HISTORY OF ARIZONA AND NEW MEXICO, 1680—1888CHAPTER XVII.
AMERICAN OCCUPATION OF NEW MEXICO.1846-1847.
In 1846 the United States began a war against Mexico for the acquisition
of territory. This war and its causes are treated fully in other parts of this
series devoted to the history of Mexico, of Texas, and of California. New
Mexico and Arizona, except in the mere fact of being parts of the territory to
be acquired, figured very slightly, if at all, in the preliminaries of the
proposed conquest. There was, it is true, a claim that Texas extended south and
west to the Rio Grande, by which shallow pretence the
government of the northern republic managed to afford some comfort to the
national conscience, on the plea that the defence of
this ‘disputed’ tract by Mexico was the first act of war. It should be
remarked, however, that the field of the first hostilities—of the Mexican invasion!—was not on the New Mexican frontier, but farther
south-east.
War, or its ‘existence’, having been declared, an army of the west was
organized at Fort Leavenworth in June. Its commander was Colonel Stephen W.
Kearny, its mission the occupation of the broad territory stretching from New
Mexico to California, and also if practicable
cooperation with other branches of the army in operations farther south. The
advance division of this force consisted of 300 regulars of the first United
States dragoons under Major Edwin V. Sumner, a regiment of mounted volunteers
called out by Governor Edwards of Missouri for this campaign, and commanded by
Colonel Alexander W. Doniphan, and five additional companies of volunteers,
including one of infant, and two of light artillery, or a total of nearly 1,700
men. The second, or reserve division, comprised another regiment of Missouri
volunteers under Colonel Sterling Price, a battalion of four companies under
Lieutenant-colonel Willock, and the Mormon Battalion, in all about 1,800 men.
The advance, or army of conquest, left Fort Leavenworth late in June; the long
supply train of over 1,000 mules was soon augmented by the 400 wagons of the
annual Santa Fe caravan; and all the companies, except the artillery, were
encamped at the beginning of August near Bent’s Fort on the Arkansas, after a
tedious but uneventful march of four companies had made an unsuccessful attempt
to overtake a party of traders believed to have in their possession arms and
ammunition for the enemy.
From Bent’s Fort, Lieutenant Decourcy was sent
with twenty men to Taos to learn the disposition of the people, rejoining the
army later with some prisoners and a report that resistance might be expected
at every point. Similar reports had previously been received from Major Howard
and the mountaineer Fitzpatrick. From Bent’s Fort, also, Captain Cooke, with
twelve picked men, was sent in advance, nominally as a kind of ambassador to
treat with Governor Armijo for the peaceful submission of eastern New Mexico,
but really to escort James Magoffin, the veritable ambassador, intrusted with a secret mission at Santa Fe. To send an
army of 1,700 men, mainly composed of undisciplined volunteers, on a march of a
thousand miles over a desert occupied by hostile savages, to conquer, by force
of arms, so populous an interior province, and one so well defended, at least
by nature, as New Mexico, was on its face a very hazardous enterprise. It was a
radically different matter from the proposed occupation by naval forces of a
coast province like California. In the annals of the latter country we have
seen, however, what agencies were relied on by the government, acting through
Consul Larkin as a confidential agent, to insure a
bloodless victory, though the success of the plan was seriously impaired by the
blundering and criminal disobedience of another and subordinate agent. These
complications of the farthest west are now well known in every
particular. That the policy respecting New Mexico was similar in its
general features, there can be no doubt, though most details have never come to
light. During the past years, the Santa Fe traders, both American and Mexican,
had done much to make the condition and disposition of each people well known
to the other, to convince the New Mexicans how futile must be any attempt to
resist the United States, and the Americans how easy would be the occupation of
Santa Fé. Doubtless, certain prominent traders had been at work virtually as
secret agents of the government at Washington, which from their reports had
come to believe that no serious opposition was to be expected to the change of
flag. It was understood that the New Mexicans, after long years of neglect and
so-called oppression, had retained but a nominal allegiance to Mexico; that
many influential citizens, from motives of personal interest as traders or
land-owners, desired the downfall of Mexican rule; that many others were
convinced that resistance would be useless, and more than half convinced that
the change would be a benefit; that prominent officials were already disposed,
or might be influenced by certain appeals to their love of gain, or ambition
for office, to submit without a struggle to the inevitable; that the masses
might be controlled for the most part through the leaders; and that finally,
any opposition based on pride, patriotism, or prejudice of race or religion,
must be more than counterbalanced by lack of unity, of leaders, of arms, and
other resources. Thus Kearny's army of the west was
sent to occupy, not literally to conquer, New Mexico. Nevertheless, the
enterprise was one attended with many risks.
Magoffin, or Don Santiago, was an Irish Kentuckian, long in the Santa Fe
trade, a man of wealth, with unlimited capacity for drinking wine and making
friends, speaking the Spanish language, and on friendly terms with most of the
leading: men in New Mexico and Chihuahua. At Washington he was introduced by
Senator Benton to the president and secretary of war, and at the request of the
three agreed to accompany the expedition, professing his ability to prevent any
armed resistance on the part of Governor Armijo and his officers. Cooke’s
party, without adventures requiring notice, arrived the 12th of August at Santa
Fé, where he was hospitably received by Armijo, who, although he seemed to
think that the approach of the army was rather sudden and rapid, concluded to
send a commissioner in the person of Dr Connelly, with whom the captain set out
next day on his return to meet the army. Meanwhile, according to Benton, our
only authority, and as there is perhaps no reason to doubt, Magoffin easily
prevailed on the governor to promise that no defence should be made at Apache Canon, a point on the approach to Santa Fe which might
have been held by a small force. He had more difficulty with Archuleta, the
second in command, but by appealing to his ambition, and suggesting that by a
pronunciamiento he might secure for himself western New Mexico, on which Kearny
had no designs, he at length overcame that officer's patriotic objections, and
thus secured an open road for the army.
Unfortunately we have no definite information from New Mexican sources respecting Armijo’s
preparations, real or pretended, for defence; and the
fragmentary rumors that found their way into current narratives are meagre,
contradictory, and of no value. The governor understood
perfectly his inability to make any effective resistance; and all that
he did in that direction was with a view merely to ‘save his responsibility’ as
a Mexican officer, even if he did not, as is probable, definitely resolve and
promise not to fight. The people were called upon, as usual in such cases, to
rise and repel the invader; and a considerable force of militia was organized
and joined the two or three hundred soldiers of the army. These auxiliaries
were, however, but half in earnest and most inadequately armed. If any
considerable portion of them or their officers ever thought seriously of
fighting the Americans, their patriotic zeal rapidly disappeared as the numbers
and armament of the invaders became more clearly known from returning scouts,
who, in many instances, were captured and released by Kearny. With perhaps
2,000 men—though American reports double the number—Armijo seems to have
marched out to Apache Canon with the avowed intention of meeting the enemy; but
on the last day, in consequence of differences of opinion between the general
and his officers, the former dismissed the auxiliaries to their homes, and with
his presidial troops retreated to the south by way of
Galisteo, near which point he left his cannon. Armijo was blamed by the many
who were hostile to the invaders and who were ashamed to see their country thus
surrendered without a struggle. Doubtless the governor, had he desired it, might have waged a guerilla warfare that would have given the foe
much trouble; and there is much cause to believe that his reason for not doing
so was not a praiseworthy desire to prevent the useless shedding of his
subjects’ blood.
Kearny’s army left Bent’s Fort on the 2d of August. The route was nearly
identical with the later line of stage travel, and differed but slightly from that of the modern Atchison, Topeka, and Santa Fé
railroad. The march was a tedious one, there being many cases of fatal illness
among the volunteers. Through some miscalculation or mismanagement of the
supply trains, the men were on short rations for a larger part of the way; and
it was besides a season of drought. The advance was in several divisions, by
slightly different routes from day to day, in order to utilize the scanty water and grass. Fitzpatrick was the guide, Bobidoux the interpreter, while Bent commanded a company of spies. After the settlements were reached, American
residents, such as Towle, Bonney, Wells, and Spry, were met, and gave
information respecting the state of things at Santa Fé and Taos. Small parties
of Mexican scouts were also frequently captured, or came voluntarily into camp,
where they gave vague and contradictory accounts of Armijo’s preparations for defence, and whence, being set at liberty, they carried
back exaggerated reports of the American force and cannon, with copies of
Kearny’s proclamation. On the 14th, 15th, and 16th, respectively, the army
reached Las Vegas, Tecolote, and San Miguel del Vado. At each of these places,
Kearny—now brigadier-general by a commission received at Las Vegas—made a
speech from a housetop, absolving the people from their allegiance to Armijo,
and promising protection to the life, property, and religion of all who should
peaceably submit to the new order of things; and the alcalde, and in some cases
the militia officers of each town, being induced more or less willingly to take
an oath of allegiance to the United States, were continued in office. A letter
was received from Armijo, making known his purpose to come out to meet Kearny;
but whether as friend or foe, the vague wording did not clearly indicate. Cooke
and Connelly were met at Tecolote, but the message brought by the latter is not
known to the chroniclers. Among the men and subordinate officers, there was an
expectation of having to encounter from 2,000 to 10,000 foes in the mountain
defile; but the general is said to have borne himself as coolly as if on
parade, as indeed well he might, knowing how slight was the
danger of a conflict. At San Miguel a Mexican officer was
captured—Salazar, son of the officer with whom the Texans had to do in 1841—who
reported the flight of Armijo. On the 17th the army passed the ruins of Pecos;
and on the 18th, marching without the slightest opposition through the famous
canon, the Americans entered Santa Fé at 6 p. m., being accorded a friendly
reception by Juan B. Vigil, the acting governor. The flag of the United States
was raised at sunset, and saluted with thirteen guns.
General Kearny slept in the old palacio, and the army encamped on an adjoining
eminence. Thus was the capital of New Mexico occupied without the shedding of
blood.
On the day following his entry into the capital, General Kearny caused
the people to be assembled in the plaza, where through an interpreter he made a
speech. Then the acting governor, secretary, alcaldes, and other officials took
the required oath of allegiance, Governor Vigil also delivering a brief address
and reading the general’s earlier proclamation. The exercises were similar, if
somewhat less hurried, to the earlier ones at Las Vegas and San Miguel. The New
Mexicans as subjects of the United States from this time were assured of full
protection for their lives, property, and religion, not only against American
depredators, but against the Mexican nation, Governor Armijo, and their Indian
foes. Three days later Kearny’s position was fully explained in the formal
proclamation which is appended.
From the 9th for many days representatives of other towns, of the Indian
pueblos, and in some cases of Navajo, Yuta, and even Apache bands, came to
listen to the general’s explanations of United States policy, and to offer
peaceful submission to his authority. Many among the ignorant populace had been
led to believe that they would be robbed, outraged, or murdered by the
Americanos; and many of a higher class had left the city with their families in
fear of insults from a lawless soldiery; but these fears were to a considerable
extent removed by the general’s words and acts, and many of the fugitives
returned to their homes. A flag-staff to bear the
stars and stripes was raised in the plaza. Captain Emory on the 19th selected a
site for a fort, and four days later work was begun on Fort Marcy, an adobe
structure commanding the city from an adjoining hill. The animals were sent to
the region of Galisteo to a grazing camp guarded by a detachment under
Lieutenant-colonel Ruff. On the 23d and following Sundays the general and staff
attended church; an express for the states was despatched on the 25th; and in the evening of the 27th Kearny gave a grand ball to
officers and citizens. Minor military movements, such as the arrival of small
parties that had lagged on the way and the stationing of local detachments,
need not be noticed in detail. There were unfounded rumors of hostile
preparations in the south, and that Colonel Ugarte was approaching with a
Mexican force from Chihuahua, which caused Kearny to march down the river with
nearly half his army. This tour extended to Tomé, occupied the time from the 2d
to the 13th of September, and revealed no indications of hostility among the abajeños.
Back at Santa Fé, the general sent strong detachments under Major Gilpin
and Lieutenant-colonel Jackson, who had succeeded Buff by election of the
volunteers—to Abiquiú and Cebolleta on the Navajo frontier; and gave his attention to the organization of a civil
government put in operation on the 22d of September. Then on the 25th, he set
out on the inarch to California by the Gila route, with his 300 dragoons, two
thirds of which number, however, were presently sent back, when Kit Carson was
met with the inaccurate news that the conquest of California had already been
accomplished. Orders left were to the effect that the Mormon Battalion should
follow the general to California, and that Doniphan’s regiment, on the arrival
of Price’s to take its place, should march south to join General Wool at
Chihuahua. Among the volunteers of both regiments there was much sickness,
caused to a considerable extent by indulgence in the various dissipations of
the New Mexican metropolis. Some 300 of the Missourians are said to have been
buried at Santa Fe. There was also a great scarcity of supplies, the commissary
department of the army of the west being grossly mismanaged, as it appears.
Provisions must be bought from fellow-citizens, not seized, as in an enemy’s
country; and even the money furnished the troops was not apparently of a kind
that could be utilized, to say nothing of exorbitant prices. The men were
profoundly disgusted with the country and its people, and their complaints were
doubtless somewhat too highly colored. Moreover, the restraints of military
life were irksome to the Missourians. They were willing to fight the Mexicans, but could not understand their obligation as
soldiers to work on the fort, wear their coats under a hot sun, observe petty
regulations, or obey orders against the propriety of which, as American
citizens, they could present strong arguments. The popularity of the officers
was therefore in inverse ratio to their knowledge and enforcement of
discipline. Brawls and arrests for insubordination were of not infrequent
occurrence. Yet amusements were not wanting, among which were theatrical
performances by a company of military amateurs.
Colonel Price with his 2d Missouri volunteers arrived at Santa Fe about
the 1st of October. The Mormon Battalion under Lieutenant Smith arrived in two
divisions on the 9th and 12th. On account of illness
about 150 of the men with most of the families were detached and sent to winter
at Pueblo, in what was later Colorado, from which point they found their way
the next year to Salt Lake. The rest of the battalion, 340 strong, was put
under the command of Lieutenant-colonel Cooke, and started
on the 19th to follow Kearny and open a wagon-road across the continent.
Meeting the returning dragoons on the 23d and turning off from the Bio Grande
November 13th, they found it impracticable to find a way for their wagons
toward the west, and accordingly directed their course farther southward to the
San Bernardino rancho on the later frontier, and thence marched by Tucson to
Kearny’s route on the Gila. The adventures of the battalion from its
organization pertain to the history of California rather than to that of New
Mexico.
Orders came back from Kearny that Doniphan before starting for Chihuahua
should undertake a campaign in the Navajo country. In September, as we have
seen, Lieutenant-colonel Jackson with three companies had been sent to Cebolleta on the frontier; and from this point, apparently
before Kearny’s last orders were known, Captain Reid, with thirty volunteers
and a chief called Sandoval as guide, starting the 20th of October, had in
twenty days made a somewhat remarkable entry far to the west and north into the
heart of the Navajo country. He met the head chief Narbona,
found the Indians well disposed toward the Americans, made
arrangements for a treaty council at Santa Fe, and returned to Cebolleta. Major Gilpin, who had been stationed at Abiquiú in September, had made an expedition into the Yuta
country, and had brought some 60 leading men of that nation to Santa Fé, where
a treaty was made on October 13th. Under the new orders, Gilpin left Abiquiú on the 22d with his two companies, reinforced by 65
pueblo and Mexican allies; went up the Chama, crossed to the San Juan,
descended that river, reached the Chelly canons, thence apparently turned
eastward and by way of the Laguna Colorada reached a
place called Ojo del Oso, or Bear Spring, on the 20th
of November. Meanwhile Doniphan left Santa Fé on October 26th, but from
Albuquerque sent most of his force down the river to Valverde to protect the
caravan of traders and make preparations for the march
to Chihuahua. With a small party he then went to Covero,
whither Jackson had moved his force from Cebolleta.
From this point, having received a despatch from
Gilpin on the San Juan, and sent in reply orders to
assemble as many Navajos as possible at Ojo del Oso,
Doniphan with Jackson and 150 men started on the 15th toward the headwaters of
the Puerco and thence north-westward, toiling through the deep snows and over
the mountains, and joining Major Gilpin on the 21st. There were about 500
Navajos present, including the chiefs of many bands. They professed friendship
and admiration for the Americans, but had much
difficulty in comprehending why the new-comers should interfere with their
warfare against the detested Mexicans. At last, however, after a day of
speech-making, they consented to a treaty, which was formally signed on the 22d
by Doniphan, Jackson, and Gilpin on the one side, and fourteen chieftains on
the other. Its terms included “a firm and lasting peace” between the Navajos
and Americans—the latter to include New Mexicans and Pueblos; mutual free
trade, including visits for trading purposes; mutual restoration of all
captives, and of all property taken since the 18th of August. Gifts were
exchanged, and then the parties separated. The Americans returned by different
routes, one division with the three regimental officers and a few native chieftains
going by way of Zuñi, where on the 26th a treaty was concluded between the
Zunis and Navajos. All were reunited at Valverde about December 12th. The
treaties, like dozens of earlier ones with the same tribes, had but slight
practical effect; but the journals of the different branches of this
complicated campaign if extant would doubtless furnish many interesting and
valuable items of geographical information.
Before the colonel’s return from the Navajo campaign James Magoffin with
Dr Connelly and a few others ventured southward, but were arrested at El Paso
and carried as prisoners to Chihuahua; the traders also started in advance of
the army, by which they were overtaken on the way y and a company of
volunteers known as the Chihuahua Bangers left Santa Fé on December 1st under
Captain Hudson, with the idea of opening communication with General Wool, but
they also turned back to join the army before reaching El Paso. Finally Doniphan’s army of about 900 men left Valverde in
three divisions on the 14th, 16th, and 19th of December. After passing the
Jornada del Muerto all were reunited on the 22d at
Dona Ana, including Hudson’s company and the traders. Two Mexican scouts were
killed with one bullet on the 24th; and at El Bracito,
some 30 miles below Doña Ana, on Christmas afternoon a force of the enemy,
estimated at about 600 regulars—Vera Cruz dragoons, with cavalry and infantry
from Chihuahua—and 500 El Paso militia, was encountered. These troops,
commanded by an officer named Ponce de Leon, made a charge upon the Americans,
but being met by a volley of rifle bullets at short range were forced to
retreat, pursued for a short distance, and losing perhaps thirty men killed. No
further opposition was encountered, and on December 27th, Doniphan took
possession of El Paso, the citizens having come out to meet him with a white
flag, offering surrender and asking for clemency and protection. After a stay
of forty-two days, and being reinforced by 117 men of
the artillery battalion under Clark and Weightman from Santa Fé, the army marched on February 8, 1847, for Chihuahua, which city
they occupied at the beginning of March, after a brilliant victory over four
times their own number of Mexican troops at Sacramento. General Wool was not
here, and after holding the town about two months to await orders and protect
the traders in the sale of their goods, Doniphan marched on to Saltillo,
presently returning by water via New Orleans to Missouri as the time of the
volunteers had expired. The expedition of the regiment had been a
remarkable one, in some respects almost without parallel, though its most
brilliant features do not pertain directly to the annals of New Mexico.
General Kearny’s original instructions of June 3, 1846, from the
secretary of war, included the following: “Should you conquer and take
possession of New Mexico and California, or considerable places in either, you
will establish temporary civil governments therein—abolishing all arbitrary
restrictions that may exist, so far as it may be done with safety. In
performing this duty it would be wise and prudent to
continue in their employment all such of the existing officers as are known to
be friendly to the United States, and will take the oath of allegiance to them.
You may assure the people of these provinces that it is the wish and design of
the United States to provide for them a free government with the least possible
delay, similar to that which exists in our
territories. They will then be called upon to exercise the rights of free men
in electing their own representatives to the territorial legislature. It is
foreseen that what relates to the civil government will be a difficult and
unpleasant part of your duty, and much must necessarily be left to your own
discretion. In your whole conduct you will act in such a manner as best to
conciliate the inhabitants, and render them friendly
to the United States”. Kearny’s proclamation of August 22d, more or less in accordance
with these instructions, though going in certain respects far beyond their
letter, has already been presented in this chapter. From the first day of
occupation, Captain Waldo, of the volunteers, was set at work translating all
the Spanish and Mexican laws that could be found at Santa Fé; while Colonel
Doniphan, a lawyer by profession, aided by Willard P. Hall—elected to congress
during this absence—busied himself with the preparation of a code of laws
founded in part on Waldo’s fragmentary translations, but mainly on the laws of
Missouri and Texas. Finally, on the 22d of September, the general published
this code—still in force in New Mexico down to 1886—printed in English and
Spanish with the old press and type found at the capital, and at the same time
his appointment of governor and other officials, thus organizing the civil
government deemed necessary. With the code was submitted to the government at
Washington an “organic law of the territory of New Mexico”, which provided for
a permanent territorial organization under the laws of the United States,
naming the first Monday in August 1847 as the day for electing a delegate to
congress.
It was noticeable that Kearny’s proclamations ignored the old theory
that eastern New Mexico belonged to Texas. A still more notable feature was the
clearly announced intention of retaining the country as a permanent possession
of the United States. This was the first open avowal of the administration’s
real purpose to make this a war for the acquisition of territory, and not, as
had been pretended, for the protection of Texan boundaries, the avenging of
past wrongs, and the obtaining of indemnity for just claims. This brought the
subject before congress, which body called on the president for all the
instructions that had been given respecting civil government in New Mexico and
California. In the debates this subject was utilized chiefly as a basis for
attacks on the administration and denunciations of the war for conquest. Nobody
cared what was done at Santa Fé except as it could furnish material for
arguments on one side or the other of the great and complicated national
struggle for political supremacy between the north and south. Belligerent
rights were, however, pretty thoroughly discussed; and
it was clearly shown that a temporary civil government might be, if the people
were submissive and friendly, a legitimate and proper feature of a conqueror's
military rule. This whole subject and others closely connected with it have
been somewhat fully presented in the History of California, and repetition is
not deemed necessary here. General Kearny as a conqueror had absolute power,
limited only by the requirements of humanity and justice, or international
usage. He might enforce strict martial law, or protect
the people’s rights and interests by civil methods, as he saw fit. He had no
power to make New Mexico a territory of the United States, or the people
citizens, or non-submissive enemies traitors, nor
could he in a sense exact an oath of allegiance to the United States. All these
matters would be settled by the final treaty closing the war. But he might
perhaps promise or threaten these things, or almost any others, and he might
exact from officials any oath they could be induced to take. His promises the
government at Washington, if the treaty should cede the territory, would be in
equity under obligation to fulfil; but it would have no right to carry out his
threats.
The president in his reply of December 22d, furnishing the desired
information, declared that Kearny’s acts, so far as they purported to establish
a permanent territorial government, and to give the inhabitants political
rights as citizens, under the constitution of the United States, had not been
recognized or approved; but that otherwise his acts, and the instructions on
which they were based, “were but the amelioration of martial law, which modern
civilization requires, and were due, as well as the security of the conquest,
to the inhabitants of the conquered territory”; and moreover, “it will be
apparent that if any excess of power has been exercised, the departure has been
the offspring of a patriotic desire to give to the inhabitants the privileges
and immunities so cherished by the people of our own country, and which they
believed calculated to improve their condition and promote their prosperity.
Any such excess has resulted in no practical injury, but can and will be early corrected in a manner to alienate as little as possible
the good feelings of the inhabitants of the conquered country”. As I have
remarked, congress paid very little attention to the matter, except as
indicating the intention of permanent occupation, which the president did not
pretend to deny. Respecting the actual operations of the civil government in
1846-7, practically nothing is recorded; probably there was very little to
record.
From the first there had been occasional rumors of intended revolt among
the natives as well as of attack by forces from the south, but such rumors
could be traced to no definite foundation, and at the time of Doniphan's
departure no danger was apprehended. Price had nearly 2,000 men with whose aid
to keep the province in subjection, though many of them were on the sick-list. The main force was stationed at Santa Fé, but
detachments were posted at other points, including the dragoons under Captain Burgwin at Alburquerque, a
company under Captain Hendley in the Mora valley, and
another near Cebolleta on the Navajo frontier. Soon
after Doniphan left the capital, disquieting rumors again became prevalent, and
in December these became of so definite a nature that many arrests were made.
The result of an investigation is affirmed to have been the disclosure of a
carefully devised plot to regain possession of the country by killing the
Americans and all natives who had espoused their cause. The leaders were Tomás
Ortiz and Diego Archuleta, who under the new regime were to be governor and
comandante general respectively; several of the priests were prominent in the
plot, notably padres Juan Felipe Ortiz and José Manuel Gallegos; and many
leading citizens of the northern sections were involved. Meetings were held at
the house of Tomás Ortiz; plans were minutely discussed and arranged; parts
were assigned to the leaders, who secretly visited the different towns to
incite the lower classes of Mexicans and pueblo Indians; and the 19th of
December was fixed for the rising. This date was subsequently changed to
Christmas night, when the town would be crowded with natives, and the
Americans, by reason of the festivities, would be off their guard. Before this
time, however, the plot was revealed, perhaps by the mulatto wife of one of the
conspirators, and many of the alleged leaders were arrested by order of Colonel
Price, though Ortiz and Archuleta escaped to the south.
From the meagre details of testimony extant, as repeated in substance by
the different writers, from the fact that no positive evidence could be found
against the parties arrested, and from the confidence felt by the authorities
that all danger ended with the revelation of the plot, it
would appear that not very much was brought to light by the
investigation, or rather that the conspiracy had not assumed any very
formidable proportions. There is no reason to doubt, however, from this
testimony and later developments that Ortiz and Archuleta had really plotted a
rising, and had found many adherents, though nothing like a general consent of
the leading men of different sections and different classes had been secured.
Perhaps the only wonder under the circumstances is, that the movement was not
more widespread. No blame or taint of treason could be imputed to the New
Mexican people—except to individual officials who had promised allegiance—had
they chosen to rise in a body against the American invaders. The temptation for
such a rising was strong. The national pride of many leading citizens had been
deeply wounded by Armijo’s disgraceful surrender of their country without a
struggle. High officials might naturally feel that in Mexico they would be regarded
as implicated in the general’s actions and regarded as traitors. The American
occupation had as yet brought no benefit to the
country. The natural bitterness of the lower and middle classes had been
aggravated rather than appeased by recent occurrences. The situation was
somewhat similar to that in southern California just
before the Flores revolt. We have no positive evidence of gross outrages or
oppression of the natives; indeed, in a sense, the efforts of the American
authorities were constant and generally effective to protect them in their
legal rights; but the volunteers were overbearing, abusive, and quarrelsome,
taking no pains to conceal how much they despised all that was Mexican; and
instances of individual insult and outrage were frequent. The natives were
naturally revengeful, many of them vicious, ignorant, and ready to listen to
the exaggerated charges and promises of the few reckless characters, who from
motives of ambition or resentment were bent on stirring up a revolt. Moreover,
the New Mexicans noted the inroads of sickness among their invaders, their
difficulty in obtaining supplies, their comparatively small number, and their
distance from reinforcements. Again, they probably received false news
respecting Mexican successes and prospects in the south; and it is not unlikely
that they heard of the Californian revolt. There was much jealousy against
those natives who had been given office on the part of those who had lost their
old positions; and it was asserted by Senator Benton that Archuleta’s hostility
arose from the fact that the Americans had not kept their promises of leaving
the western country to his control. Yet notwithstanding all this, so strong was
the influence of those who had directly or indirectly espoused the American
cause, of those whose interest required a continuance of the new regime, and of
those who realized the impossibility of a revolt that should be permanently
successful, that the masses of the people looked with little favor on the
movement, and it was practically abandoned, as I have no doubt, on the flight
of Ortiz and Archuleta.
But the embers of revolt were left smouldering among the Indians of Taos, and they were fanned into flame by a few reckless
conspirators, who trusted that once begun the revolt would become general.
Governor Bent—having on January 5th issued a proclamation in which he announced
the discovery of the plot, the flight of the leaders, and
also the victory of Doniphan at El Bracito—believing
that all danger was past, went on the 14th with Sheriff Lee and others to Taos,
his home. On the 19th, the Indians came from their pueblo to demand the release
of two prisoners. On this being refused, they killed the sheriff and prefect;
then attacked the governor’s house, killing and scalping Bent and two others.
Messengers were at once despatched in all directions
to announce that the first blow had been struck, and to urge a general rising.
It does not clearly appear that the Taos outbreak had been definitely
planned in advance, though most writers state that such was the case, as
indeed it may have been. Many Mexicans at once joined the Indians. At Arroyo
Hondo, some twelve miles away, eight men were attacked on the same day at
Turley’s mill and distillery, and seven of them killed after a desperate
resistance of two days. Two other Americans were killed at Rio Colorado; and at
Mora, eight traders who had just arrived in a wagon from Las Vegas, including
L. L. Waldo, brother of Captain Waldo of the volunteers. At Las Vegas the
alcalde not only fulfilled his oath of allegiance, but induced the people to remain quiet.
Through intercepted letters from the rebels, calling for aid, Colonel
Price at Santa Fé heard of the revolt on the 20th. Ordering reinforcements from Alburquerque, he marched northward on the 23d with
353 men, including Angney’s infantry and a company of
Santa Fé volunteers under Captain St Vrain, and four
howitzers under Lieutenant Dyer. The enemy, 1,500 strong, as was estimated, and
commanded by Jesus Tafoya, was encountered on the 24th near La Cañada, or Santa
Cruz, and put to flight with a loss of 36 killed, including General Tafoya.
Price lost two men. Four days later, at Los Luceros,
reinforcements came up under Captain Burgwin; on the
29th the foe was again driven from a strong position at the pass of El Embudo, with a loss of twenty killed; and the 3d of
February; after a hard march through deep snow, the army reached the pueblo of
Taos, within whose ancient structures the rebels had fortified themselves. A
hard day’s fighting on the 4th, marked by a continuous cannonade and several
assaults, put the Americans in possession of the church and that part of the
pueblo west of the stream. About 150 of the Indians are said to have been
killed, including one of their leaders, Pablo Chávez; while the American loss
of seven killed and 45 wounded—many of them fatally—included Captain Burgwin. Next morning the Indians sued for peace, which was
granted on their giving up Tomás, one of the leading conspirators, who was soon
killed in the guardhouse by a private. Pablo Montoya, another leader, also
fell into the hands of Price, and was hanged on the 7th, after which only one
of the chief conspirators, Manuel Cortés, survived. The army returned to the
capital, where, on the 13th, occurred the funeral ceremonies of Governor Bent
and Captain Burgwin.
With the exception of Price’s report of this campaign, there does not exist, and cannot be formed,
anything like a continuous record of the insurrection, or of the subsequent
annals of the year. After the defeat at Taos, it was only east of the
mountains, and chiefly under the direction of Manuel Cortés, that hostilities
were continued. At the first, as we have seen, Waldo and party had been killed
at Mora, but Las Vegas had been kept in subjection by the efforts of the
alcalde, and the presence of Captain Isaac R. Hendley with his company. He occupied Las Vegas on January 20th, concentrated his
grazing guards, and on the 24th appeared with 225 men before Mora, where he
attacked several hundred insurgents, killing 25 or 30 and capturing fifteen
prisoners, but was himself killed with a few of his men, and the party was
repulsed. A little later Captain Morin renewed the attack, and drove the
inhabitants into the mountains, destroying the town and a large supply of
grain. In May a grazing party and also a wagon train
were attacked, one or two men killed, and a large number of horses and mules
driven off. Following the marauders’ trail, Major Edmonson overtook them, 300
or 400 strong, in a deep canon of the Red River, but after a fight of several
hours, in which he killed many of the Mexicans and Indians, and lost only one
man, he was forced to retire. Next morning the enemy had fled. Late in June
there was trouble at Las Vegas. Lieutenant Robert T. Brown and three men,
pursuing horse-thieves, were killed; whereupon Edmonson made an attack, killed
ten or twelve men, found indications of a new revolt, captured the town, and
sent some fifty prisoners to Santa Fé, also burning a mill belonging to the alcalde,
who was charged with complicity. In July a party of 31 soldiers was attacked at
La Ciénega not far from Taos, Lieutenant Larkin and
five others being killed. On the approach of reinforcements, however, the enemy
fled. In the same month, Edmonson is said to have destroyed the town of Las Pías (?) with considerable loss to the foe, and to have
marched by way of Antón Chico to La Cuesta, where were some 400 insurgents
under Cortés and González. Fifty captives were taken, the rest fleeing to the
mountains, and many horses were recovered. After July we have no definite
record of hostilities.
Of the prisoners brought to the capital by Price, and sent in later by
his officers, some fifteen or twenty, perhaps more, were tried by
court-martial, sentenced to death, and executed. These included six of the
murderers of Brown, who were hanged on the 3d of August. Many others are said
to have been flogged and set at liberty. Others accused of complicity in the
original plot were turned over to the civil authorities. In March four of these
were indicted by the grand jury for treason, 25 being discharged for want of
evidence, and one of the four convicted and sentenced to death. This was
Antonio María Trujillo, father-in-law of Diego Archuleta, an infirm old man of
high standing, in whose behalf a petition for pardon was sent to Washington by
Governor Vigil and others. At the same time District Attorney Blair asked for instructions, since the accused had pleaded lack of
jurisdiction on the part of the court. In reply the
secretary of war for the government took the ground that, while the New Mexican
insurgents might properly be punished even with the death penalty for their
offence against the constituted authorities, they could not be prosecuted for
treason against the United States, since they were not yet citizens. For
similar reasons the president declined to pardon Trujillo, but counselled mercy
in his case. Apparently, he and others convicted at the May term were
discharged or pardoned by Price or the governor; but not, as is stated by some
Writers, by the president.
While Indians from some of the pueblos were aiding the insurgent
Mexicans in their guerilla warfare against the Americans, with aid from various
bands of Apaches and others, the tribes of the
plains—the Comanches, Pawnees, and Arapahoes, incited
and aided, as the Americans believed, by Mexicans—became troublesome from April
to August on the Santa Fé trail. Hardly a party, large or small, traders or
soldiers, crossed the plains without suffering from their depredations. Many
were killed, and large numbers of horses, mules, and oxen were lost. Lieutenant
Love, with a company of dragoons escorting government funds, had five of his
men killed, and lost his animals in June. Later in the year comparative security
was restored by the stationing of troops at different points; and then the
Indians, in their turn, were made the objects of outrage, as when a party of
Pawnees were treacherously massacred at Fort Mann. In the west and north-west
the Navajos had paid no heed to their treaty with Doniphan,
but continued their raids for plunder on the settlements of the Río
Grande.
CHAPTER XVIII.
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