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THE SECOND ATHENIAN  
CONFEDERACY

BY

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## PREFACE.

THE scope of the following dissertation is, I hope, adequately explained in the Introduction. The subject was one of those set for the Thirlwall Prize of 1905, and it is in accordance with the regulations framed for the prize that the Essay is now published. A word of explanation as to the map may here be given. It is intended to illustrate the extent of the Confederacy at the time of its greatest prosperity. I have marked Thessaly as belonging to the Confederacy, since it is reasonable to believe that it was at the time almost completely under the influence of Jason of Pherae. The 'probable members' are so indicated on the ground that Athens as mistress of the Aegean would hardly fail to absorb its islands into her Confederacy.

It remains for me to express my hearty thanks to Mr P. Giles of Emmanuel College for his kindness in reading my proof sheets and giving me the benefit of his criticisms.

F. H. MARSHALL.

LONDON,

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND OF THE  
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- Ath. Mitt.*—Mitteilungen des k. deutschen Archaeologischen Instituts, Athenische Abteilung. Athens : from 1876. In progress.
- Beiträge zur alt. Gesch.*—Beiträge zur alten Geschichte, herausgegeben von C. F. Lehmann. Leipzig : 1902, etc. In progress.
- BELOCH, *Att. Pol.*—Die attische Politik seit Perikles, von Julius Beloch. Leipzig : 1884.
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- Bull. de Corr. Hell.*—Bulletin de Correspondance Hellénique. Athens and Paris : from 1877. In progress.
- BURY, *Hist. of Greece.*—History of Greece to the death of Alexander the Great, by J. B. Bury. London : 1900.
- BUSOLT.—Der zweite athenische Bund, von Georg Busolt ; in Neue Jahrbücher für classische Philologie, Supplementband VII (1873—5), pp. 641—866.
- BUSOLT, *Griech. Staatsalt.*—Die griechischen Staats- und Rechtsaltertümer, von Georg Busolt. Zweite Auflage. In Müller's Handbuch der klassischen Altertumswissenschaft, Band IV, 1. Abteilung, 1. Hälfte. München : 1892.
- C. I. A.—Corpus Inscriptionum Atticarum. Berlin : 1873—97. This, the old title, is here retained in preference to the

- new—Inscriptiones Graecae, Inscriptiones Atticae. The supplement to vol. II is also quoted by its old title, C. I. A. IV (2). Strictly speaking, it is now vol. II, part 5 of Inscriptiones Atticae.
- Comptes Rendus de l'Acad. des Inscr.*—Académie des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres. *Comptes Rendus des Séances.* 4<sup>me</sup> Série. Paris: from 1873. In progress.
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- FREEMAN, *Hist. of Federal Government*<sup>2</sup>.—History of Federal Government in Greece and Italy, by E. A. Freeman. Edited by J. B. Bury. London: 1893.
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- HICKS and HILL.—*A Manual of Greek Historical Inscriptions*, by E. L. Hicks and G. F. Hill. Oxford: 1901.
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- HÖCK, *Die Bezieh. Kerkyras.*—Die Beziehungen Kerkyras zum zweiten athenischen Seebunde, von Dr Adelbert Höck. Beilage zum Jahresbericht des königl. Gymnasiums zu Husum, 1881.
- HOLM, *Hist. of Greece.*—History of Greece, by Adolph Holm. Translated from the German. 4 vols. London: 1894—8.

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- I. G. XII.—Inscriptiones Graecae Insularum Maris Aegaci. Berlin : 1895 ff.
- JUDEICH, *Kleinas. Stud.*—Kleinasiatische Studien, von Walther Judeich. Marburg : 1892.
- KEIL, *Anon. Arg.*—Anonymus Argentinensis. Fragmente zur Geschichte des Perikleischen Athen aus einem Strassburger Papyrus. Herausgegeben von Bruno Keil. Strassburg : 1902.
- Leipz. Ber.*—Berichte der königl. sächsischen Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften, Philologisch-historische Classe. Leipzig : 1849 ff. In progress.
- LENZ.—Das Syndedion der Bundesgenossen im zweiten athenischen Bunde, von Emil Lenz. Inaugural Dissertation. Königsberg : 1880.
- MEYER, *Gesch. d. Alt.*—Geschichte des Alterthums, von Eduard Meyer. Fünfter Band. Viertes Buch : Der Ausgang der griechischen Geschichte. Stuttgart and Berlin : 1902.
- N. Jahrb. f. cl. Phil.*—Neue Jahrbücher für Philologie und Pädagogik. Leipzig : 1831—97.
- PRIDIK, *De Cei insulae rebus.*—De Cei insulae rebus, scripsit Alexander Pridik. Berolini : 1892.
- Rev. Arch.*—Revue Archéologique. Paris : 1844 ff. In progress. N. S. = Nouvelle Série, 1860—82.
- Rhein. Mus.*—Rheinisches Museum für Philologie. Bonn, Frankfurt a. M. : 1827 ff. In progress.
- SCHAEFER, *Dem. u. s. Zeit<sup>2</sup>.*—Demosthenes und seine Zeit, von Arnold Schaefer. Zweite Ausgabe. 3 vols. Leipzig : 1856—58.
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## INTRODUCTION.

THE object of the following essay is to describe in as succinct a manner as possible what we know of the principles and history of the Second Athenian Confederacy. It may, perhaps, be thought that Busolt's monograph<sup>1</sup> upon this subject has rendered such an essay superfluous. That work must necessarily form the foundation of any subsequent account of the Confederacy, and I wish to acknowledge my great obligation to its author, whose arrangement, in its broad outlines, I have followed. It seems to me, however, that there is room for another monograph on the same subject for two reasons. In the first place Busolt's work, largely owing to the very full discussion of various questions bearing upon the Confederacy, lacks clearness and unity; in the second place (and this is the weightier of the two reasons) a fair amount of new inscriptional material has since been discovered, which sheds further light upon the principles and history of the League, while many fresh articles relating to the subject have from time to time appeared since 1874. Naturally I have directed my attention more particularly to this new material, and have sought, as far as possible, to weld it into a coherent whole.

With regard to the sources for the History of the Confederacy, there is little or nothing that can be added to Busolt's remarks<sup>2</sup>. For the principles upon

<sup>1</sup> *Der zweite athenische Bund in Neue Jahrb. für class. Phil., Supplementband, VII (1873-5), pp. 641-866.*

<sup>2</sup> pp. 660-3.



which the Confederacy was based inscriptional evidence is incomparably the most important. The great decree moved by Aristoteles<sup>1</sup> naturally stands out preeminent. Diodorus' brief account of the foundation of the Confederacy<sup>2</sup> is of very great value; for the history of the Confederacy, too, he is on the whole our chief authority. Xenophon, as a contemporary historian, deserves careful attention on the rare occasions when his narrative in any way bears upon the Confederacy. His *περὶ πόρων*<sup>3</sup> is of considerable value as depicting the condition of Athens about 355 B.C. The other authorities which demand particular mention are Isokrates, Demosthenes, and Aeschines, all of whom must be used with the greatest caution. The first-named is an avowed foe of Athenian Imperial policy, and is habitually guilty of exaggeration. Nevertheless, as a contemporary witness, whose writings in many ways bear very directly upon the Confederacy, he must constantly be consulted. Demosthenes and Aeschines (with the Scholia upon them) give several isolated pieces of information about the Confederacy. Their statements must be received with circumspection.

To attempt to write the history of the Confederacy is in many respects a very discouraging task. There is fairly full information for the opening years, but after that the Confederacy seems to disappear from view, merged, as it were, in the general history of Athens. All that can be done is to examine that history, and to give prominence to such events as may reasonably be considered to have a connection with the Confederacy, of whose continued existence we have, every now and then, definite evidence.

<sup>1</sup> C. I. A. II. 17.

<sup>2</sup> Diod. xv. 28.

<sup>3</sup> See below, p. 115.





MAP SHOWING THE EXTENT OF THE SECOND ATHENIAN CONFEDERACY  
 ABOUT THE YEAR 373-2 B.C.

## CHAPTER I.

### EVENTS LEADING TO THE FORMATION OF THE CONFEDERACY.

WHEN Lysander secured the surrender of Samos at the close of the summer of 404 B.C.<sup>1</sup>, the empire of Athens was completely destroyed. For the next few years the Athenians must have been so entirely absorbed in the internal commotions which harassed their city, and so broken in spirit by the distress which pressed upon each individual citizen, that they could hardly have realized the extent of their fall from the former glories of empire. The restoration of the democratic constitution no doubt brought considerable relief, yet the task of repairing the ravages wrought by the government of the Thirty was severe enough to preclude any immediate longing for the recovery of the lost dominion of the sea. But as a whole the renewal of prosperity was astonishingly rapid, and as material comfort improved, it was inevitable that the longing for the former greatness should revive, and that any chance of regaining the lost empire should be eagerly clutched at.

*Revival of  
Athenian  
sea-power  
under  
Konon  
(394 B.C.).*

<sup>1</sup> Xen. *Hell.* II. 3. 6.

The opportunity was destined to come from without; at home the Corinthian war, though perhaps entered upon with some idea of recovering their former supremacy<sup>1</sup>, was sufficient to occupy the attention of the Athenian citizens. Konon, doubtless eager to atone for the disastrous error of Arginusae, utilised the hostility felt by the Great King against the Spartans to effect a revival of the sea-power of his native city. The great victory of Knidos (Aug. 394 B.C.) destroyed the short-lived naval supremacy of Sparta<sup>2</sup>, and prepared the way for that restoration of Athenian hegemony at sea which is definitely marked by the formation of the Second Confederacy. The events following the battle of Knidos are of the first importance for a right understanding of the circumstances which led up to the founding of the Confederacy, and must be narrated in some detail.

The first object of Konon and Pharnabazos after their great victory was to free the islands and coast towns from the Spartan domination<sup>3</sup>. Rhodes had already been liberated by Konon in 395 B.C. It was now the turn of the other cities of the Aegean to obtain relief from Spartan oppression. Kos, Nisyros, and Teos<sup>4</sup> were first freed; then, as Konon sailed up the coast of Asia Minor, Chios expelled its Spartan garrison and

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Beloch, *Die attische Politik seit Perikles*, p. 344, and Xen. *Hell.* iii. 5. 10.

<sup>2</sup> Diod. xiv. 84. 4: *καὶ Λακεδαιμόνιοι μὲν ἀπὸ τούτου τοῦ χρόνου τὴν κατὰ θάλατταν ἀρχὴν ἀπέβαλον.*

<sup>3</sup> Cf. Xen. *Hell.* iv. 8. 1 ff.; Diod. xiv. 84. 3 ff.

<sup>4</sup> It is, perhaps, worth suggesting that *Τηλιους* not *Τητους* may be the true reading in Diod. xiv. 84. 3. It is far more natural, on geographical grounds, to couple Telos and Nisyros, than Nisyros and Teos.

welcomed the Athenian conqueror. The example of Chios was followed by Mytilene, Ephesos<sup>1</sup>, and Erythrae<sup>1</sup>. Samos<sup>1</sup>, Knidos, Iasos, Ephesos and Rhodes would appear to have formed a league among themselves, no doubt maintaining at the same time friendly relations with Athens<sup>2</sup>. Tenedos in all probability came over to Athens at this time (cf. Xen. *Hell.* v. 1. 6), and, more important still, the old Athenian possessions of Lemnos, Imbros, and Skyros were recovered<sup>3</sup>. Nothing remained to Sparta save Sestos (consistently hostile to Athens<sup>4</sup>), Abydos<sup>5</sup>, and the smaller towns of Lesbos<sup>6</sup>. About 393 B.C. a treaty was made with Eretria<sup>7</sup>, and in this same year Melos and other of the Kyklades were won over, while Kythera was placed under an Athenian governor. Karpathos was on friendly terms with Athens about this time, and its citizens were publicly thanked and granted autonomy and other privileges in return

<sup>1</sup> Statues of Konon were set up in these places: cf. Paus. vi. 3. 16 and the fragment of a decree passed by Erythrae in honour of Konon (Hicks and Hill, *Gr. Hist. Inscr.* 89; Dittenberger, *Sylloge*, 1<sup>2</sup>, 65).

<sup>2</sup> The existence of this League is shown by coins of these cities, which have a common type (Herakles strangling the serpents) and bear the inscription ΣΥΝ. See Gardner, *Types of Greek Coins*, p. 33, and Pl. xvi. 6, 7. Cf. Judeich, *Kleinasiat. Stud.* pp. 10 and 80. Beloch, *Griech. Gesch.* ii. p. 216 puts the alliance after the Peace of Antalkidas, but his arguments are not convincing. Is it likely that Persia would at that time have allowed Knidos, Ephesos, and Iasos to enter into such a League? Beloch is followed by Meyer, *Gesch. d. Alt.* v. pp. 308, 310, and Bury, *Hist. of Greece*, p. 553. The latter gives to the coins the date 394–3 B.C., but puts the alliance after the Peace of Antalkidas. The League must have broken up in 391 B.C. when Ephesos, Samos, and Knidos joined Sparta. See Xen. *Hell.* iv. 8. 17, 22, 23.

<sup>3</sup> Xen. iv. 8. 15.

<sup>4</sup> Dem. c. *Aristocr.* 158.

<sup>5</sup> Xen. iv. 8. 3–5.

<sup>6</sup> See Diod. xiv. 94. 4.

<sup>7</sup> C.I.A. iv. (2), 7 b.



for the present of a cypress tree towards the rebuilding of the old temple of Athene<sup>1</sup>. Now too Athens must have won back her old influence at Delos, for we find her authority restored there in 389 B.C.<sup>2</sup> Konon had nobly retrieved his former error, and had set Athens in a fair way of recovering her lost empire. It was to this end, no doubt, that he was zealous in promoting the rebuilding of the city walls<sup>3</sup>.

Yet so far no systematic attempt to refound the empire can be perceived. Of the maritime cities liberated by Konon, some maintained entire independence, others entered into closer relations with their champion<sup>4</sup>. The alliance with Eretria shows a perfect equality between the two contracting parties<sup>5</sup>.

For the next few years Athens was prevented by the war on land and by financial embarrassments<sup>6</sup> from extending her sea-power further. Yet she would not consent to peace on the basis of autonomy for the island communities. Hopes of recovering her former empire were still stirring, as we can see from Andokides' speech delivered at the beginning of 391 B.C.<sup>7</sup> Unhappily there seemed but little possibility of realizing these hopes. Konon had fallen into disfavour with Persia on the not unfounded charge of having employed the

A temporary  
relapse  
(391 B.C.).

<sup>1</sup> Hicks and Hill, 93; Foucart, *Bull. de Corr. Hell.* XII. p. 153 ff.

<sup>2</sup> C.I.A. IV. (2), 813 b.

<sup>3</sup> Xen. IV. 8. 12.

<sup>4</sup> Diod. XIV. 84. 4.

<sup>5</sup> See p. 3, n. 7.

<sup>6</sup> Cf. the expedients to raise revenue as indicated in Aristoph. *Eccl.* 815 (copper coinage) and 825 (the τετραρακοστή, ἣν ἐπόρισ' Εὐριπίδης). Cf. also *ibid.* 197: ναῦς δεῖ καθέλλκειν. τῷ πένητι μὲν δοκεῖ, | τοῖς πλουσίοις δὲ καὶ γεωργοῖς οὐ δοκεῖ.

<sup>7</sup> Andok. *de pace*. 15: he asks whether the war is to be continued Χερρόνησον καὶ τὰ ἀποικίας καὶ τὰ χρέα ἵνα ἀναλάβωμεν;

Great King's resources merely for the purpose of advancing Athenian interests<sup>1</sup>. The Spartans had made considerable progress towards the re-establishment of their sea-power, and that too at the expense of Athens. In 391 B.C. Ephesos, Knidos and Samos fell away to Sparta<sup>2</sup>, whilst Rhodes was torn with dissensions between the aristocratic and democratic parties, the former receiving the support of Sparta<sup>3</sup>. The rebellion of Evagoras of Cyprus against Persia involved the Athenians in a quarrel with the power which had hitherto been their chief support<sup>4</sup>; of ill omen, too, was the capture by the Spartan Teleutias of the ten ships sent out to aid Evagoras in the autumn of 390 B.C.<sup>5</sup>

It was at this dangerous juncture of affairs that Thrasybulos of Steiria came forward to prevent the undoing of the work accomplished by Konon. Setting out with a fleet of 40 ships in the spring of 389 B.C.<sup>6</sup>, he did not, as might perhaps have been expected, turn his attention forthwith to the suppression of the philo-Spartan party at Rhodes; he directed his course northwards, bent upon the establishment of a Second Athenian Empire. A quarrel had broken out between Medokos, king of the Odrysae, and his vassal Seuthes who ruled eastward on the shores of the Propontis. Thrasybulos acted as arbitrator and succeeded in winning both as allies of Athens<sup>7</sup>. He thought that the Greek cities

*Position  
changed  
by the  
expedition  
of Thrasy-  
bulos  
(389 B.C.).*

<sup>1</sup> Xen. iv. 8. 12 ff.

<sup>2</sup> See above, p. 3, n. 2.

<sup>3</sup> Xen. iv. 8. 20, etc.; Diod. xiv. 97. 4.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. Judeich, *Kleinas. Studien*, p. 88; Beloch, *Griech. Gesch.* II. p. 210.

<sup>5</sup> Xen. iv. 8. 24.

<sup>6</sup> Xen. iv. 8. 25 ff.; Diod. xiv. 94 ff.

<sup>7</sup> Cf. Höck, *Hermes*, xxvi. p. 88 f., and C.I.A. II. 12 and 12 b.



situated on the Thracian coast, such as Maroneia and Aenos, would under these circumstances be more likely to enter into alliance with the Athenians<sup>1</sup>. A democracy was set up at Byzantium<sup>2</sup>, and the old 10 % duty on goods brought in from the Pontos was reimposed. At the same time Kalchedon entered into friendly relations with Athens. Thrasybulos next turned his attention to Lesbos, where Mytilene alone had listened to Konon's overtures after the battle of Knidos; here Eresos and Antissa were definitely won over<sup>3</sup>. It is probable that the Thracian Chersonese<sup>4</sup>, Thasos<sup>5</sup>, Samothrake<sup>6</sup>, Klazomenae<sup>7</sup>, and Halikarnassos<sup>8</sup> were also brought over to Athens about this time. Subsequently Thrasybulos obtained reinforcements from the allied cities of Chios<sup>9</sup> and Mytilene, and sailed to put an end to the disturbances which had for a considerable period been harassing Rhodes. But at Aspendos, whither he had gone to raise money in order to carry on his operations, he was surprised and slain by the inhabitants, who were enraged at the plundering of their lands by his troops<sup>10</sup>.

<sup>1</sup> Xen. iv. 8. 26.

<sup>2</sup> Dem. c. *Lept.* 60, where we find that honours were granted to Archebios and Herakleides for betraying the city to Thrasybulos.

<sup>3</sup> Diod. xiv. 94. 4.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.* 94. 2.

<sup>5</sup> Dem. c. *Lept.* 59; Xen. v. 1. 7; *Ath. Mitt.* vii. 313 ff.; C.I.A. iv. 11 b. Cf. Wilhelm, *Er. Vind.* p. 241 ff., and Szanto, *Ath. Mitt.* xv. p. 72 ff.

<sup>6</sup> Xen. *loc. cit.*

<sup>7</sup> C.I.A. ii. 14 b; Hicks and Hill, 96; *Ath. Mitt.* vii. p. 174 ff.

<sup>8</sup> Lysias, c. *Erg.* 12, 17.

<sup>9</sup> Cf. C.I.A. ii. 13, recording honours granted to a Chian (388-7 B.C.).

<sup>10</sup> Xen. iv. 8. 30; Diod. xiv. 99.

There are some noteworthy points in this expedition of Thrasybulos. They must be examined carefully in relation to the policy of Athens at this time. The inscriptions from Klazomenae and Thasos reveal the fact that there was, in the mind of Thrasybulos, a definite plan for the establishment of a Second Athenian Empire on the lines of the First, as it existed at the date 413-2 B.C. From the Klazomenae inscription<sup>1</sup> we learn that the Klazomenians in 387-6 B.C. were called upon to pay τὴν ἐπὶ Θρασυβούλου εἰκοστήν, while the Thasians<sup>2</sup> were also liable to the same duty. There can be no reasonable doubt that this 5 % duty was a revival by Thrasybulos of the 5 % import and export tax imposed by the Athenians upon the members of their empire in 413-2 B.C. Probably the purpose of the measure at that time was to simplify the collection of the tribute, since the task of getting it in would fall upon the tax-gatherers, to whom the duty was farmed out<sup>3</sup>. The reimposition of this tax makes it evident that Thrasybulos was deliberately attempting to restore the former empire. This view receives confirmation from the fact that garrisons were placed in some of the newly-won cities<sup>4</sup>. At Klazomenae we find the question as to the introduction of a garrison decided by the Athenian Assembly in favour of their ally.

*His attempt to re-found the Athenian Empire.*

<sup>1</sup> C.I.A. II. 14 b.

<sup>2</sup> C.I.A. IV. 11 b.

<sup>3</sup> Thuc. VII. 28. 4; Köhler, *Ath. Mitt.* VII. p. 316.

<sup>4</sup> Another indication which points in the same direction is furnished by C.I.A. IV. (2), 11 b, where the Athenians claim the right of banishing offenders not merely from their own territory, but also *from the territory of their allies*. The date of the inscription is between 390 and 387 B.C. See Usteri, *Aechtung u. Verbannung im griech. Recht*, p. 21.

But the plans of Thrasybulos were cut short by his death. Moreover, the violent opposition which his forward policy encountered at Athens makes it evident that his actions are not to be regarded as completely indicative of a settled policy on the part of the Athenians<sup>1</sup>. His recall was, for the time being, practically a condemnation of his measures. We cannot say more than that the successes of Konon and Thrasybulos had together brought Athens into such a position that she might easily have founded a second empire on the lines of the first<sup>2</sup>, had the Athenians determined to pursue an imperial policy with a whole heart. Thrasybulos lost his life in an endeavour to obtain for himself financial supplies which were denied him from home.

Agyrrhios was sent out to succeed Thrasybulos, but the Spartans felt that an opportunity of recovering their lost position had come. Anaxibios was despatched with three triremes and 1000 mercenaries to help Derkylidas at Abydos. Iphikrates on the other hand was sent by the Athenians to oppose him, and won a conspicuous success near Abydos where Anaxibios was slain<sup>3</sup>. In 388 B.C. Antalkidas landed at Ephesos as Spartan nauarch. He sent his lieutenant Nikolochos to the Hellespont, while he himself proceeded to the Great King at Susa<sup>4</sup>. He was entirely successful in his mission. The Great King no doubt realized that the naval supremacy of Athens was detrimental to the

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Lysias, *c. Ergoel.* (xxviii.), *passim*, and Judeich, *Kleinias. Studien*, pp. 12 and 94.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Lipsius, *Ber. d. kön. sächs. Gesell. d. Wiss. zu Leipzig*, 1898, pp. 146, 147.

<sup>3</sup> Xen. iv. 8. 31 ff.

<sup>4</sup> Xen. v. 1. 6, 25 ff.

*Death of Thrasybulos followed by renewed Spartan efforts. The Peace of Antalkidas (386 B.C.).*

interests of Persia. Certain terms were formulated, and to these the combatants were required to submit, under pain of the hostility of Persia if they refused. The terms were: (1) that the cities in Asia together with the islands of Klazomenae and Cyprus should belong to the Great King; (2) that the other Greek cities, small and great, should be autonomous, with the exception of Lemnos, Imbros, and Skyros, which were to belong as of old to Athens<sup>1</sup>. Antalkidas returned to Abydos in the autumn of 387 B.C.; by a clever ruse he drew off the main Athenian fleet in the direction of Kalchedon, while he himself became master of the Hellespont, after destroying an Athenian squadron of eight ships under Thrasybulos of Kollytos and effecting a junction with 20 ships sent to the aid of the Spartans by Dionysios of Syracuse<sup>2</sup>. He had now a fleet of 80 ships at his disposal, and was in a position to deprive Athens of her corn supply. At the same time Teleutias was threatening the Peiraeus from Aegina. The moment was favourable for enforcing the Great King's terms. The Athenians did not refuse when Tiribazos summoned them to send representatives to hear the Persian rescript, and in the end they took the oath to observe its conditions. After a fruitless protest Thebes and Argos were also compelled to assent<sup>3</sup>.

<sup>1</sup> Xen. v. 1. 31; Diod. xiv. 110.

<sup>2</sup> Xen. v. 1. 25—30; cf. C.I.A. II. 38 = Hicks and Hill, 97, where the Parian Phanokritos is praised and rewarded for reporting the movements of the enemy's fleet, and the generals are indirectly censured for neglecting his warning. See Foucart, *Rev. Arch.* (N.S.), xxxiv. pp. 399 ff.; and cf. further Polyæn. II. 24; Lysias, *c. Evandr.* (xxvi.), 23; Dem. *c. Eubulid.* (LVI.), 38, 42.

<sup>3</sup> Xen. v. 1. 31 ff. The date (early part of 386 B.C.) is rendered practically certain by the Klazomenae inscription (C.I.A. iv. 14 b).

*Athens loses her chance of Empire, but not her maritime influence.*

The position of Athens was of course greatly changed by the King's Peace. The dream of the forward party, which aimed at refounding the old empire on a basis of tribute, was over. The city was now forced to be content with her old dependencies, Lemnos, Imbros, and Skyros. She had now to rely upon her own resources, and her financial depression was such as to demand imperatively a time of rest and recuperation<sup>1</sup>. Yet the efforts of the last few years had not been altogether thrown away. They had shown that Athens had to be reckoned with as a sea-power. Nor were her claims to hegemony at sea destroyed by the King's Peace<sup>2</sup>. In many ways that Peace proved a blessing in disguise. Athens no longer appeared to the island cities in the light of a mistress; rather, she stood forth as their natural protector against the insolence of Sparta and Persia. It was borne in upon her that she must definitely abandon the defects of her former empire, and treat the maritime cities more upon a basis of equality<sup>3</sup>. We find that several cities, which had been in friendly relations with Athens before the Peace, did not suffer their connection with her to be broken by it. Isokrates, speaking in 380 B.C., says that Chios, Mytilene, and Byzantium remained friendly after

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Lysias, *c. Ergocl.* 11: ὅστις ἐν τοιαύτῃ ἀπορία τῶν ὑμετέρων πραγμάτων...πόλεις προδίδωσιν κτλ.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Isokr. *Paneg.* 20: ἡ πόλις ἡμῶν δικαίως τῆς θαλάττης ἤρξε καὶ νῦν οὐκ ἀδίκως ἀμφισβητεῖ τῆς ἡγεμονίας. Also *ibid.* 72: οὐ πολλῶ δ' ὕστερον τὴν ἀρχὴν τῆς θαλάττης ἔλαβον, δόντων μὲν τῶν ἄλλων Ἑλλήνων, οὐκ ἀμφισβητούντων δὲ τῶν νῦν ὑμᾶς ἀφαιρεῖσθαι ζητούντων (380 B.C.).

<sup>3</sup> Cf. the recognition of the bad points of the First Confederacy in Isokr. *Paneg.* 114: πλὴν τοσοῦτον εἰπεῖν ἔχω καθ' ἀπάντων, ὅτι τὰ μὲν ἐφ' ἡμῶν δευνὰ ῥαδίως ἂν τις ἐνὶ ψηφίσματι διέλυσε.

the King's Peace<sup>1</sup>, and we possess the record of a treaty with Chios, evidently concluded shortly after the Peace of Antalkidas, in which alliance with Athens is concluded ἐπ' ἐλευθερίᾳ καὶ αὐτονομίᾳ, and the observance of the King's Peace is insisted upon in the most stringent terms<sup>2</sup>. Methymna must likewise have entered into alliance with Athens about this time<sup>3</sup>. The friendly relations with the Odrysae, the foundation of which had been laid by Thrasybulos, were maintained, and an inscription records the praises bestowed upon Hebrytelmis, King of the Odrysae (probably the successor of Medokos), for his loyalty to the Athenians. It is dated 386-5 B.C.<sup>4</sup> Finally, the moral effect produced by the aggressions of Sparta in the case of Mantinea, Phleius, Thebes, and Olynthos ought not to be lost sight of; their effect would be to increase the tendency on the part of the Greek cities generally to look upon Athens as their natural protector.

Such was the position of affairs at the time of the freeing of the Theban acropolis from the Spartan garrison (Dec. 379 B.C.). Sympathy with Thebes must

*The raid of Sphodrias and its consequences (378 B.C.).*

<sup>1</sup> Isokr. *Plat.* 28; cf. *Paneg.* 163: ἀν μὲν ὁ βάρβαρος ἐρρωμενεστέρωσ κατὰσχη τὰς πόλεις τὰς ἐπὶ τῇ θαλάττῃ...τάχ' ἂν καὶ τῶν νήσων αἱ περὶ τὴν ἡπειρον, οἷον Ῥόδος καὶ Σάμος καὶ Χίος, ἐπὶ τὰς ἐκείνου τύχας ἀποκλίνειαν· ἦν δ' ἡμεῖς αὐτὰς πρότεροι καταλάβωμεν κτλ. This shows that there was a disposition on the part of the islands to enter into alliance with Athens.

For Byzantium, cf. C.I.A. II. 19.

<sup>2</sup> C.I.A. II. 15 and IV. (2), p. 9, 15 c; Hicks and Hill, 98.

<sup>3</sup> C.I.A. IV. (2), 18 b, l. 5; Hicks and Hill, 103. Cf., in general, Isokr. *Paneg.* 16: τῶν γὰρ Ἑλλήνων οἱ μὲν ὑφ' ἡμῶν, οἱ δ' ὑπὸ Λακεδαιμονίοις εἰσὶ, and *ibid.* 136: περὶ τῶν Κυκλάδων νήσων ἀμφισβητοῦμεν.

<sup>4</sup> C.I.A. II. 1: c, Suppl. p. 8; cf. Höck, *Hermes*, xxvi. p. 453 ff.



have been general at Athens, but there was no desire on the part of the citizens to be embroiled in a quarrel with Sparta. Chabrias had indeed barred the road through Eleutherae against the army of Kleombrotos<sup>1</sup>, but it was one thing to refuse a belligerent passage through neutral territory, another to recognize officially help given to Thebes by unauthorized generals<sup>2</sup>. The two Athenian generals who had assisted the Thebans in their rising were condemned for their action, and one was executed, the other retiring into exile<sup>3</sup>. A breach between Sparta and Athens now seemed to have been averted. Suddenly the whole situation was changed by the action of the Spartan general Sphodrias, whom Kleombrotos on his retirement from Boeotia had left at Thespieae with a third part of the army. One night in the spring of 378 B.C. Sphodrias marched with his army in the direction of the Peiraeus with the intention of taking it by surprise. The raid miscarried, and war between Sparta and Athens was rendered almost inevitable. It is probable that neither the Thebans<sup>4</sup> nor Kleombrotos<sup>5</sup> were the instigators of the attempt. The example of Phoebidas and his success were quite sufficient to induce a second Spartan commander to seek to emulate his feat. Sphodrias knew that, if successful, his action was certain to meet with official approval, and even failure, as the event showed, might not result in condemnation<sup>6</sup>. By the acquittal

<sup>1</sup> Xen. v. 4. 14.

<sup>2</sup> Xen. v. 4. 9, 10.

<sup>3</sup> Xen. v. 4. 19.

<sup>4</sup> Xen. v. 4. 20; Plut. *Pelop.* 14.

<sup>5</sup> Diod. xv. 29. 5.

<sup>6</sup> This view, which is Grote's, seems to me the most natural. See his *Hist. of Greece* (1888 ed.), viii. pp. 93, 94.

of Sphodrias the Spartans deliberately drove the Athenians to make common cause with Thebes. The Bocotian party at Athens easily carried the people with them. Energetic measures of defence were taken. Gates were erected at the Peiraeus, the building of new ships was begun<sup>1</sup>, and an alliance was made with Thebes<sup>2</sup>. But the consequences of the raid of Sphodrias were more wide-reaching than this. It brought about a completely new policy on the part of Athens, and effected a change of great importance for the maritime cities of Greece. This new policy will be dealt with in the following chapter.

<sup>1</sup> According to Diodorus (xv. 29. 7) 200 triremes were fitted out, 20,000 hoplites and 500 cavalry mustered. Polybios (ii. 62), probably with greater accuracy, puts the number of troops at 10,000, and of triremes at 100. Cf. Schaefer, *Dem. u. seine Zeit*, 1<sup>2</sup>, p. 23.

<sup>2</sup> Xen. v. 4. 34. Xenophon, who attributes this activity on the part of Athens to the feelings aroused by the raid of Sphodrias, is to be followed rather than Diodorus, who assumes that it was consequent on the liberation of the Kadmeia (xv. 28). Xenophon, as a contemporary writer, is more trustworthy in matters of this kind, where there is no question of party bias.



## CHAPTER II.

### THE FORMATION OF THE CONFEDERACY, AND ITS PRINCIPLES.

*Steps taken with a view to the formation of a Confederacy (378 B.C.).*

IMMEDIATELY after the acquittal of Sphodrias in the summer of 378 B.C., the Athenians must have invited representatives of certain cities, which were already in alliance with them, to discuss the advisability of forming a Confederacy to check the aggressions of Sparta, and, if the project were approved, to decide upon its principles<sup>1</sup>. It is reasonable to suppose that the cities, whose representatives took part in the discussion, were Chios, Mytilene<sup>2</sup>, Methymna<sup>3</sup>, Rhodes, Byzantium<sup>4</sup>, and Thebes<sup>5</sup>. The names of the peoples

<sup>1</sup> This follows from C.I.A. II. 17, which clearly presupposes the existence of a definite scheme of Confederacy. Cf. Diod. xv. 28. 4: *ἐτάχθη δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς κοινῆς γνώμης τὸ μὲν συνέδριον ἐν ταῖς Ἀθήναις συνεδρεῖν κτλ.*

<sup>2</sup> Cf. C.I.A. II. 18.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. C.I.A. IV. (2), 18 b = Hicks and Hill, 103. For the difficulties attending this inscription see below, p. 56, n. 3.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. C.I.A. II. 19 = Hicks and Hill, 100.

<sup>5</sup> For Thebes, see Fabricius, *Rhein. Mus.* XLVI. p. 596, and cf. Diod. xv. 29. 7: *προσελάβοντο δὲ καὶ τοὺς Θηβαίους ἐπὶ τὸ κοινὸν συνέδριον ἐπὶ τοῖς ἴσοις πᾶσι.* Köhler (C.I.A. II. 17), followed by Busolt, *Griech. Staatsalt.*<sup>2</sup> p. 332 and Dittenberger, *Sylloge*, 1<sup>2</sup>, 80, n. 8, thinks that *Θηβαῖοι* in the inscription is in a different hand from

of these cities are cut by one and the same hand at the beginning of the list of confederate members which is appended to the Aristoteles decree<sup>1</sup>. We have seen above (p. 10 f.) that Chios, Mytilene, Byzantium, and Methymna were in alliance with Athens in the years which followed the King's Peace, and it is likely that Rhodes also had entered into alliance in the course of the same period<sup>2</sup>. Thebes, as we have seen, became Athens' ally shortly after the raid of Sphodrias. The above conclusions are borne out to some extent by Diodorus, who, in his short account of the foundation of the Confederacy, says that the first to listen to the proposal of secession from Sparta were Chios and Byzantium, and that these cities were followed by Rhodes and Mytilene, and by some of the other islands<sup>3</sup>. As a result of the joint deliberations of Athens and these cities, a form of alliance was agreed upon<sup>4</sup>, to serve as a model in the case of all cities which should thereafter join the Confederacy. Chios was the first to take the oath of alliance on this basis<sup>5</sup>.

It was now felt that the time had come for sending out a general invitation to the maritime cities to join

*Decree  
passed on  
the motion*

the first five names, and that therefore the Thebans did not join the Confederacy till after Feb.—March, 377 B.C. Cf., however, C.I.A. II. 17, ll. 24, 25, quoted below, n. 5.

<sup>1</sup> See below, p. 16.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. above, p. 11, n. 1, and see Beloch, *Griech. Gesch.* II. pp. 237, 238; with his view as to the date of the Rhodian Confederacy I cannot agree.

<sup>3</sup> Diod. xv. 28. 3.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. Lipsius, *Leipzig. Ber.* 1898, p. 148.

<sup>5</sup> See C.I.A. II. 17, ll. 24, 25: *ἐπὶ δὲ τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἐφ' οἷσπερ Χῖοι καὶ Θηβαῖοι κα[ὶ] οἱ ἄλλοι σύμμαχοι.* Cf. also the certain restoration of C.I.A. II. 19: *τὴν [δὲ συμμαχίαν εἶ]ναι αὐτ[οῖς καθάπερ Χῖοις].*

*of Aristoteles of Marathon.*

the Confederacy, the principles of which had just been settled. At the same time it was necessary to publish the conditions of the Confederacy in a more elaborate form. This was done February—March, 377 B.C., in an Athenian decree passed upon the motion of Aristoteles of Marathon<sup>1</sup>. No doubt the ambassadors, who went round to secure adherents, took copies of this decree with them to serve as a manifesto of the principles upon which the Confederacy was based<sup>2</sup>.

*Its provisions.*

The purport of this important inscription<sup>3</sup> must now be given. Together with the short, but valuable, account of Diodorus, it supplies us with the main part of our information as to the foundation of the Confederacy. The decree, which is dated in the 7th prytany of the archonship of Nausinikos (Feb.—March, 377 B.C.), is to the following effect. At the opening, the purpose of the Confederacy is announced. It is to compel the Lacedaemonians to allow the Greeks their freedom, in order that they may hold their own lands in security and in undisturbed independence. Three lines have here been deliberately erased, and it may be conjectured that they bore uncomplimentary reference to Sparta's late high-handed proceedings, and that they were removed about 370–69 B.C., when Athens became Sparta's ally. The whole clause could not be erased, because the Confederacy still remained, and

<sup>1</sup> C.I.A. II, 17 = Hicks and Hill, 101.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Diod. xv. 28. 2: 'Ἀθηναῖοι δὲ πρέσβεις τοὺς ἀξιολογώτατους τῶν παρ' αὐτοῖς ἐξέπεμψαν ἐπὶ τὰς ὑπὸ Λακεδαιμονίου τεταγμένας πόλεις, παρακαλοῦντες ἀντέχεσθαι τῆς κοινῆς ἐλευθερίας. Diodorus is here, as often, wrong in his chronology.

<sup>3</sup> Found at Athens, in various fragments, 1851–2. Cf. Schaefer, *Dem. u. s. Zeit*, 1<sup>2</sup>, p. 29.

would, in the case of such erasure, have been deprived of its ostensible ground of existence. Next, any of the Greeks or barbarians on the mainland, or any of the island communities, *in so far as they do not belong to the Great King*, are invited to become allies of the Athenians and their allies, under condition of complete autonomy<sup>1</sup>, without liability to admit either garrison or governor or to pay tribute, on the same terms as the Chians and Thebans and the rest of the allies. In the case of those who should make alliance with the Athenians and their allies, the *demos* solemnly renounced all claim to any landed property which it might chance to possess in the allied territory. Should there happen to be any records at Athens which told unfavourably against an ally in this respect, they should be destroyed upon application to the Council. From the date of the present decree onwards it was unlawful for anyone to acquire, whether in the name of the state or an individual, house or land property by purchase or mortgage or any means whatsoever. In case of any contravention, an ally might lay information before the representatives of the confederate cities, who should order the property to be sold, half going to the informer, and half to the common chest of the allies. Any ally would have assistance from the rest of the confederacy in the event of his being attacked<sup>2</sup>. If any

<sup>1</sup> The allies were to be exactly on an equal footing with Athens. The theory survived, though the practice altered. Thus Demosthenes (*Rhod.* 15), speaking of the Rhodians, who had revolted at the time of the Social War, says: *καὶ παρὸν αὐτοῖς "Ἐλλησι καὶ βελτίσω αὐτῶν ἐξ ἴσου συμμαχεῖν, βαρβάροις καὶ δούλοις...δουλεύουσιν.*

<sup>2</sup> Formally, therefore, the Confederacy was a defensive alliance. In practice, however, it became both offensive and defensive. Cf. Meyer, *Gesch. d. Alt.*, p. 382.

person ventured to propose any measure detrimental to the present decree, he would be liable to loss of citizen rights<sup>1</sup> and confiscation of property, and to trial before the Athenians and the allies<sup>2</sup>, the penalty to be death or exile. The names of cities already in alliance were to be recorded on the stone with the present decree, and the names of any who might subsequently join were to be added. A clause follows directing that three envoys be chosen forthwith, in order that they may, to the extent of their ability, persuade the Thebans to follow a good course.

Remarks  
on the  
character  
of the  
decree.

Though most of the points arising in connection with this decree will be dealt with in a discussion of the principles of the Confederacy, some remarks of a general nature may be made by way of preface. The decree clearly does not *found* a Confederacy in any sense; what it does is to *publish* principles already agreed upon. It is plain from the opening words of the decree, *τύχ]η ἀγαθῇ τῇ Ἀθηναίων καὶ [τῶν [συμ]μάχων*, that the Confederacy is regarded as being already in existence. The inscription in fact is an invitation to the cities of the Hellenic and non-Hellenic worlds to join that Confederacy, and bears out the words of Diodorus: Ἀθηναῖοι πρέσβεις τοὺς ἀξιολογωτάτους τῶν παρ' αὐτοῖς ἐξέπεμψαν ἐπὶ τὰς ὑπὸ Λακεδαιμονίους τεταγμένας πόλεις, παρακαλοῦντες

<sup>1</sup> *Capitis deminutio*, as P. Usteri says (*Achtung u. Verbannung*, p. 90).

<sup>2</sup> "While the penalty of *ἀτιμία* comes into force *ipso iure*, these lines deal with the *judicial* condemnation of the guilty party." Usteri, *loc. cit.*

For a discussion of the part taken by the allies in judicial matters, and of the meaning of *κρινέσθω ἐν Ἀθηναίοις καὶ τοῖς συμμάχοις*, see below, p. 35 ff.

ἀντέχεσθαι τῆς κοινῆς ἐλευθερίας<sup>1</sup>. The object of the invitation is definitely stated. It is that the Spartans may be compelled to allow the Greeks to enjoy peace in freedom and independence, and to leave them in secure possession of their own lands. Of course the Athenians were at the time perfectly sincere in making this announcement. The invasion of Sphodrias and his acquittal, coming as they did close after the acts of oppression committed by the Spartans in the years which followed the King's Peace, must have created a conviction throughout Greece that Sparta was indifferent to all ordinarily received rules of international obligation, and that she must be resisted in her aggressions by some organized opposition. Yet the announcement of this definite object as the *raison d'être* of the Confederacy, was a source of weakness<sup>2</sup>. Sparta's ascendancy soon passed away, and it was inevitable that the allies should then ask what reason the Athenians had for demanding the continuance of the Confederacy.

The decree also reveals in a striking manner how real a force the King's Peace was in the Greek political world at this period. Any of the Greeks or barbarians—the latter term presumably, as Busolt remarks<sup>3</sup>, having reference chiefly to Thracian, Macedonian, and Epeirote stocks—were invited to join only so far as they were not under the Great King's sway. How different, from

<sup>1</sup> xv. 28. 2.

<sup>2</sup> No doubt the memory of the First Confederacy, which had been directed against the aggressions of a particular foe, Persia to wit, had its influence. Meyer (*Gesch. d. Alt.* v. p. 381) emphasises the fact that the Second Confederacy is a return to the Delian Confederacy of the time of Aristeides.

<sup>3</sup> *Der zw. ath. Bund*, p. 741.



this point of view, was the object of the Second Confederacy's existence from that of the First<sup>1</sup>!

The *Panegyricus* of Isokrates showed that there was a readiness at Athens to recognize and abandon the chief defects of the First Empire<sup>2</sup>. The sacrifices made to secure the foundation of the new Confederacy were indeed considerable. It is true that the original Confederacy of Delos had provided for expressions of opinion on the part of the allies<sup>3</sup>, but the Athenians must have felt that the real glory of their city was inseparably bound up with the later period, when the Confederacy had become an Empire. Hence the significance of the sacrifice which was now made in granting to the allies the means of cooperation among themselves, and in abandoning the old system, whereby each member of the League was attached solely to the leading city<sup>4</sup>. The same spirit is seen in the surrender of the right of interference in the internal affairs of an ally and of placing a garrison in his city, as well as in the abandonment of the *φόρος*, and of all landed possessions in allied territory<sup>5</sup>.

<sup>1</sup> Cf. C.I.A. II. 51, ll. 18 ff., where Dionysios and his sons are praised, *ὅτι εἰσὶν ἄνδρες ἀγαθοὶ [π]ερὶ τὸν δῆμον τὸν Ἀθηναίων καὶ τοὺς συμμάχους καὶ βοηθοῦσιν τῇ βασιλείᾳ εἰρήνῃ ἣν ἐποίησα[ν]το Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ Λακεδαιμόνιοι* κ[α]ὶ [οἱ ἄλλοι Ἕλληνες].

<sup>2</sup> See above, p. 10, n. 3.

<sup>3</sup> Thuc. I. 97: *ἡγούμενοι...αὐτονόμων τὸ πρῶτον τῶν συμμάχων καὶ ἀπὸ κοινῶν ξυνόδων βουλευόντων...*

<sup>4</sup> Zingerle, *Er. Vind.*, p. 360 f., rightly insists upon this point, but there is no reason to suppose with him that the concessions were made with the special object of inducing Thebes to join the Confederacy. Cf. Lipsius, *Leipzig. Berichte*, p. 147, n. 5.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. Isokr. *Paneg.* 107: *ὑπὲρ ὧν προσήκει τοὺς εὖ φρονούντας μεγάλην χάριν ἔχειν πολὺ μᾶλλον ἢ τὰς κληρουχίας ἡμῶν ὀνειδίξειν, ἃς ἡμεῖς εἰς τὰς ἐρημουμένας τῶν πόλεων φυλακῆς ἕνεκα τῶν χωρίων, ἀλλ' οὐ διὰ πλεονεξίαν*

The precise meaning of the last clause which directs that three envoys be sent at once to Thebes, to persuade the Thebans, as far as may be, to follow a good course, must remain doubtful. We cannot interpret this as relating to the formal entry of Thebes into the Confederacy<sup>1</sup>. It is evident that at this critical time many questions of an important nature may have arisen, which required the despatch of ambassadors to Thebes<sup>2</sup>. The names of these envoys are of interest. Aristoteles of Marathon was the mover of the decree under consideration; Thrasybulos of Kollytos, in spite of his misfortune at the end of the Corinthian war<sup>3</sup>, was no doubt held a valuable man by reason of his influence at Thebes<sup>4</sup>. Pyrrhandros of Anaphlystos was an energetic supporter of the new Athenian policy. He moved the reception of Chalkis into the Confederacy<sup>5</sup>, and was chosen one of the ambassadors to administer the oaths to the newly entered Byzantines<sup>6</sup>.

ἐξεπέμπομεν. This passage shows the hatred excited by the cleruchies of the First Confederacy. Cf. also Isokr. *Plat.* 44: καὶ τῶν μὲν κτημάτων τῶν ὑμετέρων αὐτῶν ἀπέστητε, βουλόμενοι τὴν συμμαχίαν ὡς μεγίστην ποιῆσαι. See also Diod. xv. 29. Busolt, p. 686 f., thinks that the Athenians may have held property in outlying places, even after the King's Peace. Cf. Dittenberger, *Sylloge*, 1<sup>2</sup>, p. 127, n. 9; Grote VIII. p. 98, n. 2; Hœck, *De rebus ab Ath. in Thracia...gestis*, p. xx, n. 3, and Excursus I.

<sup>1</sup> With Hahn, *Jahrb. f. cl. Phil.*, 1876, p. 465, and Busolt, *Griech. Staatsalt.*<sup>2</sup>, p. 332. See above, p. 14, n. 5.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Hicks and Hill, p. 197.

<sup>3</sup> See above, p. 9.

<sup>4</sup> For his career, see Schaefer, *Dem. u. s. Zeit*, 1<sup>2</sup>, pp. 144-6. Cf. Aesch. *in Ctes.* 138: καίτοι πολλὰς μὲν τούτου πρότερον πρεσβείας ἐπρέσβευσαν εἰς Θήβας οἱ μάλιστα οἰκείως ἐκείνοις διακείμενοι, πρῶτος μὲν Θρασύβουλος ὁ Κολλυτεύς, ἀνὴρ ἐν Θήβαις πιστευθεὶς ὡς οὐδεὶς ἕτερος.

<sup>5</sup> C.I.A. II. 17 b, p. 398.

<sup>6</sup> C.I.A. II. 19; cf. also Schaefer, *op. cit.* p. 143.



*Method followed in discussing the principles of the Confederacy.*

The new Confederacy was sharply, too sharply<sup>1</sup>, divided into two parts—the Athenians and the allies. In a discussion of the principles of the Confederacy, it will therefore be convenient to treat of (A) the rights and duties of the allies, (B) the relations of Athens with regard to the allies, and (C) to offer some general considerations as to the character of the Confederacy as a whole.

### A. THE RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF THE ALLIES.

These are of the greatest importance in any discussion of the working of the Confederacy, and are, therefore, here examined before those of Athens herself.

*The Συνέδριον.*

The *organ*, through which the views of the allies found expression, had apparently no fixed title<sup>2</sup>, but was, perhaps, generally known as τὸ κοινὸν συνέδριον τῶν συμμάχων<sup>3</sup>. It was composed of one or more representatives<sup>4</sup> from each allied city, but no city, small or great, was allowed more than a single vote<sup>5</sup>. The Council of the allies met at Athens<sup>6</sup>, where, presumably, the representatives resided, in order to be upon the spot, whenever a meeting of their assembly was necessary<sup>7</sup>. Athens was not represented in this

<sup>1</sup> See below, p. 52.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Lenz, *Das Syndrion d. Bundesgenossen*, p. 5 f.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. Diod. xv. 28. 3, and (e.g.) C.I.A. II. 17, ll. 23, 24: τοὺς συνέδρους τῶν συμμάχων.

<sup>4</sup> C.I.A. II. 52 c, ll. 26, 27: καλέσαι δὲ καὶ τοὺς συνέδρο[υς τοὺς] Μυτιληναίων ἐπὶ ξένια εἰς τὸ πρυταν[εῖον εἰς αὐ[ριον].

<sup>5</sup> Diod. xv. 28. 4. This was a defect; see below, p. 52 f.

<sup>6</sup> Diod. *loc. cit.*

<sup>7</sup> Cf. n. 4 above; also Aeschin. *F. L.* 86: καλείτω δὲ μοι...τοὺς συνέδρους τῶν συμμάχων. Several passages from inscriptions point to

assembly, a fact which, though nowhere expressly stated, follows clearly enough from the language of Diodorus<sup>1</sup>, who sets the *συνέδριον* of the allies in contrast with the Athenian *δῆμος*.

From the composition of the Council we may pass to its *procedure*.

The views of the assembly of the allies were, as a rule, transmitted to the Athenian Ἐκκλησία through the *Βουλή*. The most important evidence for the procedure generally is furnished by two inscriptions, one of which<sup>2</sup> records a resolution of the *Βουλή* with regard to a letter sent by Dionysios I of Syracuse about the rebuilding of the temple of Apollo at Delphi<sup>3</sup> and negotiations for a general peace<sup>4</sup> in the early summer of 368 B.C. Here the *Βουλή* directs *τοὺς συμμάχ[ους δόγμα]α ἐξενε[γ]κε[ἴν] εἰς τὸν δῆμον, ὃ τι ἂν [αὐτο]ῖς βουλευομένοις δοκῆ ἄρι[στον εἶνα]ι*. In the other inscription<sup>5</sup>, a decree relating to the alliance of Athens with the Arkadians, Eleians, Achaeans, and Phleisians

*Procedure in passing δόγματα.*

the above conclusion; thus, for example, the *σύνεδροι* had to be on the spot to give and receive oaths at the admission of new members (C.I.A. iv. (2), 18 b). The duties enumerated in the following pages would seem to necessitate residence on the part of the *σύνεδροι*. Cf. Lenz, pp. 6, 7.

<sup>1</sup> xv. 28. 3, 4; cf. Swoboda, *Rhein. Mus.*, XLIX. p. 346, n. 1, where a conjecture of Wilamowitz (*Arist. u. Athen*, 1, p. 202, n. 29) is controverted.

<sup>2</sup> C.I.A. II. 51 = Hicks and Hill, 108. Cf. Höck, in *N. Jahrb. f. Phil.*, 1883, p. 518; Köhler, *Ath. Mitt.* I. pp. 14 ff.; Hartel, *Dem. Stud.* II. pp. 410 ff. (in *Wiener Sitzungsber.*, 1878).

<sup>3</sup> Which had probably been burnt down in 373/2. Cf. Jacoby, *Das Marmor Parium*, p. 120.

<sup>4</sup> Probably not the congress summoned by Philiskos (Xen. VII. 1. 27). Cf. Niese, *Hermes*, 1904, p. 127.

<sup>5</sup> C.I.A. II. 57 b = Hicks and Hill, 119. Cf. Höck, *loc. cit.*, and Lipsius, *Leipz. Berichte*, 1898, p. 152.

in 362-1 B.C., it is ordered that ἐπειδὴ... οἱ σύμμαχοι δόγμα εἰσήνευγαν εἰς [τὴν βουλὴν δ]έχεσθαι τὴν συμμαχίαν...[καὶ ἡ βουλή] προβούλευσεν κατὰ ταῦτά, δεδόχθαι τῷ δήμῳ...]. From these inscriptions it appears that (1) the Βουλὴ first requested the Council of the allies to pass a resolution on the matter in hand<sup>1</sup>; (2) that this resolution was intimated to the Βουλὴ, which, if it approved its tenor, made a προβούλευμα in accordance with it. On the other hand, if it disapproved, it prepared a προβούλευμα embodying its own views, and sent that and the δόγμα of the allies to the Ἐκκλησία, which had the task of deciding between the rival proposals<sup>2</sup>. (3) Sometimes the Βουλὴ requested the Συνέδριον to send its δόγμα straight to the Ἐκκλησία. In this case the δόγμα took the place of a προβούλευμα<sup>3</sup>. We may add (4) that sometimes, conversely, the Συνέδριον surrendered its right of passing a δόγμα upon a matter concerning the Confederacy at large, and gave the Athenian δῆμος full

<sup>1</sup> There can be little doubt, however, having regard to the strict equality in theory prevailing between the two component parts of the Confederacy, that the Συνέδριον could request the Βουλὴ to prepare a προβούλευμα on a particular matter, and that it had thus a power of initiative.

I can see no likelihood in Lenz' view (p. 59) that the δῆμος alone could request the allies to pass a δόγμα.

<sup>2</sup> Evidence for the latter part of this statement is to be found in the proceedings before the conclusion of the Peace of Philokrates. See below, p. 33 f. Cf. Gilbert, *Const. Ant. of Athens and Sparta*, p. 441; Swoboda, *Rhein. Mus.*, XLIX. pp. 349, 350. Probably the views of the Βουλὴ and the Συνέδριον usually coincided, and were merged into a single προβούλευμα (cf. C.I.A. II. 57 b).

<sup>3</sup> Cf. Höck, *N. Jahrb. f. cl. Phil.*, 1883, p. 519. He thinks that the formula  $\delta$  τι ἂν αὐτοῖς βουλευομένοις δοκῆ ἄριστον εἶναι is indicative of such a surrender of rights. For the opposing view, cf. Lenz, p. 33, and Hartel, *Wiener Sitzungsberichte*, 1878, p. 439.

powers of decision<sup>1</sup>. This follows from a passage of Aeschines<sup>2</sup>: ἀνάγνωθι δὴ καὶ τὸ τῶν συμμάχων δόγμα τί λέγει, ἐν ᾧ διαρρήδην γέγραπται, ἐπειδὴ βουλεύεται ὁ δῆμος ὁ Ἀθηναίων ὑπὲρ εἰρήνης πρὸς Φίλιππον, οἱ δὲ πρέσβεις οὐπω πάρεισιν, οὓς ἐξέπεμψεν ὁ δῆμος εἰς τὴν Ἑλλάδα παρακαλῶν τὰς πόλεις ὑπὲρ τῆς ἐλευθερίας τῶν Ἑλλήνων, δεδόχθαι τοῖς συμμάχοις, ἐπειδὰν ἐπιδημήσωσιν οἱ πρέσβεις καὶ τὰς πρεσβείας ἀπαγγείλωσιν Ἀθηναίοις καὶ τοῖς συμμάχοις, προγράψαι τοὺς πρυτάνεις ἐκκλησίας δύο κατὰ τὸν νόμον, ἐν δὲ ταύταις βουλευσάσθαι περὶ τῆς εἰρήνης Ἀθηναίους· ὅ τι δ' ἂν βουλεύσῃται ὁ δῆμος, τοῦτ' εἶναι κοινὸν δόγμα τῶν συμμάχων.

Yet it would be unwise to conclude that such a resolution as this was a normal one in the history of the Confederacy. The point that the allies here really desired to carry through was that no peace should be concluded before the return of the envoys. That point gained, the rest they were content to leave to the judgment of the Athenian Ἐκκλησία. Moreover, there can be little doubt that, after the war with the allies, the influence of the *Συνέδριον* became comparatively slight, and such a surrender of rights may have been the virtue of necessity. The scanty character of our information as to the working of the Confederacy must always be borne in mind, and the likelihood of a development in the course of time be taken into consideration<sup>3</sup>.

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Swoboda, *loc. cit.*, p. 351.

<sup>2</sup> *F. L.* 60.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. Beloch, *Griech. Gesch.*, II. p. 239, n. 1; Meyer, *Gesch. d. Alt.*, v. pp. 383, 4.

*Occasions  
on which  
δόγματα  
were  
passed.*

It is of great importance to determine as far as possible the *sphere of the Synedrion's activity*. In what cases were its resolutions requisite? Unfortunately lack of information does not allow of a really definite answer to this question<sup>1</sup>. All that can be done is to bring together the facts that bear upon it, and at least to determine the extent of our ignorance.

*Not  
necessary  
for admis-  
sion of new  
members.*

(a) Did the Council of the allies pass a resolution when new members were admitted to the Confederacy? Views as to this point are widely divergent. On the one hand it is maintained<sup>2</sup> that the reception of new members was entirely in the hands of Athens. On the other<sup>3</sup>, that such reception was the result of joint decrees passed by the *Συνέδριον* and the *Ἐκκλησία*. Swoboda<sup>4</sup> describes the procedure on such an occasion as follows: (1) A separate treaty was made between Athens and the would-be member with special regard to the Confederacy, and (2) this special treaty had then to receive the approval of the *Συνέδριον*. This view of Swoboda's, however, rests on Lolling's restoration of C.I.A. II. 49<sup>5</sup>, a decree relating to the reception of Korkyra, Akarnania, and Kephallenia into the Confederacy: *π[έμψαι δὲ καὶ συνέδρου]ς τῶν πό[λ]εων ἐκάστην εἰς τὸ συ[νέδριον τῶν συμμάχων] κατὰ τὰ*

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Swoboda, *Rhein. Mus.*, XLIX. p. 348; also Meyer, *Gesch. d. Alt.*, v. p. 383: "betreffs der erhaltenen Urkunden ist scharf zu betonen, dass wir keine Beschlüsse und Urkunden des Bundes besitzen, sondern nur solche Athens."

<sup>2</sup> E.g. by Lipsius, *Leipz. Berichte*, 1898, p. 150 ff.

<sup>3</sup> E.g. by Meyer, *op. cit.*, pp. 382, 383. He gives no evidence, however, in support of his view. Cf., in general, Lenz, p. 16 ff.

<sup>4</sup> *Loc. cit.*, p. 341 f.

<sup>5</sup> See *Δελτ. Ἀρχ.* 1888, p. 174; cf. C.I.A. IV. (2), p. 13.

[δ]όγματα τῶ[ν] συμμάχω[ν τὰ περὶ τῶν Κορκυρα]ίων. There is no reason to suppose that the latter part of the restoration is correct. Dittenberger<sup>1</sup> has: κατὰ τὰ δόγματα τῶν συμμάχω[ν καὶ τοῦ δήμου τοῦ Ἀθηνα]ίων, which would mean, I believe, "according to the foundation principles of the Confederacy<sup>2</sup>." This is far more likely than that a resolution specially relating to the admission of the Korkyraeans by themselves, should be singled out for mention. The fact that no positive reference to a δόγμα, passed by the allies at the reception of a new member can be cited, is strongly in favour of Lipsius' view that Athens alone passed decrees admitting such new members<sup>3</sup>. I cannot agree with him, however, in his assertion that this fact is a decisive proof of the predominating part played by Athens in the affairs of the Confederacy<sup>4</sup>. Was there any reason to suppose that new candidates for membership of the Confederacy would be rejected? Surely it was more natural to conclude that they would be welcomed with open arms. Why then was it necessary that the Συνέδριον should trouble itself with the passing of merely formal resolutions of admission? Such would be the feeling prevalent at the time of the foundation of the Confederacy, and it had doubtless been agreed

<sup>1</sup> *Sylloge*, 1<sup>2</sup>, 83.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. C.I.A. II. 17 b (alliance with Chalkis): μήτε φρουρὰν ὑποδεχομένους [παρ' Ἀθηναίων μ]ήτε φόρον φέροντας μήτε [ἄρχοντα παραδ]εχομένους παρὰ τὰ δόγματ[α τῶν συμμάχων]. Cf. the Aristoteles decree. This is undoubtedly the meaning of the Athenian promise in C.I.A. IV. (2), 49 b = Hicks and Hill, 106: καὶ τᾶλλα ποιήσω κατὰ [τὰ δ]όγματα τῶν συμμάχων, which simply means 'I will abide by the general principles of the Confederacy.'

<sup>3</sup> Cf. Lenschau in *Bursian's Jahresbericht*, 1904, p. 241.

<sup>4</sup> *loc. cit.*, p. 150.



at the very beginning that such formal business should be left to Athens<sup>1</sup>. Besides, in the unlikely event of the allies objecting to the admission of any new member, they were not without a remedy. We find the representatives of the allies taking and imposing the oaths when a new member was admitted into the Confederacy<sup>2</sup>. Here was their opportunity to utter protest if need arose. The Council of the allies therefore passed no resolution as to the admission of new members, because such resolution would have been (they thought) merely formal. No disagreement between Athens and her allies appeared likely to arise on such a point. Yet as time went on, the allies must have perceived that there was danger in this course. By a stricter system the Confederacy might have been saved from entanglement in costly land wars.

An  
alliance  
with a  
foreign  
power  
generally  
sanctioned  
by a δόγμα.

(b) Very different was the case of *alliance* or negotiation with a foreign power, which had no intention of becoming a member of the Confederacy. It was from the first clear that this was no formal matter; the new alliance or connection might involve the Confederacy in untold complications with other powers or in a war which would closely affect the welfare of each individual ally. It is therefore not surprising

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Hartel, *Wiener Sitzungsberichte*, 1878, p. 442.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Lenz, p. 16 ff.; C.I.A. II. 49 and IV. (2), p. 13: ἀποδοῦνα[ι τοὺς ὄρκους τα]ῖς πόλε[σι] ταῖς ἠκούσαις τὴν βουλὴν [καὶ τοὺς στρατηγούς (?) καὶ το]ὺς ἱππέας, καὶ τοὺς συμμάχ[ους] ὀμνῦναι τὸν αὐτὸν ὄρ[κον].... Cf. also C.I.A. IV. (2), 18 b (admission of Methymna): ὀμόσαι δὲ τὴν πρεσβείαν τῶν Μηθυμναίων τὸν αὐτὸν ὄρκον, ὅμπερ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι σύμμαχοι ὤμωσαν, τοῖς τε συνέδροις τῶν συμμάχω[ν] καὶ τοῖς στρατηγοῖς καὶ τοῖς ἱπάρχοις, ὀμόσαι δὲ τοῖς Μηθυμναίοις τοὺς τε συνέδρους τῶν συμμάχω[ν] καὶ τοὺς στρατηγούς καὶ ἱπάρχους κατὰ ταῦτά.

to find positive evidence that the allies passed a resolution in some cases at least of this kind. Thus when Dionysios I sent ambassadors with propositions for the bringing about of a general peace and for the settlement of other matters, the allies were requested to prepare a resolution upon the subject in hand<sup>1</sup>. In the case of the alliance concluded between the Arkadians, Achaeans, Eleians, and Phleisians on the one hand and the Confederacy on the other (362-1 B.C.), we find that a previous *δῶγμα* had expressed the approval of the allies with regard to this step: *ἐπειδὴ δ' ἐοῖ σύμμαχοι δῶγμα εἰσήνειγκαν εἰς τὴν βουλὴν δ' ἐχέσθαι τὴν συμμαχίαν καθὰ ἐπαγγέλ[λονται οἱ Ἄρ]κάδες καὶ Ἀχαιοὶ καὶ Ἡλεῖοι καὶ Φλε[ιάσιοι καὶ ἡ βο]υλὴ προὐβούλευσεν κατὰ ταῦτά, δεδ[όχθαι τῷ δήμῳ εἶ]ναι συμμάχους κτλ.<sup>2</sup> Again, the *Συνέδριον* of the allies passed *δῶγματα* upon the question of peace with Philip<sup>3</sup>. There is indeed only one positive instance in which the allies are found passing a *δῶγμα* in the case of an alliance between the Confederacy and a foreign power—that of the alliance with the Arkadians, Achaeans, Eleians, and Phleisians already cited. Yet it is clear from Aeschines (*c. Ctes.* 69) that such *δῶγματα* were usual before an alliance was concluded: *ἀνεγνώσθη δῶγμα κοινὸν τῶν συμμάχων, οὗ τὰ κεφάλαια διὰ βραχέων ἐγὼ προερωῶ. πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ ἔγραψαν ὑπὲρ εἰρήνης ὑμᾶς μόνον βουλευσασθαι, τὸ δὲ τῆς συμμαχίας ὄνομα ὑπερέβησαν, οὐκ ἐπιλελησμένοι,**

<sup>1</sup> C.I.A. II. 51.

<sup>2</sup> C.I.A. II. 57 b.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. Aesch. *F. L.* 60, 61, and *id.*, *c. Ctes.* 69, 70. For a discussion of the proceedings see below, p. 33.



ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν εἰρήνην ἀναγκαιοτέραν ἢ καλλίω ὑπολαμβάνοντες εἶναι. On the other hand there are certain instances calculated to make us refrain from asserting that the allies passed a resolution on *all* such occasions of alliance. In the inscription recording the alliance between Athens and Dionysios I<sup>1</sup> there is no mention of a previous *δῶγμα* of the allies<sup>2</sup>. The same is the case with the negotiations between Athens and Sparta in 367 B.C.<sup>3</sup>, and between Athens and the Thesalians in 361–360 B.C.<sup>4</sup> Now it may be maintained that such alliances, where no *δῶγμα* of the allies is mentioned, were solely of force between Athens and the power in question<sup>5</sup>. But such a supposition can hardly be right. Surely such alliances must have affected the interests of the members of the Confederacy very considerably. The fact is that the evidence at our disposal does not enable us to lay down a general rule with any confidence. We can only say that a *δῶγμα* of the allies appears to have preceded, as a rule, the conclusion of an alliance between the Confederacy and a foreign power, but that it was not invariably required. The principles upon which the Confederacy was based were not extensive in character; probably they did not go far beyond what is revealed by the Aristoteles decree. For the

<sup>1</sup> C.I.A. II. 52. For a discussion of the two inscriptions relating to Dionysios, cf. Höck, *N. Jahrb. f. cl. Phil.*, 1883, p. 519 ff.

<sup>2</sup> Niese, *Hermes*, 1904, p. 126, says: "Sie ist ein Bündniss Athens und seiner Bundesgenossen mit Dionysios." This is probably right, but there is no direct evidence for the assertion.

<sup>3</sup> C.I.A. II. 50.

<sup>4</sup> C.I.A. IV. (2), 59 b = Hicks and Hill, 123.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. Höck, *Die Beziehungen Kerkyras zum zw. ath. Seebunde*, p. 10, n. 1, and Hartel, *Dem. Stud.* II. p. 407 n. Cf. also Lenz, p. 30 f.

rest, the particular circumstances would be decisive. The Athenians would doubtless watch the temper of the *σύνεδροι* closely, and would consult them rather than run the risk of any dangerous friction.

As to the question of the part taken by the allies *at the declaration of war or the conclusion of peace*, it is possible to speak with greater confidence. The treaty of alliance with Korkyra<sup>1</sup> preserves the form of oath taken by the Athenians on the one hand and the new ally on the other. There can be little doubt that here we have a formula going back to the very foundation of the Confederacy<sup>2</sup>: *καὶ περὶ πολέμου καὶ εἰρήνης πράξω καθ' ὅ τι ἂν τῷ πλήθει τῶν συμμάχων δοκῆ, καὶ τᾶλλα ποιήσω κατὰ [τὰ δ]όγματα τῶν συμμάχων.* No ingenuity of argument can obscure the straightforwardness of this declaration of the Athenians in their oath<sup>3</sup>. At the foundation of the Confederacy it had been determined that in questions concerning war and peace which touched the interests of the Confederacy as a whole, the allies must pass a *δόγμα* (incidentally we learn from this treaty that a bare majority was sufficient to

*Συνέδριον consulted on questions relating to Peace or War.*

<sup>1</sup> C.I.A. IV. (2), 49 b = Hicks and Hill, 106 (375-4 B.C.). Cf. Swoboda, *Rhein. Mus.* XLIX. p. 348 ff.; Foucart, *Bull. de Corr. Hell.*, XIII. p. 354 ff.

<sup>2</sup> See above, p. 27, n. 2.

<sup>3</sup> Gilbert, *Const. Ant.* (Eng. Trans.), p. 440, says: "we can hardly imagine that Athens was in any way bound by the decisions of the Council, where a majority of votes might sometimes be nothing more than the voice of a large number of small towns." This remark, it is true, touches a weak spot in the arrangements of the Confederacy, but does not affect the main question, which is settled once and for all by the Korkyra inscription. Before the war with the allies Athens was quite as likely to yield to the *Συνέδριον*, as the *Συνέδριον* to Athens. It is equally impossible to imagine with Volquardsen (quoted by Höck, *Die Bezieh. Kerkyras* etc., pp. 8 and 9) that Korkyra was granted specially favourable terms upon joining the Confederacy.

give force to a resolution of the Council of the allies), and that such a δόγμα could not be summarily rejected by Athens. No war could be declared or peace concluded unless the Athenian Assembly adopted the resolution of the Συνέδριον; if they rejected it, matters were to remain as before<sup>1</sup>. Such at least was the theory of the Confederacy. Nothing is more characteristic of the spirit of idealism in which its first principles were framed. No such thing as a divergence of opinion between Athens and her allies was to be expected. This was of course very unpractical, but we must remember how little experience Greece had hitherto had of the working of federal institutions. The founders of the Confederacy were content to let circumstances determine the issue of a difference of opinion. A certain analogy is presented by the relations subsisting between our own House of Lords and House of Commons. There is no definite rule<sup>2</sup> determining the course to be pursued, when a difference of opinion as to a measure exists between the two Houses. Yet we know that if the House of Commons, the stronger body, is thoroughly in earnest, the Lords must ultimately give way. So it was with the Second Athenian Confederacy. The weaker body—and I believe that in the earlier years of the Confederacy's existence that body was not always the Συνέδριον—had ultimately to give way.

<sup>1</sup> There is nothing to justify Höck's view (*Die Bezieh. Kerkyras*, p. 9) that if the Athenian δῆμος rejected or altered a δόγμα of the allies, it requested them to sanction the change; and that if the allies refused their sanction, the measure was binding upon Athens alone.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. e.g. Dicey, *Law of the Constitution*<sup>5</sup>, p. 387 ff.

The one known case which definitely bears upon this point, that of the proceedings which led up to the Peace of Philocrates in 346 B.C., occurred late in the history of the Confederacy, at a time when the representatives of the allies were but few and weak in consequence of the secessions which had taken place. It is not therefore right to draw a general conclusion from this particular instance, and to apply it to the whole history of the Confederacy<sup>1</sup>.

*Its resolutions overruled at the time of the Peace of Philocrates (346 B.C.).*

There is no occasion here to enter into a discussion of the rival stories told by Aeschines and Demosthenes about the *δόγματα τῶν συμμάχων* relative to the peace with Philip<sup>2</sup>. Nor again does the question of dates greatly concern us. I give here a summary of the most probable course of events<sup>3</sup>.

(1) The first *δόγμα* of the allies (Aesch. *F. L.* 60) related to the *ψήφισμα* of Demosthenes mentioned in Aesch. *c. Ctes.* 67, and was dealt with on the 8th of Elaphebolion.

(2) In this assembly Demosthenes carried the proposal mentioned in Aesch. *F. L.* 61, in opposition to the *δόγμα* of the allies.

(3) A second *δόγμα* (Aesch. *c. Ctes.* 69, 70) was discussed on the 18th and 19th Elaphebolion. This was opposed by Philocrates, who carried through his counter proposal.

Both the decrees carried in opposition to the *δόγματα* were "probouleumatic" (Demosthenes and Philocrates

<sup>1</sup> As Gilbert does (*Const. Ant.* p. 442, n. 2).

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Aesch. *F. L.* 60 ff.; *id.*, *c. Ctes.* 68 ff.; Dem. *F. L.* 15 ff.; *ibid.* 57.

<sup>3</sup> After Swoboda, *Rhein. Mus.* XLIX. pp. 351, 352.

were then members of the *Βουλή*), and consequently the Athenian Assembly had before it (*a*) the *δόγματα* of the allies, and (*b*) the counter propositions of the *Βουλή*. Here then are two clear cases of the rejection of a *δόγμα τῶν συμμάχων* by the Athenian *δῆμος*. The allies in the first instance wished the *Ἐκκλησία* to wait for the return of the envoys, who had been sent out "to call the cities to the championship of Grecian freedom," before concluding peace. This wish was rejected, and, says Aeschines, *ἐξελέγχεται Δημοσθένης... τὸ τῶν συμμάχων ἄκυρον πεποιηκῶς ψήφισμα*. In the second instance, the Athenian decree of the 19th Elaphebolion, in defiance of the resolution of the allies<sup>1</sup>, ordered that peace *and alliance* should *αἶ once* be concluded with Philip. To argue, as Höck<sup>2</sup> and Lenz<sup>3</sup> do, that the *Συνέδριον* must have passed a third *δόγμα* in the interval between the Athenian decree and the oath-taking, to approve the conclusion of peace *and alliance*, is merely begging the question. There is not a shred of evidence for it<sup>4</sup>. But it is equally futile to build upon this single instance of the rejection of a *δόγμα* of the Council of the allies the theory that the powers of that Council were merely of an advisory character. All that it does prove is that at this period of the Confederacy's history the Athenians

<sup>1</sup> Aesch. *c. Ctes.* 69: *πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ ἔγραψαν ὑπὲρ εἰρήνης ἡμᾶς μόνον βουλευσασθαι, τὸ δὲ τῆς συμμαχίας ὄνομα ὑπερέβησαν, οὐκ ἐπιλεησμένοι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν εἰρήνην ἀναγκαιοτέραν ἢ καλλίω ὑπολαμβάνοντες εἶναι... καὶ προσέγραψαν ἐξεῖναι τῷ βουλομένῳ τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἐν τρισὶ μῆσιν εἰς τὴν αὐτὴν στήλην ἀναγεγράφθαι μετ' Ἀθηναίων....*

<sup>2</sup> *N. Jahrb. f. cl. Phil.* 1878, p. 475 ff.

<sup>3</sup> *op. cit.* p. 60.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. Swoboda, *Rhein. Mus.* XLIX. p. 352.

were strong enough to disregard the resolution, and that the allies were sufficiently weak to acquiesce in such a rejection.

The Council also performed certain *judicial functions*. The Aristoteles decree<sup>1</sup> provided that if anyone, whether in public or private capacity, should attempt to render any of the provisions of that decree null and void, he should be liable to loss of rights (*ἀτιμία*) and confiscation of property. Usteri<sup>2</sup> points out that the guilty person becomes *ἄτιμος* automatically by committing the offence. On the other hand the offender is further liable to formal trial in a court of Athenians and allies on the charge of seeking the subversion of the alliance. The court is directed to punish with death or exile, wherever the Athenians and the allies hold sway<sup>3</sup>. If he be punished with death, he may not be buried in Attika or in territory belonging to the allies, *i.e.* as an offender against the Confederacy he may not be buried anywhere in confederate soil.

I believe with Lenz<sup>4</sup> and Usteri<sup>5</sup> that the above passage in the Aristoteles decree points to the (at all events prospective) existence of a Confederate Court, composed, in what proportion we do not know<sup>6</sup>, of

*Judicial  
functions  
of the  
Συνέδριον.*

*Was there  
a Joint  
Court of  
Athenians  
and allies?*

<sup>1</sup> C.I.A. II. 17, ll. 51—63.

<sup>2</sup> *Achtung u. Verbannung*, p. 90. He thinks that the confiscation, though only coming into effect after formal condemnation, is placed in connection with *ἀτιμία* as belonging specially to the Athenian sphere of execution (p. 93).

<sup>3</sup> Usteri, *loc. cit.*, points out that Lenz (p. 9) has quite misunderstood the words *οἱ [περ] Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ οἱ σύμμαχοι κρατοῦσι[ν]* in translating them “wo sie immer seiner habhaft werden.”

<sup>4</sup> p. 10.

<sup>5</sup> p. 91; cf. Meyer, *Gesch. d. Alt.* p. 382.

<sup>6</sup> We have no right to assume (with Lenz) that the allies must have had a preponderating influence in such a court.



Athenian and allied representatives. Lipsius<sup>1</sup> on the other hand denies the existence of such a joint court, and holds that the allies were only allowed to try the accused, if he were within their territory. Usteri<sup>2</sup> remarks that if Athens had by herself the power of punishing with banishment from the whole of the Confederate territory, any judicial action on the part of the allies was superfluous. But I think that the strongest argument in favour of a joint court is to be found in the language of the decree. Can *ἐν Ἀθηναίοις καὶ τοῖς συμμάχοις* reasonably be interpreted otherwise than "in (a joint court of) the Athenians and their allies"? If separate courts were meant, we should surely expect *ἐν Ἀθηναίοις καὶ ἐν τοῖς συμμάχοις*<sup>3</sup>. As to the practical working of this joint court, it must be admitted that nothing is known, and it is probable that we have here another of those idealistic arrangements which proved of little or no use in practice. By the terms of the decree the jurisdiction of the court is limited to cases in which the abrogation of any portion of the Aristoteles *ψήφισμα* is proposed. Designs against the existence of the Confederacy were not particularly likely to take such a form. It is therefore

<sup>1</sup> *Leipz. Berichte*, 1898, p. 154 f.: "so ist dabei nicht an einen aus Athenern und Bundesgenossen zusammengesetzten Gerichtshof gedacht, sondern den letzteren die gerichtliche Verfolgung nur gegen den übertragen, der sich in ihrem Gebiete aufhält."

<sup>2</sup> p. 91.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. Kühner, *Griech. Gramm.* II.<sup>2</sup> p. 476, and examples there cited; especially Xen. *Hell.* v. 2. 11: *προσθήγαγον αὐτοὺς πρὸς τε τὴν ἐκκλησίαν καὶ τοὺς συμμάχους* (a joint assembly of the Spartans and their allies). Cf. C.I.A. IV. (2), 54 b, l. 48 f.: *ἐξεῖναι αὐτοῖς...δίκαι[s] ὑ[π]ο[σ]χ[εῖν] [κα]τὰ τ[οῦ]ς ὄρκους καὶ τὰς συνθήκας ἐν Κέῳ καὶ [ἐν τῇ ἐκκ]λήτῳ [πὸ] λει Ἀθήνησι*. Here *distinct* courts are meant.



very doubtful whether the joint court ever came into actual working. Yet this does not do away with the significance of a declaration made at the foundation of the Confederacy that such a joint court was to be one of the institutions of the League.

The Council of the allies was authorised to act by itself as a court of law to try those Athenians who should acquire landed property in the territory of the allies, contrary to the provision of the Aristoteles decree<sup>1</sup>. If it considered that the case had been proved, it was to sell the property in question, and to give half to the informer, and to put half into the common chest of the allies. Clearly any interference on the part of Athens in a matter of this kind would have been out of place.

The allies were of course deeply interested in the *finances* of the Confederacy. Inscriptions show that they had a common chest of their own<sup>2</sup>. Into this chest were paid the proceeds of the sale of confiscated property and other fines. Presumably the *συντάξεις* also were as a rule paid into this chest. Disbursements for war expenses were made from it, as was provided by the terms of the Confederacy<sup>3</sup>. There can be little doubt that the administration of the chest was in the hands of officials appointed by the allies, but of this there is no positive evidence<sup>4</sup>.

*The allies  
and  
Finance.*

<sup>1</sup> Cf. C.I.A. II. 17, l. 41 ff.

<sup>2</sup> C.I.A. II. 17, ll. 45, 46: τὸ δὲ ἄλλο κοινὸν ἔστω τῶν συμμαχῶν; C.I.A. II. 65, l. 15 ff.: [ἐὰν] δέ τις ἀφέληται πόλις, ὀφείλειν τῷ κοινῷ τῷ τῶν συμμαχῶν. Cf. Usteri, *op. cit.*, p. 19.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. C.I.A. II. 62: ὅπως [ἀ]ν ἔχ[ωσ]ιν οἱ φροῖνοι οἱ ἐν Ἀ[νδρω]ι μισθὸν ἐκ τῶν συντάξεων κ[ατὰ τὰ] δό[γματ]α τ[ῶν] συμμαχῶν; Ps.-Dem. c. *Timoth.* 49: ἐκ τῶν κοινῶν συντάξεων ἡ μισθοφορία ἦν τῷ στρατεύματι.

<sup>4</sup> Lenz, *op. cit.* p. 24.

The  
συντάξεις.

The nature of these *συντάξεις* must now be discussed. The name was due to the statesman Kallistratos, who rightly judged that the word *φόρος* would be distasteful to the members of the new Confederacy<sup>1</sup>. Gilbert says<sup>2</sup> that probably the allies paid no contributions at first, but that later on some cities commuted their military services for a money payment. Beyond the analogy of the First Confederacy there seems to be no ground for this view<sup>3</sup>. It appears to me that the statement in Harpokration points rather to the existence of *συντάξεις* from the very first, for we know that Kallistratos was most active at the foundation of the Confederacy. It is probable that among the first points agreed upon was one which dealt with these contributions, since it would be impossible for the Confederacy to get on without some form of monetary assistance from the allies<sup>4</sup>. Most likely all members of the Confederacy paid a certain sum by way of monetary contribution, but the sum would vary according to the military and naval assistance given<sup>5</sup>. The principles of

<sup>1</sup> Harpokration *s.v.* σύνταξις: ἔλεγον δὲ καὶ τοὺς φόρους συντάξεις, ἐπειδὴ χαλεπῶς ἔφερον οἱ Ἕλληνες τὸ τῶν φόρων ὄνομα, Καλλιστράτου οὐτω καλέσαντος, ὡς φησι Θεόπομπος ἐν ἰ τῶν Φιλιππικῶν.

<sup>2</sup> *Const. Ant.* p. 443. So also Busolt, *Griech. Staatsalt.*<sup>2</sup>, p. 334.

<sup>3</sup> Gilbert's arguments, *loc. cit.*, are quite unconvincing.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. Schaefer, *Dem. u. s. Zeit*, 1<sup>2</sup>, p. 34.

<sup>5</sup> This view (Schaefer's, *op. cit.* p. 35) seems to me the most probable. For details see Busolt, *Der zw. ath. Bund*, p. 703 ff. No certainty is possible in the matter. Hahn, *N. Jahrb. f. cl. Phil.* 1876, p. 455 ff., holds that Thebes did not pay *συντάξεις*. Lenz (p. 21) proposes a compromise. The principal passages in point are:

(1) Xen. vi. 2. 1: οἱ δ' Ἀθηναῖοι ἀξαναμένους μὲν ὀρώντες διὰ σφᾶς τοὺς Θηβαίους, χρήματά τε οὐ συμβαλλομένους εἰς τὸ ναυτικόν, αὐτοὶ δὲ ἀποκναιόμενοι καὶ χρημάτων εἰσφοραῖς κ.τ.λ.

the Confederacy favoured equality for all cities small or great, and the exemption of a particular ally from a money contribution, though perhaps logically justified, would be the very thing calculated to arouse discontent among the other members of the Confederacy. That ships were furnished by some at all events of the allies, is shown by the presence of Boeotian ships in Timotheos' fleet<sup>1</sup>, and by the passage of Xenophon cited above<sup>2</sup>.

The *συντάξεις* were, as a rule, paid by the allies at *Payment*. Athens<sup>3</sup>. Arrears were collected by special commissioners or by a *στρατηγός*<sup>4</sup>. On the other hand generals

(2) *id.* vi. 2. 9: (the Korkyraeans speak) ἐξ οὐδεμιᾶς γὰρ πόλεως πλὴν γε Ἀθηνῶν οὔτε ναῦς οὔτε χρήματα πλεονα ἂν γενέσθαι.

(3) Isokr. *Pax* 36: διεφθάρμεθα...ὕπ' ἀνθρώπων...οἰ...λέγειν τολμῶσιν ὡς χρὴ τοὺς προγόνους μιμῆσθαι, καὶ μὴ περιορᾶν ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς καταγελωμένους, μηδὲ τὴν θάλατταν πλείοντα τοὺς μὴ συντάξεις ἐθέλοντα ἡμῖν ὑποτελεῖν.

(4) *ibid.* 29: ἡμεῖς γὰρ οἴομεθα μὲν ἦν τὴν θάλατταν πλέωμεν πολλαῖς τριήρεσι καὶ βιαζώμεθα τὰς πόλεις συντάξεις διδόναι καὶ συνέδρους ἐνθάδε πέμπειν, διαπράξεσθαι τι τῶν δεόντων.

It is true that the statements of Isokrates must be received with caution, but they certainly point towards the imposition of *συντάξεις* upon *all* the allies.

(5) The passage most strongly favouring the view not adopted in the text is Isokr. *Areop.* i. 2: ἔτι δὲ συμμαχοὺς ἐχούσης (τῆς πόλεως) πολλοὺς μὲν τοὺς ἐτοίμους ἡμῖν, ἦν τι δέη, βοηθήσοντα, πολὺ δὲ πλείους τοὺς τὰς συντάξεις ὑποτελοῦντα καὶ τὸ προσταττόμενον ποιοῦντα. Here, however, the distinction is probably between those allies who are not members of the Confederacy and those who are. Von Stern, however (*Gesch. d. spart. u. theb. Heg.* p. 84), thinks this passage decisive in favour of the view I have not adopted.

<sup>1</sup> Ps.-Dem. *c. Tim.* 14 ff.

<sup>2</sup> no. (2).

<sup>3</sup> Plut. *Phoc.* 7: μετὰ πολλῶν νεῶν, ἃς ἀπέστειλαν οἱ σύμμαχοι τὰ χρήματα τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις κομιζούσας.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. C.I.A. iv. (2), 54 b, l. 11 ff.: εἰν δὲ μὴ ἀποδίδωσιν ἐν τῷ χρόνῳ τῷ εἰρημένῳ, εἰσπραξάντων αὐτοῦσιν οἱ ἡρημένοι ὑπὸ τοῦ δήμου εἰσπράτ[τ]ειν τὰ ὀφειλόμενα χρήματα παρὰ τῶν νησιωτῶν τρόπ[ω] ὅτῳ ἂν ἐπίστωνται.

carrying on military operations in certain districts were sometimes authorised to raise the *συντάξεις* themselves and to devote the proceeds to paying the expenses of their operations. Thus Isokrates says of Timotheos<sup>1</sup>: Ποτεΐδαιαν...εἶλεν ἀπὸ τῶν χρημάτων ὧν αὐτὸς ἐπόρισε καὶ τῶν συντάξεων τῶν ἀπὸ Θράκης. We hear also of the money accruing from the *συντάξεις* of Lesbos being assigned to Chares, Charidemos, and Phokion<sup>2</sup>.

Assess-  
ment.

The *συντάξεις* were apparently assessed by the Athenian Ἐκκλησία on a report from a στρατηγός<sup>3</sup>. This follows from a passage of the speech against Theokrines<sup>4</sup>, where it is stated that the Ἐκκλησία assessed the *σύνταξις* of Aenos on the basis of an agreement made with the στρατηγός Chares. This, however, is late in the history of the Confederacy (about 341 B.C.), and Meyer<sup>5</sup> is perhaps justified in assuming that the *Συνέδριον* of the allies, working in conjunction with the Athenian στρατηγοί and the Ἐκκλησία, must have had a share in determining the size of contingents furnished and the amounts of con-

In this case the generals of the defaulting town also took part in the collection, probably to see that things were done fairly. Cf. also C.I.A. II. 62, l. 16 ff.: εἰσπράξαι δὲ καὶ τὰ ἐγ ν[ήσων χρή]ματα Ἄρχέδημον τὰ ὀφ[ειλόμενα τ]οῖς στρατιώταις το[ῖς ἐν Ἄνδρῳ]. See also C.I.A. IV. (2), 17 c, which possibly refers to the collection of arrears in 378/7 B.C.

<sup>1</sup> *Antid.* 113.

<sup>2</sup> C.I.A. II. 108, frag. c, l. 13; such a conclusion may fairly be drawn from this fragmentary inscription.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. Busolt, p. 714.

<sup>4</sup> § 7: πινθανόμενοι Αἰνιοὶ γεγράφθαι τὸ ψήφισμα παρανόμων ὃ πρότερον Χαρίνου ἐγράψατο, τοῦτο περὶ συντάξεως, ὃ Θουκυδίδης εἶπε, καὶ πέρασ τῶν πραγμάτων οὐδὲν γιγνόμενον, ἀλλὰ τὸν μὲν δῆμον συγχωροῦντα, τὴν σύνταξιν διδόναι τοὺς Αἰνίους, ὅσην Χάρητι τῷ στρατηγῷ συνεχώρησαν....

<sup>5</sup> *Gesch. d. Alt.* v. p. 383; see Appendix.

tributions paid. Yet it must be borne in mind that the evidence for this view is slight<sup>1</sup>.

For the amount of the *συντάξεις* the information we *Amount.* possess is very scanty. It is as well to confine ourselves to what we really know. Oreos (Histiaea) and Eretria in Euboea paid each 5 talents annually, probably between the years 357–349 B.C.<sup>2</sup> In the year 425 B.C., when the amount of the tribute was raised, Eretria had paid 15 talents<sup>3</sup>. This would tend to show that, at the later period of the Second Confederacy's existence at all events, the contributions demanded were not exorbitant. Any conjectures as to the total amount of the *συντάξεις* based on the above amount of information must of necessity be futile<sup>4</sup>. Demosthenes<sup>5</sup> states that the *συντάξεις* of 355–4 B.C. amounted to 45 talents; the smallness of the sum need not surprise us, if we bear in mind the exhaustion caused by the war with the allies. Aeschines<sup>6</sup> puts the total at 60 talents at a

<sup>1</sup> Cf. however C.I.A. II. 117=Hicks and Hill, 146. In 340/39 B.C. exemption from *συντάξεις* is granted to Tenedos for a year: ἐν δὲ τούτῳ τῷ χρόνῳ μὴ εἶναι εἰσπράξει μῆτε στρατηγῶι, μῆτε ἄλλωι [μ]η[θενι μῆτε ἀργύριον μῆτε ἄλλο μηθέν, μηδὲ τοῖς σ[υνέδροις εἶναι] κατα- <τα>τάξαι ἐν τῷ χρόνῳ το[ύτῳ]....

<sup>2</sup> Aesch. c. Ctes. 94 and 100. Cf. Hahn, *N. Jahrb. f. cl. Phil.* 1876, pp. 461 f. He conjectures the total amount received from Euboea annually to have been 20 talents.

<sup>3</sup> C.I.A. I. 37=Hicks and Hill, 64, l. 56.

<sup>4</sup> See Schaefer, *Dem. u. s. Zeit.* I.<sup>2</sup> p. 36: Busolt, p. 723. The former estimates the total at 200 talents, the latter at 350.

<sup>5</sup> Cor. 234: δύναμιν τοῖνυν εἶχεν ἡ πόλις τοὺς νησιώτας, οὐχ ἅπαντας, ἀλλὰ τοὺς ἀσθενεστάτους—οὔτε γὰρ Χίος οὔτε Ῥόδος μεθ' ἡμῶν ἦν—χρημάτων δὲ σύνταξιν εἰς πέντε καὶ τετταράκοντα τάλαντα, καὶ ταῦτ' ἦν προεξιλεγμένα.

<sup>6</sup> F. L. 71: ...μισθοφόρους οἱ τοὺς μὲν τάλαιπώρους νησιώτας κα' ἕκαστον τὸν ἐνιαυτὸν ἐξήκοντα τάλαντα εἰσέπραττον σύνταξιν.

date shortly before the Peace of Philokrates (346 B.C.). In neither case does there seem to be any reason for doubting the substantial accuracy of the statement, though it is true that Demosthenes is emphasising the smallness of the figure, Aeschines the largeness<sup>1</sup>. This is really all that is known about the matter, and further conjecture would appear to be worse than useless, tending to make those who indulge in it quarrel with even the little they possess<sup>2</sup>.

Two other cases in which the *Συνέδριον* acted may, finally, be mentioned.

(a) The Council sometimes (at least) sent a representative on embassies which concerned the Confederacy, though whether the choice of the representative lay with it, is doubtful<sup>3</sup>.

(b) It appears to have been consulted when it was found necessary that an Athenian garrison should occupy an allied town<sup>4</sup>. The placing of an *ἄρχων* in an allied city was contrary to the foundation principles of the Confederacy, but in time of war might be a military necessity<sup>5</sup>.

<sup>1</sup> Hahn, *N. Jahrb. f. cl. Phil.* 1876, p. 462, thinks that the amount of the *συντάξεις* was raised during the war against Philip.

<sup>2</sup> Conjecture without stint will be found in Busolt, p. 723 ff. Cf. also Hahn, p. 461 ff.

<sup>3</sup> Aesch. *F. L.* 20: Ἀγλαοκρέοντα τὸν Τενέδιον, ὃν ἐκ τῶν συμμαχῶν εἴλεσθε (for the embassy to Philip). Cf. Lenz, p. 29 n., in contrast to Schaefer II.<sup>2</sup>, p. 216.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. *Bull. de Corr. Hell.* XII, p. 224, n. 1 = Hicks and Hill, 127, l. 25; the Council of the allies evidently took an interest in the conduct of an Athenian *ἄρχων* Androtion, who had been placed in the allied city of Arkesine in Amorgos. Cf. also C.I.A. II. 62 (Andros), and C.I.A. II. 69, l. 25 (*ἄρχοντες* in the Hellespont).

<sup>5</sup> Cf. C.I.A. II. 17 b, l. 23 f. (admission of Chalkis): μήτε φρουρὰν



B. THE RELATIONS OF ATHENS TO THE ALLIES.

These may be dealt with at less length, since, for the most part, they follow naturally from what has been said about the rights and duties of the allies. These relations may be considered as they concern matters (i) deliberative, (ii) executive, and (iii) judicial.

(i) *Deliberative powers of Athens.* It has been shown above (p. 23 ff.) that the *Βουλή* exercised important functions as an intermediary between the *Συνέδριον* of the allies and the Athenian *Ἐκκλησία*. Theoretical equality of *Συνέδριον* and *Ἐκκλησία*. The final decision, however, rested with the last two bodies. The results of the previous discussion showed that *in theory* the *Ἐκκλησία* was not considered to have any greater right than the *Συνέδριον* to settle the most important questions arising with respect to war, peace, and alliance<sup>1</sup>. When the Confederacy was first formed, it was held that the two great constituent bodies, Athens on the one hand and the allies on the other, were equal. In the enthusiasm of the moment men forgot that such an ideal equality was not suited to practical working, and that the only course possible, when there was a difference of opinion, was that the weaker body should yield. Hence in the

*ὑποδεχομένους [παρ' Ἀθηναίων μ]ήτε φόρον φέροντας μήτε [ἄρχοντα παραδ]εχομένους παρὰ τὰ δόγματ[α τῶν συμμάχων]. Cf. above, p. 27, n. 2.*

<sup>1</sup> Holm, *Hist. of Greece* (Eng. Trans.), III. p. 86, says: "The League consequently could not carry any proposal of which Athens disapproved, and conversely, Athens could not impose any policy on the League, to which the majority of its members were opposed." He fails, however, to point out that this ideal theory would not work in practice. Cf. Beloch, *Griech. Gesch.* II. p. 239, n. 1.



earlier years of the Confederacy's existence it is likely that the Ἐκκλησία would be inclined to give way to the Συνέδριον. For the later years, especially at the time of the war with the allies and after, there is evidence to show that the reverse was the case<sup>1</sup>. It was natural that there should be a tendency towards increase of power on the part of the Ἐκκλησία. Yet in spite of this, the form of the Confederacy (and herein the Second Confederacy differed from the First) continued unchanged till its dissolution<sup>2</sup>.

*The executive power in the hands of Athens.*

(ii) *Executive Powers.* It was here that Athens had a real advantage. Meyer<sup>3</sup> justly remarks that the direction of all the operations carried out by the Confederacy lay with Athenian officials, and that this tended to make Athens the real power in affairs. This was the nature of that Hegemony which Diodorus<sup>4</sup> assigns to the Athenians. It is the Athenian στρατηγοί who are everywhere active in carrying out the policy of the Confederacy. The chief command of the Confederate army and fleet is in the hands of an Athenian officer<sup>5</sup>.

<sup>1</sup> Besides the proceedings leading up to the Peace of Philocrates, there are also some instances of encroachment on the part of Athens in the judicial sphere. See below, p. 45 f.

<sup>2</sup> I. G. XII. 480 (fasc. 5, pt. 1. Siphnos) is doubtless rightly referred to the First Confederacy. The imposition of a common coinage would have been far too glaring a violation of autonomy to be possible for the Second.

<sup>3</sup> *Gesch. d. Alt.* v. p. 383.

<sup>4</sup> xv. 28. 4: πάσας δ' (sc. τὰς πόλεις) ὑπάρχειν αὐτονόμους ἡγεμόσι χρωμέναις Ἀθηναίοις.

<sup>5</sup> Busolt, p. 728 ff.; Diod. xv. 29. 7: κρίναντες δὲ πολεμεῖν αὐτοῖς, στρατηγούς τρεῖς εἴλοντο τοὺς ἐπιφανεστάτους τῶν πολιτῶν, Τιμόθεον καὶ Χαβρίαν καὶ Καλλίστρατον, and so throughout the history of the Confederacy.

(iii) *Judicial authority.* There is evidence to show that as time went on Athens was very ready to seize upon pretexts for interfering with the independence of some of the members of the Confederacy, and in this way to infringe upon their autonomy. *Infringements of the judicial independence of the allies.*

(a) As the result of disturbances in Keos shortly before or in 363–2 B.C., in the course of which the supporters of Athens had twice suffered, the judicial independence of the island was limited<sup>1</sup>. Sentence of banishment from Keos and Athens was pronounced against the rebels of Iulis. An appeal against this sentence might be entered, upon the giving of sureties, and a trial be held *at Keos in the first instance*, or at Athens in the second (upon further appeal): *ἐὰν δέ [τινες τῶν] ἀπογραφέντων ἀμφισβητῶσι μὴ εἶναι τούτων τῶ[ν ἀνδρῶ]ν, ἐξεῖναι αὐτοῖς ἐνγυητὰς καταστήσασι πρὸς [τ]οῦ[ς] σ[τρ]ατηγοὺς τοὺς Ἰουλητῶν τριάκοντα ἡμερῶν δίκαι[ς] ὑ[π]ο[σχ]εῖν [κα]τὰ τ[οῦ]ς ὄρκους καὶ τὰς συνθήκας ἐν Κέῳ καὶ [ἐν τῇ ἐκκ]λήτῳ [πό]λει Ἀθήνησι<sup>2</sup>.* Again, in the oath taken by the cities of

<sup>1</sup> See Köhler, *Ath. Mitt.* II. p. 142; C.I.A. IV. (2), 54 b; Szanto, *Ath. Mitt.* XVI. p. 30 ff.; Lipsius, *Leipz. Berichte*, 1898, p. 158 ff.; Usteri, *Aechtung u. Verbannung*, p. 94; Pridik, *De Cei insulae rebus*, p. 102 ff.

Köhler's conjecture, that this secession was consequent upon the naval expedition of Epameinondas, may very well be right, but we must remember that it is only a probable conjecture, not a certainty.

<sup>2</sup> C.I.A. IV. (2), 54 b, l. 45 ff. Meyer, *Gesch. d. Alt.* V. pp. 382, 384, thinks that originally in cases arising between the Athenians and any of their allies, where large sums were involved, the trial was transferred to some third town agreed upon by the parties concerned, and that it was only as time went on that Athens insisted that she should be the *ἐκκλητος πόλις*.

Keos to the Athenians and their allies, and to the Kean exiles restored by the Athenians, we find<sup>1</sup>: τὰς δὲ δίκας καὶ [τὰς γραφὰς τὰς κατ' Ἀθηναίων ποιήσομαι]<sup>2</sup> πάσας ἐκκλήτους [κατὰ τὰς συνθήκας, ὅποσαι ἂν ὦσιν ὑπὲρ ἐ]κατὸν δραχμῶν.

An appeal to Athens is therefore allowed in the second instance in the case of these rebels. In ordinary circumstances such an appeal would have been a distinct infringement of Kean *αὐτονομία*. In this case, however, circumstances perhaps justified it, since it might be impossible to secure a fair trial in Keos, where party feeling would run high. The second passage quoted on the other hand shows that the independence of Keos in judicial matters had received a decided limitation. Jurisdiction passes from the Kean courts to Athens in cases where more than a hundred drachms<sup>3</sup> are involved, and where Athenian citizens are defendants<sup>4</sup>. A similar limitation of the judicial rights of the Naxians appears to have taken place about the middle of the 4th century B.C.<sup>5</sup> We may therefore conclude that revolting and reconquered members of the Confederacy at all events were liable

<sup>1</sup> C.I.A. IV. (2), 54 b, l. 74 ff.

<sup>2</sup> Accepting Dittenberger's restoration, *Sylloge* 1<sup>2</sup>, 101, which Pridik, *op. cit.* p. 102 ff. objects to.

<sup>3</sup> So Szanto, *loc. cit.* p. 35; Lipsius thinks that an appeal only was allowed.

<sup>4</sup> According to Dittenberger's restoration, which, however, is not certain. Perhaps there was no such restriction. Cf. Lipsius, *loc. cit.* p. 159.

<sup>5</sup> C.I.A. IV. (2), 88 d; cf. Szanto, *loc. cit.* p. 41 ff.; Gilbert, *Const. Ant.* p. 445, confidently asserts that this limitation was the result of Chabrias' victory off Naxos in 376 B.C. It must be remembered that this assertion rests upon a double conjecture.

to have their judicial independence impaired<sup>1</sup>. This conclusion is confirmed by the decree of Koresos in Keos, dating probably from about 360 B.C., whereby the export of ruddle to any place except Athens is forbidden<sup>2</sup>. This decree (l. 20 f.) says: εἶν[αι [δὲ] καὶ ἔφεισιν Ἀθήναζε καὶ τῷ φήναντι καὶ τῷ ἐνδείξαντι. There is thus in this case positive evidence of appeal being allowed from Keos to Athens.

(b) Of considerable importance, as showing how Athens came to disregard the autonomy of the allies as time went on, are two instances of outlawry<sup>3</sup>, apparently pronounced by Athenian decree alone, and yet extending in effect over the whole territory of the Confederacy. The first passage, from an Athenian decree for the protection of the Eretrians, runs<sup>4</sup>: [ἐὰν] δέ τις τοῦ λοιποῦ χρόνου ἐπιστρα[τεύση ἐπὶ Ἐρε]τρίαν ἢ ἐπ' ἄλλην τινὰ τῶν συμμαχί[δων πόλεων, Ἀθη]ναίων ἢ τῶν συμμάχων τῶν Ἀθην[αίων, θάνατον αὐτοῦ] κατεγνώσθαι<sup>5</sup> καὶ τὰ χρήματα δ[ημόσια<sup>6</sup> εἶναι καὶ τ]ῆς θεοῦ τὸ ἐπιδέκατον, καὶ εἶν[αι τὰ χρήματα αὐτοῦ] ἀγώγιμα ἐξ ἀπασῶν τῶν πόλεω[ν τῶν συμμαχίδων· ἐὰν] δέ τις

*Right to  
outlaw  
claimed  
by Athens.*

<sup>1</sup> Lipsius rightly remarks that little or nothing as to appeal from the courts of Arkesine in Amorgos can be made out from the inscription in *Bull. de Corr. Hell.* xii. p. 229 ff., in spite of Szanto's arguments, *loc. cit.* p. 33 ff.

<sup>2</sup> C.I.A. II. 546 = Hicks and Hill, 137. Cf. Lipsius, *loc. cit.*, as against Pridik, p. 107 ff.

<sup>3</sup> According to Usteri's view, *op. cit.* p. 17 ff.

<sup>4</sup> C.I.A. II. 65, l. 9 ff. Cf. Usteri, *l. c.* The text is given after Dittenberger, *Sylloge*, 1<sup>2</sup>, 110.

<sup>5</sup> Outlawry coming into force *ipso iure*. Usteri, p. 18.

<sup>6</sup> 'Forfeit to the Athenian treasury,' says Usteri, but perhaps it merely means 'confiscated.' The fact that Athene received her tenth does not necessarily imply that the remainder went to Athens.

ἀφέληται πόλις, ὀφείλ[ειν τῷ κοινῷ τῷ τ]ῶν συμμάχων<sup>1</sup>. The second instance is from Demosthenes' speech against Aristokrates<sup>2</sup> (352 B.C.). A proposal had been made to grant special protection to Charidemos<sup>3</sup>: *ἐάν τις ἀποκτείνῃ Χαρίδημον, ἀγώγιμος ἔστω ἐκ πάσης τῆς συμμαχίδος, εἰάν δέ τις ἀφέληται ἢ πόλις ἢ ἰδιώτης, ἔκσπονδος ἔστω*. Anyone slaying him was to be outlawed throughout the whole territory of the Confederacy. True the proposal was combated as illegal, but not as infringing the rights of the allies.

Usteri<sup>4</sup> appears to be justified in seeing herein an encroachment upon the judicial independence of members of the Confederacy. Not indeed that either of the offences named are such as should have been tried in the Joint Court of Athenians and allies. I cannot see why Usteri<sup>5</sup> should think that anyone attacking Eretria ought to have been tried in that court, which had only to act where an attempt was made to repeal the Aristoteles decree<sup>6</sup>. The encroachment lies rather in the pronouncement of banishment from or outlawry throughout the length and breadth of the Confederacy by Athenian decree alone. It is of course just possible that a *δῶγμα* of the allies was passed approving such a penalty, but I think it will be admitted that this is unlikely. Yet we must beware

<sup>1</sup> 'If a town refuses to deliver up the property to the Athenian treasury the duty of obtaining it falls to the *συνέδριον*' (Usteri, p. 19). To my mind the meaning is simply 'confiscated property is due to the common chest of the allies, and if any city seizes it for itself, it must make restitution to the allies.' Cf. C.I.A. II. 17, ll. 45, 46.

<sup>2</sup> See especially §§ 35 and 91.

<sup>3</sup> I give the form of words after Usteri, p. 19.

<sup>4</sup> p. 21.

<sup>5</sup> p. 92.

<sup>6</sup> See above, p. 36.

of generalising from these two instances. The penalty of outlawry threatened against the murderer of the Delian Peisitheides<sup>1</sup> only extends throughout Attic territory. In the case of Iulis in Keos (363–2 B.C.)<sup>2</sup> banishment from Keos and Athens only, not from the whole Confederate territory, is pronounced against the rebels<sup>3</sup>.

(iv) In one instance at least *the Athenians interfered to limit the trade-rights* of a member of the Confederacy. Three towns of Keos (Karthaea, Koresos, and Iulis) are found passing decrees to limit strictly the export of ruddle from Keos. To no other place may it be exported save to Athens. These decrees were the result of the visit of an Athenian embassy, evidently sent to complain of the infringement of regulations which had previously limited the export of ruddle<sup>4</sup>. By the new decrees it was enacted that only special boats could be employed in the export; rewards were to be given to informers who reported any breach of the regulations. The degree of subserviency towards Athens which prevailed at Keos at this time can be

*Interference with commercial freedom of allies.*

<sup>1</sup> C.I.A. II. 115 b, p. 408; cf. Usteri, p. 23. Date about 350 B.C.

<sup>2</sup> C.I.A. IV. (2), 54 b.

<sup>3</sup> See Usteri, p. 94. I do not, however, agree with him that any evidence can be drawn from this inscription as to the existence of a joint court for the trial of offenders against the Confederacy as a whole.

<sup>4</sup> C.I.A. II. 546 = Hicks and Hill 137: *περὶ ὧν λέγουσιν οἱ παρ' Ἀθηναίων, εἶναι τῆς μίλτου τὴν ἐξ[αγωγὴν Ἀθήναζε...κ]αθάπερ πρότερον ἦν* (decree of Koresos). Ruddle or red ochre was used at Athens for many purposes, e.g. for giving to Attic vases their deep red tone (see Walters, *History of Ancient Pottery*, Vol. I. p. 205), for the preparation of red paint, etc. Theophrastos (*περὶ λίθων* 52) says: *βελτίστη δὲ δοκεῖ μίλτος ἢ Κελα εἶναι*. Cf. also Blümner, *Technologie*, IV. p. 479 ff., and Böckh, *Die Staatshaushaltung der Athener*<sup>2</sup>, I. p. 82 f., and II. p. 353 ff.



gauged by the words: *ἐὰν δέ τι ἄλλο ψηφίζοντα* [ἡ] Ἀθηναῖοι *περὶ φυλακῆς τῆς μίλτου, κύρια εἶναι κατακομι[σθέντα τὰ ἐψηφισμένα]*. Köhler<sup>1</sup> dates this decree between 360 B.C. and 350. It can hardly be doubted that these stringent regulations hampering Kean trade were the result of the secession of the island about 363 B.C.<sup>2</sup> Here then is another piece of evidence to show that Athens was very ready to seize any opportunity of lessening the rights of the members of the Confederacy to her own advantage.

### C. GENERAL CONCLUSIONS.

*Summary  
of results.*

The *Συνέδριον* of the allies was in theory, so far as the Confederacy was concerned, the equal of the Athenian *Ἐκκλησία*. Undoubtedly the passing of a *δόγμα* of the allies was, at the time of the foundation of the Confederacy, contemplated in all matters which materially affected the common interests of Athens and her allies, such as on the occasion of war, peace, or alliance. A joint court was to try anyone who threatened to subvert the ground principles upon which the Confederacy rested. Yet the theory of the League differed widely from the practice. Clashing of interests, though not provided for by the founders of the Confederacy, could not fail to occur as time went on. Had theory been worked out into practice, matters must have been brought to a standstill. In the earlier part of the Confederacy's existence the *Ἐκκλησία* may sometimes have given way to the *Συνέδριον*, but in the

<sup>1</sup> *Ath. Mitt.* II. p. 150 f.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. C.I.A. IV. (2), 54 b.



course of time the allies grew weaker, and Athens tended to predominate. The δόγματα of the Συνέδριον were sometimes disregarded, revolt and reconquest were followed by infringement of autonomy. Athens showed that she was eager to draw judicial authority into her own hands. An ally's freedom of trade might occasionally be restricted.

Moderate contributions were levied from all the allies, while some also supplied ships and troops. The chief command rested with Athens, and in the hands of her officials were centred all executive powers. It was these which really gave the Athenians their predominance (ἡγεμονία) in the Confederacy.

It is not difficult to point out weak spots in the foundations upon which the Second Confederacy rested. *Weak points of the Confederacy.* The very words, in which the purpose of its existence is announced, reveal a grave weakness. They show that a real permanence was not contemplated by its founders. The First Confederacy had a far higher aim set before it, that of securing Greek unity in the face of Persian aggression. Even that motive had proved insufficient to secure a lasting union. When once the object of the Confederacy's hostility ceased to be formidable, the Confederacy was turned into an Athenian Empire. The basis of the Second Confederacy, opposition to Sparta, offered still less prospect of permanency. It was by no means calculated to awaken a sense of national unity. However, it is useless to upbraid Kallistratos and his fellows with failure to achieve the impossible. They might have proclaimed Greek unity as the object of the Confederacy's existence, but in that case they would have secured no adherents. Only a sense of

immediate and pressing danger could force the Greeks into a political union.

If the purpose of the Confederacy's creation was faulty, the federal arrangements themselves are not less open to criticism. The first grave defect is the existence of two equal, and (in the long run) almost necessarily antagonistic bodies—the Athenian *Ἐκκλησία* and the *Συνέδριον* of the allies. Athens could not bring herself to surrender her proud position, and to fuse the Confederacy into a real whole by creating one common assembly with a proportional representation. That would have been the only true solution of the problem. But for a city which had traditions behind her such as Athens had, to surrender the right of separate discussion in her own *Ἐκκλησία*, even in the case of matters which concerned the whole Confederacy, would have been to give up that which the Greek held most dear. Only some overwhelming danger from without could have effected such a consummation. That which has been possible for the territorial states of modern Germany was impossible for the city-states of ancient Greece.

The system of representation which was adopted for the one half of the Confederacy was gravely defective. A mere numerical equality was aimed at. Each city, whether small or great, could give a single vote and no more, though it might have more than one representative. This again was the outcome of the ancient conception of the city-state as being completely autonomous. Yet how could it be hoped that a body composed after the manner of the *Συνέδριον* would be lasting or harmonious in working? A majority of its

members might carry the day against a minority which represented an infinitely greater material power. Was there any rational ground for making Siphnos or Sikinos equal in voting power to Thebes or Mytilene? Small wonder that Thebes was not anxious to continue a member of the Confederacy upon such terms as these. But the Greek idea of autonomy made it necessary that one city-state, in all that appertained to external form, should be the equal of another. Hence proportional voting power was out of the question. We find the same defect reappearing later on in the case of the Achaean League<sup>1</sup>.

Equally detrimental to the true interests of the Confederacy was the lack of an executive on the part of the allies. It was inevitable that heart-burnings should arise when the allies saw Athenian generals commanding by land and sea, and Athenian officials gathering in the arrears of the *συντάξεις*.

Yet there is another side to the picture, which has hitherto not been placed in so clear a light as it deserves. The Second Athenian Confederacy, defective as it was, was yet the bold<sup>est</sup> step towards Federation that Greece had hitherto seen. True it did but develop the principles exemplified in the First Athenian Confederacy during the early years of its existence; but this

*The Confederacy an important step towards Federal Government.*

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Freeman, *History of Federal Government*<sup>2</sup>, p. 22: "If the jealousy of the sovereign people could have stooped to communicate its franchise to subjects or even to allies, it was utterly impossible that the rights of Athenian citizens could have been exercised by the inhabitants of Rhodes or Byzantium. Even a Federal Union, except one which admitted the representative principle, could hardly have bound together such distant members: to unite them into a single commonwealth of the ancient type was physically impossible."

development was of the first importance<sup>1</sup>. At no time was the union that of a true Federation—the gulf fixed between Athens and the allies made that impossible—but the clear definition of the rights of the allies was an immense gain<sup>2</sup>.

The Confederacy was a stepping stone in the direction of the true federation of the Achaean League. Though the representative-system of the Council of the allies was faulty, it was, nevertheless, a representative-system. The bringing together of these *σύνεδροι* to guard the interests of their respective cities by meeting in a common Council at Athens was an extraordinarily bold step for Greeks to take. The significance of the action lies in the fact that it created an organ whereby widely-scattered cities could utter a common expression of opinion, and showed clearly that it was not necessary for all, or even the greater part, of the citizens to be present in order to give voice to their city's wishes<sup>3</sup>.

<sup>1</sup> Hence Freeman was not justified in ignoring the Second Athenian Confederacy in his *History of Federal Government*. Of the First Confederacy he says (p. 19): "The most favoured ally of Athens, Chios, for instance, or Mitylene, quite as independent internally as an American State, had absolutely no voice, in any shape, in the general concerns of the Confederacy." Certainly this was at no time true of the Second Confederacy.

<sup>2</sup> Warde Fowler, *The City-State*, p. 291, just hints at this: "This (i.e. the representation of the allies) is clearly an attempt to reproduce the most significant feature in the early constitution of the Confederacy of Delos—that feature which indicates most plainly an approach to a real federation."

<sup>3</sup> Thebes after her victory at Leuktra would appear to have organised her League somewhat on the lines of the Second Confederacy. Cf. Xen. vii. 3. 11 (defence of the assassins of Euphron): *πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ἀναμνήσθητε ὅτι καὶ ἐψηφίσασθε δῆπου τοὺς φυγάδας ἀγωγίμους εἶναι ἐκ πασῶν τῶν συμμαχιδῶν. ὅστις δὲ ἄνευ κοινοῦ τῶν*

There are other features of the Confederacy which indicate that, at all events in conception, it represents an advance in the direction of real federation. The contemplated existence of a Joint Court of Athenians and *σύνεδροι* to try those who should assail the ground principles of the Confederacy is very significant. Unfortunately the scope of the Court's jurisdiction was so limited that there was little or no chance of its ever getting into practical working order. If its scope had been more extended, it might conceivably have led the way to a more complete federal fusion, when once it was discovered that harmonious working on the part of such a Joint Court was possible.

That the allies had a common treasury is also of importance. Their treasury must have been practically a federal treasury as opposed to the Athenian treasury. Hence the complaint which arose in the case of the First Confederacy—that Athens devoted the common funds to purposes of her own—could hardly be urged in the Second Confederacy.

The Second Athenian Confederacy may therefore be regarded as in some respects the forerunner of true Federation in Greece.

*συμμάχων δόγματος κατέρχεται φυγὰς, τοῦτον ἔχει ἂν τις εἰπεῖν ὅπως οὐ δίκαιόν ἐστιν θνήσκεν;*

The Confederacy of the Kyklades also seems to have been modelled in many respects upon the Second Athenian Confederacy. In the 2nd cent. B.C. Rhodes occupied with regard to the rest of that Confederacy a position very similar to that of Athens in the present League. We find her arrogating to herself the command in war, and establishing garrisons in Confederate towns. See *Bull. de Corr. Hell.* 1903, p. 250 ff.

## CHAPTER III.

### THE EARLY PERIOD OF THE CONFEDERACY. ITS GROWTH UP TO THE SECESSION OF THEBES (JUNE, 371 B.C.).

*Earliest  
members  
of the Con-  
federacy.*

By February or March 377 B.C., the date of the Aristoteles decree, Chios<sup>1</sup>, Mytilene<sup>2</sup>, Methymna<sup>3</sup>,

<sup>1</sup> The order is that of the list of allies appended to C.I.A. II. 17. Cf. Diod. xv. 28. 3: *πρῶτοι δὲ πρὸς τὴν ἀπόστασιν ὑπήκουσαν Χίοι καὶ Βυζάντιοι, καὶ μετὰ τούτους Ῥόδιοι καὶ Μυτιληναῖοι καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τινὲς νησιωτῶν.* Cf. also Isokr. *Plat.* 28.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. the fragmentary C.I.A. II. 18.

<sup>3</sup> With regard to Methymna there is a difficulty. The evidence of C.I.A. II. 17 shows that Methymna was one of the first six cities to join the Confederacy, i.e. she became a member before Feb.—March, 377 B.C. Yet the decree which records her admission (C.I.A. IV. (2), 18 b) is almost certainly later in date than the Aristoteles decree. Cf. II. 4 ff.: *περὶ ὧν οἱ Μηθυμναῖοι λέγουσιν, ἐπειδὴ σύμμαχοί εἰσιν καὶ εὖνοι τῇ πόλει τῇ Ἀθηναίων Μηθυμναῖοι, ὅπως ἂν καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλοις συμμάχους τοὺς Ἀθηναίων ἢ αὐτοῖς ἢ συμμαχία, ἀναγράψαι αὐτοὺς τὸν γραμματεῖα τῆς βουλής, ὥσπερ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι σύμμαχοι ἀναγεγραμμένοι εἰσίν. ὁμόσαι δὲ τὴν πρεσβείαν τῶν Μηθυμναίων τὸν αὐτὸν ὄρκον, ὅμπερ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι σύμμαχοι ὤμοσαν κ.τ.λ.* I can only suggest that there had been some delay in sending a formal embassy from Methymna, but that the city had already been informally enrolled, and thus entered on the list of allies. Cf. Swoboda, *Rhein. Mus.* XLIX. p. 342, n. 1; Busolt, *Griech. Staatsalt.*<sup>2</sup>, p. 331, n. 3; Dittenberger, *Sylloge*, 1<sup>2</sup>, 82, n. 2.



Rhodes, Byzantium<sup>1</sup>, and Thebes<sup>2</sup> had formally joined the new Confederacy. The publication of the manifesto was followed by fresh accessions. Diodorus<sup>3</sup> says that the cities of Euboea (with the exception of Histiaea) were among the first and most zealous members of the Confederacy. This statement is borne out by the evidence of the Aristoteles inscription. From the order in which the members of the Confederacy are there entered, it may be concluded that shortly after March, 377 B.C., Tenedos (placed side by side with Chios on the list, but engraved in a different hand)<sup>4</sup> joined, and, some time before July, Chalkis in Euboea<sup>5</sup>. Probably the other Euboean cities named on the front of the stone, viz. Eretria, Arethusa, and Karystos, were enrolled at the same time. Plutarch<sup>6</sup> gives Timotheos the credit of winning over Euboea, and he may be right in this, for it is known that Timotheos was active at the opening period of the Confederacy<sup>7</sup>.

<sup>1</sup> Cf. C.I.A. II. 19=Hicks and Hill 100: ...ἐψηφ[ίσθαι τῷ δῆμῳ] εἶναι Βυζα[ντίους Ἀθηναίων] συμμάχους κ[αὶ τῶν ἄλλων συ]μμάχων. τὴν [δὲ συμμαχίαν εἶ]ναι αὐ[τοῖς καθάπερ Χίους], adopting Dittenberger's restorations (*Sylloge*, 1<sup>2</sup>, 79). Date probably 378 B.C.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Diod. xv. 29. 7: προσελάβοντο δὲ καὶ τοὺς Θηβαίους ἐπὶ τὸ κοινὸν συνέδριον ἐπὶ τοῖς ἴσοις πᾶσιν. For the date of the entry of Thebes, see above, p. 14, n. 5. Some think that Thebes entered after Feb.—March, 377 B.C. For this view, cf. Dittenberger, 80, nn. 8 and 25.

<sup>3</sup> xv. 30. 1.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. Köhler, C.I.A. II. 17; Fabricius, *Rhein. Mus.* XLVI. p. 597, classes Τενέδιοι as 'uncertain.'

<sup>5</sup> C.I.A. II. 17 b=Hicks and Hill, 102, dated in the archonship of Nausinikos. Cf. Fabricius, p. 597.

<sup>6</sup> *De glor. Ath.* 8: Isokrates was composing his pamphlets ἐν ᾧ Τιμόθεος Εὐβοίαν ἤλευθέρον.

<sup>7</sup> Cf. Diod. xv. 29. 7; see also Schaefer, *Dem. u. s. Zeit.* I.<sup>2</sup> p. 38, and Grote, VIII. p. 104, n. 2 (1888 ed.).



Ikos, which follows Karystos on the list, probably came over not long after, during the archonship of Kallias (377–6 B.C.)<sup>1</sup>. Perinthos was no doubt brought into the Confederacy under the influence of Byzantium, at a somewhat later date than that city. Some time in the summer of 377 B.C., after operating with the Boeotians against Agesilaos<sup>2</sup>, Chabrias was sent out with a force to Euboea in order to protect the newly-joined allies and to carry war against their enemies<sup>3</sup>. He ravaged the territory of Histiaea, which was friendly to the Spartans, and left a garrison in a strong position near that city. He then succeeded in bringing the neighbouring islands of Peparethos and Skiathos into the Confederacy, and possibly<sup>4</sup> also some other islands previously under Spartan influence, whose names may have been among those now missing from the front of the Aristoteles inscription<sup>5</sup>. In that inscription Pe-

<sup>1</sup> Cf. C.I.A. II. 22, and see Fabricius, *loc. cit.* Very likely Ikos joined the Confederacy in July 377 B.C.

<sup>2</sup> Diod. xv. 32.

<sup>3</sup> Diod. xv. 30. 3 ff.

<sup>4</sup> I cannot help thinking that the *καί τινας ἄλλας τεταγμένας ὑπὸ Λακεδαιμονίων* of Diodorus is really due to a confusion with the places won over by Chabrias after the victory of Naxos. Demosthenes (*c. Lept.* 77) says positively: *εἶλε δὲ τῶν νήσων τούτων τὰς πολλὰς* (after Naxos).

<sup>5</sup> For conjectures as to names here missing see Busolt, *Zw. ath. Bund*, p. 748 ff.; Schaefer, *de sociis Ath.* p. 19, and *Dem. u. s. Zeit*, I.<sup>2</sup> p. 58, n. 3. Syros, Tenos, Siphnos, Ios, and Oenoe and Therma in Ikaros are suggested, since these places were paying money to the Athenian commissioners at Delos at this time (C.I.A. II. 814, 'marmor Sandwiciense'). The initial letters of three of the names are legible, viz. ΠΑΛΛ (Παλαισκιάθιοι, Dittenberger—Παλλῆς, in Kephallenia, Meier), Ο..., Π.... Some of these cities must have joined after the battle of Naxos (and very probably all did).

parethos and Skiathos are followed by Maroneia (on the Thracian coast) and Dion (N.W. coast of Euboea). Probably therefore these places joined the Confederacy at this time under the influence of Chabrias. Poessa in Keos stands on the same line with Rhodes on the inscription; it is impossible to date its entry into the League with any confidence<sup>1</sup>. I think it not unlikely, however, that the place joined the Confederacy shortly after the battle of Naxos<sup>2</sup>.

This activity on the part of Athens caused Sparta to change her policy. She now used every effort to conciliate the members of her League<sup>3</sup>. When these, in the spring of 376 B.C., complained that the war was not being prosecuted with sufficient energy, and that it would be possible to fit out a fleet which would destroy the Athenian supremacy at sea and reduce Athens to a state of famine, their advice was listened to, and a fleet of 60 triremes prepared and placed under the command of Pollis<sup>4</sup>. This fleet cruised off the south coast of Attika, in the neighbourhood of Aegina, Keos, and Andros, and prevented the Athenian cornships from rounding Cape Geraestos<sup>5</sup>. As the city was

*Battle of  
Naxos and  
its results  
(376 B.C.).*

<sup>1</sup> Fabricius, *loc. cit.* Cf. Pridik, *de Cei insulae rebus*, p. 35.

<sup>2</sup> Pollis' fleet was in the neighbourhood of Keos, and would probably have attacked the place had it joined Athens previously (Xen. v. 4. 61).

<sup>3</sup> Diod. xv. 31 ff.

<sup>4</sup> Xen. v. 4. 60 ff.; Diod. xv. 34. 5.

<sup>5</sup> Beloch (*Griech. Gesch.* II. p. 242 n.) supposes that Paros (the name of which stands last but one in the left-hand column on the front of C.I.A. II. 17) and Naxos had previously joined the Confederacy, and now revolted. This is just possible, but at the same time it is unlikely. Such success on the part of the Spartans would surely have been mentioned by Xenophon. Beloch is very likely right in attributing

in danger of starvation<sup>1</sup>, vigorous measures were imperatively called for. After successful steps had been taken to ensure the arrival of corn at Athens, Chabrias was put in command of the entire fleet<sup>2</sup>, and sailed against Naxos, which had hitherto been persistent in its refusal to join the Confederacy, and which, moreover, offered a convenient naval base for the Spartans. An attempt made by Pollis to relieve the city brought on a naval engagement in the straits between Naxos and Paros. In this Chabrias gained a decisive victory (September, 376 B.C.)<sup>3</sup>. His victory resulted in the accession to the Confederacy of Naxos<sup>4</sup> and Paros<sup>5</sup> with a considerable number of the Kyklades<sup>6</sup>. Athenae Diades in Euboea<sup>7</sup> came into the Confederacy at this time<sup>8</sup>, and very likely Poessa in Keos also<sup>9</sup>.

*Chabrias' successes in the Thracian*

These successes Chabrias followed up by further efforts in the following year. Setting sail probably in the spring of 375 B.C., he directed his course towards

the disturbances at Delos (C.I.A. II. 814 = Hicks and Hill, 104) to this activity of the Spartans at sea. Cf. Dittenberger<sup>2</sup>, 86, n. 39.

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Dem. c. *Androt.* 15: τὸν τελευταῖον γὰρ ἴστε πρὸς Λακεδαιμονίους πόλεμον, ὅτε μὲν ναῦς οὐκ ἔδοκέιτ' ἀποστεῖλαι δυνήσεσθαι, πῶς διέκειθ' ἢ πόλις. ἴστ' ὀρόβους ὄντας ὠνίους.

<sup>2</sup> 83 ships fought on the Athenian side at the battle of Naxos according to Diodorus.

<sup>3</sup> Plut. *Phoc.* 6; *id. Cam.* 19.

<sup>4</sup> This cannot actually be proved, but it is entirely probable. Naxos is no doubt one of the names missing from the front of C.I.A. II. 17. Cf. Schaefer, *de sociis*, p. 10 f., and C.I.A. IV. (2), 88 d, where appeals from Naxos to Athens are mentioned. See above, p. 46, n. 5.

<sup>5</sup> C.I.A. II. 17.

<sup>6</sup> See above, p. 58, nn. 4 and 5. Cf. also Dem. c. *Lept.* 77 and 80.

<sup>7</sup> Strabo, x. p. 446.

<sup>8</sup> C.I.A. II. 17.

<sup>9</sup> See above, p. 59, n. 2.

the coast of Thrace<sup>1</sup>. He found an excellent opening <sup>district</sup> afforded by the precarious situation of Abdera, whose <sup>(375 B.C.)</sup> citizens had just suffered a disastrous defeat at the hands of the barbarous Triballi<sup>2</sup>. These last were just about to lay siege to the town when Chabrias appeared on the scene, drove off the barbarians, and placed a considerable garrison in the city, which evidently had no alternative but to join the Athenian Confederacy<sup>3</sup>. Having obtained this success, Chabrias found that his influence was strong enough to win over a considerable number of places in the Thracian district. Thasos, nearly opposite Abdera, the Thracian Chalkidikè, i.e. in all probability the revived Olynthian League<sup>4</sup>, Aenos, Samothrakè, and Dikaea (not far from Abdera) all joined the Confederacy<sup>5</sup>.

<sup>1</sup> The following sketch of Chabrias' proceedings is in the main drawn from the list of names engraved on the left *side* of C.I.A. II. 17. For Abdera we have the evidence of Diod. xv. 36. It must be freely admitted that great uncertainty attends the dates of the winning over of these Northern allies. There is much reason in von Stern's remark (*Gesch. der spart. u. theb. Heg.* p. 86) that this is a case for the employment of the *ars nesciendi*.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Aen. *Tact.* 15. 8, 9: Τριβαλλῶν ἐμβαλόντων εἰς τὴν Ἀβδηριτῶν χώραν, ἐπεξελθόντες Ἀβδηρίται καὶ παράταξιν ποιησάμενοι κάλλιστον ἔργον εἰργάσαντο...οἱ δὲ (sc. Τριβαλλοί) ὑπήγον αὐτοὺς εἰς τὰς ἐνέδρας. ὅπου δὴ λέγεται ἐκ μῆας πόλεως, τοσαύτης γε τὸ μέγεθος, πλείστους ἐν ἐλαχίστῳ χρόνῳ ἀπολέσθαι.

<sup>3</sup> [Ἀβδη]ρίται appears second on the list on the side of C.I.A. II. 17. Meyer, *Gesch. d. Alt.* v. p. 394, points out how soon one of the ideals of the Second Athenian Confederacy was overthrown by the introduction of this garrison. Cf. Diod. xv. 36. 4.

<sup>4</sup> Beloch, *Griech. Gesch.* II. p. 242, n. 1. Schaefer, *de sociis*, p. 15, supposed a town Chalkis on the peninsula of Athos to be meant (Steph. Byz. s.v.).

<sup>5</sup> Meyer, *op. cit.* p. 394, supposes that Chabrias further gained Elaëus, Selymbria, Antissa, and Eresos, etc. at this time. In view of the order of the names on the stone this seems unlikely. I do not

*Timotheos'*  
*expedition*  
*to the West*  
(375 B.C.).

About the same time as Chabrias sailed to Thrace (spring of 375 B.C.), Timotheos was despatched with 64<sup>1</sup> ships round the Peloponnese. This, says Xenophon<sup>2</sup>, was in response to a request of the Thebans, who hoped that an invasion of Boeotia would by this means be rendered impracticable. Timotheos' plans, however, extended far beyond the harassing of the Peloponnese<sup>3</sup>. Some time between the autumn of 376 B.C. and the spring of 375, the democratic party in Korkyra had joined the Confederacy. It is probable that as a result of internal disturbances this party had been driven from the city, and had, in consequence, appealed to Athens for help<sup>4</sup>. To give this assistance must have been one of the main objects of Timotheos' expedition. As he sailed up the west coast of Greece, he first touched at Kephallenia<sup>5</sup>, whose town Pronni became a member of the Confederacy. The other towns of the island were brought over, but had probably to be held by garrisons<sup>6</sup>. From Kephallenia most likely he sailed direct to Korkyra, and there, after but slight

think that Front. *Strat.* I. 4. 14 is definite enough to warrant the supposition that Chabrias made an attack on Samos in the course of this expedition (Judeich, *Kleinas. Stud.* p. 270, n. 2).

<sup>1</sup> Isokr. *Antid.* 109 says that he had 50.

<sup>2</sup> *Hell.* v. 4. 62 ff. Cf. Diod. xv. 36. 5 ff.

<sup>3</sup> For his landing there, see Nepos, *Timoth.* 2: idem classi praefectus circumvehens Peloponnesum, *Laconicen populatus*, classem eorum fugavit, Corcyram sub imperium Atheniensium redegit sociosque dein adiunxit Epirotas, Athamanas, Chaonas omnesque eas gentes, quae mare illud adiacent.

<sup>4</sup> [Κερκυραίων [ὁ δῆ]μος stands first on the side of C.I.A. II. 17. See Höck, *Die Bezieh. Kerkyras*, p. 4 ff.

<sup>5</sup> What follows seems to me the most probable order of events; the succession of names on the stone is not rigidly adhered to.

<sup>6</sup> Diod. xv. 36. Contrast προσηγάγετο with ἐπεισεν.

resistance, restored the democratic party<sup>1</sup>. He acted, however, with the greatest moderation towards the oligarchs, and inflicted political banishment upon none of them. This conduct bore fruit in a series of fresh accessions to the Athenian Confederacy<sup>2</sup>. The Akarnanians, whose name is on the Aristoteles inscription, entered, as did Alketas king of the Molossi, together with his son Neoptolemos<sup>3</sup>. We possess two inscriptions which throw further light upon these events. In August—September, 375 B.C.<sup>4</sup>, ambassadors from Korkyra<sup>5</sup>, Akarnania, and Kephallenia were present in Athens with the request that the names of their respective states might be put upon the common *stelè* of the allies. As a result the names of the Akarnanians and Pronni in Kephallenia were inscribed. The name of the *δημος* of Korkyra was already on the list, and would now serve to represent the whole community<sup>6</sup>.

<sup>1</sup> Xen. v. 4. 64: ὁ μὲντοι Τιμόθεος περιπλεύσας, Κέρκυραν μὲν εὐθὺς ὑφ' ἑαυτῷ ἐποίησατο. Isokr. *Antid.* 109: Κόρκυραν εἶλε, which implies some fighting.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Nepos, *Timoth.* 2; Xen. v. 4. 64: ἐξ ὧν τὰς περὶ ἐκεῖνα πόλεις ἀπάσας εὐμενεστέρως ἔσχεν.

<sup>3</sup> C.I.A. II. 17.

<sup>4</sup> C.I.A. II. 49 = Hicks and Hill 105: ἐπὶ Ἰπποδάμα[ντος ἄρχοντος ἐπὶ τῆς Ἀντιοχίδος δευτέρως πρυτανείας.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. the epitaph quoted by Hicks and Hill, p. 211 = C.I.A. II. 1678 (Curtius, *Arch. Zeit.* 1871, p. 28):

ἐνθάδε Θέρσανδρον καὶ Σίμυλον, ἀνδρε ποθεινῶ  
πατρίδι Κερκύρα, δέξατο γαῖα τάφῳ.  
πρέσβεις ἐλθόντας, κατὰ συντυχίαν δὲ θανόντας,  
παῖδες Ἀθηναίων δημοσίᾳ κτέρισαν.

<sup>6</sup> Doubtless the whole city now joined the Confederacy; the heading of C.I.A. IV. (2). 49 b is *Συμμαχία Κορκυραίων καὶ Ἀθηναίων εἰ[ς] τὸν [ἀεί] χρόνον*, though the *δημος* is expressly singled out in the course of the inscription.



*Spartan  
defeat at  
Alyzia.  
(375 B.C.).*

The Spartans were alarmed by these successes of Timotheos<sup>1</sup>, and made a determined effort to counteract them. They sent out Nikolochos with 55 ships, and a battle was fought between him and Timotheos at Alyzia on the coast of Akarnania opposite Leukas<sup>2</sup>. The Athenians were victorious, though Nikolochos, being subsequently reinforced by six Ambrakian ships, also laid claim to victory in a manner highly characteristic of Greek warfare. He did so on the ground that the Athenian commander refused to fight a second engagement (probably June, 375 B.C.)<sup>3</sup>. Timotheos received reinforcements from Korkyra, and thus became master of a fleet of 70 ships—a force far superior to that of the Spartans. So large a fleet however taxed his financial resources severely, and he was compelled to send to Athens for further supplies. This is the first occasion upon which we hear of that deficiency in monetary resources which was the bane of the Second Confederacy<sup>4</sup>.

<sup>1</sup> καθόλου τὰς πλείστας τῶν περὶ τοὺς τόπους ἐκείνους πόλεων ἐξιδιοποιησάμενος says Diodorus of Timotheos (xv. 36. 5). For what follows see Xen. v. 4. 65 f.; Diod. xv. 36. These accounts are supplemented by Polyaeos, iii. 10. 6, 12, 13, 16, 17; Frontinus, ii. 5. 47; Nepos, *Timoth.* 2. 1. Cf. Höck, *Die Beziehungen Kerkyras*, p. 10.

<sup>2</sup> Strabo x. p. 459.

<sup>3</sup> Polyaeos (iii. 10. 4) says that the battle was fought when the festival of the Skira was being celebrated at Athens. Schaefer (*Dem. u. s. Zeit.* 1.<sup>2</sup> p. 48), after Sievers and Rehdantz, believes that the Skira here = Skirophoria, which was celebrated on the 12th of Skirophorion (June). Cf. Schol. to Aristoph. *Eccl.* 18: Σκίρα ἑορτὴ ἐστὶ τῆς Σκιράδος Ἀθηναῖς Σκιροφοριῶνος δωδεκάτη. Höck, *op. cit.* p. 10, considers that the Σκίρα proper is meant, and that the battle was therefore fought in Pyanepsion (October).

<sup>4</sup> Cf. Ps.-Arist. *Oecon.* 2, p. 1350: περὶ Κέρκυραν δὲ πολεμῶν (sc. Timotheos) καὶ ἀπορῶς διακείμενος καὶ τῶν στρατιωτῶν αἰτούντων τοὺς μισθοὺς καὶ ἀπειθούντων αὐτῷ καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἐναντίους φασκόντων ἀποπορεύεσθαι κ.τ.λ.



Timotheos now passed the winter of 375-4 B.C. in Ionian waters<sup>1</sup>.

The financial embarrassments of Timotheos were but the reflex of the difficulties which prevailed in Athens<sup>2</sup>. The Athenians were being exhausted by the repeated war-taxes and by the annoying raids of the Spartans from Aegina. Moreover there were indications that Theban and Athenian interests were in reality divergent. Athens had won back her supremacy at sea; to prolong the war with Sparta was merely to further Theban aggrandisement on land<sup>3</sup>. The Thebans were no longer fulfilling their duties as allies, they were no longer contributing to the expenses of the Confederacy as they were bound to do. All these considerations made the Athenians ready to conclude peace with Sparta. Probably in July 374 B.C.<sup>4</sup> a treaty was signed, whereby the supremacy of Sparta on land and of Athens at sea was acknowledged, while the terms of the King's Peace were generally confirmed<sup>5</sup>.

*Financial  
difficulties  
drive  
Athens  
to make  
peace  
(July,  
374 B.C.).*

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Xen. vi. 2. 2.

<sup>2</sup> For what follows see Xen. vi. 2. 1 ff. Diod. xv. 38 is untrustworthy. He has confused the present peace with that of 371 B.C.

<sup>3</sup> Thebes had defeated the Spartans at Tegyra. Apparently Athens had recovered Oropos about this time to the great annoyance of Thebes. Cf. Isokr. *Plat.* 20: καὶ τῇ μὲν ὑμέτερά πόλει τῆς γῆς τῆς ὑπ' Ὀρωπίων δεδομένης φθονοῦσιν.

<sup>4</sup> The sacrifice made to the goddess of Peace in Hekatombaion was most likely offered on the anniversary of the conclusion of this peace. See C.I.A. II. 741, l. 30, and cf. Schaefer, *Dem. u. s. Zeit.* I. 2 p. 55, n. 1; also Stähelin in *Beiträge zur alten Gesch.* v. (1), 1905, p. 64.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. Isokr. *Antid.* 109 ff.; *id. Plat.* 10; Nepos, *Timoth.* 2. 2: quo facto (Timotheos' victory at Alyzia) Lacedaemonii de diutina contentione destiterunt et sua sponte Atheniensibus imperii maritimi principatum concesserunt pacemque his legibus constituerunt ut Athenienses mari duces essent.

The Thebans still continued in the Confederacy<sup>1</sup>, and are found contributing ships next year to the Confederate fleet<sup>2</sup>.

*Peace  
broken by  
the action  
of Timo-  
theos.*

This peace, however, was of no long duration. Timotheos was warned of its conclusion by two envoys from Athens, and was ordered to return home. On his way back he landed certain exiles (doubtless of the democratic party)<sup>3</sup> on Zakynthos. Here they occupied a strong position, called Arkadia, close to the sea, and from thence carried on attacks against the Zakynthians in the city. That these exiles restored to Zakynthos by Timotheos are to be identified with the *Zακυνθίων ὁ δῆμος ὁ ἐν τῷ Νήλλῳ*, the last entry on the side of C.I.A. II. 17, is almost certain. Nellos or Nellon was probably the name of the hill upon which the fort Arkadia was built<sup>4</sup>. Yet the credit of effecting their enrolment upon the list of the allies should in all probability be given to Iphikrates. This is indicated by the position of the entry upon the stone, which makes it likely that the name was not inscribed till 373-2 B.C., the year of Iphikrates' expedition to the West.

*Spartan  
efforts to  
capture  
Korkyra.*

The Zakynthian oligarchs appealed to Sparta for help. After making a fruitless protest to Athens, the Spartans sent a fleet of 25 triremes to Zakynthos under Aristokrates. An attempt to seize Korkyra in coopera-

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Isokr. *Plat.* 21 and 33 f.

<sup>2</sup> Ps.-Dem. *c. Timoth.* 14, 21, 48 ff. Cf. also C.I.A. II. 789, where ships are returned to Athens by the Thebans in 373-2 B.C.; e.g., l. 80: Ἀφροδισιά[ς ἦν] Θ[ηβαῖοι ἀπ]έδοσαν.

<sup>3</sup> Though Diodorus (xv. 45. 2) represents them as oligarchs and partisans of the Spartans. Cf. Xen. vi. 2. 2 ff.

<sup>4</sup> See Dittenberger, *Sylloge*, 1<sup>2</sup>, p. 130.

tion with Korkyraean oligarchs failed; a fleet of 22 vessels was despatched for that purpose under colour of a voyage to Sicily, but the plot was detected<sup>1</sup>. The design, however, of capturing Korkyra was not abandoned. About the spring of 373 B.C.<sup>2</sup>, by the efforts of Sparta and her allies, a fleet of 60 ships was sent against Korkyra under the command of Mnasippos. This fleet proceeded to blockade the city with the cooperation of a land force. The Korkyraeans were reduced to great straits, and sent urgent request to Athens for assistance, laying especial stress upon their value to the Confederacy in point of contribution both of ships and of money. The answer of the Athenians was to despatch Stesikles<sup>3</sup> with 600 peltasts without delay by the land route across Greece. In this undertaking they were assisted by their newly-won ally Alketas, who helped to convey the troops by night from the coast of Epeiros into Korkyra. Stesikles successfully effected an entrance into the city. Meanwhile orders for the preparation of a naval expedition to carry out the relief of Korkyra had been issued at Athens, and

<sup>1</sup> Diod. xv. 45. 4 and 46. 1.

<sup>2</sup> Xenophon (vi. 2. 3) says: ἐπεὶ δὲ οἱ ἐκ τῆς πόλεως Ζακύνθιοι πέμψαντες πρὸς τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους ἔλεγον οἷα πεπονθότες εἶεν ὑπὸ τοῦ Τιμοθέου, εὐθὺς οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι...ναυτικὸν πάλιν παρεσκευάζον καὶ συνετάττοντο εἰς ἐξήκοντα ναῦς κ.τ.λ. By this Xenophon probably means that preparations were pushed on during the winter of 374-3 B.C.; and this view is strengthened by the fact that the tenses are imperfect. The Korkyraeans doubtless made appeal to Athens after Alkidas' coup (cf. Diod. xv. 46. 3), but their danger was not regarded as pressing. Cf. Grote, viii. p. 134. For the above reasons Beloch's chronology (*Die attische Pol.* p. 359 ff.) does not appear to me correct.

<sup>3</sup> I here follow Xenophon entirely.

Timotheos had been appointed to the command of it<sup>1</sup>. Yet the carrying out of this commission was attended by the greatest difficulties. The resources of the Confederacy did not suffice to fit the ships out adequately<sup>2</sup>.

*Timotheos  
wins new  
members  
for the  
Confederacy  
(373 B.C.).*

Timotheos therefore endeavoured to create fresh resources by winning new members in the Thracian district and in the Aegean<sup>3</sup>. He set out in April 373 B.C.<sup>4</sup> One of his first acts was probably to induce the powerful Jason of Pherae to join the Confederacy. There can be little doubt that the name of Jason stood on the list of allies after that of Neoptolemos, and that it was subsequently (doubtless on his defection) erased<sup>5</sup>. That Jason in the latter part of 374 B.C. had some idea of joining the Confederacy is clear from his hesitating mode of expressing himself to Polydamas

<sup>1</sup> Diod. xv. 47. 2: 'Αθηναῖοι δὲ καὶ παλαιοὶ μὲν ἀπεστάλκεισαν Τιμόθεον τὸν Κόνωνος (i.e. had commissioned him to sail) ἐπὶ βοήθειαν τοῖς Κορκυραίοις μετὰ νεῶν ἐξήκοντα.

<sup>2</sup> Meyer, *Gesch. d. Alt.* v. p. 399 f., thinks that the allies had no mind to make sacrifices in order to extend Athenian power in the West. There is no evidence to justify this view.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. Xen. vi. 2. 12: ὁ δ' οὐ δυνάμενος αὐτὸθεν τὰς ναῦς πληρῶσαι, ἐπὶ νήσων πλεύσας ἐκείθεν ἐπειρᾶτο συμπληροῦν. Also Diod. xv. 47. 2: οὗτος δὲ (Timotheos) πρὸ τῆς συμμαχίας ταύτης (the expedition to Korkyra) πλεύσας ἐπὶ Θράκης καὶ πολλὰς πόλεις ἐπὶ συμμαχίαν προκαλεσάμενος, προσέθηκε τριάκοντα τριήρεις.

<sup>4</sup> Ps.-Dem. c. *Timoth.* 6 ff.: ἐπὶ Σωκρατίδου γὰρ ἄρχοντος μουνιχιῶνος μὴνὸς μέλλων ἐκπλεῖν τὸν ὕστερον ἔκπλον Τιμόθεος κ.τ.λ.

<sup>5</sup> See Fabricius, *Rhein. Mus.* XLVI. pp. 592 ff. Cf. also Schaefer, *Dem. u. s. Zeit.* I. 2 p. 58, and Dittenberger, *Sylloge*, 1<sup>2</sup>, p. 129, n. 41. Niese (*Hermes*, 1904, p. 110, n. 6) also agrees with Fabricius. Cf. Köhler, *Hermes*, v. pp. 8—10, and C.I.A. II. 88. Zingerle (*Er. Vind.* p. 365 ff.) thought that the name erased was Νάξιοι.

I place Jason's accession to the Confederacy at this date, because I think that his change of view with regard to alliance with Athens (cf. Xen. vi. 1. 10) may in this way be explained.

(Xen. VI. 1. 10): καὶ Ἀθηναῖοι δὲ εὖ οἶδ' ὅτι πάντα ποιήσαιεν ἂν ὥστε σύμμαχοι ἡμῖν γενέσθαι· ἀλλ' ἐγὼ οὐκ ἄν μοι δοκῶ πρὸς αὐτοὺς φιλίαν ποιήσασθαι. If we add the facts that Alketas, whose suzerain Jason was<sup>1</sup>, had already joined the Confederacy, and that in November 373 B.C. Jason and Alketas came to Athens as 'allies' to plead the cause of Timotheos<sup>2</sup>, it will be seen there are strong grounds for holding that Jason was really enrolled on the list of the allies. It is likely<sup>3</sup> that from Thessaly Timotheos proceeded to the coast of Thrace, and that in this region he won for the Confederacy Dion in Thrace, Neapolis, Elaeus on the Chersonese, Selymbria on the Propontis, and the unknown Ἀστραιούσιοι; Antissa and Eresos in Lesbos also came over. In the Aegean he was no less successful. Andros, Tenos, Histiaea in Euboea, Mykonos, the three towns of Keos—Iulis, Karthaea, and Koresos—, Amorgos, Siphnos and Sikinos all became members of the Confederacy. Timotheos returned with envoys from the newly-won allies (sent doubtless to take the usual oath of admission to the Confederacy), and with thirty fresh triremes<sup>4</sup>. His efforts had occupied the summer of 373 B.C.<sup>5</sup> The autumn came, but no relief had been

<sup>1</sup> Xen. VI. 1. 7.

<sup>2</sup> Ps.-Dem. c. *Timoth.* 10 and 22.

<sup>3</sup> It must be freely acknowledged that there is no certainty as to the movements of Timotheos. I merely give what seems to me a fair conclusion from the evidence of C.I.A. II. 17, and the accounts of Xenophon and Diodorus.

<sup>4</sup> Diod. xv. 47. 3. Much of Diodorus' account is wrong, but it should not on that account be rejected altogether.

<sup>5</sup> Xen. VI. 2. 13: οἱ δ' Ἀθηναῖοι νομίζοντες αὐτὸν ἀναλοῦν τὸν τῆς ὥρας εἰς τὸν περίπλου χρόνον, συγγνώμην οὐκ ἔσχον αὐτῷ.

given to Korkyra. Timotheos and his fleet lay idle off Kalaureia<sup>1</sup>.

*Deposition  
of Timo-  
theos.*

The speech against Timotheos reveals the fact that the financial machinery of the Confederacy had broken down<sup>2</sup>. How far Timotheos was really to blame we cannot say, but the Athenians at any rate judged his conduct in delaying to set out for Korkyra so severely, that they deprived him of his command and appointed Iphikrates in his stead<sup>3</sup>. Kallistratos and Iphikrates actually came forward and prosecuted Timotheos<sup>4</sup>, who was himself acquitted, largely no doubt in consequence of the powerful support of Jason and Alketas. His treasurer Antimachos, however, was found guilty of embezzlement and put to death.

Preparations for the relief of Korkyra were pushed on during the winter of 373–2 B.C. by Iphikrates<sup>5</sup>, apparently in conjunction with Kallistratos and Chabrias<sup>6</sup>. Financial difficulties were great, and unusual expedients for raising money had to be resorted to<sup>7</sup>.

<sup>1</sup> Ps.-Dem. *c. Timoth.* 13: ἄμισθον μὲν τὸ στράτευμα καταλείσθαι ἐν Καλαυρείᾳ, πολιορκεῖσθαι δὲ τοὺς περὶ Πελοπόννησον συμμάχους ὑπὸ Λακεδαιμονίων.

<sup>2</sup> Cf., e.g., § 15. The Boeotian trierarchs were near deserting for this reason.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. Xen. vi. 2. 13; Ps.-Dem. *c. Timoth.* 9, etc.

<sup>4</sup> Xen. *loc. cit.*; Diod. xv. 47. 3; Nepos, *Timoth.* 4. Timotheos' trial will have taken place in the November or December of 373 B.C. Cf. Ps.-Dem. *c. Timoth.* 22: ἀφικομένου γὰρ Ἀλκέτου καὶ Ἰάσονος ὡς τοῦτον ἐν τῷ μαιμακτηριῶνι μηνὶ τῷ ἐπ' Ἀστείου ἄρχοντος ἐπὶ τὸν ἀγῶνα τὸν τοῦτου...

<sup>5</sup> Xen. vi. 2. 14 ff.

<sup>6</sup> Xen. vi. 2. 39.

<sup>7</sup> Probably that mentioned in Polyæn. iii. 9. 30 belongs to this time, if Polyænus is right in attributing it to Iphikrates. The latter is said to have proposed that buildings which projected over public thoroughfares should be pulled down or curtailed. As a result, he



By great exertions a fleet of 70 triremes was got together, and in the spring of 372 B.C. Iphikrates started on his voyage West.

Meanwhile the Korkyraeans had, with the aid of Iphikrates' expedition to the West (372 B.C.), Stesikles, secured their own safety. Mnasippos had fallen, and the rumoured approach of Iphikrates was sufficient to cause the Spartans to retire to Leukas. Iphikrates' elaborate preparations were therefore to a great extent thrown away. However, he completely subjugated<sup>1</sup> those cities in Kephallenia which were opposed to Athens, and made an important capture off Korkyra of ten ships which had been sent by Dionysios of Syracuse to Sparta's assistance. But the usual financial difficulties were present, and in spite of the booty obtained by this capture (amounting to more than 60 talents), Iphikrates was forced to let his sailors do agricultural work in Korkyra, whilst he himself, after assisting the allies in Akarnania, went to exact money from the Kephallenians, both from members of the Confederacy and non-members alike. This he found absolutely necessary in order to support his fleet of 90 ships. He also purposed to add new members to the Confederacy in these waters during the winter of 372-1 B.C.<sup>2</sup>

received much money from the owners of the property concerned, who hoped thus to induce him to abandon his proposals. An *εισφορά* was imposed at this period; see Ps.-Dem. c. *Timoth.* 23: ἀπολελυμένῳ τοίνυν τῆς αἰτίας πολλή συνέβαινε αὐτῷ μετὰ ταῦτα χρημάτων ἀπορία εἰς τε τὰς ἰδίας χρείας καὶ εἰς τὰς δημοσίας εἰσφοράς.

<sup>1</sup> *καταστρεψάμενος* says Xenophon (vi. 2. 33). These must be the cities 'brought over' by Timotheos in 375 B.C. (Diod. xv. 36. 5). They must either have broken loose again or else been showing signs of restlessness.

<sup>2</sup> Xen. vi. 2. 38: ἔπειτα παρεσκευάζετο τήν τε τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων



*Peace  
again  
concluded  
(summer of  
371 B.C.).*

Meantime many considerations were inclining Athens to renew the peace which had been broken by the action of Timotheos in 374 B.C. First of all there was the ever-growing conviction that Thebes, not Sparta, was the real foe that menaced Athens. This feeling had been accentuated by events which had occurred since the former peace. In the summer of 373 B.C. the Thebans had wantonly destroyed Plataea, whose inhabitants had taken refuge at Athens<sup>1</sup>. The discontent excited by this action was doubtless fanned by the Plataeic oration of Isokrates. Thespieae, too, was threatened by the same fate as Plataea<sup>2</sup>. Besides this, the serious financial exhaustion of the Confederacy made peace almost a necessity<sup>3</sup>. Athens must have felt too that her supremacy at sea was now assured. The breach with Jason<sup>4</sup> would have driven home the conviction that her true interests were not to be sought on land. Kallistratos therefore used every effort to end the war. The Persian king was equally desirous that peace should be established in Greece, and had sent ambassadors to effect a reconciliation

*χώραν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν κατ' ἐκείνα πόλεων πολεμίων οὐσῶν τὰς μὲν ἐθελούσας προσλαμβάνειν, τοῖς δὲ μὴ πειθόμενοις πολεμεῖν.*

<sup>1</sup> Paus. ix. 1. 8: *ἐγένετο δὲ ἡ ἄλωσις Πλαταίας ἡ δευτέρα μάχης μὲν τρίτῃ τῆς ἐν Λεύκτροις ἔτει πρότερον, Ἄστειον δὲ Ἀθήνησιν ἄρχοντος.*

<sup>2</sup> Thebes, as Busolt, p. 786, remarks, had apparently withdrawn her representative from the *Συνέδριον* at this time. Cf. Xen. vi. 3. 2 quoted on p. 73, n. 5.

<sup>3</sup> Xen. vi. 3. 3: *καὶ Καλλίστρατος δὲ ὁ δημηγόρος παρῆν (at Sparta). ὑποσχόμενος γὰρ Ἴφικράτει, εἰ αὐτὸν ἀφείη, ἢ χρήματα πέμψειν τῷ ναυτικῷ ἢ εἰρήνην ποιήσειν, οὕτως Ἀθήνησιν τε ἦν καὶ ἔπραττε περὶ εἰρήνης.*

<sup>4</sup> Jason's name was almost certainly erased from the list of allies before 371 B.C. Cf. Meyer, *Gesch. d. Alt.* v. p. 405. His sea-power can hardly have been of much significance in spite of Xen. vi. 4. 21.

between the contending states<sup>1</sup>. A congress was held at Sparta in the summer of 371 B.C.<sup>2</sup>, when peace was concluded on the following terms:

(1) All cities were to be autonomous; foreign garrisons were to be withdrawn.

(2) Any city might (but none could be compelled to) take up arms against those who rejected the peace. None might give assistance to the recalcitrant.

(3) Athens was granted Amphipolis<sup>3</sup> and the Chersonese<sup>4</sup>.

Thebes had only with reluctance sent representatives to attend this Conference<sup>5</sup>; she well knew that her pretensions to the overlordship of Boeotia would be assailed. Nevertheless when Athens and her allies took the oaths, each separately<sup>6</sup>, she too did not refuse.

*Thebes excluded from the peace; she quits the Confederacy.*

<sup>1</sup> Diod. xv. 50. 4. Amyntas of Macedon, who was in alliance with Athens, was also represented at this Congress. Cf. Aeschines, *F. L.* 32. Dionysios of Syracuse may have exercised some influence upon the conclusion of this peace, but I do not think that this necessarily follows from C.I.A. II. 51: ὅτι ἐ[ἴσιν ἄνδρες] ἀγαθοὶ [π]ερὶ τὸν δῆμον τὸν [Ἀθηναίων καὶ] τοὺς συμμάχους καὶ βοηθ[οῦσιν τῇ βασ]ιλέως ἐ[ρῆ]νῃ ἣν ἐποίησα[ντο Ἀθηναῖοι] καὶ Λακεδαιμόνιο[ι] κ[α]ὶ [οἱ ἄλλοι Ἕλληνες]. This seems merely to mean that Dionysios was sending troops to oppose the Thebans, whose pretensions were contrary to the autonomy-clause of the King's Peace. Cf. Köhler, *Ath. Mitt.* I. p. 21.

<sup>2</sup> On the 14th of Skirophorion; see Plut. *Ages.* 28.

<sup>3</sup> Aesch. *F. L.* 32: Ἀμύντας... ἐψηφίσαστο Ἀμφίπολιν τὴν Ἀθηναίων συνἑξαίρειν μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων Ἑλλήνων Ἀθηναίους.

<sup>4</sup> Dem. *Phil.* III. 16: Χερρόνησον, ἣν βασιλεὺς καὶ πάντες οἱ Ἕλληνες ὑμετέραν ἐγνώκασιν εἶναι.

<sup>5</sup> This is a fair inference to draw from Xen. VI. 3. 2: ἐκ τούτων δὲ ψηφισάμενος ὁ δῆμος εἰρήνην ποιήσασθαι, πρῶτον μὲν εἰς Θήβας πρέσβεις ἔπεμψε παρακαλοῦντας ἀκολουθεῖν, εἰ βούλοιντο, εἰς Λακεδαίμονα περὶ εἰρήνης· ἔπειτα δὲ ἐξέπεμψαν καὶ αὐτοὶ πρέσβεις.

<sup>6</sup> Xen. VI. 3. 19 ff.

The *Θηβαῖοι* were enrolled as adherents to the peace, and in this way the claims of Thebes to be mistress of Boeotia were apparently surrendered. But a night's reflection convinced the Theban representatives of their error. A demand was made that "*Βοιωτοί*" should be substituted for "*Θηβαῖοι*." It was rejected. Thebes was excluded from the peace, and was thereby finally severed from the Athenian Confederacy. It was but the inevitable outcome of the entire divergence of interest which existed between Thebes and the Confederacy.

*Summary  
of period  
378-  
371 B.C.*

As we look back over this, the opening period of the Confederacy's history, now brought to a close by the withdrawal of Thebes, certain features stand out prominently. It is the period of hope and success<sup>1</sup>. The definite aim, set forth at the beginning of the Confederacy, is still clearly in view; the danger from Sparta is still fresh and vivid. Starting from a nucleus of some five or six members, the League grows rapidly until the sea-power of Athens is restored both in Eastern and in Western waters. About 70<sup>2</sup> to 75<sup>3</sup> members are enrolled; among them are powerful

<sup>1</sup> Cf. [Xen.] *περὶ πόρων*, 5, 6: οὐκοῦν καὶ τότε, ἐπεὶ τοῦ ἀδικεῖν ἀπεσχόμεθα, πάλιν ὑπὸ τῶν νησιωτῶν ἐκόντων προστάται τοῦ ναυτικοῦ ἐγενόμεθα;

<sup>2</sup> Diod. xv. 30. 2. Diodorus' statement is borne out by C.I.A. II. 17.

<sup>3</sup> Aesch. *F. L.* 70: συνέβαινε δ' ἡμῶν τὸν στρατηγὸν ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ ἐβδομήκοντα μὲν καὶ πέντε πόλεις συμμαχίδας ἀποβεβληκέναι, ἃς ἐκτίσατο Τιμόθεος ὁ Κόνωνος καὶ κατέστησεν εἰς τὸ συνέδριον. There can be little doubt that Aeschines loosely credits Timotheos with winning over all the members of the Confederacy. Yet even Timotheos' admirer Isokrates does not venture to assign more than 24 cities to him. (*Antid.* 113.)

princes such as Jason and Alketas<sup>1</sup>. The aim of the Confederacy is attained. Sparta's sea-power is so completely crushed, that she dares not send a squadron into the Aegean<sup>2</sup>. The cities which joined the League have no longer anything to fear from Spartan aggression. Athens is definitely recognized supreme on sea, as Sparta on land.

The withdrawal of Thebes from the Confederacy can scarcely be regarded as essentially weakening it. The position of Thebes as a member was from the first an anomalous one. All her interests lay upon land, and it was only the peculiar hostility which she felt towards Sparta that drove her to enter a Confederacy which was really maritime. Her assistance to Athens was grudging, and she was clearly using the Confederacy as an instrument for working out her own supremacy in Boeotia<sup>3</sup>.

One serious weakness of the Confederacy is, however, painfully evident from the very first. It is clear

<sup>1</sup> Of members, other than those already given, only one name is certain, viz. that of Pyrrha in Lesbos, which was represented by a *σύνεδρος* in 369–8 B.C. See C.I.A. II. 52<sup>c</sup>, l. 29. For further conjectures see Schaefer, *Dem. u. s. Zeit*, I.<sup>2</sup> p. 58. Beloch (*Griech. Gesch.* III. (i.), p. 331 n.) estimates the extent of the Second Athenian Confederacy in 371 B.C. at about 25,000 sq. kilometer. He thinks that the Athenian Empire in 431 B.C. had an extent of about 30–40,000 sq. kilometer.

<sup>2</sup> Isokr. *Antid.* 110 (speaking of the peace of 374 B.C.): Λακεδαιμονίων δὲ μετ' ἐκείνων τὸν χρόνον μηδ' ὑφ' ἐνὸς ἐωρᾶσθαι μήτε ναυτικὸν ἐντὸς Μαλέας περιπλέον μήτε περὶ στρατόπεδον δι' Ἴσθμοῦ πορευόμενον.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. Xen. VI. 2. 1: οἱ δ' Ἀθηναῖοι (in 374 B.C.) αὐξανόμενοι μὲν ὀρώντες διὰ σφᾶς τοὺς Θηβαίους, χρήματά τε οὐ συμβαλλομένους εἰς τὸ ναυτικόν, αὐτοὶ δὲ ἀποκναιόμενοι καὶ χρημάτων εἰσφοραῖς καὶ ληστείας κ.τ.λ. Cf. also Ps.-Dem. c. *Timoth.* 15 (the situation in the autumn of 373 B.C.): οἱ δὲ Βοιωτοὶ οὐκ ἔφασαν παραμενεῖν, εἰ μή τις αὐτοῖς τὴν καθ' ἡμέραν τροφήν δώσοι.

that it is quite incapable of standing any severe financial strain. In the year of its foundation, Athens endeavoured to place herself in a better position to meet the calls which might be expected. The Solonian system was abolished and the Symmories were introduced<sup>1</sup>. Yet, though this may have facilitated the raising of the *εἰσφορά*, it could not increase the resources of Athens. The *εἰσφορά* levied in 378-7 B.C. produced some 300 talents<sup>2</sup>, an amount which shows that the sacrifices made by Athens must have been relatively much greater than those made by the allies<sup>3</sup>. It is fairly certain that an *εἰσφορά* was levied at Athens each year from 378-371 B.C., during the time of hostilities with Sparta<sup>4</sup>. But these and the *συντάξεις* combined were utterly inadequate to meet the expenses of the war. In 375 B.C. Timotheos was in straits for money during his expedition to the West<sup>5</sup>, nor is this surprising, seeing that he had received only 13 talents for the entire expenses of the expedition<sup>6</sup>. The position

<sup>1</sup> Philoch. frag. 126 (Harpokr. s.v. *συμμορία*): διηρέθησαν δὲ πρῶτον Ἀθηναῖοι κατὰ συμμορίας ἐπὶ Ναυσινίκου ἄρχοντος, ὡς φησι Φιλόχορος ἐν τῇ ἐ' Ἀτθίδος. Cf. Polyb. ii. 62. 6, 7.

<sup>2</sup> There can be no doubt that this is the meaning of Dem. c. *Androt.* 44: ὑμῖν παρὰ τὰς εἰσφορὰς τὰς ἀπὸ Ναυσινίκου, παρ' ἴσως τάλαντα τριακόσια ἢ μικρῶ πλείω... It is quite impossible to accept Grote's view (viii. p. 109, n. 3) that the total of all *εἰσφοραὶ* levied from 378-355 B.C. was only 300 talents. The amount raised in the archonship of Nausinikos was exceptionally large, probably on account of the heavy naval expenditure incurred at that time. Cf. Schaefer, *Dem. u. s. Zeit.* i.<sup>2</sup> p. 22 n.; Beloch in *Hermes*, xx. p. 255.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. above, p. 41.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. Xen. vi. 2. 1, quoted above, p. 75, n. 3.

<sup>5</sup> Xen. v. 4. 66: χρήματα μέντοι μετεπέμπετο Ἀθήνηθεν· πολλῶν γὰρ ἐδεῖτο, ἅτε πολλὰς ναῦς ἔχων.

<sup>6</sup> Isokr. *Antid.* 109: ἀλλ' εἰς μὲν τὸν περίπλου τὸν περὶ Πελοπόννησον τρία καὶ δέκα τάλαντα δούσης αὐτῷ τῆς πόλεως.

of the same commander in 373 B.C. is a striking commentary upon the defectiveness of the financial machinery of the Confederacy. Things had indeed come to a pitiable pass when the *στρατηγός* found it necessary to pledge his own property and to borrow money in order to meet the expenses of the fleet. Nor did Iphikrates find matters much better in the ensuing year. He was compelled to let his sailors maintain themselves by labouring in the fields of Korkyra, and was driven further to wring money from reluctant cities in Kephallenia<sup>1</sup>.

The conclusion which these facts force upon us is that a spirit of self-sacrifice did not animate the Confederacy. The allies could certainly have contributed far more than they actually did, but an adequate incentive was lacking. As soon as it became clear that Sparta was no longer formidable, the *συντάξεις* were likely to fall into arrears, nor would Athens venture to put too much pressure upon the defaulters. Thus even in the early years of the Confederacy's existence there were not wanting signs which boded ill for the future.

<sup>1</sup> Xen. vi. 2. 37, 38. See above, p. 71.

## CHAPTER IV.

FROM THE SECESSION OF THEBES TO THE OUT-  
BREAK OF THE WAR WITH THE ALLIES. THE  
MIDDLE PERIOD OF THE CONFEDERACY (371—  
357 B.C.).

*Conference  
of Pelo-  
ponnesian  
cities  
summoned  
by Athens  
after  
Leuktra  
(371 B.C.).*

THE result of the battle of Leuktra (July, 371 B.C.) must grievously have upset Athenian calculations. A breach had just taken place with Thebes, and a firm conviction doubtless prevailed that any pretensions to supremacy on land which that city might raise would be crushed by Sparta without difficulty. It is not surprising, however, that under the shock of the moment the friendly advances made by Thebes were unceremoniously rejected<sup>1</sup>. Yet it was clear that some counterpoise to her power must be obtained, if an attitude of hostility was to be assumed with success. This counterpoise Athens hoped to find in the Peloponnese, where complete confusion reigned as the result of Sparta's downfall. She considered that Sparta was utterly crushed<sup>2</sup> and that her allies would need a fresh

<sup>1</sup> Xen. vi. 4. 19, 20.

<sup>2</sup> Reading *ὄτρω* in Xen. vi. 5. 1 with the mss. This seems decidedly more suitable than the conjectured *ὄπω*. Athens only ventured on this step because she thought that Sparta was utterly crushed, and was therefore incapable of holding her League together. Cf. Grote, viii. p. 191, n. 2.



leader to look up to. Accordingly towards the end of 371 B.C. a general invitation was issued to the cities of the Peloponnese to meet at Athens. The main object of the Congress was ostensibly the confirmation of the King's Peace<sup>1</sup>. But the real purpose of Athens went far beyond this, and her aim can hardly have been unknown to those cities which sent representatives to attend this conference.

Her determination was none other than to secure the Peloponnesian states as adherents to the Confederacy. This is shown by the form of oath taken at this meeting. Each city which approved of Athens' proposition swore as follows: ἐμμενῶ ταῖς σπονδαῖς ἀς βασιλεὺς κατέπεμψε καὶ τοῖς ψηφίσμασι τοῖς Ἀθηναίων καὶ τῶν συμμάχων. ἐὰν δέ τις στρατεύῃ ἐπὶ τινα πόλιν τῶν ὁμοσασῶν τόνδε τὸν ὄρκον, βοηθήσω παντὶ σθένει. Compare with this formula the oath taken by the Korkyraeans upon their admission into the Confederacy in 375 B.C.<sup>2</sup>: περὶ πολέμου καὶ εἰρήνης πράξω καθότι καὶ Ἀθηναίοις καὶ τῷ πλήθει τῶν συμμάχων δοκῇ καὶ τᾶλλα ποιήσω κατὰ τὰ δόγματα τῶν συμμάχων. The correspondence of phrase hardly leaves room for doubt that those cities which took the oath were incorporated as members of the Athenian Confederacy<sup>3</sup>. Now Xenophon says: καὶ ὄμωσαν πάντες πλὴν Ἡλείων. Does this mean that Sparta,

*Object of  
this step.*

<sup>1</sup> See Xen. vi. 5. 1 ff., and, for what follows, cf. especially Swoboda, *Rhein. Mus.* 49, p. 321 ff.

<sup>2</sup> C.I.A. II. 49 b.

<sup>3</sup> Swoboda, *loc. cit.* Meyer, *Gesch. d. Alt.* v. p. 421 f., approves of Swoboda's view. Beloch, *Griech. Gesch.* II. p. 258, n. 1, rejects it.

too, took the oath? The question is indeed very difficult to decide. On the one hand it is hard to believe that Sparta would voluntarily have submitted to such a humiliation. On the other, certain passages of Xenophon lend colour to the view that Sparta joined in taking the oath<sup>1</sup>. Yet the oaths mentioned in the first passage may fairly be referred to the peace sworn before the battle of Leuktra (see above, p. 73). In the second case there can be no doubt that the Congress summoned by Athens after Leuktra is referred to. But the speaker is a Corinthian, and the adhesion of Corinth to the Confederacy does not necessarily involve that of Sparta. We may therefore conclude from the inherent probability of the case that Sparta held aloof.

*Dangers of entanglement in Peloponnesian affairs.*

The step thus taken by Athens was one full of danger to herself. The unsatisfactory results already experienced from the inclusion of Thebes and Jason of Pherae in the Confederacy should have warned her against entangling herself with states whose whole interests lay on land. The only result of this move was to draw her into the prevailing complications of the Peloponnese, where it was impossible to assist one ally without running the risk of offending another<sup>2</sup>.

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Busolt, p. 794. The passages are (1) Xen. vi. 5. 36: ὁ δὲ πλείστος ἦν λόγος ὡς κατὰ τοὺς ὄρκους βοηθεῖν δέοι (when the Spartans appealed for help during the first Theban invasion). (2) *ibid.* vi. 5. 37 (Kleitales of Corinth speaks): πῶς οὖν, ἐὰν μὴ βοηθῆτε οὕτω περιφανῶς ἡμῖν ἀδικομένοις, οὐ παρὰ τοὺς ὄρκους ποιήσετε; καὶ ταῦτα ὧν αὐτοὶ ἐπεμελήθητε ὄρκων ὅπως πᾶσιν ὑμῖν πάντες ἡμεῖς ὁμόσαιμεν; Cf. Lenz, p. 56.

<sup>2</sup> Thus in the winter of 370–369 B.C. the appeal of the Arkadian League for help against Sparta had to be rejected. Diod. xv. 62. 3; Dem. *Megal.* 12: ἔπεισαν ὑμᾶς πάντων Πελοποννησίων ἐλθόντων ὡς ὑμᾶς καὶ μεθ' ὑμῶν ἀξιούντων ἐπὶ τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους ἰέναι, τούτους μὲν μὴ

On the other hand, her new allies would not lift a finger to assist Athens, when their own immediate interests were not concerned<sup>1</sup>.

Though Sparta had probably stood aloof from this Congress at Athens, the pressure of Theban invasion was to force her to come as a suppliant to her rival. Nor could Athens venture to turn a deaf ear to her entreaties. The real point at issue was this: Were the Thebans to be suffered to wipe out the independent existence of Sparta? As Isokrates observed a little later (366 B.C.), that was the last thing Athens desired, despite all the bitter recollections of the past<sup>2</sup>. Moreover Athens was bound by the principles of the Confederacy to assist Corinth, whose territory had been violated by the Theban invasion<sup>3</sup>. A further cause of hostility against Thebes was supplied by the defection of the Euboean cities and the Akarnanians from the Confederacy after the battle of Leuktra and by their espousal of the Theban cause. *Εὐβοεῖς ἀπὸ πασῶν τῶν πόλεων* and *'Ακαρνᾶνες* are found among those who followed Epameinondas in his first invasion of the Peloponnese<sup>4</sup>. All these considerations would incline Athens to respond to Sparta's urgent appeal. Kallistratos threw all the weight of his influence into

*Alliance  
of Athens  
and Sparta  
(369 B.C.).*

*προσδέξασθαι (καὶ διὰ τοῦθ', ὅπερ ἦν ὑπόλοιπον αὐτοῖς, ἐπὶ Θηβαίους ἦλθον).*  
Cf. Beloch, *Att. Pol.* pp. 149, 150.

<sup>1</sup> This is clear from their conduct at the time when Athens lost Oropos (366 B.C.). Cf. Xen. vii. 4. 1, and see below, p. 89.

<sup>2</sup> Isokr. *Arch.* 62: *ἐπίσταμαι γὰρ πρῶτον μὲν Ἀθηναίους, εἰ καὶ μὴ πάντα μεθ' ἡμῶν εἰσὶν, ἀλλ' ὑπὲρ γε τῆς σωτηρίας τῆς ἡμετέρας ὄτιοῦν ἂν ποιήσοντας.* Cf. Dem. c. *Aristocr.* 191.

<sup>3</sup> See Xen. vi. 5. 37.

<sup>4</sup> Xen. vi. 5. 23. Euboeans are also found serving in the last expedition of Epameinondas into the Peloponnese (*ibid.* vii. 5. 4).

the scale<sup>1</sup>. An *εἰσφορά* was imposed<sup>2</sup>, and a force sent to the Peloponnese under Iphikrates<sup>3</sup>. The assistance given by Athens to Sparta doubtless hastened Epameinondas' retirement from the Peloponnese<sup>4</sup>. After they had been relieved from this immediate danger, the Spartans and their allies sent an embassy to Athens with a view to fixing definitely the terms of alliance. It was finally agreed that the chief command should be held by either power alternately for five days<sup>5</sup>. How far the *Συνέδριον* of the allies took part in these proceedings, it is impossible to say (spring or early summer 369 B.C.).

*Iphikrates  
before Am-  
phipolis.*

About this time Athens turned her attention northwards, and made an effort to assert her authority in the Macedonian and Thracian districts. By the peace of 371 B.C. Amphipolis had been made over to her by Amyntas<sup>6</sup>. Permission to occupy and effective occupation were, however, two very different things. Shortly after his return from operating against Epameinondas, Iphikrates was despatched to Amphipolis in order that he might enforce the terms of the peace<sup>7</sup>. He was,

<sup>1</sup> Ps.-Dem. c. *Neaer.* 27: Λακεδαιμονίους ὑμεῖς ἐσώζετε πεισθέντες ὑπὸ Καλλιστράτου.

<sup>2</sup> Dem. *Megal.* 12.

<sup>3</sup> Xen. vi. 5. 49.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. Nepos, *Iphicr.* 2. 5: idem subsidio Lacedaemoniis profectus Epaminondae retardavit impetus, nam nisi eius adventus appropinquasset, non prius Thebani Sparta abscessissent, quam captam incendio delesent.

<sup>5</sup> Xen. vii. 1. 1 ff.

<sup>6</sup> See above, p. 73.

<sup>7</sup> Aesch. *F. L.* 27: ἐπὶ τῶν καιρῶν τούτων ἐχειροτόνησαν Ἀθηναῖοι στρατηγὸν ἐπ' Ἀμφίπολιν Ἴφικράτην, Ἀμφιπολιτῶν αὐτῶν ἐχόντων τότε τὴν πόλιν καὶ τὴν χώραν καρπούμενων.

Judeich, *Kleinias. Stud.* p. 271 f., combines together Polyæn. iii. 9. 36 and C.I.A. ii. 52 c. He thinks that Iphikrates may first have

however, but poorly supplied with ships, and could do little more than make a reconnaissance. While lying off Amphipolis he received an appeal for help from Eurydike, the mother of Perdikkas and Philip of Macedon, who was hard pressed by the pretender Pausanias. Iphikrates was naturally glad of this opportunity of asserting Athenian influence in Macedonia, and drove out the pretender<sup>1</sup>. This display of activity on the part of Athens was not allowed to pass unchallenged. A counter-move was made by Thebes, and Pelopidas obtained hostages from the regent Ptolemaeos, who was further induced to oppose the Athenian attempt to win Amphipolis<sup>2</sup>. That attempt resulted in the defection of one of the members of the Confederacy. In 375 B.C. the Olynthian League had been enrolled. But now this activity of Athens against a neighbouring city must have excited grave uneasiness, and the Chalkidians are found opposing the Athenians in their efforts to secure Amphipolis<sup>3</sup>.

This secession was calculated to make Athens anxious as to the stability of her Confederacy. Possibly some compensation was afforded by the adhesion of Leukas, which had as late as 373 B.C. adopted an attitude of hostility (368 B.C.)<sup>4</sup>. That a feeling of

*Athenian  
policy un-  
popular  
with the  
allies.*

conducted a campaign against Samos, and in so doing have received assistance from Mytilene. This is, however, the merest conjecture, and appears to be negatived by Aesch. *F. L.* 28, where it is expressly stated that Iphikrates at first had a weak force. He would hardly have ventured an attack on Samos under these circumstances.

<sup>1</sup> Aesch. *F. L.* 28 ff. Cf. Nepos, *Iphicr.* 3. 2.

<sup>2</sup> Plut. *Pelop.* 27; Aeschin. *F. L.* 29.

<sup>3</sup> Dem. *c. Aristocr.* 150. Cf. Grote, viii. p. 239, n. 1.

<sup>4</sup> C.I.A. II. 52 b = Hicks and Hill 110. The end of a treaty is preserved with the name of the Leukadians who took the oath. This

suspicion as to the intentions of Athens prevailed among the allies and that Athens was anxious to allay these suspicions comes out, I think, from the decrees passed in honour of Mytilene in 369–368 and 368–367 B.C.<sup>1</sup> Ambassadors had been sent from Mytilene to make enquiry about the policy of Athens<sup>2</sup>. From the earlier decree it is evident that Athens was extremely desirous of conciliating the Mytilenaeans; she praises their conduct during the war with Sparta which had been concluded in 371 B.C., and seeks to justify her own policy. The conclusion is irresistible that the people of Mytilene had, by their ambassadors, hinted that they were not altogether easy as to the intentions of Athens at the present period. The negotiations were clearly somewhat protracted, and in the later decree Athens is no less earnest in her efforts to appease her ally. Incidentally we learn that Pyrrha had by this time joined the Confederacy, for her *σύνεδρος* is invited to dinner in the Prytaneion with those of Methymna, Antissa, and Eresos, all towns of Lesbos.

*Alliance  
of Athens*

And in fact the policy of Athens was well calculated to arouse some uneasiness among the members of

is followed by the beginning of another decree dated [ἐ]πὶ Ναυσιγένους ἄρχοντος ἐπὶ τῆς Κεκρ[οπίδο]ς πρώτης πρυτανείας. Though it cannot be demonstrated that Leukas now became a member of the Confederacy, it is quite likely that it did so. A similar uncertainty prevails in every case of alliance now that the Aristoteles decree fails us. For the hostility of Leukas in 373 B.C. see Xen. vi. 2. 3, 26.

<sup>1</sup> C. I. A. II. 52 c = Hicks and Hill 109.

<sup>2</sup> II. 37 ff.: ἐπα[νέσαι μὲν τὸν δῆμον τὸμ Μυτ[ιληναίω]ν ὅτι καλῶς καὶ προθύμως συνδιεπολέμη[σα]ν τὸν πόλεμον τὸν παρελθόν[τα, ἀποκρί-  
νασ]θαι δὲ τοῖς πρέσβεσι[ν τοῖς ἡκουσι] ὅτ[ι 'Α]θ[η]ναῖοι ἐπολέμησαν  
[ὐπὲρ τῆς ἐλε]ν[θ]ερ[ί]α[ς τῶν Ἑλλήνων.... The rest appears to contain  
a justification of Athenian policy.



a Confederacy, whose real interests required that entanglement in the struggles on the mainland should, as far as possible, be avoided. The alliance with Sparta must have seemed to contradict entirely the avowed object of the Confederacy's existence. It was likely to draw its members into an interminable series of land wars. Nor did it stand alone. It brought Athens into close relations with Sparta's supporter, Dionysios of Syracuse. In June, 368 B.C., probably at the time when Dionysios sent his first force to aid the Spartans<sup>1</sup>, envoys from him were present at Athens, and a decree<sup>2</sup> was passed in his honour, ordering that a crown, previously voted, should be sent to him, and that he and his sons should be made Athenian citizens<sup>3</sup>. The main object of Dionysios in sending envoys on this occasion was to make certain proposals with regard to the rebuilding of the temple at Delphi<sup>4</sup> and 'the peace.' There is no necessity whatever for bringing this into connection with the Congress summoned to Delphi by Philiskos, the agent of the satrap Ariobarzanes<sup>5</sup>.

<sup>1</sup> Xen. VII. 1. 22; see Niese in *Hermes*, 39 (1904), p. 127 f. His arguments for a return to the older chronology (that of Dodwell and Clinton) seem to me very forcible. Cf. Thirlwall, *History of Greece*, chap. XI.

<sup>2</sup> C. I. A. II. 51 = Hicks and Hill 108.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. Dem. *Epist. Phil.* (XII.) 10: οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' εἰ δεῖ πάντα τὰλλα παραλιπόντα συντόμως εἰπεῖν, ὑμεῖς ἔδοτε πολιτείαν Εὐαγόρα τῷ Κυπρίῳ καὶ Διονυσίῳ τῷ Συρακοσίῳ καὶ τοῖς ἐκγόνοις τοῖς ἐκείνων.

<sup>4</sup> The temple had probably been burnt down in 373-2 B.C. Cf. Jacoby, *Das Marmor Parium*, p. 120.

<sup>5</sup> Xen. VII. 1. 27; Diod. xv. 70 (Diodorus says that Philiskos was sent by Artaxerxes). According to Xenophon this Congress was attended only by the Thebans and their allies, and by the Lacedaemonians; there is no mention of Athens or Dionysios. It probably took place at the beginning of 367 B.C.



Dionysios was simply endeavouring by his independent good offices to bring about a general peace, and it was in connection with this proposal that the allies were asked to pass a resolution. We cannot think that the allies would be enthusiastic in their reception of the tyrant's offer, and in any case nothing resulted from his proposition. The island cities had no mind to be involved in Sicilian troubles. Athens, however, was zealous for the friendship of Dionysios. At the Lenaea of 367 B.C. he was awarded first prize for his tragedy "Εκτορος λύτρα<sup>1</sup>, and just after this success an alliance was concluded between him and Athens (Feb.—March)<sup>2</sup>. The alliance is in form an alliance between Dionysios and Athens only, though the tyrant is praised ὅτι ἐστὶν ἀνὴρ ἀ]γ[α]θὸς περὶ τὸν [δῆμον τὸν Ἀθηναίων καὶ τ]οὺς συμμάχους. Whether this absence of participation on the side of the allies can be construed as a positive sign of the Synedrion's disapproval, must remain doubtful<sup>3</sup>. But there is little doubt that *in fact* the alliance would not be in accordance with the wishes of the allies. We learn without surprise that negotiations were at this time proceeding between Sparta (also Dionysios' ally) and Athens<sup>4</sup>.

and with  
Alexander  
of Pherae  
(368—  
367 B.C.).

Yet another alliance was made by Athens about this date. Alexander, tyrant of Pherae, was being hard pressed by the Thebans, who had sent out an expedition

<sup>1</sup> Diod. xv. 74. 1; Tzetzes, *Chil.* v. 180 (Nauck, *Trag. Gr. Frag.*<sup>2</sup> p. 794).

<sup>2</sup> C.I.A. II. 52 = Hicks and Hill 112. For the date see Dittenberger, *Sylloge*, I<sup>2</sup>, 90, and Niese, *Hermes*, xxxix. (1904), p. 128.

<sup>3</sup> See above, p. 30 f.

<sup>4</sup> Decree in honour of Korobos; C.I.A. II. 50 and IV. (2), p. 15 = Hicks and Hill 113.

to rescue the captured Pelopidas<sup>1</sup>. Alexander appealed for help to Athens, whose enmity against Thebes induced her to make an alliance with him<sup>2</sup>. There is no reason to believe that the tyrant of Pherae joined the Confederacy, but the alliance of Athens with a man of such character cannot have been pleasing to its members. A force of 30 ships and 1000 soldiers was despatched, and rendered the tyrant effective aid. With this Thessalian expedition of Athens must be connected the Athenian request that the second force of auxiliaries sent by Dionysios should operate in Thessaly against the Thebans<sup>3</sup>.

Thebes, however, was to have her revenge for this hostile move made by Athens. After the abortive peace congress held under the auspices of Philiskos at Delphi (early in 367 B.C.), the Spartans, to whom money for the hire of mercenaries had been given by that envoy, appear to have sent an ambassador to Susa with the object of advancing their cause with the Great King<sup>4</sup>. As a reply to this, the Thebans sent the newly liberated Pelopidas on the same journey, and the Athenians, not to be outdone, despatched two representatives, Leon and Timagoras<sup>5</sup>. Arkadian, Eleian, and

*Athenian  
and other  
envoys  
sent to  
Persia  
(367 B.C.).*

<sup>1</sup> Diod. xv. 71. 3. Cf. Dem. c. *Aristocr.* 120.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. C.I.A. iv. (2), 59 b = Hicks and Hill 123, ll. 39, 40: [τῆ]ν δὲ στ[ῆ]λ[λ]ην τῆ]ν πρὸ[ς] Ἀλ[έ]ξανδρον [κα]θ(ε)λ[ε]ῖν τοὺς [ταμί]ας τῆς θεοῦ [τῆ]ν π[ε]ρ[ὶ] τῆ]ς [σ]υμμαχία[ς]. This was on the occasion of an alliance between Athens and the Thessalians against Alexander in 361-360 B.C.

<sup>3</sup> Xen. vii. 1. 28. Cf. Köhler, *Ath. Mitt.* II. p. 199, n. 1.

<sup>4</sup> Xen. vii. 1. 33 ff.; Diod. xv. 70. 2.

<sup>5</sup> Who had perhaps journeyed to Persia on a previous occasion, shortly after the battle of Leuktra. See Grote, viii. p. 266, n. 2; Judeich, *Kleinias. Stud.* p. 198, n. 1.

Argive representatives also journeyed to Persia on this occasion. The Athenian envoys probably went by way of Sidon, and were courteously entreated by its king Straton<sup>1</sup>. The result of this embassy was entirely favourable to Thebes. The rescript which Pelopidas obtained dealt two direct blows at Athens. Amphipolis was declared independent<sup>2</sup>, and—an almost incredible insult—Athens was ordered to withdraw her ships from the high seas. It is evident from this that Thebes already had in view the design of asserting her supremacy on sea as well as on land, and we have a foreshadowing of the naval expedition of Epameinondas a few years later<sup>3</sup>. The Athenian ambassador Leon, by his resolute protest, obtained from the king a slight concession, in so far as the latter agreed to consider any alternative proposals which might be made by Athens; and subsequently the condemnation of Timagoras, who was convicted of treason, so impressed the Persians that they rescinded the decree touching Amphipolis, and ordered that it should be an Athenian possession<sup>4</sup>. In the meanwhile a congress of Greek states summoned by Thebes in the winter 367–6 B.C. completely failed to effect the object desired. The refusal to obey the king's rescript was general.

A serious blow was now suffered by Athens in the

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Schaefer, *Dem. u. s. Zeit*, I.<sup>2</sup> p. 94 f. (n. 1); C.I.A. II. 86 = Hicks and Hill 111: ...]καὶ ἐπεμελ[ήθη] ὅπως ὡς κάλλιστα πορευθῆσονται οἱ πρέσβεις ὡς βασιλεία οὗς ὁ δῆμος ἐπεμψεν.

<sup>2</sup> *Dem. F. L.* 137.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. Busolt, *Der zw. ath. Bund*, p. 800 f.

<sup>4</sup> *Dem. F. L.* 137: πρῶτον μὲν Ἀμφίπολιν πάλιν ὑμετέραν κατέπεμψεν, ἣν τότε σύμμαχον αὐτοῦ καὶ φίλην ἔγραψεν, εἰτ' οὐδενὶ πώποτ' ἔδωκε χρήματα τοῦ λοιποῦ.

loss of Oropos, which had, as we have seen<sup>1</sup>, come into her hands in or about 374 B.C. With the aid of Themison, tyrant of Eretria, certain exiles, who had probably been banished by the Athenians when the place fell into their possession, secured the city. On the approach of an Athenian force under Chares these exiles put Oropos into the hands of the Thebans. The latter naturally enough refused to surrender it, though there was some talk of arbitration. Very significant is the fact that none of Athens' Peloponnesian allies would help her to recover the place (366 B.C.)<sup>2</sup>. This disaster led to an attack upon Kallistratos and Chabrias, who were prosecuted for high treason. Although they were acquitted, we cannot doubt that a severe blow was struck at their prestige<sup>3</sup>.

The conduct of Thebes in this affair of Oropos must have made the Athenians the more ready to receive an application for alliance now made by Lykomedes of Arkadia. This man had been foremost in opposing the attempt of the Thebans to enforce the terms of the Persian rescript upon the Greek cities. The coldness so recently displayed by the Peloponnesian allies of Athens was another factor which would influence her in favour of the new alliance, since she knew that it would give displeasure in that quarter<sup>4</sup>. Thus once

<sup>1</sup> Above, p. 65, n. 3.

<sup>2</sup> Diod. xv. 76. 1; Xen. vii. 4. 1; Aesch. c. *Ctes.* 85; Dem. *Cor.* 99.

For the date cf. Schol. to Aesch. *loc. cit.*: ἐγένετο δὲ ταῦτα ἄρχοντας Ἀθήνησι Πολυζήλου (367-6 B.C.). Diodorus gives the event under 366-5 B.C.

<sup>3</sup> See especially Arist. *Rhet.* I. p. 1364; Plut. *Demosth.* 5; Dem. c. *Meid.* 64. Cf. Beloch, *Att. Pol.* p. 154.

<sup>4</sup> Xen. vii. 4. 2.

again was Athens drawn into an alliance calculated to offend the members of her Confederacy. Active assistance was given to the Arkadians, but care was taken to avoid a breach with Sparta. A treacherous, but abortive, attempt to seize Corinth shows Athenian policy in its worst light, and must still further have alienated the Peloponnesian members of the Confederacy<sup>1</sup>.

*Athens probably withdraws from war against Thebes (366 B.C.).*

This attempt on Corinth led indirectly to many of the Peloponnesian enemies of Thebes withdrawing from hostilities against her. The Spartan allies—foremost among them the Corinthians, Phleisians and Epidaurians—concluded peace on their own account, since Sparta resolutely refused to submit to terms which involved a recognition of the independence of Messene (summer of 366 B.C.)<sup>2</sup>. Meyer<sup>3</sup> believes that Athens joined in this peace, and although there is no proof of this, the conjecture is one which has much probability<sup>4</sup>. It was quite as much to the interest of Athens to get quit of the war waged on Sparta's behalf against Thebes as it was to that of Sparta's Peloponnesian allies. We shall see further that it was of great importance to Athens to have a free hand for her operations elsewhere.

*Expedition of Timotheos*

After the Great King had issued the insulting rescript of 367 B.C., the Athenians resolved to give

<sup>1</sup> Xen. vii. 4. 4 ff.

<sup>2</sup> Xen. vii. 4. 6—11. Cf. Isokr. *Archid.* 11, 91. Diodorus (xv. 76. 3) gives the date rightly, but is quite wrong as to facts.

<sup>3</sup> *Gesch. d. Alt.* v. p. 449.

<sup>4</sup> I cannot think with Meyer that C.I.G. 1118 has any connection with this peace. Cf. Stähelin in *Beiträge zur alten Gesch.* v. (1), p. 67 f.

indirect support to Ariobarzanes<sup>1</sup>, satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia, who was on bad terms with his master, Artaxerxes. In the summer, probably, of 366 B.C. Timotheos was despatched with a force of 30 ships and 8000 men for this purpose. The expedition was evidently intended rather as a demonstration than as a serious attack upon the Persian king, for instructions were given that the truce with Persia should not be violated<sup>2</sup>.

*to Asia  
Minor  
(366 B.C.).*

Timotheos received no money whatever from Athens for the expenses of his operations, nor did he collect any from the allies<sup>3</sup>, as was the common custom in such cases<sup>4</sup>. On learning that Ariobarzanes had openly revolted against the Great King, he was afraid to give him assistance; instead of doing so he turned his attention to Samos. This island had stood aloof from the Confederacy. It was at the present time, in defiance of the terms of the Peace of Antalkidas, occupied by one Kyprothemis, who had been installed there by the satrap Tigranes<sup>5</sup>. Timotheos had therefore an excellent pretext for laying siege to the place. After operations extending over ten months, during which

<sup>1</sup> Upon whom Athenian citizenship was also conferred. Cf. Dem. c. *Aristocr.* 141, 202.

<sup>2</sup> Dem. *Rhod.* 9: ὑμεῖς ἐξεπέμψατε Τιμόθεον ποτ' ὧ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι βοθηθήσοντ' Ἀριοβαρζάνη, προσγράψαντες τῷ ψηφίσματι "μὴ λύοντα τὰς σπονδὰς τὰς πρὸς βασιλέα." ἰδὼν δ' ἐκέῖνος, τὸν μὲν Ἀριοβαρζάνη φανερώς ἀφειστώτα βασιλέως, Σάμον δὲ φρουρουμένην ὑπὸ Κυπροθέμιδος, ὃν κατέστησε Τιγράνης ὁ βασιλέως ὑπαρχος, τῷ μὲν ἀπέγνων μὴ βοηθεῖν, τὴν δὲ προσκαθεζόμενος καὶ βοηθήσας ἡλευθέρωσε.

<sup>3</sup> Isokr. *Antid.* 111: μετὰ δὲ ταύτας τὰς πράξεις ἐπὶ Σάμον στρατεύσας... ταύτην οὔτε πλέον οὔτ' ἔλαττον παρ' ὑμῶν λαβὼν οὔτε παρὰ τῶν συμμάχων ἐκλέξας ἐν δέκα μηνσὶν ἐξεπολιόρκησεν.

<sup>4</sup> See above, p. 39 f.

<sup>5</sup> Dem. *Rhod.* 9. Harpokration, s.v. Κυπρόθεμις.



*Capture of  
Samos and  
establish-  
ment of a  
kleruchy.*

time he supported his army by plundering the enemy's country<sup>1</sup>, he captured Samos. During, or shortly after, the siege he appears to have in some way interfered in the affairs of Erythrae<sup>2</sup>. As Persia had disregarded the terms of the King's Peace in her action at Samos, Timotheos felt himself at liberty to do the like with regard to the cities of Asia Minor<sup>3</sup>. The conquest of Samos was followed by the establishment of an Athenian kleruchy in the island<sup>4</sup>. Further contingents were sent out in 361 and 352 B.C.<sup>5</sup> This was no violation of the principles of the Confederacy as set forth in the decree of Aristoteles. The renunciation there made applied only to the territory of members of the Confederacy, and there is no evidence to show that Samos became a member; indeed the probabilities are against it. But, as a matter of policy, it was a very questionable step to take. It was just the action calculated to arouse suspicion and to afford a pretext to those who wished to sow disaffection among the members of the Confederacy<sup>6</sup>. After the conquest of Samos Timotheos seems to have given some assistance direct or indirect

<sup>1</sup> For the methods by which Timotheos obtained money for his troops, cf. Polyæn. iii. 10. 9 and Ps.-Arist. *Oec.* ii. 23.

<sup>2</sup> C. I. A. ii. 53.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. Judeich, *Kleinas. Stud.* 273.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. Diod. xviii. 18. 9: ὁ δὲ Πέρδικκας ἀποκαταστήσας τοῖς Σαμίους τὴν τε πόλιν καὶ χώραν, κατήγαγεν αὐτοὺς εἰς τὴν πατρίδα πεφευγότες ἕτη τρισὶ πλείω τῶν τεσσαράκοντα (322 B.C.).

<sup>5</sup> Aesch. c. *Tim.* 53 (Schol.); Philoch. frag. 131. Cf. Hicks and Hill, 114 (an inventory by the Athenian treasurers of the treasures in the temple of Hera, 346-5 B.C.).

<sup>6</sup> Cf. Arist. *Rhet.* 2, p. 1384 b: ὥσπερ Κυδίας περὶ τῆς Σάμου κληρουχίας ἐδημηγόρησεν (ἡξίου γὰρ ὑπολαβεῖν τοὺς Ἀθηναίους περιεστάναι κύκλῳ τοὺς Ἕλληνας ὡς ὀρώντας καὶ μὴ μόνον ἀκουσομένους ἀ ἀν ψηφίσωνται). Cf. Beloch, *Att. Pol.* p. 156 f.

to Ariobarzanes, in consideration whereof the latter undertook to pay the Athenian mercenaries in Perinthos, who were probably engaged in defending that town against Kotys of Thrace<sup>1</sup>. Timotheos' next step was to attack and capture<sup>2</sup> Sestos and Krithote, most likely with the connivance of Ariobarzanes, in whose hands these places were. The captured cities were probably, as Schaefer remarks<sup>3</sup>, occupied by Athenian kleruchs. An appeal for assistance made by the Pontic Herakleia was refused by Timotheos<sup>4</sup>.

Since 369–8 B.C. Iphikrates had been carrying on operations off the Macedonian coast, without, so far as we can see, achieving any result of importance. In his main object, the capture of Amphipolis, he had at all events failed. On the other hand, the brilliant successes won by Timotheos stood in striking contrast. It is therefore no matter for surprise to find that Iphikrates was now (364 B.C.) superseded in his command by that general, who endeavoured, at first in

*Timotheos  
supersedes  
Iphikrates  
(364 B.C.).  
Successes  
in Macedonia and  
the Chalkidike.*

<sup>1</sup> See Nepos, *Tim.* 1: Ariobarzani simul cum Agesilao auxilio profectus est, a quo cum Laco pecuniam numeratam accepisset, ille cives suos agro atque urbibus augeri maluit quam id sumere, cuius partem domum suam quisque ferre posset. Itaque accepit Crithoten et Sestum (an account little to be trusted in detail); also Dem. c. *Aristocr.* 142; Ps.-Arist. *Oecon.* 2, p. 1351 a. Cf. Höck in *Hermes*, 26 (1891), p. 92 f.

<sup>2</sup> ἐλαβε says Isokrates (*Antid.* 112). Cf. Nepos, *Tim.* 1, and see Höck, *De rebus ab Atheniensibus in Thracia...gestis* (Kiliae, 1876), p. xxvi f.

<sup>3</sup> *Dem. u. s. Zeit.*, i.<sup>2</sup> p. 101, n. 5.

<sup>4</sup> Justin xvi. 4. It is just possible that Timotheos was at this time successful in forcing Byzantium to re-enter the Confederacy. But this view rests on the *Byzantios bello subegit* of Nepos, *Tim.* 1. 2, and is very doubtful. Probably Byzantium did not quit the Confederacy till a year later. See below, p. 97, and cf. Busolt, p. 810 f.

vain, to get the mercenary leader Charidemus to serve under him<sup>1</sup>. Timotheos' efforts were directed against Macedonia and the Olynthian League. He won Pydna and Methone, Potidaea and Torone, and other cities in this district<sup>2</sup>. Busolt<sup>3</sup> thinks that Pydna, Methone, Krithote, and Sestos became members of the Confederacy. There does not appear to be any justification for this view<sup>4</sup>. It is impossible to determine how far Athens increased her Confederacy at this period, if indeed she increased it at all. It seems to me that the probabilities point rather to the closing of the Confederacy by Athens about this time. The revival of the system of kleruchies is a step in this direction. Potidaea, at all events, was occupied by Athenian kleruchs in 362-1 B.C.<sup>5</sup> Timotheos was forced to raise funds for the expenses of this campaign from a variety of sources. Part of the cost he defrayed himself, part by means of the 'contributions' of the members of the Confederacy in the Thracian district<sup>6</sup>. All idea of the Confederacy resting upon a *defensive* alliance had long been abandoned, and the allies are called upon to pay

<sup>1</sup> Dem. *c. Aristocr.* 149 f.

<sup>2</sup> Deinarch. i. 14: Τιμοθέω...Σάμον λαβόντι καὶ Μεθώνην καὶ Πύδναν καὶ Ποτίδαιαν καὶ πρὸς ταύταις ἑτέρας εἴκοσι πόλεις. Cf. also Isokr. *Antid.* 108; Diod. xv. 81.

<sup>3</sup> p. 809. With regard to the two first-named places his view is followed by Bury, *Hist. of Greece*, p. 616.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. Hahn, *N. Jahrb. f. class. Phil.* 1876, p. 466.

<sup>5</sup> C.I.A. ii. 57. Cf. Foucart, *Rev. Arch.* (N.S.), 1878 (xxxv.), p. 220 ff. See also Dem. *Phil.* 2. 20: Ποτειδαίαν δ' ἐδίδου (Φίλιππος) τοὺς Ἀθηναίων ἀποίκους ἐκβάλλων.

<sup>6</sup> Isokr. *Antid.* 113: cf. also Polyæn. iii. 10. 4, and Ps.-Arist. *Oec.* ii. 23, from which it appears that he had to resort to a base-metal coinage.

for what are purely offensive operations on the part of Athens<sup>1</sup>. Timotheos also received assistance both in men and money from Menelaos, probably prince of the Lynkestae<sup>2</sup>, who is thanked for these services by an Athenian decree of the beginning of 362 B.C.<sup>3</sup> Perdikkas, king of Macedonia, also assisted Athens against the Olynthians, and his help was of no slight value<sup>4</sup>. He evidently felt himself for the time being constrained to keep on good terms with Athens, though the occupation of Pydna and Methone by Timotheos can scarcely have been pleasing to him.

These successes of Timotheos caused alarm at Thebes. We have seen already that the rescript obtained by Pelopidas from the Great King in 367 B.C. ordered Athens to withdraw her fleet from the high seas, and that this was an indication that Thebes intended to challenge the Athenian supremacy at sea. Epameinondas now came forward and declared openly that it was necessary for the Thebans to obtain command of the sea<sup>5</sup>. In many ways the situation was

*Naval expedition of Epameinondas (363 B.C.).*

<sup>1</sup> There is no ground whatever for supposing with Hahn, *loc. cit.* p. 468, that this money would subsequently be returned to the Confederate chest.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Dittenberger, *Sylloge*, 1<sup>2</sup>, 102.

<sup>3</sup> C. I. A. II. 55 = Hicks and Hill, 117: ἐπειδὴ Τιμόθεος ὁ στρατηγὸς ἀποφα[ίνε]ι Μενέλαον τὸν Πελαγὸνα καὶ αὐτὸν συμπολεμο[ῦντα] καὶ χρήματα παρέχοντα εἰς τὸν πόλεμον τὸν πρ[ὸς] Χαλκιδίας καὶ πρὸς Ἀμφίπολιν κ.τ.λ.

<sup>4</sup> Dem. *Olynth.* 2. 14: ὅπως μὲν γὰρ ἡ Μακεδονικὴ δύναμις καὶ ἀρχή, ἐν μὲν προσθήκη μερὶς ἐστὶ τις οὐ μικρά, οἷον ὑπήρξέ ποθ' ὑμῖν ἐπὶ Τιμοθέου πρὸς Ὀλυνθίους.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. Aristeid. *Leuctr.* 1. 18: λέγειν γὰρ ἔφη πρὸς αὐτοὺς Ἐπαμεινώνδας ὡς οὐδὲν ὄφελος τῶν ἐν τῇ γῆ πλεονεκτιμάτων, εἰ μὴ καὶ τὴν θάλατταν δι' αὐτῶν ἔξουσιν. Also Aeschin. *F. L.* 105: Ἐπαμεινώνδας, οὐχ ὑποπτῆζας τὸ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἀξίωμα, εἶπε διαρρήθην ἐν τῷ πλήθει τῶν

a favourable one for such an attempt. Athens' popularity with the members of her Confederacy was already on the wane<sup>1</sup>; her proceedings during the last few years showed a determination to expand her territory which boded ill for the autonomy of the allies. Communications were actually opened with Rhodes, Chios, and Byzantium in the hope that they might be induced to support the Thebans' efforts at sea<sup>2</sup>. At the same time an enthusiastic response was made at home to Epameinondas' call. Thebes already possessed a small fleet<sup>3</sup>, but a much larger one was needed to cope successfully with Athens. Accordingly no fewer than a hundred new triremes were built, and docks prepared for them. In 364–3 B.C. (perhaps in the spring of 363) Epameinondas put out to sea. He forced an Athenian fleet, sent out to oppose him under Laches, to retire<sup>4</sup>, and probably detached some of the allies from the Confederacy<sup>5</sup>. Most likely the commotions at Keos<sup>6</sup> were the direct result of this expedition of Epameinondas, who brought about the temporary defection of the island from Athens. During this period of un-

Θηβαίων, ὡς δὲ τὰ τῆς Ἀθηναίων ἀκρόπολεως προπύλαια μετενεγκεῖν εἰς τὴν προστασίαν τῆς Καδμείας.

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Dem. *Rhod.* 3: ἡτιάσαντο μὲν γὰρ ἡμᾶς ἐπιβουλεύειν αὐτοῖς Χῖοι καὶ Βυζάντιοι καὶ Ῥόδιοι, καὶ διὰ ταῦτα συνέστησαν ἐφ' ἡμᾶς τὸν τελευταῖον τουτοῖ πόλεμον. This feeling must have been growing sometime before the outbreak of the War with the Allies.

<sup>2</sup> Diod. xv. 79. 1.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. above, p. 66, n. 2, and Ephor. frag. 67 (Strabo ix. 400 f.).

<sup>4</sup> Diod. xv. 79.

<sup>5</sup> Diod. *loc. cit.*: ἰδίαι τὰς πόλεις τοῖς Θηβαίοις ἐποίησεν. This would naturally refer to Rhodes, Chios, and Byzantium just before mentioned; but Diodorus has probably confused matters.

<sup>6</sup> See above, pp. 45 and 49, and C.I.A. iv. (2), 54 b.

settlement Iulis seems to have entered into close communication with Histiaea in Euboea (now an ally of Thebes), and to have arranged for common rights of citizenship between the two towns<sup>1</sup>. Keos was subsequently brought back to its allegiance by Chabrias, and though a counter-revolution broke out against the restored Athenian partisans at Iulis, this was quelled<sup>2</sup>, and the island remained a member of the Confederacy<sup>3</sup>. The principal efforts of Epameinondas were directed against Athenian interests in the Hellespont. He appears to have detached Byzantium permanently from the Confederacy<sup>4</sup>. Though this was the only lasting success gained by Epameinondas through his naval expedition, we cannot doubt that his voyage shook still

<sup>1</sup> I.G. XII. 594 (Iulis). It is attributed by Hiller von Gaertringen to 363-2 B.C., "quo tempore et Histiaeenses a Boeotorum partibus stabant et Cei ab Atheniensibus defecerant."

<sup>2</sup> Probably by Aristophon, the proposer of the decree for the settlement of Iulis (C.I.A. IV. (2), 54 b = Hicks and Hill 118). Cf. Schol. to Aesch. c. *Tim.* I. 64: κεκωμψόθηται ὁ Ἄριστοφῶν...ὡς στρατηγῆσας ἐν Κέῳ καὶ διὰ φιλοχρηματίαν πολλὰ κακὰ ἐργασάμενος τοὺς ἐνοικοῦντας, ἐφ' ᾧ γραφείσιν ὑπὸ Ἵπερείδου παρανόμων ἐάλω. Cf. the opening of C.I.A. IV. (2), 54 b: ἐπειδὴ Ἰουλιῆται, οὓς κατήγαγον Ἀθηναῖοι, ἀποφαίνουσι ὀφείλουσαν τὴν π[ό]λιν τὴν Ἰουλιητῶν τῇ πόλει τῇ Ἀθηναίων τρία τάλαντα τὰ ἐκ τοῦ λογισθέντος ἀργυ[ρ]ίου κ.τ.λ.

<sup>3</sup> For the limitations, judicial and commercial, imposed upon Keos in consequence of these revolts, see above, pp. 45 and 49.

<sup>4</sup> Isokr. *Phil.* 53: εἰς Βυζάντιον δὲ τριῆρεις ἐξέπεμπον (οἱ Θηβαῖοι) ὡς καὶ γῆς καὶ θαλάττης ἄρξοντες. Cf. also I.G. VII. 2418, l. 10: Βυζάντιοι χρυσίω λαμψακανῶ σ[τατείρας] ὀδοείκοντα πέτταρας...σύνεδροι Βυζαντίων [εἰμιξαν] τὸ χρυσίον Κερκίνος κ.τ.λ. 'recensentur huc pecuniae a Boeotorum sociis ad bellum contra Phocenses gerendum collatae' (355-46 B.C.).

In 362-1 B.C. the Byzantines are found harassing Athenian cornships. See Ps.-Dem. c. *Polycl.* 6: ἔτι δὲ τῶν ναυκλήρων περὶ ἔκπλουν ὄντων ἐκ τοῦ Πόντου, καὶ Βυζαντίων καὶ Καλχηδονίων καὶ Κυζικηνῶν καταγόντων τὰ πλοῖα ἕνεκα τῆς ἰδίας χρείας τοῦ σίτου.



further the already loosened fabric of the Confederacy. Timotheos did his best, after Epameinondas' retirement, to uphold the authority of Athens in the Hellespontine district. He freed Kyzikos from a siege<sup>1</sup>, but his services do not appear to have awakened much gratitude in that city<sup>2</sup>.

*Athens  
and the  
Pelo-  
ponnese  
(362 B.C.).*

Yet once again was Athens to be involved in the tangles of the Peloponnese, from which she had escaped temporarily in 366 B.C. The recent naval expedition of Epameinondas must have revived all her old hatred against Thebes and have made her the more ready to oppose the Thebans in the campaign which culminated in the battle of Mantinea (July 362 B.C.)<sup>3</sup>. Here again was a serious inroad upon her resources, and though the peace which followed freed her and her allies for the time being from active participation in Peloponnesian affairs<sup>4</sup>, the defensive alliance, made with the Arkadians, Elis, Achaea, and Phleius in the name of the Confederacy immediately after the battle<sup>5</sup>, still rendered her liable to be drawn into a Peloponnesian conflict.

*Athenian  
failures in  
the North.*

In other directions things had been going badly with Athens. It is not necessary to describe in detail the successive failures of her generals at Amphipolis and in the Hellespont. Perdikkas of Macedon changed his attitude<sup>6</sup> and now resisted the Athenian attempts

<sup>1</sup> Diod. xv. 81. 6; Nepos, *Timoth.* 1. 3.

<sup>2</sup> See the passage from the speech against Polykles quoted above, p. 97, n. 4, and cf. below, p. 99.

<sup>3</sup> For the date see Foucart, *Rev. Arch.* 1898 (xxxiii.), p. 313 ff.

<sup>4</sup> Diod. xv. 94: ἐν μὲν γὰρ τοῖς ὄρκοις ἦν γεγραμμένον ἐκάστους εἰς τὴν ἑαυτῶν ἀπιέναι πατρίδα μετὰ τὴν μάχην.

<sup>5</sup> C.I.A. II. 57 b = Hicks and Hill 119. It is dated ἐπὶ Μόλωνος ἄρχοντος, i.e. 362-1 B.C.

<sup>6</sup> Cf. above, p. 95.

to win Amphipolis<sup>1</sup>. Kyzikos attacked the allied island of Prokonnesos<sup>2</sup>, and joined Kalchedon and Byzantium in stopping the Athenian corn-ships (summer 362 B.C.)<sup>3</sup>. Ergophilos, Menon, Timomachos, Theotimos and Kephisodotos all in turn failed in the Hellespont<sup>4</sup>. The conduct of some of these commanders must have been in the highest degree exasperating to the allies<sup>5</sup>. Meanwhile Kotys seized Sestos and pressed Krithote and Elaeus hard<sup>6</sup>. In 359 B.C.<sup>7</sup> Kotys was murdered, but his son Kersobleptes, assisted by Charidemos, forced the Athenian general Kephisodotos to recognize his claims to the Chersonese<sup>8</sup>. Chabrias was sent out but did no better<sup>9</sup>. Timotheos in 360–59 B.C. made another attempt to win Amphipolis, but again failed disastrously<sup>10</sup>. Yet the accession of Philip to power in Macedon seemed to secure to the Athenians without a blow what they had been so long vainly striving to

<sup>1</sup> Aeschin. *F. L.* 29: Περδίκκας εἰς τὴν ἀρχὴν καταστάς ὑπὲρ Ἀμφιπόλεως ἐπολέμησε τῇ πόλει.

<sup>2</sup> Ps.-Dem. *c. Polycl.* 5: Προκοννήσιοι δὲ σύμμαχοι ὄντες ἰκέτευον ὑμᾶς ἐν τῷ δήμῳ βοηθῆσαι, λέγοντες ὅτι ὑπὸ Κυζικηνῶν κατέχονται τῷ πολέμῳ καὶ κατὰ γῆν καὶ κατὰ θάλατταν. It is very possible that Prokonnesos was actually a member of the Confederacy.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.* 6.

<sup>4</sup> See Höck, *de rebus ab Ath....gestis*, p. xxxi. ff., and *Hermes*, xxvi. p. 94 ff.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. especially that of Timomachos in respect of Stryme (Ps.-Dem. *c. Polycl.* 21 f.). Höck, *de rebus*, etc., p. xxxiv. seeks to justify his action.

<sup>6</sup> Dem. *c. Aristocr.* 158.

<sup>7</sup> Cf. A. Strazulla, *Di Kotys e Kersebleptes re di Tracia in Beiträge zur alten Gesch.* III. p. 327.

<sup>8</sup> Dem. *c. Aristocr.* 167.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.* 171, 176 ff.

<sup>10</sup> Schol. to Aesch. *F. L.* 31; Polyæn. III. 10. 8.

obtain. Amphipolis was promised to them in exchange for Pydna<sup>1</sup>.

*Raids of  
Alexander  
of Pherae  
(362 B.C.).*

Nearer home the position of Athens had changed for the worse. Alexander of Pherae had assumed an attitude of open hostility. His piratical attacks on the Athenian allies had caused Athens to destroy the records of her alliance with him, and to make common cause with his enemy, the Thessalian League (361–60 B.C.)<sup>2</sup>. Since the summer of 362 B.C. the Aegean had not been safe from Alexander's fleet. Tenos was occupied and plundered<sup>3</sup>, Peparethos was blockaded. Leosthenes, who was sent out to relieve the island, suffered a severe reverse, and lost 5 ships and 600 men<sup>4</sup>. This success Alexander followed up by a sudden descent upon the Peiraeus itself, causing thereby the greatest alarm. Chares was next appointed to take Leosthenes' place. For some reason, however, he abandoned the campaign in the Aegean, and sailed instead to Korkyra. His conduct there did great damage to the Athenian cause. He took part in the internal disturbances which were harassing the island, and by espousing the oligarchical interest, increased the feeling which prevailed against Athens among the members of the Confederacy<sup>5</sup>. Though such proceedings can hardly have met with

<sup>1</sup> Diod. xvi. 4. 1; Dem. *Olynth.* 2. 6 f.

<sup>2</sup> C.I.A. iv. (2), 59 b = Hicks and Hill 123. See above, p. 87, n. 2, and cf. Dem. *c. Aristocr.* 120.

<sup>3</sup> Ps.-Dem. *c. Polycl.* 4.

<sup>4</sup> Diod. xv. 95. Cf. Polyæn. vi. 2. 1, 2.

<sup>5</sup> Diod. xv. 95; Aen. *Tact.* 11. 13 f.: ἐν Κορκύρα δὲ ἐπανάστασιν δέον γενέσθαι ἐκ τῶν πλουσίων καὶ ὀλιγαρχικῶν τῷ δήμῳ (ἐπεδήμει δὲ καὶ Χάρης Ἀθηναῖος φρουρὰν ἔχων, ὅσπερ συνήθελε τῇ ἐπαναστάσει) ἐτεχνάσθη τοῖόνδε. Not improbably Korkyra was lost to the Confederacy from this time. See Schaefer, *Dem. u. s. Zeit.* i.<sup>2</sup> p. 152.

approval at Athens, it was evident that she could not control the conduct of her generals. Most likely these events brought about the downfall of Kallistratos, the great promoter of the Confederacy<sup>1</sup>.

In the first half of 357 B.C.<sup>2</sup> Athens gained a solitary *Recovery of Euboea* (357 B.C.) success, a welcome contrast to the gloom which prevailed elsewhere. Shortly after the battle of Leuktra the Euboeic cities had, as we have seen<sup>3</sup>, quitted the Confederacy and gone over to Thebes. Early in 357 B.C. disturbances occurred in the island and rendered necessary the despatch of a Theban force to secure the cities which had before entered into alliance with Thebes<sup>4</sup>. The malcontents appealed to Athens for assistance, and Timotheos urgently pressed the *demos* to seize this opportunity of recovering the island for the Confederacy<sup>5</sup>. An expedition, apparently under the command of Diokles<sup>6</sup>, was sent, and within thirty days completely subdued the island<sup>7</sup>. An inscription, dated 357-6 B.C.<sup>8</sup>, records the successful completion of the negotiations with the Euboeic cities, which were again

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Ps.-Dem. *c. Polycl.* 48, from which it is clear that Kallistratos was in banishment in 361-0 B.C.

<sup>2</sup> For the chronology, cf. Foucart, *Rev. Arch.* (N.S.), xxxv. (1878), p. 227 ff.

<sup>3</sup> Above, p. 81.

<sup>4</sup> Diod. xvi. 7. 2.

<sup>5</sup> Dem. *Cherson.* 74 f.

<sup>6</sup> Dem. *c. Meid.* 174.

<sup>7</sup> Aesch. *c. Ctes.* 85: ἐπειδὴ διέβησαν εἰς Εὐβοίαν Θηβαῖοι καταδουλώσασθαι τὰς πόλεις πειρώμενοι, ἐν πέντε ἡμέραις ἐβοηθήσατε αὐτοῖς καὶ ναυὶ καὶ πέζῃ δυνάμει, καὶ πρὶν τριάκονθ' ἡμέρας διελθεῖν ὑποσπόνδους Θηβαίους ἀφήκατε, κύριοι τῆς Εὐβοίας γενόμενοι, καὶ τὰς τε πόλεις αὐτὰς καὶ τὰς πολιτείας ἀπέδοτε ὀρθῶς καὶ δικαίως τοῖς παρακαταθεμένοις, οὐχ ἡγούμενοι δίκαιον εἶναι τὴν ὀργὴν ἀπομνημονεύειν ἐν τῷ πιστευθῆναι.

<sup>8</sup> C.I.A. II. 64 = Hicks and Hill 128.

admitted to the Confederacy<sup>1</sup>. Severe penalties were at this time proclaimed against those (no doubt belonging to the Theban party) who had attacked Eretria, and outlawry throughout the length and breadth of the Confederacy was threatened against any who should in future attack an allied city<sup>2</sup>.

About this date Philip showed his true intentions by seizing Amphipolis for himself and laying siege to Pydna<sup>3</sup>. Those who favoured the Athenians were banished from Amphipolis<sup>4</sup>. The Amphipolitans had sent to ask help from Athens, but their request was refused. Chares was, instead, sent to the Chersonese, where he obtained what appeared to be an important success, for Kersobleptes and Charidemos recognized the Athenian claims to the peninsula, Kardia alone being excepted<sup>5</sup>. But new troubles were to make it impossible for Athens to drive home her advantage.

*Dearth of  
informa-  
tion for  
this  
period.*

Before any attempt is made to sum up this, the middle period of the Confederacy's history, it should be admitted that the narrative of events given above is open to an obvious criticism. It may be urged, and not without a show of reason, that it is a history of Athens' foreign policy rather than a history of the

<sup>1</sup> Cf. 1. 8 ff.: *ἐπαιέσαι δὲ [τὸν δῆμον τὸν Καρυ]στίων καὶ [τοὺς πρ]έσ-β[ει]ς τῶν Καρυστίων [καὶ τὸν σύν]εδρον.*

Negotiations with Eretria, Chalkis, and Histiaea are also mentioned.

<sup>2</sup> C.I.A. II. 65. See above, p. 47.

<sup>3</sup> Diod. xvi. 8; Dem. *Olynth.* 1. 8.

<sup>4</sup> Diod. xvi. 8. 2. Cf. C.I.G. 2008 = Hicks and Hill 125 (banishment of Philon and Stratokles from Amphipolis).

<sup>5</sup> Dem. *c. Aristocr.* 173, 181. Cf. C.I.A. II. 65 b, probably the actual agreement between Chares and Amadokos, Berisades, and Kersobleptes.

Confederacy. The facts which bear directly upon the progress of the Confederacy are unfortunately very scanty. Yet they are sufficient to show that it still had a real existence. Hence it is not unfair to draw from the foreign policy of Athens inferences as to the condition of her allies. Though the details are lacking, it will be found that a clear picture can be given in outline.

At the very commencement of this period Athens *Summary.* is found making a bold attempt to extend her maritime Confederacy into a League which shall embrace a number of land states as well. This attempt proved a failure. No true increase of power resulted from the inclusion of the turbulent Peloponnesian states. They drop away one by one unnoticed, each to pursue its own ends. In 366 B.C. not one would lift a finger to help Athens to recover Oropos. On the other hand Athens was inevitably drawn into the conflicts of the Peloponnesians. Many of her new allies were also allies of Sparta. The invading Thebans ravaged their lands and thus furnished them with a legitimate claim to the protection of the Confederacy. The result was that Athens found herself compelled to enter into an alliance with Sparta. What must have been the feelings of the island communities, the original members of the Confederacy, when they saw their contributions being spent upon a war with which they had no real concern? It was now that they must have felt the need of something more than the mere power of making protest at the admission of undesirable members into the Confederacy<sup>1</sup>. Nor were practical demonstrations

<sup>1</sup> See above, p. 26 ff.



of the widespread discontent wanting. Euboea and Akarnania left the Confederacy and cast in their lot with Thebes. The Olynthian League also detached itself, partly no doubt by way of protest against the threatened Athenian occupation of Amphipolis, but also, we may well believe, from a conviction that it was useless to remain in a Confederacy whose resources were being squandered in the Peloponnese.

There is very little in the way of direct evidence to show how far the *Συνέδριον* was active in the period now before us. We find it consulted as to the acceptance of Dionysios' proposals in 368 B.C. It formally approved of the alliance with Arkadia, Elis, Achaea, and Phleius in 362-1 B.C. After the reconquest of Euboea, Karystos and probably the other towns of the island sent representatives to the Council of the allies. In 364-3 B.C. Timotheos was partially supplied with money for his Thracian and Chalkidian campaign out of the *συντάξεις* of the allies in the Thracian district. This is sufficient to show that in its essential principles the Confederacy remained unaltered.

Nevertheless it would seem to have lost much of its harmony in working. The shock of Leuktra and the subsequent policy of Athens had, as we have seen, produced some disintegration. This was not repaired as time went on. The naval expedition of Epameinondas presupposes an undercurrent of discontent among the members of the Confederacy, and this manifested itself in the falling away of Byzantium and in the temporary defection of Keos. It is clear also that Chios and Rhodes were then half inclined to

embark on the course which they adopted a few years later<sup>1</sup>.

It is impossible to decide whether these secessions were to any degree counterbalanced by fresh additions to the Confederacy. Athens won not a few possessions for herself. Samos, Sestos, Krithote, Pydna, and Methone were all brought under her power. But in no case is there evidence of spontaneous entry into the Confederacy, and the probabilities are against it<sup>2</sup>. There is more likelihood of such entry in the case of Leukas<sup>3</sup> and Prokonnesos<sup>4</sup>, though even in their case membership is not by any means certain. The recovery of the cities of Euboea in 358-7 B.C. was of importance, but cannot be regarded as more than a temporary rally of the Confederacy's failing powers.

The policy of Athens during these years bears undeniably a more self-seeking character, and shows less regard for the susceptibilities of the allies than it did during the opening period<sup>5</sup>. None of the various military and naval enterprises upon which she embarked, with the possible exception of her efforts to secure the Chersonese, was likely to bring any appreciable advantage to the allies. On the other hand, where their interests were vitally concerned, Athens

*Selfish  
character  
of Athe-  
nian  
policy.*

<sup>1</sup> Diod. xv. 79: εὐθὺς οὖν ὁ δῆμος (of Thebes) ἐψηφίσατο τριῆρεις μὲν ἑκατὸν ναυπηγεῖσθαι, νεώρια δὲ ταύταις ἴσα τὸν ἀριθμὸν, Ῥοδίου δὲ καὶ Χίου καὶ Βυζαντίου προτρέπεσθαι βοηθῆσαι ταῖς ἐπιβολαῖς. Cf. Von Stern, *Geschichte der spart. u. theb. Hegemonie*, p. 222: "die grösseren Seestädte, deren Bedeutung und Wohlstand auf Ackerbau, Handel, und Gewerbe beruhte, und die vor allen Dingen Frieden brauchten, waren in heftiger Opposition gegen die athenische Politik, welche sie in immer neue Kriege verwickelte."

<sup>2</sup> Busolt, p. 809, thinks otherwise.

<sup>3</sup> See above, p. 83.

<sup>4</sup> Ps.-Dem. c. *Polycl.* 5.

<sup>5</sup> Grote, viii. p. 232 ff.

proved but a lax guardian and leader. Alexander of Pherae was suffered to harass the Kyklades with his fleet, and to lay siege to Peparethos. Instead of suppressing these exasperating raids, Chares preferred to sail to Korkyra and to take part in the internal dissensions which prevailed in that city. His interference probably lost the island to the Confederacy. The reintroduction of the system of *kleruchies* at Samos, Potidaea, and the Chersonese was calculated to excite the deepest apprehension among the allies. Though not an actual violation of the principles of the Confederacy, it was in the highest degree impolitic. Nor was this all. It was only too plain that Athens was very ready to seize upon any excuse for infringing the autonomy of her allies. After the reconquest of the revolted Keos, the independence of the island was limited, both in judicial and commercial matters. The same spirit appears in the pronouncement, by Athenian *ψήφισμα* alone, of outlawry throughout the entire territory of the Confederacy<sup>1</sup>.

*Finances.* The finances of the Confederacy show no improvement. It is true that the number of ships in the Athenian fleet steadily increases<sup>2</sup>. The difficulty, however, was to man the vessels adequately<sup>3</sup>. Though

<sup>1</sup> Above, p. 47 ff.

<sup>2</sup> See Köhler, *Athen. Mitt.* vi. p. 28 ff. In 377-6 B.C. there were over 100 triremes (100 actually put out to sea). Cf. above, p. 13, n. 1. In 357-6 B.C. there were at least 283, and very possibly 383 (see C.I.A. II. 793, and cf. Keil, *Anon. Arg.* p. 205 ff.). Thirty-one of these had been built within the last 6 years. In 353-2 B.C. the number of triremes was 349 (C.I.A. II. 795).

<sup>3</sup> Cf. Köhler, *loc. cit.* "Obwohl uns für die ersten 20 Jahre des Bestehens der neuorganisierten Marine die Daten fehlen, ist doch unverkennbar, dass die Flotte ununterbrochen, anfangs in schnelle-

εἰσφοραὶ were imposed with great frequency<sup>1</sup>, the generals were compelled to maintain their crews out of their own resources, as best they might. Timotheos received nothing from the state for the expenses of his campaign against Samos, but supported his troops by plundering the enemy's country<sup>2</sup>. At Potidaea, though he received some assistance from the contributions of the members of the Confederacy in the Thracian district, he was forced to supplement this from his own resources<sup>3</sup>. Athenian generals were driven to sheer acts of robbery through their lack of funds, witness the unjustifiable attempt of Timomachos to seize Stryme, the possession of which was in dispute between Thasos and Maroneia<sup>4</sup>. There can be no doubt

rem, später in langsamerem Tempo vermehrt worden ist. Aber das Verhängniß Athens wollte es, dass, während das Flottenmaterial beständig wuchs, sich der persönliche und die Handhabung der Marinegesetze, wie dies aus den Urkunden und den Angaben der Redner hervorgeht, in umgekehrter Progression zunehmend verschlechterte. Durch dieses Missverhältniss ist es möglich geworden, dass um die Mitte des vierten Jahrhunderts im ägeischen Meere neben der athenischen eine zweite Seemacht in der makedonischen aufkommen konnte, die vom ersten Tage ihres Bestehens an gegen Athen gerichtet war."

<sup>1</sup> Dem. *Megal.* 12: ἐπεισαν ὑμᾶς...ὑπὲρ...τῆς Λακεδαιμονίων σωτηρίας καὶ χρήματ' εἰσφέρειν καὶ τοῖς σώμασι κινδυνεύειν (369 B.C.); [Xen.] *περὶ πόρων*, 3. 7: πολλὰ μὲν εἰσήνεγκεν ἡ πόλις ὅτε Ἀρκάσι ἐβοήθει ἐπὶ Λυσιστράτου ἡγουμένου, πολλὰ δὲ ἐπὶ Ἡγησιλέω (362 B.C.). Cf. Ps.-Dem. *c. Polycl.* 8 ff. (362-1 B.C.), a passage which is especially instructive for the financial position of Athens at the time.

<sup>2</sup> Isokr. *Antid.* 111: ταύτην (Samos) οὔτε πλέον οὔτ' ἔλαττον παρ' ὑμῶν λαβῶν οὔτε παρὰ τῶν συμμάχων ἐκλέξας, ἐν δέκα μηνὶν ἐξεπολιόρηκῃσιν ὀκτακισχιλίους πελτασταῖς καὶ τριήρεσι τριάκοντα, καὶ τούτοις ἅπασιν ἐκ τῆς πολεμίας τὸν μισθὸν ἀπέδωκεν.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.* 113: Ποτείδαιαν...εἶλεν ἀπὸ τῶν χρημάτων ὧν αὐτὸς ἐπόρισε καὶ τῶν συντάξεων τῶν ἀπὸ Θράκης.

<sup>4</sup> Ps.-Dem. *c. Polycl.* 22. For the financial straits of Timomachos

that the expenses of campaigning were increased, and the conduct of warfare adversely affected, by the extensive employment of mercenary troops<sup>1</sup>.

The character of this period may thus be summed up in brief. The Confederacy shows decided symptoms of decline, some members actually falling away, others betraying unmistakable signs of disaffection. Athens indeed extends her possessions in the mere geographical sense, but her foreign policy shows a lack of reasoned purpose. There is nothing in it calculated to awake a hearty cooperation on the part of the allies, much on the contrary likely to alarm and unsettle them. The time had come when the prevailing discontent was to assume a practical form.

cf. *ibid.* § 23: ...τῶν ἀρχαίων ναυτῶν...ὠφελουμένων...βραχέα, ὅσα ἐγὼ δυναίμην ἐκάστῳ δανειζόμενος ἐπαρκέσαι πρὸς ᾧ πρότερον εἶχον παρ' ἐμοῦ, ἐπεὶ ὁ γε στρατηγὸς οὐδὲ τὸ ἐφ' ἡμέραν τροφήν διαρκῆ εἶδιδον.

<sup>1</sup> Isokr. *Pax*, 46 (an exaggeration, perhaps, but containing a basis of truth): ἐς τοῦτο δὲ μωρίας ἐληλύθαμεν, ὥστ' αὐτοὶ μὲν ἐνδεεῖς τῶν καθ' ἡμέραν ἐσμέν, ξενοτροφεῖν δ' ἐπικεχειρήκαμεν, καὶ τοὺς συμμαχοὺς τοὺς ἡμετέρους αὐτῶν ἰδίους λυμαινόμεθα καὶ δασμολογοῦμεν, ἵνα τῶν ἀπάντων ἀνθρώπων ἐχθροῖς τὸν μισθὸν ἐκπορίζωμεν. This, though written in 355 B.C., may well be applied to the present period.

Cf. also Dem. *Phil.* 1. 24: ἐξ οὗ δ' αὐτὰ καθ' αὐτὰ τὰ ξενικὰ ὑμῖν στρατεύεται, τοὺς φίλους νικᾷ καὶ τοὺς συμμαχοὺς κ.τ.λ., a charge which also applies to a time before 351 B.C.

## CHAPTER V.

ATHENS AT WAR WITH HER ALLIES. DECAY AND  
EXTINCTION OF THE CONFEDERACY. FINAL  
PERIOD (357-338 B.C.).

THE causes of discontent which existed in the Confederacy were, as we have seen, many and serious. Yet these alone might not have been sufficient to bring about an open secession. The impetus required was, however, supplied from without. Maussollos, the powerful dynast of Karia, was anxious to get into his power the islands lying off the coast of Asia Minor, and with this object in view did his utmost to foment the feeling of discontent against Athens. It was in reliance on the help of Maussollos that Chios, Rhodes, and Kos<sup>1</sup> revolted. These cities were joined by Byzantium, which had previously withdrawn from the Confederacy<sup>2</sup>, while it is not unlikely that Perinthos and Selymbria seized this opportunity of regaining their independence<sup>3</sup>. Erythrae, too, which had entered

*Intrigues  
of Maus-  
sollos.  
Outbreak  
of war  
(357 B.C.).*

<sup>1</sup> Kos must have joined the Confederacy, though we do not know at what time.

<sup>2</sup> Diod. xvi. 7; Dem. *Rhod.* 3 f.

<sup>3</sup> For Selymbria, cf. Dem. *Rhod.* 26.



into close relations with Timotheos in 365 B.C.<sup>1</sup>, now severed its connection with Athens, receiving the support of Maussollos<sup>2</sup>. The revolt was essentially oligarchic in character, and was accompanied by the overthrow of the existing democracies<sup>3</sup>. It may be suspected, also, though positive evidence is lacking, that Philip's influence was at work in bringing about these defections, and that Thebes was not altogether idle; for Thebes would desire revenge for the loss of Euboea, and Philip would wish to divert Athenian attention from his schemes in Macedonia and Thrace. The immediate cause of the outbreak of hostilities was the conduct of Chares, who assumed an aggressive attitude towards Chios, Rhodes, and other allies<sup>4</sup>. The Athenians directed their first efforts towards recovering Chios, and in the autumn of 357 B.C. Chares attacked the place with his force on the land side, while Chabrias, who was present in the capacity of trierarch<sup>5</sup>, placed himself at the head of the fleet. An attack upon the harbour cost the life of Chabrias<sup>6</sup>, whose death most

<sup>1</sup> See above, p. 92, n. 2.

<sup>2</sup> See the decree passed in honour of the Maussollos, Hicks and Hill, 134 = Dittenberger, *Sylloge*, 1<sup>2</sup>, 107.

<sup>3</sup> This follows from Dem. *Rhod.* 19, together with Arist. *Pol.* viii. (v.), 1304 b, 25 ff.

<sup>4</sup> Thus far, I think, we may trust the *ὑπόθεσις* to Isokrates' speech on the peace. See Hahn, *N. Jahrb. f. cl. Phil.* 1876, p. 472 ff.; Judeich, *Kleinias. Stud.* p. 284 ff. Cf. Dem. *Rhod.* 3: ἠτιάσαντο μὲν γὰρ ἡμᾶς ἐπιβουλεύειν αὐτοῖς Χῖοι καὶ Βυζάντιοι καὶ Ῥόδιοι, καὶ διὰ ταῦτα συνέστησαν ἐφ' ἡμᾶς τὸν τελευταῖον τουτονὶ πόλεμον.

<sup>5</sup> Chabrias' name was removed from the list of strategi for 357-6 B.C. See C.I.A. iv. (2), 64, and cf. Meyer, *Gesch. d. Alt.* v. 1, p. 483 n. Nepos, *Chabr.* 4, says: erat in classe privatus, sed omnes, qui in magistratu erant, auctoritate anteibat.

<sup>6</sup> Diod. xvi. 7.

likely led to the abandonment of the siege. At any rate we hear no more about it. In the ensuing spring <sup>356 B.C.</sup> the revolted allies assumed the offensive. With a fleet of 100 ships they ravaged Imbros and Lemnos<sup>1</sup>, and then proceeded to lay siege to Samos. Many of the loyal members of the Confederacy in the Aegean had their lands devastated, and the booty thus won served to replenish the war-chest of the revolted allies. In the face of dangers such as these the Athenians durst not remain inactive. Garrisons under ἄρχοντες were placed in some of the allied cities (we have record of those in Andros<sup>2</sup> and Arkesine in Amorgos<sup>3</sup>), and a fresh fleet of 60 triremes was sent out under Iphikrates and Timotheos to join the 60 ships already commanded by Chares (summer of 356 B.C.). The united Athenian fleet sailed to attack Byzantium. It was, as Grote remarks<sup>4</sup>, of vital importance to Athens that the Hellespont should be kept clear for the passage of the corn-ships. This move had the effect of drawing off the hostile fleet from the siege of Samos. The Athenians, on their part, now left the Hellespont and went to meet their opponents, who had probably taken up their station at Chios<sup>5</sup>. The rival fleets met off

<sup>1</sup> Diod. xvi. 21.

<sup>2</sup> C.I.A. II. 62 (dated May, 356 B.C.). Directions are given for paying the *φρουροί* in Andros out of the *συντάξεις κατὰ τὰ δόγματα τῶν συμμάχων*. For this purpose Archedemos, one of the *στρατηγοί*, is instructed to collect arrears of contributions from the islands.

<sup>3</sup> *Bull. de Corr. Hell.* XII. p. 224 = Hicks and Hill 127. Androtion is praised for his moderation as ἄρχων, and for advancing money to pay the *φρουροί* without charging interest. Aesch. *c. Tim.* 107 f. shows us what misery an unscrupulous ἄρχων could inflict.

<sup>4</sup> *Hist. of Greece*, IX. p. 221.

<sup>5</sup> Possibly with these events is to be connected the decree in honour

*Athenian  
defeat at  
Embata.*

Embata, in the straits between Erythrae and Chios<sup>1</sup>, on a stormy day<sup>2</sup>. Chares was eager to fight, but Iphikrates and Timotheos refused on account of the roughness of the sea. The result was that Chares attacked by himself and suffered a reverse. In his exasperation he accused the other generals of having accepted bribes to avoid fighting<sup>3</sup>, and Iphikrates, Timotheos, and Menestheus (son of Iphikrates) were recalled to Athens to stand their trial. Aristophon and Chares were the principal accusers, and they obtained the condemnation of Timotheos in a hundred talents for receiving bribes from the Chians. Iphikrates and Menestheus were, however, acquitted. Timotheos retired into exile at Chalkis in Euboea (356-5 B.C.)<sup>4</sup>.

*Peace  
concluded;  
cities lost  
to the Con-  
federacy  
(355 B.C.).*

Chares was now left in sole command, but naval operations were rendered impossible by the lack of funds<sup>5</sup>. Accordingly, he seized the opportunity of taking service under Artabazos, satrap of Phrygia, who had revolted from Artaxerxes Ochos. He was completely

of Philiskos, of Sane (?) in Chalkidike, passed in June, 354 B.C. (C.I.A. II. 69; Dittenberger, 1<sup>2</sup>, 116). The *ἄρχοντες ἐν Ἑλλησπόντῳ* are specially charged to look after the interests of Philiskos, who had given valuable information, probably about the movements of the Byzantines.

<sup>1</sup> Polyæn. III. 2. 29; Steph. Byz. *s.v.* Ἐμβάτα. Cf. Thuc. III. 29. 2.

<sup>2</sup> Diod. XVI. 21; Nepos, *Timoth.* 3. 3.

<sup>3</sup> Dein. *c. Dem.* 14; *id. c. Philocl.* 17: *ἐκατὸν ταλάντων τιμήσαντες ὅτι χρήματ' αὐτὸν Ἀριστοφῶν ἔφη παρὰ Σίων εἰληφέναι καὶ Ῥοδίων.*

<sup>4</sup> For the date cf. Beloch, *Att. Pol.* p. 363 f.; Hahn, *N. Jahrb. f. cl. Phil.* 1876, p. 471 f.

See also Nepos, *Timoth.* 3. 4, 5; *id. Iphicr.* 3. 3, 4; Isokr. *Antid.* 129.

<sup>5</sup> This is a fair conclusion to draw from Isokr. *Areop.* 9, 10, 83; Aeschin. *F. L.* 70 ff.; Dem. *Phil.* 1. 24; and Diod. XVI. 22: *σπεύδων τῆς δαπάνης ἀπαλλάξει τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἐπεχείρησε πράξει παραβόλῳ.*

successful in his campaign, and defeated the troops of the Great King. In return ample pay for his mercenaries was forthcoming<sup>1</sup>. But Artaxerxes knew how weak Athens really was. The threat of an invasion was sufficient to induce her to order Chares to withdraw from Persian territory<sup>2</sup>. This brought the Social War to an end. Though there was a strong party in favour of carrying on the war<sup>3</sup>, Eubulos saw that it was necessary for Athens to yield, in order that she might have time for recuperation, and his advice prevailed<sup>4</sup>. Peace was concluded and the independence of Chios, Kos, Rhodes, and Byzantium recognized<sup>5</sup>. Selymbria<sup>6</sup> and Perinthos<sup>7</sup> (the latter now, as always, under the influence of its powerful neighbour Byzantium) took this opportunity to assert their independence. Now, if not before, Korkyra tacitly withdrew from the Confederacy<sup>8</sup>, an example which was followed a year

<sup>1</sup> Diod. *loc. cit.*; Plut. *Arat.* 16.

<sup>2</sup> Diod. xvi. 22. 2.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. Isokr. *Pax*, 5 f., 51.

<sup>4</sup> Schol. to Dem. *Olynth.* 3. 28: τοῦ δὲ τοιαύτην γενέσθαι τὴν εἰρήνην αἴτιος Εὐβουλος οὕτω διοικῶν τὰ πράγματα. Cf. [Xen.] *περὶ πόρων, pass.*, and Isokr. *Pax*, *pass.*

<sup>5</sup> This, no doubt, is the true meaning of the Schol. to *Olynth.* 3. 33: αὐτονόμους εἶσαι πάντας τοὺς συμμάχους. Cf. Dem. *Pax*, 25; Isokr. *Pax*, 6, 16.

<sup>6</sup> Dem. *Rhod.* 26: Σηλυμβρίαν, πόλιν ὑμετέραν ποτὲ σύμμαχον οὖσαν (spoken in 353 B.C.).

<sup>7</sup> Plut. *Dem.* 17 (quoted by Hœck, *de rebus etc.*, p. xxxix.): Βυζαντίους ἐβοήθησε καὶ Περινθίους ὑπὸ τοῦ Μακεδόνα πολεμουμένοις πείσας τὸν δῆμον ἀφέντα τὴν ἔχθραν καὶ τὸ μεμῆσθαι τῶν περὶ τὸν συμμαχικὸν ἡμαρτημένων ἐκατέρους πόλεμον ἀποστεῖλαι δύναμιν αὐτοῖς. Cf. also Schol. to Aeschin. *F. L.* 81.

<sup>8</sup> Dem. *Cor.* 234: δύναμιν τοίνυν εἶχεν ἢ πόλις τοὺς νησιώτας, οὐχ ἅπαντας, ἀλλὰ τοὺς ἀσθενεστάτους· οὔτε γὰρ Χίος οὔτε Ῥόδος οὔτε Κέρκυρα μεθ' ἡμῶν ἦν (355 B.C.). Cf. *id. c. Timocr.* 202.

Very likely, however, Korkyra quitted the Confederacy as early as 361-0 B.C. See above, p. 100, n. 5.

or two later by Methymna and Mytilene<sup>1</sup>. All that remained of the Confederacy was Euboea and the smaller islands of the Thracian and Aegean seas, together with a few places on the Thracian coast, destined shortly to fall into Philip's hands (355 B.C.)<sup>2</sup>.

*Advance  
of Philip.*

For while Athens had been absorbed in the war with her allies, Philip had been by no means idle. He captured Pydna<sup>3</sup> and made alliance with the Olynthians, propitiating them by the present of Potidaea, from which place he expelled the Athenian kleruchs (356 B.C.)<sup>4</sup>. He next seized Krenides and founded Philippi on its site<sup>5</sup>. This last move brought him into collision with

<sup>1</sup> Dem. *Rhod.* 19: *Χίων ὀλιγαρχουμένων καὶ Μυτιληναίων* (in 353 B.C.). As in 354-3 B.C. a crown was given to Athene by the Mytilenaeans, it is probable that they did not leave the Confederacy till 353 B.C. See C.I.A. II. 699, l. 14: [*στέφανος Μ*] *Μυτιληναίων ἀνάθημα*. Cf. also [Dem.] *Synt.* 8. In 347-6 B.C. we find a tyrant Kammas in Mytilene, hostile to Athens (Dem. *c. Boeot.* (XL.) 37). Methymna also fell under tyrants. Cf. Isokr. *Ep.* VII. 8; C.I.A. IV. (2), 141 = Hicks and Hill, 143.

<sup>2</sup> Dem. *Cor.* 234, quoted above, p. 113, n. 8. In 348-7 B.C. crowns were presented to Athene by Paros and Andros, and possibly by Thasos and Naxos (C.I.A. II. 700). This seems to show that these places remained in the Confederacy. C.I.A. IV. (2), 135 (f), dated by Köhler after 350 B.C., makes it probable that Keos continued to send a *σύνεδρος* to Athens and to pay her *σύνταξις*.

Beloch, *Griech. Gesch.* II. p. 500, n. 1, gives, as members of the Confederacy about 350 B.C., the *Kyklades*, Euboea, the northern Sporades, Thasos, Samothrake, Aenos, Prokonnesos, Tenedos, Ikaros, Astypalaea (?). In 355 B.C. Neapolis, Abdera, and Maroneia were still members. The amount of information we possess, however, hardly warrants the drawing up of such a list. Cf. also Schaefer, *Dem. u. s. Zeit.* I.<sup>2</sup> p. 173 f., where such evidence as exists is given.

<sup>3</sup> Diod. XVI. 8. 3.

<sup>4</sup> Diod. *loc. cit.*; Dem. *Phil.* II. 20. Diodorus incorrectly says that Philip made over Pydna also to the Olynthians. The capture of Potidaea took place just before the birth of Alexander. See Plut. *Alex.* 3.

<sup>5</sup> Diod. XVI. 8.

Ketriporis of Thrace, who joined Lyppeios of Paeonia and Grabos of Illyria in making alliance with Athens in July 356 B.C.<sup>1</sup> Philip, however, defeated the hostile coalition before any help could be given by Athens, even had she been in a position to send it<sup>2</sup>. In the next year (early summer of 355 B.C.) Neapolis, finding herself threatened by Philip's advance, sent to Athens to appeal for assistance<sup>3</sup>. The appeal was not altogether fruitless, for the next year Chares is found with a fleet in the neighbourhood of Neapolis<sup>4</sup>. Though for the present Philip's activity on the coast of Thrace ceased, the fate of the allies of Athens in that district was as good as sealed.

The position of Athens in 355 B.C. is brought vividly before us by Isokrates' pamphlet on the Peace and that of Xenophon on the Revenues<sup>5</sup>. Whatever may be thought of the correctness of the picture of Athens' treatment of her allies as drawn by Isokrates, there can be no doubt as to the profundity of the exhaustion which his tract reveals<sup>6</sup>. The mercenaries employed in the recent wars had cost over a thousand talents<sup>7</sup>. So great was the financial need that the

*Position  
of Athens  
in 355 B.C.*

<sup>1</sup> C.I.A. II. 66 b = Hicks and Hill 131. Cf. especially l. 45: Κρη[η]-νιδ[ας] συννε[ξ]αι[ρήσω μετὰ Κερριπ]ό[ρ]ιου.

<sup>2</sup> Diod. XVI. 22; Plut. *Alex.* 3. Cf. Höck, *Hermes*, xxvi. p. 106.

<sup>3</sup> C.I.A. II. 66 = Hicks and Hill 132.

<sup>4</sup> Neapolis was a member of the Confederacy. See C.I.A. II. 17, and cf. above, p. 69. For Chares, see Polyæn. IV. 2. 22, and below, p. 116.

<sup>5</sup> I follow Schaefer's view (*Dem. u. s. Zeit*, I.<sup>2</sup> p. 193) as to date and authorship. No other date suits the arguments of the tract so well as 355 B.C. Cf. A. Pintschovius, *Xen. de vect.* v. 9, *Progr. Hadersleben*, 1900.

<sup>6</sup> Cf. §§ 19, 21, 69.

<sup>7</sup> Isokr. *Areop.* 9.



contributions of the allies had to be raised in advance<sup>1</sup>, and the amount so obtained only reached the meagre total of 45 talents. Indeed by her failure to control her generals and by her neglect of the interests of her allies, Athens had forfeited her right to lead a Confederacy<sup>2</sup>. From this point of view Isokrates was fully justified in advising Athens to give up her empire<sup>3</sup>. Yet it was only natural that she should endeavour to keep the Confederacy alive, even after all its importance had vanished. Such melancholy glimpses as we can catch of it, up to the time of its final dissolution, must not be neglected.

*Continued  
aggressions of  
Philip.*

In the spring, probably, of 354 B.C., at the time of the Theban expedition to Asia under Pammenes, Philip seized Abdera and Maroneia. We cannot suppose that Neapolis escaped capture for long, though Chares at this time used it as a base of operations, and gained some success over Macedonian mercenaries on the Hebros<sup>4</sup>. He followed this up by recapturing Sestos, which was given over to Athenian kleruchs (353 B.C.)<sup>5</sup>. Kersobleptes had, meanwhile<sup>6</sup>, entered into negotiations

<sup>1</sup> Dem. *Cor.* 234.

<sup>2</sup> Isokrates' attacks upon the Athenian imperial policy, especially in *The Peace*, are no doubt to be considerably discounted. Busolt, p. 823 ff., discusses the question in detail, and his conclusion may in the main be accepted. The causes given in the text, rather than a deliberate policy of oppression, seem to me to have been responsible for the loss of the allies.

<sup>3</sup> *Pax*, 64.

<sup>4</sup> Polyæn. iv. 2. 22: Φίλιππος τὴν Ἀβδηριτῶν καὶ Μαρωνιτῶν καταλαβῶν ἐπανήει, καὶ ναῦς ἔχων πολλὰς καὶ στρατιὰν περὶ τὴν ἄγων. Σάρης περὶ Νέαν πόλιν ἐναυλόχει κ.τ.λ.

<sup>5</sup> Diod. xvi. 34; C.I.A. II. 795, l. 133 f.

<sup>6</sup> Disregarding the obligations entered into with Athens in 357 B.C. See above, p. 102, n. 5, and cf. Höck, *Hermes*, xxvi. p. 104 f.; Strazulla,

with Philip and Pammenes against the Athenians, but the further advance of Philip was checked by Amadokos, king of the Odrysae<sup>1</sup>. Hereupon Kersobleptes thought it advisable to conciliate Athens by again surrendering the Chersonese with the exception of Kardias<sup>2</sup>.

Foiled for the time being in this direction, Philip turned against Athens' last possession on the Macedonian coast, Methone, and laid siege to it. Thanks to the slackness of the Athenians the place fell into his hands (353 B.C.)<sup>3</sup>.

Thus was Athenian influence on the Macedonian and Thracian coasts at an end, and the allies here lost, with the exception of Aenos<sup>4</sup>. For the moment Philip's advance towards the Chersonese was stayed by his operations in Thessaly, where his attempt to pass Thermopylae was checked by resolute action on the part of Athens<sup>5</sup>. But this only drove him to renew his activity in the direction of the East. In November, 352 B.C., he was besieging Heraeon Teichos, a town on the Propontis near Perinthos<sup>6</sup>, thus threatening the

*Di Kotys e Kersobleptes re di Tracia (Beiträge zur alten Gesch., III. p. 328).*

<sup>1</sup> Dem. c. *Aristocr.* 183: Φιλίππου γὰρ εἰς Μαρώνειαν ἐλθόντος ἔπεμψε (sc. Kersobleptes) πρὸς αὐτὸν Ἀπολλωνίδην, πίστεις δοῦς ἐκείνῳ καὶ Παμμένει· καὶ εἰ μὴ κρατῶν τῆς χώρας Ἀμάδοκος ἀπέειπε Φιλίππῳ μὴ ἐπιβαίνειν, οὐδὲν ἂν ἦν ἐν μέσῳ πολεμεῖν ἡμᾶς πρὸς Καρδιανούς ἢ δὴ καὶ Κερσοβλέπτῃν.

<sup>2</sup> Diod. xvi. 34.

<sup>3</sup> Diod. xvi. 34 (353-2 B.C.). The event is also given by error in xvi. 31 under 354-3 B.C. Cf. Dem. *Phil.* i. 35: *id. Olynth.* i. 9.

<sup>4</sup> Ps.-Dem. c. *Theocr.* 37.

<sup>5</sup> Diod. xvi. 38.

<sup>6</sup> Cf. Herod. iv. 90.

Athenian kleruchs in the Chersonese<sup>1</sup>. This time Amadokos was forced to give him assistance<sup>2</sup>. Byzantium and Perinthos also furnished help<sup>3</sup>, and Athens thus saw former members of her Confederacy in alliance with her deadliest foe. It was not until September, 351 B.C., that Charidemos was sent to oppose Philip<sup>4</sup>; he was now no longer a mere mercenary chief, but a duly elected *στρατηγός*. Instead, however, of directing his efforts against Philip, he appears to have given assistance to the revolted satrap Orontes<sup>5</sup>. On this occasion the *συντάξεις* of the cities of Lesbos (no doubt the smaller ones, Eresos, Antissa, and Pyrrha<sup>6</sup>) were assigned to the three *στρατηγοί*, Chares, Charidemos, and Phokion (probably 351–350 B.C.).

*Euboea  
lost to  
the Con-  
federacy  
(349 B.C.).*

Of more direct bearing upon the decline and fall of the Confederacy was the revolt of Euboea in 349 B.C. Philip had evidently been tampering with the cities of the island for some time past<sup>7</sup>. Plutarch, tyrant of Eretria, now applied to Athens for help, ostensibly as a supporter of the Athenian interests<sup>8</sup>. A force was sent out under Phokion in the February, and, in spite of the treachery of Plutarch, won a victory at Tamynae<sup>9</sup>.

<sup>1</sup> Dem. *Olynth.* III. 4 f.; for these events, cf. Höck, *Hermes*, xxvi. p. 108 ff.

<sup>2</sup> Harpokration, s.v. Ἀμάδοκος.

<sup>3</sup> Schol. to Aeschin. *F. L.* 81.

<sup>4</sup> Dem. *Olynth.* III. 5.

<sup>5</sup> See C.I.A. II. 108. For the date, cf. Meyer, *Gesch. d. Alt.* v. p. 487, and Beloch, *Griech. Gesch.* II. p. 497 n.

<sup>6</sup> Cf. above, p. 114, n. 1.

<sup>7</sup> Dem. *Phil.* I. 37, 38; Plut. *Phoc.* 12.

<sup>8</sup> Plut. *loc. cit.*; Dem. *Pax*, 5.

<sup>9</sup> See Plut. *Phoc.* 12–14; Aeschin. c. *Ctes.* 86–88; Dem. c. *Meid.* 132, 161 f. Cf. Ps.-Dem. c. *Boeot.* (xxxix.), 16.

But the success was by no means decisive. The resources of Athens were being drained by the simultaneous calls of Olynthos and Euboea<sup>1</sup>, and Phokion's successor mismanaged the war<sup>2</sup>. The Athenians appear never to have regained their hold upon Euboea, which was thus lost to the Confederacy<sup>3</sup>. The fall of Olynthos, which under pressure of Philip's attack had possibly rejoined the Confederacy<sup>4</sup>, deprived Athens of any shadow of influence that might remain to her in the cities of the Chalkidike<sup>5</sup>.

The Confederacy still maintained a formal existence. *Readmission of Mytilene (347 B.C.)*. It was recognized by the Olynthian refugees when they petitioned for exemption from the *μετοίκιον* at Athens in 348 B.C., after the capture of their city by Philip<sup>6</sup>. In the following year Mytilene, which under the tyrant Kammes had been hostile to Athens, appears to have reentered the Confederacy upon his expulsion<sup>7</sup>. The part played by the *Συνέδριον* of the allies in the peace negotiations of 346 B.C. has already been discussed<sup>8</sup>. It shows clearly that the Confederacy had, as indeed we should expect, become merely an empty name, and

<sup>1</sup> Ps.-Dem. *c. Neaer.* 3, 4.

<sup>2</sup> Plut. *Phoc.* 14.

<sup>3</sup> See Dem. *F. L.* 326. Possibly Karystos remained faithful. Cf. [Heges.] *Hal.* 38, and Beloch, *Griech. Gesch.* II. p. 504.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. Philoch. frag. 132; Hicks and Hill, 138 a (= Wilhelm, *Comptes Rendus de l'Acad. des Inscr.* 1900, p. 524 ff.). See, however, Wilamowitz, in *Hermes*, xxxvii. p. 311 and Francotte, *De la condition des étrangers* (Louvain, 1903), p. 34, n. 2.

<sup>5</sup> See above, p. 94, n. 2.

<sup>6</sup> If the conjectures of Wilhelm are to be trusted, *loc. cit.*

<sup>7</sup> C.I.A. II. 109 and IV (2), p. 36 = Hicks and Hill 139. In I. 13 f.: τὰ χρήματα τὰ ἐκ [τῆς συντρ]άξεως are mentioned.

<sup>8</sup> Above, p. 33 ff.

that the few and insignificant allies who remained were entirely subservient to Athens.

*Loss of  
Aenos  
(341 B.C.).*

About 341 B.C. Athens lost Aenos, the last member of her Confederacy on the Thracian coast. The speech against Theokrines mentions that it had cast off its allegiance<sup>1</sup>. Nor indeed is this surprising considering that Philip was completely master of Thrace<sup>2</sup>.

*Loyalty of  
Tenedos  
(340 B.C.).*

In the course of the struggle with Philip, Athens formed several new alliances, but as Busolt remarks<sup>3</sup>, these allies did not become members of the Confederacy. They were attached to Athens by means of separate treaties. Such was the nature of the alliance made with Chalkis in 342 B.C.<sup>4</sup> and with Eretria in 341-0 B.C.<sup>5</sup> But one regular member of the Confederacy, Tenedos, proved faithful to the last. Probably about the time of the expedition which saved Byzantium from Philip (summer of 340 B.C.)<sup>6</sup>, loyal assistance was given by Tenedos and money lent. A decree dated 340-39 B.C. thanks the Tenedians for their services<sup>7</sup> and orders remission of their *σύνταξις* for a year and the repayment of their loan. This inscription, which gives the last direct notice of the Second Athenian Confederacy, sheds a gleam of brightness upon its close.

<sup>1</sup> § 37: τοὺς γὰρ Αἰνίου φασὶν οὐδὲ προσέχειν τῇ πόλει (340 B.C.).

<sup>2</sup> Diod. xvi. 71.

<sup>3</sup> p. 862.

<sup>4</sup> Aeschin. c. Ctes. 89 ff.

<sup>5</sup> C.I.A. iv. (2), 116 b; Dem. Cor. 79; Aeschin. c. Ctes. 100. The alliance is with the Athenians and their allies, but this does not involve membership of the Confederacy.

<sup>6</sup> Diod. xvi. 77.

<sup>7</sup> C.I.A. ii. 117 = Hicks and Hill 146. Cf. Wilhelm, *Hermes*, xxiv. p. 134 ff.; Szanto, *Athen. Mitt.* xiv. (1889), p. 145 ff.

The battle of Chaeroneia (August, 338 B.C.) dealt the deathblow to the Confederacy. "With the Athenians," says Pausanias, "Philip nominally made a treaty, but in reality he inflicted upon them the deepest injuries of all, for he wrested islands from them and deposed them from the empire of the sea<sup>1</sup>." Certain isolated possessions were left to Athens, probably Salamis, Delos, Samos, Lemnos, and Imbros<sup>2</sup>, but the Confederacy was at an end. It was indeed time for it to pass away, for it had long outlasted its original purpose, and had found no new aim in the striving after which it might usefully have prolonged its existence.

<sup>1</sup> Paus. i. 25. 3 (Frazer's translation).

<sup>2</sup> For the evidence, see Schaefer, *Dem. u. s. Zeit*, III.<sup>2</sup> 28.



## CHRONOLOGICAL SUMMARY.

YEAR B.C.

- 394—393** EUBULIDES. Victory of Pharnabazos and Konon at Knidos (August).  
Kos, Nisyros, Teos, Chios, Mytilene, Ephesos, Erythrae, Samos, Tenedos, and other places revolt from Sparta. Sestos and Abydos alone remain to her. Many of the islands enter into alliance with Athens.
- 391—390** NIKOTELES. Temporary recovery of Sparta. Ephesos, Samos, and Knidos fall away to her.
- 390—389** DEMOSTRATOS. Thrasybulos of Steiria sets out on his expedition (Spring).
- 389—388** ANTIPATER. Thrasybulos secures Medokos, king of the Odrysae, and his vassal Seuthes as allies of Athens.  
√Democracy established at Byzantium and a 10% duty imposed on goods brought from the Pontos. Kalchedon, the Chersonese, Thasos, Samothrake, Eresos and Antissa in Lesbos, Klazomenae and Halikarnassos brought into alliance with Athens. Revival of the 5% import and export duty of the First Confederacy. Definite attempt to refound the lost Athenian Empire.  
Death of Thrasybulos at Aspendos.
- 388—387** PYRGION. The Spartan Anaxibios surprised and slain in the Hellespont by Iphikrates.  
Antalkidas goes to the Great King and obtains a rescript favourable to Sparta.

## YEAR B.C.

- 387—386 THEODOTOS. Antalkidas returns to Abydos (Autumn). Destruction of an Athenian squadron commanded by Thrasybulos of Kollytos. The Athenian fleet ✓ cut off from the Aegean. Peace of Antalkidas (early 386). Athens forced to relinquish her project ✓ of refounding her empire. Chios, Mytilene, Byzantium, and probably several other cities remain on friendly terms with Athens. A definite alliance made with Chios (ἐπ' ἐλευθερίᾳ καὶ αὐτονομίᾳ).
- 386—385 MYSTICHIDES. Decree in honour of Hebrytelmis, king of the Odrysae.
- 380 DEMOPHILOS or PYTHEAS. Isokrates' *Panegyricus* published (Summer).
- 379—378 NIKON. (December.) Thebes freed from the Spartans. (Spring.) Raid of Sphodrias.  
An alliance made by Athens with Thebes.
- 378—377 NAUSINIKOS. Principles of a Confederacy to check Spartan aggression are agreed upon between Athens and Chios, Mytilene, Methymna, Rhodes, Byzantium and Thebes. These cities form the earliest members of the Confederacy.  
(February—March.) Manifesto issued setting forth the principles of the Confederacy. General invitation to join issued. Tenedos, Chalkis, Eretria, Arethusa, and Karystos are enrolled.
- 377—376 KALLIAS. Ikos and Perinthos become members.  
Chabrias assists the newly-won allies in Euboea and wins over Peparethos and Skiathos. Maroneia (Thrace) and Dion (Euboea) enter the Confederacy about this time.  
Renewed activity of the Spartans at sea under ✓ Pollis.
- 376—375 CHARISANDROS. (September.) Victory of Chabrias at Naxos. Naxos, Paros, and many of the Kyklades join the Confederacy. Athenae Diades (Euboea) and Poessa (Keos) probably become members.

## YEAR B.C.

The δῆμος of Korkyra joins the Confederacy. (Spring.) Chabrias sets out on his expedition to the N. Aegean, Timotheos on his voyage round the Peloponnese.

Chabrias gains Abdera, Thasos, the Olynthian League, Aenos, Samothrake, and Dikaea.

Timotheos wins Pronni (Kephallenia), restores the exiled δῆμος of Korkyra, and induces the Akarnanians and Alketas king of the Molossi (with his son Neoptolemos) to become members of the Confederacy<sup>1</sup>.

(June.) Victory of Timotheos over the Spartan Nikolochos at Alyzia.

375—374 HIPPODAMAS. (Aug.—Sept.) Formal enrolment of the Korkyraeans, Akarnanians, and Kephallenians. (Winter.) Timotheos, though in straits for money, remains in Ionian waters.

374—373 SOKRATIDES. (July.) Treaty concluded between Athens and Sparta. The King's Peace is reaffirmed. Timotheos lands democratic exiles on Zakynthos. War breaks out again. Spartan attempt to seize Korkyra fails.

(Spring.) A fresh Spartan expedition sent against Korkyra under Mnasippos. Appeal of the Korkyraeans to Athens; Stesikles sent with 600 men across land, and Timotheos commissioned to prepare a relief expedition.

(April.) Timotheos, finding his resources inadequate, sets out to win fresh allies for Athens. Jason of Pherae joins the Confederacy.

373—372 ASTEIOS. Dion in Thrace, Neapolis, Elaeus, Selymbria, the Astraeousii, Antissa and Eresos, Andros, Tenos, Histiaea, Mykonos, Keos, Amorgos, Siphnos and Sikinos also join.

Indignation at Athens at the delay of the expedition for the relief of Korkyra. Deposition of

<sup>1</sup> Some of these events no doubt belong to the following year.

YEAR B. C.

Timotheos, and the appointment of Iphikrates in his stead.

(November.) Trial and acquittal of Timotheos.

(Spring.) Iphikrates sails to relieve Korkyra, but the citizens secure their own safety. The *δῆμος* of Zakynthos is enrolled in the Confederacy.

Destruction of Plataea by Thebes. Thebes withdraws her representative from the *Συνέδριον*. Jason of Pherae secedes.

372—371 ALKISTHENES. Iphikrates remains with his fleet in the West. Financial straits.

(June.) Peace Congress at Sparta. A general peace concluded upon the basis of universal autonomy. Thebes refuses to recognize the independence of the Boeotian cities, and is excluded from the peace. Final severance of Thebes from the Confederacy.

371—370 PHRASIKLEIDES. (July.) Battle of Leuktra.

Conference of the Peloponnesian states with Athens. Elis excepted, the former allies of Sparta join the Athenian Confederacy.

The Euboean cities and the Akarnanians quit the Confederacy and join Thebes.

370—369 DYSKINETOS. Sparta appeals to Athens for help against the invading Thebans. Iphikrates harasses Epameinondas' retreat.

(Spring.) Formal alliance concluded between Athens and Sparta.

369—368 LYSISTRATOS. Iphikrates off Amphipolis. Defection of the Olynthian League from the Confederacy. Uneasiness of the allies at the policy of Athens. Envoys sent from Mytilene.

Leukas probably joins the Confederacy.

Envoys from Dionysios of Syracuse in Athens. A decree passed in his honour.

YEAR B.C.

- 368—367** NAUSIGENES. Alliance of Athens with Alexander of Pherae.  
 (Feb.—March.) Alliance between Athens and Dionysios of Syracuse.  
 Abortive peace congress at Delphi under the auspices of Philiskos.  
 Greek envoys proceed to Susa. Athens is ordered to disarm her fleet and to give up Amphipolis.
- 367—366** POLYZELOS. Thebes fails to enforce the Great King's rescript. Athenian claims to Amphipolis now recognized by Persia.  
 Oropos seized by Thebes. The Peloponnesian members of the Confederacy refuse help to Athens. Attack made at home upon Kallistratos and Chabrias.  
 Alliance of Athens with Arkadia. Unsuccessful attempt to seize Korinth.  
 (Summer.) General Peace, except between Sparta and Thebes.
- 366—365** KEPHISODOROS. Timotheos lays siege to Samos and captures it after a ten months' blockade. He interferes in the affairs of Erythrae.  
 Kleruchy established in Samos.
- 365—364** CHION. Timotheos assists Ariobarzanes and obtains possession of Sestos and Krithote. Kleruchs are probably settled in these places.  
 Timotheos supersedes Iphikrates as commander in the Macedonian and Thracian districts.
- 364—363** TIMOKRATES. Timotheos captures Pydna and Methone, Potidaea and Torone. He receives help from Menelaos, prince of the Lynkestae, and from Perdikkas of Macedon.  
 Thebes opens negotiations with Rhodes, Chios, and Byzantium with a view to detaching them from Athens.  
 (Spring.) Naval expedition of Epameinondas.

## YEAR B.C.

- Byzantium quits the Confederacy. Keos revolts. The stability of the Confederacy shaken.
- 363—362** CHARIKLEIDES. Chabrias recovers Keos. Counter-revolution at Iulis quelled by Aristophon. Commercial and judicial limitations imposed on Keos.  
Battle of Mantinea (first part of July).
- 362—361** MOLON. Alliance between Athens and her allies and the Arkadians, Elis, Achaea, and Phleius.  
Potidaea occupied by Athenian kleruchs. Piratical raids of Alexander of Pherae. Tenos and Peparethos attacked. Leosthenes defeated. Alexander raids the Peiraeus.  
Failure of the Athenian generals to secure control of the Hellespont.
- 361—360** NIKOPHEMOS. Alliance between Athens and the Thessalian League against Alexander of Pherae.  
Chares takes the side of the oligarchs of Korkyra. Probable loss of the island to the Confederacy.  
Downfall of Kallistratos.  
Kotys captures Sestos. Failure of Athenian attempts to recover Amphipolis.  
Reinforcement of the kleruchy at Samos.
- 360—359** KALLIMEDES. Timotheos renews the attack on Amphipolis without success.  
Failure of Kephisodotos and Chabrias to secure the Chersonese.  
Death of Kotys of Thrace.
- 359—358** EUCHARISTOS. Growing discontent among the members of the Confederacy.
- 358—357** KEPHISODOTOS. Recovery of Euboea for the Confederacy (early part of 357).
- 357—356** AGATHOKLES. Settlement of Euboea.  
Philip captures Amphipolis and lays siege to Pydna.  
Chares recovers the Chersonese for Athens, with the exception of Kardia.



## YEAR B.C.

Chios, Rhodes, and Kos revolt from the Confederacy under the influence of Maussollos of Karia. They are joined by Byzantium, and probably by Perinthos and Selymbria.

Chares and Chabrias attack Chios unsuccessfully. Death of Chabrias.

Athenian *ἀρχοντες* placed in many of the cities of the Confederacy.

The revolted cities take the offensive. Lemnos and Imbros are ravaged. Samos besieged.

Philip captures Pydna, makes alliance with Olynthos, and founds Philippi.

356—355 **ELPINES.** (July.) Alliance between Athens and the kings of Thrace, Paeonia, and Illyria against Philip.

Chares is reinforced by a fleet of sixty triremes under Iphikrates and Timotheos. The united fleet sails against Byzantium. Siege of Samos abandoned. Defeat of the Athenians at Embata.

Iphikrates, Timotheos, and Menestheus prosecuted by Aristophon and Chares. Timotheos is condemned and retires into exile at Chalkis.

Owing to lack of money Chares takes service with Artabazos against Artaxerxes. He wins a decisive victory.

Artaxerxes demands the withdrawal of Chares under threat of war. Athens forced to come to terms with her revolted allies. Chios, Rhodes, Kos, Perinthos, and Selymbria lost to the Confederacy.

Continued advance of Philip. Neapolis appeals to Athens for help (May).

Isokrates, *On the Peace*. Xenophon, *On the Revenues*.

355—354 **KALLISTRATOS.** Chares carries on operations against Philip from Neapolis. Philip seizes Abdera and Maroneia (Spring).

353—352 **THUDEMOS.** Mytilene and probably Methymna fall away from the Confederacy.

## YEAR B.C.

Capture of Sestos by Chares. The place is given over to Athenian kleruchs.

Philip takes Methone.

351—350 THEELOS. The *συντάξεις* of the cities of Lesbos remaining in the Confederacy granted to Chares, Charidemos, and Phokion for the support of the revolted satrap Orontes.

350—349, 349—348 APOLLODOROS, KALLIMACHOS. Revolt of the cities of Euboea from the Confederacy. Victory of Phokion at Tamynae. The victory fruitless. Euboea lost to the Confederacy.

Possible re-enrolment of Olynthos.

348—347 THEOPHILOS. Philip captures Olynthos.

347—346 THEMISTOKLES. Mytilene (probably) re-enters the Confederacy.

Peace of Philokrates. Resolutions of the *Συνέδριον* rejected.

342—341, 341—340 SOSIGENES, NIKOMACHOS. Aenos withdraws from the Confederacy.

340—339 THEOPHRASTOS. Philip's attack on Byzantium repulsed.

Tenedos thanked for help given against Philip and granted remission of *σύνταξις*.

338—337 CHAERONDAS. (August.) Battle of Chaeroneia. Final break up of the Second Athenian Confederacy.

## APPENDIX.

IT was only after the above dissertation was in type that I obtained access to P. Panske's excellent article *De contributionibus societatis alterius maritimae earumque exactione quaestiones epigraphicae in Griechische Studien Hermann Lipsius zum sechzigsten Geburtstag dargebracht*. Leipzig: 1894. Upon this article Meyer's conclusions (*Gesch. des Alt.*, v. p. 383) are probably based. Panske concludes that the nominal change from *φόροι* to *συντάξεις* corresponded to a real change in the method of assessment. Whereas the *φόροι* of the First Confederacy had been determined by Athenian *ψήφισμα* alone, the *συντάξεις* of the Second could not be imposed *παρὰ τὰ δόγματα τῶν συμμάχων*, i.e. the *Συνέδριον* settled the amount of the contribution by a *δόγμα* which was confirmed by an Athenian *ψήφισμα*. Now it is quite probable that this conclusion is true as far as the theory of the Confederacy is concerned. As, however, I have remarked above (p. 27, n. 2) the phrase *παρὰ* or *κατὰ τὰ δόγματα τῶν συμμάχων* appears to be a kind of formula equivalent to "contrary" or "according to the foundation principles of the Confederacy." Hence its occurrence in inscriptions is not of very high value as evidence for actual practice.

On p. 9 f. of his article Panske maintains that the *συντάξεις* could not have been paid into the Treasury of the Allies, but were handed over to Athenian officials. I cannot see that he has brought forward adequate evidence for his assertion. On the contrary it seems far more likely that according to theory they were to be paid to officials appointed by the Allies themselves, though doubtless, as so often happened in the course of the Confederacy's history, the rule was in practice much disregarded.