from a noble house. He grew up in well-to-do circumstances, and had ample opportunity of availing himself of all means of culture offered by his native city to her youth. He was a

zealous scholar of Anaxagoras, the mighty thinker, who exercised so potent an influence upon the widest variety of minds; and his glorious delineation of the true Wise Man, in the picture of whom Anaxagoras was recognized by his contemporaries, attests how deep was Euripides' conception of the mission of philosophy. He had intercourse with Socrates; he eagerly participated in the many-sided efforts of the Sophists; in his house Protagoras recited those writings on account of which he was persecuted as having denied the gods. Furthermore, Euripides collected the writings of the ancient philosophers, among whom Heraclitus in particular made a deep impression upon him. These studies were to him a matter of paramount importance; and when he was not listening to the disputations of the Sophists, he preferred the society of his book-rolls, inquiring and meditating upon the courses in which Hellenic thought had endeavored to realize a clear conception of things divine and human. And yet he did not allow this occupation to become the task of his life; nor was he satisfied by study and inquiry. For this his mind was too open, and his power of imagination too lively; he possessed a brilliant gift of invention and exposition, and it was this which led him to dramatic poetry.\*

But here again a difficult task awaited him. The grand style of Sophoclean poetry admitted of no further perfection; if therefore Euripides desired to distinguish himself from the circle of mere imitators, it behooved him to bring upon the stage the new movement in the minds of men, to make use of the philosophy of the day for the drama. And to this task he actually devoted himself,

\* Concerning Euripides, see Suidas and the biographies; with occasional use of Philochorus. Gellius, xv. 28. Salamis was his birthplace (probably at the time when the Athenians took refuge there), and subsequently too a favorite sojourn of the poet. Welcker, *Alte Denkmäler*, I. 489. The ideal Wise Man: *Fragm.* 106. Dindorf, Clem. Alex. Strom. iv. 536 d; Bernhardt, *Gr. Litt.* II. 365. Protagoras recites *περί θεῶν* in the house of Euripides, Diog. L. ix. 8, 54. He was the most famous collector of books before Aristotle; see *Note* to p. 77.

with an endurance and a fidelity which offer a doubly glorious testimony to the energy of his character, inasmuch as the times were in general unfavorable to poetic art, while he was personally exposed to painful attacks, insults, and depreciation. It was his misfortune not to survive his great predecessor, for he was hereby prevented from ever attaining to a full enjoyment of his fame. For the Athenians, changeable as was their character, and much as they had altered during the years of war, yet from force of habit and from a true sense for art remained attached to the old dramatic style; and, however lively the interest which Euripides excited, yet the combination of art and sophistry, of reflection and poetry, appeared inadmissible. Sophocles remained the classic poet. It was he to whom the first prizes fell year after year, while of more than ninety plays of Euripides only about five received the crown. All the Conservatives were against him on principle; above all Aristophanes, although the latter and those who shared his views perceived indeed the weak points of the new style, but at the same time could not indicate any other courses for the further development of the drama, and were still less able to point to any poets who were pursuing a truer path. The labors of Euripides, however, were not in vain. In proportion as the number of fertile poets diminished, his popularity and influence increased, and towards the close of the war he was the dramatist proper of the people, the favorite of the general public. Pleasure was taken in the boldness and independence with which he treated the ancient myths, bringing them upon the stage in so living a form that the spectators fancied they were witnessing present events in these mythical stories. The common people had grown weary of the mysterious pathos of ancient tragedy, and enjoyed listening to a poet who made everything intelligible and familiar, who spoke the language of the multitude, and who brought before it heroes whom it

might regard as men of its own kind. The verses of Euripides were easily impressed upon the memory; his maxims went from hand to hand like current coin, his plays were heard with delight and largely read. For it was precisely at this time that the diffusion of writings had advanced with extraordinary rapidity; when a suit was instituted against Protagoras, the judicial prosecution extended to his writings likewise, and all copies sold had to be delivered up to the authorities.

A real mania for reading prevailed in the Attic public; the very nurses in tragedy appeal to their knowledge of myths derived from ancient writings. In his reading the Athenian felt less dependent upon the traditions of the stage, and gave himself up more freely to the feeling of satisfaction offered to him by the poet in whom he found a mirror of himself and of his age. Therefore the plays of Euripides accompanied the Athenian by land and by sea, and offered him a consolation in foreign regions and in the midst of misery.\*

And yet Euripides did not remain among his fellow-citizens. About Ol. xciii. 1 (B. C. 408), when already of advanced age, he accepted an invitation from King Archelaus to Macedonia, where he was attracted by the new Hellenic culture unfolding itself there. He was one of the first whom the dramatic Muse of Athens led among a population not Greek; he had a presentiment of the mission of Hellenic art to become the common property of all peoples striving after a loftier conduct of life. As

\* "Euripidem M. Varro ait cum quinque et septuaginta tragœdiis scripserit, in quinque solis vicisse," Gell. xvii. 4, 3. The Alexandrine writers were acquainted with 92 from the Didascalia, where only those plays were entered which had gained one of the three prizes. Nauck *Éur.* xxiii. As to Protagoras: Diog. L. ix. 8, 52. Learned nurses: *Hippocr.* 453. Euripides as travellers' reading: Aristoph. *Éom.* 52; as the consolation of prisoners (vol. iii. p. 408), who offer their thanks to him after their return, Plut. *Nic.* 29. Ignorance of the writings of Anaxagoras is accounted so decisive a proof of an uneducated mind (*ἀπειρία γραμμάτων*) that it is an insult to think it possible in Attic jurymen. Plut. *Apol.* 26 d.

Æschylus celebrated the foundations of Hiero, so Euripides commemorated those of Archelaus. When therefore we find him joyously glorifying the king, who, after the manner of the ancient heroes, was establishing civilization in the north by levelling and making secure the public roads, or blessing the primitive abodes of the Muses on the Pierian shores, where Hellenic festivals were once more flourishing,—we understand how productive an impulse was given to the poet by his migration. Even here, however, he met with enemies, who grudged him the enjoyment of the royal favor; and, after a two years' sojourn at Pella, the old man, in the 75th year of his age, fell, as it would appear, a victim to their guile.\*

Character  
of Euripides  
and his  
poetry.

Though Euripides may be called more than Sophocles a child of his times, this is not intended to imply that he was totally subject to the tendencies described above as connected with the moral decay of Athens, and that he was by them estranged from the loftier aims of his predecessors. He was not only pure in his life, and far removed from lightly despising ancient morals and manners; but there was also in him an ideal tendency of great strength and depth. He was possessed by an active religious craving, by a warm love of calm meditation on things divine and human, by an irresistible longing to solve the enigmas of the system which rules the universe; and this longing was intensified in him by his ardent sympathy with the sufferings of humanity, and by a deep sense of justice which he sought to satisfy. But his constant search led him to no goal; he found it impossible to harmonize opposing forces, and to find a satisfactory conclusion either in faith or in doubt. He was too religious to rest contented with mere negation,

\* Æl. V. H. xiii. 4. Insults at court, avenged by Archelaus, who thereby himself incurs hostility, Arist. Pol. 230, 7. Fragment of the *Archelaus*, 34: *ἔρανος ὀδουροῖς λυμῆνας*.



and too freely enlightened to follow tradition. In the tranquil soul of Sophocles the grand forms of the pre-historic age mirrored themselves, and he gave himself up to them, expanding the traditional conceptions of Gods and Heroes, deepening them, and bringing them into accord with the ideas of his age, just as Phidias did in his department of art. Euripides, on the other hand, was never able to forget his own individuality and his doubts; and the deep excitement in which he lived communicated itself to all his works. They were, therefore, incapable of exercising a tranquillizing effect, and lacked that impress of happy harmoniousness which was borne by the older works. Euripides, both as a man and as a poet, was a lifelong sufferer from the unsolved conflict between speculation and art, and this all the more, inasmuch as he possessed no means of balancing his internal dissatisfaction either by public business and glad participation in the affairs of the community, or even by the enjoyments of social life. He was therefore, in direct contrast to the serene and affable Sophocles, sullen and discontented, bitter in his judgments and prone to find fault; everywhere he saw the dark side of things, heard the discordant notes, and gave vent against gods and men to the discontent which possessed him; for even against the gods he inveighs on account of their sins of commission or omission.

But the very fact that Euripides was placed in relations so unfavorable to the growth of poetic works increases our admiration for his courage in giving a new development to the Attic drama, and for the success which attended his efforts. Moreover, he doubtless chose the right starting-points for his innovations.

The Gods and Heroes of earlier tragedy were figures handed down in fixed outlines; mythology furnished the characters, poetic fancy added its impress with a definiteness and clearness of form, wherein we recognize the same plastic sense of the Hellenes which created the national

images of the Gods in marble and bronze. Mask, cothurnus, and dress contributed to distinguish the several characters according to traditional usage; and, in consequence of the pious awe with which the personages of tragedy inspired the poets themselves, the latter never ventured to humanize them. They were to be measured by a different standard; they passed over the stage superhuman in height, resembling the Phidian figures in the temple-frieze of the Parthenon, in which every one immediately recognized a higher order of beings. Sophocles was indeed able to bring the figures of mythology into closer contact with the feelings of the spectator, and to represent in these figures the inner life of the soul. In his plays the relations between parents and children, between husband and wife, between brothers and sisters, are exhibited with more warmth, truth, and humanity. At the same time, however, the figures appearing before us are not single individuals, but, as it were, symbolic examples, comprehending entire species and groups of human beings. Notwithstanding their human weaknesses they remain ideal characters, and the lofty grandeur surrounding them has its origin in the circumstance, that only the settled principal features of each individuality are delineated.

Unless this mode of exposition, which gradually could not but fall into a certain monotony, was to be continued without change, it was indispensable to dare the attempt of bringing real men and women on the stage—and not merely as subordinate personages (such as, *e. g.*, the messengers, guards, and nurses, into the representation of whom already the earlier tragic poets had introduced striking features of ordinary life), but also as leading parts. This was ventured by Euripides, who hereby opened for himself a new sphere, where he could take advantage of all his natural gifts and of all the acquisitions of his experience and culture; of the quick sensibility of his disposition; of his brilliant gift of finding the right

word for every phase of feeling ; of his accurate knowledge of all the impulses moving his generation ; and of his sophistic training, which enabled him incisively to illustrate and account for all standpoints of human opinion. After this fashion he boldly renounced the traditions of the tragic stage ; drew forth his characters from the mists of the pre-historic age, and placed them under the clear light of the present ; reduced the diction of tragic pathos to the standard of ordinary Attic parlance ; and, instead of contenting himself with representing the Heroes in large and general outlines, depicted their woes and joys with the utmost elaboration through all stages and changes.

But in this course he was met by very serious difficulties ; for he continued to treat the <sup>His tragic art.</sup> same epic subjects with his predecessors, and thus arrived at a contradiction which made itself disagreeably perceptible. His heroes bore the names of a Heracles or Agamemnon ; they issued forth from palace portals clad in gorgeous robes, mounted on the lofty cothurnus, and reverentially surrounded by their serving-men ; but the personages themselves had dwindled into ordinary mortals, who ill accorded with the parts they played. They were human beings, too feeble to allow a struggle with the Powers of Fate to be suitably depicted in them—human beings, worried by love's labor and by wedded discord, by poverty, and by all the troubles of earthly life. From the mighty character-masks, invented for the figures of the Æschylean drama, issued the thin voice of ordinary mortals, claiming compassionate sympathy, such as we are wont to bestow upon the misfortunes of any of our neighbors. Herein necessarily lay an offence against the healthy sense for art ; for it was a humiliation of the Homeric figures, nay, it seemed like a desecration of the venerable treasure of popular tradition.

Euripides himself was not indifferent to popular my-

thology, which he had studied as a scholar. He contrived to adorn the earlier dramatic subjects with many a feature overlooked by others, and very skilfully to avail himself of new subjects, possessing a popular interest for the Athenian public, or specially adapted for effective representation. In the former respect his *Ion* is distinguished, the scene of which lies at Delphi, where the son of Apollo and of the Attic princess Creüsa dwells unrecognized as a ministrant of the temple, until he is restored from his sacred retirement to his native land, where as one of its born kings he is to found an era of the highest glory. The fragments of the *Erechtheus* likewise attest a deep and warm conception of the popular legends of his native land. Nine of his tragedies treat Attic subjects; but in the rest too he loses no opportunity of glorifying his native country; and when we find him with heart and soul celebrating the favor of the Gods resting upon Attica, the intellectual possessions of Athens, her laws and rights, and her great men, he must have touched the souls of his fellow-citizens, fostered their patriotism, and encouraged them to the imitation of illustrious ensamples.\*

In the other respect those pieces are specially distinguished, where female characters play the principal part; Phædra in the *Hippolytus* is an instance, in whom is delineated with admirable and masterly skill a criminal passion—her love for her stepson—in its gradual development from the vain effort of struggling against it up to its confession, and then from the outbreak of fury at her rejection up to her expiation of her guilt by means of a voluntary death. Not inferior was the poet's success in his representation of the inner struggles of a *Medea*, and naturally so: for in this case his peculiar gifts could most thoroughly assert themselves, without impairing the

\* Attic subjects are treated in the following: *Egeus, Alope, Erechtheus, Heracleida, Hippolytus, Theseus, Sciron*. Cf. Schenkl, *Polit. Anschauungen des Euripides* (Vienna, 1862).

dignity of the subject or defacing tradition. To such subjects as this Euripides accordingly devoted himself with special predilection.

But in general it was otherwise. Euripides, instead of abiding in the contemplation of the Heroic world, like Æschylus and Sophocles, saw no lustre either in the prehistoric past or in the present, and was only attracted by characters as well as subjects, in so far as he might hope by means of a neater construction of the plot and of a more lively delineation of character to exhibit his talent and the advantage of advanced culture. Instead of trustfully and reverentially accepting tradition, he placed himself in opposition to it as a keen critic, rejected the myths of Homer, in which he saw inventions improperly connected with the gods, and unhesitatingly allowed a sharp note of doubt and negation to make itself heard in the very midst of his pieces, so that all interest in the story was at an end. Where all Olympus is called into question, and the popular faith is met by a compassionate smile, its divinities could not but become empty theatrical figures, while a breath of icy frost blew across the stage whence the gods themselves had been banished.

Since, then, Euripides himself took no genuine delight in his subjects, and could not be blind to the degree in which their significance suffered under his treatment, he sought for other means whereby he might invest them with attractions. For this purpose he employed an artificial complication of dramatic situations, endeavoring by means of delicately planned plots to provoke an eager curiosity in his hearers, which had never been an object of the earlier poets. Furthermore, he sought so to choose and arrange his dramatic subjects, that a reference to circumstances of the day gave them the charm of novelty. Thus about Ol. xi. (B. C. 420) he wrote his *Supplices*, in glorification of Athens, which city forcibly obtains the burial of the Argive princes slain before the walls of

Thebes. This service to Argos is insisted upon, in order, as is explicitly stated at the close of the play, to induce that state to maintain a close alliance with Athens; and, again, the ancient conflicts with Thebes possessed an immediate interest after the battle of Delium, after which the Thebans had actually refused to permit the burial of their fallen adversaries (vol. iii. p. 195). The *Heracleida* has the same date and object. In this tragedy the generosity of Athens towards her enemies of those days is celebrated, in order to mark the ingratitude of Sparta and to strengthen the Attic party in Peloponnesus, quite in the spirit of the policy of Alcibiades, which the poet manifestly espoused (vol. iii. p. 309). Besides these, there occur in the most different plays isolated allusions, which could not fail to have great effect upon the assembled people. So *e. g.* the concluding lines of the *Hippolytus* (Ol. lxxxvii. 4; B. C. 428), which could not fail to remind every hearer of Pericles, whose death had quite recently taken place; the outbreak of wrath against the perfidy of Sparta in the *Andromache*, which in Ol. lxxxix. 2 (B. C. 423) must have evoked the fullest possible assent (vol. iii. p. 198), &c. In general, however, these intentionally significant passages and plays doubtless indicate no progress in tragic art; for it could not be otherwise than hurtful to dramatic works, that myths were converted into symbols of modern events and relations, and that the main interest was placed outside the action of the piece. The attention of the spectator was hereby divided, and the harmony of the whole destroyed.

The best way would have been for Euripides to have entirely abandoned the ancient myths, towards which after all he had no genuine inclination. For it became harder from year to year to produce any novelty; all the subjects had been treated repeatedly, all the characters were known, and all the relations between them fixed. "If," says the poet Antiphanes, "one merely mentions

the name Œdipus, they know all the rest: Iocaste, Laius, children, guilt, troubles and all; and if Alcæon is merely named, every child cries out: 'That is the man who killed his mother.'” The retrospect of earlier treatments of the same subject deprived the poet of a fresh and natural attitude towards his subject; and it was the most doubtful proceeding of all, when (as not unfrequently occurs in Euripides) he allowed himself to be seduced into casting critical side-glances upon his predecessors, blaming violations of probability committed by them, and thus introducing into poetry relations utterly foreign to its true nature.\*

Accordingly, nothing seems more natural, than that gifted poets should have sought after subjects where their freedom of creation was less impeded, as was not without success done by Agathon. The national history offered a wide field; and grand models existed in the *Phœniæe*, in the *Fall of Miletus*, and in the *Persæ* (vol. ii. p. 581). Euripides in his *Archelaus* approached nearest to this course. Yet he lacked original power for developing a new and independent species of drama in this direction; for this he, who was ever intent upon the search after general truths, was deficient in the sense of the actual, *i. e.* in the historic sense. In consequence of the preponderance in him of a love of reflection, which constituted a main feature in his character, the mythical subjects seemed after all the most suitable, because into these he could introduce most underlying meaning, and because they offered him occasions, in more or less suitable passages, for developing his views concerning God and the world, concerning domestic relations and the value of the several forms of government.

\* Reference to the death of Pericles: *οἶον οὐρανόθεν ἀνέβη*, Boeckh, *Trag. Princ.* p. 181; H. Hirzel, *de Eur. in comp. dic. artis*, p. 64. Antiphanes in Meineke, iii. 100. A concealed blame of earlier poets occurs in the *Phœniæe*, (752 k), the *Philoctetes*, the *Electra*, &c. Cf. Schneidewin, *Introd. to Philoct.*

For in truth the intellectual capital at the disposal of the poet was specially the Sophistic culture. Euripides understood, better than any other, how to reproduce its doctrinal propositions in words of incisive force; and therefore he is regarded as one of the most influential of its representatives, and was as such praised by the one side with passionate admiration, while the other assailed him with wrath and indignation. The adherents of ancient usage and ways of thought could not pardon his expressing views concerning marriage and family discipline of so dangerous a nature, that the multitude found in them an excuse for immoral connections and a justification of impure appetites; nor could they pardon the fair face which his specious eloquence put upon craft and guile, when, in accordance with the teaching of Protagoras, he propounded the question:

“Why, what is wrong, if to the doer it seem not so?”

or when he placed in the mouth of a faithless one the excuse:

“The tongue has sworn it, but the heart remains unsworn.”

These were expressions of Sophistic refinement, which seemed blasphemy when attributed to a Hero; expressions of despicable sentiments, which ought in no case to be heard on the Hellenic stage, although they were justified in the connexion of the play, and were by no means advanced with any evil intentions by the poet himself. From the point of view which *e. g.* Aristophanes advocated, it was demanded that the poet should preserve silence on what was evil;—or to what end was the theatre visited at the festivals of Dionysus, except to forget the wretchedness and vileness of life and to be elevated into a world whence the base was excluded? According to this view, even the wrong-doers and the guilty ought to preserve a superhuman grandeur. This was undoubtedly a narrow and one-sided standpoint; but it had given to ancient



Tragedy her peculiar perfection, her ideal dignity, and her moral significance; nor was Euripides able to compensate or make good in other ways what he destroyed in this poetic world. For poetry the Sophistic culture, by virtue of which he transferred the sentiments of modern Athens to the Heroic world, ever remained a barren soil, whence no fresh springs were to be charmed forth; and therefore Euripides, as a poet not less than as a man, was a true martyr to Sophistry. It possessed, without satisfying him; he employed it in order to bestow a new interest upon art; he contended for the right of every individual to approach in inquiring meditation all things human and divine; but at the same time he was not blind to the dangers of this tendency. He openly declared them, uttered warnings and pronounced invectives against it, and at last wrote an entire tragedy, with no other object than that of representing the miserable end of a man who opposes his reason to the system of the gods, and who refuses to acknowledge those as gods, whom, according to his idea of the Divine nature, he is unable to account as such. King Pentheus falls a victim to human arrogance, which refuses to bow down even before the irrefutable deeds of divine power, such as that which reveals itself in Dionysus; and the entire tragedy of the *Bacchæ*, one of the latest and at the same time one of the grandest of the poet's plays, is full of the most decisive attacks upon the overweening pride of human reason in divine things, and of the praise of the man who in simpleness of heart adheres to the teachings of tradition and to the beliefs of the people.

It was this oscillation between irreconcilable standpoints and this want of inner contentment which prevented Euripides, in spite of his manifold culture and of his decided tendency towards teaching others, from becoming even in his own sense a true instructor of the people. In the end, there remained nothing for him but to recommend a certain middle course; but such a system for the

conduct of life as this, the meagre result of long years of study, was naturally ill-suited to warm the hearts of men. Euripides lacked the inner illumination of the mind which marks out the born poet, and thus he offered an instance of the truth of Pindar's words: "A master is he, who is wise by nature; inborn greatness begets the power of accomplishing glorious works. He who clings to what he has learnt from others, staggers with uncertain step on a darkling path, and wearies himself in vain with artifices innumerable."\*

When the poet is without the genuine sources of inspiration, the decay of art must likewise show itself by outward symptoms. Thus, notwithstanding the expenditure of inventive power in the plays of Euripides, we find them wanting in a lucid and logical development; the significance of the whole is postponed to that of the details; the centre of gravity mostly lies in individual problems and in their skilful solution, in individual psychological developments and climaxes of sensation; thus scene succeeds scene, without any connexion of inner necessity subsisting between them, as in the works of Sophocles. Nor did Euripides mature all his pieces with loving carefulness. His high natural ability allowed him to write rapidly; and thus he often trenched upon the limits of a technical skill rather mechanical than artistic. If a subject was insufficient in extent, he combined several actions together, in which it is extremely difficult to recognize a unity, as *e. g.* in the *Hecuba*. While he rejects the simple course of the traditional narrative, he finds himself unable to conduct to its conclusion after a natural fashion, the complication which he has himself invented. In such cases some outward device is needed to untie the knot; and for this purpose Euripides resorts to the expedient of causing, towards the

\* Hipp. 607: ἡ γλῶσσο' δρώμοχ', ἢ δὲ φρήν ἀνώμοτος; cf. Nägelbach, *Nachkomer. Theol.* 439. The *Bacchæ* were composed in Macedonia.—Pind. *Nem.* iii.

end of a piece, a God to appear in the air, who announces the will of destiny to the helpless hero, and, by virtue of a higher authority, gives a calming conclusion to the action. This is the "*Deus ex machinâ*," as he was called, on account of the machinery upon which he was borne aloft, and he in truth constituted a decidedly external artifice for terminating the halting action of a play. Similarly, Euripides introduced an invention for the opening of his pieces, which at the first glance distinguishes them from those of the older masters. These placed the spectator at once in the midst of the events, as to the connexion of which a familiar knowledge might be universally presumed. Euripides, on the other hand, in order to pass quickly to the scenes wherein he could unfold his power of exposition, made a single character come forward, who gave a clear summary of the state of affairs up to the point where the action of the drama opened. This was an invention very natural in a poet who, as against the older masters, claimed the advantage of clear intelligibility; and it was at the same time a convenient artifice for evading the more difficult task of a dramatic construction perspicuous in itself, and for arriving from the outset at an understanding with the public concerning the form of the particular myth, which he often very arbitrarily altered. On the other hand, this innovation was assuredly no poetic gain. For, instead of the spectator being any longer in a fresh and lively manner placed in the midst of the course of the drama, the *Prologue* formed a strange and jejune addition, standing outside the organism of the tragedy and disturbing its unity. Moreover, these introductions, while hastily stringing together well-known events, were apt to degenerate into the monotonous and perfunctory manner of a trivial story-teller, and thus essentially to contribute to deprive the tragedies of their grandeur and dignity.

This thorough dislocation of the dramatic organism of

tragedy could not fail also to affect the treatment of the chorus. Hitherto the latter had formed the necessary background to the action of the play, and the indispensable accompaniment of the Heroes, of whom it was difficult to conceive otherwise than as surrounded by personages belonging to the same sphere as themselves. A surrounding of this description was unnecessary and inappropriate in the case of the leading personages of Euripides; indeed, by him the chorus was in truth regarded as an unwelcome extraneous addition; accordingly, he employs it for delighting the public during the pauses of the action by lyric songs, for the composition of which he was by no means unqualified by natural gifts. But these songs more and more lost their connexion with the general course of the play; as a rule, they treat subjects of general interest; and are frequently mere texts for music, such as a poet might, as the fancy seized him, write in advance and hold in readiness, so as incidentally to insert them in one or the other play.\*

But, while Lyric Poetry forfeited its importance in its original place, it assumed an all the more ambitious prominence elsewhere—not in the orchestra, but on the stage itself. For, in proportion as the poet sought to exhibit and assert the spiritual life of his individual personages in accordance with the character of his times and of his own idiosyncrasy, he was naturally inclined to give expression in lyrical recitation also to the mental phases of his stage-heroes. And this he accordingly did on an extensive scale, by interrupting, in such passages as introduce the climax of passionate emotion, the iambic speeches, and inserting longer pieces to be sung, after the

\* That Euripides was not always facile in composition is attested by the not improbable anecdote in Valer. Max. iii. 7, text. The "*Deus ex machina*" occurs in Sophocles also (according to Bergk, *Soph.* xxxviii., in imitation of Euripides), in the case of a "*nodus vindice deo dignus*." Cf. H. Abeken, *Trag-Lösung im Philoktet des S.* (Berlin, 1860). The prologues are criticised in Aristoph. *Ro.* 1200.

manner of *arias*, where the chief personages of his plays express their sentiments with the full force of passion. His actors were specially trained to produce songs of this kind, which were accompanied by pantomimic dance-movements, with masterly skill; and their very novelty sufficed to make a great impression upon the Attic public. Hence Euripides took no small pride in these "monodies;" and Aristophanes makes him say, that by means of them, Tragedy, which he had caused to grow lean, was fed up into new vigor—i. e. that by these songs he made good the loss which would otherwise have occurred in significance and dignity. But neither in this respect was the innovation tantamount to a progress. For it was based on a destruction of the ancient system, and on a mingling of the several, rigorously distinguished, species of poetic recitation. The actors became *bravour*-singers; recitation degenerated into a dithyrambic ecstasy; and because at this point passion was most unfettered, so at this point too the discipline of ancient art was most thoroughly broken; the rhythms flowed through one another without any rule; and this necessarily prevented the maintenance of a clear sequence of thought.\*

Altogether, there exists no more accurate Rhythmical  
novelties. standard by which to estimate the difference between the old and the new age, than the treatment of the rhythms. The old age demanded the subordination of the emotional meaning of each passage under a rigorously measured form; and its art triumphed in allowing living ideas to develop themselves in natural freedom notwithstanding the form imposed upon them. Upon this subjection of ideas to discipline rested the moral force of poetry, and its significance for state and people, as evinced by it, particularly in choral song. The period in which choral lyric verse attained to its full and legitimate development, was simultaneously the age when the life of

\* *Ἀντίτροπον μονοδίασις*: *Αἴ. Βασ.* 944. A parody of the monodies: *ἔ.* 1330.

the Greek communities, as such, flourished—the age to which belonged the men of Marathon; and choral song served for the youth of the country as a school not only of artistic culture, but also of civic order, of morality and of patriotism. The chorus itself was an ideal type of the community; for, in the one as in the other, the individual desires to be nothing but a member of the whole body, and knows of no higher duty than that of rightly filling the place which he occupies. The new age would have nothing to say to such a discipline as this; neither in political life, where the supremacy of the laws was disregarded, in order that the popular community might exercise an unbounded sway according to the changing humor of the hour, nor in public education, of which the ancient ordinances fell more and more into neglect,—nor again in art.

And here it was the dithyramb which struck the key-note of the new age (vol. ii. p. 573). For, after Pindar had lived to show how the full splendor of the dithyrambic song might well be united to a close observation of the laws of rhythm, the younger generation of poets neglected these, in order to free a loftier flight of thought from a burdensome fetter. The regular return of the strophæ, which prevented a lawless outflow of emotion, was abandoned; the poets delighted in a variegated sequence of different kinds of verse, and thought thereby to have gained a victory for the freedom of the intellect. But experience proved that no greater depth of meaning was attained by this absence of form. On the contrary, the new poets sank more and more into the manner of prose diction, from which they differed only by unnatural turns of expression and by forced figures of speech.

This fashion befell the cyclic chorus (as the dithyrambs were called, to distinguish them from the quadrilaterally-arranged chorus of tragedy) already during the former

half of the war, when Melanippides of Melos was the most famous master of this species of composition. The same style was continued by Cinesias, whose hollow pathos is derided by Aristophanes, and whose outward appearance—a tall, thin, and impotent figure—likewise contrasted with that of the ancient masters; and after him with particular success by Philoxenus of Cythera, who from being a slave raised himself to the highest honors of a far-famed dithyrambic poet.\*

Melanip-  
pides,

Cinesias,

Philoxenus.

As artificiality increased, the firmly-riveted organism of earlier art lost more and more of its cohesion; the consciousness of a close connexion vanished, and with it the readiness on the part of the one art to serve the other. The flute-player was no longer content to be a mere assistant, but aspired to be an independent artist. The solo-voices came forward more prominently out of the song of the chorus with longer passages of their own; and so utterly was the dignity of art forgotten, that attempts were made to imitate in the dithyrambs the thunder of the tempest, the rush of the rivers, and the voices of animals.

The impulse given by the dithyramb exercised an effect upon the remaining species of poetry, because everywhere there existed the same tendency towards escaping from the traditional rules. Agathon introduced artificial trickery into the drama.

Changes in  
the arts of  
the dance

His natural effeminacy caused him to entertain a predilection for lyric poetry, and he found it all the more easy to adopt the modern rhythms, since he treated his choral lyrics simply as pleasant passages for singing. He therefore in versification, and in music also, departed from the sobriety of the old school, introducing preludes and orna-

\* As to Melanippides: Suidas; Aristot. *Ethol.* III. 2, 6, p. 125, 3 (ἀναβολαὶ ἀπὸ τῶν ἀνωτροφῶν). As to Cinesias: Meineke, *Com.* I. 228. Philoxenus in Attic captivity in consequence of the taking of Cythera (cf. vol. III. p. 100) *Ἀοιδῶν*, Hesych. *Alph.* 643 d.

ments, employing artificial modulations of the voice and similar devices, in order to delight the ear of a multitude hankering after novelty. Thus light and loose dance-rhythms came into fashion, such as Carcinus had brought upon the stage: it was a kind of ballet, the supreme artistic resources of which consisted in *pirouettes*, in tripping double-quick movements, and in twirlings of the legs. This new Orchestic art was, in the instance of the family of Carcinus, exposed with deep indignation by Comedy, in order that the decay of the noble art might be clearly displayed.\* But the change which had come over the artistic taste of the Greeks was most perceptible of all in music.

and of music. Music is essentially the most delicate and sensitive of all arts: it is more than any other affected by every change in the current of the times, because it has the least power of resistance to oppose to them. Music above all the sister-arts served to educate the young, and to furnish a sure standard for the moral bearing of the community, and thus became the object of the most careful cultivation and superintendence on the part of the state, in whose interest it specially lay, that music should be preserved in harmony with the existing constitution. The salutary power of a well-ordered art of music, and the dangers of a degenerate one which should mistake its task, have nowhere found a more thorough appreciation than in Greece.

The fundamental law of music was the preponderant significance of the words. Music is the bearer of the words uttered by the poet; it is her function to vivify these by melody and harmony, to prepare their effect, to give strength to the impression which they create, and permanence to the significance which they possess. For this reason song is the most important part of music; but

\* Carcinus: Ar. *Vesp.* 1501; Meineke, *Com.* I. 513.



even in song the *unisono* of the chorus is chief, in order that the words may obtain their due as clearly as possible, and that their meaning may be asserted, not as the sentiments of an individual, but as the conviction of a community. We have already seen how changes were made at this point, with the intention of affording more space to the artistic skill of the individual, by the introduction of *solo*-singing on the stage; and it is easily explicable how the desire for greater freedom of movement should have pre-eminently asserted itself in music, because no other art is better adapted for giving the directest expression to human emotion, and because in no other had there prevailed more restriction and subordination than in this. For music was not only an entirely subservient art, an assistant of poetry, but, even within its own sphere, instrumental music again occupied a thoroughly subordinate position. Within these narrow bounds this art had indeed attained to an uncommonly full development; nor assuredly was more brilliant proof anywhere given of the delicate artistic sense of the Hellenes, which shows itself in their ability to achieve great results with small means, than in their music. They succeeded in presenting on the seven-stringed cither an admirable variety of tones and scales, and in thus producing the greatest effects upon the mind. Yet it was precisely in this department of art that the limited nature of the existing resources, and the inconvenience of the traditional ordinances, were most vividly felt; and for this reason it was here that the spirit of the times, in its revolt against all restricting ordinances, was busiest and most effective.

The new rhythms of Agathon were specially calculated for the music of the flute. The latter was more independent than that of stringed instruments; it was able to serve as a substitute for the human voice, which it was unable harmoniously to follow; so that the attempt to subordinate or co-ordinate the flute to

Music of  
the flute,

singing had been relinquished, after it had been made, at Delphi. In this kind of music, therefore, a greater measure of liberty had already been granted; in addition to which, the flute of the ancients was pre-eminently effective in exciting the emotions and expressing passion. The flute was the instrument of the worship of Dionysus; in it ecstatic sentiment found its natural expression; so that it specially commended itself to the tendencies of modern art.

and of the  
cither.

But neither was the innovating spirit of the age to be withstood by the music of the cither, —that chaste music of the Apolline religion, which allowed a prevalence to song, and would allow of no emotions incapable of finding an expression in clear words. This branch too was seized by the restlessness of the times, and experienced an essential transformation, taking its direction from the very locality where the art of music had received the laws acknowledged in Hellas,—viz., the island of Lesbos. Here the race of Terpander still flourished, a guild of singers, who, in the spirit of their ancestor, diligently pursued the cultivation of song and cither. A famous master belonging to this family school was Aristoclide<sup>s</sup>, who also came before the public at Athens, and attracted to himself artists of high talent; so that it became an epoch in the further development of the art of music, when the young Lesbian Phryn<sup>is</sup> became his pupil, and was by him formed into an eminent cither-player.\*

Aristoclide<sup>s</sup>.

Phryn<sup>is</sup>.

In the earlier times the rivalry of *virtuosi* was thrown into the background by choral song; but already in the days of Pericles the former asserted itself, as is proved by the construction of the Attic Odeum, designed for the production of the performances of individuals before a smaller public. Phryn<sup>is</sup> himself is said to have gained the first victory in the musical contest at

\* Aristoclide<sup>s</sup>: Schol. ad Ar. Nub. 965.

the Panathenæa. From this time the connexion between the several arts became less close in this field also, and it was Phrynias, above all, who renounced the school of Terpander, abandoned the strict rules of ancient composition, gave a more independent movement to the music of the cithar by the side of poetry, and attached more weight to brilliant skill in the management of the fingers and the voice; from the earlier school of singers he came forth as a virtuoso on the cithar, and found numerous followers in this new art, which was received with great applause.\*

Of course attempts were hereupon also made to increase the simple resources of the art, in order to secure its claims to an independent position; and invention used its utmost endeavors to produce in the treatment of stringed instruments whatever might seize upon the soul, gratify the ear, elicit applause and excite wonder. The first efforts of Phrynias in this direction were continued by Timotheus, the son of Thersander. He was a Timotheus. man of brilliant natural endowments, who came over from Miletus to Hellas, in order to domesticate there, in the place of the art of song, which was already growing obsolete, the new style of music with its new instruments and rhythms. He composed musical works, in which (as their titles, *Niobe, the Persians, Nauplius, &c.*, indicate) mythology and history were represented, in a variegated mixture of manifold forms of art: epic recitation, *arias* and choral songs, poetry, pantomime, dance and music being combined into a brilliant general effect.

But the innovations of Timotheus met with a far more obstinate resistance in Hellas than The old music and the new. he had anticipated. At Sparta in particular, the Apolline music, as it had been regulated by statutes

\* Phrynias ἐπὶ Καλλίου ἔρχομαι (Ol. lxxi. 1; B. C. 456): Schol.; probably this should be Καλλιμέχου (Ol. lxxxiii. 3; B. C. 446): Meier, *Panath.* 285. O. Müller, *Hist. of Gr. Lit.*, vol. II. p. 75, Note [Engl. Tr.]; Volkman ad Plut. *de mus.*, p. 77. Plut. 6: ἡ κατὰ Τέρπανδρον κιθαριδία μέχρι τῆς Φρύνιδος ἡλικίας παντελῶς ἀπῆλθε οὕτως διετέλει. Westphal, *Harmonik.*, p. 97.

emanating from Delphi, was so closely connected with the laws of the state and with religious orthodoxy, that whoever wished to introduce into it arbitrary changes, was regarded as the most dangerous of heresiarchs. More severity was exercised, and more sensitiveness displayed, on this head than with regard to the most important fundamental laws of the state; for it was deemed the mark of a properly-trained Spartan, that he was able on the spot to distinguish between good music and bad; and the latter epithet was given to any kind which excited the senses and debilitated the mind. All such it was thought necessary to ward off like infectious poison. The sevenfold number of the strings of the instrument, and its entire arrangement, were likewise at Sparta deemed to be matters consecrated by ancient custom and by law. But even the Athenians were strict on this head, and faithful to ancient usage; they too had ancient statutes, which fixed the several species of music and imposed penalties upon a mixture of them.\*

Hence the obstinate struggle between the old music and the new. Not only were the supernumerary strings added to the cithar by Phrynis and Timotheus officially removed again at Sparta, but at Athens too the innovators were exposed to violent invective; and while they designed to free music from antique restrictions and thus to raise it to a new perfection, they were on the other side accused of desecrating the noble art, and their activity was regarded as a sin against the Hellenic nation, and as a blameworthy defection from ancestral usage. In former times, to be sure, says Aristophanes, had the Attic boys dared to deface pure song by such artificial flourishes, roulades and cadences, as the school of Phrynis has

\* Plut. *de Legg.* 730; O. Müller, *Dorians*, II. 332 [Engl. Tr.]. As to the enlargement of the ancient heptachord see Westphal, *u. s.*, p. 95. The "Spartan decree" against Timotheus, ap. Boethius, *de mus.* I. I. *Philologus*, xix. 306.

brought into fashion, they would have been whipped as offenders who dishonored the Muse. In the *Chiron* (ascribed to Pherecrates, or perhaps more properly to Nicomachus), Dame Music appeared on the stage as having suffered shameful ill-treatment, and related her whole woful history. First, she complains of Melanippides and his twelve accursed strings; next Cinesias the scoundrel, she says, fell upon her, "and worried me so terribly with the twists and the turns of his strophæ, that in the dithyrambus, what ought to have been on the right side, came to be placed on the left. But even he was far from being the worst. No; Phrynis came next, and twined in his shakes and roulades, and bent and twisted me quite to pieces, in order to force a dozen harmonies into five strings. He, however, afterwards repented and mended his ways. But Timotheus—alas, dear public! It was he who treated me worst of all, and entirely ruined me, miserable woman." "Timotheus?—what Timotheus was that?" "Why, no other than the slave from Miletus; he tousled me far worse than all the rest together, he dragged me through the labyrinth of notes, deprived me e'en of my last ounce of force, and by his dozen strings I am undone!"

Thus it is in the art of music that the decisive revolution in Greek national feeling, the change in taste and moral bearing, the entire contrast between the old and the new, most distinctly present themselves to us; it is here that war is most openly declared to tradition, and that we find two schools of art of absolutely contradictory and irreconcilable tendencies. In the ancient times rhythm ruled the Music arts; it was the law which the words of poetry, the sounds of music and the movements of the Orchestic art obeyed; to it classical art owed its clearness, its happy order and its serious bearing; by it, tranquillity in movement was assured, and thought acquired the sway over emotion. This rhythm was the expression

of a healthy and well-ordered moral condition, and the mark of internal tranquillity and security. It was accordingly unable to maintain itself in art, after the life of men had become a different one; and for this reason the decay of the old style of music was immediately followed by a decay in the life of the community.

Timotheus and Euripides. Euripides had himself fallen under the influence of the innovations introduced into the treatment of rhythms and music. He was one of the many who admired the art of Timotheus, with whom he was personally intimate. When Timotheus was perplexed by the obstinate protests opposed to him, Euripides endeavored to console him by the assurance that the time was no longer distant when he would rule the stage. And in truth Timotheus was destined to enjoy his fame for a longer season, and in fuller measure, than Euripides. For music had more resources at its command, by which to offer new attractions as a compensation for the lost dignity of the ancient school of art. On the stage, on the other hand, it was less possible to mistake the magnitude of the loss, when the old masters were compared with the present, without any new results being obtainable which could be regarded as in an equal degree satisfactory.

Decay of the technical part of dramatic poetry. Nor are traces wanting in the tragedies of Euripides, that the spirit of the age came to command him more and more, and to carry him away with it. For while in his earlier plays—in the *Medea*, the *Hecuba*, the *Hippolytus*, the *Andromache*, the *Alcestis*—we find stricter principles observed, in the later an increasing negligence is perceptible. The versification becomes less solid and careful, and the long syllables in the iambus are more frequently broken up. In the arrangement of the dialogue too, and in the longer speeches corresponding to one another, the earlier tragedies exhibit a certain artistic symmetry, which is absent from those of

a later date. It may be shown with much probability that the period in which the poet relinquished the severer style in composition and versification falls about the 89th Olympiad,—i. e. about the time when, after the peace of Nicias, Alcibiades became the leader of the state, and carried it away into the uncertain courses of his political schemes.\*

In Alcibiades, that which made the restrictions of usage unbearable to him, seemed to be a superabundance of force; and the same appeared to be the case with the artists of genius, who desired in their sphere to open the path for a freer movement. But in truth this apparent wealth of force was nothing but a weakness, inasmuch as the highest kind of force, that of self-control, was wanting. Thus it was indeed possible to burst asunder the ancient moulds, but no new formations developed themselves; a perpetual oscillation ensued between that absence of form which genius affects, and an artificiality of the tamest description. We see the ancient ordinances, which the reflecting strength of the Hellenes had established in political life and in art alike, perishing simultaneously; and, amidst this dissolution, the creations of the Greeks also forfeited their genuinely national character.

This estrangement of art from its national character, which from the Hellenic standpoint could only be viewed as a degeneration, was, notwithstanding, the point to which the significance of Euripides in the history of the progress of civilization attaches itself. For, inasmuch as during an age extremely unfavorable to poetic creations, while acting himself in the spirit of that age and by means of its resources, he made it possible to preserve

Influence  
of Euripides  
upon subse-  
quent gene-  
rations.

\* As to the epochs of style in metre and composition, see G. Hermann, *Elem. d. Metrik*, p. 123; H. Hirzel, *de Eurip. in comp. dis. arts*, p. 92. The use of the trochaic tetrameter became frequent after the 91st Olympiad.

dramatic art alive among the Athenians, and this with so much success as to enable him to maintain a place by the side of Sophocles, and to be acknowledged by Sophocles as a master of his art, he formed the transition from the classical into the following period, and acquired a literary importance extending far beyond the immediate present. The real classics, such as Pindar, Æschylus, and Sophocles, are only to be thoroughly understood and appreciated by contemporaries, or by those who by study accommodate to them their whole way of thinking: so closely was their heart interwoven with the public life and the moral standpoint of their age. Euripides, on the other hand, by the very circumstance that he put an end to the severe style of earlier art, stepped forth from the narrower sphere of the merely popular; he asserted the purely human motives of feeling which find a response in every breast, hence his clearness and intelligibility; hence, without presuming any special interest in the subjects derived from mythology or claiming a higher strain upon the intellectual powers, he satisfies the demands which men at all times and in all places make upon the drama. He is at once interesting and entertaining, terrific, and affecting; he offers a wealth of thoughts and reflections, which come home and are of importance to every one, and is a poet for every educated man who understands the language in which he writes. For the same reason, too, he was able to affect the minds of the foremost among his contemporaries, such as Socrates; and the language of the Attic stage, as he developed it, became the standard for the drama, so that even Aristophanes was obliged to confess, that in this respect he stood under the influence of Euripides. For the same reason he also pointed out its path to plastic art, and showed it how it could do new and important things *after* the age of Phidias; and therefore, though in his lifetime he had been unable to prevail against the still acknowledged tradition of earlier art, he



filled the world with his fame after his death, and found numerous followers among the poets, who made use of the Greek myths in order to obtain dramatic effects of universal human significance. In this importance of Euripides for the general history of the world lies a certain consolation for those who are unable to contemplate without painful sympathy the long and laborious, but dark and embittered, life of the poet, who was himself never cheered by a full enjoyment of his poetic calling.

Externally, the organism of ancient tragedy was retained unchanged; tetralogies were acted as of old, because this had once for all come to be the form, consecrated by usage, of the poetic competition at the great festivals of Dionysus at Athens. But since Sophocles had begun to dissolve the connexion between the plays produced together, so that each of them constituted a poetic whole in itself, this method of proceeding, so far as it can be perceived, remained the rule for his contemporaries and successors. In proportion as the interest grew faint in the subjects of the myths, it became desirable for the dramatist to devote his whole art to the single plays. Hereby a greater popularity was preserved to the drama, inasmuch as a greater variety of enjoyment was offered to the curiosity of the multitude, while at the same time the repetition of the tragedies was facilitated on smaller stages and on occasions of less important festivities. On this head, too, Euripides appears to have attempted an innovation, when in his *Alcestis* (acted as the fourth play in the competition of Ol. lxxxv. 2, B. C. 438) he produced a piece designed as a substitute for the satyr-drama, which according to its traditional manner offered only a very limited field of operation to the poet, and required a fresh, natural humor, such as Euripides had not at his command. The *Alcestis* is neither a tragedy nor a satyr-drama, but a composition of a new species, where a pleasant turn is given to a tragic subject, and where thus

the desire of the Attic public, to recreate itself by means of a merry afterpiece, after the agitating effect of the tragedies, was gratified. But neither was this attempt, to create a new form of art within the organism of tragedy, made in any genuinely serious spirit, or with any lasting success.

Comedy. Comedy was best able to maintain itself—comedy which, throughout the entire period of good fortune and ill, followed with its clear glance the life of the Attic people. And it is sufficiently remarkable that it was precisely for comedy that was reserved the task of withstanding with heart and soul the prevailing love of innovation, and of coming forward as the champion, on the Attic stage, of what was good in the old times. Immediately before the fall of Athens we find the comic poets still engaged in a violent contest against the abuses of political life and the misdoings of the demagogues. Cleophon (cf. vol. iii. pp. 500, 558) is unsparingly attacked in the same year, Ol. xciii. 4 (B. C. 405), by Plato and Aristophanes. After the fall of the city, political opposition ceased, and the poets retreated to a field where the contest was less bitter and exciting, attacking no longer the civic community and its popular leaders, but the public and the poets whom it favored. They opposed with special acrimony the dithyrambic poets, who thrust themselves forward after so intolerably self-conceited a fashion with their formless artificialities. The dithyrambic poets in their turn took their revenge by endeavoring to deprive comedy of the subsidy reaching it from the state. In this they succeeded all the more easily, because the times were little favorable to the encouragement of merry festive plays, while in consequence of the general impoverishment the choruses were from year to year more and more neglected; already in the year of the battle of the Arginuseæ it had been necessary to institute the practice, of two choregi furnishing a chorus in common (cf

vol. ii. p. 526). This practice it was contrived to keep up even after the year of Euclides, until the dithyrambic poet Cinesias, who had been most exposed to the wanton attacks of the stage, introduced a law, whereby the public expenditure on the comic drama was restricted to such a degree that it had to renounce the chorus altogether. Comedy hurled the bolts of its wrath against this evil-doer. Strattis wrote a special play, the *Choricide*, against Cinesias; but this contest against the unkindness of the times was in vain. The choral <sup>Changes in</sup> comedy. songs, written in connexion with the stage-play and practiced by the actors for its production, above all the terrible *parabases*, were abolished, and dances and light pieces of music inserted in their stead. The entire branch of art, the most characteristic production of Attic popular life, lost its former significance, and thus, about the 97th Olympiad (B. C. 390), *Old Comedy* was gradually transformed into *New*. But so long as the former continued to exist, it remained true to its mission of doing battle against all mistaken tendencies of the age. Thus, after already Cratinus in his *Panoptæ* had lashed the Sophists in a body, as the ultra-clever, all-seeing, and omniscient ones, there followed a series of comedies, which chiefly occupied themselves with the state of literature and with the growth of a false taste; such as the *Musæ and Tragœdi* of Phrynichus, the *Frogs* and *Amphiaræus* of Aristophanes, and lastly, the same author's *Gerytades*, in which he exhibited the bankruptcy of dramatic poetry at Athens, as confessed by the poets themselves. Most assuredly this contest was not without its effect in animating the sympathy with genuine art and keeping alive respect for the ancient masters; but Comedy could do nothing more than hold a mirror up to the age, and insist upon the difference between the present and the past, at the utmost arousing in its spectators the repugnance by which it was itself pervaded against the new tenden-

cies of the times; but it too was unable to point out a new path to Attic art, or to fill up the void of the age.\*

Such was the condition of the poetic art at Athens. It maintained itself for a season at its full height, even after the symmetry of public life had been destroyed,—but only in the works of Sophocles, who continued to live in the spirit of the Periclean age. After his death poetry, like music, was seized by the same current which dissolved the foundations of the people's life, and which swept away the soil wherein the emotions of the classical period had been rooted. Accordingly in these times of general oscillation poetry was unable to supply a moral anchorage; the old perished, but the modern age with all its readiness in thought and speech was incapable of creating a new art as a support to its children. In the same way the faith of former generations had been cast aside like antiquated household gear, but without any other assurance of morality, without any other impulse towards the virtues indispensable for the life of the community having been obtained in its stead. The need of a regeneration was acknowledged; serious endeavors were made to introduce improvements and order; but political reforms could not heal such wounds as these, or furnish a new basis for the commonweal. What was required was, that men should arrive at a clear consciousness of the mazes of error into which the modern free-thinking had led; that they should turn back, and train up a new generation, in which the virtues of a god-fearing loyalty and truthfulness should again take root, that the building-up of a happier Athens should be begun from below. This was a long and arduous path to the goal, and one which ill commended itself to the self-conceit of the highly educated Athenians;—but there was no other.

\* Close of the *Old Comedy*: Cobet, *Plat.* 48, 146; Boeckh, *Publ. Ec. of Ath.* vol. II. p. 215 [Eng. Tr.]; K. F. Hermann, *Ges. Abhandl.* 41, 61. Both means and patience were wanting for the drilling of the choruses, which might require months.

But in order to lead into this path, and to make manifest the necessity of a moral renovation, which should be achieved in the moral being of every individual, there was needed a man of the prophetic class, who should clearly recognize the aberrations of the age, but at the same time himself stand above it, who should be in possession of the intellectual resources demanded for a struggle against these errors, and who should, lastly, be so assured of his mission to save and help, that he should be unselfishly ready to live and to die for it. Such a man the Athenians had among them; it was no other than that very Socrates, of whose doings in politics and society we have already on several occasions taken note (vol. iii. pp. 299, 544).

If we contemplate Socrates in his whole way of living and being, (and in truth no other personage of Greek antiquity is so distinctly brought before our eyes), it seems to us, in the first place, as if at Athens he were not in his natural place; so foreign to Athens are his ways, and so dissociated from it is his whole individuality. He cannot be fitted into any class of Athenian civil society, and is to be measured by no such standard as we apply to his fellow-citizens. He is one of the poorest of all the Athenians, and yet he passes with a proud step through the streets of the city, and confronts the richest and best-born as their equal; his ungainly and neglected exterior makes him an object of public derision, and yet he exercises an unexampled influence upon high and low, upon learned and unlearned, alike. He is a master both of thought and of speech, yet at the same time an opponent on principle of those who were the instructors of the Athenians in both; he is a man of free-thought, who allows nothing to remain untested, and yet he is more diligent in offering sacrifices than any of his neighbors; he venerates the oracles and reposes a simple faith in many

The task of philosophy.

Socrates, the son of Sophroniscus; born Ol. lxxvii. 3 (a. c. 407), d. Ol. xcv. 1 (a. c. 399).

things which the age laughs at as nursery-tales; he blames without reticence the dominion of the multitude, and yet is an adversary of oligarchs. Entirely his own master, he thinks differently from all other Athenians; he goes his own path, without troubling himself about public opinion; and so long as he remains in harmony with himself, no contradiction, no hostile attack, no derision vexes his soul. Such a man as this seemed in truth to have been transplanted into the midst of Athens as it were from some other world.

And yet, unique in his kind as this Socrates was, we are unable on closer examination to mistake him for aught but a genuine Athenian. Such he was in his whole intellectual tendency, in his love of talk and skill in talk—growths impossible in any but Athenian air—in the delicate wit with which he contrived to combine the serious and the sportive, and in his unflagging search after a deep connexion between action and knowledge. He was a genuine Athenian of the ancient stamp, when with inflexible courage he stood forth as the champion of the laws of the state against all arbitrary interference, and in the field shrank from no danger or hardship. He knew and loved the national poets; but, above all, it is in his indefatigable impulse towards culture that we recognize the true son of his native city. Herein lay a spiritual affinity between him and the noblest among the Athenians, a Solon and a Pericles. Socrates, like Solon, thought that no man is too old to learn, that to learn and to know is not a schooling for life, but life itself, and that which alone gives to life its value. To become by knowledge better from day to day, and to make others better, appeared to both to be the real duty of man. Both found the one true happiness in the health of the soul, whose greatest unhappiness they held to lie in wrong and ignorance.

Thus, with all his originality, Socrates most decidedly

stood on the basis of Attic culture ; and if it is taken into consideration, that the most celebrated representatives of Sophistry and the tendencies akin to it all came from abroad, *e. g.* Protagoras from Abdera, Prodicus from Ceos, Diagoras from Melos, it may fairly be affirmed, that as against these foreign teachers the best principles of Attic wisdom found their representative in Socrates. Far, however, from merely recurring to the ancient foundations of patriotic sentiment, fallen into neglect to the great loss of the state, and from opposing himself on an inflexible defensive to the movement of the age, he rather stood in the very midst of it, and merely sought to lead it to other and higher ends. What he desired, was not a turning back, but a progress in knowledge beyond that which the most sagacious teachers of wisdom offered. For this reason he was able to unite in himself elements which seemed to others irreconcilably contradictory ; and upon this conception was based what most distinguished him above all his fellow-countrymen, the lofty freedom and independence of his mind. Thus, without becoming disloyal to his home, he was able to rise above the restrictions of customary ideas, which he most notably achieved by making himself perfectly independent of all external things, in the midst of a people which worshipped the beauty of outward appearance, and by attaching value exclusively to the possessions which are within, and to moral life. For this reason too his personal ugliness, the broad face with the snub-nose, thick lips and prominent eyes, was a characteristic feature of his individuality, because it testified against the traditional assumption of a necessary union between physical and intellectual excellence, because it proved that even in a form like that of Silenus there might dwell a spirit like that of Apollo, and thus conduced to a loftier conception of the being of man. Thus he belonged to his people and to his age, but stood above both ; and such a man the Athenians needed, in

order to find the path, whereon it was possible to penetrate through the conflict of opinions to a moral assurance, and to reach a happiness containing its own warrant.

Socrates appears before us as an individuality complete and perfect, of which the gradual development continues to remain a mystery. Its real germ, however, doubtless lies in the desire for knowledge, which was innate in him with peculiar strength. This desire would not allow him to remain under pupilage to his father; it drove him forth out of the narrow workshop into the streets and the open places of the city, where in those days every kind of culture, art and science, was offered in rich abundance; for at the time when Socrates was in his twentieth year, Pericles stood at the height of his splendid activity, which the son of a sculptor might be supposed to have had occasion fully to appreciate. The youthful Socrates, however, brought with him out of his father's house a certain one-sided, and so to speak *bourgeois*, tendency, i. e. a sober, homely sense for the practically useful, which would not allow itself to be dazzled by splendor and magnificence. Accordingly, he passed with tolerable indifference by the much-admired works of art with which the city was at that time filled; for the ideal efforts of the Periclean age he lacked comprehension, nor do the tragedies of a Sophocles appear to have exercised much attraction upon him. If there was one-sidedness in this, on the other hand it bore good fruit, in so far as it confirmed the independence of his judgment, and enabled him to recognize and combat the defects and diseases from which Athens suffered even in the midst of her glories.

His activity. But, although the son of Sophroniscus carried the idea of the practically useful into the domain of science, he gave to it in this so deep and grand a significance, that for him it again became an impulse towards searching with unflagging zeal for all real means of culture offered by Athens; for he felt the impossibility



of satisfactorily responding to the moral tasks which most immediately await man, without the possession of a connected knowledge. Thus he eagerly associated with men and women, esteemed as highly-cultured; he listened to the lectures of the Sophists; acquainted himself with the writings of the earlier philosophers, which he found to be still of vital effect upon his contemporaries; thoroughly studied with friends desirous of self-improvement the works of Heraclitus and Anaxagoras; and in this constant intercourse he gradually became himself another man, *i. e.* he grew conscious of the unsatisfactory standpoint of the wisdom of the teachers of the day, as well as conscious of his own aims and mission. For, in putting questions of a kind which could meet with no reply, and in searching for deeper things than could be offered to him by his hearers, he gradually became himself the person from whom the impulse proceeded, and from whom in the end was expected an answer to the questions which had remained unsolved. He, the seeker after instruction, became the centre of a circle of younger men, who were enthusiastically attached to him. In how high a degree that which he endeavored to supply corresponded to the deeply-felt needs of the age is evident from the fact, that men of the most utterly different dispositions and stations in life gave themselves up to him,—youths of the highest class of society, full of self-consciousness, buoyancy, and reckless high spirits, such as Alcibiades; and again men of a melancholy and timid turn of mind, such as the well-known eccentric Apollodorus of Phalerus, who, perpetually discontented with himself and others, led a miserable existence, until in Socrates he found the sole individuality appeasing his wants, and in intercourse with him the satisfaction for which he had longed.\* To him, Socrates was all in all, and every hour during which he was away from

\* Apollodorus, ὁ μαυρὸς: Plat. *Symp.* 172 f.; cf. *Göbet, Prosop. Xen.* 63; *Arch. Zg.* 1858, 248°.

Socrates he accounted as lost. Thus Socrates was able to re-awaken among the Athenians, among whom personal intercourse between those of the same age, as well as between men and youths, was disturbed or desecrated either by party-interests or by impure sensuality, the beneficent power of pure friendship and unselfish devotion. Sober and calm himself, he excited the noblest enthusiasm, and by the simplest means obtained a far-reaching influence, such as before him no man had possessed at Athens; even before the Peace of Nicias, when Aristophanes made him the principal character in his *Clouds*, he was one of the best known and influential personages at Athens.

As Socrates gradually became a teacher of the people, so his mode and habits of life, too, formed themselves in indissoluble connexion with his philosophical development. For this was the most pre-eminent among his qualities: that his life and his teaching were formed in the same mould, and that none of his disciples could say whether he had been more deeply affected by the words or by the example of his master. And this was connected with the fact, that from the first, his philosophy directed itself to that which might make man better and more pleasing to Heaven, freer and happier at once. To this tendency he could not devote himself, without rising in his own consciousness to a continuously loftier clearness and purity, and without subjecting to reason the elements inborn in him of sensual impulses, of inertia and passion. Thus he became a man in whom the world found much to smile and mock at, but whom even those who could not stomach his wisdom were obliged to acknowledge as a morally blameless and just citizen. He was devoted with absolute loyalty to his native city, and, without desiring offices and dignities, he was from an inner impulse indefatigably active for her good, so that he, like the most hard-working man of business, throughout his long life knew no idle day, and only once (on a visit

<sup>His ways</sup>  
of life.

to the Isthmian games) quitted his native city. To whatever extent his scope exceeded the demands made by the state upon its citizens, he yet entertained a feeling the very reverse of contempt for civic duties. Of these he claimed from his disciples the most loyal fulfilment, and on this head he set them the example of a devotion which clearly proved this to be a matter of conscience with him, and not merely an outward service which it was necessary to absolve. He ventured his life in more than one battle; he fought in the thick of the fray; and even on the occasion of defeats, when no man is wont to think of aught beyond his personal safety, he exerted himself with self-sacrificing affection for others. Thus he saved Alcibiades, who lay wounded on the ground, at Potidæa, and afterwards resigned in his favor the prize of valor. After the battle of Delium (vol. iii. p. 174), when all around him were hurrying away in wild flight, he went his way fully equipped, with as proud and tranquil a step as if he had been in the streets of Athens, and saved his own life and that of his comrade, the brave Laches, whom his dignified calm put to shame. Even his adversaries were forced to allow that the armies of Athens would be invincible were they composed throughout of warriors of as imperturbable a spirit as that of Socrates. And yet he attached no value himself to this branch of his activity; he rather saw his real mission in holding up before his fellow-citizens as the soul of their moral efforts, a tranquillity and content which should be independent of any change of fortune. And, in order to point out the sole path leading to this goal, he preferred voluntary poverty to every kind of success in life, and, amidst a people eagerly pursuing profit and enjoyment, declared it to be the loftiest task to need as little as possible; inasmuch as thereby man approached most nearly to the bliss of the gods, which consisted in the absence of all wants. He desired merely to have enough, not to be disturbed in the pursuit of his calling by the

care for the daily necessities of life; and in order to reach this end he was not ashamed to accept from his friends what they sent into his house. Such offices of love were notably proffered to him by the noble Crito. This was a community of goods among friends, for which he made the fullest return on his side and with the means at his disposal. For he voluntarily gave up the best of what he possessed to every one whom he might serve thereby, and on principle scorned any compensation, although it had become quite customary at Athens for the teachers of wisdom to live by the proceeds of their science. Had not from ancient times singers, prophets, and physicians, sculptors and painters, been richly rewarded, without any dishonor arising thence to their noble art? Thus now, too, when a new and higher kind of culture belonged to the necessities of the adult youth of Athens, a reward might be claimed for its communication, as was actually done by the Sophists. Especially when they, like the teachers of the art of arms and of music, only in a higher sphere, compassed directly practical results, applicable to social life, these results, like any other communication of valuable gifts, admitted of being estimated in money; and it might be argued that a corresponding compensation on the part of those who reaped those results simply served to separate the merely inquisitive from those who were really anxious to learn.

And yet this view stood in a sharp contrast to that of Socrates. It was not his wish to communicate to his disciples any special accomplishments of which the advantages could be estimated in money, and of which it might be said at any particular point of time that now the object, as fixed by mutual agreement, had been attained; it was to change them into other and better men, to awaken in them a new life. For this purpose were required a free self-devotion and a relation of mutual affection, which would have been desecrated by

His unselfishness.

any secondary consideration. Therefore he looked upon the Sophists in the light of courtesans, who offer their love for sale to whoever will pay for it. Moreover, he took into account on this head the circumstance that the Sophists were strangers who paid the expenses of their journeys out of the gains of their profession, and who had no cordial feeling towards the Athenians as such. Now between fellow-citizens, so Socrates thought, the noblest and best of what one has to offer to the other ought never to be made the subject of a business transaction; for in their case no interest ought to be admitted on the one hand, beyond that of a pure fellow-feeling of love, and on the other, no compensation except the grateful devotion of a heart moved by the same affection.

For the rest, Socrates, with all his dislike of the pursuit of profit and pleasure, was anything but a morose eccentric, like Euripides; from this he was kept by his love of human kind. He was merry with the merry, and spoilt no festive banquet to which he had been bidden. In the friendly circle he sat as a man brave at his cups, and herein likewise offered an example to his friends, how the truly free can at one time suffer deprivation, and at another enjoy abundance, without at any time losing his full self-control. After a night of festivity his consciousness was as clear and serene as ever; he had after a rare fashion made his body an ever-ready servant of his mind; even physically he could do things impossible to others, and, as if protected by some magic charm, he passed unhurt through all the pestilences of Athens, without ever timidly keeping out of the way of danger. Fully assured of the inner mission which animated him, he allowed nothing to derange or to confound him. Hostile attacks and derision touched him not; nay, he was known to laugh most heartily of all the spectators, when that sinner Aristophanes exhibited him as a dreamer abstracted from the world and hanging in a hammock between heaven and

earth, and when the other comic poets made the public merry with his personal appearance. For the same reason, lastly he was inaccessible to all the offers made to him by foreign princes, who would have given much to attract the most remarkable man of the age to their courts. The Thessalian grandees in particular, Scopas at Crannon and Eurylochus at Larissa, emulated one another in their endeavors to secure him. But he was no more tempted by their gold than by that of Archelaus, the splendor of whose throne, obtained by guile and murder, failed to dazzle Socrates. He replied with the pride of a genuine Republican, that it ill befitted any man to accept benefits which he had no power of returning. For himself, he said, he wanted nothing; for at Athens, four measures of wheat-meal were to be purchased for an obol, and the best spring water flowed there gratuitously.\*

Socrates  
and the So-  
phists.

The relation of Socrates to the intellectual movement of his age is far more difficult to understand than his outward life. Thus it has come to pass that the same man, who was the most decided opponent of the Sophists, could himself be regarded as a genuine Sophist. This finds its explanation in the circumstance, that Sophistry as a whole was an expression of the movement which swayed the age, and that to this movement, in so far as it was justified and neces-

\* Socrates in three battles (Potidea, Delium, Amphipolis): Plat. *Apolog.* 28. The facts are confounded with one another, Athen. 216. The story of the preservation of Xenophon's life at Delium is a mistake (Str. 403; Diog. Laert. ii. 22), as Cobet has proved, *Mnemoseyne*, vii. 50 (Nov. Lect. 538). An authentic account of Delium is to be found in Plat. *Sympos.* 221, where the saving of the life of Laches is also ascribed to Socrates: δὲ καὶ ἀσφαλῶς ἀντὶ καὶ οὐδὲν καὶ ὁ ἦρως. Concerning Socrates' freedom from wants, see Xen. *Memor.* i. 6, 1f. As to offers from abroad: Diog. Laert. ii. 5, 9; Aristot. *Rhet.* ii. 23, p. 98, 30: ὕβρις τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι ἀμύνασθαι ὁμοίως εἰς παύσεως ὄντων καὶ κακῶν. As to the prices of provisions at Athens: Plut. *de transp.* 10; cf. Boeckh, *P. E. of A.* vol. i. p. 127 (Eng. Tr.): the χοῖνιξ was the average measure of daily food for one man; 4 χοῖνιξες of meal at 1 obol=1s. 2d. The prices had already doubled since the times of Solon.

sary, Socrates attached himself with full conviction. The ancient simplicity of Greek life was at an end, nor was it possible to return to the tranquil and easy acceptance of popular tradition, after the philosophical idea had once established its rights. The earlier philosophy, the philosophy of nature, had shaken the validity of the traditional views, without itself offering anything capable of helping man in his want of guidance; and the existing religion was not of a kind to be able to preserve a vigorous and sufficient life after the changes which had come over the general condition of the people's culture. The age accordingly needed another philosophy, a science which should be more practically useful for life, and enable every individual, since no general authority any longer existed, to take counsel with himself, and to acquire an independent judgment in all moral questions.

This requirement, which all men felt who were tolerably alive to their times, had been met by the Sophists; and the great skill which they displayed in this, their insight into the age, and their unflagging industry, explain their extraordinary influence upon their contemporaries.

In starting from the same requirement of the age, in demanding as decisively as possible from every individual that he should regulate all his affairs with knowledge and understanding, and at any and every moment act without dependence upon external authority with clear consciousness, Socrates undeniably took the same ground as the Sophists, who by a development of the arts of thought and speech sought to assure the personal independence of the individual. It followed, that in all doubtful cases every man is to himself the last and highest authority; and it was an absolutely inevitable conclusion which Protagoras drew in establishing the proposition, which we may regard as the very kernel of Sophistry; that "man is the measure of all things." This daring

any Hellene could perform for his country was to combat, by means of a deeper and more serious process of thought, that of the Sophists, which endangered the best possessions of the people, and to drive from the field this one-sided cultivation of the reason, which was altogether undesirous of attaining, by means of a studious research which laid bare the final causes of moral life, to any absolutely valid truth. This was what Socrates did; and for this reason the affinity between his standpoint and that of Sophistry is far outweighed by the contradiction between them.

Socrates was not blind to the truth underlying the saying of Protagoras; for man is in fact unable to determine his thoughts and his actions otherwise than according to his own judgment; it is in himself that he must possess the standard for Right and Truth. But this standard is not in the possession of any and every one, not in the possession of the individual man, such as Nature has created him, but only in that of the morally-formed, the good man. This preliminary assumption, together with all the consequences connected with it, the Sophists, following their one-sided practical tendency, had left aside. They indeed in many ways touched the domain of morality, but only in its single phenomena and outward forms; and even those among their ethical meditations which met with most recognition, as *e. g.* the allegory of Prodicus concerning Heracles at the cross-way between Virtue and Vice, remained throughout on the surface only. Socrates, on the other hand, recognised the absolute void of moral meaning in Sophistry; he constituted those questions, which the teachers of the philosophy of nature had wholly neglected and which the Sophists had shyly evaded or only playfully touched, the main questions around which his whole reflection moved, and their solution the real task of philosophy; and he thus gave to philosophy an essentially new tendency; he called it, as the ancients said, down from

The foundation of a popular system of ethics.



heaven to earth : *i. e.* instead of inquiries concerning the structure of the universe and the forces of nature he studied the laws of moral life, in order to attain to a knowledge of the true destiny of man, of the possessions for which it is his duty to struggle, and of the evils which it is his duty to avoid.

Notwithstanding the novelty of this tendency of philosophical reflection, it yet attached itself to ancient Hellenic tradition, and was in this respect also far more national than Sophistry, which started from arbitrary propositions of the Sophists' own invention. For it was impossible to solve the question, "Who is the good man, possessing in himself the standard for judging things?" otherwise than by means of a conscientious self-examination. Self-knowledge therefore was that which was contained in the first demand; and, so far from Socrates setting up this demand as a new one, it was a primitive principle of Hellenic religion. Pure hands and a pure heart were demanded by the gods in those who approached their threshold (vol. ii. p. 27); wherefore every man was bound to examine himself, before he offered up his gifts and prayed for salvation; this was the beginning, enjoined by Apollo, of all wisdom pleasing to the gods; and what Socrates asked stood already written in golden characters over the gate of the Delphic temple in the words: *Know thyself!*

Nor was this connexion by any means a mere outward form on the part of Socrates, by which he sought to introduce and recommend himself—rather, in establishing it, he was in full and solemn earnest. For since there had, with continually growing force, arisen over the manifold forms of the Greek Olympus the idea of a world-ruling Reason, and over the gods the idea of the Deity, Socrates in this point too followed Heraclitus and Anaxagoras; but he remained nearer to the popular faith than they, by conceiving of the Deity not in a cosmical energy, but pre-

eminently in relation to man ; he held fast the personal element, and was able with a delicate tact, such as only a deeply religious mind can possess, to lead the mind from the gods, in whom the people believed, to the Deity, which Reason demands. Such a transition was facilitated for him above all by the Apolline religion, that highest stage in the religious consciousness of the Hellenes ; in it there were already given the principles of a system of moral teaching capable of development. For this reason he in general adhered with simple faith to the ancestral religion, and recognized in it a wholesome discipline for man, and a sacred bond which held together all the members of the nation ; while, like the ancient Wise Men of the people, he stood in a peculiarly close relation towards the Delphic god, and towards his oracle, the primitive centre of national religion.

Development of the Socratic system of ethica. Already Heraclitus had summed up the whole meaning of his philosophical thinking in the declaration : " I sought myself." Socrates, however, was the first to make the act of self-examination the starting-point of his entire philosophy ; and, sterile as the injunction of Apollo may appear as a principle of philosophical doctrine, inasmuch as, instead of supplying anything, it only makes a demand, yet it was of the highest importance for the whole teaching of Socrates, that its beginning was a moral demand. Hereby all preliminary assumptions of any other kind were at once cut off ; and thought was conducted, out of the mixed variety of diverse objects upon which the philosophically educated were wont with predilection to engage, to one main object, which directly affected every human being ; the mind was forced to retreat out of a confusing variety upon a single central point, to renounce those things concerning which nothing is possible but an opinion, and to confine itself to that which is accessible to a real knowledge. It was for this reason that Socrates con-

fronted the vainglorious pretensions of the Sophists to knowing many things, by his confession that he knew nothing. For he recognized no acquisitions of knowledge gained from without, but descended into the depths of his own consciousness, in order there to seek for truth, of irrefragable certainty. He began with the knowing nothing, and attached so much importance to this, that he affirmed himself to be considered by the Delphic god wiser than others for no reason but this: that he did not imagine that he knew what he did not know.

This clear and resolute rejection of all merely apparent knowledge was the first act of his philosophy: by it he purified the ground, and removed the phantoms of a self-imagined wisdom conceitedly moving in a circle of vague possibilities. But this knowing nothing must be only the first step. The impulse towards knowledge is a claim which must be satisfied, which man cannot escape without becoming false to himself; and that which it is a need of the soul to know, if it is to act with consciousness according to its nature, it must also be possible to know. Proceeding by this path, Socrates established the conception of true knowledge. For if, he says, we thereby understand a perfect appropriation and comprehension, we can only succeed in this in the case of that which has an internal affinity with ourselves, nay which is to such a degree *ours*, that the causes of it lie in ourselves, so that we can produce it out of ourselves; everything else will always remain to us something foreign and enigmatical. Now, in man's own consciousness certain laws reveal themselves to man, which admit of no doubt; there, in proportion as he more seriously collects his thoughts, he learns, by watching himself, what is suited to his nature; he experiences in himself the morally good; he finds out in himself the essence of justice, valor, prudence, gratitude; and he progressively attains to a continuously increasing certainty in his consciousness and to assured judg-

ments. For he who realizes the morally good in himself, must assent to it wherever it meets him, and recognize it as that which corresponds to the nature of man, as that which is true and normal; just as the opposite actually attests itself as that which is contrary to nature, untrue, absurd and pernicious.

Here, then, man finds laws of absolute validity and by the same path, in the progress of internal experience, he attains to a belief in the gods. For the certainty of their existence, which man can no more escape than the recognition of the moral laws aforesaid,—that certainty which shows itself the more vigorously, the less corrupted and the more rational a people is,—would be something utterly unintelligible, were it not implanted in human nature as a gift of the gods, who wish therein to attest themselves to the race of mortals. Thus Socrates from his first standpoint of knowing nothing attained to a definition of true knowledge and of that which is contained therein, demonstrated the possibility of universally valid judgments, and laid bare in the human consciousness the foundations of a certain knowledge (*Erkenntnis*) irremovably fixed.

But a knowledge of this kind can be no dead knowledge; for as it is based upon a kind of thought, which presumes a serious self-inquiry and a renunciation of the sensual, it acts immediately, in the very process of its acquisition, upon the entire man. It is the light of truth itself, which, opening upon the soul, dissipates all the delusions amidst which the thoughtless man leads his life from day to day. This knowledge becomes an impelling force in man, which leaves him no peace, till he has by action of his own expressed that which he has come perfectly to know. Accordingly, after he has arrived at a true and perfect knowledge of the essential nature of justice, valor, continence and piety, he must also desire to be just, valorous, continent and pious. No knowledge is genuine

which fails to attract the will to follow it; and virtue, which consists in the exercise of the moral will, is accordingly of its essence nothing but a reasonable knowledge.

Thus directly upon the newly-gained foundation of perfect knowledge, the Socratic doctrine of virtue builds itself up. And, inasmuch as the consciousness of a God, as well as the belief in the immortality and responsibility of the human soul, can now be equally demonstrated as facts of the human consciousness, the principles of knowledge, will, and belief acquire a firm cohesion, such as no other before Socrates had yet demonstrated. That which hinders thought is nothing else than that which cripples the will; these are the lower impulses of human nature. In proportion, therefore, as these are overcome, the harmony of the inner life increases, and with it the calm and the tranquillity in man; and hereby he succeeds in hearing directly the voice of the Deity which attests itself to man in his inner nature, when it is not rendered inaudible by the external restlessness of life. Of such a divine voice, ever accompanying him and warning him against every erroneous step, Socrates was conscious; he called it his *Dæmonion*: in it he felt the Presence of the Deity, which asserted itself as an authority, wherever his own reflection lacked reasons capable of determining a decision.

Although Socrates was far from intending to erect a system of doctrine artistically correct, yet he with unerring hand defined the domain of that which science can come to know perfectly, and which is truly worthy to be known; within the limits of that which man must know, in order to fulfil his destiny, he illustrated all the main points, and thus founded a system of ethics, which was inconceivable, until the inner connection had been demonstrated between Thought and Will, between the True and the Good.

Ethics and  
dialectics.  
The Socratic  
method.

The method too of philosophizing owes an essential advance in its development to Socrates. For, in view of his purpose of leading the soul to a certain goal, he could not be otherwise than specially anxious to apply a severe conduct of thought in lieu of the disputation to and fro of the Sophists; for only by means of a connection, which could not be attacked and destroyed, being established between the ideas developed by him, was it possible irrefragably to establish the truths of morality. Starting from simple facts, he drew from what was readily conceded to him a second and a third fact as consequences to which it was impossible to deny the same assent; and thus was formed a *catena* of propositions, the concluding link of which, however surprising it might seem on being originally presented, was yet already implied in the first. This method of carrying on thought, the *inductive* method, Socrates was the first among the Greeks consciously to develop; and he employed it with triumphant force, partly to demonstrate the looseness of customary conceptions, and partly to illustrate the mighty connexion in the domain of the True, and to strengthen in his friends the faith in the possibility of a moral certainty. In the course of this process, all the ideas which come under consideration in ethical inquiries were for the first time sharply and clearly systematized, defined as against one another, and established with their distinctive characteristics. Thus Socrates became the founder of a scientific determination of ideas, *i. e.* of *Definition*.

The development of these dialectical and logical methods marks an extremely important process in the intellectual culture of the nation. For it was precisely in a severe and consecutive mode of thought, more than in other domains, that the Greeks had remained backward; and this defect had only apparently been remedied by the Sophists, when they communicated their dogmas in

a finished and complete form, without claiming any personal exertion of thinking power on the part of their audiences. But it was not admiring audiences, it was friends taking part in his inquiries, that Socrates desired; and thus his system of teaching acquired a popular freshness and excited a keen interest, such as could never accompany ambitious lecturers. Every Socratic dialogue was a little drama, in its beginnings frequently bald and trivial; but whosoever gave himself up to its progress, soon traced the power of a mind of original force, which seized and led him with so assured a strength, that he was unable to withdraw. And the final result was one which had been found in common; for Socrates, it must be remembered, desired to put nothing *into* men, he had no desire of talking them over with Sophistic skill into the acceptance of particular dogmas; what he wished, was to arouse in them the slumbering impulse of their own powers of thought, and merely to assist them in bringing to the light of day the ideas existing in them, and to make them conscious of such truths as they unconsciously bore within their minds. For this reason he termed his art of treating the mind, the *Mæeutic* art, *i. e.* midwifery.

Thus this Athenian, who rejected the name of teacher, because he desired nothing more than to offer service and assistance to others, and to be one who was a searcher together with his friends, was, notwithstanding, a chosen teacher of his age and of all the centuries ensuing,—a wise man who presented in himself the type of one truly free, and happy in unflagging inquiry and in self-denying love of his kind;—a philosopher who destroyed the heresies of a vainglorious sham-knowledge, and who, in an age denying any possibility of a reconciliation between conflicting opinions, founded a domain of Truth beyond all doubt;—and a patriot indefatigable in stimulating his fellow-citizens to a moral renovation, and in thereby gradually curing the diseases of civil society. If therefore

Science was to perform the service of which Art was incapable, if Philosophy was to recover what Sophistry had spoilt: this could only be accomplished in the way pointed out by Socrates. He offered a saving hand to his fellow-citizens: how was that hand taken?

The  
position of  
Socrates  
among the  
Athenians.  
His  
enemies and  
adversaries.

The Athenians disliked men who wished to be different from every one else, particularly when these eccentrics, instead of quietly pursuing their own path and withdrawing from the world, like Timon (vol. iii. p. 366), forced themselves among their neighbors and assumed towards them the attitude of pedagogues, as Socrates did. For what could be more annoying to an Athenian of repute, than to find himself, on his way to the council-meeting or the law-court, unexpectedly involved in a conversation, intended to confuse him, to shake his comfortable self-assurance, and to end by making him ridiculous? In any other city such conversations would have been altogether hard to manage; but at Athens the love of talk was so great, that many allowed themselves to be caught, and that gradually the number became very large of those who had been the victims of this inconvenient questioner, and who carried about with them the remembrance of a humiliation inflicted on them by him. And most of all was he hated by those who had allowed themselves to be touched and moved to tears of a bitter recognition of their own selves by his words, but who had afterwards sunk back into their former ways, and were now ashamed of their hours of weakness. Thus Socrates had daily to experience that the testing of men was the most ungrateful of tasks which could be pursued at Athens; nor could he without the sacred resolution of an absolutely unselfish devotion to his mission have without ceasing obeyed the divine voice, which every morning anew bade him go forth among men.



But that there were also more general and deep-seated grounds for the sense of annoyance manifested by the Attic public, is most clearly proved by the attacks of the comic stage. "To me too," it is said in a comedy by Eupolis, "this Socrates is offensive, this beggarly talker, who has considered everything with hair-splitting ingenuity; the only matter which he has left unconsidered is the question how he will get a dinner to-day." Far more serious were the attacks of Aristophanes. His standpoint, as well as that of Eupolis and Cratinus, was the ancient Attic view of life; he regarded the teachers of philosophy, round whom the young men gathered, as the ruin of the state; and although he could not possibly mistake the difference between Socrates and the Sophists, although moreover he by no means belonged to the personal enemies of Socrates, with whom he rather seems to have enjoyed a certain degree of intimacy, yet he thought it both his right and his duty as a poet and a patriot, to combat in Socrates the Sophist, nay the most dangerous of Sophists. The Athenian of the old school hated these conversations extending through whole hours of the broad daylight, during which the young men were kept away from the *palæstræ*, these painful discussions of topics of morality and politics, as to which it behoved every loyal citizen to have made up his mind once for all. If everything was submitted to examination, everything was also exposed to rejection; and what was to become of the city, if only that was to be allowed as valid which found gracious acceptance at the hands of this or that professor of talk? If everything had to be learnt, if everything was to be acquired by reflection, then there was an end of true civic virtue, which ought to be a thing inborn in a citizen and secured by his training as such. In these days all action and capability of action was being dissolved into an idle knowledge; the one-sided cultivation of the intellect was loosening the sinews of men, and making them

indifferent to their country and religion. From this standpoint the poet rejects all such culture of youth as is founded upon the testing of the mind and leading it to perfect knowledge, and lauds those young Athenians who do not care for wasting their time by sitting and talking with Socrates.\*

The priestly party again was adverse to Socrates, although the highest authority in religious matters which existed in Hellas and had at all events not been superseded by any other, had declared in his favor,—at the suggestion of Chærephon, who from his youth up was attached with devoted affection to his teacher. His was an enthusiastic nature; and he desired nothing so ardently, as that the beneficent influence which he had experienced in his own soul might be shared by the largest possible number of his fellow-citizens. For this reason he was anxious for an outward recognition of the merits of his so frequently misjudged friend; and he is said to have brought home from Delphi the oracle which declared Socrates to be the wisest of all men. Now, although this oracle was incapable of giving a loftier assurance of his mission to the philosopher himself, although it could not even remove the antipathy of the public, yet it might be expected that it would disarm the calumny representing Socrates as a teacher of dangerous heresies; and in this sense he could not but personally welcome the Delphic declaration. For it must be remembered that he continued to regard the oracle as the reverend centre of the nation, as the symbol of a religious communion among the Hellenes; and in disallowing all presumptuous meditation on the right way of venerating the gods, he entirely followed the

\* Eupolis, ll. 553: *μισῶ τὸν Σωκράτην τὸν πτωχὸν ἰδολόσχον*; *Ar. Ran.* 1491. Socrates defends himself against the attacks in the *Clouds* of Aristophanes; but there is no trace of any bitterness against the latter, either in himself or in any of his disciples. As to the *ψυχαγωγία* and the not quite satisfactory translation, "guidance of the soul" (*Seelenleitung*), cf. *Eheciæ Mus.* xviii. 473.

precedent of the Delphic oracle, which was in the habit of settling questions of this kind by the answer, that it was according to the usage of their fathers that men should venerate the gods. At Delphi, on the other hand, there could be no question as to the importance of one who was leading the revolted world back to reverence for things holy, and who, while his contemporaries were derisively despising the obsolete ways of the past and running after the *ignes fatui* of the wisdom of the day, held up before their eyes the primitive sayings of the temples, a serious consideration of which he declared to be sufficient to reveal the treasure of immortal truth contained in them. If it was confessedly impossible to put an end to the prevailing desire for independent inquiry, then the priests could not but acknowledge that this was the only way by which the old religion could be saved.

Even, however, the recognition by Delphi was unable to protect Socrates against the suspicion of heresy. The fanaticism of the priestly party increased in inverse ratio to its prospects of real success; it regarded any philosophical discussion of religious truths as a desecration, and placed Socrates on the same level as Diagoras. Finally, the democrats, who after the restoration of the constitution were the ruling party, hated philosophy, because out of its school had issued a large proportion of the oligarchs; not only Critias and Theramenes, but also Pythodorus, the archon of the days of anarchy (p. 51), Aristoteles, one of the Four Hundred and of the Thirty, Charmides (vol. iii. p. 578) and others, were known as men of philosophical culture. Philosophy and the tendency towards political reaction accordingly seemed to be necessarily connected with one another. In a word, Socrates found opposition everywhere; some deemed him too conservative, and others too liberal; he had against him both the Sophists and the enemies of the Sophists, both rigid orthodoxy and infidelity; both the patriots of

the old school and the representatives of the renovated democracy.\*

Notwithstanding all this hostile feeling the personal security of Socrates was not endangered, because he pursued his path as a blameless man, and because it was a matter of conscience with him to avoid every offence against the law. But after the restoration of the constitution a variety of circumstances continued to imperil his position at Athens.

Political lawsuits. Already before the complete overthrow of the Thirty, a multiplicity of lawsuits had been set in motion against the members and adherents of the oligarchy,—(just as had been the case after the fall of the Four Hundred). The best known of these suits was that of Lysias against Eratosthenes, who had remained behind at Athens with Phidon (p. 51). In itself no charge could have been more just, for nobody had suffered more severely than the son of Cephalus; he had been deprived of his inheritance without a shadow of reason; his brother Polemarchus had been illegally executed; and he had himself only with difficulty escaped death. The sacred duty of avenging the blood of his kin was the motive which first brought him into court as the accuser of the author of this crime. But his appearance in this character was at the same time the first step towards a pitiless persecution of those who during the Terror had sinned against the people, and a call to vengeance in the name of the misused resident aliens under the protection of Athens, and of all the many citizens who had suffered the heaviest of wrongs. If this summons found willing listeners and followers, the whole city would inevitably be involved anew in terrible struggles.

Accordingly after this suit had come to an end, the reconciliation among the parties, which had hitherto been

\* As to Pythodorus and Aristoteles, cf. note to p. 23. Σαρπίδης ἰ Γλαύκωνος: Xen. *Hellen.* II. 4, 19.

only outwardly accomplished, was renewed amid solemn oaths; the law of amnesty (p. 46) was to prevent all similar proceedings in the courts. It became the basis of the new political order of things; the members of the Council and the judges were every year sworn to observe it; and under the beneficent influence of Thrasybulus and in particular of Archinus (to whom, as Demosthenes said, next to the gods the city was most indebted for its salvation), peace and concord were successfully re-established. And the salutary policy of these patriots was supported by the general weariness of men's minds, by the consideration taken for Sparta, and by the just recognition of the fact, that tranquillity was above all other things necessary for the city.

Soon, however, matters changed. Hostile passions stirred once more; the families which had lost members felt the old wounds as sorely as ever, and soon the confraternity of the Sycophants were at work again, in order to take full advantage of the circumstances of the times, which were so uncommonly favorable for their trade. And they found the most suitable opportunity in the public examination (*Dokimasia*), to which according to the constitution all those were subjected who had been elected by lot or otherwise to a public office. Here it was easy to re-open the old account of wrongs, without violating the amnesty in terms; and whosoever, after giving a lively description of the oligarchic intrigues, put the question whether men who had taken part in them were really worthy of filling offices of public trust, might rely upon applause, and cheaply acquire the glory due to a friend of the people. Nor were these invectives confined to those who had actually borne a share in the deeds of the Tyrants, but a second class of citizens was proclaimed as suspect in the matter of their political sentiments, in which all those were included who had during the Terror remained undisturbed and free from annoyance at Athens.

Renewed  
agitations  
and persecu-  
tions at  
Athens.

Lysias'  
warning.

On the occasion of an objection being raised on grounds such as these to the confirmation of an election, Lysias came forward as speaker for the defence; and his words are the living expression of the views entertained in this period of agitation by the Moderates. For he adjures the Athenians, not once more to provoke division by vengefully casting suspicion upon citizens, and thus to tear asunder the community which had only just been reunited. "No man," he says, "is wont to be an oligarch or democrat by nature; but as a rule every one supports that form of constitution which best accords with his interests; it will therefore depend upon the conduct of the civic community, whether a large proportion will be satisfied with the existing order of things. Under the old democracy a great number existed who were guilty of peculation, who took bribes, who alienated the allies of Athens. Had the Thirty chastised such men as these, they would have deserved praise; but you were justly wroth with them, because they made the whole community pay for the sins of some of its members. Beware lest you are yourselves guilty of the same error! Consider moreover what it was that proved the ruin of your enemies! For so long as you heard that all those in the city were unanimous, you had but a slender hope of returning home; but when you learnt that the majority of the citizens were excluded from the public offices, while the Three Thousand were in revolt and the Thirty in discord, the event came to pass for which you had prayed to the gods; for you very well knew that you would compass your object rather by the wickedness of the Thirty than by the valor of the refugees. From this you ought to take an example, so as to regard those as the true friends of the people who adhere to the oaths which they have sworn: for there is nothing more offensive to the enemies of the city than to see you in concord among yourselves; and the oli

“garchs who at the present moment are away from the  
 “city desire nothing more strongly than that as many as  
 “possible of the citizens may suffer in their reputations  
 “and be deprived of their honor, because they hope to  
 “find in those whom you have damaged allies for them-  
 “selves; they wish nothing more ardently than that the  
 “trade of the Sycophants may flourish at its full height  
 “among you, because in the vileness of these men they  
 “see their own opportunity. Wherefore reflect, whether  
 “the men who at the full risk of their own lives have re-  
 “stored your freedom, and who now recommend internal  
 “peace to you as the bulwark of the constitution, have  
 “not a better claim upon your confidence than those who  
 “owed their return from exile to others, and who now  
 “come forward as calumniating accusers and recommence  
 “the same work which has twice already led to the estab-  
 “lishment of despotism.” \*

But, clearly and impressively as the policy of Archinus and men of his way of thinking, which alone could benefit the city, was advocated by the most talented of champions, a dark time of hostile insinuation and mutual recrimination ensued, in which those passions found vent which had remained unsatisfied immediately after the restoration of the constitution. Fellows of the vilest kind, only entitled to be tolerated in the city in consequence of the decree of Patroclides (vol. iii. p. 564), under cover of the amnesty, promoted the most shameless charges, and hired themselves out for money to annoy other citizens in the enjoyment of this very amnesty; among these notably Cephisius, a man who had already once incurred the loss

The  
Sycophants at  
work again.

Cephisius.

\* *Lysias*, xxv., defence against an indictment, in which “overthrow of the constitution” (the *mot d'ordre* of the democracy) played the chief part; whence the inaccurate designation of the Oration as “*ἔξιμου κατὰ λίσσεως ἀπολογία* :” it was spoken immediately after the restoration of the constitution (cf. Frohberger, *Reden des Lysias*, I. 177), and constitutes one of the most valuable documents for the history of the period. See Rauchenstein, *Lysias* (1864), p. 99.

of all civic honors in consequence of misappropriation of public moneys.

Persecution of the Aristocrats. These attacks were, as before, principally directed against the members of ancient civic families, and thus Andocides was by them again harassed, whose life, more clearly than that of any of his contemporaries, mirrors the restlessness of that age and of the party-doings at Athens. Once upon a time he had entered public life with the most brilliant prospects, being distinguished by birth, wealth, and talent, among the young nobility; then, becoming involved in the persecution concerning the mutilation of the Hermæ (vol. iii. p. 349), he had betrayed his associates, and, spurned by both parties, had fled the country and lost his paternal house (which it was his fate to see occupied by the demagogue Cleophon), had long moved about in foreign parts as a merchant, and had finally, in the year of Euclides, returned to his native city. Even now, however, he was not left in peace. In the autumn of B. C. 399 (Ol. xcv. 1) Cephisius, at the instigation of Callias, preferred an indictment against him; charging him as having, though still under the ban of the priests notwithstanding, impiously taken part in the celebration of the Mysteries at Eleusis. The old tales were warmed up again which sixteen years ago had agitated Athens; laws already abolished were drawn forth once more; laws and ordinances were jumbled together; an unwritten code was asserted against the written; in short, there was a return of all the abuses which it was thought had been removed for ever.\*

Measures against the Knights.

Among the upper circles in the city, the Knights were especially grudging the benefits of the amnesty; and if in this instance again

\* Andocides was born *circ.* Ol. lxxxiv. 3 (B. C. 442); and had passed the age of forty when he made his speech about the Mysteries (his birth is erroneously dated Ol. lxxviii. 1; B. C. 468). Cf. Kirchhoff in *Hermes*, i. 7, 14.



an entire class of citizens were attacked, there was in so far a certain excuse for it, that the Knights had in reality served the interests of the Tyrannis like a close corporation, and had abused the distinguished position, bestowed upon them by the community, for its disadvantage. Accordingly, the young men belonging to this order were not only in general regarded with suspicion, and excluded from the public offices, but soon after the restoration of the constitution a decree was passed, that all those who could be proved to have served under the Thirty should refund to the state the equipment-money provided by the public purse for those who entered the cavalry service; in other words, they were classed among those who illegally had in their hands public property, which was demanded back by the officers termed *Syndici* (p. 68). Nor was this deemed enough. For when in Ol. xciv. 1, (B. C. 399) the Lacedæmonians began the Persian war, and demanded for service in it a contingent of three hundred horsemen from Athens, these were taken from the number of those who had served under the Tyrannis. This was a measure of force, thoroughly opposed to the spirit of the amnesty; but it was thought a clear gain for the commonwealth, if it were ridded of these men, and it was secretly wished that they might never return to their native city, to whose misfortunes they had unquestionably contributed.\*

These hostilities are a palpable sign of the exceeding growth of bitterness and irritation which had made its appearance among the citizens of Athens soon after the amnesty; and this state of feeling in the end also reacted upon the one man who was most innocent of all the sufferings of the state. Nor was it a single or recent offence which Socrates was said to have committed; but the ill-will which had accumulated during a long period of

\* Xen. *Hellen.* iii. 1, 4 (νομίζοντες κέρδος τῷ δήμῳ, εἰ ἀποδημοῖεν καὶ ἀναπέλουντο). Repayment of the *κατάστασις* (Lys. xvi. 6): cf. Sauppe, *Philol.* xv. 60.

years came to an outbreak now that denunciation was again the order of the day, and that all those were pried on who had stood in any relations of community of sentiments, or of intercourse, with the oligarchs.

The prosecution of Socrates.

The chief accuser was Meletus, probably the same man who had a few months previously supported Cephisius against Andocides; a young and as yet unknown person, by profession a poet, and not more fortunate as such than his father and namesake, with whom we are probably justified in identifying the tragic writer derided by Aristophanes (p. 91). With him were joined Lyco and Anytus, the former a professed rhetorician, the latter, the well-known statesman and one of the liberators of Athens. Doubtless in the present matter, too, Anytus was the chief mover, although he might have his reasons for leaving Meletus to play the first part. The former had repeatedly come into personal contact with Socrates, who had in particular taken him to task with reference to the education of his son. The son of Anytus was intended to continue the tanning business, in order to repair the fortunes of the family, which had been shattered by the period of exile. Thus all superior culture was neglected in his case, and, to the exceeding annoyance of Anytus, his son proved so entirely unsatisfactory as to confirm the warnings of Socrates. Anytus also thought it his duty, as a zealous democrat, to come forward against Socrates as the champion of the interests of the state. But in order that the result should be successful, it was necessary to transfer the entire suit from the domain of civil offences, which were rather judged according to the strict letter of the law, to another domain, where it was possible to move with greater freedom;—and this was that of religious conviction and of moral conduct. Accordingly the indictment charged defection from the ancestral religion, the introduction of new gods, and the corruption of youth. Special prominence being given to

the first of these points, the suit came before the Archon-King (vol. i. p. 329), whose function it was to hear all suits concerning religious law, and to conduct the proceedings preparatory to the sentence of a jury.

Nor was it difficult to find an apparent foundation for every one of the above three charges. The first and second, closely connected with one another, were based upon the assertion that in his *Dæmonion* Socrates had cunningly invented a new deity; and with regard to the third, the circumstances of the times furnished the most welcome opportunity for attacking Socrates as the teacher of Critias, who was declared to have learnt from him his accursed political principles. Moreover, Socrates' satirical remarks concerning the clever Athenians, each of whom thought himself capable of governing the state, and concerning the public officers who were called to the head of affairs, according as the beans were drawn by lot, were sufficiently well known, to serve for the purpose of throwing suspicion upon his sentiments with regard to the democracy.\*

Meletus had demanded the sentence of death; but it is certain, that the actual issue of the suit is only to be ascribed to the behaviour of the accused: For the entire peculiarity of the man, which had at all times annoyed the multitude, made itself manifest in full measure in the course of this suit; and as the Attic popular tribunals were constituted, such currents of feeling were of decisive moment.

Socrates regarded the whole matter with the utmost tranquillity, as if it had nothing <sup>His con-</sup>demnation. to do with his own fate; nay, if any one else had been the object of the attack in his place, he would doubtless have exerted himself far otherwise, in order, so far as lay

\* As to the accusers of Socrates, see Zeller, ii. 1, 131. According to Cobet, *Mnemoseus*, vii. 250, it was the Sophist Polycrates who first charged Socrates with having been the teacher of Critias and Alcibiades.

in his power, to prevent an unjust judicial sentence. The proud calm of the accused, the resoluteness with which he declined to claim the grace of the judges according to the usage of the Athenian courts, or to promise to change his way of life, in so far as it gave offence, appeared to corroborate the charge, that he actually contemned the institutions of the city, and was accordingly a bad citizen. His whole defence he merely conducted, in order to satisfy the law, and rejected all offers of assistance on the part of others. Thus his friends were unable to be of any real use to him; and the wrath of the multitude was not to be appeased by mere words. The feeling of the city was against him; and the only circumstance which seems strange is, that of the more than 550 jurymen nearly half allowed themselves to be induced neither by the prevailing sentiment, nor by the powerful Anytus, to abandon their conviction; the accused was found guilty by a majority of only five or six votes.\*

The sentence could not be immediately carried into execution, because the Attic festive ship had sailed for Delos, and until its return the city according to ancestral usage had to remain pure and unpolluted.† This circumstance was the cause of a delay of thirty days, during which Socrates was able to converse with his friends in his prison, and to prove by his rejection of all attempts to liberate him, as well as by his absolutely serene tranquillity of soul, how well he had weighed his whole course of conduct, and how he never for a single moment repented what had passed. Up to his last breath he remained loyal to the laws of his native city, and indefati-

Death of  
Socrates.

Ol. xcv. 1. (a.  
c. 399).

May.

\* Plat. *Apolog.* 36<sup>a</sup> (where *πραΐκοντα* is a wrong reading). Cf. Lehrs, *Neue Jahrbücher für Philol.* 1859, p. 561. The passage in Diogenes Laert. ii. f. 41, is obscure; cf. Zeller, p. 135.

† As to the *Theoria* to Delos, see Mommsen, *Heortologie*, p. 402. It was an ancient regulation of Hellenic criminal law: *μη ἀνοκτινύειν ἐν ἑστρίῃ*; Xen. *Hellen.* iv. 4, 2.

gably active in speech and in intercourse for the good of those dear to him. It was he, the man sentenced to death, who consoled those around him; who, gently stroking the cheek of Apollodorus, wet with tears for his master's unjust doom, asked him, whether then he would prefer to see him die guilty; who in the end gave the last commission to his friends, bidding them sacrifice a cock to Asclepius, i. e. offer up the tribute of thanksgiving for the healthful recovery which he perceived in death. For himself, he had a pledge in the faithfulness of his friends of the assurance that he had not lived in vain; nor could the rest of his fellow-citizens long fail to recognize that he had died innocent. There is no reason to doubt that the Athenians were soon visited by a painful penitence; they are said to have shed bitter tears in the theatre, when, on the occasion of the performance of the *Palamedes* of Euripides, the following words reached their ears and consciences: "Ye Danai have slain the truly wise and innocent nightingale of the Muses, the best of the Hellenes."

Thus died Socrates, at the age of seventy, in the month of Thargelion (May) of Ol. The causes of the sentence. xc. 1 (B. C. 399); as a victim of the movement which, repressed from time to time, ever again re-asserted itself at Athens, in order to take vengeance upon those circles of the community which were hostile to the people and the constitution. It had been observed, that it was precisely out of the upper classes of society that many had attached themselves to Socrates; it was known, that relations existed between him and Critias, Alcibiades, Thramenes, Charmides, Charicles and Xenophon. Was it therefore astonishing, if many gave themselves up to the belief that intercourse with him encouraged the development of sentiments adverse to the constitution? Did not Critias affirm, just as Socrates affirmed, that governing was not every man's business, but an art which required

to be learnt?—but then such was also the opinion of Pericles. Most assuredly it was a cruel wrong, to make Socrates responsible for the criminal misdeeds of those who had transitorily been in intercourse with him; he declared decisively enough the breach between him and his degenerate scholars, he more than once risked his life against the oligarchs, he openly inveighed against their system of government, and refused all participation in illegal proceedings. For this reason the oligarchs too hated him, and endeavored to close his lips by prohibiting freedom of instruction. And his doctrine, that every official business, and above all that of government, ought to be founded upon intelligence, could, if rightly understood, only serve to raise anew and strengthen the democratic constitution; while the fact that the closest intimacy with Socrates was not necessarily productive of reactionary opinions, is probably most clearly shown by the example of Chærephon, who of all his disciples was most absolutely devoted to his master, and at the same time one of the most zealous adherents of the democracy.

Equally unjustified was the hostility of the priestly party, which, lurking in the dark, only made its appearance as a power at Athens on isolated occasions,—a party which suspected freethinking and heresy wherever there was intellectual movement. From its standpoint this party would and could as little acknowledge the religiosity of Socrates, as the statesmen his civic virtue. And yet no offence against the ordinances of the state could be proved against him; he obeyed them in word and in deed to the day of his death, and kept the oath, sworn by Attic youths on the occasion of their admission into the civic community, more conscientiously than any one of his foes. For these were the terms of the oath in question: “I will not dishonor the arms now entrusted to me; I will fight for the sanctuaries and the common weal of my native land; I will subject myself to the appointed

“judges and be obedient to the existing laws; and should any one abolish the laws, I will not permit it; and the gods and the holy things of my native city I will hold in honor;”—and was not this venerable vow sacredly kept point for point by Socrates with a more than common fidelity, which he attested by self-sacrificing devotion?\*

The accusers and judges were therefore not justified as against Socrates. He suffered for crimes of which he was innocent, being condemned by some from motives of malice, by the rest in sheer blindness and stupidity. He became the victim of a policy which had for its object the restoration of the Athens of old, without clearly realizing the means and the end. No advantage could accrue to the state from his condemnation; but by it the Athenians rendered a real service to him whom they condemned. For they furnished him with an opportunity for setting the seal upon his teaching by a free obedience towards the laws, and by a heroic death. He had accomplished his task, and for the further advance of the work which he had begun there could be no more effective stimulant than his martyrdom.

In the domain of art nothing new was to be gained capable of giving to the civic community of Athens the moral anchorage which it needed; the case stood otherwise with philosophy. In the latter no final stage had been reached, and the most important points still remained absolutely untouched. Socrates here only made the beginning, of clearly and distinctly setting before the mind those tasks of thought which were of the greatest moment to each individual. The habit of virtue which had once united the citizens and preserved the state, no longer existed: but this rule, unless the commonwealth were to fall to ruin, it was necessary to recover; nor could this be effected in any other way than by putting free conviction

\* Socrates as the champion of Attic *isopygia* as against the oligarchs: Scheibe, *u. s.* p. 76. For the civic oath, see Pollux, viii. 105.

in the place of the external authority of usage, and converting unconscious morality into one conscious of its causes. Against the false subjectivity of the Sophists there existed no other resource than that higher subjectivity which Socrates asserted—the subjectivity based upon serious self-examination, whereby alone could be obtained a valid standard for the gifts of the mind. Herein was pointed out the path for coming to the rescue of the state without breaking with the past, for founding a higher morality without which peace and tranquillity remained unattainable to both the state and the individual, and for the training up a happier generation. But the civic society of the age would not hear of any such renovation, and answered his offer of salvation by the hemlock-cup.



## CHAPTER III.

### SPARTA AND PERSIA.

WHILE Athens was entirely occupied with herself, Sparta stood at the head of the Hellenic world; she was the only state possessing both the will and the power to regulate the condition of the remaining states, and the only representative of Greece as against foreign Powers. Accordingly, upon the policy of Sparta likewise depended the further course of Greek affairs; and this becomes manifest in the first instance from the position which was assumed towards the man to whom Sparta owed her dominion in Greece.

It was soon found out, that this dominion was merely an apparent one; for the oligarchical governments in the several towns paid little regard to the authorities of the city: their eyes were turned to Lysander alone. Whosoever was hostile to him, was a fugitive; whosoever was in command, was a creature of his; and the states where his creatures held sway were dependent upon his will.

The longer that Greece had been a scene of general confusion, where opposite tendencies had combated one another in a perpetual oscillation, the more powerful was the effect now exercised by the phenomenon of a man, in whom a single will of a sudden asserted its absolute sway throughout all Hellas. This phenomenon dazzled men, so that even those who were not immediately dependent upon him, did homage to this man of might. Nor was this homage confined to the traditional marks of honor, to golden circlets and such-like gifts; but it now for the first

time came to pass, that divine honors were transferred to a mortal. At Samos, which had held out against Lysander longer than Athens itself, the new government was not ashamed to transform the primitive festival of Here in such a fashion as to address it to the person of Lysander. Altars were erected to him, sacrifices lit in his honor, and hymns composed to the new Hero.

Lysander himself rejected no form of flattery; it was his intention to be regarded as a being of a higher order. Like Pausanias of old (vol. ii. p. 370), he surrounded himself with the arrogant pomp of a satrap. He formed a court around his person, attracting to himself all the men of talent from whom he could expect a heightening of his splendor; in the festival called after his name he made his appearance in person as judge of the festive contests; and mediocre poets, such as Antilochus, made a rich harvest of money. But he was also able to adorn his circle by men of real distinction, such as notably the *Chœrilus*. poet Chœrilus, who, belonging by birth to the slave-class at Samos, had risen to eminence by his beauty and talents. He had become acquainted with Herodotus; to his intercourse with whom he had owed a most felicitous intellectual development, and the suggestion of the choice of great national subjects. What Herodotus had produced in a narrative form, Chœrilus made the subject of an epic poem; and, although he was deficient in simplicity of sentiment and in natural warmth, he yet made it possible for his *Perseïs* to find acknowledgment at Athens by the side of the Homeric poems, and to be read in the schools. But there was more talent than character in Chœrilus; and after he had gained so noble a fame as a patriotic poet, he submitted to do homage to the oppressor of Greek liberty, and became the inseparable companion of Lysander.\*

\* Lysander-worship: Plut. *Lys.* 18; Athen. 696; Chœrilli Samii *quæ sapient* coll. Nækius, p. 48.

The measureless arrogance of Lysander, who allowed his poets unblushingly to celebrate him as the "Lord in War of Hellas," could not but excite an opposition of growing strength. He had seized upon a power exceeding all bounds, by virtue of his office as admiral-in-chief, which office had in itself no organic place in the Spartan polity, and of the special powers bestowed upon him for the settlement of Greek affairs. He accordingly endeavored more and more closely to bind in his person the soldiers serving on the fleet, who chiefly came from the lower strata of the population of Lacedæmon; and this he sought to bring about by adopting every possible way of enriching his men. It was known, how his devotion to the constitution at home was only a pretence, and how it would be intolerable to his ambition that he should again submit of his own free will to the regular political system of the Lycurgic state. Everywhere his enemies were astir, in order to induce the official authorities to interfere with energy. More effective, however, than all the complaints on the part of Greeks who had suffered ill treatment at his hands, were those of Pharnabazus, who had throughout the last few years consistently continued to extend his favors to Sparta, and had afforded her the most important support.

The first occasion on which Lysander met with resistance arose in connexion with the measures ordered by him at Sestus. Here he had expelled all the citizens possessed of homesteads, in order to distribute the houses and lands which were thus left without masters among such men as had served on his fleet. In other words, he sought to establish a kind of colony of veterans, at one of the most important of the points commanding the sea. Quite apart from the injustice of such an establishment, it could not be tolerated, if only for the reason that its single object was to create a solid basis for the personal power of Lysander himself. Ac-

cordingly, the Ephors, at the instigation of Pausanias, took courage, and ordered this measure to be revoked: so that the original citizens returned to their possessions. This was the first humiliation suffered by Lysander.\*

By way of a second attack upon his authority, one of his most faithful adherents, the Lacedæmonian Thorax, whom he had set up as a military bailiff at Samos, was called to account. The proceedings of Thorax had been those of all the other associates of Lysander. He had used his opportunity for acquiring money and property; the ancient ordinances of Sparta were regarded as a dead letter, and under the standard of the all-powerful commander, who did everything in his power to stimulate and satisfy the greed of his partisans, they believed themselves to be perfectly secure. It was therefore a heavy blow, when Thorax was dealt with at Sparta according to the ancient rigor of the law and put to death, on account of his illegal possession of private property.†

and fall.  
(post *OL.*  
*xclv.* 2;  
a. c. 408).

After this had been successfully accomplished, nothing but the last step remained to be taken. An opportunity was found in the repeated messages of Pharnabazus as to the utterly inconsiderate conduct of Lysander, whom he charged with disturbing him by expeditions of plunder in his own territory. Hereupon the Ephors at once sent explicit orders to the fleet, commanding Lysander to return home and there give an account of his proceedings.‡ In many respects what happened to him was precisely what in days past had happened to Pausanias. In the vertigo of his self-consciousness he had deemed himself indispensable and unassailable, without examining the foundation of his position of power. Thus in spite of all his sagacity it befell him that in the critical moment he showed himself unequal to any attack, and resorted to the lowest kinds of

\* *Sestus*, conquered by *Xantippus* (cf. vol. II. p. 321), a colony of Lysander's veterans: *Plut. Lys.* 14.

† *Plut. Lys.* 19.

‡ *Ibid.*

self-abasement in order to maintain himself. He was aware that of all the grievances urged against him, those of Pharnabazus had been urged with the greatest effect. To Pharnabazus he accordingly addressed himself, and begged for a letter which might cause his case to be more favorably judged at Sparta. The satrap pretended to give ear to his request, and even read to him a letter of a kind calculated thoroughly to satisfy him. But for this letter Pharnabazus substituted another, the tone of which was more bitter than that of any previous dispatch, and hereby brought the greatest shame upon Lysander, who, after confidently handing to the Ephors what he believed to be a favorable testimonial, had to hear a communication of a directly opposite kind read aloud in his presence.

He ventured neither to defend himself, nor to await the judgment upon his case. Pretending to owe the fulfilment of a vow to Zeus Ammon, he not without difficulty obtained permission for the journey. Considering the character of Lysander, who had by no means as yet relinquished his schemes, it is in itself probable, that with this journey political designs connected themselves; moreover, his family had from of old relations with Libya, as may be conjectured from the name of his brother *Libys*. The oracle of Ammon, the authority of which was recognized in Greece as well as its own country, might render effective service to the ambitious commander; and we observe several instances of a connection between Lysander and oracles,—a connection established by him in order to gain over the priestly bodies to the side of his innovations.\*

Lysander having been humbled, the question now was, whether Sparta could obtain the supreme conduct of

\* According to Plutarch, the Libyan journey took place before the crisis had occurred at Athens. But it probably took place afterwards. Cf. Thirlwall, *Hist. of Greece* (12mo. edition), vol. iv. p. 462; Grote, vol. ix. p. 283.

Hellenic affairs in any other way than the Lysandrian policy of force, and to what extent she was altogether capable of fulfilling the task which had fallen to her lot after the close of the Peloponnesian war.

Spartan monuments of victory. Sparta had undoubtedly made splendid progress: she had freed herself from the incubus of inertia, and had passed out of the narrow circle in which her action had formerly moved, to such an extent as to have utterly overthrown her adversary in naval victories gained in distant seas. The power of money, too, she now held in her hand; and a series of public works of art proclaimed to the Hellenes the glorious era which had opened for Sparta. On her acropolis were erected the figures of two goddesses of victory, dedicatory offerings of Lysander in memory of his two naval victories at Ephesus (vol. iii. p. 526) and at Ægospotami; and in the sanctuary at Amyclæ two tripods which overtopped the tripods placed there in earlier times in remembrance of the Messenian wars. But the most splendid honors of all were paid to the victory at Delphi by a grandly-designed group of statuary, the front rank of which represented the Dioscuri, Zeus, Apollo, Artemis, and Posidon, the last of these in the act of placing a wreath on the head of Lysander; Abas too, the soothsayer, and Hermon, the steersman of the admiral's vessel, had places in the front rank. In a rank behind stood the statues of those who had taken a prominent part in the victory: men of origin the most diverse, who at the same time represented the civic communities to which they belonged. Thus was figuratively brought before the eyes of the beholder a new Confederation, that of the allies against Athens, who were designed to represent the very heart of the nation, like the allies against Persia of old. These and other works of art attracted a multitude of artists into the service of Sparta. And doubtless it was the in-

tention of Lysander, in this respect also, to obscure the glories of Athens, and to constitute his native city a centre of the national art-life. Although it was impossible absolutely to exclude the pupils of Phidias, yet no Athenians were admitted among the artists in question, who were taken from Peloponnesus and the Islands.\*

But this brilliant advance on the part of Sparta was after all at bottom a mere empty show. The victory which she had gained was not of a kind to have been in any case capable of exciting genuine enthusiasm; for it had been obtained by the money of the Barbarians, by the treason of Sparta's adversaries, and by cunning trickery: and in truth the entire movement which these gorgeous works were intended to celebrate, had brought with it more of loss than of gain. For, however ill adapted the Sparta of former days might have been to carry on the policy of a Great Power, yet she had been firm in herself and sure of herself; her strength had lain in her limitation; and the entire conservative party in Greece had admired the state of Lycurgus, consistent and true to itself in the midst of all the changes around it and of the general growth of insecurity and confusion.

But in truth this state now no longer existed. <sup>Changes at</sup> For such was the nature of the constitution <sup>Sparta.</sup> of Lycurgus, that it must either perish, or be preserved unchanged. Now, its preservation was impossible, inasmuch as it was only by renouncing their traditional principles that the Spartans had succeeded in carrying the struggle with Athens to a successful issue. In the state of Lycurgus the strength of its own men was to be all in all; and it was only for extraordinary emergencies that it had at its command a treasure which, formed out of the tributes of the subject population, was far too insignificant to be a real source of power. The experience of the war

\* PAUS. x. 9; PLUT. *Lys.* 18; URlichs, *Skopas*, 4.

had shown that the ancient Spartan valor was insufficient, and that success depended upon money : and for this reason resort had been had to most unworthy negotiations with the Barbarians. Thus, together with the honor of the state, the sense of honor had been forfeited. The last years of the war had brought large masses of silver to Sparta ; and the very fact that formerly the love of personal property had been forcibly repressed, even the public moneys being deposited outside the country, in Arcadia, in Delphi, and elsewhere, in order that the seducing glitter of the precious metals might be kept away from the eyes of Spartans at home, helped to make the lust of money now break forth with irresistible strength. It was indeed possible in individual cases to apply the rigor of the law, as in the case of Thorax (p. 168) ; but it was not possible to introduce a general system of control. Even such men as Gylippus succumbed to a temptation so close at hand, and fraudulently appropriated public moneys. Thus, while one section of the community found ways and means of secretly enriching themselves, others were impoverished in consequence of the rise of prices due to the greater abundance of money, and sank so low as to be unable to pay their contributions as fixed by law. Accordingly they forfeited their full civic rights, and were excluded from the common table of the men, while the rich continued to sit at this table merely by way of pretence, afterwards indulging in luxurious banquets at home.\*

A hypocrisy of this description pervaded the whole life of the Spartans. It was the inevitable consequence of their constitution excluding every idea of a progressive development adapted to the times. Lysander himself was the prototype of this external conformity to the law. In dress and fashion of wearing the hair he adhered with

\* As to the placing of Spartan moneys abroad: Athen. 233; *Corp. Inscr. Gr.* I. p. 697. As to Gylippus: Plut. *Lysand.* 16; *Nic.* 28. Diod. xiii. 106.



pedantic rigor to ancestral usage; but the moral principles of the state he recklessly renounced, and was in his mind intent upon revolutionizing the entire constitution.

The numbers of the full citizens had, in consequence of the extinction of individual families and the impoverishment of others, dwindled more and more. Foreign elements were excluded as of old, and only a Social ill. single exception had been made; in the instance of the seer Tisamenus of Elis, whom at the time of the battle of Plataeæ there had been no means of securing except the bestowal of the civic franchise.\* Nor had care been taken to supplement the civic body out of the lower strata of the population, although the constitution left room for this, according to the intentions of the legislator (vol. i. p. 208). In times of difficulty, indeed, it had become necessary to seek resources for the preservation of the state, wherever they were to be found. Brasidas has shown, how the state might make use of its husbandmen and Helots. Lysander had gone a step further; he had employed Lacedæmonians not of the full-blood in the most important public offices, and had deeply wounded the feelings of many a Hellenic community by causing it to be governed by persons of Helot descent. But at home the services performed by these men were rewarded by sheer ingratitude; a narrow spirit of caste opposed any concessions to the non-Dorian population, or the admission of its members to an equal participation in landed property, although ever so many lots of land had fallen vacant. And among the Dorians themselves, again, the wealthier shut themselves off as against the poor, and formed a more and more contracted circle of families, a privileged class which ruled the state in accordance with its own interests. The place of the much-lauded equality had been taken by an oppressive oligarchy, by the supremacy of an aristocracy of wealth

\* Herod. ix. 33.

or office, which guarded its privileges with a jealousy in inverse ratio to the legality of their foundations. And inasmuch as, in spite of this degenerating tendency, the semblance of the ancient institutions was carefully observed, and not a little altered in the fundamental laws of the commonwealth, the inevitable result was that a spirit of untruth spread in Sparta, the effect of which could not but be most demoralizing for the entire population.\*

Political  
ills.  
The Kings. With these social evils were closely connected the damages suffered by the constitution. The kingly office, originally destined to watch over the equality of property and of rights, had sunk into impotence, partly through its own fault. Already by means of the Council of War being placed by the side of the Kings (vol. iii. p. 417), they had forfeited the full command over their most important honorary office, viz., the supreme military command.† The establishment of the *nauarchy*, the most essential innovation in the political organism, constituted a still more dangerous encroachment upon the royal authority. And, in proportion as the most important transactions of the war were decided at sea, the jealousy of the Kings against this new office increased; and when Lysander arrogated to himself all the glory of warlike exploits, the

The  
Nauarchy.

\* The old civic community supplanted by the so-called *δημοιοι*, who perhaps form the *μικρά ἐκκλησία*, and are also called *ἐκκλητικοι*: Xen. *Hellen.* v. 2, 33. These names and matters are, however, involved in considerable obscurity.

† It is true that the appointment of the ten *σύμβουλοι* was only a measure designed to meet the particular case, and had reference to Agis individually; but it became a precedent for subsequent times; and for this reason Thuc. (v. 63) uses the expression *νόμον ἴδαντο, ὃς οὐπω πρότερον ἔγινετο αὐτοῖς*, which clearly indicates an epoch in the history of the royal authority. This is not disproved by the circumstance that Agis personally contrives to rid himself of this restriction (Thuc. viii. 5). These same War Commissioners reappear afterwards under different names, as Ephors with Pausanias (Xen. *Hellen.* ii. 4, 30), as a *συνίδριον* (Diod. xiv. 79), as *ἡγεμόνες καὶ σύμβουλοι* (Plut. *Lysand.* 23), with Agesilaus, Agesipolis, and others. Cf. Siewers, *Geoch.* 35; Herbst, *Neue Jahrb. f. Phil.* 77, p. 681 f.

conflict in the end rose to such a pitch, that the Kings levied an army, in order to frustrate the undertakings of their adversary. In Attica the supreme political authorities of Sparta lay encamped against one another; and the whole art of dissimulation peculiar to the Spartans was needed to hide the breach in their political system, and to preserve the outward appearance of concord.

The other enemies of the kingly institution were the Ephors, whose power increased in the same measure in which that of the Kings fell into disregard. From the beginning of the war we meet with no decisions whatever proceeding from the entire civic community; nor is there any political significance remaining attached to the "Council of the Elders," the *Gerusia*. The whole power lies with the Ephors. Their election is controlled by the wealthy, and they rule the state in the interests of the predominant party. In the quarrels between Kings and Nauarchs, the Ephors occupy a mean position, and we find the most important decisions due to the vote of a *single* Ephor (p. 56). Now, since the College of the Ephors, which changed annually, was frequently filled by men accessible to corruption, it was not difficult for the several parties to secure the majority which would control the policy of the state. Such were the influences which decided the attitude of Sparta; and, in so far as there was any question at all of a consistent policy, it depended upon the Ephors being the servants of the oligarchy of the wealthy, which, as a matter of fact, had supplanted the constitutional public authorities. And since, in addition to this, the two royal houses were as of old opposed to one another with hostile jealousy, and were only very rarely induced by a community of interests to act in unison, the deep-seated disruption and decay of the Spartan state are easy to be understood. And, indeed, it is all but incomprehensible how that state still continued able to defy the manifold dangers threaten-

ing it in its territory, and to maintain a position commanding respect abroad.

What prevented the state from falling to pieces, was the inert force of habit—the habit of giving and obeying orders, which had obtained for centuries in the valley of the Eurotas. The subject population was without any centre, without any unity, without any organ of expression; and if there was anything in good order among the Spartans, it was the police-control exercised throughout the land by the Ephors, which the malcontent rural population obeyed in fear and terror. Moreover, in spite of the decay of public life, many an element of good had survived in private life out of the old times. Certain principles of good morals and manners had passed into the very life's-blood of Spartan men: a chivalric spirit, valor and contempt of death, discipline and obedience, fidelity in the worship of the gods and in the care for the honor of the dead. These features of Spartan character never failed to display themselves in critical times; and this explains how even degenerate Sparta continued to have her enthusiastic admirers, and how her citizens, even when they made their appearance as individuals in foreign states, were able to exercise personally the greatest influence, such as was inconceivable in the case of the citizens of any other state.

And, in addition to the elements of good and new, which had been preserved, certain acquisitions unknown to the old times had been made. The ancient awkwardness, incapacity in speech, and one-sidedness, had vanished: the culture of the age had found its way into Sparta as well as into other cities. What power of speech and action there was in such men as Brasidas, Gylippus, Lysander! A great variety of different kinds of character had gradually formed itself; by the side of stern professional soldiers like Clearchus, there appear crafty Sisyphi such as Dercyllidas and Antalcidas. In

Elements  
of good in  
Sparta:  
old,

the royal houses, too, a loftier spirit occasionally made its appearance, a freer view of the world and of its affairs, rising above the standpoint of a narrow-minded Dorism and of mere political partisanship. Thus Pausanias had some conception of the significance of Athens for the common Hellenic country, and he maintained amicable relations with the leaders of the democratic parties in other cities. Doubtless those men were rarest of all, who knew how to combine the good elements of the old times with the good elements of the new, how to unite the sentiments of an ancient Spartan with an advanced culture, with intelligence and energy—such men as Lichas and Callicratidas. As a rule, we find either an inert adherence to the traditional forms of life, or a spirit of opposition to ancestral usage, and open revolt.

The inner condition of Sparta determined her attitude in its foreign relations, towards the Peloponnesian as well as towards the other states. For a state so out of gear with regard to its own institutions could not possess the capacity for creating institutions abroad and controlling the circumstances of the times from definite points of view. Indeed, there was an entire absence of any serious desire to accomplish the national task which, after the fall of Athens, had devolved upon Sparta, and at last to satisfy the long-suffering confidence of so many Hellenes. On the contrary, it now became manifest that the moderation and prudence displayed by Sparta had merely been the results of fear. For since that motive had been taken away, what had formerly been timorous irresolution now changed into defiant arrogance. Of old, Sparta's ill success in the Arcadian wars (vol. i. p. 244) had induced her to desert the path of conquest for the gentler method of leadership by virtue of her position of primacy; now she unhesitatingly returned to her ancient policy of force.

The foreign  
policy of  
Sparta.

ing their faithful confederates for their good offices, the Spartans sent their Harmosts even into cities which were members of their confederation, and simply obeyed the brutal impulse of lust of dominion, intent upon nothing but turning to every possible account the momentary advantages of the situation.

Relations  
with other  
states.

Sparta, however, overestimated her strength. In the rest of Peloponnesus, too, much had changed. There prevailed a wide-spread discontent with the management of the war; and after already, in consequence of the Peace of Nicias, the authority of the state holding the primacy had been shaken (vol. iii. p. 207), this feeling of dissatisfaction was on the increase since the capture of Athens. Was not Sparta acting as if there were no confederates in existence, whose interests might come into question? The Arcadians, Achæans, and Corinthians complained that their long years of sacrifices during the war had brought them no profits; and Elis had for some time maintained a hostile attitude towards Sparta (vol. iii. p. 288). Corinth once more came forward with the greatest boldness. Her proposal that Athens should be destroyed had been rejected;\* she now demanded at least a share in the spoils which were flowing in vast quantities into Sparta. But the mere utterance of such claims was there regarded as arrogance; and any equitable consideration of them was refused. Thus the spirit of injustice and oppression prevailing in the inner life of the Spartan state also found its way into its foreign relations.

Thebes co-  
operates with  
Corinth.

The offended states entered into a union with one another, and sought points of support beyond the Isthmus. Above all, Corinth sought the support of Thebes. Next to Corinth, Thebes had done most towards kindling the war which had restored to Sparta its absolute supremacy; Thebes had with

\* Justin. v. 10.

obstinate endurance opposed the Athenians, not, however, with the design of making Sparta great, but in order herself to gain freedom of action on the north side of the Isthmus. For this reason Thebes as well as Corinth—the former in consequence of her mainland, the latter in consequence of her maritime, political situation—had desired to see Athens annihilated. But when the Spartans placed a garrison at Athens, and made manifest their intention of making central Hellas, with the islands, a subject territory, Thebes changed her policy, because she could not but infinitely prefer that Athens should be a free city of limited power, to its serving as a strong military position for the Spartans. Thus Thebes, by encouraging the restoration of the Attic democracy, was the first state openly to oppose Sparta; and, together with Corinth, refused to send troops, when King Pausanias summoned the contingents of the confederates.

Corinth was additionally irritated in a special degree against the Spartans by their proceedings at Syracuse. Here, during the last years of the Peloponnesian war, an incessant conflict had prevailed between the adherents of Tyrannical and those of Civic government. The leader of the citizens was Nicoteles, who had come from Corinth to save the constitution of its daughter-city, and who was the bitterest of the adversaries of Dionysius. Immediately after the battle of Ægospotami, Sparta too came to be mixed up in these transactions. Probably the constitutional party applied for aid to the Spartans, the old repressers of Tyrants; and they in consequence at once sent over Aristus, with the pretended mission of over-throwing Dionysius. But in reality they had far different intentions. For, inasmuch as their own thoughts were solely intent upon oppression, a Tyrant commanding a strong military force was a welcome ally to them. Accordingly, the good fame of Sparta was ul-

Corinth, Syracuse, and Sparta.

Mission of Aristus.

hesitatingly dishonored by proceedings of utter injustice. Aristus thoroughly abused the confidence of the citizens, and had made away with the noble Nicoteles; and it was he who enabled Dionysius fully to establish himself in the possession of his unconstitutional authority.\*

But the highest importance and most considerable consequences of all attached to Sparta's relations with Persia. The Persians had furnished the means for terminating the war; and they too, alone among all the allies of Sparta, received their reward. For the first time after a long interval, Pharnabazus again visited the whole of Mysia and the Troad under the suzerainty of Persia; and though Lysander ventured to withstand the claims of Persia in the Hellespont, yet the fall of Lysander himself is the clearest proof of the potency of the satrap's influence at Sparta. The case was different in Ionia. Here the situation of affairs was this: that, in spite of their renunciation of all Asiatic territory, a very favorable opportunity presented itself to the Spartans of asserting their influence and pursuing an independent policy; everything depended upon the way in which this opportunity would be used by them.

King Darius had died in the year of the battle of Ægospotami, without Parysatis having succeeded in obtaining from him a declaration in favor of Cyrus, for whom she hoped to be able to secure the royal dignity on the same grounds which Atossa had of old advanced on behalf of Xerxes (vol. ii. 271). On hastening to his father's deathbed Cyrus found himself completely deceived in his expectations, and had to witness at Pasargadæ the solemnities accompanying the accession to the throne of his brother Artaxerxes. Indeed, instead of becoming king, Cyrus ran in danger of being exe-

\* Diod. xiv. 10; Todt, *Dionysius I.* (1860), p. 12.



cuted as a traitor against the state; for Tissaphernes, whom he had taken with him to Susa, accused him of having designed to assassinate his brother on the occasion of the investiture of the latter with the regalia. Tissaphernes contrived to prove this charge out of the mouth of a priest, Cyrus' tutor in religion; and Cyrus would have been put to death instantaneously, had not Parysatis thrown herself between him and the royal body-guard. And she was able to obtain more than this for him: for Artaxerxes, being of a gentle disposition and pliable in his mother's hands, allowed himself to be persuaded to permit his brother to return with unabridged powers into his province. He hoped that Cyrus might be gained over by magnanimous treatment.\*

But Cyrus was after his return more firmly determined than ever to carry out his designs, and contrived to take advantage for his ends of the difficult state of affairs awaiting him in Asia Minor. For Tissaphernes, who had already taken offence at the original appointment of Cyrus to the supreme military command in Asia Minor, and who disapproved of the entire policy of Cyrus, viz., that of unconditional co-operation with Sparta, now, after the failure of his plot against the life of the prince, felt himself insecure, so long as Cyrus and his party remained in power. He accordingly stood by his side in an attitude of suspicion, and sought for new opportunities of ruining his adversary. Indeed, actual hostilities occurred between them.

Besides the satrapy of Caria, Tissaphernes had under

\* That there existed at Susa no fixed order of succession, excluding special determination on the part of the reigning king, is also confirmed by Herod. vii. 2; cf. Thirlwall, *Hist. of Gr.* vol. iv. p. 231. Ἀρταξέρξης ('Arta-khshatra in Herodotus and Plutarch) Arta-khshatra magnum imperium habens. Cyrus took Tissaphernes with him ὡς φίλον (Xen. *Anab.* i. 1, 2) i. e. as if he had supposed him to be his friend. For Cyrus had for some time been aware of the hostility of Tissaphernes. Nicolai, *Politik d. Tissaph.* (1863), p. 44. As to the attempt at assassination, there is the evidence of Ctesias, § 57, against Justin. v. 11.

him a number of maritime towns on the Ionian coast, in which he exercised rights of sovereignty.\* In these Cyrus desired at any cost to be acknowledged lord and master. He had known how to conciliate the good-will of the Asiatic Greeks; he had encouraged civic liberty in the towns, and had thereby drawn them over from his adversary to himself. When Miletus too fell away from Tissaphernes, he proceeded against it with the utmost rigor, caused the leaders of the party of movement to be put to death as guilty of high treason, and drove the others out of the city. These exiles were openly received by Cyrus, and furnished him with the desired pretext for collecting an armament, apparently designed for no purpose beyond the siege of Miletus and resistance to the assumptions of Tissaphernes. For he managed to assert his claims at Susa; and Artaxerxes, won over by the extremely attentive respect displayed towards him in all his messages by Cyrus, and by the great regularity with which his brother forwarded the sums of tribute due from him, allowed matters to take their course without intervening in them. The position held by Cyrus was of so exceptional a character—for his was a triple dignity as satrap of Lydia, Great-Phrygia, and Cappadocia, as commander-in-chief of the royal troops, and as *Caranos*,—that the official spheres of the chief public officers in Asia Minor inevitably interfered with one another, without its being possible at all times accurately to keep the functions of the several authorities asunder. Moreover, it was not difficult to cast suspicion upon Tissaphernes as a jealous rival, and to represent his policy as one unworthy of the Empire and disadvantageous to its interests. On the other hand, the overthrow of Athens, effected through Cyrus, could be interpreted as a triumph of the Persians over their worst enemy; and, in the same way, the present depend-

\* Tissaphernes held the cities of Ionia as a gift from the Great King. Xen. *Anab.* i. 1, 6.

ence of Sparta, and the secure command over the coastlands, as a success of the new system of policy. The levying and drilling of Asiatic troops could not give rise to any suspicion, since this was within the powers of the *Caranos*. The case stood differently with regard to Hellenic mercenaries, for an accumulation of these within the limits of the Empire could at no time be regarded as free from danger. Accordingly, Cyrus proceeded with caution, and avoided assembling considerable bodies of troops at single points. Thus the Great King was deceived; and indeed he was at bottom well contented to think of the unquiet prince as engaged in these feuds, which satisfied his ambition, exhausted his resources, and employed him in distant regions; while Parysatis did what was in her power to encourage this view, and thereby to secure for Cyrus liberty of action.

In the further prosecution of his schemes he was greatly aided by the circumstances of the times. For the violent revolutions of the Greek communities had driven a large number of citizens from their homes; the general state of discomfort, continuing after the war, the demoralization produced by it, and the dissolution of home and family ties, were all in favor of Cyrus. He sent his emissaries in all directions, to enlist for him, on either side of the sea, by the most advantageous offers, all young Hellenes inclined for a life of military adventure. His court at Sardes was a refuge for all fugitive partisans; paying no attention to rank, descent, or political party, he contrived to attract the most useful varieties of men, to take each as he was, and to assign to each his appropriate place; he seemed a born organizer of bands of volunteers. As a youthful hero in manner and bearing, full of high thoughts, open-handed and courteous, a prince of the Persian blood-royal with the culture of a Hellene, he inevitably attracted all eyes to himself, and exercised a magical charm upon those

The armaments of Cyrus.  
Ol. xciv. 2  
(s. c. 403-2).

who came into contact with him. Under the influence of his presence men forgot friends and country, and by their enthusiastic descriptions tempted others to follow them in deserting their homes and repairing to him. Not only unripe youths were attracted, but men, too, sacrificed part of their possessions, in order to equip themselves and others. While at home everything turned upon petty interests, here they perceived the beginning of new developments; they saw a man with a great future before him; they divined the authority which he must wield, who should have at his disposal the gold of Asia and the men of Hellas; and the Hellenes, seeing themselves treated by Cyrus as a privileged race, found not only their ambition and love of lucre, but also their national pride most splendidly satisfied; and they felt themselves lords and masters of the world, while taking service under this barbarian prince.

Clearchus.

One of the men whom Cyrus honored with his especial confidence was Clearchus (p. 13). He had been called to account after the fall of Byzantium and punished; but hereupon he had, shortly before the close of the war, been sent thither anew, in order at the request of the cities on the Bosphorus to defend them against the Thracian tribes. On his voyage to Byzantium he was recalled by the Ephors, but refused to obey the summons; and his proceedings there as governor were full of ruthless cruelty, until a Spartan fleet forced him to take his departure; whereupon he made his escape to Sardes. He was precisely the man required by Cyrus, and was immediately employed by the prince to enlist soldiers in the Bosphorus; he induced the Greek cities there to espouse the cause of the Pretender, for whom he in the space of a single year collected a considerable military force, thereby arousing such self-confidence in Cyrus, that he now thought the time had come for a resolute advance upon the end which he had actually at heart.

For this purpose he now entered into negotiations with foreign powers; for he wished to engage not only individual Greeks, but Greece itself, *i. e.* the great Power absolutely supreme there, in his cause, and now to reap the harvest of his Philhellenic policy. He therefore sent envoys to Sparta, and reminded its authorities of the services which he had performed for their state, and how they owed its present position to him alone. He now called upon them to attest their recognition of his good offices, and declared his expectation that they would in their turn act as his allies. He at the same time said that he demanded no sacrifices without ample rewards. Whosoever came on foot (thus he wrote with oriental exuberance), should receive from him a steed; whosoever came on horseback, a pair of chariot-horses; the possessors of fields should be made masters of villages; and the owners of villages lords of cities. The pay for military service should not be *told* out, but *measured* out.\*

Thus, for the first time since the beginning of the Peloponnesian War, Sparta stood again face to face with a momentous resolution, and was called upon to give an answer—aye or no—by which her future would be decided. Doubtless the prospect was a tempting one, of a proved friend of Sparta by her aid mounting the throne of the Achæmenidæ; such a connection with Persia as could be hereby gained, seemed to the Spartans the very coping-stone of their fortunes, and the securest guarantee for their supremacy over Hellas. The Lysandrian party set its whole influence at work, in order to support the request of Cyrus; nor were the Ephors unfavorably disposed towards it. And yet the Spartans ventured upon no frank and courageous resolve. With crafty caution they sought to avoid open hostilities against the Great King, without at the same time forfeiting the good-will

\* Plutarch, *Artax.* 6.

of their powerful ally by a refusal. They acted as if they knew nothing of his real designs. The Nauarch was instructed to support the undertakings of Cyrus, which were nominally directed against predatory tribes of the south coast of Asia Minor, in accordance with his orders; and 700 heavy-armed men under Chirosophus manned the ships. All the steps taken were calculated upon either event: in case it were favorable, upon establishing a claim on the gratitude of Cyrus; in the opposite case, upon remaining free from reproach as towards the Great King.

The expedi-  
tion starts  
from Sardes.  
Ol. xciv. 3  
(B. C. 401).  
March.

Meanwhile Cyrus had completed his preparations, and in the spring of Ol. xciv. 3, (B. C. 401) he commenced his campaign. Even now, he continued to conceal his actual designs, and deceived the multitude by pretending that his intentions were merely to secure the frontier of his satrapy against predatory incursions, and to chastise Tissaphernes. This untruthfulness could not but create a doubtful feeling in the army; it was soon perceived that Pisidia was not the object of the march, and an awkward spirit of opposition began to manifest itself: the Greek troops were unwilling to be the blind tools of a roving ambition. It was only by their pay being raised that they would be drawn further and further eastward; and not till they had reached the Euphrates, was the full truth revealed to them, which now indeed could no longer excite surprise.

The real causes to which was due the failure of this enterprise, which had seemed so full of promise, lay in the excessive self-confidence entertained by the leader of the expedition, and infused by him into his followers. They had gradually come to convince themselves, that the prize of victory would drop into their hands without a struggle. For wherever they had naturally anticipated that the localities would be taken advantage of to block

their passage into the interior, they had marched through unresisted: in the passes of Mount Taurus, where Syenesis had voluntarily abandoned his commanding position on the heights, and again at their transit out of Cilicia into Syria, whither Cyrus had ordered the fleet, so as with its aid to force a passage. But Abrocomas abandoned the whole of Syria, and retreated to the Great King. Next, the Euphrates offered a line of defence, at which the greatest difficulties seemed inevitable to the army; but here again nothing had occurred, except that on his retreat Abrocomas had burnt all the boats at Thapsacus, a measure which remained absolutely ineffectual, because the Euphrates happened exceptionally to be so shallow, that the foot-soldiers could wade through it without the water reaching breast high. Finally, the expedition was menaced by the most dangerous of all obstacles at its entrance into Babylonia; for here the Great King had caused the "Median Wall," an ancient construction probably dating from Nebuchadnezzar, to be restored and strengthened by a trench meeting the Euphrates with an interval of only twenty feet. This had been done expressly to ward off Cyrus; here, therefore, he naturally expected to find the hostile army, and prepared himself for the decisive struggle. But when even this artificially constructed defile was left undefended, it seemed actually removed beyond all doubt, that Artaxerxes was without sufficient courage to fight for his throne. The consequence was, that all care was thrown to the winds, and that discipline was relaxed, so that the soldiers negligently strolled by the side of the wagons and beasts of burden, on which they had deposited their arms. They imagined that, in order for them to come into possession of the prizes of victory awaiting them, nothing was required but simply to march on.

Of a sudden everything changes. Two days after the last danger seemed to be passed, the imperial armada of Persia is announced, advancing against Cyrus in the open

plain with such suddenness, that time is hardly left him to gather and range his troops. Thus, then, in addition to all the advantages accruing to the Great King out of his tenfold superiority in numbers and complete command of all the resources of the country, he had also in his favor the fact, that he was acting on the offensive and taking his adversary by surprise. The nature of the ground was exactly adapted to give him the full advantage of his superiority in numbers; such was the difference between the lines of the order of battle on the two sides, that the left wing of the Greeks reached not even so far as the centre of the enemy.

The result of the battle was, however, by no means decided as yet; a prudent coherence of operations on the part of the Hellenic troops would even now have perforce ensured victory to them. But, in the first place, Clearchus neglected his duty by failing to obey the well-considered plans of the commander-in-chief; and, again, the latter forgot himself in risking his person with the utmost foolhardiness.

Battle of  
Cuanaxa,  
Ol. xciv. 4  
(B. C. 401),  
early in  
September.

Clearchus commanded on the right wing, which leant upon the river. He was ordered to advance upon the enemy's centre, because here the Great King had taken up his position, and because Cyrus foresaw that to break the centre would be to decide the battle, while the defeat of a wing would leave the main result undetermined. And yet Clearchus preferred to act according to the ordinary rules of Greek strategy, by hesitating to leave his flank uncovered. He therefore made a rapid attack upon the wing opposite him, easily drove it into flight, and pursued it with unrestrainable haste. This victory was, as Cyrus had foreseen, devoid of importance. The left wing of the Persians was indeed annihilated, but at the same time the right wing of his own army was removed from the field of battle, and rendered unable to co-operate in deciding the



day; while the centre of the army advanced unhindered, and began with its vastly superior numbers to surround the left wing of Cyrus. Hereupon Cyrus himself, although the Greek leaders had urgently entreated him to be careful of his person, (and in their own interest, too, they were fully justified in making this demand upon him,) with his squadron of horse rushed down upon the centre of the foe. His charge was irresistible; the ranks of the body-guard were broken, and the horsemen of Cyrus scattered in different directions in their pursuit, so that at last he found himself with a small body of companions face to face with his brother. And now all prudence deserted him. He was solely intent upon killing the king with his own hand. Already his lance struck his brother, but only inflicted a slight wound; while Cyrus himself, almost entirely isolated, and surrounded by enemies, sank heavily wounded from his horse, and was then slain. He fell as the victim of his knight-errantry; and with him was wrecked the whole enterprise, which was to have been the beginning of a new era for both the West and the East.

After the battle was over, the Asiatic army of Cyrus, numbering 100,000 men, had dispersed; but the 13,000 Greeks stood as victors on the field, proudly spurned all overtures of treating with them, and felt themselves strong enough to offer the throne of the Achæmenidæ to Ariæus, the friend of Cyrus, who had commanded the Asiatic infantry. But Ariæus preferred to seek the grace of the Great King, and to betray his brothers-in-arms to the foe. They had now to provide entirely for themselves and for their own preservation; and upon the proud consciousness of victory ensued a perception of the terrible situation in which they had been placed by the death of Cyrus.

In the midst of the strange continent, in the wide plains of Babylon, where no means of protection offered

The return  
march to Tra-  
pæsus.

Sept. 401—  
March 400 a. c.

themselves to them, devoid of aim or of counsel, bare of all resources, tortured by want, ignorant of the routes, hard pressed on all sides by armies infinitely superior to their own in numbers, deceived by false pretences, and, through the insidious guile of Tissaphernes, deprived of their commander, who had been murdered in his tent when they were about to make some agreement with him with regard to the homeward march,—thus the unhappy army found itself, which had started for those distant lands with such overweening hopes. But necessity steeled these Greeks, and made heroes of adventurers. They shook off the dull despair into which they had sunk; in true Greek fashion they assembled as a community in council, in order to agree freely upon an organization of their body, and to act as circumstances demanded. The captains proposed new generals; these were confirmed by the soldiery; and a penalty was imposed upon any attempt to arrive at an understanding with the foe. And after they had thus recovered their self-consciousness, they cast aside all the baggage they could spare, and courageously commenced their march in firmly-ordered ranks up the left bank of the Tigris, in order to seek a passage through trackless and unknown highlands towards the sea-coast beyond, whence they might again put themselves into communication with their native land.

The march of the Ten Thousand. Although this eight months' military expedition possesses no immediate significance for political history, yet it is of high importance, not only for our knowledge of the East, but also for that of the Greek character; and the accurate description which we owe to Xenophon is therefore one of the most valuable documents of antiquity. We see a band of Greeks of the most various origin, torn out of all their ordinary spheres of life, in a strange quarter of the globe, in a long complication of incessant movements and of situations ever varying and full of peril, in which the

real nature of these men could not but display itself with the most perfect truthfulness. This army is a typical chart, in many colors, of the Greek population—a picture, on a small scale, of the whole people, with all its virtues and faults, its qualities of strength and its qualities of weakness, a wandering political community which, according to home usage, holds its assemblies and passes its resolutions, and at the same time a wild and not easily manageable band of free-lances. They are men in full measure agitated by the unquiet spirit of the times, which had destroyed in them their affection for their native land ; and yet how closely they cling to its most ancient traditions! Visions in dream and omens, sent by the gods, decide the most important resolutions, just as in the Homeric camp before Troy ; most assiduously the sacrifices are lit, the pœans sung, altars erected, and games celebrated, in honor of the saviour gods, when at last the aspect of the longed-for sea animates afresh their vigor and their courage. This multitude has been brought together by love of lucre and quest of adventure ; and yet in the critical moment there manifest themselves a lively sense of honor and duty, a lofty heroic spirit, and a sure tact in perceiving what counsels are the best. Here, too, is visible the mutual jealousy existing among the several tribes of the nation ; but the feeling of their belonging together, the consciousness of national unity, after all prevail ; and the great mass is capable of sufficient good sense and self-denial to subordinate itself to those who by experience, intelligence, and moral courage attest themselves as fitted for command. And Xenophon. how very remarkable it is, that in this mixed multitude of Greeks it is an Athenian who by his qualities towers above all the rest, and becomes the real preserver of the entire army ! The Athenian Xenophon had only accompanied the expedition as a volunteer, having been introduced by Proxenus to Cyrus, and thereupon

moved by his sense of honor to abide with the man whose great talents he admired. Xenophon felt no impulse, and was called upon by no outward duty, to assume a prominent position in this band of soldiers without a leader; his native city was still unpopular among the Greeks, and the bulk of the army consisted of Peloponnesians, Arcadia and Achaia being most largely represented among them. And yet it was he who, obeying an inner call, re-awakened a higher, a Hellenic consciousness, and courage, confidence and wise prudence, among his comrades, and who brought about the first salutary resolutions. The Athenians alone possessed that superiority of culture which was necessary for giving order and self-control to the band of warriors, barbarized by their selfish life, and for enabling him to serve them in the greatest variety of situations as spokesman, as general, and as negotiator; and to him it was essentially due that, in spite of their unspeakable trials, through hostile tribes and desolate snow-ranges, 8,000 Greeks after all, by wanderings many and devious, in the end reached the coast.

**Behaviour of Sparta.** They fancied themselves safe, when at the beginning of March they had reached the sea at Trapezus. But their greatest difficulties were only to begin here, where they first again came into contact with Greeks; for more dangerous than all attacks of the Barbarians was the net of insidious intrigue spread for them by the Spartan authorities. For no sooner had the news of the battle of Cunaxa reached Sparta, than nothing else was thought of there but escape from the evil consequences which might now follow upon the connexion with Cyrus. Accordingly, not only was all participation in his enterprise on the part of the state denied, not only was the favor of the Great King anxiously sought by the Spartans, but they were actually not ashamed to refuse any support to the Greek auxiliary troops, when they re-issued out of the interior of Asia and came into contact

with Spartan officials,—in order that in any case Sparta might avoid the appearance of having had aught to do with any phase of the revolt.

The Cyreans (this was the name given to the troops of Cyrus from the days of Xenophon) had sent Chirosophus from Trapezus to Byzantium, for the purpose of seeking there support and means for their return home. After a long absence, Chirosophus returned with empty promises to the army, which was now at Sinope. He was chosen commander-in-chief, Xenophon having declined this honor, because he foresaw that the election of an Athenian would, now that they were approaching the territory under the influence of the Spartan dominion, inevitably create an unfavorable impression, and be disadvantageous to the army. When soon afterwards Chirosophus died, there was an utter want of a person of consideration fitted for upholding the interests of the army before the Spartan authorities. Xenophon once more, in the most unselfish way, endeavored to provide for the welfare of the army, by attempting to induce the Harmost of Byzantium, Cleander, to assume the supreme command. But he failed in his attempt; and when towards the close of the summer the army had reached Chrysopolis on the Bosphorus, there commenced the treacherous proceedings of Anaxibius, who commanded as Spartan nauarch in those waters.

This individual was a worthy representative of degenerated Sparta. He showed no movement of Hellenic sentiment, no trace of sympathy for his fellow-countrymen, who had reached the threshold of their native land as if by a miracle, and who in their anxious and difficult situation hoped for patriotic fellow-feeling. Heartlessly selfish, he was intent upon nothing beyond securing his own position, and his eyes were bent upon Persia, in order that he might obtain the favor of the satrap. For Pharnabazus had made the most splendid promises to

Anaxibius.

Anaxibius, in the event of his providing for the removal of this dangerous military force out of his province. Accordingly, Anaxibius caused the army to be transported to Byzantium. Thus of course they could not but conclude that he was at last about to fulfil the promises which he had made to Chirosophus, and to take them into his own service. In this expectation they had renounced the advantages which were open to them in Asia Minor, where by pillaging Persian places they could amply provide for their own support. But they were most cruelly deceived in all their expectations. For no sooner had they arrived on European ground, and were now, as they hoped, beyond the reach of all danger, than Anaxibius marched them out of the city on the side towards the land, without donations and without pay, as if they were a band of marauders of whom men desired to rid themselves, the sooner the better.

When the troops were again outside the walls, Anaxibius caused the gates to be closed behind them, and sent them orders to obtain supplies in the Thracian villages of the vicinity, as best they could, and then to continue their march to the Chersonnesus, where they should receive pay. Thus these unhappy men saw themselves once more cast out into a strange country, and, at the approach of winter (it was now the beginning of October), bidden to rely for their support upon more marching and more fighting. This act of treason was too gross to be patiently borne. Rising in savage revolt, the troops turned again upon the city; some of their own men, who had accidentally remained behind within the walls, helping them to open the gates. The army rushed in, eager for vengeance; the Spartan commanders ventured upon no resistance; and Anaxibius would have fallen a victim to the fury of the soldiery, had not Xenophon intervened and saved the general, as well as the citizens of Byzan-

tium. His admonitions were successful in recalling the troops to discipline and reflection; he made it clear to them, how they were on the point of provoking the hostility of the whole world, Persian as well as Greek; the momentary success which they could not fail to obtain would be the commencement of the greatest calamities for themselves. Convinced by these representations, the troops of their own accord abandoned the rich spoils already in their hands; accepted the offer of a Theban, Cœratidas by name, who promised them the richest gains from a campaign in Thrace, if they would entrust themselves to his leadership; and quietly departed from Byzantium. Anaxibius for the second time closed the gates behind them, and, as soon as his fears were at an end, issued orders, that if any soldier of the army should still be found within the walls, he should be sold into slavery.

and in Thrace;  
winter.

(H. xev. I [B. C. 400—399].)

The agreement with Cœratidas soon fell to the ground again. In the absence of a supreme commander, while discord continued to prevail among the several leaders, the troops moved hither and thither in Thrace without object or counsel. Many fell away, returned home singly, or settled in the surrounding localities. The entire army was on the eve of final dissolution, to the intense satisfaction of Anaxibius, who now hoped to reap from Pharnabazus the full reward of his conduct. But when he came into the presence of the satrap, the latter was well aware that the official year of the nauarch was ended (autumn, 400 B. C.), and that Anaxibius could henceforth be neither of any use nor of any harm to him. He accordingly had not the slightest intention of keeping his promise to Anaxibius, and entered, instead, into combinations with Aristarchus, who had arrived at Byzantium as the newly-appointed governor of the city. Aristarchus now began to play over again the part of Anaxibius; and opened his administration by causing the Cyreans who had remained

behind sick at Byzantium, 400 in number, and who by order of his predecessor Cleander had been furnished with supplies there, to be sold as slaves in the market-place.

But Anaxibius was singly intent upon taking vengeance on the perfidious satrap. It was his intention to prove to him, how even without official authority he could still find an opportunity for punishing treachery. Accordingly, he came to an agreement with Xenophon, induced him to return to the army which he had quitted at Byzantium, and to lead it across from Perinthus to Asia, with the intent of there beginning open war against the satrap. Xenophon accepted his proposals. Once more the warriors assembled around their old general, and looked for marches full of success and booty under his command in the rich coast-lands of the Propontis. The roving expedition turns again from west to east. But Aristarchus, the

new friend of the satrap, prevents it from crossing the Bosphorus; and there remains nothing for Xenophon but to enter, together with the troops once more gathered around him, into the service of the Thracian prince Seuthes, in order to help him in subjecting certain tribes which had severed themselves from his paternal kingdom.\*

Thus failed the plan of Anaxibius, of involving Sparta in war with Persia for purposes of personal vengeance. Pharnabazus found his security assured more thoroughly than before by Spartan commanders; and the entire series of transactions, which had so seriously threatened the good understanding between Persia and Sparta, viz., the revolt of Cyrus and the participation in it of the Hellenes, seemed to have passed by, in accordance with the crafty policy of the Ephors, without ulterior dangers, and with-

\* Anaxibius, according to Xen. *Anab.* vii. 2, 5 (Βυζαντίου βασίλειος, Diod. xiv. 30, an incorrect expression referring to his head-quarters), is nanarch up to the autumn of 400 B. C., and is succeeded by Polus. Cf. Weber, *de Gythio*, 88 f. As to Seuthes, cf. vol. iii. p. 551. As to his silver money as the Attic standard, see Duc de Luynes, *Num. des Satr.* p. 48.



out having exercised any lasting influence upon Greek affairs.

And yet the Spartans deceived themselves, and their unworthy and cowardly peace-policy was in the end of no use to them. For after the fall of Cyrus, Tissaphernes came to the front again. By means of the warning given by him he had enabled the Great King to prosecute his armaments in time. It was he who at the last moment had encouraged the timorous Artaxerxes to enter upon a vigorous resistance, and who alone among all the commanders had stood firm during the advance of the Greeks; after the battle, too, he had taken the most strenuous measures for the interests of the Great King. Accordingly, the latter could not but reward the faithful servant, whom he had abandoned in his quarrel with Cyrus, and could not but now regard him as the sole personage fitted to re-establish order in the maritime provinces. Artaxerxes, therefore, sent Tissaphernes with extensive powers into Asia Minor, and, in addition to his previous satrapy, entrusted to him the territory formerly under the command of Cyrus.

Herewith a new epoch commenced for the affairs of Asia Minor. The Asiatic Greeks, whom Cyrus had treated like spoilt children, now fell under the disciplinary rod of a man who not only in general disapproved of all coquetting with the Hellenes and considerate treatment of their civic liberties, but who was, moreover, a personal enemy of the maritime cities, and desired to take vengeance upon them for having espoused the cause of Cyrus against himself. His personal passion, therefore, accorded with his commission to put an end to the ambiguous state of things on the Ionic coast, and to restore the absolute dominion of the Great King.

Thus the events of former times curiously repeated themselves. Of old, the Lydian kings had advanced in order to subject the coast-towns (vol. ii. p. 133); as had

afterwards Harpagus, the general of the great Cyrus (vol. ii. p. 145), and thirdly the hosts of Artaphernes in the times of King Darius (vol. ii. p. 207). So now again Tissaphernes pressed forward towards the coast, and commenced the siege of Cymæ, with the intent of making one city after the other a provincial town of the Persian empire. And, as in the earlier transactions of the same kind, so now again a new complication with the Greek states was the result. As in the times of Cyrus and Darius, the terrified coast-towns applied to Sparta, asking aid from the state which more than ever commanded all the resources of the mother-country against the hosts of the Barbarians and the revengefulness of Tissaphernes.

One of the chief reasons why this application for aid was not at once declined, as it had been on former occasions, lay in the clear recognition of the fact, that the amicable relations with Persia were after all not to be maintained, even if a further degree of concession and servility were to be acquiesced in than had been already reached. It was impossible to deny the aid given to Cyrus; and at Susa the former friends of the Pretender were regarded as the enemies of the empire. It was accordingly patent that, as Tissaphernes was about to put an end to the semblance of liberty possessed by the Greek cities, so he also intended to break the semblance of peace still existing between Persia and Sparta.

Under these circumstances no great amount of political intelligence and resolution was requisite for beginning the war, before the Greek cities had fallen back under the Persian yoke, and the Spartans had lost the harbors on the further side of the sea. Moreover, the war was warmly urged by the whole party which had never ceased to take umbrage at the last dishonorable treaties of peace with Persia, and which rejoiced in finding an opportunity of

War between  
Sparta and  
Persia,

*Ol. xcvi. 1* (a.  
c. 399).

putting an end to them, and of thus expiating their disgrace. And yet, even thus, the Spartans would have with difficulty brought themselves to resolve upon war, had not the most recent events permitted a glance into the inner life of the Persian empire, which considerably diminished the terrors of a collision with the Persians. Up to their occurrence, Persia had indeed been no longer feared as a state likely to act on the offensive; but it had been regarded as unapproachable in its interior, and inexhaustible in internal resources. But now could any respect continue to be paid to a state incapable of conquering a band of Greek troops, surrounded in the very midst of the land of that state itself? Had not Tissaphernes himself by the assassination of the generals offered the most eloquent testimony to the fact, that he regarded a Greek army under efficient leadership as invincible; while, even when this army had been deprived of its leaders, he had in spite of his vastly superior strength, neither dared to fall upon it in its encampment, nor to pursue it into the mountains? Even after these troops had dwindled in numbers, and after their discipline had fallen away, had they not still been able to inspire the potent Pharnabazus with such fears, that he had not recovered his composure till they had been safely carried across the Bosphorus? In short, the colossus of the Persian empire had suddenly lost the nimbus of greatness, by which it had hitherto after all continued to be surrounded. It was therefore determined this time not to refuse the demand for aid proffered by the Asiatic cities. Sparta thought it possible to recommence a Hellenic policy without any risk; and, for the sake too of her reputation among the Greeks, was unwilling to lose this favorable opportunity of summoning them to arms under her command. At the same time there was every prospect of her being able to carry on the war with slight sacrifices; the lesson had been learnt how a war will itself support the troops engaged in it;

indeed, a profit might be anticipated for the treasury ; and the Spartans meant to go themselves to seize the gold formerly bestowed by Cyrus.

Thibron in Ionia. The first step taken by the Spartans consisted in their bidding Tissaphernes, as they had Spring. formerly bidden Cyrus (vol. ii. p. 143), desist from besieging the cities. When this message remained without result, they sent an army across the sea, under the command of Thibron, numbering 1,000 Lacedæmonian new-citizens, 3,000 Peloponnesians, and 300 Attic horsemen. This was a Hellenic army ; the war was treated as a national war, for which Sparta summoned the contingents, without having previously caused a regular resolution of the confederation to be passed.

War in Ionia. After landing at Ephesus, the Spartans Ol. xc. 2-3 (a. c. 399-7). soon found themselves deceived as to the reinforcements which they had hoped to obtain in Asia itself. The civic communities showed so much effeminacy and aversion from war, that it was useless to found any hopes upon them. Moreover, the want of discipline displayed by the Lacedæmonians was not adapted for securing good-will and support to the liberating army. Thibron was accordingly obliged to look round for aid in other quarters. And where could he have found a more favorable opportunity for strengthening his forces than that offered by the remnants of the Ten Thousand? These brave troops had fought as occasion demanded during two months in the service of Seuthes (p. 153) ; but under him again they had, in spite of all their labors and successes, met with nothing but bitter injustice. The king's treasurer faithlessly withheld part of the pay promised them, so that the troops began to murmur, and the position of Xenophon, between Seuthes and them, became very painful and dangerous. At this moment there arrived the summons of Thibron, which was received with the most joyous welcome. Xenophon conducted the

troops back to Asia, and here near Pergamus placed them under the Spartan general. The migratory band had passed up and down the shores of the Hellespont and the Bosphorus like a thunder-cloud, ever watched with anxious eyes by the Persians : and now at last they had come into the Persian land itself, and Tissaphernes saw before him once more the hated men whom he had assumed, on the day of Cunaxa, to be doomed to perish hopelessly under the swords of the Carduchi and amid the snow-fields of Armenia.

Deep hatred in their hearts, they hastened to begin the conflict with their ancient foe, and caused the authority of the Spartan arms to rise with great rapidity. A series of cities espoused the cause of the liberating army, in particular Pergamus and the towns in its vicinity, where the descendants of Demaratus held sway, and likewise the Æolian cities Gambreum, Myrina, and others, where ruled the house of Gongylus, the citizen of Eretria who had of old taken the side of Persia. But as a whole the results remained inconsiderable, because Thibron was not equal to his task. His successor, Dercyllidas, adopted more vigorous measures ; he belonged to the school of Lysander, and contrived to take advantage of the state of affairs in the Persian empire, then in so advanced a stage of dissolution that the several officers of the empire carried on wars and concluded treaties without taking heed of the Great King. Thus Dercyllidas by cunning negotiations obtained an undertaking from Tissaphernes, binding him to remain inactive while the satraps of the upper provinces were attacked ; whereupon, after having thus covered his rear, Dercyllidas invaded Æolis with all his forces, put himself in possession of a series of cities in this densely populated district, seized the treasures accumulated there, and finally concluded a truce with Pharnabazus, whom he had reduced

Thibron  
succeeded by  
Dercyllidas ;

(latter part of  
Summer, a. c.  
399).

Truce be-  
tween Dercyl-  
lidas and  
Pharnabazus.

B. C. 397.  
Summer. to straits; which truce lasted till after the beginning of the summer of the year 397.\*

Peloponnesus. While the Lacedæmonians were half against their will involved in a Persian war, they had simultaneously to carry on another war of which the scene lay in their own peninsula. For if they were at the present moment desirous of making their hegemony a reality, and of assuming the character of the sole Great Power in Greece in their relations to foreign countries, it was assuredly above all necessary, that they should be masters at home and suffer no recalcitrance in Peloponnesus.

But the old system of states in Peloponnesus had become unhinged ever since the Peace of Nicias; and not only had Argos, ever irreconcilable, and Corinth, ever arrogant and discontented, sought to oust Sparta from her present position, but Elis too had taken part in these measures of resistance (vol. iii. p. 288 f.).

Sparta and Elis. The relations between Elis and Sparta were of a quite peculiar kind. The close connexion between these two states was one of the foundation-stones of the common system of Peloponnesus. However insignificant the little territory of Elis was in political power, yet a disproportionate consideration attached to it on account of Olympia, and in affairs appertaining to the Sacred Law the Elean authorities enjoyed an authority acknowledged in the whole peninsula. Elis had therefore always been treated by Sparta with special favor and tenderness; Sparta had considerably extended the frontiers of Elis, and had guarded its flourishing prosperity. Elis was a confederate territory after the Spartans' own

\* Θίβρων (Θίμβρων), Xen. *Hellen.* iii. 1, 4. His march was perhaps in B. C. 400; cf. Krüger ad Clinton, s. a. 309. As to the families of Demaratus and Gongylus, Xen. *Hellen.* iii. 1, 8; Herod., vi. 63, 70. Δερκυλίδας (Δερκυλλίδας) cf. Plutarch and Diodor.) Σίσυφος, Xen. *Hellen.* iii. 1, 8.

hearts; a land without towns, pacific, free from politics, peopled by large landed proprietors, priests, peasants, and fishermen.

A change had befallen these relations, since a capital had been founded on the Peneus (vol. ii. p. 433). This event had immediately awakened political life and a spirit of independence, which revolted against the predominant power of Sparta. The Eleans were no longer willing to be permanently nothing but the henchmen of Sparta, and in particular objected to the campaigns abroad. To this was added the quarrel concerning Lepreum (vol. iii. p. 288), to which the Spartans had given a turn most signally disagreeable to the Eleans. For they not only confirmed to the Lepreatæ their immunity from dues, but also placed a garrison in their city, which constituted a permanent menace to the frontiers of Elis. Hereby the feelings of mutual ill-will were deepened into an open rupture; the democratic party gained the upper hand at Elis, and the state joined the Argive Separate Alliance, and hereupon entered into the league with Athens, Argos, and Mantinea.

But the Eleans also took advantage of the peculiar resources at their disposal, in order to make the Spartans feel their wrath. They not only caused a monument with an inscription to be erected at Olympia itself in commemoration of the league into which they had entered in despite of Sparta, but they also intervened with measures of the severest rigor, when during the term of an Olympic truce Sparta had marched troops into the territory of Lepreum. For this act the Eleans imposed upon Sparta a fine of 2,000 minæ,\* hoping thereby to enforce the restoration of Lepreum. But when neither such a restoration nor the payment of the fine ensued, the Eleans (in the twelfth year

Pertinacious opposition of the Eleans to Sparta.

\* 2,000 minæ, Æginetan, at the value in silver of 5*l.* 2*s.* 9*d.*; two for every hoplite: a fine nominally fixed by law

of the Peloponnesian war) excluded all the citizens of Sparta from participation in the national festival; and, even after withdrawing from the Separate Alliance, they defied the Spartans; caused a Spartan of consideration, who had in spite of the prohibition taken part in the Games (vol. iii. p. 457), to be flagellated; refused admission to King Agis when he was about to offer sacrifices for victory against Athens; in their own state completed the edifice of a purely democratic constitution; established a fleet; and even after the victories of Lysander unhesitatingly supported the Attic democrats. The chief of the popular party and vigorous leader of the state was Thrasydæus.\*

So pertinacious a system of resistance could not in the long run be tolerated by the Spartans. No sooner had they regained freedom of action, so far as Athens was concerned, than they resolved to use all necessary energy in settling the affairs of Peloponnesus, in restoring what was the fundamental law of these, viz. an absolute obedience to any Spartan summons of military contingents, and in punishing the recalcitrant members of the Confederation. They determined to make an example of Elis, in order to frighten off the remaining states from similar attempts; nor could any more favorable time be chosen for the purpose than the present, inasmuch as, in consequence of the years of war, all the states were exhausted. Moreover, the Eleans had pursued their own separate interests with so much harshness and one-sidedness, that they could not calculate upon sympathy and support from the other Peloponnesians. Finally, at Elis itself the Spartans were not without partisans, who had forfeited their authority under the democratic system of government, and who were therefore desirous of a restoration of the former condition of things.

\* Θρασυδαῖος, Xen. *Hellen.* iii. 2, 27; προσετηκώς τοῦ Ἡλείων δήμου, Pausan. iii. 8, 4. He was the friend of Lysias, *Vit. X. Orat.* 835.



Sparta accordingly advanced the following demands: that the Eleans should *ex post facto* pay the war expenses for the campaigns in which they had irregularly abstained from taking part, and that they should relieve those neighboring towns, which they had subjected to themselves as *perizœci*, from this relation. It is uncertain, what was the extent to which this proposal was made to apply; probably the Spartans intentionally left their demands indefinite, in order to be able to raise or moderate them according to circumstances. Their immediate object was only to assert their right of intervening in the internal affairs of the several states; and for this end they could not have found any better pretext, than by coming forward as the protectors of the liberty of Hellenic communities against unjust measures of violence. This was the policy with which they had entered upon the Peloponnesian war; and after they had dissolved the Athenian state, the Great Power, they now designed in the same way to weaken and humiliate the states of secondary importance which had increased their strength by incorporating lesser places in their vicinity. And the case of Elis seemed least of all to call for any hesitation; inasmuch as Elis was regarded as owing its territory only to the grace of Sparta.

The Eleans entertained no thoughts of giving way; on the contrary, they made answer with defiant spirit: that the Spartans were least of all entitled to deny their rights over towns belonging to them by conquest and by the use of many years, inasmuch as the Spartans were themselves everywhere by ruthless force of arms asserting the right of the stronger. The war commenced, and the first events in it could not but serve to raise the courage of the Eleans. For when, in the spring of 401, King Agis invaded the country, coming from Achaia across the river Larissus, it soon became manifest, how the whole of this

The demands  
of Sparta.

The war in  
Elis.

Ol. xciv. 3  
(a. c. 400).

enterprise troubled the minds of the Lacedæmonians themselves. They were filled with religious qualms, as they stepped upon the sacred soil of Elis; and when an earthquake ensued, they saw in it a divine signal, warning them against continuing the violation. The army turned back. Hereupon the Eleans redoubled their zeal in endeavoring to unite all the states averse from the Spartans in a common armament against them. But for this the general feeling was not as yet sufficiently confident; the Ætolians alone, a tribe of ancient kinship with the Eleans (vol. i. p. 133), responded to their cry for aid; while the Thebans and Corinthians contented themselves with assuming an attitude of passive resistance against Sparta, and refused to send their quota of forces, when in the summer of the same year Sparta called in the contingents for a second campaign.

This time, Agis advanced more resolutely. Entering from the Messenian frontier, he marched through Triphylia into the district of the Alphæus, everywhere meeting with a friendly reception; so that it must be assumed that the places of the district had been subjected to severe repression on the part of the Eleans. Although in Olympia he found vigorous resistance, yet he succeeded in offering up sacrifice unhindered at the high-altar of Zeus, and restoring the authority of Sparta in the national sanctuary. Hereupon the troops poured with avidity over the plains; for in all Hellas there was no district which, naturally fertile and most carefully cultivated, had enjoyed so unbroken a peace. Peloponnesians and Athenians (for the latter too had furnished a contingent), employed the opportunity to the full for providing themselves with stores of all kinds. The fair suburbs of the city of Elis on the Penæus were also plundered; the city itself, however, was, notwithstanding its imperfect means of defence, not attacked, probably because here the best of the Elean troops

Second year  
of the war in  
Elis.

α. xciv. 4  
(a. c. 400).

were assembled for a resolute resistance, and because King Agis hoped to be able to gain his end more certainly without sanguinary conflicts. For while he was despoiling the country round the port of Cyllene, at Elis itself the party of the wealthy landed proprietors, who had suffered the most severely of all, rose in his favor, with Xenias at their head. Their object was to remove the popular leader Thrasydæus, and thus to weaken the party of their opponents. But, in the confusion which ensued, another man was killed in his stead; Thrasydæus, supposed to be dead, appeared again among the people, who gathered around him with enthusiastic unanimity, and expelled the Laconizing party. Thus the enemy within the walls was overcome, while the national foe stood outside; and Agis was forced for the second time to dismiss his army, without having broken the obstinate spirit of the Eleans.\*

But this time he left an occupying force behind him by the Alphæus, whence it was gradually to exhaust the endurance of the Eleans, according to the precedent of what had been done in Attica from Decelea. The fugitive Eleans in the Spartan camp did what they could to make this method of operations as disastrous as possible to their native city, so that in the following summer its power of resistance had become exhausted. Thrasydæus began to negotiate. Elis had to consent not only to the renunciation of all its claims upon Lepreum, but also to the surrender of the whole of Triphylia. On the northern bank of the Alphæus, too, Letrini, Marganeæ, and Amphidoli, had to be released from their subjection (these were small localities belonging to the ancient district of Pisatis); the har-

The chastisement of Elis.

\* Xenophon in the first instance mentions only with regard to the neighbors on the Elean frontiers (the Arcadians and Achæans), that they provisioned themselves in Elis (*ἐπιπρωτόν*, *Hellen.* III. 2, 26). But it seems as if the expedition had also included Athenians, with the object of purchasing plunder. See the following Note.

bor-port of Phea, recently constructed on a peninsula jutting out into the sea (now Katakolo), was demolished, and Cyllene, the port-town, abandoned. Finally, the Eleans also had to renounce the highland district, extending in the rear of their capital towards Arcadia, the 'Acrorea' and its capital, the mountain-town of Lasium, to which they had laid claim. The negotiations lasted longest with regard to Epëum, a Triphylian mountain-town commanding the valley of the Alphëus. Upon this the Eleans held that they possessed a special claim, because they had purchased from it a renunciation of its independence. But even this claim the Spartans rejected with cynical contempt; it was much the same thing, they declared, whether the weaker were deprived of their liberty by force or by a commercial bargain.

Thus the Elean state was utterly broken to pieces and dissolved; the beginnings of its naval power were annihilated; it had to abandon its arsenal and its ships of war, and to pull down the walls encircling its capital. It was cut off from the coast, and despoiled of the protecting passes leading into the country, of the highland district, and of more than half of its entire territory. It was henceforth to recognize a number of village communities as neighboring states equal in rank to itself. Nothing was wanting, but that the superintendence of the sanctuary at Olympia should be taken away from it; nor did the places in Pisatis, which seemed now to have recovered their vitality, neglect this opportunity for reviving their primitive claims. But it now became manifest, how wisely the Eleans had acted in allowing no considerable place to continue to exist in the vicinity of Olympia. The Lacedæmonians could not transfer the honorary rights in question to a community of peasants, and thus allow the sacred festivals by their fault to fall into decay. They accordingly contented themselves with opening to their power every point of access on the sea as well as on the

land-side; but otherwise allowed the administration of the sanctuary to continue as before on the ancient footing.\*

Such was the end of the Elean campaigns. However limited was the area in which they took place, and however insignificant were the places whose independence was in question, yet no small importance attached to the quarrel. Sparta had, by virtue of her so-called liberating policy, succeeded in converting a power which had been recalcitrant and hostile for years, into a defenceless petty state; she had now established her leadership over the communities on the Alphæus as absolutely as over the country-districts of Southern Arcadia; and had in her power the harbors of the western coast. The remaining disaffected states were terrified by the awful judgment passed on Elis; and the Athenians had themselves been forced to aid in demolishing the state which in the midst of their sufferings had accorded them sympathy and sup-

\* *Notes on the chronology of the Elean War.*—Xenophon connects the war with the campaigns of Dercyllidas: *Hellen.* iii. 2, 21. Following this statement, Manso has dated it 399-6 a. c., and Krüger 398-7 a. c.; the latter being followed by Sievers and Hertzberg (*Agostlaos*, 242). On the other hand, Diodorus, xiv. 7, places its commencement in Ol. xciv. 3 (a. c. 401). It is not a necessary deduction from Xenophon that the quarrels in Asia and in Elis were contemporaneous; and this view is controverted (1) by the story of the Elean Phædo, who had been sold to Athens before the death of Socrates, and had doubtless been made a prisoner in the Elean war, as Preller has shown in the *Rhein. Mus. (Neue Folge)*, iv. 394; cf. *Gea. Abh.* 365; (2) by the chronology of the Spartan kings. According to Diod., xii. 35, Agis reigned for twenty-seven years; according to Thuc., iii. 89, from 426 a. c. (Archidamus was probably already sick in a. c. 427; cf. Ley, *Fat. of cond. Ag.* 38). Thus Agis would have died in 400 or 399. But Agis' accession took place in 399, if his death is dated (as by Boeckh, *Memphis*, 369-71; cf. Schaefer, *Demost.* i. 442) in 358, and if his reign is held (in accordance with Plutarch, *Agis.*, 40) to have lasted for forty-one years. Now, inasmuch as the 96th Olympiad was celebrated in the summer of a. c. 400, and celebrated, as we must assume, after the traditional fashion, the Elean war must have occurred in 401-400 a. c.; and Grote rightly conjectures (vol. ix. p. 316) that the Eleans were anxious to bring it to a close before the celebration of the festival. But he errs in extending its duration over three years. The statement that the Spartans met with resistance at Olympia is based upon Pausanias and Diodor., in contravention of Xen. *Hellen.* iii. 2, 26.

port. What was hereafter to prevent Sparta from continuing, with all the forcible means at her disposal, the subjection of the Greek states?

The Spartans at Cephallenia and Naupactus, In the first instance, the Spartans employed their newly-gained ascendancy on the shores of the western sea in expelling from Cephallenia, as well as from Naupactus, the Messenians settled there by the Athenians, and pursued them with their hatred even into Sicily, where they had met with a hospitable reception from Dionysius.\* On the other side, they

and in the Trachinian Heraclea. renewed their fortified military position under Mount Ceta, where they had founded the Trachinian Heraclea (vol. iii. p. 143). Disturbances which had broken out there furnished them with a welcome occasion for sending thither a military governor, by name Herippidas, who treated the citizens with the most arbitrary cruelty, expelled part of the CETAean population, and, by his utterly despotic proceedings, terrified all the northern states, and Thebes in particular.

Death of Agis. Ol. xcv. 1 (400 or 399 B. C.) On his return from his campaign, Agis fell sick on the road at Heræa, and soon afterwards died at Sparta. On his sick-bed he had, in presence of many witnesses, acknowledged his son Leotychides as his successor; but the funeral ceremonies were hardly at an end, when all Sparta was, by the question as to the legitimate succession to the throne, agitated to a degree unprecedented in the history of the two royal Houses.

Agesslaus and Lysander. Assuredly, the express recognition of Leotychides by his father would have put an end to all doubts, and have caused the series of Proclidæ on the throne to have continued in uninterrupted succession according to ancient usage, had not

\* Diod. xiv. 34. Lycon, commander of the place in the times of the Thirty, *ἡγεμὸς Ναύστατον*, *op. Metagen.*: Meineke, *Com.* ii. 755; cf. Bergk, *Ed. Com.* 422.

Lysander taken advantage of the peculiar circumstances existing in the present case for the purpose of his political schemes. He had withdrawn from the world in gloomy resentment, since the power by which he had held all Greece as in a net had been taken from his grasp. He saw himself neglected and set aside; his patron, Cyrus, to whom in reality he owed all his triumphs, had fallen, and his party was broken up. And yet he had not abandoned his ambitious designs. His hopes mainly rested on his relations to Agesilaus, the younger brother of Agis, and for this reason he had long been waiting for the death of the king.

Agesilaus sprang from the second marriage of King Archidamus, which he had concluded at an advanced age with Eupolia, a wealthy heiress. Her personal appearance seemed so little to entitle her to the royal dignity, that the marriage was generally believed to have been concluded only for pecuniary reasons, and that the Ephors took occasion to find fault with the royal choice, because such a woman could never become the mother of kings. And, in fact, the son born from this marriage seemed to confirm the presumption. Agesilaus was, like his mother, small of stature and insignificant; he was even lame in one foot. In this body, however, there lived an uncommonly gifted mind; an energy of will shrinking from no exertions for removing innate defects by incessant exercises; a vivacious and cheerful temper; wit and humor; and a great versatility in personal intercourse with other men; and, however modest his bearing, there yet dwelt in him something of his father's royal spirit, and from his youth up he was ruled by a fiery sense of honor.

On this boy Lysander had concentrated his attention. Inasmuch as Agesilaus was a posthumous son of Archidamus, and was therefore trained just like any other citizen's son, Lysander could, without provoking remark, attract him into intimacy with himself, the more so because

he was himself related to the House of the Heraclidæ. He entered into that species of intimacy with him which associated the men and boys of Sparta in couples—the man choosing whichever young Spartiate he pleased, in order by the influence of his personal intercourse to train him into a worthy citizen, and to infuse into him the true spirit of public life. Thus Lysander stood as a fatherly friend (*εἰσπρηλάς*) by the side of Agesilaus as he grew up : he endeavored to kindle the sparks of ambition in him, and to form him into a man who might be of use to him for the execution of his own schemes. For in the case of a king's son, who felt himself created by nature for royalty, but saw himself excluded from the throne by the existing laws of hereditary succession, Lysander could calculate upon a steady support if he were about to execute his scheme of overthrowing the family-laws of the royal House of Sparta.

The dispute about the succession to the throne at Sparta.

Circumstances were additionally favorable, in that the rights to the throne of the prince, who alone stood in Agesilaus' way, were not free from doubt. For it was generally rumored in Sparta that Queen Timæa had been seduced by Alcibiades, and that Leotychides was not King Agis' son at all (vol. iii. p. 445). No hesitation was felt in taking ruthless advantage of this circumstance for the purposes of ambition. It was affirmed that Leotychides had only by prayers and tears brought about his recognition on the part of his dying father ; and Lysander was incessantly active to overcome any scruples which Agesilaus might entertain against publicly attacking the fair fame of his royal sister-in-law, and against despoiling his brother's son of all his honors and property. In Lysander's eyes everything was welcome which contributed to destroy the existing relations in the two royal Houses ; for every innovation, if successfully brought to an issue, levelled the path for subsequent reforms. Accordingly, Agesilaus



came forward as a claimant to the throne, and for the first time a question of disputed hereditary succession was decided at Sparta in the public assembly.

The parties were sharply opposed to one another. All those who were afraid of the intrigues of Lysander were against Agesilaus, who was regarded as his adherent, and as devoid of a will of his own; above all King Pausanias, the old adversary of Lysander, who desired to protect the throne from shame, and to see honor done to the last expression of his royal colleague's will. The priestly party too, with the powerful Diopithes at its head, espoused the cause of Leotychides as that of legitimacy; they took advantage of the physical defect of the Pretender, and produced an oracle, in which every evil was predicted for the Lacedæmonians, should a lame king come to rule among them. The decision wavered; and there was a wish at all events to wait, until a declaration should have been obtained from Delphi with regard to the character of the oracle. But Lysander feared all delay, because for the nonce the prevalent feeling was in favor of his side. With happy presence of mind he acknowledged the oracle, which frightened his adherents, to be genuine and final; only it ought to be rightly understood. For the "lame" signified a bastard royalty: and it was this against which the warning of the god was directed. It is said that this device decided the question. The younger generation were upon the whole for Agesilaus; many desired once in a way to have a king who had lived with them on the footing of a comrade; it was hoped that he would bring with him better times, and put an end to the many evils disquieting the country; in short, Agesilaus became king by popular election; and thus, after a long term of neglect and impotence, Lysander had at last once more carried his desire. Unbending traditional usage, represented by the royal party, had been broken;

Agesilaus  
King.

Ol. xcv. 2 (a.  
c. 399).

and Lysander's pupil had been chosen, not only because his rights were good, but also because his merits were superior.

Summer.

The new king did all honor to his master's teaching. From Lysander, Agesilaus had acquired that worldly wisdom which renounces matters of secondary importance, in order to achieve main results. Spartan royalty was a splendid dignity without corresponding power. The efforts of Agesilaus were directed towards giving it a new importance; but he concealed his ambition, and avoided furnishing occasion for any conflict; he was more courteous towards the people, more ready to give way to the Ephors, and less careful with regard to external marks of honor, than any of his predecessors. As he had not grown into manhood in the exceptional position of a prince, he knew how to treat other men in daily intercourse; he was one of the few who ever sat on the throne of the Heraclidæ who had learnt to obey before they came to the throne. From calculation, he was modest and humble; like Lysander, he welcomed any means for making friends in all classes; and, again, like Lysander, he sought cautiously and quietly to extend his power by securing a personal following, in order thereafter together with his own power to raise that of the state.\*

Viewed on the outside, Sparta had never been more powerful than at the time of the accession of Agesilaus. She was the first Power, by land and by sea, in the Greek world; in the peninsula all resistance had been broken; beyond the Isthmus she had in Heraclea gained a new strong position

Sparta's  
power  
abroad;

\* The date of Agesilaus' accession is 399 B. C. (he was born 442): Pauly, *Realencyclopædie*, I<sup>2</sup>, p. 552; Hertzberg, *Leben des Ages.* (1856). There was a similar dispute as to the succession between Leotychides and Demaratus [vol. ii. p. 232], but not at the commencement of the reign. Diopithes ἀνὴρ εὐδαιμόνος ἐνὶ χρηματολογίᾳ, Plutarch, *Ages.* 3; Xen. *Hellen.* iii. 3, 2. He was the same man as the accuser of Anaxagoras (vol. iii. p. 47); cf. Aristoph. *Aves*, v. 989; *Equites*, v. 1065.

whence she could command the mainland, while in Thessaly she had upheld the Tyrant Lycophron of Pheræ against the attacks of his enemies; her garrisons were distributed in Megara, Ægina, Tanagra, and in the islands; beyond the sea, in Æolis and Ionia, Spartan troops stood in arms as victors against the satraps; in Thrace, Dercyllidas was walling off the Greek peninsula, as Miltiades and Pericles had done of old, in order to place the cities in those regions under the protection of Sparta; her navy ruled even the Western Sea, and the new despot at Syracuse, Dionysius, was only by Sparta enabled to maintain himself against his adversaries, domestic and foreign. But the dangers accumulating for Sparta at home more than counterbalanced these successes.

The mutual hatred of the different classes had grown from year to year; the state resembled two camps of hostile armies, of which and dangerous condition at home. the one was only watching for an opportunity to destroy the other. The new election to the throne had intensified the prevailing excitement; it was already regarded as a successful attempt at breaking with traditional usage. Lysander's intrigues further contributed to disquiet men's minds; for it was no longer a secret, that he intended innovations of a thorough-going character. Everywhere the ancient ordinances were called into question; new views of life had penetrated among the population. How was it possible that the lower classes should remain tranquil in the midst of this general movement? How, that the idea should not suggest itself to them, that for them too the time had come for freeing themselves from the intolerable oppression under which they lay?

In truth, a deep feeling of resentment agitated all those elements of the population which stood outside the narrow circle of the ruling houses. This resentment was shared by those Spartans whose families had, by becoming impover-

ished, lost their full civic rights; by the villagers or *Periœci*, who constituted the main part of the army and received no thanks for their services, who were forced to liberate the villages of the Eleans while themselves remaining in a state of subjection; and, lastly, by the Helots, who for centuries had borne the heavy yoke with gnashing of teeth, but who now bore it more unwillingly than ever, because far greater demands were made upon them in the foreign undertakings of the state, whereupon after serving its purposes they were forced to return into their pristine servitude.

Thus the bulk of the free and unfree population was pervaded by an equal rage, and grew into a party, determined on putting an end to the entire political system, full as it was of injustice, and on overthrowing the sway of the privileged families.

The  
conspiracy  
of Cinadon. Cinadon, a young Spartan who himself belonged to one of the civic families fallen into decay, a man of great gifts and of a fiery love of honor, placed himself at the head of the revolutionary party. On account of his ability, he had on several occasions been employed by the authorities in important affairs of state, but had remained excluded from all honors and profits. He organized the multitude for an attack, and indicated the means for creating an armed force; all the implements of iron in the hands of the country population were to be converted into weapons. By personal application he sought to induce those who were still irresolute to take part in the attempt. Thus, he is stated to have taken men to the side of the market-place, and to have asked them, what was their estimate of the numbers of the full citizens, and of the numbers of those not enjoying an equality of rights, and of the *Periœci* and the Helots; and when he was answered, that probably, exclusively of the Kings, Gerontes and Ephors, there might be about forty Spartiæ in the place, and more than four

thousand Lacedæmonians without full civic rights, he said: "Well, then, all these are thy allies, and those few are thy enemies. Is it just and enduring, to see those few hold sway? Is there any question as to the side where the victory will be when the decisive day arrives?"

Thus Cinadon prepared the rising, which was to bring about the annihilation of the class of the lords. The certainty of victory made him incautious; while the authorities were all the more vigilant, because their real power was so small; and this time too they were informed by their spies in sufficient time to anticipate the revolt.

They did not dare to seize Cinadon in Sparta itself. They accordingly sent him with an apparently very important commission to Aulon on the frontiers of Messenia and Elis, and caused him to be seized on the way. Hereupon he was put on the rack, where the names of his fellow-conspirators were extorted from him. After these had been secured and every mutinous outbreak prevented, Cinadon was brought into Sparta as a prisoner; led with his companions through the streets of the city, with his neck and hands in irons, amidst flagellations and other tortures, and then put to death. After this terrible judgment the people sank back into stolid indifference, and the oligarchy was saved.\*

It was fortunate, that immediately afterwards events occurred which diverted attention from home affairs. The war in Asia Minor had only been interrupted by a truce (p. 202); and this interruption had been very effectively employed by Pharnabazus to weaken the authority of Tissaphernes, and to bring about an entirely new state of things. He had gone up to Susa, in order to represent to the Great King the shameful condition of matters in the maritime provinces, and the necessity of altering the mode of conducting the

Pharnabazus  
at Susa.  
Ol. xcv. 4  
(s. c. 397).

\* Cinadon: Xen. *Hellen.* iii. 3, 4-11; *Polymn.*, ii. 14; *Aristot. Polit.* 207, 27; *Polyb.*, ii. 8, ὅπως τῆς πολιτείας τὸν μὴ δυνάμενον τὸ τέλος φέρειν μὴ μετέχειν.

war. He pointed out how the political system of Tissaphernes, based upon hatred and fear of the Greeks, was utterly undermining the Persian dominion; and showed how the result of the disgraceful treaties which were now being concluded was, that the armies of the enemy were being kept up in the empire by royal payments. It was necessary, he declared, to restore to the power of the Great King its previous authority; which could only be effected by a Greek commander being taken into the royal service and entrusted with a fleet. No more rational resolution could have been taken; and Pharnabazus was moreover in a position to name the man pre-eminently qualified for such a commission,—viz., the Athenian Conon.

Conon and Euagoras. Conon, the son of Timotheus, had alone been free from guilt among the ten generals in command of the Attic fleet at *Ægospotami* (vol. iii. p. 55).\* He had escaped from the rout with eight vessels, and had repaired to Cyprus, where he was hospitably received by Euagoras. But Conon was not the man to remain contented with having brought his own person into security; his heart beat loyally for his country, and his mind was strong in hope. He was incessantly intent upon the restoration of the greatness of Athens, and in his endeavor he met with the warmest response on the part of his generous host. It was an alliance of a rare character and of momentous import, which was concluded here, at the extreme end of the Greek world, between the Greek refugee and the lord of Salamis.

In this age, poor in men and in deeds, no other figure is to be met with so attractive as that of Euagoras. While elsewhere we find nothing but reaction and decay

\* Conon, whose father and son were both called Timotheus (it was a family-name of the Eumolpids; cf. Behdantz, *Vita Iph. Cæ. Timoth.*, p. 46), was alone free from guilt. (Philocles however was, like him, free from dishonesty; cf. vol. iii. p. 562.)

in the public life of both Hellenes and barbarians, Cyprus is a land of a hopeful progress, entirely associated with the lofty efforts of this *one* man. He had with heroic vigor not only recovered the princely power of which his house had been despoiled, but he had also begun to make a Greek land of the whole island, which after the days of Cimon (vol. ii. p. 446) had been flooded by Phœnicians and completely estranged from the Hellenes; so that the Cyprians now thoroughly detached themselves from the East, would marry none but Greek wives, and outvied one another in their devotion to Greek manners, culture, and art. Euagoras looked upon himself personally as an Athenian, because he sprang from the Teucridæ, whose home was the island of Salamis; already in the last years of the Peloponnesian war he had supported Athens by the importation of corn; and he delighted in connecting himself in any way with Athens, as with the luminous prototype of that culture the spread of which he now regarded as the task of his life. These were the fruits of the efforts of the Periclean age, to constitute Athens the centre of Hellenic culture. Conon, as a citizen of Athens, found Euagoras most ready to support his patriotic designs.

But Conon very clearly perceived that nothing could be effected by unaided Greek resources; he saw the necessity of returning to the policy of Alcibiades, and of endeavoring to direct the flow of Persian gold, whereby Sparta had gained her victories, in the interests of the Athenians. It was therefore of primary importance to obtain influence at the court of the Great King; and the circumstances of the times were favorable to Conon. The revolt of Cyrus had brought about an essential change in the feelings of the Persian court; the veil had been torn from the pretended friendship of Sparta. Persia needed other friends, and a different policy; never had the powers at Susa been more

Conon's  
negotiations  
with the Per-  
sian court.

accessible to friendly counsel than at present; nor were there wanting Greeks, who played a considerable part among the suite of Artaxerxes (such as in particular the court-dancer Zeno and the body-physicians Polycritus and Ctesias), and who were ready to act as mediators.\*

His war plans. The negotiations were commenced in a very skilful way. In the first instance, it was indispensable to bring about amicable relations between the Great King and Euagoras; for otherwise any proceedings originating at Cyprus would have been received with disfavor. Accordingly, the fears created at Susa by the bold establishment of a Hellenic princely house in the island were appeased; and ample payments of tribute served to prove Euagoras a loyal vassal, so that his friendship became a recommendation for Conon. Hereupon the latter drew up a report on the right method of conducting the war. He showed how absurd it was for Persia uselessly to exhaust her resources upon operations by land, whereas it was by sea that the question must be decided as to who should hold the supremacy along the coasts. He explained how by sea Sparta was weak and unskilful, while the Great King had at command inexhaustible resources of money, and ships, and crews. All that was required was to make use of these, and to find a commander of proved experience against the Spartans, who might easily be placed in the most untoward position, inasmuch as they were hated by the Greeks not less than by the Persians. At the same time he offered his own services. Ctesias placed his letter in the royal hands, and advocated its contents. Euagoras urgently recommended the acceptance of the services of the Athenian; whereupon Pharnabazus too, with whom Conon had already entered into relations, gave his support. Once before, already,

\* Euagoras: Isocr. *Euag.* Diodor., xiv. 98. Ctesias, p. 58, 77, ed. O Müller.



the satrap had journeyed to Susa in order to plead for an alliance with Athens (vol. iii. p. 514); he now, under more propitious circumstances, renewed his recommendations, which at the same time furnished him with an opportunity for humiliating Tissaphernes. For the same reason Parysatis too must have been favorable to the plans of Conon: for her policy was determined solely by personal motives.

A naval armament was therefore decreed. Pharnabazus was for this purpose granted 500 talents (122,000*l. circ.*), and Conon was appointed to the command of the naval force. But notwithstanding this determination, so much timidity prevailed that the impression was feared which the armaments would create at Sparta. It was desired not to irritate Sparta prematurely; the Spartan envoy, who happened to be at Susa, was accordingly detained there, and a despatch was transmitted to the authorities at Sparta itself, intended to keep them in a feeling of absolute security.

Thus the Great King was in trembling apprehension of the war-plans of the Spartans, <sup>The tidings reach Sparta.</sup> while these again were most deeply agitated, when a Syracusan, Herodas by name, whom business affairs had taken to Phœnicia, arrived at Sparta, and accidentally brought over the first tidings of the mighty armaments in progress in the Asiatic harbors of war. Not the remotest thought had been entertained of such dangers as these. All of a sudden the Spartans saw a new Persian war at hand; and, feeling incapable of resisting by themselves such event, in spite of the indifference which they had hitherto shown to national opinion, they now summoned the deputies of the confederate states, so that the imminent war between the two nations might be discussed as an affair of national Hellenic interest, and that resolutions might be arrived at upon it in common.\*

The present conjuncture was one which could not but

\* Herodas: Xen. *Hellen.* iii. 4, 1.

Spartan  
armaments.  
Lysander.

arouse in Lysander the belief that his hour had come. This was the moment, when his vigor of action, his experience and good fortune in maritime war, his influence upon the Asiatic cities, and his skill in the contrivance of advantageous alliances, could not but assert themselves. His ulterior schemes, too, he thought he might now bring to an issue; for how could he doubt that the king, who owed everything to him, would allow himself to be led entirely by the will of his benefactor? Accordingly, Lysander called the whole of his influence into play, in order to determine his fellow-citizens to prosecute the Asiatic war with new energy, before the slow-moving Persians had passed to the offensive; and to entrust the conduct of the war to their newly-elected king, thereby proving to Hellenes and Barbarians the thoroughness of their intentions. At the instigation of Lysander, convoys arrived from the cities beyond the sea, to request that Agesilaus might be placed in command of the army destined for their protection. The king himself became a candidate for the office of general, and demanded not more than thirty Spartans as his personal following, it being impossible, considering the difficulties of the aspect of things at home, to take a larger number abroad. But of these men it was designed to form the annually changing Council of War; they were to act as a Commission of Control in the name of the state, as the Ten were wont to do (p. 174); but they were also to furnish the commanders of the several divisions. Lysander was placed at the head of the Thirty;—doubtless in the case of this new institution, he had again taken the best means of advancing his own ends. Furthermore, 2,000 men were levied out of the remaining population and 6,000 Confederate troops. But how utterly the Spartans had deceived themselves in supposing that a national war proclaimed by the Sparta of the day would meet with a response on the

Unwilling-  
ness of the  
other states.

part of the nation! Who could trust Sparta to pursue a Hellenic policy? She was not even strong enough to force the states by fear to send their contingents; at Athens, the great change which was, through the instrumentality of Conon, being prepared, in the relations between the Powers, was no longer a secret, and, on the pretext of exhaustion, the civic community there evaded its obligations towards Sparta; Thebes refused outright to furnish her contingent, although to that city had been sent Aristomenidas, a relative of King Agesilaus, one of those who of old, in order to secure the favor of the Thebans, had condemned the Platæans to death (vol. iii. p. 134). The Corinthians likewise failed to put in an appearance, averring that they had received an evil omen in the inundation of their temple of Zeus.\*

This beginning was the reverse of encouraging; and inasmuch as the Spartans had quietly to submit to all reprisals, and could not for the present think of measures of force or punishment, they doubtless had every reason to advance as modestly as possible with their small body of troops. But the contrary took place. Agesilaus

Agesilaus at  
Aulis.

Ol. xcv. 4 (a.  
c. 396).

Spring.

\* As to the activity at this point of Lysander, cf. Plutarch, *Lys.* 23; *Agos.* 6 (the mission from the Asiatic cities is doubted by Herbst, u. s. p. 702). It is true that, as king, Agesilaus was commander by right of birth. Still, the expression "candidature" is justifiable, inasmuch as the case is not one of a regular levy of the ordinary Lacedæmonian army under its accustomed military chief, but of a quite extraordinary expedition, which it is requested that the king may command. The Thirty were certainly more of a kind of staff than of a board of control; but they are called outright *επιβουλα* and *συνέβουλοι*; nor can it be doubted that they were to fulfil functions by the side of the king, like those of the Ten attached to Agis (cf. Note to p. 174); although they as a matter of fact came to occupy a subordinate position, so that even the nomination of them was left to Agesilaus (Diodor. xiv. 79). A great want of fixity had come to characterize all the public institutions of Sparta. Aristomenidas (query *Ἀριστομένηδης*; cf. Kell, *Anat. Epigr.* 236) was the grandfather of Agesilaus on the mother's side, according to Paus. iii. 9. But Plutarch, *Agos.* i. mentions as such Melesippides; cf. Hertsberg, u. s. p. 236. Pausanias' statement as to the strongly warlike spirit of the Corinthians is strange; it sounds like irony. For *κατακαυθήντος*, Camerarius wrongly reads *κατακαυθίεντος*; cf. Curtius, *Pelopon.* ii. 537.

was solely intent upon opening his expedition with the utmost brilliancy of effect possible; he desired to recall the most glorious reminiscences of the past, and to make it appear as if another Trojan war were commencing under his leadership. He therefore, instead of crossing to Asia by the direct route, sailed with his troops along the Greek coasts to Eubœa, whence he repaired to Aulis. Here, where the ancient king of the Achæan hosts had sacrificed before the temple of Artemis, ere he began his expedition against Ilium, Agesilaus, as his successor also designed to make his offerings. Inasmuch as the decisive influence in the army was still exercised by Lysander, one is tempted to assume, that he encouraged this absurd stage-play; in which case his sole motive must have been to throw ridicule upon the king of Sparta, and, with him, upon the kingly office. At least he seems to have done nothing by way of opposing the childish vanity of Agesilaus, which speedily met with the bitterest punishment. For no sooner had the altar at Aulis been lit, and the soothsayer solemnly announced the favorable disposition of the gods, than a squadron of Theban horsemen galloped up and interrupted the ceremony, declaring that Agesilaus had, in defiance of the custom of the country, excluded the native priest of Artemis from the sacrificial act. The burning fragments of the sacrificial victims were scattered about the ground, and the new Agamemnon was forced to retreat in haste on board his ship.\*

The king sailed to Ephesus, in hopes of  
 Agesilaus in soon extinguishing, by successful exploits of  
 Ionia. war, the impression created by this evil omen.  
 Ol. xcv. 4 (a. c. 398).

But neither was he here to prosper as he had hoped. For, although Tissaphernes had not yet com-

\* Geræstus was the regular port of transit between Asia and Attica. *Strab.* 446. It might be thought that Agesilaus took the circuitous route, in order to obtain further contingents, and especially in order to enter into negotiations with the Boeotarchs (*Plutarch, Ages.* 6). But *Xen., Hellen.* iii. 4, 4, also mentions the sacrifice at Aulis as his main object; and so *Pausan.* iii. 9. As to the failure cf. *Xen. Hellen.* iii. 4, 15.

pleted his armaments, yet Agesilaus was too weak to be able to act with vigor, and thus found himself obliged to accept a truce. The satrap promised to employ the time conceded, in obtaining the liberation of the cities of Asia Minor from the Great King; and though it was out of the question to believe his intentions in this respect to be honest, Agesilaus consoled himself with the seeming glory of such an impression having been created by the mere fact of his arrival in Asia Minor; moreover, the cessation of arms was welcome to him for the purpose of securing an authoritative position in the strange land, and above all as towards his own followers.

Ionia was to Lysander as familiar as home. He renewed all his connexions of former times; the famous general was surrounded by his ancient partisans, while the unknown and in itself insignificant individuality of Agesilaus was quite cast into the background. Moreover, Lysander allowed it to be perceived clearly enough that he ought to be regarded as the chief personage. He demeaned himself on the old ground with the full self-confidence of old days, intending to show his friends that they had not counted upon him in vain; he was ready to resume the work which he had then begun,—and to bring it to a consummation. But as he had formerly deceived himself with regard to the authorities at Sparta, so he now deceived himself as to Agesilaus.

The King was by no means minded to stand by the side of Lysander as a merely <sup>Lysander</sup> humiliated. ornamental personage, such as had formerly been the case with Aracus (vol. iii. p. 547). He took deep offence at the homage which, asked and unasked, was paid to his companion; and other persons around him, likewise hurt by the ambition of Lysander, further stimulated his sense of irritation. Thus he began to withdraw himself from the oppressive influence of Lysander; next, he declined the proposals and recommendations of his counsellor,

because it was by him that they were made; and finally he sought for an opportunity of openly humiliating him. He conferred upon him one of the court offices, which had remained in existence from the days of the ancient Achæan kingship, and named him chief officer of the royal table. What might even in this age have been a distinction in the case of insignificant men, was a mockery in the present instance; and upon no man could the offence have rested more heavily than upon Lysander, who had invariably laughed to scorn the antiquated pomp of the royal Houses. After having been first humiliated by King Pausanias (p. 168), he was now for the second time put to shame in a far more cutting manner by his own pupil; and his position had thus become untenable. He requested a commission in some other quarter; whereupon Agesilaus sent him to the Hellespont, and in lieu of him found in Xenophon a man who could be of the greatest service to him, without burdening him with claims upon his gratitude, or constituting an obstacle to his royal authority.

This time also Lysander fell, without his fall provoking an outbreak; he whom the Ionic cities had once upon a time worshipped as a divinity, had long come to be regarded with indifference there. Agesilaus, on the other hand, by the rigor with which he had ridden himself of his self-seeking guardian, obtained and assumed a totally new position. He was now for the first time acknowledged by the army as its actual commander-in-chief, and the members of the Council of War subordinated themselves to him, since he showed himself equal to his mission. For however audacious it might seem to make war upon the Persian Empire with so small a force, yet it was a task which even a general of mediocre military talents might hope to accomplish. The wealthy maritime cities furnished him with an admirable base of operations; before him lay an unguarded land, replete with material re-

sources, inhabited by a population akin to the invaders and averse from the Persians, whence it was easy to draw the means necessary for supporting so moderate a number of troops. The climate was favorable to the expeditions in quest of booty, which were interrupted by convenient periods of rest in winter-quarters; and the satraps, whose duty it was to watch over the maritime provinces, were animated by feelings of deeper hostility against one another than against the Hellenic commander. The one urged him to attack the other, or at all events looked on in absolute apathy when he saw his colleague hard-pressed. Tissaphernes remained chiefly in the interior of Caria, where lay his private lands; and Pharnabazus in his satrapy on the Hellespont. Either sought to obtain information as to the movements of the enemy, and thereupon to counteract them; but there is no question of any vigorous resolution of advancing upon the coast, and of annihilating the hostile forces, or obliging them to take their departure. Finally, too, the vigilance and sagacity of the Persian military commanders were so small, that they allowed themselves to be deluded by the simplest stratagems. From the Phœnician fleet, on the other hand, there was in the first instance nothing to fear. Under these circumstances, the conduct of the war was by no means a very difficult matter, in particular no fixed and important ends were kept in view, but merely isolated advantageous undertakings intended.

After Tissaphernes had broken the truce, Agesilaus entered upon his campaign, in the summer of 396. He caused the march-through of his troops to be announced along the route towards Caria, in order thus to detain his adversary on the line of the Mæander. Hereupon he marched, unopposed, in a contrary direction towards the districts on the coast-line of the Hellespont, took possession of a series of towns and of an immense

The Ionian  
War.  
First cam-  
paign.

OL xcvi. 1  
(B. C. 396).

quantity of booty, but was by the advance of the enemy's cavalry obliged to retreat again to Ephesus: there was manifestly a want of horses and of light-armed troops in the Greek force. The winter was zealously employed in improving its armaments. Ephesus became a great depôt of arms and drilling-ground; the effeminate mercantile city seemed utterly to have changed its character; for all its store-houses were full of implements of war, in the fabrication of which all its artisans were employed. Recruiting progressed on the grandest scale. The rich booty excited a general desire for a soldier's life. The gymnasia and palæstræ were thronged; Agesilaus caused stimulating competitive games to be held, and at the head of his youthful associates dedicated the wreaths of victory in the Artemisium. It seemed as if the ways and habits of life on the Eurotas had been transplanted into Asia Minor; nor were any means of kindling a warlike spirit among the townsmen neglected. Agesilaus caused the prisoners to be exhibited naked, so that men might look upon the tender bodies of these Asiatics, who rarely doffed their robes, and who, accustomed to riding in carriages instead of walking, were unsuited for the fatigues of war. To fight against adversaries such as these, was obviously for men to fight against women. The Ionian townsmen, notwithstanding, preferred to provide substitutes in lieu of personal service. Their money brought in recruits, and horses from the best breeding districts; and doubtless this arrangement answered more satisfactorily both for themselves, who could now attend undisturbed to their business, and for the interests of Agesilaus.\*

The second campaign opened with a fresh deception being practised upon Tissaphernes. For Agesilaus allowed his real intentions to

Second campaign.  
Victory of the Pactolus.

\* Xen. *Hellen.* iii. 4, 15. Agesilaus relieved the wealthy Ionians, who furnished a horseman each, from personal service; the remainder served in person. (These are the "militia," *infra*, p. 245.)



become known, and hereupon, when the satrap Ol. xcvi. 1  
(B. C. 385). was on this occasion full of apprehensions on behalf of Caria, and was there awaiting the attack, marching with his army (which in the interval had probably grown to 18,000 or 20,000 men) inland up the valley of the Cayster; then turned to the left, past the range of Olympus, into the valley of the Hermus, over whose exuberant and hitherto untouched plains the army poured, without meeting with any resistance. But, this time, Tissaphernes massed his troops together, in order to save the central point of the entire administration of Asia Minor, the ancient capital of Lydia. Agesilaus saw the cavalry of the Persians descending into the plains of the Hermus, while their infantry yet remained behind. He therefore rapidly threw himself upon the vanguard of the army, with which he came up at the point of confluence of the rivers Pactolus and Hermus; and by a skilful application of the various kinds of troops, which he had assuredly learnt from Xenophon, succeeded in utterly defeating the foe. The rich camp was seized, while Tissaphernes remained without stirring at Sardes, and lacked the courage to avenge with his fresh forces this shameful rout before the very gates of his capital.

This was the first military exploit on a grander scale, and its consequences were important in several directions.

The immediate result was the overthrow of Fall of  
Tissaphernes. Tissaphernes, whose position at court had long been undermined. It was not, indeed, without difficulty that the Great King could be brought to let fall the servant to whom he owed his throne; but the power of the party of Pharnabazus had steadily increased; and the monarch was made to believe that Tissaphernes had by means of money-payments induced the enemy to spare his own province. The rout on the Pactolus settled his account; and thus on him too was at last wreaked the vengeance of the blood-thirsty Parysatis, which contrived

to fall upon all the enemies of Cyrus, one after the other. He was summoned to a council of war at Colosse, where his person was secured by the same kind of stratagem in which he believed himself master; and then he was given up to his successor in office, who began his tenure of it by sending the head of Tissaphernes to Susa.\*

Further consequences of the victory. Ol. xcvi. 2 (a. c. 395).

The Greeks loudly rejoiced at the overthrow of their hated adversary; and the authority of Agesilaus was raised higher among them than ever before. From home, too, the most brilliant mark of acknowledgment reached him. He was, since Leotyichides the first king of Sparta who had defeated the Persians in their own land, the first who at such a distance from his native city, in the midst of all the splendor of the East, and in possession of the fullest military glory and power, had yet remained thoroughly trustworthy and loyal. The highest hopes were attached to his personal career; and it was therefore resolved to unite with the royal authority, from which strict law had hitherto kept it separate, the dignity of the nauarchy.† Thereby the land-war too advanced into a new stage. Hitherto it had consisted of isolated expeditions of pillage; and this had been a method of conducting it suitable to the circumstances, and one for which the king and his army were perfectly adapted. After the last victory the claims made upon them had risen; more comprehensive strategical plans were now to be made; and this was perplexing to the victors. For a real war of conquest,

\* Various traditions existed as to the fall of Tissaphernes. It is accounted for by his revolting and committing treason against his sovereign: Nepos, *Onon*, 2, 3. *Contra*, Xenophon, Diodorus, Plutarch. Cf. Nicolai, *Politik d. Pers.* 37. As to the growth of discouragement after the death of Tissaphernes, Xen. *Ages.* 1. 35.

† The nauarchy is termed by Aristot. *Polit.* xlix. 31, a *ἐπίστα βασιλεία*; and Plutarch, *Ages.* 10, says: *τοῦτο μόνον πάντων ἐπὶ ἄρξεν Ἀγησιλάου*. See also Pausan. iii. 9. It can therefore hardly be doubted that (probably since the reason of Pausanias) a legal usage had prevailed, prohibiting the combination of the two dignities.

a subjection of the interior, entered neither into the plans of the king, nor into such a policy as Sparta could reasonably adopt.

What alone seemed feasible, was to annihilate the Persian power in Asia Minor by instigating the provincial governors to revolt. Results of this kind were not removed beyond the scope of a reasonable calculation. The satraps found themselves utterly incapable of offering resistance to the Hellenes by means of their own resources; the successor of Cyrus, too, had been obliged virtually to acknowledge the independence of the regions of the coasts; and the rigorous demands of the court, which never consented to renounce the tributary payments of the cities, caused intolerable difficulties to the governors. At the same time the latter, in consequence of their distance from the court, were in reality so uncontrolled in the exercise of their authority, that it was not ventured to depose or summon such a man as Tissaphernes, and that it was only possible to contrive his removal by a treacherous device. Under such circumstances it could hardly fail to suggest itself to the rulers of the province, that the best policy for them was to arrive at an understanding on their own account with the Greeks, and to achieve their emancipation from the authority of Susa by Greek aid. Had not Tissaphernes himself, the worst enemy of the Greeks, a Greek body-guard, which he regarded as the solitary assurance of his personal security? After the overthrow of Tissaphernes, who was looked upon as a strict royalist, and on account of his extended powers was feared by the lesser governors, the bonds of discipline and of cohesion with the empire were still further relaxed. Asia Minor appeared to be dissolving into a series of states and races, whose princes were dependent upon Greek support, and who therefore must necessarily be found ready to make concessions.

Agesilaus was active in this direction. He <sup>New plans</sup> of Agesilaus.

succeeded in inducing Otys, the local king of Paphlagonia, openly to revolt. This negotiation was managed by Spithridates (a subordinate of Pharnabazus), whom Lysander had persuaded to take the side of the Greeks. Agesilaus contrived a marriage between Otys and the daughter of Spithridates, in order to attach the king still more closely to himself, and if possible to form a group of princes, united in a common support of the Greek interest. It was hoped to attract even Pharnabazus into such a union;—but before these plans were matured, a complete change in the course of the events of the war occurred, which was likewise a result of the victory on the Pactolus.\*

<sup>Tithraustes.</sup> The place of Tissaphernes had been filled by Tithraustes, a man whom it was far more difficult to manage, because he pursued higher ends. Tithraustes in no wise deceived himself as to the realities of his position. He recognized the impossibility of warding off the foreign armies by force of arms, and accordingly began to negotiate on a new basis. He declared himself ready to acknowledge the independence and autonomy of the maritime cities, provided that they paid a certain rent to the Great King, whose notion of proprietorship in the soil on which the cities were built it was useless to contest. This proposal was doubtless the sole basis on which an understanding could be on either side arrived at, and the sole method of securing to the cities their civic liberties, without the presence of a foreign army in Asia Minor and the uninterrupted endurance of a state of war. Many Greek colonies existed on similar conditions, without their right to the name of free Greek cities ever being contested.†

\* Otys (Cotys in Xen. *Hellen.*): Plutarch, *Ages.* 11; Xen. *Ages.* ii. 26.

† Tithraustes, commander of the royal body-guard, belonged to the party of Ctesias; cf. Nicolai, *s.* a. p. 36. The negotiation with Agesilaus was managed by a certain Callias: Xen. *Ages.* viii. 3. Oibia is an example of colonies which paid a chief-rent.

But it was impossible for Agesilaus, after his victory, to accept such conditions; and Tithraustes was for the present unable to do anything besides ridding himself of his adversary after the fashion of Tissaphernes, by paying him large sums for his troops, and obtaining in return a promise that he would turn again to the Hellespont. Thus neither did Pharnabazus derive any benefit from the fall of his opponent; but his condition was worse than ever before. For his princely residence, Dascyleum on the Propontis, became the winter-quarters of Agesilaus, who indulged in the pleasures of the chase in the preserves of the satrap, while the latter wandered from place to place with his treasures, pursued by flying bodies of troops.

But meanwhile Tithraustes had found other, and more effective, means for putting His negotiations with the Greek states. an end to the troubles in Asia Minor. If the war must inevitably be carried on by gold instead of by arms, it was better to give the gold, not to the king of Sparta, who was thereby merely enchained to the soil of Asia Minor, but to the enemies of Sparta in the mother-country. Tithraustes was aware how matters lay there, how vast an amount of combustible materials had accumulated, and how a war kindled in this quarter must furnish the safest means of restoring to the royal maritime provinces the peace which they had so long desired. By sea, Conon had already assumed the conduct of the war; now (in the summer of 395), Tithraustes des- Mission of Timocrates. patched the Rhodian Timocrates to Athens, Thebes, Argos and Corinth. The Persian subsidies, for which in the Peloponnesian war the Athenians had so eagerly longed, and for which the Spartans had paid the price of manifold humiliations, were now voluntarily offered to, and placed before, the cities hostile to the Spartans; the golden "bowmen," applied in the right quarters, had their due effect. The leaders of the democratic

party, whose interests now coincided with those of the Great King, freed his land from the oppressive enemy, by making Greece, after a short cessation of arms, once more the theatre of a war, which was carried on by sea and by land for seven years, and which essentially altered the mutual relations of the Greek states.\*

\* Agesilaus *μυρίαις τοξίταις ἐφελανόμενος τῆς Ἀσίας*: Plutarch, *Ages.* 15. The Great King's image as a bowman: Brandis, *Münchener te Vorderas.*, 244, 360.

## CHAPTER IV.

### THE CORINTHIAN WAR.

WHEN Agesilaus crossed the sea to Asia, in order to attack the Great King in his own empire, this might, viewed on the outside, have been deemed a magnificent sign of progress on the part of Sparta. But in reality she was hereby only evading the incomparably harder task incumbent upon her in Greece itself; and the utter incapacity displayed by her in the conduct of Hellenic affairs inflicted upon the state a damage far exceeding the advantages it drew from its new military glory. After the deeds of the Cyreans, triumphs gained over Persian satraps could no longer create any impression; the appeals to national sentiment, artificially set in motion, met with no response, because they were mere figments; and the age was too devoid of enthusiasm to allow itself to be deluded by the pompous demeanor of Agesilaus. During his campaigns the general feeling of discontent had increased instead of diminishing. Above all, the cruel treatment of Elis had provoked the bitterest indignation; it was now seen what were the ultimate intentions of Sparta, when she had the power in her hands. And it was perceived at the same time, that while the small and defenceless states in her vicinity fell a prey to her lust of vengeance, the greater and more remote states remained unpunished for the most open resistance and the most callous insults. Thus the fear of Sparta gradually vanished: the disproportion became evident between her claims to power and her power as it actually was; and this facilitated the growth of an understand-

ing between the states which now desired to rid themselves of the pressure exercised by Sparta, some for the first time, others anew,—the latter recovering from their defeat, the former entering into the contest with vigorous freshness, in order to secure a position of independence. Thebes, Argos, Corinth, and Athens were the localities where the agitation was at work; everywhere considerable men stood at the head of the movement: at Argos, Cylon and Sodamas; at Corinth, Timoleus and Polyantbes; at Thebes, Androclides, Amphitheus, and Galaxidorus. At Athens the popular orators Agyrrhius and Epicrates acquired influence, and the state more and more returned into the paths of the old democracy. The same tendency likewise manifested itself in the other states together with the movement against Sparta, and served as a common bond among them.\*

This state of things was known in Persia through Conon; and the instructions of Timocrates were drawn up in accordance with it.

The situation was so favorable, that no bribes were needed in order to gain over traitors, and to direct the policy of the several states into a new course. It was possible to negotiate openly; and there was therefore additional security for the money not being expended uselessly. The revolt had in fact already taken place: both Corinth and Athens had refused to send their contingents in compliance with the Spartan summons; Thebes, which the Spartans had endeavored by special overtures to gain over through the mission of Aristomenidas (p. 223), had adopted the same course in a far harsher form, and had

\* "Κορινθιακός πόλεμος": Isocrates; Isæus, Diod. xiv. 86 (who distinguishes the Bœotian war, and yet allots eight years to the war in general); Paus. iii. 8; Sievers, *Geoch.* p. 50 f.; Hertzberg, *Agcs.* 80; Spiller, *Kritische Geschichte des Korinthischen Krieges* (1852). Xen. *Hellen.* iv. 4, 7 (land-war) 4, 8—5, 1 (naval war), without chronology. The solitary indubitable basis of dates is furnished by the eclipse of the sun, *Hellen.* iv. 3, 10.—Κύλων, Σωδάμας, &c.: Paus. iii. 9; Xen. *Hellen.* iii. 5.



moreover publicly cast the rudest insult upon King Agesilaus. Such relations as these could not be maintained; their end must be war; nor was it assuredly advantageous to wait until Sparta, enriched by the Asiatic spoils and encouraged by a fortunate peace with Persia, might perchance for her part think the conjuncture of circumstances favorable for chastising the recalcitrant states, and dooming one after the other to the fate of Elis. Nothing was wanting but resources with which to carry on the war; when, therefore, these offered themselves unasked and in abundance, it was neither possible nor permissible to delay any longer. This explains the speedy effect following upon the mission of Timocrates, and brilliantly confirming the prospects developed by Conon.

The Thebans displayed the utmost ardor; it was they who caused the outbreak of the war. This they did, in order to avoid a direct advance against Sparta itself, by occasioning a border-feud in their own neighborhood. The Opuntian Locrians, who stood under the influence of Thebes, were instructed to lay claim to a strip of land, of which the possession was disputed between them and Phocis. The Phocians, as was to be anticipated, invoked the aid of Sparta, and the Thebans sent word to Athens. Athens was a defenceless city, upon which a cautious attitude was accordingly incumbent; the Athenians had not accepted any war-subsidies from Persia, and hesitated to enter upon any open acts of hostility. On the other hand, however, they could not tolerate the renewed entry of Peloponnesian troops into Central Greece, and the resumption of the policy of Lysander; for in this event they had to fear for themselves also the worst consequences. They therefore despatched envoys to Sparta, with the request that the Phocian border dispute might be decided by a judicial tribunal. But when the answer was only a military armament, the resolution of the civic community of Athens was quickly ta-

League between Athens and Thebes. (s. c. 395).

ken. Though they saw the Spartan garrisons established round Attica on every side—in Eubœa, Tanagra, Ægina, Megara;—though they were themselves without walls and without ships, they were yet unwilling to leave the benefactors of the city in the lurch. Besides such men as Epicrates, of whom it was at least rumored that they had accepted Persian money, Thrasybulus of Collytus, and Thrasybulus of Stiria, the liberator of Athens, addressed the citizens, and awakened the ancient spirit of warlike confidence. It was determined to send military aid to the Thebans; and this resolution was the first act by which Athens came forth from her retirement, and the first success of the Boeotian party, which had begun to form itself simultaneously with the liberation of the city (p. 77). Already in the autumn of B. C. 395 (Ol. xcvi. 2) Thrasybulus marched to Thebes with an auxiliary force, delighted to be able to prove his gratitude towards his former hosts, who received him with a joyous welcome.\*

The zeal for war at Sparta was based upon the fact that Lysander had re-established his influence there. Undismayed by all the rebuffs which he had undergone, he had incessantly pursued his schemes, and had again gathered round himself a party warmly attached to him. What he above all needed, was a new opportunity for proving himself to be the man alone able to effect the subjection of the Hellenes. The revolt in Central Greece was in itself a triumph for him, because the absurdity was thereby made manifest of the lax and forgiving policy which had been against his advice pursued; he hoped to be now once more the one indispensable personage, and to be able, in the absence of Agesilaus, to resume his interrupted work with better success; so as to succeed in avenging upon both the kings the humiliations inflicted upon him.

\* Xen. *Hellen.* iii. 5, 3: *παίθουσι* Δοκρούς. § 2 (Ἀθηναῖοι οὐ μεταλαμβάνοντες τοῖς χρευσίαις) in opposition to Pausan. iii. 9, 5 (Epicrates, *σακεσφόρος*); Demosth. xviii. 98; Frohberger, *Philol.* xvii. 438.

He obtained his nomination to the supreme command. He undertook to assemble a confederate army to the north of Thebes; Pausanias was commissioned to collect the Peloponnesian troops, and to advance across the Isthmus. The two armies were hereupon to unite in Southern Bœotia, and to crush the hostile forces, before these had strengthened themselves by further accessions. Lysander in his impatience hurried in advance, gathered troops in Phocis and Thessaly, and marched upon Haliartus, where he was to effect his juncture with the king. But Pausanias was not found there by Lysander; who, full of eagerness to accomplish the first military exploit alone, rashly advanced upon the well-defended city. On the one side he was attacked by the besieged, on the other by the Thebans hastening to the rescue, and in this unequal struggle he was cut down with part of his troops.

Battle of  
Haliartus.  
Ol. xcvi. 2  
(*a. c. 396*).

Death of  
Lysander.

Thus pitifully ended the life of a man, who for a time was more puissant in Hellas than any Hellene before him, who caused himself to be adored like a god, and who, after he had brought about the most important decision known to the history of the Greek states, thought that he also retained its further development in his hands. Lysander had a clear consciousness of the meaning of the remark made by the Corinthians to the Lacedæmonians at the commencement of the Peloponnesian War: "For a state, which bears itself quietly, permanent institutions are excellent; but if it engages in manifold undertakings, it cannot rest in its old forms, but must improve and change many things." Thus he too was minded to transform antiquated Sparta, in order that she might be equal to her new task. But that which impelled him to his innovations was not patriotism; they were to serve his own purposes. Unconscientiously self-seeking, he desired to annihilate every obstacle to his ambition; from his youth up he restlessly wrought for a

His character and plans.

single end ; but a curse rested upon all his doings, and his victories brought no blessing either to himself or to his native city ; it was his lot to survive his fame, to suffer the bitterest insults, and finally, in an enterprise which his error made a failure, to die prematurely and ingloriously.

After his death a document was discovered, which he had caused to be drawn up by Cleon of Halicarnassus, in order to expound the ideas lying at the root of the constitutional changes intended by him. His plans remain a secret, but so much is clear : that he wished to put an end to the conflict of powers, which rendered Sparta incompetent to pursue a vigorous and consistent policy. The kingship was to be preserved as an institution sanctified by primitive declarations of the gods ; but it was to become a different thing from what it had been : out of the whole body of Heraclidæ, or out of the whole body of Spartans, the man suited to the office was to be raised to the headship of the state. Further, it was also necessary to abolish the Ephors, and to establish a new, and enlarged, civic community for choosing this head. The state was therefore to be renovated both as to its head and as to its members, and for the sham kingship was to be substituted a personal government, the sway of *one* strong will, able to rule Sparta, from Sparta, the entire Greek World. Lysander had laid all the states prostrate at the feet of his native city ; and he accordingly deemed himself to be the man, whose mission it was, in the capacity of newly-elected chief of the state, firmly to establish the dominion which had been gained through him, and to unite Greece under a single dictatorship.

But for a *coup d'état* effected by violence Lysander lacked both the resources and the courage. His was not a heroic nature, such as would have assembled around him the people, and have advanced directly upon its goal ; he could not even make himself the centre of a strong party.

Intrigue was the element in which he lived, and by entirely giving himself up to this tendency he, as time went on, lost more and more of his resoluteness and vigor of action. He sought to secure partisans in the priests, in order to transform the state, which was still governed in accordance with signs from heaven, without offending against legal forms; he desired to receive his powers, as if he had been a second Lycurgus, from Delphi, where he had made himself a favorite by splendid dedicatory gifts. It was bruited abroad, that the Delphic archives contained divine oracles still unread, the contents of which none but a son of Apollo might reveal; indeed, there was brought to Delphi, from somewhere near the Pontus, a youth, whom his mother declared to be the son of a god; as such he was to be acknowledged at Delphi, and thereupon to announce the new revelations. If it is remembered, how at Dodona and in Libya Lysander likewise set the oracles in motion, the grandeur of the scale on which this game of intrigue was carried on must cause profound astonishment. But his devices were woven too finely, so that the threads were torn asunder even while he held them in his hands. Undoubtedly Lysander was the most gifted statesman produced by Sparta in her latter days; no man was his equal in knowledge of men and of affairs; and that in his political essay the evils of the Spartan constitution were accurately signalized, is assuredly to be concluded from the very circumstance, that hesitation was felt about allowing the document to become public, notwithstanding the wish of Agesilaus to the contrary. But Lysander lacked the courage of a good conscience; and for this reason he, with all his great gifts, achieved nothing. He merely contributed to promote the disorganization of his native city, to make his fellow-citizens eager for money and prone to intrigue, and thoroughly to lower the spirit of Sparta. He thought no device too bad and no means too immoral; and yet he

fell in consequence of his policy being one of half-measures, inasmuch as he desired to combine with one another the revolution and legality, and was perpetually oscillating between timid hesitation and reckless arrogance. Perhaps this self-contradiction may be connected with a mental disorder, from which he is said to have suffered in his later years, and which is easily to be explained by the manifold self-delusions of his passionate ambition.\*

Misfortunes of Pausanias. Ol. xcvi. 2 (a. c. 396.)

On the day after the death of Lysander, Pausanias made his appearance with the Peloponnesians. He saw lying under the walls of Haliartus the bodies of the fallen, an unprotected prey in the hands of the foe; for after the failure of the surprise the Phocians had during the night dispersed to their homes. The entire plan of the campaign had been frustrated; nor was the spirit prevailing among the king's troops by any means encouraging; they found themselves threatened by a superior force of cavalry, the Athenians having likewise in the meantime reached the scene of the conflict; in short, the situation of Pausanias was one of the utmost anxiety. It was out of his power to obtain by force of arms that which it was his immediate duty to secure, viz. the rescue of the dead bodies out of the hands of the enemy; and he had accordingly, after listening to his council of war, no choice but to request the enemy to grant him a truce and a peaceable surrender of the dead. But even this was only granted to him on condition of his evacuating the country. He was forced at once to commence his retreat, during which he was

\* Μεταγχολία of Lysander: Aristot. *op.* Plutarch, 2. As to the revolutionary plans of Lysander, see Plutarch, 25; Diodor. xiv. 13; Nepos, following Ephorus. "A second Pausanias," Athen. 543. According to Grote, Cleon (Plutarch, 18) composed the essay on his own account: *contra* Lachmann, ii. 304; Hertzberg, 282. In so far as Lysander intended essentially to change the nature of the kingship, Aristot., *Polit.* xciv. 31, states him *ἐπιχειρήσαι καταλύσαι τὴν βασιλείαν*; but he does not state it as a fact. Nepos, *Lysand.* iii. 5. The story of the pretended son of Apollo is told by Plutarch on the authority of an ἀντὶ ἱστορίας καὶ φιλόσοφος (*quærens* Theophrastus?).

pursued by exulting enemies, who would not permit the troops on their march out of the country to turn to the left or to the right out of the highroad, for the purpose of obtaining supplies. The king was received at Sparta with loud expressions of dissatisfaction: he was charged with tardiness and cowardice; and the Lysandrian party availed itself of this state of public feeling, to make him pay the penalty of Lysander's rashness, and to render him accountable for Lysander's death. His former conduct in Attica was also now raked up as an accusation against him. Pausanias did not venture to appear before the judicial tribunal; and, sentenced to death, took flight to Tegea.\*

In the enemies' camp this unexpected success had called forth an extraordinary revolution of feeling. The most dangerous of their adversaries was now removed for ever; Sparta was humiliated, and Thebes full of victorious confidence. There could no longer be any difficulty in bringing about an open alliance in arms against Sparta. Argos and Corinth, between whom an understanding already existed, joined hands with Thebes and Athens; a federal fund was formed, and a federal council constituted which was to sit at Corinth, and thence to direct the common measures of the Confederates. Hereupon envoys went forth from Corinth, as in the days of Themistocles, to summon the remaining states to the struggle for their independence. The Locrians had been already gained; but now the Malians likewise joined, who had been irritated by the foundation of Heraclea (p. 210), as well as the cities of Eubœa, and in the West the Acarnanians, Leucadians, and Ambraciotes; all having either to suffer or to fear Lacedæmonian oppression. On the side of Sparta there stood only those communities of the peninsula which were entirely without independence, and the states in which a

The Corinthian League.  
B. C. 395.

\* Xenophon, *Hæcæ*. iii. 5, 23, denies that Pausanias was guilty.

minority of the citizens or individual despots maintained by Sparta held sway. The Corinthian League summoned the Greeks to freedom as against every kind of oppression. Called into life by Persian money, it was yet supported by the feeling of the people; it was accordingly no counter-league of seceders, as which it was regarded by Sparta, but a national league, and therefore soon became a recognized power, whose military aid was demanded, wherever the interests of civil liberty were in question; in fact, this league took the place of ancient Sparta as the adversary of Tyrannical government. Such was the case in Thessaly. Here Medius, the dynast of Larisa, had for years been involved in a feud with Lycophron, the Tyrant of Pheræ. The latter, being supported by Sparta, had the advantage in this quarrel. As soon, therefore, as the Larissæans heard of the anti-Spartan league, they applied to it, and by means of an accession of 2,000 auxiliaries succeeded in taking Pharsalus, of which the citadel was garrisoned by Lacedæmonians. The whole of Thessaly joined the League; Heraclea opened its gates, and was occupied by Argive troops; the highland-tribes in the vicinity sent their armed contingents; and the Phocians, who were commanded by Spartans, suffered a heavy defeat at Narycus. In the space of a few months, the influence of Sparta in Central and Northern Greece had been virtually annihilated, and the new League was regarded as the Hellenic Power proper from the frontiers of Laconia up to Mount Olympus; it possessed an army, ready for active service, of 15,000 men; and it held in its hands the passes of the Isthmus. Sparta was surrounded on all sides, and at the same time by no means certain of her own population or of the remaining members of the Confederation; she was involved in a foreign war, of which the ulterior development was beyond calculation; for the brilliant military exploits filling the despatches of Agesi-

Thessaly  
joins the  
League.



laus brought no lasting results with them, nor did they relieve Sparta from the fear of the Phœnician fleet. This fear increased, as the consideration suggested itself, that this fleet might make its appearance off the coasts of Hellas in the midst of the war against the Separate League, and might make common cause with the enemy. At Sparta therefore the feeling was loud and deep against the whole of the complication beyond the seas which had been entered into; and orders were without delay sent to the Asiatic army to return home with all possible speed.

It was in the spring of the year 394 B. C. (Ol. xcvi. 2), that the messenger of the Ephors arrived at the head-quarters of the king at Astyra in Mysia, when he was on the point of opening the campaigns intended to remove the war into the interior, and to shake the empire of the Great King at its very core. In the midst of victory Agesilaus saw himself overcome by the far-darting arms of Tithraustes, and was forced with a heavy heart to commence a retreat, which at once freed his foes from all dangers, and rendered useless all the combinations effected by him, while it led himself and his troops to a battle-field where heavy struggles with little glory, and great hardships without any spoils, awaited them. He sought to mitigate his ill-fortune by illuReturn of Agesilaus.ry promises to himself and others of a speedy return Ol. xcvi. 2 (B. C. 394). to Asia. He moreover did what was in his power to ret as much as was possible of the advantages already gained. He arranged that, during his absence, in addition to the fleet, an army of 4,000 men under Euxenus was to defend the coast-towns; and for this purpose he chose European troops, upon whom he could depend, while he took with himself to Europe the militia-contingents levied in the cities themselves: he wished these contingents at the same time to serve as hostages for the cities, and hereby to preserve the newly-founded defensive strength of the Asiatic Greeks: he in-

tended to accustom them to a brotherhood-in-arms with Spartan troops, and above all to secure the dominion of Sparta on either side of the sea, the establishment of which constituted his greatest glory. He contrived very skilfully to excite emulation among the cities in the equipment of their contingents, and was thus able to cross the Hellespont in July at the head of a large and well-appointed army.

Meanwhile the struggle in the mother-country had more nearly approached the proper domain of the Spartan power, and the Bœotian had become a Corinthian war. For the Northern members of the League had in view nothing beyond the liberation of their territories from the pressure exercised by Sparta, and the confinement of that state to the peninsula. The geographical and political boundaries were once more to be made identical: the passes of the Isthmus accordingly acquired a new significance, and everything depended upon obtaining possession, with the aid of Corinth, of three outlets from Peloponnesus; the pass of Cenchreæ, the gorge of Acrocorinth, and especially the broad road along the coast between Corinth and Lechæum. For these outlets were at the same time the inlets into the Northern districts, which here had a common bulwark, while on the hither side of the Isthmus they were open to the invasion of the enemy; Athens in particular, so long as she was deprived of her own walls, had no walls to rely upon but those of the Isthmus. Thus Athens and Thebes were agreed in the point of view assumed by them, and in their strategical policy they counted upon the ancient aversion of the Peloponnesians from campaigns beyond the Isthmus, and upon the unskilfulness of the Spartans in the conduct of sieges.

Division of  
opinion in the  
Council of  
War.

But the Peloponnesians could not assent to these points of views; for Corinth of course lay outside this line of defence, and even less

than Corinth was Argos protected by it. A mercantile city such as Corinth could not look favorably upon a long war, carried on, without any prospect of decision, in her own territory; inasmuch as for her it was of supreme importance to maintain an open intercourse with the interior and with foreign lands. Corinth necessarily desired that the war should be brought to a speedy issue; in other words, that Sparta should be humbled; which humiliation could only be effected at Sparta itself. Timolaus therefore, in the diet of the League, proposed an immediate attack upon the enemy. As yet, this enemy was discouraged; Lysander was dead, and Agesilaus far away. The present, he urged, was the right moment. When one he said, wished to protect himself against a plague of wasps, he surely did not wait for the approach of the whole swarm, but set fire to the nest; and when one wished to cross a river, he crossed it as near as possible to the source. In the same way the enemy ought now to be sought out, before he had increased his strength by the accession of troops. The party reasoning thus was, however, unable to prevail. Thebes, which was the most powerful among the states, and which under its general Ismenias had gained all the notable successes hitherto achieved, retained the leading voice in the League, without at the same time being wholly able to suppress opposition. In the inner life, too, of the Peloponnesian states belonging to the League there prevailed a hostile opposition between different parties: the Democrats, who had kindled the war, regarded the smallness of the states as the foundation of the Spartan supremacy, and advocated a close alliance with other states and the formation of larger state-territories; while the aristocratic party inflexibly adhered to the principle of the independence of the several cities. This conflict was particularly keen at Corinth, where party-feeling was still more intensified by the fact, that the citizens suffered losses of such severity

in consequence of the war. In the other states of the League engaged in the war, the fields could be tilled undisturbed; Corinth had to bear its burden for all the rest. The discontent hereby excited answered the purposes of the Aristocrats, who desired peace with Sparta; and it thus became difficult to maintain a harmonious understanding in the Council of War. In short, the League was afflicted with all the drawbacks which are wont to attend combinations of secondary states, unaccustomed to pursue a policy of their own, and induced by events of an exceptional character to enter into a union with other states, with which they are not in the habit of co-operating, and only have special interests in common; while in the present instance the League was moreover formed of states hitherto mutually hostile, and accordingly found it peculiarly difficult to agree upon a common management of affairs.

Battle of  
Nemea.

Ol. xcvi. 2 (a.  
c. 304).

July.

The Spartans had no intention of looking quietly on, while they were being blockaded in the peninsula; moreover, further delay on their part might lead to further defections in their Confederation. They accordingly assembled the contingents in Arcadia, in order to march upon the Isthmus; but, instead of taking the shortest routes, probably because they feared to meet with enemies lying in ambush in the mountain-passes, they took a widely circuitous path along the shores of the Corinthian Gulf towards the district which was inevitably to become the theatre of the war, and chose Sicyon for their headquarters.\* Two bodies of troops, of considerable numbers, lay opposite to one another here. The heavy-armed infantry probably numbered about 20,000 men on either side; in cavalry and light-armed troops the advantage

\* Xen. *Hellen.* iv. 2, 13: ἐβήσαν τὴν ἀμφιάλον. Herbst, *Neue Jahrb. f. Philol.* 690, would read, ἀμφὶ Ἀλλίαν. Perhaps ἀγγχάλον. I believe I have correctly given the sense of the passage in the text.

was probably with the Leaguers. On the other hand, they lacked a vigorous leadership, and were at issue as to the disposition as well as to the command of the troops; probably because it was not wished to allow the Corinthians, in whose territory the fighting was being carried on, to have the supreme command. The Spartans were led by Aristodemus, the guardian of King Agesipolis, who had succeeded the dethroned Pausanias. About the middle of the summer, 394 B. C., the armies met by the stream Nemea, the lower course of which formed the boundary-foss between Corinth and Sicyon. The Thebans prematurely rushed upon the Achæans fronting them, and thereby broke the cohesion of the line, so that it was possible for the Spartans to outflank the Athenians (who were fighting, 7,000 strong, under Thrasybulus; while the rest of the army was driven back in extreme confusion. The situation became still worse, when the fugitive bands reached the gates of Corinth, and found them closed by the Laconian party: it was not till after some time had passed, that they succeeded in forcing an entrance and reaching a safe retreat behind the walls. The forces of the League had suffered great losses, but they were able to maintain their position, and, as before, to control the passes. Aristodemus deemed it advisable to proceed to no fresh attack at present, because he might, in view of the approach of Agesilaus, expect the whole situation of the war soon to change for the better.\*

For neither in Northern Greece was the Se-  
 parate League, notwithstanding its rapid ex-  
 March of  
 Agesilaus.

\* Battle of the Nemea: Xen. *Hellen.* iv. 2. 18; Lys. xvi. 15. Demosth. xx. 52: ἡ μεγάλη μάχη πρὸς Α. ἡ ἐν Κορίνθῳ. Xen. *Agos.* vii. 5: ἡ ἐν Κ. μάχη. The date is fixed by Aristides, II. 370 (Dindorf): τῆς ἐν Κ. μάχης καὶ τῆς ἐν Λεχαιῶν μέσσης ἄρχων Εὐβουλίδης. According to this passage, the first battle was fought in the year of the archonship of Diophantus, which ends with July 14th, 394 B. C. Cf. Kirchner, *de Aud. quæ fertur tert. or.* p. 19. Agesilaus receives the tidings of the battle at Amphipolis. According to this, the battle was fought in the middle of July, about the same time as the battle of Cnidus.

tension, possessed of sufficient power and influence, to be able to stay the march of the king, who was irresistibly urging on his approach. It was easy to see what schooling he and his troops had received beyond the sea. They displayed an agility and power of marching, of which formerly no conception had been entertained; a series of common winter and summer campaigns had created among them a firm cohesion and a thorough feeling of comradeship, and under proved commanders they had attained to exemplary discipline. They had learnt to provide themselves everywhere with supplies, to vanquish every difficulty, and to apply craft and force, according as either was opportune. Thus Agesilaus passed successfully through Thessaly, hostile though it was; he found the pass of Thermopylæ open; was able undisturbed to unite with his forces the Phocians, as well as the Orchomenians, the neighbors and enemies of Thebes; and thirty days after he had crossed the Hellespont, on the 17th of August, (the day is fixed by an eclipse of the sun), he stood, ready for the conflict, in Bœotia.

Battle of  
Coronea.  
Ol. xevi. 3  
(a. c. 394).  
August.

It was now that part of the Leaguers first came across Mount Helicon into the plain of Coronea, where, reinforced by an accession of troops from Bœotia and the surrounding districts, they took up a position by the temple of Athene Itonia, the federal sanctuary of the district,—where once already, fifty-three years before, the Bœotians had successfully defended their independence (vol. ii. p. 449). Agesilaus advanced from the Cephisus, and disposed his forces for battle; his right wing consisting of the Lacedæmonians, the centre of the Asiatic troops, and the left of the Phocians and Orchomenians. The left of Agesilaus was directly fronted by the Thebans; next to whom, in the centre, stood the Athenians with the other Leaguers, and then the Argives. Agesilaus had a superior number of light-armed troops; in other respects the ar-

mies were about equal. But while the forces of the League came from a defeat, and on the present occasion again were not led by any firm hand, their adversaries had been invariably accustomed to victory, were commanded by masters in the art of war, and were mostly veterans,—as above all the Cyreans. This time also the Thebans rushed forward at once, and drove the enemy's left into flight; the battle severed itself into three battles; and, while the Thebans after this advance were already falling upon the camp of the Lacedæmonians, they saw the remaining two divisions driven from the ground, and taking refuge upon the heights of Mount Tilphussium in the rear of Coronea. It was impossible for the Thebans to keep the field unassisted; but they intended to cut their way through to their allies. It was then that Agesilaus advanced to meet them with his whole army, highly gratified to see before him the most hated of all the Greeks, and evidently intent upon taking bloody vengeance for the insults suffered by Sparta. Instead of surrounding them on the flanks, he declined the advice of Xenophon, and by directing a general attack on the whole line forced them to a desperate struggle. A terrible melee ensued. The king, fighting in the thickest of the fray, was covered with wounds; but in spite of his utmost exertions he was unable to prevent the Thebans from forcing a path through the very midst of his army, and from successfully effecting their juncture with their allies. Twice the Thebans had been the victors; but the ground remained in the hands of the Lacedæmonians, who bore the corpses of their foes into the centre of their camp, in order to force the Leaguers to supplicate for the delivery of their dead, and thus to acknowledge their defeat. The king had saved his honor, but the actual gain of the battle was so slight, that the Lacedæmonians were unable to maintain themselves in Bœotia. Agesilaus himself went to Delphi, in order to see to the healing of his wounds, and to dedicate to the

god the title of the Asiatic booty, amounting to not less than one hundred talents (243,000*l. circ.*). But how soon was the glory of his victories to pale! Already, before the battle he had received the tidings of the utter revulsion which had taken place in affairs in Ionia; and therewith his exploits were wholly cast into the shade by the undertakings of Conon.\*

Conon at  
Caunus.  
B. C. 396-5.

It was by Conon that Attic ideas and Attic policy first again acquired influence upon the relations among the states on the *Ægean*.

With equal sagacity and energy he had taken advantage of the situation of the Persian empire, in order to make a position for himself at Susa, to prepare the fall of Tissaphernes, and, in conjunction with Pharnabazus, to lay the lines of a new war-policy, for the execution of which he was indispensable. Thus the treasures of the Great King were placed at the disposal of the homeless *protege* of the prince of Salamis. This had happened before Agesilaus had yet crossed into Asia. But the work advanced slowly. The empire was in so lamentable a condition that every naval armament had to be begun at the beginning, and it was a matter of considerable trouble, to collect in the first instance even as many as forty vessels, which Conon exercised in the waters of Cilicia, in order to obtain the nucleus of a fleet. The promised pay failed to make its appearance; the adverse party still continued powerful; and the Southern coasts formed part of the satrapy of Tissaphernes, who contrived in every possible way to hinder the easy progress of the armaments. Conon was forced to withdraw before the Lacedæmonian fleet into the harbor-of-war at Caunus, and remained blockaded here for a long time (396-5); so that Agesilaus began to contemn the new danger which had excited terror at Sparta, and hoped to be able to bring the whole war to a

\* The statement as to the corpses is only to be found in Xen. *Agæ* II. 15; cf. Herbst, *u. s.*, 692.



close by land. Meanwhile Conon waited patiently, and relied upon his friends. He perceived, how the Spartan plundering expeditions could not but contribute to intensify the eagerness of Pharnabazus to support him. Pharnabazus actually relieved Conon from the blockade, so that he was now able to unite with his fleet the newly-built ships, and to increase it to eighty vessels, and afterwards to double that number.

Hereupon he without further delay began the execution of his schemes; established com-<sup>Conon at</sup> Babylon. munications with the democratic party in Rhodes; provoked the revolt of this important island from Sparta; and captured the transports carrying Egyptian corn to the Spartan fleet. Of these first successes he availed himself, to claim by virtue of them a fuller confidence and a more assured position. If the work was to progress, he could not any longer afford to depend on court-coteries and on the whims of satraps. He repaired in person to Babylon, and conducted his negotiations there with much success; in the council of the king it was determined to make war upon Sparta simultaneously by land and by sea; the financial resources were to be entrusted to Conon, to whom was to be committed the supreme conduct of the war. He was sagacious enough to request that Pharnabazus might be associated with him in his office, and to leave the honor of the supreme command to the satrap. But Conon was the soul of the entire undertaking. The ancient coyness of the Persians had been overcome; they perceived that their military and naval forces could only be of effect against Greece, if directed by a Greek. They confided themselves, their power and their treasures, to this Athenian citizen, and allowed him to provide for them; so that it seems that these relations at this time gave rise to the proverb: "The war is the business of Conon."\*

\* Conon in Susa, according to Paus. iii. 9, 1 (before the arrival of Agesilaus in Asia; according to Justin. vi. 2, during the blockade of

Battle of  
Cnidus.

Ol. xevi. 3 (a.  
c. 394).

Beginning of  
August.

At the same time, however, the other side collected its forces. Agesilaus became commander-in-chief by land and sea (p. 230). He contrived to animate the ardor of the coast-towns; they furnished 120 ships; but by appointing his brother-in-law, the inexperienced Pisander, admiral, he conferred the greatest obligation upon Conon, who already in August had an opportunity of justifying in the fullest measure the confidence bestowed upon him by the Great King. He met the fleet off the peninsula of Cnidus. Pisander could not avoid a battle, although he was in no respect capable of contending against his adversary. He suffered the most thorough of defeats. Pisander himself fell in the conflict, and fifty vessels were captured. The tidings of this battle reached King Agesilaus on his entry into Bœotia; but he kept them secret from his troops until after the day of Coronea, on which he was himself already fighting with broken hopes. For not only all the results of his two years' campaigns, but all his future victories, were destroyed by a single blow. All Ionia was lost; it was no longer possible to detain the Ionian troops with the army; and all thoughts of returning to Asia were at an end for him. Thus the battle of Cnidus directly affected the state of affairs in either continent; and Agesilaus returned to Sparta with the remnant of his troops, as if he had lost instead of gained a battle (autumn of 394 B. C.).\*

Caenus); in Babylon, the winter-residence of the Great King, according to Diod. xiv. 81. Nepos, *Conon*, 3, follows some good authority (instigated by Pharnabazus to undertake the journey, and introduced by Tithraustes, Conon brings about the overthrow of Tissaphernes). Diod. xiv. 81: *Κόνων Φαρνάβαζον ἰλόμενος*. Pharnabazus was not only treasurer to Conon (Nep. 4), but also nominally commander-in-chief: Xen. *Hellen.* iv. 3, 11. To the time of his armaments in Cilicia and of his command of the fleet belong the Pharnabazus-coins from Tarsus: Luynes, *Monn. des Satrapies*, p. 7; Brandis, p. 236. The Hellenic ships (τὸ μετὰ Κ. Ἑλληνικὸν, *Hellen.* iv. 2, 12) were chiefly Attic (*φυγάδες καὶ ἰθελονταί*, Plat. *Menex.* 245a). Πάλαμος δὲ Κόνωνι μελήσει, Diogen. vii. 75; Rehdantz, p. 2.

\* According to Diod. xiv. 83, Pharnabazus and Conon had more than

• Meanwhile the victorious fleet sailed up the coast from Caria. By the advice of Conon all Hellenic cities were promised liberty and autonomy; and, inasmuch as the presence among them of Agesilaus had after all invariably entailed upon them many sacrifices and inconveniences, they were all the more ready to accept the changed condition of things. A free commercial intercourse with the empire remained the primary interest for these cities; and since all their desires were now liberally granted, they one and all, even Ephesus, renounced the Spartan alliance,—as far up as the Hellespont, where Dercyllidas maintained himself in Abydus and Sestus.

Defection  
of the Ionian  
cities.

In the following spring the fleet took its course towards Greece. Just a century had passed away, since the first maritime expedition had started from the shores of Asia against Attica. But this time the Perso-Phœnician fleet was a liberating force, a considerable proportion of it was Greek, its admiral an Athenian, and its task the restoration of his native city. All the Cyclades were freed from the Spartan yoke; and the Harmosts, wherever they had contrived to maintain themselves hitherto, were driven away. Cythera was occupied, and the coast of Messenia threatened; whereupon Conon conducted the fleet to the Isthmus, in order to arrive at an understanding with the Council of the League, and to concert measures for the vigorous prosecution of the land war. Thus he was approaching his real object. For he found no difficulty in representing to the Persians, as well as to the Greek League, that the matter which as an Athenian he had nearest at heart was also in their own interest; the Spartans, he declared, would never renounce their claims

Conon in  
Greece.

Ol. xcvi. 3  
(a. c. 393).

ninety, and Pisander eighty vessels. Xen., *Hellen.* iv. 3, 12, is obscure. The accounts of the battle are quite inadequate. Newton believes that he has discovered a monument of the battle; cf. *Göttinger Gel. Anzeiger*, 1864, p. 383.

to dominion over Greece, so long as the walls of Athens lay in ruins. It was not till these had been restored, that the city would be enabled to act as a counterpoise, as was demanded by the policy of the Great King and by that of the League. Pharnabazus agreed to everything, and, while returning himself to Asia with part of the fleet, allowed Conon to anchor with eighty vessels in the Piræus. The crews were disembarked; architects and masons were engaged; hundreds of workmen came from Thebes and other towns; and thus the work of Themistocles, Pericles, and Cimon, the walls enclosing the port-town and the Long Walls, was, while paid for by the money of the Great King, restored by the joint labor on the one hand of Phœnicians, Cilicians, and Cyprians, on the other of Athenians and Bœotians. Since of the three Long Walls the Phalerian had already become superfluous by the construction of the Middle Wall (vol. ii. p. 513), it was naturally considered enough to build two parallel walls, which sufficiently united the Upper and Lower Towns. In many places the construction still remained incomplete, but the main object was achieved. Sparta's plans of dominion seemed now for the first time to be securely frustrated, and amidst endless rejoicings Athens celebrated her regeneration. For now, and not before, the work of liberation seemed accomplished, and the humiliation of the past expiated. The deeds of Thrasybulus and his comrades were cast into the shade; Conon and Eua-goras were the heroes of the day, the second founders of Athens.\*

Fortunately for Athens, the Lacedæmonians were still barred off in the peninsula. Their victories had availed them nothing for the main progress of the struggle; they were extremely unskilled in the new method of conduct.

\* Building of the walls: Xen. *Hellen.* iv. 8, 7-10; Diod. 85; Demosth. xx. 68. Thrasybulus and Conon; *Philol.* xvii. 439.

ing war in which they were involved. They lay inactive at Sicyon, unable to break through the lines of the Isthmus; nor is it likely that they would have effected this, had not treason in the enemy's camp come to their aid.

For in Corinth the mutual hostility of the parties opposed to one another had become more and more intense. The power of the Democrats was strengthened by the presence of the Persian fleet, and they had moreover with Persian money again built ships in Lechæum; their object was to recover the command of the Corinthian Gulf; this was the easiest method of approaching the enemy's camp, of gaining influence over the riverain states, and of finding a compensation for the troubles of war weighing upon the Corinthian territory itself. Already in the year 393 Agathinus commenced operations with Corinthian vessels.

Massacre at  
Corinth.

Ol. xcvi. 4 (a.  
c. 392).

Spring.

But meanwhile the discontent on the part of the large and small landed proprietors had continuously increased; the dragging progress of the land-war inflicted upon them the most sensible losses in cereals, herds, and slaves, and had swelled the following of the peace-party. To this state of things the members of the League could not remain indifferent. Once already they had experienced that the gates had been closed to them by the adherents of Sparta; it was necessary for them to secure the most important military position. An agreement was accordingly effected with the leaders of the Democrats, for the purpose of destroying those who took advantage of the discontent of the citizens, in order to hinder the operations of the troops, and to play into the hands of the Lacedæmonians. For the execution of the plot advantage was taken of the festival of Artemis Euclea (in the spring of B. C. 392). More than a hundred citizens were cut down in the theatre, in the market-place, and even at the altars; the remaining partisans of Sparta retreated

to the citadel, where they thought to defend themselves. But, cut off from all assistance, and terrified by unfavorable omens, they were induced to enter into a reconciliation with their fellow-citizens, and to submit.

The democratic and war-party now pre-  
 "Argolizers." vailed; and yet the attitude of Corinth remained oscillating and uncertain. By itself Corinth was too incapable of independent action; and the Leaguers, who had helped to bring about the victory of the democracy, in their turn put forward demands in consequence, and thus occasioned new party-combinations. For although the war-party desired that the city should lean upon a powerful state, yet the large majority was opposed to any concession being made to the Athenians or Thebans. It was the old conflict of feeling between the Peloponnesians and Central Greece, which drove them rather to enter into a combination with Argolis. Thus was formed out of the Democrats the party of the "Argolizers." These prevailed. The boundary-pillars between the two territories began to be removed; Argive troops occupied the citadel; and while Corinth vanished out of the number of independent states, Argolis, as in the days of Agamemnon, extended its territory from the frontier of Laconia to the Isthmus.\*

But this revolution again awakened new indignation in the circles of the aristocracy. To the Aristocrats it seemed an abomination, an intolerable crime, that their native city should be allowed to become an integral part of Argolis. Moreover, the authority of the ancient families of Corinth was hereby broken for ever; and, finally, the formation of a North-Peloponnesian state of larger size involved a serious danger to Sparta and to all the adherents of Sparta. Everything therefore depended upon

\* *Εὐκλεῖα* (according to the analogy of the festive calendar of Coreyra) in February: Kirchner, p. 10. *Οἱ ἀργολίζοντες*: Ephorus *ap. Steph. s. v.* "Ἀργος. Amalgamation of Argos and Corinth: Xen. *Hellen.* iv. 4, 6; cf. Vischer, *Staaten u. Bünde*, p. 25.

the overthrow of these innovations, before they had firmly established themselves; and the Aristocrats accordingly entered into treasonable combinations with Sparta,—just as the Laconizers at Athens had done, when in their native city they desired at any cost to prevent the construction of the walls (vol. ii. p. 416).

Two party-leaders, Alcimenes and Pasimelus, opened to the enemy a portal in the bifurcate wall stretching in the direction of Sicyon. The Spartans entered, entrenched themselves between the two walls uniting Corinth with Lechæum, and collected around them their partisans. On the next day a bloody conflict ensued, the Argives, Corinthians, and Athenians having approached with the intent of driving the enemy out of the lines of fortifications. But the Spartans remained victorious, and continued to hold their position. Corinth was thus cut off from the sea and the fleet; part of the connecting walls was pulled down; and even beyond the Isthmus, Crommyon and Sidus, the inlets of the passes towards Megara, were taken.

By this brilliant success of the Spartan arms the entire plan of operations of the League seemed frustrated. But while Sparta failed to take advantage of her victory, the Athenians displayed the utmost activity. It was necessary for them to do everything in their power to detain the foe at the Isthmus, so long as their walls were still uncompleted. They had sent to the theatre of the war Iphicrates, a young man of obscure origin, who had distinguished himself in the recent naval engagements (doubtless, therefore, under Conon). Through Iphicrates the subsidies obtained by Conon first acquired their true significance for Athens; for he contrived to discipline, and to make use of, the mercenaries engaged by this money, in such a way as thereby to restore the fame of the Attic arms. In the battle between the walls he was unsuccessful: this was no suitable field of operations for his light

Battle  
between the  
Walls.  
Ol. xevi. 4  
(B. C. 392).  
Summer.

armed bands. But only a few months later he had succeeded in establishing what resembled a blockade over the Lacedæmonians in their entrenchments. He commanded the entire districts, made requisitions on Sicyon and Phlius; nay, far into Arcadia the inhabitants trembled before the flying bands of Iphicrates. Under the protection of his arms the walls of the Isthmus were restored; the whole body of the citizens of Athens hastened across, in a few days built up the western wall, and then, more leisurely, the eastern (spring of B. C. 391).

Agessilaus takes. Le-chæsum. This revulsion in the state of things at the Isthmus was irreconcilable with the honor of Sparta; and, in particular, irritation was excited there by the Corinthian fugitives; for, since the day of the treason, it was they who had incessantly urged Sparta forwards, and who had exercised a decisive influence upon her resolutions. They pointed to the importance of their native city, as the gate-keeper of the peninsula, and declared that, unless the Spartans were secure of it, their days as a great power were at an end. Accordingly, it was determined to set seriously about the task, and Agessilaus had to assume the supreme command, however little it might agree with his inclinations to measure the distance of the entire peninsula, in order to pull down a wall which in all probability would speedily be built up again behind his back. Fatiguing marches without any prospect of glory or gain—this was the direct opposite of the Asiatic campaigns which had spoil the king. In the spring of B. C. 391, immediately after the second walling-off of the Isthmus, he set out on his march; and, in order to give his undertaking a more impressive and dignified character, he caused himself to be supported by a naval squadron, equipped out of the treasure captured in Asia and commanded by his brother Teleutias. The co-operation of the pair led to advantageous results. The walls were rapidly destroyed; and

Ol. xxvii. 1-2 (a. c. 391).



Lechæsum, with the ship-sheds, now first fall completely into the hands of the Lacedæmonians. After this the king returned home.\*

The Corinthian fugitives, ill-satisfied with this speedy departure, invented a new plan of operations which better suited the tastes of the king, and was to exercise a more important influence upon the position of their native city; for their object was, from first to last, to disgust their fellow-citizens with the war, and thus to overthrow the war-party. To this end they recommended a campaign directed towards the Piræum. This was the name of the portion of the Corinthian territory lying on the further side of the Isthmus, and jutting out from the mountain-range of Megara into the Corinthian Gulf, like a large quadrilateral peninsula. Towards the west it forms a beak-shaped projection, which, together with the coast of Sicyon opposite, surrounds the bay of Lechæsum; while in the northeast the peninsula projects towards the coast of Bœotia. Its position was therefore of extreme importance; for it constituted, in the rear of Megara, the communication between Corinth and Bœotia. Moreover, in this mountainous peninsula were the pasture-grounds of the Corinthians, and more particularly so at the present time, since the more immediate vicinity of the city had become

Agesilaus in Piræum.

Ol. xcvi. 2 (a. c. 390).

\* Battle between the walls (*δυσχωρία*, Plat. *Menex.* 240). The capture of Lechæsum is to be distinguished from the conflict near Lechæsum according to Grote and Herbst, *s. a.* p. 694. The probable sequence of events is as follows: Commencement of the war, Ol. xcvi. 1-2, a. c. 395, summer; Haliartus, Ol. xcvi. 2; Cnidus, beginning of August, a. c. 394; Coronea, middle of August; Agesilaus dismisses his army, autumn, 394. Encampment at Corinth and Sicyon, 393. Conon at the Isthmus; naval armament of Corinth; agitation in Corinth, 392. Euclea, February; destruction of the walls; occupation of Crommyon and Sidus (*ἐκ δὲ τούτων στρατιαὶ μεγάλαι διετίθεντο*, *Hellen.* iv. 4, 14). Flying expeditions of the mercenaries, 391 (winter, spring). Teleutias (*δηομήτριος* of Agesilaus, Plutarch, *Ages.* 21: *γαῖρα*, son of the ill-favored Eupolia by a second marriage? Herbst, *s. a.* p. 703) nauarch. Lechæsum taken, Ol. xcvi. 2. Dismissal of the army. Isthmia, 390. Agesilaus in Piræum. Defeat of the *μέγαρα*; Hyacinthia, May. Agesilaus in Acarnania, 389. This chronology follows Grote and Kirchner.

the theatre of war. Its chief place was Piræum, a fortified position which communicated with other smaller strongholds. It is very probable that these fortifications were, at the time in question, not perhaps constructed, but at all events renewed, in order to secure the connexion between Corinth and its new allies. For, inasmuch as Megara was hostile, it was necessary to take advantage of these means for the purpose of communication with Thebes.

In every respect, therefore, this remote hilly district (which would hardly have suggested itself to any one at Sparta, had it not been for the Corinthian fugitives) was a locality extremely well adapted for inflicting sensible damage upon the enemy: and doubtless the fugitives had also purposely selected the time of the campaign; for it was about midsummer (390 B. C.), and the Isthmian festival was at hand: and, in their eyes, it was an abomination that this ancient Corinthian festival should now, for the first time, be celebrated in the name of Argos. They therefore reached the Isthmus with the Spartan army, precisely at the commencement of the great sacrifice to Posidon, dispersed the festive assembly, and hereupon, themselves, as the true Corinthians, resumed their interrupted sacrifice. After this, Agesilaus continued his march into the hilly district, and found the expectations held out to them by his guides fully confirmed. He took an enormous quantity of spoils within a narrow area, and his proceedings there were animated by savage wrath. The captives were made slaves, or even given up for destruction to their enemies, the fugitives. The Thebans, terrified by the unexpected appearance of the hostile army on their frontiers, sent envoys to Agesilaus to negotiate for peace. He conceived the best hopes of a successful termination of the case.

But of a sudden he was disturbed in the midst of the intoxication of success; for the tidings arrived, that an

entire division of Spartan warriors, about six hundred in number, belonging to the army at Sicyon, had been destroyed near Corinth. Iphicrates destroys a Spartan Mora.

They had convoyed the Amyclæans, who, May. according to ancient usage, desired to celebrate at home the festival of the Hyacinthia, and were then, on their return to the camp, surprised by Iphicrates. This was an irreparable loss to Sparta, poor as she was in men and at the same time a deep humiliation; for the victors had been the despised mercenaries. In vain Agesilaus rushed to the scene of the battle, in order, at all events, to secure the dead bodies in honorable conflict; they had already been returned in answer to a supplicatory request. The defeat therefore stood confessed, and nothing remained for the king but to take his departure after a terrible devastation of the open country. So far, therefore, as the main progress of the war was concerned, nothing had been gained by the victorious campaigns of the two years. Iphicrates controlled the Corinthian territory more absolutely than before: indeed, immediately after the departure of the king, he reoccupied the position beyond the Isthmus, so as to keep the route to the north open. Meanwhile in Lechæum and Sicyon the Spartans lay, from first to last, without knowing what course of action to pursue; and such terror now prevailed, that the Corinthian fugitives, who never ceased to carry on petty warfare, ventured to cross from the one camp into the other by water only. Moreover, the state of things in Peloponnesus became more and more anxious and difficult; for the news of the misfortune which had befallen the Spartans had been received in the Arcadian towns with open manifestations of delight; and when the king had united with his forces the remnant of the luckless band, and was returning home by Mantinea and Tegea, he deemed it advisable to arrange his plans of march, so as not to enter his quarters for the night till after sunset. Doubtless this was a bitter con-

trast to the campaign in Asia, where Agesilaus had indulged in easily-won glory, and had been honored like a demi-god by friend and foe. It is not hard to understand his unwillingness to resume the Isthmian conflicts.\*

But neither could he reconcile himself to the narrow limits and the lowering atmosphere at home. He looked around impatiently for new opportunities of warfare, and therefore welcomed the convoys of the Achæans, who about this time arrived at Sparta, with a request for military assistance. A vigorous and high-minded spirit still lived in the population of Achaia; and inasmuch as they could in no direction extend their small territories landwards, they sought to make new acquisitions on the further side of the Gulf. Here it was now easier to operate; for the dominion of Athens had been broken, and that of the Corinthians had not yet been restored. The Achæans had accordingly with the troops of their Confederation boldly crossed from Patræ into Ætolia, and had formally admitted the city of Calydon into their league of cities. But this acquisition involved them in hostile relations with the Acarnanians. The latter, at that time a vigorous and flourishing people, had no intention of confining themselves to the western banks of the Achelous; and the Achæans stood in the way of their extension eastwards. Already in former times the Acarnanians had taken the side of the Athenians (vol. iii. p. 146); and now again they had joined those who had leagued themselves together against Sparta, and with their aid intended as decisively to ward off Peloponnesian intervention from the Achelous-country, as did the Athenians

\* Piræum: Curtius, *Peloponnesos*, vol. ii. p. 552. The celebration of the Isthmia took place every three years; in the second and fourth years of each Olympiad, not long before the Olympic festival. Isthmia, we know, were held in the spring of 412 a. c. (Poppo ad Thuc. viii. 9), and therefore also in 390. Kirchner, 12.—Pilgrimage to the Hyacinthia after the commencement of the spring.

and Thebans from their districts. They demanded the evacuation of Calydon; and Attic and Theban troops had entered their land to support the demand. The Achæans had a right to claim an acknowledgment on the part of Sparta for the faithful support which they had accorded her; it was necessarily the interest of Sparta to allow no hostile power to assert itself in the Corinthian Gulf; and Agesilaus was all the more ready to take the matter up, inasmuch as here a theatre of war opened for him, such as he desired: rich, virgin districts, inhabited by pastoral tribes, to which he might hope by his tactical skill to be wholly superior. Nor was any effective support of them on the part of Athens and Thebes to be apprehended, inasmuch as the ardor of the allied states was already perceptibly on the decrease. Thus he prosecuted the war in favor of the hard-pressed Achæans, and felt himself once more in his element, when in the spring of B. C. 389 he crossed the Gulf with a considerable army, liberated Calydon, and marched to the banks of the Achelous.

With hesitating caution he at first remained at the rim of the district, as if he neither intended nor dared to penetrate further into the interior; so that the Acarnanians in the high-lying districts gradually came to think themselves quite safe, and allowed their flocks and herds to graze in the open. Then, he suddenly advanced by forced marches; surprised the enemies on the banks of their fair lakes; secured immense quantities of booty; and, although he did not succeed in taking one of the fortified cities of the Acarnanians, yet so thoroughly broke their courage, that they resolved to abandon the Separate League, and to join the Spartan Confederation, in order not to expose themselves to a second campaign of this description. For Agesilaus carried on the work of destruction with so revolting a ruthlessness, that he not only annihilated the harvest of the year, but even caused the fruit-trees to be

Agesilaus in  
Acarnania.

*Ol. xcvii. 4*  
(B. C. 389-8).

torn out of the earth by the roots. Thus the main object was rapidly achieved, while the Achæans were ill-pleased with this mode of prosecuting the war: it was a savage expedition of pillage, which secured no pledge for the future; and no thought whatever was taken of establishing a closer connexion between the districts of the Achelous and the system of the Peloponnesian states, which now more than ever required reinvigoration.

It may seem most surprising of all, that Agessipolis in Argolis. a. c. 388 circ. we find so little notice in the history of the war of that state, which in fact among all the members of the Separate League lay nearest to the vengeance of Sparta, and which from the first had taken part in the war with special ardor and with far-reaching plans—viz. Argos. A strange contradiction is observable in the history of this state. Argos with audacious arrogance extends her territory even beyond the Isthmus and asserts herself as a new Peloponnesian great power, and yet on the other hand she lacks vigor and self-confidence for defending her own land against the neighbors whom she treats with such defiance. Accordingly, the Lacedæmonians being about to cross the frontier, the Argives urged religious pretexts and ancient compacts between the two neighbor-states; they once more took advantage of the festive month of Carnæus and of other holy periods, in order to protect their threatened boundaries. The Spartans were simple enough to respect Carnæus, which patiently allowed itself to be moved backwards and forwards by the Argives; and led back their troops, when the heralds, wearing their wreaths, came to meet them, and admonished them to stay their advance. Finally, however, they lost patience. They sought consolation for their conscientious scruples at Olympia and Delphi; and, after already Agesilaus had before the capture of Lechæum invested Argolis, King Agessipolis invaded the country from Nemea, and devastated it. But

on this occasion also hearty spirit and vigorous action were wanting; unfavorable omens occasioned a speedy retreat; and in all her enterprises against Argos, Sparta seems incomprehensibly crippled. For the rest, Argos must after all have been more frequently a theatre of the war, than is generally assumed; and doubtless many a fight occurred, as to which no more special information is forthcoming. Thus particularly at the village of CENOË in the valley of the Charander on the road from Argos to Mantinea; where a conflict of some importance must have taken place, of which we are without any precise account, in which the Argives, in combination with Attic auxiliaries, defeated the Lacedæmonians. In the absence of individual successes of this description, the bold advance observable in the policy of the Argives, and the voluntary self-subordination of such a state as Corinth, would, moreover, be hardly intelligible.\*

The campaigns in Acarnania and Argolis had only a quite secondary significance for <sup>Situation</sup> of Sparta. the main progress of the war. Its real decision had long ago passed into other quarters; and the tardiness of the Spartans, who in the last years did nothing in order to bring about a change in the war by means of an important armament, is doubtless connected with their having meanwhile entered upon a new course of policy, and hoping to be able to confront their enemy by more effective and certain means than mere military force. The Separate League itself was not their principal danger, for its strength had already been exhausted; the greatest peril of all which had resulted from the years of war was rather the rebuilding of the walls of Athens. Hereby

\* For the chronology of the feuds in Acarnania and Argolis we have no information besides the sequence of events in *Hellen.* iv. 6 and 7. *Andoc.* iii. 27, *ἰβία καὶ πατριὰ εἰρήνη* (ancient Heraclidic treaties). *Ἐποφείπειν τοὺς μῆνας*, *Hellen.* iv. 7, 2.—Victory of the Athenians at CENOË, *Paus.* i. 15, 1; x. 10, 4; *Apophth.* *Lac. war.* 7; Kirchhoff, *Gesch. d. gr. Alph.* 202. With this event Xenophon concludes the *κατὰ γῆν πόλεμος*.

the entire state of affairs in Greece had been once more changed, and all the gains of the Great War had been once more forfeited. The old enemy had regained a position of independence; and, if the friendship between Conon and Pharnabazus was maintained, the Attic dominion over the coasts might be imperceptibly revived, while Sparta was more incapable than ever before of resisting such a power as this. Against such perils the wild bravery of an Agesilaus could effect nothing. It was an occasion for the men of the school of Lysander to come to the rescue, in order to create a change in that quarter, from which the unfavorable alteration in the position of Sparta had originally proceeded.

Antalcidas at Sardis. Ol. xevi. 4 (a. c. 392).

Agesilaus had no wish to change Sparta's course of action; for in his eyes any negotiation with Persia was a denial of his heroic period, and a renunciation of all its fruits.

But in opposition to him another party came into prominence, headed by Antalcidas, the son of Leon. To him it seemed foolish that Sparta should consume her strength in futile petty warfare, without being able to decide the main issue; he urged that the power of the adversary should be attacked at its roots, and that the authority of Sparta should be re-established after the same fashion in which it had been founded by Lysander. Antalcidas himself became this new Lysander. He soon gained a considerable party, and, already before the capture of Lechæum (p. 200), was sent by the Ephors to Sardis, in order at any cost to bring about a reconciliation, and a new combination between Persia and Sparta. As Ly-

sander had found Cyrus, so Antalcidas found Tiribazus. Tiribazus (formerly the satrap of Armenia, and since 392 the successor of Tithraustes), newly appointed to the supreme command of the royal troops; and in this instance again, as was so frequently the case, the new official was the reverse of satisfied with the policy



of his predecessor. For, as a rule, the attitude to be assumed by the king's lieutenant-governors towards the most momentous questions was left to their personal discretion; and Persian policy determined itself, according as this satrap had been directly exposed to losses by the campaigns of Agesilaus, while that was trained up in the ancient traditions of hatred against Athens. Tiribazus was from the first well-inclined towards the Spartans, and as a loyal servant of his king was, from honest conviction, in favor of a combination with them. But hardly had he commenced to negotiate in this sense with Antalcidas, when from the opposite party too an embassy arrived, led by Conon, in order to operate against Antalcidas. It consisted of four Athenians, and, at the request of the Athenians, also of Bœotian, Corinthian, and Argive envoys. Thus already in the year 392 the satrap's court at Sardis became the real arena of conflict between the belligerents.

At this point the advantage was decidedly on the side of Sparta; and Antalcidas was the Propositions of Antalcidas. right man to make the best use of the favorable situation. The successes of his adversaries served him as the best handle for his schemes; and in particular the new rise of Athens was made use of for an effective attack upon Sparta's most dangerous enemy. He sought to convince the satrap that Conon in his capacity as an officer of the Great King had kept nothing in view but the interests of his own city, and had unwarrantably abused the confidence reposed in him. For assuredly the moneys had not been granted from the treasury for the purpose of restoring Athens as a great power, and of flattering the pride of the citizens, whose city had become powerful through the defeats of the Persians, and was filled with monuments of victory defrayed out of Persian spoils. But the intention of Antalcidas was not merely to deprive the Attic general of the satrap's confidence, which was all the

more easy to effect, inasmuch as at the same time the position of Euagoras at the Persian court had likewise undergone a change, and had become one of hostility. He also contrived to represent to Tiribazus the true interests of Persia under a totally new point of view. It was easy to explain the defects of the policy which she had hitherto pursued. Tissaphernes had been removed, and yet his principles had been recurred to; for the course of action due to Pharnabazus and Tithraustes was in truth nothing but that which Alcibiades had of old counselled Tissaphernes to pursue; one party among the Greeks was supported against the other, in order that neither might be allowed to become powerful enough to inflict damage upon the empire. This principle implied that Persia should be constantly under arms, and should either carry on war herself, or cause it to be carried on for her pay; in consequence of which she never enjoyed tranquillity. Surely, Antalcidas argued, it was far more correct to provide for the non-existence of any Greek power dangerous to Persia. The sole cause of all danger for the empire lay in the oppression of individual Greek states by others, and in the consequent union under these of larger groups of cities, whose resources were thus placed at the disposal of their oppressors. But these acts of violence were equally opposed to the national wishes of the Hellenes and to the interests of the Great King; they constituted the germ of endless quarrels, and of continuous agitation and interruption of commercial intercourse in the whole circle of the *Ægean*. In order, therefore, to put an end to these evils, the absolute independence of the individual Greek cities ought, with an intelligent view to the interests of all the riverain states, to be acknowledged as a principle of international law, and to be placed under the guardianship of the most powerful among the states. Thus alone could a real guarantee be secured for a lasting peace; and by their unreserved acceptance of this

principle the true friends of the King and of peace would be tested.

It is easy to perceive, how cunningly this exposition was calculated for the advantage of Sparta. Her position in Peloponnesus was not endangered by the principle advanced; for nominally her confederates were to retain their independence; but any extension of power hostile to Sparta was thereby designated as illegal, and abolished. In the event of the adoption of these views Argos would have to let go Corinth (which, it will be remembered, was the principal end of the exertions of the Corinthian fugitives, to whom doubtless an essential share may be ascribed in the proposals of Antalcidas); and again Thebes, the provincial towns of Bœotia; and Athens, the islands still remaining to her, viz. Lemnos, Imbros, and Scyros, which at this very moment she was again regarding as the nucleus of a new Confederacy. And Sparta was not only the solitary state, the existing limits of whose dominion were not imperilled by the present peace-proposals, but she could in secret calculate upon having, in conjunction with the Great King, to take the second place as guardian over their execution, and upon finding therein an opportunity of providing for her own dominion, so soon as she should have humiliated and materially weakened the adverse states. For this reason Sparta unhesitatingly assumed the standpoint of Persian interests, so that Hellenic interests were altogether left out of the question; for this reason too no independence was claimed, as towards the Persians, for the Asiatic cities, on whose behalf Sparta had quite recently been engaged in war.

The immediate object was completely gained. Tiribazus on the present occasion was not less blind to the real designs of the Lacedæmonians, than others had formerly been with regard to the intentions of Conon; the satrap was delighted with these proposals, the execution of which seemed at last to render possible a settled and advan-

tageous policy on the part of Persia in the Archipelago. When the envoys of the other states uttered their protests, he saw in them only the expression of hostile sentiments, and the full confirmation of the representations of Antalcidas. Conon on the other hand he treated not as an envoy, but as a royal official, bound to answer the charge resting upon him of abusing the king's confidence, and caused him to be placed under arrest, notwithstanding that he had been cautious enough not to dispose of the Persian moneys on his own responsibility, but only to spend them after arriving at an understanding on the subject with Pharnabazus. Antalcidas, on the other hand, now received a supply of money; and Tiribazus repaired to Susa, in order to gain acceptance for his views in the quarter where the ultimate decision lay.

The negotiations, however, progressed less favorably than they had begun. The design of Tiribazus, of bringing about a sudden and complete change in Persian policy, met with eager opposition. The devastating campaigns of Agesilaus were still too freshly remembered, and in particular the Great King himself was still to the highest degree wroth with the Lacedæmonians, who, although they owed their successes in Greece to nothing but Persian support, had yet turned their offensive force against Persia, in order to retake from the empire those very cities of the coast, of which the treaties with Sparta were intended to guarantee the secure retention. Of this state of feeling at court the opponents of the new system of policy seem to have availed themselves, in order to detain Tiribazus for a considerable time from returning to Asia Minor, and in his place to establish at Sardis, as commander-in-chief over the maritime provinces, an adherent of Pharnabazus, Struthas by name. He was a warlike and energetic man, who made it a point of honor to take ven-

Arrest of  
Conon.

Ol. xcvi. 4  
(a. c. 392).

Opposition to  
Antalcidas.

Struthas.

geance upon the Spartans for the calamities brought by them upon the royal dominions. From first to last, he regarded the Athenians as the King's allies; and it was probably he who brought about the liberation of Conon from his imprisonment.

This change amounted to a defeat for Antalcidas, who had already deemed himself so near to his goal; and it is natural that the party adverse to him at Sparta should have again taken courage. They demanded that the satrap, whose sentiments were hostile to Sparta, should also be openly treated as an enemy, and that troops should be sent to Ephesus. Inasmuch as the treasures brought home by Agesilaus had by this time been spent, the prospect of new booty was very tempting. Without Persian money it was absolutely impossible to do anything effective; if therefore it was not offered in the shape of subsidies, it must be sought as booty of war. In the beginning of the year 391 B. C. Thibron was despatched with a squadron to Ephesus, in order to recommence a series of campaigns in the style of Agesilaus. But he found an adversary, such as he had by no means expected, in Struthas. During a negligently-managed foray Thibron was surprised, and cut down with a considerable number of troops.\*

Simultaneously the conflict broke out at a wide variety of points. The Athenians were intent upon once more collecting a body of confederates, and appropriating to themselves the fruits of the victory of Cnidus; while the Spartans, on the other hand, desired to take from them the positions which they had gained. At the head of the

\* Antalcidas the opponent of Agesilaus: *Plut. Ages.* 23; *Apophth. Lac. Ages.* 60 (Herbst, p. 699, denies the existence of political opposition between them). First mission, B. C. 392 *etc.*: *Xen. Hellen.* iv. 8, 12; Kirchner, 36. Coins of Tiribazus, Brandis, 363 f. Struthas: *Hellen.* iv. 8, 17. Some stated Conon to have lost his life at court; "Dionon . . . effugisse scripsit" (probably by the contrivance of Struthas): *Nep. Conon*, 5. His death at Cyprus: cf. *Sauckenstein ad Ages.* xix. 39.

Teutias,  
naval com-  
mander.

Spartan forces stood the two brothers, who were the leaders of the war-party, Agesilaus and Teutias; for the latter, the successor of the unfortunate Pisander, was from 393 B. C., during a series of years, either nauarch, or commander of individual squadrons. After a long interval he was the first capable man, to whom ships of war could be entrusted, a popular leader in war, the favorite of the ships' crews, and distinguished by effective eloquence, as well as resolute in action. It was Teutias who brought about the fall of Lechæum, and who restored the Spartan supremacy in the Corinthian Gulf (p. 261); while another squadron under Ecdicus, the nauarch of the year 391 B. C. (Ol. xcvi. 1-2), set sail for Rhodes, in order to recover this island, with the defection of which the calamitous course of events by sea had commenced.

Position of  
parties in  
Hellas.

Thus, in its fourth year, the Bœoto-Corinthian War had become a naval war, against which the scene of the conflict on the Isthmus fell into the shade. On both sides vigorous preparations were made and great plans pursued, without, however, any genuine confidence existing on either. External influences had kindled the war, external resources had made possible the armaments of the League; but now these resources ran dry, and the struggle could only be continued by sacrifices brought by the members of the League themselves; and for these there was but slack readiness, in proportion as the prospect of a safe success diminished. In fact, a common object in the prosecution of the war was wanting. For when the universal indignation against Sparta had come to an outbreak, all had been united in their desire to humiliate Sparta, but in nothing else; for in all other respects the several points of view greatly differed. The moderate parties at Athens and Thebes desired nothing beyond securing the independence of their states; while the war party at Argos and Corinth

necessarily looked to an annihilation of the Spartan power; for so long as there yet existed a Sparta possessed of any degree of strength, she could not possibly renounce her hegemony over Peloponnesus. Among the members of the League the Argives were, accordingly, the most eager in the prosecution of the war; they demanded that the struggle should be continued, until Sparta had been forced to accord perfect freedom of movement to the states of the peninsula. In Athens there likewise existed a party which adhered to the views of the Argives, and which opined that the power of Sparta must be thoroughly broken, if a new future was to open for Athens: but the same city also contained a very considerable peace-party; and among the statesmen of the latter tendency the most important was Andocides (p. 158).

He belonged to a house in which this political tendency was a family-tradition. His grandfather Andocides had helped to conclude the Thirty Years' Peace (vol. ii. p. 451); his uncle Epilycus had taken part in an embassy to Persia, probably the same of which Callias was the head (vol. ii. p. 454).\* The younger Andocides likewise actively worked from his youth upwards in the spirit of his ancestors. For already as a young man under thirty years of age he was a spokesman of the aristocratic circles, and opposed to the popular orators, who were endeavoring to overthrow the Peace of Nicias immediately after its conclusion, and bringing about combinations with the Peloponnesian states (vol. iii. p. 333). To this standpoint he adhered, however far he was in other respects from being a man of character; and at the present conjuncture he advocated, as he had thirty years before, those Athenian interests which demanded a secession from the Separate League and an agreement with Sparta. The circumstances of the times were in his favor. The fighting had continued for four years, without the

Andocides  
head of the  
peace-party  
at Athens.

\* Epilycus: Hiecke, *de pace Omon.* 9; Kirchner, 66.

Leaguers having as yet been successful in any set battle. At that time Iphicrates had not yet had any opportunity of achieving any brilliant stroke. The capture of Lechæum had reopened the Corinthian passes; the fortification of Athens was still uncompleted; and the issue of the war on the Isthmus was less certain than ever before, particularly since Teleutias controlled the waters of the Corinthian Gulf. But neither was the advantage to such a degree with the Lacedæmonians, that they had reason to pitch their demands excessively high. Their prospects of Persian aid had been frustrated; Thibron had fallen; in Rhodes, their plans remained unaccomplished. They were accordingly obliged to renounce their ulterior schemes of dominion, and in the first instance to look to separating the members of the League, in order to arrest the revulsions which had taken place in Peloponnesus, to humiliate Argos, and to become master again at home.

Peace-  
negotiations  
between  
Athens and  
Sparta.  
Ol. xcvi. 2  
(a. c. 391).

Of this state of affairs the peace-party at Athens most effectually availed itself. An embassy was sent to Sparta, headed by Andocides. He succeeded in causing negotiations to be once more opened with Athens, as with a power of equal rank; the two states were to set the example by concluding peace, and then to call upon the rest to accede to it. Among the several points the independence of the Greek states was again primarily insisted upon—a clause of course aimed at Corinth and Bœotian Orchomenus—while, in order to anticipate any interpretation of this point unfavorable to Sparta, the *status quo* of her possessions was expressly acknowledged; and similarly that of the Athenian, inclusive of Lemnos, Imbros, and Scyros. And in particular the Athenians were to be permitted to complete their fortifications, and also to provide themselves with as many ships of war as they chose to build.

With this treaty Andocides returned home, in order to



recommend its adoption to the citizens; it was to be ratified on the fortieth day. He with reason thought that his was a great achievement; for Sparta had renounced her absolute hegemony, Athens was once more a Great Power, and the shame of the last peace was thus expiated. And yet Andocides found that he had not satisfied either party. The one was wroth that he had not availed himself of his powers to conclude peace definitively at Sparta. The other was altogether averse from peace of any kind, refusing to possess walls and ships by the grace of Sparta, and to be restricted to the three islands; finally, it apprehended danger to the constitution from any and every approximation to Sparta.

Andocides defended his handiwork and his point of view. He demonstrated to the citizens, how the history of Athens, more impressively than that of any other city, taught the evils of war and the blessings of peace. Every successive peace which had been concluded (for the unhappy capitulation after the defeat at *Ægospotami* ought not to be regarded as one of the number) had been the starting-point of a happy period of progress, and of a rapid rise to prosperity and power. A rational policy demanded the preservation of amicable relations with the strong: but the perversity of the Athenians consisted in their tendency to quarrel with the great states, and to ally themselves with the small: thus *Amorges* had been preferred as an ally to the Great King (vol. iii. p. 347), the *Egestæans* to the *Syracusans*, and the *Argives* to the *Spartans*. The designs of the *Argives*, who wished with the aid of Athens to retain *Corinth*, and who were continually urging their allies to the prosecution of the war, while they sought in every way to cover their own position, could only be realized by means of a complete victory over Sparta; for which purpose there were no sufficient resources, while *Persia* would never permit its accomplishment. The full measure of condi-

Andocides  
de pace.  
(B. C. 391.)  
Autumn.

tions of peace which Athens could expect at the end of a war in which victory remained with the enemy, was now offered to it. Let the Athenians be weary of their new friends, and remember who it was that after the catastrophe of the city proposed its destruction (vol. iii. p. 570), and to whom it had then owed its preservation. The Thebans, he said, were likewise now inclined to peace. If, then, the Athenians were in any event determined upon war, let them earnestly reflect, whether they were willing to bear all its sacrifices without deriving any advantage from it themselves, in order to enable the Argives to attain to their selfish ends.

Andocides was therefore recurring to the principles of Cimon, when he desired to see the affairs of Hellas arranged by means of a mutual understanding between the two great states; he desired, like Pericles, to see, even as towards the Barbarians, relations established by treaty, under which the trade in the *Ægean* could undisturbedly develop itself. And, doubtless, a peace-policy of this description was at no time better justified than at the present, when Athens was utterly incapable of asserting herself as a military Power, being without a treasure, without a navy, without a civic community ready to make sacrifices, and without trustworthy allies. Moreover the combinations between Antalcidas and Tiribazus were not unknown; and most assuredly it was in accordance with the real interests of Athens, that Andocides should use his utmost exertions for preventing a one-sided agreement between Sparta and Persia. Athens had providentially gained disproportionately much in return for slight concessions; there was at present absolutely no prospect of her obtaining more; and it was therefore advisable to secure as speedily as possible the advantages due to Conon.

Such was the wish of Andocides. But he failed to convince the citizens. He was not a man generally trusted. The fact that he in-

Negotiations  
broken off.  
B. C. 391.

clined towards Sparta made him unpopular; and against him there were the Bœotian party and the Democrats proper, who regarded hostility against Sparta as a pledge of civic liberty. Many may in addition have entertained hopes of Persian subsidies; and it is likewise permissible to assume, that ambitious men, such as Thrasybulus and Iphicrates, were anxious not to be deprived of the opportunity for brilliant feats of arms. And, most especially, the question of the Thracian Chersonesus was kept in view. The Athenians wished to see their possessions there recognized by Sparta; while Sparta on the other hand had no intention of renouncing the Hellespont, of which she had in recent years come clearly to perceive the importance for the supremacy at sea. In short, the treaty negotiated by Andocides was not ratified; and Andocides himself was charged with having abused his powers, and banished. The conflict broke forth again with renewed vehemence. It was at this time that there ensued the devastation of the mountainous district in the Corinthian territory (p. 261); and that Iphicrates proved his new style of tactics by annihilating the Lacedæmonian *mora*, a success which induced the Thebans likewise to break off their peace-negotiations with Agesilaus.\*

But the most momentous events took place by sea. Teleutias received orders to promote the enterprise at Rhodes. Delighted to gain a wider theatre of action, he quitted the Corinthian Gulf, sailed across the Archipelago, seized Samos for Sparta, and captured ten Attic vessels

Banishment  
of Andocides.

Maritime  
exploits of  
Thrasybulus.  
Ol. xcvi. 3  
(a. c. 390-89).

\* Party-pamphlet of Andocides, dating from the years 420-15: *Hermes*, l. 5. The genuineness of Andocides' speech *de pace* (upon which doubts are already cast by Dionysius) is contended for by Boeckh, *Publ. Ec. of Ath.*, vol. i. p. 237 [Eng. Trans.]; Grote, *Hist. of Greece*, vol. ix. p. 475; Kirchner, *de Andoc. &c.* To the embassy of Andocides, Philochorus testifies in the Argument to the Oration. There are errors with reference to earlier history (as also in Demosth.), but there is no contradiction against the political situation of the year 391; not even with respect to the walls, to the love of peace prevalent at Thebes, and to the wish of the Corinthians definitely to acquire (ἀλαίῃ) Argos. Cf. Hertzberg, *u. s.* p. 304.

which had been sent to the aid of Euagoras. Athens, who in consequence of the victory of Cnidus still looked upon herself as the mistress of the seas, found herself suddenly scared out of her sense of security. Thrasybulus, after having been for some time cast into the shade by Conon, was now once more the foremost man in Athens, and the leader of the war-party: to him was entrusted the first considerable fleet, which Athens after her restoration was able to equip, consisting of forty vessels, with which he was to oppose the Spartans in the Rhodian Sea. In the spring of the year 390 B. C. (Ol. xcvi. 2) he weighed anchor in the Piræus. But instead of sailing to Rhodes, he took a northward course, into the Thracian waters, into those regions the importance of which had come under consideration during the last peace-negotiations, and had probably been specially insisted upon by Thrasybulus himself, as one of the leading opponents of Andocides. In this quarter he displayed a great activity leading to important results; entered into advantageous combinations with the Thracian princes as well as with the democratic parties in the maritime cities; in this way secured Byzantium and Chalcedon; re-established the levy of sound-dues at Chrysopolis (vol. iii. p. 501), and farmed them out; and after this returned to the Ægean. In Lesbos a Spartan Harmost still held sway. Thrasybulus defeated him, and gained over to the side of Athens the island cities, with the exception of Methymna. In the following spring he continued his course further south, but not even now to Rhodes, although the most urgent instructions reached him from Athens, bidding him hasten to the assistance of the Rhodians, who were hard pressed. He preferred to harry the coasts of Caria, chiefly, as may be surmised, because he had himself to provide for the maintenance of his troops, and was therefore unable to enter into any serious warfare, offering no opportunity for booty. The discontent aroused by his self-willed proceed-

ings became, however, more intense at Athens from day to day; bitter complaints reached the city from men connected with it as confederates or by relations of hospitality, and from Athenian citizens, whom he had subjected to ill-treatment: the party adverse to him stimulated the feeling against him and against his colleague Ergocles; he was accused of having, at the instigation of Ergocles, conceived the plan of establishing himself with his troops at Byzantium, in order by virtue of his position there, in combination with his Thracian following, to defy the orders of the civic assembly, and to create for himself an independent power. Doubtless the main blame rested upon Ergocles, who was immediately summoned home, to give an account of his proceedings; while Thrasybulus was for the present allowed to retain his command, until he should have accomplished his task in Rhodes; but before he reached that island, he met with his death on the Eurymedon, in the territory of <sup>Death of Thrasybulus.</sup> the city of Aspendus, whose soldiers slew him in his tent on the occasion of a nocturnal surprise. The ships were conducted to Rhodes by Agyrrihus.\*

Meanwhile the Spartans had been induced by the naval armaments of Athens, and by <sup>Further naval feuds.</sup> the exploits of Thrasybulus, to arm in their turn. They directed their attention to two <sup>Ol. xvii. 4 (a. c. 389-8).</sup> favorably situated points, in order to employ them as military positions against Athens,—viz. <sup>Abydus.</sup> Abydus and Ægina. In Abydus, Dercyllidas had maintained himself with great skill (p. 255). Anaxibius was put in his place, to break the power which Athens had newly obtained there, and to destroy the Attic trade. Iphicrates was despatched against him with

\* As to the campaign of Thrasybulus in 390 a. c. and the following year, cf. Froberger, *Philol.* xvii. 439. As to the indictment of Ergocles after the death of Thrasybulus: *Lys.* 28 and 29. Sound-dues: Boeckh, *P. Ec. of Ath.* vol. ii. p. 39 [Eng. Tr.].

eight vessels and 1,200 peltasts, and, laying a well-con-  
trived ambush against him near Abydus, slew him to-  
gether with many of his followers.

Far more threatening were the attacks from  
and Ægina. Ægina. For here, to the extreme terror of  
the Athenians, the sea once more proved to be as insecure  
as it had been of old before the Persian Wars. Sparta  
instructed the islanders, whom she had re-established in  
Ægina, to equip privateers for harassing the opposite  
coasts. An Attic besieging force was surrounded before  
Ægina; nor was it until after several considerable losses,  
that Chabrias, on his way to Cyprus, succeeded in landing  
unexpectedly in the island, killing the Harmost Gorgopas,  
and once more open in the sea to the Athenians. But  
no lasting security was obtained; the Lacedæmonians sent  
Teleutias to Ægina, where he animated the seamen with  
new courage, and was able to venture a surprise of the  
Piræus; on which occasion, after his troops had pene-  
trated as far as the magazines of the port, they made  
their way back unhurt, and laden with rich spoils.

Thus fighting went on in the widest variety  
of localities; but nowhere was anything deci-  
sive effected. On the other hand an essential  
change gradually ensued in the mutual rela-  
tion of the parties. The Athenians had entirely sepa-  
rated themselves from the allies with whom they had  
originally entered into the Bœoto-Corinthian War; the  
struggle for the passes of the Isthmus had become a naval  
feud, in which Athens, restored by means of Persian sub-  
sidies, was intent upon securing the advantages gained by  
the Persian naval victory. But in the course of this feud  
the Athenians had unintentionally become involved in a  
war *against* Persia, finding it obligatory upon them, in  
consequence of the benefits received from Euagoras, to  
support that prince in his revolt, and together with him  
Egypt, which had likewise risen. Sparta on the other

Approxima-  
tion between  
Sparta and  
Persia.

x. c. 388.

hand, which had formerly been allied with Egypt against Artaxerxes (p. 253), and which had recently sent Thibron and Diphridas to Ephesus, to make war upon Persia, had in its political conduct followed an opposite current. For while the Spartan land-forces were still fighting against the Persians, the naval commanders of Sparta were capturing the Attic vessels, intended to support the revolt in Cyprus; and finally, in the year 388 B. C. (Ol. xcvi. 4), Sparta created Antalcidas commander-in-chief of her naval forces, and thereby made manifest her wish to resume negotiations with the court of the Great King.

Antalcidas had never renounced his schemes. He perceived how his designs were favored by the incautious proceedings of the Athenians, and took advantage of these proceedings for his purposes, just as Conon had six years previously turned to account for his ends the expeditions of Agesilaus. At the same time his patron Tiribazus had recovered authority and influence. It was no longer possible at Susa to refuse to recognize the fact, that the policy proposed by Antalcidas was the most advantageous which Persia could adopt. The feeling of aversion from Sparta was outweighed by the desire of satisfying the demands of the coast-provinces. It was necessary for the Persians to be undisturbed by the Greeks, if they were to direct their whole strength against Cyprus and Egypt; for the combination between these two dangerous powers could not but in the highest degree claim the attention of the Great King. Accordingly, the Spartan admiral was most favorably received at court; all his propositions were approved; and he was now solely intent upon inducing the Athenians also speedily, and without entering into further conflicts, to accept the peace. And in this he succeeded all the more easily, because the Athenians had scattered their slight offensive resources, and were continuing the war without energy

Antalcidas  
commands  
the sea.

n. c. 388-7.

Antalcidas at once repaired to the Hellespont; relieved Abydus; took eight vessels from Thrasybulus (of Collytus); and then collected reinforcements in such numbers from the Persian ports and from Sicily, that at the head of a fleet of eighty vessels he controlled the sea. Athens, uncertain of the command of her own waters in consequence of the Æginetan privateers, and now moreover deprived of supplies from the Pontus, and incapable of equipping a fleet able to defy her enemies, had to look forward to a new siege and famine. All the terrors of the year 405 rose before the eyes of the citizens, while the advantages to be expected from the alliance with Cyprus and Egypt lay in the remote distance, and the amicable relations which had begun to be established with Dionysius had likewise again been absolutely reversed. Thus, not one of the orators ventured to recommend the continuation of the war. Thebes was exhausted as to both public and private resources, and incapable of sustaining any longer the incessant feud with Orchomenus. Argos and Corinth could not alone and unassisted defy the foe. Sparta herself, on the other hand, though issuing forth successful and victorious out of all the troubles of the war, could not possibly think of immediately using her present superiority for the oppression of the other states; for her power was solely based on the support of the Great King, and this support had only been accorded to her for the purpose of putting an end to the war which hindered Persia in her undertakings, and which fed the Cyprian revolt. Therefore neither was Sparta for the present interested in anything beyond taking advantage of the universal exhaustion of the belligerent states, so as to bring about with all possible speed a peace-congress and a general Hellenic disarmament. The congress was to take place at Sardis, whither Tiribazus caused the envoys to be summoned.

Peace-congress at Sardis.

Ol. xcviil. 2  
(n. c. 387).



Hereby Sparta immediately secured a twofold advantage. In the first place, she might assume that the authority of the Great King would contribute materially to facilitate the consummation of the peace, because every manifestation of opposition must now appear in the light of an act of hostility against that power, which was most feared on account of its fleet and of its pecuniary resources: it was the only power, which during the entire course of the war had uniformly been successful and victorious. Again, the states adverse to Sparta were in the Persian empire not looked upon as members of a League, entitled after a war carried on in common to offer conditions in common, but simply as individual states, bound, not less than Sparta herself, to submit to a general regulation of Greek affairs. Hereby the position of Sparta became a far more favorable one. And that Persia was the regulator of the new order of things, was to a certain extent justifiable by the fact, that a Persian distribution of money had provoked the entire land-war, while the main decision by sea, the single decisive battle of the whole struggle, had been a victory gained by the Persian fleet.

The conditions of peace were those originally drawn up by Antalcidas, from which they <sup>The</sup> "Peace of Antalcidas." only differed in according more favorable terms to Athens. At the previous congress, held at Sardis (p. 256), the most strenuous opposition had been offered by Athens; for Athens was the one state, where the principle was still upheld, that it was shameful to sacrifice Hellenes to the barbarians; the one state, in fine, whose troops still stood under arms; and moreover Chabrias was operating with success in Cyprus, and the revolt there might possibly be very useful to the Athenians. Their connexion with Euagoras had therefore above all to be terminated; and this was one of the main objects of the Persians in the entire transactions concerning the peace. For this reason those concessions upon which

the Athenians had especially insisted at the previous meeting of envoys, were now granted to them,—viz., the possessions of Lemnos, Imbros, and Scyros. These islands had not been taken from the Persians; and might be regarded as legitimately acquired, as portions of Attica situate on the further side of the sea. Accordingly, the instrument of the peace was drawn up in the following terms:—

‘King Artaxerxes deems it just, that the cities in Asia should belong to him, and, of the islands, Clazomenæ and Cyprus: the remaining Hellenic states on the other hand, both great and small, are to be independent; only Lemnos, Imbros, and Scyros are, as of old, to belong to the Athenians. Whichsoever states shall not accept this peace, upon them I shall, in conjunction with those who accept it, make war by land and by sea, with ships and with money.’

Congress  
at Sparta.

Ol. xcviil.  
2 (a. c. 387).

The instrument of this peace was a masterpiece of diplomatic skill. Seemingly clear and simple, it yet had a meaning which only those who saw deeper could justly appreciate.

In the first place it was drawn up in such terms, as completely to satisfy the Great King: to him, as the victor of Cnidus, was awarded the chief gain, in the recognition of his absolute dominion over Asia Minor and Cyprus. Next, according to the words of the treaty, the interest of the members of the League against Sparta was also taken into account; for their struggle had for its object the destruction of the despotism of Sparta over Greece, and this was abolished by full power of self-government being secured to all the Greek states. But in what way this stipulation was to be understood, was not made a subject of discussion at Sardis. Tiribazus contented himself with laying the royal message before the assembled envoys as the immutable basis of the peace; but its execution was

left to the Hellenic states; and for this purpose a second congress was convoked at Sparta, and probably held before the summer of the year 387 B. C. had come to a close.\*

At Sparta the discussions were more animated than they had been in the palace of the satrap; for it was now that the real significance of the second article of the treaty came to be debated. Sparta at this congress appeared in the character of the state entrusted by Persia with the execution of the treaty; for although it had been carefully and prudently avoided explicitly to assign to her such a position, yet it was tacitly assumed that upon the state which had taken an immediate share in the drawing up of the instrument, and which enjoyed the full confidence of the Persian Court, rested the obligation of watching over the execution of the compact; and its last clause contained a sufficiently clear promise, that in the event of any opposition Sparta might count upon energetic assistance in arms and in money from Persia. The Persian message was now translated into Lacedæmonian; and its terms were, that all the recent attempts on the part of individual states to oppress others were opposed to the autonomy of the Greek communities, as guaranteed by the treaty of peace, and were therefore invalid: consequently, Argos was declared to be bound to renounce her hold upon Corinth, and Thebes her territorial sovereignty over the cities of Bœotia. Scenes of the utmost violence ensued. The Thebans desired to be heard as representing the entire district of Bœotia; and their envoys were in-

\* Grote (*Hist. of Gr.* vol. ix. p. 535) rightly distinguishes between the first and the second congress, although such a distinction is nowhere drawn by the ancients; but see *Hellen.* v. 1, 30 ff. The treaty was concluded at Sardes under the presidency of Tiribasus, nineteen years after Ægospotami; Diod. xiv. 110, 117. Terms of the treaty; *Plut. Art.* 21; cf. Justin, vi. 6. Xenophon is quite satisfied with the treaty, *Hellen.* v. 1, 36; *Agæ.* ii. 21. Otherwise Plutarch, *Artax.* 21.

structed only to sign the treaty as Bœotians. But an immediate armament on the part of the Spartans forced them to give way. Orchomenus was recognized as an independent state; and orders were likewise given for the restoration of Plataea.\*

Argos.

Argos met with the same treatment. The Argives could appeal to the fact, that Corinth had joined them of her own free will; and it was inexplicable, why a state should not by virtue of its autonomy also enjoy the right of uniting itself with a neighboring state. But the Spartans refused to see in this hated union anything but an illegal act of violence, which had been merely facilitated by a party at Corinth. They immediately levied an army, for the purpose of invading Argos; the Argives, in their helplessness, were obliged to give way, and to withdraw their garrison from Corinth, whither the exiles now returned, who, after having during a term of six years pursued their ends with admirable energy, now brought their intrigue to the happiest of consummations: they were, so it was said at Sparta, received with open arms by their fellow-countrymen; *i. e.*, their return was viewed in the light of a termination of the terrorism exercised by a small party, and as a restoration, after a long interval, of the lawful order of things. The adverse party had to decamp; the petty state was restored within its ancient boundaries; and Corinth, united with the Lacedæmonians more firmly than ever, once more acted in their interest as the gate-keeper of the Peninsula.

Signifi-  
cance of the  
Peace of  
Antalcidas.

Thus it is evident, how the tame and harmless articles of the treaty of peace concealed a bristling zeal for war; and Agesilaus was above all active in giving proof of this spirit. A reconciliation had taken place between him and the party of Antalcidas, when the treaty concluded by the latter proved to be not a shield behind which Sparta was fain to crouch,

\* Restoration of the Platæans, Paus. ix. 1. 4.

but a sharp sword against her enemies. Upon the most defiant among them a heavy blow had once descended; and there lay a bitter truth in the saying, whereby he excused the Spartans for their relations towards the Great King—it could not be said, he declared, that Sparta was *medizing*; rather this was the state of the case, that the King of the Medes was *laconizing*. So effectually had the Great King, without intending it, served the interests of Sparta; just as in the earlier treaty with Conon, he had provided for Athens, when desirous only of providing for himself.

There was however, after all, a great difference between the two cases. Conon had entered the Persian service as a private individual, and had employed his influence patriotically; whereas now, at the instigation of Sparta, Persia was formally acknowledged as the power whom it behooved to settle the affairs of Greece. An entirely new code of public law had been called into life, a new system of states, of which the centre of gravity lay at Susa. Persia was henceforth the Great Power proper, and the great states of Greece had become states of secondary rank, standing in a relation of vassalage towards Persia, whose will they had to obey, and against whose will they were not allowed to alter their relations towards one another. The Great King was now the overlord of Hellas. He summoned congresses of the Greek states, whose deputies humbly accepted his imperial orders; in all internal disputes which seemed to him of sufficient importance, he might intervene by word and by action, while the ultimate appeal lay to his decision; every violation of the peace was an act of revolt against the recognized lord and master.

This relation was the necessary result of the policy pursued by the Greeks. Already at the beginning of the Peloponnesian War Sparta had courted the favor of the Persians (vol. iii. p. 75), and Athens had followed her

example. On either side it had become more and more habitual to allow success to depend upon the attitude of the Great King; and thus Persia, though suffering from internal disruption, conquered in every battle which she had fought, and driven back from every coast, had by her conquerors been placed in her present position, of having to give the ultimate decision in the struggle between the Greek states. The overthrow of Athens was the work of Persia, and equally so was the restoration of Athenian independence. Already in these times it was a popular proverb in Greece, that "the fate of the Hellenes lies in the hands of the King;" and the relation herein expressed, which had as a matter of fact long been in existence, was now by the Peace of Antalcidas formally recognized and legalized. Herewith the glorious age of the War of Liberation was virtually at an end, while the direct reverse of that which had been gained at Salamis, Plataea, and Mycale, had come to prevail; for the Persians had in the end after all achieved the objects for which they had of old sent their hosts into Hellas. What had Mardonius demanded beyond the recognition of a Persian protectorate in Greece; and was not European Greece now avowedly in a relation of dependence towards the Persian coast? With regard to Asiatic Greece on the other hand, the principle, from which Persia had never swerved, that to her belonged all the coast-lands of Asia Minor, was now solemnly acknowledged by all the Greeks. Hellas on the hither, and Hellas on the further, side of the sea had once more been torn asunder, and for the first time since the battle of Mycale the Great King was absolute master over Asia Minor; he had in his hands all the ports, and disposed for his purposes over the men and ships and pecuniary resources of the cities, which he needed at the present moment more than ever, in order to restore his power in Cyprus and Egypt. The unfortunate cities, after being so often freed, without ever becoming

free, because it had invariably been their fate to serve the purposes of whatever state happened to command the sea, now fell under a dominion, which was the opposite of the gentle and indulgent treatment formerly experienced by them at the hands of Mardonius and Cyrus. They were made to feel the yoke newly imposed upon them the more heavily, in proportion to the length of time during which they had been withdrawn from it. Citadels were built in the towns, and garrisons placed in them; those cities which had ventured upon attempts at revolt were destroyed; and taxes were exacted to as large an amount as possible. The Persian fleet controlled the Ionian and Carian seas; and although the territorial domain of Persia was for the present very closely confined to the mainland, so that even the city of Clazomenæ, only separated from the mainland by a narrow sound, was expressly assigned to the Persians, yet a line of demarcation of this kind has at all times proved ineffectual and untenable; nor could any one fail to perceive, that the state in possession of all the ports and military positions along the coast would at the next opportunity likewise annex to its territory the islands fronting the coast, Samos, Chios, &c. These islands were of themselves defenceless; and therefore the treaty of peace, by preventing the formation of any power capable of serving to protect them, likewise sacrificed to the Persians the islands and the entire island-sea. But the worst of all was this: that the resources of Asia Minor, so soon as they had been renounced by the Hellenes, could not but immediately serve to enable the Great King to subject other Hellenes, and in particular to suppress the most hopeful of all the risings at any time undertaken by a Greek population against Persia,—viz., to conquer Euagoras.\*

\* The Spartans προτάται τῆς ἐπὶ Β. καταπεμφθείσης εἰρήνης, *Hellen.* v. 1, 36. Ἐν Βασιλείᾳ τὰ τῶν Ἑλλήνων: *Arist. Phys. auct.* iv. 3; 210 b; Persia is the κινητικόν.—As to the treatment of the Asiatic cities, *Isocr. Paneg.* 117; *de pace* 97 *et al.*

The Cy-  
prian War.  
a. c. 394—385.
 Euagoras had been forced to perceive from the first, that the amicable relations established between himself and Artaxerxes could not long endure. During a short time the one served the interests of the other. For the ships of Euagoras constituted the greater part of the fleet which restored to the Persians the dominion over their coasts and the Archipelago; from which preponderance of power it again resulted, that Athens recovered her walls, and was thereby enabled to become an independent ally of Euagoras. Meanwhile the suspicions entertained by the King against Euagoras (p. 220) had never been extinguished; and a hostile feeling between the two ensued immediately after the victory of Cnidus. Consideration for his own security would have of itself obliged Euagoras to address himself to the extension of his power from Salamis over the other island-towns. Now, in Cyprus there existed nine or ten petty kingdoms, ruled over by Hellenic or Persian houses under Persian superiority. This division of power secured the dominion of the Great King. He was accordingly bound not to permit the spread of the power of Euagoras, or to leave unregarded the requests for aid preferred by his threatened vassals in Amathus, Citium, and other cities. An island of the size of Cyprus (its extent in length is equal to the distance between the southernmost promontories of Peloponnesus), with such resources in metals, timber, corn, &c., and situated so as to be indispensable to any state desirous of commanding the seas between Asia Minor, Phœnicia, and Egypt, could not be permitted to fall into a single hand, least of all into that of so daring a man, who allowed the popular elements most dangerous to the Persians to assert themselves, and who, far from confining himself to the island, entered into combinations with others, with Syracuse, with Egypt, and doubtless also with the Greek cities on the south coasts of Asia Minor. These were the relations out of which



sprang the Cyprian war, a conflict by land and by sea which lasted for ten years, and which, after being first waged between Salamis and the lesser cities, grew into an offensive war against Persia, and finally closed with a siege of Salamis.

The first stage of the conflict was an island-war, in which Persian troops too participated under the command of the Carian dynast Hecatomnus and of Autophradates, the satrap of Lydia; but this intervention was ineffective, and failed to prevent Euagoras from more firmly establishing and extending his dominion. He made Salamis the capital of an independent island-realm, and provided it with institutions formed after Hellenic models. He introduced the Rhodian standard of currency, and issued gold coins like the Great King himself. Acoris, who ruled over Egypt, which had remained in revolt against Persia since the year 411 (Ol. xcii. 2), was an active ally to Euagoras, because it lay in his interest, not to allow Cyprus, the outpost of the Nile-country, to fall again into Persian hands, and to become a Persian basis of military operations against Egypt. The Athenians likewise remained true to Euagoras, and furnished effective aid. In particular, Chabrias succeeded, in the year 388 (Ol. xcvi. 1), in gaining brilliant victories in Cyprus. Almost the whole island was subjected; so that Euagoras was now able to proceed to a war of offence. He turned against the cities of Phœnicia, by which the island had been so long kept in a state of oppressive dependence; he took Tyre by storm, and caused Cilicia to revolt; the fleet which Conon had commanded, was to be the last collected in the coast-districts of Mount Taurus and Mount Lebanon for the Great King. All the malcontent vassals of Persia were united in a great coalition; the most important provinces of the Empire were in a state of revolt; and the dominion of the Achæmenidæ trembled in the balance.

Artaxerxes therefore needed to have his hands free, and to be able to dispose at will over his armies and his treasures; and he necessarily also desired the pacification of Greece, in order to be able to gather mercenaries from all parts of it. It was for this reason that Tiribazus so eagerly pressed on the conclusion of the peace; and after this had been effected, an armament was immediately set on foot both of land and of naval forces, such as had not been witnessed since the days of Xerxes. In the cities of Ionia a fleet of 300 sail was collected; Tiribazus conducted it to Cyprus, and commenced the attack which brought the war into its last stage. Even now Euagoras did not lose courage. He contrived by means of his cruisers to cut off the supplies from the invading army, and then with his 200 triremes fought a great naval battle against the foe, in which he was at first successful, but was afterwards defeated, whereupon he was blockaded in Salamis. Abandoned by Athens, and by Egypt too insufficiently supported, he was finally obliged to enter into negotiations; and after the removal of his bitterest enemy, Tiribazus, he contrived to be allowed to retain his ancestral principality in Salamis as a vassal of the Great King (Ol. xcviil. 4; B. C. 385).

Thus ended the Hellenic rising in Cyprus, the continuation—which came a century too late—of the Wars of Liberation in Ionia and Hellas. Euagoras was abandoned by the Athenians, although he was resuming the work of Cimon and expiating the blood of Attic warriors, uselessly shed in the glorious battle by land and sea at Salamis. The Greek states were so full of mutual jealousy and of selfishness, that they had no feeling left for the single national struggle undertaken in this age, or for the hero who was conquering for Hellas the richest island of the Mediterranean. They allowed it once more to sink back under the yoke of the Barbarian

End of the  
Cyprian War.

Ol. xcviil. 4  
(a. c. 385).

The gains  
of Persia.

monarch, and the instruments which he employed in bringing this about were the Greeks of Ionia. This then was the chief gain which accrued to the Persians out of the Peace of Antalcidas; and for this reason that peace fully amounted to a Persian victory and to an overthrow of the Hellenes, who by it betrayed the most glorious epoch of their national history, and dishonored the memory of their greatest heroes. But this humiliation cast a double shame upon the Greeks, inasmuch as they had not succumbed in arms to a superior power, but had abased themselves before a foe whom they had overthrown everywhere, by land and by sea, and whose internal weakness was now more decided and notorious than ever. In order mutually to ruin one another, they had first individually, and now conjointly, taken upon their shoulders the shameful yoke of the foreigner; and although it was an old sin of theirs to be perpetually wooing the favor of the Persian Court, yet the open and general confession of so disgraceful a dependence, and the formally executed renunciation of the position held by the Hellenes in the *Ægean* since the battle of Mycale, constituted an act which could not but blunt the last feelings of honor left in the Greek states and undermine such remnants as still survived of national dignity.

But deep as was the moral overthrow of the Greeks, yet its external consequences were less than might have been concluded from the arrogant terms of the instrument of the Peace. The new overlord of Hellas was after all incapable of asserting a real supremacy; and the internal affairs of Greece accordingly remained in the hands of the Greek states, and in particular of those two states, which in the last treaty too had been recognized as the two powers holding the primacy of Greece. For this reason it is necessary, in order to understand the development which ensued, to review the situation of Athens and Spar-

ta before, and immediately after, the Peace of Antalcidas.\*

Athens  
before the  
return of  
Conon,

About the time when Sparta was carrying on war in Elis and Asia Minor, Athens had enjoyed several years of comparative tranquillity, during which it seems as if her condition had gradually again become more prosperous. But the impoverished and depopulated city was not permitted to recover her strength, nor could her citizens permanently reconcile themselves to an economical system of administration. No sooner had a few public resources been accumulated, than the old financial misrule recommenced. Under the archonship of Diophantus in Ol. xcvi. 2 (B. C. 395-4), festival-moneys to the amount of a drachm per head were distributed among the people, and about the same time the rest of the system of salaries was revived. This was done chiefly at the instigation of the demagogue Agyrrhius, who in home affairs had supplanted the former leaders of the community, Thrasylulus and Archinus, and together with them the entire party of the moderate democrats. He recklessly pandered to the love of self-indulgence of the lower classes, and for their sake re-introduced the payment for attendance in the popular assembly, or at all events raised it to half a drachm. Hereby the public finances were necessarily cast into the utmost confusion; and from the public want of money it again followed, that every method was resorted to of obtaining money for the

\* The existence of ten Cyprian principalities is demonstrable from cuneiform inscriptions: Rawlinson, *Herodotus*, i. 483. Brandis, *Assyria*, in Pauly's *Realencyclopædie*, i. 1898.—The Cyprian War lasted ten years: Diod. xv. 9; Isocr. ix. 64 (Dates: subjection of the principalities, B. C. 394-1; Persian war without important events, 391-87; Euagoras at the height of his power, loss of the fleet, and capitulation, 386-6). Engel, *de Euagora* (1846); *de temp. quo divulgatus est Isocr. Pæneg.* (1861), Rauchenstein, Isocr. v. 22.—State of the currency: Brandis, *Münzwesen*, p. 364 sq. Egypt, in a state of revolt since the year 411, aids the Spartans (Nephereus: Diod. xiv. 79; Justin. vi. 2).—Acoris: Diod. xiv. 98; xv. 2 f.; Theopompus, Fr. iii.; Sievers, 368.

exchequer. And the worst of all these methods was the ordinary one, viz. an unfair administration of justice. How low must the moral feelings swaying the majority of the citizens have sunk, when it was deemed quite natural that the Council, so soon as it was at a loss how to meet the current expenses, allowed indictments for high treason to lie, in order to obtain money by the confiscation of lands; when the prosecutors could venture to tell the juries, that their salaries would run short, if they refused to give the verdict of condemnation demanded; when Lysias, in defending the unfortunate children of Aristophanes (p. 299), is found openly declaring that his task would be rendered very difficult to him by two circumstances,—the one, that the property in the case was believed to be very considerable; and the other, that the public treasury was in extreme want of an influx of money. And even Lysias himself, instead of daring to evoke the consciousness of right in the citizens against such proceeding, merely urges on the opposite side another consideration in the public interest, by attempting to make his hearers understand, how the transitory profit of illegal confiscations is outweighed by the greater loss necessarily arising out of the mutual hostility thereby provoked among the citizens. It is true that other remedies were also tried. Euripides (perhaps the younger tragedian of the name) introduced a law, according to which  $2\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. were to be levied on all taxable property, in order that thus a sum of 500 talents might be accumulated: the entire taxable capital must accordingly have been reckoned by him at 20,000 talents (4,875,000*l.*). This financial law was warmly welcomed, of course by the multitude not possessed of means; but the object desired and promised was not achieved; and the orator, after earning high praise, soon fell into utter disfavor with the citizens. This happened at the same time in which Agyrrhius stood at the height of his influence, and in which the poet Aristophanes in his *Eccle-*

*stazuse* (Ol. xcvi. 4 ; B. C. 393) lamented the wretched condition of the city and the bad leaders of the citizens. The orators had altogether left off speaking of what was advantageous to the common weal, and only discussed the momentary profits obtainable for the multitude. To screw personal gains out of public offices, and to make a fortune as envoy by Persian gifts, was no longer regarded as in any way disreputable; and even citizens of desert, men who had taken part in the liberation of the city and had been real benefactors of the people, lost their footing in these unhappy and demoralizing times. One of these was Epicrates, who even if he did not take money from Timocrates (p. 238) was subsequently condemned as having been open to a bribe.

and after. Such was the state of things at Athens, when the city entered into the war with Sparta.

Beyond a doubt Athens was less capable than ever of accomplishing anything to her credit by her own strength. Then, however, came Conon, whose arrival was a day of rejoicing for the city, such as it had not experienced since the return of Alcibiades (vol. iii. p. 508). And how far purer and more thorough was the joy called forth on the present occasion! The most loyal of the citizens of Athens had returned, and had returned with full hands, bringing with them unexpected and exuberant good fortune. A new life hereupon began at Athens; and the joyous gratitude animating the citizens elevated them, cast selfishness into the background, and aroused patriotism in its place. Copious hecatombs were offered to the Saviour Gods, and noble dedicatory gifts were placed by Conon in the citadel, or sent to Delphi. In the Piræus, now once more connected with Athens, was built a sanctuary of Aphrodite, as worshipped at Cnidus, in memory of the naval victory gained there; and doubtless at the same time the buildings in the port, which the Thirty had destroyed, were re-erected. Athens had, as by the touch

of magic, been transmuted from a poor and impotent district-town into a wealthy and powerful city, the ally of the Great King as well as of the rich and fortunate prince in Cyprus. In the intoxication of this good fortune, Conon was honored like a demigod, and a bronze statue was erected to him on the terrace above the market-place by the side of Harmodius and Aristogiton—an honor never before paid to any citizen.

And now the Athens of old seemed suddenly to rise into life again. The sea had been swept clear of all hostile vessels; in Cythera an Athenian had been established as governor, and all the islands and coast-towns which in consequence of the victory had fallen away from Sparta—Cos, Teos, Ephesus, Samos, Chios, and the Cyclades—seemed hereby already to have become a new possession of the Athenians. Moreover, Eubœa and the Thracian Chalcidians had already joined the Separate League, which indeed but for Conon would have never been called into existence. But this scheme went still further. On his motion, Eunomus and Aristophanes, who together with his father Nicophemus was among Conon's most faithful adherents, repaired to Syracuse, in order to persuade Dionysius to enter into a matrimonial alliance with Euagoras and into the league against Sparta; and by this embassy at least so much was gained: that the ships which were to be sent to aid Sparta from Syracuse, were detained there.

At the same time the man rarely adapted for despoiling the Spartans of their glory in <sup>An Athenian levy.</sup> the land-war also, was found in Iphicrates. The Athenians again displayed valor in the field. A tomb in the Ceramicus honored those who had fallen before Corinth; and immediately in front of the Dipylum Dexileus was buried, who had fallen during the archonship of Eubulides (Ol. xcvi. 3; B. C. 394-3), in the twenty-first year of his age, as one of the "five horsemen," and whose mar-

ble image has been recovered in a state of good preservation. These Five must accordingly have distinguished themselves, before the battle of Lechæum had yet been fought, by some exploit of arms; and it is probable that the Knights, who were at this period unpopular among the multitude, were anxious for an opportunity of recovering their honor. Mantitheus, who had belonged to the body of the Knights under the Thirty, himself relates in the speech composed for him by Lysias, how he had conducted himself at the beginning of the war. "When you Athenians," he says, "concluded the league with the Bœotians, and were thereupon bound to march to the rescue of Haliartus, I was called out for service in the cavalry by Orthobulus. But inasmuch as I found the opinion widely spread, that the cavalry would have but a small part to play in the fighting which was expected, while others who had no right to do so were exchanging into the cavalry, I went to Orthobulus and caused my name to be struck out of its lists, because I deemed it a disgrace to take part in the campaign in personal security, at a time when the majority of my fellow-citizens would have dangers to undergo. When hereupon my fellow-demesmen had assembled before the march-out, and when I perceived that some among them were worthy and brave men, but lacked the necessary means for equipping themselves, I proposed that the wealthy should come to the aid of the needy, and myself presented to two men thirty drachms apiece. When at a later date the expedition to Corinth was undertaken, and many a one held back, because serious perils would evidently have to be encountered, I managed to fight in the front rank; and although our phyle suffered beyond all the rest and lost the majority of its men, yet I held my ground longer than Thrasylulus with his grand air, who loves to upbraid all men with cowardice."

This description offers us a very clear conception of the



nature of the proceedings in connexion with an Attic levy of men at the commencement of a war, and shows how on such occasions at one time and money and objects belonging to an equipment, and at another time courage, were wanting. Money was brought by Conon, and the want of civic courage was supplied by the mercenaries; nor was there any lack of skilful generals. But that which was absent during the entire war, from its beginning to its close, was definite goal, as well as a man genuinely trusted, and able to lead and elevate the community. The peace-party, supported by the love of ease prevalent among the citizens, the party of Andocides (p. 275), operated to hinder vigorous action. But even those animated by patriotic and warlike sentiments, were not united. Thrasybulus of Stiria was their natural leader, but he was personally far from popular, as is shown by the sarcasm of Mantitheus. Like Themistocles of old, he made the mistake of too loudly and too frequently insisting upon his own services: he thought that as the liberator of Athens he might go further than other men; for this reason he became involved in a quarrel with his old associate Archinus, and, on the indictment of the latter, was on one occasion sentenced for having proposed an illegal motion. His assumption of grandeur displeased the multitude; and it is intelligible, how they felt more at their ease under the leadership of an Agyrrius.\*

But hereupon the appearance of Conon Conon and Thrasybulus. suddenly changed everything for the better. Abundant resources and definite ends again existed; and

\* Confiscations (*ἀναστροφή*): Boeckh, *Publ. Ec. of Ath.* vol. II. p. 127 [Eng. Trans.]. Lysias on indictments for high treason, xviii. 17. Euripides: *Ar. Eccles.* 818. Boeckh, *u. a.* p. 257. Epicrates: *Dem.* xix. 277. Nicophemus in Cythera: *Hellen.* iv. 8, 8; *Lys.* xix. 7. Consequences of the victory: Boeckh, *u. a.* p. 157. Embassy at Syracuse, *Lys.* xix. 19 (according to Sauppe's emendation). Tomb of Dexileus: Rangabé, *Ænomia* (1863, May 31st); *Göttinger Nachrichten* (1863), 190; *Salinas Monumenti sepulcrali scoperti in Atene* (1863). Mantitheus, Lysias, xvi. Position of Thrasybulus, *Philol.* xvii. 445.

once more all elements gathered around *one* man. But neither was the influence of Conon enduring. His double position as the confidential agent of Persia and as an Athenian patriot was untenable. His task could only be that of freeing Athens from the ban under which she had lain, of restoring to her freedom of movement, obtaining for her allies, and as it were opening the portal for a new era in her history. The rest depended on the conduct of the Athenians themselves: it was imperative that they should in a spirit of self-sacrifice recover their manly vigor, and by their own exertions continue the construction of the edifice on the basis offered to them. But no such sustained onward effort ensued. The citizens had been spoilt by Conon. Instead of gratefully employing what they had received, they were wroth as soon as the money-payments became less abundant, and as soon as the Persian fleet ceased to keep the seas clear of hostile ships. When, therefore, Antalcidas gained influence, the authority of Conon at once sank; and then the outbreak of the Cyprian War finally ruined his position. The Athenians were placed in the same difficulty through Euagoras, in which the Lacedæmonians had been placed through Cyrus. Both were first the authors of friendship with Persia, and afterwards the causes of hostile relations with

her. Conon vanished from the scene, without leaving a trace behind him, and died in Death of Conon. n. c. 389 (circ.). Cyprus about the year 389. The fruits of his victories were lost, before they had been appropriated by Athens; and of his whole system of policy nothing remained but the combination with Euagoras,—a combination now so full of danger, which the Athenians were unwilling to break off, but which on the other hand they would not venture energetically to turn to account.

After the departure of Conon Thrasybulus again came into the ascendant; but we have already seen how unsatisfactory was his position, and how insufficient were the

resources at his disposal (p. 281). Moreover, feelings of suspicion prevailed against the generals abroad, who were expected punctually to fulfil their instructions, and were yet obliged themselves to provide for the maintenance of their enemy. The distrust of Thrasybulus rose to such a height that he, the liberator of Athens, was thought to be on the road towards seeking Tyrannical power. After his death the state of affairs became still worse, when Agyrrhius took the command of the <sup>Death of Thrasybulus.</sup> ships, without being able to accomplish anything. It was an aimless struggle to and fro, without any inner coherence and without any real prospect of success; no damage could be done to Sparta, and the only fear was, lest she should separately bring to pass treaties with Persia. Every one at Athens was conscious of the wretched condition of his native land, and longed for a change in it, and for peace; and no man comprehended the situation of the times in a nobler and more dignified spirit than Lysias, who attempted, during the celebration of the <sup>Speech of Lysias at Olympia.</sup> Olympic festival (in July 388), to take advantage of the tone of mind naturally prevailing among the festive assembly, in order <sup>Ol. xviii. 1 (a. c. 388).</sup> to recall to its members their national duties, and to contribute his utmost to the termination of the unhappy war, now approaching its ninth year. "This festival," he said, "was founded for the purpose of preserving friendship among the Hellenes. Discord has brought us into the humiliating position in which we now stand. On the one side the Persian King, on the other the Sicilian Tyrant, are menacing the liberty of Hellenic cities; the task is accordingly incumbent upon us, of terminating our home feud, and of then turning our united forces against our common enemies." He reminds the Spartans of their duty, as the born leaders of the Hellenes, not to allow Hellas to be utterly ruined. This was a genuinely national policy, worthy of the best age of Greece. Such

sentiments, therefore, at this time still animated Athenian breasts.\*

It was at Athens, therefore, that the policy of Antalcidas also necessarily met with most opposition. For, of all the Greeks, the Athenians were least able to adopt it, without sinking into the deepest humiliation, if they abandoned the cities, whose protection they had claimed as it were as the right of a mother-city, and at the same time their greatest benefactor, the noble Euagoras, to whom they had quite recently erected a statue in the market-place. To him were devoted the best exertions of the party of Conon. More than any man Aristophanes, the son of Nicophemus, had actively applied himself to advocating the requests for aid on the part of his prince (p. 299). He had even risked the greater part of his property, and had by entreaties and pledges induced his acquaintances to advance money to the public treasury. The fall of Aristophanes and of his father probably connects itself with the calamity suffered by the ships on their way to Cyprus (p. 283). Both father and son were indicted for high treason, and put to death, without any regular inquiry, according to martial law (B. C. 389). This amounted to a victory for the peace party, which was strictly opposed to all foreign complications. Even now, however, the cause of Euagoras was not abandoned. In the following year Chabrias crossed to Cyprus with ten vessels and 800 mercenaries, and great results were achieved (p. 293). Prospects of the widest kind opened in the event of further victories being gained, and of an intimate connexion, based upon identity of interests, being kept up with the princes of the two wealthiest countries of the ancient world, the resources of which were now being placed at the disposal of the Athenians.†

Execution  
of Aristophanes  
and  
Nicophemus.

Ol. xvii. 4  
(B. C. 389).

\* Olympian speech of Lysias: Schäfer, *Philol.* xviii. 188.

† Trial of Aristophanes: *Lys.* xix. 22; Meier *de bonis dam.* 192.

Now, it was precisely at this time that Athens was called upon to accede to a treaty of peace, which was to be concluded essentially with the view of thwarting the princes of Cyprus and of Egypt. Doubtless a considerable part of the citizens opposed to the recall of the victorious general from Cyprus, and the faithless tearing asunder of an alliance, of which the fruits were at this very time beginning to mature. But the peace-party prevailed. The Spartans were shrewd enough to confine themselves for the present to the humiliation of Argos, Corinth, and Thebes. To the Athenians concessions were made; and, inasmuch as nothing special had been fixed with reference to the Archipelago, they might flatter themselves with the hope of gradually recovering their dominion over the islands. For the immediate present they were only interested in escaping from the pressure brought upon them by the privateering of the Æginetans, and by the loss of the imports from the Hellespont. Their accession to the treaty decided its conclusion, and put an end to the eight years' war, which was in every respect most hurtful to Greece.

It was a war, begun by the Persians and ended by the Persians, which from its very commencement lowered the national consciousness, and on the other hand contributed little to arouse vigor and courage; the most important gain had fallen into the laps of the Athenians without any exertion on their part, the most momentous victory had been gained without their co-operation. And the petty war which the Greeks had carried on among themselves, was chiefly a species of robbers' feud, tending to uncivilize the people, and bringing hopeless devastation upon the districts of the land. Agesilaus transferred to Hellas the fashion of making war upon barbarians, lit destructive fires wherever he went, caused the fruit trees to be pulled up by the roots, and shamelessly sold as chattels human beings, members like

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the War*

himself of the Hellenic nation. Nor was a contest among fellow-citizens of a single town ever carried on with more unyielding violence of passion, than at Corinth.

But the most momentous occurrence of the whole war was the transformation of the military system, which connects itself with the campaigns in Asia. For while the states of Greece were falling into utter discord with one another, the fame of the warlike capabilities of the nation had steadily risen; its superiority was to such a degree acknowledged by all the barbarians, that they thought themselves able neither to conquer it, nor to conquer without it. Hence, wherever wars were carried on, there Hellenic men were in demand. Formerly, only such persons had offered themselves for mercenary service abroad, as were without any genuine native country of their own, *i. e.* who belonged to no regularly organized policy claiming the services which they would give, such as the Arcadians, Cretans, Carians, Thessalians, and again those who had been expelled from their own states, and were homeless and bankrupt in their fortunes. But since the system of mercenaries had acquired a new splendor through Cyrus, the inclination towards it became more and more general. For it was no longer as of old, when to lack a home had been the greatest misfortune which could befall a Greek. Party-feuds and civil wars had destroyed men's loyalty to the canton to which they belonged, and their attachment to the place where they had been born. Instead of these feelings, there prevailed a craving to go forth into the wide world, and a hankering after adventures. Thus generous natures, as *e. g.* Xenophon, unscrupulously entered the service of a Persian prince, if opportunity offered itself for chivalrous deeds. Herein, at the same time, the national pride could likewise find abundant satisfaction; and the sentiment asserted itself with constantly increasing vivacity, that it was the mission of Greek valor and culture, to transform the lands of the East

Mercenary  
armies in  
Hellas.

The system of Greek mercenaries in Asia Minor, moreover, reacted upon the mother-country. Here it had already for some time obtained at sea; and, on more than one occasion, one fleet had sought to weaken the other by an increase in the rate of pay (vol. iii. p. 523). But for the mainland, the Corinthian War was the beginning, and the Isthmus the original home, of the system of mercenaries. Here a certain Polystratus hired troops for the moneys brought by Conon; Iphicrates assumed the command over them, and gave to the mercenary forces the importance which belongs to them in Greek history, by introducing a reform into the Athenian military system, well adapted to the times. For a soldier to provide himself with a complete equipment of arms, it was necessary that he should be well-to-do; but the number of citizens in this condition had very considerably dwindled, and those who were most easily able to furnish the cost were on an average most prone to consider their own comfort and most spoiled by self-indulgence, and doubtless therefore not the best materials for war. But heavy arms were entirely calculated for the old style of warfare, for regular battles fought in line, in which the skilful use of the ground and tactical movements were of less moment. They were intended to protect the lives of citizens as far as possible; and, the fully-armed warrior being accompanied by a servant, who carried his shield and attended to his weapons, the army was unnecessarily swelled, and its flexibility impeded.

Furthermore, Iphicrates perceived, how in a war with Sparta, who immovably adhered to her ancient military system, a reform adapted to its purposes constituted the most effective means for securing a superiority over the foe. Already Demosthenes had by the employment of light-armed troops and by innovations in tactics (vol. iii. p. 395) gained important successes; Iphicrates called into

Military reforms of Iphicrates.

life a series of thorough changes. He made the arms of defence lighter and easier, by introducing a circular shield (*Pelte*) of smaller size, and replacing the bronze greaves by a species of gaiters (*Iphicratides*); on the other hand, he made the weapons of offence more effective, by lengthening the spear and substituting the rapier for the sword. Being thus lightly armed, the soldiers could carry a larger quantity of supplies and undertake longer marches. Thus Iphicrates created the new infantry of the line, the *peltasts*, who were incomparably better adapted for rapid movements in gorges and mountains, than were the heavy masses of the civic militias.

Towards mercenary troops the commander stood in a totally different relation, from that which he held towards fellow-citizens. Among the former it was possible, and it was necessary, to maintain the strictest discipline; there was not the same need of sparing them; and they were attached immediately to the person of the general, from whom they derived pay, glory, and booty; the mercenaries of Iphicrates followed him from Corinth to the Hellespont. Iphicrates, himself a man of low birth, was in his own person rarely adapted for the management of his men. He was ruthlessly strict, and yet popular. He could venture to cut down on the spot a sentinel whom he found asleep at his post; he knew how to tame the most savage, and to turn their passionate vehemence to account for the service; he openly declared his preference for those who were most eager for money and for enjoyment. Everything depended on the spirit of the soldiery; and, besides his great talents for command and for organization, Iphicrates was also gifted with the faculty of having the right word at once forthcoming in the right place. The newly-created army was in readiness in an incredibly short time, and at once gave to the Athenians a decided superiority in the field. The single defeat suffered by the Spartans in this War, was inflicted upon them by peltasts (p.262).



Doubtless Iphicrates entertained plans far His political schemes. outstripping those which he was able to carry into execution. For can any one believe, that he made his military reforms only for the purpose of carrying out this or that successful surprise? He was not merely a bold *condottiere*, but also a politician of keen intelligence and of far-reaching conceptions. Of all those who supported the policy of Conon, and who sought to turn to account for Athens the benefits which he had conferred upon her, Iphicrates effected far the most. It was he who showed, how the portal of the peninsula must be burst open, which had hitherto stood in the way, like the inaccessible castle of the Spartan power; who first occupied Acrocorinthus with Attic troops, and first appreciated the significance of this fastness for the general relations between the states of Greece. He conceived the bold idea of securing Corinth for Athens; for the establishment of a garrison there was in point of fact the most radically effective expedient for quelling Sparta's hankerings after intervention,—a better expedient at all events than the bifurcate walls of Lechæum, which had to be guarded against a chronic danger of attack, and were, according to the successive issue of events, either built up or pulled down again. Now, inasmuch as the Corinthians themselves recognized their incapacity, as a petty state, of defending themselves against the Lacedæmonians, and therefore resolved to renounce their independence (p. 258), it may well have seemed to be the duty of Athens to protect Corinth; and possibly there was at Corinth itself a party which desired to join Athens, and not Argos. Certain it is, that at Corinth itself a sanguinary quarrel occurred between Iphicrates and the Argive party, some of whom he put to death; that, after the union with Argos had been effected, the departure of the Attic mercenaries was demanded; and that the whole body of the citizens of Argos marched out to take possession of Corinth. But

Iphicrates was not the man voluntarily to give up such a post as this. He offered to hold Acrocorinthus; but at Athens so bold a policy was declined, and Iphicrates resigned his command, vexed at the timorousness of his fellow-citizens, who refused to employ the weapon which he had forged for them. On the other hand, the Athenians were afterwards credited with their refusal to enter into their general's schemes of annexation, as with a proof of magnanimity and wise moderation.

Effects of the system of mercenaries. To the happy reforms in her military system, then, Athens owed that rise in her power which enabled her to humiliate Sparta even by land, to terrify Arcadia, and to entertain thoughts of establishing an Attic military position in the peninsula. But, on the other hand, the disadvantageous consequences of the innovation likewise soon manifested themselves. The close connexion between the army and the commonalty, whereupon was founded the strength of ancient states, was dissolved; and whatever the army was, it was through the commander. The citizens more and more withdrew from military service; a military class arose, which regarded itself as outside civic life, a restless and homeless sort of men, ever on the look-out for an opportunity of applying their handicraft of arms, and accordingly making any disturbance which might anywhere break out doubly dangerous. Money now decided everything. For money those ready to bear arms enlisted, without asking any questions as to the cause for which they were to fight; and by money the band was kept together. "The bodies of the Hellenes," says Lysias, "belong to those who can pay." Thus the people was severed into two halves: the one, which was in constant military practice, was estranged from its home; the other, the civic community proper, lost the habit of military service. Instead of the calm valor of the settled citizen, fighting for his house and home, the wild courage of homeless adven-

turers decided the fortunes of the states,—men whose conduct depended on the individuality of their leaders, and whose loyalty held out just as long as there was money in the military chest.\*

Athens was unfortunate, in experiencing rather the evil than the good effects of the <sup>Athens</sup> <sup>after the war.</sup> system of mercenaries. Athens was the solitary city, where the mercenary force had been organized with creative genius and in a patriotic spirit, and had without delay achieved the utmost success; but this success it was not contrived to hold fast, for the courage was wanting to allow the commander of the mercenaries to take his own course; and thus it came to pass, that his great deeds remained without any influence upon the issue of the war. And indeed, it was in general the misfortune of Athens, to oscillate to and fro without fixity between political tendencies of the most diverse kinds during the whole period of the war; such men as Thrasybulus and Archinus, Agyrrhius, Conon, Andocides and Iphicrates, being successively and simultaneously influential. Not one of them permanently enjoyed the confidence of the community, or became the permanent leader of the city. Hence, neither could there be any question of a fixed system of policy; instead of pursuing with consistent energy of will ends chosen by themselves, the Athenians grew accustomed to wait for impulses and decisions from abroad. Thus it came to pass that in spite of the various particular successes obtained by Athens in this war, she upon the whole lost more in it than she gained. At its close, she was more thoroughly disintegrated than before: she had lost all her allies, had found her best men untrustworthy, and had anew recognized the insufficiency of her own resources; and was in the end forced under the pressure of necessity to conclude a peace, which deeply injured the

\* Polystratus and his successors: Dem. iv. 28. Schemes of Iphicrates; Diod. xiv. 92; Aristid. *Panath.* 167; Rehdantz, *Vita Iphicr.*, Ob., T. p. 16.

honor of the city, and by no means corresponded to the original purposes of the war. For this had in truth been a rising against Sparta, intended to dispute her right to interfere in the affairs of the remaining states. But at the close of the war the predominance of Sparta, was placed on a new basis, which she employed with the object of arrogating to herself, more confidently than ever before, the right of intervention in the affairs of all the other states of Greece.

The position of Sparta. For Sparta had under the most diverse forms persistently adhered to her ancient policy. Careless of the national honor, she desired to be mistress in Greece; and whatever support she could find for her claims to dominion, was welcome to her. These claims she had asserted by force of arms, by treaty, and by divine authority. These means had lost their effectiveness; and after already the Peloponnesian War had been virtually decided by the Great King, he was now also formally set up as the authority, which in the absence of any other had to serve for regulating the relations between the Greek states in favor of Sparta. In the place of the Delphic god, it was the king of the barbarians whom Sparta caused to sanction her assumption of primacy in Hellas. According to the words of the Treaty, indeed, all the states were equal before the Great King; he alone overtopped all the rest, and was the one Great Power, from whose throne issued the condition of peace. But the carrying-out of these conditions had been committed to the hands of Sparta; for this purpose the Spartans had to watch over Hellenic affairs; to them fell the *execution* upon all who resisted the new order of things. In other words, therefore, they laid claim to the beginning in Greece by virtue of the royal authority, and this authority was thoroughly consonant with their own policy. Had they not drawn up the terms of the powers in their own sense, and merely contrived to obtain the royal seal

to the demands of their ambition? As towards the Great King, they undertook an obligation identical with what had ever been their own desire, viz. to prevent the rise of any greater power in Greece, and to keep it split up into petty states, weak and defenceless.

Sparta could not have stood in a more advantageous position than that which she now held. She still had her adherents, from of old, in all the states, and was still regarded by the majority of the Hellenes as the state upon which was incumbent the conduct of national affairs. It was only in the year preceding that of the Peace that Lysias said: "The Lacedæmonians are accounted the leaders of the Hellenes, and justly so, by reason of their inborn valor, by reason of their skill in war, and because they alone dwell in a state which has never been devastated, without fortifications, without civil discord, unconquered and ever under the same constitution."\* Sparta had victoriously issued forth from all the dangers which had beset her; all the combinations formed against her had remained ineffectual; no enemy stood in the field; nowhere was there a state displaying vigor of action; the craving for peace was universal; and, although the new form of the hegemony offended many, yet in the masses the feeling for national honor had been too much blunted, for the position of power held by Sparta to have run any danger from it. The remaining states, as well as she, had humbled themselves before the Great King; and after all she had only contrived better than the rest, to obtain for herself the good-will of the mighty ally, and to make certain of his support.

Had Sparta used the Peace with caution, she might have reaped its fruits in full, and have gradually accustomed the states to peaceable subordination. But no such thoughts were entertained at Sparta. Her lust of dominion was not satis-

The falsity  
of the Peace  
of Antalcidas.

\* Lys. xxxiii. 7.

fied, but kindled anew ; she stood not at the end, but at the beginning, of her schemes. Nineteen years after the battle of Ægospotami she saw her foes disarmed for the second time, and desired nothing short of carrying out what she had then begun, with more sagacity and with better success. She intended that the Great King should only serve as a pledge for her own dominion ; and the autonomy guaranteed to the states was to be the net in which their liberty should be strangled. At bottom, everything about this Peace was false. The independence of the Greek states is proclaimed, whereas the object is their dependence. From Persia proceed the conditions which have been devised at Sparta ; and the Great King dictates the peace as the overlord of Hellas, while he is more impotent than ever before, and unable to protect himself in his own land against flying bands of Hellenic soldiery.\*

\* Concerning the Peace of Antalcidas, viewed as thoroughly consistent with the ancient policy of Sparta, see in particular Herbst, *Neue Jahrbücher für Philol.* lxxvii. p. 704.

## CHAPTER V.

### THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE PEACE OF ANTALCIDAS.

THE next eight years of Greek history are nothing but a history of Lacedæmonian policy. All the other states are crippled; Sparta alone acts, by carrying out the Peace in her own interest, by re-establishing her omnipotence afresh, and by endeavoring to humble in succession one after the other of those states in which a power of resistance has survived.

At Sparta itself, indeed, there was an absence of concord. Here, too, there existed a party of thinking men, who endeavored to prevent an abuse of the treaty of peace and of the momentary preponderance of the Spartan power; whom morality and political insight induced to demand that the rights of Hellenic states should be respected; and who foresaw, how a new policy of force would involve the state in new perils. The representative of these principles was Agesipolis, who followed his father Pausanias in his conception of Greek affairs (p. 56). The youthful king had conducted himself with respectful modesty towards his colleague, who sought to attract him to himself by treating him confidentially, as a soldier treats a comrade. Soon, however, Agesipolis assumed a very independent position. He was animated by magnanimous and national sentiments, worthy of one descended from Leonidas and from the noblest members of the house of the Agiada. He possessed an intelligent judgment, together with a tender susceptibility for the honor of his native city. It was impossible to him, to conceive of himself in his relations

towards the other states as of a mere Spartan; he regarded a Hellenic policy, such as Brasidas and Callicratidas (vol. iii. p. 530) had pursued, as the only salutary course of action; he was the leader of the party, which adhered to the bonds and to the duties dating from the ancient Confederation; and it was therefore not inherited jealousy or perversity, but well-founded conviction, which made him the opponent of Agesilaus. From the first, he disapproved of the treaty, by which Sparta had subordinated herself to the national enemy, in order to be able to rule over fellow-members of the Hellenic race; but inasmuch as this treaty had been once concluded, he desired, to see it used as an expedient of protection, against any dangerous extension of the Attic or the Bœotian power, but not to have it employed as a pretext for an illegitimate lust of dominion.

Agesilaus, on the other hand, had long ago renounced the character of a Hero king at the head of the hosts of Hellas, which he had played for a time; during the last years of the recent war he had become a partisan of the most narrow-minded Laconism; and his sole intention now was, to take full advantage of the peace in this sense. He thought that tranquillity could be permanently restored in Greece only in the event of every rising against Sparta being strangled in its birth. Nor was even this object pursued openly and honestly with impartial severity, as behooved a state conscious of its ruling mission; but attempts were made in a petty spirit to take vengeance for former injuries, and to make defenceless cities pay the penalties of their previous conduct.

For this line of policy Agesilaus was precisely the man. It was not the honor of his native land, not even that of his native city, which lay nearest to his heart, but his own person; personal vanity, which is wont to be a specially marked characteristic of the deformed in body, was the motive of his designs; and after his great plans had suf-



ferred shipwreck, he knew no other ambition but that of making his power felt by those who had treated him without consideration. From the scenes in Aulis (p. 224) down to those in Arcadia, where he had been forced to make his way through the country by night, in order to escape the gibes of the Mantineans (p. 263), he had not forgotten a single taunt, a single injury; and with savage vehemence he sought for opportunities of vengeance.

Thus the ancient opposition between the two royal houses once more prevailed in full measure; but from the first the advantage was decidedly on the side of Agesilaus. He was far superior to his colleague in experience and military fame; he contrived to maintain his popularity; very skilfully played, as he had always done, the part of the representative of the ancient Spartans; and by means of cunning concessions managed to secure the good-will of the official authorities. For, whereas the kings had formerly attached the greatest importance to a careful maintenance of their honorary rights, and to preserving intact their inherited dignity, Agesilaus, who was extremely vain, but not proud, saw no objection against recognizing the Ephors as his superior authority, which it was his duty unconditionally to obey; in the point of form, too, he sacrificed the independence of the royal office, by being the first to rise from his royal throne, when the Ephors passed by. He flattered them in every way, in order through them to direct the measures of public policy. Furthermore, his intentions were actually seconded by the inclinations of the Lacedæmonians, who sought quarrels with the petty states, and who wished to play the lords in other cities, in order to obtain booty and money. For the hostile spirit by which Agesilaus was animated was spread among all those who had taken part in his campaigns; the influence of his ambitious brother (p. 261) likewise supported him; and thus it is not wonderful, that Agesipolis with his pacific and equitable principles

should have found little favor, while his adversary in all essential points determined the conduct of Sparta.\*

For the rest, Sparta, instead of immediately displaying her designs, at first contented herself with having gained her object against Argos and Thebes; and hereupon waited to observe what impression the Peace had created in the surrounding territories.

Even in the peninsula, the times of an absolute subordination under the mere will of Sparta had long passed away. The confederate cities felt offended, at a peace of so universal an importance having been concluded without their participation; and the bolder among them had no intention of allowing their future to be settled off-hand. After all, the same autonomy, which had in the interest of Sparta been restored to the Corinthians and Orchomenians and Plataeans, might be claimed as against Sparta; and there is no doubt, that in the peninsula too voices were raised, which appealed to the treaty in this sense, and laid claim to full autonomy for the states to which they belonged.

Xenophon, indeed, makes no mention of these movements of the liberal party, because it is his general habit, as a zealous adherent of Agesilaus, to pass over what was adverse to the latter; but trustworthy authorities attest, that several states really asserted their autonomy with really serious intentions, and took advantage of the right conceded to them, of governing themselves according to their own laws, to call to account the officials who had hitherto held sway under the authority of Sparta. Strict inquiries were set on foot, which the leaders of the Lacedæmonian party evaded by flying from the popular tribunals, and seeking protection at Sparta.†

\* Agesilaus and Ageaspolis: Plutarch, *Ages.* 20; *Xen. Hellen.* v. 3, 20; *Diod.* xv. 19. Συμμαχική αἴρεσις, Polyb. ix. 23. Agesilaus and the Ephors: Plutarch, *Ages.* 4; Manso, *Sparta*, iii. 1, 215.

† The Peloponnesian cities ἐπιλαβοῦσαι τὰς ἀνελευθέριας λόγων ἐνήθρου παρὰ τῶν ἐλευθεροφύλων ἐπὶ τῆς Λακεδαιμονίαν ἡγεμονίας, *Diod.* xv. 5.

These risings on the part of individual communities could not lead to any lasting results; and the Spartans succeeded, without much trouble, in bringing back their partisans, and in convincing the confederate cities, by force of arms, that they had misunderstood the article concerning the autonomy. But these movements they employed as an opportune pretext for henceforth watching with greater severity over Peloponnesian affairs; and as formerly, after the overthrow of the Messenians, the Messenian party had been persecuted throughout the entire peninsula (vol. i. p. 243), the same was now the case with regard to the Argive party. For it had been from Argos that the most daring attack upon the supremacy of Sparta had proceeded; Argos had not only concluded anew a Separate League, but had also endeavored to blend together the revolted confederate cities into a greater and more powerful state in the North. This amounted to the most dangerous attempt ever made against Sparta; and for this reason those states which had directly or indirectly taken part in it, could not but be the next object against which the Spartan arms directed themselves. Among these states none was more suspected than Mantinea.

Mantinea was the single city of Arcadia which had dared to pursue an independent line Sparta and Mantinea. of policy. Not until the Persian Wars the community coalesced out of five villages into one fortified city; this being done at the instigation of Argos, which already at this early date entertained thoughts of forming for itself a confederation in its vicinity. Mantinea had endeavored to increase its city and territory by conquest, and after the Peace of Nicias had openly opposed Sparta (vol. iii. p. 290). After the unfortunate termination of the first war waged by a Separate League, Mantinea had indeed again subordinated itself to Sparta (vol. iii. p. 312), but it had remained a democracy, and the ancient aversion

from Sparta continued. No secret was made of the satisfaction caused by the victory of Iphicrates; and, had not the city found itself fettered by a treaty, concluded with Sparta in the year B. C. 418 for a term of thirty years, it would doubtless have taken advantage of the favorable conjuncture of the last war, and have resumed its ancient line of policy. It can hardly be doubted, that at Argos the accession to the league of the bold and warlike city of Mantinea was calculated upon; and how dangerous a turn might not the Corinthian War have taken for Sparta, had the three contiguous territories of Argos, Mantinea, and Corinth been blended into a single hostile state! Here, then, were reasons enough for hating Mantinea worse than any other Peloponnesian state, and for letting it be the first to suffer chastisement. In the second year after the peace operations were commenced accordingly. The thirty years' treaty had expired; and the Spartans now desired no new settlement of their relations with Mantinea by treaty, but the unconditional submission of the city, which as a focus of democracy disturbed the happy peace, and the desired subordination of the government of the Arcadian cantons. Clearly, this anomaly must be removed; and therefore the matter was taken in hand without much ceremony. The messengers of Sparta brought a series of complaints to Mantinea; the citizens, it was declared, had under empty pretences evaded sending their contingent; they had displayed bad feeling (this referred to the march-through of Agesilaus); they had assisted the Argives by furnishing them with supplies. These complaints were accompanied by the demand, that the city should pull down its walls; and as the citizens, who were still led by the Argive party, although they could not expect aid from any quarter, were courageous enough to reject this proposition, the Ephors without further delay decreed war against them.

Agesilaus evaded the conduct of this war, putting for-

ward as a pretext the amicable relations, which had subsisted between his father Archidamus and the Mantineans. In reality, he may have expected little honor from this campaign; for the confederates were averse from it, and the conduct of sieges was not his strong point. But probably his chief reason was this: that he wished to avail himself of this opportunity for insulting and damaging his colleague in office. For it may be conceived, how unwillingly Agesipolis entered upon this task,—unwillingly, not only by reason of his political principles, but also because some of the present leaders at Mantinea were on friendly terms with him through his father. No opposition was, however, offered by Agesipolis, who carried the expedition to a more speedy and successful issue than his unfriendly colleague had hoped for. After establishing a blockade over the enemy in the city, he very cleverly availed himself of the conditions of the ground, in order to force the besieged, without loss of life, to capitulate. He caused the stream Ophis, which traversed the city and which at this season (the late part of the year) was swollen, to be dammed off below the city, so that there being no means of efflux for its waters, they inundated the streets, and rose high alongside of the walls. These walls, having been built of unbaked clay, were softened from below, until rifts made their appearance in them, and it was a useless labor to prop them up by beams and boards. Thus Mantinea was disarmed without a struggle; no citadel existed into which the citizens might have retreated; and all further resistance was out of the question.

When, hereupon, negotiations commenced, the father of Agesipolis, who lived in exile at Tegea, contrived to assert his influence. Perhaps even the damming-off of the stream should be attributed to him; for as he had for some time been familiar with the district, he could not have failed to

War with Mantinea.

Ol. xcvi. 3-4  
(a. c. 385).

Fall of Mantinea.

Ol. xcvi. 4  
(a. c. 385).

be aware, that in the border-feuds between the Mantineans and the Tegeatæ this Ophis-stream had already more than once been called into action for the purposes of warfare. And it was obviously his interest, that his son should gain a rapid victory, and that this victory should be attended by as little bloodshed as possible on either side. After the fall of the walls, he accordingly used his good offices with his son, and obtained permission for six hundred citizens belonging to the Argive party, and already designated by their enemies inside and outside the city as victims for slaughter, freely to depart. It was an instance of magnanimous generosity, offering a very marked contrast to the ways of his colleague, when Agesipolis drew up his warriors, arms in hand, before the gates at either side of the high-road, to protect these men during their departure against the vengeance of their own fellow-citizens. By order of the Ephors the city was now broken up; the citizens had to pull down their own dwelling-houses, and to disperse once more into the ancient villages. Each of these henceforth formed a separate community, furnished its own contingent, and willingly obeyed every command issued by Sparta. Such was the promised independence of the Greek communities! And this act of oppression was, forsooth, to be regarded as a benefaction, as a liberation from the sufferings of city-life, as a restoration of the patriarchal happiness of peasant-life! Xenophon, in point of fact, assures us that the Mantineans, however vexed they had been at first when their town-houses were pulled down, soon grew wiser, and gratefully appreciated the convenient proximity of their lands and the tranquillity of rural life, interrupted by no popular orators. Doubtless the aristocrats were glad to have recovered possession of the communal offices, and cannot have failed to send to Sparta the most favorable reports concerning the success of this re-settlement.\*

\* Diodorus dates the outbreak of the feud with Mantinea, Ol. xviii. 3

By the expedition against Mantinea the policy of Agesilaus had openly asserted itself. This was no other than the old Lysandrian policy, only of a still more ruthless and unabashed character. It was no longer thought in the least necessary to deduce a semblance of justification from the Peace; force and arbitrary violence were unscrupulously employed, in order definitively to establish the absolute influence of Sparta; and for this purpose the services of the troops of the confederates were demanded, as if a matter of Hellenic interest were in question. The Mantinean campaign was the logical continuation of the war with Elis; the end aimed at was the unconditional furnishing of contingents for any object Sparta might choose to propose; the Peloponnesian was to become a Lacedæmonian army.

The success achieved by the Lacedæmonian party in Mantinea occasioned immediate attempts by the same party in other quarters, directed towards a similar establishment of their influence. The first instance was that of Phlius.

The city of Phlius in the upper valley of the Asopus was one of those Greek communi-<sup>Sparta and Phlius.</sup>ties which, in a small territory surrounded by neighbor-states of preponderant power, preserved their independence and characteristic individuality from the earliest times. The Phliasians lived in their fair mountain-valley, withdrawn from the great struggles agitating the world, in happy prosperity. But they were at the same time brave and prepared for warfare; they possessed an effi-

(B. C. 386-5), and its progress, *Ol. xcviil. 4* (B. C. 385-4). Xenophon, *Hellen. v. 2, 2*, places its commencement in the year in which the treaty expired. According to Thuc. *v. 81*, the treaty was concluded as early as 418. It is therefore necessary either, notwithstanding Xenophon, to assume an interval of two years to have occurred between the expiration of the treaty and the outbreak of hostilities, or, notwithstanding Thucydides, to date the conclusion of the treaty a few years later than the battle of 418. Cf. Hertberg, p. 313 f. Concerning the Ophis-stream, see Curtius, *Peloponnesos*, I. 299.

cient force of horsemen ; proved themselves patriotic Hellenes in the Persian wars ; and afterwards adhered to Sparta as faithful members of the Confederacy. They were governed by families which encouraged this attitude ; and inasmuch as the city, lying away from the sea, supported itself by husbandry and the culture of the vine, this state of things endured for a long time without change. In the end political movements made their appearance even here. A democratic party formed itself, and the former leaders of the community were expelled. This had occurred when the Corinthian war scared the quiet valley of the Asopus out of its wonted tranquillity, and when the bands of Iphicrates from their head-quarters on the Isthmus devastated the surrounding district. Phlius was utterly isolated. Its citizens were still too much attached to their ancient traditions to join the Separate League, and yet they had at the same time severed themselves from Sparta. They intended to support themselves by their own strength ; but Iphicrates inflicted great damage upon them ; whereupon they found themselves after all obliged to invoke the protection of Sparta, and to admit Spartan troops among them. The Spartans behaved with prudent moderation ; and instead of their demanding, as it had been feared they would, the recall of the exiles, these men, disappointed in their expectations, had to wait for other times.

Restoration  
of the Phli-  
sian exiles.  
Ol. xciv. 1  
(a. c. 383).

After the fall of Mantinea, the Phliasian exiles conceived new hopes. Observing how the state in possession of the primacy was now with thorough strictness reviewing all the Confederate cities in succession, with reference to their loyalty as members of the Confederation, they now denounced their native city as a community which had been guilty of revolt (Ol. xcix. 1 ; B. c. 384). So long as they had been its leaders, it had, they declared, been among the most loyal ; but since the victory of the popular leaders,



it had, like Mantinea, become negligent as to its duty of furnishing its contingent, recalcitrant, and hostile. In Sparta the importance of Phlius for the control of the Isthmian districts could not be mistaken. If, so long as the Separate League remained under arms, it had been thought necessary to treat Phlius tenderly, in order not to drive it over to the enemy, there now seemed no reason to reject this opportunity of strengthening the power of the state holding the primacy. The complaints of the exiled Phliasians found a ready ear; the reasons for their expulsion were declared unsatisfactory; and their recall was demanded. When these orders arrived at Phlius, the existing government perceived its inability to defy them; the state of feeling among the citizens was not to be trusted, for the fugitive party-men still had numerous adherents in the city. It was accordingly resolved to re-admit them, and to re-instate them in their lands; those who had in the interval acquired the lands in question, were to be compensated out of the public resources, and all eventual disputes were to be judicially decided. That the matter was not hereby settled, could easily be perceived. Sparta, however, had completely gained her immediate object; and already she had in view other and wider aims, for which she intended to claim military aid, according to the newly regulated system of the contingents.\*

In the spring of the year 383, an embassy arrived at Sparta, which suddenly directed the attention of the Ephors to the distant north of the Ægean. It was composed of envoys sent by the Chalcidian cities of Apollonia and Acanthus, headed by the Acanthian Cligenes, and supported by the Macedonian king. They demanded assistance against the powerful city of Olynthus, which, as they declared, was

Embassy  
from  
Apollonia.  
Ol. xcix. 1  
(a. c. 383).

\* Sparta and Phlius: *Hellen.* iv. 4, 15. Xenophon lauds Sparta's abstinence from restoring the exiles as an act of special generosity on her part.

without restraint extending its frontier, subjecting a number of independent communities, and forming on the Thracian Sea a dominion, the existence of which utterly contradicted the conditions of the Peace.

On the question of this unexpected demand, again, the two parties at Sparta were directly opposed to one another. Agesipolis was an opponent of all undertakings directed against Hellenic States; he foresaw how they must lead to new acts of injustice, and in the end, prove hurtful to Sparta. The Ephors, together with Agesilaus and his adherents, on the other hand, were resolved not to reject the overtures of the envoys; they regarded the proposition as a welcome opportunity for re-establishing, under the most favorable circumstances, the power of the city in districts of incomparable importance for the control of the Archipelago; and considered a great war as the best means for accustoming the Hellenic contingents to the leadership of Sparta. They, accordingly, produced the envoys before the popular assembly and the deputies of the confederates, who must at this point of time have been present at Sparta for the purpose of discussing and regulating the affairs of the confederacy.

On this occasion Cligenes made a speech, in which he expounded the situation of matters. "Great and important transactions," he said, "are taking place in Hellas, of which you, as it seems to me, have no knowledge. Of Olynthus, indeed, you have all heard,—the greatest of all the cities in the Thracian peninsula. This city began with attracting to itself several of the lesser communities, in order together with these to form a common state; hereupon, it conquered a few of the larger cities in the vicinity, then caused a series of places to renounce their allegiance to the Macedonian King, even Pella, the greatest of his cities; and it appears as if Amyntas were being gradually forced to surrender his whole territory to the advances of the Olynthians. Re-

Speech of  
Cligenes.

cently they have further proceeded to send messages to our cities, and have intimated to us, that we should unite our military forces with theirs,—otherwise they would make war upon us. Now, our sole desire is, to live according to our laws, and to remain free citizens; but without external aid this is out of our power; for Olynthus has at her disposal 8,000 heavy-armed, and a still larger number of light-armed, troops; and her cavalry, should we give in our adherence, will amount to more than a thousand men. But you ought to know, that the Olynthians are pursuing plans of a yet far wider scope. We have seen among them envoys from Thebes and Athens; and we were told, that they were, for their part also about to send envoys to these cities, in order to conclude an alliance with them. But should such an alliance be brought about, it behooves you to reflect, how it will be possible for you to withstand it. Many other cities share our views, and hate the Olynthians as we hate them; but they have not dared to take part in our embassy. If, then, you are troubled, even concerning Bœotia, and are unwilling to allow it to contract itself into a single whole,—consider that in the present case an incomparably more dangerous power, one which is a land- and a sea-power at the same time, is forming itself. For the Olynthians are in possession of everything needed for the purpose, of forests for building ships, of abundant revenues from harbors and mercantile places, and of a population numerous on account of the fertility of the soil. Moreover, they have for neighbors the free Thracian tribes, which even now are ready to do them service, and which, as soon as they shall have been completely subjected, will constitute a very considerable accession to their power, especially since they are in that event likely to bear the proprietors of the gold-mines. All these are matters which are not the product of our invention, but the subject of daily discussion among the Olynthians. Such is the situation of affairs; and it

now rests with you to decide, whether it be worthy of your attention. Up to the present moment the power, which we have described to you, is one not difficult to meet; for those who have against their own will joined the new union of states, will also fall away from it again, so soon as they shall see a power asserting itself in opposition to it. But when, as is their intention, they shall, by a mutual grant of the civic franchise, have become more and more blended together, and when they find it to their own advantage to adhere to those who are mightier than themselves (as is the case with the Arcadians with regard to Sparta), it may be doubted whether the league of states will any longer so easily admit of dissolution."

Results of the embassy. This speech had, with the assent of the Ephors, been sagaciously calculated for the purpose of impressing the Thracian campaign upon the Spartans as a political necessity; the policy of intervention was, so to speak, represented as a policy of prevention, and offensive as defensive war. Again, the dangerous side presented by the speech of the envoys, was cleverly evaded. For it was dangerous to allow a relation of subordination, such as was being carried out more strictly than ever in Peloponnesus, to be represented as intolerable on the Thracian coast, and to demand from the Peloponnesians a defence of Acanthus and Apollonia against the domineering ambition of Olynthus, while in the peninsula every attempt at independence was chastised as an act of revolt. The Spartans would in this matter draw no distinction but one of time. In their eyes, the establishment of a new league of states, damaging the independence of Greek cities, amounted to an illegal and revolutionary proceeding; but not less was such the case with the dissolution of a dominion over the neighbor-states, consecrated by the course of centuries; ~~and~~ indeed, a very explicit reference is made to this distinction in the speech as given by Xenophon. It is conceded, that in the event of the Olyn-

thians being allowed to realize their cravings after a hegemony, a really fixed and historically coherent whole might be the result, in which case the Acanthians too might be satisfied,—just as at this very time the Arcadian communities were placed in an uncommonly favorable situation by virtue of similar relations, so that they enjoyed the comfort of canton-life, and at the same time participated in the advantages which only a great power could offer to its constituent members.

And yet it was nothing but fear of Sparta, which made the confederates willing to co-operate; for after such a judgment as Mantinea had suffered for having neglected duly to furnish her contingent, they were all thoroughly frightened and ready to do service. Of this state of affairs, then, the fullest advantage was taken by the envoys, as well as by the authorities of the city; and the praise of great energy cannot be denied to the war-party which controlled affairs at Sparta. The ancient sluggishness of movement had been shaken off, and all the restraints of timidity had been overcome. After such marches as those which Agesilaus had undertaken, distances had lost their importance; no thought was taken of the possibility of serious resistance on the road from the Isthmus to Thrace, although the feeling of disaffection in Bœotia was well understood; and Agesilaus, who was the soul of the war-party, gloried in demonstrating the advance which Sparta had made since the days of Brasidas, when Thraco-Macedonian applications for aid had for the first time reached Sparta (vol. iii. p. 178). A levy of 10,000 men was resolved upon, and the armaments were carried on with the utmost ardor. In arrangement of the federal *matricula* on this occasion, a new principle was for the first time, so far as we know, acted upon. For it was resolved to leave to the confederates the choice of sending money instead of men; and for this purpose a calculation was made of three Æginetan obols (i. e. 4½ <sup>Army-reforms.</sup>

Attic obols *circ.*) *per diem* for each fully-armed warrior, and of the quadruple of this, equivalent to a *stater* (2s. 2d. *circ.*), for each horseman. Two peltasts were reckoned to each hoplite; and it may with certainty be assumed, that Agesilaus attentively took advantage for his native city of the recent important innovations with regard to light infantry and its tactical application. Finally, it was fixed, that in case of any city not fulfilling its obligation, Sparta should have the right of levying a fine of a *stater* daily on account of every one man missing.

These ordinances, by which the system of the Confederate army was regulated, were the results of a sagacious combination of strictness and indulgence. For while care was taken that no man should be missing in the field, the duty of bearing arms was lightened by means of an equivalent money payment being permitted in lieu of personal service, which was intentionally not fixed at a higher rate than that to which the pay and the expense of maintenance in war amounted. Thus it was in the power of the wealthier communities, to evade personal service in arms; and Sparta gained this advantage: that the Peloponnesians, who preferred the money-payment, grew unaccustomed to military service, and became unwarlike in proportion as Sparta increased in military strength of her own. Sparta, therefore, hereby fully adopted the policy of the Athenians, who had established their absolute maritime hegemony by permitting to the lesser island communities the payment of an equivalent for personal service in money, and by thus gradually disarming them. And Sparta could drill and dispose of troops enlisted by herself after a quite different fashion from that which had been possible in the case of the men furnished by the confederate states; so that the entire reform served essentially to raise the military strength of Sparta. And advantage was taken of the first war conducted on a greater scale and resolved upon in common. in order to call into

life these new institutions; so soon as they had been carried out in Peloponnesus, it would be possible to adopt them as regulations for the armies in the remainder of Greece; for that such were the ultimate intentions of the party of Agesilaus, there can be no doubt.\*

When the spring of the year 383 arrived, the entire peninsula fell into a condition of warlike agitation; and the Lacedæmonian captains passed through all the cantons, in order to collect men or moneys. But action was not delayed till the armaments should have been completed; for the envoys most justifiably insisted upon a rapid advance; everything, according to their view, depended upon the Peloponnesian troops being at their post, before the still wavering or unwilling cities had been forced by Olynthus to give in their adhesion. It was accordingly resolved in the first instance to form a brigade of 2,000 men under the brothers Eudamidas and Phœbidas. With one division of this Eudamidas immediately set out, advancing in forced marches up towards Thrace; the other followed about the middle of the summer.

Phœbidas was a passionate adherent of the war-party. He was completely mastered by the feverish excitement which prevailed in part of the civic community, and which delusively pictured to them the ultimate goal of Spartan ambition as easily attainable; he burnt with desire, for his part too, to contribute some notable service, in order to extend the dominion of his native city over Greece as rapidly as possible. Thus he came to Bœotia, and pitched his camp before the walls of Thebes, where the two parties stood sharply opposed to one another; the democratic party had carried the election of their leader, Ismenias, and the opposite party that of Leontiades, on the Board

Expedition  
of Eudami-  
das and  
Phœbidas.

Ol. xcix. 2  
(a. c. 383).

Phœbidas  
before  
Thebes.

Ol. xcix. 2  
(a. c. 383).

\* Cligenes: *Hellen.* iv. 4, 15. Army-reforms: *ib.* 14; Grote, *Hist. of Greece*, vol. x. p. 77; Boeckh, *Publ. Ec. of Ath.*, vol. i. p. 360.

of Generals. As yet the two parties held the balance to one another; but the oligarchs felt that their power was on the decline, and that they needed support from without, if they were to maintain themselves. For this purpose no better opportunity could be found than the present. While, therefore, Ismenias held proudly back, and never showed himself in the camp, his opponent entered unobserved into an understanding with the Spartan general, and proposed to him the occupation of the citadel of Thebes, which he undertook to deliver into his hands without fighting or danger.

Let the situation of affairs be considered. In spite of an outwardly peaceful relation, a feeling of bitter indignation prevailed at Sparta against Thebes, as the chief focus of the last war. It was known, how unwillingly she had submitted to the execution of the peace ordered by Sparta; and the present relations between the two states had fallen into a condition of doubtfulness, in which they could not long remain. Against Mantinea Thebes had still furnished her contingent; but now, under the influence of Ismenias, it had been publicly proclaimed, that no citizen was to join the Thracian expedition. For any Spartan undertaking extending beyond the Isthmus was the worst of abominations in the eyes of the states of Central Greece, who well knew what must be the result of such attempts. On hearing the reports of the envoys, the Spartans could entertain no doubt as to the fact, that a league was in progress between the states of Central and those of Northern Greece, which alone at the present time retained capabilities of resistance, and which, if united, would form an extremely dangerous power. Sparta was without a fleet. The success of the Thracian campaigns, accordingly, essentially depended upon a secure command being obtained over the land-route; but, as matters stood at present, it was to be apprehended that, upon the first mischance which might befall the Spartan arms, the The-



bans would openly declare themselves against Sparta, and prepare the greatest difficulties for the troops sent to reinforce their predecessors. For the security of the line of march the decisive position was the Cadmea.

How, then, could an ambitious general such as Phœbidas was, have under these circumstances hesitated long, when the occupation of the Cadmea was offered to him, and when by boldly striking a sudden, unscrupulous blow it was in his power to secure without bloodshed, what sooner or later must in any case be secured, if Sparta was to carry through her system of policy,—and what, moreover, would then presumably have to be obtained in a sanguinary and perilous war?

Leontiades had chosen day and hour with the utmost cunning. The Thebans had a great festival, of which the centre was the temple of Demeter, a sanctuary of primitive antiquity, on the Cadmea. This festival was celebrated by the women apart; they secluded themselves on the citadel, where the gates were closed upon them; and the key for this day was in the hands of Leontiades. The Council was assembled in a hall in the market-place; the way from the Southern gate of the city to the citadel was very short, and touched none of the open places within the walls; and moreover the citizens were in the most unsuspecting frame of mind, in harmony with the festive character of the day. No one was thinking of the Spartans, who were known to have received orders about noon to break up their camp and march for the north. No sooner, then, had Leontiades convinced himself, that the noontide heat had driven every human being from the streets, than he mounted his horse, as if about to honor the departing general by convoying him along the first part of his march; and thus the citadel, together with the women, was in the hands of the Spartans, before either Council or citizens had any suspicion of the danger. Leontiades him-

Seizure of  
the Cadmea.

Ol. xcix. 2  
(a. c. 383).  
Summer.

self was the first man to announce to the Council what had occurred, and to declare any resistance to be impossible. His adherents immediately surrounded him; and, since the opposite party had been completely taken by surprise, the oligarchs carried everything, in particular the arrest of Ismenias, and the appointment to his post of a member of their own party; while the leaders of the democrats took flight to Athens. The treasonable design had been successfully consummated in a few hours; and all that remained for Leontiades to do, was to hasten to Sparta, in order there also to be the first to announce the great event.\*

That an event, all the details of which fit into one another so precisely, should have been brought about quite by chance and incidentally, by means of an understanding arrived at within a short time, is doubtless extremely improbable. Nor is it conceivable, that the leader of the Læonian party at Thebes, who must in any case have prepared his plan long beforehand, should not have previously informed himself, whether, and to what extent, he might look for co-operation on the part of the Spartans. We shall therefore be justified in assuming as very probable, that Phœbidas had received instructions at home to pitch his camp on the appointed day near Thebes, to establish communications with Leontiades inside its walls, and generally to see what was to be done. But these instructions must have been of a non-official character, and have been given to him in the closest confidence; for only thus is the impression to be explained, which the arrival

\* Eudamidas requests the Ephors to allow his brother Phœbidas to follow him with the remainder of the troops, who were not yet quite ready for taking the field: *Hellen.* v. 2, 24. Diod. xv. 20, is inaccurate.—Capture of the Cadmea, Πυθίων ὄρνων according to Aristid. i. 419, Dindorf (accordingly Clinton fixes the date in Ol. xcix. 3); Xenophon, *Hellen.* v. 2, 29, is more precise: δια τὸ τὰς γυναῖκας ἐν τῇ Καδμείῃ θεσμοφορέειν. The Thesmophoria in the month of Demetrios are conjecturally placed by Boeckh (*Monochylon*, 83) after the middle of September. Others have thought of other festivals of Demeter, Sievers, p. 159 of the Thalsys (Thaluthius—Thargelion—May).

of Leontiades and the tidings of the seizure of the Cadmea created at Sparta.

Here, Agesipolis and those who shared his opinions were of course filled with the most serious anger by the violation of the Peace; and demanded the punishment of the general, and the restoration of the Cadmea. The excitement however was too great, to admit of its being ascribed to moral indignation at the dishonorable and illegal character of the deed. Other reasons must have existed, why many Spartans, not belonging to the party of Agesipolis, disapproved of the transaction; and doubtless one of the main reasons of the feeling of displeasure lay in the circumstance, that a secret understanding between Agesilaus and Phœbidas had to be assumed as a matter of course, and that this was regarded as an unconstitutional interference with the rights of the authorities. For the personal hatred of king Agesilaus against Thebes was notorious, and it was known how he had from the first looked upon the Peace as an instrument for the chastisement of Thebes; he, therefore, was regarded as the real author of this act of violence, upon which, without having such a support as this in the background, Phœbidas would never have ventured. The excitement was accordingly directed against Agesilaus, who was now standing at the height of his influence, and who, swayed by his ambition, was intent upon carrying on a personal government at Sparta, and upon controlling the policy of the state.

Agesilaus was accordingly in his turn obliged to use his whole influence, in order to protect Phœbidas; and the way in which he succeeded in effecting this, offers a sure test of the state of feeling at this time prevailing at Sparta. The large majority of the citizens were quite content with the thing itself which had been done; but it was not permissible to approve of its execution, lest a dangerous precedent should be established for the future.

Phœbidas was accordingly called to account for his unauthorized proceeding; he was removed from his command over the army, and sentenced to a fine. This satisfied the injured dignity of the Ephors, while at the same time it involved a humiliation for Agesilaus. But as to the main point he completely, and without difficulty, secured his object. For his open declaration, that every act on the part of a Lacedæmonian commander ought to be judged according as it either redounded to the advantage of the state or not, and that this alone must be the standard, was at bottom so ancient a principle of Spartan policy, that only very few could on this head seriously contradict him; and, inasmuch as the occupation of Thebes was regarded as the greatest advantage gained by Sparta since the battle of *Ægospotami*, while under existing circumstances nothing could have been so dangerous to her as a withdrawal from the *Cadmea*, there could remain no doubt as to the course to be pursued by the government. The troops received orders to hold the place; and three harmosts were despatched thither, to assume the supreme command.

The act of sudden violence perpetrated by Phœbidas has both in ancient and in modern times given exceptionally great offence; but this impression is only in so far justified, that the deed was one of an exceptionally surprising and daring character, and befell one of the most considerable cities of Greece: in other respects it accords so thoroughly with the general character of Lacedæmonian policy, that it is impossible to find in it anything extraordinary.

For it should be remembered, how Sparta on principle would never consent to recognize the other states as enjoying an equality of rights with herself, or to bind herself by such general rules of law as prevailed between states co-ordinate with one another. Moreover, there existed in all the cities a party which shared the standpoint of Spar-

ta ; and those who held these opinions, were not regarded as one party on a level with the rest, but as the men who were alone justified in asserting themselves as the loyal patriots ; while their opponents, the democrats, were looked upon as the revolutionary faction, which sinned, not only against Sparta, but also against the common country. From this point of view Sparta was able to look upon intervention on behalf of her adherents as a kind of duty incumbent upon her as the state holding the primacy ; and, in order in a still higher degree to surround the violent interference in the affairs of other communities with an equitable semblance, it was customary to conceive of the condition of those states which were governed as democracies, as if a revolutionary reign of terror were prevailing in them, under which their citizens were oppressed by a band of turbulent agitators ; so that it seemed all the more incumbent upon Sparta, to apply to them a wholesome disciplinary force, and to restore the legal state of things. And in Thebes the proceedings of Sparta manifestly admitted of something more of justification than elsewhere ; for with the Thebans democracy was an innovation of the last few years. It was one of the two highest public officers who here of his own accord handed to the Spartans the keys of the citadel entrusted to him by the community. Furthermore, Thebes had now refused to furnish her contingent, although bound to furnish it according to the Spartan view and according to what Thebes had herself in recent years acknowledged as her duty ; and this refusal, which had been made in an extremely offensive form, could not but be regarded as a proof of her being already in secret league with Olynthus against Sparta. Thus Thebes was already *de facto* at war with Sparta ; and it is quite obvious, what importance attached to the Cadmea during a war against Olynthus. Finally, appeal could be made to the fact, that the Thebans had themselves proceeded with far greater harshness

against Plataea, and this again simply under the pretext, that the democracy there constituted a breach of usage and an insufferable revolt.

With regard to the chief objection to the conduct of Sparta, viz. her violation of the very treaty which she had recently herself proclaimed, she had already made it sufficiently clear, that she refused to recognize any autonomy but such as consisted in the voluntary self-subordination of all the states to her leadership, as to that of the primary state.

The Spartans further showed their extreme anxiety to invest the occupation of the Cadmea with the semblance of an act performed in the name and in the interest of the whole nation, by the legal proceedings which were set on foot against Ismenias, who had been delivered up to them. They instituted a kind of Amphictyonic tribunal, to which they summoned assessors from all the confederate cities. The accused was charged with having occasioned the Corinthian War, and having entered into secret communications with the Persian King. He contrived to defend himself well with reference to these special points. But how could he deny, that he was devoted to popular government, and had actively opposed the claims of Sparta? And this sufficed for his condemnation. By putting him to death the Spartans obtained not only the satisfaction of their craving for vengeance upon the person of the most hated of their adversaries, but also the declaration on the part of a Hellenic judicial tribunal, that democratic opinions and hostility against Sparta amounted to high treason; so that her entire proceedings at Thebes were hereby simultaneously recognized as lawful.\*

A still clearer light falls upon these transactions from the occurrences which soon afterwards ensued at Phlius. Since the enforced

\* Ismenias, judicially sentenced as *μεγαλόφρων και κακοπράγμων* at Thebes, according to Xenophon; at Sparta, according to Plutarch, *Pl.* 5.

re-admission of the exiles (p. 325) Phlius had conducted itself with consistent loyalty towards Sparta. Agesipolis, invariably anxious to remove every occasion for further acts of oppression, had doubtless done his best to gain the hearts of the Phliasians by kindness; and it was a special satisfaction to him, that notwithstanding the difficult condition of their home affairs they readily fulfilled their obligations as confederates, and even afforded him an opportunity of publicly commending them on account of the promptitude and the abundance of their money-contributions. This occurred when Agesipolis was following with the main army on the expedition against Olynthus; so that the Phliasians must have been among those confederates, who took advantage of the new army-regulations (p. 330) to pay a money equivalent exempting them, entirely or in part, from personal military service;—which was doubtless done by many of the wealthier confederate cities in the case of an expedition directed to so remote a point abroad. Very probably, moreover, where there existed in a city two parties on very unfriendly terms with one another, neither of the two may have desired to weaken itself by sending out men.

But when, since the spring of the year 381, Agesipolis was on the march, and when his conciliatory influence could no longer assert itself, new quarrels broke out at Phlius. No advance could be made with the discussions concerning the settlement of landed properties; and no agreement could be arrived at as to a decision of the questions of possession in dispute, which should be equitable for both parties. The democrats refused to acknowledge any court of appeal beyond that of their native judicial tribunals; but these were composed of citizens who, like the large majority of the town population, were attached to the popular form of government. The late exiles, who had still not completely recovered possession of their lands, hereupon openly accused the tribunals of

partiality; declined to commit to them the decision of legal questions which were of an essentially political character; and demanded that these should be brought before another, and a foreign, court. This demand was so thoroughly in accord with the policy of Agesilaus, that we are probably justified in assuming it to have been made at his instigation; for he was not less active in exciting the evil spirit of discord, than his noble colleague was everywhere desirous of allaying it.

When, then, the exiles turned to Sparta, and brought forward their complaints as to the denial of impartial proceedings-at-law, a fine was imposed upon them by the civic community at Phlius, because of course an independent city could not permit any of its individual citizens to carry their grievances before foreign states. The Ephors, on the other hand, had no intention to allow this opportunity for a fresh intervention to escape them. Thus they acted quite in the sense of the policy of Agesilaus, who wished democracy to be treated as an excess involving a common danger, and therefore advocated the bringing of all questions connected with it before a Hellenic commission,—in other words, before the arbitrating authority of the state which held the primacy. On this occasion, again, the oligarchs, who at home were accounted traitors and had been legally sentenced, were regarded as the true patriots and as the actual civic body, which it was necessary to protect against the injustice of a small party; although the contradiction between this pretence and the real state of things was in the present instance incomparably more gross and palpable than in the case of Thebes. But in order that the conduct of the Phlians might appear in an additionally invidious light, the case was represented, as if they had merely waited for the departure of Agesipolis, before defiantly confronting Sparta, in the belief that the other king would hardly quit the city, and that they were thus secured against any armed



intervention. But we can hardly allow ourselves to suppose the Phliasiensians to have judged the state of affairs with so little intelligence.

The further course of events was in its development thoroughly consistent with this opening. Agesilaus, personally connected with the leaders of the fugitives, Podanemus and others, urged their cause with extreme energy. He pronounced their demands to be completely justified, and the imposition of a fine upon them to be invalid; and immediately marched out at the head of an army. The Phliasiensians wished to anticipate him, and promised to submit to the resolutions of Sparta; but for this it was now too late. The city, it was said, had shown itself too untrustworthy; nothing short of garrisoning its citadel would serve as a sufficient pledge of its fidelity. On receiving this answer, the citizens determined manfully to defend their liberty, although they had not had time to prepare for a war, and were without any hope, except such as might possibly accrue from their being clearly in the right, from the strong situation of their city, and from the ill-will created among the confederates by the unjust proceedings of Sparta.

Expedition  
against  
Phlius.

Ol. xcix. 4  
(a. c. 381).

The city of Phlius rose on a series of three terraces between the streams flowing directly from the springs of the Asopus. On the lowest of these terraces lay the market-place with the buildings surrounding it, on the middle one the temple of Asclepius, on the uppermost the citadel. The plateau of the citadel had a very strong situation, and was roomy enough to contain groves and corn-fields; which circumstance perhaps contributed to make a protracted resistance possible. The popular leader Delphion conducted it,—with a fearlessness and endurance forcing admiration even from the enemy. He was surrounded by 300 young men, the kernel of the defensive force of the citizens;

Siege of  
Phlius.

Ol. xcix. 4  
(a. c. 380).

and with these he at the right moment protected every point threatened, and also annoyed the besiegers by means of sallies. Among the besiegers there was much unwillingness; the Peloponnesians showed how little they were inclined to serve as executioners to the Spartans, so as to help them to chastise any town against which they might chance to entertain a grudge; the siege protracted itself for an entire year; the service was of an extremely heavy description; and the injustice of the entire proceeding became very palpable to the confederates, when they viewed the little band of the exiles, whose restoration they were to effect by force of arms. The king, indeed, on this occasion too sought to spread the notion, that the democrats were carrying on a reign of terror within the walls, and that Delphion was a Tyrant, who by his body-guard repressed the real sentiments of the citizens; but Delphion replied by causing the citizens to assemble on an open terrace, visible to a great distance, so that the besiegers might convince themselves with their own eyes, how the city was so far from being terrorized, that a civic community of 5,000 men was of one mind against the traitors in the Lacedæmonian camp.

Agesilaus refused to be prevented from continuing to play his game of a hypocritical policy. In the end the want of supplies could not but make itself felt in Phlius, after the city had held out twice as long as the exiles had declared to be possible. The less trustworthy citizens began to escape from the walls; and hereupon Agesilaus gave orders, that the exiles should use all the connexions at their command in order to tempt their fellow-citizens to their side. Those who came were received with open arms, and provided with food and weapons; and thus, by the employment of all kinds of artifices, the band of the Phliasians in the camp was after all swollen to more than a thousand, to whom Agesilaus would point as the kernel of the civic community, which ought to be restored to possession of its rights.

At last the brave city's power of resistance declined. Phlius demanded free transit for an embassy, to be sent to the authorities at Sparta; but the king, deeply offended at being thus passed over, induced the Ephors to commit the decision absolutely into his hands. With this answer the envoys returned; and now nothing remained for the unfortunate city, but to surrender unconditionally to its bitterest foe. Enraged by the long endurance of the siege, which had lasted for more than a year and a half, and finally in addition by the escape of Delphion, he ordered the utmost rigor to prevail. He instituted a commission of a hundred men, composed half of exiles, and half of citizens acceptable to them. These were to decide "who in the city was to remain alive, and who had deserved death." The same commission was furthermore, under the protection of the Spartan arms, to draw up a new constitution.

About the same time the tidings arrived of the capitulation of Olynthus. After several alternations of success and defeat, in which the brave Teleutias, the general sent out after Eudamidas, had fallen before the enemy's walls, and subsequently Agesipolis too had been carried away by a fever in the prime of life, Polybiades had finally by establishing a complete blockade overcome the proud city, and thereby put an end to its much-feared league of towns.\*

This was the summit of the supremacy of Sparta in Greece, based on the Peace of Antalcidas. Bœotia was now a vassal-state; and in the peninsula everything had been arranged as the Spartans wished. The revolutionary tendencies which had manifested themselves there since the Peace of

\* Phlius besieged for a term of twenty months: *Hellen.* v. 3, 25; Plutarch, *Agæ.* 24. Nature of the locality: Curtius, *Peloponnesos*, ii. 471 ff. Agesipolis died before Olynthus a. c. 380—*κατὰ θέρους ἀκμήν*, *Hellen.* v. 3, 19—after reigning fourteen years, in the third year of the Olynthian War. The capitulation of Phlius falls in the latter part of the summer of a. c. 379; cf. Sievers, p. 390.

Nicias, had been suppressed; the northern post, the most dangerous on account of its remoteness from Sparta and of its inclination towards a Separate League, was now held firmly in hand; on the frontiers of Argos a chain of secure posts had been gained in Mantinea, Phlius, and Corinth; oligarchical Corinth for the sake of its own security had to act as the guardian of the Isthmus for Sparta. Thus Argos was surrounded; while the single state which besides Argos was still under a democratic government, viz., Athens, had been exhausted by the Corinthian War, and was moreover utterly isolated, and menaced in the rear by the garrison of the Cadmea. The most dangerous of all possible combinations, that between Thebes, Athens and Olynthus, had been nipped in the bud. The most powerful of the cities to the north of the Sea followed the leadership of Sparta. The system of the confederate contingents had been newly and suitably organized. Sparta might hope to render her army more and more the sole controlling military force, and to transform her hegemony into an absolute dominion. A variety of Amphictyonic traditions had been successfully resuscitated, in order thereby to invest the new-Spartan supremacy with a semblance of legality. The ancient contest against the Tyrants had, by a transmutation in accordance with the times, become a persecution of popular government; and the success with which individual *foci* of democracy had been annihilated, seemed to justify the hope, that it would be possible entirely to overcome and extirpate this tendency in the Hellenic nation. Sparta was the single state in Greece which pursued a fixed system of policy; she was clearly conscious of her aim, and equally reckless in her choice of means. Hence her rigor of action, such as she had never displayed in former times. The ancient discord between Kingship and Ephors had come to an end. Agesilaus by his cunning complaisance had gained over the

authorities, had freed himself from the obstacles placed in his way by the influence of his fellow-king, and now ruled as independently, as hardly a Heraclide had ruled before him. Hereby the conduct of public affairs came to be characterized by unity and effectiveness; both friends and foes knew what they had to expect from Sparta. This was a kind of government such as Lysander had had in view; his system of party-policy was renewed, and his institutions were imitated, by Agesilaus; but the latter possessed the advantage of a fixed position in his own state, which Lysander had lacked, who contended against the revolution, and yet was himself a revolutionary politician; while Agesilaus, without giving offence, as the universally acknowledged representative of Spartan feeling attained to personal rule in his native city. In this, too, Agesilaus was more sagacious than his political tutor: that in the first instance he confined himself to the mainland, and applied the peculiar resources which still existed at Sparta to the establishment of a secure continental supremacy, and to its maintenance by means of a well-contrived network of garrisons.

It should be remembered in addition: that the supremacy of Sparta rested not only on the force of arms, but also on a body of adherents spread through all the cities; that beyond the limits of Hellas she kept up advantageous and important connexions, above all with the Great King, who, rejoicing in the tranquil possession of his coasts, was at all times ready to give his support for the maintenance of the Peace of Antalcidas in the sense in which Sparta interpreted it, furthermore with the Tyrant of Syracuse and with the kings of Macedonia; that, lastly, she victoriously asserted her arms even in Epirus, and bade the Illyrians desist from a further advance, who are said to have cast a longing glance towards the treasures of Delphi (Ol. xcvi. 4; B. C. 384). And thus we may understand, with what

The climax  
of the Spartan  
supremacy.

satisfaction Agesilaus and his friends looked upon their handiwork, and how securely founded it seemed to them : for although it was not yet completed, why, upon a favorable opportunity presenting itself, should not the occupation of the remaining places which still preserved an independent power, in particular of the Acropolis of Athens, which had been abandoned in an hour of weakness, be as successfully accomplished, as the occupation of the Cadmea?

And yet this very deed, intended as the corner-stone on which the supremacy of Sparta was to rest, became the stumbling-block on which that supremacy was to shiver into fragments. However splendid the power of Sparta might seem, yet its footing was feeble, because she ignored and contemned the moral forces and the spirit of freedom, still existing in the Greek communities. The resistance was thought to be at an end, of which the activity had only been temporarily suppressed ; and an arrogant self-delusion opined that a single act of sudden violence had accomplished all. Sparta, herself devoid of intellectual life, was likewise without the remotest conception of moral forces, and was incapable of truly uniting and leading Greece ; she could only take—she had nothing to give ; she merely knew how to oppress free communities by brutal force, and to introduce oligarchical party-governments. This system of treatment produced the force of resistance ; and the deed of Phœbidas, when judged from the very stand-point of sheer expediency, adopted by the policy of Agesilaus, proved to have been an act of utter perversity. For it provoked agitation in a population whose resources had as yet been the least exhausted ; and the new rising against the overbearing arrogance of Sparta was all the more dangerous because it proceeded, not from a league, whose members maintained little cohesion among one another, but from a single city, which accepted the contest against Sparta, first on behalf of its own liberty, and then for the supremacy in Hellas.

**BOOK THE SIXTH.**



**THEBES THE GREAT POWER OF GREECE.**

**FROM OL. c. 2, (B. C. 379) TO OL. civ. 3 (B. C. 362).**

NOTE.—The chief source for the period of the hegemony of Thebes was Ephorus, whose Æolic patriotism (cf. Book VII. chap. ii.) likewise extended to Bœotia; whoever read his books, was seized with admiration for Epaminondas: cf. Plut. *de garrul.* 22. He is blamed for his ignorance of military matters by Polybius, xii. 38. He furnished materials to Diodorus, who for many facts is the sole authority, but who also makes quite erroneous statements, a. g. xv. 82. Xenophon is of use by way of controlling Diodorus (who takes no account of him), but, by reason of his partiality, is otherwise wholly untrustworthy. He misrepresents history; with him every piece of good fortune happening to Thebes is an accident, and every success on the part of Agesilaus merit; nor is justice done by him to Epaminondas until the closing campaign. His *Hellenics* narrow themselves more and more into an account of Peloponnesian history. The genuineness of his *Agesilaus* is doubtful. Plutarch's *Agesilaus* has good authorities (*ἀγαπητὰ λακωνικά*, c. 19). In his *Pelopidas*, and in the *Dialogue on the Death of Socrates*, he has excellent materials derived from native tradition. Some details from his *Life of Epaminondas* may be preserved in the *Apophthegmata*. The *Hellenics* of the Olynthian Callisthenes (beginning from the Peace of Antalcidas) were used by Diodorus (cf. Wesseling ad xv. 54). Pausanias, in his ninth Book, has very valuable information, in particular c. 14. Nepos, too, is the solitary authority for certain credible facts. Occasional information is to be found in the orators, Isocrates (*Platonic.* 12, unjust against Thebes), Demosthenes, Æschines, Dinarchus. The Bœotian historians, Anaxis, and Dionysodorus, whose works extended to the accession of Philip (Diod. xv. 95), were used by Diodorus and Plutarch, without there being any possibility of demonstrating what was extracted from them. Chronology is in this period, too, very uncertain, especially up to the battle of Mantinea. Fixed points are furnished by the Olympic games, civ. 1 (a. c. 364), and by the eclipse of the sun on July 13th, a. c. 364, which immediately preceded the last expedition of Pelopidas.



## CHAPTER I.

### THE UPRISING OF THEBES, AND HER STRUGGLE IN SELF-DEFENCE.

**BÆOTIA** was one of the most fortunate of <sup>Bœotia.</sup> the districts of Greece. It lay in the heart of Hellas, well protected on the outside by natural frontiers and at the same time washed by three seas (if the two divisions of the Eubœan channel, separated from one another by the straits, are regarded, as they were by the ancients, as two distinct seas): a country presenting a rare combination of the advantages of coast-land and of interior. For it touched the main routes of Greek maritime intercourse, and at the same time contained in its inland parts a wealth of resources. Fat pastures spread along the rivers and lakes; corn and wine flourished abundantly; and its horticulture and breeding of horses gave to Bœotia a pre-eminence before all the neighboring lands. It was densely peopled by a healthy race of inhabitants: the men of Bœotia were famed for their bodily vigor, and the women of Thebes for their beauty. Manifold immigrations from the interior as well as from the sea had carried into Bœotia the germs of a higher civilization. The land was filled with those systems of divine worship, which everywhere among the Greeks gave an impulse to culture and to artistic life, in particular with the worship of Apollo and that of Dionysus; it was richer in highly-famed seats of oracles than any other country. Seven-gated Thebes we remember as the point among all the cities of the Greek mainland, where we first meet with a higher civilization; still clearer testimony remains as to the glory and wealth

of Minyan Orchomenus; nor is anything more profoundly astonishing to the traveller, than to behold on the ruin of the morass, so gloomy and desolate at the present day, in the centre of the district, the ruins of the cities of primitive antiquity, which once upon a time encircled as with a thick wreath the basin of the valley.

That the Bœotia of history should never have attained to a significance corresponding to the natural advantages of the locality and to the prosperity of the district in the pre-Homeric age, is due above all to one principal cause. The immigration of the Thessalian Bœotians, from which the country derived its name and the beginnings of its connected history, destroyed the earlier civilization of the land, without succeeding in establishing a new civilization capable of conducting the entire district to a prosperous and harmonious development.

Condition of Bœotia in the historic times. It cannot be said that the ancient germs of culture were suppressed, or that barbarous times supervened. The ancient seats of the gods and oracles continued to be honored, and the ancient festivals of the Muses on Mount Helicon, and of the Charites at Orchomenus, to be celebrated. In Bœotia too the beneficent influence of Delphi was at work, and the poetic school of Hesiod, connected as it was with Delphi, long maintained itself here (vol. ii. p. 95). And a yet stronger inclination was displayed by the Æolian immigrants towards music and lyric poetry. The cultivation of the music of the flute was encouraged by the excellent reeds of the Copaic morasses. This was the genuinely national species of music in Bœotia. Flute-playing and singing were practised in public competition contests; and although the lofty art of Pindar attached itself in some respects to foreign schools, yet it was rooted in its native soil. The existence of poetesses such as Myrtis and Corinna, who would venture to compete with Pindar, attests the spread among the people of a love of art, and shows

how the Bœotian Æolians herein proved themselves the born equals of their kinsmen in Lesbos.

And yet the Bœotians lacked the capacity for attracting to themselves the earlier elements of population in such a way as to bring about a happy amalgamation. In the southern part of the country Old-Ionic population maintained itself (vol. i. p. 120); and we know, how inflexible was its attitude towards the Æolians, how different were the courses pursued by Thebes and by Platææ respectively. In the west the ancient traditions of the Minyæ attached themselves to the rocky fastness of Orchomenus, where an indelible aversion from the new lords of the land handed itself down from generation to generation. Nor were the political institutions adapted for promoting a peaceful union; for the knightly families which had conquered the country kept themselves apart, and retained all the rights of government. Although several attempts were made to regulate by law the order of things which had been established by force, as is proved by the laws of the Bacchiade Philolaus at Thebes (vol. i. p. 294), yet these ordinances were solely intended to support the power, founded by force of arms, of the nobility holding the land. The common interest of the ruling families, distributed through the cities of the country, was the single bond of cohesion among the different territories, while the people itself was kept away from political affairs and oppressed. But the worst evil of all was, that the aristocracy of the country did nothing to render itself worthy of its position. The Bœotian lords were not much preferable to the Thessalian; nor was there any region far or near, inhabited by Greek tribes, which presented a harsher contrast in culture or manners, than the district where the road led from the Attic side of Mount Parnes across to the Bœotian. But this inferiority by no means excited emulation; on the contrary. the

The  
Bœotian  
aristocracy.

Æolians in Bœotia secluded themselves with a kind of defiance from all intellectual movement, in proportion as beyond the hills the Ionic race developed an active vitality; they became more and more stolid and indolent; as against the over-refinement of the Athenians they were rather proud of their own rustic roughness and rudeness; and for the higher enjoyments of life, which were denied to them, they sought compensation in sensual indulgence. Luxurious banquets were the most important matters in their social life; to justice and law they paid no respect either among themselves or as towards others, and their quarrels they preferred to decide by blows.

Under these circumstances, there could be no question of a prosperous development. The natural resources of the country were only very partially turned to account; trade and navigation were neglected, and the harbors lay unused. All free intellectual culture was left aside, and the gymnastic art was allowed to degenerate into the pursuit of athletics, since instead of a general development of physical vigor and agility the aim was merely the highest possible degree of muscular strength. The dialect of the Bœotians likewise stood still at a very primitive stage, and was in particular distinguished from the other more advanced branches of the Hellenic language by its predilection for hollow vowels. Pindar wrote in a dialect different from that spoken by the people (vol. ii. p. 99). He endeavored by means of his art to obtain for his fellow-countrymen a better name among the Hellenes; but there was no district of Greece in which he met with so little response as in Bœotia; nor was he after all by origin a genuine Bœotian (vol. ii. p. 288); he had acquired a culture far surpassing that of his native land, and was animated by a national sentiment contradictory to the tendency prevailing there. For the ruling families had attached themselves to the national enemy; and the people, without any will of its

own, was forced to pour out its blood at Platææ on behalf of the foreign invaders. Thus the most glorious age of Hellas became a time of the deepest shame for Bœotia; and, while the other Hellenes enjoyed the beneficent results of the War of Liberation, Thebes was driven into a more and more unworthy policy. Full of venomous jealousy of Athens during the growth of her prosperity, but too weak to damage her hated neighbor by her own strength, Thebes stood under cover of Sparta, and was unceasingly busy in goading on the enemies of the Athenians. The outbreak of the Peloponnesian War, and the scenes of horror enacted at Platææ, were a triumph of this system of policy.

No sooner had Athens been humbled, than Sparta and Thebes began to pursue divergent Revolusion at Thebes. courses. At Thebes the democratic party, which had already existed for a considerable period, and which had even already temporarily attained to the conduct of affairs (vol. ii. p. 448), acquired lasting influence. The first sign of this revulsion was the resolution passed by the Thebans, that every house and every town in the country should open their gates to the banished Athenians. Sparta did what was in her power, to estrange from herself, and to drive over to the side of Athens, all the friends of legality. The ancient hostility between the two neighbor-states began to vanish; and in Bœotia a considerable party formed itself, which aroused a higher political consciousness in the people, fostered the hatred against Sparta, spread love of liberty and Hellenic feeling, and enthusiastically cherished the idea, that the time had now at last come, to expiate ancient shame, and to give to Thebes an honorable place among the Greek states. A new history was to be commenced, and all the shortcomings due to the long misgovernment of selfish oligarchs were to be made good. For this purpose it was necessary, not only morally to regenerate the people of the capital, but also to gain over the en-

tire country to the new ideas, and to blend all its towns into a united and free Bœotia, newly aroused and re-invigorated by the liberty of communal life.

Such was the policy of the Theban patriots, the Young-Bœotian party, to which the nobler part of the younger generation of the land adhered. For in a country where the people had been oppressed for centuries, it was very natural, that the starting-point of this regeneration was not the people, but the well-born circles of the population. The movement was accordingly supported by members of ancient houses who gloried in opening for the Bœotian people the way to a new and honorable history; and here again we find houses belonging, like that of Pindar, not to the Bœotian country-nobility, but to the most ancient nobility, which had been settled in Thebes already before the Bœotian immigration, and from whose trunk fresh branches were even at so late a time yet springing forth.

The  
house of  
Polymnis.

One of these houses, in which the regeneration of Thebes was prepared, was that of Polymnis. It carried its pedigree back as far as the times of Cadmus, but it had long ago forfeited its former splendor. The family accordingly lived in modest retirement, without participation in the lawless life of the wealthy Bœotians, and in perfect tranquillity fostered the germs of higher culture, which had never quite died out at Thebes, and which now received a new impulse by beneficent influences from abroad.

In Lower Italy the persecution of the Pythagoreans had been several times renewed (vol. iii. p. 267). It was intended to destroy the schools, whose influence annoyed the multitude; but, as has invariably been the case with persecutions directed against schools possessed of vitality and moral vigor, this persecution also inevitably served to spread the doctrines against which it was directed. Fugitive Pythagoreans found their way to Thebes among other places, in particu-

Pythagorean  
influences.  
Philolaus.

lar Philolaus, who first put the Pythagorean wisdom into writing, and who was a contemporary of Socrates. He found eager listeners, and the names of two men in particular clearly prove, that the spirit of scientific inquiry was at that time vigorously asserting itself at Thebes, viz. those of Simmias and Cebes. Both these men, who had derived their first impulse towards <sup>Simmias</sup> and Cebes. philosophic meditation from Philolaus, afterwards went to Athens. Here Cebes was among the followers of Socrates accounted the most unwearying inquirer, and Simmias is praised by Plato, as having left no peace to himself or others, constantly suggested new problems, and pursued everything to its ultimate consequences. These men accordingly made philosophy one more bond between Athens and Thebes; in their energy and endurance the Æolic temperament displays itself from its best side; both men belonged to the higher spheres of society. Of Cebes it was related that he purchased the freedom of the Elean Phædo, in order to secure him for philosophy; and Simmias, after having undertaken long and distant journeys, made his house a meeting-place of philosophical friends.

Upon Philolaus, who had first made Thebes <sup>Lysis.</sup> a seat of Pythagorean wisdom, followed the Tarentine Lysis. He too arrived as a fugitive, and met with a hospitable reception in the house of Polymnis, who treated him entirely as a member of his family. This generous hospitality bore rich fruit, in the first instance for the sons of the house, Epaminondas and Caphisias, of whom the former, and elder (born about the year 418), proved specially open to the philosopher's influence, and together with a personal veneration for him imbibed a deep love of scientific study.\*

\* Connexion between Thebes and Magna Græcia: Boeckh, *Philolaos*, 10. —Simmias and Cebes: Xen. *Memor.* i. 2, 48; iii. 11, 7; Plat. *Phæd.* 85; C. Zeller, ii. a, 171. Lysis must have lived down to Ol. xciii., if Epaminondas was born in Ol. xcii.: Plut. *de Gen. Socr.* 3; Nepos, ii. 2. Epaminondas was forty years of age at the time of the Liberation: Plut. *de occ. vit.* c. 4.

The training of Epaminondas.

An education such as that which the youthful Epaminondas received, had not as yet fallen to the lot of any Theban. His ardent spirit found a guide and teacher capable of offering him a wealth of treasures, and who devoted himself to him in daily intercourse, as to a son of his own. Thus a mental horizon stretched before his eyes, passing far beyond the limits hitherto open to a Bœotian. The wealthy world of the colonies in the distant West, the glorious Greek cities on the coasts of Italy and Sicily, became as familiar to him as another home. The wisdom of Ionia and Athens had likewise already found its way to Thebes. How must he, while thus looking around upon the chief seats of Greek culture, have become conscious of the lofty mission of the Hellenes, and with what humiliation must he have turned to gaze upon his own native city! Moreover, there acted upon him the special influence of the Pythagorean dogma. It was of its nature reforming; instead of only occupying the head, it laid claim to the entire man; it was an ideal Hellenism, striving after realization in actual life, and irresistibly urging him who had comprehended it to spread it further. Thus the house of Polymnis became the focus of a higher life, whence light and warmth radiated; and Epaminondas was, by means of his personal individuality, the best witness to the ennobling force of philosophy. Its demands had become a second nature to him. A contempt for wealth and for sensual indulgence, a rigorous continence and self-denial, humility and power of secrecy, self-sacrificing love of country and friends, a firm and equable earnestness which suppressed every movement of passion, and invariably kept the loftiest ends in view,—these Pythagorean virtues were at the same time the characteristics of this young Theban; while he by no means held himself, like a philosophical eccentric, at a distance from social intercourse and the arts customary to his country; he was taught by the best flute-players of Thebes, and he also de-



voted himself to the cithar and to song. He zealously attended the palaestræ; but even here he had a different end in his view from that pursued by his fellow-countrymen: for his object in exercising his body, was to render it a willing and agile organ of the mind, and efficient for the service of his native land. The art of oratory he likewise cultivated with the utmost ardor; for while little desirous of shining as an elegant speaker, he at the same time esteemed it an essential task of Hellenic training, that a man should understand how to come forward at the right time, and how both to point out the right and to castigate the wrong in brief words, and to expound his conviction in fuller flow of speech. Thus his eloquence was likewise rooted in the moral foundation upon which his entire individuality rested; he regarded it as a patriotic work to obtain an honorable recognition for the art of speech in Bœotia, among a population so indolent in both thought and speech.

He was a Theban and a Hellene, the one and the other from his very heart; and the purpose of his efforts was the elevation of his native city, whereby a service would be simultaneously rendered to the common fatherland. For the welfare of Hellas depended upon the endeavor of its individual towns to make true Hellenism a living reality; nor was any other precedence justified in his eyes, than that resting upon Hellenic virtue and culture. Athens had conceived this mission in a grander spirit than any other city, but she had lost her position by departing from the principles of Pericles. The primacy of Sparta was a shameful oppression by force. If Sparta continued in the way she was pursuing, and with soldierly arrogance misused the Hellenes, enslaved their cities or dissolved them into villages, encouraged treason and punished patriotism by illegal executions,—then the best possessions of the Hellenic nation were in danger. To rise

The ends  
aimed at  
by Epami-  
nondas.

against such a tyranny was a national duty, and such a rising was primarily called for in the case of the city which had suffered the most severely of all. In a just resistance against criminal excess all the nobler forces would be set in motion; and it was therefore thus that Thebes would also soonest attain to a place among those states, whose destiny it was to exercise a supreme influence over the common affairs of Greece. The opportunity had arrived for a courageous endeavor to ennoble the material strength existing in Bœotia by assigning to it a lofty task, and to awaken the people out of its stolidity.

Not all the points of view which we observe gradually presenting themselves, were taken at once. The immediate object of Epaminondas was the moral and political elevation of the citizens, in order that they might become capable of recovering, and of worthily maintaining, their liberty. That Epaminondas labored towards this end for years, is beyond doubt. Otherwise he could not have been found with his resolutions so thoroughly matured, or so well-prepared, when the hour of the crisis arrived.

Epaminondas had no thoughts of pursuing his objects of reformation by founding a philosophic order, such as it had been attempted to form in Magna Græcia. He rejected whatever estranged him from the people, and on the other hand sought to take full advantage of the best forces contained in it for the commonwealth, above all of the power of friendship. He brought about a combination between himself and other Thebans sharing his sentiments, and united them with one another. In this he was aided by the circumstances of the times; for a salutary ferment had perceptibly made its appearance among the Bœotians, and there existed a young generation, displaying a higher capacity for culture, and able to take vigorous resolutions for the advance of their native city. They were ready to attach themselves to Epami-

nondas, and under his guidance to labor for the regeneration of Thebes. One of the most important of the men sharing this tendency was Pelopidas.

Pelopidas, the son of Hippocles, belonged like Epaminondas to a family of ancient nobility; but he was at the same time a man of large property, and belonged to one of the most highly-considered families at Thebes. Moreover, he had very largely increased his paternal inheritance by means of a marriage. It accordingly shows liberality of mind, that he is found at so early an age and so decisively renouncing his connexion with a party, which counted him among its members, and which held out to him the prospect of a full share in its privileges and advantages. His was a generous nature, brave even to foolhardiness, and capable of self-sacrifice; and although he had no inclination towards philosophical studies, but found the principal pleasure of his life in the chase and in military exercises, yet he had many fine natural gifts,—knowledge of the world, versatility, receptivity towards all intellectual impulses, and a ready appreciativeness of moral greatness; he was elevated above love of money and sensual indulgence, munificent towards his friends, moderate and simple as to himself, a declared foe of injustice, and an enthusiast for all the higher blessings of life. To a man of such sentiments the attitude of the Bœotian aristocracy and the position of his native city could not but be intolerable: he therefore attached himself heart and soul to the Young-Bœotian party, of which by means of his external resources, as well as of his chivalrous individuality, he soon became one of the principal supports.

After the Peace of Antalcidas this party had, instead of diminishing, increased. For its power rose with every new act of violence of which Sparta became guilty; and in the end the Laconian party had seen no other method

Pelopidas  
and the  
oligarchs.

of self-preservation but that of throwing itself entirely into the arms of Sparta, and hereupon thought to have assured its victory. Its policy however was not less shortsighted than criminal; for since the betrayal of the city no mere political party standpoints were any longer at issue, but such opposite principles, as were clearly and incorruptibly judged by all Hellenes in- and outside Thebes, in so far as they were not blind partisans of Sparta: what was now in question was the liberty or enslavement of a Greek city; what had formerly been a domestic affair of Thebes had now become a national matter. The oligarchs, indeed, acted like the Spartans of those days, who merely took into account visible forces, and derided public opinion. The most notable among the oligarchs, Leontiades, Archias, Philippus, and others, in turn filled the public offices, and put dependents of their own into the government places, down to that of jailer. They carried on a pure party-rule, as Critias and his fellows had in their time done at Athens. Those whom they disliked were placed under arrest; neither property nor honor was safe against the government. The supreme power lay with the commanders of the Peloponnesian troops. Sparta lorded it over the whole of Bœotia as over a dependent territory; nor, doubtless, was it without a political intention that Agesilaus caused the tomb of Alcmena, the original ancestress of the Heraclidæ, at Haliartus to be opened, and the contents to be transported to Sparta. For the transfer of such relics, according to Greek belief, constituted a sanction of supreme lordship (vol. iii. p. 289). But however secure the Spartans, and the oligarchs under the protection of the Spartan troops, might feel, yet the opposite party was neither destroyed nor disarmed, and the fugitive Thebans became a real power by the fact that all patriots in Greece unanimously stood on their side, and with them longingly awaited the hour of vengeance.\*

\* Ἡ περὶ Ἀρχίας τε τῶν πολιμαρχούντων καὶ ἡ περὶ Φιλίππου τυραννίς Ἑλλένων.

The number of the Thebans who found a refuge at Athens was three or four hundred. <sup>The Thebans at Athens.</sup> Here the services, rendered by Thebes to the Attic patriots twenty years before, were gratefully remembered, and the indignation against Sparta was at this point of time so universal, that the fugitives met with kindness even in the aristocratic circles, which were as a rule pervaded by friendly sentiments towards the Lacedæmonians. All the demands and suggestions of Sparta were rejected with generous firmness; the fugitives were not only supplied with shelter and provisions, but were also officially accorded an honorable position under the protection of the state in the community, like the homeless Plataeans of old. And Sparta, even under Agesilaus, was without sufficient energy to carry through her demands by force; she hesitated to drive the Athenians to extreme measures.

Thus, without any outward rupture of the peace having taken place, Athens and Thebes <sup>Preparatory steps at Thebes.</sup> lay face to face like two hostile camps, vigilantly observing one another. The Theban government had its spies at Athens, who closely followed the steps of the conspirators. With the aid of these spies Androclidas, who after the death of Ismenias had become the leader of the party, was successfully made away with by assassination, and thus the immediate schemes of his fellow-partisans were frustrated. On the other hand the fugitives had a number of trustworthy friends at Thebes, who after their fashion prepared the liberation of their native city. Some of them joined the Tyrants, but only as a pretence, and gained their confidence, so that they obtained influential posts, in which they were able to be

v. 4, 2. Ἔργη μὲν τύραννοι, λόγῳ δὲ πολέμαρχοι, Plut. Ages. 24. Οἱ περὶ Ἀρχίας καὶ Ὑπάτην, Hellen. vii. 3, 7. Character of the government: Du Mesnil in Sybel's *Histor. Zeitschrift*, ix. 294.—Bellicæ of Alcmena: Plut. *de Genio*, 5f.; Boeckh, *Sonnenkreise*, p. 145.

of the greatest use to their party. Thus in particular Phyllidas was by the polemarchs Archias and Philippus appointed their private secretary, and employed upon the most confidential missions. Others were secretly busied with preparing the youth of Thebes in mind and body for the critical day; among these above all Epaminondas, who hitherto, although he had already attained to the maturity of manhood, had refrained from taking part in public life, and had displayed no trace of ambition. The Tyrants accordingly regarded the poor philosopher in his retirement as the reverse of dangerous, and allowed him calmly to go his way, although he, and no other, was the very centre of the endeavors towards liberty. A thorough understanding in all main points prevailed between him and those who had fled to Athens. With the most active of their number, Pelopidas, he had entered into a brotherly union of intimate friendship; he had served with him in the Arcadian campaign (p. 325), and had saved the life of his wounded at the risk of his own. He was incessantly active in evoking patriotism, vigor of action, and moral earnestness; he made use of the competitive games carried on between the Thebans and the Spartans as a preliminary to serious contests, and weaned his fellow-citizens from their servile fear of their oppressors. The circumstance too, that just about this time he lost Lysis, his paternal friend, contributed to his henceforth devoting himself all the more resolutely to his fellow-citizens. With him men of mark co-operated, such as more especially Gorgidas, who acquainted the exiles with all affairs belonging to the public business of the city, and Pammenes, a man of considerable influence, who, without taking any active part himself in the work of liberation, encouraged the efforts of Epaminondas, and added to his authority.

Although the same end was pursued from sides so various, yet one year after the other passed, without that

end being reached. It was a heavy trial of patience for the fiery souls of the heroes of liberty, and yet it was a time full of blessings. For in it the younger population of the Thebans grew strong in the midst of oppression, and ripened for the day of liberty. The moral invigoration, proceeding from Epaminondas, spread and proved itself. In the same way the protracted sojourn of the exiles at Athens was a season of refinement and strengthening; they showed by their endurance that they were not moved by the impulse of a passing enthusiasm; they learnt at Athens, what demands were made upon a state desirous of placing itself at the head of the national movement. Finally, the feeling of security on the part of the Tyrants became deeper and deeper; they relaxed their measures of precaution, and deceived themselves so utterly, that they regarded the philosophical tendencies of the Thebans as a desirable diversion from political aspirations. Thus Archias and Leontiades themselves occasionally took part in the discussions in the house of the traveled Simmias, although it was a meeting-place of the men who had conspired against the Tyrannis.\*

During four long years the exiles waited for the day of vengeance. For a time they may <sup>The resolution taken.</sup> have indulged the hope, that Athens would begin the rising against Sparta and open a path home for them; but the Athenian civic community was too faint-hearted, and the Boeotian (p. 238) was unable to prevail. The exiles had accordingly to depend upon themselves; it was necessary for them to take the first step, in order to draw the

\* 300 fugitives (Diod. xv. 20), 400 (Androtion Schol. Aristid. iii. 278, Dindorf. *Tyrannides* ap. C. Müller, *Fr. H. Gr.* iv. 646). In Xen. *Hellen.* v. 2, 31, the reading is uncertain.—Androclidas (cf. p. 222): *Hellen.* iii. 5, 1; Plut. *de Genio*, 29.—Epaminondas and Pelopidas at Mantinea: Plut. *Pelop.* 4; Paus. ix. 13 (doubts of Palmer and Krüger ap. Clinton *ad ann.* 385).—The Thebans forced to send their military contingent: Vater, *Leben des Pelopidas (Jahn's Jahrb. Suppl.* viii.), p. 238 (likewise in the case of the expedition against Olynthus, *Hellen.* v. 2, 37).—Gorgidas and Pammenes: Sievers, 197 f.—Archias a visitor to Simmias: Plut. *de Genio Socor.*

Athenians after them, and doubtless their political friends, Cephalus and other popular orators of note, said to them: "Only begin! Athens neither can nor will leave you in the lurch." Pelopidas, although one of the younger of their number, had assumed the lead among the exiles, after by the assassination of Androclidas they had been deprived of their leader and had thus for a time been awed into inaction: next to him Melon was the chief personage. There was no time for further delay. It was in the fifth year, about the beginning of the winter. Olynthus and Phlius had fallen; the power of the Spartans grew from week to week. There could be no thought of an open campaign; opportunities must be found for a secret return. The bad time of the year, in which little intercourse took place, seemed to favor the enterprise; in the winter the Spartans could least of all be expected to move with rapidity to the spot; moreover, the date of the shortest day coincided with the turn of the year among the Bœotians, and with the festival of the Heraclea, during which it was hoped to find the city in a corresponding state of carelessness. Lastly, one of these most zealous democrats, Amphytheus, had been recently placed under arrest; and it was hoped that by bold action he might still be saved.

Departure  
of the con-  
spirators  
from  
Athens.  
Ol. cix. 2  
(a. c. 379).  
December.

Thus, then, day and hour were fixed in accordance with the friends at Thebes. Probably the secret had not been revealed even to all the exiles. The majority of them remained quietly at Athens; for the departure of considerable numbers would have betrayed everything. A hundred quitted the city, and assembled under Pherenicus in the Thriasian plain, in order to advance upon the frontier from the direction of Eleusis; while twelve who had volunteered for the first and most perilous enterprise—with Pelopidas, Melon, Damoclidias, and Theopompus among them,—furnished as for the chase, and accompanied by dogs, marched by the straight road across



Mount Parnes, and in small detachments quietly made their way into Thebes. The wind and snowdrift which prevailed allowed them, without exciting suspicion, to draw their cloaks over their heads; the gates and streets were deserted. Thus they succeeded in reaching, by different paths, the house of Charon, where they united with six-and-thirty conspirators dwelling at Thebes. The most useful service of all was rendered to them by Phyllidas, the secretary. He had bidden the polemarchs to a banquet on the same evening; the close of the official year was to be brilliantly celebrated, and, in order to heighten the giddy excitement, the host had promised the arrival of some handsome women after the banquet. But this was also the reason why Archias, who wished to be sure of perfectly confidential company, had requested that Leontiades might not be invited; thus the scheme of uniting all the heads of the government at one spot failed.

The conspirators were preparing in solemn calm for the deed of blood—they were standing, crowned with wreaths, by the altar of the house, and the soothsayer was watching the flame—when a knock was heard at the door, and voices outside vehemently demanded admission. They belonged to messengers from the polemarch, who summoned Charon to Archias. It was impossible not to suppose that everything had been betrayed. And, in point of fact, rumors of what was in progress had reached the ears of Archias; but the tranquillity and presence of mind of Charon, who made his appearance without delay, and the representations of Phyllidas, succeeded in removing the suspicion, which was a very unwelcome interruption of his pleasure to the polemarch. Indeed; he was now so thoroughly resolved not to allow anything further to interfere with the festive enjoyment of the day, that he placed a letter from Athens, which arrived immediately after the departure of

The conspirators at Thebes.

Assassination of the oligarchs.

Charon and revealed the entire plot, unopened under the cushion. "No business till to-morrow," he cried in drunken audacity, bade the banquet progress with renewed spirit, and in lustful impatience called for the promised courtesans.

At last they are declared to have arrived. Steps are heard; the servants are dismissed; the doors of the banqueting-room fly open; the robes of veiled women become visible, and are welcomed with clapping of hands, their heads being shaded by thick wreaths. These were the conspirators, Charon, Melon, Caphisias (p. 357), and others, in disguise. They pause for a moment on the threshold, in order to take a clear view of their victims. Then they cast off their coverings, and grasp their daggers; Melon slays the drunken Archias, Charon slays Philippus; and most of the remaining guests it was likewise found necessary to put to death, because in their vinous excitement it was impossible by words either to gain them over or to calm them.

The more difficult part of the task had been undertaken by Pelopidas with Caphisodorus, and a few others. They directed their steps to the house of Leontiades, announcing themselves at the door as messengers from Callistratus at Athens. No sooner had they been admitted, than Leontiades became sensible of his danger. He received them in his sleeping-apartment with his sword drawn, and cut down Caphisodorus, who had entered first; nor was it till after a desperate struggle that Pelopidas succeeded in overcoming Leontiades, and in avenging his friend, who dying stretched forth his hand to him in grateful acknowledgment. The last victim was Hypates who was overtaken while endeavoring to effect his escape.

Thus within a few hours of the night a terrible judgment had been held upon those who had betrayed their native city, who with the help of the arms of the stranger had kept their fellow-citizens under the yoke, and had

therefore according to the Greek view thoroughly deserved the name and the doom of Tyrants. Before the night was out, the prison was opened; Amphitheus and many other martyrs of the good cause in joyous surprise grasped the hands of their friends. The trumpets held in readiness for the festival of the Heraclea, proclaimed to the citizens that a far more glorious festival had commenced for the city; while the Spartan garrison, numbering 1,500 men, who by a timely intervention might have given a very dangerous turn to the affair, were so completely taken by surprise by the outbreak of the revolution, that they timorously remained within the walls of the citadel, where the small body of adherents to the government sought their protection. Thus the bonfires blazed with impunity all around the Cadmea, and next morning the Tyrannicides were able unhindered to make their appearance in the market-place, and to render an account to the assembled citizens of the deed done in the night.\*

This was the day of the regeneration of Thebes, the day on which she rose anew out of the heavy oppression under which she had lain. Now all the rest of the exiles arrived; the Theban warriors, whom Epaminondas and Gorgidas had been quietly training, publicly appeared in their military array; a new civic community seemed on this morning of liberty to have assembled in the market-place; the two parties which had been naturally working for one another, now joined hands. Epaminondas had been unable to reconcile with his principles a personal participation in the assassination of the oligarchs; for the slaying of a citizen without a

The first  
popular  
assembly at  
Thebes.

\* Melon was, according to Xenophon, the chief author of the Liberation; hence ἡ τοῦ Μέλωνος ἐστὶ τοῦς περὶ Δεοτυλῆος ἐλευθέρωσις. *Hellen.* v. 4, 19. The close of the Boeotian year about the time of the winter solstice: Plut. *Polop.* 24. Election of Boeotarchs for the last days of the year: Plut. 18; Sievers, 186; Vater, u. s., 342.

judicial sentence was a proceeding, which his conscience would have refused to justify. He was, however, unwilling to set up his own sentiments as the standard for the judgment of others. He could not but acknowledge the act of the conspirators to have been one demanded by the circumstances and free from selfish motives. He therefore himself introduced the Tyrannicides, when they presented themselves before the community as suppliants on account of the civic blood shed by them. The citizens jubilantly hailed them as their preservers and benefactors; the priests accorded them expiation; and three of them who had acted the most prominent parts, Pelopidas, Melon, and Charon, were immediately called to the head of the commonwealth as Bœotarchs. All this took place under the very eyes of the Lacedæmonian troops, whose commanders were for the present unable to contrive anything beyond the despatch of flying messengers to Sparta and to the garrisons of Plataeæ and Thespiæ asking for speedy aid. The Thebans on the other hand rested their hopes upon Athens; nor were they deceived.

In Athens the Bœotian party had been uncommonly active. Information had quickly come of the events imminent at Thebes, and troops had been sent to the frontier.

Attitude of the Athenians. Cephalus had proposed, that the state should take part in the liberation of the neighbor-city.

This motion had not passed the popular assembly; yet not only did individual volunteers hasten across to Thebes, but two Attic generals, who had been sent to the frontier simply for the purpose of observing events, allowed themselves to be induced by the Theban appeal for aid, to intervene actively on their own responsibility. Chabrias occupied the pass of Eleutheræ, so as to close the road to Thebes against the Spartans; and Demophon entered Bœotia, being convinced that he was simply acting in the interests of Athens, when aiding the Thebans to free their citadel.

At Thebes he found everything in full military activity. The Spartan force attempting to come to the rescue from Platææ had been beaten back, and under the directions of Pelopidas the Cadmea had been completely blockaded. The expectation of a Lacedæmonian army increased the zeal of both sides. Day and night assaults were made upon the walls of the citadel; the garrison was not left in peace for a single hour, in order that it might be tired out as soon as possible; prizes were proposed, to promote emulation; the danger of being attacked in the rear by a second army increased with every hour. And doubtless the besieged would have been able to hold the strongly walled fortress, had they had time to provide themselves with sufficient supplies. As it was, the numbers of the troops, still further swelled by the Thebans who had taken refuge in the citadel, were disadvantageous to them. The troops consisted in the main of confederates, who were by no means inclined to sacrifice themselves for the purpose of preserving the fortress to Sparta; and thus the harmosts found themselves forced to surrender the citadel, on condition of being allowed a free departure. The troops on their way from Thebes came already at Megara upon a Spartan army, which would have arrived in time to relieve the citadel only one or two days after the capitulation. Circumstances had proved fortunate beyond all expectation for the Thebans. Within a term of a few days the Tyrants had been slain, the Spartans had been overcome, and by means of emulation in the midst of concord the foundation-stone had been laid for a new history of the state.\*

Capitulation of the Cadmea. Ol. c. 2 (a. c. 379). December.

\* Spokesman of the Bœotian party (οἱ βουλευόμενοι; cf. the ἀποβουλεύματα of Antiphanes), Thrasybulus of Collytus, Leodamas, Aristophon, Cephalus, Thrason (proxenus of the Thebans), Archedemus, Pyrrhander, Phormisius, Eleus: Dinaroh. l. 38. As to the participation of Athens, Xenophon attests, as against the confused account of Diodorus, that nothing was done by the state as such: Grote, *Hist. of Greece*, vol. x. p. 122; Schäfer, *Demosth.* l. 16

Few epochs of Greek history began so suddenly as that of the liberation of Thebes. The city itself was surprised by the secret deeds of the night; at Athens only a few were privy to them. Far greater of course was the surprise of the more distant cities. The first impression was nearly everywhere the same; the whole nation was pervaded by joyous sympathy with a deed of freshness and boldness such as had not been experienced for a long time. It recalled the deeds of the prehistoric age, the Heroes who entered the paternal house arms in hand, in order to liberate it. Even in Sparta it was impossible to repress a certain degree of appreciation and interest, although in the sense of the ruling party the heroes of liberty could not but be regarded as rebels. It was moreover necessarily an event leading to many momentous consequences. A power which laid a heavy hand of oppression upon the whole of Greece, but which at the same time seemed more absolutely unassailable than at any previous time, had been suddenly shaken; it had been humiliated in a way in which no Hellene could fail to recognize the just punishment of haughty arrogance; and the state through which this humiliation had been accomplished, had thereby stepped forth from its subordinate position. If it succeeded in maintaining its new position, the entire system of the relations between the states in Greece must inevitably change. All men therefore anxiously awaited the development of affairs, which could not but be close at hand.

The tasks  
of Thebes.

The first step had been a splendid success on the part of the Thebans; but with it the

The occupation of the passes of Mount Cithæron by Chabrias probably only served to maintain the neutrality of Athens. But the trial of the generals (*Hellen.* v. 4, 19) proves that not merely individual volunteers took part. Whether Demophon was one of the condemned, remains doubtful; Chabrias certainly was not. Diodorus probably confounds two quite distinct events, the struggle for the Cadmea and the summer-campaign: Schäfer, *u. s.* p. 18.

far more serious task had merely begun. For obstacles presented themselves on all sides against a permanent rise on the part of the Theban power. Thebes was nothing more than a single district town; its supremacy over Bœotia, which it had with inflexible persistency again and again sought to secure, had been completely overthrown by the Peace of Antalcidas; Platææ had been rebuilt; Orchomenus was independent; all the neighboring cities jealously watched over their independence. It was therefore necessary, as against the enemy outside, to begin from the beginning the hard task of uniting the country; for not Thebes, but only Bœotia as a whole, was capable of defying the superior strength of that enemy with any prospect of success: the city, therefore, which had so boldly opened the contest, required first to secure to itself the basis of a sufficient power. Nor was it possible, that Thebes should content herself with certain rights of primacy and claims upon the furnishing of contingents, but the whole country of Bœotia must be blended into a single whole, into a state-territory with a centralized government.

Of course preliminary steps had already been taken in this direction. The Young-Bœotian party at Thebes numbered adherents The unification of Bœotia. in the other towns as well, where there was no lack of opposition against the ruling families, which were at the same time the real representatives of the desire for independence on the part of the several cities. The distinctness and fixity with which the Theban patriots had settled their scheme of action already before the Liberation, are most clearly manifest from the circumstance, that on the very day following upon that event not polemarchs, but Bœotarchs were elected; for the polemarchs were city officials, while the Bœotarchs were officers of the entire country, generals of the confederation. In other words, the ancient confederation of the Bœotian towns (vol. i. p. 121)

was immediately renewed, but from points of view quite different from those pursued at any previous time, because the necessity of a fixed union was vividly felt by the democratic party. Its adherents were accordingly actively at work throughout the country, to overcome the inborn feelings of aversion entertained by the several cities towards one another and towards Thebes; they everywhere called upon their fellow-countrymen to neglect all separate interests for the sake of the common cause; they offered to all the same advantages which they had achieved for Thebes, freedom from Sparta and from oppression by an oligarchy cherishing Spartan sentiments, equality before the law, and equal rights of election and suffrage. A desire for liberty moreover prevailed outside as well as in Thebes; and the prevalence of greater fervor among the people facilitated the blending of elements at other times so hard to reconcile. Thebes had by its heroic daring acquired a new position in the land, and the first Bœotarchs were men who were hailed with joyous confidence by the leading party throughout Bœotia. Thus, then, the very first dangers of war caused volunteers ready for service to gather from the several districts of the country; and there was reason to hope, that the regeneration of Thebes would be followed by that of all Bœotia. It was desired that Thebes should not only become the first and leading city of the country, but that all Bœotia, blended into a single whole, should find itself represented in Thebes, as Attica was in Athens; for which reason, too, the citizens of Thebes in their public transactions no longer called themselves Thebans, but "Bœotians in Thebes."

But for the attainment of such an end as <sup>Disturbing elements.</sup> this, a successful rise of public spirit, which filled men's minds with enthusiasm, which caused the better tendencies to prevail, and which repressed jealousies and quarrels, could not permanently



suffice. The old brutality of feeling again and again asserted itself. Already the first victory had been desecrated by the ill-treatment both of living and dead, when, on the departure of the garrison, the populace lay in wait for those of its fellow-citizens who had sought the protection of the Spartan soldiery. Some of them were saved by the Athenians. Others fell as victims to a popular fury which refused to spare even the children of the unfortunate men. Even among the members of the patriotic party there was no lack of conflicting elements; for together with democracy its evils immediately made their appearance. Ambitious men who had co-operated in the Liberation, deemed themselves treated with insufficient respect, and for this reason became bitter opponents of Pelopidas and Epaminondas,—as *e. g.* Meneclides. Others wished to take advantage of the sudden change in public affairs, so as to commit violence upon the noble families by shameful outrages, and to carry through a bloody revolution,—as *e. g.* Eumolpidas and Samidas.

Under such circumstances, inner difficulties of infinite magnitude beset the new popular <sup>The Sacred Band.</sup> leaders, who recognized in the moral and intellectual elevation of the people the condition indispensable in the case of an attempt on the part of Bœotia to assume an honorable position among the Greek states. Inasmuch, then, as it was impossible of a sudden to animate with a right spirit the mass of the population which had been so long utterly neglected, and which under a selfish oligarchical government had been excluded from any participation whatever in public affairs, those men who were establishing the work of the regeneration of their country, sought to spread and domesticate civic virtues, without which a lasting advance was impossible, in the first instance in smaller circles; and it was thus that they formed a body of elect, who were to be the model of the rest, the kernel of the people of the new Bœotia.

This was an institution, connecting itself with earlier usages of the land. For already in the battle of Delium (vol. iii. p. 174) a band of the Three Hundred is mentioned, who fought, like the heroes of the Homeric age, associated in pairs, from their chariots in front of the main body of the soldiery. This doubtless very ancient institution was now revived and carried out in a new spirit under the guidance of Epaminondas and Gorgidas. They had quietly assembled around them a circle of youths, with whom they had presented themselves before the community on the day of the Liberation, so that they were regarded as the founders of the Sacred Band of Thebes. It was now no longer a privilege of the nobility, to belong to the Three Hundred; but those among the youth of the land who were in feeling the noblest and most high-minded, and who already under the oppression of the Tyrants had been preparing themselves for the struggle for freedom, were henceforth the elect and the champions. It was their duty to stimulate the rest eagerly to follow their example of bravery and discipline; they were associated with one another by the bonds of friendship and by identity of feelings for the struggle on behalf of the lofty aims of their native land. This Sacred Band was a most beneficent institution, in which a soldier-like spirit was happily blended with ethical and political points of view, and ancient national usage with the ideas of the present and with Pythagorean principles; and it constitutes an honorable monument of the wisdom of Epaminondas.\*

\* Meneclides: *Plut. Pelop.* 25.—Samidas and Eumolpidas: *Plut. de Gen. Socr.* 3—The Three Hundred (elsewhere also the normal number of a select band, as in Cyrene, Sparta; cf. vol. II., Note XIV. Appendix) at Delium: *Diod.* xii. 70: οἱ παρ' ἐκείνους ἡνίοχοι καὶ παραβάται καλούμενοι, just as in the Homeric age the warriors in chariots fought in the van of the foot-soldiers, and were at the same time associated two and two. The use of the war-chariot must have long maintained itself in Bœotia; hence the appellation remained in use even as late as the Peloponnesian War: Grote, *Hist. of Greece* vol. vi. p. 530. *Plut. Pelop.* 18: ἃ ἐκ πύλων Λάχος. According to

But how little confidence could be derived from this small band in the struggle now imminent! For although there existed a party in Sparta, which had seriously disapproved of the deed of violence committed by Phœbidas, and which was consequently not displeased to observe its evil results, yet it could not be anticipated that the Spartan government would give way. The Thebans on the other hand were anything but prepared for the war; their situation was far less favorable than when they had commenced the struggle seventeen years before. At that time they had possessed Persian subsidies and Greek allies, while the power of the enemy had been divided. At present, the Thebans stood quite alone; for, although Athens had very effectively supported them on the occasion of the recovery of the Cadmea, yet she had not done this as a state. When, therefore, the Spartans demanded an explanation at Athens, the civic assembly was not courageous enough to sanction the proceedings of its generals; the anti-Theban party took advantage of the timidity of the citizens; the generals were indicted, and were both sentenced to death for having overstepped their powers. Sparta had her whole military force at her disposal against Thebes, and her army was better drilled and organized than at any previous time; while Thebes, unaccustomed to carrying on war by herself, felt uncertain of the districts of her own country, or was at open feud with them. The approaches towards Thebes were open on all sides; the coasts were defenceless; and Platææ, Thespiæ, and Orchomenus served as military positions to the enemy in the midst of the Bœotian territory. Probably, therefore, no state ever began war in a more disadvantageous situation as against

Plutarch and Polyænus, the Sacred Band was a creation of Gorgidas; according to Athen. 602, of Epaminondas. According to Thirlwall, vol. v. p. 48, its original purpose was the occupation of the citadel. *Plut. de Gen. Socr.* 6: οἱ κρείττους λεγόμενοι. The subsequent development of the Sacred Band was a service rendered by Pelopidas.

Sparta. Thebes had in her favor nothing but the spirit of her great leaders, who were able to infuse into a part of the population courage and patriotic enthusiasm; but the preparatory measures which they had taken for rendering Bœotia capable of resistance were as yet far from complete; nor was any man less desirous than Epaminondas of meeting the Spartans with defiant self-confidence and challenging them to a decisive contest. To him no bloodshed among Hellenes could on principle be anything but an abomination, or appear justified on any occasion, except when the cause was the defence of the most sacred possessions of a free commonwealth against deeds of violence. It is therefore perfectly credible, that with his co-operation (for it was with him that the leading ideas of Theban policy doubtless originated, although he had no seat at the board of the generals of the confederation) an embassy went to Sparta with proposals of peace, in which even certain rights of hegemony were conceded to Sparta, and the fulfilment of the earlier treaties was promised.

Thebes and  
Sparta.

Ol. c. 2  
(B. C. 378).

These negotiations, however, remained without result. At Sparta the military governors who had abandoned the Cadmea without waiting for relief, were condemned; while it was resolutely intended to chastise Thebes at once. The supremacy of Sparta depended upon force; it was doomed, so soon as expulsions of Lacedæmonian garrisons were left unpunished, or actually recognized as justified popular risings. The authority of the city was at stake; nor was it allowable to wait, until the new enemy, who had suddenly sprung from the soil like the dragon-brood of Cadmus, should gain strength and unite Bœotia.

In other words, the policy of Agesilaus now as before prevailed at Sparta; and both in and outside the city it was assumed as a certainty, that he would undertake the

command of the expedition against Thebes. However, he declined it, appealing to the fact, that, after doing military service for more than forty years, a king was not less than any other citizen freed from serving beyond the frontiers. But this was not the real reason, which rather lay in the circumstance, that by his proceedings at Phlius, and probably also by his connection with Phœbidas, Agesilaus had become very unpopular in a wide variety of circles, so that, if he took a personal part in an undertaking, the worst fears were entertained in Greece. Now, in Sparta there were at this time Theban fugitives, who had saved themselves with the garrison of the Cadmea; and on this, as on many other occasions, the Ephors allowed the exiles of another state to determine their measures. These Thebans represented to them, that the appearance of Agesilaus in Bœotia would only increase the vehemence of its resistance, because from him men were invariably accustomed to expect the most terrible method of carrying on war, the hopeless devastation of the land, the sale of the inhabitants into slavery, executions, and the establishment of despotic governors. The Ephors gave way; Agesilaus retired in vexation of spirit, and declined to have anything more to do with the whole affair. In his stead the youthful Cleombrotus assumed the command of the army, the brother and successor of the noble Agesipolis, and like him a man of Hellenic patriotism and of kindly sentiments towards the confederates. He would doubtless have willingly accepted the peace offered by the Thebans. In obedience to the Ephors he entered Bœotia already in the month of January 378; advanced with his army as far as the neighborhood of Thebes; pitched his camp by the heights of Cynosephalæ; and remained here for sixteen days. Then he returned home again without having inflicted any kind of damage. The entire campaign was purely a demon-

Cleombrotus  
in Bœotia.

Ol. c. 2 (a. c.  
378).  
January.

stration, so that, when the Peloponnesian troops returned home, they were quite ignorant why they had marched out. The whole party of Agesilaus could not but be in the highest degree indignant; the best time for the attack had been wasted; and the whole proceeding appeared in no other light than that of an extremely dangerous display of good-will towards the rebels. The war-party was not, however, strong enough to overthrow Cleombrotus; and the peace-party being equally unable to gain the upper hand, there could amid these oscillations be no question of a policy leading to satisfactory results.\*

Yet the short winter-campaign was not to remain without consequences of importance. For Cleombrotus had left a considerable part of his troops behind him in Bœotia,—at Thespiæ, which, situate at a distance of three hours' march from the capital, seemed admirably adapted for the purpose of a dangerous military position. The supreme command he gave to Sphodrias, who was at the same time furnished with moneys for the levying of fresh troops.

Thus, in spite of the harmless campaign of Cleombrotus, the Thebans were placed in a very perilous position. Before their gates lay a Peloponnesian army, which perceptibly reinforced itself out of the cities of Bœotia hostile to them, and which at the same time served to overawe the Athenians, who for their part did everything to satisfy Sparta. They recognized the change which had taken place in their position, since the passes of the Isthmus were again in the hands of the Spartans; for to the north of the Isthmus there were so many inlets into Central Greece, that the stopping of this or that pass was in the main absolutely useless.

Under these circumstances it is not wonderful that the Thebans should have resorted to a stratagem, in order to bring about the re-

Sphodrias' attempted surprise of the Piræus.

\* Embassy to Sparta: *Isocr.* xiv. 29. Vexation of Agesilaus: *Hellen.* v. 4, 13: εἰς αὐτοὺς βουλευέσθαι ὁμοίον τι βούλοισιν.

sult which was now necessarily of primary <sup>Ol. c. 2 (a. c. 379).</sup> importance to them, viz. a rupture between Athens and Sparta, and the triumph of the Theban party at Athens. Sphodrias, the harmost of Thespiæ, was known as a man of passionate temper; and it might be calculated upon as a certainty, that he would not be averse from perpetrating a sudden act of violence after the manner of Phœbidas, if an opportunity should be offered to him. A secret communication was accordingly made to him,—it is said, at the instigation of Pelopidas and Melon,—by a Bœotian, who introduced himself to the harmost as a faithful partisan of Sparta, to the effect that the circumvallation of the Piræus was still incomplete. It would accordingly, he was told, be an easy matter to penetrate from Thespiæ through the Eleusinian plain and the coast-districts of Attica into the port-town, before any suspicion of the movement had reached the Upper City. Sphodrias fell into the trap. The Lacedæmonians, barren of devices of their own, were all the more accessible to suggestions from other quarters; nor can we be surprised to find an ambitious Spartan carried away by the idea, that it was in his power by means of a single night's march to obtain possession of the Attic port-citadel, docks, and fleet, and thus to render a service to his own native city, which would so to speak form a consummation to all previous enterprises of the same kind. The policy of ruthlessly pursuing the interests of the individual state had come so thoroughly to pervade the public life of Sparta, that Sphodrias could not entertain any doubts but that his surprise, if successful, would meet with an *ex-post-facto* approval. Moreover, the feeling prevailing at Athens was well known, and it might be assumed that the Athenians were only waiting for the first mishap which might befall Sparta, in order to put themselves forward again: thus a series of dangerous struggles could be nipped in the bud by means of a bold deed swiftly carried

out, and perhaps only a few days remained during which it was possible to accomplish it.

Sphodrias, therefore, commenced operations without delay ; but in the execution of them he showed himself uncertain and irrational. He was frightened by the torches burning around the sanctuaries of Eleusis, because he believed them to be fiery signals lit by the Athenians. And, again, he had not even properly calculated the length of the road ; at daybreak he had only reached the boundary between the plains of Eleusis and Athens : his plan of a nocturnal surprise was therefore frustrated. Nothing remained for him but to retrace his steps. But even now he acted with strange perversity : for, instead of taking his departure as quietly as possible, he pillaged several villages, and then marched away across Mount Cithæron, while the citizens of Athens were sallying forth to avenge his shameful violation of the peace.

The offence was doubly criminal, inasmuch as at this very time the Spartan envoys were still sojourning at Athens, who had demanded and received satisfaction for the breach of neutrality committed during the Theban rising. The Athenians were, as a matter of course, only to be appeased by the immediate punishment of Sphodrias. The Ephors dismissed him from office, and summoned him before the judicial tribunal, the Council of the Old (vol. i. p. 210). No one doubted that he would be sentenced to death, since none of the considerations which had saved the life of Phœbidas, could be urged in his behalf. Sphodrias himself had not dared to appear. And yet he was acquitted ; and the tale went, that a tender relation of friendship subsisting between the sons of Sphodrias and of Agesilaus had contributed to this result. The king unexpectedly pleaded for the accused, giving as his reason, that Sparta could not spare such men.

The act of Sphodrias has been variously judged in both ancient and modern times.

Acquittal of  
Sphodrias at  
Sparta.

Conse-  
quences of  
his acquittal.



He was known as an adherent of Cleombrotus, whom it was accordingly sought to hold accountable as the real originator of the attempt; but it is too strikingly contradictory to the policy of the young king and of his family. Again, the entire well-attested story as to the Theban stratagem has been rejected as improbable, but without sufficient reasons. The Thebans might with a good prospect of success try this way of bringing about a quarrel between Athens and Sparta; for in the worst event (and one according to their estimation extremely improbable, viz. of the Munychia having been successfully surprised), the Athenians would have been driven immediately to conclude an alliance with Thebes, in order to recover the citadel. The acquittal of Sphodrias could certainly not be anticipated with confidence by the Thebans; but even without this the attempt itself could not but advance their end, and heighten the feeling of ill-will against Sparta. The relation between Sphodrias and the two kings remains the obscurest point in the whole matter. Both are said to have been on his side against the Ephors: the one, as it seems, from motives of old friendship; while the other can hardly be presumed to have opposed public opinion and rendered a service to his adversaries, simply from motives of weakly parental affection. He must have approved of the attempt on principle; and in the present case we may suppose that it was a triumph to him to see the friend of Cleombrotus a convert to his policy and a votary of the view, that every resource ought to be employed in order to increase the power of the state. Men holding such sentiments ought not to be sacrificed to the enemy, even though they happened to have failed in a particular design. Thus the one king thought it his duty to protect an old, and the other a newly-gained, member of their respective parties.\*

\* Grote's reasons against the story of Sphodrias, *Hist. of Greece*, vol. x. p. 135; "the origin of the story due to Spartan invention," Schüller, i. 16. But why should the Spartans have set this story afoot? What gain resulted to

The acquittal of Sphodrias converted his expedition, so devoid of importance in itself, into an event of far-reaching consequences. In Sparta the authority of Agesilaus sank: for he was made accountable for the unjust judicial decision, which all the more offended the feelings of the better among the citizens, because he was believed to have weakened the supremacy of the law on purely personal considerations. But not only his unconscientiousness was made clearly manifest, but also the entire absence of political sagacity, which could surely least of all be spared in the case of such a policy as that of Agesilaus. In Athens the Lacedæmonian envoys had not been allowed to depart, until they had given the assurance that Sphodrias would be condemned to death on account of his act of self-will. His acquittal amounted to the transfer of his guilt to the state, while the promised satisfaction was not accorded. This suddenly changed everything. The Athenians, who had only quite recently proved so tame and yielding, and had thereby essentially facilitated the subjection of Thebes, now rapidly and resolutely renounced their connexion with Sparta. The Theban party, recently exposed to penalties in person and in purse, took the helm of the state into their hands with the general consent of the people. A spirit of warlike ardor arose; the circumvallation of the Piræus was completed, and the scheme for the restoration of the maritime power of

Alliance between Athens and Thebes. Athens was seriously urged on; the other states were summoned to combine for a common struggle against Lacedæmonian despotism; and, above all, an offensive and defensive alliance was concluded with Thebes.

Agesilaus in Bœotia. Ol. c. 2-3 (a. c. 378). Summer. Thus the situation of affairs was considerably less favorable for Sparta, when in the next summer she armed for a second campaign; for the question was no longer the chastisement of

them or to Sphodrias, from his being represented as a man who allowed a Bœotian commercial traveller to talk him over into a breach of the peace?

a single city, but the two chief cities of Central Greece stood united to resist any intervention on the part of Sparta; Thebes was encouraged by this alliance, saw her frontiers covered, and could rely upon timely support in any decisive contest. The Thebans, however, had no intention of risking their good fortune in open battles, and in the first instance arranged everything for an effective defence. For this purpose they converted the precincts of their city into a vast entrenched camp. All the more convenient inlets were stopped up with fosses and palisadings, the work being facilitated by the heights, lakes, and rivers in the neighborhood: and doubtless it was the military insight of Epaminondas which directed its execution according to a fixed plan. The troops were at the same time exercised by an incessant drill; and reliance was above all placed upon the cavalry for obstructing, by means of its swift movements, an entrance within the lines of the fortifications. Chabrias, who had already stopped the march of Cleombrotus into Bœotia on a former occasion, commanded the Attic auxiliaries, and was thoroughly trusted; he had gained great glory and gathered ample military experience up to the time of the Peace of Antalcidas at Cyprus, and afterwards in the service of King Acoris (p. 293). He was present with 5,000 foot-soldiers and 200 horse. Thus the approach of the enemy was calmly awaited. This time Agesilaus came in person, at the head of a force of 18,000, and of 1,500 cavalry. Taken by surprise by the excellent preparations of the Thebans, he found himself unable to make use of his superior numbers. Like a beast of prey outside the walls of a well-guarded farm, he passed up and down in front of the entrenchment; wherever he sought to enter, he was met by troops ready for action; and when he marched off without having accomplished anything, his rear-guard had to suffer sensible losses at the hands of the flying squadrons, who contrived to turn every local opportunity to advantage.

Finally he succeeded in effecting an entrance, but even then only accomplished a devastation of the city territory. For the enemy, instead of abandoning the field, so courageously in happily-chosen positions withstood the attacks of Agesilaus, that he for his part discontinued the contest and called off his troops, which were already advancing to the assault. This was equivalent to a defeat. Agesilaus, finding himself disarmed by the calm bravery of his adversaries, contented himself with fortifying Thespiæ anew and establishing Phœbidas there as military governor, and then took his departure home with his troops.

Boeotian campaigns (B. C. 377-6.) Thereupon the allies issued forth from their camp with increased confidence; attacked Thespiæ; defeated and killed the hated Phœbidas; and daily increased the numbers of their adherents in Bœotia, till nothing remained for the Spartans, but to levy their forces afresh with the commencement of the next spring. But now the Peloponnesian confederates likewise became every year less easily manageable. The Theban war was extremely unpopular; instances of open resistance occurred; and although the king gained isolated advantages here and there by means of successful forced marches and other tactical devices, learnt by him in Asia, yet in the main no progress was made. While the courage of the allies was constantly on the increase, the authority of Agesilaus sank in the eyes of both friend and foe; and the ambitious king had for the second time to quit Bœotia, without having in reality accomplished anything beyond causing fruit-trees to be cut down by the roots, farms to be burnt to the ground, and corn-fields to be mown bare. During his return he met with an accident at Megara, and was carried home sick to Sparta; he could not but perceive that a curse rested upon this war, which he himself had originally occasioned. When in the following year (B. C. 376) Cleombrotus made one more expedition against Thebes, he never even crossed Mount

Cithæron ; but, finding the passes occupied by the allies, marched away again after an unsuccessful skirmish.\*

But during the last campaigns a new war had already broken out, which threatened the power of Sparta from another quarter. Athens, scared out of her irresolute attitude by the criminal attempt of Sphodrias, had entered upon a

The year of  
Nausinicus.

Ol. c. 3 (B. C.  
378-7).

totally new system of policy. It was now clear, what was to be expected from Sparta ; the necessity was palpable of being prepared against so insidious an enemy ; and thus for the first time there was re-awakened in the Attic community a clear consciousness of its political task, a unanimous and resolute rise to action. Instead, therefore, of contenting themselves with supporting Thebes, and in conjunction with her rejecting the claims of Sparta to supremacy over Central Greece, the Athenians vigorously addressed themselves to the restoration of their own power, and the recovery of their ancient position. In this respect the year of the archonship of Nausinicus, Ol. c. 3 (B. C. 378-7), constitutes a decisive epoch ; it was the year in which the most considerable statesmen of Athens united to establish a new political position for their native city ; and although their proposals imposed new sacrifices, they were accepted by the citizens without reluctance. A new financial

New system  
of taxation.

census was held of the inhabitants ; the whole of the property existing in Attica, inclusive of the public property and of that held for wards, being accurately registered ; while, instead of the capitalists being individually called upon from time to time to bear the burdens of the state, associations of tax-payers were formed, in which the poorer as well as the richer members contributed according to the standard of their property ; and thus a

\* Expedition of Agesilaus before the harvest: *Hellen.* 38. Military dispositions of Chabrias : *Diod.* xv. 32 ; *Dem.* xx. 76 ; *Nepos, Chabr.* 1, 2 ; *Behdanta*, 53.

broader and safer basis was obtained for the system of public burdens. The citizens subject to taxation, from which only those devoid of property (*i. e.* probably those whose possessions were estimated below 25 minæ = 93*l.* *circ.* in value) remained exempted, were divided into twenty associations, every one of which represented an equal paying power. These associations as a body guaranteed the payments claimed by the state. The highest-taxed in the several associations, three hundred in number, provided for the actual payment of the contributions, pledged themselves for it to the state, and, if necessary, undertook to make advances. Hereby immediate intervention on the part of the magistrates was avoided, and the wealthiest of the citizens acquired, as a compensation for the considerable sacrifices expected from them, a corresponding degree of influence.

The new  
naval con-  
federation.

Hereupon the Piræus became full of life, as of old in the days of Themistocles; one hundred triremes were immediately constructed, the ship-sheds put in order, and the sailors drilled. The Athenians had no lack of efficient commanders. They had at their disposal the inventive genius of Iphicrates, the proved capacity of Chadrias, and the noble and generous spirit of Timotheus, Conon's son, whose mission it pre-eminently was to resume the work of which his father had laid the foundations by the construction of the Walls. These men were one and all born generals; while in Callicratidæ of Aphidnæ Athens possessed a statesman, whose eloquence, experience, and knowledge of the world admirably adapted him for promoting the new development of her power: for everything depended upon a wise regard being paid to the circumstances of the times. But for the success of their new efforts the Athenians were chiefly indebted to the Spartans. By their abuse of their supremacy of position since the destruction of the Attic fleet, the Spartans had provoked so much wrath not only on

the mainland, but also in all the island and coast-towns, and even now these were treated by them with so defiant an arrogance, that the Athenians had on their side the inestimable advantage of being able to appear before the Greek seaports, which had all more or less tasted the rule of Spartan harmosts, in the character of preservers and liberators,—just as the Spartans themselves had once upon a time summoned the same places to freedom from the yoke of the Athenians. But now it was of primary importance to convince the maritime states of the fact, that they were not about to be deceived once more, and that it was not their destiny to be perpetually exchanging one yoke for the other. Definite pledges were therefore required, to show that the Athenians were now pursuing a policy with regard to their confederates essentially different from their former policy of maritime dominion. They showed that they had learnt the lesson of the past, and set forth as the first principle of the new association a conscientious respect for all the existing forms of state-government; there was no desire to rule in the confederate towns by means of parties; Athens was then to be, not the ruling capital, but only the directing city in possession of the primacy (*der leitende Vorort*), the seat of the Federal Council, in which all communities, both great and small, were to be represented. Callistratus was in a sense the Aristides of the new confederation, and doubtless did much to bring about an agreement; it was likewise his work that in the place of the “*tributes*” of odious memory the payments necessary to the existence of the confederation were introduced under the gentler name of “*contributions*,” which term expressed the voluntary character of the offerings. Furthermore, Athens solemnly renounced the possession of any landed property in the island-states; she relinquished all claims on former state-domains there; while at the same time it was settled, that in future neither should any Attic citizen be allowed to acquire landed

property abroad,—a provision which freed the islanders from the fear of the ancient *cleruchies* (vol. ii. p. 533) being renewed. At the same time care was taken not to irritate Persia, lest she should be perchance again impelled to take the side of Sparta. The Peace of Antalcidas was tacitly retained as the basis of the new system of relations between the states; it being merely intended to make a reality of that clause of the Treaty, which Sparta had so vilely abused and in the end so shamefully broken,—in this sense, however, that it was not to exclude a voluntary association of allies enjoying equal rights. These states were then conjointly to constitute a Hellenic power, for resistance against any act of injustice on the part of Sparta.\*

Never was a policy more in accordance with its age and more happy in its conception put forward by Athens than on the present occasion. It met with sympathy and joyful assent far and near. The foreign connexions, which had secretly continued to be maintained even during the time of the absolute supremacy of Sparta, were now publicly renewed,—among them that with Chios, the ancient faithful ally of the Athenians, which had undergone evil experiences during the maritime dominion of Sparta (vol. iii. p. 546), and those with Mitylene, which Thrasybulus had freed from Spartan harmosts (p. 280), and with Byzantium. Amicable relations were resumed with the Cyclades, Rhodes, and Perinthus; in other words, the ancient union of navies was at once renewed upon a large scale and in a wide extent. Even such states joined it, as had hitherto never stood in confederate relations with Athens, above all Thebes, which drew the immediate advantage from this resurrection of the Attic naval power. For the energy of the Athenians, which had again revived in full measure,

\* As to the naval confederation in the year of Nausinicus, see Diod. xv. 28f. and the documentary instrument of the confederation, discovered in 1851, and edited by Eustratiades, Rangabé, M. H. E. Meier, and Schäfer. Cf. Schäfer, *Demosth.* i. 26. *Σύμμαχος* in lieu of *φύλαξ*.



actually enabled them to appear in the *Ægean* with squadrons of war vessels already during the last two *Bœotian* campaigns. *Chabrias*, *Timotheus*, and *Callistratus* were the first commanders of the new confederate fleet. The Spartans indeed at first pretended not to take these important movements into account at all. But their confederates at the next meeting protested very loudly against the exclusively mainland policy pursued by the Spartans in the conduct of the war, which uselessly wasted the *Peloponnesian* resources; it was simply a repetition of the ancient system of warfare pursued by *Archidamus* (vol. iii. p. 57). The *Corinthians* were doubtless pre-eminently active in insisting upon a naval armament. The new naval power, it was urged, ought not to be allowed to attain to maturity; *Athens* ought to be cut off by sea, and starved out. This, it was urged, was the single proper mode of attack; by sea it would likewise be easier to reach the *Thebans*. The Spartan government was obliged to give way; and thus it came to pass, that the expedition to *Bœotia* was postponed for the present, while maritime affairs absorbed all attention.

Proceedings of Sparta and her confederates.

Within a short time *Pollis*, the *Lacedæmonian* admiral, was able to weigh anchor with sixty vessels, and made his appearance so unexpectedly in the waters of *Ceos* and *Andros*, that a whole fleet laden with corn, which was on its voyage from the *Hellespont*, only with difficulty escaped him. The ships made their way into the harbor of *Geræstus* in *Eubœa*, but were unable to continue their voyage. The *Piræus* remained blockaded, and a new famine was imminent.

Hereupon the citizens rose to the occasion, and at once equipped so large a number of ships-of-war, that they were able to break the blockade and bring in the supplies. *Chabrias* commanded the fleet. Instead of resting satisfied with the success already achieved, he sailed to *Naxos*, in order to lay siege to the island-city. *Pollis* followed; and

Battle of  
Naxos.

Ol. ci. 1  
(B. C. 376).  
September.

in the broad sound between Naxos and Paros the fleets met; the Attic being superior in numbers by twenty vessels. It was about the middle of the month Boëdromion, the month of victory with the Athenians (vol. ii. pp. 291, 324, 339, and Note xxvii. *Appendix*); and the day of the month chosen by Chabrias for the battle was the sixteenth (September 9th, 376 B. C.); it was the first of the days of the Eleusinian festival, which was opened with the cry: "To the sea, ye Initiated!" Pollis successfully attacked the left wing of the Athenians, until Chabrias came up with the kernel of his fleet, and, most efficiently supported by the youthful Phocion, who commanded under him, sank more than half of the enemy's vessels, captured eight, and gained so brilliant a victory, that he might have destroyed the insignificant fleet of the foe, had he not been rendered cautious in the use of his good fortune by the remembrance of the fate of the generals at the Arginusæ (vol. iii. p. 538). He returned home with 3,000 prisoners, and brought to the city spoils to the value of 110 talents (26,800*l. circ.*).

This was the first victory which Athens again owed to herself,—a genuine citizens' victory, the just punishment for the breach of the peace committed by Sphodrias, the full justification of the claims with which Athens once more came forward among the maritime states of Greece. How soon had the entire relations between the states changed in the course of a few years! Sparta, after quite recently in unmeasured arrogance indulging in the belief that she had reduced all Greece to servitude, had now been humiliated by land and by sea. Though she had called into play all the auxiliary resources at her disposal in repeated campaigns, she had proved incapable of breaking the resistance of a single city which had cast off her yoke; and had then at the hands of a second power, which had arisen with equal suddenness, suffered a defeat, whereby she was forced to abandon the entire maritime

region of the Archipelago, and to hide timidly with her vessels behind Cape Malea.\*

To Thebes the successes of Athens were of inestimable value. During these years Thebes was able to devote herself undisturbed to her most immediate tasks, and firmly to establish her position in Bœotia. In this she proceeded with a sagacious moderation, doubtless based upon a system of policy introduced by Epaminondas. All violent means were eschewed, in order that the work of union might not be desecrated by bloody party-struggles. Confidence was placed in the growth, increasing from year to year, of the national party, in the progress towards maturity of a young generation of patriots, and in the impression created by the defeats of Sparta, which could not but discourage her adherents. And in truth the difficulties in which the oligarchical governments were involved steadily increased. In Thespiæ matters had come to such a pass, that the oligarchs for the sake of self-preservation conceived the desperate scheme of falling upon their adversaries in the town with the assistance of Lacedæmonian soldiery, and massacring them in a body. It was therefore one of the very last acts of Agesilaus in Bœotia, to prevent the outbreak of civil warfare at Thespiæ.

But the more faithfully the Lacedæmonian party held out under unfavorable circumstances in Tanagra, in Thespiæ, in Orchomenus, the more was it entitled to a vigorous support. Immediately, therefore, after the battle of Naxos a new military expedition was resolved upon; Sparta,

\* Battle of Naxos: *Hellen.* v. 4. 60; *Diod.* xv. 34; *Plut. Phoc.* 6; *Dem.* xx. 77. *Περὶ τὴν ναξόληρον*: Boeckh, *Mondey-len*, 4. "Ἄλαβε μύσται": Mommsen, *Heortologie*, 246. Boeckh dated immediately before the battle the decree of Cephalus in honor of Phanocritus of Parium, who receives a reward for having brought information concerning the movement of a hostile squadron (*Corp. Inscr. Gr.* 84; cf. a similar decree with regard to Phillseus, *Göttinger Nachr.* 1867, p. 261). However, this combination, which already Grote called into question, cannot be maintained, as is shown by Kirckhoff, *Abhandl. d. Berlin. Akad.*, 1861, p. 606.

after having abandoned the *Ægean* to the Athenians, hoped to be left at peace by them, and turned anew to operations against Thebes. The Thebans on the other hand sought to escape the imminent danger by means of skilful negotiations, and in particular once more set in motion their friends at Athens. These insisted upon the necessity of not leaving the work half-finished, and the victories which had been gained unused. The maritime dominion of Athens ought to be restored in its full extent, if she was to maintain a secure hold over what she had already recovered. It was known that the maritime states in the Western Sea desired to join the new confederacy; and thus, to the terror of the Spartans, a fleet of fifty vessels was in the spring of the year 375 sent out under Timotheus. It first landed forces upon the coast of *Læconia*, which was devastated by them, and then steered round *Peloponnesus* into the *Ionic Sea*, in order here to test the fortunes of the recovered maritime dominion of Athens. The results were uncommonly favorable. The community of the *Paleans* in *Cephalenia* was the first to give in its adherence; *Corcyra* followed. The magnanimous conduct of the *Attic* commander gained him all hearts; for everywhere he respected the existing constitutions, and conscientiously abstained from any abuse of his power. An *Attic* confederacy rapidly formed itself in the *Ionic Sea*, and was joined by the princes of *Epirus*. The consequence was that the same terror which had of old contributed most to the outbreak of the *Peloponnesian War*, viz., of the *Peloponnesus* being surrounded on all sides and so to speak throttled by the maritime power of Athens, once more befell the Spartans and their confederates: the states which had remained true to Sparta, in particular *Leucas* and *Ambracia*, urgently demanded support. The intended campaign by land was therefore, quite in accordance with the desire of the Thebans, once more

Timotheus  
in the *Ionic*  
Sea.

A. C. 375.

Summer.

postponed, while a fleet of fifty-five vessels was sent out under Nicolochus, to maintain the Peloponnesian supremacy in the Ionic Sea. In the month of June the fleets met off the coast of Acarnania, opposite the island of Leucas, near Alyzia. Timotheus pursued the same course which Chabrias had followed before the battle of Naxos, in remembering the festival which was celebrated at Athens on the day of the battle, and sailing to meet the foe with ships wreathed with myrtles. He employed a small squadron for the purpose of tiring out the enemy by rapid manœuvres; and not till then did he advance to battle with his remaining ships. Though the victory gained by him was not so decisive as that of the preceding year, yet the superiority of the Athenians was undoubted; and Timotheus, reinforced by the Corcyræan auxiliaries, remained in undisputed possession of the sea. In a short time, and with small resources, successes had been achieved, such as had of old cost extreme exertions lasting many years; and this time they had not been purchased by means of bloody revolutions; the victor's hands were pure, his glory was without a stain, and the moral dignity of the Athenians stood higher than ever before.\*

But Athens herself was not what she had been of old. The citizens were no longer joyously ready to make all necessary sacrifices, no longer energetically determined to stake everything upon the restoration of their power. The most splendid successes of Timotheus failed to call forth any lasting ardor for war; the joy inspired by his

\* Agesilaus at Thespiæ: *Hellen.* v. 4, 58; *Plut. Ages.* 27 (the king falls sick at Megara; his illness and weakness continue for a long period, till after the battle of Leuctra). Παλαίης and Κερκυραίων ὁ δῆμος: instrument of the confederation (Schäfer, *Comm. de Sociis Ath.* 11). Battle of Ἰωνία, Xen.; "περὶ Λευκάδα," *Diod.*; *Polyæn.* iii. 10, 4 (ἦν ἰσότης Σαίρα). The Scira (in the latter part of the autumn) are easily confounded with the Scirophoria; Schömann, *Griech. Alterth.* iii. 466. On account of the season of the year, such a confusion has with much probability been assumed to have occurred in this instance also; if so, the battle would fall οὐ the 12th Sciroph.—June 27th. Cf. Schäfer, *Demosth.* i. 48.

reports of his victories was embittered, and turned into vexation, by the demands for money made at the same time. And indeed there existed no treasure whence the needs of the war could have been defrayed; the contributions flowed in scantily; the money for the fleet had to be collected by means of a property-tax, sensible to every individual. Finally, the grievous impression prevailed, that these heavy sacrifices chiefly redounded to the advantage of the Thebans. They alone derived a certain and undoubted profit from the expenditure, while the permanence of the Attic successes was open to reasonable doubts.

At Athens men thought that more than enough had been done to restore the honor of the state; and since Sparta had likewise very considerably toned down her demands, since she was sick of the naval war into which she

Peace negotiations.  
Ol. ci. 2 (a. c. 374).

had been forced against her will, and desirous of having her hands left free for more important purposes, it was possible for the peace negotiations to be opened with the best prospect of success. And indeed the two chief powers soon came to an understanding,—on the basis of the Peace of Antalcidas,—to this effect: that all garrisons should be removed from the territory not belonging to their state, and that Sparta and Athens should be mutually recognized by one another; the former as holding the primacy among the Peloponnesian states, the latter as the primary state of her naval confederacy. The treaty, after being negotiated at Sparta, was at Athens submitted to the deputies of the naval confederacy for ratification. Not one of the states, with the exception of Thebes, had any interest in the continuation of the war. Athens was completely satisfied by the concessions of Sparta; and the remaining states were well contented to have shaken off the tyranny of the Spartans by means of such slender exertions. The Thebans could not assert their separate inter-

Peace with Sparta.  
Ol. ci. 2 (a. c. 374).

Attitude of Thebes.

ests, which were opposed to the general desire for peace ; but they had instructed their deputy not to sign otherwise than in the name of Bœotia. The deputy in question was Epaminondas. It created astonishment when the Theban envoy pleaded his cause in a manner which placed him on a full equality with his opponent Callistratus, the greatest orator of Athens. Epaminondas attested by his personal bearing as well as by his speech, that a new era had in truth opened for Thebes, and that she was well capable of assuming another position than that which she had heretofore held. In no quarter however was there any inclination to postpone the desired peace again on account of Thebes: this point would have necessitated fresh negotiations with Sparta, who, it was well known, would refuse to give way on this head ; on which Athens was at bottom thoroughly at one with her. For the Athenians regarded with increasing disfavor the endeavor of the Thebans to force themselves in among the great powers of Greece ; no sooner had the despotic supremacy of Sparta been broken, than the feeling of fraternity, which had formed itself between Athens and Thebes in the struggle against that supremacy, vanished, and the old aversion re-appeared, intensified by suspicious fears, such as might with reason suggest themselves to a jealous neighbor-city on the occasion of the presence of a man like Epaminondas. Callistratus upheld the treaty agreed upon at Sparta, and in the whole diet Epaminondas was not supported by a single vote. He stood absolutely alone ; and, as he obeyed his instructions, Thebes was excluded from participation in the treaty. On his return home, the question was once more taken into consideration ; the state of affairs was not held to be ripe as yet for venturing on the decisive step ; conciliatory overtures were therefore made, and a second embassy signed the treaty in the form demanded by the other states.\*

\* Peace : *Hellen.* vi. 2, 1. Manso, Vöhmel, and others deny the Peace of

This act of self-control, to which the Thebans once more consented, was a step of wise moderation productive of the best results. For, instead of the general indignation turning against them, as the solitary disturbers of the peace, and furnishing Sparta with an opportunity for undertaking a new expedition of vengeance, the cause of strife had now been evaded. On the other hand, the understanding between the two great powers at once showed itself to rest on very unsafe foundations. For, precisely as in former times of war, so now again the commanders could not after the publication of the conclusion of peace abstain from seeking to secure small advantages for which a fitting opportunity offered itself. Timotheus, feeling himself after all for the moment master of the Western Sea, before quitting it, landed a body of Zacynthians in their island, and supported them in their endeavors to seize the government. This breach of the peace aroused the wrath of the Spartans; and since they received no satisfaction for it at Athens, they immediately despatched a fleet to Zacynthus, and at the same time took advantage of the invitation of a party favorable to them in Corcyra, and attacked this island, which they were least of all willing to leave under Attic influence, because it was of too great importance for them with a view to their relations with Sicily. In this attempt they met with the most vigorous support from the maritime states of Peloponnesus; and, as Timotheus had meanwhile quitted these parts, they, after in the first instance trying, but failing in, a surprise, besieged the city of the Corcyraeans most vigorously from the land side as well as from the sea, with sixty ships and 1,500 men. But the Athenians

New naval  
war off Cor-  
cyra

Ol. cl. 2  
(a. c. 374).

374; Sievers (220) says "it was never executed." Rehdants (71) gives the correct view. Callias concluded peace twice (387 and 374 a. c.): *Hellen.* vi. 3, 4. Sacrifice on the occasion of the peace; Isocr. xv. 110; Nepos, *Timotheus*. 2. Diodorus clearly distinguishes between two series of peace-negotiations (xv. 31 and 50). The former probably at Athens: Rehdants, 73. Ἐφεσίων, "praesidiorum deductores," §. 72.



were at hand without delay; they sent an auxiliary force by land to Epirus, whence, with the aid of the friendly government, it was transported to Coreyra, and arrived at the right moment for averting immediate danger; while at the same time they equipped sixty vessels-of-war, to follow under Timotheus.

Thus, after a sham peace of a few weeks, the war had burst forth afresh; and it was now the task of the Thebans to employ this new term, which an unexpected good-fortune offered them, with the utmost energy, so as at last to regulate the affairs of their own land as they wished, and to prepare themselves for the inevitable day of the crisis.

A peaceful blending of the territories of the several towns of Bœotia, such as Epaminondas and his friends had hoped for, would not admit of realization, though it was manifest enough that the entire future of the country depended upon its union around a single centre. The Orchomenians still found the idea intolerable, that their city of ancient fame was to become an insignificant hamlet in the country which had its seat of government at Thebes; the lower classes were too little advanced to appreciate the blessings promised them by the political regeneration of the land; and the ruling families refused to give way, although they could not but recognize that their position was becoming daily more untenable. And, as to the Platæans, who could blame them for having allowed an invincible hatred against the authors of their terrible calamities to take root among them? The excellent men who were at present directing the policy of Thebes had to suffer for the former conduct of their native city.

It was therefore necessary to proceed by force of arms; and there was the less reason for entertaining any scruples on this head, since the obstacles against the union of the country were foreign garrisons. For the new Thebes adopted this principle from the old: that every

Thebes obtains possession of Bœotia.

Ol. ci. 2  
(a. c. 374).

combination on the part of a Bœotian town with a foreign power amounted to a criminal act of disloyalty and of treason against the common country,—the same principle which the Thebans had urged upon the Spartans in reference to Plataeæ, and which the Spartans held to have been abolished by the Peace of Antalcidas. Pelopidas first took the field for Thebes. After several fruitless attacks upon Orchomenus, he made use of the moment when the Lacedæmonian force which guarded the citadel there had marched out to Locris. At the head of the Sacred Band and a squadron of cavalry he appeared before the city; but here other troops had unexpectedly arrived,—a sign of the anxiety with which the Spartans endeavored to maintain their positions in Bœotia, even though they were for the present occupied with other matters. Pelopidas retreated along the road to Tegyra, which lay on the further side of the valley of Lake Copais, opposite Orchomenus, in the direction towards Locris. Here he suddenly came upon the Lacedæmonians on their return thence. There was no question of evading the conflict. He, therefore, in spite of their numbers being double his own, attacked them with his cavalry, and then with the Three Hundred broke through the enemy's line. The Lacedæmonian leaders fell, and the ranks opened for Pelopidas to pass through. But he, now no longer satisfied with this success, once more attacked the troops, and drove them into flight; so that it was only under cover of the night that they were able to make good their escape into Orchomenus.

Thus the menace of danger was changed into a brilliant victory; and this day of honor for the Sacred Band created a great impression throughout Bœotia. Probably the Bœotian towns simultaneously gave in their adherence, without a single one of them being destroyed. About the same time, immediately after the outbreak of new hostilities between Athens and Sparta, communications were likewise already opened with Iason, the Tyrant of Pheræ, and

attempts made to bring about a combination between Phocis and Bœotia. These were the first endeavors towards founding a confederation in the mainland of Central Greece.

While thus the policy of Thebes already ventured beyond the confines of Bœotia, the last decisive events within these were also already occurring. With a new war in certain prospect, it was inadmissible to leave any fortified places standing, which Sparta might immediately use as military positions. Above all, Platææ had long been an object of vexation to the Thebans. Information now reached them, that this city was intending to place itself under the protection of the Athenians: it was, therefore, in spite of the Peace (p. 395), rapidly taken by means of a cavalry attack, and laid level with the ground, after the population had been permitted to depart unhurt, on condition, however, of never again entering Bœotia. Very soon afterwards Tanagra and Thespisæ were likewise utterly reduced, and doubtless deprived of their walls. At last matters had been thoroughly set to rights at home; the goal of many years' endeavors had been reached. Thebes was the first and the only city of Bœotia.\*

Meanwhile the naval war had been continued with varying results. The Corcyræans with painful anxiety awaited the promised fleet. There was at Athens no lack of goodwill. But the want of money had already made itself felt before the departure of the fleet, and crippled all proceedings. Timotheus did what lay in his power to do. Personally, he made the greatest efforts. The trierarchs added

\* Zacynthus: *Hellen.* vi. 2, 2. Tegyra: *Plut. Pelop.* xvi. 17; *Diod.* xv. 37. The straight road between Orchomenus and Tegyra was impassible: Ulrichs, *Reisen*, I. 202. Destruction of Platææ: according to Pausan. ix. 1, 3, under the archonship of 'Acræios, 373-2 B. C.; according to *Diod.* xv. 16, under that of Socratides, 374-3; according to Clinton-Krûger in the summer of 374, i. e. before the peace. *Contra*, *Isocr.* xiv. 10 (*αὐτῶν*), 14 (*εἰρήνην εἶχε*), and 44. This is not to be understood as referring to the Peace of Antalcidas: H. Weissenborn, *Zeltchr. f. Alt.*, 1847, 921.

advances of their own for the maintenance of the crews; and thus in April 373 the fleet weighed anchor; but instead of making for Corcyra, where the situation of the besieged daily grew more unbearable, Timotheus sailed to the north, to the coasts of Thessaly and Macedonia. He evidently had in view a long and decisive war, and accordingly deemed it above all incumbent upon him to open new resources and to gain new allies. Men are generally prone to attach the highest importance to that for which they personally feel the highest capacity; and thus Timotheus did not scruple to keep the Corcyræans waiting, while by the charms of his manner he succeeded in inducing the Prince of Pheræ, Iason, and a series of island and coast-states, to join the Attic confederacy. While he cruised about in the *Ægean* as a peaceful victor, successfully adding new members to the naval confederacy, the summer passed away. The brilliancy of his return, with a fleet increased by thirty confederate vessels, and with a large number of envoys, instructed to sign the instrument of the confederation, once more reconciled the Athenians, who had already begun to murmur, with their general, so that they conferred on him anew the command of the fleet.

But neither was its second departure followed by any results. Wherein lay its use, if the means were wanting for its maintenance? Timotheus was full of ambition to do great deeds and of patriotic readiness to make personal sacrifices. He pledged his own lands to the trierarchs for the advances which they made to the state, but these efforts merely served as a momentary stop-gap; it was impossible under such circumstances to open a regular campaign, and far away from home to defy a well-trained fleet. He could therefore do nothing for the present but cruise to and fro in the *Ægean*, in order to supplement his resources in men and money; whereupon he again lay for a time inactive in the roads of Calauria. Doubtless there was no man to whom this inactivity was more painful, than it was to the

general himself. And yet upon him the blame was cast of a useless protraction of the war and of the loss of valuable time. He was more popular at a distance from Athens than at home among his fellow-citizens. His most dangerous adversaries were Iphicrates and Callistratus, who, otherwise not on friendly terms with one another, had combined to attack him. Iphicrates had returned from Egypt, where he had commanded Greek mercenary troops under Pharnabazus, and desired a new theatre for glorious enterprises; Callistratus was one of those who felt themselves injured and cast into the shade by the pride of Timotheus. The general was accordingly indicted as having deceived the civic community (vol. ii. p. 257) and betrayed the state; and was dismissed from the supreme command. Iphicrates became his successor,—as it would seem, with extraordinary powers; inasmuch as he was left at liberty to choose his colleagues in office. He must at that time have contrived to make himself very highly trusted. Probably this is also the period of his endeavors to open new sources of income for the Athenians; for he was the author of a law which commanded the removal of such projecting parts of houses as interrupted the traffic in the streets, or which placed a special tax upon them; hereby a not inconsiderable profit was derived by the public treasury from the well-to-do citizens, who were anxious to preserve the arrangement of their dwellings intact.\*

In his office as general Iphicrates displayed uncommon energy. As a born commander of mercenaries, he was accustomed to go straight to the point; he rigorously insisted upon the citizens paying their contributions for the fleet, and within a short time collected seventy vessels.

\* Indictment of Timotheus: Schäfer, iii. B. 132.—Financial law of Iphicrates: Polyæn. iii. 9, 2; Boeckh, *P. Ec. of Ath.*, vol. 1. p. 88 [E. Tr.]; Rendantz, 92 f.—Attack of Sparta upon Coreyra: 373 a. c. spring. Mnasippus sent out: autumn. Timotheus deposed in the month Mæmacterion (November). Expedition of Iphicrates: 372, spring (or just before the close of the year 373), Weissenborn, 924.

He was sagacious enough to choose for his colleagues the men who might do him the greatest harm, viz. Callistratus, and by his side Chabrias. This aroused confidence; for he who asked for such men as these, thereby made it clear, that he shrank from no control in his conduct of the war. He left behind him at Athens the mainsails, thereby indicating, that his ships were not destined for promenades in the Archipelago, but that they were from first to last meant to be instruments of war. Already the rapid voyages which he made round Peloponnesus were designed as a schooling for war; he contrived in the midst of the greatest exertions to keep his men fresh and ready for work, to stir a spirit of emulation among them, and to arouse their ambition. General admiration was excited by the spirit, the discipline, and the warlike training which prevailed on board his fleet.

Already at his arrival on the scene of war, he found that an essential change had taken place in the condition of affairs. The citizens of Corcyra had by means of a desperate sally freed themselves, unaided, from the worst pressure; on this occasion they had slain the Spartan general Mnasippus, and had so greatly discouraged the besieging army, that, when the news came of the approach of an Athenian fleet, the siege was entirely abandoned. Thus the fortunate Iphicrates was victorious before his arrival; and he hereupon surprised an auxiliary squadron from Syracuse, which the Spartans, departing in timorous haste, had neglected to await. Of ten Sicilian triremes, which were moreover laden with dedicatory gifts of the costliest kind for Delphi and Olympia, nine fell into the hands of the Athenians. The sums paid in ransom for the captured Syracusans, and obtained by the sale of the dedicatory gifts, which Iphicrates, empowered thereto by a sufficiently clear expression of the will of the civic community, turned into money at once, for a time supplied the means necessary for the fleet. Simultaneously he carried on a lucra-

tive freebooter's war by means of the ninety ships of the united fleet of Athens and Corcyra, laying contributions upon the coasts of Peloponnesus and Central Greece, and also collecting voluntary payments from the confederates.\*

So wildly desultory a system of conducting the war could not be long continued. Iphicrates himself perceived this, and could not but agree with Callistratus on this head. Callistratus was accordingly requested by Iphicrates to go to Athens, in order to obtain either the means for a regular war,—or peace. Callistratus had only the latter alternative in view. His was the clearest insight into the whole situation of affairs; he could entertain no doubt, but that Sparta would now, even more readily than three years ago, recognize the naval dominion of Athens; while the Athenians themselves were without ulterior objects, for the sake of which they ought to carry on the war. Moreover, Antalcidas had again been sent to Susa; and it was in the interest of Athens, to prevent a new intervention on the part of Persia. But the reason which above all could not but incline both states to peace, lay in the affairs of Bœotia. The unexpected destruction of Platææ had provoked great indignation among the Athenians; and the expelled Platæans, who had met with a hospitable reception at Athens, stimulated the ancient aversion to Thebes, depicting in the most glaring colors the arrogance of the new capital, which would soon find even the limits of Bœotia too narrow for its ambition. Though at the same time there was no lack of men who were able to justify the proceedings of the Thebans, and who represented them in the light of a political necessity, yet the majority of the citizens decidedly took the side of the Platæans, on whose behalf Isocrates also composed his Platæan Oration. Ac-

\* Iphicrates chooses Callistratus: οὐ μάλ᾽ ἐπιτίθειον ἔσται, *Hellen.* vi. 2, 39 (not to be altered, as proposed by Boeckh, *P. Ec. of Ath.* vol. ii. p. 162 [E. Tr.]); according to Thirlwall, vol. v. p. 81, "proof of magnanimous self-confidence."—Dedicatory gifts: *Diod.* xvi. 57.

ordingly the proposals of Callistratus found ready listeners, and a peace-embassy to Sparta was decreed; while at the same time the confederates, and Thebes in particular, were summoned to take part in the negotiations.

Congress at Sparta. Ol. cil. 1 (a. c. 371). June.

It was a memorable day for Greece, when in June 371 the congress met at Sparta. A desire was generally felt, to be freed from the obscurity and uncertainty of the existing state of things; and a consciousness prevailed, that the decision of great questions was at issue. Besides the Greek states, Macedonia and Persia likewise had their representatives at Sparta. The Persians deemed it their interest, to promote the termination of the Greek quarrels; for, taught by long experience, they could not but favor by preference a condition of things, in which the two chief states held the balance of power to one another; moreover, they could more easily obtain mercenary troops for their own purposes, as soon as the internal quarrels of the Greeks should have ceased. The negotiations were conducted on the part of Sparta by Agesilaus. Athens was represented by several men of mark. Among them was Callias, Hipponicus' son (vol. iii. p. 2), who had saved but little of his inherited wealth, but clung all the more determinedly to the ancestral fame of his house, and whom it had been impossible to pass over, both on account of the ancient relations of that house to Persia, and of his holding the position of *proxenus* of the Lacedæmonians; further, the popular orator Autocles, Strombichides' son, Melanopus, and others. But the real soul of the embassy was Callistratus. Thebes was represented by Epaminondas, this time furnished with very definite instructions.

The deliberations began in the presence of the committee of the Laconic civic community, and were opened by the Athenians as the movers. Callias, the diplomatist for show, gave a very circumstantial account of his ancestor Tripolemus, who, he stated, had communicated the mysteries



of Demeter to Heracles, the ancestor of the kings of Laconia; wherefore it was assuredly most unbecoming, that the descendants of Heroes associated in so close a friendship should live in strife with one another, and that the Peloponnesians should design to cut off the supplies from those who had first conferred upon them the boon of corn. Upon these feeble phrases followed the speech of Autocles, which came straight upon the Spartans like a keen blast of wind. With unsparing openness he exposed before them the policy which they had pursued in Greece since the end of the great war between the states. "Ye Spartans," he said, "have ever asserted the independence of the individual communities to be the principle upon which our national affairs ought to be regulated; and yet no state has more rudely violated this principle, than yourselves; for in the first place you demand from the Peloponnesians unconditionally the furnishing of contingents, without inquiring whether they approve of the war or not; and again, which is much worse, you establish governments beyond the limits of the peninsula, commissioned to keep the communities in subjection by all possible means of force. You are wroth with the Thebans for desiring to bring the Bœotian towns under their dominion; and meanwhile you occupy the citadels of towns which are not your own yourselves. How is a restoration of tranquillity throughout Greece possible, if you employ the provisions of the Peace of Antalcidas as a means of enchaining others, while you thereby open an unlimited sphere of action to your own lust of dominion?"

The Lacedæmonians were forced to listen to these reproaches without contradiction; and it was a great satisfaction to many of the injured states that the Spartans should once in a way have the truth thus openly told them in their own city, before a large assembly. The peace oration proper it was reserved for Callistratus to make. He was the conciliating statesman, who mitigated the severity of his predecessor's oration by

Speech  
of Calli-  
stratus.

readily conceding that mistakes had been committed on both sides. The question was not, he observed, that of casting up the account between these mistakes, but that of making such a use of the lessons and chastisements received on either side, as should redound to the advantage of the whole nation. The Spartans would by this time probably have learnt to understand what had been the result of the treatment hitherto accorded by them to the Peace of Antalcidas. Thebes, which was to have been humbled, was at the present time more powerful than ever before. They would therefore probably be found inclined to pursue a moderate policy. "The Athenians," he said, "are animated by a real love of peace; nor have they been induced to make their present overtures, as some think, by the embassy which you have sent to Susa; for what should they have to fear from the Persian King, inasmuch as their objects are identical with his? Nor are we involved in any kind of difficulty, from which we might be seeking to extricate ourselves by means of a rapid pacification. It is rather considerations for the general condition of Greece, and the community of interests, which make a close union between the two states advisable. For so long as they stand in arms against one another, the feeling of hostility between the Attic and the Lacedæmonian party must continue in all the communities. This ancient evil is only to be cured by means of a sincere understanding between the two states, which cannot but cause those elements of party-hatred to lose their importance; and thus a real establishment of peace is possible in the Greek world without any foreign intervention. Again, the conduct of certain of our confederates, which is as little pleasing to us as it is to you, is an inducement to us to unite our interests with yours. Inasmuch as your power by land has been well preserved, and our power by sea has been restored, the only reasonable policy which both of us can pursue, is to secure ourselves by means of a frank alliance against every danger by land

and by water, either state resting satisfied with the favorable position which it has obtained, instead of acting after the manner of a passionate gambler, who, after he has made a lucky throw, doubles his stakes, in order to win all; for usually such a proceeding leads to all being—lost.”

It was according to the principles developed in this speech that the treaty of peace was executed. It amounted in the main to a re-<sup>The treaty of Peace of Ol. cii. 1 (B. C. 371).</sup>newal of the Peace of Antalcidas, only with this difference, that Sparta was not, as on the former occasion, charged with the execution of the treaty. This power, which she had so cruelly abused, it was not wished again to commit to her hands. The most natural course would have been for the two great states to have jointly undertaken the responsibility of maintaining the treaty; for, inasmuch as its purpose was the general pacification of Greece, it was in point of fact indispensable to make provision for the event of a breach of the peace occurring from any side whatever. But in the first place a scruple was felt against absolutely excluding Persia, which, as has been seen, was also represented at Sparta, and which had been the guarantor of the earlier treaty; and, again, Athens could not bring herself to undertake definite obligations of this description. For every one foresaw an event close at hand, which would give occasion for an execution of the conditions of peace by forcible means: and with reference to this event Athens was not in the least inclined to fetter herself by anticipation. Inasmuch, then, as it was after all necessary to arrive at some kind of settlement, the guarantees for the due observance of the treaty contained in the third clause of the instrument of B. C. 387 were this time simply abolished; and it was expressly provided, that it was not incumbent upon any individual state or upon any association of states to watch over the maintenance of the treaty, but that every state should be at liberty according to its own choice to come to the aid of a community injured in its rights.

By means of this clause the peace, which was most solemnly established at Sparta for the whole of Greece, became in point of fact a sham peace, an empty delusion. For all the particular provisions inserted in the treaty—viz. that Sparta should withdraw her governors and garrisons from places abroad, and put an end to all threatening movements, military or naval—now lost their significance: because there was no one to watch over the fulfilment of the articles of peace. It was therefore, certainly, a bitter humiliation for Sparta to have to hear the truth told her in open assembly, to have to recognize Athens as a great power like herself, and to accept without reservation the conditions of peace proposed; her entire conduct had been plainly condemned by the public voice, and her arrogance had been unsparingly chastised. The Spartans were to all appearance forced to adopt a new course of action, and to abandon the policy of Agesilaus. But in point of fact they had after all obtained what they chiefly desired. They were not bound to attack the states withstanding the treaty, but they had the right to do so; they had acquired freedom of action against Thebes, and this under the most favorable conditions, if Thebes could be represented to be the disturber of the general peace. And the most important clause of the treaty for the Spartans was that which apparently was of all the emptiest of meaning: viz. the provision, that by virtue of the universal autonomy no state should be obliged to furnish aid in arms against another. Hereby all the previous associations for the purpose of securing the regular furnishing of military contingents, the Peloponnesian among them, seemed to be dissolved; and Sparta no longer possessed as hitherto the right of calling the cities of the peninsula to arms in support of her policy. But in point of fact everything remained as before; and while the cities confederate with Athens were regarded as independent members of the congress, Sparta maintained her position as head of the Peloponnesian confederacy.

ponnesian confederacy unchallenged, and in so far successfully issued forth from this crisis also as the ancient and single great power of Greece.

The most important and questionable point, viz. the relation of Thebes to the districts surrounding it, had not been brought under discussion at all in the meetings of the congress. It was intentionally evaded by either side. Epaminondas had spoken with vigor in the sense of Autocles against the Spartan policy; it was a satisfaction to him, to see that policy meet with so open a disapproval; nor was there any reason for his objecting to the articles of the treaty, so far as their words went: the only question was, in what way they were to be applied to Thebes; and this only became manifest towards the close of the congress. On the 14th of Scirophorion (June 16th) the treaty was signed and sworn to by the representatives of

The Peace  
signed.

the greater states, Persia, Sparta, Athens, Thebes; hereupon the confederates of Athens also signed, each in his own name. On the next day, we are told, the Thebans appeared with the demand, that their signature should

Ol. cii. 1  
(A. C. 371).  
June 16th.

Demand of  
Epaminon-  
das.

be altered, and that the word "Bœotians" should be substituted for "Thebans." This demand must have been occasioned by something special which had occurred in the interval; probably, the protocol of the treaty was kept open for signatures still absent, and, in secret connivance with the two great powers, deputies of Bœotian communities presented themselves, to acquire by signing on their own account a documentary claim to independence. Epaminondas was this time resolved not to give way. His signature, he declared, had validity for the whole of Bœotia; he had not signed as an official of the city of Thebes, but as Bœotarch; there existed no Bœotia besides Thebes; and he therefore demanded an alteration of the signature, so as once for all to cut off any independent participation of Bœotian towns or villages in the conclusion

of the Treaty. Why should Bœotia alone renounce the right of forming a union of its districts within its natural boundaries? If the Peace of Antalcidas was to be carried out in the sense of the Spartan policy, a dissolution of all the states of Greece might be demanded. Lacedæmon itself consisted of a group of villages, which had by sheer force been united into a single whole, and the peace just negotiated nowhere recognized as legally existing a relation involving the obligation of furnishing military contingents. Thebes accordingly firmly insisted upon her good right, and was resolved to defend it against all the cavils of foreign powers.\*

Thus the declaration of directly opposite standpoints, which had been long in preparation, had at last been openly made; nor was anything to be gained in this matter by negotiations. Agesilaus accordingly propounded to his adversary the decisive question, whether he would consent on the basis of the renewed Peace of Antalcidas to acknowledge the autonomy of the Bœotian towns. "Only," replied Epaminondas, "in case you Spartans yourselves recognize your own provincial towns as free communities." The proud assurance of the Theban heightened the fury of the king; in utter wrath he sprang from the seat which he occupied as president of the congress, and signified his final declaration by cancelling the name of the Thebans in the document of the treaty. Hereby war had been declared against Thebes; and the end of the peace congress was the outbreak of a conflict which was to determine the entire system of relations between the states of Greece.

It hardly admits of doubt, that the turn taken by affairs was foreseen and brought

Declaration  
of war  
against  
Thebes.

The objects  
of the war.

\* Epaminondas in Sparta: Plut. *Ages.* 28; Paus. ix. 13; Nep. *Epam.* 6. Xenophon's (*Hellen.* vi. 3, 3 f.) account is decidedly unfavorable to Epaminondas. Hertberg, p. 347; Herbst, *Neue Jahrbüch. f. Philol.* lxxvii. 701; W. Vischer in the *N. Societ. Museum*, 1864, 23.

about by the leading statesmen. Agesilaus had borne with humiliation after humiliation, so as in the end to throw the whole blame of the frustration of the hopes of peace upon Thebes, utterly to isolate her, and thus at last to be able to execute the expedition of vengeance, so long delayed, under the most favorable circumstances. After the negotiations at Athens (p. 390) it might be considered certain, that Thebes would assert herself as the capital of Bœotia; Callistratus and Agesilaus were from the outset agreed upon not permitting this; and since Athens as well as Sparta insisted upon regarding the Theban claims as contradictory to the fundamental provisions of the treaty of peace, the remaining states never thought of protesting against the proceedings of Agesilaus and their indisputably arbitrary character.

The rapid transition from peace to war likewise shows how everything had been prepared and calculated with a view to the event which had actually taken place. For if there had been any serious intention of executing the conditions of the peace, a beginning would have had to be made with a complete disarmament, the withdrawal of all the garrisons, and the dissolution of all the military bodies, in order then, if it were desired, to arm for a new war, and to obtain for it the consent of the confederates. And such were actually the views of the party of the Moderates at Sparta; and when Cleombrotus, who was still in Phocis with a Spartan army, with the view of protecting this country against the attack of Thebes (p. 392) inquired of the Ephors, what line of conduct he was to pursue, Prothous indeed came forward at Sparta and demanded, that the provisions of the peace recently sworn to should be observed, and the army dismissed at once; but he remained entirely without support, and was derided, as if he had been a fool, for his sentimental policy; and it was unanimously determined to make full use of the advantage in hand, to reinforce Cleombrotus as largely

as possible, and to order him to invade Bœotia without delay, so as to force Thebes, which had defiantly dared to question the supremacy of Sparta in her own land, to give way. The whole of Greece expected, that the power of Thebes would be inevitably broken in the briefest period of time, and that the vengeance of Sparta would be accomplished. For this time, instead of disputed points admitting of settlement, nothing less was at issue than the existence of the city which desired to force itself into a place among the great powers, and to overthrow the existing order of things in Hellas. The war therefore had for its object nothing short of the destruction of the city; deprived of its walls, dissolved into hamlets, sentenced to the payment of tithes to the gods, it was to serve as a terrible example of the consequences of an arrogant revolt against Sparta. Meanwhile the Thebans for their part had likewise done their utmost to prepare themselves for the critical hour. They were now to prove that the proud words spoken at Sparta were backed by a people possessed of courage and vigor sufficient to make these words a living reality; the leaders of the movement had constantly pointed to the fact that young Bœotia had yet to undergo a severe baptism of blood, and they were themselves firmly resolved rather to fall in the struggle, than to go into exile for a second time. Epaminondas stood at the height of his influence, which he had slowly, but surely, acquired. He had always regarded the development of the military forces of the state as the most important branch of his activity as a statesman; he had incessantly urged the blending of the several contingents into a Bœotian popular army, and had at the same time reflected on means whereby victory might be wrested even from superior numbers.

The tactics  
of Epami-  
nondaæ

The art of war as pursued by the Spartans, in spite of isolated reforms (p. 331), continued to be based on the ancient tactics for fighting



in line; they still retained their phalanx, the order of battle drawn up at equal depth, in which they advanced against the foe. In their eyes a battle was still a kind of duel, both armies seeking a spacious ground on which to measure their strength against one another. By means of firm cohesion in the ranks, and of the presence everywhere of equal valor, they thought that victory might be made a certainty in any given battle. Nothing could accordingly be more advantageous for the adversaries of Sparta, than a successful introduction of such innovations as might find the Spartans unprepared, and render them unable to carry on the fight after the fashion to which they were accustomed.

It was on this that Epaminondas had long reflected; he had attentively followed every progress in the military art: he had convinced himself of the gains obtainable under difficult conditions by grouping the masses, by heightening the mobility of the several divisions of a force, by adopting a skilful order of march, and by taking advantage of the peculiarities of locality. The conduct of troops, emancipated from the ban of ancient tradition, had become an art, and the organization of the military system a subject of serious study. Iphicrates and Chabrias had shown what could be effected against the old school of Lacedæmonian tactics by ingenious innovations. Following such precedents, Epaminondas, whose philosophical mind could not rest satisfied with isolated changes and inventions, now sought to develop a new system of tactics, the introduction of which should determine the course of the war and, implicitly, the mutual relations between the Greek states.

The fundamental principle was a very simple one. The ancient system of tactics was based upon the practice of beginning the fight simultaneously and with equal vigor along the whole line; Epaminondas forsook this, by no longer drawing up his troops in a line of battle of equal

depth, but giving special strength to the right or left end of the line. Thus was formed a column of attack behind the front, designed to direct itself like a wedge against some particular point in the enemy's line, so as to break it by one ponderous onslaught, and to create confusion in his whole order of battle. This system brought with it the advantage of obliging those who employed it to assume the offensive in every open battle; while at the same time it was specially favorable in this respect, that in the attack the particular point in the enemy's line could be chosen at will, and that at this point the enemy's strength was necessarily far inferior to that of the assailant; so that in other words success was in the first instance almost certain. And to these tactics a decisive significance attached with reference to the whole of the enemy's line in the case of a Lacedæmonian army, where everything depended upon the cohesion of the different parts being maintained undisturbed; while a more agile army, and one better practised in the opening and closing of the ranks, would have been well able to evade such shocks, and to escape their dangers.

The Bœotians were naturally adapted for a mode of attack consisting in a rapid advance, and were also habituated to it (pp. 243, 246); and inasmuch as during recent years they had been schooled by constant practice in such manœuvres of thrusting forward an attacking column, and of breaking through the enemy's line, it may truly be said that in his so-called slanting or oblique order of battle Epaminondas had as it were furnished them with a new weapon for the defence of their land against the Lacedæmonians. In order to secure his ends, he of course also availed himself of other means, such as were offered to him by the experiences of the most recent times of war. Above all, he contrived to turn to account the special strength of Bœotia, her cavalry; it served him admirably for occupying the enemy by bold attacks, and for diverting his attention from the decisive

Preparations for the battle.

point, and it was all the more effective, because the enemy's cavalry was in the worst possible condition. The wealthy citizens of Sparta maintained the horses, on which, when the day for marching out arrived, were mounted the most inefficient men. In the same way Epaminondas managed to secure great advantages by means of light-armed soldiery, as well as by combining different species of troops.\*

Thus prepared, he at the head of about 6,000 men awaited the approach of the enemy, <sup>The field of Leuctra.</sup> in the direction from the valley of the Cephissus, where the broad and easy road descended from Phocis: for this time it was no longer the defence of the capital, but that of all Bœotia, which was in question. He therefore took up his position on the southern shore of Lake Copais, near Coronea, which was probably not chosen by him without intention, as being the locality of the Bœotian festivals and festive games. Cleombrotus, however, preferred another route; he turned into the southern part of Phocis, marching by irksome mountain-paths from Ambrysus along the south side of Mount Helicon past Thisbe and Creusis, and thus reached the more open hilly country which extends between the advanced heights of Mounts Cithæron and Helicon. He probably underwent the difficulties of this circuitous route, in order to unite with his army the auxiliary troops sent after him from Peloponnesus, and thus to meet the enemy with his full forces. Spartan troops continued to occupy the passes of Mount Cithæron, and till shortly before the battle joined the king's army, which now probably doubled the Theban in numbers.

Thus the low-lying land between the two mountain-ranges became the field of contest. Cleombrotus pitched his camp by the southern heights forming the extreme portion of Mount Cithæron, to the west of Platææ: the

\* As to the *λοξὴ φάλαγξ*, see Diod. xv. 54.—Spartan horseman: *Hellen.* vi. §. 11.—Combination of light troops (*ἀμικτοὶ καὶ πελαγοναὶ*) with cavalry: *Hellen.* vii. 5, 24 and 25.

Thebans pitched theirs opposite, at the rim of the plain, near the little town of Leuctra, in the territory of Thespiæ, and distant an hour and a half's march from Platææ. Between the two ridges of heights stretches from east to west a plain rather more than a mile (Eng.) in breadth, the soil of which in the winter is marshy, while in the summer it is rent by rifts in the ground.

It was the first time that the Thebans met the Spartans in the open field. They had not yet overcome their ancient fear of the Lacedæmonian phalanx; moreover, the enemy was superior in numbers, and the nature of the locality admitted of a free unfolding of them. No wonder, therefore, that before the battle Epaminondas should have had to undergo arduous struggles; that, like Miltiades at Marathon, he should have in the first instance had to conquer the irresoluteness and timidity of his own colleagues. Fortunately, the fiery Pelopidas stood by his side. Both were agreed in the conviction, that the present was not the time for betraying fear or withdrawing behind entrenchments. Not a foot of Bœotian ground ought to be sacrificed, or the Bœotian towns would rise anew, and the Spartans be encouraged. Thus they succeeded in gaining the majority of the votes of the seven generals. Next, it was necessary to inspire the troops with that moral spirit, upon which, for such a commander as Epaminondas, everything depended. The present was to be a holy struggle for the independence of their native land, and this struggle was to be a voluntary one; he therefore publicly called upon all those who were reluctant at heart, to leave the ranks. The high-mindedness implied in this summons did not fail of its object. Again, he contrived to invalidate the discouraging omens, which were busily bruited about by those who wished to avoid fighting on the present spot; like Themistocles before the battle of Salamis, he made use of the oracles and priestly bodies, inducing them to assert their influence so as to

elevate the minds of the soldiers. A divine saying averred that the Spartans would suffer a defeat at "the tomb of the virgins;" and this saying was interpreted to refer to the resting-place of two daughters of the land who had been ill-used by the Spartans, and who lay buried in the vicinity. Here a sacrifice was offered, and vengeance was vowed to the virgins' shades. Then the tidings arrived from Thebes, that the gates of the temples had suddenly opened, and that the armor of Heracles had vanished from the temple of the Hero of the land. He had, then, personally taken arms, to hasten to the rescue, and to bear his part in the fray, as the *Æacidæ* had done at Salamis.

Thus the main point was already gained. Full of courage, the troops ranged themselves in order of battle according to the dispositions of their commander. On the left wing he formed, unobserved by the enemy, the columns of attack, fifty men deep; their extreme end being composed of the Sacred Band under the command of Pelopidas. It was to reserve itself for the final decision.

The battle  
of Leuctra.  
Ol. cii. 2  
(B. C. 371).  
July 6th.

In the hostile army there was far more disorder and tumult. Here were wanting a directing intelligence and a resolute will. This time again Cleombrotus was indisposed to give battle; he was without confidence either in himself or in his cause. But those who surrounded him urged him on, and demanded that he should lead the army into battle. He must now, they said, refute the suspicion that he was not in earnest about fighting the *Bœotians*; he would be accounted a traitor, if he allowed the enemy's army to escape from the spot. After breakfast the final council of war was held, which lasted till noon. Heated by wine, the Spartans led their troops in front of the camp at the declivity of the heights. They drew up their infantry in a long line, twelve men deep, with the wings advanced on either side; doubtless their plan was, to outflank the much

shorter line of battle of the enemy, and to surround it. Thus they advanced into the plain; and with so much violence and haste, that in their blind ardor they drove back part of the baggage attendants, who (as the Thebæans had already before done) were about to separate from the Theban army, so that these men had against their will to re-occupy their former position. Then the real battle began. Epaminondas sent forward his cavalry, which hurled back the enemy's horse upon the infantry. Hereby the Spartans were hindered from advancing in a level line; and the opportunity had now arrived for Epaminondas to execute his main attack. He ordered his left wing to advance at a quick step straight upon the right wing of the enemy, where Cleombrotus stood. The column wedged itself with the whole impetus of its weight into the enemy. At first the ranks of the Spartans maintained their cohesion; and even now an intention remained of outflanking the Thebans. But no sooner had Pelopidas observed this movement, than he suddenly broke forth with his picked body of men from the rear guard, and by a vehement onset forced Cleombrotus to abandon his design. The king hereupon wished to call back those of his troops which were in advance of the rest. But at the same time Epaminondas, who now saw himself covered on the left, with increased confidence charged the core of the enemy's forces. The front ranks fought man against man; the rear ranks following closely, pushing forward step by step, and rapidly filling up every gap that had arisen in front of them. The battle was at a dead-lock; it seemed as if a stone wall opposed itself to the Thebans. "Give me one step more," exclaimed Epaminondas to his men, "and the victory is ours." And once more the charging column advanced, the Spartan line wavered, gave way, and broke. As into a breach poured in the Thebans, themselves in indissoluble cohesion. On the right of them and on the left of them fell the Spartans, after their ranks had been broken. The king

was wounded to death; and the bloodiest of hand-to-hand fights arose around his body. Sphodrias and a number of the best commanders lay on the ground; all order and discipline were at an end. In full flight the broken masses effected their escape up to the height where the camp had been pitched. After the right wing had abandoned the field, the left was likewise involved in the retreat, so that the army could not be drawn up again in line of battle till it had found shelter behind the fosse of the camp. Even now the Peloponnesians were superior in numbers; their left wing was virtually intact. They might have recovered themselves and renewed the battle, in order at least to hold the field and to bury their dead. But the confederates were not inclined to redeem the defeat of the Spartans at the risk of their own lives; Epaminondas had by his entire method of attack shown clearly enough that it was not against them that he was fighting: and again, it was not till now that the Spartans realized their enormous losses. Of 700 citizens 400 had fallen, besides at least 1,000 Lacedæmonians; and their cavalry was broken and dispersed. Under these circumstances even the most defiant lost courage. The defeat had to be openly confessed, and a herald to be sent into the enemy's camp, to ask for a truce for the burying of the dead. Epaminondas granted it, provided that first the confederates, and then the Spartans, should take up their dead bodies. The former sought, but found at most a few stray corpses; all the dead were citizens and subjects of Sparta. This proved palpably against whom the battle had been directed, and how the Nemesis had overtaken those whose guilt had provoked the entire war. Epaminondas likewise retained the shields of hostile commanders, in order to hang them up at Thebes in remembrance of the victory, while a trophy was erected on the spot itself in honor of the gods of the land, who had averted so heavy a calamity from Bœotia.\*

\* *Leuctra: Hellen.* vi. 4, 2; *Diod.* xv. 51; *Plut. Pelop.* 20.—Date: *Plut. Ages.*

Such was the battle of Leuctra, which was fought in the beginning of July, not quite three weeks after the congress at Sparta. So rapidly followed the answer of Epaminondas to the defiant decision of Agesilaus, and the proof by facts, that his native city was not less justified in regarding the Bœotian land as her territory, than was Sparta in thus regarding the Lacedæmonian. It was the most important of all the battles ever fought between Greeks. On this day Thebes became an independent power in Greece, and a return of Spartan despotism was henceforth impossible for all times. For this reason the day of Leuctra could not but be a day of joy, not to Thebes only, but to the whole of Greece. For had Cleombrotus been victorious, the peace recently confirmed by oath would doubtless have been broken, Bœotia would have again been filled with Lacedæmonian garrisons, and thus Athens too would have been menaced at the first opportunity. So long as Sparta had the power of committing acts of injustice, no other policy could ever be expected from her; there was accordingly no other method of obtaining a real peace and a lasting security for the Hellenes, than that of once for all making Sparta incapable of seizing positions by main force beyond her own boundaries. The Thebans therefore thought themselves justified in regarding their struggle not as the rupture of the national peace, which

28, Cam. 19; *Marm. Pav. Hebatomb.* 6, according to Ideler: July 8th; after the octaëteris, July 7th. Cf. Ascherson, *Archæol. Ztg.*, 1836, p. 204.—Orderly retreat into the camp according to Xenophon, *ἡμετέρας τροπῆς* according to Diodorus. Leuctra lay at the southern height over the precipitous declivity of Parapungia: Ulrichs, *Reisen und Untera.* II. 102 f.; Vischer, *Erinnerungen*, 551.—*Λευκτροῖδες*, the daughters of Scedasus: Plut. *Polop.* 19; *de Malig.* Herod. 11; Ulrichs, u. s. 107.—*Τροφῆνια*, Diod. xv. 53.—The Tropæum of the Thebans Ulrichs thought to have discovered in 1839. Vischer, *Erinnerungen*, 552, assented. Keil, *Sylloge Inscr. Bœot.* 90, thinks the ruin more probably a sepulchral monument.—With reference to the statement, p. 416, that the Thebans here for the first time met the Spartans in the open field, it should be remarked that at Coronea they were chiefly opposed by confederates and mercenaries.



it seemed to Agesilaus, but as its confirmation; and in this sense they also immediately sent a herald to Athens, in order to announce there what had taken place, and to establish anew the friendly and neighborly relation, which had so happily proved itself on the occasion of the downfall of the Thirty, as well as on that of the recapture of the Cadmea. But the message failed to meet with the joyous response which had been expected. The annoyance at the brilliant advance made by Thebes outweighed the feeling of satisfaction at the humiliation of Sparta. The Athenians were vexed to think that the Thebans had succeeded in what Athens had never even attempted, viz. in hurling back a Spartan army from the frontier of the land by a battle fought in the open field. They were vexed to have contributed to all this advance on the part of Thebes and to the confirmation of her power, and were little inclined to recognize this state, which they were still wont to regard with a certain contempt, as their natural equal. The policy of Callistratus prevailed at Athens, and the citizens were not ashamed to allow their dissatisfaction to be perceived. Instead of joyous sympathy and congratulations the messenger of the victory found an offensive coldness awaiting him: and even the most ordinary forms and considerations were omitted. The herald of the Theban state was not even invited to share the hospitality of the council, and received no answer whatever to his proposals.

On the field of Leuctra the battle had been followed by a calm which endured for weeks; it seemed as if the Thebans, taken by surprise by their own good fortune, needed time, in order to come to a clear determination as to the ulterior measures to be pursued by them. This pause was not however due to any want of resolution; rather, it was the tranquil and clear spirit of Epaminondas, which was causing his fellow-countrymen to refrain from all premature steps. Far removed from any over

estimation of himself, and fully content with what he had already achieved, he had no intention of pursuing his victory by further expenditure of blood. After the Thebans had secured the glory of having alone and unassisted, like the Athenians of old at Marathon, been found equal to the struggle against the foe of Hellenic freedom, this deed was to be acknowledged as a national deed, redounding to the advantage of all Hellenes; and the results of the victory were to be assured by means of a combination of states sharing the same sentiments. For if at the present conjuncture the states of the northern mainland joined hands, in order to withstand every renewal of Spartan despotism, it was to be expected that Sparta would be forced to give way, and that unnecessary bloodshed would be avoided.

Iason of  
Phæræ at  
Leuctra.

Hence the embassies, which went from the field of battle to Athens and to Thessaly, where Iason of Phæræ had at that time first united the entire country under his rule. Iason had long attentively followed the course of events; and to him every opportunity was welcome, which offered itself for an intervention on his part in Greek affairs. He therefore hailed with lively pleasure the message which Athens had received so coldly; declared himself ready at once to enter into the proposed alliance; and appeared in the briefest time possible with an army on the battle-field, with the intent of there asserting his voice as mediator, before the Spartans had yet taken their departure.

The Spartans were blockaded in their camp; part of their confederates, to whom Epaminondas conceded a free departure, had deserted them. In their anxious position they were very glad to accept the mediation of Iason, and Epaminondas was at one with the latter, as to its being undesirable to attack the fortified camp, and to drive the enemy to the extreme efforts of despair. Magnanimously to permit the con-

Conduct of  
Sparta after  
the battle.

quered foe to withdraw, seemed more humiliating for the authority of Sparta, and more honorable for Thebes, than a renewal of the contest. The troops were too much discouraged, to be willing in their present position to await reinforcements from home; and the commanders had no scruple as to accepting the proffered salvation, however deeply they thereby offended against their native laws of war. Deeply aware of their dishonor, and not without suspicions as to the promises made to them, they took their departure from the camp by night-time, and, instead of following the straight road across Mount Cithæron, retreated by the same side-route, by which Cleombrotus had entered the country, to Megara. Here they came upon the troops which had left home under Archidamus, the son of Agesilaus, in order to relieve the Spartan camp.\*

Sparta had, on the arrival of the terrible news, shown that she had not yet completely forfeited her ancient greatness. It was the last day of the Gymnopædia (vol. i. p. 237), the day on which the city was filled with festive choral dances, and on which the flower of its male youth presented themselves to the gods. At such a moment arrived the messenger from Leuctra. The Ephors would not permit the festival to be interrupted. The women received strict commands to refrain from public lamentations. On the next morning those whose relatives had fallen on the field of battle were seen to appear with joyous countenances, while the others were sad and ashamed, because they had to confess to themselves, that their kinsmen had only avoided death by flight. Hereupon the

\* The herald at Athens: *Hellen.* vi. 4, 19. Retreat of the Lacedæmonians to Egosthena, *ib.* 26. There is a conflict of statements between Diodorus, xv. 54, and Xenophon. The former makes Cleombrotus unite with Archidamus before the battle, and begin the fighting by a breach of the truce (as Wesseling conjectures, following Callisthenes). Cf. Niebuhr, *Lectures on Anc. Hist.* vol. ii. p. 235 [E. Tr.], and Grote, *Hist. of Greece*, vol. x. p. 261.

authorities issued orders for a general levy; all the men of an age fit for bearing arms marched out of the city under the son of king Agesilaus. The king himself lay on a sick-bed, and thus had to witness all the disastrous consequences of his policy, without being able himself to lend a helping hand. The army of Archidamus was not intended for any serious undertaking; and it dispersed, as soon as the remainder of the troops returning home from Bœotia were in safety.

Herein, again, the Spartans under this heavy blow displayed a becoming attitude, that they refused to give way to the ill-will prevailing against Agesilaus; and in spite of the superstitious fancy asserting itself among the people, to the effect that all the disasters of the state were due to the interruption of the legitimate succession to the throne, and to the "lame king" (p. 213), against whom the oracle had uttered a not meaningless warning, continued to repose confidence in Agesilaus, and confided to his hands the decision of a very painful question, which now had necessarily to be discussed. For according to Spartan law the returning citizens were subject to a heavy penalty. In order to save their lives, they had abandoned the field of battle; they had, therefore, according to the strict letter of the law, placed themselves among the *τρέσαντες*, the deserters, who had forfeited their civic rights, and who for the rest of their lives had to bear upon them the marks of polluted honor. The rigorous execution of this fundamental law was however at the present moment virtually impossible; it would have amounted to a kind of suicide, committed by the state upon itself; moreover, such a proceeding would have been accompanied by the most dangerous movements. The king, well conscious of his own guilt, could not but be peculiarly unwilling to vote for unconditional severity; but, in order not to set a dangerous example by the abolition of ancient laws of the state, he declared that the laws

should on this occasion be allowed to slumber. Herewith this question was settled.\*

But the worst difficulties were not those of the present moment, but those which only gradually made themselves manifest, the more that the situation of affairs was realized. For there was in truth no state to which lost battles were so dangerous as they were to Sparta. Her diminished number of citizens could not support such losses; in all probability the total of those who after the battle constituted the kernel of the old civic body amounted to not more than 2,000. The power of Sparta had long been far more considerable in appearance than in reality, and the claims put forward by her were quite out of proportion to her actual resources; her chief power consisted in the traditional authority enjoyed by the state, and in its reputation for military efficiency. If these foundations were shaken, what remained, now that the ancient devotion of the Hellenes had been converted into a just feeling of wrath? To this difficulty were added the discord prevailing within the state, and the loathing with which the subject classes of the population bore the sway of the wealthy and privileged full-citizens. Under these circumstances, Sparta could only be preserved by means of a thorough-going political reform. It was time to enlarge the narrow sphere of the oligarchy, and to form a new civic body; to admit into the state with equal rights the impoverished families of citizens and the free subjects, and to give voluntarily what had already been sought by means of a revolt (p. 216). Had this been done, Sparta might have recovered herself for a new advance. But to such ideas the narrow-minded and short-sighted aristocracy of Sparta could not rise. Sparta did nothing, beyond allowing the "laws to slumber," in order

\* As to the remorse of the Lacedæmonians, *ὅτι τὸν ἀπρίνοθα ἐμβαλόντες εἴλοντο χαλόν*, and the proceeding with reference to the *τρίσκαυρα*, see Plut. *Agæ.* 30.

to preserve to herself the remnant of citizens capable of bearing arms; and by her conduct she openly avowed her inability to avenge the defeat of Leuctra, and her equal inability to prevent the further calamities which were approaching. While Sparta in irresolute inaction lost the most precious time, an unwearying activity prevailed in the camp of her adversaries, and pursued its ends with the clearest consciousness.\*

Proceedings  
of the Thebans  
after the battle.

After the departure of the vanquished army, Thespisæ and Orchomenus were overcome without offering any resistance. Epaminondas prevented any outbreak of ill-will against those Bœotians who had up to the last moment adhered to the enemy of the land; in his view, everything depended upon preserving the glory of the victory free from stain. His second care was to secure its gains, and to obtain for his native city the position to which she had established a claim by her struggle and by her victory. This was accomplished in the same way in which Sparta and Athens had acquired their supreme positions, *i. e.* by treaties of confederation with the neighboring states with regard to a common military system.

The envoys of Thebes went to Phocis, Locris, Ætolia, and Acarnania. Everywhere they found the Laconian party discouraged, and the opposite party powerful; for this reason they found willing listeners, when they pointed to the common task of preventing by means of firm cohesion any intervention of the Peloponnesians in the affairs of Central Greece; and nowhere were the victors of Leuctra denied the right of being the directors and leaders of the new league-in-arms. It was likewise joined by Eubœa, which regarded itself as a portion of the mainland of Central Greece, by the CEtæan tribes, the Malians, and even by the citizens of Heraclea, Sparta's daughter-city

\* Number of citizens at Sparta: Clinton-Krüger, p. 415. "Corruerunt opes Laced.": Cic. *de Off.* l. 24; Isocr. v. 47.

(vol. iii. p. 143)—so universal was the hatred of Sparta, so opportune and necessary seemed a vigorous union among the states of the mainland, for the purpose of once for all rendering impossible a return of Peloponnesian acts of oppression. The moderation and dignity observed by the Thebans, who under the direction of Epaminondas seemed as it were transmuted, secured them respect and confidence; and thus was formed in the shortest time, without resort to force or party-struggles, a new Amphictyony, a firmly cohering group of states naturally belonging together, with Delphi as their centre.

It cannot be doubted, that with Delphi, too, relations of greater intimacy were established, <sup>Thebes</sup> and Delphi. such as were in accordance with tradition. It could not but agree with the interests of the state now newly holding the primacy, to revive the repute of the ancient centre of the Greek world, and to take advantage for its own purposes of the power of Delphi. Accordingly, Thebes out of the spoils of her victory founded a treasury of her own at Delphi, and proved her newly-gained influence among the Amphictyonic states, by renewing the functions of the Federal Council as the supreme court of appeal in affairs common to all Hellas, and by indicting Sparta before this tribunal as a violator of the national peace. And the crime of Phœbidas was all the more amenable to the tribunal of Sacred Law, inasmuch as it had been committed during a festive season. Sparta was sentenced by the Amphictyons to a fine of 500 talents; which fine was after a short lapse of time doubled. Of course Epaminondas might foresee, that even the repetition of the sentence would not avail against its remaining disregarded, because Sparta would never recognize the obsolete rights of the Federal Diet. But he attached importance to the connexion with Delphi, because it gave prominence to the national significance of the struggle into which Thebes had entered, and involved a public recognition of the fact,

that Sparta's crime remained unexpiated. The authority of the Delphic Institution had been obscured, but not abolished. A moral effect was therefore produced by the exclusion of Sparta from the Pythian games, while Thebes strengthened her newly-acquired authority by connecting herself with a sacred institution of the highest antiquity, and by having on her side the majority of the Amphictyonic votes, and being able to execute her further undertakings against Sparta, so to speak, under the sanction of Delphi.

Yet even now Epaminondas would not allow himself to be carried away to hasty proceedings; on the contrary, he once more gave proof of his conciliatory sentiments and of his aversion to domestic war. Proposals for a settlement were made to the Spartans; the Achæan towns, which had abstained from coming into contact with the political troubles of the times, and which on account of their neutral position seemed naturally fitted to give judgment as arbiters, were to decide the question in dispute. But this attempt at a settlement likewise came to naught; the reason doubtless being a refusal on the part of Sparta, who showed vigor and resolution in nothing except in the obstinacy of her pride.\*

After Epaminondas had exhausted all peaceable means towards the establishment of a new legal order of things in Hellas, he passed from the defence of Bœotia to an attack upon Sparta in the position which she held in Peloponnesus.

\* With regard to the citizens of Heraclea, it should be noted that this city, captured by Sparta in the year 399 (p. 358), was again lost in the Corinthian War (p. 350; Diod. xiv. 82). The Heracleotes of the present period were therefore Trachinians.—Thebes and Delphi: Diod. xvi. 23f.; Justin. viii. 1; Grote, *Hist. of Gr.* vol. x. p. 276; commencement of a new importance of Delphi—an importance fatal to Greece. Dedicatory gifts at Delphi: Paus. x. 11, 4. Achæia: Pol. ii. 39; Str. 384. Grote has doubts on the subject.



## CHAPTER II.

### THE OFFENSIVE WARS OF THEBES.

THE Spartans had no suspicion of the plans Thebes and  
Messenia. with which their great adversary was occupied. For while they thought him solely intent upon his own native city, he had the whole of Greece in view. In his eyes the war was a struggle for liberty which he had undertaken not in the separate interests of Bœotia, but as a Hellenic,—a national rising against the oppression exercised by Sparta. After, therefore, the crime perpetrated against Thebes had been expiated and her independence secured, reparation was likewise to be made for the wrongs wreaked by Sparta upon other Hellenes and in earlier times,—just as in the great War of Liberation first the territories at home had been defended, and then the coasts opposite freed. Was not the fairest of all the countries of Peloponnesus, Messenia, the earliest victim of Spartan greed of dominion, still lying desolate, despoiled of its cities, in spite of its excellent harbors devoid of commerce and traffic, with its soil tilled by slaves, while the rightful owners of the soil dwelt in foreign lands, or fled homeless from one exile into the other!

As Epaminondas possessed an accurate acquaintance with Magna Græcia, for which he was indebted to his Pythagorean friends, he had heard of the many Greeks of Messenian descent, who dwelt on the further side of the sea. The best of this tribe had of old migrated across in three expeditions; and from the descendants of the heroes

of Eira and Ithome had sprung on the shores of the Sicilian Sea a flourishing race, which constituted the core of the civic communities of Rhegium and Messana (vol. i. p. 242). For this reason, too, after the fall of Athens the Naupactians had from the Corinthian Gulf likewise crossed to Rhegium; and the majority of them had gone still further, to the Great Syrtis, where on the western rim of the territory of Cyrene lay the city of Hesperides (vol. i. p. 488), the daughter-city of the Cyrenæans, which at that period was hard-pressed by the neighboring tribes of the desert, and demanded a fresh accession of Hellenic men. The Naupactians obeyed the summons; and the same man who had commanded them during the fighting at Sphacteria (vol. iii. p. 164), Comon, conducted them across to the Libyan coast.

Notwithstanding their wide dispersion by land and sea, the Messenians had preserved their love for their home, their hatred against Sparta, their ancient rites of worship, and their native dialect; it was therefore at once a grandly conceived and a politic idea on the part of Epaminondas, not only to turn the resources of the Messenian people to account against Sparta at isolated points, or to excite risings in desolate Messenia itself, as the Athenians had formerly done (vol. ii. p. 442: vol. iii. p. 153), but also to re-unite the scattered bands, in order thus to restore to the mother-country an abundance of generous popular blood, which it had forfeited through the fault of the Spartans, and to establish by Mount Taygetus a state, the restoration of which must necessarily drive back Sparta into the position held by her before the commencement of her policy of conquest. For this purpose envoys went forth from Thebes, to summon the Messenians in Italy, in Sicily, and in Africa, to return home.

Such was the course of action adopted by the victor of Leuctra. How utterly therefore were those deceived, who regarded his self-restraint after the battle as weak-

ness! He it was, who commanded his times, as the one man who pursued great aims and directed the destinies of the Hellenes. By his calm vigor he had made his deeply humbled native city the state holding the primacy in Central Greece; and, responding to his summons, the Messenians gathered from the remotest corners of the Hellenic world, to demand their country back from Sparta, and thereby to transform the entire Peloponnesus.\*

But before this transformation had yet been accomplished, other movements, which had not originated at Thebes, broke out in the penin-

Troubles  
in Pelopon-  
nesus.

sula. For however much its inhabitants had become accustomed to the old order of things, so that they could hardly conceive of the Peloponnesus without Spartan headship, yet even here the principle, again and again solemnly re-proclaimed, of the independence of all Greek communities, had met with a response; nor could the Peloponnesians fail to be filled with vexation, when they had to hear it constantly repeated to them, that for them this principle had no significance, and that with them everything must remain as it was. After, therefore, already the Peace of Antalcidas had produced manifold agitation (p. 318), the bold rising of Thebes aroused the utmost sympathy. What indeed could have more deeply impressed the vassal-states of Sparta, than to see the revolt of Thebes remain unpunished for years, and the chastisement of that city ultimately abandoned? This amounted to a defeat of Sparta, which by a long time preceded the loss of the battle. Accordingly, at this period again attempts occurred at open rebellion against Sparta and the Spartan party, whence arose sanguinary conflicts which shook the system of the Peloponnesian states, before influences from abroad had yet asserted themselves.

\* The special interest taken by the Thebans in Messenia already manifests itself in the circumstance, that before the battle of Leuctra the shield of Aristomenes was brought out, and a trophy decorated with it under the eyes of the enemies; Paus. iv. 32, 4.—Comon: Paus. iv. 23.

**Phigalea.** One instance was that of Phigalea, the ancient mountain-city on the southern border of Arcadia. It had of old been implicated in the Messenian wars; had after the fall of Eira been conquered by Sparta like a hostile city (vol. i. p. 244); nor was it until after an arduous struggle that its citizens had recovered possession of it. An ancient feeling of bitterness, and a strong Anti-Spartan party, had therefore maintained themselves here. This party now took arms, and expelled the ruling families, which adhered to Sparta. The exiles established themselves at Heræa; and starting thence suddenly fell upon their native city, when it was celebrating a festival of Dionysus. They instituted a terrible massacre among their fellow-citizens, from pure lust of vengeance. For they had become aware that they were incapable of maintaining themselves in power; and accordingly, after satisfying their vengeance, retreated to Sparta.

**Corinth and Phlius.** Similar scenes were enacted at various places, but mostly with the opposite results. For in the majority of towns the party of movement was weaker; its adherents having been driven out in recent years, and the power of their opponents having been confirmed. For this reason in Corinth, and also in Phlius, the endeavors of the democrats to recover possession of their native cities were frustrated,—in both places after much bloodshed.

**Scytalism at Argos.** The head-quarters of the Peloponnesian democracy were at Argos. This city was their place of retreat, and the starting-point of their undertakings. But Argos itself was the scene of the most vehement civic quarrels; for although here no party supporting itself by Spartan influence had yet come into power, incessant irritation prevailed between the popular leaders and the members of the government, who were principally chosen from the higher classes.

OL. cil. 3 (B. C. 370) circ.

Ultimately, the men in power, sick of the intolerable annoyances inflicted upon them, formed a scheme for ridding themselves of their adversaries. The scheme was discovered; and thirty of the most considerable citizens had to pay the penalty of their lives. But this was only the beginning. For the affair had produced the most terrible excitement throughout the civic body, and of this the popular orators availed themselves, in order to demand that the city should be thoroughly purged of all anti-popular elements. The multitude, set free from all restraint, armed itself with cudgels, and fell upon all those who seemed from any cause to deserve to be suspected. Twelve hundred citizens became the victims of brutal violence; and when the popular leaders, themselves terrified at the excess of the horrors due to their own instigation, wished to stay them, they were themselves seized and put to death, so that tranquillity was not restored until the multitude had fully exhausted itself with bloodshed. This was the rebellion at Argos known under the name of the *Scytalism* (cudgelling): an event hitherto unparalleled in Greek history,—so unprecedented, that even abroad it was looked upon as an awful sign of the times, and that the Athenians instituted a purification of their city, being of opinion, that the whole Hellenic people was polluted by these horrors.

This event was about contemporaneous with the battle of Leuctra; the sanguinary con-<sup>Natural</sup>licts in the other cities are stated to have occurred in the years preceding it, and are possibly connected with the negotiations of the year 374 (p. 394); just as already the first conclusion of a peace on the basis of general autonomy was seen to have produced similar party-movements (p. 318). Everywhere the ancient systems of communal life and of state-confederations were shaken at the base. In the physical world, too, phenomena occurred at this period, which, like those preceding the Persian wars,

were regarded as threatening signs. Thus the Hellenic world was, in the year of the archonship of Asteus (B. C. 374-3), terrified by a comet of unheard-of size and brightness, the so-called fire-beam; and in the same year took place the most fatal earthquakes, which have at any time visited Peloponnesus, the ancient "dwelling-house of the earth-shaker Posidon." The Achæan town of Bura vanished through a rift of the earth; and Helice was, with the soil on which it stood, swallowed up in the sea, in the depths of which it was thought that the remains of the ancient Ionic city were still discoverable.\*

When, hereupon, the tidings of the battle of Leuctra spread through the cities of the peninsula, the party which had for years been working for the transformation of the state of things in Peloponnesus, naturally gained new confidence. The fear which had crippled its action was at an end. Exhausted Sparta, unable to spare a single man, withdrew her governors from the places, where hitherto a special superintendence had been held necessary. To outward appearance this was done, in order to fulfil the obligations of the last treaty; but no one supposed that Sparta would have taken this step, had Cleombrotus been victorious at Leuctra.

It now seemed to be an easy task to make the promised liberty of the several communities a reality in Peloponnesus also; the ban had been broken, and the movement was set free. It was, however, uncommonly difficult to pass out of the familiar tracks of the ancient state of things

\* Phigalea, Corinth, Phlius: Diod. xv. 40. As to Heræa, E. Curtius, *Peloponnesos*, i. 346; Th. Wise, *Excursion in the Pelop.* i. 73. Diodorus dates these movements after B. C. 374. Grote's reasons to the contrary are not convincing.—Scytalism (according to Diod. xv. 62), Ol. cii. 3; B. C. 370. The Argives were probably accustomed to assemble with cudgels in their hands; the Spartans had at an early period laid aside this custom. Plut. *Lya.* 11.—"Fire-beam": *ὑπὸ τῆς βολῆς*, Diod. xv. 50; *Marm. Par.* § 83; *Corp. Inscr. Gr.* ii. p. 822. That this means the tail of a comet is attested by Aristotle, *op. Senec. Quæst. Nat.* vii. 5. As to Bura and Helice: Curtius, *Peloponnesos*, i. 450.—The Peloponnesus *εὐκνήμιον τοῦ Ποσειδῶνος*, Diod. xv. 42.

into new paths of progress. Such was the force of habit, that even after the battle the levy announced by Sparta met almost everywhere with an obedient response, although the whole war against Thebes had from the first been unpopular. The entire peninsula was in a condition of ferment; but what was absolutely wanting to the movement was a centre as well as a common goal. Sparta had isolated all the states, and none ventured to take the first step.

This position of affairs was not unobserved by the Athenians. Already during the negotiations at the last congress Athens had beyond a doubt had in view the termination of the dependent relation of the Peloponnesian states towards Sparta, but she had not gained her end, and had after all completely recognized Sparta's primacy. It was now intended to redeem this failure. At the present moment the primacy in Peloponnesus seemed virtually vacant; what therefore was alone requisite, was not to allow a third state to fill up the gap. Accordingly, soon after the day of Leuctra a summons was despatched to the Peloponnesian states to send deputies to Athens, where the conditions of the last treaty of peace should be anew confirmed by oath. Hereby Athens took into her hands the right of watching over the peace; and this right received a yet higher significance, by the provision being this time established, that all the concluding parties should be bound to repel by joint exertions any attack upon the independence of individual states which had adhered to the peace. It amounted to starting in a thoroughly new and bold line of policy, when Athens took steps to gather around her the communities of the peninsula, which lacked any other leader. And if, as towards Sparta, it certainly seemed an insidious offence against the loyal sentiments which ought to obtain between confederates, that the Athenians should immediately turn to account in

The Peloponnesian policy of Athens.

B. C. 370.

their own interest the defeat of the Spartans, that the power of the latter should be as it were declared to be extinguished, and that the Athenians should show themselves ready to enter upon the vacant inheritance,—there was only this excuse to be made for such a proceeding: that it was intended thereby to oppose any intervention on the part of Thebes. It soon, however, became manifest, that the Athenians were incapable of taking the direction of Peloponnesian affairs into their hands.

Here the movements soon assumed a very serious and decided character, in particular in Popular movement in Arcadia. Arcadia. For this country had, of all the divisions of the peninsula, been most hindered in its development by the overbearing power of Sparta. Arcadia consisted of a group of town and rural communities, which were from ancient times united by common rites of worship, such as those of Zeus Lycaeus and of Artemis Hymnia. The summit of Mount Lycaeus was the sacred mountain, the Olympus of all the Arcadians. A hardy population of mountaineers inhabited the Arcadian cantons, and the numerous mercenaries, who issued forth from these regions, to gain glory and wealth in Sicily, in Asia, and in Egypt, are a proof of the superabundance of vigor and enterprise existing in this people. It had, therefore, always been one of the chief objects of Spartan policy to employ the resources of this population, and to make them serviceable for Spartan purposes. Since, then, the subjection of Arcadia had been frustrated by the resistance of the Tegeatsæ and their allies (vol. i. p. 246), Sparta was incessantly intent upon hindering the formation of any independent power in Arcadia. She exercised the most absolute control over the peasant-communities, which dwelt in the valleys of the Alphæus and of its tributary streams, and which in consequence of the looseness of their tribal union had no thought of pursuing a policy of their own. Of the towns of Arcadia, Tegea was bound



to Sparta by ancient treaties, and on account of its importance was always treated with special prudence and caution. Over Mantinea, on the other hand, the disciplinary power of Sparta had held judgment with the utmost severity; dispersed into rural communities, the citizens, as men assured one another at Sparta, lived in perfect content (p. 322). No sooner, however, had the Mantineans acquired liberty of action, than they renounced this condition, recalled the expelled popular leaders, and, after they had lived dispersed during fourteen years, rebuilt their city. Rebuilding of Mantinea. Ol. cil. 3 (a. c. 370.) Made wise by the damage inflicted upon them in the siege by Agesipolis (p. 321), they now dammed off the Ophis-stream, and furnished the wall round the city with a stone socle, securing it against damage from water.

The restoration of the city of Mantinea was an open act of revolt against Sparta, and the first armed rising of a decided kind against her on the part of any of her confederates. It was therefore regarded as a matter common to all Peloponnesus. The neighboring towns helped in the building of the city, and the Eleans sent money contributions in order to hasten the construction, before it was hindered by the Spartans. But the latter were so utterly discouraged, that they never thought of seriously endeavoring to prevent it. They were merely anxious to avert the open insult to their honor and authority. Accordingly, Agesilaus, who had friendly connexions at Mantinea, had to seek by means of personal efforts to effect at least a postponement of the building of the walls. Let the Mantineans, merely for form's sake, ask for the consent of Sparta; he pledged himself that this consent should be given; indeed the Spartans would themselves assist in the work. His mission was in itself of a very disagreeable character; but still more humiliating was the fact, that the authorities of New-Mantinea seized the occasion thoroughly to impress upon the king of Sparta the change

which has taken place in the state of affairs. He was coldly refused, because, so the answer ran, no alteration could be made in the decree of the civic body;—and even to this humiliation Sparta was obliged quietly to submit. She was therefore in Peloponnesus, as she had been in Central Greece, first punished at the point where she had most grievously offended; and devastated Mantinea became the starting-point of the general rising of the Arcadian people.

Arcadia was, as a mountain country, created by nature for freedom; it supported a numerous population, which was healthy and moderate in its wants, fond of armed exercises, and enterprising,—a people of peasants, hunters, and shepherds, which deemed itself the real primitive race of the peninsula. At the time of the Persian Wars the entire military strength of Arcadia amounted to about 25,000 men, of whom one-third belonged to the three larger towns, Tegea, Mantinea, and Orchomenus, the rest to the smaller towns and district-unions. For Arcadia was, it will be remembered, a model chart of republics. In its different cantons the constitutional forms of the most various epochs existed side by side, from the most modern city-settlements, such as the democratic New-Mantinea, to the simplest and most primitive of all constitutions, such as obtained in the peasant-cantons of the valley of the Alphæus, among the Parrhasians, Cynurians, &c., who, settled in scattered hamlets, had nothing in common except the sacred places of their race. Sparta had in every possible way favored this minute subdivision, because in it lay the weakness of the country. In this condition Arcadia was incapable of withstanding the Spartan influence; it was the open route for the march of the Lacedæmonian armies; its inhabitants furnished material, always ready for service, for the plans of war devised at Sparta; and the votes of the numerous small communities assured her a majority in all the deliberations of the confederates.

This unworthy servitude had long provoked a deep discontent, which came to an outbreak when the power of Sparta decayed. After the battle of Leuctra the party which desired to emancipate Arcadia openly asserted itself. A national consciousness was awakened. Men felt how shameful it was, that the most ancient people, and at the same time the strongest and the most numerous, of the peninsula, should have remained so bound down and weak, as to be constantly misemployed for the purposes of another state; they felt, that this people was naturally called upon to assume quite another position in the Greek world. Thebes acted as a bright example, pointing the way. In consequence of the victory of the popular party, she had within a few years risen from vassalship to Sparta to the position of a great power. The same idea was now likewise kindled in Arcadia; a desire prevailed to put an end to the contemptible conditions of political life besetting a mere body of separate petty states; a free, united, and strong Arcadia was to be established; and thus arose movements passing far beyond the districts of Mantinea, and extending over the whole of Arcadia.\*

The  
national  
party in  
Arcadia.

The task was infinitely more difficult here than in Bœotia. Arcadia contained no city, such as Thebes, capable of becoming the centre of the country; it was necessary to create a new centre, to found a new capital, and to do this in that part of the country, where as yet no town existed, in the midst of the districts which lay nearest to Sparta and were most thoroughly dependent upon her.

The site of  
the new  
capital.

The democratic party must have been long at work in secret; for immediately after the battle of Leuctra an agreement was arrived at among the several communities

\* Peloponnesian diet at Athens: *Hellen.* vi 5, 1 (*obru*, not *obru*, notwithstanding Grote, vol. x. p. 274).—Arcadia: Curtius, *Peloponnesos*, i. 185. Zeus Lycæus and Artemis Hymnia: Pinder u. Friedl., *Beiträge zur all. Münzkunde*, i. 85 f.—Mantinea: Curtius, *Peloponnesos*, i. 240.

with reference to the most important measures, and we find the most decisive decrees in course of execution. The locality of the new capital had been chosen—in the most fertile plain of Southern Arcadia, on the banks of the river Helisson, a tributary of the Alphæus, at rather more than two miles' distance from the latter. This place was not chosen with a view to strength of situation; for it lies in a trough-shaped fall of the ground, without a height for a citadel, and without natural defences. On the other hand, the fertility of the region around was extremely favorable to the prospect of a considerable city flourishing here, where a combination of country and town-life was possible, such as well accorded with the tastes of the Arcadians, who were accustomed to rural pursuits; but what was of primary importance, was the circumstance that two of the principal tribes of Southern Arcadia here came into contact, viz. the Mænalians and the Parrhasians. The Helisson flows down from the Mænalus-range, and the southern half of the new city was called Oresteia, after a Mænalian hamlet. The opposite bank belonged to the Parrhasians, who occupied Mount Lycæum, the wooded heights of which overtop the valley of the Alphæus in the west; for which reason a branch-institution of the worship of the Lycæan Zeus, the primitive centre of the entire country around, was established in the heart of the new city. Its situation constituted it a meeting-point of the principal high-roads connecting Arcadia, Messenia, and Laconia; it was to become a fixed gathering-place for the village communities of the neighborhood, whose territory had hitherto lain perfectly open to the Spartans. Thus, not only were the Arcadian communities hereby summoned to establish for themselves an independent existence, but the tribes akin to them, whose lands had for centuries been incorporated in Laconia (vol. i. p. 245), the inhabitants of the upper valley of the Eurotas and of the valley of the CEnus, were likewise set in motion, so soon as they

perceived the possibility of joining a new-born and powerful Arcadia, while at the same time the territorial possessions of Sparta herself were endangered.

The swift and happy choice of the locality for the new city, as well as the energetic execution of its foundation, would be hard to understand, had the Arcadians, who were so ill prepared for joint undertakings, and who had among them no city leading them by virtue of a position of primacy, entirely depended upon themselves. Some external influence was indisputably at work, and indeed Epaminondas is expressly named as the founder of the new capital. We may therefore assume that it was from him that the leading ideas were derived; he brought about the formation of a magistrature, which, being chosen out of the several towns and districts of the country, and provided with the necessary powers, caused the joint work to be carried out. This magistrature was composed of ten men, two from Mantinea, from Tegea and Clitor, from the Mænalians and the Parrhasians respectively. Under their superintendence the building of the city proceeded,—and proceeded in a grand style. For it was to be no mere military position for the defence of the frontier, no mere circle of walls for the reception of villagers in times of war; but as a handsome and thoroughly-furnished settlement, as a regularly-built modern city of indisputable magnitude and dignity, it was suddenly to arise, as if by magic, in the midst of a region inhabited by peasants and herdsmen, and to transform the entire country. An oval circle of walls, 50 stadia in circumference, included the streets and public places, which spread on either side of the river. It was called the “Great City” (*μεγάλη πόλις*); and it was zealously sought to prove by the splendid constructions of the theatre, the market-place, the bridge, &c., that the Arcadians lacked neither means nor culture. Rich individuals adorned the city with gorgeous edifices, which were

Foundation  
of Mantinea.

Ol. cii. 3  
(a. c. 370).

named after their munificent builders—*e. g.* the Thersilium, the edifice intended for the assemblies of the General Council of New-Arcadia.

Pammenes, the Theban general (p. 362), was instructed to keep guard over the design and execution of the whole plan. But no dangers of war presented themselves. In the same consciousness of security, which shows itself in the choice of the locality and in the proud appellation given to the city, the building of this standing defiance to Sparta on the frontiers of Laconia was carried on, precisely as if there had no longer been any Sparta in the world; in truth, she was so crippled, that she submitted to every humiliation, and no longer dared to send her soldiers beyond her own frontiers.

As yet, however, Megalopolis remained a city without a state. It was the fruit of a rapid national advance, the symbol of a unity, the realization of which was a still unsolved problem. The establishment of a constitution for Arcadia had indeed been contemplated simultaneously with the building of the city. Megalopolis was to be a centre not merely for those cantons which had hitherto been without a town, but also for the whole of Arcadia; it was to be the seat of the Arcadian central authorities, and of a communal assembly representing the entire country. Such a body were the so-called Ten Thousand for whom the Thersilium had been erected: a committee of all the civic communities of Arcadia, which was to hold its sittings here at fixed periods and to elect the magistrates, who again were to reside in the capital and to have at their disposal a standing army of 5,000 men, the *Eparitai*.\*

\* Epaminondas οἰκιστὴς of Megalopolis: Paus. viii. 37, 2. Site: Curtius, *Peeloponnesos*, I. 281. Thersilium: *ib.* p. 285. Pammenes: Paus. viii. 37, 2. Μύριοι with the *ἔξουσία* περὶ τοῦ πολέμου καὶ εἰρήνης βουλευέσθαι, Diod. xv. 59.—Intention of forming a united state: Vischer on Freeman's *Hist. of Fed. Govt.* in *Neues Schwed. Mus.* 1864, p. 25. Ἐπαρίται ('Ἐπαρόητοι) οἱ παρὰ Ἀρκάσι δημόσιοι φύλακες, Hesych.

It was easy to draw up the scheme of the constitution, but its execution met with insuperable obstacles. For the obstinacy in adhering to local distinctions, which was a peculiar characteristic of the Hellenes, was nowhere stronger than in Arcadia, where every community had a clearly marked separate life of its own. The blending of the several cantons into one common country was first frustrated by those states which now as before adhered to Sparta, and which were therefore from the outset hostile to the entire anti-Spartan and democratic movement. One of these was Orchomenus, an ancient town-canton with a lofty height crowned by a citadel. It lay to the north of Mantinea, and, in addition to the territory of the city proper, had subjected, and governed as bailiwicks, a few hamlets (Methydrium, Thisoa, Teuthis). Here a government by families was rigorously kept up, and in consequence a firm devotion to Sparta prevailed. This feeling was heightened by jealousy of the neighboring Mantinea; and inasmuch as the hamlets dependent upon Orchomenus had been summoned to take part in the creation of the capital as independent communities, Orchomenus itself was naturally very hostile to these innovations. A similar position was that of Heræa, the town holding the primacy over nine districts, scattered along the right bank of the Alphæus, and the banks of the Ladon and the Erymanthus, where the narrow mountain-country opens towards Elis.

Opposition  
to the efforts  
for unity.

Orchomenus.

Heræa.

These two states withstood like strong bulwarks the democratic current of the times; and while in the other towns there indeed remained fragments of the population friendly to Sparta, on account of ancient family-traditions, in these two no democratic party had ever been able to rear its head. Although, therefore, Sparta was incapable of opposing the Arcadian movement as a whole,

yet she could not neglect such allies as these. And in fact provision was made to cover Orchomenus by means of a garrison of 1,000 Lacedæmonians, to which was further added a band of 500 Bœotian and Argive refugees, whom the Orchomenians took into their pay, under the command of Polytropus. And about the same time Heræa was enlarged and fortified; it became for the first time a real town; and this new Heræa was now, in opposition to the democratic capital, to be a basis of military operations and a centre for the conservative party.

The efforts towards unity met with a second obstacle in the resistance of the petty communities in South-Western Arcadia. It was principally in their interest that the new foundation had been made; moreover, the deputies of these communities had declared their readiness to contribute inhabitants to the new city. But when the Parrhasians were actually to descend from their wooded heights, and to settle within the walls, the ancient love of home awoke in full strength; and four communities in particular decisively refused to abandon their habitations. Thus it came to pass, that an undertaking which had had its origin absolutely in the freest national will, and which seemed to be nothing but the fulfilment of desires long cherished by the people, had to be carried through by force. Lycoa and Tricoloni were forced to obey. The Trapezuntians emigrated, in order to escape a similar fate; while Lycosura at the foot of Mount Lycæum, according to mythology the earliest city on which the Greek sun ever shone, was spared the application of forcible measures. Its inhabitants remained, while the other communities of the valleys of the Alphæus and of its tributaries renounced their independence and migrated, entirely or in part, into the capital.

Even harder, however, was the case of those towns which had from ancient times been independent, and which possessed a history of their own. Here party-con-



flicts were inevitable, inasmuch as the national party demanded that the towns should renounce their independence in favor of a united Arcadia, which to the other party seemed equivalent to a treason against hearth and home; they refused to make a sacrifice of themselves. For this reason, in addition to the aristocrats proper, who abominated the reforms on account of their democratic character, many citizens of a more moderate tendency were opposed to the demands of the national party, and the civic bodies were severed into mutually hostile halves. Such was especially the case at Tegea.

The Tegeatæ had for centuries been faithful allies of Sparta. In the families, which directed public affairs in this sense, there prevailed a worthy spirit, such as shows itself in Stasippus, at that time the leader of the conservative party, a man of honor, who is stated to have angrily rejected all demands urging him to rid himself of his adversaries by unlawful means. The leaders of the opposite party were Callibius and Proxenus, the latter one of the commissioners who had conducted the foundation of the new capital. As a state, therefore, Tegea had promoted this foundation, had made a pecuniary grant towards the capital, and had probably also sent thither a part of its population. But the national party desired to go further; and when the government of the city declined to listen to proposals for a renunciation of its independence, resort was had to measures of force. The nationalists take arms; Proxenus falls in a street-fight; and his band of followers is driven to the end of the city in the direction of Mantinea. Here, in the building containing the portal, they make good their footing, and, while Stasippus is delayed by negotiations which have been commenced, and thereby prevented from completely suppressing the revolt, contrive secretly to receive a reinforcement from Mantinea, the chief focus of the Arcadian democracy.

Party-conflict at Tegea.  
Ol. cil. 3 (a. c. 370).

At this point fortune turns. The party of Stasippus have to abandon the city, and retire into a suburban sanctuary of Artemis. But the sanctity of the spot affords no protection to these unfortunate men. They are driven out, disarmed, fettered, and transported on a wagon into the city. Here a tribunal awaits them, formed quite irregularly, as it includes the Mantineans. By this tribunal they are sentenced, and thereupon they are executed. This proceeding was a revolutionary terrorism, which regarded all resistance against the interests of the united state in the light of high treason, and which desired to root out the elements opposed to itself.

Eight hundred escaped to Sparta, where they demanded the protection of their interests. The Ephors thought it necessary to do something, in order in consonance with the sworn treaties to avenge the breach of the peace; and Agesilaus was sent out with an army, which was joined by auxiliaries from Heræa and Lepreum. The Arcadians stood at Asea with their united forces, with the exception of the Mantineans, who had meanwhile marched out against Orchomenus.

Agesilaus advanced into the territory of the Mænali-  
Agesilaus in Arcadia. ans, where he occupied the hamlet of  
Ol. cii. 3 (s. c. 370). Eutæa, which belonged to the district formerly subjected by the Mantineans (p. 319).

The inhabitants, it would seem, had not yet emigrated to Megalopolis; they were treated with great gentleness, and were even aided in the restoration of their walls; they were to recognize, how little Sparta desired to impair their independence. Hereupon Agesilaus passed on to Mantinea, followed by the Arcadians; but neither side was inclined for a battle. The pride of Agesilaus had fallen so low, that he deemed it glorious merely to have shown his face with an army outside the boundaries of Laconia, to have devastated a few fields, and to have offered to give battle. The season had already become

inclement. But the main reason of his retreat lay in the prospect of a Theban army. For in their consciousness of their own weakness and insecurity the Arcadians had looked round for aid from abroad. They had applied to Athens, because after the most recent negotiations (p. 435) they were entitled to expect support in this quarter. Athens had refused them; but Thebes they found as ready as Athens had been unwilling.\*

Thebes had gained a strong position in Central and in Northern Greece. She now needed another theatre of action and another task, in order to prove herself worthy of her new power, to strengthen the warlike spirit which had arisen, and in joint undertakings to confirm the combinations which she had brought about in Bœotia and in the countries surrounding it. She was carrying on the War of Independence on behalf of all the Hellenes (p. 429); she was standing forth as the protector and ally of those tribes of the peninsula which were struggling to secure autonomy. The union of Bœotia as a single state served as a model to the Arcadians; Heræa and Orchomenus had to be overcome by force, like Plataeæ, Thespiæ, and the Bœotian Orchomenus, to the end that the one united state might be called into life. The difference was, that in Arcadia there existed no state with historic claims to the primacy, no federal capital, whose pretensions it sufficed to revive. On the contrary, there was here an entirely new capital, an artificially created central power; and the federalists of Arcadia were according to the whole nature and history of the country incomparably more in the right as against the party of union, than was the case in Bœotia. Epaminondas himself certainly had no intention

Thebes  
called into  
Peloponne-  
sus.

\* Synœcism of Heræa: Str. 337; Curtius, *Peloponnesos*, i. 394.—Polytropus: *Hellen*. vi. 5, 12.—Lycosura: *Peloponnesos*, i. 295.—Conflicts at Tegea: *Hellen*. vi. 5, 6 f. (*ἑσπερα*, the old treaties; though Thirlwall refers the expression to the recent congresses).

of forcing upon the Arcadians any particular form of state-union; but it was his duty to insist, with all the power at his command, upon Arcadia not being hindered in her transformation by Sparta, and to do his best to make Arcadia permanently capable of resisting new attacks on the part of the enemy. Hereby he at the same time offered a proof of the unselfishly national character of the policy of Thebes, which was desirous, not of ruling over weakened states, but of allying itself with newly-strengthened states for the protection of the independence of the Greek tribes. He was therefore very glad to receive the application for aid from the Arcadians, who were joined by Argos and Elis; in order that Thebes, after having already asserted its influence in the affairs of the Messenians and Arcadians, might now also appear arms in hand as the Hellenic Power in the peninsula.

The Peloponnesus was still accounted the securely guarded innermost citadel of Hellas. It seemed to be by nature so carefully barred off by means of the mountains of the Isthmus, that the idea of breaking through these barriers appeared foolhardy. Iphicrates had broken through them, but not one of the combinations effected between Central Greece and individual states of the peninsula had firmly endured. A change now ensued. The fear of Sparta had vanished, and herewith the Isthmian passes had likewise lost their significance. Epaminondas, Pelopidas, and the other generals of the confederation, led the army across the Isthmus before the end of the year 370, and effected a junction with the Arcadians, Argives, and Eleans near Mantinea, where an army of 70,000 men assembled, of whom more than half were heavy-armed troops.

So far as the protection of the Mantineans was concerned, the arrival of the army was useless; for the mere rumor of the approach of the Thebans had sufficed to induce Agesilaus to take his departure. Were the Thebans

now likewise to return at once? This was the prevailing opinion in the council of generals; and it seemed the more reasonable, inasmuch as the official tenure of the Boeotarchs was about to come to an end very speedily, at the time of the winter-solstice, while no powers had been given for further undertakings. But Epaminondas had assuredly from the first had other intentions; he was unwilling to return home without having achieved anything. He was aware that the Arcadian movement had extended to the countries on the borders of the Spartan territory, and that the frontier-places were ill-guarded, as the Spartans expected no attack at this season of the year. The Peloponnesian confederates urged him to take advantage of the present opportunity; and he might hope to put a speedy and glorious end to the whole war against the despotic supremacy of Sparta.

He therefore made himself, together with Pelopidas, responsible for the remainder of the campaign; the other generals withdrew from its direction, and what ensued was in reality a personal achievement of the two friends. They led the troops in four divisions through the mountain-passes of Laconia; effected a junction of these divisions in the valley of the CEnus at Sellasia; marched from the north of the CEnus down to the left bank of the Eurotas, and without having met with any resistance, stood before Sparta, separated by nothing but the bridge over the Eurotas from the market-place of the city, the wide extent of which was guarded by no walls or outworks.

Epami-  
nondas  
on the  
Eurotas.  
(*a. c.* 369.)  
Winter.

When it is remembered, how secure the Spartans had hitherto deemed themselves within their valley environed by lofty mountains, and how since the expedition of the Heraclidæ no hostile army had made its appearance in the valley of the Eurotas, it is easy to understand the unheard-of terror which seized upon the population. The men capable of bearing arms were weak in numbers and

faint in spirit, while the women, who had never beheld the smoke of an enemy's camp-fire, heightened the confusion by their incessant lamentations. The villages of the Perioeci regarded the army of the allies as their liberators, and rose against their masters; it was necessary to summon the Helots to the defence of the city; but even these were not to be relied upon, nor was it certain whether there was more to be feared or to be hoped from their newly-formed bands, which in numbers amounted to as many as 6,000. But worst of all was the discontent among the citizens themselves, among whom there was no lack of traitors who believed that Sparta's last hour had arrived, and that no time should be lost in offering homage to the conqueror. For we know how abundant were the materials of agitation and of revolutionary cravings existing in the city.

To this crisis Agesilaus was found equal. Agesilaus saves Sparta. He, who could not but confess to himself, that it was through his policy that the state had fallen into its present situation, now did what was in his power to atone for all his earlier errors, and to save his native city. His activity exceeds belief. He contrived to gather around him by a safe road the reinforcements arriving from a few states; he preserved order in the city, while it resounded with lamentations; he stayed the furious eagerness for battle on the part of those men who would only have succeeded in delivering Sparta into the hands of the foe, if they had risked an open battle; he distributed the troops on the heights; with admirable presence of mind suppressed the treasonable intrigues in progress, and with a severity hardly justified by the laws carried out summary sentences of death upon the mutineers. The site of Sparta was in his favor. For such was the natural character of the locality, that by means of the river and the morasses along its banks on the one hand, and its various groups of hills on the other, it ad-

mitted of being defended even without artificial fortifications. The first intention of Epaminondas was to advance straight across the bridge over the Eurotas into the heart of the city; but on arriving at the bridge, he saw the troops so skilfully drawn up by the sanctuary of Athene Alea, that he refrained from venturing to force his way across, and cutting himself a passage through the narrow lane which led to the market-place close at hand. He therefore marched lower down the Eurotas, which with its highly-swollen waters acted as the best ally of Sparta, along the base of the Menelaïum, which, like the Janiculus at Rome, overtops the shore opposite to the city. About two miles and a half lower down he with some difficulty effected a crossing; and, establishing himself at Amyclæ, from this position flooded with his horsemen the entire southern vicinity of the city, and made a second attempt to penetrate into it. But during their advance his troops were, in the low-lying land by the Eurotas, fallen upon out of an ambush, and driven back by a simultaneous onset of horsemen. The Thebans were but little prepared for conflicts of this description, while their confederates were still less efficient and trustworthy. Of the Peloponnesians the majority were not intent upon anything beyond deriving profit from pillaging expeditions; and after they had succeeded in this to their hearts' content, in a country well cultivated and free from enemies, they began to seize the first opportunity of returning home, especially as the Laconian winter caused itself to be felt in its full severity.

Epaminondas, having undertaken this campaign at his own risk, was obliged to be most carefully on his guard against any serious disaster. He therefore abandoned further attempts upon Sparta, passed down the valley of the Eurotas, and avenged the many plunderings formerly inflicted upon his native land, by thoroughly devastating the country as far down as the coast of Helos. The un-

fortified towns were fired; Gytheum with its docks and arsenals was besieged for three days, and taken; indeed, a Theban garrison was placed in it, so that it might serve as a basis for the continuance of petty warfare. It was a Decelea on Laconian soil, of double importance, because the population of the surrounding districts hated the Spartans, and had in great numbers joined the allies. This population it was necessary to protect against the vengeance of Sparta. It is said, that Epaminondas was already on the point of quitting Laconia, when Agesilaus caused ten talents to be offered to him through the Spartan Phrixus, as an inducement to him to depart. In any case he acted in accordance with his own resolutions, by taking advantage of his Lacedæmonian campaign, to combine with it the execution of his favorite plan, which he had been maturing for years, viz. the restoration of Messenia.\*

Epaminondas in Messenia.

Ol. cii. 3  
(B. C. 369).

He found Messenia in a condition of declared revolt. The peasants, who had been degraded into Helots, rose against the lords of the soil; and the gulf, after lying desolate for centuries, was filled with numerous vessels, on which the Messenians were hurrying in from Italy, Sicily, and Africa, to recover their native habitations (p. 429). The personal presence of Epaminondas was needed, to stay the confusion inevitable in this sudden restoration of Messenia; above all, the new state required a fixed centre. As to the choice of this there could hardly be any doubt. For, like a horn of Messenia, the range of Ithome rises with its double wooded summit between the two principal plains of the country,—the fastness of Aristodemus, to which attached the most glorious traditions of the past. On the terraces of Ithome the Messenians had of old been most successful in their struggle against Sparta (vol. i. p. 230);

\* Theopompus *op. Plut. Ages.* 32 (μισθὸς τῆς ἀναχωρήσεως). A sarcasm, according to Bauch, *Epam.* 49.



eighty-six years ago the same mountain had once more, though only temporarily, been the refuge of liberty.

At the present time an enduring creation was to be accomplished; the foundation-stone <sup>Foundation of Messene.</sup> was to be laid of a state vigorous with vitality; and it was doubtless one of the happiest days in the life of Epaminondas, when it was permitted to him, in the midst of a population gratefully hailing his restoration of their freedom and of their native land, and recognizing the justice of the gods in the expiation of an ancient wrong, to commence with solemn sacrifices and prayers the building of the city of Messene. It was the first city which had ever borne this name. It spread at the foot of the lofty summit of Ithome in a hollow valley abounding in woods and water, with a declivity towards the south, where there is an open view of the gulf. The construction of the city was carried on with copious resources, and in full accordance with the rules of art. The walls encircling it were built so as to follow the rim of the valley, and to include the crest of Ithome and its ancient temple of Zeus; below, along the course of a spring-fed stream, spread the public squares and edifices. The principal gate of the city was the northern, the well-preserved remains of which to this day attest the solid magnificence of the entire design and the efficiency of the architects; it was the gate leading to Megalopolis. The two cities were newly built with the same purpose under the same influence, as the twin bulwarks of Peloponnesian freedom against Spartan lust of dominion. The Arcadians brought down from their mountains the sacrificial victims for the hecatombs at the Messenian foundation-festival; while the Messenians regarded Arcadia as a second native land of their own. This was an ancient tradition dating from the times of Aristomenes (vol. i. p. 242), which was now in full measure renewed. Argos likewise took part in this foundation, and, next to Epaminondas, the Argive general Epi-

teles was the most active promoter of the building of Messene.

Other new cities of Messenia. But it was not merely within the walls of the capital that Messenia rose again; other places of ancient fame were at this period one after the other restored;—among them Nestorian Pylus, Eira, and the ancient seaport of Methone. Of these foundations no other evidence exists besides the remains of the walls, still surviving in the Messenian land and recognizable as works of this date.

Divine rites of Messenia. Special attention was at the same time devoted to the ancient forms of divine worship. Their suppression had been Sparta's chief crime; their restoration was therefore the first task of those who desired an expiation of the past. The most sacred worship of the country was that of the "Great Goddesses" Demeter and Persephone, which had been celebrated with venerable dedicatory rites in the grove near Andania, the most ancient Messenian capital. They had been extinguished at the close of the Second Messenian War; and it was an arduous task to resume the thread of the obsolete tradition. It is related, that the gods themselves helped to solve this difficulty; for that the Hero Caucon, the founder of these rites, appeared to Epitales in a dream, and revealed to him the spot where Aristomenes had hidden the sacred writings in the earth, when forced to abandon his native land to the foe. A roll of tin was discovered, on which the whole ritual of the dedications was written; and since descendants of the Messenian priestly families had likewise returned to Messenia, these resumed their ancient functions and rights; and after an interval of three hundred years the annual solemnities recommenced in the cypress-grove of Carnasium, and became once more so popular, that they were considered inferior in significance only to the Attic Eleusinia. We have here a re-assembling of the people after a long

dispersion, and a restoration of its religious rites, resembling that which took place in the people of Israel after the Captivity.

Of course the claims of descent could not be closely examined in the case of the new settlers. Moreover of the very kernel of the Messenian people a large proportion remained abroad, where its members held positions of the highest consideration,—so especially in Rhegium and Messana. On the other hand, a multitude of adventurers presented themselves, with the view of acquiring pieces of land, large quantities of which had come to be without owners in consequence of the expulsion of the Spartans. Hereby a really popular renovation of the country and the permanent foundation of a new development for it were from the first considerably hindered. Colonies, too, were introduced from abroad; thus the seaport of Coronea arose, under the direction of Epimelides of Coronea, as a Bœotian colony on the Messenian Gulf. As to the degree of speed with which all these institutions were accomplished, and as to their order of sequence, we have no evidence; but it is worthy of high admiration, that the difficult task should have progressed so rapidly and with such freedom from obstacles. The one explanation of this success, and of the similar success in the case of Megalopolis, lies in the extraordinary skill which distinguished the Greeks in the settlement and organization of the cities; while the chief merit should doubtless be ascribed to Epaminondas, who controlled the whole work as its directing spirit, guided the multitudes, and contrived to secure the most suitable personages, such as Epiteles, for the promotion of the undertaking, and to commend the regeneration of Messenia to the neighboring tribes as a matter of general Peloponnesian interest.

Hereupon Epaminondas began his march back, doubtless also encouraging the building of the city at Megalopolis by his personal presence. He had every reason for

Epaminondas returns home. (a. c. 369.) Spring.

hastening his homeward march. For meanwhile the Spartans had applied for aid at Athens; and the Athenians were to such a degree frightened by the development of the power of Thebes in the Peloponnesus, that they without delay called out their entire military force, in order to preserve Sparta from annihilation, and to place a restraint upon the arrogance of her enemies. No sooner, however, was it known that the city of Sparta itself was safe, than this ardor cooled; and Iphicrates, who was in command of the expedition, made, indeed, a pretence of an intention to bar in the Thebans in Peloponnesus, by occupying the passes, so familiar to him, near Corinth; but the road by the coast, leading along the eastern rim of the Isthmus by the way of Cenchreæ, he left open, or at all events defended it so slackly, that Epaminondas was able to return home safe.

At the close of this campaign Epaminondas is stated to have come into still more direct contact with the Athenians; and it is not improbable that, after he had safely placed the Isthmus in his rear, he availed himself of the opportunity to let the Athenians likewise feel his power, after by this sudden commencement of hostilities they had caused him extreme peril. He had now just cause for regarding Attica as a hostile country, and accordingly unhesitatingly marched through Attic territory, allowing his flying detachments to approach the city itself. The Athenians never dared to issue forth from their walls, in obedience, it is said, to the express orders given for this event by Iphicrates.\*

\* Building of Messene: Paus. iv. 26 f.; Diod. xv. 66; *Peloponnesos*, ii. 138 (Commencement of the building, Ol. cii. 3, a. c. 370-69; continuation, Ol. cii. 4: Paus. vi. 2.) Epitales: Paus. xxvi. 4. Renovation of the dedicatory solemnities by Methapus: Sauppe, "Inscript von Andania," in the *Abhandl. d. Götting. Ges. d. Wissensch.*, 1860, p. 220. Corone, a Theban colony: *Peloponnesos*, ii. 166.—Epaminondas in Attica: Paus. ix. 14; Thirlwall, vol. v. p. 107. Erroneous criticism in Grote, vol. x. p. 337.

Thus Epaminondas returned home, four months after the legal expiration of his term of office as general. Now at the time of the establishment of the democracy rigorous laws had been passed against every kind of abuse of official authority; nor were envious men wanting who lay in wait for every opportunity of damaging those who were at present the heroes of the day. The cavils proceeded from the party of Meneclides (p. 372), who was the most prominent speaker in the market-place, and who sought to compensate himself as the champion of popular rights for the failure of his ambitious schemes. In the present instance an open breach of the constitution had been committed, and an arbitrary prolongation of the supreme command had taken place, which could easily be represented in the light of a beginning of Tyrannical efforts. It cannot be doubted that preliminary steps were taken towards a judicial procedure; but when in rendering an account of his tenure of office, in which all illegalities necessarily came under discussion, Epaminondas simply stated the gist of what had been done in the four months, this produced so powerful an effect, that all invidious intrigues fell to the ground. For during his short campaign, and without losses, results had been achieved, which transformed the entire system of the relations between the states of Greece, and first fully established Thebes in the position of the foremost power there. The rocky portal of Peloponnesus had been burst asunder; inaccessible Laconia had seen the troops of her enemies pass from one end of her territory to the other, and the impotence of Sparta had been demonstrated at her own hearth; the internal cohesion of her state had been dissolved by means of the defection of the Pericæci; her seaport was in the hands of Thebes; half of her territory had been torn away from the rest and established as New-Messenia; Arcadia, Argos, and Elis were in arms under the guidance of Thebes against Sparta; and, finally,

the newly-built cities served as pledges of a lasting success, since they venerated Thebes as their mother-city, and constituted enduring monuments of her glory, which, together with Mantinea and Argos, formed a belt around Sparta, a line of hostile positions, which for all times prevented freedom of motion on her part, and placed a wall in the way of all future cravings for supremacy which she might entertain. The jealousy of Athens had likewise only been made to serve to increase the glory of the Thebans; for her greatest commander had not ventured openly to meet Epaminondas in the field. In short, the first campaign abroad undertaken by the Thebans was so rich in honors and in achievements, that it was impossible to pass sentence upon the author of this good fortune in war for the violation of legal ordinances; and it is accordingly stated, that no actual judicial proceedings took place.

Continuance  
of agitations  
in Peloponne-  
sus.

Moreover, the condition of affairs was certainly such, that the foreign relations into which Thebes had entered, could not be fully surveyed and directed by any man but Epaminondas. It was he personally, in whom confidence was placed in Arcadia and Messenia; and it was therefore, so to speak, a matter of course, that he could not be dismissed in the midst of his work. Accordingly, the ordinances of the constitution had only in so far been neglected, that he had not appeared at Thebes in person, in order to become a candidate at the beginning of the new official year, in the month of Bucatius, for the renewal of the dignity of general.\*

But notwithstanding all the magnificence of the results of the first campaign, they had merely occasioned a revolution in the existing state of affairs, but by no means es-

\* Accusation against Epaminondas (Nepos, 8; Appian, *Syr.* 41); against Epaminondas and Pelopidas: Plut. *Pelop.* 25. No ψῆφος: Paus. ix. 14. Sievers, 274, maintains, without cause, that Epaminondas and Pelopidas were not chosen Beotarchs for the year 369. Appian compares Epaminondas with Scipio Africanus, *op. Liv.* xxxviii. 51.

tablished a new order of things. Argos and Arcadia continued the war, in order to remove the remaining props of the Spartan supremacy. The Arcadians took Pellene (vol. i. p. 213), and hereby tore away from Sparta the upper valley of the Eurotas; while the Argives attacked Phlius, doubtless with the connivance of the Thebans, to whom it was necessarily of importance to have a secure hold over a few positions on the Corinthian Gulf, so as to be able from it freely to enter the peninsula. This was all the more important, inasmuch as the Athenians now continued to consider it their duty—so strangely had circumstances changed—to guard the passes of the Isthmus towards the north, and at present proceeded with much greater energy. This time it was Chabrias to whom the watch over the frontier was entrusted. He collected at Corinth an army of 10,000 men,—Athenians, Megareans, and Achæans from Pellene who adhered with special fidelity to Sparta. Besides this there was a second army of equal strength, composed of Lacedæmonians and other Peloponnesians, in part fugitive partisans from Arcadia, in part belonging to those states which were thoroughly averse from the new changes, such as Lepreum, and the cities of Argolis: Hermione, Epidaurus, Trœzen, &c. Corinth was likewise now thoroughly on the side of Sparta; for on the one hand she saw her maritime power endangered by Thebes, which sought to secure possession of the Corinthian Gulf; and again, she was by no means willing to allow the passes of her territory to be at all times open for the Thebans to march through. Finally, the Spartans had also entered into communications with Dionysius of Syracuse, for the purpose of obtaining auxiliary troops for the defence of the Isthmus. Thus every exertion was made to secure the control of these passes, and to break the connexion between Thebes and her Peloponnesian confederates. Were this accomplished, it was deemed certain that these confederates would by them-

selves be unable to achieve anything effective or enduring; their policy would come to ruin, like all earlier schemes of a Separate League.

Under these circumstances the Thebans were obliged again to march out in the same year. This time they

found the Onean range with the three ways of access to it, the two passes by the shore at

Second campaign of Epaminondas.

Ol. cii. 4 (a. c. 369).

Summer.

Cenchræ and Lechæum, and the middle way through the gorge of Corinth, carefully guarded by an army, which in addition to the most favorable position had the advantage of a threefold superiority in numbers. Epaminondas had before him what resembled a closed fortress; and he was obliged to try to take the inlets by storm, since the enemy was by no means willing to descend into the open for a battle. He selected the westernmost of the three passes, through which lay the shortest road to his goal. Here were drawn up the Lacedæmonians with the Achæans from Pellene, completely separated, as the nature of the locality implies, from the other divisions of the army. After Epaminondas had throughout the night kept his enemies along his whole line on a constant stretch of expectation, he succeeded on the following morning in driving them back at the first onslaught, and in so utterly discouraging them, that they requested a truce, and permitted him to pass freely through. Hereupon the Thebans effected a junction with their confederates, who had taken up a position at Nemea, and with them advanced before Sicyon, which, being simultaneously attacked by Pammenes from the sea, went over to the allies.

The subsequent undertakings were not so successful. It proved impossible to take Pellene, the Achæan neighbor of the Sicyonians, which had a strong site and was inhabited by brave citizens. An expedition to Epidaurus remained without any real result; an attack upon Corinth even led to an unfortunate encounter; and the situation



of the Thebans was rendered still worse by the contemporaneous arrival of the auxiliaries of Dionysius at Corinth. The consequence was, that Epaminondas returned home.

But the campaign had not been made in vain. For in the first place it had succeeded in diverting attention from the south, and in thus affording full leisure to the Messenians and the Megalopolitans, for continuing the construction of their walls. Secondly, the taking by storm of the Corinthian pass was a brilliant feat of arms, and its reward was the possession of Sicyon. Now, a primitive connexion existed between the Sicyonian territory and the Bœotian shores opposite to it; and to renew this connexion at the present time, was of the highest importance for the military undertakings of Thebes. She was now assured of a convenient landing-place, and had acquired open access through the valley of the Asopus into the interior of the peninsula, which the Lacedæmonian party was now virtually rendered incapable of closing. In spite of this triple result, the campaign was a failure in the eyes of the Thebans, who expected nothing short of extraordinary achievements from Epaminondas (as the Athenians had formerly from Alcibiades), and regarded every failure as a want of will. He was specifically charged with having after the fight at Lechæum treated the Spartans with unwarrantable tenderness, and the result was that he was dismissed from his office of general.\*

Epaminondas dismissed from office.

In the meantime, the war had not remained confined to Peloponnesus; Thebes had simultaneously found another very important field of political activity in the north, particularly in Thessaly.

Thessaly had long been to Hellas a land over the border. With its families of dynasts,

Thebes and Thessaly.

\* Sicyon and Thebes: *Peloponnesos*, ii. 484; *Archæol. Z.*, 1853, p. 69.

who held their court in the cities, and the mass of unfree population which cultivated the soil, it formed a world by itself, which only occasionally came into contact with the Greek states, when a special movement took place, of a nature to agitate the condition of affairs in Thessaly itself, and to excite the attention of the Greeks. These movements proceeded in part from individual chiefs, ambitious for a larger measure of power, in part from the peasants, who rose against the lords of the soil. Of the former description was the conflict, which after the battle of Ctenophyta occasioned an Athenian intervention. At that time Orestes, the son of Echebrates, a powerful dynast at Pharsalus, had applied for aid to the Athenians; and it was a grand moment in the brief continental supremacy of Athens, when her troops in conjunction with the Bœotians and Phocians appeared before Pharsalus, in order to assert her position of arbitress and to extend her influence as far as Mount Olympus. Of a democratic tendency were the movements in Thessaly during the Peloponnesian War; and of these again advantage was taken by Athens for the purpose of acquiring influence (vol. iii. p. 576). But these relations were as devoid of results as the earlier enterprise. Nor was it in the interest of the Athenians, unconditionally to promote the democracy in Thessaly, since they had from ancient times been connected with the dynasts by treaties for the supply of mercenaries. The dynastic families themselves were also at discord with one another, and we find individual members of them at the head of the popular party, which rose against the power of the nobility (vol. iii. p. 180),—*e. g.* Polymedes and Aristonus, who at the beginning of the Peloponnesian War came to the aid of the Athenians. Both these men belonged to the party which was adverse to the existing government. These conditions of division and party-conflict continued during the entire period of the Peloponnesian War; and we see individual party-chiefs, who suc-

cumbed at home, seeking for aid abroad, and thus drawing foreign states into the sphere of the domestic affairs of Thessaly. Thus Hellenocrates, the Larissæan, applies to the Macedonian king Archelaus, and again Aristippus to Cyrus, who sends him money, to enable him to hire troops and maintain himself at Larisa.

By this time the ancient relations with Athens had of course come to an end. On the other hand Sparta resumed her endeavors to acquire power in Thessaly with fresh ardor after the overthrow of Athens. The Spartans recovered possession of the city of Heraclea, originally founded by them as a position against the Athenians on the southern border of Thessaly (vol. iii. p. 143), placed a garrison in Pharsalus, and established for themselves a supremacy over the tribes of Southern Thessaly. These proceedings again are doubtless connected with internal troubles.\*

For about the close of the Peloponnesian War new movements had broken out in Thes-  
Lycophron  
of Pheræ.  
 saly, which led to far more important results than those which had preceded them. Their starting-point was Pheræ, the ancient city in the south-western part of the great inland plain of Thessaly, four miles distant from the sea, where it possessed the seaport of Pagasæ, of ancient fame. Here arose a prince, who conceived the idea of making his city the centre of all Thessaly, Lycophron by name. The object of his policy was the overthrow of the families of the old nobility, the Aleuadæ and Scopadæ at Larisa, Pharsalus, and Crannon; his power was based on the population, which had up to that time remained in a condition of dependence; and for this reason his rule was termed a Tyrannis. In September, 404, he gained a

\* Orestes: Thuc. I. 111. Polymedes and Aristonus: *ib.* II. 22; Buttmann, *Mythologus*, II. 235; Meineke, *Monatsberichte*, 1851, p. 587. Hellenocrates: Aristot. *Polit.* 219, 24. Aristippus: Xen. *Anab.* I. 1, 10.—Spartans in Thessaly and Heraclea: Diod. xiv. 38; Polyæn. II. 21 (Ol. xcv. 2, a. c. 399). Pharsalus had a Lacedæmonian garrison in the year 391: Diod. xiv. 82.

great victory over the Larissæans; it was he who subsequently besieged the above-mentioned Aristippus, of the house of the Aleuadæ, in Larisa itself; and doubtless he was supported in his attacks upon the Thessalian towns by Sparta. This explains why the states leagued together against Sparta in the Corinthian War also took the side of the adversaries of the Tyrant, and sent mercenaries to aid Medius, the dynast of Larisa. At that time Pharsalus and Heraclea were successfully taken away again from the Spartans, whose entire influence in Thessaly came to an end with the defeat at Haliartus (p. 244).

But Lycophron contrived to maintain himself even without foreign support; and now succeeded in placing Pharsalus on his side. The mercenaries of Medius were there fallen upon and massacred; all Greece was horrified by the abominations committed on this occasion; for the corpses of the foreign mercenaries were left in heaps on the open field, so that the story ran, how all the ravens from Attica and Peloponnesus assembled at Pharsalus.\*

The schemes of Lycophron were carried out by Iason, his successor in the government,

Iason of  
Phæræ.

\* Nothing is established with certainty concerning the history of Lycophron, beyond his victory over the Larissæans: *Hellen.* ii. 3, 4; eclipse of the sun on September 3d, 404. Probably the commencement of his Tyrannis (a different view is taken by Hamming, *de Iasone*). Aristippus (*μαζόμενος ὑπὸ τῶν ἀπαιτασσομένων*) supported by Cyrus on condition of his not making peace without Cyrus' consent (a proof of the intention of that prince to obtain influence in the affairs of Greece): *Anab.* i. 1, 10. After the departure of the auxiliaries under Meno the power of Lycophron is again extended with the aid of Sparta (Pharsalus probably conquered by both in common), up to the intervention of the Thebans and Argives, who conjointly with the Aleuade Medius expel the Lacedæmonians from Pharsalus (*Diod.* xiv. 82), *Ol.* xvi. 2, a. c. 395. Medius caused the Pharsalians to be sold into slavery (he therefore regarded the citizens as his enemies). New supremacy of the Aleuadæ; on the return of Agesilaus, Thessaly was hostile to him (*Hellen.* iv. 3, 3). Hereupon again ensued an extension of the power of the Tyrant of Phæræ, and the great massacre of the mercenaries of Medius (*Aristot. Hist. Ania.* ix. 31), which is without reason referred by Schneider *ad Xen.* and by Du Mesnil, *de Rebus Phæacis*, and Pahlé, *Zur Geschichte der phæacischen Tyrannis, Neue Jahrb. für Philol.*, 1866, p. 530.

and probably his son-in-law, a man of uncommon mental power, thoroughly adapted by his accurate acquaintance with the times, and by his unwearied energy in obtaining and turning to account new resources, for converting a small into a great state. He was a man in the style of Themistocles, and at the same time, notwithstanding his intellectual superiority and princely birth, charmed all men by his courtesy and freedom from haughty pride in his nobility. He was in a high degree gifted with the cunning, which it was the custom to regard as a Thessalian characteristic, and for which the endless party-intrigues formed a good school. Nor was he over-conscientious in his choice of means; but he knew how to moderate his ambition; he was free from tyrannical whims, a man of chivalrous sentiments, controlling himself, and just to others. Of his duty in life he had a worthy conception, and regarded true intellectual culture as its primary condition. He was familiar with the best circles of Attic society; a friend of Timotheus and Isocrates, and an admiring pupil of Gorgias.

Iason was animated by no ordinary ambition; for he recognized that the condition of the times made a claim upon himself and his people; which claim he desired to satisfy. Hellas needed a state wielding a primary power, if it was not to exhaust its strength in internal conflicts, and to sink into absolute dependence upon Persia. And it seemed as if such a position of prominence properly belonged above all to the northern tribes, whose strength was still unwasted. The Macedonians and Epirotes were too much strangers to the Greeks and at too low a stage of civilization. Thessaly, on the other hand, was in point of fact the home of the noblest branches of the Greek people, the most ancient seat of its common religious and political systems. Abounding in resources of every description, all that was necessary, if the greatest future was to be secured to the Thessalian people, was to regulate its

political system anew, to remove the ancient rule of the nobility, the mainspring of incessant disputes, and to unite the whole strength of the population under a princely house trained in Greek culture. For the states of the second rank, which asserted themselves against Sparta, could not possibly successfully compete with a united Thessaly. Who therefore was to dispute with Iason the leadership of the Hellenes? But in order to incline the individual states to resign a complete independence for the sake of unity, and to overcome their aversion to a monarchical supremacy, it was necessary to be able to offer a prospect of national glory and spoils of victory. This Iason thought to obtain by leading the Hellenes once more against Persia. The union of Thessaly, a single undivided Hellas from Mount Olympus to Crete, and a Persian war under Thessalian leadership,—these, then, were the ends of the bold prince of Pheræ; and from the same shores, whence of old European Greeks had launched their first ships into the sea (vol. i. p. 98), from the ancestral home of the Minyæ, the beginning of a new order of things in Hellas seemed now to proceed.

Iason  
master of  
Thessaly.

Ol. ci. 3  
(a. c. 374).

In Thessaly there existed several kinds of subject tribes. Some were subject to individual city-communities; others paid tribute to the whole body of the ruling cities; and again others only apparently and temporarily recognized those cities as supreme. These various groups of tribes Iason, following in the course already commenced by Lycophon, contrived to attach to himself; the Dolopes and other mountain peoples did homage to him. Hereby he gradually undermined the power of the cities, so that even these, one after another, were forced to join him; nor did he ever neglect to make the conditions of adherence to him as acceptable as possible, since he was not anxious to destroy, but only to unite. In the year 374 he was no longer defied by any city but Pharsalus on the Enipeus. Here he met

with resolute resistance. The most eminent among the leaders of the party of the old nobility, Polydamas, had been chosen chief-justice of the city here; and Pharsalus was the last stronghold of the ancient Thessalian system of government. Polydamas placed his hopes upon Sparta, which state had in the meantime changed its Thessalian policy, and now deemed it its duty to oppose the power of the Pheræan prince. But all action on the part of Sparta was prevented by Thebes. Iason attached the greatest importance to a specific settlement. He wished to hold sway only according to lawful forms, to which the country was accustomed; he therefore sought the dignity of the captain-generalship, the *ραγεία*; and the innovation desired by him simply consisted in this: that this dignity should not be for all eternity a hereditary possession of the Aleuadæ and Scopadæ, but accessible to that house which by the personal eminence of its members and by its general position of power was naturally marked out for the leadership. A term was granted to Polydamas, for awaiting Spartan support. When this failed to make its appearance, he surrendered the citadel; Iason was now recognized as general-in-chief throughout Thessaly; and it amounted to a triumph for his policy, that this had been accomplished without the application of force, and that no devastations or expulsions had been necessary, which would have led to the intervention of foreign states.

Iason proved himself worthy of the confidence bestowed upon him. The ancient institutions of the country were not abolished, but only regulated afresh. Thus in particular the taxation of the free peasants and of the tributary serfs or Penestæ (vol. iii. p. 576). On this head much confusion and arbitrary imposition had occurred, which provoked a just discontent and kept Thessaly in an uninterrupted state of agitation. Iason recurred to the legal provisions, issued by one of the Scopadæ as the head of the confederation. But what was

of primary importance in his eyes, was to regulate and raise the military strength of the land, which had hitherto exhausted itself in foreign mercenary service and internal party-conflicts. Notwithstanding the full measure of liberty which Thessaly left to the individual cities, it was to be a single whole in its military constitution; it was by means of a common army, placed at the disposal of the leader of the land, more and more to coalesce in all its parts, and to learn to understand its own strength. Iason himself kept up a well-disciplined army of mercenaries; to which were added the contingents levied in the Thessalian towns. He was unwearied in developing the organization of his troops, and within a short time was able to assemble under him 20,000 men in full panoply, besides a large number of light-armed soldiers and 8,000 picked horsemen. At the head of such a force, always ready for battle, he could already look upon himself as the master of Greece, which could not, with its civic militias and isolated bands of mercenaries, be equal to a contest with an army like this. Nor was the danger unperceived by the more far-sighted of the Greeks. They beheld with anxious expectation the cloud gathering in the north and slowly drawing nearer, which threatened their liberty.

Iason, however, proceeded with caution. and in Hel-  
las. In the first instance he sought to strengthen himself by combinations with foreign powers, and among these no ally was more important for him than Alcetas of Epirus, in conjunction with whom he was assured of the whole mountain-country in the rear of the Greek states. In order to be also able to take the latter in the flank, and to be master of the most important routes by sea, he needed the island of Eubœa. Here he established in several cities despots who did homage to him,—*e. g.*, the Tyrant Neogenes at Histiaea, on the north coast of the island. It was far more difficult to bring about the right state of relations with Central Greece, where the new im-



portance acquired by Thebes was a very considerable obstacle in the way. He perceived more clearly than any of his contemporaries how this importance rested upon Epaminondas, whose strict sense of right he is said repeatedly to have attempted to shake, so as to involve him in his own schemes of personal ambition. But after failing in this, he could not hesitate about joining Epaminondas as an ally; for it was in perfect accordance with his own interests, that Sparta should be crippled, and the Peloponnesian confederacy broken up. He therefore united himself with the Thebans, in so confidential a fashion, that he gave to his daughter the name of Thebe, and appeared without delay on the battle-field of Leuctra, in order to congratulate the victorious allies and take counsel with them as to ulterior measures. His advice to them, to abstain from an attack upon the Spartan camp, was, although right in itself, yet hardly given without secondary motives of a selfish character; for he could not desire a complete rout of Sparta, inasmuch as the continuance of the war between the Hellenic states promoted his personal ends.

The Thebans, in their turn, could not but begin to entertain doubts as to the honest intentions of their ally. For instead of contenting himself with having on this occasion for the first time showed himself with his splendid army in Central Greece, he employed his homeward march for his selfish purposes in an extremely palpable way. For he passed up from the plain of the Cephissus through the little valley of the Assus, and on his march fell upon the city of Hyampolis, which at this point shut off the access from the north into Phocis and Bœotia; he then possessed himself of Heraclea (vol. iii. p. 143), which fell into his hands by treason, and destroyed its fortifications, while he distributed its country territory among the Ceteans and Malians, and thereby made friends of these tribes. He thus became master of Thermopylæ. In

other words, he only departed in order to return, and he destroyed the gates which might have been shut in his face.\*

After his return home he redoubled his activity. The highland tribes of Northern Thessaly, in particular the Perrhæbians, were incorporated in his military organization, partly by amicable agreement, partly by force; the armaments and manœuvres were continued without interruption: Thessaly had become one vast military camp; while on the sea too, in the ancient roads of the Argonauts, the construction of ships-of-war began. Phæræ was the centre and focus of the entire country; the ancient families of the grandees had been gained over, or made safe by means of hostages, who lived at the court of Phæræ; a single will ruled from Thermopylæ to the pass of Tempe. No doubt existed, but that Iason would soon make his real intentions manifest; and Epaminondas, too, naturally felt himself very unpleasantly hindered in his undertakings.

The feeling of anxious expectation increased, when in the spring of the year 370 the tidings spread, that Iason would make his appearance at Delphi for the approaching festival of the Pythia, in the character of supreme military chief, clothed in the full splendor of his power. Incredible rumors flew about. A contribution towards the sacrificial

Iason at  
Delphi.  
Ol. cii. 3  
(a. c. 370).

\* Iason makes his appearance in Thessalian history in a way hitherto unexplained. That he succeeded to the Tyrannis by hereditary right, is already made probable by the name of his son Lycophron. Now Lycophron and his brothers (Tisiphonus and Pitholaus) were stepsons of Iason, and only ἀποκτήματα of Thebe (Photius, *Bibl.* p. 142). It is therefore very probable that the lady who was Iason's second wife was a daughter (and the only child) of the elder Lycophron, as has been shown by Pahle, *u. s.* He conjectures Iason to be identical with the party-leader Prometheus (vol. iii. p. 543), and to have exerted himself in conjunction with Critias on behalf of Lycophron already in the year 408, when he was about twenty-four years of age. The identity of the two personages was already suspected by Wyttenbach, because the story of the assassin, who involuntarily performs a successful operation (Val. Max. i. 8, *ext.* 6; Plut. *Mor.* 890), is referred to both.—Alcetas: *Hellen.* vi. 1, 7. Neogenes: Diod. xv. 30. Polydamas: *αἰσθητός ἀρχων*: Sievers, 323.—Hyampolis and Heraclea: *Hellen.* vi. 4, 27.

expedition had been imposed upon all the cities of Thessaly according to the standard of their prosperity; and whichever furnished the finest bull as leader of the procession, was to receive the prize of a golden wreath. Thus 1,000 bulls were collected, and more than tenfold the number of other beasts of sacrifice, sheep, goats, and swine. In this monster hecatomb the wealth of the country was to present itself to the god, while a selection of the troops attested the vigor of Thessaly, regenerate for a new life. Iason's design was to make an exhibition at Delphi of his regal power. But he intended something beyond this.

Delphi was the link by which Thessaly had remained connected with Hellas through the course of all the centuries; and the institutions of the Amphictyonic League furnished the clearest evidence of an age, when the Thessalian tribes had formed a great popular whole with those who had emigrated southwards. In recalling this connexion, Iason therefore, by means of the grand homage paid by him to the Delphic god, not merely intended to attest himself as the new territorial sovereign of Thessaly, and to cause himself to be after a certain fashion recognized as such, (and indeed it was an ancient Thessalian usage for the chief of the country to be designated by the Oracle,) but also to revive the relations with Delphi, which had become an empty form, in a manner suitable to the times. And since of the twelve votes in the Amphictyonic Council seven belonged to the tribes of Thessaly, which were united under his supremacy, he designed to found a claim on this circumstance, for obtaining a position corresponding to his power in the system of the Greek states, to assert his honorary right to the protection of the Oracle and to the direction of the festival, and to lay the foundation for a new union of the tribe and states. Doubtless the sagacious prince had already long since entered into combinations at Delphi itself; and assuredly among the influential personages there many anticipated a new period

of splendor for Delphi, and were not disinclined to support the claims of Iason. They likewise calmed the apprehensions of the population, which not without reason suspected Iason to have also the treasures of Delphi in view, by causing the god to declare, that he might be left to himself to take the care of his treasures.

Assassination of Iason.  
Ol. cil. 3  
(A. C. 370).

The Pythian festival was at hand; the great sacrificial processions had set themselves in motion, and the king was holding his final review of the cavalry, with which he intended to make his entry at Delphi. In all the vigor of his youth he stood on the threshold of the great future, with his self-consciousness strengthened by manifold, almost miraculous, tests and brilliant success, and full of confidence in his good fortune. The review was over. He sat on his throne under the open sky, in order to receive personal petitions. It was then that a group of seven youths approached him, in order to prefer a joint request; but no sooner had they surrounded him, than they fell upon and murdered him. One of the conspirators, who had been impelled to the deed by the infliction of a punishment injurious to their honor, was during the execution of the murder slain by the body-guard; a second was overtaken in his flight. The rest effected their escape on the horses which had been held in readiness, and were at divers places honored as men who had rendered a service to the liberty of the Hellenes,—a clear sign of the view which had been taken of the most recent proceedings of Iason.

The successors of Iason.

With him the whole future of Thessaly was carried to the grave. The sons whom he left behind him were under age. The supreme military command was therefore conferred upon his brothers, Polydorus and Polyphron. The latter ruled for a year, after making away with his brother, and was then himself murdered by Alexander, a kinsman of the house, who pretended to be the avenger of Polyphron, but who,

instead of according to his promise overthrowing the Tyrannis, possessed himself of it. It is only when we contemplate the state of things which ensued after Iason's death, that we fully realize his greatness. For although Alexander married the daughter of Iason, and prepared to carry on the work of his predecessor, yet the contrary of all that Iason had sought to bring about actually came to pass: instead of a lawful government, savage despotism; instead of union of the land, division and discord; instead of a power reaching beyond the boundaries of Thessaly, weakness, intervention from abroad, and dependence upon foreign powers.\*

The acts of government ascribed to Alexander are mere outbreaks of passionate fury against individual adversaries, against entire communities, and above all against the ancient enemies of his house, the members of the Thessalian aristocracy. Already Polyphron had caused the Pharsalian Polydamas, whom Iason had wisely spared, to be assassinated. Alexander once more provoked agitation among the Aleudæ, who had already learnt to submit to the new order of things, by his prosecution of them, so that they applied for aid to Macedonia. The result was that Amyntas, the son of Alexander, invaded Thessaly, where, as he found no army ready to ward him off, he occupied the cities of Larisa and Crannon. But his auxiliary expedition was manifestly nothing but an attempt at extending his own power; he began to establish himself in the valley of the Penæus as in a Macedonian province, and the Thessalians, disappointed in their hopes, now asked succor from Thebes.

The amicable relations between Thebes and Pheræ had been already disturbed in the last year of Iason's life by

\* Iason and Delphi: *Corp. Inscr. Gr.*, i. p. 811. His schemes against Persia: *Isocr.* v. 119. Assassination *Ἰσίδωρος Πυθίας*, *Diod.* xv. 57; *Hellen.* vi. 4. 22. — Alexander and Thebe: *Plut. Pelop.* 28 (he afterwards wooed the widow of his father-in-law; who was therefore the second wife of the latter, and probably a Theban lady: *Hellen.* vi. 4. 37).

Theban intervention in  
Thessaly.  
Missions of  
Pelopidas.

B. C. 369-8.

the unmistakable designs of his ambition. The Thebans were of course still less inclined to make common cause with his successors. Taught experience by recent events, they necessarily gave a keener attention to Thessalian affairs; it behoved them to allow neither a Tyrannis of overbearing power to be erected, nor on the other hand a firm footing to be established there by Macedonia. Their line of policy was accordingly clearly marked out for them; it was to protect the Thessalian cities against all oppression, whether from within or from without, and to be the champions of the autonomy of the communities here as they were in Peloponnesus, so as thereby to secure their influence in the country. Their successes against Sparta had heightened their courage, so that they unhesitatingly entered upon a new theatre of war; and about the period when Epaminondas was for the second time marching through Peloponnesus, Pelopidas led a Theban army into Thessaly.

His proceedings there led to the most favorable results. He liberated Larisa, and regulated the affairs of Thessaly on the principles of free communal constitutions; and then passed on into Macedonia, where he settled the disputes as to the throne, which had broken out between Alexander and the pretender Ptolemæus. The proud Aleuadæ placed themselves under the protection of Thebes; the king of Macedonia gave his brother as a hostage into the hands of Pelopidas; and the Tyrant of Pheræ consented to a treaty, in which he had to recognize the independence of the liberated cities, and doubtless to promise a military contingent to the Thebans.

The untrustworthy character of Alexander soon necessitated a second mission. Meanwhile the authority of Thebes in Thessaly seemed to have been so firmly established, and Pelopidas personally had so much confidence in himself and in his good cause, that he undertook to go

to Thessaly without an army and accompanied only by Ismenias, in order to call the Tyrant to account;—a proceeding which quite recalls the security and self-confidence with which the officers of Sparta had formerly appeared in the Greek states (vol. i. p. 312). He hereupon collected a body of mercenaries, with whom he passed into Macedonia, where King Alexander had been slain by Ptolemæus. Having been deserted by his mercenaries, he fell into great danger here; but Ptolemæus attached too high an importance to a good understanding with Thebes, and concluded a fair treaty with Pelopidas. He met with worse fortune on his way back. He marched with a newly-hired body of mercenaries against Pharsalus, with the intent of chastising the troops which had betrayed him; and here unexpectedly met with a strong army of the Tyrant of Pheræ, who took advantage of Pelopidas' want of caution, to make prisoners of him and his companion.

Pelopidas  
and Ismenias  
taken prison-  
ers.

This act of violence suddenly changed the situation of affairs. It was the signal for a new war. Thebes eagerly armed, while Alexander of Pheræ had to look out for other allies. He accordingly applied to Athens, because there he might presume most jealousy to prevail against Thebes; nor was he deceived in his expectation. The Athenians joyously accepted his money and his homage, immediately concluded an alliance with him, and despatched thirty ships and 1,000 foot-soldiers in his support. But the chief advantage now reaped by the Tyrant lay in the fact, that the Thebans had at that time voluntarily deprived themselves of their best general. Epaminondas had been dismissed from office (p. 461); he was serving as a private soldier under Cleomenes. The army was not inconsiderable; it numbered 7,000 well-armed warriors and 700 horsemen; but the true leadership was wanting. Cleomenes and Hypatus had made a rapid advance, but were forced by lack of supplies to retreat, without being

able to give battle to the enemies swarming around them. But it was during the retreat itself that their troubles first began. The enemy was enabled by his superior strength in horsemen and light-armed troops to inflict extreme damage upon the Thebans; they lost many men, and finally were reduced to so disastrous a condition, that the army unanimously demanded Epaminondas as its leader. No sooner had he assumed its direction, than confidence and order was restored; the terror inspired by his name crippled the attacks of the foe, and the skilfulness of his generalship preserved the army.

and liberated.

The best result of this unfortunate campaign was the revulsion which took place in the sentiments of the Thebans towards Epaminondas, and his re-establishment in the office of general. After filling up the gaps in the army, so far as this was indispensable, he immediately took the field again (B. C. 368 or 367; Ol. ciii. 1), in order to break the arrogance of the Tyrant, before the latter could firmly establish himself in the land. It was a difficult task; for the life of Epaminondas' friend was in danger, if Alexander were driven to desperate measures. Epaminondas contrived to solve the problem; by his resolute proceedings in Thessaly he managed completely to discourage the enemy, so that the latter regarded it as a great piece of good fortune, when a truce of thirty days was granted him on condition of his surrendering his prisoners. But for Pelopidas even the period of his imprisonment had been a season of glory; for in it he had proved his indomitable heroism, and even while his life depended upon the will of the Tyrant, had expressed his loathing of him with courageous freedom.\*

Although in fact no definite ends had been secured by the truce, yet it was necessary for the present to rest satis-

\* Pelopidas in Thessaly: Diod. xi. 67; Plut. *Pelop.* 26 ff.; Polyb. viii. 1.



fied with the results obtained; for in the meantime other and more important transactions had come into the foreground, which for the next few years diverted the attention of the Thebans from Thessaly. Thebes had been victorious in the north and in the south; she was indisputably the most powerful state of the Greek mainland, the only state which pursued a definite policy and counted among its citizens men naturally qualified to lead Greece.

In spite of these successes the result was small. The old system had been destroyed, the overbearing power of Sparta had been annihilated; but instead of a new and fixed order of relations, there was perceptible among the Hellenic tribes nothing but an increase of agitation and confusion.

In the first instance, Sparta, although deeply humbled, was not utterly crippled; she still maintained herself by means of the fidelity of some of her confederates, who either, as *e. g.* Epidaurus, had never wavered, or in opposition to Thebes had now attached themselves to Sparta more closely than ever, as above all Corinth and Phlius; moreover, Sparta was assured of the favorable sentiments of Athens, and had found an important ally in Dionysius of Syracuse.

Again, the states in Peloponnesus, which had taken arms against Sparta, were in relations of anything but concord with one another and with Thebes. Hitherto Thebes had been the leader of the Peloponnesian Separate League. She had given the example and the impulse to the rising; Epaminondas had directed it; to him were in the main due all the results which had been achieved; and his unselfish policy was assuredly suited for meriting a perfect confidence. The Arcadian people, suddenly disturbed in its rural conditions of life, and drawn without preparation into the political movement of the times, was incapable of set-

The confederates of Sparta.

Lycomedes in Arcadia.

Ol. cii. 4 (a. c. 368).

ting into moderation and stability. Passionate orators gained influence over the assemblies which met in the market-place of Megalopolis, and which were entirely devoid of men, who, experienced in public affairs, spoke the language of prudence. The leading orator was Lycomedes of Mantinea. The Arcadians, he said, were the most ancient people of the peninsula, and at the same time the most numerous and the most warlike. Their arm was needed wherever brave men were in requisition, in the east and in the west of the Hellenic world. Without them, the Spartans would never have reached Athens, nor the Thebans Sparta and Gytheum. Why, then, should they always only shed their blood for the glory of foreigners, and be the squires of others? An end ought to be put to this. The Arcadians could shift for themselves. As inhabitants of the central land, of the heart of the peninsula, they were not only the first settlers in it, but also its natural lords and masters, and only by establishing this mastership would they secure the real prize of the struggle, and set the true seal upon their newly-acquired independence.

Hitherto Lycomedes became the hero of the day. He was omnipotent; he filled up according to his choice the posts in the administration and in the army; he introduced a demagogic dictatorship, and excited among the Arcadians a transport of ardor for war. He bade them now prove, that they stood in no need of the Thebans for the execution of the glorious deeds. They hastened to the aid of the Argives, who had in the course of an attack upon Epidaurus come to be hard pressed by the Athenians and Corinthians; and they hereupon carried on the contest against Sparta on their own account. After they had taken Pallana in the upper valley of the Eurotas, they further endeavored to penetrate into the interior from the coast. They surprised Asine, the ancient seaport near Gytheum, overcame the garrison and slew its commander,

the Spartiate Geranor. Of this style of warfare the Arcadians were masters; as hardy highlanders well practised in the military craft, indefatigable pedestrians, and acquainted with all the roads, they were pre-eminently capable of terrifying their enemies by unexpected on-laughta. The success of their expeditions raised their courage to a pitch of blind self-confidence, and wherever their bands arrived, they recklessly gave themselves up to a blind greed for booty. After this fashion they could not indeed make any friends among the Peloponnesians; of whom the Eleans had the least cause for satisfaction with them. For in rising against Sparta the Eleans had chiefly had in view the recovery of those parts of their territory which had been taken from them by the Spartans (p. 208). But the Arcadians had no intention of assisting them to this end; they appealed to the circumstance, that the inhabitants of Triphylia declared themselves to be their fellow-tribesmen; and they were by no means inclined to let slip this opportunity of extending the territory of Arcadia to the sea-coast. Thus a bitter hostility arose between the two neighboring states; and since at the same time the Thebans were extremely wroth at the conduct of the Arcadians, and justly complained of their ingratitude, a complete separation had come to pass between those states, whose common interests should have most caused them to rely upon one another.

In order to heighten the confusion in Greek affairs, an intervention was added from abroad.

At that time the satrapy of Phrygia was held by the Persian Ariobarzanes, a friend of Antalcidas. He from the first favored the Lacedæmonians, and was the less inclined to allow the annihilation of their state, because he was himself secretly ambitious to extend his power and make himself independent. He was therefore

Quarrels  
between the  
Arcadians  
and Eleans.

Attempts  
of Philiscus  
to make  
peace.

Ol. cii. 4  
(a. c. 368).

interested in preserving those states from which he might at the critical moment look for support. He accordingly took advantage of the position of the Great King, as recognized in the Peace of Antalcidas, in order in his name to summon a congress, which was to serve for the establishment of the national peace, but in reality to prevent the encroachments of Arcadia and the further humiliation of Sparta. For this purpose Ariobarzanes had at command a skilful agent, who had already long enjoyed his confidence, a Greek of Abydus, Philiscus by name, who had made his fortune as a captain of mercenaries. This man appeared at Delphi with Persian powers, and, which was of more importance, with Persian money. Negotiations took place between the Lacedæmonians, the Athenians and the Thebans. The chief subject of discussion was Messenia.

It was endeavored to induce Thebes to give way on this head; but it was of course out of the question that she should consent to destroy her own work, and to sacrifice Messenia with its newly completed city to the Spartans. Her refusal brought all negotiations to a standstill; and Philiscus assembled an army of mercenaries, in order to proceed to active measures in favor of Sparta. Although he was himself recalled to Asia, he made over 2,000 mercenaries, paid by him in advance, to the Spartans, who thus after all alone profited from the confused condition of affairs. For the division which had occurred in the camp of their adversaries gave them fresh encouragement, which was increased by their agreements with the Athenians, who prepared to furnish occupation to Thebes in the north, and by new succor from Sicily, consisting of Celtic bands in the pay of Dionysius.

The  
"Tearless  
Victory"  
of Sparta.  
(B. C. 368.)

For the Spartans it was now above all necessary to secure their own frontiers. The insolent incursions of the Arcadians had provoked an inexpressible wrath; and yet the youthful

son of Agesilaus, the fiery Archidamus, was precisely the man to stimulate and take advantage of the hot eagerness of a war possessing the Lacedæmonians. Accompanied by the Celtic auxiliaries, he passed up through the valley of the Œnus, took Caryæ, and chastised the mountaineers for their defection; and then penetrated into Southern Arcadia. The Celts were soon on their way back to Sparta, because, as their leader Cissides declared, their period of service had expired. But on their march back they were surrounded by the Messenians, so that they had in haste to apply for Spartan succor. Archidamus approached, but simultaneously the Arcadians and Argives also drew near, in such a fashion as to block the enemy's way back into Laconia. It had been an act of folly, to prevent the departure of the Celts; but it was still more insane to oblige the hostile forces, at a moment when they were about to disperse, to common action and to a desperate self-defence. The most terrible punishment befell this arrogant self-confidence. The Spartans, fighting for their lives, under the lead of the son of their king, encouraged by his example and by favorable omens, charged their enemies with such vehemence, as to break them up in an instant. Nor could there be any question of an orderly retreat; so that thousands were put to death by the horsemen and the Celts, while of the Lacedæmonians not a single man is stated to have fallen. This was the so-called "tearless victory"—a victory which after so many disasters first revived confidence at Sparta.\*

Agesilaus, accompanied by the authorities of the city, came forth to welcome his son with congratulations; but the defeat of the Arcadians gave almost as much pleasure at Thebes and Elis as it had given at Sparta. It was re-

\* Lyscomedes: Diod. xv. 59; 62 (here rightly *Μαυρωτίς*); treated with great disfavor by Xenophon, *Hellen.* vii. 1, 23.—Artochares and Philliscus: Diod. xv. 90; *Hellen.* vii. 1, 27.—Plut. *Ages.* 33: *ἀδακρυε μέγχι* (Diod. xv. 72; *Hellen.* vii. 1, 22); at Midea or Malea *Peloponnesos*, i. 336.

cognized that arrogance had met with its just punishment, and it was hoped that the lesson given would have its effect. The Eleans hoped that concessions would be made to them with regard to Triphylia, and the Thebans, that the Arcadians would now perceive how they required prudent guidance, and without Thebes could do nothing.

Epaminondas was doubtless among all the Thebans most devoid of malicious satisfaction in the calamities of others; he sorrowed to find confusion and quarrels incessantly renewing themselves among the Greek states; and he was anxious for nothing but to see a fixed order of things at last established. He had gained his main objects, the union of Bœotia, the restriction of Sparta to her ancient territory, the regeneration of Messenia, the establishment of the independence of Arcadia; and he was solely intent upon having these results of his activity recognized as unalterable facts, and a system of international rights permanently founded upon them. He was ready to welcome any means leading to this result, so long as they were not opposed to his moral principles. It is therefore no matter of astonishment, that Thebes should have to this end applied to Persia; nor is there any reason to assume, that this was done against the wish of Epaminondas.

Embassy  
to Susa.  
Ol. ciii. 1  
(A. C. 368).

For Thebes had from the first not stood in the same attitude of enmity against Persia as had been assumed by the other states; it was therefore no renunciation of her earlier history, such as was the case with Athens, for her to enter into negotiations with the Great King. Moreover, she sought no ally at Susa, as Sparta and Athens had done, nor was any man justified in accusing her of treason against the national cause.

The treaties had conceded a certain authority with regard to Greece to the Persians; from them had proceeded the Peace, which constituted the basis of the existing system of states. The principles of the Peace of Antalcidas,

which had only served the Spartans as means whereby to satisfy their ambition, had been first made a reality by Epaminondas. It would therefore be a great advantage, if by the recognition of these facts on the part of Persia the Spartans were deprived of their supposed legal basis of action. To regulate the state of relations between Greece and Persia, was after all the cardinal point of Greek foreign policy and the special duty of the great power directing it; and for Thebes to be able to negotiate as a great power at the court of Susa was therefore a great gain in the eyes of the Greeks themselves, as would be the recognition at that court of her claims to hold a position of primacy.

To bring about a direct understanding, was moreover doubly important, because after the negotiations with Philiscus at Delphi (p. 480), whether he had actually received his powers from the Great King himself, or only from Ariobarzanes, Thebes might appear to have been the self-willed disturber of the peace. It behooved her to controvert this view, and to endeavor to assert her actual rights at Susa. Finally, the fact had to be taken into account, that Sparta had already once more entered into fresh combinations with Persia, and that Athens entertained similar intentions. Sparta had after the death of Antalcidas deputed an envoy of the name of Euthycles. It therefore seemed necessary to counteract his endeavors, lest the old Treaty of Peace should perchance be renewed, and Sparta be provided with resources for resuming her old policy. To this circumstance accordingly the Thebans chiefly pointed, when they called upon their confederates to arrange a joint embassy to Susa. The Arcadians and Eleans responded to the summons; and Pelopidas and Ismenias conducted the embassy in the name of Thebes. The Athenians hastened to depute Leon and Timagoras, to represent their interests in Susa. The envoys seem this time also, as had been done on former

occasions (vol. iii. p. 514), to have travelled unsuspectingly in one another's company.

At the Persian court the envoys of course were highly welcome; for their mission amounted to a new concession on the part of the Hellenes, that they could not manage their affairs without the Great King, and to a new homage voluntarily offered to his power. The bloody war between the states was converted into a diplomatic contest, which was decided by the personal character and action of the envoys.

The Thebans had the advantage from the first. They were preceded by the fame of their deeds; and after the sufferings which the Persians had had to undergo from the arrogance of Agesilaus, they welcomed the news of Leuctra as joyful tidings, and admired the heroes who contrived to restrict to the valley of the Eurotas the very state which had only recently intended to conquer Asia. Antalcidas personally experienced the revulsion in the sentiments of the Persian court towards Sparta; his proposals were frigidly rejected; and, meeting with contempt at home as well as at Susa, he is said in the depth of his vexation to have committed suicide.

Neither with Sparta nor with Athens had the Persians been able to establish permanent relations of confidence; the case was different with Thebes. From this city the Persians had never met with ill-treatment; they had been connected with it by relations of mutual hospitality since the days of Xerxes (vol. ii. p. 315); Thebes had at that time been their most faithful ally, and had in consequence of her fidelity been made to undergo extreme hardships. Now, gratefulness was one of the most prominent characteristics of the Persians; and they likewise had a just estimation of true manliness. Thus a decisive significance attached to the chivalrous individuality of Pelopidas, to his generous bearing, and absolute unselfishness; while he was admirably supported in the transaction of business by



the adroitness of Ismenias. In comparison with the other embassies, the Thebans were given full credit for their straightforwardness of speech, clearness of intentions, and open honesty of expression. Pelopidas was unmistakably preferred to all the rest, and his proposals were thoroughly approved by the Great King. In the first instance, therefore, an end was put to the relations between Sparta and Persia, as set on foot by Antalcidas; Sparta ceased to be the state exclusively enjoying the confidence of Persia. Next, the condition of things brought about by Thebes was recognized as lawfully established—in particular, therefore, the independence of Messenia. But Thebes desired yet more than this. At the present moment, when she was endeavoring firmly to establish her position, no state was more in her way than Athens, with whom she had in all sincerity, but without success, endeavored to establish amicable relations. Thebes might feel convinced, that the Athenians would oppose and hinder every step forward taken by her in Peloponnesus as well as in Thessaly and Macedonia; and a feeling of bitterness on her part against Athens was only natural. Now, for Persia too the Attic fleet was invariably an object of more apprehensions than was anything else; and thus the Thebans were gratified by a royal decree, containing the deepest humiliation for Athens, viz. the order that she should dismantle her ships-of-war and draw them on shore, in other words disarm and make herself defenceless. Her claims on Amphipolis too, although they had been recognized at the congress in Sparta, were expressly rejected, that city being placed under the royal protection.

The result of the embassy to Susa was equivalent to a fresh victory for Thebes. A transformation of the Peace of Antalcidas in her favor had been brought to pass; a new system of states under Persian superintendence had been

Pelopidas  
and Artaxerxes.

Ol. ciii. 1 (a.  
c. 368-7).

Results of  
the embassy.

Ol. ciii. 1 (a.  
c. 368-7).

established in compliance with her proposals; Thebes, intimately allied with Persia, had obtained a recognition of her primacy, and was entrusted with the execution of the treaties. But how insecure were these results; how little reliance could be placed upon the Great King on the one hand, and on the other upon the assent of the Greek states to the agreement concluded at Susa!

The latter became evident first. For when hereupon a congress of states was summoned to Thebes, where a new confederacy was to be formed on the basis of the treaty, nothing was effected. Not one of the envoys declared that he was furnished with powers to take the oath; while of all the states represented the Arcadians showed the sternest front, whose envoy at Susa had found himself treated with less consideration than the Elean, and had given the most vivid description of the miserable condition of the Persian empire to his countrymen. Lycomedes therefore protested at Thebes against any intervention of Persian authority, entirely disputed the right of the Thebans to hold the diets in their city, and finally in the name of Arcadia formally seceded from the congress.

Hereupon the Thebans attempted another way of procedure. They sent envoys to the several states individually, and propounded the treaty for their acceptance. But this attempt likewise failed. The Corinthians, giving reasons similar to those advanced by the Arcadians, definitely refused acceptance; and the envoys returned home with the royal letter, without having achieved anything. The entire endeavor to assert a claim, sanctioned by the express authority of the Great King, to the hegemony, and to establish a new system of states by Persian mediation, proved fruitless. Thebes met with a stronger resistance than she had expected; and this resistance was all the more unpleasant, because it gave itself the aspect of honorable and national motives, although in reality it was only caused by an obstinate determination on the part of

individual states, to pursue each the policy of its own particular choice. In any case Thebes could not but perceive, that force of arms alone could bring about a fixed system of relations.\*

Thebes, therefore, once more armed; and Epaminondas, whose successful operations in Thessaly had restored to him the full confidence of his fellow-citizens, for the third time led an army into Peloponnesus. Corinth and Arcadia maintaining a hostile attitude, it was now indispensable to establish a firm footing at other points; and for this purpose no region was more important than Achaia, because it was of the highest importance for Thebes to have the control of the Corinthian Gulf. In the coast-towns of Achaia aristocratic constitutions prevailed, such as had been set up there during the period of Spartan supremacy. Epaminondas proceeded here with the highest wisdom; he pledged himself to the families which directed the public affairs of the several communities, that no violent changes should take place; so that, being far distant from Sparta, they without difficulty joined the Thebans, while at the same time they renounced the cities on the opposite shore dependent upon them, viz. Naupactus and Calydon. This was a genuine gain for the power of the Thebans in the Corinthian Gulf; and likewise for their power by land, because they now no longer needed the passes of the Isthmus, in order to reach Peloponnesus.

Third  
Theban ex-  
pedition into  
Pelopon-  
nesus.

Ol. ciii. 2  
(a. c. 367).

Thebes  
and Achaia.

(a. c. 367.)

Summer.

\* The embassy to Artaxerxes (*Hellen.* vii. 1, 33; *Plut. Pelop.* 30; *Artax.* 22) is placed by Grote, on insufficient grounds, before the detention in prison of Pelopidas. Schäfer, *Demosth.* i. 82; Sievers, 285, 367. Antalcidas' suicide by refusal of food: *Plut. Artax.* 22.—Persian guarantee for the autonomy of Amphipolis demanded: *Demosth.* xix. 137; *Rehdants, Iph.* 181. The provisions hostile to Amphipolis are certainly not creditable to the Thebans; but it should be taken into account that Amphipolis had itself driven the Thebans to this policy, because it so coldly declined any connexion with Thebes, and thereby made impossible the establishment of a fixed order in Greek affairs by means of Greek states.

These measures, notwithstanding, produced much discontent in Thebes itself, and still more among the confederates. That the governing families should have been tenderly treated, was declared to be treason against the principle of popular liberty acknowledged by all the states in arms against Sparta; inasmuch as the bond between them, their union and common strength, was democracy. Cities governed by aristocrats never ceased to remain secret allies of Sparta; and whoever anywhere maintained and supported the aristocrats, could not but be in secret connivance with the Spartans. So little was the policy of Epaminondas understood, who certainly had a loftier end in view than a democratic propaganda, and who desired not to excite party-passions, but to appease them.

The Arcadians made complaints at Thebes, where they found willing listeners. The same party-spirit was dominant here, and it was thought necessary to treat the Arcadians with consideration, although no rational man could fail to perceive, that in spite of all concessions no reliance was to be placed upon that people. The Thebans therefore simply put an end to the treaties which had been concluded, sent governors into the cities of Achaia, and expelled the noble families. Thus fraternal unity had been re-established among the allies; but at the same time the signal had been given for a new civil war, which seized upon the north of the peninsula and made itself as much felt among the Arcadians as anywhere. For the expelled families maintained themselves in Arcadia as armed bands, which, having been betrayed by Thebes, returned to the side of Sparta, and in expeditions of plunder laid a heavy hand upon the Arcadian borders, so as to avenge the injustice inflicted upon them.\*

The example once set exercised its effects in  
 Euphron  
 of Sicyon. yet other quarters. At Sicyon the internal

\* Interferences of Sparta in the affairs of the Achæans: THUC. v. 82; *Peloponnesos*, I. 417.

affairs of the city had been likewise left intact, and it had been thought sufficient to number this important community among the members of the confederacy. Among the noble Sicyonians a citizen of the name of Euphron now came forward, an ambitious man, upon whom special confidence had formerly been reposed at Sparta. This personage, in consequence of the proceedings in Achaia, entered into negotiations with the allies, and declared himself ready to overthrow the ruling families in Sicyon also, to establish a popular government there, and by these means for the first time to attach his native city in a really trustworthy manner to their cause. The Arcadians and Argives eagerly assented to his proposals, and Euphron brought about a revolution, in consequence of which he became personally the commander of the troops and, with the aid of mercenaries, master of the city. The entire political system of the community was radically changed; the ancient families were driven into exile; their possessions were confiscated; legal proceedings were instituted against all the members of the wealthier classes as pretended friends of Sparta; property belonging to the temples was seized; and a multitude of new citizens were admitted into the civic body. An absolute rule of force had been called into life; and the new Tyrant carried on his proceedings with such violence, as in the end to oblige the allies themselves to interfere against him. Euphron had to take flight. While effecting his escape, he immediately changed his line of policy; before embarking, he surrendered the port to the Spartans; hastened to Athens, and returned thence with a band of mercenaries. But he was unable to maintain himself at Sicyon, and repaired to Thebes, in order here to intrigue for new combinations. Certain party-adversaries who had followed him to Thebes, murdered him in the Cadmea. The assassin justified his deed as Tyrannicide, and was acquitted; but at Sicyon itself there remained so large a number of adherents of

this Euphron, that a tomb and sanctuary were erected to him as a Hero in the market-place. Thus we recognize in the case of Euphron the model type of the most reckless personal ambition, and at the same time the utter insecurity which characterized current opinion on men and on questions of public law.

Thebes  
gains possession of  
Oropus.

Ol. ciii. 2  
(a. c. 367).

The affairs of Peloponnesus were yet further complicated by a fresh intervention on the part of Athens. About this time the Athenians lost Oropus, the city at the mouth of the Asopus, the possession of which had been in dispute from ancient times, and which was a position they could, on account of the traffic with Eubœa, hardly afford to spare. They had lost it in the Decelean War (vol. iii. p. 483), but had again recovered possession of it after the Peace of Antalcidas; but since it had been the intention of the statesmen of Thebes to restore and unite Bœotia in its full extent, the important coast-district on the Eubœan Sea could not but form a principal object of their attention. It behooved them to endeavor to drive out the Athenians; and for this purpose a welcome opportunity was offered by the party-movements among the ever untrustworthy and unsettled population of Oropus in the year after the Persian embassy. The party hostile to the Athenians was expelled by its adversaries; but subsequently returned into the city with the aid of Eubœan Tyrants (p. 468.) The Athenians armed to recover possession of Oropus; but before they had succeeded in this, the Thebans contrived to have the disputed city given up to them; and no sooner had they once become masters of it, than they showed themselves fully determined to remain such.\*

\* As to the chronology of events connected with Euphron, Xenophon is to be followed, as against Diod. xv. 17. Xenophon decisively dates the beginning of the Tyrannis after the third expedition of Epaminondas (Thirlwall, vol. v. p. 129).—Oropus: *Hellen.* vii. 4, 1; Diod. xv. 76. Polyzelus was then still archon, Ol. ciii. 2, according to the new *Schol. ad Æsch.*, § 84 Cf. Schäfer, *Neue Jahrb. für Philol.*, 1866, p. 26.

This occurrence produced extreme bitterness of feeling at Athens, and this not only against Thebes, but equally against the allies of Athens herself, in particular against Sparta, by whom she saw herself forsaken in return for all her services as an ally. And this feeling predominated to such a degree, that the Athenians not only withdrew their auxiliary forces from Peloponnesus, (which they did immediately after the outbreak of the disturbances at Oropus,) but also themselves assumed a hostile attitude against Sparta, and thus indirectly conferred an advantage upon the Thebans.

The Athenians once more conceived the idea of availing themselves of the weakness of Sparta, to play an independent part in Peloponnesus, (p. 435), and to establish a firm footing in the north of the peninsula. In this scheme they specially had Corinth in view, since they generally had troops at the Isthmus. But this intention resulted in its direct contrary. For the Corinthians were warned in time; they were utterly sick of the troubles of war; yet now, when they could put no trust in the Athenians, they were to maintain at their own expense the forces necessary for their protection against Thebes. This became intolerable to them. They therefore took occasion from this new danger, with which they were menaced by their own confederates, to make representations as to their situation at Sparta. They declared that, loyal as they were, they must yet take steps to secure a neutral position. If they were to carry on the contest without ceasing, they would exhaust themselves to such a degree, as never again to be able to be of use to the Spartans; reason therefore demanded that they should spare themselves now. The same inclination towards peace prevailed at Phlius, the most faithful of all the cities confederated with Sparta. Phlius had to suffer unspeakably at the hands of the Arcadians and Argives; and was subjected to a permanent state of siege. Sparta, unable

Separate  
peace with  
Corinth and  
Phlius.

to give succor, assented to the cities coming to an understanding with Thebes in accordance with their interests. Corinth, Phlius, and probably also Epidaurus, now established relations with Thebes, recognized the peace offered by her, and undertook to furnish military contingents, on the condition, however, of not being forced to fight against the ancient head of the confederation to which they had belonged. Thus affairs assumed a somewhat more tranquil aspect in the north of the peninsula; while new complications were arising in its interior.\*

The Arcadians, under the leadership of Lycomedes, had no sooner observed this change in the policy of Athens, than they eagerly seized this opportunity for putting an end to the connexion with Thebes, which was intolerable to them. The authorities of the Arcadian confederation at the instigation of Lycomedes offered an alliance to the Athenians, who accepted it, without, however, on that account renouncing their league with the Spartans. They were therefore simultaneously the allies of Sparta and of Arcadia, while the Arcadians again were simultaneously allied with Thebes and with Athens, although the latter was engaged in an open conflict with Thebes. At the same time the old border-war continued without interruption in the mountains between Megalopolis and Laconia, and in this war the Syracusan auxiliaries likewise took part on the Spartan side; and finally, so as to fill up the measure of confusion, a war also broke out between Arcadia and Elis.

Conflict  
between  
Elis and  
Arcadia.

Between these two states a deep feeling of mutual ill-will had long prevailed. The Eleans found themselves deceived in their desire for the recovery of Lepreum (p. 203); and the Arcadians had likewise failed to forgive the Eleans for the malicious joy displayed by them after the "tearless victory" of Archidamus, and for the preference shown

\* Treaty of neutrality with Corinth and Phlius: *Hellen.* vii. 4 6 f.



them at the court of Artaxerxes (p. 486). Far from being willing to surrender the district of Triphylia with Lepreum, which had voluntarily joined them, they rather cast covetous glances upon the other territories of the rich land of their neighbors, and in particular upon the treasures of Olympia. They hoped that their conquest of Elis, which was an open country, would be further facilitated by the circumstance, that a party favorable to them existed there, whose influence was constantly on the increase. But for this very reason the party hostile to the Arcadian democracy, which still held the helm of affairs in Elis, urged that decisive steps should be taken. The Eleans marched out, and took Lasion, a place high up in the mountains near the sources of the Penæus, which had fallen away from the Elean government and had joined Arcadia; but they were beaten back by the Arcadians, whose troops hereupon threatened the Elean capital and established themselves in the high-lying country above Olympia.

The Eleans were in a most perplexing situation. They were without any aid but that of the bands of Achæan volunteers (p. 488), who covered their city; while the democratic party separated itself from the civic community, and, after a futile attempt upon the acropolis of Elis, seized the important city of Pylus in the rear of the capital. In the midst of these troubles there remained nothing for the Eleans but to apply to Sparta, where there was every reason not to refuse the request for succor. The Spartans had already long regretted their loss of influence at Olympia; they had suffered a bitter humiliation there, when in the last Olympiad (ciii., B. C. 368) a Messenian (Damiscus) had for the first time been proclaimed victor, and when the independence of Messenia had thus been solemnly recognized by all Hellas. The utmost exertions were made on either side; for already the time of the new Olympic fes-

Battle at  
Olympia.

Ol. civ. 1  
(B. C. 364).  
July.

tival was at hand; and the Eleans displayed an energy such as had not been expected from a population upon the whole peaceable and of a tendency to effeminacy. For they were aware, that the Arcadians had in view nothing short of overthrowing the rules of the great national festival which had been followed for centuries, and of holding the celebration in common with the Pisatæ, the most ancient possessors of Olympia, under the supremacy of Arcadia. The defence of the most important rights of honor of the state, as well as of the treasures of the god, was therefore in question. For the furtherance of their purpose, the Eleans therefore occasioned an irruption of Archidamus into the mountainous districts of Arcadia, where Cronus was occupied. No sooner were they freed from the presence of foreign troops, than they set out to reconquer the places in their own country seized by the democrats; but when the Arcadian troops returned with greater speed than could have been expected, and availed themselves of a strong position in Olympia to celebrate the festival there under the protection of their arms at the customary season, about the time of the first full-moon after the summer-solstice, the Eleans came up with the Achæans, in order at all events to have the satisfaction of not allowing this revolutionary celebration of the Olympiad to proceed undisturbed. The Arcadians with their auxiliaries from Argos and Athens were drawn up beside the Cladeus, which forms the boundary of the sacred soil towards the west; on the opposite bank stood the Eleans, excluded from the celebration of the festival of their own land. Their indignation at this humiliation kindled a real heroism in them. They crossed the Cladeans, broke the lines of the Arcadians, and drove them before them with irrepressible vehemence as far as the centre of the grove of the temple, where the great sacrificial altar stood. But here they came into a most unfortunate situation. For the halls and temples around were occupied by enemies;

and the Eleans, hard pressed and exposed to missiles from every side, were forced to go back over the Cladeus. The night ensuing, it was employed by the Arcadians to construct entrenchments; so that on the next morning the Eleans could not venture upon a fresh attack, and had to leave the enemy of the land in possession of the sacred soil.

The Arcadians deemed themselves to have compassed a mighty result. They were now the protecting power of Olympia; they had in their possession those rights of honor, to which Sparta had always attached special importance (vol. i. p. 258); and at the same time, since the Pisatæ were not a power at all, they had in their hands the sanctuary itself with all its treasures. In truth, they could have inflicted no keener humiliation upon their enemies, Sparta and Elis. But no blessing rested upon this triumph; and no sooner had the treasures of the temple fallen into their hands, than they became the occasion for a bloody quarrel among the conquerors.

The question of the temple treasures.

The Arcadian commanders had laid hands upon the treasures at once, in order to be able to pay their troops what was owing to them. No public treasure existed; it was therefore necessary to have resort to the gains of the military expeditions. Under these circumstances the commanders saw no reason for treating the spoils of war obtained at Elis differently from any other. The federal authorities sanctioned the proceeding; and it could not but prove an incalculable gain for all those who really desired a single united state, if the temple treasure could be used as a federal fund, and the federal army be thus maintained independently of the contributions of the individual states. In this way, and in this way only, could the central authority attain to a fixed position of power.

But precisely herein lay a reason for opposition on the part of those who were against

Division among the Arcadians.

Ol. civ. 2 [a. c. 362]. such a strengthening of the federal state; and it was certainly possible most vigorously to support this opposition by religious scruples; for to empty the sacred treasury was after all even a worse impiety than to seize dedicatory gifts, when on their way to the god on enemies' vessels (p. 402). At the present moment the Mantineans in particular objected, among whom since the death of Lycomedes the aristocratic party had again grown stronger, which advocated the autonomy of the city. The Mantineans declared against the expenditure of the temple moneys; they sent pay to their contingent out of their civic treasury, and solemnly renounced every participation in this crime. The federal authorities on the other hand called those of Mantinea to account for this act of revolt, pronounced sentence against them, and sent troops to use force against the recalcitrant member of the confederation. But the Mantineans refused admittance to the soldiers; and as the application of rigor proved absolutely ineffectual, a very perceptible change of feeling soon ensued in Arcadia. The impotence of the central authorities manifested itself palpably, and many of the lesser communities now ventured to join the Mantineans. Among a population of so primitive ways of life a feeling of gloomy dread arose in the minds of many; they were unwilling to burden their consciences; they feared, lest the desecration of the sacred temple would be visited upon them and upon their children; and finally the majority of votes in the great federal assembly decided to abstain from touching the moneys of the temple.\*

The first consequence was, that all who were without means quitted the army, while those who were in better circumstances remained. They offered to serve as volun-

\* Cromnus: Athen. 547; *Peloponnesos*, i. 291 f. Silver pieces were coined out of the moneys robbed from the temples, according to O. Müller, *Med. de l'Arcadie*; *Annali dell' Inst.*, 1836. Contra, the author's "*Bem. über archad. Münzen*," in Pinder u. Friedl., *Beiträge zur älteren Münzkunde*, p. 85.

teers, and induced their friends to enrol themselves in the federal militia on similar terms; and thus the whole transaction ended in the kernel of the troops being formed by the sons of the families possessed of lauded property; it was an aristocratic reaction, agreed upon at Mantinea, against those principles of democracy upon which the entire political system of New-Arcadia was built; it amounted at the same time to a thorough crippling of the central authority, which was now wholly dependent upon the good-will of the individual states, and to a decisive victory for the tendency against union.

Lycomedes, whose death had taken place immediately after the conclusion of the alliance with Athens, had no successor capable of keeping the national party together and of uniting Arcadia by means of it. The country once more fell to pieces; and simultaneously the ancient opposition between Mantinea and Tegea again asserted itself, in this way: that Mantinea became the focus of the aristocratic tendency and of the endeavor to maintain the separate governments of the several states, while Tegea, where also lay a Bœotian garrison, became the headquarters of the democracy and of the party advocating a federal state.

This conflict of opinions likewise determined the foreign relations of Arcadia. For the leaders and officials of the people, who in the interest of the federal state had urged the unscrupulous appropriation of the temple moneys, were, after they had remained in a minority, afraid of being actually called to account. They accordingly applied for succor at Thebes, where they pointed out the danger of the whole of Arcadia being about to fall into the hands of the aristocrats, who would beyond a doubt sooner or later carry it over to the other side of the Spartans. But no sooner had this step become known, than it occasioned a counter-demonstration by the opposite party; they carried a joint resolution, which represented the

former embassy as totally unjustified, and declined any intervention from abroad, while at the same time provision was most eagerly made, to avoid all occasion for such intervention.

At the instigation of the Mantineans, a reconciliation was brought about with Elis, including of course a complete renunciation by Arcadia of all rights at Olympia. The Arcadian confederation was outwardly restored; and in order thoroughly to annoy the Thebans, of all places Tegea, where the Bœotian troops were quartered, was chosen for the celebration of a solemn peace-festival. Deputies were present from all the cantons; and it may be presumed, that the newly settled rules of the federation were drawn up in the interest of the aristocratic party.

But while the multitude was unsuspectingly celebrating the festival of fraternization, the adverse party was laying an insidious design. The same men were at work, who were still anxious on behalf of their personal safety, and who had no prospect of gaining the upper hand by themselves. They accordingly addressed themselves to the Theban commander, who was an extremely unwilling spectator at the festival, who contrived to represent it to him in the light of an insult to Thebes, and induced him, perhaps in consequence of disturbances and improprieties intentionally provoked, suddenly towards nightfall to order the gates to be closed, and the chief spokesmen of the Arcadians assembled at Tegea to be arrested. In this way it was hoped to seize all the leaders of the aristocratic faction, and in particular of the Mantineans, and thus to put an end to the entire anti-Theban movement. But the attempted surprise had a very unfortunate ending; for while the Mantineans, whom it had been principally desired to secure, all reached the outside of the walls before the gates were closed, the prison and council-house of the Tegeatæ were filled with mostly insignificant folk. Here-

Peace-  
Congress at  
Tegea.

Ol. civ. 2  
(a. c. 363).

upon the direct reverse of what the surprise was to have accomplished ensued. The national party had been put into the wrong; at its instigation Thebes had broken the peace. Instead, therefore, of having been humiliated and discouraged, Mantinea now first took the lead in full self-consciousness and in assurance of the justice of her cause; sent envoys to all the cantons; marched her civic army before Tegea; demanded the liberation of the prisoners, and pledged himself, that those among them, against whom there existed any cause for complaint, should appear to give an account of themselves before the federal tribunal.

The Theban commander, in the midst of an excited population, was in a position of extreme difficulty. Not venturing to reject the demand, he excused himself by stating the intention, as it seemed to him, to have been, that the country should completely abandon the side of Thebes and go over to that of Sparta. Hereupon the Mantineans sent to Thebes, and demanded the execution of the general for so unwarrantable a violation of the peace. These were the occurrences in Peloponnesus from the Olympic festival in the summer of 364 to the spring of 362. Everything now depended upon the spirit in which the tidings of these events would be received at Thebes.

The Thebans had since their third Peloponnesian expedition been occupied with far different matters both by land and by sea. For, Thebes as a naval power. B. C. 363. if the disarmament of Athens, which had been an object of the last peace with Persia, was to become a reality, Thebes must be made a naval as well as a land power; and although Epaminondas himself, according to his entire tendency, had no inclination towards naval affairs, and dreaded the unsatisfactory results which might attend upon his fellow-countrymen devoting themselves to them, yet, since circumstances made it necessary, an energy was

displayed in this direction also, which calls for the highest admiration. For already in the year 363 the first fleet of Thebes was able to weigh anchor; and it proved able to drive back the Athenians, who wished to detain it in the Eubœan Sea; after which it victoriously sailed through the Archipelago from North to South. This first self-assertion of the young naval power led to decisive results. For the larger maritime cities were very ready to seize this occasion of separating themselves from the Athenians; Rhodes, Chius, and Byzantium joined the Thebans.

With these armaments are closely connected the undertakings in Thessaly, which had been necessarily neglected during the embassy to Persia and the third Peloponnesian expedition. This period had been employed by Alexander, once more to extend his power over the country. The bitterest complaints concerning his acts of violence reached Thebes; and, which was the most serious point of all, the Athenians were at all times ready to support the Tyrant, in order to derive advantage from him. It therefore behooved the Thebans to destroy this combination, to break the power of Alexander, and to make his naval power serviceable to themselves. For this purpose Pelopidas was to invade Thessaly with an army of 7,000 heavy-armed troops. It was in the month of June 364. Everything was in readiness for the march-out. But the occurrence of an eclipse of the sun (on June 30th) excited such terror, that it was no longer possible to carry out the undertaking. But Pelopidas would not allow his military ardor to be restrained. He left the army behind him, and entered upon the expedition with 300 picked horsemen. The hatred prevailing against Alexander was his best ally. No sooner had he crossed the frontier, than the whole population joined his standard. In the character of a liberator he passed from city to city; at Pharsalus, by the heights of Cynoscephalæ, the Tyrant of Phæræ awaited

Death of  
Pelopidas in  
Thessaly.

Ol. civ. 1 (a.  
c. 364).



him at the head of a force doubling his in numbers. Pelopidas made the first onset. He caught sight of Alexander; and hereupon nothing could restrain him from rushing with foolhardy courage upon the body-guard, in the centre of which he intended to slay the hated Tyrant with his own hand. But before he could reach Alexander, who was drawing back before him, he fell to the ground, pierced by the spears of the mercenaries. His men hurried after him, and avenged his fall by gaining a complete victory. The consequence of this was, that Alexander was restricted to the territory of his city, and had to promise regularly to furnish a contingent; but the chief gain of this dearly-bought victory consisted in the disruption of the combination between Phæræ and Athens, and in the fact, that the privateering vessels of the Tyrant henceforth materially contributed to weaken the naval dominion of Athens, and inflicted heavy damage upon her in the Archipelago as well as on her own coasts. These events occurred at the very season when Epaminondas was for the first time making his appearance with a fleet of Bœotian ships-of-war in the Ægean.\*

Such had been the progress made by the Theban power in the north and on the sea, <sup>Application of the Mantineans.</sup> when the envoys from Arcadia arrived, to demand the punishment of the Theban military governor. Epaminondas stood as general-in-chief at the head of the state, and at the height of his authority; his fellow-citizens felt more distinctly than ever, what he had made them; while he was himself resolved to use all his energy in the application of decisive measures to Peloponnesus. He had hoped, with the assistance of the great majority of the Peloponnesian communities, to overthrow the supremacy of Sparta, without having recourse to sanguinary war; but his plans had been frustrated by the interven-

\* Epaminondas' dislike of the sea: Plut. *Philopomen*, 14.—Theban fleet; Diod. xv. 78.—Pelopidas buried on the field of battle: Plut. *Pelop.* 33.

tion of Athens. Mantinea, on which he had always specially reckoned, had become the head-quarters of his adversaries. Nothing now remained for him, but to gather the remnants of the Theban party, and utterly to break the resistance of his opponents.

The Mantineans reprimanded by Epaminondas.

He therefore gave to the envoys an answer so severe and bitter, as had never yet been heard to issue from his lips. The military governor, whose punishment they demanded, had, they were told, only erred in having released his prisoners. The Thebans, it was added, had for the sake of Arcadia, and at the demand of its population, imposed the heaviest sacrifices upon themselves and entered upon arduous wars; it was owing to Thebes alone, that an independent and free Arcadia was in existence. Hereby Thebes had assuredly at all events acquired a title to object to the conclusion of treaties of peace, and to the establishment of new political institutions by the Arcadians without her consent. Any self-willed proceeding of this kind amounted to a breach of federal obligations, and to an act of treason. Such a state of things could not be allowed to endure. He would himself proceed to Arcadia, in order to unite with those who were loyal, and to let the opposite party feel the fulness of his rigor.

The arrival of such an answer as this in Arcadia created a feverish excitement throughout the country. The Arcadian federation was practically at an end; two opposite camps existed. In the one Mantinea took the lead, declaring that now at least the real intentions and designs of Thebes were manifest. Her sole intention was to rule the Arcadian cities by military governors. This was the reason, why she had so utterly objected to the peace-diet at Tegea; since the disunion of Arcadia was an indispensable condition for the execution of the ambitious schemes of Thebes. The determination to frustrate these schemes at any cost outweighed all other considerations.

In order, therefore, to prevent the establishment of the Theban supremacy in the peninsula, no scruple was felt in resuming combinations even with Sparta herself. The Spartans for their part naturally perceived in these overtures a very welcome change in public feeling; they saw the hated federal state at discord with itself, and the democratic spirit, which had been its creator, repressed by a native party opposed to it. To this party they accordingly hastened to promise succor, without at the same time re-asserting their ancient claims to the hegemony. On the contrary, a totally new principle was on this occasion asserted with regard to the system of the Peloponnesian confederation; viz. of the confederate states, that state was to have the right of directing the conduct of the war, in whose territory the war was being carried on. On the strength of this condition Athens likewise joined the anti-Theban alliance.

Thus the states had now grouped themselves in a perfectly novel manner. On the one side Arcadia, led by Mantinea, leagued with Elis and Achaia, with Sparta and Athens; on the other side the remaining half of Arcadia, with Tegea, the city holding the primacy among the cantons in favor of Thebes, of which notably Megalopolis was one, leagued with Messenia and Argos. Finally there were also states which had concluded peace with Thebes, but on condition of being allowed to remain neutral as towards Sparta,—such as Corinth and Phlius. A similar position was claimed in the north by Phocis, which declared itself to be under no obligation of furnishing its contingent, except in case of Bœotia being attacked.

None of these relations admitted of being permanently maintained; a fixed condition of things was only to be established by renewed conflict. If the city of Epaminondas was to assume the direction of the Greek world, a second Leuctra was

Novel  
grouping of  
the states.

Fourth ex-  
pedition into  
Peloponne-  
sus.

to conduct to a common end. Moreover, they mostly took place under circumstances extremely unfavorable to the Thebans. Thus, even the success obtained here and there had no real significance. Epaminondas contrived to penetrate with his body of men as far as the market-place, from which the main-roads led to the several quarters of the city; he likewise occupied some of the heights on the right bank of the river. But at other points the troops which had entered were irresistibly pushed back towards the river by the ardor of the Spartans, and not without heavy losses. No rising occurred on the part of the Helots and Pericæci in favor of Thebes; on the other hand, the arrival of Sparta's allies from Arcadia was hourly to be expected.

Retreat of  
Epami-  
nondas.

Under these circumstances it was unadvisable for Epaminondas to remain longer. His plan of occupying Sparta before the arrival of Agesilaus had been frustrated by treason; and since he could not think of awaiting the enemy in the difficult valley of the Eurotas and there giving battle, he resolved rapidly to return to Arcadia, being aware that the other head-quarters of his adversaries, Mantinea, were now void of troops, and thus hoping to be able to execute a second surprise with better success. He accordingly caused the watch-fire on the heights of the left bank of the Eurotas to be kept up, so that a renewal of the struggle was naturally anticipated at Sparta for the next morning; while, as soon as night had arrived, he took his departure unobserved with the bulk of his forces, and returned to Arcadia by several routes. On the following day he allowed the infantry to rest in Tegea, but the cavalry he sent on at once into the territory of Mantinea, the citizens of which were mostly outside the gates, taking advantage of the cessation of warfare which had been unexpectedly granted them, to bring in their harvest. The sudden appearance of the hostile

Attempted  
surprise of  
Mantinea.

squadrons spread the utmost terror among the Mantineans. Not only their harvest, and their flocks and herds, with a large number of laborers, of women and children, who were in the fields, but also their city itself was placed in a situation of extreme peril.

But about the very hour when part of the citizens were hastening full of fear into the city, to announce the danger which was upon it, the Athenian auxiliaries had unexpectedly arrived. Their force, which had marched without let or hindrance in the rear of Epaminondas through the passes abandoned by him, numbered 6,000 men, and were under the command of Hegesilaus. The cavalry had not yet had time to recover by rest and food from their night-march; but under existing circumstances they were, notwithstanding, ready at once to take the field; and their attack upon the Theban and Thessalian horse, superior in numbers to themselves, was so well conducted and so vigorous, that their opponents were after a hot skirmish forced to retreat to Tegea, since there was no infantry to support their attempt. Thus the Mantineans and their city were preserved; and the second well-devised strategical plan of Epaminondas had been likewise frustrated by circumstances which no human ingenuity could have foreseen.

The spirit of the general was not broken by these mishaps. He had desired to avoid a bloody battle; in this he had failed. It was now necessary to fight a battle in the open field; and in the open field he was most assured of his superiority. His troops had by no means been discouraged by their resultless forced marches and fatigues, but joyously obeyed their general's orders. This state of feeling showed itself notably among the Arcadians, generally so prone to aversion from Thebes; and it furnishes the most splendid testimony to the greatness of Epaminondas as a general, that we find them, on account of their admiration of his personal char-

Epaminondas before Mantinea.

acter and bearing, evincing a desire to be themselves Thebans, placing the Bœotian crest, the club of Heracles, on their shields, and preparing for the battle as for a festival.\*

Epaminondas could not allow himself to postpone the battle; probably part of the confederates had only bound themselves for a certain time. He advanced with all his troops from Tegea through the Pelagus-forest into the enemy's territory; but, instead of advancing in a straight line against the enemy, who had again assembled his forces in their full numbers before Mantinea, he turned off to the left towards the heights bounding the plain in the north-west. Here he caused his troops to halt and pile their arms, and appeared to be about to pitch his camp. The enemy, who had already drawn up in complete order of battle, as soon as Epaminondas made his appearance out of the wood, concluded from his having turned aside on his march, that he wished to avoid a battle; they therefore broke up their ranks and took the bridles off their horses. But Epaminondas' real reason for choosing the more remote position had been to delude the enemy, and to prepare the attack unobserved by him.

He formed his left wing out of the best troops of the Thebans and Arcadians; and it was this wing which was to decide the battle. He gave it a deep wedge-like disposition, designed for breaking through the enemy's line, while the centre and the right wing merely occupied the foe to the extent of preventing him from helping to resist the main attack. For this purpose he had placed at the end of the right wing a special division of Eubœans and mercenaries, who were to threaten the left wing of the enemy in the flank, and thus to be obstacles to his freedom of movement.

\* The Thespiean Euthynus (quære Εὐθύνης, Kell, *Syll. Inscr. Bœot.* 214), *Plut. Ages.* 34. With Schäfer, *Demosth.* iii<sup>2</sup>. 5, I consider the account of Callisthenes the more trustworthy.—Hegesilaus: Sievers, *Gesch. Griech.* 330

When everything was ready, the signal was given. The cavalry, also disposed wedge-wise, and drawn up by the side of the wing which was to make the attack, first advanced, in order to surprise the enemy. The latter flew to arms in hot haste, and amidst much tumult; every man sought his proper place, the horses were bridled, and the Spartan cavalry drew itself up in a broad mass, in order to drive back the Thebans who were charging their wing. But in vain. The Thebans broke the line, scattered their enemies, and threw them back upon the infantry.

Battle of Mantinea.

Ol. civ. 3 (a c. 362).

July 3d.

Hitherto it had been thought that nothing was in question beyond a cavalry charge, intended to make good the failure of a few days before. But suddenly the entire army was seen approaching from the base of the heights, with Epaminondas in person at the head of the wing, which was advancing at a quick step. The Mantineans and their allies disposed their ranks as best they could. Together they formed a line drawn right across the plain, with its rear towards the city, which it was their object to cover. On the right wing stood the Mantineans with the rest of the Arcadians; to them, according to the most recent treaty, the supreme command belonged. Next came the Lacedæmonians, then the Eleans and Achæans. The left wing was composed of the 6,000 Athenians. The total is said to have amounted to 20,000 infantry and 2,000 horse; the enemy was therefore considerably superior in numbers. There was no lack of courage or ardor for battle; but there was no leader among them who might have been capable of contending in tactical skill with an Epaminondas. They had no plan of their own, and by the breadth of the line in which they were drawn up facilitated the execution of their opponent's de-

Ephorus *op. Diog. L. Xen.* 10; Demosth. xix. 290.—Crest on the shields, *Hellen.* vii. 5, 20; misunderstood by Grote, vol. x. p. 463. Clark, *Peloponnesus*, p. 138, wishes to read βέναια ἔχοντες. All difficulties are removed by following the best MSS. in omitting ἔχοντες.

signs. When the enemy's column threw itself into their right wing, no resistance was offered. The entire wing was broken up, and involved the centre in the confusion which ensued. The battle had been gained by the Thebans as soon as it had begun. But at the very moment when the victory was decided, the victors lost all the results obtained by them. For Epaminondas had thrown himself too recklessly into the fray, and had to be carried out of the battle seriously wounded. For a time the advantage remained in undisputed possession of the Thebans; but soon the troops felt themselves without guidance; the pursuit stood still; the enemy began to reunite; and the Athenians even succeeded in waging a successful contest with the Theban division, drawn up at the extreme end of the right wing.

Death of  
Epaminon-  
das.

Where the vast plain of Tripolitza contracts itself into a narrow pass, formerly the boundary between the territories of the cities of Mantinea and Tegea, a ridge of heights, shaped like a tongue, projects from the western side of the mountain, offering a free view over the field to the north. At its base spread the oak-forest of Pelagus, which covered the pass and extended for the distance of a full hour's march towards Mantinea. This ridge was called *Scope*, the "watch-tower," and was doubtless frequently employed by the Tegeatæ in their numerous border-feuds, for observing the movements of their enemies. This was the place to which Epaminondas was carried. Here he once more awoke from his severe wound to full consciousness, and was pleased when his shield, which had dropped from his arm in the fray, was brought him by faithful comrades; he lived to hear the tidings of the victory, and was about to issue instructions to his captains Iolaïdas and Diophantus, as to the use they were to make of it. But when it was announced that these too had fallen, he gave the advice, which he bequeathed as his last words to his native



city, to make peace. Hereby he indeed lived to acknowledge that the goal, for which he had striven, had not been reached, and could not be reached. But this feeling failed to disturb the sublime calm of his soul; for he was conscious of having labored unselfishly to the last for the freedom and greatness of his people. With tranquil equanimity he bade them draw the point of the spear from his breast; and died.

Even as his friend lay beneath the Thessalian soil, so he was himself buried by his countrymen in the field of Mantinea,—on the spot where his Thebans had first fallen upon the Spartan cavalry. Thus the very burying-place of these two men gave testimony, in what regions Thebes, made great by their virtues, had been victorious and powerful.\*

On a review of the events from B. C. 379 to 362, it must be confessed, that there is hardly any period of Greek history, in which the relations between the several Greek states were transformed so rapidly and thoroughly, as in these seventeen years.

Review of  
the period  
of the  
greatness of  
Thebes.

We see a city, long devoid of glory and restricted to a small inland territory, densely surrounded in its own country by the most jealous neighbors, distracted by parties and then completely humbled by Sparta, rising within a short period of time by the development of its own resources to become the centre of a state. This state we see laying utterly low the military power supreme in Greece, tearing from it half of its land, calling into life new cities and states in Peloponnesus, forcing Thessaly to furnish a military contingent, causing Macedonian princes to be

\* A description of the battle is given by Schäfer, *Demosth.* III., Appendix 1. Date: *Archæol. Zeits.*, 1856, p. 263. After the octaëteris (Boeckh, *Monatsh.*, 28) the 1st of the month of Hecatombæon of Ol. civ. 3 falls on July 2 (2-3); hence the 12th of Scirophorion of Ol. civ. 2 between July 3d-5th.—Scope: *Peloponnesos*, i. 247.—Eparinondas buried at the public cost, *See war law*: *Plut. Comp. Per. et Fab.* 1.

given up to it as hostages, uniting Byzantium and Rhodes in a naval league, and negotiating abroad as the power holding the primacy in Hellas.

The policy of Thebes was not new in itself; it rather represented the old principles, which were merely being fought out in another form, and in opposition to the claims of Sparta, ever desirous of becoming again the mistress of Greece; and from the moment that Thebes asserted herself as an independent power as against these claims, she acted in the spirit of the Attic policy, while Athens herself was too weak to continue it.

It is also remarkable to observe the agreement in points of detail between the formation of the Theban and that of the Athenian power, which differ only in this respect, that in Theban history a brief series of years contains compressed into it what in the gradual growth of Athens is separated by centuries. Thus, in the first instance, either city based its power upon the union of the country into the territory of a single state. Again, in either state the overthrow of an illegal dominion became the starting-point of a new history; in either state the casting-off of the yoke of Tyrants was accompanied by a display of new vitality throughout the population, which was not confined to political life. An intellectual activity, such as displayed itself at Athens about the time of the Persian Wars, a vivid desire for varied and higher culture, likewise asserted themselves at Thebes, when she was vindicating to herself her freedom; and just as Athens appropriated to herself the new elements of culture from the islands and from Asia Minor, so Thebes again acquired them from Athens and from Southern Italy.

Either state had to prove its young liberty and the intellectual advance of its citizens in a conflict,—and in the first instance in a conflict waged in self-defence against the attempts made to re-impose the Tyrannical yoke

Compara-  
son between  
the greatness  
of Thebes  
and that of  
Athens.

upon it. Leuctra was the Marathon of the Thebans. The defensive was converted into an offensive war, because no real security could be gained except by seeking out the foe in his own domains, although the other Hellenes oppressed by him were liberated, and he was himself rendered incapable of pursuing his policy of oppression. Thebes became, as Athens once had become, the champion of national liberty, by struggling against the pressure of a selfish and faithless system of force which weighed upon all Hellas ; and her lot was more unfortunate only in this, that she had invariably to fight against members of the same Hellenic race, while to the Athenians was granted the glorious epoch of a national contest against the foreign foe.

When small states come forth from their restricted sphere, to undertake great tasks, <sup>The two great men of Thebes.</sup> they can only succeed in accomplishing them under the guidance of individual men prominent in the community by energy of will and intellectual gifts. About the time of her rising Thebes possessed not a few high-minded men, capable of sacrificing everything for important ends ; yet her entire greatness rested on two individualities, which had to accomplish what was done for Athens by a brilliant series of Attic statesmen. Pelopidas was the heroic champion and pioneer who, like Miltiades and Cimon, with full energy absolved the tasks immediately at hand ; while Epaminondas was the statesman whose glance took a wider range, who organized the state at home, and established its foreign relations upon a thoroughly thought-out plan ; he created the bases of the power of Thebes, as Themistocles and Aristides had those of the power of Athens, and maintained them, so long as he lived, by the vigor of his mind, like another Pericles. And indeed it would be difficult to find in the entire course of Greek history any two great statesmen who, in spite of differences of character and of outward conditions

of life, resembled one another so greatly, and were as men so truly the peers of one another, as Pericles and Epaminondas.

In the case of both these men, the chief foundation of their authority was their lofty and varied mental culture;

Comparison between Epaminondas and Pericles.

what secured to them their intellectual superiority, was the love of knowledge which pervaded and ennobled the whole being of either; and the orator Alcidas explicitly remarks,

that Thebes enjoyed good fortune after she had secured philosophers as her leaders. We therefore find in Thebes, as well as in Athens, in the midst of a democratic commonwealth an aristocratic leadership, a personal rule of the man who was intellectually the first among the citizens. Epaminondas, like Pericles, directs his native city as the man in whom the civic community places supreme confidence, and whom it therefore re-elects from year to year as general; like Pericles too, he has in the midst of his career to suffer from the vacillating spirit of his fellow-citizens, and from the hostile machinations of an adverse party, which considers democratic equality to be injured by his superiority. Such men as Meneclidas (p. 456) at Thebes correspond to Cleon and his like. Epaminondas, too, bore with lofty equanimity all hostile cavils and attempts to subject him to neglect; and he too enjoyed the satisfaction of seeing the confidence of his fellow-citizens ever and again return to him, and remain true to him up to his last hour. Like Pericles, he was invariably successful as a military commander in all undertakings of greater importance, because like him he knew how to unite the highest prudence to the utmost energy, and in particular because he understood how to ennoble and elevate his troops by his own spirit. He taught them, as Pericles had taught the Athenians, to overcome superstitious prejudices, and to let party-hatred and vulgar violence fall into disuse. No sooner had his influence

been impaired, than they fell back into their old faults: and to such intervals belong those actions which brought shame and failure to the Thebans, such as the breach of their promise to the Achæan cities (p. 488), and the cruel destruction of Orchomenus. Under Epaminondas the Bœotians were changed men, who had laid aside their former heaviness, and put a restraint upon their savage passions. Like Pericles, Epaminondas left no successor behind him; and his death also was the close of a historical epoch, which could never again return.

The Attic statesman was left desolate by the ravages of the Plague, which carried off the kernel of the elder generation; Epaminondas stood alone from the first; and while Pericles with all his superiority yet stood essentially on the basis of Attic culture, Epaminondas on the other hand was, so to speak, a stranger in his native city. Nor in truth was it ever his intention to be a Theban in the sense in which Pericles was an Athenian; the object of his life was rather to be a perfect Hellene, while his efforts as a statesman were likewise simply an endeavor to introduce his fellow-citizens to that true Hellenism which consisted in civic virtue and in love of wisdom.

Epami-  
nondas  
a true  
Hellene.

To himself philosophy had become a force seizing upon and transforming the entire man, without at the same time thereby estranging him from the sphere of popular Hellenic notions. In the very last hour of his life, when he was delighted by the preservation of his shield, he showed himself a genuine Hellene; thus, again, it was a genuinely Greek standpoint from which he viewed the war against Sparta and Athens as a competitive contest for the honor of the hegemony in Hellas, an honor which could be justly won only by mental and moral superiority.\*

The conflict was inevitable; it had become a national

\* Alcidasas *op. Aristot. Eth. II. 28* (προσόνται φιλόσοφοι). Epaminondas as an active opponent of superstition: *Diod. xv. 53 et al.*

duty, because the supremacy of Sparta had become a tyranny dishonorable to the Hellenic nation. During the conflict Epaminondas was never false to Hellenic patriotism, and never allowed himself to be guided by the interests of his own city to such a degree as had Themistocles and Pericles. He was exposed to the bitterest cavils on the part of his fellow-countrymen on account of gentle treatment of Sparta, but he could never bring himself to forget that his adversary was of the same race as himself. He therefore avoided settlements by bloodshed as long as this was in his power; and all his campaigns, both in Peloponnesus and in Thessaly, were provoked, not by ambition or lust of vengeance, but by the most definite and urgent causes. Nor was it ever his intention to annihilate Sparta, as Sparta had intended to annihilate Thebes; he merely wished to take the power of harm from the state hostile to popular freedom. For this purpose he employed the noblest means, in particular, as the founder of cities. In the cities everything which distinguished the Hellenes before other nations, had sprung into maturity; the dissolution of the communal life of a city was therefore the deepest humiliation and the worst violence which could be inflicted upon the Hellenic tribe. But Sparta in her selfishness unhesitatingly sought to strengthen her power by destroying city-centres, or by impeding city-unions, for it was everywhere hers only to take, not to give, to hinder, not to advance. Epaminondas on the other hand in this respect too pursued a genuinely Hellenic policy, that he deemed it his duty to aid dependent communities in recovering their independence as states, and to create new centres of historical life. He never designed to force the Hellenes into forming a single united state; he rather inflicted the bitterest of all punishments upon the Spartans by the very fact, that he for his part made a reality out of what on their lips had been nothing but a hypocritical phrase, viz. the autonomy of the Hel-

lenic communities, when he re-established Messenia and made Southern Arcadia independent, by virtue of the Peace of Antalcidas. But after Epaminondas had liberated the Greek cities from the Spartan yoke, it became the object of his Bœotian patriotism, to make his own native city worthy and capable of assuming the direction, as the state holding the primacy, over the freely confederated states, and to fulfil the weighty duties of this honorary office with more justice than had been shown by Sparta and Athens.

Aware of the difficulty of this task, he employed all permissible means for raising the authority of his native city. For this purpose he entered into combinations with Delphi and even with Persia, in the latter instance acting with far greater unselfishness than Sparta and Athens had shown; for there is no evidence, that he had Persian gold in view. But what had offended no man in the Lacedæmonians, was not forgiven to the Thebans; and of all the measures of their policy this brought the least blessing with it. And in truth it is specially painful in the case of men of such national pride, to find them confirming their claims in Greece by letters patent from the Great King. These steps, however, had been rendered necessary by those of their adversaries; and what there is of shamefulness in them, lies at the door of those states which had placed Hellas in a condition of dependence upon a foreign power.

How far Epaminondas might have succeeded in securing a permanent hegemony over Greek affairs to the Thebans, who shall attempt to judge? He fell in the full vigor of his manhood on the battle-field, where the states which withstood his policy had brought their last resources to bear: Greece lay exhausted before him, and the Theban confederacy reached from the Messenian Gulf to Macedonia, and already likewise comprehended the foremost

The results of his career not the criterion of his greatness.

maritime states of the Archipelago. Who would have dared to resist the peace established throughout the nation, which Epaminondas would have proclaimed in the name of Thebes?

Of all statesmen he is therefore least to be judged by the actual results of his policy. His greatness lies in this: that from his childhood he incessantly endeavored to be to his fellow-citizens a model of Hellenic virtue; that he allowed no difficulties and no misjudgment of himself to divert him from this endeavor, and could never be induced to desecrate his noble ends by impure means. Chaste and unselfish he passed, ever true to himself, through a most active life, through all the temptations of unexampled success in war, through the whole series of trials and disasters. He proudly rejected the offers of the Tyrant Iason, who was very desirous of inducing him to co-operate in his schemes; he lived in voluntary poverty, and sought no other joys than those arising out of the loyal fulfilment of the mission in life which he had deeply realized, and out of his intercourse with his friends.

Friendship was to the Hellenes, and in particular to the Pythagoreans, not only a precious gift of life, but also a virtue without which a complete and true human life was inconceivable. This genuinely Greek view was never more deeply comprehended and thoroughly proved than by Epaminondas, who recognized in an intimate fraternization between all holding the same sentiments the essential means for raising his native city to a higher stage of culture and power. And again, within the wider league, he and Pelopidas were a pair of friends such as the Greek world never saw either before or afterwards. They stood side by side, wholly free from envy and jealousy, in stainless mutual fidelity, either of them supplementing and advancing the other in their common life and work. Pelopidas was more in harmony with the world, with men, than the more

His friendship  
with  
Pelopidas.



serious and self-contained Epaminondas; he was the more popular of the pair, and therefore doubtless greatly helped to bring about a recognition of his friend's merits in wider spheres. He had as it were fought in the rank before him in the bold stroke executed against the Tyrants; after this he thoroughly accommodated himself to his friend's course of action, and subordinated himself with amiable modesty to his loftier spirit. Pelopidas was the man of action, who with joyous confidence helped to carry out the ideas of Epaminondas.

The meagre accounts of the ancients tell us only of the successes of Theban policy abroad. <sup>His policy at home and abroad.</sup>

Our admiration would be heightened, were we able to survey the activity of the two friends in the interior of the city, and the difficulties which they there had to overcome. Epaminondas was not merely the founder of a military organization; he equally proved the inventiveness of his mind, in contriving to obtain for his country, which was wealthy neither by trade nor by manufactures, pecuniary resources sufficient for maintaining a land-army and a war-navy commensurate with the needs of a great power.

He made himself master of all the productive ideas of earlier state-administrations; and <sup>His examples.</sup> in particular the Athenians naturally stood before his eyes as models and predecessors. On the one hand he turned to account for his native city the improvements made in arms and tactics, which were due to Xenophon, Chabrias, and Iphicrates; and was encouraged by the successes of the last-named commander to break through the passes of the Isthmus, and to attack the Spartans in their peninsula (p. 309). On the other, the example of the Athenians taught him that the question of the hegemony over Greece could only be settled by sea; and in the same way he adopted from the founders of the more recent Attic naval confederation the principle, that the

native constitutions of the confederates ought to be spared (p. 382). For this reason he most decidedly opposed a ruthless political propaganda, such as was desired by the popular leaders at Thebes. Finally, Epaminondas, more than any other Greek statesman, followed in the footsteps of Periclean Athens, in regarding the public fostering of Art and Science as a main duty of that state, which desired to claim a position of primacy.

His efforts  
for Science  
and Art. Personally he did his utmost to domesticate philosophy at Thebes,—not only as intellectual discourse carried on in select circles, but as the power of higher knowledge which elevates and purifies the people. Public oratory found a home at Thebes together with the free constitution, and not only did Epaminondas personally prove himself fully the equal of the foremost orators of Athens, of Callistratus in particular, in power of speech and in felicitous readiness of mind; but, as the embassy at Susa shows, his friends too learnt in a surprisingly short time to assert the interests of Thebes by the side of the other states, which had long kept up foreign relations, with vigor, skill, and dignity.

In every department there were perceptible an intellectual mobility and a vigorously sustained effort, designed to make good the deficiencies of the past. Bœotian history was written by Anaxis and Dionysodorus. Of the arts, painting received a specially successful development. Aristides was the head of a Bœotian school of painters, which flourished about the period of the liberation of Thebes. It was distinguished by a serious and dignified tendency, by a thoughtful and clear treatment of intellectual ideas; and by these qualities it achieved a national reputation.

Of the architecture of this period honorable evidence is to this day given by the well-preserved remains of the fortifications of Messene constructed under the direction of Epaminondas (p. 453); they are typical specimens of ar

chitecture executed in the grandest style. The walls are composed of mighty blocks; which, large of size and in part irregularly cut, are left rough on the outer side, but very accurately inserted in one another and neatly polished at the rims, so that the characteristic of power is combined in a peculiar fashion with that of pleasing elegance.

Plastic art likewise found a home at Thebes. Already the first establishment of a political connexion between Athens and Thebes was sealed by art, inasmuch as Alcámenes executed for Thrasybulus his dedicatory gift (p. 77). At the time of the Corinthian War a school of bronze-founding existed at Thebes which enjoyed much consideration. To this belonged Hypatodorus and Aristogiton, who on the occasion of the fight at Cenoë (p. 267) erected for the Argives at Delphi statues of the allies of Polynices and of the Epigoni. Rapidly progressing, the artists left behind them the old-fashioned style, which had maintained itself in the art, as in the language and writing, of Bœotia. The leading members of the later school of Athens were summoned to Thebes; Scopas was the sculptor of the Athene, which stood before the entrance to the Ismenium at Thebes, corresponding to a Hermes by Phidias close by; and Praxiteles decorated the pediment of the Heracleum with sculptures. For, as at Athens, so at Thebes after the glorious struggles, the sanctuaries of the city, in particular those of the Ismenian Apollo and of Heracles, the ancestral Hero of the Bœotian tribe, were adorned in new dignity. To the Athene *Promachos* of Phidias (vol. ii. p. 606) corresponded the Heracles *Promachos* of the Thebans; and in the market-place of their city arose the temple of Artemis Euclea with the statue by Scopas,—of the same deity to whom the Athenians also did honor after the victory of Marathon. Many other works in the city and on the citadel were probably partly accomplished, partly intended, by Epaminondas; for it was his endeavor, although with prudent moderation, to transfer the splendor of Periclean

Athens to Thebes; for which reason he is also said to have declared to his fellow-citizens, that if they desired theirs to be the foremost city in Hellas, they ought to place the Propylæa of Athens at the ascent to the Cadmea.\*

Significance  
of the efforts  
of Epaminon-  
das for suc-  
ceeding ages.

The greatness of Thebes was, however, no mere echo of earlier ages; notwithstanding the brevity of its endurance, it also possesses a mighty significance, of an independent and typical kind, for the ensuing times.

Through Epaminondas Thebes was raised to an equality with the city of the Athenians as a seat of a policy aiming at freedom and national greatness. It thus became possible for the two cities to join hands in the subsequent struggle for the independence of Greece; and in this sense Epaminondas worked beforehand for the objects of Demosthenes. But he was not less a predecessor of the Macedonian kings in their noblest and most important achievements. For he showed, how the victor might in a peaceable way turn to account his triumphs, how he might call forth new life in oppressed districts and peasant cantons, and create enduring monuments of a beneficent influence by means of the foundation of cities. If it is considered, how with his small resources and in so short a period of time Epaminondas founded, or helped to found, Mantinea, Messene, and Megalopolis; how through him other places, such as Corone and Heraclea, likewise received Theban settlers,—the honor will not be denied to him, of having in the royal art of the foundation of cities been the predecessor of Alexander and his successors.

But he was also their predecessor in another point. By spreading Greek manners and ways of life, he enlarged the narrow boundaries of the land of the Greeks, and intro-

\* Bœotian historiography (*Fragm. Hist. Gr.* ii. 84); painting (Brunn, *Gesch. der Griech. Künstler*, ii. 159, 171); architecture (*Peloponnesos*, ii. 139); plastic art (Brunn, *u. s.* i. 293).—Foreign artists at Thebes: Ulrichs, *Scopas*, 71 f.; Stark in *Philol.* xxi. 425.—Propylæa: *Æschin. de fals. Leg.* 105.—Art-laws at Thebes *Æl. Var. Hist.* iv. 4.

duced the peoples of the North into the sphere of Greek history. In his own person he represented the idea of a general Hellenic character, which, unconditioned by local accidents, was freely raised aloft above the distinctions of states and tribes. Hitherto only statesmen had appeared, who were great Athenians or great Spartans; in Epaminondas this local coloring is of quite inferior importance; he was a Hellene first, and a Theban only in the second place: and thus he prepared the standpoint, from which to be a Hellene was regarded as an intellectual privilege independent of the locality of birth; and this is the standpoint of *Hellenism*.

Because the Hellenic character appeared in Epaminondas in freer and more humane form, than in previous leaders of Greek states, it was the more easy for the later generations to understand him. They had less difficulty in realizing him to themselves; and his individuality could serve as a model, wherever Hellenes or Philhellenes dwelt. Thus his example gave encouragement to the men, who in the closing times sought to uphold the honor of the Hellenic nation,—to Philopœmen and Polybius; and in the Roman world, too, no Greek seemed worthy of higher esteem, than Epaminondas.\*

Under these circumstances it would be impious to regard his career as one which remained without results, and his lofty endeavors as made in vain. He largely contributed to increase the intellectual wealth and the eternally valid elements of Greek history; to him belongs a prominent place in the development of Hellenic culture, although the external results of his activity at once fell to pieces, when he had drawn his last breath.

All Greece had in anxious expectation awaited the day

\* Polyb. vi. 43. Philopœmen: Plut. *Philopœm.* 3. Aratus: Plut. *Arat.* 19. Timoleon: Plut. *Timol.* 36. Cato: Plut. *Cat. Mai.* 8. Cf. Schäfer, in *Philol.* xxiii. 658. In general we above all regret the loss of Ephorus, in whose history the account of Epaminondas was doubtless the most prominent section.

of Mantinea. So many warlike forces had never yet stood opposed to one another in the ancient struggle for the hegemony. This time, it was thought, everything must be settled. Thebes gained the battle; but it was a victory without victors, nor was any prize distributed among the combatants. It was only known that Sparta had once for all lost the hegemony, and that it would not fall to Thebes.

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