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History.

GREECE.

BY

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TABLE,
ANALYTICAL AND CHRONOLOGICAL,
TO THE FIFTH VOLUME OF
THE HISTORY OF GREECE.

CHAPTER XXXVII.

FROM THE PEACE OF ANTALCIDES TO THE END OF THE WAR
BETWEEN SPARTA AND OLYNTHUS.

B. C.		Page
	Review of past Transactions	- 2
387.	Position of Sparta at the Peace of Antalcidas	- 4
	War with Mantinea	- 5
385.	Reduction and Dismemberment of Mantinea	- 7
383.	Spartan Interference at Phlius	- 9
	Jealousy of Sparta roused against Olynthus	- 10
	Macedonia threatened by Olynthus	- 11
	Sparta decrees War against Olynthus	- 13
332.	Phœbidas seizes the Cadmea	- 15
	Consequent Proceedings at Sparta	- 17
	Expedition of Teleutias against Olynthus	- 18
381.	Second Campaign and Death of Teleutias	- 20
380.	Third Campaign and Death of Agesipolis	- 21
	Siege of Phlius	- 22
	Delphis	- 23
379.	Reduction of Phlius and Olynthus	- 24

CHAP. XXXVIII.

FROM THE END OF THE WAR WITH OLYNTHUS TO THE BATTLE
OF LEUCTRA.

	The Power of Sparta culminating	- 25
	Pelopidas and Epaminondas	- 26
	Pythagoreans at Thebes	- 27

vi ANALYTICAL AND CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE.

B. C.		Page
	Leontiades and Archias	- 29
	Enterprise of the Theban Exiles	- 31
	Deliverance of Thebes	- 35
378.	Expedition of Cleombrotus	- 37
	Inconsistent Proceedings at Athens	- 38
	Attempt of Sphodrias	- 39
	He is protected by Agesilaus	- 40
	Revival of the Athenian Confederacy	- 42
	Expedition of Agesilaus against Thebes	- 45
377.	Second Expedition of Agesilaus	- 47
	Institution of the Sacred Band at Thebes	- 48
376.	Battle of Naxos	- 49
	Expedition of Timotheus toward the West	- 51
375.	Victory of the Thebans near Tegyra	- 52
374.	Cleombrotus sent to Phocis	- 53
	State of Thessaly	- 54
	Jason of Phœræ	- 55
	His Plans	- 56
	Treaty with Polydamas	- 57
	Peace between Athens and Sparta	- 58
	Hostilities renewed	- 59
373.	Mnasippus in Coreyra	- 60
	His Defeat and Death	- 62
	Disgrace of Timotheus	- 63
	Expedition of Iphicrates	- 64
	Destruction of Thespiæ and Platæa	- 66
371.	Negotiation between Athens and Sparta	- 67
	Treaty of Peace	- 68
	Thebes excluded from the Treaty	- 69
	Cleombrotus at Leuctra	- 71
	Visions and Omens	- 73
	Battle of Leuctra	- 75
	Expedition of Archidamus	- 77
	Jason's Mediation	- 78

CHAP. XXXIX.

FROM THE BATTLE OF LEUCTRA TO THE FOUNDING OF MESSENA.

	Congress at Athens	- 80
	Rebuilding of Mantinea	- 81
	Agitated State of Peloponnesus	- 83
	Project for the Union of Arcadia	- 85
	Foundation of Megalopolis	- 87
	Arcadian Constitution	- 89
	Struggles between the Factions at Tegea	- 91
370.	Expedition of Agesilaus	- 93
369.	The Thebans in Peloponnesus	- 95

ANALYTICAL AND CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE. vii

B. C.		Page
	<u>Invasion of Laconia</u>	96
	<u>Danger of Sparta</u>	98
	<u>Conspiracy crushed by Agesilaus</u>	100
	<u>Retreat of the Invaders</u>	101
	<u>Founding of Messena</u>	103
	<u>Population of Messena</u>	104
	<u>Retreat of the Thebans</u>	107
	<u>Trial of Epaminondas and Pelopidas</u>	108

CHAP. XL

FROM THE FOUNDING OF MESSENA TO THE BATTLE OF MANTINEA.

	<u>Compact between Athens and Sparta</u>	110
368.	<u>Second Invasion of Peloponnesus by the Thebans</u>	111
	<u>Spirit of the Arcadians</u>	112
	<u>Congress at Delphi</u>	113
	<u>Death of Jason</u>	115
	<u>Alexander of Phere</u>	116
	<u>Expedition of Pelopidas to Thessaly</u>	117
	<u>He is Imprisoned by Alexander</u>	118
	<u>Epaminondas obtains his Release</u>	119
	<u>Orchomenus destroyed by the Thebans</u>	121
367.	<u>Victory of Archidamus</u>	122
	<u>Grecian Embassies to Susa</u>	123
	<u>Congress at Thebes</u>	125
366.	<u>Third Expedition of Epaminondas into Peloponnesus</u>	126
	<u>Euphron</u>	127
	<u>Tyrant of Sicyon</u>	128
	<u>Murdered at Thebes</u>	129
	<u>Athens deprived of Oropus</u>	131
	<u>Corinth desirous of Peace</u>	132
	<u>The Archidamus of Isocrates</u>	133
	<u>Weakness of Sparta</u>	135
365.	<u>War between Arcadia and Elis</u>	136
364.	<u>Siege of Cromnus</u>	137
	<u>Battle at Olympia</u>	139
	<u>Discord among the Arcadians</u>	140
363.	<u>Violent Proceedings of the Thebans at Tegea</u>	141
	<u>Coalition against Thebes</u>	143
364.	<u>Death of Pelopidas</u>	144
362.	<u>Epaminondas enters Peloponnesus</u>	145
	<u>Invades Laconia</u>	146
	<u>Battle of Mantinea</u>	150
	<u>Death of Epaminondas</u>	151
361.	<u>A general Peace</u>	152
	<u>Results of the Battle</u>	153

CHAP. XLII.

PHILIP OF MACEDON.		Page
B. C.	Review of past Events	- 155
	Prospects of Greece	- 156
	Macedonia under Perdiccas II.	- 157
	Archelaus	- 158
	A Patron of the Arts	- 159
	Amyntas II.	- 161
	Alexander II.	- 162
	Philip sent as a Hostage to Thebes	- 163
	Perdiccas III.	- 165
	Philip's Education at Thebes	- 166
	His Character	- 169
359.	Difficulties of his Position	- 171
	He prepares to mount the Throne	- 172
	Attempt of Argæus	- 173
	Philip makes Peace with Athens	- 175
	Defeats the Illyrians	- 176
	The Phalanx	- 177
	The Royal Guard	- 179
	Macedonian Constitution	- 180

CHAP. XLIII.

FROM PHILIP'S ESTABLISHMENT ON THE THRONE OF MACEDONIA TO THE END OF THE SOCIAL WAR.

	Importance of Amphipolis	- 184
	Attempts of Athens to recover it	- 185
	Charidemus of Oreus	- 187
360.	Timotheus repulsed at Amphipolis	- 190
358.	Philip makes War on Amphipolis	- 191
	Secret Negotiation with Athens	- 192
	Philip lays siege to Amphipolis	- 195
	Fall of Amphipolis	- 196
	Conquest of Pydna	- 197
357.	Philip gives Potidæa to Olynthus	- 198
356.	Birth of Alexander	- 199
	Founding of Philippi	- 200
	Mines of Crenides	- 201
	Revival and Growth of the Athenian Confederacy	- 203
	Conquests of Timotheus	- 205
	Project of Epaminondas	- 207
	Alexander of Pheræ	- 208

B. C.	Page
	Piracy - - - - - 209
	Employment of Mercenaries - - - - - 210
	The Greek <i>Condottieri</i> - - - - - 211
	Athenian Generals - - - - - 213
	Chares - - - - - 214
	Abuses in the Athenian Navy - - - - - 215
	Cotys and Miltocythes - - - - - 216
358.	Death of Cotys - - - - - 219
	Division of his Kingdom - - - - - 221
	Cersobleptes and Charidemus - - - - - 222
	Execution of Miltocythes - - - - - 224
	Negotiations with Cersobleptes - - - - - 225
357.	Expedition to Eubœa - - - - - 227
	The Thracian Chersonesus ceded to Athens - - - - - 229
	Origin of the Social War - - - - - 231
	Death of Chabrias - - - - - 233
356.	Second Year of the Social War - - - - - 234
	Chares aids Artabazus - - - - - 235
355.	End of the Social War - - - - - 236
	Loss of Corcyra - - - - - 237
	Trial of Iphicrates - - - - - 238
	Death of Timotheus - - - - - 239
	Isocrates - - - - - 240
	His Advice to the Athenians - - - - - 241
	His Description of the State of Athens - - - - - 242
	Athenian Generals and Demagogues - - - - - 243
	His View of the Prospects of Athens - - - - - 245

CHAP. XLIII.

FROM THE END OF THE SOCIAL WAR TO THE FALL OF OLYNTHUS.

	Debates at Athens on War with Persia - - - - - 246
	Demosthenes - - - - - 247
	His Education - - - - - 249
	Suit with his Guardians - - - - - 250
	Natural Defects - - - - - 252
	Studies - - - - - 253
	Imputations on his Character - - - - - 255
	Speech against the Law of Leptines - - - - - 257
354.	Speech on War with Persia - - - - - 258
	Sextus taken by Chares - - - - - 259
	State of Eubœa - - - - - 260
	Violence of Parties at Athens - - - - - 261
	Battle of Tamynæ - - - - - 262
	Origin of the Sacred War - - - - - 263
	Amphictyonic Decrees against Sparta and Phocis - - - - - 265
	Delphic Treasury in danger - - - - - 267

X ANALYTICAL AND CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE.

	Page
A. C.	- 268
	- 269
357.	- 270
	- 271
	- 272
	- 273
	- 275
	- 276
	- 277
	- 278
353.	- 279
352.	- 280
	- 281
	- 282
	- 283
	- 285
	- 286
	- 287
	- 288
	- 289
	- 291
	- 292
	- 293
	- 295
	- 297
	- 299
	- 300
	- 301
	- 302
	- 303
	- 304
351.	- 305
	- 307
349.	- 309
	- 311
	- 313
	- 314
	- 315
	- 316
348.	- 317
347.	- 317

CHAP. XLIV.

FROM THE FALL OF OLYNTHUS TO THE END OF THE SACRED WAR.

Views entertained by the Greeks of Philip's Power	- 321
Grounds of their false Confidence	- 322
Philip desirous of Peace	- 324
Project of a League against Philip	- 325

B. C.	Page
	Æschines - - - - - 326
	His Embassy to Arcadia - - - - - 327
	Projects of Alliance with Thebes - - - - - 328
	Progress of the Sacred War - - - - - 329
	Phalæcus deposed - - - - - 330
	Negotiation opened between Philip and Athens - - - - - 333
	Motives which led both Parties to wish for Peace - - - - - 335
346.	First Embassy of Ten - - - - - 337
	Counter-Revolution in Phocis - - - - - 340
	Breach between Athens and Phalæcus - - - - - 341
	Audience of the Embassy at Pella - - - - - 343
	Return of the Envoys to Athens - - - - - 346
	Views of Demosthenes - - - - - 349
	Congress of Allies at Athens - - - - - 350
	Its Resolution - - - - - 351
	Macedonian Embassy - - - - - 353
	Debates on the Peace - - - - - 354
	Cersobleptes excluded from the Treaty - - - - - 355
	Second Athenian Embassy to Philip - - - - - 357
	Audience at Pella - - - - - 359
	Ratification of the Treaty - - - - - 361
	Return of the Envoys - - - - - 362
	Report made by Æschines - - - - - 363
	Third Embassy to Philip - - - - - 365
	Posture of Phalæcus - - - - - 367
	Philip overruns Phocis - - - - - 368
	Feelings of the Athenians - - - - - 369
	Their imprudent Proceedings - - - - - 370
	Doom of Phocis - - - - - 371
	Advantages resulting to Philip - - - - - 373
	Oration of Isocrates to Philip - - - - - 375
	Execution of the Decree against Phocis - - - - - 376

APPENDIX.

On the Order of the Olynthiacs - - - - -	378
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HISTORY OF GREECE.

CHAPTER XXXVII.

FROM THE PEACE OF ANTALCIDAS TO THE END OF
THE WAR BETWEEN SPARTA AND OLYNTHUS.

THE position in which Sparta was standing at the end of the Peloponnesian war was so strong and commanding, that only a little moderation and prudence on her part seemed to be wanting, to secure her dominion over Greece, and the general tranquillity, for a long course of years. Yet not many, as we have seen, had passed, before she found herself engaged in a new struggle, which at one time threatened her safety, and, even when most prosperously conducted, added little to her glory, and did not compensate by any solid advantage for the sacrifices which it required. It is not easy to determine, how far this result must be ascribed to errors of policy committed by the Spartan government, or to causes which it could not control, or to the nature of the constitution, which every year changed the officers of state who had the principal share in the administration of affairs. But after making full abatement for unavoidable adverse circumstances, it can hardly be questioned that the Spartans were too much elated by success, that they overlooked the bounds of a reasonable ambition, and neglected the steps and the instruments by which they had risen to their lofty station. Their treatment of Athens was clearly injudicious. The ob-

ligation conferred by their resistance to the wishes of their allies, who proposed the harshest exercise of the rights of war against their fallen enemy, was cancelled by the sanction afterwards given to the atrocities of the Thirty; and all the benefit that might have been derived from the support of that odious government was thrown away by the lenity which permitted its overthrow; yet in such a manner as neither to excite any feelings of gratitude, nor even in any degree to weaken the impression of their previous hostility, which was shortly after renewed and confirmed by the ungenerous exaction of the loan by which they had endeavoured to avert the revolution. This unwise fluctuation was indeed the effect of a struggle between parties at home; but it seems to have been assumed by all parties, that it was impossible Athens should ever again become formidable, and that she might safely be either trampled on, or restored to independence.

The war undertaken on behalf of the Asiatic Greeks seems to have been in itself a politic as well as an honourable measure. But the Spartan government appears not to have formed a clear view of its own designs, or to have been blinded by inordinate ambition to the danger as well as the difficulty of its enterprises. The war, so long as it was confined to the object of protecting the Asiatic colonies, might have been both safe and useful to Sparta: but even for this purpose it was necessary that she should not at the same time have been embarrassed by a contest in Greece: and when the views of her commander were enlarged to the conquest of Asia, it became time to consider whether, even if the resources of Sparta were adequate to this end, it could be accomplished without the ruin of her institutions. There was evidently some miscalculation at the outset of the expedition of Agesilaus, since it was found necessary to recall him in the midst of his triumphs; even if Sparta did not involve herself in the unseasonable quarrel with her old allies, which broke out in the Corinthian war, through her own impru-

dence. How far this was the case, depends on a question which we cannot now determine. It is not clear whether the animosity of Thebes was wholly provoked by the conduct of the Spartan government, or may rather be attributed to political changes, which arose at Thebes immediately on the close of the Peloponnesian war from other entirely unknown causes. But at least we can hardly acquit Sparta of an excessive confidence in her own strength, when we see her needlessly braving the united hostility of the principal powers to which she owed her success in her recent conflict with an enemy, who, though humbled and weakened, was neither conciliated nor subdued.

The peace of Antalcidas, though it did not restore to Sparta all that she had lost in the preceding interval subsequent to the Peloponnesian war, placed her in a situation in some respects more advantageous than that which she stood in at the beginning of this period. Athens indeed was no longer a subject existing only by sufferance of her sovereign, but was once more an independent and powerful state. She was however confined almost entirely to her natural resources, and forbidden to aspire to imperial rank. Thebes was irrecoverably lost as an ally. The injuries she had suffered were so deep, that it was scarcely possible the breach between her and Sparta could ever be amicably healed, or that a party favourable to the Spartan interests could ever prevail there so long as the state retained its independence. But the injury had disarmed the animosity which it provoked. Thebes was no longer anything more than the first of the Bœotian cities, and was surrounded by implacable and vigilant enemies, all connected by the firmest ties of interest with Sparta. Peloponnesus, now that Corinth was restored to the aristocratical party, was more than ever at the beck of her ancient mistress, who thus saw herself without a rival in Greece: and so long as her views were confined to this range, the Persian alliance, though less honourable, was likely to be more useful to her than that of

the Asiatic Greeks. Xenophon indeed would appear grossly to have deceived himself, or to have endeavoured to mislead his readers, if he meant to assert that Sparta had acquired any additional glory by the peace of Antalcidas¹: but if his expression, as it seems it may do, only imports that her state was rendered much more flourishing by this transaction, his remark was undoubtedly true.

Nevertheless her new position, as we have already observed, was an artificial and precarious one. What had been done was to dissolve the power of Greece nearly into its first elements. These elements might be again combined together, and directed against Sparta. The single legitimate object of her policy was to keep them disunited, and as far as possible subservient to her. But both vigilance and moderation were necessary for this end. Her power would be the more stable the less it was felt. Every case in which it was wantonly and oppressively exercised, tended to spread general alarm, and to rouse a spirit of resistance, which could not long want means and opportunities. But the Spartan government was again blinded by ambition and resentment, and was tempted by the prospect of immediate advantage to sacrifice all that it had gained by the peace of Antalcidas.

A cautious policy would have dictated the expediency of at least covering all acts of aggression with some pretext derived from the character which Sparta assumed of conservator of the peace. But her very first measure was one for which she did not plead any pretence but her own interests or vindictive feelings, and which must have given the greater umbrage, as it was avowedly the beginning of a series of retaliations, by which she proposed to chastise those of her allies who had offended her during the war. The first victim selected as an example of this system was Mantinea, which was obnoxious on account of her democratical constitution and her attachment to Argos, and had not disguised the

¹ Hell. v. 1. 36. *οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, κατὰ ἐπιποθέσειν ἐγένοντο ἐκ τῆς ἐπ' Ἀνταλκίδου εἰρήνης καλλωμίσης.*

reluctance with which she had hitherto served the Spartan cause. It may be remembered that, after the destruction of the Mora, Agesilaus made a forced march past the walls of Mantinea, to spare his troops the mortification of witnessing the joy which he expected to see expressed there at the recent disaster. But it seems that the only overt act of hostility which could be alleged against the Mantineans, was, that they had supplied Argos with corn during the war. The other grounds of complaint were still slighter, and more difficult of proof; that they had sometimes evaded their share of service in the Spartan army, under false pretexts, and had discharged its duties with manifest ill-will. These however were considered at Sparta as reasons sufficient to justify the demand, that the Mantineans should throw down their walls; and when they refused to give this pledge of obedience, preparations were immediately made for invading their territory.

This invasion, however contrary to the spirit of the peace of Antalcidas, does not appear to have violated the Greek international law; for a truce which had been concluded for thirty years between the two states after the battle of 418, had, at least according to the Spartan calculation, expired. Yet it seems as if Agesilaus did not approve of the expedition; for he obtained leave to decline the command on a plea which can scarcely have been more than a pretext. The Mantineans had rendered important services to Sparta in the last Messenian war, which had been conducted by his father Archidamus; and he affected to consider this as an obligation conferred on his family. It might have been thought that if such an excuse was admitted, the threatened hostilities ought to have been withheld on the same ground. Agesipolis however took the command, though his father Pausanias was connected by ties of personal friendship with the chiefs of the democratical party at Mantinea, against whom the blow was especially aimed; for the destruction of the walls would have placed them at the mercy of Sparta, and conse-

quently of their political adversaries. We learn through Diodorus, that they applied to Athens for succour, but without effect. This is less surprising than that Sparta should have sought and obtained aid from Thebes. This fact indeed is not mentioned either by Xenophon or Diodorus; but it is recorded by Plutarch¹, with details which seem to leave no room for doubt, for he relates that an engagement took place between the invaders and the Mantineans, in which the two great Thebans, whose names will soon become familiar to us, fighting side by side, narrowly escaped death. When we remember the dispositions which prevailed at Thebes towards Sparta at the time of the treaty, we can hardly understand a proceeding which seems to imply a renewal of the ancient alliance; and we are left to a doubtful conjecture, whether at this time the fear which the Thebans entertained of the Spartan power was stronger than their resentment, or the party friendly to Sparta had recovered a temporary ascendancy. The battle however is also mentioned by Pausanias²; but Xenophon only relates that Agesipolis, finding that he could not shake the enemy's resolution by the ravages which he committed in their territory, proceeded to invest the city with a trench and a wall. The Mantineans prepared to sustain a siege; and as the last year's harvest had been unusually abundant, and the place was plentifully victualled, Agesipolis, dreading the cost and tediousness of a long blockade, resorted to a fresh expedient. The Ophis, a small stream, but at times swollen to a considerable size, flowed through the town, and Agesipolis, taking advantage of an extraordinary flood³, raised an embankment, by which he forced it back, and laid the low grounds at the foot of the adjacent walls under water. Their basements, as well as those of the houses, were built, as was usual throughout Greece, of unbaked bricks, and they soon began to crack and totter. It was according to Pau-

¹ Pelop. 4.

² VIII. 8. 7.

³ Diodor. xv. 12.

sanias by a like device that Cimon made himself master of Eion on the Strymon. The besieged however still held out for a time, and propped up their sinking walls with wooden buttresses, and only sent an offer of submission when they found that the water was gaining upon them, so that longer delay would expose them to the horrors of a storm. But they were now informed that the conquerors would no longer be content with the rasing of the walls: they required that Mantinea should cease to exist as a city, and that its population should be dispersed among the four villages out of which it had been collected in the capital.¹ It was too late to dispute about any terms short of death or slavery; and the besieged capitulated. The popular leaders expected no mercy; but Pausanias exerted his influence with his son in their behalf, and they were permitted to go into exile. There were about sixty who took the benefit of this indulgence, and as they left the city along a road lined with the hostile troops, Agesipolis had some difficulty in sheltering them from the rage of their political enemies. The conditions were then executed. The aristocratical Mantineans, Xenophon observes, regretted the destruction of their houses, which put them to the expense of building new ones. But they were consoled for this loss by the power which they thus acquired in the villages near which their estates lay; and they cheerfully contributed their contingents to the Spartan levies. The Spartans affected to treat each village as a separate state, and on these occasions sent a different officer (a *xenagus*) to each, to collect its forces.

The only remark which this transaction draws from Xenophon is, that the event might serve as a warning, not to build a town so that a river should run through it. We do not know why he did not add the alternative: or to build the walls with more solid masonry.

¹ Vol. I. p. 412. So in 1162 the population of Milan was distributed by Frederic I. among four villages, which were to be upward of eight miles apart from one another. Diodorus (xv. 5.) says that the Mantineans were made to migrate *eis tās tetrinas vici nōmas*. But one of these was the site of Mantinea.

But it seems more important to observe, that this attack on Mantinea was an act of mere open violence, and that, as Xenophon does not throw out any hint that it was sanctioned by the terms of the peace of Antalcidas, we have no reason to suppose that the Spartans themselves pretended to put such a construction on it.¹ Such a pretence would indeed have been too glaringly inconsistent with their declared motives; and it would have been difficult to show why on the same principle Tegea likewise was not dissolved into the nine hamlets of which it was originally composed. On the other hand it seems that, by a liberal interpretation of the treaty, Plataea was held entitled to resume its place among the Bœotian cities. The remains of the ancient people returned from Athens and Scione to the glorious land of their forefathers, and rebuilt their walls. Whether Sparta permitted them to retain their connexion with Athens, may perhaps be doubted.²

The temper manifested by the Spartan government in these proceedings, held out encouragement to every party throughout Greece, which was discontented with the state of things at home, and desired a change consistent with the interests of Sparta, to address itself to her for assistance. The first application was made by the exiles of Phlius, who now hoped to be restored to their native city. They seem to have belonged to the same party which we mentioned as in banishment from Phlius, when we last had occasion to notice the affairs of that little state.³ For that was a party deemed to be so much attached to Sparta, that its adversaries had ground to fear that she might exert her power in their behalf. But it also appears to have been subsequently reinforced by other exiled adherents of the same cause; for they claimed Spartan aid on the ground that, since their banishment, Phlius had ceased to contribute its

¹ We should indeed not have thought of it, if Wachsmuth (1. 2. p. 240.) had not described Sparta as enforcing the terms of the treaty against Mantinea.

² To Wachsmuth, however (1. 2. p. 271.), it appears unquestionable that they continued in a relation of isopolity to Athens.

³ Vol. IV. p. 419.

contingents to the armies of the confederacy, and had refused to receive the Spartans within its walls. The ephors were well disposed to comply with their wishes ; but, though they no longer thought fit to exercise the forbearance which they had shown when the party now in power intrusted them with the citadel, they assumed an appearance of mildness and moderation which they had neglected in the recent case of Mantinea. Instead of an imperious demand, they sent a bland message, importing that the exiles were friends of Sparta, and had been guilty of no offence, and requesting their recall as a favour. But after the example of Mantinea, the government of Phlius could not mistake the force of this gentle language ; and it saw that its chance of successful resistance to the will of Sparta was the slighter, as the exiles had still left many kinsmen and friends behind them. It therefore thought it safest to yield with a good grace, and repealed the decree of banishment. By the same decree, however, their property had been confiscated, and it had been subsequently purchased by private persons. It now became necessary, for the sake of tranquillity, to restore it to its late owners ; and the method adopted for the satisfaction of all the parties concerned was to refund the price to the purchasers from the treasury.¹ All disputes which might arise out of the conflict of old and new claims were to be referred to an impartial tribunal.

Though Xenophon gives no other instance of a similar interference, there may have been some foundation for the statement of Diodorus, who represents the peace of Antalcidas as the occasion of a general reaction in the states which had previously acknowledged the Spartan supremacy, attended with the banishment of many friends of Sparta, who were afterwards forcibly restored by her interposition.² But early in 382, the attention of the Spartan government was drawn towards a more

¹ It does not appear that this arrangement was prescribed, as Manso represents (Sparta iii. l. p. 111.), by Sparta.

² xv. 5.

important object by an embassy from the Chalcidian cities, Acanthus and Apollonia. Their envoys came to solicit protection against the power of Olynthus, which was threatening their independence. The Chalcidian cities, which seem from the first to have been linked closely together by their common origin and interests, had, as we have seen, been brought into a still closer union by their struggle with Athens. The issue of the Peloponnesian war released them from all control and apprehension with regard to their old mistress and enemy, and left them at full liberty to regulate their own concerns. But the struggle had begun with a great step toward the aggrandisement of Olynthus, which henceforth assumed the first place among them, and in the year following the peace of Nicias, further strengthened herself by the acquisition of Mecyberna¹, a port town only between two and three miles off. It was natural that with these advantages she should aspire to the rank of an imperial state, and it appears that, not long at least after the end of the war, she had succeeded in forming a confederacy among the kindred cities, of which she was acknowledged as the head. The terms which she granted to them would have been liberal, if they had been cities of a different origin from her own. They were admitted to that kind of political connection which the Greeks described by the word *sympolity*.² Their citizens enjoyed all the civil rights of citizens of the sovereign city. They were capable of acquiring property in land in the Olynthian territory, and of allying themselves with Olynthian families; but they were excluded from all the political privileges which were exercised in the Olynthian assembly, and were compelled to submit to the laws, and, it seems also, to adopt the constitution of the ruling state. It was to be expected that several of the Chalcidian towns should prefer political independence to any advantages that might result to them from such an union with Olynthus: even if the state of parties

¹ Thucydides v. 39.

² Heil. v. 2. 13. ἰσ' ἧ' τι τοῖς αὐτοῖς χρῆσθαι νόμοις καὶ συμπολιτεῖν.

created no grounds of discontent. If—as has been conjectured¹—Apollonia was anciently considered as the capital of Chalcidice, her reluctance to submit to the sovereignty of Olynthus may be the more easily understood. She and Acanthus had resisted the demand, which the Olynthians had endeavoured to enforce by a threat of war, that they should join their forces to the army of the confederacy: and it was to avert the execution of this threat that the embassy was sent.

The power of Olynthus had recently received an enormous accession through a series of events, which however have been related but obscurely, and not without an appearance of contradiction. Amyntas, the prince to whom the Macedonian sceptre had now descended, had been defeated in battle by the Illyrians, and found himself for a time unable to maintain possession of his dominions. According to Diodorus, in his despair he made over a large part of them to Olynthus, which continued for some time to collect the revenues of the ceded territory, and when the king, having by an unexpected turn of fortune expelled his barbarian enemies, demanded it back, refused to restore it. Amyntas, notwithstanding his successes against the Illyrians, found himself unable to cope with the power of the Olynthian confederacy, and applied for succour to Sparta. Indeed, the language of Diodorus would lead us to conclude, that his ambassadors accompanied those of the Chalcidian cities; but it is difficult to reconcile this supposition with the speech which Xenophon puts into the mouth of the Acanthian minister. This speech also gives a very different account of the transactions which had taken place between Amyntas and the Olynthians. It passes over the danger with which the king had been threatened by the Illyrians in total silence, and charges Olynthus with an attempt—for which no motive or occasion is assigned—to engage the Macedonian towns in a revolt against their sovereign. This attempt, it is said, was begun upon some of the smaller

¹ By Colonel Leake, *Travels in Northern Greece*, iii. p. 457.

towns which lay nearest to the Chalcidian border, and had been gradually pushed further, until the king was expelled from his capital, Pella. The truth probably lies somewhere between these seemingly conflicting statements. Perhaps Amyntas, when his affairs seemed desperate, committed a part of his kingdom to the Olynthians, who may have taken advantage of their temporary possession to excite a desire for republican government at Pella and in other cities; and when Amyntas claimed his deposit, may have supported them in open rebellion.

The Chalcidian envoys, after having stated these facts in an assembly which was attended by deputies from the principal states of the Peloponnesian confederacy, proceeded to rouse the jealousy of Sparta by a more exact description of the resources, prospects, and plans of her new rival. The force which Olynthus was already able to bring into the field was considerable: not less than 8000 heavy infantry¹, and a far greater number of targeteers, together with a body of not much less than 1000 horse. Potidæa had already acceded to the confederacy; and the towns of the adjacent peninsula might be expected soon to follow her example: for, notwithstanding their extreme aversion to the dominion of Olynthus, they stood in such awe of her power, that they had not ventured to take any part in the embassy which was sent to plead the common cause. Several of the neighbouring tribes of independent Thracians had begun to pay court to her rising greatness, and their submission would be the more important, as the extension of her conquests in this quarter might lead to the acquisition of the gold district of Mount Pangæum. With a well-filled treasury, an overflowing population, and abundance of ship-timber, there was nothing to prevent Olynthus from becoming formidable by sea as

¹ The emendation *ἑξακισχίλιον* for *ἑξακισίον* in Xen. *Hell.* v. 2. 14., seems absolutely necessary, as the former number exceeds the amount of the force mentioned by Demosthenes *De F. L.* p. 425—in a passage where his argument leads him to rate the power of Olynthus at this period as low as possible—very much less than the latter number falls short of it.

well as by land. Her ambition kept pace with the growth of her power, and she was preparing to strengthen herself by an alliance with Thebes and Athens, which had already sent ambassadors to open a negotiation with her. But, though no time was to be lost, it was not too late for Sparta to interfere. If indeed the confederacy were suffered to last much longer, it would become so firmly cemented by mutual interest and habit, through intermarriages and the intermixture of landed property, that it might be very difficult to dissolve it. But at present many of its members were impatient of the relation into which they had been forced to enter with Olynthus, and would hasten to break it off, as soon as they were assured of Spartan protection.

The Spartan government affected to leave the decision of the question to its allies; but its inclination to comply with the request of the Chalcidians was generally known, and many of the deputies were eager to pay court to it by anticipating its wishes. It was agreed to send an army of 10,000 men against Olynthus: and the influence of Sparta was no less manifest in the arrangements which were adopted for carrying this resolution into effect, than in the proposition itself. The confederates were to be at liberty to commute the services of their contingents for money, at the rate of three Ægeetan obols — five Attic — for the foot soldier, and four times as much for the trooper: and every city which withheld its contingent was to be liable to forfeit a stater a day for each man. The Chalcidian envoys however observed that the levying of this army would demand a considerable time, while their friends were in want of immediate succour: and that it would be better not to wait until the whole should be collected, but to send a smaller force—whatever troops were then ready to march—without delay, under a Spartan officer, whose presence would animate the wavering to resistance, and would shake the devotion of those who had already submitted to Olynthus. Accordingly about 2000 Lacedæmonian troops were ordered to march forthwith under the

command of Eudamidas ; a Spartan of some influence : for at his departure he engaged the ephors to commit the division which was next to follow from Laconia to the charge of his brother Phœbidas. He himself proceeded without lingering on the road, to the Chalcidian peninsula, where he was received at Potidæa, which he made his head-quarters. And notwithstanding the smallness of his force he not only carried on hostilities against Olynthus, but was able to spare some of his men to garrison the other towns.

Not long after, Phœbidas set out on his expedition ; but he did not pursue his march without interruption. He stopt at Thebes, and encamped near the walls. His pretext for this delay was perhaps to obtain a reinforcement from the city. But as it had so lately sent envoys to treat with the Olynthians, he can hardly have expected to succeed in this object ; and we are therefore led to suspect a different motive. Diodorus¹ may only have expressed a suspicion, which was naturally suggested by the ensuing events, when he described Phœbidas as acting upon secret instructions of the Spartan government ? — Xenophon speaks as if he had never heard of such a rumour ; but as he assigns no reason for the stay in the neighbourhood of Thebes, even his account strengthens the probability, that Phœbidas had been invited to this step by one of the Theban parties, though he may not have had a distinct view of its consequences. The old oligarchical faction, which was interested in maintaining the alliance with Sparta, as it had never been forcibly dislodged, had not been wholly deprived of its influence by the revolution which took place shortly after the close of the Peloponnesian war. It was still strong enough to procure the appointment of Leontiades, one of its adherents, to the high office of a polemarch, which seems to have possessed much larger powers than were exercised by the Athenian *strategus*. On the other hand, the adverse party swayed the popular assembly ; and Ismenias, one of its leaders, was the

¹ xv. 20.

colleague, or one of the colleagues — for the number is not certain — of Leontiades. The negotiation with Olynthus had no doubt been the work of this party, and it now carried a decree forbidding all Thebans to join the expedition of Phœbidas. Leontiades had from the first paid assiduous court to the Spartan general, whom his rival Ismenias totally neglected, and by degrees established himself in his confidence, sufficiently to venture on a proposal full of risk to both. He offered to put him in possession of the citadel. This would convert Thebes from a jealous rival into a useful dependant of Sparta: its forces would immediately be at the disposal of Phœbidas for the main object of his expedition; and in the meanwhile he would have achieved a conquest far more important than that of Olynthus itself. Xenophon remarks — apparently to guard against the doubts which his readers might conceive as to the fidelity of his own narrative — that Phœbidas was a man who loved a brilliant exploit better than his life, but that he was not of a very calculating or cautious temper. He seems indeed to have embraced the offer without hesitation, and it was concerted between them, that he should set forward as if on his march, for which he had already made preparations, but that at the proper juncture Leontiades should overtake him, and conduct him and his troops into the citadel. The day selected was the great festival of Demeter, the Thesmophoria, when the Theban women celebrated the mystic rites of the goddess in the Cadmea, as the citadel was called from its supposed founder, and the council, which commonly sat there, met near the market-place. In the stillness of a sultry noon, when the crowd, seeking shade and repose, had left the streets almost empty, Leontiades rode out after Phœbidas, who, immediately changing his line of march, followed his guide to the citadel, and took possession of it without opposition.

Leaving him there, Leontiades proceeded to the council, where Ismenias was transacting business. He had the councillors not to be alarmed because the citadel

was in the hands of the Lacedæmonians, who were not come with hostile intentions toward any of the peaceable citizens. But as the law empowered a polemarch to arrest any one who was chargeable with a capital offence, he should immediately exercise his authority, and commit Ismenias to prison, as guilty of stirring up war. Then, without further parley, he ordered some of his officers, whom he had either brought with him, or had stationed near at hand for the purpose, with some armed men, to seize the prisoner, and convey him to the Cadmea. Diodorus speaks of an unsuccessful attempt made by the party of Ismenias to dislodge the enemy; but according to Xenophon they were struck with consternation by the surprise of the citadel, and, as soon as the arrest of Ismenias became known, about 400 of them quitted the city, and took refuge in Athens. Ismenias was removed from his office, and Archias appointed in his room; and Leontiades then repaired to Sparta, to obtain the sanction of the Spartan government for these proceedings.

They were, so far as the Spartan general was a party to them, a grosser breach of faith, and a more palpable violation of the treaty of Antalcidas, than had yet been witnessed. Accordingly the intelligence was received at Sparta with an appearance of as much concern and indignation, as Charles V. expressed at the violence offered by his generals to the pope. But when the conduct of Phœbidas came to be discussed, Agesilaus did not scruple to defend it, with a freedom worthy of the boldest of the sophists. According to Xenophon he distinctly laid down the principle, that the case was to be tried by no other rule than that of expediency; if what had been done was against the interest of Sparta, Phœbidas deserved to be punished; if it was for the good of the state, he was not bound to wait for orders. The simple question was, whether they were gainers or losers by the transaction. Plutarch with reason considers this language as inconsistent with the professions of a high regard for justice which Agesilaus often had

in his mouth; but it does not seem to afford any ground for suspecting that he was privy to the plot before its execution. As to the practical conclusion, all doubts — if any had been ever felt — were removed by the arguments of Leontiades. He reminded the Spartans of the hostility which Thebes had displayed toward them on every occasion since the close of the Peloponnesian war, and of the jealousy with which they had viewed her ascendancy in Bœotia. She had now ceased to be formidable to them, and, if they would but protect their friends, a scytalé would at all times be sufficient to procure whatever they wished from her. It was the bargain which they had made at Athens with the Thirty: and experience had not taught them that the gain was less clear than the dishonour. After their treatment of Mantinea indeed they might think that it would be folly to forego any advantage for the sake of their reputation. Their decision afforded a new and more signal confirmation of the assertion made by the Athenians in the conference at Melos: that “of all states Sparta had most glaringly shown by her conduct, that in her political transactions she measured honour by inclination, and justice by expediency.” But what gave a peculiarly Spartan character to this proceeding was, that while they determined to keep the fruits of iniquity, they assumed the office of avengers of wrong. They sentenced Phœbidas to a fine of 10,000 drachmas; and deposed him from his command: but instead of evacuating the Cadmea, they strengthened the garrison, and appointed Lysanoridas, with two colleagues, in the room of Phœbidas, and sent a commission composed of three Spartan judges, and of one from each of the confederate states, to sit in judgment upon Ismenias. The charges brought against him were that he had accepted Persian gold, had devoted himself to the interests of the barbarian, and together with Androclidas had been a principal mover of the late war. With what success he defended himself against these allegations does not appear. Xenophon

thinks it enough to say, that he was unable to convince his judges that he was not a man of great and dangerous ambition, in other words a formidable enemy to Sparta: he was therefore condemned and put to death; Archias and Leontiades, and their faction, remained masters of Thebes under Spartan patronage.

By this event the Spartan government was both encouraged and enabled to prosecute the war against Olynthus with increased activity. A requisition was sent to all the cities of the Peloponnesian confederacy, to furnish their contingents to the force which had been voted by the congress at Sparta, which, with the troops still due from Laconia, or as many as could be spared there, were placed under the command of Teleutias, the brother of Agesilaus, whose rank and personal reputation disposed the allies to engage with greater readiness in an expedition, which, considered with regard to their own interests, most of them must have viewed either with indifference or aversion. The new government of Thebes in particular displayed its gratitude to Sparta, and its respect for Agesilaus, by the zeal with which it contributed both infantry and cavalry for the purpose of subjecting another independent city to the dominion of Sparta. Teleutias, urging these levies with all his influence in the places which he passed through, while he maintained the best discipline among his troops, advanced with no great speed. But he sent notice of his approach to Amyntas, calling upon him to raise as many mercenaries as he could, and to engage the neighbouring princes by subsidies either to espouse his cause, or at least to remain neutral. He also sent to Derdas, prince of Elymia, representing the danger with which his principality was threatened by the ambition of Olynthus, and exhorting him to aid in repressing it. These applications were successful, and before he arrived at the theatre of war, he was joined both by a body of Macedonian troops, and by Derdas himself, at the head of about 400 Elymian cavalry. Thus reinforced he found himself strong enough to advance immediately

against Olynthus. On his march from Potidæa through the Olynthian territory he abstained from such ravages as might impede his retreat, but he met with no enemy till he had come up close to the walls: where the Olynthian army was drawn up to receive him. The cavalry charged his right wing, where the main body of his own was posted, with such vigour that even the infantry began to give way; and a general rout would perhaps have ensued, if Derdas — whom Teleutias, to show his respect for so useful an ally, and his admiration for the fine condition of his men, had stationed in the left, which he himself commanded in person — had not made a movement toward the gates, which induced the Olynthians, through fear of being cut off from the town, to make a hasty retreat. In this they were very roughly handled by the Elymians, and their whole army sought shelter behind their walls. Teleutias reared a trophy, and on his return to Potidæa ravaged the enemy's territory. This seems to have been the principal advantage he obtained in this campaign. At the end of the summer he dismissed his Macedonian and Elymian auxiliaries, and the Olynthians then began in their turn to make inroads on the allies of Sparta.

Early in the spring of 381 Teleutias was again joined by Derdas, who happened to have arrived at Apollonia only a few hours before a body of 600 Olynthian cavalry, in one of their marauding excursions, not aware of his presence, came up close to the gates. His appearance, when he sallied forth with his horse, put them to flight, and he chased them back to Olynthus with a loss of eighty men. The Olynthians were now again nearly confined to their walls, and were able to cultivate but a small part of their territory; and somewhat later in the season Teleutias himself took the field, to renew and complete the devastations of the year before. As however he approached the town, the Olynthian cavalry came out to meet him, and even ventured to cross a river which separated them from

the enemy. Indignant at their presumption he hastily ordered Tlemonidas, the commander of his targeteers, to charge them at full speed. The Olynthians seeing these troops advancing towards them, quietly retreated to the other side of the water, which the targeteers immediately forded; but before they had recovered from the disorder of the passage they were attacked and routed by the cavalry, and Tlemonidas himself was slain. At this sight Teleutias entirely lost his temper, and ordered a general charge of horse and foot, but in the heat of the pursuit he inadvertently approached so near the walls, as to be within the range of the enemy's missiles from the battlements.¹ This compelled him to fall back in some disorder, and the Olynthians took advantage of the favourable moment, to sally out with their whole force and charge the phalanx. Teleutias himself fell; and after his death his army was entirely broken up, and fled, pursued with great slaughter, to the nearest friendly cities.


This disaster did not divert Sparta from her object; it only roused her to fresh exertions. It was now thought necessary to send one of the kings to conduct the war. It was perhaps known that the presence of Agesilaus would be required nearer home; and his colleague Agesipolis was appointed to take the command at Olynthus, with a council of thirty Spartans to supply the defects of his experience. He levied a considerable army of volunteers — at least of troops so called — from Laconia, and from several of the allied states, as well as supplies of money; on his march through Thessaly he attracted a body of cavalry into his service; and when he arrived in Macedonia, he was supported by Amyntas and Derdas with even greater zeal than they had hitherto shown. It seems however that he did not begin operations against Olynthus

¹ Xenophon (Hell. v. 3. 5.) observes, that this was a very common oversight; though he thinks proper to moralise on the indiscretion of Teleutias. It is surprising that Schneider should have been uncertain about the meaning of the sentence πολλοί — ἀπιχόμενοι, where the tense so clearly marks a general reflection.

before the spring of the following year, 380, when he marched against the city without encountering any serious resistance, wasted its territory, and took Torone by storm. But in the midst of his successes he was seized with a fever which, in the course of seven days, put an end to his life, at Aphytis in the peninsula of Pallene, whither he had been conveyed at his own desire, to enjoy the deep shade, and the clear cool waters, which he had observed near a temple of Dionysus. His body, immersed in honey, was carried home for a royal burial. Xenophon makes a remark on this occasion which is meant to excite our admiration for the magnanimity of Agesilaus, but which is perhaps more striking as an illustration of the state of feeling which commonly prevailed between the two royal families at Sparta. Agesilaus, he says, instead of betraying any joy—as might have been expected—at the death of his rival¹, shed tears over the young man, whom he had always found an agreeable and respectful companion.

While Agesipolis was absent on his last campaign, Agesilaus had been employed in reducing another of Sparta's refractory allies to complete subjection. The exiles who had been restored to Phlius complained that their claims were not referred to an impartial tribunal; for none such, as they contended, was to be found in the city; and the adverse party would not submit to foreign arbitration. It rejected their demands with the greater confidence as, having assisted Agesipolis with a liberal subsidy for which it had received his thanks before his departure, it no longer felt any apprehension of Spartan interference. The exiles however applied to Sparta for redress, whether before Agesipolis set out on his expedition is not clear; but it seems to have

¹ οἷχ, ὡς τις ἄν εἶπε, ἦσθε ὡς ἀνεπιδόλω. Hell. v. 3. 20. Schneider, in his notes on v. 3. 16. 25., thinks that this refers to a quarrel which had arisen between the two kings on the subject of Phlius. But Xenophon affords no ground for this conjecture; and the rivalry between the two royal houses is sufficiently notorious. What Diodorus says, xv. 19., of the difference between the characters and views of the two kings, does not refer particularly to Phlius, and probably had no other foundation than the part taken by Agesipolis in the affair of Phæbidas.



been after his departure that the government of Phlius ventured to condemn their opponents, who had gone without a public commission to plead their cause at Sparta, to a penalty. This imprudent display of animosity furnished those who were soliciting the interposition of Sparta with fresh motives and stronger arguments, which were seconded by the influence of Agesilaus, who had some personal and hereditary connections among the exiles. The ephors were induced to decree an expedition against Phlius, and Agesilaus himself took the command. On his march he was met by several deprecatory embassies from the party in power, with offers of money to purchase his forbearance. But he now remembered his ancient regard for justice, which he had forgotten in the case of Phœbidas, and declared with great solemnity, that the object of his expedition was not to wrong any one, but to succour the oppressed. The envoys at length professed their readiness to make any sacrifice he required to avert the invasion. But he answered that promises from men who had already broken their compact with their fellow-citizens, would not satisfy him: he must have some more solid security: and that which he insisted on was nothing less than the occupation of the citadel. As they refused to give him this proof of confidence, he proceeded to besiege their town. There were however several Spartans in the camp, who, not being biassed by similar feelings in favour of the exiles, loudly expressed their disapprobation of an enterprise undertaken against such a place as Phlius, which was able to arm 5000 men, for the sake of a few individuals. To silence these murmurs, Agesilaus directed his Phliasian friends to give the most liberal reception to all their fellow-citizens who might be drawn by ties of blood or friendship to come out and join them: to form them into companies, and provide them with arms and the means of military training; and, if their own funds were not sufficient, not to hesitate to borrow money for that purpose. In this manner a corps of refugees was raised,

exceeding 1000 men : so well equipped and disciplined, that the remonstrants themselves admitted they could not desire more serviceable comrades.

Still by dint of extraordinary abstinence, patience, and courage, the besieged held out for a year and eight months. They husbanded their stock of provisions with such parsimony, as to make it last twice the time for which it had been calculated. Delphio, one of the leading men, with a band of 300 devoted followers, maintained order within, annoyed the enemy with frequent sallies, and repressed the disposition to surrender, which began to manifest itself, as food grew scarce, and hope faint. At length however, early in 379, finding their provisions entirely spent, they were obliged to capitulate, and, probably expecting to obtain milder terms from the ephors than from Agesilaus, the personal friend of the refugees, they requested leave to send envoys with offers of unconditional submission to Sparta. Agesilaus, piqued at the slight thus put upon his own authority, granted a safe-conduct to their ambassadors, but at the same time exerted all his influence to be appointed arbiter of the terms of peace, and in the meanwhile redoubled his precautions to prevent the escape of the besieged. Nevertheless Delphio, and a slave who had often shown his dexterity in carrying away arms from the enemy's camp, contrived one night to elude the vigilance of the sentinels, and escaped. The rest received orders from Sparta to submit to such conditions as Agesilaus should dictate. His edict was, that 100 commissioners should be chosen, one half from the refugees, the other from the besieged¹, with power to put to death or banish as many of their fellow-citizens as they would, and then to frame a new constitution ; and before he marched away he lodged a garrison in the citadel, with pay for six months, to remain until this business should be accomplished. It is to be hoped

¹ τῶν ἀξίων. Plass (iii. p. 598) interprets this expression to mean *Spartans* : apparently without either grammatical or historical grounds. By a still stranger oversight he calls Delphio a *native of Delphi*, though he is described by Xenophon not only as Δελφίων τις, but simply as Δελφίων.

that as much regard to equity was shown in the selection of the commissioners, as in the nominal proportion assigned between the opposite parties. Xenophon does not mention the immediate result ; but the permanent effect was to render Phlius a devoted vassal of Sparta.

In the course of the same year the Olynthian war was brought to a close by Polybiades, who had been appointed to the supreme command after the death of Agesipolis, and pressed the Olynthians by sea and land, until they were reduced by famine to sue for peace. It was granted on no harder condition than that they should become members of the Peloponnesian confederacy, on the same footing of subjection to Sparta with the rest. The importance of this event could not be duly estimated at the time. It was probably considered at Sparta as a glorious triumph ; and those who viewed it with different feelings were equally unable to perceive how pregnant it was with calamities both to her and to Greece.

CHAP. XXXVIII.

FROM THE END OF THE WAR WITH OLYNTHUS TO THE
BATTLE OF LEUCTRA.

THUS by a vigorous and dexterous use of the advantages which she gained from the peace of Antalcidas, Sparta had advanced some steps nearer than she had ever been before to a complete subjugation of Greece. If her old rival had now recovered her independence, Thebes was reduced to a state of subjection like that in which Athens had been held by the Thirty. Within the peninsula the hostility of Argos was counterpoised by the attachment of the newly-restored Corinthian oligarchy: and the fate of Mantinea and of Phlius struck the smaller states with awe. The acquisition of Olynthus raised her reputation no less than it immediately strengthened her power. To one who considers the dangers — at this time completely veiled from human foresight — which really impended over the liberty of Greece, the establishment of the Spartan dominion may seem to have been, as at least the lighter evil, a desirable event. Such it would certainly have been, if it could have been effected so as not to excite irritation and alarm. But the causes which made the Spartan ascendancy generally odious, rendered it also insecure. Pleas might be found for the proceedings against Phlius, and Mantinea, and Olynthus. But the seizure of the Cadmea was so glaring an act of injustice, that even at Sparta, according to Xenophon, no attempt was made to defend it except on the score of expediency. It was probably some consolation to Spartan pride, to ascribe the reverses by which it was soon after deeply humbled to the anger of the gods: and Xenophon directs the attention of his readers to the manner in which Sparta fell from her most palmy state to one of degradation unexampled in

her history, as a signal proof of a superintending Providence. Thebes, which had suffered the wrong, was chosen as the instrument of divine wrath for punishing the guilty.

But though we would not neglect the moral and religious side of the subject, there are some others which it will be fit to notice, and which Xenophon appears studiously to have kept out of sight. Thebes at this time possessed two great men, not perhaps the first or the last whom she produced, but the only ones whom the course of events permitted to take a prominent part in the affairs of Greece. These two men were not more conspicuous for their personal qualities, than for the mutual attachment by which they were united, notwithstanding a dissimilarity amounting almost to a contrast in their characters and circumstances. Pelopidas was of noble birth, inherited an ample fortune, and enlarged his connections by an honourable marriage. He was wholly possessed with an ardent desire of action and glory, conscious of abilities equal to the loftiness of his aims, and valued the advantages of his rank and wealth only as they might be subservient to a generous ambition, in which his own elevation was not distinguished from his country's greatness. His friend Epaminondas was of a nature formed rather for contemplation than for action, and highly cultivated by philosophical studies; but it was also one which found a sufficient impulse to the most strenuous exertions in the light which his philosophy threw on his duties as a man and a citizen. He was it seems of a good family, but was bred and lived in poverty: poverty not merely relative to his birth and station, but real and absolute as that of Socrates. But as it did not exclude him from the best society, nor from any opportunity of serving the state, he appears to have reckoned it as one of the favours of fortune, which kept him free from useless incumbrances. His mind had been chiefly formed by his intercourse with Lysis, one of those Italian Greeks who preserved and unfolded the doctrines of

Pythagoras, and who were induced by some causes which are now only matter for conjecture, to fix their residence at Thebes.¹

The arrival of these learned emigrants would have been an event of no slight importance, if it had produced no other effect than that of moulding the character of Epaminondas. But it seems probable that it was attended with consequences much more extensive, and that it contributed not a little to that great turn in the affairs of Greece, which we are now about to relate. We collect from Plutarch's work on the Genius of Socrates, that these Pythagoreans diffused a general taste for philosophical pursuits among the Theban youth. One tendency of these new intellectual habits may have been to soften the Theban prejudices against Athens, now the central seat of literature and philosophy, and thus to prepare for the hospitable reception of the Athenian exiles, which in its turn may be supposed to have given a fresh impulse to liberal studies at Thebes; and this was an excitement which must have rendered those who shared it the more impatient of Spartan domination, and the more indignant at the treachery by which Thebes had been subjected to it. The violence of Sparta probably united many Thebans in the cause of liberty, whose political sentiments might otherwise have kept them wide apart. There is no reason for thinking that the exiles who took refuge at Athens after the seizure of the Cadmea were in general partisans of democracy. Among them were several men of the highest rank, including almost all who had filled the high office of *hipparchus*, or master of the horse, which at Thebes seems to have been invested by the old aristocratical institutions with somewhat of a religious, as well as a military and civil character. But whatever may have been their previous opinions, they were now naturally led to consider the independence of

¹ Boeckh (*Philolaos*, p. 10.) thinks they may have been descendants of the exiled Corinthian Bacchiads, and have been induced to settle at Thebes, as the city which had given shelter to Philolaos, of whom the reader will find some account, Vol. I. p. 432.

Thebes as intimately connected with the establishment of popular government.

Pelopidas and Epaminondas were attracted toward each other by the secret sympathy of kindred natures; that it was no accidental cause which cemented their friendship, was proved by the invariable constancy with which it maintained itself through the course of a highly agitated public life, in which less congenial spirits would have found abundant motives for jealousy and discord. They had served together in the Theban division which had been sent to support the Spartan invasion of Mantinea¹, and had fought side by side in the engagement which has been already mentioned as having taken place before the siege of that city. Their line had partially given way, and they were almost surrounded by the enemy. Pelopidas fell pierced with wounds, and Epaminondas, though he believed him to be dead, continued to shield his body until he himself, having received several wounds, was nearly overpowered by superior numbers, when Agesipolis came up to his relief. But this occurrence might rather be considered as an indication of the friendship established between them, than as its foundation, or as the occasion from which it derived much additional warmth. Epaminondas is said to have been the only one among the friends of Pelopidas, whom he could not prevail on to accept pecuniary assistance from him. Pelopidas on the other hand emulated his friend's poverty in the simplicity of his own habits, though he took no interest in his philosophical pursuits, but after the old Theban fashion gave his leisure to field sports and athletic exercises.

On the seizure of the citadel Pelopidas joined the fugitives, and accompanied them to Athens. Epaminondas remained at Thebes, probably not because his feelings were undecided, nor because he thought himself secured from jealousy by his poverty or his philosophy,

¹ Not, as Plass (iii. p. 600.) misinterprets Pausanias, ix. 13. 1., to the aid of Mantinea; which would contradict instead of confirming Plutarch's account.

but because he conceived that to be his proper post, where he had the best prospect of preventing violence and bloodshed. He and his family kept up a secret correspondence with the refugees, who were burning with impatience to return and take vengeance on the traitors, and were stimulated with fresh eagerness by all the accounts which they received of their proceedings. LeontiaDES and Archias were men of very different characters: but their opposite qualities seem to have concurred to aggravate the burden and the shame of the tyranny—Xenophon himself uses the word—which they exercised with the aid of the foreign garrison. LeontiaDES was an active and vigilant party leader, who devoted his whole attention to public affairs, and found constant occupation in providing for the security of his government. For the designs of the exiles were suspected, and it was known that they had left many friends behind them, who would be ready to aid them; and it was his chief care to repress such attempts from without by caution and severity at home. Archias was a man of voluptuous habits, who desired power as an instrument of sensual indulgence. He quailed indeed before his more vigorous and austere colleague: but still was able to gratify his passions with the dishonour of the most reputable families. It was probably such provocations, rather than any encouragement which they received from the state of affairs, that toward the end of the year 379 ripened the wishes of the Theban exiles into a plan for the recovery of their city. The events of the year indeed were such as might otherwise have deterred them; but they seem to have relied on the general eagerness of the population of Thebes to shake off the degrading yoke, and perhaps had received promises of support from their well-wishers at Athens. It is possible that their movements may have been accelerated by the efforts which their adversaries made to counteract them. LeontiaDES had sent private emissaries to Athens for the purpose of taking off the foremost of the refugees by assassina-

tion. But the meditated blow only reached Androclidas, and served to put the rest on their guard. The Spartan government then endeavoured by an imperious mandate in the name of the confederacy to induce the Athenians to dismiss their Theban guests. But Athens now requited the hospitality shown to Thrasybulus with similar firmness in resistance to this demand.

Pelopidas was, it seems¹, the first to form the resolution of exposing his life in a bold attempt for the common cause. But he easily found associates, among whom were several men of the first Theban families, eager to share the danger with him. They communicated their design to their friends at Thebes; and Epaminondas was urged to lend his aid to it. But he was restrained by scruples — not perhaps simply of natural humanity or even of philosophy, but rather arising out of his Pythagorean religion — from engaging actively in an enterprise which could only be executed by means of a tumult, in which it was likely that some innocent Theban blood would be shed. He would not, it seems, have hesitated to punish the traitorous tyrants without any legal forms; and he could have depended on the calmness and moderation of Pelopidas; but among the partners of his project were some men of more fiery temper or less scrupulous character, who it was to be feared might seize the occasion to revenge themselves on their personal enemies.² He therefore thought it most becoming to await the issue, and not to come forward until he saw a clear opportunity of promoting the public good without becoming a party to any private wrong. He even dissuaded his friends from the enterprise: whether he proposed any other mode of accomplishing its object, does not appear; but we are informed that he endeavoured to excite the self-

¹ According to Plutarch (Pel. 8.), whose authority in this matter we prefer to Xenophon's, who not only represents Mellon as the author and leader of the enterprise, but omits the name of Pelopidas altogether in his account of it: a silence, which speaks too much against himself: though it certainly refutes Diodorus, who (xv. 81.) says of Pelopidas, that all writers agreed in ascribing the chief merit in the recovery of the Cadmea to him.

² Plutarch, De Gen. Soc. 3.

confidence of the Theban youth, and encouraged them to try their strength with the Lacedæmonians of the garrison in gymnastic exercises, in which they had commonly the advantage, as a prelude to more serious conflicts. His brother Cephisias however was not checked by the like scruples, but entered with ardour into the undertaking. But the most important confederate of the party at Thebes was Phyllidas, who according to Xenophon having been sent on some business to Athens, instigated the exiles to the attempt, and yet had so completely concealed his sentiments from the government at home, that he filled the post of secretary to the polemarchs, and insinuated himself into the especial favour of Archias, by a show of willingness to pander to his lust.

A day was at length fixed for the attempt, and it was concerted that the main body of the exiles, headed by Pherenicus, should post themselves in the Thriasian plain—or perhaps, should slowly advance from Eleusis toward the border—while a small party—twelve according to Plutarch, but according to Xenophon no more than seven—among whom Pelopidas, Mellon, Damoclidas, and Theopompus, were the most conspicuous for their rank, if not for their zeal, should make their way into Thebes, and join their associates there. Two of the Athenian generals, presuming it seems on the approbation of the people, and apprehending that to procure a formal decree for the purpose would defeat the plan by publishing it to the enemy, undertook on their own authority to march with an Athenian force to the frontier, and there to remain in readiness to succour their friends as occasion might require. Pelopidas and his companions assumed the garb of hunters, and when they reached Mount Cithæron despatched a messenger to Thebes to announce their approach, and to make arrangements for their reception.¹ Charon, one of their most resolute partisans, offered his house as a hiding-place for them, and a rendezvous for all the

¹ Plutarch, de Gen. Socrat. 2.

conspirators, and their messenger returned to give them the necessary directions. In the meanwhile Phyllidas, in expectation of the event, had appointed the same evening for a banquet which he was to give to Archias and Philippus, one of his colleagues, under the pretext either of a public festival¹, or of celebrating the termination of their year of office, which was now near at hand. And he had promised Archias that he would endeavour toward the close of the entertainment to procure the presence of some Theban matrons. But as Leontiades would not have approved of such proceedings, Archias had desired that he should not be invited to their orgies.

The success of the enterprise depended very much on the promptitude with which it might be carried into execution. The rumours which had reached Thebes of a plot against the government had alarmed the Spartan harmosts; and their anxiety seems to have been increased by some accounts which they received of sinister omens and prodigies that had been lately observed. Lysanoridas had even been induced to set out for Haliartus on the very day appointed for the arrival of the exiles, to perform some propitiatory rites enjoined by a Theban soothsayer who was in the plot. The forces of Thespiæ were ordered to be kept in readiness for marching whenever the Spartan commanders should send for them. But as the hour of action drew near, Hippostenidas, one of the patriotic party at Thebes, began to be disheartened, and was struck with the seeming absurdity of the scheme, of dislodging the foreign garrison by the massacre of a few citizens. Without consulting any of his associates, he determined to put a stop to their enterprise, and despatched a man named Chlidon, who had been employed in Mellon's service, to prevent him and his comrades from pursuing

¹ Schneider raises a question, whether the Aphrodisia mentioned by Xenophon (v. 4. 4.) is not to be taken figuratively. It seems very doubtful whether such a metaphor could have been used by Xenophon, and whether, if the banquet had only been given to celebrate the termination of the year of office, it would not have been postponed until the year had expired.

their way. But the messenger himself was detained at Thebes by an accidental hinderance; and the little band of exiles, who as soon as they had crossed Cithæron took different roads, and thus more easily escaped notice through the inclemency of the weather, entered the city unobserved, and met safely in Charon's house, where they were joined by their partisans, until the whole number amounted to forty-eight.¹

They had not been long assembled, before they were threatened with a new danger. A message came from Archias to summon Charon into his presence. It seemed probable that the plot had been discovered: and the recent pusillanimity of Hipposthenidas directed general suspicion against him as the informer. Charon obeyed the summons with little hope that he should see his friends again, among whom he left his young son as a hostage for his own fidelity. He however returned, and informed them that Archias and Philippus, whom he found already much excited with wine, had heard that some of the exiles were concealed in the city, but the report was so vague that they had sent for Charon without any suspicion, merely to make inquiries on the subject. The confederates were soon after unconsciously exposed to still greater peril. Charon had not long quitted the presence of the polemarchs, when a letter was brought to Archias from an Athenian of the same name, who was at this time hierophant, communicating to him almost all the details of the plot. Happily the polemarch was now so heated and stupefied by the debauch, that when the bearer of the letter told him it related to important business, he laid it aside unopened, exclaiming: Let business wait until to-morrow; and expressed his impatience for the ap-

¹ Yet Xenophon (v. 4. 3.) describes the conspirators as passing a night and a day in their dangerous concealment before they struck the blow. If so, they were probably waiting for the entertainment to be given by Phyllidas, which according to Plutarch as we have seen took place on the day of their arrival. It is remarkable that Schneider, with the evidence of this discrepancy between the two writers before him, should observe "*De tem-pore consentit Plutarchus.*"

pearance of the female visitors whom Phyllidas had led him to look for.

This was the moment chosen for the attack. Mellon and a few of his companions were at the door, disguised either as women or as revellers; and Phyllidas, on pretence of respect for the delicacy of the matrons, had induced Archias to dismiss all the attendants. The conspirators were then admitted, and after a short struggle despatched Archias, Philippus, and the other guests. In the meanwhile Pelopidas with Damoclidus and Cephisodorus repaired to the house of Leontiades, which was already closed for the night. He himself was still reclining after a temperate meal, while his wife was spinning by his side. With some difficulty they gained admission. He was roused by the noise in time to seize a weapon, with which he made a vigorous resistance, and slew Cephisodorus, but at length fell by the hand of Pelopidas. Having then closed the doors of the house, and threatened death to the inmates if they should open them, the survivors proceeded to that of Hypates, another leading member of the government, who lived close by. He made his escape, but was overtaken and despatched. Before the death of Archias and his colleagues was made public, Phyllidas went to the prison, where a number of his friends were confined for political offences, and having obtained entrance on pretence of an order from the polemarchs, overpowered the jailors, and set the prisoners at liberty. They found arms in the public porticoes and the armourers' shops, and rushing through the streets, proclaimed the fall of the tyrants, and invited all Thebans to rise in the cause of freedom.¹

During the night the citizens, who did not know what to believe, remained quiet; but Hermippidas and

¹ According to Plutarch, the attack on Archias, which was headed by Mellon, was simultaneous with that which was undertaken against Leontiades and Hypates by Pelopidas. And this looks the more probable account. But Xenophon, who seems anxious to prevent the reader from suspecting that Pelopidas had any share in the exploit, represents Phyllidas — of course after the death of Archias — as leading the way first to the houses of Leontiades and Hypates, and then to the prison.

Arcesus, the colleagues of Lysanoridas, who were left in command of the citadel, hearing the uproar, sent for succours to Thespiæ and Platæa; and the insurgents despatched couriers to their friends in Attica. In the morning, as soon as the events of the night were fully ascertained, the people were called together, and Pelopidas and the other champions of freedom, among whom Epaminondas now took his place, entered the assembly in solemn procession, accompanied by the priests, who bore the sacred symbols of suppliants, and conjured the spectators to fight for their hearths and altars. The exiles were hailed with shouts of applause as the deliverers of their country; and Pelopidas, Mellon, and Charon, were placed at the head of the government with the title of Bœotarchs, which seems to have been meant to indicate that Thebes was about to resume her ancient station among the Bœotian cities. The whole military force of Thebes declared itself on the side of independence; and when it was known that a body of troops was on its way from Platæa to reinforce the garrison, the Theban cavalry sallied forth to meet them, and dispersed them with some slaughter. In the course of this and the following day, the two Athenian generals, who were waiting with their forces on the frontier, marched into Thebes, and began to cooperate with their allies in the siege of the citadel. Xenophon says that the garrison was very weak, though other accounts make it amount to 1500 and even to 5000 men.¹ But the troops which composed it were probably in general but ill affected to the service: the assailants offered large rewards to the first who should scale the walls; and the Spartan commanders found themselves compelled to propose terms of capitulation, which were gladly granted by the besiegers. The garrison was allowed to march out with their arms; but several of the Thebans who had taken refuge among them were arrested and put to death by their exasperated

¹ Plut. de G. S. 33. But in Pel. 12. he says it amounted to 1500, exclusive of the Thebans who joined it.

countrymen, who, according to Xenophon, even wreaked their fury on the families of their victims. The Athenians however were humane enough to interpose, and succeeded in sheltering some from the vengeance of their enemies.

The news of the Theban insurrection was received at Sparta with the vexation which men commonly experience when they are deprived of the fruits of their injustice. It vented itself first on the harmosts who had surrendered the Cadmea.¹ Hermippidas and Arcesus were put to death before they returned home, and it seems with scarcely any form of trial, at Corinth; and Lysanoridas, likewise as Plutarch leads us to suppose in his absence, was condemned to a penalty so heavy as to be equivalent to a sentence of banishment.² The partisans of the tyranny, who were now in their turn driven into exile, roused the hostility of the Spartan government against the city which had so audaciously asserted its independence, and an army was ordered to march against Thebes. It was expected that Agesilaus would have taken the command, but he declined it on the plea that his age entitled him to exemption from foreign service. His real motive, Xenophon informs us, was that he shrank from the reproach which he apprehended of involving his country in war for the support of an odious cause. His excuse was admitted, and his colleague Cleombrotus, the brother of Agesipolis, was forced to conduct the expedition. He seems to have engaged in it with feelings not unlike those

¹ Xenophon (H. v. 4. 10. 13.) speaks of only one harmost. Plutarch's statement, which was probably drawn from Theban historians (see Schneider on Xen. H. v. 4. 2.) as to the three whom he names, is better entitled to credit. If it were not that two were put to death, as equally sharing the whole responsibility, we might have supposed that they were appointed according to the practice which has been already noticed (see Vol. IV. p. 17. n. 1) to take the command in succession. This would reconcile Xenophon with Plutarch; and perhaps the condemnation of both officers is sufficiently explained by the extraordinary irritation produced at Sparta by the recent loss.

² Plut. Pel. 13. Here again one might be tempted to apply the fragment of Theopompus, which suggested the conjecture proposed in Vol. IV. p. 380. n. 1; for the slight variation in the name of Lysanoridas, or Lysandridas, raises no difficulty; but the execution of the women seems to imply that they were the chief offenders.

which his father had shown towards the Athenians in similar circumstances.¹ The road into Bœotia through Eleutheræ was guarded by Chabrias the Athenian general at the head of a body of targeteers. Cleombrotus therefore crossed the mountains by the pass above Plateæ, which he found occupied by a small Theban force, consisting according to Xenophon of the liberated prisoners; but they were cut down almost to a man by his light troops. He remained encamped in the Theban territory about sixteen days, but so studiously abstained from committing any damage, that his men were at a loss to understand whether they had been at war or at peace with the Thebans. On his return, he left Sphodrias as harmost at Thespiæ, with a third part of the allied forces, and all the money he had brought from home, and directed him with it to enlist mercenaries in his service. He himself descended to the sea-coast on the gulph of Creusis, and, as he pursued his march along the mountain road toward the Isthmus, was assailed by a storm of wind so violent as to carry away a considerable quantity of arms and baggage with the beasts of burden into the sea. It was considered, Xenophon says, by some, as an omen of the impending political tempest.

The expedition of Cleombrotus, fruitless as it was with regard to the Thebans, seems to have made an impression at Athens which could not have been expected, and which it is difficult to explain. That the wishes of the people at large were strongly in favour of the independence of Thebes, cannot be questioned, and indeed had been distinctly declared when Chabrias was sent to guard the pass of Eleutheræ. Nevertheless after the return of Cleombrotus the two generals who had aided in the recovery of the Cadmea were brought

¹ Xenophon (H. v. 4. 14.) very clearly describes the beginning of the expedition of Cleombrotus as subsequent to the recovery of the Cadmea, and to the arrival of the Thebans, who made their escape after that event, at Sparta. On such a point he is certainly the best authority. Plutarch however represents Cleombrotus as marching to the relief of the citadel, and as having reached Megara before he heard of its surrender from the garrison which met him there.

to trial; one of them was put to death, the other, who did not abide the trial, was outlawed. It seems absolutely necessary to suppose that they had acted without the sanction of the people, and Xenophon describes their offence to have been, that they were privy to the attempt of the Theban exiles. Yet an orator of the next generation asserts, that a decree was passed on the motion of Cephalus, a leading statesman of this period, for sending succours to dislodge the Lacedæmonian garrison.¹ If this was the case, we must conclude that the charge on which they were condemned was, that, by the encouragement which they gave to the exiles, they had drawn Athens into hostilities against Sparta. According to Xenophon, the expedition of Cleombrotus led the Athenians for the first time to reflect on the danger to which they had exposed themselves by their breach of the peace, now that Corinth no longer served as a barrier to protect them from invasion; and in the height of their alarm they condemned the two unfortunate generals. Yet the character of the Athenians renders it hard to believe that they were impelled on this occasion by mere timidity. There was, as may be collected from Plutarch², a party at Athens — the relics of the oligarchy — with the popular orator Callistratus at its head, favourable to the oppressors of Thebes, and desirous of upholding the ascendancy of Sparta. It had been unable to resist the first impulse of the public feeling in behalf of Theban liberty. But when the sympathy which had been roused by the danger of the cause had been somewhat weakened by its success, it seems as if its adversaries found means to produce a temporary reaction, in which the two generals were sacrificed to the hope of reconciliation with Sparta.

This turn in the public mind at Athens gave great alarm to the new government of Thebes.³ Pelopidas

¹ Dinarchus c. Dem. p. 95.

² De Gen. Socr. c. 31. Pelopidas and his companions pretended to be the bearers of a letter from Callistratus to Leontiades.

³ According to Plutarch, Pel. 14., it would seem that Gorgidas had been created Bæotarch in the room of Charon or of Mellon.

and his friends had reckoned on the support of the Athenians, and feared that, if abandoned to their own resources, they must be crushed by the irresistible force of the Peloponnesian confederacy. In this emergency they may have been driven to a stratagem which was perhaps suggested to them by the well-known venality of the Spartan character. Sphodrias, the harmost at Thespiæ, had passed through an honourable career of soldiership, but he was believed to be incapable of resisting a bribe, and the event seemed to prove that he had been corrupted by Theban emissaries.¹ He was induced to march from Thespiæ as if with the intention of surprising Piræus, in which the gates were not yet finished. If indeed he was, as Plutarch represents him, a man of high ambition and weak judgment, it would be conceivable that he was seized with a desire of emulating the exploit of Phœbidas, and as he might think more safely, since the Athenians had been the aggressors. His measures however were in this case so ill concerted, that by daybreak he had advanced no further than the Thriasian plain, where his men are said to have been struck with superstitious terror by a blaze which seemed to issue from the temple of Eleusis. It was now manifestly useless to proceed; but, instead of retreating as rapidly and quietly as possible, he indulged his troops with havoc and plunder. In the meanwhile news had been brought to Athens, that a great army was marching against it: and the whole city was up in arms. It happened that three envoys had arrived not long before from Sparta; and they were immediately arrested as privy to the designs of their generals. They however not only asserted their own innocence, which they contended was sufficiently proved by their presence at a juncture when, if they had been aware of the movements of Sphodrias, they would certainly have withdrawn from the city, but assured the Athenians

¹ Such appears to have been Xenophon's opinion. Plutarch, in his *Ageilaus*, 24, ascribes the conduct of Sphodrias entirely to ambition or vanity; but in *Pel.* 14, adopts the report that he was bribed by Pelopidas.

that they would soon receive satisfaction from the Lacedæmonian government, which they doubted not would capitally punish the general who had taken such a step without its orders. They were believed, and suffered to depart.

Sphodrias indeed was recalled, but, not venturing to return home, was tried in his absence. His doom was generally considered certain, being not only merited by his rashness, but demanded by policy to soothe the Athenians : and Etymocles, one of the envoys who had held out the expectation of his punishment at Athens, was among his judges. He seemed to have the less chance of escape, as he belonged to the party which was opposed to Agesilaus, and had perhaps on this account been selected by Cleombrotus for the command at Thespiæ. But the character of Agesilaus was distinguished from the ordinary Spartan mould by an amiable softness, which he did not scruple to indulge at the public expense ; and he was on this occasion assailed on his weak side. His son Archidamus was on a footing of affectionate intimacy with Cleonymus, the son of Sphodrias, and the tears of his young friend induced him to intercede with his father in behalf of the culprit. Agesilaus, though convinced that Sphodrias had not merely been guilty of imprudence, but had sold the interests of the state, could not resist his son's intreaties, and exerted all his influence to save Sphodrias, alleging that it would be hard and unwise to put to death a man whose previous conduct had been irreproachable, for a single offence. His interest prevailed, and Sphodrias was acquitted.

The report of the sanction thus given to his conduct excited great indignation at Athens, where the secret springs of the transaction were probably long unknown ; and the friends of Thebes eagerly availed themselves of it, to urge the people into a close alliance with her. Active preparations were now made for withstanding the common enemy. The fortifications of Piræus were completed ; a new fleet of a hundred galleys was

put on the stocks¹; and, as if the shock had roused her from her lethargy, Athens began to remember her ancient maritime dominion, and to stretch her hands out to recover it. She at this time possessed several eminent generals and statesmen; the ingenious and enterprising Iphicrates; Chabrias, a kindred spirit, though somewhat more tardy in maturing his plans, displaying an energy bordering upon rashness in their execution; his young friend Phocion, already capable of supplying the defects of the elder general by his promptness of decision, and steady coolness of temper.² Conon was now gone. He had it seems escaped, or had been released from his Persian prison, and ended his days in Cyprus.³ The gratitude of the Athenians honoured him with a brazen statue, the first that had been erected to a citizen since the time of Harmodius and Aristogeton, as well as his friend Evagoras, both in an august position, expressive of their signal services to the state, near that of Zeus the Deliverer.⁴ He had left a son Timotheus, who inherited his talents and virtues, and was peculiarly qualified by his upright and amiable character, even more than by his abilities, for completing his father's work, by the restoration of the Athenian empire, with such limitations as the altered condition of Greece now prescribed. We do not exactly know on what footing the cities recovered for Athens by Conon and Thrasybulus were placed. It seems however most probable — especially as Conon is so constantly spoken of as the liberator of the Greeks⁵ — that they retained their independence, and only paid really voluntary contributions for their own protection as occasion required.⁶ After the peace of Antalcidas their connection with Athens was dissolved, and Sparta ap-

¹ Polybius ii. 62.² Plutarch. Phoc. 6.³ Lysias De bonis Aristoph. p. 155.⁴ Demosth. Lept. p. 478. Isocr. Evag. p. 200. c.⁵ Demosth. Lept. p. 477. Dinarchus c. Demosth. p. 91.⁶ Boeckh (iii. c. 17.) seems to be of a different opinion. But at least it may be inferred from the facility with which the confederacy was afterwards revived, that none of the old abuses had crept in before the peace of Antalcidas.

pears to have taken possession of most of them again. Several of them were now weary of the imperious and oppressive rule exercised by her harposts, and believed that Athens, schooled by her reverses, might be more safely trusted with power than her rival. Chios and Byzantium first revolted from Sparta, and sought Athenian protection. They were followed by Rhodes and Mitylene, and these formed the nucleus of a new confederacy, which gradually embraced a great number of insular and maritime states. Athens was to preside; no longer however as a sovereign, but in the spirit with which Aristides regulated the constitution of the original league. All the members were to be equally independent; they were to send representatives to a congress¹ which was to be held at Athens, and in which the smallest state had a vote, and the greatest, Athens herself included, was to have no more. This assembly was no doubt empowered to fix the amount of the contributions², which took the place of the old arbitrary tribute. Athens however was to receive and dispose of them. According to Diodorus³, one of her first measures was to give her new allies an earnest of the equity and moderation which were henceforth to govern her conduct towards them, by a decree, which directed the restitution of all the lands that had been parcelled out among her citizens in the *cleruchial* colonies, and forbade all Athenians to acquire or cultivate land out of Attica. We should however have wished for some higher authority than Diodorus to satisfy us, both that this decree was not simply prospective, and how far, both as to time and place, its retrospective range extended. That Athens had formed any new cleruchial establishments since the Peloponnesian war, as Diodorus seems to state⁴, and now gave them up, appears hardly credible. One peculiarity in the constitution of the new

¹ συνέδριον.

² Συνοχῆς. A name invented by Callistratus. Theopompus in Harpocration Συνοχῆς.

³ xv. 29.

⁴ xv. 23. We do not think it at all clear that Diodorus here means to speak of new colonies, though Boeckh (iii. c. 18.) understands him so.

confederacy was, that it was not confined to the maritime states, but included Thebes among its members. The addition of so powerful an ally tended to counterpoise the preponderance of Athens, and thus to secure the independence of the rest. But it altered the character of the confederacy, as it implied the maintenance of a land force, to which the contributions of the maritime states were to be applied, as those of Thebes to the common navy. The decree by which Diodorus says the Athenians resolved to raise an army of 20,000 heavy infantry and 500 cavalry, and to equip a fleet of 200 sail, was most probably an act of the congress, and described the amount of the united forces which it voted for carrying on the war.

For this information we are indebted almost wholly to Diodorus: Xenophon passes over this important event in profound silence. Yet though Diodorus has evidently fallen into one of his usual errors, when he refers the origin of the confederacy to the interval between the recovery of the Cadmea and the attempt of Sphodrias, we shall probably not be far mistaken if we suppose that it was formed very soon after the latter event. The danger with which Sparta saw herself threatened by the defection of her maritime allies, induced her, it is said, both to treat the rest more mildly, and to adopt a new system for the regulation of their contingents. The whole confederacy was divided into ten classes: Sparta herself forming the first, the Arcadian states the second and third, Elis the fourth, the Achæans the fifth, Corinth and Megara the sixth, Sicyon, Phlius, and the towns of the Argolic Acté the seventh, the Acarnanians the eighth, the Phocians and Locrians the ninth; Olynthus, and the other cities on the coast of Thrace, made up the tenth. As to the other details of the new arrangement Diodorus is silent, except that one heavy-armed soldier was deemed equivalent to two light-armed, and one trooper to four heavy-armed: which seems to imply that each state was permitted to determine the quality of its contingent.

After the acquittal of Sphodrias, the Spartan government prepared for a fresh expedition against Thebes. The forbearance of Cleombrotus had been viewed with great disapprobation at Sparta, and Agesilaus was now invited to take the command. He no longer thought it indecorous to accept a commission which gave him an opportunity, probably by no means unwelcome, of gratifying his old resentment. His first care was to secure the passes of Cithæron, and for this purpose he took advantage of a war which was at this time carried on between the Arcadian towns of Cleitor and Orchomenus¹, in which the former employed a body of mercenaries. He bargained with Cleitor for the use of this little army, and as soon as he had crossed the border, having furnished its commander — the *condottiere* as the Italians would call him — with a month's pay, sent him forward to occupy Cithæron with his troops. To protect Cleitor in their absence he enjoined the Orchomenians to suspend hostilities as long as the expedition should last, and issued a general proclamation, that if any city should attack another while the army of the confederacy was in the field, it should be the first against which his arms would be turned. Having crossed Cithæron without interruption, he advanced through Thespiæ to the Theban frontier. He found the approaches to the plain of Thebes on this side closed against him by a trench and palisade which were guarded by the Theban cavalry. But the enemy soon lost their advantage from the want of persevering vigilance, and Agesilaus, having passed through their undefended lines, spread havoc over the fertile plain, which was just white for the harvest. Xenophon would lead us to suppose that he met with no further opposition, but withdrew, as soon as he had completed his ravages, for want of any other object. Other credible accounts

¹ It seems that it may not be unnecessary to assure the reader that Cleitor, or Clitor, was not a town in Bœotia, and that there was an Arcadian town named Orchomenus: since a person ignorant of these facts thought himself qualified to write a history of Greece, and made this war *within Bœotia* the subject of profound political remarks.

however inform us, that his movements were watched by Chabrias at the head of an Athenian army which was sent to the aid of the Thebans, who were commanded by the Bœotarch Gorgidas, a worthy colleague of Pelopidas, and that at one time a battle was expected. The Athenian and Theban troops were advantageously posted on the range of hills two miles south of the city; yet Agesilaus thought himself strong enough to attack them. He first sent his targeteers against them, and when these were repulsed, advanced to the charge with his phalanx. Chabrias ordered his men to keep their ground, pointing their spears against the enemy¹, and resting their shields upon one knee; Gorgidas followed his example. The attitude was new, and indicated a spirit which might make the victory doubtful; and Agesilaus thought it prudent to sound a retreat. The manœuvre acquired so much celebrity, that a statue was afterwards erected to Chabrias at Athens, in the attitude which he had devised; and it seems to have hastened the enemy's retreat from the Theban territory. Agesilaus, passing through Thespiæ on his return, helped the inhabitants to repair their fortifications, and then, having left his client Phœbidas there as harmost, pursued his march home.

Phœbidas in the course of the year annoyed the Thebans so much by frequent inroads, that at length they collected all their forces, and under the command of Gorgidas invaded the territory of Thespiæ. But they were checked in their meditated ravages by the activity of the Spartan general, who hovered about them, to cut off all stragglers from the phalanx with his light troops. They found their position irksome, and even dangerous, and began to retreat, closely followed by Phœbidas, who hoped to put them to the rout. But a wood which lay on their road forced them to turn upon their pursuer, and their cavalry made a

¹ The *δόξατα ἄρθα προτιναμένους* of Polyænus ii. 1. 2. and *projecta hasta* of Nepos, Chabr. 1., must interpret or correct the phrase of Diodorus, xv. 32., *ἐν ἄρθῳ τῶν δόξατι μένεν*.

charge in which Phœbidas fell, and his troops, disheartened by their loss, fled in disorder to Thespiæ.¹ This success encouraged the Thebans to renew their invasion of the Thesopian territory, and to make attempts upon some of the other Bœotian cities. Xenophon observes that in all these cities an oligarchical government had been established, like that from which Thebes had just been delivered, and that large migrations had taken place from among the commonalty, to Thebes; so that the friends of Sparta were in need of succour. A new general was sent with a mora — which was transported across the Corinthian gulf — to Thespiæ, to bridle the Thebans a little in the absence of an invading army.

Early in the following spring (377) Agesilaus again took the field. The commander of the garrison at Thespiæ had by his orders secured the pass of Cithæron, and he descended to Plataea. It was expected that he would this time take a different road from that by which he had entered the plain of Thebes the year before, and an intrenchment had been thrown up across the vale of the Asopus at Scolus to arrest his march. But he deceived the enemy into a belief that he meant again to pass through Thespiæ; and they abandoned their position at Scolus, to take up one near the western border. He then made a rapid march down the vale of the Asopus, and having passed Scolus unopposed, first ravaged the eastern side of the Theban territory as far as the confines of Tanagra, which was in the hands of a friendly party, and then marched along the plain westward, leaving the city on his left, until he reached the place, — a pass named Graosstethos — where the Thebans were either waiting his approach from Thespiæ, or prepared to oppose his retreat. They were however so strongly posted that he did not think it prudent to attempt to dislodge them by force, but, changing his

¹ Notwithstanding the many discrepancies between Xenophon's narrative, H. v. 4. 44., and that of Polyænus, ii. 5. 2., it seems probable that they refer to the same occurrence; nor is it impossible that Xenophon, when he represented the valour of the Thebans as the effect of necessity, may have trusted too much to the Lacedæmonian report of the affair.

front, moved towards the city. Alarmed for its safety — for it had been left very weakly guarded — they hastily quitted their position, and marched towards Thebes. On their way they fell in with the enemy; but after a little skirmishing Agesilaus retreated, and encamped for the night at the position which they had left. The next day they were encouraged by this slight advantage to pursue him; but their light troops were driven off with considerable loss by the Olynthian cavalry, which was now serving in his army according to the terms of the treaty. He staid a short time at Thespiæ, to compose the feuds which were still raging there. The oligarchy, notwithstanding the Lacedæmonian garrison and the migrations of the commonalty, still thought itself endangered by the presence of the disaffected, and wished to rid itself of them by a massacre. Agesilaus diverted his partisans from this design, and induced them and their adversaries to give one another the security of oaths of mutual amnesty. Having thus established an appearance of tranquillity, he crossed over to Megara. Here he met with an accident — the bursting of a blood-vessel as Xenophon describes it — which was the beginning of a long illness.

His two expeditions had destroyed two successive harvests; and scarcity began to be felt at Thebes. To relieve it agents were sent with two galleys to purchase corn at Pagasæ. But Alcetas, who commanded a Lacedæmonian garrison at Oreus on the opposite coast of Eubœa, having intelligence of their movements, sent out three galleys which intercepted them on their return, and captured their vessels with about 300 men. The prisoners were lodged in the citadel of Oreus. But they were so negligently guarded, that during the absence of Alcetas, who was in the habit of paying too frequent visits to the lower town, they contrived to make themselves masters of the fortress, and the Lacedæmonian force was so small, or had rendered itself so odious, that the townsmen seized this opportunity to renounce their connection with Sparta. Thus not only

were the ships and cargo recovered, but a secure channel was opened for fresh supplies.

But the damage which the Theban agriculture suffered from these inroads of Agesilaus, was perhaps more than compensated by the military experience which the Thebans gained from them. They had not indeed been able to protect their territory, nor had they ventured to meet the enemy on even ground, or fought a regular battle. But they had not been confined to their walls; they had engaged in partial conflicts with a Lacedæmonian army, they had seen it retreat before them, and had found a pretext for erecting a trophy. And all this when opposed to the ablest commander that Sparta had ever possessed, at the head of the forces of her newly augmented confederacy. They were thus learning to shake off the terror which the Spartan name inspired; and it was not without reason that Agesilaus was reproached with the lessons which he had given them.¹ The great men who now conducted their affairs perceived the importance of these trials of strength, for rousing the spirit of their fellow-citizens, and made it their object to provide as many as they could with safety. Among the expedients to which they resorted for cherishing the martial ardour thus excited, one, which is attributed sometimes to Gorgidas, sometimes to Epaminondas, and which we might almost suppose to have been suggested by Pythagorean recollections, was the institution of a kind of military brotherhood consisting of 300 men, selected not merely with regard to their personal qualities, but to their mutual intimacies. They were maintained in the Cadmea at the public expense, to be in constant training and readiness for action, and either from this or from some other unknown cause acquired the name of the Sacred Band.

The next spring (376) found Agesilaus still confined to his chamber, and Cleombrotus was ordered to take his place at the head of the army which was again to

¹ Plut. Ages. 26.

invade the Theban territory. But he neglected the precautions with which his colleague had secured the passes of Cithæron, and found them occupied by Theban and Athenian troops. He sent his targeteers to dislodge the enemy, but they were repulsed, routed, and some forty of them slain. He chose to treat the obstacle as insurmountable, and led his army home. His conduct again excited loud murmurs at Sparta, not only among his fellow-citizens, but among the allies, who, in a congress which was held there after his return, complained that more energetic measures were not adopted for bringing the war to a close. No use, it was observed, was made of their naval superiority, which would enable them either to starve Athens into submission, or to transport an army at any time to one of the Bœotian or Phocian ports, so as to attack Thebes at the proper season. This suggestion was adopted: a fleet of sixty galleys was fitted out, and placed under the command of Pollis, who was instructed to cruise among the Cyclades, and intercept the corn-ships bound for Piræus. Athens, entirely dependent on foreign supplies, began to suffer from the blockade. But she was now able to meet the enemy at sea. A fleet, according to Diodorus of more than eighty galleys, was quickly manned, and the command was assigned to Chabrias. For the purpose it would seem of forcing the enemy to a battle, he undertook the siege of Naxos. Pollis, coming up to relieve it, did not decline an engagement, which after a hard struggle, in which Phocion greatly distinguished himself, was decided in favour of the Athenians. The enemy's loss on the most moderate calculation seems to have exceeded thirty galleys, and, if we may believe Diodorus, would have been far greater, if the recollection of Arginusæ had not restrained Chabrias from pursuit, and induced him to devote his whole attention to his own people, who were to be saved from the wrecks of eighteen ships. The victory, though with respect to the numbers engaged much less brilliant than many of an earlier period, was

peculiarly seasonable and important, not only because it delivered Athens from the danger of famine, but because it encouraged the people in their hopes of regaining the dominion of the sea ; for it was the first that had been won by an Athenian fleet — at Cnidus Conon commanded a foreign navy — since the end of the Peloponnesian war.

Early in the following year (375) Sparta renewed her preparations for the invasion of Bœotia. But before they were completed, the event of the battle of Naxos suggested to the Thebans that Athens might render them much more efficacious service than they had received from her troops, if she would revive the practice of former times, and would send a fleet round Peloponnesus, which, threatening the enemy at home, would divert him from the meditated expedition. The proposal was very readily adopted ; and Timotheus was ordered to sail westward with sixty galleys. It does not appear that he had any more specific instructions, or that he attempted to do any mischief on the coasts of Laconia. He first bent his course to Corcyra, and according to Xenophon's language immediately made himself master of the island, but used his success with great moderation, did not treat it as a conquered country, banished none of the citizens, and made no change in the laws. All this perhaps means nothing more than that at his first appearance the Corcyræans willingly renewed their ancient connection with Athens, and that Timotheus did not abuse their confidence. He was no less successful in Cephallenia and Acarnania, and even drew Alcetas, king of the Molossians, whose authority seems to have extended over a great part of the Epirot tribes, into the Athenian alliance. He was not however suffered to make this progress without interruption. A fleet was sent out from Peloponnesus to oppose him, under the command of the Lacedæmonian admiral Nicolochus. He found Timotheus in the bay of Alyzia on the Acarnanian coast, and, though he had no more than fifty-five galleys, and expected six from Ambracia,

he did not hesitate to offer battle. He was however defeated ; but it would seem with little loss ; for having soon after received the reinforcement from Ambracia, he again sailed up to Alyzia, where Timotheus was re-fitting, and his challenge not being accepted, raised a trophy in his turn. But he was not able long to present so bold a front ; for Timotheus, having repaired his vessels, and obtained some addition to his force from Corcyra, put to sea with seventy sail : an armament which the enemy could not repel, but which the Athenian general, who, according to his friend and eulogist Isocrates, had brought with him only thirteen talents from home, found it very difficult to maintain ; and the intelligence of his successes was accompanied with an application for fresh and larger supplies from the treasury.

His expedition however had answered the purpose for which the Thebans had suggested it. It gave such occupation to Sparta as prevented her this year from renewing the invasion of Bœotia, and thus enabled them to direct their forces against the Bœotian towns, which, under the sanction of the peace of Antalcidas and the patronage of Sparta, had asserted their independence. These towns recoiled more than ever from the dominion of Thebes, because, while the Theban government had been assuming a more popular character, their institutions had become under Spartan influence more purely oligarchical than before. There were three among them which were viewed at Thebes with peculiar animosity, which they returned with a deadly hatred, excited by the contests and mutual injuries of many generations. These were Platæa, Thespiæ, and Orchomenus : and they continued to hold out, after most of the others had been compelled to renew their ancient connection with Thebes. Orchomenus, as the most important, had received a Lacedæmonian garrison of two moras. In the year 375 Pelopidas, who was annually re-elected to the office of Bœotarch, hearing that the garrison was absent on an expedition into Locris, con-

ceived hopes of surprising the city. Expecting probably that success would depend more on the rapidity of his movements than on the force employed, he took with him only the Sacred Band — which had hitherto never been brought into action, either by itself or as a separate body, but had been distributed over the foremost ranks of the Theban armies — and a small troop of horse. But on his arrival he found that a sufficient force had been sent to supply the place of the absent garrison at Orchomenus, and that it would be prudent to retreat. He took the road which skirted the north-east corner of the Copaic lake, and was marching along the foot of the hills on the eastern side, about three miles in a direct line from Orchomenus, near Tegyra, when he was suddenly encountered by the two moras, commanded by the polemarchs Gorgoleon and Theopompus, which were returning from Locris. The numbers of the enemy, according to the ordinary composition of the mora, must have been three or four times larger than his own; and the first impression produced on his followers was dismay. He himself did not despair; and when one came running up to him with the exclamation: "We have fallen into the midst of the enemy," coolly answered: "Why not they into the midst of us?" He seems to have relied on the effect of one desperate effort to break through the enemy's line; and having first sent his cavalry forward to the charge, brought up his little band, formed according to the old Theban practice in a great depth. It is doubtful what the issue would have been, if the two Spartan generals had not fallen in the first onset. This event decided the fortune of the day. Their troops indeed at first preserved sufficient presence of mind to open their ranks, so as to afford a passage for the Thebans, who, they supposed, could not aim at anything more than making their way through. But Pelopidas, instead of using the opportunity of escape, successively attacked each division of the enemy, until he had completely routed their whole army. He did not however think

it prudent to follow up his success, fearing that he might be overtaken by fresh troops from Orchomenus.

The importance of this victory is not to be measured by the numbers engaged. Xenophon indeed passes over it in total silence ; but this may be considered as a tacit testimony to the merits of Pelopidas. The battle of Tegyra contributed more than any previous event to raise the Thebans in their own estimation, and to abate their fear of Spartan valour and discipline. It encouraged them to bolder enterprises, and made them more careless of the support and goodwill of their neighbours, and less attentive to the appearance of mildness and moderation in their treatment of their enemies. In the spring of 374 they undertook an expedition against Phocis ; from what motive — whether merely to hurt an ally of Sparta, or to revenge themselves for assistance which the Phocians had given to the Bœotian towns — we are not informed. The Phocians applied for succour to Sparta, and Cleombrotus was sent with an army which he transported into their country across the Corinthian gulf. Upon this the Thebans retreated, and remained upon the defensive within their own frontier. It was at this juncture that a warning voice reached Sparta, revealing a danger which threatened her and the rest of Greece, and which, it seems, neither she nor any other state had hitherto descried.

The glimpses which we have caught from time to time in the course of this history of the internal state of Thessaly, have shown us that country, though acknowledging a kind of political unity, as seldom, if ever, and at the most very imperfectly united under one government. A few great families, whose possessions lay chiefly about the cities of Larissa, Crannon, and Pharsalus, were sometimes able to extend their influence over several other towns. Now and then one of their chiefs was raised to the dignity of *tagus* : at other times their authority, even in the cities where they resided, was shaken by civil feuds. At the period which we have now reached the principal seats of power were no

longer the same: most of the Thessalian towns acknowledged the ascendancy of Pharsalus or of Pheræ. At the close of the Peloponnesian war, Pheræ was under the dominion of Lycophon. His elevation was perhaps connected with those struggles against the old aristocracy in which, not many years before, Critias had taken a part. He felt himself strong enough to aim at extending his power over the whole of Thessaly; and among the events of the year in which Athens surrendered, Xenophon records a victory which he gained over the Thessalians who opposed him, among whom those of Larissa were foremost, but does not mention any results that ensued from it. Some ten years later, at the breaking out of the Corinthian war, we find him still engaged in a contest with Larissa, which was then subject to Medius, probably the head of the Aleuads. Lycophon was supported by Sparta; and Medius applied for succours to the confederacy which had just been formed against her. The Theban Ismenias was sent to his aid with a body of 2000 men, Bœotians and Argives, and enabled him to make himself master of Pharsalus, which was occupied by a Lacedæmonian garrison. Medius is said to have sold all the inhabitants as slaves. It seems as if the success of Agesilaus, after his return from Asia, gave a different turn to the affairs of Thessaly. Pharsalus, having apparently recovered the greater part of her population, not only regained her independence, but rose to a new eminence, and became a rival to Pheræ.

The city however was no longer in the hands of the Scopadæ; it was divided between contending factions, which for the sake of quiet and security had resorted to an expedient less common in the history of the later Greek republics than it had been in earlier times. They placed themselves in the power of an individual on whom all could rely. It was one of their fellow-citizens named Polydamas, whose reputation and virtues attracted and earned this honourable confidence. He was intrusted with the citadel, and with the whole ad-

ministration of the public revenue. He discharged his trust with the strictest integrity and disinterestedness, rendering an account every year, and sometimes supplying the deficiency of the revenue by advances from his private fortune.

At Phæræ the supreme power had now passed into the hands of Jason, probably Lycophron's son, as he is said to have inherited his father's hospitable relation to Sparta, which continued after his own political connection with her had ceased. He likewise succeeded to Lycophron's ambitious views, but enlarged them into bolder schemes of aggrandizement, and with superior genius and energy, possessed far ampler means of fulfilling them.

He kept a standing army of 6000 mercenaries in his pay, all picked men, trained under his own eye with unintermitting care, and attached to his service both by a judicious liberality, and by the respect and confidence which his character inspired. He had compelled most of the Thessalian cities of the first rank to enter into alliance with him, or in other words to become his subjects, notwithstanding the opposition of Pharsalus; and his sway was acknowledged by several of the neighbouring tribes. Even Alcetas the king of Epirus was leagued with him on the footing rather of a vassal than an equal. This success encouraged him to carry his views much further; and to whatever quarter he looked, he saw no barrier to his ambition, which he did not feel himself able to surmount. The first step which he had to take was to acquire the title of tagus, and to unite all Thessaly under his legitimate authority. The force which Thessaly alone was at this time able to furnish, was estimated at 10,000 heavy infantry, and 6000 cavalry. He might then calculate on the submission of all the bordering tribes, which would yield both an abundant supply of light troops, and regular tribute. The state of Macedonia was such as seemed to give him a warrant for looking upon its resources as his own. In those, together with the Penest population of Thes-

saly, he perceived the elements of a naval power, which would make him master of the Grecian seas. He would then perhaps be strong enough to cope with the united power of Greece, and the dissensions of the Greek states would render his triumph certain. He had already formed an alliance with Thebes, chiefly perhaps because Pharsalus was already connected with Sparta, through Polydamas, whose family had long been attached to the Spartan interest by the bonds of public hospitality. But policy would probably have inclined him to prefer the weaker side, as that which was likely to prove most subservient to his projects. On a like principle he declined the alliance to which Athens would gladly have admitted him; for he considered her as a rival, whose friendship would only obstruct the accomplishment of his designs for the foundation of a maritime empire. As soon as the affairs of Greece should be settled to his wish, a boundless prospect of greatness lay open before him. The retreat of the Ten Thousand, and the Asiatic campaigns of Agesilaus, had taught him how easily he might effect the overthrow of the Persian monarchy, and make himself master of the east. In himself he seems to have combined most of the qualities and habits requisite for such undertakings as those which were continually present to his thoughts: a frame capable of enduring every hardship; indefatigable activity, and constant presence of mind; a thorough knowledge of human nature, and perfect self-control.

One part of his vast plans now seemed ripe for execution. Pharsalus and the towns which were still dependent on it, were the only obstacle to the union of Thessaly under his rule. He was strong enough to have overcome their resistance by force; but knowing the character of Polydamas, he believed that his object might be attained by milder methods, which his own character, no less than policy, led him to prefer. He therefore concluded a truce for the purpose of a personal conference with Polydamas, and when they met frankly

unfolded his schemes, pointed out the means which he possessed of carrying them into effect, and on the ground of an irresistible necessity urged Polydamas to use his influence at Pharsalus to put an end to an unavailing opposition, and as the reward of his co-operation promised him a place only second to his own in the new order of things. Polydamas met this proposal with equal openness, and informed Jason that the main difficulty which prevented him from immediately acceding to it, was his reluctance to abandon his old allies the Spartans, against whom he had no ground of complaint. Jason applauded his loyalty, and gave him leave to go to Sparta, and lay the whole state of the case before the government there, and then ask if they were prepared to protect Pharsalus from Jason's attacks. Polydamas accordingly proceeded to Sparta, where the subject was discussed in a style equally foreign to that of modern diplomacy. He disclosed the danger which threatened not only Pharsalus, but the liberties of Greece; described Jason's character, plans, and resources; and informed his allies, that unless they could send a force sufficient to encourage the Thessalians to assert their independence, it would be more advisable that they should remain quiet. Nothing less, he intimated, than a Spartan army, with a king at its head, would answer the purpose. The government took three days to deliberate; and having considered the number of their troops already engaged in foreign service, and those which were required for the defence of Laconia, now that the Athenians had begun to threaten their coasts, they came to the conclusion that they were not in a condition to afford protection to their Thessalian allies, and therefore advised Polydamas to make the best terms he could for himself and for Pharsalus. He thanked them for their candour, and took their advice. On his return to Thessaly, he begged Jason to permit him to keep the citadel of Pharsalus for those who had committed it to his custody; but promised that he would exert his influence with his fellow citizens to

induce them to enter into alliance with him, and that he would assist him to obtain the dignity of tagus. Jason was generous enough to appreciate this noble uprightness, and the compact was soon concluded between them. The result appeared in a general pacification, which immediately followed; and not long after Jason was elected tagus, or assumed the title with universal consent. His first care was to regulate the military force of the country. He determined the contingents of infantry and cavalry to be furnished by each of the Thessalian towns, and by his foreign allies; and he seems to have raised them to an amount never before equalled. For the army which he was now able to bring into the field consisted of not less than 28,000 heavy-armed, and more than 8000 cavalry. As to light troops, Xenophon observes that there were enough to be a match for the whole world, as there was no reckoning the towns which supplied them. For the maintenance of this great establishment he revived the tribute which had been imposed on the subject tribes of Thessalians by Scopas, one of his ancient predecessors.

While this formidable power was taking its stand at so short a distance from the theatre of war, where the states of southern Greece were wasting their strength in a fruitless contest, one of the belligerents began to be desirous of peace, not from any sense of the common danger, but from weariness, disappointment, and jealousy. Athens found that the cost of the struggle in which she had engaged in behalf of Thebes, fell chiefly upon herself: her coasts and shipping were infested by privateers from Ægina; her citizens harassed by repeated calls for military service, and the wealthier burdened by the war-taxes; while the Thebans refused to contribute to the support of the navy by which their territory had been saved from invasion. It does not appear whether she remonstrated with her allies, but she sent envoys to Sparta, and concluded a separate peace.

It was however destined to be of very brief duration. Two of the envoys, according to instructions which they had brought with them, sailed from Laconia as soon as the treaty was signed, to carry the intelligence to Timotheus, with orders to return home. On his passage along the coast of Zacynthus, he stopt to land a party of exiles, who, having been expelled by their adversaries from the island, had sought his protection. They undoubtedly belonged to the democratical side, though Diodorus, with more than ordinary self-contradiction, states the reverse.¹ Timotheus enabled them to occupy a stronghold near the city, and furnished them with means of annoying their adversaries. The oligarchical Zacynthians made complaints at Sparta, and Spartan envoys were sent to Athens, to remonstrate against the proceedings of Timotheus. But they obtained no satisfaction there: the sacrifice of the exiles was thought too dear a price for peace; and at Sparta the refusal was held a sufficient ground for renewing the war, and a decree was made for raising a fleet of sixty galleys from the principal maritime states of the confederacy. A squadron of twenty-five was sent, it appears, in the autumn of the same year (374), under the command of Aristocrates, to the relief of Zacynthus. But early in the next spring the remainder, or according to Diodorus an additional armament of sixty-five galleys, with 1500 mercenaries, sailed under Mnasippus to the same quarter, but with a different destination. The main object of this expedition was to recover Corcyra, in compliance with the solicitations of a body of refugees, who had been encouraged by the hope of Spartan protection to rise against the popular government. If we may believe Diodorus, this armament was preceded by a squadron of twenty-two galleys under the command of Alcidas, which was avowedly

¹ But in such a writer as Diodorus this affords no ground for suspecting any corruption in the text. We take this opportunity of observing, that Diodorus has evidently confounded the short peace which was broken through this step of Timotheus, with that which was concluded next before the battle of Leuctra, and has prematurely introduced the embassy of Callistratus and Epaminondas.

bound for Sicily, but was directed to surprise the city of Corcyra. Xenophon only says, that before the sailing of Mnasippus envoys were sent from Sparta to Syracuse, to obtain aid from Dionysius for the recovery of Corcyra, as an object not less interesting to him than to Sparta.

On his landing in Corcyra Mnasippus found no enemy to face him in the field. He ravaged the country, where he collected a rich booty, and then occupied an eminence about half a mile from the city, which he thus cut off from all communication with the rest of the island, while his fleet blockaded the port. The Corcyraeans were soon reduced to great distress, and sent envoys to Athens to implore succour: and notwithstanding the depressed state of their finances, the Athenians prepared vigorously to contest the possession of this important island. A fleet of sixty sail was decreed, and Timotheus was appointed to the command. But as this fleet could not be immediately manned, Stesicles was sent before with about 600 targeteers to Epirus, and king Alcetas was requested to afford him the means of transporting them across the channel to Corcyra, and under favour of night they effected their entrance into the town.¹ But at first they only aggravated the sufferings of the besieged by diminishing their scanty stock of provisions. Many were driven by hunger to make their escape from the city into the enemy's camp, and at length these desertions became so frequent that Mnasippus made a proclamation that all fugitives should

¹ Diodorus (xv. 46.) relates that a person, whom he calls Ctesicles, had been previously sent to Zacynthus, to take the command of the exiles. As to the identity of his Ctesicles with Xenophon's Stesicles, there will now be no doubt, though Wesseling seems to have thought that they were different persons (not, as Schneider represents, that Ctesicles returned from Zacynthus to Athens before he was sent to Corcyra). The way in which Schneider and Manso would reconcile Diodorus with Xenophon, by supposing that Stesicles proceeded from Zacynthus, in vessels furnished by Alcetas, to Corcyra, seems inconsistent, as Wesseling appears to have perceived, with the language of Xenophon, who evidently means to represent Stesicles as sent toward Corcyra directly from Athens. Where Xenophon and Diodorus differ on a point of this kind, we cannot hesitate to prefer the contemporary writer. Otherwise nothing could be more natural than that some succours should have been sent to the Zacynthians, who were the occasion of the war.

be sold as slaves. But as starving men were not to be repelled even by this threat, he ordered them to be driven back with scourges. A part, probably the bulk, of these unhappy persons were slaves; and these were not admitted within the walls: many were starved to death. Mnasippus now began to look upon the city as his own; and the near prospect of success unfolded a tendency in his character to that greediness and arrogance which seem to have been the most common failings of Spartan officers. Though he was in no want of money, having received pecuniary contributions from several towns in lieu of their contingents, he began to reduce the number of his mercenary troops, and to withhold the pay of those which he retained, apparently, as Xenophon intimates, with a fraudulent purpose. The men were consequently dissatisfied; and by way of compensation he seems to have connived at some relaxation of discipline. The posts were less vigilantly guarded, and parties were more and more frequently seen scattered over the country in quest of plunder. The besieged watched their opportunity, and on one of these occasions made a sally, and took or killed several of the stragglers. Mnasippus hastened to repel this attack with a few troops whom he had about him, and ordered his officers to lead out the mercenaries. Some of them now ventured to observe that they could not depend on the obedience of men who had been disappointed of their pay; but Mnasippus silenced them with blows. They collected their troops, but all moved reluctantly to action. The enemy however gave way at their approach, and Mnasippus pursued them as far as the sepulchral monuments, which, as at Pompeii, lined the road near the gates. Here they made a stand, and, mounting on the tombs, assailed their pursuers with missiles, while reinforcements issuing from the adjacent gates fell on the flanks of the besieging army, and at length put the two wings to flight. Mnasippus, who was in the centre, and fully occupied with the enemy in front, found himself gradually abandoned,

until there remained only a handful of men about him to bear the shock of all the forces opposed to him. As soon as he fell, the rout became universal; and the Corcyræans might have made themselves masters of his camp, if they had not been deterred by the multitude of the camp-followers, whom they mistook for effective troops. This victory had the effect of raising the siege. Intelligence came soon after, that an Athenian armament was close at hand, and it was believed that the Corcyræans were on the point of manning their ships to join it. Hypermenes, who was second in command to Mnasippus, embarked his men with such haste, that not only a great part of the valuable booty which they had collected, but some of the sick, were left behind in the camp. The fleet then made for Leucas.

The Athenian armament, which was at this time off the coast of Messenia, had been delayed by financial embarrassments, which led to a change in the command. The decree which had directed Timotheus to sail to the relief of Corcyra with sixty galleys had not supplied him with the means of equipping them; and he found it necessary for this purpose to resort to the allies of Athens. He sailed from Piræus in the spring to collect men and money from the islands and coasts of the Ægean. This cruise occupied a long time. He seems to have obtained a reinforcement from Bœotia¹, and to have visited the coasts of Thrace and Macedonia; and it was perhaps on this occasion that he contracted a friendship with king Amyntas, from whom he did not scruple to receive a present of timber for a house which he was building at Athens. But as to the main object of his voyage, he appears to have effected but little; possibly because the mildness of his character would not allow him to extort what he could not obtain by gentle means. In the meanwhile the people at home, not fully aware of his difficulties, grew impatient; and he had rivals who were ready to put the worst construction on his proceedings; Iphicrates and Callistratus com-

¹ [Demosthenes] in *Timoth.* p. 1188.

bined their influence against him. A considerable part of the season was spent, while the danger of the Corcyræans grew every day more urgent, and the people were informed that he had advanced no farther southward than the island of Calauræa, and that the fleet was in a state of mutiny for want of pay.¹ He was now formally accused by Iphicrates and Callistratus, and was recalled to answer their charges. But before the trial he was removed from the command of the fleet, which was conferred upon Iphicrates, with whom at his own request were associated Callistratus, though they had not previously been on good terms², and Chabrias. Several points in this transaction are very obscure. The trial of Timotheus was deferred till late in the autumn, when his two principal accusers appear to have been absent. It was signalized by one remarkable incident, which illustrates the character of the man and of the times. The Epirot king Alcetas, and Jason of Pheræ, having heard of the peril of Timotheus, made a journey to Athens for the purpose of interceding in his behalf. They lodged in his house; but he was at this time so poor — having it seems spent almost all his patrimony in the public service — that he was obliged to borrow a small sum of money, as well as vessels and furniture, for the reception of these distinguished guests. Their intercession was of more avail to him than his own or his father's services would have been: perhaps even than his innocence, however clearly it might have been proved. There was however another motive, equally foreign to the merits of the case, which may have had some weight in his favour. The king of Persia offered him employment in Egypt, which was at this time in a state of revolt; and the prospect of the advantage which Athens might derive from his interest at the Persian court might be urged as an argument for his pardon or acquittal.

¹ Demosthenes u. s.

² *ὁ μάλιστα ἐπιεικτέριος ἦν αὐτῷ.* Xen. H. vi. 2. 39. Voemel, in his *Notes in Libanii Vitam Demosthenis*, p. 9., has strangely mistaken Xenophon's meaning, as if it was that Callistratus was not well fitted for the post.

Iphicrates, having been appointed to the command, showed himself either more active or less scrupulous in the fitting out of the fleet; or his connection with Callistratus enabled him to obtain more from the people. Every galley that could be found, and even the *Paralus* and *Salaminia*, were placed at his disposal, under a promise that he would soon send back many others in their room: and thus he was enabled to man above seventy vessels. He had reason to expect that he should have to meet the enemy as soon as he reached *Corcyra*: but his crews were in great want of training, and on the other hand the emergency admitted of no delay. He however contrived to effect his object, without devoting any time exclusively to it, by converting the voyage itself into one continued lesson in the principal operations of naval warfare; so that before he reached his destination, his men had become masters of all the evolutions on which in an ancient sea-fight the victory mainly depended, and at the same time had acquired habits of strict military discipline. While still on the coast of *Peloponnesus*, he had heard a report of the death of *Mnasippus*, and of the events connected with it: but it was not until he arrived at *Cephalenia* that he fully ascertained the truth. There he rested awhile, and brought over the whole island to the *Athenian* alliance, and then proceeded to *Corcyra*. He had not long arrived there, before he received intelligence of the approach of a squadron of ten galleys, which had been sent by *Dionysius* to the aid of his allies. He immediately stationed his scouts on the heights so as to be apprised by preconcerted signals of the enemy's first appearance and subsequent movements, and ordered twenty of his captains to be in constant readiness to put to sea at a moment's warning. The *Syracusans*, unconscious of their danger, had landed on another part of the coast. One of their commanders, a *Rhodian*, had urged his colleagues not to protract their stay there, and set the example of embarking. He alone, though he fell in with the enemy, made his escape. The other

nine galleys were taken by the Athenians, with all their crews, and the admiral Anippus. Iphicrates returned in triumph to the town, and being in great need of money agreed with his prisoners to accept a certain ransom, for which the Corcytæans gave him security. From Anippus he hoped to extort a larger sum by the threat of selling him as a slave; but the Syracusan, overwhelmed by his misfortunes, put an end to his own life. Leaving the greater part of his crews in Corcyra, where they found employment in the labours of husbandry, he crossed over with his military forces to Acarnania, which was divided between the Athenian and the Lacedæmonian interest. After having carried on the war there with various success, he returned to Corcyra, and sailed with his whole fleet, which now amounted to about ninety galleys, to Cephallenia, where he stayed some time, raising contributions, and meditating to invade Laconia and other parts of the enemy's coast, if circumstances should require it.

But in the spring of 371 a prospect of peace began to open. Callistratus, who was much less in his element in the camp than in the popular assembly, had returned to Athens with the consent of Iphicrates — probably in 372 — having undertaken either to procure a supply of money, or to bring about a peace. He himself, as we have already seen, had been from the first averse to the alliance with Thebes. Iphicrates, and probably Chabrias also, wished the war in Greece at an end, because the state of the Persian empire held out opportunities for a much more brilliant and profitable service in the east. And if we may believe Diodorus¹, the Persian king was desirous of terminating a contest which rendered it more difficult to obtain Greek auxiliaries for his wars with his revolted subjects, and sent envoys to Greece to declare his wishes. Xenophon makes no

¹ xv. 50. The motive of Artaxerxes is explained on the occasion of another embassy, which (c. 38.) he represents as the origin of the preceding treaty, which was broken by Timotheus. There seems to be strong ground for suspecting that both these Persian embassies are purely fictitious, and that they were suggested by those of Antalcidas and of Philiscus.

mention of this embassy, and indeed indirectly contradicts the statement¹, but only points out some of the causes which again inclined the Athenians toward peace. They had more reason than ever to be dissatisfied with the conduct of the Thebans. While they had been exerting their almost exhausted strength against the common enemy, Thebes had been aggrandizing herself, or gratifying her resentment, by attacks upon the old allies of Athens, carried to the utmost extent of vindictive rancour. The Phocians, indeed had been protected by the arms of Sparta; but in the latter part of 373, while Iphicrates was absent on his expedition to the west, Platæa and Thespiæ had been erased from the list of the Bœotian cities. The Platæans, according to Diodorus, had signified an intention of placing themselves under the protection of Athens, and had even sent or were on the point of sending for an Athenian garrison; and it is possible that the movements of the Thebans may have been quickened by the fear of seeing their prey rescued from their grasp. A Theban army marched suddenly against Platæa, surprised a large part of the population outside the walls, and took many prisoners; and the town, unprepared for a siege, and perhaps seeing no certainty of succour in any quarter, soon capitulated on condition that all the inhabitants should be allowed to depart with their moveable goods. They took refuge in Athens, and were admitted to their ancient privileges²; but their city, except the sacred buildings, was again levelled with the ground. Isocrates on this occasion undertook to plead their cause in a rhetorical pamphlet, to which he gave the form of a speech, in which the supposed orator urges the Athenians to interfere and restore the outcasts to their town and territory. In this declamation the injury which they had suffered is described as a perfidious violation of a state of peace: though it is admitted that they had declined to enter into that dependent connection with

¹ By the allusion to the expected coming of Antaclidas. H. vi. 3. 12.
² *εὐαγγελία*. Diodorus, xv. 46.

Thebes to which most of the Bœotian towns had submitted. According to this statement the Thespians appear to have stained still greater wrong: for they, it is said, had acknowledged the authority of Thebes, though only through compulsion. But their subjection did not save them from a fate like that of Plateæ. They were forced to evacuate their city, which was also razed to the ground; but the main part of the inhabitants appear to have occupied a strong-hold named Ceressus, situate on a rocky spur of mount Helicon, where they maintained themselves for some years longer.¹ In the meanwhile their complaints and supplications helped to rouse the indignation of the Athenians against Thebes. The people decreed that an embassy should be sent to negotiate a peace with Sparta; but to avoid the appearance of breaking with their present allies, invited the Thebans to become parties to the treaty. Callias, the Torchbearer, on account of the relation between his family and Sparta, was placed at the head of the embassy; he was accompanied by six colleagues, and by Callistratus, who appears to have attended without the title of an ambassador. His presence seems to have been very much needed; for, of three speeches reported by Xenophon as delivered on this occasion by the Athenian envoys, his is the only one which was not grossly irrelevant and unseasonable. Callias was chiefly anxious to impress his hearers with a due sense of his own dignity, and glancing slightly at the events of the day, grounded his argument in favour of peace on the legends of Triptolemus and Hercules. He was followed by Autocles in a speech not equally absurd, but much more misplaced, being full of invectives against the hypocrisy or inconsistency of the Spartans, who, professing to be the champions of liberty and independence, exerted a despotic authority over their allies, oppressed the weaker cities with tyrannical governments of their own appointment, and in the seizure of the Cadmea had directly violated the treaty which they pretended to

¹ Pausan. ix. 14. 2. 4.

enforce. Charges, no doubt, very well founded, but which so urged at such a time could only serve to defeat the purpose of the speaker's mission; and they manifestly produced general surprise and embarrassment, and gave great offence to the Spartan part of the audience. Callistratus however judiciously remedied the effects of his colleague's indiscretion, acknowledging that there had been faults on both sides which called for mutual forbearance, and endeavouring to show that the interests of both states, properly understood, would be best promoted by an amicable agreement between them on the footing which the peace of Antalcidas professed to establish. We learn from an allusion in this speech, that Antalcidas was at this time absent on a mission to the Persian court; and the orator thinks it necessary to notice an insinuation which it appears had been thrown out by some who were averse to peace, that Athens had been impelled to these overtures by the apprehension that Antalcidas might return with a supply of Persian gold for the prosecution of the war.

The terms of the treaty were then discussed and adjusted. It was agreed that the Spartans should withdraw their harmosts from the towns which they now occupied: that the armies should be disbanded on both sides, and the fleets laid up; and that every state in Greece should be left to the enjoyment of independence. A clause was added, which provided that if the treaty should be infringed to the injury of any of the contracting parties, any of the rest should be at liberty, though not bound, to aid in obtaining redress by arms. This article, of so sinister an aspect, seems to have been inserted chiefly with a view to Thebes, and to indicate a suspicion which was soon confirmed. The Athenian embassy had been accompanied or followed by envoys from Thebes, with Epaminondas, who was distinguished among his countrymen by his eloquence, no less than by his other attainments, at their head. The treaty was ratified by the Spartan government in the name of the whole Peloponnesian confederacy: Athens and her allies

were introduced as distinct parties; and so, according to Xenophon, the name of Thebes was at first inserted without any further explanation. But the next day the Theban envoys demanded that it should be erased, and the name Bœotians substituted in its stead. This brought the question to a point.¹ A debate ensued, in which Agesilaus and Epaminondas, whose speech on this occasion seems to have gained great celebrity, took the principal parts. — Agesilaus put an end to it, by asking whether the Thebans would permit the Bœotian towns to ratify for themselves. Not, replied Epaminondas, until we see the provincial towns of Laconia annexing their oaths to the treaty. Agesilaus then declared that he would allow the name of Thebes to stand there on no other condition, and bade them take their choice. They persisted in their resolution, and the negotiation ended with the exclusion of Thebes, which was thus left alone exposed to the hostility of all parties. This result gave great pleasure at Athens, where, according to Xenophon, hopes were entertained that the penalty which Thebes had incurred during the Persian wars² might still be exacted.

The Athenians forthwith executed their part of the treaty: withdrew their garrisons, and recalled Iphicrates, ordering him to restore all that he had taken since the ratification. The Spartans also withdrew their harbours and garrisons; but a question then arose, whether Cleombrotus, who it would seem had continued with his army in Phocis from 374, should be recalled. Opinions were divided on the subject in the Spartan assembly. A person named Prothous seems to have been the organ of a moderate party, which was desirous that the conditions of the treaty should be faithfully executed, and

¹ Nepos, Ep. vi. 4. *Maxime ejus eloquentia eluxit Spartæ, legati ante pugnam Leuctricam.* I have not hesitated to refer the altercation between Agesilaus and Epaminondas, related by Pausanias ix. 13. 2., to this occasion, though the author himself assigns it to the epoch of the peace of Antalcidas, since he supposes it subsequent to the battle of Mantinea, in which Epaminondas was wounded. Diodorus also speaks of the eloquence displayed by Epaminondas on this occasion, (xv. 38.) — as appears from the mention of Callistratus — though he also assigns a wrong date.

² See Vol. II. p. 354.

perhaps was secretly inclined to favour Thebes. He proposed that Cleombrotus should evacuate Phocis, but that a fund should be raised by the voluntary contributions of the allies, to be deposited in the temple at Delphi, and that if the Thebans persisted in their refusal to acknowledge the independence of the Bœotian towns, an army should be collected against them from all the states of the confederacy which might be persuaded to concur in the enterprise. But the influence of Agesilaus prevailed in the assembly, and this motion was rejected with contempt; and Cleombrotus, who had sent home for instructions, was directed immediately to invade Bœotia, if Thebes did not withdraw her pretensions. Diodorus says that envoys were despatched to receive her final answer, and that on this occasion the Thebans were called upon not only to resign their claims of sovereignty in Bœotia, but to restore the Platæans and Thespians to their homes. As their determination remained unchanged, Cleombrotus began his march toward the Bœotian frontier. He found the pass near Coronea guarded by a division of the Theban forces under Epaminondas, and therefore made a circuitous march, first crossing the mountains so as to come down upon Creusis, where he made himself master both of the town and of twelve Theban galleys which were lying in the port, and then took the road which leads up to the plain of Leuctra, where he encamped. The Thebans as soon as they heard of his movements, reunited their forces, and occupied a rising ground at no great distance over against him. Epaminondas commanded as Bœotarch with six colleagues of the same title: Pelopidas did not fill that office this year, but was appointed to the command of the Sacred Band. The Lacedæmonian army is said to have consisted of 10,000 heavy infantry, with 1000 horse, and the usual complement of light troops: the Thebans are said to have been not more than 6000 strong; but perhaps in this estimate their cavalry was not included.

Notwithstanding his superiority in numbers, Cleombrotus, it seems, would fain have declined an engage-

ment; and he had enemies about him who were on the watch to see whether he would give this decisive proof of the friendly feelings which he had long been suspected of entertaining towards the Thebans. His friends reminded him of the unfavourable impression which had been made at Sparta by his conduct on former occasions: when he abstained from ravaging the Theban territory, and afterwards suffered himself to be deterred by a trifling obstacle from invading it: and they warned him that if he now spared the enemy, he had nothing to expect but ignominy and exile. By these suggestions he was goaded into the resolution of offering battle, though it does not appear from Xenophon's description that there was in this step any of that temerity which Cicero imputes to it. On the contrary it was a question warmly agitated on the Theban side, whether they could prudently run the risk of an action. Xenophon avoids mentioning the name of Epaminondas — which was no doubt grating to a Spartan ear — and represents the decision to which the Theban commanders came, as the desperate choice of men who, having tasted the bitterness of exile, preferred the prospect of death in battle to that which Dante feelingly describes, of again eating a stranger's bread, and pacing up and down a stranger's stairs.¹ They foresaw, he says, that if they shrank from fighting, the Bœotian towns would declare against them; Thebes would be besieged, and, when provisions failed, would be surrendered in spite of them by their own partisans. We learn however from other authority which we have no reason to question, that three out of the seven Bœotarchs thought it safer to abide the event of a siege, and proposed to remove their wives and children into Attica, and that it was chiefly the influence of Epaminondas, combined with that of Pelopidas, though he had no vote in the council of war, that decided for immediate action.²

¹ Tu proverai si come sa di sale Lo pane altrui, e com' è duro calle Lo scendere e 'l salir per l' altrui scale. Parad. c. 17.

² Pausanias, ix. 13. 6. Plutarch, Pel. 20.

Whether it was the courage of despair, or a clear-sighted confidence in their own resources, by which they were animated, may perhaps be more safely collected from the sequel.

It was not only the superior numbers of the enemy that inspired apprehension. Notwithstanding the success which the Thebans had obtained in some little engagements, as in that of Tegyra, they had not shaken off their old awe of the Spartan valour and discipline; and the chiefs thought it necessary to resort to some extraordinary expedients for raising the spirits of their troops. Epaminondas, it is said, was so scrupulous a lover of truth, that he never permitted himself to utter a falsehood even in jest. It may not follow that in defence of his country he would have refused to concur in a pious fraud; but at least no such scruples were felt by his friends and colleagues. The momentous crisis prepared the minds of men to expect and receive omens and prodigies; and care was taken that they should not be disappointed. A report was spread through the camp, that the arms which were hung up in the temple of Hercules at Thebes had suddenly disappeared, carried away by invisible hands: by those of the ancient heroes, it might be inferred, who were coming to aid their people in the approaching struggle. A still more distinct intimation of victory was obtained from the oracular cave of Trophonius at Lebadea, which was consulted it is said by order of Epaminondas.¹ The superstitious hopes of the multitude appear to have been strongly excited by a local legend, which was revived, now perhaps for the first time to become the basis of a favourable prophecy. The plains of Leuctra had, it was believed, been the scene of an act of violence, offered by some Lacedæmonians² to daughters of the

¹ According to Diodorus, xv. 53, the answer was, that the Thebans must vow to institute games in celebration of their approaching victory. According to Pausanias, iv. 32. 5, they were enjoined to set up a trophy with the shield of Aristomenes. This is probably the version which was fabricated after the design of restoring Messene had been conceived.

² For whom the significant names, Parathemidas, and Phrurarchidas, were probably invented, in allusion to the treacherous occupation of the Cadmea.

land, who had killed themselves, and were buried there ; and their father Scedasus, having in vain sought satisfaction for the injury, had likewise destroyed himself, uttering imprecations against Sparta with his last breath. A Spartan exile in the Theban camp, named Leandrias, seems to have assisted Pelopidas in adapting this story to the occasion.¹ He attested that his countrymen had long been warned by oracles, that their commonwealth was to suffer a great visitation of divine vengeance at Leuctra ; but as there were other places of that name, the prediction had been neglected as unintelligible. To render its meaning clearer, Scedasus himself was said to have appeared to Pelopidas in the night, and to have demanded a sacrifice for the tomb of his daughters—a human one according to Plutarch's account, which has very much the appearance of a later fiction devised after the victory. Propitiatory rites however were performed by the Thebans at the fated monument.

Epaminondas himself is said to have expressed his contempt for omens which forbade a citizen to defend his country, in the language of the Trojan hero.² If he did not disdain the aid of superstition, he seems at least to have employed some nobler expedients for rousing the energies of his countrymen. As there were in the army troops from various parts of Bœotia—among them, according to Pausanias³, a body of Thespians—who, he had reason to suspect, might be disaffected to the cause, he proclaimed that all who would were at liberty to quit the camp. All the Thespians, and some others, are said to have availed themselves of this permission. The Thebans he endeavoured to inflame with indignation against their enemy, to whom—not perhaps without some exaggeration, yet neither probably, as Xenophon himself seems to indicate⁴, without reason—he imputed the design of rasing Thebes to

¹ Diodor. xv. 54. The name Leandrias bears a suspicious resemblance to that of the exiled harmost, Lysanoridas, or Lysandridas.

² Diodor. xv. 52. Compare Plutarch, Dem. 20. Reg. et Imp. Ap. 8.

³ ix. 13. 8.

⁴ See above, p. 69.

the ground, destroying the males, and enslaving the women and children.¹ That a design was entertained of subjecting Thebes to the same kind of political dissolution which Mantinea had experienced, is attested by a contemporary², as well as by Plutarch and Diodorus; and it is possible that the Spartans may have accompanied their last demands with threats which justified the language of Epaminondas.³

Xenophon's account of the battle seems to contain little more than the pretences by which the Spartans, to console themselves for their defeat, endeavoured to detract as much as possible from the skill and valour of their enemies. He thinks it worth notice, that as Cleombrotus held the last council of war, which was called just before the battle, toward noon, he and his officers were believed to have been somewhat heated with wine: and that the market-people, and other followers of the camp, having been prevented from withdrawing by the enemy's cavalry and light troops, caused the numbers of the Thebans to appear more formidable than they really were. But he attributes the event of the battle chiefly to the superiority of the Theban cavalry over that of the Spartans, which was at this time in a very low condition, being filled with the substitutes of the wealthier citizens, whom they provided with horses and arms, but who were never trained for the service; whereas the Theban cavalry had constant exercise in their expeditions against Orchomenus and Thespiæ. Hence, in the skirmish before the battle, the Lacedæmonian cavalry — which however probably formed but a small part of that which belonged to the Peloponnesian army — was quickly routed, and in its retreat created some confusion in the phalanx, which nearly at the same time was charged by the Theban infantry. Other writers expressly ascribe the issue of

¹ Frontinus Strat. i. 11. 6.

² Isocrates, Philip. p. 91. Λακεδαιμονίους στρατιωμάτων ἐπὶ Θεβαίων, καὶ βασιλείων λυμένασθαι τὴν Βοιωτίαν καὶ διοικίσει τὰς πόλεις. Compare Plutarch, 303. b.

³ Plutarch, Pel. 20., distinctly asserts that the danger which hung over Thebes was ἀντικρυς ἀπειλή καὶ καταγγιλία διοικισμοῦ.

the action to the tactics of Epaminondas¹, whom Xenophon does not mention, though he notices the great disparity between the depth of the Theban phalanx and that of the enemy. The Thebans were formed not less than fifty deep; more than four times the depth of the Lacedæmonian line, in which the *enomoty*, of thirty-six men, stood in three files. It was the object of Epaminondas to bring his mass to bear upon the enemy's right wing, where the Spartans were posted; and he seems to have succeeded in detaching it from the main body, so that it had to sustain the whole brunt of the first onset. Pelopidas, with his Sacred Band, contributed greatly to the success of this operation. The Spartans did not long keep their ground: Xenophon seems anxious to prove that they were not immediately routed. Cleombrotus himself fell early, but was carried off the field alive: though he survived but a short time. Among the Spartan officers who fought by his side, none distinguished themselves more than Sphodrias, and his son Cleonymus, who were both left among the slain. The part of the Peloponnesian army which had not been engaged, seeing the Spartans give way, fell back with them upon their camp, which was on a rising ground, and protected by a trench. Here they formed again, and the victors made no attempt to force their intrenchments.

So ended the battle of Leuctra: one of the most decisive in the history of Greece. Yet according to Xenophon the loss of the Lacedæmonians did not exceed 1400; and Diodorus, who states it at 4000, has probably followed an account which greatly exaggerates it, even if it was meant to include the loss of the allies, which appears to have been very trifling. But of this number 400 were Spartans: more than half of all were present in the army², who were only 700; and no inconsiderable portion of the whole Spartan population.

¹ Diodor. xv. 55. *Ἰβία τῆς καὶ μεγίστης τάξεως χερσὶ μισθοῦ.* Plut. Pel. 23.

² This must be Xenophon's meaning in Ages. ii. 24. He could not mean that the whole number of the Spartans who survived the battle, both at home and abroad, was less than 400.

The Thebans, according to Diodorus, lost only 300; according to another author, only forty-seven.¹ But these numbers are of no importance: they had gained a clear victory in a fair battle over a regular Lacedæmonian army, much more numerous than their own, with a king at its head: it mattered little with how many lives they had purchased such a triumph. The Spartans could hardly be brought to submit to their defeat, and were desirous of returning to the field, to recover their slain, and prevent the enemy from raising a trophy. But their commanders perceived that, even if they had strength sufficient left for such an attempt, the temper indicated by their allies, who were all manifestly unwilling to renew the engagement, the issue of which some scarcely affected to regret, would render it very dangerous. A council of war was held, in which it was unanimously agreed to acknowledge the loss of the battle by the usual application for leave to bury the slain. Epaminondas, it is said, to prevent the Spartans from concealing the extent of their misfortune, required that their allies should collect their dead first: it was then seen that almost all the slain were their own.²

The messenger who carried these tidings to Sparta found the city engaged in the celebration of one of its great festivals, the *Gymnopædia*. The people were in the theatre, and a chorus exhibiting. The ephors did not interrupt the performance, or abridge the amusements of the day, and when they communicated the names of the slain to their friends, enjoined the women to refrain from the customary wailings. The spirit of the old institutions manifested itself on this occasion in all its energy, perhaps not without some mixture of politic ostentation. The only signs of grief and dejection which any of the strangers who had been attracted to Sparta by the festival could have witnessed, were shown by the few relatives of the survivors who appeared in public the next day; the friends of the fallen thronged the streets with the countenances and

¹ Paus. ix. 13. 12.

² Paus. u. 2.

mutual congratulations of men who had received joyful tidings.

But the emergency called for something more than a cheerful face. The defeated army, which was still in the presence of the victorious enemy, could not be considered safe; and the whole remaining force of the city that was capable of foreign service was ordered to march to its relief. Two moras had been kept at home, together with the veterans who wanted less than five years of the term of the military age. These were now called out, and even the citizens who had before been exempted from military duty by civil offices, were directed to join them. Agesilaus was still unable to take the field, and his son Archidamus was charged with the command of the expedition. The oligarchical governments of the peninsula, feeling themselves involved in the danger which threatened the head of the confederacy, exerted themselves to raise reinforcements for him. Tegea, Mantinea, Corinth, Sicyon, Phlius, and the Achæans — probably only some of their cities — are mentioned by Xenophon as the most zealous in the cause.

While Archidamus was busied with his preparations, the Thebans were no less eager to profit by their victory. Immediately after the battle they had sent a herald, crowned as a messenger of good news, to announce it at Athens, and to call upon the people to avail themselves of the opportunity which now offered itself of taking vengeance for all the injuries they had ever suffered from Sparta. But to the feelings which now prevailed at Athens the contents of this message were so unwelcome, that the invitation sounded like mockery. The council, which received it, did not disguise its displeasure, and dismissed the herald not only without any answer to his application, but without the usual honours of hospitality. The Thebans at the same time solicited succours from their ally the tagus of Thessaly; and Jason very promptly complied with their request, though with views widely different from those which suggested it. He gave orders for manning a squadron, as if it

was his design to proceed to Bœotia by sea ; but having by this feint thrown the Phocians off their guard, he made a forced march through their country with a small body of troops — according to Diodorus, 1500 infantry and 500 horse — which they could easily have stopt, and arrived without interruption at Leuctra. Here he was urged by the Thebans to join them in an attack, to be made from opposite sides, on the enemy's position. But he represented to them the danger of driving such an enemy to despair, and so risking the fruits of their glorious victory ; and offered his mediation. With the Spartan commanders he had probably less difficulty, when he sought to convince them of the advantages which they would reap from a convention which would enable them to withdraw their disheartened and disaffected troops in safety. The friendly footing on which his father had stood toward Sparta, and the character of proxenus by which he himself was still connected with her notwithstanding his alliance with Thebes, gave a colour of disinterested goodwill to his advice. His object, as Xenophon observes, was to maintain a balance between the two states, so as to keep them both dependent on himself. At the request of the Spartans he concluded an armistice for them ; and their generals were so anxious to take advantage of it, and so fearful lest it should be broken by the enemy, that having given orders which expressed their intention of crossing Cithæron, they set out the same evening in the direction of Creusis, and pursuing their march all night in great disorder and alarm along the rugged coast road, reached the Megarian town of Ægosthena, where they met with Archidamus and a part of his forces. He waited there for the rest, — perhaps to give a better air to his retreat, — and as soon as they arrived marched back to Corinth, and disbanded his whole army. ¹

¹ Diodorus gives a very different account of several transactions connected with the battle of Leuctra from that which has been given on Xenophon's authority in the text. He represents the arrival of Jason as preceding the battle, and as followed by a truce concluded through Jason's mediation between Cleombrotus and the Thebans, which bound the Spartan king to withdraw his forces from Bœotia. But on his retreat he met with

Archidamus, who had been sent with a strong reinforcement to support him: and the two commanders, regardless of the recent compact, returned to Leuctra, and fought the fatal battle. It is remarkable enough that Wesseling, who is usually disposed to place too much confidence in his author, in this instance very judiciously questions his accuracy; while Schneider, without a shadow of an argument, and in defiance of every principle of sound criticism, assumes that it is Xenophon who has grossly distorted facts, which, at the time when his history was written, were notorious to all his readers. Wesseling saw that Xenophon's narrative, in its leading outlines, bears the clearest stamp of truth; he might have added, that Diodorus has here only committed one of his ordinary blunders. It was probably the misplacing of Jason's arrival that drew him into all the other mistakes. Niebuhr in his Lectures observed: "According to Diodorus the Spartans, in the loss of the battle, suffered the punishment of perjury. Either Archidamus joined his colleague before the battle, or Cleombrotus was calumniated after his death. I believe that Diodorus here adopted a story invented by the Spartans."

CHAP. XXXIX.

FROM THE BATTLE OF 'LEUCTRA TO THE FOUNDING OF
MESSENE.

THE ill-humour with which the news of the battle of Leuctra was received at Athens, seems to have arisen merely out of the old jealousy and animosity with which the Athenians had been used to regard their northern neighbours, and which revived as soon as the affairs of Thebes became prosperous. For in the event itself, considered with respect to their own interests, they could have seen nothing to deplore. And they proceeded without delay to take advantage of the shock which it had given to the influence of Sparta. It seems to have been the prevailing opinion throughout Greece, and not least at Sparta itself, that the Spartan power had suffered a fatal blow; and Xenophon intimates that the Athenians were surprised to find that any of the Peloponnesian states still adhered to the ancient chief of their confederacy. They believed that the time had now come when Athens might step into the place of Sparta, as guardian of the peace of Antalcidas, and might transfer all the advantages which her rival had reaped from that title to herself. They therefore assembled a congress in their own city, to which they invited deputies not only from their old allies, but from all the states of Greece which were willing to adopt the peace of Antalcidas as the basis of their mutual relations. It seems to have been attended by many, if not by most members of the Peloponnesian confederacy; and the resolution to which it came in the oath by which each state was to ratify the compact was thus expressed: "I will abide by the treaty sent down by the king, and by the decrees of the Athenians and their allies, and if an at-

tack be made on any of the states which take this oath, I will succour it with all my might." So that Athens found herself able to obtain better security for the execution of the treaty, than had been given in the last congress held for the like purpose at Sparta, where none of the parties had been bound to enforce its observance by arms: and yet the engagement for mutual defence now involved those who entered into it in danger of a contest both with Sparta and Thebes. Elis would gladly have united herself to an association which would separate, and might protect her from Sparta; but she would not resign her claims to the sovereignty of the Triphylian towns. The congress on the other hand determined that every town, small or great, should be alike independent, and commissioners were sent round to exact an oath to this effect from the magistrates of each state. It was taken, Xenophon says, by all but the Eleans.

We should have been glad to know which of the Peloponnesian states acceded to this confederacy. But all the information that Xenophon gives as to this point, only enables us to conclude that the Mantineans at least were of the number. One of the first effects of the battle of Leuctra seems to have been a revolution which overthrew the Mantinean aristocracy; and the declaration of the congress at Athens — though it expressed the very same principle on which the Spartans had professed to act when they scattered the Mantineans over their four villages — was now interpreted by the democratical party as a license to restore their political unity, and to rebuild their city; and the work was immediately begun. The Spartan government felt that the restoration of Mantinea would prove to all Greece that it was no longer formidable even to its nearest neighbours; but, in its anxiety to escape this humiliation, it resorted to a step which still more clearly betrayed its weakness, and showed how much it was dispirited by its recent reverse. Agesilaus, who had now recovered from his illness, was sent to use all his hereditary influence at Mantinea to stop the work; and

he was instructed to undertake, that, if it was only deferred for the present, he would procure the consent of the Spartan government, and even some help toward defraying the expense of the building. He was not allowed to lay this proposal before the popular assembly, but was informed that the decree of the people rendered it necessary to proceed without delay. Though he felt this repulse as a personal affront, and though it set the power of the state at defiance, it was not thought expedient at Sparta to have recourse to arms, and the treaty last concluded with Athens served as a plea for acquiescence. For it was now admitted that the independence of Mantinea had been violated, when it was dismembered for the sake of the aristocratical party. Some of the other Arcadian towns sent workmen to assist the Mantineans, and Elis contributed three talents to the cost of the fortification. The new city was so constructed as to be secure from such attacks as had proved fatal to that which it replaced.¹

Peloponnesus had for some years been violently agitated by political convulsions, and had been the scene of incessant struggles between the two leading parties, the friends of aristocratical and of democratical institutions. It seems that the principles on which the peace of Antalcidas was professedly founded, had encouraged the partisans of democracy to hope that they might establish their ascendancy, wherever they were the strongest, without any obstruction from Sparta. Her conduct towards Phlius and Mantinea must have checked these hopes; yet they seem to have revived when the new confederacy between Thebes and Athens after the recovery of the Cadmea, and the revolt of several maritime states, compelled Sparta to observe more moderation towards her remaining allies. In many places the

¹ "They were careful not only to exclude the river from their city, but also to make the substruction of their walls of such a height as could not possibly be submerged by means of such streams as those which water the Mantinea." (Leake, *Morca*, iii. p. 73.) But when elsewhere (ii. p. 41) he says that "we find the Mantinenses choosing a level situation for their new city in preference to its old position upon a hill," this seems only to mean that the insulated rocky height of Gurtzuli (see i. p. 103.) had been included within the ancient fortifications; but even of this we find no proof.

aristocratical party was overpowered, and suffered severe retaliation for the oppression it had exercised during the period of its domination. But these triumphs were only the beginning of a series of fierce and bloody contests. The exiles were continually on the watch for an opportunity of regaining what they had lost, and the attempt, whether it succeeded or failed, commonly ended in a massacre. The oligarchical exiles of Phigalea, having seized a fortress near the town, surprised it during a festival, while the multitude was assembled in the theatre, and made a great slaughter among the defenceless crowd, though they were at last forced to retreat, and take refuge in Sparta. The Corinthian exiles, who had found shelter at Argos, were baffled in a similar enterprise, and killed one another to avoid falling into the hands of the opposite party, which immediately instituted a rigorous inquiry at Corinth, and condemned numbers to death or exile on the charge of abetting the conspiracy. Like scenes took place at Megara and Sicyon. Phlius more especially was continually harassed by civil feuds. The democratical exiles took possession of a stronghold in its neighbourhood, and collected a body of mercenaries, with whose aid they defeated their enemies in battle, and killed 900; but afterwards having been betrayed by their auxiliaries they were overpowered, 600 were slain, and the rest were forced to take refuge in Argos. Argos itself was not an indifferent spectator of these events. Though democracy had long been firmly established there, the jealousy of the people was roused against the class, which might well be suspected of wishes hostile to the existing government, but perhaps had given no other occasion for a charge of treasonable designs. It may easily be supposed that the confluence of democratical exiles from other cities tended to keep up a state of constant unnatural excitement at Argos; and there were demagogues who took advantage of it to instigate the multitude against the wealthier citizens, who, if we may believe Diodorus, were at last driven into a con-

spiracy for self-defence. But it seems extremely doubtful whether any sufficient proof of the fact was ever obtained. Those on whom suspicion first fell were put to the torture: others killed themselves to avoid it: at length one of the accused, either to obtain relief from torment, or with a motive like that which prompted the confession of Andocides, offered to make a discovery, and informed against thirty of the most eminent citizens, who, it seems almost without the form of a trial, were put to death, and their property confiscated. But this disclosure, as it appeared to confirm the original charge, served rather to inflame than to allay the popular suspicions, which were continually cherished by the arts of the demagogues. Arrests were multiplied, until the number of the prisoners amounted to 1200; and the populace, impatient of legal delays, arming itself with clubs, rose upon them, and massacred them all: this bloody execution became memorable under the name of the *scytalism*.¹ The demagogues who had excited the phrenzy, now endeavoured to restrain it from further excesses; but the attempt only turned it against themselves, and most of them shared the fate of their victims. Their blood seemed to propitiate the infernal powers: the flame, no longer supplied with fuel, expired; and tranquillity was restored. It must be considered as an indication of a remarkable superiority in the Athenian character and institutions over those of Argos, that under similar circumstances, in the affair of the Hermes-busts, when religious and political fanaticism combined their influence to madden the people, no such spectacles were witnessed at Athens.²

The spirit of hostility to Sparta, which had been let loose in Arcadia by the battle of Leuctra, manifested itself not long after in a much more important event

¹ *σκυταλισμός* — from the weapon (*σκυτάλη*) which seems to have been principally used.

² Niebuhr observes, that no massacre took place at Athens, and considers this as an effect of the mild humane character of the people, and of the theatrical amusements by which it was softened and refined. "The people of Argos had but a shadow of Athenian life, and so sank into a savageness into which Athens never fell."

than the restoration of Mantinea. The chiefs of the parties opposed to the Spartan interest in the principal Arcadian towns concerted a plan for securing the independence of Arcadia, and for raising it to a higher rank than it had hitherto held in the political system of Greece. With a territory more extensive than any other region of Peloponnesus, peopled by a hardy race, proud of its ancient origin and immemorial possession of the land, and of its peculiar religious traditions, Arcadia—the Greek Switzerland—had never possessed any weight in the affairs of the nation; the land only served as a thoroughfare for hostile armies, and sent forth its sons to recruit the forces of foreign powers—Greek or barbarian—and to shed their blood in quarrels in which they had no concern. A wish for a better state of things may have occurred to Arcadian patriots at an earlier period; or it may have been first suggested by the destruction of Mantinea: but it was the battle of Leuctra that opened a prospect of carrying it into effect. A Mantinean named Lycomedes, a man of large fortune and of the highest birth in his native city, seems to have been either the author or the most active mover of the project which was now formed, and which was at least partly executed in the course of the same year (371). The object was to unite the Arcadian people in one body, yet so as not to destroy the independence of the particular states; and with this view it was proposed to found a metropolis, to institute a national council which should be invested with supreme authority in foreign affairs, particularly with regard to peace and war, and to establish a military force for the protection of the public safety.

The plan in itself was one which might have presented itself to a friend of aristocracy, who took an interest in the honour and prosperity of Arcadia, as readily as to a man of opposite political sentiments. But the aristocratical interest in the Arcadian towns depended upon Spartan protection; and for Sparta no event was more to be dreaded than one which made

Arcadia united, powerful, and independent. The erection of such a state on her northern frontier manifestly tended to exclude her from all political intercourse with the rest of Greece; and it had therefore been a main object of her policy to keep the Arcadian cantons as much as possible separate from each other. And though there is no reason to doubt that Lycomedes, and those who shared his views, were chiefly desirous of rescuing their country from a degrading subjection to her imperious neighbour, and of elevating her to an honourable station among the Greek commonwealths, they undoubtedly did not overlook the accession of strength which would result from this event to their party in its contest with its domestic adversaries. Their plan could not fail to be agreeable to the Thebans, just in proportion as it was alarming to Sparta; and it was very early communicated to Epaminondas. If indeed we could rely on some expressions of a late Greek author, according to their literal interpretation, we should suppose that the plan was first conceived by him.¹ But it seems rather more probable that he only fostered it with his encouragement and advice, and lent his aid to the execution. Xenophon touches upon this subject with evident reluctance; he mentions the civil discord to which the project of the union gave rise in Arcadia, but scarcely hints at the issue of the struggle; and we are thus forced to depend upon such information as is to be gleaned from later writers, and after all are left in ignorance of several interesting particulars. It appears however that within a few months after the battle of Leuctra, a meeting of Arcadians from all the principal towns was held, to deliberate on the measure; and under its decree a body of colonists, collected from various quarters, proceeded to found a new city, which was to be the seat of the general government, and was called Megalepolis, or Megalopolis (the Great City).²

¹ Paus. viii. 27. 2. ix. 14. 4.

² Niebuhr says: "Megalepolis, afterwards Megalopolis." Pausanias ix. 14. 4. Μεγάλη καὶ ἔτι ἡμῶς ἐστὶ καλεῖται πόλις; but he calls the citizens Μεγαλοπολίται.

The site chosen was on the banks of the Helisson, a small stream tributary to the Alpheus, in the upper part of the plain — the only one of considerable extent on the western side of Arcadia — through which the river flows before it reaches the gorge at Carytena : at a short distance from one of the passes leading into the vale of the Eurotas, but still nearer to the borders of Messenia. The site was perfectly level, resembling those of Tegea and Mantinea, and strikingly contrasted to those of the old Arcadian cities. We do not know that Epaminondas was consulted with regard to the situation ; but even if he was, it is not certain that his choice was determined by the advantages which the ground offered for defence ; as indeed none such have yet been discovered in it. It seems more probable that the work was begun in a sanguine and confident spirit, which paid less regard to strength than to convenience of position, and believed that safety would be sufficiently provided for by an ordinary fortification. The city was designed on a very large scale, and the magnitude of the public buildings corresponded to its extent ; the theatre was the most spacious in Greece. The territory annexed to it seems to have been chiefly composed of the districts belonging to the Mænalian and Parrhasian villages, perhaps nearly the same as during the Peloponnesian war acknowledged the sovereignty of Mantinea, until they were restored to independence by the interference of Sparta. But the population was to be drawn not from these only, but from a great number of the most ancient Arcadian towns. Pausanias gives a list of forty which were required to contribute to it. The greater part of them appear to have been entirely deserted by their inhabitants ; others retained a remnant of their population, but in the condition of villages subject to Megalopolis. It is not quite clear whether the migration was voluntarily undertaken by any, or they all only submitted to a decree of the majority ; but there seem to have been few who did not at least submit willingly, and whose attachment to their native

seats was not for the time overcome by their enmity to Sparta, or by their patriotic zeal, or by the prospect of the advantages connected with the franchise of a great city.¹ Four towns only — Lycoa, Tricoloni, Lycosura, and Trapezus — either retracted their consent, or refused to sacrifice their inclinations to the public will. They were among the most ancient in the land; and it is only remarkable that the same repugnance was not more generally felt. Lycoa and Tricoloni however were compelled to yield, and their inhabitants were transferred to Megalopolis. Trapezus made an obstinate resistance; and its citizens who survived the struggle preferred quitting their native land to changing their abode in it, and having found means for embarking for the Euxine, were hospitably received as kinsmen in the city of the same name. Lycosura — which boasted of being the most ancient city under the sun — was spared out of respect for the sanctity of one of its temples. The districts which were thus drained of their population never recovered it, and were left in a great measure uncultivated.

The most interesting subject connected with this event, the constitution under which Arcadia was to be united, is unfortunately involved in the greatest obscurity. Megalopolis was the place appointed for the deliberation of the supreme council of the Arcadian body. But of this council we only know that it was commonly described by the name of the Ten Thousand: an appellation which raises a number of perplexing questions. For that it was a representative assembly, and was not intended to consist only of Megalopolitans, is clear both from the terms in which it is spoken of, and from the nature of the case. this would have been a privilege which the other cities would never have conceded to a colony formed out of the most insignificant townships. On

¹ So Pausanias, viii. 27. 3. 5., speaks of the general *προβουσία* διὰ τὸ ἔχθρος τῶν Λακιδαιμονίων, and the *σπουδή* with which they obeyed the decree. And he seems as well entitled to credit as Diodorus, who (xv. 94.) gives a different view, which however is adopted by Niebuhr (Lect.): "The population of forty townships was forced to settle in Megalopolis."

the other hand, that so numerous a body should have been collected either at stated times, or as often as occasion required, from the other parts of Arcadia, is scarcely less hard to understand. Equally strange does it appear, that no mention should be found of any more select council, which, according to the uniform practice of the Greek democratical states, should have prepared the business to be transacted by the assembly of the Ten Thousand. These difficulties remain just the same whether the name was used in a vague sense for a great multitude, or was adopted upon an estimate, meant to be more or less exact, of the numbers which might be brought together for the purpose of consultation. But though no express mention is to be found of a smaller council, there is what may be considered as a trace of one, sufficiently clear perhaps, where the existence of the thing might fairly be presumed from analogy without any other evidence. Among the buildings of Megalopolis Pausanias enumerates the council-house of the Ten Thousand, which was called from its founder the Thersilium. But the remains which appear by their position to answer most nearly to the description of the Greek antiquarian, indicate, as we learn from a modern traveller¹, that the edifice to which they belonged was not designed for the meeting of 10,000 persons, nor is it probable, as the same author remarks, that any was appropriated to that purpose, except either the theatre, or one resembling the Athenian Pnyx. We are therefore inclined to conclude that the Thersilium was intended to receive a smaller number of deputies, who were properly the council of the great assembly. And if this was the case it becomes less important to inquire how the assembly was composed. On the other hand, it is possible that in the enthusiasm with which the undertaking was begun, more was expected than was afterwards performed. Ten thousand may have been the amount of the army which it was proposed to keep on foot, and which was also to con-

¹ Leake, *Morea*, ii, p. 39.

stitute the assembly for deciding on peace or war, and other questions of public interest.¹ But the practice may have differed widely from this theory of the constitution, though the name was retained. Our information is no less defective as to the executive power. Diodorus calls Lycomedes the general of the Arcadians; but whether this was the title of the chief magistrate of the Arcadian body, is a question which we cannot resolve. It is certain however that there were other magistrates², who no doubt presided in the great council, and perhaps composed the smaller one. The force raised for the public service at the outset seems not to have exceeded 5000 men. They were distinguished by a peculiar name, as the Eparites — a word probably of appropriate meaning in the Arcadian dialect, but which we do not find explained.³ Their ordinary station was most likely fixed at Megalopolis; and if the conjecture just proposed as to the character of the assembly of the Ten Thousand is well founded, it would seem to follow that they must have had votes in it.

Ten commissioners were appointed to superintend the first settlement of the colony, and were honoured with the title of founders. Two of them, Lycomedes and Opoles, were Mantineans; two, Timon and Proxenus, were leaders of the democratical party at Tegea. Of the rest, two came from Clitor, two from Mænalus, and as many from the Parrhasian cantons.⁴ As there was reason to apprehend that Sparta might attempt to interrupt the work in its beginning, Epaminondas sent Pammenes, one of his ablest officers, with 1000 choice troops, to guard and assist the colonists; and hence he also might be looked upon as one of the founders; but

¹ Waehsmuth, l. 2. p. 293., takes a similar view of the subject; only he considers 10,000 as a rough estimate of the whole military force of Arcadia; but this, according to Mr. Clinton's calculations (F. H. il. p. 419.), would be too far below the truth. Niebuhr observes: "Megalopolis was to be the centre of Arcadia, and in Arcadia 10,000 were to form a rural commonalty (*eine Gemeinde von Landleuten*) but were not all to reside in Megalopolis." He afterwards calls them *das Collegium der 10,000*.

² ἄρχοντες. Xen. H. vii. 4. 33.

³ Unless it was equivalent to *εὐρίστου*, which Diodorus substitutes for it, xv. 62.

⁴ Paus. viii. 27. 2.

it does not appear that he had the foremost, much less, as was sometimes contended, an exclusive claim to that title.¹ It was not however at Megalopolis that any opposition was offered to the undertaking; but in other places violent contests arose between the advocates and the adversaries of the new measure. At Orchomenus it seems to have been viewed with general aversion, not merely because of the aristocratical ascendancy in the government, but also on account of the neighbourly hatred felt towards Mantinea; and the animosity of the Orchomenians was perhaps inflamed by the loss of three of their subject towns, Theisoa, Methydrium, and Teuthis, which were annexed to the territory of the new capital. They openly renounced all connection with the Arcadian body, and received a garrison composed according to Diodorus of 1000 Lacedæmonians, and of 500 Bœotian and Argive refugees, who had been collected at Corinth under the command of one Polytropus, who would therefore seem to have been a Spartan; but Xenophon merely describes them as mercenaries. It was however at Tegea, the chief seat of Spartan and aristocratical influence in Arcadia, that the hardest struggle took place. Though Proxenus and Timon had been deputed as founders of Megalopolis, Stasippus and his partisans did not cease to exert their utmost efforts to counteract the plan of the union, and to keep Tegea in its ancient state of subserviency to Sparta, or, as Xenophon expresses it, probably in their language, in the enjoyment of its hereditary institutions. Proxenus and another democratical leader named Callibius, conscious, though they were outvoted in the oligarchical councils, that the majority of the citizens was on their side, appealed to arms. Stasippus however was able to meet them with an equal force, and an engagement ensued outside the walls, in which Proxenus

¹ The remark of Pausanias, viii. 27. 1., seems to have been pressed too far by some modern writers. So Colonel Leake speaks of Epaminondas as *choosing the site of the new capital of Arcadia*: an assertion for which we want better authority. What Pausanias says, ix. 14. 4., as to the foundation of Megalopolis, is not more accurate than the accompanying statement about the rebuilding of Mantinea.

was slain, and his followers put to flight ; but Stasippus, who was by nature averse to bloodshed, would not suffer them to be pursued. Callibius, having collected his scattered troops, returned towards the city, and posting them close to the walls, opened a negotiation with his adversaries. This however was only a stratagem to gain time ; for he was every hour expecting a reinforcement which he had sent for from Mantinea. As soon as it appeared, some of his men scaled the walls, and threw open the gates. Stasippus and some of his party immediately quitted the city by another road, and, before they were overtaken, reached a temple of Artemis, where they barred themselves in. But their enemies respected the sanctity of the place no more than Greeks usually did on such occasions, and having induced them to surrender, by assailing them with missiles from the roof, conveyed them bound on a waggon to Tegea, where after a mock trial, in which the Mantineans assisted as judges, they put them all to death. Their surviving partisans, to the number of 800, fled to Sparta.

The safety of Sparta seemed to require that she should not passively submit to the blow thus struck at the last remains of her influence in Arcadia, and among the Tegean refugees were several private friends of Agesilaus, and probably of other leading Spartans, who solicited redress and revenge against the Mantineans and their political adversaries. The interference of Mantinea in the civil feuds of Tegea was construed as a violation of the principle which had been recognised in all the treaties concluded since the peace of Antalcidas, and therefore afforded a fair colour for taking up arms : and war was accordingly declared against Mantinea on this ground.¹ But the strongest motive by which the Spartan government was urged to this step, appears to have

¹ Xenophon's language, H. vi. 5. 20., βοηθητίον εἶναι—κατὰ τοὺς ἕρκους, seems more applicable to the oath prescribed by the congress at Athens, than to that of the treaty previous to the battle of Leuctra, which did not impose any obligation. Yet it is hardly credible that Sparta sent deputies to the congress.

been the necessity which it felt for some effort which should restore confidence and cheerfulness at home. For notwithstanding the heroic countenance with which the news of the battle of Leuctra had been received, it had made an impression of deep despondency, from which the city had not yet recovered. After the return of the defeated army, a grave question had arisen as to the manner in which it should be treated. According to the precedents of earlier times, the Spartan who saved his life by flight was subject to the loss of all his civil privileges, and to marks of ignominy; and we have seen that it was thought necessary to inflict a temporary degradation on the prisoners who had surrendered — with the permission of their superiors — at Sphacteria.¹ There were some who held that the dishonour which the Spartan arms had incurred at Leuctra, could only be effaced by a rigorous enforcement of the ancient martial law. But Agesilaus, and probably most other members of the government, saw that such severity would be now very ill-timed; and according to Plutarch he was empowered to frame some new regulations on this head, but instead of any formal innovation simply proposed that the law should be suffered to sleep for this once, without prejudice to its application on future occasions.² It was however on this account the more desirable to divert the thoughts of the people from the recent disaster by a fresh expedition; and Agesilaus was now sufficiently recovered from his illness to take the command.

Xenophon says that he marched with one mora, probably meaning only the Spartan division of his forces. He was joined by troops from Heræa and Lepreum, and sent for Polytropus and his mercenaries from Orchomenus. In the meanwhile the Arcadians had collected their forces at Asea, near the frontier of La-

¹ Vol. III. p. 310.

² So Plutarch, Ages. 30. Valerius Maximus, vii. 2. E. 12, refers the suspension of the laws to a different occasion, which will be shortly mentioned; and we are strongly inclined to suspect that the expression of Agesilaus reported by Plutarch belongs to that occasion, not to this, where it is certainly much less appropriate.

conia, all but the Mantineans, who did not think it safe to leave their city exposed to the attack of Polytropus, and therefore first marched against Orchomenus; and, though they were compelled to retire from the town, in their retreat they made a successful stand against Polytropus, who was pursuing with his light troops, killed him, and made some slaughter among his men. Agesilaus was at this time waiting for him in the small Arcadian town of Eutæa, which he found quite defenceless; for all the men of military age were absent in the camp at Asea, and the walls were in a ruinous condition. Yet with politic generosity — for Sparta needed friends more than spoil — he not only spared persons and property, but even employed his men in repairing the walls. When he heard of the death of Polytropus, he continued his march towards Mantinea, leaving the Arcadians in his rear. They soon followed in the same track; and he might have attacked them before they joined the Mantineans: some of his council urged him to do so; but he thought himself too near the hostile city, or perhaps, as Plutarch says, wished if possible to avoid a battle, and therefore suffered them to effect the junction unmolested. He himself was soon after reinforced by the light troops from Orchomenus, and by a squadron of cavalry from Phlius; and the enemy was strengthened by a body of Argives. Neither side however was willing to fight: Agesilaus, because his first care was to husband the strength of Sparta: the Arcadians, because they expected soon to be joined by a Theban army: for they were informed by the Eleans that Thebes had borrowed ten talents from Elis for the purpose of the meditated expedition. Perhaps the same intelligence increased the anxiety of Agesilaus to return home. But that his retreat might not appear to be the effect of fear, he remained three days before Mantinea, and ravaged the plain¹: and then marched back with the utmost speed. Still the honour of Sparta had been

¹ Plutarch, Ages. 30., adds that he took a small town belonging to the Mantineans. One might suspect that he had only read about Eutæa.

vindicated, and the fallen spirits of his countrymen were cheered by the result of the expedition.

The Thebans were in fact advancing with a powerful army, and not long after joined the Arcadians — who employed the interval after the retreat of Agesilaus in an inroad into the Heræan territory — at Mantinea. The victory of Leuctra had so completely changed their position, that they had now the forces of almost all northern Greece, except Attica, at their command. Even Phocis, though as hostile as ever, was compelled to aid them against her late allies. All the Eubœan towns, the Locrians both of the east and west, the Acarnanians, the Trachinian Heraclea and the Malians¹, contributed to swell their army; and Thessaly furnished cavalry and targeteers. The whole force now assembled at Mantinea amounted according to Diodorus to 50,000, according to Plutarch to 70,000 men, of whom 40,000 were heavy-armed.² The professed object of the expedition was to protect Mantinea, and as it now was no longer in danger, and the season — it was midwinter — was unfavourable to military operations, several of the Theban commanders proposed to return. Xenophon indeed, who still mentions none of their great names, represents them as at first unanimous on this head, and as only detained by the persuasion of their Peloponnesian allies, who urged them to invade Laconia. But we can more easily believe Plutarch's statement: that Epaminondas and Pelopidas, who were both in command as Bœotarchs, were no less desirous not to let slip such an opportunity of crushing or humbling Sparta; and indeed it can hardly be doubted that they had already conceived the design of a great work which they executed before they withdrew from Peloponnesus. But it seems that they had some difficulty in obtaining the consent of their colleagues, who were disposed to exaggerate the obstacles of the Laconian frontier, and the resistance which they had to expect when they

¹ Or, according to Xen. Ages. ii. §4., Enianians.

² Ages. 31.

should have crossed it. They expected to find all the passes, which were naturally difficult, strongly guarded, and could not at once reconcile themselves to the thought of seeking an enemy, who till lately had been deemed almost invincible, in his own country, where he would be animated by the strongest motives to extraordinary exertions. Their apprehensions were only overcome when they received invitations and assurances of support from Laconia itself, and were encouraged by some of the provincials, who came for that purpose to the camp, to expect that the appearance of their army would produce a general revolt of the subject population, which it was said had already refused to obey the orders of the government when it was summoned to the defence of Sparta. They were also informed that one of the principal passes, which led through Caryæ and Sellasia into the vale of the Eurotas, was quite unguarded; and some of the inhabitants of Caryæ offered themselves as guides, and were ready to pledge their lives for the truth of their assertions. The invasion was then unanimously resolved upon.

To distract the enemy's attention, and to accelerate their own movements, the invaders divided their forces so as to penetrate into Laconia simultaneously by different routes. Xenophon speaks only of two divisions, that of the Thebans, who were to take the road which led through Caryæ into the valley of the Œnus, and that of the Arcadians, who were to cross the border more to the west and to traverse the district called Sciritis. But from Diodorus we learn that there were two other divisions, consisting one of the Argives, the other of the Eleans; and though he has not very distinctly described their lines of march, it seems clear that they formed the two wings of the invading army, the Argives making a circuit which brought them through the Thyreatis over Mount Parnon, the Eleans one by which they were led into the upper vale of the Eurotas. Sellasia was the place of rendezvous appointed for all the four divisions. The Thebans and

the Eleans appear to have met with no resistance. The Argives found the passes guarded by a body of troops consisting partly of Bœotian refugees, commanded by a Spartan named Alexander, who however was overpowered, and fell with 200 of his men. The pass of the Sciritis might also have been occupied, and from its natural strength it was believed that the Arcadians would never have been able to force it; but Ischolaus, a Spartan who was posted near it at the village of Ium with a garrison of neodamode troops, and about 400 of the exiled Tegeans, instead of securing the pass, determined to make his stand in the village, where he was surrounded by the enemy, and slain with almost every one of his men. The four divisions then effected their junction without further opposition, and after having plundered and burnt Sellasia, descended to the banks of the Eurotas, and encamped in a sanctuary of Apollo at the entrance of the plain of Sparta. The next day they pursued their march along the left bank of the river, which was swollen by the winter rains, until they reached the bridge which crossed it directly over against the city. A body of heavy-armed which appeared on the other side deterred them from attempting the passage, and they proceeded, still keeping the left bank, to plunder and destroy the dwellings which were thickly scattered in the neighbourhood of the capital, and which from Xenophon's description, who says they were full of good things, seem to have been chiefly villas of the more opulent Spartans, and were probably better stored and furnished than their houses in the town. It was the first time that fires kindled by a hostile army had ever been seen from Sparta, since it had been in the possession of the Dorian race; and the grief and consternation excited by the spectacle in the women, and the elder part of the men, were proportioned not merely to its strangeness, but to the pride and confidence with which the traditions of so many centuries had taught them to regard their soil as inviolate, and their city, though unwall'd, as impregnable.

The danger which threatened the state was indeed sufficient to have shaken any ordinary courage. A handful of Spartans was the only force that could be securely relied on for the defence of an open city, spread over a great extent of ground, against the mighty host which was now separated from it only by the river. The subject population, free and servile, was in part at least either in declared revolt, refusing to obey the requisitions of the government, or notoriously disaffected. And the recollection of Cinadon's plot might suggest suspicions — as the event proved, not unfounded — of disloyalty even among the members of the ruling class. But however faithful they might be to one another, the terror of some, and the rashness of others, might in a moment defeat every precaution, and involve the whole in ruin. In this emergency all eyes were turned upon Agesilaus. As he was fully aware of the danger, so he clearly perceived the course which could alone afford a prospect of deliverance. To remain strictly on the defensive, and in case of an attack to take advantage of the inequalities of the ground, and of the position of the streets and buildings in the outskirts of the town, and in the meanwhile to maintain tranquillity and obedience within, was all that was left to be done, and this, with the means at his disposal, demanded all his abilities. The Spartans, when distributed over the wide range which they had to defend, made so poor a show, that the government thought it necessary to resort to an expedient which had been adopted before on less urgent occasions: to arm as many of the helots as could be induced to enlist by a promise of emancipation. And notwithstanding the atrocious purpose which had been cloaked by a similar proposal in former times, more than 6000 volunteers now presented themselves. Their services were accepted with trembling, and employed with continued distrust, until the arrival of some foreign auxiliaries gave a little more security to the government. Not many days after, a small force — probably less than 6000 strong — collected from Corinth,

Sicyon, Pellene, Epidaurus, Trœzen, Hermione, and Halia, having been transported in succession over the Argolic gulf to Brasie on the coast of Laconia, crossed the mountains, and, though the enemy was encamped only two or three miles off, made its way into the city.

In the meanwhile the invading army, having ravaged the eastern side of the plain till it came over against Amyclæ, then crossed the river, and turned its front towards Sparta. As the greatest breadth of the plain lies between the river and the foot of Taygetus, still more spoil was found here than on the other side, and this with the greater part of the allies was the single object of attention. The Theban generals alone appear to have been able to prevent their troops from ranging at large in quest of plunder, and to have taken precautions against a surprise from the city. What Epaminondas most desired was to draw the enemy into an engagement, and he is said to have tried the effect of a taunting challenge on Agesilaus, whose temper was not always proof against provocation. But on this occasion he controlled his own feelings, and calmed the general excitement by his authority and example. When this attempt failed, and the sight of the devastation committed for three or four days by the invaders, did not rouse the Spartans from their defensive attitude, the cavalry was ordered to advance towards the city, perhaps in the hope that a skirmish might ensue, and become the occasion of a general action. If indeed we may not conjecture a deeper design, and suppose that this movement was concerted with a disaffected party within, which at least seems to have seized this opportunity of declaring itself, in a manner which at any other juncture, or without some understanding with the enemy, would appear to have been strangely imprudent. The Spartans had a small body of cavalry, very inferior not only in numbers, but in condition, to that of the allies; it was however drawn up on the level south of the city. Its appearance served rather to heighten than to check the confidence of the assailants. But an

adjacent building, which was consecrated by tradition as the house of the tutelary Twins, concealed about 300 of the young Spartan infantry, who, when the enemy drew near, started from their ambush to support the charge which was made at the same time by their own cavalry. This unexpected attack threw the advancing squadrons into confusion, and though they were pursued but to a short distance, they did not stop till they reached the Theban phalanx, and even a part of the infantry were so much alarmed by their flight, as to begin a hasty retreat. It was perhaps on this occasion, while the allies were advancing, that a band of about 200 men, who had for the most part been long suspected by the government, occupied the Issorium, one of the heights on the skirt of the town toward the river. As they had received no orders, it was evident that they were acting with treasonable designs; and some proposed that they should be forthwith dislodged by force. Agesilaus however thought it more prudent, as the extent of the conspiracy was not known, to try a milder course, and going up to the place with a single attendant, affected to believe that they had mistaken his orders, and directed them to station themselves in different quarters. They obeyed, thinking that they had escaped detection: but fifteen of them were arrested by the orders of Agesilaus, and put to death without form of trial in the night. The suppression of this attempt may have led to the discovery of another more dangerous conspiracy, in which a number of Spartans were implicated. They were arrested in a house where they held clandestine meetings. The clearer their guilt, the more dangerous it probably appeared to bring them to trial: yet there was no power in the state which could legally put a Spartan to death without one. Even the authority of the ephors had never yet been carried so far. They determined however, after a consultation with Agesilaus, to dispense with legal forms¹, and the

¹ This is the occasion to which, as has been mentioned in a preceding note, we believe the proposal of Agesilaus (Plut. Ages. 30) that the laws

prisoners were delivered to a secret execution. The desertions which took place among the helots and the Laconian troops were carefully concealed from public knowledge: but this may not indicate their frequency, so much as the vigilance of Agesilaus.

The reports brought to the camp of the allies as to the state of things in Sparta, did not encourage Epaminondas to repeat the attempt in which the cavalry had been repulsed, or to prolong his stay in the neighbourhood of the capital. He directed his march southward, and ravaged the whole vale of the Eurotas as far as the coast. Some unwall'd towns were committed to the flames, and an assault was made for three successive days on Gythium, the naval arsenal of Sparta, but without success. If it was the design of Epaminondas to take advantage of the discontent which was supposed to prevail in the subject population toward the government, to effect a permanent revolution, the devastation committed by his allies, which he was probably unable to restrain, must have tended to counteract it. He was joined, Xenophon says, by some of the provincials; but the majority must have looked upon the invaders as enemies. Their stay was protracted for some weeks. At length the Peloponnesian troops began to withdraw with their booty, leaving the country almost exhausted. The growing scarcity of provisions, and diminution of numbers, combined with the hardships of the season, would have admonished Epaminondas to retire, even if, as Xenophon would lead his readers to suppose, his only business, after recrossing the border, had been to march homeward. But the historian, professing to mention all the motives which induced the Thebans to quit Laconia, has carefully suppressed the main object which Epaminondas had in view, and which he accomplished during his stay in the peninsula. He meditated

should be allowed to sleep for one day, but should remain in force ever after, ought to be referred. On the occasion to which Plutarch assigns it, it is difficult to understand what particular day could be meant, or how Agesilaus should have been led to use such a phrase.

a blow much more destructive to the power and prosperity of Sparta than the invasion of her territory. His design was to deprive her of Messenia, to collect the Messenians in the laud of their forefathers, and to found a new city where they might maintain their independence. He had already sent to the various regions in which the remains of the heroic people were scattered, to invite them to return to their ancient home. After the close of the Peloponnesian war those who had found refuge in Naupactus were expelled by their triumphant enemy. A part betook themselves to their kinsmen in Rhegium and Messana; but the greater number crossed over to Africa, in compliance with a timely invitation which they received from the inhabitants of Hesperis, one of the Cyrenaic cities, who, pressed by the assaults of their barbarian neighbours, sent to Greece to collect new settlers. Pausanias intimates that some had already arrived in Peloponnesus, and were consulted by Epaminondas on the site of the city which he was about to build for them.¹ It is however hardly credible that he was himself undecided on that point, or that he ever turned his thoughts with this view to Andania or Œchalia. Ithome was recommended, at once by the most animating recollections, and by the advantages of its strong and central position; and the western slope of the ridge on which the ancient strong-hold stood, was selected for the new city, Messene. The foundations were laid with the utmost solemnity; and if we may trust Pausanias, Epaminondas on this occasion did not disdain to practise a pious fraud, for the purpose of showing that the undertaking was sanctioned by the will of the gods. We read of visions in which the priestly hero Caucon appeared, first to him and then to Epiteles, the commander of the Argive forces, and which led to the discovery of a metal roll, on which were inscribed the liturgical forms which Caucon was said to have brought from Eleusis into Messenia. It was believed to have been buried at mount Ithome, by

¹ iv. 26. 6.

Aristomenes, when he found that the end of his struggle was approaching, in conformity to an ancient prophecy, as a pledge vouchsafed by the gods, on condition that it should be kept secret until the destined hour arrived for the restoration of his country. The name of Aristomenes was invoked with peculiar veneration, not only by the Messenians, but by the Greeks of every race who took part in the founding of the city : and the victory of Leuctra was, now perhaps for the first time, ascribed to his supernatural interposition. But though Epaminondas did not neglect the aid to be derived from pious and patriotic enthusiasm, he at least paid equal attention to all the material means of securing the duration of his work. The most judicious use was made of the natural advantages of the site ; the most approved architects of the day were employed upon the plan, and the most skilful workmen in the execution ; and the fortifications of Messene, which some centuries later excited the admiration of Pausanias, are still found to justify his praise by the solid and beautiful masonry of the remains which are yet standing.

The population of the new capital undoubtedly did not consist wholly of the Messenians who were recalled from foreign lands by the invitation of Epaminondas ; though we do not perceive so great a difficulty as some authors have found in adopting the statement of Pausanias, which leads us to suppose that they had already returned to Peloponnesus when the first stone of Messene was laid. This indeed would be scarcely possible, if the design of building the city had first occurred to the Theban general after he entered Peloponnesus. But it seems probable that he had been long meditating it, and perhaps he had formed it soon after the battle of Leuctra. That event, which was generally considered as a death-blow to the Spartan power, may have excited hopes in the Messenian helots of recovering their independence, and their wishes may have been secretly communicated to the Theban government. The proceedings of the Arcadians would confirm them in their

projects, and the foundation of Megalopolis might easily suggest the thought of a new Messenian capital to Epaminondas. We do not indeed venture with a modern historian¹ to interpret a vague, and certainly hyperbolical, expression of Xenophon's, into an intimation that a general insurrection had taken place in Messenia soon after the battle of Leuctra; but it seems highly probable that the Messenian helots broke out into open revolt as soon as they heard of the arrival of the Theban army in the peninsula, and that their envoys were among the most urgent in exciting Epaminondas to invade Laconia. They no doubt contributed the largest share to the population of Messene: whether they were admitted to a perfect equality with the Naupactian exiles, who, as they were singularly tenacious of their Dorian dialect and customs, probably included many Dorian families, is a different question. It seems at least clear from the accounts of Diodorus and Pausanias, that they were considered as the core of the colony, though the Spartans always affected to treat the whole as a mere mass of revolted helots.² Indeed, it is difficult to understand the remark of Polybius³ — that the democratical equality which was established at a later period at Messene gave great offence to the old citizens — except on the supposition that its institutions were from the beginning aristocratical. And — notwithstanding the prevalence of democratical principles in the states of the Theban confederacy — the distinction which must have been felt between men who had been lately serfs, and men who had been always free, might have been universally admitted as a sufficient

¹ Manso, lili. 2. p. 80. It is, it must be observed, in a passage where Xenophon is merely alluding to the events which had taken place in Laconia, and that for the purpose of eulogising the Phliisians, that he uses the expression ἀποστάντων πάντων τῶν Ἑλλήτων. In his own direct narrative of the same occurrences he had already informed us, that the helots were so far from having all revolted, that they were invited by the government to enrol themselves in the regular infantry, and accepted its offers with great willingness.

² Isocr. Archid.

³ vii. 10. Ὅσοις δημοκρατίας ἀπὸ τῶν Μισσηνίων, καὶ τῶν μὴ ἀξιολόγων ἀνδρῶν περιγαδιώμενοι, τῶν δὲ κατακλιθευχηκότων τὰς ταύτας οὐσίας ἰσικρατοῦσαν τῆς πολιτείας, δυσχερῶς ὑπέβηον ἐν τοῦτοις ἰσχυραῖσι οἱ μίσητας τῶν ἀρχαίων πολιτῶν.

ground of a political inequality between the two classes. The Messenian Gorgus, whom Polybius describes as distinguished among his fellow-citizens by his birth and his wealth, as well as by the prizes which he gained in the national games¹, reminds us by his name of the son of Aristomenes, who led the colony to Rhegium; and it may safely be presumed that families which traced their descent to the companions of that hero and of his sons, were viewed in a very different light from those which had submitted to the conqueror, and had been degraded by ages of servitude.²

If there was a privileged class of this kind, it probably enjoyed peculiar advantages in the distribution of the territory. But however this may have been, all the lands which had hitherto been in the hands of the Spartans, now undoubtedly became the property of their cultivators and the other new settlers. This portion probably included the most valuable part of the inland districts. Those which belonged to the subject-freemen, which lay chiefly near the coast, continued perhaps to be held on the same terms as under the preceding government. But the whole country was not immediately recovered from the dominion of Sparta. Some of the towns were guarded by Lacedæmonian garrisons. Such at least was the case with Asine; though Pausanias says that the Dryopes were permitted to retain it, because they had refused to aid the Spartans in the second Messenian war³; and therefore we cannot rely with perfect confidence on a statement — otherwise probable enough — of the same author: that the Nauplians, who prudently propitiated the new lords of the soil with presents and professions of loyalty, were left in possession of Methone.

When the fortifications of Messene had been carried so far, that the presence of the army was no longer

¹ Polyb. vii. 10. 2. Probably the son of Eucletus, whose statue at Olympia is mentioned by Pausanias, vi. 14. 11.

² Niebuhr however expressed we believe the common opinion when he observed of Messene: "Sparta had now a purely democratical people by her side."

³ iv. 27. 8. Compare iv. 15. 8.

needed, Epaminondas, leaving a garrison there, began his march homeward. The building of Messene is so coupled with that of Megalopolis in the accounts of Diodorus and Pausanias, that we may perhaps infer that he did not pass through Arcadia without contributing some important assistance to the latter work, which was still in progress. An enemy however still awaited him at the Isthmus. In their distress the Spartans had applied for succour to Athens: and their ambassadors were accompanied by envoys from the Peloponnesian states which still adhered to them, among whom those of Corinth and Phlius appear to have supported their request with the greatest earnestness. They appealed to the generosity, to the jealousy, to the fears, and the hopes of the Athenians. Some discussion arose in the assembly as to the right or obligation of interference. The conduct of the Mantineans in the civil war of Tegea was regarded in various lights: by some as an unjustifiable aggression, by others as a rightful defence of the aggrieved democratical party; and, according to these different views, the Spartan invasion of Mantinea, which had provoked the retaliation of the Arcadians, was either condemned as an encroachment on the rights of an independent state, or vindicated as an act permitted and even required by the principle laid down in the last congress, and which therefore entitled Sparta to the aid of the Athenians. The Corinthian envoy observed, that whatever difference of opinion there might be on this question, the Thebans had at least been guilty of an unprovoked aggression toward his own city, having in their passage through its territory committed various acts of wanton hostility. But there was already a general disposition among the people, if not in favour of Sparta, yet strongly adverse to Thebes. The assembly, after having heard the ambassadors, would not listen to any arguments on the other side, but decreed that the whole force of the commonwealth should march to the relief of Sparta, and appointed Iphicrates to the command. An army

was immediately raised; and the troops are described by Xenophon as so zealous in the cause, that they murmured because Iphicrates halted for a few days at Corinth. But when they resumed their march, expecting, the historian says, to be led to some glorious action, no such result ensued. It seems that Iphicrates had no wish to seek the enemy, and, perhaps having heard that Sparta was freed from immediate danger, he contented himself with attacking some places in Arcadia, either for the sake of plunder or in the hope that this diversion might hasten the enemy's retreat from Laconia. But it does not appear that his operations produced any effect on those of the Theban army.¹ When Epaminondas began to move toward the Isthmus, he posted himself there to guard the passes at the southern extremity: but through some oversight which Xenophon notices with evident surprise, as an extraordinary failure of his military skill, he left the most convenient of them — that on the side of Cenchræ — open; and the Thebans penetrated without any opposition to the Isthmus. A body of cavalry, which was sent to observe their movements, and which, Xenophon says, was larger than that purpose required, though insufficient for any other, approached so near as to be drawn into a skirmish, and lost some men in its retreat. With this little advantage over one of the greatest captains of the age, who commanded the forces of the only power which could now be considered as a rival to Thebes, Epaminondas concluded this memorable campaign.²

¹ Yet it is rather for want of better authority to confirm it, than on account of its intrinsic improbability, that we hesitate to admit the assertion of Nepos, Iphicr. ii. 5.: that the expedition of Iphicrates caused the Thebans to withdraw from before Sparta. Diodorus (xv. 65.) says that the Athenians were too late (*ὕστερον ἢ τὸν καιρὸν*): meaning apparently too late to save Laconia from devastation. Xenophon has left the movements of Iphicrates in great obscurity, through his desire to keep clear of all allusions to the foundation of Messene.

² Pausanias however adds (ix. 14. 7.), that he appeared before Athens, and that Iphicrates restrained the Athenians from marching out to give him battle. Possibly the only mistake in this statement is, that it represents the presence of Iphicrates, instead of his absence, as the cause which prevented the Athenians from fighting. According to Xenophon he must have been in the rear of Epaminondas.

The services which he had rendered to his country were in general duly appreciated by his fellow-citizens ; but they excited, and did not disarm, the envy of some inferior minds, and the expedition itself, successful as it had been, afforded them a pretext for assailing him. The yearly term for which he held his office of Bœotarch had expired, it seems, soon after he entered Peloponnesus, and he and his colleagues had retained their command, without any express sanction, three or four months longer. On this ground he and Pelopidas were separately charged with a capital offence. It was merely an experiment to try the strength of their popularity ; for their conduct, though perhaps it infringed the letter of the law, was manifestly in accordance with the will of the people. It is indeed somewhat surprising that their adversaries should have ventured on such an attempt, and still more that the issue, as we learn from Plutarch, was considered doubtful, because Pelopidas was first brought to trial. Epaminondas, it is said, declared himself willing to die, provided the names of Leuctra, Sparta, and Messene, and the deeds by which his own was connected with them, might be inscribed upon his tomb. Both, however, were acquitted in the most honourable manner¹ ; and Pelopidas, less magnanimous or more irritable than his philosophical friend, who would have forgiven the harmless display of malice, afterwards employed the forms of law to crush their principal accusers.²

¹ In the case of Epaminondas it is said (Paus. ix. 14. 7.) that the judges would not go through the form of voting before they dismissed the charge. Compare Plutarch, Reg. et Imp. Apoph. 23.

² Manso (Sparta iii. 2. p. 219.) objects to Dodwell's arrangement of the events following the battle of Leuctra down to the return of the Thebans from Peloponnesus, and assigns the spring of the archon Lysistratus (368) for the close of the campaign in which Messene was built. His chief argument seems to be, that otherwise there will be no events to fill the year between April 369, and April 368. He also lays some stress on the authority of Diodorus, who places the invasion of Laconia under Lysistratus. But he either rejects the testimony of Pausanias, who distinctly refers the founding of Megalopolis to the archonship of Phrasiclides, and that of Messene to the year of Dyscinetus, or attempts to explain it away in a manner which seems very unsatisfactory : intimating, if we understand him right, that Pausanias is in each case speaking not of the act, but of the design : for with regard to Messene at least nothing can be plainer than that, according to the belief of Pausanias, not a stone was laid before the

arrival of Epaminondas. It would have been better, if necessary, openly to discard the testimony of Pausanias altogether. But it is neither necessary for any purpose, nor convenient. If according to Dodwell's arrangement there is a scarcity of events in the year of Lysistratus, Manso seems not to have observed that according to his own the latter half of that year is much too crowded. For he supposes the second invasion of Peloponnesus to take place in the course of the same spring in which the first expedition ended.

CHAP. XL.

FROM THE FOUNDING OF MESSENE TO THE BATTLE OF
MANTINEA.

THE storm had passed over Sparta, and, chiefly perhaps through the prudence and energy displayed at this critical juncture by Agesilaus, had left her standing erect; but it had shaken her power to the centre, had stript her of the fairest half of her territories, and converted it into a strong-hold for a foe from whom she had to expect implacable and active hostility, and who possessed the means of offering her continual annoyance. The prospect of the internal disorders likely to be produced by the blow which deprived so many of her citizens of the whole or the greater part of their property, was sufficient to excite alarm for the safety of her institutions; and she still saw herself exposed to the recurrence of the same danger which had lately threatened her very existence. The whole line of her frontier was encompassed by enemies, who might again invite and support an invader; and within the peninsula her allies were few and feeble. Beyond the Isthmus there was no power to which she could look for efficacious assistance, but her ancient rival; and one of the first measures of the government, when Laconia was relieved from the enemy's presence, was to send an embassy to Athens, for the purpose of cementing the alliance between the two states, and of concerting plans for mutual defence. The Athenian council, in compliance with the views of the Peloponnesian ministers—for envoys came from Phlius and other allied states—proposed a decree to the assembly, by which it was to be declared, that the naval armaments of the confederacy were to be under the con-

trol of Athens, the land forces to be commanded by Sparta. This arrangement, which was warmly recommended by the Phliasian envoy, seemed at first to meet with general approbation. But Cephisodotus, an Athenian orator, appears to have thought the opportunity favourable for the display of superior sagacity, and, having pointed out to his fellow-citizens that they were placing themselves under a disadvantage—inasmuch as while they would have to serve under Spartan generals, none but helots or subjects of Sparta would man the Laconian contingents in the allied fleets,—he succeeded in rousing their jealousy. The proposed decree was amended, and the command by sea and land was assigned to each state alternately for five days. The Peloponnesian envoys, who came invested with full powers, and were conscious that they appeared in a character which was in fact that of suppliants, were forced to acquiesce in this absurd distribution of authority, which manifestly tended to defeat the purposes for which the alliance was formed.

In the spring of 368 Epaminondas again marched at the head of a Theban army to invade Peloponnesus. The forces of Athens under Chabrias had already joined those of Sparta and her other allies at the Isthmus, and according to Diodorus numbered 20,000 men, while the Thebans scarcely exceeded the third of that amount. Yet the allies thought it necessary to throw up an intrenchment across the Isthmus between Cenchreæ and Lechæum, and when the Thebans encamped in the plain remained on the defensive, and declined their offer of battle. Xenophon, who says nothing of the intrenchment, but only observes that the Lacedæmonians occupied the weakest position, on the western side, represents Epaminondas as first gaining a partial advantage over them by surprise, and then as having been permitted to descend unmolested on the plain of Sicyon, through the remissness of the Spartan commander, who might easily have defended the pass. Diodorus merely relates that he forced the enemy's lines. Having thus

effected a junction with his Peloponnesian allies; he first led them against Sicyon and Pellene, and, it appears, compelled both cities to renounce their alliance with Sparta¹, and then, to gratify Argos, proceeded to ravage the territory of Epidaurus. On his return to the Isthmus, he made an attempt upon Corinth, which was victoriously repulsed by Chabrias, and soon after a Syracusan squadron of twenty galleys sailed into Lechæum, with a body of barbarian mercenaries, Celts and Iberians, and a troop of about fifty horse, sent by Dionysius to the aid of his allies. This cavalry distinguished itself above that of Athens and Corinth in the skirmishes which took place while the enemy remained at the Isthmus; but in the course of a few days the Thebans returned home, and their allies disbanded their troops. Whether their departure was hastened by the arrival of the Syracusan reinforcement—which after having gained some trifling advantage over the Sicyonians, itself returned to Sicily in the autumn—does not appear. It may have been the effect of jealousy, which was beginning to arise between Thebes and the chief of her Peloponnesian confederates. For the Arcadians, since they had been united in one body, manifested a new spirit of national pride and independence, which was sedulously cherished by Lycomedes, who bade them consider that their support was no less necessary to Thebes than it had been to Sparta, and urged them no longer to content themselves with a subordinate station. They eagerly listened to his persuasions, and though no breach immediately ensued, it soon became evident that they no longer looked upon Thebes as their champion and guardian, but rather wished to show that they did not need her aid. They made a successful expedition to the relief of Argos against Chabrias and the Corinthians, and another for the purpose of reducing Asine in Messenia, which was still held by a Lacedæmonian garrison. They seem indeed here to have

¹ Xenophon (vii. 1. 18.) only speaks of an attack: *περιβαλον*. Diodorus (xv. 69.) says *κατακληθέντες προσεράγιστο*.

failed in their main object, but they ravaged the suburbs, gained a victory over the garrison, and slew the Spartan commander. They were still more fortunate in an irruption which they made into Laconia, where they stormed Pellana in the upper vale of the Eurotas, put the Lacedæmonian garrison, amounting to about 300, to the sword, and carried away the inhabitants into slavery. No hardships or difficulties could damp their ardour; and they were so elated with the consciousness of their strength, that they began to neglect not only the Thebans, but their other allies, and instead of restoring the Triphylian towns to Elis, claimed them as their own, on the ground that the Triphylians regarded themselves as Arcadians. Thus the same object of contention which had caused the quarrel between Elis and Sparta, now began to estrange Elis from her new allies.

Toward the end of the year an attempt was made to bring about a general pacification; but the proposal came not from any of the belligerents, but from a quarter where it might have been supposed that the discord of the Greeks would have been viewed with no feeling but pleasure. A Greek of Abydus, named Philiscus, was employed for this purpose by Ariobarzanes, the Persian satrap of the Hellespont, in the name it would seem of Artaxerxes, though without any commission from the court of Susa.¹ Ariobarzanes had his private motives for wishing to serve Sparta, and his agent came amply furnished with money, as well as clothed with the authority which the Persian king had of late years assumed in the affairs of Greece. He convened a congress at Delphi, which was attended by deputies from the states of both the confederacies. Whether Delphi was chosen for the place of meeting merely to give greater solemnity to the occasion, or in the hope that some use might be made of the oracle, is uncertain. But Xenophon observes in a tone of pious reprobation that, instead of referring the business for which they

¹ Xenophon (vii. 1. 27.) only names Ariobarzanes. Diodorus (xv. 70.) does not mention him, but says that Philiscus was sent by Artaxerxes.

were assembled to the decision of the god, they deliberated on it themselves. Their consultations proved fruitless ; and perhaps even the authority of the oracle, if it had been appealed to, would have been unable to compose the conflict of their adverse interests, and clashing pretensions. The Thebans either absolutely refused to renounce their claims of sovereignty over the Bœotian cities, or would only consent to do so on condition that Sparta should acknowledge the independence of Messenia. This demand the Spartans rejected ; and Philiscus, affecting to consider the Thebans as the enemies of peace, dropt the character of a mediator, and began to levy troops for the service of Sparta. The Athenians paid extraordinary court to Ariobarzanes. They conferred the honour of their franchise on him and on three of his sons as well as on Philiscus, who seems to have been a worthless military adventurer, who abused the satrap's favour to exercise a cruel and insolent tyranny over many of the Greek cities on the Asiatic side of the Hellespont, and was at length killed by two conspirators at Lampsacus.¹

Thebes had never been less inclined to make concessions degrading to her dignity ; for she had lately been extending her influence in a new quarter, to which it will now be proper to recall the reader's attention. After the battle of Leuctra a series of revolutions had taken place in Thessaly, which made an opening for Theban intervention, and gave it great weight, in the affairs of that country ; and the personal reputation of the great men who now presided over the Theban councils procured respect for the name of their city still farther to the north of Greece. Jason's career had been abruptly terminated in the year after the battle of Leuctra, at a time when, having firmly established his authority in Thessaly, he was beginning to unfold his ulterior designs. He had given a strong indication of them on his march homeward from Leuctra, when he rased the walls of the Trachinian Heraclea, that it

¹ Demosthenes, c. Aristocr. § 166. Bekk.

might not afford an enemy the means of blocking up the pass of Thermopylæ. In the following spring he made preparations for an expedition toward the south, which excited general attention by the novelty of its avowed object, and gave occasion to a variety of conjectures as to its real end. He called upon his subjects to furnish a sacrifice for the approaching Pythian festival; and it was computed that, although no district was heavily burdened, their contributions would amount to 1000 oxen, and 10,000 head of smaller victims. He at the same time ordered a levy of troops throughout Thessaly, and declared his intention of marching to Delphi, and presiding over the Pythian games. The Delphians were so much alarmed at this intimation, that they consulted the oracle as to the course which they should pursue, if Jason should meddle with the sacred treasures; and they were said to have received the same answer as had been given on several similar occasions: that the god would take care of his own. But when the time drew near, having one day reviewed his cavalry, and then taken his seat in public, to give audience to all who had business to transact with him, he was murdered by seven young mén, who pretended to appeal to him for the settlement of some private differences. Five of the conspirators made their escape on horses which were waiting for them; and the honours which they received in most of the Greek cities through which they passed, proved the alarm which had been excited by Jason's ambition.

His dynasty however survived him; and two of his brothers, Polydorus and Polyphron — one of whom was suspected of having had a hand in the murder — for a short time shared his authority between them. But on a journey which they took together to Larissa Polydorus died suddenly in the night, assassinated, as was believed, [by Polyphron, who remained sole tagus, and by his administration converted the office into a tyranny. He put to death the estimable Polydamas, and eight other principal citizens of Pharsalus,

and drove many into exile from Larissa. But, after a reign of a year, he was murdered in his turn by his nephew Alexander, who professing to revenge the death of Polydorus, succeeded to the government, but soon became infamous for his outrageous cruelty. He is described as a monster who delighted in torture and bloodshed, and who was restrained by no ties divine or human. Like the fabulous Cæneus, he paid divine honours to the spear with which he killed Polyphron. The towns of Melibœa and Scotussa had incurred his resentment, but deemed themselves secure under the faith of treaties and professions of amity. Alexander surrounded the popular assembly in each town at the same time with his troops, and massacred all the citizens who were present. Such atrocities inspired all classes of his subjects with terror, but more especially the ancient families which might be considered as objects of his jealousy. The Aleuadæ of Larissa, unable to resist him, began to look out for foreign protection; and their local position, as well as their political relations, inclined them first to seek it in Macedonia. We abstain for the present from entering into any account of the circumstances of that country, farther than is necessary for the understanding of this narrative. The order of events is not perfectly clear; but it seems that Alexander, who was now on the throne of Macedon, was invited by the Thessalians, and that he both complied with their request, and succeeded even beyond their wishes. For he not only relieved them for a time from their fears of the tyrant, who was ignominiously repulsed from Larissa, but took possession first of that town, then of the citadel, and afterwards of Crannon, which he occupied with his garrisons. But his power was not yet securely established at home, and the danger which threatened him there, seems to have compelled him to withdraw his troops from Thessaly, or at least to have prevented him from affording any further succour to his Thessalian friends. Finding themselves exposed to the vengeance

of the tyrant of Phæræ, they applied for aid to Thebes, and while Epaminondas was engaged in the expedition to Peloponnesus which was last related, Pelopidas was sent into Thessaly.

He was admitted into Larissa, and either the force or the reputation which he brought with him, so awed Alexander, that he sought a personal interview with him, and seemed at first willing to submit to his mediation. But the discoveries with regard to his character and conduct to which this meeting gave rise, appear to have exasperated Pelopidas, whose temper was warm, and induced him to vent his indignation in very severe language, which made the tyrant tremble for his safety. He broke off the negotiation by a clandestine retreat, leaving Pelopidas supreme arbiter of the affairs of Thessaly; which he settled on an apparently firm footing. This however was not the only honour he earned for himself and for his country in the course of this expedition. He was invited into Macedonia by the rivals who were there contending for the crown, and having restored tranquillity, took thirty noble Macedonian boys as hostages for its maintenance, and carried them away to Thebes. Among them, according to a statement of Diodorus and Plutarch, which we shall hereafter have occasion to examine, was a brother of the king's, who was destined some years later to mount the throne of Macedon, and to make a new epoch in the history of Greece.

But the order which he had left established in Thessaly was not of long duration. Soon after his return, fresh complaints reached Thebes of the conduct of Alexander, and in the course of the same summer Pelopidas again set out to take cognizance of them, accompanied by Ismenias, a friend of congenial character. They went in the quality of ambassadors, without any military preparations, relying on the influence which Pelopidas had already peacefully exerted, or on the forces which they might be able to raise in Thessaly. But having unexpectedly fallen in

with the tyrant, they imprudently put their persons in his power¹; and he did not scruple to throw them into prison. He was however well aware of the danger to which he exposed himself by this step from the resentment of Thebes, and to avert it sent an embassy, with proposals of alliance, to Athens. The detention of Pelopidas could not there be viewed otherwise than as a happy event; it was an important object of Athenian policy to obstruct the progress which Thebes had been making toward the dominion of Thessaly; Alexander might prove a useful ally, and he seems to have courted the favour of the people by liberal subsidies. Under these circumstances it is not surprising that his personal character should have been overlooked, his proposals accepted, and his munificence requited with a statue erected to his honour², as well as with a decree, which directed Autocles to sail with thirty galleys, and 1000 men, for his defence, when Thebes sent an army to avenge the insult she had received, and to recover her hero.³ The command of an expedition for such a purpose could have been entrusted to no one so fitly as to Epaminondas, but his conduct in his last campaign in Peloponnesus had given a handle for calumny. According to Diodorus⁴, his enemies spread an opinion that he might have pushed the advantage which he gained in the passage through the Isthmus, much farther, and excited a suspicion, that he had purposely spared the Spartans; though we have seen that, if we may believe Xenophon, his own situation might have become embarrassing, if the road had not been left open through the negligence of the Lacedæmonian com-

¹ The imprudence of Pelopidas is censured by Polybius, viii. 1. (iii. p. 2. Tauchn.) in a passage, which, though it applies simply to the consequences of this one act of indiscretion, has been perverted, by a writer whose bold strokes of this kind we have had frequent occasion to notice, into an observation: "that the mismanagement of Pelopidas in Thessaly produced serious ill consequences to Thebes, and especially great loss of reputation." The true reading is *αὐτῷ* — he injured his own reputation. But the "positive imprudence" to which Polybius imputes his misfortune, is precisely that which is described by Plutarch and Diodorus, namely, as Polybius goes on to say, *εἰπὴ καὶ ἀκρίτως πιστεύσας οἷς ἤμιστ' ἐχρήθη*.

² Plutarch, Pelop. 31.

³ Diodorus, xv. 71.

⁴ xv. 72.

mander. The people however were induced to remove him from the office of Bœotarch, and he accompanied the expedition for his friend's deliverance as a private soldier. Alexander seems to have made preparations for a vigorous resistance ; and his superiority in cavalry enabled him to reduce the enemy to such a scarcity of provisions, that the Theban generals found themselves compelled to retreat before they could strike a blow. But to retreat under such circumstances was an operation full of difficulty and danger. Alexander, reinforced by the Athenian troops, and by many Thessalians who went over to the prosperous side, hung upon their rear, obstructed their march, and made great slaughter among them with the missiles of his light troops. Their condition had become desperate, when Epaminondas was called upon by the soldiers to take the command. His tactics, aided by the charm and the terror of his name, saved the whole army from destruction.

On his return, Cleomenes and Hypatus, the generals to whose imprudence the danger was attributed, were punished with a fine, and Epaminondas was reinstated in his office, and in the esteem and confidence of his fellow-citizens. The enterprise was renewed under his command ; whether in the same year or early in 367, is not clear. The result places the ascendancy of his genius or of his reputation in a very strong light. The army with which he was sent into Thessaly was probably not more formidable than the last. Yet now, according to Plutarch, the tyrant offered no resistance ; and Epaminondas was only withheld from crushing him by fear that, if he should be driven to despair, he might take his revenge upon his Theban prisoners. They had been treated of late with greater rigour, probably after the attempt for their deliverance had been baffled, though it is difficult to believe that the citizens of Phœæ were at first permitted to visit Pelopidas, and to listen to his invectives against their tyrant. But it may not be too romantic an incident for this period of

ancient history, that Alexander's wife, Thebe, a daughter of Jason, obtained a secret interview with him, and was roused by his exhortations to fiercer resentment, and to purposes of vengeance against her brutal and profligate husband. It was therefore the object of Epaminondas to terrify the tyrant, but not so as to goad him to a desperate resolution; and Alexander was so much alarmed by his preliminary operations, that to conjure the impending storm he consented to release his prisoners, though in return he obtained nothing more than a thirty days suspension of hostilities.

It seems to have been while Epaminondas was absent on this expedition, that a measure which he had once successfully deprecated, was carried into effect by a party at home, which was either incapable of his enlarged views, and humane feelings, or recklessly lent itself to a popular prejudice. Already in the year after the battle of Leuctra, a proposal had been made in the Theban assembly to destroy Orchomenus, once the sovereign, long the rival of Thebes, and still an object of jealousy both on account of its rank among the Bœotian towns, and as the chief seat of aristocratical influence in Bœotia. But the people had been shamed out of this barbarous design by the remonstrances of Epaminondas; who endeavoured to animate them with sentiments more worthy of the high station to which their recent victory entitled them to aspire.¹ The project however was not abandoned by its authors, as the passions which suggested it could only be laid in a brief calm by the voice of reason and humanity. But now either an accidental combination of circumstances favoured its execution, or an atrocious plan was concerted to ensure its success, and to take advantage of the absence of the man who alone perhaps would have been able to frustrate it. A plot was disclosed to the Theban government, which had been formed it was said by a party of Theban exiles, to overturn the democratical constitution, and in which the nobles, or members of the equestrian order, of

¹ Diodorus, xv. 57.

Orchomenus were to be the principal agents. The conspirators intended to take the opportunity of a review which was to be held at Thebes, and was to be attended by 300 of the Orchomenian cavalry, to effect an aristocratical revolution. It is possible that the whole story may have been a fiction, and it seems at least to have been greedily received by the magistrates and the people. The Orchomenians were arrested, and brought before the assembly, which seems to have sat in judgement on the charge, and probably without very mature deliberation decided against the accused. They were all condemned to death, and the whole city was involved in their doom. A Theban army was immediately sent against it, which rased it to the ground, put the men to the sword, and carried the women and children away into slavery.¹ Epaminondas on his return did not suppress his grief at the event, and is said to have declared that, if he had been present, he would have prevented it.² The precipitation with which the people indulged their evil passions in his absence, may be considered as the most honourable homage ever paid by a Greek state to the virtue of a citizen.

In the spring of 367 another body of auxiliaries arrived from Syracuse in the Corinthian gulf, and a question arose as to the manner in which they should be employed. The Athenians proposed that they should be sent into Thessaly, where Alexander was perhaps at this time threatened by the Theban arms. But Sparta had need of them for a purpose much more urgent; and a majority among the deputies of the allied states decided in favour of her claim. They were accordingly ordered to sail round to the coast of Laconia, and to join an army which was placed under the command of Archidamus. His first object was the reduction of Caryæ, which seems to have held out, perhaps under the protection of a foreign garrison, ever since the invasion. It was now stormed, and every man taken in it put to the sword. He then crossed the border, and

¹ Diodorus, xv. 79.

² Pausanias, ix. 15. 3.

proceeded to ravage the territory of Megalopolis, but on the approach of an Argive-Arcadian army retreated westward, and encamped near the Arcadian town of Midea. Here Cissidas, the commander of the Syracusan auxiliaries, informed him that the time to which Dionysius had limited his stay — probably according to his contract with the barbarian mercenaries — had expired, and immediately set out to return to Sparta. But he found the pass through which his road lay occupied by a body of Messenians, and was obliged to send for aid to Archidamus. Having reunited their forces, they marched in another direction on the Laconian frontier, but were again intercepted by the Argive-Arcadian army. A battle became inevitable; and Archidamus, having drawn up his troops on a small plain, which lay between him and the enemy, exhorted his countrymen to vindicate the ancient honour of Sparta, and to exert themselves that day, so as to be able once more to meet the gaze of their women and children and old men, and that of foreigners, which had once been turned toward them in admiration, without a blush. The effect of this address was heightened by some favourable omens, and the spirit which it breathed animated his hearers with an impetuous courage, which in better times would not have been deemed sober enough for Spartan warriors. The enemy scarcely waited to receive their furious onset; and the cavalry and Celtic mercenaries made great havock among the fugitives. Of the Lacedæmonians, according to the report which Archidamus sent home, not a man was killed. This may have been a piece of exaggeration, such as was common enough in Spartan despatches: but we could more easily believe the fact, than that Archidamus meant only that no Spartan life was lost.¹ The loss on the other side appears to have been great, though it can scarcely have amounted, as Diodorus relates, to 10,000 men. The news of the victory, which would once have made but little impression at Sparta, drew tears of joy from

¹ Manso's conjecture, Sparta, lii. l. p. 179.

Agasilaus, the senators, and the ephors. But the disaster of the Arcadians caused scarcely less pleasure at Thebes and Elis, where the spirit which they had lately shown was treated as arrogance, and their success was viewed with jealousy.

The obstacles it opposed to the supremacy which Thebes aimed at establishing in Peloponnesus, but still more perhaps the proceedings of Philiscus, had led the Theban government to look to another quarter for more effectual means of securing its preponderance; and intelligence of a negotiation which Sparta was carrying on at the Persian court, seemed to require that some steps should be taken to counteract it. There could be no doubt as to the person who was best qualified for such a mission; and Pelopidas was no sooner restored to liberty, than he set out on a journey to Susa, accompanied by Ismenias. The fame of the battle of Leuctra and of the invasion of Laconia had preceded them, and their progress through the Persian provinces was a kind of triumph. At Susa the courtiers gazed with admiration on the representatives of a state, which had humbled the haughty mistress of Greece, whose victorious arms not many years before made their monarch tremble for his throne. Envoys from Sparta and Athens, from Arcadia, Elis, and Argos, met them at the king's gate; but Artaxerxes distinguished the Thebans with peculiar honours. He had previously shown by his treatment of Antalcidas, that his favours were dispensed to foreigners in proportion to the political influence of the states to which they belonged. Antalcidas, whom on his first embassy he had flattered with marks of most signal condescension, when he appeared at the Persian court after the battle of Leuctra, met with such a supercilious reception, that he is said on his return to Sparta to have been driven to suicide by the taunts of his enemies.¹

¹ Plut. Artax. 22. But this part of the story is very doubtful. Antalcidas appears from the anecdote in Plut. Ages. 32, to have been one of the ephors at the time of the invasion in 369, and we have no hint of any Spartan embassy to Susa between this year and 367, when Euthycles was the chief envoy. Antalcidas however appears to have been ambassador at the Persian court in the year before the battle of Leuctra (Xen. H. vi. 3.

Euthycles, who now filled his place, was indeed able to claim a little more respect on the ground of the recent victory of Archidamus ; but even this served to raise the credit of Thebes ; for it had been gained over the Arcadians, and Argives, and seemed to prove that they could not conquer without her help. They could therefore procure very little attention, and Timagoras, one of the Athenian envoys, appears to have discovered that the surest way to conciliate the king's good graces was to side with the Thebans. The royal bounty was largely showered upon him, and the example of former ambassadors perhaps encouraged him to hope that he might enjoy it with impunity. But the people, exasperated by the failure of his mission, which he probably could not have brought to a more advantageous issue, wreaked their disappointment on him, and put him to death, on the impeachment of his colleague Leon, for an offence which they might otherwise have been easily induced to overlook. Pelopidas obtained everything that he asked. One of his objects was to procure the king's sanction for the independence of Messenia ; another to disarm the naval power of Athens ; and this seems to have been part of a plan which was earnestly entertained by Epaminondas, of transferring to Thebes the maritime dominion which Athens had begun to recover. An article was inserted in the royal rescript, by which the Athenians were enjoined to lay up their fleet ; and when Leon protested against this partiality, all the satisfaction he received was the addition of a clause by which they were permitted to appeal to the king, if they thought themselves aggrieved by the injunction. It may probably be attributed to the address of Pelopidas, that the Arcadians, whose political importance, if it had been rightly estimated, would have entitled them to more respectful consideration, were

12.) ; and though he was then expected soon to return, his stay in Persia may have been prolonged until the news of the battle arrived there, and he may then have experienced the change of treatment described by Plutarch, who however (Art. 32.) distinctly asserts what is equally probable, that he was sent to apply for Persian succours immediately after the battle.

treated as of inferior moment to the Eleans; a slight, which so deeply offended their envoy Antiochus, that he refused to accept the king's presents, and on his return to Greece exposed the pompous weakness of the Persian court to the derision of his countrymen. Pelopidas likewise declined all the magnificent presents offered to him by Artaxerxes, retaining only some simple tokens of regard; but in addition to the more solid advantages conveyed by the rescript, the Thebans were honoured with the title of the king's ancient allies.

It was not however in Persia, but in Greece, that the real success of the embassy was to be proved; and the result disappointed the expectations which were raised by its reception at the court of Susa. Thebes hoped to have placed herself in the station which Sparta had occupied by means of the peace of Antalcidas; but she found the Greeks no longer willing to submit to Persian dictation. The reports brought back by the envoys of the state of the empire, had perhaps divulged the secret, that the threats of the great king were little more than an empty sound. A congress was held at Thebes, in which a Persian commissioner, having with the usual solemnity produced the royal seal, read the document to which it was affixed; and the Theban government then called upon the deputies of the other states, as they valued the king's favour, to bind themselves by an oath to comply with its contents. All however rejected this demand, and observed that they were sent not to swear, but to listen to the king's message. Lycomedes, who was one of the Arcadian deputies, took a higher tone, and denied the right of Thebes to summon the congress, which he contended ought to have been held in that part of Greece which was the theatre of war. This objection provoked an angry reply, which induced Lycomedes and his colleagues to withdraw abruptly from the congress. The Thebans then sent ambassadors to each state separately with the same demand, hoping that as none could be sure of support from the

rest, none would venture to incur their enmity as well as that of Persia, by the refusal. But Corinth, to which the first application was made, having rejected the oath, emboldened the other states to follow her example, and the whole project, concocted with such elaborate preparations, fell at once to the ground.

The disposition manifested by the Arcadians rendered it important for Thebes to strengthen her footing in Achaia; and in the spring of 366 Epaminondas undertook a third expedition into Peloponnesus for that purpose. The Isthmus was still guarded by Lacedæmonian and Athenian troops; but at his request Pisias, the Argive general, by a night march made himself master of the pass near Cenchreæ, and thus enabled the Theban army to enter Achaia. Oligarchy had gained the ascendancy in the Achæan cities under Spartan patronage, and had not been disturbed by the last Theban invasion, but they remained for the most part neutral in the contest between Thebes and Sparta. The leading men now threw themselves on the forbearance of Epaminondas, and by assurances of fidelity to Thebes induced him to exert his influence in their behalf to prevent a revolution which would have driven them into exile. Having taken security for their obedience, and finding, it seems, no other occasion that required his presence in the peninsula, he marched home. But the democratical Achæans, and the Aroadians, complained that he had left Achaia in the state most favourable to the renewal of Lacedæmonian ascendancy; and the Thebans, copying the example of Sparta, sent harmosts to the Achæan cities, who instigated the commonalty to expel the oligarchs, and established democratical institutions. This change however was soon followed by a counter-revolution. For the exiles, having collected their forces, found themselves strong enough to recover possession of their cities, and now openly renewed their alliance with Sparta, and gave great annoyance to their Arcadian neighbours.

At Sicyon affairs took a different turn. There Eu-

phron, an able and enterprising man, had enjoyed the confidence of the Spartan government, as the leader of the oligarchical party, while the city adhered to Sparta. We do not know what part he took in the change of policy by which in 368 Sicyon went over to the Theban alliance. Its constitution seems not to have undergone any formal alteration in consequence of that event; but it may have somewhat affected Euphron's influence, and he may thus have been led to desire a revolution which would place him again, though in a different attitude, at the head of the state. When Epaminondas withdrew from Achaia, as we have just seen, leaving the oligarchical governments standing, the dissatisfaction expressed by the Arcadians and Argives at this toleration, appears to have suggested to him the means of gratifying his ambition. He proposed to renounce his connection with his old friends, and himself to introduce democracy at Sicyon: the only effectual security, as he pretended, against the restoration of the Spartan dominion, which he had long endured with impatience, and would fain avert by any sacrifice. The Arcadians and Argives gladly lent their aid; and the revolution was quietly and easily effected. Euphron assembled the people, invited them to the enjoyment of liberty and equality, and bade them begin the exercise of their rights with the election of a college of generals. Five were chosen, and he was one of the number. The first advantage which he took of his office was to appoint his own son to the command of the foreign mercenaries employed by the state, and to gain as many of them as he could to his interest by a lavish expenditure of the public money. The confidence of the people which he enjoyed as the restorer of freedom, enabled him to resort even to the treasure of the temples for that purpose; and the charge of *Laconism*, which was brought against many of the wealthy citizens, yielded an ample supply of confiscations. It only remained for him to get rid of his colleagues, and when some of them had been removed by the dagger, and the rest driven into

exile, Euphron, being left sole general, became in name as well as in deed tyrant of Sicyon.

His government appears to have been mild and popular, though the want of money urged him to persecute the rich. But though he had strengthened the democracy by the admission of many new citizens, among whom were several emancipated slaves, he felt that his power rested on the support of his allies, who had helped him to lay its foundation, and he endeavoured to propitiate their favour by the readiness with which he joined their expeditions, and by presents distributed among their leading men. So perhaps he conciliated the Theban harmost whom he was obliged to receive into the citadel. But his position amidst so many conflicting interests was too difficult to be long maintained. We are unable, from the string of obscure allusions which Xenophon has here substituted for a narrative, to gather the motives which induced Æneas, the general of the Arcadians, to overthrow his authority, and to restore oligarchy at Sicyon. But the Theban harmost seems to have concurred in this measure, since he continued to hold the citadel, after the Arcadians had retired. Euphron made his escape to the port, and sending for Pasimelus the Spartan officer who was commanding at Corinth, delivered it up to him, and renewed his connection with Sparta, not without attempting to vindicate his past conduct by pretences which did not deceive those who listened to them. This however was not his last political apostasy. The discord which continued to prevail in Sicyon between his partisans and the party which Æneas had restored, enabled him, with the aid of a body of Athenian auxiliaries, to regain possession of the town. But as the citadel was still occupied by a Theban garrison, he ventured on the bold step of going in person to Thebes with all the money he could collect, in the hope, by his gold and intrigues, to procure a decree for expelling his adversaries, and re-establishing his authority. His proceedings however were watched by his enemies, some of whom followed him to Thebes; and

when they perceived that he had so far ingratiated himself with the leading men as to have a fair prospect of success, they relieved themselves from their fears by despatching him openly in the Cadmea, not far from the place where the council was assembled. The perpetrators of this outrage were arrested, and were brought before the council for punishment by the magistrates, who perhaps sincerely regretted his death. But one of the culprits having avowed his share in the deed, so forcibly exposed the character and conduct of Euphron — an outlawed tyrant and traitor, who had aggravated his guilt by the arts of corruption with which he endeavoured to screen it from vengeance — that his judges pronounced the murder a legitimate act. The majority of Euphron's fellow-citizens viewed it in a different light: they still revered him as their benefactor, and having transported his body to Sicyon, interred it with the honours due to a heroic Founder, in the market-place.¹

While Sicyon and Pellene were compelled by terror of the Theban arms to forsake their old ally, Phlius, where the dominant party had more reason to dread a revolution, remained firmly attached to Sparta. It was on this account exposed to the unremitting hostility of its more powerful neighbours, suffered great hardships,

¹ There is some obscurity about the chronology of Euphron's reign; but on the whole it seems safer to adopt Xenophon's statements, than to suppose with Dodwell that he was grossly mistaken in his account of a person who evidently attracted no small share of his attention. If Euphron's tyranny began immediately after the second Theban invasion of Peloponnesus (368), Xenophon, who distinctly places its beginning after the third invasion (366), must have fallen into an error very unusual with him, not only as to the date but as to the facts. The authority of Diodorus (xv. 70.) as to the beginning of Euphron's tyranny, can have no weight in itself when opposed to Xenophon's. Manso (iii. 2. p. 241.) following Dodwell, supposes that the campaign against Phlius, described by Xenophon (vii. 2. 11.), in which Euphron accompanied the Theban commander of Sicyon, took place in the year preceding the third expedition of Epaminondas into Peloponnesus, and hence infers that the Thebans had left a garrison in Sicyon in 368. But the *ἀρχὴ αὐτοῦ* in this section may be equivalent to *τὸ ἀρχαῖον ἔτος*; and Xenophon's account of the manner in which Euphron acquired the tyranny is utterly inconsistent with the supposition, that there was at that time a Theban garrison in Sicyon. Nor is it easy to believe that he would have related the interference of Æneas at vii. 3. 1. if it occurred in the year before the third Theban invasion. Dodwell indeed asserts: Imo ejectos optinates Euphronis quidem consilio, opera tamen Thebanorum, postquam Bœotarchiâ exutus esset Epaminondas, agnoscit ipse Xenophon. But I am unable to discover in Xenophon anything to that effect.

and was often placed in extreme peril. Xenophon — who extols not only the courage, but the constancy of the Phliasiens, in which we see little beyond the instinct of self-preservation — dwells, at greater length than we can spare for such a subject, on the adventures in which, either alone, or with the aid of a small body of Athenian troops, they repulsed the attacks of their enemies, who were instigated and seconded by their exiled fellow-citizens. After several attempts on the town and the territory had been baffled, they were threatened with still greater and more frequent annoyance by the erection of two fortresses on their frontier, one called Tricaranum, which was built by the Argives, the other called Thyamia, which was begun by the Sicyonians, but had not been finished in the year 366, when the Phliasiens, supported by the Athenian general Chares, who had been sent to the relief of Phlius, wrested it from them, and then carried on the fortifications as a bulwark for themselves against Sicyon. While Chares was lending his aid to this work, he was suddenly called away to the defence of Attica itself. The frontier town of Oropus, which on account of its position with regard to Eubœa was of great importance to the Athenians, had some years before been restored to them, through a domestic revolution which drove a number of its citizens into exile. The refugees found shelter at Eretria, which was at this time under the rule of Themison; and with his help they crossed the channel, and recovered possession of their city.¹ The whole disposable force of Athens immediately marched against them; Chares was hastily recalled; and it is probable that the Spartan officer who commanded at Corinth, was requested to cooperate with him. But it happened that

¹ In the account here given of these transactions we have adopted the view taken by Winiewski, *Comment. in Dem. De Cor.* p. 23. Its accuracy depends on the interpretation of Xenophon's words, vii. 4. 1. Ἦρωτες ὑπὲρ τῶν φιλωμένων κατελήθη. But it seems impossible to suppose that Xenophon can have meant any other exiles than a party in Oropus itself. Yet even Schlosser has assumed that they were Athenians (l. 3. p. 52.). Can he have been misled by a writer, who had seized this fictitious handle for a fresh declamation on the *tyranny of the Athenian democracy* which had driven these *unfortunate men* into exile?

just at this juncture the Lacedæmonian garrison was dislodged from the port of Sicyon by the Sicyonians and Arcadians; and perhaps this occurrence prevented him from marching, or sending a reinforcement to assist in the reduction of Oropus. The immediate result of the Athenian expedition seems strange, and it is not clearly explained by any of the ancient writers who mention or allude to it. The Oropians, alarmed at the enemy's strength, and perhaps not prepared for a siege, appear to have proposed to commit their town to the keeping of the Thebans, as neutrals in this quarrel, until their claims should have been peacefully adjusted. The Athenians were induced, chiefly it seems by the advice of Chabrias and Callistratus, to consent to this compromise, which, as the Thebans afterwards refused to give up the place, contributed to widen the breach between the two states, and proved fatal to one of its authors. But at the time the displeasure of the Athenians vented itself in reproaches upon their allies who had failed them in their hour of need. This state of their feelings soon became known in Arcadia, and encouraged Lycomedes, who viewed Athens rather as the enemy of Thebes than as the ally of Sparta, to hope that she might be gained over to the Arcadian interest. He himself undertook the negotiation, and concluded a separate alliance, which the Athenian assembly, notwithstanding some scruples which made it hesitate for a while, at last decided was no breach of its engagements with Sparta: she, it was argued, must be concerned no less than Athens, to keep Arcadia independent of Thebes. This was the last service which Lycomedes rendered to Arcadia. Almost every Greek who took an active part in public affairs might in any part of Greece fall in with some deadly enemies. Lycomedes returning from Athens by sea, was landed at his own desire on a point of the Peloponnesian coast, where a party of Arcadian exiles happened to be collected, and fell beneath their daggers.

Though Athens professed to have taken this step

without any views hostile to her former allies, but rather to promote one of the objects of their alliance, it was manifest that it could not but change her relations toward those among them in whom the fear of Thebes was not so strong as their enmity to the Arcadians. Such it seems was known to be the case with Corinth; and hence a motion was soon after made in the Athenian assembly by one Demotion, that the generals be directed to take care that Corinth was not lost to the people of Athens. This proposition, which under any other government would have been kept strictly secret, created an alarm which rendered it abortive. The Corinthians no sooner heard of it, than they dismissed all the Athenian troops who were stationed in various posts within their territory, after having paid all arrears due to them; and when Chares soon after appeared before Cenchreæ with a squadron, and offered his services to protect the city from some attack with which he pretended to have heard it was threatened, he was courteously thanked, but was not permitted to enter the harbour.

To supply the place of the Athenians, and to guard against the effects of their resentment, the Corinthians collected a body of mercenaries; but as this was a burden which they could not long endure, they at the same time began to turn their thoughts toward peace, and having ascertained that the Theban government was not averse to it, they requested that as many of their present allies as might be willing to concur with them might be admitted to a share in the treaty. Having obtained leave to sound their allies, they first applied to Sparta. The language of their envoys, as its substance is reported by Xenophon, breathes a feeling of tenderness for the pride and the misfortunes of their ancient ally, which reminds us of the friendships of the heroic age. The Spartans themselves are called upon to say, whether they see any prospect of safety for Corinth, if the war should be much longer protracted. The Corinthians would most gladly see Sparta sharing

the blessings of peace with them ; but if this may not be, then they beg leave to save themselves from ruin, that at some future time they may again be able to serve her. The Spartans responded to this delicate loyalty with a generous frankness. They admitted the urgency of the case, advised the Corinthians to make peace, and permitted their other allies who were weary of the war to join them. But for themselves they declared that, whatever might befall them, they would never resign their claim to Messenia, and, so long as this was made the condition of peace, would continue the war as they could.

An oration is preserved among the works of Isocrates, which appears to have been written for this occasion, either to be delivered by the prince Archidamus, who is the supposed speaker, or as a manifesto to vindicate the tenacity with which Sparta clung to her alledged right, now apparently the only obstacle to a general peace.¹ In this work her title to Messenia is grounded not merely on length of possession, but on a donation, by which the sons of Cresphontes, after the murder of their father, are said to have transferred their rights to the Spartan Heracleids, and which was confirmed by the Delphic oracle. The new Messenians are represented as a mere herd of revolted slaves. The oration, as appears from these arguments, was designed chiefly for Spartan hearers or readers : and a great part of it is occupied with motives for a persevering resistance to the demands of their enemies, drawn as well from the justice of their cause, as from the examples furnished by the history of their own times, of signal reverses, and unexpected deliverances. But a project which follows, and is pro-

¹ Niebuhr refers the oration to a later date — after the battle of Mantinea — and observes of it : " It is a specimen of the folly which looks upon an obstinate refusal to acknowledge existing circumstances as something magnanimous (der Verkehrtheit, die ein starsinniges Verläugnen der Wirklichkeit als etwas Grosses ansieht). It is a silly notion that Isocrates wrote this speech for Archidamus, to convince the Spartans in the *ἡγεμονία*. It is a mere declamation." — We must however remember the speech which Cleon made for Lysander, and that Xenophon (H. vii. 4. 9.) gives us reason to believe that the spirit prevailing at Sparta was just that which breathes through the Archidamus

posed in a tone of earnestness as deep as Isocrates was ever able to convey by the silver chime of his melodious eloquence, seems rather to have been calculated for other ears. It sounds like an indirect threat, to warn their enemies not to drive them to despair. Sooner than submit to the dismemberment of their territory, Archidamus would persuade his countrymen to remove their wives, and children, and aged parents, to some place of shelter, which they might easily find in the Dorian colonies, and then to abandon Sparta, where they had always lived as in a camp, and return to the life which their forefathers led when they issued from Doris to invade Peloponnesus. As an invading army without a home, fortifying themselves in an enemy's territory, and spreading devastation around them, they would, wherever they appeared, be irresistible and intolerable: and those who now dictated such insulting terms would be glad to restore Messenia as the price of peace. — It is singular enough that, at the end of so many centuries, Sparta should again be found borrowing the voice of an Attic schoolmaster, to rouse the courage of her sons in a new Messenian war; and the change which she had undergone in the interval may perhaps be not improperly measured by the distance between the poetry of Tyrtaeus and the rhetoric of Isocrates. It would seem indeed that even since the beginning of the Peloponnesian war the taste of the Spartan assembly had been brought much nearer to that of the other Greeks, and that the homely brevity of the ephor Sthenelaidas would no longer have produced a like effect.¹

The permission granted by Sparta was accepted by Phlius, and some of her other allies, who sent envoys along with those of Corinth to Thebes. The Theban government at first required that they should join its confederacy; but they remonstrated against this condition, which instead of relieving them from the cala-

¹ Among the apophthegms of Epaminondas in Plutarch's collection, one (16.) is in answer to a long invective in which a Spartan had indulged against the Thebans: At least they have taught you Spartans to make longer speeches.

mities of war, would only have turned their arms in a new direction, and against their old ally. The Theban councils were swayed by men generous enough to respect and to spare these feelings; and peace was granted on the simple basis of mutual restitution. The treaty however was not in all points faithfully observed by the stronger side. The Phliasians restored Thyamia to Sicyon; but Tricaranum, which belonged to them, was retained, first by their refugees, and then by the Argives, under some barefaced pretence, which, though frequently summoned, they would not submit to an impartial decision. Still the practical operation of the treaty was nearly equivalent to a general peace, since Sparta remained on the defensive, and the jealousy which prevailed between Thebes and Arcadia secured her from danger of immediate attack. Yet — notwithstanding the language put into the mouth of Archidamus by the Attic rhetorician — we find a fact recorded by Xenophon, which seems to indicate a degree of weakness, which, it might have been supposed, must have rendered her an easy prey to her least powerful neighbours. Though Caryæ had been taken, Sellasia, near as it lay to the capital, was, it seems, still in a state of open revolt; and it sounds still more strangely that it was finally reduced, soon after the treaty was concluded at Thebes, not by the single force of Sparta, but with the co-operation of a fresh body of Syracusan auxiliaries sent by the younger Dionysius, who had succeeded his father, and still maintained his policy toward Sparta. But even after the recovery of Sellasia the district of Sciritis, which had formerly contributed a very useful body of troops to the Spartan armies, remained at least in great part hostile.

The safety of Sparta depended less on the strength of her allies — for she now stood almost alone — than on the disunion of her enemies. But the conflicting interests of the different states, and of the opposite parties in each, afforded her a fair prospect of some favourable change; and in the oration which has just been men-

tioned the discord and confusion that prevailed in those parts of Peloponnesus which had renounced their alliance with Sparta, are among the grounds of hope on which Archidamus or Isocrates insists. This hope was in some degree fulfilled in the year after the treaty of Thebes (365), when the jealousy which had been long smouldering between Elis and Arcadia, burst out into open war. It sprung as we have seen out of their rival pretensions to the Triphylian towns, but it was fostered by their political variance; for in Elis the oligarchical party was now predominant, while in Arcadia the maxims of the government, if not the principles of the constitution, were strongly democratical. The first act of overt hostility proceeded from Elis; and it was connected with both these causes of mutual animosity. A party of Arcadian exiles which had taken refuge in Elis, with the connivance, and perhaps at the suggestion of the government, surprised Lasion, one of the Triphylian towns, and a place of great strength. The Arcadian government, having in vain applied to that of Elis for restitution, sent an army to reduce it. The Eleans marched to its relief, but with a very small force, consisting chiefly of two bands, described by Xenophon as the Four Hundred and the Three Hundred, which seem to have been formed by the oligarchs out of their own class, as a standing guard, perhaps in imitation of the Sacred Band of Thebes. They were soon put to flight, with a loss of more than 200 men, by the Arcadians, who then pursued their march, making themselves masters of several places subject to Elis in their way, to Olympia, where they threw up an intrenchment on mount Cronium, and having left a garrison there, proceeded toward Elis. They met with no opposition until they reached the market-place. From it they were dislodged by the oligarchical troops, who earned the honours of a trophy. But their presence encouraged the democratical leaders, on a secret understanding with them, to seize the citadel. This attempt however was likewise baffled by the alertness of their adversaries,

and they were forced to quit the city with about 400 of their adherents. This party soon afterward took possession of the Elean Pylus, and was there joined by great numbers who flocked in to them from the capital. By their persuasions the Arcadians were induced to make another inroad into the Elean territory in the course of the same year. But Pellene, which had now again allied itself to Sparta, sent a body of troops to guard the city, and the invaders contented themselves with ravaging the plain. When they withdrew, they made a forced march into Achaia, and took Olurus, a place belonging to Pellene, where they collected the whole democratical party of the state, and for some time harassed the city; but the oligarchs, notwithstanding the scantiness of their numbers, at length forced them to surrender the fortress.

In the following spring (364) the Arcadians again invaded Elis. The Eleans in the mean while had renewed their alliance with Sparta, and a Spartan named Soclidas, had been sent to direct their military operations. It was perhaps against his advice that the Elean general Andromachus¹ ventured on an engagement with the Arcadians, in which he was defeated, and Soclidas was slain. The Eleans, now reduced to great distress, begged Sparta to make a diversion in their favour, and Archidamus was accordingly sent into Arcadia, where he took the little town of Cromnus, in the neighbourhood of Megalopolis, and having left a garrison there, returned home. The Arcadian army, after it had ravaged Elis, marched against Cromnus, and laid siege to it. Archidamus was sent to its relief, and having attempted without effect to draw off the besieging army by the ravages which he inflicted on other parts of Arcadia, he advanced upon the town with the view of dislodging the enemy from an eminence over which the line of circumvallation was carried. But having

¹ He is described, according to the present text of the Hellenics (vii. 4. 19.), as ὁ Ἑλίας Ἰσπάρχος — a singular title for a Greek magistrate. In Diodorus (xv. 85.) we find mention of ὁ τῶν Ἑλλήων Ἰσπάρχος, and this is probably the true reading in Xenophon.

entangled himself in a disadvantageous position, he was repulsed, was himself wounded, and lost some of his principal officers. In the mean while the Eleans took advantage of the retreat of the Arcadians to recover Pylus and another of their conquered towns. The garrison of Cromnus, where no provision had been made for a long siege, found means of making known to the government at home, that they could not hold out above ten days more.¹ A small body of troops was sent for their deliverance, which forced its way by night through the intrenchments, and rescued all but about 100, whose flight was arrested by the besiegers, and who fell into their hands. It appears from the equal distribution of these prisoners among the captors — which, as several of them were Spartans, Xenophon thinks worth notice — that Thebes, Argos, and Messene, had contributed their contingents to the Arcadian army.

The Arcadians, so soon as they had recaptured Cromnus, again directed their whole force against Elis, and marching to Olympia occupied the sacred ground. An Olympic festival was approaching, and they resolved to display their strength, and to mortify their enemy in the most sensible manner, by celebrating it under the presidency of Pisa, which had not forgotten its ancient title to this honour. Its claim had, as we have seen, been recognised on a former occasion by Sparta; but though she was then very desirous of humbling Elis, she did not think it expedient to commit so important a trust as the care of the national sanctuary, with all the treasures which had been deposited there by the piety of so many generations, to the rustic inhabitants of a small canton. But the men who were now at the head of affairs in Arcadia, were so far from being restrained by the same scruple, that the insignificance of Pisa, as it ensured her subservience to their views, was probably with them an

¹ According to a fragment of Callisthenes in Athenæus x. p. 542. the besieged conveyed the intelligence of their condition through a herald — who it must be supposed received his message in the enemy's hearing — by means of an allusion to an allegorical figure of Famine, which was painted in the temple of Apollo at Amyclæ as a female in chains.

additional motive for setting up her antiquated pretensions. The shadow of her name was a convenient cover for the design which they seem already to have formed, of making use of the sacred treasure. The Eleans however did not tamely submit to the exclusion; but having summoned their Achæan allies to their aid, appeared, in the midst of the games, in battle array on the banks of the Cladaus, the western boundary of the Altis. The Arcadians, who had been reinforced by 2000 Argives and 400 Athenian cavalry, drew up their troops within the sacred precincts; and an engagement ensued, in which the Eleans routed their enemies, and pursued them until they were themselves compelled to retreat by the missiles discharged at them from the sacred buildings. During the following night the Arcadians were busily employed in throwing up an intrenchment to secure themselves from a fresh attack; and the next morning the Eleans, not deeming themselves strong enough to contend against the advantages which the enemy possessed in the ground and the buildings, returned to the city. They had hitherto passed for the worst soldiers in Greece: but on this occasion they fought with a spirit which Xenophon seems to think the favour of the gods alone could have infused into them. Something may indeed have been due to the inspiration of the place, where they looked upon their enemies as sacrilegious intruders; but we have already noticed another cause, which may have exerted as favourable an influence on their military character, as the Sacred Band on that of the Thebans.

It was the want of money to maintain their standing army that induced the heads of the Arcadian government to have recourse to the treasures of the Olympian temple: for Xenophon, who had no bias in their favour, does not intimate that they applied any part to their private use: and we may therefore neglect the charge brought against them by Diodorus.¹ But it seems that

¹ xv. 82. Otherwise it might not be entitled to the less attention, because, with his usual infelicity, he has fixed upon the Mantineans as the delinquents. Τῶν Μαντινίων ἀναλαβόντων εἰς τοὺς θεῖους βίους οὐκ ὀλίγα τῶν ἀναθημάτων.

they might have spared this expense, if they had not chosen to enlist men whose circumstances did not permit them to serve without pay, while citizens of better condition, who would have been willing to enter the ranks at their own charge, were not called out. How far this was the result of democratical jealousy, which regarded the wealthier class with suspicion, or of an opinion that the times required men who made war their sole business, and depended on it for their livelihood, is a question which we cannot answer. And as little does Xenophon throw any light on the motives of the opposition which began on the part of Mantinea to the proceedings of the government with regard to the sacred treasures. The avowed objection was of course the religious scruple, which might be felt by men of all parties ; but there were probably other springs at work. A decree was passed at Mantinea, condemning the sacrilege, and directing that the money required for the pay of the Mantinean contingent, should be drawn from the treasury of the city. The members of the supreme government, who were responsible for the measure thus reprobated, complained that the authors of this decree were disturbing the national union, summoned them before the Ten Thousand, and as they did not appear, passed sentence on them, and sent a body of troops to arrest them ; but the Mantineans shut their gates against it. This example animated several members of the national assembly to express the same sentiments ; and the tide now set in so strongly this way, that the Ten Thousand came to a vote, that no more of the sacred treasure should be so employed. When this supply was stopt, that part of the soldiery which depended on its pay for subsistence, quitted the service, and their place was filled by volunteers of a higher rank. The change thus effected in the composition of the army alarmed the persons who were liable to be called to an account for the spoliation of the Olympian temple, and they sent a warning to Thebes — which was no doubt well grounded, though Xenophon affects

to treat it as a dishonest artifice — that Arcadia was on the point of returning to the Spartan alliance, and could only be restrained by Theban interference. The Theban government began to prepare for an expedition into Peloponnesus; but the party which now carried all before it in the Arcadian assembly, prevailed upon the Ten Thousand first to send an embassy to Thebes, to deprecate the threatened intervention, and then to conclude a peace with Elis, and to restore the Olympian temple to her.

The treaty was ratified not only by deputies from all the Arcadian cantons, but also by a Theban officer, who had been stationed at Tegea with a garrison of 300 Bœotian troops. The ratification, perhaps on this account, took place at Tegea, and was celebrated with general rejoicings by the Arcadians. But in the midst of their festivity, the Theban commander, who notwithstanding his apparent concurrence, saw that the peace must weaken the Theban influence in Arcadia, and was indeed designed for that end, was persuaded by the Arcadian magistrates, who dreaded its effect on their private interests, to send his own men, together with some of the Arcadian soldiery who were attached to the government which had supplied them with pay, to shut the city gates, and arrest a great number of the higher class. The jail and the prytaneum were soon crowded with prisoners. But as most of the Mantineans had been induced by the shortness of the distance to return home early in the day, very few of them were arrested, though it was against them that the blow was especially aimed; yet the outrage excited no less indignation at Mantinea, than if the hostages taken from it had been more numerous. The Mantineans immediately called upon the other Arcadian towns, to put themselves in a posture of defence, and sent envoys to Tegea, to demand the release of their own fellow-citizens, and to require that no Arcadian should be illegally put to death or kept in prison: offering security for the appearance of as many as were charged

with any offence, to take their trial before the great council of the nation. This firmness alarmed the Theban, so that he released all his prisoners, and endeavoured to justify his conduct by the pretence, notoriously false, that he had received information of a plot to betray Tegea to the Spartans. The Arcadians would not take their revenge into their own hands, but sent to Thebes to require that he should be capitally punished for the outrage.

It was indeed apparently a breach of faith, and a violation of justice, scarcely less flagrant than the occupation of the Cadmea ; and it is somewhat painful as well as difficult, to believe that such a man as Epaminondas should have defended the delinquent and have vindicated the deed. According to Xenophon he declared that the accused officer had acted more properly when he arrested the prisoners than when he released them. It was no less, he said, than treachery on the part of the Arcadians, to conclude a separate peace without the consent of the allies who had engaged in the war on their behalf ; but Thebes would notwithstanding send an army into Arcadia, to carry it on in conjunction with the cantons which still adhered to her.¹ The character of Epaminondas, as a man, stands so much higher than that of Xenophon, as a historian, that we should have suspected some misrepresentation in this statement, if we were not aware that among the Greeks the strongest minds and noblest spirits were seldom, 'if ever, capable of rising above the prejudices of a narrow patriotism, to which they often sacrificed justice and honour without shame or remorse. The language attributed to him seems to justify the suspicion which was loudly expressed by the Arcadians on the return of their envoys : that it was the object of Thebes to reduce Peloponnesus

¹ But it seems quite an arbitrary assumption of Leo's (*Universal-Geschichte*, i. p. 301.), that Epaminondas sanctioned the spoliation of the Olympian temple. It is by no means clear that his Pythagorean philosophy would have inclined him to regard sacrilege with indifference. But however this may have been, it does not appear that he was called upon to express an opinion on the subject, which did not affect the question of the expedition into Peloponnesus.

to the lowest stage of weakness, in order the more easily to subject it to her dominion. Yet Epaminondas may have seen reason to apprehend that the two great barriers which he had raised against the power of Sparta, the independence of Messenia, and the union of Arcadia, were endangered by the recent turn of affairs, and needed the presence of a Theban army to secure them. A general alarm however was awakened throughout Peloponnesus, though Argos and Messenia, and, in Arcadia, Megalopolis and Tegea, remained bound by their peculiar interests to Thebes. The Mantineans took the foremost part in the preparation for the approaching struggle. Envoys were sent to solicit succours against the threatened invasion, not only from Athens but from Sparta. But the application to Sparta was accompanied with a condition, that the supreme command should be exercised by each state within its own territory; and she was now content to renew her connection with Arcadia on these humiliating terms.

Epaminondas seems to have felt that the juncture was critical for the ascendancy of Thebes, and that an extraordinary effort was requisite to break the new hostile coalition. The army with which he took the field in the spring of 362, included the whole force of the Theban confederacy, with the exception of the Phocians, who withheld their contingent, alledging that their alliance with Thebes was merely defensive, and did not bind them to assist her in an attack upon foreign states. But he was now no longer supported by the energy and the counsels of the friend who had hitherto shared most of his dangers and triumphs. Thebes had lost Pelopidas two years before. He fell in battle, in the moment of victory. During his absence in Persia, the tyrant of Pheræ had renewed his attacks on the liberty of the Thessalian cities, and had greatly extended and strengthened his dominion in the tributary districts. After the return of Pelopidas to Greece, he was appointed to conduct a fresh expedition, which the Thebans were induced by the complaints of the Thessalians, or by their

own jealousy, to decree against Alexander. But just as he was about to march, an eclipse of the sun spread universal dismay at Thebes (June 13. 364). Pelopidas, though probably little affected by the omen himself, did not think it safe to take the field with an army disheartened by superstitious forebodings, and resigning the command, set out for Thessaly at the head of about 300 cavalry volunteers, and a small body of mercenaries. He relied on the power of his name, to unite the Thessalians against the tyrant, who he knew was not safe even in his own house. At Pharsalus he collected a force with which he thought himself strong enough to seek his enemy, who met him at Cynoscephalæ with an army twice as numerous, and had occupied an advantageous position on the heights from which the place was named. Nevertheless he was dislodged after a hard struggle, and was slowly retreating, when Pelopidas, in his eagerness for revenge, pressed forward too far beyond his own line to force Alexander, whom he saw before him, into a personal combat, but before he could reach him was overpowered, and slain by his guards. His death however served rather to animate than to dispirit his troops, who completed the victory which he had begun, with the total rout, and a great slaughter of the enemy. The most studied honours were paid to his remains by the Thessalians; and by earnest intreaty they obtained leave from the Thebans to bury him in Thessalian ground. His death was soon after more fully avenged by his countrymen. The army which had been at first placed under his command was committed to Malcites and Diogiton, two generals not otherwise named, and they forced the tyrant, whose strength was already broken by the battle of Cynoscephalæ, to resign his conquests, withdraw his garrisons from Phthiotis and Magnesia, and to enter into a treaty with Thebes, by which he bound himself to furnish troops for her service, in whatever war she might engage.

Thus the army of Epaminondas was reinforced by a great number of Thessalian auxiliaries, in addition to

Locrians and Eubœans. Since the treaty with Corinth the passes of the Isthmus were no longer guarded, and he proceeded without interruption to Nemea. Here he halted for some days in the hope of intercepting the Athenians, who had not yet joined their Peloponnesian allies. This delay afforded time to the Arcadians to collect their forces at Mantinea, and it did not answer its purpose ; for the Athenians having been apprized of their danger, decreed that their troops should be transported by sea to Laconia. This was perhaps a feint to deceive the enemy ; and it induced Epaminondas to continue his march to Tegea, where he was in the neighbourhood of all his Arcadian allies, and his troops enjoyed the shelter of a friendly city. Still his situation soon became embarrassing. A limit had been prescribed — we do not know for what reason, unless it was on account of the harvest — to the duration of the expedition ; and the term was drawing near. Though on a previous occasion he had not been afraid to retain his command three or four months beyond the legal period, he seems now to have thought such a step impracticable, and perhaps had cause to apprehend that if he attempted it, he might be abandoned by a great part of his northern troops. There was also great and continually growing difficulty in providing for the subsistence of such an army ; for according to Diodorus it amounted, after it had been joined by the Peloponnesians, to 30,000 foot and 3000 horse. On the other hand it was necessary, no less for the interest of Thebes than for his own reputation, that so formidable a host should not have been brought into Peloponnesus without effect. Xenophon praises the judgment with which he selected Tegea for his head-quarters ; but at the same time intimates that he was disappointed in the main object of his expectations, as his presence did not awe any of the hostile states into submission ; and represents the resolution which he finally adopted as a sudden thought suggested by his perplexing situation. It seems however quite as probable that it was a design which he

had long before conceived, and that he had only been waiting at Tegea for the most favourable moment to execute it. The opportunity which presented itself was at least one on which he might have reasonably calculated. The Lacedæmonian army commanded by Agesilaus, was on its march to join the allies at Mantinea, and had taken the road of the upper Eurotas through Pellana. Epaminondas was informed of its movements, and when he learnt that it had nearly reached the frontier, he set out in the dusk of the evening from Tegea, and having marched all night, arrived in the forenoon of the next day before Sparta.

He expected to find it unguarded and defenceless ; but, notwithstanding the precautions which he had used to conceal his intention, Agesilaus had received timely intelligence of the danger from a deserter, and appears to have returned with a part of his forces before the enemy arrived. He had at least sent advice to Archidamus, who seems to have been left at home ; and preparations had been made for defence. The old men and boys were posted with missiles on the roofs of the buildings in the skirts of the city, and the avenues were guarded by troops as far as the scantiness of their numbers permitted. Epaminondas however crossed the Eurotas, and attempted to enter the city from the north-east. He carried one of the eminences nearest the river — perhaps that which was called the Acropolis — and thence descended upon the Agora which lay just below. But Archidamus, at the head of a chosen band — Xenophon says, fewer than a hundred — defended its approaches with desperate valour. It was perhaps at this juncture that a young Spartan, Isadas, the son of Phœbidas, a form like a sculptured Apollo, rushed out of his house, where he had just been anointing himself for exercise, without any covering, but with a lance in one hand and a sword in the other, and plunging into the thickest of the fray, astonished both friends and foes, and, though he dealt many mortal blows, did not receive a wound. He

was afterwards crowned by the ephors for his valour, but mulcted for the imprudence with which he exposed his life.¹ Yet his exploit sounds less fabulous than that of Archidamus, who with his hundred men repulsed the whole invading army, though, according to Xenophon, it had not only its vast superiority of numbers, but also all the advantage of the ground in its favour. We doubt both of these assertions, which indeed seem to be virtually contradicted by the historian's own admission, that when the Spartans advanced a little beyond the ground of the first encounter, they were driven back with loss. The general result however is unquestionable. The assault was baffled; and Epaminondas, not thinking it prudent to wait until the Spartans should have received the succours which they were expecting from Arcadia, determined to retreat. Having recrossed the Eurotas, and allowed his troops a few hours to refresh themselves, and having left a few horsemen in the camp to kindle fires for the purpose of deceiving the enemy; he set out by the same road, and made another forced night march, which brought him in the course of the next forenoon to Tegea.

He had hastened his retreat, to take advantage of the absence of the Mantineans and their confederates from their city. The infantry, after its late extraordinary exertions, needed repose; but he sent the cavalry forward without delay to Mantinea. The only object which Xenophon assigns to this expedition is plunder; and, as the harvest had just begun, and the fields were full of cattle and labourers, as well as of the old and young of the free population, the prospect of booty was in itself sufficiently tempting. But other writers — who suppose that he moved forward at once with his whole force — represent him as aiming at the capture of the city itself. It seems easy to conceive that he had both objects in view, and that, after his infantry had recovered from its fatigue, he resumed his march. But

¹ Plutarch, Ages. 34.

in the meanwhile his cavalry had met with an unexpected resistance. As soon as the Theban army had broken up from Nemea, the Athenians abandoned their purpose—if they ever really entertained it—of sending their troops to Laconia by sea. Their whole force amounted to about 6000 men; and it was commanded by a general named Hegesilochus, or Hegesilaus, whose celebrity, which would seem to have been considerable in the books read by Diodorus, has scarcely preserved his name from utter oblivion. The cavalry appears to have been about half a day's march in advance; for it had already taken up its quarters in Mantinea when that of Epaminondas made its inroad; and it alone is mentioned by Xenophon: but according to other writers the Athenian infantry made its appearance in the distance at the same juncture.¹ The cavalry sallied out to protect the Mantinean fields; and notwithstanding the superior numbers and higher reputation of the Theban and Thessalian horse, after a hard-fought action put the enemy to flight: a victory, which, when we consider the effect of the surprise and the previous exhaustion on the defeated side, does not seem clearly entitled to the praise which Xenophon—as if to prove his impartiality—bestows on it in language that might have been thought inspired by patriotic enthusiasm.

This second repulse rendered it the more necessary for Epaminondas to strike some blow worthy of his threats and preparations, before his allotted time expired: so that even if the enemy had outnumbered him, he must have been strongly impelled to seek a general action. His forces however were so far superior as to afford a well-grounded hope of victory: for according to Diodorus the hostile army amounted to no more than 20,000 foot and 2000 horse; and though no reliance can be placed on this estimate, the proportion is probably not much exaggerated. He had inspired his troops of every name with that ardour and confidence in their commander, by which great generals form the

¹ Diodorus, xv. 84.

instruments of their success ; so that even the proud Arcadians adopted the Theban device of a club on their shields.¹ It therefore sounds a little strange that Xenophon describes him as yielding with some degree of reluctance to the pressure of outward circumstances, while the other side made no attempt to avoid an engagement, but rather waited for it with eagerness. Xenophon's language might lead us to conjecture that he had a presentiment of his approaching fate ; but he was used to say that the most desirable death was on a field of battle.² The movements of the Spartans and their allies, during the operations of Epaminondas which we have just described, are veiled in Xenophon's narrative as in a mist ; and we are even left in doubt whether Agesilaus commanded the Lacedæmonian forces in Arcadia ; for Xenophon does not again mention his name. Yet, as it is very much easier to account for the historian's silence than the king's absence, it may be considered as nearly certain that, after the retreat of the Thebans, he accompanied the Arcadians who came to the relief of Sparta back to Mantinea, where we next find them, prepared to accept an offer of battle. It is however a different question, whether the supreme command of the allied forces was assigned to him ; though his rank and military reputation render this the most probable supposition.³

After the engagement of the cavalry Epaminondas had, it seems, taken up a position on the eastern side of the plain of Mantinea within view of the enemy. He had made known to his troops his intention of giving battle ; and on the other side there was a like expect-

¹ *ἰσχυράματα, βέβαλα ἔχοντες, ὡς Θεβαίων ἔντι.* Xenophon's brevity has conjured up a *Theban band of clubmen* in the mind of a modern writer, who profoundly discusses the *utility of the institution*.

² *Plut. Reg. et Imp. Ap.*

³ On the other hand the student will scarcely need to be warned against the palpable mistake of Palmerius and Schneider, who imagined that they had the authority of Ephorus, as cited by Diogenes Laertius (Xenophon 10) for the assertion, that Agesilaus was commander-in-chief. Nothing can be clearer than that an Athenian general must be signified by the words *Ἡγεσίλω στρατηγόντος*, as Cephisodorus, who is mentioned just before, is evidently the commander of the Athenian cavalry. This Hegesilaus is the Hegesilochus of Diodorus.

tation of an immediate contest, which, it was universally supposed, would decide the destinies of Greece. But when he began to move from his encampment, instead of advancing directly toward the enemy, he turned the head of his column toward the Mænalian range of hills, the western boundary of the plain of Tegea, made a circuitous march along its skirts, and at last again halted at the foot of the hills to the west of Mantinea, so as to induce the enemy to believe that he meant to encamp there, and to avoid an action at least for that day. The consequence was that their spirits, which had been kept on the stretch all the morning by the prospect of the approaching combat, relapsed into their ordinary tone, and their ranks fell out of fighting order; and this, it appears, was the chief object of the evolution. In the meanwhile Epaminondas made fresh dispositions for battle, corresponding to those of the enemy, in whose army the Arcadians occupied the right wing, the Athenians the left; the Spartans stood next to the Arcadians, and the rest of the line was filled up with the Eleans, Achæans, and other troops of inferior repute. Epaminondas formed his phalanx in a figure which Xenophon compares to the bow of a galley, for the purpose of bearing on the right side of the enemy's line, calculating that a breach made in it would decide the fortune of the day. He collected the Bœotians and Arcadians in front, and distributed the rest, whom he did not mean to bring into action, in the back-ground. The bulk of his cavalry he also formed into a solid wedge, and strengthened it by an intermixture of light infantry, trained to this kind of service. This he seems to have destined to act on the same side against which he proposed to direct his main attack. But he likewise posted a detachment of horse and foot on some eminences near the enemy's left flank, to occupy the attention of the Athenians. In this order he again moved forward to give battle. The enemy hastily recovered their ranks; but the mood in which they received his onset was no longer that of calm or eager courage. On the details

of the battle Xenophon is very brief, Diodorus redundantly and childishly copious; yet he seems to have read and spoilt some better description. We may however collect from both, that on the whole the plan of Epaminondas succeeded in all its parts. The Athenians were kept employed, though in the end they were so far victorious over the troops immediately opposed to them, as well as over a part of the light infantry which fell upon them from the Theban left, as to retain possession of the slain. The charge of the Theban and Thessalian cavalry, with which the battle began, was completely successful, and prepared for the deeper impression afterwards made by the shock of the pointed phalanx. But in the moment of victory Epaminondas received a mortal wound, and was carried out of the field to a rising ground, from which his eye, still lighted up, while life was ebbing, by anxiety for the issue, could range over the scene of combat. He would not, it is said, allow the weapon, which was left in the wound, to be extracted, until he was assured that he had won the day, and expired almost immediately after. The variations of tradition as to the hand by which he fell, prove the importance which his contemporaries attached to the event. Among the claimants were a Mantinean, a Spartan, and a Locrian of Amphissa. The Spartan's descendants became a privileged family. The Locrian received heroic honours from the Phocians. But the Athenians, and the Thebans themselves, assigned the deed to Xenophon's son Gryllus, who was slain in the action, and was honoured by the Mantineans with a public funeral and a statue, and by his fellow citizens with a conspicuous place in a painting of the battle, representing him in the act of giving the mortal wound; yet as he served in the Athenian cavalry, it is difficult to understand how he could have encountered Epaminondas, who was at the head of the Theban infantry.

When Epaminondas fell, the action was already decided, the disorder in the enemy's line irretrievable; but he left no one capable of supplying his place. Iol-

lidas and Daiphantus, two Theban officers whom he appears to have held in high esteem, were likewise slain; and, according to one of Plutarch's anecdotes, when he heard of their death, he observed that it was time for Thebes to make peace. None attempted to follow up the victory; the routed seem to have fled only until they found that they were not pursued; and the Athenians even remained masters of a part of the field and of the slain. It is probable therefore that the carnage was not much greater on the one side than on the other. Even the empty honour of the bloody game was not undisputed: both parties raised trophies; both were forced to send heralds to recover their dead. Xenophon lets the curtain drop on the field, and concludes his history with the observation, that greater confusion and uncertainty prevailed in Greece after the battle than before.¹ Yet it was not quite so fruitless as he represents. It was followed by a negotiation, in which the Thebans and their Arcadian confederates gained at least one advantage very important to Megalopolis. They induced the allies of Sparta to acknowledge the independence of Messenia; and as Sparta, swayed by the counsels of Agesilaus, still refused to treat on this basis, she was excluded from the peace which was made the year after (361) among all the other states. She had indeed no reason, though thus left alone, to apprehend an immediate renewal of hostilities from any quarter; for the belligerents were all alike weary of war, and none had any definite objects beyond the maintenance of their present condition. But her contest with Thebes had been one series of disasters; and the battle of Mantinea, in which she suffered a greater loss than any of her

¹ We part from Xenophon with regret, because we have no better guide, as Ephorus or Theopompus would have been, to supply his place; but with little gratitude, notwithstanding his valuable services: because we see that, if he had chosen, he might have spared us much of the difficulty and obscurity that have perplexed us while we have been travelling in his company. Wolf (in his Lectures edited by Guertler, li. p. 295.) observes of the Hellenica: "I have always believed, that it was not a fully developed work, but a summary sketch (nicht ausgeführt, sondern summarisch entworfen): hence its great dryness." This would be an excuse for every defect but the want of honesty.

allies, extinguished every hope which she might still have cherished, of recovering the position which she once occupied in Greece. She had however the consolation to see that none of her rivals was, or would be able to supplant her. The sceptre had indeed been wrested from her hands; but it had at the same time been broken to pieces. Thebes was obliged to abandon the thought of that supremacy for which she had been struggling, and which seemed at one time within her grasp, and to confine her views to the north, to the security of her sovereignty in Bœotia, and the strengthening of her influence in Phocis and Thessaly. Not because after the death of Pelopidas and Epaminondas she was left without able men to direct her counsels, and lead her armies; for Pammenes was still living, as perhaps were also Gorgidas and Ismenias; and it is probable that many good officers, as well as soldiers, had been formed in the Sacred Band: the martial spirit which had been roused by her great men, and fostered by so many victories, was not quenched, nor was her ambition moderated, by the battle of Mantinea: but the events which had lately taken place must have convinced all reflecting men, that it was no longer possible for any state to bring all Peloponnesus under one head: and that Thebes had accomplished the utmost she could now reasonably aim at, when she disabled Sparta from aspiring to regain her ancient supremacy.

CHAP. XLI.

PHILIP OF MACEDON.

To an enlightened and patriotic Greek the prospects of his country must have appeared more gloomy after the battle of Mantinea than at any previous epoch. The most desirable of all conditions for Greece would have been, to be united in a confederacy, strong enough to prevent intestine warfare among its members, and so constituted as to guard against all unnecessary encroachment on their independence. This was the mark toward which the aims of the nation would have been most wisely directed. But though the Amphictyonies, particularly that of Delphi, afforded not only a hint, but a ground-work, which might have been enlarged and adapted to this purpose: though the Lycian colonies exhibited an admirable example of a similar union¹: though the Persian invasion held out a strong motive, and a fair opportunity for such an undertaking; it is doubtful whether the thought had ever occurred to a single Greek statesman; and it is probable that, if it had suggested itself, it would have been rejected as a chimera. The next good to this would have been the supremacy of some Grecian state, powerful enough to enforce peace, but not to crush liberty. Nearly such had been that which Sparta exercised over the Peloponnesian confederacy before the Persian war. And, for a few years after, the division of power between Sparta and Athens might have seemed to promise the attainment of the blessing, in a different form indeed, but in one which afforded better security for freedom than

¹ See Vol. ii. p. 103.

could have been enjoyed under the sway of either alone. But the restless ambition of Athens soon destroyed the equipoise on which these hopes rested, and plunged the nation into greater calamities than it would probably have incurred, if all its states had been left absolutely independent of each other. The only benefit which could have compensated for the evils of the Peloponnesian war, would have been the conviction, which it ought to have produced, of the necessity of national union under a mild but firm federal government. But the lessons of the past were lost upon those whose conduct was chiefly to determine the future. Sparta was not warned by the example of Athens; she threw away a golden opportunity of establishing her own ascendancy on the tranquillity and happiness of Greece, forfeited the confidence of her allies, and proved, for the instruction of those who might have fancied that the misrule which Athens exercised abroad was connected with the peculiar character of her domestic institutions, that the dominion of an oligarchy might be still more oppressive to its foreign dependents than that of a democracy. Thebes in her turn, even under the administration of Epaminondas — though probably without any fault on his part — wasted the sympathy and admiration which she had attracted by the wrongs she suffered, and by the energy with which she avenged them, through her tyrannical treatment of the Bœotian towns, and the spirit in which she had interfered in the affairs of Peloponnesus. The time had past by, when the supremacy of any state could either have been willingly acknowledged by the rest, or imposed upon them by force.

The hope of any favourable change in the general condition of Greece was now become fainter than ever. The immediate result to be expected, unless some extraordinary interference should avert it, was that she would gradually waste her strength away in a series of domestic wars. It was however possible that this lingering decay might be interrupted by a sudden re-

volution, which might subject her either to some native tyrant, such as Jason or Dionysius, or to a foreign yoke. But at the time which our history has now reached, no danger of this kind could be thought near enough to disturb that sense of general security which had prevailed ever since the Persian wars, and which permitted and encouraged each state and party to concentrate its attention on its own affairs, and to look with indifference on all occurrences which did not affect its particular and immediate welfare. Notwithstanding the destructive struggles of so many generations, Greece was still in the prime of her vigour. The forces which had been brought into the field at the battle of Mantinea, if they had been arrayed on one side, might have defied the attack of any power then known to the Greeks. Toward whatever side they might turn their view, they could descry no reasonable ground for apprehension. In the west all the efforts of the Carthaginians had been baffled by the resistance of Syracuse. In the east the Persian empire had owed its safety to the divisions of the Greeks, and their mercenaries formed the strength of its armies. There was indeed a danger, and very near at hand; but it was one which no human sagacity could yet have perceived; and the quarter from which it arose, was perhaps the last to which a statesman would have looked for the enemy who was to crush the independence of Greece. The state of Macedonia, the seat of the new power which was destined soon to become so formidable, had hitherto been such as but very slightly to attract the attention of the Greeks, and still less to awaken their fears. Since the close of the Peloponnesian war we have but rarely found occasion to mention it at all, and, whenever its name has occurred, we have seen it rather passively than actively connected with Grecian politics. As we are now about to enter on a period in which it will appear in a very different point of view, this will be the fittest place for such information as we are able to collect concerning the leading events of its past history,

which have not been yet noticed, and which may serve to give a clearer insight into its condition at the epoch which we have arrived at.

The weakness of the Macedonian monarchy in the reign of that Perdiccas who filled the throne during the greater part of the Peloponnesian war — from 454 to 413 — is betrayed not only by the feeble resistance which it offered to the Odrysian invasion, but by the duplicity and intrigues to which Perdiccas found himself obliged to resort in his transactions with the leading states of Greece. And we learn from Thucydides, that at his death the country was extremely deficient in the means both of internal communication and of defence. A new era began with the reign of his successor Archelaus, who, according to an account which we have no reason to question as to the main facts¹, was an illegitimate son of Perdiccas; mounted the throne by violence, and secured himself on it by the murder of

¹ Plato, *Gorgias*, p. 471. A writer who considers it as the great business of history to place royalty in the most favourable light, of course thinks it his duty to depreciate the credit of this story to the utmost. It would perhaps be sufficient for a historian who does not write with such an aim, to observe that it is just as unlikely that the story — relating to a prince who was on good terms with Athens, and a munificent patron of Athenian arts and literature — should have become current there without a good foundation, as that it should have been invented by Plato. Mr. Clinton (*F. H. ii. p. 223.*) contents himself with the remark that “the circumstances respecting the character of Archelaus touched upon by Aristotle, make it credible that he might have risen to the throne by irregular means.” We cannot help thinking that Plato’s story is strongly confirmed by the plot of the *Archelaus* of Euripides, which he wrote, as we are informed by one of the poet’s Greek biographers, in Macedonia, to gratify his patron. An outline of the argument is given by Hyginus, from which, as well as from the remaining fragments, it appears that the dramatic Archelaus, the founder of *Ægæ*, and the progenitor of the royal line, was an adventurer — though a Heracleid by birth — who having taken refuge in Macedonia at the court of the king Cisseus, delivered him by his military achievements from the foreign enemies by whom he was threatened. The king had promised to reward him with the hand of his daughter and the succession to the throne. But having been induced by evil persuasions to break his word, and to aim at his benefactor’s life, he was himself killed by Archelaus, who then, under the protection of Apollo, became the founder of a new dynasty. It seems hardly credible that such a subject should have been chosen by Euripides for his drama, if the history of the real Archelaus had not presented some parallel circumstances. The details mentioned by Plato concerning the murder of Alctas and his son — which, it ought to have been unnecessary to observe, are related not of Perdiccas but of Archelaus — correspond very closely with those of the catastrophe of Cisseus in the drama. The fragment xxxiv. (*Matthiæ*) *Ἰσχυρὸς ἀδελφὸς Ἀρχελαίου* may be compared with what Thucydides relates of Archelaus.

the rightful heir, and it seems, by marriage with his father's widow, Cleopatra.¹ But the atrocity of the crimes by which he usurped the crown, was lost in the lustre of his reign. He may be considered as having laid the foundation of Macedonia's subsequent greatness, in the roads, walled towns, and fortresses, which were his principal monuments, and by the establishment of a regular force of cavalry and infantry, stronger than had been maintained by any of his predecessors. Still the actual power of his kingdom does not appear to have been very considerably enlarged. For we find that he was fain to terminate a war in which he was engaged with Sirras and Arrhabæus — apparently the princes of Elymea and Lyncestis — by bestowing the hand of one of his daughters on the Elymean²: and when Pydna, one of the maritime towns on the Thermaic gulf, revolted from him, he reduced it with the aid of an Athenian squadron commanded by Theramenes, and then removed it to a new site between two and three miles from the coast, where he probably expected to hold it more under his control.³ Nevertheless his reign seems on the whole to have been peaceful and prosperous; and perhaps by friendly relations to Athens, which toward the close of the Peloponnesian war was no longer formidable to him, contributed to preserve that tranquillity, which enabled him not only to execute the works which we have mentioned, but to cultivate the arts of peace beyond any of his predecessors. It seems to have been his object to transplant the literature, the fine arts, and even the philosophy of Greece, par-

¹ Aristotle, Pol. v. 8. compared with Plato, u. s.

² Aristotle, u. s., where perhaps, instead of Σίββας, we ought to read Δίρδαν: so a few lines below the name Πύρρων has been written instead of Πύθων.

³ Diodorus, xiii. 49. It was hardly worth while, for the sake of a little more railing against the Athenians, to cite Diodorus for an assertion directly contrary to that which is contained in the Greek text. It must therefore, in candour, be presumed, that the historian who informs his readers that "the Athenians excited the people of Pydna to rebellion and supported them in it," was misled — naturally enough for one who held the *idle learned* in profound contempt — by the ambiguity of the *cui* in the Latin version, which unfortunately might be referred either to the *urbem* immediately preceding, or to *Archelao*.

ticularly of Athens, into his kingdom. He induced Euripides, the favourite poet of the most refined Athenian circles, to take up his residence in Macedonia, where he ended his days. Agathon likewise, a dramatist of high reputation, and Timotheus, a celebrated master of music and of lyric song, were also among his guests. It is somewhat surprising, but is a fact sufficiently attested, that Socrates was one of the foreigners whom he invited; perhaps because he had heard of him as the subtlest and most accomplished of the Athenian sophists. Socrates, we are informed, declined the invitation, because he would not live in a place where he must receive benefits which he could not requite: alluding it may be to the character of Archelaus, of whom he is said to have observed, that he had taken more pains to furnish his house, than his mind. Archelaus had engaged Zeuxis of Heraclea, one of the most famous painters of the day, at an expense of nearly seven talents, to adorn his palace, which drew many strangers to Pella by the report of its magnificence.¹ And it was perhaps chiefly with the view of attracting foreigners, and thus encouraging trade and commerce among his subjects, that he instituted a festival and games in imitation of those of Olympia, at Ægæ. But there is no reason to believe that these refinements of the court produced any sensible effect on the main body of the nation, which, so far as we can judge from the hints given by Thucydides, seems hitherto to have been very imperfectly civilised.² It probably retained its simple habits — more nearly resembling those of the heroic ages than of Greece in the fifth century B. C. — as it continued to speak a semibarbarian dialect, compounded, it would appear, of Pelasgian and Illyrian

¹ Ælian, V. H. xix. 17.

² We are unable to discover any evidence for an assertion of Droysen (*Geschichte Alexanders des Grossen*, p. 37.)—who in this part of his work has certainly too often suffered his fancy to fill up a historical blank—that under the wise direction of Archelaus, the light of civilisation was diffused into the remotest valleys of Macedonia. This is too much to infer from what Thucydides says of his works, though they no doubt contributed something toward the civilising of the distant provinces. See the end of note 1, page 157.

elements, with a mixture of the later Greek. Whatever taste was introduced for the pursuits of art, science, and literature, seems to have been confined to the higher classes; and as there are strong indications that it was accompanied with great corruption of morals in the court circle¹, it was perhaps happy for the people that it was not, and could not, be more widely diffused. It was partly by the indulgence of odious vices, though partly also by the abuse which he suffered Euripides to make of his favour, that Archelaus provoked a conspiracy among his courtiers, by whom he was murdered in the fourteenth year of his reign.²

If Archelaus mounted the throne in the manner which has been related on the best remaining authority, we can the more easily understand how it happened that his dynasty was of short duration. He was succeeded by Orestes, apparently his youngest son, by Cleopatra. Aeropus, the young prince's guardian, suffered him nominally to reign four years, but then dispatched him, and seized the crown for himself. He was probably encouraged by the recollection that his ward's title was founded on a like usurpation. At all events we find no need — as there is no historical evidence — for the conjecture, that this change of dynasty was the result of a reaction, undertaken by a party which interest or prejudices attached to the ancient state of things, against the innovations introduced by Archelaus.³ The success of Aeropus appears to have called forth other more legitimate claims to the throne. He indeed died a natural death, after a reign of six years. But his son Pausanias was assassinated in the year of his accession by a representative of the old royal family, Amyntas II., whose grandfather, of the same name, was a younger son of king Alexander, the contemporary of Xerxes. The reign of Amyntas, which

¹ Aristotle, *Pol.* v. 8., and *Ælian*, V. H. ii. 21. xiii. 4.

² Aristotle, *u. s.*

³ This conjecture is *Droysen's*, p. 38. He would perhaps not have fallen upon it if he had not neglected — either as unimportant or as unworthy of credit — the circumstances under which Archelaus mounted the throne.

began 394, was disturbed by disasters and vicissitudes which we have already had occasion to notice, and which for a time threatened the existence of Macedonia as an independent state. We may here add that the Illyrians, by whom he was expelled from his dominions very soon after his accession, appear to have supported the claims of a pretender named Argæus¹, who in fact remained in possession of the throne for two years, at the end of which Amyntas, with the aid of the Thessalians — that is probably of the same great families whom we afterwards find connected with the kings of Macedonia — regained a footing in a part of his territories. But it was not until Sparta had broken the power of Olynthus, that he was able to recover the whole. We are not distinctly informed of any subsequent irruption of the Illyrians into Macedonia. Yet Amyntas must have been again threatened by them, and have felt himself too weak for resistance, if, as Diodorus relates, he consigned his youngest son Philip to them as a hostage. And we would not reject this statement because it has been combined with one scarcely credible, that the Illyrians lodged their hostage at Thebes.. Amyntas continued to his death (370) in close alliance with Sparta; but he also cultivated the friendship of Athens, more especially toward the close of his reign, when the interests of Athens and of Sparta began to concur in opposition to Thebes; he professed to favour the claims of the Athenians on Amphipolis², and took so much pains to conciliate the goodwill of Iphicrates, that he is said to have adopted him as his son.³

These transactions do not tend to convey the impression that Macedonia was in a flourishing condition under Amyntas. It is surrounded by powerful enemies,

¹ Droysen (p. 39.) without alleging any authority, calls him the youngest son of Archelaus. The manner in which Aristotle (Pol. v. 8.) speaks of the two sons of Archelaus — Amyntas, and the one whom he had by Cleopatra, whom we suppose to have been Orestes — seems rather to imply that he had no others; at least none who could pretend any title to the throne.

² Æschines De F. L. § 35.

³ Æsch. De F. L. § 30.

and is only enabled to maintain a precarious existence by foreign aid. In the period which intervened between his death and the accession of his son Philip, it laboured under the evils of a disputed succession, and intestine warfare, while it was still threatened by the same formidable neighbours. Amyntas left three sons, Alexander, Perdikkas, and Philip, then thirteen years old. Alexander II. had arrived at manhood, assumed the reins of government without opposition, and on the occasion which drew him, as we have seen, into Thessaly to aid his father's old allies against the tyrants of Phæræ, discovered signs of an enterprising spirit. We are not informed as to the origin of the contest in which he was engaged with Ptolemy of Alorus: we do not know whether Ptolemy was in any way related to the royal family¹, nor whether he laid claim to the crown.² But it seems clear that he was favoured by the queen Eurydice, the widowed mother of the three princes. Perhaps it was her quarrel that he espoused against her eldest son, whose death, when he was treacherously murdered by Ptolemy or his emissaries³ in the second year of his reign, appears at least not to have excited her resentment against the assassin. The account of Diodorus and Plutarch, that Philip was among the

¹ Diodorus, xv. 71., and Dexippus, ap. Syncell. p. 500. ed. Bonn. are apparently at variance on this point; though, if Ptolemy was an illegitimate son of Amyntas, their statements may be reconciled.

² That he did so, seems to have been too hastily assumed by Fläthe, *Geschichte Macedoniens*, i. p. 39., who proceeds to argue that his claims must have had some foundation; because otherwise he would not have subjected them to the arbitration of Pelopidas: and then conjectures that he accepted an apanage as a satisfaction for them.

³ Among whom it appears from Demosthenes, (*De F. L.* § 216.), was one Apolliphanes of Pydna. That Ptolemy was the principal in the plot is proved by the testimony of Marsyas in Athenæus (xiv. p. 629.) from whom we learn that the conspirators executed their purpose at a court revel, in which they performed the national war-dance. This is one of the instances from which we may learn to appreciate the value of many sceptical arguments grounded on the silence of the orators. A writer anxious to save Ptolemy's character, and ignorant of the author quoted by Athenæus, reasons: "Some notice of this crime, had it been real, could hardly have failed (qu. to be found?) among the orators, especially Demosthenes." Apolliphanes himself, as we are informed by Demosthenes, was afterwards assassinated, and his relatives thought it prudent to remove his infant daughters for shelter to Olynthus. He was therefore most probably murdered by the friends of Alexander — perhaps by agents of Perdikkas — during the regency of Ptolemy, when he could not be brought to justice.

hostages delivered to Pelopidas, when he came to arbitrate between Alexander and Ptolemy, contradicts the testimony of the contemporary orator Æschines, who relates that Philip was still in Macedonia at the time of his eldest brother's death. The authority of Æschines indeed cannot be deemed conclusive as to all the particulars which he mentions, and it might therefore be suspected, that he had been misinformed with regard to the precise date of the scene which he describes, and that it took place in the reign of Alexander.¹ But we are inclined to adopt this part of his narrative, as on the whole the most probable in itself, though it still raises great difficulties as to the occasion on which Philip was carried away to Thebes. According to Plutarch, after the murder of Alexander, which must have happened very soon after the compromise, Pelopidas, who was in Thessaly on his second expedition against the tyrant of Pheræ, was invited into Macedonia by the friends of the deceased king, and obliged Ptolemy to enter into an engagement to preserve the crown for the younger brothers. Ptolemy, it is said, gave fifty hostages as a security for the performance of his promise, among whom was his own son Philoxenus. It seems more natural that Philip should have been committed to the custody of the Thebans under these circumstances than on the occasion of the contest between Ptolemy and Alexander; especially if Eurydice was generally believed to have been an accessory to her son's murder—a crime with which she is charged by some later writers—and if she was suspected of a criminal intercourse with Ptolemy: a suspicion which seems at least to have been entertained at a subsequent period, and which is strongly confirmed by her acquiescence in the murderer's authority.²

¹ But Flathe (i. p. 39.) is certainly not justified in charging Æschines with deliberate misrepresentation.

² The stories told of Eurydice by Justin may not be all true, but it is not clear on what grounds Mr. Clinton (F. H. ii. p. 226.) observes, that "they are virtually contradicted by the narrative of Æschines." It was surely quite possible, though she had conspired with her paramour against the

But from Æschines we learn that, soon after Alexander's death, a new pretender to the crown, named Pausanias, appeared in Macedonia, made himself master of several towns, and was supported by a very powerful party. It happened that at this juncture Iphicrates was on the coast in command of a small squadron destined to act against Amphipolis. Eurydice sent to him to request an interview; and, when he came, placed her two sons in the attitude of suppliants at his knees, and reminding him of the proofs of regard which he had received from Amyntas, implored his protection. Iphicrates was moved by her intreaties to turn his arms against Pausanias, and expelled him from the kingdom. Æschines represents Ptolemy as at this time regent, and as one of the parties obliged by the intervention of Iphicrates¹; thus clearly indicating that he made common cause with the queen. It is certainly difficult to conceive how after this event Pelopidas could have been invited into Macedonia, in the manner described by Plutarch. But this difficulty is scarcely a sufficient ground for the supposition that Æschines was mistaken as to Philip's presence at the interview with Iphicrates²; especially as the orator himself alludes to a treaty into which Ptolemy afterwards entered with the Thebans. It may therefore be safest to conjecture that Pelopidas was called in by some friends of the royal family to shield

life both of her husband and her eldest son, and designed to destroy the two younger, that she might still make use of them in the manner described by Æschines, to obtain the protection of Iphicrates against Pausanias. The writer whose "accustomed judgment" Mr. Clinton commends, was at least consistent with himself, when, having — perhaps through the oversight pointed out by Mr. Clinton in a preceding note — placed the fact of the assassination of Alexander by Ptolemy among the stories of Justin and Athenæus which seem unworthy of credit, he likewise rejected the tale about Eurydice as fabulous. But Mr. Clinton, who admits that Ptolemy was the murderer of Alexander, and thinks it probable that he was appointed regent in a regular way during the minority of Perdiccas, ought to have explained how it happened that Eurydice, when she was imploring the protection of Iphicrates against Pausanias, did not throw out a word about Ptolemy's crime, and the danger which threatened the young princes from a regent who had murdered their elder brother. The narrative of Æschines appears to us virtually to confirm Justin's tale — which however, it must be remembered, consists of many parts.

¹ *Λαχάρωνος και διουίνης ἑγγυος διατρέχοντος.*

² This is Flathe's way of solving the difficulty, u. s.

it from the danger with which it might well seem to be threatened by Ptolemy's ambition. Ptolemy kept possession of the government three years: Diodorus simply says, that he reigned so long: probably however he never assumed any other title than that of regent, though he may have had no intention of ever resigning his power to the rightful heir. And it was perhaps as much in self-defence, as to revenge his brother's murder, or his mother's shame, that Perdiccas killed him (364.)

Concerning the reign of Perdiccas III. we have but very scanty information; but all that we know of him leads us to conclude that he was not deficient in spirit and ability. He resisted the attempts of the Athenians on Amphipolis, and appears to have gained some advantage over them either in war or by negotiation. He was also a patron of arts and letters, and like Archelaus is said to have shown an imprudent partiality for some of the learned men whom he drew to his court. We hear that one Euphræus, an Eubœan of Oreus, acquired such influence over him, and so foolishly abused it, as to exclude all guests from the royal table, who could not contribute to the conversation by their scientific or philosophical accomplishments. Though there may be some exaggeration in this statement, it seems certain that he became powerful enough to excite vehement indignation in some of the courtiers; and that it was chiefly in revenge for the insolence which he had shown in his prosperity, that he was afterwards put to death at Oreus by the Macedonian general Parmenio.¹ Perdiccas however does not appear to have neglected the duties of his station. He took the field against the Illyrians, but was defeated and slain by them in the fifth year of his reign. He left an infant son named Amyntas.²

¹ Athenæus, xi. p. 508., from Carystius.

² Justin, vii. 5. Justin does not mention his name, which is supplied by other writers. The reader is probably aware that it has been asserted — with the assurance of contented ignorance — that “among extant ancient authors Justin alone tells of an infant son left by Perdiccas, who succeeded him on the throne, and for whom Philip long acted as guardian and regent.”

At the time of this event Philip was twenty-three years of age. Diodorus supposes that he was still at Thebes, but that, on receiving intelligence of his brother's death, he made his escape, and suddenly appeared in Macedonia.¹ It is not difficult to understand how the story may have taken this form: a hostage so important, it might easily be supposed by writers acquainted with his subsequent history, would not have been willingly surrendered by the Thebans: it is certain however from better authority, that he had been already restored to his country, and it is probable early in the reign of Perdiccas, when the Thebans could have no motive for detaining him. Extravagantly as some modern writers have indulged their imagination with regard to the manner in which his time was employed during his sojourn at Thebes, it is hardly possible to overrate the importance of the opportunities it afforded him for the acquisition of various kinds of knowledge, or to doubt that he availed himself of them with all the energy and perseverance which belonged to his character. It is perhaps less probable that the house of Polymnis, the father of Epaminondas, should have been chosen for his residence, as Diodorus relates, than that of Pammenes, according to Plutarch's statement²: and

But Justin's main fact, that Perdiccas left an infant son, is fully confirmed by the testimony of Q. Curtius, vi. 9. 17., vi. 10. 24., and Polyænus, viii. 60. The former mentions the plot formed by Amyntas, son of Perdiccas, against his cousin Alexander: the latter that he married a daughter of Philip. Their evidence is illustrated and confirmed by Arrian (i. 5.,) from whom we learn that the princess had become a widow soon after Alexander's accession to the throne. There can therefore be no doubt that this is the Amyntas to whom Plutarch alludes, (De Alex. M. Fortuna l. p. 327. C.) though Wyttenbach has confounded him with another Amyntas, son of Antiochus. The statement therefore, so superciliously rejected, rests in the main on as good ground as almost any in history. But Justin's *dis* seems to proceed from some mistake, being hardly consistent with his own context.

¹ This is evidently the meaning of Diodorus, xvi. 2. To pretend that his account wants "no violence to make it accord with that of Philip's establishment in Macedonia given by Speusippus," only betrays the incapacity of the writer who makes the remark, to understand a plain Greek sentence. Wesseling was indeed one of the *idle learned*, but he possessed a kind of knowledge not useless even to a historian of Greece.

² The French author who supposed that, on account of the poverty of Polymnis, a public pension was assigned to defray the expense of Philip's education, perceived the difficulty, but was not happy in his expedient for removing it.

the fable of his Pythagorean studies—worthy of Diodorus—is below criticism.¹ But a certain tincture of philosophy was at this time deemed almost an indispensable requisite in a liberal education. The fame of Plato, who had no doubt many admirers and disciples at Thebes, could not but engage Philip's attention, and awaken his curiosity. We do not undertake to determine, whether the relations subsisting between Thebes and Athens, during his stay in Greece, were such as permit us to suppose that he visited Athens, or became personally acquainted with the founder of the Academy. But it seems an almost inevitable inference from a fact attested by contemporary evidence, that some kind of communication took place during this period between Plato and Philip, which impressed the philosopher with a favourable opinion of the prince: and it is not too bold, if it be not an indispensable conjecture, that Philip's esteem and admiration for Aristotle, of which he afterwards gave so remarkable a proof, had its origin in an acquaintance formed at the same epoch. Speusippus, Plato's kinsman and favourite scholar, related that, by Plato's recommendation conveyed through Euphræus, Perdiccas was induced to bestow a principality by way of apanage on his brother, who was consequently in possession of it, and in Macedonia when the throne became vacant. The authority of Speusippus must be deemed sufficient to place the substance of this account—the grant itself, and his uncle's recommendation—beyond question; nor is there anything in the slightest degree improbable, or inconsistent with the known characters and situation of the parties, in any one of the particulars. Only it may be necessary to observe, that

¹ It did not deserve the elaborate discussion which Wesseling has bestowed on it in his note on xvi. 2. The main fact, which is the only point of importance—Philip's residence as a hostage at Thebes—is not at all affected by the discrepancies which he notices. This is another instance which ought to teach us caution in drawing arguments from the silence of the orators. It is certainly remarkable that no allusion occurs in any of them to this period of Philip's life—especially as Dio Chrysostom (ii. p. 248. Reiak.) mentions a report, which, if it had been current in the time of Demosthenes, might have afforded a topic for invective; but no intelligent critic will think this a sufficient reason for questioning the fact.

it does not follow that Philip's return to Macedonia was effected through Plato's mediation, or that Plato had been previously in correspondence with Perdiccas. The king had no reason to be jealous of his brother¹; and after the death of Ptolemy, the Thebans, as we have already remarked, could not have wished to detain him. It is therefore probable enough that the term of three years assigned to his stay at Thebes, though not on the best authority, is not far from the truth. It would be the part of his life which intervened between the age of sixteen and of twenty.

It was undoubtedly not the study of philosophy, either speculative or practical, that chiefly occupied Philip's attention during this period. To the society in which it was passed he may have been mainly indebted for that command of the Greek language which enabled him both to write and speak it with a degree of ease and elegance not inferior to that of the most practised orators of his day. But the most important advantages which he gained from his stay at Thebes, were probably derived from the military and political lessons with which the conversation of generals and statesmen like Epaminondas, Pelopidas, and their friends, could not fail to abound. It was by them that the art of war had been carried to the highest point it had yet reached in Greece; or rather they, more particularly Epaminondas, had given it a new form: and the details of their battles and campaigns would be eagerly collected by an intelligent and ambitious youth. Thebes was at this time the great centre of political movements: the point from which the condition, interests, and mutual relations of the Greek states might be most distinctly surveyed. Here too were to be gained the clearest ideas of the state of parties, of the nature and working of republican, especially of democratical institutions: here probably Philip learnt many of those secrets, which

¹ It is a merely arbitrary conjecture of Flathé's (l. p. 48.) that Philip's desire to obtain the government of a Macedonian province, had provoked a misunderstanding between him and Perdiccas, which was adjusted by Plato's mediation.

often enabled him to conquer without drawing the sword. And as he was placed in one of the most favourable positions for studying the Greek character, so the need which his situation imposed on him of continual caution and self-control, must have served very greatly to sharpen his natural sagacity, and to form the address which he afterwards displayed in dealing with men, and winning them for his ends. What were the impressions made upon his taste and feelings by his residence at Thebes, it would be vain to inquire; but it is remarkable that there are parts of his political conduct which it is not easy to explain, except on the supposition that he viewed Athens with a certain degree of predilection; which inclined him, where his own interests allowed liberty of choice, to favour her at the expense of her Bœotian rival.

Nature had gifted him with almost every quality that could fit him for the station which he was destined to fill: a frame of extraordinary robustness, which was no doubt well trained in the exercises of the Theban palæstras: a noble person, a commanding and prepossessing mien, which won respect and inspired confidence in all who approached him: ready eloquence, to which art only applied the cultivation requisite to satisfy the fastidious demands of a rhetorical age: quickness of observation, acuteness of discernment, presence of mind, fertility of invention, and dexterity in the management of men and things. There seem to have been two features in his character, which, in another station, or under different circumstances, might have gone near to lower him into an ordinary person, but which were so controlled by his fortune as to contribute not a little to his success. He appears to have been by his temperament prone to almost every kind of sensual pleasure. But as his life was too busy to allow him often to indulge his bias, his occasional excesses wore the air of an amiable condescension. So his natural humour would perhaps have led him too often to forget his dignity in his intercourse with his inferiors. But to Philip, the great king, the

conqueror, the restless politician, these intervals of relaxation occurred so rarely, that they might strengthen his influence with the vulgar, and could never expose him to contempt. From that he was secured by the energy of will, which made all his faculties and accomplishments of mind and body, and even his failings, as well as what may be called in a lower sense his virtues — his affability, clemency, and generosity — always subservient to the purposes of his lofty ambition. A moral estimate of such a man's character is comprised in the bare mention of this ruling passion, and cannot be enlarged by any investigation into the motives of particular actions; and it is scarcely worth while to consider him in any other light than as an instrument of Providence for fixing the destiny of nations.

The time had come, when all these qualities and attainments were to be called forth into action, and were to be matured in a new and harder school of practical experience. The situation in which he was placed by his brother's death was one of great apparent difficulty and danger. As the nearest kinsman of the royal infant he of course immediately took charge of the government; it is possible indeed that it was committed to him by Perdiccas, when he set out on his expedition. The throne which he had to defend was threatened by enemies in many quarters. The Illyrians had not taken advantage of their victory to carry their arms farther into the country. The main body at least had returned home with their booty. But they were said to be collecting their forces for a fresh invasion, and from the language of Diodorus¹ it would even seem as if they still retained possession of some Macedonian districts or towns adjacent to their frontier. The western provinces lay at their mercy. The Pæonians, the nearest neighbours of Macedonia toward the north, seized the opportunity to make an inroad for plunder. At the same time the juncture invited two pretenders to put forward their claims to the crown, or rather to use them as a

¹ xvi. 4.

pretext for seizing it by means of foreign aid. Pausanias, no doubt the competitor of Perdiccas, who, as we have seen, had been expelled by Iphicrates, obtained promises of aid, from the king of Thrace, perhaps Cotys, whose dominions included most of the maritime provinces of the Odrysian empire; and he might reckon on finding many partizans in Macedonia, where he had been so strongly supported but a few years before. Argæus too, the old adversary of Amyntas, appears to have revived his pretensions, unless he had transmitted them to a younger claimant of the same name. Argæus, whoever he may have been, had gained the Athenians over to his interest, by a promise of some concessions with regard to Amphipolis, which had been during the last reign the main subject of contest between the republic and Macedonia. Mantias, an Athenian general, had been sent with a considerable squadron, and a force including 3000 heavy-armed, to support him. This was the antagonist immediately the most formidable: both as having disciplined troops at his command, and as being enabled, with the help of the Athenian navy, to threaten the most important provinces, and the seat of government. A war with Athens, while the kingdom was exposed to so many other enemies, was of itself greatly to be dreaded.

There was however one advantage which Philip drew from his alarming and embarrassing position. The evils of civil war and foreign invasion, with which the country was either threatened, or actually assailed, turned all eyes toward him as the man on whom the hopes of the nation rested. The infant king was generally overlooked, and he was encouraged immediately to direct his views to the crown, and was perhaps regarded by many from the first as his brother's successor. The law of succession, though, in peaceful times and ordinary cases, it recognised the principle of lineal representation, seems not to have been more precisely determined, or at least more inflexible, in Macedonia, than in the Greek monarchies of the Homeric ages.

Still it appears that Philip did not attempt at once to set his nephew aside, or assume the regal title, which would have been impolitic, while there were two other pretenders to the crown, powerfully supported from without. But he took his measures that, as soon as these competitors should be removed, he might execute his purpose without opposition. If we may believe Justin¹, a prophecy was circulated, which, if it was really current at this period, must have been fabricated by his emissaries with this object: *that Macedonia should flourish exceedingly under one of the sons of Amyntas*. And we may collect from Diodorus², that he was at great pains to gain the affections of the army, and frequently exerted his eloquence for this purpose; though the annalist speaks of his numerous harangues as if they were only designed to infuse courage into his troops. The admiration excited by this rare talent served at least to strengthen the impression produced by his person and manners, and by the affability with which he tempered the strictness of military discipline.

The forces which he was able to collect would probably have been scarcely sufficient to sustain so many different attacks as now threatened him at once: and his genius inclined him to try other means of averting the danger. The Pæonian chief, whose only aim appears to have been to enrich his people with booty, having partly accomplished his purpose, was easily induced by an embassy, which carried presents and promises to him and his leading men, to withdraw his army. The king of Thrace, a weak luxurious prince, who was hardly master of his reason, was persuaded by a negotiation similarly conducted, to abandon the cause of Pausanias; and this pretender had no other means of enforcing his claims. Philip was thus left at liberty to direct his whole attention to the Athenians and Argæus: and he would gladly have rid himself of them by like methods. It was the hope of recovering Amphipolis, not any wish to place Argæus on the throne, that had induced Athens

¹ vii. 6.

² xvi. 3.

to interfere ; and Philip seems to have hoped, by satisfying her on this point, to detach her from the side of his rival. The language of Diodorus would of itself lead the reader to suppose that Amphipolis was at this time occupied by a Macedonian garrison, and that Philip, before hostilities had been begun by the Athenian armament under Mantias, withdrew his troops from the place, and publicly renounced his claims to it.¹ Polyænus still more distinctly intimates that this was the state of the case²: and if we may believe—on still inferior authority³—that Philip received divine honours at Amphipolis before he became finally master of it, this extravagant display of gratitude would seem to require the supposition of some solid and extraordinary benefit, something therefore beyond a mere verbal recognition of its independence. On the other hand we have no express information, nor any other reason to conjecture, that Perdiccas had ever become so far master of Amphipolis: and to suppose that Philip parted with so important a place, on the chance of being able to recover it as soon as the immediate object of the sacrifice should have been attained, would be to imagine a finesse, not indeed too deep for his character, but still requiring stronger evidence than the fact rests on. A suspicion indeed will readily suggest itself to any one acquainted with Diodorus, that he has here mentioned the step which Philip took a little later with regard to Amphipolis, prematurely. But it is not at all unlikely that, before any blow was struck, he should have endeavoured to deprive Argæus of Athenian support, by a declaration which cost him nothing. Nor does it seem to have been even at the time altogether ineffectual. Mantias indeed arrived at Methone, on the Thermaic gulf, with the pretender: but he seems to have done nothing. Argæus, who was accompanied by a number of Macedonian exiles,

¹ xvi. 3. ἔκουσις ἐξεχώρησεν τῆς πόλεως, ἀφ' ἧς αὐτὴν πύργου.

² iv. 2 17. Philip — while still at war with the Illyrians — being required by the Athenians to restore Amphipolis, οὐκ ἀπίθωνος, ἀλλ' ἀφ' ἧς ἐλευθέρου.

³ Aristides, i. p. 715. Dindorf.

hoped to find partisans in the country; and it is remarkable that the place where he expected to be most favourably received, was no other than the ancient capital *Ægæ*. In that direction he set out at the head of a body of mercenaries—whether collected by himself or brought by *Mantias*, does not appear. *Mantias* remained at *Methone*; but he suffered some of the Athenian troops to accompany his ally. The attempt on *Ægæ* totally failed: no one ventured to declare himself in the pretender's favour; and he was so disheartened by this repulse, that he determined to return to *Methone*. But in the meanwhile *Philip* had assembled his forces, and marched to cut off the invader's retreat. An engagement ensued in which *Argæus* was defeated with considerable loss, and the remnant of his army forced to take refuge on an eminence, where they were surrounded and reduced to capitulate with the conqueror. They obtained leave to depart unmolested on condition of giving up the exiles. Whether *Argæus* was one of the number, or had fallen in the battle, we are not informed: his name appears no more in history.

Among the prisoners taken by *Philip* on this occasion, were some of the Athenian troops.¹ These he detained only to distinguish them with peculiar favours; for he not only set them at liberty, but made presents to each of them, equivalent to the property they had lost. They were of course bound to return home; and it is probable that *Mantias*, having no longer any mission to execute in *Macedonia*, led his whole armament back to *Athens*. The prisoners were accompanied or followed by envoys bearing a letter from *Philip* to the people, in which—probably with expostulations on their unprovoked hostility—he expressed his desire to renew the friendship which had subsisted between his father and the republic. The subject of *Amphipolis* was not passed over in silence in this letter; though, as we are uncertain

¹ *Diodorus* does not mention them: the language of *Demosthenes*, where his immediate object would have inclined him not to underrate the number, seems to imply that it was small. *Aristocr.* § 144. Ἀργαῖον κατάγοντας λαῶν τῶν ἡμετέρων τιὰς πολιτῶν.

what Philip had before done with regard to it, we are the less able to determine what he now said. The sequel however leads us to suspect, that he did not confine his professions to the declaration—now either first made or repeated—of his willingness to leave it independent, but that he threw out hints, from which it might be gathered that he would not be unwilling to see it reduced under the sovereignty of Athens. However this be, it is certain that his liberality toward the prisoners made a very strong impression in his favour on the assembly, and inclined the Athenians to expect all they could desire from the friendly disposition of which, even under such provocation, he had given so striking a proof. Demosthenes intimates that the people's gratitude was at the moment so lively, that almost any honours might have been obtained for Philip.¹ If, as is probable, Argæus was no longer in the way, there remained no further obstacle to peace; and it was soon after concluded, apparently without any express stipulation, on either side, with regard to Amphipolis.

Philip's victory raised the spirits of his troops, which had been cast down by the defeat of Perdiccas. The success of his negotiations secured his government from internal opposition. But still it appeared to rest on a merely precarious foundation, so long as the tranquillity of the country might be said to be purchased from one enemy, or to be due to the forbearance of another. Fortunately for him, just as he had freed himself from the burden of the Athenian war, the death of Agis king of the Pæonians, afforded him an opportunity of invading Pæonia at the juncture when it was least capable of resisting his arms. He defeated the forces which were brought against him, and compelled the Pæonians to render him tokens of submission, which were perhaps chiefly important as they humbled the insolence of the nation, and encouraged the Macedonians to regard themselves as its masters. But a more formidable enemy remained in the Illyrians, who hitherto, in the

¹ Aristocr. u. s.

wars between the two nations, had been almost always successful aggressors, and were now in possession of many places belonging to Macedonia. Their king Bardylis, though he still retained sufficient vigour of mind and body to discharge the duties of his station, had reached an age—ninety it is said¹—in which the most restless spirits grow patient of repose. Philip's successes and increasing reputation no doubt also tended to dispose him toward peace; and hearing that the Macedonian prince was making preparations to invade Illyria, he endeavoured to avert the attack by pacific overtures. The terms he proposed were simply, that each party should retain what it possessed. Philip however now thought himself strong enough to require that the Illyrians should evacuate all the territory they had conquered from Macedonia. It is not quite clear whether this demand comprised only what had been lost through the defeat of Perdiccas, or earlier conquests of the Illyrians. It was however rejected; the Illyrian king prepared to meet the threatened invasion, and notwithstanding his advanced age led his forces into the field in person.² According to Diodorus, the numbers of the two armies were nearly equal, and the heavy infantry in each amounted to 10,000 men. His description of the battle seems not to have been drawn so much as usual from his imagination, and suggests the idea, that on this occasion, perhaps for the first time, Philip put in practice the lessons he had learnt from his Theban masters, and gained the victory chiefly by a judicious concentration of his force, and employment of his cavalry—in which he seems to have been superior to the enemy—after the example of Epaminondas. The loss of the Illyrians is said to have amounted to 7000 men; and they were compelled to accept the terms of peace imposed by the conqueror. They ceded to him all that they possessed east of the lake of Lych-

¹ Lucian, *Macrob.* 10. iii. p. 215. Reiz. From which passage it may be inferred that he either fell in the battle, or died in the course of the same year.

² Lucian, *u. s.*

nus, and thus not only gave him the command of the principal pass by which they had been used to penetrate into Macedonia, but opened a way by which he might at any time descend through their own territory to the shores of the Adriatic.¹

It may safely be presumed that after this brilliant success Philip no longer hesitated to assume the kingly title. His usurpation — for such it appears to have been according to the laws of Macedon — was however most probably sanctioned by the unanimous consent both of the army and the nation. How secure he felt himself in their affections, is manifest from his treatment of his deposed nephew. He was so little jealous of him, that he brought him up at his court, and in time bestowed the hand of one of his daughters on him.² The transfer of the crown was so quiet and noiseless, that it seems not to have reached the ears of the Athenian orators, whose silence may at all events be admitted as a proof, that there was nothing in the transaction on which they could ground a charge against Philip.

His victory over the Illyrians is connected by Diodorus with the institution of the Macedonian phalanx, which he is said to have invented. The testimony of the ancients on this point has been very confidently rejected in modern times without any good reason. We may indeed doubt whether this body, as it existed in the beginning of Philip's reign, differed in any important feature from that which was already familiar to the Greeks, or at least from the Theban phalanx. But it is another question whether the Macedonian armies had ever before been organised on this plan; and there is nothing to prevent us from admitting the statement of authors certainly better informed than ourselves, that it was first introduced by Philip.³ Nor is there any diffi-

¹ See Leake, Northern Greece, iii. p. 321.

² Polygnus (viii. 61.) calls her Κοννάση. Arrian, (i. 5.) Κόνα. Athenæus, (xiii. p. 557.) from Dicæarchus, Κόνα.

³ Eustathius on Homer, Il. N. 130., φράζαντες δόρυ δορυ, σάκος σάκι περιβλήμεν, has a quotation from Hermolytus, a writer on tactics, which is curious, and which we have not seen anywhere noticed. Hermolytus had

culty in believing that he at the same time made some improvements in the arms or the structure of the phalanx which entitled it to its peculiar epithet, and him to the honour of an inventor. Both the tactics and the discipline of the army seem to have been in a very low state under his predecessors ; and this was perhaps the main cause of the defeats which they so often experienced from the neighbouring barbarians. Philip paid no less attention to the discipline than to the organisation of his forces. His regulations were strict, and were enforced with inflexible severity. He forbade the use of carriages, even to his officers, allowed the cavalry only a single attendant for each man : and for the infantry but one in common to every ten soldiers, to carry the more cumbrous parts of their baggage. Examples of his rigid discipline have been preserved. He is reported to have dismissed a distinguished foreigner from his service for using a hot bath — observing, it is said, that this was a luxury which even the Macedonian women did not allow themselves — and to have banished two of his generals for having introduced a singing girl into the camp. One youth of high rank, who held an office near his person, was punished with stripes for turning aside from the line of march to quench his thirst at a tavern ; and another who, presuming on his favour with the king, had quitted the ranks contrary to orders, was put to death.¹

There were some other institutions, partly civil, partly military, which contributed much to the security of the monarchy, and are attributed by ancient authors to Philip ; but their origin is involved in like obscurity with that of the phalanx. According to some writers², it was he who first accustomed the Macedonian nobility to send their sons to be educated at his court, where they performed menial services, like those which were required

said, that Lycurgus introduced this *εὐνάσις* by law among the Lacedæmonians : but Lysander ἐν ἰσχυρῶν ἰδίδουσι, καθὰ καὶ Ἐπαμεινώνδου Θηβαίου, καὶ Χαλκιδέως τοῖς Ἀγαθάς τε καὶ Μακίδονας.

¹ Frontinus, iv. i. 6. Polyænus, iv. c. 2. § 10. l. 3. Ælian, xiv. 49.

² Ælian, xiv. 49. Arrian, iv. 13.

in the feudal halls from squires and pages of gentle blood. According to others¹ the custom was transmitted from earlier times: and this account, though resting on inferior authority, seems much the more probable. Yet there may have been some ground for considering Philip as the author of this usage. The advantages of such a connection between the great families and their sovereign, must forcibly have struck a prince, who had made his way to the throne through the struggles of a disputed succession, and who did not hold it by a perfectly legitimate title. Though it is scarcely conceivable that he could have introduced such a practice, he may have extended and enforced it, and perhaps made this domestic service a necessary step to the attainment of a certain military rank. The royal household was a school through which the young nobles passed into the ranks of the guard, from which they might rise into posts of honour, which in the next reign became more valuable than the crown of Macedon itself. How far the organisation of the royal guard, a description of which belongs more properly to a later period, is to be regarded as Philip's work, is a question similarly doubtful; but it is certain that it was in his reign it first acquired celebrity as a distinct and formidable corps. Its peculiar appellation — equivalent to that of **COMRADES**² — as it is the same with which Homer's chiefs address their followers, may have descended from the earliest ages of the monarchy; but the title, importing **FOOT-COMRADES**³, which was applied to the infantry of the guard, seems to be noticed by a contemporary orator as if it was of recent invention.⁴

¹ Curtius, viii. 6. 2. 8. 3. Valer. M. iii. 3. E. 1. Perizonius endeavours to reconcile Curtius with Ælian — certainly against the Roman author's meaning.

² *ἰσάριον, ἄγχιμα τῶν ἰσάριων.*

³ *πυλῖσάριον.* The testimony of the ancients — particularly that of Anaximenes quoted by Harpocration, Photius, &c. — seems clearly to prove that this title belonged only to the footguards, not to the whole phalanx. Yet Droysen (Alex. p. 96.) adopts the latter opinion, without any discussion, and yet referring to Sainte Croix, who on the contrary follows the lexicographers, as does Schlosser, l. 3. p. 209. But it seems to be through mistake that the words of Anaximenes, from the first book of his history of Philip, are referred by the lexicographers to Alexander instead of Philip.

⁴ Demosth. Olynth. ii. § 17.

However Philip may have contributed to the formation of the Macedonian phalanx in a military point of view, there can be little doubt that it was he who first established it as a standing army. In the engagement with the Illyrians he brought, as we have seen, upwards of 10,000 men into the field. This force he appears never to have disbanded, but gradually to have increased it, as he extended his conquests, and multiplied his resources, until it more than doubled that number. This measure appears to have been required not merely for the objects of his ambition, but for the security of the state, especially in an age when mercenary troops, who made war their sole business, were so generally employed: but it involved important political consequences. It in fact converted the Macedonian government into a military despotism, tempered only by the national spirit which the soldiery retained, and by the privileges which they exclusively enjoyed. The Macedonian people, without any formally defined constitution, perhaps without any written laws, had inherited a very large share of liberty from the heroic ages. There had been from time immemorial popular assemblies, whether held periodically, or as occasion required, we cannot discover, which among other rights exercised jurisdiction in cases of treason: for this offence no Macedonian could legally suffer death without such a trial. It may perhaps be presumed that the character of a tribunal was not the only one which these assemblies assumed; and that they tended in various other ways to limit the royal authority. Their prerogatives, whatever they were, appear to have been all transferred to the army, which was treated as the representative of the nation, and the king's pleasure, unless it happened to clash with the will of the soldiery, seems to have been no longer subject to any restraint. During Philip's reign however the forms of the government retained much of the ancient simplicity, and a semblance of freedom; and it was only on extraordinary

public occasions that he was distinguished from his subjects by the outward appendages of royalty.

The phalanx was drawn from the body of the free-men ; the cavalry and the whole of the royal guard were selected from the higher classes, and included all the noble youths who had been educated at court. What was the origin of the Macedonian nobility, what were its privileges and distinctions, are interesting questions which we have no means of answering. The tendency of Philip's institutions was to attach it more firmly to the throne, and to raise it higher than before above the mass of the people. *His* nobles were no longer distinguished merely or chiefly by their descent, or their possessions, but by the superior cultivation of their minds, and their extraordinary proficiency in such parts of Grecian learning as were proper for warriors and statesmen, so that the king was able to employ them not only in the field and the cabinet, but in the most difficult and delicate negotiations with the free states of Greece.

In the course of about a year from his brother's death, Philip had freed himself from all his domestic embarrassments, and had seated himself firmly on the throne : had humbled the most warlike of his barbarian neighbours, and had extended and strengthened his frontier : he had made an honourable peace with the only Greek state that was capable of annoying him, and had secured the stability of his government by institutions which placed the whole strength of his kingdom at his absolute disposal. These were great things to have accomplished in so short a time : but a prince of four-and-twenty who had done so much could not rest satisfied with so little. Macedonia, notwithstanding its natural wealth and its hardy population, was still a poor and feeble kingdom. On the west and north side the barbarous hordes, though a little awed by the check which some of them had recently sustained, were still as able as before, whenever opportunity invited them, to pour an inexhaustible tide of war into its provinces.

In the opposite quarters almost the whole line of its coast was occupied by independent Greeks, who prevented it from enjoying the full benefit of its natural productions, and whose coalition not many years past had nearly proved fatal to its political being. Nor did it require great sagacity to perceive that the peace with Athens could not last long without concessions or acquiescence such as the safety and honour of the country forbid. Even if no visions of a distant, dazzling, greatness had yet begun to gleam upon his mind, the dangers and obstacles with which he was surrounded, were for Philip sufficient motives to action, and the state of Greece afforded ample encouragement for the most aspiring hopes. The enterprises in which we have hitherto seen him engaged, had been forced upon him in self-defence: the ability with which he had conducted them had indeed raised his reputation; but little could be inferred from them as to his character and views. These began to be disclosed in the transactions which we are now about to relate.

CHAP. XLII.

FROM PHILIP'S ESTABLISHMENT ON THE THRONE OF
MACEDONIA TO THE END OF THE SOCIAL WAR.

WHEN the Athenian orators wished to rouse the spirit of their countrymen in their contest with Philip, they sometimes reminded them that Macedonia had once been subject and tributary to Athens.¹ This was indeed a rhetorical figure; but yet not without a substantial meaning: nor was it, as has sometimes been imagined, only applicable to the state of things in the reign of one of Philip's remote predecessors. Arrian has put a speech into the mouth of Alexander the Great, in which he mentions among the benefits which his father had conferred upon his people, that instead of paying tribute to the Athenians, he had reduced them to depend upon Macedonian protection.² It seems clear that these expressions can only relate to the maritime part of Macedonia; and even in that sense it is not easy to assign their exact value. It is certain however that Philip, at the beginning of his reign, did not possess a single place of any importance on the coast. Several maritime towns which had belonged to his predecessors, were then subject to Athens, and probably contributed to the common fund of her revived confederacy. And though it does not appear that after the Peloponnesian war the Athenian government levied any duties in any foreign port, except at Byzantium, still those with which the Macedonian commerce was burdened in the towns dependent on Athens, might, in vague language,

¹ Demosthenes Olynth. iii. § 28. ad epist. § 18. Hegesippus de Halon. § 12.

² vii. 9.

be described as tribute which she received from Macedonia ; and, so long as her fleets commanded the sea, nothing could be directly exported or imported without her permission. It may easily be supposed that one of Philip's first objects, as soon as he was at leisure to look around him, was to deliver his kingdom from this somewhat degrading, and very inconvenient servitude. And this was no doubt one of the motives which led him to covet the possession of Amphipolis. Amphipolis however was of the utmost importance to him in several other points of view. Its situation — at the lower opening of the great fertile valley of the Strymon — rendered it highly inexpedient that it should be left in foreign hands ; and to the king of Macedon it afforded a passage into Western Thrace, by which he was enabled immediately to enlarge his dominions with a most valuable conquest. It would therefore be no uncandid surmise, even if we had no express authority for the fact, that at the time when, to pacify the Athenians, he professed to abandon his claims to it, or actually gave up his hold on it, he had secretly determined to take the first opportunity of making it his own. But before we proceed to relate the steps by which he effected this design, it is necessary, for the better understanding of the position in which he now stood with respect both to Amphipolis, and to Athens, to give an account of the attempts which the Athenians had made to recover it since the death of Amyntas. This retrospect is the more important, because perhaps no portion of Grecian history has been so grossly distorted as this ; and apparently for the purpose of attributing to Philip a species of merit, which was certainly the last he would have wished to claim.

Ever since Athens had resumed the character of an imperial state, Amphipolis had been one of the principal objects of her ambition. Its value for her arose not so much from any of those circumstances in its situation which rendered the acquisition of it so important to the king of Macedonia, as from the vicinity of

the vast forests which clothed the mountains that inclose the basin of the Strymon, and afforded an inexhaustible supply of ship-timber. Philip's father, as we have seen, had recognised her claim to her colony, perhaps the more readily because he knew that the acknowledgment would not bring her one step nearer to the attainment of her wishes; and he himself was precluded by the state of his affairs from extending his views so far. Soon after his death, or immediately after that of his son Alexander, Iphicrates, as has been already related, was engaged in an expedition against Amphipolis, which led him to the coast of Macedonia, and afforded him the above-mentioned opportunity of rendering an important service to the royal family. The force under his command at this time was small, and according to Æschines had been sent merely for the purpose of observation. It appears to have been very soon after augmented by the addition of a body of mercenaries commanded by an adventurer named Charidemus, a native of Oreus in Eubœa, one of those soldiers of fortune, who abounded in this period; a person who henceforward fills a somewhat conspicuous part in Grecian history. But the regent Ptolemy, perhaps seeing Amphipolis in danger, did not think himself bound by the acts of Amyntas, and supported it in its resistance to the Athenian arms.¹ Olynthus, which in the decline of the Spartan power had begun to lift up her head again, lent her aid for the same purpose, and seems to have acquired a preponderating influence at Amphipolis.² At the end of three years, during which Iphicrates continued in command, though it is probable that his attention was by no means exclusively directed to this quarter, he appears to have made but little progress toward the accomplishment of his main object.

¹ Æschines, De F. L. u. s.

² This, we think, may still be inferred from the manner in which Olynthus and Amphipolis are coupled together by Demosthenes (c. Aristocr. p. 669.) in the words *μισθοὶ αὐτῶν Ὀλυθίας τοῖς ἡμαθίαις ἰχθυσί, καὶ τοῖς ἰχθυοῦσι Ἀμφίπολι κατ' ἐκείνου τὸν χρόνον*: though the insertion of *καὶ*, according to Bekker's reading, destroys some of the inferences which had been drawn from this passage.

Then however a change suddenly takes place in the aspect of affairs. We have no information as to its causes, and may with equal probability conjecture that it was connected with Ptolemy's death¹, or that it arose from jealousy excited by the conduct of the Olynthians. The language in which it is related by Demosthenes, who is our only authority, would incline us to adopt either of these suppositions, rather than believe that it was the effect of any extraordinary military success obtained by Iphicrates. It seems evident that it was a change in the state of parties at Amphipolis, and that the party which wished well to the Athenians had somehow or other gained the upper hand. The result appears to have been, that the government entered into an engagement to put Iphicrates in possession of the city, and gave hostages for its performance, which were delivered to him by one Harpalus, perhaps the leader of the dominant party. Just at this juncture it happened, through some turn of events at Athens the particulars of which are unknown to us, that Iphicrates was superseded. Before his departure he consigned the hostages to the care of Charidemus; but a decree soon after arrived, directing that they should be sent to Athens. Very gross partiality alone could induce any one to extract a charge against the Athenians from the fact, that they wished to secure these important hostages, which had been received by their general²;

¹ That the three years during which (according to Demosth. u. s.) Charidemus served under Iphicrates, were the three years of Ptolemy's regency, and that the subsequent operations of Timotheus against Amphipolis took place in the reign of Perdiccas, are propositions which may now be considered as beyond controversy. They are of great importance to this part of our history, and the reader's attention is now called to them, because he has probably been accustomed to see these transactions placed several years later—in Philip's reign, and several conclusions affecting the character of Philip and his contemporaries grounded on this erroneous and utterly incoherent chronology. The student, after he has compared the accounts of Æschines, u. s., Demosthenes, u. s., and Diodorus xv. 81., will find it useful to consult Voemel's note on the second Olynthiac, p. 83. of his edition and his Prolegomena, p. 69.

² The accusation rests entirely on the assumption, that "the hostages had been specially intrusted to the faith of Iphicrates:" an assumption which the learned reader knows to be purely arbitrary, but which unlearned readers would receive without suspicion, in proportion as it must seem improbable that a writer, who valued his reputation, should invent such a statement, when it was to ground a charge of *profligacy* against any

and this is all we know of their conduct in the business. As little ground is there for the supposition, that this decree injured their interest at Amphipolis. It is barely possible that, following as it did the removal of Iphicrates, it might raise a suspicion, that they did not mean to observe the terms of the capitulation. But it is just as probable that a reaction quite independent of this cause had taken place at Amphipolis. We however have only been informed of the issue. Charidemus, who like all men of his profession was always looking out for the most gainful service, was induced to give up the hostages to the Amphipolitans. He was no doubt the more easily tempted to this piece of treachery, as he had a prospect, and perhaps had already formed the resolution, of passing into the service of the Thracian king Cotys: though such had now become the importance of mercenary troops in the wars of Greece, that, notwithstanding so flagrant an act of insubordination, he might still have continued to receive Athenian pay.

Timotheus, whose friends had probably procured the removal of his ancient rival Iphicrates, had been appointed to succeed him. But we learn from Æschines, that he did not immediately take the command on the coast of Macedonia. In the interval the Athenian forces there were commanded by another general, named Callisthenes, who prosecuted the war against Amphipolis. But Perdiccas, who had now mounted the

of the parties concerned — even though it was the Athenian people. That an author so careless of truth, and so destitute of candour, should have had the hardihood to talk of the *romance of the good Rollin*, — *Quis tulerit?* — This reminds us that some readers may wish to know why no notice has yet been taken here of so remarkable an event as the planting of a colony of Cyrenians at Amphipolis under Lacedæmonian patronage, in number so large that occasion was afterward taken to call it a *Lacedæmonian colony*: especially as they may have seen the statement of this interesting occurrence supported by such excellent references as “Or. Isocr. ad Philipp. p. 316. t. l. Ep. Philipp. ap. Demosth. p. 164.” They may however be assured that in the first of these passages there is only an allusion to the Lacedæmonian colony of Cyrene, for the purpose of contrasting its situation with that of the Athenians at Amphipolis. In the second Philip alludes to the revolution effected at Amphipolis by Brasidas — an allusion which will be immediately understood by any one who compares Thucyd. v. 11. This however was an innocent romance, and certainly an amusing one, though quite as wide of real history as any of Rollin’s narratives.

throne, adopted the policy of the regent Ptolemy, and espoused the cause of the Amphipolitans so actively as to become the leading party in the contest with Athens. Æschines represents him as compelled to yield to the Athenian arms; but the orator himself throws some doubt on the truth of this statement by the fact which he subjoins: that Callisthenes was induced to consent to a suspension of hostilities on such disadvantageous terms, that afterwards, when he was brought to trial, and put to death, his treaty with Perdiccas was commonly supposed to have been the principal motive, if not the professed ground, of the sentence. Timotheus arrived soon after: but, if the truce had expired, he must have deemed it hopeless forthwith to renew the attempt upon Amphipolis. He wished, but was not able to retain Charidemus, who carried away his troops to Cotys, in vessels with which he had been supplied by the Athenians, though they were now at war, or at least on a very unfriendly footing, with the king of Thrace. His defection contributed perhaps to induce Timotheus to turn his attention toward a different quarter, where he had a prospect of serving his country with more success. Diodorus informs us¹, that in the first year of the hundred and fourth Olympiad, which was that in which Perdiccas mounted the throne, Timotheus besieged and took Potidæa, and Torone; and there is no reason to question the correctness of this date. It is probable that at this time both these towns belonged to Olynthus, or were members of her confederacy: and we learn from other authors², that

¹ xv. 81.

² Polyænus, iii. 10. 14. Ulpian on Demosth. Ol. ii. § 14. It has been supposed (see Voemel on this passage of Demosthenes) that this war may have been one waged several years earlier by Amyntas, and that Perdiccas only acted as his lieutenant. But from the description of Æschines it appears that Perdiccas, even at the time of his father's death, was scarcely old enough to have commanded an army.—It is proper to remark that this passage of Demosthenes (who only says: Macedonia furnished a considerable addition to our forces under Timotheus against Olynthus,) is the only ground that has been alleged for the assertion, that it was Philip who aided Timotheus, and enabled him to take Potidæa and Torone. Yet on this assertion, which contradicts all the testimonies of the ancients on this subject, and if received would create inexplicable confusion in the history of this period, its author has not scrupled to found a charge of *ingratitude*

Timotheus was aided in the war which he carried on against Olynthus, and the Chalcidians, by Perdiccas. We must therefore conclude that some Macedonian auxiliaries were among the forces with which he effected these conquests, which, if we may believe his admirer Isocrates, were followed by the reduction of all the Chalcidian towns.¹ The policy of Perdiccas in this transaction, though not perfectly clear, is not inexplicable. Olynthus, which in his father's reign had nearly become mistress of the kingdom, and though humbled by Sparta had begun to recover her strength, and probably to resume her ambitious designs, may have appeared to him more formidable than Athens; and though he did not wish to see the Athenians in possession of Amphipolis, he may have been willing to assist them in weakening the old enemies of his house. We find from Diodorus, that Timotheus was called away in the course of the same year to the Hellespont, and we know that about a year later he was still fully occupied there, as we shall soon have occasion to relate. It seems to have been only toward the end of the reign of Perdiccas, in 360, that he commenced his operations against Amphipolis. Olynthus, notwithstanding the losses she had suffered, made preparations for defending it, and invited Charidemus, who was then it appears in the Thracian Chersonesus, to enter her service. He accepted the offer, and embarked his troops at Cardia; but in the passage fell into the hands of Timotheus, and to avoid worse consequences, consented to serve against Olynthus.² Whether Perdiccas took any part in this contest against the Athenians, whom undoubtedly he did not assist, we are not informed. We know

against the Athenians, whom he represents as inflicting a grievous injury on Philip (of which we shall speak shortly) at the very time that he was making conquests for them. Mr. Clinton, who now and then corrects this writer's chronological errors in less important points, passes over this matter in silence.

¹ *επι* *ἀρριδ.* § 119.

² It was in the voyage, *πλῆον ἰατρῶν*, not after he had actually entered the Olynthian service, that he was captured by Timotheus. Demosth. *Aristocr.* § 176.

however that notwithstanding the cooperation of Charidemus, this expedition of Timotheus totally failed. It seems that he was surprised by the unexpected appearance of the enemy in greatly superior force, and was fain to set fire to his galleys in the Strymon, and to make a hasty retreat by land.¹ It is only by the subsequent transactions between Philip and the Athenians in the affair of Amphipolis, which have been already related, that we are led to conjecture, that this last effort of Timotheus was defeated through Macedonian interposition, and that this was the immediate cause of the influence, apparently supreme, over Amphipolis, which we find attributed to the Macedonian government, whether that of Philip or Argæus, at the death of Perdiccas.

Such then, so far as we are able to collect it from the scattered and very imperfect accounts remaining of these events, appears to have been the state of affairs in this quarter, when Philip, having relieved himself from the embarrassments which crowded on him in the outset, was no longer diverted by any more pressing cares from the execution of the designs which he had formed against Amphipolis. There were however three parties to be considered, from whom, though their interests were widely different, he might apprehend opposition: Athens, Olynthus, and the people of Amphipolis itself. A coalition between Athens and Olynthus for the defence of Amphipolis might not only defeat his project, but raise an insurmountable obstacle to all his ambitious views: and even either singly might be able to supply Amphipolis with the means of effectual resistance. A difficulty of another kind arose from the footing on which he had hitherto stood with the Amphipolitans. At the time when he declared them independent, he must have been regarded as their protector and ally; and that act, even if it did not excite their gratitude, cannot have abated their goodwill toward him. But

¹ Polyænus, iii. 10. 8. We know of no other period to which the story can be referred.

the mere ascendancy of his party in the city, founded on such feelings, was probably not enough to satisfy his aims: he wished to rule there as master, and therefore to establish his authority on the right of conquest. It was necessary for this purpose that he should break with the Amphipolitans. Whether he used any artifices to accomplish this end, or the collision of parties spared him the need of such a disingenuous proceeding, and furnished him with a welcome pretext for hostilities, we do not pretend to determine. Diodorus merely relates that the Amphipolitans were alienated from him, and afforded him many handles for war.¹ This statement is equally consistent with either supposition; but that their conduct, whatever it may have been, really provoked him to attack them, when they would otherwise have been left unmolested, is an absurdity too childish for any but a fanatical partisan, such as Philip would have desired for a dupe, but would have deprecated as a historian of his actions.

After the repulse of Timotheus the Athenian interest at Amphipolis must have sunk lower than ever; and even when the amicable relations which then subsisted between the city and Macedonia had ceased, and made way for unfriendly dispositions, if not for open hostility, still it does not appear that the party which then became predominant was connected with Athens. The Athenians, as we shall see, considered themselves as entirely excluded from the place, and had but little immediate prospect of recovering it by their own arms. It is therefore most probable that it was a party attached to Olynthus that now prevailed, and had drawn the city into the quarrel with Philip. As soon as he had

¹ xvi. 8. πολλὰς ἀφορμὰς δόντων εἰς πόλεμον. For readers even but moderately familiar with the language, it is hardly necessary to point out that the word *causas*, in the translation in Wesseling's edition, does not adequately express the meaning of ἀφορμὰς. The passage therefore does not warrant the statement, that "the party adverse to the Macedonian interest, holding the principal power in the city, proceeded to violences which are no otherwise described by the historian than as very offensive, and giving large and repeated provocation for the direction of the Macedonian arms against them." Yet Wesseling has a note on the passage, which might have enlightened the writer's ignorance, if he was misled by the Latin translation.

declared his purpose of reducing it by force, the Olynthians were the first to take measures for repelling his attempt; and as their own strength was hardly sufficient for the contest, they sent envoys to invite the Athenians to enter into a league with them for the defence of what appeared to be their common interests.¹ They were probably surprised to find their overtures abruptly rejected. An intrigue which they could not have suspected, and which was carefully concealed, had been carried on for some time between Athens and Philip, and stifled the uneasiness which the Athenians would otherwise have felt at the danger of Amphipolis. Philip found means to persuade them that he did not intend to keep the place, but, as soon as he had taken it, to restore it to them. This was the secret of a negotiation concerning which our information would have been still more deficient than it is, if it had not become very celebrated through the caution with which it was wrapt in mystery. We do not know when, or by which of the parties, it was opened. It may have been merely a continuation of that in which peace had been last concluded between them, when Philip had made professions with regard to Amphipolis, which called for some explanation, as soon as he began to threaten it with his arms. Demosthenes alludes to this famous secret,² but only discloses so much of it as was necessary to convict Philip of fraud: another very important part of the transaction which he suppresses — conscious perhaps that it was not honourable to the Athenians — has fortunately been preserved in a fragment of Theopompus.³ From him we learn that Antiphon and Charidemus⁴ were sent on an embassy to Philip, avowedly with the general purpose of drawing the bonds of amity closer

¹ Demosthenes Olynth. ii. § 6.

² τὸ θολοίμετόν ποτι ἀπίσθηται. u. s.

³ Preserved, from the thirty-first book of his history, by Suidas *τῶ ἰεροῦ τῶ ἐν σ.* Tom. iii. p. 467.

⁴ Of course a different person from the adventurer of Oreus. We must own ourselves surprised by Wachsmuth's observation (l. 2. p. 341. n. 35.) "that he does not see sufficient ground for distinguishing the Eubœan Charidemus from an Athenian demagogue of the same name." Other occasions will occur in which it is scarcely possible to confound them.

between him and the republic.¹ But they had secret instructions, and apparently large powers, to treat with him for Amphipolis. Without such authority they probably would not have ventured to make such an offer as they are reported to have made to him: or even to have accepted the proposal, if it proceeded from him. They are said to have promised that, if he would make the Athenians master of Amphipolis, they would put him in possession of Pydna.

Pydna, as we have already mentioned, had revolted from Archelaus, and, when he had reduced it to submission with the assistance of the Athenians, had been transferred by him to a site a little farther removed from the sea. It seems probable that the inhabitants took advantage of the weakness of the Macedonian government in the reign of Amyntas, to shake off his authority.² They were brought over to the Athenian alliance, it is said, by Conon³, and perhaps at the same

¹ ἀράξοντας καὶ περὶ φιλίας.

² This supposition certainly appears difficult to reconcile with the singular fact mentioned by Aristides (*Σωμμ.* A. i. p. 715. Dindorf.) that the Pydnæans had a temple in honour of Amyntas, in which a perfidious massacre was perpetrated when they surrendered to Philip. The difficulty would be less, if we suppose them to have revolted in the latter part of the reign of Amyntas, and to have been afterwards admitted into the Athenian confederacy by Timotheus. This is at least an easier solution than the one proposed by M. Cousinery, *Voyage dans la Macédoine*, ii. p. 37., who states, that Pydna was conquered by Amyntas, but permitted to retain its independence, on account of its alliance with Athens; and that it was in gratitude for this favour, as Aristides informs us (where?), that they honoured him as a god.

³ But the only authority for this fact is a passage in an oration of Dinarchus c. Demosth. p. 91. And when we compare the account there given of Conon's exploits with the enumeration of those of Timotheus in Isocrates (*π. ἀντιδ.* § 115.), it seems difficult to repress a suspicion, though I have not seen it expressed before, that the genitive λαζόντος has been substituted for the dative λαζόντι, which would refer the conquests there attributed to Conon, to Timotheus. It is true that Diodorus (xiv. 84.) likewise mentions a number of cities which were in some sense acquired for Athens by Conon: but it is remarkable that his list does not contain one of the names mentioned by Dinarchus, nor does he give any hint that in the course of this expedition Conon—who was still in company with Pharnabazus—visited the coast of Macedonia or Thrace. Indeed his description almost excludes the supposition of that fact. Then, if we look again at the passage of Dinarchus, it seems strange, to say the least, that, when the orator's purpose was to represent the services of Timotheus, he should mention only one—the voyage round Peloponnesus which ended in the conquest of Corcyra—should then proceed to enumerate the conquests made by Conon, and yet, as if the exploits just described had been those of his son, should speak of the *ἰσχυρίσας* of Timotheus. But moreover the number of cities taken—according to the present text of Dinarchus—by Conon (Samos, Methone, Pydna, Potidæa, and twenty others) is exactly

time returned to their old maritime position. We are however inclined to suspect, for reasons which we have assigned in a note, that this acquisition was made by Timotheus. They could not have been surrendered to their ancient masters by the Athenians without a gross breach of faith; and the discovery of such a design would probably have defeated it, as it would immediately have dissolved their alliance with Athens, and there is no reason to suppose that their town was occupied by an Athenian garrison. For Philip a seaport so near the confines of Thessaly was a point of great moment; but his main object was undoubtedly not to acquire it by such means, but to cajole the Athenians, until he should have effected the more important conquest of Amphipolis. The ambassadors on their return were permitted to make their report secretly to the Council of Five Hundred. The people appear to have been for some time satisfied with a general assurance, which was probably itself made as little public as possible, that Amphipolis was to be ceded to them. There was hardly any price at which they would not have been willing to purchase it; and therefore about the terms they were curious, but not uneasy. Thus it was that the Olynthian envoys were dismissed, and the Olynthians found that, if they wished to defend Amphipolis, they must prepare to sustain a conflict with Macedonia alone. Philip however thought it advisable to conciliate them, and to purchase their acquiescence, rather than hazard a trial of strength. The town of Anthemus — the situation of which does not seem to be yet well ascertained¹ —

the same as the number mentioned by Isocrates, of the cities conquered by Timotheus (τιμοθέου καὶ ἰσοκράτους πάλαι κερταίους ὑμᾶς ἰσχυρίσται). This coincidence appears to me so decisive, that I think a future editor of Dinarachus would be justified, even if no manuscript authority should be found, in introducing the reading λαβέειν in the text. Yet Boeckh (iii. c. 17.) supplies the account of Dinarachus from Diodorus without any misgiving.

¹ This remark is thrown out for the purpose of directing the attention of qualified judges to the question: whether the Anthemus which was ceded by Philip to the Olynthians, and which had been an object of contention between them and his predecessors, can have been the inland town, the site of which — on the borders of Mygdonia near the flowery margin of the lake Langaza — is described by Cousinery (i. p. 112.) and Leake (*Northern Greece*, iii. p. 450.), and which gave its name to a division of the

had always been claimed by his predecessors, though sometimes subject to Olynthus. It was probably at this time in his hands: for in the successful war in which Perdiccas had cooperated with Timotheus against Olynthus, it would certainly not have been allowed to remain — if it had previously been — in the enemy's power. He now gave it up to the Olynthians, who were so much gratified by this unexpected concession, that it would have been vain to attempt to instigate them against him, especially in an enterprise of so much risk and difficulty as the defence of Amphipolis. He therefore proceeded without interruption to lay siege to the town. Diodorus would lead us to suppose that he achieved the conquest speedily: that he made a breach with his engines, and so, after a great slaughter among the troops which manned the walls, took it by storm. But this seems to be a too summary, if not an erroneous account of his operations. From better authority we know, that when the danger was felt to be pressing at Amphipolis, and no hope remained of succour from Olynthus, an embassy headed by Hierax and Stratocles — who appear to have been chiefs of the party devoted to the Athenian interest — was sent to Athens, with an offer to surrender the city to the Athenians.¹ It was perhaps to counteract this application, that Philip thought it expedient to renew the promise which he had made to the Athenian envoys, in explicit terms, by

Macedonian cavalry, the *ἄλλ' Ἀσθίμουρα*. What can have been the origin of the claim set up by Olynthus to a district so remote? Are we to seek it in the grant of land near lake Bolbe — which is in the same vale with Langaza — made by Perdiccas II. to the inhabitants of the Chalcidian towns, who abandoned their habitations, and settled in Olynthus (Thuc. i. 58.). This grant indeed was only to hold for a time — as long as the war with Athens should last. But length of possession may have seemed to create a right which Olynthus may have asserted. It is remarkable that Leland (Philip, i. p. 106.), probably in entire ignorance of the geography, but with a correct tact, describes Anthemus as a city which separated Olynthus from the sea. A maritime position appears also to be required for the Anthemus which Amyntas offered to Hippias, at the same time that the Thessalians offered him Iolcus. (Herod. v. 94.) Mueller, in his map of Macedonia, places Anthemus on the coast south of Therma: but he does not notice any other. If it was ascertained that the Strepsa mentioned by Æschines (De F. L. p. 31.) was a maritime town, there could be no doubt that Anthemus was so too.

¹ Demosth. Olynth. i. p. 11.

a letter addressed to the people.¹ Yet it appears that the proposals of the Amphipolitans might not have been rejected, if the attention of the Athenians had not been drawn away, by events which we shall shortly have to relate, toward a different quarter. As it was, they cast themselves upon Philip's word, and allowed him to make himself master of Amphipolis without opposition. Whether after all he took it, as Diodorus states, by assault, or, as Demosthenes intimates², by means of a correspondence which he kept up with his partisans within, is a point which we cannot determine, and of small importance. No less difficult is it to ascertain the real foundation of the accounts which we find of his treatment of the conquered. That of Diodorus is in itself highly probable: that he banished the citizens who had distinguished themselves by their opposition to his interests, but dealt mildly with the rest. It is confirmed by an inscription still extant among the ruins of Amphipolis, which records a decree of perpetual banishment, and confiscation of property, against Stratocles — probably the ambassador above mentioned — and one Philo, and their children; and threatens all who should give them shelter in the city, or attempt to procure the repeal of the decree, with the like penalty.³ Demosthenes on the other hand alludes to the event in a manner which implies, that instead of rewarding those who had betrayed their fellow citizens, he treated them with great rigour⁴: that he put them to death is perhaps only a conjectural explanation of the orator's meaning.⁵ The fact may have been, that he did not screen them from the vengeance of their political adversaries.

The conquest of Amphipolis did not immediately make a breach between him and the Athenians. It remained to be seen whether he would perform his promise; but according to the secret compact he was

¹ Demosth. c. Aristocr. p. 659. π. Αλο. § 28.

² Olynth. i. p. 11. Ἀμφιπολιτῶν τοὺς παραιδόντας αὐτῷ τὴν πόλιν.

³ Leake, iii. p. 187. ⁴ u. s. ⁵ Given by the Greek Scholiast.

not bound to do so before he was put in possession of Pydna. Whether any steps were taken for this purpose by the Athenian government we do not know. Philip probably did not allow time for them. He appears to have marched against Pydna immediately after the fall of Amphipolis, and either through terror or treachery¹ was admitted into the town. If the Pydnæans had been informed of the agreement by which their independence was to be sacrificed, it would not be surprising that they should have thrown open their gates. That he exercised any unnecessary severity toward them, is certainly not to be believed on the authority of a rhetorician who lived many centuries later²; but it would not be incredible, that at the moment of occupation some blood was shed in a military or political tumult, which may have given Demosthenes occasion for an allusion to Philip's conduct, exactly like that which he makes on the subject of Amphipolis.³ He of course considered himself as no longer bound by his promise; and it seems to have been given in such terms, that, though it furnished the Athenian orators with a topic of invective against his duplicity, it could not be regarded even at Athens as ground for a demand.⁴ The resentment excited there by the disappointment was probably the greater on this account: the people, so far as it understood the transaction, felt itself to have been not only injured, but overreached. It is a little surprising that we do not hear that it vented its anger upon any of the persons who had conducted the negotiation on its behalf. But Philip was henceforth viewed as an open enemy, and this was the beginning — though without any formal declaration — of a state of hostility between the two powers, which was called, from its origin, the Amphipolitan War.

¹ Demosth. Lept. p. 476. *οἱ προδόντες τὴν Πύδναν καὶ τὰλλα χωρία τῷ Φιλίππῳ.* ² Aristides, u. s. ³ Olynth. i. p. 11.

⁴ Hence Æschines was not able to take any notice of it before Philip in his argument, reported by himself (De F. L. § 36.) in defence of the Athenian title to Amphipolis.

Philip was aware that he could not hope any longer to pacify the Athenians by words; and all that he could do was to guard against the effects of their enmity. He seems to have been still afraid lest a league should be formed against him between Athens and Olynthus, and resolved to avert the danger by bestowing another boon on the Olynthians, which should at the same time strongly attach them to him, and separate them more widely than ever from Athens. He knew that they longed to recover Potidæa, and encouraged them to attack it by a promise of assistance. It was held by an Athenian garrison, but was forced to yield to the united forces of the allies. It seems as if he still wished it to be believed that he had not acted with any hostile intentions toward Athens, and was desirous of preserving peace. He forced indeed the Athenian settlers to withdraw, and put the Olynthians in possession of their lands and houses: but he treated the garrison in the most gracious manner, and sent it back to Athens. The loss of Potidæa was the more keenly felt there, as it must have deprived a great number of citizens of their whole property. An expedition was decreed for the relief of the place; but, if it was sent out, it arrived too late.¹ Its fall was attributed, like that of Amphipolis and Pydna, to treachery. But as this was a supposition which soothed the people under such misfortunes, and served as a plea to shelter its servants, when they failed in any undertaking, from its displeasure, it must be received with caution.

What interval may have elapsed between the capture

¹ Demosth. 1. Olynth. § 9. 1. Philipp. § 40. The first of these passages is cited by Sainte-Croix, *Examen*, &c. p. 589. to prove that the siege of Potidæa lasted long, and that the inhabitants made an obstinate defence. It is surprising that an assertion resting on so infirm an argument should have been adopted by Schiosser (l. 3. p. 52.) But in this part of his narrative Schiosser himself has committed some oversights very unusual with him. We are, for instance, nowhere informed that the Olynthians assisted Philip to take Pydna; and it is certain that Pydna was taken before Potidæa; but it was not the garrison of Pydna, where, as we have observed in the text, the Athenians are not known to have maintained any, but that of Potidæa, that Philip so liberally dismissed. The confusion between the names Pydna and Potidæa in the text of Diodorus (xvi. 8.) arose, we fear, from the author, not from a transcriber.

of Pydna and that of Potidæa, is a question on which chronologers are at variance. It would perhaps imply an extraordinary rapidity in Philip's operations to suppose that both these places were taken in the same year with Amphipolis, as the narrative of Diodorus represents.¹ On the other hand, there is reason to believe that the three events came close upon one another, and we therefore find it difficult to adopt a tradition recorded by Plutarch, which would fix the fall of Potidæa in the early part or about the middle of the year 356, very near the beginning of the hundred and sixth Olympiad. Plutarch relates², that Philip had just taken Potidæa, when he received intelligence of three other happy events: a victory won by his chariot at the Olympic games; another gained by his general Parmenio over the Illyrians; and the birth of his son Alexander, the prince who was to succeed him on the throne, and to fill the world with his fame. The prize in the chariot-race is not unworthy of notice, as it shows Philip's anxiety to claim the privileges of a Greek, and to acquire reputation among the Greeks by a kind of display suited to the national taste. Parmenio's campaign was evidently connected with a league, which, according to Diodorus, was formed against Philip, in the first year of the hundred and sixth Olympiad, between the kings of Illyria, Pæonia, and Thrace; though he describes Philip as crushing it by an expedition which he made against them in person, while their preparations were yet incomplete. It may however be asked, if Diodorus was mistaken in this point, and the victory was really gained

¹ Sainte-Croix's objection to this inference, grounded on the expression: *αὐτῆς δὲ ἐπὶ τὰς εὐτυχίας ἀρχῆς μετακλίσεως τὸν λόγον*, in Diodorus (xvi. 8.), seems to us no less futile than his argument mentioned in the last note.

² Alex. 3. Mr. Clinton (F. H. ii. p. 124.) seems to think the authority of Plutarch decisive; and we should be of the same opinion, if no better reason could be alledged against it, than the singularity of the coincidence, which alone is urged by Schlosser (u. s.), and a French writer whom he quotes, as a ground for doubting the fact. Our doubt arises from the consideration, that there is no apparent reason why Philip should have delayed so long to attack Potidæa after the capture of Amphipolis and Pydna, when it evidently became his interest to set Olynthus at enmity with Athens.

by Parmenio, what was the engagement which prevented Philip from taking the field according to his custom. If we adopt Plutarch's statement, we must of course suppose that he was occupied with the siege of Potidæa. But it is not necessary to resort to this explanation: for we are informed that, soon after he had reduced Potidæa, he undertook another expedition, with a very important object, which he seems to have had in view when he first meditated the conquest of Amphipolis. This was to make himself master of the mine-district of Pangæus, which begins on the left bank of the Strymon, and had hitherto been in the hands sometimes of the native Thracian tribes, at others of the Thasians, or the Athenians. The Thasians were now in possession of the most valuable portion of it, and only three or four years before had formed a new settlement in a place called Crenides—from its situation on a hill abounding with springs—in a plain at the eastern foot of Pangæus, which it separates from a part of the range of Hæmus. We do not hear that Philip thought it necessary to alledge any pretext for this invasion. If the Thasians had dislodged one of the tribes of Hæmus¹, when they settled at Crenides, he might think that so recent an occupation conferred no title which he was bound to respect: or he may have chosen to consider them as allies of Athens, whose territory might lawfully become his by right of conquest. They were not in a condition to offer any resistance, and it does not appear that any of them were driven out of their habitations. They were only compelled to receive a numerous colony of new settlers, probably Macedonians, whom Philip sent to share the land with them. The importance of the place thus enlarged into a considerable city was marked by the new name of Philippi, with which he honoured it: a name destined to become more memorable after his kingdom had become a Roman province.

The mines which had attracted the Thasians he of course seized as crown property; and he employed so

¹ The Satræ, as Cousinery endeavours to prove, ii. p. 101.

much more skill or labour than had hitherto been applied to the working of them, that they are said to have yielded an addition of a thousand talents to his revenue. This was probably the largest sum which he drew from any one mine. But it must not be concluded, because it was on this account particularly noticed, that this was all he derived from such sources. A single silver mine in Mygdonia or Bisaltia had formerly produced a talent a day to his ancestor Alexander I.¹ The mines of Crenides, which had previously been in very low repute², must have been distinct from those of Datus³, which were not indeed very far distant, but nearer the sea, and were much earlier celebrated and coveted for their extraordinary productiveness—as they undoubtedly were from those of Scapte Hyle, in which the property of Thucydides lay. Datus was proverbial for the fertility of its soil, for the richness of its gold-works, and for the convenience it offered for ship-building.⁴ It seems to have been first colonised by the Thasians — whose island stretched across the Pierian gulf over against it — and afterwards by the Athenians. If, as is probable, it was the same town as Neapolis⁵, it might

¹ Herod. v. 17. See Leake, Northern Greece, iii. p. 212.

² παντλῶς λιτὰ καὶ ἄδοξα ταῖς κατασκευαίς, Diodor. xvi. 8.

³ We can perceive no ground for Cousinery's assertion (ii. p. 101. n. 3.): "Observons que Diodore de Sicile, qui parait avoir été copié par Arrien (he means Appian, B. C. iv. 105.) confond la ville de Datus avec Crénidès, lorsqu'il attribue à cette dernière ville toutes les richesses que Philippe retirait généralement des mines du Pangée." How does it appear that Diodorus does this?

⁴ Strabo, Epit. l. vii. p. 331.

⁵ According to Leake's opinion (North. Greece, iii. p. 224.). Cousinery, in his disquisition about Datus (ii. p. 99.) seems entirely to have overlooked the ναυπήγια mentioned by Strabo, which prove that it was a maritime town, as it is described by Eustathius ad Dionys. p. 517. πάλιν ἰδοῦσθαι πρὸς τὴν τοῦ Στρυμόνος παραλίαν.—With singular inaccuracy he supposes that the colony founded by Athenodorus and Callistratus (according to Isocrates De Pac. p. 164. a) was no other than Neapolis (p. 122.), though he had before said (p. 100.): "Isocrate assure qu'Athenodore et un nommé Callistrate (!) qui était banni d'Athènes, établirent à Datus une colonie." Yet he all along supposes Datus and Neapolis to have been different places. Isocrates, as every body knows, does not name the place where Callistratus founded his settlement, but only describes it as in some part of Thrace. Mr. Clinton (F. H. ii. p. 127.) supposes it to have been in the Thracian Chersonesus. But this is inconsistent with the language of Isocrates, who makes a clear distinction between the Chersonesus, which he had mentioned p. 163. d., and the rest of Thrace, καὶ τῆς Θερσάκης, where Athenodorus and Callistratus had been able to found cities.

be looked upon as the port of Crenides, and there can be little doubt that it was seized by Philip at the same time. Philippi itself was chiefly valuable, not on account of its gold mines, or of the adjacent fruitful plain, but as a military position, which commanded the passes leading into the vale of the Nestus, and so opened the way to a number of objects in the north of the Ægean, which had already — as the sequel leads us to believe — begun to inflame Philip's ambition, while it secured those which had been just acquired from the inroads of the Thracian hordes. Yet what has been said may be sufficient to show the futility of the objections which have been raised in modern times to the uniform tradition of antiquity, as to the bribery practised by Philip, on the ground that he did not possess means sufficient for it.¹ If he was not rich, it was only because his expenditure was large. We are not indeed able to form any estimate of the amount of his revenue, but it is evident that — unlike that of Athens — it rested on a secure basis, and was continually increasing through the whole course of his reign. It was perhaps in these conquests that he was engaged, while Parmenio was commanding his forces against the confederacy of the northern barbarians. The establishment of the military colony at Philippi may have made a pause in his progress in this direction.² He had paved the way for future conquests, which he might push as far as he would ; but the season for them had not arrived. They would only have excited a jealousy among the Greeks

¹ It has been asserted, with the usual confidence of a writer, whose assertions cost him neither trouble nor scruple, that "it was enough known that Macedonia, though greatly raised in power, and rapidly thriving in circumstances, was yet a poor country: and to talk of Macedonian gold as all-powerful would have been considered as irony." Yet at the very time when this is said to have been known, Isocrates could tell Philip that he addressed him (among other reasons) on account of his pre-eminence both in wealth and power, which afforded him means both of persuasion and compulsion: *καὶ πλοῦτον καὶ δύναμιν κερημίων ὄσσην οὐδεὶς τῶν Ἑλλήνων, ἃ μόνον τῶν ὄντων καὶ πείθειν καὶ βιάζεσθαι πέφυκεν*, Philip. § 17., and again, § 156., Philip himself intimates pretty clearly that he did not want the means of bribery, in his letter, § 22.

² Yet it is possible that the expedition related by Theopompus in the first book of the Philippics (Athenæus, xii. c. 42.) may have been made at this time: though he seems to have been speaking of Cotys as still living.

which might injure his interest more than they could promote it. Greatly as he had now increased his power and his resources, he was aware that he could yet do nothing against Greece, and that he could be nothing without Greece. It was in and through Greece that he had to seek the highest objects of his ambition. He had to make Macedonia a Grecian state of the first magnitude, and then to try if it could not swallow up the rest. For this purpose it was expedient that he should wait quietly for an opportunity of interfering with advantage in Grecian affairs. And so he appears to have rested awhile from military enterprises; but we may be sure that the interval was not idly spent; it was probably now that he began to lay the foundation of a marine, for which his recent conquests afforded abundant materials, not perhaps in the hope of commanding the sea, but with the view of protecting his own coasts and commerce, and of annoying the Athenians. Here for a time we must drop the narrative of his actions, to relate a series of events, which, without his cooperation, contributed more to his final triumph than any of the victories and conquests which he had hitherto achieved.

That the state of things out of which these events arose may be more clearly understood, it will be necessary to go back into the history of the new confederacy, into which Athens had begun, as we have seen, to draw some of her old allies in 377, soon after she had entered for the second time into alliance with Thebes against Sparta. The states which first acceded to it were Chios, Byzantium, Rhodes, and Mitylene. They appear to have joined it spontaneously, disgusted with the treatment they had received from Sparta, and remembering the mild and equitable proceedings of Conon and Thrasylbulus, whose example they had reason to hope would be followed by Conon's son, and by the other able men whom they might expect to see in the command of the Athenian forces. We have seen what care was taken to secure their confidence by the conditions

of the league, which were expressly framed to guard against the recurrence of the old abuses.¹ The participation of Thebes afforded an additional safeguard against the encroachments of the leading maritime power. The Thebans however no sooner saw their territory delivered from the terror of the Spartan invasion, than they began to direct their attention to the reestablishment of their authority in Bœotia, neglected the interests which they had in common with Athens, and withheld the contributions which they had paid for a time to the charges of her navy, though it had been employed at their request for the purpose of effecting a diversion in their favour. It would seem therefore as if they no longer wished to be considered as members of the confederacy, in which they occupied a subordinate station, which was probably from the first mortifying to their pride, and only rendered tolerable by the temporary pressure of distress and danger. Yet when, after the momentary peace of 374, hostilities broke out afresh between Athens and Sparta, they sent a small squadron to join Timotheus, who however was to provide the pay.² But soon after, their connection with the Athenian confederacy was entirely and finally dissolved.

The change which the battle of Leuctra made in the relative position of all parties, was on the whole very favourable to the interests of Athens. Sparta was humbled, and weakened, and yet had to bear nearly the whole burden of the war. Attica was not invaded; and as the object of the Athenian policy was only to balance the power of Thebes, it did not require or permit any very costly exertions on behalf of an ally, who — as appears from the negotiation which took place after the Theban invasion of Laconia — was still

¹ See above, p. 42.

² The orator (in Timoth. p. 1188.) from whom alone we learn any thing about this squadron, does not mention its numbers. But we may infer that it was extremely small: since Timotheus, when pressed by the Bœotian captains for pay, was able to content them with 1000 drachmas = 10 minas. As 20 minas a month were required for the subsistence of a single galley, the half of this sum cannot have sufficed for more than five galleys above a couple of days.

regarded with jealousy. When the liberty of Thebes was threatened by Sparta after the recovery of the Cadmea, the Athenians, who felt that their own independence was at stake, had made extraordinary efforts and sacrifices. A new valuation of all private property had been made with a view to a more equable system of taxation¹: and though the burdens of the state were increased for a time, there can be no doubt that the result was beneficial to its finances. In the interval between the battles of Leuctra and Mantinea, it must have been continually gaining strength both at home and abroad. Its agriculture and commerce experienced no interruption, and the confederacy over which it presided received the addition of several very important members. Most of these acquisitions were due to Timotheus, whose upright and amiable character effected perhaps as many conquests as his military talents. The praise bestowed on him by his friend Isocrates², who accompanied him in some of his campaigns, wrote his despatches, and was munificently rewarded by him³, must be cautiously interpreted. But it affords ground for believing that he used no unnecessary violence, treated conquered enemies with mildness, and neutral states with openness and moderation, and every where maintained strict discipline among his troops. The reputation which he acquired by these means, it is said by his panegyrist, induced many cities which had previously been ill-disposed towards Athens, to throw open their gates to him. There are however two points, as to which we should have desired some more particular information than Isocrates has thought fit to communicate. He extols the ability displayed by Timotheus in several important conquests, which he made without any supplies from the Athenian treasury. But he does not explain how this could be done without violence

¹ For the nature of this valuation, which was made in the archonship of Nausinicus, the reader who desires the fullest information will of course consult Boeckh's admirable discussion (*Public Ec. of Athens*, iv. c. 4).

² *τις ἀντιδ.* § 114—136.

³ *Vite X. Orat. Isocrates.*

and wrong inflicted somewhere or other ; and he leaves us to conjecture that the means were furnished by plunder, or forced contributions, levied from the inhabitants of the Asiatic coast. He also praises the forbearance and delicacy with which his hero treated neutral Greek cities. But he has neglected to mention under what pretext he compelled those which he conquered to join the Athenian confederacy. And we can only suspect that he took advantage of their political dissensions, and, professing to side with one party, reduced all to submission.

According to Isocrates, whose calculation is confirmed as we have seen by Dinarchus, the number of the cities which he brought into subjection to Athens amounted to twenty-four. Æschines indeed, speaking without any apparent intention of eulogising Timotheus, asserts that he acquired seventy-five.¹ But as the whole number of the cities which became members of the new confederacy is stated by Diodorus at seventy², it must be supposed that it did not exceed seventy-five, and that the orator only mentioned Timotheus, because his services were the most celebrated. It is besides certain that many were added to the congress by other generals : as it is related of Chabrias by Demosthenes³, that he took seventeen ; and we may safely presume that Iphicrates had many similar victories to recount. In the year 362 Timotheus, with the help of the Persian satrap Ariobarzanes, as we shall soon have occasion to mention again, obtained possession of the Hellespontine towns Sestus and Crithote ; and according to Isocrates this acquisition first inspired the Athenians with the hope of recovering the whole peninsula. It seems to have been not long after that he laid siege to Samos, which had been occupied by a Persian garrison⁴, with a fleet of thirty galleys, and with 8000 targeteers, and

¹ De F. L. § 73.

² xv. 30.

³ Lept. § 89. See also § 85., where he says that the Athenians were indebted to Chabrias for the alliance of most of the islands : and compare Diodorus, u. s.

⁴ Demosthenes, De Rhod. Lib. § 10.

reduced it to surrender at the end of eleven months. Isocrates, who was present, and is said to have received a talent for his share of the spoil, observes with admiration that he drew the whole pay and subsistence of his forces throughout the siege from the enemy's country.

Of the manner in which he wrested Potidæa and Torone from Olynthus, we have already spoken. Isocrates, we must remark, does not notice the cooperation of Perdiccas, but only informs us that Timotheus defrayed the whole expense himself, partly from his private resources, and partly from contributions raised in Thrace, meaning perhaps Thasos and its subject towns. We learn from other authors, that one of his expedients was to debase the Macedonian coin for a temporary medium of exchange.¹ Whether it was in the interval between this conquest, and his unsuccessful attempt upon Amphipolis, or at an earlier period, toward the end of the reign of Amyntas, that he annexed Pydna and Methone to the Athenian confederacy—if we may assume that this was his work—we cannot determine.

Thebes, though constantly occupied with the attempt to establish her supremacy in Greece on the ruin of Sparta, and though frequently engaged with the affairs of Macedonia and Thessaly, was not inattentive to the progress of the maritime power of Athens; and Epaminondas seems to have formed the design, which perhaps his death alone prevented him from executing, of transferring the sovereignty of the sea and the islands to his own city. But he probably would not have conceived this thought, if he had not known that some of the leading allies of Athens had begun to be disgusted with her: which implies that some of the old grievances had been already renewed. Diodorus says, that in the year before the battle of Mantinea he made a speech which induced the Thebans to pass a decree for the building of a hundred galleys, and an arsenal; and it

¹ Polyænus, iii. 10. 14. Compare § 1. of the same chapter, and Aristot. *Œconom.* ii. 2. 23.

must have been on this occasion that he used the bold figure reported by Æschines¹, that the propylæa of the Athenian Acropolis — the emblem of the imperial state of Athens — must be transferred to the Cadmea. The same decree directed that an attempt should be immediately made to detach Chios, Rhodes, and Byzantium, from the Athenian alliance; and Epaminondas was appointed to the command of a squadron destined to that object.² His force was strong enough to compel the Athenian admiral Laches, who had been sent against him, it is said, with a considerable armament, to withdraw; and Diodorus adds that he induced the three states to enter into an alliance with Thebes. This however must be exaggeration: otherwise we should have heard something about the event and the issue of the war. Only with regard to Byzantium we have other intimations, to be mentioned hereafter, which may be thought to confirm the statement of Diodorus. But the death of Epaminondas seems to have released Athens from all fear of Theban competition. Perhaps it also exposed her to new annoyance from another quarter: for in the same year her old ally, Alexander of Phæræ, as if sure that he should not again need her succour, ventured to fit out a squadron for piratical excursions, with which he took the chief town of the isle of Tenos, and enslaved the inhabitants; and in the year following he not only plundered some others of the Cyclades, and laid siege to Peparethus, but even landed a body of troops in Attica itself, and seized the port of Panormus,

¹ De F. L. § 111. Epaminondas ἴσκι διαβήδην ἐν τῷ πλῆθει τῶν Θεβαίων ὡς δὲ τὰ τῆς Ἀθηναίων ἀκροπόλεως προπύλαια μνηστεύειν εἰς τὴν προπύλαιον τῆς Καδμείας. Æschines himself uses a similar figure in Ctes. § 145., τὸ βουλευτήριον τὸ τῆς πόλεως μνηστεύειν εἰς τὴν Καδμείαν.

² This is probably the expedition alluded to by Isocrates, Phil. § 59. Θεβαίων . . εἰς Βυζάντιον πηχέρις ἰστισμῶν ὡς καὶ γῆς καὶ θαλάσσης ἀξέστοις. Schlosser (l. 2. p. 208.) throws out a doubt as to the naval force said to have been raised by Epaminondas, and the designs attributed to him. The strength of the armament which he commanded we have indeed no means of ascertaining. Of course it must not be estimated from the terms of the decree mentioned in the text, which perhaps was never carried into complete execution. But as to his projects, and the fact of the expedition, even if the statements of Diodorus were less precise and apparently trustworthy, the passages we have quoted from Æschines and Isocrates would be sufficient to remove all doubt.

a little eastward of Sunium. He was it seems defeated by the Athenian admiral Leosthenes, and forced to raise the siege of Peparethus; but he delivered his troops which were blockaded in Panormus, took five or six of the enemy's galleys, and, imitating the bold exploit of Teutias¹, sailed into Piræus, landed on the quay, plundered some counting-houses, and, before the forces of the city were raised, retreated in safety with the spoil. Leosthenes was charged with collusion, and sentenced to death, perhaps through the intrigues of Chares, who was appointed in his room.²

These expeditions of Alexander are significant in more than one point of view: partly as they show that Athens was not so completely mistress of the sea, as she had been in former times; and partly as an example of piracy on a large scale. This was an evil which henceforward continued to increase: but it was connected with another, one of the main causes of the ruin of Greece, which has already been slightly noticed, and will now claim more particular attention. We have had frequent occasion to mention the mercenary bands, which from the beginning of this century take a more and more prominent part in Grecian warfare. It was no doubt the long continuance of the Peloponnesian war, and the troubles which ensued, that called them into existence³; but it was not in the wars of Greece alone that they found employment, nor, it would seem, did these hold out the strongest temptation to needy adventurers to enter upon this course of life. Higher pay and richer plunder were to be found in Asia, where

¹ Vol. iv. p. 441.

² Diodorus xv. 95. Polyænus vi. 2. We have endeavoured in the text to reconcile these accounts, which at first sight may appear hardly consistent with each other. Diodorus does not expressly mention any victory gained by the Athenians over Alexander, on which Polyænus makes the tyrant's second stratagem to turn; but perhaps it may be implied in the words, 'Ἀθηναίων δὲ βοηθούστων τοῖς Περσέσι.' Demosthenes Pro Cor. Tr. § 9. alludes to the seafight in which the Athenians had been defeated by Alexander.

³ The Arcadians mentioned by Herodotus viii. 26. (ἐλπίσι τοῖσι) are, as Wachsmuth remarks, an earlier example of the practice; but it is one which does not affect the general truth of the observation in the text.

the disturbed state of the Persian empire created almost continual occasions for the services of Greek auxiliaries, whose superiority in arms was universally acknowledged by the barbarians. Hence the number of persons who devoted themselves to an occupation which attracted ardent spirits by its dangers and vicissitudes, as well as the more sordid by the prospect of gain and pleasure, was constantly increasing; there was no state which might not carry on war with such troops, if it could only find means of maintaining them: and their regular training and experience perhaps gave them an advantage over the native militia of most cities. By Sparta and Thebes, which assiduously cultivated the art of war, and grounded all their pretensions to political pre-eminence on their military strength, they were very sparingly employed. But Athens began early to make frequent use of them, and by degrees fell into the practice of employing them oftener than her own citizens, and sometimes alone.

The pernicious effects of this system soon became manifest in a variety of ways. A greater number of citizens remained at home, not however engaged in useful industry, but subsisting chiefly on the pittance granted for their attendance in the assembly and the tribunals, and on the largesses which many of the numberless festivals brought with them, along with the shows and other pleasures of the day. And this was no doubt the main motive which led to the preference of mercenaries for military service. On the other hand these men communicated their dissolute habits to the citizens who served in the same camp, and thus contributed to corrupt the manners of the city more deeply than ever. These may perhaps be considered as the most direct causes of that visible increase of dissipation and licentiousness, which struck a Greek historian of this period in the character of Athenian society.¹ But in a political point of view the most important effect of this change of system was that which it produced on

¹ Theopompus ap. Athenæum, xii. 48. Compare Justin. vi. 9.

the Athenian generals, who collected and commanded these mercenary troops in the service of the commonwealth. They were led to consider themselves very nearly in the same light as the men who made the collecting and commanding of such forces a profession, and to adopt their views, and follow their example. The mercenary leaders, whatever might be the variety of their talents and characters, all perfectly resembled one another in one point. They had broken the ties which bound them to their native cities: they were under no controul, and had nothing to hope and fear from their fellow-citizens: their sole object was to secure their independence, and to establish themselves in opulence and power elsewhere. There were two roads by which they were often able to attain this object. The foreign princes into whose service they entered were frequently willing to attach them to their interests by a domestic alliance, and an honourable settlement.¹ Thus it was that Seuthes would have detained Xenophon, offering him the hand of one of his daughters, and one of his most valuable towns near the coast.² Several other instances of this kind will shortly occur to us. Another very common mode of accomplishing their wishes, was to seize some fortified town, and to erect a tyranny in it. So Charidemus, after he had quitted the Athenian service, crossed over to Asia, and made himself master of the towns of Scepsis, Cebren, and Ilium.³ He was encouraged to make this attempt by the unsettled state of the province, which was an object of contest between two rival Persian satraps. But like opportunities were frequently offered on the coast of Asia, which held out the strongest temptations to these adventurers, by the fertility of the soil, and the wealth of the cities. The orators of this age represent such acts of violence as having become an ordinary practise. "You know," the speaker says in an oration of Demosthenes delivered

¹ Another point of resemblance to the Italian *condottieri*.

² Vol. iv. p. 356.

³ Demosthenes *Aristocr.* § 181.

in 352, that all these chiefs of mercenaries make it their aim to take possession of Greek cities and to rule in them, and that they go ranging about, and everywhere conducting themselves as the common enemies of all who wish to live in freedom according to their own laws.¹ Isocrates represents the inhabitants of the Asiatic coast as the principal sufferers, and enters into details, which show that the treatment they received from the freebooters into whose power they fell, was usually marked by the foulest excesses of wantonness and cruelty.²

It is however hardly possible to read the account which the same author, in a passage to which we have referred a few pages back, gives of the exploits of Timotheus, without observing, that the main points which distinguished the Athenian general from such men as Charidemus, were on the one hand his loyalty to Athens, and on the other the natural gentleness and moderation of his character, which prevented him from inflicting any wanton wrong. But in other respects he conducted his operations very much after the manner of the mercenary chiefs, and was not scrupulous as to the means of finding pay for his troops. It was to be supposed that other generals placed in a like situation would be much less careful of the interests of Athens, and would pay much less regard to the feelings of the Greeks who might be subject to their pleasure. Accordingly we find that Iphicrates and Chabrias spent much of their time in foreign service, and not only without any respect to the interests of Athens, but sometimes in direct opposition to them. At a time when it was very desirable for Athens to cultivate the friendship of the Persian king, Chabrias, without asking permission from the people, accepted the command of the forces with which the revolted Egyptians were making war against him. He was compelled indeed to return by a threatening decree which was passed in compliance with the remonstrances of the Persian court³; but he was a man of

¹ Aristocr. § 162.

² Epist. ix.

³ Diodorus, xv. 29.

such dissolute and expensive habits, contracted most probably in his campaigns in the east, that even the liberty of Athens did not satisfy him, and he resided as much as he was able abroad.¹ Iphicrates ventured still more openly to drop the character of an Athenian citizen, when it would have imposed an inconvenient restraint upon him. He not only entered into the service of Cotys, and married one of his daughters, but aided him in several acts of unequivocal hostility against his country. Yet he was suffered to retain the rewards which had been bestowed upon him for his past deserts, apparently on the same ground which rendered the Athenians so indulgent to Charidemus. Chares, whom we have hitherto had but little occasion to notice, but who will hereafter be seen taking a very prominent part in the history of these times, seems to have been inferior in military and political abilities to the three men just mentioned, and much less under the restraint of any motives of patriotism or honour. He was too indolent and too much addicted to pleasure to be keenly sensible to the spur of ambition, and was perfectly reckless as to the choice of the means by which he might gratify his inclinations. Of him, as well as of Timotheus, Chabrias, and Iphicrates, it was observed by Theopompus, that he preferred sojourning in foreign parts to living at Athens: and that Sigeum, near the mouth of the Hellespont, was his ordinary residence. The historian indeed puts this remark in a general form, as applying to all the eminent men of Athens: and attributes the fact to the intractable temper of the people. But as the examples he adduces all belong to this period — except that of Conon which is manifestly irrelevant — we may be allowed to believe that the cause was not one which had existed long before, and at least not in a slighter degree, but one peculiar to this age: and it may be most easily traced to the change which we have been noticing in the Athenian military system. As the commander of a mercenary force, an Athenian general,

¹ Theopompus ap. Atheus. xii. 43.

so long as he could keep his troops together, possessed almost absolute authority, as far as his power reached. As the chief witnesses of his conduct were strangers, who were generally benefited by his worst proceedings, he was seldom liable to be called to account at home, unless he very grossly betrayed or thwarted the interests of the commonwealth. The Athenians were not capable of feeling much concern for the sufferings of others, and were easily induced to connive at a wrong by which they did not lose, still more easily at one by which they gained. They paid little heed to the complaints of their allies, so long as their contributions were regularly brought in, still less to those of any other foreigners. Chares adopted an expedient, which, if not absolutely new, seems never to have been so largely employed before, to obtain impunity and favour with the people. He spent a part of the sums which he received, and which ought either to have been paid into the treasury, or applied to the service of the state, to gain some of the venal orators, and to influence the proceedings of the tribunals.¹ By these arts, and by promises which became proverbial from the readiness with which he made and broke them², he was enabled to squander the public money on his dissolute pleasures, and still to be accounted a useful and trusty servant of the commonwealth.

In a country like Greece the increase of piracy was necessarily connected with such a military system as we have described. Every freebooter was, or might easily become, a pirate; as Charidemus is said to have begun his career as the captain of a pirate vessel.³ Athens, as mistress of the sea, and chief of a great maritime confederacy, ought to have removed this nuisance, or at least was bound to protect her allies from it. But her negligence, or that of her commanders, who were themselves often engaged in a kind of warfare not much more

¹ Theopompus in Athenæus. u. s.

² Χάρεςτος ὁραχίστος. Suidas.

³ Demosthenes Aristocr. § 173.

legitimate, suffered it to gain ground, until, as we shall see in the sequel, it acquired a certain degree of political importance.

It is easy to conceive that out of this state of things many causes of discontent may have arisen to alienate the members of the confederacy from Athens. Among them we may notice an abuse which had crept into the naval service. It became not unusual for the citizens on whom the duties of the trierarchy devolved, to transfer them to those who were willing to undertake them at the lowest rate. By such a bargain the trierarch, who always received a certain sum from the state, might often be a gainer, independently of the exemption he enjoyed from personal trouble and risk. The other party was commonly, it seems, a needy adventurer, whose object it was to get all he could by rapine and extortion. The trierarchs indeed were liable to be called to account for the misconduct of their substitutes¹: but the lawfulness of the practice seems hardly to have been disputed: and the cases in which it was attended with danger to them, were not those in which the evils it produced fell upon the allies of Athens. It may well be supposed that they were the more sensitive to injuries and encroachments on their rights, as she was no longer the formidable power she had once been: and that the leading states watched the manner in which she observed the stipulations of the league, with a jealousy quickened by their sense of their own importance. As to any particular provocation however offered to any of them, history is silent; it is chiefly from some general allusions of Isocrates that we are able to collect, that the exactions of the Athenian generals, for the support of their mercenary troops, were among the principal causes of a war, which broke out in the year 357 between Athens and her allies, from whom it took the name of the Social War.² But before we enter upon the his-

¹ Dem. De Coron. Trier. § 9 & foll.

² *Παλ. σίγ.* § 588.

tory of this war, we must relate some transactions which immediately preceded it, and perhaps contributed in some degree to hasten its outbreaking.

Among all their ancient possessions there was none to which the Athenians looked with keener regret, and more anxious longing than to the Thracian Chersonesus : and from the time that their maritime power began to revive, the recovery of this province, which was still more important with a view to the commerce of the Euxine and its vicinity to Asia, than on account of the fertility of its territory, seems at least to have divided their attention and wishes with Amphipolis. When Sparta ceased to be able to protect it, it appears to have become for the most part subject to the king of Thrace : though Sestus, and perhaps some other towns, may have retained their independence. The reign of Cotys was frequently disturbed by insurrections and revolts, a fact which is sufficiently accounted for by his character. In these seasons of danger he usually endeavoured to conciliate the Athenians by friendly professions ; and at one time he so far gained their confidence, that they honoured him with their franchise, and even with a crown of gold. In or before the year 362¹, Miltocythes, who seems to have been a powerful and popular chieftain, revolted from him, engaged a part of the kingdom in rebellion, and made himself master of a stronghold called the Sacred Mountain. He sent an embassy to Athens, and offered to purchase the aid which he requested by the cession of the Chersonesus. His proposals were favourably received ; and it appears that the Athenian general Ergophilus, who was commanding off the coast of Thrace, was ordered to support him. Cotys, alarmed

¹ For (as we learn from Demosthenes Polycl. § 6. 16.) in Metageitnion, the second month of the Archonship of Molon (362) Meno was sent out to supersede Autocles, whose command only began (Demosthenes Aristocr. § 122.) after the war had lasted a long while (συγγένειά τε καὶ χρόνον) between Cotys and Miltocythes, and just as the decree was passed which drove the latter to despair. Hence the reader may estimate the anachronism involved in the conjecture, that this decree was that by which Charidemus was enabled to effect his retreat from Asia in the manner which we shall presently relate.

by this confederacy, addressed a letter to the Athenians¹, full of fair promises, which must have led them to believe that they might gain their object from him more easily than they could from Miltocythes. Ergophilus was recalled; Autocles was appointed in his room; and a decree was passed, the contents of which have not been reported, but which impressed Miltocythes with the persuasion that the Athenians had abandoned his cause. It may have been no other than that which conferred the franchise, or other honours, on Cotys. Its effect was so to dishearten Miltocythes, that he withdrew from the contest: Cotys recovered the Sacred Mountain, where he found a great treasure, and reduced the whole kingdom to obedience. The Athenians, it seems, had not expected, or desired, this result of their decree: and Autocles, who had probably only remained passive, was removed from his command, and brought to trial, on the charge of having caused the ruin of Miltocythes. Meno, and Timomachus, who succeeded him, were not able to repair the mischief, and a letter which Timomachus received from Cotys², showed that the Athenians could not reckon on any of his promises. In the great rebellion in which the principal satraps of western Asia engaged about the year 362, against the Persian court—which as it is not immediately connected with the affairs of Greece, we reserve for more particular notice in another place—Cotys seems to have shown himself hostile to the revolted satraps, not of course through

¹ Demosthenes *Aristocr.* § 137.

² The Athenians and their general were probably as little surprised by these letters from a prince, who cannot have been at a loss for a Greek secretary, as Philip may have been by that which he received from Cotys. But, the reader may ask, have I not been told on the authority of *Plut. Apophth.* that "the simple mention of a letter from Cotys excited wonder and ridicule among the Macedonians," and that "its contents drew a smile from the polite Philip." The reader may be assured that this apophthegm of Plutarch is still unedited—lying perhaps among the MS. of the learned and scrupulous historian who cites it. All that we know on the subject is contained in a passage quoted by Athenæus from Hegesander vi. c. 53. "King Philip having mentioned that he had received a letter from King Cotys, Cleisophus (a celebrated Athenian parasite) being present, exclaimed: Excellent, by the Gods! And when Philip replied: Why, what know you about its contents? he rejoined: By almighty Jupiter, a capital reproof."

any goodwill to their master, but probably because the Athenians espoused their cause, and because the Hellenic cities, which would not acknowledge his authority, had placed themselves under their protection. This we may at least collect to have been the case with Sestus and Crithote. With regard to Sestus, we are expressly informed that it belonged to Ariobarzanes, and was besieged by Cotys, and that he was compelled to raise the siege¹; and that Ariobarzanes, to reward the services of Timotheus, put him into possession both of Sestus and of Crithote. The acquisition of these places appears to have been followed by that of Elæus. It is added, we know not how correctly, that Timotheus collected a booty from the territories of Cotys, which produced 1200 talents to the Athenian treasury.² Such a loss must have aggravated the animosity excited by the collision between his interests and those of the Athenians. But not long after Sestus was again wrested from Athens, by a revolution which had its origin in Abydus, where the ruling party was always hostile to her. It aided the people of Sestus, who in the absence of Timotheus may have suffered some provocation from Athenian officers, to release themselves from her yoke. But they now found themselves compelled to submit to the authority of Cotys, who continued to prosecute the war with vigour, and not being able to induce his son-in-law Iphicrates to command his forces in such an expedition, engaged Charidemus, who had just returned from his adventure in Asia which has been already mentioned, to assist him in completing the conquest of the Chersonesus. Iphicrates, after his refusal, found his position so insecure, that he withdrew from his

¹ Xenophon, Agesil. ii. § 26. Schneider, as if he knew of no other Cotys, supposes this to have been the king of Paphlagonia.

² Nepos Timoth. l. Isocrates is quite silent about the satrap's assistance, though Nepos represents it as a proof of his hero's disinterested patriotism, that, when he might have received a pecuniary recompense for the services which he had rendered to Ariobarzanes, he preferred making this addition to the Athenian territory or revenue: *Itaque accepit Crithoten et Sestum*. We must not here inquire how this account is to be reconciled with that of Demosthenes, De Rhod. Lib. § 6.

father-in-law's dominions, and having no reason to expect a very favourable reception at Athens, crossed over to Lesbos, and took up his abode at Antissa.¹ Charidemus had involved himself in a very embarrassing situation in his Asiatic expedition, and would neither have been able to keep the towns which he had seized, nor to withdraw from them in safety, but would have fallen into the hands of the satrap Artabazus, whom he had deceived and injured, if he had not induced the Athenians who were sending a squadron under Cephisodotus to the Hellespont², to mediate in his behalf, by a promise that he would lend them his aid to recover the Chersonesus. He was thus enabled to effect his retreat. But when he arrived in Europe, instead of keeping his promise, he turned his arms against them in conjunction with Cotys, who proceeded to lay siege to Crithote and Elæus. The result of these operations is not related; and it is not improbable that they were interrupted by the violent death of Cotys, which took place in the first half of 358.³

If the stories which were current about Cotys may be believed, he must have been subject to temporary fits of frenzy, which may have been connected, as in the cases of Cambyses and Cleomenes, with the excess to which he seems to have indulged in the pleasures of the table.⁴ It was his habit in summer to range over

¹ We do not collect from Demosthenes, Aristocr. § 155., that any hostilities took place between Cotys and Iphicrates, as Schlosser assumes, i. 3. p. 58. Indeed the words ἡγούμενον . . . παρ' ἐπιπέδου οὐκ ἰσχυρῶς ἴσως μάλιστα, seem clearly to preclude such an assumption.

² That it had not yet arrived, is evident from § 194. For readers capable of understanding the Greek of Demosthenes, it might have seemed superfluous to observe, that the words *τησῶν ἐπιπέδου παρ' ἐπιπέδου*, § 184., which have been cited to prove "a decree of the people directing Cephisodotus to transport Charidemus, and his troops to the European shore" only express the wish of Charidemus.

³ The expressions, *ἰσχυρῶς*, Demosth. e. Aristocr. § 186. and *ἰσχυρῶς* ibid. §. 192, indicate that nothing was effected; and the orator would no doubt have mentioned any further injury which the Athenians had suffered from Charidemus.

⁴ Anaxandrides in Athenæus (u. s.): Κότυς . . . γρούμιον τῶν κρατέρων πρότερον μεθύσει τῶν πινόντων. These verses have been referred to as the testimony of Theopompus to the fact, that Cotys was "led by his disordered imagination to insist that he would wait at table upon his brother-in-law Iphicrates." They are introduced by Athenæus with the words: "Ἀναξάνδριδος . . . διακίρου τὸ τῶν Ἰφικράτους γάμων συμπόσιον, ὅτι ἤγιστο τὸς Κότυος θυγατέρα.

the Thracian woodlands, in search of shady haunts watered by pleasant streams, where he would encamp, and spend several days in revelry.¹ Deep drinking was customary among the Thracians, as among their northern and southern neighbours, and the quarrels which commonly followed their long carouses were almost proverbial.² It was probably on such an occasion that Cotys either was heated by wine and flattery into the delusion, or amused himself with the assertion, which might put the complacency of his courtiers to a new test, that he was the especial favourite of the goddess Athene: and some of his guards, who did not humour this fancy, are said to have paid for their dullness with their lives. It is also related by a contemporary that in a fit of jealousy he murdered his wife in a most barbarous manner.³ These stories are chiefly interesting, as they mark the character of one of Philip's most powerful neighbours. His violence and cruelty were it seems not confined to his own subjects, whom they sometimes instigated to revolt.⁴ They had fallen—in what way we are not informed—on a citizen of Ænus, a Greek town on the Thracian coast; and Python, and Heracleides, the sons of this Ænian, in revenge slew Cotys.⁵ The murderers fled to

¹ Theopompus in Athenæus xii. c. 42. There is nothing, either in this passage, or in that of Anaxandridas, to indicate that the luxury of Cotys displayed itself in anything more than a rude magnificence. Even if we could safely infer from the burlesque description of the comic poet that Greek musicians were employed at the marriage feast, this would go but a little way to prove that Cotys—according to all accounts a brutal savage—“desired to improve the ignorance and rudeness of his people by introducing Grecian science and arts among them.”

² Horace ii. Od. c. 18. Sithoniis non levis Evius
Quum fas atque nefas exiguo fine libidinum
Discernunt avidi.

c. 27. Natis in usum lætitiæ scyphis
Pugnare Thracum est.

³ Theopompus in Athenæus (u. s.) Compare the fact mentioned by Aristotle, (Pol. v. 8.) about Adamas, as a specimen either of the humanity or the refined taste of Cotys.

⁴ Aristotle, u. s.

⁵ Aristotle Pol. v. 8. For the sake of a caution to unlearned readers, it may be proper to observe, that no one capable of understanding the purpose for which Aristotle collects the examples of which this is one, could think it possible that “the death of the father of the assassins may have been suffered in legal course and for just cause:” though if it had been “the orator,” (Demosthenes) not Aristotle, who had mentioned the motive of the deed, such a conjecture could not have been refuted. Aristotle does not say that the father was put to death: “the orator” does not allude to him at all. The oversight was certainly a very convenient one.

Athens¹, or rather presented themselves there to receive the rewards which they might expect for a deed, which according to the ordinary Greek notion was just and pious in itself, and which had delivered the commonwealth from a formidable enemy. The avengers of their father, who were also public benefactors, were honoured with the franchise, and with crowns of gold. That under such circumstances they should have been well received at Athens, was to be expected. It may seem a little more extraordinary, that Python should afterwards have gone over to Philip, and have been admitted, as he appears to have been, into his intimate confidence.² But this last fact, if well established, would only confirm what is sufficiently proved by Aristotle's authority, that he was known to have acted under provocation which was universally thought to justify his conduct, and that Philip at least can have seen nothing blamable in that of the Athenians.³

The death of Cotys produced a change in the affairs of Thrace very favourable to the interests of Athens. His kingdom was divided, or at least the right of succession was disputed, among three princes, Berisades, Amadocus, and Cersobleptes, who, though their relation to one another is not distinctly expressed by any contemporary author, may have been brothers, all sons of Cotys,

¹ That this was the case with both of them, may be inferred from, Demosthenes, Aristocr. § 142. *πέρτερον ἕξιδος ἢ ἐν τῷ Πύθωνι καὶ τῷ ἄδελφῷ.*

² Python, the Ænian, after having received the Athenian franchise, became a distinguished partizan of Philip's. So much we learn from Demosthenes c. Aristocr. p. 662. §. 150. Some years later we find a Python — a man of great eloquence — employed by Philip in embassies and other state matters. (Æsch. De F. L. p. 44. § 132.) But this Python is called a Byzantian. Hence it is not quite clear whether they are the same, or two different persons. The name however was not so common that it should be likely to have been borne by two persons so similarly situated: while nothing can be easier to suppose than that the Ænian, who after the murder could not have been safe at Ænus, might obtain the franchise of Byzantium, and settle there. Demosthenes, when speaking of the murder, would of course mention his birthplace.

³ It has been made, as was to be expected, a topic for a good deal of declamation against the Athenians, which would perhaps have been more impressive, if the political object had been less apparent; but would still have wanted even a decent colour, if the facts had been fully and correctly stated. It was necessary to overlook the authentic testimony of Aristotle as to the motive of the murder, and to omit all notice of the strong reasons which there are for believing that the murderer became Philip's bosom counsellor.

though not by the same mother. Of Cersobleptes at least we know, that he was the son of Cotys; and we are also informed that Cotys had other sons of nearly the same age; it may therefore be thought improbable that they should have been excluded, while strangers or more distant relatives were admitted to a share in the succession.¹ Cersobleptes was at this time very young², perhaps hardly of age to take the government into his own hands; and Charidemus, being in command of the forces, and probably master of the prince's person, was enabled to assume the entire direction of his affairs. An alliance which he formed after the example of Iphicrates with the royal family, by marriage with one of the princesses³, strengthened his influence, and at the same time connected his interests more closely with those of Cersobleptes. The Athenians however at first, relying perhaps on the representations of Cephisodotus, seem to have persuaded themselves that he was only waiting for an opportunity of fulfilling his promises to them. But they were soon undeceived by an attack which he made on a squadron which they had stationed at Perinthus; and they found that he was earnestly bent on excluding them from the Chersonesus. A band of pirates, who appear to have been some of those who were sent out by Alexander of Pheræ⁴, had occupied the promontory of Alopeconnesus on the south-east coast of the peninsula. An Athenian armament was sent to besiege them,

¹ To this argument, on which however, with such scanty information, we cannot lay much stress, we may perhaps add the testimony of Justin, though not so precise as could be wished. But the *fratres duo, reges Thraciæ*, whom he mentions, viii. 3, seem to have been Cersobleptes and Amadocus.

² Demosthenes Aristocr. § 193. *μικρακίλλιον καὶ πάντες εἰ τοῦ Κόνου παῖδες*: not however a boy, any more than Demosthenes was at the age when he calls himself *μικρακίλλιον*. Meid. § 100. And it is more probable that he was the youngest, as Voemel describes him, Proleg. in Philipp. i. p. 93., than, as Schlosser says (i. 3. p. 59.), the eldest; as well on account of the order in which the names are first mentioned by Demosthenes, as because Berisades died soon after, leaving several children.

³ *Ἐγὼ σπονῶ Κόνου, ὅτι κηδεύωντες ἢ Ἰφικράτης τὸν αὐτὸν ἄρσεν ὄντως Κασιδίμω Κισσοῦλίαντι*. We need not infer from this, either that Iphicrates married the sister of Cotys; or Charidemus the daughter of Cersobleptes. The former supposition contradicts positive testimony, the latter chronology.

⁴ So we explain the allusion of Demosth. Aristocr. § 192., connecting it with § 197.

not of course without the further object of gaining a footing on the coveted ground ; but Charidemus, though he had rejected proposals which he had received from Alexander, marched to the relief of the pirates, and repelled the Athenian invasion. Cephisodotus, who had been appointed to the command perhaps chiefly on account of his personal enmity to Iphicrates¹, found himself so little able to make head against Charidemus, that, being probably desirous of the honour of recovering the contested territory at any rate, he consented to a compromise, by which it seems to have been ceded to Athens, but under conditions which rendered the possession almost useless. The terms however of the treaty have not been reported ; we only collect their nature from the fact, that they excited so much indignation at Athens, that Cephisodotus was recalled, brought to trial, and fined, and narrowly escaped a sentence of death. Another general, named Athenodorus, was sent out to take the command in his room. But it is probable that he would not have been able to bring the war to a more prosperous issue, if the state of affairs had not been suddenly changed by a remarkable occurrence.

The orator from whom we derive almost all our information on this subject, does not enable us to ascertain either the relation between Cersobleptes and Berisades or Amadocus, on the footing on which they stood with one another. His language however seems to imply that all three ruled with the title of king in different parts of Thrace, that they were at peace with each other, but not without mutual jealousy, and that the portion of Cersobleptes, being the largest, excited the envy of the others. He too may have coveted their shares ; but there is no hint that he considered them as usurpers, or pretenders. After the death of Cotys, Miltocythes appears to have renewed his attempts ; but, soon after the treaty which has just been mentioned, he was betrayed by one of his partizans into the hands of

¹ Demosthenes Aristocr. § 184.

Charidemus. Charidemus wished to be rid of him, but did not venture to put him to death, and knew that his life would be spared if he was delivered to Cersobleptes. The reason assigned for this by Demosthenes leads us to conclude that capital punishments were as little known among the Thracians as among the ancient Germans.¹ It is not customary, he says, among the Thracians to kill one another. Even high treason, it seems, was not a capital offence. Charidemus therefore, intending to accomplish his purpose without any breach of the national custom, sent Miltocythes, and his son, who had been arrested with him, to Cardia, where the ruling party was attached to his interests, and violently hostile to Athens. It found that the death of the prisoners would be agreeable to Charidemus, and knew that it would equally displease and injure the Athenians. Under the impulse of this double motive, it was not satisfied with a simple execution, but despatched its two victims with ostentatious cruelty. This inhumanity however defeated its end. The Thracians, among whom Miltocythes probably retained many adherents, were universally roused to indignation by the bloody deed; which they imputed, we do not know how justly, to Cersobleptes. His two rivals, Berisades and Amadocus, availed themselves of the national feeling, and combined their forces against him; and Athenodorus seized the opportunity to conclude an alliance with them. Thus threatened, Cersobleptes found himself compelled to accept the terms dictated by the Athenian general. They were: that the kingdom should be equally divided among the three princes, and that they should all concur in ceding the Chersonesus to Athens.

But when the storm raised by the death of Miltocythes had blown over, Charidemus, who had ratified the treaty in the name of Cersobleptes, delayed as long as possible to execute that part of it which concerned Athens: and Athenodorus, receiving no supplies from home, was forced to disband his troops

¹ Tacitus, Germ. 7. Compare Moser, *Osnabruecksche Geschichte*, 1. § 14.

for want of pay. He himself however still remained in Thrace, and not long after contracted a domestic alliance with Berisades, like that which Iphicrates and Charidemus had formed with the family of Cotys. Chabrias was now appointed to the command in the Hellespont; but he arrived with only a single galley. It was thought perhaps that the war was at an end, or that he would be able to provide for it, as Timotheus had so often done, without charge to the state. This remissness of the Athenians encouraged Charidemus openly to renounce the treaty which he had made with Athenodorus, and to propose a new one to Chabrias, which Demosthenes describes as still more disadvantageous to Athens, than that which had been concluded with Cephisodotus. The ground of this complaint appears to have been, that the greater part of the revenues of the Chersonesus were reserved to Cersobleptes. Chabrias however thought it prudent to accept these terms, as he had no means of enforcing the preceding treaty; but at Athens, notwithstanding his reputation, and the efforts of his friends, they were disavowed, and ten commissioners were appointed to proceed to Thrace, with instructions, if they could not prevail on Cersobleptes to ratify the treaty of Athenodorus, to obtain a renewal of the engagements of the two other princes, and to concert measures for reducing Cersobleptes to compliance by arms. The commissioners found Berisades and Amadocus very willing to adhere to the compact from which they had derived such great advantages. But the negotiation with Cersobleptes was protracted without any result, until it was suddenly brought to a favourable issue, chiefly it seems through the success which had attended the exertions of the Athenians in a different quarter.

At the first revival of the Athenian confederacy, it was strengthened by the accession of most of the Eubœan cities, which distinguished themselves above all the rest by the zeal with which they entered into it. Hestia,

or Oreus, alone kept aloof¹, through gratitude to Sparta, which had a short time before delivered it from the tyranny of a military adventurer, named Neogenes, who had seized the citadel. Chabrias, who was sent to establish the Athenian ascendancy in Eubœa, endeavoured to reduce the Hestians to submission; but their resistance was so obstinate, that, after having ravaged their territory without effect, he was obliged to sail away, leaving a garrison in a fort which he had built near their city to annoy them. We do not know whether they finally yielded; but it seems as if the Athenians afterwards rather lost than gained ground. We have seen that they were not able to prevent Themison from making himself master of Eretria, and that he even deprived them of Oropus. Chalcis too had fallen under the dominion of a tyrant named Mnesarchus, who was likewise hostile to them²; and the island appears to have been torn more and more by factions and civil wars. Such was its condition at the time when the events last related were taking place in the Thracian Chersonesus. Athens does not appear to have interfered in its affairs, further than was necessary to protect her own interests, and to exclude the intervention of other powers. But the Thebans now hoped to be able to take advantage of its distracted state; they were invited by some of the contending parties, and sent a body of troops to their aid. The news of the Theban expedition roused the jealousy of the Athenians, which was inflamed by the energetic exhortations of Timotheus, who was at this juncture at Athens.³ "Are you deliberating (he is

¹ Diodorus, xv. 30. It is a surprising instance of excessive caution, that so sagacious a critic as Wesseling should have rejected, or even questioned, the conjecture of Palmerius on this passage ('*Νεγενών*, '*Νεγένων*' for '*Νεγενίων*, '*Νεγενίων*') on the ground that it is not necessary for the understanding of the narrative. How is it possible that Therippidas should have liberated Oropus by the siege of the citadel of Hestia, or that the liberation of Oropus should have inspired the Hestians with gratitude toward Sparta? It is however a different question, whether the error is to be imputed to the carelessness of a transcriber, or to that of Diodorus himself, who was perhaps quite capable even of so gross a blunder.

² *Æschines in Ctes.* § 85.

³ *Demosthenes De Chera.* § 80.

reported to have said) when you have the Thebans in the island, what you ought to do? Will you not cover the sea with your galleys? Will you not immediately go down to Piræus, and drag your ships out of dock?" The people caught his ardour: an armament was decreed: but it was found that so many of the wealthy citizens, on whom the duties of the trierarchy would have devolved according to law, were, or had lately been, employed in other expeditions, that there was not a sufficient number left, who could be legally compelled to undertake the equipment and command of the vessels destined for Eubœa.

In this emergency the patriotism of the higher classes came to the relief of the state, in a manner which proved that there still remained much of the old Athenian feeling, not quenched by the prevailing selfishness of the age. For the first time in the annals of the Athenian navy, several citizens—among whom was the orator Demosthenes, though not one of the richest—voluntarily presented themselves to bear the extraordinary burden. And the preparations were urged with such unwonted vigour, that on the fifth day after the assembly was held¹, the troops were landed in Eubœa. The expedition however was commanded, it seems, not by Timotheus, but by Diocles, with whom there is some reason to think Chares was joined.² Of the operations which followed we have but very scanty accounts, which however agree very well together as to the general result, though there is a little appearance of variation in the details. The contemporary orators, who may be supposed to exhibit only the bright side of the story, represent the Athenians as completely triumphant, Diocles as granting permission to the Thebans—who of course had been defeated—to withdraw from the island, and the whole as reduced under the power of Athens,

¹ Demosthenes Androt. § 17. ἡμεῶν ἡμεῶν. Æsch. in Ctes. § 85. ἐν αὐτῷ ἡμέραις. The one seems to speak exclusively, the other inclusively, of the same time.

² Demosth. c. Aristocr. § 206. Ἰσονομοῦμεν εἰς Εὐβοίαν, καὶ Χάρεα ἔσται ἔχων τοὺς ἕτους.

which generously allowed all the cities to retain their free constitutions: and all this as the work of less than thirty days. But according to Diodorus, the campaign was much less brilliant, and the issue not exactly the same. He expressly states, that there was no regular battle, but only skirmishes and petty engagements, in which victory was sometimes with the Athenians, sometimes with the Thebans: and that at last the Eubœans, to deliver their island from the ravages of the two hostile armies, agreed to a general pacification, upon which both the belligerents withdrew their forces. Still even according to this statement, the advantage would have rested with the Athenians; for the Thebans had at least been foiled in their attempt, and the state of the island was not less favourable to the interests of Athens at the close of the campaign, than it had been before. The spirit displayed by the Athenians in the expedition was a topic of exultation, with which they were frequently flattered by their orators—a proof how rare such exertions had now become with them—and perhaps contributed more to raise their confidence and their reputation, than the success with which the effort was crowned.

Whether the occupation which this contest gave to the Athenians, encouraged Charidemus to evade the execution of his treaty with Athenodorus, we are not able to ascertain. But it seems that peace was no sooner restored in Eubœa, than Chares sailed with the armament which had just been employed there to the Hellespont, invested with absolute authority by an extraordinary commission as general *autocrator*, and that his arrival immediately changed the aspect of affairs in that quarter. Charidemus, again threatened with a combination of the forces under Chares and those of the two rival kings, at length consented to the terms imposed by the Athenians, which seem to have amounted to a simple unconditional cession of the Chersonesus. Only he was still able to carry one very important point. Cardia, which, by its position on the Isthmus, was the key to the

peninsula on the side of Thrace, retained its independence, and was consequently more than ever devoted to Charidemus. Sestus too was not surrendered, and continued hostile to Athens; but she was at liberty to enforce her claims to it, as she could. Though the conduct of Charidemus, as we have related it—on the authority indeed of a political adversary, whose statements we have no means of comparing with more impartial evidence—appears to have been uniformly hostile to Athens, it seems that he had partizans among the Athenian orators, gained perhaps by arts like those which were employed by Chares, who persuaded the people that they were mainly indebted to him for the recovery of the Chersonesus: and he was rewarded with the franchise, and with a crown of honour as a public benefactor.

This acquisition appears to have been made just on the eve of the disastrous war which broke out in the course of the same year (357) between the Athenians and some of their principal allies.¹ We have ventured to surmise, that it may have been connected with the causes of their rupture; because it seems not improbable that one of the immediate occasions of the quarrel may have arisen from the appointment of Chares to the extraordinary command which he held when he concluded the treaty with Charidemus, and an ancient writer, though one of very doubtful authority, expressly ascribes the origin of the war to his misconduct.² But the ac-

¹ The greater part of the modern writers who have treated this portion of history, have been misled by Diodorus xvi. 34. to refer the cession of the Chersonesus to the year 353. (Ol. cvi. 4.), when an Athenian colony was sent to take possession of it. So Wachsmuth, Fische, Droysen, Voemel. But it is by no means clear that Diodorus himself meant this, since the participle *ὑποδύναστος* may refer to an earlier period. In the date here assigned to the event we have been guided by the narrative in the Aristocrates, which in the leading outlines bears all the marks of truth, and is quite inconsistent with the supposition that the expedition of Chares took place after the end of the Social War. This has been clearly perceived and shown by Winiewski, p. 195.

² The anonymous author of the argument prefixed to Isocrates on the Peace.—According to this account, Chares had been sent against Amphipolis, which was then independent; but thinking that he could at any time make himself master of it, and being more desirous of recovering the ancient power of Athens, he attacked the Chians, Rhodians, and the other allies (?). They resisted and defeated him, so that he was at a loss how to

counts which have been preserved of this Social War are as scanty, in proportion to its importance, as those of the event which is commonly known by the same name in Roman history. One cause of the obscurity in which its origin is involved, may be that it had been kindled some years before, though it was only now that the flame burst out. The attempt of Epaminondas, already mentioned, to detach Chios, Rhodes, and Byzantium, from the Athenian confederacy, whatever abatement may be required for the account which Diodorus gives of its success, implies that, even so early as the year 363, these states were meditating a separation, or at least that their jealousy and resentment had in some way been provoked by the conduct of Athens. In the year following, we find the Byzantians taking some strong measures to relieve themselves in a time of scarcity, which seem to have excited hostile feelings at Athens. They detained the corn-ships on their passage out of the Euxine, and their example was followed by Chalcedon and Cyzicus. A number of vessels so freighted, and belonging to Athenian owners, were stopt at the mouth of the Euxine by the dread of this violence, while the price of corn was rising in the Athenian market. This was one of those injuries which every one felt; and one of the objects for which the squadron which was sent this year, as has been related, under Meno, and Timomachus, to the Hellespont, was to protect the shipping.¹ It is hardly possible that this should have been done so as not to leave some ill will rankling in the minds of the Byzantians; and indeed we find that they repeated their aggressions after Timo-

act: for if he had retired, and turned his arms against Amphipolis, they, by way of retaliation, would have invaded Attica. The Athenians, on hearing this, requested peace, which was granted by the allies; and this, the writer adds, was the Social War. There are perhaps some fragments of historical truth in this statement; but it is difficult to extract and put them together. It seems clear that the author has confounded dates, and had altogether but a very confused idea of the history of the war. Yet Voemel (*Proleg.* p. 68.) adopts so much of the narrative as relates to Chares, though without a reference, with apparently perfect confidence.

¹ Demosthenes, c. Polycl. § 5.

machus had succeeded to the command¹; and it may easily be imagined, that a very slight provocation or persuasion would have sufficed to impel them into open hostility to Athens. Under such circumstances the presence of such a general as Chares, elated with success, and clothed with unlimited power, so near at hand, was very likely to widen the breach.

But though the expedition of Epaminondas appears to have been directed principally, if not solely, to Byzantium, it is not certain that she took the lead in the confederacy formed against Athens, or that she was urged by any motives which she had not in common with most of her allies. If we are satisfied with the information which we derive from Demosthenes as to the causes of the war, we must believe that Chios, Rhodes, and Byzantium, all alike professed to engage in it in self-defence, to guard against the attacks with which Athens, as they thought, was threatening their independence. This indeed would seem to imply some injuries already suffered, but such as fell indiscriminately on all. On the other hand the same orator leads us to suppose, that it was not Byzantium, but Rhodes, that took the foremost part in the coalition, and that Rhodes herself did not act spontaneously, or under the pressure of any grievance, but was an instrument in other hands. The real author of the war, according to this account, was Mausolus, the vassal king, or hereditary satrap, of Caria. Mausolus, who had inherited an extensive territory, and several strong places, among which his capital Halicarnassus was well adapted to become the seat of a great maritime power, had conceived the design of making himself completely independent of the Persian court, and of enlarging his dominions on the continent, and among the islands of the Ægean. He had sided with the revolted satraps in the rebellion which has been already noticed, and appears to have taken advantage of it to gain some addition to his territory in Lydia, though he was defeated in an attempt to make himself master

¹ Demosthenes, c. Polycl. § 22.

of Miletus¹, and also to establish his authority in some of the neighbouring islands. This it was his aim to do in Rhodes, which however he could only hope to attain with the help of a party among the Rhodians devoted to his interests; and such a party could only gain the ascendancy, when their connection with Athens should have been dissolved. The government of Rhodes was at this time democratical; but there was, it seems, a strong oligarchical faction, which entered into his views. Still their influence would scarcely have been sufficient to effect the revolution, which was the first step toward the accomplishment of their designs, if the great mass of the people had not been already alienated from Athens, and impatient of the dependence to which it had been reduced, or apprehensive of further encroachments on its liberty.

The first impulse then seems to have proceeded either from Rhodes, or Byzantium; but the motives which induced Chios to enter into the league against Athens, may likewise be easily imagined. It was perhaps more exposed than either Byzantium, or Rhodes, to the exactions and insults of the Athenian officers, and had more grounds of complaint. We may also collect from Demosthenes², that about this time the government fell into the hands of an oligarchical party, which no doubt actively promoted the rupture with Athens. Cos also declared itself very early on the same side: it was one of the islands which are said to have been subject to Mausolus.³ Hostilities appear to have begun on the part of the Athenians with the siege of Chios. According to Diodorus, Chabrias was joined with Chares in the command, and conducted the operations of the fleet, which consisted it seems of sixty sail⁴, while the land-forces were led against the city by Chares. Yet we would not reject as altogether improbable the state-

¹ Polyænus, vi. 8. where the name *Ægyptus* is singular. Lucian D. M. xxiv.

² De Rhod. Lib. § 23.

³ Lucian u. s. Demosthenes De Rhod. lib. § 34.

⁴ Compare Diodorus, xvi. 7. and 21.

ment of Nepos, in which he may have followed Theopompus, that Chabrias accompanied the armament in a private capacity, and only commanded his own galley as a volunteer. All authors however agree that he sacrificed his life at the very beginning of the siege by an imprudent display of valour. He led the way into the harbour of Chios, but was not immediately followed by the rest, and was overpowered by the enemy. Yet it seems that he might have saved his life, if he had chosen to retreat, or to abandon his vessel. But with Spartan obstinacy he preferred to die sword in hand. Athens thus lost one of her ablest generals; and the immediate consequence appears to have been, that the attempt upon Chios was defeated, and the allies became masters of the sea. We do not know what became of Chares, or what interval may have elapsed before the Athenians found it necessary to equip another fleet of sixty sail, which was commanded by Iphicrates and Timotheus. These two generals had been for some time reconciled, and had cemented their union by an alliance between the daughter of Timotheus, and Menestheus, the son of Iphicrates. According to Nepos, Menestheus was appointed to the command, but was aided by his father and father-in-law, who nominally served under him. It appears however from the sequel, that they must have held a public and responsible office. Still they were only associated with Chares, who had not lost the confidence of the people.

In the following year (356) Samos appears to have been the principal scene of hostilities; but it is difficult to determine the precise course which they took. According to Diodorus, the allies, whose fleet amounted to a hundred sail, after having ravaged Lemnos and Imbrus, proceeded to Samos, wasted the country, and laid siege to the city; at the same time levying contributions from other islands which adhered to the Athenians; but were at length called away to the relief of Byzantium, which the Athenians besieged for the purpose of effecting a diversion. But other accounts, not

less authentic and probable, inform us that Samos likewise had revolted, and that its territory was ravaged by Iphicrates¹, and we are thus led to suspect, that the Athenians were diverted from the siege of Samos by the operations of the enemy in the north of the Ægean. However this may be, it seems certain that the Athenian commanders united their forces near the Hellespont within such a distance of the allies, that preparations were made on both sides for a general engagement. Chares was eager for it: but on the day when he proposed to make the attack, the state of the weather induced his colleagues to decline it. This refusal produced an open breach between them; and Chares, we are told by Diodorus, after having publicly protested against their conduct, wrote a letter to the people, in which he charged them with treachery. But here the narrative itself seems to betray some omission; for the mere postponement of a battle could hardly have been alledged as ground for such a charge; and a comparison of another account inclines us to suppose, that Chares, thinking perhaps that his colleagues would not venture to withhold their support, led his division against the enemy, and was defeated; and then, to screen himself, laid the blame on them.² He had, as we have seen, partizans at home, who were always ready to defend his conduct; and it is possible that the real circumstances of the case, if he actually exposed himself to a risk which his colleagues shunned, may have given a specious colour to the accusation. The result was that they were recalled, and were afterwards brought to trial; and Chares was left entrusted with the sole management of the war.

It seems necessary to suppose that this event took place in the latter half of 356; for the account given by Diodorus of the manner in which the contest was terminated, implies that there was an interval of at least

¹ Polyænus, iii. 9. 36.

² Nepos Tim., iii. 4. Male re gestâ, compluribus amissis navibus, eodem unde erat projectus, se recepit.

several months between the transactions just related, and the close of the war. Chares, though no longer restrained by the presence of his colleagues, neither ventured, as it appears, to attack the enemy, nor was able to find subsistence for his troops by the means which he had hitherto been used to employ. The contributions which the islands still attached to the Athenian interest could furnish, had been for the most part pre-occupied by the allies, and they were strong enough to protect the others from his exactions. From Athens he could not expect a supply equal to his wants; and perhaps to have applied for it would have endangered his popularity. In this emergency he resorted to an expedient which was probably the best that the case admitted. The war between Artabazus and the satraps who acknowledged the authority of Ochus, the successor of Artaxerxes, which, as we have seen, had drawn Charidemus over to Asia, still continued. Artabazus was threatened by superior numbers, and stood in great need of a body of Greek auxiliaries, whose aid he was willing to purchase at a high price. Chares on the other hand only wanted a present provision for his troops, and a subsidy which might enable him afterwards to prosecute the war. He did not look to any political consequences that lay beyond these immediate advantages, and perhaps could hardly have foreseen them. He entered into the service of Artabazus, and according to Diodorus soon turned the scale, and gained a victory which extricated him from his dangerous position: success which seems to imply that Chares was by no means deficient in military talents. The satrap fulfilled his promise, and furnished him with a sum of money which enabled him to keep his forces together. We are not informed in what manner the allies availed themselves of his absence from the theatre of war; but it does not seem that they can have profited by the opportunity for any purpose more important than that of infesting the commerce, and annoying the dependents of Athens: for the proceedings of Chares

were known to the people, and were at first greatly applauded. But the aid which he had given, and might continue to give, to Artabazus, had been represented to the king of Persia as so important, that he thought it necessary to send an embassy to Athens, to complain of his conduct.¹ These complaints were probably accompanied with threats, more or less definite, that the king would support the confederates with his maritime power. Orders were forthwith sent to Chares to break off his connection with Artabazus. But intelligence soon after arrived that the Persian court was fitting out an armament of 300 galleys, to cooperate with the enemies of Athens. This report probably did not first suggest the desire of peace to the Athenians, who must for some time have felt the want of it; but it seems to have convinced them that they could not carry on the war any longer without extreme danger. Diodorus and another author² intimate that they made the first advances; but we find that the confederates sent an embassy to Athens³; and we can easily believe that they were little less eager for the termination of a struggle which must have cost them great sacrifices. They seem to have required nothing but the acknowledgement of their independence, and this was no doubt secured to them.

We are not informed how many states, beside the principal parties, were included in the treaty; but it seems that Athens must have lost a great number of her most important allies: for she is said to have retained none but the less considerable islands, and the amount of the yearly contributions was reduced to forty-five talents⁴, which however may have been but a temporary deficiency, arising from the pressure of the war. To her losses of this kind in the Ægean was added one in the west, which must have been as painful as any: one of which the Social War was probably rather the occasion than the cause; for it may be pretty clearly traced

¹ Diodorus, xvi. 22.

² Argument to Isocrates, De Pac.

³ Isocrates, De Pac. § 32.

⁴ Demosthenes de Cor. § 293.

to events which had taken place a few years before, though the accounts we have of them are somewhat obscure. In 351 Chares had been appointed as we have seen in the room of Leosthenes, and soon after was sent — we know not whether with any other purpose than that of levying contributions — to Corcyra. Since its connection with Athens had been renewed, the island appears to have been under democratical government, but there was, as at all former periods, an oligarchical party, which was now eager for a revolution. It would be hardly credible, if the testimony of ancient writers to the fact was not confirmed by the sequel, as to which there is no doubt, that this party was encouraged and abetted by Chares in a conspiracy, by which it overthrew its adversaries, and after much bloodshed placed itself at the head of the state.¹ This change was so clearly adverse to the interest of Athens, that we can hardly attribute the conduct of Chares to any other motive than bribery. The new rulers were not the better disposed toward the Athenian alliance for the aid which they thus received, and seem to have taken the opportunity afforded by the Social War for renouncing it.

What had been so lost there could be little hope of ever retrieving. The war expenditure must also have been burdensome to the finances of Athens; the damage inflicted on Athenian property abroad by the navy of the allies as well as by confiscation was perhaps still more severe; and commerce seems to have undergone a temporary stagnation. The city is described at the close of the war as deserted by the foreign merchants and the resident aliens.² These however were wounds which time might heal. But it could not repair the loss of the three great commanders, who had revived the power of the commonwealth, and might perhaps have averted some of its subsequent disasters. The death of Chabrias was only matter for regret; but the services of Iphi-

¹ Diodor. xv. 95. The character of the party aided by Chares is determined by Æneas Pollorc, c. 11.

² Isocrates de Pac. § 26.

crates and Timotheus were sacrificed by means as dishonourable as the end was unhappy for the state. Iphicrates was brought to trial first, with Menestheus. The prosecution was conducted by Aristophon, a very eloquent orator, who in the course of his long political life had himself been seventy-five times impeached, and could boast of having been as often acquitted, and whose reputation renders it somewhat surprising that he should have become the coadjutor of Chares in an affair of this nature.¹ Iphicrates defended himself with soldierlike eloquence, seasoned with sarcastic wit; but he seems to have been aware that the disposition of his judges was not favourable to him, and to have relied on other means of averting the danger. We may collect from Isocrates that he and Menestheus were more concerned for the safety of Timotheus than for their own. They took on themselves the whole responsibility of the joint command: Iphicrates that of the military operations, Menestheus that of the administration of the public money.² This boldness would be sufficiently explained, if we believe that Iphicrates had secured the support of a body of partizans — perhaps the members of one of the clubs which still subsisted for various purposes at Athens, — that he caused threatening rumours to be circulated before the trial, and in the course of his speech, laying his hand on his sword, hinted to his judges, that they might have cause to repent if they condemned him.³ The fact is that both he and Menestheus were acquitted: what follows appears to prove that they owed their escape to some extraordinary means. Timotheus was afterwards arraigned, likewise by Aristophon, on a similar charge, for which, according to Isocrates, there could have been no colour against him, if his colleagues were innocent. Yet he was found

¹ Ælian indeed, xiv. 2, calls him *καρῆνος*, but apparently with no other ground than a passage in the speech of Timotheus, which he may have misunderstood: as the same epithet is applied to Eubulus by Athenæus, iv. 61., manifestly through a misunderstanding of the words of Theopompus which he quotes.

² *σ. ἀντιβ.* § 137.

³ Polyæn. iii. 9. 29.

guilty, and condemned to the enormous fine of 100 talents. The capital article in the indictment was that he had received bribes from the Chians and Rhodians.¹ But we cannot doubt that passion, or cupidity, or factious intrigues, contributed more to aggravate the sentence, than the speciousness of the prosecutor's proofs. Isocrates attributes it to the offence which Timotheus had given by his lofty, ungracious deportment, and his neglect even of the fair arts by which other generals paid their court to the people, and the leading orators, whom he had made his enemies. This would account for the conduct of Aristophon, though so as to leave a blot upon his character. Timotheus was unable to pay the fine, and retired to Chalcis, where he died not long after. The injustice of the sentence was tacitly acknowledged by the people after his death. His son Conon was permitted to compromise with the treasury for a tenth part of the fine, in the honourable form of a donation for the repair of the walls restored by his grandfather.²

While the negotiation with the allies was pending, or soon after the peace, Isocrates wrote what we should call a pamphlet in the form of a speech intended to be delivered in the assembly held to deliberate on the treaty. The work is of considerable value as a historical document, though it affords less information than might have been expected from it with regard to the war. Isocrates was a rhetorician by profession: the framing of sentences, and turning of periods, was the great business of his long life: the only one in which he was very successful; in that he attained to the highest skill labour could give, and amassed great wealth as a teacher. But he appears to have been a hearer of Socrates, was disgusted with the Sophists, and had little taste for the ordinary subjects of their disputations; he was thus led to apply his art to morals and politics, not like most of the Socratic school in the discussion of general prin-

¹ Dinarch. in Demosth. § 15. Polycl. § 17.

² Nepos. Timoth. iv. l.

ciples, but in practical precepts and counsels. He was the first Greek writer who employed his pen on questions which arose out of passing events.¹ He seems to have believed that nothing but the weakness of his voice, and the shyness and timidity of his character, prevented him from taking a leading part in the public debates.² But it is very doubtful whether any strength of lungs, or hardness of brow, could have rendered discourses such as he has left acceptable to an Athenian assembly, at least after it had learnt from Demosthenes, what real eloquence was. He valued himself not a little on his political sagacity, as to which a stronger mind than his own has entertained a widely different opinion.³ But he was a respectable, well-meaning man; he deplored the evils which afflicted Greece, and thought he saw a remedy; but seems to have given little heed whether it might not prove worse than the disease. His general notion was union under a single chief; which however he wished to reconcile with liberty and independence. How inconsistent the plan which he proposed was with the combination of these objects, will appear in the proper place.

The advice however which he gives on the occasion of the peace seems indisputably good: and every Athenian patriot must have regretted that the people was so little disposed to follow it, and that even in the most elegant diction, and the most graceful periods, there is not a charm strong enough to eradicate ambition and cupidity, especially when confirmed by long indulgence, from the human breast. Its effect may have been somewhat impaired by the ambiguity of the language in which it is conveyed, which, he himself admits had a repulsive, paradoxical, sound.⁴ He exhorts the Athenians to cease to aim at the command of the sea,

¹ Vit. x. Orat. p. 837. B.

² Panathen, § 12. 13. Philip. § 93.

³ Niebuhr Kl. Schrift, p. 474., and in the Philological Museum, ii. p. 492. "at least in his old age a thoroughly bad citizen, as well as an ineffable fool."

⁴ § 77. 80.

and appeals to history, both their own and Sparta's, to prove that this dazzling object of competition had only been a source of the greatest calamities to every power that had acquired it. He had before spoken with the highest approbation of the peace of Antalcidas, so far as it provided for the independence of the Greeks, and had recommended that this should be adopted as the basis of the treaty under discussion¹: so that it might have been supposed that he wished to see the connection between Athens and her allies totally dissolved. This however, it appears from the sequel, was not his meaning. On the contrary it is that she may be again at the head of a confederacy as extensive as that which she had presided over in the days of Aristides², that he desires she should renounce the command of the sea. All that he means by the command of the sea, is an unjust domination grounded upon, and maintained by force. He would have a confederacy, in which all the members should be perfectly free, willingly submitting to the supremacy of Athens, paying none but voluntary contributions, and exempt from all kinds of molestation and encroachment. His proposition therefore, when distinctly understood, was not so paradoxical as it sounded. It was nothing more than had been done when the Athenian confederacy was revived; and all that was necessary to comply with his advice, was to return and adhere to the terms then laid down. How, if the people had been really desirous of this, it was to recover the confidence of its allies, is a question which he does not discuss.

Even as to the manner in which those terms had been violated, he affords very scanty information. He hints, rather than expressly asserts, that the Athenians had suffered their citizens to acquire property in the islands, against the spirit at least of the self-denying resolution, by which they had renounced all cleruchial possessions.³ He speaks also of arbitrary exactions, which have been already mentioned, and represents the

¹ § 20.

VOL. V.

² § 91. 92.

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³ § 6.

allies as entirely abandoned to the discretion of the Athenian generals.¹ He is however more explicit as to the domestic causes of the evil, which he is aware must be removed before any salutary change can be made in the foreign policy of the state. The people must discard its dishonest counsellors, must employ men of acknowledged probity both at home and abroad: it must cease itself to be indolent, voluptuous, rapacious, ambitious, greedy of flattery, and impatient of reproof. Hard conditions, and certainly surpassing the power of such rhetoric as that of Isocrates to bring to pass. For the old abuses, which had been repressed by the public calamities, and partially reformed, had sprung up again during the more tranquil and prosperous period that followed, with fresh luxuriance, and in new, more extravagant, and odious shapes. The city was again infested with a swarm of sycophants, more shameless, active, and venomous, than in former times. The needy, idle, throng which lived upon the fees of legislation, government, and justice, viewed the men whose calumnious charges gave it most opportunities of exercising its judicial functions, as its greatest benefactors.² The wealthy were exposed to continual vexation: Isocrates does not scruple to assert that they led more wretched lives than the indigent.³ Here however his own example shows how cautiously his general descriptions must be received. He complains much of the annoyance which he himself had suffered from the sycophants; and certainly his wealth, his incapacity for public speaking, his connection with Timotheus, and other distinguished citizens, and with foreign princes, and his avowed political sentiments, must all have conspired to point him out as one of the most signal objects for their attacks. Yet in the ninety-fifth year of his age he could look back upon a life of almost undisturbed prosperity, with no other regret than that he had been de-

¹ § 160.

² § 154. ἀλλοίους ζῆναι τοὺς τὰς ἀσπίδας πενήτας ἢ τοὺς συνιχθῶς παραμένους.

³ § 156.

barred by his natural defects from more active participation in public business.¹ So too it can only be considered as a rhetorical exaggeration, that he represents the vilest, most profligate, and senseless demagogues, as the most popular. Had things come to this pass, no room would have been left for the influence of the able and upright men, whom we shall find for several years ordinarily taking the lead in public affairs. The real ground of this statement was probably that the same decay of public spirit which appeared in the growing neglect of military exercises, and the evasion both of foreign and home service, betrayed itself in the assembly by the levity and haste with which important matters were often handled, and the applause with which indecorous sallies of gaiety were received. This want of earnestness—which however might easily seem greater than it really was in an Athenian audience—was a subject of complaint with Demosthenes also.

In this piece Isocrates notices an innovation, which appears to him pregnant with pernicious consequences, or at least as a symptom of degeneracy, but which admits of being viewed in a different light. He speaks of it in a way which shows that he was only intent upon an antithesis; but the fact he alludes to is more clearly described and illustrated by Plutarch.² In earlier times all the great men of Athens combined the characters of the general and the statesman in one person. In the period at which we have now arrived, they were beginning to be more and more separated from each other. Many of the orators never saw the camp: the generals rarely ascended the bema. This practice was the effect, partly of the progress of eloquence, and the wider range of rhetorical studies³, which demanded longer preparation, and more laborious exercises, partly of the new military system, which, as

¹ Panathen. § 9-13.

² Phocion, 7.

³ Τῆς ῥητορικῆς πύξινος, as Aristotle observes, Pol. v. 4. 4., where, in the words δι' ἀπαιτίαν τῶν πολιτικῶν, he may mean to indicate the progress of the art of war, as another main cause of the phenomenon.

we have seen, tended to draw the generals away from Athens. Phocion is remarked as one of the last Athenians in whom the two characters were still blended. According to modern notions this division of military and civil duties might be thought a great gain for the service of the state. Whatever evil sprang from it seems to have arisen from the corruption of the age. The responsibility both of the generals and the ministers — as we may call them — of the republic, was lessened; and it was easy for men like Chares to find advocates, apparently disinterested, to defend all their proceedings. The worst abuse connected with it was, that military command was so much coveted, that if we may believe Isocrates, the election of generals was often determined by the most open bribery.¹

If it were not that we have no hint of any negotiation between Athens and the confederates, before Chares had provoked the intervention of the Persian court, we might have supposed that Isocrates wrote this oration, before the threats of Persian hostility had been heard of at Athens. For he takes no notice of them, though they afforded the fairest opportunity of recommending his favourite scheme for the establishment of tranquillity and prosperity in Greece. He touches only by one slight allusion on the war with Philip and with Cersobleptes, in a way which implies that in his judgement there was no more danger to be apprehended from the one quarter than the other. He conceives that there was no essential and necessary opposition between the interests of either of these princes and those of the commonwealth, and that, if they were only convinced of her pacific disposition towards them, Philip would readily resign Amphipolis, and Cersobleptes the Chersonesus, to her.² And his general conclusion is, that, notwithstanding the great loss and damage which she had suffered in the

¹ § 63.

² His language (§ 28.) might lead any one to infer that the Chersonesus was still in the hands of Cersobleptes, if it did not as strongly imply that Amphipolis was still in the possession of Athens, which, at least, was certainly not the case.

Social War, it would be her own fault, if she did not become more powerful and prosperous than ever. Let her only abstain from aggression and wrong, hold herself in readiness for self-defence, and show herself willing to protect the weak against the strong: justice would bring back an age of gold. The rich would be relieved from taxation; the poor would find employment in the arts of peace: the public revenues would be doubled; a tide of wealth would flow into Piræus¹; foreign princes would pay their court to her, and would gladly purchase her favour by the cession of a part of their territories: in Thrace alone she would be able to find ample and undisputed space for any colonies she might wish to send out: and the Greeks would look up to her with reverence and attachment, as to the guardian of their liberty and rights. A picture unhappily not more sharply contrasted with the past and the present than with the reality of the future.

CHAP. XLIII.

FROM THE END OF THE SOCIAL WAR TO THE FALL OF
OLYNTHUS.

WE have been used to see the Athenians making the most vigorous exertions in the midst of their greatest calamities: we might otherwise have been disposed to question the accuracy of the descriptions we have received of the disastrous consequences of the Social War. For that war was scarcely at an end, before we find them again acting on the offensive, and even ready to enter into a new contest, apparently still more arduous and hazardous than that from which they had just retired with such heavy loss. There is reason to believe that in the course of the same summer in which they made peace with the allies, they sent an expedition against Olynthus, as to which we are informed that it was the second occasion that called forth the services of voluntary trierarchs, and that a body of Athenian cavalry was employed in it¹; facts which imply a considerable effort, though we have no account of the results; nor is the precise date well ascertained. Notwithstanding the peace the public mind continued to be agitated by rumours of the Persian preparations; and it appears that there were orators — politicians, we may suppose, of the school of Isocrates — who endeavoured to instigate the people to declare war against Persia. The deliberation of the assembly on this subject is chiefly known to us as the occasion on which Demosthenes began his career as a statesman, with an oration

¹ Demosth. Meid. § 204. 249. The date of this expedition depends on that of the birth of Demosthenes. See Böckh, P. E. of Ath. iv. 13.

which is still extant. Our attention is thus turned toward this extraordinary man, who will henceforth occupy it more and more throughout the period comprised in this portion of our history.

Demosthenes was the son of an Athenian merchant of the same name¹, who was among the wealthier citizens of the middle class. By the mother's side his blood, according to Athenian notions, was perhaps not so pure. His maternal grandfather, Gylon, had been charged with treason, as having betrayed the town of Nymphæum in the Tauric Chersonesus to the enemies of the state. He did not await a trial, and was condemned to death, but found refuge in the Greek principality on the Cimmerian Bosphorus, and received a mark of favour from its ruler, which may have been the reward of treasonable services: the town of Cēpi in the island on the eastern side of the Bosphorus.² Here he

¹ The term *merchant* may perhaps startle some readers who have been used to see the orator's father described as a sword-cutler, if not from Juvenal as a blacksmith. But it seems the most appropriate appellation for a person whose property was invested in such a variety of ways as we find his to have been from his son's statement, I. Aphob. p. 816. The sword manufactory was but a small part of it. Together with that of sophas, which he carried on at the same time, its value amounted only to six talents, out of fourteen or fifteen at which the whole estate was estimated. He had considerable sums out at common interest and on bottomry.

² Æschines, In Ctes. § 171. The well-informed and intelligent reader knows how to appreciate the romance which has been founded on this passage by an author, of whom Mr. Clinton (F. H. ii. p. 353) observes — making free use of the *Litotes*, while he quietly exposes a combination of ignorance, rashness, and prejudice, not often paralleled in historical writing — that he is *not favourable to Demosthenes*. We need hardly observe that by *τιγαννῶν* Æschines did not mean a *Scythian king*. The use of the plural number ought not to raise any doubt that he was speaking of one of the Archæanactiæ. Mr. Clinton's conjecture (F. H. ii. p. 284.) that their dynasty was interrupted, between Seleucus and Satyrus I., by usurpers to whom Æschines applied the term tyrants, seems quite unnecessary to fill up a chasm in Diodorus. Whether these tyrants were the same as the *enemies* to whom Gylon is said to have betrayed Nymphæum, is a different question. The predecessor of Satyrus I. may have been hostile to Athens, though the succeeding princes were her allies and benefactors. It may however not be superfluous to point out the fallacy of the argument, that the silence of Demosthenes on this subject, in his reply to Æschines, "amounts to an admission that the story of Gylon and his daughters was true beyond controversy." The fact that Gylon had been condemned for treason, was most likely incontrovertible; and this would be a sufficient motive for avoiding the subject, however inaccurate the rest of the story might be. Yet the passage about Gylon in the second oration against Aphobus might almost warrant a conjecture, that the sentence had been rescinded before Gylon's death.

obtained the hand of a rich heiress, who, perhaps for no other reason than because she was a foreigner, and a native of the barbarous region, was described at Athens as a Scythian. Their two daughters were sent with large portions to Athens, where one of them, Cleobula, married the elder Demosthenes: ground sufficient for her son's political opponents to call him a Scythian, and a hereditary enemy of his country. Demosthenes, who according to the most probable opinion was born in the last year of the ninety-eighth Olympiad, 385¹, lost his father when he was but seven years old, and was left, with his mother, and a younger sister, under the care of three guardians, two of them the next of kin, the third an intimate friend of the family, who according to the Attic law continued to administer his affairs until he had completed his eighteenth year. It can scarcely be doubted, though we have only the statements on one side, that they grossly abused their trust, and by waste, embezzlement, or mismanagement, reduced his ample patrimony, which ought to have been greatly augmented, to a very slender income. It is little less clear that this injury, which in ordinary cases would have been a misfortune, was among the causes which contributed most to form his character, and to lay the foundation of his greatness.

His bodily frame was in his early youth weak and sickly, and perhaps not capable of supporting the fatigue of the ordinary gymnastic exercises; or his mother's anxiety for the health of her only son prevented him from attending the palæstra: for it seems certain that in this respect his education was neglected. It would not be surprising that a nickname expressive of

¹ On this subject the reader may compare Mr. Clinton's arguments in his Appendix, c. 20., with an essay *On the Birth-year of Demosthenes*, in the Philological Museum, Febr. 1833. Vol. ii. p. 389. by the author of this history, and with Westerman's *Commentatio*, prefixed to his edition of the *Vite x. Oratorum*, p. 18.—21., which was published only a few months later in the same year. Westerman has shown that these Lives may be Plutarch's, and contain materials for more accurate biographies.

effeminacy¹, should have been fastened on him by his young companions, and that it should afterwards have been interpreted by his enemies as a proof of unmanly luxury and vicious habits; especially as at a later period of life he did not abstain from certain indulgences which his fortune permitted, and perhaps his infirmities required, but which, though perfectly harmless, may have excited envy, and were sufficiently unusual to afford a subject for obloquy.² For military service he was of course the less fitted, as he wanted the training by which every Greek citizen was commonly prepared for it³, and the consciousness of this defect might well have led him to shrink from it: possibly too his bodily weakness was coupled with some degree of timidity; though we have no evidence that can raise more than a faint suspicion, that he was deficient in the lowest kind of courage. By these disadvantages however his strong mind and ardent spirit were bent the more resolutely on the cultivation of his intellectual powers, and on the civil pursuits which alone afforded him a prospect of that eminence to which he must very early have felt himself entitled to aspire. It seems probable that even during his minority he conceived suspicions of the misconduct of his guardians, or was dissatisfied with the treatment he received from them. He charges them with having defrauded the masters under whom he studied of their dues⁴: which however did not prevent him from receiving the best instruction in the literary part of a liberal education⁵: whether the story, that he could not pay the high price which Isocrates demanded for his lessons, had any other foundation, we cannot determine.

¹ Βάκαλος. Plut. Dem. 4. But it is more probable that it referred to the defect in his articulation. See Schæfer, Appar. ad Demosth. Vol. ii. p. 251. Næke, De Battaro Valesii Catonis, in the Rhenish Mus. Vol. ii. p. 117.

² Æschines, De F. L. § 105. Dinarchus c. Demosth. § 37.

³ Æschines, In Ctes. § 256.

⁴ I. Aphob. § 53.

⁵ It is strange that Becker, forgetting the orator's *ἰδιδασκίς γυμνασία*, *ἐνὸς δ' ἰσάτων*, should repeat Plutarch's error (Dem. 4.) — *man sah den schwächlichen Knaben in keiner Schule. Demosthenes als Staatsman*, p. 9.

The account which he obtained from his guardians, when he came of age, must have convinced him that he had no hope of redress but through litigation: and their abilities, wealth, and influence, rendered them formidable adversaries. The very institution of legal proceedings against persons so closely connected with his family by blood or friendship, wore an ungracious appearance; and the parties interested did not fail to represent it as the effect of unnatural malignity, which they seem to have expressed by another opprobrious epithet.¹

A hard contest lay before him, in which he must have been aware that the justice of his cause would avail him little without the aid of forensic skill: and it was one on which his after fortunes mainly depended. It was therefore for immediate use, on the most pressing occasion, that he sharpened the weapon with which he was to achieve so many memorable victories. This however was not the only motive which urged him to the study of eloquence. About the same time that he became his own master, he had been present at the trial in which Callistratus defended his conduct in the affair of Oropus. The impression made upon the youth by that masterly pleading, and by the admiration it excited, was like that which the hearing of Herodotus is commonly believed to have wrought on Thucydides: it was perhaps then first that Demosthenes felt that he too was an orator. There was however a wide interval, not to be surmounted without many years of laborious application, between the point which he had attained, and the ideal mark which he proposed to himself. He placed himself under the direction of Isæus, an advocate of high reputation, a scholar of Isocrates, though in style much more nearly resembling Lysias. To him he may have been in some degree indebted for the grace, simplicity, and vigour, which are the most conspicuous qualities of his forensic pleadings. For this purpose he could not have found a better model: nor for any prac-

¹ Ἄγχις, a viper. *Æsch. de F. L.* § 105.

tical end any much worse than Isocrates. Yet he may have wished to obtain the instructions of so celebrated a master, and we can easily believe that, when deterred by the price which the rhetorician asked, he still diligently studied his works.¹ There was also a tradition, resting indeed on nameless authority, that he was for a time one of Plato's hearers²: and the difference of style would not induce us to reject it: but his acquaintance, which may safely be presumed, with the philosopher's writings would sufficiently explain, if any such explanation were needed, that lofty strain of morality which pervades his great works, and which, as may be inferred from the observation of Panætius³, he first ventured to introduce into speeches addressed to Athenian courts and assemblies, audiences, which Plato himself would scarcely have deemed worthy or capable of receiving such sublime truths.

His suit with his guardians, though it was delayed three or four years by their artifices, was finally decided in his favour: and though they still evaded the execution of the judgment, he appears at length to have recovered a considerable part of his property. It would otherwise be difficult to reconcile his own statements concerning the expensive charges which he undertook in his youth⁴, with his account of the small remnant of his patrimony which his guardians rendered to him. The assertion made long after in general terms by one of his enemies, that he had wasted his fortune⁵, was probably drawn from the defence set up by his guardians; it may at all events be safely pronounced an impudent calumny, for which its authors could hardly have hoped to gain a place in history. It is refuted by the clearest evidence the case admits. Not only were the habits of Demosthenes so notoriously abstemious, as

¹ Callibius, In Plutarch Demosth. 5. Compare Vit. x. Orat. Dem. p. 844. c.

² Plut. Dem. u. s.

⁴ De Cor. § 399.

³ In Plutarch Dem. 13.

⁵ Æschines Ctes. § 173.

to be made on that ground a subject of ridicule by his political opponents¹: but his early life, for about ten years after he came of age, was spent in a continued struggle with difficulties, and in the most laborious preparation for the attainment of the great objects of a noble ambition.

The success with which he had pleaded his own cause was encouraging, but not decisive as to his higher prospects. The speeches which he delivered on that occasion were deemed worthy of his master Isæus, and certainly give proof of no ordinary talents. But a different kind of eloquence was requisite for the debates of the assembly; and defects of utterance and gesticulation which might be overlooked by a court of justice in a youth claiming redress, appeared intolerably offensive, in one who presented himself as a public counsellor. The reception he met with on his first appearance before the assembled people, was such as might have stifled the hopes of one less conscious of his own powers. His articulation was imperfect, his action disagreeable, his voice, naturally not strong, was ill managed; and even his style startled his hearers by its novelty, and was thought harsh, strained, and confused.² Though not silenced, he descended from the bema in the midst of murmurs and laughter. There were however among his audience persons able to discern the merit of the attempt, and friendly enough to encourage and aid him with useful advice. Old men were still living who had heard Pericles in their boyhood; and one of them it is said cheered Demosthenes with an assurance, that he reminded him of that great orator, whose fame appears to have been hitherto unrivalled at Athens. Satyrus also, the player, an amiable and estimable man, was believed to have directed his attention to the principal faults of his elocution. He saw all that he wanted, and with unconquerable resolution set himself to the task of

¹ Demosthenes ii. Phil. § 92., de F. L. § 51., and the joke of Demades (Lucian Demosth. Encom. § 15.) *ὡς αἱ μὲν ἄλλαι πρὸς ὕδαρ λίγαίτι, τὸν Δημοσθένη δὲ πρὸς ὕδαρ γράφουσι.*

² Plut. Dem. 6.

overcoming his natural impediments, correcting his unsightly habits, and perfecting every organ and faculty which he had to employ as a public speaker. He is reported to have withdrawn for a time from society, to pursue his work without interruption; and we know that he resorted to new and very irksome methods of mastering his personal disadvantages.¹ These exercises he continued until he had acquired a manner of delivery, as to which it is sufficient to say, that it was thought by his contemporaries worthy of his eloquence, and that it distinguished him no less above all his rivals.²

It was not however merely to enable himself to satisfy the eye and ear of the public, that he entered on this course of training. He had felt that the equally fastidious taste and judgement of an Athenian assembly demanded more than it had found in his first essay, which probably fell short by a much greater distance of his own idea. He applied himself to an assiduous study of all the theoretical works he could procure, which could furnish him with rules and hints for the cultivation of his art; and still more diligently consulted the great models of eloquence in which he recognised a kindred genius. In Thucydides he appears to have found, as we do, the richest mine of thought and language; and the value which he set on his history is attested both by the tradition, that he copied it out eight times, and could almost recite it by heart³, and by the evidence of his own style, notwithstanding the difference required by two kinds of composition so completely distinct. In the meanwhile his pen was constantly employed in rhetorical exercises. Every question suggested to him by passing events served him for a topic of discussion, which called forth the application of his attainments to

¹ Plut. Dem. 11. from Demosthenes himself, on the testimony of Demetrius Phalereus.

² Dionysius, De Adm. vi. dic. in Demost. 22.

³ See on these reports Krueger *Leben des Thukydides*, p. 81, 82. Cicero indeed, Orat. 9., when he asks: *Quis unquam Græcorum rhetorum a Thucydide quidquam duxit?* seems never to have heard of them. But at least Demosthenes might have learnt as much for the purpose of his art from Thucydides as from Isocrates.

the real business of life. It was perhaps as much for the sake of such practice, as with a view to reputation or the increase of his fortune, that he accepted employment, as an advocate, which until he began to take an active part in public affairs, was offered to him in abundance. If he viewed these occasions in this light, we might believe the story that he once furnished each of the adverse parties in a cause with a speech, and yet might not consider it as a very deep stain upon his honour. His main occupation however was not with forms, or words, and sentences. The profession of an advocate itself required an extensive range of information. Causes especially which related to contested laws or decrees generally involved a number of questions, that called for a large share of legal and political knowledge. Demosthenes, who from the first was always looking forward to the widest field of action, undoubtedly did not content himself with the indispensable study of the Athenian laws and constitution, but bestowed no less earnest attention on the domestic affairs, the financial resources, and the foreign relations of the commonwealth, and on the political divisions, powers, and interests, of the rest of Greece. The state of the finances, and of the naval and military establishments of Athens, the defects of the existing system, and the means of correcting them, appear more particularly to have occupied his thoughts.

Such was the process by which he became confessedly the greatest orator among the people by whom eloquence was cultivated as it has never since been by any nation upon earth. He brought it to its highest stage of perfection, as Sophocles the tragic drama, by the harmonious union of excellencies which before had only existed apart. The quality in his writings which excited the highest admiration of the most intelligent critics among his countrymen in the later, critical, age, was the Protean versatility with which he adapted his style to every theme, so as to furnish the most perfect examples of every order and kind of eloquence. They,

who understood and felt the beauty of his compositions in a degree beyond the reach of the most learned foreigner, were aware that, with all their enthusiasm of delight, they could but faintly conceive the impression which that which they read must have produced on those who heard it animated by the voice and action of the orator, when he was addressing himself to real interests and passions.¹ This however is a subject on which it would be foreign to our present purpose to enlarge. We will only observe that Demosthenes, like Pericles, never willingly appeared before his audience with any but the ripest fruits of his private studies; though he was quite capable of speaking on the impulse of the moment in a manner worthy of his reputation; that he continued to the end of his career to cultivate his art with unabated diligence, and that even in the midst of public business his habits were known to be those of a severe student.

With so many claims to admiration on this side, he has left, we will not say an ambiguous, but a disputed character.² It would indeed have been surprising had the case been otherwise with a man whose whole life was passed in the midst of the most violent political storms, and the most furious party-strife. His efforts to defend the liberties of Athens and of Greece against a foreign king, have earned him still more virulent attacks in modern times, than he experienced from the sycophants of his own day, or from his personal enemies. The extreme scantiness of our information as to his private history, and indeed as to the public events of his times, must always render it impossible distinctly to refute the imputations which have been thrown upon his moral worth: all that can be said in his defence is, that so far as can be now ascertained, not one of them

¹ Dionysius, *De Adm.* vi. dic. in Demosth. 22.

² We need hardly observe that Quintilian's: *atque malum virum accepimus*, xii. l. 14., as appears from the writer's annexed remark, implies no more than this: though it shows that, as usual, the scandal which Quintilian disbelieved was most eagerly read, and of course most frequently repeated.

rests upon any better foundation, than partial statements or doubtful surmises : while whatever we know with certainty of his public life is good, and often great. That he was free from faults, no one can suppose : his character was human ; it was that of a Greek, and an Athenian, in a corrupt and turbulent age, and in a difficult and trying station. It must not be compared with any purer models of virtue than the most illustrious statesmen of his country. From such a comparison, according to the view which he himself professed to take of his public conduct and his political aims, he had no need to shrink : for many of them had been more successful, but none in an undertaking so glorious as that in which he failed. Most of the graver charges which have been brought against him, are intimately connected with his public history : and our opinion of the man must be mainly regulated by the judgement we form of him as a statesman. If he truly represented the great object of his life to be that of preserving Greece from foreign domination, and if the means by which he strove to accomplish this purpose were, to husband the resources, to rouse the energies, and exalt the character of the Athenians, his own will stand in little need of an apology. This however is a question which it would be premature now to enter on, and which the history must decide. For the same reason we shall not here attempt to exhibit the portraits of any of the men who became celebrated either as his coadjutors or his adversaries, but shall resume the narrative from which we have been digressing.

In the course of the preceding year, Demosthenes had exhibited his powers in an oration which he delivered himself, in a public cause which excited great interest, as it was instituted for the repeal of a law lately enacted on the proposal of one Leptines, by which all exemptions from the expensive services technically termed *liturgies*, that had been granted to deserving citizens, or other benefactors of the commonwealth, were abolished, all such grants were declared illegal for the

future, and even to solicit them from the people was forbidden under a most severe penalty. On this occasion Demosthenes appeared as the advocate of Ctesippus, the son of Chabrias, who was one of the principal parties to the cause, and deeply concerned in the issue, as the heir — a very unworthy one — of his father's privileges. Demosthenes undertook his part, chiefly it seems out of regard for his family, but not without a decided opinion on the inexpediency of the law which he opposed. It had been recommended by Leptines as a measure of relief to the citizens who were burdened with the charge of the public amusements; for the exemptions in question did not extend to the trierarchy, or to the war-taxes. To Demosthenes it appeared that the purpose might be more equitably, honourably, and usefully, answered by a fairer distribution of the burden; and in the room of the sweeping abolition of former grants, he proposed an inquiry into the claims of those who enjoyed them. The law was repealed. We do not know whether the proposal of Demosthenes — which would probably have disclosed many abuses — was adopted; but the speech, which is an admirable specimen of his oratory, must have raised him high in public estimation, and have inspired him with confidence to take a part in the debates of the assembly.

The oration however on the question of the Persian war shows that he was much less intent on making a display of eloquence than on offering useful advice. It is calm, simple, grave, statesman-like, indicating the outlines of the policy which he ever after continued to recommend. He points out the danger to which Athens would expose herself, if, relying on uncertain rumours, she should rush into a war in which Persia might be able to combine the other maritime Greek states against her. But he urges the necessity that she should immediately place herself in a strong defensive posture, not more against the attack with which she had been threatened, than against those which might be made on her from other quarters which were avowedly hostile.

It is a little surprising that though this is the general purpose of the speech, the name of Philip does not once occur in it, and it contains no distinct allusion to the war with Macedonia. We may infer from this silence, that Philip's proceedings, though they had provoked the resentment of the Athenians, had not yet excited any alarm even in Demosthenes. It is likewise remarkable that he speaks of Thebes, though the popular prejudice had never been more violent against her at Athens than at this period, in an extremely mild, respectful, conciliating tone. But he does not confine himself, like Isocrates, to vague general advice: the contrast between the practical statesman and the wordy rhetorician is strongly illustrated in the one's speech, and the other's pamphlet, which were produced at so short an interval of time, under similar circumstances, and with views apparently not discordant. Demosthenes proposes a specific well-digested plan, which would enable the commonwealth to equip her fleets with the least possible delay, and, if necessary, to raise her naval force to 300 galleys. Into the details of this scheme we need not enter. It was an attempt to remedy one of the crying evils of the existing system which will be mentioned hereafter. We are not informed whether it was adopted; but the proposal of war with Persia was rejected.

The occupation which the Social War gave to the Athenians, seems to have prevented them from taking advantage of the cession of the Chersonesus: after that war was ended, the losses which they had suffered in it must have rendered them the more desirous of extracting all the profit they could from their newly acquired territory. Accordingly in the course of the next year a body of cleruchial colonists was sent to establish themselves there. The ancient claims of Athens to the Chersonesus may have been thought to justify this measure, notwithstanding the apparent contravention of the terms on which the revived confederacy had been based: as the public necessities overruled every other consider-

ation of policy. Not only however did Cardia remain independent, but Sestus refused to submit, and Chares was ordered to reduce it to obedience. He besieged and took the town; and, it appears without any instructions, but probably to gratify the resentment which it had provoked by a long course of hostility, as well as to make more room for the Athenian settlers, he put to death all the males, and sold the women and children. A renewal of the ancient ferocity which had contributed to the downfall of the commonwealth in its most palmy state, peculiarly ill-timed when it had been so lately weakened by an unsuccessful struggle, and was still engaged in one with a most formidable enemy.

Philip seems to have kept aloof from the Social War: it enabled him perhaps to effect his conquests in Thrace with less interruption than he might otherwise have experienced: but after the reduction of Potidæa he remained, as we have observed, for a time apparently inactive, or wholly occupied with the internal affairs of his kingdom. There can however be little doubt, that during this pause in his military enterprises, his attention was earnestly fixed on the events which were taking place in Greece; and it was probably because he anticipated the opportunity which they would afford him for interference, that he abstained from all movements which might either employ his forces, or might draw the eyes of the Greeks toward himself. Nevertheless he did not neglect an opportunity which offered itself, in the course of the same year in which Demosthenes delivered his first public oration, (354) for gaining a footing in the immediate neighbourhood of Attica, such as might for the present attract little notice, but yet might prove very useful to him in his future undertakings. The occasion was presented by the troubled state of Eubœa. Chalcis and Eretria, each under the rule of one of its own citizens, still, it would seem, retained their ancient rivalry. At Chalcis a dynasty had been established by Mnesarchus, and was maintained after his death by his sons Callias and Taurosthenes: at Eretria Themison

had been succeeded — whether immediately or otherwise we are not informed — by Plutarchus. Both Mnesarchus and Themison had manifested hostility to Athens; and their successors were probably not more amicably disposed toward her. Callias endeavoured to strengthen himself by alliance with Philip, who sent a small body of troops to aid him in his quarrel with the tyrant of Eretria¹, or to extend his dominion in the island. Plutarchus was thus led to apply to Athens for protection; and the succours which his enemies had received from Macedonia, may have excited a jealousy there favourable to his interest, and it seems that he had also powerful friends there to plead his cause. Yet Demosthenes declared himself against the proposition of sending an expedition to his assistance, thinking it more politic to let the feuds of the island take their natural course, than to engage in a war which held out little prospect of advantage to counterbalance the expense and the danger.² He did not consider Plutarchus as a desirable or trustworthy ally; and seems either to have thought that the manner in which Philip had interfered did not deserve much notice, or to have apprehended that the proposed intervention of Athens might lead to a struggle with him for the possession of Eubœa, in which the risk would be all on her side, the gain on his.

Demosthenes however stood almost alone in his opposition to the war, and only irritated the partizans of Plutarchus by the attempt. One of the foremost among them was a person named Meidias, a man of great wealth and influence, and of abilities sufficient at least to enable him to take a part in public business. He was united to Plutarchus by the bonds of friendship and hospitality, and had been for several years an open enemy of Demosthenes, from a quarrel which appears to have grown out of his suit with his guardians. We have intimations that at this period party-violence ran very

¹ *Æschines Ctes.* § 87. *Plutarch Phoc.* 12.

² *Demosthenes, De Pac.* § 5.

high at Athens. Frequent mention is made of a murder committed by one Aristarchus, apparently from political motives ; and Meidias attempted to involve Demosthenes, who was connected with Aristarchus, in the same charge. We may also gather from several facts stated by Demosthenes, that while, in the administration of public affairs, the spirit of democracy was levelling the few barriers of law and custom by which it had hitherto been restrained, abuses were tolerated by which a large share of power was thrown into the hands of an oligarchical faction. We formerly noticed, as a remarkable indication of the character and aims of the individual, the licence assumed by Alcibiades in his intercourse with his fellow-citizens during the early part of his life. That was a singular case, in which an extraordinary measure of popular favour was abused by an extraordinary man. But that Meidias, a person every way, except in wealth, below all comparison with Alcibiades, should have ventured on similar excesses, as he appears to have done, can scarcely be explained except by the reliance which he placed on the strength of his party. Demosthenes who appears at all times to have distinguished himself by the liberality of his contributions both to the amusements of his fellow-citizens and the service of the state, had voluntarily undertaken to act as *choragus* — to furnish a chorus — for his tribe, at one of the Dionysiac festivals. While he was discharging this office, Meidias, who had previously offered him several gross insults of a more private nature, struck him openly in the theatre in the presence of the assembled people, and tore the rich vestment which was one of the ensigns of his official character. The fact could not be denied ; and as the person of a choragus, during the performance of his functions, was sacred, it exposed the offender to the penalties of sacrilege. Demosthenes immediately commenced a prosecution against Meidias, and composed a speech for the occasion, which has been preserved, though it was not delivered, and did not receive his finishing touches. For he was induced to

drop the proceedings before they came to the trial, and to accept a sum by way of compromise, so small that it could hardly be viewed as anything more than an acknowledgment of the injury. The conduct of Demosthenes in this transaction — which however it must be observed was much less repugnant to the Greek ideas of honour than to those of chivalrous times — cannot be ascribed either to avarice or to forbearance, which was wholly foreign to his character. It would seem therefore to have been the effect of fear inspired by the party which supported Meidias. But we do not know enough of the circumstances to pronounce how far it may have deserved the reproach of pusillanimity. It certainly appears to confirm the suspicion which is suggested by other passages in his life, that he was naturally timid, and bold only by an effort of reflection, or under the impulse of strong feelings.

The event of the measures which he opposed seems to prove the wisdom of his counsels. An expedition was decreed, and placed under the command of Phocion, perhaps the ablest general yet remaining to the republic. He was joined in Eubœa by Plutarchus: but he suffered himself to be drawn into a perilous position near Tamyne, where his army, if defeated, must have been entirely destroyed, or compelled to surrender; and here he was attacked by Callias, with, it seems, a greatly superior force. He however extricated himself from this danger by his skill and presence of mind, and gained the victory in a hard fought battle. But the conduct of Plutarchus, whose rashness nearly ruined his allies, seems to have excited a suspicion, which however can hardly have been well founded, that he had acted in collusion with the enemy. After the victory indeed it is possible that his views may have undergone a change, and he may have betrayed an alienation from the interest of the Athenians, which they would consider as treachery. The fact is that henceforth Phocion treated him as an enemy, expelled him from Eretria, and made himself master of Zaretra, a fortress in a

central position between the eastern and western coasts. If we believe what Plutarch adds, that he dismissed the prisoners who fell into his hands there, through fear that the people might be induced by the orators to put them to death, we must suppose a state of excitement at Athens, for which, unless it was produced by indignation against a perfidious ally, we cannot account. After the expulsion of Plutarchus popular government was restored at Eretria¹; and perhaps the Athenian interest was at first predominant. But it was not long before Philip's partizans began to show themselves there: nor was the power of Athens completely established in the rest of the island. Phocion indeed left it seemingly in a tranquil state; but his successor Molossus, who probably wanted his prudence and moderation, was engaged in fresh hostilities, and conducted them so ill as to fall into the enemy's hands.²

We have neglected chronological arrangement in this part of our narrative, in order that the history of much more important events, which were at this time agitating Greece, and which took their rise some years earlier, may be carried forward without interruption. The principal of these events was a war which broke out in 357, or 356, between Thebes and Phocis, and became one of the most memorable in ancient history, under the name of the Sacred War: the second to which that epithet had been applied. With this were connected movements in Thessaly, which opened a passage for Philip into the heart of Greece, and at length made him the master of her destiny.

The main causes of this Sacred War are more clearly ascertained than its immediate occasion. Animosity had long been rankling between Thebes and Phocis under a show of peace and amity. The Phocians had openly preferred the alliance of Sparta and Athens as long as they dared, came over to the Theban side with evident reluctance, as much as possible withheld active

¹ Demosthenes, Phil. lil. § 68.

² Plut. Phoc. 14

co-operation, and took advantage of the letter of the treaty to refuse it in the campaign which ended with the battle of Mantinea. That refusal probably excited resentful feelings, which were only restrained by the expectation of a favourable opportunity; but they appear to have been aggravated by subsequent injuries. The price which Thebes had paid for her doubtful victory in the loss of her greatest general and statesman, must have revived the spirit of all her enemies; and it seems to have encouraged the subject Bœotian towns to attempt a revolt, and the Phocians to come to their aid: for such is the most probable interpretation of Justin's statement, that the charge against the Phocians which gave rise to the war, was that they had ravaged Bœotia.¹ And it is possible that the step with which the Thebans began the fatal struggle, was prompted less by revenge than by precaution, in the view of disabling the Phocians from thus assailing Thebes on her tenderest side. Had Eparinondas still guided their counsels, they would scarcely have resorted to such an expedient. As it was, they seem to have hoped to obtain all the advantages of a successful war without bloodshed or risk.

It was long since the name of the Amphictyonic Council had been connected with any important events: but it still retained its existence as a venerable shadow², and continued to celebrate its periodical meetings with harmless solemnity, and perhaps to issue decrees for the regulation of matters relating to the temple of Delphi, not devoid of interest for the little tribes, which, politically insignificant, commanded a great majority of votes in its deliberations. After the decline of the Spartan power, they appear generally to have submitted to the guidance of Thebes, with which several of them were united by their common hatred of their neighbours the Phocians. The Thebans had already made use of their ascendancy to obtain a sentence which condemned Sparta to a penalty for the seizure of the Cadmea. We

¹ viii. 1.

² Ἡ ἐν Δελφοῖς συνέδριον. Demosth. De Pac. ad fin.

do not know under what pretext the council took cognizance of this offence, which, though a foul breach of faith, was not otherwise connected with religion; and we might therefore be led to suspect that it grounded its claim of jurisdiction in this case merely on the sounding title which it sometimes assumed, of a national congress.¹ We may perhaps infer from Xenophon's silence, that these proceedings were not instituted before the death of Epaminondas, who would probably have disdained this kind of revenge.² It may have seemed a good expedient for taming the obstinacy of Sparta, when she refused to acknowledge the independence of Messenia, and suffered herself on that account to be excluded from the general peace. She paid no regard to the sentence, which, after the battle of Mantinea, there was none to enforce; but it seems to have suggested the thought, that a like engine might be pointed with more effect against the Phocians. They had laid themselves open to a charge of sacrilege, having taken into cultivation a portion of the fruitful plain, which had been doomed by the decree of the Amphictyons in the first Sacred War to lie for ever waste. Such at least is the account of Diodorus, which is confirmed by what we learn of the quarrels between the Phocians and their Locrian neighbours on boundary questions, coupled with the subsequent conduct of the Locrians of Amphissa.³ Thebes did not put herself forward, but pro-

¹ Τὸ καὶνὸν τῶν Ἑλλήνων συνέδριον it calls itself in the decree cited by Demosthenes, De Cor. § 198.

² This supposition is likewise at least perfectly consistent with the language of Diodorus xvi. 23. Ἀκιδαιμονίων διαπολιμοσύνης τὸν Λιωτικὸν πόλεμον καὶ καταπαλειμθίντων. Flathe's remark, i. p. 131. that the Thebans by means of this sentence "gained another voice on their side and vented their hatred in a way in which they could not have vented it by arms," seems much more applicable to the period after the battle of Mantinea, than to the war in which they wreaked such terrible vengeance on Sparta.

³ Pausanias, iii. 9. 9., attributes the origin of the war which recalled Agesilaus from Asia, to a boundary feud between the Phocians and the Locrians of Amphissa. Xenophon, on the contrary, names the Locrians of Opus (Hel. iii. 5. 3.); and we do not know how Winiewski (p. 45.) referring to this passage of Xenophon, can say: "ager ille Cirrhæus idem fuisse videtur, de quo continua Locros inter et Phocenses erat controversia, quæ Olymp. Jam xvi. ansam Thebanis præbuit ad bellum contra Lacedæmonios commovendum:"—unless he would have the words τῶν Ὀπουνίων expunged from Xenophon's text. But they are placed beyond

bably instigated some of the Thessalian members of the council to prosecute the Phocians for this offence; and they were condemned to pay a very heavy fine.¹ As the delinquents did not obey the judgement, the council, probably at its next meeting, followed it up by a fresh decree, which declared that unless the fine was paid, the refractory people should forfeit their territory to the god whom they defrauded of his due. The language used seems to have amounted to a threat of reducing the Phocians to the condition of Penests or Helots, only subject not to private masters, but to the temple, or the government, of Delphi, long, as we have seen, the bitter enemy of Phocis. Such a sentence was clearly prompted by the state which could alone have thought itself able to carry it into execution; and under the same influence a clause was added to it, which threatened Sparta, if she persisted in her contumacy, with a like penalty.

If Thebes was the author of these proceedings, no farther explanation is needed to account for them; nor can it be necessary to suppose that she was impelled by any other motive than the prospect of reducing the Phocians to submission, and preventing them from interfering in the affairs of Bœotia. Yet there were contemporary politicians who charged the Thebans with a deeper and more iniquitous design: that of seizing Delphi, and plundering the sacred treasury. We have no means of judging whether there was any ground for this charge: nor indeed whether it had so much as a real suspicion to rest upon, and was anything more than a calumnious fabrication of their enemies.² But the fic-

suspicion by the subsequent account of the operations of Gylis (iv. 3. 21.) which were clearly directed against the Eastern Locrians: otherwise he would have accompanied Agesilaus to Delphi, which was close to the Ozolian frontier. See Vol. iv. p. 415. It seems therefore that Pausanias must have been mistaken as to this point; and yet his statement that the Phocians had a contest about land with the Locrians of Amphissa may have been very well founded.

¹ Flathe's conjecture (p. 125.) that the sentence against the Phocians had been passed in much earlier times, and had lain dormant, has nothing to support it; against it we might remark that, if this had been the case, it would probably have been revived sooner: for instance on the occasion mentioned in the last note.

² A writer whose assertions should always be viewed with most suspicion when they profess to be supported by authorities in the margin, observes:

tion itself, if it was nothing more, seems to indicate that such an event could not have excited much surprise; and indeed many things had happened which might have served to prepare the minds of the Greeks for it. Delphi itself, it is true, had never been directly threatened, except by the Persians, since the barbarous ages to which tradition referred the attempts of the Phlegyæ, and other impious enemies of the Delphic god.¹ But it was in a period of great refinement, yet before superstition had lost any considerable part of its influence, that Hecatæus advised his countrymen to apply the treasures of the same god at Branchidæ to their use in their contest with the Persians. On the eve of the Peloponnesian war we have seen that a similar proposal was made concerning those of Olympia and Delphi in a congress at Sparta by the Corinthian deputies, though disguised under the pretext of a loan. Still more recently, after the foundations of religion and morality had been shaken, by the speculations of the sophists, and by the crimes, convulsions, and calamities, of half a century, Jason was so strongly suspected of sacrilegious designs against the Delphic treasury, that perhaps in the hope of deterring him, the oracle was consulted on the subject, and the god was made to

¹ That it (the treasure at Delphi) was now the object of the Theban rulers is asserted equally by Demosthenes, at the head of one party in Athens, and by Isocrates at the head of the opposing party." The margin refers to Demosth. de legat. p. 347., Isocr. Or. ad Philipp. The reader who is able to consult these passages (that of Isocrates occurs p. 93. b. § 60.) in the original language, will find that Demosthenes is not delivering any opinion of his own, but only reporting the language of Æschines; and that Isocrates is so far from making the assertion attributed to him, that he says just the reverse: viz., that the Thebans made war with the Phocians, trusting that they should be able to get the better of the treasures of Delphi by their own funds: *ὡς τῶν χρημάτων τῶν ἐν Δελφοῖς περιγενόμενοι ταῖς ἐκ τῶν ἰδίων δαπάναις.* Whether any Latin translation may be accountable for a part of these mistakes, we have not time to inquire. But it is surprising that Flathé also (p. 133.) should have cited Isocrates as evidence of the general suspicion, and still more that Schlosser (l. 2. p. 217.) should have copied both the erroneous quotations. Pausanias (x. 2. 2.) makes Philomelus tell the Phocians: *Θηβαίων, καὶ εἴ τις ἄλλος κατασκαίῃ σφίσι ἐν πόλει, περιεῖσθαι καὶ ἀρετῇ σφᾶς καὶ δαπάνῃ χρημάτων.* We take this opportunity of warning the reader that he is not to expect any discussion of what Schlosser (l. 2. p. 217.) justly calls the ridiculous conceit (*den lächerlichen Gedanken*) of the *bank* at Delphi. A romance, as we find frequent occasion to observe, cannot be refuted.

¹ Vol. i. p. 104.

answer as of old, that he would take care of his own.¹ A party in Arcadia, with the tacit sanction of Thebes, had actually laid violent hands on the Olympic treasury. After such precedents, it required no extraordinary sagacity to foresee that the riches of Delphi would not long be protected by the sanctity of the place,² if those who were able to seize them should ever be tempted to the sacrilege by any urgent occasion.

Such an occasion had now arisen. The Phocians, threatened by the Amphictyonic decree, and by the powerful enemies who were eager to execute it, saw the need of a vigorous effort, and were ready to listen to bold counsellors. A man equal to the emergency seems at this time to have filled a high office in the commonwealth, Philomelus of Ledon, the son of Theotimus. He was probably general, or in some station of equivalent dignity, which our imperfect knowledge of the Phocian constitution does not enable us to ascertain. In a general assembly which was held to deliberate on the state of affairs, he pointed out the injustice of the decree, the enormous disproportion between the penalty and the offence, and urged the necessity of resistance. To render it effectual, he showed that they had only to assert their ancient rights, and take possession of Delphi, where they were entitled to the presidency of the oracle, which would enable them to reverse the proceedings of the Amphictyons. If they would entrust him with the enterprise, he pledged himself to bring it to a prosperous issue. These assurances inspired his hearers with confidence, and he was created commander-in-chief of the national forces, or, if he before held that office, was now invested with new and unlimited authority.

His first step, according to Diodorus, was to proceed to Sparta, and communicate his plans to Archidamus, who, it is said, declined openly to sanction them, but promised all the aid he could give, short of avowed co-operation, and furnished him with an immediate

¹ Xenophon, H. vi. 4. 30.

subsidy of fifteen talents. If this account is to be believed, it seems an almost unavoidable inference, that Philomelus had already formed designs which he had not ventured to disclose to his countrymen, but which he so far intimated at Sparta, that Archidamus, notwithstanding their common interest, shrank from the danger of an open alliance with him. But as it is probable that he did not suffer any longer interval than was absolutely necessary to elapse between the announcement of his purpose in the Phocian assembly, and the attempt to execute it, we are inclined to suspect that the interview with Archidamus took place before he was raised to the supreme command, and that with the supplies he received, and his private resources, he made preparations which enabled him, as soon as he had obtained the consent of the people, to strike the meditated blow. It certainly fell very suddenly on Delphi, and, if it had been expected, might it seems have been easily warded off. For it was with no more than 1000 Phocian peltasts, and perhaps an equal number of mercenary troops, that he marched to surprise the city of Apollo; and he appears to have met with no resistance from the mass of the inhabitants, who, it may be supposed from their manner of life, were among the least warlike of the Greeks.¹ Only the ruling families, which, apparently through a traditional connection with the Thracians of Daulis², bore the name of Thracidæ, relying perhaps on the sanctity which they derived from the temple of which they were hereditary guardians, made an impotent struggle, which provoked Philomelus to put them to death. That he ever entertained the thought of destroying the city, killing the men, and enslaving the women and children, is highly improbable: and little less so the account that he was diverted from this useless atrocity by the intercession of Archidamus.³

¹ See Athenæus, iv. 74.

² Schlosser, i. 2. p. 216., ridicules this opinion, which was not recommended to him by the character of the work in which he found it. But it has been lately defended, and illustrated by Huellmann: *Wuerdigung des Delphischen Orakels*, Bonn. 1837. p. 5.

³ Paus. iii. 10. 4.

We can much more readily believe Diodorus, who represents him as cheering the Delphians with assurances of safety.

The Locrians of Amphissa were first roused by the news, and immediately marched to the deliverance of Delphi, but they were defeated, and forced to retreat with great loss. After the victory Philomelus proceeded to destroy the records of the Amphictyonic judgement against Phocis. At the same time he publicly declared that he did not intend to rob the temple, but only to reinstate the Phocians, its ancient and legitimate guardians, in their rights. Yet it can scarcely be doubted that, while he was making these professions, he had already begun to touch the sacred treasure, unless it be supposed that the confiscated property of the Thracidæ was sufficient for his immediate wants. He certainly required considerable sums; for he not only continued to enlist fresh mercenaries, whom he invited by the addition of one half to the ordinary pay, but fortified the temple with a new wall. But he seems at least to have resolved not to take more than he found absolutely necessary for self-defence, and to keep even this measure secret as long as he could. It was partly perhaps with this view that having raised his forces to the number of 5000, he invaded and ravaged the Locrian territory. In this expedition the peculiar character of the war began to display itself. The Locrians in some trifling engagement had been left in possession of a few of the enemy's slain; and when the herald came with the usual application for their interment, refused to give them up, alledging that, according to Greek usage, men guilty of sacrilege were not entitled to funeral rites. But Philomelus having soon after gained a victory, and remaining master of the field, obliged them to consent to an exchange of the dead. He led his army back to Delphi laden with the spoil of Locris, which may for some time have supplied him with the means of paying it at the enemy's expense.

The interval of repose which followed this expedition,

was spent in active preparations for war, which however he conducted so as to show his intention of sparing the temple as long or as much as possible. He was evidently anxious to avert the odium of sacrilege from his cause, and had not yet despaired of escaping it. It may however have been less with this view, than to quiet the scruples of his own followers that he determined to employ the machinery of the oracle: possibly not much caring whether he gained its authority in his favour, or so shook it in the attempt, as to render it harmless for the future. He compelled the prophetess by threats to mount the tripod, and pronounce a declaration, importing, as we gather from Diodorus, that all his proceedings were agreeable to the will of the god, and encouraging him to persevere, or, as his enemies perhaps expressed it in derision, to do as he would. The oracle was no doubt couched in more decent terms; and he published it with great solemnity in an assembly which, though chiefly composed of his soldiers and partizans, was probably open to all the Greeks then present at Delphi, and may have been meant to represent an Amphictyonic *ecclesia*.¹ Propitious omens likewise were not wanting, nor kept secret.² But with these appeals to superstition he coupled other less ambiguous expedients for increasing the moral strength of his cause. He sent envoys, carefully chosen from among his friends, to all the principal states of Greece, Thebes itself not excepted, to defend his conduct. They were instructed to declare that he had only taken possession of Delphi to do justice to Phocis: that he had no intention of spoiling the temple: that he was ready to produce an inventory of all its treasures, minutely describing their number and weight, and to give an account before all Greece of his custody of them. In the meanwhile he proceeded to levy fresh troops, and, to meet his growing expenses without a breach of his

¹ Which bore the same relation to the *συνίδριον*, as that of a *δῆμος* to its *βουλή*.

² Diodorus, xvi. 27.

recent declaration, or at least to save appearances, and at the same time to punish his bitterest enemies, he laid heavy contributions on the wealthy Delphians. The Locrians, who had hitherto received no assistance, still thought themselves able to cope with him, and renewed their invasion. Another obstinate battle was fought near Delphi, in which they were completely routed¹; and now despairing of the success of their solitary efforts sent ambassadors to Thebes, to implore succours in the name of the god.

The reception which the envoys of Philomelus met with, was of course determined by the previous wishes and interests of the states to which they address themselves. But his moderation and fair professions encouraged those who were favourable to him to declare themselves without reserve. At Athens and at Sparta he was readily accepted as an ally: but at Thebes it is probable that his ministers could scarcely obtain an audience, and they were certainly dismissed with hostile threats. Yet it seems as if the imputation of sacrilege was not thought sufficient to excite the popular indignation to the proper pitch, and that a story was spread at Thebes, of an outrage committed by some Phocian on the person of a Theban lady.² The request of the Locrians was eagerly granted; and Thebes now came forward as the principal party to the contest, and herself sent envoys to Thessaly, to rouse not only the Thessalians but all the little tribes in that quarter, which had a voice in the council, to arm for the holy war. All obeyed the summons; and they alone probably among the belligerents were animated by some degree of religious zeal; though with most of

¹ Flathe, l. p. 143., brings a charge of *savage cruelty* against Philomelus, which has no other ground than a misconception of the meaning of Diodorus, xvi. 28. Diodorus clearly means not, as Flathe supposes, that Philomelus put his prisoners to death, but that many of the Locrians in their flight were driven—as Philomelus himself afterwards was—over the precipices near the field of battle. Flathe has confounded the two chapters in Diodorus, 25. and 28.; and represents this imaginary cruelty of Philomelus, as a retaliation for the denial of sepulture to his troops.

² Duris in Athenæus, xlii. 10. The accompanying parallels do not speak much for the truth of the story.

them the Phocians, not the enemies of the god, were the real object of hatred. Thus Philomelus saw almost the whole of northern Greece leagued against him: his enemies surrounded him on all sides, and were urged to the utmost exertions by the strongest motives of interest, passion, and prejudice, while from his allies he could look for little assistance. Athens, weakened by her Social War, and intent on different aims, was not disposed to engage very actively in a cause of ominous aspect, and not immediately touching her interests. Sparta could not but view the cause as her own: but, with Messene and Megalopolis at her side, could promise little, and might be disabled from stirring at all. There were indeed some other Peloponnesian states which wished well to the enemies of Thebes; but no expectations of important succours could be safely founded on their friendly dispositions.

Thus then the time had come when one help alone remained, to save the Phocians from destruction. They had need of a powerful army to face the confederacy formed against them, and they had no means of raising or maintaining one, unless the god lent them his treasures, as he had already granted them his sanction. Philomelus now threw off all disguise. It was indeed necessary for his purpose that it should be generally known, that he possessed the power of enriching all who might enter his service, and that he would no longer shrink from using it. As soon as it became notorious that the temple treasure was the fund from which his soldiers were to draw their pay, adventurers flocked to his standard from every part of Greece. That they were men of a worse character than any others of the same class may be considered as a hostile exaggeration¹: yet it is credible enough that the large pay by which they were attracted, and the cause in which they fought, concurred to promote a more than ordinary degree of licentiousness among them. Having thus raised his forces to upwards of 10,000, Philomelus again

¹ Diodorus, xvi. 30.

invaded Locris, where the enemy had already been joined by a body of Theban troops. Notwithstanding the excellence of the Theban cavalry, he defeated them in a combat of horse, and gained another victory after they had been reinforced by 6000 men from Thessaly. He himself soon afterward received a reinforcement of 1500 Achæans; but the arrival of a fresh army,—according to Diodorus 13000 strong—from Bœotia, compelled him, it seems, to take up a position, where he remained for a time on the defensive.

While the two armies were encamped here at no great distance from each other, the character of the war displayed itself in deeds more atrocious than either party had hitherto ventured on. The Thebans, confident in their strength, but perhaps not so much to gratify their hatred, as to intimidate the enemy, and to deter others from entering into the Phocian service, brought out some mercenaries whom they had taken in foraging excursions, and, having made a proclamation that the Amphictyons condemned them to death as abettors of sacrilege, massacred them all in cold blood, in the presence, it seems, of both armies. The soldiers of Philomelus were, as might have been expected, not dismayed but violently exasperated by this cruelty, and demanded vengeance for the blood of their comrades. Retaliation was absolutely necessary for his own safety. The mercenaries exerted their utmost efforts to collect as many prisoners as they could; and Philomelus led them all out to public execution according to the example set by the Thebans. This measure did not of course tend to allay the mutual animosity, but it prevented the repetition of the crime which had been perpetrated in the name of religion. We have no connected account of the military operations which ensued, and cannot determine the object of the movements by which the two armies were again brought into each other's presence near the town of Neon, or Tithorea, which lay at the foot of a precipice in one of the upper valleys of Parnassus.¹

¹ Paus. x. 32. 9.

The meeting is said to have been unexpected: we might conjecture that Philomelus was taking the mountain road for the purpose of invading Bœotia, while it was left unguarded. The enemy was far superior in numbers, and the engagement, which followed without any previous arrangement, ended in the defeat of the Phocians. Philomelus himself, after having fought with desperate valour, and received a number of wounds, was hurried along, it is said, in the general rout among the mountain crags, and perished. According to Diodorus he found his flight stopt by a precipice, and threw himself over its edge. Pausanias¹ gives a more marvellous colour to the event: as if by a preternatural instinct he had sought the very kind of death, which, by ancient custom, and by the decree of the Amphictyonic council, was the appointed penalty of sacrilege²; and we find this view of the subject still more distinctly expressed in another tradition: that the rock on which he stood, rolled down and crushed him with its ruins.³ Perhaps Justin's simpler statement, that he died fighting in the thickest of the battle, may be not less deserving of credit.

Philomelus, it is said, was the eldest of three brothers; and Onomarchus, one of the younger⁴, commanded a division of the Phocian army. It seems not to have taken so active a part in the battle as that which was immediately under Philomelus: he effected a safe retreat, and collected many of the fugitives. The victory was not so decided as to encourage the Thebans to

¹ X. 2. 4.

² Elian, xi. 5. calls it Delphic law; but from Paus. v. 617., we may perhaps infer a more general usage.

³ Philo, in Wesseling's note to Diodorus, xvi. 31.

⁴ We have adopted this statement on the authority of Diodorus, xvi. 56. 61.: but we cannot help expressing surprise at the unhesitating assent it has received from, we believe, every modern writer who has had occasion to mention it. Flate alone is silent: whether from doubt, does not appear. It is at least very strange that Diodorus should mention the relation between Onomarchus and Philomelus for the first time in this incidental way, and have said nothing of it before, when the name of Onomarchus was first introduced to the reader (xvi. 31.); and equally strange that Pausanias is silent about it, though he takes care to mention, that Phayllus was the brother of Onomarchus: as does Diodorus in the proper place, that is, on the earliest occasion (xvi. 56.) A slip of the pen of such a nature would not be surprising in Diodorus. If Onomarchus was not the brother of Philomelus, he may have been the son of Euthykrates mentioned by Aristotle, Pol. v. 3. 3., whose quarrel with Mnascas gave rise to

attempt the recovery of Delphi; and they returned home to await the effect which the loss of Philomelus might produce on the enemy's counsels.¹ Onomarchus led his army back to Delphi, and immediately called an assembly to deliberate on the state of affairs. A division, which had probably existed for some time before among the Phocians, but had been suppressed by the authority of Philomelus, now came openly to light. There was a party strongly desirous of peace: willing perhaps to purchase it by any concessions not inconsistent with the national honour and independence; and averse to the war not merely through fear of a disastrous issue, but on account of its peculiar character, and of the consequences which were to be apprehended even from the most favourable event. There were no doubt many who were struck with religious scruples by the spoliation of the temple, and who thought at least that nothing could justify it but the most urgent necessity. But there were perhaps still more who were jealous of the power which the war, if successfully conducted, was likely to place in the hands of a single family, and contemplated with alarm the prospect of a dynasty resting on the support of a greedy and licentious foreign soldiery. On the other hand the house of Philomelus was strong in its hereditary and newly acquired influence, and in the cause itself: for it still preserved the aspect of a just and noble resistance to oppression: and whoever else might hope for safety in submission, the leaders in such a contest had no choice between their perilous eminence, and a ruinous fall. The popular feeling was probably with Onomarchus; his adherents prevailed, and he was elected to fill the place of the deceased autocrat.

In military and political talents, in prudence and

the Sacred War: which Wachsmuth (i. 2. p. 374. n. 47.) denies, only because Onomarchus the general was a son of Theotimus; citing Pausanias, x. 2. 1., where the parentage of Philomelus alone is mentioned.

¹ Flathe, i. p. 147. thinks it *evident* that the cause which prevented the Thebans from making use of their victory, was that the Thessalians were called away to serve against the tyrants of Pheræ, and that they were probably followed by many of the northern allies. But this is surely too much to assume without authority.

energy, he seems to have been not inferior to Philomelus. But he wanted the moderation, and self-command, which, even through the shade of adverse statements, may be clearly traced in the conduct of his predecessor. Philomelus was ready to sacrifice all that others held sacred to the interest of the state, perhaps to that of his own ambition. But Onomarchus was addicted to vicious pleasures, and reckless as to the means of indulging in them: and he appears from the first to have regarded the treasures of the temple as a patrimony which he might spend as he would, and as a mine which he needed not fear ever to exhaust. The common metals of the sacred offerings furnished arms: the gold and silver not only pay for his troops, but presents, with which he endeavoured to gain partizans, to conciliate enemies, and to quicken the zeal of his friends throughout Greece, and with which he did not scruple to reward the ministers of his sensual enjoyments. It was probably from him that Chares at one time received a sum it is said of sixty talents, with which he gave a feast to the people in honour of some not very important advantage gained over a body of Philip's troops¹: an example which may serve to illustrate the rate at which the Delphic treasures were lavished. At the same time his domestic administration assumed a more despotic character than his predecessor's. Philomelus had treated the Delphians with great rigour; but they were enemies, who had only submitted to force; and their property might seem less sacred than that of the temple: Onomarchus ventured to arrest the principal Phocians of the opposite party, to put them to death, and confiscate their estates: whether with or without the forms of a trial, matters little. Considered even as the

(1) Theopompus, In Athenæus, xiv. 43, from a book *περὶ τῶν ἐκ Δελφῶν εὐληθίστων χρημάτων*. There is nothing in the passage to mark the date, and not the slightest reason for referring it to the period of the Olynthian war, in which the Phocians had but a remote interest. It seems most probable that it belongs to the time of Philip's first invasion of Thessaly, when we know Chares was commanding against him. Westermann (*De orationum Olynthiacarum ordine*, p. 37.) supposes the victory to have been gained by Chares, when Philip was repulsed from Thermopylæ.

work of a faction, still, under the direction of such a chief, it amounted to little less than an act of military despotism under a thin disguise. The profusion, however, with which he lavished his gold, answered his immediate ends. It enabled him to recruit his army, and probably to increase it; so that after the retreat and separation of the confederates, he was able to fall upon them singly at a great advantage. He invaded both the western and the eastern Locrians, extorted humiliating concessions from those of Amphissa, and took Thronium, one of the Epicnemedian towns, and reduced its population to slavery: Doris too, and its little townships, he laid waste with fire and sword. He then advanced into Bœotia, and made himself master of Orchomenus, now perhaps inhabited by a Theban colony. He next undertook the siege of Chæronea, but was compelled to raise it by the approach of a Theban army, and to retire with some loss into Phocis.

It was at this juncture that a new party entered into the contest. Philip's eye had no doubt been fixed on it from the beginning; and he must soon have perceived that it was likely to afford him an opportunity of acquiring an influence in Greece, such as none of his predecessors had possessed or aspired to. It was so evenly balanced, that he might throw a decisive weight into either scale. But it was first necessary that he should be brought nearer to the scene of action, from which he was separated by Thessaly: and it happened through a singularly opportune combination of events, that at the very time when it was most important to him to gain an entrance into that country, the way was opened for him by the state of its affairs. He had previously done all that rested with himself for this end, having removed the last obstacle that lay between him and the Thessalian frontier. This was the town of Methone, which had long shown a very hostile spirit, and afforded a shelter to his enemies which enabled them to annoy him greatly. He laid siege to it perhaps so early as the spring of 353, but the inhabitants made so

vigorous a defence, as to occupy him for the greater part of a year : and it seems that he had not yet made himself master of the place, when the events occurred which called for his presence in Thessaly. It was perhaps a consequence of the eagerness with which he now urged the attack, that he needlessly exposed himself to danger, and received a wound from an arrow which deprived him of an eye.¹ Not long after, the place surrendered at discretion. A weaker prince might have been irritated by its long resistance, and his personal hurt. Philip did not lose his self-command, and in his treatment of the besieged took a course equally removed from imprudent lenity, and from the appearance of cruelty. According to the Greek usages of war it was an instance of praiseworthy moderation that he spared their lives — all but that of Aster the archer who had aimed at him with deadly purpose — and permitted them to depart. The town he abandoned to pillage, and then razed it to the ground, and gave the land to a Macedonian colony.

Thus the road to Thessaly was cleared, and it seems to have been almost immediately afterward that he began his march southward, on an expedition undertaken at the request of the northern Thessalians, the old enemies of the dynasty of Pheræ, who had besought his aid. The tyrant Alexander, after having made himself an object of general dread and hatred to his subjects and to foreigners by his cruelties and piracies, at last wearied out the patience, or excited the fears, of his wife Thebe, a daughter of the celebrated Jason. She had three half brothers, named Tisiphonus, Lycophron, and Pitholaus, whose lives as well as her own, her husband is said to have threatened. She was a woman of masculine spirit ; and one night, having secured his sword while he slept, and removed the fierce dog which usually

¹ The story in Plutarch, *Par. 8.*, is not only fiction, but nonsense. Timotheus once said (*Plut. Apophth.*) when he heard a general boasting of a wound before the people : I took shame to myself, when a bolt from a catapult fell near me at the siege of Samos. As to Philip's imprudent bravery see *Isocrates, Ep. ii. § 3.*, *Polyænus, iv. 2. 15.* Leland's remark on the strength of Methone (*Life of Philip, l. p. 214.*) is one of the passages which beguile the reading of a not very interesting book.

guarded his chamber, she introduced the three brothers, whom she was forced to urge to the deed by threatening to alarm the tyrant, and stood by, while they dispatched him. His corpse was cast into the streets, and treated with the utmost contumely; but the Pheræans appear to have made no attempt to free themselves from monarchical government. Thebe gained the officers of his mercenary troops by threats and promises, and induced them to acknowledge the authority of Tisiphonus, whom she guided with her counsels, or exercised her power under his name.¹ But his reign lasted not long. Toward the end of 353, we find Lycophron at the head of affairs, and hear no farther mention of Thebe. It seems that the new dynasty soon became, if not so wantonly cruel, yet as arbitrary, and almost as oppressive, as that which it supplanted. We do not know whether it had given any new provocation to the Aleuads and its other enemies, or whether, after the death of Alexander, who must have possessed some abilities with his fearful energy of character, they conceived hopes of a more prosperous issue in a struggle with his successors; but at the juncture we have mentioned, when the Sacred War had begun to take a turn very unfavourable to their allies, they invited Philip to espouse their cause against Pheræ. Pheræ had not taken any part in the Sacred War with the rest of Thessaly, perhaps had already entered into alliance with the Phocians; and it is not improbable that the fear of this confederacy between their domestic enemy and the new power which was becoming so formidable, may have been the motive that induced the Aleuads to address themselves to Philip, whom they might otherwise have justly considered as a very dangerous auxiliary.²

¹ Conon. 50.

² Several modern writers, and among them — which is surprising — Flathé, i. p. 115, have been misled by the expressions of Diodorus, xvi. 14. into the belief that Philip entered Thessaly on this invitation in the year 357. But it is clear from numerous passages of Demosthenes, that he never invaded Thessaly before the capture of Methone in 353; and it is evident that Diodorus, in the passage which has been understood as an account of an earlier expedition, is only giving a general view of the course of events in Thessaly, and does not mean to confine it to the year of Alexander's death.

This conjecture is confirmed by the subsequent events. As soon as Philip entered Thessaly, Lycophron, it is said, sent for succours to Phocis: which seems to imply a previous compact for mutual aid. Onomarchus ordered his younger brother Phayllus to join him with a body of 7000: a proof that the Phocian army had been greatly increased since the death of Philomelus. Philip however defeated Phayllus, and compelled him to retreat from Thessaly, and then made himself master of the important town of Pagasæ, the sea port of Pheræ. This conquest, which cut off the tyrant's communication with the sea, rendered his situation alarming; and Onomarchus thought his alliance so valuable as a counterpoise to the hostility of the other Thessalians, that he determined to bring all his forces to his relief. Philip, who it seems had received little support from his Thessalian allies, found himself very inferior in numbers to the enemy. He did not however shrink from an engagement, but fought two battles, the first of course with no decided result; but in the second the victory was so clearly on the side of Onomarchus, that the king was with difficulty able to effect his retreat into Macedonia.¹ Onomarchus did not attempt to avail himself of his success for any further enterprises in Thessaly, but leaving Lycophron to recover Pagasæ, and humble the Aleuads as he could, again carried the war into Bœotia. A victory which he obtained over the Thebans enabled him to reduce Coronea, or induced it to open its gates to him. But not long after, he was called away by the intelligence that Philip had reentered Thessaly with a more numerous army, and was preparing to renew his attack upon Lycophron; and immediately advanced to meet him, now at the head of 20,000 men. Philip had not only recruited his forces in his own kingdom,

¹ It is perhaps to the last of these battles that we should refer the narrative of Polyænus, ii. 38. 2., where Philip is made to say: I did not fly, but fell back like the battering rams, to give a more violent shock another time.

but on his return to Thessaly had urged his allies to more vigorous exertions in the common cause; and they had so far complied with his demands, that he could bring into the field 20,000 infantry, and 3000 Thessalian cavalry. Now too perhaps he thought it expedient more distinctly to assume the character of a champion of religion, and made his soldiers wear wreaths of laurel¹, plucked perhaps from the hallowed groves of Tempe, to mark that they were going to fight for the god.

Onomarchus, equally strong in infantry, had only 500 horse, probably of inferior quality. If the loss of the battle which ensued was not the consequence of this deficiency, it probably rendered the defeat more decisive, and more disastrous to the vanquished. The Phocians were completely routed, and as the field of battle was not far from the coast — probably of the Pagasæan gulph — off which Chares was cruising with an Athenian squadron, they mostly fled toward the shore, and many of those who reached it cast away their arms, and attempted to swim to the friendly vessels. Six thousand were slain, or perished in the waters; and 3000 were taken. Onomarchus himself was among the dead: but his body, though he too is said to have plunged into the sea, fell into the enemy's hands. Philip ordered it to be fastened to a cross, and, if we may believe Diodorus, caused all his prisoners to be drowned as guilty of sacrilege. But though it would be likely enough that his Thessalian allies might have instigated him to such an atrocity, which was sanctioned by the decree of the Amphictyons, and by the example of the Thebans, as it is not evident that policy required it, and there was in his case neither passion nor superstition to prompt it, we cannot but suspect that the story may have arisen out of a misunderstanding, by which the fate of the prisoners was confounded with that of the fugitives who were driven into the sea.²

¹ Justin, viii. 2.

² It would be a mistake just like that of Flathe's, mentioned in a preceding note. p. 272.

By this victory Philip had made himself master of Thessaly. Lycophron and Pitholaus surrendered their capital to him, but stipulated for leave to depart, and retired with 2000 mercenaries, to join their allies in Phocis. Philip wished to be considered as a liberator; and he restored popular or at least republican government at Pheræ¹, but he kept possession of Pagasæ, and took Magnesia, which had also belonged to the tyrants, and occupied it with a garrison. After having thus settled the affairs of Thessaly, he began his march southward, apparently with the design of overpowering the remnant of the Phocian forces, and putting an end to the war. But in the meanwhile the Athenians had been roused by the exigency, and prepared to meet it with unusual alertness. The squadron under Chares, which was lying off the coast near the field of battle, had probably been sent to protect Pagasæ, but had arrived too late. It would carry the news of Philip's victory to Athens, and there was every reason to expect that he would speedily advance to dictate terms of peace to the Athenians and their allies. To avert this danger an armament was promptly equipt and despatched to the Malian gulf; and when Philip reached Thermopylæ, he found the pass strongly guarded. It is possible that he might have been able to force it, and that it was not fear of the Athenians that hindered him from making the attempt. But there is some reason to doubt that he was desirous of making an immediate end of the war. Had he been earnestly intent on this object, he would probably have followed up his victory with more rapidity. A struggle that was wasting the strength of Greece, was not at all adverse to his interests: it was perhaps only at the request of the Thessalians that he had made the movement which the Athenians anticipated; and he may have been secretly well pleased to find a fair pretext, for desisting from it. At Athens however the result of the expedition to Thermopylæ

¹ Diodorus, xvi. 38 τῷ πάλαι τῆς ἐλευθερίας ἀποδοῦς.

was regarded as a happy deliverance, and a glorious triumph. It in some measure consoled the people for the losses and insults which they had suffered not long before in several quarters, where they could least have apprehended an attack from him. He had either fitted out a naval force of his own, or, having by the capture of Pagasæ become master of that with which Alexander had so much annoyed the Athenians, he likewise turned it against them. His galleys invaded Lemnos and Imbrus, and among the spoil carried away several of the inhabitants. They also captured a number of Athenian merchant vessels, richly laden, off Geræstus in Eubœa, and a little later ventured to appear in the bay of Marathon, and made a prize of the *Paralus* which was lying there.¹

In the meanwhile the Phocians had time to repair their losses ; and, as the sacred treasury was still rich, they did not want the means. Phayllus, the surviving brother of the ruling house, had probably conducted the wreck of the defeated army home ; and he was appointed, it seems without opposition, to succeed Onomarchus. He immediately began to make fresh levies, and, though he found himself obliged to raise the pay of his troops to double the usual rate, collected a large body of mercenaries. He also called upon his allies for assistance ; and as his applications were seconded by a lavish distribution of money or presents, not in vain. In the profusion both of his public and his personal expenditure, he seems to have surpassed his predecessor. Sparta sent 1000 men : 2000 came from Achaia : but Athens furnished the most liberal succours : an army of 5000 infantry and 400 horse under the command of Nausicles. It was probably not pure anxiety for the safety of the Phocians, who after Philip's retreat were no longer in imminent danger, that impelled the Athenians to this effort : nor need we suppose that it was suggested by venal orators,

¹ Demosthenes, *l. Phil.* § 25. 39. Compare Strabo, *ix.* p. 437.

though Phayllus may have had some in his pay: but it was manifestly desirable to maintain such a body of troops at the expense of the Phocians. Phayllus soon found himself in a condition to invade Bœotia; and though Diodorus describes him as defeated by the Thebans in three successive battles, it is remarkable that the account given of them proves that he was not only able to remain in Bœotia, but to keep advancing toward Thebes: for the first took place near Orchomenus, the second on the banks of the Cephissus, the third near Coronea. It would seem as if the Thebans had only succeeded so far as to protect their own land from invasion: for we next find Phayllus not retreating homeward as might have been expected, but marching into the Epicnemidian Locris, where he is said to have made himself master of all the towns, except Naryx, which he besieged. Bribery may have contributed to the rapidity of these conquests: as Naryx had nearly been betrayed to him. Diodorus is very confused in his description of the rest of the campaign: but we may perhaps collect from it that the Thebans made an inroad into Phocis, and having thus drawn him with his main force away from Naryx, marched upon it to raise the siege. But his activity dconcerted their plans: he suddenly appeared again before the place, defeated their army, and then stormed the town which he razed to the ground. If his habit of body was sickly, the fatigue of these marches and countermarches may have hastened his death: he was carried off in the course of the same year by a disease in which his enemies discerned the finger of heaven.¹ His office seems scarcely to have been considered any longer as elective; it passed, as by inheritance, to Phalæcus, a son of Onomarchus², who was still so young as to need a guardian; and Mnaseas, to whose care he was committed by Phayllus, prosecuted the war as his

¹ Νέω φθιπέδι, Diodorus, xvi. 38. φθαμένη νόσος, Pausanias, x. 2. 6.

² According to Diodorus, xvi. 38., whose authority on this point seems preferable to that of Pausanias, x. 2. 7., who calls him the son of Phayllus: this was the more natural error.

lieutenant. But he was soon after killed in one of the night combats, which at this stage of the war seem to have become very frequent, and his ward then, notwithstanding his youth, took the command in person.

Before Philip's intervention had begun to alarm them for their own safety, the Athenians had not felt any deep interest in the Sacred War. They looked on without expectation of any positive advantage from it, unless it might be the acquisition of Oropus, and were only anxious that the Thebans might not prevail. Sparta both felt a livelier sympathy for the Phocians, and was more immediately interested in the contest, not only by her fears but by her hopes. It opened a prospect for her of recovering her ascendancy in Peloponnesus, and of demolishing the barriers within which she had been confined by Epaminondas. Little credit therefore seems due to a story, which was among the scandalous anecdotes collected by Theopompus¹ concerning the Sacred War, that Archidamus had been induced to give his countenance to the Phocians by presents made to himself, and his queen Dinicha. He at least discerned the interest of Sparta too clearly to need such an impulse. If the Thebans were occupied at home, or if she was supported by her northern allies, she might still hope to reduce, first Megalopolis, and then Messene. Both these new states depended mainly on Theban protection. The population of the Arcadian city was composed, as we have seen, of very diverse elements, which had been brought together partly by a temporary political excitement, and partly by force. There was a party, not inconsiderable in number and influence, which earnestly desired to dissolve the community, and to be restored to the ancient seats, where the wealthier class had probably enjoyed more independence, and a larger share of power. Soon after the battle of Mantinea this party had openly declared itself:

¹ Pausan. iii. 10. 3.

the terms of the treaty were capable of a construction favourable to its wishes: and a great number quitted the town to settle again in their native cantons. The rest would not consent to this migration, and attempted to bring them back by force. The malcontents implored the protection of the Mantineans, and of the other Peloponnesians who had sided with them in the late war: and the Megalopolitans were obliged to call upon Thebes for aid. The Thebans sent Pammenes with 3000 foot and 300 horse to support them.¹ It must have been the name of Thebes, still formidable in Peloponnesus, which enabled him with so small a force to overcome all resistance. He laid waste some of the refractory townships, to strike terror into the rest, and finally compelled the seceders to return to the capital.

Sparta it seems kept aloof from this struggle: a sign of conscious weakness: for she was principally concerned in the result. But when the Sacred War began to take a turn unfavourable to Thebes, she bent her arms against Megalopolis, and not finding her own strength sufficient, called on Athens for assistance. The principle now put forward to gain the concurrence of the Athenians, was a general recognition of ancient rights. Elis was to recover the part of Triphylia which she claimed: Phlius the fortress of Tricaranum. On the same ground Athens would be entitled to Oropus; and Sparta tendered her aid towards the attainment of this much coveted object of Athenian policy. Then it was represented that the same principle required the restoration of Thespiæ and Platæa, which Athens no less ardently desired, as the surest means of

¹ According to the received reading of Diodorus, xv. 94., it was not the Thebans, but the Athenians, who sent Pammenes to Megalopolis. But it seems absolutely necessary to substitute *Θηβαίους* for *Ἀθηναίους* — unless we ascribe the error to Diodorus himself. Wesseling observes: "*Demiror Demosthenem, Or. de Megalopolit., nihil horum attingere. Occasio certe quidem accommoda erat.*" Well indeed might he wonder exceedingly: and he might have added, that the whole tenor of the oration is inconsistent with the supposition, that Megalopolis had ever received such succours from Athens, or applied to her for help before. When we further consider the name of Pammenes — the celebrated Theban general — hardly any doubt can remain on the point.

permanently humbling and curbing Thebes. But the further consequences of the proposal, the dissolution of Megalopolis, and the reduction of Messene, as they were the points which Sparta had solely in her own view, she appears to have kept as much as possible out of sight.

The Megalopolitans, notwithstanding their connection with Thebes, ventured to send envoys to Athens to oppose this application, and to solicit the Athenians to espouse their cause. Demosthenes on this occasion delivered a speech which has been preserved, and is interesting, as exhibiting the view which he took at this time of Grecian politics. He argues the question on the simple ground of expediency, but his calculations are entirely formed on the ancient state of things, only a little modified by the passing events of the Sacred War: it seems as if the power of Macedonia was not at all taken into the account. He at the outset lays down the principle, that the interest of Athens required that both Sparta and Thebes should be weak.¹ The situation of Thebes was at this juncture very critical, and the general belief in Greece appears to have been, that she would sink in the struggle she was carrying on.² On the other hand, if Sparta succeeded against Megalopolis, she would find it less difficult to reduce Messene; and this addition to her strength, when that of Thebes was impaired, would destroy the balance which Athens must wish to preserve. On these grounds the orator supported the proposal of alliance with Megalopolis.

It seems that it was not carried; but neither was any help given to Sparta. After the defeat of Onomarchus however, the Thebans were able to send a body of 4500 infantry, and 500 horse, to the aid of the Megalopolitans, who were likewise joined by all the forces of Argos, Sicyon, and Messene. The Spartans also received a reinforcement from Phocis of 3000 foot,

¹ Pro Megalop. § 5. ἀσθενεῖς. In Aristocr. § 120. the same sentiment is expressed by the terms μὴ ἰσχυροί.

² § 36. ἡ δὲ ἀσθενεὶς αἰ ἐπὶ τῶν καὶ ἐπιβόων.

and 150 of the Thessalian cavalry who had followed Lycophron and Pitholaus from Pheræ. The two parties were now so evenly balanced, that after two campaigns, in which several battles were fought—though it seems with little bloodshed—the Spartans consented to a truce with Megalopolis, and the tranquillity of Peloponnesus was for a time restored.

Philip was probably the less inclined to put an end to the Sacred War, as he had plans in his mind which would be the more easily executed, the more the attention of the Athenians was occupied near home. It was quite sufficient for his purpose to have gained a sure footing in Greece, with a pretext for interference which he might use at his pleasure. There he aimed at nothing more than political ascendancy and controul; his views of conquest were all directed toward the north and the eastern coasts of the Ægean; and he had probably begun already to look beyond to still more dazzling prospects. Before his expedition to Thessaly his amicable relations with Olynthus had ceased, and she had concluded an alliance with Athens. The cause of this change in her policy is not mentioned by the extant authors: to say that it was an effect of the predominance of a new party, explains nothing. We may indeed safely attribute it to jealousy of Philip, for which there were ample grounds: but there must have been some special occasion: and we have some inducements to conjecture, that this was no other than a conquest which he had made in Chalcidice, which might well appear to indicate designs threatening the independence of the other towns, and, notwithstanding his professions, that of Olynthus herself. We do not know the precise time when he made himself master of Apollonia, but the fact is mentioned in a manner which indicates that it took place at no long interval from the capture of Methone¹: and the fall of so important a town, which it will be remembered had resisted Olyn-

¹ Dem. iii. Phil. § 54. Ολυνθον μὲν δὴ καὶ Μιθώνης καὶ Ἀπολλωνίας καὶ δύο τριάκοντα πόλεις ἐπὶ Θράκης εἶναι.

thus at the height of her power, justified the gloomiest apprehensions which Philip it seems took no pains to remove. He had no longer the same motives for conciliating the Olynthians, and perhaps was not loth to come to an open rupture with them.

They however were not now the immediate object of his attention. The state of affairs in Thrace held out an opportunity to him of gaining a footing there, as he had just done in Thessaly, perhaps of extending his dominions to the Hellespont, where he might assail Athens in a vital point, and afterwards open a road to greater enterprises. After the cession of the Chersonesus, Cersobleptes had for a time continued on good terms with the Athenians, and even obsequiously courted them: kept in awe, as Demosthenes represents¹, by the presence of their forces in the Hellespont, where it seems they had a squadron always stationed during the Social War, perhaps also foreseeing that an occasion might arise, in which he might need their favour. Such an occasion arose not long after the end of the war, and perhaps about the same time that they sent their colony to the Chersonesus. Berisades, one of the rival princes, died, leaving his children under the guardianship of Athenodorus. This event rekindled the ambition of Cersobleptes, and gave him hopes of enlarging his territory at the expense of the orphans. Athenodorus was faithful to his trust, but, as he was an Athenian citizen, he might be expected to pay deference to the will of the people, if it should be strongly declared on the side of Cersobleptes. Charidemus, as well as his master, had endeavoured to ingratiate himself with the Athenians, and appears to have formed a party among the orators, through whom he prepossessed the people with a high opinion of his talents and influence, so as to induce a general belief that he was the man best able to cope with Philip, and to recover Amphipolis, still the object of their anxious regret. He had already received the

¹ Aristocr. § 214.

Athenian franchise, and had been honoured with a crown, and other marks of popular favour. The expedient now devised for the professed purpose of attaching him more closely to the Athenian interests, was to pass a decree, declaring his person inviolable, and making any one who should kill him amenable to justice from every state in alliance with Athens. The decree was moved by one Aristocrates, and carried, but was afterwards subjected to revision by an impeachment brought against him as the author of an illegal measure; and the prosecutor, an obscure person, was furnished by Demosthenes with one of his most elaborate orations. It no doubt expresses the view which the advocate himself took of the question as affecting the public interest. We do not learn from it what reasons Aristocrates had assigned for the extraordinary safeguard which he proposed to throw round the person of Charidemus: but we collect that it had been represented partly as the reward of his past services, and partly as the price of others which might be expected from him. We have already seen the main facts by which Demosthenes proved that Charidemus was a worthless and dangerous adventurer: he pointed out with great acuteness the objections to which the decree was liable on the ground of law and justice: but the main question in his view was the effect which it was likely to produce on the Athenian interests in Thrace. He contends that it was meant to intimidate Athenodorus, and the other generals who were serving the rivals of Cersobleptes, and would probably if confirmed overpower all opposition, and put him in possession of the whole kingdom of Cotys: in that case the Athenians, who owed the Chersonesus to his weakness, might speedily lose it again.

We are hardly able to appreciate the force of the political argument, or to judge of the real tendency of the measure. But the speech incidentally mentions a fact, which would alone be sufficient to account for the hostility of Demosthenes to Cersobleptes and his minister. Philip it seems on some former occasion, probably in

the course of the year before the decree was passed, had advanced with his army into Thrace as far as Maronea, and here was met by an agent of Cersobleptes with overtures of alliance, the purpose of which, according to Demosthenes, was a combined attack on the Chersonesus, and would have been carried into effect, if Amadocus, whose territory Philip would have had to cross, had not refused to give him passage. There is also an obscure allusion to a similar negotiation, which had been carried on at the same time with Pammenes, the Theban general, who was then serving in Asia under Artabazus against the Persian king.¹ These would indeed have been substantial grounds for withholding confidence from Cersobleptes and Charidemus. Yet they indicated that Philip's intervention might soon render it necessary for Athens to take some decided part in the contest between the Thracian princes. And this occasion arrived very soon after, hastened perhaps by the issue of the trial, on which depended the validity of the decree, and all the measures connected with it. We are not indeed expressly informed what the issue was; but facts which will be hereafter mentioned render it nearly certain that Demosthenes failed, that the decree was confirmed, and the alliance between Cersobleptes and Athens cemented by a new bond. It was perhaps a consequence of this decree that Amadocus, seeing the Athenians pledged to the support of his rival, threw himself upon the protection of Macedonia², and that Philip henceforth became the declared enemy of Cersobleptes. Soon after his return from Thessaly, he set out on an expedition to Thrace, which is one of the most obscure passages in his history. It is only from some very vague oratorical allusions we are able to collect, that though his design of invading the Chersonesus was sufficiently manifested

¹ Aristocr. § 219., Diodorus, xvi. 34.

² Theopompus in Harpocratio, *Ἀμαδόκος*: from which we learn that Amadocus, Philip's ally against Cersobleptes, was the son of another Amadocus; but which of them it was that succeeded Cotys, does not appear. The one mentioned by Demosthenes may have died about the time of Philip's expedition related in the text, and have left a son of the same name. Otherwise he cannot have been a son of Cotys.

to alarm the Athenian colonists, he for some time found occupation for his arms in the interior¹, where he penetrated perhaps to such a distance from the coast, that no certain intelligence of his movements could be procured at Athens; and various rumours were spread, humouring the people's wishes, sometimes of his death, sometimes of his illness. An expedition which threatened the most valuable of the state's foreign possessions, seemed only to furnish matter for idle talk.

It was at this juncture, and while the public mind was thus suspended between hope and fear, conscious of a great danger hanging over it, but disinclined steadily to consider the means of averting it, and seeking relief from its anxiety in a forced credulity, that Demosthenes came forward with the first of the orations which, from their exclusive reference to the contest with Philip, received the name of the Philippics.² It marks a great epoch in the orator's life: for it is the first indication of a change which must have taken place not long before in his political views. It seems clear, as we have already intimated, that when he made his speech on the affair of Megalopolis, he had not yet begun to look upon Philip as the one truly formidable enemy of Athens and of Greece. An ambitious, restless, troublesome neighbour, whose encroaching spirit required to be watched and checked, the king must of course have appeared to him from the beginning of the transactions relating to Amphipolis. But that the power of Macedonia was the element of prime moment in the Greek political system, that Philip could ever endanger the freedom of the nation, that the struggle between him and Athens was not

¹ Demosthenes. Olynth. i. § 13. τοὺς μὲν ἐκβαλὼν, τοὺς δὲ καταστήσας τῶν βασιλείων. This can hardly refer to the war with Cersobleptes. Isocrates however, Philip. § 23, also says, ἀπάσης τῆς Θρακίας αὐτὸς ἠεὐελλήθη διατίτας κατίστος.

² It has been justly observed, that "through the celebrity of these speeches their title of Philippic became a common term for orations abounding in acrimonious invective." But it would have been no more than candid to add, that the original Philippics abound in no such matter: that Philip's personal character is but very sparingly alluded to in them: and that the tone in which he is mentioned is mild, not only as compared with Cicero's against Antony, but with that of Theopompus in his descriptions of Philip's court and character.

for power or honour merely, but for life, was a conviction which probably never entered his mind, until Philip began to take a part in the Sacred War. Nor can we charge him with any lack of political sagacity on this account, when we reflect how small were the beginnings of Philip's greatness, and how short a time had elapsed since Macedonia had been little more than a province of Olynthus. This has not always been duly considered by those who, taught by the event, have condemned him as either a fanatic or a traitor, who hurried his country into a contest which could not but terminate in her ruin. But the events which had lately happened had in a great measure opened his eyes to the extent of the danger which now threatened Athens, as they had in fact entirely changed Philip's position with respect to Greece. He had become master of Thessaly: it could hardly be questioned that he held the scales in the war between Thebes and Phocis: he had a fleet which was already able to annoy and insult Athens, and he was now engaged in an expedition which, if it succeeded, might not only deprive her of the Chersonesus, but establish his sway in the countries on which she mainly depended for the means of subsistence. Demosthenes saw all this, like many other men; and he also looked round him, and observed the resources, and the spirit which Athens possessed for self-defence: his merit was, that he neither shut his eyes to the danger, nor viewed it with indifference, nor submitted to it in passive despair; but set himself manfully to face it, and to wrestle with it.

This it was that distinguished him not only from the selfish and time-serving orators of his day, but also from men of equal integrity with himself, but who were deficient in this kind of courage. There may have been others of this class among the political adversaries of Demosthenes, but the only one whose character has been transmitted to us in broad and clear outlines, and with features which cannot be mistaken, is Phocion. Phocion rose, it seems, from a rank in society somewhat lower than that to which Demosthenes belonged. The

trade which his father followed was accounted so mean, that Plutarch thought it incredible that the son of such a person could have received so liberal an education as Phocion undoubtedly enjoyed. But neither poverty nor low birth would have prevented him either from seeking, or gaining admittance to the school of Plato, where his character, naturally simple, candid, and upright, yet mild and benevolent, was formed by philosophical reflection to a more austere and rigid virtue. From the lessons of the Academy however he derived not only principles of conduct for his own guidance, but likewise views of society, which though they did not deter him, like his master, from engaging in active life, inspired him with a deep contempt for the age, the people, and the institutions, in which his destiny had fixed his sphere of action. There was no doubt much in the character of his contemporaries to provoke such a feeling; but there was something too much like pride or peevishness in the manner in which he displayed it. His public deportment was marked by a stern and inflexible gravity, which was never known to be relaxed either into smiles or tears. This repulsive exterior—especially as it concealed a kind and generous heart—was perhaps a privilege of philosophy: as was the extraordinary simplicity of his manner of living, in which he adopted the habits of Socrates. More questionable appears the prudence of the sarcastic bitterness with which he on all occasions expressed his scorn of the multitude. An oracle, it is said, warned the people against a man who alone was opposed to the whole city: Phocion claimed the honour of such singularity for himself. When one of his proposals was received with unusual approbation, he turned round to his friends, and asked whether he had let anything escape him that was wrong. In his speeches he carefully avoided all rhetorical embellishments, which he had learnt from Plato to consider as a kind of flattery unworthy of an honest man, and studied a sententious brevity, which however was so enlivened with wit and humour, as often to make a

deeper impression than the most elaborate periods. It was even observed by one of his adversaries, that Demosthenes was the best orator, but Phocion the most powerful speaker. And Demosthenes himself, it is said, trembled for the effect of his own eloquence when Phocion rose after him, and would whisper to his friends: Here comes the hatchet to my speech.

Yet, with all this sharpness of language, and roughness of manner, Phocion, against his will, was a favorite with the people, which he despised, and in return for his professions of disdain, received the most solid proofs of its esteem. He possessed considerable military talents, which he had cultivated by the side of his friend Chabrias: and though he never solicited any public employments, in a period when the higher offices of the state were more than ever coveted and often purchased by bribery, he was forty-four times elected general. In the assembly too, as we have seen, he obtained more than a patient hearing, and on the strength of his personal reputation could say many things with safety, which would hardly have been tolerated from any other man. A tribute, it must be admitted, to virtue which was unhappily rare: but one surely which proves that the men who paid it were not absolutely worthless or hopeless. Yet this was the supposition on which Phocion throughout his life regulated his political conduct. He did not indeed withdraw from the service of his country: he discharged the duties assigned to him uprightly and zealously: he conciliated the allies of Athens by mild and just treatment: the counsels which he gave to the people were the pure dictates of his sincere convictions, and designed to promote its welfare. But he early despaired of the commonwealth: he did not think it capable or worthy of any great effort: he connived at the grossest and most pernicious abuses at home, and gave the sanction of his name to their authors and advocates, because reform could effect no permanent good: amidst the evils with which Greece was afflicted and threatened, he saw no better course than to sit quiet, and wait for the flood,

and patiently to bow the head to it when it came. And thus the austere philosopher, the incorruptible patriot, became the associate of the most profligate and venal demagogues and parasites, of a Eubulus and a Demades, and the submissive subject, and even the willing tool, of a foreign master.

The first Philippic was the effusion of a different spirit, the language of a man who would not lose all without a struggle, who thought the liberty and honour of Athens still well worth a vigorous effort to save them, and hoped that his fellow-citizens might be roused by the emergency to exertions worthy of the cause. He was not blind to their degeneracy: but he thought it possible that the impulse which forced them into an unwonted course of action, might produce a salutary effect on their moral constitution, and might give them strength and energy to shake off some of the worst abuses of their political system. The speech contains a plan calculated not only to meet the impending danger, but to check Philip's attempts against their foreign possessions for the future. The people needed encouragement, that it might not make its despondency a pretext for inertness: it perhaps still more needed to be convinced, that without a vigorous change of measures it ought not to cherish hope. The orator dispenses consolation and reproof with masterly skill. He reminds his hearers that not many years had gone by, since Sparta was as formidable as Philip had become: but they had not quailed under her superior power; they had ventured to resist it and had overcome. Still more recently, Philip was the weaker party, and, surrounded as he was by enemies, might well have shrunk from a contest with Athens. Courage and activity had enabled him to aggrandize himself with possessions wrested from her grasp: but there was no divinity about his greatness, to exempt it from the common vicissitudes of human affairs. If indeed they had already put forth all their strength, made use of all their means of resistance, they would have had cause for dejection: but

they might cheer themselves with the remembrance of their past errors, if they would only henceforth adopt a wiser course. It was their tardiness and negligence that had made Philip powerful; and as long as they remained passive, he would continue to encroach. Unless they would bestir themselves, fortune could do nothing for them. Even if the news, which they caught so greedily, of Philip's death, should prove true, it would avail them nothing: another Philip would start up in his place. Even if an opportunity offered itself of recovering Amphipolis (as they hoped to do with the aid of Charidemus) they would be unable to profit by it.

He then proceeds to unfold his plan, and to point out the particular defects in their system of warfare, to which he ascribed their past reverses. The fault had been not so much that they had done little, as that they had done nothing at the right time. They had always been talking, when they should have been acting, and only began to move, when the season for action was past. Like unskilful boxers, it was only after they had received a blow, that they made a stroke at the quarter from which it came. They had always followed the enemy's movements, and at a distance which rendered it impossible to counteract them. The expeditions which they had sent to the relief of the places attacked by Philip, had all arrived too late. Why, but because their preparations for the defence of the state, were so much worse regulated than those by which they provided for the celebration of the festivals, on which such enormous sums were spent. There every man knew his place and his part beforehand; and therefore all was executed with unfailing exactness: but when an expedition was decreed, there were questions to be discussed, disputes to be settled, ways and means to be found, and the preparations were never completed until the object was lost. The remedy which he proposes is that an armament of fifty galleys should be kept in constant readiness for sailing, together with horse-transport, and that the citizens should be compelled by law to man

them in a certain order, whenever their services might be required. This was one part of his plan: the other was, that a small squadron should be constantly stationed at some point near the coast of Macedonia, as well for the purpose of annoying the enemy by sudden descents, as to protect the Athenian shipping from attacks such as it had lately suffered. He desires no more than ten galleys and 2000 soldiers with 200 cavalry for this service: but then he insists, as on the most important head of his project, that one fourth of the men should be Athenian citizens. The force he proposed would, he was aware, appear contemptibly small, after the great armaments which the orators were used to talk of; but it was as large as the state of their finances could then support, and not too small to answer its end. But the main point was that the citizens should not shrink, as they had been used to do, from military duty, but should begin again, in part at least, to fight their own battles: and that the military officers who were elected every year should be able to find fitter employment than the superintendence of a civic procession or a religious ceremony. Unless every army they employed included a body of Athenian troops, however small might be its proportion to the whole, they could have no security for the conduct of the soldiers they paid, or of any general, though a citizen, that they could appoint. The mercenaries would still plunder their allies, instead of seeking the enemy: and, if their pay was not regularly furnished, would engage in a more profitable service, and,—as had happened in the case of Chares toward the end of the Social War—would force their commander along with them.

This was the argument which was likely to be most felt by his hearers; but the orator's principal aim in both parts of his plan was perhaps to break the habits of indolence and luxury which were fostered by the exclusive employment of mercenary forces, and gradually to inure his fellow-citizens to military service. He speaks as a young counsellor who is obliged delicately

to insinuate advice which he knows to be unpleasant, and cautiously to feel his way. Hence perhaps, rather than because means were deficient, the inconsiderable amount of the standing force which he proposed to raise; and yet he takes care to add that he means the time of service for the citizens should be short. On another very important subject,—the waste of the public money in shows and feasts—he is still more guarded. The contrast indeed which he points out between the order and efficacy of the preparations for the amusement of the idle, and the confusion and delay of those which were made for the safety of the state, must have excited a feeling of shame; and when, after having mentioned the poverty of the treasury, he spoke of the great resources of the people, the seeming contradiction could scarcely fail to suggest the question: How were those resources employed? But this was very dangerous ground. According to the ancient law the whole surplus of the yearly revenue, left after the necessary expenses of the civil administration had been defrayed, was in war time appropriated to the defence of the commonwealth, or carried into what was called the Military Fund. But the men who were charged with the administration of the fund destined for the public amusements, and whose interest it was to augment it as much as possible, had by degrees it seems induced the people to divert all that could be spared from the other branches of expenditure into this, until at length the Theoricon swallowed up the whole surplus, and the supplies needed for the purposes of war were left to depend on extraordinary contributions. But it was reserved for the demagogue Eubulus to perpetuate this abuse, which not only drained the resources of the state, but retarded all its military movements, and was a main cause of that frequent waste of precious opportunities which Demosthenes deplored. He was the author of a law which made it a capital offence to propose that the Theoric fund should be applied to the war service, or converted into a military fund. This expression was probably

chosen to give a colour to the measure, as if it was designed to guard against an innovation, instead of establishing one of the most pernicious tendency. Not long before the first Philippic was delivered, when Philip's enterprizes against Lemnos and Imbros had excited alarm and indignation at Athens, one Apollodorus, a member of the Five Hundred, had carried a decree empowering the people to determine whether the surplus revenue should be thrown into the Military or the Theoric fund.¹ The proposition was so guarded as to secure him from the capital punishment denounced by the law of Eubulus: but he was impeached and fined as the author of an illegal decree², which of course became void. The subject therefore was one which required to be approached with the utmost caution; and Demosthenes did as much as prudence permitted, when he so clearly intimated his opinion and wishes.

We cannot speak with certainty of the immediate effect produced by his oration. The obscurity which was hanging over Philip's movements may have served as a welcome pretext for delay. But news which came from the north toward the end of 352, roused the people into a mood for vigorous efforts. Philip, it was ascertained, had laid siege to a fortress called Heræum, on the Propontis, not far from Perinthus on the side of Byzantium. We can only judge of its importance from the alarm which the intelligence is said to have excited at Athens. It appears to have been held by an Athenian garrison; but it is not clear whether it was of moment chiefly as a factory for commercial intercourse with the interior of Thrace, or on account of its vicinity to Perinthus, which may have been involved in its danger.³ Under the first impulse of its feelings the people decreed an armament of forty galleys for the relief of the place, a general levy of the serviceable citi-

¹ In Næær. § 7.

² But Bœckh has committed an oversight (il. 7.) in the statement, that Apollodorus was actually fined fifteen talents: this was the prosecutor's estimation of the penalty; the court reduced it to one.

³ See Væmel, Proleg. in Phil. i. § 29.

zens under five and forty to embark in the expedition, and an extraordinary war-impost of sixty talents. The command it seems was assigned to the same Charidemus who, as we have seen, had been taken under the peculiar protection of Athens, by the decree of Aristocrates, which Demosthenes had fruitlessly opposed. It appears that this adventurer wished to combine the authority of an Athenian general with that which he possessed as the chief counsellor of Cersobleptes ; or, beginning to apprehend danger from Philip's hostility to the Thracian prince, desired to secure a retreat for himself in the favour and confidence of the Athenian people. This may suffice to explain his presence at Athens at this juncture, without any conjecture as to the particular business on which he had come. The preparations however for the execution of the vigorous measure that had been decreed, proceeded slowly as usual, the more as the season was unfavourable : and before much progress had been made, fresh tidings came, which for a time entirely suspended them. A report was again spread, first of Philip's death, then of his illness. There may have been some foundation both for this and for the earlier rumours of the same kind. The king's health may have suffered from a wound or a neglected disorder, which more than once might confine him to his bed, and interrupt his military operations. Whether however he was thus compelled to abandon the siege of Heræum, or made himself master of the place, while the Athenians were waiting for fresh news, so that the object was lost before the preparations for the expedition were renewed, is doubtful. It is only certain that the spring and summer of 351 were allowed to pass, without any attempt to counteract Philip's enterprises in Thrace, and as far as we know in total inaction, except that a body of troops appears to have been sent under Nausicles for the protection of Imbros. It was not until the latter end of September that Charidemus set sail for the Hellespont. Not however with forty galleys, but with ten : not with an Athenian force, but

with orders to collect mercenaries; and yet not with sixty talents, but with five. Possibly the title and the power were what he most coveted; and he may not have regretted the absence of the Athenian citizens, which left him at perfect liberty to act as he would.

Still it may be inferred from the scantiness of these supplies that the Athenian possessions in the north were no longer considered in immediate danger: and in fact during the next two years Philip's history is a mere blank, which we can neither fill up, nor satisfactorily explain. It is scarcely conceivable that the state of his health, which in general was very robust, can have kept him inactive for any great part of this time.¹ His Thracian expedition seems indeed to have been so far successful, that, when he returned to his own dominions, he carried away with him a son of Cersobleptes as a hostage²; but even if he had accomplished all that he thought immediately desirable in Thrace, it might have been expected that the war with Athens would have given rise to some occurrences deserving a place in history, especially as it appears that the fleet which attended the army on its march homeward, was threatened by Chares, who was cruising with a squadron of twenty galleys off the coast of Thrace about Neapolis, and was only delivered by a stratagem of Philip's.³ Yet it is not merely the silence of Diodorus; that proves he knew of no important events, connected with the struggle between Philip and Athens, in this period. The fact that in the course of these two years Phocion was carrying on a war in Cyprus on behalf of the Persian

¹ Yet this may seem to be implied in the summary account of his enterprises given by Demosthenes *Ol. i. § 13.* ὥστε εἰς Θεσσαλίαν εἰς ἡσθίνας πάλιν ραΐσας οὐκ ἐπὶ τὸ βαθυμειν ἀπέκλινεν, ἀλλ' εὐθὺς Ὀλυμπίους ἐπεχείρησεν. This is at least proof that Philip was confined by a severe and tedious illness.

² *Æsch. De F. L. § 86.* The words indeed might leave it doubtful, whether it was on the first or the second embassy, that Æschines saw the young prince at Philip's court. Flathe, p. 203, supposes the second: but then what could have induced the orator to mention the fact? It could only serve to vindicate his conduct, if it was referred to the first embassy: and then it seems to justify the statement in the text.¹

³ *Polyænus, iv. 2. 22.* We know of no other period to which this story can belong. May the presence of Chares in the north of the Ægean serve to account for the delay in the sending of Charidemus?

king, points to the same conclusion. It is confirmed by the conduct of Demosthenes himself, recorded in one of his extant speeches, which was delivered in one of these two years. After the death of Mausolus the democratical party at Rhodes had conceived hopes of overthrowing the oligarchy, and it appears had applied to Athens for aid. Demosthenes thought it an opportunity which ought not to be neglected for restoring the Athenian influence in that island; and seems to have hoped that the example of the democratical Rhodians, if they succeeded, might shake the oligarchical governments of Chios and Lesbos, which were the chief obstacles to the renewal of their alliance with Athens. The principal argument that had been urged on the other side, was that the interference of Athens might involve her in war either with the Persian King—who it seems had taken the ruling party in Rhodes under his protection—or with Artemisia, the widow of Mausolus, who now reigned alone in Caria. The orator endeavours to show that Artemisia would probably remain neutral, and that the risk of provoking the king ought not to deter the Athenians; and he is thus led to the remark, that there were persons who often affected to treat Philip with contempt, while they represented the Persian as a formidable enemy: so that the people, if it listened to these counsellors, would take no precautions against the one, and make no resistance to any pretensions of the other.

Such a remark could only have been made at a period of comparative repose, when no immediate danger was apprehended from Philip: and though the speech contains no definite plan, yet as it recommends that the people should vigorously espouse the cause of the Rhodian democracy, it implies that, in the orator's opinion, there was at the time no more pressing occasion for the exertion of its strength. It is not improbable that the state of the Persian empire, which had encouraged the hopes of the democratical Rhodians, was also connected with the long pause which interrupted the course of

Philip's enterprises against Athens and Greece. The King was engaged in a war which he conducted in person, with Egypt and other revolted provinces: and when Demosthenes made his last mentioned speech, the issue of the contest was doubtful, and the Persian throne was commonly supposed to be in great danger.¹ That Philip kept his eye attentively fixed on the progress of these important events, cannot be questioned: but perhaps he was not a mere spectator, ready to take advantage of any sudden revolution; the shelter which he gave to the rebellious subjects of the Persian king raises a suspicion that he may have been previously in secret correspondence with them. On the other hand there is some reason to think that his own kingdom was not perfectly tranquil during this period; for we hear of three princes of the royal blood, sons of Amyntas, who had excited his jealousy, so that he put one of them to death; and the two others took refuge in Olynthus.

The shelter which they found there was according to Justin the occasion of the war which at length broke out between Philip and the Olynthians, and ended in their destruction. Whether it served him as a pretext, we cannot decide; but his attack on Olynthus had probably been long meditated; and the chief difficulty is, as we have just seen, to explain why it was so long delayed. Olynthus, it seems, had renounced her alliance with him before his expedition to Thessaly; and the pains which he had once taken to conciliate her friendship, prove that he could not have viewed her hostility or estrangement with indifference. Perhaps however during the two years which are left vacant as to actions of his by Diodorus, he was not only making preparations for the execution of his design, but had actually entered upon it, and had begun to encroach upon the territories of the Greek towns near his frontier, yet so that Olynthus, though disquieted, might not think it necessary to interpose. If any farther explan-

¹ De Rhod. Lib. § 13. πρῶτοντος (βασιλῆως) ὡς λίγισται, καὶ διημαρτημένος οἷς ἑπαχίρηται.

nation of his seeming inactivity were needed, it might be found in the state of affairs in Thessaly, which, though it did not yet demand his presence, was such as to afford him frequent occupation, and to require constant vigilance. The Thessalians are represented as a restless, turbulent, fickle people. Those of his party, when they called him in as an ally, did not mean to make him their master. But his conduct after the expulsion of the tyrants soon began to awaken their distrust. He continued to occupy Pagasæ, and began to build new fortifications at Magnesia: a strong intimation, that he considered it as his own, and had no intention of abandoning it. He likewise continued to receive a large portion of the revenues of the country, which it appears had been ceded to him for a time to meet the expenses of the war with Phæræ. These indications of designs inconsistent with the independence of Thessaly, appear to have excited uneasiness, which vented itself in murmurs, complaints, and even remonstrances; and he was obliged to pacify his discontented allies, with assurances of his honourable intentions as to Magnesia, and with promises of farther aid in the Social War.¹

There was probably at Olynthus, as at Athens, a party which dreaded a war with so formidable a neighbour, hoped that it might be averted, and flattered itself with the belief that Philip, who had once shown such disinterested friendship, even now harboured no hostile purpose against the city. This party had no doubt opposed the peace with Athens, and had laboured, hitherto with success, to preserve neutrality: for no alliance had yet been concluded with Philip's enemies. We do not even know whether the reception given to his two half-brothers,—supposing the fact certain—preceded the open rupture. But in 349 Philip began to manifest his designs in a manner which nothing but wilful blindness could mistake, by an attack on one of the cities of the Chalcidian confederacy, which Olynthus

¹ Demosth. Olynth. i. ii.

was bound both by honour and interest to defend. Diodorus calls the place Geira, a name otherwise unknown, for which it has been proposed to substitute that of Stageira, Aristotle's birth place. The place was evidently of some importance, for when Philip had taken it, and rased it to the ground, the terror inspired by its fate induced several of the neighbouring towns to submit without resistance to the conqueror. This aggression, which, as far as we know, was totally unprovoked, seems to have been considered by the Olynthians as manifestly directed against themselves; and it probably for a time silenced the party which had hitherto advocated neutrality. An embassy was sent to Athens to propose an alliance, and to request succours. Philip however affected indignation at the suspicions of the Olynthians, and sent envoys to vindicate his conduct, and exhort them to peace. His object in this step was perhaps not so much to deceive the people and prevent the alliance with Athens, as to gain some of the leading men by corruption, and to afford them a colour for openly espousing his cause. And it happened, opportunely for such a purpose, that at this juncture the affairs of Thessaly rendered his presence necessary there. Pitholaus, aided perhaps by the discontent which prevailed even among the partizans of Macedonia, had recovered possession of Pheræ. We might almost suspect Philip of having connived at this enterprise, which was in every way most favourable to his interests. To expel the intruder cost him little more than the march: Pitholaus seems to have withdrawn at his approach. But the service thus rendered to Thessaly, the danger which this event proved to be still hanging over it, stifled the murmurs of the Thessalians, gave him a pretext for deferring the execution of his promises, and for extending his encroachments on their liberty, and enabled him to prosecute his designs against Olynthus without fear of interruption from that quarter.

The Olynthian embassy was welcomed at Athens by

all who viewed the growth of Philip's power with dread. If out of Greece there was any state that could oppose an effectual barrier to his progress, it was supposed to be Olynthus, once the mistress of a great part of his kingdom, still strong in herself, and at the head of a confederacy which included thirty-two of the neighbouring Greek towns, some of them places of considerable note. We can hardly adopt the statements of Demosthenes, when he represents Olynthus as in a more flourishing condition at the beginning of the war with Philip, than she had been before she was conquered by Sparta.¹ But still there was enough in her past history and her present resources seemingly to justify the hopes of the Athenians, who were not yet able to estimate the full difference between Macedonia as it had been under Amyntas, and what it had become under his son. An alliance with Olynthus for offence and defence against Philip, had for some time been regarded by most Athenian statesmen as the best safeguard of Athens²; nor had efforts probably been wanting to secure it for her. What had been so ardently desired, now unexpectedly offered itself: there could be little question whether it ought to be accepted. We hear indeed of opposition made to the advocates of the proposed alliance by Demades³, a man of no ordinary talents, but still more distinguished in the worst times of Athens by a degree of impudence and profligacy, public and private, which exceeded all former examples. But as we do not know the grounds of his opposition, it may have been directed, though probably with the most perfidious intention, not against the measure itself, but against the plans proposed for the attainment of its objects.

Demosthenes appears to have taken the lead in the debates which arose on this question: it was against him that Demades made his stand. He has left three orations, delivered at different times, all within a year,

¹ De F. L. § 301.

² Olynth. iii. § 8.

³ Suidas. Δημάδης.

on this subject. Unhappily the order in which they were produced, has been long matter of a controversy which is not yet settled. This uncertainty detracts not a little from their historical value; for though the reader may form a decided opinion on the point, the historian cannot consider his own as beyond dispute. We shall however notice their contents in that order which appears to us the most probable, but shall as much as possible avoid resting any conclusions on this assumption. The oration which seems to have been delivered on the occasion of the embassy by which the Olynthians sought alliance with Athens, though it opens with a congratulation on the favour of heaven, shown in the opportunity just presented, proceeds as if it was designed to animate the Athenians to a contest from which they were disposed to shrink through fear of Philip's overwhelming power: it is chiefly occupied with a view of his history and character adapted to this purpose. Yet it is hardly credible that at this juncture the mood that prevailed in the people can have been one of despondency, for which there was no apparent cause, either in the recent occurrence, or in the events of the last two or three years. The fears however to which the orator professes to address himself, were in themselves very reasonable; and the less they were really felt by his hearers, the more advisable he might think it to suggest them, not of course in order to damp their spirit, but to rouse them to an effort worthy of the greatness of the struggle. There were some, as he had observed in his speech on the Rhodians, who were used to represent Philip as a despicable antagonist: this he knew to be a false and dangerous way of inspiring the people with courage. He wished that they should recognize Philip's power as truly formidable, but that they should be convinced it had become so only through their own remissness or unwise policy; that they should believe it might be overthrown, but not without a complete change in their measures and habits. It is in substance the argument of the first Philippic. The

general effect is encouraging ; but the encouragement is directly subservient to the practical exhortation. Demosthenes shared the hopes which had been awakened by the Olynthian embassy, but he was aware that their fulfilment depended on the manner in which Athens availed herself of the opportunity, and this was the conclusion to which he points throughout the speech. The contest is a hopeful one, because Philip's power, overgrown as it is, does not rest on secure foundations : his artifices are detected and spent, his promises and professions can deceive none of his neighbours any longer : his Thessalian allies are growing impatient of his yoke : even his Macedonian subjects are become weary of the burdens which his ambition imposes on them : his personal character does not inspire either love or respect : his ablest officers are disgusted by the jealousy which he betrays of their merit, and by the favour which he shows to the vilest parasites and the coarsest buffoons. Fortunate indeed he has been ; but his good fortune has been the folly and negligence of the Athenians, and will last as long. If they would recover what they have lost, they must shrink from no sacrifices, no labours : their property, their personal services, must be freely devoted to the common weal.

The speech however contains no specific proposal, unless it be that an embassy should be sent to instigate the Thessalians against Philip. But even this suggestion seems to have been made chiefly for the sake of the condition annexed to it. Such an embassy he observes, will avail nothing, unless it be supported by efforts which would prove that the people had at length roused itself from its lethargy, and was prepared to exert itself to the utmost in behalf of its allies. The measure finally adopted was far from corresponding to these exhortations, and cannot have been proposed by Demosthenes. The succours decreed consisted in a fleet of thirty galleys, manned indeed from Athens, but bearing no greater military force than 2000 mercenary peltasts. The expedition was placed under the com-

mand of Chares.¹ As to its issue we have no express information : it is only from the sequel that we find it must have proved altogether fruitless, and that Philip, on his return from Thessaly, prosecuted the war more vigorously than ever against the Chalcidian cities, still however abstaining from the invasion of the Olynthian territory, and from a declaration of war against Olynthus itself. His conquests did not the less on this account alarm the Olynthians for their own safety ; and they sent a second embassy to Athens, to solicit more effectual succours. It is not clear whether any blame was due or was imputed to Chares : perhaps he had done all he could, but found himself unable with his small land-force to relieve any of the threatened towns against Philip's army. On the other hand, it does not appear that he incurred any considerable loss, and therefore had probably sent an account of his operations to Athens which flattered the people's hopes. In his oration on the second embassy Demosthenes speaks as one who was much less confident than his hearers, and who dreaded the effect which might have been produced on them by the language of preceding speakers, who talked of punishing Philip. He endeavours to convince them that this is not the tone which befits their present circumstances : that they might well be satisfied for the present, if they could provide for the safety of their allies, and that even their own was in great danger, unless they would adopt some new and extraordinary measures. He thinks it necessary to crave indulgence for his boldness, and a patient hearing before he ventures to make the proposition on which he grounds all his own hopes of success in the contest with Philip : not merely because it was in itself unpopular, but because it would expose him to the resentment of a powerful faction, which on this subject had the ear of the assembly. He does not name Eubulus, but clearly describes the arts by which he and his party

¹ Philochorus ap. Dionys. ad Amm. 9.

had gained the people's favour, had enriched themselves at its expence, and by humouring its love of ease and pleasure, kept it in a degrading dependence on themselves. A regulation made for financial purposes, by which 1200 of the wealthier citizens were divided into classes, had given rise to oligarchical cabals, of which Demosthenes had complained in his former speech, and it seems that Eubulus found these classes convenient instruments for his purposes. The maxim of his administration was to keep the people satisfied at home by his distribution of the public money, and to deprive it as much as possible of all means of controuling the conduct of its servants abroad. Works of more show than use or cost, for the ornament of the city, were frequently undertaken, and were represented as proofs of prosperity. In the mean while all the great interests of the state had been neglected: its most valuable possessions lost, 1500 talents had been wasted in a disastrous war: and the poorer citizens, who were supposed to be chiefly benefited by these abuses, were wretched as well as idle in the midst of luxury and splendour. The remedy which the orator proposes is a revision of the law of Eubulus, and of the other pernicious innovations which supported this destructive system. But though he distinctly urges the people to this step, he contends that the authors of those laws, as they had hitherto enjoyed the popularity arising from them, ought to be forced to undertake whatever risk might be necessary in order to procure their repeal.

The diffidence which he expresses in several passages of his speech as to the power of his eloquence, was too well grounded. It was not able to overcome the indolence of the people, or the influence of the prevailing faction. This was probably the occasion on which Demades distinguished himself by his opposition to Demosthenes. The question was not whether fresh succours should be sent to Olynthus: on that, as Demosthenes observes, all were agreed: but as to the

ways and means. It was still thought most convenient to employ a mercenary force of the same description as that which had served under Chares: but the number now added to it was 4000, and 150 cavalry with eighteen galleys to strengthen the fleet, which probably remained on the same station. But Chares himself was recalled; not, as the sequel proves, because he had forfeited the confidence of the people, but apparently because the partizans of Charidemus thought this a fair opportunity of giving him employment in a country where he was well known, and where his services had been sought many years before, when Timotheus prevented him from taking the command there. He himself, it seems, was still in the Hellespont¹; but he was called away to put himself at the head of the new expedition. Concerning his campaign at Olynthus, we are not left so totally destitute of information as about that of Chares; but the few facts which we learn of it, provoke rather than satisfy our curiosity. It appears that he made an inroad into the adjacent districts of Bottiæa and the peninsula of Pallene: and it is said that he ravaged them, as if this had been his only object; which would imply that they were already in the enemy's possession: but in that case Olynthus must have been already besieged. We are therefore led to suspect that these movements were designed to repel the incursions of the Macedonians, and were in some degree successful: for we also hear of Macedonian prisoners, who at this time had fallen into the hands of the Olynthians, with Derdas, probably their commander, and a man of rank.² But from the same authority we learn that Charidemus, while he commanded at Olynthus, not only indulged in the most shameless profligacy, but treated the Olyn-

¹ Philochorus. *Χαρίδημος τὸν ἐν Ἑλλησπόντῳ στρατηγόν.*

² Theopompus, in Athenæus, x. 47. It must be noticed however that neither the name of the person, nor the date of the story, is mentioned in the extract. But as to the person the description Athenæus gives of him, as *Charidemus of Oreus on whom the Athenians bestowed their franchise*, is too precise to admit a suspicion of mistake. And until some other epoch is found, to which the presence of Charidemus at Olynthus under such circumstances can be referred, we must conclude that the occasion was the one stated in our text.

thian magistrates with an insolence, which, unless that which we read was a solitary example, must have given great offence.

It was perhaps as well the indignation excited by such conduct, as the progress of Philip's arms, that induced the Olynthians again to apply to Athens, with an earnest request to send not a mercenary force, but one composed of Athenian citizens. The application was made in terms which implied that they considered themselves as now in extreme danger. Philip was gaining ground, partly by force, partly by corruption, which had procured him partizans in Olynthus itself. Before the third embassy to Athens, it appears that they had ventured to propose negotiation with the enemy¹; nor is it certain that they had not carried this point; for we hear of a violent struggle between them and the friends of Athens, which ended in the expulsion or disgrace of one of their principal adversaries named Apollonides², and may have turned on the question of war or peace: though if this Apollonides was the same who is elsewhere described as an emissary of Charidemus³, his banishment may have proceeded from a different cause. The Athenians were now it seems for the first time sensible of the impending danger, and ready to listen to Demosthenes, when he told them they had to choose between war before Olynthus and one at their own door, and that they must no longer commit their defence to other hands, but must arm themselves in their own cause. A small force would be of no avail, nor would

¹ We infer this from I Olynth. § 4.

² Demosthenes, Phil. III. § 67. 79. It must however be observed that the word used in both passages, *ἐκβαλεῖν*, *ἐκβαλέντες*, does not imply that Apollonides was obliged to seek his safety by flight from Olynthus; any more than Demosthenes means that Æschines was actually forced to quit the theatre, when the spectators *ἐξέβαλλον αὐτόν*. De F. L. § 389., or Æschines that Demosthenes was forced to fly out of Court, when he says, De F. L. § 4., *ἔσθην ὄν' αὐτὸν ἐστὶ τῆς αἰτίας ὅσα ταύτους ἐξέβαλλον*, and afterwards § 163. *ἰσ' ὃ μεταξὺ μὲν λίγων ὄσ' ὁμῶν ἐξέβρισθον*. Nevertheless, as we find from the speech in Næm. § 121. that Apollonides received the Athenian franchise, which was afterward taken from him by the decision of a tribunal, it is certainly not improbable that he withdrew from Olynthus on this occasion.

³ Demosthenes, c. Aristocr. § 219. Vœmel, Prolegom. in Philip. § i. p. 27., calls him a Cardian, but cites no authority.

a single armament be sufficient: two expeditions must be fitted out at the same time, one to protect Olynthus, the other to attempt a diversion by the invasion of Macedonia. An embassy also must be sent to cheer and rouse the Olynthians with assurances of support, and thus to counteract the persuasions of those who might advise them to negotiate with Philip, and the artifices by which he might tempt them to renounce the alliance with Athens, and to throw themselves on his mercy. As to the financial question, that, in so pressing an emergency, is not of the first importance. A fund must be provided: if they chose to raise one by extraordinary taxation, rather than use that which was already at their disposal, and which they spent upon their pleasures, they must do as they would: but the crisis admitted of no delay.

The case itself spoke no less forcibly than the orator. The people decreed a fresh squadron of seventeen galleys, a body of 2000 heavy-armed infantry, and 300 horse, all Athenians: Charidemus it seems was superseded, and Chares—perhaps the ablest general that could be found—was restored to the command. This reinforcement might have been sufficient to sustain, though not to end, the war, if it had been well employed, and the Olynthians had been all true to themselves. But in the spring of 348 Philip, having made himself master of Mecyberna, the port of Olynthus, as he had of Torone, by bribery¹, advanced to lay siege to Olynthus itself. And now for the first time perhaps he threw off the mask, and declared—whether in answer to any overtures from the besieged we do not know—that either they must quit Olynthus, or he Macedonia.² Twice they drew out their forces to give him battle, but were as often defeated: yet even after this hope had failed, they made a vigorous defence, and the besiegers were often repulsed with great loss. But two men who filled some of the highest stations, Las-

¹ Diodorus, xvi. 53.

² Demosth. iii. Phil. § 16. Cherson. § 60.

thenes and Euthyrates, had sold themselves to Philip, and now concerted a plan for betraying the city. Lasthenes, who had the command of the cavalry, under the pretence it seems of a sally, contrived to place a body of 500 in such a position that they were forced to lay down their arms. After this piece of treachery, it is probable he did not return to Olynthus: but his friends who remained there completed what he had begun, and found means of admitting the Macedonians into the town. Possibly they had deluded themselves with the belief that they were averting greater evils, which were likely to ensue upon a longer resistance. But the conqueror had resolved that Olynthus should never more endanger or disturb his kingdom, or become a rallying point for his enemies. He levelled it with the ground; and — whether swayed by resentment or policy — sold the captive population. Their lands served to reward his officers, more especially the foreign adventurers in his service, on whom he bestowed large estates.¹ So the chief of the Chalcidian cities was swept from the earth. Those which did not share its fate were reduced to helpless subjection; and the whole of the tripartite peninsula, which had so long separated Macedonia from the sea, became one of its fairest provinces.

It has been hastily inferred from a strong expression of Demosthenes², that the traitors, Lasthenes and Euthyrates, were put to death, or at least severely treated by Philip, when he had no further need of their service. The real state of the case is more truly indicated by one of Plutarch's anecdotes, which represents them as complaining to Philip that some of his courtiers had called them traitors. The Macedonians, he is said to have replied, are blunt, rough, folks: they call a spade, a spade. Nothing worse appears to have befallen them than the disappointment of their ambitious aims, in the utter ruin

¹ Theopompus, in Athenus, vi. 77.

² De Cherson. § 40. *ἰσχυρὰ τὴν πάλιν προύδοσαν πάντων κάκιον ἀκολάλασιν*. But the orator himself has fully explained his meaning in another passage, De Cor. § 58 — 60.

of the city where they had probably hoped to rule, and the condition of exiles, with the consciousness that they were abhorred by the friends of their country, and despised by its enemies. At Athens they were outlawed, as Arthmius of Zelea had been.¹ Yet even this decree was afterwards reversed. That was the work of Demades²: it was reserved for a modern historian to make the still bolder attempt, to reinstate them, as honourable men, in the estimation of posterity.

The king solemnized his triumph with great magnificence at Diium near the border of Thessaly, by the ancient festival in honour of the Muses, which Arche-laus had ordered after the model of Olympia, and which Philip celebrated on this occasion with extraordinary pomp, of banquets, games, and theatrical entertainments. Artists and spectators flocked to the spectacle from many parts of Greece. All found a hospitable and courteous reception: Philip entertained the most distinguished foreigners at his table, honoured them with liberal presents, won them by the affability and grace of his manners. He gained still more applause by an act of clemency which he performed at the request of Satyrus, the player, the early friend of Demosthenes, who was one of his guests, and took this opportunity to intercede in behalf of a friend's daughters, who, though not Olynthians by birth, were among the captives doomed to slavery. Philip granted the request, which was made before a numerous company, though their father had been one of the murderers of his brother Alexander.³ The occurrence is perhaps chiefly remarkable, as it proves the rigour with which the sentence he had passed upon the conquered city was carried into execution.

The princely and soldierlike liberality which Philip displayed on such occasions was no doubt congenial to

¹ Suidas *Δημάδης*, i. p. 537. confirmed by Demosthenes, *De F. L.* § 303. *κατὰ τῶν Ὀλυνθίων προδόντων πολλὰ καὶ διὰ ἐψήφισασι.* The *ἀτιμία* is explained by Demosthenes, *Phil.* iii. 54.

² Suidas. u. s.

³ Demosth. *De F. L.* § 213—216. The variation, *In Æsch. De F. L.* § 166. must either have been fabricated by the orator, or belonged to a different occasion.

his nature ; but it was not the less adapted to promote his political ends. It served as a public invitation to needy and unprincipled adventurers of every class, who were able to serve him, whether with the sword, or the tongue and the pen. Men of a higher character might be more liable to be seduced by the address of the giver than by his gifts. It probably required no little strength of republican virtue to withstand the corrupting influence of such a court as the Macedonian had now become. Theopompus has perhaps exaggerated its profligacy : but if its manners were not so gross as he has painted them, its splendour, gaiety, and freedom, might be so much the more attractive, and might render it the more dangerous a residence for a patriotic Greek.¹

¹ Though the view here presented of Philip's war with Olynthus is in substance the same as appears to have been universally received until late times, yet as many readers may have been rendered more familiar with a totally different account of these transactions, it may not be useless to subjoin a few remarks. The more a narrative professedly historical assumes the licence of a romance, the more difficult it is to refute, and the more tedious to criticise it ; and, it may be added, the more hopeless must be the attempt of a later hand to transform it into a history, by here and there inserting in brackets, at the bottom of a page, some of the facts which have been neglected or distorted by the original author ; though they may be useful as samples of his ignorance or partiality. For this reason we shall abstain from all comment on supposed intrigues between the *war-party* at Athens, and the *war-party* at Olynthus, which every well-informed person knows to be mere products of a heated imagination. There are some other points on which it is more practicable to ascertain the truth.

1. The statement of Philochorus (ap. Dionys. ad Amm. 9.), whose authority is not questioned, contradicts, as clearly as words can do, the assertion that the Olynthians were the aggressors, and that Philip did not begin the war until his territories had been invaded by Chares. Yet in the margin of the text which contains this assertion there is a reference to Philochorus. 2. That the forces described by Demosthenes (De F. L. p. 426.) as sent to the relief of Olynthus, were all decreed at one time, is a blunder which it might have been thought could not have occurred to any one who had once read the Olynthiæ, even in a translation. 3. The nature of the treachery to which Demosthenes ascribes the rapidity of Philip's conquest of the inferior Chalcidian towns, as it cannot be safely inferred from his expressions, must be left open to conjecture. But with regard to Olynthus itself, we are better informed. The assertion that Apollonides commanded the Olynthian cavalry, that it deserted while under his command, and that he was afterwards obliged to seek his own safety by flight from Olynthus, is, as the learned reader knows, a sheer fiction, distinctly contradicted by the statements of Demosthenes, who nevertheless is cited in support of it. From him we learn, that after Apollonides had been forced to withdraw, Lasthenes was elected commander of the horse. (Phil. iii. § 79.) *καλῶς Ὀλυθίαν ἐξέτιστο τὸν τὸν μὲν Λαθεθὴν ἠναγκάσθη χειροτονησάντων, τὸν δὲ Ἀπολλωνίδην ἐκβαλόντων*, and that after this appointment a body of 500 cavalry laid down their arms (De F. L. u. s.), which was the immediate occasion of the loss of the city. (Phil. ii. § 67.) From these facts we may conclude, that Ethyocrates and Las-

thenes were not raised to power for the very purpose of surrendering the place to the king of Macedonia. The desertion of the cavalry would in that case have been, to say the least, superfluous. It would scarcely have enabled Laethenes and Euthyrates to obtain more favorable terms. 4. The whole hypothesis of the [favorable] disposition to Philip which prevailed at Olynthus, and was hardly kept down by the war-party and their Athenian auxiliaries, is overturned by Philip's declaration, that — not the war-party, but — the Olynthians, must quit the city, or he Macedonia. He must at least have discovered his popularity from the deserters; and if he had made the threat in ignorance, would surely not have carried it into effect. 5. Hence his treatment of the conquered city becomes a question of some importance for the determination of the other contested points. The assertion that "support wholly fails among the orators of the day, for the report of the annalist of three centuries after, that he plundered the town, and sold the inhabitants for slaves," is surprising even in a work in which we are used to see ignorance and prejudice screening each other by turns from the suspicion of deliberate falsehood. The story of Satyrus, though told by Demosthenes, is confirmed by Æschines as to the state of things implied in it, which, being a circumstance material to the charge, he was concerned, if he could, to deny. And though it is Demosthenes who mentions the Olynthian woman brought to Athens by Philocrates (De F. L. § 352), there is no reason for questioning the truth of the report he gives of the speech of Æschines, in which he had described the sight he witnessed on his embassy to Peloponnesus — the thirty Olynthian captives, boys and women, whom Atrestidas had received as a present from Philip; and it is amply confirmed by his adversary's silence. Still stronger perhaps is the confirmation which the fact receives from the allusion of Dinarchus, in Demosth. § 27., where he compares the fate of Olynthus with that of Thebes; not to mention the story of the Olynthian girl in the preceding page of the same speech. Support therefore does not wholly fail for the annalist's report among the orators of the day. Nor is other confirmation wanting: e. g. the language of the Ætolian orator Chlæneas at Sparta in Polybius ix. 22. ("Ὀλυθιοὶ ἐξαιδεκαποδιστάμενος Φίλιππος καὶ παραδύναμα πειθήσας, in which his antagonist Lyciscus does not seem to have perceived any exaggeration, though he uses the milder expression ἀτυχία. The accusation brought against Aristotle; κατασκευασίης Ὀλυθίων μινύσιν ἐπὶ λαφυροποιλίῳ Φιλίππῳ τοῖς αλευσιωτάτοις τῶν Ὀλυθίων. Aristocles ap. Euseb. P. E. xv. 2. (Wesseling, on Diodorus, xvi. 53.) And it must be remembered that, if the report had stood quite alone, there would have been nothing to shake its credit. The suspicion that the story told by Diodorus may have been merely a licentious paraphrase of an expression of Demosthenes in the second Philippic, προδοθῆντι ὑπ' ἑλλήλων (αἱ Ὀλυθιοὶ) καὶ πειθῆντι, was indeed natural enough for a person who despised the idle learned, and probably found it as difficult to read the Greek language, as to write his own; but Diodorus could do both. We do not dispute the justice of the comparative eulogy pronounced by Mr. Clinton (F. H., Introduction, p. xxlii.) on the author who has given occasion to this note; but certainly it was not without reason that he was called by Dobree (Adversaria, i. p. 128.) *historiæ Græcæ corruptor loquacissimus*.

CHAP. XLIV.

FROM THE FALL OF OLYNTHUS TO THE END OF THE
SACRED WAR.

IT is peculiarly necessary in this period of Greek history to distinguish between the impression made by the events on the mind of the reader, who reviews them at a distance of many ages, and that which they produced on the chief actors and their contemporaries, as they occurred. To us the fall of Olynthus, which completed the subjugation of the Chalcidian peninsula, may seem to have decided Philip's contest with Athens, and virtually to have made him master of Greece. Thessaly might be considered as already almost a province of Macedonia. The struggle between Thebes and Phocis had reached such a point, that the one party needed assistance, and the other could not hope to withstand the force with which he was able to support its antagonist. Then, if his arms terminated the conflict, the use to be made of the victory would depend on his will, and there remained no Greek state capable of resisting him. In Peloponnesus there was a similar division of strength and interests: and the side on which he threw his weight must prevail. He had already formed a considerable marine, which after the conquest of the Chalcidian towns he had means of continually augmenting, and which enabled him to threaten and molest the foreign possessions of Athens. The road to Thrace lay open to him: he had already gained a strong footing there: the rival princes were either his humble allies, or enemies who lay at his mercy. We see little prospect that the Greek cities on the Hellespont should long preserve their independence,

or Athens the Chersonesus, if it should be his pleasure to expel her colonists. Even the principal channel through which she receives the means of subsistence may soon be closed against her commerce.

There was apparently only one event which could oppose any serious obstacle to his progress : this was a coalition among all the principal states of Greece, directed against him, animated by a spirit capable of vigorous efforts, and guided by a master mind. But it was not their clashing interests, and mutual jealousy, alone, that rendered such an event improbable, but still more perhaps the difficulty of awakening them to a lively sense of their danger. The rise of the Macedonian power was too recent, and had yet been too gradual, to be at once generally viewed in the true light. The Peloponnesians could scarcely see beyond the politics of their own peninsula. Whatever was passing in or out of Greece, was in their eyes important only as it affected the relative strength of Sparta and her hostile neighbours. They looked upon the Sacred War with interest, only so far as the issue might make Peloponnesus once more the theatre of war between Thebes and Sparta, or might release Sparta from all fear of her most dangerous rival. Philip too was deemed worth notice merely as he might be a useful ally, or a formidable enemy, to either of the contending Peloponnesian parties. The increased power of his kingdom was not contemplated as bringing it into any new relation to Greece, as a whole. It was not so long since his father had owed his throne to the protection of Sparta ; and even after the power against which she had defended it was laid in the dust, she could not easily bring herself to think of the son of Amyntas, as a patron, or a master. The case was not very dissimilar with the parties immediately concerned in the Sacred War. The Phocians indeed, conscious of the insecure ground on which they stood, dreaded his enmity, though it was but lately that their forces had met on equal terms, and that each side had been by turns victorious ;

but they did not wholly despair of propitiating it; for Thebes might more reasonably excite his jealousy. On the other hand Thebes was aware that her success depended on his aid: that his opposition would defeat all her plans; but more than this could scarcely enter into her calculations. Not many years had gone by, since she had disposed of the Macedonian sceptre: still fewer since he himself had been a hostage within her walls.

Beside these more evident causes of a false security, there were others, which may have operated not the less forcibly, because they were but indistinct feelings, scarcely ever reduced to a shape in which they could become a subject of sober reflection. Demosthenes has been charged with a gross want of candour, because in defiance of good historical testimony, proving the Hellenic origin of the royal family of Macedonia, he sometimes called Philip a barbarian. The charge is childish, as well as false, and can only serve to keep the real state of the case out of sight. Demosthenes everywhere speaks, not of the man, but of the king, the chief of the nation, and attributes its character to him; with perfect justice in respect of his subject.¹ But the very judgement which was supposed to establish Philip's Hellenic descent, implied that his people were considered as barbarians. His ancestor had only been acknowledged as a Greek, because he had been able to make it appear that he was not by blood a Macedonian.² To our present purpose it is immaterial, whether in Philip's age the line which parted the Macedonian from the Greek was narrow or broad, whether there was any real

¹ If in the reign of Peter the Great the power of Russia had been known to threaten the liberty of Europe, would an English orator have been guilty of falsehood or exaggeration, who should have spoken of the czar, as the Muscovite, the Barbarian? Or would the ascendancy of such a power cease to be accounted a less terrible calamity, if it were wielded by a prince of Teutonic blood, and conversant with all the refinements of European culture?

² Niebuhr questions the truth of the story about the Argive descent of the Macedonian kings, and thinks it arose out of the epithet *'Αργιάδαι* which is given them in the verses of the Sibyl, quoted by Pausanias, vii. 8. 9. But it is surely more probable that the epithet alludes to the received tradition. Wachsmuth, *Europäische Sittengeschichte*, i. p. 16., likewise treats the story as an idle tale.

affinity of genius and character between them, or the resemblance was only produced by a slight varnish of Greek civilisation spread over the surface of a part of Macedonian society. The Greeks had certainly some reason for thinking so ; since they saw that the Macedonian princes were obliged to borrow from them the things on which they prided themselves most, the works of their fine arts, and the skill of their artists, and that though Philip might gain a victory over them, he could not celebrate it as he wished without their help. But we are here speaking only of the universal feeling, or, if it was no more, the vulgar prejudice¹, according to which the Macedonians were an inferior race, whose dominion would on that account indeed be the more odious, but, until it had become inevitable, was probably the less apprehended. With this pride of birth there was coupled a consciousness of national unity, still subsisting notwithstanding the discord which prevented union : there was still always a possibility that, whenever an adequate occasion should arise, a confederacy might be formed capable of resisting any foreign power, as their forefathers had repelled the Persian invasion. If the forces, which met in hostile conflict a few years before at Mantinea, had been arrayed on one side, what Macedonian army could have faced them ?

Philip himself, though fully sensible of his own advantages, certainly did not think meanly of the strength which Greece still possessed, and would have been very unwilling, from regard to his own safety, to provoke a coalition among the principal states which might call it into action. It seems equally clear that his designs towards Greece were never hostile, any farther than his interests required. We ought rather perhaps to say that his disposition towards Greece was positively friendly, so far as his interests permitted. There can be little doubt that he valued himself upon his ancestry, through which he traced his pedigree up to Hercules, not less

¹ Which however is not only attested, but avowed, by Isocrates, by way of compliment to Philip. Philip. § 125.

than upon his royal dignity. His blunt, rough, Macedonians, who called a spade, a spade, made loyal subjects, and brave soldiers; but he liked to think of himself as a Greek: and it is not an extravagant supposition, that his respect for Athens, as the centre of Grecian art, knowledge, and refinement, was constantly counteracting the resentment she provoked by her determined hostility. It is also nearly certain that Greece was never the ultimate end of his ambition. We cannot indeed pretend to determine the time when the great designs which he afterwards disclosed first took a definite shape in his mind; but from the beginning of his reign so many occasions were continually arising to draw his attention towards the East, that we may fairly presume these designs were in some measure blended with his earliest views of conquest and aggrandisement. But at least at the epoch which we have now reached, they must have been fully matured: for they became shortly after, as we shall see, a subject of reflection and discussion, of earnest desire and confident expectation to others, who assuredly did not either see farther than Philip, or outstrip his wishes and hopes. But, that he might enter on the projected undertaking with safety, and a reasonable assurance of success, two things were necessary: that he should be master of the European coast of the Hellespont, and that Greece should be reduced to such a state, that he might have no hindrance or interruption to apprehend from her. Just to this point, if it could be found, he would have wished to see her sink: beyond this he cannot have thought it politic to degrade or hurt her. We cannot be surprised that, with such views, he should have preferred the way of negotiation, whenever it would serve his purpose, to that of arms; especially as he was conscious of extraordinary talents for diplomacy; or that notwithstanding his success in the war with Athens, he should have taken the first opportunity after the conquest of Olynthus, to signify his desire of peace. A closer inspection of the state of affairs in Greece at this time will perhaps enable us to understand

both the motives which induced the Athenians gladly to listen to his overtures, and some of the especial temporary purposes with which he made them.

It was at Athens that the national consciousness, fostered by the inexhaustible recollections of the Persian war, and by the sight of no less glorious monuments of genius and art, which above all other trophies attested the superiority of the Greek over the barbarian, was always most lively.¹ It was there too that the extent of Philip's power was best understood, and the danger with which his ambition threatened Greece was most clearly perceived: for the encroachments which he had been incessantly making on the Athenian empire were at once provocations and warnings. And accordingly it was in the minds of Athenian statesmen, that, while others thought only of deprecating his hostility, or conciliating his favour, the project of a confederacy for the purpose of barring his progress seems first to have arisen. In the oration, which we supposed to be the last of the Olynthiacs, Demosthenes urged the expediency of sending embassies wherever there was a prospect of success, to instigate the other Greeks against Philip. This advice appears to have been generally approved, and especially after the fall of Olynthus to have been regarded as the last remaining resource of the state. It was warmly adopted by Eubulus and his party, opposed as they were on other questions to Demosthenes, and they even brought it forward in a more definite shape as their own. Hence we may infer that the measure was very popular: but yet we shall see reason to believe that Eubulus did not on this occasion act merely in compliance with the wishes of the people, but had an object in view which he did not yet venture to unfold, but which he hoped to accomplish by means of this proposition. We find that his first step was taken in concert with a party at Megalopolis, where, as

¹ Οὕτως Ἀθηναίους, καὶ παρὰ τῆς ἡμέρας ἐκείνης ἐν πᾶσι καὶ λόγοις, καὶ συνήμασι τῆς τῶν προγράτων ἀριστῆς ὑπερημέμαθ' ἔχουσι. Demosth. De Cor. § 83.

might be expected, there were some who — whether honestly or from impure motives — desired the aid of Philip in their contest with Sparta, while others, probably the greater number, preferred the more congenial and safer alliance of Athens. Ischander, a son perhaps of the celebrated actor Neoptolemus¹, seems to have been sent on a secret mission into Arcadia, and on his return made a report favourable to the views of Eubulus. The occasion is memorable, as the first on which Æschines, afterward the celebrated rival of Demosthenes, is known to have taken a prominent part in public affairs.

Æschines was the son of an honourable citizen, Tromes, or Atrometus, who seems to have been connected by birth with one of the most illustrious priestly houses, but, after having lost his property in the Peloponnesian war, was forced to quit Athens during the government of the Thirty, served for a time as a mercenary in Asia, and on his return was forced, if we may believe Demosthenes, to seek subsistence in a somewhat disreputable occupation. The orator's mother too appears to have been forced by poverty to earn her living in the service of a foreign form of superstition, which was generally regarded as despicable. Notwithstanding these disadvantages Æschines, who was gifted with an uncommonly fine person, sonorous voice, and talents only inferior to those of Demosthenes himself²; acquitted himself honourably of the ordinary duties of a citizen, served abroad in several campaigns, and sometimes earned the distinguishing notice of his commanders. At home it seems that in his youth he was fain to be satisfied with very humble employment for his voice and

¹ But we do not know that he was himself a player, as Leland calls him (L. of Ph. ii. p. 29.), deceived by the sarcastic title *διωτραγωιστής* by which Demosthenes (De F. L. § 10.) manifestly alludes to the ancient profession of Æschines. Gysar indeed (*De Græcorum tragædia qualis fuit circa tempora Demosthenis*, p. 29.) adopts a punctuation (*Ἰσχανδρον, τῶν Νισσαλιῶν διωτραγωιστής*) according to which Ischander would be described by his scenic relation to Neoptolemus; but this seems improbable.

² *Μῆναις Δημοσθένους μὲνδὲς δῖωτρας.* Dionys. De Admir. VI. Dic. In Dem. 85.

person, sometimes in the office of a public clerk, sometimes as an actor of third-rate parts in the theatrical entertainments of rural festivals. The works he has left however indisputably attest the diligence with which he must have cultivated his great abilities: and he must have found opportunities of displaying them which recommended him as an able coadjutor to Eubulus; the more readily perhaps, as he had signalled himself in the last-mentioned campaign in Eubœa, so as to earn public honours and the esteem of Phocion. This may have been the accident which determined the outset and the direction of his political career. He undertook the part of introducing Ischander to the council, and the assembly, warned the people against the arts by which Philip was extending his secret influence in Greece, and proposed that embassies should be sent in all directions to counteract them, and that all the Greek states which were open to persuasion should be invited to a congress to be held at Athens, to deliberate on the means of prosecuting the war with Philip. This proposition appears to have been carried. It amounted to nothing more than an extension of the congress in which the allies of Athens had been used regularly to meet and discuss their affairs: though possibly these consultations had been suspended since the Social War. Eubulus himself proposed an embassy to Megalopolis, which was decreed: and Æschines was appointed one of the envoys. His task was to rouse the Arcadians against Philip, and he appears to have performed it with great energy. In the account which he gave of his embassy on his return, he laboured no less vehemently to inflame the indignation of the Athenians, by the description of a piteous spectacle which had met his eye on his journey homeward, when he saw one Atrestidas travelling with a herd of Olynthian captives, about thirty women and boys, whom he was said to have brought from the Macedonian court. The story gave occasion for a strain of invective against Philip, in which, if we believe Demosthenes, he did not spare the most opprobrious epithets, and excited

the people to demand justice from the Arcadians on the traitors who sold their country to the *bloodstained barbarian*.¹

Whether this mission of Æschines was attended with any practical results we are not informed; in general, as he himself testifies, whatever attempts were made to rally the Greeks round Athens entirely failed.² But the proposal of Eubulus seems to have been connected with another more important object, which Demosthenes attributes to him, apparently on grounds which rendered the fact notorious. An alliance with Megalopolis was hardly consistent with that by which Athens was still united with Sparta. A rupture with Sparta seemed a step which must sooner or later lead to a reconciliation with Thebes: and to promote an alliance with Thebes, was, Demosthenes asserts, a main aim of the policy of Eubulus.³ So far we see a probable connection between two well attested facts; but we are left to conjecture for an explanation of his ulterior views. It seems most likely that he wished to detach Athens from the Phocian alliance; and he may have hoped that, as the price of her accession to the Theban side, she might obtain terms of safe and honourable peace for the Phocians, which would deprive Philip of all pretext for interference. The alliance with Thebes had also, as we learn from the same authority, been a favourite measure with Aristophon: it was the only political question on which he and Eubulus always agreed. He however may have thought it desirable, simply as more conformable to the institutions of Athens than the connection with Sparta, which brought her into conflict with Argos, Messene, and the democratical states of Peloponnesus, her natural allies. But Demosthenes himself is charged by Æschines with a strong leaning toward the Theban interest⁴, and is said to have betrayed it at a time when it was hardly safe openly to acknowledge it,

¹ Βάρβαρον τι καὶ ἀλάστορα, Demosth. De F. L. § 347, without contradiction. Æschines (De F. L. § 33.) expressly admits the main fact.

² De F. L. § 84.

³ Demosth. De Cor. § 207.

⁴ De F. L. § 112. Πρὸς τοῖς ἄλλοις κακοῖς βιωτιάζει.

and even to have connected himself with Thebes by ties of public hospitality.¹ His object must have related chiefly to the contest with Philip, and can scarcely have been any other than to prevent the Thebans from casting themselves on the king's protection. He cannot have intended, or have expected that the people would consent, to sacrifice the Phocians to the revenge of their enemies. But it may have appeared to him that Thebes, if the sovereignty of Bœotia was secured to her, might now be willing to adjust her quarrel with Phocis on more equitable conditions, and perhaps to cede Oropus to Athens, as the reward of her mediation.

It is at least certain, that the turn which the Sacred War had taken, about the time of the fall of Olynthus, was more favourable than ever to such a project. After the death of Mnaseas, the two principal belligerents had continued to spend their strength in unavailing efforts. The young general Phalæcus conducted the war, it seems, with no less ability than his predecessors, but, like them, without any decisive success. Each party by turns was victorious in some trifling engagements; the Phocians maintained their footing in Bœotia, and continued to make attempts on the towns still subject to Thebes; the Thebans regularly invaded and ravaged Phocis, but were sometimes attacked in their retreat, and suffered more damage than they had inflicted.² It would have been very difficult to explain by what means they were enabled to sustain the conflict so long, with an enemy who had such resources at his disposal, if we had not been informed that they received 300 talents from the Persian king, as the price, partly of their forbearance, and partly of the succours which they sent to him in his expedition to Egypt³: and we may reasonably conjecture that they had reaped similar, if not equal profit, from the important services which their general, Pammenes, rendered some years before to thè

¹ § 148. 151. Τὴν πρὸς Θηβαίους φιλοξενίαν, τοῦ Θηβαίου φιλοξίνου.

² Diodorus, xvi. 56. Isocrates, Philip. § 61.

³ Diodorus, xvi. 40. 44.

revolted satrap Artabazus.¹ Still, the burden of the war became every year more and more oppressive, as the prospects of aggrandisement with which they had entered on it, and even their hopes of recovering the ground they had lost in Bœotia, were dimmed. On the other hand the profusion with which the treasures of Delphi had hitherto been scattered, was beginning to approach its natural term. The administration of Phalæcus was, in proportion to his means, not less wasteful than that of his predecessors.² It might, without any greater misconduct, have given more offence, if he found himself forced to resort to precious and revered relics, which they, in the midst of abundance, had been able to spare. Yet it is probable that discontent arising from this cause would have been easily stifled, if the pay of the soldiery had continued to flow as regularly and copiously as at the first. But as soon as murmurs began to be heard in the camp, the party in the state which had opposed Onomarchus before his accession, seems to have been encouraged to renew its attacks on the ruling dynasty, and was now able to effect a revolution. Phalæcus was charged with embezzlement, and with the additional impiety of having caused excavations to be made in the inmost sanctuary of the temple, for treasures which on the authority of some Homeric lines, were believed to lie buried there. The shock of an earthquake, it was reported, had put a stop to the sacrilegious search. Phalæcus was forced to abdicate his office, or to retire from Phocis, and three new generals were elected in his room. This could scarcely have happened, unless he had been abandoned by the greater part of his troops; and it is not difficult to collect, how they were tempted to take part with his adversaries. It was alledged, it

¹ Diodorus, xvi. 34.

² On this subject Diodorus forgets himself; xvi. 30., he says that Philomelus was obliged to lay hands on the sacred treasure: c. 56. that he abstained from it. In c. 56. it is Onomarchus; in 61. Phayllus, who spent the largest amount. Ephorus, in Athenæus, vi. 22., represents Phalæcus as equalling the prodigality of Onomarchus and Phayllus.

seems, that the treasure would have been still sufficient for the pay of the army, if it had not been diverted to the private uses of the general and his friends. A severe inquiry was instituted into the mode of its application.¹ One Philo, who had been entrusted with the management of the largest portion, and was the agent employed by Phalæcus in his sacrilegious search, was convicted of malversation, and, having been put to the torture, disclosed the names of his accomplices. All were obliged to refund as much of the spoil as remained in their possession, and then suffered the punishment of sacrilege.

These proceedings seem to show, that it was the object of the new government to throw the odium of the spoliation of the temple as much as possible on their predecessors. Perhaps they wished it to be supposed elsewhere, that they had always disapproved of the violation of the sacred treasure altogether. But at home they can hardly have taken such high ground, but must have made a distinction between the legitimate use, for the defence of the state, and the sacrilegious waste, for private gratification. In the meanwhile the confiscation of the property of the offenders yielded a supply which they might employ for the public service without open participation in their guilt. This change of administration seems to have taken place soon after the fall of Olynthus; and it opened a prospect of a speedier termination of the war than could have been expected from the dynasty of Phalæcus. It was clear that the new government, whether it abandoned or re-

¹ The remark of Diodorus, xvi. 56., that Philomelus abstained from the sacred offerings, cannot of course warrant the assertion, that "the tribunal to which the inquiry was referred completely acquitted the memory of Philomelus, declaring that his administration was found pure." This is one of those arbitrary strokes which efface the limits that ought to separate history from romance. It may however be proper to observe, that if this was the result of the inquiry, it would only prove that Philomelus had not been found to have embezzled any of the sacred treasure, not that he had abstained from using it. Diodorus distinctly mentions that the subject of the inquiry was the embezzlement that had been practised. If, as we have seen reason to suspect, Philomelus was not related to his successors in office, we can the better understand why no imputation was cast on him.

newed the expedients hitherto used, could not stand long in its own strength; and there was reason to conclude that it would be glad, for the sake of peace and amnesty, to surrender the Bœotian towns to Thebes, and to make such concessions with regard to the temple as might satisfy the demands of the Thessalians. Nevertheless we do not find that they made or received any pacific overtures, or that this revolution in Phocis immediately excited much attention, or gave rise to any new political calculations at Athens. But by Philip, it was certainly not overlooked; and it probably had considerable influence on the subsequent course of his policy.

The longer his war with Athens had lasted, and the heavier the losses she had sustained in it, the more of course was the resentment of the people kindled against him; and it seems that some violent men, to humour the prevailing temper, had threatened to impeach any one who should propose to open a negotiation for peace.¹ After the fall of Olynthus, nothing could be expected but that he should press the enemy, over whom he had gained such a momentous advantage, with fresh vigour. Unless a league could be brought about to resist him, the very existence of Athens might be threatened. It was therefore with joyful surprise that, in the course of the following summer (347), the Athenians received intimation, through several channels, that he was willing to treat with them. According to Demosthenes it would appear, that the Athenian prisoners taken in Olynthus, afforded him the first opportunity of disclosing his pacific dispositions.² The friends of some of them prevailed on the people to send an agent, clothed with the cha-

¹ Yet it is by no means certain that even so much as this is implied in the language of Æschines, *De F. L.* § 13. It is perhaps no more than a hyperbolic description of the implacable enmity professed against Philip by demagogues like Lycinus. But at least if he had meant to speak of "a savage decree forbidding the entrance of a herald from Macedonia upon the Athenian territory" he would not have used such an expression as *πρότερον καὶ αὐτὸ τοῦτ' ἰκαλύπτει ὑπὲρ τισῶν*—not to mention the difficulty of supposing, that, while such a decree remained in force, any individual should have petitioned the people to send an ambassador on his behalf to Philip, and that the petition should have been granted before the decree was rescinded.

² *De Cor.* § 26.

racter of an ambassador, to treat for their ransom ; and the player Aristodemus, who was known to Philip in the exercise of his art, and perhaps had been engaged for the festival at Dium, was appointed on this mission. If however we believe the statement of Æschines, that the petition thus granted was actively supported by Demosthenes and Philocrates, one of the orators who were the chief authors of the ensuing peace, we can hardly doubt that the object of this embassy was purely political, and that it was a consequence of some earlier hints which had been received of Philip's intentions. The first, according to Æschines, had been conveyed by envoys from Eubœa, who came to treat for their own states, but, as allies of Macedonia, announced that they had been instructed by Philip to inform the Athenians, that he wished to adjust his differences with them. It may have been upon this encouragement that Aristodemus was sent, with the tacit but notorious object of ascertaining the truth. Before his return however, it appears that other assurances to the same effect were received. The player Neoptolemus obtained leave to make a journey to Macedonia, under pretext of recovering a sum which was due to him there ; and he also on his return made a report concerning Philip, calculated to produce so favourable an impression, that Demosthenes was convinced, and the event seems to have proved, that he was bribed for the purpose. Finally one Phryno, having been captured by Philip's troops, either during the Olympian truce, or during that which he had proclaimed — in imitation of the Olympic law — for the celebration of his festival at Dium¹, induced the people to send him back in the quality of an ambassador, accompanied by Ctesiphon, for the professed purpose of recovering the ransom which had been exacted for his release. Philip granted his request in the most obliging

¹ This supposition (which is Corsini's, F. A. P. i. Diss. iii. p. 139.) seems rather preferable, chiefly because it is difficult to conceive how Phryno could have been taken by Philip's soldiers on his way to Olympia : and if the capture had taken place, Ol. c. viii. 1., and was only used as a pretext, the petition might have seemed to have been too long deferred.

manner, restored the property which had been taken from him, with excuses for the mistake of his soldiers, and dismissed the two envoys with professions of like import to those already mentioned.

From first to last the chief doubt felt at Athens seems to have been, whether Philip was in earnest, and might be safely trusted. That peace was at this juncture highly desirable for the republic, scarcely admitted a question; and as soon as it was ascertained that it might be had, the people were unanimous in their will to obtain it. The war had been one series of losses and disasters: notwithstanding the subsidies received from Delphi, it was computed that it had cost 1500 talents, of which 200, said to have been spent on the expedition to Thermopylæ, were perhaps the part least unprofitably employed, and that 150 galleys had been sent out, which had never returned. The Chersonesus, the only important acquisition that had been made, had been so threatened, and was still in such danger, that Æschines affirmed, probably not wholly without foundation, that it had been abandoned by the Athenian colonists.¹ For the Athenians therefore even a short suspension of hostilities, not requiring any farther sacrifice, but leaving both parties as they stood, would be a clear gain: and it seemed reasonable to presume, that Philip did not expect they should purchase the peace which he so freely offered, by any injurious or degrading concession. Such were manifestly the views of Demosthenes himself: however little he might be inclined to believe Philip's professions of goodwill, he thought it plainly expedient to meet his advances so far as to discover on what terms he was willing to treat.

But the motives which induced Philip to wish for peace with Athens, were by no means equally evident: for there can hardly have been any of his contemporaries—unless perhaps Isocrates—who attributed his offers to pure generosity: and but few of the more intelligent who really believed—though Demosthenes

* De F. L. § 75.

professed to think so—that the damage which his coasts and commerce suffered from the Athenian cruisers and privateers, drove him to this mode of seeking relief.¹ On the other hand, it would be rating Philip's sagacity too highly, to suppose that, when he first invited the Athenians to negotiation, he clearly foresaw the advantages which he was to reap from it. Demosthenes, in a later review of these transactions, ascribed Philip's offers, not to the annoyance which he suffered from the Athenian privateers, but to his fear that the Thebans, exhausted by the Sacred War, might be forced to take refuge in the protection of Athens.² But even this explanation, though it no doubt comes much nearer to the truth than the other, is not satisfactory, unless we take into the account some of the facts which have been mentioned, which seem to throw the requisite light on it. The weakness of Thebes in itself was certainly no reason why she should seek an alliance with Athens. Unless she had some ground to expect that the Athenians would acknowledge and support her claim to the sovereignty of Bœotia, it was more likely that she should address herself to Philip, who had already declared himself on her side. But the connection which he saw the Athenians endeavouring, not without an appearance of success, to form with Megalopolis, beside that it interfered with his views in Peloponnesus, might well alarm him, as a step toward a reconciliation with Thebes. And if about the same time a revolution took place in Phocis, which placed the supreme power in the hands of men who discovered a more tractable spirit, while it proved that a settlement of the quarrel could not be long delayed, this must have quickened his apprehensions, and have afforded an additional motive for the attempt to divert the Athenians from this project by the prospect of peace. He might foresee that, if they were thus relieved from their fears of him, they would never consent to any measure which would strengthen the neighbour whom they still hated and dreaded.

¹ De F. L. § 362. De Cor. § 185.

² De Cor. § 23.

Thus then to us Philip's object may appear sufficiently intelligible: but it was scarcely possible that it should be suspected by the mass of the Athenians, or perhaps by their most sagacious statesmen, until it was partially revealed by subsequent events. Hence arose, as we have observed, the distrust with which they received his friendly messages, as news too good to be believed. And it was probably rather to satisfy the people, than because they were credulous themselves, that the orators suggested the thought, which was the most flattering to Athenian pride, that Philip was no less distressed and weakened by the war than Athens, and that peace was a boon which he solicited from Athenian generosity. It was apparently to strengthen this persuasion, that Philocrates now moved a decree, which was voted unanimously, that Philip should have leave to send a herald and ambassadors to Athens to treat for peace. Notwithstanding this unanimity, there were, it seems, orators, who thought this a favourable opportunity for a display of extraordinary patriotism, which could not be better shown than by professions of implacable animosity toward Philip. One Lycinus impeached Philocrates as the author of an illegal decree: assuredly not because negotiation with Philip had ever been expressly forbidden: but on the ordinary ground of objections on the score of policy. The tone taken seems to have been, that it was degrading to Athens to meet the advances of the barbarian, until she had humbled him still more, and had avenged herself for the wrongs she had suffered from him.¹ Philocrates, disabled by the state of his health from pleading his own cause without assistance, called in Demosthenes as his advocate: proof undoubtedly that Demosthenes was already decided in favour of peace; for between him and Philocrates—a man it seems of notoriously profligate character—there was no bond of union except a temporary coincidence on a political question. The defendant was acquitted; and Lycinus did not even obtain the number of votes

Æschines, De F. L. § 77.

necessary to screen him from the penalty of a calumnious charge. Not long after, Aristodemus returned from his embassy. His report was anticipated by one of the prisoners in whose behalf he had been sent, who, having been released without ransom, brought an account of Philip's amicable professions, which was fully confirmed by Aristodemus, when he appeared before the Five Hundred, with the addition, that Philip had expressed not only much goodwill toward Athens, but a wish to become her ally. Demosthenes was a member of this council, which had just entered into office; and he proposed that the honour of a crown should be bestowed on Aristodemus: a token of satisfaction not only with his conduct, but with the result of his embassy.

Sufficient ground had now been laid for the final step. A decree was carried on the motion of Philocrates, for the appointment of ten ambassadors, who were to treat with Philip, and to desire him to send ambassadors to Athens, with full powers. The envoys appointed were all men of eminence for station, or ability, or recommended by the share they had taken in the preliminary proceedings. Their names were, Ctesiphon, Aristodemus, Phrynon, Iatrocles, Philocrates, Demosthenes, Æschines, Nausicles, Dercylus, Cimon. With them was joined Aglaocreon of Tenedos, as the representative of the allies who held their congress at Athens.

The services of Aristodemus were deemed so valuable, that on the motion of Demosthenes envoys were sent to several cities where he was engaged for the exercise of his art, to obtain his release from the penalties under which he had bound himself to appear there on the stage.¹

¹ Leland (ii. p. 57.) and a later historian, infer from the sarcastic allusions which Demosthenes makes to the theatrical performances of Æschines, that he held the profession of Aristodemus *in contempt*, and that it was *esteemed degrading even at Athens*: as if no profession could be reputable that was ever practised by bunglers. The instance before us certainly does not favour the supposition, that the art which had been practised by Æschylus and Sophocles had fallen into contempt. Of De-

Such was the origin of that famous negotiation which some years later gave occasion to the two pleadings of Æschines and his great adversary, who prosecuted him for misconduct in the discharge of his commission. To these speeches we are principally indebted for our information on the transactions now to be related; and they abound in details which would have rendered them even more valuable than an ordinary history, if unhappily the opposite views and interests of the orators had not led both of them to suppress or distort the truth, and to contradict one another and themselves, in a manner which renders it one of the most difficult historical problems, to extract a clear and consistent story from their conflicting statements. The event so utterly disappointed all the hopes with which the negotiation was opened by the Athenians, that each felt it necessary to disclaim as much as he could of the part he took in the steps which led to such a disastrous result. Demosthenes charges Æschines with a corrupt and treasonable attempt to deceive the people on a point of vital importance to its interests. Æschines defends himself with the plea, that he shared a common delusion, from which his accuser was not exempt more than others. Demosthenes, with regard to his posthumous reputation for patriotism, might safely have admitted all that is alleged against him by his adversary on this subject: for, if true, it proved nothing either against his honesty, or even his sagacity, but only that he had been deceived, by artifices through which it was scarcely possible for any human discernment to penetrate, and had not discovered a secret which no one suspected. Here we see traces of a weakness which must not be palliated as the infirmity of a noble mind, and which evidently betrayed him into disingenuous concealment of truth, if not into positive

Demosthenes Grysar observes (u. s. p. 35.) : *Is quanto studio hosce homines (histriones) prosecutus sit, quis est qui nesciat?* The well known remark of Nepos (*Præf.*) : *In scenam prodire nemini in usdem gentibus fuit turpitudini*, might seem sufficiently decisive as to this point. Aristotle's observation (*Probl.* xxx. 10. *Aul. Gell.* N. A. xx. 14.) on the ordinary habits and character of actors in his day — which is equally applicable in modern times — does not affect this question.

falsehood. Nor, even while we must admire his eloquence, can we sympathise with the tone in which he attacks his adversary, which is in disadvantageous contrast with the moderation and dignity which he preserves in his deliberative orations. We cannot help suspecting that he feels less indignation than he expresses ; and we see that he is accommodating his language to a vicious moral taste, which delighted in virulent invectives, and countenanced the widest departure from truth for the sake of oratorical effect. All this indeed is equally apparent on the other side ; and therefore, independently of the deep shade of suspicion which rests on the political honesty of Æschines, we cannot without prejudice admit the graver charges which he brings against his enemy's private character. These indeed would cast an indelible stain on it ; but they may be all mere calumnies : they can neither be proved nor refuted. All that we must disapprove in Demosthenes belongs, as we have already remarked, not simply to the man, but to his country, his age, and the sphere in which he moved.

The commission of the ten envoys is only described to us in general terms : we do not know the expectations with which they set out, or the instructions which they had received.¹ Only it seems that the people had been encouraged to hope that Philip might consent to the restitution of Amphipolis. With respect to Thrace, the chief object must have been the security of the Chersonesus. Cersobleptes was not an ally for whom much anxiety could be felt, except so far as his territories might be considered as bulwarks of the Athenian possessions and the Greek cities on the Hellespont, against Macedonia. But as to the most interesting question, the manner in which the affairs of Thebes and Phocis

¹ Hence it has been observed : " Immediate deputies of a multitude, they appear to have received no precise instructions : " as if the immediate deputies of a multitude might not, in the decree which appointed them, receive instructions as precise as the ambassador of a sultan. It seems to have been only on points on which secrecy was necessary that Athenian envoys were left to their own discretion. Æschines, De F. L. § 107. Ἀνιγνώσθη μὲν τὸ ψήφισμα καθ' ὃ ἐπεσβύσαμεν, καὶ τὰ προσηταγμένα ἡμῖν πρὸς τῶ τοὺς ὄρκους ἀπολαβεῖν συνηθημύμθα.

were to be adjusted, it is very doubtful whether the people at large, or any party, was conscious of a distinct plan, or had formed more than general hopes or wishes, which were to remain in suspense, until Philip's intentions should be discovered. The uncertainty and confusion which had hitherto prevailed on this subject, had been much heightened by the new turn which events had taken in Phocis about the same time that the embassy was decreed. Through some reaction, the causes of which are entirely unknown, Phalæcus had been reinstated in his office, and had recovered his power. Diodorus mentions the fact without the slightest explanation, and does not give so much as a hint to assist conjecture.¹ He represents the new government as having mercenaries in abundance at its command, and as so prosperous in the war, that the Thebans were now forced to implore succour from Philip, who sent some troops, but in very small numbers², merely sufficient to show a decent interest in their cause. That he should not have sent a larger force, when he was looking forward to a negotiation with Athens, is intelligible enough; but the total silence of the orators renders the statement of Diodorus on this point extremely suspicious; for, however trifling the effects of Philip's interference at this time might be, it was still an indication of design, which must have excited much attention at Athens, and, we should have supposed, have been eagerly seized as a handle for reasoning or declamation. We next hear of a defeat which the Phocians suffered at Abæ, where they were building a

¹ He only says, xvi. 59., that when Philip afterwards came to invade Phocis, he found Phalæcus *πάλιν τῆς στρατηγίας ἐξωμίειν*. Gemistius Pletho indeed, ii. 14., fills up the blank thus: *Φάλακκος δὲ, ἐπεὶ οὐκ ἠλέγχθη διὰ τι πικρῶς τῶν χειμάτων, ἀλλ' ἐς τὴν στρατίαν ἕκαστα ἀνυπακούσας, ἐς τὴν στρατηγίαν αὐτῆς δὴ ἀποκατίστη*. But it is uncertain whether this is anything more than an inference which he drew from Diodorus, and even if Diodorus had made the statement, we should not the less have suspected that the restoration of Phalæcus was not brought about in so quiet and legal a manner as it seems to imply. The proceedings against the other culprits, who were evidently treated as his friends or ministers, had been too violent.

² His words indeed, xvi. 58., are *οὐκ ὀλίγους*, but the context plainly requires the omission of the negative.

fortress, perhaps to curb the town, which — whether through religious associations, maintained by its temple, or from any other cause—was known to be adverse to the war. But there is no reason to imagine that this reverse, which seems to have been chiefly memorable because it was attended with an accidental conflagration of the temple, where some of the Phocian troops took refuge—at all shook the credit of the government. We must therefore confine ourselves to the bare fact, that it was forced to give way, and that, on the eve of its fall, it applied to the Athenians for aid, and offered to put them in possession of Alponus, Throntum, and Nicæa, three places on the eastern coast, which commanded the pass of Thermopylæ. They of course gladly embraced an offer which placed so important a barrier in their hands. Proxenus, their general, was ordered to take possession of the towns; and a fleet of fifty galleys, and a general levy of citizens under the age of thirty, was decreed for the expedition.¹ Whether resistance was apprehended, as these preparations may seem to indicate, we are not informed. Proxenus however set out with a much smaller force, but arrived too late. He found the government changed, and the three towns occupied by the adherents of Phalæcus. The envoys who had invited the Athenians were thrown into prison on their return, and Athens was openly treated as an enemy by the restored general, and even insulted in the persons of her heralds, who about this time were proclaiming the solemn truce of the Eleusinian mysteries. Phalæcus however had given no further intimation of the course he meant to pursue. The Athenians, though offended with his conduct, may have distinguished between his party and the public cause; and even if their resentment was kindled against the Phocians, it was certainly

¹ Æschines, De F. L. § 140. It surely requires a singularly jaundiced eye to perceive *scandalous perfidy* in this transaction; and all the boldness as well as ingenuity of a practised sycophant were needed, to represent the revolution which restored Phalæcus as the motive that induced Demosthenes to favour the negotiation with Macedonia, of which Æschines shows he had been a principal mover long before.

not strong enough to overpower their jealousy and hatred of Thebes. Their position between the belligerents had by this revolution been rendered more unsettled and perplexing than before.

So great was the general eagerness for the treaty at Athens, that the envoys did not wait for the return of a herald, who had been sent before them to obtain a safe-conduct, and who was appointed it seems to meet them at Oreus in Eubœa; they did not even stop when they reached Oreus, but immediately crossed over into Thessaly, though a Macedonian army under Parmenio was at this time besieging Halus, which lay on their way, and they were obliged to obtain the general's permission to pass through his lines. It is to the accidental mention of this fact, with which Demosthenes illustrates the zeal shown by his colleagues on this journey, that we owe our information on Philip's proceedings in Thessaly. He had undertaken the siege of Halus, not it appears on account of any provocation which he himself had received, but because it resisted the claims of the Pharsalians, who, as old enemies of the tyrants of Pheræ, were probably his firm allies. It was one of the welcome occasions which the state of Thessaly might frequently furnish him for armed interference. Halus on the other hand had entered into alliance with Athens, but not it seems on terms which entitled her to demand succours. He himself remained at Pella, partly perhaps to receive the Athenian embassy; but he was also making preparations for another expedition into Thrace. The envoys, having met their herald at Larissa, proceeded without delay to the Macedonian court. During the journey it appears from the reluctant admission of Æschines, that he and Demosthenes were apparently on a footing of closer intimacy with each other than with most of their colleagues, for only Iatrocles and the Tenedian shared their repasts: though each of the orators is anxious to make it appear that the other made the first advances. If we may believe Æschines, the main subject of their conferences was the

claim to Amphipolis, as to which, when one of their colleagues expressed his fears that Philip might have the advantage in argument, Demosthenes boasted that he should be able to silence him, and to induce him to restore it to Athens. But there is reason to suspect that Æschines¹ either devised or overcharges this anecdote, to heighten the effect of the scene which he next describes, in which he endeavours to place his adversary's behaviour in the most odious and contemptible light.

It is however from him alone that we have any account of the audience in which the main business of the embassy appears to have been transacted: and the silence of his rival on this subject in some degree confirms his report, as it proves that Demosthenes could advance nothing concerning it, which he thought favourable to himself or his cause. On the other hand Æschines, whose sole object was to exhibit a contrast the most honourable to himself between his adversary's conduct and his own, has dwelt on matters either merely personal or comparatively unimportant, and has passed over the substance of the negotiation in total silence. It had been agreed among the envoys that they should address the king in the order of seniority; and Demosthenes happened to be the youngest. It therefore fell to the turn of Æschines to speak before him, and in his defence of himself he reports what he must have deemed the most important part of his speech. It was entirely confined to the question of Amphipolis: entered at large into all the grounds, mythical and historical, on which the Athenians rested their pretensions to the place, and recounted the services which Iphicrates had rendered to the royal family after the death of Amyntas. The orator does not intimate that he touched upon any other subject. Yet Demosthenes could afterwards assert that he had not so much as mentioned this²; but this is apparently no more than a violent exaggeration of the admission which Æschines afterwards made, that he had not said all he could on this

¹ De F. L. § 20. Dem. De F. L. § 13.

² De F. L. § 284.

head, which his adversary seems to have distorted into a confession, that he said nothing at all on it.

At last Demosthenes rose. We can easily believe that the expectations both of the king and his court had been highly excited, not, as Æschines insinuates, by what they had heard of his boastful professions on the journey, but by the fame of his eloquence, which may by this time have begun to spread over Greece; and it is not difficult to imagine that his consciousness of the peculiar attention which he drew from hearers, who, he was aware, listened to him with no friendly curiosity, and the anxiety which he must have felt to support his reputation on this new occasion, may have deprived him of his presence of mind, and have deranged the whole order of his thoughts. According to Æschines after a short and very confused opening he hesitated, grew more and more embarrassed, and at last was obliged to break off, and, though Philip politely encouraged him to recollect himself and proceed, could not recover the thread of his speech. The envoys were then desired to withdraw, to allow the king time to consider his answer.

The only reason we have for doubting the truth of this story is that Æschines, as he himself avows, made an entirely different report on his return in the assembly, and that he explains this contradiction by a pretence which is utterly incredible, and not very honourable to him, if believed. After a short interval, during which he represents himself as taxed with rashness by Demosthenes for the freedom with which he had pleaded for the rights of the commonwealth, the envoys were recalled into the presence-chamber, and were addressed by Philip in a long speech, in which he noticed all the principal arguments he had heard; but it was more especially to those of Æschines, according to his own account, that the reply was directed; to Demosthenes there was nothing to be said. Amphipolis therefore, we are led to conclude, was the main, if not the only subject of the king's answer. Yet it was known that

Philip was on the point of marching to Thrace ; and the danger which threatened the Chersonesus was not overlooked : Philip promised that he would not invade it until the question of peace or war should have been decided at Athens. Some discussion also must have taken place on the subject of Cardia, since its independence was expressly recognised in the subsequent treaty. As to the part taken by Aglaocreon, we have no information ; nor as to the nature of the interests which he represented. Yet his presence seems to imply, that one of the questions which had been expected to arise related to the allies of Athens, who were to be included in the treaty. If this question was agitated, it could scarcely, we should suppose, have failed to bring the affairs of Phocis under consideration. And the sequel appears to show that something was said on this subject, though Philip did not unfold his views. The ambassadors on their departure were charged with a letter from him to the people, and he promised that his ministers should speedily follow them to Athens.

It was natural to suppose that Demosthenes, if he had experienced so mortifying a failure, should have been anxious to conceal it. But the artifice which Æschines represents him to have practised for that purpose on the journey homeward is so grossly improbable, that it leads us to suspect violent exaggeration at least in the preceding part of his narrative. Demosthenes, we are told, now endeavoured, by flattery and affectation of extraordinary good humour, to ingratiate himself with his colleagues, more particularly with Æschines. In a convivial hour, when they were all conversing on the subject of their audience, he playfully alluded to his own embarrassment, and expressed the highest admiration for Philip's talents and address : Æschines was thus induced to make a remark on the king's retentive memory and ready eloquence ; and Ctesiphon, who was the eldest among them, declared that in the course of his life he had never met with a person of such gracious and winning manners, especially at the festive board. This

gave Demosthenes an opportunity of challenging them to repeat these praises before the Athenian assembly: they were simple enough to fall into the snare, and engaged to do so: and Æschines, at the earnest intreaty of Demosthenes, promised to report to the people, that he too had spoken in vindication of the claim to Amphipolis, and that he himself had purposely left some part of the subject in his hands¹: as if this collusion could have stopt the mouths of their colleagues, whom Demosthenes, if we believe the story, was about to provoke by a malignant and wanton attack.²

The ambassadors on their return first made a summary report of their proceedings, and presented Philip's letter, to the council: and Demosthenes, as a member, moved the ordinary compliment of an honorary chaplet and an invitation to the public table, accompanying the motion, according to Æschines, with a high eulogy on the talents and fidelity with which all his colleagues, and Æschines in particular, had discharged their commission. But when they appeared before the assembly to give a fuller account of their embassy, where they delivered their reports in the order of seniority, they were surprised to find his tone entirely altered. The praises which, in fulfilment of their imprudent stipulation, they bestowed on Philip, only afforded Demosthenes an opportunity of decrying his merit — a topic more welcome to his audience, — and in answer to Æschines, who, according to his promise, threw a veil over his failure at Pella with some sacrifice of his own credit, he denied the obligation, with an insulting remark, that it was one which it did not belong to his colleague's character to confer: he liked to display his eloquence too well to part

¹ This is clearly the meaning of the text § 46., ἐδίηθη μὴ παραλείπειν κ. τ. λ., but it seems as clearly to need emendation to reconcile it with § 51. 55. and with Demosth. De F. L. § 284.

² It appears that in Valckenaer's time there were doubts about the truth of the story. He says in a note to his Orat. De Phil. Maced. p. 276. "De re quæ coram tot testibus evenit, quamquam negare nunquam sustinuit Demosthenes (how could he, when his adversary had the last word?) *quam a nonnemine dubitatum memini*, verba quedam adscribam accurate quid everit narrantis — who, does the reader suppose? — Æschinis" — a strange authority to silence such doubts.

with a subject for any one's sake. Æschines with reason bids his hearers observe the capricious inconsistency, as well as the perfidious cunning of his adversary : and we must add that the conduct imputed to Demosthenes does not fall within the range of ordinary human motives. These unprovoked affronts offered to persons on whose forbearance his reputation depended, were not necessary for any purpose that Æschines assigns. The most important part of the business for which the assembly was called was left by the preceding speakers to Demosthenes. It was on his motion that the Macedonian herald, who, it seems, had accompanied the Athenian envoys, was received with the usual forms, that a safe-conduct was granted to the expected ambassadors, and that two assemblies were appointed to be held, to decide on the proposals of peace and alliance, on two successive days, which, as they were known to be already on their road, were fixed on the eighteenth and nineteenth of the month, leaving an interval of nine or ten days, which, it was supposed, would be sufficient for the remainder of their journey.

Æschines does not mention any debate as having arisen on the motion ; and yet it seems to have involved the only question on which any difference of opinion remained. The people had already determined for peace, and knew the conditions on which Philip insisted : that it must abandon its claims to Amphipolis, and recognise the independence of Cardia ; but it probably felt much less interest in either of these subjects than in the issue of the struggle between Thebes and Phocis. Jealousy of Thebes was still the prevailing political feeling at Athens : and though Thebes had been brought very low by the war, it was easy to foresee that the Phocians could not hold out much longer, and that if they should be forced to yield, either through the failure of their resources or by Philip's intervention, their enemy might not only speedily recover the Bœotian towns which had been wrested from her, but might acquire a great addition to her power. Such an event would put an end to all the hopes which

the Athenians never ceased to cherish of regaining Oropus, would endanger their possessions in Eubœa, and would leave Thebes again predominant, and enable her to renew her attempts to establish her influence in Peloponnesus. The Phocian cause therefore was not to be abandoned: the triumph of Thebes was to be prevented at any risk; but it was an important and very difficult question, whether the better way of attaining the object was to make an open stand in favour of the Phocians in the pending negotiation, and to get them included in the treaty, or to trust to certain appearances, which were thought to portend a favourable termination of the contest, and to render all exertions of the Athenians unnecessary in their behalf. The decision of this question was seen to depend on Philip's intentions with regard to the contending parties; but at Athens these were still only matter for conjecture. If it had been known that he was not only hostile to the Phocians, but disposed to promote the interests of Thebes, then, if peace with him was still considered desirable, it would at least have been fit that it should be accompanied with every possible precaution against the dreaded danger. But if on the contrary Philip's views coincided as to the main point with those of Athens, if he was no less averse to the extension or restoration of the power of Thebes, then it might be unnecessary, and even impolitic to make any stipulations on behalf of Phocis, and it might be expedient that her name should not be mentioned in the treaty.

At Athens however Philip's designs could only be matter for very uncertain conjecture. Yet there were indications, which, even if they had not been interpreted by eager wishes, might have seemed to warrant a persuasion, that more was to be hoped than to be feared from him. It did not appear that his interest could be promoted by the aggrandisement of Thebes. On the contrary the same policy which induced him, as well as Athens, notwithstanding her alliance with Sparta, to take part with Messene, would, it might be supposed, lead him to protect the independence of the inferior Bœotian

towns. In the long contest between Thebes and Phocis he had hitherto kept aloof: for though he had repelled the Phocians from Thessaly, he had done nothing in behalf of Thebes. The letter too which he had sent by the Athenian ambassadors contained a passage, cited without contradiction by Demosthenes, which seemed to favour these hopes. It expressed a desire for alliance as well as peace with Athens, and hinted at some important benefit which he designed to confer on her, as soon as their amicable relations were firmly cemented. But whether the expectation was reasonable or absurd, we have sufficient evidence that it existed at Athens: for even in the first Philippic Demosthenes mentions it as one of the reports of the day. And the sequel will be found to render it probable that some pains had been taken to impress the Athenian ambassadors with the same belief during their stay in Macedonia. But if such were Philip's intentions, he could not openly declare them, so long as it was convenient to him to keep up an appearance of friendship with Thebes: and to introduce an article into the treaty which would force him prematurely to disclose them, must have appeared to those Athenians who believed they were in the secret, the very way to frustrate their own wishes.

Such seem to have been the views with which Demosthenes himself returned from Philip's court, and by which he was governed in all the steps which he took to hasten the conclusion of the treaty. He does not venture to acknowledge the delusion by which he had been misled, pardonable as it was, because the confession would have strengthened his adversary's plea: but his conduct can hardly be explained on any other supposition. It appears likewise to furnish a key to the meaning of several statements in which the rival orators most directly contradict each other and themselves. Æschines asserts that ambassadors had been sent from Athens into various parts of Greece, to excite the Greeks against Philip, who had not yet returned when he and his colleagues reached home. He makes it the ground of a

grave charge against Demosthenes, that by his precipitate measures he prevented the people from waiting for the return of these envoys, and thus deprived it of the advantage which it would have gained if it had treated in concert with other states: he appeals to a state paper, the existence of which is attested by Demosthenes himself, and which seems at first sight conclusive evidence of the fact. The deputies of the states which still adhered to the Athenian confederacy were at this time assembled at Athens: they had probably been summoned for purposes connected with the treaty; and according to Æschines, they passed a resolution in their congress, in which they mentioned that embassies had been sent to rouse the Greeks to the defence of their liberty, and had not yet returned; and recommended that, when the ambassadors should have returned, and have made their reports, two assemblies should be held to consult on the proposed treaty with Philip. That such a congress was sitting, and that it made some proposal relating to the treaty, is admitted by Demosthenes, who asserts that he supported the same measure. But he denies that any envoys had been sent on the mission mentioned by Æschines, which, as he observes, would have been a piece of most shameless and useless treachery, if the Athenians were at the same time negotiating for peace. Yet in his accusation of Æschines one of his charges is, that, after his return from Macedonia, he made an offensive speech in the presence of the envoys who had been invited to Athens from various Greek states, on his own proposal, made before he had sold himself to Philip. Æschines in answer challenges him to produce the name of any one such envoy who was present on the occasion, and is willing to stake his cause on this fact.

On the part of Demosthenes however the seeming contradiction may be resolved into a very slight exaggeration. The envoys of whom he speaks were probably not the ministers of any independent states, but the deputies of the allies of Athens, who were undoubtedly in the city at the time: so that he might consistently deny that

any others were expected. But Æschines likewise, in the course of the same speech, distinctly contradicts the statement which he pretends to prove by the proposition of the congress; for he defends himself against the charge of political apostasy by a plea, which clearly implies that, after his embassy to Peloponnesus, no further attempt had been made to instigate any Greek states against Philip.¹ It is also clear that he knew of but one resolution of the congress relating to this subject: but on another occasion he gives a totally different account of its contents, according to which it made no allusion to any past embassies, but simply proposed that any Greek state might be admitted to a share in the treaty, which should apply for leave within the next three months.² Which of these is the more correct report, is a question of little importance; the great difficulty lies in the fact, that the congress did make one or other, or both, of these propositions. That they should have proceeded from independent states in alliance with Athens, which might wish as many others as possible to be associated with them in the treaty, would indeed be easy enough to understand: but it is not so clear with what object they could have been made by the deputies of the tributary allies, who had little concern in the war with Philip, or must have wished to see it brought as soon as possible to an end: and if the measure was not their own spontaneous act, it would still remain to be explained how, and from what motive, it was suggested to them. We might perhaps have suspected that the design of its authors was merely to invite some of the northern maritime states — as the Greek cities on the Hellespont — to take part in the treaty, both with the view of protecting them from Philip's encroachments, and to unite them more closely with Athens. But if this had been the object, some allusion to it would probably have been found in one of the orators: and certainly this was not the subject

¹ De F. L. § 84. οὐδὲν ἀνεθέσταν ἰπικουρῶντος πῆ νόμι.

² Ctes. § 70.

which was at this time uppermost in the minds of the Athenians; their attention was, we know, more anxiously directed to objects nearer home: to the fate of Phocis and of Thebes. We are therefore led to conclude that the real aim of those who framed the resolution of the congress, was no other than to invite the Phocians to share the benefits of the treaty. There may have been many, men of all parties, at Athens, who thought this expedient, and it is possible that the congress was only employed as an instrument to effect their end, in what might appear the fittest manner, on account of the ambiguous relation in which Athens had stood to Phocis since the restoration of Phalæcus. But there is also another way in which it seems possible to account for this extraordinary activity of an assembly which was usually very insignificant, and which appears in this instance to be moving out of its sphere. If the congress was on this occasion attended by a Spartan deputy, he might well think that, for the interests of Sparta, it was highly desirable to place Phocis under the protection of the treaty; and the resolution may have been adopted on his motion.

Whatever may have been the views of Demosthenes, there can be no doubt as to one part of his conduct: that he exerted himself strenuously to promote peace, and that he supported the proposal which was deemed much more questionable, for alliance with Philip. Soon after the day of the assembly in which he and his colleagues made their report, Philip's ambassadors arrived. They were three of the most eminent among the many able generals and statesmen in his service: Antipater, Parmenio, and Eurylochus. It was not it seems within the legitimate functions of any Athenian magistrate to provide for the reception of foreign ambassadors. This charge was usually undertaken by some citizen who was connected by the kind of private alliance which has been often mentioned with the state that sent them. We must suppose that the king of Macedonia had no proxenus at Athens: for we find that Demosthenes

took upon himself all the offices of hospitality which it would have belonged to such a person to perform toward the Macedonian envoys. They fell indeed on him with a certain propriety, as he was a member of the council—it seems the only one—who had been on the late embassy to Macedonia. The attentions which he paid to them were the more conspicuous because it happened that they arrived just on the eve of the great Dionysiac festival. It might indeed be considered incumbent on him to present them to the council, to make the ordinary motion by which they were invited to the seat of honour in the theatre, and to conduct and attend upon them there. But it seems that even in this respect he did more than was necessary or usual; though we need not believe his adversary's assertion that there was anything so extravagant in his civilities as to incur public disapprobation. He himself however did not scruple to avow that he entertained them¹, and with extraordinary magnificence. The Macedonians prided themselves on the splendour of their hospitality; and he thought it proper, he says, to show them that an Athenian citizen could display as much liberality and good taste. But this was probably only one of his motives; and it can hardly be doubted that it was his wish by these signal marks of respect to testify as strongly as he could his anxiety for peace. Of this indeed, if we might believe his adversary², he had given a still more striking proof in a motion by which he proposed the eighth day of the month for the deliberation on the treaty; for this was a festival of Æsculapius, on which an assembly had never been held before.

The proceedings of the two assemblies on the eighteenth and nineteenth are so distorted by the contradictory statements of the rival orators, that it is hardly possible to discover the real course of the debates, or the precise nature of the questions which were agitated. Each is anxious to shift the odium of the measure which was

¹ Ἐξίτιον, F. L. § 260. But it does not appear that, as Leland supposes, they were lodged at his house.

² Ctes. § 67.

finally carried, and of all association with its author Philocrates, from himself on the other: each represents himself as supporting, and the other as opposing the proposition of the allies. The truth evidently lies between them, but apparently more on the side of Æschines. By the proposition of the allies the treaty would it seems have been delayed, either for three months, or for an indefinite time: and this was certainly contrary to the views of Demosthenes. There was room indeed to apprehend that such a delay would afford Philip a pretext for invading the Chersonesus, which he had not promised to spare as long as it might suit the interests of the Athenians to keep the negotiation in suspense. But the principal question that arose on the terms of the treaty concerned the Phocians. Philip's ambassadors had declared that he would not permit them or Halus to be included in it among the allies of Athens. Hence the orators seem to have been divided into three parties on this subject. There were some, it appears, who made this and the other demands of Philip — as the cession of Amphipolis, the recognition of the independence of Cardia — a ground for breaking off the treaty. It was probably to repel their attempts that Æschines entered into a review of the various occasions on which the people had been misled by evil counsellors to reject advantageous offers of peace¹ and that Eubulus had the assembly consider how it was to provide for the cost of a fresh war.² But on the other hand Philocrates proposed not only to accede to all Philip's demands, but even expressly to exclude the Phocians and Halus from the treaty. To this extreme it is probable Demosthenes and Æschines were both opposed: and thus we see how the arguments of each might have a double aspect, which made it easy with some colour of truth to exhibit them in opposite lights. Philocrates found that on this point the sense of the people was against him, and he was obliged to drop both the names. Another difference of opinion which

¹ De F. L. § 78. foll. "

² Dem. De F. L. § 333.

divided those who were in favour of peace, arose on the question of alliance. Æschines says, that when the first day's assembly broke up, the general impression was that a peace was to be concluded, but that the alliance was to be declined, and that the peace was to be shared by every Greek state that wished to be included in it: and that the alliance was only carried by an artifice of Demosthenes, who the next day called up Antipater before the assembly, and by means of some preconcerted questions persuaded the people, that the peace could not safely be separated from the alliance.¹ Thus both were decreed, and, it appears, on the terms dictated by Philip.

A strong indication that the affairs of Phocis were the main subjects of discussion in these debates, is that throughout them according to Æschines no mention was made of Cersobleptes. He had at this time no representative to protect his interests at Athens. But before the day came on which the deputies present in the congress were to take the oaths in ratification of the treaty to the Macedonian ambassadors, one Critobulus of Lampsacus appeared on his behalf: and in an assembly in which Demosthenes happened to preside, a motion was made that the treaty should be ratified by his envoy together with the other allies of Athens. This motion, if we believe Æschines, was carried, though Demosthenes, as long as he safely could, resisted the wishes of the assembly; but if this was the case, we must suppose that Philip's envoys afterwards refused to let Critobulus take the oath: for that he should have been prevented by either of the orators, as each asserted of the other, sounds quite incredible; and it is certain

¹ Here is a point in which Æschines betrays the weakness of his own defence. Demosthenes (F. L. § 17.) charged him with speaking on the second day, on the side of Philocrates, in contradiction to the opinion he had delivered the day before. The defence of Æschines is, that the second day, according to the decree moved by Demosthenes, was to be entirely occupied with voting, and that no speaking was then allowed (*λόγων μὴ προτιθέντων, τῶν δὲ προίδρων, καλυόντων, εὐα ἐνῆς εἰσιτιν.* F. L. § 69.) Yet in Ctes. § 71. he relates that on the second day Demosthenes got the start of all the other speakers — *προκαταλαμβάνων τὸ βῆμα, εὐδὲν τῶν ἄλλων παρελκτικῶν λόγων.*

that his name was not annexed to the treaty. It appears that there was ground for a question whether Cersobleptes was entitled to be considered as an ally of Athens ; and, in a letter written some years afterward, Philip alleges that the envoy of Cersobleptes was prevented from taking the oath by the Athenian generals, the board before which the treaty was ratified. But the generals could no more than either of the orators have taken upon them to decide such a question, especially against the decree of the assembly : the objection must have been raised by the Macedonians, and perhaps was reserved by mutual consent to be discussed in a conference with Philip, for which it was expected that an early opportunity would be afforded, when he signed the treaty. Demosthenes continued his hospitable attentions to the Macedonian ambassadors, as long as they remained at Athens, and on their departure he not only procured beasts for their journey, but himself accompanied them a part of the way on horseback.¹

Within a very few days after peace was decreed, if not in the same assembly, an embassy was appointed to proceed to Philip's court, to receive the ratification of the treaty from him and his allies. Ten ambassadors were again chosen, and certainly the greater part, probably all, were the same as had been sent on the first embassy² : Aglaocreon also again accompanied them, as the representative of the allies. Demosthenes afterwards wished it to be believed that the debates on the peace had raised such suspicions in his mind as to the integrity of his former colleagues, especially Philocrates and Æschines, that he would have declined the office, if he had not undertaken to procure the release of some of the Athenian prisoners who were detained in Macedonia.³ Æschines treats this as an empty pretext, be-

¹ Æschines (Ctes. § 76.) says *ὡς Θυόνας* — a specimen of rhetorical exaggeration.

² Sprengel (*Ueber die Pseudeponymie*, Rheinisch Museum, ii. p. 383.) thinks there could be no need of a fresh election : that the ten ambassadors who had acquitted themselves in their first mission to the satisfaction of the people, would be confirmed in their office for the purpose of receiving the oaths, as a matter of course.

³ The account he gives of this transaction is extremely perplexing.

cause Philip had never been used to exact ransom for his Athenian prisoners during the war; and a promise had been given in his name, that all should be released as soon as peace should be concluded. But it is clear that this related only to those whom he kept in his own hands; and Æschines himself admits that among the instructions of the second embassy, one was to negotiate for the release of the prisoners. That Demosthenes however was specially charged with this commission, does not appear¹; though he affects to consider it as the only business for which he could justly be held responsible: and notwithstanding his vehement obtestation, we cannot believe that he accepted his commission with reluctance, or would willingly have foregone the opportunity of watching the proceedings of his colleagues.

Before their departure, according to Æschines, news arrived from Thrace, which represented the affairs of Cersobleptes as in an utterly desperate condition. It was contained in a despatch from Chares, who it seems was still commanding a squadron near the Hellespont. It was perhaps not very long before, when Philip's intention of invading the dominions of Cersobleptes became known at Athens, that the people had been obliged to send in search of Chares, with the singular message, that they wondered, when Philip was on his march to the Chersonesus, that they had not so much as been informed where their general and his armament was. Chares had probably been since observing Philip's movements, and

From F. L. § 189. it would seem that on the first embassy he had promised some of the prisoners to return with their ransom. Yet the narrative in § 186., which appears to be meant as an explanation of this engagement, must be referred to the second embassy, which was the only occasion on which he could say: *ἐν ὧν αὐτὸ πάρετος πρὸ Φιλίππου διατίθεσθαι ἐν Πιίλλῃ*. Vœmel (Proleg. in Orat. de Pace, p. 250.) supposes him in these words to be speaking of the first embassy, but has not noticed the extreme difficulty of reconciling this supposition with the context, in which the orator had clearly been describing the occurrences of the second embassy. Nor is there the slightest reason to imagine that Philip was away from Pella, when the first embassy arrived there.

¹ Winiewski (p. 92. foll.) conjectures that four of the others were likewise charged with special commissions. But the conjecture seems unnecessary; and his arguments for it are all fallacies.

the first intelligence received from him was, that Cersobleptes had lost his kingdom, and that Philip had taken possession of the Sacred Mountain, one of the most important places in it. This is the defence which Æschines sets up against his adversary's charge, that Cersobleptes was ruined through his delays. He wishes to prove that nothing remained to be saved in Thrace. This however does not follow from the language of Chares, even if he has reported it faithfully. It seems to imply nothing more than that Philip was rapidly advancing toward the conquest of the kingdom: and this is the very ground on which Demosthenes professes to have urged his colleagues to hasten their departure. Even if it had been too late to protect Cersobleptes, there might have been time to interpose between the conqueror and some of the Greek towns on the Thracian coast. Such seems to have been the general impression at Athens, notwithstanding, or perhaps in consequence of the intelligence: and on the motion of Demosthenes the council, which had been empowered to give such instructions, made an order on the third of the next month (April) that the envoys should depart without delay, and that Proxenus, who was stationed at Oreus, should convey them to any quarter where they might hear Philip was. In obedience to this order they immediately proceeded to Oreus; but instead of embarking for the Hellespont, which Demosthenes says they could have reached in two or three days, they first lingered in Oreus, and then took a circuitous route to Macedonia, so as to consume three and twenty days in the journey. When they arrived at Pella, Philip had not yet returned from Thrace, and they still had to wait nearly a month for him there. Æschines admits the waste of time, but pleads that the order of the council did not direct them to go to Thrace. This certainly looks like a paltry evasion: for they were ordered to seek Philip wherever he might be found: and the length of the interval seems to confirm the statements of Demosthenes as to the consequences of their

neglect, or at least to render it probable that every thing was not lost in Thrace before they set out from Athens.

Philip on his return found his court crowded with envoys from all parts of Greece : among the rest from all the states principally concerned in the Sacred War : from Thebes, Thessaly, Phocis, and Sparta. It was now universally notorious that he was about to take some decisive step toward the termination of the contest : the eyes of all Greece were anxiously fixed upon his movements : but his designs were still wrapped in impenetrable obscurity. The Athenian ambassadors, though the express object of their mission was only to procure the ratification of the treaty, and to transact some other business of a formal nature, had received instructions *to promote the interests of the commonwealth in any other way as they might find opportunity* ; and the meaning of this clause was sufficiently intelligible, at a time when public attention was engrossed by one subject. Æschines however takes credit to himself for the sagacity with which he discerned the secret object, which it would not have been prudent to intimate more distinctly in the decree under which he and his colleagues were to act ; and in a conference which they held together before they were admitted to an audience, he represented to them that it was their duty to plead the cause of the Bœotian towns, and to instigate Philip against Thebes. We collect from his report of the conversation which ensued, that Demosthenes thought nothing would be gained by such an attempt, and that it could only serve to exasperate the Thebans. It was finally agreed that each should use his own discretion in the choice of the topics on which he addressed the king. At the audience, according to Æschines, Demosthenes — not abashed by his previous misfortune — though confessedly the youngest, forced his colleagues, notwithstanding the unfriendly terms on which he now stood with them all, to allow him to speak first. But we could more easily believe the story of his failure on the former occasion, than what his adversary relates of

this : that he excited the ridicule of the bystanders, and put his colleagues to the blush, by a fulsome enumeration of the good offices he had rendered to Philip's ambassadors at Athens. It was certainly not for such a purpose that he demanded the first turn. Æschines is probably more faithful in his report of his own speech. It turned it seems on the history of the temple of Delphi, and the Amphictyonic league, and its object was, to convince Philip that by the destruction of Thespiæ and Platæa the Thebans had violated the fundamental laws of the league, and had broken the oath which had been handed down from the times of Amphictyon or Acrisius for the security of the Amphictyonic cities against each other's hostile violence. He acknowledged that the war with Phocis was just and pious : that the Amphictyonic council ought to be re-instated in its ancient authority, and the authors of the sacrilege — the guilty individuals, not the state, if it surrendered them to justice — to be punished ; and he exhorted Philip not to sanction the injustice of the Thebans, whom moreover he seems to have charged with a design of seizing the sacred treasure for themselves. Excellent arguments, no doubt, for the purpose of enlightening Philip's conscience, but so wide of every other, that when we remember they were addressed to the conqueror of Methone and Olynthus, the orator's simplicity is almost enough to awaken a doubt about his honesty.

For the more private scenes which passed during the embassy's stay at Philip's court, we can still less rely on the statements of either orator. Demosthenes accuses his colleagues, especially Æschines, of bribery, and a treasonable clandestine correspondence with Philip ; but he seems to admit that the charge rests mainly on his construction of their subsequent conduct. Philip did not ratify the treaty at Pella ; but induced the Athenian ambassadors to accompany him on his march through Thessaly as far as Pheræ. The pretext which he alledged for this delay was that he desired their medi-

ation between the Pharsalians and Halus: but his motive seems clearly to have been that which Demosthenes assigns; he did not wish them to return to Athens before he was ready to invade Phocis.¹ The place in which he at length signed the treaty was, according to Demosthenes, one not at all proper for such a solemnity, but favourable perhaps to his object: a common inn at Pheræ. Here it seems he demanded that the Phocians and Halus should be expressly excluded from the treaty; and Demosthenes says that his colleagues consented to accept the ratification in this form; and that this was the fact which first roused his suspicions that they were lending themselves to Philip to accomplish the ruin of Phocis.² Philip however had from the first declared by his ambassadors, that he did not mean to treat with the Phocians³: and perhaps he was forced by the remonstrances of the Thebans and the Thessalians to insist upon this correction of the treaty; though

¹ The manner in which Demosthenes (De Cor. § 40.) has expressed himself on this subject has afforded a handle for an imputation on the Athenians, of *ignorance* even grosser than might be expected in an English county-meeting. Demosthenes, it seems, trusted that his audience were not aware "that nothing could so effectually check the hostile preparation of a power desiring that its preparation should remain a secret, as the presence of the embassies from powers interested to oppose the purpose of the preparation." This ignorance would indeed be surprising in the Athenians, since Æschines informs us (Ctes. § 83.) that Demosthenes himself used to warn them that Philip's ambassadors were spies. But the wonder ceases when we observe that Demosthenes represents his colleagues as all in Philip's interest; and with regard to himself, he explains how he was prevented from sending home information, unless he had chosen to convey it in a separate despatch. (F. L. § 192.) Why he should not have ventured to take that step, is a different question. We have already intimated, that he was probably not yet aware of the object of Philip's expedition himself; and this, not the actual preparation, was what Philip desired to keep secret. But on the face of his own statements there is at least no absurdity.

² De F. L. § 49. ἐκ τοῦ, ὅτι τοὺς ἄρκους ἤμελλε Φίλιππος ἠμύνειν τοὺς πρὸ τῆς ἰσθμῆς, ἐκπεσόντας ἀπερᾶσθαι τοὺς Φωκίας ὑπὸ τούτων, ὃ σιωπᾶν καὶ ἰδῶν ἰπὸς ἦν, ὡςτε ἤμελλεν σφύζεσθαι. We have transcribed the passage, that the reader may be able to judge at once whether the following comment on it—though by a conterminer of the *idle learned*—can have been the effect of simple carelessness, or of honest ignorance. "We find him (Demosthenes) acknowledging that the interest of the Phocians was totally unprovided for in the treaty with Macedonia, and this he justifies so far as to avow that he imputed no ill even to Æschines on that account: σιωπᾶν καὶ ἰδῶν ἰπὸς ἦν; it was very well to be silent about it and let it alone."

³ Demosth. F. L. § 368. αἱ παρ' ἐκείνου πρὸς τοὺς προύλογον ἡμῖν ὅτι Φωκίας οὐ προσδίδεται Φίλιππος συμμάχους.

it seems hardly credible that the Athenian ambassadors should have ventured to permit it: so that this fact did not much alter the previous state of things, and could not be considered as a decisive indication of his designs. It is probable therefore that the suspicions of Demosthenes were still but feebly excited. He says indeed that he proposed a draught of a letter to the people which his colleagues rejected, and that they sent another instead, full of delusive representations. But we neither hear what were the contents of his letter, nor why he did not send one privately on his own behalf to communicate his doubts and fears. He also asserts that he wished to leave his colleagues, and to return home by himself, and that he had hired a vessel for this purpose, but was not suffered to embark. But any one who is familiar with the manner of the Attic orators, will be inclined to suspect, that this may have been only a strong way of expressing the fact, that, after the ratification of the treaty, he endeavoured as much as he could to hasten the departure of the embassy, and perhaps threatened to return alone. We do not know how long it remained at Pheræ, after it had transacted its business: but it set out for Athens, where it arrived on the tenth of June, about the same time that Philip began to move toward Thermopylæ.

The crisis was near at hand: yet Demosthenes contends that there was still time left to avert it, if the Athenians and their allies had not been blinded to the danger by the perfidious arts of Æschines. If the Phocians had united their forces with those of Athens to resist Philip's progress, he would probably have been compelled to abandon his attempt: but even an Athenian armament, not supported by the Phocians, might at least have opposed a formidable obstacle to his passage. He had however taken measures to secure himself on both sides; and found means at the same time to lull the Athenians into inaction, and to allure the Phocians into submission. The result is much clearer than the machinations by which it was accomplished: yet

with respect to Athens even these are so plainly disclosed by the concurrent testimony of the two rival orators, that there can be little doubt as to their general nature.

The envoys on their return made their report, as on the former occasion, first to the council, and then to the assembly. The council-chamber, Demosthenes says, was thronged with spectators¹: perhaps an unusual indication of the public anxiety; and he took this earliest opportunity of protesting against the conduct of his colleagues; and, as he obtained a patient hearing, his charges produced such an effect on the council, that it withheld the vote of thanks, and the invitation to the public table, with which every embassy on its return was usually honoured. The assembly was held on the thirteenth; and here Æschines was heard first. The only difference between him and his adversary as to the substance of his speech relates to a point of very slight importance. They perfectly agree as to the main fact: that all he said was adapted to raise expectations in the minds of the people, which proved completely fallacious. Demosthenes asserts, that Æschines professed to be thoroughly acquainted with Philip's designs, and assured the people that they might safely remain quiet, and that within a few days they would have news exactly to their wish; Thespiæ and Platæa were to be restored; Thebes to be humbled, deprived of her sovereignty over Bœotia, and even to be called to account for the designs imputed to her on the Delphic temple. The Eubœans too, as he had learnt from one of their ambassadors at the court of Macedonia, were aware that Philip meant to give up their island to Athens, as a satisfaction for Amphipolis. Nor were the benefits which they were to expect from him to end here: there was still another in reserve which the orator had laboured to obtain for them, but which he would not yet mention: a hint, which no one could mistake, at the recovery of Oropus. According to his own account

¹ De F. L. § 19. *μικρὸν ἰδιωτῶν*, not as Vœmel (Proleg. ad Orat. de Pace, p. 267.) explains it: *referta imperitis senatoribus*.

Æschines had given no pledges, had held out no promises, but had simply related what he had said himself, and what he heard from others, on his embassy; he had {thought} it his duty to inform the people of all the reports which were current among the Greeks on a subject which so deeply interested Athens.¹ But in another part of the same speech he rests his defence on a very different ground. He asks: whether at the time when he is accused of deceiving the people, all Greece was not under the same error? whether it was not notorious that the Spartan ministers at the Macedonian court were confident and threatening, the Thebans dejected and alarmed? whether the Thessalians did not exultingly proclaim that Philip's expedition was undertaken only on their account? whether some of Philip's chief courtiers had not expressly declared to some of the Athenian ambassadors, that their master meant to restore the Bœotian cities? and whether it was not the universal expectation at Athens, that he would humble Thebes? That it was, appears certain; but another question is, whether it was not by Æschines himself that it had been so widely diffused? Philip himself was clearly much more guarded; the letter which he sent with the envoys on this occasion was, according to Demosthenes, less encouraging than the former one. It contained an apology for the delay of the embassy's return, which he took upon himself: threw out a hint about the prisoners tending to depreciate the merit of the services rendered to them by Demosthenes², and gave the most obliging assurances of goodwill: but in language which evidently meant nothing. Yet, in the mood which Æschines had inspired, even such professions might seem to confirm his report. Demosthenes says that he endeavoured in vain to awaken a more sober and cautious spirit: he was heard with impatience

¹ F. L. § 126. ὁμιλήσει δὲ τὴν πόλιν μηδὲν λόγου Ἑλληνικοῦ ἀνέμοιο εἶναι.

² Yet the brevity of the quotation, τοὺς ἀρχηγλοτατοὺς εἰδ' ἐπιθυμηθῆναι φρεσι λίσσασθαι, (F. L. § 44.) renders it difficult to understand how it could have such a tendency.

when he declared that he knew nothing about the truth of the report made by his colleagues; but when he added that he did not believe it, his voice was drowned by popular clamour, which aided by the taunts of Æschines, and the jests of Philocrates, who said it was no wonder that he and a water-drinker were not of the same way of thinking, reduced him to silence: and the manner in which Æschines meets this assertion, confirms rather than disproves it. The prospects which had been exhibited were too dazzling to be readily exchanged for a reality very unwelcome in itself, and imposing the necessity of immediate vigorous exertion. The people rested complacently on its hopes. The interests of the Phocians were an object of subordinate importance; provided Thebes was not exalted by their fall, they might safely be abandoned to Philip's justice and generosity. A decree was carried on the motion of Philocrates, in which Philip was praised and thanked, and the peace and alliance were extended to his successors: and it was declared that unless the Phocians consented to deliver up the temple to its rightful guardians, the Amphictyons, Athens herself would lend her aid to compel them. Another embassy was immediately appointed to present this decree to Philip, and, it seems, to attend the council of the Amphictyons, which it was expected would shortly be convened to deliberate on the affairs of Phocis. Æschines and Demosthenes were both nominated as ambassadors. But Demosthenes solemnly declined the commission, on a plea confirmed by his oath, as the law in such cases required. Æschines according to his own account had returned in ill health from the second embassy; and though he did not decline the new office, was unable to set out immediately, and obtained leave to stay behind. His adversary treats this a mere pretext; and it seems probable that if Demosthenes had gone he would not have staid at home.

Thus then Philip's object was completely attained at Athens, and the Phocians were deprived of the aid

of their nearest and most powerful ally. How far their deliberations were swayed, or their fate determined, by these proceedings of the Athenian assembly, is still a doubtful question, on which we cannot come to any satisfactory conclusion, because we are not sufficiently acquainted with the state of parties in Phocis, or with the situation of Phalæcus. It suited the purpose of Demosthenes to take no notice of him, but to represent all that he did as the act of the Phocian people, and as the effect of the treachery of Æschines, and the credulity of the Athenians. Æschines contends that before his first embassy Phalæcus had manifested his distrust of Athens, and his inclination to place confidence in Philip: and the first part of this assertion, as we have seen, was certainly true; but that he was at first more disposed to trust Philip, is not so clear. It seems indeed that while Philip was on his march toward Thermopylæ, the Phocians were joined by a Lacedæmonian army commanded by king Archidamus. Diodorus says that they had sent for these succours: which might be naturally conjectured, but is rendered very doubtful by the sequel. A hint of Demosthenes¹ inclines us to believe, that, when Philip was known to be preparing an expedition to Phocis, the Spartans sent this force either on a secret understanding with him, or on the strength of the assurances which they received of his favourable intentions from their ambassadors at Pella. When Philip drew near, Archidamus — possibly with an honourable purpose of making the best terms for the Phocians — proposed to Phalæcus to garrison the frontier towns which commanded the pass of Thermopylæ. But Phalæcus did not find his account in a plan which would have deprived him of the means of bargaining for himself: and it seems that he rejected the offer with a taunting admonition: that it would be better to look to the dangers which threatened Sparta at home, than to con-

¹ De F. L. § 86, τοὺς Λακιδαιμονίους μετακίματο πάντα τὰ πράγματα ἑνεργήσαντες πρῶτον ἑαυτοῖς: which has been construed into an invitation to the Spartans to take the lead in settling the Sacred War.

cern himself about those of Phocis.¹ Archidamus, either conceiving some suspicion of treachery, or seeing no prospect of serving the Phocians, withdrew.² Nevertheless we cannot but suppose that Phalæcus wished to remain in his country, and to retain his dignity, and that he would not have rejected any aid for this purpose which did not endanger his independence. But when he saw Philip advancing with the avowed intention of putting an end to the war, and restoring the authority of the Amphictyonic council, it became necessary for him to make his choice. It may indeed be doubted whether if he had been sure of support both from Sparta and Athens, and had not been conscious that he had personally alienated both states, he would have ventured to defy the power of Macedonia, though it appears that after his restoration he had carried on the war in Bœotia with unabated success. But if he had wavered before, the proceedings at Athens after the second embassy, as they proved that he had nothing to hope for from that quarter, must have decided him. It was now evident that his only chance of safety lay in timely submission; and even a purely patriotic feeling might have deterred him from prolonging a useless contest. He had envoys, or at least couriers³, at Athens on the thirteenth of June, from whom he received early

¹ ἀπικρίναντο αὐτῷ τὰ της Σπάρτης δεινὰ δίδίνας, καὶ μὴ (τὰ. Cod. Reg.) παρ' αὐτοῖς. (Æsch. De F. L. § 140.) We have ventured on the interpretation given in the text of this difficult passage — which seems also to have been Taylor's, who says: *verba sonant: res vestras curate*—notwithstanding Weiske's admonition, *De Hyperbola*, ii. p. 25. n. 21. It may independently of the context be more natural to supply φάσκαοντες than κλιόντες or ὡς δὲ: but the latter construction is certainly admissible (on the infinitive used for the imperative see Matthiæ Gr. Gram. § 547.) and the sense appears to require it. If the subject of δίδίνας is Phalæcus (οἱ τύραννοι) the answer seems absurd, whatever sense be given to τὰ Σπάρτης δεινὰ. Weiske's proposal, to read καὶ τὰ μὴ παρ' αὐτοῖς, with the sense *periculosos sibi et graves esse Spartanos, etiamsi procul sint*, nedum si in Phocide aut in Pylaicis castellis: is at least as surprising as any of those which he rejects.

² We refer the story to this epoch, though Æschines De F. L. § 143. seems to intimate that the affair took place before he was appointed on the first embassy to Philip. But he was probably tempted to apply to Sparta what he had only proved with regard to Athens: and it seems clear that Demosthenes is alluding to the expedition of Archidamus, apparently with the meaning we have assigned, De F. L. § 86.

³ Demosthenes calls them πρίστεις, Æschines δρομοκέρυκτες.

intelligence of all that took place in the assembly on that day. It need not be supposed that he had been in suspense up to that moment ; but the accounts he heard, while they satisfied his own mind, enabled him to quiet the doubts and scruples of others, and perhaps for the moment to reconcile the great body of the people to the step he was about to take. He had no doubt been for some time in negotiation with Philip, and the final compact was soon adjusted. Phalæcus was permitted to retire with his troops, and led 8000 mercénaries away with him to seek his fortunes in Peloponnesus. He afterwards crossed over into Crete, where, after several vicissitudes, he was killed while besieging Cydonia, as some believed, by fire which fell from heaven ; according to other accounts by one of his own soldiers. Philip took possession of Alponus, Thronium, and Nicæa, and advanced without delay into the heart of Phocis. No conditions it seems had been made on behalf of the Phocians ; and on the approach of the Macedonian army, which was now reinforced with Thessalian and Theban troops, most of the towns surrendered at discretion. There were however some which, either irritated by the presence of their inveterate enemies as Philip's allies, or instigated by some leading men, who may have had private grounds of alarm in the consciousness of their past conduct, made a fruitless attempt at resistance. They were taken by storm, and rased to the ground, and the inhabitants were reduced to slavery. Philip himself avows this proceeding ; and as it was not more rigorous than his treatment of other places which gave him no greater provocation, there is no reason to attribute it to the influence of the Thebans or Thessalians. He then proceeded to take possession of Delphi, and convened a council of the Amphictyons, to sit in judgment on those who had incurred the guilt of sacrilege.

The tidings of these events, which were successively brought to Athens, roused the people from a pleasing dream to a bitter feeling of disappointment, fear, and

resentment. It seems that before they learnt the decisive blow, they received a letter from Philip, in which he invited them to join their forces with his. Demosthenes indeed speaks of two such letters; and perhaps that which was brought by the second embassy contained such an invitation. But if so, it appears from Æschines, that it must have been repeated after the treaty with Phalæcus. Æschines contends, that, if the Athenians had complied with it, they might have counteracted the controul which the Thebans and Thessalians exerted over Philip, and have enabled him to fulfil the intentions which he had intimated, and really entertained; but that Demosthenes and his party excited a suspicion that he meant to seize the Athenian troops as hostages.¹ On the other hand, Demosthenes professes to believe, that even after Philip had penetrated through Thermopylæ, a vigorous effort on the part of Athens might have encouraged the Phocians to resist him, and have enabled them to sustain his attacks, until scarcity of provisions in a country which had so long been the theatre of a wasting war, would have forced him to retreat.² We can hardly decide which supposition is the more improbable: but it seems clear that the course which the Athenians adopted was the most unwise that could have been suggested to them. They received the first intelligence, if not of Philip's convention with Phalæcus, at least of his hostile march through Phocis, from Dercylus, one of the envoys, who had proceeded on their way to the Macedonian camp as far as Chalcis in Eubœa, where they heard the news which seemed to render it necessary that they should obtain further instructions from home. Dercylus seems to have been sent forward, and reaching Athens on the twenty-fourth, found the people in assembly, on some business concerning the arsenal, in Piræus. He reported, perhaps

¹ De F. L. § 145. The sense of the passage is clear enough, but it seems necessary to insert ξ before $\mu\epsilon\tau\alpha\sigma\tau\epsilon\mu\epsilon\lambda\epsilon\iota\sigma\iota\nu$.

² De F. L. § 135.

with some exaggeration, the accounts he had heard, which seemed to indicate that Philip had declared himself unreservedly on the side of Thebes: and it is probable that he now made no secret of his intentions as to the Bœotian towns, if he did not in the course of his march compel some of them to admit Theban garrisons. Still, if we may rely on the narrative of Æschines, the news did not seem so certain or so decisive, as to call for an immediate demonstration of public feeling, or even to prevent the embassy from renewing its journey to attend the council of Amphictyons: and Æschines, having now recovered his strength, did not shrink from the duty of accompanying them, though it compelled him to witness the extinction of all the hopes which he had at least helped to raise as to the issue of the war. After their departure it seems that either the first tidings were confirmed, or new and more alarming reports received. For the people was induced to manifest its grief and consternation by a decree, which directed all the preparations usually made when a hostile army was about to invade Attica. It ordered the fortresses on the frontier to be put in a state of defence, the fortifications of Piræus to be repaired: women and children and moveable property to be brought within the walls: and that a festival of Hercules which usually took place in the country, should be celebrated in the city. This measure was no doubt less an effect of a real panic, than a burst of ill humour, which it would have been wiser to suppress. It afforded Philip occasion for expostulation, which must have inflamed the people's anger the more, as it admitted of no reply. He addressed another letter to them, in which he calmly apprised them of the manner in which he had occupied Phocis, and the punishment he had inflicted on the towns which resisted him. He had heard that they were preparing to succour the Phocians, and wrote that they might spare themselves so useless a labour. It was hardly right, just after they had made peace, to go forth to battle; especially as the Phocians were not comprehended in

the treaty : so that all they would gain by their interference would be the shame of an unavailing aggression.

It seems very improbable that Philip or his allies should have waited for the ordinary time of an Amphictyonic meeting, which would not have arrived before the autumn, to accomplish their several ends. The Thebans and Thessalians were burning for revenge on the Phocians ; and Philip had an object in view for the sake of which he was willing to gratify their wishes. The Amphictyonic council, reinstated in its ancient authority with a force such as it never before had at its command to execute its decrees, first deliberated on the penalty due to the impiety of the Phocians. The states which it represented on this occasion were all, except Athens, bitter enemies of the conquered people. But it is remarkable that among them all none exhibited such violent animosity as the tribes of Mount Ceta. Their deputies, according to Æschines, proposed to inflict the extreme punishment of sacrilege—precipitation from the rock—on the whole adult male population, at least of some Phocian towns. Æschines claims the merit of having successfully interceded to avert this bloody sentence, which probably never entered into the minds of any of the leading members of the council, and would not have been sanctioned by Philip. Their hatred was satisfied with a milder doom, which, as far as was possible, erased the name of Phocis from the list of Greek states, and crushed its independence for ever. All the Phocian cities except Abœ, twenty-two in number, were condemned to be levelled with the ground, and the population to be dispersed in villages at a certain distance from each other, and none containing more than fifty dwellings. They were to pay a yearly tribute of sixty talents to the temple of Delphi, until they should have restored the whole amount of the plundered treasure, which was estimated—and there was no one to controul this valuation—at 10,000 talents, and in the mean while they were not allowed to possess arms or horses : the persons who had taken the principal

part in the spoliation of the temple, and who had fled the country, were to be pursued and brought to justice. Finally the Phocians were deprived of all access to the temple, and of their seat in the Amphictyonic council; and the two votes which they had possessed were transferred to the king of Macedonia and his successors. Sparta was also deprived of her share in the Amphictyonic privileges of the Dorian race.¹ The honour of presiding at the Pythian games was henceforth to be shared by Philip with the Thebans and Thessalians.²

Thus then Philip had attained an end which he had probably been long aiming at, but which was nevertheless of such a nature that it was not easy for any one else to divine it: and this was the great advantage which contributed more perhaps than any other to his success. He had little need of any deeper artifices than silence and patience. While he kept aloof from the chief scene of action, which secretly engaged the largest share of his attention, and extended his power in other quarters, and suffered the Greeks to form their conjectures on his designs, with perhaps no more encouragement than a few hints dropped by his generals and ministers, the course of events was quietly working in his favour, and put him in possession of all that he desired almost without a struggle. Perhaps he might have preferred, if he had been able, to recognise the independence of the Bœotian towns; but the goodwill of Thebes was at this juncture more important to him than that of Athens: and he could still wait, and be silent. And hence we are led to doubt whether in this transaction he resorted to the arts of corruption which Demosthenes imputes to him; as on the other hand we see nothing clearly proved in the conduct of Æschines up to this point, that affords a fair ground for the charge of treasonable collusion with Philip.

¹ Paus. x. 8. 2.

² Diodorus (xvi. 60.) adds as a reason, because the Corinthians had taken part in the impiety of the Phocians—as if Corinth had previously presided at the Pythian games. Possibly Diodorus confounded them with the Isthmian.

That he consented under such circumstances as we have mentioned to go on the third embassy: that he accepted grants of land from Philip¹: that henceforth his tone and conduct with respect to Macedonia became so different from what they had been at the time of his mission into Peloponnesus: these may seem to be facts, which coupled together testify strongly against him: and they do indeed raise suspicions of his integrity which can never be wholly removed. But it would be unjust not to observe, that the period was now approaching, when upright men might more and more doubt the expediency of a contest with Macedonia: and that it was peculiarly difficult for a personal enemy of Demosthenes not to feel some prepossession for Philip.

The object which Philip had accomplished was important to him in several points of view. The honour of a seat in the Amphictyonic council, though conferred on the king, reflected upon his people; it was equivalent to an act of naturalisation, which wiped off the stain of its semi-barbarian origin: the Macedonians might henceforward be considered as Greeks. He probably also reckoned that it would afford him pretexts, occasions, facilities, for interference, as often as he might desire it, in the affairs of Greece. It was likewise a step toward a higher object, which now at least stood distinctly before his view, as the mark toward which all his future enterprises were to be directed. He had now a clear prospect that at no very distant time he should be able to begin his meditated attack on the Persian empire in the name of Greece, and with all the advantages that were to be derived from the consent, whether real or apparent, of the nation. This project, which he had probably long harboured, had been recently presented to his mind by Isocrates in a pamphlet, written during the interval between the con-

¹ The charge is made by Demosthenes with a distinct specification of the yearly value, half a talent (F. L. § 158.), and is not contradicted by *Æschines*.

clusion of the peace with Athens and the end of the Sacred War, and addressed to him in the form of an oration: exhorting him first to interpose his authority to bring about a general pacification in Greece, which would follow as soon as he had healed the breaches that separated the leading states, Thebes and Athens, Sparta and Argos, from one another: and then to place himself at the head of the national confederacy for the invasion of Persia. This national war with Persia was the great thought which haunted Isocrates almost all his life; though perhaps he took it up at first merely as a theme for a rhetorical exercise.¹ In it he saw the only remedy for all the evils that afflicted Greece: a bond of union between the ambitious rivals whose discord had hitherto wasted her strength: a channel, by which the hosts of restless adventurers who preyed upon her resources might be drawn off to more alluring fields, and the needy citizens, whose poverty rendered them the ready tools of political intrigues, to foreign settlements, where they would find an ample and secure provision: and through which a portion of the wealth of the East might flow into Greece. He had recommended his project to public notice on various very different occasions. While Sparta was at the height of her power, and by the humiliation of Olynthus was breaking down one of the barriers which she would afterwards gladly have seen standing between her and Macedonia, Isocrates in an oration professedly designed to be recited before the spectators assembled at the national games, urged the expedience of a coalition between Sparta and Athens for war with Persia. Again, after Sparta had been reduced to the lowest stage of weakness, when Archidamus had mounted the throne, the rhetorician seems to have persuaded himself, and attempted to persuade the Spartan king, that the enterprise of pacifying Greece, and conquering Persia, did

¹ It had before been treated by Gorgias, from whose declamation Isocrates is said to have borrowed. Vit. X. Orat. p. 837. F. Philostratus De Vit. Soph. i. 17. 3.

not exceed his means. But when Philip's successes had turned the eyes of all Greece toward him, Isocrates too could not doubt that this was the hero destined to execute his favourite plan. As long however as the war lasted between Athens and Macedonia, it would have been useless, and perhaps hardly safe, to propose it. The peace encouraged him to speak out.

The rhetorician lays great stress on Philip's pretended descent from Hercules, as a motive both for his good offices in behalf of the four states which in various ways had been so closely connected with his divine ancestor, and for an undertaking in which he would be emulating the glory of that mighty conqueror. And Philip, though he could not be touched by the argument, may not have been insensible to the flattery implied in it. But we can better understand the force of his appeal to history, when he encourages Philip by the examples of Jason, Agesilaus, and the Ten Thousand. Perhaps however the most remarkable passage in the whole is one in which he alludes to certain suspicions, which were current, he says, among the malignant or credulous, as to Philip's intentions. There were persons, it seems, lovers of trouble and confusion, who affected to believe, and others so senseless as to be persuaded by them, that the growth of Philip's power was dangerous to Greece: that his object was to set the Greek states at variance with each other, in order to reduce them all to subjection: as for instance that he professed to side with the Messenians against Sparta, to make himself master of Peloponnesus. Isocrates would hardly have deigned to notice these absurd suspicions, which Philip himself, in his consciousness of the purity of his intentions, might be inclined to despise, if they had not been so widely spread among the multitude by the arts of the designing. But the plan which he has suggested of uniting Greece, and conquering Persia, is the surest way to refute such calumnies.

It cannot be doubted that he was perfectly in earnest,

and that he expressed all that he thought; though his infatuation may seem hardly credible, and it is not easy to find a parallel that would completely illustrate its extravagance. The Italian cities in the middle ages had reason to rejoice, when an emperor, who threatened their liberties, could be forced to embark in a crusade: because it was known that such an expedition was likely to weaken his power. But they would have suspected the sanity of a citizen who should have advised them to combine their forces to put the German emperor in possession of the Greek empire; as we should that of a modern politician, who should propose a confederacy among the European states, to aid Russia in the conquest of Turkey, Persia, and India. Isocrates unquestionably believed that Philip was sure of success in the enterprise he recommended, and that when he had made himself master of Asia, he would still be a safe neighbour to the Greeks, and would look upon himself only as the general of their confederate army. Nor can it be said that he only erred through excessive confidence in Philip's generosity: for this could not ensure the moderation of his successors. Perhaps the best excuse that can be offered for the rhetorician is, that he could not conceive the thought of Greece subject to a foreign master.

The Amphictyonic decree relating to Phocis appears to have been soon carried into execution, so far as was deemed necessary. But we may collect even from Demosthenes¹, that the condemned cities were not totally rased to the ground, but only their fortifications dismantled; and possibly a small remnant of the population was left in each. According to Demosthenes Thebes was permitted to add a part of Phocis to her territory; but it is not clear whether this statement, which he makes in very vague language, is to be taken

¹ For it is more probable that he exaggerates where, as De F. L. § 154, he speaks of the destruction as total — *ὅλον τῶν τοιχῶν καὶ πόλιν ἀναίρεται* — than that he falls short of the truth where he only mentions the demolition of the walls, as F. L. § 373.



in a literal sense, or had any real foundation.¹ She however, certainly recovered Orchomenus, Coronea, Corseæ, and whatever other places she had lost in Bœotia. But those of the inhabitants who dreaded her resentment were allowed to withdraw: a numerous body of Bœotian, as well as Phocian exiles, took refuge in Athens, where their presence must have excited feelings by no means friendly toward Philip. He however returned to Macedonia, as Diodorus says, with a great increase of reputation: and there can be no doubt that he carried with him the praises and blessings of the Thessalians and Thebans, who extolled the gratification of their revenge and ambition as a work of piety, and were blinded, by the temporary advantage they had obtained for themselves, to the irreparable evil they had brought upon Greece.

¹ F. L. § 139. τῆς Φωκίαν χώρας ἐγκρατῆς γιγνώσκει. But § 154. he has τῆς τῶν Φωκίων χώρας ἐπίσημι βουλευταί.

APPENDIX.

ON THE ORDER OF THE OLYNTHIACS.

I AM not about to add another dissertation to the many which have been written on this perplexing subject, but only to direct the reader's attention to some questions connected with it, which have not been noticed in the text. It will be observed that I have not only followed the order of Dionysius, but have assumed that each oration was delivered on the occasion of a fresh embassy from Olynthus. On this point, as well as on the other, opinions differ, and those who agree on the one question may take opposite sides on the other.

As to the occasion, it seems clear that Dionysius, when he wrote (ad Amm. c. 10.) *μετὰ γὰρ ἄρχοντα Καλλιμαχον, ἐφ' οὗ τὰς εἰς Ὀλυθον βοθηίας ἀπίστευαν Ἀθηναῖοι πεισθέντες ὑπὸ Δημοσθένους*, meant that the succours described in the passages which he had just before cited from Philochorus, were granted each time in compliance with the exhortations of Demosthenes, and that he conceived the speeches to correspond to three distinct stages of the war. Libanius, on the contrary, in the argument to II. (I. D.), supposes that I. and II. were both delivered before any succours had been sent. This opinion has been adopted by A. G. Becker, the author of several valuable works on Demosthenes, and by other modern critics. F. Jacobs, in his translation of Demosthenes (*Demosthenes Staatsreden*, 2d ed. p. 159.) goes a step farther, and contends that the case was the same with all three. His ground is the absence of all allusion, such as might have been expected on the contrary supposition in the last two orations, whichever they were, to succours already sent. It seems evident indeed that if this argument has any force, it must compel us to adopt the same conclusion with regard to all three. Now it may be difficult to explain how it happened, if an expedition had been not only decreed but sent, that the orator should have made no mention of it, when he was urging the necessity of more active co-operation, and should have spoken as if

nothing had been done. But, on the other hand, if such a decree had been passed, and had not been carried into execution, it is not much easier to account for his silence on this subject, when it might have seemed so natural, as to be almost unavoidable, that in one at least of the subsequent speeches he should have reminded the people of the time that had elapsed since they had decreed an armament which, even if it was not adequate to the emergency, might still have done some service. But the difficulty which strikes one as the greatest on this supposition, is the extreme improbability that Demosthenes should have made three speeches between the first and second embassy of the Olynthians, while on the occasion of the second embassy, when according to Philochorus their distress was much greater (Ἐλιζομένην τῷ πολέμῳ) and after the third, when the danger had become still more pressing, either he did not speak at all, or his speeches have not been preserved. This seems a sufficient reason for believing that one at least of the three was delivered on the occasion of one of the last two embassies; and it raises a strong presumption that, in some order or other, they correspond to the three epochs of the war described by Philochorus. This presumption appears to be confirmed when we consider their contents. Whatever may be imagined to have been the motive of the delay which is supposed to have given rise to the second speech, nothing can easily be conceived less appropriate to the subject, than that which is so placed in the order of Dionysius. The second of the other order would indeed be much more suitable if the cause of the delay was the fear which the Athenians entertained of Philip's power. But this supposition itself appears to me so extravagantly improbable, that the more plainly the speech, if delivered to hasten the sending of an expedition previously decreed, would imply such a state of public feeling, the less I could believe that it was destined for such a purpose. The Athenians in their contest with Philip were indeed often dilatory and remiss, and let slip many opportunities, but we have no reason to think that this was ever the effect of timidity. Their ordinary fault we know was one of the opposite kind. If they were not too much afraid of Philip to persevere in their war with him, it would be strange that their fears should have restrained them from supporting the Olynthians, whom they had so long desired to draw over to their side.

The question as to the order of the speeches is, as we have observed, distinct from that of the occasion, yet not so as to be altogether independent of it. If all the three were delivered before the second Olynthian embassy, it may be presumed that the state of affairs abroad was not much changed between the

first and the last: and that the orator had only to seek fresh arguments derived from the same circumstances, or to place the same facts in a new point of view. If this was the case, the last two speeches might be considered as supplementary to the first, which might contain the most forcible reasons, and the most important suggestions. But if the three speeches were delivered on the occasions described by Philochorus, since the need and the danger were growing more and more pressing from the beginning to the end of the period, we naturally expect to find the orator's tone corresponding to the altered state of affairs. This is the view by which I have been determined in favour of the order of Dionysius.

Since the preceding part of this volume was sent to the press, I received a new work on the history of Philip, by Brueckner, entitled, *Koenig Philipp und die Hellenischen Staaten*, Goettingen, 1837, which contains a great deal of good criticism. But the author has a remark on this subject, p. 312. which seems to me to place it in a false point of view. He observes that the first oration (III. D.) contains a *general* exhortation to succour the Olynthians, while in the second Philip's situation is discussed with a view to lessen the fear which he inspired. Now the supposition that this fear had caused a delay of the meditated expedition, since it involves the point in dispute, and is, as I have endeavoured to show, highly improbable in itself, must be dropped from the argument. But then the second speech (I. D.) so far as it contains an estimate of Philip's power—which is the subject of nearly the whole—is evidently of a more *general* nature, that is, less appropriate to any special occasion, than either of the two others. Such a review of the causes of Philip's greatness was at all times equally adapted to the purpose of rousing and encouraging the Athenians to more strenuous exertions. But it certainly suggested itself to the orator more naturally, when the contest begun by Olynthus had just opened a prospect of retrieving what had been lost through past negligence, than after this prospect had been overclouded, and the growing distress of the Olynthians threatened Athens herself with still more imminent danger. After either of the other orations, this would have formed an anticlimax, whatever may be thought of its object: whether it was designed to cheer the dejected spirits of the Athenians, or to warn them against supineness and procrastination.

It appears no less evident that the oration I. (III. D.) is that which represents the danger as most pressing, and most emphatically declares the safety of Athens herself to be involved in the event of the struggle. For instance there is a sentence both in III. (II. D.) and in I. (III. D.) beginning with the

words 'Ο μὲν οὖν παρὸν καιρὸς, ὃ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι. The description of the present juncture which follows in the first passage is: εἰπερ ποτε καὶ νῦν πολλῆς φροντίδος καὶ βουλῆς δεῖται. The second proceeds with the words: μοσονουχὶ λέγει φατὴν ἀφαιεῖς, ὅτι τῶν πραγμάτων ὑμῖν ἐκείνων αὐτοῖς ἀντιληπτίον ἴσθιν, εἰπερ ὑπὲρ σωτηρίας αὐτῶν φροντίζετε. This last was surely the critical, or the more alarming emergency. So again in both these orations there is mention of the danger which threatened Attica itself from Philip's arms. In the first it is thus noticed: χωρὶς τῆς αἰσχύνης . . . οὐδὲ τὸν φόβον μικρὸν ὄρω τὸν μετὰ ταῦτα. In the second: νῦν αἰρήσις ἴσθιν ὑμῖν, πότερον ὑμᾶς ἐκεῖ χρὴ πολεμεῖν, ἢ παρ' ὑμῖν ἐκείνου: and farther on the object of the proposed succours is described as being, ἀπαθεῖν ἐκείσε τὸν πόλεμον. It is difficult to understand how Jacobs could say, of a speech which dwells on such a topic at such length, and in such a strain, that it breathes a cheerful confident spirit of joy and hope: (*In dieser Rede weht ein frischer, muthiger Geist, hervorgegangen aus der Freude über das lang gewünschte Ereigniss, und beseelt von der frohen Hoffnung.* u. s. w., p. 165.)—the alternative εἰὰν μὲν ἀντίχρ' τὰ τῶν Ὀλυθίων, ὑμεῖς ἐκεῖ πολεμήσετε . . . ἂν δ' ἐκεῖνα Φίλιππος λάβῃ, τίς αὐτὸν ἔτι κωλύσει δεῦρο βαδίζειν; surely sounds much more like the language of fear, than that of hope or joy—or that it shows the danger which threatens Athens, if ease and enjoyment should be preferred to the use of arms, in the back ground. (*Die Gefahr, die Athen bedrohe, wenn man bequemen Genuss dem Gebrauche der Waffen vorziehe, zeigt die Rede im Hintergrunde.*) It was hardly possible on such an occasion to make the topic more prominent.

It must not however be supposed that I consider these passages as decisive, or that I am not aware there are others in the speeches from which they are cited that seem to point to a different conclusion. They have been here produced, not to convince the reader, but to illustrate the main ground of my own opinion. How far the question still is from having been brought to a satisfactory decision, is known to every one who is at all acquainted with the literature of the controversy. It would be especially presumptuous in one who holds the view here adopted, to be confident that he has arrived at the truth, as it can hardly be denied that the greater weight, both of ancient and modern authority, is in the opposite scale. The single judgment of Dionysius, even if it was entitled to more deference than can reasonably be claimed for it, could not of itself counterbalance the testimony of antiquity in favour of the other order. And though my impression on the subject agrees with Flathe's, I should not have ventured to use such strong language as that in which he expresses it, (I. p. 183.)

where he says: "To recognise the correctness of the order in which Dionysius has placed the three Olynthiacs, there needs nothing but accurately to examine the contents and the tone of each, and to compare them with the course of events." The examples of the learned men who have changed their opinions — not at first hastily taken up, and publicly avowed — on this question, should be sufficient to teach us caution. Who, after all, can yet be sure that he has not overlooked some most important element in it? Brueckner, for instance, thinks it so evident that I. (III. D.) is an inferior composition to the two others, that he is strongly inclined to doubt whether it was the work of Demosthenes: a suspicion which must here be left for the reader's consideration.

Another question was started a few years ago on this subject by Ziemann (*Adolphi Ziemanni in Demosthenem de Bello Philippi Olynthico Commentatio. Edidit et epistolam adjecit C. F. Ranke, 1832.*) whose opinion deserves notice, both for the novelty of the thought, and for the elaborate discussion with which it is maintained. According to his view the second embassy mentioned by Philochorus (ad Amm. 9.) was sent not by the Olynthians, but by their allies the Chalcidians, under which name Olynthus itself was not included. It came so soon after the first Olynthian embassy, that Philochorus speaks of it as arriving about the same time: *περὶ τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον*. The Chalcidians had been first attacked by Philip; and Olynthus, notwithstanding his protestations, both aided them with her forces, and, thinking herself in danger, applied to Athens for alliance and succour. While the Athenians delayed their help, the Chalcidians finding themselves more and more pressed by the war, sent an embassy of their own for the same purpose. This was the occasion of the first Olynthiac (III. D.), and both Chares and Charidemus were sent to the theatre of war, Chares to protect the Chalcidean towns, Charidemus to act on the offensive in Bottiæa and Pallena, which were then occupied by the Macedonians, and might therefore be regarded as a part of Macedonia, which Demosthenes proposed to invade. In the meanwhile Philip, being called away by the affairs of Thessaly, makes peace with the Olynthians, who thus break their league with Athens; but when, on his return from Thessaly in the following spring (348), he renews his hostilities against the Chalcidians, Olynthus arms against him again, and Demosthenes delivers the second Olynthiac (I. D.) to persuade the Athenians to admit the Olynthians once more into their alliance. The Olynthians send another embassy for succour, which finds the Athenians filled with confidence by some slight successes of Charidemus, and dreaming about

punishing Philip. This was the occasion of the third Olynthiac (II. D.)

As to the geographical question, it is evident that it matters little what were the original limits of Chalcidice. The only point to be considered is, whether Philochorus might not have described Olynthus by the expression, *Χαλχιδίων τῶν ἐπὶ Θράκης*. That he might do so, seems clear even from the passages cited by Ziemann himself, p.7., with which the reader may compare colonel Leake, *Northern Greece*, iii. p. 454. It then remains to be asked whether any one can suppose that the war mentioned in the second extract from Philochorus (*Ἐλισομένον τῷ πολέμῳ*) is a different one from that which he had spoken of in the first: *Ὀλυθίοις πολεμουμένοις ὑπὸ Φιλίππου*. It seems impossible to doubt that the second passage alludes to the first. Ziemann however conceives that the allusion lies not merely in the words *τῷ πολέμῳ*, but in the date *περὶ τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον*, and that the time meant was that in which the Olynthians made their first application for alliance and succour: which of course would prove that the second embassy came from a different quarter. But it is surprising that Ziemann should have overlooked, that the words, *περὶ δὲ τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον*, refer not to the events related in the first extract, but to those which intervened (*τὰ μεταξὺ γινόμενα*) between the first and the second embassy. These indeed, according to Dionysius, were *ὀλίγα*. But who would venture to infer from this expression, that the time of the second embassy might not be parted from that of the first by an interval of at least a month or two? Moreover, it is evident that these events, whatever they were, followed the expedition under Chares, mentioned in the first extract, which must therefore have preceded that commanded by Charidemus. So that there would be an embassy which gave occasion to the alliance between Athens and Olynthus, without any speech from Demosthenes, and a speech on behalf of Olynthus not suggested by any embassy.

Ziemann however has at least rendered one valuable service to this part of history in the last section of his essay, where he points out how the account given by Demosthenes, of the succours furnished by the Athenians to Olynthus, may be reconciled with that of Philochorus. Demosthenes speaks of fifty triremes, 10,000 mercenaries, and 4000 citizens. Philochorus of 65 triremes (30 + 18 + 17), 6000 peltasts (2000 + 4000) and 2000 heavy-armed citizens, and two bodies of cavalry, 150 mercenaries, and 300 Athenians. Ziemann observes that the complements of the crews which manned the thirty triremes first sent with Chares (signified by the *συναπλήρωσαν* of Philochorus) would make up the 10,000 of Demosthenes.

Philochorus has mentioned the Athenian cavalry, and heavy-armed infantry, omitting the light troops which as usual accompanied them. Demosthenes speaks of the Athenian troops in the mass; and in the enumeration of the ships he has probably omitted those which sailed in the last expedition, either because they were mere transports, or because they had been already employed in the armament which first sailed under Chares.



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