

THE
HISTORY OF GREECE.

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TO

JULIUS CHARLES HARE.

MY DEAR HARE,

You will not be surprised, though you have received no previous intimation of my intention, to find this volume inscribed with your name. At the close of a work which has occupied a considerable portion of many years of my life, my thoughts naturally revert to the scenes and objects in the midst of which it was begun: to the days when we were living within the walls of the same college, and associated together in labours to which we have still reason to look back with pleasure. How much this work is indebted for whatever is good in it to that intimacy, and more especially to that literary partnership, it would not become me to say, even if I were able distinctly to point it out. But I am conscious that it would probably have been less

faulty if I had more constantly considered it as subject to your inspection. This dedication comes too late either to raise a suspicion that it is meant to bias your judgment, or to incur the charge of presumption, as inviting the scrutiny of an eye so critical and so familiar with the best models, to what I myself feel to be a very imperfect essay. You will accept it as it is meant, for a token of friendship and esteem which neither time nor distance can abate, and with which I remain,

MY DEAR HARE,

Yours faithfully,

C. ST. DAVID'S.

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HISTORY OF GREECE.

CHAPTER LX.

FROM THE BATTLE OF IPSUS TO THE DEATH OF
PYRRHUS.

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By the event of the battle of Ipsus the allies, who had been united by their common enmity to Antigonus, were transformed into jealous rivals. Their

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LX.

B. C. 301.

CHAP.
LX.
Conse-
quences of
the battle
of Ipsus.

struggle with him was no sooner decided, than the clashing interests of Ptolemy and Seleucus threatened an immediate rupture, which was averted indeed, but so as to leave neither party secure, and one of them deeply offended. It was clear that the possession of Syria must be a subject of perpetual contest between the two states. On the other hand, Lysimachus had reason to be satisfied— if it was in the nature of ambition to be so—with the rich acquisition which had fallen to his share: but he could feel no confidence in the moderation of his powerful neighbour, and might well suspect that Seleucus would endeavour to resume so important a concession on the first opportunity. In the eyes both of Lysimachus and Ptolemy, Seleucus had stepped into the place of Antigonus; and they soon gave public proof of the jealousy with which they regarded him, by a new alliance which they contracted with one another. Lysimachus, although he had so lately married Amastris, and had children by a former wife, an Odrysian princess— among whom the eldest Agathocles was a youth of great promise— accepted the hand of Arsinoe, Ptolemy's daughter by Berenice. It seems that he would willingly have retained Amastris¹, whom he sincerely loved and esteemed; but she was too high-spirited to endure the presence of a rival, and retired to Heraclea, which she continued to govern during the minority of her sons with admirable ability. It was a sacrifice of the domestic affections to reasons of state, destined by a tragical retribution to prove fatal, not only to the happiness of Lysimachus, but to his throne and his life.

Seleucus, notwithstanding his superior power, could not be indifferent to this coalition, which was evidently formed against him. It was to be expected that he should endeavour to strengthen himself by a new alliance; but it must have excited general surprise that

¹ Memnon ap. Phot. p. 224, b.

for this purpose his choice fell upon Demetrius, whose fortunes, as we see from the turn which his affairs had taken in Greece, most men considered as irretrievably ruined. Not so however Demetrius himself. He had already experienced and witnessed too many strange vicissitudes to be deeply dejected by his late reverse. He had seen his father a fugitive, seeking protection from Antipater, and, within a year after, in condition to contend for the dominion of Asia. Seleucus had fallen as low, before he rose to an equal height, and owed much less to others. Demetrius was not yet reduced to the situation of a suppliant: he still retained some fragments of his lost power, together with unabated confidence in himself, and seems to have been anxious to show that he had not given himself up to despair. Though he was too weak either to attempt to recover Athens, or to protect his interests in Peloponnesus, he ventured to assume the offensive against one of his most powerful adversaries. In the spring of 300, leaving Pyrrhus at the Isthmus, he made an expedition with his fleet to the Thracian Chersonesus, and ravaged the coast, which Lysimachus was unable to defend. The immediate object of this movement may have been to enrich the troops with plunder, and to keep up their spirits; but Demetrius probably wished at the same time to draw attention on himself, to show that he still possessed means of annoying his enemies; and he must have been aware that an attack on Lysimachus would give no offence to Seleucus.

CHAP.
LX.

B. C. 300.
Movements
of Deme-
trius.

Still it must have been with no less surprise than pleasure, that he soon after received an embassy, by which Seleucus asked the hand of Stratonice, the daughter of Demetrius and Phila, for himself: though his heir-apparent, Antiochus, might have seemed a fitter consort for the blooming princess. Since it is

B. C. 299.
His alliance
with Se-
leucus;

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evident that the object of the proposed alliance was to counteract that which had been formed between Ptolemy and Lysimachus, it might perhaps have been expected that he should rather have addressed himself to Cassander, whose power was far greater, and whose interest coincided with his own no less than that of Demetrius. But it is probable that Cassander was too closely connected with Lysimachus, even if negotiations had not already been set on foot for the marriages which took place not many years later, between Antipater, Cassander's second son, and Eurydice, the daughter of Lysimachus, and between Alexander, the youngest of the Macedonian princes, and Lysandra, Ptolemy's daughter by Eurydice. But moreover Seleucus may have thought Demetrius better able to secure his object, on account of his fleet, and his possession of Cyprus and the Phœnician towns, which he still occupied with his garrisons¹; while a man in such circumstances was likely to prove a more obsequious ally than the king of Macedonia, Demetrius joyfully accepted the brilliant offer, and sailed with his whole fleet, accompanied by his daughter, towards Syria. On his passage he landed—it is said merely to obtain the necessary supplies—at several places on the coast of Cilicia. But Pleistarchus, taking umbrage at this intrusion on his territory, retired to Macedonia, to complain to his brother of the league into which Seleucus was entering with the common enemy. Demetrius took advantage of his absence, to make himself master of Quinda, where he found 1200 talents still remaining; and, having been joined by Phila, proceeded to Rhossus in Syria. There he was met by Seleucus, who first entertained him in his camp, and then, more fully to show their perfect mutual confidence, went on board his father-in-law's galley, as his guest.

¹ Diodorus, *xxi.* Eclog. *i.* p. 489. Plut. Dem. 32.

These festivities were followed by many grave conferences on their common affairs; but their discussions and arrangements, of which it is probable very little was publicly known at the time, are now concealed from our curiosity by an impenetrable veil. The only point which we are able to discern with any degree of clearness is, that it was the object of Seleucus to avoid a rupture with the rival powers. For this purpose, while Phila was sent to pacify her brother, he brought about an alliance between Ptolemy and Demetrius, which was to be cemented by a match between Demetrius and Ptolemy's daughter Ptolemais; and Pyrrhus, whose sister Deidamia followed her husband to Syria, but died not long after, was sent to the court of Alexandria, as a security for the execution of the treaty. But its terms, though they may have been more definite and important than Plutarch represents, are entirely unknown to us; and the modern conjectures on the subject are so uncertain as to be barely worth mentioning.¹ The part of the transaction most difficult to comprehend is, that Seleucus should have promoted an alliance which manifestly tended to render Demetrius less dependent on him. But he may have thought that this danger was counterbalanced by the maintenance of peace, which he must have needed for the settlement of his new state, and by the prospect, that the

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and with
Ptolemy.

¹ Droysen (*Hellen.* i. p. 559.) believes that Ptolemy acknowledged Demetrius as king of Cyprus, Cilicia, and Phœnicia. But how is it possible to suppose that Seleucus was a party to a treaty containing such an article? No less unlikely does it appear, that Demetrius joined in a general stipulation, that Seleucus should indemnify Ptolemy for the loss of Syria, without knowing in what the indemnity was to consist; for, according to Droysen (p. 544.), it was Cyprus that Seleucus intended to cede to Ptolemy. Flathe's conjecture (ii. p. 18.) that Demetrius was recognised as king of Greece, seems in substance very much more consistent with the interest and views — so far as they can be collected — both of Ptolemy and Seleucus: nor is it irreconcilable with the succours which Ptolemy sent to the Athenians, after the change that took place in the relations between Demetrius and Seleucus. Raleigh (*Hist. of the World*, iv. 5.) saw and expressed the state of the case very plainly. *Seleucus and Ptolemy could both of them have been contented better, that Demetrius, with help of their countenance, should seek his fortune somewhat further off, than settle his estate under their noses.*

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connection into which Ptolemy now entered with Demetrius, would weaken that in which he stood with Lysimachus. For Ptolemy it was a clear gain, that he could not only hope to detach Demetrius from the interests of Seleucus, but was put in possession of a hostage, whose title to the kingdom of Epirus might be used as an instrument for acquiring influence over the affairs of Macedonia and Greece. We are told that Pyrrhus took pains to ingratiate himself with Ptolemy, and for that purpose assiduously paid his court to Berenice. Perhaps it might have been said with equal truth, that Ptolemy strove to win the young king's friendship by kindness, and singled him out to receive the hand of Antigone, Berenice's daughter by her former husband Philippus, not more on account of his merit, than to serve his own political views.

For an interval of two or three years after this treaty, we are no better informed as to the proceedings of the parties than as to their compacts or intentions.¹ So long it appears they continued in the same relations to one another. Demetrius, who, immediately after the treaty had occupied Cilicia, was permitted to retain undisturbed possession of it. Apparently, Ptolemy and Seleucus were engaged with their domestic affairs; and it seems to have been during this period that Cassander made an unsuccessful attempt to recover Corcyra, and was compelled to retire by the Syracusan tyrant Agathocles, with the loss of almost all the ships he had employed in the expedition.² Seleucus may have thought it

¹ This interval is only collected from the history of Demochares, as it appears on the face of the decree concerning him at the end of the Vit. x. Orr. Plutarch (Demetr. 32. 33.) gives no hint of such an interval; and Mr. Clinton (F. H. B. C. 299.) follows him. But if the genuineness of the decree be admitted, which Mr. Clinton does not dispute, it seems an almost unavoidable inference — as will be afterwards seen — that his chronology is here erroneous.

² So Droysen (i. p. 559. n. 12.) infers from the position of the fragment in Diodorus xxi. relating to this expedition, which indicates that it was subsequent to the battle of Ipsus.

expedient to temporise until he saw what measures Cassander would adopt on the complaint of Pleistarchus. But he certainly never intended to have Demetrius for a permanent neighbour, or to leave either Cilicia or the Phœnician ports in his hands. Perhaps he expected that Demetrius, conscious of his inability to contend with the master of the East, would resign them at the first summons. But, if so, when at length they came to an explanation on the subject, he found that he had deceived himself. He first attempted to induce Demetrius to accept a sum of money as a compensation for Cilicia. Demetrius declined the bargain. He then, in an angry tone, demanded Tyre and Sidon, as appertaining to his own dominions. Demetrius denied his title, and strengthened the garrisons of the towns; declaring, that, *not if he had lost ten thousand fields like Ipsus, would he consent to pay at such a rate for his son-in-law.* The conduct of Seleucus, it is said, was commonly regarded as ungenerous, and he did not deem it expedient immediately to enforce his claims by any warlike movements. But henceforth there was an open breach between him and his father-in-law.

Demetrius was not on this account the less ready to embark in a new enterprise, though it was one which drew him away from the only realm he possessed, while it was threatened by the ambition of at least one powerful neighbour. He still kept his eye fixed on Greece, and especially on Athens; and the state of affairs there seemed to him now to open a fairer prospect of retrieving his losses. Cassander also had been endeavouring to re-establish his authority there, but without success. After his failure in Corcyra, he had undertaken an expedition to Greece, had it seems made himself master of Phocis, at least of Elatea, and had invaded Attica. The power of Athens was not sufficient to repel him with-

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B. C. 298.
Rupture
with Se-
leucus.

Cassander's
attempt on
Athens.

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out assistance ; but she still possessed a man of considerable political and military talents, who was a zealous friend of liberty. Her general Olympiodorus sailed to Ætolia—the journey overland would, it seems, have been exposed to too many risks—and prevailed on the Ætolians to send succours to Athens. The arrival of these forces induced Cassander to withdraw his army from Attica¹: and not long after, it seems, Elatea revolted from him, and was enabled, by the aid of Olympiodorus, to hold out against his attacks.² He did not, however, abandon his designs on Athens, but conceived a hope that he might attain his end by an easier, though perhaps slower course. Lachares, the popular leader of the day, was an ambitious, greedy, and unprincipled adventurer, and was persuaded by Cassander to aspire to the station which had been occupied by Demetrius the Phalerian.³ He now became a secret adherent of the Macedonian interest, while he waited for an opportunity of espousing it more openly, and of rising through it to power. This juncture, when the Athenians were incensed against Cassander, and had still to apprehend a repetition of his attempt, seems to have been that which Demetrius considered so favourable to his hopes, that it encouraged him to make an expedition for the recovery of Athens.⁴

B. C. 297.
Demetrius
returns to
Greece.

It was probably in the spring of 297 that he set sail with a formidable armament ; but off the coast of Attica he was overtaken by a storm, in which the greater part of his ships were wrecked, and many lives were lost. After this disaster he no longer ventured to present himself at the mouth of the

¹ Pausanias, i. 26. 3.

² Ibid. x. 18. 7., i. 26. 3.

³ Ibid. i. 25. 7.

⁴ Here our narrative cannot be reconciled with Plutarch, who clearly supposes (Dem. 33.) that Demetrius was induced to undertake his expedition against Athens by the intelligence that Lachares had seized the tyranny. As Lachares, after he became tyrant, made himself very odious, this was a natural conjecture for one who did not minutely examine the chronology of the events he related.

Piræus, but sent orders for the equipment of a new fleet in the eastern ports, and in the meanwhile, having made some hostile demonstrations in Attica with little effect, marched into Peloponnesus, to reduce the towns which had revolted from him. The only place named among those which he threatened is Messene, where his assaults were repulsed, and he received a dangerous wound. He recovered however in time to attack some other towns more successfully; and these operations probably occupied the remainder of the year. In the course of the following winter an event took place which made an important change in the face of affairs. Cassander was carried off by a disease, which popular tradition represented as a stroke of Divine vengeance for his atrocious crimes¹, but which is also described as an ordinary consumption²: he was succeeded by his eldest son Philip.

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Death of
Cassander.

The return of Demetrius to Greece, and his hostilities in Attica, appear, as might be expected, to have changed the disposition of the Athenians with regard to Macedonia, and perhaps gave rise to new divisions among them. By a large party he was hated and feared more than Cassander. This party seems to have been headed by Demochares, who had probably returned from his exile, as soon as he heard of the battle of Ipsus. We find him displaying great activity in a war which was once no doubt well known under the name of the Four Years' War; but for which it is now somewhat difficult to assign a place in history. It is however nearly certain that it belongs to this period³: and it may have included the

¹ Pausanias, ix. 7. 2. ἐπελήφθη ἰδέρω, καὶ ἀπ' αὐτοῦ ζῶντι ἐγένοντο εὐλαί. Compare Acts, xii. 23.

² Dexippus in Syncellus, p. 504. ed. Bonn. φθινάδι νόσφ διαλυθείς, and Porphyry. Euseb. Arm. i. p. 327.

³ So much has I think been satisfactorily shown by Droysen in an article on this war in the *Zeitschrift f. d. Alterthumswissenschaft*, 1836. But it is difficult to conceive that the war can have received a designation by which it was known at Athens, as Droysen supposes (i. p. 563.), with reference to its duration, so far as it

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contest with Cassander, as well as that which immediately followed with Demetrius, and thus have ended with the surrender of the city. We hear of no negotiations between the Athenians and Cassander after the re-appearance of Demetrius. But we learn that Demochares was sent on an embassy to Lysimachus, and obtained a subsidy of thirty talents from him: and that he carried a decree for an embassy to Ptolemy, who sent fifty talents¹, and, it seems, promises of farther support. There is also some ground to believe that Demochares went on a like mission to Philip, Cassander's successor; though the behaviour imputed to him on this occasion is utterly incredible.² Philip's reign lasted only four months; but, as he died at Elatea³, it may be inferred that he was engaged in the prosecution of his father's plans. He was succeeded by his younger brother, Antipater. It was perhaps about the same time, in the spring of 296, that Demetrius was preparing to lay siege to Athens. The city had been well provided with the means of defence under the direction of

B. C. 296.
Demetrius
besieges
Athens.

concerned not Athens, but Demetrius. It seems preferable to make it begin with Cassander's attempts upon Athens in 298.

¹ The Decree at the end of Vit. x. Orr. p. 92. ed. Westermann.

² Seneca (*De Ira*, III. 23.), to illustrate Philip's patience under insults, relates that Demochares — *Parrhesiastes ob nimium et procacem linguam appellatus* (compare Polybius, XII. 13.) — having been sent on an embassy to him, when the king asked what he could do to oblige the Athenians, answered, Hang yourself. The bystanders were indignant. Philip however dismissed this Thersites unhurt, bidding his colleagues tell the Athenians that men who said such things were more arrogant than those who patiently listened to them. Seneca evidently supposed Alexander's father to have been the hero of this story, which indeed suits his character: but then Demochares, the nephew of Demosthenes, cannot have been the ambassador. The story however might originally have been told of Demochares with reference to an embassy to Philip, Cassander's son. As to the fact — in the form in which Seneca relates it — it requires a peculiar bias — from which Droysen has shown himself on other occasions not wholly exempt — to believe that any Athenian ambassador was ever guilty of such outrageous and brutal folly. In the case of Demochares, not only would it be inconsistent with the judgment of Polybius (u. s.) on his character, and with the impression which the extracts from his memoirs preserved by Athenæus must make on an impartial reader; but it is utterly incredible that a man who had committed so gross a breach of decency in his embassy to Philip, should have been sent a few months after in the same capacity to his successor, when the object was to implore succours. The silence of the Decree casts some suspicion on the fact of the embassy to Philip.

³ Dexippus, u. s.

Demochares; the walls had been repaired, and the arsenal amply stored with ammunition; and he did not cease to seek aid from without. He concluded a treaty of peace and alliance with the Bœotians, and headed an embassy to the young king, Antipater, from whom he received a subsidy of twenty talents.¹ But the subsistence of the Athenians still depended on continual supplies from abroad. Demetrius ravaged the country from Eleusis to Rhamnus, and proceeded to blockade the city by sea and land. He put to death the owner and master of a vessel laden with corn, which they attempted to bring into the harbour; and this severity deterred most private adventurers from such attempts. In the course of the summer an Egyptian fleet of 150 sail appeared in the Saronic gulf, and excited hopes of more effectual relief.² It was but a short gleam of sunshine. Soon after, Demetrius received reinforcements from Cyprus and Peloponnesus, which raised his fleet to 300 sail, and compelled the Egyptians to seek safety in flight.

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Meanwhile, the city was agitated by the strife of parties, whose views or pretexts are now only matter for conjecture. We know however that it afforded Lachares an opportunity of executing his long-cherished design, and that he became absolute master of Athens. Demochares, who was not a man to truckle to the tyrant, was driven into exile.³ The

Tyranny of
Lachares.

¹ The Decree (u. s.). Grauert (*An.* p. 349.) suspects that this may be the younger Antipater, who reigned for about six weeks in 279. But one does not see why the Athenians should either have sought or received a subsidy from him. Mr. Clinton (p. 380.) proposes to change the text.

² Droysen (*Zeitschrift f. A. u. s. w.* 1836, n. 20.) conjectures that this was the same fleet which brought Pyrrhus back to Epirus.

³ The Decree, u. s. *ἀνθ' ὧν ἐξέπεσεν ὑπὸ τῶν καταλυσάντων τὸν δῆμον*, which can hardly be applied to Demetrius, who was the professed restorer of democracy. But it appears unnecessary to press the meaning of *ἀνθ' ὧν*, as Droysen has done, referring it to the alliance with the Bœotians, and showing, with his usual ingenuity, how that treaty might have been made a ground of charge against Demochares by the Macedonian party. It may surely mean nothing more than that the patriotism of Demochares, of which he had given such signal proofs in his measures for the defence of the city, rendered him odious to the enemies of freedom, and was the cause of his banishment.

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usurper was probably supported by a body of mercenaries: but he was still exposed to constant danger both from within and from without. Polyænus relates¹, that Demetrius obtained arms for a thousand men from a party in Piræus, under the pretext that they were to be employed against Lachares. The story seems almost to imply, that Piræus was in the hands of this party, and that they were expecting reinforcements. The extraordinary cruelty imputed to Lachares² may be attributed to his uneasy position in the midst of so many enemies. Yet he appears to have been more infamous for sacrilege than for bloodshed. He evidently saw that he could not retain his power long, and used it for the most sordid ends. He plundered the temples, and stripped the statue in the Parthenon of its precious ornaments. As the blockade continued, the price of the common necessaries of life rose to a height which placed them out of the reach of all but the wealthy. As a specimen of the sufferings of the besieged, we read of a contest between a father and son for a dead mouse. Epicurus, who was at this time living at Athens, as the head of a philosophical society, shared a certain number of beans among the members for their daily meal.³ The patience with which the Athenians submitted to such privations may serve as a measure of the dread and aversion they felt for Demetrius. In fact, they had passed a decree making it a capital offence to propose a capitulation with him. The terror inspired by Lachares must however be taken into account. There were no doubt many who were eager to be delivered at any rate from his tyranny.

¹ iv. 7. 5. But Polyænus does not say, as Droysen (i. p. 567.) seems to represent, that Demetrius became by these means master of Piræus, nor can this be safely inferred from Paus. i. 25. 8.

² Pausanias, i. 25. 7.

³ Plut. Dem. 34. It may seem from the fragment of the comic poet Demetrius, in Athenæus, ix. p. 405., that Lachares himself had no better fare for his guests. Yet the expression *Λαχάρου τινός* is strange, if the noted tyrant was meant.

It seems, that at length he himself found his position insupportable or untenable.¹ He stole out in a rustic disguise through a postern, and then mounted a horse which was waiting for him at a short distance. He is said to have dropped gold pieces on his road, and thus to have detained a party of light horse who were sent in pursuit of him. He arrived safely at Thebes, where he found shelter, as in an allied city.² Perhaps a part of his sacrilegious plunder had been already lodged there.

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After his departure the gates were immediately thrown open to Demetrius, and an embassy sent to propitiate him, though with little hope of a favourable hearing. The conqueror was not vindictive; and he resolved to astonish the people by a display of magnanimity, which was also likely to promote his interests in Greece. He ordered them to assemble in the theatre: the avenues were occupied, and the stage lined with his guards. While the audience sat in trembling suspense, Demetrius made his appearance at the entrance commonly assigned to the principal personage of a drama, and came forward to the front of the stage. It was to have been expected, that a harangue full of bitter reproaches would introduce some tragic scene. But his first words dispelled these apprehensions. He complained of their conduct toward him, but in the mildest terms, and the gentlest tone, as if only to assure them of his forgiveness; and as a seal of reconciliation, promised a donation of corn, and the re-establishment of their democratical institutions. And when one of his hearers corrected a grammatical error which he committed in his harangue, he expressed his gratitude

B. C. 295.
Athens sur-
renders to
Demetrius.

¹ It is not quite clear what Pausanias (I. 25. 7.) meant by his ἀλισκομένου τοῦ τείχους. Polyænus (III. 7. 1.) also has ἀλισκομένων Ἀθηνῶν.

² Polyænus, III. 7. 1. Pausanias (I. 25. 7.) thought that he was murdered on this journey.

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for the lesson by a liberal addition to his present.¹ It may easily be conceived, that the most practised orators could hardly find language strong enough to express the gratitude and admiration excited by this speech. But the transports of the spectators were probably a little cooled, when Dromoclides, who at least understood the mind of Demetrius, proposed that Piræus and Munychia should be placed in his hands. The motion was of course carried by acclamation; but Demetrius, as we shall see, did not long remain satisfied with this mark of confidence.

Demetrius
against
Sparta.

We have seen that, in his last campaign in Peloponnesus, he had been repulsed from Messene. It is therefore not surprising that, when he had made himself master of Athens, he should have returned to complete the conquest of the peninsula. But instead of Messene, we find that Sparta is now the object of his attack: and no cause is assigned for the fact. Sparta was at this time so weak, and had kept so carefully aloof from all the contests which had disturbed Greece since Alexander's death, that it is improbable she should have offered any provocation to Demetrius. She had however shown her determination to preserve her independence; and it seems that, during Cassander's invasion of Peloponnesus in 317, the Spartans had already for the first time begun to fortify some points of their city.² Possibly Demetrius had demanded some tokens of submission which they refused.³ They were at least aware of his design before he had advanced very far, and made such pre-

¹ Plut. Reg. et Imp. ap. Δημητρίου, 2.

² Justin, xiv. 5. 5.

³ Droysen believes that, without having been threatened or provoked, they were induced by Ptolemy's instigation to begin hostilities against Demetrius. This seems hardly consistent with the caution and the weakness of Sparta, and contradicts Plutarch's statement, Dem. 35. It is more surprising that Demetrius should have left the Spartans unmolested so long, than that he should have attacked them now. If there were any ground for Flathe's conjecture (ii. p. 22.), that he was jealous of the title of their kings, it would only increase this difficulty.

parations as they could for defence. King Archidamus, a nephew of Agis, who fell in the battle with Antipater, was sent with an army, which must have been almost entirely composed of the subject classes, or mercenaries, to meet the invaders, and fell in with them near Mantinea.¹ The two armies were separated from one another by a woody hill, a spur of the Lycæan range. Demetrius set fire to the wood, and, while a north wind drove the flames against the enemy, made a charge which threw them into confusion.² Archidamus retreated with the remainder of his forces to protect Laconia, and the Spartans, expecting an immediate invasion, hastily threw up some additional intrenchments round the capital. Still they ventured on another action in the immediate neighbourhood of Sparta, but were again defeated with the loss of 200 slain and 500 prisoners: and the chief hope they had now left was in the strength of their newly-raised ramparts. Against the Besieger such defences could not have availed them long. But at the moment when the success of Demetrius seemed most certain, he was called away by intelligence which opened the prospect of a much more important conquest in another quarter.

After his departure for Greece, Ptolemy and Seleucus seem to have agreed to divide his eastern possessions between them. Ptolemy at least was permitted to conquer Cyprus; which was the easier, as Demetrius had drawn off all the naval forces he could raise there for the siege of Athens; and there can be little doubt that Seleucus at the same time made himself master of all he could wrest from his father-in-law on the main land. They perhaps invited Lysimachus, he at least took the opportunity, to reduce the towns which still belonged to Demetrius on the

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¹ Plut. Dem. 35.

² Polyænus, iv. 7. 9.

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coast of Asia Minor. According to Plutarch, Demetrius heard of all these losses at the same time, just as Sparta was on the point of falling; and the news from Cyprus touched his personal feelings; for his mother and children were besieged by Ptolemy in Salamis, the only place in the island which still held out. Nevertheless, it is quite incredible that this intelligence had any effect on his movements. It was no doubt the change which had taken place in the state of affairs in Macedonia, that induced him suddenly to break up his camp on the Eurotas.

Civil war
in Macedo-
nia.

Alexander, Antipater's younger brother, was the favourite of their mother Thessalonice, and perhaps was encouraged by her to aspire to the throne, or at least to the possession of a princely appanage; for it seems that he had claims, and adherents to support them. Antipater, in a fit of rage, for no advantage could be hoped from such a crime, murdered his mother with his own hand. Yet it appears that the deed excited so little horror among his subjects, that he might have continued to reign, if Alexander, who saw himself unable to maintain his footing in Macedonia, had not called in foreign aid. He could expect none from Thrace, since Antipater had married the daughter of Lysimachus; and this rendered it the more necessary to seek it elsewhere. There were two other quarters which he might apply to. Pyrrhus had now regained the throne of Epirus. He had been furnished with troops and money by Ptolemy, about the same time that Demetrius was engaged in the siege of Athens, and had first compelled Neoptolemus to share the kingdom with him, and then got rid of his rival, who, as he gave out, had plotted against his life. To him, now master of an undivided realm, Alexander addressed himself in his need; but that he might have a double hope to lean on, he sent an embassy for the same purpose to Demetrius.

Pyrrhus was the nearest at hand, and consented to march against Antipater, but on condition that Alexander should cede to him a large extent of territory, apparently including all the conquests that had been made by Cassander on the side of Ætolia, together with a portion of Macedonia itself.¹ The young prince granted this high price through fear of Lysimachus, and because Demetrius was too much occupied by his affairs in Greece to comply immediately with his request. Antipater was unable to resist the invader, and, it appears, tried in vain to avert his hostility by an offer of 300 talents. Lysimachus was at this time engaged in war with the Getes, which prevented him from interposing in behalf of his son-in-law, otherwise than by an ineffectual attempt to deceive Pyrrhus. He forged a letter to him in Ptolemy's name, recommending him to accept Antipater's offer. But Pyrrhus detected the fraud by the greeting of the letter, which, instead of the affectionate form always used by Ptolemy in their correspondence, "*The Father to his Son,*" ran, in court style, "*King Ptolemy to King Pyrrhus.*" Still Lysimachus was anxious for peace, which Pyrrhus, having accomplished his immediate objects, was willing to grant. But the ratification was prevented, it is said, by a sinister omen. It appears nevertheless that Antipater was permitted to retain a part of Macedonia.² Nothing could better suit the interests of Pyrrhus

¹ Plut. Pyrrh. 6. According to Niebuhr's emendation. *Τὴν τε Στυμφαλίαν, καὶ τὴν Παρῶν τῆς Μακεδονίας* (iii. p. 459. Engl. Tr., where *Παρῶν* and *Παρῶν* should be transposed).

² This is distinctly stated by Justin, xvi. 1. 19.; it perhaps suggested the notion of an antecedent *divisio regni*, mentioned at the beginning of the chapter, and is even clearly implied in Plutarch's narrative, Pyrrhus 6., coupled with Demet. 37. Nor would it be easy otherwise to explain the assertion of Pausanias (ix. 7. 3.), that Antipater was dethroned by Demetrius. Droysen relies more on the expression *σίνεδρον τῆ βασιλείᾳ* in the fragment of Diodorus, xxi. He also believes that Antipater fled twice to the court of Lysimachus, once before Pyrrhus, and again before Demetrius. This supposition seems at least unnecessary, and no argument for it can be safely drawn from Dexippus.

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Demetrius
in Mace-
donia.

than such a partition of the neighbouring kingdom. Alexander remained in quiet possession of the rest.

This must have been the intelligence which called Demetrius so suddenly away from Sparta: not the first application which he received from Alexander, but the news that Pyrrhus had entered Macedonia. He had probably not been informed of the negotiation between Pyrrhus and Alexander, or he would have instantly broken off every affair that detained him in Greece, rather than resign such an opportunity of aggrandisement to the king of Epirus, whom, since the death of Deidamia, he could only consider as his rival, and the devoted ally of his enemy Ptolemy. Feigning himself unconscious that his aid was no longer needed or desired, he advanced without delay, so as even to give his retreat from Sparta the appearance of a flight¹, to the frontiers of Macedonia. Alexander, alarmed and uncertain about his designs, marched with all his forces to meet him, and received him at Diium, as an honoured guest, yet so as clearly enough to betray the uneasiness he felt at the unwelcome visit. Demetrius was privately informed that his royal host intended to assassinate him at a banquet. He provided for his own safety, but dissembled his suspicions, and the next day, pretending to have received news of some movements in Greece, which forced him to hasten his return, began to make preparations for his departure. Alexander, rejoicing at the unexpected deliverance, would accompany him as far as Larissa.² There, as his enemies gave out

¹ Polyænus, iv. vii. 10. Here is an extremely striking and instructive example, to show how dangerous it is to ground an inference as to chronology on the seeming continuity of events in Plutarch's narratives. Mr. Clinton (F. II. under B. C. 299.) places the siege of Athens by Demetrius about two years after the battle of Ipsus, because Plutarch enumerates the intermediate events without any indication of a longer interval. Yet Plutarch (Demetr. 35.) connects the capture of Athens with the invasion of Sparta, which preceded the accession of Demetrius to the throne of Macedon (fixed by Mr. Clinton in 294) not many weeks, by the word *εὐθὺς*.

² So Plutarch, Dem. 36. ; and there is no reason for questioning that his joy was

after his death, he hoped still to execute his murderous design; but, that he might not awaken suspicion by an appearance of distrust, suffered himself to be forestalled. It is certain that he accepted an invitation from Demetrius, and, as he was leaving the banqueting-room, was cut down by the guards whom Demetrius had posted there for the purpose, together with several of his friends. One of them is said to have acknowledged that Demetrius had gained the start of them only by a single day: but a fact so improbable cannot safely be admitted on such suspicious testimony.

CHAP.
LX.
Murder of
Alexander.

It was night when the deed was perpetrated; and the news filled the Macedonian camp with alarm and tumult until the morning, when a message was brought from Demetrius, by which he expressed his desire to address the army, and to give an account of his conduct. He not only vindicated it to the satisfaction of the military assembly, but made so favourable an impression on his hearers¹, that, preferring him to the parricide, and having no other competitor before them, they elected him to fill the vacant throne: and he returned to Macedonia at their head. The choice of the army was approved by the great mass of the people, who had never much affection for the blood-thirsty Cassander, or any of his family, and least of all would wish to be governed by Antipater. Whatever title his grandfather, their old governor, had to their regard, was inherited by the noble-minded Phila, and thus devolved upon her husband and their son Antigonus, surnamed Gonatas², who

B. C. 294.
Demetrius,
king of
Macedonia.

sincere, and not—as Droysen represents it, i. p. 580.—assumed to mask his murderous intentions. There was no adequate motive for such a dangerous attempt after the departure of Demetrius.

¹ Plutarch observes (Dem. 37.) that he had no need of long speeches: and, indeed, with an army to second him, and so many circumstances in his favour, addressing troops without a leader, he might well dispense with eloquence.

² According to Dexippus and Porphyry, from the Thessalian town of Gonni (compare Steph. Byz. s. 2.), where they suppose him to have been born or brought up. And this seems quite as probable as Niebuhr's conjecture (*Kleine Schriften*,

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LX.

was now a youth capable of bearing arms, and had accompanied his father in this expedition. Antipater, probably finding himself generally abandoned, and having no hope of gaining any thing from Demetrius, either by arms or negotiation, fled to the court of Lysimachus. But Lysimachus, who was now engaged more earnestly than ever with his preparations against his northern neighbours, was glad to make peace with Demetrius, and it seems compelled his son-in-law to renounce his claim to the part of Macedonia, which had been assigned to him in the treaty with Pyrrhus.¹ Thus, seven years after the battle of Ipsus, and just at the time when he saw himself deprived of the last remnants of his patrimony in the East, Demetrius had acquired a new kingdom, in which he had never been able to set his foot while his father's power was at his command. At the same time he heard that Ptolemy had been generous enough to let his mother and children depart with munificent presents, after they had fallen into his hands at Salamis. It might be considered as an additional favour of fortune, that Seleucus had given up the beautiful Stratonice to his heir-apparent Antiochus, whose life appeared to be in danger through the violence of his passion for his mother-in-law, and, reserving the government of the provinces west of the Euphrates for himself, had committed the rest of his vast empire to his son.

It remained for Demetrius to complete the subjugation of Greece, and to unite it firmly with his new dominions. This was the more necessary, as he had a formidable rival in Pyrrhus, who would be ready to seize whatever he might leave unoccupied. Thessaly,

p. 228.), that the epithet was derived from a part of his armour, the γομαράς, an iron piece which covered the knee; which however has the usual spelling in its favour.

¹ So Justin, xvi. 1., *tradita ei altera parte Macedonia, quæ Antipatro genero ejus obvenerat, pacem cum eo fecit.*

it seems, as little more than a province of Macedonia, forthwith acknowledged his authority. But the Bœotians had not submitted to him, and we may collect that, after his retreat from Laconia, they had entered into treaty with Sparta, and had been encouraged by promises of Spartan succours to assert their independence. But Demetrius surprised them by the rapidity of his movements. He sent a herald before him with a declaration of war; but the day after the Bœotarchs received it at Orchomenus, he himself encamped at Chæronea.¹ In their consternation they sued for peace, which he granted on moderate terms. Hoping perhaps that he had secured their fidelity by his generosity, he exacted no other pledge, and it appears returned immediately to Macedonia, where there was no doubt much to demand his presence, especially as the affairs of Lysimachus were in a critical position. But shortly after his departure, the Bœotians were induced to revolt by the arrival of a Spartan army commanded by Cleonymus, the uncle of the king Areus. The Spartan government probably hoped that the resistance of Bœotia might protect its own territory from a second invasion which it had reason to apprehend, as soon as Demetrius should be at leisure. A citizen of Thespiæ, named Pisis, who possessed the power without the name of a tyrant, also excited his countrymen to renew the struggle. But they soon found that they had misreckoned their means. Demetrius returned with a powerful army, forced Cleonymus to withdraw, and laid siege to Thebes. The retreat of the Spartans struck their allies with dismay, and they again submitted to the conqueror. Lachares, who had hitherto remained at Thebes, hid himself for some days when the city surrendered, and then made

CHAP.
LX.

B. C. 292.
Demetrius
in Bœotia.

¹ Polyæn. iv. 9. 12.

CHAP.
LX.

his escape to Delphi.¹ Demetrius used his victory with great moderation, though he did not again trust the loyalty of the Bœotians. Only fourteen of the principal authors of the revolt suffered punishment²; but he exacted heavy contributions, and threw garrisons into their cities, and appointed Hieronymus of Cardia, the historian, governor-general of Bœotia. Pisis, who fell into his hands, he treated with unexpected lenity, leaving him in full possession of his former authority at Thespiæ, with the title of polemarch.³

Fortifica-
tion of the
Museum.

It was perhaps the Bœotian insurrection that led Demetrius to take a new precaution for the security of Athens, and it was probably now⁴—at least not later—that he fortified an eminence called the Museum, within the walls of the city, and lodged a garrison there under the command of Heraclides. Polyænus relates a plot laid by the Athenian generals to introduce a body of Athenian troops into the city, to kill Heraclides and overpower the garrison. But it was defeated through the defection of a Carian leader of mercenaries, named Hierocles, who disclosed it to Heraclides, and enabled him to destroy all the conspirators.⁵ It seems clear that this occurred after the Museum had been fortified, and the attempt was a natural result of the resentment which must have been awakened in the Athenians by the conduct of Demetrius. On the other hand, it is not

¹ Polyæn. iii. 7. 2.

² Diodor. xxi.

³ Plut. Dem. 39.

⁴ Paus. i. 22. 8. *ὕστερον πολέμου κρατήσας.*

⁵ Polyæn. v. 17. 1. The scene of the interview between Hierocles and the Athenian generals, the Eleusinium on the Ilissus (Leake's *Athens*, p. 114.), seems to connect this enterprise so closely with the Museum, that it must be supposed either that Pausanias (i. 29. 10.) made a mistake, or that, notwithstanding the similarity of the circumstances, he is speaking of a different transaction. This can scarcely have been the victory which he alluded to in the passage quoted in the last note. The difficulty arising from the remark of Polyænus, *αὐτὸς ἦν περὶ τῆν Λυδίας*, remains the same on either supposition, and is not satisfactorily explained by Droysen's conjecture, that it was somehow or other occasioned by the name of the Macedonian river *Λουδίας*. *Διορίζαντας* should be *διανοίξαντας*, as it is translated, *aperta quadam parte portarum*.

improbable that the evidence which it gave of their spirit may have been the occasion which induced him to recal a number of Athenian exiles. As Dinarchus, the enemy of Demosthenes, was one of them, and they are said to have owed their restoration to the influence of Theophrastus¹, it may be concluded that they all belonged to the oligarchical party which had opposed Demetrius when he appeared as the champion of liberty, but in which he might expect to find his firmest supporters, as soon as he had proved his resolution to adopt the maxims of Cassander, and to govern Athens by military force.²

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LX.

When he had completed the conquest of Bœotia, he returned to Macedonia. There can be little doubt that he would have pursued his march into Peloponnesus, to take revenge on Sparta for the recent provocation, and to accomplish what he had been obliged to leave unfinished, had not the state of affairs in the north more urgently demanded his attention. It was not long after that Lysimachus set out on an expedition, which Demetrius must have watched with great anxiety, as its issue could not but materially affect his own prospects. Its object was to decide the contest which had now been carried on for some years between the Greek kingdom of Thrace and the great Thracian tribe, called the Getes. This division of the race had, it seems, been driven eastward from its seats on the right of the Danube by an irruption of the Triballians, who were themselves making way for the Gauls.³ The Getes then establishd themselves in the country on the north-west shore of the Euxine, which had once been occupied by the Scythians, whose

Lysimachus
and the
Getes.

¹ Plut. x. Oratt. p. 850. D. Dionys. Dinarch. 2.

² This is Droysen's combination (i. p. 588., and in Zimmermann's *Zeitschrift*, 1836, p. 168.).

³ Niebuhr, *KL. Schr.* p. 374., where he had in his mind a passage of Applan (Illyr. 3.), which he has referred to elsewhere. (Hist. of Rome, ii. p. 512. Engl. Tr.)

CHAP.
LX.

great empire had been long dissolved into a number of feeble disunited hordes. In their new territories they had become formidable neighbours to the Greek princes of the Tauric Chersonesus (Crimea); for the Thracian, Aripharnes, who supported Eumelus, one of these princes, with an army of 22,000 foot and 20,000 horse in a war against his brothers for the succession, seems to have been king of the Getes.¹ They were now governed by one named Dromichætes, under whom their power appears to have reached its greatest height, and whose noble character would impress us with a favourable opinion of his subjects, if it was not evident that he was as much superior to his own people, as he was to most of the contemporary kings. Lysimachus, we know not how long after the battle of Ipsus, had extended his dominions on the north-east frontier at the expense of the Getes; but his eldest son, Agathocles, had afterwards fallen into the enemy's hands. Dromichætes sent the young prince back with presents to his father, hoping that Lysimachus would meet this generosity by restitution and forbearance. But Lysimachus probably attributed conduct so foreign to his own character and to the maxims of the age, to the fear which the barbarian felt of his power, and was only encouraged by it to prosecute his plans of conquest. He invaded the country of the Getes with an army, it is said, of 100,000 men, accompanied by Clearchus, the eldest son of Amastris², who no doubt brought a body of troops from Heraclea. But, trusting to the guidance of a Thracian who pretended to have deserted to him, he suffered himself to be drawn into a position where, to avoid starving, he was fain to surrender with all his forces.³ Dromichætes received his royal prisoner with more than chivalrous courtesy, saluted him with

B. C. 292.
Lysimachus
defeated.

¹ Diodor. xx. 22. Niebuhr, u. s. p. 381.

² Memnon ap. Phot. p. 224. 4to ed. Bekk.

³ Polyænus, vii. 25.

the name of father, and respectfully conducted him to the Gete city of Elis. There the barbarians were clamorous for vengeance on an enemy who had shown himself dead to all sense both of justice and gratitude. Still Dromichætes soothed them, and, representing to them that they would gain nothing by the death of Lysimachus, whose dominions would probably be occupied by a more powerful successor, but that if they spared him they might recover all they had lost, he obtained their consent to treat him as he himself thought fit. He first made inquiry among the prisoners after the principal courtiers and attendants of Lysimachus, and restored them to their places about their master's person. Then, on occasion of a sacrifice, he invited Lysimachus and his nobles to a banquet, where he also entertained the persons of highest rank among the barbarians. But he had ordered preparations to be made so as to exhibit the Macedonian luxury and the Thracian simplicity in the most glaring contrast with each other. While on one side of the hall the prisoners, stretched on couches adorned with the rich furniture found among the spoil, were sumptuously regaled and drank from gold and silver vessels, the conquerors lay over against them on coarse matting, partook of their usual homely fare, and drank out of horns or wooden cups. Toward the close of the feast, Dromichætes asked his guest which style of entertainment he preferred, and took occasion to point out to him the folly of his aggression on an enemy who had so little to lose. Lysimachus might well think himself fortunate to receive no severer lesson. He gladly consented to cede all that he possessed east of the Danube, and offered the choice of his daughters to his generous monitor, who replaced the diadem on his brow, and dismissed him and his chief officers with presents.¹ Clearchus re-

CHAP.
LX.

Recovers
his liberty.

¹ Diodor. xxi. Exc. Vat. p. 44. Strabo, vii. p. 302.

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LX.

mained some time longer a captive, but he too was afterwards released at the intercession of Lysimachus.¹

The news of the defeat and capture of Lysimachus soon reached Macedonia, and Demetrius hastened to take advantage of it. He marched into Thrace, and it appears made himself master of Sestus. Lachares, who had taken refuge in the dominions of Lysimachus, happened to be in the town, and when it surrendered lay concealed for some days, and then made his escape in female disguise, under a black veil, as one of the mourners at a funeral, and fled to Lysimachia², the new capital founded by Lysimachus on the isthmus near Cardia. But Demetrius was suddenly arrested in his career of conquest by intelligence from two opposite quarters. He heard, it seems nearly at the same time, that Bœotia had again revolted from him, and that Lysimachus had recovered his liberty, and was on his way homeward.

B. C. 291.
Revolt of
Thebes.

The conquest of Thrace must have been an object of far greater moment to him than the reduction of the Bœotian towns, in which he could not have expected to find much difficulty, and which was the less pressing, as he had left Antigonus with a force sufficient, as the event proved, to quell the insurrection without him. It is therefore a little surprising, that he should have suffered himself to be diverted from his enterprise. But perhaps he apprehended that if he persevered, he might have not only Lysimachus, but his new ally, the king of the Getes, upon his hands; and still more, that he might be attacked by Pyrrhus. This, and not his resentment against the Bœotians, was probably the motive that induced him to decamp from the Chersonesus, and to march with all speed southward. When he arrived in Bœotia, he found

¹ Memnon ap. Phot.

² Polyænus, vii. 3.

that the insurgents had already been defeated by Antigonus, and he immediately laid siege to Thebes. There can be little doubt that the Bœotians had been secretly stimulated by Pyrrhus to their attempt, which would otherwise have been desperately rash : and he now made a diversion in their favour. He invaded and overran Thessaly, and advanced as far as Thermopylæ. Demetrius, leaving his son to conduct the siege, hastened to meet him. His army must have been very strong ; for he not only compelled Pyrrhus to retreat into Epirus, but was able to leave a corps of 10,000 foot and 1000 horse for the protection of Thessaly, and then returned to prosecute the siege. The Thebans, now despairing of forgiveness, made an obstinate resistance. Demetrius found it necessary to resort to the use of his huge Helepolis. In the meanwhile he ordered repeated assaults, in which he lost so many of his men, that Antigonus remonstrated with his father on the needless sacrifice of life. The answer was characteristic : *Why, my son, should that concern you? Have you to pay the dead?* He however exposed his own person to animate the assailants, and received a severe wound in his neck. The siege appears to have lasted the greater part of a year : in 290 the place surrendered at discretion. After so many provocations the besieged had reason to expect the most rigorous treatment : yet the conqueror again contented himself with a very lenient vengeance. Some thirteen were put to death : a few banished, and an amnesty proclaimed for the rest.¹

It was the year of the Pythian games, and was rendered memorable by an innovation with respect to them, which illustrates the character, if not the policy of Demetrius. At the time when the games were to be celebrated at Delphi, the passes of the road from

CHAP.
LX.

B. C. 290.
Demetrius
at Athens.

¹ Plut. Dem. 40. According to Diodorus, *xxi. Eclog. x. p. 491.* only ten suffered.

CHAP.
LX.

Athens to Delphi were occupied by the Ætolians, who, it seems, were in alliance with Pyrrhus; so that the sacred embassy, usually sent by the Athenians to attend the festival, could not safely undertake the journey. Demetrius could probably have furnished it with a sufficient escort, both to have cleared the road of all obstacles, and to have guarded against interruption during the games. But he preferred to celebrate them at Athens, not on the ground of the temporary emergency, but declaring that the city where Apollo was worshipped, under a title which implied the antiquity of its devotion to the god, was the fittest of all places for his festival. Demetrius may have wished to gratify the vanity of the Athenians; it is clear, that in this proceeding he assumed the functions of the Amphictyonic council.⁴

B. C. 289.
He invades
Ætolia.

Nevertheless, the conduct of the Ætolians rendered it necessary for the reputation of his arms that he should chastise them; and it was also time to retaliate upon Pyrrhus for his late invasion of Thessaly, and to wrest from him the Macedonian provinces which he still retained. Demetrius had perhaps another motive, which will be presently mentioned, for an expedition to the west. And it was no longer a matter of choice with him, whether he should bestir himself or remain quiet. He had placed himself in a situation which demanded a continual succession of fresh enterprises. From the time of his accession to the throne of Macedonia, it seems that it had been his constant object to increase his military and naval power, to an extent adequate to the vast projects which that unexpected turn of fortune probably first suggested to him. For he now aspired to nothing less than the recovery of his father's empire; an attempt which he well knew must bring him into a conflict with the

¹ Plut. Dem. 40.

combined forces of Lysimachus, Ptolemy, and Seleucus; even if Pyrrhus should have been previously subdued. He had raised an army quite out of proportion to the ordinary resources of his kingdom; and it was not only kept on foot, but continually growing. One consequence was, that his government became a pure military despotism, and that he was quite independent of the goodwill of the people, and depended entirely on the army; another was, that he was obliged to find employment for his troops, both to relieve his treasury, and to guard against the disorders arising from the leisure of the camp. In the spring then of 289 he invaded Ætolia, and after he had ravaged the country, left his general, Pantauchus, with a strong division to curb the Ætolians, while he himself marched into Epirus. In the meanwhile Pyrrhus, foreseeing that his own territory would otherwise be the next seat of war, had moved to succour his allies. The two armies however happened to take different roads; so that nearly at the same time Demetrius arrived in Epirus, Pyrrhus in Ætolia. Pantauchus did not decline a battle; and, as he was distinguished above all the generals of Demetrius for strength and courage, seized the opportunity to display his personal prowess against a royal foe. Before the engagement began, he came forward and challenged Pyrrhus to a single combat. Pyrrhus, in person and in spirit no unworthy descendant of Achilles, disdained all scruples, whether of usage or prudence, and advanced to the encounter. He received a wound, but gave two, and would have slain his antagonist, if he had not been rescued by his friends. The Epirots were animated by the event of the combat; the enemy disheartened, as well by the absence of their commander, as by its cause. In the end, Pyrrhus gained a complete victory, and took 5000 prisoners: the number of the slain is not men-

Victory of
Pyrrhus.

CHAP.
LX.

tioned, and perhaps he thought it prudent to spare the lives of the Macedonians as much as possible. But the advantage which he reaped from his success extended much farther. The Macedonians who had witnessed his exploits, were struck with admiration, and perhaps found some solace for their defeat in the praises they bestowed on the conqueror. *He was indeed a soldier, worthy to command soldiers; the only king of the age in whom there could be traced any likeness to the great Alexander. Pyrrhus revived this image by the fire and vigour of his movements in the field of battle; the rest only mimicked the hero, whose title they assumed, in their demeanour, and in the trappings and state of royalty.* It was a comparison peculiarly dangerous for their own sovereign, whose arrogance and love of ostentation had grown more inordinate than ever, since he sat on Alexander's throne.

Demetrius
and Lanassa.

Demetrius found no one to resist him in Epirus, and ravaged and plundered there at his pleasure. He made no attempt to seek Pyrrhus, most probably because he was occupied with another, easier, and more agreeable conquest. Pyrrhus had lost his queen Antigona, and after her death, according to the now prevailing usage of Greek princes, married three wives: all, it seems, for the sake of advantageous alliances. One was a Pæonian, another an Illyrian princess; and to these he added Lanassa, the daughter of Agathocles, with whom he received Corcyra as her portion. But the pride of the Greek princess was soon wounded by the attention which he continued to pay to his barbarian wives. She quitted him, and retired to Corcyra, where she looked out for an opportunity of revenge. She knew that she might reckon on the services of Demetrius, and invited him to take possession of her person and of the island. How welcome such an offer must have been to him, may be gathered from the fact, that when the Spartan Cleonymus made

himself master of Corcyra¹, both Demetrius and Cassander courted his alliance.² As Cleonymus was known to entertain hostile designs against Agathocles, it may be supposed that the relations which had hitherto subsisted between Demetrius and the Sicilian tyrant had been far from friendly. But about this time Agathocles sent his son, who bore the father's name, to Demetrius, to conclude an alliance with him. Demetrius received the young prince with the highest honours, invested him with a royal robe, and sent him back with splendid presents, accompanied by one of his own courtiers, named Oxythemis, who was publicly charged with the ratification of the treaty, but was secretly instructed to observe the state of Sicily, on which it seems Demetrius had cast his eye, as on a prize which might perhaps one day become his. How far this negotiation was connected with Lanassa's offer does not appear: but it must have been on the occasion of his expedition to Epirus that Demetrius complied with her invitation, and made himself master of Corcyra.

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LX.

In the following year Demetrius was attacked by a dangerous illness, and, while he lay sick at Pella, Pyrrhus made an irruption into his kingdom, overran it almost entirely, and advanced as far as Edessa. Demetrius however recovered in time, and, when he was able to take the field, soon expelled the invader. Still the continuance of the war with Pyrrhus offered little prospect of advantage, and, as appeared from the events of the late campaign, might lead to disastrous consequences. It was only in Asia that he could hope to find a field worthy of his ambition, where he might rely on the constant attachment of his troops, so long as fortune favoured his enterprises.

¹ See Vol. VII. p. 386.

² Diodor. xx. 105. Schlosser (*Univers. Uebersicht*, i. 3. p. 437.), through some oversight, describes the embassy as one to Agathocles.

CHAP.
LX.

B. C. 288.
His mili-
tary pre-
parations.

He therefore concluded a truce with Pyrrhus, that he might be able to devote his whole attention to the preparations which he was making for his expedition to the East. They were now very far advanced, and were on a scale proportioned to the magnitude of the object he had in view. To the fleet of 300 sail with which he had besieged Athens, he had added 200 new ships, built under his personal superintendence at Athens, Corinth, Chalcis, and Pella: all large, and several of extraordinary dimensions, yet capable of easy and quick movements.¹ Beside the force necessary to man this fleet, he had collected an army of nearly 100,000 foot and 12,000 horse. It is difficult to imagine how he found means to equip this huge armament: and it has seemed an inevitable conclusion, that he must have drained the resources of Macedonia and Greece, and have laid almost intolerable burdens on his subjects.² Yet we do not find this mentioned among the causes of their discontent. Plutarch only speaks of his luxury and magnificence; particularly of the theatrical splendour with which he adorned his person³, and of the Asiatic seclusion in which he affected to keep himself concealed from public view, of the difficulty which suitors found in reaching the royal presence, and of the arrogance and harshness with which they were received. On this head the biographer relates an anecdote, which indicates a disregard of public opinion bordering on infatuation. One day, as Demetrius came out of the

His arro-
gance.

¹ Plutarch (Dem. 43.) observes, that galleys of fifteen and sixteen banks of oars were never known before. He proceeds to remark, that in Ptolemy Philopator's state galley (more fully described by Callixenus in Athen. v. 37.) there were forty, and these required 4000 rowers. But we find that the Heracleot octeres (Memnon ap. Phot. p. 226. b. ed. Bekk.) was rowed by 1600 men. Hence a rough estimate may be formed of the numbers needed to man the fleet of Demetrius, which however was probably never completely equipt.

² Droysen, i. p. 603.

³ On which compare Duris in Athenæus, xii. 50., who however may be suspected of exaggeration; for while Plutarch (Dem. 41.) describes a chlamys, on which the constellations of the zodiac and other stars were embroidered in gold, as only begun and never finished, Duris speaks as if Demetrius had many such in his wardrobe.

palace, he was observed to be of easier access than usual; and a crowd of petitioners approached to present their memorials: he gathered them in his mantle, and proceeded, followed by the anxious throng, to the bridge, and there threw them all over into the *Axius*. This conduct was the more offensive to the Macedonians, because they had never been used to it in their rulers. Old men remembered the readiness and affability with which Philip had been wont to listen to all classes of his people; the simplicity with which he and Alexander maintained their dignity: more recently, Antipater had retained the habits of a frugal citizen, while he wielded a much greater power than Demetrius now possessed. The less was it to be endured that this upstart, who was born a subject, should assume the pomp and state of a Persian despot.

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LX.

It would perhaps be attributing too deep a policy to Demetrius, to suppose that he meant to dazzle and awe the Macedonians; but it seems that he did not become aware, until it was too late, how deeply and widely his conduct had excited disgust and contempt. The army itself could not love or respect a prince of such a character, who kept his soldiers at such a distance, and whose ordinary habits were so remote from the freedom and plainness of the camp. If Demetrius had been conscious of his danger, he would have seen an additional motive to hasten his preparations for the enterprise in which he was about to venture his all on the struggle for universal empire. It had become the last expedient by which he could hope to secure what he already possessed. But the jealousy of his rivals was alarmed by his extraordinary exertions; and they determined not to wait until he should carry the war into their dominions. Seleucus, Ptolemy, and Lysimachus, renewed their league with one another against him, and sent ambassadors to re-

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⎵

monstrate with Pyrrhus on the impolitic engagement he had contracted with the common enemy. They warned him of the danger to which he would be exposed, if he suffered Demetrius quietly to execute his plans of conquest, and reminded him of the injury and dishonour he had lately sustained in the loss of Corcyra and Lanassa.¹ He was easily induced to break his treaty with Demetrius, and to join the confederates. They fell upon him while he was still engaged in his preparations. In the spring of 287, Ptolemy appeared with a great armament off the coast of Greece, and invited the Greek cities to revolt. We do not know the nature of his operations, or with what degree of success they were immediately attended. It is most probable that the Greeks waited for the issue of the contest which had begun in Macedonia. For, nearly at the same time, Lysimachus invaded the upper provinces, and, it appears, gained possession of Amphipolis, through the treachery of Andragathus, the officer who commanded there for Demetrius²; and, while Demetrius was on the road to meet him, tidings came that Pyrrhus had penetrated into the heart of the lower country, and had made himself master of Berœa, where he fixed his head-quarters, and sent out detachments to reduce other places. The intelligence excited a tumult of grief and indignation in the Macedonian camp. The men were alarmed for the safety of their property and their families; they broke out into loud complaints and invectives against their king, and threatened to quit his standard, and return to their homes. But there were rumours, and perhaps voices, which apprised him that it was their intention to go over to Lysimachus. The name of Lysimachus,

Pyrrhus in-
vades Ma-
cedonia.

¹ Plutarch, Pyrrh. 10. Dem. 44.

² So *Droysen* (i. p. 612, 613.) explains *Polyæn.* iv. 12. 2. ; and the mention of Amphipolis in *Pausan.* (i. 10. 2.), as the scene of an engagement between Demetrius and Lysimachus, in which Lysimachus was worsted, though in itself apparently erroneous, confirms this view.

Alexander's old companion, was itself of powerful attraction to the Macedonians; and he had with him their exiled prince, his son-in-law, who was ready to renew his pretensions to the throne. Demetrius had reason to fear that, if he advanced farther, he might soon find himself deserted by his troops. He therefore resolved to retrace his steps, and to seek Pyrrhus, for he was not yet aware how completely he had lost the affections which he had disdained to conciliate; he did not suspect the feeling which prevailed in his army in favour of the Epirot, and believed that every bosom glowed with indignation against the foreign invader. But when he drew near to Berœa, he was soon undeceived. The conqueror had treated his captives with kindness; he had won all hearts by his condescension; numbers of the Berœans flocked to the camp of Demetrius; and the report which they spread of the affability and generosity of Pyrrhus confirmed the impression which had been made during the campaign in Ætolia by his heroic valour and soldier-like bearing, and excited a general enthusiasm in his behalf. He himself employed secret emissaries, who, assuming the character of Macedonians, exhorted the soldiers to seize the favourable moment, and get rid of their vain, haughty, oppressive despot.¹ The flame thus fanned, soon burst forth with uncontrollable violence. When Pyrrhus approached at the head of his army, his enemy's troops were prepared to receive him as their benefactor. All eyes were turned in search of the hero; for a time they could not find him, because he had taken off his helmet; but, when he had put it on again, and enabled them to recognise him by the lofty crest, and the horns at its sides, the Macedonians quitted their ranks, and came running up to ask him, as their chief, for the

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¹ Plut. Pyrrh. 11. Justin, xvi. 2. 3. *exercitu ejus corrupto.*

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Flight of
Demetrius.

pass-word. Many seeing that his attendants wore garlands of oak-leaves, crowned themselves in like manner. Demetrius quickly perceived that all was lost. Of those who were near him, some bade him begone, telling him that the Macedonians were tired of spending their strength to support his luxury; others assailed him still more rudely with threats and reproaches. It was clear that his only hope of safety lay in flight. He retired to his tent, exchanged his gorgeous robes for a dark mantle, laid aside his diadem, and stole out of the camp. His departure became the signal for general confusion, and a struggle took place for the plunder of the royal tent. But the tumult was suppressed by the arrival of Pyrrhus, and the Macedonian soldiers unanimously saluted him as their king. Lysimachus, however, had not taken up arms merely to aggrandise Pyrrhus; he claimed a share in the fruits of the victory for himself, and Pyrrhus was obliged to consent to a partition of Macedonia.¹ Antipater now thought that the time had come for urging his claims. But his father-in-law, who had protected the parricide, put the pretender to death, and even confined Eurydice, because she had pleaded for her husband.²

Thus, after a reign of seven years, Demetrius descended from the throne of Macedonia as suddenly as he had mounted it. He first took refuge in Casandrea, where it seems Phila was residing. The generous woman could not bear to see him again reduced to the condition of a fugitive, and, despairing of better days, ended her life by poison. But Demetrius always found it easier to gain than to keep. He could not use or bear prosperity; but adversity braced his nerves, roused his energy, and brought all his talents into action; so that every fall was fol-

¹ Plut. Pyrrh. 12.

² Justin, xvi. 2. 4.

lowed by a rebound. From Cassandrea he passed into Greece, where, when he marched against Lysimachus, he had left his son. But it seems, before he was joined by Antigonus, he entered Thebes, with few attendants, and none of the ensigns of royalty; and he thought it expedient to conciliate the Thebans by the restitution of the political privileges which they had lost after their last revolt.¹ His garrisons however remained faithful to him; Antigonus no doubt had a body of troops under his command, and before long the royal adventurer saw himself again at the head of a little army. Not however in time to save Athens. As soon probably as the revolution in Macedonia was known there, a few brave men, with Olympiodorus at their head, resolved to make another struggle for liberty. The people answered to their call; young and old flocked to their standard. The garrison of the Museum came out to quell the insurrection, but was defeated, and driven into the fortress. It was immediately stormed. Leocritus made his name memorable as the first who mounted the wall, and leaped into the place, where he fell in the combat. Piræus and Munychia were also recovered nearly at the same time.² The people celebrated its victory by the abolition of the priesthood instituted in honour of Antigonus and Demetrius, and the restoration of the ancient practice by which the chief of the Archons gave his name to the year.³ But the accounts which were soon after received of the growing strength of Demetrius, began to inspire new fears; and, as Ptolemy had withdrawn from the coast of Greece, an embassy was decreed to obtain aid from Pyrrhus. In the meanwhile the spirits of the

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LX.

Liberation
of Athens.

¹ Plut. Dem. 46. *Θηβαίους ἀπέδωκε τὴν πολιτείαν.*

² Pausan. i. 26.

³ Plut. Dem. 46., where we should have expected some notice of the expulsion of the Macedonian garrisons.

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Athenians were raised by another victory, achieved under the command of Olympiodorus, over a division of the enemy¹, which had made an inroad into the plain of Eleusis.² With no other force than he could raise in Eleusis itself he put the invaders to flight. Demetrius however soon after appeared with his army, and closely invested the city. We are informed that the Athenians sent an embassy to him, with the philosopher Crates at its head, who, by entreaty or argument, induced him to withdraw his forces.³ No eloquence or reasoning of all the philosophers in Greece could have produced such an effect on Demetrius. He must have found it necessary to raise the siege; and it was most probably the approach of Pyrrhus that forced him to decamp. Pyrrhus in fact complied with the request of the Athenians, and came to Athens, where he went up to the Acropolis, and sacrificed to the goddess. But it appears that it did not suit his plans at this juncture, when his footing in Macedonia was not quite secure, to entangle himself in the affairs of Greece. He thanked the Athenians for their confidence, but advised them not to admit any king again within their walls.⁴ Demetrius was equally unwilling to spend his time and strength in a contest with Pyrrhus, as he was still resolved to try his fortune on the other side of the *Ægæan*. Both parties therefore were disposed to peace: and they concluded a treaty, the terms of which are not recorded; but it is probable that Demetrius resigned his pretensions to Macedonia, on condition that Pyrrhus should not interfere with his interests in Greece.

Pyrrhus at
Athens.

Demetrius
in Asia.

Demetrius now collected his fleet, and embarked with no more than 11,000 foot and a small body of

¹ Droysen (i. 615.) conjectures that it was a detachment from the Macedonian garrison at Corinth.

² Paus. i. 26. 3.

³ Plut. Dem. 46.

⁴ Plut. Pyrrh. 12.

cavalry, leaving Greece to the care of Antigonus, and steered for Miletus. His enterprise would have been desperately rash if he had relied on this slender force; but he seems to have had reason to hope that he might excite a general insurrection in his favour in the Asiatic dominions of Lysimachus, whose rapacity had perhaps rendered him odious to his subjects. On his arrival at Miletus, he found there Ptolemy's queen Eurydice, and her daughter Ptolemais, whose hand had been promised to him thirteen years before in the treaty concluded through the mediation of Seleucus. The marriage was now celebrated, and afforded some encouragement, if not support, to Demetrius in the campaign which he opened immediately after.¹ At the outset he made a rapid progress; several important places, among them Sardis itself, either yielded to his arms or willingly submitted to him: some of the generals of Lysimachus went over to him with the troops and treasure entrusted to them. But the arrival of Agathocles, the son of Lysimachus, whom his father sent with an army to meet the invader, altered the state of affairs. Agathocles was so superior in numbers that Demetrius did not venture to give battle, and determined to seek another theatre of war. He conceived the seemingly extravagant project of penetrating into the eastern provinces of Seleucus. He believed that, if he could reach Armenia, he might bid defiance to all his enemies, and might next invade Media and rouse it to insurrection. So little of foresight and calculation appears in this plan, that it inclines us to suspect

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¹ Prideaux (*Connection*, P. 11. B. 1.) supposes that Eurydice was sent with her daughter to Demetrius by Ptolemy himself. But beside that we hear nothing of a change in Ptolemy's relations to Demetrius, Plutarch's expression, *Εὐρυδικῆς ἐκδιδοίσης*, seems sufficiently to show that it was the act of Eurydice, and that she had already quitted Ptolemy's court in disgust. This is Droysen's view of the transaction. Flathe (ii. p. 42.) supposes a previous negotiation between Demetrius and Ptolemy, and that Demetrius sent Eurydice to Egypt to fetch Ptolemais. This at all events is utterly inconceivable.

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Demetrius must have been attracted towards the East chiefly by the recollection of his father's conquests, and of the great revolution which Seleucus had so rapidly effected there with even slenderer means than he himself now had at his command. He therefore took the road toward Phrygia, and, it seems, advanced far enough eastward to suggest a suspicion of his design to his army, which was not disposed to share his adventures in those remote regions. But he was closely followed by Agathocles, and, though he was commonly victorious when he could draw the enemy into a skirmish, they stopped his foraging parties, and reduced him to great distress. He also lost a great number of men in the passage of the Lycus, which he attempted at a point where the river was not fordable for infantry, relying on his heavy cavalry to break the force of the rapid current.¹ In time the scarcity gave rise to a disease, which carried off some additional thousands, and compelled him to seek, not a new field of conquest, but shelter from the pursuit of Agathocles. He retraced his steps, and crossed the mountains into Cilicia, where he halted at Tarsus: and Agathocles did not pursue him beyond the frontier of his father's dominions, but contented himself with the precautions requisite to prevent him from re-passing the defiles of Taurus.

Demetrius did not now wish to provoke Seleucus, and, urgently as his troops needed refreshment, abstained from the supplies which the country yielded, until he had appealed to the king's generosity. He wrote a long and moving letter to Seleucus, who was at first touched with pity, and ordered his generals to afford royal entertainment to Demetrius, and abundant subsistence to his army. But the remonstrances of Patrocles, one of his most trusty counsellors, who re-

¹ Polyænus, iv. 7. 12.

presented to him the danger he would incur if he should harbour a man of such restless ambition in such desperate circumstances, induced him to change his views and measures. He himself marched with a powerful army into Cilicia, and withdrew the supplies which he had granted. Demetrius in alarm retreated to a strong position at the foot of Taurus, and again addressed Seleucus, requesting that he would either allow him to take possession of some territory now occupied by independent barbarians, or maintain his army in Cilicia during the winter. This proposal strengthened the suspicions which had been awakened in Seleucus; he offered to let Demetrius pass two months of the winter in Cataonia, but demanded his principal officers as hostages, and at the same time proceeded to secure the passages leading to Syria. Demetrius now no longer scrupled to treat him as an enemy, made marauding inroads into the country, and engaged him in several slight actions with constant success. He soon obtained a more important advantage, having made himself master of a pass which gave him entrance into Syria. His troops were inspired with new confidence in their leader; he himself began to recal the dreams of conquest which had floated before him while he was still on the throne of Macedonia, and looked upon himself as engaged in a contest for no less a prize than the dominion of Asia. On the other hand Seleucus, notwithstanding his great advantage of numerical strength, could not but secretly acknowledge the ascendancy of his rival's genius, and dread some sudden turn of fortune in his favour. He began to regret that he had rejected the offers of assistance which he had received from Lysimachus, and did not dare to run the risk of a battle single-handed. It is indeed still doubtful what the issue of the contest might have been, had not Demetrius been seized by a disorder which threatened his

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life, confined him for several weeks, and reduced him to a state of extreme weakness. During this interval of inaction his men deserted him in great numbers, either to return to their homes, or to join the enemy: and, when he was again able to take the field, he found only the wreck of an army remaining. With this it was no longer practicable to advance into Syria: and he set out in the opposite direction, as if it was his intention to return to Cilicia; but suddenly turning eastward, by a night-march he gained the pass of Amanus, and fell plundering and ravaging on the plains of Cyrrhestis.

Here he was soon overtaken by Seleucus. He made an attempt to surprise the enemy's camp in the night; and he might have succeeded if he had not been deterred by a stratagem of Seleucus, who, having been warned in time by some deserters, ordered the trumpets to sound, a fire to be kindled at every tent, and the men to raise a shout, as if prepared for defence.¹ The next day the Syrian army came up to attack him. He directed a movement against one wing, and threw it into some disorder: but when Seleucus had pushed forward on the other side through a hollow way with a select body of troops and eight elephants, and, baring his head, called upon the mercenaries, who formed the main strength of Demetrius, to abandon a famishing adventurer, and enter the service of a king who had treasure to satisfy all their desires, they with one accord laid down their arms, and saluted him as their master.² Demetrius fled with a few attendants; but, after a few days wandering in the forest at the foot of the mountains, and an ineffectual attempt to escape across them to the coast, he was induced by his friends to surrender himself to Seleucus. Seleucus was at first inclined to treat him rather as a friend

B. C. 286.
Surrenders
himself to
Seleucus.

¹ Plut. Dem. 49. Polyænus, iv. 9. 2.

² Plut. Dem. 49. Polyænus, ix. 9. 3.

than a prisoner; but when he saw his own courtiers, encouraged by this show of favour, flocking round the fallen prince, his jealousy revived, and he removed him to the Syrian Chersonesus, where he ordered him to be kept under a strong guard at one of the royal residences, with entertainment suited to his rank, but confined within the park annexed to the palace.

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For some time the captive retained his wonted spirit, and perhaps his hopes. He sent directions to his son, and to the commanders of his garrisons in Greece, to pay no attention to any letters which they might receive in his name, nor even to his seal, but to maintain their posts as if he were dead, and his rights had passed to his successor. Antigonus on this occasion nobly displayed the filial affection which honourably distinguished this family above most of the princely houses of the age. He earnestly solicited his father's liberation, and induced several cities and sovereigns—their names are not recorded—to support his request. He even offered in return to deliver up all the places he still held, and to surrender his own person in his father's stead. The conduct of Lysimachus was as base as this was generous. After the departure of Demetrius from Europe, he had instigated Pyrrhus to break his treaty with him, to invade Thessaly, and to endeavour to wrest from him all he possessed in Greece. As soon as he heard that the affairs of Demetrius were irretrievably ruined¹, he suddenly turned his arms against Pyrrhus, surprised and defeated him near Edessa, and, having cut off his supplies, prevailed on the principal Macedonians to renounce their allegiance to a master, whose ancestors had of old been the subjects of their kings. Pyrrhus, seeing the defection spread, thought it prudent to

¹ Paus. i. 10. 2. *γενομένου ἐπὶ Σελεύκῳ Δημητρίου*. But this would extend the reign of Pyrrhus in Macedonia beyond the seven months assigned to it by Dexippus (Synzell. i. 506. Bonn.) and Porphyry (Euseb. Arm. i. 323. Aucher.).

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withdraw into Epirus¹, and thus, after a reign of seven months, yielded his share of the kingdom to his rival. Still Lysimachus did not think himself secure so long as Demetrius lived, and is reported to have tempted Seleucus by an offer of 2000 talents to put his prisoner to death.² Seleucus indignantly rejected the proposal: observing to the ambassadors, that their master wished him not only to break his word, but to stain his hands with the blood of a kinsman. He even professed an intention to set Demetrius at liberty and restore him to his kingdom³, and that he only waited for the arrival of Antiochus and Stratonice from Babylon, that they might have the pleasure of executing this act of grace.⁴ But it is very doubtful whether he really entertained any such purpose. Demetrius lingered two years in confinement and never saw his royal daughter again. At first he was able to find amusement in the chase, for which the park afforded ample room. But by degrees he grew weary of this pastime, and, shutting himself up in the palace, and neglecting all bodily exercise, sought refuge from thought, or a solace for the misery of hope deferred, in the pleasures of the table, and in intemperance, to which he had not before been addicted. The operation of these combined causes brought his active and strangely chequered life to a premature and inglorious close in the fifty-fifth year of his age (284). Seleucus ordered his ashes to be carried in a golden urn to Greece. Antigonus met the vessel which brought them as it crossed the Ægæan, took the urn on board his own galley, the largest of the fleet, and returned with it to Corinth, where it was received with funeral pomp.

B. C. 284.
Death of
Demetrius.

¹ Droysen (i. 626.) collects from Pausanias (i. 10. 2.) that Antigonus united his forces with those of Pyrrhus, and that they were defeated by Lysimachus. But it seems very doubtful that this is what Pausanias meant.

² Diodorus, xxi. Plut. Dem. 51.

³ Diodorus, xxi. Κατάγειν ἐπὶ τὴν βασιλείαν μεγαλοπρεπῶς.

⁴ Plut. Dem. 51. Diodor. xxi.

It was finally transported to Demetrias, a city recently founded on the gulf of Pagasæ on the site of Iolcus, and peopled from the small towns on the coast.

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After the death of Demetrius there remained but two competitors for power, of Alexander's immediate successors. For the king of Egypt had already abdicated his throne in favour of Ptolemy, afterwards named Philadelphus, his son by Berenice. His motive for this step was not merely his passionate fondness for Berenice. It was apparently with good reason that he preferred her son to the legitimate heir, another Ptolemy, his son by Eurydice, who, from the reckless violence of his character which his subsequent conduct discloses, acquired, as Hamilcar and Bajazet, the epithet of Ceraunus (the Thunderbolt).¹ The court of Egypt was no longer a safe place for the prince who had been excluded from the succession; and he fled with his younger brother Meleager. But he sought shelter, not, as might have been expected, from Seleucus, but from Lysimachus. It seems that he thought he had less to dread from his rival's sister, queen Arsinoe, than to hope from Lysandra, who after Alexander's death had married the Thracian heir-apparent Agathocles. He was hospitably received, and gained the favour and confidence of Arsinoe herself, whose influence he found all-powerful with the old king. Still no breach followed on this account between Lysimachus and the Ptolemies: on the contrary, a new alliance was concluded between the royal families through the marriage of the young king of Egypt with the princess Arsinoe, the sister of Agathocles. Ptolemy, the father, died within about two years after he had resigned the crown.

¹ Memnon ap. Phot. p. 225. b. ἐπώνυμον διὰ τὴν σκαιοτήτητα καὶ ἀπόνοιαν τῶν κεραυνῶν ἔφερον. Paus. i. 6. 2. τολμηῆσαι πρόχειρος καὶ δι' αὐτὸ κεραυνὸς καλούμενος Clearchus I. of Heraclea, who called himself a son of Zeus (Memnon ap. Phot. p. 222. b. Bekk.), gave the name of Ceraunus to his son (Justin, xvi. 5.), *ut deos non mendacio tantum verum etiam nominibus eludat.*

CHAP.
LX.

B. C. 283.
Acqui-
sitions of
Lysima-
chus.

Seleucus and Lysimachus might also have remained at peace to the end of their lives, which were now drawing near to their natural term, if none but political causes of hostility had arisen between them. Lysimachus indeed had of late greatly extended his European dominions; for, about the same time that he drove Demetrius out of Macedonia, he treacherously made himself master of Pæonia, having entered it as the ally of Ariston, the lawful heir of the deceased king Autoleon.¹ In Asia too he had found an opportunity of enlarging his territory, and—to him a no less interesting object—replenishing his coffers. Amastris had been put to death by her two sons, Clearchus and Oxathres, who were probably jealous of her influence. It is remarkable, that though Lysimachus, as he was sincerely attached to Amastris, desired to avenge her murder, he did not think it necessary to profess his abhorrence of the parricide, but contrived to gain admittance into Heraclea under the mask of friendship. He then put the murderers to death, and took possession of their treasures, and permitted the people of Heraclea to revive their republican institutions. On his return he spoke with warm admiration of the proofs which he had seen in the cities ruled by Amastris of the prosperity which they had enjoyed under her government; and Arsinoe took occasion to solicit that he would grant her the newly-conquered principality. He reluctantly complied with her request, and she sent one of her creatures as governor to Heraclea, which he oppressed and plundered.² Still these acquisitions were not of a nature to excite the

¹ Polyæn. iv. 12. 3. But I should not venture with Droysen (l. 617.) on the strength of the very uncertain reading *Σαρδίων*, to suppose that Ariston fled to Demetrius, and happened to find him at Sardis: *ἀφικτάσαστο εἰς τὴν Σαρδίῳ* would be a singular way of relating that fact; and, we may add, not the way of Polyænus, who elsewhere describes the place imply as *Σάρδεις* or *αἱ Σάρδεις* (ii. 1. 9. iv. 9. 4. vii. 6. 2, 3. 13, 14.). Indeed, I believe it would be difficult to produce any example in support of Droysen's conjecture.

² Memnon, u. s. p. 225.

MURDER OF AGATHOCLES.

jealousy of Seleucus: Lysimachus, in whom ambition seems to have become subordinate to avarice, and who was watched by two hostile neighbours in Greece and Epirus, could not have been a formidable rival to the master of the East. But a domestic tragedy, which shook the throne of Lysimachus, awakened hopes of conquest that had long slumbered in the bosom of Seleucus, and gave occasion to a war which proved fatal to both.

CHAI
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Arsinoe, when she obtained possession of Heraclea, probably designed chiefly to strengthen herself with a view to a farther and more important object. Her husband's advanced age filled her with anxiety for the prospects of her children, and she resolved, if she could, to put Agathocles out of the way before the throne became vacant. That she had conceived a criminal passion for him, and was disappointed through his scruples, is hardly credible. If there was any ground for this report, it may have been that she imputed such advances to him.¹ But it is certain that she induced Lysimachus to regard his eldest son as his enemy, and to consent to his death.² They feared, it seems, to use open violence, for the prince was generally beloved; but after an ineffectual attempt to poison him, they threw him into prison, and it is said that Ptolemy Ceraunus despatched him there with his own hand.³ Lysandra fled with her children, accompanied by Alexander, the brother of Agathocles, to Seleucus, and implored his intervention.⁴ He learnt that the deed had excited universal indignation

Murder
his son
Agathoc

¹ Pausan. I. 10. 3. ἤδη δὲ ἔγραψαν κ. τ. λ.

² Strabo (XIII. p. 623) says ἠναγκάσθη τὸν υἱὸν ἀνελεῖν. But Memnon (ap. Phot. p. 225. b.) represents him as inflamed with such violent hatred of his son (for which hardly any motive can be conceived but jealousy), that after the attempt to poison him had failed, he invented a charge of treason against him, as a pretext for putting him to death in prison. Justin, XVII. 1. *Agathoclem non solum patrium, verum etiam humanum ultra morem, perosus, ministra Arsinoe noverca, veneno interfecit.*

³ *Abroχσίρ.* Memnon, u. s.

⁴ Paus. I. 10. 4.

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War be-
tween Se-
leucus and
Lysima-
chus.

among the subjects of Lysimachus, and that they were ripe for rebellion. He also received a message from Philetærus, governor of the fortress of Pergamus, where Lysimachus had deposited a treasure of 9000 talents, who, on the prince's death, being alarmed for his own safety, as Arsinoe was avowedly his enemy, and attempted to deprive him of his master's confidence¹, offered, if Seleucus would invade the country, to put him in possession of the place, and of all the treasure it contained.² Seleucus was tempted by the prospect thus opened to him, and not merely because it promised a great addition to his empire. He secretly yearned to see his native land again, and he could now only return to it as conqueror and king. He resolved to make war on Lysimachus. The king of Thrace was apprised of the danger which threatened him. It is said that he crossed over into Asia to anticipate the attack which he expected, and that he began hostilities with Seleucus; but it is probable that he aimed at nothing more than to stop the progress of disaffection in his Asiatic dominions, and to put himself in a posture of defence. It was believed that he discovered, when it was too late, the falsehood of the charges which had been brought against his son.³ But he had alienated the most trustworthy of his family and his servants, and, if he had learnt the truth, was obliged to dissemble his feelings. He left Arsinoe in possession of all her power: perhaps with the authority of regent. The important city of Cassandrea was entirely in her hands; having apparently been assigned to her as a place of refuge against a change of fortune. It seems also that Ptolemy Ceraunus accompanied Lysimachus on his expedition, and remained with him to its close. All the details of the struggle which ensued between the

¹ Strabo, XIII. p. 623.

² Paus. I. 10. 4.

³ Ibid. I. 10. 3.

BATTLE OF CORUPEDION.

two rivals are lost; its termination only is known. A battle was fought (B. C. 281) at a place called the plain of Corus, in western Phrygia¹ — a name which now conveys no information to us — in which Lysimachus was defeated, and slain by a man of Heraclea named Malacon.² According to some accounts, his corpse, which lay for many days neglected, and only guarded by his faithful dog from the wolves and vultures, was found and interred by Thorax, a Pharsalian. According to others, his son Alexander obtained permission, not without some opposition on the part of Lysandra, to convey it to the Thracian Chersonesus, where the inhabitants of Lysimachia received it with the honours due to the founder of their city, and deposited it in their principal temple, to which they gave the name of the Lysimacheum.³

CH/
LX
B. C. 2
Battle
Corupe
dion.

There had scarcely been a moment, since Alexander's death, when it appeared more likely that all the provinces of his empire might fall into a single hand, than after this event. Seleucus might safely calculate that the whole kingdom of Lysimachus would submit to him without resistance, except such as might be made by private adventurers, at insulated points. So it seems to have been after the decisive battle that Theodotus, the governor of Sardis, refused to surrender the citadel, which contained a considerable treasure. But when Seleucus had set a price of 100 talents on his head, distrusting the fidelity of his troops, he opened the gates to the conqueror.⁴ Ceraunus likewise threw himself on the generosity of Seleucus, who not only received him

¹ Appian, Syr. 62.

² Memnon, u. s.

³ Appian, Syr. 64. Pausanias (i. 10. 5.) describes the tomb as situate between Cardia and Pactya. The fidelity of the dog was celebrated enough to serve as an illustration to Plutarch, *Reip. Ger. Præc.* c. 28.

⁴ Polyæn. iv. 9. 4. Droysen believes that this occurred before the defeat of Lysimachus. But a strong presumption to the contrary seems to be raised by the presence of Arsinoë at Ephesus (Polyæn. viii. 57.) at the time of her husband's death.

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with kindness, as the son of his old friend, but promised to restore him to the throne, his birth-right, of which he had been deprived by his father's unjust partiality.¹ It was an opportunity for interference which might kindle a civil war in Egypt, and make the ally of the successful claimant the real master of the kingdom. He so little anticipated any resistance in the European dominions of Lysimachus, that, without any apparent necessity, he suffered more than six months to elapse after the battle² before he proceeded to take possession of them. It is said to have been his intention to resign all the Asiatic provinces to Antiochus³, and to end his days in Macedonia. But a different destiny awaited him.

If Ptolemy Ceraunus consented to murder Agathocles, it was not, as the event clearly proves, with a view to promote the interest of his sister and her children. It is probable, that, before the death of Lysimachus, he had already conceived the ambitious project which he afterwards executed, and that he looked upon Agathocles as the only formidable obstacle between himself and the throne. He would not perhaps have suffered the old king to stand much longer in his way. As he was utterly insensible to all restraints of piety, honour, and gratitude, the victory of Seleucus would not have changed his design, and might seem, in some respects, to open a fairer prospect of success, as it was now an invader, not the rightful sovereign, whom he had to supplant. The reckless daring, from which he derived his surname, was in him coupled with an equal measure of cunning and forethought; and, bold as the stroke was by which he hoped to win the crown, he seems to have taken

¹ Memnon, p. 226. b. Appian, Syr. 62.

² Justin, xvii. 2. *Post menses admodum septem.*

³ Memnon ap. Phot. p. 226. a. Pausanias (i. 16. 2.) describes the intention as executed.

all the precautions prudence could suggest to guard against miscarriage. He had probably a strong party of adherents in Thrace, with whom he concerted his measures, and perhaps had even gained some of the officers of Seleucus, among whom there might be several to whom the proposed change in the residence of the court was not acceptable.

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Seleucus, having transported his army across the Hellespont, marched toward Lysimachia. On the road, not far it seems from the city, was an ancient altar, erected, according to the traditions of the country, either by the Argonauts, or by the heroes who besieged Troy, and, from whichever origin, named Argos. It was a name — as was at least afterwards generally believed — of ill omen to Seleucus, who is said to have been warned by an oracle *to beware of Argos*. But the altar attracted his notice by its size and conspicuous position, and he stopped to examine it, and to learn its history. While he was listening to the tale of the antiquarians, he received a mortal wound in the back from Ptolemy Ceraunus¹, who immediately mounted a horse, and rode to Lysimachia. Here he was welcomed as the avenger of Lysimachus, and immediately assumed the diadem as his successor, and returned with a brilliant escort to the camp.² It does not appear that he had collected any military force; we rather find intimations that he needed no such protection. Yet it is certainly somewhat surprising, that the man who had just basely assassinated a great and revered monarch at the head of his victorious army, should have ventured to present himself to the troops whom he had so deprived of their leader. The result however was, that he was received, if not with favour, at least without any determined resist-

B. C. 281.
Assassination of Seleucus.

¹ Appian, Syr. 63.

² Μετὰ λαμπρᾶς δορυφορίας. Memnon, p. 226. b.
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ance, and was proclaimed king by the army of Seleucus. One account states that it yielded to necessity, the nature of which is not explained¹: another, that the acquiescence of the soldiers was purchased by the permission which they received to plunder the royal treasure.² Each seems to imply that the loyalty which was so easily overpowered was not very ardent. But if a considerable portion of the troops had originally belonged to the army of Lysimachus, and had been compelled to follow the conqueror, the transaction would be quite intelligible.

Ptolemy
Ceraunus,
king of
Thrace,

The assassin found himself in possession of a powerful army, a considerable number of elephants, and a fleet which included a squadron of vessels of extraordinary bulk from Heraclea. The European dominions of Lysimachus, north of Macedonia, submitted to him without an attempt at resistance; and the state of affairs in other quarters was singularly favourable to the measures which he took for the security of his throne. Antiochus would have been urged both by his interests and his feelings to avenge his father's murder; but he was fully occupied with the defence of his vast inheritance against a variety of other enemies.³ The king of Egypt was easily persuaded to let his brother enjoy a distant kingdom, on the condition which he proposed, of resigning his claims to the Egyptian crown. Pyrrhus would have been his most formidable rival. But just at this juncture his ambition was engrossed by the prospect of conquest in the West, and he was only anxious to obtain a reinforcement for his Italian expedition, and to provide for the safety of his hereditary dominions during his absence. Ceraunus won him by the offer of both these advantages. He placed 5000 foot, 4000

¹ Memnon, u. s.

² Paus. i. 16. 2.

³ Memnon, p. 227. α. Ἀντίοχος πολλοῖς πολέμοις, εἰ καὶ μάλιστα καὶ οὐδὲ πᾶσαν ὁμοῦ ἀνασώσασθαι τὴν πατρίαν ἀρχήν.

horse, and 50 elephants, at his disposal, nominally for a term of two years; and, having induced him to accept his daughter's hand as a pledge of his good faith, took Epirus under his protection.¹ And thus he was enabled to defy the hostility of a fourth rival, whom he could neither soothe nor bribe. Antigonus was no longer a potentate; but he was still master of some strong places in Greece, and of a fleet; and the lower the ebb of his fortune, the more eager he was to seize the opportunity, which seemed to be offered by the recent revolution, of recovering the throne of Macedonia. He was forced indeed to consign a part of his navy to Pyrrhus, as the price of his neutrality. But he felt himself strong enough, with the remainder, to venture on an expedition against Ceraunus, whom he hoped to find unprepared. The Thracian fleet however met him before he could effect a landing on the coast of Macedonia, and, chiefly through the overpowering size of the Heracleian vessels, or the skill of their seamen, gained a decisive victory, and compelled him to retire to Bœotia. During his absence events had occurred in Greece, which rendered his possession less secure and commanding than it had previously been there. Sparta had made an effort to engage all the principal states of Greece in a confederacy for the maintenance of their freedom. The undertaking was notoriously directed against the power of Antigonus; though its first avowed object was apparently but very remotely connected with its real aim. An expedition was sent under the command of king Areus against the Ætolians, who were in alliance with Antigonus, and were also in possession of the sacred land of Cirrha. Areus however was surprised, while he was ravaging their fields, by a small band of Ætolians, and put to flight with great

¹ Justin, xvii. 2.

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loss. This defeat seems to have put an end to the Spartan project of a general union among the Greeks; but it did not prevent Sparta herself from prosecuting hostilities against Antigonus, whose garrison was, it seems, not long after dislodged from Trœzen by a Spartan force under Cleonymus, the uncle of Areus. But the most important result of the movements which followed the death of Seleucus, was the foundation of the Achæan League, to which we shall return in the next chapter.

and of Ma-
cedonia.

Perfidy of
Ceraunus.

Macedonia submitted without resistance to the conqueror, as soon as he appeared there¹, and Antiochus no longer hesitated to conclude a treaty of peace with the successful usurper.² He was now near the summit of his fortune: only one stroke was wanting to fill up the measure of his prosperity and his crimes. So long as Arsinoe remained in possession of Casandrea, with her children, whose title to the crown was at least more legitimate than his own, he could not feel perfectly secure. Yet he did not venture on an open attack: for he was less anxious to make himself master of the place, important as it was, than of the persons it contained, who might have eluded his grasp, if he had attempted to reduce it by force. He therefore resolved to compass his object by treachery; though to gain the confidence of Arsinoe, whose accomplice he had been, who both knew him, and was herself a stranger to all scruples of conscience, honour, and humanity, was apparently as hopeless a project as he had ever yet formed. He was able however to interest her ambition, and perhaps her vanity, in opposition to her sober judgment and natural suspicions. He invited her to share his throne, and held out a prospect of a more remote succession for her children, to whom in the meanwhile he would

¹ Memnon, p. 226. b.

² Justin, xxiv. 1.

be as a guardian; and he requested her to send one of her friends to receive such assurances as she might desire of his sincerity. It was no doubt with tormenting misgivings and forebodings, that she consented to treat with him; but the fear of provoking him by the appearance of distrust, combined with her wishes and hopes, prevailed, and she commissioned a minister, named Chlodion, to witness the ratification of his offers and professions. To him Ptolemy eagerly exhibited whatever sanctions the most holy places, the most solemn rites, and the most awful forms of adjuration, could be supposed by superstitious minds to enhance the obligation of an oath. Arsinoe could no longer decline an interview with her brother; and her fears were so far quieted by his language and demeanour that, notwithstanding the warnings of her eldest son, Ptolemæus, she finally consented to the marriage. The nuptials were celebrated with royal magnificence; and when she had been crowned, and saluted as queen, in the presence of the army, all her remaining doubts were silenced, and she seemed only anxious to atone for her past mistrust by proofs of unreserved confidence. She invited her husband to take possession of Cassandrea, and made preparations to receive him with every sign of festive welcome. Her two younger sons, Lysimachus and Philip, came out with chaplets on their heads, to meet him. The eldest, after having ineffectually warned his mother, fled, it appears, to the king of the Dardanians. Ceraunus loaded the boys with caresses, until his troops had entered the gate, and then gave orders to seize the citadel, and to put his two nephews, the elder of whom was but sixteen, to death. They were massacred in their mother's arms; and she was not even permitted to bury them. She herself—neglected rather than spared—was dragged, it is said, out of the city, but was suffered to retire, with two at-

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tendants, to Samothrace.¹ She was yet destined to share the throne of Egypt with her younger brother Philadelphus.²

B. C. 280.
Irruption
of the Celts.

Ceraunus did not enjoy the fruit of all these crimes much longer than a year and a half, during which he had to defend his dominions against the Dardanian king, who had given shelter to the son of Lysimachus.³ He was then deprived at once of his kingdom and his life by a sudden calamity, which the ancients, with a right feeling, regarded as a stroke of Divine vengeance; the rather, as he seemed to have exposed himself to his fate with an infatuation which might well be considered as judicial, though it was a natural result of the success which had attended him in so many criminal enterprises. The irruption of the Gauls, which produced this and other momentous changes in the affairs both of Macedonia and of Greece, might indeed have been anticipated, without any uncommon reach of sagacity, by any one whose political horizon was not bounded by the limits of civilised society in the West. For it appears that Celtic tribes had been long in possession of the countries on the eastern side of the Adriatic, from which the invaders issued, and had been engaged in continual warfare with their neighbours, which kept them as averse as they had ever been from habits of peaceful industry, and as impatient of any fixed abode. Their presence in regions not very remote from Macedonia had been announced by the embassy which Alexander had received on the banks of the Danube; and their movements, though scarcely heard of beyond

¹ *Protracta*, Justin, xxiv. 3. Memnon (l. c.), τῆς βασιλείας ἐξεκέρυξε.

² Paus. i. 7. 1. As her son Lysimachus was sixteen when he was murdered by Ceraunus, she must have possessed, with her fiendish character, some singular fascination, independent of personal attractions. Droysen (ii. p. 241.) imagines political motives — the claims of Arsinoë on the Asiatic cities which she had lost — which seem quite inadequate to the supposed effect.

³ Prolog. Trog. Pomp. xxiv. *Bellum quod Ptolemæus Ceraunus in Macedonia cum Monio (Monunio) Illyrio, et Ptolemæo Lysimachi filio habuit.*

their immediate vicinity, were probably felt as far as the shores of the Ægæan, through their influence on the Thracian wars of Lysimachus. But they were too far out of sight to attract notice in the Hellenic world; and the storm burst upon it not the less suddenly because it had been long gathering. The immediate occasion of this movement, or the causes which removed the hinderances that had hitherto prevented it, lie beyond the reach of history. Ceraunus himself first received warning of his danger from the king of the Dardanians¹, who, though he had been but a short time before at war with him, regarded it as so pressing, and so threatening to his own safety, that he at the same time offered him a body of 20,000 auxiliaries. In the blindness of ignorance, or the confidence of prosperous wickedness, Ceraunus disdainfully rejected this offer, treating it as degrading to the honour of his kingdom, to suppose that Macedonia could need the protection of the Dardanians against such an enemy.² It was not long before he received more direct intimation of the approach of the Celts, from an embassy which they sent to him with proposals for peace, if he was willing to purchase it by tribute. Their object, it appears, was not so much conquest as plunder; and they would have been content to drain the Macedonian treasury without a blow. Ceraunus attributed their overtures to fear, and replied by an arrogant message,

¹ From a silver tetradrachma bearing the superscription MONOTNIOT ... ΣΙΑΕΩ, and apparently not much later than the age of Alexander, coupled with the fact, that a Monunius was king of the Dardanians in the period of the war with Perseus (Livy, xlii. 30. compared with Polybius, xxi. 5.), and that the same name occurs on a coin of Dyrrhachium (ΒΑΣΙΛΕΩΣ ΜΟΝΟΤΝΙΟΤ ΔΤΡΡΑ), Droysen (*Zimmermann's Zeitschrift*, 1836, No. 104.) has, with his usual sagacity, shown a degree of probability nearly amounting to certainty, that this king of the Dardanians was the Monunius of these coins, and that his name ought to be substituted for *Monio* and *Mystillo*, in the Prologues to Trogus, xxiv. xxv.

² Justin, xxiv. 4. Droysen however (u.s.) thinks that the conduct of Ceraunus may be better explained by his just distrust of a prince who had so lately been his enemy.

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bidding them, if they wished for peace, send him their chiefs as hostages, and lay down their arms. This language would have been not unworthy of a high-spirited prince, resolved to risk all for liberty and honour, if he had been better acquainted with the force which he defied, and had not so rashly neglected the means of defence which the friendship of the Dardanian king would have enabled him to command. As it was, it only served to quicken the steps of the invaders, who, threatening that *he should soon learn whether their offer of peace more concerned their safety or his own*, advanced without delay, and in the course of a few days began to pour into Macedonia. We have little information either as to his preparations or his movements, beside the simple fact that he met them in the field. It seems that, though greatly outnumbered, he engaged prematurely, against the advice of his friends, before he had collected all his forces.¹ He probably relied on the strength of the phalanx, and the show of his elephants; but found these advantages more than counterbalanced by that which the Celts derived from the impetuosity of their onset, and the strangeness of their aspect and mode of fighting. He was defeated, and, having been thrown by the elephant on which he rode, fell into the enemy's hands, and was presently despatched: according to one of the more authentic accounts, torn to pieces, as if in a contest among the captors for the ornaments of his person.² His head was struck off, and carried about the field on the point of a lance, to heighten the consternation of his army, which is said to have been so completely routed, that almost all were slain or taken.³ (B. C. 280.)⁴

Death of
Ceraunus.

¹ Diodorus, xxii.

² Memnon, p. 226. b. Διασπαραχθεὶς ἐπὶ τῶν Γαλατῶν· ζῶν γὰρ ἐλήφθη.

³ Justin, xxiv. 5.

⁴ In the fifth month of Ol. 125. 1. (Porphyr. ap. Eus. Arm. p. 330.)

After this blow the open country was at the mercy of the conquerors, who ravaged and plundered it as far as the borders of Thessaly; and a detachment made a devastating inroad into the vale of the Peneus. But they wanted skill and patience for the siege of fortified places, so that the Macedonians were secure within the walls of their cities, and gradually regained courage. The reins of government were successively seized by Meleager, the brother of Ceraunus, who held them only two months, and by Antipater, a nephew of Cassander, who seems to have dethroned his predecessor, but did not retain possession for more than forty-five days.¹ How his reign was terminated does not appear; but we are informed that there were many competitors for the throne among the noble families², whose contests must have aggravated the general confusion and distress. A man at length appeared who showed himself capable of command, yet moderate in his ambition: a nobleman named Sosthenes.³ He collected a body of troops, and obtained some advantages over the enemy, who probably believed themselves secure from all further attempts at resistance. And this check seems to have induced them to withdraw the sooner from the country, where there was now perhaps but little left to tempt their cupidity. Sosthenes was saluted king by his army; but he declined the title which he had so well earned, and only desired his soldiers to swear obedience to him as their general.

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Sosthenes
checks the
Celts.

The Celts returned, it would seem, to the country from which they had set out on their expedition. But little reliance can be placed on the accounts which have reached us of any transactions that passed at the back of the theatre of war, which were probably but

B. C. 279.
Expedition
of Brennus.

¹ Porphy. ap. Euseb. Arm. i. 330.

² Justin, xxiv. 5. *Multis nobilibus regnum Macedonia affectantibus.*

³ *Unus de Macedonia principibus*, Justin, u. 8.

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very imperfectly known in Greece at the time. So it is difficult to say what degree of truth there may be in the statement, that the Celts at the outset divided their force into three bodies, one of which, under the command of a chief named Belgius or Bolgius, was destined for the invasion of Macedonia; the second, under Brennus, directed against Pæonia; and the third, under Cerethrius, against Thrace and the Triballians. For the same account represents Brennus as at home when Belgius returned from his Macedonian expedition, and as exerting all his influence and address to render his countrymen dissatisfied with the conduct of Belgius, and to obtain the command of a powerful army, which he undertook to bring back laden with the spoils of Greece, which he described as of inestimable value.¹ This object at least he accomplished: and the force which he led was estimated at 150,000 foot, and about 20,000 cavalry, with the addition of two mounted followers to each cavalier. A chief named Acichorius is sometimes described as his colleague, but seems to have held only a subordinate rank. It is in Dardania that his host first appears in motion; and here a quarrel is said to have taken place among the commanders, which induced two of them, Leonorius and Lutatius, to separate from Brennus, and to lead the troops under their orders, a body of 20,000 men, into Thrace², where they will soon again engage our attention. Brennus pursued his march into Macedonia, and began to ravage the country, which could have recovered but little from the effects of the preceding invasion. Sosthenes ventured to take the field against him; but he seems to have miscalculated his strength. The Macedonians were totally defeated, and forced to seek shelter behind their ramparts; and Brennus con-

¹ Paus. x. 19. 8.

² Livy, xxxviii. 16.

tinued to waste and spoil without resistance, until he thought it time to seek the richer booty which he expected to find in Greece.¹

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The ravages which his army committed in its progress through Thessaly, warned the Greeks afresh that from the enemy who was now approaching, it was not inglorious subjection that they had to expect as the alternative of victory, but death or miseries far more dreadful. Accordingly, on this occasion we find none of the wavering, the lukewarmness, or the treachery, which tarnished the glory of their ancestors in the Persian war. All private interests and feelings were absorbed by the urgency and fearfulness of the common danger. On the other hand, the preparations for meeting the invader were confined to the states north of the Isthmus, though it appears that the Messenians would have taken a part in the struggle, if the Spartans had consented to grant them a truce.² As the Celts had no fleet, the Peloponnesians, it is said, believed that they should be sufficiently secured by a wall across the Isthmus.³ It must however be remembered that Peloponnesus was almost entirely in the possession, or under the influence of Antigonus, who was no doubt only concerned to husband his resources as much as possible. He was induced indeed, apparently at the instance of the Athenians, to send a body of 500 men under the command of Aristodemus to their aid, perhaps only

¹ So Justin, xxiv. 6., and this, as the account least glorious to the Greeks, is the most credible. That of Porphyry in Euseb. (u. s.) represents Sosthenes as expelling Brennus. But this is no reason for referring it to a later period with Flathe (ii. p. 80.), who, with still less probability, and without assigning any reason, transfers the quarrel mentioned by Livy (xxxviii. 16.), from the beginning to the end of the expedition of Brennus. That Sosthenes was not only defeated, but slain, as is stated by W. A. J. Schmidt (*Das Oibische Psephisma*, *Rhein. Mus.* iv. 4. p. 575.), is probable enough, but is not related, as far as I know, by any of the ancients. I take this opportunity of observing, that this essay of Schmidt's is extremely valuable, not only as a most important contribution to the history of the Celtic migrations, but as containing at once an exposition and illustration of sound principles of historical criticism.

² Paus. iv. 28. 3.

³ *Ibid.* vii. 6. 7.

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following the example of Antiochus, who sent precisely the same number under Telesarchus. One can hardly attribute any better motive to either, than the wish to save appearances. The change which had taken place in the state of Greece since the days of Salamis and Plataea, was strongly marked by the proportions in which the northern states contributed to the force raised for their common defence. Bœotia furnished 10,000 heavy-armed foot, and 500 horse; Phocis as many cavalry, and 3000 heavy infantry; the eastern Locrians 700 foot, and Megara 400 foot. But the largest contingent, including both horse and foot, heavy and light armed, was that of the Ætolians. Athens could only bring 1000 heavy-armed, and 500 cavalry into the field; but all the galleys fit for service — the number is not stated — were sent to take their station in the Malian gulph, to support the operations of the army. Old recollections, which in the presence of such a danger would have more than ordinary influence, seem to have induced the allies to assign the supreme command to the Athenian general, Callippus.¹

The defence of Thermopylæ.

It was resolved to defend every tenable position in front of Thermopylæ, where the army was assembled, and as soon as it was ascertained that the Celtic host had reached the foot of mount Othrys, a thousand light infantry and a body of cavalry were detached to guard the passage of the Spercheius, and, having destroyed the bridges, encamped on the right bank. Brennus however was not deficient in military skill. He sent a division of 10,000 men, selecting the tallest and the most expert swimmers, to cross the river in the night at the lower part where it spread over a marsh. The Greeks, when they learnt that the enemy had effected the passage, retreated to their camp, and Brennus

¹ Paus. x. 20.

ordered the inhabitants of the country to repair the bridges, a task which they willingly performed, to be relieved the sooner from the presence of the invader. He then pushed forward without delay against Heraclea, which had now become an Ætolian city, having been compelled the year before to join the Ætolian league. The Ætolians defended it as their own, and easily repulsed the unskilful assailants, though they could not protect the fields from plunder and havock; nor was the place of sufficient importance to divert Brennus from his main object, even if he had seen a fairer prospect of success. He was eager to dislodge the Greeks from Thermopylæ, and it seems advanced as confidently as Xerxes had done to the attack. The onset of the Celts was probably more furious than that of the Persians had been, and perhaps not less orderly. But the numbers of the combatants were now more nearly equal, and the changes which had taken place in the nature of the ground on which they fought operated in favour of the Greeks, for the Athenians were able to bring their galleys so near to the scene of action, as to gall the enemy with their missiles, and thus at least contributed very materially to the victory of their countrymen, even if the report that they likewise distinguished themselves by their valour above all the other Greeks on shore, is to be set down to the partiality of the author from whom we have received it.¹ The assailants were at length forced to retreat with great loss: as many were trodden under foot by one another or sunk in the morass, as were slain by the enemy. Of the Greeks forty only are said to have fallen. The Celts, whether from pride or carelessness, neither sought permission, nor made any attempt to bury their dead.

¹ Most probably Timæus, as Schmidt has shown in his interesting essay, *De Fontibus veterum auctorum in enarrandis expeditionibus a Gallis in Macedoniam atque Græciam susceptis*. Droysen is inclined to suppose it may rather have been Demochares. But see Schmidt in *Zimmermann's Zeitschrift*, 1837, No. 94, 95.

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Invasion of
Ætolia.

Brennus allowed six days to pass without any movement. On the seventh he sent a detachment to explore the steep and narrow road which led through the gorge of the Asopus, near the ruins of Trachis, across mount Ceta. A secondary object was to gratify his troops with the plunder of a temple of Athene, which stood on a height above the pass. But the Celts found it guarded by a body of Greeks, under the command of Telesarchus, and were repulsed, though the Syrian general fell in the combat. The leading officers of the Celtic army now began themselves to despond about the issue of the expedition. Brennus resolved to attempt a diversion, which, if successful, would at the same time give employment to a part of his own forces, and weaken the enemy. He ordered a division of 40,000 men, under the command of Combutis and Orestorius, to recross the Spercheius, and ascending the valley to make an inroad into Ætolia. He hoped that the Ætolians, who formed so main a part of the allied army, would withdraw to the defence of their own country. His plan was faithfully executed, and proved completely successful. The invaders made themselves masters of Callium, the town nearest to the eastern border of Ætolia, and committed the most horrible atrocities on the defenceless population, not perhaps more to indulge the instincts of savage nature, or in revenge for their recent defeats, than in compliance with the instructions they had received, and with a view to strike terror into the Ætolians, and to call those of them who were encamped at Thermopylæ to the protection of their homes. This indeed was the immediate effect of their barbarity: but they had not foreseen how the remoter consequences would affect their own safety. When they had exterminated the inhabitants and had set fire to the town, they began to retreat with their booty: but they found the road,

itself mountainous and difficult, beset with enemies burning for revenge. When the tidings of the destruction of Callium reached Thermopylæ, the Ætolians quitted the camp in a body and hastened homeward; but the whole mass of the Ætolian population, including even the women, had also risen in arms and poured in upon the retreating invaders; and they had been joined by a body of heavy-armed Achæans, from Patræ.¹ The Celts fought with their usual fury, and by their superiority of numbers bore down every obstacle opposed to them in close combat; but they suffered so much from the showers of missiles, to which their flanks were continually exposed in the defiles, that not half of them was believed to have reached the camp.

In the meanwhile however the path across the highest ridge of Callidromus, by which the Persians had been led to the destruction of Leonidas, had been betrayed to Brennus by the people of Heraclea and the Ænianians, whose territory it traversed, who were so impatient to be delivered from the evils inflicted on them by the neighbourhood of the barbarian army, that they scrupled not to purchase a temporary and partial relief at the expense of the rest of Greece. And it even appears, as will be seen a little farther on, that a number of Ænianian and Thessalian adventurers associated themselves with the invaders. Brennus gladly accepted their proffered guidance, and, leaving Acichorius with the main body, put himself at the head of 40,000 of his best troops for the passage of the mountain.² A body of Phocians

¹ Pausan, vii. 18. 6. But Lucas (*Ueber Polybius Darstellung des Aetolischen Bundes*) seems clearly to be mistaken, when (p. 71.) he supposes that the disasters mentioned by Pausanias, which compelled the greater part of the population to abandon Patræ, befel it in this war. If that had been the case, it would never have been a member of the Achæan League. In the expedition against the Celts it does not appear to have suffered any material loss, but was enriched with considerable booty. (Paus. vii. 20. 6.)

² Whether Brennus is a proper name, or, according to the prevailing opinion, the Cymric appellative *brenhin*, king, may admit of a doubt (see the note in Arnold's

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had been posted, as in the Persian war, to guard the descent on the opposite side; but a mist concealed the approach of the Celts, so that they had all the advantage of a sudden attack. The Phocians nevertheless made a gallant resistance, but were at length forced to give way, and hastened forward to apprise their allies of the impending danger. The warning came in time to afford them an opportunity of escape; for to have attempted resistance would have been but a useless sacrifice of the strength and hopes of Greece. They found refuge on board the Athenian galleys, and as they were landed dispersed to their homes.

The Celts
before
Delphi.

Brennus, according to one statement, pursued his march, eager for the spoil of Delphi, without waiting for Acichorius, whom he had ordered to follow him, as soon as the pass was clear. But, as we find that the force with which he attacked Delphi consisted of 65,000 men¹, it seems that there must have been some farther concert between the two chiefs, and it is not improbable that, after Brennus had received a reinforcement, they agreed to take different lines of march, and to meet at Delphi; a plan which secured a more abundant supply of provisions, and held out the prospect of richer booty. But Brennus arrived first; the progress of Acichorius was retarded by the persevering vengeance of the Ætoliens, who hung upon his rear, cutting off the stragglers, and seizing every opportunity of impediment and annoyance. The force assembled for the defence of Delphi, composed chiefly of Phocians, Locrians, and Ætoliens, did

History of Rome, i. p. 524.). But that Brennus and Acichorius are one and the same person, as is maintained by Schmidt (*De Font.* p. 49.) and Droysen, must be denied, until some better reasons appear than any which have yet been produced, to show that all the details of the narrative in which Brennus and Acichorius are represented as distinct persons must be rejected. Diefenbach (*Celtica*, ii. p. 275.) suggests, that Cichorius, or Acichorius, may have been the proper name of the chief called Belgus.

¹ Justin, xxiv. 7.

not, after it had received its last accessions, exceed 4000 men. The accounts remaining to us of the events which ensued, are as full of wonders as the description given by Herodotus of the disasters which befel the Persians on the same ground, and the prodigies said to have happened on both occasions are so similar, that the later report might seem a mere repetition of the earlier one. We are informed that the oracle was consulted, and declared that the god would protect his sanctuary; and that the promise was fulfilled by an earthquake¹, which rent the rocks, and brought down huge masses on the heads of the assailants, by a tempest, in which many of them were consumed by the lightning, and by the appearance of celestial warriors who fought against them. But this is no proof that these marvellous incidents of the later story are merely fictions borrowed by the author to embellish his narrative. No doubt a great change had taken place in the heart and mind of the nation since the Persian War. The people had become somewhat less credulous, and less disposed to expect a supernatural interposition on any occasion. The scenes of the Sacred War had also tended to weaken the ancient reverence for the oracle and the temple, which had been so openly and repeatedly profaned with impunity. But Delphi was still commonly regarded as holy ground, and as favoured at times with a Divine presence. The remembrance of the local traditions would be forcibly awakened in the little band which had devoted itself to the defence of the temple, while it awaited the enemy's approach, and might readily suggest the hope of Divine assistance; and the guardians of the oracle would not neglect any of the pious arts which had been practised on the like occasions by their predecessors, to cherish and direct

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¹ According to Pausanias (x. 23. 1.), exactly co-extensive with the ground occupied by the Celts.

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the enthusiasm of their champions. We may therefore easily account for the rise of a genuine popular legend on the subject.¹

Be this as it may, the supernatural element of the story has not so disfigured it, as wholly to conceal the real course and connection of the events. It seems that Brennus, when he arrived in the valley of the Pleistus, was advised by his Greek guides² to proceed without delay to the attack of Delphi. But either because he thought that his troops needed refreshment, or because he was unable to restrain them, he permitted them first to gorge themselves with the plunder of the farms and hamlets, where large stores of corn and wine had, it is said, been purposely left. In the meanwhile, the approaches of the city were fortified, and preparations made to take the utmost advantage of all the means of resistance afforded by the nature of the ground. When the Celts advanced to the assault, they were perhaps stupified and bewildered by their recent excesses, so as to be more than usually susceptible of superstitious terrors. Brennus, we are told, endeavoured to stimulate their rapacity, by the assertion that the gilded statues which they saw gleaming from the terraces of Delphi, were of solid gold.³ It may be doubted whether he himself was aware of the loss which the treasury had suffered in the Phocic war. The assailants, who in general were easily deterred by slight obstacles in such operations, were repulsed and disheartened.

¹ On the tenacity of popular belief among the Greeks, one may refer with pleasure to an Essay of G. W. Nitzsch, *Die Heldensage der Griechen nach ihrer nationalen Geltung*.

² Justin, xxiv. 7. *Emanus et Thessalorum duces qui se ad prædæ societatem junxerant*. Schorn (*Geschichte Griechenlands*, p. 35.) restores the true reading by a happy conjecture: *Ænianum et Thessalorum*: which is rendered nearly certain by the reading *Ænlanus* in one MS. Thus we find the Thessallians acting the same part as in the expedition of Xerxes (Herodot. viii. 31.): and it seems by no means improbable, that they were animated by a similar motive of hereditary enmity toward the Phocians.

³ Justin, xxiv. 7.

Fragments of rock rolled down from the top of the cliffs, contributed to their defeat and consternation. A sudden change of weather to frost and snow, and the effects of surfeit followed by scarcity, and by disease arising out of both, began to thin their ranks, and determined Brennus to abandon the hopeless enterprise. The order for retreat was to the Greeks a signal for a series of attacks, with which they continued to harass the enemy as far as the camp at Thermopylæ, where a division had been left to guard the booty. The junction with Acichorius, which seems to have taken place soon after the retreat began, only served to increase the confusion and to retard the march of the Celts, while the numbers and the confidence of the Greeks were growing from day to day. Brennus, who had been wounded before Delphi, is said to have destroyed himself to escape the resentment of his countrymen¹; and Acichorius, who succeeded to the command, to have put his sick and wounded to death², and to have abandoned his baggage to secure his retreat. No estimate can be safely formed of the amount of the loss sustained by the Celts in their passage through Greece and Macedonia. But the assertion, with which some of our authors round the tale, that they were cut off to a man, is a patriotic exaggeration, almost as gross as the fictions with which the Roman historians, to save the national honour, disguised the issue of the Celtic expedition against Rome. We are informed that one part of the host of Brennus, commanded by a chief named Bathanatius³, reached the banks of the Danube, near its confluence with the Save⁴, while another, under Comontorius, was strong enough to effect a settlement,

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Retreat of
the Celts.

¹ Paus. x. 23. 12. Justin, xxiv. 8. *cum dolores vulnerum ferre non posset.*

² Diodorus, xxii.

³ Athenæus, vi. 25. Zeuss however (*Die Deutschen*, p. 175.) thinks it more probable that Bathanatius was the chief who first led the Celts into Illyria.

⁴ Justin, xxxii. 3.

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and to establish an independent kingdom, with a capital named Tyle, in the maritime part of Thrace.¹ And it is probable that the bands of Celtic adventurers, whom we shall find a few years later in Macedonia and Epirus, and in the pay of Greek princes, were a remnant of the same body.²

The most important immediate effect produced on Greece by the Celtic invasion was perhaps that it raised the reputation and the confidence of the Ætoli-ans, who claimed the largest share in the issue of the war, and cherished the recollection of their exploits with almost as much self-complacency as the Athenians that of their victories over the Persians. They dedicated a trophy, and a statue representing Ætolia as an armed heroine, at Delphi, for a perpetual memorial of the vengeance they had inflicted on the destroyers of Callium.³ But the consequence which most deeply and permanently affected the state of Greece, and of the ancient world, was the restoration of Antigonus to the throne of Macedonia, which took place within a few months after the retreat of Brennus, though he was destined yet to experience many vicissitudes of fortune before the final establishment of his dynasty. The death of Sosthenes, who remained, it seems, only about eight months at the head of affairs⁴, left the country exposed to the miseries of anarchy and civil war. We find mention of several obscure pretenders to the crown, among whom Antipater, probably the same who had been expelled by

B. C. 278.
Antigonus
Gonatas in
Macedonia.

¹ Polybius, iv. 46. Steph. Byz. Τύλις.

² Diefenbach (*Celtica*, ii. 1. p. 243.) would draw a like inference from a passage of Pausanias, x. 19. 1., the meaning of which he has strangely mistaken, as if *ἐπιθήμετος δίκη* referred to a pecuniary mulct.

³ Paus. x. 19. 1.

⁴ Porphyry. ap. Euseb. Arm. i. p. 331. assigns two years to Sosthenes. But Schmidt (*Das Oibische Psephisma*, p. 576. 595.) has pointed out the error and its probable origin — the government of Sosthenes was divided between two Olympic years. Schmidt supposes that the *anarchy* terminated by the accession of Antigonus, which, according to Porphyry (p. 342.) lasted two years and two months, did not last more than two months.

Sosthenes, appears to have gained the ascendancy; for it is between him and Antigonus that the last struggle takes place. Antigonus overpowered him with the aid of a body of Celtic mercenaries, whose chief is named Biderius, and who are represented as accompanied by their wives and children. Antigonus is reported to have compelled them, by a stratagem, to accept less than they demanded as the reward of their services¹: but he now appears as undisputed master of Macedonia (B. C. 278), with a powerful army and fleet, elephants, and a great treasure; and we next find him engaged in war, and concluding an honourable peace, with Antiochus.² In this war he sided with Nicomedes king of Bithynia, whose dominions Antiochus had invaded to revenge the loss of an army which, with its general Patrocles, had been cut off in an ambuscade by the Bithynians. Nicomedes likewise obtained the aid of the Celts, who, as we have seen, had followed Leonorius and Lutarius to the coast of Thrace, where they continued to ravage the territory of Byzantium and other Greek cities, and to levy contributions, until, with the co-operation of Nicomedes, they effected their passage into Asia.³ It was perhaps the treaty which Nicomedes concluded with them, by which they bound themselves to a perpetual alliance, defensive and offensive, with him, his descendants, and confederates, that induced Antiochus to avoid a conflict, and come to terms, by which he probably renounced his hopeless pretensions both to Bithynia and Macedonia. The Celts whom Nicomedes brought over continued long to take a very

¹ Polyænus, iv. 6. 17.

² Justin, xxv. 1. *Inter duos reges Antigonum et Antiochum statuta pace, cum in Macedoniam Antigonus reverteretur, novus eidem repente hostis exortus est.* Hence, Schmidt (*Das Oib. Ps.* p. 576.) supposes the peace to have been concluded before Antigonus set out from Greece for Macedonia. But it is difficult to reconcile this supposition with Memnon's account of the war (ap. Phot. p. 227. a.), *χρόνον συχρόν κατέτριψε.*

³ Memnon, p. 227. b. Strabo, xii. 5.

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active part in the wars of western Asia, always eager for pay and plunder, and a terror to the peaceful population, but often willingly lending their aid to protect the freedom of the cities against the neighbouring kings¹, and finally occupied a territory on the Halys, to which they gave the name of Galatia, where they organised their states with peculiar, and, it would seem, not ill-contrived, institutions.²

If we might rely on the sequel of Justin's narrative, which however is subject to strong suspicions of great inaccuracy and confusion, Antigonus had not long returned to Macedonia before he was threatened with invasion by another body of Celts, who are described as part of the army of reserve left by Brennus, when he set out on his fatal expedition, to guard the frontier of the nation. They are said to have sent envoys to Antigonus, with a demand of tribute as the price of peace, and to have been excited rather than discouraged by the reports they received of the treasures which the king imprudently displayed, of his elephants, and his military and naval preparations. Though their numbers, according to Justin, did not exceed 15,000 foot and 3000 horse, Antigonus, not venturing to meet them in open field, abandoned his camp at their approach, but afterwards surprised them as they were engaged in the plunder of his vessels, and defeated them with great slaughter.³ Now at least he was left in undisturbed possession of his throne, though probably fully occupied with the necessary provisions for its stability and security, until the return of Pyrrhus from his Italian expedition threatened him with new dangers. It was during

¹ Memnon, l. c. τῶν βασιλέων τὴν τῶν πόλεων δημοκρατίαν ἀφελεῖν σπουδαζόντων αὐτοὶ μᾶλλον ταύτην ἐθεβαίου.

² Strabo, u. s.

³ Justin, xxv. 2. Droysen (*Hellen.* ii. p. 176.) believes this to have been the victory over the barbarians gained by Antigonus near Lysimachia, alluded to by Diog. Laert. ii. 140.

this interval that he wrested Cassandrea from its tyrant Apollodorus, who, having gained the confidence of his fellow-citizens by his professions of an ardent zeal for liberty, seized the government with the help of a band of conspirators, whom he is said to have pledged in a draught of human blood. Yet it appears that his tyranny was at first exercised only at the expense of the rich, and for the benefit of the poor. But it was maintained by a body-guard of Celts, who were the ready instruments of every cruelty: and the possession of absolute power seems to have tempted him to the worst abuse of it. Antigonus besieged the city for ten months, and at last made himself master of it only by treachery; for which he employed the agency of a pirate captain named Ameinias, who insinuated himself into the tyrant's confidence, and thus found means to introduce the enemy within the walls.¹

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Pyrrhus landed in Epirus in 274, after an absence of six years, with no more than 8000 foot and 500 horse, and without the means of maintaining even this small force, unless at the expense of some enemy. He had never been less inclined for repose than after the series of disappointments he had experienced in the West, where he had signally displayed his military talents and his personal prowess, and had always shown himself superior to his fortune. He could not now hesitate as to the quarter toward which he should turn his arms. Macedonia tempted his ambition, and Antigonus had provoked his resentment, or at least furnished a pretext for hostility, by a recent refusal to aid him with troops or money for his Italian war.² After a short interval of rest he formally declared war against Antigonus, and forthwith followed up his threat by the invasion of Macedonia. He had

B. C. 274.
Pyrrhus
returns to
Epirus.

B. C. 273.
He invades
Macedonia.

¹ Polyænus, iv. 6. 18.

Justin, xxv. 3.

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strengthened his little army with a body of Celtic mercenaries, and the first object of his operations was plunder, which was probably all he could promise them. But before Antigonus was prepared to meet him, he had made himself master of several towns in Upper Macedonia, and had induced a corps of 2000 Macedonian troops to go over to him. Still Antigonus was, it appears, at the head of greatly superior numbers, and in addition to his phalanx and his elephants he had a strong body of Celts, notwithstanding his recent hostilities with their countrymen, in his pay. Pyrrhus however anticipated his approach, and by means, it would seem, of a circuitous march, was able to surprise his army, near the issue of a defile, with a sudden attack on the rear.¹ Notwithstanding the general confusion however, the Celts, who formed the rear-guard, made a vigorous resistance, but were at last nearly cut to pieces, and the elephants, which had been stationed in the same part of the column, were surrendered by their leaders. Pyrrhus then advanced upon the phalanx, which was not only full of disorder and consternation, but very ill disposed to sacrifice itself for the sake of Antigonus, who had no claim on the respect or affection of his troops comparable to those of his adversary, the first warrior of the age, who was moreover favourably remembered as the prince who had delivered Macedonia from the insolent tyranny of Demetrius. It would be not an improbable surmise that there had been previously some correspondence between Pyrrhus and the principal Macedonian officers. No attempt was made to strike a blow: on the first invitation, when stretching out his hand he called them by their names, they went over to him, and were followed by all their men. Antigonus made his escape to the sea-coast, where his

¹ Plut. Pyrrh. 26.

remaining force was sufficient to retain Thessalonica and a few other places in their obedience. A fresh army of Celtic mercenaries, which he found means to collect, enabled him soon to renew the struggle; but he was again entirely defeated by Ptolemæus, the son of Pyrrhus, and became for some time a fugitive outcast, wandering from one hiding-place to another, attended by no more than seven followers, while the whole of Macedonia and Thessaly submitted to his rival, who now sent for his son Helenus and his friend Milo from Tarentum. The reputation of the Celtic arms was at this time so high in Greece, that Pyrrhus esteemed the victory he had gained over them no slight addition to his renown, and commemorated it by an inscription on the spoils of the *bold Gaels*, which he dedicated in a temple of Athene between Pheræ and Larissa. And he even seemed to set a higher value on the services of his Celtic mercenaries than on the attachment of his new subjects. A Celtic garrison which he left at Ægæ broke open the sepulchres of the Macedonian kings in search of plunder, and wantonly scattered their bones.¹ Pyrrhus took no notice of this outrage, a sign perhaps that he would have been likely to lose his new kingdom as easily as he had won it, even if he had been successful in the expedition which closed his history.

Cleomenes II., king of Sparta, son of Cleombrotus who fell at Leuctra, survived Acrotatus, the eldest of his two sons, who left a son named Areus behind him. On the death of Cleomenes, the succession to the throne was disputed between Cleonymus, his younger son, and Areus, the representative of Acrotatus. The Gerusia, to which the question was referred, decided in favour of Areus, either on the simple ground of right, or because his uncle had betrayed indications of character which awakened distrust.²

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Cleonymus.

¹ Plut. Pyrrh. u. s.

² Plut. u. s.

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The ephors however endeavoured to soothe his disappointment by high honours and important military commands¹, and, when an application was made by the Tarentines for a Spartan general to conduct their war against the Lucanians, he was appointed to this service², which gratified his ambition, while it removed him into a kind of honourable exile. His career, as a leader of mercenaries in Italy and Sicily, was neither glorious nor fortunate, and he returned to Sparta without any increase of reputation, but less than ever disposed to rest satisfied with a private condition, or to conform to Spartan habits. Still however he was honoured and employed as before, though Areus had long arrived at maturity, and he might perhaps have reconciled himself to his lot, if his feelings had not been wounded by a fresh injury from the same quarter which was the origin of his former humiliation. His young wife, Chelidonis, did not disguise her preference of Acrotatus, the son of Areus, and the domestic dishonour of Cleonymus was notorious over all Sparta. This affront seemed to fill up the measure of his wrongs, and determined him to run all risks for the satisfaction of his ambition and his revenge. His eyes were naturally turned toward Pyrrhus, whose adventures bore some resemblance to his own, and as soon as the contest for the throne of Macedonia seemed to be decided in favour of the Epirot, Cleonymus appeared in his camp, and urged him to make war upon Sparta. Pyrrhus was easily persuaded to engage in an enterprise which opened a new field of action with a prospect of easy conquests, and which seemed necessary to complete his victory by the reduction of the places still held for Antigonus in Greece. In the year 273 he marched into Peloponnesus with an army of 25,000 foot, 2000 horse, and

B. C. 272.
Pyrrhus in
Pelopon-
nesus.

¹ Paus. III. 6. 3.

² Diodorus, xx. 104.

24 elephants. The arrival of this great force, which it appeared impossible to resist, no doubt excited many hopes and fears in the Grecian states. Embassies from Athens, Achæa, and Messenia, repaired to his camp.¹ His professions were moderate and specious: the object of his expedition was merely to restore the freedom of the cities which were held in subjection by Antigonus. Even when he had advanced as far as Megalopolis, and envoys came from Sparta to ascertain his intentions, he still held similar language, adding that he meant to send his younger sons to be trained in the Spartan discipline.² It was useless to question his sincerity; but it seems hardly possible that the Spartans could have been deceived by such artifices, even if he had not been accompanied by Cleonymus. He no sooner crossed the border than he laid aside the mask. Plutarch, in his Life, says that he immediately began to ravage the country, and that when the envoys who accompanied him expostulated with him on the unprovoked aggression, which had not been preceded by the usual declaration of war, he only retorted with a sneer on the Spartan dissimulation. But elsewhere Plutarch relates, that he required the Spartans to receive Cleonymus as their king³, and it seems to have been the threat with which he accompanied this demand, that drew forth the reply which Plutarch reports in the Laconian dialect: *If you are a god, we are safe in our innocence; if a man, you are not invincible.*

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The invasion had been so little foreseen, that not only had no preparations been made for the defence

He besieges
Sparta.

¹ Justin, xxv. 4.

² Plut. Pyrr. 26. Droysen (u. p. 190. n. 62.) observes, as a decisive objection to this account of the language of Pyrrhus, that Helenus, the youngest of his sons, was at this time old enough to be entrusted with military command. But who supposes that Pyrrhus expected to be believed?

³ Apophthegm. Lac. Δερκυλλίδας. In Pyrrh. 26. the envoy is named Mandricidas. In Stob. Flor. i. p. 213. Galsf. Dercyllidas, one of the Gerusia, makes a similar speech in the assembly at Sparta.

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of the capital, but king Areus himself was absent in Crete. The city had been partially fortified in its wars with Cassander and Demetrius, but was still open at several points, and the population was thin. Cleonymus urged Pyrrhus to attack it immediately on his arrival; and it seems probable that the attempt would have succeeded. The friends of Cleonymus felt so little doubt of his speedy restoration, that his house was prepared for the reception of his royal protector. Pyrrhus himself rejected his advice only because he thought his conquest secure, and did not wish to see it sullied with bloodshed and pillage. He encamped for the night, expecting to make a peaceful entry the next day. It was perhaps mainly the presence of Cleonymus, and dread of his vengeance, that decided his countrymen on a desperate resistance. Acrotatus, who had most to fear from him, filled his father's place. It was at first proposed to send the women away to Crete; but they retained all the spirit of ancient times with increased influence, derived from enormous wealth. Archidamia, the mother of Acrotatus, and the richest heiress in Sparta, is said to have entered the Gerasia with a drawn sword to remonstrate against the resolution. It was withdrawn, and the women earned their share of the danger by their exertions in the hour of need. A ditch had been begun on the side facing the enemy's camp. They laboured at it themselves, during the night, while the men spared and recruited their strength for the approaching struggle. At each end of the ditch was formed a barricade of waggons buried up to the axles in the ground, chiefly as a rampart against the elephants.¹ The next day Pyrrhus advanced to the assault, as to a conquest which had become more difficult, but not less certain. He was however unable

¹ Flathe (II. p. 94.) conceives that the waggons were placed in the ditch: which I can neither understand, nor reconcile with Plutarch's description.

to force the passage of the ditch : and his son Ptolemæus, whom he had ordered to break through the barricade with a detachment of Gauls and Chaonian picked troops, was repulsed with great loss by Acrotatus and a handful of Spartans. Sparta had seen another glorious day ; but it was purchased by a sacrifice of life, which weakened the hopes, though not the courage, of the survivors.

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Pyrrhus himself had become so far anxious about the result, that a dream which he had in the night, and which seemed to him promising, raised his spirits, and he related it with great satisfaction to his friends : but when his soothsayer suggested a different interpretation he affected to make light of omens, and applied the celebrated line of the Iliad, which expresses the same generous sentiment, to himself, though none of his contemporaries seems to have been less exempt from superstition. At daybreak the assault was renewed. The efforts of the assailants were again directed toward the ditch, which was now partly filled with arms and corpses : but apparently not so much with a view to cross it, as to divert the attention of the besieged, while Pyrrhus made an attempt to force an entrance at another point. And it seems as if this would have succeeded, if he had not been thrown by his horse, which was wounded as he was mounting a steep bank. Having been repulsed through this accident, he gave orders to put a stop to the assault : perhaps because he had been too much hurt by his fall to conduct it in person : but he also expected that the besieged, who seemed reduced by losses and wounds to the last stage of weakness, would shortly offer terms of surrender. But the reward of their fortitude was now at hand. Ameinias, probably the pirate, who commanded for Antigonus at Corinth, made his appearance with a body of mercenaries, accompanied perhaps by some

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IX. Argive auxiliaries¹, and soon after Areus arrived with 2000 men from Crete. The Messenians too, though they had been willing, as we saw, to treat with Pyrrhus, sent succours unsolicited to their old enemy.² The ramparts were now so well manned, that the old men and the women who had bravely exposed themselves in the most dangerous situations, while they supplied their warriors with weapons and food, might return to their homes.

RETREAT. Pyrrhus did not immediately abandon his enterprise, because it had become so much more difficult; but after several fresh attempts, in which he was repulsed and wounded, he found it necessary to shift his quarters, and began to ravage the country, professing his intention to winter there. But it seems doubtful whether this was ever his real design, as he must by this time have heard that Antigonus, who had again collected an army, was on his march toward Peloponnesus. At this juncture an invitation from Argos, where Aristetas sought his assistance against a rival named Aristippus, who was favoured by Antigonus, afforded him at least a fair colour for a change of plan. He forthwith began his march to Argos. The Spartans probably regarded it as a retreat, and Areus occupied one of the passes on the road with an ambuscade. A combat ensued, in which Pyrrhus lost not only a considerable number of his rear-guard, but his son Ptolemæus, the one who most resembled him in prowess and valour. He avenged

¹ Paus. i. 13. 6.

² Schorn (p. 46.) supposes that they did not come until they knew that their aid was not needed; and takes occasion to make a severe reflection on the character of the Messenians. The fact is certainly a little strange; especially as Sparta had so recently refused to grant them a truce, when they would have joined the allied army to oppose the Celtic invasion. If however, as the language of Pausanias (iv. 28. 3.) seems to intimate, the refusal was produced chiefly by the personal influence of Cleonymus, it would at least be intelligible that they might desire to prevent his restoration, which, so brought about, would have invested him with nearly absolute power. Schorn does not notice the passage (i. 13. 6.) in which Pausanias first mentions the Messenian succours in a manner very adverse to the supposition, that they came when the danger was nearly past.

his death on the field; and, after having celebrated his obsequies with splendid games, proceeded without farther interruption. When he reached the plain of Argos, he found that Antigonus was already encamped on one of the adjacent heights; and he endeavoured by an insulting message to provoke him to a battle, which Antigonus calmly declined. There was, it seems, a moderate party in Argos, or a number of citizens belonging to neither of the contending factions, and desirous of saving the city from the yoke of a foreign prince. Through their influence envoys were sent both to Pyrrhus and Antigonus, with the request that they would withdraw their forces, and permit the city to preserve a friendly neutrality. Antigonus, perhaps knowing Aristippus to be the stronger, consented, and offered to deliver his son as a hostage. Pyrrhus did not refuse, but would give no pledge. Aristetas had promised to introduce his troops within the walls. Accordingly, a gate was opened for him in the night, through which his Celtic troops made their way into the market-place unobserved. Pyrrhus himself followed with a part of the elephants, leaving his son Helenus with the bulk of the forces on the outside, to await further orders. The entrance of the elephants, which could not pass through the gateway until their towers were taken down, was attended with delay and confusion, which at length alarmed the slumbering inhabitants. The citizens were soon in arms, and sent to Antigonus for succour. In the meanwhile they were joined by Areus, who had followed close at the heels of Pyrrhus with Cretan and Spartan light troops. Antigonus advanced near to the walls, and sent his son Halcyoneus with a strong detachment into the city, but himself remained without. After the night had been spent in wild tumult, aimless struggles, and random blows, the dawning light enabled Pyrrhus to perceive

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His at-
tempt on
Argos.

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that all the strongest positions in the city were securely occupied by the enemy, and he deemed it advisable to retreat. But, fearing that some obstruction might again occur in the narrow gateway, which might now be attended with disastrous consequences, he sent orders to Helenus to break down a part of the walls, and to protect the egress of the troops from molestation. Through some mistake in the delivery of the message, Helenus, instead of opening a fresh passage, advanced with his best troops and the remainder of the elephants to the same gateway toward which the tide of the retreat was rolling. The confusion created by the confluence was still more embroiled by the fall of one elephant, and the ungovernable wildness of another. Every avenue leading to the gate was choked by a solid living mass, which could only stir as one body. Pyrrhus, on horseback, was in the rear, in a somewhat more open space, endeavouring to ward off the pressure of the enemy. The Argive women were looking down on the throng from the housetops; and one of them, seeing Pyrrhus turning on her son who had wounded him, raised a ponderous tile with both hands, and hurled it with so true an aim, that it fell on the back of the king's head. According to the Argive legend, it was the goddess Demeter herself, in human form, who had dealt the fatal stroke.¹ Stunned by the blow, he sank from his horse; and though he had taken the precaution to divest his helmet of its diadem, he was recognised by some soldiers of Antigonus, who

Death and
character of
Pyrrhus.

¹ Paus. i. 13. 8. Droysen (ii. p. 197.) collects from the variations in the brief allusions of Strabo (viii. 376.) and Justin (xxv. 5.), that Pyrrhus did not enter the town at all, but was slain in a battle outside the gates. But it seems as difficult to reconcile their language (particularly Strabo's), with this supposition as with Plutarch's narrative. Strabo says: 'Αργείοι δὲ Πύρρον μὲν οὐκ ἐδέξαντο, ἀλλὰ πρὸ τοῦ τείχους ἔπεσε, γραίδιου τινός, ὡς τοῖκε, κεραμίδα ἀφέντος ἄνωθεν ἐπὶ τὴν κεφαλὴν. Justin, *Repulsus a Spartanis Pyrrhus Argos petit: ibi, dum Antigonum in urbe clausum expugnare conatur inter confertissimos violentissime dimicans, saxo de muris ictus, occiditur.*

dragged him aside, and severed his head from his body. Halcyoneus, who was at hand, took possession of the bleeding trophy, carried it to his father, who was seated among his friends, and threw it down at his feet. Antigonus had enough of good feeling or discretion to be ashamed of his son's ferocious exultation. He hid his face, if not his tears, with his mantle, ordered the remains of his illustrious rival to be honoured with fitting obsequies, and received Helenus more like a friend than a prisoner. The Argives are reported to have interred the hero's bones in the temple of Demeter, which Pausanias seems to say was erected for the purpose near the place where he fell.¹

Inglorious as was this termination of a career like that of Pyrrhus, the closing scene of his life was not without some points of resemblance to its general character. He was undoubtedly one of the nobler spirits of his age, though it would seem that it could have been only in one which was familiar with atrocious crimes, that he could have gained the reputation of unsullied virtue, more particularly of probity, which we find attached to his name.² With extraordinary prowess, such as revived the image of the heroic warfare, he combined many qualities of a great captain, and was thought by some to be superior even to Alexander in the art of war.³ But his whole life was not only a series of unconnected, mostly abortive, enterprises, but might be regarded, with respect to himself, as one ill-concerted, perplexed, and bootless adventure. From beginning to end he was the sport, not so much of fortune, as of desires without measure

¹ L. 13. 8. But, comparing II. 21. 4., I am inclined to suspect that τοῦ θεοῦ χηφαιρος has been transposed, and belongs to τέθαρται.

² Justin, xxv. 5. *Satis constans inter omnes auctores fama est, nullum nec ejus nec superioris ætatis regem comparandum Pyrrho fuisse; raroque non inter reges tantum, verum etiam inter illustres viros, aut vitæ sanctoris, aut justitiæ probatoris visum fuisse.*

³ Procles, the Carthaginian, ap. Paus. iv. 35. 4. His work on the art of war was in request in the time of Cicero. *Ep. ad. Div.* ix. 25.

CHAP. I.A. } or plan, of an impetuous, but inconstant will. His ruling passion was less ambition than the love of action: and he seems to have valued conquest chiefly because it opened new fields of battle. But viewed as subservient to higher ends, both his life and his death were memorable and important. He contributed to adjust the balance of power among Alexander's successors in the West. He exercised the Roman arms with a harder trial than they had ever before undergone, and inspired the people with a confidence in its own strength which nerved it for the struggle with Carthage, and prepared it for the mastery of the world. His death forms a momentous epoch in Grecian history, as it left the field clear for the final contest between the liberty of Greece and the power of Macedon, which was only terminated by the ruin of both.

CHAPTER LXI.

FROM THE DEATH OF PYRRHUS TO THE ACCESSION
OF ANTIGONUS DOSON.

Rise of the Achæan League.— Its early History and Revival.— Constitution of the League.— Tyranny of Aristotimus.— Antigonus besieges Athens.— Alexander of Epirus.— End of the Chremonidean War.— Constitution of the Achæan League.— Aratus.— His Character and Designs.— He surprises Sicyon, and annexes it to the League.— Constitution of the League.— Aratus sails to Alexandria.— Restores Tranquillity at Sicyon.— Artifices of Antigonus.— Aratus General of the League.— Antigonus gains Corinth.— Corinth surprised by Aratus.— Attempts of Aratus upon Argos.— Agis IV. at the Isthmus.— Accession of Demetrius II.— Acarnanian Embassy to Rome.— Aratus invades Attica.— Demetrius in Northern Greece.— Attempts of Aratus upon Argos.— Megalopolis joins the Achæan League.— Revolution in Epirus.— The Illyrians in Epirus.— Defeat the Achæans at Sea.— Roman Embassy in Greece.— Death of Demetrius II.

THE appearance of Antigonus with an army before Argos implies a series of events, which are scarcely noticed by any of the authors who have preserved fragments of the history of this period. Pausanias says the most, when he mentions that, while Pyrrhus was occupied with the invasion of Greece, Antigonus recovered the Macedonian cities. Pyrrhus, as we have seen, had given some offence to the national feelings, and even without such an occasion it would not have been surprising that a revolution should have taken place during his absence. But the recovery of places in Macedonia cannot have been the first or chief object that engaged the attention of Antigonus. For the present all he wanted was an army to enable him to

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meet his rival in Greece, and in this period nothing was easier than to raise one. There were every where military adventurers ready to flock to any standard which held out a prospect of prey or plunder. It is probable that, as soon as he had collected a sufficient force, he began his march, reserving the settlement of Macedonia for his future leisure. After the fall of Pyrrhus, the greater part of his army, which was chiefly composed of Macedonians, seems to have passed into the service of Antigonus. But he did not find it so easy to recover the hold which he had lost during his recent adversity in Peloponnesus, where his influence must have been violently shaken, first by the disaster which deprived him of his throne, and then by the appearance of his victorious enemy. And here he could not, consistently with his previous policy and professions, resort in all cases to open force for the accomplishment of his ends. He had ruled under the title of a protector and ally. Whether he introduced a garrison or established a tyrant, it was probably always under the pretext of providing for the security and tranquillity of the city. Flourishing as the state of his affairs had now become, it would still not have been prudent immediately to adopt a different system, and to claim the rights of a master. The spirit which Sparta had displayed in the late war, and the attitude of Ætolia, were additional motives for caution. But a course of dissimulation and intrigue could only be pursued slowly; and accordingly it appears that Antigonus was detained a long while, perhaps until late in the following year (272), by the affairs of Peloponnesus, before he returned to Macedonia.

B. C. 281.
Rise of the
Achæan
League.

He could not suspect that a power which was at this time silently growing in a corner of the peninsula, was destined to become a formidable adversary to his house. Yet seven years had now elapsed since the origin of a new confederacy among the towns of

Achaia, which already comprehended the whole of that land. This Achæan League, which became so celebrated, and earned the melancholy honour of giving a name to the whole of Greece, when it was reduced into a Roman province, was founded on the recollections of earlier times, but was called into being by the wants and miseries of the period in which it arose. After the abolition of monarchical government, the old confederacy had subsisted, with few vicissitudes of fortune, and little change of condition, until the reign of Alexander. The most brilliant epoch in its obscure history was that in which its mediation was sought, and its institutions adopted, by its powerful colonies in Italy¹; the most inglorious, that of the Persian invasion, when, either from selfish indifference or pitiful hatred toward Sparta, it kept aloof from the national struggle for freedom. Its inaction at such a crisis left the deeper stain upon its honour, because, in the course of the Peloponnesian War, it submitted, no doubt very reluctantly, to the Dorian alliance.² The history of that war shows the laxity of the union which then subsisted among the members of the League, for we find Pellene at one time taking part with Sparta, while the rest remained neutral³, and at another, Patræ alone warmly espousing the cause of Athens.⁴ It displayed a more generous spirit when it sent succours to the side of independence at Chæronea, but suffered a loss which it continued to feel for many years.

Confined to a narrow tract of not exuberantly fertile land, between the mountains and the sea, with few commercial advantages, the Achæans never attained to any great share of either public or private wealth, and were on this account probably the more exempt

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Its early
history and
revival.

¹ Polyb. ii. 39.

² Ibid. v. 58. Vol. III. p. 333.

³ Thuc. ii. 9.

⁴ Ibid. v. 52. Vol. III. p. 329.

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from the evils of faction, and enabled to retain a simplicity of manners and equality of fortunes, which cherished the spirit, as well as preserved the form, of their democratical constitution: though when we find the destruction of Helice, which was overthrown by an earthquake and overwhelmed by the sea, in the year 373, B.C., attributed to the sacrilegious murder of suppliants who had been torn from an altar¹, we perceive a symptom of some violent political agitation. In the reign of Alexander, Pellene was estranged from the League, having fallen under the dominion of a tyrant named Chæron, of whom we only know that he gained an extraordinary number of prizes in the wrestling-matches at the Olympic games.² He was supported by the Macedonian influence, and hence Pellene kept aloof from the struggle which ended with the disastrous battle of Mantinea³, and was exempt from the penalty which the conquerors imposed on the other Achæan towns, which all took part with Sparta. This second blow, falling upon them before they had recovered from that of Chæronæa, left them so weak that they could not stir in the Lamian war, though their hearts were undoubtedly with their countrymen, as the name of Cheilon, also a wrestler, was long preserved in honourable remembrance among them, as that of the only Achæan who served in the allied army.⁴ The policy of Alexander's successors in Macedonia was continually bent, so far as Achaia attracted their attention, on effecting the dissolution of the League: and this work, which was successfully begun by Cassander and Demetrius, was accomplished by Antigonus Gonatas, who had at length the pleasure to see every town either occupied by his troops, or subject to the tyranny of one of his creatures.⁵ The latter of these conditions was

¹ Paus. vii. 24. 6.

² Vol. III. p. 338.

³ Ibid. vii. 27. 7.

⁴ Paus. vii. 6. 5.

⁵ Polyb. ii. 41.

perhaps that which best suited his interest, but it must have been by far the most grievous to the sufferers, as the smallness of the towns rendered it the more difficult to elude the despot's observation, and their poverty rendered his exactions the more oppressive. The misery had probably become almost insupportable when the convulsion which followed the death of Lysimachus in Macedonia opened a prospect of deliverance: and it seems to have been instinctively felt, that this could only be effected by the revival of the ancient union. The example was set by Patræ and Dyme, the two maritime towns nearest to the western border, and was speedily followed by Tritæa and Pharæ, their neighbours in the interior. The confederation of these four towns was not, it appears, the result of any formal negotiation, as we are informed that it was not regulated by any written compact.¹ It was probably considered simply as a restoration of the old state of things which had been violently interrupted by foreign intervention. Five years after, the League was joined by Ægium, which expelled the Macedonian garrison, and by Bura, which put its tyrant to death. The accession of Ægium was the more important, because, after the destruction of Helice, the ordinary assemblies and festivals of the League had been transferred to Ægium², and its territory had been enlarged by that of its fallen neighbour. A temple had been consecrated there to Zeus under the title of Homagyrius (the Assembler), probably with reference to these meetings, though in later times a local legend traced the origin of the epithet to the Trojan war.³ A column was now erected, inscribed with the names of the

¹ Polyb. u. s.

² Liv. xxxviii. 30. *Ægium, a principio Achaici concilii, semper conventus gentis indicti sunt.* Paus. vii. 7. 2.

³ Paus. vii. 24. 2. He seems also to have borne the title 'Ομᾶριος, on which a remark will be found in a subsequent note.

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confederate towns, and perhaps with the conditions of their union. The list was almost immediately increased by the addition of Cerynea, where the tyrant Isceas, having the example of Bura before his eyes, and finding himself nearly encompassed by hostile neighbours, abdicated his authority, and having obtained security from the Achæans, annexed his town to the League. There now remained only three, Leontium, Ægira, and Pellene, to complete the number which had been left after the loss of Helice; for Olenus, which was once one of the twelve, had it seems been already abandoned by its inhabitants¹; and the accession of these three was not long delayed.

Constitu-
tion of the
League.

The constitution of the new League then became fixed in its main outline, though it subsequently underwent some slight changes, which will be noticed hereafter. It appears to have differed from that of the old League, chiefly in two points. The bond of union was drawn closer than before. No township was permitted to make war or peace², or to enter into any negotiation with foreign states apart from the entire body; though each appears to have retained the unfettered management of its internal affairs. And now it seems for the first time two officers with the title of *strategus*, but with functions partly civil and partly military, were placed at the head of the

¹ Polyb. ii. 41. 7. Strabo, viii. p. 384. προσελάμβανόν τινας τῶν δώδεκα, πλὴν Ὀλένου καὶ Ἐλικῆς, τῆς μὲν οὐ συνελθοῦσης, τῆς δ' ἀφανισθείσης ὑπὸ κόματος. p. 386. he says, συνώκισαν (οἱ Ἀχαιοὶ) Ὀλενον εἰς Δύμην. But Pausan. vii. 18. 1. ἀπὸ χρόνον τοὺς οἰκήτορας ἐκλιπεῖν ὑπὸ ἀσθενείας φασὶ τὴν Ὀλενον, καὶ ἐς Πειπὰς τε καὶ ἐς Ἐδρωταῖας ἀποχωρῆσαι. Vestiges of Olenus were pointed out to Strabo (u. s. δεικνυται ἶχνος), which seem to have disappeared in the days of Pausanias, who proves its existence by reference to a poem of Hermesianax. Colonel Leake's statement (*Morea*, ii. p. 157.), that *the Olenii refused to join the revived Achaic League*, is as little warranted by Strabo's expression, as his inference that *Olenus was at that time a place of some importance*.

² The aid given by Patræ to the Ætolians against the Gauls (Paus. vii. 18. 6. κατὰ φιλίαν τῶν Αἰτωλῶν), hardly deserves to be called an apparent exception, especially as the League was then only just coming into being; though it is alleged by Tittman (p. 678.) as an illustration of a general rule. He is obliged, of course, to treat the prohibition against sending ambassadors to Rome (Paus. vii. 9. 4.) as an exception. But it is highly improbable that the Achæans would have ventured to make such a one, or that the senate would have suffered it.

federal government. To them was added a Secretary of State (*grammateus*), probably as in the old League, and a Council of ten *demiurges*, which, as it answers to the number of the Achæan towns, may also have subsisted under the same name in the former period.¹

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The federal sovereignty resided in the General Assembly², which was held regularly twice a year. To it belonged the election of the federal magistrates³, the federal legislation, and the decision of all the great questions, as of war, peace, and alliances, connected with the foreign affairs of the League. In this assembly every Achæan who had completed the age of thirty⁴ had a vote, and was allowed to speak⁵; and in this franchise the democratical character of the constitution mainly consisted. There were however arrangements by which the share of the sovereignty which could be exercised by any private citizen, was reduced within a narrower compass than might appear on a superficial view. The time allowed to one assembly for the transaction of any business was limited by law to three days.⁶ A special general assembly⁷ could only be convoked by the magistrates, the Generals, and Demiurges: no matters could be brought forward of which notice had not been previously

¹ *δημιουργοί*. In the Inscriptions, n. 1542, 1543, *δημοργοί*. See Boekh, l. p. 11. Liv. (xxviii. 30.) calls them *Damiuryis civitatum, qui summus est magistratus*. Both Tittmann (p. 687.) and Helwing (p. 236.) have been perplexed by the number ten, forgetting how that of the Achæan townships had been reduced by the loss of Helice and Olenus. Schorn (p. 62.) supposes, very probably, that the two Generals of the new League supplied the places of the two Demiurges, who made up the number twelve in the old one.

² *σύνδοτος, ἐκκλησία, συνέδριον*; and, according to Niebuhr (ii. p. 30. n. 54.), *ἀγορά*. But Tittmann (p. 684.) gives a different explanation of that word in Polyb. xxix. 9. 5.

³ That the Demiurges had the exclusive right of proposing candidates for the chief magistracy, is inferred both by Schorn (p. 64. n. 4.) and Droysen (ii. p. 463.), from a passage of Polybius (xxviii. 6.), in which no mention is made of the Demiurges, and in which I can find no intimation of anything but a private agreement of some powerful individuals, to promote the election of certain persons of their own party.

⁴ Polyb. xxix. 9. 6.

⁵ Liv. xxxii. 20.

⁶ Ibid. xxxii. 22. Polyb. xxix. 9. 10.

⁷ *σύγκλητος*, Polyb. xxix. 9. 6.

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published¹; nor any measure proposed without the concurrence of a majority of the presiding magistrates.² The value of each citizen's vote seems to have been still further limited by the manner in which the votes were taken. Every question was decided, not by an absolute majority of the citizens present, but by that of the towns, members of the League.³ Thus, as Niebuhr observes⁴, the general assembly was a representative one. Each town had as much weight in the Assembly, if but one of its citizens was present, as if it sent its whole population. But if there be room for a doubt whether this was the case with regard to the General Assembly, there can hardly be any as to the representative character of the Great Council⁵, which we find occupying an intermediate place between the General Assembly and the Board of Magistrates. But our information as to the constitution and the powers of this body is unfortunately very scanty. We do not know either what its number was, or whether it continued always the same: but it seems clear, that at a later period it cannot have been less than 120.⁶ All affairs of great

¹ Liv. xxxi. 25.

² Ibid. xxxii. 22.

³ This most important observation was at least first brought into general notice by Niebuhr (ii. p. 29. n. 51. Engl.). Schorn (p. 63. n. 2.) adopts it with the remark, that, if the case had been otherwise, Argos and Megalopolis would have prevented the alliance with the Romans. But the Argives did not all withdraw on that occasion (Liv. xxxii. 22. *quidam Argivorum*), and it is not quite certain that the Megalopolitans were not convinced of the necessity of the measure, though they did not choose to concur in it. But Livy's language (*omnibus fere populis haud dubie adprobantibus relationem, et prae se ferentibus, quid decreturi essent*) seems to leave hardly any room for doubt on the point.

⁴ U. s. p. 30. But Helwing's notion (p. 229.) that the assembly was composed of delegates, is utterly untenable, and without any colour but Livy's *principes Achaeorum*, xxxii. 21.

⁵ *Βουλή*. The term *γερουσία*, which occurs but once (Polyb. xxxviii. 5. 1.), seems to have been applied to a less numerous body; probably the board consisting of the Demiurges and the other magistrates.

⁶ This seems a necessary inference from the offer made by Eumenes, of 120 talents, for the purpose of paying salaries to the *Βουλή* with the interest (Polyb. xxxiii. 7.), a passage which has not received — so far as I know — from any of the writers who have discussed the constitution of the Achaean League, the attention which its importance seems to claim. The number 120 = 10 × 12, corresponds both with the old and the new number of the Achaean towns.

moment appear to have passed through the Council before they were submitted to the General Assembly¹: and it is probable that the result of its deliberations contributed at least very materially to determine the final issue. There were also cases in which it acted as a committee of the Assembly, and, as it seems, was authorised to decide finally on the questions which came before it.

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If from this point of view the democratical character of the Achæan League appears tempered by a different element, we are led to a like conclusion when we observe the tendency of its institutions to increase the political influence of property. The existence of such an influence in the councils of the League is too apparent in the course of its history to be disputed; and yet it was neither the effect of a pecuniary qualification attached to the exercise of the franchise, nor do we find any intimation that the mode of taking the votes was regulated with a view to this object.² It seems rather to have been the natural inevitable effect of the circumstances by which the federal government was distinguished from that of a single city. As the League spread, a longer and longer journey was necessary for the greater part of those who had the right of voting to attend the assembly at Ægium. This of itself would operate as a timocratical restriction on the exercise of the franchise; it would exclude most citizens of the lowest class. In the Board of Magistrates and the Great Council, and in the federal courts of justice³, as more of their time was devoted to the performance of their official duties, wealth

¹ Polyb. ii. 466.

² As is supposed by Droysen, ii. p. 462.

³ From an expression in Plut. Philop. 7., where the wealthy Achæans who served in the cavalry are described as *μάλιστα κύριοι τιμῆς καὶ κολλάσεως*, it would seem that the federal tribunals were filled by this class. In one instance (Polyb. xxviii. 7. 9.) we find that two foreigners, Rhodians, had been appointed judges. Whether for the particular case mentioned, does not appear. It was one which related to the honours which the League had conferred on Eumenes of Pergamus.

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would preponderate still more. For, as we know to have been the case with regard to the Council, so we have reason to believe that no salary was annexed to any of these places.

If the revival of the League had been deferred only six or seven years, that is, until the death of Pyrrhus, it is probable that Antigonus would have stifled the rising power in its infancy. But it had now acquired such a consistency, that he could only have overwhelmed it by an exertion of force, which at this juncture, while so many other more important affairs remained unsettled, he might not deem advisable. After he had taken such measures as appeared to be most urgently required for the furtherance or security of his interests in Peloponnesus, it became high time to turn his attention toward Macedonia, the rather as some events seem to have taken place, near the western frontier of his kingdom, which he could not but view with uneasiness. Pyrrhus had been succeeded on the throne of Epirus by his son Alexander, who soon gave proof of talents and a spirit not unworthy of his father. He appears scarcely to have mounted the throne before he was engaged in a war with Monunius, who had perhaps hoped to find Epirus defenceless. We have no information as to the issue of the war: but there is ground to believe that it was not unfavourable to Alexander. He probably foresaw that, sooner or later, he should be engaged in a conflict with Antigonus, and therefore sought to strengthen himself by an alliance with the Ætolians, which was apparently cemented by an act of injustice, in which they were partners. We learn the fact only from a brief notice in Polybius, who mentions that Alexander divided Acarnania with them.¹ No date is assigned to this transaction; but

¹ II. 45. Justin (xxviii. 1.) alludes less distinctly to the same transaction. *Partem Acarnanie, quam in portionem belli acceperat.*

from other facts it may be inferred, that it took place very early in his reign. Antigonus must have viewed both the partition and the alliance with great disquietude. The feeling which subsisted at this time between him and the Ætolians is indicated by another occurrence, which belongs to this period of his reign, and which also illustrates the nature of the ascendancy which he was endeavouring to establish in Greece. With his aid an Elean named Aristotimus had made himself master of Elis, where his power was upheld by a band of mercenaries, whose leaders were permitted to indulge their brutal passions in the most atrocious outrages on the persons of the citizens.¹ He put many of the principal citizens to death, and forced 800 into exile. They took refuge in Ætolia, and the Ætolians interceded with the tyrant for the release of their wives and children, whom they had left behind. He feigned compliance, but only to aggravate the misery of the sufferers by fresh excesses of rapine and cruelty. His tyranny however lasted but five or six months: the exiles intrenched themselves in a stronghold named Amygone, to carry on war against him. Craterus marched from Corinth, where he commanded in the name of his half-brother Antigonus, with a strong force to his assistance, and advanced as far as Olympia. But he came too late: for a conspiracy had been formed against the tyrant within the city, and he was despatched as he clung to an altar. Cylon, who, under the mask of friendship, had taken the principal part in the plot, was honoured with a statue at Olympia by the Ætolians.²

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Tyranny
of Aristotimus.

¹ Plutarch, *de Mul. Virt. Mixta kal Meyiorá*. The name of one of these *condottieri*, Lucius, indicates that a part at least of these troops came from Italy.

² Paus. vi. 14. 11. Compare v. 5. 1., where Cylon is said to have struck the blow; which Plutarch's author (Droysen thinks Phylarchus) seems not to have known. Justin (xxvi. 1.) only mentions Hellenicus; but the statue seems to corroborate the other accounts. Flathe (ii. p. 98.), deceived by the false reading *Epirorum* in Justin, xxvi. 1. (which however had been long corrected), transfers

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. C. 268.
Antigonus
sieges
them.

The state of Macedonia, exhausted by a long series of destructive wars, and threatened by an able and enterprising neighbour, will fully account for the interval of three or four years, which elapsed before Antigonus again makes his appearance in Greece. He returned with a fleet and army, and with undissembled designs of conquest: though it is probable that he did not proceed to execute them so abruptly, and with so little show of pretext, as is represented by the accounts which remain to us of his expedition. They bring him at once to the siege of Athens, while an Egyptian armament, commanded by Ptolemy's admiral Patroclus, and a Lacedæmonian army under king Areus, are combined to protect it.¹ The presence of the Egyptian fleet in the Greek waters may have been the occasion, rather than the consequence, of the siege. Sparta could not but feel that her own independence was threatened, and that she was fighting her own battle in Attica. But both Areus and Patroclus were much more careful to guard themselves than to relieve the Athenians. Patroclus, who had entrenched himself on a little island, which afterwards bore his name, near the Attic coast, over against Laurium², offered to second the operations of the Lacedæmonian army with his own troops on the main land, if Areus would attack the enemy. But Areus, though his men, it is said, were eager for combat, did not venture to risk lives which Sparta

the event to Epirus; and this mistake perhaps mainly led him into the fancies with which he has bewildered himself in his account of Alexander's war with Antigonus.

¹ Pausan. iii. 6.

² Pausan. i. 1. 1. It was no doubt from this station, that he sent the symbolical present, of fish and figs, to Antigonus (Phylarchus ap. Athen. viii. 9.), which Antigonus himself interpreted; ἡ θαλασσοκρατεῖν ἡμᾶς φησι Πάτροκλος ἢ τῶν σύκων τρώγειν. But the interpretation needs an exposition. Droysen's (ii. p. 213.) seems to imply, that φησι might be equivalent to κελεύει. Nor is it clear that τῶν σύκων τρώγειν would be properly rendered, *to grow figs* (σῦκα φίλ' ὀρνίθεσσι, φυτεύειν δ' οὐκ ἐθελοῦσιν, Ath. iii. p. 80. e.). Compare Erasmus, *Adagia*—*Fisci-vores, Συκοτραγίδης*.

could so ill spare, and might so soon need for her own defence, without a clearer prospect of victory. Even when an opportunity presented itself of attacking the enemy at the greatest possible advantage, no use was made of it. A mutiny it seems had broken out among the Celtic mercenaries in the service of Antigonus, who had either been posted at Megara, or had taken up a position there: and Antigonus thought it necessary to march against them with the bulk of his forces. The small body which he left to guard his camp before Athens might, it is supposed, have been easily overpowered if it had been attacked by the allies. But it appears that they made no attempt either to storm the camp, or to impede his operations against the Celts, who are represented as having made such a determined resistance, that they first slew their wives and children, and then perished, fighting, to the last man.¹ Antigonus returned to his head-quarters unmolested; and soon after Areus, whose provisions were exhausted, withdrew his army from Attica, and Patroclus sailed away, perhaps to establish his master's authority with less cost and danger in other parts of the Ægean. But the Athenians, though thus abandoned, and seemingly betrayed by their allies, did not lose courage. They sustained the siege with a patience and vigour worthy of the ancient times: and Antigonus was so exasperated by their resistance, that he not only ravaged the country, but set fire to the celebrated temple of Poseidon at Colonus, and to the sacred grove in which it stood.² The war with Antigonus lasted six or seven years: but as he invested the city both by sea and land, they could not by any dint of resolution, have held out so long, if the siege

¹ If, as Lucas thinks (*Ueber Polybius' Darstellung des Aetolischen Bundes*, p. 72.) the stratagem in Polyænus (iv. 6. 3.) belongs to this siege of Megara, we learn that Antigonus had brought elephants with him.

² Paus. i. 30. 4.

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had not been at times interrupted so as to enable them to introduce supplies. And though this is not expressly related, we find that on two occasions Antigonus was called away from Athens during the course of the war. As to one of these movements, we only know that it terminated in a battle fought with a Lacedæmonian army near Corinth, in which Areus—who may have been roused to more zealous exertions by the murmurs of his fellow-citizens—lost his life¹; and we find that about the same time he was engaged in hostilities with Alexander, son of Craterus, who had probably succeeded his father in the government of Corinth, and was at one time master of Eubœa.² The other diversion probably compelled him to raise the siege for a much longer interval. Alexander of Epirus made an inroad into Macedonia³: and Antigonus, when he marched against the invader, was deserted by his troops, and for a time had lost possession of his throne. There is nothing to indicate how long the struggle lasted: but the final recovery of his kingdom is ascribed to his son Demetrius⁴, who is said to have defeated Alexander in a battle fought at a place called Dardia⁵, and afterwards to have made himself master of Epirus, while Alexander took refuge

Alexander
of Epirus.

¹ Plut. Agis. 3. Trog. Prol. xxvi.

² Suidas, *Eubœoïan*.

³ Flathé (ii. p. 101.), with that boundless licence of arbitrary conjecture, which so often disfigures his otherwise useful and able work, chooses to reject Justin's express statement as to the time of Alexander's invasion of Macedonia (xxvi. 2.), places it after the fall of Athens, and attributes to it effects, which, so far as any evidence appears, never existed but in his own imagination.

⁴ Justin, xxvi. 2. *Hujus filius Demetrius, puer admodum*. Droysen (ii. p. 214.) rejects this statement, though it is confirmed by the independent authority of the Armenian Eusebius (i. p. 340., from which we learn the name of the place), because this Demetrius was then scarcely twelve years old; and he supposes that the commander must have been one of the brothers of Antigonus, probably Demetrius the Handsome (Justin, xxvi. 3.), son of Demetrius I. and Ptolemæus, who would have been about twenty years old. It should however be remembered, that Perseus was only twelve years old when he was entrusted by his father with the command of an army (of course with a council to assist him): and Livy, where he relates the fact (xxxii. 28.), uses the same expression. *Filium Perseæ, puerum admodum, datis ex amicorum numero qui ætatem ejus regerent, cum parte copiarum . . . mittit.*

⁵ According to Droysen's probable conjecture in *Elymiotis*, where the name of Dardas was common in the ruling family.

in Acarnania, probably in the part which he had annexed to his dominions. Demetrius however could not secure his conquest: how long he retained it we are not informed: but Alexander is said to have been restored by the regret of his subjects, and with the aid of his allies, who were probably the Ætolians. And as we hear of no further hostilities between him and Antigonus, it seems not improbable that the war was about the same time terminated by a treaty.

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As soon as this danger had passed by, Antigonus proceeded to renew the siege of Athens, and he is said to have abridged it by an artifice which Polyænus thought worthy of a place in his collection of stratagems.¹ He granted a suspension of hostilities; Polyænus calls it a peace; and withdrew his forces, as the seed time was approaching in the year 263. The Athenians took advantage of the opportunity to sow their land; but neglected to lay in a fresh supply of corn, calculating that their remaining stock would suffice until the next harvest. But before the corn was ripe, Antigonus again invaded Attica, and invested the city, which, having now spent all its provisions, was compelled to submit to his pleasure, and to receive a Macedonian garrison in the Museum, Piræus, Munychia, Sunium, and Salamis. It may easily be supposed that the citizens who had most distinguished themselves by their zeal in the cause of independence, were forced to quit their country. One of these exiles, named Chremonides, who appears to have taken so prominent a part in the defence of the city, that the war was sometimes called from him the Chremonidean, found shelter and favour at the court of Alexandria, and was afterwards entrusted with the command of an Egyptian fleet.² Athens, reduced to extreme weakness by her long, unequal struggle, and

B. C. 263.
End of the
Chremonidean War.

¹ iv. 6. 20.

² Teles ap. Stob. Flor. ii. p. 92. Gaisf. Polyæn. v. 18.

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deprived of her most active and patriotic citizens, ceased to be an object worthy of the conqueror's jealousy; and he revealed the lowest depth of humiliation to which she had ever yet sunk, when some years afterwards he voluntarily withdrew his garrison from the city, retaining however those which he had stationed in the other Attic fortresses. Yet there is reason to believe, that he at the same time took the precaution of demolishing the Long Walls. The Athenians, after they had gained this semblance of liberty, were still anxious to show their loyalty to Antigonus, and to convince him that his confidence was not misplaced. It was apparently with this view, that they deposited the keys of the city with the philosopher Zeno, who had spent the greater part of a long life at Athens, and was revered as the head of the Stoic school. But it is probable that this would not have been deemed a sufficient motive for such an extraordinary mark of public esteem toward a foreigner, if he had not also enjoyed the favour of Antigonus, who not only professed the highest admiration for the philosopher, but affected to treat him as an intimate friend, and after his death induced the Athenians to inter him at the public expense, among their heroes in the Ceramicus. Zeno deserved this honour so well, that it is to be regretted it should not have been more freely conferred, and that his monument in fact attested the subjection of Athens, rather than the merit of the philosopher.¹

¹ The Chremonidean War was the subject of one of Niebuhr's most ingenious and characteristic essays (*Rhein. Mus.* i. p. 159. *Kl. Schr.* p. 451.), and it has since received all the additional light which Droysen's learning and sagacity could throw upon it in the newly-published volume of his *Hellenismus* (ii. p. 205. fol.). Yet some of the details with which he has enriched this very obscure portion of history, are of such a nature that nothing less than his own talent for combination and description is required to invest them with an air of probability. That, before the outbreak of the Chremonidean War, Piræus and Munychia had been governed by independent rulers who could be described as *οἱ Πειραιέως τυραννέοντες*, is a proposition too strange to be admitted on the mere presumption that the Glaucon, the water-drinker, mentioned by Pythermus (in *Athenæus*, ii. p. 44. c.), was the Glaucon of Teles (*Stobæus Flor.* ii. p. 82. Gaisf.). If the conjecture by which

After the conquest of Athens, the history of Greece presents almost an utter blank for a period of about ten years, during which we hear of only two occurrences worth recording. We find that Sparta was engaged in a war with Aristodemus, the tyrant of Megalopolis, in the course of which, Acrotatus, the son of Areus, fell in battle, leaving his queen pregnant of an heir to his crown, who was born after his death¹; an event which must have strengthened the power of Aristodemus, and consequently the Macedonian interest in Peloponnesus. During the same interval an important change took place in the constitution of the Achæan League. A single magistrate was appointed in the room of two, to the supreme command. It is not quite certain, though probable, that a new office, that of Hipparch (commander of the horse), was substituted for the one which was thus abolished.² We

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tion of the
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League.

Niebuhr proposed to explain their identity is not to be admitted, it seems easier to suppose, with Scheibe (*Die Oligarchische Umwälzung zu Athen.* p. 69., though he does not notice the Glaucon of Teles), that Glaucon had been enumerated by Pythermus among the tyrants of 404. Droysen believes that the sea-fight off Cos alluded to by Plutarch (*De seipsum citra inv. laud.* 16.), occurred in the course of this war; not however, as might have been imagined, between Antigonos and Patroclus; but on a much more extraordinary hypothesis. He supposes that the naval force of Antigonos was so inferior to that of Patroclus, that he did not venture to risk an engagement, but nevertheless that on his return from Macedonia, having anticipated that Philadelphus would send a reinforcement to his admiral, he sailed to intercept it, and gained a victory over the Egyptian fleet off Cos. Droysen seems even to intimate (p. 219. n. 119.) that Patroclus owed his escape to the generosity of Antigonos. Droysen makes the Chremonidean War to begin in 266, the year after that which he assigns to Zeno's death: for during the war, he argues, Antigonos could not have sent Thraso (as Diogenes Laert. relates, vii. 15.) to request the Athenians to bury Zeno in the Ceramicus; after the surrender of the city, he would not have requested, but have commanded. This reasoning at least seems quite fallacious. On such an occasion the conqueror must have desired that his friend should be honoured with every appearance of free public sympathy. Niebuhr's view of the circumstances under which Zeno was entrusted with the keys of the city (Diog. Laert. vii. 6.) is incomparably the most probable. That the Athenians should have done so before the war, seems hardly conceivable. If it were certain that Zeno did not live to witness the evacuation of the city, one might rather be inclined to suspect, that a compliment paid to him by order of Antigonos, had been attributed to the Athenians. Droysen attaches perhaps too much weight to the effect of Zeno's philosophy on the origin of the war. Chremonides, notwithstanding his intimacy with Zeno, may have been no more of a stoic than Antigonos himself.

¹ Plutarch, Agis. 3. Paus. iii. 6. 6. Compare (as illustrating the carelessness of Pausanias in historical matters) viii. 27. 11. and 30. 6.

² Schorn, p. 62.

also find mention of a Vice-general¹, but without any account of the mode of his appointment, or of the relation in which he stood to his chief. That his office was not one of very high trust, may be inferred from the fact, that in case of the General's death it was not he, but the General's immediate predecessor, who stepped into his place.² But the effect was to invest one person during his year of office with the undivided confidence of the League. To him was entrusted the common seal. He convened its assemblies at home; he negotiated with foreign powers in its name; he wielded its military force in the field with absolute, though not irresponsible authority. It was a change which seems to indicate a heightened consciousness of the federal union, and a disposition to render the action of the League more vigorous and uniform. The man who was first honoured with this dignity, was Marcus of Cerynea, who, before his native town had joined the League, had devoted himself to its service, and commanded its forces in the expedition by which Bura was delivered from its tyrant.³ There was nothing however in this innovation that apparently altered the character of the confederacy, nothing that disclosed any ambitious views, or seemed to portend an approaching enlargement of its sphere. And though Antigonos probably kept an eye, which was no doubt far from a friendly one, on its movements, he could scarcely discover anything either to excite alarm, or to afford a pretext for hostility, though, as we know nothing of the manner in which he was himself occupied during this period, no inference can be drawn from his apparent inaction. The League must have appeared now to have attained its full growth; it had acquired an extent and consistency which, most likely, far ex-

Polyb. xi. 4. 2. Compare v. 94.

² Ibid. xi. 2. 1.³ Ibid. ii. 41. 43.

ceeded both the designs and the hopes of those who began the work of restoration. Yet its collective strength, as Plutarch observes, was not equal to that of one considerable city, and it is very doubtful whether it would ever have emerged from the obscurity to which it seemed to be destined, without that peculiar combination of circumstances which connected it with the fortunes of Aratus.

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Sicyon, his birth-place, after a period of confusion which followed the overthrow of the old Dorian aristocracy, had again fallen under the dominion of tyrants¹, but men widely differing in their character from the ancient rulers, who, under the same title, exercised a mild and popular authority, which they transmitted peaceably through successive generations. These later adventurers, who rapidly supplanted one another, seem to have maintained their power, whether they seized it for themselves, or were indebted for it to Macedonian aid, by a system of terror which rendered their short reigns no less wretched than hateful. Death, or exile, and confiscation, were the lot of their principal adversaries, and, when their own turn came, of their adherents. After the downfall of one of these tyrants, named Cleon, an attempt was made to put an end to this state of things. Two of the most eminent citizens, Timocles and Clinias, were appointed, under what title, or with what powers, we are not informed, but for the purpose of restoring order and preserving liberty. Some degree of tranquillity had been re-established, when the death of Timocles left the whole burden of their arduous functions to devolve upon his colleague, together with all the danger from which they had hitherto shielded one another. The opportunity was seized by a man named Abantides, to murder Clinias, and make him-

Aratus.

¹ Plut. Ar. 2.

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self master of the city. The family and friends of Clinias were the first objects of the tyrant's jealousy; some were put to death, others saved themselves by flight. His son Aratus, at this time only seven years old, was especially marked for destruction. In the general confusion, the child escaped from his father's house, and wandered for some time alone through the city. His father's brother had married a sister of Abantides; the boy sought refuge in her house, and she concealed him there until she found means of sending him to Argos, where Clinias had many friends, who took the orphan under their protection, and, it would seem, some property, which rendered Aratus independent of their bounty. Here he spent the next thirteen years of his life, while several fresh revolutions took place at Sicyon. Abantides, like many bad men of that age, took a lively interest in philosophical speculations, and he was killed in the Agora by a band of conspirators, who fell upon him while he was engaged in a learned conversation with the dialectic philosopher Aristoteles, who had himself laid the plot. But the tyranny remained in the hands of his father Paseas, until he too was assassinated by one Nicocles, who stepped into his place. Aratus, as he grew up toward manhood, applied himself more to exercises of the body than of the mind. He submitted to the training of a competitor for gymnastic honours, and carried off some prizes in the public games. Even in his statues the thoughtful and dignified mien of the statesman and the general did not altogether conceal the traces of his early familiarity with the discipline of the palæstra. It may be that he did not merely indulge a natural wish to improve the advantages of a robust and agile frame, or even look forward so much to the need which he might expect to find on great occasions for an extraordinary capacity of bodily exertion and endurance, as he desired to elude the

His character,

jealousy of his enemies by the semblance of frivolous pursuits, and of a vulgar ambition. This part of his history may sufficiently explain two features which were afterwards most prominent in his character; his abhorrence of tyranny, which seems to have been with him more a natural instinct than a moral feeling; and a singular combination of timidity and hardihood, which perplexed his admirers, and afforded a fruitful theme of ingenious speculations to the ancient historians and philosophers.¹ He was bold in the dark, resolute in an ambuscade, daunted by no obstacle or danger which he had to encounter alone, or with a few companions; but his courage, presence of mind, and readiness of invention, were almost always observed to forsake him in open day, and at the head of an army.

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At the accession of Nicocles he was about twenty years of age. He had no doubt long dwelt upon the thought of an attempt to deliver and recover Sicyon; and the state of affairs under the new government appeared to be very favourable to such an undertaking. Nicocles was, it seems, more unpopular than his predecessors, and the measures by which he strove to secure his dominion rendered it still more odious. The Ætolians had been encouraged by his weakness to make an attempt on the city, in which they were very near succeeding. Antigonus, who had probably protected the house of Abantides, kept aloof from the usurper who had overthrown it; and Aratus, for a time, hoped that he might be induced, especially as Clinias had been connected by friendly relations with the royal family², to aid him in his enterprise. But Antigonus could place no confidence in an inexperienced youth, and could only have consented to use him as an instrument; and this certainly

and designs.

¹ Plut. Ar. 29. Polyb. iv. 8.

² Plut. Ar. 4.

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not with a view to restore liberty at Sicyon. Yet he thought it advisable to amuse him with promises, which however soon ceased to deceive; and as the court of Alexandria, though there also Aratus possessed some hereditary interest, appeared too distant to furnish any effectual assistance, he fell back on his own resources.

The Sicyonian exiles, a numerous body, had begun to turn their eyes toward him, as well on account of his birth as of the promise afforded by his personal qualities, and to some of them he now opened his projects. But he found very few who were either so zealous for the cause, or so willing to rely upon his judgment, as to enter heartily into his plans. Indeed his most active associates were two exiles of Megalopolis, Ecdemus and Demophanes, who afterwards became celebrated for many important services to the cause of freedom. His first thought was to seize some stronghold in the territory of Sicyon, from which to carry on open war against the tyrant. But he was induced to abandon this scheme by information which he received from a citizen who had escaped from prison, and had made his way over the city wall at a part where it rose to no great height on the outside, and was nearly on a level with the ground within. This discovery suggested an undertaking still more congenial to the character of Aratus; he resolved to attempt, with a small band of followers, to surprise the city by night.

B. C. 251.
He sur-
prises.
Sicyon,

Plutarch's description of the preparations which he made for his expedition, casts a strong light on the condition of Greece in these times. We are reminded of the picture which Thucydides draws of it in the ages preceding the settlement of its population. Society, in its highest stage of refinement, had relapsed into the wildness and disorder of its infancy. Aratus found it easy to provide arms without awak-

ening suspicion: for it was a time, the biographer observes, when every body was engaged in marauding adventures and mutual incursions. The scaling-ladders, made so as to be taken to pieces, were supplied by one of the exiles who gained his living by the construction of machinery. The Argive friends of Aratus contributed each ten men from their own households. He himself was able to arm thirty slaves. And to make up the number which he thought necessary, he contracted with Xenophilus, a noted captain of robbers, for the services of a few of his troop, who were led to believe that the object was to carry off some horses belonging to Antigonus. They were directed to go out in small scattered parties, and to assemble at the Tower of Polygnotus, a point on the road to Nemea. The ladders, packed in boxes, were sent forward in waggons. The chief hindrance in the attempt to scale the wall unobserved was apprehended from the dogs kept by a gardener, who lived in a lone house on the outside, not far from the place where the ladders were to be fixed. To forestal this danger, Aratus had despatched his friend Cephisias with four comrades, who were to arrive at the house after the city gates were shut, in the garb of common travellers, and, under the pretext of seeking hospitality, were to secure the man and his dogs. Some further precautions were still necessary to throw Nicocles off his guard; for he had been led to suspect that something was meditated against him, and he was known to have sent spies to Argos to watch the movements of Aratus. To blind them, Aratus appeared in the morning in the usual places of public resort, went home accompanied by some young men who were used to share his convivial hours, and made conspicuous preparations for a banquet. The spies were deceived, and as soon as the repast was finished he proceeded to join his

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friends at the place of rendezvous. At Nemea he disclosed his real object to the whole band, and, by dint of promises and entreaties, prevailed on them to share the perilous adventure. He regulated the march so as to have the benefit of a bright moon on the road, and to reach Sicyon just as it was setting. But as they drew near to the gardener's house, Cephisias met them with the unwelcome tidings, that, though he had secured the master, the dogs had escaped. It was with difficulty that Aratus could now persuade his followers to persevere; and their reluctance was justified by the imminent danger in which they were placed by the vigilance of the dogs, which kept up an incessant barking at the heels of the party that was sent forward under the orders of Ecdemus to apply the ladders and explore the wall, while Aratus followed slowly with the main body. When the ladders were fixed, those who mounted foremost were very nearly discovered by two parties of the patrol, which passed in opposite directions soon after one another. Finally, after Aratus, having been apprised that all was secure, had reached the foot of the wall, a great hound, which was kept in the nearest tower, having been at length roused by the barking of the smaller dogs, joined in with it so loudly as to attract the attention of a sentry beyond. But as his master, when called upon to account for the noise, attributed it to the recent passing of the patrol, the followers of Aratus, who overheard the conversation, concluded that he must have been gained to favour their enterprise, and began to mount the ladders with revived spirits. It was now near day-break, and the ladders would only bear the weight of one man at a time. When forty had reached the top, Aratus himself followed, and, having waited for but a very few more, hastened to the tyrant's house, and to the guard-room of his

mercenary troops. They were overpowered and secured without bloodshed, but Nicocles made his escape by a subterraneous passage. Aratus now sent round to the houses of his friends to announce his presence and success, and the tidings soon spread through the city. By day-break the theatre was filled by an anxious and curious crowd; but as soon as the herald had proclaimed that Aratus, the son of Clinias, invited his fellow-citizens to assert their freedom, the multitude rushed to set fire to the tyrant's house. The fire was soon extinguished by the exertions of the soldiers and the discreeter citizens, but all the property of the tyrant was abandoned to pillage.

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The glory of this exploit was not stained by a single drop of blood, either during or after the struggle. But the first measure of Aratus was to recal the exiles, and this act of justice was attended with consequences, which threatened the state with fresh convulsions. Amidst the revolutions of half a century, during which Sicyon had been subject to a succession of tyrants, the number of the exiles had grown to nearly 600. The influence of Aratus was able to restrain them, after their return, from the indulgence of animosity and revenge against their political adversaries; but he could not hinder them from claiming their confiscated property, the greater part of which had now passed into the hands of owners, who had long enjoyed it under various titles derived from inheritance, contract, or other lawful modes of transfer. He endeavoured in vain to mediate between the contending parties: none would surrender or compromise their rights: attempts were made to dislodge the possessors from their lands and houses by force: there was reason to dread, not only that scenes of violence would frequently disturb the public tranquillity, but that the hatred and jealousy which were

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and an-
nexes it to
the League.

nourished by these contests might soon undo all that had just been so happily effected; for Antigonus was at hand, and on the watch to take advantage of their dissensions. He was probably not a little displeased to see that an undertaking from which he had withheld his aid, had been accomplished without it: both the immediate result and the tendency of the example were adverse to his interests, and there could be no doubt that he would be willing to support any one who promised to subject Sicyon to his authority, or to govern it as his creature. The danger, from within and from without, appeared to Aratus so pressing, that he was induced to look to the nearest quarter for assistance, and the Achæan League presented a prospect of ready and zealous, if not very powerful help. Its proceedings, principles, and institutions, were such as to engage his lively sympathy and approbation. He and it were labouring in the same cause: it was natural and expedient that they should combine their strength. Such, we are informed by Plutarch, who had read the Memoirs which Aratus left of his own Life, were the motives which led him to incorporate Sicyon with the League. And it is not unimportant to observe, that this event, the most momentous in the history of the League, which altered its character and decided its destiny, was seemingly the accidental effect of the embarrassing position in which Aratus found himself placed at this juncture. If he had been able to extricate himself from it immediately by the expedient which he finally adopted, it is doubtful whether he might ever have made what to Sicyon must have appeared a sacrifice, though it certainly opened a wider field to his personal ambition, and constituted him the benefactor of his adopted country, no less than of his native city. The circumstances under which the union took place, contributed perhaps mainly to fix the terms on which it was effected.

Greatly as the power of Sicyon exceeded that of every one of the Achæan towns, it claimed no superiority or privilege, but was admitted on a footing of perfect equality; it obtained one vote in the councils of the League, and no more, though its contingent might be double that of any other member. This would seem perhaps not unequitable at a time when Sicyon was in distress, and came to the League for succour. But the precedent was afterwards followed in cases where no such reason existed, and so far as it determined the course which was pursued in the sequel, it may be considered as the origin of many calamities which subsequently afflicted Greece and hastened its ruin.

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It does not even appear that, either in consequence of the accession of Sicyon, or at any subsequent period, any change was made in the constitution of the federal magistracy and government. The number of the Demiurges seems to the last to have been limited to ten, and that of the Council always to have retained its original proportion to that of the Achæan towns. Hence, strange as it appears, we are led to conclude that the places in both these boards continued to be filled by Achæans. This occasion suggests another interesting question on which our information is not sufficiently full to preclude a great variety of opinions.¹ Polybius celebrates the happy uniformity of political institutions, which in his time, when the League had reached its largest compass, prevailed throughout its whole extent. All the Peloponnesians, he says, then used the same laws, weights, measures, money, the same magistrates, councillors, and judges.² This statement is evidently

Constitu-
tion of the
League.

¹ Tittman (p. 677.) and Schorn (p. 75.) contend for the independence of the particular states. Helwing (p. 237.), Flathe (II. p. 150.), Droysen (II. p. 463.), and C. K. Hermann (*Lehrbuch der Staats All.* § 186. apparently straining the sense of *πολιτείας* in Polyb. IV. 1. 7.), adopt the opposite view, though with manifold discrepancies.

² II. 37. 10.

quite consistent with the supposition that the individual states of the League were nevertheless allowed to retain their own laws, magistrates, and political institutions of every kind; and as it is notorious that this was the case with regard to some of the things which Polybius enumerates¹, it was most probably so as to all the rest. Yet this passage seems mainly to have impressed some modern writers with the belief, that the League interfered to assimilate the institutions of all the states incorporated in it to its own. But there is neither reason nor authority to support this conclusion. It is indeed highly probable that democratical institutions, under various forms and modifications, were established throughout the League, not excluding, but still less enforcing, the influence of property.² But this kind of uniformity might well arise without any direct interposition; and when we consider that in every Greek city there was a powerful democratical party, it will be clear that the triumph of democratical principles was sure, in every instance, either to precede or to follow the union with the League.

Aratus himself was raised by this transaction to the highest degree of reputation and popularity among the Achæans, and established an indefeasible claim to their gratitude; and the modesty with which he submitted to their laws, and served as a private soldier in their cavalry, whether calculated or not, was admirably adapted to strengthen his influence over them. A supply of five and twenty talents, which about this time he received from Ptolemy, while it proved the value which the king attached to his friendship, enabled him to relieve some of his poorer fellow-citizens, and thus to secure their affections in

¹ For instance, as has been shown by Tittmann and Schorn, the *ἔρχορες* and *νομίσματα*.

² As Droysen is inclined to believe (ii. p. 463.).

favour of the new government. It may also have suggested to him the possibility of a remedy for the disorders with which the pretensions of the restored exiles continued to threaten the city. He resolved to sail to Alexandria, and to solicit a larger donation, which might afford the means of an amicable adjustment without a sacrifice from either party. He had not neglected to cultivate the favour of his royal benefactor by such returns as he was able to make for his bounty, and it happened to have been in his power to gratify one of Ptolemy's tastes at little cost. The Sicyonian school of painting was at this time still celebrated in Greece, not only for eminent artists, but as having more than any other preserved the purity of the ancient style. Even the great Apelles had thought it essential to his reputation, if not to the cultivation of his art, to take some lessons from the Sicyonian masters. During the dominion of the tyrants the school had produced many valuable works, several of which were tributes of flattery to the ruler of the day, and one of these was so beautiful that Aratus was induced to exempt it from the general destruction to which he doomed all such memorials of the public dishonour. It was the strongest proof he could give of his discerning love for the art; and his good taste enabled him to take full advantage of the opportunities presented to him by his position, to enrich Ptolemy's gallery with a number of choice masterpieces.

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His voyage to Alexandria was not accomplished without many personal risks and hardships. His vessel was driven by a gale on the coast of Hydreia¹,

Aratus sails
to Alexan-
dria.

¹ Plut. Ar. 12. τῆς Ἀδρίας. Droysen (II. 312. 218.) corrects Ἀνδρου. But the emendation which I have ventured to assume in the text, Ἰδρίας, not only comes much closer to the corrupt reading, but agrees better with the whole series of Plutarch's narrative. Aratus sailed from Methone in Messenia, doubled cape Malea, and then, being unable to keep his course to the south-east, παραφερόμενος μάλιστ ἤψατο τῆς Ἰδρίας. A glance at the map seems sufficient to show, that this description cannot suit Andros.

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where it was seized by an officer who commanded there for Antigonus, while he concealed himself with a single friend in a wood. It was afterwards a Roman vessel which, chancing to touch there, afforded him the means of escape. It was bound for Syria; but Aratus, it seems, did not think himself safe in the dominions of Antiochus, and prevailed on the master to land him on the coast of Caria, where he had still to wait long before he could find a passage to Egypt. These perilous adventures, encountered for so noble an object, might plead with Ptolemy in his behalf. It is certain, that his presence confirmed the favourable impressions which had been made on the king by their correspondence; and the result of his visit was a subsidy of 150 talents, forty of which he immediately carried home with him; the rest was transmitted in successive payments. With this sum he was able to satisfy every claim to the confiscated property, for which one of the parties in each case was easily induced to accept a pecuniary equivalent. But still, the settlement of so many controversies, many of which must have been rendered very intricate by lapse of time, and perplexity of titles, must have been a most laborious and difficult work. The people testified the unlimited confidence which they reposed in Aratus, when they created him sole arbitrator with full power. He, on the other hand, to place his moderation and disinterestedness beyond suspicion, declined this invidious honour, and caused fifteen other citizens to be joined with him in the commission. The arrangement was at last effected in a manner which seems to have given universal satisfaction, and to have healed every breach. The services of Aratus were acknowledged by the people with public honours, and by the exiles with a bronze statue, which bore an inscription expressive of their admiration for his courage and justice, and of their gratitude to the

Restores
tranquillity
at Sicyon.

deliverer, who had restored them to their homes, and had bestowed equality of rights and orderly government on his country.¹ The fame of this peaceful achievement has been still more widely spread, and fixed in a monument more durable than brass, by the pen of Cicero, who, having learnt the value of such men by bitter experience, amidst the death-struggles of Roman liberty, extols the conduct of Aratus with the equivocal eulogy, which however he meant for the highest, that so great a man deserved to have been born a Roman.² The right of Aratus to such praise has indeed been questioned on the ground, that in this instance the course prescribed by the purest patriotism, exactly coincided with that which he would have pursued, if he had aimed at nothing but the promotion of his own influence and reputation.³ It might be enough to say, that Cicero was praising the statesman; but in an age when most men found it easier to rise to power through wrong and violence, there was surely no small merit in the choice of right means, even for a like end; nor will it follow that Aratus was not in earnest with his patriotism, because, as we shall find, he was not always capable of sacrificing his personal ambition to the public good.

The terms on which he stood with Antigonus may be collected from the foregoing narrative. He had been forced to conceal himself from the king's officer, and his vessel had been seized as an enemy's property. Yet, after his return from Egypt, Antigonus affected to court his friendship, not with any hope or desire of gaining it, but to throw suspicion on Aratus, and

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Artifices of
Antigonus.

¹ *Οτι παρῆδη τῇ σῆ Δαίμων Ἰσον, δέλεον τ' ἕρασας εὐνοίας. Plut. Ar. 14. One might perhaps have expected a more distinct reference to the recent transaction.

² De Off. ii. 23.

³ Merleker (*Geschichte des Aetolisch-Achaischen Bundesgenossen Krieges*, p. 14.). He seems to think true magnanimity required that Aratus should have exposed himself to the risk of popular odium and suspicion, instead of adopting an expedient by which he averted it both from himself and others.

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particularly to awaken Ptolemy's jealousy. From Corinth, where it seems he had taken up his residence for a time to watch the progress of the League, he occasionally sent some little presents to Aratus; and at table, when guests were present who would be sure to report his words, he professed to admire the young man's discernment, who had detected the weakness which was covered from ordinary eyes by the theatrical pomp and splendour of the Egyptian court, and had now thrown himself without reserve into the arms of a more trustworthy ally. The artifice appears to have produced no effect at Sicyon, but it succeeded so far as to inspire Ptolemy with a temporary distrust of Aratus. Antigonus himself can hardly have expected any very important results from it; and it is probable that he was at this time endeavouring to accomplish his main end in a very different manner. For it is to this period, that it seems necessary to refer a treaty, which is more than once mentioned by Polybius¹, though unfortunately without a date, concluded between Antigonus and the Ætolians, with a view to the dismemberment of the Achæan League. It was not before the accession of Sicyon, that the League could have appeared so formidable as to give occasion to such a compact. Nor do we find any earlier trace of hostility between Ætolia and the League. The Ætolians had indeed, as we have seen, made an attempt on Sicyon; and this, when Sicyon had become Achæan, might have involved them in a war with the body in which it was incorporated. They are said to have made the first advances to Antigonus, probably in the interval between the revolution at Sicyon, and the year in which Aratus was for the first time raised to the supreme command. It was in 246, in the

B. C. 245.
Aratus general of the League.

¹ II. 43. 9.; 45. 1. ix.; 34. 6.

twenty-sixth year of his age, that he first filled the office of General of the League; and all his military operations in this year, of which there remains any record, were directed against the Ætolians. The accounts left to us of these operations are very scanty and unconnected. It is only related that he ravaged the territory of Calydon and the Ozolian Locris, which at this time belonged to the Ætolians, and that he marched into Bœotia with an army of 10,000 men to succour the Bœotians, who were in alliance with the League, against the same common enemy. But this beginning of his military career was a little ominous, for he arrived too late; the Bœotians had been defeated at Chæronea, and had lost 1000 men, and the Bœotarch Abiocritus.¹ They immediately abandoned the League, and attached themselves to the Ætolians; and their public spirit was so broken by this disaster, that they could hardly ever be again roused to take any part in the affairs of Greece.² How far this Bœotian alliance was designed by Aratus to counterbalance that of Antigonus with the Ætolians, can only be surmised. But there is one inference which may be drawn from his campaign in Northern Greece, that may serve to remove a seeming difficulty. Even if Antigonus was not at this time engaged by treaty to co-operate with the Ætolians, it may seem strange that he should have taken no advantage of the absence of the Achæan forces from their country. But the movements of Aratus indicate that Antigonus was not at this time in possession of Corinth. The Isthmus was evidently open, and this agrees with what we learn from other accounts of the state of things there.

The possession of Corinth had always been regarded by the Macedonian princes as an object of the highest

¹ Plut. Ar. 16. Compare Polyb. xx. 4., who lays the blame on the Bœotians,

² Polyb. xx.

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importance with a view to the command of Peloponnesus. Antigonus—probably when he set out on his unsuccessful expedition against Ptolemy Ceraunus—had entrusted it to his half-brother Craterus, the son of Alexander's general of the same name, and of Antipater's daughter Phila. But Craterus seems to have been encouraged by the reverses of Antigonus to treat the place as his own, and, it appears, kept it in his hands until his death.¹ Yet his relations to Antigonus were not always avowedly hostile; as may be collected from the fact, that in the last war with Pyrrhus the Macedonian general Ameinias is described as bringing succours to Sparta from Corinth. But it does not follow that Antigonus had recovered possession of the citadel, and the sequel clearly indicates that this could not have been the case. For Craterus, on his death, was succeeded in the command of the place by his son Alexander, who was likewise independent, though he may have been on friendly terms with his royal kinsman, and even have professed obedience to his authority, with no more real submission than many a feudal vassal or Turkish pasha, absolute master of his province, has yielded to his nominal sovereign, while he retained the style of a subject, and performed acts of outward homage. Accordingly we have seen Antigonus at Corinth, carrying on his intrigues against Aratus: and we are informed that Aratus at first regarded Alexander as his enemy, and had formed the project of wresting Corinth from him, but that he was diverted from this design by Alexander's voluntary accession to the

¹ So Schorn infers (p. 18.) partly from the fact, that Truzen is described as held by a garrison of Craterus (Frontin. iii. 6. 7.), and partly from the natural supposition, that Alexander's power was inherited from his father. Droysen however (ii. p. 216.) believes, that Alexander first revolted from Antigonus. He seems to think that this may be inferred from Plutarch (*De Frat. Amore*, 15.), where however Craterus is only mentioned as having served his brother in an inferior station. The passage contains not a word about his fidelity; nor was this necessary to the propriety of the illustration.

League¹, by which he must have openly renounced all connection with Antigonus. It was apparently this alliance with Alexander that enabled Aratus to execute the operations which have been related, so boldly and safely.

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Alexander died soon after, as it was believed, of poison administered to him through the contrivance of Antigonus²: and certainly there is nothing in the character of Antigonus to repel this suspicion, and much in his subsequent proceedings to suggest or confirm it. Alexander's widow, Nicæa, retained possession of the fortress: and Antigonus at once sent his son Demetrius, though it seems he had already married Stratonice, the daughter of Antiochus Soter, to Corinth, as a suitor for her hand. The difference of their ages, — for she was somewhat past her prime, — rendered her perhaps the more open to the illusions of female vanity.³ She accepted the young prince's dazzling offers, and Antigonus himself came to Corinth to celebrate their nuptials with royal splendour. She was however prudent enough to retain possession of the citadel. We are not informed whether it was the subject of any stipulation in the marriage contract; but no wish was expressed by Antigonus that could awaken her suspicions. All cares of state seemed to have been banished from the mind of the delighted father, who was only intent on providing a succession of entertainments for the object of his son's choice. A musical performance was to take place in the theatre, which Nicæa consented to grace with her presence. She was conveyed with royal state in a sumptuous litter, accompanied by Antigonus himself.

¹ Plut. Ar. 18.

² Niebuhr (*Kl. Schr.* p. 256.) says, that Nicæa was suspected of having poisoned her husband; but, as he quotes no authority, it seems nearly certain that for once his memory must have betrayed him; as Plutarch (Ar. 17.) distinctly relates that the suspicion fell on Antigonus.

³ Her passion for the philosopher-poet Euphorion (*Σουλδα, Εὐφοριῶν*) indicates the warmth of her temperament.

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B. C. 244.
Antigonus
gains Co-
rinth.

But at the point where the road turned off toward the gate of the citadel, he quitted the train and hastened up to the fortress, which he found carelessly guarded; a great part of the garrison was among the spectators below. He gained admittance,—it appears without a struggle,—for a force sufficient to secure possession of the place.¹ He is said to have displayed immoderate joy at the success of this despicable stratagem, and to have celebrated it with revelry ill becoming his age and station. The marriage, it may easily be supposed, was broken off; and we hear no more of Nicæa.

If Aratus had been led to conceive the thought of an attempt upon Corinth while it was held by Alexander, there were now much stronger motives to urge him to the undertaking. But he could hardly hope or wish to carry it into execution until he was again in office; and, according to a fundamental article of the Achæan constitution, the supreme magistracy could not be held by the same person for two successive years. At the end of the prescribed interval he was re-elected, and the opportunity for which he was constantly on the watch soon presented itself. Three brothers, Syrian Greeks, had pilfered from the royal treasure at Corinth, and one of them named

¹ Plut. Ar. 17. Polyæn. iv. 6. 1. Droysen (ii. p. 371.) treats this story as so little trustworthy, that nothing can be safely collected from it beyond the fact, that Antigonus recovered possession of Corinth. But we can hardly help suspecting that, in this severe criticism, the excellent author has been unconsciously blinded by a wish to save the credit of Gonatas, whom he represents as an almost faultless model of a philosophic king. He observes that it was surely no extraordinary treachery in Antigonus to resume the possession of Corinth, which he had lost through Alexander's repeated disloyalty. But this is not at all the question which affects the character of Antigonus. The point is, whether he compassed his end fairly, or by means of a dishonourable trick. That the latter was the case there is no reason to doubt. It is surely contrary to all rules of sound criticism to reject the whole body of the narrative because there is one circumstance in it—the precise mode in which Antigonus seized the citadel—obscurely related. Droysen indeed intimates that he perceives many other difficulties, but does not specify them. As to the character of Antigonus, it must be remembered, that, if he was the patron of Zeno—a connection so useful to his reputation that he might well regret the philosopher's death (Diog. Laert. vii. 15.)—he was no less the protector of such monsters as the Elean Aristotimus.

Erginus, came to Sicyon from time to time to exchange their plunder at the house of a banker well known to Aratus. Through this channel Aratus learnt that there was an accessible point in the wall of the citadel; and Erginus, having engaged the concurrence of a fourth brother who served in the garrison, undertook to conduct Aratus to the place, where the wall was no more than fifteen feet high. The brothers demanded a large reward. Sixty talents were to be deposited with the banker, to be paid to them in the event of success; and even in the case of failure, if they escaped, each was to receive a house and a talent. Aratus could not immediately raise so large a sum, and was forced to pledge his plate and his wife's ornaments, purchasing, as Plutarch observes, the privilege of a perilous adventure for the good of his country, at a price which it would have been accounted magnanimous to reject, if it had been offered as a bribe. When the time came which had been fixed for the attempt, leaving the main body of his forces under arms, he proceeded with 400 men, few of whom were in the secret, toward Corinth. As they approached the wall, the light of the full moon, which would have rendered concealment almost impossible, was intercepted by clouds which rose from the sea. Several other propitious circumstances contributed to his success, though he fully earned it by his courage. Erginus with seven others, disguised as wayfarers, gained entrance at a gate and overpowered the guard, while Aratus, with only a hundred of his men, scaled the wall, and advanced toward the citadel with the scaling-ladders, ordering the rest to follow. But on his way through the town he fell in with a patrol, one of whom escaped, and soon raised a general alarm.

Antigonus had entrusted the place to three generals. The command of the Acrocorinthus he had

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assigned to Persæus, who had been the preceptor of his son Halcyoneus, but seems to have had no better title to his confidence than that he had been educated by Zeno, to whom he at first belonged as a slave, and whose tenets he afterwards professed to expound. The choice would not perhaps have been a very happy one, even if philosophy had been a sufficient qualification for such a post; for Persæus is said to have coupled loose habits with his rigid doctrines.¹ His military science was, it may easily be imagined, no less purely theoretical, though it does not appear whether Aratus derived any advantage from his incapacity. Archelaus commanded the bulk of the forces in the lower town, where the third general, Theophrastus, seems to have held some post under him. Aratus—again favoured by the moon which broke through the clouds as he was entangled in the most intricate part of the ascent—reached the wall of the citadel safely, and was soon engaged in a hard combat with the garrison. As soon as the alarm was raised, Archelaus, finding that the citadel was attacked, hastened with all his forces in that direction. But he chanced to light on the 300 Achæans, who, unable to find the track of their comrades, had cowered behind a projection of the rock. They now sprang out as from an ambuscade, and completely routed and dispersed his troops. But they were recalled from the pursuit by Erginus to the succour of Aratus, and their arrival decided the struggle. By sunrise he was in possession of the fortress, and the forces which had followed him from Sicyon, making their appearance at the same time, were joyfully admitted

B. C. 243.
Corinth
surprised
by Aratus

¹ An extract from one of his works given by Athenæus (xiii. 86.), with the illustration there subjoined, may serve to show how he reconciled his principles with his practice. The story in Diog. Laert. (vii. 36.) indicates that Antigonus himself did not give him credit for such rigid stoicism as is attributed to him by Droysen (ii. p. 372.).

into the lower town by the Corinthians, who helped to capture the royal soldiers. Archelaus himself was taken, but was afterwards released by Aratus. Theophrastus refused to abandon his post, and was put to death. The philosopher made his escape during the combat, and fled to Cenchreæ. He returned, it seems, to the government of his school; but he used to admit that Aratus had taught him to question the truth of his master's dogma: that the wise man is the only general.

When order was restored, and the people assembled in the theatre, Aratus came down to address them. There was a difference of opinion among the ancients as to his powers of oratory: but, whatever they were, we may easily conceive that, when he stood on the stage, visibly jaded by the fatigues of the night, and waited, resting on his spear until the applause of the spectators had subsided, his silence was more eloquent than the speech which followed. Since the battle of Chæronea the Corinthians had never been in possession of the keys of their own city. These Aratus now restored to them; and he easily persuaded them to enter into the Achæan League, to which alone they could look for protection. The Achæans however continued to occupy the citadel, where they kept a garrison of 400 heavy-armed, and a pack of fifty hounds, and as many huntsmen; a common precaution, it seems, against surprise.

This great acquisition opened an almost boundless prospect of further conquests. One of its first fruits was the surrender of Lechæum, where a royal squadron of five and twenty galleys fell into the hands of the conquerors. Aratus was not slow to follow up his advantage. Megara, Trœzen, and Epidaurus, joined the League in the course of the same year; and he crowned his achievements by an expedition to Attica, in the course of which he ravaged

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Salamis before the eyes of the Macedonian garrison. He had probably hoped, that the Athenians would declare themselves in his favour; and, though they did not stir, he released all his Athenian prisoners without ransom in the hope of preserving their goodwill for some future occasion. Another measure which was adopted by the League at his suggestion indicates less self-confidence than might have been expected after such a series of success. He induced it to conclude an alliance with Ptolemy Philadelphus, by which the king was declared commander-in-chief of all its forces, both on land and sea. The Achæans however had no reason to fear any encroachment on their independence from so remote an ally: and they might think the title which they conferred on him, though it appeared to detract a little from their national honour, not too high a price for the substantial benefit which they might derive from his subsidies and fleets in the struggle which they had to expect with Antigonus. The event seems to have proved, that with regard to Ptolemy they had as little ground for hope as for fear. He was neither formidable as a protector, nor useful as an ally. But the honour of the Achæans was less endangered by his friendship than that of Aratus himself, who accepted a yearly pension of six talents from his royal patron.

Attempts
of Aratus
upon Argos.

To liberate the Peloponnesian cities from their tyrants, and to incorporate them with the League, continued to be the great object of his policy; and Argos, as well on account of its position and importance, as of his own personal connection with it, excited an interest in him little short of that which he had felt for the recovery of his native city. Aristippus, who, after the death of Pyrrhus, was, it may be supposed, established in the government under Macedonian protection, had been succeeded by Aristomachus, probably his son. If he was already master

of Argos, when Aratus delivered Sicyon, he had since become more vigilant and suspicious; for he had prohibited the possession of arms to the citizens under severe penalties. Nevertheless, Aratus found means both to set a conspiracy on foot against him in Argos, and to supply the conspirators with weapons. A quarrel which arose among them led to a disclosure of the plot, and probably saved the tyrant's life. It must be observed that Aristomachus was not at war with the League. It was simply as a tyrant that he was marked for assassination. Even the principle, which had long been generally admitted in the Greek republics, that a tyrant was the public enemy of all his subjects, is not sufficient to justify the conduct of Aratus in this attempt. Either he shut his eyes to the baseness of the deed, or he had persuaded himself that a tyrant ought to be regarded as a monster, who had forfeited all claims to protection under the common laws of civilised society. Some of the pernicious consequences of this maxim soon became apparent. Aristomachus was killed shortly after by his slaves; perhaps not without the privity of Aratus, though he claimed no share in the exploit; but he was quietly succeeded by a second Aristippus, most likely grandson of the first. This man, Plutarch observes, exceeded his predecessor in cruelty, no doubt from the same cause which drove him to the most pitiable precautions for the security of his person. Aratus hoped to find Argos in confusion, and the citizens ready to rise against the tyrannical government: and he immediately marched, with as many Achæan troops as he could collect at the moment, to take advantage of the opportunity. But the Argives, cowed, or broken in to the yoke, did not answer to his appeal, and he was compelled to retreat. The only immediate result of this expedition was, that it furnished Aristippus with a just ground of

complaint against the Achæans, which was referred to the arbitration of Mantinea; whether according to previous treaty or a special agreement, is not certain. But neither Aratus, nor any one else, appeared on the part of the League; and judgment was given for Aristippus, though with a merely nominal mulct. Aristippus however was now induced to enter into alliance with Antigonus, and openly to declare himself the enemy of the League; and he retaliated on Aratus by several attempts at assassination, in which he is said to have been aided by the king.¹ Plutarch attributes the escape of Aratus to his popularity, and contrasts his security with the tyrant's wretched anxiety; but as he had wilfully provoked the danger, he was probably always on his guard against it.

He continued for many years trying fresh expedients from time to time for the accomplishment of his end: and once he was very nearly master of Argos. He had scaled the wall in the night with a few followers, and had overpowered the guard; and the next day he kept his ground against the tyrant's superior force, though himself severely wounded, until the evening. But the Argives looked on—as Plutarch observes, probably in the words of Aratus himself—as quietly and impartially as if they had been sitting as judges at the Nemean games; and Aratus was so discouraged by their apparent apathy, being also in want of water, and disabled by his wound, that he gave up the attempt, and withdrew; while the tyrant thought himself in such danger, that he had made preparations for flight. But Aristippus, with the exception of his secret machinations against the life of Aratus, seems to have remained entirely on the defensive; and Antigonus himself, through causes

¹ *Συνεργούμενος Ἀργυρόβου*, Plut. Ar. 25.—perhaps only a suspicion expressed by Aratus in his Autobiography.

which are nowhere explained, took no directly hostile measures against the League to the end of his life. But it was probably at his instigation that the Ætoli-ans, in the year 241, when Aratus was in office for the third time, resolved to invade Peloponnesus. They were however no doubt willing enough, without such incitement, to retaliate on the Achæans for the ravages which Aratus had inflicted on their territory in his first year of office. Otherwise it would be a little surprising that they did not wait for a Macedonian reinforcement before they took the field. Their preparations were on such a scale as to excite both attention and alarm among the Achæans; and the forces of the League did not seem sufficient for its defence. It is on this occasion that we first have any trustworthy account of its relations with Sparta.¹ An alliance was already subsisting between the two states, of what date we know not²; perhaps merely a defensive one, against their common enemy Antigonus, and his allies, the Ætoli-ans. Aratus wrote to the ephors to claim assistance³; and, from causes which will be hereafter explained, there was a general disposition at Sparta, independent of any apprehension of danger, to comply with his requisition. The young king, Agis IV., commanded the force which was sent to join the Achæan army. In the council of war which was held after his arrival, he warmly seconded the wish which prevailed among the Achæans, to meet the enemy at the northern approaches of the Isthmus. Aratus alone, it seems, opposed this plan, and would not consent to risk the fortunes of the League without necessity on the event of a battle. He does not appear

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LXI.

B. C. 241.
Agis IV.
at the
Isthmus.

¹ For reasons which will be hereafter stated, I cannot consider those which are found in Pausanias (ii. 8. 5. ; vii. 7. 3.) in that light.

² Lucas (p. 84.) and Droysen (ii. p. 381.) imagine that it was a result of the defeat which, on the authority of Pausanias, they believe Agis to have suffered at Pellene; and Droysen adds, that it was perhaps concluded through Egyptian mediation; which is, of course, as uncertain as all the rest.

³ Plut. Agis, 13.

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to have disclosed any plan of operations; and it is not certain that he had formed one. But he may have foreseen that the Etolians, if allowed to enter the peninsula, would be betrayed into some incautious movement by their eagerness for plunder; and, as the harvest had been already secured, he persuaded himself that no serious evil was to be apprehended from their inroad.¹ But a less timid general would scarcely have ventured on such a manœuvre. The council, though none were convinced by his arguments, yielded to his authority; but he had to sustain a storm of reproach and ridicule from his own people; and Agis, surprised and indignant at conduct which looked so much like pusillanimity, and perhaps considering his presence as useless if no battle was to be fought, returned home.² The event however seemed to justify the policy of Aratus, and perhaps gained him more credit for sagacity than he deserved. The Etolians, meeting with no resistance at the Isthmus, marched into Achaia. Having traversed the territory of Sicyon, they fell upon the little town of Pellene, which was quite unprepared for defence, and made themselves masters of it at the first assault. But while they were engaged in plunder, an alarm was given that the Achaean army was approaching, and before the greater part had returned to their ranks they were attacked by Aratus, who easily routed them, and pursued them into the town. They lost 700 men, and hastily retraced their steps homeward. Antigonus was so little able to support his allies, that, after this failure, he concluded a truce with the Achæans, which lasted to the end of his life; though Aratus did not scruple to violate it by an

¹ Plut. Agis, 15.

² Aratus seems to have related in his Memoirs that he dismissed his allies; and Droysen (ii. p. 391.) thinks this seemingly strange conduct may be explained by his apprehension of the revolutionary principles prevailing in the Spartan army. But it seems easier to conceive that Agis had first requested leave to withdraw.

attempt to surprise Piræus, the obloquy of which he vainly endeavoured to shift upon the Syrian Erginus, who was notoriously but his instrument.

CHAP.
LXL

The death of Antigonus Gonatas, which happened in 239, produced a change in the state of affairs which seemed at first highly favourable to the interests of the League, as the Achæans were now freed from danger both on the side of Ætolia and of Macedonia, and were left at liberty to gain ground in Peloponnesus, having nothing to apprehend from without, except the influence of Macedonian gold. Antigonus was succeeded by his son Demetrius II., who seems to have inherited his father's ambition and his policy, if not his energy and his talents. For the accounts remaining of his reign are so scanty, that they have suggested entirely opposite views of his character and capacity to different observers. In fact, the only transactions in which we know him to have been personally engaged during the period of ten years for which he occupied the throne, are an expedition into Greece, which was at least partially successful, and a war with the Dardanians, in which he was defeated and perhaps lost his life.¹ This certainly does not convey the idea of a very able or enterprising prince; but unless we knew much more than we do both of the difficulties which he may have had to contend with and of the extent of his success, it would be unsafe to pronounce any judgment on him. It is highly probable, though there is no distinct evidence of the fact, that the Dardanians, and perhaps some other barbarian tribes, disquieted his northern frontier in the early part of his reign. Yet soon after he came to the throne he involved himself in a war with the Ætoliens, at the same time that he incurred the enmity of the Syrian court. Alexander of Epirus

B. C. 239.
Accession
of Deme-
trius II.

¹ Prolog. Trog. xxviii. *Ut rex Macedonia Demetrius sit a Dardanis fusus; quo mortuo . . .*

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died, leaving two sons, Pyrrhus and Ptolemæus, and a daughter, Phthia, to the care of his widow Olympias, who governed the kingdom for some years as regent. On the death of Antigonus, the Ætolians seem to have attempted to wrest from her that portion of Acarnania which they had ceded to her deceased husband. Olympias sought protection from Demetrius, and induced him to accept her daughter's hand, though his queen Stratonice was still living, and, as he must have foreseen, not of a character to brook such an insult. She indignantly withdrew to the court of her nephew, Seleucus Callinicus, and endeavoured to engage him in a war with her husband.¹ The name of Demetrius however did not deter the Ætolians from the prosecution of their design, and it seems that he was too much occupied with his other enemies to lend any effectual assistance to his mother-in-law. But the Acarnanians themselves were strongly averse to a union, which would subject them to the sovereignty of a people whom they had long been used to account inferior to themselves. In their distress they turned their eyes toward Rome, which had recently brought her first great struggle with Carthage to a triumphant close. The Acarnanian envoys, it seems, dexterously employed the fable of Rome's Trojan origin, to flatter the vanity of the great families, and to recommend their suit, on the ground that the Acarnanians alone among the Greeks had kept aloof from the expedition against Troy.² It was probably the first time they had ever boasted of the omission of their name in the Homeric catalogue. The senate did not need this argument as a motive, for since the war with Pyrrhus it must have begun to look across the Adriatic, but found it useful as a pretext for interference, in a case

Acarnanian
embassy to
Rome.

¹ Agatharchides in Joseph. c. Apion. i. 22. Justin, xxviii. 1. *ad fratrem Antiochum*. See Niebuhr, Kl. Schr. p. 255.

² Justin, xxviii. 1. Strabo, x. p. 462.

where it would have been hard to devise any other ; and a Roman embassy, the first that appeared in Greece, called upon the Ætolians to evacuate the territory of a people which had remained neutral in the Trojan war. It was a specimen of diplomacy which might well have alarmed all the Greek states which could not plead the same title to the favour of Rome. The Ætolians are said to have dismissed the envoys with an arrogant and insulting reply¹, and to have made a fresh inroad into Acarnania, in order to display their contempt for the Roman intercession. They could do so for the time with impunity. The juncture had not arrived for Rome to mediate with the sword.

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When the Ætolians had broken with Macedonia, their interests became more accordant with those of the Achæans; and as Pantaleon, who was at this time at the head of the Ætolian government, willingly met the overtures of Aratus, a treaty of alliance, offensive and defensive, was soon concluded between the two powers.² The Ætolians appear to have reaped almost all the benefit of this alliance. The Achæans are said to have rendered them very important services³, but gained nothing for themselves north of the Isthmus, and the Ætolians could not have prevented the acquisitions which they made within Peloponnesus. It is not certain whether the Ætolians, during this period, extended their dominion on the eastern side of Greece; but there are indications that they were endeavouring to do so; and it is most probable that they now made themselves masters of some of the Thessalian towns which we find afterwards in their hands. It was apparently in the south of Thessaly that Aratus was defeated by

¹ Justin, xxviii. 2., who puts into their mouth allusions to the second Punic war.

² Polyb. ii. 44. Plut. Ar. 33.

³ Polyb. ii. 46.

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a Macedonian general named Bithys.¹ He returned safe, in great haste, to Corinth, but was so generally believed to have been either killed, or taken prisoner, that Diogenes, the Macedonian commander in Piræus, sent a letter to Corinth, to demand the restitution of the fortress, as if, after such a loss, the Achæans could no longer hope to retain it; and Demetrius himself despatched a vessel to fetch the supposed prisoner. If Aratus had reason to be gratified with such proofs that he was universally acknowledged to be the soul of the League, the same occasion afforded a disheartening specimen of Athenian levity or servility. The rumour of his death was hailed at Athens with public demonstrations of joy, as if he had been a hostile tyrant. It was no doubt in despair of deliverance, and to flatter the conqueror, whose yoke seemed now fixed more firmly than ever, that this exhibition was made; but still it was unnecessary; and Aratus, it is said, was so much wounded by it, that he invaded Attica², and advanced as far as the suburbs of Athens, where he had it in his power to inflict irreparable damage on the sacred groves and buildings, the pride and delight of the citizens. But he suffered his anger to be soothed by the Athenian eloquence, and left the country unharmed.

Aratus in-
vades At-
tica.

Demetrius
in Northern
Greece.

If Thessaly was the theatre of war, where Aratus was defeated by Bithys, Bœotia must then have been still in alliance with the Ætolians. But it was induced to abandon them, and to submit to Macedonia,

¹ Περὶ Φυλακίας, Plut. Ar. 34. This name is otherwise unknown, but it suggests the idea of some connection with Φυλάκη. There was indeed also an Arcadian town of that name; but we have no other intimation of the presence of a Macedonian army in Peloponnesus during the reign of Demetrius.

² Plut. Ar. 34. This account of the motives of Aratus is liable to just suspicion; and would be not the less so if it had been given by Aratus himself. Droysen (II. p. 443.) imagines that Aratus, expecting Demetrius would soon follow up the victory of Bithys in person, was anxious to gain Athens as a bulwark against the Macedonian invasion. But if we may conjecture in this way, it would be as easy to suppose that he wished to show how little he was weakened or disheartened by the check he had lately received in Thessaly.

by the terror of an army which Demetrius commanded in person.¹ We hear nothing more of this expedition. But this result indicates that the Macedonian ascendancy was firmly established on this side of Greece, as far as the Isthmus. Hence it is not improbable, that in the course of this campaign Demetrius carried his arms into Ætolia, though little reliance can be placed on a passage of Strabo, which has been supposed to prove the fact.² There is still less appearance of any evidence that he penetrated within Peloponnesus.³ There, it seems, he only endeavoured to counteract the progress of the Achæan League by subsidies and pensions, with which he supported the tyrants, against whom Aratus maintained his contest with unremitting activity. Having been baffled in all his attempts to take Aristippus by surprise, he at length determined to bring him to a fair trial of strength, and marching into Argolis began to ravage the country. The tyrant did not decline a battle, and showed himself a better general than Aratus, who by his personal timidity lost the victory, when it was nearly secured by the valour of his troops. He however soon after made up in some measure for his military failure, by a diplomatic conquest. He induced Cleonæ to join the League; the more easily perhaps, as, notwithstanding its insignificance, it re-

¹ Polyb. xx. 5.

² x. p. 451. The inhabitants of Pleuron were induced to migrate by the ravages which their fertile plain suffered from Demetrius, τοῦ ἐπικληθέντος Αἰτωλικοῦ. This, it is agreed, could only be Demetrius II. But one MS. reads Πολιορκητοῦ. Both Droysen and Schorn (p. 411.) prefer the reading Αἰτωλικοῦ. But while Droysen alleges this epithet as an indication of the brilliant success which must have attended the arms of Demetrius (ii. p. 441.), Schorn supposes that it was given to him in derision, on account of the losses which he suffered through the conquests of the Ætolians in Thessaly. Before we decide which of these views is the more probable, it might be desirable to be furnished with another example of such an epithet in Grecian history.

³ Droysen (ii. p. 443.), clinging to the reading Μακεδόνων in Pausanias (ii. 8. 5.), conjectures that Demetrius made himself master of Mantinea. He speaks of the reading Λακεδαιμονίων, which would clearly refer the event to the Cleomenic war (Polyb. ii. 57. Plut. Ar. 36.), as an emendation. But it is the reading of Bekker's Paris MS.

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LXI.

Attempt
of Aratus
upon Argos.

garded Argos as a rival who had usurped its rights. For Cleonæ also claimed the presidency at the Nemean games, and now, under shelter of the Achæan arms, once more enjoyed that honour. But the Argives celebrated them at the same time in their own city, and the competitors who appeared there might well think themselves entitled to the usual privilege of safe conduct for their return to their homes. Yet those who passed through the territory of the League were seized and sold as slaves by order of Aratus; a piece of cruel injustice, in which Plutarch sees nothing but his stern hatred of tyranny. Aristippus however, in his eagerness to recover Cleonæ, was shortly afterwards surprised by Aratus, who had entered the town in the night, while he was believed to have marched in another direction. The Argives were put to flight, and hotly pursued, and the tyrant himself was overtaken and slain near Mycenæ. Yet his death produced no immediate visible advantage to the League, whether through remissness on the part of Aratus we know not; but a second Aristomachus immediately assumed the vacant government, and found time, before the conquering army arrived, to introduce a body of Macedonian troops into Argos; so that though Aratus, continuing the pursuit, effected an entrance into the city, none of the citizens on whose support he had reckoned, ventured to declare themselves in his favour, and he was compelled to retire. Aristomachus, it seems, made this a pretext for putting eighty of the principal citizens to death¹, and his authority was soon established as firmly as that of his predecessor.

¹ Polyb. ii. 59. It is not perhaps absolutely certain that this was the occasion to which Polybius alludes. But we know of no other attempt made by Aratus on Argos during the government of Aristomachus II. The descriptions of Plutarch (Ar. 29.) and Polybius are perfectly consistent with one another, and the expressions *παρεισεσώθησαν* and *παρεισεσώθητος*, seem clearly to refer the two narratives to the same occurrence.

The fall of Aristippus however was attended with a consequence perhaps even more important than the acquisition of Argos itself would have been, if, as both Plutarch and Polybius appear to intimate¹, it mainly contributed to induce Lydiades, tyrant of Megalopolis, to abdicate his usurped authority, and to unite the city to the Achæan League. According to Plutarch's authors, he had been impelled by youthful ambition to seize the tyranny as the fair prize of a generous emulation: but the success of Aratus, while it rendered his position every day more insecure, opened his eyes to nobler aims, and fired him with a more virtuous rivalry.² But perhaps some other causes, more closely connected with Arcadian politics, may have concurred to produce this result. It was probably not long before this event that Laconia was invaded by an Ætolian army, which was accompanied by Spartan exiles, penetrated as far as Tænarum, where it plundered the temple of Poseidon, ravaged the country, and after an unsuccessful attempt on Sparta retreated with an immense booty, including, according to Plutarch, 50,000 captives of the free Laconian population. Unfortunately this great expedition is only known to us through casual allusions, which afford no means of ascertaining either its precise date, or the causes which gave rise to it.³

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Megalopolis
joins the
Achæan
League.

¹ Plut. Ar. 30. Polyb. ii. 44. 5. προῖδμενος τὸ μέλλον.

² Polyb. iv. 34. ix. 34. Plut. Cleom. 10. 18.

³ Lucas (p. 86.) refers it to the reign of Agis; and this opinion is adopted by Schömann (*Prolegg. ad Plut. Ag. and Cleom. xxxi.*), on the ground that the Ætolians were then at war both with Sparta and the Achæans. Droysen (ii. p. 387.) agrees with them, and endeavours to fix the date and the occasion more precisely. He supposes that the Ætolians were instigated by Antigonus, and that his object was to crush the revolution which had been just begun by Agis, and to restore Leonidas. Schorn on the other hand (p. 91.) supposes the expedition to have been subsequent to the abdication of Lydiades, and would connect it with his proposal to invade Laconia. This, as the proposal of Lydiades was not adopted, seems improbable; but Schorn seems to be quite right when he observes, that the exiles, whom the Ætolians attempted to restore, were undoubtedly the adherents of Agis. The period following the death of Agis appears to correspond better than any other to the allusions in Plut. Cleom. 10. 18. Plutarch's silence on the subject in his Agis and Aratus is least surprising on this supposition. On Droysen's, he could scarcely

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But there are reasons which incline us to believe that it may be most probably referred to the first half of the reign of Demetrius, and that about the same time several Arcadian towns, Tegea, Phigalea, Orchomenus, perhaps even Mantinea, which we find afterwards in the possession of the Ætoliens, were induced to connect themselves with their confederacy. This would at least have been likely to alarm Lydiades as much as the more distant operations of Aratus. But he naturally preferred the Achæan to the Ætolian League, as in the former he had the prospect of the highest honours, from which he would have been excluded by the Ætolian constitution, according to which none but Ætoliens were eligible to the supreme dignity.

When the reign of Demetrius was verging to its close, the Ætoliens were still intent on the conquest of Acarnania; and Demetrius, though anxious to protect the Acarnanians, was prevented, either by the renewal of his war with the Dardanians, or by some other unexplained cause, from marching in person to their aid. The Acarnanian town of Medeon was besieged by the Ætoliens, and after an obstinate resistance was on the point of yielding, when the Illyrian king Agron was induced by a subsidy from Demetrius to send an armament to its relief. While the Ætolian chiefs were disputing about the distribution of the anticipated booty, the Illyrians suddenly landed, defeated and dispersed the besiegers, and made themselves masters of their camp and baggage, and sailed home laden with spoil. This success of the Illyrians was attended with very important consequences. Their king Agron was so elated with the victory which his people had gained over an enemy so formidable as the

have spoken as he does about the return of Leonidas (Agis, 16.). Nor does it seem possible, that, so soon after such a destructive inroad, Aratus could have deliberately permitted the Ætoliens to enter Peloponnesus, on the ground that they were not likely to do much damage.

Ætolians, that he abandoned himself to an excess of intemperance, which soon put an end to his life. He was succeeded by his queen Teuta, who was led—whether by evil counsellors or by her own ignorance and vanity—to believe that she might safely enrich herself and her subjects with the spoil of every coast accessible to the Illyrian boats. Accordingly she not only granted an unlimited license of plunder to her privateers, but sent out an armament with instructions to her officers to treat every coast as an enemy's country.¹ This expedition took place toward the end of the reign of Demetrius, after a revolution had been effected in Epirus, by which the monarchical form of government was abolished, and democracy established in its stead. The young king Pyrrhus died early, but, according to one author, after he had poisoned his mother², and was succeeded by his brother Ptolemæus, who was treacherously slain while engaged in an expedition which was apparently undertaken against the Ætolians. Olympias, according to another account, sank into the grave under the stroke of her double bereavement.³ There now remained only one of the royal family in Epirus, the princess Deidamia⁴, who however showed a manly as well as royal spirit. She took possession of Ambracia, and did not dissemble her intention of punishing the murderers of Ptolemæus. But they were connected with a powerful party, perhaps also supported by the Ætolians, who had profited by their crime. The country was threatened with a civil war, and Deidamia shrank from the contest. She entered into a treaty with the insurgents, and renounced her claims to the throne⁵ on condition that she should enjoy the patrimony of

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Revolution
in Epirus.

¹ Polyb. ii. 4.

² Helladius ap. Phot. p. 530. a.

³ Justin, xxviii. 3.

⁴ Justin (u. s.) calls her Laodamia. The true name is preserved by Polyænus (viii. 52.) and Pausanias (iv. 35. 3.).

⁵ Pausanias (u. s.), ἐπιτρέπει τῷ δήμῳ τὰ πράγματα.

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her ancestors, and the honours of royalty.¹ But the securities which she took for the execution of the treaty did not guard her person from treachery and violence. She was forced to seek refuge in a temple, and was there murdered at the altar by a man named Milo, whose hands were believed to have been already stained with the blood of his own mother.

The Illyrians in Epirus;

It was not long after this event that Teuta's piratical expedition took place. It was bent at the outset against the coast of Elis and Messenia, which the Illyrians had before frequently visited for the like purpose. But the commander, having touched for a supply of provisions at the coast of Epirus, near the city of Phœnice, found an opportunity to make himself master of the place. The democratical government had imprudently entrusted it to a body of Celtic mercenaries, who had alternately served the Carthaginians and Romans in the first Punic War, but at the end of it were transported by the Romans out of Italy, as men who had proved, by repeated acts of treachery and sacrilege, that they acknowledged no ties human or divine. They now betrayed Phœnice to the Illyrians, who, as it was the strongest and wealthiest city in Epirus, found a richer booty than had often fallen into their hands. The Epirots collected all their forces to wrest their chief town from the invaders, who retained possession of it. But through want of foresight and military discipline they were defeated near Phœnice, while the Illyrian general, Scerdilaidas, entered Chaonia with a fresh force of 5000 men. They now implored succour from the Ætolians and Achæans, and the allies sent an army to their relief. No battle however ensued, as the Illyrian forces were recalled by Teuta, who was threatened with revolt at home. They made terms with the Epirots, to whom

¹ Polyænus (u. s.), ἐπὶ τῶν κληῖρον καὶ τὰς τιμὰς ἔχειν τῶν προγόνων.

they restored the city with all the free inhabitants, but were allowed to carry off the slaves, and every thing else that it contained. After their departure the Epirots, dreading perhaps a fresh attack from the same quarter, more than any other danger, and seeing the Acarnanians safe under Illyrian protection, entered into alliance with Teuta.

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The depredations committed by the Illyrians on Italian merchant vessels during the stay of their armament at Phœnice, gave occasion to the embassy by which the Romans demanded reparation, and to the expedition — the first in which they crossed the Adriatic — by which they avenged the murder of their ambassador. But while they were making their preparations, Teuta, delighted with the spoil of Phœnice, fitted out another more powerful armament for a fresh excursion. It failed in an attempt on Epidamnus, and proceeded to lay siege to Corcyra. The Corcyreans, whose embassy was accompanied by envoys from Epidamnus and Apollonia, sought protection from the Ætolians and Achæans: and an Achæan squadron of ten galleys was sent to raise the siege. But it was defeated by the Illyrians, whose fleet was strengthened by seven Acarnanian galleys. Four of the Achæan ships were boarded and captured by the pirates, and a fifth sunk with its whole crew, among whom was Marcus of Ceryncea, the man who, next to Aratus, had rendered the most important services to the League. Corcyra, now despairing of succour, capitulated soon after, and received an Illyrian garrison, commanded by Demetrius of Pharos, an adventurer who afterwards acquired notoriety by his restless and reckless ambition. On the appearance of the Roman fleet sent against Teuta, both the Corcyreans and Demetrius, who had in some way lost the queen's confidence, opened a negotiation with the consul, Cn. Fulvius, and, when he arrived, delivered up the city and the

Defeat the
Achæans
at sea.

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Roman em-
bassy in
Greece.

Illyrian garrison to him. Corcyra placed itself under the protection of Rome, and Demetrius guided the Roman army into Illyria, and when Teuta had submitted received, it is said, the largest portion of her dismembered kingdom as the reward of his treachery.¹ The victorious consul, A. Postumius, sent envoys both to the Ætolians and the Achæans to announce the success of the Roman arms against the common enemy; and the account which Polybius gives of this embassy—the first, as he believed, that the Romans had sent to Greece²—at least proves that there was no resentment or jealousy on either side.³ The envoys explained the motives which had induced Rome to take up arms against the Illyrians, related the chastisement which had been inflicted on Teuta, and read a copy of the treaty concluded with her. The article in which the Greeks were most concerned was, that the Illyrians were forbidden henceforth to sail south of the Lissus with more than two boats at a time, and those not equipped for war. The Illyrian piracy had spread so much terror along the western coasts of Greece, that the Romans were entitled to the gratitude of the nation, and the obligation seems to have been acknowledged by both the confederate states. Another embassy was sent to Corinth and Athens. The Corinthians honoured the Romans with the privilege of participation in the Isthmian games⁴, a boon not without its value, as it seemed to imply a recognition of national affinity. The Athenians granted their franchise, and the right of initiation in the Eleusinian Mysteries.⁵

¹ Polyb. ii. 11. τοὺς πλείους τῶν Ἰλλυρίων. Appian, III. 8. ἔστιν ἡ χωρία.... τὴν ἀπιστίαν τοῦ ἀνδρὸς ὑφυρώμενοι. This would be the more probable account, if it were but of equal authority.

² Niebuhr (*Kl. Schr.* p. 256.) felt the difficulty, but observes that Polybius might the more easily fall into such an error more than a century after the event, as the Roman mediation was attended with no result.

³ Polyb. ii. 12.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ Zonaras, viii. 19. καὶ πρὸς Ἀθηναίους δὲ φιλίαν ἐπεποιήκεσαν, καὶ τῆς πολιτείας σφῶν, τῶν τε μυστηρίων μέτεσχον. They were perhaps admitted to isopolity.

About this time Demetrius died¹, after having suffered a defeat from the Dardanians²; perhaps on the field of battle. He left an only son named Philip, a child eight years of age. The government was assumed, in his name, by his kinsman Antigonus—a son of Demetrius the Handsome, son of Demetrius I. and Ptolemais—who was distinguished by an epithet which satirically expressed a feature in his character by which he afterwards became known to the Greeks, as one forward to promise, but slack to perform; hence he incurred the nickname of Dосon (about to give). Yet he discharged his duties toward his ward with strict integrity; and though he married Chryseis, the widow of Demetrius II., and had children by her³, he continued to treat Philip as his own son, and rightful heir to the throne, though it seems without any intention of resigning it to him during his own lifetime. The death of Demetrius II. was attended with important changes in the mutual relations of the Greek states; and the administration of Antigonus Dосon is the most critical period in this portion of Greek history.

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B. C. 229.
Death of
Deme-
trius II.

¹ Polyb. ii. 44. 2.

² Prolog. Trog. xxviii.

³ Euseb. Arm. i. p. 334. *Quum justum in procuratione Phuscum vidiissent, regem eum crearunt; uxoremque ipsi Aureolam desponderunt; ipse vero filios qui ex Aureola nati fuerunt vix educabat, ut imperium sine perfidia Philippo conservaret.* Compare Justin, xxviii. 3. Philip after his death styled him father. Polyb. iv. 24. 7.

CHAPTER LXII.

FROM THE ACCESSION OF ANTIGONUS DOSON TO THE
BATTLE OF SELLASIA.

State of Sparta. — Rhetra of Epitadeus. — Progress of Luxury. — Agis IV. and Leonidas. — Military Operations of Agis. — His Friends. — His Plan of Reform. — Leonidas dethroned. — Agis at the Isthmus. — The Counter-revolution. — Agis arrested, and put to Death. — The Re-action. — Cleomenes ascends the Throne. — Progress of the Achæan League. — Relations of Sparta to the League. — Beginning of the Cleomeic War. — Aratus and Aristomachus. — Aratus surprises Mantinea. — Murder of Archidamus. — Battle of Ladocea. — Revolution at Sparta. — Reforms of Cleomenes. — Jealousy of Aratus. — Battle of Hecatombæon. — Proposals of Cleomenes. — Intrigues of Aratus. — Embassy to Antigonus Doson. — Negotiation with Cleomenes broken off. — Cleomenes Master of Argos. — His Negotiation with Aratus. — Antigonus at the Isthmus. — Revolution at Argos. — Retreat of Cleomenes. — Advance of Antigonus. — Fall of Mantinea. — Resources of Cleomenes. — He attacks Megalopolis and lays it in Ruins. — Philopœmen. — Cleomenes before Argos. — Battle of Sellasia. — Cleomenes sails to Egypt. — Cleomenes at Alexandria. — His death.

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State of
Sparta.

SINCE the close of her disastrous struggle with Thebes, which deprived her of the fairest portion of her territory, and left her insulated and beset with hostile neighbours, Sparta has taken little share in the affairs of Greece. It is but seldom, and on extraordinary occasions, that we have seen her name mentioned. The part however which we find her acting on these occasions is an honourable one, and worthy of her ancient renown; a struggle for the national independence, such as that in which Agis III. fell, or a gallant resistance in her own defence, such as she opposed to the superior forces of Demetrius and

Pyrrhus. She appears indeed to have discarded all ambitious views, to have buried all thoughts of her old supremacy, and to have adopted a merely defensive policy; but her patriotism, her sense of honour, and her love of liberty, seem to have survived.

During the period on which we are now about to enter, she again for a time fills the most prominent place among the Greek states, and is engaged in a contest for the mastery of Peloponnesus, and we are in consequence enabled to learn something of the course of her internal history, which was intimately connected with this change in her political attitude. These events were prepared by others which occurred several years earlier, in the reign of Antigonus Gonatas, but which we have reserved for this place, that they might not interrupt the progress of the narrative, and might not be separated from their more important sequel.

We have seen that so far back as the year 399 B. C., when Sparta was apparently at the summit of her prosperity and power, she was nevertheless threatened with a bloody revolution, which was perhaps only averted by a timely accidental discovery. But the causes which provoked Cinadon's plot were not removed by its violent suppression. It does not appear that any attempt had since been made to remedy the evil; and it had been greatly aggravated, not only by the continued operation of the same causes, but by an innovation subsequently introduced into the law which regulated the distribution of property. According to the ancient law, the head of a Spartan family was only tenant for life of his portion of land, and had no power to alter the order of succession by which it descended after his death to the person who represented him. We are not informed what provision was made by law or usage for the cases, which must have become not uncommon even before the end of

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the Peloponnesian War, in which a portion was left vacant by the extinction of the family. It would seem that the arrangement most accordant with the principles of the constitution, and best adapted to promote the common weal, would have been to transfer such lands to the younger branches of other families. But we do not hear of any such rule or practice; and the facts which have come to our knowledge render it more probable that the vacant portions were disposed of in a way much less beneficial to the state, and went to increase the wealth of the rich and powerful, rather than to supply the wants of the poorer citizens. But the inequality of fortunes which would thus grow in proportion as the population decreased, was very much augmented after a change had been made in the law, by which all restraints on the alienation of land were removed, and every Spartan was enabled, either in his lifetime or by his will, to convey his whole estate away from his own family to strangers. This innovation—which must have been preceded by a general change of sentiment with regard to the ancient institutions—was effected by a *rhetra*, which was proposed by an ephor named Epitadeus, a man, it is said, of great influence, and of a stern, imperious character, who having been displeased by his son wished to deprive him of his patrimony. The anecdote is of course much less certain than the fact which it is supposed to explain. Such a measure could not have been carried if there had not been a disposition generally prevailing to take advantage of it.¹ What Epitadeus is said to have designed out of ill-will toward his son, other parents may have done under the pressure of poverty, or in compliance with the importunity of grasping

Rhetra of
Epitadeus.

¹ This was written before I had seen C. F. Hermann's *Antiquitates Laconicae*, where (p. 212. fol.) reasons are given for questioning the extent of the operation assigned by Plutarch to the law of Epitadeus.

neighbours. It is only by the imagination that we can trace the working of the new law; but the final result is distinctly recorded. As the ruling caste dwindled away, its property was accumulated in fewer and fewer hands, until at length the number of the Spartans did not exceed 700, and of these only about 100 possessed a piece of land, or any means of independent and honourable subsistence. One peculiar and important feature in this state of Spartan society was the extent of female ascendancy. According to Aristotle two-fifths of the land even in his days belonged to women.¹

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When the state had thus shrunk up into an oligarchy of 100 persons, all that in former times constituted the strength of Sparta was gone. It is difficult to conceive how even the outward form was preserved, how tranquillity was maintained at home, and why attempts like that of Cinadon's were not frequently repeated, or were never successful. All the vigilance and energy of the government must, one would think, have been needed for its own security. For any vigorous intervention in the affairs of Greece, any effort to regain the smallest degree of political weight, Sparta seemed now utterly disabled. Even if the spirit of the ancient institutions had remained in all its purity, it could have availed nothing, when the body which it should have animated was so nearly wasted away. But the spirit languished as the body decayed. The contrast between the extremes of wealth and poverty was rendered more glaring by the luxury which had at the same time taken the place of the primitive simplicity among those who had the means of indulging in it. This change of manners seems indeed to have crept into Sparta somewhat later than it became visible in the

Progress of
luxury.

¹ Pol. II. 6. p. 55. Goettling.

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rest of Greece, where it was rapidly spread by the intercourse which Alexander's conquests opened with the East; for the reign of Areus is represented as the period of its commencement.¹ He and his son Acrotatus, it is said, first affected to imitate the voluptuousness of the foreign courts: but the fashion which they introduced was so eagerly followed, that their mode of living seemed frugal and homely, when compared with the refinements of private Spartans in the next generation. Then the plain fare, and simple garniture, of the common meals, were exchanged for delicate viands, soft couches, fragrant and precious ointments, and the other devices of the modern luxury. And while the wealthy shook off the restraints of the ancient discipline, the bulk of the citizens were prevented by poverty from complying with its regulations, and were unable to exercise the privileges to which they were entitled by their birth, and thus practically degraded to an inferior rank.

Agis IV.
and Leonidas.

To such a pass had matters been brought, when Agis IV. succeeded to the throne of the Eurypontids, the sixth of the line from the conqueror Agesilaus. He was under twenty at the time of his accession, and had been nursed in the lap of ease and luxury by his mother, Agesistrata, and his grandmother, Archidamia, the wealthiest of the Spartan ladies. He himself inherited an ample patrimony in land, with a treasure of 600 talents. But it is not surprising, nor is any particular occasion needed to account for the fact, that a high-minded youth should not have been satisfied with the honours or pleasures of such a station.² Tradition still preserved the memory of Sparta's departed greatness, and enough was retained of the forms of her ancient life, to

¹ Phylarchus, ap. Athen. iv. p. 142.

² It seems equally superfluous to imagine with Schorn (p. 99.) that he was stimulated by the recollection of his great ancestor Agesilaus, as to suppose with Kortüm (in Schlosser's *Archiv.* iv. p. 174.) that his emulation was kindled by the fame of Aratus. But the latter conjecture is the less probable.

suggest a saddening comparison between the past and the present. The more vividly the images of other days rose upon his mind, the more impatient he would become of his own shadowy, inactive, inglorious royalty, with its vain titles, vacant leisure, or frivolous occupations. But without some great change in the state of Sparta, he could not hope to see any field opened to him for honourable exertion. It was absolutely necessary, not only that the ancient discipline should be in some measure restored, and the ancient spirit in some degree revived, but that a new people should be formed, for such a discipline and spirit to work upon. A more comprehensive plan, embracing the whole free population of Laconia, and removing all political distinctions which raised one class in it above another, either never entered the mind of Agis, or appeared to him impracticable or inexpedient. All that he aimed at was as nearly as possible to bring back the state of things which was supposed to have existed before the conquest of Messenia, to restore the institutions of Lycurgus to their primitive vigour. This indeed was a sufficiently difficult undertaking—as much so perhaps as a more complete revolution would have been—one in which he had to expect powerful and vehement opposition. His colleague, Leonidas, the son of the traitor Cleonymus, who, when Acrotatus fell in battle, became the guardian of his infant child, and had succeeded to the throne on the death of his ward, was so little disposed to favour such attempts at reformation, that, having spent a great part of his life in the Asiatic courts, he had introduced new refinements of luxury at Sparta. With Leonidas stood the elder citizens, whose habits had been formed under the modern laxity, and who shrank from a return to the severity of the primitive discipline, and the wealthy women, who dreaded the loss, not only of their lux-

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rious enjoyments, but of the respect and influence which accrued to them from their large possessions. On the other hand, with all who had more to gain than to lose by a revolution, with the young, the needy, the ambitious, and with as many as had their country's welfare and dignity at heart, the project of a reform was popular, and the royal authority, though very feeble for ordinary purposes, when placed at the head of a party made an addition of incalculable importance to its strength.

Military
operations
of Agis.

If we could rely on some accounts delivered to us by Pausanias, we should be led to believe that he endeavoured—as Cleomenes afterwards—to prepare the way for his meditated political changes by a series of military operations. For we read in Pausanias of unsuccessful attempts which he made on Pellene¹, and Megalopolis², and of a great battle in which he was defeated by Aratus near Mantinea.³ But some of

¹ II. 8. 5. VII. 7. 3. It is precisely what befel the Ætolians at the same place. Agis had made himself master of the town, but is dislodged by Aratus. Manso (Sp. III. 2. p. 106.) pointed out the great probability that Pausanias only made a mistake about the assailants; and even Schömann (*Prolegg. ad Plut. Ag. xxxv.*), who maintains the credibility of the two other statements, cannot reconcile himself to this. Lucas (p. 83.), and Droysen (II. p. 380.), indeed say they do not venture to reject it. But it seems rather an excess of boldness to admit such a singular coincidence on such slight authority.

² VIII. 27. After the accession of Megalopolis to the Achæan League (which took place some years after the death of Agis), Agis lays siege to Megalopolis, but is compelled to raise it by a hurricane, which destroyed his battering-engine. Manso (u. s.) justly suspects that Pausanias has here confounded this Agis with his predecessor Agis III. (see VI. p. 311.)

³ VIII. 10. The battle is described with a copiousness of details which certainly raises a strong presumption in favour of the substantial truth of the narrative, though Pausanias was so ill-informed or forgetful as to relate that Agis was slain, and undoubtedly supposed that Lydadas had already abdicated his tyranny. (Compare VIII. 10. 6. with VIII. 27. 2.) But on the other hand so much the more difficult is it to believe, that Plutarch could have passed over such an event in total silence. Schömann and Droysen indeed contend, that the military career of Agis did not enter into Plutarch's plan; but, not to mention that such transactions could not be without influence on the state of affairs at Sparta, it is quite evident from the manner in which the biographer notices one expedition of his hero, that he would not purposely have omitted his other military movements. But even if we admit this very unsatisfactory explanation for the Life of Agis, it will not account for the omission in the Life of Aratus. Schömann's remark, *non omisurus opinor, in hac (Arati vitâ) rem nec lecem et Arato gloriosam*, applies quite as much to this battle as to the deliverance of Pellene. It seems clear that Plutarch found no mention of either in the autobiography of Aratus. The story might, as Manso observes, have had its origin in the same confusion which probably gave rise to that about the siege of Megalopolis.

these accounts are liable to strong suspicion on other grounds, and it seems hardly possible that any of them could have been known, or at least believed by Plutarch, when he wrote his Lives of Agis and Aratus, and Pausanias is not an author entitled to much confidence.

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Agis, in the warmth and openness of a youthful heart engrossed with a new and great idea, seems to have believed that he might safely rely on the goodness of his cause, and that the object which appeared to himself so noble and attractive, could not fail to excite equal interest in others. He seems from the first to have made no secret of his intentions, as in his dress and mode of living he strictly observed the primitive rule, trusting that he should be able to effect his purpose without either artifice or violence, to which his generous and gentle nature was almost equally averse.¹ And in fact, the success of his endeavours to infuse his convictions and wishes into other bosoms, was apparently greater than could have been reasonably expected. Three persons of the greatest weight among the elder citizens, his mother's brother Agesilaus, a man of fluent speech, a descendant of the celebrated Lysander, who bore the same name and inherited much of his ancestor's reputation and influence, and Mandrocleidas, who is described as surpassing all the Greeks of his age in dexterity and boldness for the management of affairs, were induced to enter into the young king's views, and seconded his enterprise with a great show of zeal. The motives of Agesilaus, though he affected to yield to the persuasions of his son Hippomedon, a man of

His friends.

¹ Droysen (p. 395.) very justly observes, that the character of Agis, as it appears in Plutarch's narrative, is hardly consistent with the numerous military enterprises attributed to him by Pausanias, and therefore suspects that his character has been misrepresented. But as there is no other reason for questioning the truth with which it has been drawn, it seems as fair to consider it as an objection to those otherwise most suspicious accounts of his military career.

high military reputation¹, soon, as we shall see, became perfectly clear. Those of Lysander and Mandrocleidas are not so manifest. It seems probable that they were chiefly attracted by the prospect of power, hoping to take the lead in the new order of things which they might help to establish. But with the ladies of his family Agis was still more decidedly successful. After a short opposition, which was overcome in part by the arguments of Agesilaus, he so completely inspired them with his own enthusiasm, that they consented to every sacrifice of their personal interests, and laboured to gain converts to the cause among others of their sex and rank. The party adverse to reform rallied round Leonidas, and prepared for a strenuous resistance to the measures of Agis; but his adherents were so numerous that Leonidas scarcely ventured openly to declare himself, though he sedulously strove to undermine his colleague's influence by secret calumnies, charging him with the design of overthrowing the constitution, and purchasing a tyranny with the bribes which he offered to the poor out of the fortunes of the rich.

His plan of reform.

The first step taken by Agis toward the accomplishment of his object, was to procure the election of Lysander among the next ephors. He then proceeded to introduce a *rhētra*, which comprehended his whole plan of reform. All debts were to be cancelled: the whole territory to be divided into two parts: one, comprising the vale of Sparta and some adjacent districts, to be parcelled into 4500 equal shares for as many Spartans; the other into 15,000, for as many Laconians capable of military service. The number of the Spartans to be made up by an extension of the highest franchise to natives or foreigners of free birth, liberal education, and fitting

¹ On Hippomedon's career, see Niebuhr, *Kl. Schr.* p. 456. 461.

personal qualifications; to be distributed into companies for the public meals, and to be inured to the observance of the ancient discipline.

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Before the rhetra became a law, it was necessary that it should pass through the Gerusia, a body in which the enemies of reform were predominant, but which was naturally cautious, and not inaccessible to the influence of public opinion. The advocates of the measure therefore hoped to sway the deliberations of the Council in its favour by a previous appeal to the popular assembly, and by some other perhaps less honest expedients. Oracles, old and new, were produced, containing admonitions against the accumulation of wealth, and in favour of equality, and were urged by Lysander, who called the assembly together, and by Mandrocleidas and Agesilaus, in support of the projected changes. After them Agis pleaded the same cause in a short speech, but one full of weighty matter, being indeed itself not simply a speech but an act. For he declared his intention to make an unreserved surrender of his property to the state; the lands to be subjected to the proposed division; the money, it seems, to be paid into the public treasury: and he announced that the other members of his family, who together possessed a large portion of the wealth of Sparta, as well as many of his friends, had consented to make a like sacrifice to the common weal. It may be easily imagined that such a proof of disinterested patriotism, worthy of the ancient virtue, was received with great applause by an assembly consisting chiefly of persons who were to be personally benefited by the gift. It dispelled all suspicions as to the young king's motives, and exhibited the selfishness of his adversaries in the stronger relief. But it confirmed Leonidas in his opposition to the measure, as he perceived that if it was carried he should be obliged to submit to the like loss without the credit

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of a sacrifice. But as it was necessary to bring forward some arguments more in accordance with the feelings of his hearers than his real motives would have been, he took the ground of a friend to the constitution, and an admirer of Lycurgus, and asked Agis whether their great Legislator had ever made any provision for the cancelling of debts, or for the admission of foreigners to the franchise—he who had deemed it necessary to keep the city free from the presence of strangers. It was not difficult for Agis to expose the sophistry of this appeal to antiquity, and to show that his reform was perfectly consistent with the principles of Lycurgus, who could not have meant the Spartans to contract debts when he forbade them to possess money, and whose aim was not so much to exclude the persons of foreigners as to guard against the contagion of foreign manners, though it was not surprising, he observed, that such distinctions should be overlooked by Leonidas, who had been brought up abroad, and had allied himself by marriage to a Syrian satrap. But he had to deal with opponents who were not to be moved by arguments, and their interest prevailed in the Gerusia, though not without a hard struggle; the rhetra was lost by a single vote.

His friends however were men not to be disheartened by a defeat which was so nearly a victory; it only induced them to set other engines at work. They determined to remove Leonidas, who was the main strength of the adverse party, out of the way; and that part of his private history which had afforded occasion for Agis's sarcastic allusion, seemed to furnish them with the means of effecting their purpose in a constitutional manner. Leonidas had in fact married the daughter of an Asiatic, the governor of one of the provinces of Seleucus, by whom he had two children: it was only when, having lost his wife's affection, he

found his situation grow irksome, that he had returned reluctantly to Sparta. Lysander now instructed his adherents to revive the recollection of an ancient law, which forbade a Heracleid to marry a foreigner, and even made him liable to capital punishment if he took up a fixed residence in a foreign land. When the public mind had been duly prepared for the agitation of the question, Lysander himself brought it forward in the way most likely to raise a strong prejudice against Leonidas. According to a custom which must have arisen in very remote antiquity, the ephors met once every nine years on a clear but moonless night, to observe the heavens in silence. If a meteor was seen to shoot across the sky, it was inferred that the kings had incurred the displeasure of the gods, and they were suspended from their functions until they were absolved by a favourable oracle from Delphi or Olympia. The custom had probably been long a mere ceremony; but Lysander now found a use for it. He declared that he had beheld the sign, and proceeding to interpret it by the facts which had recently become the subject of earnest discussion, he brought Leonidas to trial for a breach of the law, and at the same time induced Cleombrotus, who had married the king's daughter, Chilonis, and was next in succession, to claim the throne. Leonidas, anticipating an unfavourable decision and a rigorous application of the law, took refuge in the sanctuary of the Brazen House, where he was joined by Chilonis. In his absence he was condemned, and the sceptre, which he was pronounced to have forfeited, was transferred to Cleombrotus.

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Leonidas
dethroned

But his partisans did not give up the contest. The official year was drawing to a close; and at the next election of ephors they were able to fill the board with their own adherents. The new ephors immediately took Leonidas under their protection, and impeached

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Lysander and Mandrocleidas as the authors of illegal and revolutionary measures. It was evidently a crisis which called for some vigorous stroke to prevent the ruin of their cause, and they persuaded the kings to assert what they maintained to be their legitimate authority over the ephors, who, according to them, were only entitled to interfere in affairs of state when the kings happened to be at variance. Agis and his colleague assembled their friends, compelled the ephors to retire, and appointed a new board, which included Agesilaus, in their room. They then proceeded to arm the younger citizens, and to release the prisoners. Their opponents now could only hope to save their lives, and expected a general massacre. Leonidas fled, and he owed his safety to the generosity of Agis, who, finding that Agesilaus had despatched emissaries in pursuit of him, to put him to death, sent an escort to conduct him to Tegea. The movement was not stained with a single drop of blood.

It was no doubt with reluctance that Agis consented to resort to such violent proceedings; but it now only remained to reap the fruits of them. All resistance was quelled; and if the rhetra had been again proposed, it would probably have been carried in the Council without opposition. But Agis now let himself be guided by the counsels of Agesilaus, which were the more agreeable to him, as they wore the appearance of forbearance and moderation. Agesilaus had been induced to take the side of reform, neither by any patriotic feeling, nor by the persuasions of his son Hippomedon, who was sincerely attached to it, but by the prospect which it held out of relieving him from a load of debts which encumbered his estate; and he now easily played upon the young king's simplicity and inexperience. He suggested to him that it would be best to proceed gradually toward the accomplishment of his designs, and not to attempt to introduce

so many startling changes at once. Let him first conciliate that class of citizens which was groaning under the burden of debt by a general release; he might then hope more easily to carry the more obnoxious innovation which related to the division of the land. Agesilaus gave such a specious colour to this proposal, that even Lysander was deceived and assented to it. By an edict, it would seem of the ephors, all creditors who held written securities for their money were obliged to bring them into the market-place, where they were piled in a heap, and committed to the flames. As they burnt, Agesilaus exultingly declared, that *he had never beheld a brighter blaze, or a purer fire*. By the great mass of the spectators it had probably been viewed with pleasure only because they regarded it as an earnest of the boon which they expected for themselves. A loud cry was soon raised for the division of the land, and both the kings urged Agesilaus to gratify the wish of the people, and to finish their work. He however evaded their request, and devised successive pretexts for continued delay, until he was relieved from their importunity by a turn of affairs, which has been already related. It was at this juncture that Aratus applied to Sparta for aid to resist the threatened invasion of the Ætoliens. Agesilaus gladly seconded this call, which was doubly welcome to him, as it afforded a fresh pretext for delay, and freed him from the presence of the persons who were most zealous and active in pressing the claim which he wished to elude. Agis, as we have seen, was sent at the head of an army to the Isthmus. The discipline of his troops, who, believing their fortunes secured at home, and regarding him as their benefactor, paid the most punctual obedience to his orders, excited great admiration along the whole line of their march; and it was no less generally acknowledged, that he himself presented a complete

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Agis at the
Isthmus.

image of a Spartan king of the old times, sharing with his men the toils and hardships of the camp, and not to be distinguished from the private soldier either in his arms or his fare¹, though there were many who dreaded his presence, as likely to spread a revolutionary contagion, and perhaps Aratus himself was not altogether free from such anxiety, and hence less disposed to regret the departure of his allies.²

But during his absence the state of affairs had undergone an unhappy change at Sparta. Agesilaus had cast aside every restraint of decency, and abstained from no kind of gainful iniquity for which his office afforded colour or opportunity. For the sake of some fraudulent advantage he had even intercalated an additional month in the year. Cleombrotus he treated with open contempt; and he affected to account Agis worthy of respect, not as king, but only as his kinsman. Growing conscious however that he had provoked general indignation, and apprehensive that the patience of the people might soon be spent, he took a band of armed followers into his pay. This was the first step toward formal tyranny; and he seemed resolved to follow it up: for, perhaps to sound the public feeling, he caused a report to be circulated that he meant to continue in office another year. It seems to have been at the time when the ferment excited by these proceedings had nearly reached its height, that Agis returned from his expedition. It was too late to avert the consequences of his uncle's misconduct. The adverse party took advantage of the general disgust and disappointment which it had caused to effect a counter-revolution, while the poorer

The
counter-
revolution.

¹ Plut. Agis, 14. It seems to be most distinctly implied in this description, which Droysen adopts (p. 389.) without scruple, that this was the first occasion on which Agis had been seen at the head of an army out of Laconia.

² This was written before I had seen that Droysen (p. 390.) takes the same view of the jealousy of Aratus; but I still scruple to make the same use of this supposition.

citizens, who perhaps were led to believe that they had been deceived by Agis, looked on either with unconcern or with a vindictive joy. Leonidas was openly recalled and reinstated in his dignity. Agis and Cleombrotus, abandoned by their friends, took shelter, the former in the Brazen House, the latter in the temple of Poseidon. The chief offender, Agesilaus, was allowed to escape into exile through the intercession of his son, who was universally loved and esteemed.¹ The revenge of Leonidas was first directed against Cleombrotus, whose hostility toward one who stood in so near a relation to him, appeared to partake of ingratitude and impiety. Yet he suffered himself to be overcome by the supplication of his heroic daughter, and permitted her husband to quit the country. But Chilonis, as in her father's adversity she had shared his danger, had mourned for his absence, and breathed nothing but displeasure against his triumphant rival, so now, notwithstanding his entreaties, she accompanied her dethroned husband, whom she could neither love nor esteem, in his exile.²

Agis had no such advocate to plead in his behalf, and he had provoked more implacable enmity in the persons whose interests he had assailed, in proportion as his aims were higher, and his virtue purer; Leonidas at first tried to draw him out of his asylum by fair words: *it was well known that he had been misled by the arts of Agesilaus: his error was forgiven, and he would be allowed to retain his dignity.*

¹ Hippomedon himself was in exile not very long afterwards, as appears from Teles in Stob. Flor. II. p. 82. Gaisf., and possibly he withdrew with his father.

² Even if it were certain, as Droysen believes, that Plutarch (Agis, 18.) drew this part of his narrative from Phylarchus, and that this historian was rather too fond of exercising his talent (one which the author of *Hellenismus* has displayed in a very eminent degree) for lively, graphic description, and particularly of exhibiting interesting female characters in striking situations, all this would afford no ground for questioning the truth of any essential feature of the narrative, nor does it much invalidate the general authority of Phylarchus.

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Agis ar-
rested,

But finding that Agis would not trust his professions, he had recourse to another device. He had removed all the ephors, and filled their places with his own creatures, among whom was a sordid wretch named Amphares, who was on a footing of some intimacy with Agis and his family, and having recently borrowed some drinking vessels, and other things of great value, from Agesistrata, hoped that in the calamity which now threatened the royal house, he should be able to retain them as his own property. This man, with two of his associates, named Demochares and Arcesilaus, who were likewise on familiar terms with Agis, visited him in his retreat, and sometimes escorted him to a bath at some distance from the temple. On one of these occasions, having concerted their measures, they seized him, and dragged him to prison. Here the ephors assembled some of the Council, their devoted partizans, and constituted themselves a tribunal to sit in judgment on the king. The trial seems to have been as irregular as the court was illegal. By way of accusation, he was called upon to defend himself; and as he disdained to plead before such judges, he was asked, first, whether he had been forced into the steps which he had taken by Lysander and Agesilaus. He replied, that he had acted without any compulsion, but following the example of Lycurgus, and aiming to revive his institutions. The next question was, whether he repented of his conduct, and when he declared that he felt no regret for his glorious undertaking, however fatal its issue might be to himself, he was forthwith condemned to death. A Spartan king, limited as was his authority, was invested with a kind of sanctity in the eyes of the people, who saw in him a lineal descendant of Hercules. The officers of justice, and even the soldiers of the government, did not venture to lay hands on Agis, and Demochares was obliged

himself to drag him to the chamber of execution, where he was immediately strangled. He maintained the same calm and noble bearing to his last moments; and consoled an attendant who bewailed his fate, with the remark, that *he was still superior to his murderers.*

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and put to
death.

The execution was hastened, because his mother and grandmother had come to the prison doors, and were loudly demanding that he should be allowed a hearing in the assembly of the people, the only constitutional tribunal for such a cause. A crowd was gathering round them, and to prevent a tumult, Amphares, still wearing the mask of friendship, invited them to enter, and see Agis. It would seem that they had been involved in his sentence, for they were immediately put to death without any form of trial. Agesistrata, who suffered last, after having laid her mother's corpse by the side of her son, offered her neck to the cord with the parting wish, *May it but bring good to Sparta.*

The main motive of this atrocious butchery seems to have been policy rather than revenge, as the three bodies were exposed to public view, and the period which ensued was evidently a reign of terror, in which it was dangerous to betray the slightest degree of sympathy with the sufferers. Leonidas continued to govern without a colleague; the first instance of the kind in the annals of Sparta. Archidamus, Agis's brother, had fled to Messene. The young king's widow Agiatis, and their infant son, were left to the mercy of their enemies. But as Agiatis was a wealthy heiress, Leonidas thought it advisable to unite her in marriage with his own son Cleomenes, thus at the same time securing the possession of her fortune, and the custody of the rightful heir to the throne of the Proclids. He himself ruled with the aid of a mercenary force; yet, not as an absolute

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sovereign, but as the head, if not rather as the minister of the oligarchy, which had employed him to crush the project of reform. He was content with a life of ease and luxury, and willing to let his friends grasp and enjoy as they were able. The powerful citizens oppressed the weak, and embezzled the public property with impunity; and their license was the more free from all restraints of fear and shame, as, according to the spirit which commonly prevails in such times, any appeal to the principles of law and justice might expose one who ventured on it to the suspicion of revolutionary views, and ostentatious neglect of the ancient discipline would be regarded as a sign of zealous attachment to the cause of order and good government. All public spirit, and sense of national honour, seemed to be extinct. The coasts of Laconia were insulted by Illyrian pirates; and when the Ætoliens, in the expedition already mentioned, had quietly carried off their rich booty, the loss of so many captives was treated as a happy riddance. The government, conscious that it was hated by its subjects, accounted the weakness of the country its own strength, and dreaded the growth of the population more than a hostile invasion. Nevertheless, complete and secure as the triumph of the oligarchy seemed to be, the last words of Agis were not, even with regard to the success of his cause, altogether an empty boast, and the dying prayer of Agesistrata did not wholly fall to the ground; and the expedient by which Leonidas had thought to strengthen his dynasty, and to perpetuate the ascendancy of his party, proved the occasion of the overthrow of both.

The re-
action.

Though Agiatis had been brought into the house of Cleomenes, who was then very young, almost as a captive, and never ceased to abhor his father, a sincere and warm affection soon sprang up between

them, which was not weakened by that with which she clung to the memory of her deceased husband, and which she did not attempt to dissemble. On the contrary, her recollections of Agis became a bond of union as well as a topic of frequent conversation between her and Cleomenes. He listened with a warm interest, as she dwelt with enthusiasm on the conduct and views of the ill-fated prince, which he had, no doubt, been used to hear grossly calumniated. The contrast between that pure and heroic character and the baseness of his enemies, between his tragical calamity and their insolent prosperity, could not but rouse strong emotions in a generous spirit. These impressions were strengthened by lessons in the stoical philosophy which he received from a disciple of Cleanthes, Sphærus of Olbia¹, who had fixed his residence in Sparta. Philosophy had been little studied there, so long as it was practically enforced; but as discipline was relaxed, and manners became corrupt, the austere doctrines of the most rigid school seem to have come into vogue in the higher circles, as a branch of polite learning and a liberal accomplishment, and there is no reason why Leonidas himself may not have derived as much amusement from the stoical speculations of Sphærus, as Antigonus Gonatas from those of his master. But it could scarcely have occurred to him to imagine, that his son was capable of treating such things seriously, and that discourses about virtue and happiness might help to mould his character, and to fix his destiny. The result however was, that the thoughts and images with which the young prince's mind was nourished during the latter part of his father's life, were such as disposed him to tread in the steps of Agis.

¹ 'Ο Βορυσθεϊνης, Plut. Cl. 2. Diogenes Laert. (vii. 177.) calls him δ Βορροπλαρος.

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B. C. 236.
Cleomenes
ascends the
throne.

In 236 Leonidas died, and Cleomenes succeeded to the throne. He could now better survey his prospects, measure his resources, and decide upon his course of action. His situation appeared to him little better than an irksome and degrading confinement. He found himself utterly without weight or authority at home. The ephors, the organs of the oligarchy, governed the state with unlimited sway, and regarded him as their minister. Their policy, which aimed at nothing beyond the preservation of domestic tranquillity, and tolerated all insults rather than draw the sword, seemed to condemn him to perpetual inaction, as well as Sparta to continual dishonour. His reflections soon led him to the conclusion, that the only remedy for the disorders of the state was a revolution such as Agis had meditated, and the only question remaining was, how he might follow the example of Agis with greater safety and fairer hopes of success. It was difficult to find a friend to whom he could safely unbosom his views or wishes. One named Xenares, with whom he had lived on that peculiar footing of intimacy, which was sanctioned and regulated by the Spartan institutions, had also been well acquainted with Agis, and from him Cleomenes endeavoured to gather the most exact information as to the steps by which Agis had proceeded toward the execution of his plans, until the insatiable curiosity with which he inquired after these details awakened the suspicions of Xenares, who not only chided him sharply for his imprudence, which seemed to border on frenzy, but, though he kept the dangerous secret, henceforward shunned his society. This was a sufficient warning to Cleomenes to conceal his designs until an opportunity should present itself for some decisive movement, and he became convinced that such an opportunity was not likely to arrive until he should see himself at the

head of an army abroad. During the reign of Demetrius however no events occurred to force the Spartan government to engage in military operations, or to call Cleomenes across the frontier; and the only change which took place in his position, seems to have been that by the death of Eurydamidas, the son of Agis, all the functions of royalty were both really and nominally centered in him. With regard to any object which he could have had immediately in view, this event was apparently of very little importance to him. Yet it became the ground of an imputation, which has thrown a dark shade over his character; he was reported to have poisoned the child. Pausanias, who has preserved this anecdote, seems to have found it in the Memoirs of Aratus. But even if it rested on better authority than that of a mortal enemy, we might fairly reject it as incredible. It may be admitted that Cleomenes was not scrupulous in the choice of means for the attainment of an object which interested his ambition. But the murder of a child, who had been placed under his protection, and whom he had so little reason to fear, was a villainy which seems incongruous with all the known elements of his character, inconsistent with the affectionate intercourse in which he lived to the last with Agiatis, and hardly intelligible on any calculations of policy; for the brother of Agis, the next heir to the throne, and a more formidable rival, was still living at Messene.

After the death of Demetrius affairs took a turn more favourable to the views of Cleomenes, as the progress which the Achæan League then made in Peloponnesus brought it into collision with Sparta.

The beginning of a new reign in Macedonia usually set the neighbouring nations in motion, and a regency afforded a more than ordinary temptation to

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aggression. Antigonus Doson was a long time fully occupied with the defence of the kingdom and the establishment of his own authority. He had at once to guard his frontiers against the Dardanians, and to suppress an insurrection in Thessaly, which however appears to have enabled the Ætolians to make themselves masters of several Thessalian towns; and even after he had quelled the foreign enemy, and had reduced his rebellious subjects to obedience, he still found himself threatened at home by popular tumults, or by the machinations of a party which refused to acknowledge him as king.¹ But when this danger had passed by, and left him at leisure to pursue schemes of conquest, his attention was directed, not toward Greece, but Asia: for we next find him engaged in a maritime expedition to that quarter, the object and results of which we can only collect from the fact, that he is said to have subdued Caria. But we learn that at the period of this expedition Bœotia was no longer subject to Macedonia, though there was a strong party there which espoused the Macedonian interest, while Thebes, still it seems retaining some feeling of her ancient dignity, adhered to the cause of independence. The vessels of Antigonus were stranded, through an extraordinary ebb of the tide, on the coast of Bœotia: a general alarm was spread, that he had come to overrun the country; and Neon, the commander of the Bœotian cavalry, repaired to the spot with all the horse he could muster. He found the Macedonians so embarrassed with their disaster, that he might have attacked them at a great advantage: and at Thebes he was considered as culpable, because being himself a leader of the Macedonian party he suffered them to proceed on their voyage without molestation. Antigonus himself felt,

¹ Justin, xxviii. 3.

and subsequently acknowledged, the obligation under which he was placed by Neon's forbearance.

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Progress of
the Achæan
League.

While then his forces were thus employed, Aratus was left at liberty to extend the influence of the Achæan League in the South, and its adversaries could no longer expect support from Macedonia. The Athenians were the first to seize the opportunity of deliverance, and when they heard of the death of Demetrius called upon Aratus to aid them in the recovery of their independence. Though it was not his year of office, and he was weakened by a long illness, he immediately caused himself to be conveyed in a litter to Athens. Diogenes, the Macedonian commander in Attica, deemed his own position so insecure, that he entered into negotiation with the Athenians, and at length consented, for 150 talents, of which twenty were contributed by Aratus as a free gift to the city¹, to withdraw all the Macedonian garrisons from Attica. Though Athens did not become a member of the League, this event greatly raised the reputation of the Achæans, and disheartened the adherents of Macedonia throughout Peloponnesus. Ægina, Hermione, and Phlius, forthwith entered the League; and soon after Aratus accomplished the object which he had so long desired, and which had cost him so many fruitless efforts, the acquisition of Argos. Aristomachus, seeing himself cut off from all hope of Macedonian succours, and the Achæans gaining ground in Argolis and Arcadia, now listened to the proposals of Aratus, and declared himself willing to join the League on certain conditions. One of these was that he should receive fifty talents for the payment of the mercenaries whom he was to disband; and perhaps it was also stipulated that he should succeed Aratus at the end of his next year of office.

¹ Plut. Ar. 34. Pausan. ii. 8. 6. says a sixth part.

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While however Aratus was making provision for the performance of his part of the contract, Lydiades, who was at this time chief magistrate of the League, and ill-pleased to see so important a business transacted by another, took the negotiation into his own hands, and persuading Aristomachus that he could not safely trust a man who was the implacable enemy of all tyrants, undertook himself to conduct the affair in the Achæan assembly. But his interference only served to afford a fresh and remarkable illustration of the all-powerful influence of Aratus, as well as of the jealousy with which he guarded it. For he prevailed on the Achæans to reject the treaty when it was proposed by Lydiades, and soon afterwards to ratify it, when he was again induced to sanction it with his own concurrence.¹

Relations of
Sparta to
the League.

After so great an accession to the power of the League, Aratus might not unreasonably believe that to extend it over the rest of Peloponnesus would prove the less difficult part of his undertaking; for though, beside Sparta, Messenia and Elis and some of the Arcadian commonwealths still remained independent, it was probable that the example of Sparta would determine the policy of the other states; and the weakness and supineness of her government afforded ground for hope that she would not offer any very obstinate or vigorous resistance to his designs. Such hopes were perhaps encouraged by the exiled partizans of Agis; and Cleomenes had not yet given proofs of a character or talents such as to render him a formidable antagonist to an experienced statesman. Nevertheless there were insurmountable obstacles to

¹ Flathe (ii. p. 157.) supposes that this did not take place until the following year, when Aratus came into office again; and this view is certainly in some degree confirmed by Plutarch's expression (Ar. 35.) *ἐνιαυτῷ ὑστερον*. Yet it seems difficult to believe that Aratus would have suffered an object which he had so much at heart to be endangered by a long delay. The official year however may have been near its close when Lydiades brought the measure forward.

a voluntary union between Sparta and the League, and it soon became evident that Aratus was not the man to overpower her reluctance by force. The friendly relations which subsisted between the two governments in the reign of Agis IV., had perhaps been first interrupted by the invasion which Sparta had suffered from the Ætolians while they were in alliance with the Achæans. But the accession of her inveterate enemy Megalopolis to the League probably produced a far wider alienation, if not open hostility. Then, even if the Spartan pride could have submitted to be placed on a level with the Achæan townships, and to obey the requisitions of an Achæan magistrate, such a connection with democratical institutions would not have been welcome to a grasping and jealous oligarchy. Thus Cleomenes found the disposition of the ephors and the ruling class perfectly in accordance with his own views on this point; and they believed themselves forced by regard to their own safety into the war which he desired as a step toward the overthrow of their power.

The plan of Aratus was, it seems, to make himself master of the Arcadian towns which still kept aloof from the Achæan League, and thus to reduce Sparta to a state of total isolation, in which she might be compelled to accept his terms, as the only means of avoiding continual danger and annoyance: and the Spartan government felt that it was necessary to make a stand against him in Arcadia. The first occasion of direct collision seems to have been afforded by three of the towns, which, as we have seen, had attached themselves to the Ætolian League; Orchomenus, Tegea, and Mantinea. In each of them there appears to have been a strong party adverse to the Ætolian alliance, which was encouraged and aided by Cleomenes and the Spartan government; and all three about the same time renounced that alliance, and

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entered into the strictest union with Sparta. As this acquisition was made at the expense of the Ætolians, they alone could have reason to complain of it. But though usually very ready to vindicate their rights, they not only submitted patiently to the loss of these important places, but formally ceded them to Sparta. The motive of their forbearance was the jealousy they now felt of the progress which the Achæan League was making in Peloponnesus; for as on the death of Demetrius the common danger which kept the two powers united had ceased, their alliance was converted into hostile rivalry. It is probable too that at this juncture the Ætolians found full employment for their forces in Thessaly, and were on that account the more willing to resign their pretensions to the three towns, so as at once to strengthen the defences of Sparta, and to embroil her with the Achæan League. The result fully answered their expectations. We do not know what pretext Aratus alleged for his interference. He might indeed claim possession of Mantinea with some colour of right, if it had once belonged to the Achæans; but no such reason was applicable to the case of Tegea or Orchomenus. Yet it appears that before he had any aggression to complain of on the part of the Spartan government, he was preparing to make himself master of both these towns by a nocturnal surprise. Cleomenes, it seems, had received intelligence of his designs; and he now obtained leave of the ephors to make a movement which was judged necessary for the security of Laconia. He was directed to take possession of a place called the Athenæum, in the district of Belbina, or Belemina, which commanded one of the passes leading into Laconia, but was claimed by Megalopolis as belonging to her territory.¹ The occupation of this post, which is represented by Poly-

B. C. 227.
Beginning
of the Cleo-
menic war.

¹ Pausan. viii. 35. 4.

buis as an act of wanton aggression, marks the beginning of the Cleomenic War.

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Cleomenes fortified the stronghold on the frontier without interruption, and nearly at the same time Aratus made his attempt to surprise Tegea and Orchomenus. It failed as to both through the cowardice of his partizans within; and Cleomenes insulted his disappointment by a taunting letter, in which he affected to inquire with friendly concern after the purpose of his night's march. Aratus in reply professed that the object of his expedition had been to prevent the fortification of Belbina; but he had no answer to make when he was requested to explain the use of the torches and scaling ladders with which he had provided himself. He is said to have laughed at the retort, and to have asked Democrates, one of the Lacedæmonian exiles, what kind of youth this Cleomenes was. Democrates only warned him, *if he had any designs upon Sparta, to hasten them before this game-chicken's spurs were grown*. The ephors, wishing to confine themselves to defensive measures, and if possible to avoid a war, soon recalled Cleomenes, who had advanced into Arcadia with a few hundred men. But Aratus, on his return home, assembled the Council of the League, and represented the seizure of Belbina in such a light as to induce them to declare war against Sparta, and thus to sanction his own very questionable proceedings. The reduction of Caphyæ in Arcadia was the only other achievement by which he signalled his year of office. Aristomachus, who succeeded him, was anxious to carry the war into Laconia; and perhaps it was the report of his intentions, rather than the success of Aratus at Caphyæ, that alarmed the Spartan government, and led it again to send out Cleomenes, who made himself master of the Arcadian town of Methydrium, and overran a part of Argolis. His forces amounted to

Aratus
and Aris-
tomachus.

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less than 5000 men; and Aristomachus now took the field with 20,000 foot and 1000 horse. Yet Aratus, when he was consulted by Aristomachus on his projected expedition, wrote—for he was staying at Athens—to dissuade him from it, and advised him to avoid an engagement with Cleomenes. But as Aristomachus could not reconcile himself to such inactivity, he came to the camp to direct the operations of the campaign by his counsels; and when Cleomenes unexpectedly presented himself and offered battle, near Palantium, he persuaded Aristomachus to decline it, and to retreat before an enemy who did not number a quarter of his force. It is difficult to decide, whether timidity or jealousy had the larger share in the motives of Aratus on this occasion. But the result was so flagrantly disgraceful to the Achæan arms, that all his influence was needed to soothe the indignation which it roused against him at home. Lydiades openly accused him, and became his competitor at the next election, which however was carried as usual in his favour.

For the twelfth time then he had the forces of the Achæan League at his disposal. But the events of the next campaign, as the responsibility now rested exclusively with him, only served to exhibit more glaring evidence of his military incapacity, and even to throw a suspicion of much worse failings on his character. He opened it with an expedition into Elis, where perhaps he thought himself less in danger from Spartan interference. The Eleans however applied to Sparta for aid, which the ephors, however indifferent they might feel, could not decently refuse; especially as the late brilliant success of Cleomenes had begun to revive the old sense of national honour. He had reminded the people of a saying of one of their ancient kings: *that Spartans never asked about their enemies, how many, but where they are*; and he soon illus-

illustrated it by a fresh achievement; for he came up with the Achæan army on its march homeward, near the foot of mount Lycæum, and gained a complete victory. It was so utterly routed, that for some days Aratus himself was believed to have fallen. But he had escaped from the field, and took advantage of the report to strike one of those clandestine blows to which he owed so much of his fortune and his reputation. Having collected some of his scattered troops, he led them against Mantinea, which, being unprepared to resist this unexpected attack, fell into his hands. He protected the town from pillage, though after its revolt from the Achæan League, Polybius thinks, it had no reason to expect such clemency; but to secure its fidelity for the future, he compelled it to receive an Achæan garrison, and to admit the resident foreigners to the franchise; and it seems probable that he provided for these new citizens at the expense of those who had shown themselves most adverse to the Achæan interest. By this conquest he no doubt in some degree repaired his credit; but it is not easy to understand all the consequences which Plutarch attributes to it. He represents it as having caused so much discouragement at Sparta, that Cleomenes could no longer obtain leave to prosecute offensive operations against the enemy. It may however have furnished the ephors with a pretext which they before wanted for restraining his ardour; and it seems that their opposition turned his thoughts with redoubled eagerness toward his long-cherished projects of revolution. Yet the step which he next took is not one which could have been expected as most clearly adapted to forward such a design. We are informed by Plutarch that he invited Archidamus, the exiled brother of Agis, to return to Sparta, thinking, it is said, that with the support of a colleague he should be better able to balance the authority of the ephors.

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B. C. 226.
Aratus sur-
prises Man-
tinea.

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Murder
of Archi-
damus.

It is certainly difficult to reconcile this with all we know as to the character and schemes of Cleomenes, and hence the sequel naturally suggests the suspicion, that his object was not to call in an ally, but to rid himself of a rival; for Archidamus was put to death, according to Plutarch, as soon as he entered the city. Polybius¹ would fix the guilt of this transaction entirely on Cleomenes; and relates that the Messenian Nicagoras, the friend and host of Archidamus, who negotiated the treaty with Cleomenes in his behalf, having accompanied him to Sparta, though he was himself allowed to depart unhurt, conceived bitter hatred and thirst of vengeance against Cleomenes, which, as we shall see, he was afterwards enabled to gratify. Plutarch, on the other hand, represents it as notorious, that the deed was perpetrated by the party which had nothing but vengeance to look for from the family of Agis; but whether with the consent of Cleomenes is a question which, as it was disputed among his contemporaries, must always remain doubtful. The reasons which would incline us to acquit him of the murder of Eurydamidas, are for the most part equally applicable to this transaction. The treachery and baseness which would be implied in the recal of Archidamus, if it was meant as a snare for his destruction, were apparently quite foreign to the nature of Cleomenes, and no adequate motive is assigned for them in this case: the juncture was not one likely to awaken his jealousy or fear of Archidamus, and it might suggest the thought that he should find the brother of Agis a useful associate in a struggle with the ephors.

He had been endeavouring to form a party at Sparta, and his mother, Cratesiclea, a woman worthy of her son, not only exerted all her influence to promote his designs, but was thought to have given her hand to a second husband, a man of great reputation

¹ v. 37.

and influence, named Megistonous, only that she might gain him for her son's cause. But Cleomenes saw that, before he could effect his object, he must be again at the head of an army. The ephors, whether from timidity or distrust, wished to keep him at home; but their cupidity was too strong for their prudence, and they let themselves be bribed to send him out on a fresh expedition, which proved honourable to Sparta, but fatal to themselves. He first made himself master of the border town of Leuctra, and when Aratus marched to protect Megalopolis, advanced to a place called Ladocea, in the immediate neighbourhood of the city¹. In an engagement which took place almost under the city walls, the Achæan light troops at first gained the advantage over the enemy. But Aratus refused to follow it up, and kept the main body of his army motionless behind the bed of a torrent. Lydiades, having in vain urged him to action, put himself at the head of the cavalry, and by a vigorous charge broke the Spartan left wing and put it to flight, but in the heat of pursuit was entangled in difficult ground, where he was surrounded and slain. After his death the cavalry fled, and falling back upon the phalanx, threw it into disorder, which was the occasion of its entire defeat. Cleomenes sent the body of Lydiades to Megalopolis, adorned with a purple robe and a garland, while Aratus returned to Achaia amidst the murmurs of his troops, to give an account of his conduct in the assembly at Ægium. The patience of the people seemed to be exhausted, and the general feeling was so strong against him that a decree was passed which declared—if it is accurately reported,—that the League would no longer supply him with money or troops for the war, but that he must carry it on, if he would, at his own charge.

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Battle of
Ladocea.

¹ τὰ Λαδόκεια καλούμενα, Polybius, ii. 51., and Paus. viii. 44. 1. Plutarch, Cleom. 6.

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It sounds like a resolution to give up the war, but it was probably only meant as a vote of want of confidence in Aratus. Yet the people may by this time well have begun to be weary of such a wasteful contest, for which it would have been difficult to assign any worthy object. That the League could make any material progress in opposition to Sparta, had now at least become utterly hopeless: there was clearly more room to apprehend a series of disasters which might endanger its very existence; and though Cleomenes might wish for the continuance of the war, the Spartan government had shown itself strongly inclined to peace, and would no doubt gladly have accepted any reasonable terms. The assembly plainly intimated by its resolution, that it did not regard the war as undertaken on the part of the League in self-defence, but as an attempt to carry out a project of Aratus, which, whatever might have been its merits, the event had proved to be impracticable.

Yet no one seems to have ventured to call for a discussion of this question, which was the only one of real interest to the people, and the influence of Aratus was too firmly established to be shaken by an expression of passing disapprobation, which was forgotten as soon as the feeling had subsided. He thought, it is said, at first of throwing up the seal of office, as if he had been injured by the vote of censure, but on calmer reflection judged it wiser to retain his dignity and to attempt to retrieve his honour. Before his year expired he again took the field, and in the neighbourhood of Orchomenus defeated a body of Lacedæmonian troops, and Megistonous was among his prisoners, but, it must be supposed, was soon exchanged or ransomed, as we find him shortly after again at the side of Cleomenes. This slight advantage was of the less moment, as in the course of a few months events took place at Sparta, which re-

moved the object for which Aratus was striving,—
 the extension of the League over Peloponnesus—
 further than ever from his reach.

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Cleomenes had been inspired with fresh confidence by his victory at Ladocea, and he now ventured to disclose his projects to Megistonous, and engaged his concurrence, and afterwards that of two or three other friends. He felt, and they believed, that, to enable him to restore Sparta's ancient ascendancy in Greece, nothing was wanting but to reform her institutions, and emancipate the royal authority from the control of the ephors. He might well think, having effected so much with such scanty means, in spite of so many hindrances, there was nothing which he might not accomplish when the force of the renovated nation, a really Spartan army, should be placed at his unfettered command. A dream related to him by one of the ephors, who, as he slept in the oracular temple of Pasiphae, saw four of their seats removed from their place of session, and heard a voice saying: *This is best for Sparta*, was reported to have confirmed his resolution and to have quickened his movements. Again he marched into Arcadia, with an army composed in part of mercenaries and in part of that class of citizens from which he had to expect the most active resistance to his measures. Traversing Arcadia with great rapidity in various directions, he reduced Heræa and Alsæa, victualled Orchomenus, and threatened Mantinea. The Spartans were at last so fatigued with long marches and counter-marches, that they were glad to be left behind in Arcadia, when he returned for an interval to Laconia.¹

Revolution
 at Sparta.

¹ Droysen (489.) conceives that the danger which threatened Orchomenus was the real motive of the expedition of Cleomenes, and that some machinations of the Spartan oligarchy, which it was encouraged to undertake by his absence and the captivity of Megistonous, and to which the ephors lent their aid, were the immediate cause which induced him to strike the decisive blow. I cannot perceive the slightest appearance of necessity for such an explanation of his conduct.

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On his way homeward, Cleomenes revealed his design to a few trusty followers, and regulated his march so as to reach Sparta about the time when the ephors were sitting down to supper. Euryclides was sent forward to obtain admission into their presence, under pretence of a message from the army, and while they were listening to his report, some of the other conspirators, with a few soldiers, rushed in and fell upon them. Four of the ephors were massacred: the fifth, named Agesilaus, having been left among them apparently lifeless, afterwards recovered strength enough to crawl into an adjacent sanctuary. About ten other persons lost their lives at the same time in defence of the ephors. No other blood was shed, and Agesilaus himself was spared, when he came out of his place of shelter the next morning. All who would were allowed to leave the city during the night, and it is probable that many took advantage of this permission.

At daybreak Cleomenes summoned an assembly of the people. Two indications of the recent revolution met their view in the market-place: a table was exhibited containing the names of eighty citizens who were enjoined to leave the country, and four of the seats of the ephors were removed, the fifth being left to be occupied by Cleomenes.¹ He now came forward to vindicate his conduct and to explain his intentions. He went back, it appears, to the origin of the ephoralty, with a view to show that the power claimed by the ephors in later times had been acquired through usurpation. The office itself, he asserted, was unknown to the primitive constitution, in which the su-

¹ Droysen (491.) thinks that by this Cleomenes meant to intimate that he assumed all the powers which had been exercised by the ephors. It would be more important if we could ascertain that he actually did so. He clearly professed to resume all those branches of the royal prerogative which the ephors had usurped; but it seems that he also charged them with the exercise of a tyrannical power, which had never been claimed by the kings themselves (*ἐξουσία ἐπιθέτω τὴν πατρῴαν καταλύοντας ἀρχήν*. Plut. Cl. 10.).

preme authority was vested in the kings and the Gerusia ; and it was only after the Messenian war that the kings had begun to appoint officers under the title of ephors, to discharge some of their functions in their absence. These vicegerents and servants of the kings had in course of time erected themselves into a distinct, independent, and permanent tribunal, and had enlarged their jurisdiction by a series of encroachments, until it overrode all the other magistracies in the state. The memory of the ephor Asteropus, who had introduced some of the most important of these innovations, was comparatively recent. It was only by degrees that the ephors had assumed the right of summoning the kings before them ; that it had not been always recognised, appeared from the usage of modern times, according to which the kings were only bound to attend on the third summons. Still this power, unconstitutional and exorbitant as it was, might for the sake of tranquillity have been tolerated, if it had been exercised with moderation and with some regard to the public good. But when it was abused, as it had lately been by ephors who took upon them to banish their kings and to put them to death without trial, and who established a system of terror to prevent measures of reform which were indispensably necessary for the honour and well-being of Sparta¹, it could be endured no longer. Happy should he have thought himself if the evils under which the country groaned, the luxury and extortion, and the inequality of fortunes, which was the source of all the rest, could have been corrected by any milder remedy ; but the use of force in extreme cases had been sanctioned by the example of Lycurgus himself : the more as he was but a private person when he appealed to arms against king Charilaus. It had now

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¹ Here, if Droysen's conjecture were well founded, should have been some allusion to the later attempts of the oligarchy.

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B. C. 225.
Reforms of
Cleomenes.

become necessary to resort to the like means to overpower the resistance of the adversaries of reform ; but no needless violence had been employed, no greater severity exercised than the public safety required. He then proceeded to unfold his plan, which, in its leading features, was the same as had been proposed by Agis. All debts were to be cancelled ; so that the creditors, whose securities had been destroyed, seem to have been allowed to revive their claims ; the land was to be equally divided, and a new roll of citizens formed, to include the foreigners who, on strict examination, should be found worthy of the franchise. When the honour of Sparta should have been entrusted to a sufficient number of armed citizens, they would not again see her territory insulted by Illyrian or Ætolian inroads.¹

The cancelling of the debts was perhaps considered only as the enforcement of the law passed by Agis. The division of the lands was, it seems, made to wear the appearance of a voluntary sacrifice on the part of those who possessed more than the legal measure. Cleomenes himself set the example by the surrender of his own patrimony, and this, it is said, was followed first by Megistonous and his other friends, and afterwards by all the other citizens. In the distribution a portion was allotted to each of the exiles ; and Cleomenes announced that they would all be permitted to return when tranquillity should have been firmly established. After the enrolment was completed, the Spartan infantry amounted to 5000 men ; and Cleomenes introduced some changes in its weapons and armour, in particular by the substitution of the sarissa for the old Grecian spear, which brought it nearer to the character of the Macedonian phalanx. At the same time he diligently applied himself to re-

¹ An allusion which seems plainly to indicate that the period of the Ætolian invasion was not so long passed as Droysen represents.

store the ancient system of education and discipline, a task in which he is said to have received much assistance from the philosopher Sphærus; a proof that he did not rigorously confine himself to the traditional details, but took the opportunity to effect many seasonable improvements. The abolition of the ephoralty was not the only innovation which Cleomenes made in the constitution. It appears that he likewise in some way altered the character or contracted the powers of the Gerusia; and he is said to have changed its name, and to have substituted a description referring to the subdivisions of the tribes which the Council was supposed to represent.¹ But the fact so stated is not easily explained; for he evidently studied to preserve the forms of antiquity whenever they did not thwart his purposes; and it rests on the authority of a writer who was very liable to error. Another of his measures was certainly an infringement of the constitution, though it was one of which the oligarchy which, after the murder of Agis, had permitted one king to reign without a colleague, had no right to complain. Since the sons of Aristodemus shared the royal office between them, there had never been two kings of the same house at a time. Cleomenes now filled the vacant throne of the Proclids with his brother Euclides. If this proceeding was not to be justified by the legend which traced the origin of the

¹ Paus. ii. 9. 1. τὸ κράτος τῆς γερουσίας καταλύσας πατρονόμους τῷ λόγῳ κατίστησεν ἀντ' αὐτῶν. The meaning of Pausanias seems to be as stated in the text, and so it was understood by Mueller (Dor. ii. p. 132. Engl. Tr. 2d ed.), who says: *Cleomenes instituted a college of πατρονόμοι in the place of the gerusia.* But in the note he seems to adopt Boekh's interpretation (*Corp. Insc.* i. p. 605.), who says on the words of Paus., *hoc est, vim Senatus resolvit Cleomenes non senatum ipsum*; and has shown (p. 610.) that in later times at least, the πατρονόμοι existed together with the gerusia, and that even after the restoration of the ephoralty, the chief of the πατρονόμοι continued to give his name to the year; but it is quite another question, whether this is what Pausanias meant to say. Droysen (ii. 492.) seems to suppose that Cleomenes abolished the name of the gerusia, and nominally substituted the πατρονόμοι in their room: that is, with powers really inferior to those of the gerusia; but it seems more probable that τῷ λόγῳ is to be referred to πατρονόμους.

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two royal houses to one ancestor, it was at least a proof that Cleomenes did not aim at despotic power, and it was more in harmony both with that ancient precedent and with the spirit of the constitution than the undivided monarchy, in which the enemies of reform had so long acquiesced.

Such was the revolution which was represented by Polybius¹, and by other writers, both ancient and modern, as a subversion of the hereditary form of government, and a transformation of the legitimate royalty into what the Greeks called a tyranny. By others it has been regarded as a salutary and temperate reform, conducted with great moderation on constitutional principles, and preserving as much both of the substance and the form of the national institutions as was consistent with the main end, the security and welfare of the state. It can hardly be denied, that the facts afford some colour to each of these opinions; the case is one which, like all political changes not effected by strictly legal means, presents an ambiguous aspect; but the view taken by Polybius, whose prejudices deprive him of all authority on this question, appears to be the more narrow and superficial, and to exhibit least of the real character of the transaction, while it is grossly unjust so far as it involves any judgment on the motives and intentions of Cleomenes. The essence of *tyranny*, in the Greek sense, is the usurpation of arbitrary power in a state which had been previously governed by law; and it must be admitted on the one hand, not only that the means by which Cleomenes compassed his ends were violent and illegal, but also that the power which he acquired by the revolution was in one point

¹ II. 47. 3. Paus. VIII. 27. 16. ἐκ βασιλείας μετέστησεν ἐς τυραννίδα ὁ Κλεομένης τὴν πολιτείαν. Brückner has examined the question in an article in Zimmermann's Zeitschrift, 1837, No. 151. *On the Reforms of Agis and Cleomenes*. But the conclusion at which he arrives seems hardly worth the pains he has taken to establish it. He finds that the judgment of Polybius, though partial, was not without foundation in fact, inasmuch as the means by which Cleomenes compassed his ends were illegal.

of view very nearly absolute ; as, after he had abolished the ephoralty, placed his brother on the throne, and formed an army of citizens devoted to his interest, there was no one in Sparta who could counteract his will. But on the other hand it must be considered that, however little foundation there may have been in authentic records or tradition for his assertions as to the origin of the ephoralty, and though the office was probably, in some form or other, as old as the Dorian conquest, still in later times it had unquestionably assumed a new character and place, and had usurped prerogatives, unknown to the early constitution, which rendered it an irresistible engine of an oppressive and baneful oligarchical domination. Whether it would have been possible to retain the office and to reduce its authority within moderate bounds, may be doubtful, but Cleomenes had good grounds for the view which he took of it, as an excrescence which must be amputated before the state could be restored to a healthy condition. Nor is there any reason for questioning the sincerity of his conviction, that he was merely reviving the royalty of the primitive ages, in the peculiar form which it had assumed at Sparta, exempt indeed from the restraint to which it had been so long subjected by the growth of the power which had gradually encroached upon its rights, but yet not an unlimited sovereignty. He ruled over a free and willing people, in which there was only one disaffected party, the oligarchy which he had overthrown. They indeed, pretending to consider themselves as the state, might consistently treat him as a tyrant, for they submitted to him only through fear. But his main strength lay in his Spartan phalanx, the citizens who composed the popular assembly, and over this body he could possess no other dominion than the legitimate influence which he derived from their gratitude, admiration, and confidence. As he had thrown

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his private wealth into the common stock, so in his person and whole manner of living, both in the camp and at home, by a simplicity and frugality which were perfectly free from all tinge of affectation, he presented a model of a Spartan king, only distinguished from the best of the old times by the advantage which he may have gained from his philosophical education.

Jealousy
of Aratus.

The tidings of the revolution at Sparta were received by Aratus and his friends with a mixture of hope and alarm. They hoped that it might prove the beginning of a long series of civil commotions, which might keep Cleomenes occupied at home. On the other hand, the cancelling of debts and repartition of the land excited their fears, lest the contagion of this pernicious example should reach the multitude in the Achæan towns, and impel them to like enterprises, or incline them to seek alliance with Sparta. Aratus owed a great part of his reputation to the prudent forbearance with which he had respected the rights of property at Sicyon, after the return of the exiles. The revolutionary measures of Cleomenes were utterly repugnant to his nature and his principles; and there can be little doubt that they did not merely serve as a pretext for that hostility to Sparta, which he carried to such a fatal extreme, but really contributed to heighten it. His sympathies were all on the side of the defeated oligarchy: in his eyes the Spartan king was a demagogue, who had made himself a tyrant; as it was in these colours that his character came down to Polybius.

The winter, including the beginning of 224, had probably been occupied at Sparta with the remodelling of the state. Early in the spring, not long before Hyperbatas the successor of Aratus went out of office, Cleomenes, anxious to dash all hopes which his enemies might have built on the supposed continuance of internal disorders of Sparta, and to prove that the

recent changes had not tended to abate the ardour, or to relax the discipline of his troops¹, invaded the territory of Megalopolis, where he inflicted much damage and collected a great booty. The Megalopolitans, who had suffered severe losses in the preceding campaigns, offered no resistance, and no succours came from Achaia, where the government felt itself insecure, and the people had no more heart for the war. To encourage his partizans by a signal display of his superiority in the field, Cleomenes, having found a company of players on their road from Messene, caused a temporary theatre to be erected, and entertained his army with a dramatic exhibition; though in general his camp was distinguished by the absence of all frivolous and enervating amusements, while every other in Greece, no less than in Macedonia or Asia, was followed by a train of musicians and dancers, jugglers and buffoons. He accustomed his soldiers to fill up the intervals of their martial exercises with conversation seasoned with Laconic pleasantry; as at his own table he provided no other recreation for his guests.

His commanding attitude seems to have produced the effect which he desired at Mantinea. There the party adverse to the Achæan connection invited him to recover possession of the town; and in concert with them he surprised it in the night, and overpowered the Achæan garrison, which was almost all put to the sword. To Polybius, who chooses to overlook the distinction of parties in this affair, the conduct of the Mantineans appears to be marked by the foulest treachery and ingratitude²; but those of them who hailed Cleomenes as the restorer of their laws and constitution, could not be conscious of any great obli-

¹ Plut. Cleom. 12. But this does not imply, as Schorn (p. 113.) represents, that the expedition had no other object.

² ii. 58.

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Battle of
Hecatom-
bæon.

gation to the Achæans. After a few hours' rest he set out again for Tegea, and by a circuitous march through the west of Arcadia and Elis, penetrated into Achaia. Hyperbatas, who was directed in all his movements by Aratus¹, took up a position with the largest force he could master, at a place called Hecatombæon, near the western extremity of the country, and Cleomenes—rashly as it was thought—placed himself between the town of Dyme and the enemy's camp. But his object was to force a battle, and he gained a complete victory. Its immediate fruit was the reduction of a place called Langon², which he restored to the Eleans; but in the meanwhile he opened a negotiation with the Achæan League, which promised much more important advantages. It is not quite clear whether he had already, before the battle, made overtures to the Achæan government, which had been rejected through the influence of Aratus: but his aim must have been long well understood. It seems to have been almost universally expected, and perhaps very generally desired, that all the Peloponnesian states should be united in one body: the only question was whether the union was to take place under Achæan or under Spartan supremacy; whether Sparta was to be annexed to the Achæan League, or the Achæan League to Sparta. The success of Cleomenes had now made it evident, that, if he entered the League, it must be on his own terms. Those which he offered after the battle appear to have been moderate, though we have no information as to the details. It is not clear on what footing Sparta was to be placed with regard to the League; but for him-

Proposals
of Cleo-
menes.¹ Plut. Cleon. 14. Ἀράτου τὸ πᾶν ἦν κράτος.² Plut. Cleom. 14. ἐπελθὼν καὶ Λάγγωνι. Droysen (p. 505.), with Manso (III. 1. p. 318.) and Schömann (p. LV.), supposes this to be a mistake, and that the place was Lasion in the Acrorea of Elis; and he would account for this operation by the conjecture, that Cleomenes designed to afford time for the revolutionary movement in the Achæan towns to develop itself. Yet one would think that his presence in Achaia must have been more likely to accelerate the progress of this movement.

self Cleomenes demanded to be acknowledged as its chief. Plutarch speaks of this, as if it were to have been a mere title of honour, in return for which he held out the prospect of many solid advantages to the Achæans.¹ But there can be no doubt that it implied nothing less than that the forces of the League should be placed at his disposal, with powers as large as those which had been exercised by Aratus, and without even the same degree of responsibility. The national feeling of the Achæan race might be wounded by such a concession to a Dorian prince. But there was no great danger lest a Spartan king should abuse it, either by unnecessary wars undertaken to gratify his own ambition, or by wanton aggression on public or individual liberty. The coalition or alliance with Sparta at least promised an immediate cessation of that harrassing petty warfare in which the strength of the League had been so long wasted; and if Cleomenes was to be feared as a protector, he was certainly not less formidable as an enemy. This view of the question prevailed in the Achæan Council. The Achæan ministers were instructed to accept the king's proposals, to conclude a truce with him, and to invite him to attend an assembly to be held near Argos, in which the treaty was to be ratified. But an illness, the effect of excessive fatigue and an imprudent draught of water, compelled him to postpone his journey to Argos, and to return for a time to Sparta. He however so fully relied on the promises he had received, that, as one of the stipulations of the convention was the release of his prisoners, he set the principal of them at liberty forthwith. This accidental delay was apparently the occasion of great calamities. It afforded time to Aratus for intrigues, by which he was enabled to put an end to all prospects of peace.

¹ Ar. 36

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Intrigues
of Aratus.

Aratus, when he began the war, probably considered Sparta as an easy conquest. He was not prepared to find a formidable antagonist in the young king, and could not expect that the people which had tamely submitted to the inroads of the Illyrians and Ætolians, would offer any effectual resistance to the arms of the Achæan League. But he had been very soon undeceived: and he had long ago foreboded such a crisis as had now arrived, and had pondered the course he should take when the emergency arose. The resolution which he finally adopted was one which even now we cannot read of for the first time without the same kind of painful surprise, which we feel when a man whom we have hitherto esteemed has committed a dishonourable action. It was no other than at once to undo the great work of his public life, to call the king of Macedonia into Peloponnesus, as an ally and protector against Cleomenes. And this resolution he formed, confessedly with a clear insight into the consequences which were likely to result from this step, a full view of the danger with which it threatened the liberties of Greece. The struggle which this determination cost him, may be in some measure estimated by the perplexity which Polybius betrays in his attempt to defend it. The plea which Aratus set up in his Memoirs, and which is urged by the historian, his apologist and admirer, is necessity. But it is admitted that he had reconciled himself to the thought, had harboured the purpose, before the necessity existed; and this supposed necessity was after all only the creature of his own will; it was but his want of self-command, his incapacity for a great sacrifice, which led him to lay down as a first principle of action, inviolable as the laws of nature, that Cleomenes must be resisted to the last, and that any alternative was to be preferred to compliance with his demands. We can indeed

very easily conceive how deeply mortifying such compliance would have been to Aratus: how much it would have cost him to retire from public life, baffled and humbled, and from the shade of his forced seclusion to witness the triumph of his young rival. These are considerations, which may well dispose us, with Plutarch, to view his conduct with more of pity than of indignation, as an example of ordinary human weakness. But they must be discarded, when an attempt is made to vindicate his policy on the ground taken by Polybius, as not unworthy of a patriotic statesman. We can then only inquire, whether the ambition of Cleomenes threatened Greece, or even the Achæan League, with any dangers so fearful as were to be apprehended from the restoration of Macedonian ascendancy: and this is a question on which Aratus can hardly have been so far blinded by passion as to mistake the truth.

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Nothing is more remarkable in the account given by Polybius of the steps by which Aratus was led to the practical result of his deliberations, than the place assigned to the Ætolians. The importance of the figure which they make in the historian's vindication of his hero, stands in most strange and suspicious contrast to the paucity and insignificance of the actions which he attributes to them during the same period. According to this statement a coalition between the Ætolians and Spartans was the original cause of the war, and first induced Aratus to believe that the safety of the Achæan League was endangered by the enterprises of Cleomenes. Yet the only proof he alleges of the existence of such a confederacy is, that the Ætolians surrendered their claims to the three Arcadian towns, which had abandoned their alliance, and had connected themselves with Sparta; and it is not pretended that they ever sent a single man into Peloponnesus to the aid of Cleomenes, or

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that they in any way interposed in his behalf otherwise than by one demonstration to be mentioned in the sequel, which came very late and was totally useless. Another statement, equally questionable, and which proves as little, is, that the Ætolians opened a negotiation with Antigonus Dosoⁿ in the hope of engaging him in a war against the Achæan League, with a view to the partition of its territory. Whatever their projects may have been, not only were these never realised, but the only part which they actually took in the war was a declaration of hostile intentions toward Macedonia. It must therefore be pronounced an utterly hollow pretext, when we are informed by Polybius that fear of the Ætolians drove Aratus to the thought of an alliance with Antigonus.

Embassy to
Antigonus
Dosoⁿ.

The precise juncture when Aratus took the first step toward the execution of his design, is not distinctly marked in the narrative of Polybius; but it seems to have been subsequent to the opening of the campaign in which Cleomenes first took the field after the revolution at Sparta. It was probably while he was ravaging the territory of Megalopolis without resistance that Aratus concerted a plan with two of its citizens, Nicophanes and Cercidas, his old friends, for an embassy to Macedonia, to sound Antigonus. At his suggestion they were appointed envoys to the Achæan Council, and having obtained its permission proceeded to the Macedonian court. They received their instructions from Aratus, who furnished them with the arguments which he judged best adapted to make an impression on Antigonus. The substance of them has been preserved by Polybius: and none certainly could have been devised better suited to the purpose of convincing and persuading the king. It is only surprising that Aratus, while he suggested them, should not have felt that

they were so many reasons which ought to have deterred him, as a patriotic Greek, from the prosecution of his attempt. The envoys were to represent the danger which was impending over the Achæan League from the insatiable ambition of the Ætolians and Cleomenes, who were banded against it, and to point out that if the confederates were allowed to overpower the League, and Cleomenes became master of Peloponnesus, they would soon extend their conquests into northern Greece, and must at length come into mortal conflict with Macedonia. It was for the king to consider whether it suited his interest better to fight his battle with Cleomenes for the command of Greece in Peloponnesus, with the Achæans and Bœotians on his side, or to stake his kingdom on the issue of a contest against the united forces of Ætolia and Bœotia, the Achæans and the Lacedæmonians, in Thessaly. It was indeed a simple calculation: and when the envoys added, that if the Ætolians remained quiet, as they affected to do then, the Achæans would hold out as long as they could without assistance, but if fortune proved adverse, or the Ætolians took part against them, they would then call upon him for timely succour, Antigonus had nothing more to wish than that they might soon find themselves compelled to implore his protection. Nothing however could be more agreeable to him than that they should previously waste their own and their enemy's strength, since they would then be the more willing to accept his terms. Indeed, as if to remove all doubt on this head, Aratus expressly undertook to provide the amplest securities, and the most solid proofs the king could desire of gratitude for his favours.

That Antigonus received these proposals with joy, and dismissed the envoys with the warmest assurances of his goodwill, hardly needs to be related. He sent a letter with them addressed to the people of Megalo-

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polis, in which he promised, if it was also the wish of the Achæans, to march to their aid. The report which they made on their return of the king's favourable disposition, made such an impression at Megalopolis, where, ever since the time of Philip, there had always been a strong friendly feeling toward Macedonia, that they were immediately commissioned to repair to the Achæan assembly, and to call upon the League to solicit the Macedonian succours without delay. Aratus, we are told, was delighted to learn that Antigonus was willing to forget the injury which his house had sustained in the loss of the Acrocorinthus, and no less pleased that the ardour of the Megalopolitans released him from the responsibility of an experiment which he felt to be extremely hazardous: no blame could now be attached to him if it should happen that Antigonus crushed the liberty which he was invited to protect. He had only to moderate their impatience, while he commended their zeal; and he exhorted the people to persevere as long as they could in their unassisted exertions, and only if fortune frowned upon them to betake themselves to the promised aid.

Though Aratus had been able to obtain the sanction of the Achæan Council for this negotiation, it is not to be supposed that the measure was generally popular in Achaia. The events which followed prove that it was carried by a comparatively small though powerful party, chiefly through the influence of Megalopolis, and the regard which was felt to be due to her services and sacrifices in the common cause. Not only was there a strong inclination in favour of Cleomenes among the lower classes, who hoped under his protection to obtain release from their debts and a new agrarian law, but many of the leading men dreaded Macedonian intervention, were impatient of the preponderance of Aratus, and willing to acquiesce in the

supremacy of Sparta. According to a usage which had never before been interrupted since Aratus first filled the office of General, he should have succeeded Hyperbatas. But he solemnly declined it, and the election fell on Timoxenus. According to Plutarch, he wished it to be believed, that his refusal was the effect of the resentment he retained for the affront he had suffered after his defeat at Ladocea, but his real motive was well known to be his despondency as to the prospects of the League, produced by the battle of Hecatombæum. But even if we must infer from this that Aratus himself alleged the pretext mentioned by Plutarch, it would still be probable that he meant to intimate his conviction, that the resources of the League were no longer sufficient to carry on the struggle, and that the time had come when it was necessary to claim the promised aid of Antigonus. But though he exerted the most strenuous efforts to counteract the overtures of Cleomenes, he could not prevent the conclusion of the preliminaries already related; and if Cleomenes had been able immediately to attend the assembly at Argos, it is probable that he would have found it willing to accede to his terms. But during the interval in which he was detained at home by his illness, Aratus appears to have recovered his ascendancy, and found means to avert the pacification which threatened his interests. He immediately sent his own son, the younger Aratus, to Antigonus, apparently without any other authority, to conclude the negotiation which had been opened by the Megalopolitan envoys. All was now adjusted between them, except one point, which it was still necessary to leave open for some time longer. Antigonus required the restitution of the Acrocorinthus, as the price of his assistance; and Aratus himself was quite willing to consent to this condition; but he could not undertake that even his influence would

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Negotiation
with Cleo-
menes
broken off.

prevail on the Achæans to surrender the Corinthians, whom they had encouraged to revolt from Macedonia, into the hands of their old masters. It was therefore arranged that, while Aratus waited for an opportunity of accomplishing this object, Antigonus should complete his preparations so as to be in readiness to begin his march at the first summons. All that remained was to bring about a rupture with Sparta, and this he effected by a stroke of policy, in which he was aided by the Spartan king's impetuous temper. When Cleomenes had recovered from his illness, he set out for Argos to meet the Achæan assembly, which had been convened there according to the agreement. But on his road he received a message, requesting him to leave his troops behind him and to come alone, or, according to another account, with a small train¹; hostages were offered for his security.² The message seems to have been so contrived as at once to betray distrust and to awaken suspicions of treachery. Cleomenes took fire at the affront, sent a letter to the assembly containing bitter invectives against Aratus who replied in a similar strain, and despatched a herald to Ægium with a declaration of war, which he followed up by the invasion of Achaia, where he surprised Pellene. Several towns in the adjacent part of Arcadia submitted to him without resistance, and the government received intelligence, which led it to apprehend that even in Sicyon and Corinth he had partizans who were plotting to deliver those cities into his power. To suppress this attempt, it withdrew the cavalry and mercenaries from Argos, at the time when the Nemean games were about to be celebrated

¹ Plut. Ar. 39. I cannot perceive the absurdity which Droysen finds in this statement (506. n. 42.).

² According to Plut. Cleom. 17., as many as 300; a number suspiciously large. It is that of the followers whom, according to the other statement, he was to be allowed to bring with him.

there.¹ Cleomenes took advantage of their absence to march suddenly upon Argos, where he surprised the quarter contiguous to the citadel in the night, and the appearance of his army amidst the confusion of the festival created such consternation, that the city immediately capitulated, entered into alliance with Sparta, acknowledging Cleomenes as its chief, gave twenty hostages for its fidelity, and received a Lacedæmonian garrison. Cleomenes was unfortunately induced by the assurances of Megistonous to dispense with the precaution of banishing some of the citizens who were notoriously adverse to the new order of things. Aristomachus, who had joined the Achæan League with reluctance, and probably entertained no friendly feelings toward Aratus, declared himself on the side of Sparta. But perhaps the surrender may have been hastened chiefly by the democratical party, which at Argos, as elsewhere, desired a change in the distribution of property, like that which had taken place at Sparta, and hoped to effect it with the countenance of Cleomenes.² The submission however of the city, which for so many ages had been Sparta's most formidable rival, added much to the reputation of his arms, and it was soon followed by that of all the other towns of the Argolic peninsula. Aratus hoped to arrest the progress of the defection, which was spreading with alarming rapidity among the members of the League, by rigorous measures. He seems to have accompanied the troops which were sent from Argos to Sicyon, armed with unlimited authority to proceed against the persons suspected of treasonable correspondence with Cleomenes, and he put many of them to death. He then proceeded to institute a like investigation at Corinth; but here the disaffection to the Achæan government was so

CHA
LXI
B. C. 223
Cleomenes
master of
Argos.

¹ February, a.c. 223.

² Plut. Cleom. 20.

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general, and the people so much exasperated against him, that when intelligence arrived of the events which had taken place at Argos, an attempt was made to seize him, which he only eluded by extraordinary presence of mind. Being alarmed in time by their angry cries and threatening gestures, as he was about to enter the theatre in which they were assembled, he calmly bade them wait until he had given his horse in charge to some one, and so reaching the gate, after a hasty warning to the commander of the citadel, rode away, soon hotly pursued, and with very few companions, to Sicyon.¹ The Corinthians immediately sent a deputation to surrender their city to Cleomenes, whom it scarcely consoled for the escape of Aratus. But as soon as he had completed the conquest of Argolis, he marched to Corinth, and proceeded to blockade the Acrocorinthus.

An assembly was held soon after at Sicyon, though very thinly attended, in which Aratus was created Strategus Autocrator, an extraordinary office previously unknown to the Achæan constitution, which must have been nearly equivalent to the Roman dictatorship. It was apparently a formal ratification, or prolongation, of the irresponsible authority, which he had received or assumed for the purpose of keeping down the disaffected party. But, now perhaps for the first time, a guard was formed by the citizens for the protection of his person. It was apparently difficult to approach more closely to the position of a tyrant, or to show that the name with which he affected to brand Cleomenes was less applicable to himself. Cleomenes for a time abstained from further hostilities, and tried every expedient to conciliate his

His nego-
tiation with
Aratus.

¹ So Plutarch (Ar. 40.), and with slight variations, Cleom. 19. Polybius (II. 52.) only says that the Corinthians required the Achæans and Aratus to quit the city. Polybius speaks as if Aratus had been at this time ordinary στρατηγός ('Ἀράτω στρατηγούσι).

rival, and to induce him to cede the possession of the Acrocorinthus. He carefully preserved the property of Aratus at Corinth untouched, while he sent his uncle Megistonous, and a Messenian named Tripylus¹, or Tritymallus², successively, to negotiate with him. They were instructed to offer him a pension of twelve talents—double the amount of that which he received from Ptolemy—and even to propose that the garrison of the Acrocorinthus should be composed in part only of Spartans, and partly of Achæan troops. But as to the claim of the supreme dignity and command, no concession was made on the part of Cleomenes; and this was probably the demand most offensive to Aratus, and the main obstacle which rendered the negotiation fruitless. He remained inflexible, covering his refusal with the vague pretext, *that circumstances were not in his power, but rather he in the power of circumstances*, which might indeed be true in the sense, that he had gone too far to recede. Such language at length convinced Cleomenes that he had nothing to expect from overtures of peace. He indignantly took the field, ravaged the territory of Sicyon, and encamped before its walls. No doubt could now be left in the mind of Aratus as to the course which he would pursue. All his hopes were henceforth centred in Antigonus. But still he did not venture to take the final irrevocable step, to engage for the admission of a Macedonian garrison into the Acrocorinthus, without a vote of the Achæan assembly; and it seems to have been for the purpose of showing that he was willing to try all other resources before he threw himself on Macedonian protection, that he sent envoys to solicit succour from the Ætolians and from Athens.³ The embassy to Ætolia Polybius passes over in silence: but it is not

¹ Plut. Ar. 41.² Plut. Cleom. 19.³ Plut. Ar. 41.

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more at variance with the tenor of his argument in vindication of Aratus, than other facts which he relates. It was, as must have been foreseen, unsuccessful; and the Ætolians might consistently decline to violate the neutrality which they had hitherto observed in the contest between Sparta and the Achæans. The Athenians, whose assistance would have been utterly unavailing, were, it is said, not unmindful of their obligations to Aratus, but were restrained by Euclides and Micio, the two leading orators of the time, from a display of gratitude, which would have been alike useless and impolitic.¹

While Cleomenes lay with his army before Sicyon, an assembly was held at Ægium which Aratus was summoned to attend.² The journey exposed him to great risk of falling into the enemy's hands: and Plutarch, drawing no doubt from his Memoirs, represents the women and children at Sicyon as endeavouring to detain him by the most moving entreaties: but he made his way, accompanied by his son and ten friends, through the Spartan lines to the coast, where he embarked and arrived safely at Ægium. The business for which the assembly was convened is not distinctly stated. It seems probable that the election of the ordinary General had already taken place. Timoxenus, a steady partizan of Aratus, was again in office: but perhaps one object of the assembly was to confirm the extraordinary authority with which Aratus had been invested at Sicyon. The chief subject of deliberation however was undoubtedly the negotiation with Antigonus; and Aratus now found the assembly willing to take the last step. The scruples of honour by which he himself had hitherto been re-

¹ Plut. Ar. 41. Pausanias (ii. 9. 4.) writes the names Euryclides and Micon. Lucas (p. 89.) says that the Athenians were diverted from their purpose by the Lacedæmonians under Euclides, as if he had read in Plutarch of *περὶ Ε. Λακεδαιμόνιοι*.

² Plut. Ar. 42.

strained had been removed by the revolt of the Corinthians; and his influence seems to have gained strength in proportion as the League had shrunk within its original limits. A decree was passed that Antigonus should be put in possession of the Acrocorinthus; and the son of Aratus and his Sicyonian friends who accompanied him to Ægium were sent to conclude the treaty, to urge the king to begin his march, and to remain with him as hostages until the proposed security should be delivered into his hands. The decree, when it became known at Corinth, excited vehement indignation there: the populace pillaged the house of Aratus, and the assembly of the people bestowed it on Cleomenes. Cleomenes immediately withdrew his forces from the neighbourhood of Sicyon after having ravaged its territory¹, and began to fortify the pass between the Acrocorinthus and the part of the Oneian range which guards the south-east extremity of the Isthmus.²

Antigonus had collected his forces, and was waiting on his southern frontier for the summons to march: as soon as he received the embassy, he sent to prepare the Achæans for his coming, and set out for the Isthmus. The only interruption he found on his road was interposed by the Ætoliens, who threatened to stop him if he should attempt to pass through Thermopylæ. They might perhaps have annoyed him more seriously if they had not thus put him on his guard; but the only effect of their threat was a slight inconvenience and delay. He transported his army across the Maliac Gulph into Eubœa, and thence again to the main land, so as to avoid the pass. The Ætoliens made no other demonstration of hostility, and sent no aid to Cleomenes. Antigonus found the Isthmus so

¹ Plut. Cleom. 19. The *ἐμβαλὼν* may be Plutarch's mistake.

² Polyb. (u. s.), *διαλαβὸν χάρακι καὶ τάφρῳ τὸν μεταξὺ τόπον τοῦ τε Ἀκροκορίνθου καὶ τῶν Ὀνείων καλουμένων ὄρων*. See Leake's *Morea*, III. p. 311.

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Antigonus
at the
Isthmus.

strongly guarded that he at once renounced all hope of forcing his way through the Spartan intrenchments, and lay for some time encamped at the foot of mount Geranea, revolving various projects for effecting his entrance into the peninsula at some other point. In the meanwhile Aratus, accompanied by the Demurges, crossed over to Pegæ at the north-west corner of the Corinthian gulph, and had his first interview with Antigonus. He is said to have felt some uneasiness as to his reception; but he was soon reassured by the king's affability and marked attention to himself, and was confirmed in the conviction which had first encouraged him to look toward Macedonia, that princes make their interest, not their feelings, the measure both of their enmity and their friendship: his recent services to Antigonus might well be allowed to outweigh the old injury done to the royal house. But it seemed at first as if their schemes would be disconcerted by the foresight and vigilance of Cleomenes. Antigonus made an attempt in the night to turn his lines on the side of Lecheum, but was repulsed with some loss. He then began to entertain a project of transporting his troops to the coast of Sicyon from the headland of Heræum, the nearest point of the Isthmus. But it would probably have been difficult to escape observation, and the landing at so short a distance from the enemy's camp would have exposed him to great danger, and transports for so large a force were not easily found. On the other hand, he foresaw that the deficiency of supplies would not permit him to remain long in his present position. But he was unexpectedly relieved from his perplexity by an opportune revolution which broke out in Argos, and effected a diversion in his favour.

Revolution
at Argos.

The people, or the democratical party at Argos, had expected, as we have seen, that the ascendancy of the Spartan interest would be attended with

measures of confiscation which would benefit them at the expense of the opulent. But these hopes were soon discovered to be fallacious. Cleomenes did not mean to assume the character of a demagogue in foreign cities, or to apply the same violent remedy which he had deemed necessary for the disorders of Sparta to all other cases. The disappointment excited general discontent; and a man named Aristoteles, encouraged by the vicinity of the Macedonians, and apparently in concert with Aratus, roused the multitude to insurrection, and began an attack on the Lacedæmonian garrison in the citadel, while he sent to Sicyon for succours. Timoxenus immediately marched to his aid with the Achæan troops under his command, and Aratus arrived not long after with 1500 Macedonians, whom he had obtained from Antigonus, and had brought over the Saronic Gulph to Epidaurus. On the first intelligence of the revolt, Cleomenes despatched Megistonous—whose imprudent confidence in the disposition of the Argives had misled him into his ill-judged lenity—with 2000 men to Argos; he himself remained in his intrenchments to observe Antigonus, and, for the encouragement of the Corinthians, affected to speak of the insurrection as a trifling tumult of a few turbulent persons. But Megistonous was slain, soon after he reached Argos, in an attempt to recover possession of the city; and the garrison, reduced to almost the last extremity, sent courier after courier to Cleomenes, to solicit support. Apprehending that the loss of Argos would expose Sparta to the danger of a hostile inroad, and believing that nothing less than the display of his whole force would be sufficient to guard against it, he abandoned his intrenchments and marched into Argolis. But the sacrifice came too late to retrieve what had been lost, and only completed the ruin of his prospects. It threw open the gates of Pelopon-

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Retreat of
Cleomenes.

nesus to the enemy, who took possession of Corinth and the Acrocrinthus without resistance. In the meanwhile Cleomenes forced his way into the Larissa, and effected a junction with his troops, who still held out there, and even made himself master of an adjacent quarter of the city. But while the issue of the struggle was yet doubtful, the Macedonian arms were seen glittering on the heights, and the cavalry pushing forward at full speed across the plain. Cleomenes did not feel himself strong enough to risk an engagement near a hostile city, and therefore sounded a retreat, evacuated the citadel, and took the road through Mantinea to Tegea, which he reached unmolested, but not before he had been deserted by a part of his Peloponnesian troops. At Tegea he was met by tidings of a domestic calamity, the death of his noble-minded wife Agiatis, whose influence had so greatly contributed to form his character, and to induce him to spurn inglorious ease for a life of toil and danger, which he could not regret even in the midst of the misfortunes which darkened its close. His affection for her had been so strong, that when his arms were most successful he could not endure to be long absent from Sparta. But he controlled his feelings with stoical firmness, and before he proceeded homeward calmly gave directions for putting Tegea in a state of defence. Continuing his march during the night, he reached Sparta early the next morning, and after he had paid the last offices to Agiatis turned his thoughts on the posture of his affairs. In the calculation of his means of defence, he found himself most embarrassed by financial difficulties, and foresaw that it would be easier to raise an army that might cope with the enemy, than to keep it in the field. There was only one quarter in which he had a prospect of assistance to extricate him from this strait. Ptolemy Euergetes had withdrawn his pension from Aratus as soon as

it was known that he had attached himself to Antigonus, and was willing to support Cleomenes by subsidies in his conflict with Macedonia. But the accounts which had reached him of the character of the Spartan king were it seems not such as to inspire him with perfect confidence in his steadfastness, and he therefore required, as the condition of his assistance, that Cleomenes should send his mother and children to Alexandria as hostages. It was only after a hard struggle with his feelings that Cleomenes could bring himself to disclose this demand to his mother, but she received it with the spirit of a Spartan matron, chided him for his hesitation, and bade him instantly send her wherever her presence would be most serviceable to Sparta. Preparations were forthwith made for her departure, and when they were completed Cleomenes escorted her at the head of his troops to the place of embarkation at Tænarus. Before she went on board they retired to the temple of Poseidon to interchange a parting embrace; and the mother, who, in her old age, was going to be thrown on the mercy of strangers in a distant land, is said to have exhorted her son to master his emotions, and to preserve the composure which befitted a king of Sparta.

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In the meanwhile the progress of Antigonus was a series of easy triumphs. In Argos the people elected Aratus to the office of Strategus, and, on his motion, granted all the property of the persons, who were now branded with the name of tyrants and traitors, to the king of Macedonia. Aristomachus, it seems, escaped out of Argos, but fell into the hands of his enemies at Cenchreæ, where he was put to death by the order or with the sanction of Aratus, and, as it was rumoured, after the infliction of torture, which however Polybius denies.¹ All the other towns of Argolis submitted

Advance of
Antigonus.

¹ II. 60. 8.

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without resistance to the conqueror, who then marched into Arcadia and as far as the borders of Laconia, where he dislodged the Spartan garrisons from Belemna and Ægys, and consigned the fortresses to the custody of the Megalopolitans. He attempted no further aggression on the territory of Sparta, and, it seems, made no assault on any of the Arcadian towns, but proceeded to Ægium, where he was to meet a general assembly of the Achæans. It may easily be supposed that this assembly was not less ready to comply with his demands than that which had invited him into Græce. The title which had been refused to Cleomenes was conferred on Antigonus, and with such additions as entirely to destroy the independence of the League, and almost to efface its character. He was declared Chief of all the allies¹, which can only signify that the Achæans were henceforth to be members of a great confederacy, including all the other Greek states, which were in alliance with Macedonia, among which Epirus, Phocis, Bœotia, Acarnania, and Thessaly, are afterwards named.² If the League might be considered as still retaining a distinct existence, it seems to have been only for the purpose of increasing its burdens. It charged itself with the pay and maintenance of the Macedonian troops, while it renounced the right of sending an embassy, or even addressing a letter, to any other prince, without the consent of Antigonus. Antigonus was not content with the substance of power, but exercised it in a manner which showed that he looked upon his new allies as his subjects, and had not forgotten that they had been his enemies. He restored the statues of the tyrants at Argos, and ordered those which had been

¹ Polyb. II. 24. 4. *κατασταθεὶς ἡγεμὸν πάντων τῶν συμμάχων*. It seems rather difficult to reconcile this with Droysen's view (II. p. 557.), that no formal pre-eminence was assigned to Macedonia in the League (*nicht ein Bund mit und unter Makedonien geschlossen, Makedonien zur Hegemonie bestimmt war*).

² Polyb. IV. 9. 4.

erected at Corinth to the liberators of the city, to be pulled down, all but that of Aratus, who interceded in vain for those of his friends. The Achæans, on their part, would hardly rest satisfied with the ordinary tokens of respect due to his royal dignity, but paid their court to him with honours rather belonging to a god. Sicyon took the lead, and celebrated his arrival when he came as the guest of Aratus, with sacrifices, processions, and games. The other towns followed the example. Festivals were dedicated to him, and called after him the *Antigonia*; and Aratus thought himself obliged to appear on these occasions with the festive wreath, conducting the sacrifice and leading the pæan in honour of a man, whose character he left painted, in his Memoirs, in very dark colours.¹ After the assembly at Ægium, Antigonus closed the campaign, and took up his winter-quarters in Sicyon and Corinth.

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Early in the next spring he opened a fresh campaign with the siege of Tegea, which was soon forced to surrender: and he then advanced toward the frontier of Laconia, where he found Cleomenes prepared to defend the passes. But after some time spent in fruitless attempts on his enemy's position, he was induced to return northward, by information that the garrison of Orchomenus had marched to join the army of Cleomenes. He immediately proceeded to attack the almost unguarded town, and took it by storm, and gave it up to pillage. It was too useful a conquest, for the access which it gave to the interior of the peninsula, to be restored to the Achæans, and it was henceforth occupied by a Macedonian garrison. Mantinea was the next object of attack, and was soon reduced in like manner. It also was abandoned to

B. C. 222.
Fall of
Mantinea.

¹ Plut. Cleom. 16. *τουτανι αυτην 'Αντίγονον ειρηκώς κακά μυρία, δε' ὄν ἀπολέ-
λοιπεν ὑπομημάτων.*

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plunder, and all the citizens sold into slavery, a lenient punishment, in the judgment of Polybius, for the ingratitude it had shown to the Achæans, whom he regards as the protectors of its liberty, a light in which they certainly did not appear to those who rose against them. The dispeopled city was placed by the conqueror at the disposal of Argos, which decreed that a colony should be sent to take possession of it under the auspices of Aratus. The occasion enabled him to pay another courtly compliment to the king of Macedonia. On his proposal, the name of the *lovely Mantinea*¹—as it was described in the Homeric catalogue—was exchanged for that of *Antigonea*; a symbol of its ruin, and of the humiliation of Greece. Antigonus now turned his arms against the western side of Arcadia, where Heræa and Tilphusa submitted to him without resistance: and this was, on his part, the last achievement of this campaign. He forthwith returned to attend the Achæan assembly at Ægium, sent his Macedonian troops back to their homes, and put the rest into winter-quarters.

It seems evident that he was not at all eager to bring the war to a close, whether because he believed that his own influence in Peloponnesus would be strengthened by the delay—as the Achæans would be more compliant and submissive while the issue was yet in suspense—or hoped that the resources of Sparta would soon be spent, and Cleomenes forced to resign the unequal contest.² Cleomenes indeed, thrown back upon Laconia, found it extremely difficult to maintain a force capable of resisting the master of Macedonia and

¹ Μαντινέην ἑρατειήν. II. ii. 607.

² Droysen (p. 523.) believes that Antigonus was waiting until Ptolemy should be weary of supplying Cleomenes with subsidies, or should have been induced to abandon him. But if this was his policy, it seems strange that he should have changed it just at the time when he might expect shortly to reap its fruits, and should have brought the contest to an issue by the invasion of Laconia, before the resources of Cleomenes had been in the slightest degree impaired through Ptolemy's desertion, which, according to Droysen (p. 543.), Antigonus purchased at no less a price than the cession of Caria.

of the greater part of Greece. Notwithstanding the pledges he had given, it does not appear that he received any considerable subsidies from the court of Alexandria¹ where the ministers of Antigonus exerted their utmost efforts to counteract his application, and seem to have spread a report that he was negotiating with the Achæans, and playing a double game, so that his mother wrote to exhort him, if he found means of concluding an honourable peace, not to sacrifice the interests of Sparta through anxiety for the safety of an old woman and a child. It does not appear however that Cleomenes ever entered into such negotiations after the arrival of Antigonus in Peloponnesus², and it is certain that he never allowed the threatening aspect of his affairs to abate his courage or relax his energy. To the last he neglected no expedient, lost no opportunity, shrank from no venture, that promised any advantage. To recruit his finances he allowed 6000 helots to purchase their emancipation for five minas apiece, and thus raised 500 talents³; and perhaps out of this number organised a body of 2000 men, armed after the Macedonian fashion, like the troops which were distinguished by their white bucklers. In the course of this summer he had very nearly made himself master of Megalopolis by surprise⁴, and as soon as Antigonus had dismissed his

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Resources
of Cleo-
menes.

He attacks
Megalopolis,

¹ Droysen (p. 523. 541.) thinks it clear that he received subsidies from Egypt to such an amount that Antigonus might hope that Ptolemy would not be able to afford them much longer. But this at least seems inconsistent not only with Plutarch's *γλίσχωρος και μόλις πορίζοντα τοῖς ξένοις μισθόν κ. τ. λ.* (Cl. 27. compared with Polyb. ii. 63., v. 1.), but with the measures adopted by Cleomenes for replenishing his treasury.

² The statement of Pausanias (vii. 7. 3, 4.), that Cleomenes made peace with Antigonus and the Achæans, and that his attack on Megalopolis was a breach of this treaty—by which Pausanias conceives he incurred Divine vengeance—cannot be considered as entitled to any weight, being virtually refuted by the silence of Polybius and Plutarch, which implies that of Aratus.

³ Plut. Cleom. 23. Droysen (527.) questions the fact, which certainly does not very well harmonise with his view of the dependent condition of Cleomenes.

⁴ Polyb. ii. The allusion which Polybius makes to the event in this passage seems to show that the loss which Cleomenes suffered on this occasion was not so great as Droysen infers from the language in which Polybius speaks of it elsewhere (ix. 18. *ἐξέπεσε πολλοὺς ἀποβαλὼν, και κινδυνεύσας τοῖς ἔλοις*). Droysen supposes that the 6000 helots were levied to repair this loss.

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troops to their winter-quarters, he renewed the attempt, and with better fortune. Polybius adopted a report that he was aided by the treachery of some Messenian exiles, who were residing in the city, and opened a gate in the night time. But it seems questionable whether he was indebted to any thing but the prudence with which he concerted his measures, and the promptitude and secrecy with which they were executed, for the success of his enterprise. The great compass of the walls rendered it difficult to man them with a population thinned, as that of Megalopolis had been, by several disastrous battles in the course of the war. The lateness of the season, and perhaps the success with which they had repelled his former attempt, seem to have thrown the citizens off their guard. Cleomenes ordered his troops to provide themselves with victuals for a march of five days, and took the road to Sellasia, as if with the design of invading Argolis: but he soon turned his front in another direction, and came down into the territory of Megalopolis, where, after a short rest for the evening meal, he pursued his march during the night, until he came near to the city. He then sent forward an officer named Panteus, with a small detachment, to take possession of a part of the walls which was known to be the least carefully guarded. Panteus met with little resistance, and by the time that Cleomenes came up with the main body, had demolished some of the defences to open a passage for them; and the whole army had effected its entrance before the alarm had become general among the inhabitants. The bulk of the citizens, as soon as the danger was discovered, fled with their families, and as much of their property as they were able to remove, toward Messene. But a small band of nobler spirits, headed by Philopœmen, the son of Craugis, made a gallant stand against the enemy, and, though

they could not dislodge him, kept him so long employed as to enable the fugitives to withdraw without molestation, and afterwards made good their own retreat, leaving only a few of their number prisoners.

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Among these were two men of the highest reputation and influence in the city, named Lysandridas and Thearidas. They, according to Plutarch, prevailed on Cleomenes to try pacific measures with their fellow-citizens, and undertook themselves, accompanied by a Spartan herald, to carry his overtures to Messene. But he probably needed little persuasion to satisfy him that it was much more desirable to detach Megalopolis from the Achæan alliance, than to wreak his vengeance on its deserted buildings. He restrained his troops from all acts of pillage with the most scrupulous rigour, until the return of the envoys. They invited their fellow-citizens to return to their homes, on the condition of renouncing their connection with the Achæan League, and entering into alliance with Sparta. We cannot think so highly of the magnanimity of the people who rejected this offer, as Polybius would persuade his readers to do. It was not only one which must have shocked their deep-rooted hereditary prejudices against Sparta, but, when Antigonus was so near with a force so far superior to that of Cleomenes at his command, had little to recommend it on the score of prudence. Yet, if we might believe Plutarch, there was a very strong inclination among them to accept the proposal, and they were only diverted from it by the remonstrances of Philopœmen, who worked upon their anti-Spartan feelings by the remark, that while Cleomenes offered to restore the city to them, his real object was to make himself master of them as well as of the city. Phylarchus, a better authority, and on this point confirmed by Polybius, described the temper of the Megalopolitans as so violently adverse to all terms of paci-

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and lays it
in ruins.

Philo-
pœmen.

fiction, that they would not even hear the letter of Cleomenes read to the end, and were near stoning the bearers. There was probably something irritating in the manner in which the proposal was rejected, as well as in the rejection itself. Cleomenes, as soon as he received the report of the envoys, collected all the booty he could find in the city, and then proceeded to lay it in ruins with such elaborate hostility as, according to Polybius, to extinguish all hope that it would be ever again inhabited. The value of the plunder — strangely exaggerated by Phylarchus — was not it seems sufficient to afford any material relief to Cleomenes in his financial difficulties.¹ After this stroke of vengeance he marched back to Sparta.

We have mentioned a name which will appear very frequently and prominently in the sequel; that of a man whose character reflects some lustre on the decline of Greek independence, and who was entitled, by an admiring Roman², *the last of the Greeks*. His character seems indeed to have been cast rather in the Roman than the Grecian mould. It is not one to which we must look for any great elevation, either of mind or spirit, yet not without moral dignity, and exciting some interest by the simplicity, energy, and perseverance with which it was bent on the pursuit of an object, on the whole perhaps as virtuous and noble as the circumstances of that age could have suggested to the ambition of a Greek. Philopœmen lost his father, one of the most distinguished citizens of Megalopolis, at an early age: but he grew up to manhood under the care of affectionate and able guardians; first, his father's most intimate friend, a Mantinean exile, named Cleander; and afterwards

¹ Droysen however (530.) thinks that the booty collected from the territory of Megalopolis, which was not taken into account by Polybius when he estimated the value of the spoil at 300 talents (ii. 62.), may have produced a much larger sum.

² Plut. Philop. 1. Ῥωμαίων τις ἑκταίων. Art. 24. οἱ Ῥωμαῖοι Φιλοποίμενα θαυμάζοντες.

two of his most celebrated fellow-citizens, Ecdemus and Demophanes¹, men who, as we have seen, combined the study of the Academic philosophy with a warm interest in the political movements of their day, and who had contributed their aid to deliver both their native city and Sicyon from tyrannical government. Their lessons and counsels may have helped to guide him in the choice which he seems to have made very early, and to which he steadfastly adhered, of a life of unremitting hardship and labour in the political and military career which the state of Greece opened for him. The example of Epaminondas—the hero whose memory was dearest and most sacred to every citizen of Megalopolis—shone as a polestar on his path, though he was thought to resemble his great model rather in the sterner than the more amiable features of his character. From his boyhood he disclosed a remarkable fondness and aptness for martial exercises and military studies: and though his excellence in the accomplishments of the palæstra was such as, in the judgment of his friends, to promise success in the contests of the public games, he renounced the prospect—so tempting to most of his countrymen—with contempt, when he became aware that the training of the athlete was utterly irreconcilable with the habits of the camp. As soon as he had reached the age of military service, he distinguished himself in the inroads which were frequently made into Laconia; endeavouring always to be the foremost in the advance, and the last in the retreat. In the intervals left by these duties he divided his time between civil business, literary studies, husbandry, and the chase, still however keeping his main end steadily in view. He commonly left the city toward evening for a farm which he possessed two or three

¹ The name is written *Megalophanes* in Pausanias, viii. 49. 2.

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miles off, where he rose early to take a part in the labours of the field, until private or public engagements called him back to Megalopolis. The cultivation of his estate was regarded by him not merely as a healthy exercise but as the means of securing his political independence. His favourite reading was such as bore directly on his chief pursuit; the *Tactics* of Evangelus or the history of Alexander's campaigns. From the works of philosophers and poets he drew as much as might serve the purpose of a general and a statesman. The image of war was constantly in his mind. On his journeys every turn of the road or change in the face of the country suggested to him a military problem which he would discuss with his companions, leading him to consider the evolutions which the nature of the ground would have required if he had found himself there at the head of an army in presence of an enemy. Philopœmen was thirty years old when Megalopolis was taken by Cleomenes; and we can easily understand how intolerable the thought of a composition with the victorious enemy must have been to such a spirit, and how he burnt for an opportunity of retrieving possession of his home with the sword, and of avenging its ruin on Sparta.

The news of the fall of Megalopolis reached Aratus while the Achæans were assembled at Ægium, and he announced the disaster from the bema, after a pause, as of unutterable grief, during which he covered his face with his cloak.¹ But it seems that the assembly,

¹ Droysen (527.) suspects that both Antigonus and Aratus were aware of the danger to which Megalopolis was exposed, and purposely forebore to avert it, and secretly rejoiced in the ruin of the city. With regard to Antigonus, there can be no doubt that his aim (as that of all his predecessors since Philip I.) was as much as possible to break the power of Greece; and it was for this reason that, until the domination of Rome appeared to be the more oppressive and destructive of the two, resistance to Macedonia was the object which a patriotic Greek statesman would have kept constantly foremost in his view. But still, when we consider the attachment of Megalopolis to the royal house of Macedon, and its enmity to Sparta, it would seem that this was just the one great city of Peloponnesus which, for his own sake, he must have wished to see standing. As to Aratus, one would

as if stunned by the calamity, broke up without any deliberation on the measures to be adopted in consequence of the event. They were perhaps left expressly, or by tacit understanding, to the judgment of Antigonus. In fact, he forthwith gave orders for the re-assembling of his troops from their winter-quarters. But this was probably designed only to evince his sympathy. His orders were slowly executed, and before any force had come together, as the enemy had retired from Arcadia, no object remained for military operations. He therefore countermanded the movement, and proceeded with a small body of mercenaries to Argos, where he took up his residence for the winter.

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The eye of Cleomenes was upon him, and early in the following spring he took advantage of his enemy's position to make a movement, which was bold enough to be generally regarded by his contemporaries as desperately hazardous, but is acknowledged by Polybius to have been very judiciously calculated as well as completely successful. He made an inroad into Argolis, and ravaged the plain, where the corn was yet green, as far as the city walls. He foresaw that, if Antigonus should be induced by the impatience of the Argives to march out and give battle, he should be almost sure to gain an important, perhaps a decisive victory. On the other hand, if he should be allowed to waste the country without opposition, discontent and dejection would ensue within the city; in either case he should raise the reputation of his arms and the spirit of his people. The event answered to his expectations, though the result was less important

Cleomenes
before
Argos.

not lightly think him capable of such atrocious hypocrisy and villany; and the grounds which Droysen assigns for his suspicion all depend on a most questionable hypothesis as to the state of parties at Megalopolis. One may affirm with a more reasonable confidence that Aratus felt himself only too safe, under Macedonian protection, from any attacks of political adversaries. He had paid dearly for his security.

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than he had hoped. Antigonus did not move. The Argives murmured loudly at his inaction, and even thronged the gates of his lodging, clamorously demanding that he would either protect their fields, or resign his command to his abler rival. He turned a deaf ear to their taunts, and let the tumult spend itself in empty noise. Cleomenes, when his provisions were exhausted, led his army back to Sparta.

So far all is perfectly intelligible; but Plutarch relates another expedition of Cleomenes in the same direction, but undertaken under widely different circumstances. The truth of his narrative seems to have been never questioned by modern writers¹; yet it is so difficult to understand, that the more we consider it, the more we are inclined to reject it as incredible, and to attribute it to mistake. According to this statement, soon after the return of Cleomenes to Sparta, Antigonus having assembled his forces marched to Tegea with the design of invading Laconia. Cleomenes, when he heard that the enemy was so near his frontier, led his army by a different road into Argolis, where he committed great devastation, having provided his troops with large wooden swords to beat down the standing corn. Some of his officers wished to set fire to the gymnasium of Cylarabis, a place hallowed by several sacred monuments: but he forbade this mischief, with an intimation, it is said, of regret for the damage which he had been provoked to inflict on Megalopolis. Antigonus on the other hand, finding that he had it in his power to enter Laconia

¹ Schorn, Flathe, Helwing, and Lucas (p. 90.) adopt it without the slightest hesitation. Manso (iii. 334.) seems to betray a little misgiving, observing in the note — *The expedition is evidently a second one, distinct from the first, but has been passed over by Polybius.* The two expeditions are indeed clearly distinguished from one another by Plutarch; but there is no action attributed to Cleomenes in the second which might not have belonged to the first. Droysen (544.) suggests the possibility that Antigonus might have been waiting at Tegea for the Achæan contingents, and that Cleomenes intended to prevent their junction with him.

without opposition, and probably to make himself master of Sparta, immediately marched back to Argos, and occupied all the passes by which the enemy might have effected his retreat. Cleomenes affected to set him at defiance, sent heralds to request the keys of the famous temple of Here, between Argos and Mycene, that he might sacrifice there before his departure, and, having performed the sacrifice on the outside, took the road to Phlius, crossed Mount Oligyrtus, where he had to force his way through a defile guarded by Macedonian troops, and having come down near Orchomenus, returned to Sparta, by the high road of Mantinea and Tegea, without encountering any other obstacle.

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We can hardly help suspecting that Plutarch must have referred two different narratives of the same expedition to two distinct occasions, following Polybius in the one and Phylarchus in the other. Polybius is quite silent about the second invasion of Argolis, which, after his remarks on the policy of the first, he could scarcely have failed to mention, if he had heard of it, and his own narrative of the events immediately ensuing seems inconsistent with the supposition that they had been preceded by the operations which Plutarch describes.

According to Polybius, Antigonus, having collected his army in the beginning of the summer, opened the campaign with the invasion of Laconia; and Cleomenes, instead of attempting any diversion, bent all his thoughts toward the guarding of the passes on the frontier, so as to prevent the enemy from penetrating into the vale of the Eurotas. Expecting that Antigonus would take the road which led through Sellasia down the valley of the Cenus, having fortified the other passes, chiefly by ditches and felled trees, so as not to be obliged materially to weaken his army for their defence, he advanced with all his forces, about

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20,000 men, to occupy a strong position on the Cenus near Sellasia, where the stream flowed between two hills named Evas and Olympus, which were parted from each other by a small level. He strengthened his position by a trench and palisade, stationed his brother Euclidas with one division of the infantry on mount Evas, while he himself encamped with the flower of the Lacedæmonian troops and the mercenaries on Olympus, and covered the opening between the two hills with his cavalry. In this posture he was found by Antigonus, whose army numbered 30,000, composed of Macedonians, Illyrians under Demetrius of Pharos, Acarnanians and Cretans, Peloponnesians, among whom Megalopolis furnished a thousand foot and a body of horse, which was commanded it seems by Philopœmen, and mercenaries. Antigonus having encamped near the foot of the hills behind a rivulet, the Gorgylus, tributary to the Cenus, waited several days in the hope of discovering some weak point in the enemy's lines. But Cleomenes, as Polybius admits, had so skilfully availed himself of all the advantages of the ground, that his adversary was at length forced to renounce the thought of a surprise, and prepared to stake his fortunes on a fair trial of strength.

Phylarchus had related that about ten days before the battle an envoy from Alexandria arrived in the Spartan camp, to announce that Ptolemy would grant no farther subsidies to Cleomenes and advised him to make peace with Antigonus; and it was by this message, according to Phylarchus, that Cleomenes, whose treasury was exhausted, and who feared that the hopeless condition of his finances might soon become known to his troops, was induced to risk an engagement, when, in consequence of events which were taking place in a distant quarter, a delay of a few days would have relieved him from danger, and

have restored his ascendancy in Peloponnesus. Polybius, though he mentions this statement only to expose the inconsistency of Phylarchus, who had represented the spoil of Megalopolis as amounting to 6000 talents, seems afterwards in some degree to confirm it, as he says that both parties determined to join battle. Yet his own description seems to show that Cleomenes remained as long as he could on the defensive. His account of the battle differs very widely from that which Plutarch reports from Phylarchus, who had imputed its loss to the treachery of a Spartan officer named Damoteles, who deceived Cleomenes by false information, which prevented him from sending timely succour to his brother, and induced him to advance prematurely against Antigonus. Polybius, on the other hand, ascribes the event partly to the sagacity and energy of Philopœmen and the valour of the Achæan cavalry, but in a still greater degree to the incapacity of Euclidas, which proved fatal first to himself, and then to Cleomenes. His narrative suggests no suspicion of treachery, and it seems in all respects the more trustworthy. In the earlier part of the day, Philopœmen had the merit of making a charge at the head of the Megalopolitan cavalry, without orders, which saved the wing of the army on the side of mount Evas from total defeat. His superior officer, when he pointed out the emergency, had refused to move until he saw a preconcerted signal. Philopœmen was afterwards praised for this seasonable breach of discipline by Antigonus, who said that his cautious general had acted like a stripling, the Megalopolitan youth like an experienced general. Euclidas committed the error of waiting on the brow of the hill to sustain the enemy's attack, and thus lost all the benefit of his vantage ground, which would have enabled him to charge

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B. C. 221.
Battle of
Sellasia.

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them before they reached the top with overpowering effect. His division was driven back with great slaughter over the precipices on the other side of the hill, and he himself slain. In the meanwhile the Lacedæmonian cavalry was beginning to give way to the Achæans, who felt, Polybius says, that the whole contest was for their liberty, and were animated by the example of Philopœmen, who, when his horse had been killed under him, continued to fight on foot, and did not even retire from the field when both his thighs had been transfixed by a javelin. It was now, according to Polybius, that Cleomenes, seeing himself in danger of being surrounded by the victorious enemy, resolved on a last effort to retrieve the fortune of the day, and quitted his intrenchments to charge the Macedonian phalanx, which was commanded by Antigonus himself, and on account of the narrowness of the ground was formed in twice the ordinary depth. The Spartan valour strove in vain to break this impenetrable mass, and was at length, after a hard struggle, overwhelmed by its weight. The slaughter which followed was terrible, but is probably exaggerated, when it is said, that out of 6000 Lacedæmonians not more than 200 are said to have escaped. Cleomenes, seeing all lost, quitted the field, and hastened, accompanied by a few horsemen, to Sparta. Here he exhorted his countrymen not to think of irritating the conqueror by a useless attempt at resistance: *he himself, though unable to stay, would still, whether in life or death, devote himself to the service of Sparta.* While his companions rested and refreshed themselves, he went into his house, but would neither sit down nor slake his thirst. He stood for a while, as lost in thought, leaning his brow on his arm as he stayed it against a pillar, and then, with the friends who adhered to him, proceeded to Gythium, where he embarked in a vessel which had

been provided for the contingency, and sailed away for Alexandria.

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Cleomenes
sails to
Egypt.

If he had delayed his departure for a few days longer, he might have returned safely to his capital, and perhaps have kept possession of his throne.¹ The conqueror proceeded to Sparta, where he was submissively received, and used his victory with a lenity and moderation which Polybius extols as a proof of magnanimity. But the opposite course would have been no less impolitic than cruel: nor had he suffered any provocation which could incite him to tread hard on the necks of the fallen. He can have felt no resentment even against Cleomenes, whom in his heart he must have esteemed incomparably above Aratus. But he seems to have taken the measures best calculated to prevent Sparta from ever rising again. He is said to have restored her ancient laws and constitution. The exact meaning of this phrase is not explained by the writers who use it²; but one of the measures to which it refers, was undoubtedly the revival of the ephoralty: and it is most probable that this was accompanied by others, including the recal of the exiles, and a recognition of their title to property which had passed into other hands, all tending to overthrow the work of Cleomenes, to restore the abuses of the ancient system, and to sow the seeds of perpetual discord. But in the course of a very few days Antigonus was called away from Sparta and from Greece, by intelligence that the Illyrians had invaded Macedonia. It seems indeed, according to the more probable meaning of an obscure passage of Polybius, that he left his Theban friend Brachyllas,

¹ So Polybius, ii. 70. Droysen (ii. p. 550.) considers this as a very inadequate view of the subject. Antigonus he thinks would not have suffered himself to be called away by an Illyrian inroad, until he had completed the settlement of affairs in Peloponnesus. But it seems bold to assert that he would certainly have staid there until he made himself master of the person of Cleomenes.

² Polyb. ii. 70. iv. 9. 9. ix. 36. 4. Plut. Cl. 30. Pausan. ii. 9. 2.

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the head of the house of Neon, governor of Sparta¹; perhaps, as we hear nothing more of him, only to remain there until the new order of things should be established. On his road northward he halted at Tegea, where he is said likewise to have re-established the hereditary polity, that is no doubt the ascendancy of a party favourable to the Macedonian interest, and then proceeded to Argos. Here he arrived just in time to be presented at the celebration of the Nemean Games, where he was greeted, as well by the Achæan League as by its separate cities, with all the homage pertaining, as Polybius expresses it, to immortal glory and honour. We may judge of the adulation which was now offered to him by the compliments which he had received before the decisive victory. Leaving a body of troops under the command of Taurion, to preserve tranquillity in Peloponnesus, he hastened his march homeward. He found the Illyrians still in Macedonia, and brought them to an engagement, in which he gained a complete victory. But the germ of a wasting disease was, it seems, already lodged in his frame², and the exertion of his voice during the battle so weakened his lungs, that he sank into an illness, which in the course of a few months carried him to the grave. He was succeeded by his nephew and adopted son, Philip III., now a youth of seventeen, for whom he appointed by his will a council of ministers and the principal officers of the court and army, and left directions for the administration of his kingdom. His intentions toward him were undoubtedly good, though he was singularly unfortunate in the choice of the men whom he

¹ Polyb. xx. 5. 12. *κύριος γενόμενος τῆς Λακεδαιμονος, ἐπιστάτην ἀπέλασε τῆς πόλεως Βραχύλλην.* But the context certainly raises a doubt whether Sparta or Thebes is the city meant. Flathe (ii. p. 184. and 228.) interprets it of Thebes (but erroneously describing Brachyllas as a Macedonian); Schorn, Brückner (u. s. p. 1232. n. 19.), and Droysen, of Sparta.

² Plut. Cleom. 16. 30.

placed about his person: and he showed his anxiety for his welfare, as well as for the perpetuity of his own work, when in his last illness he sent him into Peloponnesus with instructions to conciliate the friendship of Aratus.¹

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Before we resume the thread of Grecian history, it will be convenient to anticipate the course of events, that the reader may be enabled to follow the adventures of Cleomenes, without farther interruption, to their close. Having touched at Cythera, and afterwards at another island named Ægialea, — where Plutarch supposes him to have been urged by one of his companions to put an end to his life², — he crossed over to the coast of Cyrene, and was escorted by Ptolemy's officers to Alexandria. His deportment and conversation by degrees impressed Ptolemy with so favourable an opinion of his character and abilities, that he promised to aid him with ships and money toward the recovery of his kingdom, and in the meanwhile assigned a yearly pension of twenty-four talents for his maintenance. A very small part of this allowance was needed to supply the wants of Cleomenes and his friends, who retained their Spartan habits; and with the surplus he endeavoured to secure the goodwill of the Greek refugees who had emigrated to Egypt.

But these prospects were soon overcast by the death of Ptolemy Euergetes, who was succeeded by his son Philopator, a weak and dissolute prince, addicted to the most shameful vices, though not destitute of literary tastes and talents³, and, like Antigonus

Cleomenes
at Alex-
andria.

¹ Plut. Ar. 46.

² The conversation reported (c. 31.) has very much the appearance of having been drawn from some sophistical exercise.

³ He was, as we learn from the Ravenna schollast in Aristoph. Thesm. 1059., quoted by Droysen, the author of a tragedy called Adonis, on which his favourite Agathocles commented; and he built a temple in honour of Homer. Ælian, V. H. xiii. 21.

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Gonatas, a patron of the Stoical philosophy.¹ He was seldom, it is said, entirely sober; and the gravest occupation of his most lucid intervals was to celebrate the mystic orgies of some Egyptian superstition. The government of his kingdom he abandoned to his mistress Agathoclea, her brother Agathocles, and her infamous mother Enanthe. A man of this cast could not but feel an instinctive aversion to a Cleomenes. Yet at the beginning of his reign an occasion arose in which, finding himself in danger, he was willing to make use of the stranger's military talents. He dreaded his half-brother Magas, who was supported by the interest of his mother Berenice, and popular among the soldiery. In this emergency Cleomenes was called in to aid the king with his counsels. Ptolemy and his ministers had indeed already made up their minds on one point, that Magas was to be despatched. The only question on which they wished to consult Cleomenes was, how this purpose might be most safely accomplished. Cleomenes however betrayed his ignorance of the court by the simple remark, that it would be better for Ptolemy if he had more brothers to uphold his throne: and when Sosibius, the chief favourite, pointed out the danger to be apprehended from the wavering fidelity of the mercenaries, so long as Magas lived, he bade them dismiss all anxiety on that score, as he would undertake to answer for some 4000 of the number: Peloponnesians and Cretans, who would be ready to act at his beck, and would easily overpower the Syrian and Carian troops. This assurance, though not unwelcome at the time, sank deep into the minds of the king and

¹ Diog. Laert. vii. 177. The same Sphærus who had given lessons to Cleomenes, accepted the king's invitation to Alexandria, which Chrysippus more prudently declined (Diog. Laert. vii. 185.). Ptolemy amused himself with the Stoic, as Frederick II. with his French philosophers. He deceived him with a dish of pomegranates in wax (or birds, Athen. viii. p. 354. e.), to make him own that the wise man might assent to an erroneous impression of the senses.

his courtiers, and rendered Cleomenes himself an object of jealousy and suspicion, which his demeanour, calm but watchful, did not tend to allay. Carrying his deep thoughts and high aims constantly about with him in the midst of a frivolous and licentious court, he seemed to them like a lion prowling about a sheepfold.

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He soon perceived that he must resign all hope of the assistance which had been promised by the late king. But when he learnt the state of affairs in Greece which followed the death of Antigonus, he was eager to be allowed to depart accompanied only by the friends whom he had brought with him. Even this request however he urged in vain. Ptolemy himself was too much occupied by his revels and his devotion to attend to it: and Sosibius thought it dangerous to part with a man who knew so much of the secrets of the court, and the weakness of the kingdom, and who might soon be in condition to take advantage of it.

While he remained in this feverish suspense, a combination of seemingly trifling occurrences brought a still darker cloud over his prospects. Nicagoras the Messenian arrived at Alexandria with a cargo of horses for the royal stables. According to Polybius, Nicagoras, while he panted for revenge on Cleomenes for the death of Archidamus¹, professed to be deeply indebted to him for the forbearance shown on that occasion toward himself. On his landing he met Cleomenes with two of his friends walking on the quay, and after a friendly greeting, Cleomenes, having inquired what he had brought, observed, that a troop

¹ It is remarkable that Plutarch does not even notice the cause which Polybius (v. 37.) assigns for the enmity of Nicagoras toward Cleomenes, but relates that it arose out of a debt contracted in Greece, which Cleomenes in his exile was unable to pay. But, on the showing of Polybius, Nicagoras was not a man of scrupulous veracity; yet the share imputed by Polybius to Cleomenes in the murder of Archidamus, seems to rest on his testimony.

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of minions or music girls would have been better suited to the present king's taste. Nicagoras took the first opportunity to report this sarcasm to Sosibius, who, having discovered his animosity against the man whom he himself hated and feared, induced him by bribes and promises, before he set sail, to write a letter, charging Cleomenes with a design upon Cyrene.¹ The letter was shown to Ptolemy, and under the double excitement of anger and alarm, yet partly it seems restrained by shame or other fears, he ordered Cleomenes and his friends to be confined in a large house, though in other respects treated as before. Still Cleomenes, who it seems was not informed of the cause of his imprisonment, regarded it for a time as merely a temporary effect of the king's capricious displeasure. But an accidental discovery convinced him that his keepers did not mean ever to release him from his cage, and that if he was to regain his liberty, it could only be by some hardy stroke in which he must risk all.

The attempt which he finally made was indeed one in which it was impossible for any reasonable man to expect success; and it seems more than any other act of his life to have subjected him to the reproach of a wild temerity; but it may more probably be ascribed to the impatience of despair, which preferred death to the prolongation of captivity, and caught at any chance of deliverance as a clear gain. Having eluded the vigilance of his guards, while Ptolemy was absent on an excursion to Canopus, he made a sally into the streets with his friends, thirteen in number, all with drawn swords, and raised the cry of liberty. The Alexandrian populace gazed and applauded, as at a scene on the stage, but with as little thought of taking any part in the action. The Spartans killed

¹ Plut. Cleom. 35. Polybius (v. 38.) speaks less definitively.

the governor of the city, and another courtier, but after an ineffectual attempt to break open the prison in the citadel, finding themselves universally shunned, they abandoned their forlorn hope, and turned their swords against their own hearts. Panteus, the dearest of the king's friends, consented at his request to survive until he saw that the others had breathed their last. Ptolemy, as soon as he learnt what had happened, ordered all the women and children belonging to the deceased to be put to death; and the young wife of Panteus is said to have paid the like pious offices to Cratesiclea, who was forced to witness the butchery of her two grandsons, as Cleomenes had received from her husband. The body of Cleomenes was flayed and hung on a cross, until, if we may believe Plutarch, an extraordinary occurrence awakened Ptolemy's superstitious fears, gave occasion for new expiatory rites in the palace, and induced the Alexandrians to venerate Cleomenes as a hero.

Such indeed he was, when measured with them. As we turn from them to the proper subject of this history, we feel as it were that we are beginning again to breathe a healthier atmosphere: and we carry away a strengthened conviction, that great as were the evils which Greece suffered from the ill-regulated passion for liberty, it was still better living there than under the sceptre of the Ptolemies — among a people who can hardly be said to have a history, in any higher sense than a herd of animals, always prone, unless when goaded into fury.

CHAPTER LXIII.

FROM THE BATTLE OF SELLASIA TO THE END OF THE
SOCIAL WAR BETWEEN THE ACHÆANS AND ÆTOLIANS.

The Ætolian League. — Its Constitution. — Habits of the People. — Its Relations with Foreign Cities. — The Ætoliens at Phigalea. — Their Aggressions on Messenia. — Dorimachus and Scopas. — Preparation for War. — Battle of Caphyæ. — The Ætoliens at Cynætha. — Commotion at Sparta. — Philip at Tegea. — Beginning of the Social War. — Dispositions of the Allies. — Revolution of Sparta. — Lycurgus King. — Philip besieges Ambracus. — Invades Ætolia. — Winter Campaign in Peloponnesus. — Invasion of Elis. — Intrigues of Apelles. — Conspiracy against Philip. — Philip at Thermus. — The Conspirators arrested. — Philip in Laconia. — Perfidy of Apelles. — The Conspiracy crushed. — Aratus tranquillises Megalopolis. — Philip in Thessaly. — Battle of Thrasimene. — Counsels of Demetrius the Pharian. — Warnings of Agelaus. — Treaty of Naupactus.

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AFTER the termination of the Cleomenic War, Greece enjoyed a short interval of general tranquillity. The states which had taken a part in the recent contest needed repose; and the Achæans, though they were now rid of their formidable antagonist, were not the more at liberty to engage in any fresh enterprises without the consent of the master to whose dominion they had been subjected by the selfish and short-sighted policy of Aratus. Throughout Peloponnesus military preparations and martial exercises were suspended¹: the people returned to the occupations of peace: the Megalopolitans began to settle again amidst the ruins of their city.²

The death of Antigonus produced no immediate

¹ Polyb. v. 7. 7.

² Ibid. v. 25. 4.

visible change in the state of affairs; but yet it may be considered as the main cause of the movements which ensued, and which soon after involved Greece in another wasteful and calamitous war. The occasion of this new struggle arose indeed at a great distance from Macedonia, without any intervention of the Macedonian government, and seemingly more through accident than design; yet it could hardly have taken place, and certainly would not have been attended with such consequences, if the restraint hitherto imposed on those who were desirous of change by the ability and success of Antigonus, had not been withdrawn. When his sceptre passed into the hands of a boy of seventeen, the Ætolians believed that they had nothing to apprehend on the side of Macedonia, and readily followed the first impulse which they had received from turbulent and ambitious leaders, who wished for private ends to disturb the quiet of Greece.

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As the internal state of Ætolia throws some light on the origin of these movements and is illustrated by them, this may be a convenient place for a general survey of its political constitution and social relations. The main points which have been preserved to us by incidental notices of the ancient writers lie within a narrow compass. We are not able to trace the steps by which the primitive monarchical form of government was exchanged for that which we find established in the period we have now reached. The title of king was retained in one district, that of the Agræans, down to the Peloponnesian War.¹ In the reign of Philip I. all were united in a democratical confederacy or commonwealth²: and it is probable that no other polity

The Æto-
lian League.

¹ Thuc. iii. 3.

² Schorn (p. 25.) infers from Arrian's account of the Ætolian embassy to Alexander, as *κατὰ ἴδωσιν* (i. 10.), that the League was not then formed; but that it existed at least as early as the reign of Philip, not only appears (as is observed by Nitsch, *Polybius*, p. 119.) from an inscription on the statue of Ætolus at

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LXIII.Its consti-
tution.

subsisted in any of the towns; but it is not clear what degree of independence each canton preserved in its internal administration, nor indeed is it quite certain that it is more correct to consider the whole body as a league than as a single republic. It seems that the union of the Ætolians was still closer than that of the Achæans; that there was a deeper consciousness of national unity, and a greater concentration of power in the national government. The great Council of the nation, called the Panætolicon, in which it is probable all freemen who had reached the age of thirty had a voice, was assembled once a year at the autumnal equinox at Thermus for the election of magistrates, general legislation, and the decision of all great national questions, more especially those which related to transactions with foreign states. We find no indication of any other ordinary general assembly. But there was another deliberative body called the Apocletes, — a name which suggests that it was a council of deputies, — which appears to have been permanent, though we do not know whether it held regular sittings, or was only convoked as occasion required. It was so numerous that a committee of thirty might be drawn from it for the transaction of special business.¹ The chief magistrate, who bore

Therma, quoted by Ephorus (in Strabo, x. p. 463. Αἰτωλῶν τὸνδ' ἀνέθηκαν Αἰτωλοὶ σφετερὰς μνημ' ἀρετῆς ἑσορᾶν), but may also be inferred from the cession of Naupactus, which was made to them by Phillip (Strabo, ix. p. 427. ἐστὶ δὲ τῶν Αἰτωλῶν, Φιλίππου προσκρίναντος. See Vol. VI. p. 20. and Boekh, Corp. Inscr. i. p. 857.).

¹ Schorn (p. 27.) considers it is an aristocratical council, which represented the noble families, probably relying on Livy's description (xxxv. 45., where *triginta principes* answers to *τριάκοντα τῶν ἀποκλήτων* in Polyb. xx. 1.). But it seems that no reliance can be safely placed on Livy's expression, as it is clear that he mistook these thirty for the entire council, and supposed that they were appointed on extraordinary occasions by the national assembly. Tittmann (p. 727.) regards them as a standing committee for foreign affairs; and so Pastoret (*Hist. de la Leg.* viii. p. 378.): *C'étoit une sorte de commission intermédiaire des États nationaux*: adding, without the slightest evidence, that the assembly delegated to it *la décision des objets d'un ordre inférieur*. But this view likewise seems to rest on Livy's misconception. Another question is, whether the *συνέδροι* mentioned in the Inscriptions (Boekh, n. 2350. 3046. *συνέδρους ἀεὶ τοῦς ἐνάρχους*) are connected with the *ἀπόκλητοι* — as a judicial committee for cases of

the title of Strategus, was annually elected, presided in the assemblies, represented the sovereignty of the people, and disposed of its military force. His office, among such a people, conferred great power; and there is an indication that it was viewed with some degree of jealousy, for it seems that he was not allowed to speak in the Assembly on a question of war or peace.¹ A Commander of the Cavalry (*Hipparchus*) served under him in the field, and perhaps filled his place, when necessary, at home. A Chief Secretary² was also elected annually.

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The Ætolians still retained their predatory habits, which Thucydides had pointed out to his contemporaries as an illustration of the primitive semibarbarous manners of Greece. The ruggedness of their land, the strength of their mountain fastnesses, the vicinity of still wilder tribes in the north, concurred with the hardy, reckless, self-confident character of the people, to prevent any change in this part of their hereditary usages. They were still a nation of freebooters and pirates. Plunder was to them what eloquence or music was to other Grecian races, — their study, their business, their pleasure, their pride.³ In their marauding excursions they spared nothing. They paid as little regard to the sanctity of the things and places which were most revered in Greece as if they had professed a different religion; yet we have no

Habits of
the people.

piracy — or were an entirely distinct body. Boekh's opinion about them is not quite clearly expressed. (C. I. II. p. 633. *Synedri sunt concilii Ætolici magistratus ordinarii, senatus quippe.*)

¹ Livy, xxxv. 25. Tittman (p. 726.) questions the fact, because elsewhere it is expressly stated that the Strategus made proposals. But the instance to which he refers (Livy, xxxi. 32.) is perfectly consistent with the supposition which he disputes. Damocritus only interposes to adjourn the discussion. Schorn (p. 28.) supposes the reason of the rule to have been, that the General was entitled to a large share of the spoil. But though this is probable in itself, it does not appear from the passage of Polybius (II. 2.) to which he refers. It was clear however that the General's bias would always be towards war.

² *Γραμματεὺς.*

³ Maximus Tyrus, Diss. xxiii. 2. Flatch (II. p. 139.) endeavours to rescue them from this reproach, but only damages his own reputation for impartiality by his attacks on Polybius.

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reason to believe that they were freer from superstition than their more civilised neighbours. One of the consequences of this appetite for plunder was that the democratical character of the Ætolian institutions was in no small degree tempered by the influence which the chiefs who took the lead in such expeditions naturally acquired over their followers, and the weight which they thus gained in the councils of the nation. But it seems that they found it necessary to sustain the popularity which they earned in the foray by the exercise of liberality and hospitality at home, on which they frequently spent more than their share of the booty, and thus were often induced to look to predatory excursions as the readiest means of repairing their damaged fortunes. Many of the leading men possessed houses at Thermus which they adorned with great magnificence, and at the time of the annual elections they appear to have vied with one another in the splendour of their entertainments. For though they had made so little progress in civilisation, the Ætolians were not at all behind the other Greeks in luxury. An ancient author expressly connects their eager pursuit of pleasure with their contempt of death.¹ They were willing, it seems, to crowd the enjoyments for which alone they valued life, by profuse expenditure, into a narrow compass. The sanctuary of Apollo at Thermus was adorned with a multitude of statues, works indeed of foreign schools, but not the less gratifying to the national vanity as a display of wealth and refinement: and those yearly meetings were probably not inferior in exhibitions of art, particularly dramatic and musical entertainments, to any of the kind which were celebrated in the rest of Greece.²

¹ *Agatharchides ap. Athen. xii. 33. Αἰτωλοὶ τοσούτη τῶν λοιπῶν ἐτοιμότερον ἔχουσι πρὸς θάνατον, ὅσῳ περ καὶ ζῆν πολυτελεῶς καὶ ἐκτενέστερον ζητοῦσι τῶν ἄλλων.*

² A law specially providing for the security of the artists (*οἱ Διονυσιακοὶ τεχνῖται*) is referred to in the Inscription, n. 3046. (Boekh).

RELATION OF THE LEAGUE WITH OTHER STATES.

It seems that nearly as soon as the national union was firmly cemented, the Ætolians began to aim at extending their power and enlarging their territory. One of the earliest occasions on which they appear acting as one body is that on which they acquired Naupactus from the Achæans; and they never afterwards omitted any opportunity of gaining ground upon their neighbours, until, elated by the success with which they had defended themselves against their Macedonian and Celtic invaders, and encouraged by the weakness of the other states, they aspired to take the lead in Grecian politics. Their conquests, as we have already seen, were not confined to northern Greece, where in process of time they made themselves masters of Locris, Phocis, Bœotia, and parts of Acarnania, Epirus, and Thessaly, and assumed the entire control of the Delphic oracle and Amphyctyony.¹ They also annexed some Peloponnesian cities to their dominions; and we afterwards find not only the island of Cephallenia, but places at a great distance from their frontier,—cities of Thrace and Asia Minor—in a similar relation with them.

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Hence a question of some importance arises as to the origin and the precise nature of this relation. That in most cases it was the effect of compulsion, as is expressly related with regard to the Trachinian Heraclea², can hardly be doubted, but rather whether there is sufficient reason to believe that it was in any instance purely voluntary, so that it may be attributed to a peaceful attraction which the Ætolian League exercised upon foreign states. We are informed indeed by Polybius that Mantinea of its own accord abandoned its connection with the Achæans to attach

¹ Plut. Demetr. 40. Polyb. iv. 25. 8. See Boekh. Corp. Inscr. n. 1694.

² Pausan. x. 20. 9. Οἱ Αἰτωλοὶ συντελεῖν τοὺς Ἡρακλέας ἠνάγκασαν ἐς τὸ Αἰτωλικόν.

itself to the Ætolian League¹; and this was no doubt true in the limited sense which the historian's argument required. But whether this accession took place, as appears most probable at least with regard to Tegea and Orchomenus, in the course of the expedition in which the Ætolians swept Laconia, or after Megalopolis had become a member of the Achæan confederacy, on either supposition motives may be suggested for it quite distinct from a preference grounded on the character of the Ætolian League.² In the more distant dependencies, such as Lysimachia on the Hellespont, and Cios on the eastern coast of the Propontis³, the object was either protection from more dreaded neighbours or security against the piratical incursions of the Ætolians themselves, who were not least formidable to those who had never injured them. We know that the people of Cios were glad to plead their mythical connection with Naupactus, after it had fallen into the hands of the Ætolians, to obtain exemption from the attacks of Ætolian privateers.⁴ And we may collect from the inscription which records this transaction, that the Ætolians not unfrequently abused the power they had usurped over the temple at Delphi, and the name of the Amphictyonic Council which they had appropriated to themselves, to give a legal and even a religious colour to their aggressions. Even Teos thought it worth while to send an embassy to Thermus to conclude a treaty of the closest amity, which provided against the violation of its city and terri-

¹ ii. 57. 1. Brückner (in Zimmermann's *Zeitschrift*, 1837, p. 1226. n. 7.) expresses a doubt as to the fact, but only refers to Plut. Arat. 31, 32. 35. (perhaps 36.), where I can find nothing even inconsistent with the assertion of Polybius, much less capable of overthrowing his authority.

² Brückner (u. s.) justly remarks, that Mantinea seems to have been from the time of Epaminondas in constant opposition to Megalopolis.

³ Polyb. xvii. 3. 11, 12.

⁴ Corp. Inscr. ii. n. 2350. Μηθένα ἔγειν Αἰτωλῶν μηδὲ τῶν ἐν Αἰτωλίᾳ πολιτεούντων τοὺς Κεῖους, μηθαμόθεν ὀρμώμενον, μήτε κατὰ γῆν μήτε κατὰ θάλασσαν, μήτε ποτ' Ἀμφικτυόνικον, μήτε ποτ' ἄλλο ἔγκλημα μηθέν, ὡς Αἰτωλῶν ὄντων τῶν Κείων.

tory.¹ These examples illustrate the mode in which the Ætolians gained adherents to their League on the continent of Greece. On the whole, notwithstanding their impetuous courage and sturdy love of freedom, it seems that they were never either liked or respected by the other Greeks: they were regarded, as they were, as a half-civilised race; and even if the Achæan League had not been in their way, would probably never have been able to extend their own so as to embrace the whole nation.

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Another interesting question relates to the terms on which they admitted new members into their body. So little information has been afforded to us by the ancient authors on this point, that room has been left for directly opposite opinions on the subject among modern writers, some of whom represent the relation as one of subordination and dependence², while others suppose the newly incorporated members to have been received on a footing of perfect equality³, and to have enjoyed every privilege of Ætolian citizens, with the single exception, that none but native Ætolians were eligible to the supreme dignity. The truth seems to lie midway. It is nearly certain that the term *sympolity*, which is most frequently used to describe the condition of the newly admitted states, was applied to a great variety of very different relations. That the general assemblies were sometimes held beyond the borders of Ætolia, as at Naupactus, Heraclea, and Hypata, undoubtedly raises a strong presumption, that the citizens of those towns shared all the political franchises of Ætolians: but it would be rash to conclude that this was the case with all, even if there were not evidence that in some instances at least the

¹ Corp. Inscr. n. 3046.

² Niebuhr, *Hist. of Rome*, II. p. 51. English transl.

³ Flathe, II. p. 151.

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relation was one of simple subjection¹, and the payment of tribute enforced by the constant presence of an Ætolian garrison.²

The Æto-
lians at
Phigalea.

Such appears to have been the case with the Arcadian town of Phigalea, which was situated near the right bank of the Neda, close to the borders of Triphylia and Messenia, and not many miles from the coast. As it was thus easily accessible to the Ætolians, it lay very commodiously for the prosecution of any designs which they might form against the southern part of Peloponnesus, and might serve as a starting-point for their inroads, and a place of refuge where they might deposit their booty. We can only conjecture when the connection began: but at the death of Antigonus Dason, we find it under the protection of the Ætolians, and furnishing them with a pretext for enterprises which involved Greece in a fresh war, one of those which received the name of the Social.

We are not informed what danger was supposed to threaten Phigalea: but very soon after Philip's accession, Dorimachus, the son of Nicostratus, was sent thither avowedly to provide for the security of the city, but, as Polybius intimates, with secret instructions to observe the state of affairs in Peloponnesus.

Dorimachus was a man of noble parentage in the Ætolian sense; for his father had made himself notorious as one of the leaders of an expedition, in which the Ætolians in time of peace fell upon the Bœotians

¹ Schorn (p. 29.) infers this with regard to Cephallenia from the article by which it was excluded from the treaty (Polyb. xxii. 13. 15. Liv. xxxviii. 9. 11.). He argues that if it had been in sympollity with the Ætolians it would have been expressly ceded; if it had been a free ally, like Elis, it would not have been necessary to mention it at all. But it seems that the same thing may be inferred as to places which were said *μετέχειν τῆς Αἰτωλῶν συμπολιτείας*, from Polyb. iv. 25. 7.

² Polyb. (u. s.), *ἀφρορήτους, ἀφορολογήτους*. Flathe (ii. p. 237.) flings this aside as a calumnious insinuation; though he treats (p. 250. n. 1.) the same expressions in the proposal made to the Eleans (Polyb. iv. 84.) as an admission that this was the common lot of the allies of Macedonia.

at Coronea, while they were assembled for the celebration of their national festival, and plundered the temple of Athena Itonia, one of the most ancient and venerated sanctuaries in Greece. Dorimachus was not a degenerate son of such a father, and though young had inspired his countrymen with confidence in his disposition and capacity to emulate the achievements of Nicostratus. He had not been long at Phigalea before he was joined by a band of adventurers, whom Polybius describes simply as pirates, and who therefore probably flocked to him from the coast of Elis, where the Ætolian privateers always found harbour. Dorimachus, deeming it his first duty to provide for his hungry followers, encouraged them to cross the Neda, and carry off the cattle from the Messenian pastures, though the Messenians were at this time in alliance with the Ætoliens. The freebooters soon extended their depredations, so far as to break open the Messenian farm-houses in the night, and complaints were addressed to Dorimachus by the Messenian government. As he himself received a share of the spoil, he delayed for some time to return any answer; but at length, being pressed by a succession of expostulating embassies, he promised to go to Messene, and investigate the alleged grievances. But when on his arrival the injured parties applied to him, instead of redress or excuses, they met with insult and invectives. During his stay in Messene, the public indignation was exasperated by a fresh outrage of the pirates, who attacked a farm in the neighbourhood of the city, killed several of the inmates who defended their master's property, and carried away the rest of the slaves and the cattle. The Messenian ephors now summoned Dorimachus to appear before the council of the magistrates, where the ephor Sciron proposed to detain him until he should give satisfaction. This proposal, which was

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Their ag-
gressions on
Messenia.

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Dorimachus
and Scopas.

received with general assent by the Assembly, produced a vehement altercation between him and Dorimachus, in the course of which he threw out a sarcasm which deeply stung the Ætolian. In the end Dorimachus was allowed to depart, on an engagement that compensation should be made for the wrong which had been done : but he returned home bent on revenge. Still a private quarrel provoked by such outrageous aggression on his own part, did not seem to him a ground on which he could appeal to the sympathy of the nation. But he was able to wield the power of the state for his purpose without a public disclosure of his motives. The Strategus Ariston was his kinsman, and, being prevented by ill-health from taking the field, had devolved the cares of his office on Dorimachus and another of his kinsmen, named Scopas. All therefore that Dorimachus needed was to gain over Scopas to his views : and Polybius supposes that Scopas was won by the prospect of a rich booty in Messenia, which had been long exempt from hostile ravages, while Philip's youth and the weakness of the Achæans removed all fear of consequences. So much might be inferred from the events which ensued ; and it can only be regarded as a like inference, when the historian adds, that the two chiefs, without consulting either the national Council or even the Apocletes, and only in concert with a few of their private friends, resolved to make war on Messenia, Épirus, Achaia, Acarnania, and Macedonia, at once. It is very doubtful that they formed any such plan of war : but it appears that they gave license and encouragement to a series of hostile aggressions on all these states, without either legal authority, or colourable pretext.

The Ætolian privateers sallied forth in all directions, and brought in a Macedonian merchant-vessel, captured off Cythera, which was sold as a lawful

prize, together with the whole ship's company. But some other operations of warlike aspect, which took place at the same time, could only be regarded as acts of the government. Vessels were borrowed from the Cephallenians, with which descents were made on the coast of Epirus; and an attempt to surprise the Acarnanian town of Thyreum in the night, which had been concerted with some of the inhabitants, only failed it seems through some mischance. We do not so clearly perceive the object of another movement which Polybius attributes to Dorimachus and Scopas. He says that by their direction a small body of Ætolians made their way clandestinely through Peloponnesus, and seized a stronghold called Clarium in the territory of Megalopolis, where they established a market for the booty which they collected from the country round; but they were forced, in the course of a few days, to surrender to Timoxenus the General of the Achæans, and Taurion, who united their forces to besiege the place. It might have seemed that this inroad would probably put the Peloponnesians on their guard, and thus interfere with the main design of the Ætolian leaders: but it appears that no further notice was taken of it; and Dorimachus and Scopas proceeded to strike the blow, which was their chief aim. Having waited until the year of Timoxenus had nearly expired, so that he could not be expected to undertake an expedition which might last much longer than his command, they assembled the whole force of Ætolia at Rhium, where the Cephallenian vessels and a great number of transports were in readiness to carry it across the Straits, and having landed on the opposite point directed their march through the territory of Patræ, Tritæa, and Pharæ, toward Messenia. They affected however to disclaim hostile intentions toward the Achæans, but probably made no serious attempt to restrain the national pro-

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pensity, and the track of the army was marked by havoc and depredation as far as Phigalea. They then invaded Messenia, where they met with no resistance, and found the wealth accumulated during a long peace exposed to their rapacity.

While they were gorging themselves with plunder, the Achæans met for the election of their magistrates at Ægium, and Aratus was elected as usual to succeed Timoxenus. In this assembly Messenian deputies appeared to implore protection: and loud complaints were heard from the cantons which had suffered from the passage of the Ætolians; but the insult offered to the national territory excited still warmer indignation. A decree was carried by which the General was empowered to muster all the forces of the League, and to march to the aid of the Messenians. Further deliberation was reserved until the nation should be assembled under arms. Aratus, who was probably the mover of this decree, was eager for its immediate execution. But Timoxenus was the less inclined to begin a campaign when he had but a very few days to remain in office, as he felt little confidence in the Achæan troops, which had not only lost much of their military habits and discipline since the end of the last war, but had never shown the same spirit since they began to depend on Macedonian protection.¹ He was ready however to resign his authority to Aratus, and Aratus did not scruple to assume the command five days before he was legally entitled to it, and having received the common seal from Timoxenus, issued orders to the cities of the League, to arm their contingents, and send them forthwith to Megalopolis. There, when the army was collected, the Messenian

B. C. 220.
Preparation
for war.

¹ Polyb. iv. 7. Plut. Ar. 47. But it does not appear that Timoxenus endeavoured, as is stated by Schorn (p. 141.), to prevent the outbreak of hostilities, or, as K. W. Nitsch expresses it (*Polybius*, p. 15.), dissuaded the war. All we learn is, that he shrank from the personal risk.

deputies appeared, to renew their entreaties for succour, to which they now added the request, that they might be admitted into alliance with the Achæans. This part of their petition was rejected, as the Achæans were not at liberty to contract any new alliance without the consent of Macedonia; but succour was promised to them, on the condition that the envoys would send their sons as hostages to Sparta, for a security that the Messenians would not make peace with the Ætolians without the sanction of the Achæans; for Sparta had not yet disclosed any hostile intentions, and had sent her contingent into the field, though it kept aloof from the Achæan army, as if watching the issue. Having taken this precaution, Aratus sent a message to the Ætolian commanders, requiring them to withdraw their forces from Messenia, and to abstain from setting foot on the Achæan territory in their retreat. Dorimachus and Scopas, who were now chiefly anxious to carry away their spoil in safety¹, promised compliance, and immediately wrote to Aristo to send the transports to the isle of Pheias, off the coast of Elis, to be in readiness for the embarkation of the troops, and two days afterwards began their march in that direction.²

Aratus, deceived by their professions, hastily dismissed the bulk of his forces, retaining only 3000 foot and 300 horse, together with the auxiliaries under Taurion, with which he took the road to Patræ, intending to observe the movements of the Ætolians. The Ætolian generals, as Polybius himself believed,

¹ Merleker (*Geschichte des Bundesgenossen-Krieges*, p. 43.) represents Aratus as having required the Ætollans to leave their booty behind them, and as so much displeased when he found that they had carried it away with them, that he determined to attack them. But neither of these statements is warranted by Polybius.

² Col. Leake (*Morea*, III. p. 124.) gives a different account of their plans, supposing that they meant to embark at Rhium, and only assembled the transports at Pheias to secure their embarkation of the baggage, in case they should be unable to convey it across the Strait of Rhium.

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apprehended that he designed to attack them during the confusion of the embarkation; and they were thus it appears induced to change their plan.¹ They sent the booty to the coast of Elis, under the escort of a detachment which they ordered to meet them at Rhium, and then by a sudden change in their line of march moved toward Olympia: but hearing that the Achæans had advanced northward as far as Clitor, so that they could not hope to embark at Rhium without molestation, they resolved to watch for a favourable opportunity for a battle with Aratus. With this view they encamped at Methydrium; and Aratus, when he learned that they were so near, moved southward into the plain of Caphyræ. The Ætolian commanders then advanced toward Caphyræ, expecting a battle, and confident of victory; but they were daunted when they observed the strength of the position which Aratus had taken up, and were proceeding to enter the defiles of Mount Oligyrtus, when Aratus, who might have attacked them to advantage on even ground, drew them into an engagement in such a manner as to expose every portion of his army in succession to the certainty of defeat. It was totally routed, and would perhaps have been destroyed if the vicinity of Caphyræ and Orchomenus had not afforded refuge to the fugitives. The Megalopolitans, who had marched in full force to join the Achæans, arrived in time to bury the slain; while the victors, quietly pursuing their way toward the north-east, after having made an unsuccessful attempt on Pellene, and ravaged the territory of Sicyon, returned home by the Isthmus.

The errors which Aratus had committed in this short campaign were so many and gross, that Poly-

¹ Polybius's account of their movements, notwithstanding its minuteness, is very obscure, as appears from the various ways in which it has been understood by Leake (l. c.); Lucas, p. 102.; Merleker, p. 43.; Helwing, p. 173.; and Schorn, p. 142.

battle of
Caphyræ.

bius is led into a digression to explain how so great a man could be capable of folly, such, the historian says, as could not be surpassed. An Assembly of the League was held soon after his return, in which he found himself the object of general indignation as the author of the recent disaster; and his adversaries did not fail to point out how much the fault of his illegal usurpation was aggravated by the remembrance of the many similar calamities which he had drawn upon the state by his military incapacity. Still his influence was so predominant, that, though he could not venture altogether to vindicate his conduct, by an appeal to the indulgence of his audience, on the ground of former services, he completely turned the current of public feeling in his favour, and gained the assent of the Assembly to all his measures. It decreed that an embassy should be sent to Philip and the other allies, to call for succour against the Ætoli-ans, and to propose that the Messenians should be admitted into the confederacy; and that in the meanwhile the General should raise an army of 5000 foot and 500 horse for the protection of Messenia, and should fix the contingents of Sparta and Messene. Each was to furnish 2500 foot and 250 horse; so that Aratus would have had at his disposal a standing army of 10,000 foot and 1000 horse, a force which might have seemed adequate, without foreign aid, to guard Peloponnesus against invasion from Ætolia. But Aratus may already have begun to distrust the fidelity of Sparta; and this is the best excuse that can be offered for this second invitation of Macedonian interference in the affairs of Greece. An Ætolian Assembly was held about the same time, which, as if unconscious of any wrong, declared its purpose to remain at peace with the Lacedæmonians and Messenians and all other states, but to make war on the Achæans if they should admit the Messenians into

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their alliance; a threat which Polybius considers as glaringly inconsistent with their pacific language, but which expressed their resolution to resist the extension of the Achæo-Macedonian League. This was now the point on which the question of peace or war turned; and the Macedonian government when, in conjunction it seems with the other allies, it adopted the proposal of the Achæans with regard to Messene, virtually decided for war: yet they did not treat the past aggressions of the Ætoliens as a ground for active hostility, but proclaimed their intention to continue at peace with them.

The Ætoliens however still thought it better to act as if war had been declared, than to declare it in words. They entered into secret negotiations with Sparta, and they took the earliest opportunity to make a fresh inroad into Peloponnesus. An Illyrian chief named Scerdilaidas, who, with Demetrius of Pharos, in spite of their treaty with Rome, had made an expedition with ninety galleys toward the south, after a fruitless attempt on Pylos, had parted from his associate, and, while Demetrius with fifty galleys made for the Cyclades, sailing homeward with the rest, touched at Naupactus. Dorimachus and Scopas, who, through intelligence with a faction in the Arcadian town of Cynætha, hoped to become masters of it, engaged the Illyrian, for a share of the spoil, to aid them in their enterprise.

Cynætha was unhappily distinguished among the Arcadian cities by the long prevalence of internal discord, and the sanguinary excesses of party rage with which it had been afflicted. Polybius, in one of his most pleasing and instructive digressions, traces this singular ferocity of the Cynæthians to their neglect of the institutions, which chiefly contributed to soften and elevate the character of their countrymen, early instruction in sacred music, and the frequent cele-

bration of religious festivals. After a long series of convulsions, always accompanied with massacres, banishments, and confiscations, one of the parties, having expelled its antagonists, committed the guard of the city to an Achæan garrison. But, growing perhaps impatient of this burden, they afterwards accepted the overtures of the exiles, and permitted them to return, with the sanction of the Achæans, who withdrew their troops. The exiles however, who were about 300 in number, were no sooner restored than they opened a secret negotiation with the Ætolian chiefs; and it was to take advantage of their perfidy that Dorimachus and Scopas united their forces with those of Scerdilaidas. They marched across Achaia, and arriving at Cynætha in the night, were admitted by some of the conspirators, and soon made themselves masters of the town. They then immediately began an indiscriminate massacre, in which their friends were the first victims; all who were suspected of concealing property were put to the torture. When they had finished the work of pillage, they proceeded to attack a celebrated temple of Artemis at Lusi, between Cynætha and Clitor, but allowed themselves to be propitiated by a portion of the sacred treasure, the more willingly, as they were about to make an attempt on Clitor. Having been repulsed by the Clitorians, they began their retreat, collected fresh booty from the temple lands at Lusi, set fire to Cynætha, and embarked at Rhium with their plunder, which they brought home safely. During their stay in Arcadia Aratus had sent to solicit succours from Philip, and in the meanwhile had assembled the force of the League, and called upon Sparta and Messenia for their contingents. Sparta sent only a handful of men to save appearances. Still he might have attacked the invaders on many points of their march with the prospect of an easy victory; but, as if to

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The Ætolians at Cynætha.

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compensate for his recent temerity by an equal degree of inertness, he suffered them to pass unmolested. Taurion was more active; he prevailed on Demetrius, who had been chased from the Cyclades by the Rhodians, and had put into Cenchreæ, to transport his galleys across the Isthmus, and intercept the Ætoli-ans; but he arrived two days too late. Philip too set his army in motion, as soon as he received the summons of Aratus; but he did not reach Corinth until the emergency was past. He however invited all the allies to send deputies to hold a congress with him at Corinth, and in the meanwhile advanced to Tegea for the purpose of restoring tranquillity at Sparta, which had been lately the scene of violent tumults. The great body of the Spartans, notwithstanding the changes introduced by Antigonus, retained all the feelings of animosity toward Macedonia and the Achæans, which had been infused into them by Cleomenes. They eagerly longed and hoped for the return of their hero, and as long as he lived kept the throne vacant, or rather treated it as filled. They viewed the proceedings of the Ætoli-ans with secret sympathy, and only waited for an opportunity of declaring themselves. Three of the ephors, who were favourable to the alliance with Ætolia, fearing that they might be denounced by their colleague Adeimantus, caused him to be murdered, with several other partizans of the Macedonian interest, and immediately sent envoys to pacify Philip, who met them as he was crossing Mount Parthenius and directed that commissioners should be appointed by the ephors to confer with him at Tegea. Ten were despatched accordingly with Omias at their head, and pleaded the cause of their party in the royal council, endeavouring to throw the blame of the late commotion on Adeimantus, and to soothe Philip by the strongest protestations of fidelity. But when they had with-

Commotion
at Sparta.

Phillip at
Tegea.

drawn, the voices of the Council were unanimously raised against the Spartans, though opinions were divided as to the measure of punishment which it deserved. There were some who advised Philip to make an example of Sparta, as Alexander had of Thebes. The elder and more discreet counsellors thought that it would be sufficient to punish and remove the authors of the tumult, and to lodge all the functions of government in the hands of the opposite party. But the young king carried his forbearance far beyond even this degree of lenity. He laid down the broad principle, that, as chief of the League, he had no right to interfere, otherwise than by remonstrance or advice, in the domestic concerns of any of the allied states, so long as they did not affect the general interests of the confederacy. It would be strange, he observed, if the Spartans, now that they professed unshaken attachment to the common cause, should receive harsher treatment from him than from his father (Antigonus), who had spared them while they were open enemies. He accordingly dismissed the Spartan ministers, and sent Petreus, one of his friends, along with them, to exhort the people to stedfastness, and to receive oaths of fidelity from the government. Polybius supposes that Philip's language was prompted by Aratus; and no doubt it expressed the maxim which he must have wished to see observed by his powerful ally. But Philip was of the age to which popularity is most attractive, and a liberal sentiment most congenial.

He then returned to Corinth, where he found the deputies of the allies waiting his arrival, and immediately opened the Congress. Every state had to complain of some injury from the Ætolians, and war was unanimously decreed against them. The decree however not only set forth their recent aggressions, but declared the resolution of the League to recover

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cial War.

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whatever territory or city belonging to any of the allies they had conquered since the death of Demetrius, Philip's father; to restore all who had been compelled to enter into the relation of sympolity with them to entire independence, and to re-instate the Amphictyonic Council under its ancient laws in the control over the temple at Delphi, which they had usurped. Such, Polybius remarks, was the formal beginning of the Social War; and envoys were sent in the name of the congress to procure the ratification of the decree from each of the confederates. Yet Philip addressed a letter to the Ætolians, in which he declared himself still willing to listen to any plea which they might have to allege for their conduct, but warned them that they must not think to shelter themselves from just retaliation under the pretence that their aggressions were the acts of individuals, not of the state. To this letter he received an answer, proposing a conference at Rhium. The offer was made with the belief that it would not be accepted. But when the Ætolian chiefs found that Philip was ready to meet them, they retracted their proposal, on the pretext that they could not treat with him until they were authorised by the great Council of the nation. It met very soon after for the annual election; but as if to show how little was to be expected from the sense of justice, it invested Scopas, the associate of Dorimachus, with the chief magistracy. The Achæan Assembly, which was held about the same time at Ægium, ratified the decree of the Congress at Corinth, and proclaimed public licence of reprisals against the Ætolians. Philip appeared at this assembly, and addressed it in a long speech, which was received with great applause, and a vote was passed by which all the honours conferred on his predecessors were revived in his favour. He then returned to Macedonia, to make preparations during

the winter for the ensuing campaign, leaving a strong impression of his ability and moderation on the minds of the Greeks. It was already clear that he possessed extraordinary talents and activity, and that he was quite equal to the government of his kingdom. In the course of the winter he not only ordered fresh levies, and took measures to secure his north-west frontier against his barbarian neighbours, but ventured to seek an interview with Scerdilaidas in his own dominions. The Illyrian prince had been defrauded by the Ætolians of his share of the booty which he had helped to win. He was therefore well disposed to meet Philip's advances, pleased with the confidence placed in his generosity, and easily induced to become the ally of Macedonia, and to engage, for a yearly subsidy of twenty talents, to make war on the Ætolians with a squadron of thirty galleys.

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The result of the embassies sent in the name of the Congress to receive the ratification of the decree, showed how large a part of the burden and risk of the war would fall on Macedonia. The Acarnanians alone seem to have pledged themselves honestly and without reserve to the common cause, though none had so much reason to dread the enmity of the Ætolians. The Epirots, though they likewise ratified the decree, passed a resolution not to begin hostilities until Philip should have set the example: and they represented to the Ætolian envoys, that they were determined to remain at peace. Even the Messenians, though the war had arisen in their defence, declined to enter into it immediately. They were ruled by an oligarchical party which considered this policy as the best calculated to secure their possessions from the danger of another Ætolian invasion: and they informed the envoys of the League, that they would not declare war until Phigalea, which now enabled the Ætolians to infest their border, should have been taken from

Dispositions
of the allies.

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them. At Sparta the ministers of the Congress were dismissed without an answer: a sign, Polybius thought, of perplexity; but which seems rather to indicate that the adverse parties balanced each other. New ephors came into office not long after, who were disposed to maintain the alliance with Macedonia: but it seems that about the same time the death of Cleomenes became known, and encouraged the leaders of the opposite party to make a fresh attempt. At their request an Ætolian envoy was sent to Sparta; and they then called upon the ephors to introduce him to the Assembly of the people, and to fill up the vacancy of the throne. The ephors reserved the question of the succession for future consideration, but fearing to irritate the younger citizens, who were eager for change, consented to grant an audience to Machatas, the envoy. Yet in the Assembly, the recollection of the evils inflicted on the country by the Ætolian invasion, which some of the elder speakers contrasted with the forbearance of Antigonus, turned the current of public feeling against his proposals. The Macedonian alliance was confirmed, and the envoy dismissed. But this failure seems only to have instigated the leaders of the disappointed party to bolder and more decisive measures. A festival which was celebrated with an armed procession of the younger citizens to the Brazen House, and with a sacrifice performed there by the ephors, afforded an opportunity which they seized not the less willingly because it involved the profanation of a sanctuary hitherto regarded as inviolably sacred. They engaged some of their young partizans to fall upon the ephors while they were busied with the sacrifice. All were murdered: and the terror inspired by this deed quelled all resistance to the conspirators. Some members of the Gerusia were put to death: all who had opposed the Ætolian envoy in the assembly

Revolution
of Sparta.

were banished, and the ephorate filled with men devoted to the party, who made it their first business to take measures for concluding an alliance with the Ætoli-
 lians. Machatas, who had not yet it seems reached home, was recalled: and in the meanwhile royalty was restored, yet not with a strict adherence to the constitutional order of succession. The place of Cleomenes indeed was filled by the legitimate heir, Agesipolis, a grandson of Cleombrotus, the rival of Leonidas. He was under age, and his uncle Cleomenes was appointed his guardian: so that it was evident the whole business of the royal office would for some time devolve on his colleague. But in the house of Procles, though the murdered Archidamus had left two sons, who were still living, as well as others of the same line, a man named Lycurgus, who had no lawful title, was raised to the throne. Polybius intimates that he was not even a Heracleid, and represents it as notorious, that he purchased his elevation by a bribe of a talent to each of the ephors. But it is probable that the chief ground of their preference was, that they could rely on his devotion to the interests of their party. Machatas then, on his return to Sparta, found the objects of his mission accomplished, and had only to exhort his friends to close the door against reconciliation with their late allies, by an early commencement of hostilities. Lycurgus accordingly made an irruption soon after into Argolis, where he surprised several towns on the coast, and then proceeded to lay siege to the Athenæum, the fortress which Cleomenes had seized at the beginning of the last war. Machatas, on his way home, persuaded the Eleans to follow the example of Sparta.

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Lycurgus
king.

Such was the state of affairs in Greece, when Aratus went out of office, and was succeeded by his son, who bore his father's name, but seems to have been en-

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Philip be-
siegues Am-
bracus.

dowed with no great share of his abilities. The Achæan League, surrounded by active enemies, had no ally nearer than Macedonia to whom it could look for effectual aid: and its own resources had been very much reduced by its exertions in the Cleomenic War. Some of the mercenaries who served in that war had never received their full pay, and consequently the new General found it difficult to draw others into the service. Philip took the field early in the spring, with an army of 15,000 foot and 800 horse, and marched from Thessaly into Epirus with the design of invading Ætolia: a movement, by which, if he had executed it without delay, he would, as Polybius believed, soon have brought the war to a close. But he yielded to the solicitation of the Epirots, who wished to become masters of Ambracia, and laid siege to Ambracus, a place of great strength in the vicinity of that city: and the time which he thus wasted was employed by the Ætolians to the best advantage, both with a view to defence and offence. Dorimachus indeed was repulsed with some loss in an attempt on Ægira, through the greediness with which his troops fell on the plunder. But the Ætolian general Euripidas, who had been sent to take the command of the Elean forces, ravaged the north of Achaia with impunity, and fortified an ancient stronghold called Teichos, near Cape Araxus, which enabled him to infest the territories of Dyne, Pharæ, and Tritæa with continual inroads. The people of these three cantons, after having repeatedly applied for succour to their General without effect, resolved to withdraw their contributions from the League, and to apply them to the maintenance of a body of mercenaries for their own protection. Thus the League seemed to be in danger of internal dissolution, while it was most vigorously assailed from without. Polybius charges the younger Aratus with supineness and neglect; but his position

would probably have been embarrassing, even to a man of extraordinary energy.

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While Philip lay before Ambracus, Scopas, with the bulk of the Ætolian forces, marched through Thessaly into Pieria, and after having ravaged the plain country advanced against Dium, the Macedonian Olympia. The inhabitants abandoned the town at his approach, and he found nothing but the buildings whereon to wreak his fury. These, whether private dwellings or public monuments, he destroyed or defaced; he dismantled the walls, demolished the gymnasium, set fire to the precincts of the sacred ground where the games were celebrated, stately galleries or cloisters richly adorned with choice works of art, and threw down all the statues of the Macedonian kings. In Ætolia this barbarous outrage was regarded as a glorious triumph, proving that, while their own land remained untouched, no enemy's country was secure from their victorious arms. Philip received the mortifying intelligence while he was still detained before Ambracus, which he only compelled to capitulate by extraordinary exertions at the end of forty days, the garrison, 500 Ætolians, being allowed to retire. He then delivered possession of the town to the Epirots, and proceeded through Acarnania, where he was joined by the Acarnanian contingent, 2000 foot, and 200 horse, into Ætolia. Here, after some slight advantages, he encamped on the Achelous near Stratus, and ravaged the adjacent country. He was thus occupied when Achæan envoys came to request that he would make a diversion in their favour by the invasion of Elis, where his army would find ample booty. Professing to require time for deliberation on this proposal, and keeping the envoys by his side, he moved forward toward the southern coast, by Metropolis, Conope, and Ithorea, leaving the towns of Metropolis and Ithorea, which were de-

Invades
Ætolia.

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serted at his approach, in ruins, and wasting the country through which he passed, until he came to Pæanium, a strong place, which he took by storm, and having razed it to the ground carried away the materials of the houses with a view to the siege of Cœniadæ. The Ætolians had made preparations to defend the citadel of Cœniadæ, but after the fall of Pæanium abandoned it in terror. Philip perceiving the manifold advantages of its position, both as a place of embarkation for Peloponnesus, and with a view to operations in Ætolia, having first made himself master of Elæus, another fortress on the Calydonian coast, was proceeding to fortify Cœniadæ, and to connect the harbour by a wall with the citadel, when he was interrupted by the news, that the Dardanians were collecting their forces to invade Macedonia during his absence. He immediately dismissed the Achæan envoys with a promise, that, as soon as he had provided for the safety of his kingdom, he would endeavour to succour his allies, and then set out for Macedonia by the same road which he had taken southward. At the mouth of the Ambracian gulf, he fell in with Demetrius the Pharian, who had been driven out of Illyria by Æmilius Paulus, and had made his escape with a few galleys.¹ He was kindly received by Philip, who directed him to proceed to Corinth, and thence repair by land to his court. He himself reached Pella before the Dardanians had entered Macedonia, and though they were near the border, they were so much alarmed by the news of his return, that they abandoned their enterprise, and disbanded their forces. Philip likewise, finding that the danger was past, dismissed his troops to their homes for the vintage, and fixed

¹ Polyb. III. 19. 8. Afterwards, indeed (IV. 66. 4.), he says that he arrived ἐφ' ἐνδὲς λέμβου. But Zonaras also (VIII. 20.) relates that he escaped μετὰ πολλῶν χρημάτων.

his own residence for the rest of the summer at Larissa.

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At the next election of the Ætolian magistrates Scopas was succeeded by his friend Dorimachus, who signalled the beginning of his administration by an achievement like that which had gained so much renown for his predecessor. He made an expedition into Epirus, in the course of which, among other acts of wanton havoc, he destroyed the temple of Dodona. After this the season seemed too far advanced for military operations; and neither friends nor foes expected that Philip would stir again before the spring. But when he took up his quarters at Larissa he appears to have meditated a movement which was quite at variance with the common rules of Grecian warfare, but on that very account afforded the fairer prospect of brilliant success. He set out from Larissa in the depth of winter with a small force, 3000 heavy-armed, 2000 targeteers, 300 Cretan bowmen, and 400 horse; and taking the route of Eubœa, Locris, and Bœotia, arrived at Corinth before any rumour of his approach had reached Peloponnesus. Having ordered the city gates to be closed, and the roads strictly guarded, to prevent the tidings from passing to the enemy, he next day sent for Aratus from Sicyon, and at the same time by letters appointed a day on which the General should meet him with the forces of the League at Caphyæ. After his conference with Aratus he continued his march, and encamped in the territory of Phlius. It happened that the Ætolian general Euripidas, who had fixed his quarters at Psophis in Arcadia, had chosen the same time for an inroad into the territory of Sicyon with a body of about 2000 men. He had passed the Macedonian encampment in the night, and was about to cross the Sicyonian border the next morning, when he learnt Philip's vicinity from some foragers who

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fell into his hands. Keeping his discovery to himself, he gave immediate orders for retreat, hoping by a forced march again to pass the Macedonian army before it had entered the plain of Stymphalus, so as to return by Phenca to Psophis unobserved. But he was deceived by his calculation, and fell in with the enemy in the passes of mount Apelauros, between Phlius and Stymphalus. Seeing that an engagement was unavoidable, and believing defeat certain, he basely abandoned his men, and escaped with a few horsemen over the mountains to Psophis. His troops, whom he had not even warned of their danger, and who at first sight mistook the Macedonians for Achæans, were completely routed, 1200 taken, and almost all the rest slain. The fame of this victory was to most of the Peloponnesians the first report which they heard of Philip's arrival.

At Caphyæ he was joined by the younger Aratus and about 4000 Achæans, and indulged his troops, who had suffered great hardships amidst the deep snows of mount Oligyrtus, with two days' rest; and then proceeded to lay siege to Psophis. The place, situate at the confluence of two rapid streams, Aroanius and Erymanthus, was so strong both by nature and art, that Philip seems to have owed his success in a great measure to the boldness of the attempt. When he had stormed the town, the citadel capitulated. The Elean garrison was allowed to depart, and Euripidas to return to Ætolia. Philip then assembled the Achæans, and having pointed out the importance of the place, delivered it into their possession as a token of his goodwill. To this favour he shortly after added the cession of Lasium, which he found evacuated by the Eleans. After a short repose at Olympia, he advanced into the vale of Elis, to collect the booty which it offered in greater abundance than any other district of Greece. The Eleans

Invasion of
Elis.

still retained their love of rural pursuits, and all the wealth of the people was spread over the face of the country: and the attempt which they made to secure it only enabled the enemy to take possession of it the more easily and quickly. A great multitude of husbandmen, with their flocks and herds and other moveable riches, sought refuge in a stronghold called Thalamæ, which was deemed impregnable, and was defended by two hundred mercenaries under the Elean general Amphidamus. But when Philip had overcome the difficulties of the first approach, Amphidamus surrendered the sooner, as he could maintain no control over such a motley mass. The conqueror carried away more than 5000 captives beside cattle without number; and the camp was so encumbered with booty, that he was obliged on that account to hasten his return to Olympia. An expedition which he next undertook against Triphylia was no less successful, though Dorimachus, at the request of the Eleans, had sent Philidas with 600 Ætolians to their aid. After the reduction of Aliphera the Triphylian towns opened their gates to the king, so that he had made himself master of the whole country in the course of six days. The Phigaleans, who had begun to feel their connection with Ætolia burdensome, now took up arms against the pirates, and having compelled them to retire, surrendered their city to Philip. The hindrance which had kept Messenia neutral was thus removed. As Philip moved forward to Megalopolis, the Spartans believed that they should be the next to feel his presence; they evacuated the Athenæum, and razed it to the ground, and began to remove their property from the country into the city. Yet an attempt which had been made just before to effect a counter-revolution had signally failed. One Chilon, a man of the royal blood, who believed that he had been unjustly excluded from the

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throne which was usurped by Lycurgus, formed a conspiracy, into which he drew two hundred associates, to overturn the government. His first measure was to put to death all the ephors as they sat at table—a fit retribution for the crime by which they had risen to power,—and he then proceeded with like intention to the house of his rival; but Lycurgus was concealed by his neighbours, and escaped to the frontier. Chilon, whose hopes were dashed by this failure, now only persevered because it was too late to recede; and he shortly found that, though he was able to get rid of a few more of his enemies, he could not gain a single new friend to his cause: even the proposal of a new agrarian law, on which he chiefly relied, as the engine by which Cleomenes had accomplished his ends, produced no effect on the multitude. It seems to have been felt that he represented a party which was directly opposed to the policy of Cleomenes, and which leaned on Macedonia for support. Accordingly, when he found it necessary to fly from Sparta, he took refuge in Achaia. Philip however did not think it advisable at this juncture to invade Laconia, but proceeded to pass the rest of the winter at Argos.

Intrigues
of Apelles.

While he was thus successful in all his undertakings, and was unfolding such extraordinary talents, hands were at work spinning a web of intrigues around him, which as it thickened threatened to fetter his activity and to mar his prospects. Antigonus by his will had assigned the principal place in his council to Apelles, an ambitious, overbearing man, who was willing enough to promote his master's interests so long as his own influence was supreme in the cabinet, but impatient of a rival, and capable of sacrificing every principle of honour and duty to pride and jealousy. Apelles viewed the course of events in Greece, as it was probably viewed by every Macedonian statesman, as affording an opportunity for

reducing Greece to complete subjection; and when he accompanied Philip into Peloponnesus, he made it his aim to accustom the Achæans to the same state of dependence and acknowledgment of inferiority, to which the Thessalians had already submitted, though they still retained the forms of a free constitution, and even looked down on the Macedonians, as subjects of a monarchy, with some degree of contempt. In the prosecution of this plan, he encouraged the Macedonians to turn the Achæans out of their quarters, and to deprive them of their share of the booty, and he endeavoured to break their spirit by the infliction of corporal punishments for every slight fault. During Philip's last sojourn at Olympia, some of the Achæans had complained of this conduct to Aratus, who reported their grievances to the king, and Philip had promised to protect them, and had enjoined Apelles to desist from all encroachments on their rights and on the authority of the Achæan General.

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Apelles now regarded Aratus as his enemy, and endeavoured both to estrange the king from him, and to undermine his influence among his countrymen. He sought out and caressed his political adversaries, and represented to Philip that, so long as he followed the advice of Aratus, he would obtain nothing from the Achæans beyond the letter of the treaty; but if he would be guided by different counsels, and support the opposite party, he would be able to make use of the Peloponnesians at his pleasure. Philip quite agreed with his minister as to the desirableness of the end, and adopted his suggestions as to the means. At the next election, under colour of an expedition against the Eleans, he stopped at Ægium on his way, and by secret influence caused Timoxenus, the friend of Aratus, to be rejected, and Eperatus, a man, according to Polybius, of small abilities, but perhaps a zealous partizan, to be elected General. He then

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continued his march westward, and encamped before Teichos, which the Elean garrison, not venturing to stand a siege, presently surrendered; and, having restored it to the Dymæans, he made an inroad into the territory of Elis, and returned to Dyme with a great booty.

Apelles had been unremitting in his endeavours to inspire the king with distrust of Aratus, and shortly after the election he had found a pretext for a new and bolder calumny. Amphidamus, the Elean general, who was taken prisoner at Thalamæ, when he was brought to Olympia, had obtained an audience of Philip, and undertook, if he was allowed to return home, to negotiate an alliance between Elis and Macedonia. Philip was thus induced to release him without ransom, and empowered him to make very liberal offers to his countrymen. But it appeared that he had greatly overrated his influence or his powers of persuasion, for instead of gaining their assent to his proposals, he became an object of their suspicions. Apelles imputed this failure to the artifices of Aratus, who, he pretended, had secretly warned Amphidamus to beware how he endangered the independence of Peloponnesus by such an addition to the power of Macedonia. This charge he ventured to repeat in Philip's presence, when confronted with Aratus, who, as he was unable immediately to prove his innocence, could only request the king to suspend his judgment until he should have more fully investigated the truth. During Philip's stay at Dyme the truth came to light. The recent invasion had excited the suspicion of the Eleans against Amphidamus, and a design was formed to arrest him and to send him in chains into Ætolia. But having discovered his danger in time, he fled to Dyme, and Aratus immediately begged Philip to examine him on the allegations of Apelles. His statement convinced Philip that the charge brought against

Aratus was utterly groundless. This discovery, while it revived the king's confidence in Aratus, shook that which he had hitherto reposed in the author of the detected calumny, and he soon found other reasons for deeper distrust of his minister.

Eperatus had scarcely entered upon his office before it became manifest that, either from want of energy or of credit, he would never be able to further his patron's views. Philip was in need of money and provisions for the pay and maintenance of his army, and he caused an Assembly to be held at Ægium in the hope of obtaining a supply. But as the new General possessed no weight, and that of Aratus and his party was thrown into the opposite scale, the Assembly showed no disposition to meet the king's wishes. He now perceived the error into which he had been drawn by the counsels of Apelles; and having induced the government to transfer the Assembly to Sicyon, he in the meanwhile made overtures for a reconciliation with Aratus and his son, expressed his regret for the steps into which he had been misled by Apelles, and solicited a renewal of their friendship and good offices. He soon reaped the fruits of this condescension. When the influence of Aratus was exerted in his favour, the Assembly displayed the utmost readiness to comply with his requests. It granted an immediate subsidy of fifty talents, as three months' pay for his army, and a large supply of corn, and decreed that for the future he should receive seventeen talents a month, as long as he should carry on the war in Peloponnesus. He now resolved to equip a fleet as the most effectual instrument of annoyance to the enemy, who would neither be able to guard themselves nor to succour one another against attacks from the sea-side, which could never be foreseen. He therefore collected all the naval forces of the League, together with his own, at Lechæum, and exercised his Macedonians in nau-

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Conspiracy
against
Philip.

tical evolutions, until he had rendered them expert in all the operations of naval warfare. But in the meanwhile Apelles, seeing his credit declining, and despairing of recovering his master's confidence, resolved to break the power which he was no longer allowed to wield, and to thwart every plan adopted without his concurrence, hoping it seems that, by a series of failures and disasters, Philip might be compelled to abandon himself to his guidance. Among the other great officers whom Antigonus had appointed by his will, two, Leontius and Megaleas, were entirely devoted to his interests, and by malicious insinuations he had alienated Philip from the other two, Taurion and Alexander, the commander of the guard, and had caused them to be removed from their posts. Leontius and Megaleas entered into his schemes, and it was concerted among them, that Apelles should on some pretext retire to Chalcis, and intercept all supplies which the king had to expect from the north, while his two associates, remaining by the king's side, should take every opportunity of baffling his enterprises.

The first operations of the fleet were directed against Cephallenia, which had long been the arsenal that supplied the Ætoliens with most of the vessels they used for their expeditions. As well on this account, as for the convenience of its position, it was an object of the highest importance to Philip, who set about the conquest of the island with the siege of Palæ, which contained large magazines of corn. Here, according to his previous requisition, he was met by reinforcements from Messenia, Acarnania, Epirus, and Illyria. The town was accessible only on one side, where there was a small plain on which he stationed his engines and light troops, so as to cover the operations of his miners. When they had undermined the wall to the length of two furlongs, he felt

so sure of victory that he went up in person to call upon the besieged to surrender. On their refusal he ordered the props on which the wall was resting to be fired. It immediately fell, and he sent Leontius with his targeteers to mount the breach. But the traitor, faithful to his compact with Apelles, found means, with the help of some of his officers whom he had previously corrupted, thrice in succession to check and embarrass his troops, after they had gained the top of the broken wall, and were on the point of pouring into the city. In the end they were repulsed with severe loss, and Philip, seeing symptoms of treachery which he could not with certainty trace to their source, raised the siege, and for the present abandoned his designs on the island.

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While he lay before Palæ, Lycurgus invaded Messenia, and Dorimachus made an irruption into Thessaly with one half of the Ætolian forces, to divert him from his purpose. The Acarnanians now sent envoys to advise him to invade Ætolia during the absence of Dorimachus; while the Messenians implored his protection, and pointed out to him that, during the continuance of the summer winds, he could reach Messenia in a day from Cephallenia. But they seemed to have overlooked that he might be detained in Messenia by the same cause through the summer. Leontius and his associates, who clearly foresaw this result, for this reason warmly supported the proposal of the Messenians. But Aratus, with superior force of argument, maintained the opposite opinion, and urged him not to neglect so fair an opportunity of overrunning Ætolia without resistance. Philip, who had already begun to distrust Leontius, adopted the advice of Aratus, and having directed Eperatus to succour the Messenians, transported his vessels across the Leucadian Isthmus, and sailed to Limnæa, in the south-east corner of the gulf of Ambracia. Here he

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was joined by the whole force of Acarnania, eager to avenge the repeated injuries which they had suffered from the Ætolians. The Epirots, who were equally zealous, were unable, on account of the extent of their country, and the shortness of the notice, to come up in time.

The main object of the expedition was to surprise Thermus. Leaving a sufficient force at Limnæa to guard the baggage, Philip set out in the evening, and, by a long night-march, reached the Achelous between Conope and Stratus at day-break. Leontius, who knew that the success of the expedition depended on rapidity of movement, wishing to gain time for the Ætolians, would have persuaded Philip to allow his troops an interval of repose, but Aratus conjured him not to risk the loss of the golden opportunity by any needless delay; and Philip, now more and more disgusted with Leontius, crossed the Achelous, and pursued his march without intermission, wasting the country through which he passed, until he reached Metapa, a town on the western edge of the lake Trichonis, about seven or eight miles from Thermus. It had been abandoned by the Ætolians, and he occupied it with 500 men for the security of his rear. The approach to Thermus from Metapa was a series of defiles, overhung with rocks and thick woods; and for the last three or four miles, beginning from the village of Pamphias, the road ran along a narrow crest with precipices on each side, until it opened on a small elevated plain, where stood Thermus, the citadel of Ætolia. Philip, using every precaution of a wary general, though he saw no enemy, and leaving another detachment at Pamphias, arrived at Thermus long before night-fall. The Ætolians, who had never thought that he would venture so far into the heart of their country, and had no time to make preparations for defence, had abandoned the place, but had not re-

Philip at
Thermus.

PHILIP AT THERMUS.

moved any of its treasures. The plunder of the houses, and of the neighbouring villages, occupied the remainder of the day. The next morning the invaders, having selected the most valuable part of the spoil, burnt all that they could not carry off, among the rest 15,000 suits of armour, which were found in the public armouries. So far, Polybius remarks, they conformed to the rules of civilised warfare. But before they quitted the place, to retaliate for the destruction of Dium and Dodona, they set fire to the sacred buildings, and levelled them with the ground, defaced all the works of art, and threw down the statues, which were not fewer than two thousand, sparing only those of the gods from total ruin. Polybius condemns this imitation of a bad example, as not less impolitic than sacrilegious and barbarous; and no doubt Philip lost an opportunity for a display of generosity, which would have greatly raised his reputation and strengthened his power; but this act of vengeance was probably the main object of his expedition, and there is no reason to attribute any very important share in it, as the historian suggests¹, to the influence of Demetrius the Pharian, or on the other hand to suppose that Aratus viewed it with much regret. Philip professed at least to regard himself as the minister of Divine retribution; and many parts of the blackened ruins were inscribed with a line composed by his foster-brother, Samus, son of Chrysogonus, in which the flames that scathed Thermus were wittily described as a bolt of the god whose sanctuary had been profaned at Dium.²

When this was accomplished, he set out on his retreat. In the meanwhile the Ætolian general Alexander had assembled a body of 3000 men, with which,

¹ Polyb. v. 12. vii. 14. ix. 23.

² Ὁρῆς τὸ δῖον εἰς βέλος διέπτειτο. It can hardly be translated so as to preserve the allusion.

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as soon as the Macedonians began to descend from the table land of Thermus, he attacked their rear: but he was drawn into an ambuscade, and totally defeated; and Philip, having destroyed Pamphia and Metapa, brought his army out of the defiles in safety, and encamped near Acræ not far from the western bank of the Achelous. The next day he ravaged the country about Conope; and on the third marched up the vale, and crossed the river near Stratus, where he made a short halt, having heard that an Ætolian force of about 4000 men was assembled in the town, and hoping to draw it into an engagement. But no enemy appeared until the rear of his column had passed the town, when it was charged by the Ætolian cavalry, aided by a body of Cretan bowmen. This attack however was soon repelled; and the army, pursuing its march without further molestation, arrived safely at the camp at Limnæa. Here he celebrated a thanksgiving sacrifice, and gave a banquet to his principal officers.

Leontius and Megaleas were so deeply disappointed and dejected by their master's triumph, that they could not even assume a decent degree of cheerfulness at table, and attracted the king's attention by the contrast which he perceived between their behaviour and that of his other guests. The fumes of the wine at length thawed their reserve, and raised their courage, without restoring their good humour. When the entertainment was over, they waylaid Aratus as he was returning to his tent, and assailed him, first with invectives, and then with stones. A crowd gathered round them, and a scene of confusion ensued. The noise reached the king's ear, and he sent to learn the cause of the uproar. Leontius disappeared. But Megaleas, and one Crinon, who had taken part with him, were summoned into the royal presence, and sharply reprimanded. But instead of offering an

The con-
spirators
arrested.

apology, they so far forgot themselves, as to declare their purpose of revenging themselves on Aratus. Philip, incensed at their insolence, ordered them to find surety for the payment of twenty talents, and in the meanwhile to be taken into custody. The next day he sent for Aratus, and promised to give him satisfaction for the insult he had received. Leontius came soon after to the royal tent, with some of his targeteers, thinking to strike terror into the young king, and asked who had presumed to arrest Megaleas? But when Philip replied in a firm tone, that it had been done by his own order, he was cowed, and withdrew, only uttering an angry murmur. On his voyage back to Corinth Philip touched at Leucas, and remained there two days, to give time for the sale of the booty, and during this interval brought Megaleas and Crinon to trial before a council of his friends. Aratus came forward as the accuser not only of Megaleas, but of Leontius, and, it is said, unmasked their conspiracy with Apelles, and established his charge by proof and testimony; though it is difficult to conceive how he could have found evidence of such a secret compact. The court however was satisfied, and unanimously condemned the prisoners. Crinon, being unable it seems to pay the penalty, remained in confinement. Megaleas was released on the undertaking of Leontius to become his surety.

In the meanwhile Dorimachus had entirely failed in his expedition to Thessaly, where he found Chrysogonus and Petræus so well prepared to receive him, that he did not venture to descend into the plains. As soon as he heard of Philip's irruption into Ætolia, he hastened back to defend his country, but found the enemy gone. Lycurgus had effected as little in Messenia; and though he afterwards made himself master of the town of Tegea, he was unable to take

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Laconia.

the citadel to which all the inhabitants had retired. Philip, on his arrival at Corinth, immediately despatched couriers to summon the Peloponnesian allies to meet him at Tegea within three days, and setting forward the next morning, reached Tegea by the way of Argos on the second evening. Here he was joined by the Achæan forces under the command of Aratus, and after a night's rest resumed his march toward Laconia. To conceal his movements from the enemy, he took a circuitous route through a wild country, and on the fourth day came down into the vale of the Eurotas, and encamped at Amyclæ, to the amazement of the Spartans, who had only just heard of the destruction of Thermus, and had begun to think of sending Lycurgus to succour the Ætolians. He then ravaged the country downward to the coast of the Laconian gulf, and, after an unsuccessful attempt on Asine, extended his incursions as far as Tænarus on the one side, and Boiæ near Malea on the other. In the meanwhile Lycurgus had intercepted a body of Messenians, who, having arrived too late at Tegea, were making their way to join the Macedonian army over the mountains of the eastern coast, and compelled them to retreat with the loss of their horses and baggage. Elated by this success, on his return to Sparta he resolved to make a stand against Philip, when he should pass by Sparta on his way back. For this purpose he occupied the heights of the Menelaion, which rise above the eastern bank of the river opposite the city, with 2000 men; and ordered the remaining forces of Sparta to be in readiness on a preconcerted signal to be drawn up on the space between the city and the western bank; and the more effectually to obstruct the enemy's passage on that side of the river, he by means of a dam laid the low grounds under water. Philip however dislodged him from his position, worsted the Spartan cavalry

which threatened his rear, and brought his whole army safely through the pass, and encamped for the night a quarter of a mile above the city. On his road to Tegea he halted to survey the field of battle near Sellasia, and offered a sacrifice on the summit both of Olympus and Evan. On his return to Corinth he found envoys from Rhodes and Chios, who had been sent to offer their mediation for the purpose of terminating the war, which the islanders probably found detrimental to their commerce. He professed himself disposed for peace, and encouraged them to address themselves to the Ætolians. But in his heart he was bent on the continuance of the war, from which he had reaped honour and profit, and he was now meditating an expedition into Phocis, from which he anticipated some important advantages. While he was making his preparations for this expedition at Lechæum, a violent mutiny broke out at Corinth among the troops under the command of Leontius and his associates, who had taught them to believe that they were wronged in the distribution of the spoil. They plundered the lodgings of the king's principal friends, and even broke into the royal residence. Philip, hearing of the tumult, hastened back from Lechæum, and by judicious management restored tranquillity, but carefully concealed his knowledge of the origin and authors of the disturbance.

The conspirators, defeated in this attempt, saw no prospect of recovering their footing at court without the aid of Apelles, and by repeated messages at length induced him to return from Chalcis. He was not aware how far he had himself lost ground in Philip's confidence during his absence. He had been so successful in his endeavours to cut off the supplies of the royal treasury, that the king was sometimes forced to pledge his plate for the subsistence of his household. Philip more than suspected the cause of these embar-

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Perfidy of
Apelles.

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rassments, and he had also been deeply offended by the arrogance of Apelles, who, representing himself as the real head of the government, and the fountain of all authority, drew the administration of affairs entirely to himself. The king's officers in Macedonia and Thessaly addressed themselves to him for instructions: and the Greek cities assigned a more prominent place in their honorary decrees to him, than to Philip himself. Aratus too did not fail to take advantage of his enemy's indiscretion, and to inflame the king's resentment against him. Philip however had so steadily dissembled his feelings, that Apelles returned to court under a full persuasion that his presence would at once restore the credit of his friends. To give the greater weight to his first appearance, they procured that he should be met on his entry into Corinth by a great concourse of officers and soldiers, and thus escorted he repaired immediately to the palace. But instead of seeing the gates thrown open to him as in times past, he was informed by one of the attendants, that the king was not at leisure to give him audience. He withdrew in surprise and perplexity; and the ardour of his followers was so rapidly chilled by the first breath of royal displeasure, that before he reached his lodgings he was abandoned by all but his own menials. Philip still admitted him now and then to his table, and treated him with some show of respect; but excluded him from his counsels and familiar intercourse. Megaleas now seeing his last hope extinguished, made his escape during the king's absence in Phocis, and fled to Athens, and not being allowed to remain there took refuge at Thebes. Philip, on his return, having first taken the precaution to send the targeteers on some pretext into Triphylia under the command of Taurion, ordered Leontius, as the surety of Megaleas, to be thrown into prison. The targeteers

at his instigation sent some of their number to the king, with a request, in very free language, that if their commander was arrested for any offence, he might not be brought to trial in their absence; and offered, if he was imprisoned on the ground of his suretyship, to redeem his pledge by their own contributions. But Philip was so much exasperated by their interference, that he forthwith ordered Leontius to be put to death.

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In the meanwhile, the Rhodian and Chian envoys had induced the Ætolians to accept their mediation, to conclude a truce of thirty days, and to appoint a day for a conference with Philip, at Rhium. Philip, on their report, ratified the truce, and summoned a congress of the allies to meet him at Patræ. Here letters were brought to him, which had been intercepted in Phocis, addressed to the Ætolians by Megaleas, in which the writer exhorted them to persevere in the war, describing Philip's finances as quite exhausted, and assailing his character with bitter invectives. It is not clear, whether Philip was able to trace these letters to Apelles, or made use of them as a pretext against him. But he immediately sent him, with his son and another intimate friend, under a guard of soldiers to Corinth, where all three were shortly after put to death. About the same time Megaleas, having been arrested by Philip's orders at Thebes, and sued for the penalty, laid violent hands on himself. These executions, which crushed a dangerous conspiracy, and thus rendered Philip more formidable than ever to his enemies, nevertheless put a stop to the negotiation for peace. The Ætolians, who had before been eager to terminate the war, which had begun to press very hard upon them, when they heard of these occurrences, conceived hopes that the punishment of persons so high in command might give rise to discontent and mutiny in the Macedonian

The conspiracy
crushed.

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army, and they were thus induced to put off the conference at Rhium. Philip gladly seized this pretext to break off the treaty, and having exhorted the deputies who came to attend the congress, to bend all their thoughts to the prosecution of the war, returned to Corinth, and dismissed his Macedonian troops to their homes for the winter. He himself embarked at Cenchreæ, and sailed through the Euripus to Demetrias. Here he brought Ptolemæus, the only surviving associate of Leontius, to trial before a Macedonian Assembly, which condemned him to death. He was thus finally extricated from a great danger, but not perhaps without suffering deep and lasting injury. If any share is to be assigned to outward circumstances in the development of his character, none can be conceived which could have tended more to stifle every ingenuous feeling, and to harden and corrupt his heart, than the detection of such foul treachery in the guardians of his youth, the men who had been the earliest objects of his esteem and confidence.

After his departure, the Achæans suffered much from the incursions of the Eleans and Ætolians, against which Eperatus was unable to provide any defence. The cities, finding themselves unprotected, became tardy and irregular in their contributions: the troops, being often forced to wait long for their pay, were not active in the service, and the mercenaries at last quitted it altogether. Polybius still lays the whole blame on Eperatus¹; we might otherwise suspect, that he was embarrassed by the opposition of Aratus and his party, and would have done more if he had been better supplied with the sinews of war. The Spartans did not move during the winter: for Lycurgus, having incurred the suspicions

¹ iv. 30.

of the ephors, had been compelled to fly, and took refuge in Ætolia. Eperatus was succeeded in office by Aratus: and the Achæans immediately recovered their spirits for the prosecution of the war. The Assembly decreed to maintain mercenaries to the number of 8000 foot and 500 horse, with 3300 troops of the League, of which 500 foot and 50 horse were to be raised by Megalopolis, and as many by Argos. It was also resolved, that three galleys should cruise about the coast of Argolis, and as many in the Corinthian gulf. In the meanwhile Lycurgus had been recalled by the ephors, who had ascertained the groundlessness of their suspicions, and concerted measures with Pyrrhias, the Ætolian general who commanded in Elis, for combined operations in Messenia. Aratus, having discovered their intentions, marched to Megalopolis to succour the Messenians. But though Lycurgus invaded Messenia and made himself master of Calamæ, he was unable to effect a junction with Pyrrhias, and was obliged to return to Sparta. Aratus now prevailed on the Messenians and Taurion, who seems to have been restored to his command, to keep a small force in the field for the protection of the interior of the peninsula against the Spartans, while the main army of the League was to be employed against the Ætolians and Eleans in the north of Achaia. During his stay at Megalopolis, he accomplished another object not less important for the security of Arcadia. Megalopolis, just rising out of its ruins, was divided between two parties, one, which included the poorer class, requiring that the compass of the walls should be contracted, so as to be both completed and defended with less difficulty, and that the wealthy citizens should give up a third of their lands for the support of a body of new settlers. But the opulent would neither part with their possessions, nor consent to reduce the dimensions

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Aratus
tranquillises
Megalopolis.

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of the Great City. Violent disputes had also arisen about a code of laws which had been framed for them by Prytanis, a Peripatetic philosopher, whom Antigonus had appointed as their legislator. Aratus, under a decree of the Achæan Assembly, undertook the adjustment of these differences, a task for which he was eminently well qualified, and in which he appears to have satisfied both parties; but the terms of the compact which he concluded between them are not related by Polybius, perhaps because they had been inscribed on a column which was erected near the altar of Vesta in one of the public buildings of his native city.¹

The war was now carried on by the Achæans with unusual vigour and success both by land and sea. They defeated Euripidas, who at the request of the Eleans had been sent to replace Pyrrhias, invaded and ravaged Elis, and after another victory carried off their booty in safety. The merit of these achievements however belonged, not to Aratus, but to his lieutenant, Lycus of Pharæ. The Achæan admiral made several captures from the enemy in the Corinthian Gulf, landed his troops on the coast of Ætolia, wasted the country, and worsted the Ætolians in two engagements. So that the League seemed now well able to maintain the war without Macedonian assistance, though there was no prospect that it would in this way be brought to a close, until the strength of the belligerents should be exhausted. Philip in the meanwhile had made himself master of Bylazora, the

¹ Polyb. v. 93. ἐν Ὀμαρίῳ. The Ὀμαρίον at Megalopolis answered to the temple of Ζεὺς Ὀμαγύριος at Ægium, which Strabo (viii. 385. 387.) seems also to have called τὸ Ὀμαρίον, or (according to Welcker's emendation of the readings Ἀράριον and Αἰνάρριον, *Episch. Cycl.* p. 128.) Ἀμάριον. It was the temple of Ζεὺς Ὀμάριος, the god of concord. Welcker believes that the common temple erected by Croton, Sybaris, and Metapontum, when they regulated their confederacy on the Achæan model (Polybius, ii. 39.), was also dedicated to Ζεὺς Ὀμάριος. The explanation of the reading Ὀμαρίον given by Helwing (*Geschichte des Achaischen Bundes*, p. 54. n. 5.) that the worship of the god was brought over from Hellas, a neighbouring country, is at least utterly improbable.

chief city of Pæonia, which gave him the command of the passes by which the Dardanians were used to penetrate into Macedonia, and thus relieved him from the fear of invasion in that quarter. He then collected all his Macedonian forces, and marched into Thessaly, where he was foiled in an attempt on Melita¹, but proceeded to lay siege to the Pthian Thebes, for which he had been making active preparations during the winter. It was still in the hands of the Ætolians, and enabled them, at their pleasure, to make inroads into the most fertile regions of Thessaly. He met with a stout resistance, until he had thrown down a part of the wall by a mine, and his troops were on the point of mounting the breach. The besieged then surrendered: and Philip took this opportunity to convince all who still doubted of the treachery by which, with precisely similar advantages, he had been repulsed before Palæ. He reduced all the inhabitants to slavery, planted a Macedonian colony in their room, and exchanged the name of Thebes for Philippopolis. Here he received another embassy from Chios and Rhodes, whose envoys were now accompanied by others from Byzantium and Ptolemy Philopator, with renewed offers of mediation. He repeated his former pacific professions, and sent them away to sound the Ætolians, but in his heart was as little as ever inclined to peace. The object on which he was now immediately bent, was to chastise and humble Scerdilaidas, who, having been offended by some omissions in the payment of his stipulated subsidy, had sent a squadron which, before its hostile purpose was suspected, captured four Corinthian vessels, and afterwards, cruising between Leucas and Malea, infested the coast, and attacked all the merchant ships that fell in its way. Philip equipped an

Philip in
Thessaly.

¹ He arrived either before or after the preconcerted time (Polyb. v. 97. ix. 18.), and his scaling ladders proved too short.

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armament in the hope of overtaking the Illyrians, but, having missed them, returned to the Isthmus, sent his larger vessels round by Malea to the Corinthian gulf, and caused the rest to be transported over land to Lechæum. In the meanwhile he made a hasty excursion to Argos, to celebrate the Nemean games.

While the Greeks were wasting their strength in these bootless struggles, Italy was the theatre of the contest on the issue of which their future condition depended. That their interests must be deeply affected by the conflict which had been lately renewed between the two great powers of the West, could not but be evident to every intelligent Greek. When Hannibal had crossed the Alps, it became still clearer that a mighty crisis was approaching. Yet it seems to have been only when a blow had been struck which apparently gave a decisive advantage to one of the parties, that even a few of the more thoughtful Greeks became so far sensible of the importance of the events which were passing on the other side of the Adriatic, as to feel the littleness, the uselessness, and the folly of the feuds by which their country was torn and drained of its resources. While Philip was viewing the games at Argos, he received the news of the battle of Thrasimene in a despatch brought by a courier from Macedonia. Demetrius the Pharian was among the friends who accompanied him to Argos, and had now evidently gained the highest place in his confidence. To him alone he showed the letter, under an injunction of secrecy; and in his subsequent deliberations on the new aspect of affairs, he suffered himself to be guided by the Pharian's counsels. Demetrius was entirely bent on two objects: he was eager to revenge himself on the Romans, and to recover his territories in Illyria; and as he regarded Philip only as his tool, the advice he gave was that which was dictated by his own passions and interest. He urged

B. C. 217.
Battle of
Thrasimene.

the king to drop the Ætolian war, and to turn his attention from Greece, which was already subject to him, to the great prospects of conquest and glory which were now opened to him in Illyria and Italy. The disaster which had befallen the Roman arms invited him to the great theatre of war.

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Counsels of
Demetrius
the Pha-
rian.

If Philip had consulted a less selfish or interested adviser, the question might not have been simply whether he should remain neutral, but into which scale he should throw his sword, and whether it might not be safer for him to aid the weaker side than to help to crush it, and to establish the predominance of its antagonist. But perhaps Philip would scarcely have listened to such a suggestion. The course proposed by Demetrius was the most agreeable to his temper, and apparently the best suited to his interest. It held out the temptation of immediate gain. By an attempt to balance the two parties he might only incur the enmity of both. If either was to prevail, he had less to fear from the one whose seat of empire was the more distant; and it was much safer to reckon on Rome's weakness than on her gratitude. He however at once adopted the views of Demetrius, but, without disclosing his real motive, held a council of his friends, and proposed the question of peace with the Ætolians. Aratus himself was willing to put an end to the war, which he could not expect to conclude on more favourable terms than at a time when the Achæan arms were everywhere prosperous. The rest of the council probably saw and yielded to the king's wishes. Without waiting for the envoys of the mediating states, he despatched a Naupactian prisoner, named Cleonicus, to open the negotiation with the Ætolians. They were now heartily tired of the war, and eagerly accepted his overtures. He himself proceeded to Panormus, on the coast opposite Naupactus, and summoned a con-

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Warnings
of Age-
laus.

gress of the allies to meet him there. After the congress had met, an embassy headed by Aratus and Taurion was sent over to Naupactus, where the Ætoli-ans were assembled, and Ætolian envoys came to request Philip to cross over and conclude the treaty in person. He accordingly transported his forces across the gulf, and encamped at the distance of two or three miles from Naupactus. The negotiation then proceeded rapidly, for both parties were equally desirous of peace. Philip proposed, as the basis of the treaty, that each should retain what it then possessed: the Ætoli-ans readily assented, and it only then remained to come to a mutual understanding on the construction of this principle and its application in detail. Many conferences were held for this purpose, and on the first of these occasions a Naupactian named Agelaus is reported by Polybius to have addressed a memorable warning to Philip and the assembled ministers. He reminded them that there never had been a time when the Greeks had not great need of union, and reason to be very thankful to the gods, if by their combined exertions they could protect themselves against the influx of the barbarians. But the danger was now visible and imminent. It could not be supposed that either Rome or Carthage, if victorious in their present contest, would remain content with the possession of Italy and Sicily. As the safety of the Greeks depended on their union, so Philip's security lay in the goodwill and confidence of the Greeks, and it was his interest not to consume their strength, but on the contrary to cherish it as the firmest defence of his throne. If he was bent on conquest, Italy presented an ample field for his ambition. Let him reserve his quarrels with the Greeks for a season of greater leisure, but above all let him take care to keep the power of warring and treating with them in his own hand; for if the clouds then

gathering in the West should once lower upon Greece, it was to be feared that there would be an end for ever to their child's play of hostilities and negotiations, and they would wish in vain to recal the time when peace and war, or any other subject of public deliberation, was in their own power.

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These warnings would have come too late, even if they had produced more than a momentary impression. But it is doubtful whether they were attended with any practical effect, except so far as they happened to coincide with the temporary views and feelings of the hearers. Agelaus was afterwards raised to the highest dignity in the state; but in this choice his countrymen probably expressed the need they had felt of the peace which he helped to conclude, rather than their sense of his political sagacity. Philip took his advice so far as it tallied with his preconceived designs; but did not let it move him one step toward a more liberal course of policy.

Treaty of
Naupactus.

CHAPTER LXIV.

FROM THE END OF THE SOCIAL WAR BETWEEN THE ÆTOLIANS AND THE ACHÆANS TO THE PROCLAMATION OF THE LIBERTY OF GREECE UNDER ROMAN PROTECTION.

Philip's Naval Preparations. — He sends Envoys to Hannibal. — They are taken by the Romans. — Philip at Messene. — He lays Siege to Apollonia. — Influence of Demetrius the Pharian. — Death of Aratus. — Treaty between Rome and the Ætolians. — Firmness of the Acarnanians. — Operations of the Roman Fleet. — Philopœmen reforms the Achæan Cavalry. — Philip at Argos. — His Expedition to Elis. — Threatening Posture of his Affairs. — His Movements in Peloponnesus. — Philopœmen General of the Achæan League. — Reforms in the Achæan Army. — Battle of Mantinea. — Death of Machanidas. — The Ætolians make Peace with Philip. — Philip's Treaty with Rome. — Internal State of Ætolia. — Tyranny of Nabis. — Philip threatened by the Romans. — His Operations in the Ægean. — Attempt upon Rhodes. — Battle of Chios. — Philip's Escape from Caria. — Roman Pretexts for War. — Philip before Abydos. — Surprise of Chalcis. — Philip invades Attica. — Neutrality of the Ætolians. — Galba in Macedonia. — Movements of the Roman Fleet. — Philip encamped on the Aous. — T. Quinctius Flaminius. — Forces Philip's Position. — Advances into Thesaly. — Roman Embassy to the Achæan League. — The League concludes an Alliance with Rome. — Conference of Nicæa. — Nabis at Argos. — Flaminius at Thebes. — Battle of Cynoscephalæ. — Negotiation with Philip. — Submission of Acarnania. — Murder of Brachyllas. — Complaints of the Ætolians. — The Proclamation at the Isthmian Games. — General Peace.

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B. C. 217.
Philip's
naval pre-
parations.

GREECE was now permitted to enjoy another short interval of repose, while Philip returned to Macedonia, where his presence was needed to protect his north-west frontier against the inroads of Scerdilaidas. He was fully occupied in this quarter during the rest of the summer of 217, and in the ensuing winter he increased his navy with 200 new galleys built on the

Illyrian model. In the spring he embarked his forces, and sailed round Peloponnesus into the Adriatic. Though Italy was uppermost in his thoughts, so as to haunt his dreams, he thought it necessary, before he crossed the channel, to secure his dominions more effectually against Scerdilaidas, and for this purpose resolved to make an expedition to the coast of Illyria. He expected, it seems, that the Romans would send succours to Scerdilaidas, as in fact the Illyrian, when he heard of Philip's maritime preparations, had requested them to do; and he therefore waited for some time between Cephallenia and Leucas, to ascertain the movements of the Roman fleet. But having learnt that it was still at Lilybæum he sailed up toward Apollonia, and had anchored near the mouth of the Aous, when he received advice that Roman galleys had been seen at Rhegium bound for Apollonia. Believing that the whole Roman fleet was at hand, he gave immediate orders for retreat, and, as if chased by a victorious enemy, pushed forward day and night until he reached Cephallenia. The panic was caused by a false alarm; a squadron of only ten vessels had been detached from the fleet at Lilybæum. Philip however after a short stay, to colour his flight with some pretence of affairs to be transacted in Peloponnesus, returned to Macedonia, and appears to have remained inactive during the rest of the year. In the meanwhile the battle of Cannæ seemed to have extinguished the last hopes of Rome. Philip's aid was become so much the less important to the conquerors; and if he had ever expected concessions of territory in Italy, as the price of his alliance, he could no longer flatter himself with such a prospect. Yet according to Livy¹ it was only after he had received the tidings of this third great disaster of the Roman

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B. C. 216.
He sends
envoys to
Hannibal.

¹ xxiii. 33.

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arms, that he resolved on sending envoys to Hannibal. But it seems hardly credible, that there should not have been some previous correspondence between them, and the difficulty of eluding detection might perhaps account for the length of the delay, and for Philip's apparent supineness. Now however toward the end of the year B. C. 216, he sent an embassy with Xenophanes, an Athenian, at its head, to conclude a treaty with the Carthaginians. The envoys landed safely in the south of Italy, but were stopped in Apulia on their road to Capua by Roman soldiers, who led them to the camp of M. Valerius Lævinus, the prætor. Here Xenophanes pretended that he was on his way to Rome to conclude an alliance between Philip and the Roman people, and, having been courteously entertained and sent forward by the prætor, found means to escape from his escort, and to reach Hannibal's quarters at Capua. He there negotiated a treaty, which is reported by Livy¹, and transcribed, apparently in full, by Polybius²; but the Roman historian's report differs essentially from the copy preserved by the Greek author; and it is probable that false accounts of the articles were circulated by the Roman government for the purpose of inflaming public resentment against Philip. It was a treaty of friendship, fraternity, and alliance, offensive and defensive, between the Carthaginians and their allies on

¹ xxiii. 33.

² vii. 9. The obtestation of the gods worshipped on both sides occupies a considerable space. Flathe (ii. p. 279.) supplies a number of articles, which he supposes the Roman government to have erased from the treaty when it fell into their hands, by which Phillip provided for the independence of a part of Italy. Flathe indulges in a licence of conjecture hardly to be found in any other modern historian. But the parts of his work which are most likely to mislead an incautious reader, are not those in which he has avowedly substituted his own guesses in the room of the facts recorded by the best authors, as by Polybius, who, as he comes oftenest in the way of his hypotheses, is uniformly treated with supreme contempt. The worst is, that Flathe often disguises and distorts the facts which he finds, so as to convey an impression very different from that which they must make on every unprejudiced reader in the original report. He thinks he has perceived that Phillip was signally deficient in energy of will, and decision of character. So the narrative is every where adapted — as in a romance — to exhibit this defect in the most glaring light.

the one part, and the Macedonians and the other Greeks, their allies, on the other; and it stipulated that Philip should aid the Carthaginians in their war with the Romans, and that when this should be brought to a successful termination, the Romans should not be allowed to retain their possessions on the eastern side of the Adriatic, and should restore all that they had taken from Demetrius of Pharos: the Carthaginians were to succour Philip against the Romans and all other enemies. It appears therefore that he had now abandoned all thoughts of conquest in the West, and only wished to be relieved from the restraints which Rome had laid on his ambition; but it is not clear what advantage he was to derive from the treaty: whereas, according to the other reports, Greece, Epirus, and the adjacent islands were to be annexed to Macedonia.¹ Three Carthaginian envoys were sent with Xenophanes when he returned; but the ship in which they sailed was captured by a Roman squadron, which was guarding the coast of Calabria. Xenophanes endeavoured to deceive the Roman commander by a repetition of his former artifice; but the presence of the Carthaginians led to a discovery of the truth, and the envoys were sent with all their papers to Rome. The Senate immediately resolved not to wait for a Macedonian invasion. A fleet of fifty sail was ordered to watch Philip's movements; and the prætor, M. Valerius, was directed, if occasion should appear, to cross over to Macedonia, and endeavour to find employment for the king at home. In the meanwhile however Philip learned the disaster of his embassy from a ship which escaped when they were taken; but as he did not even know

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They are
taken by
the Romans.

¹ Liv. u. 3, *Quæ civitates continentis, quæ insulæ ad Macedoniam vergunt, eâ Philippî regni quæ ejus essent.* So in substance Zonaras, viii. 4. Τὴν μὲν Ἰταλίαν τοὺς Καρχηδονίους λαβεῖν, τὴν δ' Ἑλλάδα καὶ τὴν Ἠπειρὸν μετὰ τῶν νήσων, ἐκεῖνον: and, still more briefly, Appian, Mac. 1. Τρισχνομένοις αὐτῶ συμμαχήσειν ἐπὶ τῇ Ἰταλίᾳ, εἰ κάκεῖνος αὐτῶ σύνθοιτο κατεργάσασθαι τὴν Ἑλλάδα.

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B. C. 215.
Philip at
Messene.

the result of the negotiation, he was obliged to send a fresh embassy to Hannibal; and though it executed its commission successfully, the summer (215) was spent before it returned to Macedonia. We hear of no military operations undertaken by Philip this year. But he paid a visit to Peloponnesus, with what view does not appear, accompanied by Demetrius the Pharian; and on this occasion we learn how little he had imbibed the liberal principles of Agelaus. Discord had grown so fierce between the aristocratical and the democratical party at Messene, that it threatened to break out into open violence. Aratus, again for the sixteenth time General of the League, was on his road to Messene with his son to preserve tranquillity and heal the breach. But Philip arrived the day before, and secretly fanned the flame, asking the magistrates whether they had no laws to control the multitude, and the democratical leaders whether they had not hands to resist tyrants. Thus instigated, the party in power provoked its adversaries by injudicious severity, and a tumult ensued, in which all the magistrates and about 200 private persons were massacred. It seems to have soon become notorious that Philip's insidious suggestions had been the cause of this bloodshed; and even after it had taken place, instead of endeavouring to reconcile the contending parties, he manifestly did his utmost to irritate their mutual animosity. Aratus and his son were deeply disgusted with this conduct, and the younger, who had hitherto treated Philip with the affection of an elder friend toward an amiable youth, gave vent to his indignation in bitter reproaches addressed to him in the theatre. Philip was evidently stung, but forbore to reply, and proceeded with the elder Aratus and Demetrius to sacrifice on the summit of Ithome. At the usual inspection of the entrails he consulted his two advisers, whether it seemed to be the will of

the gods that he should keep the citadel, or restore it to the Messenians. The Pharian bade him interpret the omens as a king, and hold the ox by both horns. The king understood the allusion to the two strongholds which commanded the peninsula, and entreated Aratus, who remained long silent, to deliver his opinion. At length he reminded the king, that he had not thought it necessary to seize the mountain holds of Crete, or Bœotia, or Phocis, or Acarnania, but had hitherto found it sufficient in those lands to secure the affection and confidence of the people, and he would never gain any stronger fortress than these in Peloponnesus. Philip, though he must have been conscious that this truth was no longer seasonable, still retained so much shame or respect for Aratus, that for the time he dropped his half-formed treacherous project. But Aratus felt that his influence was lost, and he kept henceforth more and more aloof from the court, and the next summer, when Philip undertook a fresh expedition to the coast of Illyria, declined to accompany him.¹

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Philip's object in this expedition was to make himself master of Apollonia and Oricum, the possession of which he seems to have regarded as an indispensable preliminary to the invasion of Italy. He had sailed up the Aous with 120 galleys, had taken Oricum by assault, and was besieging Apollonia, when the prætor, M. Valerius, to whom the people of Oricum had sent for succour, arrived on the coast. He immediately recovered Oricum, and a detachment of 2000 men which he sent to Apollonia surprised the Macedonian camp in the night; and as Valerius immediately brought up his fleet to the mouth of the river, Philip was forced to burn his ships and retreat over land, leaving his baggage, ammunition, and a great part of

He lays
siege to
Apollonia.

¹ Plut. Ar. 51.

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Influence
of Demetrius the
Pharian.

the arms of his troops in the enemy's hands. Such was the issue of his first trial of strength with Rome. In the interval of leisure left by this disaster, he again turned his thoughts to Peloponnesus. Whatever impression had been made on his mind by the maxims of Aratus, had been effaced by the suggestions of Demetrius, who was always by his side. As if repenting of his weakness, he sent Demetrius to surprise Messene; but the attempt failed, and Demetrius himself was slain.¹ His genius however seemed ever after to preside in Philip's councils, for it was in fact not unlike Philip's own. Polybius seems to have greatly exaggerated the influence which this adventurer exercised on the young king's character, and Plutarch saw more of the truth, when he supposed that the germs of all the vices which rendered the man so odious were only concealed in the boy, and waited for time and opportunity to unfold them², though Plutarch also appears to exaggerate, when he represents Philip as even in his early years only restrained by fear from the full indulgence of his evil nature³; it was no doubt constantly gaining strength, and not merely brought to light, but cherished and matured by prosperity and power, flattery and bad counsels. But when he had stifled his sense of decency and honour, and thrown off his respect for public opinion, his progress in crime became fearfully rapid. To revenge himself on the Messenians for his disappointment and for the loss of his favourite, he ravaged their territory, and Aratus did not suppress his displeasure. He had also discovered that Philip had abused his son's hospitality to seduce his wife, and it was perhaps chiefly on this account that Philip resolved to silence his remonstrances. He found a ready

¹ Polyb. iii. 19. 11. This authority greatly outweighs that of Appian who states (Illyr. 8.) that he was put to death by the Romans.

² Ar. 49.

³ Ar. 51.

instrument in Taurion, who undertook to remove Aratus, as his master proposed, by slow poison.¹ It took effect while he was filling the office of General for the seventeenth time. The symptoms seemed to him to betray the cause of his disorder, and he referred it at once to its author, but he only once disclosed his suspicions to a trusty attendant, observing, as he noticed one of the tokens of the poison, *This is the reward of my friendship for Philip*. He was ashamed, Polybius remarks², of Philip's ingratitude. But this shame was probably blended with a more or less distinct consciousness of those fatal errors by which he had himself sunk in the esteem of all reflecting men. He could scarcely but feel that Philip could not have been ungrateful, if he himself had not been culpably imprudent, and had not sacrificed the welfare of his country to petty passions. That he should perish through the arts of the man whom he had so faithfully served, was a kind of retribution which might well have awakened both shame and remorse. His countrymen however remembered only his ancient services. His remains were conveyed from Ægium, where he died, to his native city, which earnestly claimed them. Both law and a deeply-rooted superstition forbade the burying of a corpse within the walls; but an oracle was brought from Delphi, which was understood as an injunction to treat the remains of Aratus as the relics of a Hero, and they were interred with festive pomp in an inclosure dedicated to him as the Founder of the city, and one of its tutelary Powers. The day on which he had delivered it from its tyrants, as well as that of his birth, were

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B. C. 213.
Death of
Aratus.

¹ Polyb. VIII. 14. Plut. Ar. 52. Flathe (II. p. 288.) with his usual independence of testimony, conjectures that Philip had discovered that Aratus had entered into correspondence with Rome. On the other hand, Mr. Long (Biographical Dictionary, — Aratus) questions the fact, observing, *tales of slow poisons are suspicious evidence*. But it is not often that they are confirmed by the opinion of the patient.

² VIII. 14.

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commemorated by yearly sacrifices, for which a priest was assigned to him, and these rites were still celebrated, though with diminished splendour, in the time of Plutarch, three centuries after his death, when his posterity were still dwelling in Sicyon and Pellene.

B. C. 211.
Treaty between Rome
and the
Ætolians.

Valerius, with a single legion and a fleet of fifty ships, kept Philip occupied, while the Romans were recovering ground in Italy. Until the tide had begun to turn, all Greece remained in suspense. Even the Ætolians, though as hostile as ever to Philip, and now again weary of peace, did not venture to declare themselves. But after the fall of Syracuse and Capua, Valerius, having previously sounded Scopas and Dori-machus, induced them to summon an Assembly which he attended in person, and which he persuaded to conclude an alliance offensive and defensive with Rome. Elis and Sparta, Scerdilaidas and his son Pleuratus¹, and Attalus of Pergamus, were included in the treaty as their allies. The conquered towns and territory were to belong to them, the spoil to the Romans; and it was expressly stipulated that Acarnania should be reduced under their dominion. They then declared war against Philip, and the Romans began to execute their part of the contract, though the year (211) was now drawing to a close. They made themselves masters of Zacynthus all but the citadel of the town, and wrested Æniadæ and Naxos from the Acarnanians, and having delivered all up to their allies returned to Corcyra. Philip had taken up his quarters for the winter at Pella, when this news reached him, and as he expected that his presence would be required in Greece early in the following spring, he immediately took the field again to

¹ Livy, xxvi. 24. seems to call him a king of the Thracians, but he appears to be the same who is afterwards (xxx. 28.) described as the son of Scerdilaidas.

strike terror into his western and northern neighbours. After an expedition into Illyria, in which he advanced as far as Apollonia, he returned eastward to the borders of Thessaly, where he left 4000 men under Persæus, to guard the pass of Tempe, and then marched northward to invade the territory of the Mædians, a tribe in the interior of Thrace, who were used to infest his frontier during his absence from home. He had laid siege to their chief city, Jamphorina, when Acarnanian envoys came to his camp, to implore his succour against the Ætoliens, who, hearing of his Thracian expedition, had collected all their forces under Scopas, for the conquest of Acarnania. In the meanwhile however the Acarnanians opposed a firm countenance to their enemy's superior force. They sent their wives, children, and men past sixty, into Epirus. The rest bound themselves by oath to conquer or die, pronounced terrible imprecations on all Acarnanians who should harbour a fugitive from the army, and adjured the Epirots not to receive one, but, should fortune prove adverse, to inter the slain in a common grave, with an inscription recording that they had fallen in defence of their country against the violence of the Ætoliens.¹ Thus prepared they marched to the border to await the enemy's approach. But the Ætolian leaders began to doubt whether it would be safe to drive men who showed such a spirit to extremities, and when they heard that Philip was on his march to succour the Acarnanians they abandoned their enterprise. The king had advanced by forced marches south of Dium, when he was informed of their retreat, and he then returned to Pella for the rest of the winter.

Early in the next spring (210) Lævinus sailed into the Corinthian Gulf, and combined his forces with

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LXIV.

Firmness
of the Acarnanians.

B. C. 210.
Operations
of the
Roman
fleet.

¹ Livy, xxvi. 25. Polyb. ix. 40.

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those of the Ætolians, to besiege the Locrian town of Anticyra, and when it surrendered disposed of the place and the booty according to the terms of the treaty. He was called away immediately after by tidings that he had been elected consul, and P. Sulpicius Galba appointed to succeed him; and on his return to Rome he advised that the legion should be withdrawn, as the fleet would suffice to secure the coast of Italy against Philip, who was now occupied with a war nearer home. Galba found himself indeed strong enough for this purpose and for aggression on Philip's defenceless allies, though not for any more important operations. He made his appearance on the eastern coast of Greece, conquered Ægina, and having carried off the inhabitants as slaves put the Ætolians in possession of it.¹ But their united forces were not able to raise the siege of Echinus, which surrendered to Philip after they had been defeated in an assault on the Macedonian camp.² The presence of the Romans only served to keep the balance even, which would otherwise have inclined in Philip's favour. The war in other respects assumed the character of that which had been terminated by the treaty of Naupactus. Sparta was again induced to side with her old allies, though now under a different leader. Lycurgus, who had soon forced his young colleague Agesipolis to go into exile, had been succeeded by another usurper named Machanidas, though he had left a son of tender years, Pelops, who seems to have been permitted to retain a shadow of royalty. The Achæans again found themselves exposed to the descents of the Ætolians on their coasts, while Machanidas and the Eleans pressed them on the land side: and in the year 209 they were so much distressed by these attacks that they were obliged to solicit aid from Philip. Yet they now pos-

¹ Polyb. xxiii. 8. 2. xi. 6. 8.

² Ibid. ix. 42.

sessed an advantage which they had not enjoyed in the last war; they had a man among them capable of seeing and drawing forth their military strength, as well as of conducting it in the field. Philopæmen had returned after a long absence to his native city. After the battle of Sellasia he had declined the offers of Antigonus, who would have taken him into his service.¹ He wished to enlarge his military experience, but not to sacrifice his personal independence; and he therefore preferred seeking employment in Crete, which was at this time agitated by a civil war between Cnossus and Lyttus, in which all the other cities of the island took part. Cnossus was in alliance with the Ætolians, and obtained Ætolian succour: and when the Social War broke out her enemies addressed themselves to Philip and the Achæans, who admitted them into their alliance and furnished them with troops. The contest thus became intimately connected with that which was carried on at the same time in Greece: and though Philopæmen only sought for a school of war, there can be little doubt which side he chose; and in the end the whole island was brought over to the Achæo-Macedonian confederacy.² Philopæmen however seems not to have returned to Greece so soon as tranquillity was restored in Crete, but to have remained abroad until the time when the Achæans began to be harassed by the attacks of Machanidas. His reputation had preceded him, and at the next election he was appointed commander of the Achæan cavalry. He found this, as all other parts of the army, in a very defective condition. The wealthier citizens, though bound by law to personal service in the cavalry, had been allowed, through connivance of the magistrates who preceded Philopæmen, to evade the performance of their duty³, and they had been

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Philo-
 pæmen re-
 forms the
 Achæan
 cavalry.

¹ Plut. Philop. 7.

³ Ibid. x. 25. Plut. Philop. 7.

² Polyb. vii. 14. 4.

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used to send substitutes wretchedly mounted, unpractised, and timid. He immediately applied his attention to remedy this abuse. By the exertion of his authority combined with personal influence, he induced the youths of the higher class to serve in person, excited their zeal and emulation, and in the course of a short time, by training and exercise, formed them into a well-organised body, which executed all its movements with easy and orderly promptitude. Philip complied the more readily with the request of the Achæans, as Attalus of Pergamus, on whom the Ætoli-ans, by an extraordinary decree, had conferred the title of their chief magistrate, was reported to be on the point of crossing over to Europe. On his march through Thessaly he found an Ætolian army at Lamia, reinforced by auxiliaries furnished by Attalus, and 1000 Romans sent by Galba¹, under the command of Pyrrhias, who had been appointed either colleague or lieutenant to the king of Pergamus.² They were worsted however in two engagements, and forced to take shelter behind the walls of Lamia, while Philip advanced to Phalara on the Malian Gulf. Here he was met by envoys from Ptolemy, Rhodes, Chios, and Athens, who came to offer their mediation; and the Ætoli-ans themselves were so far moved by the remonstrances of the envoys, who pointed out the imminent danger with which the liberty of Greece was threatened by Roman interference, that they had engaged Amynder, chief of the Athamanians, to negotiate on their behalf. A truce was concluded for thirty days, within which a day was fixed for an Achæan Assembly at Ægium. Philip then continued his march south-

¹ Who, as Schorn suspects (p. 186.), was himself gone in quest of the Carthaginian fleet; but it rather seems from the sequel that his object was to ravage the coast of Achala.

² Liv. xxvii. 30. *Duce Pyrrhia, qui prator in eum annum cum absente Attalo creatus erat.*

ward, and, having left a garrison at Chalcis in Eubœa to protect it against Attalus, proceeded with a small escort of cavalry and light troops to Argos, where he was honoured with the presidency of the Heræan and Nemean games expressly on the ground of his Argive descent; a delicate piece of flattery which assumed his connection with the ancient line of the Macedonian kings; a relation which he fondly claimed, but could hardly prove. After the celebration of the Heræa, he repaired to the congress at Ægium.¹ But in the meanwhile the views of the Ætolians had been changed by the arrival of Attalus at Ægina, and of the Roman fleet at Naupactus. They now took the tone of conquerors, and demanded the restitution of Pylos to the Messenians, and cessions of territory for the Romans and their Illyrian allies. Philip indignantly broke off the negotiation, and leaving 4000 men for the protection of the Achæans, returned to Argos to celebrate the Nemean festival. But in the midst of this entertainment he was called away by the tidings that Galba, having crossed over from Naupactus, was ravaging the coast between Sicyon and Corinth. He immediately put himself at the head of his cavalry, ordering the infantry to follow, and hastened to repel the invasion, surprised the Romans while they were spread over the country and encumbered with spoil, and drove them with some loss to their ships. He then returned to enjoy the glory of his victory, and to finish the celebration of the games at Argos. He was still fond of the shadow of popularity, though he cared little for real affection and esteem. To gratify the multitude he laid aside the diadem and the purple, and assumed the garb of a private citizen; but at the same time he indulged his passions in the most tyrannical licence, and where the arts of seduction were

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B. C. 209.

Philip at
Argos.

¹ The reading Rhium, in Liv. xxvii. 30, seems clearly corrupt.

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unavailing forced husbands and parents to sacrifice the honour of their families to his lust. He had already carried off the wife of the younger Aratus into Macedonia, and had murdered her husband by drugs which deprived him of his reason.

His expedi-
tion to
Elis.

Soon after the festival he set out on an expedition against Elis, which had received an Ætolian garrison within its walls. Philip hoped to expel the Ætolians, and again to enrich his army with the spoil of that fertile region. At Dyme he was joined by the Achæan forces under the General Cycliades and Philopœmen. Near the banks of the Larisus, the confine of Elis and Achaia, they found the enemy waiting for them, and a sharp skirmish of cavalry ensued, in which Philopœmen slew the Elean commander Damophantus with his own hand. The invaders met with no farther resistance until they reached the gates of Elis; but they were not aware that Galba had landed at Cyllene, and had entered the city with 4000 men. The presence of the Romans was only discovered after an engagement had begun between the Ætolians and the Macedonian light troops. It was too late to retreat, and Philip charged the Romans at the head of his cavalry. His horse was killed under him, and he narrowly escaped being made prisoner, but fought bravely on foot until the combat became too unequal, and he was forced to mount another horse and quit the field. Yet the enemy had not gained any advantage which tempted them to seek a fresh engagement. He marched the next day against the stronghold where most of the country people had taken refuge with their cattle, carried it at the first assault, and found 4000 persons and 20,000 head of cattle within. While he was dividing this spoil, he received tidings of revolt in his own dominions, and of threatened movements among the Dardanians, and hastened back to the North, leaving 2500 men for the protection of

the Achæans. It turned out that the Dardanians had been encouraged to invade Macedonia by a rumour of his death, arising out of an accident, through which one of the ornaments of his helmet having been broken off had fallen into the hands of an Ætolian, who had sent it to Scerdilaidas. After his departure, Galba sailed eastward to join Attalus at Ægina, which the Ætolians made over to their royal ally for thirty talents¹, and the Achæans found themselves strong enough to invade Messenia, and gained a victory over the Eleans and Ætolians near Messene.

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The prospect which opened on Philip with the following spring (208), was more threatening than any that had presented itself since his accession to the throne. A storm seemed to be gathering in every quarter of his horizon. His enemies, either by concert or coincidence, were preparing to attack him at once on every assailable point. Galba and Attalus, having wintered together at Ægina, sailed to Lemnos with a fleet of sixty pentereme galleys, of which twenty-five were Roman, and were visibly meditating a blow on some of his maritime possessions, while the Ætolians resumed their operations with redoubled activity in the West. Philip had assembled his forces at Larissa, and took up his quarters at Demetrias, as the most convenient station for watching the enemy's movements, and here he received alarming and important embassies from all his allies. The Achæans again needed succour, for Machanidas had taken the field with a force which it seems turned the scale decidedly against them. The neighbours of the Ætolians, especially the Acarnanians, were suffering from their inroads, and they were fortifying the pass of Thermopylæ with a fosse and rampart. At the same time the Illyrians and Mædians were stirring to invade

B. C. 208.
Threaten-
ing posture
of his
affairs.

¹ Polyb. xxiii. 8. 10.

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Macedonia in his absence, and the hostile fleet had crossed over to Peparethus, its troops were ravaging the island, and the chief town was hardly able to hold out. It was on this side that the danger seemed most pressing, for it was clear that Attalus and Galba were aiming an attack on Eubœa, the loss of which would have almost entirely shut out the king of Macedonia from the south of Greece. Philip dismissed all the envoys with cheering promises, but his first care was to send troops into Peparethus and Bœotia, and to strengthen the garrison of Chalcis. He himself proceeded to Scotussa, to put himself at the head of his army, and moved by forced marches upon Heraclea, hoping to surprise Attalus and an Ætolian Assembly which had been convened there to confer with their royal ally. But he arrived too late for this purpose, and having ravaged the Malian plain retreated to Scotussa, where he left his army and returned with his Escort to Demetrias. Not knowing what point would soonest require his presence, he ordered beacons to be erected on conspicuous heights, in Phocis, Eubœa, and Peparethus, and a watch-tower on Mount Tisæus at the entrance of the bay of Pagasæ, so as to communicate the earliest intelligence of the enemy's approach.

The allied fleet had moved from Peparethus to Nicæa, on the Malian coast, and thence crossed over to the north of Eubœa, to lay siege to Oreus. Attalus was to invest it on the land side, the Romans from the sea. But before they began the assault, they gained Plator, the commander of the Macedonian garrison, who betrayed the town into their hands. He interceded however for the garrison, which was sent by sea to Demetrias: he himself entered the service of Attalus: the Romans plundered the town. Through Plator's treachery the beacons had not informed Philip of the danger of Oreus until it would

have been too late to relieve it, even if he had been able to send succours by sea. But when he learnt that Chalcis was threatened, he instantly rejoined his army at Scotussa, and marched southward with almost incredible rapidity, forcing his way through the Ætolian intrenchments at Thermopylæ, and reaching Elatea the same day. But in the meanwhile the Roman general had abandoned the enterprise of Chalcis, where the road was dangerous, the town strong and well garrisoned, and the officers faithful to their master, as hopeless, and had sailed back to Cynus, the port of Opus. The city surrendered at the first sight of the enemy, and was abandoned by Galba to the Asiatic troops, as a compensation for the plunder of Oreus; and Attalus was nearly surprised here by Philip, while he lingered to extort money from the principal citizens. He was soon after recalled to Asia by intelligence that his dominions had been invaded by his neighbour, Prusias of Bithynia, and Sulpicius on his departure retreated to Ægina. Philip, after the conquest of two or three places held by the Ætolians, proceeded to Elatea, where he had appointed a meeting with the envoys of Ptolemy and the Rhodians, who had been renewing their attempts at mediation in the Ætolian Assembly at Heraclea. But the conference was interrupted by a report that Machanidas was preparing to attack Olympia during the celebration of the games. Philip, eager to appear as the protector of the national solemnity, dismissed the envoys with professions of his desire for peace, and set forward toward Elis.¹

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¹ Livy, as has been shown by Manso (III. 2. p. 273.), but in a much more satisfactory manner by Schorn (p. 186. n.), has not only committed the error of making the hundred and forty-third Olympiad begin in the consulship of C. Claudius Nero and M. Livius Salinator (see Clinton, F. H. III.), but has assigned the events of Greek history, which should have been related under the years U. C. 545, 546. (Varr.), to the years 546, 547. Schorn has pointed out the great probability that the treaty between Rome and the Ætolians concluded in the autumn of 211

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LXIV.His move-
ments in
Pelopon-
nesus.

But when he arrived in Arcadia, he found that Machanidas, alarmed by the report of his approach, had returned to Sparta. He himself proceeded to Ægium to meet a congress of the Achæans; and he seems to have felt it necessary, not only to animate his allies by exaggerated statements of his recent success, but to strengthen their attachment by some concessions of territory. He at least recognised the claim of the Achæans to Triphylia and Heræa, and that of Megalopolis to Aliphera.¹ He had expected to find at Ægium a Carthaginian fleet which had been brought to his aid the year before², and had sent a squadron to join it in the Corinthian gulf.³ But the Carthaginian admiral, having heard that Attalus and the Romans had left Oreus, apprehended that they were coming in pursuit of him, and dreading to be overtaken within the gulf had sailed away to the coast of Acarnania. He nevertheless crossed over with six Achæan galleys to Anticyra, where he found his own squadron, and after a descent for the purpose of plunder on the coast of Ætolia sailed to Corinth, and, sending his land forces home through Bœotia, returned by sea to Demetrius, and thence to Macedonia, where he was occupied during the rest of the year with the chastisement of the Dardanians, and with the enlargement of his navy, for which he placed 100 war galleys on the stocks at Cassandrea.

The Ætolians would, it seems, have been willing, after the departure of Attalus, to abandon the war, in which they had gained no advantage adequate to their efforts; but Galba eluded their wishes under

(U. C. Varr. 543.), of which Livy says (xxvi. 24.) a copy was deposited by the Ætolians at Olympia two years afterwards (*biennio post*), was so placed on record at the ensuing Olympic festival, which therefore, according to his own calculation, must have fallen in the year preceding the consulship of Claudius and Livius, and that the mission of L. Manlius, who was directed to attend at the Olympic games (Liv. xxvii. 35.), was connected with this solemn ratification of the treaty.

¹ Liv. xxviii. 8.

² *Ibid.* xxvii. 15. 30.

³ *Ibid.* xxviii. 7.

the plea that he had no authority to treat for peace, while in a secret despatch he represented to the Senate, that the interest of Rome required the continuance of the war in Greece. The Senate is said to have forbidden them to treat, and to have sent a reinforcement to their aid, with which they made themselves masters of Ambracia.¹ But it appears that these succours were soon recalled, and that for two years after the Ætolians were left to carry on the war alone. They would scarcely have been able to maintain it so long, if Philip had not been frequently diverted from them by the hostility of his barbarian neighbours. For during this interval the energy of Philopœmen infused new vigour into the Achæan League, and delivered it from its most formidable enemy.

CHA
LXI

At the election which followed next after the campaign just related, Philopœmen was raised for the first time to the office of General.² As the success of the reforms which he had introduced in the cavalry had contributed mainly to his elevation, it both encouraged him to undertake still greater changes, and served to smooth the way for them. As a Greek, jealous of liberty, as a patriotic citizen of the Achæan League, and as a soldier passionately fond of his art, he had reason to be very much dissatisfied with the existing state of things. He found the Achæans, though they possessed ample means of making themselves respected by their neighbours, reduced to a miserable and degrading dependence on a foreign Power, for protection against aggressions which they

Philopœ
men Ge
neral o
Achæan
League

¹ Appian, Mac. 2. There is, no doubt, great confusion in Appian's account of these negotiations, since the force with which he represents the Senate to have aided the Ætolians in the prosecution of the war, is no other than that which Sempronius brought over after they had concluded their treaty with Phillip (*Liv.* xxx. 12.). But it does not seem necessary on this account, with Schorn (*p.* 203. n. 6.), to reject the facts stated in the text.

² B. C. 208. Schorn (*p.* 210—214.) has rendered it highly probable that from Ol. 140. 4. the election of the Achæan Strategus took place about six months earlier than in the preceding period, when it was held in May.

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might have repelled by their own exertions, and purchasing succours which kept them subject to Macedonia, by subsidies which ought to have contributed to the support of their own armies. Though almost always at war, they had not become a military people. Their chief strength lay in their mercenary force, which, though a heavy burden on their resources, sometimes failed them in the hour of need, and was never quite trustworthy in the service of a free state. This defect was intimately connected with the personal qualities of the man, who had for so many years exercised almost absolute sway over their councils. Aratus, himself destitute of military talents and martial spirit, was neither capable nor desirous of training a nation of soldiers. For the extension of the League, he relied on bold stratagems, dexterous negotiations, or simple corruption: and he was content to meet every exigency as it arose, by such expedients as necessity suggested. The men who filled the chief magistracy during the same period in the alternate years, were mostly his friends and creatures, without either ability or character adequate to the conception of a different system. The habits of the Achæan citizens were totally foreign to a military life. They had a keen taste for luxurious enjoyments, and were much addicted to frivolous ostentation in dress and furniture, by which many were led into expenditure which exceeded their means. These tastes they carried with them into the camp, while they regarded its service as an irksome task, and grudged whatever they were obliged to lay out on their martial accoutrements. Philopœmen saw, that to raise his countrymen to the place which they ought to occupy among the states of Greece, it was necessary both to reorganise the army, and to change the whole course of their social usages, tastes, and feelings. The former of these objects was by far the least difficult: it only

required the consent of the Assembly to his scheme, and a few months' training to carry it into effect. The latter would have seemed hopeless to another man, and could only have been accomplished by the personal influence of one in whom his fellow-citizens felt pride as well as confidence. Philopœmen achieved both with singular ease, and in a surprisingly short time. He substituted complete armour, long spears, and large shields, for the light equipments of the Achæan infantry, and trained it to the close array and complicated evolutions of the Macedonian phalanx. At the same time that he obtained leave to introduce this change, he by a single speech turned the current of public opinion and sentiment into a new channel. He exposed the effeminacy of that luxury in which the wealthy youths had been used to vie with one another, and pointed their emulation to different objects, in which personal display would be associated with the ideas of toil, hardship, danger, patriotic sacrifices, duty, and glory, and so would be neither enervating nor futile. When the point of honour was once shifted, the habits of the rich underwent a rapid change. They began to take pride in the splendour of military equipments, and to curtail their other expenses, that they might make a better appearance at the review. Their plate was sent to the crucible, to be employed in the decoration of arms and caparisons. No arts were so much in request as those which ministered to the pomp and lustre of war. It was thought ridiculous to be seen richly attired, except on the parade. Philopœmen took care that these exhibitions should not be an empty show, but accompanied with a constant progress in the knowledge and practice of soldiership. He went round the cities of the League, to inspect and exercise their contingents, and to animate them by his exhortations and his example. In the course of less than eight months

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B. C. 207.
Reforms in
Achæan
army.

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he had formed an army, with which he was ready to take the field against Machanidas.

Battle of
Mantineæ.

The Spartan chief had entered Arcadia with a formidable force, and expected to overrun the open country as usual, without opposition. He was agreeably surprised when he heard at Tegea, that the Achæans had assembled their forces at Mantineæ, and he hastened the next day to meet them there, with full confidence of a decisive victory which would make him master of Peloponnesus. The core of his army was a Lacedæmonian phalanx, armed and organised like that of the Achæans: but he had also a strong body of mercenaries in his service. Such were also the greater part of Philopœmen's light troops, among which was a corps of Illyrians.¹ Philopœmen drew up his forces before Mantineæ, so as to place his phalanx behind a trench which crossed the middle of the plain, with the light infantry in one wing, and the cavalry in the other. The progress of military art is marked by a feature which does not appear in the description of the earlier battles. Machanidas had brought engines for the discharge of heavy missiles, which he disposed at intervals along the whole front of his line, to play upon the enemy and throw them into confusion before the encounter began. Philopœmen forestalled the effect of the artillery by a charge of his Tarentine cavalry, which led to a general engagement between the mercenaries of both sides. Those of Machanidas soon showed themselves superior to their antagonists, not only in number, but in condition, and at length put them to flight: and Polybius points out that no other result was to have been expected, where the combatants on

¹ But the Tarentines, who served on both sides (Pol. xi. 12.), are not to be considered as natives of Tarentum. It was only a name for a species of heavy cavalry. Steph. Byz. Τάρας. Ταραντίσειν (perhaps Ταρα τίζειν) τὸ τὴν ἑσπλίον καὶ εἰς τὰς μάχας χρησίμων ἰππασίαν ποιεῖσθαι. Liv. xxxv. 28.

the one side fought for a master who would be sure always to need and must therefore reward their services, while those on the other knew that the more decisive their victory the earlier they would be discharged.¹ Machanidas however, instead of following up this success with an attack on the Achæan phalanx, which would probably have given him the day, let himself be hurried on by the instinct of pursuit to a great distance beyond the field of battle. In the meanwhile Philopœmen, having changed the position of his phalanx to meet the new emergency, waited until the Lacedæmonians, eager to complete the victory which they saw begun, moved forward to cross the ditch, which on their side offered an easy descent, and was at this time nearly dry. While their ranks were disordered by this operation and by the difficulty of the ascent, Philopœmen charged and routed them with great slaughter, and was already completely master of the field, when Machanidas returned from the pursuit and found himself intercepted. After a fruitless attempt to cut his way through the enemy, at the passage of a bridge he was overtaken by Philopœmen, who slew him with his own hand as he was

Death of
Macha-
nidas.

¹ These remarks of Polybius (xi. 13.) are illustrated by those of Guicciardini (*Storia d' Italia, libro 1.*) on the Italian mercenaries in the fifteenth century. A namesake of Polybius, likewise a native of Megalopolis, served and was entrusted with an important command in this battle. But in one of the Vatican fragments (p. 448.) Polybius remarks, Μηδένα μέχρι γε τῶν καθ' ἡμᾶς καιρῶν ταυτῶν ἡμῶν ὄνομα κεκληρονομηκέναι κυρίως ὅσον γε ἡμᾶς εἰδέναι. On which Cardinal Mai observes, "*Insignis est hic vaticani codicis locus ad refutandos Casaubonum, Fabricium, Reiskium, et Schweighæuserum, qui Polybium Megalopolitanum, libro xi. 15., memoratum, negant esse hunc nostrum historicum; sed paulo seniore credunt, et historici fortasse patrum aut avum. Ergo in predicto etiam loco sine dubio intelligendus est historicus noster.*" But he has omitted to notice a difficulty which renders this inference more than doubtful. Mr. Clinton (F. H. iii. p. 75.) observes, *It appears (from Polyb. xxv. 7.) that Polybius was under the age of thirty in a. c. 181.* In this case he was a child of, at most, not more than three or four at the time of the battle of Mantinea. And even if it be supposed that the Achæan laws required the age of forty in an ambassador, he would have been a boy of only thirteen or fourteen at the time of the battle. That he should have commanded there at that age would certainly be more wonderful than that his memory should have deceived him on a very trifling point when he was past seventy. (I now see that Lucht, in his useful edition of the Vatican Fragm. of Polyb. p. 82., has noticed Mai's oversight as to the chronology, but believes that the name Πολυβίου, xi. 15., has been substituted by a mistake of the transcribers for Παλλόβου).

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spurring his horse across the ditch. His head was cut off and shown to the conquerors to animate them in the pursuit, which was continued as far as Tegea, where, having carried the town sword in hand, they halted for the night. Four thousand Lacedæmonians were left on the field of battle, and a still greater number, together with all the baggage and arms, fell into the hands of the Achæans, whose loss was trifling. The next day Philopæmen enjoyed the pleasure of encamping on the banks of the Eurotas: and though he did not venture to attack Sparta, he carried his ravages to the farthest corner of Laconia.

After this victory the Achæans stood in no need of Macedonian succours, though Machanidas was soon afterward succeeded by another usurper named Nabis, who became in time as formidable as his predecessor, and a much more odious tyrant; and Philip, when he was left at leisure by his Illyrian and Thracian neighbours, could turn his arms against the Ætolians without interruption. We have but scanty and fragmentary notices of his operations against them; but it appears that he wrested Ambracia from them¹, and made at least one expedition into the heart of their country. He had gained Amynder to his interest by the cession of the island of Zacynthus², and was thus enabled to lead his forces through Athamania into the upper part of Ætolia. In one of these inroads he again sacked Thermus, and repeated his sacrilegious devastations in the sanctuary of Apollo.³ The Ætolians, apparently deserted both by Attalus and the Romans, began to be earnestly desirous of peace, and of their own accord renewed the negotiation with Philip, and accepted the terms which he

B. C. 205.
The Ætolians make peace with Philip.

¹ Appian, Mac. 2.

² Liv. xxxvi. 31. A strange acquisition, apparently, to be coveted by the prince of a highland valley far removed from the sea on every side.

³ Polyb. xi. 4.

prescribed. They were no doubt moderate enough, if, as Livy intimates, he knew or suspected that the Romans were on the point of sending a fresh armament to the Ætolians. The treaty had scarcely been concluded, when the proconsul, P. Sempronius, brought over a fleet of 35 galleys, 10,000 foot, and 1000 horse, and finding that he had arrived too late for his main object sailed to Dyrrachium, and endeavoured to rouse the adjacent Illyrian tribes against Macedonia; but seeing that his forces were not sufficient to meet Philip in the field, and that he could not induce the Ætolians to break the recent treaty, he listened to the proposals of the Epirots, who, being themselves weary of the war, assumed the character of mediators, and at length prevailed on Philip and the proconsul to come to a conference at Phœnice, which was attended by Amynander and the Epirot and Acarnanian magistrates. Sempronius demanded the cession of some parts of Illyria to the Romans, and in return offered Atintania, the valleys northward on the upper Aous, to the king. To these conditions, which were to be subject to the Senate's approbation, Philip consented. The absent allies of each party were included in the treaty: on Philip's part the Achæans, Bœotians, and Thessalians, and Prusias of Bithynia; on that of Rome, the Eleans, Messenians, and Athenians, Nabis, Pleuratus, and Attalus. To these, in honour of the legend by which the Romans traced their origin to Asia, was added the name of Ilium. A truce of two months was granted to allow time for an embassy to Rome, where the Senate, intent on the approaching crisis of the struggle with Carthage, and knowing that it would never be too late to re-open the discussion with Philip, adopted the treaty, and it was ratified by the unanimous suffrages of the tribes. The Ætolians, who had been the staunchest allies of Rome, and the chief sufferers in

CHA
LXI

Philip's
treaty v
Rome.

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her cause, were passed over in the treaty in an ominous silence, which showed that she considered all her obligations toward them as cancelled by their claim of independence.

Internal
State of
Ætolia.

For a few years after the battle of Mantinea Greece remained tranquil. The Ætolians were fully occupied with their domestic concerns. The long series of wars in which they had been engaged had it seems enriched none, but while it impoverished the state had ruined most private fortunes; for whatever gain it yielded to successful adventurers was consumed by the growing prodigality of their mode of living. The two chiefs who to gratify their own avarice and ambition had plunged the nation into these wasteful wars, Dorimachus and Scopas, were themselves deeply involved in debt; and when by the peace they were thrown upon their own encumbered patrimonies, they appear to have resorted to a new kind of spoliation which they carried on under the forms of law. Through the intrigues of a party, which comprehended all who were in like embarrassment with themselves, they were invested with an extraordinary commission to revise the laws. The history of their legislative proceedings has not been preserved; but there can be little doubt, that they chiefly concerned the relation between debtor and creditor; and the character of the men renders it easy to conceive the use they would make of such an opportunity; especially as we are informed that one main object which Scopas had in view in the execution of his task was to secure his election to the chief magistracy.¹ In this however he was disappointed, and he then quitted his country to seek his fortune at Alexandria, where he was admitted into the king's service on very liberal terms, but afterwards lost his treasure and his life through

¹ Polyb. XIII. 1. 2. XVIII. 36—38.

his insatiable rapacity. In Ætolia his legislation gave occasion to civil discord which frequently broke out in open violence and bloodshed.

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In Peloponnesus the fame of Philopœmen was sufficient for a time to repress any inclination which might exist among the enemies of the Achæans to disturb the peace. At the Nemean festival which next followed his great victory, being a second time General, he exhibited his phalanx amidst the admiration and applause of the assembled Greeks, and was greeted in the theatre as the protector of Grecian liberty. A renown so pure seems to have excited Philip's envy and hatred; and he was at least generally believed to have suborned emissaries to take away the life of Philopœmen by the method which he had practised against Aratus, but the plot was—we are not informed how—detected and baffled.¹ A mere rumour, which proved to be groundless, of his approach is said to have struck such terror into a Bœotian army which was on the point of assaulting Megara, that it precipitately retreated, leaving its scaling-ladders fastened to the walls. In the meanwhile however a power was growing up at Sparta, of a kind which had scarcely been ever before witnessed in Greece. We are not informed by what means Nabis seized the vacant throne; but they were probably like those by which he maintained himself in it. One of his first acts was to despatch Pelops², whom Machanidas had suffered to preserve a title which kept up some resemblance to the ancient form of Spartan royalty, and thus gave a show of legitimacy to his government. Nabis reigned, as without a colleague, so without any affectation of respect for the ancient constitution. He had emancipated a great number of slaves or helots, and had made a new dis-

Tyranny
of Nabis.

¹ Plut. Philop. 12. Justin. XII. 4.

² Diodor. xxvii.

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tribution of land in their favour. But it was not on their support that he chiefly relied. He had collected a body of mercenaries from the vilest refuse of society. The worst criminals, the most desperate outlaws, found an asylum at Sparta, a bountiful patron and a gracious master in Nabis, and were preferred as his guards, and the ministers of his will.¹ The citizens most eminent for birth and wealth were either put to death or driven into exile, and their wives and fortunes transferred to the tyrant's favourites. Even in exile they were not safe, but were often murdered by his emissaries even in the cities where they had taken refuge. Those who remained at Sparta were subject to incessant exactions and to exquisite tortures if they were suspected of possessing more than they disclosed, or refused to comply with his demands.² He seems to have valued power chiefly as an instrument for amassing wealth, and he turned Sparta into a nest of pirates and a den of robbers. He harboured the corsairs of Crete, and received a share of their booty; and he sent out gangs of villains who roamed through Peloponnesus, waylaying and murdering travellers and plundering houses and temples, and divided the spoil with their master. When he had carried on this system for two or three years he grew bolder from impunity, and began to meditate greater enterprises. A pretext was easily found. One of his most valuable horses had been carried off by some Bœotians, who being overtaken at Megalopolis appealed to the magistrates when their pursuers would have dragged them away, and were protected from their violence. Nabis, under colour of retaliation, made inroads into the territory of Megalopolis, which

¹ Diodor. u. s. Polyb. XIII. 6. 7. XVI. 13.

² He had contrived a figure representing his wife Apaga, which clasped the sufferer in its embrace, and pierced him with nails, with which its arms and bosom were studded. Polyb. XIII. 7.

however did not immediately provoke hostilities on the side of the Achæans. He seems thus to have been encouraged to make an attempt which no one could have foreseen, as it was directed against an ally from whom he had received no provocation. He surprised Messene and made himself master of the town. Philopœmen at this time filled no office, and he could not prevail on the General, Lysippus, to march to the relief of Messene, which appeared to him to be irrecoverably lost. But by his private influence he collected the forces of Megalopolis and led them into Messenia, and Nabis, hearing of his approach, evacuated the town by the opposite gate, and made a hasty retreat into Laconia.¹ In his third year of office Philopœmen, having assembled the forces of the League with great secrecy at Tegea², led them to the borders of Laconia, where he drew the tyrant's mercenaries into an ambuscade and defeated them with great slaughter, so that Nabis did not venture beyond the frontier for the rest of that year.

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In the meanwhile the contest between the two great Powers of the West was decided by the battle of Zama, and the Senate was left at leisure to turn its attention toward the affairs of Greece. Philip, as might easily be supposed, had watched the approach of the crisis which so closely affected his interests, with deep anxiety. But his conduct during this interval seems strangely at variance not only with the dictates of an enlightened policy, but with the plainest maxims of common prudence. He knew that the enmity of the Romans continued unabated, and that it was not in his power to conciliate them unless by unqualified submission. But this was no

¹ Plut. Philop. 12. Polyb. xvi. 16. 17. Pausanias (iv. 29. 10.) speaks of a convention: ἀπὸ λαθροῦ ἐπίδοσπονδος, and viii. 50. 5. ἐξέτισεν ἐπίδοσπονδος.

² Polyb. xvi. 36. Manso (Sparta, III. 1. p. 401.) has erroneously assigned this stratagem to the campaign of the year 192.

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reason why he should provoke them by demonstrations of hostility which could neither hurt them nor benefit himself. Yet this he did. He sent a body of 4000 men under the command of Sopater, a Macedonian of the highest rank, being distantly connected with the royal family, to join the Carthaginian army in Africa, together with a supply of money¹, and he seems not to have abstained from petty aggressions on his neighbours who were in alliance with Rome. Complaints on these heads were brought against him before the Senate, which sent three envoys to remonstrate with him, and M. Aurelius, one of the three, staid in Greece under the pretext of protecting the allies of the republic, and often engaged in open combat with Philip's officers. It might indeed be suspected, if Philip had shown more discretion in other respects, that these quarrels had from the first been fomented by Roman intrigues. After the battle of Zama, when a Macedonian embassy came to Rome with a reply to the Senate's remonstrances, the Senate declared its approbation of the conduct of Aurelius, and sternly rejected the king's excuses, with the threat:—*He was seeking war, and if he persisted, he would soon find it.* He had reason indeed to expect it, even though he had taken the utmost pains to avoid it, and therefore prudence required that he should employ the interval of peace in the most active preparations for the defence of his kingdom. But instead of this he provoked new enemies and embarked in fresh wars and expeditions, which, even if successful, would have yielded but little advantage to him in his conflict with Rome, and he formed plans of aggrandizement which were merely visionary, so long as the issue of that conflict remained uncertain. The death of Ptolemy Philopator,

B. C. 202.
Philip
threatened
by the
Romans.

¹ Liv. xxx. 26. 42.

whose heir Epiphanes was a child four or five years old, opened a prospect which so inflamed the ambition of Philip and Antiochus of Syria, that they entered into a compact to divide his dominions between them. It was agreed that Antiochus should take possession of Egypt and Cyprus, and Philip of Cyrene and all the conquests of Ptolemy Euergetes in Ionia and the Cyclades, and that they should aid one another to effect these conquests.

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Philip seems to have hoped that, before he should have a war with Rome on his hands, he might establish his ascendancy in the Ægean, so as to bar the Roman fleets from the eastern coasts of his dominions; but though perfectly reckless of honour and good faith in the means which he chose to compass this end, he appears to have miscalculated his strength, and the tortuous policy to which he trusted for success only led him into dangers and difficulties which he would otherwise have avoided. The two great maritime Powers which stood in the way of his design were Attalus and Rhodes. Attalus was a rival and an enemy, and the breach between the two kings had been widened by Philip's alliance with Prusias of Bithynia, who had married his daughter. The Rhodians were by no means hostile to Philip, and had given sufficient proof that they would not willingly have sacrificed him to the Romans. But it was clear that they and Attalus, if either were attacked, would defend each other. Philip however resolved to force the Rhodians into a war with him, while he inflicted a heavy blow on their marine by an act of perfidious aggression. He had men in his service who were capable of every crime. He placed a squadron of twenty galleys under the command of the Ætolian Dicearchus, with general orders to levy contributions among the islands of the Ægean, and to treat all trading vessels as lawful prizes, and with special

His operations in the Ægean.

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Attempt
upon
Rhodes.

instructions to aid the Cretan pirates against the Rhodians, who had been obliged to declare war on them for the protection of their commerce.¹ The spirit in which Dicæarchus executed his commission may be gathered from his practice of erecting two altars to Impiety and Lawlessness at the places where he anchored.² Yet this was the most open and honourable part of Philip's scheme, and it served to cover a fouler device, which he entrusted to another very fit agent, the Tarentine Heraclides. This man, who having attempted first to sell his native city to the Romans, and then to betray the Romans to Hannibal, had been forced to fly from Italy³, had been admitted by Philip to a degree of favour and confidence like that which he had formerly granted to Demetrius the Pharian, and by calumnious accusations he had induced the king to put five of his principal councillors to death.⁴ Hence there were some who attributed the corruption of Philip's character to Heraclides⁵, and with perhaps as much reason as those who referred it to Demetrius. In each case Philip only attached himself to a congenial adviser. Heraclides undertook to destroy the Rhodian navy in a way worthy of his reputation. He renewed the stratagem of Zopyrus, and pretended to seek refuge at Rhodes from Philip's cruelty. The Rhodians were not blindly credulous; but their suspicions were lulled to rest by the sight of a letter of Philip to the Cretans, produced by the fugitive, in which he undertook to make war on the Rhodians. Having thus gained their confidence, Heraclides only waited for the first windy night, and then set fire to the arsenal, and made his escape in a boat.⁶ The conflagration did great damage; but it was not by a

¹ Diodor. xxvii. xxviii.

² Ibid. xiii. 4.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Polyb. xviii. 37.

⁵ Diodor. xxviii.

⁶ Polyæn. v. 17. 2. Polyb. xiii. 5.

BATTLE OF CHIOS.

stroke of this kind that a wise enemy would have thought to crush such a power as Rhodes. Yet the Rhodians were slow to declare war against Philip, and they continued to hesitate even after another signal specimen of his bad faith and rapacity. He had reduced the towns of Lysimachia, Chalcedon, and Cius, though they were all in alliance with the Ætoli-ans, and carried off the inhabitants as slaves. Cius he sacked in the presence of the envoys of several Greek cities, who had come to intercede for it, and the news was brought to Rhodes at the time when a Macedonian ambassador was haranguing the Rhodians on his master's magnanimous forbearance toward the conquered city.¹ He afterwards treated Thasos in the same manner, after it had capitulated with his general Metrodorus.² The Rhodians now made preparations for war; but yet hostilities were begun almost without their consent by their brave admiral Theophiliscus, and it was not until the first blow had been struck that they applied themselves in earnest to the contest, and induced Attalus to combine his forces with theirs. Philip had taken Samos and was besieging Chios, where he made a fruitless attempt to excite the slaves to revolt³, when the fleets of the allies appeared in superior numbers. He attempted to escape to Samos, but was overtaken and defeated with a great loss both of ships and men.⁴ Philip affected indeed to claim the victory, because he had forced Attalus to run his galley ashore and to leave it in the enemy's hands, but he declined a second combat when it was offered to him soon after by the combined fleets. The Rhodian

¹ Polyb. xv. 23.

² *Ibid.* 24.

³ Plut. *De Mul. Virt. Xii.* He tempted them with the offer of liberty and their masters' wives. According to Plutarch's author, the women were roused to extraordinary exertions, but none of the slaves revolted.

⁴ Polyb. xvi. 2—9.

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admiral died of his wounds the next day, and it was perhaps this event that turned the fortune of the war for some time in Philip's favour. The allies parted their fleets, and the Rhodians were defeated off Lade.¹ This victory enabled Philip to make himself master of Samos and Chios, and probably of several other places on the coast of Ionia², and to invade the dominions of Attalus, where he committed much useless havoc on sacred buildings and works of art in the neighbourhood of Pergamus, but, through the precautions which had been taken by Attalus, found it difficult to provide for the subsistence of his troops.³ He afterwards again moved southward, and ravaged the territory of the Rhodians on the main land, and made himself master of several towns, but when he would have returned to Europe, found himself blockaded by Attalus and the Rhodians who had again united their armaments, and he was compelled to winter in Caria, much straitened for provisions, and in great anxiety about the safety of his own dominions.⁴ He extricated

¹ Polyb. xvi. 14. 15. Livy (xxx. 14.) seems to have adopted the account of the Rhodian authors, Zeno and Antisthenes, whom Polybius censures for their partiality.

² Appian, Mac. 3.

³ Polyb. xvi. 1. But this fragment appears to be misplaced. That the invasion of the dominions of Attalus was subsequent to the battles of Chios and Lade, may be inferred not only from Appian, and from the remark of Polybius (xvi. 9.) that it was the Rhodian admiral Theophiliscus who, by his example, induced Attalus to begin hostilities against Philip (Schorn, p. 221. n. 5.), but perhaps still more decisively from Philip's plea (Polyb. xvii. 6.) that Attalus and the Rhodians were confessedly the aggressors in the battle of Chios. Οὐ γὰρ ἡμεῖς Ἀττάλου πρότεροι καὶ Ῥοδίοις τὰς χεῖρας ἐπέβαλον, οὗτοι δ' ἡμῶν ὁμολογουμένως: language which he could not have used if he had made such an attack upon Attalus before the sea-fight. He had urged the same plea to M. Æmilius: *ab Attalo et Rhodiis ultro se bello laceratum* (Liv. xxxi. 18.), and Æmilius virtually admits the fact. Compare however Polyb. xvi. 34. The Vatican Fragment of Polybius (p. 409.), *ὅτι μετὰ τὸ συντελεσθῆναι τὴν περὶ τὴν Λάδην ναυμαχίαν καὶ τοὺς μὲν Ῥοδίοις ἐκποδῶν γενέσθαι, τὸν δ' Ἀττάλον μηδέπω συμμεμαχημέναι* (Cod. *συμμεμαχέναι*), seems to intimate that the battle of Lade preceded that of Chios, and Lucht adopts this conclusion. But it is difficult to conceive that the Rhodians could be said *ἐκποδῶν γενέσθαι* before the battle of Chios; whereas what is said of Attalus may be explained, as in the text, of his subsequent co-operation with the Rhodians. Lucht also supposes the invasion of Pergamus to have preceded the battle of Chios.

⁴ Polyb. xvi. 24.

himself however from this embarrassing position early in the next spring (B. C. 200), by a stratagem. He sent an Egyptian to the enemy, who, pretending to have deserted, informed them that Philip was preparing to engage the next day. The report was confirmed by an unusual number of fires, which were lighted in the Macedonian camp during the night. The blockading squadron was recalled to make preparation for the battle, and in the morning Philip was far out at sea¹, and though pursued by Attalus and the Rhodians arrived safely in Macedonia.²

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B. C. 200.
Philip's escape from Caria.

It was high time, for Rome had already declared war against him. The Senate had disclosed its intentions or disposition, even before the conclusion of the peace with Carthage, and needed no fresh motive to stimulate the spirit of conquest and domination in the whole body, or the eagerness of its leading members for new provinces and triumphs, of which they saw a boundless prospect opening in the rich unwarlike East. Pretexts too, sufficient for its purpose, had been furnished through Philip's imprudence before the battle of Zama. Yet it was glad to find more of these and to receive fresh complaints against him from its allies; for the Roman people, which was ultimately to decide the question of war or peace, had not altogether the same interests with the men who commanded its armies, governed its provinces, and conducted its negotiations: it was just at this time weary of war, and longed for an interval of repose. The Senate therefore gave willing audience to the envoys of Attalus and the Rhodians, when they came to report Philip's aggressions; and though it rejected the petition of the Ætoli-ans, who solicited a renewal of their alliance, it care-

Roman pre-
texts for
war.

¹ Polyæn. iv. 17. 2.

² Liv. xxxl. 14.

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fully treasured up their complaints against Philip.¹ Another ground of quarrel still more acceptable was supplied by the Athenians, and they earned the unhappy distinction of suggesting the immediate occasion of the war. Two young Acarnanians, who, through ignorance of the sacred observances, had entered the temple at Eleusis during the celebration of the Mysteries, had been discovered, and, though there was no doubt as to the innocence of their error, were put to death by the priests. Their countrymen were indignant at this cruelty, and prevailed on Philip to furnish them with a body of Macedonian troops, with which they overran Attica and returned laden with spoil.² Henceforth the Athenians, who it seems had steadily resisted all Philip's overtures³, were incessantly harassed by Macedonian privateers from Chalcis and by inroads from Corinth, and they were threatened with another invasion against which they sought protection at Rome, where their envoys received the thanks of the Senate for their courageous fidelity. But the views of the Roman government were perhaps most effectually forwarded by the accounts received from M. Aurelius of Philip's military and naval preparations, and of his movements in the *Ægean*. The despatch described Philip as a second Pyrrhus, equally ambitious, and much more formidable, and urged the necessity of forestalling his designs upon Italy by the invasion of Macedonia. This was a comparison which might work upon the feelings of the Comitia; and it proved very useful to the Senate: for when the war

¹ Appian, *Mac.* 3. Liv. xxxi. 1. 29. Schorn (225. n. 2.) supposes Livy to have been in error when in the first of these passages he says that the Romans renewed the war with Macedonia in part on account of the *Ætolians*. Livy however only says that the Romans were *in fensi Philippo, et infidam adversus Ætolos alioque regionis ejusdem socios pacem*: and the embassy of the *Ætolians* proves that they had some complaints against him. The only difficulty is to reconcile the conduct of the parties on this occasion with that which we find related, Liv. xxxi. 15. (*gaudentes utcumque composita cum Philippo pace*) and 29—32.

² Livy, xxxi. 14.

³ *Ibid.* 5.

with Philip was proposed by the consul, P. Sulpicius Galba, to whose lot the province of Macedonia had fallen, it was at first rejected by a great majority of the Centuries; and it was only when the consul, in a second Comitia, insisting on the example of Pyrrhus, argued that the only question left was, whether the war should be waged in Macedonia or in Italy, that the people, unable to detect the fallacy, gave a reluctant assent.

Attalus and the Rhodian admiral, when they followed Philip to Europe, made first for Ægina; and as they happened to arrive there at the time when three Roman envoys who were on their way to Alexandria were staying at Athens, Attalus crossed over to Piræus, and was received by the Athenians with extravagant adulation: a new tribe was created to bear his name, and the Athenian franchise or isopolity was conferred on the Rhodian people. Attalus declined presenting himself before the Assembly on the plea of modesty; but addressed a letter to the people, in which he recounted the benefits he had bestowed on them, and exhorted them to declare war against Philip. It was not yet known that Rome had declared war; and the Roman envoys sent a message to Philip's general Nicanor¹, who had made an inroad into Attica and had advanced near to the city gates, bidding him inform his master, that, if he would have peace with Rome, he must abstain from hostilities against the Greeks, and must make such compensation to Attalus, as should be awarded by an impartial tribunal. This message had induced Nicanor to withdraw his troops.² Yet the Athenians with at least the tacit sanction of the Roman envoys declared war against Philip. But the allies who instigated them to this step neither set them an example of vigour in the prosecution of the

¹ He was distinguished by the singular addition of the Elephant. Polyb. xviii. 7. 2.

² Polyb. xvi. 27.

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Philip
before
Abydos.

war, nor provided for their security. The Rhodians sailed away to Rhodes, only compelling the islands which lay on their passage, all but Andros, Paros, and Cythnos, to submit to them. Attalus lingered long in utter inaction at Ægina, waiting the result of an embassy which he had sent to the Ætolians, but which could not rouse them to take up arms. In the meanwhile Philip was left at liberty to strengthen himself by new conquests. On his return to Macedonia he had sent Philocles with a small force to ravage Attica, while he conducted an expedition in person to the Thracian Chersonesus, and after having gained several maritime towns hitherto occupied by Ptolemy's garrisons in that region laid siege to Abydos. The Abydenes, though they received scarcely any succour from Attalus or the Rhodians, made a gallant resistance. Yet they would at length have capitulated, but Philip required them to surrender at discretion. Being thus driven to despair, they devoted themselves to destruction; and the conqueror, when he took possession of the city, found hardly a living person in it, beside the women and children. During the siege, M. Æmilius, one of the three envoys who were proceeding to Alexandria, was deputed by his colleagues to repair to Philip's camp, and remonstrated with him in a tone to which the king's ear was not yet accustomed, repeating the demands which had been before conveyed to him through Nicanor, with an addition in favour of Ptolemy and the Rhodians. Philip retorted with a sarcastic defiance, which he had no reason to regret, as on his return to Macedonia he learnt that the Roman consul had already landed in Epirus. It was late in the summer when Galba arrived, and, having taken up his own quarters at Apollonia, he sent a squadron detached from the fleet which was stationed under L. Apustius at Corcyra, under the command of C. Claudius Centho, for the protection

of Attica. Claudius not only chased the enemy's privateers from the Attic coast, but sailing by night up the Euripus surprised Chalcis, made a great slaughter of the garrison and the inhabitants, set fire to the magazines and armoury, broke open the prison, threw down the king's statues, and carried off a rich booty. His force was not sufficient to retain possession of the place unless he had withdrawn that which was needed for the defence of Attica. Yet the abandonment of Chalcis did not enable him to secure Attica; and the evils which he drew upon it were greater than any from which he had hitherto preserved it.

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} Surprise of
Chalcis.

Philip was at Demetrias when he received intelligence of the disaster which befel Chalcis: and he immediately set out with 5000 foot and 300 horse, in the hope of surprising the Romans there. But as, notwithstanding the rapidity of his march, he found nothing but the smoking ruins, his next thought was to retaliate by a like blow; and leaving a few of his men to bury the dead he continued his march with equal speed toward Athens. He would probably have succeeded in his attempt, if the movement of his column had not been descried by a sentinel from a watch-tower, who ran forward and roused the city from its midnight slumbers. Philip came up a few hours later, yet before daybreak; and perceiving lights and other signs that his approach had been discovered, halted to let his troops take breath, purposing still to try the event of an open assault. But when he advanced along the broad causeway which led from the city to the Academy, the gate was thrown open, and the Athenians, with a body of mercenaries and some Pergamenian auxiliaries, came forth in battle array. Philip however, charging them with great fury at the head of his cavalry, soon forced them to take shelter behind their walls. He

Philip in-
vades At-
tica.

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then encamped in the outskirts, and proceeded to wreak his vengeance on the Athenians, as he had indulged it at Thermus and Pergamus. He destroyed or defaced all the monuments of religion and of art, all the sacred and pleasant places which adorned the suburbs. The Academy, the Lyceum, and Cynosarges, with their temples, schools, groves, and gardens, were all wasted with fire. Not even the sepulchres were spared. The next day, finding that the garrison had been reinforced with fresh troops from Ægina and by the Romans from Piræus, he moved his camp a few miles further off, and after an unsuccessful attempt to surprise Eleusis, proceeded to Corinth, and suddenly made his appearance at Argos in an Assembly of the Achæans, which had been convoked to deliberate on means of defence against Nabis.

Philopœmen had been succeeded in his office by Cycliades, a man not only of very inferior abilities but of very different views, being regarded as a devoted partizan of Philip. It was apparently on this account, and not through impatience of a private station or for want of sufficient occupation at home, that Philopœmen, at the request of the Gortynians, made another voyage to Crete, and undertook the command of their forces.¹ His absence encouraged Nabis to renew his aggressions on Megalopolis, which he reduced to such distress by his incessant inroads, that the inhabitants were fain to sow the open spaces within the walls to ward off famine. The Achæan army had been disbanded, and it was necessary, before succour could be sent to Megalopolis, to fix the contingents of the several cities. Philip offered to take the whole charge on himself, and not only to drive the enemy back into his own territory, but to carry the war into Laconia. This proposal was received with great ap-

¹ Plut. Phil. 13

plause; but the gratitude of the Assembly was cooled when Philip added, that he should expect the Achæans, while he protected them against Nabis, to serve in the garrisons at Corinth and in Eubœa. It seemed clear that his object was to employ the Achæan forces so as to have them completely in his power, and to involve the League in his contest with Rome.¹ But even his friends seem not to have been willing to go this length in his cause. An Achæan embassy had been sent earlier in the year to Rhodes, to offer its mediation between him and the Rhodians, who however were forbidden to accept it by the Roman envoys.² This was perhaps the greatest effort that his Achæan partizans could venture on in his favour; Cycliades thought it safest not to provoke a discussion, but alleging that he had no power to propose any other question than that which they were met to consider, after a decree had been passed for the levy of troops against Nabis, dismissed the Assembly. Philip, having only collected a few volunteers in Peloponnesus, returned into Attica. There he was joined by Philocles, who had it seems taken up his head-quarters in Eubœa. But after some fruitless attempts on Eleusis, the Piræus, and Athens itself, they again divided their forces, and carried the same kind of devastation which had been recently exercised within sight of the city through the whole length and breadth of Attica, levelling and burning all the rural sanctuaries, the temples of the demes, which, though less sumptuously adorned than those of the capital, were mostly of still more venerable antiquity, having been founded before Athens had become the centre of the united state, and enriched with many precious works of art.³ When no

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¹ Liv. xxxi. 25.

² Polyb. xvi. 35.

³ Liv. xxxi. 26. Aristides says of them, under the Antonines, that there were ποικίλα λαμπρότερον τῶν ἀλλαχού πόλεων κατασκευασμένοι (Panathen. t. i. p. 305. Dindorf.).

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more subjects could be found for his barbarous rage to work upon, Philip returned to Macedonia.

In the meanwhile Galba, still remaining himself near the coast, had sent Apustius with a part of his forces into the upper valley of the Apsus, and the lieutenant had taken several towns, ravaged the Macedonian border, and defeated a body of Macedonian troops, and had returned laden with booty to the consul's camp. The success of this expedition encouraged the Dardanian and Illyrian princes and the Athamanian Amynder to offer their services. Galba sent Apustius back to the fleet at Corcyra with orders to join Attalus at Ægina. He himself seems to have delayed opening the campaign in person until he had made an attempt to engage the Ætolians on his side. The Senate was no longer averse to receive them into alliance, and Amynder was directed to exert his influence to animate them against Philip.

Neutrality
of the
Ætolians.

But the Ætolian Assembly, which was held soon after to debate the question of war or peace, and was attended by Macedonian, Roman, and Athenian envoys, came to no decision, a result which seems quite intelligible, when we consider how little either of the belligerents had done to earn the confidence of the Ætolians, without the cause reported by Livy, that Damocritus, the presiding magistrate, had been corrupted by Macedonian gold. The neutrality of the Ætolians however was at this juncture of great moment to Philip, who had to expect an attack which would try his strength to the utmost, from the Roman army and their Illyrian allies on the land-side, while the Roman fleet, with Attalus and the Rhodians, threatened his eastern coast. He entrusted the armament which he had collected at Demetrias, and the defence of the maritime region, to Heraclides, sent a body of troops, nominally under the command of his son Perseus, a boy of twelve, but with a council

of officers at his side, to occupy the passes through which the Dardanians were used to penetrate into Macedonia, and then devoted his whole attention to preparations for resistance to the Roman invasion. While he was still assembling his forces, Galba had taken the field. He had taken a circuitous route, perhaps with the view of effecting a junction with the Dardanians, which brought him into the upper valleys of the basin of the Axios, where Philip first fell in with him. Philip however declined a battle, but thought it necessary to send for the division under Perseus, and thus to open the passes to the Dardanians. The consul, though superior in the field, did not venture to push forward toward the eastern coast of Macedonia, but overran the central highlands, where he found it difficult to provide for the subsistence of his troops, and he finally returned to his winter-quarters at Apollonia, without any much more important advantage than the conquest of a few towns. Still he had been uniformly successful, and had worsted the enemy in two or three engagements of cavalry: the Dardanians too, with the Illyrians under Pleuratus, had taken the opportunity to invade Macedonia; and as Attalus and the Roman fleet were at the same time threatening Eubœa, Philip's situation seemed less hopeful than at the beginning of the campaign. This aspect of his affairs put an end to the hesitation of the Ætolians; and Damocritus himself now strongly urged them to join the victorious side, and to press upon their falling ally. They forthwith declared war against Philip, and, in conjunction with Amynder, invaded Thessaly, where they stormed and sacked some towns, and, against Amynder's advice, spread over the level country in quest of booty, as if perfectly secure from attack. Yet an enemy was close at hand. Galba's retreat had induced the Dardanians to betake themselves home-

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Galba in
Macedonia

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ward, and Philip, having sent a body of light infantry and cavalry under Athenagoras to harass their rear, hastened into Thessaly, where he surprised the Ætolians, as they were encamped in the plain near the town of Pharcadon. Amynder had taken the precaution of intrenching himself on rising ground. He was thus enabled to afford a refuge to his allies, when they were forced to abandon their camp; and when they fled panic-struck the next night he guided them over the mountains, so as to elude the enemy's pursuit, into Ætolia. Athenagoras likewise executed his commission successfully, though the good order in which the Dardanians conducted their retreat secured them from much loss. Soon afterwards the number of Philip's enemies was reduced by a cause in which he had no share, but which produced the effect of a diversion in his favour. Scopas returned from Alexandria with a large sum of money and an unlimited commission to levy troops in Ætolia for the king of Egypt. He raised 6000 men, horse and foot, and would have carried away more, if he had not been checked by the remonstrances of Damocritus, who, either from patriotic anxiety or because Scopas had not bribed him, interposed his warnings and authority, to prevent the country from being drained of all its citizens of military age.

Movements
of the
Roman
fleet.

Apustius with the fleet joined Attalus at Cape Scyllæum on the coast of Argolis, and they then sailed together into Piræus. The Athenians, now released from all fear of Philip, gave vent to their anger in a decree, by which they condemned him to perpetual ignominy and execration, while they heaped honours no less extravagant on their protectors. The course of the combined fleets, which were reinforced with twenty Illyrian boats, and subsequently by a Rhodian squadron of twenty galleys, as they proceeded northward, was chequered with successes and

reverses. They conquered Andros, and made descents on Eubœa, but failed in an attempt on Cythnus, and were repulsed with considerable loss from Cassandrea. Acanthus, which they stormed and sacked, was the extreme point which they reached. They then returned heavily laden with booty to Eubœa, and after a conference with an Ætolian embassy at Heraclea, from which Attalus and the Ætolians departed in mutual displeasure, laid siege to Oreus, which yielded after an obstinate resistance. This was their last, as their most important conquest. Here, as in all other cases, the town was given up to Attalus, the spoil and captives to the Romans. As by this time the autumnal equinox was approaching, Apustius returned by Malea to Corcyra: and Attalus, after having celebrated the Eleusinian Mysteries, passed over to Asia, and the Rhodians to their island.

In the division of the provinces at Rome in the beginning of the year Macedonia had fallen to the consul P. Villius Tappulus. It was late in the autumn when he arrived, and before he took up his quarters for the winter at Corcyra he was occupied with the suppression of a dangerous mutiny which had broken out in the army. It had been for some time gathering to a head, and had perhaps contributed in some degree to retard the progress of his predecessor. About 2000 of his troops, who after the battle of Zama had been transported to Sicily and thence to Macedonia as volunteers, complained that they had been embarked against their will, and tumultuously demanded their discharge. The consul appeased the disturbance by a promise that, if they returned to their duty, he would lay their case before the Senate. Philip toward the close of the year had undertaken the siege of Thaumaci, a town strongly situated near the defiles of Mount Othrys, but was compelled to abandon it by the vigorous sallies of a body of Ætolians who

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threw themselves into the place. During the winter he sent an embassy to the Achæans, to receive their yearly oath of fidelity, and at the same time to conciliate them by a fresh promise of the cession of Triphylia and Heræa, to which he now added Orchomenus.¹ He also thought it expedient to sacrifice his profligate minister Heracleides to the public indignation, and threw him into prison, to the great joy of all his subjects.² In the meanwhile he carried on his military preparations with unremitting activity, keeping his troops in constant exercise during the winter, and early in the following spring sent Athenagoras with the light infantry into Chaonia, to occupy the defiles near Antigonea. He himself followed a few days after with the main body, and, having carefully inspected the features of the country, resolved to fortify a position on the river Aous, where it flows between two high hills, Aeropus and Asnaus, leaving only room for a narrow road on one bank. He had not been long encamped here, before Villius came over from Corcyra, and was guided to the pass by Charops, an Epirot of great influence, who, almost alone among his countrymen, had declared himself a partizan of the Romans.³ Having viewed the enemy's position, he held a council of war on the question, whether he should attempt to force his way through the defile, or should take the more circuitous route by which his predecessor had invaded Macedonia the year before. The deliberation occupied several days; and he was still in perplexity, when he received advice that the consul T. Quinctius Flamininus, to whom the province of Macedonia had been assigned, had already crossed over to Corcyra.

B. C. 199.
Philip encamped on the Aous.

T. Quinctius Flamininus.

Flamininus had mounted by one step from the ædileship to the consulship, notwithstanding the pro-

¹ See above, p. 294.

² Diodorus, xxviii. liv. xxxii. 5.

³ Polyb. xxvii. 13. liv. xxxii. 6. 11. (*Charopo principe Epirotarum*), 14.

test of two tribunes against a novelty which they regarded both as dangerous and illegal. He had not yet completed his thirtieth year, and had performed no very important services, either military or civil: though in the government of Tarentum, and the settlement of two colonies, he had displayed talents for business, which might prove that he was qualified for higher offices. It must have been chiefly to his manners and address that he owed his extraordinary elevation. He was a Roman of the new school, which studied to soften the homely roughness of the old Italian character, and to adapt the forms of Roman society to the altered relations of the state. He was conversant with the Greek language, now an indispensable instrument for a Roman statesman, who looked beyond the narrow field of the old Italian politics into the new sphere of war and negotiation now opened for the Roman arms and diplomacy among the nations and princes of the East, and who was ambitious of conducting the affairs of the commonwealth in those regions. A happier lot for Rome had rarely fallen, than that by which the Macedonian war was committed to Flamininus. It was a work which required such a man, and which probably would never have prospered in the hands by which it had hitherto been carried on. Much was felt to be wanting for the fulfilment of the omen which Galba had reported to the Senate: that a laurel had sprung up in the stern of one of his galleys.¹ The contest with Philip, which had now occupied two successive consuls, had scarcely been brought a step nearer a decision, and was even beginning to assume a more threatening aspect: for an embassy had come from Attalus, to announce that his dominions had been invaded by Antiochus, and to request the

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¹ Liv. xxxii. 1.

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Senate either to send a force sufficient to protect him, or to permit him to employ his own fleet and troops for the defence of his kingdom. The Senate did not choose to provoke Antiochus at such a juncture. It declined to send succour to Attalus against a prince who was the friend and ally of the Roman people, but left him at liberty to use his own forces as he thought fit, and promised to intercede with Antiochus in his behalf. A reinforcement of 8000 foot and 800 horse was decreed for the army of Macedonia, and Flamininus selected them among the veterans who had served in Spain or Africa. He also prevailed on the Senate to appoint his brother Lucius to the command of the fleet. Instead of staying at Rome like his predecessors, to enjoy the civil honours of his office, until the season for warfare was spent, he embarked as soon as he had completed his preparations, and on his arrival at Corcyra immediately crossed over with a single galley to Epirus, and hastened forward to the camp on the Aous, where he dismissed Villius, and, while he waited for the rest of his troops, deliberated with his council on the plan of his future operations. If he took the safer and more circuitous route, it was probable that another summer would be wasted in marches and counter-marches, in reaping the harvest of the highland valleys, and in trifling engagements. He therefore determined on the more arduous and dangerous attempt, which promised the greatest advantages in case of success, and bent all his thoughts toward forcing the enemy's position.

But to see what was most desirable was much easier than to find means of accomplishing it. He remained forty days in presence of the enemy, without any decisive movement. Philip conceived the hope that he might put an end to the war by negotiation; and through the intervention of the Epirot magistrates an interview took place between him and

the consul on the banks of the river, at a point where it was so narrow that they could hear one another from the opposite sides. The substance of the consul's demands was that he should withdraw his garrisons from the Greek towns, and make restitution or reparation for his aggressions. And Philip professed himself not unwilling to resign his own conquests. But when they proceeded to details, and Flamininus began with a demand of liberty for the Thessalians, Philip indignantly broke off the conference, exclaiming, *What harder terms would you impose if I were conquered?* The next day the Romans made a vigorous assault on the enemy, but gained no ground; and they must probably have abandoned the attempt, if a herdsman, sent by Charops, had not offered to show a path by which they might reach the summit of the defile in the rear of the Macedonians. Flamininus sent a tribune with 4000 men, to follow the shepherd's guidance, with the requisite precautions against treachery, and with instructions to signify their arrival on the heights by a bonfire, and on a preconcerted signal to fall upon the enemy. The detachment, marching only by night and reposing in the day-time, made the circuit in two days. On the third morning a column of smoke announced their presence, and Flamininus gave orders for a general assault. The Macedonians, who advanced to meet it, were driven into their intrenchments; but the advantage was as usual on their side when the Romans had entered into the defile, until the consul raised the appointed signal, and they found themselves attacked from behind. A general panic immediately ensued: the whole army took to flight, and would have been utterly destroyed, if the conquerors had not been obstructed in the pursuit by the nature of the ground. Philip halted at a few miles' distance, to collect the fugitives, and

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B. C. 198.
Forces
Philip's po-
sition.

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found only 2000 missing. With the rest he took the road to Thessaly.

He expected that the Romans would speedily follow him thither; and as he did not venture to await their coming, he resolved to deprive them as far as possible of the fruits of their victory. This at least was the pretext, under which he plundered and destroyed several Thessalian towns, after having compelled the inhabitants to quit their homes with as much of their property as they could carry away. At Pheræ however the gates were shut against him; and fearing to be overtaken by the Romans he made no further attempt on it, but retreated into Macedonia. The success of Flamininus had roused the Ætolians and Amynder, and they too invaded Thessaly at the same time, though with separate forces: the Ætolians apparently with a view merely to plunder; Amynder to the conquest of Gomphi and some other strong places adjacent to his own territory. In the meanwhile Flamininus had traversed Epirus, where, notwithstanding the disaffection which had been betrayed by the people toward Rome, he spared their fields, and, sending for Amynder as a guide across the mountains, entered Thessaly from the northwest. He studied to exhibit a contrast to Philip's barbarous policy, by the care which he took to restrain his troops from all wanton outrages, and instead of living at the expense of the Thessalians, sent over to Ambracia for a supply of corn, which he had previously ordered to be brought from Corcyra. Yet several of the towns which were defended by Macedonian garrisons offered a vigorous, and some a successful, resistance. He was occupied for a long time with the siege of Atrax on the Peneus, and at last was constrained to abandon it as hopeless. He then passed into Phocis, where for the sake of easier communication with the Corin-

Advances
into Thes-
saly.

thian Gulf, he designed to fix his winter-quarters. For this purpose he made himself master of Anticyra, which he selected for his magazines; and several other small towns yielded to him with little or no resistance: but Elatea set him at defiance, and sustained a siege. He was still lying before it, when the cause of Rome received a weighty access in Peloponnesus.

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While the consul remained encamped on the banks of the Aous, his brother Lucius, having succeeded Apustius in the command of the fleet, had sailed round Malea, and arrived at Piræus at about the same time that Attalus and the Rhodian admiral Agesimbrotus, who had combined their forces near Andros, began the siege of Eretria. Lucius soon after joined them there. The Macedonian garrison kept the town in awe, but after Philocles had been repulsed in an attempt to reinforce it from Chalcis, could not prevent overtures of capitulation being made to Attalus. While these were pending, Lucius surprised the town in the night. The inhabitants fled to the citadel, which soon after surrendered. The town contained little treasure, except works of art, in which it was uncommonly rich. Carystus capitulated a few days later, the Macedonian garrison being allowed to depart at a fixed ransom without their arms, and the allied fleets then sailed to Cenchreæ, and made preparations for the siege of Corinth. But before they opened the siege, it was thought advisable to make an attempt to gain over the Achæan League, and with the consul's approbation an embassy composed of envoys representing the three allied powers and Athens was sent to Sicyon, where an Assembly was held to receive their proposals. Ambassadors from Philip were also present. The party which espoused the Roman interest among the Achæans had already so far prevailed, that Cyliades had been banished on account

Roman embassy to the Achæan League.

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of his attachment to the Macedonian connection¹, and Aristænus, his successor, was an open and zealous partizan of Rome. But among the mass of the people opinions and feelings were almost equally divided on the subject. It gave rise to disputes so violent as to disturb the peace of families and to embitter all the pleasures of social intercourse. It was the standing topic of conversation in every company, the great matter for consultation in every family. For the question was one which deeply affected not only the welfare of the state, but the safety of every citizen, and it was one of which the most enlightened and patriotic statesmen, the most exempt from prejudice and passion, might take opposite views. Philip was in possession. The triumph of the Romans was by no means certain, especially if Antiochus should throw his weight into the opposite scale. They might be forced to abandon their allies to the resentment of the king of Macedonia, who would be the more offended by the defection of the Achæans, as he had of late been striving to conciliate their goodwill by spontaneous concessions; and, little as he was entitled either to their confidence or their gratitude, to turn against him without any fresh provocation in his hour of danger wore the appearance of treachery and baseness. Least of all was it possible to foresee whether Roman protection would prove less burdensome than Macedonian dominion. No wonder that the Achæans felt themselves in a strait; but the manner in which they betrayed their perplexity, according to Livy's description, was almost ludicrous. The first day of the Assembly was occupied with the speeches of the envoys. A difference might be observed between the tone of the Romans and their allies, and that of Philip's ambassador, Cleomedon.

¹ Liv. xxxii. 19. Polyb. xvii. 1.

The Romans urged the League not only to enter into their alliance, but to take an active part in the war, and held out the restoration of Corinth as a recompense. Cleomedon asked so faintly for support, as to make it clear that his master hoped for nothing more than neutrality on the part of the Achæans. The next day, when the usual invitation had been given by the crier, no orator rose to address the Assembly. It was in vain that Aristænus, as president, endeavoured to excite a debate: not a murmur was heard among the multitude. Aristænus then undertook to plead the cause of the Romans himself. He insisted chiefly on Philip's manifest inferiority and his inability to protect the Achæans, if they should be attacked by the allied fleets while Nabis pressed them in the interior of the peninsula. Even this speech however produced only confused murmurs and contention, but no regular debate. The Demiurges themselves, to whom it belonged to put the question, were equally divided: five declared their intention to take the votes of the Assembly on the alliance with Rome: the other five protested against this proceeding, as a breach of the law by which it was forbidden that any measure adverse to the alliance with Philip, should be either proposed by the magistrates or decreed by the Assembly. The rest of the day was spent in violent but fruitless altercations. On the third, when the law required that the decree should be moved, one of the protesters, whose resolution had given way to his father's threats, went over to the Roman party, and the general sense of the Assembly now showed itself so clearly on the same side, that before the question was put to the vote all the Dymæans and Megalopolitans present and a part of the Argives rose up and quitted the place. The old connection between Megalopolis and the royal house of Macedon, the benefits which Philip had recently conferred on Dyme, having

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The League
concludes
an alliance
with Rome.

ransomed its citizens from the masters to whom they had been sold after the town was taken by the Romans, his supposed descent from an Argive stock, and his manifold relations of friendship and hospitality with Argive families, furnished reasons for their conduct which were admitted to be sufficient even by the Romans and their partizans. The decree of alliance with Attalus and the Rhodians was then carried forthwith; and the alliance with Rome was only deferred until the requisite sanction of the Roman people could be obtained. In the meanwhile it was decreed that all the forces of the League should march to the aid of L. Quinctius, who, having taken Cenchrææ, was now laying siege to Corinth. He had reckoned on a division between the Corinthians and the Macedonian garrison. But the citizens and the soldiers appeared to be animated by one spirit, as if defending their common country. And he was also deceived in his calculations as to the strength of the garrison itself, which, beside the Greeks and Macedonians, included a great number of Italian deserters, who having the fear of an ignominious death before their eyes fought with desperate fury, and when it had been reinforced by a body of 1500 men brought by Philocles Attalus advised Lucius to abandon the hopeless enterprise: the Roman clung to it a little longer, but at last, seeing the obstacles to be plainly insurmountable, raised the siege, and returned to winter at Corcyra. The consul about the same time made himself master of Elatea; but on the other hand Philocles, after the relief of Corinth, was invited to Argos by the Macedonian party, and surprised the Larissa in the night. There was a garrison of 500 Achæans in the town, commanded by the Dymean Ænesidamus, who at first made some show of resistance; but seeing himself far outnumbered he accepted the permission offered by Philocles for his troops to depart. He himself re-

fused to abandon his post, and with a few followers who remained by his side perished in a shower of missiles. CHAP.
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After the election of the consuls for the ensuing year, the friends of Flaminius exerted all their influence to prevent him from being superseded by either of the new consuls, and through the intercession of two tribunes the consuls were induced to submit their claims to the pleasure of the Senate, which decided that he should retain his command until a successor should be appointed in his room, and that both the consuls should remain that year in Italy. A reinforcement of 5000 foot and 300 horse was decreed for his army, and 3000 for the fleet, which was also to remain under his brother's command. Before Titus knew that his wishes had been thus gratified, and while he was on the point of besieging the citadel of Opus, where he had been admitted into the town by an aristocratical party though the Ætoliens had been previously invited by their adversaries, he received a proposal from Philip who was wintering at Demetrias, to appoint time and place for an interview. Flaminius desired above all things the honour of terminating the war, and being uncertain how long his command might last willingly complied with the king's request. They met on the coast near Nicæa in the Malian gulf: Flaminius accompanied by Amynder, Dionysodorus, an envoy from Attalus, the Rhodian admiral Agesimbrotus, Phæneas, the Ætolian General, and several of his countrymen, and the Achæans, Aristæus and Xenophon; Philip only bringing with him, beside his two Macedonian secretaries, the Achæan exile Cycliades, and Brachyllas, his leading partizan in Bœotia. Flaminius stood on the beach; the king at the prow of his galley, declining to land, on the plea of distrust toward the Ætoliens. Philip, though he was the only speaker on his own

Conference
of Nicæa.

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side, showed himself more than a match for all his adversaries in the management of his cause, only indulging his humour in sarcastic sallies and retorts more freely than was thought to beseem his dignity.¹ The main article in the conditions required by the Romans was that he should withdraw his garrisons from all the Greek cities; they also demanded that he should deliver up the prisoners and deserters, restore the places in Illyria which he had taken since the treaty of Epirus, and all those belonging to Ptolemy which he had conquered since the death of Philopator. But each of the other allied states had its separate complaints and demands, which, with Philip's replies, occupied the greater part of the day, and toward evening it was agreed that they should set down in writing the terms which they insisted on, and that the conference should be renewed at the same place the next morning. But on the morrow he did not appear before the afternoon, pretending to have been perplexed by the difficulty of the demands made on him, but apparently wishing to avoid fresh altercation, and then proposed a private interview with Flamininus, to which the Roman consented. The result however did not satisfy any of the allies, and the conference was again adjourned. At the third meeting Philip obtained leave to send an embassy to Rome, and a two months' armistice for that purpose; but as the price of this favour he was obliged immediately to withdraw all his garrisons from Phocis and Locris. Flamininus and the allies likewise sent envoys to watch the proceedings of the king's ministers at Rome, and to put the Senate on its guard against them. These envoys obtained an audience at Rome before Philip's ambassadors, and they drew the Senate's attention chiefly to one point,—that Greece could never be

¹ Polyb. xvii. 1. foll. Liv. xxxii. 32.

really independent so long as Chalcis, Corinth, and Demetrias remained in Philip's hands. These were, as he himself was used insultingly to call them, *the fetters of Greece*, and she could not stir a limb while Peloponnesus was commanded by the garrison of Corinth, the central provinces threatened from Chalcis, and Thessaly overawed by a force stationed at Demetrias.¹ The Senate seized this handle, and stopped Philip's orator at the beginning of his speech by the question, whether his master was ready to evacuate Corinth, Chalcis, and Demetrias, and when it appeared that the ambassadors had received no instructions on this head they were roughly dismissed. The terms on which peace should be granted were left to the discretion of Flamininus, who finding the Senate so ready to meet his wishes declined a fresh interview with Philip, and declared that he would receive no embassy from him which did not lay down as the basis of the negotiation the entire emancipation of Greece.

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In the course of the winter Philip received another mortifying intimation of the opinion which generally prevailed in Greece as to the issue of the contest. Now that the crisis of his destiny seemed to be approaching, he could ill spare the force which might be necessary to defend Argos, and he no doubt thought he had devised a happy expedient for relieving himself from this burden, while he secured a useful ally, when he instructed Philocles to commit Argos to the custody of Nabis, to be restored if his arms should prosper, and to hint that the king was willing to give some of his daughters in marriage to the tyrant's sons. Nabis on this occasion conducted himself in a manner worthy

¹ Polyb. xvii. 11. Πέδας Ἑλληνικός. Strabo, ix. p. 428. Πέδας ἐκάλει Φιλίππος τῆς Ἑλλάδος τὴν Χαλκίδα καὶ τὴν Κόρινθον, πρὸς τὰς ἐκ τῆς Μακεδονίας ἀφορμὰς βλάπτων· ἐπιδέξιμος δ' οἱ ὄσπερον προσηγόρευον ταύτας τε καὶ τὴν Δημητριάδα· καὶ γὰρ αὐτῇ παρέδωκεν ἢ κυρία τῶν περὶ τὰ Τέμπε, τό τε Πήλιον ἔχουσα καὶ τὴν Ὀσσῶν.

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Nabis at
Argos.

of his reputation. He at first affected to decline the proposal unless the Argives should consent to the transfer. But when in their public Assembly they rejected his protection with the strongest expressions of loathing and horror, having now a sufficient handle for his purpose, he immediately closed with the overtures of Philocles, and was admitted by night into the city. A few of the opulent citizens made their escape in the tumult, and only lost their property, which was immediately confiscated. The rest were not only robbed of all their gold and silver but compelled to raise large sums by fear of torture, which was inflicted on all who hesitated or were suspected of concealing their wealth. Having thus sustained the character of the tyrant, he proceeded to play the part of a demagogue, and called an Assembly in which he proposed a decree for the cancelling of debts, and the re-distribution of the land. It was a repetition of the process by which he had made himself master of Sparta. It only remained for him to secure his acquisition by another piece of perfidy. He sent envoys to open a negotiation with Flamininus and with Attalus, and invited them to an interview at Argos. It took place at a little distance from the city. The Roman required that Nabis should make peace with the Achæans and send auxiliaries against Philip. Nabis consented so far as to grant a truce for four months, and he supplied the proconsul with 600 of his Cretans. But though he professed to have come to Argos as its protector at the request of the people, Attalus could not induce him to withdraw his troops that they might freely declare their mind. He left a garrison in the city, and on his return to Sparta sent his wife to Argos to complete the spoliation which he had begun. Apega was worthy of such a consort; and her dissimulation, avarice, and cruelty, were not unfitly represented by the engine of torture which Nabis had contrived in

her image. She summoned the Argive women of the higher class into her presence, and did not let them go until by threats or torments she had stripped them of every ornament of their persons.¹ Flaminius, on his way back to his winter-quarters, stopped at the gate of Corinth, to show his Cretans as a proof of the tyrant's defection, and, having invited Philocles to an interview, found that even his fidelity was beginning to waver, and that he was watching the turn of events for a fitter season to betray his trust.

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There were now only two states south of Thermopylæ which had not declared themselves in favour of Rome: Acarnania and Bœotia. The Acarnanians, partly through their sense of honour, partly through their enmity to the Ætolians, adhered to Philip to the last. In Bœotia Thebes was the stronghold of the Macedonian interest. The Theban partizans of Macedonia, at first a very small faction with Brachyllas the chief of the house of Neon at their head, had, under the protection of Antigonus Doson and Philip, become masters of the state. They kept the people in good-humour by largesses from the treasury and by connivance at their transgressions of the law, while they themselves eluded all inquiry into their administration, and spent their fortunes in a continual round of feasting. It was this wretched state of things which had induced the Megarians to return to their connection with the Achæans; and the Bœotian force which was sent to recover Megara was scared away, as we have seen, by the mere rumour of Philopœmen's approach.² When the Romans had established themselves in the heart of Greece, and seemed to be on the point of bringing their contest with Philip to a successful close, his partizans at Thebes were in a still

¹ So Polybius, xvii. 17. Πάν γένος αἰκίας καὶ βίας προσέφερε: which is singularly softened by Livy, xxxii. 40., *blandiendo ac minando*.

² Polyb. xi. 4—6.

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Flaminius
at Thebes.

harder strait than the Achæans had been before their last decision. They could not bring themselves to renounce the advantages which they owed to Macedonian patronage, but still less could they venture to defy the enmity of the Romans. They wished therefore to be allowed to remain neutral; but, in their attempt to escape between two opposite dangers, they were so unhappy as to fall into both, without the merit or honour of either. They were neither constant to Philip nor acquired the favour of Rome, but were betrayed by their own duplicity into the hands of Flaminius. Having caused a general Assembly of the Bœotians to be summoned to the capital, he marched from Elatea with 2000 legionaries, and encamped five miles from Thebes. The next day, accompanied by Attalus and by the ministers of the allied states, he advanced toward the city, ordering the troops to follow at the interval of a mile. At half-way he was met by the Bœotarch Antiphilus, with whom he engaged in friendly conversation, but slackened his pace as they drew near to the city, to let his men overtake him. In the bustle of his entrance their approach was not perceived, until it was too late to exclude them. He was thus master of Thebes, and the Assembly, which was held the next day, could only exhibit the vain semblance of free consultation. Attalus opened the proceedings with a speech in favour of Rome; but the exertion caused a fit of paralysis, in which he was carried away from the Assembly, and which, though not immediately fatal, he did not survive many months. The decree however of alliance with Rome was carried without a dissentient voice; and Flaminius could thus turn all his thoughts to the approaching contest, without any anxiety as to the part of Greece which he would leave behind him when he next marched against Philip.

Early in the spring of 197, Philip assembled his

forces at Dium for the decisive conflict. If it had been possible to elude it much longer the delay would only have exhausted all the resources which afforded him a hope of success. Even now the population of his kingdom had so shrunk during the long series of wars waged by him and his ancestors, that he was obliged to fill up the muster-rolls with boys of sixteen, and veterans past the age of military service. He therefore resolved to give battle in the plains of Thessaly, where he would have the advantage of favourable ground, and his kingdom to fall back upon. Flamininus was detained two or three days on his march northward at Thermopylæ, while an Ætolian Assembly held at Heraclea was debating on the amount of the force which it should send to him. On the borders of Thessaly he was joined by 2000 foot and 400 horse under Phæneas, and after an unsuccessful attempt on the Pthiotic Thebes, encamped about six miles from Pheræ. Philip had already advanced to Larissa, and as soon as he heard of the enemy's position marched to meet him. While the two armies lay near Pheræ, a skirmish of cavalry took place, in which the Ætolians were victorious. But the ground about the suburbs of Pheræ, being thickly planted and intersected with walls, was ill suited for the operations of either army; and the two commanders, as if in concert, moved at the same time toward the territory of Scotussa, attracted by the corn which was just ripe. Without any intelligence of each other's movements they encamped on opposite sides of a ridge, called from some rocky summits Cynoscephalæ (the Dogs-heads). This was the field of the battle which decided the fate of the Macedonian monarchy.¹

The two armies were about equal in numbers; the B. C. 197.

¹ Polyb. xviii. 3—16. Liv. xxxiii. 6—10.

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Battle of
Cynos-
cephalæ.

Macedonian phalanx consisted of 16,000 men, to which were added 7000 light infantry and 2000 cavalry. The Romans had the advantage by the number of the Ætolian horse. It was the first time that an opportunity had occurred for the phalanx and the legion to measure their strength against each other, and the empire of the civilised world depended on the result. Yet to a superficial observation it might seem that on this occasion a blind chance had interfered to prevent a fair comparison. On the morning of the battle the ground was covered by so thick a mist, that Philip, thinking it impossible that any action could take place that day, had sent out many parties to gather green food. But a Roman detachment sent from the camp to explore the country, and discover the enemy's position, fell in with one which he had posted on the heights of Cynoscephalæ. An engagement ensued, in which the Romans were beginning to give way, when the Ætolians came to their aid, and turned the fortune of the fight. Philip was obliged to send his cavalry, and the greater part of his light infantry, to support the first detachment, and their arrival again changed the scene. The Romans were dislodged from the heights and driven down into the plain, and they would have been completely routed, if they had not been protected by the Ætolian cavalry, which is admitted by Polybius to have been the best in Greece for service of this kind. Flamininus now deemed it necessary to bring up the legionaries, who quickly put the Macedonians to flight. In the meanwhile Philip had been induced by exaggerated accounts of the first successes obtained by his troops to set the phalanx in motion. Yet it was only a part of it that was brought into action. Reluctantly, and against his better judgment, misliking, as he declared, both the place and the time, he nevertheless in compliance with the importunity of his officers

hastened forward with the right wing, that he might not lose the supposed favourable juncture, ordering the rest to follow as quickly as possible. And this right wing, which reached the top of the heights in time to protect the fugitives, who were driven back by the advance of the legionaries, was completely victorious over the left of the Roman army. The Roman arms could make no impression on that hedge of spears, ten of which were pointed against each soldier.¹ The Macedonians also stood on the higher ground, and after the first shock, which was accompanied with a tremendous shout of both armies, continued to gain on the retreating foe. Flamininus soon perceived that the day was lost on this part of the field. But the rest of the phalanx, which was just appearing on the heights, had not yet formed, and was impeded by the unevenness of the ground. While it was still in this confusion, the Roman general, having first sent the elephants to increase the disorder, charged it with the whole of his force not previously engaged: and as the phalanx, if not irresistible, was utterly helpless, it was presently routed, and the Romans had only to slaughter their defenceless enemies. One division raised its sarissas in token of surrender; but as the Romans did not understand the sign, it was only the more exposed to their attack; and Quinctius, though he discovered the error, could not or would not prevent the carnage. The victory was completed by the promptness of a Roman tribune, who, without orders, like Philopœmen at Selasia, charged the Macedonian right wing in the rear. Unable to change its front, and seeing the enemy, who had hitherto been retreating before it, now making a

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¹ Livy (xxxiii. 8.) deceived by his imperfect knowledge of Greek, has fallen into the ludicrous mistake of supposing that the phalanx laid aside its sarissas, which he fancied encumbered it by their length, and translates *καταβαλοῦσι τὰς σαρίσσας, hastis positis.*

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stand, it could only seek safety in flight. Philip, having first with a few followers ascended an eminence, from which, as the mist had now rolled away, he could survey the field of battle, and having satisfied himself that the day was irrecoverably lost, rode off at full speed toward Tempe; and having stopped for one day at Gonni to collect as many of the fugitives as could overtake him, and having sent to Larissa to destroy his papers there, pursued his way into Macedonia. On his side 8000 were slain, 5000 made prisoners. The loss of the Romans was estimated at no more than 700.

Such was the issue of the battle of Cynoscephalæ; and it might seem, as has been observed, at first sight, rather a work of chance, produced by an extraordinary combination of fortuitous circumstances, than a proof of any intrinsic superiority of the one army over the other. And so it appears to have been common among the Greeks to attribute the success of the Romans to fortune. But Polybius has pointed out very clearly that the very essence of the advantage which the legion had over the phalanx lay in this: that there was so much room in all military operations for the intervention of fortuitous circumstances. The efficacy of the phalanx was in fact merely conventional; it depended on certain conditions which no general could command, and on events which none could foresee. It was therefore no match for a force which could readily adapt itself to every position and emergency. Philip lost the battle only as he must have done in every other case, unless his enemy had allowed him to choose his own time and ground.

The Romans, on their return from the pursuit, proceeded to plunder the Macedonian camp: but they found that the Ætolians had already carried off the greater part of the booty; and they were the more offended with the greediness of their allies, as

the Ætolian cavalry might have done much harm to the flying enemy, and perhaps might have overtaken the king himself. The murmurs which arose from this circumstance were a prelude to more serious differences. The Ætolians, as we have seen, had done good service in the earlier part of the battle; but they claimed almost the whole glory of the victory: and the Roman general himself was deeply displeased by some verses which circulated through the camp, in which the name of the Ætolians stood foremost, and he and his army were described as if they had taken a subordinate part in the work.¹ There was another still deeper ground of offence. The Ætolians had pretensions which were at variance with the interests of Rome: and Flaminius soon made them feel the change which had taken place in their relations with him, from the moment that he had no further use to make of them. At Larissa he was met by three envoys from Philip, who came to ask the ordinary truce for the burial of the slain, and leave to send an embassy to the Roman camp. Flaminius granted a truce for fifteen days, and consented to admit Philip to a conference at Tempe, adding an encouraging message, which gave great offence to the Ætolians, who complained that they had not been consulted, as they used to be on all matters before the battle, and threw out insinuations that the Roman general was making advances to the king from corrupt motives. A few days before that which had been fixed for the conference, Flaminius held a council to consider the terms of peace which should be demanded. The Ætolians would hear of none, but urged him to follow up the victory, until Philip should be despatched or driven out of his kingdom: an occasion which Flaminius did not neglect, to enlarge on the

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Negotiation
with Philip

¹ Plut. Flam. 9.

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generosity with which Rome was wont to treat her vanquished enemies. Amynander innocently expressed a hope, that the terms would be such as would enable him to maintain himself against Philip after the departure of the Romans. At the conference Philip cut off all dispute at the outset, by a declaration, that he accepted all the conditions which had been previously prescribed to him by the Romans and their allies, and was ready to submit to the decree of the Senate on other points. But an angry altercation ensued between Flamininus and the Ætolians, who demanded the restitution of their Thessalian towns, while the Roman refused to give up any which had opened their gates to him: Pthiotic Thebes, which had been taken by force after it had refused to surrender, they might deal with as they would.¹ A truce of four months was concluded with Philip, who was required to pay 200 talents immediately, and to deliver his son Demetrius and some of his friends as hostages; but the money and hostages were to be restored to him if the treaty should be broken off at Rome.²

It was not any magnanimous feeling, but the threatening movements of Antiochus that had rendered Flamininus unwilling to push Philip to extremities: and the same cause made the Senate anxious to terminate the Macedonian war. Notwithstanding therefore the opposition of the new consuls, each of whom wished for the Macedonian province, the peace was decreed and confirmed by the comitia of the tribes. The heads of the treaty were embodied in an ordinance of the Senate, and ten commissioners were appointed, according to established usage, to carry it into effect, and to consult with Flamininus on some points which were left to their discretion.

¹ Polyb. xviii. 17—22. Liv. xxxiii. 11—13.

² Liv. xxxiii. 13.

The battle of Cynoscephalæ put an end to the resistance of the Acarnanians. Their magistrates and leading men had yielded to the solicitations of L. Quinctius, or saw more clearly than the common people that it was vain to withstand the power of Rome; and they held a congress at Leucas, in which a decree was passed in the name, but without the authority, of the nation, for alliance with the Romans. But this decree was soon after indignantly annulled by the people, and its authors called to account, though pardoned on acknowledgment of their offence. Lucius, as soon as he heard of this reaction, sailed from Corcyra and laid siege to Leucas, which made a long and most gallant resistance, though exposed to attack both by sea and land, and only surrendered after the enemy had been treacherously admitted into the citadel. A few days after, the contest was decided in Thessaly, and the rest of the Acarnanian towns submitted to the conquerors.

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Submission
of Acar-
nania.

About the same time the Achæans, under their General Nicostratus, gained a victory over Androstenes, the commander of Corinth, which delivered the Achæan territory from the ravages which it had previously suffered from the garrison; and a body of Achæan auxiliaries aided the Rhodians to recover the greater part of the Peræa. Philip himself did not remain inactive after his defeat; but when the Dardanians, supposing that they might now insult him with impunity, made an inroad into Macedonia, he hastily collected a small army, fell upon them suddenly near Stobi, and chased them with great slaughter out of his dominions.¹

Toward the close of the year the tranquillity of Greece was slightly disturbed by some struggles of

¹ Liv. xxxiii. 14—18.

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the two Bœotian factions, which kept up their contest after that of their patrons had ceased. Notwithstanding the alliance which had been concluded with Rome, a number of Bœotians fought on Philip's side at Cynoscephalæ under the command of Brachyllas; and he, with many others of them, was among the prisoners. Flamininus however, to conciliate the Bœotians, consented to release them; but he could not soothe their hostility by this favour, which they affected to ascribe to Philip's intercession; and Brachyllas on his return was elected Bœotarch. The chiefs of the opposite party, who had promoted the alliance with Rome, began to be uneasy about the lot which awaited them when their adversaries should be no longer overawed by the vicinity of a Roman army, and they consulted Flamininus on the expediency of removing Brachyllas. Flamininus would not meddle with such a transaction himself, but advised them to speak to the Ætolian General Alexamenes. By him they were furnished with six men, three Ætoli-ans and three Italians, who killed Brachyllas as he was returning home at night with some dissolute companions from a feast. But the contrivers of the murder were afterwards detected, and one of them was put to death after he had been examined by torture, in which he probably disclosed the connivance of Flamininus. The discovery inspired all classes of the Bœotians with mortal hatred toward the Romans; and as they did not venture to exhibit it openly, they wreaked it by a series of cowardly assassinations on the individual Roman soldiers who happened to pass through Bœotia. When at length search was made by the order of Flamininus, 500 corpses were found, with clear signs of violent death, at the bottom of the lake Copais. Flamininus demanded the delivery of the murderers, and imposed a contribution of 500 talents on the Bœotians. When they offered excuses instead of compliance,

Murder of
Brachyllas.

COMPLAINTS OF THE ÆTOLIANS.

he invaded the country, and laid siege to Acraphia and Coronea, the towns nearest to the principal scenes of bloodshed. The Bœotians now were ready to submit, but could only obtain forgiveness through the intercession of the Achæans and the Athenians, and on condition of surrendering the guilty, and paying a fine of thirty talents.

By the decree of the Senate which was brought by the ten commissioners, peace was granted to Philip on the following terms:—all the Greeks, both in Europe and Asia, were to be free, and governed by their own laws; but with one very important exception. The districts subject to Philip, and the towns held by his garrisons, were to be delivered up to the Romans before the next Isthmian Games. Yet this exception again was so qualified, that several towns were named which he was immediately to evacuate, and to restore to absolute freedom. These were Euromus, Pedasa, Bargylia, and Iassus in Caria, Abydus, Thasos, Myrina, and Perinthus, all places far remote from Greece. Titus was to write to Prusias of Bithynia, in the name of the Senate, on behalf of Cios. Within the same time Philip was to surrender all the Roman prisoners and deserters, and all his ships of war except five boats and his state galley, a huge and useless vessel; and he was to pay 1000 talents, one half immediately, the rest by instalments in ten years.

The articles, according to Polybius, diffused universal joy throughout Greece, except among the Ætoli-^olians: they alone complained that the liberty announced by the decree was a mere name, destitute of reality. Polybius attributes these complaints to their resentment, yet he admits that they were not without plausibility: and though the sagacity of the Ætoli-ⁱans may have been quickened by their disappointment, it is probable that their suspicions were shared by many who had not the courage to express them. They ob-

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served that, since the towns which Philip was to set at liberty were named, it was clear that those which he was to deliver up to the Romans were not included in the same class, or to enjoy the same freedom: and among these, beside Oreus and Eretria, were Chalcis, Demetrias, and Corinth. It was therefore evident that the *fetters* of Greece were not to be unlocked, but only to be transferred to the grasp of a stronger hand. Polybius, with a breach of candour into which he is often betrayed by his ill-will toward the Ætolians, treats these objections as mere verbal cavils and exaggerations. But it is certain that the Ætolians not only put a fair construction on the language of the decree, but penetrated the intentions of the Senate. The Senate meant to keep these important places in its own possession: not indeed so much through distrust of the Greeks, as for the sake of precaution against Antiochus. It had not however finally determined this point, but left it to the decision of the commissioners after consultation with Flaminius. For there was room for hesitation as to the expediency of the measure. If on the one hand it was dangerous to leave these places exposed to attack from Antiochus, it was also unsafe at such a juncture to forfeit the confidence and alienate the good-will of the Greeks. The question became the subject of a long and warm debate between Flaminius and the commissioners, who were inclined to carry out the Senate's original design in every part. But Flaminius so strongly pleaded the necessity of stopping the mouths of the Ætolians, and of making good the professions which the Romans had so often held out to their allies, that the commissioners yielded on some points to his opinion. It was settled that Corinth should be immediately delivered up to the Achæans, according to the terms of their late treaty with Rome, but that the Acrocorinthus, Chalcis, and Demetrias should be re-

tained by Roman garrisons. Livy supposes it to have been expressly declared in the decree of the council, that this occupation should be merely temporary, to last only as long as the movements of Antiochus should afford cause for anxiety; but Polybius is silent as to any such restriction.¹

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These deliberations took place at Corinth, and the final decision of the commissioners was to be published at the Isthmian festival which was now near at hand. It was attended by an unusual concourse of Greeks, anxious to learn the fate of their country and the use which the Romans would make of their victory. This was the subject which engrossed all conversation, and various conjectures were formed about it; but the prevailing opinion, as reported by Polybius², seems not to have differed very widely from that of the Ætolians. When the spectators were assembled, before the games began, after silence had been bidden by the sound of the trumpet, proclamation was made by a herald, that the Roman Senate and Titus Quinctius, having overcome King Philip and the Macedonians, give liberty to the Corinthians, Phocians, Locrians, Eubœans, Achæans of Phthia, Magnetes, Thessalians, and Perrhæbians, with exemption from garrisons and tribute, and permission to govern themselves by their hereditary laws. The catalogue included every part of Greece which had hitherto been occupied by Philip; and the proclamation was in substance, as it was sometimes described, a declaration that the independence of Greece was restored. So it was understood by those who heard it. A shout of joy rent the air, such that birds which were flying over the heads of the multitude are said to have dropped to the ground: and the herald was obliged to repeat the proclamation, as well for the sake of

B. C. 196.
The proclamation
at the
Isthmian
Games.

¹ Polyb. xviii. 20. Liv. xxxiii. 31.

² xviii. 29.

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those who had not heard it distinctly, as because the rest could scarcely believe the evidence of their senses. The shout then rose again still louder than before: the spectacle which followed passed unheeded: the whole assembly was occupied with one thought and one feeling. Titus, as he withdrew at the end of the games, was almost stifled by the throng which crowded about him, to gaze and applaud, to grasp his hands, and shower garlands and fillets on his head. Yet we may suspect that the pressure which he found most painful was that of undeserved gratitude; for he probably thought much less highly of his own services than Polybius, who does not scruple to observe, that, extravagant as the display of gratitude might seem, it fell short of the obligation: a reflection so glaringly wide of the truth, that we can hardly explain it, so as not to question either his judgment or his sincerity. The enthusiasm of the multitude was more excusable, as they could not foresee all the advantages which the Romans were to reap from their victory over Philip, and either did not yet know that they had resolved to keep the fetters of Greece in their hands, or believed that this was only a temporary measure and a necessary precaution. But the joy of the more considerate might have been damped by the thought, that such a boon could only be bestowed by a master who was able to resume it at his pleasure.

General
peace.

After the festival Flamininus and the commissioners proceeded to adjust the other affairs which were committed to their discretion. The envoys of Antiochus were dismissed with a peremptory injunction to their master, to evacuate all the Asiatic cities which had belonged either to Philip or to Ptolemy, and to abstain from aggression on those which retained their independence, and above all not to pass over in person, or to send forces into Europe: but it

was announced that some of the Ten would shortly seek an interview with the king. The province of Orestis, which had revolted from Philip during the war, was declared independent, and he was thus, to his bitter mortification, prevented from taking revenge for its disloyalty.¹ The Illyrian districts of Lychnis and Parthi, which had been subject to Philip, were given to Pleuratus. Thessaly was as far as possible dismembered; the Perrhæbians, Dolopes, and Magnetes were detached from it as independent states; Phthiotis however was annexed to it with the exception of Thebes and Pharsalus. The claims of the Ætolians to Pharsalus and to Leucas were referred to the Senate; but they were permitted to renew their former relations with Phocis and Locris. Corinth, Triphylia, and Heræa were restored to the Achæans. The commissioners wished to bestow Oreus and Eretria on Eumenes, who had succeeded his father Attalus on the throne of Pergamus, but, on the remonstrance of Flamininus, the question was referred to the Senate, which decided that these towns, together with Carystus, should be restored to liberty. Valerius Antias, a writer of very slight authority, related that, by the original decree of the Senate, Ægina, which Attalus had purchased from the Ætolians, and the elephants, were given to his son of the same name, and that the Athenians were rewarded with the lordship of Paros, Imbros, Delos, and Scyros.² Nothing but the silence of Polybius throws a doubt on either fact. The commissioners then parted to undertake various missions. Cn. Cornelius, who was sent to Philip, prevailed on him, that he might not seem to be reserving himself for Antiochus, to sue for alliance and amity with Rome. Cornelius next proceeded to the Ætolian Assembly at Thermus; but he was there received with

¹ Liv. xxxiii. 34. Compare xxxix. 23.² Ibid. xxxiii. 30.

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complaints, upbraidings, and reproaches, which grew at last so violent that he thought it safest to decline discussion, and to advise them to send an embassy to Rome, where they would be sure to obtain satisfaction of all reasonable demands. So ended the Macedonian war: with a plentiful sowing of the dragon's teeth.

CHAPTER LXV.

FROM THE PROCLAMATION OF THE LIBERTY OF GREECE
UNDER ROMAN PROTECTION TO THE EMBASSY OF CAL-
LICRATES TO ROME.

Antiochus the Great. — Rebuilds Lysimachia. — War with Nabis. — Flamininus invades Laconia. — Conference with Nabis. — Siege of Sparta. — Treaty with Nabis. — Departure of Flamininus. — Constitution of Thessaly. — Intrigues of the Ætoliens. — Philopœmen returns to Greece. — War with Nabis. — Philopœmen defeated at Sea. — Ravages Laconia. — Roman envoys in Thessaly. — Projects of the Ætoliens. — Nabis assassinated. — Revolt of Demetrius. — Antiochus in Greece. — Beginning of Hostilities. — Plans of Hannibal. — Antiochus at Chalcis. — Battle of Thermopylæ. — The Ætoliens sue for Peace. — Obtain a Truce. — Philopœmen at Sparta. — Parties in the Achæan League. — Diophanes and Flamininus. — The Spartan Exiles. — Renewal of the Truce with the Ætoliens. — Siege of Ambracia. — Treaty with the Ætoliens. — An innovation of Philopœmen. — Greek Embassies at Rome. — Subjugation of Sparta. — Foreign Embassies to the Achæan League. — Roman Interference in Greece. — Q. Cæcilius Metellus. — Parties at Sparta. — Revolution at Messene. — Capture and Death of Philopœmen. — Submission of Messene. — Policy of Lycortas. — Embassy of Callicrates to Rome. — His perfidious Counsels. — Effects of his Treachery.

ANTIOCHUS, the son of Seleucus Callinicus and the sixth from the founder of his dynasty, surnamed by his contemporaries the Great, was perhaps eminent in energy and ability above most of his line, though certainly not comparable in this respect to his ancestor, the Conqueror. He seems to have owed that title,—which however imported little in an age so lavish of such distinctions, that his grandfather, a vile and odious prince, was surnamed the God—chiefly to the contrast between the low state into which the Syrian

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monarchy had fallen when he ascended the throne, and that to which he finally raised it, but especially to his expedition for the recovery of the eastern provinces which had been taken from it by the Parthian and Bactrian kings, an expedition which by its extent, duration, and dazzling success, might to a degenerate race recal the achievements of the Macedonian conqueror. He seems to have been elated with the sounding epithet¹, and to have forgotten how largely he was indebted for his triumphs to the imbecility of his Egyptian neighbours; and in an evil hour he conceived the project of enlarging the bounds of his empire until it should include all the conquests made by the first Seleucus after his victory over Lysimachus. In the prosecution of this undertaking he crossed the Hellespont in the spring of 196, and made himself master of the Thracian Chersonesus; and being struck with the advantageous site of Lysimachia, which had been ruined by the Thracians after Philip had withdrawn his troops, he determined to rebuild it and make it the capital of his European dominions, which he intended should comprehend the whole kingdom of Lysimachus.² While this work was going on he collected as many as he could of the old inhabitants, many of whom he ransomed from slavery, and invited new colonists.³ He was thus employed when L. Cornelius, who had been sent by the Senate to mediate between him and Ptolemy, and three of the commissioners who had just been regulating the affairs of Greece, came to Lysimachia. They were

¹ Applan, Syr. 1. Gervinus (*Ueber die Historische Grösse*, in Schlosser's *Archiv*. v. p. 423.) seems to doubt whether Applan's authority is sufficient to prove that Antiochus received the epithet in his lifetime. But it could hardly have been bestowed on him after the reverses which befel him toward the end of his life, though Roman self-complacency was interested in the greatness of a conquered enemy, and even magnified it in honour of the hardy race which achieved the victory—*ingentem cecidit Antiochum*. Niebuhr (*Kl. Schr.* p. 221.) observes that the house of Seleucus never produced a great prince.

² Liv. xxxiii. 40. xxxiv. 58. Polyb. xviii. 34.

³ Liv. xxxiii. 38.

amicably received and hospitably entertained. But when they required him to restore the conquests he had made from Ptolemy and Philip, and demanded an explanation of the purpose for which he had come over to Europe, he firmly rejected their dictation, reminded them that Rome had no more to do with Asia than he with Italy, and asserted his claim to the European as well as the Asiatic possessions of Lysimachus. The conference, which had been carried on in a very high and sharp tone on both sides, was abruptly broken off by a false rumour of the death of the young king of Egypt, which induced Antiochus to return to Asia, leaving his son Seleucus at Lysimachia. The commissioners on their return to Rome made a report which prepared the Senate for an approaching war with Syria, and at the same time directed its attention to the hostile temper of the Ætolians and the independent attitude of Nabis.

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The only doubt with regard to Nabis was, whether there was any sufficient pretext for a declaration of war against him; and it appeared so difficult to find one that it was decided to refer the question of war or peace to Flaminius. As soon as this decree of the Senate reached him, he summoned a congress of the allies at Corinth, and professing that he should be entirely guided by their wishes, bade them consider whether they would have Argos left in the power of Nabis. It was a matter in which Rome had no concern, except so far as it interfered with the liberty of Greece, and thus impaired the glory of her work. The Athenian deputies extolled the Roman magnanimity, with some reflections on the malignity of its detractors: an allusion which roused the Ætolians, against whom it was pointed. They had been deeply offended by the result of their last embassy to Rome, where the Senate, as if to aggravate injury with insult, referred their claims again to their adversary Fla-

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mininus.¹ They now inveighed against the meanness of the Athenians, complained of the wrong by which they were defrauded of Echinus and Pharsalus, and taxed the Romans with dissimulation and hypocrisy. *They pretended to be the liberators of Greece, and yet held it in its old fetters. Argos and Nabis were only pretexts to cover the continued presence of their army. Let the legions be embarked for Italy, and the Ætolians would undertake that Nabis should withdraw his garrison from Argos.* The truth would only have displeased the Romans: the boast disgusted the other allies. The Achæan General, Aristæus, declaimed bitterly against the Ætolians, and intreated Flamininus not to leave Peloponnesus until he had secured it against their aggressions. The rest of the deputies joined in the same strain, and the war against Nabis was unanimously decreed.

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Nabis.

Flamininus, having sent for his troops from Elatea, marched against Argos, and at Cleonæ was joined by Aristæus with an Achæan army of 10,000 foot and 1000 horse. Nabis had committed the command of the garrison at Argos to his wife's brother Pythagoras, who was also his son-in-law, and he made the best preparations for its defence. He suppressed an insurrection which was prematurely attempted by some of the citizens on the approach of the Romans, and no further movement took place within when Flamininus encamped in the suburbs. Finding this hope disappointed, he called a council to deliberate on a siege. All the Greek officers, except Aristæus, thought that as Argos was the occasion of the war the first operations of the army should be directed against it. But Flamininus adopted the advice of Aristæus, to carry the war into the enemy's country, and, having reaped or wasted the harvest in the plain of Argos, he

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Flamininus
invades La-
conia.

¹ Lib. xxxiii. ult.

marched to the borders of Laconia, where he waited some time for a reinforcement which he expected from Philip, and for a supply of provisions which he had ordered the Peloponnesian towns to furnish. He was joined by 1500 Macedonians and 400 Thessalian horse, and by a numerous body of Lacedæmonian exiles, with Agesipolis at their head. About the same time his brother Lucius had sailed into the gulf of Laconia with forty galleys, and Eumenes and the Rhodians were approaching with their combined squadrons. Nabis however did not abandon himself to despair, though his whole force amounted to no more than 15,000 men, being composed of 2000 Cretans, 3000 other mercenaries, and 10,000 Laconian troops. He strengthened the defences of his capital with a new ditch and rampart, and struck terror into his subjects by the arrest of eighty suspected citizens whom he put to death the following night, and by the execution of some helots who were charged with having attempted to desert. When the Romans, having descended the vale of the Cenus to the banks of the Eurotas, were proceeding to pitch their camp within a short distance from Sparta, they were thrown into great confusion by a sudden charge of the tyrant's auxiliaries, who were only repelled by the advance of the legionaries, and the next day, when the Roman column, moving southward, had passed the city, Nabis again sallied out and fell upon its rear with his mercenaries; but the Romans, who anticipated an attack, shifted their front so rapidly and in such good order, that after an obstinate combat he was put to flight, and the Achæans were enabled by their knowledge of the ground to intercept or overtake many of the fugitives, before they could gain the city gate. Flamininus then ravaged the adjacent plain without farther interruption, and afterwards continued his devastations down to the sea-coast.

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Conference
with Nabis.

In the meanwhile Lucius, after he had taken several of the smaller towns on the coast, laid siege to Gythium, the arsenal of Sparta, a populous and well fortified city; and as Eumenes and the Rhodians arrived about the same time the works made rapid progress. Two officers, Gorgopas and Dexagoridas, commanded the place with equal authority. Dexagoridas, when defence seemed hopeless, opened a clandestine correspondence with the Roman general, but was detected and put to death by his colleague. But he too was reduced to despair, when Titus came up with a body of 4000 men to support the besiegers; and he surrendered on condition that the garrison should be allowed to withdraw. Nabis, though he had been reinforced by 1000 mercenaries and 2000 Argives under Pythagoras, who had left Argos under the charge of Timocrates an Achæan, when he heard of the fall of Gythium began to think his situation desperate, and sent Pythagoras to solicit an interview with Flamininus. This request was granted, and they met with a few attendants on each side in the plain of Sparta. In the conference, as reported by Livy, the strength of the argument seems to have been on the side of Nabis; for it was difficult to point out any change that had taken place to afford a just ground for hostility against him, since the day when Flamininus accepted his aid against Philip. The Roman had then virtually, if not expressly, recognised his title, not only to Sparta, but to Argos. The answer which the Roman historian puts into the mouth of his countryman is hardly intelligible, but apparently quite inconsistent with the facts recorded by the historian. Flamininus is made to deny that the Romans had contracted any friendship or alliance with Nabis, and then to allege the tyrant's misgovernment, his aggression on Messene, his alliance with Philip, and his piracies, as grounds of war: but the

validity of all these grounds manifestly depended on the truth of an assertion, which, if Livy's narrative is to be believed, was notoriously false. Flamininus however was in a position in which it might be considered as a condescension to reason even on false premises. Aristænus more ingenuously exhorted Nabis to abdicate his power, and reminded him of many tyrants who had descended of their own accord to a private station, and had afterwards lived in safety and honour among their fellow-citizens. But Nabis had not so used his power that he could venture to resign it. The conference was adjourned to the morrow; and then Nabis offered to evacuate Argos, and to give up his prisoners and deserters; if the Romans had any other demands to make, he desired that they might be set down in writing, that he might deliberate on them with his friends. A truce was granted, during which Flamininus conferred with his allies on the question of peace. At first they were all unwilling that it should be granted to him on any terms; and Flamininus, who had private motives for desiring it—chiefly the fear that he might otherwise be superseded before he had brought the war to a close—could not bring them over to his mind until he had frightened them with a prospect of the heavy contributions which he should be obliged to lay on them for the support of the army, if he was forced to undertake the siege of Sparta, which he represented as likely to last through the winter. He was then allowed to prescribe terms of peace. They were sufficiently hard. One of the more important articles provided for the dismemberment of Laconia. Gythium, and the other maritime towns, were to be severed from the dominion of Nabis, as independent allies of Rome. He was also to give up all the towns which he possessed in Crete to the Romans, and to surrender his whole navy, retaining only two boats

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He was strictly confined to Laconia, and forbidden even there to build or fortify, as well as to make war or contract alliances. But he was left absolute master of Sparta, and the only provision introduced in favour of the exiles was an article by which their property, which included the emancipated slaves, their children, and as many of their wives as wished to share their fortunes, were to be restored to them. Nabis was to pay 100 talents immediately, and 400 more by instalments in eight years. A six months' truce was to be granted for an embassy to Rome.

Nabis however found the conditions insupportable, especially those which deprived him of his maritime possessions, which were the chief source of his wealth, and furnished the main strength of his army. The article of restitution to the exiles was no less disagreeable to the great mass of his creatures and dependants, and the mercenaries dreaded the end of a profitable occupation. Nabis inflamed the general discontent, and the Romans were soon apprised by a renewal of hostilities that the negotiation was broken off. Flamininus now saw himself obliged to make an attempt on Sparta; but his object still was it seems rather to terrify the tyrant into submission than to make himself master of the city. He sent for all the crews of the three allied fleets, and when they arrived his whole force amounted to no less than 50,000. With this multitude he surrounded the city and ordered a general assault, while three divisions of his best troops were led against three quarters in which the fortifications had not been completed. The city would have been carried at these points if Pythagoras had not set fire to the adjacent houses, and thus compelled the assailants to retire. The main purpose of Flamininus however had been answered; for three days after Nabis sent his son-in-law to implore peace. It was granted on the same conditions which had

Siege of
Sparta.

Treaty with
Nabis.

FINAL MEASURES OF FLAMININUS.

been before prescribed: the money was paid, and hostages, including a son of Nabis, delivered. In the meanwhile the Argives, having heard of the tyrant's danger, rose and expelled his garrison. Flamininus arrived at Argos soon after with his victorious army, and was invited to preside at the Nemean festival, which, having been omitted in the season of public distress, was now celebrated in honour of the recent deliverance (B.C. 195). The liberty of Argos was solemnly proclaimed by a herald during the Games, and the universal joy was only allayed by one reflection which afforded fresh matter for the invidious insinuations of the Ætolians, that Rome still sanctioned and upheld the tyranny of Nabis, while the rightful heir of the Spartan throne was allowed to remain in exile.

The Senate ratified the treaty with Nabis, and resolved to withdraw its army from Greece, and its garrisons from the Greek towns, either moved by the influence of Flamininus, or because the goodwill of the Greeks and the honour of Rome appeared more important than the advantage which would be derived from the continued occupation of these places in a war with Antiochus, which was still indeed expected as much as ever, but with more eagerness than anxiety. The reputation of Flamininus, as the patron of Greece, required this measure, to enable him to complete his task and terminate his mission with lustre. During the winter, after his campaign in Laconia, he remained at Elatea, occupied with the settlement of the internal affairs of the Greek cities in which the Macedonian interest had hitherto been predominant; and it had probably been every where so much abused, that he might seem to be merely redressing wrongs, and protecting liberty, while he turned the scale in favour of Rome. In the spring he summoned the deputies of all the allied cities to Corinth, where, as

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he took his leave, he recounted the benefits which they owed to the Romans, to his predecessors, and to himself; vindicated the peace with Nabis as necessary to save Sparta from destruction; and announced, that he was on the point of returning to Italy with his whole army, that he should immediately put the Achæans in possession of the Acrocorinthus, and that within ten days they would hear that the Roman garrisons had been withdrawn from Deinetrias and Chalcis. They would then know what credit to give in future to the charges of the Ætolians. He concluded with an exhortation: to use their liberty soberly and discreetly; to cherish concord both between city and city, and within each; and to show themselves worthy of the boon bestowed on them by the Roman people; remembering, that though their freedom had been won for them by the arms, and restored to them by the good faith of a foreign power, it could only be preserved by their own care. It was no doubt an earnest and friendly warning, and it drew tears from the audience, which affected the speaker himself. After a short pause he added a parting request, that they would collect as many Roman citizens as they could find living among them in slavery, and send them after him within two months into Thessaly. This was gladly promised, and the number redeemed in Achaia alone amounted to 1200, and cost the Achæans 100 talents. Before the Assembly was dismissed, it saw the garrison descend from the citadel, and march out of the city. Flamininus followed it, amidst acclamations of gratitude from the Greeks, and took the road to Elatea. He then sent his lieutenant, Ap. Claudius, with all the forces to Oricum, there to wait for him, and proceeded to Eubœa, where he withdrew the Roman garrisons not only from Chalcis but from Oreus and Eretria, and in a congress of Eubœan deputies repeated the

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Departure
of Flami-
ninus.

advice which he had given at Corinth. He next passed on to Demetrias, where, while he withdrew the garrison, he seems to have taken measures to secure the ascendancy of the partizans of Rome; and he probably at the same time regulated the federal constitution of the Magnetes, who henceforth have a magistrate at their head with the title of Magnetarch. His last work was to restore order and tranquillity in Thessaly, which he found in extreme confusion. The character of the people is described as turbulent and unsteady, and under the Macedonian government, which superseded the forms of their ancient constitution but substituted no definite system in its room¹, they seem to have experienced the evils of anarchy and despotism by turns.² The object of Flamininus appears to have been to assimilate the Thessalian constitution to that of the Achæan League, establishing a perfect equality with regard to the election of the federal magistrates and the administration of public affairs³; for this was the feature in the Achæan constitution, which, as it tended most to limit the power of the League, best suited the views of Rome. But the polity which he introduced into the cities approached nearer to that of Rome itself. It was what the Greeks called a timocracy, an oligarchy founded on the basis of property.⁴ The government was lodged in a senate, or council of the wealthier citizens; and a pecuniary qualification was required for the exercise of judicial functions. Every oligarchical party throughout Greece regarded Rome as its patron.⁵ It was no doubt in reliance on the efficacy of these measures for the

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Consti-
tution of
Thessaly.

¹ Niebuhr (*Kl. Schr.* p. 248.) gives a concise but luminous view of the internal history of Thessaly.

² Liv. xxxiv. 51.

³ Niebuhr, u. s.

⁴ Liv. u. s.

⁵ Liv. xxxv. 34. *Inter omnes constabat, in civitatibus principes, optimum quemque, Romana societatis esse, et præsentis statu gaudere, multitudinem, et quorum res non ex sententia ipsorum essent, omnia novare velle.*

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security of the Roman interest that he had advised the withdrawing of the troops; but he knew that Rome had nothing to fear, if he should be deceived in his calculations. He then proceeded to embark at Oricum with his ransomed countrymen, and returned to Italy to receive the honours of a triumph, which few Roman generals ever deserved better. His conduct in Greece is entitled to nearly as high praise as it was possible for him to earn in such a station. He probably never for a moment lost sight of the aggrandizement of Rome, as the mark to which all his aims were directed. But his policy was as liberal as was consistent with this object; and as appears from the opposition which he encountered, few of his contemporaries were capable of equal moderation or generosity. He would possibly not have shrunk from any violence or fraud which he deemed necessary for the establishment of the Roman ascendancy in Greece; but he was willing, and even desirous, that the Greeks should enjoy the largest measure of prosperity and apparent freedom, that could co-exist with real dependence on the will of Rome. The part of his conduct which it is perhaps most difficult entirely to justify even from this point of view, is that which relates to Nabis, whom he seems purposely to have left as a thorn in the side of the Achæans, while he committed the maritime towns of Laconia to their protection, though it was easy to foresee that the result would be a fresh collision between them.

Intrigues
of the Æto-
lians.

The Ætolians were ready to give the necessary impulse. In their contest with Philip, though it arose out of their own aggressions, the Ætolians might with some colour of truth represent themselves as champions of the national independence. Their connection with Rome might perhaps be defended on the plea of a supposed necessity: though no fair excuse could be offered for the iniquitous compact into which they

entered with her. But they were now about to set Greece in a flame, without any assignable motive but lust of power and gain, jealousy of the Achæans, and resentment against the Romans. They waited for a time after the departure of Flaminius, in the hope that it would be a signal for the enemies of Rome to enter the vacant field. But when they found that all remained quiet, they held an Assembly at Naupactus, and, by the advice of their General Thoas, resolved to do their utmost to kindle a fresh war. They sent envoys at the same time to Antiochus, Philip, and Nabis, to work upon the ambition or revenge of each by appropriate arguments. Antiochus was indeed meditating war, and he had now Hannibal at his side to urge and direct him; but the season for the commencement of hostilities against Rome had not yet arrived. Philip had bought his experience too dearly, to let himself be drawn so soon into a struggle so much more hopeless than the last. Nabis, as he was more impatient of the condition to which he had been reduced, yielded more easily to the persuasions of the Ætolian envoy, and began immediately to make attempts for the recovery of the maritime towns, gaining some of the leading men by bribes, and removing those who adhered to the Roman cause by assassination, and finally laid siege to Gythium. The Achæans as protectors of these towns, while they remonstrated with Nabis, sent a body of auxiliaries to Gythium and envoys to Rome. Philopœmen had now returned from Crete. His absence, at a period when his services were supposed to be required for the defence of his country, had given so much offence at Megalopolis, that a decree was very nearly carried for depriving him of the franchise: and this dishonour was only averted through the interposition of Aristænus, the General of the League, who, though afterwards at least opposed to Philopœmen in his political views,

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was induced to intercede in his behalf. We are informed that Philopœmen was moved by resentment for this affront to aid several of the subject Arcadian towns in an attempt which they made to deliver themselves from their dependence on Megalopolis.¹ The motive assigned for this step is certainly too petty for such a man. But we do not find any reason to believe that this was a democratical measure.² If these towns were admitted into the League, it was most probably Philopœmen's object simply to counterbalance the preponderance of the old Achæan towns, as we shall find him afterwards the author of another innovation manifestly designed for that end. Now however he was again General of the League. But though Nabis, while he vigorously pressed the siege of Gythium, made inroads into the Achæan territories, it was not thought prudent to undertake any offensive operations against him, until the Senate's pleasure should be known. Even when they learnt, on the return of their envoys, that the Senate had directed the prætor, A. Atilius, to carry succours to their Laconian allies, they would not come to any resolution until they had consulted their patron Flaminius. They then held a Council at Sicyon. It seemed evident that Gythium and the whole coast would be lost, unless measures were speedily taken to check the progress of Nabis; and these would have been voted

¹ Plut. Philop. 13.

² So it is represented by Nitzsch (Polybius, p. 17.), who observes that *the ancients seem to have been so much occupied with Philopœmen's military inventions, that they forgot his political plans*: that is, in other words, we have no satisfactory evidence remaining as to their real nature. If so, it is now scarcely possible, by any effort of sagacity, to fill up the void. This little work of Nitzsch is full of interesting hints, bold surmises, and startling assertions. It may seem ungrateful to complain of its brevity, otherwise than in the way of praise: but much time would have been saved to ordinary readers if the author's views had been more largely developed. One of the more serious defects of the work is, that very questionable propositions are laid down, not only without evidence, but without any intimation that they are doubtful, and often the more dangerously, because coupled in the same period with others which are undeniable. It is also to be regretted that the propositions toward which the induction is pointed are seldom so distinctly stated as to enable the reader to estimate the exact force of the argument.

unanimously, if a letter of Flamininus had not been read, in which he advised them to wait for the prætor's arrival. The opinions of the Assembly were then divided. Philopœmen declined to express his own, but declared himself ready to execute their decree, whether it were for peace or war. This was construed as a sufficient guarantee: war was decreed, and the time and mode of conducting it left to his discretion. Philopœmen himself would willingly have waited for the Roman fleet, but the danger of Gythium seemed to admit of no delay, and there was little hope that any relief could be brought to it unless by sea. He resolved therefore, though totally destitute of knowledge or experience in marine affairs, to attempt a naval expedition for that purpose. The Achæan navy was not strong; but Nabis, having so lately surrendered all his ships to the Romans, had only been able to equip a very small squadron for the blockade of the port: this however he kept in constant exercise. Philopœmen had heard of a large galley of war which was laid up at Ægium, and believing that it would be a valuable accession to his fleet ordered it to be manned, and placed it under the command of Tiso, the Achæan admiral. But he seems to have forgotten that it had been captured eighty years before¹, and he was not informed that its timbers were utterly decayed. Yet it performed the voyage to the gulf of Laconia, and led the way with gallant port against the enemy. But at the first shock which it received from one of the tyrant's new ships, it went to pieces, and the whole crew was taken. The rest, dismayed by the fate of their admiral, took to flight,

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Philopœ-
men de-
feated at
sea.

¹ Plutarch (Philop. 14.) says, forty years had passed since it had been last used; which is not inconsistent with the date of its capture, given by Livy (xxxv. 26.), who says it was taken while carrying Nicæa, the wife of Craterus, from Naupactus to Corinth. One may suspect that either, as Schorn believes (271.), the word *φίλι* has dropped out of Livy's text, or that Livy confounded Craterus with his son Alexander, as we do not know that the father's wife was also named Nicæa; but even Alexander had now been dead more than fifty years.

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and did not stop till they reached Patræ. Happily Philopœmen was on board one of the smaller vessels. He was not disheartened by a failure which detracted nothing either from his military or nautical reputation, but was only stimulated to set all the resources of his art in action against the tyrant. He soon after with a detachment of light troops surprised a division of the enemy which was stationed a little to the east of Gythium, set fire to the camp, which was formed chiefly of huts of reed, and made a great slaughter: and having ravaged a part of Laconia proceeded to Tegea, where he assembled all his forces and summoned a Council, which was attended by ministers from Epirus and Acarnania. He now resolved, as the last expedient for the relief of Gythium, to march against Sparta. But on the very day when he crossed the border, Gythium was taken by assault, and Nabis, having information of his movements, hastened to occupy a pass¹ by which he expected he would descend into the vale of the Eurotas. Philopœmen, though taken by surprise and at a great disadvantage, not only extricated himself by a skilful manœuvre from his perilous situation, but drew the enemy into an ambuscade, scattered his whole army on the mountains, and, having posted some of his own troops on two of the roads which led to Sparta, intercepted so great a number of the fugitives that hardly a fourth part was believed to have escaped. Nabis no longer ventured to stir beyond the walls, and Philopœmen, having ravaged Laconia for about thirty days, returned home; with the glory of a victory which his admiring countrymen were inclined to prefer to all the achievements of Flaminius himself.²

Ravages
Laconia.

Flaminius in the meanwhile had returned to

¹ Liv. xxxv. 27. *Pyrrhi castra*: clearly a different place from δ Πύρρου καλοῦμενος χάραξ of Polyb. v. 19., with which it is confounded by Manso, Sp. III. 1. p. 402.

² Liv. xxxv. 30. Plut. Philop. 15.; though here, as in Flamin. 13. and Pausanias, VIII. 50. 10., there is great confusion of dates.

Greece, having been sent as envoy with three colleagues to counteract the machinations of the Ætolians, and to keep the other Greeks stedfast in the Roman alliance. He is said to have been so much offended by the comparison drawn between himself and Philopœmen, that he interposed his authority for the protection of Nabis, and granted him a truce.¹ But however capable Flamininus may have been of such jealousy, there are strong reasons, beside Livy's silence, for doubting that he betrayed it in this manner. His mission required that he should carefully conceal any displeasure which he might feel toward the Achæans; and it is related that he relied on their hostility to Nabis as a pledge of their friendly disposition toward Rome.² Nor does it appear that the supposed truce could have had any object: for it is not probable that Philopœmen would have undertaken the siege of Sparta, which Flamininus with 50,000 men at his command had treated as so arduous an enterprise. The war seems only to have been intermitted through the weakness of Nabis, who however made repeated applications to the Ætolians for succour.

The four Roman envoys, after a very short stay in Achaia, proceeded northward, through Athens and Chalcis, to attend a Council of the Thessalians. They appear to have met with no symptoms of disaffection until they came to Demetrias, where an Assembly of the Magnetæ was convoked to meet them. Here they found that great alarm had been spread by a report that Demetrias was to be restored to Philip: and on this ground or pretext several of the leading men, among whom was the Magnetarch Eurylochus, had declared themselves in favour of the Ætolians. The envoys did not venture either to acknowledge or deny the truth of the report: for it seems clear, and it is even intimated by Livy, that the Senate, to

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Roman envoys in Thessaly.

¹ Paus. u. 2.

Liv. xxxv. 31.

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prevent a union between Philip and Antiochus, had not only released the prince Demetrius and remitted the arrears of the Macedonian tribute, but had at least held out a hope to Philip that he should recover Demetrius. The envoys therefore were obliged to elude the inquiries and complaints of Eurylochus and his party on this head, by the recital of past services and other irrelevant topics which produced little impression on their hearers; and when, in the course of the debate, Eurylochus ventured to observe that even then Demetrius was free only in semblance but really subject to the beck of the Romans¹, there were many assenting murmurs, though the envoys and their adherents assumed a tone of indignant astonishment. The Roman interest was indeed so strong, that when the Assembly broke up, Eurylochus thought it prudent to make his escape from the city, and took refuge in Ætolia.

About this time Thoas, the Ætolian ambassador who had been sent to Antiochus, returned accompanied by Menippus, an envoy from the Syrian king. An Assembly was summoned to give them audience, and in the meanwhile they circulated extravagant accounts of the forces and treasure of Antiochus. Quintius, who had agents in Ætolia by whom he was informed of all that took place there, sent an Athenian embassy to plead the cause of Rome in the Assembly; but the popular feeling was so strong against it that the Assembly could hardly be persuaded to admit the Romans themselves to a hearing. Quintius however availed himself of this permission, not with any expectation of preserving peace, but with the view to fix the blame of the war on the Ætolians. This end he accomplished, for they passed a decree in his presence, inviting Antiochus to come

Projects of
the Æto-
lians.

¹ Liv. xxxv. 31. *Re verè omnia ad nutum Romanorum feri*

and emancipate Greece; and when he asked for a copy of this decree, Damocritus the General replied that he could not then attend to his request, but would shortly publish the decree from the Ætolian camp on the Tiber. It was the absurd vanity of the Ætoliens, rather than the violence of their resentment, that precipitated the war in a manner very advantageous for Rome. Having now thrown off all reserve, they wished to strike some important blow before Antiochus arrived to share their glory. It was resolved in the Council of the Apocletes to make an attempt on the same day on Demetrius, Chalcis, and Sparta. At Demetrius the enterprise succeeded. Diocles, to whom it was entrusted, having been appointed to escort Eurylochus, who had been recalled from exile, took possession of the city by means of a stratagem like that which had made Flamininus master of Thebes. But at Chalcis the partizans of Rome called in the Eretrians and Carystians to their aid, and presented such a front to Thoas, who was sent with a small army to surprise them, that he was obliged to retire, concealing his disappointment under professions of friendly intentions. At Sparta the plan was successfully executed, but its authors, through the blind greediness of their agents, lost the fruit of their iniquity, which was reaped by their enemies, while they themselves only retained the guilt and shame of a foul crime.

Nabis, as has been said, had importuned them for succour to enable him to carry on the war into which they had urged him. Alexamenus was now sent with 1000 foot and 30 chosen horsemen, who were instructed by Damocritus in the Council of the Apocletes to execute whatever order they might receive from their commander, however strange and perilous it might seem. Alexamenus, on his arrival at Sparta, represented Antiochus as already on his way to Greece,

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and exhorted Nabis to exercise his troops that they might be ready to bear their part in the great contest which was now approaching. Accordingly reviews were frequently held in the plain near the city, at which Nabis was only attended by a few horsemen, and Alexamenus made it his practice frequently to ride off to one wing, where the Ætolian troops were posted, as if to inspect them, and then to hasten back to the tyrant's side. Having thus guarded against all suspicion of his design, one day when he had reminded his horsemen of their secret instructions, he bade them follow him with their spears couched, and imitate his example. He then charged Nabis, who was riding up to him, and threw him on the ground, where he was soon despatched. Before the tyrant's guards, who were posted in the centre of the line, had recovered from their amazement, Alexamenus had quitted the field with all the Ætolians to take possession of the palace. It now only remained to invite all who were averse to tyranny to declare themselves, and the Ætolians would soon have been hailed by the multitude as the liberators of Sparta. But the leader and his men followed their national instinct: while he ransacked the palace they began to plunder the city. At length indignation armed the people with courage to collect their forces in defence of their property. They found a boy of the royal blood who had been brought up among the tyrant's children, and having set him on horseback, as a rallying point, fell upon the spoilers. Alexamenus was killed in the palace; most of his troops within the precincts of the Brazen House to which they fled as an asylum. The few who escaped out of Laconia were stopped on their way through Arcadia, and sold as slaves. Philopœmen, as soon as he heard of these events, hastened to Sparta, which he found in great confusion; and having assembled the principal citizens persuaded

Nabis as-
sassinated.

them to enter into the Achæan League. The arrival of Atilius with a fleet of twenty-four great galleys at Gythium contributed to overcome all opposition. The League received an accession which Aratus had scarcely dared to hope for.

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After the repulse of the Ætolians from Chalcis, Quinctius sailed into the Euripus, where he met Eumenes of Pergamus, who strengthened the garrison with 500 of his troops, and proceeded to Athens, while the Roman envoys continued their voyage to Demetrias. They hoped that the failure of the recent attempt on Chalcis would tend to incline the Magnetes to renew the alliance with Rome. Villius, one of their number, was sent forward to sound the disposition of the people at Demetrias, while Eunomus, the Thessalian general, was directed to assemble all the forces of Thessaly to encourage the partizans of Rome. But Villius was not allowed to enter the harbour of Demetrias, and after an angry altercation with Eurylochus was obliged to rejoin his colleagues, who sailed back to Corinth.

The revolt of Demetrias proved a great gain to the Romans; for it hurried Antiochus into rash counsels, and induced him to begin the contest he had so long meditated without sufficient preparation, and in a manner most disadvantageous to himself. He had already shown by his treatment of Hannibal how largely he had been indebted to fortune for his past successes, and he was now about to prove still more clearly how unequal he was to the great designs which he had conceived. Hannibal, driven out of Carthage by the jealousy of the Romans, had taken refuge at his court; for a war with Rome the trustiest and ablest of counsellors; bringing embittered hatred of their common enemy, with enlarged experience and knowledge both of her strength and her weakness, wanting only the means which Antiochus possessed

Revolt of
Demetrias.

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in abundance, to annoy and distress her, if not to bring her once more into mortal peril. He asked for 100 galleys, 10,000 foot, and 1000 horse. With this armament he undertook to rouse Carthage to revolt, to invade Italy, and keep the Romans employed, while Antiochus took possession of Greece, and threatened to cross the Adriatic. Antiochus had for a time adopted this plan, and Hannibal sent an emissary to Carthage to concert measures with his friends. His projects, of which various rumours had reached Rome from time to time, seem to have alarmed the Senate much more than the power of Antiochus; and it was apparently on this account that after the return of Flaminius from Greece, P. Sulpicius and P. Villius were sent to the Syrian court. Antiochus had fixed his residence at Ephesus, but when the envoys arrived was engaged in an expedition to Pisidia; and during his absence they held frequent conferences with Hannibal. These meetings, when reported to Antiochus, inspired him, as the Romans designed, with distrust of his guest¹, who was for a time excluded from his counsels, and seems never entirely to have recovered his confidence. But the real cause of his alienation appears to have been, that he could not help seeing that notwithstanding his title Hannibal was the greater man; and he willingly lent an ear to the Greeks who flattered and deceived him. The project of the expedition to Italy was not laid aside, but it was reserved as a subject for maturer deliberation; and it was the less necessary to decide upon it immediately, as the forces which he had been collecting in the eastern provinces were still at a distance, and on the western coast of Asia he had not

¹ Polyb. iii. 11. *Σπουδάζοντες εἰς ὑποψίαν ἐμβαλεῖν πρὸς τὸν Ἀντίοχον ὃ καὶ συνέθη γενέσθαι.* Livy (xxxv. 14.) does not like to acknowledge the artifice, and tries to mask it. *Secutum sua sponte est, velut consilio petitum esset, ut vilior ob ea regi Hannibal, et suspectior ad omnia fieret.*

yet been able to overpower the resistance of Smyrna, Alexandria, Troas, and Lampsacus, which he wished to secure before he passed over to Europe. He was thus wavering when Thoas the Ætolian came to announce the revolt of Demetrias, and to urge him to go over to Greece without delay. All Greece, Thoas made him believe, was ready to welcome him; the Ætolians and Sparta were already in arms; Philip was only waiting for his arrival to declare himself: for the present he needed no greater force than he had already with him. This however was the very force, it amounted at least to no more than that which Hannibal required for his proposed expedition. Thoas therefore endeavoured to dissuade the king from this project, and by insinuations which revived his jealousy of Hannibal induced him to drop it altogether, and without any further preparations at once to cross over to Europe.

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I.XV.

Antiochus, having first sacrificed at Ilium as if to appease Rome's tutelary deity, embarked with no more than 10,000 foot, 500 horse, and six elephants, in a fleet of 100 galleys, of which only 40 were completely decked, and 200 transports. He made for the gulf of Pagasæ, and was received at Demetrias with great joy by Eurylochus and his party. He soon after proceeded with a thousand men to Lamia to attend an Assembly of the Ætolians, in which he was created Commander in chief of the national forces with uncontrolled authority¹, and thirty of the Apocletes were appointed to assist him with their counsels. It was resolved to begin operations with a fresh attempt on Chalcis, where it was thought his presence would overcome all opposition. He therefore set out with the force which he had brought from Demetrias, and a small body of Ætolians, and having encamped at

Antiochus
in Greece.

¹ Livy (XXXV. 45.) *Imperatorem*. Appian, Syr. 12. (anticipating the decree), *εργασιῶν ἀντοχάτορα*.

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Salganeus on the Euripus, crossed over, accompanied by his Ætolian councillors, to Chalcis. The magistrates and chief men of the city, among whom Mictio and Xenocides, the leaders of the Roman party, were foremost, went out to meet him, and a conference ensued between a select number on each side. It was conducted in a friendly tone, as the Ætolians affected to regard alliance with Antiochus, who had only come to restore liberty to Greece; as consistent with the friendship of the Romans. But Mictio, who was the chief speaker on the other side, declared that the people of Chalcis, in common with all Greece, already enjoyed perfect liberty, for which they were indebted to the Romans, without whose sanction they would neither conclude any fresh alliance, nor receive any foreigners within their walls. With this answer, as he was not prepared to use force, Antiochus was obliged to return to Demetrias. It was then determined to try the effect of negotiation with the Achæans and Bœotians, and with the king of the Athamanians. Amynder, a weak man, was easily gained through his wife's brother Philippus, a native of Megalopolis, but of a Macedonian family, which claimed descent from the great Alexander; and the Ætolians, humouring him in this pretension, prevailed on him to draw Amynder into an alliance with Antiochus. The Bœotians were well known to be ill affected toward Rome, and the answer they gave to the application, that they would deliberate when the king himself should have come into Bœotia, was equivalent to consent. With the Achæans on the contrary there was no apparent ground to hope for success, but the supposition of personal rivalry and animosity between Philopœmen and Flamininus, which, even if it existed, could not have produced any such result. Flamininus himself was present at the Assembly which was held at Ægium to give audience to the envoys of Antiochus and the

Ætolians. They enlarged with rhetorical exaggeration on the immense preparations which the king had made, both by land and sea, to overwhelm his enemies, and pompously enumerated the various distant nations which were to swell his countless host. All that they asked however of the Achæans was neutrality. Flamininus ridiculed their bombast with some humour, and pointed out the glaring contrast between the mighty armaments which they had described, and the paltry force with which Antiochus had actually landed in Greece. It was indeed much too small to put the fidelity of the Achæans to the test. The Assembly, without the slightest hesitation, resolved that they and the Roman people would have both friends and enemies in common, and declared war against Antiochus and the Ætolians, though the Romans themselves had not yet done so. They also, at the request of Quinctius, sent 500 men for the protection of Chalcis, and as many to Piræus; for Antiochus had found partizans at Athens, who were endeavouring to draw the needy multitude over to his side by the prospect of royal largesses, and the adherents of Rome thought it necessary to send for Quinctius, whose presence with that of the Achæan troops quelled the spirit of disaffection, and Apollodorus who had fomented it was condemned to banishment. Antiochus, when he heard of the vote of the Achæans, sent his general, Menippus, with 3000 men, and his whole fleet under Polyxenidas, to intercept all succours destined for Chalcis, and a few days after followed them with 6000 men of his own, and as many Ætolians as he could collect at Lamia. They did not arrive until the Achæan troops, with some auxiliaries furnished by Eumenes, had been safely conducted into the town by Xenocides; but Mictio, who had been sent to request an additional reinforcement from Quinctius, and had

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Beginning
of hos-
tilities.

obtained 500 Romans¹, on his return found the road to Aulis barred by Menippus, and he therefore turned aside to Delium. Here, before they found means of embarking for Eubœa, while the men wandered about, some in the sacred grove, others for forage in the adjacent fields, apprehending no hostility, as war had not yet been begun or declared, and believing themselves sheltered by the sanctity of the place which possessed the privilege of an asylum, they were suddenly attacked by Menippus, and almost all cut to pieces or taken. A few escaped with Mictio in a small transport. The Romans hardly regretted a loss which enabled them to exclaim against Antiochus as the aggressor; and the Greeks thought it an ill omen that he had begun the war with an act of sacrilege.² To him however it may not have been useless, as on his next summons, when he arrived at Aulis, notwithstanding the remonstrances of Mictio and Xenoclidès, the Chalcidians opened their gates to him; and their example was followed by all the other towns in the island.

At Chalcis he received an embassy from Epirus, headed by the same Charops, who had before stood almost alone on the side of the Romans. The Epirots, in cautiously guarded and somewhat perplexed language, intimated that they would gladly admit him into their harbours and towns, if he brought a fleet and an army to protect them; but, lying so near as they did to Italy, they could not venture sooner to declare themselves in his favour. The Eleans, professing to fear an invasion from the Achæans, solicited aid, and a body of 1000 men was sent for their defence. Antiochus himself then repaired to Thebes, where he was warmly welcomed, and though he still

¹ Livy (xxxv. 50.) does not say whence these Romans came: perhaps it was from the fleet under Attilius.

² Diodor. Exc. p. 574.

affected only to ask that the Bœotians should receive him into their alliance without prejudice to their connection with Rome, a decree was passed which amounted to a declaration of war against her. He then returned to Demetrias, where he held a council with the Ætolian commissioners and Amynder, at which Hannibal, whom he had not for a long time before called in to take a share in his deliberations, was likewise present. The question for discussion was, whether an attempt should be made to gain the Thessalians, and, all being unanimous on this point, opinions were only divided as to the time and manner of the enterprise: some thought it best to try the effect of negotiation, others to make a display of force; whether immediately or not before the spring was another question. Hannibal had remained silent; but when his advice was asked he pointed out the futility of all that the king had hitherto done in Greece, and of the measure which was then the subject of debate; how little it imported toward the issue of the war, whether he had the Thessalians or any other Greeks,—who would always be with the strongest,—on his side; how great a mistake he had committed, when he came over with so small a force, trusting to the promises of the Ætolians; that the only power on that side of the Adriatic which could either serve or injure him materially was Macedonia. The sum of his advice was, that his forces should be brought over as early as possible from Asia; that Philip should either be won by persuasion, or, if he adhered to the Romans, should be kept occupied in his own dominions by attacks which Seleucus might make from Lysimachia on his north-east frontier; that one division of the Syrian fleet should infest the south coast of Italy, while the rest was stationed at Corcyra, and Antiochus himself with all his land forces took up a position in Epirus, threatening, and always ready if occasion required, to pass over into Italy.

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I.XV.

Plans of
Hannibal.

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LXV.

This was indeed the plan which the Romans dreaded, and against which they had been endeavouring to shield themselves by timely precautions. But Antiochus and his other counsellors were too jealous of the sagacity which exposed their shortsightedness to profit by it, and the only result of Hannibal's advice was, that Polyxenidas was sent to hasten the passage of the armament from Asia. Envoys were sent to the Thessalian assembly at Larissa, while Antiochus moved against Pheræ, where he was joined by Amynder and the Ætolians. Here he committed a fatal mistake. He sent a body of 2000 men to collect the bones of the slain at Cynoscephalæ, and interred them with magnificent obsequies; and he assigned the command in this expedition to Philippus, the pretender to the Macedonian crown, a choice which probably rendered this invidious ostentation of sympathy doubly offensive to Philip. He had hitherto wavered, and had taken no decisive step, but he now invited the Roman proprætor, M. Bæbius, who was wintering with his army at Apollonia, to a conference, that they might concert measures to check the progress of Antiochus in Thessaly. Antiochus, when the Thessalians rejected his overtures, made himself master of Pheræ and Scotussa and several other towns, and proceeded to lay siege to Larissa. But he let himself be scared away by the stratagem of Ap. Claudius, who, after the meeting between Bæbius and Philip, was sent with a small detachment into Thessaly, and led the enemy to believe that the whole allied army was approaching. Antiochus took up his winter-quarters at Chalcis, that he might gratify the passion he had conceived for the daughter of one of the citizens, and having married her, as if he had no weightier business on his hands, gave himself up entirely to the celebration of festivities in honour of his nuptials. His officers, following his example, laid aside all military cares and exercises,

Antiochus
at Chalcis.

and, when the army was re-assembled in the spring, it was found that in the long interval of ease and luxury discipline had been dissolved, and the habits of the camp were almost forgotten, so that Philopœmen was heard to regret that he was not at this time General of the Achæans, to have surprised and cut down the Syrians as they roved from tavern to tavern.¹ His first operation was an expedition to Acarnania, where through the treachery of two leading men whom he had corrupted by bribes he gained possession of Medion; but while he was besieging Thyrium he was alarmed by a report that the consul M. Acilius Glabrio, had entered Thessaly with his army, and he immediately hastened back to Chalcis.

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Bæbius and Philip had previously united their forces, and were recovering the Thessalian towns which had submitted to Antiochus and the Athamanians, when the consul arrived. On his appearance all opposition ceased. The pretender Philippus surrendered to him, and after having suffered the mockery of his rival was sent in chains to Rome. Philip won the goodwill of the Athamanian prisoners by mild treatment, and through them, having dismissed them to their homes, soon after made himself master of Athamania. Amynder fled with his family to Ambracia. While Philip was thus occupied with his own interests, he permitted the consul to advance without him to the vale of the Spercheus, and afterwards, either being detained by illness or feigning it, did not overtake him until the crisis was past. Antiochus, as the enemy approached, sent messenger after messenger to Polyxenidas, to hasten the passage of his forces from Asia; but with so little effect that when the Roman army, about 40,000 strong, had nearly reached Thermopylæ, he had only 10,000 foot and 500 horse to bring against them. The Ætolians

B. C. 191.
Battle of
Thermo-
pylæ.

¹ Plut. Philop. 17.

HISTORY OF GREECE.

AP.
CV.

too failed him almost entirely in his hour of need. Only some 4000 could be induced to take part in the unequal conflict. These, after he had entrenched himself with a double rampart, fosse, and wall, in Thermopylæ, he sent to protect Hypata and Heraclea against the Romans; but the consul, having ravaged their fields, encamped near the pass, and the Ætolians threw themselves into Heraclea. Antiochus now despatched a messenger to them, to request that at least they would guard the Path over the mountain, that he might not suffer the fate of Leonidas without his glory. Only half of them complied with this request, and dividing themselves into three bodies occupied the summits, Callidromus, Rhoduntia, and Tichius. The consul sent two of his tribunes, M. Porcius Cato and L. Valerius Flaccus, with 2000 men to dislodge them, while he attempted to force the pass below. This he would probably never have accomplished, as the force of Antiochus was sufficient to defend his fortifications: but in the heat of the conflict, Cato, having surprised the Ætolians on Callidromus and driven them from their post, appeared with his troops, chasing them before him, on the heights in the rear of the Syrians. As soon as this was perceived a panic spread through the host of Antiochus: all threw down their arms and fled. Antiochus himself did not stop until he reached Elatea, and then with as many followers as he could collect proceeded to Chalcis. But the Roman cavalry made such havoc among the fugitives that not more than 500 are said to have escaped. The whole loss of the Romans was estimated at 200. The Ætolians in Heraclea took the opportunity to attack the camp of the conquerors in their absence, and were not repulsed without loss on the part of the Romans. The consul now marched toward Chalcis, receiving on his way the submission and deprecations of the revolted Pho-

cian and Bœotian towns, which he treated with clemency. On his approach Antiochus embarked for Asia with his Eubœa¹, the only permanent acquisition he had made in Greece. The island submitted without resistance to the conqueror, who, at the intercession of Flamininus, spared even Chalcis.

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The Ætolians were thus left to maintain the contest which they had so rashly and prematurely begun, alone. Yet, hopeless as it now appeared, their pride did not permit them immediately to abandon it, and they rejected the consul's overtures, when he summoned them to surrender Heraclea, and to throw themselves on the clemency of Rome. Heraclea sustained a siege which lasted nearly a month, during which the assault was continued night and day without intermission. At the same time Philip, who had met the consul on his return from Bœotia with congratulations and excuses for his absence, laid siege to Lamia. But when Heraclea had fallen, Acilius desired him to desist, as the Romans, who had won the victory, were entitled to its fruits. Yet he did not himself turn his arms against Lamia; for there now seemed a prospect that the war would be soon ended. A few days before the capture of Heraclea, an Ætolian Council assembled at Hypata had decreed to send an embassy to Antiochus, to request that, if he could not immediately pass over again with all his forces into Greece, he would support them in the struggle with subsidies and troops. But the loss of Heraclea sunk their spirits, and before they had received an answer from Antiochus they sent envoys to the consul to sue for peace. He granted an armistice of ten days, and sent his lieutenant, Valerius Flaccus, back with them to Hypata. Here when they would have pleaded their ancient services, Flaccus bade

The Ætoli-
ans sue
for peace.

¹ Polyb. xx. 8. Applan (Syr. 20.), *Eóðas*.

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LXV.

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THE ÆTOLIANS SUE FOR PEACE.

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¹ Polyb. xi. 8. Appian (Syr. 20.), *Edd'as*.

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LXV.

them consider all such claims as forfeited by recent injuries to the Romans, and advised them to confine themselves to the language of humble supplication. They believed that they were following good advice when they passed a decree by which they committed themselves to the Roman FAITH. They had adopted a phrase of the Roman international law under a mistaken notion of its meaning, and while they supposed that they had placed themselves under the safeguard of the Roman honour and piety as suppliants, they had unconsciously rendered themselves at discretion. The consul however pointed out the phrase very lucidly to their envoys when they came to him with the decree; for when he hesitated to give up Amynder and some other noxious persons whom he demanded, he ordered them to be put in chains; and it was only through the intercession of Flaccus that they were allowed to return to consult with their countrymen at Hydruntum. There vehement indignation was excited by the knowledge of the consul's behaviour, as well as by the reasonableness of his demands; and as it happened at this juncture a supply of money was brought them from Antiochus by one of their envoys, together with cheering promises and dazzling descriptions of the king's preparations, they resolved to hold out still longer before they threw themselves on the Roman *faith*. But they seemed to have no alternative left for any other than defensive hostility; and when Acilius crossed Mount Corax to besiege Naupactus they neglected the opportunity of attacking him, which was heavily laden with baggage, on a difficult road, where they might probably have repelled the invaders with a defeat not less disastrous than the Athenians had formerly suffered in the region. Naupactus however made a vigorous defence, and as the garrison was stronger than at Heraclea

after the consul had been lying before it two months, it was still in a condition to occupy him much longer. In the meanwhile Philip was making conquests in Thessaly and the adjacent regions. He had obtained permission from the consul, when he set out from Naupactus, to recover the places which had revolted from the Romans. Demetrius, fearing the vengeance of the Romans, had opened its gates to him, notwithstanding the efforts of Eurylochus, who slew himself as the Macedonians entered. The soldiers and vessels of Antiochus were allowed to depart. Philip then proceeded to reduce the towns which had not yielded in Dolopia, Aperantia, and Perrhæbia. His progress did not escape the observation of Flaminius, and furnished him at least with a pretext for interposition in behalf of the Ætolians, who, when he came over to Naupactus, earnestly implored his intercession. They had indeed little claim to his good offices, but it belonged to his character, as patron of Greece, to extend his protection to them. He therefore drew the consul's attention to Philip's acquisitions, and persuaded him to grant a truce to the Ætolians, that they might send an embassy to sue for peace at Rome. A stop was thus put to the progress of the Macedonian arms. Acilius raised the siege, and sent his army into Phocis, while he accompanied Quinctius to Ægium, where they had business to transact with the Achæan Assembly.

CHAP.
LXV.

Obtain a
a truce.

The expedition of Antiochus had apparently promoted the interests of the Achæans, as the Peloponnesian states which still kept aloof from the League, were induced to declare themselves on his side, and thus afforded a pretext for the renewal of hostilities against them. Indeed, if we may trust Plutarch¹,

¹ Cato, 12. But it is very difficult to reconcile this embassy of Cato with Livy's account of the operations of Acilius before the battle of Thermopylæ, when we consider that Cato was present at it, and carried the news with extraordinary speed to Rome.

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some movements in favour of Antiochus took place or seemed to be threatened in Achaia itself, at Patræ, Ægium, and Corinth, so that before the battle of Thermopylæ, Acilius thought it necessary to send Cato to maintain tranquillity there. It is more certain that Sparta showed a disposition to revolt, and that Diophanes, the Achæan General, seized this occasion to make an expedition into Laconia. Diophanes was not, it appears, so devoted a partizan of Rome as Aristænus: but he was a personal rival of Philopœmen, though it was in his school he had acquired all his military experience¹: he was eager for reputation, and hoped, with the sanction of the Romans, to gain important advantages for the League. It was in vain that Philopœmen privately remonstrated with him, and pointed out that, at a juncture when the contest between Antiochus and the Romans was still pending in Greece, it would be more prudent for the Achæans quietly to await the issue.² Diophanes was confirmed in his design by the approbation of Flamininus, who accompanied him into Laconia. Philopœmen then ventured on a very bold step. He hastened to Sparta, and composed the disturbances which had broken out there, by his authority, and by warnings of the approaching danger: so that when the Achæan army arrived there was no appearance of any commotion to justify hostile measures, and neither Diophanes nor Flamininus entered the city. This is probably all that we are to understand when it is said that he shut the gates against them.³ The Spartans believed that Philopœmen had delivered them from a great calamity, and they wished to show their gratitude by a present of 120 talents, the sum which had been brought into the treasury by the sale of the property of Nabis. But Timolaus,

Philopœmen at Sparta.

¹ Polyb. xxiii. 10. 4. xxi. 7.

² ἀπέκλεισε, Plut. u. s.

³ Plut. Phil. 16.

PHILOPÆMEN AT SPARTA.

whom they sent with this offer to Megalopolis, was so struck by the simplicity of Philopæmen's domestic habits, and the dignity of his conversation, that he could not summon courage to deliver his message, until he was sent a third time. Philopæmen, who was superior to all such temptations, though he declined the offer, did not neglect the opportunity it afforded of strengthening his influence. He went to Sparta, and advised them to spare such gifts for their enemies and bad men whose mouths they might stop by bribes, but not to attempt to corrupt and degrade men of honour who were already their friends.

The flight of Antiochus, though it did not produce any great change in the state of affairs in Peloponnesus, was attended by a sensible alteration in the tone and deportment of the Romans toward their Greek allies, and removed all doubt as to the position which the Achæans were henceforth to occupy. But though no reasonable man among them could any longer hope for absolute independence, much might turn on the attitude which they maintained in their transactions with the superior Power. There were two extremes between which it was possible and advisable to steer: on the one hand an excess of servility, which, while it degraded the national character, would invite insult and oppression; on the other, an affectation of defiance, which could only provoke resentment, and plunge them into utter ruin. One of these extremes was represented by Aristænus, who did not scruple openly to recommend unreserved compliance with the will of the Romans in every point. Philopæmen, who saw quite as clearly that the power of Rome was irresistible, nevertheless indignantly rejected these slavish maxims, and sharply censured their author, who, he said, was precipitating the destiny of Greece. He saw that there was a mean which combined honour with

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safety, and that the nation would not suffer the worse treatment, if it showed a sense of its own dignity, while it acknowledged the majesty of Rome.¹ Diophanes on the other hand seems to have cherished extravagant hopes, and to have deceived himself with a vain reliance on the forbearance of the Romans. He believed that the time was now come to force Elis and Messenia to enter into the League. The Eleans, when they were summoned, returned an evasive answer, promising that they would consider the proposal when the Syrian troops still remaining in Elis had been dismissed. The Messenians took no other notice of the requisition than to prepare for war. But when Diophanes began to ravage their territory and to threaten Messene, they sent to Flamininus, who was then at Chalcis, offering to surrender to the Romans. He hastened to Megalopolis, and ordered Diophanes immediately to raise the siege and come to him: and when they met, having gently reproved him for engaging in such an enterprise without his sanction, bade him disband his forces. He however enjoined the Messenians to incorporate themselves with the Achæan League and to recal their exiles, but gave them leave to apply to him, if they wished for any indulgence or security. Diophanes had attempted to make another acquisition for the League. Zacynthus, when Philip ceded it to Amynder as the price of his alliance, had been committed to the charge of a Sicilian named Hierocles, who, when he heard of the defeat of Antiochus, agreed with Diophanes to deliver it up to the Achæans. But the Romans now put in their claim to the island, and said that it was not for the benefit of Diophanes and the Achæans that their legions had fought at Thermopylæ. Diophanes ventured to vindicate his own conduct and the rights of the League, but there were many voices in the Achæan

Diophanes
and Flami-
ninus.

¹ Polyb. xxv. 9.

Council, among them no doubt that of Aristænus, which condemned his pertinacity, and proposed to submit the question to the judgment of Flamininus. Flamininus on this occasion compared the League to a tortoise, which is safe only so long as it keeps within its shell: so the Achæans would be in danger as soon as they began to sally beyond Peloponnesus. The League drew in its head, and the island was given up to the Romans.

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The Spartans who showed themselves so grateful to Philopœmen seem to have been only a party, and not a very numerous or powerful party. It was probably the same which had been placed at the head of affairs by Philopœmen, when he first united Sparta with the Achæan League, and, having lost its ascendancy in the reaction produced by the arrival of Antiochus, was restored to power, as we have seen, through Philopœmen's intervention. But as soon as the danger was past its adversaries appear to have recovered their superiority; and one of their first measures was an infringement at once of the constitution of the Achæan League, and of the treaty between the Achæans and Rome, which provided that no embassy should be received at Rome from any of the states, members of the League, apart from the entire body.¹ They notwithstanding sent envoys to request the Senate to release their hostages, and to restore the maritime towns to the dominion of Sparta. One of their complaints with regard to these towns was, that so long as they were shut out from their coast, they could not conveniently send ambassadors to Rome, though by the Achæan constitution, which had been affirmed by the treaty, they were forbidden to do so. But the motive which rendered them most anxious to recover these places was, that they afforded a refuge for the exiles.

The
Spartan
exiles.

¹ PAUS. VII. 9. 4.

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The return of the exiles was what all classes at Sparta, except the party which was protected by Philopœmen, most dreaded, as it was likely to be attended by a revolution, in which the greater part of the new citizens admitted by the tyrants would have been in danger of losing their property, their franchise, and their personal freedom. The main object of the embassy to Rome was apparently to avert this calamity, and it is probable that the exiles at the same time sent envoys to support their claims there. The Senate reserved the petition as to the hostages for further consideration¹, but some time after released all of them, except the son of Nabis, who would perhaps also have been sent back if he had not been carried off by sickness.² The question as to the towns it referred to the decision of Flaminius and his colleagues: on the subject of the exiles it seems to have answered with studied ambiguity, expressing surprise that they were not recalled to their homes now that Sparta was once more free. This was the business on which Flaminius came with Glabrio to Ægium, after the siege of Naupactus had been raised. The cause of the exiles was probably viewed with favour by the Roman government, as that of an oligarchical party, and their restoration could not fail to produce frequent occasions for Roman intervention. Philopœmen also wished to bring it about, but for a very different end: to reduce Sparta into more complete dependence on the League³; and he prevailed on the Council to reject the request of Flaminius and the consul, when they interceded in behalf of the exiles.⁴ The case of Elis was discussed at the same time. The Eleans no longer refused to enter into the League, but they desired, it is said, to be admitted on their

¹ Polyb. xx. 12.

² Ibid. xx. 13.

³ Liv. xxxviii. 31.

⁴ Liv. xxxvi. 35. Plut. Philop. 17. Paus. viii. 51.

TREATMENT OF THE ÆTOLIANS.

own application rather than through the intervention of the Romans.¹ But it may have been the jealousy of the independent party among the Achæans which declined that intervention in this case as in that of the exiles. Thus at last the work begun by Aratus was completed; the whole peninsula was united in the League: but the time when it thus reached its greatest compass of territorial extent was the beginning of a period in which it continued to descend from one stage of humiliation to another, until it sank into total subjection to a foreign yoke.

The Ætolian envoys, though Flamininus, who had returned to Rome, pleaded in their behalf, found the majority of the Senate implacable, and after a warm debate which lasted several days, they were bidden to choose one of two conditions: to surrender at discretion, or to pay 1000 talents and to acknowledge the allies and enemies of Rome as their own. When they hesitated between the extinction of their freedom and a burden which they could not support, and attempted to make stipulations, they were sternly dismissed. On the return of their envoys, the Ætolians, taught by experience, secured the passes of Mount Corax; and Acilius, finding that he could not safely return to Naupactus, suddenly marched against Lamia, which he stormed in the course of two days. He then sat down before Amphissa, and was still occupied with the siege, when he was superseded by the new consul L. Scipio, who came, accompanied by his brother Africanus, to carry on the war with Antiochus in Asia. With such an object before them, they had no mind to be detained by an Ætolian town; and they gladly accepted the mediation of the Athenians, who interceded in behalf of the Ætolians. Yet they could not relax the rigour of the terms

¹ Liv. u. 3.
c c 3

CHAP.
LXV.

B. C. 190.
Renewal of
the truce
with the
Ætolians.

which had been prescribed at Rome, and the Ætolians were persuaded by their Athenian friends once more to solicit a truce, that they might again implore the clemency of the Senate. The Scipios willingly granted six months for this experiment, and then proceeded on their march to the East. Philip, whom the Senate had gratified by the release of his son Demetrius, had already prepared roads, bridges, and magazines, for the passage of the Roman army through Macedonia and Thrace, and he escorted it in person as far as the Hellespont. He was rewarded for his loyalty by the remission of the remainder of his tribute.

Before the issue of the contest with Antiochus became known in Greece, the Ætolians, though they had sent an embassy to Rome, rashly crediting, as it seems, a rumour of the defeat of the Roman army in Asia¹, resumed hostilities against Philip, restored Amynder to his dominions, recovered Amphiloehia and Aperantia, and drove the Macedonians out of Dolopia.² These unfortunate conquests reached the ears of the Senate while the Ætolian envoys were still in Rome, and inflamed the resentment which they provoked by their injudicious language. They were dismissed with notice, that an Ætolian embassy which should come to Rome, unaccompanied by a Roman commissioner, would be treated as enemies.³ The tidings of the battle of Magnesia had struck the Ætolians with dismay; the answer of the Senate plunged them into despair, as they learned at the same time that the new consul, M. Fulvius Nobilior, had crossed over to Apollonia. In their terror they entreated the Rhodians and Athenians to intercede for them with the Senate, and notwithstanding the recent prohibition sent a fresh embassy, which how-

¹ Liv. xxxvii. 48.

² Ibid. xxxviii. 1—3.

³ Ibid. xxxvii. 49.

ever was intercepted by the Epirots before it reached Italy.¹ Fulvius began his operations with the siege of Ambracia, which was in union with the Ætolian League. The Ambracians themselves afterwards alleged, that they were ready to submit, but compelled by unprovoked hostility to close their gates against him.² They received a reinforcement of 1500 Ætolians, and defended themselves with persevering courage. The consul might perhaps have been forced to raise the siege, if the Ætolians had been able to employ all their forces for the relief of Ambracia. But they were obliged at the same time to guard their coast against the combined attacks of the Illyrians and Achæans, and to repel the Macedonians, who, under the command of Philip's son Perseus, had laid siege to Amphilochia. Thus pressed on three sides, they resolved to end the unequal conflict at any price. Through the intercession of Amynder, who had submitted to the Romans, and the more powerful influence of C. Valerius, the consul's half-brother and a son of that Lævinus who concluded the first treaty with the Ætolians, they obtained an abatement of the tribute which had been demanded by the Senate to 500 talents, of which they were to pay 200 immediately, and the rest by instalments in six years. The Ambracians had with some difficulty been induced to surrender by the friendly advice of their ancient guest, Amynder. The city was stripped of all its works of art, with which it was richly adorned during the period when it was the residence of Pyrrhus, but suffered no other injury³: and the conqueror's clemency was acknowledged by a decree of a golden crown, of the value of 150 talents. C. Valerius accompanied the Ætolian envoys to Rome, where they

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B. C. 189.
Siege of
Ambracia.

¹ Polyb. xxii. 8, 9.

² Liv. xxxviii. 43.

³ This appears to be clear from Polyb. xxii. 13., notwithstanding the allegations of the Ætolians reported by Livy, xxxviii. 43.

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LXV.

Treaty with
the Æto-
lians.

found that a Macedonian embassy was endeavouring to prejudice the Senate against them. But perhaps Philip's animosity may as little have injured their cause, as it was probably aided by the eloquence of the Rhodian and Athenian orators who pleaded in their behalf. The Senate apparently granted peace because no greater advantage could have been expected from a continuance of the war: and it was not even desirable entirely to crush a people so hostile to Philip. By the articles of the treaty they became, with regard to their foreign relations, mere vassals of Rome, and were bound to serve in her wars. They renounced their title to all the possessions which had been taken from them since the consulship of L. Quinctius Flaminius and Cn. Domitius Ahenobarbus.¹ Ceniadæ and its territory was annexed to Acarnania. Cephallenia was expressly excluded from the benefit of the treaty; for the Senate was determined to take possession of this, as of the other Ionian islands. No change was made in the article relating to the tribute. Thus ended the resistance of the Ætolians; and their humiliation ought to have been embittered by the reflection, that they deserved their fate: that their policy had been uniformly at once selfish, iniquitous, and short-sighted; and that they had contributed more than any other people, by their blind rapacity and reckless ambition, to hasten and aggravate the degradation of Greece.²

After the submission of the Ætolians Fulvius crossed over to Cephallenia, and summoned the four towns of the island to surrender. All obeyed and gave the hostages demanded by the consul. But the people of Same, excited by a report that the Romans

¹ Polybius (xxii, 15.) and after him Livy (xxxviii, 11.) have made a mistake in the prænomens of Quinctius.

² I do not make these remarks without having weighed the attempts which have lately been made by Fiathe and other writers (as Nitzsch, *Polybius*) to place the conduct of the Ætolians in a fairer light.

intended to displace them, flew to arms, and closed their gates. They held out for four months; and it was only after they had been reduced to a handful of men, weakened by wounds and fatigue, that the town was stormed.

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LXV.

From Cephallenia, when the conquest was completed, the consul passed over into Peloponnesus, to settle some differences in which he had been requested to interpose his authority. Philopæmen was now again at the head of the League; and he had taken the opportunity to introduce a change of some importance in its laws. As an Arcadian, he could feel no sympathy in favour of any exclusive privileges of the old Achæan towns, and he now proposed to abolish that which had hitherto been enjoyed by Ægium, as the place of assembly, and to share this advantage in rotation among all the cities of the League.¹ For the same reason that Ægium loudly protested against this innovation, it was received with great complacency by the other cities. Philopæmen had summoned an Assembly for the discussion of his measure to Argos, and notwithstanding the opposition of the Demiurges, who attempted to transfer it to Ægium, it appeared so clearly that they could not collect one there, that Fulvius himself, though he wished to thwart Philopæmen, was obliged to attend at Argos, and he found the general inclination so strong in favour of the proposal, that he thought it best to give way. His dislike to it seems to indicate that, in his judgment at least, it tended to promote the stability and prosperity of the League. But his presence was required by another still graver question. The Spartans, growing more and more impatient of the restraint imposed on them by the vicinity of the exiles and the loss of their maritime towns, surprised

An innovation of Philopæmen.

¹ See above, pp. 90. 93.

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one of these towns named Las, in the night. They were soon dislodged by the inhabitants; but the attempt so much alarmed the other towns on the coast and the exiles, that they complained of the aggression to the Achæans. On the motion of Philopœmen envoys were sent to Sparta, with a declaration that the Achæans would consider their treaty with Sparta as dissolved, unless the Spartans surrendered the authors and abettors of the attack on Las. This demand roused both indignation and alarm at Sparta, where it was viewed not only as an insult, but as a prelude to the restoration of the exiles. Thirty of the party which had been supported by Philopœmen were put to death, and the Assembly of the people decreed to renounce the connection with the Achæans, and to send an embassy to Fulvius with an offer to surrender to the Romans. When the Achæan envoys brought back a report of these proceedings, the Achæan Assembly unanimously decreed war against Sparta; but the season was too far advanced for the commencement of regular hostilities. Fulvius caused an Assembly to be convoked at Elis, where he expressed himself so as to foster the hopes of each party, but enjoined both to abstain from war until they should have consulted the Senate. Each accordingly sent an embassy to Rome. That of the Achæans, to which the Spartan exiles likewise committed their cause, was conducted by Lycortas, the father of Polybius the historian, a partizan of Philopœmen, and by his rival Diophanes, who had returned from Asia with a great increase of reputation from brilliant exploits which he had achieved in the Roman service against Antiochus at the head of the Achæan auxiliaries. The envoys did not act in concert with each other. Diophanes was willing to refer the whole dispute to the arbitration of the Senate. Lycortas insisted on the rights of the League. The Senate dismissed both parties with an

Greek embassies at Rome.

answer so framed that each might construe it as suited its own interest. The Achæans understood it as a permission to deal as they would with Sparta.

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Philopœmen was re-elected for the following year, and in the spring led an army to Compasium, on the frontiers of Laconia, where the Spartan exiles flocked to his camp. He sent a message to Sparta repeating the demand for the surrender of the aggressors, some of whom he named, but with a promise that they should have a fair trial. On the faith of this promise those who were demanded by name repaired to the Achæan camp, accompanied by many friends and advocates. But as they approached they were assailed by the exiles, first with invectives, and at length with personal violence. The envoys and Philopœmen endeavoured in vain to allay the tumult, in which the Achæans, instigated by the exiles, took an active part against the Spartans. Seventeen were arrested and put to death on the spot, and sixty-three more the next day, after a mock trial, in which their enemies were judges. Those who remained in the city were so cowed by this execution that they offered no resistance to the orders of Philopœmen. He required that the walls of Sparta should be rased and the foreign mercenaries who had served under the tyrants sent out of Laconia; that all who had been emancipated by the tyrants should leave the country before a certain day, under pain of being seized and sold for slaves; and that the laws and discipline of Lycurgus should be abolished, and the Achæan institutions established in their room.¹ It would seem from Livy's description, that the restoration of the exiles was not exacted until the other demands were so far fulfilled, that the city was left completely defenceless. It was decreed in an Assembly which

B. C. 188.
Subjuga-
tion of
Sparta.

¹ Plut. Philop. 16. Liv. xxxviii. 32—34.

CHAP.
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was held at Tegea; and as at the same time intelligence was received that a number of the disfranchised citizens, instead of quitting Laconia, were lurking in the country, Philopœmen was directed to return with a body of light troops and seize as many as he could find. He took about 3000, who were all sold, and with the produce of the sale a colonnade at Megalopolis, which had been in ruins since the time of Cleomenes, was rebuilt. The debated territory of Belemna was likewise re-annexed to Megalopolis. These measures were undoubtedly unjust, tyrannical, cruel, and impolitic. They violated the wisest maxims which Philopœmen himself had adopted, and which he appears to have observed in almost every other case; for they afforded a fresh occasion for Roman interference, which it should have been the chief aim of every Greek statesman as much as possible to prevent. But it seems as if the feelings of the Megalopolitan were too strong for his ordinary moderation and prudence, and blinded him to the real character and tendency of his measures. He could not resist the temptation of so signal a triumph over the old enemy of his country, of such ample retaliation for the injuries it had suffered from Cleomenes.

Foreign
embassies
to the
Achæan
League.

The surprise which may be felt at the boldness of these measures is somewhat abated, when we find that at this time the most powerful princes of the East in alliance with the Romans courted the friendship of the Achæans, and were eager to purchase it by costly presents. While Philopœmen found it necessary to send an embassy to Rome headed by an Elean named Nicodemus, to apologise for the recent transactions in Laconia, he introduced into the Achæan Assembly an envoy from Ptolemy Epiphanes, who came to solicit a renewal of the ancient alliance between Egypt and the League. An embassy headed

EMBASSIES TO THE ACHÆAN LEAGUE.

by Lycortas was sent to Alexandria, to negotiate a fresh treaty. When this embassy returned, Philopœmen had been succeeded in office by Aristænus, the leader of the opposite party. Lycortas was accompanied by ambassadors from Ptolemy, and in the same Assembly in which they were admitted to an audience, ministers likewise appeared from Eumenes and Seleucus Philopator, who had just succeeded Antiochus on the throne of Syria. The Egyptians brought a present of 6000 suits of armour and 200 talents of copper money. But the ratification of the treaty was postponed, and Aristænus gained a triumph over his adversaries, by the discovery that, whereas several treaties of alliance had been concluded at various times between the two Powers on divers conditions, it had been neglected in the recent negotiation to determine which of these was to be renewed. The envoys of Eumenes were instructed to offer the sum of 120 talents for a singular purpose. It was to be put out to interest, and the produce was to be applied to the payment of salaries to the members of the Achæan Council. But Apollonidas of Sicyon, one of Philopœmen's party, warmly protested against the acceptance of a donative which he denounced as an odious bribe, designed to extinguish the freedom of their future deliberations. The feelings of the Assembly were still further turned against Eumenes by an Æginetan, who reminded it that his native island was still occupied by the king of Pergamus. The magnificent present was indignantly rejected, and a decree was passed, by which all such honours conferred on Eumenes as were illegal and unseemly were abolished.¹ Selcucus likewise desired the renewal of the alliance which had subsisted between his house and the Achæans, and offered a squadron

¹ Polyb. xxviii. 7.

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LXV.

of ten galleys of war to the League. But toward him the Assembly assumed an equally dignified attitude. The alliance was accepted, the present refused. It seems clear that these princes must have expected some advantage from the connection which they were so anxious to form with the League, though what it was we can hardly conjecture, unless that, as will be seen hereafter, occasions sometimes arose in which Achæan troops might render them important service in their wars.¹ But the tendency of such scenes was undoubtedly to encourage and strengthen the party which wished as far as possible to preserve the tone and demeanour of independence in the national transactions with the Romans.

Roman interference
in Greece.

But every fresh transaction between Rome and the League contributed more and more to dispel all illusions as to the real footing on which they stood with each other. Immediately after the last revolution at Sparta, a Lacedæmonian embassy brought complaints to Rome against Philopœmen's oppressive measures, and the consul M. Æmilius Lepidus addressed a letter to the Achæans, expressing his disapprobation of their proceedings. Philopœmen in consequence sent Nicodemus to Rome, and he returned and made his report at the same time that the foreign embassies just mentioned were admitted to an audience in the Achæan Assembly. But while Philopœmen was still in office, he was forced to lend his sanction and support to another encroachment of the Roman Senate on the independence of Greece. Zeuxippus, the author of the assassination of Brachyllas, had been long endeavouring to accomplish his return from exile through the interest of Flaminius, and the Senate was at length induced to send an order for his restoration. He had not yet been formally convicted of the murder,

¹ Polyb. xxix. 8.

because, through the intrigues of the ruling party, there had been a suspension of forensic business in Bœotia for five and twenty years.¹ But his enemies now hurried two indictments which had been long laid against him, one for a sacrilegious embezzlement, the other for the murder of Brachyllas, through their remaining stages, and when the order of the Senate arrived, they were able to plead the sentence which had just been passed on him as a ground for declining to obey the Senate's order. The Senate however paid no regard to this excuse and ordered the Ætolians and Achæans to restore Zeuxippus; and, after friendly exhortations had proved ineffectual, Philopœmen was obliged to resort to measures which would have led to a war, if the Senate had thought fit to insist on the execution of its mandate.²

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LXV.

The answer which Nicodemus had brought from Rome signified the Senate's disapprobation of the treatment which Sparta had suffered, but intimated no intention of repealing the acts of the League. Not long after however the Achæans were called to account for their conduct by Q. Cæcilius Metellus, who had been sent with two colleagues on an embassy to Macedonia, and seems to have been instructed to inspect the condition of Peloponnesus after he had finished his more important business with Philip. Aristænus convened a meeting of the Achæan magistrates at Argos, where Metellus censured the course which had been adopted toward Sparta, and urged them to redress the wrong which had been done. Aristænus remained silent, as having no vindication to offer; but Diophanes openly condemned the measures of Philopœmen, not only with regard to Sparta, but to Messenia. Metellus, being thus supported, became more vehement in his demands. But Philopœmen and his

Q. Cæcilius
Metellus.

¹ Polyb. xx. 6.

² Ibid. xxxiii. 2.

CHAP.
LXV.

friends vindicated their proceedings, and the sense of the majority was on their side. Metellus then called upon the Magistrates to convoke a General Assembly ; but being unable to show any instructions from the Senate which he had to communicate, he was informed that the law did not permit them to comply with his request. He withdrew deeply mortified and displeased, and would not even receive the written answer which was tendered to him.¹ As it was easy to foresee what kind of report he would make at Rome, the Achæans sent an embassy, headed by Apollonides, to explain and defend their conduct. But their envoys not only had to encounter the accusations of Metellus, but found themselves opposed by the Spartan exiles themselves, whom Philopœmen had restored. The exiles had not wished to see their country reduced to such a state of helplessness and abject dependence on the Achæan League as had been the result of Philopœmen's measures, and they had sent two of their number, Areus and Alcibiades, to complain to the Senate. As a fresh embassy, with Appius Claudius at its head, had just been appointed to visit Macedonia, it was directed to proceed to Greece, and there to arbitrate the dispute about Sparta. The Senate accepted the excuse offered by the Achæan envoys for the denial of the Assembly to Metellus, but required that the law should be altered for the future, so that a Roman ambassador might never be again subject to a similar refusal.

Aristænus had been succeeded in office by Lycortas, when Ap. Claudius conducted the embassy to Macedonia ; and before he came into Greece the Achæan General held an Assembly, to prepare the public mind for his reception. He or his friends pointed the indignation of the Assembly against the Spartan exiles,

¹ Polyb. xxiii. 10—12. Liv. xxxix. 33.

more especially the two who had represented them at Rome, and a decree was tumultuously passed by which Areus and Alcibiades were condemned to death. A few days after, Ap. Claudius and his colleagues arrived in Peloponnesus, and an Assembly was called at Clitor in Arcadia to receive them. But to the dismay of the Achæans they came accompanied by Areus and Alcibiades. Appius went over the same heads of complaint which Metellus had dwelt on the year before: the massacre at Compasium, the dismantling of the walls, the abolition of the old Spartan institutions. Lycortas, as belonged to his office and his political connections, undertook to reply. If Livy found any good authority for the arguments which he puts into his mouth, he ventured on some allusions to passages in Roman history which it would have been more prudent to have avoided, and exposed the inconsistency of the Senate's intervention in such a case with the liberty which had been proclaimed at the Isthmian Games.¹ But he took his stand on ground which seems less solid. He alleged that religion forbade the Achæans to rescind acts which had been confirmed by an oath, and recorded on monuments of stone for perpetual remembrance. There is no wrong or folly which might not be made irrevocable, if such scruples were to be admitted. If the Achæans had sworn to perpetuate injustice, the impiety was in the oath, not in the breach of it. Appius however disdained to reason, and would only advise the Achæans to comply while they could with a good grace, and not to wait until they were forced to yield. The Assembly groaned at the threat, but felt that it was not to be defied. The religious sanction however still afforded some shelter to the national dignity. The Romans were requested to make what changes

¹ XXXIX. 36.

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LXV.

Parties at
Sparta.

they would in the state of Sparta, but not to compel the Achæans to incur the guilt of perjury. The only concession immediately made to Appius was the repeal of the decree passed against Areus and Alcibiades. All other points were again referred to the decision of the Senate, and fresh embassies were sent to Rome both from the League and from Sparta. From Sparta the Senate received ministers who represented the claims of four distinct parties.¹ The exiles were divided among themselves. One body, which had the prince Agesipolis at its head, claimed the entire restitution of their ancient possessions. The rest, among whom were Areus and Alcibiades, would have been content to recover a portion of their property, to the value of one talent. There was a third party, which desired the re-establishment of the order of things which had been settled in Sparta before the late violent changes, but so as to preserve the union with the Achæan League. Whether it was adverse to the exiles, or only wished to see the walls rebuilt and the laws of Lycurgus revived, does not clearly appear. A fourth deputation represented those who had been condemned to death or banishment by the decree of the Achæan Assembly, and prayed that they might be restored to their country. The Senate referred these intricate controversies to a committee composed of Flamininus, Metellus, and Appius Claudius, all more or less unfriendly to Philopœmen and the Achæans. There were however two points on which the four parties seemed to be agreed. None asked to be separated from the Achæan League; and the petition of those who wished to have their condemnation reversed was not repugnant to the claims of any of the rest. At the suggestion of Flamininus an agreement was drawn up including these two articles only, and was

¹ Polyb. xxiv. 4.

subscribed by all the Spartan deputies. It was then proposed to the Achæan envoy Xenarchus, who, not seeing how to reject the one and accept the other, likewise put his seal to the whole. But the question of property was left undecided, probably because it was seen to be of much greater moment for the tranquillity of Sparta. Sparta in fact became soon after the scene of fresh commotion in which the original exiles were again expelled, and Agesipolis was slain by pirates as he was on his voyage to Italy, with other envoys, for the purpose of another appeal to the Senate.¹

When Flaminius annexed Messenia to the Achæan League, he had encouraged the Messenians to seek protection or redress from Rome, if they should be oppressed by the Achæan government.² It had been the policy of Philopœmen to strengthen the popular party at Messene, as of principles most congenial to the constitution of the League. The measures which he had taken for this purpose were condemned, as we have seen, by his political opponents in the Achæan councils; and it was by this time well known that he was not viewed with a favourable eye at Rome. The oligarchical faction was thus stimulated to make an effort to recover its power under Roman patronage, and sent Dinocrates, one of its leading men and a personal enemy of Philopœmen, to plead its cause before the Senate. He arrived in Rome at the time when Q. Marcius Philippus had just been appointed ambassador to Macedonia and Greece, and Flaminius to Prusias of Bithynia. He had formerly insinuated himself into the intimacy and favour of Flaminius, though his character and habits could only inspire the Roman with contempt³; but he was not the less useful as a political instrument. Flaminius entered

¹ Polyb. xxiv. 11.² Livy, xxxvi. 31.³ Polyb. xxiv. 5. Plut. Flam. 17. Philop. 18.

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into his views, and when he sailed for Greece on his way to Asia took Dinocrates with him. On his arrival at Naupactus he wrote to the Achæan Magistrates to summon an Assembly. Philopœmen was now General for the eighth time. He was aware of the object for which Flamininus desired an audience ; but he also knew that he had received no instructions with regard to Greece. He therefore replied, that he would call an Assembly if Titus would state the business which he had to bring before it ; since the law did not permit an Assembly to be summoned without such notice. No answer could be devised to this objection, and Flamininus proceeded on his journey without having been able to effect anything either for Dinocrates, or for the newly expelled Spartan exiles, who also had reckoned on his patronage.¹ Dinocrates however, though disappointed, was not discouraged. He had probably received assurances of support from Flamininus, and perhaps had previously concerted measures with his partizans, which he did not think it safe to defer, or for which he could not expect a fairer opportunity, since Philopœmen was lying sick of a fever at Argos.² On his return to Messene he effected a revolution by which the government was placed in the hands of his faction. They proclaimed Messenia independent of the Achæan League, and made preparations for the defence of the country. Philopœmen, as soon as he heard these tidings, despatched Lycortas with all the forces at his disposal into Messenia. But notwithstanding his illness, and though he was now in the seventieth year of his age, he could not bear the confinement of a sick room at such a juncture, and a day or two after set out for Megalopolis, which he reached in one day. Here he collected a small body of the Megalopolitan cavalry, and pushed on to

Revolution
at Messene.

¹ Polyb. u. s.

² Plut. Philop. 18. Paus. viii 51. 5.

overtake Lycortas. Dinocrates however had taken such precautions to secure the passes leading into Messenia, that Lycortas was not able to force his way through. We want the details which would have explained how it was that Philopæmen neither met him on his retreat, nor was checked by the same obstacle. Livy says, that his object was to relieve Corone, which had not yielded and was threatened by the enemy.¹ He advanced near to Messene, and worsted Dinocrates in a skirmish, but was soon forced to retreat by the arrival of a fresh body of Messenian troops; and while he exerted himself beyond his strength, and exposed himself to the brunt of the enemy's charge to cover the rear of his little squadron, he was thrown from his horse, and, being stunned by the fall, was taken and led in triumph to Messene. Dinocrates and his party, to gratify the curiosity of the multitude, exhibited him for a short time in the theatre, but apprehending that the spectacle was likely to rouse the public sympathy in behalf of their noble prisoner, they hurried him away to their council chamber, and then threw him into a dungeon called the Treasury, a pit with only one opening, a hole at the top, which was secured by a heavy slab of stone. Here he was kept in chains till the morrow, when his enemies, alarmed, it seems, by the indications which they perceived of popular feeling in his favour, held another secret council, in which it was resolved to despatch him. An executioner was sent with a cup of poison; and Philopæmen, when he had learnt that Lycortas was safe, and that the Megalopolitan cavalry had escaped, calmly swallowed the fatal draught.

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B. C. 184.

Capture
and death
of Philo-
pæmen.

¹ χκκix. 49. *ad præoccupatum Coroneæ.* Plutarch, Philop. 18. (of Dinocrates) *Κόμην τὴν καλουμένην Κολωνίδα προσγγέθη μέλλων καταλαμβάνειν.* Colonia, or Colonides, was adjacent to Corone. Paus. iv. 34. 8. *Τῇ Κορωναίων πόλει ἐστὶν ὄμαρος Κολωνίδες. . . κείται δὲ τὸ πόλισμα αἱ Κολωνίδες ἐπὶ βήηλοῦ, μικρὸν ἀπὸ θαλάσσης.*

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The last great man whom Greece produced, or for whom she could have found any fit employment. Even he came too late to do more than give proof of abilities, by which, in a different age, he might have rendered more important services to his country. We can hardly help thinking, that the part he had to sustain was better suited to the genius of Aratus, and that if he had lived earlier, the independence of Greece might not have expired so soon.

The tidings of his death excited vehement grief and indignation throughout the League, except in the small party of his political adversaries; for Philopœmen was not only the pride of the nation, as the greatest, indeed the only very able commander it had to boast of; he also possessed its confidence and esteem, as he represented its feelings and wishes. An Assembly was immediately summoned to Megalopolis, where the people manifested their feelings by the election of Lycortas to supply his place. And there would probably have been no hesitation or dispute as to the immediate adoption of the most active measures for avenging his death, had it not happened that at this juncture Q. Marcius arrived in Peloponnesus on his return from Macedonia. It appears that he was present when the decree of war against Messenia was brought forward, and he endeavoured to divert the Achæans from their purpose, and to induce them to wait until they had consulted the Senate. But the Assembly was not in a temper to take this advice, even if it had believed that it might obtain satisfaction at Rome. War was declared, and Lycortas immediately invaded Messenia with an overpowering force, and ravaged it with vindictive animosity. It was however thought advisable to send an embassy to Rome to propitiate the Senate. The Spartan exiles, and the party now in possession of the city, also renewed their applications. But Marcius

returned about the same time, and the policy of the Senate was determined by his report and advice. He suggested that a slight hint of the Senate's displeasure toward the Achæans would encourage Sparta to make common cause with Messene, and then the League would be glad to place itself under Roman protection. Accordingly, the agents of the Spartan government were informed that the Senate had already done all in its power for them, and did not consider the business as one which concerned it any longer. The Achæan envoys requested that, if they might not hope for aid from Rome, according to the terms of the alliance, in their war with Messene, the Senate would at least prevent arms or provisions from being brought to the enemy out of Italy. The Senate did not even notice this request, but declared that the Achæans must not be surprised, if, though Sparta or Corinth or Argos should revolt from the League, the Romans did not regard this as their concern: an answer which, as Polybius observes¹, was equivalent to a proclamation of a licence to all members of the League to dissolve their connection with it. The Achæan envoys however were detained at Rome, until it should be seen what turn events took in Messenia.

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The oligarchical government at Messene was neither able to resist the enemy in the field, nor was it strong at home. For some time indeed it suppressed the murmurs of the people by terror, and declined the proffered mediation of the Bœotians. But at length the general discontent under the suffering produced by a war carried on to serve the interest of a small faction, broke out in demands which the rulers did not venture to resist. Dinocrates and his friends retired to their houses, while the Assembly of the people, following the advice of some of the elder

B. C. 183.
Submission
of Messene.

¹ xxiv. 10.
D D 4

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citizens and of the Bœotian envoys, who had not yet quitted Messene, appointed ambassadors to Lycortas, to sue for pardon and peace. Lycortas prescribed three conditions: that the authors of the revolt and of Philopœmen's death should be given up to him; that all other persons and matters should be subject to the decision of the national Assembly; and that the citadel should be immediately surrendered. As none but the oligarchical party had any thing to dread from the vengeance of the Achæans, these terms were gladly accepted. Lycortas, when he had garrisoned the citadel, entered the city and cheered the Messenians with a promise of lenient treatment; but he sent orders to all who had taken a part in the condemnation of Philopœmen to put an end to their own lives. Dinocrates had already killed himself. There were others, it seems, whose cases were reserved for the cognisance of the Achæan Assembly.¹ The body of Philopœmen was burnt, and his bones were carried in solemn procession to Megalopolis. The urn which contained them was borne by Polybius the historian, and was almost hidden under the load of garlands and fillets which were showered upon it. At Megalopolis the remains were magnificently interred with heroic honours², and according to Plutarch Messenian prisoners were stoned to death at his grave. If this is true, they must have been the wretches, who, as Plutarch also relates but without confirmation from Polybius, proposed to put him to death with torture.

It happened to be the time for one of the ordinary Achæan Assemblies, and Megalopolis was the place of meeting.³ In this Assembly the Messenians were re-

¹ Polyb. xxiv. 12. Plut. Philop. 21. Pausan. viii. 51. 8.

² Liv. xxxix. 50. *Adeo omnibus humanis congestis honoribus, ut ne divinis quidem abstineretur.*

³ Polyb. xxiv. 12. 12.

LYCORTAS.

admitted into the Achæan League. But the towns of Thuria, Abia, and Pharæ were separated from Messene, and constituted distinct members of the League.¹ The Achæan envoys now returned from Rome, and with an answer very different from that which they had at first received there. The Senate, as soon as it learnt that the Achæans did not need its aid, descended to the meanness of declaring, that it had taken measures to prevent the exportation of arms and provisions from Italy to Messene. Lycortas soon after convened another Assembly at Sicyon, to decide on the relations which should subsist between Sparta and the League. The question seems to have been, whether the League should recognise the party which had expelled the exiles as the legitimate government of Sparta. The Senate, by the evasive answer with which it had dismissed the Spartan envoys, seemed to have dropped the cause of the exiles, and to have left the Achæans at liberty to act as they would. Lycortas took advantage of this supposed permission, to persuade the Assembly to acknowledge Sparta as a member of the League, and notwithstanding the opposition of Diophanes a decree was passed to that effect, but on the condition that those of the exiles who had not shown themselves hostile to the Achæans should be recalled. The Senate, which was again consulted, seemed to acquiesce in this arrangement, though it wrote a letter to the Achæans in favour of the exiles. But as the Achæan envoy on his return represented this letter as written merely to get rid of their importunity, no further notice was taken of the recommendation so long as Lycortas remained in office.² The Senate however probably foresaw that it would serve as a hook to hang fresh intrigues upon. In the meanwhile the League enjoyed a

¹ Polyb. xxv. 1.

² Ibid.

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Policy of
Lycortas.

short interval of repose, in which it might seem to have recovered its dignity and independence. The domestic administration was at once mild and vigorous. The Messenians were relieved by an exemption from taxes for three years, as a compensation for the damage their country had suffered during the war.¹ The Achæan General exercised a wholesome superintendence over the internal affairs of Sparta. A young man of low origin named Chæron, who had been the agent of the Spartans proscribed by Philopœmen at Rome, seemed to be treading in the steps of the tyrants. He had acquired sufficient influence to carry an enactment, by which the property which had been left even by Machanidas and Nabis to the female relatives and children of the exiles who remained at Sparta was confiscated, and distributed in a capricious manner among the indigent multitude. He next obtained some office which placed the public revenues at his disposal, and misapplied them to further his own ends, and finally, when an attempt was made by some of the citizens to bring his malversation to light, he suborned assassins to murder the chief manager of the inquiry in open day. Lycortas hereupon made a journey to Sparta, caused Chæron to be brought to trial, convicted, and thrown into prison, and directed the investigation to be carried on, and the confiscated property to be restored to the families of the exiles.²

It was about the same time that the League received a fresh embassy from Ptolemy Epiphanes, with the offer of a squadron of ten galleys completely rigged.

¹ Polyb. xxv. 3., expressly referring to the damage (*τὴν τῆς χώρας καταφθοράν*) as the ground of the relief granted. Yet Nitzsch (*Polybius*, p. 122. n. 5.), without a particle of evidence except a very questionable hypothesis as to the financial administration of the Achæan League, ventures to say, that the exemption seems to have been granted to compensate for the loss of the three towns which were separated from Messene.

² Polyb. xxv. 8.

The question of the alliance, which had been left in suspense, seems to have been dropped by tacit consent, as of no moment. All the ends of both parties were satisfied, it appears, by the maintenance of mutual good understanding. The Assembly accepted the king's offer, though it had before declined a similar one from Seleucus, and appointed Lycortas, his son Polybius, and Aratus, a grandson of the first, envoys to Alexandria, to return thanks for the former present and to take charge of the ships. But before they set out news arrived of Ptolemy's death, which, as his successor Philometor was a child of six years old, put a stop to the embassy.¹

There was only one safeguard by which the Achæan League had hitherto been protected against the power of Rome—its manifest and notorious feebleness. Not that there was in the Senate the slightest touch of any magnanimous feeling, which might have induced it to deal gently with the weak and to respect either their honourable pride or their clearest rights, nor because it viewed the efforts of the Greeks to preserve a shadow of independence with contemptuous indifference. It was content with nothing short of their absolute submission to its despotic will, and no impulse of pity or generosity diverted it for a moment from the prosecution of this purpose. But even these great masters of political deception could not devise any artifice by which they could persuade the Roman people, as they had with regard to Philip and Antiochus, that the Achæan League was an object of alarm to Rome, or that any thing had taken place in Greece to provoke hostility, or to require the intervention of a Roman army. They had also a character of moderation to sustain, which was of great use in negotiation with foreign Powers, and which it would

¹ Polyb. xxv. 7.

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not have been prudent lightly to forfeit by an open act of wanton tyranny. The Senate therefore, in its transactions with the Achæan League, was confined to the exercise of its diplomatic arts, in which it probably surpassed every cabinet, whether of the ancient or the modern world. Its aim, which it kept steadily in view, was to foster divisions in Peloponnesus, and to afford as much encouragement and support as it could with decency to the enemies of the League. Still so long as this was the case it could hardly be said that the liberty of Greece was merely precarious. An Achæan statesman had ground to stand on, where, by circumspection and address, he might hope, notwithstanding the opposition of the Senate, to keep his footing with honour and advantage to his country. As long as he avoided direct collision with the Senate, treated it with respect, and abstained from all acts that could afford a provocation or pretext for hostility, he might safely and firmly insist on any pleas with which the laws and constitution of the League might furnish him. The success however of this peaceful resistance would depend on the unanimity with which he was supported by the great body of the people. Hitherto, as we have seen, the patriotic party, that of Philopœmen and Lycortas, had a decided preponderance in the counsels of the League over those who, possibly with upright intentions, argued for unreserved obedience to every intimation of the Senate's pleasure. But now, in the year 180, a change begins, a new epoch opens in the history of the downfall of the League, which is marked by the appearance of Callicrates.

In this year Lycortas was succeeded in office by Hyperbatus, a partizan of Aristænus and Diophanes. The new General, with what motive does not appear, but probably at the instigation of Callicrates, recalled the attention of the Achæan Assembly to the letter

which the Senate had written the year before in favour of the Spartan exiles. Lycortas contended that the Senate, though willing to succour the unfortunate as far as justice permitted, could not wish to force the Achæans to violate a religious engagement, and that it would desist from its application, if it was informed that the thing it desired was inconsistent with the fundamental laws, solemn oaths, and public records of the League. Hyperbatus and Callicrates recommended simple unqualified compliance with the wishes of the Senate. But as a question had been raised as to the Senate's real mind, it was resolved to send an embassy to Rome, to explain the grounds stated by Lycortas which compelled the Achæans to disobey the Senate's injunctions on this point. Callicrates himself was appointed to this embassy, perhaps under the belief that his political principles would give the greater weight to the plea which he was instructed to maintain. With him were associated Lydiadas of Megalopolis, and Aratus, both probably friends of Lycortas. But when they were admitted to an audience at Rome, Callicrates, instead of pleading the cause of his countrymen, offered his best advice to their enemies. *The Senate, he said, had only itself to blame, if the Greeks did not obey all its commands. There were in every city men enough who were willing to inculcate the necessity of submission to Rome, but they needed encouragement and support. The cause of their adversaries, who appealed to the laws and federal compacts of the League, was the more national and popular, and would always prevail with the multitude, unless the Senate would show some countenance to the other side.* Callicrates himself afforded a fair sample of the goodly crop of traitors, sycophants, and sophists, which might be expected to spring up in Greece under the sunshine of Roman patronage. The Senate adopted his advice, and issued a rescript calculated

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B. C. 180.
Embassy of
Callicrates
to Rome.

His per-
fidious
counsel.

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to silence the patriotic party in the League, and to invite all who coveted power and influence to follow his example. It repeated the injunction to restore the exiles, and proposed Callicrates as a model which all Achæan statesmen would do well to imitate. But at the same time letters were sent to most of the northern states, to the Ætolians and Epirots, to the Athenians, Bœotians, and Acarnanians, exhorting them to lend their aid toward the same object. It would not be for want of encouragement from Rome, if they did not come into collision with the Achæans, and it was probably only their weakness that prevented this result. Callicrates on his return could show that his adversaries had misrepresented the Senate's mind, and that he enjoyed its entire confidence. He of course did not make an exact report of the advice he had given to the Senate, though if it had been heard by his colleagues it is not clear how he could have concealed it, as he is said to have done. But through the influence which he thus acquired, with the help of corruption for which he may have been supplied with means at Rome, he carried his election to the office of General, and the first measure of his administration was to restore the exiles both to Sparta and Messene.¹

Effects of
his trea-
chery.

Polybius has perhaps assigned too much importance to the embassy of Callicrates. His allusions to the Roman generosity, compassion, and love of justice, might have been properly introduced in a speech of Lycortas, but are quite out of place in a history; and it would be absurd to suppose that the Senate needed a lesson from Callicrates in state-policy. It had already shown in numberless instances, like those of Zeuxippus and Dinocrates, that it was thoroughly conversant with the maxims which he laid down.

¹ Polyb. xxvi. 1—3.

Nevertheless it may be true, that through the treachery of Callicrates a regular correspondence and connection was first established between the Roman government and the party in the Achæan League, which was willing to become the tool of the stranger for the sake of securing its own ascendancy at home, the Senate was encouraged to adopt a more imperious tone and harsher measures, and the defences by which the patriots endeavoured to avert or retard the ruin of the League were more rapidly swept away.

CHAPTER LXVI.

FROM THE EMBASSY OF CALLICRATES TO ROME TO THE
REDUCTION OF GREECE INTO A ROMAN PROVINCE.

Philip's Preparations. — Jealousy of the Romans. — His son Demetrius at Rome. — Death of Demetrius. — Death of Philip. — Character of Perseus. — First Measures of his Reign. — His Alliances. — Expedition to Greece. — Roman Embassies. — Visit of Eumenes to Rome. — Eumenes assailed at Delphi. — Roman envoys to Perseus. — Stratagem of Q. Marcius. — Dissolution of the Bœotian League. — War with Perseus begun. — Victory of Perseus over Licinius. — His Overtures for Peace. — Rapacity of the Roman Commanders. — Complaints of the Greeks. — Success of Perseus. — Conduct of the Roman envoys in Greece. — Expedition of Perseus to Illyria. — Marcius penetrates into Pieria. — Timidity of Perseus. — His Parsimony. — Paullus in command. — Battle of Pydna. — Surrender of Perseus. — Paullus in Greece. — Division of Macedonia. — Greek Traitors. — Towns of Epirus pillaged. — Polybius and his Friends. — Deportation of the Thousand Achæans. — Fruitless Embassies to Rome. — Charops. — Callicrates. — Embassy of Gallus. — Return of the Achæan Exiles. — Diæus and his Party. — State of Athens. — Embassy of the Philosophers. — Origin of the Achæan War. — Duplicity of Diæus. — Death of Callicrates. — Andriscus. — Overpowered by Metellus. — Embassy of Orestes. — Embassy of Julius Sextus. — Critolaus. — Inflames the Achæans against Rome. — Lays Siege to Heraclea. — Is defeated by Metellus. — Measures of Diæus. — Battle of Leucopetra. — Destruction of Corinth. — Proceedings of Mummius. — Greece a Roman Province. — Mediation of Polybius. — His Legislation. — Honours paid to him in Greece. — Decline of Population in Greece. — Its probable Causes. — Misgovernment. — Causes assigned by Polybius. — Roman Colonies in Greece. — Continual Decrease of Population. — Monuments and Traditions. — Religion. — Irruption of the Barbarians. — Slavonic Settlements. — The Modern Greeks.

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THE Romans as we have seen had treated Philip with some degree of forbearance so long as they had anything to hope or to fear from him. To soothe him

after the affront he had suffered when he was compelled to abandon the siege of Lamia, he had been permitted to make some petty conquests in Thessaly and the adjacent regions. The release of his son and the remission of the tribute concurred with his distrust of Antiochus and the Ætolians, to retain him on the Roman side until the contest with the Syrian monarchy was decided by the battle of Magnesia. But he had learnt by very costly experience that no reliance could be placed on the moderation of Rome: and after the conclusion of the peace he had bent all his thoughts toward repairing his losses, and increasing the internal strength of his kingdom. He began to recruit its exhausted population as well by regulations tending to encourage the growth of families, as by large draughts of Thracian colonists whom he transplanted to Macedonia, and strove to replenish his treasury, both by the improvement of all the branches of his ordinary revenue and with the produce of the mines: resuming old works which had been interrupted, and opening others in many places before untried. On the other hand, the Romans could feel no confidence in a prince whom they had so deeply injured. It was not without misgiving that the Scipios committed themselves to his guidance in their march to the Hellespont; and when Manlius was attacked by the Thracian tribes on his return from Asia, there was a strong suspicion that they had been secretly instigated by Philip.¹ It is not certain that in these measures he aimed at anything beyond his own security, though he was no doubt eager for revenge, and would have seized any opportunity of seeking it with a tolerable prospect of success. But in the eyes of the Roman Senate preparations for self-defence, and a wish for independence, were sufficient

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Philip's
preparations.

Jealousy of
the Romans.

¹ Livy, xxxviii. 40. *Opinio erat, non sine Philippi fraude id factum.*

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evidence of hostile intentions in a neighbouring sovereign; and the more flourishing the state of his dominions, the more it excited the Roman cupidity and ambition. The Senate only wanted a pretext for a fresh war with Philip, and soon made it known that it was willing to receive complaints against him. Envoys from Eumenes, and from others of his neighbours who had claims or grievances to allege against him, found an attentive and favourable audience at Rome; and though Philip also sent an embassy to vindicate his rights before the Senate, three commissioners, L. Cæcilius Metellus, M. Bæbius Tamphilus, and Ti. Sempronius, were appointed to go and decide the question after they should have heard his own defence of himself. There was a twofold advantage in this course :the certainty of humiliation to Philip, and the likelihood that he would be betrayed by indignation into some indiscretion. The three commissioners first held their court near Tempe, and the king of Macedonia came before them to plead his cause against the Thessalians, Perrhæbians, Magnetes, and Athamanians, who claimed the restitution of the places which he had occupied in their territory. They were the conquests which he had made with the express consent of Acilius. But a cavil was now devised to elude this title; and the commissioners decided, that he must evacuate all these possessions, and confine himself to the ancient limits of Macedonia. In the heat of the controversy Philip dropped an angry word, which was carefully treasured by the Romans: *the last sun had not yet set*. He was next obliged to appear before them at Thessalonica, to answer for some additions which he had made to his territory on the coast of Thrace. There he had made himself master of Ænus and Maronea after the Syrian garrisons had been withdrawn; and Eumenes, to whom the Senate had granted Lysimachia and the Thracian Cherson-

sus, pretended that these towns had been included in the grant. Philip, while he denied this assertion, seems to have taken this occasion to complain of the treatment he had suffered from the Romans. The commissioners reserved the question of right for the cognizance of the Senate, but required that the Macedonian garrisons should be withdrawn from the Thracian towns; and on their return to Rome the Senate sent another embassy with Ap. Claudius at its head, to see whether their orders had been obeyed, and to clear the Thracian coast of Macedonian troops. The object of this interference was plainly not so much to weaken Philip, as to gall and irritate him; to provoke him to some rash step which might afford a decent colour for a declaration of war. And such was its effect; for Philip, having been apprised of the Senate's decision before the arrival of Ap. Claudius, wreaked his vengeance on the inhabitants of Maronea by a bloody massacre, which he afterwards tried to represent as the result of their own intestine dissensions. But as the Roman envoys declared themselves dissatisfied with this statement, he thought it necessary to send his son Demetrius to Rome, to plead in his behalf, or deprecate the Senate's displeasure. In the meanwhile he made an expedition into Thrace, under the pretext of succouring the Byzantians, defeated the Thracians in battle, and took prisoner one of their chiefs named Amadocus.

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The arrival of Demetrius seems to have suggested a new plan to the Senate; for it can hardly be supposed that it did not foresee the consequences of its behaviour toward him. It received him with the most gracious benignity: when he appeared to be perplexed by the multiplicity of complaints brought against his father—for as the Senate's disposition became more notorious the number of Philip's accusers rapidly increased—he was called upon to read the private

His son
 Demetrius
 at Rome.

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instructions which he had brought with him ; and thus the Senate heard many comments on the unjust and insolent conduct of its envoys, which Philip had not intended for its ears. The answer which it gave to Demetrius was framed in terms the most gratifying to him, but calculated in the same degree to wound his father's feelings. The Senate consented for his sake to overlook much which it could not approve, and would not otherwise have endured, in his father's conduct : it reposed entire confidence in the friendship and honour of Demetrius ; it knew that his heart remained a hostage at Rome, after his person had been restored to his father ; to show its regard for him, it would send envoys to Macedonia, that past omissions might be supplied in an amicable way. And it wished Philip should understand that he owed this indulgence entirely to his son.

There can be no doubt that every phrase in this answer was calculated for the effect which it produced. Whether ambitious hopes were directly infused into the mind of the young prince during his stay at Rome, we do not know ; but the Senate's language was of itself sufficient, and was apparently designed, to suggest them, and, even if it failed to corrupt Demetrius, could not but excite the jealousy of his elder brother. There was thus a fair prospect of a feud in Philip's family, which might kindle a civil war, and was almost sure to afford some fresh occasion for Roman interference. Livy admits that Demetrius, on his return home, showed himself elated by the Senate's favour, and that it was generally believed among the common people in Macedonia that the Romans would place him on the throne after his father's death.¹ At the same time rumours were spread which threw doubt on the legitimacy of Perseus.² And while his birth-

¹ Liv. xxxix. 53.

² Liv. u. c. Plut. Æm. Paull. 8.

right was thus threatened, Philip found himself reduced to depend as it were on the patronage of his younger son, and deprived of his authority on the question of the succession to the crown. But his jealousy and resentment were much inflamed by the arrival of the Roman envoys, who not only exacted the performance of all the injunctions which he had previously received, but brought fresh requisitions from the Senate, which he obeyed indeed, to avoid affording a pretext for war, but with the bitterer vexation, as he observed that Demetrius passed more of his time in the society of the envoys than at court. Whether Demetrius was really as innocent as he appears in Livy's pathetic narrative, must remain a secret to us; but his conduct afforded ground for suspicion, and Philip had reason to look upon a son who was a favourite with the Senate as an enemy and a traitor. His distrust of Demetrius grew with his hatred of the Romans, and both are said to have been fostered by the artifices of Perseus and the principal courtiers, who, perceiving Philip's alienation from his younger son, took part with the heir-apparent. But Demetrius at least lent a handle to their machinations by the unguarded warmth with which he defended the Romans whenever they were attacked in his presence. He was now, it seems, excluded from the council in all deliberations relating to Rome, or to the negotiations which Philip was carrying on—as the Senate gave out with hostile designs against Italy—with several barbarian tribes in the north. A lustration of the army, and sham fight, in which the two princes commanded the opposite sides, led to some scenes on which Perseus founded a charge, that his brother had made an attempt against his life. Demetrius, it seems, convinced his father of his innocence on this head; but Philip sent two envoys, Philocles and Apelles, to Rome, with secret instructions to

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inquire into the truth of another accusation which Perseus had brought against him, that he had disclosed his ambitious designs to Flaminius and other Romans. In the meanwhile the king made an expedition into the wilds of Thrace, professedly for the purpose of ascending the highest summit of the Balkan, which was reported to command a view reaching on the one side to the Euxine, and on the other to the Adriatic. But undoubtedly he did not undertake this laborious march, which was not altogether free from danger, merely to gratify his curiosity. It is highly probable that he really entertained the project attributed to him by the Romans, of inducing some of the northern barbarians to make an irruption into Italy, and that this journey to the Balkan was in some way connected with that plan. He took Perseus along with him, but left Demetrius behind, under the colour of parental tenderness, at Stobi, and directed Didas, the governor of Pæonia, to escort him to Macedonia. Didas had been secretly gained by Perseus, and insinuated himself into the confidence of the young prince, to betray him. He soon after reported, whether truly or falsely we can only conjecture, that Demetrius was meditating to escape into Italy, and had solicited his aid; Philip hastened his return to investigate this matter, but remained in suspense until his envoys returned from Rome. He had chosen Philocles and Apelles for this commission, because he believed them to be impartial between the brothers. But they too were devoted to Perseus, and, among other calumnious impostures, brought a forged letter purporting to be addressed to Philip by Flaminius, so composed as to imply the reality of all that had been imputed to Demetrius, while it deprecated his father's displeasure. Herodorus, the most intimate friend of Demetrius, was put to the rack, and died under the torture, but no information could be extorted

DEATH OF DEMETRIUS AND PHILIP.

from him. Philip however was now convinced of his son's guilt, and it is supposed instructed Didas secretly to despatch him. Demetrius was poisoned at a banquet, and his dying exclamations against his murderers were stifled with brutal violence. Philip did not long survive this event, and his end was hastened by remorse and anguish at the discovery that his son had been the victim of a conspiracy, and that the pretended letter of Flamininus was a forgery. The fraud was detected, it appears, so as to leave no room for doubt, through the exertions of the king's cousin Antigonus, a nephew of Antigonus Dason. Perseus henceforth kept at a distance from the court, but having no fear of a rival was indifferent about his father's resentment. Philip, now doubly irritated, conceived the design of transferring the succession to Antigonus, and endeavoured to recommend him to the acceptance of the Macedonians. But he was overtaken by death at Amphipolis, while Antigonus was returning from an embassy on which he had been sent to invite the Bastarnians¹, from beyond the Danube, to invade and settle in the land of the Dardanians. The king's physician, as soon as he perceived the symptoms of his approaching agony, sent notice to Perseus, who was thus enabled to take possession of the throne without resistance: and one of the first acts of his reign was to put Antigonus to death.

Philip left his kingdom in a condition to defy any power but that of Rome: with an abundant population, a well-filled treasury, an army of 30,000 foot and 5000 horse, and large magazines of arms and provisions. It remained to be seen what use would be

¹ It has been much disputed whether the Bastarnians were a Teutonic or a Celtic race. Niebuhr (*Kl. Schr.* p. 385) thinks it impossible to decide the question, as Polybius (xxvi. 9.) appears to be contradicted by Strabo, vii. p. 306., and Tacitus, *German.* 46. Zeuss (*Die Deutschen*, 128.) pronounces the evidence of Tacitus conclusive in favour of their Teutonic origin. But Diefenbach (*Celtica*, ii. 1. p. 218.) shows that they were most probably a mixed race.

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Character
of Perseus.

made of these preparations, and into what hands they would finally pass. Perseus, with the crown, had inherited all the motives of enmity which had subsisted between his father and the Romans, together with a large addition on his own account. He must have felt that the war which had been averted through the mediation of Demetrius was now inevitable; and his policy was entirely directed to two objects—to hold himself in readiness for the impending struggle, and to defer it as long as possible. As long as his exertions were required for no other purpose than this, he displayed a degree of energy and prudence which seemed worthy of his station. But though his character has undoubtedly been misrepresented through hostile prejudices and wilful calumny, and he was probably neither so odious nor so despicable as it suited the Senate's interest to have him described¹, he was clearly still less equal to a contest with Rome than his father; and notwithstanding the sympathy which we cannot refuse to the justice of his cause, we can feel none with the man. It is true that he seems to have been free from some of his father's vices²; but it was perhaps because his own were of an opposite kind. He was temperate, and addicted to no licentious pleasures: so that either on this account, or because, like his ancestor Antigonus, he took some interest in the speculations of the schools, he is termed by the author who has left the most favourable description of his character, a philosopher.³ On the other hand, he is charged with a blind and abject love of money for its own sake; and so many glaring instances of this failing are recorded in his history, that it is impossible to consider them all as malicious inven-

¹ Liv. XLII. 5. *Nec ullo commendabilem merito.*

² Polyb. XXVI. 5.

³ Appian, Mac. ix. 2. Flathe (xi, p. 534.), by a strange complication of mistakes, talks of his *love for the arts and sciences*, referring to the description in Livy, xli. 20. (from Polybius, xxvi. 10.), of the extravagances of Antiochus Epiphanes.

tions.¹ He was apparently deficient in moral, if not in personal, courage. His dread of the Romans stimulated him to vigorous exertions so long as they were at a distance; but seems to have deprived him of his presence of mind when they came in sight. The worst acts imputed to him appear to have been the effect of this timidity. We have no reason to believe that he was inclined to wanton cruelty, or inordinately passionate or vindictive; but he was probably as unscrupulous as his father about the choice of means for the accomplishment of his designs, and never shrank from the perpetration of a safe and useful crime. Still, when compared with most of the contemporary kings, he almost rises into a hero; and his misdeeds are few and light, if weighed against the enormous guilt contracted during the same period by the Roman Senate.²

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The first measures of his administration, after he had established himself on the throne, were indeed extremely judicious, and calculated to suggest the best hopes of his government. He remitted all arrears of debt due to the crown, and released all who had been thrown into prison for offences against his father;

First mea-
sures of his
reign.

¹ Flathe labours to rescue his character from this imputation, but, beside vague arbitrary suspicions of Roman calumnies, he has no argument to produce, except his own interpretation of Liv. xliiv. 46., which (p. 561.) he chooses to consider as an admission that Perseus had spent almost the whole of his treasure. He notices indeed the reports that Perseus carried 2000 talents (Liv. xliiv. 45.), or (according to Justin, xxxiii. 2.) 10,000 talents with him to Samothrace, but omits the authentic statement of Polybius (xviii. 18.). Τῆς ἄλλης χωρὶς κατασκευῆς καὶ χορηγίας ἐν αὐτοῖς εὐρέθη τοῖς δεσπασαυοῖς ἀργυρίου καὶ χρυσοῦ πλείω τῶν ἑξακισχιλίων ταλαντῶν.

² It may be hardly necessary, but yet it will be safer, to observe once for all, that it is not intended by this language to involve all the members of the Senate in an indiscriminate condemnation. There was, no doubt, within that body a great variety of characters, and of opinions both as to the mode of extending the power of Rome and of the use to be made of it. And we would gladly believe what Nitzsch (*Polybius*; see particularly ii. 5.) endeavours to show, that there was a moderate party in the Senate (represented by the Scipios, Flaminius, and Æmilius Paulus), which desired no conquests east of the Adriatic, but only wished to see Rome at the head of a system of independent states, and holding the balance between Macedonia and the Achaean League, Rhodes and Pergamus, Syria and Egypt. But we must regret that the proofs which he has adduced in support of this proposition are not commensurate with its importance.

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and he published an amnesty for those Macedonians who had fled from the pursuit of the law, whether in public or private causes, and invited them to return to their homes, with promises of security for their persons and property. As he caused this act of grace to be recorded in the temples of Delos, Delphi, and Coronea, his liberality and clemency became no less generally known to the Greeks than among his own subjects.¹ Soon after his accession he found himself compelled, in self-defence, to make war on a Thracian chief named Abrupolis who had made an inroad on the mines of Pangæum, and not only repelled his aggressions but made himself master of his territories. The conquest may have strengthened his northern frontier; but it exposed him to danger on another side; for Abrupolis was an ally of Rome.² He hastened however to avert this danger by an embassy which he sent to renew the treaty which the Romans had concluded with his father. The affair of Abrupolis was not overlooked: the Macedonian envoys were instructed to vindicate their master's proceedings; but the Senate took care not to bind itself by any distinct admission. It viewed Perseus as a prey on which it resolved to fasten as soon as an opportune juncture arrived; but the state of its affairs was not at this time such that it could conveniently embark in a war with Macedonia, nor had it hitherto any sufficient provocation to allege. It therefore tacitly reserved the subject of Abrupolis as a future ground

¹ Polyb. xxvi. 5. Schorn (p. 332.) understands this passage very differently, considering it as an invitation to Greek exiles and outlaws; and the term *ἑλληνοκοπεῖν* is no doubt in favour of this explanation: but on the other hand the expressions *κατακαλεῖν* and *καταπορευομένοις*, and more especially *τοῖς ἐπὶ βασιλικοῖς ἐγκλήμασι παρακεχωρηκότας*, and *τῶν ὑπαρχόντων κομῆθην ἀφ' ὧν ἕκαστος ἔφυγε*, seem to place it beyond a doubt that the persons described were Macedonian subjects. The good opinion of the Greeks was sought by the publication of this record in the three temples.

² Polyb. Exc. Vat. p. 413. Pausan. (vii. 10. 6.) absurdly exaggerates the importance of the war. From him however we learn that Abrupolis was king of the Sapeans. Cf. Strabo, xii. p. 549.

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of complaint, and in the meanwhile acknowledged Perseus as king, and received him into its alliance in the room of his father.¹

Perseus did not let himself be lulled into a false security by the favourable result of this negotiation, or relax his endeavours, to provide as he best might against the impending storm. He cultivated the relations of friendship into which Philip had entered with several of the Thracian, Illyrian, and Celtic tribes²; and the Odrysian king Cotys, who is described as an intelligent, active, and estimable prince³, became his steady ally. Philip's plan for the extermination of the Dardanians had been interrupted by his death. The Bastarnians, who were on their march through Thrace when they received tidings of that event, began to commit disorders which provoked the hostility of the Thracian tribes, and the greater part were forced to return across the Danube. Thirty thousand of them however are said to have penetrated into Dardania⁴, and perhaps these were afterwards reinforced by fresh bands of their countrymen. They made war on the Dardanians in concert with the Scordiscans, a kindred race, and some of their Thracian neighbours, and seem for some time at least to have pressed very hard upon them. This war became a fresh subject of complaint against Perseus at Rome. The Senate, under what pretext we know not, was continually sending envoys to explore the state of Macedonia, and was thus first informed of the war. Afterwards it received an embassy from the Dardanians, who were joined by the Thessalians, soliciting protection, and attributing the invasion of their territory to the instigation of Perseus.⁵ The Senate appointed commissioners to ascertain the fact, and

¹ Appian, Mac. ix. 3. Liv. xli. 24.

² Justin, xxxii. 4.

³ Polyb. xviii. 10. Τὴν ψυχὴν πάντα μᾶλλον ἢ ἰσχύϊ. Diodorus, Exc. p. 577.

⁴ Liv. xl. 58

⁵ Polyb. xxvi. 9.

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Perseus was obliged to send fresh envoys to defend him from this charge, and to deny that he had any share in the enterprise of the Bastarnians. It was true that it had been planned and set in motion by Philip. The Senate waived this question, and contented itself with a grave admonition to the king, to be very careful to avoid all appearances of an infringement of the treaty.¹ The warning probably served to quicken his vigilance and activity. His agents appear to have been busy in every quarter from which he could expect any accession of strength or reputation. He had formed a connection with the Illyrian king Gentius, perhaps at the same time that he afforded shelter to some conspirators who had killed Artheturus, another Illyrian chieftain, who was an ally of Rome. He was also reported to have sent ministers to Carthage; and as the Carthaginians were at this time almost driven to despair by the Senate's perfidious connivance with Masinissa's unrelenting hostility², the report may have been well founded, though it rests on no better evidence than the assertion of Roman envoys³, and answered the double purpose of a charge against Carthage and against Perseus. But it is certain that his alliance was coveted by several of the Asiatic princes. Prusias of Bithynia and Seleucus Philopator of Syria thought themselves favoured, when he granted his sister to the one and—having, it was said, put to death a former wife—accepted the other's daughter in marriage. They evidently regarded Macedonia as a bulwark against the encroachments of Rome; and the free Greek cities of Asia looked to Perseus with like feelings. Even the Rhodians, though they had nominally re-

¹ Liv. xli. 19. *Ut sanctum haberet fœdus, quod ei cum Romanis esse videri posset.* Even if we reject the emendation of J. Gronovius: *ut sanctum habere fœdus, quod ei cum Romanis esset, videri posset*; we shall not believe, with Flathe (p. 539.) that the Senate meant to express a doubt as to the existence of the treaty.

² Liv. xlii. 23.

³ *Ibid.* xli. 22.

ceived a large tract of continental territory as the reward of their services in the war with Antiochus, and had not yet fully discovered how little reason they had to be grateful for it, paid their court to him in a very signal manner. They lent their galleys to convey the Syrian princess Laodice to Macedonia', and were rewarded by a present of timber for their fleet, as well as by other royal gifts. On the same occasion Perseus received innumerable embassies of congratulation accompanied with presents.

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In Greece too he had a fair prospect of recovering the influence which his father had lost. The good wishes of every Greek, except those who had either sold or were ready to sell themselves to the Romans, were on his side. In Ætolia and Thessaly the general poverty, caused by the calamities of war and the Roman exactions, had given rise to a struggle of parties, which in Ætolia was attended with terrible scenes of bloodshed.² The wealthy, who aggravated the distress of their countrymen by usurious extortions, hoped for protection from the Romans: the indigent, who could only expect relief through sweeping and violent changes in the distribution of property, seem to have turned their eyes toward Perseus as their friend.³ In Bœotia fear alone prevented his partizans from openly declaring themselves: the feelings of the people were everywhere with him. It was no doubt to animate his well-wishers by a display of his power and his moderation, that in 174 he made an expedition into the heart of Greece. The Dolopians, who had been allowed to remain subject to Macedonian rule, had revolted, and put his governor to a cruel death.⁴ They would then have appealed to

Expedition
to Greece.

¹ An inscription still extant (Marmor. Oxon. p. 277., or Boeckh. ii. p. 231.) testified the gratitude of the Dellans for her pious munificence, which she exercised no doubt in the course of this voyage.

² Diodorus, Exc. p. 623. Liv. xli. 25. xlii. 5. Polyb. xxx. 14.

³ Liv. xlii. 5. 12, 13.

⁴ Liv. xlii. 41. Appian, Mac. ix. 3.

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Rome; but Perseus invaded their country, and reduced them to submission, and then, pretending some religious scruples, marched across the range of Œta to Delphi, and after a sojourn of three days there returned home through Thessaly, leaving a very favourable impression by the excellent discipline which he enforced throughout his march.¹ He was most anxious to draw the Achæans into friendly relations with him; but as in the warmth of their zeal for the Romans they had passed a decree to exclude all Macedonians from their territories, it was not easy to gain access to them. The separation however thus made between the two states had been attended with a consequence very annoying to the Achæans, who had no remedy when their runaway slaves took refuge in Macedonia. Perseus now collected as many of these fugitives as he could find, and wrote a letter in which he offered to restore them to their owners, but at the same time reminded the Achæans that it rested with themselves to guard against losses of the same kind for the future. The letter was read in the Achæan Assembly by Xenarchus, the General; and a motion was founded upon it for the repeal of the inhospitable decree, but was rejected through the influence of Callicrates, who represented Perseus as on the eve of a war with Rome. Livy supposes that some offence was taken because an embassy was not sent with the letter, and so it appears Perseus himself had been informed; but when he sent envoys to repair this omission they could not obtain an audience.²

Roman
embassies.

The Senate continued to send ambassadors across the Adriatic to inspect the state of affairs in Macedonia and Greece, to keep the Greeks quiet, and to collect information against Perseus. Nothing was done to relieve the misery of the Ætoliens; but

¹ Liv. xli. 22.

² Ibid. xli. 23, 24.

hostages were taken from the contending parties and lodged at Corinth, so as to place both more than ever in the power of the Romans.¹ In Thessaly something was done to mitigate the evil: by the authority of the Roman envoy the rate of interest was reduced, and a long term allowed for the payment of debts by yearly instalments.² The Achæans—that is, Callicrates and his party—were praised for the firmness with which they had adhered to the decree which interdicted commerce with Macedonia: a declaration of enmity to Perseus which might serve at once to irritate him, and to give countenance to the Achæan partizans of Rome.³ But in Bœotia the Macedonian party gained the ascendancy, and concluded a treaty of alliance with Perseus, copies of which were preserved at Thebes, Delphi, and Delos.⁴ Two leaders of the opposite faction, Evercas and Callicritus, were despatched on their return from Rome, and this violence was laid to the charge of Perseus.⁵ The Roman envoys reported, that they had found it difficult to obtain an audience of him, but pretended to have observed, not only that he was preparing for war, but on the point of beginning hostilities.⁶ Yet he too continued to send embassies to Rome, with apologies for his proceedings, which were received it seems by the Senate with apparent acquiescence.⁷

The rupture was hastened by the efforts of Eumenes. He was either so blinded by ambition or animosity that he did not perceive how much his own safety depended on that of Perseus, or, believing the war to be inevitable, desired to pay his court to the Senate by advice which met its inclinations. In the year 172 he came in person to Rome for the

B. C. 172.
Visit of

¹ Liv. XLII. 5.

² Ibid. u. 8.

³ Ibid. XLII. 6.

⁴ Ibid. XLII. 12.

⁵ Ibid. XLII. 13.

⁶ Ibid. XLII. 2.

⁷ Ibid. XLII. 42. *Cum Bœotis amicitiam fecimus. Hæc, qualiacumque sunt, per legatos meos non solum indicata sed etiam excusata sunt sæpe in senatu vestro. Sed nondum Romam accusator Eumenes venerat.*

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Eumenes
to Rome.

purpose of describing the formidable preparations, extensive alliances, and hostile acts of Perseus, and warned the Senate, that, if it remained passive much longer, it would have to contend with him for the possession of Italy. This alarm of invasion, which had done good service when a pretext was wanted for the first Macedonian war, would now have been a little too stale, as well as absurd, in the mouth of a Roman; but coming from a foreign prince it had a more plausible sound. In the whole of his speech, as reported by Livy, there is only one wholesome truth, which he hardly ventured to intimate, but which he might be the more willing to disclose as it tended to enhance the merit of his own loyalty: this was, that Perseus owed his popularity to the hatred everywhere felt toward the Romans.¹ Envoys had come at the same time from Macedonia, Rhodes, and many of the Asiatic cities; for the journey of Eumenes had raised a general expectation of some important result. But the Senate would not allow the Macedonians to be confronted with him; and Harpalus, the chief of the embassy, finding his audience steeled by their prejudices against all his arguments, is said to have been provoked to use language which sounded like defiance. The Rhodians fared no better, though they were permitted to plead with Eumenes; their complaints against him only seemed to strengthen the Senate's prepossessions in his favour. He departed with the highest honours it could bestow on a stranger, among which an ensign of Roman magistracy, the curule chair, was accounted the chief.

Still nothing that he had alleged against Perseus was thought worthy to be published at the time as a ground for war. He was destined to accomplish his

¹ Liv. XLII. 13. *Quod ipse vereatur dicere, invidia adversus Romanos favorem illi conciliet.*

intention in a manner which he had neither foreseen nor wished: at the expense of personal suffering and danger. On his return to Asia he paid a visit to Delphi, but between Cirrha and the temple he was waylaid, and nearly killed by heavy stones which were rolled down on him from the top of a wall under which he was passing. The assailants, said to have been four in number, made their escape to the top of Parnassus, and the royal guards could not overtake them; but, according to the Roman story, they were soon discovered to have been emissaries of Perseus, one Evander, a Cretan officer in his service, and three Macedonians, who had been recommended by letters from the king to the hospitality of a wealthy Delphian lady named Praxo. She herself was soon after brought to Rome by one of the Roman envoys who had been last sent to Macedonia, and of course confirmed the charge against Perseus; for her evidence was heard and reported by his enemies. But at the same time the Senate received information of a still fouler plot contrived by the same unscrupulous foe. One Rammius, or Evennius, a principal citizen of Brundisium, was brought to Rome with Praxo, and related that he had been solicited by Perseus to poison the Roman commanders and envoys, who usually lodged at his house when they embarked at Brundisium. This last story is so improbable in itself as to throw additional doubt on the former, which, though strange, is apparently better attested; as the main fact, the assault on Eumenes, is unquestionable, and not otherwise accounted for. Revenge might certainly have impelled Perseus to such a deed, though we should not have expected that he would have chosen such means to compass his end. The other charge is hardly credible. If Perseus was capable of the attempts imputed to him, the Senate was at least equally capable of as vile a calumny. The

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Eumenes
assailed at
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Roman en-
voys to
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stories, true or false, were most happily suited to its purpose, and far better fitted to work on the public mind, and to excite general indignation against Perseus, than any enumeration of his political transgressions. Accordingly war with Macedonia was now resolved on, and preparations for it were immediately begun, though it was not to be formally declared until the year after, on account of a quarrel in which the Senate was involved with the consuls, C. Popillius and P. Ælius. Orders were given for a levy of troops to be carried over to Epirus to occupy the towns on the coast, and secure a safe landing for the consul to whose province Macedonia might fall. In the meanwhile ambassadors were sent to demand reparation from Perseus, and in the case of refusal to renounce his friendship and alliance. He had been already apprised by Harpalus of the Senate's temper, which rendered it evident that peace could not last much longer, and we may therefore easily believe that he was earnestly engaged in preparations for the defence of his kingdom. But the envoys on their return not only described his warlike attitude, but reported that he had replied to them in a strain of reproach and defiance, had declared that he no longer considered himself bound by the treaty which his father had made with Rome, and would consent to none unless on terms of equality, and when they renounced his alliance, had ordered them to quit his dominions in three days.

After such a scene it might have been supposed that he must have abandoned all thoughts of peace. But we find the case to have been so far otherwise, that he lost whatever advantages he might have derived from the forward state of his preparations, through his anxious desire and credulous hopes of averting the inevitable war. We have therefore strong reason to suspect that his language was vio-

lently exaggerated and perverted by the envoys, even if the answer which they pretended to have received from him was not a mere forgery. It is at least certain, from the admission of the Roman historian himself, that the Senate's transactions with Perseus in the course of the year preceding the commencement of the war were a tissue of the most disgraceful frauds, and perhaps the extraordinary inconsistencies which perplex this part of Livy's narrative may have arisen from his unwillingness to unfold the full extent of the Senate's duplicity. As soon as the consuls of the ensuing year, P. Licinius Crassus and C. Cassius Longinus, entered into office, the decree of war was carried through the comitia. The province of Macedonia fell to Crassus, and the new levies were prosecuted with the utmost activity. But earlier in the year 171 the prætor, Cn. Sicinius, had crossed over to Epirus with 5000 foot and 300 horse, encamped in the territory of Apollonia, and thrown garrisons into several places near the western border of Macedonia; and nearly at the same time five commissioners, Q. Marcus, A. Atilius, a Publius and a Servius Cornelius Lentulus, and L. Decimius, were sent into Greece. Marcus, it must be observed, was connected by a hereditary relation of hospitality with the royal house of Macedon. They were escorted as far as Corcyra by a thousand men, and then, having arranged their various destinations with one another, divided the escort into three parties. But before they separated they received a letter from Perseus, inquiring, it is said, for what purpose the Romans had brought troops over to Greece, and occupied towns there; but they dismissed the messenger with a verbal answer, that it was for the security of the towns themselves. They then set out on their several missions: Decimius to the Illyrian king Gentius, who was still wavering between Rome and Macedonia; the two Cornelius's

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to Peloponnesus, where they made a circuit of the principal towns, exhorting all without distinction to maintain the loyalty to Rome which they had shown in her wars with Philip and Antiochus: a confusion of dissimilar cases which is said to have given great offence to the Achæans, who found that, notwithstanding their long and steady attachment to the Roman cause, they stood no higher in the estimation of the Romans than the Eleans and Messenians, who had sided with Antiochus and had on that account been annexed against their will to the Achæan League. Possibly it was meant that they should be reminded that the latest services alone possessed any value in the eyes of the Romans. Marcius and Atilius passed over to Epirus, where they prevailed on the Assembly to send 400 men for the protection of Orestis, and then proceeded through Ætolia, where they only staid to see Lyciscus, a partizan of Rome, elected in the room of the deceased General, into Thessaly. Here it seemed at first that they had nothing to do but to exchange professions of friendship with the Thessalians; but it soon became clear that their mission had a farther and more important object. Perseus, who was at Dium, heard that Marcius, the son of his father's friend, was at Larissa. He conceived a hope that through his interest the negotiation with Rome might be renewed with a fairer prospect of success, and sent to request a personal conference with him. Marcius encouraged this hope, and intimated that he had come for that very purpose, but put off the interview on the plea of indisposition. The meeting at length took place on the banks of the Peneus; and as Perseus wished for a fresh hearing before the Senate, Marcius, as if he was granting a great favour, consented to a truce, that the king might send ambassadors to Rome. Thus his hands were tied for the interval that was necessary to com-

Stratagem
of Q. Mar-
cius.

plete the Roman preparations; and this was the object which Marcius had in view, and probably the main end of his mission.

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From Thessaly he and Atilius proceeded to Bœotia. They had already, on their arrival in Thessaly, been met by Bœotian deputies, who, being upbraided with the alliance which had been concluded with Perseus, had represented it as the work of a faction headed by Ismenias, and as carried against the will of several townships. Marcius took this occasion to hint, that he should soon discover which of the towns could claim the benefit of this excuse, as they would be at liberty to take measures each for itself. The effect of this hint now became visible: it had produced a general anxiety among the Bœotian towns to sever their cause from that of the federal Bœotian body, and to place themselves individually under Roman protection. The Roman commissioners fixed themselves at Chalcis, to receive the embassies of the towns. They were accompanied by a band of Theban exiles, who had been recently condemned in a struggle for office with Ismenias, one of the new Bœotarchs.¹ Ismenias himself came to Chalcis, and proposed that the Bœotian nation should submit in a body to the Romans. But this proposal was directly contrary to the views of Marcius, who aimed at the dissolution of the Bœotian League; and therefore, while he gave a most gracious reception to the deputies of those towns which were willing to enter separately into the same relation to Rome, he treated Ismenias with such harshness and contumely as encouraged his enemies to attack him, and he was obliged to seek shelter from their fury at the tribunal of the Romans. In the meanwhile a fresh contest took place at Thebes, in which the Macedonian party was supported by an influx of strangers

¹ Liv. XLII. 43.

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Dissolution
of the
Bœotian
League.

from Coronea and Haliartus, but it ended in the complete triumph of their adversaries. The friends of Ismenias were forced to withdraw, and fled to Chalcis, while decrees were passed for a separate treaty with Rome, and the restoration of the exiles. Thus the object of Marcius was completely attained: the Bœotian confederacy was broken up; its towns became severally subject to Rome; Ismenias and others of his party were put to death. Neon, the head of the house of Brachyllas, fled to Macedonia. The commissioners next proceeded to Peloponnesus, while Ser. Cornelius took their place at Chalcis, and the Achæans at their desire sent 1000 men, to serve at once as a garrison for Chalcis and as a security for the good behaviour of their own fellow-citizens. Marcius and Atilius then returned with P. Cornelius to Rome.¹ When they made their report in the Senate, and boasted of the manœuvre by which they had fettered the operations of Perseus, a few of the elder senators were startled, not at the baseness of their cunning, but at the distrust which it seemed to imply in the superiority of the Roman arms. The majority however applauded their conduct; and they were sent back to Greece: Marcius with full powers to act as might appear expedient, Atilius to occupy Larissa with 2000 men whom he was to take from Sicinius. The envoys of Perseus, who came about the same time², were for the sake of decency admitted to an audience; but the only answer vouchsafed to their arguments and deprecations, was an order to them and all their countrymen residing in Rome to leave

¹ Polyb. xvii. 2. Ταῦτα διαπραξάντες ἐν τοῖς Ἑλλήσι κατὰ χειμῶνα. Liv. xlii. 44. *principio hiemis*. Yet he has previously related (c. 35.) that the prætor, C. Lucretius, set out for Brundisium after having solemnised the Latinæ on the first of June: so that the reader would naturally suppose that the winter he afterwards speaks of was the following, not the preceding one. But it is clear, from his own narrative, that the return of Marcius cannot have been earlier than May; which is not absolutely inconsistent with the language of Polybius.

² Compare Liv. xlii. 46. 48.

the city the same day, and Italy within thirty.¹ Perseus was not more successful in the other embassies which he sent during this interval, which he might have employed to dislodge the Romans from the coast of Epirus, and to guard against the impending invasion. From the Rhodians he could not obtain even the promise of their mediation; for they had been visited a little earlier by a Roman embassy, which had decided their fluctuation in favour of Rome. On the other hand, in Bœotia, Coronea and Haliartus still clung to him, and implored his aid against Thebes; but he felt himself obliged to refuse their request, that he might not break the truce.

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Licinius set out from Rome at the beginning of June, 171, and appears to have landed with his army in Epirus about the same time that Perseus learnt from his envoys the trick by which he had been cheated of a golden opportunity. Yet he had counsellors who still advised him to sue for peace, and, if possible, to purchase it either by tribute or by cession of territory; and he would probably have been glad to do so, if he could but have hoped to secure a portion of his kingdom against the encroachments of Roman ambition. It was in a spirit of desperate resolution, rather than of cheerful courage, that he at length threw himself on his own resources, and yet they were such as no former king of Macedon, since Alexander, had ever possessed: an army of 39,000 foot and 4000 horse, including a phalanx of 20,000,

B. C. 171.
War with
Perseus
begun.

¹ Polyb. xxvii. 7. Liv. xlii. 48. Diodor. Exc. p. 623. Appian, Mac. ix. 5., but without any reference to the embassy of Marcius. It is clear that these envoys were dismissed just before the consul set out for his province. Yet Livy (c. 38.) gives an account of another embassy from Perseus which came to Rome at the beginning of June, and to which—as war had been already decreed—audience was given in the temple of Bellona, and which was then ordered to quit Italy within eleven days. It is added: *Hæc Romæ acta nondum profectis in provinciam consulis.* I have not seen this confusion anywhere noticed. But it seems as if Livy must have seen two different accounts of the same embassy, and have referred them to two distinct occasions.

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and all troops inured to service, with stores and treasure sufficient for the supply of its wants for ten years.¹ The Macedonian cities offered voluntary contributions of money and corn, which the king declined, only requiring them to provide carriages for his ammunition. Having collected all his forces, he marched into Thessaly, made himself master of some towns in the north, and finally took up a strong and commodious position at Sycurium, near the foot of Ossa. But he neglected to occupy the passes between Epirus and Thessaly, where he might easily have stopped the enemy's progress, and would probably have defeated him with great slaughter. Licinius was allowed to penetrate unopposed through the highlands of Athamania, with an army inferior in numbers, and consisting mostly of raw recruits. In his camp on the Peneus he was joined by Eumenes and his brother Attalus with 4000 foot and 1000 horse, and received other reinforcements which raised the whole amount of his forces nearly to an equality with that of the enemy. Yet for some time he shrunk from an engagement, and suffered the fields of Pheræ to be ravaged before he would accept the challenge which Perseus repeatedly offered. An action at length took place, in which the Macedonian cavalry was victorious, and the Romans lost 2400 slain, and 400 prisoners. But the timid or treacherous counsels of Evander—the Cretan whom he was said to have employed for the attempt on the life of Eumenes—prevented him from following up this advantage, and probably saved the Roman army from total discomfiture. The consul thought it necessary for the safety of his camp to transfer it to the other side of the Peneus in the night, and then, to console his troops, shifted the blame of the disaster on the Æto-

Victory of
Perseus
over Li-
cinius.

¹ Liv. XLII. 51, 52. Compare XLII. 13.

lians, who were the first, it was alleged, to turn their backs. This account of the matter not only saved the credit of the Roman arms, but served as a pretext on which three Ætolian officers, who were supposed to be adverse to the Roman interest, were sent to Italy, to undergo a trial on the charge of treachery.¹ But not even victory could animate the courage of Perseus. In the midst of his triumph he still quailed under the ascendancy of the genius of Rome, and let himself be persuaded to solicit peace from his vanquished enemy, on the same terms to which his father had submitted after he had lost the battle of Cynoscephalæ. But his pusillanimity was hardly equal to the Roman arrogance. Licinius, by the advice of his council, replied, that Perseus could only obtain peace by unconditional submission to the will of the Senate. Even this repulse did not rouse his pride or his resentment, but only urged him into lower depths of dishonour, and induced him to make larger offers, which were rejected with inflexible disdain. When he found every humiliation fruitless, he resumed his hostile position.² The campaign ended without any other important event. The Romans on one occasion claimed a slight advantage; but on the whole they remained on the defensive until Perseus led his army back to Macedonia for the winter. But such a negotiation might well have appeared to them equivalent to a victory.

Nevertheless the report of their defeat contributed to aggravate the calamities of Greece, by the encouragement which it gave to the partizans of Macedonia. It seems to have caused a reaction at Thebes which restored their ascendancy there. Haliartus, with the aid of a reinforcement from Coronea, defended itself obstinately against the prætor C. Lucretius who com-

CHAP.
LXVI.

His over-
tures for
peace.

¹ Polyb. xxvii. 13, 14. Liv. xlii. 60.

² Polyb. xxvii. 8.

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—

Rapacity of
the Ro-
man com-
manders.

manded the Roman fleet, but was at length stormed, pillaged, and rased to the ground. The old men and children were mostly put to the sword, the garrison was sold as slaves. He then marched against Thebes, which surrendered without resistance, and was delivered up to the exiles and their faction. Their adversaries were probably all condemned to death or banishment, as their property is said to have been confiscated.¹ The Thebans were now harassed by the hostility of Coronea, which alone, of all the Bœotian towns, still adhered to Perseus, and on their intreaty the consul, after he had recovered a few places in Thessaly, and had left the greater part of his forces in winter-quarters there, marched with the rest into Bœotia.² We gather from an incidental allusion³, that he made himself master of Coronea by a capitulation which he broke to indulge his cruelty and avarice, that he put the leading men to death, and sold the rest as slaves; and we know that he treated several other towns, the names of which are not recorded, in like manner. The prætor Lucretius carried his rapacity still further, and did not even spare the staunchest allies of Rome, against whom he had no complaint whatever to allege. He plundered the temples of Chalcis to adorn his villa at Antium with statues and pictures, and abandoned the property and persons of the citizens to the outrages of his lawless marines, whom he quartered in their houses. Another mode of oppression practised by the Roman commanders is illustrated by the example of Athens. The Athenians sent the largest military and naval force which they were able to furnish to the aid of the Romans; but the consul and prætor declined their services, and demanded a large quantity of corn, though Attica itself depended on the importation of

¹ Liv. XLII. 63.

² Ibid. XLII. 67.

³ Ibid. XLIII. 4.

foreign grain for its subsistence.¹ The Greeks fared no better the next year, when Licinius was succeeded by the new consul A. Hostilius, and L. Hortensius took the command of the fleet. Hortensius followed the example of his predecessor at Chalcis, and having treacherously stormed Abdera during a truce gave it up to pillage, and exercised the like cruelty toward the inhabitants as those of Coronea had suffered from Licinius. Complaints were brought to Rome by the injured Greeks, and the Senate showed itself willing to interfere, and as far as possible to redress the wrong. It reprimanded Hortensius, ordered the enslaved citizens of Coronea and Abdera to be restored to freedom, and called Lucretius to account. He was brought to trial by the tribunes, and condemned to a heavy fine. But the love of justice had very little share in any of these proceedings. They were apparently connected with the ill success which attended the Roman arms during the first two years of the war, which seemed to render it advisable to soothe the Greeks by the correction of some of the more flagrant abuses under which they were groaning. A great part of Epirus had been driven to revolt by the system which the Senate had adopted at the suggestion of Callicrates. There it had a still more profligate instrument of its tyranny in the person of Charops, a grandson of the man of the same name who distinguished himself by his attachment to the Roman interest in the first Macedonian war. The younger Charops was sent to Rome by his grandfather after his father's death, in his boyhood, to learn the Latin language, and contracted an acquaintance with many of the principal Romans. On his return to Epirus, he endeavoured to push his way, by arrogant pretensions and base intrigues, to the head of affairs, and the war

CHAP.
LXVI.

Complaints
of the
Greeks.

¹ Liv. XLIII. 6.

CHAP.
LXVI.

B. C. 170.
Success of
Perseus.

with Perseus gave him an opportunity of exciting the Senate's jealousy against the rivals whom he wished to supplant, whom he accused of a leaning to the Macedonian interest. The charge was the more plausible, as the leading men of the opposite party, Cephælus and Antinous, had been on terms of friendship with the royal house of Macedon. But the course of policy which they had pursued was that prudent and honourable mean which it had been the aim of Philopœmen and Lycortas to preserve in the counsels of the Achæan League. They were aware of the calumnies with which Charops was assailing them, but, conscious of their innocence, believed for a time that they might defy his malice. But when they saw the Ætolian officers sent as culprits to Italy, they thought it no longer safe to trust themselves in the power of the Romans, and openly went over to Perseus.¹ A plot was laid by some of their partizans for seizing Hostilius on his way through Epirus and giving him up to Perseus, and the consul only escaped through an accidental change in his plans.² He displayed as little capacity or energy as his predecessor in the prosecution of the war, was repulsed in an attempt which he made to penetrate into Elymiotis, and afterwards remained on the defensive in Thessaly, and acknowledged the enemy's superiority by declining a battle. Perseus not only made himself master of several towns in Thessaly, but found leisure for an expedition against the Dardanians, defeated them with great slaughter, and carried off much booty.³ He was even encouraged by the supineness of the prætor, who seems to have been much more intent on the plunder of his allies than on the annoyance of the enemy, to make an attack on the Roman fleet at Oreus, where he took

¹ Polyb. xxvii. 13. Liv. xliii. 18. Diodor. Exc. p. 578.

² Polyb. xxvii. 14.

³ Plut. Æmil. Paull. 9. Liv. xliiii. 18.

or sank a great number of transports, and several galleys of war.¹

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LXVI.

The accounts which the Senate continued to receive of the conduct of its officers in Greece induced it to issue a decree, by which it forbade any one to furnish supplies for the purposes of war at the requisition of the Roman magistrates without its authority.² Hostilius received this ordinance while he was in winter-quarters at Larissa, and sent C. Popillius and Cn. Octavius to publish it in Greece. They carried it first to Thebes, and then round the cities of Peloponnesus, which had probably all suffered from arbitrary exactions. But while they displayed this proof of the Senate's clemency and kindness, they dropped several intimations of their displeasure at the conduct of men, who in their hearts were hostile to Rome, and under the pretence of moderation and discretion were only waiting for an opportunity of declaring themselves against her. It was well understood that these hints were pointed against Lycortas, Archon, and Polybius; and it was supposed that the envoys had designed formally to accuse them in the Assembly at Ægium. But they could find no colourable ground for any charge, and perhaps perceived that the temper of the Assembly was not favourable to such an attempt. They then passed over to Ætolia, where in an Assembly held at Thermus they endeavoured to obtain hostages from the party which was suspected of disaffection to the Roman cause; and in this demand they were supported, not only by Lyciscus, but by Thoas, who had now the baseness to instigate the Romans against the men through whose intercession he had been released after he had been delivered up by Antiochus. But the popular feeling displayed itself so strongly against his treachery and ingratitude, that the envoys

Conduct of
the Roman
envoys in
Greece.

¹ Plut. Æmil. Paull. 9.

² Liv. XLIII. 17.

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LXVI.

thought it prudent to waive their demand. In Acarnania, which they visited next, their partizans ventured on a still bolder attempt, and exhorted them to introduce Roman garrisons into the towns, as a security against the machinations of the Macedonian party; but the aversion which the people manifested to the measure induced them to abandon it, and they returned to Larissa without having accomplished any other object.¹ As their mission was one of conciliation, and the juncture required an exhibition of gentleness and forbearance, it was not difficult to foresee what would be the fate of the Greeks, as soon as the motives which led the Senate to spare them should have ceased to operate.

Expedition
of Perseus
to Illyria.

In the depth of the winter, when the snow lay so deep on the Cambunian hills as to be an insurmountable barrier against an invading army, Perseus undertook an expedition into Illyria, chiefly with a view to draw Gentius into his alliance. In the field his operations were successful; he made himself master of several strong places, and advanced near to the frontier of the dominions of Gentius; but the negotiation which he then proceeded to open with the Illyrian king was long protracted without any effect, though Gentius from the first declared himself willing to make war on the Romans, because Perseus could not bring himself to spare the subsidy which he required. After his return to Macedonia he made another laborious expedition into Ætolia. There Stratus would have opened its gates to him, for its principal citizen Archidamus had been goaded into revolt by the calumnious accusations of Lyciscus and Thoas, as Cephalus by those of Charops; but C. Popilius, who had been sent by the consul with 1000 men to Ambracia, having received intelligence from

¹ Polyb. xxviii. 3—5.

the opposite party of the approach of Perseus, arrived in time to save Stratus, and to prevent the Ætolian General Dinarchus from joining the Macedonian army with all the troops under his command. Aperantia however was induced, through the influence of Archidamus, to submit to Perseus, as would probably have been the case with all the rest of Ætolia but for the timely intervention of Popillius. During the same time the Macedonian general Clevas successfully defended the revolted Epirots against a Roman army under Ap. Claudius, and forced him to retire with loss into Illyria.

CHAP.
LXV

Early in the spring of 169 Hostilius was superseded by the new consul, Q. Marcius Philippus, who brought a reinforcement of 5000 men to the army. Marcius, notwithstanding his advanced age and unwieldy person¹, seems to have been a man of greater energy than either of his predecessors in the command, and he was most probably stimulated by the impatience which had been excited at Rome by the long continuance of the war to more vigorous efforts. As soon as he had put himself at the head of the army in Thessaly, he resolved to penetrate into Macedonia. The pass of Tempe was so strongly fortified as to preclude all attempts on that side. His choice lay between the different passes of the mountains, all difficult, even if no resistance should be offered by the enemy, and if defended extremely dangerous. He selected the eastern route, which led over Mount Olympus down to the sea-coast of Pieria, where Perseus himself was encamped near Dium. He had been apprised of the consul's design, though not of the route which he meant to take, and he had sent a body of 12,000 men under Hippas to occupy the heights of Olympus, and 10,000 light infantry to

B. C. 169.
Marcius
penetrates
into Pieria.

¹ Liv. XLIV. 4. *Prægravis corpore.*

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LXVI.

the pass over the Cambunian range. But these precautions seemed to have exhausted all his powers of thought and action. He remained on the coast awaiting the issue, which by a slight exertion of foresight and alertness he might have determined in his own favour. Hippias maintained his ground, and a desultory combat was carried on between the light infantry of each for two days, during which Perseus, who was not more than twelve miles from the scene of action, might have come up with fresh troops, which would probably have forced the Romans to a disastrous retreat. But instead of this Marcius, having left a body of 4000 men to observe Hippias, was allowed to descend by a ravine of indescribable difficulty, where a handful of men might have destroyed his whole army. This was only the first in a series of fatal errors, by which Perseus threw away the fairest opportunities, and marred the brightest prospects. When Marcius had come down safely into the plain, his situation was still extremely perilous. He was inclosed in a narrow space between the mountains and the sea. Retreat was utterly hopeless, and a very slight fortification would have rendered the king's position at Dium impregnable. The consul therefore must have remained motionless as long as the enemy chose to keep guard over him, and in the meanwhile depended for subsistence entirely on the fleet, that is, on the weather and the season, and before even the first necessary supply could arrive would have been reduced to extreme distress. From this embarrassment however he was immediately extricated by the infatuation of Perseus, who, seized with a panic at the approach of the Romans, abandoned himself to despair at the very moment when an abler general would have conceived the most sanguine hopes of a decisive advantage. He not only abandoned Dium, after having removed the guilt

Timidity of
Perseus.

statues on board the fleet, and fell back upon Pydna, but withdrew all the garrisons which guarded the strongholds of Tempe, and sent Nicias his treasurer to Pella, with orders to sink all his treasures deposited there in the lake¹, and Andronicus to Thessalonica, with a commission to burn the arsenal. Marcius advanced to the distance of two days' march beyond Diium, hardly believing that a place so rich and strong could have been abandoned to him unless with a view to some stratagem; but the scarcity of provisions compelled him to retreat to Diium, and afterwards to Phila. The fleet brought no supply, and his army would have starved, if it had not been seasonably relieved by the corn found in the evacuated fortresses of Tempe. This retrograde movement a little revived the courage of Perseus. He again took possession of Diium, and encamped five miles to the south, on the left bank of the river Enipeus. He now began to be ashamed of his cowardice, and to wish to conceal it. He accused the generals whom he had recalled from their posts of throwing open the passes to the enemy. Andronicus had wisely deferred the execution of his frantic order. The treasure had been thrown into the lake, but was mostly recovered by diving; and Perseus is said to have put the divers, as well as Nicon and Andronicus, to death, in the hope of covering his own disgrace. The Roman fleet, under the prætor C. Marcius Figulus who was accompanied by Eumenes, made unsuccessful attempts on Thessalonica, Cassandrea, and Torone; and a division of the army, which had been sent by the consul to besiege Melibœa, was put to flight by the Macedonian general Euphranor, who, though he had but 2000 men under his command, was likewise able to protect Demetrias

¹ Liv. XLIV. 10. *Gazam in mare dejici Pella.* Diodorus, Exc. p. 579., writes the treasurer's name Nicon, and that of the place Phacus. *Τὴν ἐν τῷ Φάκῳ γὰρ καὶ τὰ χρῆματα καταποντίσαι.*

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LXVI.

and its territory against the fleet which lay at Iolcus. The armies on both sides went soon after into winter-quarters; and at the end of the third campaign, notwithstanding the folly of Perseus, the Romans had only gained a footing on the threshold of Macedonia, without any clear prospect that they would be able to advance a step further. Marcius himself, when a Rhodian embassy came to his camp at Heracleum with congratulations on his success, suggested to the envoys that their government would do well to offer its mediation between the belligerent powers. This intimation encouraged the Macedonian party at Rhodes, as a proof that the Romans themselves did not consider their affairs as prosperous; and the consequence was that an embassy was sent to Rome, which tendered its mediation in haughty and almost threatening terms. Polybius believes that Marcius, expecting that the war would soon be brought to a triumphant issue against Perseus, desired to embroil the Rhodians in a quarrel with Rome, and to furnish a pretext for hostile proceedings toward them.¹ There can be no doubt that he was quite capable of such perfidious cunning; but it may be questioned whether he felt so much confidence as to the approaching termination of the war, and would not have wished that peace should be granted to Perseus before he was himself superseded. Even Eumenes began to waver in his loyalty to the Romans. He entered into a private negotiation with Perseus, and went so far as to consent to accept a subsidy from him, possibly hoping to overreach him, and to avoid any overt act of hostility toward Rome. But the treaty was broken off, because Perseus would not part with his gold.² This wretched parsimony was still more conspicuously displayed in two other transactions nearly at the same

His parsimony.

¹ xxviii. 15.

² Liv. xlii. 25.

time. He had at length made up his mind to purchase the aid of Gentius at the price which the Illyrian demanded—300 talents. The hostages were interchanged, and the treaty solemnly ratified by Perseus in the presence of the Macedonian cavalry, whom he wished to encourage by the intelligence of this important alliance. Ten talents were sent to Gentius as an earnest; the rest was sealed in the presence of his envoys, to be conveyed to him by Macedonian bearers, who were directed by Perseus to wait when they reached the frontier for further orders. Gentius now embarked frankly in the cause, and not only sent ambassadors to accompany those of Perseus to Rhodes, but threw two Roman envoys into prison. Perseus, as soon as he heard that his ally had thus broken with the Romans past all hope of reparation, retained the rest of the subsidy.¹ In like manner he lost the services of an army of 20,000 Bastarnians whom he might have taken into his pay. The bargain was concluded; the Celts advanced within five or six days' march of his camp, when Perseus, unable to endure the sacrifice of so much treasure even for the sake of a kingdom, resolved to engage only 5000 of the cavalry; but as he did not send the stipulated gold even for these, the Celtic chief indignantly marched away.²

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LXVI.

At Rome, though no apprehension was felt as to the final issue of the Macedonian war, its state at the end of the third year was not regarded as promising; and L. Æmilius Paullus was raised for the second time to the consulate, with a general hope that his tried abilities would bring the contest to a speedy close, though the province was not assigned to him, as Plutarch relates³, but, apparently at least, fell to him by

Paullus in
command.

¹ Polyb. xxviii. 8, 9. xxix. 2, 3, 5. Liv. xlv. 23, 27.

² Liv. xlv. 27. Plut. Æmil. Paull. 12. Diodor. Exc. p. 580.

³ Æmil. Paull. 10. Οὐκ ἔδσαντες κληῖρον γενέσθαι.

lot.¹ He himself, after his election, caused commissioners to be sent to inspect the condition of the army; and their report of it was not at all cheering. A levy of 14,000 foot and 1200 horse was decreed to reinforce it. He set out from Rome with Cn. Octavius, who commanded the fleet, on the first of April, arrived at Corcyra on the same day on which he sailed from Brundisium, five days after celebrated a sacrifice at Delphi, and in five more had reached the camp in Pieria.² His soldiers, who had been accustomed to great licence³, soon learnt, by the regulations which he introduced, that they had now a general as well as a consul at their head; and Perseus no longer felt himself safe behind the Enipeus, when he saw the Roman camp moved forward to the opposite bank. The terror with which he was inspired by the fame of Paullus was soon heightened by tidings that whatever hopes he had built on his alliance with Gentius had fallen to the ground. After a war of not more than twenty or thirty days Gentius, besieged in his capital, Scodra, surrendered to the prætor Anicius, and was carried with all his family to Rome, to adorn his enemy's Triumph, having received ten talents as the price of his throne and his liberty. Perseus however did not neglect the precautions which his situation required. He fortified his position on the Enipeus, detached a body of cavalry to protect the coast of Macedonia from the operations of the Roman fleet which had entered the gulf of Thessalonica, and sent 5000 men to guard the northern pass of Olympus at Petra, which opened a way near the highest summit of the mountain, the Pythium, by which an enemy might descend to the plains in his rear. This was

¹ Liv. XLIV. 17. *Designatos ex templo sortiri placuit provincias Æmilio Macedonia evenit.*

² Liv. XLV. 41.

³ Plut. Æmil. Paull. 13. Liv. XLIV. 1. (probably exaggerating the merits of Hostilius).

indeed the danger which he had most reason to provide against; for Paullus, having weighed all the modes of attack by which he might attempt to dislodge the enemy from his position, finally decided on this. He sent P. Scipio Nasica, accompanied by his eldest son Fabius Maximus with 8000 men, to force this pass, while he occupied the attention of Perseus with a series of assaults on his entrenchments. Nasica, after a long circuit, surprised the Macedonians at Petra, and drove them down before him; and Perseus, at his approach, hastily abandoned his position and retreated toward Pydna, where the consul, having been joined by Nasica, came up with him the same day, but deferred giving battle until the morrow. An eclipse of the moon, which took place in the night filled the Macedonians with superstitious terror; the Romans had a tribune in their army who was able to predict and explain it. Perseus, though with blank misgivings, yielded to the advice of his friends who exhorted him to risk an engagement: he could not but perceive that further retreat would be attended with the dispersion of his forces and the loss of his kingdom. The next day (June 22., B. C. 168) a short combat decided the fate of the Macedonian monarchy. The power of the phalanx was again tried under circumstances the most advantageous to it, and again failed through the same causes which occasioned the loss of the battle of Cynoscephalæ. Victorious on the level ground, it fell into disorder when it had advanced upon the retreating enemy to the foot of the hills, where it could no longer preserve the evenness of its front and the compactness of its mass, and opened numerous passages through its ranks for the legionaries, who rushed in to an almost unresisted slaughter. The slain on the Macedonian side are said to have amounted to 20,000; upwards of 10,000 were made

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B. C. 168.
Battle of
Pydna.

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prisoners; the Romans lost scarcely 100 men. Perseus took little part in the battle: as the Romans gave out, through cowardice; but it appears that he had received a kick from a horse the day before, which compelled him to use a litter.¹ It is certain however that as soon as the rout began he left the field with the cavalry, which remained untouched, and fled toward Pella. He was soon deserted by his Macedonian followers, and even at Pella found that he was no longer obeyed by his subjects. In the first movement of his passion he killed two officers of his household with his own hand, and continued his flight with no attendants beside the royal pages but three foreigners—Evander the Cretan, Neon the Bœotian, and the Ætolian Archidamus,—with 500 Cretans, whose attachment was only retained by permission to plunder the royal plate, which Perseus afterwards recovered from them by a disgraceful trick. At Amphipolis he sent three persons of low rank, the only messengers he could find, with a letter to Paullus, but only stayed long enough to embark the treasure deposited there, and sailed with it down the Strymon to Galepsus, and thence to Samothrace.

Little loyalty could seem due to such a king, even if his fortunes had been less desperate. The whole of Macedonia submitted immediately without resistance to the conqueror. The Roman fleet soon pursued the royal fugitive to Samothrace. But Octavius spared the sanctity of the asylum, and only demanded Evander, as a man whose hands were stained with the blood of Eumenes, and Perseus was said to have despatched him, to prevent a disclosure of his own guilt. But he suffered himself to be overreached by another Cretan, who engaged to convey him to the coast of Thrace where he hoped to find refuge at the court of

¹ Plut. Æmil. Paull. 19.

Cotys, but sailed away without him, as soon as his treasure had been put on board. He then hid himself in a nook of the temple, until his remaining servants had been tempted by a promise of free pardon to surrender themselves, and his younger children had been betrayed into the hands of Octavius by the friend who had charge of them. He then gave himself up to the prætor with his eldest son Philip, and was immediately conducted to the consul's camp. He was courteously received by the conqueror, but is said to have forfeited the respect which would have been paid to his rank, by the abjectness of his demeanour ; though he was thought to have been guilty of extravagant presumption, when in the letter which he wrote immediately after his defeat he retained the title of king. About the same time that these events were taking place in Macedonia, Anicius, after the subjugation of Illyria, marched into Epirus. At Phanota, where the plot had been laid for the seizure of the consul Hostilius, the whole population went out to meet him with the ensigns of suppliants. All the other towns of Epirus submitted likewise without resistance ; only in four, in Molossis, was there so much as an appearance of hesitation, which was the effect of the presence of Cephalus and some other leaders of the Macedonian party.¹ But this obstacle was soon removed by their execution or voluntary death, and these towns also surrendered without any opposition. Anicius distributed his troops among the principal cities, and left the whole country perfectly tranquil, when he returned to Illyria, to meet the five commissioners who were sent from Rome to regulate its affairs.

A commission of Ten was appointed as usual to settle those of Macedonia. In the summer of 167, before the arrival of the commissioners, Paullus, ac-

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Surrender
of Perseus.

Paullus in
Greece.

¹ Liv. xlv. 26.

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accompanied by his second son the future conqueror of Carthage and Numantia and by Athenæus a brother of Eumenes, made a tour in Greece: not with any political object, but simply to gratify the curiosity of a stranger who was familiar with Greek literature, and whose house at Rome was full of Greek rhetoricians, and artists, and masters of all kinds for the education of his sons. He went to view the monuments of art, scenes celebrated in history or fable, or hallowed by religion: to compare Phidias with Homer.¹ It was not only Athens and Sparta, Sicyon and Argos and Epidaurus, Corinth and Olympia, that attracted his attention: the comparatively obscure shrines of Lebadea and Oropus were not without their interest for the Roman Augur, who was no less exact in the observance of the sacerdotal ritual than in the maintenance of military discipline², and sacrificed at Olympia before the work of Phidias with as much devotion as in the Capitol. He did not indeed wholly lay aside the majesty of the proconsul: at Delphi he ordered his own statues to be placed on the pedestals which had been erected for those of Perseus. But he made no inquiries into recent political transactions, and displayed his power chiefly in acts of beneficence; for amidst so many memorials of ancient prosperity he everywhere found signs of present poverty and distress, and the vast magazines of corn and oil which had fallen into his hands in Macedonia enabled him to relieve the indigence of the Greeks by liberal largesses.³ His visit to Greece is a pleasing idyllian episode in a life divided between the Senate and the camp; and it is characteristic of the beginning of a new period, being as far as we know the first ever paid to the country for such a purpose.⁴

¹ Polyb. xxx. 15. Liv. xlv. 27, 28. Plut. Æmil. Paull. 28.

² Plut. Æmil. Paull. 3.

³ Ibid. 28.

⁴ Livy intimates that even in his time such tours in Greece were not very common: *Nobilitata fama magis auribus accepta sunt, quam oculis noscuntur.* (xlv. 27.)

It would have been happy for Greece if her destinies had now depended on the will of Paullus. But he was the minister of a system by which the rapacious oligarchy which wielded the Roman legions was enabled to treat the fairest portion of the civilised world as its prey, becoming, as it grew bolder with success, more and more callous to shame and remorse in the prosecution of its iniquitous ends, which it scarcely deigned to cover with the threadbare mantle of its demure hypocrisy. Such men as Q. Marcius and C. Popillius were now the fittest agents for its work. A scene occurred to Paullus, as he passed through Thessaly on his return to Macedonia, which exhibited a slight prelude to the miseries which Greece was to endure under the absolute ascendancy of this system. He was met by a multitude of Ætoli-ans in the garb of suppliants, who related that Lyciscus and another of his party, having obtained a body of troops from a Roman officer, had surrounded the council-room, had put 550 of their opponents to death, forced others into exile, and taken possession of the property both of the dead and the banished. Paullus could only bid the suppliants repair to Amphipolis, where he was to arrange the affairs of his province in concert with the ten commissioners, who had already arrived in Macedonia. They had brought with them the outlines of a decree¹, which when the details had been adjusted was solemnly published from the proconsular tribunal at Amphipolis, in the presence of a great concourse of people: first recited in Latin by Paullus, and then in a Greek translation by the proprætor Octavius. By its provisions Macedonia was divided into four districts, to which Amphipolis, Thessalonica, Pella, and Pelagonia, were assigned as capitals. They were to be governed each

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Division of
Macedonia.

¹ Liv. xlv. 18.

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by its own councils and magistrates, and were to be not only independent of each other, but separated from each other by the strictest prohibition of mutual intercourse, both of intermarriage and of contracts for the acquisition of land or houses beyond the border within which either of the parties dwelt.¹ Even the importation of salt was forbidden, as well as the working of gold and silver mines—to guard against the abuses which were admitted to be inseparable from the administration of these royalties on the Roman system²—and the felling of ship-timber. As the three regions which bordered on the territories of barbarian tribes were expressly permitted to keep garrisons for the protection of their frontiers, the use of arms for any other purpose seems to have been tacitly, if not expressly, interdicted. A tribute of 100 talents, one half of the amount of the taxation under the royal government, was reserved for the Romans. Whether the burdens of the people were lightened to the same extent, or the difference was more than equal to the increased expence of the quadruple administration, has been perhaps justly questioned.³ The most important benefits conferred on the conquered nation were exemption from the rule of a Roman magistrate and the rapacity of Roman farmers of the revenue,—which however was only a precarious and temporary boon—and a new code of laws, compiled under the care of Paullus himself, and therefore probably framed on equitable principles and wisely adapted to the condition of the country, as it is said to have stood the test of experience. That nevertheless the decree was received with deep discontent by every Macedonian who

¹ *Neque connubium neque commercium agrorum ædificiorumque inter se cuiquam extra fines regionis suæ.* (Liv. XLV. 29.)

² Liv. XLV. 18. *Ubi publicanus est, ibi aut jus publicum vanum, aut libertatem sociis nullam esse.*

³ By Schlosser, *Universal-hist. Uebersicht*, II. 2. p. 143.

retained any degree of national feeling, may be easily supposed; and we hardly know whether Livy is in earnest, when he affects to correct the error of those who complained of the dismemberment of their country, not aware, he thinks, how adequate each region was to the supply of its own wants. The jealousy of the Senate however was not satisfied with these precautions. The government of each region was committed to an oligarchical council¹; and, to secure an election of its members conformable to the interests of Rome, all the Macedonians who had held any office in the king's service were ordered, under pain of death, to go with their children who had passed the age of fifteen to Italy.

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The authority of the commissioners was not confined to Macedonia. They were invested with an unlimited jurisdiction over all political causes in Greece, and even beyond the shores of Europe; for they sent one of their number to rase the town of Antissa in Lesbos to the ground, and to remove its whole population to Methymna, because it had received a Macedonian admiral in its port, and supplied his fleet with provisions. Every part of their instructions seems to have breathed the same spirit of vindictive cruelty, and insolent, shameless tyranny; for they were directed to follow the counsels of Calliocrates, Charops, and Lyciscus. From all parts of Greece the principal traitors and sycophants flocked to their tribunal; for no state ventured to send any representatives but the men who had been most forward on the side of Rome. From Achaia, Calliocrates, Aristodamus, Agesias, and Philippus; from Bœotia, Mnasippus; from Acarnania, Chremes; from Epirus, Charops and Nicias; from Ætolia, Lyciscus and Tisippus—the authors of the recent massacre—

Greek
traitors.

¹ Liv. xlv. 32. *Senatores, quos Synedros vocant.*

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are named among the men who came to share the triumph of the Romans, and to direct their persecution against the best and most patriotic of their fellow-countrymen. Paullus saw and despised the baseness of these miscreants, and would not have sacrificed better men to their malice; but his was only one voice against ten.¹ His colleagues were better informed as to the intentions of the Senate, and knew that Callicrates and Charops possessed, as they deserved, its entire confidence. The manner in which they decided on the case of the Ætolians, who had been the victims of the recent violence, removed all doubt as to the course which they meant to pursue, and encouraged their partizans to lay aside all shame and reserve. No inquiry was made except as to the political principles of the actors and the sufferers.² The bloodshed, the banishment, and the confiscation, were all sanctioned and ratified; only Bæbius was pronounced to have been in fault, when he lent his soldiers for such a purpose. Still even Ætolia was not deemed to be yet sufficiently purged from disaffection. There, as well as in Acarnania, Epirus, Bœotia, and Achaia, as the commissioners were assured by their Greek advisers, there were still many covert enemies of Rome, and until this party was everywhere crushed, and the ascendancy of the decided advocates of the Roman supremacy firmly established, there could be no security for the public loyalty and tranquillity. Lists of the suspected citizens were drawn up by their adversaries, and letters were despatched in the name of the proconsul to Ætolia³, Acarnania, Epirus, and Bœotia, commanding them all to proceed to Rome to take their trial. With the Achæans it was thought prudent to adopt a different

¹ Polyb. xxx. 10.

² Liv. xlv. 31.

³ Justin. xxxiii. 2. 8. *Universarum urbium senatus, cum conjugibus et liberis, qui dubia fide fuerant, Romam missus.*

course; for it was doubted whether they might submit so quietly to such an order; especially as no papers had been discovered in the Macedonian archives, to implicate any of their proscribed citizens in the charge of correspondence with Perseus. Two of the commissioners, C. Claudius and Cn. Domitius, were sent to Peloponnesus, to accomplish their object without danger of tumult or opposition. In the meanwhile, for a specimen of the justice which awaited the accused, Neon the Bœotian, and Andronicus the Ætolian, were beheaded: Neon, as the author of the alliance with Perseus; Andronicus, because he had followed his father to the war against the Romans.

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When these affairs had been transacted, after having celebrated magnificent games at Amphipolis, in which the spoils of the Macedonian monarchy which were about to be transported to Rome formed the most splendid part of the spectacle, Paullus set out for Epirus. On his arrival at Passaro he sent for ten of the principal citizens from each of seventy towns, mostly of the Molossians¹, which had been involved in the revolt of Cephalus or in a suspicion of disloyalty to Rome, and ordered that the gold and silver of every town should be collected and brought forth into the public place. A detachment of soldiers was then sent into each, in such order that all were occupied precisely at the same time, and at the same hour, on a preconcerted signal, were all given up to pillage. The inhabitants, whose fears had been previously lulled by an intimation that the garrisons were to be withdrawn², were carried away as slaves. A hundred and fifty thousand human beings were thus at one blow torn from their homes, and plunged into the lowest depth of wretchedness. The produce of the

Towns of
Epirus pil-
laged.

¹ Polyb. xxx. 15. *Μολοσσῶν τὰς πλείστας.*

² Liv. xlv. 34. Appian (Ill. 9.) says they were promised forgiveness on condition of surrendering their gold and silver.

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spoil was divided among the troops.¹ The guilt of this atrocious wickedness rests with the Senate, by whose express command it was perpetrated. Paullus, though a severe exacter of discipline, who threw the deserters under the feet of his elephants², was of an affectionate and gentle nature, softened by study, inclined to contemplation, deeply sensible of the instability of mortal greatness, and shrinking with religious awe from wanton oppression of a vanquished enemy, as he showed when, after his Triumph, he interceded for Perseus, and procured his release from the dungeon to which he had been mercilessly consigned.³ That such a man should have been made the instrument of such a deed, may be numbered among the most melancholy examples of military servitude.

That the conduct of the Roman government toward the Achæans may be better appreciated, we must resume the thread which we dropped after an account of the embassy of Popillius and Octavius. The threats thrown out by the envoys against the neutral or moderate party induced the men of all shades of political opinion, who might regard themselves as affected by them, to hold a conference on the common danger and the means of avoiding it. Lycortas still adhered to the view which he had before taken of the course which it became them to pursue: to keep aloof from a contest in which they could not wish success to either party, but least to that which it would have been madness to provoke by direct opposition. There were others who agreed with him as to the necessity

¹ Plutarch (*Æmil. Paull.* 29.) and Livy (*xliv.* 34.) follow widely different reports as to its amount.

² Val. *Maxim.* ii. 7. 14.

³ Plut. *Æmil. Paull.* 37. Diodor. *Fragm.* xxxi. Livy (*xliv.* 42.) seems to draw a veil over the fate of Perseus, who, according to other accounts, was committed to the custody of barbarians, who killed him by depriving him of sleep. Zonaras (*ix.* 24.) relates that he killed himself, when he began to despair of recovering his kingdom. But it is scarcely credible that after the Triumph he should even for a moment have cherished such a hope.

of this neutrality, but thought it desirable to present an attitude of firmer resistance to the slavish and mercenary faction which was ready to surrender every thing to Rome. The majority however, remembering the intimations which they had so lately heard from the Roman envoys, thought that they ought so far to yield to circumstances as to avoid giving any handle for calumny to their adversaries. On this side were Archon, Polybius, and Xenon; and Archon, as the representative of this opinion, was promoted to the chief magistracy, Polybius to the command of the cavalry. An opportunity was very soon afforded for an indication of the policy which they had adopted, by the arrival of envoys from Attalus who came to solicit the restoration of his brother's honours, and in this suit they were supported by Polybius, who obtained a decree for the restitution of all such honours to Eumenes as were not either illegal or degrading to the Achæans.¹ When Marcius had taken the command of the Roman army in Thessaly, a more decided movement was made in the same direction. A decree was passed to place all the forces of the League at the consul's disposal; and an embassy was sent to him, with Polybius at its head, to learn his pleasure on the subject. When this embassy arrived in Thessaly Marcius was just on the point of crossing the mountains, and Polybius did not obtain an audience from him until he had effected his descent into Pieria. Then however he declined the offer, as having no need of additional forces, which indeed in that critical position would probably have increased his difficulties. Polybius sent his colleagues home with this answer, but remained himself in the Roman camp, until Marcius learnt that Ap. Claudius, who commanded in Illyria with a very small army which had been

CHAP.
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Polybius
and his
friends.

¹ Polyb. xxviii. 6, 7.

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LXVL

weakened by a disaster in the preceding campaign¹, had applied to the Achæans for a reinforcement of 5000 auxiliaries. Marcius now sent Polybius to Peloponnesus with private instructions to prevent his countrymen from complying with the call of Appius. Polybius professes to doubt whether his object was, as he pretended, to relieve the Achæans or to thwart Appius, evidently believing the latter to have been his real motive. But it might not be an improbable or unjust surmise, that he also wished to entrap the Achæans into a refusal which might afterwards be used as a ground of accusation against them. And thus when the demand of Appius was brought before the Achæan Assembly, Polybius found himself placed in a very embarrassing position: on the one hand, not feeling himself at liberty to reveal the instructions which he had received from Marcius; on the other, fearing to incur the appearance of opposition to the interests of Rome. To extricate himself from this dilemma he appealed to the recent Ordinance, which forbade compliance with such requisitions unless authorised by the Senate. The question was consequently referred to the consul, who of course decided according to the terms of the Ordinance; and thus the appearance of entire submission to the will of the Senate was preserved, though Polybius was conscious that he had probably given mortal offence to Ap. Claudius.²

In this affair the moderate independent party had avoided all collision, not only with Rome, but even with Callicrates; but before Marcius had been superseded another transaction occurred, in which Callicrates found an opportunity of displaying his servility, and perhaps a handle against his adversaries. The Ptolemies, Philometor and his brother, Euergetes II.

¹ Liv. XLIII. 10.

² Polyb. XXVIII. 10, 11.

or Physcon, having composed their differences, needed protection against Antiochus Epiphanes, and sent envoys to obtain a body of auxiliaries from the Achæans. They asked for 1000 foot and 200 horse, and desired that Polybius might have the command of the cavalry, and that the whole might be under the orders of Lycortas. This request was opposed by Callicrates, on the pretext that, so long as the contest with Perseus remained undecided, the Achæans ought to keep all their forces at home, to be at the disposal of the Romans in case of need. Polybius reminded the Assembly, that the consul had declined their proffered aid, and that, if it were otherwise, a state which could bring 40,000 men into the field might well spare a handful for the service of an old ally. The discussion was adjourned at the instance of Callicrates on a point of legal form, and in the interval it appears he called in the aid of Marcius; for when the subject was brought before another Assembly, in which he proposed that, instead of sending succours, the League should tender its mediation between the Ptolemies and Antiochus, when the motion of Lycortas was on the point of being carried, a courier arrived with a letter from Marcius, in which he exhorted the Achæans, in conformity with the wish of the Senate, to endeavour to reconcile the kings. This was a mere pretext; for the attempts which had been made by the Senate itself for the same purpose had hitherto failed. But it answered the end of silencing the party of Lycortas. Envoys were appointed to act as mediators, and the Egyptian ambassadors then produced a letter from their masters, which was only to be delivered if their first request should be rejected, soliciting that Lycortas and Polybius might be sent to Egypt, to aid them with their counsels in the war. The celebrated circle of Popillius precluded the need of this or any other assistance.¹

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¹ Polyb. xxix. 8—10.

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¹ Polyb. xxix. 8—10.

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Such appears to have been the entire amount of provocation, and ground for jealousy, that had been given to Rome by any party in the League, before the arrival of the two Commissioners, C. Claudius and Cn. Domitius. We may therefore but faintly conceive the mixture of astonishment and indignation with which the Achæan Assembly summoned to receive them listened to their demands, when they alleged that there were some powerful men who had contributed both by supplies of money and in other ways to the aid of Perseus in the war, and required that they should all be condemned to death. After sentence had been pronounced the commissioners would publish the names of the criminals. The Assembly however was not yet so broken to the yoke as to submit to such an outrageous mockery of justice, and called upon them first to name the accused. They were not disconcerted by this repulse, and at the suggestion of Callicrates declared that all who had filled the office of General since the beginning of the war were involved in the charge. Xeno now came forward to assert his innocence; but he was betrayed by the warmth of his feelings into an imprudent offer. He too had been in that office, but had never either done wrong to the Romans or shown favour to Perseus; and this he was ready to maintain either before an Achæan or even a Roman tribunal. The Romans caught at this undertaking, and required that all the accused should go to be tried at Rome.¹ Xeno's offer served as a pretext, to cover the fear which induced the Assembly to consent to this tyrannical demand; if indeed its consent was asked; for we know only the result. Callicrates drew up a list of more than 1000 names, of course including all who, by station or character, had any title to his fear or his

B. C. 167.
Deportation
of the
thousand
Achæans.

¹ Paus. vii. 10.

hatred—the best and purest portion of the nation. All were forced to embark for Italy, and on their arrival, instead of being put upon their trial, were by order of the Senate distributed among the Etruscan towns. Only Polybius was permitted to find a home in the house of Paullus¹, having probably become known to him or his sons in Greece. Here he contracted an intimate friendship with Scipio Æmilianus, the future conqueror of Carthage and Numantia, which enabled him to render some services to his country, and no doubt added much to the value of his history, though its influence on the tone and spirit of his narrative may not have been always favourable to an unreserved exhibition of the truth.

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The men who had been carried away from Peloponnesus were not a faction, but represented the feelings, and were accompanied by the good wishes, of the whole nation. Great anxiety therefore was felt about their fate, which for a time was believed to depend on the event of the expected trial. But when year after year rolled by, and nothing more was heard of them than that they were still detained in the Italian cities, and it was no longer possible to suppose that the Senate had been prevented by the pressure of other business from taking cognizance of their cause, an embassy was sent to Rome, to request that they might be brought to trial. The Senate in its answer affected to be surprised that the Achæans should make such a request with regard to persons whom they themselves had already condemned.² A fresh embassy therefore was sent in the year 164 to correct this mistake, to inform the Senate that the prisoners had never been either condemned or even heard by their countrymen, and to pray that they might not be left to waste their lives in confinement without a trial; and that if the Senate

Fruitless
embassies
to Rome.

¹ Polyb. xxxii. 9.

² Ibid. xxxi. 8.

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itself was not at leisure to sit in judgment on them, it would commit the inquiry to the Achæans, who would endeavour to conduct it with the strictest impartiality. This proposal drove the Senate out of its last subterfuge, and extorted a declaration of its intentions on the subject. It dismissed the envoys with the answer, that it did not seem to it expedient, either for the interest of the Romans or of the Greeks, that the prisoners should return home. This decision, while it crushed the hopes of all patriotic Achæans, inspired Calliocrates, and all the other creatures of Roman influence throughout Greece, with fresh confidence.¹ The insolence of Charops now began to break through every restraint which either fear or the sense of decency had hitherto imposed on his cruelty and rapacity; and he established a tyranny in Epirus similar to that of Nabis, but with the difference, that his favour with the Senate supplied the place of foreign mercenaries, and secured the unresisting submission of his countrymen to his despotic will. For a time he contented himself with a series of murders, perpetrated through his emissaries on some of the wealthier citizens, often in the face of day and in public places, either in the cities or on the high roads, as well as in their own houses, and followed by the confiscation of their whole property to his use. He afterwards ventured on a more sweeping measure, and published a list including all the most opulent Epirots of both sexes, as condemned to banishment. It was however soon generally understood, that this was only intended as a new mode of spoliation, and that the proscribed might make private bargains with Charops for leave to remain in Epirus. While he himself drew large sums from the men as the price of this indulgence, the women were directed to address themselves to his

Charops.

¹ Polyb. u. s.

mother Philotis¹, in whom he found as willing and able a coadjutrix in the work of rapine as Apega had proved to Nabis. But when he had obtained all that could be extorted from them by the fear of exile, he nevertheless accused them before the Assembly of disaffection to Rome, and, by intimidation or corruption, caused them to be condemned to death. As they mostly made their escape, he thought it necessary to exert all his interest to obtain a ratification of his proceedings from the Senate, and for this purpose undertook a journey to Rome, well furnished with money, which it seems was already known to possess great influence over the deliberations of that Assembly. Two doors however were closed against him: neither Æmilius Paullus, nor M. Æmilius Lepidus, then Chief Pontiff and First of the Senate, would let him enter their houses; and it is probable that the protector of Polybius actively opposed his application to the Senate. The result was that he was dismissed with the answer, that the Senate would instruct envoys of its own to inquire into the case. Charops felt that such an answer was equivalent to an expression of disapprobation, and that it would give a dangerous shock to his authority at home; and he therefore suppressed it on his return, and substituted another conformable to his wishes; a fraud which we can hardly suppose he would have ventured on, if he had not received private intimation from his patrons that he might do so with impunity, and that the threatened investigation was merely a colour to save appearances. Still this repulse seems to have operated as a check upon his conduct, which kept him within bounds short at least of his previous excesses, and somewhat alleviated the misery of the people subject to his rule; and as he died a few years after at Brundisium, on his way to

¹ Φιλότηδος, Polyb. xxxii. 21. Φιλώτας, Diodor. Exc. p. 597.

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or from Rome, it may be inferred that he continued to regard his position as insecure. He had probably done so much to afflict and exhaust Epirus, that even the jealousy of the Senate was satisfied with the degree of weakness to which it was now reduced, and believed that the time had come when it might interpose its protection without fear of restoring strength sufficient for any independent movement. An embassy sent from Epirus to Rome in the year after his death received a promise, that the commissioners who were about to proceed to Illyria should be furnished with instructions for the regulation of affairs in Epirus.

The state of things was perhaps not very different in Ætolia, Acarnania, and Bœotia, though none of the partisans of Rome who held rule there equalled Charops in ferocity and recklessness. But still it was a happy riddance and the beginning of quieter times for Ætolia, when the blood-thirsty Lyciscus came to his end; and nearly at the same time Acarnania was delivered from Chremes, and Bœotia from Mnasippus. Each had so abused his power that his death was a public blessing, and attended with a salutary change in the state of affairs.¹ Callicrates survived all these kindred spirits, and retained his ascendancy to the end of his life. He was probably as unscrupulous, shameless, and greedy as any of them, and would have shrunk from no kind of outrage which he could commit with safety. But notwithstanding the Roman patronage his power was limited by the spirit which still animated the Achæan League, and which had a force still at its command by no means contemptible in itself, though quite incapable of sustaining a struggle against Rome. The removal of his adversaries did not screen him from the most galling marks

¹ Polyb. xxxii. 21, 22.

of general loathing and contempt, which he did not dare to resent. He found himself shunned in public places as an infection, and heard himself hooted as a traitor by the boys in the streets.¹ Even in the Assembly, where he could wield the terrors of Roman vengeance to overawe opposition, he was not omnipotent. He could not prevent a series of embassies from being sent to Rome to solicit the release of the captives. It may however have been in part owing to his counteraction that these attempts were so long unsuccessful. Direct attacks therefore on the persons or property of his fellow-citizens, such as Charops and Lyciscus might venture on, were beyond the means of Callicrates; and the advantages which he derived from his infamy seem to have consisted chiefly in the price which he received for the exercise of his influence.

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Soon after the Senate had declared its intentions with regard to the detained Achæans, its suspicions were directed against Eumenes, and it was induced to send C. Sulpicius Gallus and M. Sergius to Asia, to investigate the charges which had been laid against him, or to collect materials for future accusations; and it instructed them to visit Greece on their way, and take cognizance of the dispute which was still agitated between Sparta and Megalopolis about their confines.² According to Pausanias, a like question had been revived between Sparta and Argos.³ But whatever controversies of this nature may have been brought before him, Gallus it seems thought them all beneath his notice, and referred them to the decision of Callicrates, an opportunity which his delegate probably did not neglect, to enrich himself at the expense of one or both the parties. Gallus however

Embassy of
Gallus

¹ Polyb. xxx. 20. On the other hand we learn that statues were erected to him (Polyb. Exc. Vat. p. 448.); which however was anything but a proof of public esteem.

² Polyb. xxxi. 9.

³ vii. 11. 1.

had received some other more secret instructions, which he could only execute by the exercise of his own authority. He was directed to take measures for detaching as many places as he could from the Achæan League. Yet within Peloponnesus he seems to have found no occasion or pretext for any act of dismemberment, and we only hear that he gave an encouraging reception to the Ætolians of Pleuron, when they came to him with a petition that their connection with the Achæans might be severed, and permitted them to send an embassy for that purpose to the Senate, which finally decided in their favour.¹ The conduct of Gallus toward Eumenes in Asia, as described by Polybius², justifies the belief that there is no exaggeration in the account given in general terms by Pausanias, of the arrogance with which he treated the Greeks. To mortify and humble them by all means in his power, was probably a part of his instructions, and he could not execute this commission better than by conferring honours and favours on Callicrates.

But so long as the exiles were detained in Italy, the voice of Callicrates seems to have been sufficient to decide all questions of public policy in the Achæan Assembly. In the year 152, on the occasion of a war which had broken out between Crete and Rhodes, envoys from each island came to solicit aid from the Achæans. When both sides had been heard, the inclination of the Assembly manifestly leaned in favour of Rhodes. But Callicrates then rose, and put an end to the debate with the simple declaration, that the Achæans ought not either to wage war or send succours without the sanction of Rome.³ On such questions he was listened to as the organ of the Senate, and the speaker's unpopularity did not at all lessen the weight of his counsels.

¹ Paus. u. s. § 5.² xxxl. 10.³ Polyb. xxxiii. 15.

Yet, justly odious as he was, the time was at hand when his countrymen found reason to look back with regret on the period of his sway, and might be tempted to believe that they could not have followed wiser guidance. At the end of seventeen years after their transportation to Italy, when through a variety of causes, which however might all be traced to the sickness of hope deferred, the original number had shrunk from above 1000 to below 300, the exiles were permitted to return to Peloponnesus. The embassies which had been sent to intercede for them, after the Senate had refused to grant them a trial, had waived all pleas of right, and confined themselves to the language of the humblest supplication, but with no better effect. The Senate would not even consent to the release of Polybius and Stratius, when this was made the object of a special request.¹ It was not before the year 154 that any indications could be discerned of a more favourable disposition at Rome. Opinions were then so divided on the subject, that when the question was debated, if the presiding prætor, A. Postumius, had not been adverse to the exiles, there would have been a majority in their favour.² Yet two years later another suppliant embassy was dismissed with another peremptory refusal.³ The Roman friends of Polybius were, it seems, too well acquainted with the views and temper of the Senate, to intercede directly even in his behalf. It was not until long after the death of Paullus that a prospect was opened, to encourage them to make any attempt in behalf of the whole body of his fellow-sufferers. But in the year 151, when the question was raised once more, Scipio Æmilianus exerted his interest with the censor Cato, whose son had married his sister, to gain the accession of his voice on their side; and Cato's authority turned the scale in their favour. It

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Return of
the Achæan
exiles.

¹ Polyb. xxxii. 7.

² Ibid. xxxiii. 1.

³ Ibid. 13.

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was however only after a long debate, and then by an appeal, not to the justice or the humanity of the Senate, but to the Roman pride. "Have we nothing better to do," he asked, "than to be deliberating a whole day about a few old Greeks, whether they shall be put in the grave here or in their own country?" But when the restoration was decreed, and Polybius proceeded to solicit Cato's intercession for an additional boon, that he and his friends might be reinstated in all the privileges which they had enjoyed before their deportation, the old man warned him with a smile, not to venture back into the cave of the Cyclops for the sake of any trifles which he might have left behind there.¹

It seems clear from this authentic account, that the Senate was taken by surprise and shamed out of its jealousy, and granted the indulgence which had been so long importunately implored in mere indifference and contempt. If it had foreseen the results which were to ensue from the return of the exiles, it would most probably have consented to it sooner; but they were such as it was hardly possible to calculate.² Among the restored were some whose presence in Greece was at this juncture the worst calamity that could befall their country. We have to deplore the loss of that part of the work of Polybius in which he gave a full account of the character and history of the men, among whom he names Diæus and Damocritus, Alcamenes, Theodectes, and Archicrates.³ But from

Diæus and
his party.

¹ Polyb. xxxv. 6.

² Not only Flathe (ii. p. 639.), but Schorn, who is so much more cautious and impartial (p. 381.), believes that the restoration of the exiles was designed by the senate to give occasion to disturbances which might afford a pretext for open hostility.

³ Polyb. xi. 4. 9. Lucas (p. 44. n.) observes that this passage was probably the ground of Heeren's assertion (*Alte Gesch.* 1821, p. 342.), that *Diæus, Critolaus, and Damocritus had returned from their confinement in Italy with exasperated feelings*, but does not warrant it; since even if the reading *τερευχόμες*, which Schweighæuser would alter to *τερευχόμεναι*, be retained, the passage cannot refer to

the terms in which he speaks of them in the extant fragments, and from the facts recorded of them, we may collect that they were, like so many who have been placed in similar circumstances, men who had learnt nothing and forgot nothing in their exile, who came back burning with hatred and thirst of vengeance, not only against the Romans but against all whom they regarded as friends of Rome, bent on satiating this vengeance at any cost, but quite incapable of a sober estimate of the means they possessed of compassing their end. There were probably several among them who had been carried away to Italy when they were just entering on public life.¹ In the seclusion of the Italian towns they could gain little political experience; and the long indulgence of malignant passions, the dreams of ambition and revenge with which they beguiled their tedious hours, the perpetual fluctuation between sanguine hopes and listless despondency common to men in such a situation, could only tend to weaken and distort their natural judgment. When to all this it is added that they were as mercenary and unprincipled as Callicrates himself, it will be evident that they were even still less fitted than he to direct the counsels of the nation, and that nothing but ruin was to be expected from the predominance of their influence. Polybius also revisited Greece for a time. In the

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the Italian exile. And this indeed seems clear from the cause assigned for their return, *διὰ τὴν ἐνεστῶσαν ἀκρισίαν*, which is plainly the *ἀκρισία* and *τοραχὴ* mentioned before (xxviii. 4. l.). But the connection between the return of the exiles and the subsequent disturbances is distinctly stated by Zonaras (ix. 31.). *Ἐπεὶ τῶν Ἑλλήνων οἱ κορυφαῖότατοι ὑπὸ τοῦ Παύλου Αἰμιλίου μετακίσθησαν εἰς τὴν Ἰταλίαν, οἱ λοιποὶ τὸ μὲν πρῶτον πρεσβείαις τοὺς ἄνδρας ἀπήλυον. Ὡς δ' οὐκ ἔτυχον, καὶ τινες ἐκείνων, τὴν οὐκ αὖτε ἀπογνόντες ἐπάνοδον, ἑαυτοὺς διεχρήσαντο, χαλεπῶς διέκωντο, καὶ πένθος δημόσιον ἐποίησαντο, τοῖς τε τὰ Ῥωμαίων φρονούσι παρὰ σφίσι ἀργίζοντο, οὐ μόντοι καὶ πολέμιόν τι ἐπεδείξαντο, μέχρις οὗ τοὺς περιλιπεῖς τῶν ἄνδρων ἐκείνων ἐκομίσαντο. Τότε δὲ διανεχθέντες ἀλλήλοις οἱ ἠδικημένοι καὶ οἱ τὰ ἄλλότρια ἔχοντες, ἐπολέμησαν.*

¹ Polybius (xi. 4. 4.) observes of Stratius that he was ἤδη γήραος. The remark seems to indicate that it would not have been applicable to many who had returned from Italy.

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first year of the third Punic War he was summoned to attend the consul Manilius at Lilybæum; but when he reached Corcyra, having received intelligence of the submission of the Carthaginians, he returned to Peloponnesus¹, not however, it appears, to make a long stay there. He probably found that his intimacy with Scipio, and the favour by which he had been distinguished at Rome, were so many barriers, which intercepted his prospects of honour, authority, and useful activity in his native land. Possibly he abandoned himself too soon to despair, was too eager to return to the society of his Roman friends, and to the great theatre where he had an opportunity of witnessing, from the most favourable position, the most momentous scenes in the history of mankind, to record which was the main business of his life. He may have deceived himself with the belief that he was likely to be more useful to his country in Italy than at home. Perhaps he would have acted a more generous part if he had remained in Peloponnesus to support the patriotic efforts of his friend Stratius. His proper place may have been at Corinth, when he was standing before Carthage. But, beside that he may again have been obeying orders from Rome, we can only say, that in him such devotion to a sinking cause would have been singularly magnanimous; there appears not the smallest likelihood that it would have produced any sensible effect on the course of events.

State of
Athens.

The closing scenes in the history of the Achæan League are represented as having been introduced by a transaction in which Athens bore a principal part, and which is chiefly remarkable as an illustration of the state into which that city had now sunk. Even before the disastrous war in which its territory suf-

¹ Exc. Vat. p. 447.

ferred so much from Philip's merciless ravages, it had been driven to seek occasional relief from the growing pressure of poverty at the hands of the Eastern princes, particularly the Ptolemies, whose munificence it endeavoured to attract and requite by the most profuse and exquisite flattery.¹ The policy of Euryclides and Micio, who directed its affairs during several years of Philip's reign, seems to have consisted almost wholly in such mendicancy. Its connection with Rome, which set little value on its choicest honours and most sounding phrases, was rather burdensome than profitable. According to Valerius Antias indeed, the Senate had rewarded it for its loyalty at the end of the first Macedonian war by the grant of Paros, Imbros, Delos, and Scyros.² But the fact is questionable, as we learn from Polybius³ that after the termination of the war with Perseus they sent an embassy to Rome, to ask for Delos and Lemnos. The same envoys were instructed to intercede for the people of Haliartus; but, if they found the Senate inexorable, then to beg that the territory of Haliartus might be annexed to Attica. The Senate rejected the first of these petitions, but granted the territory of Haliartus⁴ and the two islands, and, in answer to the remonstrances of the Delians, decreed that they should migrate with all their moveable property to Achaia.⁵ They were there admitted to the franchise, and the Athenians were compelled by the Senate to adjust the differences which arose out of the transfer according to the Achæan laws. The Senate at the same time declared Delos a free port, and was thus enabled to strike a ruinous blow

¹ Polyb. v. 106.² Liv. xxxiii. 30.³ xxx. 18.⁴ Polyb. Exc. Vat. p. 437. 'Ἐκ τῆς τῶν Ἀλιαρτίων χώρας δυνείδος αὐτοῖς μᾶλλον ἢ κερπός τις συνεξηκολούθησεν. Strabo, ix. p. 411. Τὴν χώραν ἐχουσίαν Ἀθηναῖοι δόσαν Ῥωμαίων.⁵ Polyb. xxxii. 17.

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Embassy of
the phi-
losophers.

at the commerce and revenues of Rhodes.¹ But the possession of Delos, and the sovereignty of Lemnos, could not afford any very important relief to the poverty of Athens; and in the year 156 the public distress was so urgent there, that the people was persuaded, by some advisers it seems less scrupulous and discreet than Micio and Euryclides, to resort to an extraordinary remedy. An expedition was undertaken against Oropus, which was surprised and plundered. The Oropians complained of this outrage to the Senate, which was indignant at such encroachment on its monopoly of rapine, and directed the Sicyonians to lay a mulct on the Athenians proportioned to the damage done to Oropus. No advocates appeared in behalf of Athens at Sicyon, and the sentence imposed the enormous penalty of 500 talents. The extravagance of this sum, whether as compared with the value of the spoil carried off from Oropus or with the resources of Athens, may be the better estimated, if we remember that Polybius calculates the amount of all the booty found by Cleomenes in Megalopolis at 300 talents, and that no more than 500 were exacted by the Romans themselves in the utmost bitterness of their anger from all Ætolia. It was to obtain a remission or mitigation of this penalty that the Athenians sent the celebrated embassy of the three philosophers to Rome: the Stoic Diogenes, the Peripatetic Critolaus², and Carneades, the founder of the third Academic school. If they were not profound thinkers, they were in their various styles among the most eloquent talkers of the day. Yet it is probable they would scarcely have

¹ Polyb. κκxi. 7. Καταλέλυται ἡ τοῦ λιμένος πρόσδος, ὁμῶν Δῆλον ἀτελῆ πεποικῶτων. The customs (τὸ ἐλλυμένιον. See Bockh Ath. Staatsh. iii. 5.) had sunk from 1,000,000 to 150,000 drachmæ.

² This was no doubt one of those great occasions on which alone Critolaus thought it fit that his services should be used, like the Salaminia or the Paralus. (Plut. Relp. Ger. Præc. 15.)

been selected for such a mission, if their success had depended entirely on the impression which their pleading might make on the Senate. But it was known that there was now a large circle among the highest families of Rome, in which the clinching logic of Diogenes, the ethical paradoxes of Critolaus, who maintained that pleasure was an evil¹, and the speculative impartiality of Carneades,—whose most intimate scholar could never discover what opinion he really held on any question², as there was none which he could not maintain with equal plausibility—would be received with avidity and delight. The envoys in fact found numerous patrons and admirers at Rome. On their first introduction to the Senate, their speeches were translated by a senator, C. Acilius, who also supported their suit in his own person³; and while their cause remained pending, each of them, but especially Carneades, drew crowds of the young nobility to their private exhibitions of philosophical rhetoric.⁴ Cato was deeply displeased and alarmed by the reports he heard of the fascination which they were exerting on the Roman youth; and in his place in the Senate he censured the magistrates, who had allowed a set of men to be waiting so long for the despatch of their business, who were able to gain assent to whatever proposition they would.⁵ It was not however, we must observe, the matter of their discourses, nor the indifference with which Carneades, after he had descanted in praise of justice one day, showed on the next that as much might be as well said against it⁶, that gave offence to the old Cen-

¹ A. Gell. N. A. ix. 5.² Cicero, Ac. Quæst. ii. 45.³ A. Gell. N. A. vii. 14. Plut. Cat. Maj. 22.⁴ Macrobius, Sat. i. 5. *Quos ferunt seorsum quemque ostentandi gratia per celeberrima urbis loca magno conventu hominum dissertavisse.*⁵ Plut. u. s.⁶ Lactantius, Div. Inst. v. 15. *Audiente Galba, et Catone Censorio. He spoke, it seems, boldly. Romanis ipsis, qui totius orbis potirentur, si justii velint esse, hoc est, si aliena restituant, ad causas esse redeundum.*

sor, who had himself unconsciously imbibed the principles of Polus, Thrasymachus, and Gorgias, to his heart's core, had never been able to perceive a distinction between might and right, justice and expediency¹, and thought it no bad argument for the destruction of Carthage, that the African figs were so large and good.² The danger which he dreaded was lest the growing enthusiasm for foreign literature and arts should supersede the old Italian tastes and modes of thinking, and the young Romans should be diverted from the business of the forum or the camp by a passion for frivolous disputations. The success of the philosophers in the object of their embassy was greater in appearance than in reality.³ The Senate indeed reduced the penalty to 100 talents; but it must have been known that even this was much more than it was in the power of Athens to raise. Nor was it ever paid. By means of a negotiation, which is related in a manner not perfectly intelligible to us, the Athenians prevailed on the people of Oropus, not only to forego the compensation which had been awarded to them, but to accept an Athenian garrison and to give hostages to the Athenians, on condition that, if they should create any fresh ground of complaint to the Oropians, the garrison should be withdrawn and the hostages restored.⁴

In the year following the return of the exiles this case arose. The Athenian garrison committed some outrage on the townspeople, who demanded the restitution of the hostages and the evacuation of their town. This the Athenians refused to grant, but offered to punish the offenders. The Oropians applied

¹ Polyb. xxxii. 2. § 6. *Aiei συνέβαινε, τοὺς Καρχηδονίους ἐλαττοῦσθαι παρὰ τοῖς Ῥωμαίοις, οὐ τῷ δικαίῳ, ἀλλὰ τῷ πεπεῖσθαι τοὺς κρινόντας, συμφέρειν σφίσι τὴν τοιαύτην γνώμην.*

² Plut. Cat. 27.

³ According to Ælian (V. H. iii. 17.), the Senate declared that the Athenians had sent envoys who were irresistible.

⁴ Paus. vii. 11. 5.

to the Achæan League for redress ; but the Achæan Assembly, which had no authority over either party and bore no ill-will to Athens, declined to interfere. A Spartan named Menalcidas was at this time chief magistrate of the League, and his character seems to have been so notorious as to encourage the Oropians to tamper with him. For a bribe of ten talents he undertook to espouse their cause ; and that he might be able to execute his engagement he promised five talents to Callicrates as the price of his assistance. The influence of Callicrates we find still continued unimpaired, and he carried a decree to send succours to Oropus. The Athenians however no sooner heard of it than they made another expedition to Oropus, again pillaged the town, and then withdrew their garrison. The two associates then urged the invasion of Attica, but met with opposition, it is said, from the Lacedæmonian troops, which induced them to desist and disband their forces. Menalcidas, though he had rendered no service to the Oropians, exacted payment of his bribe ; but when he had received it defrauded Callicrates of his share. Callicrates in revenge brought a capital charge against Menalcidas, when he had gone out of office, as having endeavoured to persuade the Romans to detach Sparta from the Achæan League. Menalcidas found himself in so much danger, that he thought it necessary to purchase the protection of his successor Diæus with a bribe of three talents, and with his help escaped condemnation. But he was so generally odious that Diæus incurred much obloquy through his interference, and according to Pausanias it was to divert public attention from this subject that he pushed the Achæans into violent measures against Sparta, which in the end involved the League in a fatal struggle with Rome.¹

¹ Paus. vii. 12. 3.

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B. C. 150.

Origin of
the Achæan
war.

B. C. 149.

Duplicity
of Diæus.

The occasion seems to have been furnished by an appeal which the Spartans made to the Senate against the decision of Callicrates on the boundary dispute. The answer they had received was, that they must submit to the decree of the Achæan Assembly in all matters not involving questions of life or death. But Diæus misrepresented this answer, and persuaded the Assembly that it was invested with an unlimited jurisdiction over Sparta, and when the Spartans proposed to ascertain the fact by a reference to the Senate, charged them with an infringement of the fundamental article of the constitution, which forbade any of the united states to send an embassy to a foreign Power without the sanction of the whole body. On this ground war was declared against them, and Diæus made preparations for the invasion of Laconia. Conscious of their inability to resist, they sent embassies to the principal cities of the League to deprecate the threatened attack, and endeavoured to propitiate Diæus himself. But every city declared itself bound to obey the orders of the General when he called for its contingent. And Diæus professed that he was not going to make war on Sparta, but on the men who disturbed her tranquillity. On this hint the Gerusia inquired the names of the individuals who were the objects of his hostility, and he sent in a list of four and twenty of the principal men of Sparta. They adopted the sagacious proposal of Agasisthenes, who advised them to seek refuge at Rome, with full confidence that they would soon be restored by the Senate. After their departure they were condemned to death by a Spartan tribunal, and the Achæans sent Callicrates¹ and Diæus to Rome, to oppose their restoration. Callicrates fell ill and died on the road,

Death of
Callicrates.

¹ This renders it very doubtful that his statues were removed, as Lucht supposes (ad Polyb. Exc. V. p. 82.), at the instance of Polybius and the other exiles immediately on their return.

at a juncture when for the first time in his life he might have done some service to his country; though the nature of his relations to Diæus is too obscure to permit more than a very uncertain conjecture on this point; but it is not improbable that he might have checked the violence, and have counteracted the intrigues of his colleague. At Rome Diæus found Menalcidas his chief antagonist, though he does not seem to have been one of the Twenty-Four; and a warm altercation arose between them in the Senate. But the answer which they carried back declared that the Senate was about to send envoys to decide the dispute between Sparta and the Achæan League. This embassy however delayed its appearance somewhat long, and in the meanwhile both Diæus and Menalcidas, having perhaps been themselves the dupes of the Senate's equivocation, deceived their countrymen with a false report of their success. Diæus gave out that the Spartans had been enjoined to obey the Achæans in all things; Menalcidas, that they were to be detached from the Achæan League.¹ Thus the Achæans were encouraged to renew hostilities, the Spartans to venture on resistance.

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In the meanwhile a fresh war had broken out in Macedonia, where Andriscus, a young man of low birth, a native it is said of Adramyttium, giving himself out to be a son of Perseus, whom he resembled in his person², and assuming the name of Philip, had been universally acknowledged as king. We are the less surprised at his success, when we observe that

Andriscus.

¹ PAUS. VII. 12.

² ZONARAS, IX. 28. LIV. EPIST. XLIX. FLORUS, II. 14. *Ex similitudine Philippi, Pseudo-Philippus vocabatur*: probably a conjecture to explain the name. But I find no authority any where for Schorn's statement (p. 386.) that he gave himself out for Philip, the brother and adopted son of Perseus. From Polybius (Exc. Vat. p. 446.) it only appears that when the first rumour of his attempt reached Rome, it was supposed there that he was personating that Phillip; and so Polybius observes that the true Phillip was known to have died at Alba. It is the explanation of the preceding remark: τὸ μὲν πρῶτον οὐδ' ἀνεκτὸς ὁ λόγος ἐφαίνετο.

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Macedonia had been the scene of continual disorders and tumults, ever since the establishment of a republican government; and we can hardly doubt that the Senate foresaw and designed this effect of the new constitution. Three years after the battle of Pydna Roman envoys were sent to inspect the state of Macedonia, because, as Polybius remarks, the Macedonians, being unused to a democratical and representative government, were divided into factions.¹ Two years after we find a Macedonian, named Damasippus, who, after having massacred the members of one of the legislative councils, had fled with his wife and children, sailing in the same galley with a Roman envoy²; and if we might rely on an insulated statement of uncertain authority, we should be led to infer that in the year B. C. 158 at least one important change was introduced into the internal administration of Macedonia; for we are informed that the mines, the closing of which had been considered as indispensable for the preservation of tranquillity, then began to be worked again.³ In the same year in which the Achæan exiles returned a Macedonian embassy had been sent to Rome, to request that Æmilianus might be appointed commissioner to heal their dissensions.⁴ It was natural therefore that any pretender, who held out a prospect of internal peace together with the restoration of the monarchy, should be hailed by all parties with an eager welcome. Andriscus, or, as the Romans called him, Pseudo-Philippus, appears to have been endowed with qualities which he could scarcely have inherited from the father whom he claimed, and which rendered him worthier of the throne than any

¹ xxxi. 12. Ἀφθεῖς ὄντας δημοκρατικῆς καὶ συνεθριακῆς πολιτείας, στασιάζειν πρὸς αὐτούς.

² Polyb. xxxi. 25.

³ *Cassiodori Chronicon. M. Æmylius et C. Popilius. His coss. metalla in Macedonia instituta.*

⁴ Polyb. xxxv. 4.

son of Perseus would probably have been. But the accounts remaining of his actions are so scanty, that we may be in danger of overrating his abilities. Having failed in his first attempt to excite an insurrection in Macedonia, he had fled to Syria, to solicit aid from Demetrius Soter, but by him was sent as a prisoner to Rome. The Senate did not think him worth notice, or was not loth to see him renew his enterprise, and suffered him to depart. He collected a band of adventurers, drew several towns east of the Strymon over to his side, and strengthened himself by alliances with the Thracian tribes, which supplied him with a large body of auxiliaries, with which he made himself master of Macedonia, and advanced into Thessaly.¹ The Senate at first thought it sufficient to send Scipio Nasica, to quell the revolt by a peaceable intervention², but soon learnt that the danger had grown serious. Nasica collected an Achæan force³, marched into Thessaly, and compelled Andricus to retreat into Macedonia, and kept him occupied there until he was relieved by the arrival of a Roman army under the prætor, P. Juventius Thalna. A battle ensued in which Thalna was defeated and slain, and Andricus again invaded Thessaly. The next year the prætor, Q. Cæcilius Metellus, was sent against him with a stronger force. Metellus arrived in Macedonia nearly at the same time that Damocritus, who had succeeded Diæus as General, was preparing to invade Laconia. At this juncture a Roman embassy was on its way to Asia, and at the desire of Metellus endeavoured to prevent hostilities in Peloponnesus, and urged the Achæans to wait for the

¹ Polyb. Exc. Vat. p. 446. Πάρεστί τις ἐπὶ τὴν Μακεδονίαν ἀεροπετής φ.

² Zonaras (u. s.). Εἰρηρικῶς πως τὰ ἐκεῖ διοικήσονται.

³ Liv. Epist. 1. *Thessulia quum et illam invadere armis et occupare Pseudo-Philippus vellet per legatos Romanorum auxiliis Achæorum defensa est.* Zonaras (u. s.), Nasica. Eis τὴν Ἑλλάδα ἐλθὼν, . . . δύναμιν παρὰ τῶν ἐκεῖ συμμάχων ἀθροίσας, ἔργον εἴχετο, καὶ προσῆλθε μέχρι Μακεδονίας. Polyb. Exc. Vat. p. 447. Θετταλῶν γράμματα καὶ πρεσβευτὰς πεμφθέντων πρὸς τοὺς Ἀχαιοὺς καὶ παρακαλούντων βοηθεῖν.

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commissioners who were coming from Rome to compose their dispute with the Spartans. Damocritus however paid no heed to their advice, but as soon as they were gone marched into Laconia. The Spartans gave him battle with it seems very inferior numbers, and were defeated with the loss of 1000 of their best troops. It was generally believed, that if Damocritus had followed up his victory with due activity he would have made himself master of Sparta, and at the close of his official year he was brought to trial on a charge of treachery, and condemned to a fine of fifty talents, which, as he was unable to pay it, forced him to go into exile. He was succeeded in office by Diæus.

B. C. 148.
Overpowered by
Metellus.

In the meanwhile the war in Macedonia was brought to an end. Attalus of Pergamus brought a fleet to second the operations of the Roman army, and Andriscus, being obliged to provide for the defence of his coast, fell back on Macedonia. Near Pydna however he defeated the Roman cavalry, but was afterwards induced to divide his forces into two corps, which were separately routed by Metellus. Andriscus escaped into Thrace, where he collected another army with which he again gave battle to the Romans, but lost the day, and having taken refuge with a Thracian chief named Byzes was delivered up to Metellus.¹ While he waited in Macedonia for the arrival of the commissioners who were to reduce it into a province, Diæus was preparing to prosecute the war with Sparta, but, being warned by Metellus to desist, promised to suspend hostilities until the expected mediators should arrive. But if he observed the letter of this promise he broke it in substance, for he introduced Achæan troops into the Laconian towns in the vicinity of Sparta, which it seems continued to

¹ Zonaras (u. s.) Liv. Epist. 1. Florus, ii. 14.

infest the country by frequent inroads. The Spartans were driven by their distress to an expedient like that to which the Athenians had resorted in the case of Oropus: they surprised and plundered the border town of Iasus. But as this was a palpable breach of the armistice, and an act of direct disobedience to the injunctions of Metellus, they soon repented of their rashness, and Menalcidas, who had drawn them into the undertaking, was so alarmed at the prospect of the consequences, that he put an end to his own life by poison.¹

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The embassy which was to restore tranquillity to Greece seems to have been purposely delayed until the end of the Macedonian war, when it might safely assume a tone of absolute authority which would hardly have been prudent while Andriscus was still formidable. It arrived in Peloponnesus while Diæus was in office, and the chief commissioner, M. Aurelius Orestes, called a meeting of the Achæan magistrates to Corinth, and plainly informed them that the Senate did not think it right, that either Sparta or Corinth itself should any longer be comprehended in the Achæan League, but desired that Argos and Heraclea in Trachis, and the Arcadian Orchomenus, should be restored to independence, being of different origin and late accessions to the League. In other words, the League was to be reduced to its primitive state, when it included only the Achæan towns. The Achæan magistrates were so indignant at this demand, that they did not even wait until Orestes had ended his speech, but rushed out into the streets and hastily summoned an Assembly, to which they communicated the proposal which they had just heard. It roused a furious burst of popular resentment, which however was directed against the Spartans

B. C. 147.
Embassy of
Orestes.

¹ PAUS. VII. 13.

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Embassy
of Julius
Sextus.

sojourning in Corinth. As many of them as could be found were arrested, and some of them were dragged away from the house of Orestes himself. It was in vain that he expostulated with the multitude, and warned them that they were offering wrong and insult to Romans. All who had been seized, and who proved to be Spartans, were a few days after thrown into prison. Orestes himself and his colleagues narrowly escaped violence.¹ On their return to Rome they complained with much exaggeration of the treatment they had received, which they maliciously represented as the effect of deliberate contrivance. The Senate appointed a fresh embassy with Julius Sextus at its head, but instructed him to use the mildest language of friendly admonition, and only to require satisfaction from the authors of the outrages. Polybius would consider this as a proof that the object of the instructions given to Orestes was not to break the League, but merely to frighten and humble the Achæans; though there were some, he observes, who regarded this forbearance as mere dissimulation, adopted because the war with Carthage was still unfinished. He himself professes to believe that the Romans wished to spare the Achæans, and only sought to inspire them with a wholesome terror.² But this supposition is utterly inconsistent both with the character of the Senate, and with the policy it had hitherto pursued toward the Achæans, as well as toward the other states of Greece. The dissolution of the League was the object to which its measures had been long tending, and it might easily foresee that the sudden change in its tone would be so misinterpreted as to give occasion to some fresh indiscretion, which might afford a fair pretext for greater severity. After the departure of Orestes the Achæans had

¹ Paus vii. 14. Polyb. xxxviii. 1.

² U. s.

sent Thearidas at the head of an embassy, to offer an apology for the scene which had taken place at Corinth. Their envoys met Sextus on their way to Rome, and at his desire returned with him to Peloponnesus. Diæus had now been succeeded in office by Critolaus, an equally violent and imprudent enemy of Rome, and no less bent on widening the breach, on which he probably believed all his hopes of authority and influence, and even his personal safety, to depend. The pacific language of the Romans in the Assembly at Ægium was treated by him and his partizans as a symptom of fear. The Senate, they supposed, or endeavoured to persuade the multitude, felt itself embarrassed by the Celtiberian and Carthaginian wars, and therefore wished to avoid a struggle with the Achæans. It must also have been imagined that the state of Macedonia was not yet sufficiently tranquil to permit Metellus to employ his troops elsewhere, and in fact after the overthrow of Andriscus a fresh pretender named Alexander started up, calling himself a son of Perseus, and established himself for a time on the banks of the Nestus, but was forced to fly before Metellus into Dardania. A courteous answer however was given to Sextus. Thearidas was directed to proceed on his mission to Rome; but the Roman envoys were invited to a conference at Tegea, for the purpose of adjusting the dispute with Sparta. Sextus and his colleagues accordingly repaired to Tegea, where they were met by Spartan ministers; but after they had been kept long waiting for the arrival of the Achæans, Critolaus came almost alone, and after an interview with the Spartans informed Sextus that he had no authority to decide on such questions, but that he would refer them to the next regular Assembly, which was to be held at the end of six months. Sextus saw that a plan had been laid to deceive and affront him, and immediately set

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Critolaus.

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Inflames the
Achæans
against
Rome.

out on his return to Italy. His report seems to have induced the Senate to decree war with the Achæan League. Critolaus in the meanwhile was exerting his utmost efforts to hasten the rupture. In the course of the winter he made a circuit through the principal towns, to inflame the passions of the people against the Romans and the Spartans by perhaps partial and exaggerated accounts of the conference at Tegea; and he won the most numerous class of the community to his side by an order which must have been a great strain of the prerogatives of his office, that the magistrates should suspend all legal proceedings for the recovery of debts until the war should be brought to a close.¹

Metellus had hoped to follow up the conquest of Macedonia with the pacification of Greece, and the intelligence which he received of the course which affairs were taking in Peloponnesus induced him to send four of his officers to attend the Achæan Assembly at Corinth, and if possible allay the ferment which had been excited by Critolaus. They were instructed it appears to repeat the gentle warnings and advice of Sextus. But the popular feeling had now been so strongly roused against Rome that their smooth phrases only served to feed the flame, and they were obliged to retire amidst the jeers and hootings of the multitude, and were even bespattered with mud as they passed through the streets.² Polybius indeed intimates that Critolaus was chiefly supported by the lowest of the populace, and by the soldiery.³ This was no doubt so far true, that those who had most to lose were least willing to expose themselves to the risk of a war with Rome, and most clearly perceived the danger. But there is no reason to believe that the hatred toward Rome was confined to any class;

¹ Polyb. xxxviii. 2, 3. Paus. vii. 14.

² Strabo, viii. p. 381.

³ Polyb. xxxviii. 2. 8.

and Polybius himself observes, that all the cities of the League were infatuated, but Corinth most generally and deeply.¹ Critolaus took this occasion to deliver an inflammatory harangue, in which he inveighed against the Romans, threw out hints that he had received promises of assistance from foreign Powers, and told the people that if they were men they would be in no want of allies, nor, if weaklings, of masters.² He set the Council³, which attempted to restrain him, at defiance, and declared that he feared neither Sparta nor Rome, but only the traitors who were in correspondence with the enemy and divulged the secrets of the state. By such arts he carried a decree of war, nominally, as Polybius observes, with Sparta, but really against Rome. It was in itself equivalent to an assertion of the absolute independence of the League; and by another decree the General was invested with unlimited authority; and it was thus left to the discretion of Critolaus to conduct operations in the way which he might think best calculated to provoke hostilities with the Romans.

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Such appears to have been the use which he made of his enlarged powers. When he took the field in the spring of 146, it was to march not against Sparta, but northward to the vale of the Spercheius, where he laid siege to Heraclea, which had renounced its connection with the Achæan League, or refused to enter into it. This movement seems to have been undertaken in the hope of exciting a general revolt in Bœotia and Eubœa. The Thebans, apparently under the pressure of the general poverty, had made inroads into the territories of their neighbours, and had been condemned by Me-

Lays siege
to Heraclea.

¹ XXXVIII. 4. 5. Πᾶσαι μὲν ἐκόρυζον αἱ πόλεις, πανδημίη δὲ καὶ μάλιστα πᾶσι ἢ τῶν Κορινθίων.

² U. s. § 9. Ἐὰν μὲν ἄνδρες ᾄδωσι, οὐκ ἀπορήσουσιν συμμάχων, ἐὰν δ' ἀνδρόγυνοι (Diodorus, Mal, p. 96., ἀνδράποδα), κυρίων.

³ Τῶν τῆς γεροντίας, probably, as I have already observed, the Demiluges. See above, p. 91.

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tellus to pay three fines, one to the Phocians, another to the Eubœans, the third to the Locrians of Amphissa.¹ In their misery and despair they had promised to join Critolaus with all their forces, and the Bœotarch Pytheas, who seems to have had some private grounds of alarm, had instigated the Achæans to the war. Whether Chalcis was urged by any stronger motive than the remembrance of the oppression it had suffered from the Romans, we are not informed; but it sent a body of auxiliaries to the Achæan army. It was now known that the command of the forces destined for the war with the Achæans had been assigned to the consul L. Mummius, who was expected shortly to arrive in Greece. As Metellus was on this account more anxious than ever to bring the Achæans to terms, so he might reasonably expect that, when such a storm was gathering over their heads, they would be more willing to listen to his overtures. He again sent to assure them that they need not despair of pardon, if they would even now comply with the injunctions of the Romans which had been conveyed to them by Orestes, and abandon their connection with Sparta and the other cities which it had been proposed to separate from the League.² Critolaus however had gone too far to recede with safety, and remained inflexible. According to Pausanias Metellus had begun his march from Macedonia at the same time that his envoys set out on their mission, and he was therefore probably already in Thessaly when he met them on their return. He is said to have advanced with such speed that he had

¹ Paus. vii. 14. 7.

² This appears to be the meaning of Pausanias (vii. 15. 2.), which however is very differently understood by Schorn (p. 396. n. 1.), who supposes that Metellus only required the Achæans to part with the places which had actually revolted from the League, namely, Sparta, Heraclea, and Pleuron: and he owns himself surprised at the moderation of these terms. I see nothing in the words of Pausanias to suggest such an interpretation, but a clear allusion to the demands of Orestes, as described (c. 14. 1.).

already crossed the Spercheius before the Achæans were apprised of his approach. Their leader was then seized with consternation equal to his previous temerity, and not only raised the siege of Heraclea, but did not even venture to make a stand at Thermopylæ. Yet he allowed himself to be overtaken a little south of the pass, near Scarphea; his forces were there entirely broken, and he himself disappeared, and was never heard of more.¹ The victors advancing to Chæronea fell in with 1000 Arcadians who were returning to Peloponnesus, having marched as far as Elatea to join Critolaus when they heard of his defeat and cut them all to pieces.² The country through which Metellus pursued his march toward the Isthmus was a scene of desolation, misery, and dismay, for which Polybius can hardly find expressions sufficiently strong, though he sets before us the inhabitants of the towns quitting their homes to wander in the mountains, numbers taking refuge from their fears and sufferings in suicide, others attempting to provide for their own safety by voluntary information against their neighbours, or to propitiate the conqueror by the most abject humiliation. Thebes was found entirely deserted; and, though Metellus would not let the fugitives be pursued, many must have perished from hunger and hardships in the trackless wilds to which they fled. Pytheas escaped with his family to Peloponnesus.³

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In the meanwhile Diæus had taken the place of Critolaus, by virtue of the law which provided that on the death of the General his predecessor should resume

Measures
of Diæus.

¹ Pausanias (vii. 15. 4.) supposes him to have been drowned. Zonaras (ix. 31.) has simply Κριτολάου πεισόντος. From Livy (Epist. lxx.) it would seem that he escaped from the battle: *Critolaus veneno sibi mortem conscivit*. But there may have been some confusion between the fate of Critolaus and that of Diæus.

² Orosius (v. 3.) represents Polybius to have related that these Arcadians were commanded by Diæus. But it is hardly possible to reconcile this with Pol. xi. 2.

³ Polyb. xi. 3. Pausanias (vii. 15. 10.) seems to suppose that he was taken in Bœotia, and put to death by Metellus.

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the command until an Assembly was held for a new election. Diæus was no doubt aware that resistance was utterly unavailing. But as the mildest fate he had to expect, if he fell into the power of the Romans, was perpetual exile, he was resolved to hold out to the last. He immediately sent Alcamenes, one of his partizans, with 4000 men to occupy Megara, and himself proceeded to Argos to superintend the levy of fresh troops. He ordered all freemen of military age to appear in arms at Corinth, and 12,000 household slaves to be set at liberty and equipped for the field at the expense of their masters, and raised large sums under the name of voluntary contributions from the opulent, compelling the women to part with the ornaments of their persons. As those who were called upon to make these sacrifices knew that they must be fruitless, and had not the same motives for despair as Diæus, they obeyed his orders with reluctance, especially as he showed great partiality in the assessment of the emancipated slaves, and frequently eluded them; for the whole amount of the new levies, including the freedmen, appears never to have exceeded 14,000 foot¹ and 600 horse. Elis and Messenia, which had never been well affected toward the League, now openly kept aloof. Even the township of Tenea, in the territory of Corinth, is said to have revolted from the Corinthians and to have joined the Romans, who afterwards rewarded it for its desertion.² Before Diæus came to Corinth a council was held there by the Vice-general Sosicrates, in which it was resolved to attempt negotiation with Metellus; and Andronidas, Archippus, and Lagius were sent to his head-quarters. He was eager to terminate the war on any terms con-

¹ τὸ ὀπλιτεῖον, PAUS. VII. 15. 7.

² Strabo, VIII. p. 380. Προσθέσθαι τοῖς Ῥωμαίοις ἀποστάντας Κορινθίων καὶ κατασκαφίσης τῆς πόλεως συμμεῖναι. The Teneates had another claim on the favour of Rome: they pretended to be of Trojan origin. PAUS. II. 5. 4.

sistent with the dignity of Rome, and not only dismissed them with fair promises, but sent Philo, a Thessalian, with similar proposals to Corinth. In the meanwhile he advanced toward the Isthmus. Alcamenes, on his approach, made a hasty retreat from Megara, and the city opened its gates to the Romans. But the arrival of Diæus at Corinth extinguished all hopes of accommodation. He was confirmed in his office by the Assembly, and so prejudiced the people against the envoys by charges of treasonable correspondence with the enemy, that on their return they were arrested, and dragged to prison with the greatest indignities. Philo was admitted to an audience, and Stratius, now an old man, earnestly implored Diæus to accept his proposals. But as he could not believe that he and his party could be included in the benefit of any treaty, he continued inexorable, and urged the people to violent measures against his adversaries. He caused Sosicrates to be condemned to death for the part he had taken in the negotiation with Metellus, and endeavoured to extort a confession of guilt from him by torture, under which he expired, asserting his innocence to the last. The envoys would have suffered a like fate, but the cruel treatment of Sosicrates produced a reaction in their favour, and two of them propitiated Diæus with bribes; for gloomy as his prospects were, he was not the less intent on every opportunity of sordid gain.

Such was the state of affairs when Mummius arrived at the Isthmus, accompanied by Orestes, who seems to have come to see vengeance exacted for the affronts he had endured. Mummius immediately sent Metellus back to Macedonia with his army. His own forces, when they were all assembled, amounted to 23,000 foot and 3500 horse, beside Cretan bowmen and a body of auxiliaries sent by Attalus under the command of his general Philopœmen. The Ro-

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Battle of
Leucopetra.

mans felt so secure in the consciousness of their superiority that they let their advanced posts be surprised by the enemy, who carried away 500 shields, the last trophies of independent Greece. Diæus was so elated by this trifling victory that he immediately led his troops out to battle. Mummius readily accepted the challenge.¹ The Achæan cavalry, all belonging to that class which was adverse to the measures of Diæus, did not even wait for the charge of the Romans, but fled at the beginning of the battle. The infantry, though discouraged by this desertion, kept their ground bravely, until they were attacked in their flanks, which should have been protected by the cavalry. The slaughter was probably not very great, as the field of battle was not far from Corinth; and perhaps the city might, as Pausanias thought, have been allowed to capitulate if it had stood a siege. But it may have been better for Greece that her agony came soon to an end; and, according to Polybius, the saying in every one's mouth was, *If we had not been ruined betimes we should not have been saved.*² Diæus, whether he had lost all presence of mind or felt that he could not retain his authority during a siege, did not attempt to take shelter in Corinth, but brought the first tidings of the disaster to Megalopolis, and having killed his wife with his own hand swallowed a draught of poison.³ The fugitives who escaped from the battle quitted Corinth the same night, together with the greater part of the inhabitants. Mummius had not expected so easy a conquest, and, though

¹ Aur. Victor furnishes a name for the battle. *Corinthios apud Leucopetram vicit.* The place is, I believe, nowhere else mentioned. The analogy of the Italian cape Leucopetra renders it probable that it was the name of a head-land. Justin's account of the presumption of the Achæans as carried to such a height that they brought vehicles with them to carry away the spoil, and placed their wives and children on the tops of the adjacent hills to witness their expected victory, seems scarcely to deserve so much credit as Schorn (p. 401.) is inclined to give to it.

² XL. 5. 12.

³ Aur. Victor adds that he set fire to his house; which seems not to harmonise so well with the manner of his own death.

informed that the gates were open, suspecting some stratagem, suffered an entire day to pass before he marched into the city. Though no resistance was offered, all the men found within the walls were put to the sword; the women and children were reserved for sale; and when all its treasures had been carried away, on a signal given by blast of the trumpet, the city was consigned to the flames. So it is said the Senate had expressly decreed.¹ But vengeance for the insults offered to the Roman envoys was probably more the pretext than the motive for this cruelty.² It was at least no less a crime in the eyes of the Roman soldiers that Corinth was the richest city of Greece. Scarcely any other was adorned with so many precious works of art. Mummius himself had as little eye for them as any of his men, who made dice-boards of the finest master-pieces of painting³; but he knew that such things were highly valued by others, and he therefore preserved those which were accounted the choicest to embellish his triumph; stipulating with the contractors who undertook to transport them to Italy, that they should replace all that might be lost on the passage with new pieces of equal worth.⁴ Those of inferior note he sent as a present to Attalus. It seems to have been chiefly by this indifference that he earned the praise of disinterestedness which is bestowed on him,

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B.C. 146.
Destruction
of Corinth.

¹ Florus, II. 16. *Turbâ præcincte deleta est.* Oros. v. 3. *Muralis lapis in pulverem redactus.*

² Liv. Epl. L. LII. *Omni Achaia in deditionem accepta Corinthon ex senatus-consulto diruit, quia ibi legati Romani violati erant.* Cic. Pro. Leg. Man. 5. *Legati quod erant appellati superbius.* Compare Cic. De Off. I. 11. III. 11. Plut. Lucull. 19.

³ The Dionysus of Aristides, which Polybius himself saw treated in this manner (sp. Strab. VIII. p. 584.) was afterwards put up to sale, and was purchased by Attalus at so high a price, that Mummius, now discovering its value, would not part with it, and notwithstanding the king's complaints carried it to Rome, and dedicated it in a temple of Ceres, with which it was afterwards burnt.

⁴ V. Paterc. I. 13. He was *novus homo.* Dio Chrysostom, Corinth. (u. p. 123. Reisk.) gives other instances of his ignorance. Yet, according to Valer. Max. (VI. 4. 2.), *enervis vita.*

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Proceedings
of Mum-
mius.

not only by the Roman writers, but by Polybius¹, and it seems still more questionable how far he was entitled to the character of lenity which is attributed to him by the same historian, whose narrative of these events in the extant fragments sometimes sounds rather official than historical. Before the arrival of the ten commissioners who were sent in the autumn to regulate the state of Greece, he made a circuit in Peloponnesus to inflict punishment on the cities and persons that had taken an active share in the war. The walls of all such towns were dismantled, and their whole population disarmed.² The adherents of Diæus were sentenced to death or exile, and their property confiscated; and the Achæans—that is, the cities which had contributed to the war—were condemned to pay 200 talents to Sparta. The greater part of the Corinthian territory was annexed to Sicyon, which undertook the superintendence of the Isthmian festival.³ Mummius afterwards marched northward to deal like retribution among the insurgents of Bœotia and Eubœa. He rased Thebes and Chalcis—or at least their walls—to the ground; condemned the Bœotians and Eubœans—or more probably those cities alone—to pay 100 talents to Heraclea, which they had helped to besiege; and at Chalcis he shed so much blood of the principal citizens, that Polybius himself can only reconcile his conduct with the supposed mildness of his character by the suggestion, that he was urged by his council to unwonted severity.⁴

¹ XL. 11. Dlv. Epit. l.ii. *abstinentissimum virum egit*. Compare Strabo, viii. p. 381. Plin. N. H. xxxiv. 17. *Mummius devicta Achaia replevit urbem: ipse excessit non relicturus filia dotem*. Aur. Victor. *Quibus cum totam represset Italiam, in domum suam nihil contulit*. Cic. De Off. ii. 22. *Italiam ornare quam domum suam maluit*.

² Paus. vii. 16. 9. This must limit the statement (ii. 1. 4.) which represents all the walled cities in Greece to have suffered the same treatment.

³ Strabo, viii. p. 381. Paus. ii. 2. 2.

⁴ XL. 11. 4, 5. Zonaras, ix. 31. Τὸ ἄλλο Ἑλληνικὸν παραχρῆμα μὲν καὶ σφαγαῖς καὶ χρημάτων ἐκλογαῖς ἐκακώθη Diodor. Mal, p. 15. Σφαγὰς καὶ πελεκισμοὺς καὶ

It remained for the ten commissioners, according to the instructions of the Senate, to fix the future condition of the conquered nation. All Greece, as far as Macedonia and Epirus, was constituted a Roman province; and Achaia enjoyed the melancholy distinction of giving its name to the whole.¹ But the Senate's jealousy was not satisfied with the formal establishment of its sovereignty: it had also decreed a series of regulations tending as much as possible to restrict every kind of union and intercourse among the Greeks, and to reduce them to the lowest stage of weakness and degradation. All federal assemblies, all democratical politics, were abolished, and the government of each city committed to a magistracy for which a certain amount of property was required as a qualification. No one might acquire land in any part of the province but that in which his franchise lay. The details of this outline, and all temporary measures for the settlement of the country, were left to the discretion of Mummius and the Ten; and Polybius, who appears to have arrived in Greece soon after the fall of Corinth², was now able in some degree to alleviate the calamity which he had found it impossible to

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Greece a
Roman pro-
vince.

ἀρπαγῆς καὶ πανδημείας μεθ' ὄψεως ἀνδραποδισμοῦ. The anecdote in Plutarch (*Sympos.* ix. 1. 2.), even if considered as authentic, would only prove a degree of sensibility not uncommon in men capable of the greatest cruelty. Compare what Plutarch relates of Alexander of Pheræ, *Pelop.* 29.

¹ Strabo, xvii. near the end. Ἐξέδομην Ἀχαίαν μέχρι Θετταλίας καὶ Αἰτωλῶν καὶ Ἀκαρνανῶν, καὶ τινῶν Ἡπειρωτικῶν ἔθνῶν, ὅσα τῇ Μακεδονίᾳ προσέειστο. But as *μέχρι* is here inclusive, a negative seems to be required before *Μακεδονίᾳ*, and perhaps *τῇ* should be *μὴ*.

² Orosius (v. 3.) observes that Polybius was in Africa when Diæus was defeated; and Lucas (p. 45. n.) adopts this statement. Havercamp, the editor of Orosius, considers it as an error, and infers from the fragment of Polybius in Strabo (viii. p. 38.), that he was an eye-witness of the destruction of Corinth; and so Krause (*Vitæ Vett. Historicor. Romanorum*, p. 168.), and Mr. Clinton (*F. H.* 111.). It certainly seems as if scenes such as Polybius described from his own observation could not have taken place long after the fall of the city. On the other hand, it is not likely that Polybius would have hurried to Greece until he learned that the struggle was over. Mai (*Polyb. Exc. Vat.* p. 403.) says: *Corintho delenda inter-fruit, teste Plutarcho, Vit. Philop. fin.* But Plutarch says nothing that intimates any opinion on the point. Schorn likewise (p. 406.) seems to think that he did not arrive before the fall of Corinth.

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Mediation
of Polybius.

avert; and perhaps it would not have been equally in his power to render such services to his countrymen if he had been previously less alienated, at least in appearance, from the national cause. As the intimate friend of the conqueror of Carthage, he was treated with the highest respect and confidence; and he employed his influence so as to win the esteem and gratitude of his fellow-citizens. He refused to accept any portion of the property of Diæus, and induced his friends for the most part to abstain from purchasing that which had been confiscated in other cases; and it seems probable that it was rather to his intercession than to the mercy of the Romans, that the wives and children of the condemned were indebted for the permission they received to retain the property of their husbands and fathers. A Roman, whom he either did not deign or did not think it prudent to name, urged the commissioners to extend the inquisition which they were carrying on against the Achæans who had shown themselves enemies of Rome even to those who had been long dead, and on this ground both to remove the statues of Philopœmen and to abolish the commemorative rights with which he was still honoured. Polybius was obliged to treat the charge—which really did more honour to the memory of his countryman than any statue—as a calumny; but he was able to prove to the satisfaction of the commissioners, that Philopœmen's opposition to the measures of the Romans had never exceeded the limits of mild and respectful remonstrance. Not only were his remaining statues permitted to stand, but those which had been already carried away to Acarnania for embarkation, one of the mythical Achæus, of Aratus, and of Philopœmen—perhaps the most valued as works of art—were restored to Peloponnesus.¹ Mummius himself, when sated

¹ Polyb. xl. 8. Plut. Philop. ult. But it is not clear how these accounts are to

with bloodshed and rapine, showed a disposition to conciliate the vanquished. Before his departure, though he had removed the statue of the Isthmian Poseidon, to dedicate it—in gross violation of religious propriety—in the temple of Jupiter at Rome¹, he repaired the damage which had been done to the public buildings on the Isthmus, adorned the temples of Olympia and Delphi, and made a circuit round the principal Greek cities to receive tokens of their gratitude.²

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Polybius rendered other services to his country which were clearly more solid and important, though we are not sufficiently informed as to their precise nature fully to appreciate them. We learn from Pausanias that he framed political institutions and laws for the cities of the Achæan confederacy³, and he himself relates that he was directed by the commissioners, when they were on the point of departing homeward in the spring after the fall of Corinth, to make a circuit round the cities for the purpose of determining doubtful points, until the people should have become familiar with the constitution and the laws.⁴ It would seem therefore that he drew up the laws and forms of municipal government, of which Pausanias speaks, in the course of the preceding winter. We do not know what cities shared the benefit of his legislation, for which the Macedonian code of Æmilius Paullus might perhaps serve as a model. The political institutions were of course, according to the Senate's decree, strictly oligarchical. And in

His legis-
lation.

be combined with the fragment of Polybius, Mai, p. 459. *Διὰ τὴν προπάρχουσαν τοῦ πλήθους πρὸς Φιλοποιμένα εβνοίαν, οὐ καθέλκον τὰς εἰκόνας αὐτοῦ ἐν πόλεσι τισιν οὖσας.*

¹ Dio Chrys. T. II. p. 123. Belsk. *Ἀνέθηκε τῷ Διὶ φεῦ τῆς ἀμαθίας τὸν ἀδελφὸν ἐς ἀνάθημα.*

² Polyb. XI. 11. Paus. v. 10. 5. 24. 4. and 8.

³ VIII. 30. 9. *Ἑλλήνων ὑπόσαι πόλεις ἐς τὸ Ἀχαικὸν συνετέλουν, παρὰ Ῥωμαίων εβροντο αὐται Πολύβιόν σφισι πολιτείας τε καταστήσασθαι καὶ νόμους δεῖναι.*

⁴ XI. 10. *Μέχρι οὐ συνηθείην ἔχουσι τῇ πολιτείᾳ καὶ τοῖς νόμοις.* These laws therefore were new, and were probably those of which Pausanias speaks.

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Honours
paid to him
in Greece.

this respect no alteration seems ever to have been granted by the Roman government. But in some other points the rigour of its original regulations was a few years afterward greatly relaxed. The fines imposed on the Achæans, and on the Bœotians and Eubœans, were remitted; the restraints on intercourse and commerce were withdrawn; and the federal unions which had been abolished were revived.¹ There can be no doubt but that this indulgence was obtained through the intercession of Polybius, and the influence of his friend Æmilianus.² An inscription on the base of a statue erected to Polybius by his grateful countrymen at Megalopolis, recorded his extensive travels, the services he had rendered to the Romans in their wars, and the success of his mediation, by which he had appeased their resentment against the Greeks. An inscription on another statue declared, that Greece would not have fallen if she had always followed the advice of Polybius, and that after her fall she had found succour through him alone.³ The Romans in their official language seem to have described this renewal of the old forms as a restoration of liberty to Greece.⁴ But even if the monu-

¹ Paus. vii. 16. 10. *Συνέδρια κατὰ ἔθνος ἀποδιδοῦσιν ἕκαστοι τὰ ἀρχαῖα.*

² Plut. Relp. Ger. Præc. 18. *Πολύβιος καὶ Παναίτιος, τῆ Σικιπῖωνος εὐνοίᾳ πρὸς αὐτοὺς μεγάλα τὰς πατρίδας ὠφελήσαντες.*

³ Paus. viii. 30. 37. Polybius himself (Mai, p. 455.) claims this merit: *παραιτουμένους τὴν τῶν κρατούντων ὀργὴν, ὅπερ ἡμεῖς ἐπ' αὐτῶν τῶν πραγμάτων ἐποιήσαμεν ἀληθινῶς.*

⁴ N. 1543. Boeckh and Rose, p. 405. An inscription found among the ruins of Dyme by Mr. Hawkins, and presented by him to the library of Trinity College, Cambridge: a letter from the proconsul, Q. Fabius Maximus, Q. F., to the magistrates and council of Dyme (*Δυμαίων τοῖς ἄρχουσι καὶ συνέδροις καὶ τῇ πόλει*), in which he alludes to an attempt made by one Sosus, who had written laws contrary to the constitution (*πολιτεία*) which had been restored to the Achæans by the Romans, and had given rise to a sedition in which the public archives of Dyme had been burnt — proceedings which appeared to the proconsul to tend to the subversion of social order and of the liberty which had been restored to the Greeks (*τῆς ἀποδομένης κατὰ κοινὸν τοῖς Ἑλλησιν ἐλευθερίας*). He had therefore inflicted capital punishment on Sosus and one of his accomplices, and had sent a third to be tried at Rome. Boeckh's commentary on this very interesting monument is not so satisfactory as usual; and I agree with Nitzsch (Polyb. p. 136.), that it must be referred to the period subsequent to the renewal of the League; but not at all for the reason assigned by Nitzsch, because it is evident, or even in the slightest degree probable, that the *περὶ Κυλλανίων συνέδροι*, from whom

ment in which this sounding phrase appears to be applied to it did not itself illustrate the vigilance with which the exercise of political freedom was checked by the provincial government, we might be sure that these revived confederations answered no other purpose than that of affording an occasion for some periodical festivals, and some empty titles, soothing perhaps to the feelings of the people, but without the slightest effect on their welfare. The end of the Achæan War was the last stage of the lingering process by which Rome enclosed her victim in the coils of her insidious diplomacy, covered it with the slime of her sycophants and hirelings, crushed it when it began to struggle, and then calmly preyed upon its vitals.

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We have brought the political history of ancient Greece down to a point which may be fitly regarded as its close; since in the changes which afterwards befel the country the people remained nearly passive. The events of the Mithridatic War, in which the Achæans and Lacedæmonians, and all Bœotia, except Thespiæ, are said to have declared themselves against Rome, and the royal army in Greece received a reinforcement of Lacedæmonian and Achæan troops¹,

the proconsul had received a report of the disturbances, were the congress of the League, but because it seems impossible to explain the allusion to the restoration of liberty otherwise than by reference to the revival of the federal unions; *of περί Κυλλάνιον συνέδριοι*, may perhaps be the *conventus*. After the fall of Corinth the Achæan *συνέδριον* seems to have been always held at Ægium, as it was in the days of Pausanias (vii. 24. 4.). This inscription seems likewise to prove that if there is no error in Plutarch's statement (Cim. 2.), that in the time of Lucullus the Romans had not yet begun to send prætors into Greece (*ὄστω εἰς τὴν Ἑλλάδα ῥωμαίων στρατηγῶν διπέμψοντο*), at least we must reject the conclusion drawn from it by Zinkeisen (*Gesch. Griechenlands*, p. 548.), that Achæa was then free from Roman prætors. Nitzsch, on the other hand (p. 87.), refers the description in Polyb. (ii. 37.) to the provincial administration of Achæa, which, he says, *satisfied all the demands which appeared to Polybius most essential for the interests of Peloponnesus*. Bitter as Flathe is against Polybius, he has said nothing to lower his character as a patriot so much as this interpretation of his words.

¹ Appian, Mithrid. 29.

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might serve to indicate that the national spirit was not wholly extinct, or that the Roman dominion was felt to be intolerably oppressive. But Athens certainly no more deserved Sylla's bloody vengeance for the resistance into which she was forced by the tyranny of Athenio, than for the credulity with which she had listened to his lying promises. In another point of view however it will not be foreign to the plan of this work to take a brief survey of the fortunes of Greece after its incorporation with the Roman empire.

Decline of
population
in Greece.

No historical fact is more clearly ascertained than that from this epoch the nation was continually wasting away. Strabo, who visited Greece but a little more than a century later (B. C. 29¹), found desolation every where prevailing. Beside his special enumeration of ruined towns and deserted sites, and his emphatic silence as to the present, while he explores the faint vestiges or doubtful traditions of the past, the description of almost every region furnishes occasion for some general remark illustrating the melancholy truth. Messenia was for the most part deserted, and the population of Laconia very scanty in comparison with its ancient condition; for beside Sparta it contained but thirty small towns in the room of the 100 for which it had once been celebrated.² Of Arcadia it was not worth while to say much, on account of its utter decay.³ There was scarcely any part of the land in tillage, but vast sheep-walks, and abundant pasture for herds of cattle, especially horses; and so the solitude of Ætolia and Acarnania had become no less favourable to the rearing of horses than Thessaly. Both Acarnania and Ætolia—he

¹ x. p. 485.

² viii. p. 362. Ἐκλειμμένης τῆς πλείστης ἔκου γε καὶ ἡ Λακωνικὴ λειπανδρεῖ, κρινομένη πρὸς τὴν παλαιὰν εὐανδρίαν.

³ viii. p. 388. Διὰ τὴν τῆς χώρας παρτελῆ κάκωσιν. Αἱ τε γὰρ πόλεις ὑπὸ τῶν συνεχῶν πολέμων ἠφανίσθησαν . . . τὴν τε χώραν οἱ γεωργήσαντες ἐκλελοίπασιν.

repeats elsewhere—are now utterly worn out and exhausted; as are many of the other nations.¹ Of the towns of Doris scarcely a trace was left; the case was the same with the Ænians.² Thebes had sunk to an insignificant village, and the other Bœotian cities in proportion; that is, as he elsewhere explains himself, they were reduced to ruins and names, all but Tanagra and Thespiæ, which, compared with the others, were tolerably well preserved.³ Thessaly would furnish a long list of celebrated names, but few of its towns retained their early importance; Larissa more than any other.⁴

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It has been usual in modern times to attribute this decline of population to the loss of independence, to the withering influence of a foreign yoke, in a word to Roman misrule. And it would be bold, and probably an error, to assert that it was wholly unconnected with the nature of the government to which Greece was subject as a Roman province. It is too well known what that government was; how seldom it was uprightly administered⁵, how easily, even in the purest hands, it became the instrument of oppression.⁶ The ordinary burdens were heavy. The fisherman of Gyarus, who was sent ambassador to

Its probable
causes.

Misgovern-
ment.

¹ x. p. 460. Νυνὶ μὲν οὖν ἐκπεπὸνῆται καὶ ἀπηγέρκεν ἐκ τῶν συνεχῶν πολεμῶν, ἢ τ' Ἀκαρνανία καὶ Αἰτωλοί, καθάπερ καὶ πολλὰ τῶν ἄλλων ἔθνῶν.

² ix. p. 427. Θαυμαστὸν εἰ καὶ ἴχνος αὐτῶν εἰς Ῥωμαίους ἦλθε. Τὰ δ' αὐτὰ πεπὸν-
θασι καὶ οἱ Αἰνιῶνες.

³ ix. p. 402. Πράττοντες ἐνδεέστερον ἀεὶ μέχρι εἰς ἡμᾶς, οὐδὲ κόμης ἀξιολόγου τύπον σώζουσι. καὶ ἄλλαι δὲ πόλεις ἀνάλογον, πλὴν Τανάγρας καὶ Θεσπιῶν αὐταὶ δ' ἱκανῶς συμμένουσι πρὸς ἐκείνας κρινόμεναι. p. 410. Νυνὶ μόνη συνίστηκε (Θεσπιαί) τῶν Βοιωτικῶν πόλεων καὶ Τανάγρα· τῶν δ' ἄλλων ἐρείπια καὶ δνόματα λέλειπται.

⁴ ix. p. 430. Τῶν πόλεων ὀλίγα σώζουσι τὸ πάτριον ἄξιωμα· μάλιστα δὲ Λάρισα.

⁵ Cic. Manil. 22. *Etiam si qui sunt pudore ac temperantia moderatiores, tamen eos esse tuiles, propter multitudinem cupidorum hominum nemo arbitratur. Difficile est dictu, Quirites, quanto in odio simus apud exterarum nationes propter eorum quos ad eas per hos annos cum imperio misimus, injurias ac libidines.*

⁶ Cic. Epist. ad Q. Fratrem. l. i. p. 291. b. *Nequaquam satis, ipsum hæc habere virtutes, sed esse circumspiciendum diligenter ut in hac custodia provinciæ non te unum sed omnes ministros imperii tui, sociis, et civibus, et reipublicæ præstare videare.* p. 293. b. *Parvi refert abs te ipso jus dici æquabiliter et diligenter, nisi idem ab iis fiat, quibus tu ejus muneris aliquam partem concesseris.*

Augustus, to complain that a tax of 150 drachmas was laid upon his island which could hardly pay two-thirds of that sum¹, afforded but a specimen of a common grievance. Greece was not exempt from those abuses which provoked the massacre of the Romans in Asia at the outbreak of the Mithridatic war.² And even if we had no express information on the subject, we might have concluded that it did not escape the still more oppressive arbitrary exactions of corrupt magistrates, and their greedy officers. *Who does not know*, Cicero asks³, *that the Achæans pay a large sum yearly to L. Piso?* It was notorious that he had received 100 talents from them, beside plunder and extortion of other kinds.⁴ The picture which Cicero draws of the evils inflicted by him upon Greece is no doubt rhetorically overcharged; but it is one of utter impoverishment, exhaustion, and ruin.⁵ And here we may remark that the privileges of the free cities included in the province afforded no security against the rapacity and oppression of a Piso or a Verres. The Lacedæmonians, Strabo observes, were peculiarly favoured, and remained free, paying nothing but voluntary offerings.⁶ But these were among the most burdensome imposts⁷; and so Athens, which enjoyed the like immunity, was nevertheless, according to Cicero's phrase, torn to pieces by Piso. To this it must be added that the oligarchical institutions every where established—and even Athens was forced so to qualify her democracy that little

¹ Strabo, x. p. 485. Tacit. Ann. i. 76. *Achaiam ac Macedoniam onera deprecantes.*

² See Plut. Lucull. 20., and the interesting story of Damon (Cim. 1.), where the brutal centurion and the hired sycophant may be regarded as not uncommon characters.

³ De Prov. Cons. 3.

⁴ Pis. 37.

⁵ Pis. 40. *Achaia exhausta: Thessalia vexata: lacerata Athenæ: Locri, Phocii, Boeotii exusti.*

⁶ viii. p. 365. *Ἐπιμήθησαν διαφερόντως καὶ ἕμειναν εὐλεύθεροι, πλὴν τῶν φιλικῶν λειτουργιῶν ἄλλο συντελοῦντες οὐδέν.*

⁷ See Ernesti, *Clavis Cic. Adillitius: Vectigal: Coronarium: and Walter, Geschichte des Römischen Rechts*, p. 227.

more than the name seems to have been left¹—tended to promote the accumulation of property in few hands: as we read that the whole island of Cephallenia was subject to C. Antonius as his private estate.²

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Nevertheless it seems certain, that when these are represented as the main causes of the decline of population in Greece which followed the loss of her independence, their importance has been greatly exaggerated, while others much more efficacious have been overlooked or disparaged. For on the one hand it is clear that this decline did not begin at that epoch, but had been going on for many generations before. A comparison of the forces brought into the field to meet the Celtic invasion by the states of northern Greece with those which they furnished in the Persian War, would be sufficient to prove the fact with regard to them; while as to Peloponnesus it is expressly attested by Polybius, who does not scruple to declare that in the period of the Cleomenic War it had been utterly wasted.³ Polybius is indeed in this passage speaking of the financial resources of the Peloponnesians; but the cause which he assigns for their decay is manifestly one by which the population must have been affected in proportion. He attributes it to foreign invasion and intestine warfare.⁴ The long continuance of destructive wars is also the cause assigned by Strabo for the desolation which he beheld. Yet in his time Peloponnesus and the greater part of northern Greece had enjoyed a century

Causes assigned by Polybius.

¹ Strabo indeed (ix. p. 398.) says Ῥωμαῖοι παραλαβόντες αὐτοῖς δημοκρατούμενους ἐφύλαξαν τὴν αὐτονομίαν αὐτοῖς καὶ τὴν ἐλευθερίαν. But Appian (Mithrid. 39.) alludes to the restrictions imposed on them by the Romans after the conquest, which were renewed — probably with increased rigour — by Sylla; and the recovery of the democracy (τὴν δημοκρατίαν ἀνακτησαμένους) was one of the baits held out to them by Athenio (Posidon. ap. Athen. v. 48. 51.). See Ahrens, *De Athenarum Statu Politico inde ab Achaici Fœderis Interitu usque ad Antoninorum tempora.* (p. 25.)

² Strabo, x. p. 455. Τὴν ἄλλην γῆσον ὑπήκοον ἔσχεν, ὡς ἴδιον κτῆμα.

³ ii. 62. 3. Ἄρδην κατέφθαρτο.

⁴ u. s. Ἐπὶ τε τῶν ἐν Μακεδονίᾳ βασιλέων, ἔτι δὲ μᾶλλον ὑπὸ τῆς συνεχείας τῶν πρὸς ἀλλήλους πολέμων.

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of uninterrupted peace and tranquillity. This shows that the evil lay deeper than the ravages of war. And we have now the evidence of Polybius¹, that in the period either immediately preceding, or immediately subsequent to the establishment of the Roman government — a period which he describes as one of concord and comparative prosperity², when the wounds which had been inflicted on the peninsula were beginning to heal — even then the population was rapidly shrinking, through causes quite independent of any external agency, and intimately connected with the moral character and habits of the society itself. He is giving an example of a case in which it was unnecessary to consult an oracle. *For instance, he observes, in our times all Greece has been afflicted with a failure of offspring, in a word with a scarcity of men³; so that the cities have been left desolate and the land waste; though we have not been visited either with a series of wars, or with epidemic diseases. Would it not, he asks, be absurd, to send to inquire of the oracles by what means our numbers may be increased, and our cities become more flourishing, when the cause is manifest, and the remedy rests with ourselves? For when men gave themselves up to ease, and comfort, and indolence, and would neither marry nor rear children born out of marriage, or at most only one or two, in order to leave these rich, and to bring them up in luxury, the evil soon spread, imperceptibly, but with rapid growth; for when there was only a child or two in a family for war or disease to carry off, the inevitable consequence was that houses were left desolate, and*

¹ Exc. Vat. p. 449.

² II. 62. 4. 'Εν τοῖς καθ' ἡμᾶς καιροῖς, ἐν οἷς πάντες ἐν καὶ ταυτὸ λέγοντες, μεγίστην καρποῦσθαι δοκοῦσιν εὐδαιμονίαν. But the fragment referred to in the last note shows how much this statement needs to be qualified.

³ 'Ἐπέσχεν ἐν τοῖς καθ' ἡμᾶς καιροῖς τὴν Ἑλλάδα πᾶσαν ἀπαιδία καὶ συλλήβδην ὀλιγανθρωπία, δι' ἣν αἱ τε πόλεις ἐξηρημώθησαν καὶ ἀφορίαν εἶναι συνέβαινε, καίτερ οὐτε πολλῶν συνεχῶν ἐσχηκότεν ἡμᾶς οὐτε λοιμικῶν περιστάσεων.

*cities by degrees became like deserted lives.*¹ *And there is no need to consult the gods about the mode of deliverance from this evil: for any man would tell us, that the first thing we have to do is to change our habits, or at all events to enact laws compelling parents to rear their children.*²

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We see then the evil was not that the stream of population was violently absorbed, but that it flowed feebly, because there was an influence at work which tended to dry up the fountain-head. Marriages were rare and unfruitful through the prevalence of indifference or aversion toward the duties and enjoyments of domestic life. The historian traces this unhealthy state of feeling to a taste for luxury and ostentation. But this explanation, which could only apply to the wealthy, seems by no means adequate to the result. The real cause struck deeper, and was much more widely spread. Described in general terms, it was a want of reverence for the order of nature, for the natural revelation of the will of God; and the sanction of infanticide was by no means the most destructive, or the most loathsome form in which it manifested itself.³ This was the cancer which had been for many generations eating into the life of Greece. The progress of luxury which followed Alexander's conquests no doubt quickened and extended its ravages, and the subsequent political changes probably contri-

¹ Τῶν ἀνθρώπων εἰς ἀλεξανείαν καὶ φιλατρεμοσύνην ἔτι καὶ βαθυμίαν ἐκτετραμμένων καὶ μὴ βουλομένων μήτε γαμεῖν μήτε ἀγάμους τὰ γεινόμενα τέκνα τρέφειν, ἀλλὰ μάλιστα ἐν τῶν πλείστων ἢ δύο χάριν τοῦ πλουσίου τούτους καταλιπεῖν καὶ σπαταλῶντας δρέψαι, ταχέως ἔλαθε τὸ κακὸν αὐξηθῆναι, καὶ γὰρ ἕνος ὄντος ἢ δυεῖν, τούτων δὲ τὸν μὲν πολέμῳ ἢ νόσῳ ἐνοστῶσα παρείλετο, δῆλον ὡς ἀνάγκη καταλείπεσθαι τὰς οἰκῆσεις ἐρήμους, καὶ καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν μελιττῶν τὰ σμήνη, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον κατὰ βραχὺ τὰς πόλεις ἀπορουμένας ἀδυνατεῖν.

² Μάλιστα μὲν αὐτοὶ δι' αὐτῶν μεταθέμενοι τὸν ζῆλον, εἰ δὲ μὴ, νόμους γράψαντες ἵνα τρέφῃται τὰ γεινόμενα.

³ All that F. Jacobs has said (*Vermischte Schriften, Akademische Reden*, i. p. 212-254.) on the subject here alluded to is one side of the truth, but no more. The other is exhibited by Zumpt, in an instructive essay in the Transactions of the Berlin Academy, 1841, *Ueber den Stand der Bevölkerung und die Volksvermehrung in Alterthum*, p. 14-16.

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buted to heighten its effects, though no others could have remedied or materially checked the mischief. The despondency produced by a single overthrow drove the Bœotians, as Polybius informs us¹, into a round of sensual dissipation, in which all duties, both public and private, were utterly neglected; and we cannot doubt that the far heavier despair which weighed upon the spirit of the entire nation, when at length it felt its chains, and saw itself bestridden by the Roman Colossus, was everywhere in some degree attended with like consequences. The more active and hopeful migrated to seek employment, wealth, and reputation, in Italy or the East.

How little the vices of the Roman government had to do with the decrease of population in Greece, becomes still more apparent as we follow its course through the history of the Empire. The change from republican to monarchical institutions was in general beneficial to the provinces, and especially to Greece, which was not only exempt from the danger of arbitrary oppression, but was distinguished by many marks of Imperial favour. Within the space of a few years, about the beginning of this period, three new colonies animated the south coast of the Corinthian gulf. Pompey planted a settlement of pirates in the solitude of Dyme.² His great rival restored Corinth, and, if he had lived longer, would perhaps have opened a canal through the Isthmus. Though the commerce which at the fall of Corinth had been diverted to Delos³, and afterwards dispersed by the Mithridatic War, may not have wholly returned into its ancient channel, still there can be no question that the advantages of this

Roman colonies in Greece.

¹ xx. 4. 6.

² Strabo, viii. p. 387. Plut. Pomp. 28.

³ Strabo, x. p. 486. Cicero, Manil. 18. *Delos, quo omnes undique cum mercibus atque oneribus commcabant.*

restoration were very largely felt throughout Greece. Augustus founded another populous Roman colony at Patræ, which enjoyed the privileges of a free city.¹ Nicopolis indeed was rather designed as a monument of his victory, than to promote the prosperity of Greece; for it was peopled from the decayed towns of the adjacent regions, and the effect was to turn Acarnania and Ætolia into a wilderness.² Athens too had soon repaired the loss it suffered through Sylla's massacre, though Piræus did not rise out of its ruins.³ But the Athenian population was recruited, as it had long been, by the lavish grant or cheap sale of the franchise. It was like the galley of Theseus, retaining nothing but the name and semblance of the old Athenian people, without any real natural identity of race: so that it was no exaggeration, when Piso called it a jumble of divers nations.⁴ The poverty indeed of the city, which had been a main cause of its unfortunate accession to the side of Mithridates⁵, still continued, and was but slightly relieved by the bounty of benefactors like Pomponius and Herodes Atticus, or even by the growing influx of wealthy strangers who came to pursue rhetorical or philosophical studies there. While its splendour was increased by the magnificent structures added to it by Hadrian and Herodes, perhaps the larger part of the freemen was never quite secure of their daily meal. Still the good-will of the early emperors was unequivocally manifested. They seem always to have lent a favourable ear to the complaints and petitions

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¹ Paus. vii. 18. 7.

² Strabo, vii. p. 325. Paus. v. 23. 3. viii. 24. 11. vii. 18. 8. x. 38. 4.

³ Serv. Sulpicius, Ep. ad Div. iv. 5. Strabo, ix. p. 395. Τὸν Πειραιᾶ συνέστειλαν εἰς ἄλιγην κατοικίαν.

⁴ Tacit. Ann. ii. 55. *Non Athenienses, tot cladibus extinctos, sed colluviem illam nationum.* And with this may be combined what is said in Philostratus (V. S. ii. 7.) on the decay of the purity of the language at Athens — though there attributed to the influx of the sojourners.

⁵ Posidonius in Athen. v. 43.

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of the province¹; and Nero went so far as to reward the Greeks for their skilful flattery of his musical talents by an entire and general exemption from provincial government, which may have compensated for the presents he exacted from them.² The Greeks, it is said, abused their new privileges by discord and tumults, and Vespasian restored the proconsular administration, and above all the tribute—which was perhaps his real motive — with the remark, that they had forgotten the use of liberty.³ But it is evident that on the whole, from the reign of Augustus to that of Trajan, the increase of the population was not checked by oppression or by any calamity. Yet at the end of this period we find Plutarch declaring, that Greece had shared more largely than any other country in the general failure of population which had been caused by the wars and civil conflicts of former times over almost all the world⁴: so that it could then hardly furnish 3000 heavy-armed soldiers — the number raised by Megara alone for the Persian war; and his assertion is confirmed by the pictures drawn by another contemporary witness of the desolation which had overspread some of its most fertile regions.⁵

Continual
decrease of
population.

Monuments
and tra-
ditions.

In times when the present was so void and cheerless, the future so dark and hopeless, it was natural that men should seek consolation in the past, even though it had been less full, than was the case among the Greeks, of power and beauty, prosperity and glory. Nor was it necessary then to evoke its images by learned toil out of the dust of libraries or archives.

¹ Tacit. Ann. i. 76. Strabo, viii. p. 366.

² Paus. vii. 17. 3. Plut. Flam. 12. Tacit. Ann. xv. 45. His spoliation of the works of art did not impoverish the country.

³ Paus. viii. 17. 14. Ἀπομαθηκέναι τὴν ἐλευθερίαν τὸ Ἑλληνικόν.

⁴ De Def. Or. 8. Τῆς κοινῆς ὀλιγανθρίας . . . πλείστον μέρος ἢ Ἑλλάς μετέσχηκε.

⁵ Dio Chrys. Venator. See especially T. i. p. 233. Reisk. and ii. p. 11. Οὐχ ὁ Πηνειὸς δι' ἐρήμου βεῖ Θετταλίας, οὐχ ὁ Λάδων διὰ τῆς Ἀρκαδίας ἀναστᾶτου γενομένης;

The whole land was covered with its monuments in the most faultless productions of human genius and art. There was no region so desolate, no corner so secluded, as to be destitute of them. Even the rapacity of the Romans could not exhaust these treasures. Though Mummius was said to have filled Italy with the sculptures which he carried away, it is probable that in the immense multitude which remained, their absence, in point of number, might be scarcely perceived. If Nero robbed Delphi of 500 statues¹, there might still be more than 2000 left there.² The expressive silence of these memorials was interpreted by legends which lived in the mind and the heart of the people; and so long as any inhabitants remained in a place, a guide was to be found thoroughly versed in this traditional lore. The town of Panopeus at the northern foot of Parnassus, though celebrated by Homer as a royal residence³, had been reduced, when it was visited by Pausanias, to a miserable assemblage of huts, in which the traveller could find nothing to deserve the name of a city, as it contained neither courts nor a gymnasium, nor a theatre, nor a market-place, nor a fountain; but yet the people remembered that they were not of Phocian, but of Phlegyan origin: they could show the grave which covered the vast bulk of the great Tityus, and remnants of the clay out of which Prometheus had moulded the human race.⁴ Relics of like antiquity were at the same period reverently treasured in most parts of Greece.⁵

¹ Paus. x. 7. 1.

² Plin. N. H. xxxiv. 17. *Rhodi etiamnum tria millia signorum esse Mutianus ter consul prodidit: nec pauciora Athenis, Olympiæ, Delphis, superesse creduntur.* The identity of the number in these four places rather lessens the authority of the statement. On the fecundity of this branch of Grecian art, see F. Jacobs, *Verm. Schr. Ak. Red. Ueber den Reichthum der Griechen an plastischen Kunstwerken.*

³ Il. xvii. 307.

⁴ x. 4.

⁵ So, the bones of Pelops (Paus. vii. 22. 1.), of Arcas (viii. 9. 3. and 36. 8.), and Linus (ix. 29. 8.), the head of Medusa (ii. 21. 5.), and her hair (viii. 47. 5.), the skin of the Calydonian boar (viii. 47. 2.), the dice of Palamedes (ii. 20. 3.),

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The memory of the past was still more effectually preserved by a great variety of festivals, games, public sacrifices, and other religious solemnities. After the extinction of the national independence the battle of Plataea did not cease to be commemorated by the Feast of Liberty¹; as notwithstanding the absence of all political interests, the forms of deliberation were kept up in the Amphictyonic², the Achæan, Phocian³, and Bœotian Councils.⁴ The heroes both of the Mythical and the Historical age were still honoured with anniversary rites: Aratus⁵ and Demosthenes⁶, and the slain at Marathon⁷, no less than Ajax⁸ and Achilles⁹, Temenus¹⁰, Phoroneus¹¹, and Melampus.¹²

Religion.

The religion of the Greeks, which was so intimately associated with almost all their social pleasures and their most important affairs, had never lost its hold on the great body of the nation. We hear much of the change wrought in the state of religious feeling by the speculations of the Sophists, and the later kindred philosophical schools, by the frequent examples of sacrilegious violence, by the progress of luxury, and the growing corruption of manners. But the effect seems to have been confined to a not very large circle of the higher classes. With the common people Paganism continued, probably as long as it subsisted at all, to be not a mere hereditary usage, but a personal, living, breathing, and active faith. In the age of the Antonines the Attic husbandmen still believed in the potent agency of their hero Marathon¹³, as the

the wood of the plane-tree at Aulis (ix. 19. 7.), the trophy of Polydeuces (iii. 14. 7.), the staff of Agamemnon (ix. 40. 11.).

¹ Plut. Aristid. 21.

² Paus. vii. 24. 4. Ἐς Ἀΐγιον καὶ ἐφ' ἡμῶν ἔτι συνέδριον τὸ Ἀχαιῶν ἀβροίζεται, καθότι ἐς Θερμοπύλας τε καὶ ἐς Δελφούς οἱ Ἀμφικτύονες.

³ Φωκικόν, ἐς δ' ἀπὸ ἐκάστης πόλεως συνίασιν οἱ Φωκεῖς.

⁴ ix. 34. 1. In the sanctuary of the Itonian Athene: ἐς τοῦ κοινῶν συνίασιν ἐνταῦθα οἱ Βοιωτοὶ σύλλογον.

⁵ Plut. Ar. 53.

⁶ Paus. ii. 33. 5.

⁷ i. 32. 4.

⁸ i. 35. 3.

⁹ ii. 1. 8.

¹⁰ ii. 38. 1.

¹¹ ii. 20. 3.

¹² i. 44. 5.

¹³ Philostrat. V. S. ii. 7.

Arcadian herdsmen fancied that they could hear the piping of Pan on the top of Mænalus.¹ The national misfortunes, as they led the Greeks to cling the more fondly to their recollections of the past, tended to strengthen the influence of the old religion, and rendered them the less disposed to admit a new faith which shocked their patriotic pride and dispelled many pleasing illusions, while it ran counter to all their tastes and habits, and deprived them of their principal enjoyments. Accordingly it seems that Christianity, notwithstanding the consolations it offered for all that it took away, made very slow progress beyond the cities in which it was first planted; and its ascendancy was not firmly established long before the beginning of a period in which a series of new calamities threatened the very existence of the nation.

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The result of the Persian invasion in the mind of the victorious people was a feeling of exulting self-confidence, which fostered the development of all its powers and resources. The terror of the Celtic inroad was followed by a sense of security earned in a great measure by an honourable struggle. Far different was the impression left by the irruption of Alaric, when Greece was at length delivered from his presence. The progress of the Barbarians had been stopped by no resistance before they reached the utmost limits of the land. They retreated indeed before Stilicho, but not broken or discomfited, carrying off all their booty to take undisturbed possession of another, not a distant province. It was long indeed before the Greeks experienced a repetition of this calamity, but henceforth they lived in the consciousness that they were continually exposed to it. They neither had strength to defend themselves, nor

Irruption
of the Bar-
barians.

¹ Paus. viii. 36. 3.

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could rely on their rulers for protection. The safety of Greece was one of the last objects which occupied the attention of the court of Constantinople. In the utter uncertainty how soon a fresh invader might tread in the steps of Alaric, every rumour of the movements of the hordes which successively crossed the Danube might well spread alarm even in the remotest corners of Peloponnesus. The direction which they might take could be as little calculated as the course of lightning. Who could have foreseen that Attila and Theodoric would be diverted from their career to fall upon other prey? that Genseric after his repulse before Tænarus would not renew his invasion? that the Bulgarians would be so long detained by the plunder of the northern provinces? In the reign of Justinian the advances of the Barbarians became more and more threatening, and in the year 540 northern Greece was again devastated by a mixed swarm of Huns and other equally ferocious spoilers, chiefly of the Slavonic race. The strengthened fortifications of the Isthmus indeed withstood this flood, though they could not shelter the Peloponnesians from the earthquakes and the pestilence, which during this unhappy period were constantly wasting the scanty remains of the Hellenic population which had escaped or survived the inroads of the Barbarians. Justinian's enormous line of fortresses revealed the imminence of the danger, but could not long avert it. In the course of the seventh and eighth centuries the worst forebodings were realised: after many transient incursions the country was permanently occupied by Slavonic settlers. The extent of the transformation which ensued is most clearly proved by the number of the new names which succeeded to those of the ancient geography. But it is also described by historians in terms which have suggested the belief that the native population was utterly swept away, and

Slavonic
settlements.

that the modern Greeks are the descendants of barbarous tribes which subsequently became subject to the empire, and received the language and religion which they have since retained from Byzantine missionaries and Anatolian colonists; and such is the obscurity which hangs over the final destiny of the most renowned nation of the earth, that it is much easier to show the weakness of the grounds on which this hypothesis has been reared, than to prove that it is very wide of the truth.¹

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Greeks.

The discussion of this subject would be altogether beyond the limits of this work, and the question has

¹ The texts on which the author of this hypothesis (Fallmerayer, *Geschichte der Morea*) mainly builds, are a passage of Evagrius, *Hist. Eccl.* vi. 10. (In which the Avars are said to have stormed and enslaved Singidon, Anchialus, καὶ τὴν Ἑλλάδα πᾶσαν . . . ἀπολλύντες ἅπαντα καὶ πυρπολοῦντες): a letter of a patriarch of Constantinople in the year 1081 (In Leunclavius, *Jus Græco-Romanorum*, p. 279., in which the Avars are said to have occupied Peloponnesus for 218 years before the deliverance of Patras in 807: καὶ τῆς Ῥωμαικῆς ἀρχῆς ἀποστεμόμενων ὡς μήδε πόδα βαλεῖν ὄλωσ δύνασθαι ἐν αὐτῇ Ῥωμαίων ἄνδρα); and an expression of Constantine Porphyrogenitus (*de Them.* ii. 6. ἐσθλαβῶδη πᾶσα ἡ χώρα καὶ γέγονε βάρβαρος). But Fallmerayer himself proves by his own example how unsafe it would be to rely on such phrases in writers from whom accuracy is so little to be expected. In his preface (p. 141.) he asserts that not a drop of pure and unmixed Hellenic blood flows in the veins of the Christian population of modern Greece. But in the work itself we find this statement gradually qualified, so that at p. 239. vol. i. it appears that at the end of the Slavonic immigration the Hellenic portion of the Peloponnesian population formed one-eighth of the whole: a proportion of course merely arbitrary. The inferences which Fallmerayer draws from the geographical names are, as Zinkelsen and others have shown, no less precarious. But still, when his strong phrases are reduced to their precise value, the difference between him and his opponents as to the extent of the change which took place in this period does not seem to be very material. But then the effect of the subsequent wars and of the Albanian immigration remain to be taken into the account. Fallmerayer also insists on the disappearance of the old dialects of the language as an argument in favour of his hypothesis. Thiersch however is believed to have shown that the Tsakonian dialect contains old Greek roots, which are peculiar to it. But a solitary exception rather confirms than invalidates the rule. On the other hand a very candid and philosophical observer (Brandis, *Mittheilungen ueber Griechenland*, iii. p. 9.)—who however admits that the great majority of the ancient population was extirpated in the seventh and eighth centuries—conceives that the modern Greek language exhibits a character irreconcilable with Fallmerayer's hypothesis of its origin. Another impartial and intelligent traveller, whose judgment carries with it all the weight that can be derived from an accurate knowledge of Greece, both as it was and as it is (Bründsted, *Reisen in Griechenland*, Vorrede, p. xvi.), observes, that the modern Greeks resemble their forefathers, the Hellenes, in their natural endowments, their failings, their form and physiognomy, much more closely than could have been expected. It should not be forgotten that the primitive Hellenes are represented as bearing a very small proportion in point of numbers to the earlier population; though on the other hand there is reason to believe that the great mass of the Pelasgian tribes was much more nearly akin to them than any portion of the Slavonic race.

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been alluded to only for the sake of one concluding remark.

We have lived to witness a memorable and happy coincidence. The prostration of Greece under the Turkish yoke was intimately connected with the revival of the study of Greek literature in the West of Europe. The opening of a new era for philology, even more important than that of the fifteenth century, one which has already added more to our knowledge of the old Grecian world than had been gained in the three preceding centuries, has been followed by the emancipation of the Greeks from their bondage, and was certainly not without its share in the preparation of that glorious event.¹ The better the free Greeks become acquainted with the people from which they believe themselves sprung, the more unwilling they must be to part with the persuasion of such an illustrious origin. But still it is well that they should remember that their title to the sympathy of civilised Europe, and to the rich inheritance of their land and their language, does not rest on their descent, but has been earned by struggles and sacrifices of their own, equal to any recorded in history; struggles and sacrifices however in which their Albanian brethren, who make no pretensions to such a descent, bore their full share. And it might perhaps be a less burdensome, and yet equally animating consciousness of their relation to their great predecessors, if they were content to regard them, not as ancestors whom they represent, and whom they may therefore be expected to resemble and emulate, but simply as departed benefactors, whose memory they are bound to cherish while they enjoy their bequests, but not so as either to overlook their errors and faults, or to strain after the excellence of a mould, which the Power that formed it appears to have broken.

¹ See Jacobs, *Verm. Schr.* u. s. p. 120—150.