READING HALL

THE DOORS OF WISDOM 2025

HISTORY OF ROME. THE WAR FOR SUPREMACY IN THE WEST

CHAPTER III.

THE FIRST PUNIC WAR, 264-241 B.C.

First Period.—

To the capture of Agrigentum, 262 B.C.

In no country inhabited by Greeks had the national prosperity suffered more than in Sicily by violent and destructive revolutions, by a succession of arbitrary rulers and atrocious tyrants, by the destruction of towns, and by the transplantation or butchery of their inhabitants. Even the older and milder rulers of Syracuse, Gelon and his brother Hiero, practised, with the greatest recklessness, the Asiatic custom of transporting whole nations into new settlements, and the confiscation and new division of land. Their successors—especially the first Dionysius and the infamous Agathocles—vied with the Punic barbarians in cruelties of the most revolting kind. All towns in the island experienced, one after another, the horrors of conquest, plunder, devastation, and the murder or slavery of their inhabitants. The noble temples and works of art of a former age sank in ruins, the walls were repeatedly pulled down and built up again, and the fruitful fields laid waste. We can scarcely imagine how it was that Greek civilization and even a remnant of prosperity could survive these endless calamities; and we should welcome any evidence which might tend to prove that historians depicted in too glaring colours the troubles which were experienced in their own time. But the gradual decline of Greek power in all parts of the island, the growth of barbarism, and the helplessness of the people, are too clearly to be discerned to leave any doubt of the truthfulness of the picture as a whole.

There was no town in the island which during three centuries had been visited by greater calamities than Messana. Messana had been originally a Chalcidian colony, but was seized by a band of Samians and Milesians, who, being expelled from their homes by the Persians, went to Sicily and drove away or enslaved the old inhabitants of the town. Shortly after this the town fell into the hands of Anaxilaos, the tyrant of Rhegium, who introduced new colonists, especially exiled Messanians, and changed the original name of Zankle into Messana. In that devastating war which the Carthaginians carried on with the elder Dionysius, and in which Selinus, Himera, Agrigentum, Gela, and Camarina were destroyed, Messana suffered the same fate, and its inhabitants were scattered in all directions. Rebuilt soon after (396 BC), and peopled with new inhabitants by Dionysius, the town seemed in some measure to have recovered, when it fell (312 BC) into the power of Agathocles. It shared with all the other towns of the island the fate which this tyrant brought on Sicily; yet in spite of the many blows it suffered, it appears to have reached a certain degree of importance and prosperity, which must be attributed in part at least to its unrivalled position in the Sicilian straits. After the fall of Agathocles a new misfortune befell it, and Messana ceased for ever to be a Greek colony. A band of Campanian mercenaries, who called themselves Mamertines, that is, the sons of Mars, and who had fought in the service of the Syracusan tyrants, entered the town, on their way back to Italy, and were hospitably entertained by the inhabitants. But, instead of crossing over to Rhegium, they fell upon and murdered the citizens, and took possession of the place.

Messana was now an independent barbarian town in Sicily. Shortly after, a Roman legion, consisting of Campanians, fellow-countrymen of the Messanian free-booters, imitated their example, and by a similar act of atrocity took possession of Rhegium on the Italian side of the straits. United by relationship and common interests, the pirate states of Messana and Rhegium mutually defended themselves against their common enemies, and were for a time the terror of all surrounding countries, and especially of the Greek towns.

After Rhegium had been conquered by the Romans, the day of punishment seemed to be approaching also for the Mamertines of Messana. Apart from the consideration that the possession of Messana would be a great acquisition to the state of Syracuse, that city, as the foremost Greek community in Sicily, was called upon to avenge the fate of the murdered Messanians, and to exterminate that band of robbers, which made the whole island unsafe. Hiero, the leader of the Syracusan army, was sent against them. He began by ridding himself of a number of his mercenaries who were troublesome or whom he suspected of treason. He placed them in a position where they were exposed to a hostile attack from the enemy, and left them without support, so that they were all cut down. He then enlisted new mercenaries, equipped the militia of Syracuse, and gained a decisive victory over the Mamertines in the field, after which they gave up their predatory excursions and retired within the walls of Messana. The success of Hiero made him master of Syracuse, whose citizens had no means of keeping a victorious general in subjection to the laws of the state. Fortunately, Hiero was not a tyrant like Agathokles. On the whole, he governed as a mild and sagacious politician, and succeeded, under the most difficult circumstances, when placed between the two great belligerent powers of Rome and Carthage, in maintaining the independence of Syracuse, and in securing for his native town during his reign of fifty years a period of reviving prosperity. First of all, he aimed at expelling the Italian barbarians from Sicily, and at establishing his power in the east of the island by the conquest of Messana. The Mamertines had taken the part of the Carthaginians during the invasion of Pyrrhus in Sicily, and with their assistance had successfully defended Messana. The attack of Hiero, who in some measure was at the head of the Greeks, as the successor of Pyrrhus, forced the Mamertines to seek aid from a foreign power, after their most faithful confederates, the mutineers of Rhegium, had perished by the sword of the Romans or the axe of the executioner. They had only the choice between Carthage and Rome. Each of these states had its party in Messana. The Romans were further off than the Carthaginians, and perhaps the Mamertines were afraid to ask for protection from those who had so severely punished the Campanian freebooters of Rhegium. A troop of Carthaginians under Hanno was therefore admitted into the citadel of Messana, and thus the long-cherished wish of Carthage for the dominion over the whole of Sicily seemed near its fulfillment.

Of the three strongest and most important places in Sicily, they had now Lilybaeum and Messana in their possession, and thus their communication with Africa and Italy was secured. Syracuse, the third town of importance, was very much reduced and weakened, and seemed incapable of any protracted resistance. Carthage had long been In friendly relations with Rome, and these relations had during the war of Pyrrhus taken the form of a complete military alliance. Carthage and Rome had, apparently, the same interests, the same friends, and the same enemies. On the continent of Italy, Rome had subjected to herself all the Greek settlements. What could be more natural or more fair than that the fruits of the victory over Pyrrhus in Sicily should be reaped by Carthage? The straits of Messana were the natural boundary between the commercial city, the mistress of the seas and islands, and the continental empire of the Romans, whose dominion seemed to have found its legitimate termination in Tarentum and Rhegium.

But the friendship between Rome and Carthage, which had arisen out of their common danger, was weakened after their common victory and was shaken after the defeat of Pyrrhus at Beneventum. It was by no means clear that Carthage was free from all desire of gaining possessions in Italy. The Romans at least were jealous of their allies, and had stipulated in the treaty with Carthage, in the year 348 BC, that the Carthaginians should not found or hold any fortresses in Latium or indeed in any part of the Roman dominions. They showed the same jealousy when in the war with Pyrrhus a Carthaginian fleet entered the Tiber, ostensibly for the assistance of Rome, by declining the proffered aid. When a Carthaginian fleet showed itself before Tarentum in 272 BC, and seemed about to anticipate the Romans in the occupation of this town, they complained formally of a hostile intention on the part of the Carthaginians. The Carthaginians denied having this intention, but the Romans nevertheless had good reason to be on their guard, and to entertain fear of Carthaginian interference in the affairs of Italy as well as jealousy of their powerful neighbour, who had now got a firm footing in Spain and governed all the islands of the Sardinian and Tyrrhenian seas. While this feeling was prevalent in Rome, an embassy came from the Mamertines, commissioned to deliver over to Rome Messana and the territory belonging to it, a present which indeed involved the necessity of first clearing the town of the Carthaginians and then of defending it against them. The Carthaginians, it appears, had made themselves obnoxious since they had had possession of the citadel of Messana, and the Roman party felt itself strong enough to take the bold step of invoking the aid of the Romans.

But for Rome the decision was a difficult one. There could hardly be any doubt that to grant the request to the Mamertines would be to declare war against Carthage and Syracuse, and that such a war would tax the resources of the nation to the utmost. In addition to this the proposal of the Mamertines was by no means honourable to Rome. A band of robbers offered dominion over a town which they had seized by the most outrageous act of violence; and this offer was made to the Romans, who so recently had put to death the accomplices of the Mamertines for a similar treachery towards Rhegium. Moreover, the assistance of the Romans was called in against Hiero of Syracuse, to whom they were indebted for aid in the siege of Rhegium, and at the same time against the Carthaginians, their allies in the scarcely terminated war with Pyrrhus. Long and earnest were the deliberations in the Roman senate; and when at length the prospect of extension of power outweighed all moral considerations, the people also voted for an undertaking which seemed to promise abundant spoils and gain. However, if the decision was not exactly honourable, neither could it, from the Roman point of view, be condemned. The surprise of Messana by the Mamertines was, as far as Rome was concerned, different from the act of the Campanian legion in Rhegium; the latter, being in the service of the Romans, had broken their military oath, and had been guilty of mutiny and open rebellion. On the other hand, the Mamertines in Sicily were, as regarded the Romans, an independent foreign people. They had wronged neither Rome nor Roman allies or subjects. However atrocious their act had been, the Romans were not entitled to take them to account for it, nor called upon to forego any political advantages merely because they disapproved of the deed. The unblushing desire for extension and conquest needed no excuse or justification in antiquity; and Rome in particular, by reason of her former history and organization, could not stop short in her career of conquest, and pause for moral scruples at the Sicilian straits.

A new era begins in the history of Rome with the first crossing of the legions into Sicily. The obscurity which rested on the wars of Rome with Sabellians and Greeks disappears not gradually but suddenly. The Arcadian Polybius, one of the most trustworthy of ancient writers, and at the same time an experienced politician, has left us a history of the First Punic War drawn from contemporary sources, especially Philinus and Fabius Pictor, written with so much fullness that now, for the first time, we feel a confidence in the details of Roman history which imparts true interest to the events related and a real worth to the narrative.

The first war with Carthage lasted twenty-three years, from 264 to 241 BC. The long duration of the struggle showed that the combatants were not unequally matched. The strength of Rome lay in the warlike qualities of her citizens and subjects. Carthage was immeasurably superior in wealth. If money were the most important thing in war, Rome would have succumbed. But in the long war, which dried up the most abundant resources, the difference between rich and poor gradually disappeared, and Carthage was sooner exhausted than Rome, which had never been wealthy. The difference in the financial position of the two states was the more important, as the war was carried on not only by land but also by sea, and the equipment of fleets was more expensive than that of land armies, especially for a state like Rome, which now for the first time appeared as a maritime power. It must not, however, be forgotten that the naval and financial strength of all the Greek towns in Italy, and also of Syracuse, was at the disposal of the Romans. If they are less frequently mentioned in the course of the war than might be expected, it is due to the usual custom of historians, who, out of national pride, pass over in silence the assistance rendered by subordinate allies. The prize of the war, the beautiful island of Sicily, was gained by the victorious Romans. But this was not the only result. The superiority of Rome over Carthage was shown, and the war in Sicily, great and important as it was, was only the prelude to the greater and more important struggle which established the dominion of Rome on the ruins of Carthage.

The carrying out of the decree to give the Mamertines the desired assistance was intrusted to the consul Appius Claudius Caudex, while the second consul was still in Etruria, bringing to an end the war with Volsinii. Appius proved himself equal to the task in the council as well as in the field. Although the war with Carthage and Syracuse was, by the decision of the Roman people, practically begun, no formal declaration was made. Appius dispatched to Rhegium his legate C. Claudius, who crossed over to Messana, with the ostensible object of settling the difficulty that had arisen, and invited the commander of the Carthaginian garrison in the citadel to a conference with the assembled Mamertines. On this occasion, the Roman honour did not appear in a very advantageous light by the side of the much abused Punic faithlessness. The Carthaginian general, who had come down from the citadel without a guard, was taken prisoner, and was weak enough to give orders to his men for evacuating the fortress. The Roman party had clearly gained the upper hand in Messana, since they felt assured of the assistance of Rome.

Thus Rome obtained possession of Messana, even before the consul and the two legions had crossed the straits. It was now the duty of the Carthaginian admiral, who was in the neighbourhood with a fleet, to prevent their landing in Sicily. But Appius Claudius crossed during the night without loss or difficulty, and thus, at the very beginning of the war, the sea, on which hitherto Carthage had exercised uncontrolled dominion, favoured the Romans. The experience of the war throughout was to the same effect. On the whole, Rome, though a continental power, showed itself equal to the maritime power of Carthage, and was in the end enabled by a great naval victory to dictate peace.

In possession of Messana, and at the head of two legions, Appius followed up his advantage with ability and boldness. Hiero and the Carthaginians had been obliged, by the decisive act of the Romans, to make common cause together. Per the first time after 200 years of hostility, Syracuse entered into a league with her hereditary enemies the Greeks. But the friendship was not to be of long duration, thanks to the rapid success of Rome. No sooner had Appius landed than he attacked Hiero, and so terrified him that he immediately lost courage, and hurried back to Syracuse. Thus the league was practically dissolved. Appius then attacked the Carthaginians, and the result was, that they gave up the siege. After Messana was in this manner placed out of danger, Appius assumed the offensive. With one blow the whole of Sicily seemed to have fallen into his power. On the one side he penetrated as far as Syracuse, and on the other to the Carthaginian frontier. The Roman soldiers were doubtless rewarded with rich spoils; and this seemed to justify the decision of the people, who had consented to the war partly in the hope of such gain. But Syracuse, which had gloriously resisted so many enemies, was not to be taken at a run. Appius Claudius was obliged to return to Messana, after experiencing great dangers, which he could escape only by perfidy and cunning. The conquest of this town, therefore, was the only lasting success of the first campaign which Rome had undertaken beyond the sea.

In the following year, the war in Sicily was carried on with two consular armies, that is, four legions, a force of at least 36,000 men, consisting in equal parts of Romans and allies. This army seems small when we compare the numbers which are reported to have been engaged in the former wars of Carthaginians and Greeks in Sicily. It is said that at Himera (480 BC) 300,000 Carthaginians were engaged; Dionysius repeatedly led armies of 100,000 men into the field, and now there was a force of only four legions against the combined army of Carthaginians and Greeks. We shall do well to test the huge exaggerations of the earlier traditions by the more credible account given by Polybius of the Roman military force. The Greeks were, it is true, in the third century much reduced, and their force was probably only a shadow of their early armies; but the Carthaginians were now at the very zenith of their power, and had certainly reason to pursue the war in Sicily in good earnest.

On the appearance of the Roman army, the Sicilian cities, one after another, deserted the cause of Hiero and the Carthaginians, and joined the Romans, so that the latter, without a struggle, obtained possession of the greater part of the island, and now turned against Syracuse. Then Hiero saw that, in concluding an alliance with Carthage, he had made a great mistake, and that it was high time to alter his policy. His subjects shared his desire for peace with Rome, and therefore it could not be a difficult task to arrive at an agreement, especially as it was in the interest of the Romans to break up the alliance between Carthage and Syracuse, and, by friendship with Hiero, to have the chief resources of the island at their disposal. Hiero accordingly concluded a peace with Rome for fifteen years, engaged to deliver up the prisoners of war, to pay the sum of a hundred talents, and to place himself completely in the position of a dependent ally. The Romans owed a considerable part of their success to the faithful services rendered by Hiero during the whole course of the war. He was never tired of furnishing supplies of all kinds, and thus he relieved them of part of their anxiety for the maintenance of their troops. Nor was the Roman alliance less useful to Hiero.

It is true he reigned over Syracuse only by the permission and protection of Rome, and the city suffered grievously from the long continuation of the war. Nevertheless, it recovered from its declining state; and Hiero, emulating his predecessors Gelo, Hiero, and Dionysius, could display before his countrymen all the magnificence of a Greek prince, and appear as a candidate for the prizes in the Greek national games.

The Carthaginians could not maintain their advanced Decline of position in the neighbourhood of Messana, in front of the two Roman consular armies, although no engagement power in seems to have taken place. The towns also, which had hitherto been on their side, joined the Romans. Even Segesta, the old and faithful ally of Carthage in Sicily, made use of its alleged Trojan origin, to ask favourable conditions from Some, and killed the Carthaginian garrison as a proof of its attachment to its new ally. Thus, in a short time, and without much exertion, the Romans gained a position in Sicily which the Carthaginians had for centuries aimed at in vain.

Compared with the rapid and successful action of the Romans in the beginning of the war, the movements of the Carthaginians appear to have been singularly slow and weak. Before the breaking out of hostilities, the advantage had been decidedly on their side. They had military possession of Messana; with their fleet they so completely commanded the straits that in the conscious pride of their superiority their admiral declared that the Romans should not without his permission even wash their hands in the sea. The resources of almost the whole of Sicily were at their disposal, and the communication with Africa was at all times secure. Whether the important city of Messana was lost by the incapacity or timidity of Hanno, who paid with his life for his evacuation of the citadel, or through an exaggerated fear of a breach with Rome, or by confidence in Roman moderation, it is not possible to decide. Nor do we know how the Romans were able, in the face of a hostile fleet, to cross the straits with an army of 10,000 men, and in the year after with double that number. It seems that this could not have been easy even with the assistance of the ships of Rhegium, Tarentum, Neapolis, Locri, and other Greek towns in Italy, for even the assembling of these ships in the straits might have been prevented. The small strip of water which separates Sicily from Italy was sufficient in modern times to limit the French power to the continent, and, under the protection of the English fleet, to save Sicily for the Bourbons. How was it that the same straits, even at the first trial, caused the Romans no greater difficulties than any broad river? Was the Carthaginian fleet too small to prevent their crossing by force? Was it the result simply of negligence, or of one of the innumerable circumstances which place warlike operations by sea so far beyond all calculation? Apparently, Carthage did not expect a war with Rome, and was wholly unprepared for it. This may be inferred with tolerable certainty, not only from the result of their first encounter with the Romans in Messana, but also from the fact that in the second year of the war they left Hiero unsupported, and thus com­pelled him to throw himself into the arms of the Romans.

The gravity of their position was now apparent, and them to make preparations for the third campaign on a more extensive scale. For the basis of their operations they chose Agrigentum. This town, which since its conquest and destruction by the Carthaginians in the year 405, had alternately been under Carthaginian and Syracusan dominion, had by the aid of Timoleon acquired a precarious independence, but had never recovered its former splendour. Situated on a rocky plateau surrounded by steep precipices at the confluence of the brooks Hypsos and Akragas, it was naturally so strong as to appear impregnable at a time when the art of besieging cities was so little advanced; but as it was not immediately on the coast and had no harbour, it was impossible to supply it with provisions by sea. It is therefore strange that the Carthaginians should choose just this town for their basis, instead of their strongest fortress, Lilybaeum. Probably, the choice was determined by the closer vicinity of Syracuse and Messana, the conquest of which they had by no means ceased to hope for.

The consuls for the year 262, L. Postumius Megellus and Q. Mamilius Vitulus, marched with all their forces against Agrigentum, where Hannibal was stationed for the protection of the magazines with an army of mercenaries so inferior in numbers that he could not hazard a battle. They set to work in the slow and tedious mode of attack which they had learnt in Latium and Samnium, and which, when they had superior numbers at their command, could not fail eventually to lead to success. Outside the town they established two fortified camps in the east and the west, and united these by a double line of trenches, so that they were secured against sallies from the besieged as well as from any attacks of an army that might come to relieve the town. After they had cut off all communications, they quietly awaited the effects of hunger, which could not fail soon to show themselves. By the prompt assistance of their Sicilian allies, especially of Hiero, they were amply supplied with provisions, which were collected by them in the neighbouring town of Erbessus.

But when, after five months’ siege, a Carthaginian army under Hanno marched from Heraclea to relieve the town, the situation of the Romans began to be serious, especially after Hanno had succeeded in taking the town of Erbessus with all the stores in it. The besiegers now experienced almost as much distress as the besieged. They began to suffer want and privation, although Hiero did all that was possible to send them new supplies. An attack on the town promised as little success as one on the army of Hanno, who had taken up a strong position on a hill in the immediate neighbourhood of the Romans. The consuls already thought of raising the siege, which had lasted almost seven months, when fire signals from the town, giving notice of the increasing distress of the besieged, induced Hanno to offer battle. With the courage of despair, the Romans accepted it, and obtained a decisive and brilliant victory. The Carthaginians, it appears, now for the first time made use of elephants, which they had learnt to apply to the purposes of war during either the invasion of Agathocles in Africa or of Pyrrhus in Sicily. But these animals seem on this occasion, as on many others, to have done more harm than good. Almost all fell into the hands of the Romans. The fragments of the Carthaginian army fled to Heraclea, leaving their camp, with rich spoils, to the victorious army.

In the night following this victory, Hannibal took advantage of the exhaustion and confusion in the Roman army secretly to leave Agrigentum and to slip away unnoticed over the Roman lines. In this manner, he saved at least a part of his army, after it had been materially weakened by hunger and desertion. But the miserable inhabitants of the town, who doubtless had unwillingly shared in the struggle and in the horrors of a seven months’ siege, were doomed to pay the penalty for the escape of the Carthaginians. They were all sold as slaves, and so for the second time the splendid city of Akragas perished, after it had nearly recovered from the devastation caused by the Carthaginians. But new settlers soon gathered again on this favoured spot. Even in the course of the same war, Agrigentum became again the theatre of some hardly-contested struggles between Carthaginians and Romans; and not until it had been conquered and laid waste in the wars with Hannibal for the third time did it cease to exist as a Greek town. With such persistent energy did the Greeks cling to the spots where they had set up their household hearths and their temples, and where they had intrusted to the mother earth the ashes of their dead.

The siege of Agrigentum is the first event in the military history of Rome which is historically authenticated not only in its final result but to some extent also in the details of its progress. The earlier descriptions of battles are altogether fancy pictures. Even of the battle of Heraclea, the first in the war with Pyrrhus which is related intelligibly, we cannot tell for certain how far the narrators made use of the notes of Pyrrhus or of other contemporaries and how much they actually invented. Hence we may measure the amount of benefit to be obtained from studying the details of Roman military operations in the Samnite or Volceian wars, and the innumerable descrip­tions of sieges and battles given by Livy.

The Romans had sat down before Agrigentum in the early part of summer. At the end of the year the consuls returned to Messana. Their losses in the battles, and from privations and sickness during a tedious siege, had been very great; but a glorious success had been gained.

Sicily, with the exception of only a few fortresses, was entirely subdued; and the Romans, it would seem, now began for the first time to aim at a higher object than that which they had had in view at the beginning of the war. Their ambition was now no longer restrained to keeping the Carthaginians out of Messana. The prospect was opening before them of acquiring the whole of Sicily; and the prize which after centuries of bloody wars was not' attained by their haughty rival, which the rulers of Syracuse and lastly the King of Epirus had vainly aimed at, appeared after a short conflict about to fall into the hands of the Roman legions as the reward of their courage and perseverance.

Second Period, 261-255B.C.

THE FIRST ROMAN FLEET. MYLAY. ECONOMUS.  REGULUS IN AFRICA

Under these circumstances, the Romans boldly resolved to meet the enemy on his own element; and indeed, there was no other alternative, if they did not intend to retire from the contest with disgrace. Rome was obliged to encounter Carthage at sea, not merely if she wished to overthrow and humiliate her rival, but if she meant to hold her own ground.

The success which attended the first great naval engagement of the Romans, and which surpassed all expectations, inspired them with an enthusiasm which imparted fresh strength to their national pride. New honours and a permanent monument commemorated the victory which restored the wavering fortunes of war even on that element on which the Romans had never before ventured to meet their enemies nor to hope for success. For this reason the resolution of the Romans to build a large fleet, and their first naval victory, were favorite topics for the patriotic historians, and exaggerated accounts were the consequence. To make the effort of the nation still more conspicuous, it was asserted that the Romans had never ventured on the sea before, that they had not possessed a single ship of war, and were wholly and entirely ignorant of the art of building ships, or of fitting them out and using them for military purposes. That this is a great error it is hardly necessary to say. Though Rome originally had no fleet worth mentioning, and left to the Etruscans the trade as well as the dominion at sea, still, by the conquest of Antium she acquired ships and a serviceable harbour. Since the treaty with Naples, in the second Samnite war, she had Greek seamen and Greek ship-builders at her disposal. At the same time she sent out ships to make hostile invasions in Campania. In the year 311 two Roman admirals are mentioned, and, as we have seen, the war with Tarentum had been caused by the appearance of a Roman fleet before the harbour of that town. The assertion that the Romans were utterly ignorant of maritime affairs becomes thus unintelligible. The error is quite evident, and warns us against accepting without examination the other accounts of the building and the manning of the first Roman fleet.

The truth which lies at the root of the narrative is this,  that the Romans in the beginning of the war in Sicily had neglected their navy. They were never fond of the sea. While the mariners of other nations challenged the dangers of the high seas with enthusiasm, the Romans never trusted themselves without trembling to that inconstant element, on which their firm courage did not supply the want of skill and natural aptitude. They had therefore failed to take advantage of the opportunity which the possession of the harbour of Antium offered to them of keeping up a moderately respectable fleet. They probably laid the burden of the naval wars as much as they could on their Greek and Etruscan allies, and they may have hoped at the beginning of the Punic war that they would never need a fleet for any other object than for crossing over to Sicily. The impossibility of entertaining such an idea any longer was now proved, and they were obliged to make up their minds to meet the masters of the sea on their own element.

The narrative of the building of the first Roman fleet is hardly less a story of wonder than those of the regal period; and had the incident been recorded a few generations earlier, benevolent gods would have appeared, to build ships for the Romans and to guide them on the rolling waves. But Polybius was a rationalist. He believed in no divine interference, and he relates the wonderful in a manner that excites astonishment, but does not contradict the laws of nature. The decision of the Roman senate to build a fleet was not carried out, it is said, without the greatest difficulty. The Romans were utterly unacquainted with the art of building the quinqueremes—large ships of war with five benches for rowers, one above the other, which formed the strength of the Carthaginian fleets. They knew only triremes—smaller ships with three benches for rowers, such as formerly had been used among the Greeks. They would, therefore, have been obliged to give up the idea of building a fleet, if a stranded Carthaginian quinquereme had not fallen into their hands, which they used as a model. They set to work with such zeal that, within two months after the felling of the wood, a fleet of one hundred quinqueremes and thirty triremes was ready to be launched. They were maimed by Roman citizens and Italian allies who had never before handled an oar, and in order to gain time these men were exercised on the land to make the movements necessary in rowing, to keep time, and to understand the word of command. After a little practice on board the ships, these crews were able to go out to sea, and to challenge the boldest, the most experienced, and most dreaded seamen of their time.

We cannot help receiving this description with some hesitation and doubt. That it was utterly impossible to build within the short space of sixty days a ship capable of holding three hundred rowers and one hundred and twenty soldiers, we will not exactly maintain, as we know too little of the structure of those ships, and as old historians who did know it thought that the feat was wonderful, and even hardly credible, but not positively impossible. It is, however, surely a different thing when the story asserts that an entire fleet of one hundred and twenty ships was built in so short a time. Extensive dockyards, and the necessary number of skilled ship-carpenters, might perhaps be found in a town like Carthage, where ship­building was practised and carried on on a large scale all the year round. These conditions did not exist in Rome; and we may therefore well ask whether it is probable that all the ships of the new fleet were now newly built and built in Rome, and, further, whether in the Etruscan towns, in Naples, Elea, Rhegium, Tarentum, Locri, and, above all, in Syracuse and Messana, there were no ships ready for use, or whether it was impossible to build any in these places. Surely this would be in the highest degree surprising. We know that the Romans availed themselves without scruple of the resources of their allies, and we see no reason why they should have done so less now than at the breaking out of the war, when they made use of the Greek ships for crossing over to Sicily.

We believe, therefore, in spite of the account of Polybius, that the greater portion of the ships of the Roman fleet came from Greek and Etruscan towns, and were manned by Greeks and Etruscans. The latter supposition is even more forced upon us than the former. A few rowers may have been drilled in the way indicated, and mixed up with old, experienced seamen; but how anyone can possibly imagine that the ships were entirely manned by crews who had learnt rowing on land is incomprehensible. We should have to consider the art of navigation of the ancients as in the highest degree contemptible; we should not be able to understand how the historians could speak of naval powers and of a dominion of the sea; how her fleet could be said to constitute the glory, security, and greatness of Carthage, if it had been possible for a continental power like Rome, without any preparation or assistance, in two months to find ships, captains, and sailors who on their first encounter were more than a match for the oldest naval empire. If we bear in mind that it was a common practice among the Roman historians to appropriate to themselves the merits of their allies, we shall with the less hesitation doubt the boastful stories which tell us how the first fleet was built, and we shall in the end venture to suspect that a greater, and perhaps much the greater, part of the credit belongs to the Etruscans and to the Italian and Sicilian Greeks.

The first undertaking of the Roman fleet was a failure. The consul Cn. Cornelius Scipio sailed with a detachment consisting of seventeen ships to Sicily, and was incautious enough to enter the harbour of the small island of Lipara, which had been represented to him as ready to revolt from Carthage. But a Carthaginian squadron which lay in the neighbourhood, and blocked up the harbour in the night, took the consul’s ships and their crews, and, instead of the expected glory, Scipio obtained only the nickname of Asina.

This loss was soon after repaired. The Carthaginian admiral, Hannibal, the defender of Agrigentum, emboldened by this easy success, sailed with a squadron of fifty ships towards the Roman fleet, which was advancing along the coast of Italy from the north. But he was suddenly surprised by it, attacked, and put to flight, with the loss of the greater part of his ships. After this preliminary trial of strength, the Roman fleet arrived in the harbour of Messana; and as the consul Scipio, who was to have taken the command of the fleet, was made prisoner, his colleague, Caius Duilius, gave the command of the land army to his subordinate officer, and without delay led the Roman against the Carthaginian fleet, which was devastating the coast in the neighbourhood of Pelorus, the north-eastern promontory of Sicily. The enemies met off Mylae, and here was fought the first battle at sea, which was to decide whether the Roman state should be confined to Italy, or whether it should gradually extend itself to all the islands and coasts of the Mediterranean—a sea which they were now to prove themselves entitled to speak of as emphatically ‘their own’. It is said that the Carthaginian fleet, under the command of Hannibal, consisted of one hundred and thirty ships. It had therefore ten more ships than the Roman. Each of these was without doubt far superior to the Roman ships in the manner of sailing, in agility and speed, but more especially in the skill of the captains and sailors, even though, as we suppose, a great number of the Roman vessels were built and manned by Greeks. The tactics of ancient naval warfare consisted chiefly in running the ships against the broadside of the hostile ships, and either sinking them by the force of the collision, or brushing away the mass of bristling oars. For this purpose the prows had under the water-line sharp iron prongs called beaks (rostra), which penetrated the timbers of the enemy’s ships. It was, therefore, of the greatest importance for each captain to have his ship so completely under his control as to be able to turn about, to advance, or retreat with the greatest rapidity, and to watch and seize the favourable moment for the decisive rush. To fight from the deck with arrows and other missiles could, in this species of tactics, be only of subordinate importance, and therefore there was only a small number of soldiers on board the ships by the side of the rowers.

The Romans were well aware of the superiority of the Carthaginians in maritime tactics. They could, not hope to vie with them in this respect. They therefore hit upon a plan for supplying their want of skill at sea, by a mode of fighting which should place not ship against ship, but man against man, and which in a certain way should make the sea-fight very much like a battle on land. They invented the boarding-bridges. On the fore part of the ship, against a mast twenty-four feet high, a ladder thirty-sis feet long was fixed, twelve feet above the deck, in such a manner that it could be moved up and down as well as sideways. This drawing up and down was effected by means of a rope which passed from the end of the ladder through a ring at the top of the mast on to the deck. How the horizontal movements were produced does not appear from the account of Polybius, who fails also to explain how the lower end of the ladder, which was fixed to the mast twelve feet above the deck, could be reached. Perhaps there was a second part to the ladder fixed to it with hinges, leading from the deck up towards the mast, and serving at the same time to move the ladder all-round the mast. The ladder was so broad that two soldiers could stand abreast on it. Railings right and left served as a protection against missiles and against the danger of falling. At the end of the ladder was a strong pointed hook bent downwards. If the enemy approached near enough, they had only to let go the rope which held the ladder upright. If it fell on the deck of the hostile ship, the hook penetrated the timbers and held the two ships together. Then the soldiers ran from the deck along the ladder to board, and the sea-fight became a hand-to-hand engagement.

When the Carthaginians under Hannibal perceived the Roman fleet, they bore down upon it and began the battle, confident of an easy victory. But they were sadly disappointed. The boarding-bridges answered perfectly. Fifty Carthaginian vessels were taken or destroyed, and a great number of prisoners were made. Hannibal himself escaped with difficulty and had to abandon his flag-ship, a huge vessel of seven rows of oars, taken in the late war from King Pyrrhus. The remainder of the Carthaginian vessels took to flight. If the joy at this first glorious victory was great, it was fully justified. The honour of a triumph was awarded to Duilius; and the story goes that he was permitted to prolong this triumph throughout his whole life by causing himself to be accompanied by a flute-player and a torch-bearer whenever he returned home of an evening from a banquet. A column, decorated with the beaks of conquered ships and with an inscription celebrating the victory, was erected on the Forum as a memorial of the battle.

This decisive victory of the Romans happened just in time to restore the fortune of war, which had seriously gone against them in Sicily. Most of the towns on the coast and many in the interior had fallen, as we have seen, during the preceding year, into the hands of the enemy. The Carthaginians were now besieging Segesta, to revenge themselves for the treachery of the Segestans, who had murdered the Carthaginian garrison and given the town over to the Romans. During the consul’s absence from the army the military tribune C. Cascilius had attempted to assist the town, but was surprised and suffered much loss. The greater part of the Roman army in Sicily lay in Segesta. It was, therefore, very fortunate that Duilius was able, after his victory at Mylae, to take the soldiers from the ships and relieve this town. With the army thus set free, he was able to conquer some towns, as for instance Macella, and to put other friendly cities in a state of defence.             

Since the fall of Agrigentum, the command of the Carthaginian troops in Sicily had been in the hands of Hamilcar, not the celebrated Hamilcar the father of Hannibal, but a man not unlike his namesake in enterprising spirit and ability. It was probably owing to him that during these years the Carthaginians did not lose Sicily. He succeeded in so far counteracting the effect of the Roman victories at Agrigentum and Mylae as to make it doubtful to which side the fortune of war was turning. These exploits of Hamilcar cannot be given in detail, as the report of Philinus, who wrote the history of the war from the Carthaginian point of view, has been lost, and as the order of time in which the events succeeded each other is also doubtful. Still, the grand form of Hamilcar stands out in such bold relief that we recognize in him one of the greatest generals of that period. In the outset he sacrificed a part of his mutinous mercenaries after the manner which we have already seen applied by Dionysius and Hiero. He sent them to attack the town of Entella, after having first warned the Roman garrison of their approach, and thus attained a double advantage, inasmuch as he got rid of the inconvenient mercenaries, and, as despair made them fight bravely, he inflicted considerable injury on the Romans. This faithless proceeding, which, as we have seen, was by no means unheard of or exceptional, shows how dangerous for both sides was the relation between mercenaries and their commanders. On the one side, instead of patriotism, faithfulness, and devotion, we find among the soldiers a spirit of rapacity, hardly restrained by military discipline; on the other we observe cold calculation and heartlessness, which saw in a soldier no kinsman, citizen, or brother, but an instrument of war purchasable for a certain sum, and worthy of no considerations but those which called for the preservation of valuable property.

With quite as much harshness, though with less cruelty, Hamilcar treated the inhabitants of the old town of Eryx. This town of the Elymi, at first friendly to the Punians and then subject to them, appears to have been exposed to the attacks of the Romans because it was not situated immediately on the coast. Hamilcar razed it to the ground, and sent the inhabitants away to the neigh­bouring promontory, Drepana, where he built a new fortified town, which, with the neighbouring town of Lilybaeum, formed as it were a common system of defence, and subsequently proved its strength by a long-continued resistance to the persevering attacks of the Romans. Of the venerable town of Eryx there remained only the temple of Venus, the building of which was attributed to Aeneas, the son of the goddess.

After Hamilcar had thus covered his retreat, he proceeded to the attack. We have already heard of the siege of Segesta. The victory of the Romans at Mylae saved Segesta, after it had been driven to the utmost distress. But in the neighborhood of Thermae, Hamilcar succeeded in inflicting a great blow. He surprised a portion of the Roman army, and killed 4,000 men. The consequences of the victory at Mylae appear to have been confined to the raising of the siege of Segesta. The Romans did not succeed in taking the little fortress of Myttistratum (now called Mistrella) on the northern coast of Sicily. In spite of the greatest possible exertions, they had to retreat, at the end of a seven months’ siege, with heavy losses. They lost, further, a number of Sicilian towns, the greater part of which, it appears, went over voluntarily to the Carthaginians. Among these is mentioned the important town of Camarina in the immediate neighborhood of Syracuse, and even Enna, in the middle of the island, the town sacred to Ceres and Proserpina (Demeter and Persephone) the protecting goddesses of Sicily. The hill Camicus, where the citadel of Agrigentum stood, fell also again into the power of the Carthaginians, who would indeed, according to the report of Zonaras, have again subdued the whole of Sicily if the consul of 259, C. Aquillius Floras, had not wintered in the island, instead of returning to Rome with his legions, according to the usual custom after the end of the summer campaign.

In the following year fortune began once more to smile on the Romans. Both consuls, A. Atilius Calatinus and C. Sulpicius Paterculas, went to Sicily. They succeeded Romans in retaking the most important of the places which had revolted, especially Camarina and Enna, together with Myttistratum, which had just been so obstinately defended. At the conquest of this town, which had cost them so much, the resentment among the Roman soldiers was such that, after the secret retreat of the Carthaginian garrison, they fell on the helpless inhabitants, and murdered them without mercy, until the consul put an end to their ferocity by promising them, as part of their spoil, all the men whose lives they would spare. The inhabitants of Camarina were sold as slaves. We do not read that this was the fate of Enna; but this town could not expect an easier lot, unless it redeemed its former treason by now betraying the Carthaginian garrison into the hands of the Romans. From these scanty details we can form some idea of the indescribable misery which this bloody war brought upon Sicily.

The successes of Hamilcar in Sicily, in the year 259, were, it appears, to be attributed in part to the circumstance that the Romans after the battle of Mylae had sent L. Cornelius Scipio, one of the consuls of the year 259, to Corsica, in the hope of driving the Carthaginians quite out of the Tyrrhenian sea. On this island the Carthaginians had, as far as we know, no settlements or possessions. Still they must have had in the town of Aleria a station for their fleet, whence they could constantly alarm and threaten Italy. Aleria fell into the hands of the Romans, and thus the whole island was cleared of the Carthaginians. From thence Scipio sailed to Sardinia; but here nothing was done. Roth Carthaginians and Romans avoided an encounter, and Scipio returned home. This expedition to Corsica and Sardinia, which Polybius, probably on account of its insignificance and its failure, does not even mention, was for the Cornelian house a sufficient occasion to celebrate Scipio as a conqueror and hero. They were justified in saying that he took Aleria; and as the expulsion of the Carthaginians from Corsica followed, he might he regarded as the conqueror of Corsica, though in truth Corsica was not occupied by the Romans till after the peace with Carthage. Accordingly these exploits are noticed on the second grave-stone in the series of monuments belonging to the family of the Scipios, with the first of which we have already become acquainted. From this modesty, which confined itself to the real facts, we cannot help inferring that the inscription was composed shortly after the death of Scipio, when the memory of his deeds was fresh, and a great exaggeration could hardly be ventured upon. If it had not been so, and if the ascription had had a later origin, there is nothing more certain than that in this, as in that of the father, great untruths would have been introduced. This becomes quite evident from the additions which we find in later authors, and which can have originated only in the family traditions of the Scipios. Valerius Maximus, Orosius, and Silius Italicus mention a second campaign of Scipio in Sardinia, in which he besieged and conquered Olbia, defeated Hanno, the Carthaginian general, and displayed his magnanimity by causing his body to be interred with all honours. He then gained possession without difficulty of a number of hostile towns by a peculiar stratagem, and finally, as the Capitoline fasti testify, celebrated a magnificent triumph. These additions, of which neither the epitaph of Scipio, nor Zonaras, nor Polybius know anything, are nothing more than empty inventions. Moreover, we see from Polybius and Zonaras, that, in the year before Scipio’s consulate, Hannibal, not Hanno, had the command in Sardinia. When the former, in the year following (258), had been blocked up in a harbour in Sardinia by the consul Sulpicius, and, after losing many of his ships, had been murdered by his own mutinous soldiers, Hanno received the command of the Carthaginians in Sardinia, and could not therefore have been conquered, slain, and buried by Scipio the year before.

The year 258 had restored the superiority of the Romans in Sicily. They had conquered Camarina, Enna, Myttistratum, and many other towns, and driven back Hamilcar to the west side of the island. The expeditions which they had undertaken against Corsica and Sardinia had also been on the whole successful. The power of Carthage in the Tyrrhenian sea was weakened, and Italy for the present secure against any hostile fleet. To these successes was added in the following year a glorious battle by sea (257 B.C.) at Tyndaris, on the northern coast of Sicily. It was no decisive victory, for both parties claimed an advantage. Still it inspired the Romans with new confidence in their navy. It induced them to enlarge their fleet, and to prosecute the naval war on a larger scale. It prompted the bold idea of removing the seat of war into the enemy's country, and of attacking Africa instead of protecting Italy against the Carthaginian invasions. Whether their hopes went further, whether they had already conceived the scheme which Scipio succeeded in carrying out at the end of the second war with Carthage, that of aiming a deadly blow at the very centre of Carthaginian power, and so bringing the struggle to a conclusion, would be difficult to prove. In that case they would have estimated the strength of Carthage much too low, and their own powers too high?

Efforts were now made in Rome to fit out an armament. A fleet of 330 ships of war sailed to Sicily, took on board an army of about 10,000 men, consisting of two consular armies, and sailed along the south coast of Sicily westwards, under the command of the two consuls, M. Atilius Regulus and L. Manlius Vulso. Between the promontory of Ecnomus and the town of Heraclea the Romans met a Carthaginian fleet still stronger than their own, under the command of Hamilcar and Hanno, whose object was to obstruct their way to Africa. If we may rely on the accounts of Polybius, there was here an army of 140,000 Romans, opposed to 150,000 Carthaginians. But it is hardly credible that the Carthaginian ships should have had an army on board equal to that of the Romans, as the latter intended a descent on Africa, and had their whole land force, i.e. four double legions, with them. The Carthaginians would have had no object in encumbering their ships to that extent, especially as their tactics did not consist so much in boarding as in disabling their enemies’ ships, and as they endeavoured in every way to avoid the Roman boarding-ladders. We have no Carthaginian authority to test the report of Roman witnesses that the fleet of Hamilcar consisted of 350 ships. There is, then, no choice left but to follow Polybius, who has described the battle at Ecnomus with such clearness and accuracy of detail that nothing more can be desired.

The Carthaginian fleet advanced from the west in a single long extended front, which stretched from the coast far out into the sea, and only on the left wing formed an angle, by one detachment being placed rather in advance. The Roman fleet, consisting of four divisions, formed with three of them a hollow triangle, the point of which, headed by the consuls in person, was directed against the Carthaginian line. The quinqueremes, which formed the base of the triangle, had the ships of burden in tow, while the fourth division formed the rear in one line of war­ships, which carried the veteran troops, the triarians of the legions. If this wedge-like form of the Roman fleet was suited to breaking through the Carthaginian line, the long line of the latter was on the other hand calculated to surround the Romans. This disposition determined the issue of the battle. The consuls broke through the line of Carthaginian vessels without trouble. By their advance the two lines of Roman ships which formed the sides of the triangle were separated from the base. Against this remainder were now directed the attacks of both the Carthaginian wings. The great naval battle resolved itself into three distinct parts, each of which was sufficiently important to rank as a battle by itself. The Roman ships with the transports were hard pressed and obliged to slip their cables, to sacrifice the transports, and to retreat. The reserve, with the triarians, was in the same distress. At length, when the consuls, giving up the pursuit of the Carthaginian centre, came to the assistance of their own main body, the victory turned to the side of the Romans. The boarding-ladders seem again to have rendered important service. Thirty Carthaginian ships were destroyed, sixty-four were taken. The loss of the Romans was at the outside twenty-four ships.

After such a decided victory the way to Carthage was open to the Romans. But to our astonishment we read that they returned to Messana for the purpose of taking in supplies, and repairing their damaged vessels. From this we may conclude that the losses of the Romans were also considerable, and must have fallen heavily especially on the transport ships, which carried the provisions, a circumstance of which our narrator makes no mention. After a short time the fleet again set sail, and without any opposition reached the African coast near the Hermaean promontory (Cape Bon) east of Carthage. The Romans then sailed eastwards along the coast as far as Clypea, which they took and fortified.

From this point they made expeditions into the most fertile part of the Carthaginian dominions, which in the fifty years since the devastating invasion of Agathocles had recovered themselves, and presented to the eyes of the Italians a picture of unimagined riches and luxurious fertility. The industry and skill of the inhabitants had converted the whole of those districts into a garden. Agriculture flourished among the Carthaginians in the highest degree; more especially they understood how to render that rich but hot and dry soil productive, by conducting over it, in innumerable canals, an ample supply of water, the most needful of all requisites. The country, which still in the time of the emperors was the granary of the Romans, was under the Carthaginians in the most flourishing state. It was covered with numberless villages and open towns, and with the magnificent country residences of the Punic nobility. Carthage, as mistress of the sea, feared no hostile invasions, and most of the towns were unfortified. No chain of fortresses, like those of the Roman colonies on the coast or in the interior of the country, offered places of refuge to the distressed inhabitants, or contained a population able and ready to fight, like the Roman colonists, who could oppose the predatory marches of the enemy. The horror and distress therefore of the African population were great when, all of a sudden, 40,000 rapacious foes overran their country, exercising the fearful rights of war which delivered into the hands of the conquerors the life, possessions, and freedom of every inhabitant. The Carthaginians had in the course of the war disturbed the coast of Italy, burnt houses, destroyed harvests, cut down fruit-trees, carried away spoil and prisoners. They now suffered in Africa an ample retribution, and the Roman soldier indemnified himself thoroughly for the dangers he had undergone, and the terrors with which his imagination had filled the unknown bounds of the African continent. We read of 20,000 men torn from their homes and sold as slaves. The spoils were all sent to the fortress of Clypea. Thither some time afterwards orders were sent from Rome that one of the two consuls with his army and with most of the ships and spoils should return to Italy, while the other consul with two legions and forty ships should remain in Africa to carry on the war. This resolution of the Roman senate would be unintelligible if the expedition to Africa had been intended to answer any purpose other than that of a vigorous diversion. It could not have been supposed in Rome that two legions, which were not sufficient in Sicily to keep the Carthaginians in check, could carry on the war effectually in Africa and overthrow the power of the Carthaginians in their own country. If Regulus had confined himself to enterprises on a small scale, the success would have been adequate to the sacrifice. But elated, it seems, by his unexpected good fortune, he raised his hopes higher and aspired to the glory of terminating the war by a signal victory.

The battle at Ecnomus and the landing of the hostile army on their coast had entirely disconcerted the Carthaginians. At first they were afraid of an attack on their capital, and a portion of the fleet had sailed back from Sicily to protect it. There were clearly no great forces in Africa, as a hostile invasion was not apprehended. Now the Romans had effected a landing, thanks to their victory at Ecnomus; and the Carthaginians were not in a position to defend the open country against them. In their anxiety for the safety of the capital they at first concentrated their troops near it; and in this fact we find an explanation of the great successes of Regulus. He was enabled not only to march through the length and breadth of the country without danger, but to maintain his advantage when the Carthaginians ventured to attack him. He is said to have won a decided victory because the Carthaginians, out of fear, would not venture on the level ground, but kept on the heights, where their elephants and horse, their most powerful arms, were almost useless. Mention is also made of a revolt of Numidian allies or subjects, which caused to the Carthaginians a greater loss than that of signal defeat. They were therefore disposed to peace, and tried to negotiate with Regulus, who on his side wished to end the war before he was superseded in the command by a successor. But the conditions which he offered were such as could be accepted only after a complete overthrow. He insisted that they should resign Sicily, pay a contribution of war, restore the prisoners and deserters, deliver up the fleet and content themselves with a single ship, and, finally, make their foreign policy dependent on the pleasure of Rome.

The negotiations were therefore broken off, and the war was carried on with redoubled energy.

In the meantime the year of the consulship of Regulus expired. He remained, however, as proconsul in Africa, and his army seems to have been strengthened by Numidians and other Africans. The Carthaginians also increased their forces. Among the Greek mercenaries whom they now got together was a Spartan officer of the name of Xanthippus, of whose antecedents we know nothing, but who, if all that is related of his exploits in the African war be true, must have been a man of great military ability. It is said that he directed the attention of the Carthaginians to the fact that their generals were worsted in the war with Regulus because they did not understand how to select a proper ground for their elephants and their powerful cavalry. By his advice, it is said, the Carthaginians now left the hills and challenged the Romans to fight on the level ground. Regulus, with too much boldness, had advanced from Clypea, the basis of his operations, and bad penetrated into the neighbourhood of Carthage, where he had taken possession of Tunis. Here he could not possibly maintain himself. He was obliged to accept a battle on the plain, and suffered a signal defeat, which, owing to the great superiority of the Carthaginian cavalry, ended in the almost complete annihilation of the Romans. Only about 2,000 escaped with difficulty to Clypea; 500 were taken prisoners, and among these Regulus himself. The Roman expedition to Africa, so boldly undertaken and at first so gloriously carried out, met with a more miserable fate than that of Agathocles, and seemed indisputably to confirm the opinion that the Carthaginians were invincible in their own country.

It was necessary now, if possible, to save the remainder of the Roman army, and to bring them uninjured back to Italy. A still larger Roman fleet than that which had conquered at Ecnomus was accordingly sent to Africa, and obtained over the Carthaginians at the Hermaean promontory a victory which, judging by the number of Carthaginian vessels taken, must have been more brilliant than the last. If the Romans had intended to continue the war in Africa till they had utterly overthrown Carthage, they would have been able now to carry their plan into execution, though not under such favourable circumstances as before the defeat of Regulus. The fact, however, that they did not do this, and that they sent no new army to Africa, strengthens the inference suggested by the withdrawal of half of the invading army after the landing of Regulus, viz., that the expedition to Africa was undertaken only for the sake of plundering and injuring the land, and for dividing the Carthaginian forces. The only use made of the victory at the Hermaean promontory was to take into their ships the remnant of the legions of Regulus and the spoils which had been collected in Clypea.

The Roman fleet sailed back to Sicily heavily laden. But now, after so much well-merited success, a misfortune overtook them on the southern coast of Sicily from which no bravery could protect them. A fearful hurricane destroyed the greater number of the ships, and strewed the entire shore, from Camarina to the promontory Pachynus, with wrecks and corpses. Only eighty vessels escaped destruction, a miserable remnant of the fleet which, after twice conquering the Carthaginians, seemed able from this time forward to exercise undisputed dominion over the sea.

Third Period, 254-250.

THE VICTORY AT PANORMUS

It was among such reverses as these that Rome showed her greatness. In three months a new fleet of 220 ships joined the remnant of the disabled fleet in Messana, and sailed towards the western part of the island, to attack the fortresses of the Carthaginians, who, little expecting such a result, were fully engaged in Africa in subduing and punishing their revolted subjects. Thus it happened that the Romans made a signal and important conquest. Next to Lilybaeum and Drepana, Panormus was the most considerable Carthaginian stronghold in Sicily. Its situation on the north coast, in connection with the Punic stations on the Liparaean Islands, made it easy for an enemy to attack and ravage the Italian coast. The place, which, under Punic dominion, had reached a high state of prosperity, consisted in a strongly fortified old town and a suburb or new town, which had its own walls and towers. This new town was now attacked by the Romans with great force both by land and sea, and after a vigorous resistance it fell into their hands.

The defenders took refuge in the old town, which was more strongly fortified; and here, after a long blockade, they were forced by hunger to surrender. They were allowed to buy themselves off each for two minae. By this means 10,000 of the inhabitants obtained their freedom. The remainder, 13,000 in number, who had not the means to pay the sum required, were sold as slaves. This brilliant success was gained by Cn. Cornelius Scipio, who six years before had been taken prisoner in Lipara, and had since then gained his freedom either by ransom or exchange.

The undisturbed blockade of the important town of Panormus, in the neighbourhood of Drepana and Lilybaeum ,shows that at that time the Carthaginians had not a sufficient army in Sicily, as otherwise they would certainly have tried to deliver Panormus. They were fully engaged in Africa. The Romans accordingly ventured in the same year to attack Drepana, and though their enterprise failed, they attempted in the following year to take even Lilybaeum, and then made a second expedition into Africa, most probably in order to take advantage of the difficulties of the Carthaginians in their own country. This undertaking, which, like the former invasion, was intended to be only a raid on a large scale, utterly failed, producing not even the glory which crowned the first acts of Regulus. The great Roman fleet, with two consular armies on board, sailed towards the same coast on which Regulus had landed, east of the Hermaean promontory, where lay the most flourishing part of the Carthaginian territory. The Romans succeeded in landing in different places, and collecting spoil; but nowhere, as formerly in Clypea, could they obtain a firm footing. At last the ships were cast on the sand banks in the shallow waters of the lesser Syrtis (Gulf of Cabes), and could only be got afloat again with the greatest trouble, on the return of the tide, and after everything had been thrown overboard that could be dispensed with. The return voyage resembled a flight, and near the Palinurian promontory on the coast of Lucania (west of Policastro) the ships were overtaken by a terrible storm, in which a hundred and fifty of them were lost. The repetition of such a dreadful misfortune in so short a time, the loss of two magnificent fleets within three years, quite disgusted the Romans with the sea. They resolved to relinquish for the future all naval expeditions, and, devoting all their energies to their land army, to keep equipped only as many ships as might be needed to supply the army in Sicily with provisions, and to afford all necessary protection to the coast of Italy. We may fairly feel surprised at finding in the Capitoline fasti the record of a victory of the consul C. Sempronius Blaesus over the Punians. If such a triumph really was celebrated after such an utter failure, it would follow that under certain circumstances the honour was easily obtained.

The two years of the war which now followed were years of exhaustion and comparative rest on both sides. The war, which had now lasted twelve years, had caused innumerable losses, and still the end was far off. The Romans had, it is true, according to our reports, been conquerors in almost every engagement, not only by land, but, what was prized far higher and gave them far greater satisfaction, by sea also. The defeat of Regulus was the only reverse of any importance which their army by land had experienced. In consequence of that reverse they had to leave Africa; but in Sicily they had gradually advanced further westward. The towns which at the beginning of the war had been only doubtful possessions, inclining first to one side and then to the other, were all either in the iron grip of the Romans, or were destroyed and had lost all importance as military stations. In the west the limits of the territory where the Carthaginians were still able to offer a vigorous resistance were more and more contracted. From Agrigentum and Panormus they had fallen back upon Lilybaeum and Drepana, and even towards these the Romans had already stretched out their hands. Still more, Rome had contended for the mastery over the sea with the greatest maritime power in the world, and had been victorious in each of the three great naval engagements. But they were not at home on that element, and in the two tremendous storms of the years 255 and 253 they lost, with the fruits of their heroic perseverance, even their confidence and their courage. The greatest burden of the war fell on the unfortunate island of Sicily, but Italy suffered also by her sacrifices of men and materials of war, by the predatory incursions of the enemy, and by the interruption of her trade. It may therefore easily be explained how both belligerents were satisfied to pause awhile from any greater enterprise, and thus gain time to recover their strength.

But the war did not cease entirely. In the year 252 the Romans succeeded in taking Lipara, with the aid of a fleet which their faithful ally Hiero, of Syracuse, sent to their assistance, and Thermae (or Himera), the only place on the north coast of Sicily which was left to the Carthaginians after the loss of Panormus. That the Carthaginians should quietly allow this, without making any attempt to ward off the attack, is very surprising. In the annals which have come down to us, the history of the war is unfortunately written so decidedly from a Roman point of view that we know nothing at all of the internal affairs of the Carthaginians, and of what they were doing when not engaged against the Romans. We may suppose they had still enough to do in quelling the insurrection of their subjects, and so were compelled to leave the Romans in Sicily to act unopposed.

At length, in the year 251, they sent a fleet of 200 ships under Hasdrubal, and a strong army of 30,000 men into Sicily, with a detachment of 140 elephants. These animals, known to the Romans since the time of Pyrrhus, had again become objects of fresh terror after the defeat of Regulus, of which they had been the principal cause, and the greatest timidity reigned in the army of the proconsul. Caecilius Metellus shut himself up in Panormus with only a consular army, and evaded the engagement. In the meantime Hasdrubal laid waste the open country and drew near to the town, where, between the walls and the river Orethus, he had no room either for drawing up his forces—especially the elephants and the horse—or for retreating in case of a reverse. Confident of success, and intent only on drawing the enemy out of the town and getting them to accept a battle, he failed to take the common precaution of covering himself with mounds and trenches. On the other side, Metellus, who could at any time retreat, formed his column inside the gates, and sent a number of light-armed troops to harass the Carthaginians and draw them nearer to the town. When the elephants had driven back the Roman skirmishers as far as the town trench, and were now exposed to their missiles and unable to do anything further, they fell into great disorder, became unmanageable, turned round on the Carthaginian infantry, and caused the utmost confusion. Metellus availed himself of this moment to burst forth out of the town, and to attack the enemy in flank. The mercenaries, unable to keep their ground, rushed in wild flight towards the sea, where they hoped to be taken in by the Carthaginian vessels, but the greater part perished miserably. Metellus gained a brilliant and decided victory. The charm was broken, the Romans were themselves again, Panormus was saved, and the Carthaginians were compelled henceforth to give up all thoughts of an aggressive war, and to confine themselves to the defence of the few fortresses which they still possessed in Sicily. Having lost Thermae in 252, and still earlier Solus or Soluntum, Kephalaedion and Tyndaris, they now abandoned Selinus, transplanting the inhabitants to Lilybaeum. The incompetent Hasdrubal on his return paid for his defeat the penalty of crucifixion. The captured elephants, the number of which, according to some writers, was about 120, were led in triumph to Rome and there hunted to death in the circus. Never had a Roman general merited or celebrated a more splendid triumph than Metellus, who, with two legions, had defeated and annihilated an army of double the strength of his own. The elephants on the coins of the Caeciliun family preserved, until late times, the memory of this glorious victory.

The battle of Panormus marks the turning-point in the war, which had now lasted thirteen years. The courage of the Carthaginians seemed at length to be quite broken. They decided to enter into negotiations for peace, or to propose at least an exchange of prisoners. The embassy dispatched to Rome for this purpose has become famous in history, especially because, as it is related, the cap­tive Regulus was sent with it in order to support the proposals of the Carthaginians with his influence. The conduct of Regulus became the subject of poetical effusions, the echo of which we find in Horace and Silius Italicus. Closely connected with this is the tradition of the violent death of Regulus, which is so characteristic of the Roman historians that we cannot pass it over in silence.

Five years had passed since the unhappy battle in the neighbourhood of Tunis, which consigned Regulus and 500 of his fellow-soldiers to captivity. Now when the Carthaginians decided, after their defeat at Panormus, to make an exchange of prisoners, and, if possible, to conclude peace with Rome, they sent Regulus with the embassy, for they considered him a fit person to advocate their proposals. But in this expectation they were signally disappointed. Regulus gave his advice not only against the peace, but also against the exchange of prisoners, because he thought it would result only in the advantage of Carthage. He resisted all the entreaties of his own family and friends, who wished him to stay in Rome; and when they urged him, and the senate seemed disposed to make the exchange, he declared that he could no longer be of any service to his country, and that, moreover, he was doomed to an early death, the Carthaginians having given him a slow poison. He refused even to go into the town to see his wife and children, and, true to his oath, returned to Carthage, although he knew that a cruel punishment awaited him. The Carthaginians, exasperated at this disappointment of their hopes, invented the most horrible, tortures to kill him by slow degrees. They shut him up with an elephant, to keep him in constant fear; they prevented his sleeping, caused him to feel the pangs of hunger, cut off his eyelids and exposed him to the burning rays of the sun, against which he was no longer able to close his eyes. At last they shut him up in a box stuck all over with nails, and thus killed him outright. When this became known in Rome, the senate delivered up two noble Carthaginian prisoners, Bostar and Hamilcar, to the widow and the sons of Regulus. These unhappy creatures were then shut up in a narrow cage which pressed their limbs together, and they were kept for many days without food. When Bostar died of hunger, the cruel Roman matron left the putrefying corpse in the narrow cage by the side of his surviving companion, whose life she prolonged by spare and meagre diet in order to lengthen out his sufferings. At last this horrible treatment became known, and the heartless torturers, escaping with difficulty the severest punishment, were compelled to bury the body of Bostar, and to treat Hamilcar with humanity.

This is the story as it is found related by a host of Greek and Roman authors. Among these, however, the most important is wanting. Polybius mentions neither the embassy of the Carthaginians, nor the tortures of Regulus, nor those of Bostar and Hamilcar; and he observes, as we have seen, the same significant silence with regard to the alleged ingratitude and treachery of the Carthaginians towards Xanthippus. Moreover, Zonaras, who copied Dion Cassius, refers to the martyrdom of Regulus as a rumour. Besides, there are contradictions in the various reports. According to Seneca and Florus the unhappy Regulus was crucified; according to Zonaras, Regulus only pretended he had taken poison, whilst other authorities say that the Carthaginians really gave it him. Apart from these contradictions the facts reported are in themselves suspicious. That the Romans should not have agreed willingly to an exchange of prisoners is hardly credible; they did it two years later, and it is highly probable that Cn. Scipio was thus released from his captivity. And can we imagine that the Carthaginians tortured Regulus in so useless and foolish a manner, at the same time challenging the Romans to retaliation? Were they really such monsters as the Roman historians liked to picture them?

Such questions and considerations have for a long time been called forth by the traditional story of the Carthaginian embassy and the death of Regulus. The account of the martyrdom of Regulus has been almost universally regarded as a malicious invention, and the suspicion has arisen that it originated within the family of Regulus itself. This view is recommended by its internal credibility. The noble Carthaginian prisoners were given up probably to the family of the Atilii, as a security for the exchange of Regulus. But Regulus died in imprisonment before the exchange could be made. Thinking that cruel treatment had hastened his death, the widow of Regulus took her revenge in the horrible tortures of the two Carthaginians, and, to justify this, the story of the martyrdom of Regulus was invented. But the government and the Roman people as such took no part in the tortures of innocent captives; on the contrary they put an end to the private revenge as soon as the fact became known. The senate was not capable of defiling the Roman name by unheard-of cruelties towards prisoners, and of thus giving the Carthaginians an excuse for retaliation. Only to the revengeful passion of a woman, not to the whole Roman people, may be attributed such utter contempt of all human and divine law as is represented in the cruelties practised towards the Carthaginian prisoners. If we take this view of the story we shall find it improbable that Regulus took a part in the embassy of the Carthaginians, whatever we may think of the authenticity of the embassy itself.

Fourth Period, 250-249 B.C.

LILYBAEUM AND DREPANA

The brilliant victory at Panormus had inspired the Romans with new hopes, and had perhaps raised their demands. They determined to complete the conquest of Sicily, and to attack the last and greatest strongholds of the Carthaginians in that island, namely Lilybaeum and Drepana.

Lilybaeum (the modern Marsala), situated on a small strip of land, terminated by the promontory of the same name, was founded after the destruction of the island town of Motye, and had been since that event the chief fortress of the Carthaginians. Besieged by Dionysius in the year 368 B.C., and by Pyrrhus in 276 B.C., it had proved its strength, and had remained unconquered. Nature and art had joined hands in making this fortress invincible, if defended with Punic fanaticism. Two sides of the town were washed by the sea, and were protected, not only by strong walls, but, more especially by shallows and sunken rocks, which made it impossible for any but the most skilful pilots or the most daring sailors to reach the harbour. On the land side the town was covered by strong walls and towers, and a moat one hundred and twenty feet deep and eighty feet broad. The harbour was on the north side, and was inclosed with the town in one line of fortifications. The garrison consisted of the citizens and 10,000 infantry, mostly mercenaries, not to be relied on, and a strong division of horse. It was impossible to take such a maritime fortress without the co­operation of a fleet. The Romans were obliged to make up their minds to build a new fleet, in spite of their resolution three years before. The two consuls of the year Atilius Regulus and L. Manlius Vulso, of whom one was a kinsman, the other the colleague, of M. Regulus of the year 256, sailed towards Sicily with two hundred ships, and anchored before the harbour of Lilybaeum, partly to cut off the town from supplies, and partly also to prevent the Carthaginian fleet from interrupting the landing of necessaries for the large besieging army.

The Roman land army consisted of four legions, which, with the Italian allies, made together about 40,000 men. In addition to these, there were the Sicilian allies, and the crews of the fleet, so that the report of Diodorus does not seem improbable, that the besieging army amounted altogether to about 110,000 men. To supply such an immense number of men with provisions, at the furthest corner of Sicily, and to bring together all the implements and materials for the siege, was no small labour; and as the task extended over many months, this undertaking alone was calculated to strain the resources of the republic to the very utmost.

The siege of Lilybaeum lasted almost as long as the fabulous siege of Troy, and the hardly less fabulous one of Veii, with this difference only, that Lilybaeum resisted successfully to the end of the war, and was delivered up to the Romans only in accordance with the terms of peace. We have no detailed account of this protracted struggle, but it is od the whole pretty clearly narrated in the masterly sketch of Polybius, which possesses a greater interest for us than any part of the military history of Rome of the preceding periods. We see here exemplified not only the art of siege, in its most important features, as practised by the ancients, but we discern in it clearly the character of the two belligerent nations, the bearing of their strong and their weak points on the prosecution of the war; and we shall feel ourselves rewarded therefore by bestowing a little more attention on this memorable contest than we have given to any previous events in the military history of Rome.

In the art of besieging towns the Romans were but little advanced before their acquaintance with the Greeks, and even among the Greeks it was long before the art reached the highest point of perfection that it was capable of attaining in antiquity. Trenches and walls were the material difficulties with which besiegers had to contend. Before the walls could be attacked, the trenches must be filled up, and this was done with fascines and earth. As soon as the trenches were so far filled up as to allow a passage, wooden besieging to were and rams were pushed forward. These towers consisted of several stories, and were higher than the walls of the town. On the different stories soldiers were placed, armed with missiles, for the purpose of clearing the walls, or of reaching them by means of drawbridges. The rams were long beams, with iron heads, suspended under a covering roof, and were swung backwards and forwards by soldiers to make breaches in the walls. These two operations were the most important. They were supported by the artillery of the ancients—the large wooden catapults and ballistae, a kind of gigantic crossbows, which shot off heavy darts, balls, or stones against the besieged. Where the nature of the ground permitted, mines were dug under the enemy’s fortifications, and supported by beams. If these beams were burnt, the walls above immediately gave way. Against such mines the besieged dug counter­mines, partly to keep off the advance of the underground attack, and partly to undermine the dam and to overthrow the besieging towers that were standing on it.

All these different kinds of attack and defence were resorted to at Lilybaeum. The Romans employed the crews of their ships for the works of the siege, and by the aid of so many hands they soon succeeded in filling up part of the town trench, while by their wooden towers, battering-rams, protecting roofs, and projectiles, they approached the wall, destroying seven towers at the point the siege where it joined the sea on the south, and thereby opening a wide breach. Through this breach the Romans made an attack, and penetrated into the interior of the place. But here they found that the Carthaginians had built up another wall behind the one which had been destroyed. This fact, and the violent resistance opposed to them in the streets, compelled them to retreat. Similar attempts were often made. Day after day there were bloody combats, in which more lives were lost than in open battle. In one of these, it is said, the Romans lost 10,000 men. The losses on the Carthaginian side were probably not less. Under such circumstances, the ability of the besieged to resist had diminished considerably. Enthusiasm and patriotism alone can inspire courage in a reduced and exhausted garrison. But enthusiasm and patriotism were just the qualities least known in the Carthaginian mercenaries. Above all others the Gallic soldiers were the most vacillating and untrustworthy. They were inclined to mutiny; some of their leaders secretly went over to the Romans and promised them to induce their countrymen to revolt. All would have been lost, if Himilco had not been informed of the treachery by a faithful Greek, the Achaean Alexon. Not venturing to act with severity, be determined by entreaties, by presents, and by promises to keep the mercenaries up to their duty. This scheme succeeded with the venal barbarians. When the deserters approached the walls and invited their former comrades to mutiny, they were driven hack by stones and arrows.

Many months had passed since the beginning of the blockade. While the Roman army had inclosed the town on the land side by a continuous circumvallation and trenches which extended in a half circle from the northern to the southern shore, the fleet had blockaded the harbour and endeavoured to obstruct all entrance by sinking stones. Lilybaeum was thus shut off from all communication with Carthage, and was left to itself and the courage of its garrison. But it was neither forgotten nor neglected. It might be supposed in Carthage that a town like Lilybaeum would be able to hold out for some months without needing aid, and it had been well supplied with provisions before the siege began. It was well known also that if it were necessary to break through the blockade, the Roman ships would not be able to hinder it. Probably the greater part of their ships were drawn up on shore, while the rowers were employed in filling up the moat. Some few ships might be out at sea, or might be lying at anchor, ready to sail, in well-protected roadsteads; but the violent storms, and the still more dangerous shallows of that coast, rendered it impossible for the Roman captains to make the blockade of Lilybaeum effective. The Carthaginian fleet which was stationed at Drepana, under the command of Adherbal, instead of attacking the Roman fleet before Lilybaeum, made use of the time to scour the coasts of Italy and Sicily, and to hinder the conveyance of provisions for the supply of the immense besieging army.

Meanwhile an expedition was fitted out in Carthage for reinforcing and victualling the garrison of Lilybaeum. An enterprising admiral called Hannibal, a man not unworthy of this great name, sailed with fifty ships and 10,000 men from Africa to the Aegatian Islands, west of Lilybaeum. Here he lay, quietly hoping for a favourable wind. At last it blow strong from the west; Hannibal now unfurled all sail, and without paying attention to the Roman ships, but still fully equipped for an encounter, steered through the difficult channels between cliffs and sandbanks towards the entrance of the harbour, where the stones which the Romans had sunk had long since been washed away by the storms. The Romans, seized with astonishment and admiration, dared not obstruct the way of the Carthaginian vessels, which shot past them heavily laden, and with their decks crowded with soldiers, ready for battle. The walls and towers of Lilybaeum were lined with its valiant defenders, who, with mingled fear and hope, looked on at the grand spectacle. The harbour was gained without loss. The complete success of this undertaking inspired the besieged with fresh hope and courage, and gave the Romans warning that Lilybaeum was not likely soon to be in their power.

Himilco determined to avail himself of the enthusiasm which Hannibal’s arrival had stirred up. Sallying out on the following morning, he made an attempt to destroy the machines for the siege. But the Romans had anticipated this, and offered obstinate resistance. The battle was long undecided, especially near the Roman works, which the Carthaginians tried in vain to set on fire. At length Himilco saw the futility of his attempt, and commanded a retreat. In this manner the Roman soldiers were compensated for the vexation which the superiority of their enemies at sea had caused them on the previous day.

The night following, Hannibal sailed away again with his fleet. He went to Drepana, taking with him the horse-men, who till now had lain in Lilybaeum, and were of no use there, while in the rear of the Roman army they could do excellent service, partly in harassing the enemy, and partly in obstructing the arrival of provisions by land.

The bold exploit of Hannibal had proved that the port of Lilybaeum was open to a Carthaginian fleet. From this time even isolated vessels ventured in and out, and defied the slow Roman cruisers, who gave themselves useless trouble to intercept them. A Carthaginian captain, called the Rhodian Hannibal, made himself specially conspicuous by eluding the Romans in his fast-sailing trireme, slipping in between them and purposely allowing them almost to reach him, that he might make them the more keenly feel his superiority. The Romans, in their vexation, now sought again to block up the mouth of the harbour. But the storms and the floods mocked their endeavours. The stones, even in the act of sinking, Polybius says, were thrown on one side of the current; but in one place the passage was narrowed, at least for a time, and, luckily for the Romans, a quick-sailing Carthaginian galley ran aground there, and fell into their hands. Manning it with their best rowers, they waited for the Rhodian, who, coming out of the harbour with his usual confidence, was now overtaken. Seeing that he could not escape by dint of speed, Hannibal turned round and attacked his pursuers; but he was unequally matched in strength, and was taken prisoner with his ship.

Trifling encounters like these could have but little influence on the progress of the siege. Slowly, but securely, the Roman works proceeded. The dam which levelled the filled-up moat became broader and broader; the artillery and battering-rams were directed against the towers which still remained standing; mines were dug under the second inner wall, and the besieged were too weak to keep pace with the works of the Romans by counter-mines. It appeared that the loss of Lilybaeum was unavoidable unless the besieged should receive some unlooked-for aid.

In this desperate situation Himilco determined to repeat, under more favourable circumstances, the attempt which had once so signally failed. One night, when a gale of wind was blowing from the west, which overthrew towers and made the buildings in the town tremble and shake, he made a sally, and this time he succeeded in setting fire to the Roman siege-works. The dry wood was at once kindled, and the violent wind fanned the flame into ungovernable fury, blowing the sparks and smoke into the eyes of the Romans, who in vain called up all their courage and perseverance in the hopeless contest with their enemies and the elements. One wooden structure after another was caught by the flames, and burnt to the ground. When the day dawned, the spot was covered with charred beams. The labour of months was destroyed in a few hours, and for the present all hope was lost of taking Lilybaeum by storm.

The consuls now changed the siege into a blockade, a plan which could not hold out any prospect of success so long as the port was open. But it was not in the nature of the Romans easily to give up what they had once undertaken. Their character in some measure resembled that of the bull-dog, which when it bites will not let go. The circumvallations of the town were strengthened, the two Roman camps on the north and south ends of this line were well fortified; and, thus protected against all possible attacks, the besiegers looked forward to the time when they might resume more vigorous operations.

For the present, this was not possible. The Roman army had suffered great losses, not only in battle, but in the labours and privations of so prolonged a siege. The greatest difficulty was to provide an army of 100,000 men with all necessaries at such a distance from Rome. Sicily was quite drained and impoverished. Hiero of Syracuse, it is true, made every effort in his power, but his power soon reached its limit. Italy alone could supply what was necessary, but even Italy sorely felt the pressure of the war. The Punic fleet of Drepana commanded the sea, and the dreaded Numidian horsemen, the ‘Cossacks of antiquity,’ overran Sicily, levied heavy contributions from the friends of the Romans, and seized the provisions which were sent by land to the camp of Lilybaeum.

The winter had come, with its heavy rains, its storms, and all its usual discomforts. One of the two consuls, with two legions, returned home; the rest of the army remained in the fortified camp before Lilybaeum. The Roman soldiers were not accustomed to pass the bad season of the year in tents, exposed to wet, cold, and all kinds of privations. They were in want of indispensable necessaries. The consuls had hoped to be able in the course of the summer to take Lilybaeum by storm, and therefore the troops were probably not prepared for a winter campaign. Added to all this came hunger, the worst of all evils at this juncture, bearing in its train ravaging sickness. Ten thousand men succumbed to these sufferings, and the survivors were in such pitiable case that they were like a besieged garrison in the last stage of exhaustion.

In Rome it was felt that the Roman fleet, which lay useless on the shore, must be once more equipped. The following year therefore (249) the consul P. Claudius Pulcher, the son of Appius Claudius the Blind, was sent to Sicily with a new consular army, and a division of 10,000 recruits as rowers, to fill up the gaps which fatigue, privations, and sickness had caused in the crews of the fleet. The object of this reinforcement could only be that of attacking the Carthaginian fleet under Adherbal in Drepana, for this fleet was the chief cause of all the misery which had befallen the besieging army. Claudius had without doubt received an express order to hazard a battle by sea. It was nothing but the ill-success of this undertaking that made him afterwards an object of the accusation and reproaches which all unsuccessful generals have to expect. He began by re-establishing strict discipline in the army, and thus he made many enemies. He then vainly sought once more to block up the entrance to the harbour of Lilybaeum, and thus to cut off the supply of provisions to the town, which during the winter had been effected without any difficulty. His next step was to equip his fleet, mixing the new rowers with those still left of the old ones, and manning the ships with the picked men of the legion, especially volunteers, who expected certain victory and rich spoil; and, after holding a council of war, in which his scheme was approved, he sailed away from Lilybaeum in the stillness of midnight, to surprise the Carthaginian fleet in the harbour of Drepana, which he reached the following morning. Keeping his ships on the right close to shore, he entered the harbour, which, on the south of a crescent-shaped peninsula, opens out towards the west in the form of a trumpet. Adherbal, though unprepared and surprised, formed his plans without delay, and his arrangements for the battle were made as soon as the ships of the enemy came in sight. His fleet was promptly manned and ready for the engagement; and while the Romans sailed slowly in at one side of the harbour, he left it on the other and stood out to sea. Claudius, to avoid being shut up in the harbour, gave the order to return. While the Roman ships were one after another obeying this order, they got entangled, broke their oars, hampered each other in their movements, and fell into helpless confusion. Adherbal seized the opportunity for making the attack. The Romans, close to the shore and in the greatest disorder and dismay, were unable to retreat, manoeuvre, or assist each other. Almost without resistance they fell into the hands of the Carthaginians, or were wrecked in the shallows near the neighbouring coast. Only thirty ships out of two hundred and ten escaped. ninety-three were taken with all their crews; the others were sunk or run ashore. Twenty thousand men, the flower of the Roman army, were taken prisoners. Eight thousand were killed in battle, and many of those who saved themselves from the wrecks fell into the hands of the Carthaginians when they reached the land. It was a day of terror, such as Rome had not experienced since the Allia—the first great decisive defeat by sea during the whole war, disastrous by the multiplied miseries which it occasioned, but still more disastrous as causing the prolongation of the war for eight years more.

The consul Claudius escaped, but an evil reception awaited him in Rome. It was not customary, it is true, for the Romans to nail their unsuccessful generals to the cross, as the Carthaginians often did; on the contrary, like Sulpicius after the Allia, and like Varro, at a later period, after Cannae, they were treated mostly with indulgence, and sometimes with honour. But Claudius belonged to a house which, although one of the most distinguished among the Roman nobility, had many enemies, and his pride could not stoop to humility and conciliation. With haughty mien and lofty bearing he returned to Rome; and when he was requested to nominate a dictator, as the necessities of the republic were urgent, he named, in utter contempt of the public feeling, his servant and client Glicia. This was too much for the Roman senate. Glicia was compelled to lay down the dictatorship, and the senate, setting aside the old constitutional practice, and dispensing with the nomination by the consul, appointed A. Atilius Calatinus, who made Metellus, the hero of Panormus, his master of the horse. After the expiration of his year of office, Claudius was accused before the people on a capital charge, and only escaped condemnation by the timely outburst of a thunderstorm, which interrupted the proceedings. It seems, however, that he was afterwards condemned to pay a fine. Henceforth he disappears from the page of history. It is uncertain whether he went into exile, or whether he soon died. At any rate he was not alive three years later, for it is reported that at that time, his sister, a Claudian as proud as himself, said once, when annoyed by a crowd in the street, she wished her brother were alive to lose another battle, that some of the useless people might be got rid of.

The hypocritical piety of a time in which the whole of religion was nothing but an empty form, attributed the defeat at Drepana to the godlessness of Claudius. On Claudius, the morning of the battle, when he was informed that the sacred fowls would not eat, he ordered them, it is said, to be cast into the sea, that at least they might drink. It is a pity that anecdotes such as these are so related by Cicero as to leave the impression that he himself recognised the wrath of the avenging gods in the fate of Claudius. Perhaps the story is not true, but like so many similar tales it was inspired by pious terror after the day of the misfortune. If it could, however, be proved to be true, it would show that the national faith had disappeared among the higher classes of the Roman people in the first Punic war. For a single individual would never venture on such ridicule of the popular superstitions if he were not sure of the approval of those on whose opinion he lays great weight. That the sacred fowls and the whole apparatus of auspices had not the smallest share in determining the result of the battle, the Romans knew, in the time of Claudius and of Cicero, as well as we do. The reason of the defeat lay in the superiority of the Carthaginian admiral and seamen, and the inexperience of the Roman consul and crews. The Roman nation ought to have accused itself for having placed such a man as Claudius at the head of the fleet, and for having manned the vessels with men who for the most part could work with the plough and the spade, but who knew nothing of handling an oar. The misfortune of Rome is attributable to the cumbersome Roman ships, and to the 10,000 newly levied rowers, who were sent by land to Rhegium, and from Messana to Lilybaeum, and who probably knew nothing of the sea.

The Carthaginians made the best use of their success. Immediately after their victory at Drepana, a division of their fleet sailed to Panormus, where Roman transport ships lay with provisions for the army before Lilybaeum. These now fell into the hands of the Carthaginians, and served to supply the garrison of Lilybaeum abundantly, while the Romans before the walls were in want of the merest necessaries. The remainder of the Roman fleet was now attacked at Lilybaeum. Many ships were burnt, others were drawn from the shore into the sea, and carried away; at the same time Himilco made a sally and attacked the Roman camp, but had to retreat without accomplishing his purpose.

The disaster of Drepana was soon after almost equalled by another calamity. Whilst the consul P. Claudius attacked the Carthaginian fleet with such bad success, his colleague L. Junius Pullus, having loaded eight hundred transports in Italy and in Sicily with provisions for the army, had sailed to Syracuse. With a fleet of a hundred and twenty ships of war, he wished to convoy this great number of vessels along the south coast of Sicily to Lilybaeum. But the provisions had not yet all arrived in Syracuse when the necessities of the army compelled him to send off at least a part of the fleet under the protection of a proportionate number of war ships. These now sailed round the promontory of Pachynus (Cape Passaro), and had advanced as far as the neighbourhood of Ecnomus, where the Romans seven years before had gained their most brilliant naval victory over the Punians, when they suddenly found themselves face to face with a powerful hostile fleet consisting of a hundred and twenty ships. There was nothing left for them but to shelter their vessels as well as they could along the shore. But this could not be effected without much loss. Seventeen of their war ships were sunk, and thirteen were rendered useless; of their ships of burden, fifty went down. The others kept close to the shore, under the protection of the troops and of some catapults from the small neighbouring town of Phintias. After this partial success the Carthaginian admiral Carthalo waited for the arrival of the consul, hoping that he, with his ships of war, would accept battle. But when Junius became aware of the state of things, he immediately turned bade, to seek shelter in the harbour of Syracuse for himself and his great transport fleet. Himilco followed him and overtook him near Camarina. Just at this time signs were seen of a storing gathering from the south, which on this exposed coast involves the greatest danger. The Carthaginians, therefore, gave up the idea of attacking, and sailed in great haste in the direction of the promontory Pachynus, behind which they cast anchor in a place of safety. The Roman fleet, on the other hand, was overtaken by the storm, and suffered so terribly that of the transport ships not one was saved, and of the hundred and five war ships, only two. Many of the crew may have saved themselves by swimming to land, but the provisions were certainly all lost.

The destruction of this fleet crowned the series of misfortunes which befell the Romans in the year 249 B.C., the most dismal time of the whole war. It seemed impossible to fight against such adverse fate, and voices were heard in the senate urging the termination of this ruinous war. But pusillanimity in trouble had no place in the Roman character. A defeat only acted as a spur to new exertions and more determined perseverance. Immediately after the great losses at Drepana and Camarina, the consul Junius resumed the attack, as though he would not allow the Carthaginians time to be aware of having gained any advantage. A large portion of his crew had been saved. He was able therefore to bring reinforcements into the camp before Lilybaeum, and he succeeded in establishing himself at the foot of Mount Eryx, not far from Drepana, which town he partially blockaded in the hope that he might thus prevent the Carthaginians sallying thence and overrunning the country. Hamilcar had destroyed the old town of Eryx some years before, and had settled the inhabitants in Drepana. On the summit of the mountain, looking over a vast extent of sea, stood the temple of the Erycinian Venus, which, according to a Roman legend, was founded by Aeneas, and was one of the richest and most celebrated of ancient temples. This was a strong position, easily defended; and, after the destruction of the town of Eryx by the Carthaginians, it had remained in their possession and was used as a watch tower. Junius, by a surprise, seized this temple, thus securing a point which, during the subsequent years of the war, was of great importance to the Romans.

Another undertaking of Junius was less successful in its result. He endeavoured to establish himself on the coast between Drepana and Lilybaeum on a promontory stretching out into the sea, called Aegithallus. Here he was surrounded by the Carthaginians in the night, and taken prisoner, with part of his troops.

Fifth Period, 248-241 B.C.

HAMILCAR BARCAS. BATTLE AT THE AEGATIAN ISLANDS. PEACE.

From this time the character of the war changes. The great enterprises of the previous years were succeeded by hostilities on a small scale, which could not lead to a final decision. The Romans again, gave up the naval war, and determined to confine themselves to the blockade of Lilybaeum and Drepana. These were the only two places remaining in Sicily for them to conquer. If they could only succeed in blocking up the Carthaginians in these places, Sicily might be regarded as a Roman possession, and the object of the war would be attained. This blockade demanded, it is true, continued sacrifices and exertions. But during the whole of the war the Carthaginians had hardly made any attempt to issue from their strongholds and to overrun Sicily, as in former times. A comparatively small force, therefore, was sufficient to observe and to restrain them. The Carthaginian fleet, which had had undisputed rule of the sea, could not be warded off in the same way. It could not be confined and watched in one place. The whole extent of the Italian and Sicilian coast was at all times exposed to its attacks. To meet these numerous attacks colonies of Roman citizens had been established in several sea towns. The number of these was now augmented by the colonies Alsium and Fregellae—a sign that even the immediate neighbourhood of Rome was not safe from Carthaginian cruisers. The coast towns were, however, not entirely helpless, even without the assistance of Roman colonists. As the instance of the small town Phintias, on the south coast of Italy, shows, they had catapults and ballistae, which they used as strand batteries to keep off the enemy’s ships. The larger, especially the Greek towns, were protected by walls, and the peasants in the open country found in them a temporary refuge, with their goods and chattels, until the enemy had retreated. In time the Romans, Greeks, and Etruscans also practised this kind of privateering, which, like the piracy of antiquity in general, and of the middle ages, occupied itself not so much with the taking of vessels on the high seas as with pillaging the coasts. War began now to be an occupation on the Roman side, which enriched a few citizens, whilst the community at large was impoverished. To what extent this privateering was gradually carried we learn from the story of an attack on the African town Hippo. The Roman adventurers sailed into the harbour, plundered and destroyed a great part of the town, and escaped at last, though with some trouble, over the chain with which the Carthaginians had in the meantime attempted to close the harbour.

Two events belonging to the years 248 and 247 may enable us to form an idea of the situation of the Roman republic at this time. These are the renewal of the alliance with Hiero, and the exchange of Roman and Carthaginian prisoners. In the year 263, Rome had granted to Hiero only a truce and an alliance for fifteen years. During this long and trying period Hiero proved himself a faithful and indispensable ally. More than once circumstances had occurred in which, not merely enmity, but even neutrality on the part of Hiero would have been fatal to Rome. The Romans could not afford to dispense with such a friend. They therefore now renewed the alliance for an indefinite period, and Hiero was released from all compulsory service for the future.

The second event, the exchange of the Roman and Carthaginian prisoners, would not be surprising if it were not for the tradition that such a measure had been proposed by Carthage three years before (250 B.C.), and rejected by Rome on the advice of Regulus. Be this as it may, the exchange of prisoners in the year 247 cannot be denied, and it follows that the losses of the Romans, especially in the battle of Drepana, were sensibly felt. The consul Junius was probably among the prisoners now set free.

In Sicily the war was now locally confined to the extreme west. The chief command over the Carthaginians was given in the year 247 to Hamilcar, surnamed Barcas, that is Lightning, the great father of a still greater son—of Hannibal, who made this name above all others a terror to the Romans, and crowned it with glory for all lime. Hamilcar, though still a young man, showed at once that he was possessed of more brilliant military talent than any officer whom Carthage had hitherto placed in command of her troops. He was not only a brave soldier but an accomplished politician. With the small means which his exhausted country placed at his disposal, he was able so to carry on the war for six years longer that when at last the defeat of the Carthaginian fleet, occasioned by no fault of his, compelled Carthage to make peace, this peace was made on conditions which left Carthage an independent and powerful state.

When Hamilcar arrived in Sicily, he found the Gallic mercenaries in a state of mutiny. The prayers, promises, and donatives by which three years before Himilco had purchased the fidelity of his mercenaries in Lilybaeum, were more likely to encourage them in their insubordination than to keep them in strict discipline. Different and more efficient means were now applied to coerce them. The mutineers were punished without mercy. Some were sent to Carthage or exposed on desert islands, others thrown overboard, and the remainder surprised and massacred by night.

In a war carried on with such soldiers, even the best general had hardly any prospect of success against a national army like the Roman. So much the more brilliant appears the genius of the Carthaginian leader, who made his own personal influence among the troops supply the place of patriotic enthusiasm. He could not carry on the war on a grand scale. Neither the numbers nor the fidelity and skill of his troops were such that he could venture to attack the Roman armies, which from their fortified camps were threatening Lilybaeum and Drepana. Compelled to conduct the war differently, he took possession of Mount Heircte (now Monte Pellegrino), near Panormus, whose precipitous sides made it a natural fortress, while on its level summit some ground was left for cultivation, and its nearness to the sea secured immediate communication with the fleet. While, therefore, the Romans lay before the two Carthaginian fortresses, Hamilcar threatened Panormus, now the most important possession of the Romans in the whole of Sicily; for not only had the reinforcements and supplies of their army to be forwarded from it, but it was the only place through which direct communication with Italy by sea was kept up. By the Carthaginian garrison at Heircte, not only was the importance of Panormus neutralised, but its safety was endangered, and Rome was compelled to keep a large garrison in it.

For three years this state of things continued. From his impregnable rocky citadel, Hamilcar, as irresistible as the lightning whose name he bore, attacked the Romans whenever he chose, by sea or by land, in Italy or in Sicily. He laid waste the coasts of Bruttium and Lucania, and penetrated northwards as far as Cumae. No part of Sicily was secure from his attacks. His adventurous raids extended as far as Mount Etna. When he returned from such expeditions he made the Romans feel his presence. The task of describing the almost uninterrupted fighting between the Romans and the Carthaginians before Panormus seemed to Polybius almost as impossible as to follow every blow, every parry, and every turn of two pugilists. The detail of such encounters escapes observation. It is only the bearing of the combatants in general and the result of which we become aware. Hamilcar, with his mercenaries, supported gloriously and successfully the unequal struggle with the Roman legions. The war thus waged by him was a prelude to the battles which his illustrious son was to fight on Italian soil. At length in the year 244 he left Heircte unconquered, and chose a new battle-field in a much more difficult situation on Mount Eryx, in the immediate neighbourhood of Drepana. The reason for this change is not reported. Perhaps it may have been the precarious position of Drepana, which the Romans continued to besiege with increasing vigour. Close by Drepana, at the foot of the mountain, the Romans had an intrenched camp. On the summit they held the temple of Venus. Half way up the hill, on the slope towards Drepana, lay the ancient town of Eryx, demolished by the Carthaginians in the fifth year of the war, but now partly restored and converted into a Roman fortification. This post Hamilcar surprised and stormed in a night attack, and then took up a strong position between the Romans at the foot and those at the top of the mountain. He kept open his communication both with the sea and with the garrison at Drepana, though on difficult roads. It is easy to conceive how dangerous such a position was in the midst of the enemy. Predatory excursions could hardly be undertaken from this point. Instead of gain and spoil the soldiers encountered dangers and privations; the fidelity of the mercenaries again wavered, and they were on the point of betraying their position and surrendering to the Romans, when the watchfulness of Hamilcar anticipated their intentions and compelled them to fly to the Roman camp to escape his revenge. The Romans did what they had never done before. They took these Gallic troops as mercenaries into their pay. We need no other evidence to prove the extremity to which Rome was now reduced.

The war now really began to undermine the Roman state. It is impossible to ascertain the weight of the burdens which fell upon the allies. Of their contributions and their services, their contingents for the army and the fleet, the Roman historians purposely tell us nothing. But we know, without any such record, that they furnished at least one-half of the land army, and almost all the crews of the fleet. The thousands who perished in the battles at sea and in the wrecks were, for the most part, maritime allies (socii navales) who had been pressed into the Roman service. Nothing is more natural than that the extreme misery and horror of the hated and dreaded service should have excited them to resistance, which could only be quelled with great difficulty. What Italy suffered by the predatory incursions of the Carthaginians is beyond our calculation. But an idea of the losses which this war caused to Italy is given by the census of this time. While in the year 252 B.C. the number of Roman citizens was 297,797, it fell to 251,222 in the year 247 B.C., being reduced in five years by one-sixth.

The prosperity of the people suffered in proportion. The trade of Rome and of the maritime towns of Italy was annihilated. The union of so many formerly independent political communities into one large state, which, by putting down all internal wars seemed so likely to promote peaceful development and progress, involved them all in the long war with Carthage, and exposed them all alike to the same distress. One sign of this distress is the debasement of the coin. Before the war the old Roman As was stamped, or rather cast, full weight. But by degrees it sank down to one-half, one-third, a quarter, and in the end to one-sixth of the original weight, so that a coin of two ounces in weight was substituted, at least in name, for the original As of twelve ounces, by which, of course, a proportionate reduction of debts—in other words, a general bankruptcy—was caused. It was natural that in this gradually increasing poverty of the state, some individuals should become rich. War has always the effect of injuring general prosperity for the benefit of a few; just as diseases, which waste the body, often swell the growth of one particular part. In war, certain branches of industry and trade flourish. Adventurers, contractors, capitalists make their most successful speculations. In antiquity, the booty of war constituted a source of great profit for a few, particularly because the prisoners were made slaves. The armies, accordingly, were followed by a great number of traders who understood how to turn the ignorance and recklessness of the soldiers to their own advantage, in buying their spoils and purchasing slaves and articles of value at the auctions which were held from time to time. Another mode of acquiring wealth called forth by the war after the destruction of peaceful industry and trade was privateering, a speculation involving risks, like the slave trade and the blockade-running of modern times. This kind of private enterprise had the further advantage of injuring the enemy, and formed a naval reserve, destined at no distant period to be of the most important service.

The war in Sicily made no progress. The siege, of Lilybaeum, which had now continued for nine years, was carried on with considerably less energy since the failure of the first attack, and its object was plainly to keep the Carthaginians in the town. The lingering siege of Drepana was equally ineffectual. The sea was free, and the garrisons of both towns were thus furnished with all necessaries. It was not possible to dislodge Hamilcar from Mount Eryx. The Roman consuls, who during the last six years of the war had successively commanded in Sicily, could boast of no success which might warrant them in claiming a triumph, in spite of the easy conditions on which this distinction might he obtained.

At length the Roman government determined to try the only means by which the war could be brought to an end, and once more to attack the Carthaginians by sea. The finances of the state were not in a condition to furnish means for building and equipping a new fleet. The Romans therefore followed the example of Athens, and called up the richest citizens, in the ratio of their property, either to supply ships or to unite with others in doing so. The Roman historians were pleased to extol this manner of raising a new fleet as a sign of devotion and patriotism. It was, however, in reality only a compulsory loan, which the state imposed upon those who had suffered least from the war, and had probably enjoyed great gains. The owners of privateers had the obligation and the means of supporting the state in the manner just described. A new fleet of two hundred ships was thus fitted out and sent to Sicily under the consul C. Lutatius Catulus in the year 242. The Carthaginians had not thought it necessary to maintain a fleet in the Sicilian waters since the defeat of the Roman navy in the year 249. Their ships were otherwise engaged in the very lucrative piratical war on the coasts of Italy and Sicily. Lutatius therefore found the harbour of Drepana unoccupied. He made some attacks on the town from the sea and the land side, but his chief energies were directed to the training and practising of his crews, thus avoiding the mistake by which the battle of Drepana was lost. He exercised his men during the whole of the summer, autumn, and winter in rowing, and took care that his pilots should be minutely acquainted with the nature of a coast singularly dangerous from its many shallows. Thus he anticipated with confidence a struggle which could no longer be delayed if Carthage did not wish to sacrifice her two fortresses on the coast.

The die was cast in March the following year (241). A Carthaginian fleet, heavily laden with provisions for the troops in Sicily, appeared near the Aegatian Islands. The object of the commander was to land the provisions, to take Hamilcar, with a body of soldiers, on board, and then to give battle to the Romans. This object was frustrated by the promptness of Catulus, who, although wounded, took part in the battle after having handed over the command to the praetor Q. Valerius Falto. When the Carthaginians approached with full sail, favoured by a strong west wind, the Roman ships advanced, and compelled them to give battle. It was soon decided. A complete and brilliant victory crowned the last heroic exertions of the Romans. Fifty ships of the enemy were sunk, seventy were taken with their crews, amounting to 10,000 men; the rest, favoured by a sudden change of wind, escaped to Carthage.

The defeat of the Carthaginians was not so great as that of the Romans had been at Drepana. But Carthage was exhausted and discouraged. Perhaps she was alarmed by the premonitory signs of the terrible war with the mercenaries which soon after brought her to the very brink of ruin. Sicily had now been for several years as good as lost to the Carthaginians. The continuation of the war held out to them no prospect of winning back their former possessions in that island. Carthage therefore decided on proposing terms of peace, and she might entertain the hope that Rome would be not less ready to bring the war to a close. The negotiations were carried on by Hamilcar Barcas and the consul Lutatius as plenipotentiaries. At first the Romans insisted on dishonourable conditions. They demanded that the Carthaginians should lay down their arms, deliver up the deserters, and pass under the yoke. But Hamilcar indignantly refused these terms, and declared he would rather die in battle than deliver up to the enemy the arms with which he was intrusted for the defence of his country. Lutatius therefore waived this claim, the more readily as he wished to bring the negotiations speedily to on end, in order to secure for himself the credit of having brought the long war to a close. The preliminaries of peace were thus settled. Carthage engaged to evacuate Sicily; not to make war upon Hiero of Syracuse; to give up all Roman prisoners without ransom, and to pay a sum of 2,200 talents in twenty years. On the whole the Roman senate and people approved of these terms. The formal conditions of the treaty involved the abandonment by Carthage of the smaller islands between Sicily and Italy (which was a matter of course), as well as the mutual obligation that each should refrain from attacking and injuring the allies of the other, or entering into an alliance with them; but the war indemnity imposed on Carthage was raised by 1,000 talents, to be paid at once.

Thus ended at length the war for the possession of Sicily, which had lasted uninterruptedly for three-and-twenty years,—the greatest struggle known to the generation then living. The most beautiful island of the Mediterranean, the possession of which had been contested for centuries by Greeks and Punians, was wrested from them both by a people who till quite lately had lain beyond the horizon of the civilised nations of the ancient world, which had exercised no influence on their political system and international dealings, and had never been even taken into account. Before the war with Pyrrhus, Rome was among the Mediterranean states of antiquity what Russia was in Europe before Peter the Great and the war with Charles XII. By her heroic and successful opposition to the interference of Pyrrhus in the affairs of Italy, Rome emerged from obscurity, and made herself known to the rulers of Egypt, Macedonia, and Syria as a power with which they might soon have to deal.

After the departure of Pyrrhus (273 B.C.) an Egyptian embassy was sent to Rome, to offer, in the name of King Ptolemy Philadelphus, a treaty of amity, which the Roman senate willingly accepted. About the same time messengers came to Rome from Apollonia, a flourishing Greek town on the Adriatic, perhaps for the same purpose. This was the time when the Greek world was opening to the Romans, when Greek art, language, and literature made their first entry into Italy—an event which sixteen centuries afterwards was to be followed by a second invasion of Greek learning. The Sicilian war was to a great extent a Greek war. For the first time all the western Greeks united in one great league against an ancient foe of the Hellenic name; and Rome, which was at the head of this league, appeared to the Greeks in the mother country, in Asia and Egypt, more and more as a new leading power whose friendship it was worth while to secure. No wonder that the history of this people began now to have the greatest possible interest for the Greeks, and that the first attempts of the Romans in writing history were made in the Greek language, and were intended for the Greek people.

While Rome, by the conquest of Sicily, gained, with regard to other powers, a position of importance and influence, it became unmistakably clear for the first time that old institutions, suited for a town community and for the simplicity of ancient life, were insufficient for a more extended field of political and military operations. The Roman military system was organised for the defence of narrow boundaries, and not for aggressive warfare in distant parts. The universal duty of military service and the periodical formation of new armies, which was a consequence of it, had not appeared prejudicial in the wars with the Italian nations, who had the same institutions, and as long as the theatre of war was the immediate neighbourhood of Rome. When, however, it became no longer possible to dismiss every legion after the summer campaign, it was at once seen that a citizen army on the old plan had great military and economical disadvantages. The peasants, who were taken from their homesteads, grew impatient of prolonged service, or if they were ordered into distant countries like Africa. It was necessary to steer a middle course, and to let at least one consular army return annually from Sicily to Rome. Only two legions wintered regularly at the seat of war, to the great injury of military operations. Thus the time of service of the Roman soldiers was lengthened out to a year and a half. Even this for a continuance caused great difficulty. It was necessary to offer the soldiers some compensation for their long absence from home. This was effected in two ways, first by allowing them the spoils taken in war, and, secondly, by offering them a reward after the expiration of their time of service. The prospect of booty operated on them much as their pay influenced the mercenaries. It was a means for making the universal military service less onerous, for it could not fail to draw volunteers into the army. The granting of lands to veterans also served to render service in the legions less obnoxious. These military colonies, the traces of which are even now apparent, are not therefore to be regarded as a symptom of the disorders of the state consequent upon the civil wars. They were a necessary result of the Roman military system; and as long as there was unoccupied uncultivated land at the disposal of the state, such a measure, far from being hurtful, might even possess great advantages for the well­being of the state, as well as for the veterans.

Considering the military training of the Roman soldiers, and the simplicity of the old tactics, the frequent change of the men in the legions was of less consequence than we might suppose, especially as the officers did not, as a matter of course, leave the service with the disbanded troops. When the rank and file were released from their military duty, the staff of the legion, it is true, did not remain; but it was in the nature of things that the centurions and military tribunes of a disbanded legion should be for the most part chosen again to form a new one. The military service is for the common soldiers only a temporary duty, but it constitutes a profession for the officers. The Roman centurion was the principal nerve of the legions, and for the most part repaired what the inexperience of the recruits and the want of skill in the commanders had spoilt. Regular promotion, according to merit, secured the continuance of the centurions in the army, and placed the most experienced of them at the head of the legion, as military tribunes. They were to the army what the paid clerks were to the civil magistrates—the embodiment of professional experience and the guardians of discipline.

Such men were the more necessary as the Romans continued the practice of annually changing their commanders-in-chief. There was no greater obstacle to the military successes of the Romans than this system. It suited only the old time when the dimensions of the state were small. In the annual campaigns against the Aequians and the Volscians, which often lasted only a few weeks, a commander needed no especial military education. But in the Samnite wars, a perceptible lack of experience, and more particularly of strategic skill, on the part of the consuls, delayed the victory for a long time. These defects were far more deeply felt in Sicily. Before a new commander had had time to become acquainted with the conditions of the task before him, even before he was on an intimate footing with his own troops, or knew what sort of enemy he had to oppose, the greatest part of his time of office had probably expired, and his successor might perhaps be on his way to relieve him. If, urged by a natural ambition, he sought to mark his consulship by some brilliant action, he was apt to plunge into desperate undertakings, and reaped disgrace and loss instead of the hoped-for victory. This was the inevitable result, even if the consuls elected were good generals and brave soldiers. But the issue of the elections was dependent on other conditions than the military qualities of the candidates, and the frequent election of incapable officers was the inevitable result. Only when there was an urgent cause, the people of necessity elected experienced generals. Under ordinary circumstances, the struggle of parties, or the influence of this or that family, decided the election of consuls. The power of the nobility was fully established in the first Punic war. We find the same families repeatedly in possession of the highest magistracies; and the fact that military ability was not always required of a candidate is proved above all by the election of P. Claudius Pulcher, who, like most of the Claudians, seems to have been a man unworthy of high command.

If, in spite of these deficiencies, the result of the war was favourable to the Romans, it must be ascribed to their indomitable perseverance and the keen military instinct which enabled them always to accommodate themselves to new circumstances. Of this we have the clearest evidence in the quickness and facility with which they turned their attention to the naval war and to siege operations. The successes of the Romans at sea may, it is true, be attributed chiefly to the Greek shipbuilders, and to the Greek sailors and captains who served on their ships. The Greeks were also their instructors in the art of besieging towns with the newly invented machines, but the merit of having applied the new means with courage and skill belonged nevertheless to the Romans. The extravagant praise which has been lavished on them on account of their naval victories, it is scarcely necessary to repeat, they did not deserve; and it is a disgrace to them, heightened by the contrast of former times, that they never afterwards equipped fleets like those which fought at Mylae and Ecnomus, and that, at a later period, when their power was supreme, they allowed the pirates to gain the upper hand, until the supplies of the capital were cut off, and the nobility were no longer safe in Campania, in their own country seats. This weakness, which became conspicuous at a later period, confirms our hypothesis of the prominent share which the Italian and Sicilian Greeks had in the first organisation of the Roman navy. It is at least a significant fact that the Hellenic nationality in Italy and Sicily declined with the decay of the maritime power of Rome.

The merits and defects of the Carthaginian manner of conducting the war were very different. The Carthaginians had standing armies, and they allowed their generals to keep the command as long as they possessed their confidence. In both these respects they were superior to the Romans. But the materials of their armies were not to be compared to those of their antagonists. Their soldiers were mercenaries, and mercenaries of the very worst kind; not native but foreign, a motley mixture of Greeks, Gauls, Libyans, Iberians, and other nations, of men without either enthusiasm or patriotism, urged only by a desire of high pay and booty. In the fickleness of these mercenaries, amongst whom the Gauls seem to have been the most numerous and the least to be trusted, lay the greatest weakness of the Carthaginian military system. The very best of their generals did not succeed in educating these foreign bands to be faithful and steady. From the beginning of the war to its close, examples abound of insubordination, mutiny, and treachery on the part of the mercenaries; and of ingratitude, faithlessness, and the most reckless severity and cruelty on the part of the Carthaginians. If the mercenaries entered into negotiations with the enemy, betrayed the posts confided to them, delivered up or crucified their officers, the Carthaginian generals intentionally exposed them to be cut to pieces by the enemy, left them on desert islands to die of hunger, threw them overboard into the sea, or massacred them in cold blood. The relation of commander and soldier, which calls on both sides for the greatest devotion and fidelity, was with the Carthaginians the cause of continued conspiracy and internal war. The weapon which Carthage wielded in the war against Rome threatened either to break with every blow or to wound her own breast. We know probably only a small part of the disasters which befell Carthage, owing to the fickleness of her troops. How many undertakings failed, even in the design, owing to want of confidence in the mercenary troops, how many failed in the execution, we cannot pretend to ascertain. So much, however, is proved to our satisfaction, from isolated statements preserved to us, that the bad faith of the Carthaginian mercenaries was their chief weakness, and spoiled all that by their experience and their skill as veteran soldiers they might have accomplished.

We know little of the Carthaginian generals. But it is clear that on the whole they were superior to the Roman consuls. Among the latter, not one appears to be distinguished for military genius. They could lead their troops against the enemy and then fight bravely; but they could do nothing more. Metellus, who gained the great victory at Panormus, was perhaps the only exception; but even he owed his victory more to the faults of his opponent and his want of skill in managing the elephants than by the display of any military talent on his own part; and when he commanded the second time as consul, he accomplished nothing. On the other hand, it cannot be denied that Hannibal, the defender of Agrigentum, Himilco, who had the command for nine years in Lilybaeum, Adherbal, the victor at Drepana, and Carthalo, who attacked the Roman fleet at Camarina and caused its destruction, and above all Hamilcar Barcas, were great generals, who understood not only the art of fighting, but also the conduct of a war, and by their personal superiority over their opponents outweighed the disadvantages involved in the quality of their troops. Among the Carthaginian generals some, of course, were incapable; as, for instance, those who lost the battles of Panormus and the Aegatian Islands. If the Carthaginians punished these men severely, we may perhaps be entitled to accuse them of harshness, but not of injustice; for we find that other unfortunate generals, Hannibal, for instance, after his defeat at Mylae, retained the confidence of the Carthaginian government; and thus they punished, it would seem, not the misfortune of the generals, but some special fault or offence.

The defeats of the Carthaginians at sea are most surprising. The Roman boarding-bridges cannot be regarded as the single, or even as the chief, cause of this. The only explanation which we can offer has been already given—that the Roman fleet was probably for the most part built and manned by Greeks; and even then it is still astonishing that the Carthaginians were only once decidedly victorious at sea in the course of the whole war. Nor can we understand why they did not fit out larger and more numerous fleets, to shut out the Romans from the sea altogether at the very beginning, as England did with regard to France in the revolutionary war. That they sent no second fleet after the defeat of Ecnomus to oppose the Romans, and to prevent their landing in Africa, and that after their last defeat they broke down all at once, must, from our imperfect acquaintance with the internal affairs of Carthage, remain incomprehensible. Perhaps the financial resources of this state were not so inexhaustible as we are accustomed to believe.

The peace which handed over Sicily to the Romans affected the power of Carthage but little. Her possessions in Sicily had never been secure, and could scarcely have yielded a profit equal to the cost of their defence. The value of these possessions lay chiefly in the commerce with Sicily; and this commerce could be carried on with equal ease under Roman rule. Spain offered a rich and complete compensation for Sicily, and in Spain Carthage had a much fairer prospect of being able to found a lasting dominion, as there she had not to encounter the obstinate resistance of the Greeks, and as Spain was so distant front Italy that the Roman interests were not immediately concerned by what took place in that country.

CHAPTER IV.

THE WAR OF THE MERCENARIES, 241-238 B.C.