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THE
HISTORY OF GREECE.

VOL. VI.

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THE
HISTORY OF GREECE.

BY
WILLIAM MITFORD, ESQ.

A New Edition,
WITH NUMEROUS ADDITIONS AND CORRECTIONS.

TO WHICH IS PREFIXED
A BRIEF MEMOIR OF THE AUTHOR,
BY HIS BROTHER, LORD REDESDALE.



IN TEN VOLUMES.

VOL. VI.

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CONTENTS OF VOLUME VI.

CHAPTER XXV.

AFFAIRS OF GREECE, AND TRANSACTIONS OF THE GREEKS IN ASIA, FROM THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE GENERAL CONFEDERACY AGAINST LACEDÆMON TO THE TREATY BETWEEN LACEDÆMON AND PERSIA, AND THE RE-ESTABLISHMENT OF THE LACEDÆMONIAN POWER IN GREECE, THROUGH THE GENERAL PEACE DICTATED IN THE KING OF PERSIA'S NAME, COMMONLY CALLED THE PEACE OF ANTALCIDAS.

SECT. I. Confederacy in Greece against Lacedæmon.— Recall of Agesilaus from Asia.— Proposed Invasion of Laconia.— Battle of Corinth.— March of Agesilaus to Greece.— Summary View of the History of Cyprus.— Evagoras, Prince of Salamis.— Connection of Salamis with Athens.— Combination in Asia against Lacedæmon.— Fleet under Conon.— Defeat of the Lacedæmonian Fleet near Cnidus.— Victory of Agesilaus near Coronea.— Successes of Pharnabazus and Conon, and Downfal of the Lacedæmonian Dominion in Asia - - - - Page 1

SECT. II. Evils of the Grecian political System.— Sedition of Corinth.— Singular Union of Corinth with Argos.— Successes of the Lacedæmonian General, Praxitas, near Corinth - - - - - 21

SECT. III. Invasion of Laconia by Pharnabazus and Conon.— Restoration of the Long Walls of Athens.— Sea-fight in the Corinthian Gulf - 31

SECT. IV. Improvement of the Grecian Art of War by the Athenian General Iphicrates.— Affairs of Phlius.— Causes of failing Energy of Lacedæmon.— Successes of Iphicrates in Peloponnesus.— Antalcidas Ambassador from Lacedæmon, and Conon from Athens, to the Satrap of Lydia.— Expeditions of Agesilaus into Argolis and Corinthia.— Isthmian Games.— Slaughter of a Lacedæmonian Mora.— Farther Successes of Iphicrates 35

SECT. V. Unsteadiness of the Persian Government.— War renewed by Lacedæmon against Persia.— Thimbron Commander-in-chief.— Expedition into Acarnania under Agesilaus; into Argolis under Agesipolis - 50

- SECT. VI. Affairs of Rhodes. — Diphaidas Commander-in-chief of the Lacedæmonians in Asia; succeeded by Teleutias. — An Athenian Fleet sent to Asia under Thrasybulus. — Asiatic and Thracian Dominion recovered to Athens. — Death of Thrasybulus and Conon. — Anaxibius Commander-in-chief of the Lacedæmonians in Asia, Iphicrates of the Athenians. — Defeat and Death of Anaxibius - - - - - Page 57
- SECT. VII. Freebooting War of the Æginetans against Attica. — Siege of Ægina. — Lacedæmonian public Revenue. — Connection of Athens with Cyprus. — Teleutias Commander on the Grecian Coast. — Antalcidas Commander in Asia, and again Ambassador from Lacedæmon to the Satrap of Lydia. — Able Conduct of Antalcidas, in military Command and in Negotiation. — Treaty concluded between Lacedæmon and Persia, and Peace dictated to Greece by the Lacedæmonian Government, in the King of Persia's Name, commonly called the Peace of Antalcidas - - - 67

CHAPTER XXVI.

AFFAIRS OF GREECE FROM THE PEACE OF ANTALCIDAS TILL THE DEPRESSION OF THE LACEDÆMONIAN POWER, AND THE ELEVATION OF THEBES TO SUPREMACY AMONG THE GRECIAN REPUBLICS, BY THE BATTLE OF LEUCTRA.

- SECT. I. Despotism of Lacedæmon. — Punishment of Mantinea. — Restoration of Phliasian Exiles - - - - -
- SECT. II. Uncommon Tranquillity in Greece. — New political Phenomenon in Greece. — Inconvenience of the Grecian political System. — Growing Power of Olynthus. — War resolved against Olynthus, by the Congress of the Lacedæmonian Confederacy. — Composition for personal Service in Arms - - - - - 87
- SECT. III. Sedition of Thebes. — Prevalence of the Lacedæmonian Party, and Subjection of Thebes to Lacedæmon. — Trial of Ismenias, Polemarch of Thebes. — Teleutias Commander-in-chief against Olynthus. — Defeat and Death of Teleutias - - - - - 94
- SECT. IV. Agesipolis Commander-in-chief against Olynthus. — Rebellion in Phlius against Lacedæmon. — Agesilaus Commander against Phlius. — Delphion, Demagogue of Phlius. — Surrender of Phlius. — Death of Agesipolis. — Polyblades Commander-in-chief against Olynthus. — Reduction of Olynthus - - - - - 104
- SECT. V. Apparent Confirmation and real Instability of the Lacedæmonian Supremacy in Greece. — Conspiracy and Revolution in Thebes - 112
- SECT. VI. Motives at Lacedæmon for lenient Conduct toward Thebes. — Command in War against Thebes, declined by Agesilaus, committed to Cleombrotus. — Uncommon Storm. — Change in Athenian Politics, adverse to Thebes - - - - - 121

- SECT. VII. Motives of the Theban Leaders for persevering in Opposition to Lacedæmon. — Pelopidas, Epaminondas. — Corruption of the Lacedæmonian General Sphodrias. — Weak Concession of Agesilaus. — Renewal of Alliance between Athens and Thebes. — Agesilaus Commander against Thebes. — State of the smaller Republics of Greece. — The Thebaid ravaged. — Winter Campaign. — Second Invasion of the Thebaid under Agesilaus. — Sedition at Thespiæ - - - - - Page 127
- SECT. VIII. Distress and Exertions of Thebes. — Naval Assistance obtained from Athens. — Timotheus Commander. — Pressure upon Lacedæmon, and Successes of Thebes. — Accommodation and Breach again between Lacedæmon and Athens. — Siege of Corcyra by the Lacedæmonians. — Successes of the Athenians under Iphicrates - - - - - 136
- SECT. IX. Tyranny of Thebes in Success. — Dissatisfaction of Athens. — General Peace negotiated by Athens. — Refusal of Thebes to accede to the Terms of the Treaty - - - - - 152
- SECT. X. Independency of the Bœotian Towns, asserted by the Lacedæmonians, resisted by the Thebans. — Battle of Leuctra - - - - - 159

CHAPTER XXVII.

AFFAIRS OF GREECE FROM THE ELEVATION OF THEBES BY THE BATTLE OF LEUCTRA TO THE FAILURE OF THE ATTEMPT TO EXTEND THE THEBAN SUPREMACY OVER GREECE THROUGH SUPPORT FROM PERSIA.

- SECT. I. Reception of News of the Battle of Leuctra at Lacedæmon; at Athens. — Jason of Pheræ in Thessaly. — Polydamas of Pharsalus. — Jason elected Tagus of Thessaly. — Power and great Views of Jason. — Mediation of Jason between the Lacedæmonians and Thebans. — Magnificent Preparation of Jason for the Pythian Festival. — Death and Successors of Jason. — Fall of the Thessalian Power - - - - - 167
- SECT. II. Partiality, among the Peloponnesians, for the Lacedæmonian Supremacy. — Congress at Athens. — Cessation of Jealousy of Persia. — Opposition of Elis to the Proposal for the universal Independency of Grecian Cities. — Irritating Conduct of the democratical Party in Mantinea toward Lacedæmon. — Agesilaus, King of Lacedæmon, Ambassador to the Mantinean People. — Evils resulting from the separate Independency of Cities. — Liberal Project of the Tegeans for a Union of the Arcadian Cities illiberally executed. — Violent Interference of the Mantineans. — Arbitrary Assumption of Authority by the Lacedæmonians. — Union of Arcadia accomplished, and Megalopolis founded - - - - - 178.
- SECT. III. Invasion of Arcadia under Agesilaus. — Superior Conduct of the Theban Leaders. — Invasion of Laconia by the Army of the Theban Confederacy, under Epaminondas. — Resolution of the Athenians to support Lacedæmon. — Retreat of Epaminondas from Peloponnesus. — Restoration of the Messenians. — Distress of Sparta - - - - - 191.

- SECT. IV. Bad Arrangement of military Command by the popular Assembly of Athens.—Second Invasion of Peloponnesus by the Thebans under Epaminondas.—Lycomedes of Mantinea.—Alienation of Arcadia from the Theban Interest.—Military Merit of the Arcadians.—Quarrel of Arcadia with Elis - - - - - Page 203
- SECT. V. Congress of Delphi assembled at the Instance of a Minister of the Satrap of Bithynia.—The Tearless Battle, won by Archidamus Son of Agesilaus.—Expedition of the Thebans into Thessaly under Pelopidas.—Embassies from the principal Grecian Republics to the Persian Court.—Able and successful Conduct of Pelopidas, Ambassador from Thebes.—Congress at Thebes.—Attempt of Thebes to acquire the Supremacy of Greece, through Support of Persia, defeated - - - - - 210

CHAPTER XXVIII.

AFFAIRS OF GREECE FROM THE FAILURE OF THE ATTEMPT TO ESTABLISH THE SUPREMACY OF THEBES OVER THE GRECIAN REPUBLICS, THROUGH THE SUPPORT OF PERSIA, TILL THE DEPRESSION TOGETHER OF THE ARISTOCRATICAL AND DEMOCRATICAL INTERESTS, AND THE DISSOLUTION OF THE ANCIENT SYSTEM OF GRECIAN CONFEDERACY, THROUGH THE EVENT OF THE BATTLE OF MANTINEA.

- SECT. I. Difficult Circumstances of the Theban Administration.—Affairs of Achaia.—Advantageous Constitution of Achaia, and advantageous Character of its People.—Interference of Thebes.—Generous Policy of Epaminondas.—Impolitic Illiberality of the Theban Confederacy.—Miseries, Virtues, and Enjoyments of the People of the smaller Republics exemplified in the History of Phlius - - - - - 221
- SECT. II. Affairs of Sicyon.—Euphron, Tyrant of Sicyon.—Liberal Despotism of Æneas, General of Arcadia.—Principles of Grecian Law of Nations and of Theban civil Jurisprudence illustrated.—Public Honours to the Memory of Euphron - - - - - 234
- SECT. III. Affairs of Athens.—Athenian Exiles.—Oropus.—Progress of Change in Grecian Politics adverse to Theban Supremacy.—Alliance of Arcadia with Athens.—Insecurity of Person in Greece.—Alienation of Corinth from Athens.—New Pressure upon Lacedæmon.—Magnanimity of Lacedæmon.—Uprightness of Corinth.—Partial Peace.—Injustice of Argos - - - - - 243
- SECT. IV. Considerations on which the Conduct of Lacedæmon was founded.—Disposition of Athens.—Narrow Views of the Grecian Politicians.—Advantage of the Measures of Agesilaus.—Progress of Dissension among the Peloponnesian Confederates of Thebes.—War of Arcadia and Elis.—Danger of Thebes from Sedition.—Cruelty of the Thebans.—War of Thebes in Thessaly.—Death of Pelopidas - - - - - 252

SECT. V. Invasion of Elea by the Arcadians, of Arcadia by the Lacedæmonians. — Arcadian Eparites, or select Militia. — Liberality in Grecian Law of War. — Interference of the Arcadians in the Presidency of the Olympian Festival. — Battle of Olympia - - - Page 262

SECT. VI. Sacrilegious Robbery of the Olympian Treasury by the democratical Administration of Arcadia. — Opposition of Mantinea to the Sacrilege. — Support solicited from Thebes by the Perpetrators. — Remonstrance against Interference from Thebes by the Arcadian Sovereign Assembly. — Congress at Tegea. — Violence of the Theban Commissioner, supported by Epaminondas. — Re-union of Arcadia, Achaia, and Elis, in Alliance with Lacedæmon - - - - - 269

SECT. VII. Principles of Grecian Politics. — Fourth Expedition of the Thebans, under Epaminondas, into Peloponnesus. — Second Invasion of Laconia. — Battle of Mantinea - - - - - 279

SECT. VIII. General Pacification. — Lacedæmon excluded. — Troubles in Arcadia. — Interference of Thebes — Views of Agesilaus. — Affairs of the East. — War of Evagoras with Persia. — Rebellion of the Persian maritime Provinces. — Expedition of Agesilaus to Egypt. — Death of Agesilaus. — Distraction together of the aristocratical and democratical Interests in Greece, and Dissolution of the ancient System of Grecian Confederacy - 293

SECT. IX. Illustration of the State of Greece. — Seditions, in Argos, Phigalia, Corinth, Megara, Sicyon, Phlius, Thessaly. — Prosperity of Megara, Cos, Sicyon, Rhodes, the Asiatic Cities. — Circumstances promoting the Cultivation of Science, Arts, and Commerce. — Prosperity of Athens 315

APPENDIX TO THE TWENTY-EIGHTH CHAPTER.

Memorials of Xenophon - - - - - 333

THE
HISTORY OF GREECE.

CHAPTER XXV.

AFFAIRS OF GREECE, AND TRANSACTIONS OF THE GREEKS IN ASIA, FROM THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE GENERAL CONFEDERACY AGAINST LACEDÆMON TO THE TREATY BETWEEN LACEDÆMON AND PERSIA, AND THE RE-ESTABLISHMENT OF THE LACEDÆMONIAN POWER IN GREECE, THROUGH THE GENERAL PEACE DICTATED IN THE KING OF PERSIA'S NAME, COMMONLY CALLED THE PEACE OF ANTALCIDAS.

SECTION I.

Confederacy in Greece against Lacedæmon. — Recall of Agesilaus from Asia. — Proposed Invasion of Laconia. — Battle of Corinth. — March of Agesilaus to Greece. — Summary View of the History of Cyprus. — Evagoras, Prince of Salamis. — Connection of Salamis with Athens. — Combination in Asia against Lacedæmon. — Fleet under Conon. — Defeat of the Lacedæmonian Fleet near Cnidus. — Victory of Agesilaus near Coronea. — Successes of Pharnabazus and Conon, and Downfal of the Lacedæmonian Dominion in Asia.

WHILE the Lacedæmonian king was thus busied in preparation for enterprise in Asia, seeming to give fair promise of conquest the most glorious, and a revolution among the greatest known in the annals of the world, a storm gathered within Greece, threat-

B. C. 394.
Ol. 96. 3.
Xen. Hel.
1. 4. c. 2.
s. 1. Diod.
1. 14. c. 83.

ening to overwhelm Lacedæmon itself. The accession of Athens to the Bœotian alliance was but the beginning of a confederacy, more formidable than had yet been formed, of Grecian powers against a Grecian power. Athens led Argos into it, and Argos Corinth, now, under sway of the democratical party, closely connected with Argos. The influence of Athens and Corinth together then engaged Acarnania, Ambracia, Leucadia, part of Thessaly, all Eubœa, and the populous towns of Chalcidice in Thrace. Body, and form, and means of energy were given to the confederacy by the establishment of a congress of deputies from every state at Corinth.¹ Instead of allowing, according to the old system, the dangerous supremacy of any one republic, it seems to have been proposed that such a congress of deputies from all should regulate the common concerns of the Greek nation. The idea was good, but the detail of the plan was defective. A combination of numerous republics, not enforced by some one power pervading the whole, but dependent upon the varying interests of parties in the moment prevailing in each, was far too frail to be lasting; and, not committing even executive government to one person, or one simply consti-

Xen. Hel. l. 4.
c. 2. s. 1.

tuted council, its energy would be very uncertain. It was nevertheless, in the moment, highly formidable to Lacedæmon. The alarm was heightened by the rumours circulated of Persian money distributed among men of most influence in the hostile states, and the expectation that, while Persia was pressed by the Lacedæmonian arms, that kind of assistance, which Persia could best give and the Greeks most needed, would not be wanting to the new con-

¹ Diodorus here has a merit which I have pleasure in noticing. He has been fortunate in the selection of his author, whoever he was, from whom he has given a clear though succinct account of the forming of this confederacy; which Xenophon's Hellenics, evidently in many respects an unfinished work, would not readily furnish; and yet the account of Diodorus not only is in perfect consonance with Xenophon's, but, in almost every particular, somewhere confirmed by it.

federacy. Not only the supremacy of Lacedæmon, so in appearance established over Greece by the event of the Peloponnesian war, was pressingly threatened, but, by the connection of two of the most powerful states of Peloponnesus itself with the hostile confederacy, even the security of Laconia was endangered. Nor had the superior abilities, which such a crisis required, been anywhere conspicuous in Sparta since the loss of Lysander. Those who now directed public affairs tottered in their lofty situation : at the head of the politics of Greece, where they should have held the balance of surrounding nations, they were unable to hold that of their own commonwealth. Feeling urgently the need of both support and guidance, they despatched a requisition for Agesilaus to return, with the utmost speed, to relieve his threatened country.

Agesilaus was enjoying in Asia honours and power and hope of glory, such as had never fallen to the lot of any Greek. Added to the great authority of a Lacedæmonian king in foreign command, his popularity, among the Asiatic Grecian cities, was beyond any thing before known ; for, having found them, says Xenophon, all miserably
Xen. Ages. c. 1. s. 37.
distracted by parties, he composed the differences of all, and established everywhere peace, and the present effect at least of concord, without executions or expulsions. He was then at the head of an army such as no Greek had ever commanded out of Greece ; and he had before him a field, the most inviting that human ambition could easily imagine. Nothing therefore could be more mortifying than the summons to quit this splendid situation, with all the alluring views attending, to return to the condition of a Lacedæmonian king at home, under the immediate control of the ephors. It is implied, even by his panegyrist, that all his united patriotism and magnanimity were wanting for the resolution to obey. Immediately
Ibid. & Hel. 1. 4. c. 2. s. 2.

however assembling the allies, he explained his country's and his own necessities, adding assurances that he should never forget his obligations to the Asian Greeks; and that, should the event in Europe be prosperous, he would not fail to return, and use his best ability in the prosecution of measures which might most conduce to their welfare. Affection for the chief whom they were going to lose, co-operating with the change from high hopes to the fear of a great reverse, threw the assembly into tears. They proceeded however immediately to a unanimous vote, that succours for Lacedæmon, from all the Asian Greek cities, should attend Agesilaus into Europe; and that, should the hoped-for success follow, those troops should return under his command to prosecute the war in Asia.

Xen. Hel. 1. 4.
c. 2. s. 3, 4. Two cares principally engaged Agesilaus before his departure; to provide security for the Asian Greeks in his absence, and to have a numerous and well-appointed army to lead into Greece. For the former purpose, naming Euxenus to preside, with the title of harmost, he placed a body of four thousand men under his orders. With the latter view, he proposed prizes for the cities which should furnish the best troops; and for commanders of mercenaries, horse, heavy-armed, bowmen, and targeteers, whose bands should be the best chosen, best appointed, and best disciplined. The prizes were mostly arms, elegantly wrought; but, for higher merit, or the merit of those of higher rank, there were some golden crowns; and Xenophon mentions it, as a large sum for the occasion, that the expense amounted to four talents, less than a thousand pounds sterling. Three Lacedæmonians, with one officer from each Asiatic city, were named for judges; but the decision, or the declaration of it, was judiciously referred to the arrival of the army in the Thracian Chersonese.

Unable as the leading men in the Lacedæmonian admini-

stration were, either to conduct a war against the powerful confederacy formed against them, or, upon any tolerable terms, to prevent it, the recall of Agesilaus seems to have been a necessary measure. The army assembled by their enemies was such as had not often been seen in wars within Greece. Argos furnished seven thousand heavy-armed; Athens had already recovered strength to send six thousand, and add six hundred horse; Bœotia, Corinth, Eubœa, and Locris, made the whole of the army twenty-four thousand heavy-armed, with above fifteen hundred cavalry; to which was added a large body of the best light-armed of Greece, Acarnanians, Ozolian Locrians, and Malians. The fighting men of all descriptions must have amounted to fifty thousand. The avowed purpose was to invade Laconia. "The Lacedæmonian state," said the Corinthian Timolaus, in a debate on the plan of operations, "resembles a river, which, near the source, is easily forded, but the farther it flows, other streams joining, the depth and power of the current increases. Thus the Lacedæmonians always march from home with their own troops only; but as they proceed, being re-enforced from other cities, their army swells and grows formidable. I hold it therefore advisable to attack them, if possible, in Lacedæmon itself; otherwise, the nearer to Lacedæmon the better."

Xen. Hel. 1. 4.
c. 2. s. 10.

s. 6 & 7.

s. 9.

Against so powerful a league, the allies, whom the Lacedæmonians could now command, were principally from the smaller Grecian cities, and none beyond Peloponnesus. Marching themselves six thousand foot and six hundred horse, and being joined by the Mantineans and Tegeans, whose numbers are not reported, they were farther re-enforced by no more than seven thousand five hundred heavy-armed, from Epidaurus, Hermione, Trœzen, Sicyon, Achaia, and Elea. Aristodemus, of the blood

royal, as regent, commanded for the king, Agesipolis, yet a boy.

B. C. 394.
Ol. 96. 2-3.
Xen. Hel.
1. 4. c. 2.
s. 7.

Circumstances commonly occur to render confederate armies less efficacious, in proportion to their strength, than those under a single authority.

A dispute about the command-in-chief, with some difference of opinion about their order of battle, some of the generals being for deeper, others for more extended phalanges, gave opportunity for the Lacedæmonians to collect their forces, and march far beyond their own frontier, so as to meet the

s. 11. enemy near Corinth. In the account of the preparatory sacrifices there drops from Xenophon a

remarkable confession, that those ceremonies were sometimes engines of policy. While the Bœotians, he says, held the left of their army, they were in no haste to engage; but, as soon as they had prevailed to have their situation in the line changed, so that the Athenians would be opposed to the Lacedæmonians, and themselves to the Achæans, then they declared that the symptoms of the victims were favourable. They saved themselves perhaps some slaughter by this disingenuous artifice. In the battle which ensued the Achæans fled, and all the allies of Lacedæmon equally yielded to those opposed to them. But the Athenians were defeated with considerable slaughter; and the superior discipline of the Lacedæmonians so prevailed against superior numbers that, with the loss of only eight of their own body, they remained

c. 3. s. 1. finally masters of the field; in which, if we may trust Xenophon's panegyric of Agesilaus for what

he has omitted to state in his general history, no less than ten thousand of the confederate army fell. Probably however, though the Lacedæmonians themselves suffered little, their allies suffered much; for the victory seems to have been little farther decisive than to prevent the invasion of Peloponnesus.

Meanwhile Agesilaus was hastening his march from Asia. He crossed the Hellespont about the middle of July. At Amphipolis he met Dercyllidas, who had been sent to inform him of the victory obtained near Corinth. Immediately he forwarded that able and popular officer into Asia, to communicate the grateful news among the Grecian cities there, and to prepare them for his early return, of which there seemed now fair promise.

Dodwell
Chron. Xen.

Through Thrace and Macedonia the country was friendly, or feared to avow hostility. Thessaly, inimically disposed, and powerful through population and wealth resulting from the natural productiveness of the soil, was however too ill-governed to give any systematical opposition. The defiles of the mountains against Macedonia, where a small force might efficaciously oppose a large one, seem to have been left open. But the influence of the principal towns, Larissa, Cranone, Scotusa, and Pharsalus, in close alliance with the Bœotians, decided the rest, and as the Lacedæmonian army crossed the plain a body of horse, raised from the whole province, infested the march. It was singularly gratifying to Agesilaus that, with his horse, promiscuously collected, and entirely formed by himself, supporting it judiciously with his infantry, he defeated and dispersed the Thessalian, the most celebrated cavalry of Greece.

Xen. Hel. 1. 4.
c. 3. s. 2.

s. 3, 4.

On the day after this success he reached the highlands of Phthia; and thence the country was friendly quite to the border of Bœotia. But there news met him, unwelcome for the public, unwelcome on his private account, and such as instantly almost to blot out his once bright prospect, which, as the historian, his friend and the companion of his march, shows, he had thus far been fondly cherishing, of conquest in Asia, and glory over the world. While the misconduct of the Lacedæmonian administration had excited a con-

federacy within Greece, which proposed to overwhelm Lacedæmon by superiority of land force, and, with that view, to carry war directly into Laconia, a hostile navy had arisen in another quarter, powerful enough to have already deprived her, by one blow, of her new dominion of the sea. The train of circumstances which had produced this event, though memorials fail for a complete investigation of it, will require some attention.

Ch. 5. s. 2. of
this Hist. We have seen Cyprus, at a very early age, from a Phœnician, become a Grecian island, and Salamis the first Grecian city founded there. We have then observed the Cyprian Greeks yielding to the Persian power, which the greatest kingdoms around them had been resisting in vain; and yet, not long after, a petty prince of Salamis, incited by the revolt of the Greeks of Asia Minor, and encouraged by the advantage of insular situation and the inexperience of the Persians in maritime affairs, rebelling against the Persian dominion, and extending his authority over almost all Cyprus. With the reduction of the Asian Greeks however Cyprus fell again under Persian sovereignty; and then probably the Phœnician interest in the island would receive countenance in opposition to the Greek. Nevertheless a Grecian prince of Salamis sent his tributary squadron to swell the immense armament of Xerxes, intended for the conquest of Europe; and his brother was among the prisoners made by the confederated Greeks, in their first action with the Persian fleet.

Ch. 6. s. 2.

Ch. 7. s. 2.

Ch. 8. s. 4.
of this Hist.

The ruin of the marine, the inertness of the court, and the distraction in the councils of Persia, which followed, would afford opportunity and temptation for the Cypriots, beyond other subjects of the empire, again to revolt; and the Persian interest, and the Greek, and the Phœnician, and the tyrannic, and the oligarchal, and the democratical, would

be likely to fall into various contest. Such, as far as may be gathered, was the state of things, which first invited Athenian ambition to direct its view to Cyprus, when the Athenian navy, rising on the ruins of the Persian, was extending dominion for Athens on all sides, Ch. 12. s. 2. under the first administration of Pericles. This view, quickly diverted to other objects, was however, after a change in the Athenian administration, resumed; and Cimon, s. 4. as we have seen, died in command in Cyprus.

The policy of Athens would of course propose to hold dominion, there as elsewhere, through support given to the democratical interest. But after the death of Cimon wars in Greece so engaged the Athenian government as to prevent the extension of any considerable exertion to such a distance; and the Cyprian cities were mostly governed by their several princes or tyrants², under the paramount sovereignty of Persia.

The liberal policy however of the Persian government did not yet deny princely honours and power, in small dominions within its empire, even to Greeks. Toward the beginning³ of the Peloponnesian war a Greek was reigning in Salamis. But the inhabitants of that city being a mixed people, opportunity was open for the ambition of Phœnicians, who would be not unlikely to win favour with the satraps, or even with the court, against the Greeks. A Tyrian, thus finding means to expel the Grecian prince, obtained the patronage of the Persian government in the dominion which he seized. After some years however a conspiracy, among his own people, ended his reign and life together. His successor, also a Tyrian, proposed to secure himself by the severities common in such revolutions. Num-

² Κατὰ πόλεις ἐτυγαννοῦντο οἱ Κύπριοι. Strab. l. 14. p. 684.

³ The time is so far decided by the circumstance, mentioned by Isocrates, that it was before the birth of Evagoras, afterward prince of Salamis. Isocr. Evag. p. 282 t. 2.

bers were banished, or fled to avoid greater evil; and the Tyrian's oppression was such that a large proportion, even of the Phenician citizens, became adverse to him. Among the fugitive Greeks was Evagoras, a youth who claimed descent from the ancient princes of Salamis, of the race of Teucer. Informed of the state of things, this young man formed the bold resolution, with only about fifty fellow-sufferers in exile, devoted to his cause, to attempt the recovery of what he claimed as his paternal principality.

Isocr. Evag.
p. 286, 288, &
290.

From Soli in Cilicia, their place of refuge, they passed to the Cyprian shore, and proceeded to Salamis by night. Knowing the place well, they forced a small gate, probably, as in peace, unguarded, marched directly to the palace, and, after a severe conflict, overcoming the tyrant's guard, while the people mostly kept aloof, they remained masters of the city, and Evagoras resumed the sovereignty.

This little revolution, in a distant island, became, through a chain of events out of all human foresight, a principal source of great revolutions in Greece. How Evagoras obtained the favour or obviated the resentment of Persia; whether he was ever acknowledged by the court; or by what satrap, careless of the administration of the head of the empire, he may have been patronised, we have no information. His character has been transmitted

Isocr. Evag.

in elegant panegyric, as among the most perfect known to history, but of his conduct little remains recorded. Evidently however his situation, in his new eminence, was precarious. Protection from the Persian court to its most faithful, or even its most favourite, distant vassals, was little to be depended upon. The welfare of a prince of Salamis must rest on his own energies, accommodated to circumstances more immediately about him; those in his own city, in the other cities of his island, in the nearest satrapies of the continent, and in the more powerful republics of the

nation of which he boasted to be, and of which his city was a colony.

In this state of things it was a great advantage for Evagoras that friendly communication was of standing beyond memory between his city and Athens; whether maintained from the original founding of the colony, or produced by the necessities or advantages of commerce, and only assisted by the idea of fellowship in blood between the people. The facility however for supplies of corn, which Cyprus could furnish, was a benefit resulting from alliance with its principal city, to which the Athenian many would readily attribute value; and on the other hand, alliance with the most powerful maritime state of the age was highly important for Evagoras. Hence an extraordinary intimacy grew between the Athenian democracy and the tyrant of Salamis, (for that was the title which Evagoras commonly bore among the Greeks,) insomuch that the tyrant was associated among the Athenian citizens.⁴ Nevertheless, while his able policy enabled him to hold the favour of the Athenian many, he did not scruple to cherish those of their best citizens whom they expelled from their community. Exiles, from any part of Greece, but especially from Athens, bringing character and means of livelihood, or talents which might make them worth their livelihood, found certain favour at Salamis. So it appears from Isocrates; and we have corresponding testimony from Andocides, the companion in youth of Alcibiades, who himself experienced in banishment the friendly hospitality of Evagoras.

Isocr. Evag.
p. 302.

Andoc. de
myst. & de red.

Such nearly is the amount of what may be gathered con-

⁴ It is remarkable enough that Isocrates, living under a democracy, and the eulogist of democracy, mentions it, to the praise of Evagoras, that he acquired the TYRANNY, *Τύραννον αὐτὸν τῆς πόλεως κατίστησιν*, and presently after, that he acquired it righteously, *κτησάμενος δόσιως*.

cerning the state of the Salaminian principality, when, in the ruin of Athens, impending from the defeat of Ægospotami, Conon fled thither with eight triremes, saved from the general destruction of the fleet. Conon had previous acquaintance with Evagoras; and eight triremes at his orders, equipped and ably manned, would enable him, in seeking refuge, to offer important service. Nor were naval force and military science all that he carried with him: versed in political business, he was moreover practised in communication with Persian satraps; whence he was peculiarly qualified for a service perhaps beyond all others important to Evagoras. Congenial character then and mutual need produced that friendship between Evagoras and Conon which Isocrates has celebrated. The Athenian refugee became the most confidential minister of the Cyprian prince, or rather his associate in enterprise. Undertaking negotiation with Pharnabazus, he conciliated that satrap's friendship for Evagoras; which so availed him that, without resentment from the court, or opposition from other satraps, he could add several towns of the island to his dominion. Some he gained by negotiation and the credit of his just administration: but against some he used arms. Meanwhile he greatly improved the city of Salamis itself: forming a port and wharfs; inviting commerce and population, and providing security by new fortifications. To his territory at the same time he gave increased value by encouraging cultivation, and he added to the public strength by building ships of war, and establishing discipline among his people.⁵

⁵ Nepos and Diodorus report that Conon went to the Persian court, where he managed negotiation with great ability and success, according to one, for Pharnabazus, according to the other, for Evagoras. Whether those writers have taken some loose expressions of earlier authors, concerning negotiation with Persia, as indicating that Conon went to the residence of the great king, Babylon or Susa, the omission of both the contemporary historian and the contemporary orator, the panegyrist of Evagoras and Conon, to make any

While Agesilaus was threatening the conquest of Asia, and Pharnabazus, having obtained, in a manner, from his generosity and mercy, a respite from the pressure upon himself, was nevertheless apprehensive that his satrapy, separated from the body of the empire, might become dependent upon the Lacedæmonian commonwealth, Conon suggested that the progress of the Lacedæmonian arms, which seemed irresistible by land, would be most readily and efficaciously checked by a diversion by sea. A considerable fleet of Phenician ships was at the satrap's orders: Evagoras had a fleet which might cooperate with it; the Athenian interest, still considerable in the island and Asiatic Grecian cities, would favour the purpose; and Conon himself had consideration among those cities, and especially among their seamen. Even before Agesilaus left Asia, a project, founded on these suggestions, seems to have been in forwardness. Soon after his departure, through the combined exertions of Pharnabazus, Evagoras, and Conon, a fleet very superior to the Lacedæmonian was assembled; and the generous Pharnabazus formed the resolution, extraordinary for a Persian satrap, to take the nominal command in person, having the good sense apparently to leave the effective command to the superior abilities and experience of Conon. Near Cnidus they met the Lacedæmonian fleet, and the brave but inexperienced Pisander, brother-in-law of Agesilaus, would not avoid a battle. Conon and Evagoras led the Grecian force against him: Pharnabazus took the particular command of the Phenician, forming a second line. The Grecian force alone, according

Isocr. Evag.
p. 304. 306.

Xen. Hel. 1. 4.
c. 4. s. 6.

Xen. ut sup.
Isocr. Evag.
p. 306.

mention of so remarkable and important a fact, cannot but excite, at least, a doubt if Conon went any further to negotiate than the court of the satrap Pharnabazus.

to report, though Xenophon does not speak of it as certain ⁶, outnumbered the Lacedæmonian fleet. The allies in the left of the Lacedæmonian line, alarmed at the view of the enemy's great superiority, presently fled. Pisander was then quickly overpowered. His galley being driven on the Cnidian shore, the crew mostly escaped; but, refusing himself to quit his ship, he was killed aboard. The victory of

Diod. l. 14.
p. 441. Conon was complete: according to Diodorus fifty ships were taken.⁷

Such was the disastrous event, the news of which met Agesilaus on his arrival on the confines of Bœotia. The first information struck him with extreme anguish and dejection. Presently however the consideration occurring how disadvantageous, in the existing circumstances, the communication of it might be, he had command enough of himself to check all appearance of his feelings. His army consisted mostly of volunteers, attached indeed to his character, but more to his good fortune; and bound, as by no necessity, so by no very firm principle, to partake in expected distress. With such an army he was to meet, within a few days, the combined forces of one of the most powerful confederacies ever formed in Greece. To support, or, if possible, raise, the confidence and zeal of his troops, though by a device of efficacy to be of short duration, might be greatly important. He therefore directed report to be authoritatively circulated that Pisander, though at the expense of his life, had gained

⁶ According to Diodorus, the whole force under Pharnabazus, Evagoras, and Conon little exceeded ninety triremes, and the Lacedæmonian fleet was of eighty-five. We commonly find contemporary, and especially military writers, speaking with most diffidence of the strength of armies, and even of the strength of fleets, which is far more easily ascertained.

⁷ Diodorus, or perhaps rather his transcriber, calls the Lacedæmonian commander Perilarchus. Xenophon was too much in the way of things to be misinformed of the commander's name on so remarkable an occasion, and the correctness of his transcriber is confirmed by our copies of Plutarch. *Vit. Agesil.* p. 1102. t. 2. ed. H. Steph.

a complete victory; and, to give sanction to the story, he caused the ceremony of the evangelian sacrifice to be performed, and distributed the offered oxen among the soldiers. Xen. Hel. 1. 4.
c. 5. s. 9.

Resuming then his march, in the vale of Coronea he met the confederate army, consisting of the flower of the Bœotian, Athenian, Argive, Corinthian, Eubœan, Locrian, and Ænian forces. Expecting this formidable assemblage, he had been attentive to all opportunity for acquiring addition to his own strength. Some he had gained from the Grecian towns on his march through Thrace. On the Bœotian border he was joined by the strength of Phocis, and also of the Bœotian Orchomenus, always inimical to Thebes. A Lacedæmonian mora had been sent from Peloponnesus to re-enforce him, with half a mora which had been in garrison in Orchomenus. The numbers of the two armies were thus nearly equal: but the Asiatic Grecian troops, which made a large part of that under Agesilaus, were reckoned very inferior to the European. It was in the spirit of the institutions of Lycurgus that Agesilaus, otherwise simple, even as a Spartan, in his dress and manner, paid much attention to what our great dramatic poet has called “the pomp and circumstance of war;” aware how much it attaches the general mind, gives the soldier to be satisfied with himself, and binds his fancy to the service he is engaged in. Scarlet or crimson appears to have been a common uniform of the Greeks, and the army of Agesilaus appeared, in Xenophon’s phrase, all brass and scarlet. s. 8.

According to the usual manner of war among the Greeks, when the armies approached a battle soon followed. On the present occasion both quitted advantageous ground; Agesilaus moving from the bank of the Cephissus, and the confederates from the roots of Helicon, to meet in a plain. Xen. Ages. c. 2.
s. 9. & 10.

Perfect silence was observed by both armies till within nearly a furlong of each other, when the confederates gave the military shout, and advanced running. At a somewhat smaller distance the opposite army ran to meet the charge. The Lacedæmonians, on its right, where Agesilaus took post, instantly overthrew the Argives, their immediate opponents, who, scarcely waiting the assault, fled toward Helicon. The Cyreans supported in Greece the reputation they had acquired in Asia; and were so emulated by the Ionians, Æolians, and Hellespontines, from whom less was expected, that, all coming to push of spear together, they compelled the centre of the confederate army to retreat. The victory seemed so decided that some of the Asiatics were for paying Agesilaus the usual compliment of crowning on the occasion; when information was brought him, that the Thebans had routed the Orchomenians, who held the extreme of his left wing, and had penetrated to the baggage. Immediately changing his front, he proceeded toward them. The Thebans perceived they were cut off from their allies, who had already fled far from the field. It was a common practice of the Thebans to charge in column, directing their assault, not against the whole, but a chosen point of the enemy's line. Thus they had gained the battle of Delium against the Athenians, in the eighth year of the Peloponnesian war. To such a formation their able leaders had recourse now; resolving upon the bold attempt to pierce the line of the conquering Lacedæmonians; not any longer with the hope of victory, but with the view to join their defeated allies in retreat. Xenophon praises the bravery, evidently not without meaning some reflection on the judgment, of Agesilaus; who chose to engage them, he says, front to front, when, if he had opened his line and given them passage, their flanks and rear would have been exposed

Xen. Hel. 1. 4.
c. 3. s. 9, 10.

s. 11.

Ch. 16. s. 3.
of this Hist.

Xen. Hel. 1. 4.
c. 3. s. 12.

to him.⁸ A most fierce conflict ensued. Shield pressed against shield, stroke was returned for stroke; amid wounds and death no clamour was heard; neither, says the historian, who accompanied the Spartan king, was there complete silence, for the mutterings of rage were mixed with the din of weapons.⁹ The perseverance, the discipline, and the skill in arms of the Thebans were such, and such the force of their solid column, that, after many had fallen, a part actually pierced the Lacedæmonian line, and reached the highlands of Helicon; but the greater part, compelled to retreat, were mostly put to the sword.

In this obstinate action Agesilaus was severely wounded. His attendants were bearing him from the field when a party of horse came to ask orders concerning about eighty Thebans, who, with their arms, had reached a temple. Mindful, amid his suffering, of respect due to the deity, he commanded that liberty should be granted to them to pass unhurt, whithersoever they pleased. In the philosopher-historian's manner of relating this anecdote is implied that, among the Greeks, in such circumstances, revenge would have prompted an ordinary mind; and, even in Agesilaus, the generous action is attributed, not to humanity, but to superstition; not to an opinion of the deity's regard for mercy and charity among men, but to the fear, unless it were rather the desire of inculcating the fear, of his resentment for any want of respectful attention to himself. When pursuit ended, the victorious army anxiously employed itself in dragging the enemy's slain within its own lines: a remarkable testimony, from the same great

Xen. Hel. l. 4.
c. 3. s. 13.

Xen. Ages.
c. 2. s. 15.

⁸ So even in his Agesilaus: c. 2. s. 12.

⁹ It is implied in the account of Xenophon that he was present, though, perhaps for political reasons, he has avoided speaking of himself. Plutarch expressly says that he was in the action — *παρῆν αὐτῷ τῷ Ἀγησιλάῳ συναγωνιζόμενος*. Agesil. v. 2. p. 1106.

writer, to the prevalence still, in a degree that may surprise us, of that barbarism in war, which in Homer's description is striking, though in his age less a matter for wonder.

Xen. Hel. 1. 4.
c. 3. s. 14.

Next morning early the troops were ordered to parade with arms, all wearing chaplets. Agesilaus himself being unable to attend, the polemarch Gylis commanded at the ceremony of raising the trophy; which was performed with all the music of the army playing, and every circumstance of pomp, that might most inspire, among the soldiery, alacrity and self-satisfaction. Why then no measures were taken to profit from the advantages, which victory apparently should have laid open, is not shown. The Thebans sending, in usual form, for permission to bury their dead, a truce was granted them, evidently for a longer time than, for that purpose alone, could be wanted. Meanwhile the Lacedæmonian army withdrew into Phocis, a country friendly or neutral, to perform a ceremony to which Grecian superstition indeed attached much importance, the dedication of the tenth of the spoil collected by Agesilaus in his Asiatic command. It amounted to a hundred talents; perhaps something more than twenty thousand pounds.

s. 15, 16.

After this second triumphal rite the army, committed to the orders of Gylis, proceeded into the neighbouring hostile province of Ozolian Locris, where the object seems to have been little more than to collect plunder, which, according to the Grecian manner, might serve the soldiers instead of pay. Corn, goods, whatever the rapacious troops could find in the villages, were taken. The Locrians, unable to prevent the injury, did nevertheless what they best could to revenge it. Occupying the defiles which, in returning into Phocis, were necessarily to be re-passed, they gave such annoyance that Gylis was provoked to take the command of a select body in pursuit of them. Entangled among the mountains, he was himself killed, and

the whole party would have been cut off, had not the officers left with the command of the main body brought seasonable relief. Agesilaus, still from his wounds unfit for fatigue, passed by sea to Laconia, and the army was distributed in quarters. Xen. Hel. l. 4. c. 4. s. 1.

If any other writer gave any authority for the supposition, we might suspect that Xenophon's account of the battle of Coronea was written under the influence of partiality for his friend and patron, and that the victory was less complete than he has described it.¹⁰ Yet we are not without information of circumstances which may have given occasion for the line of conduct which Agesilaus pursued. The defeat of Cnidus produced a great and rapid revolution in Asiatic Greece. The small islands of Cos and Nisyra obeyed the first summons of the victors. The news alone sufficed to diffuse instant ferment over the rich and populous island of Chios. Diod. l. 14. c. 85. The democratical party took arms; the Lacedæmonian troops were expelled; and a message was sent to Conon, proposing a renewal of the old alliance with Athens. The powerful city of Mitylene in Lesbos, and, on the continent, Erythræ, with the still more important city of Ephesus, followed the example. Pharnabazus and Conon did not neglect encouragement for a disposition so favourable. Coasting northward, they sent requisitions to the Greek cities, both of the continent and the islands, for the Lacedæmonian governors to be sent away, but with promises that no citadels should be fortified to awe them, nor any violence put upon their municipal government. Xen. Hel. l. 4. c. 8. s. 1, 2. The liberal characters of the Persian satrap and the Athenian admiral procuring

¹⁰ Plutarch is warm in zeal for the fame of his fellow-countrymen the Bœotians, yet he admits the victory of Agesilaus; and indeed it seems pretty evident that he had no account to follow but Xenophon's, or none more to his purpose; unless for some circumstances little important, for which he quotes no authority, and which are of very doubtful aspect.

credit to the promises, the requisitions were obeyed with alacrity; and thus the fabric of the Lacedæmonian empire, seemingly so established by the event of the Peloponnesian war, and since so extended by the ability of the commanders in Asia, was in large proportion almost instantly overthrown. Most of the principal officers, and many inferior men, of the numerous Asiatic troops under Agesilaus, would be deeply interested in this revolution. The principal sources of pay for all would cease; and hence the plain of Coronea seems to have been the last field of fame for the Cyreans. We find no mention of them afterward from Xenophon: apparent proof that their following fortunes were not brilliant; not such as he could have any satisfaction in reporting. Probably they dispersed, some to their homes, some to seek new service, and never more assembled.

Xen. Hel. 1. 4.
c. 8. s. 4, 5.

One superior man, Dercyllidas, preserved yet a relic of the Lacedæmonian empire in Asia. He was in Abydus when Pharnabazus and Conon passed along the coast; and the Abydenes, attached by his popular manners, and confident in his integrity and ability, were to be shaken neither by threats nor promises. Abydus became in consequence the refuge of the expelled governors and their partisans. Strength thus collected, and credit gained, enabled Dercyllidas to prevent a meditated revolt in the neighbouring city of Sestus, on the European shore. But he could not preserve the other towns of the Chersonese, or give security to the colonists, who had settled in that fruitful country under the authority of the Lacedæmonian government. All were compelled to abandon their lands; and it was only within the walls of Sestus and Abydus that he could give present security to their persons and effects, with some faint hope of a settlement somewhere, at some

s. 6.

future time, under Lacedæmonian protection. The satrap and the Athenian admiral endea-

voured, by threats, by waste of lands, and by interception of maritime commerce, to bring Abydus to submission; but winter approaching, and the Abydenes continuing firm, they gave up the point, and directed their attention to increase their naval force for the operations of the following spring.

SECTION II.

Evils of the Grecian political System. — Sedition of Corinth. — Singular Union of Corinth with Argos. — Successes of the Lacedæmonian General, Praxitas, near Corinth.

THE event of the Peloponnesian war, which placed the Lacedæmonian state decidedly at the head of the affairs of Greece, gave also, in the moment, a decided superiority to the aristocratical cause throughout the nation. But in the very establishment of that reign of aristocracy, the materials of a new revolution seem to have been prepared. Almost immediately the democratical interest gained the superiority in Thebes, where, for a long course of years, it had been held in subjection. Unnoticed by historians as any result of that revolution in Thebes has been, it has been nevertheless evidently the leading step to some of the most important occurrences in Grecian history. The establishment of democracy there gave the first means for the restoration of democracy, which quickly followed in Athens. Corinth had long been closely connected with Thebes; and the growing jealousy of the Lacedæmonian power not only strengthened the bonds of friendship, but led both states to a connection with Athens, to which they had lately been virulent enemies. Argos, always democratical, and the most ancient, most constant, and most determined of all the enemies of Lacedæmon, had for those very reasons commonly been the ally of Athens, and had always held communication with the democratical parties in Thebes and

Corinth : so that, when Thebes and Corinth became democratical, the political connection of Thebes, Corinth, Athens, and Argos was in a manner already formed. Thus, within a very short time after the triumph of the aristocratical interest, which the event of the Peloponnesian war produced, democracy was again approaching to preponderancy among the Grecian republics.

We have already had too many occasions to observe that, while Greece afforded the most sublime instances of virtue in individuals, extensive patriotism, political virtue pervading a people, was not more common there than elsewhere ; but, on the contrary, political crimes, most atrocious crimes, abounded ; the unavoidable consequences of a political system in which, through want of a just gradation of ranks, and amalgamation of interests, one portion of the people was, by political necessity, the enemy of another : and party-spirit was stimulated by those all-involving interests and dangers, which allowed none either to choose privacy, or to be, in a public situation, assured of the next day's fate. Notwithstanding that well-poised constitution and equal law, or, in the expressive language of Greece, that

Pind. Ol. 13.
Ch. 5. s. 2.
of this Hist. eunomy of the Corinthian state, which Pindar

has apparently with justice celebrated, Corinth was not secure against those effects of sedition under which, during ages of her own prosperity, she had seen so many other Grecian cities suffering the direst calamities. Indeed no small state, the territory of a single city, can have the security of a large one, like the modern European kingdoms, against sedition within, any more than against war from without. In extensive territory distance gives leisure and opportunity for virtue and prudence, in one part, to obviate the measures of villany or madness in another. But, in a small state, a spark excited, if not extinguished in a moment, will, in the next moment, involve all in flame. Hence

arose a supposed necessity, a most unfortunate necessity, could it be real, for not only indulgence, but encouragement, to individuals to assume public justice into their own hands, and assassination became dignified with the title of tyrannicide: a resource in its nature so repugnant to all civil security that, if it be allowed upon principle, any momentary good which it may possibly produce cannot fail to be followed by far greater and more lasting evil.

The Corinthian constitution, though evidently one of the best of Greece, if the ease of its subjects and security of person and property be the test of merit, neither excited the attention of foreigners, like the Lacedæmonian, by its pointed singularities, nor was blazoned, like the Athenian, through the superior talents of its own historians and orators. Corinth figured as an important member of the Grecian political system, but its particular history little engaged curiosity; and thus we remain uninformed of what may have deserved to be known, the circumstances of that revolution by which the supreme power passed from the aristocracy, which had held it so long, and generally exercised it so ably. It seems very soon to have followed the revolution of the same kind in Thebes; the particulars of which are equally unrecorded. Possibly a general jealousy of Lacedæmon may have forced the leading men to consent to a connection of the republic with the democratical states of Argos, Thebes, and Athens; and then that connection itself would tend to give the democratical party the superiority against them.

Events adverse for the public are always favourable for the party in opposition to the existing administration. The defeat at Coronea would shake the democratical leaders in Corinth. A momentary relief would then come to them from the dismissal of the army of Agesilaus, which ensued. But presently new difficulties occurred. Sicyon remaining attached to Lacedæmon, a Lacedæ-

Xen. Hel. l. 4.
c. 4. s. 1.

monian force was stationed there, with the double purpose of protecting the place and its territory, and keeping the war distant from Laconia. On the other hand, possession of the isthmus being a great point for both parties, troops were sent from Athens, Bœotia, and Argos, to assist the Corinthians in holding it. Thus the Corinthian territory became the seat of a winter war, which not a little pressed the Corinthian people, while their allies were quiet in their homes. Under these circumstances it became easy for the aristocratical chiefs to persuade the multitude that they had been misled; that their true interest would have kept them steady in their old alliance, the alliance of their forefathers, with Lacedæmon. Such is the nature of confederacies: each member, as it becomes pressed, grows regardless of the common good, and attentive only to its own.

The democratical leaders were aware of their danger, and not scrupulous about means of prevention. Xenophon, upon this occasion, does not spare his fellow-countrymen; he accuses the Athenian administration, together with the Bœotian and Argive, of being accomplices in the horrid plot. A time appropriated to religious solemnity, when it is esteemed decent, says the historian, to avoid the execution even of condemned malefactors, the last day of the Euclean festival, was chosen for a massacre; because then, all the people of all ranks being assembled in places of public resort, the business might be more readily and completely performed. A signal was given, and, in the agora, the execution began. Many were put to death before they had the least apprehension of danger; some in circle conversing, some engaged with the spectacles

Xen. Hel. 1. 4.
c. 4. s. 2.

B. C. 394. (11)
Ol. 96. 3.
End of autumn or beginning of winter.
[B. C. 393. Cl.]

Xen. Hel. 1. 4.
c. 4. s. 3.

¹¹ Xenophon has by no means clearly marked this date. The mention of a Corinthian festival has principally furnished the clue for the industrious acuteness of Dodwell in the investigation of it.

of the theatre, some even sitting in the office of judges. The rest fled to the nearest altars and images of the gods; but the assailing party, regardless of those salutary laws of superstition which even philosophy would approve as a check upon ruthless violence, killed them even in the most sacred places; so that amid the carnage a scene of impiety and scandal was exhibited, uncommon even in the fury of Greek sedition.

Those who fell in this massacre were mostly Xen. Hel. l. 4. c. 4. s. 4. elders, of the principal families. Pasimelus, one of the chiefs of the youth, having some suspicion of what was intended, had assembled the younger of the aristocratical party in another part of the city. Surprised there by the outcry, and presently farther alarmed by the sight of some flying toward them for refuge, all ran to the Acrocorinthus; and overthrowing a body of Argives who, with a few Corinthians, opposed them, got possession of the fortress. Fortune could scarcely have given them a more desirable possession: yet an accident, the most insignificant, induced them presently to abandon it. They s. 5. were consulting on measures to be taken, when from a column, near them, the capital fell; and, the cause of the accident not being obvious, it was taken for a portentous prodigy. Recourse was immediately had to sacrifice; and the augurs, from observation of the entrails, declared it advisable to quit the place. Political wisdom evidently was not upon this occasion the moving spring. A Themistocles, a Lysander, perhaps a Xenophon, would have proved the augurs mistaken. Utterly at a loss what to do and where to go, the fugitives, obedient to the expounders of occult science, hastened down the mountain, without any other hope than to find safety in exile. Dismay had sped them beyond the Corinthian border, when the lamentations of their mothers, the persuasion of their

friends, and assurances of personal safety, given upon oath by some of the chiefs of the democratical party, induced them to return into the city.

The democratical leaders had now taken measures which they thought might suffice, without more murder, to establish the interest of their party. They had united their state in one commonwealth with Argos, thrown down the boundary-stones which marked the separation of the territories, abolished the Corinthian assemblies, and every characteristic of a distinct government, annulled even the name of Corinthians, and declared by law, solemnly decreed and proclaimed, that the two people were thenceforward to be all Argives. This is a singular phenomenon in Grecian history. A league between two cities, so close as to establish a kind of fraternity, we may have observed elsewhere¹²: the removal of the people of one town to establish them as citizens of another, we have also seen practised; but a union, such that one was lost in the other, or even that two should form but one state, with one republican government common to both, has not before occurred. To judge of the merit of the plan, our information of particulars is too defective; nor have we the opinion of Xenophon delivered in a manner at all satisfactory. Justly indignant at the crimes of those who carried the measure, feeling perhaps for persons known to him, who perished by it, and not wholly free from the prejudices of party, as a political project he has altogether slighted it; and it was too transitory to afford proof of its merit in practice.

The returned fugitives found their persons indeed safe, but their condition very much lowered. Their opponents held the sovereign power¹³: they were themselves lost, in a

¹² Such a league, we learn, existed between the neighbouring cities of Chalcis and Eretria, in Eubœa; and something of the same kind between towns so far distant from each other as the Asiatic and the Italian and Sicilian Greek.

¹³ The expression of Xenophon is remarkable, *Ὁρῶντες δὲ τοὺς τυραννεύοντας*, *κ. τ. λ.*: and the whole passage is in terms not to be exactly rendered in modern language.

city which, says the historian, was no longer Corinth but Argos. They were allowed the privileges of Argive citizens, or rather they were obliged to become members of the Argive commonwealth; a privilege which they were very far from desiring; for with it they found themselves of less consideration, in their altered country, than many foreigners. In the true spirit of Grecian patriotism, narrow but ardent, they thought life, continues the historian, contemptible upon such terms; and they resolved (for, though frightened by the falling of a stone, they were brave men) that, at any risk, their country, which had been Corinth from earliest times, should still be Corinth.¹⁴ In the true spirit of Grecian love of liberty they resolved that Corinth should again be free. Personal freedom, as far as appears, themselves with all Corinthian citizens enjoyed; but Xenophon, swayed by party-prejudice, seems to have thought, with them, that association in civil rights, with the people of another free commonwealth, was a freedom not to be endured. To purify the city from the pollution of murderers, another of their resolutions, would have been of less questionable rectitude, had the means by which they proposed to accomplish it been unexceptionable. With all these ideas together their minds were highly heated: insomuch that, in their doubt of being able to accomplish their purpose, they could find gratification in the thought, as the contemporary historian assures us, that, “should their best endeavours fail, yet, in pursuit of the greatest blessings, they should obtain the most glorious of deaths.”

Thus prepared for bold exertion, Pasimelus and Alcimenes, young men of the first consideration in their party, undertook to communicate with Praxitas, the Lacedæmonian commander at Sicyon. To avoid observ-

Xen. Hel. 1. 4.
c. 4. s. 7.

¹⁴ τὴν πατρίδα, ὥσπερ ἦν καὶ ἐξ ἀρχῆς, Κόρινθον ποιῆσαι, κ. τ. λ.
It is difficult, in rendering this passage in modern language, to avoid an air of ridicule, which however Xenophon has certainly not intended.

ation and inquiry from the guards at the gates, they made their way out of the city by a gully, the course of a winter torrent, which interrupted the continuity of the wall; and they proposed to Praxitas to introduce a body of troops within that fortification, which, like the famous long walls of Athens, secured the communication of Corinth with its port of Lechæum. For the execution of their purpose they chose a night on which they were intrusted, by the existing administration of their country, with the guard of one of the gates of the long walls. Praxitas, at the head of a Lacedæmonian mora, with the whole strength of Sicyon and about a hundred and fifty Corinthian refugees, entered without opposition. Expecting however to be quickly attacked by superior numbers, he set immediately to raise works, which might enable him to maintain his ground till re-enforcement could reach him: for, on one side, Corinth was filled with a military people, strengthened by a body of mercenaries; and, on the other, Lechæum was held by a Bœotian garrison; nor was it doubted but the force of Argos would hasten to relieve the new member of the Argive commonwealth.

That day however, and the next, Praxitas held his situation unmolested; but, on the following morning, a body of Argives being arrived, Corinth poured out its force to attack him. We learn from Thucydides that, in his time, the general reputation of the Peloponnesian troops was superior to that of any others known. This reputation, it appears, was not lost when Cyrus raised his army to march against Artaxerxes. In the wars however which arose within Greece, after the conclusion of that distinguished by the name of the Peloponnesian, we find very great difference among the Peloponnesian troops; a difference which could arise only from the different attention given to military discipline and military exercises, and the different manner in which such attention was enforced by the political institutions of the several re-

publics. The Sicyonians, long allies of Lacedæmon, and continually serving with the Lacedæmonian forces, could not want means to know the Lacedæmonian discipline; yet their military was nevertheless held Xen. Hel. 1. 4. c. 4. s. 10. in contempt; and, in the battle within the long walls of Corinth, they proved the justice of the general opinion. Being attacked by the Argives, they yielded to the first onset; and, flying through their own entrenched camp, those who escaped the swords of the pursuing enemy were stopped only by the sea. Pasimachus, who commanded a small force of Lacedæmonian cavalry, was witness to this defeat. Either the nature of the ground forbade, or, through his ignorance of a service less cultivated by the Lacedæmonians, he saw no opportunity for bringing horse into action; and yet, indignant at the defeat of his friends, he resolved to act. Dismounting, he persuaded, for it seems he could not command, some of his cavalry to follow him. The method of our dragoons not being within their practice, they fastened their horses to some trees which happened to be near, and the small shields they carried on horseback not being fit for engaging with heavy-armed infantry, they supplied themselves with those of the slain and flying Sicyonians. Thus accoutred they marched against the Argives, who, seeing the Sicyonian mark, an *ess*, on their shields, little regarded their approach. Pasimachus, observing this, is reported to have said, using the common Lacedæmonian oath, “By the twin-gods, Argives, these *esses* shall deceive you.” With the valour of a true Spartan soldier, but not with the just discretion of an officer, rushing then to the assault of numbers too superior, he was killed, with most of his band.¹⁵

¹⁵ The speech of Pasimachus, in the original, forces itself the more upon notice by something of a whimsical effect, arising from the Lacedæmonian dialect, in which it is reported: *Ναὶ τῶ σιῶ, Ἀργεῖοι, θέσει ὑμῖν τὰ σίγματα ταῦτα.* Beside the general peculiarities of the Doric dialect, the Lacedæmonians, as appears fully in the *Lysistrata* of Aristophanes, commonly pronounced

Xen. Hel. l. 4.
c. 4. s. 10.

Meanwhile the Lacedæmonian heavy-armed, having defeated the Corinthians and mercenaries, and committed pursuit to the Corinthian refugees, turned to engage the Argives. These, who so despised the Sicyonians, were so alarmed, in the midst of victory, by the approach of the Lacedæmonians, that, to regain communication with the city, as the means of support and shelter, they lost all other consideration. Hastening to pass that dreaded enemy, they exposed their right flank; of all things, in the ancient practice of war, the most dangerous; because the shield, so important for the soldier's protection, became inefficient. The Lacedæmonians did not neglect the advantageous opportunity. The Argives, suffering in their defenceless flank, still pushed for the city gate; but, before they could reach it, were met by the Corinthian refugees, returning from pursuit. This, checking their way, completed their consternation. The Corinthians in the city, fearing to open a gate, afforded them no other refuge than by ladders let down from the walls. The slaughter ensuing was such, that, says the historian, as corn, or billets, or stones are often seen, so the bodies lay in heaps. Praxitas then led his victorious troops to the assault of Lechæum, and added the Bœotian garrison there to the number slain.

s. 12.

The success of the Lacedæmonian arms was thus complete, and the dead, with the usual ceremonies had been already restored, when the forces of the Peloponnesian allies of Lacedæmon arrived. Praxitas employed them in making a breach in the Corinthian long walls, sufficient for the convenient passage of an army: he then assaulted and took Sidus and Crommyon on the isthmus, and he fortified Epüicia. Placing garrisons in all

s. 13.

Σ for Θ. The effect altogether would perhaps be most nearly imitated in English, by giving the speech in the Lowland Scottish dialect, and adding the change of S for Th: "By se twain-gods, Argives, sese esses," &c.

those places, by which he secured the command of the isthmus, he dismissed the rest of his army, and returned himself to Lacedæmon.

SECTION III.

Invasion of Laconia by Pharnabazus and Conon. — Restoration of the Long Walls of Athens. — Sea-fight in the Corinthian Gulf.

By the victories of Corinth and Coronea the force of the formidable confederacy formed against Lacedæmon had been broken; and, by the recent successes of Praxitas, the command of the isthmus being recovered, means were again open for carrying war against the enemies of Lacedæmon beyond the peninsula. Instead therefore of any longer dreading invasion at home, Lacedæmon should have been again formidable to her enemies. But that policy, by which she had profited in the latter years of the Peloponnesian war, was now turned against herself: the wealth of Persia supported her foes; her command of the sea was already gone; and her armies, which should have carried vengeance against her most distant foes, were necessary at home, and yet unequal to the protection of her own coast.

Whatever personal esteem Pharnabazus might have for Agesilaus, he was highly exasperated against the Lacedæmonian government. Of a temper to feel the disgrace of the condition of a fugitive, to which, in the sight of all his dependents, and to the knowledge of the Persian court, he had been reduced, he was anxious to recover his honour, as he had been to vindicate his property. During Xen. Hel. 1. 4. c. 8. s. 6, 7. winter therefore he was diligent in adding to the number of his ships, and in raising a force of Grecian mercenaries, the only troops that could be effectually opposed to Greeks; and he resolved to carry war, in person, to the

coast of Laconia, where no Persian had ever yet appeared in arms.

B. C. 393.
Ol. 96. 3.

In pursuance of this resolution, embarking in spring, with the Athenian Conon for his vice-admiral, he sailed among the islands of the Ægean; and, from the Ionian shore to Melos, all submitted. Proceeding then directly to the Laconian coast, he had the satisfaction to make good his landing on it near Pheræ, and to ravage unresisted the country around. Re-embarking before the Lacedæmonians could come in force against him, he repeated his debarkations in various parts for plunder, and always with success. Under the able advice of Conon, he did not loiter on a coast where rocks and tempests and want were to be apprehended not less than an enemy whom he well knew to be formidable. He crossed to the island of Cythera, which in the early part of the Peloponnesian war had been conquered by the unfortunate Nicias. Being without strong places, it yielded without resistance; and, in the idea that it might be made a useful acquisition, a garrison was placed there, under Nicophebus, an Athenian. The satrap then directed his course to the Corinthian isthmus, where the congress of the confederacy was assembled. There he had opportunity to communicate with the leading men, and with them he concerted measures for the prosecution of the war against Lacedæmon. Leaving then a sum of money for its support, he returned with his fleet to Asia.

While the impression of satisfaction with his successful expedition, in which he had earned a glory so new to a Persian satrap, was fresh in the mind of Pharnabazus, Conon took the favouring opportunity for obtaining some most important advantages for his country. A man of courage and honour, the satrap was no deep politician. He felt keenly the injuries he had suffered from the overbearing power of Lacedæmon, commanding at once the naval and

military force of Greece : but the expense of maintaining the fleet, by which he had delivered, and in some degree revenged, himself, pressed upon his treasury. It was therefore a grateful proposal, which Conon made, to transfer a large share of that burthen to the Athenian commonwealth ; urging however that, to enable Athens to bear it, two things were necessary ; first, that the tribute from the islands, by which Athens had formerly maintained her navy, should be restored, the combined fleet enforcing regular payment ; and then, that her long walls, so essential to her security against the overbearing ambition of Lacedæmon, should be rebuilt. The liberality of Pharnabazus granted all that Conon demanded. He allowed the fleet to be employed in re-establishing the claim of Athens to contributions for the support of her navy ; he allowed the crews to be employed in working upon the long walls ; he gave a large sum of money toward the expense, and he sent masons and mechanics to assist in the work. Neighbouring states, which had the democratical interest at heart, added their voluntary aid ; and it is remarkable that among the most zealous and liberal were the Bœotians, lately the most vehement enemies of Athens, remorselessly urgent for its destruction. But so it was among the warring interests of parties in the little republics of Greece : walls, connecting the capital with its ports, were esteemed the bulwark of the democratical, and the bane of the oligarchal cause. From the moment therefore when the revolution in Bœotian politics took place, whereby the democratical became the ruling interest, it became most the object of the leading men to restore what their predecessors in administration thought they had the greatest interest in destroying.

Thus Conon, thirteen years after his flight from his country's ruin, had the singular good fortune and glory to return,

with the present of a fleet and fortifications, in short, of dignity, power, and dominion in his hand. The gratitude of the Athenian people was shown in honours, we are told, of the highest kind, conferred upon Conon, and his friend and patron the virtuous tyrant of Salamis; of which however we find nothing specified but their portraits in marble, placed by the side of the statue of the Preserving Jupiter; in memorial, says the contemporary rhetorician, of the greatness of their services, and of their friendship for one another. Of any gratitude shown by the Athenian people to the generous satrap we have no information. Possibly the prejudices of the age would not allow them to a barbarian, of whatever merit, of the same kind as to Evagoras; who, though a tyrant, was a Greek, and an Athenian citizen.

While the satrap's money thus laid anew the foundation of naval power for the Athenian commonwealth, it enabled the Corinthians to maintain a fleet for the security of their own gulf. Meanwhile the Lacedæmonians, utterly unable to oppose the fleet which, under Conon, commanded the eastern seas, equipped however a squadron to dispute the western with the Corinthians, and give protection to the Achæans, and others their allies in those parts. Coming to action with the Corinthian fleet, the Lacedæmonian admiral, Polemarchus, was killed, and Pollis, the next officer, wounded; but Taleutias, brother of Agesilaus, arriving with a re-enforcing squadron, the Corinthians avoided farther action, and the Lacedæmonians commanded the gulf.

Isocr. Evag.
Enc. t. 2.
p. 306.

Xen. Hel. l. 4.
c. 8. s. 11.

SECTION IV.

Improvement of the Grecian Art of War by the Athenian General Iphicrates. — Affairs of Phlius. — Causes of failing Energy of Lacedæmon. — Successes of Iphicrates in Peloponnesus. — Antalcidas Ambassador from Lacedæmon, and Conon from Athens, to the Satrap of Lydia. — Expeditions of Agesilaus into Argolis and Corinthia. — Isthmian Games. — Slaughter of a Lacedæmonian Mora. — Farther Successes of Iphicrates.

THE Athenian forces had shared in the loss of two great battles, and in one of them had suffered considerably, but the Athenian territory remained yet unhurt by the war. The Lacedæmonians however commanding both the isthmus of Corinth and the gulf, the passage to Attica was easy for them; and, while the restoration of the long walls would of course excite their jealousy, the ravage of Laconia by Conon could not but have excited a desire of revenge. It was therefore much an object for the Athenians to keep the Lacedæmonians employed within their own peninsula. After the victories of Agesilaus and Praxitas it might indeed appear rash to send a land force to make war in Peloponnesus; but Athens, fertile in great talents, had a general formed for the peculiar circumstances of the existing occasion.

Iphicrates was the author of a system of tactics new among the Greeks. The phalanx, almost irresistible where it could exert its force, was cumbersome in evolution, unfit for mountainous or woody countries, incapable of rapid motion, either in pursuit or retreat. Its character is marked in a saying reported of Iphicrates. Comparing Plut. Pelopid. p. 507. an army with the human body, the general, he said, was as the head, the light-armed as the hands, the cavalry as the feet, and the phalanx as the chest and shoulders. Of course he considered the Peloponnesian army, not-

withstanding the general superiority of the heavy-armed, as very defective; for its light-armed were mere untrained or ill-trained slaves; and the cavalry generally deficient, both in number and discipline. Indeed, among the Greeks, cavalry was of little use but in pursuit, except against the light-armed; no body of horse daring to charge a phalanx; and hence the cavalry was compared to the feet. Under this view of things Iphicrates directed his attention to improve what he called the hands of the army. Athens had always had bowmen superior to the Peloponnesian, and had often profited from that superiority. Iphicrates conceived that great advantage might be drawn from an improved discipline of the middle-armed or targeteers, who to the agility of the light-armed might unite some degree of the force of the phalanx. Indeed how much practice, in any of the three styles of discipline, was necessary to excellence, we may gather in some degree from Xenophon; where he observes that even a Spartan would not, with target and dart, engage a Thracian armed in the same manner, any more than the Thracian would, with shield and spear, engage any Greek practised in the discipline of the heavy-armed.

Xen. Mem.
Socr.

Circumstances which brought forward for historical notice the little republic of Phlius, previously obscure among the complicated politics and wars of Greece, opened also the first field of fame for Iphicrates and his new system. Phlius was a member of the Lacedæmonian confederacy

Xen. Hel. l. 4.
c. 4. s. 15.

when the chiefs of the Lacedæmonian party were expelled. According to the general course of things in Greece, it was to be expected that Phlius would then renounce the Lacedæmonian alliance, and engage in the new confederacy of Bœotia, Athens, and Argos. But an inveterate hatred, a kind of horror of the Argives, pervaded all parties in Phlius: insomuch that it was resolved,

with all the forbidding circumstances attending, to endeavour to preserve the connection of the commonwealth with Lacedæmon. In other times probably, spurning at the proposal, the Lacedæmonian government would have commanded those who ruled in Phlius to restore the exiles : but, in the existing situation of affairs, Lacedæmon no longer held her former imperious tone ; and, though the Phliasi-ans carried their avowal of jealousy so far as to refuse, in any case, to admit Lacedæmonian troops within their walls, their offered friendship was not slighted.

The preference thus given by a democratical party to the Lacedæmonian alliance was a disappointment to the democratical confederacy, which excited revenge ; and the central situation of Phlius, between Argolis, Corinthia, Sicyonia, and Arcadia, gave that little state an importance which urged attention. Accordingly Iphicrates led his targeteers into Phliasia, and marked his way with ravage. His purpose was to provoke pursuit, and lead the Phliasi-ans into an ambuscade. He succeeded ; and so large a proportion of their small force of heavy-armed fell that the survivors thought themselves unequal, not only to the protection of their fields, but even to the defence of their walls. Pressed then by distress and danger, they were induced so far to remit their former jealousy as to request from Lacedæmon a protecting force, and even to put B. C. 393.
Ol. 96. 4. their citadel into the power of a Spartan governor. The trust was executed with fidelity, and even with scrupulous delicacy ; for, when the Phliasi-ans, after arranging their affairs, thought themselves again equal to their own protection, the Lacedæmonian government, in withdrawing the garrison, avoided even to mention a restoration of the exiles. The conduct was liberal and wise ; worthy of Agesilaus, if he was the mover ; but the Lacedæmonian administration cannot deserve quite so much credit for it as

if they had been less under the pressure of difficult circumstances.

Xen. Hel. 1. 4.
c. 4. s. 16.

After his success in Phliasia Iphicrates overran great part of Arcadia; and such was the new terror of his targeteers that even the Arcadian heavy-armed feared to quit their towns. The Lacedæmonians however were not to be so daunted. Iphicrates falling in with a body of them, his targeteers, according to their usual method, after throwing their javelins, retreated to avoid stationary action. But the Lacedæmonians pursuing, such was the practised vigour of some of their younger men, with their full armour they overtook and killed some of the targeteers, and made some prisoners. After this experience, it was with difficulty that the targeteers could be led within dart's throw of any Lacedæmonian forces. Iphicrates nevertheless taught them still to support their reputation against other troops; insomuch that, near Lechæum, he defeated a body of Mantinean heavy-armed.

s. 17.

Thus, says the contemporary historian, the Lacedæmonians, who held the targeteers in contempt, found reason to hold their own allies in still greater contempt; and it became a common sarcasm among them, that the allies were afraid of the targeteers as children of hobgoblins.

s. 18.

Notwithstanding the employment thus found for the Lacedæmonians by Iphicrates, the Athenians were still uneasy under the apprehension of a renewal of those evils which had been experienced in the frequent invasions of their country during the Peloponnesian war. They were therefore anxious to deprive the Lacedæmonians of the command of the isthmus, and with this view it was resolved to restore the long walls of Corinth. Accordingly the whole force of the commonwealth marched to support a body of workmen so numerous that the restoration of the western wall was completed in a few days. A

good defence being thus gained on the side of Sicyon, the enemy's principal garrison in those parts, they proceeded with the eastern wall more leisurely.

In tracing, with the able contemporary historian, the events which followed the return of Agesilaus from Asia and his victory in Bœotia, some wonder is apt to arise at the little exertion or little means, at the confined action and narrow views, of that seemingly formidable commonwealth, which, after the Peloponnesian war, completely commanded Greece, and not only threatened Persia, but was actually carrying conquest far into Asia. To her land force no misfortune had happened. On the contrary, before Agesilaus returned, a victory had checked the exertions of her enemies in Greece. He then brought to her assistance a powerful army of veterans, formed in various service, and he gained a victory on his arrival. This was followed by success under Praxitas, which secured the way for carrying invasion into the territories of any of the hostile republics. No use appears to have been made of these advantages. One defeat at sea had deprived Lacedæmon of her transmarine dominion, and three victories by land did not give her quiet within her own peninsula. From the course of Xenophon's narrative however may be gathered that two powerful causes for this apparent inertness and real inefficiency existed; the diminution of pecuniary resources, through the loss of the Asiatic dominion, and the disaffection of the Laconian subjects to the Spartan government. Means failed for putting the Asiatic army any more in action, and the measures of government for external exertion were cramped by the necessity of watching the disposition to revolt at home. Xenophon, on account of his connection with the Spartan government, has spoken always with delicacy and reserve on both topics, yet he has not wholly omitted to throw light on them.

Humbled then and distressed, by land and by sea, abroad and at home, pressed and at a loss for measures, while their adversaries the Athenians were recovering extensive dominion, the Lacedæmonians turned their thoughts to a reconciliation with Persia. They had experienced the advantage of the Persian alliance when they possessed it; they now felt its pressure against them; and they perceived that, contemptible as the military of the empire was become, yet, in the divided state of Greece, the Persian king, or even a satrap, by the force of money alone, employing Greeks against Greeks, could decide the balance between their republics. They had moreover had large opportunity to know that the councils of the Persian empire had scarcely more energy than its arms; so that, in the looseness of the connection of the distant members with the head and with one another, means for negotiation and intrigue were almost always open. In the present moment Pharnabazus was highly incensed against them; and his resentment had afforded opportunity for the able admiral and minister of Athens to attach him to the Athenian interest. But the new satrap of Lydia, Tiribazus, had no cause of personal animosity, perhaps no principle of political enmity, toward them; and, to judge from past experience, the very attachment of one satrap to the Athenian might incline the other to the Lacedæmonian cause.

B. C. 393.
Ol. 96. 3-4.
Xen. Hel. 1. 4.
c. 8. s. 12. 14.

These considerations urging, Antalcidas was sent ambassador to Sardis. The Athenians, alarmed at this, sent also an embassy, at the head of which was Conon, accompanied by ministers from Bœotia, Corinth, and Argos. Antalcidas represented, that "the support, given by Pharnabazus to the Athenians, went far beyond what a just consideration of the interest of the Persian empire would allow: that, on the contrary, the terms of peace which, on the part of La-

cedæmon, he was commissioned to propose, could not fail of being agreeable to the king. The Lacedæmonians would no longer dispute the king's sovereignty over the Grecian cities in Asia; and, for the islands and the European Greek cities, they only desired complete independency. Were then no sovereignty of one Grecian city over another allowed, it would be impossible for any to carry hostilities with any efficacy against the king; so that the expense of maintaining a fleet for the Athenians, and of making war upon the Lacedæmonians, might be equally spared."

Tiribazus was pleased with this proposal, but Xen. Hel. 1. 4. c. 8. s. 15. the Athenian, Bœotian, and Argive ministers could not be brought to consent to a peace upon such terms. Under the stipulation for the independency of all Grecian states, the Athenians feared to lose the islands of Lemnos, Imbrus, and Scirus, their ancient possession, the Thebans their command over the Bœotian cities, and the Argives their new connection with Corinth. As far therefore as peace was the object, the negotiation failed. But Antalcidas nevertheless carried a great point for his country; for he gained Tiribazus, who, scrupling to conclude an alliance with Lacedæmon without express authority from his court, secretly furnished money for the equipment of a Lacedæmonian fleet, imprisoned Conon on pretence of injurious conduct toward the king, and went himself to Susa, to solicit authority for the measures he desired to pursue.

While Antalcidas was thus successfully negotiating at Sardis, the Lacedæmonian administration, stimulated by the depredations of Iphicrates in various parts of Peloponnesus, and alarmed by the restoration of the s. 19. long walls of Corinth, resolved at length to put Agesilaus again at the head of an army, and appoint his brother Teleutias to co-operate with him in naval command.

Quickly all Argolis was ravaged ; and, the attention of the confederates being thus called to that country, Agesilaus suddenly crossed the mountains, while Teleutias conducted a squadron of twelve ships up the Saronic gulf, and not only the unfinished long walls of Corinth but also the naval arsenal were taken. The expedition was ably conducted, and the success important ; yet, under the deficient administration of Lacedæmon, the blow was not followed : the forces of the allies were dismissed, and Agesilaus led the Lacedæmonians home to celebrate the Hyacinthian festival.

Xen. Hel. 1. 4.
c. 8. s. 19.
& Agesil. c. 2.
s. 17.

In the whole conduct of this war we find nothing like that greatness of design which might have been expected, could Agesilaus have directed measures. It was evidently a war of the ephors, and the king was merely the general, acting under their orders. In the ensuing spring he was directed again to put himself at the head of the army.¹⁶ The refugee Corinthians had communicated information that Corinth was principally subsisted from a stock of cattle, collected at an obscure port of the Corinthian territory on the Saronic gulf, of the same name with the celebrated harbour of Athens, Piræus. To deprive the enemy of that supply was thought an object for an expedition which the king should command. After events more adapted to engage and fill the mind, these little transactions are apt to appear uninteresting. They are nevertheless important, as they are connected with great revolutions that followed, links in the great chain of events ; and sometimes as they afford information, the clearest and the most impressive, of the religion, politics, warfare, and manners of this interesting age.

¹⁶ Neither season nor year is specified here by Xenophon ; but the industrious acuteness of Dodwell, indignant at the evident confusion of Diodorus, has endeavoured to ascertain the dates from the mention of the Isthmian festival in the Hellenics of Xenophon, and of the Hyacinthian in the Agesilaus.

The time selected for the expedition was that of the Isthmian games; which, in the Peloponnesian war, we have seen, diffused a temporary peace around them; insomuch that, amid designs and preparations on both sides avowedly the most hostile, the Athenians could safely trust their persons in the power of the Corinthians, then the most virulent of their enemies. But the same superstition, which at that time ensured the observation of the armistice, now provoked to interrupt the sacred season with hostility. Corinth, by fiction of policy being now Argos, Corinthians and Argives indifferently, but all with the name of Argives, presided at the ceremony, and performed the prescribed sacrifice to Neptune. This the Corinthian refugees held to be a portentous pollution. They claimed themselves to be the Corinthian commonwealth, the exclusive privilege and exclusive duty of whose members it was to officiate in that solemnity. The Lacedæmonians approving their claim, Agesilaus led his army directly to the isthmus. The Argives were not prepared against attack, nor even against surprise. They fled on the first alarm; yet not so timely but, as they hurried along the road by Cenchrea, they were seen by the Lacedæmonians from the heights above, and might have been overtaken, but Agesilaus would not allow pursuit. So little indeed was the approach of an enemy apprehended that the victim was left ready slain, and the preparations complete for the feast which should have followed. Agesilaus put his Corinthian friends in possession of these, and remained three days, while the sacrifices and games were performed under their presidency. Xenophon mentions, as a circumstance interesting to the Greeks, that after his departure the Argives caused the solemnity to be repeated in all its parts; so that some of the games were twice performed, and the same conquerors in some of them were twice proclaimed.

Ch. 19. s. 2.
of this Hist.

Xen. Hel. 1. 4.
c. 5. s. 2.

Xen. Hel. 1. 4.
c. 5. s. 3.

On the fourth day Agesilaus led his army to the Corinthian Piræus. There he found a large force so strongly posted, with Iphicrates commanding, that, in doubt of the success of an assault, he recurred to stra-

s. 9.

tagem. Spreading report that Corinth was to be betrayed to him, he decamped suddenly and directed his march thither. The Corinthian administration were so little secure of their own people that, in great alarm, they sent for Iphicrates to come and save Corinth. That active general, ready at the call, with his light targeteers passed the Lacedæmonian heavy-armed in the night. Agesilaus, informed of this, returned at day-break to Piræus,

s. 5.

and occupied the commanding heights. Upon this the troops remaining there, together with all the men, women, and slaves of the place, took sanctuary in a neighbouring temple of Juno, and soon after surrendered themselves to the mercy of Agesilaus. His generosity was not conspicuous upon the occasion; perhaps it was not at his command: those accused as accomplices in the massacre at Corinth were given up to the refugees: the rest, men, women, goods, everything included in the capture, were sold.

s. 6.

The terror of the arms of Agesilaus, probably however not unassisted by some intelligence or some apprehension of the success of Antalcidas in negotiation, brought ministers to the Lacedæmonian camp from several of the hostile states, and particularly the Bœotian, to know upon what terms peace might be expected. These ministers were waiting the king's leisure, while, with designed ostentation, he was reviewing his captives and other booty, when a messenger arrived with intelligence of a disaster to the Lacedæmonian arms, which checked both their desire of peace, and his means to command it.

s. 11.

It was a custom from very early ages, and supposed of divine origin, that the Laconians of the

town of Amyclæa, on whatsoever public service employed abroad, should return home to sing the pæan at the Hyacinthian festival. The season being at hand, Agesilaus, in marching for Piræus, had left all the Amyclæans of the army in Lechæum; directing the polemarch, who commanded the garrison there, to provide for the security of their return to Laconia. The polemarch, zealous in the execution of what was esteemed a sacred duty, committed the defence of Lechæum to the troops of the allies, while, with a mora of Lacedæmonian infantry, consisting of about six hundred men, and another of cavalry, probably a much smaller number, he marched to escort the Amyclæans. He took the road to Sicyon, not as the direct way to Lacedæmon, but as the readiest to get beyond danger from the enemy in Corinth, and to have a friendly line of country afterward to traverse, with a fresh escort, if it should be necessary. Xen. Hel. l. 4. c. 5. & 12. Having passed Corinth without molestation, and proceeded within four miles of Sicyon, he committed the Amyclæans to the charge of the cavalry, directing the commanding officer¹⁷ to accompany them as far as they should themselves desire, and then press his way back to overtake the infantry in their return to Lechæum. He knew that the force in Corinth was large; but the late successes of the Lacedæmonian arms had inspired confidence, and he thought none would dare to attack a body of Lacedæmonian heavy-armed.

Unfortunately for the Lacedæmonian cause, that very stratagem which gave Agesilaus easy possession of Piræus had considerably increased the force in Corinth, and at the same time sent thither a general not likely to miss an opportunity for striking a blow. Iphicrates was there with his

¹⁷ His Athenian military title would have been *Hipparch*, but the Lacedæmonian was *Hipparmost*; which assists to prove that *Harmost* may properly be rendered *Commander*, or *Governor*.

targeteers; and Callias son of Hipponicus, chief of the Daduchian family¹⁸, commanded a body of Athenian heavy-armed. They observed the polemarch returning, without cavalry and without light troops, and they led out their forces. Having preconcerted measures, Callias kept aloof, while the targeteers hung on the flanks and rear of the Lacedæmonian column, directing their missile weapons at the undefended parts of the heavy-armed soldier's body. The polemarch continued his march under the annoyance, till

Xen. Hel. l. 4.
c. 5. s. 15.

several were wounded and some fell. He then ordered those within ten years after boyhood, perhaps those under four and twenty, to assault and pursue.¹⁹ This, a common expedient of the Grecian heavy-armed when unsupported by cavalry or light troops, had succeeded, as we have seen, once, even against Iphicrates: but to such an officer every loss was a profitable lesson, and the expedient succeeded no more. His targeteers, superior both in arms and discipline to any before known, evaded the pursuit of the Spartan youth, encumbered with their heavy armour, turned upon them if they scattered, overtook them when they retreated, wounded many, killed some, and compelled the rest to rejoin the main body, upon which then, more daringly than before, they renewed their attacks. The polemarch was thus provoked to order all under thirty to assault. In retreating again more fell than after the former charge. Already the most active and daring soldiers were mostly killed or wounded when the horse joined. These were ordered to charge, and the younger men of the infantry with

¹⁸ For this ch. 22. s. 2. of this Hist. may be seen.

¹⁹ Τὰ δέκα ἀφ' ἡένης. The exact value of this expression, which occurs more than once in Xenophon, is, I think, not satisfactorily ascertained. According to Plutarch, the Lacedæmonian ἡένης, boyhood, seems to have ended at the age of twelve years, after which, to the age of nineteen, the Lacedæmonian youths were called Eirens. Thus the pursuers would have been those only between the ages of nineteen and twenty-two. [See Vol. VI. p. 124.]

them. The cavalry service appears to have been ill cultivated among the Lacedæmonians. Xenophon blames the conduct of their horse on this day. Instead of pushing the pursuit of the retreating targeteers, they carefully kept even front with their infantry, halted when they halted, and retreated when they retreated. Immediately as they turned the targeteers turned, and horse and foot together suffered from their missile weapons. Another charge was then made; but in the same manner, and with no better success. As their numbers were thus reduced, their efforts slackened, and those of the enemy grew more spirited. Distressed and at a loss at length for measures, they halted on a small eminence, about two furlongs from the sea, and two miles from Lechæum. Thence, while suffering from missile weapons, and unable to return a blow, they saw, on one side, boats from Lechæum intended to relieve them, on the other, the Athenian heavy-armed approaching to attack them. Upon this they took to flight. The horse escaped to Lechæum. Of the infantry, who mostly made for the sea, scarcely any survived.²⁰

Xen. Hel. l. 4.
c. 5. s. 17.

Agesilaus, upon being informed of this disaster, seized his spear, and, not waiting to communicate with the enemy's ministers, who were attending, assembled all his officers. Having given his orders, he marched immediately with a chosen body, leaving the rest to follow after refreshment taken. He had already entered the vale of Lechæum when messengers met him with information that the bodies of the slain were in the possession of their friends. Upon this

²⁰ Xenophon here says the killed, in all, were about two hundred and fifty. He had before said that the infantry were, in all, six hundred, and that those carried off by the shield-bearers, (ὕπασπισται,) before the first assault upon the targeteers, were all that were really saved, μόνοι τῆς μάχης τῇ ἀληθείᾳ ἐσώθησαν. It looks as if two hundred and fifty were the number admitted by the Lacedæmonians, but that the historian knew the real number to have been greater.

he returned to Piræus, and next day, says the historian, with a simplicity which may excite a smile, he sold the prisoners.

This misfortune to the Lacedæmonian arms had an effect approaching that of the capture of Sphacteria, in the Peloponnesian war. It did not indeed give equal advantage to the enemy, because no prisoners were made. The loss in slain was very inferior even to what many of the little Grecian republics had often suffered; but it made great impression upon the Lacedæmonians, because, says the historian, they were unaccustomed to such blows; and, as Plutarch well remarks for readers less familiar with the ideas of the times, it was an unheard-of disaster, and esteemed a portentous event, that heavy-armed should be defeated by targeteers, and Lacedæmonians by mercenaries. A deep grief therefore, as the contemporary historian proceeds, pervaded the army: only, according to their great lawgiver's precept, the sons, fathers, and brothers of the slain, as sharers in glory earned through their family misfortune, ostentatiously exhibited a joy which among other people might have been esteemed indecent on the occasion. The reputation accruing to Iphicrates was great throughout Greece, and the enemies of Lacedæmon were not a little encouraged.

The Bœotian ministers, attending in the camp of Agesilaus, being sent for to declare the object of their mission, did not even mention peace, but only requested free passage to communicate with their troops in Corinth. Agesilaus knew that what they now wanted was to get information of the amount of the late success. Next day therefore, marching toward Corinth, he took them in his train, and allowed them a view of the trophy raised by their friends, which he would not permit his own troops to remove; but if olive, vine, or

Xen. Hel. l. 4.
c. 5. s. 10.
Plut. Ages.

Corn. Nep.
v. Iphicr.

Xen. Hel. l. 4.
c. 5. s. 9.

s. 10.

other valuable tree had escaped former ravage, he ordered it to be destroyed. Having made them spectators of this insult, to show that he could still command the country, he sent them, not into Corinth, but across the sea to Creusis, to relate in Bœotia all they had seen. Such at this time was the distraction of Greece within itself.

Here however ended exertion. Placing a complete mora in Lechæum, and taking with him the small relics of the mora which had suffered, Agesilaus marched from Lacedæmon. His anxiety to conceal from the friendly towns, in which he was to take quarters by the way, the amount of a loss apparently so little considerable, is remarkable. He was careful to enter them all as late in the evening, and quit them as early in the morning, as with any convenience might be; and, finding the soldiers hurt with expectation that the Mantineans would take a malignant joy in their disaster, though he moved from Orchomenus at daybreak, and did not reach Mantinea till dark, he would not halt there, but still proceeded to the next town.

Xenophon has not said whether this retreat of the army was a measure of Agesilaus or of the ephors, or what necessity induced it. If not necessary, it appears an imprudent measure. Iphicrates presently took Sidus, Crommyon, and Cœnoe; the two former garrisoned by Praxitas, the latter by Agesilaus himself. Thus all the territory northward and eastward was recovered for the Corinthians of the city, and the Lacedæmonians no longer commanded the isthmus. For the rest of the year operations were reduced to excursions for plunder, chiefly by those Corinthians of the Lacedæmonian party who had taken refuge in Sicyon. Since the misfortune of the Lacedæmonian mora, not daring to move far by land, they directed their little expeditions by water, whithersoever they

Xen. Hel. 1. 4.
c. 5. s. 18.

s. 19.

had best hope of seizing, still only on the territory of their city, with least danger, any small booty that might contribute to their subsistence.

SECTION V.

Unsteadiness of the Persian Government. — War renewed by Lacedæmon against Persia. — Thimbron Commander-in-chief. — Expedition into Acarnania under Agesilaus ; into Argolis under Agesipolis.

B. C. 392.
Ol. 96. 4-97. 1. DURING all this year the great fleet collected by Pharnabazus and Conon seems to have remained inactive. Possibly, since the negotiation of Antalcidas, the imprisonment of Conon, and the resolution of Tiribazus to apply in person to the court of Susa, the Hellespontine satrap may have been cautious of taking a decided part. perhaps he may have been without an officer to whose ability or fidelity he would trust such a command. There was however evidently no steady policy in the Persian councils : nothing of that great design for establishing a commanding influence in Greece which later writers have fancied in them. Struthas, who, in the absence of Tiribazus, was appointed to the Lydian satrapy, instigated by consideration of injuries the king's territories had borne from the Lacedæmonians, (possibly his own property had suffered, or his family had been insulted,) warmly favoured the confederacy now at war with them.

Xen. Hel. 1. 4.
c. 8. s. 17. The Lacedæmonian administration then, by what good policy prompted it is difficult to discover, renewed hostilities against Persia. The reappointment of Thimbron to a command, in which he had already shown himself deficient, strengthens the probability that the Lacedæmonian councils were at this time ill directed ;

Ibid. &
Diodorus,
1. 14. c. 100.

and the slighting manner, in which Xenophon repeatedly mentions that officer, enough marks that he was not chosen by Agesilaus. Thimbron had some success in plundering the Persian possessions in the rich vale of the Mæander; but he did not establish a better reputation for military ability than in his former command. Courage he possessed: but, though a Spartan, he was a man of pleasure; indulgent to his soldiers, careless of those for whose protection he and his soldiers were sent. Courage may be even mischievous in a general with deficient abilities. It led Thimbron to extravagant contempt of an enemy not incapable of profiting from his error. Struthas, having observed the hasty and careless manner in which he often led small bodies to action or pursuit, sent a few horse to plunder the Grecian possessions in the neighbourhood. Thimbron was sitting at table with the celebrated musician Thersander when intelligence came that the enemy he despised was thus insulting him. Immediately he rose; and Thersander, expert in martial exercises, and an emulator of Spartan prowess, followed him. In his usual manner, without any previous care to have troops in readiness, Thimbron hastened, with the first he could collect, to chastise the plunderers. Struthas presently appeared with a large body of horse in good order: the Greeks were overpowered, and Thimbron and Thersander were killed. The rest of the Grecian army, advancing too late to support their improvident general, were then charged and broken. A few saved themselves in the neighbouring friendly towns; but the greater part fell by the swords of the conquering Persians.

This serious check stopped, for a time, that apparently ill-judged exertion of the Lacedæmonians in Asia which had followed the recall of Agesilaus. Meanwhile, in Europe, some accidental circumstances, and not any great design,

Xen. Hel.
l. 3. c. 1.
s. 8. & c. 2.
s. 6. & l. 4.
c. 5. s. 22.
l. 4. c. 8.
s. 17.

s. 22.

led or rather forced them to carry their arms beyond Peloponnesus.

Such was the unfortunate implication of interests in the Grecian political system that, unable ever or anywhere to give peace, which was its object, that system had a constant tendency to spread the flames of war. Calydon, a principal town of Ætolia, had renounced its connection with the body of the Ætolian people, and made itself a member of the Achæan people, on the other side of the Corinthian gulf. We find here again something like that fiction of policy by which we have lately observed Corinth become a part of Argos. The Achæans however found the acquisition inconvenient ; for, to preserve it, they were obliged to keep a body of forces in Calydon, and sustain a war with the Ætolians.

We have formerly seen the Acarnanians, after a course of successful warfare, generous at the same time and prudent in granting terms of peace to their defeated neighbours. From that period they had passed more than fifty years in so fortunate an obscurity as to offer, for the historian's notice, neither crime nor misfortune. They were now led again to step forward on the field of fame. The Ætolians, anxious to recover Calydon, and unable with their own force, solicited and obtained the good offices of their allies of Acarnania. The Acarnanians had alliance with the Athenians and Bœotians, who readily contributed assistance against allies of Lacedæmon. Thus the Achæans became so pressed as to be unable to preserve Calydon, unless they also could obtain assistance. They applied of course to Lacedæmon ; but they found the Lacedæmonian administration little disposed to send a force beyond Peloponnesus. Thinking themselves ill used, they remonstrated warmly. " Wherever the Lacedæmonians required their services," they said, " they always

Xen. Hel. 1. 4.
c. 6. s. 1.

Ch. 15. s. 6.
of this Hist.

Xen. Hel. 1. 4.
c. 6. s. 2.

marched on the first summons ; and, without reciprocal assistance in need, they could no longer abide by a confederacy, the terms of which were so unequal. Instead of any more sending forces to serve in the Lacedæmonian armies, they must necessarily employ their whole strength against their own particular enemies, or make a separate peace upon the best terms they could obtain.”

This remonstrance had the desired effect ; and the abilities of Agesilaus were in consequence to be employed in a war whose object was that the people of the obscure town of Calydon should be members of that branch of the Greek nation called Achæans, and no longer of that called Ætolians. He led into Acarnania two moras of Lacedæmonians, with the whole strength of Achaia, and the contingents of all the other allies. No force that the Acarnanians could raise was able to oppose him in the field. Terms of peace, which he offered, being refused, he made complete destruction of the country as he went, but he advanced only ten or twelve furlongs a day. The Acarnanians were thus encouraged to bring their cattle, which had been driven far among the mountains, back again toward their best pastures, and to return themselves to the tillage of great part of their lands. Agesilaus obtaining intelligence that almost the whole stock of the country, with numerous attending slaves, was collected on the borders of a lake about twenty miles from his camp, by a hasty march came upon it by surprise, and took almost all.

The proposed business of the next day was to give rest to his troops, while he sold his captives to the slave-merchants, the common attendants of a Grecian army. Meanwhile the Acarnanians assembled in great numbers on the heights around his camp. Less practised than the Peloponnesians in the discipline of the heavy-armed, the

Xen. Hel. 1. 4.
c. 6. s. 3, 4.

[B. C. 391. Cl.]

Xen. Hel. 1. 4.
c. 6. s. 0.

s. 7.

Acarnanians were remarkable, through Greece, for their expertness in the use of missile weapons; and they so annoyed the army of Agesilaus within its lines that they compelled him, when evening was already approaching, to move his camp to ground less commanded. After this experience he was anxious, on the following day, to regain the plain. But he found the heights commanding his way occupied; and the activity of his younger soldiers was in vain exerted to repel or deter the assaults, made or threatened from them. His small body of cavalry was equally inefficient on ground so hilly and rough. Thus, through the usual deficiency of a Peloponnesian army in light troops and cavalry, he was in no small danger from an enemy, who, in any number, would not stand the assault of almost the smallest detachment that he could send against them. Fortunately he discovered a better passage, which, though guarded by the Acarnanian heavy-armed, he resolved to force; and, not without difficulty, principally arising from the annoyance of missile weapons, he succeeded.

Regaining thus at length the plain, he extended ravage on all sides. To gratify the Achæans he assaulted some towns, but without success. Autumn then advancing, he proposed to quit the country. The Achæans, dissatisfied that not a single town had been gained either by force or persuasion, urged him to stay, so long at least as to prevent the Acarnanians from sowing their winter grain. Such, in the deficiency of means for the attack of walls, was, yet in that age, among the modes of reducing an enemy to terms. Agesilaus however replied, "that they mistook their interest; for he intended to return next summer; and the enemy's solicitude for peace would be exactly proportioned to their fear of the destruction of a plentiful harvest."

To regain Peloponnesus then for winter quarters was a business not without difficulty and danger. The com-

mand of the isthmus was lost, as we have seen, in the autumn of the former year, by the retreat of Agesilaus himself, after his success at the Corinthian Piræus, and the unfortunate action which took place at the same time near Lechæum. An Athenian squadron, commanding the western seas, watched the passage from Calydon to Peloponnesus. No alternative remained but to march through the hostile country of Ætolia; a country so strong by nature that, says the historian, neither a great nor a small force can traverse it against the good will of the warlike inhabitants. Agesilaus was skilful and fortunate enough to induce them to acquiesce, by holding out the hope of recovering Naupactus, so long held by the Messenians.

In the following spring the army was reassembled. The Acarnanians, informed of this, began to consider, says again the historian, that as they had no sea-ports through which to obtain supplies, the destruction of their harvest would produce all the evils of a blockade of their towns. They sent therefore ministers to Lacedæmon, and a treaty was concluded which established for them with the Achæans peace, and with the Lacedæmonians that kind of alliance, familiar among the Greeks, by which the forces of the inferior people were to march at the command of the superior. The Acarnanians however being not likely to be zealous allies, the principal point gained, by success in this little war, was the prevention of the secession of Achaia from the Lacedæmonian confederacy.

This however was the more important, as an enemy already existed, within Peloponnesus, so powerful as to make it dangerous for the Lacedæmonians to send any large proportion of their forces beyond the peninsula: Attica and Bœotia had been secure through their alliance with Argos. It was resolved therefore now to carry an expedition into

Xen. Hel. 1. 4.
c. 6. s. 14.

B. C. 390.
Ol. 97. 2-3.
Xen. Hel. 1. 4.
c. 7. s. 1.

Xen. Hel. 1. 4.
c. 7. s. 2. 5. Argolis itself; and the young king Agesipolis, son of Pausanias, just of age, and highly ambitious of distinction, was appointed to the command.

The army was ready to march, and the border-passing sacrifice had been declared propitious, when a herald arrived from Argos with a proposal of truce. The superstition of the young king, or of his council, was alarmed; insomuch that he went to Olympia to learn, from the oracle of Jupiter, if he might religiously refuse a truce insidiously proposed: for it was notorious that no sincere desire of peace had prompted the Argives, but the mere purpose of averting an invasion which, with their single strength, they could not oppose, and of which intelligence had reached them too late to call in their allies. The god signified that the truce, iniquitously offered, might be religiously refused. Not even thus satisfied, Agesipolis proceeded to Delphi, and inquired of Apollo, "If he was of the same opinion with his father." Such, precisely, is the philosopher-historian's expression. But this transaction, whatever may appear ridiculous in it, shows the value of that union in religion which obtained through the Greek nation. It was a beneficent superstition that could occasion but a pause about prosecuting the ravages of war, and generally ensure opportunity for treating about peace.

s. 3. Apollo however confirmed the opinion of Jupiter. Agesipolis then hastened to Phlius, where he found his army assembled, and he marched immediately, by the way of Nemea, into the vale of Argos. On the first evening, during the usual libations after supper, an earthquake was felt. The Lacedæmonians, taking it as a favourable omen, sang the pæan to Neptune, the supposed author of earthquakes; but the allies were alarmed; and, in justification of their fears, they observed that Agis, upon a similar occasion, had withdrawn his

army from Elea. Agesipolis however ably refuted their construction of the omen: "Had they been but about to enter the enemy's territory," he said, "the earthquake would have indicated the god's prohibition of the measure: being already entered, it declared his approbation."

The terrors of the army being thus quieted, a sacrifice was performed to Neptune, and then ravage was carried to the very gates of Argos; which the Argives feared to open even to admit a body of Bœotian horse coming to their assistance; who would have been destroyed, as they stuck, in the historian's phrase, like bats under the battlements, had not the Cretan bowmen of the Lacedæmonian army been accidentally absent. After plunder and destruction widely spread, the symptoms in a sacrifice deterred the proposed fortifying of a post in the country, and Agesipolis, returning home with his booty, dismissed his army.

SECTION VI.

Affairs of Rhodes. — Diphridas Commander-in-chief of the Lacedæmonians in Asia; succeeded by Teleutias. — An Athenian Fleet sent to Asia under Thrasybulus. — Asiatic and Thracian Dominion recovered to Athens. — Death of Thrasybulus and Conon. — Anaxibius Commander-in-chief of the Lacedæmonians in Asia, Iphicrates of the Athenians. — Defeat and Death of Anaxibius.

THE destruction of the army under Thimbron, while the abilities of Agesilaus were confined to the Acarnanian war, had checked the apparently ill-judged exertion of the Lacedæmonians in Asia. Sedition, arising from the incompatibility of interest of the wealthy and the poor, that great mover of Grecian domestic politics, again drew the attention of the Lacedæmonian government thither, and Asia was an inviting field for those who could obtain commands.

B. C. 391.
Ol. 97. 1-2.

That civil order, or, in one word of his own close and expressive language, better painting his object, that eunomy, which Strabo admired in the island of Rhodes when, in common with all surrounding countries, it held its government under patronage of the Roman empire, did not at this time flourish there. The rich and the poor could not agree upon a form of government which might enable them to hold their fine island in independency, though no foreign power offered them violence. Incapable of coalescing, and each beyond all things decided against submission to the other, each solicited subjection to a foreign authority. After the conclusion of the Peloponnesian war the many had for some time rested under the government of the few, the party everywhere patronised by the conquering people. But, when the Lacedæmonian interest in Asia was suddenly overthrown, when Athens again became a name among the Grecian powers, and an Athenian admiral commanded the seas, whether from ambition of chiefs or sufferings of the people, or both together, civil contest arose; the democratical party, forming connection with Athens, obtained the superiority; and all the men of higher rank were expelled. Lacedæmon, of course, became their refuge. The Lacedæmonian administration thought it important to prevent such an accession as that of all Rhodes to the Athenian dominion; and so little was apprehended from the fleet, lately so formidable, under Conon, that eight triremes were supposed sufficient for the purpose. But the intelligence, on which this judgment was formed, appears to have been very defective; for the Rhodians themselves possessed twice the number of ships of war; so that the Lacedæmonian squadron, having reached the port of Cnidus, without an object to which its strength was equal, remained mostly there.

Xen. Hel. l. 4.
c. 8. s. 20.

B. C. 391.
Ol. 97. 1-2.

Xen. Hel. l. 4.
c. 8. s. 21.

When it was resolved, at Lacedæmon, to keep a squadron on the Asiatic station, it was resolved also to send an officer to take the command by land in Asia Minor, who might collect the broken relics of Thimbron's army, preserve the towns yet disposed to the Lacedæmonian interest, and prosecute war against Struthas. This command was committed to Diphridas ; who, though unsupported by any force from Peloponnesus, yet, by his activity in business, civil and military, with assistance from the pleasantness of his manners, restored in a considerable degree the Lacedæmonian affairs in Asia. In several towns the Lacedæmonian interest was revived or confirmed, and a fortunate incident gave means for raising an efficient military force : Tigranes, with his wife, the daughter of Struthas, was made prisoner ; and a large sum being obtained by their ransom, Diphridas used it to raise a body of mercenaries, which he found means also to support.

Xen. Hel. 1. 4.
c. 8. s. 22.

In the following year the Lacedæmonian administration, earnest to recover Rhodes, ordered Teleutias, brother of Agesilaus, to pass with his squadron from the Corinthian gulf to Asia, and take the command-in-chief. Thus re-enforced, the Asiatic fleet consisted of twenty-seven ships, with which Teleutias was proceeding from the station at Cnidus to Rhodes when he fell in with an Athenian squadron of ten, and took all. Xenophon remarks an inconsistency in the measures of both parties on this occasion. The Athenians, in actual alliance with Persia, or, at least, with the western satraps, had sent that squadron to assist Evagoras king of Cyprus against Persia ; and the Lacedæmonians, at actual war with Persia, intercepted that squadron going to fight against their ene-

B. C. 390. ⁽²¹⁾
Ol. 37. 2-3.

Xen. Hel. 1. 4.
c. 8. s. 23.

²¹ This and the preceding are Dodwell's dates, made out from circumstances in Xenophon's narrative. [Mr. Clinton also assigns the capture of the ten Athenian vessels by Teleutias to B. C. 390.]

mies. But what seems principally to deserve notice is the evidence afforded of the weakness and distraction of the Persian councils, in consequence of which that vast empire submitted to insults, on all sides, from the little Grecian republics. These, if they sought its alliance, sought it through insults and injuries; and, in the actual enjoyment of great advantages from its alliance obtained, still they did not refrain from insults and injuries.

The usual activity of the Athenians was excited by the loss of their ships, and by the apprehension that the Lacedæmonians might recover the dominion of the sea. A fleet of forty triremes was committed to the orders of Thrasybulus. That able and experienced officer, pressing his way to Rhodes, found Teleutias there. The Rhodian refugees held a post in the island, which he had fortified for them. With some assistance from him they had ventured a battle, but were defeated, and the democratical party commanded the country. Thrasybulus therefore, finding them thus able to support themselves, and having tried in vain to bring Teleutias to action, proceeded to the Hellespont. Hostilities had arisen between Amadocus, or Medocus²², paramount sovereign of the Odrysian Thracians, and Seuthes, the prince restored, through the assistance of the Cyrean Greeks, to the command of the country bordering on the Propontis. He effected a reconciliation between them, and, by forming an alliance with both for the Athenian commonwealth, he added considerably to the importance of the Athenian patronage for the Grecian towns on the Thracian coast. He proceeded then to Byzantium, and restored the collection of the toll, formerly imposed by the Athenians, of a tenth of the value of the cargo of all vessels passing the

Xen. Hel. 1. 4.
c. 8. s. 25.

s. 27.

²² In the Hellenics we find the name written Amadocus, in the Anabasis always Medocus, which is the orthography that Diodorus has followed, l. 4. c. 95.

Bosporus.²³ Seemingly this should not have been a measure very agreeable to the Byzantines, who might naturally enough think themselves best entitled to such a tax collected there; but, among the Greeks, when party-views interfered, the general interest of the commonwealth was little considered. Thrasybulus abolished the oligarchal government, established in Byzantium by the Lacedæmonians, and restored democracy. With the democratical party therefore, thus become the ruling party, the Athenian name was highly popular; and in the first moments of joy anything was borne from their benefactors. If indeed from the accounts given even by Xenophon, the friend and admirer of Lacedæmon, a general judgment is to be formed of the conduct of some of the Lacedæmonian governors upon some occasions, it was not wonderful that popularity should attach in the moment to any change.²⁴ Thrasybulus had similar success at Chalcedon. The other Grecian towns, on the Asiatic shore, were already in the interest of Athens, as the ally of Persia, or of the satrap in whose province they lay, excepting only Abydus, where at the time nothing invited his endeavours.

²³ Ἀπίδοτο τὴν δεκάτην τῶν ἐκ τοῦ Πόντου πλιόντων.—Decumam, e Ponto navigantibus impositam, publicanis vendit.—Decimas eorum quæ e Ponto veherentur, ἀπίδοτο, locavit, scilicet, publicanis. Hesychius: ἀπίδοτο, ἐκδίδωκε. Εκδιδόναι autem, apud Herodotum, idem quod μισθῶσαι. Though I have not on all occasions perfect faith in Hesychius, for explanations relating to the age of Xenophon, yet I believe these may be nearly right. I should however have been glad of more explanation on the subject from Xenophon himself. He indeed mentions the thing again in other words, rather confirming these interpretations, presently after:—ἡ δεκάτη τῶν ἐκ τοῦ Πόντου πεπραμένη εἶη ἐν Βυζαντίῳ ὑπὸ Ἀθηναίων. s. 31.—venditam ab Atheniensibus esse rerum e Ponto vectarum decumam. [There is another gloss of ἀπίδοτο in Hesychius: ἀπίδοτο ἀπίπωλήσατο: on which Alberti remarks: “ἀπημολήσατο scripsisse puto Hesychium. Ἀπιμολήσατο correxerat Kuster.”]

²⁴ Plutarch mentions it as a popular saying in Greece, (Agesil. v. 2. p. 1107.) that the Lacedæmonians collectively (δημοσίᾳ) were the better men, but the Athenians individually (ἰδίᾳ). It was with individuals in command that the colonies had mostly to do.

His next attention therefore was given to the large and rich island of Lesbos ; large among the islands of the Ægean, but scanty to form a state sufficing for its own protection. The Lesbians nevertheless had no notion of coalescing under one government. Four, five, or six towns affected each its separate sovereignty. Mitylene, the most populous and powerful, was attached to the Athenian interest ; all the others to the Lacedæmonian ; and in Methymne, the next in power to Mitylene, a Lacedæmonian harmost resided. But refugees from all were unceasingly watching opportunities for restoring themselves. On these circumstances Thrasybulus founded the project of bringing the whole island into the interest, and, in effect, under the dominion of Athens. He was well received in Mitylene ; and, by holding out the hope that all Lesbos might be reduced under their dominion, he engaged the Mitylenæans to march with him against Methymne. The refugees from the other towns were induced to join him by the hope, otherwise Xen. Hel. 1. 4. c. 8. s. 30. desperate, of restoration to their country. The Lacedæmonian governor, venturing an action with him, was defeated and killed. Some of the towns then surrendered, and the plunder of the lands of the rest served for present pay to the victorious army.

The dominion, or the influence, which Athens formerly held over that large part of the Greek nation which was settled in the islands, on the Asiatic coast, and on the Hellespontine shores as far as the Euxine, was now in great proportion recovered. Abydus, yet held by Dercyllidas, and the few Ionian towns that Diphridas had been able to preserve to the Lacedæmonian interest, were the principal exceptions. After these important services it remained still for Thrasybulus to accomplish what was the particular object of his instructions in leading the armament from Athens.

Having therefore passed the winter in Lesbos²⁵, he was anxious in spring to get to Rhodes as early as possible, but to get there prepared in the most effectual manner to meet such a commander as Teletias. Money, which the treasury of his republic could not supply, must be obtained to support his armament. On that curious subject, the collection of tax or tribute from those numerous self-governed towns, over which the patronage of Athens extended or the fear of its arms operated, though mention of it frequently occurs, we do not find among ancient writers the desirable explanation. Thrasybulus, after obtaining money from many other towns, proceeded to Aspendus on the river Eurymedon, the scene of the celebrated double victory of Cimon over the Persians. The Aspendians had already paid a contribution, when some irregularities committed by the troops so exasperated them that they attacked the Athenian naval camp by night, and Thrasybulus was killed in his tent.

B. C. 389.
Ol. 97. 3-4.

Xen. Hel. 1. 4.
c. 8. Diod.
l. 14. c. 100.

Such was the end of a man of no common merit, tried on various occasions; in seditions among fellow-citizens, in commands against common enemies, and proved, in them all, for honesty and true patriotism, at least after Aristides and Cimon, the most unequivocal character among the numerous superior men that Athens had to that time produced. But, in Athens, no character could escape the licentious calumny of those who made accusation a trade; and, among the remaining orations of Lysias, we find Thrasybulus involved in a charge of peculation. Certainly the mode used by the Athenians, extorting revenue with an armed force, gave the

²⁵ We find Xenophon still deficient in marking dates; but the laborious ingenuity of Dodwell has again here, I think, been successful. Contrary to Diodorus, he has assigned the departure of Thrasybulus from Athens to about midsummer of the year B. C. 390; his departure from Lesbos, in which he agrees with Diodorus, to spring B. C. 389. [The death of Thrasybulus, Mr. Clinton observes, "happened in the archonship of Demostratus, and perhaps in the beginning of B. C. 389." *Fasti Hellen.* p. 98.]

tax-gathering generals great opportunity for sinister practices : but then it opened unbounded opportunity for calumnious imputation, difficult for the clearest probity to refute ; because, to prove honesty, a negative must be proved. Xenophon appears to have had no partiality for Thrasybulus : in party indeed they were rather opposite ; but in relating his death he speaks his panegyric : “ Such,” he says, “ was the end of Thrasybulus, a man of the highest estimation ²⁶ ;” a concise, yet perhaps a completer eulogy than, in all his remaining works, we find bestowed upon any other political character, excepting only his particular friend and patron Agesilaus.

Isocr. Paneg.
p. 270. t. 1.
Lys. pro bon.
Aristophanis,
p. 155. vel
638.

To the loss of this great man was added that of Conon ; of whose fate after his imprisonment by Tiribazus we have nothing certain ; but it seems most probable that he escaped from confinement, reached the island of Cyprus, where he had large property, and died there. ²⁷

²⁶ So I think the import of the Greek phrase may most fairly be given in our language,—*μάλα δοκῶν ἀνὴρ ἀγαθὸς εἶναι*—which the Latin translator has rendered, perhaps as nearly as the Latin language would admit,—*maximā virtute viri*. Cornelius Nepos’s eulogy of Thrasybulus seems the same expression amplified in translation : “ Si per se virtus sine fortunā ponderanda sit, dubito an hunc (Thrasybulum) primum omnium ponam. Illi sine dubio neminem præfero ; fide, constantiā, magnitudine animi, in patriam amore.”

²⁷ The biographer Nepos says that, according to some reports, Conon was carried into the king’s presence, and was put to death, or died, in Upper Asia ; but that, according to the historian Dinon, in his opinion the best authority for Persian affairs, he escaped from confinement. It is somewhat remarkable that none of the extant contemporary writers mention the death of so illustrious a man. Xenophon relates his imprisonment, and there leaves him. A licentious Latin translation seems to have led some to quote Isocrates as asserting that he was put to death by the Persians—*Κόνωνα μὲν—ἐπὶ θάνατον συλλαβεῖν ἐτόλμησαν*—(Paneg. p. 268. t. 1.) which, apparently for the sake of a rounder period than an exact version would readily have allowed, is rendered by Auger, *Cononem comprehensum interficere ausi sunt*. The meaning appears to me to be no more than that they seized him with the purpose of putting him to death ; and as the completion of the purpose is not expressed, it seems implied that it did not follow. From Lysias we learn that the large property of Conon in Cyprus was disposed of, after his death, in conformity to a written will which he left, (Lys. pro bon. Aristoph. p. 155. vel 638.) and it seems in some degree implied,

As no others perhaps could have raised Athens from ruin to that degree of strength and splendour which she had already recovered, so none possessed the means of Thrasybulus and Conon, whether by abilities and experience, or by interest and influence among Grecian states and foreign powers, to promote still her progress to empire. Xen. Hel. l. 4. c. 8. s. 31.
 The Lacedæmonians nevertheless were alarmed at what had been already done, and especially at the recovery of the command of the Bosphorus, and of the toll collected there. Dercyllidas, who had remained in his government of Abydus without a force sufficient for s. 32. effectual operation against Thrasybulus, was, perhaps, while the affairs of Greece required the presence of Agesilaus, the fittest man that Sparta could furnish for the Asiatic command. But the interest of Anaxibius prevailed with the ephors. He sailed with only three triremes and s. 33. no troops, but he was furnished with levy money for a thousand men.

To supply the lost abilities of Thrasybulus and Conon, Iphicrates now stood foremost among the Athenian officers. It is an important, though, for the modern reader, an over concise passage of Xenophon, in which he mentions that Iphicrates, while commanding in Peloponnesus, put to death some Corinthians for their zeal for the connection with Argos; a violence of which the united republics took no farther notice than to dismiss him and his troops, with the pretence of having no farther need of them.

Nevertheless the appointment of a new commander from Lacedæmon, to act in the Hellespont s. 34. with an increased force, induced the Athenians to send Iphicrates thither with eight triremes and twelve hundred tar-

in the same passage, that he died there. The omission of all mention of his death, after noticing his imprisonment, seems to mark that Xenophon knew nothing of his having been put to death by the Persians.

geteers. Desultory expeditions, for the collection of booty, for some time employed both generals. A proposal to revolt at length coming to Anaxibius from a party in Antandrus, he led thither the greater part of his force, consisting of Abydenes, mercenaries, and those Lacedæmonian governors, with their followers, who had taken refuge in Abydus, with Dercyllidas. Iphicrates, informed of this movement, crossed the Hellespont in the night, landed on the Asiatic shore, and, directing his march toward Cremaste, on the highlands of Ida, where, says Xenophon, were the gold mines of the Antandrians, he took a station commodious for intercepting the Lacedæmonians on their return. His squadron hastened back to Sestus, and, at daybreak, according to orders given, moved up the Hellespont toward the Propontis. It was seen from the Asiatic shore holding that course, and the feint completely deceived Anaxibius; who, in the persuasion that Iphicrates was gone on some expedition to the northward, marched in full security. He no sooner saw the Athenian infantry, so well was the ambuscade planned, than he saw his own defeat inevitable. With the ready and firm conciseness of a Spartan, addressing his people, he said, "It will be proper for me to die here: hasten you to save yourselves before the enemy is upon you." Taking then his shield from his shield-bearer, and being joined by twelve of the expelled Lacedæmonian governors, they fought on the spot till all were killed. This testimony to the remaining vigour of the institutions of Lycurgus is the more remarkable as Xenophon, in doing justice to the bravery of Anaxibius, appears to have been very far from having had either personal regard for him, or esteem for his character.²⁸ The

²⁸ Dercyllidas appears to have been much the friend of Xenophon, who seems to have thought him ill used by the appointment of Anaxibius to supersede him. By Anaxibius himself, when he had before the command in the

rest of the army flying was pursued, with considerable slaughter, to the very walls of Abydus.

SECTION VII.

Freebooting War of the Æginetans against Attica. — Siege of Ægina. — Lacedæmonian public Revenue. — Connection of Athens with Cyprus. — Teleutias Commander on the Grecian Coast. — Antalcidas Commander in Asia, and again Ambassador from Lacedæmon to the Satrap of Lydia. — Able Conduct of Antalcidas, in military Command and in Negotiation. — Treaty concluded between Lacedæmon and Persia, and Peace dictated to Greece by the Lacedæmonian Government, in the King of Persia's Name, commonly called the Peace of Antalcidas.

WHILE Athens was recovering empire beyond the Ægean, she was suffering at home those evils of predatory war to which, in the scantiness of their territories, the most powerful of the Grecian republics were always liable. Hitherto commercial intercourse between Athens and Ægina, though Ægina was of the Lacedæmonian alliance, had not been interrupted; the Lacedæmonians themselves, in the desire of finding opportunity to divide the formidable confederacy that opposed them, having been cautious of carrying hostility directly against Attica. But since a naval war was begun, in which the Athenians of course took the lead, such caution was laid aside; the Æginetans were encouraged to infest the Attic

B. C. 387. *
Ol. 97. 4.

Xen. Hel. 1. 5.
c. 1. s. 1.

Hellespont, Xenophon had been, as we have seen, according to his own account, very ill treated. It may deserve observation that he mentions the impiety of Anaxibius, shown in his contempt of augury, as among the causes of his catastrophe.

[* Mr. Mitford states below that Chabrias, as he proceeded to Cyprus, to aid Evagoras, landed at Ægina to repress the annoyance suffered from that island. According to Mr. Clinton, Chabrias was despatched with succours to Evagoras B. C. 383. Fasti Hellen. p. 100.]

trade and pillage the coast, and Ægina became again "the eyesore of Piræus."

Xen. Hel. 1. 5.
c. 1. s. 2.

Distressed by this annoyance, the Athenians sent Pamphilus with ten triremes and a body of heavy-armed to besiege Ægina. Teleutias happened to be in the neighbourhood, collecting tribute among the islands. For notwithstanding their professions of total disinterestedness during the Peloponnesian war, the Lacedæmonians had now avowedly, and indeed not without necessity, abandoned that system, and followed the example of Athens in raising

Diod. 1. 14.
p. 400.

a public revenue. After the Peloponnesian war, according to Diodorus, they collected yearly a thousand talents, perhaps near two hundred and fifty thousand pounds, which he seems to have considered as a great exaction. On the approach of the Lacedæmonian fleet the Athenian squadron retired, but the siege of Ægina by land

Xen. Hel. 1. 5.
c. 1. s. 3.

was continued. The season of the annual change of commanders occurring soon after, Hierax, the successor of Teleutias in the command-in-chief, led the greater part of the fleet to Rhodes, leaving only twelve triremes under Gorgopas; who, with that small force, so blockaded the Athenian troops that they suffered and risked more than the Æginetans whom they were besieging. An

s. 5.

exertion of the Athenian government relieved them by reconveying them to Attica. But, immediately as the Æginetans were thus set at liberty, depredation was renewed on the Attic shores with increased sedulity and vigour. A squadron of thirteen triremes was therefore appointed, under the command of Eunomus, to

s. 8, 9.

guard the coast. By a surprise in the night, ably conducted, Gorgopas took four, and compelled the rest to seek shelter in the harbour of Piræus.

We cannot refuse admiration to the activity and spirit of enterprise of the Athenian government, which, amid these

distresses at home, could direct its attention to the eastern end of the Mediterranean, and, while Attica was so pressed, could resolve to send succours to a distant ally, a meritorious ally indeed, Evagoras, tyrant of Salamis in Cyprus. We find lofty eulogy on the mutual friendship, the magnanimous friendship, of the Athenian people and Evagoras, uninterrupted in various fortune, and in a length of years, among ancient and modern writers, but the contemporary writer is not among them. Declamation rather than reason seems to have been thought fittest to give credit to such mutual sentiments, though the connection certainly subsisted between a single despot and a despotic multitude. But political connections have commonly their real source in mutual wants; and we are not wholly without information of those which produced, and maintained, the friendship between the Athenian democracy and the tyrant of Salamis.²⁹ Athens had a population which the scanty produce of its own barren and narrow territory, with cultivation long wholly interrupted by hostile armies, and, of late years, committed almost entirely to slaves, could not feed. Its nearest resource was Eubœa; its greatest the shores of the Euxine. But, in wars so frequent and almost continual among the Greeks, the hazard for heavy trading-ships, in threading the Bosphorus and the Hellespont, and then winding their way among the islands of the Ægean, was so great that supplies from that plentiful country would be precarious, and other resources highly desirable. From Cyprus the navigation to Athens might be open when that from the Euxine was pre-

²⁹ Valuable information no doubt may be gathered from that oration of Isocrates entitled *The Encomium of Evagoras*, which is said to have been written for the funeral of the Salaminian prince. It is however not by taking ingenious panegyric in the lump, but by sifting it, by comparing it with information remaining from other, especially contemporary, writers, by observing its connection with the course of events, and its consistency with known facts, and with the temper of mankind and of the age, that the truly valuable is to be discovered and ascertained.

Andoc. de
reditu.
Ch. 22. s. 2.
of this Hist.

cluded; and a contemporary orator informs us of one occasion, when Athens, pressed by dearth and apprehension of famine, looked principally to Cyprus for relief. Probably the service of the Athenian people which procured Evagoras the honour of being admitted to the freedom of the city, consisted in supplying them with corn in the last years of the Peloponnesian war. Such a benefit would be likely to make impression on the many, to win their favour and engage their attachment, even to a tyrant; while their leaders, more particularly connected with him, would know how to esteem the connection which enabled them to minister to the wants of the many, their tools and masters. On the other hand, for Salamis Athens was a valuable market; and to Evagoras, pressed by the control of Persia, at the discretion of its satraps, sometimes threatening his safety, always checking his ambition, every alliance, founded on mutual interest, and especially that of a maritime power like Athens, would be highly valuable.

Xen. Hel. 1. 5.
c. 1. s. 10-13.

Induced by such considerations, with perhaps others less indicated by ancient writers, the Athenian government resolved that a considerable force should pass to Cyprus; and the advantageous choice was made of Chabrias, one of the first military characters of his active age, for the command. But that Attica might be safe while a large part of its force was on distant service, the armament was directed first to the repression of the annoyance suffered from Ægina. Chabrias landed on that island; an action ensued; Gorgopas was killed, and such slaughter was made of his troops and seamen that, for some time, the Attic coast and navigation, in the contemporary historian's expression, were unmolested as in peace.

The Lacedæmonian revenue, notwithstanding the tribute collected, was evidently scanty for the expense of a naval war; a deficiency to which, apparently in a great degree,

must be attributed the narrow and desultory exertion by land. After the blow in Ægina the surviving crews refused to obey the orders of Eteonicus, who succeeded Gorgopas in the command, because he had no pay for them. The resource of the Lacedæmonian government was in the personal character of Teleutias. Not raised to fame by any achievement of extraordinary splendour, Teleutias had the merit of attaching, in a singular degree, the affection and esteem of those who served under him. On his arrival to take the command from Eteonicus joy pervaded the armament. Assembling the soldiers and seamen, "I bring no pay with me," he said, "but, God willing, and you assisting, I will endeavour that you shall not want. You know that, when I commanded before, my door was always open to any who desired to speak with me, and so it shall be now. When you have plenty you shall find me well supplied; but when you see me bearing cold and heat and watching, you must expect in these also to have your share. You have, I know, deserved the reputation of brave men. It will be your business now to increase that reputation. We must labour together, that we may enjoy together; and what is more gratifying than to procure our subsistence by our arms, without flattering any man, Greek or barbarian, for pay? Plenty at the enemy's expense, is at the same time wealth and glory." He was answered with a universal shout, "Command, and we will obey!"

Teleutias resolved immediately to use this ready zeal. He ordered all aboard in the evening, with one day's provision; and crossing the gulf, to within a mile of the harbour of Piræus, waited for daybreak. With his small squadron, only twelve triremes, he then pushed into the port. A force more than sufficient to overwhelm him was there, but not a ship in a state for action. The surprise was as complete as he had foreseen or could

Xen. Hel. 1. 5.
c. 1. s. 13.

s. 3, 4.

s. 16, 17, & 18.

wish. The triremes which fell readily within his reach he rendered unserviceable; many laden merchant-ships he towed away, and some of his crews, leaping ashore, surrounded some sea-faring and mercantile men, and forced them aboard, prisoners. Alarm spread rapidly among the inhabitants: those within doors ran out to inquire what the disturbance was; those without, as where defence (not the business merely of a garrison) was the near interest of all, hastened in for their arms; while some ran to the city to communicate the intelligence; and shortly all Athens, horse and foot, came down, in the apprehension that the port was already in the enemy's possession.

Meanwhile Teleutias, sending away his prizes under convoy of four triremes for Ægina, with the rest of his squadron coasted Attica southward. Numerous fishing vessels, with some passage-boats from the islands, concluding that a squadron from Piræus must be Athenian, fell into his hands without attempting flight. At Sunium he captured several trading ships, some laden with corn, some with other merchandise. Directing then his course to Ægina, and there selling his prizes, he gave his crews a month's pay in advance, and quickly his complements, which he had found deficient, were filled with volunteers; and he had a squadron as zealous in the service and orderly as it had lately been backward and mutinous.

But when a naval force, without which their own territory must always be insecure, could not be maintained and brought into action without the singular ability and popularity, and perhaps too the good fortune, of a Teleutias; when, after great victories by land, they had scarcely advanced a step against their enemies, even in Europe; and, in Asia and the islands, the extensive command which de-

volved to them by the extinction of the empire of Athens was nearly passed away, the Lacedæmonians became aware that their resources were unequal to break a league of half Greece against them, assisted with money from Persia: they found that a war to pull down the once widely dreaded power of Athens, and a war to maintain their own power, now become little less invidious, were very differently considered by those whose support was necessary to them; and that, after recalling their able and successful commander from Asia, not only their authority among the Grecian states of their alliance, but even the safety of their own territory, was precarious.

Under this pressure, looking around for means of relief, there were circumstances affording hope that negotiation with Persia might be attempted with advantage, and the resolution was taken to make the trial. Tiribazus, who had shown a disposition so friendly to them, was returned to the chief command in Asia Minor; and the hostile Pharnabazus, honoured with the gift of the king's daughter in marriage, was gone from his satrapy to the capital. At the same time, in consequence of successful negoti-

Xen. Hel. 1. 5.
c. 1. s. 25.

ation at Syracuse and among the Italian states, a powerful re-enforcement to the fleet was expected; which might enable Lacedæmon to treat upon more equal terms than if excluded from the seas, and sinking under her enemies' arms. Antalcidas, who had successfully conducted the former negotiation with Tiribazus, was the person who stood forward for the management of the business, or whom the administration, and apparently the public voice, called for. Besides his interest in Lacedæmon, which appears to have been powerful, not only the favour he had acquired with Tiribazus, but his connection of hospitality with Ariobarzanes, who governed the Hellespontine satrapy in the absence of Pharnabazus, strongly

s. 6. & 22.
B. C. 388.
Ol. 97.2—98.1.

recommended him ; and he was appointed both commander-in-chief in Asia, and ambassador to the Persian government.

B. C. 388.
Ol. 98. 1.
Xen. Hel.
l. 5. c. 1.
s. 6. & 22.

Arriving at Ephesus in autumn, Antalcidas sent the fleet, consisting of twenty-five triremes, under his vice-admiral Nicolochus, to oppose Iphicrates

in the Hellespont. He went himself immediately to wait upon Tiribazus, whom he found not only disposed to Lacedæmon and to himself in the same friendly manner as before, but furnished with authority from his court to engage in even offensive alliance, for the purpose of compelling the confederated republics to accede to terms of peace which had been settled in the Persian cabinet.³⁰ Returning then to

Ephesus, the satrap accompanied him.³¹ There

s. 7. & 22.

intelligence came to them that Iphicrates, having collected all the scattered naval force of the Athenians in the neighbourhood of the Hellespont, to the number of thirty-two triremes, blockaded Nicolochus in the harbour of Abydus ; and it was to be feared that the squadron, daily expected from Syracuse and Italy to assist the Lacedæmonians, would be intercepted. Upon this Antalcidas hastened by land to Abydus. By a stratagem he took eight triremes, proceeding from the Thracian coast to reinforce Iphicrates. He was soon after joined by twenty from Sicily and Italy. Collecting then the naval force of all the Ionian towns, over which the influence of Tiribazus extended, and, through the friendship of Ariobarzanes, re-

³⁰ ξυμμαχεῖν βασιλεία, εἰ μὴ ἐθέλοιεν Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ οἱ ἐξυμμαχοὶ χεῖσθαι τῇ εἰρήνῃ ἣ αὐτὸς ἔλεγεν. Upon a comparison of this passage with that where Tiribazus was last before mentioned, the meaning of the historian appears, I think, clearly that given in the text : but the incomplete connection and deficient explanation in many parts of the Grecian Annals show that the work never had the author's finishing hand.

³¹ Ὁ δὲ Ἀνταλκίδας κατέβη μὲν μετὰ Τιριβάζου. The historian has omitted to mention whether Antalcidas went to wait upon Tiribazus. The Latin translator seems to have understood it to be in Upper Asia ; but I rather think the word κατέβη means no more than that Tiribazus *came down* to the coast with Antalcidas, probably from Sardis.

ceiving some even from the Æolian, which would rather have gone to re-enforce the enemy, had Pharnabazus remained in the satrapy, he was at the head of a fleet of above eighty triremes. The Athenians were utterly unable to contend with this force: the Lacedæmonians commanded the seas; and the Athenian authority, trade, and revenue in the Hellespontine countries ceased.

Antalcidas, possessing means thus for conquest, persevered nevertheless in his purpose of making peace; and the temper of the principal belligerent republics, which had felt severely the pressure of war, at this time favoured his purpose. The Athenians, seeing the command of the sea decidedly gone from them, and the great king, who had been theirs, become the enemy's ally, fearing a second siege of Athens itself, and in the mean time unable to protect their territory against the ravage even of Æginetan privateers, were earnest for peace. Even the Lacedæmonians, employed, in some towns, in guarding against the danger of foreign assault, in others in the more irksome service of obviating sedition and preventing revolt; a whole mora stationed in Lechæum and another in Orchomenus, while Corinth was a constant and most harassing object of contest; tired of continual calls to these and similar duties, were little allured by the prospect of conquest beyond the Ægean. Still more the Argives, distressed by repeated ravage of their rich territory, more exposed than any others of the confederacy to a repetition of the evil, and without a fleet to revenge, or transmarine possessions whence to supply themselves, had more than others occasion for peace. The Bœotians only remained, less solicitous to put an end to a war from which latterly they had less suffered, but which they could not support alone.

The proposal however for peace was not made in a manner the most creditable to Lacedæmon, or likely to be very

Xen. Hel. l. 5.
c. 1. s. 26.

Xen. Hel. 1. 5.
c. 1. s. 27.

gratifying to the Greek nation. It came from

Tiribazus in the form of a requisition for a congress of ministers from all the belligerent republics which might be disposed to accede to terms of peace to be offered by the king. Nevertheless all sent their ministers.

B. C. 586. (32)
Ol. 98. 2.
Spring. [B. C.
587.* Cl.]
Xen. Hel. 1. 5.
c. 1. s. 28.

The congress being opened, Tiribazus produced a rescript from the king, showed the royal signet, and then read thus: "Artaxerxes the king holds it just, That all cities on the continent of Asia belong to his dominion, together with the islands of Clazomenæ and Cyprus; and that all other Grecian cities, little and great, be independent, except that the islands of Lemnus, Imbrus, and Scirus remain, as of old, under the dominion of Athens. If any refuse these terms, against such I will join in war with those who accept them, and give my assistance by land and by sea, with ships and with money."³²

However strange this dictatorial address from a Persian governor to the Greek nation may appear to those whose ideas of the Grecian spirit of independency have been drawn from declaimers under the Roman empire, yet, from contemporary writers, it does not seem that the general mind was greatly shocked by it. Evidently however the Greeks had no reason to fear, and did not fear, the Persian military power. Persia was incomparably weaker than in the reign of Xerxes, and Greece united would have been stronger.

³² Polybius (l. 1. p. 7.) and Strabo (l. 6. p. 287.) say, that the peace of Antalcidas was made in the 19th year after the battle of Ægospotami; and this has been the canon to which Dodwell has accommodated his dates. [* Mr. Clinton considers the treaty to have been concluded about autumn. Dodwell's inconsistency respecting the date of the battle of Ægospotami is pointed out in the Appendix to the *Fasti Hellenici*, p. 270. His erroneous date of the peace of Antalcidas is examined *ibid.* pp. 276, 277.]

³³ The change from the third to the first person, here copied from the Greek, has probably been preserved from the Persian.

Clazomenæ was separated by so very narrow a strait that it was generally considered as a city of the Ionic main: it has been specified here apparently to obviate cavilling.

Perhaps indeed there never existed, at any period, a nation so superior in military force to the rest of the world, as that assemblage of little military commonwealths at this time was, could they have been firmly united. But though incapable of steady union, they had felt severely the inconveniences of discord, and of that unfailing source of discord, the separate independency of every city. Nothing but the fear of greater, and indeed of the greatest evils, could have produced the submissive attachment of the smaller republics to Athens or Lacedæmon; while even those commanding cities found perpetual uneasiness from an authority which they could neither quietly hold nor safely abdicate. When the military power of Persia then ceased to be feared; when, on the contrary, the Grecian military were sought by the Persian satraps, and employment in the Persian service became familiar to Grecian troops; when friendly intercourse and the pledge of hospitality became common between Greeks of rank, and the Persian great; but especially after the high favour with which Cyrus had distinguished the Greeks, and when the event of his expedition had so clearly shown that the Persian king was to be feared only on account of his wealth, which enabled Greeks to subdue Greeks, but no longer enabled Persia, without Grecian assistance, to be formidable to Greece, the Persian king might be considered as no unnatural mediator in the destructive quarrels of the Greeks among themselves. Accustomed to the authority of men nearer their own level, officers of the Lacedæmonian or Athenian governments, they little felt the indignity of submission to the mandate of the great potentate of Asia.

Thus prepared then, all the belligerent republics, upon being applied to by their respective ministers at the congress, immediately acceded to the terms proposed. Even the Thebans did not, as far as appears, profess to make any difficulty. Their great object was, not

Xen. Hel. l. 5.
c. 1. s. 29.

the freedom of Greece, but the establishment of their own power over all the Bœotian towns. They required therefore that the oath of the Theban ministers should be taken as the complete representatives of Bœotia. A remarkable controversy ensued. Agesilaus, says the historian his friend, declared he would not accept their oath, unless made in exact conformity to the king's rescript, which required the independency of every Grecian city, little and great. The Theban ministers said that "no such requisition had been received at Thebes." "Go then," said Agesilaus, "and ask. But at the same time tell your employers that, unless they comply, Thebes will be excluded from the benefit of the peace." The ministers

Xen. Hel. 1. 5.
c. 1. s. 30.

went accordingly: but Agesilaus, in his animosity against the Thebans, would immediately employ coercive measures, and his influence decided the ephors. Orders were issued for the army to assemble, Lacedæmonians and allies, at Tegea; and the king himself, after a propitious border-passing sacrifice, hastened thither. Before he was ready to march however the Theban ministers returned, with a declaration of the acquiescence of their commonwealth. Thebes accordingly was admitted to the general terms of peace, and the Bœotian towns were restored to independency.

s. 31. The Corinthians and Argives, after having separately sworn to the peace³⁴, were still for preserving the union of the two republics; but this could not be done, so powerful still was the adverse party in Corinth, without keeping a body of Argive troops there. Agesilaus threatened immediate hostility against both Corinth and Argos if these were not withdrawn. A reluctant obedience was paid to his requisition thus enforced. Upon

³⁴ This is not directly said, but seems clearly enough implied in the concise expression of Xenophon.

the departure of the Argives all those Corinthians who, since the Argive connection, had been living in banishment, returned to their country; those who had been most active in promoting that connection, together with the more notorious of those who had been concerned in the massacre which preceded it, aware that Corinth was no longer a place of safety for them, emigrated; and Corinth and Argos became, as formerly, distinct republics. Thus peace was established throughout Greece; armies were dismissed, fleets laid up, and friendly and commercial intercourse became open, among all the republics of the nation; at least as far as the political circumstances of the country would allow; numerous citizens of every republic remaining in exile, and faction yet within all.

Agesilaus, it is evident, approved the treaty of Antalcidas; and, in one of the most studied of the political tracts of Isocrates, in which he has most urgently contended for the general freedom of Greece, we find it not only approved, as a proper measure at the time, but recommended as a model for following occasions. "Nothing," he says, "can be juster, nothing more advantageous for Athens."³⁵ On another occasion indeed, when stimulation against Lacedæmon was among his objects, he has taken the abandoning of the Asian Greeks to subjection under Persia as ground for vehement invective. And indeed throughout Greece, wherever there was a disposition adverse to Lacedæmon, or the purpose of exciting such, this appears to have been a favourite topic for reproach. Hence perhaps Xenophon, in

Isocr. de Pace,
p. 172. t. 2. ed.
Auger.

Isocr. Pana-
then. p. 496.
t. 2.

³⁵ Plutarch, in his *Life of Agesilaus* (p. 1111.), says that Antalcidas was the political enemy of Agesilaus; but the contrary appears sufficiently evident from Xenophon; and, were confirmation wanting, we have it from Plutarch himself; for, according even to his account, Agesilaus justified the treaty in argument, and supported it by deed; p. 1112. ed. II. Steph. In his *Life of Artaxerxes* Plutarch is very futile on the subject of this treaty.

his general history treating of the peace of Antalcidas as if concurring in sentiment with his patron Agesilaus, has, in his panegyric of that prince, wholly avoided the subject. The surrender of the patronage of the Asiatic Grecian states was indeed a surrender of the proudest and fairest claim of glory that Lacedæmon perhaps ever acquired. Yet it seems not justly to be imputed as a peculiar crime or dishonour to Antalcidas. A similar or rather a more disgraceful dereliction of the cause of those states occurred on the conclusion of the Peloponnesian war. They had been found under the protection (so half Greece would have termed it, but at worst under the dominion) of a Grecian people; they were left to the mercy of barbarians, in subjection to the Persian empire. But on the present occasion the Lacedæmonians had to allege that not they, but their enemies, had betrayed the common cause of the nation, by producing the necessity for recalling Agesilaus from those glorious exertions which had rescued the Asian Greeks from foreign dominion, and given them independency.³⁶

A deep policy has, by some writers, without any apparent foundation, been attributed to the Persian court in this transaction. Considering the interest of Lacedæmon, as distinct from the common interest of Greece, Antalcidas certainly served his country very ably. Simple and concise as the terms of the peace are, not only they appear directly calculated to promote the interest of Lacedæmon, but (except as far as dominion in Asia may have been an object of ambition) they answered the principal purposes of Lace-

³⁶ One cannot but smile at the grave assertion of Diodorus, that the abandoning of the Asian Greeks was what hurt the Athenians and Thebans on this occasion. Diod. l. 14. c. 111. The Asian, like the European Greeks, were divided between the aristocratical party and the democratical. Perhaps both would be as free and happy under Persia as under Lacedæmonian supremacy. The aristocratical would have been sure to suffer under Theban or Athenian.

dæmon completely. To break the growing power of Thebes by emancipating the Bœotian towns, and to divide Corinth from Argos, had been the great objects of the war, and were the immediate effects of the peace; for the more ready and quiet production of which Athens was bribed with permission, contrary to the general spirit of the treaty, to retain the dominion of its three islands. Accordingly it is observed by Xenophon that the Lacedæmo-

Xen. Hel. 1. 5.
c. 1. s. 33.

nians established their credit and influence in Greece much more completely, and put their commonwealth altogether in a much more splendid situation, by the peace which had its name from Antalcidas, than by that which had concluded the Peloponnesian war; and it is remarkable that he attributes the advantage to their having presided in the business (modern language will scarcely render his expression more exactly) under a commission from the Persian king.³⁷ So much, however, if we may trust Plutarch for the anecdote, was Agesilaus persuaded that the interest of Lacedæmon was well considered in the treaty, that, when somebody, reviling the peace of Antalcidas, said that Lacedæmon was gone over to the Persian interest, "Rather," he answered, "Persia to the Lacedæmonian;" and so, in truth, it seems to have been.

Plut. Agesil.
t. 2. p. 1112.

³⁷ οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι πολὺ ἐπικυδίστεροι ἐγένοντο ἐκ τῆς ἐπ' Ἀνταλκίδου εἰρήνης καλουμένης· προστάται γὰρ γινόμενοι τῆς ὑπὸ βασιλείᾳ καταπεμψθείσης εἰρήνης, κ. τ. λ.

CHAPTER XXVI.

AFFAIRS OF GREECE FROM THE PEACE OF ANTALCIDAS
TILL THE DEPRESSION OF THE LACEDÆMONIAN POWER,
AND THE ELEVATION OF THEBES TO SUPREMACY AMONG
THE GRECIAN REPUBLICS, BY THE BATTLE OF LEUCTRA.

SECTION I.

Despotism of Lacedæmon. — Punishment of Mantinea. — Restoration of Phliasian Exiles.

THE real disgrace of the peace of Antalcidas, and apparently too the clamour against it, arose principally from the ensuing conduct of the Lacedæmonian government. Trouble and misfortune had not yet taught them moderation. No thought was entertained of attaching the Greek nation by a just and generous conduct; by any fair communication of rights and privileges; by any establishment, pervading all the republics, that might ensure justice to the subordinate against the imperial state, or to the subjects of each against their respective administrations. A maxim of Agesilaus is mentioned by Xenophon, that Lacedæmon always would be powerful enough if the Greeks were prudent; that is, if they duly regarded their own interest.¹ Perhaps the maxim might be inverted: Greece might have been powerful, had Lacedæmon been prudent. But the very first measure of its government, remarkable enough to claim the

¹ . . . ἰσχυρὰν δὲ τότε, ὅταν οἱ Ἕλληνες σωφρονῶσιν. Xen. Agesil. c. 7. s. 3.

notice of history, was even impudently arbitrary. Having enforced the acceptance of peace, among all the republics of the nation, according to their own construction of the king of Persia's rescript, they proceeded to take into consideration the state of their confederacy. Some of those called their allies had been held to their engagements by fear only: it was well known that their wishes were rather for the success of the enemy. These, after deliberation on the subject, it was resolved to punish, and, by strong measures of coercion, to prevent future defection.

Xen. Hel. 1. 5.
c. 2. s. 1.

B. C. 386.
Ol. 98. 3.
[Cf. date of
Peace, ch. 25.
s. 7.]

They began then with showing, in the instance of Mantinea, that it might sometimes be safer to be the enemy than the ally of Lacedæmon. It was imputed to the Mantineans that, during the war, they had sent supplies of corn to the Argives; that, on pretence of a truce, they had sometimes omitted to send their proportion of troops to the army; that their troops, when with the army, served ill; that, in short, it was well known the Mantineans always repined at the success, and rejoiced in the misfortunes of the Lacedæmonian arms. On all these accounts it was required that the Mantineans should themselves destroy the fortifications of their city; and declaration was formally made to them, that nothing less would be accepted, in proof that the various acts of treason, in the war, were not acts of the commonwealth, with admonition added that, in the current year, the Thirty years' truce between Mantinea and Lacedæmon would expire. The value of this admonition we can only gather from what we find scattered among the early Greek writers concerning Grecian ideas of natural justice; by which we learn that the condition of the Ecspondi, those to whom we are bound by no express compact, if they were the weaker party, was indeed terrible.

Xen. Hel. 1. 5.
c. 2. s. 2.

Diod. 1. 15.
c. 5.

Ch. 15. s. 4.
of this Hist.

Xen. Hel. 1. 5.
c. 2. s. 3.

The Mantineans refusing obedience to the despotic injunction, war was immediately denounced against them. But Agesilaus, though unable apparently to prevent the measure, was so little satisfied with it that, on pretence of personal obligation to the Mantineans, for services to the king Archidamus, his father, in the Messenian rebellion, he requested of the general assembly² to excuse him from the command. Those services to the king must have been equally services to the commonwealth; but, while the excuse was admitted, the resolution against Mantinea was prosecuted. Agesipolis also was not without cause of forbearance toward Mantinea, for services to his father, Pausanias; who was still living there, and indebted particularly to the chiefs of the democratical party, which now governed the city, for his best comforts in banishment. It may have been some confidence in their interest with the reigning kings of Lacedæmon that emboldened the Mantineans to resist the mandates of those whom Thebes and Argos had not dared to resist. Agesipolis however, fearing probably the consequences of a contrary conduct, undertook the command of the expedition against them.

s. 4.

The usual ravage of Grecian armies over the Mantinean territory not producing the obedience required, Agesipolis proceeded to encompass the town with a contravallation. The work was already far advanced when he was informed that the town was so provided, through the uncommon abundance of the preceding harvest, that there could be no hope of quickly reducing it by famine. Fearing therefore the various inconveniences, both to Lacedæmon and the allies, of a protracted blockade, he recurred to a mode of siege for which the peculiar circumstances of the place offered opportunity. A very

² Ἐδίσθη τῆς πόλεως.

plentiful stream, the Ophis, flowed through it. Stopping the current below, he flooded the town; and the foundations, not of houses only, but of the fortifications also, formed of unburnt bricks, were shortly sapped. Every effort of the Mantineans was inefficacious to check the threatened ruin. They proposed to capitulate, but the offer to demolish their already tottering fortifications was not now accepted. It was required that the city should be abandoned, and that the people should separate to their several boroughs, whence their forefathers had assembled to make Mantinea the common capital of their little territory. The expected horrors of a storm, or of the lot, so dreadful among the Greeks, of prisoners at discretion, enforced the acceptance of this severe condition.

Xen. Hel. 1. 5.
c. 2. s. 4. &
Pausan. 1. 8.
c. 8.

Ch. 4. s. 2.
of this Hist.

The chiefs of the democratical party, and especially those whose disposition to the Argive connection was most notorious, dreading the sanguinary animosity of their fellow-citizens of the opposite party still more than the vengeance of the Lacedæmonians, were apprehensive that the sanctity of the capitulation, enforced only by sacrifice and oath, would be but a weak protection for them; and the historian has evidently thought their fear not unfounded. The influence however of the banished king, Pausanias, was so exerted with his son that the desired though wretched resource of exile was secured to them. In taking possession of the town, the Lacedæmonian troops lined the street leading to the gate, while sixty of the most obnoxious passed out: "and though," says the historian, "they had spears in their hands and enmity enough in their hearts, yet they were restrained from offering injury much more easily than the best of the Mantineans;" meaning the nobility, or oligarchal leaders: "a great instance of subordination," he continues, "and which ought not to pass

Xen. Hel. 1. 5.
c. 2. s. 6.

unnoticed." This testimony from Xenophon marks the Greeks to have been as incapable of coalescing in a just and well-regulated free government as the French at the time of their revolution.

Xen. Hel. 1. 5.
c. 2. s. 7.

Not the fortifications only, but those houses which had withstood the flood were then demolished. The removal was at first very grievous to the people, most being under necessity to build new habitations. Those however, who had any landed property, soon became satisfied with the change: finding, as Xenophon observes, convenience in living near their estates, and, by the establishment of aristocracy, being delivered from the vexation of demagogues. The Mantinean commonwealth became thus, under the name of alliance, completely a province to Lacedæmon. The men of property, depending upon Lacedæmonian protection, both for their authority and for the best security to their possessions, were of course attached to the Lacedæmonian cause; while the lower people, the power of intriguing orators to direct their passions in one overbearing current being checked by their separation, and their minds being in consequence less occupied by politics, obeyed more readily and cheerfully the requisitions of the Lacedæmonian officers whenever their military service was required.

s. 8, 9, 10.

The affairs of Mantinea being so settled, those of Phlius were taken into consideration. A petition had been presented from the exiles of that little republic, who seem to have had a fair claim to attention and protection from the Lacedæmonian government. A representation was accordingly sent to Phlius, stating that the exiles were not only friends of Lacedæmon, but guiltless toward their own commonwealth; and it was therefore hoped that coercive measures would be needless, to procure their restoration. Those who ruled Phlius were strongly

disposed to resist; but the numerous friends of the exiles, together with some men (such, says Xenophon, as are found in most cities) ready for any change, deterred them. It was therefore decreed, "That the exiles should be re-
 admitted; that their property should be restored
 to them; that those who had bought any part of it from the public should be reimbursed by the public; that any dispute arising, about any thing claimed, should be decided by due course of law."

B. C. 385.
 Ol. 98. 3.

SECTION II.

Uncommon Tranquillity in Greece. — New political Phenomenon in Greece. — Inconvenience of the Grecian political System. — Growing Power of Olynthus. — War resolved against Olynthus by the Congress of the Lacedæmonian Confederacy. — Composition for personal Service in Arms.

AFTER the dispersion of the Mantineans and the composure of the affairs of Phlius there followed an uncommon suspension of crimes and calamities in Greece; insomuch that, during more than two years, nothing occurred for the historian's notice. This quiet was
 at length interrupted by the arrival of ministers
 at Lacedæmon from the Grecian towns of Acanthus and Apollonia in Thrace; whose business the ephors deemed so important as to require that a congress of the confederacy should be summoned.

B. C. 382. (3)
 Ol. 99. 2.
 Spring.
 Xen. Hel. 1. 5.
 c. 2. s. 11.

The circumstances were indeed new in Grecian politics. That territory on the Thracian coast, which acquired the name of the Chalcidic, had been settled in very early times, as we have formerly seen, by colonies from Greece; invited

³ This is Dodwell's date. But he seems to have crowded too many transactions into the latter part of this year, B. C. 382. Apparently the embassy from Thrace must have taken place very early in 382, if not rather before the close of 383.

perhaps not more by the fertility of the soil, and the ease with which they could possess themselves of it, than by the extent of maritime situation which its three peninsulas afforded within a narrow compass, not only advantageous for commerce, but also whence they could readily support each other by sea, and were less open to assault from any overbearing power by land.

Of the numerous commercial towns which arose in this region, each, in the Grecian manner, a separate republic, Olynthus was the most considerable. By what fortunate circumstances led, or by what superior politicians guided, we are uninformed, the Olynthians had adopted the unusual policy of associating the citizens of some small neighbouring towns in all their civil and political rights. The advantage of this wise and liberal system being soon experienced by all parties, some of the larger towns were led to the same association. With strength and credit ambition grew in Olynthus; and it was proposed to draw the Macedonian cities from allegiance to their king Amyntas. In the weakness and instability of the Macedonian government, worn by a long series of civil broils, and now pressed in war by the Illyrians, some of the nearer were quickly gained;

Xen. Hel. l. 5.
c. 2. s. 11.
Diodor. l. 14.
c. 95.

example induced others, more distant, to accede; and, when the Acanthians set out on their mission, Pella, the largest town of Macedonia, had

joined the growing commonwealth, and Amyntas was nearly expelled from his kingdom.

In the whole course of Grecian history, with exception for the apparent good principle of the governments of the heroic ages, nothing in politics had occurred so worthy of imitation throughout Greece as the Olynthian system. What precisely was the form of the Olynthian government we have no information. From circumstances however we gather that it was a mixed republic; constituted on a more

liberal plan, and better balanced, than any other noticed by ancient writers. Throughout the Grecian states an excessive jealousy, growing for centuries, had produced a strange alienation of Greeks from Greeks. In Homer's age intermarriage was common from one end of the country to the other. But the narrow distrustful spirit, equally of oligarchy and democracy, which had superseded the tempered monarchies of elder times, had by degrees insulated almost every township; insomuch that each was a distinct little nation, separated from all others by legal interdictions, not common among great nations, even of different race and different language. Intermarriage was forbidden, and none were allowed to possess lands Xen. Hel. ut ant. within the territory of another state. Thus, excepting some communion in religious rites, the same formalities of hospitality, which might bind a Greek with a barbarian, almost alone could connect him with Greeks of the next town or village.

But such is the force of habit and prejudice, there was among the Greeks a prevailing partiality for this sullen, unsocial, illiberal, unprofitable independency; originating from the low passions of jealousy and fear, yet rendered in some degree perhaps necessary by the moral impossibility of uniting, in an unmixed constitution, strength of government with security for freedom. The liberal and beneficial policy of the Olynthians, associating numerous townships into one republic, and allowing intermarriage and intermixed possessions, was mentioned by the Acanthians, and considered by the Lacedæmonians, as a portentous innovation.⁴ Unfortunately the Lacedæmonians, by those very institutions which had made them great, were denied the advantage of the liberal policy of Olynthus. They must give up what

⁴ Πρᾶγμα φερόμενον ἐν τῇ Ἑλλάδι. Xen. Hel. l. 5. c. 2. s. 12.

had most contributed to make their state the most powerful in Greece, and their name one of the most glorious in the world, or remain for ever distinct from all other people. This, if anything, must be their excuse for the apparent exclusion of every idea of a liberal and extended policy in their conduct after the peace of Antalcidas. The professed basis of that peace was the independency of every Grecian state ; Xen. Hel. 1. 6. c. 3. s. 5. yet the separate treaty of alliance between Lacedæmon and every city of its confederacy overthrew that independency ; for the ancient compact, that the allies should follow in arms wherever the Lacedæmonians might lead, was required of all. The narrow policy of holding the body of the people in subjection by supporting everywhere a favoured party, source of immoderate tyranny and innumerable crimes, was followed with regard to all. Of the larger commonwealths, Thebes, Argos, and Athens, which were not easily to be so held in subjection, suspicion and jealousy were endless and little disguised ; and as, with them, in the actual state of things, no connection truly friendly could exist, so none was thought of.

Under these circumstances the people of those larger commonwealths considered the restored and increased preponderancy of Lacedæmon with dissatisfaction and apprehension, from which, of course, they would endeavour to relieve themselves. Accordingly, the new power of the Olynthian commonwealth attracting their attention, as its government was in some degree congenial with theirs, the speculation of their politicians was directed to draw it to their party. With this view the Athenians and Bæotians 1. 5. c. 2. s. 12. had sent ministers to Olynthus ; and, before the Acanthian ministers left Thrace, a decree of the Olynthian people was already passed for sending ministers to Thebes and Athens.

Circumstances were thus in train for constituting a con-

federacy formidable to Lacedæmon. But, prosperity commonly exciting arrogance, the conduct of the Olynthians, in general ably directed, may nevertheless not always have been kept within the bounds of a wise and just moderation. While still prosecuting their views in Macedonia they invited the Apolloniats and Acanthians to join their confederacy; but they added a threat of war in case of refusal. It is however possible that, while the known inclination of the body of the Apolloniat and Acanthian people to their cause invited to this measure, the hostile disposition of the oligarchal, which was the ruling party, may have provoked to it; so that it may have been neither unjust, unwise, nor unnecessary, though it was unfortunate. It drove the men in power in Acanthus and Apollonia to make that application to Lacedæmon which has been mentioned; foreseeing that, unless they could obtain support, such as Lacedæmon alone among the Grecian states likely to befriend them could give, it would be impossible for them to hold their power. Their ministers were therefore instructed to show that Lacedæmon was nearly interested in the preservation of the independency of their cities: "It is a great point with you," they said to the congress of the Lacedæmonian confederacy, "that the Bœotians should not coalesce into one state. It cannot therefore be indifferent to you that a much more powerful state than Bœotia is forming. Beside a large force of heavy-armed⁵, and targeteers yet more numerous, the

Xen. Hel. 1. 5.
c. 2. s. 12.

⁵ According to our copies the text of Xenophon states the Olynthian heavy-armed at eight hundred only; and editors and commentators, as far as I have seen, mention no suspicion of error in transcription. It will however be evident to any who will consider the circumstances, that eight hundred cannot have been the number intended by the author. The manner in which he speaks in general terms of the power of the Olynthians, compared with other Grecian people, particularly the Bœotians, (Hel. 1. 5. c. 2. s. 12.) might alone prove so much. But we find (s. 17.) that two thousand Lacedæmonians, with the added people of Potidæa, could wage war against them, according to the

cavalry of the Olynthians, should we join them, would be more than a thousand. They are masters of Potidæa, which commands Pallene; so that the whole force of that rich and populous peninsula must shortly fall under their power. The independent Thracians of their neighbourhood already court them; and, if completely brought under their authority, will add not a little to their strength. They have then but to stretch their hands, and the gold mines of mount Pangæus will be theirs. The fruitfulness of their territory nourishes a great and increasing population; timber abounds in it; their ports are numerous, and their flourishing commerce already furnishes a considerable revenue; so that nothing is wanting for the creation of a powerful marine. It is with this state then that the Athenians and Thebans are going to form alliance. Nevertheless its strength, great as already it is, may yet easily be broken: because some of the towns, unwilling associates, will readily revolt when they see support ready. But when intermarriages and intermixed possessions, allowed by decrees already passed, shall have confirmed the connection between the various parts, and all have not only learned to confide in their united strength, but experienced its advantages, it may then indeed be difficult to dissolve this formidable coalition."

Xen. Hel. 1. 5.
c. 2. s. 13.

The Acanthian minister having thus stated the circumstances, the Lacedæmonians paid the compliment to the deputies of the allies, to desire that they would first give their opinions, what, in the existing emergency, the welfare of Peloponnesus and of the confederacy required. A majority, instigated by those who sought favour with the Lacedæmonian administration, declared for send-

historian's expression, only as an inferior force against a superior; and afterward (s. 27. & seq.), that the Olynthians could oppose in the field ten thousand Peloponnesians, with perhaps a larger number of their allies. It appears therefore scarcely, I think, to be doubted but that for *ὀκτακοσίων* should be read *ὀκτακισχίλιον*.

ing an army into Thrace. Accordingly ten thousand men were voted. It was then proposed and carried, that any state of the confederacy might compound for the personal service of its citizens, at the rate of an Æginetan triobolus (nearly a groat sterling) daily for every heavy-armed foot-soldier, and four times that sum for every trooper; and that if any state of the confederacy refused or neglected to send troops or money, according to its apportionment, it should be lawful for the Lacedæmonians to levy on it a fine to the amount of a stater (a pound sterling) daily for every man deficient. We have seen the use of mercenary troops, or, in the modern phrase, standing armies, gradually gaining among the Greeks. This is the first mention we meet with of a regular composition for personal service, so extensively and so formally allowed. But, whether for raising troops or money, a power of coercion, however in itself necessary, committed to the discretion of the Lacedæmonian government without control, shows a strange deficiency in the political connection of the republics composing the confederacy over which Lacedæmon presided, and strongly marks how much some better order of things, such as the Olynthians appear to have been endeavouring to establish, was wanted throughout Greece.

These matters however being so decided, the Acanthians declared their opinion that the force proposed would be equal to the object: but, as the assembling of the contingents of the allies and the levies of mercenaries required time, it would tend much, they said, to forward the purpose of the confederacy if a Lacedæmonian general were immediately sent with such troops as might march with the least delay. The fear of a connection between Athens, Thebes, and Olynthus seems to have instigated the Lacedæmonian administration, and Eudamidas was ordered immediately to proceed

Xen. Hel. l. 5.
c. 2. s. 14.

s. 15.

s. 16.

for Thrace with two thousand Laconians, while his brother Phœbidas remained to collect and conduct the troops which were to follow.

The arrival of Eudamidas indeed was critical. Though in the field he could not face the enemy, yet the small force he brought, and the credit of the Lacedæmonian name, enabled him so to support the party adverse to the Olynthian connection that he preserved several towns upon the point of acceding to the growing republic; and Potidæa, which immediately opened its gates to him, was a very important acquisition.

SECTION III.

Sedition of Thebes. — Prevalence of the Lacedæmonian Party, and Subjection of Thebes to Lacedæmon. — Trial of Ismenias, Polemarch of Thebes. — Teleutias Commander-in-chief against Olynthus. — Defeat and Death of Teleutias.

B. C. 382.
Ol. 99. 2-3.

WHILE Eudamidas, by his successful activity in the duty imposed upon him by his country, began the ruin of a political project, which all Greece should have emulated, Phœbidas, with mistaken zeal, quitting the line of his instructions, gave fire to a train of evils of a length and complicity beyond human foresight then to discover or imagine. In his march northward, he encamped under the walls of Thebes. The Theban military had been, for some time, advancing toward a perfection that might vie with the Lacedæmonian; but the civil government remained as ill constituted as most in Greece. Faction was violent; and the parties so nearly balanced that Ismenias and Leontiades, contending chiefs, were together in the office of polemarch, the principal magistracy. Ismenias, vehement in aversion to the Lacedæmonians, avoided communication with Phœbidas. On

Xen. Hel. 1. 5.
e. 2. s. 17.

the contrary Leontiades, whose party, long oppressed, emerging only since the peace, and still hopeless of superiority but through connection with Lacedæmon, was assiduously attentive to him. Some advantage was expected, some influence on the minds of the Xen. Hel. 1. 5. c. 2. s. 18. people, from the neighbourhood of the Peloponnesian army: but the party of Ismenias still so swayed the general assembly that a decree was carried, forbidding any Theban to engage in the expedition against the Olynthians.

In struggles of faction among the Grecian republics, the precise line of conduct for virtue to hold, and the precise time at which to stop, were often difficult to determine; because, as we have seen among the French republicans of the present day, civil justice was little to be hoped for but through the possession of political power; self-defence was seldom complete till the opposing party was prostrate. So unfortunately situated, the Grecian party-leaders may often demand our pity while they incur our blame. Leontiades was in danger of losing, with his own power, all security of person and property for his adherents; the banishment of many was the least among the evils to be apprehended. Under this pressure he proposed to Phœbidas to introduce a Lacedæmonian garrison into the Cadmea, the citadel of Thebes. Thus his party might be enabled to overbear their opponents, and Phœbidas might command what proportion of the Theban forces should march with him into Thrace.

Phœbidas was a man of ardent temper and weak understanding. The acquisition of Thebes s. 19. appeared an object so much greater than that for which, with such solicitude, the Lacedæmonian administration had intrusted him with so great a command, that he was dazzled by the traitorous proposal; and for the imagined importance of the end he overlooked the iniquity of the means.

Measures being concerted, he broke up his camp, and began his march northward. It was the season of one of the festivals of Ceres, in which, according to ancient custom, the Cadmea was given up to the women, for the celebration of the ceremony called Thesmophoria, and the council sat in the portico of the agora. In the noontide heat, when, in summer, the streets were most unfrequented, Leontiades, having seen that everything favoured his purpose, urged his horse's speed to overtake Phœbidas, conducted him with a select body directly into the citadel, and put the key into his hand. Going then himself to the council, "The Lacedæmonians," he said, "are in possession of the citadel, but no alarm need be taken, for they disavow all intention of hostility." His own office of polemarch however authorising him to apprehend all persons suspected of treason, he commanded the attending guards to take Ismenias into custody.

A sufficient number of counsellors of the party of Leontiades were present, the guard had been picked for the purpose, and the surprise was complete. Some of the opposite party, fearing immediate death, instantly quitted the city: some ventured home to prepare for departure. But, when it was known that Ismenias was actually imprisoned in the Cadmea, four hundred fled for Athens.⁶

⁶ My valuable guide, Dodwell, with whom I am always sorry to differ, has been induced to dispute Xenophon's accuracy in marking the season of this remarkable event. *Θέρος δὲ ὄντος καὶ μεσημβρίας, πλείστη τὴν ἐρημίαν ἐν ταῖς ὁδοῖς.* This expression, as Dodwell justly observes, marks midsummer; but he continues, the Thesmophoria, mentioned just before, mark midwinter, or however a season not earlier than the beginning of November; and Plutarch, in his Life of Pelopidas, bears testimony to the coincidence of the seizure of the Cadmea with the Thesmophoria. Therefore he concludes, "De viarum in meridie solitudine, propter æstatem, vel interpretatione aliquâ leniendus est Xenophon, vel plane non credendus. Fieri potest ut aliâ aliquâ causâ viæ fuerint infrequentes, quam ille de θεῶσι intellexerit."

Many parts of the Hellenics bear marks of hasty writing, of having wanted the finishing hand of the author; but no deficiency appears in the narrative of

All power in Thebes thus devolving to the party of Leontiades, a new polemarch was chosen in the room of Ismenias, and then Leontiades hastened to Lacedæmon. He found there the ephors and people indignant at the presumption of Phœbidas in taking a measure of such importance beyond the line of his commission: but he found a friend to Phœbidas and to his own cause in Agesilaus, whose magnanimity and probity seem on this occasion to have been in some degree overborne by his hatred toward the democratical party in Thebes. "If the conduct of your general," said the king, "has been injurious to the commonwealth, let him be punished; but, if beneficial, it will stand justified by the principles of your constitution, and by all former practice, which warrant, for men in such a command, the exercise of a discretionary power."

Xen. Hel. l. 5.
c. 2. s. 23.

The way being thus advantageously prepared for him, Leontiades addressed the assembled Lacedæmonian people.⁷ He touched upon various circum-

s. 24.

this transaction, in which the honour of the writer's friend Agesilaus and his own quiet and safety were implicated. Here only he has related it: all mention of it in his panegyric of that prince has been studiously omitted. For myself therefore I cannot, in compliment to Diodorus and Plutarch, or in respect for the possibly mistaken season of the Thesmophoria, suppose that Xenophon has mis-stated the time of a transaction in which he was so much interested, and which passed almost under his eye. The sequel of the narrative moreover is perfectly consistent with what he has said about the season, and utterly inconsistent with Dodwell's supposition. For various important transactions passed, after the seizure of the Cadmea, before Teleutias marched for Thrace: the historian expressly says that Teleutias did not hurry his march; and yet he arrived time enough to execute many military operations before, in the historian's phrase, the summer was over; the summer, according to Dodwell himself, of the same year in which the Cadmea was seized. ["Phœbidas seizes the Cadmea, *Θίβους ὄντος*. Hel. v. 2. 29. ἐπὶ ἄρχοντος Μεσάνδρου. Diod. xv. 20.—At the time of the *Pythia*: Aristid. tom. i. p. 258. Jebb. Πυθίαν ὄνταν ἡ Καδμεία κατελήφθη. Teleutias marched to Olynthus *after* that event. Hel. v. 2. 37—38., and yet he withdrew, *τοῦτο στρατιωσάμενος τὸ Θίβους*. Ibid. 2. 43. Mr. Mitford, in a judicious note, is with reason dissatisfied with Dodwell. Ann. Xen. p. 256." Clinton, Fasti Hellen. p. 104.]

⁷ *Τοὺς ἐγκλήτους. Consilii publici cœtum.* Probably it should be, as we find it in other places, *ἐκκλήτους*, those who formed the *ἐκκλησία*.

stances, marking the inveterate enmity which the democratical party in Thebes bore toward Lacedæmon, and concluded with the alliance lately made by the Theban government with the Olynthians, at the moment when it was known the Lacedæmonians were marching against them. He mentioned the solicitude with which the Lacedæmonians had always observed, and endeavoured to thwart, the measures of Thebes for holding Bœotia in subjection: "In regard to this then," he said, "your business is now done for you: Thebes need no longer be an object of your jealousy. Give that attention only to our interest which we shall give to yours, and a small scytale will suffice to ensure obedience to all your commands."

Xen. Hel. 1. 5.
c. 2. s. 25.

This allurements was too powerful for Lacedæmonian virtue. It was decreed that the Theban citadel should continue to be held by a Lacedæmonian garrison, and that not Phœbidas, but Ismenias, should be brought to trial. Three judges appointed by Lacedæmon, and one by every other city of the confederacy, formed the partial tribunal. Ismenias was accused of "seeking foreign connections; pledging himself, with views injurious to Greece, in hospitality to the Persian king; being a principal author of the late troubles in Greece:" and to these general charges was added one of a specific nature, "that he had partaken of the money sent by the Persian king." He refuted all; but being nevertheless unable, says Xenophon, to persuade his judges that he had not entertained great and pernicious designs, he was condemned and executed.⁸

⁸ Ὁ δὲ ἀπειλογίτο μὲν πρὸς πάντα, οὐ μὲντοι ἔπειθέ γι τὸ μὴ οὐ μεγαλοπράγμων τε καὶ κακοπράγμων εἶναι. *Purgabat ille quidem se de his omnibus, verum persuadere non poterat ut non res arduas et perniciosas tentasse existimaretur.* The Latin *purgabat* is perhaps stronger than the phrase in the original, standing singly, would justify; but the context seems to warrant it.

Plutarch says (vit. Pelopid.), that not contented with this formal murder of Ismenias, the Lacedæmonians ridded themselves of another chief of the same

That Xenophon, as an honest man, altogether disapproved these proceedings, is evident. In his Panegyric of Agesilaus he has avoided mention of them. In his Grecian Annals, while he has clearly felt for the honour of his friend and patron, the impartiality of his concise narrative is highly creditable to himself. Yet if we compare this revolution with others, innumerable among the Grecian republics, we shall find in it the merit at least of being remarkably bloodless. Its disgrace was that it gave Lacedæmon influence, amounting to dominion, over Thebes, though scarcely dominion so absolute as the Theban people had before exercised over the other Bœotians, or as France, early in its revolutionary course, exercised over the Dutch; who, with a French general commanding a French army in Amsterdam, amused themselves with the names of republic and liberty. Even in the trial of Ismenias there seems to have been more attention to preserve the appearance of a regard for justice, and a respect for the Grecian people, than was always observed upon similar occasions. It is our familiarity with the peculiar advantages of the law and the practice of our own country that makes deficiencies, elsewhere ordinary, appear to us strange irregularities. If we compare the law of treason in England, when most severe, or the whole of the law for the security of person and property, when, under the Plantagenet reigns, our constitution was least defined, with what we learn of the same law in those called the best times of Greece, the difference will appear truly prodigious. It may seem as if, like philosophy and the fine arts in one

party by assassination. Plutarch is seldom anxious for consistency, and it seems not likely that the same administration would, at the same time, proceed against one chief with so much formality, and against the other with so little, when apparently they might equally have chosen their method against either. But Xenophon's account, which appears candid throughout, virtually contradicts the fact; and Grecian history is but too full of crimes related on authority.

country, equal law and wholesome polity were of indigenuous growth in the other, healthy and vigorous without cultivation, and flourishing among all sorts of weeds, in spite of tempests and adverse seasons.

Thebes being reduced to a state of complete dependency, nothing seemed wanting to the lasting firmness of the Lacedæmonian supremacy over Greece but to crush the growing commonwealth of Olynthus. To this point then, with increased earnestness, the administration directed its attention. It may possibly have been in contemplation next to resume the prosecution of that plan of conquest in Asia which had been interrupted principally by the measures of the party in Thebes, of which Ismenias had been chief. Xenophon has not expressly said that the conduct of Agesilaus was influenced by such a view; but he mentions, as to his honour, that his enmity to Persia was maintained through life, and that he refused with disdain the philanthropic connection of hospitality offered him, apparently through a proxy, by the Persian king. What were the measures which he directed, what those to which he simply consented, and what, if any, those which he could not prevent, we are not precisely informed; but the tenor of Xenophon's narrative, as well as a variety of the circumstances reported, mark that he had large influence at this time in the Lacedæmonian councils. His brother Teleutias was appointed to the command-in-chief in Thrace. The slowness and negligence of the allies in obeying the requisition for troops for the Thracian war, though enforced by a vote of the congress of the confederacy, may have given the Lacedæmonians to apprehend the decay of their authority, and thus may have contributed to instigate the unjust measures taken in the Theban business. Several cities had not yet sent the full number assessed upon them.

Xen. Hel. 1. 5.
c. 2. s. 27.

Xen. Ages.
c. 7. s. 7.

c. 8. s. 3.

The popular name of Teleutias assisted the exertions of the ephors, whose scytales were sent around; and the new Theban administration, zealous in showing their respect to the brother of Agesilaus, were diligent in preparing their apportionment, horse and foot.

The precaution of Teleutias indicates the strength of the Olynthian commonwealth. Though the season was far advanced, he would not hasten his march; less anxious to arrive early than with an army the most powerful that could be collected. Meanwhile he sent to Amyntas king of Macedonia, and Derdas prince of Elymia; urging the former, if he would recover his kingdom, to raise mercenary troops and subsidise neighbouring princes; and admonishing the latter, that the same growing power, which had nearly overwhelmed the great Macedonian realm, would not long leave the smaller in peace and independency were not measures taken to check its ambition. His care and diligence thus seconding his influence, he assembled in Potidæa a very powerful army, which he led directly to Olynthus.

Xen. Hel. 1. 5.
c. 2. s. 28.
B. C. 382.
Ol. 99. 3.
Autumn.

Xen. Hel. 1. 5.
c. 2. s. 29.

Without conquest, without a battle noticed in history, the Olynthians, by the wisdom and liberality of their policy, had formed a commonwealth so powerful that they did not fear to meet in the field the greatest army ever sent by the Peloponnesian confederacy so far from their peninsula, re-enforced by troops, still much more numerous, of the most warlike nations of the continent north of Greece. The only cavalry, which Teleutias appears to have led from the southern provinces, were Laconian and Bæotian. In his order of battle he placed these, together with some received from Amyntas, in the right wing of his army. Derdas brought him a body of only four hundred, but of superior reputation in the northern countries. Teleutias seems to have proposed a compliment to

s. 30.

that prince in placing his cavalry alone in the left wing, of which he took himself the immediate command.

Xen. Hel. 1. 5.
c. 2. s. 31. A battle quickly ensued; and the cavalry of the right wing being first charged by the Olynthians, the Lacedæmonian commander was presently dismounted and severely wounded, numbers killed, and at length the whole body put to flight. The confusion spread among the nearest infantry, and there was imminent danger that a complete defeat would have followed, when Derdas, arriving with his cavalry, encouraged the dismayed phalanx to stand. Teleutias at the same time making a movement with the Peloponnesian infantry to support him, the Olynthians, in danger of being surrounded, retired in s. 32. haste, and suffered in their retreat. Their infantry then also withdrew within their walls. Teleutias s. 33. erected his trophy for a victory just sufficing to deter the enemy from molesting his retreat from their territory, which he wasted as he went. The advanced season, in a severe though southern climate, forbade any farther enterprise; and it was necessary to find quarters for the Peloponnesian army in the friendly towns, while the Macedonian and other troops of the country were dismissed to their several homes.

During the winter the Olynthians made frequent and often successful incursions upon the lands of the towns in B. C. 381. Ol.
99. 3. Xen. Hel.
1. 5. c. 3. s. 1, 2. alliance with Lacedæmon. In the beginning of spring, a body of their cavalry, after plunder of the territory, approaching with improvident carelessness the town of Apollonia, received a severe check from the activity and bravery of Derdas, who, unknown to them, had arrived there that very day with his Macedonian horse. Thenceforward they confined themselves more within their walls, and ventured upon the cultivation but of a very small part of their lands.

According to the usual mode of war among the Greeks, Teleutias waited for the season when ravage, being most injurious, would be most likely to provoke the enemy to a general engagement, or would best forward the effect of a blockade of their towns. While with these views he lay encamped near the walls of Olyn-^{Xen. Hel. l. 5. c. 3. s. 3.} thus, he observed a body of cavalry, from the town, crossing the river which ran by it, and very leisurely approaching his camp. Indignant at their boldness, he ordered his targeteers to attack them. The horse, turning, very quietly repassed the river: the targeteers followed confidently, as if pursuing a broken enemy. The horse, when so many only had crossed the river^{s. 4.} as they might readily overpower, turned, charged and routed them, and killed, among many others, Tlemonidas, the general commanding.

Teleutias, with manners so popular, and generally so amiable, was nevertheless of a temper^{s. 5. & 7.} too hasty to preserve, on all occasions, the cool recollection so important in military command. Irritated by what he saw, he seized his spear, put himself at the head^{s. 5.} of his heavy-armed, and, with some passion, ordered the targeteers and the cavalry to pursue the enemy without remission. The incautious order was zealously obeyed. The Olynthians retiring within their walls, the Peloponnesians did not stop till, from the towers, they received a shower of missile weapons. In the necessity of warding off these with their shields, as they hastily retreated, confusion arose. The able leaders of the Olynthians used the critical moment. Their horse^{s. 6.} again rushed out of the gates; the targeteers and then the heavy-armed followed. The impression was such that the Peloponnesian phalanx was in disorder when it was attacked. Teleutias himself was killed; those about

him then gave way, and presently the whole army fled. Pursued, as they divided, toward Potidæa, Spartolus, Acanthus, Apollonia, a large proportion and almost the whole effective force of so great an army was destroyed.⁹

SECTION IV.

Agesipolis Commander-in-chief against Olynthus. — Rebellion in Phlius against Lacedæmon. — Agesilaus Commander against Phlius. — Delphion Demagogue of Phlius. — Surrender of Phlius. — Death of Agesipolis. — Polybiades Commander-in-chief against Olynthus. — Reduction of Olynthus.

IT now seemed as if the political phenomenon, arising on the frontiers of Thrace and Macedonia, might, by the terror of arms, have spread political wisdom over the southern provinces of Greece. Had the Lacedæmonian government in the least yielded under the severe blow it had received, had it been without able men to promote energy and direct exertion, the consequence of its unfitness to coalesce with other states might have been a rapid downfall, and perhaps complete ruin. But the necessity for exertion was seen by the administration, and able men were not wanting to direct

Xen. Hel. l. 5. c. 3. 8. 8. it. The command-in-chief was committed to the king, Agesipolis, a youth of little experience, but of great expectation. Thirty Spartans were appointed to attend him, as formerly Agesilaus in Asia. The character of Agesipolis being popular, many volunteers offered. We gather from Xenophon that, in this age, the few remaining families distinguished by the name of Spartans went on foreign service only in the rank of officers. The volunteers he mentions to have been of three descriptions ; the Laconian towns furnished some, and they were of

⁹ ὅτι τις ὄφιλος ἦν τοῦ τοιοῦτου στρατεύματος.

the best families of those towns; some were bastards of Spartan families, educated in the best discipline of the city, and these were remarked for their fine figures: the rest were strangers, or men not acknowledged among either Spartans or Laconians, yet distinguished by a name which seems to imply that they were maintained by the public.¹⁰ Volunteers from the allies moreover were numerous, and the Thessalian cavalry, ambitious of being known to the Spartan king, were particularly forward in their zeal. The rank of the new commander-in-chief also warranting the earnestness of the Lacedæmonian government in the cause, inspirited the exertions of the Macedonian princes. It is not mentioned that any troops were furnished by the cities of the confederacy to supply the loss in the battle of Olynthus; but it is implied that most, if not all of them, paid compositions in money; and that the new levies were mostly or perhaps entirely of volunteers. Phlius received the thanks of Agesipolis for the largeness and readiness of its contribution.

Xen. Hel. 1. 5.
c. 3. s. 10.

The apparent zeal however of those who ruled Phlius was found to have a sinister motive. They proposed to earn the connivance of Lacedæmon at gross injustice toward their fellow-citizens. All the anecdotes of Plutarch, who read and speculated when Trajan ruled half a hemisphere, do not paint the internal state of divided and independent Greece like a few small touches from the life by the contemporary historians. With the view therefore to acquire a just idea of it, the affairs of Phlius will deserve that we should interrupt, for a moment, the narrative of the war in Thrace.

¹⁰ Τῶν περιόικων καλοὶ κάγαθοί, καὶ ξένοι τῶν Τροφίμων καλουμένων, καὶ γόθοι τῶν Σπαρτιατῶν, μάλα εὐειδίης τε καὶ τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει καλῶν οὐκ ἄπειροι.

In the scantiness of our information concerning the political economy of Lacedæmon we must glean as we can. I am unable to give any better explanation of this remarkable passage than that ventured in the text.

The tyranny of that superintending power, which the Greeks had imagined the best resource for holding together a confederacy of republics too small to subsist each by its own strength, we have seen remarkably exhibited in the affair of Thebes. Phlius affords an instance not less remarkable, of oppression from a republican government to its own citizens, in defiance of the superintending power. The Phliasian exiles, restored, as we have seen, at the requisition of Lacedæmon, and entitled by a decree of their own general assembly to recover all their property, in vain sought justice from Phliasian tribunals; for the Phliasian tribunals were composed of persons holding that property, or connected with those who held it. Among the Grecian republics it was not unusual to refer a case of such a kind to the tribunal of some neighbouring republic; but the Phliasian government would listen to no proposal for an impartial decision. This imprudent iniquity impelled the injured persons to seek redress from Lacedæmon. But there were circumstances which encouraged those who ruled in Phlius to disregard this. It was contrary to all known practice for both kings to be at once absent from Sparta. Agesipolis was now far advanced on his march toward Thrace: and, in the confidence that Agesilaus would not move, and of course no vigorous measures would be taken, the Phliasian chiefs resolved that to those from whom they differed in party it was unnecessary to be just. Instead therefore of being disposed to yield to Lacedæmonian interference, they procured a decree, imposing the penalty of a fine on all who, without warrant from the Phliasian government, had made application to Lacedæmon.

We should admire the spirit of this decree, if it was not so immediately connected with gross injustice: we should approve its wisdom, had it been founded upon any prac-

Sect. 1. of
this Chap.

Xen. Hel. l. 5.
c. 3. s. 11.

B. C. 381.
Ol. 99. 4.
Autumn.

licable plan of liberal policy. But it appears to have been the result only of daring profligacy, illiberal and improvident. The hope even that Lacedæmon would not instantly interfere with vigour was ill conceived. The ephors resolved that the injurious insolence of the Phliasians should be restrained by arms; and Agesilaus undertook the command. Among those who had recurred to Lacedæmon for redress were two families which had particular claim to his protection; that of the venerable Podanemus, who had been connected in hospitality with the revered king Archidamus, his father, and that of Procles, who had the same connection with Agesilaus himself.

Xen. Hel. 1. 5.
c. 3. s. 13.

No delay was made: the border-passing sacrifice was not likely to be unpropitious; Agesilaus was ready to enter Phlasiæ, when an embassy met him, deprecating hostilities, and offering money. He answered that "he was not coming to injure any, but only to relieve the injured." "They professed themselves ready to do whatever could be required." "Professions," he told them, "could find no credit when deceit had already been practised." Upon being asked then what pledge he required, he answered, "the same with which Lacedæmon had formerly been trusted, without injury to Phlius: they must give him possession of their citadel." This being refused, he prosecuted his march, and without delay surrounded Phlius with a contravallation.

s. 14.
B. C. 381.
Ol. 99. 4.
Autumn.

Xen. Hel. 1. 5.
c. 3. s. 15.

s. 16.

All the Lacedæmonians however were not satisfied with these measures. It was observed by many, even in the army, that, however those who ruled Phlius might be tyrannical sovereigns, they had been valuable allies; and, whatever might be the plea of generosity or justice, it was no good policy, for the sake of comparatively few families, to make Lacedæmon eternally odious to a city which had

five thousand men able, and till now ready, to bear arms in its service. Agesilaus skilfully obviated this growing discontent. The Phliasian refugees were not without friends in the city. Such encouragement was held out for desertion that, in a short time, those serving in the besieging army were more than a thousand, distinguished among the troops for being well-armed, able-bodied, exact in subordination, and zealous in service; insomuch that the late murmurs were changed for the observation that these were such allies as Lacedæmon wanted.

s. 21. But, in Phlius, a system of order, economy, and forbearance, usual where due military subordination is established, but contrary to all common experience among the turbulence of the Grecian democracies, disappointed the expectation of the besiegers. The blockade had already exceeded the time calculated for the consumption of the provisions in the place. But one of those extraordinary characters of which Greece was fruitful, and which its political circumstances were peculiarly adapted to bring forward, had at this time the lead among s. 22. the Phliasiens. In the instance of Delphion, says Xenophon, was seen the ascendant which daring courage may obtain over the minds of the multitude. He was a man of high rank in his city, but his dependence was upon about three hundred followers. With these at his devotion he so awed the whole people that a clear majority in the general assembly, desirous of capitulating, dared not come to a vote upon it. Under a government called a democracy he imprisoned at his pleasure, on suspicion, or pretended suspicion, of disaffection to the popular cause. His despotism however was not wanton or useless. He alone could enforce a strict military discipline; and, by an unwearied personal activity, he did enforce it. Constantly

Xen. Hel. 1. 5.
c. 3. s. 17.

attending himself, he compelled the citizens to regular attendance in their turn for guard; never failing to go the rounds, he ensured watchfulness and fidelity on guard. Nor was he thus daring only toward the multitude, his sovereign; he showed himself worthy of command by daring against the enemy. In many sallies, at the head of his three hundred, he was successful against the posts of the besiegers. When, notwithstanding the short allowance which had been established by a vote of the general assembly, famine began to press, his warrant sufficed for searching every house for corn. All resources at length failing, he gave the word, and a herald was sent to Agesilaus, requesting a truce, that ministers might carry to Lacedæmon a decree of the Phliasian people for surrendering the city to the pleasure of the Lacedæmonian government.¹¹

Xen. Hel. 1. 5.
c. 3. s. 23.

Agesilaus seems to have felt that, by this message, it was intended to put a slight upon him.

s. 24.

He nevertheless immediately granted the truce, and his influence in Lacedæmon sufficed to procure an order that the Phliasian ministers should be sent back to treat with him, as plenipotentiary for the Lacedæmonian commonwealth. It does not appear that Delphion was a man of great views, or that, from the first, he had any well-founded hope of final success. He seems rather to have been a man fond of action and enterprise, with daring courage and moderate abilities; ready in emergencies, but incapable of extensive conceptions; fitter to command Phlius, and Phlius besieged, than to direct the affairs of a great nation, or of any but in time of turbulence. For daring enterprise upon a narrow scale his talents were extraordinary. After the granting of the truce the Lacedæmonians strengthened their

¹¹ Τοῖς τέλει τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων.

guards, and kept a stricter watch to prevent egress from the town. Nevertheless, attended by one faithful slave, who had given frequent proof of his courage and address in pilfering the besiegers' arms¹², Delphion escaped by night.

The conditions which Agesilaus required may seem, in modern times, not mild; but, due regard being had to the manners and circumstances of his age, and to the responsible situation in which he stood, they will be found strongly marked with that spirit of liberality which was generally conspicuous in him. Had precedents been desired, they might have been found, for sending commissioners from Lacedæmon to decide arbitrarily between the two parties of the Phliasian people; to banish, and even condemn to death at discretion. Agesilaus committed the business

Xen. Hel. 1. 5.
c. 3. s. 25.

to a tribunal composed of a hundred Phliasians; fifty only of those who had been driven into exile, and an equal number friendly to the opposite party, or so far esteemed so that they had remained in the city. After deciding who should suffer death as authors of the late civil war, and who should live to compose the future Phliasian commonwealth, they were to model at their discretion the constitution and the laws by which that commonwealth should be governed. Upon these conditions, in the twentieth month of the blockade, the town was surrendered; and, to enforce order till the new constitution should be settled, a Lacedæmonian garrison was placed in it.

While Agesilaus was employed in this petty kind of domestic war within Peloponnesus, Agesipolis had begun to show the vigour and ability expected of him in his foreign command. He wasted the Olynthian territory, he took Torone by storm; but, in the middle of

¹² Στιγματίας τις ὅς πολλὰ ὑφέλιετο ὄπλα τῶν πολιορκούντων. The fact, if related by an author not a military man, might be doubted; from Xenophon it cannot. The explanation I leave to military men who have given their attention to the ancient art and practice of war.

the summer heats, he was seized with an inflammatory fever which presently threatened to be fatal. The science of medicine, notwithstanding the deserved fame of Hippocrates, appears not yet to have been generally diffused among the Grecian republics. A little before his illness Agesipolis had visited the temple of Bacchus, at Aphyteus, famous for the beauty and coolness of its shady bowers and limpid waters. A strong desire seized him to revisit them, in the imagination that they would afford a relief which his medical attendant could not give. He was accordingly conveyed to Aphyteus, but died soon after, with-
[B. C. 380.
Cl.]

out the temple: the superstition, which taught the Greeks to fear the anger of the deity for permitting the pollution of death within the hallowed building, apparently denying to the suffering prince the repose and shelter which he so much wanted. Neither attention nor expense however was spared, after his decease, to honour his memory, and show respect to his rank. His body, according to the Spartan ceremonial, was preserved in honey, and in that state carried the long and difficult journey to Lacedæmon, there to have the funeral rites performed, which custom had established for the burial of the kings.

Agesipolis seems to have been a real loss to his country. Though aiming, and with fair prospect of success, to rival Agesilaus in military fame, no jealousy subsisted between them. He treated his elder colleague, on all occasions, with the respect due to superior age and high character. He received in return unfeigned friendship from Agesilaus, whose liberal mind considered him less as a rival than, in public affairs, a valuable assistant, and in private a desirable companion.

The successor of Agesipolis in the Thracian command, Polybiades, was but too successful in restraining the liberal and beneficent policy of

Xen. Hel. l. 5.
c. 3. s. 26.
Diod. l. 15.
c. 23.

Olynthus within the narrow limits of a single city. In undertaking to withstand the power of Lacedæmon, the Olynthians had depended upon the support of Athens and Bœotia. But the unexpected revolution in Thebes had given the force of Bœotia to their enemies, and deterred the interference of Athens. Possibly, after their great success against Teleutias, their affairs may have been conducted with less prudence than when they were but rising to power. They may have lost some of their ablest leaders: or prosperity, inflating the popular mind, may have given advantage to turbulent demagogues, and interested intrigue or popular caprice may have overborne wise counsel. Xenophon has left us no particulars; he has not even named one of their leading men. We hear of no battle fought, no town taken; Polybiades was master of the country; the Olynthians could receive no relief by sea; famine pressed, and they sent ambassadors to Lacedæmon to sue for peace. It was granted upon the usual terms of subordinate alliance; that the friends and enemies of Lacedæmon should be respectively such to Olynthus, and that the Olynthians should serve in arms wherever the Lacedæmonians might lead.

B. C. 379.
Ol. 100. 1.
Spring.

SECTION V.

Apparent Confirmation and real Instability of the Lacedæmonian Supremacy in Greece. — Conspiracy and Revolution in Thebes.

THUS Lacedæmon acquired the glory of crushing finally the wisest and noblest project for a republican government, upon a broad foundation, perhaps ever attempted in Greece. Such at least the Olynthian union appears, in the slight sketch, a mere shadow, without a decided outline, which remains to us from Xenophon. Possibly it may have had great defects, with which we are not made acquainted; and

indeed if a government had ever been seen in Greece possessing all the merit which his account, not intended for panegyric of the Olynthian, indicates, unbalanced by very gross defects, we should still more wonder at, and still less excuse, the excessive deficiency of the political ideas transmitted to posterity in the writings of such men as Xenophon, Plato, Isocrates, and Aristotle. It is indeed remarkable that the celebrated panegyric oration of Isocrates, in which, while his great object was to persuade the Greeks to peace among themselves, he could propose no means but union in war against Persia, then at peace with them, was spoken or published while the Lacedæmonian arms were employed in the destruction of the Olynthian constitution. Could Lacedæmon have adopted a policy so liberal as, in its general outline, the Olynthian appears to have been, could she have united herself with such a republic, and used her extensive influence to promote the scheme, a state might have been formed of a firmness to resist all external violence, and capable of dissolution only from that internal corruption to which the Author of nature has willed that every thing human shall be liable. But, as we have already observed, those very institutions, by which Lacedæmon had now flourished for centuries, and, for the smallness of her means, was become wonderfully great, those very institutions made it impossible for her to become so great. To coalesce was beyond her nature: her great lawgiver's system, admirable for its purpose, had no such purpose: she could be great, and even safe, only by keeping those around her divided. This was now done. The reviving empire of Athens was broken: Bœotia was split into many states; Corinth and Argos were separated; the Olynthian union was dissolved; the renovation of existence, given to the obscure kingdom of Macedonia, harmonised with the plan of division; those

Isoc. paneg.
p. 250. t. 2.

allies who had dared to show an adverse disposition had been punished; and thus, as the contemporary historian Xen. Hel. 1. 5. c. 3. s. 27. has observed, the authority of Lacedæmon over Greece seemed more firmly established than at any former period.

But the Lacedæmonian authority over Greece was not of a nature to be permanent: too weak for command; too proud for influence. We have seen, in the authentic testimony of Xenophon to what the Cyrean army experienced, the haughty despotism of the Lacedæmonian commanders at a distance from home. We find such conduct indeed sometimes severely punished; proof that the Lacedæmonian administration was aware of evils likely to arise from it; yet that the restraint was very uncertain is sufficiently evident. The administration was better able to check the indiscreet or interested tyranny of its officers within Greece. But it could not equally restrain, in the dependent republics, the chiefs of the Lacedæmonian party, by whom those republics were held in submission to Lacedæmon. To men so necessary great indulgence would be indispensable: to support them, without inquiry, or even notoriously against right, might appear sometimes of political necessity. Hence discontent, vehement discontent, was unceasing, sedition ever working, and revolt ready.

Evident however as it is that the foundation of the Lacedæmonian power was slippery in extreme, still, when we consider the value of the advantage it possessed in the abilities and virtues of Agesilaus, we cannot behold, without astonishment, the minuteness of the force, and the trivial character of the circumstances, which began its overthrow, in the very moment when it appeared most established. Xenophon ascribes all to the just c. 4. s. 1. vengeance of the Deity; honestly declaring the infamy of the conduct of Lacedæmon, though his friend

and patron was implicated, in holding the citadel of Thebes by violence, directly against the most solemn oaths, under the sanction of which, among the articles of confederation, the independency of every Grecian city was warranted. The new government of Thebes was necessarily odious to the great body of the Theban people, and indeed to every honest Theban citizen. But fear, which restrained action, taught also to conceal sentiments; and thus a government of violence, whether the form of the tyranny be monarchal, oligarchal, or democratical, is always risking to defeat its own purposes.

Among the revolutions of the Theban commonwealth, that part of the constitution seems to have remained unaltered by which the principal executive power, civil and military together, that power which had formerly been held by hereditary princes, was committed to annual magistrates, entitled polemarchs, chief warriors. Archias and Philippus held the high office when Phyllidas, Xen.-Hel. 1.5. c. 4. s. 2. their secretary and confidential minister, was called on some business to Athens. Phyllidas there found a Theban of rank, named Mellon, with whom he had formerly been intimate, living in exile, to which the revolution had driven him. Their past opposition in politics did not prevent Mellon and Phyllidas from communicating again as private friends; and, Mellon's curiosity leading him to inquire about men and things in Thebes, to his surprise he found the secretary highly dissatisfied with the existing government there. More explanation thence taking place, the result was a plot for overthrowing that existing government, and restoring democracy. Phyllidas returning to Thebes, measures were prepared. Mellon then, with only six associates, passed by night from Attica into the Theban territory. Lying concealed during the following s. 3. B.C. 379. Ol. 100. 2. Nov. or Dec. day, they approached the city as evening closed,

and entered with the last of that crowd of husbandmen returning from their daily toil, who, in a country politically constituted like the greater part of Greece, dared not inhabit detached cottages or open villages. Proceeding unmolested, they were received in the house of Charon, a party to the plot, where they staid the night, and the following day.

Immediately preceding the expiration of the annual magistracies was, according to ancient custom, the season of a festival of Venus at Thebes.

The polemarchs, Archias and Philippus, were men of pleasure. Their secretary, Philidias, possibly a warm patriot, was certainly not a man of nice honour or strict honesty. According to report, which Xenophon thought worthy of notice, he was trusted by the polemarchs as a confidential minister to their private pleasures; and, favoured by the licence of the festival, he had undertaken to bring the most beautiful women of the best families of Thebes to their revel. Through his privilege of unlimited access, when the polemarchs and their company were far gone in in-

Xen. Hel. 1. 5.
c. 4. s. 4.
Plut. vit.
Pelopid^a

toxication, he introduced the conspirators, three habited as ladies, the others as their female attendants. The dismissal of male attendants was procured, on pretence of delicacy toward the ladies. As far, at least, as this story tends to reveal the manners of the age, we may give it credit

as it is told by Xenophon: though, he says, according to some, the conspirators were introduced as ordinary visitors.¹³ What we learn with certainty is, that the polemarchs were on that night assassinated.

s. 7.

¹³ Concerning a matter in which private history was so much involved with public, and party interest with both, various stories, some true, some false, and some partly true, partly false, were likely to be circulated. Xenophon, who lived at the time, yet long outlived the time, and was in a situation to be better informed than almost any other could be, has related some things with confidence, others as less certain. Plutarch, who wrote some centuries after,

This important beginning being successfully made, Leontiades, author of the late revolution, was the next object of the conspirators. Phyllidas, in whom Leontiades, as well as the polemarchs, fully confided, conducted them to his house. Pretence of business from the polemarchs gained him immediate admission to an inner apartment, whither Leontiades had retired from supper, and where his wife was sitting by him, busied in those works of the distaff or needle in which the Grecian ladies principally employed themselves. Leontiades was killed upon the spot, and silence was imposed upon the lady, with the threat of death to every person in the house, unless as soon as the assassins went out, the doors were locked, and afterward kept close.

The leaders of their opponents being thus despatched, the conspirators proceeded to the state-prison, where some of their friends were confined. Phyllidas, pretending an order from the polemarchs, obtained admission there also. The keeper was instantly put to death; and the prisoners, being released, were directed where to find arms, and whither to repair with them.

The conspirators so confided in extensive hatred of the existing government that, without farther preparation, they caused summons to be proclaimed, for all the citizens, equally the knights and those enrolled in the heavy-armed, to assemble in arms; adding the information that "the tyrants were no more!" Diffidence however kept all within during night. Meanwhile messengers were despatched to the refugees on the Attic borders, and to Athens itself: for it was known that two of the annual generals of Athens were warm in the cause. When day broke, what had passed becoming notorious, the citizens,

has differed from Xenophon in regard to some particulars, added to him many, declared no authority, except Xenophon's, and expressed no doubt. His purpose was to tell a good story, of which Pelopidas was to be the hero,

horse and foot, assembled in arms, and arranged themselves with the conspirators.

Xen. Hel. 1. 5.
c. 4. s. 10.

The first alarm, which reached the Lacedæmonian governor in the citadel, was from the nightly proclamation. Immediately he sent to Platæa and Thespiæ for re-enforcement to his scanty garrison. A detachment marched from Platæa; but the Theban horse met and routed it. Refugees from the borders and a body of Athenian auxiliaries arrived nearly as the victorious cavalry returned. With this addition of strength it was

s. 11. resolved, without delay, to assail the citadel. The

Lacedæmonians saw the preparation, and heard large reward proclaimed for who should first mount. Thinking then their numbers unequal to resist all Thebes, united and zealous, they proposed to surrender the fortress, upon condition that they might depart in safety with their arms. To this the Thebans gladly consented, and the capitulation

s. 12. was ratified with libations and oaths. Their

march out of the place was watched with a jealousy justified by preceding circumstances. But, when there were seen among them some of those Thebans who had been active in the late government, then the virulence of Grecian sedition broke forth: the victims were dragged from their protection, and none so taken escaped death.¹⁴ But the

¹⁴ Ἐξιόντων μέντοι, ὅσους ἐπέγνωσαν τῶν ἐχθρῶν ὄντας συλλαμβάνοντες ἀπέκτειναι. Xenophon has not specified them by any name but that of enemies; but what he mentions afterward of the treatment of their families, were it otherwise doubtful, would ascertain that the executed were Thebans, and not Lacedæmonians.

It has been owing apparently to the general irregularity and uncertainty of Grecian criminal law that the Greek language, so superior to all others in accuracy for most purposes, is so inferior to our own in words for distinguishing the various degrees of criminality which may attend the act of putting a man to death. Hence we have sometimes difficulty to gather, from the expressions of historians, what degree of turpitude we should impute to the actions which they relate. Ἀποκτείνω, the common word for *to kill*, is equally used to express the foulest murder, or putting to death after just trial, in the most legal manner

state of Greece, a kind of hotbed of crimes, gave occasion also for the exercise of virtues. The Athenian auxiliaries, who looked upon the Thebans of the Lacedæmonian interest, not with the rancorous hatred of party opponents, but with the more liberal enmity of foreign foes, exerted themselves generously for them; and by favouring their concealment, saved many. They could not however save some more helpless and innocent objects of the horrid revenge or base fear of the Thebans: the children of those who had been executed were put to death.

Among the revolutions of which Greece was so fruitful, for justness of cause, boldness of undertaking, ability of plot and arrangement, and daring vigour in execution, the delivery of Thebes has been justly celebrated. Perhaps moderation in assassination should be added to its eulogy; for the execution of those who were at mercy, and the murder of the children who could have deserved no ill, did not take place till the revolution was completed; and, we may hope, should be ascribed, not to deliberate design in the leaders, but to the wild fury of popular passion, which they could not restrain. The better-taught judgment however of modern times will not, with the philosophic Plutarch, give unmixed applause to the means employed, and extol the revolution of Thebes as a model, to be justly compared with that effected at Athens by Thrasybulus through open war, unsullied by assassination and perfidy.¹⁵ Xenophon, in his Agesilaus, has not ill defined that deception which may be allowable in politics

by the hands of the public executioner, as in this chapter of Xenophon, s. 13. The additions *δικαίως, ἀδίκως, βιαίως, ἀκρίτως, ἐκ προνοίας*, and perhaps others, are sometimes used to mark a distinction, but often omitted. If Xenophon's expression on this occasion, *συλλαμβάνοντες ἀπέκτιναν*, might imply that some legal forms were observed, yet it appears difficult to reconcile this with the treatment of the children of the sufferers.

¹⁵ He calls the two revolutions of Athens and Thebes, *μείγισται καὶ κάλλισται τῶν σφάξεων*. Plut. Pelop. p. 513, 514.

Xen. Ages.
c. 11. s. 4.

and war. Agesilaus, he says, held that "to deceive those who mistrust us is wise; those who trust us, wicked." ¹⁶

¹⁶ The necessity has frequently occurred, by no means a pleasant necessity, to speak slightly of Plutarch's authority. If any reader, swayed by the merit altogether of Plutarch's works, or by the respect in which he has been extensively held, may think I have been extreme in depreciating his judgment or his accuracy as an historian, I should wish his account of the Theban revolution compared with Xenophon's. The Life of Pelopidas, as his fellow-countryman, was a favourite subject with Plutarch, and the exploit by which Thebes was delivered from the Lacedæmonian dominion a very favourite part of it. On this favourite subject an ill-judging zeal, the zeal of a closet philosopher, unversed in active life, to make his hero keep the stage with effect, has led him, I must own it appears to me, into strange puerilities. He exhibits Pelopidas babbling publicly, when evidently the most cautious secrecy was requisite. He describes him engaged in furious combat, under circumstances tending strongly to confirm Xenophon's account, according to which the business was so much better managed that nothing more was necessary than to poniard an unarmed man, surprised in the security of domestic privacy. He attributes then to the sage Epaminondas an indiscretion truly wonderful. While, according to his account, the eloquence of Pelopidas incited the exiles, Epaminondas, by an ingenious device, prepared the minds of the citizens, at home, to join in the proposed scheme of revolution. In the places of public exercise he encouraged the Theban youth to venture upon wrestling and boxing with the Lacedæmonians of the garrison. To their surprise, they found themselves far superior to their antagonists: they were of course elated with unexpected success; and thence Epaminondas took occasion to reproach them with the baseness of their submission to a people inferior. It might be supposed, from this story, that Epaminondas meant to admonish the Lacedæmonians to strengthen their garrison, and keep stricter watch.

It is among the real merits of Plutarch, which I have before taken occasion to observe, that he not unfrequently names his authors. Now it is remarkable that, in his account of the Theban revolution, the only author he quotes is Xenophon; from whom indeed evidently, if not the greatest, yet the best part of his account has been taken. As a contemporary historian, much interested in the political events of the time, Xenophon had his partialities, and they were not in favour of Pelopidas or Epaminondas. On the contrary, the Lacedæmonians were his friends, and very particularly Agesilaus. Nevertheless, his simple concise narrative does far more real honour to the authors of the Theban revolution than Plutarch's studied panegyric. Without any mention of secrecy, he shows that extraordinary secrecy was observed. Without any mention of courage or magnanimity, he exhibits, in the conduct of the conspirators, the daring prudence of so many Cæsars or Cromwells. While he thus does justice to those who, as public men, were his enemies, he acknowledges so candidly the faults of his friends that even Plutarch could accuse them of nothing more. Among the advantages then of Xenophon in the comparison, the reader of taste will admire that elegant simplicity, that perspicuous conciseness, which modern writers cannot too diligently emulate, but which, even were Xenophon the writer, no modern language could equal.

SECTION VI.

Motives at Lacedæmon for lenient Conduct toward Thebes. — Command in War against Thebes, declined by Agesilaus, committed to Cleombrotus. — Uncommon Storm. — Change in Athenian Politics, adverse to Thebes.

It was incumbent upon the Lacedæmonian government to punish the Theban rebellion and support its authority over Greece, or at once to resign that invidious authority, which perhaps could not be resigned with safety. Though midwinter, therefore, it was resolved that an army should immediately march. In the same spirit severity was exerted against the late governor of the Cadmea, who suffered death for surrendering his trust.

There is something of mystery in the conduct of Agesilaus toward the Thebans, and not less of the Thebans toward Agesilaus, which the philosopher-historian, who acted in the military and political transactions of the time, seems to have left studiously veiled. The gross affront put upon Agesilaus, previously to his sailing for Asia, when sacrificing in the Theban territory, is not accounted for. The cause of that deep-laid scheme of enmity to Lacedæmon, which occasioned the recall of Agesilaus, is equally unexplained. Why Agesilaus, when he had gained a great victory over the Thebans near Coronea, did not pursue the advantage, but, on the contrary, led his army immediately out of their territory, remains an enigma. After this, that Agesilaus bore a hatred to the Thebans, which he suffered

Plutarch, in his tract entitled, little enough to its purpose, *On the Dæmon or Genius of Socrates*, has enlarged the story of the delivery of Thebes into a kind of novel, giving much dialogue together with the deeds. It is an ingenious and amusing little work, and interesting for the information interspersed concerning the philosophical theology of Plutarch's day; but it bears no symptom of historical authority, beyond the gleanings from Xenophon.

sometimes to sway his political conduct, the candour of Xenophon has led him to avow. The partiality of Plutarch, himself a Bœotian, would countenance an imputation, which seems however to have had no better origin than the ordinary malice of party-spirit in Greece, that Agesilaus instigated the seizing of the Cadmea. That however he supported the measure, when taken, in a manner not creditable to his character, Xenophon himself has shown. Yet when, in consequence of the revolution which followed, war was denounced against Thebes, and an army was ordered to march, he declined the command.

But much of what historians have not expressly declared may be gathered from what they have made known. The pointed enmity of Thebes, toward Agesilaus and Lacedæmon, arose from a revolution in that city, by which, soon after the conclusion of the Peloponnesian war, the power passed from the oligarchal party to the democratical. The new leaders could not hope to hold their power unless they could engage their commonwealth to break the Lacedæmonian connection; and a gross affront to a popular king might be very efficacious for their purpose. But, as the other party was still considerable, and the principal landowners were among its members, Agesilaus, after the battle gained on his return from Asia, might withdraw his army from the Theban territory to favour the lands, not of his enemies, but of his friends; and he might hope that his moderation, after victory, might soften the enmity of one party, while the credit of that victory would promote the influence of the other. If the oligarchy could be quietly restored in Thebes, his purpose would be better answered than by any success in arms; and means might thus, more than by any other measures, be promoted, for his return with his army to prosecute his favourite plan of conquest in Asia.

Patriotism upon a narrow scale, or attachment to a particular commonwealth, though oftener only to a party in that commonwealth, was common among the Greeks; but even the pretension to patriotism including all Greece was rare.¹⁷ Xenophon ascribes to Agesilaus that nobler patriotism; which seems indeed to have been an inheritance from his father Archidamus, communicated to both the kings his sons; though the inferior abilities of Agis gave less brilliancy to the fair portion. If we add the Athenian Cimon, and perhaps the friend of Archidamus, Pericles, it will be difficult to find another Grecian commander who has any clear claim to the eulogy. These however seem entitled to it, and we must therefore confine to the time when Agesilaus reigned the praise which Xenophon makes peculiar to him. What other general, he asks, has been known to decline taking a town when he thought the plunder in his power, or to hold it a misfortune to conquer when Greeks were his enemies? But Agesilaus, when, on his march from Asia, intelligence met him of the great victory obtained near Corinth, where, with the loss only of eight Lacedæmonians, more than ten thousand of the Theban confederacy were slain, instead of showing satisfaction, "Unhappy Greece!" he exclaimed; "your children, thus destroyed in quarrels among themselves, were enough to have obtained glorious victory over any number of barbarians." When afterward, as he lay near Corinth, the refugees pointed out a plan for easily storming the city, he would not allow the attempt: "To chastise a Grecian people," he said, "may be necessary; to extirpate or enslave them cannot."¹⁸

Xen. Ages.
c. 7. s. 4, 5, 6.

Xen. ut sup.
et Plut. Ages.

¹⁷ The Greek term *φιλόπατρις* was nearly synonymous with *φιλόπολις*. To express the more liberal patriotism, extending to the whole nation, the Greeks used the term *φιλέλλην*.

¹⁸ Xenophon has himself reported that Agis would not take Elis when in his

But the great purpose of Agesilaus, universal peace in Greece, and a union of the whole nation against the barbarians, was singularly thwarted by the prevalence of the democratical party in Thebes; and this consideration, with perhaps some added stimulation from personal affronts, appears to have warped the general rectitude of his mind so far as to have led him to support the treachery of Phœbidas in seizing the Theban citadel. When however he observed those Thebans who, through the ensuing revolution, acquired the lead in the government of their city, conducting themselves with no moderation¹⁹; when, on the contrary, after the counter-revolution effected by Mellon and Pelopidas, the whole Theban people seemed united in the opposite interest; he would no longer stand forward in a cause which he found so odious, and which a considerable party, even in Lacedæmon, reprobated. He avoided taking any part in the debate on measures to be pursued; and, when it was resolved that an army should immediately march, he claimed the privilege of his age for declining the command.²⁰

Xen. Hel. 1. 5.
c. 4. s. 13.

power. (Xen. Hel. 1. 3. c. 2. s. 19. and ch. 24. s. 2. of this Hist.) Hence it is clear that the peculiarity of the eulogy must be confined to the time when Agesilaus reigned.

¹⁹ Τύραννοι is a title which Xenophon more than once gives them. (s. 9. & 13.)

²⁰ Ἐπὶ τῆς πεσσοράκοντα ἡλικίας. The uncertain value of this expression has been already noticed. Dodwell (Chron. Xen. ad ann. A. C. 378, p. 55.) supposes πεσσοράκοντα ἡλικίας fifty-seven or fifty-eight, and that Agesilaus was already sixty-three. Thus he must have been forty-five at his accession to the throne, when he was, according to Xenophon, (Ages. c. 1. s. 6.) ἔτι μὲν νέος, still a youth. I should rather suppose him under thirty-five at his accession, and between fifty-two and fifty-five when his age excused him from foreign service. The excuse was common to the king and the private soldier. ["Mr. Mitford omits to notice that Dodwell's argument for the age of Agesilaus is founded upon Xenophon himself, who testifies that he was about 80—ἀμφὶ τὰ ὀγδοήκοντα ἔτη—when he passed into Egypt in B. C. 361. In his 63rd year therefore in B. C. 378. Dodwell however is unsatisfactory in treating of the term ἡλικίας. Plutarch, Lycurg. c. 17. εἰρηνας καλοῦσι τοὺς ἔτος ἤδη δευτέρου ἐκ παιδῶν γεγονότας, μελλείρηνας δὲ τῶν παιδῶν τοὺς πρεσβυτάτους· οὗτος οὖν ὁ εἰρην, εἴκοσι ἔτη γεγονώς, ἀρχει τε τῶν ὑποτιταγμένων ἐν ταῖς μάχαις. The Spartans then

Cleombrotus, who had succeeded Agesipolis in the throne of the Eurysthenidean family, seems, together with the ephors and the whole administration of Lacedæmon, to have imbibed a share of the moderation of Agesilaus. But had no step been taken in favour of the Lacedæmonian, the oligarchal party, in the Bœotian towns, its complete ruin, with the severest sufferings to individuals, to many individuals who deserved highly of Lacedæmon, must have followed. Already, in Thebes, the return of the emigrated, of one party, had been the signal for the leading men of the other to seek personal safety by quitting whatever else was most dear to them.²¹ Though midwinter therefore, and very severe weather, the resolution for the immediate march of an army for Bœotia was persisted in, and Cleombrotus was directed to take the command. The readiest passage

B. C. 378.
Ol. 100. 2.
Jan. Dodw.

were called *παῖδες* till 18, and *εἴρηνες* at 20, and the computation ἀφ' ἡβης might take its beginning from the age of 18. As the institutions of the two states were wholly different, this term would have a very different meaning at Lacedæmon from that which it bore at Athens. Cragius (p. 2653.) imagines that military service began at 30. *Ætatis militaris videtur fuisse is annus qui et virilis ætatis, quo ex ephebis egrediebantur: videlicet annus trigesimus.* But this is wholly unfounded. The age at which *ex ephebis egrediebantur* was 20 years: and, if their service began at that period, and if the 40 years ἀφ' ἡβης closed at 58, their term of service was only 38 years. And yet the expressions of Xenophon, (Rep. Lac. c. 11.) speaking of their military institutions, εἶρηκε δὲ (Λυκοῦργος) καὶ κομᾶν τοῖς ὑπὲρ τὴν ἡβητικὴν ἡλικίαν, νομίζον οὕτω καὶ μείζους ἄν—καὶ γοργότερους φαίνεσθαι, and of Plutarch (Lycurg. c. 22.), κομῶντες εὐθύς ἐκ τῆς τῶν ἐφήβων ἡλικίας, imply that military service began immediately ἀφ' ἡβης, and without any interval of two years. Either therefore the service began at 18, or the ἡβητικὴ ἡλικία commenced at 18, and the terms ἀφ' ἡβης, οἱ ὑπὲρ τὴν ἡβητικὴν ἡλικίαν, οἱ ἐκ τῆς ἐφήβων ἡλικίας, mean those who had passed through that period, and had reached the age of twenty. Their service in that case extended to the age of 60, the period of life at which the members of the *γεροῦσία* were elected: Plutarch, Lycurg. c. 26. ἔταξε καθιστάναί τὸν ἀριστον ἀρετῇ κομθέντα τῶν ὑπὲρ ἐξήκοντα ἔτη γεγονότων. It would seem that the citizens were eligible into this council after they had passed the age of military service, and that this terminated at 60 years of age. The Lacedæmonians then served abroad either from 18 to 58, or from 20 to 60." Clinton, *Fasti Hellen.* pp. 386, 7., note u.]

²¹ This circumstance, familiar among the Greeks, it was sufficient for Xenophon to express by the single word *ἐκπιπτακώτων*.

Xen. Hel. 1. 5.
c. 4. s. 15.

of the mountains north of the isthmus²² was occupied by the Athenian general Chabrias, with a body of targeteers. Cleombrotus however found the Plataean road open. Passing then by this into the Theban territory, he encamped at Cynoscephalæ. There he remained sixteen days, and then withdrew to Thespiæ. The purpose of the expedition seems to have been merely to give that protection which the Lacedæmonians owed to the Bœotian towns against the new government of Thebes; and for

s. 16.

this it was thought sufficient now to leave a third of the army, under the command of Sphodrias, with a sum of money for raising a body of mercenaries. Cleombrotus led the rest back toward Peloponnesus; all, says the historian, while they reflected how carefully every injury to the Theban territory had been avoided, wholly doubting whether it was to be war or peace.

s. 17.

In passing the mountain-barrier against the isthmus the army was assailed by an uncommon storm. Between the town of Creusis and the Corinthian gulf its violence was such that many asses, laden with baggage, were tumbled down the precipices; shields were blown from the men's arms into the sea, and, in the impossibility, with their complete armour, to withstand its fury, resort was had to the expedient of depositing shields among the crags, and loading

s. 18.

them with stones. With difficulty, each making his way as he could, they arrived, in the evening, at Ægosthena in the Megaric territory. Though this was no ordinary tempest, yet the account of it, given by Xenophon, may mark the cause why, in a climate whose summer heats we are apt to suppose more intolerable than the roughness of the waning or early year, winter operations were so generally avoided. Such an event never failed to alarm Grecian

²² The way by Eleutheræ; for which Dodwell proposes, apparently with reason, to read *Erythræ*.

superstition. Some thought the displeasure of the gods announced at the conduct of Lacedæmon towards Thebes: others supposed ill-fortune to the youthful general portended. With recollection of the omen, following events, it was imagined, gave its explanation. As soon as the weather became moderate, the abandoned arms were collected; and, the march being then prosecuted into Peloponnesus, the troops were, as usual, dismissed.

The little done in this expedition, to the vulgar eye, was yet in its consequences important. Those in Athens, Xen. Hel. l. 5. c. 4. s. 19. desirous of peace, or averse to the Theban connection, represented with effect to the people, that the Corinthian territory was no longer the seat of war; already they had seen the Peloponnesian army pass by Attica into Bœotia; and before next harvest they might expect the ravage of Attica itself. The ungenerous fear of the tyrannous multitude thus was so excited that, of the two generals who had favoured the delivery of Thebes from the Lacedæmonian yoke, one was condemned and executed, the other saved himself by flight.

SECTION VII.

Motives of the Theban Leaders for persevering in Opposition to Lacedæmon. — Pelopidas, Epaminondas. — Corruption of the Lacedæmonian General Sphodrias. — Weak Concession of Agesilaus. — Renewal of Alliance between Athens and Thebes. — Agesilaus Commander against Thebes. — State of the smaller Republics of Greece. — The Thebaid ravaged. — Winter Campaign. — Second Invasion of the Thebaid under Agesilaus. — Sedition at Thespiæ.

THE great change which had taken place in the politics of Athens was highly alarming to the ruling party in Thebes. B. C. 378. Ol. 100. 2-3. Unsupported they could not hope long to resist the power of Lacedæmon; and, whatever indications might have appeared of moderation and a peaceful dis-

position in the Lacedæmonian government, yet no peace with Lacedæmon could come unattended with the ruin of the chiefs of the party, assassins of the late polemarchs, and objects of the revenge of living numbers, whom they had driven into banishment. But among them were men of talents, such as Thebes had not before offered to the world's notice. Of these, Pelopidas and Epaminondas were becoming eminent. Both of distinguished families, both of the democratical party, they contracted an early friendship, though otherwise their circumstances and their dispositions differed. Pelopidas was rich, Epaminondas poor : Pelopidas delighted to pass his time in action, war, hunting, and the palæstra : Epaminondas in study and the schools of the philosophers.²³ The warm temper of Pelopidas urged him to put himself forward in public business : Epaminondas thought it a duty to qualify himself for his country's service ; but then claimed indulgence for his inclination to retirement and study, till circumstances might require his exertion. The activity of Pelopidas made it impossible that he could be an indifferent character in any public commotion. When therefore the party of Leontiades, with the assistance of the Lacedæmonian army under Phœbidas, obtained the supreme power in the commonwealth, Pelopidas had been among those who were driven to seek their safety by flight ; while Epaminondas, considered only as a philosopher, remained undisturbed in Thebes. Pelopidas, according to Plutarch, was, both in council and in action, foremost among the associates of Mellon in the ensuing revolution : Epaminondas joined in it only with the body of the Theban people. When the revolution was effected, Pelopidas was raised, together with Mellon and Charon, to the office of Bœotarch, a title assumed by the first magistrates

Diod. l. 15.
Corn. Nep. vit.
Epam. & Pelop.
Plut. vit. Pelop.
& Ages.

²³ "Pythagoreus ille Lysis Thebanum Epaminondam (instituit), haud scio an summum virum unum omnis Græciæ." Cic. de Orat. l. 3. c. 34.

of Thebes, instead of their ancient title of polemarch, or conjointly with it ; in assertion of the claim of the Theban people to a superintending authority over all the cities of Bœotia, which the Lacedæmonians, under the pretence of vindicating the freedom of those cities, but really to ensure their own command over them, had always strenuously opposed.

The intrigue which set Athens again at variance with Lacedæmon was, according to Plutarch, Plut. vit. Pelopid. devised and managed by Pelopidas. Xenophon gives it to Theban policy, without specifying the author. Xen. Hel. 1. 5. c. 4. s. 20. Bribery was the inducement, at least suspected, for Sphodrias, the Lacedæmonian general in Thespiæ, to take measures not to be otherwise easily accounted for. Marching in the afternoon, he entered Attica by night, with the purpose, or the pretended purpose, to be before dawn at Piræus, which had then no gates, and to take it by surprise. At Thria day broke upon him, and he returned ; s. 21. but, instead of endeavouring to conceal his hostile intention, he plundered houses and drove off cattle.

Before day intelligence reached Athens that a large army was approaching. Alarm spread rapidly, and the whole people took arms. Three Lacedæmonian ministers, then in the city, were arrested. s. 22, 23. Astonished themselves at the fact related to them, they however soon convinced the principal Athenians that whatever the plot might be, they could be no parties to it ; and, declaring their confidence that Sphodrias not only could have no authority for his injurious conduct, but that his high rank and great connections would not screen him from due punishment for it, they were presently released. So far their assertions were soon confirmed that Sphodrias was summoned home, and a capital prosecution was instituted against him.

Xenophon has laboured, not to justify the ensuing conduct of Agesilaus, but to win excuse s. 24—33.

for it. Cleonymus, son of Sphodrias, a youth of great merit, was the intimate friend of Archidamus, son of Agesilaus, a youth also of great merit. Archidamus was distressed by his friend's distress; and Agesilaus, feeling for both, allowed his feeling to overbear his judgment. In the unfortunately divided state of Greece, private feelings could not fail to interfere, more than in larger realms, with public interest. Against his own opinion of what was just and honourable, and against his country's clearest interest, Agesilaus exerted himself in favour of Sphodrias. It appears that trials of men in high public situations, in Sparta equally as at Athens, were before either the assembled people, or a court nearly as numerous as the ordinary popular assemblies. Of course opportunity was open for intrigue, and interest decided the judgment. Sphodrias nevertheless feared to return home; yet his trial, according to the general practice of Grecian courts, proceeded as if he were present. It was apparently in consequence of the notoriety of his guilt that his friends chose to rest his defence principally on the plea of his former merits; but the influence of Agesilaus gave such efficacy to this plea that he was acquitted. Xenophon, anxious for the credit of his friend and patron, has nevertheless evinced his superior regard for truth, by avowing that the decision was very generally considered as singularly iniquitous.

The remoter consequences of this disreputable transaction were beyond human foresight; but the strong probability, amounting almost to certain necessity, of what immediately followed, should not have escaped so experienced a politician as Agesilaus. Indignation pervaded the Athenian people; and it was no longer possible for those leading men in Athens, who desired to maintain the Lacedæmonian connection, to refute the orators of the Bœotian party, who asserted that the Lacedæmonians not less evidently approved

and had encouraged the treacherous project against Piræus, than the not less abominable, but more successful treachery, by which Thebes had been actually subjected to Lacedæmon. After the manner of democracies, not understanding convinced, but passion excited, like the reflux of a strong surf, bore all violently the way contrary to that which it had lately impelled; and a majority of the same rash multitude which, a little before, had condemned its generals to death for promoting the delivery of Thebes from the Lacedæmonian yoke, now, with equally hasty and unreasonable zeal, engaged in war with Lacedæmon to support the measure. War, defensive and offensive, became the popular care. Piræus was secured with gates, ships were built, and want of zeal in the Bœotian cause was considered as want of fidelity to the Athenian commonwealth.

Having thus, by partiality for a guilty individual, brought a formidable addition to the before pressing weight of war against his country, Agesilaus could no longer deny himself to the public voice; which loudly called for his known ability and large experience to command the army, in preference to the untried talents of his youthful colleague. Thebes remained the great object of hostility: but, with Athens now adverse, it was no longer easy for an army to pass from Peloponnesus into Bœotia; and command of the road over the intervening mountains must by some means be secured.

It is only incidentally that we get any information concerning those numerous inferior republics which composed the far larger portion of the Greek nation. When it occurs it is of course valuable. To the citizens of Lacedæmon and Athens great objects of ambition offered; and, if numbers suffered in the contest so excited, numbers would participate at least in the joyful hope of one time finding large recompense. Meanwhile the body of the Lacedæmonian people

might live in security and a dignified ease, after the manner prescribed by the peculiar institutions under which they were bred : and, for the Athenian, all the arts and every science combined to produce gratifications ; for the wealthy every kind of gratification, at their own expense, except security of person, property, and character ; and, for the poorest, luxuries at the public expense, such as no others enjoyed, with quiet and peace of mind, if not always in their power, yet less liable to disturbance than among those whose private riches might draw popular envy. But, for the bulk of the Greek nation, the citizens of those numerous little republics to whom the higher rewards of ambition were totally denied, our information hitherto has not represented their lot as generally enviable ; and what we proceed to learn will be gratifying only as it may teach us to bless Providence for our own.

Xen. Hel. 1. 5.
c. 4. s. 36, 37. A war, unconnected with the greater concerns of the Lacedæmonian confederacy, already existed within Bœotia. In that empire, which some of the Grecian republics exercised over others, and the Lacedæmonian, for a long time, over all, we see something of the principle of some despotic governments of modern Europe ; allowing the people, as a recompense for deprivation of other liberty, that of assassinating one another. The little, almost unheard-of, municipality of the Clitorians waged war with their neighbours the Orchomenians. Unequal to their enemies in native military force, they had however pecuniary resources which enabled them to supply the deficiency : they took into their pay a body of those troops, the use of which had, as we have seen, long been increasing in Greece ; vagabonds from various republics, who made war a trade, and were ready to engage in any service for the best hire. Thus hostilities went forward, unregarded by any superintending authority, till a particular interest of Lacedæmon required

that the broil should stop; and then a mandate from Sparta sufficed to still the storm. Agesilaus saw means prepared for by this little war securing the passage of his army from Peloponnesus, over the mountains, into the Bœotian plain. He demanded the service of the Clitorian mercenaries for the purpose. The Clitorians, desirous of gratifying the king and people of Lacedæmon, were only anxious that, while their mercenaries were employed in the Lacedæmonian service, their lands, which they were themselves unable to protect, might not be ravaged. For this Agesilaus undertook to provide; and he did it effectually, by sending his orders to the Orchomenians to abstain from hostility while Lacedæmon might have occasion for the Clitorian troops. It seems there was an existing decree of the congress of the confederacy, forbidding war between the confederated republics while an expedition in the common cause was going forward; and under the sanction of this decree, Agesilaus threatened the Orchomenians with the first vengeance of the arms of that confederacy of which their city was a member, if they disobeyed his order. The Orchomenians prudently acquiesced, and the Clitorian mercenaries occupied the passes.

Bœotia being thus laid open to the Lacedæmonian arms, it remained for those able men who led the Theban councils to devise how, with unequal forces, they might best protect the small but rich territory of their city. They fortified the whole frontier; and still their numbers were unequal to the defence always and everywhere. Agesilaus, able and indefatigable, penetrating their lines, plundered, burnt, and wasted to the city-walls. The consummate skill of the Athenian general Chabrias, to whom the Thebans deferred on that occasion, baffled his endeavours to force a general action; but the common object of a Grecian

Xen. Hel. 1. 5.
c. 4. s. 38—41.

Diod. l. 15.
c. 32, 33.
p. 474. Corn.
Nep. vit.
Chab.

campaign was accomplished. Agesilaus then placed a force in Thespiæ under the command of Phœbidas, to protect the allies of Lacedæmon in northern Greece during winter, and, returning into Peloponnesus, dismissed the rest of his army.

The patronage of a man distinguished, like Phœbidas, by that treachery which had reduced Thebes under subjection to Lacedæmon, we should not consider as creditable; but we are so little informed of Spartan domestic politics that ground fails even for conjecture how far his appointment was the work of Agesilaus. Phœbidas however, though an unprincipled politician, seems to have been an active and able officer. The Thebans, like the Dorian Peloponnesians, descended from the same Æolian stock, valuing themselves upon their heavy-armed phalanx, disdained the missile weapons and desultory action of most of the northern Greeks; whom they considered as, in their warfare, little above barbarians. But the Lacedæmonians, by severe experience in their wars with Athens, had at length learnt the use of light-infantry; and, though the force left under Phœbidas consisted mostly of targeteers, he did not content himself with defensive war, but so harassed the enemy's territory with predatory inroads that the whole force of Thebes was collected to repress the troublesome and destructive intrusion. The Theban army invaded the Thespian territory. Phœbidas, avoiding general action, gave nevertheless such annoyance by desultory attacks with his light troops on the enemy's flanks and rear that he made both phalanx and cavalry retire in such disorderly haste that, without previous circumspection and decision, the cavalry were stopped by a deep glen crossing the way. This however, which, in the ordinary course of events, should have been the ruin of the defeated, proved, in the chance of war, that of the victorious party. The

Xenoph. ut
ant. Diodor.
l. 15. s. 34.

Theban cavalry being forced into action again, it happened that, in the first charge, Phœbidas was killed; and here, as we have been led on former occasions to observe, was shown of what consequence the life of one man might be. The mercenaries all fled; the few Lacedæmonians of the army were overpowered: approaching night prevented great slaughter, but the consequences were those of a complete victory. The Thebans thenceforward commanded the country: their allies and partisans were encouraged, their adversaries dejected: instead of any longer suffering in their own territory, they plundered the lands of all around them: they were indeed unable to take a single town; but the lower people of many deserted to them in numbers; and throughout Bœotia the Lacedæmonian party was so weakened that almost everywhere support was wanting to check sedition and prevent revolt. These circumstances being reported at Lacedæmon, a mora was sent under the orders of a polemarch, who took his head-quarters in Thespiæ.

Xen. Hel. 1. 5.
c. 4. s. 46.

The Peloponnesian army was again assembled in spring, re-enforced by a body of horse from that distant new member of the confederacy,

B. C. 377.
Ol. 100. 3.
Xen. Hel. 1. 5.
c. 4. s. 47-54.

Olynthus; and Agesilaus again took the command. By early precaution he secured the passes of Cithæron, and without opposition entered the Bœotian plain. The Thebans remained on the defensive within their lines; but even those lines, by movements ably planned and rapidly executed, Agesilaus passed unopposed. Fearful of a battle, the enemy attended his motions with little effect, while he extended ravage beyond Thebes as far as the Tanagræan lands. When thus all the inimical Bœotian territory had been wasted, returning to Thespiæ, he found that little city torn by the common rancour of faction in Greece. One

Xen. Hel. 1. 5. party claiming to be more eminently the Lacedæmonian party, urged the moderate petition, that their opponents, though professing themselves friends also of Lacedæmon, yet, for their less ardent zeal in the cause, might be put to death. It could not be easy to bring men, so violent in variance, to live within the same town in cordial friendship. Agesilaus however effected at least the semblance of a reconciliation; and, for better security, required solemn oaths from both sides for what the interest of both strongly demanded, but passion, more imperious, had opposed, the preservation of the peace of their little commonwealth. After this good deed he returned into Peloponnesus, and the army was dismissed.

SECTION VIII.

Distress and Exertions of Thebes. — Naval Assistance obtained from Athens. — Timotheus Commander. — Pressure upon Lacedæmon, and Successes of Thebes. — Accommodation and Breach again between Lacedæmon and Athens. — Siege of Corcyra by the Lacedæmonians. — Successes of the Athenians under Iphicrates.

B. C. 377.
Ol. 100. 4.
Winter.

THAT mode of offensive war, which had compelled the flourishing and formidable commonwealth of Olynthus to receive laws from Lacedæmon, now began severely to press upon Thebes. For two successive years neither harvest, nor those fruits which, in the hotter climates, are scarcely less important than harvest, had been gathered by the Thebans from their territory; and the surrounding states best able to afford supplies acknowledged the Lacedæmonian empire. Bœotia, though its extent, from the Eubœan channel to the Corinthian gulf, gave it the advantage of two seas, nevertheless was low in the scale of Grecian maritime power. The supremacy of Thebes was unfavourable to maritime ex-

Xen. Hel. 1. 5.
c. 4. s. 58.

ertion, its proper territory being wholly inland; yet Thebes, whether through just or usurped dominion, at this time commanded ports and possessed ships of war. In the distress therefore arising from the pressure of the Lacedæmonian arms, it was resolved, before any concession should be made, to endeavour to procure supplies by sea.

Two triremes were accordingly appointed to attend commissioners, to whom ten talents, about two thousand pounds sterling, were intrusted to purchase corn at Oreus in Eubœa. The people of Oreus were known to be friendly, but they were restrained by a Lacedæmonian garrison in their citadel. The Theban commissioners therefore went to Pagasæ, on the opposite Thessalian coast; hoping thence to manage their business with the requisite secrecy. The Lacedæmonian governor nevertheless receiving information of their measures, allowed them quietly to complete their purchase, and then, watching their departure, intercepted both ships, at such a distance from shore that none of the crews escaped. The result however was far more beneficial to the Thebans than if their commissioners had met with unchecked success. For the prisoners placed in the citadel of Oreus found opportunity to rise and overpower the garrison. The townspeople, relieved thus from the terror of the commanding fortress, disclaimed subjection to Lacedæmon; and, through the rest of autumn, and all the following winter, Thebes was abundantly supplied from Eubœa.

The disposition to yield, which want had begun to excite among the Thebans, being thus obviated, it remained for the Lacedæmonians, with the returning season, to repeat the invasion of Bœotia. An accidental injury to a blood-vessel, ill-treated by an unskilful surgeon, had brought upon Agesilaus a severe

Xen. Hel. 1. 6.
c. 4. s. 3.

B. C. 576.
Ol. 100. 4.
Spring.

Xen. Hel. 1. 5.
c. 4. s. 58.

illness, which disabled him for military command. Cleombrotus was therefore again placed at the head of the army. With the usual deficiency of our information concerning the domestic politics of Lacedæmon, it remains unexplained why that inexperienced prince profited neither from the advice nor the example of his able colleague to secure the passes into Bœotia. Not till he arrived at the foot of the mountains he sent forward his targeteers; and they were repulsed by the Athenian and Theban troops, which had preoccupied the commanding heights. Without another effort he returned into Peloponnesus, and dismissed his army.

Xen. Hel. 1. 5.
c. 4. s. 60.

Impatience and discontent pervaded the congress of the confederacy, which soon after met in Lacedæmon. It was observed that the yearly calls for foreign service bore hard upon the citizens of the allied republics, and yet no progress was made. Management and exertion were certainly deficient, or so great a force would have produced greater effects. A proper use of the unemployed navy, far superior in strength to the enemy's, might have contributed to shorten the duration of the evil. Not only troops might have been securely transported into Bœotia, and the disgrace of an unsuccessful attempt to force the passage of the mountains avoided, but Athens, dependent upon transmarine supplies for so large a part of her subsistence, might have been reduced by famine. In consequence of such remonstrances, a fleet of s. 61. sixty triremes was equipped, and, under the command of Pollis, took stations at Ægina, Ceos, and Andrus. This measure had the proposed effect. The corn-ships, bound for Athens, commonly made Geræstus in Eubœa. There getting information of the disposition of the enemy's fleet, they dared not proceed; and want began to be apprehended in Athens.

But the race of great men there was not yet extinct. Chabrias, esteemed the most scientific officer of the age, was placed at the head of the fleet. Near Naxus he met and defeated Pollis, and thus again the seas were open for the Athenian trade.

Xen. Hel. 1. 5.
c. 4. s. 61.
Diodor. l. 15.
c. 34. Corn.
Nep. vit. Chab.
Xen. Hel. 1. 5.
c. 4. s. 62, 63.

Preparation meanwhile was making for transporting a powerful army from Peloponnesus across the Corinthian gulf, to carry war into Bœotia; but the consequence of the weak compliance of Agesilaus in compassion for a deserving son and a guilty friend, the compassion amiable in the individual, but the compliance highly blamable in the public man, fell now severely upon Lacedæmon. Thebes applied to Athens, its ally, for naval assistance, and, under the command of Timotheus, son of Conon, a fleet of sixty triremes was sent to circumnavigate Peloponnesus, and alarm the coast. The Peloponnesian forces were in consequence detained at home for the defence of their respective territories. The Thebans thus had leisure for offensive measures; whence their able leaders profited so well that the great object of their party, what might best enable them in all events to resist Lacedæmon, what, of course, it had been the great purpose of the Lacedæmonians to prevent, was completely accomplished. With co-operation everywhere of the democratical party, every town of Bœotia was brought, with the name of alliance, under real subjection to Thebes.

Xen. Hel. 1. 5.
c. 4. s. 29. &
l. 6. c. 2. s. 6.

The Athenian fleet meanwhile commanding the sea, when it had saved Bœotia from invasion, invaded Corcyra; and, a friendly party there assisting, the whole island was brought over to the Athenian cause. Timotheus however would allow none of the usual severities against the overpowered party; no selling into slavery, no banishment; but, by his liberal conduct, composing dif-

1. 5. c. 4. s. 64.

ferences, he produced a general attachment to himself and to the Athenian name.²⁴

Xen. Hel. 1. 5.
c. 4. s. 65, 66. The Lacedæmonians always saw with particular jealousy any interference of Athens in the western seas. Immediately therefore they exerted themselves to assert their command there, and a fleet of fifty-five triremes was put under the orders of Nicolochus. More distinguished for daring courage than for talents or naval experience, Nicolochus scorned, in fleets so numerous, to weigh the difference of five ships. Without waiting for a re-enforcement expected from Ambracia, he hastened to meet Timotheus, and he was defeated. Nevertheless the Ambraciot squadron soon after joining him, he again proposed action. Timotheus however being joined by a squadron from Corcyra, which made his fleet more than seventy triremes, even the rashness of Nicolochus then avoided to renew the trial of arms.

1. 6. c. 1. s. 1. During this unsuccessful exertion of Lacedæmon at sea new emergencies arose, pressingly requiring new exertion by land. The Thebans, after reducing all Bæotia under their obedience or influence, carried their arms into Phocis; and ministers arriving from that country represented that it must be lost to the Lacedæmonian alliance unless speedily and powerfully relieved. Those who held the sway in Lacedæmon apparently with reason deemed it of great importance not to allow the new power of Thebes thus to spread. It was therefore resolved to send an army, larger than the former, for the protection

²⁴ The circumstance that Timotheus was a pupil of Isocrates has led to a short but pithy panegyric of him from Cicero: "Isocrates clarissimum virum Timotheum, Cononis, præstantissimi imperatoris, filium, summum ipsum imperatorem, hominemque doctissimum (instituit)." M. T. Cic. de Orat. 1. 3. s. 34. To the same general purpose Diodorus, (1. 15. c. 36.) Ταῦτα δὲ πάντα ταχέως καὶ φειδίως ἐπετέλεσε, πείθων μὲν διὰ τοῦ λόγου δυνάμειος, νικῶν δὲ δι' ἀνδρείαν καὶ στρατηγίαν διότι οὐ μόνον παρὰ τοῖς πολίταις, ἀλλὰ καὶ παρὰ τοῖς ἄλλοις Ἕλλησι, μεγάλης ἐτύγχανεν ἀποδοχῆς.

of the northern allies. But while the Peloponnesian shores were everywhere threatened, it was judged prudent to avoid requiring the usual proportion of the confederates; whose governments and people would naturally be anxious to keep their utmost force at home for the protection of their own lands. At the risk of Laconia itself therefore it was determined to send a larger proportion of Lacedæmonians, with the hope, by this attention to the wishes and feelings of the allies, and mark of confidence in their bravery and fidelity, to conciliate attachment. Unfortunately Agesilaus was yet unable to take the command: it was therefore committed to Cleombrotus. The army crossed Xen. Hel. l. 6. c. 2. s. 1. the Corinthian gulf without opposition, and the Thebans presently evacuated Phocis; but they occupied strong posts on the border, apparently determined to dispute the entrance of the Lacedæmonians into Bœotia.

Things were thus critically situated, the Athenian fleet threatening the whole circuit of the Peloponnesian coast, when unexpected relief came to Lacedæmon. Among the Athenians dissatisfaction with their new political connection had spread. They were consuming their public treasure, burthening themselves with imposts, and suffering depredation from Æginetan corsairs, yet the Thebans had refused, possibly being little able, to contribute to the expense of that fleet, which had given the great turn in their favour; which had saved Bœotia from invasion, perhaps Thebes from ruin, and afforded the opportunity through which Thebes was now mistress of Bœotia. Those lead- Ibid. ing men in Athens, who were desirous of peace, took advantage from this turn in the public mind, and ministers were sent to Lacedæmon. No complex interests occurring for discussion, peace was quickly concluded; and orders were sent from Athens for Timotheus to stop the operations of his victorious fleet, and return home.

Unfortunately a matter, in a great degree accidental, and of which the modern eye with difficulty discovers the importance, presently unsettled all that appeared so happily accommodated. Timotheus, in his way home, put some Zacynthian exiles ashore on their island. The Zacynthians in power complained of it to Lacedæmon as a gross injury. This concise statement from the contemporary historian will not be wholly unintelligible to those who have thus far followed Grecian history. The Athenians however, conscious of offence or not, so little expected that it would occasion a renewal of hostilities that they had already laid up their fleet and dismissed their crews, when a vote passed the Lacedæmonian assembly, declaring that the Athenians had acted injuriously, and that reparation should be sought by arms. It seems as if an interchange of character had taken place between the Athenian and Lacedæmonian governments. Great certainly was the merit of those leaders of the Athenian councils who could make circumspection and moderation distinguish the proceedings of a democracy, while, notwithstanding the general authority and general prudence of Agesilaus, the measures of the elderhood of Sparta were subject to the influence of passion. An earnestness appeared, as if the dearest interests of Lacedæmon were threatened. Requisitions were sent to all the maritime allies; and from Corinth, together with its colonies, Leucas and Ambracia, Elis, the Achæan cities, Zacynthus, and the independent Argolic states, Epidaurus, Trœzen, Hermione, and Haliæ, a fleet was collected of sixty triremes. In doubt still of the sufficiency of the force to be obtained within Greece, ministers were sent to Dionysius, whose power or influence directed the politics of Syracuse and the greater part of Sicily, representing how incompatible it was with his interest that the Athenians

Xen. Hel. 1. 6.
c. 2. s. 7, 8.

s. 2.

s. 3.

should command Corcyra, and requesting assistance against them.

Here the contemporary historian discovers to us a motive for the conduct of the Lacedæmonian government, superior to the mere consideration of the interest of a friendly party in Zacynthus. The means which the connection with Corcyra gave to Athens, for maintaining a fleet and holding a commanding influence in the western seas, always an object of the highest jealousy to Lacedæmon, made any attempt to extend the Athenian interest there; at the expense of the Lacedæmonian, peculiarly offensive and alarming. But if, in the silence of Xenophon, the probable report of Diodorus may be taken, there was a farther allurements and incentive. The oligarchal party in Corcyra, at a crisis with the democratical then in power, applied to Lacedæmon for assistance; and thus the recent transaction of Timotheus in Zacynthus may seem to justify in some degree the interference of Lacedæmon in the affairs of Corcyra. Measures however were taken with a haste, and in a style of violence, forbidding friendly discussion. Immediately against Athens indeed war was not declared, nor any hostility directed; but Mnasippus, appointed to command the fleet, was instructed generally, “to take care of the Lacedæmonian interest in the western sea,” and particularly, “to reduce Corcyra.”

Diodor. l. 15.
c. 146. p. 480.

Xen. Hel.
ut ant.

We have seen that unfortunate island, toward the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, singularly a scene of bloodshed and desolation, from the rage of its own citizens against one another. Taught by their sufferings, the survivors had settled into orderly government; and their experience seems to have been transmitted, by report, as an advantageous inheritance to their children; for Corcyra was at this time remarked for its high cultivation

l. 6. c. 2. s. 4.

and the splendour of its country houses; the security of an insular commonwealth allowing and encouraging improvements there, which, on the continent, and in most of the larger islands, divided into several states, the constant danger of hostile neighbours forbade. While the Corcyræans were yet unaware of the purpose of Lacedæmon, all the fury of Grecian war was let loose upon their devoted land; for Mnasippus was not of a temper to go beyond the ordinary practice of his age in mercy to an enemy. The cattle in the fields, the numerous slaves employed in husbandry, and, beside the common plunder of the crops, large store of wine in capacious cellars, here appendages of the farms, though on the continent only found in towns, became the prey of the invaders. The troops, in consequence, mostly mercenaries, elsewhere accustomed to coarse fare, learnt here, says the historian, to be fastidious; insomuch that, for their common drink, they demanded old and flavoured wines. Plunder and waste having been extended over the island, Mnasippus formed the blockade of the city by land and sea.

Xen. Hel. 1. 6.
c. 2. s. 5.

The Athenian government, in the same spirit of moderation in which it had stopped the course of successful hostilities for the sake of an equitable peace, appears now to have remained calm under provocation, and slow to resent the ill-judged aggression of Lacedæmon. Nothing had been done in consequence of the affronting decree of the Lacedæmonian government and the hostile measures following, when deputies arrived from the besieged Corcyræans, imploring the Athenian people, with every added argument that could be drawn from their own interest, to relieve their injured, distressed, and highly valuable allies. "What a loss," they said, "would Corcyra be to the Athenians, what an acquisition to their enemies! No republic of the confederacy could furnish equal naval force, or equal

pecuniary contribution. How important then the situation of Corcyra, for awing the western Greeks, for commanding the Corinthian gulf, for attacking the Laconian shores, and, above all, for interrupting the communication of Peloponnesus with Sicily and Italy, where the Grecian towns had been mostly united by Dionysius under the leading government of Syracuse, the ally of Lacedæmon!" Xen. Hel. l. 6. c. 2. s. 7. These were the considerations which had excited the jealousy of the Lacedæmonians, and given spring to their measures against Corcyra; and, thus seasonably put forward, they now excited the solicitude of the Athenians for its preservation. A body of six hundred targeteers was immediately sent, which, eluding the vigilance of the besiegers, entered the city of Corcyra by night to re-enforce its garrison; and a fleet of sixty triremes was to follow, under the orders of Timotheus, with the purpose of raising the siege.

The fleet however remained to be manned; and Timotheus, knowing the enemy's fleet to be not only of equal or superior force, but already practised in service, was solicitous for crews of the best seamen. With a squadron therefore he went among the islands to collect them. The usual impatience of the Athenian people was thus excited; s. 8. the dilatory caution of Timotheus was condemned; and, before he could complete his levies, Iphicrates was appointed to supersede him in the command.

In compliance with the manifest inclination of an absolute sovereign no measures could be too strong. Iphicrates profited from circumstances so adapted to the promotion of his immediate object. He acted as the favourite vicegerent of a despot. He pressed men; he was strict in compelling those, the wealthiest of the Athenians, on whom popular sovereignty imposed the burthensome duty of fitting out triremes, to be diligent in their part of the business; he obtained a decree for adding to his force any ships of the republic cruising near

the Attic coast²⁵, and particularly the sacred ships Paralus and Salaminia. Thus he increased his fleet to seventy triremes, with which he hastened his departure; and, in the passage itself around Peloponnesus, a passage requiring time, with the rowing and coasting navigation of the ancients, he found or made opportunity to give the requisite practice to his crews, and instruct them in whatever was most necessary for action.

Xen. Hel. 1. 6.
c. 2. s. 15—17.

The haste of the Athenian people had not been wholly unreasonable; for the Corcyræans were severely pressed by famine, insomuch that, when Mnasippus had declared by proclamation that he would sell for slaves any who in future, on pretence of desertion, should come from the town, still they deserted. Mnasippus caused them to be scourged and sent back again; and many of servile condition, whom the Corcyræans would not re-admit, perished of hunger.

s. 9.

Whatever public benefits may arise from private vices, it may be doubted if any vice was ever ultimately beneficial to the individual, unless sometimes, among things that happen against all calculation, prodigality; but no vice is equally apt to defeat its own purpose as avarice. When the extreme distress of the besieged became clearly proved to Mnasippus, he considered the public business intrusted to him as done, and the season come for putting the finishing stroke to a scheme of private gain. His army was composed, in large proportion, of mercenaries; for the cities of the confederacy, averse to a transmarine service, had mostly paid the

²⁵ Μάλα δ'εξίως τὰς ναῦς ἐπληροῦτο, καὶ τοὺς τριηράρχους ἠνάγκαζε· προσίλαβε δὲ παρὰ τῶν Ἀθηναίων καὶ εἰ ποῦ τις ναῦς περὶ τὴν Ἀττικὴν ἔπλει. — *Celeriter admodum naves complebat, ac triremium prefectos vel invites cogebat: præterea sumebat secum naves omnes quæcumque oram Atticæ legebant.* I have endeavoured to render this passage as nearly as in modern language may be. The Latin translator has, I think, missed the meaning throughout, and particularly of the phrase προσίλαβε δὲ παρὰ τῶν Ἀθηναίων, κ. τ. λ.

compensation for avoiding it. Two months' pay was now due when he dismissed some of his mercenaries unpaid, and still procrastinated settlement with the others.²⁶ Discontent pervaded the army: the guards were negligent and disorderly: the soldiers off duty wandered about the country.

The change was observed by the Corcyræans. They sallied, killed some of the besiegers, and made some prisoners. Mnasippus, alarmed at this new boldness, called all to arms, but was ill obeyed. Illiberal severity, then exercised toward his officers, produced zealous obedience neither among them nor among the soldiers. With his troops however at length collected he drove the Corcyræans back to their walls; but there they made a stand; while, from the tombs, which Greek as well as Roman custom placed by the road-side without their towns, their light-armed discharged missile weapons with advantage. Meantime, under direction of the able Athenian general Stesicles, more troops, rushing from the town by another gate, advanced toward the besiegers' flank. These, attempting an evolution to form a face of sufficient extent for receiving the new attack, were thrown into confusion by the supervening enemy; and being unable to recover their order, fled. No relief could come from the right, engaged toward its own front. Progressively therefore from the left, the line joined in flight; and Mnasippus, among whose vices was no want of Spartan courage, left at last with a very few, was overpowered and killed. The conquerors then pursued; and, but for the apprehension of a military force among the servants, suttlers, and others, whose numbers appeared for-

Xen. Hel. 1. 6.
c. 2. s. 10—12.
Diodor.
1. 15. c. 47.

²⁶ Καὶ τοὺς μὲν τινὰς αὐτῶν ἀπομίσθους ἐπιποιήκει, τοῖς δ' οὖσι καὶ δυοῖν ἤδη μηνῶν ὤφειλε τὸν μισθόν. *Quippe nonnullis eorum adimebat stipendia, nonnullis, quos secum retinebat, duum mensium stipendium debebat.* That the Latin translator has given the right sense appears not doubtful, though the Greek phrases seem either military of the day, or perhaps corrupted in transcription.

midable, the camp might have been taken. Report then arriving of an Athenian armament approaching under Iphicrates, the remainder of the besiegers embarking withdrew to Leucas, so precipitately that not only large stores of corn and wine were left to supply the pressing wants of the Coreyraëans, together with numerous slaves to repair the loss by desertion and famine, but even the sick of the army were abandoned to their mercy.

s. 19. Iphicrates was yet on the Laconian coast when report of the fate of Mnasippus met him.²⁷ According to the common manner of the coasting navigation of the time, when the progress of a fleet of ships of war resembled an army's march, he halted and s. 17, 18. landed, even on the Laconian shore, for meals. Trading vessels, loftier and deeper, and navigated, in proportion to their burthen, by far fewer hands, could far better keep the open sea. Expecting action immediately on reaching his destination, Iphicrates, not to be encumbered with the mainsails²⁸ of his triremes, had left them in the arsenal at Piræus. For practice to his crews he chose to make his way mostly with oars, the ready use of which was so important in the ancient manner of action. With a fair breeze however he had allowed his crews to rest: in adverse winds, not too violent, he made them row by reliefs. How little indeed the ancient triremes were adapted for sailing may be gathered from the circumstance that, though large enough to carry from two to three hundred men, the mast

²⁷ In that age Messenia was commonly included under the name of Laconia, or the Laconic territory.

²⁸ Τὰ μεγάλα ἰστία, *vela magna*, which might be the mainsails, in contradistinction to the forsails; or larger sails, in contradistinction to smaller, used on the same mast; as now is usual with the latteen-sail vessels of the Mediterranean, and our luggers; and our cutters have their great, middle, and storm jibs. The information remaining to us concerning the ancient ships of war is in almost every point very defective.

was not fixed, but raised only when the sail was to be used. Iphicrates set his masts, while his crews were ashore, for advantage to the look-out of his scouts. In serene weather, instead of lying encamped ashore, which was the common practice, he proceeded by night. Coasting and halting thus he made as quick a passage as, with the navigation of the time, was common. His last halt, on the Peloponnesian shore, was in the mouth of the Alpheus, where he passed a night. Thence he crossed to Cephallenia; and, getting there satisfactory information of transactions in Corcyra, he remitted somewhat of that fatiguing preparation for action in which he had hitherto required the exertion of his crews.

Xen. Hel. I. 6.
c. 2. s. 20.

s. 19.

s. 21—23.

His own attention to his country's service however was not remitted. The original object of the expedition no longer pressing, he employed his leisure so that he brought Cephallenia, divided as we have seen once, and probably still, between four republics, under obedience to Athens. Then he proceeded to Corcyra, and there he received intelligence of the approach of ten triremes sent by Dionysius of Syracuse to join the Lacedæmonian fleet. Anxious to intercept these, he went himself to examine the heights, where a look-out might be most advantageously kept; and selecting twenty triremes, he gave strict orders for the crews to be ready at a moment's warning. Not requiring them, on such an occasion, to remain aboard, indicates, perhaps beyond anything that has even yet occurred, the deficient accommodation of the ancient ships of war. This deficiency seems to have put nine ships of the Syracusan squadron into his hands. Eager for relief, after the long run, as with the ancient navigation it was reckoned, from Sicily, the Syracusans landed on the first shore they approached. One ship, commanded by a Rhodian, who, apprehensive of attack, had hastened his people aboard,

escaped. The other nine were taken; the vessels on the beach, the crews ashore.

The numerous prisoners made on this occasion were ransomed, sureties for payment being found among the Corcyræans themselves, who, political enemies, as they now were, did not forget their derivation from one common origin, and their long connection, in religious rites, in commercial intercourse, and in hereditary friendship with the Syracusans. This ray of liberality pleasingly enlivens the gloom which Grecian morals generally cast over Grecian history. But the gleam does not come unmixed; and the cloud to darken the cheerful prospect arises from a quarter whence it should be least expected. Every other prisoner was redeemed at a stipulated price; but for the commander of the squadron, Anippus, so immoderate a sum was demanded, in failure of which he was threatened with sale into slavery²⁹, that, in despair, disappointing the avarice which oppressed him, he killed himself.

Xenophon however, from whom we have the account, thought very highly of Iphicrates, at least as an officer.

Xen. Hel. 1. 6. c. 2. s. 27. "Among the many occasions," he says, "on which Iphicrates commanded, I admired not least his conduct in the expedition to Corcyra; and, among other things, for this, that, on his first appointment, he desired, for colleagues, two men of superior talents, not his political friends³⁰; Callistratus, the most popular speaker,

²⁹ Τοῦτον δ' ἐφύλαττεν (ὁ Ἰφικράτης), ὡς ἢ πραξόμενος πάμπολλα χρήματα, ἢ ὡς πωλήσαν. *Illum enim custodiebat, ut vel ab eo ingentem auri summam exigeret, vel hominem venderet.* The Latin translator, according to the too common method of translators, has very carefully imitated, instead of explaining, all that is dubious in the original. I am inclined to suppose some small error in the copy; yet the context, I think, pretty sufficiently warrants the version I have given.

³⁰ Οὐ μάλ' ἀπιτήδειον ὄντα, is Xenophon's phrase, speaking of Callistratus, which the translator has rendered, I think in complete mistake, *hominem gerendis rebus non admodum idoneum.*

and Chabrias, the most renowned general of the age. If he had reasonable hope of faithful assistance from such men, there can be no doubt but he did wisely. If, on the contrary, he expected from them the malignity of party opponents, it surely marked a magnanimous confidence in himself, that he could be detected in want neither of courage, nor of ability ³¹, nor of diligence."

Under the Athenian government indeed it was difficult to say what conduct would best give security to men in high office, except that flattery to the people and the bribery of public entertainments were always indispensable. The expense of the fleet under Iphicrates was heavy. The force was greater than had been first voted for the service. Whatever might obviate demands upon the treasury would be in his favour. If there is an excuse, or a palliation, for his conduct toward the unfortunate Syracusan, we must find it here. The illiberality of the sovereign people of Athens, the shame of which was lost among the multitude of partakers, would sometimes impose severe duties upon their officers. If then such men as Chabrias and Callistratus could not advise how to carry on the public service without severity to an individual prisoner, their inability would certainly tell toward the justification of Iphicrates. On the other hand, if it could not but be allowed that he had taken every measure to supply the armament, without calling upon the treasury, such testimony would go far to justify the demand when it became unavoidable. For the subsistence of his rowers, in the intermission of naval operation, a resource was used for which he and his advisers will have credit; though it is not the first occasion on which we find mention of it in Grecian history: they were employed in husbandry for the Corcyræans;

Ch. 20. s. 4.
of this Hist.
Xen. Hel. 1. 6.
c. 2. s. 25.

³¹ Καταβροχυσμῶν seems to mark the weakness of the mind including want of courage with want of ability.

who were glad of hired labour, to assist their diminished stocks of slaves in restoring their wasted farms and vineyards.

Meanwhile Iphicrates used his small force of heavy-armed, with his larger body of targeteers, to put forward the great object of his expedition, the extension of the Athenian command. The peacefulness of past times in Acarnania had given way to the political division, so prevalent through the rest of Greece. By assisting the friendly party in those towns where it was pressed by its opponents, and using actual hostilities against one only, Iphicrates confirmed or restored the Athenian interest in that province. Assem-

Xen. Hel. 1. 6.
c. 2. s. 26. bling then his fleet again, and adding to it the naval strength of Corcyra, he sailed with ninety triremes; a force that no fleet in the power of the Lacedæmonian confederacy to raise could resist. His purpose was to direct operations against Peloponnesus itself, not without hope that some cities there, only upon seeing the means he possessed to protect them in revolt, would desert the Lacedæmonian cause; while others, more steady to their engagements, might be forced to submission.

SECTION IX.

Tyranny of Thebes in Success. — Dissatisfaction of Athens. — General Peace negotiated by Athens. — Refusal of Thebes to accede to the Terms of the Treaty.

THE ordinary temper of mankind, it has been of old observed, is more formed to bear adversity with dignity than prosperity with moderation; and it seems not less true, though seldomer said, that power and glory, but especially the sudden change from humiliation and misery to power and glory, too much for most individuals to support with propriety, still more

certainly intoxicates a community. Later writers have celebrated the magnanimous disinterestedness of Pelopidas, and the philosophical self-denial and clear integrity of Epaminondas. Unfortunately, the able contemporary historian, intimately connected with their adversaries, and of course not their friend, has been careless of informing us what part they took in the Theban councils. Nevertheless the independent spirit and daring courage of the Theban people, even in his account, we admire; but liberality, moderation, justice, wherever we search, are as little to be found, in their proceedings, as in those of either the Lacedæmonian aristocracy or the Athenian democracy, when their tyranny has been most complained of by contemporaries, and reprobated by posterity. The supremacy, asserted by the Theban people over all Bœotia, everywhere abhorred by the aristocratical party, carried oppression sometimes to excess even against the democratical, by which it had risen. The whole people of the little states of Plataea and Thespiæ were expelled. Numerous as the distressing circumstances unavoidably attending banishment must be, yet, through the division of Greece into parties, if subsistence did not fail, personal security could generally be found somewhere. But the unhappy Plataeans and Thespians whither could they go? oppressed by that party to which they had always been among the firmest adherents. Lacedæmon, the enemy of their oppressors, was their hereditary enemy. With Athens indeed they had friendly connection; old and inherited connection; but Athens was now allied with Thebes, whence their persecution came. Their best hope nevertheless was in Athens, and thither, as suppliants, they directed their steps.³²

M. T. Cic.
Corn. Nep. v.
Epam. Plut.
vit. Pelopid.

Xen. Hel. 1. 6.
c. 3. s. 1.
Isocr. Archid.
p. 28. t. 2.
Diodor. 1. 15.
c. 46.

³² Diodorus, in this part of the history, has mentioned several circumstances not noticed by Xenophon: but his narrative is so confused, and so continually marks deficient judgment, that little satisfactory can be gathered from him.

It is in the nature of democracy to be both tyrannical and ambitious; but, like single despots, democracies will not always approve the tyranny, and still less the ambition, of other democracies. The overbearing haughtiness of Thebes, in her new prosperity, had already disgusted the Athenians. The invasion of Phocis, the ancient ally of Athens, they much resented. The excessive violence used toward the Thespians and Plataeans, the Plataeans among their oldest and most constant confederates, at one time almost incorporated among the Athenian people, gave still more offence. Both Plataeans and Thespians therefore found at Athens a ready and kind attention. With their situation that of all Greece was taken into serious consideration by the Athenian government. The conduct of the Lacedæmonians had been provoking: the prospect of success against them, while the Athenian fleet, triumphant, commanded the seas, was alluring: but the very successes of that fleet had tended to raise Thebes to the power which now was becoming an object of jealousy at Athens, and the more as Thebes was a nearer neighbour than Lacedæmon.

It is often extremely difficult to ascertain the real springs of political measures in a free government; because of the variety of jarring interests influencing the individuals who compose the political body, and of the dependency of public measures upon the accidental preponderance of this or that private interest. There is much appearance of a wise moderation in the Athenian government on this occasion; and indeed it seems unquestionable that the affairs of Athens were at this time generally directed by able men. Among them Iphicrates certainly was eminent; but Iphicrates did not carry the princely influence of a Pericles. At the head of a triumphant armament he found his situation uneasy and perilous. When opposition from enemies was nearly overborne, that from fellow-citizens became only more alarming.

The conduct of Iphicrates was wise; but his moderation, his ready concession to the wishes of those who desired to check the progress of his glory, is accounted for by circumstances reported by the contemporary historian. A supply of money was becoming indispensable for the maintenance of his fleet; the application for which, at Athens, when the treasury could not furnish it, was always highly hazardous. If it was granted, which could not be depended upon, oppression of the rich, and discontent, more or less, of all ranks, was liable to follow. This gave opportunity for a strong opposition from interested men, who coveted the leading situations in the commonwealth. It was at the same time known that Lacedæmon was negotiating with Persia, by its able and formerly successful minister Antalcidas. A view to some, at least, among these circumstances, probably had induced Iphicrates to desire the orator Callistratus for his colleague in command. Callistratus thus became jointly responsible with him for the success of measures. Were the armament in want, it was incumbent upon Callistratus, not less than upon Iphicrates, to provide for its supply. If new emergencies arose, it was incumbent upon Callistratus to devise means of warding the danger ensuing. The liberality of Iphicrates then seems to have led Callistratus, before his opponent, to become his partisan. Want of money pressing, Callistratus offered himself for negotiator with the Athenian people; pledging himself, if his colleague would be satisfied with the alternative, either to procure a vote for the money wanted, or to put forward negotiation for a peace, which would obviate the want. Iphicrates approved, and Callistratus went to Athens.

The commander-in-chief of the armament being thus induced to concede to the wish for peace, which at home began to prevail extensively, it was decreed, in an assembly

of the people, according to the historian's phrase, "that peace should be made." On first view such a decree must appear the produce of wildness in the people, or of faction misleading their voice. The inferior party in a war certainly cannot choose when peace shall be made. But Athens was at this time fortunately in a situation to hold the balance of Greece; and it was therefore wisely resolved there to open negotiations, for the purpose of producing a peace beneficial to the nation. In the conduct of the business a just attention to the rights of allies was observed. Ministers were first despatched to Thebes, to invite a concurrence in negotiation, and then an embassy was sent to Sparta.

Whatever hope was entertained of success from the pending negotiation with Persia, the Lacedæmonians were too severely pressed not to be desirous of peace upon any moderate terms. At the requisition of Athens therefore ministers from all the belligerent republics were assembled in Lacedæmon. The congress being met, the Athenian ministers first addressed it: "No lasting satisfaction," they said, "no confidence could obtain among the Greeks, if the former terms of alliance with Lacedæmon continued to be required, and if the former measures of its government were still pursued. The pretended object was universal independency; yet it was stipulated that the citizens of the allied states must march whithersoever the Lacedæmonians should lead; and thus often they were compelled to make war upon their best friends. Nor was this, however inconsistent with independency, the worst circumstance of their lot; for the Lacedæmonians, arbitrarily interfering in the internal government of the republics, committed the supreme power to what hands they thought proper; and, giving it here to a council of ten, there to a council of thirty, it was always

Xen. Hel. 1. 6.
c. 3. §. 2.

§. 5.

evidently their care, less that these should govern justly than that they should hold their respective states in the most complete subserviency to Lacedæmon." "So that," said the orator, "you seem to delight in tyrannies rather than in free governments."

The existing circumstances gave weight to this remonstrance, and the universal independency of Grecian cities was admitted by the Lacedæmonians as the basis of the treaty to be negotiated. It followed of course that all those Lacedæmonian superintendents or governors, placed in so many cities with the title of harmost, were to be withdrawn. It was then covenanted that armies should be disbanded and fleets laid up; and that, if any Grecian state acted contrary to these stipulations, it should be lawful for all to assist those on whom any injury fell from the breach of them; but that the universal independency, which formed the fundamental article of the treaty, should not be infringed by any compulsion to join in hostilities.

The ready accession of the Lacedæmonians to terms by which they gave up that supremacy, which they had so long, not only affected, but enjoyed, and which had so extensively been allowed as their prescriptive right, seems to have surprised the Theban ministers; and the general satisfaction, which it was so well adapted to produce, in some degree forced them into a concurrence which they had not intended, and which their instructions did not warrant. For the ruling party in Thebes, aware that not their power only, but perhaps their existence, depended on it, were resolved not to forego that command which they had acquired over the other cities of Bœotia. Borne away, nevertheless, by the torrent of united opinions and wishes, the Theban ministers joined in the sacrifice and in the solemn oath which bound all to the treaty.

That breach however of their instructions which in the

moment perhaps they were scarcely able to avoid, on the very next day they endeavoured to remedy; and a privilege, which the Lacedæmonians, amid their apparent Xen. Hel. 1. 6. c. 3. s. 8. moderation and real concessions, had reserved to themselves, afforded the pretence. The Athenians and their allies, by their respective ministers, had severally sworn to the observance of the treaty; but the Lacedæmonian representatives alone took the oath, expressly for themselves and their allies. No ministers from the allies of Thebes appear to have been present, and the Theban ministers had taken the oath in the name of the Thebans only. They now demanded that, for the Theban name, the Bæotian might be substituted. Agesilaus opposed this: he would allow no such alteration; but if the Thebans desired to be entirely excluded from the treaty, their name might be erased.

In this dispute were involved consequences not to be estimated by human foresight. Xenophon's penetrating and anxious eye discerned them but indistinctly, as yet under many folds. Unfortunately for so interesting a period of the history, his connection with Agesilaus, and the dependency in which circumstances had placed him upon the Lacedæmonian government, made him unavoidably a party-man: not so far that we find any reason to suppose he has related any untruth, but so as often to give cause for wishing that he had more related the whole truth; for the accounts of later writers, panegyrists of the illustrious Thebans who opposed Agesilaus, are utterly unsatisfactory. Xenophon has not named the Theban ambassadors at the congress. Diodorus, Cornelius Nepos, and Plu-

Corn. Nep. vit.
Epam. Diodor.
l. 15. c. 38.
Plut. Agesil.

tarch concur in reporting that Epaminondas was at the head of them, and by his eloquence, in

invective against the Lacedæmonians, shook the attachment of their allies. But it is commonly by private com-

munication, rather than by public harangue, except where negotiation must be managed with a popular assembly, that such points are carried. It appears indeed indicated by Xenophon that the able conductors of the Theban affairs had probable ground for depending on a disposition, in some of the republics, so far at least favourable to Thebes as jealousy still was entertained of Lacedæmon. But in the moment nothing of the kind seems to have appeared openly. The congress declared its approbation of the opinion of Agesilaus; and, when the Theban ministers, whether hampered by their instructions, or decided by their own party-views, were found to persevere in renunciation of the treaty unless the alteration of names were admitted, the Athenians, as Xenophon informs us, considered Thebes as undone; and the Theban ministers, aware of the magnitude of danger to their country, from its opposition to united Greece, departed, he adds, in much apparent dejection.³³

Xen. Hel. 1. 6.
c. 4. s. 15.

c. 3. s. 9.
Diodor. 1. 15.
c. 50.

SECTION X.

Independency of the Bœotian Towns, asserted by the Lacedæmonians, resisted by the Thebans. — Battle of Leuctra.

IN Athens, at this time, the general wish was for peace; and, no leading influence of an ambitious demagogue opposing, the conditions of the treaty concluded

B. C. 371.
Ol. 102. 1-2.

³³ Plutarch, when he has a mind to tell the truth, generally gives his authority; when he paints from his own fancy, which seems to have been very frequent with him, he is honest enough not to pretend that he has any name to vouch for the fidelity of his picture. I do not recollect that he has ever quoted authority for any of his numerous and direct contradictions of Xenophon; nor that he ever, on such an occasion, has mentioned the name of Xenophon, whom, on the contrary, on many occasions, he has commended highly. He has painted this embassy in colours apparently quite his own. His style of historical painting has that facility for the painter that it imposes no necessity for the picture to harmonise with the general course of history; and of this he has abundantly availed himself.

were readily and even scrupulously executed. Athenian garrisons were everywhere withdrawn: orders were despatched for the immediate return of Iphicrates, with that fleet which nothing in the Grecian seas could oppose; and whatever had been taken, after the ceremony of swearing to the treaty, was punctually restored. The Lacedæmonians were not less exact in recalling all those superintending officers who, with the title of harmost, had governed Grecian cities: and they withdrew all their troops from the territories of those called their allies, except the army under Cleombrotus in Phocis, which they left without orders. Cleombrotus, fearful of censure, for acting or not acting, sent home for instructions. The Lacedæmonian assembly was convened; and, in result, orders were sent for the king to prosecute hostilities against Thebes, unless the independency of the Bœotian towns were immediately admitted.

Those who guided the Theban councils had taken their resolution, and they persevered in it. Pelopidas, and still more Epaminondas, who at this time principally directed those councils, were unquestionably superior men; and perhaps it should be imputed to unfortunate necessity, to the circumstances of Thebes, and to the vices in the political system of Greece, if they did not fairly earn the praise of pure political virtue and enlarged patriotism, which

M. T. Cic.
Corn. Nep.
Plut.

their panegyrists, ancient and modern, have been fond of attributing to them. They were engaged with a party. On the support of that party depended the means for themselves and their friends to exist in Thebes. The subjection of the Bœotian towns was necessary, as we have observed, to the power, and perhaps to the existence of that party; at least to its existence in Bœotia; and possibly the extermination of the unfortunate Plataeans and Thespians (a fact uncontradicted, and little palliated by

their panegyrist) may have been necessary to the security of that sovereignty of Thebes over Bœotia on which the welfare and safety, not of themselves only, but of all their party, so much depended. Evidently however, not that Greece should be free, but that Thebes should be powerful, and that they should lead in Thebes, and give law to Greece, were the objects to which all their measures directly tended.

Pressed nevertheless, as they certainly were, by unfortunate necessities, these able men did not engage their country in the unequal contest, in which the peace made by Lacedæmon with the rest of Greece left it implicated, without reasonable ground of hope that, by diligent exertion of their talents, they might so profit from existing circumstances as to make the balance equal, or even bring the preponderancy in their favour. Though all the republics of the nation were now in league with Lacedæmon, Thebes alone excepted, yet neither the late enemies, nor even the ancient allies of that state, they knew, were cordially attached to it. In every city there was a party more or less friendly to the Theban cause, if for no other reason than because it was adverse to the Lacedæmonian. This spirit of party pervaded, to a considerable extent, even the army now upon the point of invading Bœotia. The king moreover, who commanded that army, they knew was little respected in it. That in former campaigns he had shown no vigour was notorious; and, among those under him, most zealous for the prosecution of the measures which he was commissioned to promote, some did not scruple to assert, what the example of former kings of Lacedæmon might render credible, that he treacherously favoured the Thebans.

Xen. Hel. l. 6.
c. 4. s. 5.

Decided then by these complex considerations, the Theban leaders held the force of Bœotia together, and occupied the defile by which it was supposed the Lacedæmonian

Xen. Hel. 1. 6.
c. 4. s. 3. king would propose to enter their country. But, by a conduct apparently able, Cleombrotus rendered their measure vain. Instead of marching eastward, directly for the Bœotian plain, he moved southward; and, by an unfrequented mountain-road, coming unexpectedly upon Creusis, a Bœotian port on the Corinthian gulf, he took the town with twelve triremes lying in the harbour. The passage hence across the mountains being open, he proceeded unopposed into the Thespian territory, and encamped near Leuctra.

Disappointed thus in the hope of balancing their inferiority of force by advantage of ground for defence, the Thebans had to apprehend all the pressure of war upon their country which had been experienced in the invasions under Agesilaus. The fidelity of the Bœotian towns, they knew, was precarious; to prevent the ravage of their fields, any of them would surrender without siege; and the first blockade to be formed would be that of Thebes itself. With the pressure of want then, which must sooner or later follow, a turn in the disposition, even of the Theban people, would be to be apprehended: the opponents of those now ruling might regain an overbearing influence; and most of the present leaders, the contemporary historian says, having tried the evils of banishment, thought it better to die fighting than again become fugitives.

Urged by such motives Epaminondas and Pelopidas resolved upon the bold measure which for ages had been held among the Greeks as a forlorn hope, to engage the Lacedæmonians in the field with inferior numbers. Having taken the resolution then, they were ingenious and indefatigable in devising and practising whatever might promote its success. That powerful engine, superstition, was not neglected. Near the Theban camp stood a monument, where, according to old report, some virgins, violated by

Lacedæmonians, had destroyed themselves. A saying, whether already popular, or invented for the occasion, was circulated in rumour as ancient and oracular, “that a Lacedæmonian army should be defeated at the virgins’ tomb.” To increase the effect for the popular mind, the monument was ornamented with ceremonious solemnity. Intelligence was then carried to the army, that all the temple-doors in Thebes had opened spontaneously, and that the priestesses had declared the omen to portend victory to the Thebans. This was followed by information, that the arms in the temple of Hercules had disappeared; whence it was affirmed to be evident that the god would assist the Thebans in the approaching battle.

While the Theban leaders were thus employing all means to animate their people, the deficient activity, or deficient courage, of the Lacedæmonian king wanted incitement from those under his command. His friends, and those, not all perhaps properly his friends, who were leading men among his party in the army, uneasy at the reports circulating against him, anxiously urged him to refute the calumny by a vigorous conduct, and they advised him immediately to seek and fight the enemy. In no proper season or circumstances then the council of war was held, which finally determined on the battle and its order: it was after the midday meal, when the free circulation of wine had excited that animation which seems to have been otherwise deficient. The ground between the two armies was a plain, and therefore it was resolved to place the cavalry in front of the phalanx. The Lacedæmonian cavalry, never of reputation like the infantry, was at this time particularly ill conditioned. The purchase and maintenance of the horses, imposed as tax upon the wealthy, had been a duty ill executed; for the method even invited negligence. Not till the moment of

Xen. Hel. 1. 6.
c. 4. s. 7.

s. 8.

July 8.
Dodw.

Xen. Hel. 1. 6.
c. 4. s. 11.

exigency, when the men whose turn it was for service were already assembled, the horses were called for. The men least able in body and least desirous of distinguishing themselves were generally selected, or procured themselves to be named, for the cavalry; and horses, arms, accoutrements, and furniture, such as were in the moment produced by those required to provide them, they were to take, and immediately proceed on service.

To these defective troops every circumstance invited the Theban generals immediately to oppose their cavalry; always esteemed superior to most in Greece, and, at this time, not only carefully appointed and highly trained, but of considerable practice in service. Accordingly, they, like the Lacedæmonians, placed their cavalry in front of their phalanx. With the cavalry therefore the action began. The Lacedæmonian horse were quickly routed, and in their flight disturbed the order of their own infantry. The Theban phalanx, formed in column fifty deep, then, according to the preconcerted plan, charged the Lacedæmonian line, formed only twelve deep, in that part where the king had his station. The assault was repelled, but Cleombrotus received a mortal wound. He was carried alive out of the action, but died soon after.

The able generals of the Thebans quickly restored order and animation to their troops; the impulse of the column was renewed, and one of the bloodiest actions ever known in Greece followed. Generally those killed in battle while contest lasted were few: defensive armour prevented rapid slaughter till, an impression being made, and flight ensuing, the shield and the breastplate lost their efficacy. But here equality of skill, force, and perseverance made the contest doubtful while numbers fell. On the Lacedæmonian side, Dinon, one of the polemarchs com-

Xen. Hel. 1. 6.
c. 4. s. 10. 12.

s. 13.

s. 14.

manding next under the king, Sphodrias, whose corruption had brought the enmity of Athens upon his country, and his worthier son Cleonymus, the friend of Archidamus son of Agesilaus, were killed. Then the whole right wing, unable any longer to withstand the pressure of the Theban column, retired: and shortly, as the Theban Xen. Hel. 1. 6. c. 4. s. 12. generals had foreseen, the left, less pressed, retired nevertheless also to avoid attack in flank. Without total loss of order, but not wholly without the carnage incident to flight, both reached their camp, and formed behind its entrenchment.

This, and the advantage of the situation, a rising ground, stopped the pursuing victors: and then, the Lacedæmonians, resting on their arms, and looking on one another with astonishment, would, many of them, scarcely believe the transaction in which they had been partakers; for, within the reach of tradition, and, as it was believed, since the days of Lycurgus, a Lacedæmonian army had never before been defeated by inferior numbers; insomuch that throughout Greece it was generally reckoned next to impossible. Some therefore insisted that still the enemy should not be permitted to raise their trophy; that no truce should be solicited for the burial of the dead; that the bodies should be recovered arms in hand. But of seven s. 15. hundred Spartans scarcely three hundred remaining alive; of those Lacedæmonians who had not the honour of the Spartan name, near a thousand having been killed³⁴;

³⁴ It is not, I will own, to me very clear, from the text of Xenophon, whether the four hundred Spartans killed were or were not intended to be included in the expression τῶν συμπάντων Λακεδαιμονίων, and I have not been fortunate enough to find any assistance from translators or commentators. The phrase altogether would lead to suppose they were intended to be included, were not that construction rendered improbable by the most authentic accounts, of the proportion of Spartans to the other Lacedæmonians on all other occasions in the Lacedæmonian armies. In the Agesilaus (c. 3. s. 24.) Xenophon seems to assert that the number of Spartans killed at Leuctra was equal to that of the survivors, not those of the army only, but all the survivors.

the allies, who had suffered less, being nevertheless utterly averse to fresh action, and some of them so disaffected as even to rejoice in the disaster; the surviving polemarchs, having ascertained so much, justly thought the most careful circumspection requisite, and rashness in enterprise to be utterly avoided. They called therefore a council of war; and upon a deliberate review of circumstances the necessity of soliciting a truce for the burial of the slain was admitted by all. The herald therefore was sent, and the truce was obtained.

Then the Thebans erected their trophy; a trophy esteemed, under all its circumstances, the most glorious, and likely to be, in its consequences, among the most important, ever won in a battle of Greeks with Greeks. The Lacedæmonian commanders seem to have had no view to anything better than to defend themselves in their actual station till succour might arrive from home. But the Theban generals, circumspect as enterprising, would not venture assault upon their numbers and discipline in a situation giving such advantage against the weapons of antiquity. They looked around for opportunities, opened by an event so out of the expectation of all Greece as that of the late battle: they hoped for extensive success in negotiation through the credit so commonly following unlooked-for success in arms: they reckoned that they might prevent the approach of relief from Peloponnesus; and that, by merely intercepting supplies, they might compel the Lacedæmonian army to unconditional surrender.

According to Diodorus the Bœotians were only six thousand, and he says they were joined by fifteen hundred foot and five hundred horse from Thessaly. It seems not very consistent with the far more authoritative account of Xenophon that any such Thessalian force should have been at Leuctra; but the Bœotian may probably have been greater than Diodorus has stated.

CHAPTER XXVII.

AFFAIRS OF GREECE FROM THE ELEVATION OF THEBES BY THE BATTLE OF LEUCTRA TO THE FAILURE OF THE ATTEMPT TO EXTEND THE THEBAN SUPREMACY OVER GREECE THROUGH SUPPORT FROM PERSIA.

SECTION I.

Reception of News of the Battle of Leuctra at Lacedæmon ; at Athens. — Jason of Pheræ in Thessaly. — Polydamas of Pharsalus. — Jason elected Tagus of Thessaly. — Power and great Views of Jason. — Mediation of Jason between the Lacedæmonians and Thebans. — Magnificent Preparation of Jason for the Pythian Festival. — Death and Successors of Jason. — Fall of the Thessalian Power.

INTELLIGENCE of the fatal blow at Leuctra, carried to Lacedæmon, was borne with much real magnanimity, and with all that affectation of unconcern which the institutions of Lycurgus commanded. It happened to be the last day of the festival called the Naked Games ; and the chorus of men was on the stage, before the assembled people, when the officer charged with the despatches arrived. The ephors were present, as their official duty required, and to them the despatches were delivered. Without interrupting the entertainment they communicated the names of the slain to their relations, with an added admonition, that the women should avoid that clamorous lamentation, which was usual, and bear the calamity in silence. On the morrow all the relations of the slain appeared as usual in public, with a

Xen. Hel. 1. 6.
C. 4. s. 16.
B. C. 371.
Ol. 102. 1-2.
10 July.
Dodw.,

deportment of festivity and triumph, while the few kinsmen of the survivors, who showed themselves abroad, carefully marked in their appearance humiliation and dejection.

It was a large proportion of the best strength of the commonwealth that, after so great a loss in the battle, remained in a danger not in the moment to be calculated. Every

Xen. Hel. 1. 6.
c. 4. s. 17. exertion therefore was to be made to save it. Of

six moras, into which for military purposes the Lacedæmonian people were divided, the men of four, within thirty years after boyhood, (such was the term, meaning perhaps the age of about fourteen,¹) had marched under Cleombrotus; those however being excepted who bore at the time any public office. The ephors now ordered the remaining two moras to march, together with those of the absent moras, to the fortieth year from boyhood, and no

s. 18. longer allowing exception for those in office.

The command, Agesilaus being not yet sufficiently recovered to take it, was committed to his son Archidamus. Requisitions were at the same time hastened off for the assistance of the allies; and the Lacedæmonian interest, or the interest adverse to the pretensions and apprehended purposes of Thebes, prevailed so in Tegea, Mantinea, Phlius, Corinth, Sicyon, and throughout the Achæan towns, that from all those places the contingent of troops was forwarded with alacrity.

Meanwhile the leading Thebans, meaning to pay a compliment that might promote their interest in Athens, had hastened thither information of their splendid success. But the impression made by this communication was not favourable to their views: on the contrary, it showed that the jealousy, formerly entertained so generally among the

¹ This expression has been already noticed in Note 19. Ch. 25. Sect. 4. of this History.

Athenians toward Lacedæmon, was already transferred to Thebes. Thus the incessant quarrels among the Grecian republics, source indeed of lasting glory to some, brought however, with their decision, neither lasting power nor lasting quiet to any; but, proving ever fertile in new discord, had a constant tendency to weaken the body of the nation. The Grecian statesmen, quick, penetrating, and every way able, but circumscribed in means, and led by circumstances to take a deep interest in petty politics, and give their minds eagerly to narrow views, appear not to have had leisure to look abroad, so as to advert to the ready possibility of some potentate arising, capable of crushing all their divided republics together. The contemporary historian indeed, speculating in the quiet of his banishment, not with view confined by little and local interests, nor with the crude ideas of a closet-politician, but with the extended ken of one who, in the poet's phrase, "had seen the cities and observed the manners and the policy of many men,"^{Hom. Odys. init.} was aware not only that this might be, but that the formidable phenomenon already existed.

Relief to Lacedæmon in its pressing danger came, not from its own exertion, not from the interest which all the Grecian republics had in preventing Thebes from acquiring that overbearing dominion with which Lacedæmon had oppressed them, but from a power newly risen, or revived, in a corner of the country whence, for centuries, Greece had not been accustomed to apprehend any thing formidable. JASON of Pheræ in Thessaly was one of those extraordinary men in whom superior powers of mind and body sometimes meet. He was formed to be a hero had he lived with Achilles; and, as a politician, he could have contended with Themistocles or Pericles. He had the advantage of being born to eminence in his own city, one of the principal of Thessaly; and he ap-^{Xen. Hel. 1. 6. c. 1. s. 4.}
^{Ibid. Diodor. 1. 15.}

appears to have acquired there a powerful popularity. Little informed of the early part of his life, we find him mentioned as general of the Pheræans about six years before the battle of Leuctra, and commanding a force sent to assist Neagenes, chief of Histiaea in Eubœa. In the contests of faction in Thessaly it was become common to employ mercenary troops. Jason excelled in diligence in training such troops, in courage and skill in commanding them, and in the arts by which he attached them to his interest.

Diodor. l. 15.
c. 30.

Xen. Anab.
l. 1. c. 6.

Of the state of Thessaly at this time altogether we may form some judgment from what the contemporary historian has related of Pharsalus, one of its most considerable cities. The leaders of the factions by which Pharsalus was torn, weary at length of ruinous contest, came to an extraordinary agreement. Fortunately they had a fellow-citizen, Polydamas, eminent throughout Thessaly for high birth, large possessions, and that splendid hospitality for which the Thessalians were distinguished, but yet more singularly eminent for integrity. To this man the Pharsalians committed the command of their citadel and the exclusive management of their public revenue, giving him altogether a princely authority. In so extraordinary and invidious an office Polydamas had the talents and the good fortune to succeed in every thing, except in opposing the ambition of the too politic and powerful Jason. Tyrant, according to one party, chief of the patriots, as the other would call him, in his own city Pheræ, Jason had proceeded to bring most of the Thessalian cities, some by policy, some by arms, under that kind of subjection, which so commonly in Greece was entitled confederacy. The strength of Pharsalus, directed by the abilities of Polydamas, was exerted to protect them. But Pharsalus itself was threatened, when Jason sent a proposal for a conference with the chief, which

Xen. Hel. l. 6.
c. 1. s. 2.

was accepted. In this conference the Pheræan avowed his "intention to reduce Pharsalus, and the towns dependent upon Pharsalus, to dependency upon himself;" but declared that "it was his wish to effect this rather by negotiation than by violence, and with benefit to Polydamas, rather than to his injury. It was in the power of Polydamas," he said, "to persuade the Pharsalians; but, that it was not in his power to defend them, the result of all his recent efforts sufficiently showed. For himself, he was resolved to hold the first situation in Greece; the second he offered to Polydamas. What their advantages would be, if a political union took place, Polydamas as well as himself could estimate. The cavalry of all Thessaly, which would be united under them, was not less than six thousand strong: the heavy-armed infantry exceeded ten thousand; the numerous inhabitants of the surrounding mountains, subjects of the Thessalian cities, were excellent targeteers. In addition to this force then he had six thousand mercenaries in his pay; a body such as, for choice of men, and perfection of discipline, no commonwealth of Greece possessed. Some estimate might be formed of his means from his success in bringing under his dominion or patronage the Thessalian cities of which Pharsalus had been previously the patronising power: his military force had been made conspicuous in the reduction of the Maracs, the Dolopians, and the powerful chief of Epirus, Alectas, who all owned subjection to him. The Bœotians, with all the states of their confederacy, were his allies, and ready to admit him for their leader in the war against Lacedæmon, from whose overbearing power they apprehended oppression; and the Athenians, it was well known, were desirous of his alliance. But connection with Athens did not suit his views; for the Athenians affected to be the first maritime power of Greece, and he meant to make Thessaly the first maritime power of Greece; which

he thought even easier than to acquire imperial pre-eminence on land, which was nevertheless his purpose. The three necessaries to naval power were timber, hands, and revenue. With the former Athens was supplied from Macedonia, which lay much more conveniently for the supply of Thessaly. With the second their Penestian subjects were a resource to which Athens had nothing equal." (The Penestians were a conquered people, reduced to a kind of vassalage under the Thessalians, for whom they performed menial and laborious offices, but were not held in a slavery so severe and degrading as the Helots of Laconia, for we find them admitted to that military service, the cavalry, which was generally reckoned, among the Greeks, to assort only with rank above the lowest citizens.) "For revenue then, not only their country was incomparably richer, but, instead of deriving a foreign revenue from a few little scattered islands, whenever Thessaly was united under one chief all the surrounding tribes of their continent had paid them tribute."

Demosth.
περὶ σφύραξ.
p. 173. ed.
Reiske.

It had been a practice of the Thessalian republics, always acknowledging some common bonds of union, to appoint, for extraordinary occasions, a common military commander, a captain-general of the Thessalian nation, with the title of *Tagus*.² To this high rank and great command Jason aspired, and the approbation of the Pharsalian government, it appears, was necessary. But he was far from so confining his views. Even the command of all Greece did not suffice for his ambition. "That all Greece might be reduced under their dominion," he observed to Polydamas, "ap-

² The Thessalian title *Tagus* seems to have been the same word with the Teutonic *Toga*, a *Leader*; and perhaps the Latin *Dux* has been only another variety of it; whence the verb *duco*, as, in the Greek, *ταγέω* from *ταγός*. *Heretoga*, literally *Army-leader*, was the Anglosaxon word for a *General*, and, in the coarser language of modern Germany, our title of *Duke* is expressed by the word *Hertog*.

peared probable from what he had already stated : but he conceived the conquest of the Persian empire to be a still easier achievement ; the practical proof afforded by the return of the Cyrean Greeks, and by the great progress made with a very small force by Agesilaus, leaving this no longer a matter of mere speculation.”

Polydamas, in reply, admitted the justness of Jason’s reasoning ; but alleged his own connection with Lacedæmon, which he would at no rate betray, as an objection that appeared to him insuperable. Jason, commending his fidelity to his engagements, freely consented that he should go to Lacedæmon and state his circumstances ; and if he could not obtain succour which might give him reasonable hope of successful resistance, then he would stand clearly excused, both to his allies and to his fellow-citizens, in accepting the proposal offered him. The communication of this extraordinary transaction by Polydamas to the Lacedæmonian government afforded the contemporary historian the means of becoming acquainted with it. The Lacedæmonians, pressed at that time by a land Xen. Hel. l. 6. c. 1. s. 5. war against which they could hardly protect their allies, while the hostile fleet of Athens commanded the seas, having debated three days on the difficult proposition, liberally acknowledged their inability to give certain protection to Polydamas and the Pharsalians against Jason, and therefore left it to them to consult their own interest.

Polydamas, returning then into Thessaly, requested and obtained from Jason, that he should s. 6. hold under his own peculiar command the citadel of Pharsalus, which had been, in a manner so honourable to him, intrusted to his charge. For security of his fidelity to his new engagements, he surrendered his children as hostages. The Pharsalians, persuaded to acquiesce, were admitted to

terms of peace and friendship by Jason, who was then elected without opposition tagus of Thessaly.

The first object of Jason, in his high office, was to inquire concerning the force which the whole country, now acknowledging him its constitutional military commander, could furnish; and it was found to amount to more than eight thousand horse, full twenty thousand heavy-armed foot, and targeteers enough, in the contemporary historian's phrase, for war with all the world. His next care was the revenue, which might enable him to give energy to this force. Jason was ambitious, but not avaricious, and he desired to have willing subjects. He required therefore from the dependent states around Thessaly only that tribute which had been formerly assessed, under the tagus Scopas.

At the time of the battle of Leuctra Jason was already this formidable potentate, and he was then in alliance with Thebes. When therefore the Thebans sent to the Athenian people an account of that splendid action, they did not fail to communicate the intelligence

Xen. Hel. 1. 6.
c. 1. s. 7.

also to the tagus of Thessaly; and they added a request for his co-operation toward the complete overthrow of the tyranny so long exercised by the Lacedæmonians over the Greek nation. The circumstances were altogether such as Jason was not likely to look upon with indifference. Having ordered a fleet to be equipped, he put himself at the head of his mercenaries, his standing army, and taking the cavalry in the moment about him, he began his march. A war then existed between the Thesalians and Phocians, of that extreme enmity, sometimes regularly declared among the Greeks, in which all communication even by heralds was interdicted; and of course no quarter was regularly allowed, nor could any step toward an accommodation easily be taken. Nevertheless with his

s. 21.

Ibid. & Diodor.
1. 15. c. 60.

escort hastily assembled he ventured to traverse their country; and entering some of the towns before even intelligence of his approach had reached them, and getting far forward before anywhere numbers could be collected capable of opposing him, he reached Bœotia without loss; showing, as the contemporary historian observes, how much despatch may often do more than force.

Jason, the ally of Thebes, was connected, not indeed by political alliance, but by public and hereditary hospitality, with Lacedæmon. Pleased with the humiliation of his hosts, he was not desirous that his allies should become too powerful. On reaching the Theban camp therefore, demurring to the proposal of the Theban generals for an immediate attack upon the Lacedæmonians, he became the counsellor of peace; and, acting as mediator, he quickly succeeded so far as to procure a truce. The Lacedæmonians hastened to use the opportunity for reaching a place of safety. They decamped in the evening; and trusting more, says Xenophon, to concealment and speed than to Theban faith for their secure march across the plain, they reached Cithæron before dawn; and still not free from alarm, in pressing their rugged way across the mountains, they did not halt till they came to Ægosthena in the Megaric territory. There they were joined by Archidamus with the troops sent from Lacedæmon for their relief. By their safe arrival however in a friendly territory the great object of the expedition under Archidamus being accomplished, he returned to Corinth, dismissed the allies, and led the Lacedæmonians home.³

³ This simple narrative of Xenophon, certainly not flattering to his friends, would earn credit without the authority of his name. The account, given by Diodorus, of the junction of the force under Archidamus with the retreating army, and of their separation afterward for shame, is among the stories to be found in his work beneath serious criticism.

Xen. Hel. 1. 6.
c. 4. s. 27.

Jason, after having thus acted as arbiter of Greece, hastened his return to Thessaly. In his way through the hostile province of Phocis, with leisure to exercise his vengeance, for which he had not before wanted strength, he confined it to the little town of Hyampolis, whose suburbs and territory he wasted, killing many of the people. The Lacedæmonian colony of Heraclea was then to be passed. He had served Lacedæmon at Leuctra because he thought it for his interest; and he would, without scruple or fear, injure Lacedæmon, in its colony of Heraclea, because the prosperity of that colony would obstruct his views. Heraclea was most critically situated for commanding the only easily practicable communication between the countries northward and southward. He therefore demolished the fortifications; evidently not fearing, says Xenophon, that by laying the passage open he should endanger his own country, but providing that none, by holding the command of the pass, should prevent him from marching into the southern provinces whenever he might desire it.

s. 28.

Decidedly now the greatest potentate of Greece, powerful, not by his own strength alone, but by his numerous alliances, while on all sides his alliance was courted, Jason proposed to display his magnificence at the approaching Pythian games. He had commanded

s. 29.

all the republics which owned the authority of the tagus of Thessaly to feed oxen, sheep, goats, and swine for the sacrifices; and he proposed the reward of a golden crown for the state which should produce the finest ox to lead the herd for the god. By a very easy impost on them severally he collected more than a thousand oxen, and ten thousand smaller

s. 30.

cattle. He appointed a day, a little before the festival, for assembling the military force of Thessaly; and the expectation in Greece was that he would assume to

himself the presidency. Apprehension arose that he might seize the treasure of Delphi; insomuch that the Delphians consulted their oracle for directions from the god on the occasion. The answer, according to report, was similar to what had been given to their forefathers, when Xerxes invaded Greece, “that the care of the treasure would be the god’s own concern.”

Ch. 8. s. 4. of
this Hist.

Before the period for the splendid display arrived, this extraordinary man, after a review of the Pheræan cavalry, sitting to give audience to any who might have occasion to speak to him, was assassinated by seven youths, who approached with the pretence of stating a matter in dispute among them. The attending guards, or friends of the tagus, killed one of them on the spot, and another as he was mounting his horse; but the rest so profited from the confusion of the moment, and the opportunities which circumstances throughout Greece commonly afforded, that they effected their escape. What was the provocation to this murder, or the advantage proposed from it, we are not informed. No symptom appears of any political view: no attempt at a revolution is noticed by the historian; but what he mentions to have followed marks the popularity of Jason among the Thessalians, and also the deficient ideas, equally of morality and true policy, generally prevailing through Greece. The brothers of the deceased, Polydorus and Polyphron, were appointed jointly to succeed to the dignity of tagus: the assassins could find no refuge in Thessaly; but in various cities of other parts of Greece they were received with honour: proof, says the contemporary historian, how vehemently it was apprehended that Jason would succeed in his purpose of making himself sovereign of the country. Such was the unfortunate state of Greece: in the weakness of its little republics men were compelled to approve means the most nefarious,

Xen. Hel. 1. 6.
c. 4. s. 31, 32.
Diodor. 1. 15.
c. 60.
B. C. 370.
Ol. 102. 2-3.
May.

where other prospect failed, by which their fears were relieved, and present safety procured. Thus assassination became so generally creditable, or at least so little uncreditable, that hope of safety, through speed in flight, was always afforded to the perpetrators.

SECTION II.

Partiality, among the Peloponnesians, for the Lacedæmonian Supremacy. — Congress at Athens. — Cessation of Jealousy of Persia. — Opposition of Elis to the Proposal for the universal Independency of Grecian Cities. — Irritating Conduct of the democratical Party in Mantinea toward Lacedæmon. — Agesilaus, King of Lacedæmon, Ambassador to the Mantinean People. — Evils resulting from the separate Independency of Cities. — Liberal Project of the Tegeans for a Union of the Arcadian Cities illiberally executed. — Violent Interference of the Mantineans. — Arbitrary Assumption of Authority by the Lacedæmonians. — Union of Arcadia accomplished, and Megalopolis founded.

THE event of the battle of Leuctra made a great impression throughout Greece. In many republics joy prevailed at the glorious success of a rising, lately an oppressed, people, against those who had long been looked upon, by one party, at least, through the nation, as common oppressors; and many individuals, and some states, before cautious of avowing friendliness to the Theban cause, were now ready to join in war against Lacedæmon. But others, of more circumspection and better foresight, were aware that, under the political circumstances of Greece, in raising a new state to pre-eminence they were only raising new oppressors. In Peloponnesus a more general jealousy arose of the acquisition of imperial sway by a state beyond the peninsula; and wherever the aristocratical interest prevailed an apprehension of democratical tyranny struck with horror. Under

Lacedæmonian supremacy the Peloponnesian states collectively had held a superiority among those of the Grecian name. This must be lost if Thebes became the leading power of Greece. Communication therefore being held among the Peloponnesian cities, it was resolved, that the supremacy of Lacedæmon should be supported, and that, as formerly, the troops of all the confederated republics should be bound to attend the call of the Lacedæmonian government, and march wherever the Lacedæmonians should lead.

In the contest of Thebes with Lacedæmon, the leaders of the Athenian councils, generally able and moderate men, seem always to have had in view to hold the balance between them, and to avoid a decided connection with either. When, after the battle of Leuctra, the Thebans urged the utter overthrow of Lacedæmon, with the pretence that the common welfare of Greece required it, the Athenians, justly jealous of the growing power of Thebes, refused to concur: but when advantage was taken of the pause of hostility which the mediation of Jason procured to renew, among the Peloponnesian states, that union of military force under Lacedæmonian authority which would restore to Lacedæmon its former means of oppression, a jealousy no less just arose of the revival of Lacedæmonian empire. The Athenian government then resolved upon a measure becoming the dignity of their city; and, as those judging with the ordinary measure of human foresight might not unreasonably suppose, most likely to promote the quiet and welfare of Greece: they invited a congress of deputies from all the states which had been parties to the peace of Antalcidas to assemble in Athens.

We can however scarcely, without some wonder, observe the easy manner in which the able historian of these times repeatedly mentions the peace of Antalcidas, by the de-

scription of "the peace which the KING prescribed," or "the terms which the KING commanded."⁴ Not only he so speaks of it in his own person, but the same description is attributed by him to speakers, before the congress of the Grecian states; and it occurs even in a decree of the Athenian people which he has reported. In vain then shall we look for explanation of this phenomenon from later ancient authors. Of whatever concerns the politics of the republican times, the writers under the Roman empire, Greek as well as Latin, have perverted much, and elucidated very little. A collation however of the extant works of contemporaries, orators, philosophers, and sometimes the comic poet, with the historian, will often furnish light, and always the surest, wherever any may be wanting, for the generally very perspicuous narrative which Xenophon, writing for those familiar with the circumstances of the times, has in some few parts left obscure for late posterity.

It is evident that all dread of the Persian power, any farther than as Persian wealth might enable one party, in a divided nation, to overbear another, had long ceased among the Greeks; and that, since the return of the Cyreans, but still more, since the expedition of Agesilaus, the hope of conquering Persia had superseded the fear of conquest from that decaying empire.⁵ But the want of a mediator in the endless differences of their numerous little republics was constantly and pressingly felt; and when the king of Persia, who, from his superiority in wealth and extent of dominion, was commonly called the great king, or often simply the king, ceased to repel as an object of terror, none would be

c. 1. s. 4. Isocr.
ad Phil. or.
t. 1. p. 386. &
Panath. t. 2.
p. 496. Polyb.
l. 3. p. 162.

⁴ Βασιλεὺς προσέτασσε. Xen. Hel. 1. 6. c. 3. s. 5. Βασιλεὺς ἔγραψε. s. 6. Βασιλεὺς κατέπεμψε. c. 5. s. 1 & 2.

⁵ Μὴ Ἀνταλκίδας ἔλθῃ ἔχων χεῖρματα παρὰ βασιλέως — (Xen. Hel. 1. 6. c. 3. s. 6.) was the fear of the opponents of Lacedæmon.

so likely to attract as an object of respect. It is remarkable that the peace of Antalcidas, so reprobated by declaimers of aftertimes as the reproach of Greece, the first great symptom of her degeneracy, was received by a large majority of the republics as a kind of charter of Grecian freedom, and as such is mentioned by Xenophon; a charter to secure them against oppression, not from the Persian king, but from their fellow-countrymen.⁶ The congress desired by the Athenians met: no officer of the great king's attended: no symptom of Persian influence appeared: but the Athenians proposed, and the congress approved, an oath to be taken by the several deputies, in the name of their respective republics, which remains reported by Xenophon thus: "I will abide by the terms of the peace which the king sent, and by the decrees of the Athenians and their allies; and if any state, partaking in this oath, shall be attacked, I will assist it with all my strength." This congress seems to have been composed of deputies from nearly every state of Greece; and, among them, the Elean alone, insisting that Elis should retain its sovereignty over the people of Marganeæ, Scillus, and Triphylia, objected to the Athenian proposal: the rest, even the Lacedæmonians, acceded to it, with expression of much satisfaction.

It is obvious that, under that supremacy of Lacedæmon, which a strong party through the Peloponnesian cities was desirous of supporting, Greece could not be truly free. Yet events immediately following the formal abolition of that supremacy, by the treaty of Athens, sufficiently account for the politics of that party, as they evince that, when delivered from the sovereignty of one state over the rest,

⁶ In this view of the business we find Isocrates recommending adherence to the *συνθήκας γενομένας μὴν πρὸς βασιλεία καὶ Λακεδαιμονίους*, de Pace, p. 178. t. 2. ed. Auger.

Greece was still incapable of supporting freedom. The detail, as it is reported by the same able writer from whom we have the account of the expedition of Cyrus, if it should not, like the detail of that expedition, interest the imagination, will however offer political lessons of superior value; and the circumstances will require the more attention as they were the immediate causes of that political decrepitude, in which the Grecian republics ceased to have importance in the affairs of nations, long before they fell all an easy prey to a foreign power.

We have seen that, very soon after the conclusion of the treaty called the peace of Antalcidas, or the king's peace, the Lacedæmonians, whose measure that treaty really was, compelled the Mantineans, by a violence very contrary to its tenor, to abandon their town and separate themselves in villages. To those of higher rank, in general, this was not wholly disagreeable; because, whatever inconveniences it might bring, and whatever obstruction to a soaring ambition, it secured them against an odious subjection to the capricious despotism of the assembled multitude, and made that political power, which the Lacedæmonians allowed them, safe in their hands. But the treaty of Athens declaring for every Grecian state its right of separate independency, and warranting that right, the leaders of the democratical party among the Mantineans thought the moment favourable for attempting to regain their former superiority. With this view they proposed the re-establishment of the capital of their little state, and the restoration of their common assembly; and they encouraged

Xen. Hel. 1. 6.
c. 5. s. 3.

their adherents by observing, that the late treaty would secure them against the imperious interference of Lacedæmon, which was a party to that treaty. The proposal became extensively popular; and in general assembly it was decreed, that the families from the old capital

should re-assemble there, and that the place should be immediately fortified.

This gave great uneasiness in Lacedæmon. Xen. Hel. 1. 6. c. 5. s. 4. The party adverse to the Lacedæmonian interest would command in Mantinea; the friends of Lacedæmon would be oppressed; and the measure would appear, in the eyes of all Greece, to be taken in contempt of Lacedæmon: but by the treaty just concluded any forcible interference was too directly forbidden to be attempted without offence to all Greece. It happened that Agesilaus had extensive personal interest, and family interest, in Mantinea.⁷ Under the existing difficulties therefore it appeared the best resource that the king himself should go to Mantinea, and manage negotiation with its people.

For a prince who, at the head of armies, had been the avenger of his country against the Persian empire, had not only secured European Greece, but had extended protection to all the Greeks of Asia, and spread terror among the enemies of the Grecian name even to the great king upon his distant throne, it must have been a humiliating office to go, as minister from the government of his country, to solicit the people of a little neighbouring state accustomed to receive his commands. Probably, in the existing situation of his country and of Greece, he saw the importance of the object too strongly to desire to avoid the mission; but the expression of the historian, his friend and panegyrist, implies that he was liable to be commanded on it: the Lacedæmonians, says Xenophon, sent Agesilaus as their ambassador to the Mantineans.

The republicans of Greece, like some in modern times, we find were liable to be strangely deceived by the names of liberty and sovereignty. The leaders of that party,

⁷ He was *πατρικὸς φίλος* there, a friend by inheritance.

calling itself democratical, which now ruled Mantinea, fearing the popularity of Agesilaus, would not allow the people, nominally their sovereign, to receive him in general assembly and hear his proposals. They compelled him to confine his communication to themselves. Any very satisfactory result he could little expect; but, in the hope of saving appearances for Lacedæmon, without having recourse to arms, he promised that, if the Mantineans would only stop the immediate prosecution of their fortifications, he would engage for the consent of the Lacedæmonian government to all they desired. Though they must have seen urgent danger to the commonwealth in the refusal, yet the Mantinean leaders, encouraged by support from some neighbouring states, and perhaps foreseeing injury to the cause of their party from any concession, gave for their final answer, “that the decree passed by the Mantinean people could not be rescinded.” Already from some of the Arcadian states workmen were arrived to assist them, and the Eleans had sent three talents in silver toward defraying the expense. Completely therefore disappointed of the object of his humiliating mission, Agesilaus left Mantinea: highly irritated, as the historian his friend confesses; but nevertheless holding his opinion that to resort to arms would be to violate the treaty so lately concluded, warranting independency to every Grecian state, and must therefore be avoided.

The evils of a general war thus yet but hovered over Greece; though, after what had passed, they were little likely to remain long suspended. But in a country so constituted, the suspension of general war did not bring general tranquillity. On the contrary, the prohibition of external interference by the late treaty, to which the Lacedæmonian king and government so scrupulously deferred, was as the word for sedition to begin action

Xen. Hel. 1. 6.
c. 5. s. 5.

Xen. Hel. 1. 6.
c. 5. s. 28.

within each little republic. It was under the sanction of a general peace, warranting universal independency, that confiscations, expulsions, the ruin of families, and the horrors of assassination and massacre most abounded. In Argos, Megara, Corinth, Sicyon, Phlius, Phigalia, Tegea, the circumstances were remarkable enough to demand the ancient historian's notice. In Tegea principally they became implicated with the thread of Grecian history, which it will be advantageous here to pursue.

The success of the democratical chiefs of Mantinea, in recovering preponderance to their party and the principal power to themselves, by a measure which had the credit of restoring vigour and importance to their little country, excited the attention of those of Tegea.⁸ But Tegea, under an aristocratical administration, having a single and united government, no proposal of innovation, confined to the narrow bounds of the Tegean dominion, seemed likely to answer their purpose. They put forward therefore the bold project of uniting all Arcadia: "Thus alone," they said, "the peace of Arcadia could be established, and thus alone Arcadia could have its just weight and respect among the Grecian powers."

This proposal, in itself teeming with public and private benefits, could be objectionable only from the manner of carrying it into execution. But it was the measure of a party; whose object would be very incompletely attained, if it did not raise the interest of that party upon the ruin of those actually holding the power in Tegea. By these therefore it was opposed; and Stasippus, a man of superior character, at the head of them, exerted himself so effectually that the sovereign assembly rejected the innovation, and

⁸ The party is not here specified by Xenophon, but circumstances clearly show it to have been the democratical; and this is afterward directly indicated:—*νομίσαντες*, says the historian, speaking of that party, *εἰ συνέλθοι ὁ δῆμος, πολὺ ἂν τῷ πλήθει κρατῆσαι*. Xen. Hel. 1. 6. c. 5. s. 7.

determined that the ancient constitution of Arcadia should be preserved unaltered.

In the usual violence of Grecian faction the progress was generally ready from civil controversy to civil war: for the former so commonly involved banishment, and even death, that the step beyond was often thought scarcely a step toward greater danger. Proxenus therefore and Xen. Hel. l. 6. c. 5. s. 7. Callibius, leaders of the democratical party, did not scruple to resolve upon contest in arms rather than yield their purpose. Their hope was in force of numbers; the people, they thought, would be with them; and they had moreover confidence that the democratical party, now ruling Mantinea, would not be scrupulous, like Agesilaus and the Lacedæmonian administration, but would support, against any treaty, a measure in a neighbouring state in which their own party-interest was implicated. In the former hope they were deceived, for, through discovery of their purpose, being driven to take arms prematurely, the adherents which the liberal administration of Stasippus had conciliated were found to equal them in numbers; and, in a conflict which followed within the town they had the advantage, and Proxenus was killed. Stasippus, according to the honourable testimony of the contemporary historian, averse to the slaughter of fellow-citizens, checked pursuit. What followed unfortunately proved the imprudence of this liberality and humanity; and would of course prompt, on another such occasion, conduct that would be grossly illiberal and inhuman where better manners are established, and yet, among the Greeks, was so often necessary to self-preservation that it might hardly deserve to be called inhuman or even illiberal. The defeated fled to the gate leading toward Mantinea; and there, finding themselves not pursued as they had expected, they halted, and entered into conference with the victors. Their chiefs, as soon as they had found their measures for taking arms

discovered, had sent to Mantinea, only twelve miles off, for assistance, and they now sent again to hasten that assistance. Managing them to prolong the conference till the Mantinean forces arrived, they opened the gate to receive them. Stasippus perceived the treachery in time Xen. Hel. 1. 6. c. 5. s. 9. only to withdraw to the opposite gate; so closely pursued that he stopped at a temple of Diana, from whose sacredness he hoped for personal security. His enemies however, disposed to respect neither real nor imaginary duties, mounted the walls, unroofed the building, and assailed those within with missile weapons. Unable to defend themselves, Stasippus and those with him surrendered at discretion. They were immediately bound, put into waggons, and so carried to Tegea: and, being quickly brought before a tribunal created for the occasion, in which Mantineans of the opposite party were allowed to sit, they were condemned, and presently executed. About eight hundred s. 10. Tegeans then, thinking themselves unsafe in their own city, fled to Lacedæmon. Such, within a few months after the establishment of a general peace upon the ground of universal independency, was the inauspicious beginning of a new war, which quickly involved all Greece.

The Mantineans had now clearly put themselves in the wrong: they had broken the treaty of Athens by their interference in the affairs of the Tegeans; and it was not reasonably to be expected of the Lacedæmonians, it would have been neither becoming nor right, to leave the atrocious crime, by which their friends in Tegea had suffered, unnoticed, and the survivors of those friends, who had taken refuge in Lacedæmon, unassisted. But the precise line of conduct proper and prudent for Lacedæmon, under the existing circumstances, to hold, was perhaps not easy to determine; and that which the Lacedæmonian government took seems to have been neither right nor prudent. Unable yet to

resolve upon parting with that imperial authority which they had so long exercised among the Grecian states, they did not make it so much their object to protect and reinstate the oppressed Tegeans as to use the pretence for revenging themselves on the Mantineans. Apparently a congress of all Greece ought to have been called, such as that lately held in Athens; but they chose rather to take the law into their own hands. Without consulting, as far as appears, any other state, they decreed an expedition, assembled the force of Laconia, and appointed Agesilaus to command.

Meanwhile the democratical Tegean leaders, profiting diligently and ably from their success so nefariously obtained, and warmly supported by Mantinea, had accomplished their great and valuable project for a union of the Arcadian people.⁹ The measure became extensively popular. Orchomenus only of the Arcadian cities, instigated by inveterate enmity to Mantinea, and probably fearful of oppression from the influence which Mantinea would acquire, persevered in refusal to accede to it. In most of the others a preponderant party concurred, with warm zeal, in founding a new city; to be, with the name of Megalopolis, Great town, the common capital, the place of assembly for the general council, of the Arcadian people.

The Orchomenians, in thus separating themselves from their fellow-countrymen, did not hope to be allowed the quiet enjoyment of that independency which they claimed as their right, transmitted from earliest times, and especially warranted by the late treaty. For support therefore in the resolution they had taken, they engaged a body of mercena-

⁹ According to Pausanias, whom Barthelemi, little apparently in the habit of weighing historical evidence, has implicitly followed, Epaminondas was the projector and patron both of the restoration of Mantinea and of the foundation of Megalopolis. If he was so, it will appear, from the sequel, that his political foresight failed him on those occasions. We may however better take the contemporary historian's account; who, political opponent as he was to Epaminondas, is really his best panegyrist. Ill-judging or careless zeal will often injure the cause it means to favour.

Xen. Hel. 1. 6.
c. 5. s. 11.
Diod. 1. 15.
Pausan. 1. 8.
c. 27. & 33.

ries which had been in the service of Corinth. This alarmed the Mantineans, who suspected the purpose of Orchomenus to be no longer defence but attack. While then the force of the rest of the confederated Arcadians assembled at Asea, to protect the country at large against the attack threatened from Lacedæmon, the Mantineans remained at home, for the particular defence of their own territory, against the apprehended malice of the Orchomenians. Such was the uneasy state of jealousy in which the Greeks, in their days of liberty, mostly lived, even in the short intervals of rest from internal sedition; every township fearful of violence from the next.

This miserable restlessness, rendered by the political circumstances of Greece habitual through the nation, would enhance the difficulty of what in no circumstances could be easy, bringing a number of states to concur in a wise, liberal, and generally beneficial plan of union. We are little informed of the constitution of united Arcadia: but we find party-purposes much considered in forming it, and perhaps unavoidably; for the union probably could not otherwise have been effected. The federal congresses, which we have seen already familiar in Greece, offered an example of something approaching that principle of representation, which the merit and fame of the English constitution have brought into universal estimation among the politicians of modern Europe. But that valuable principle would have ill suited the means, however it might accord with the wishes, of those whose support was from a democratical party. Their sovereign assembly therefore (judging, in the deficiency of accounts of it, from its title, which may be translated either the Ten-thousand or the Numberless¹⁰) was composed of the

¹⁰ Leunclavius translates the title of the general assembly of united Arcadia *Decies mille*, Ten thousand. (Xen. Hel. 1. 7. c. 4. s. 2.) Amasæus, whose version of Pausanias Kuhnius has adopted, evidently embarrassed on the occasion, calls the place of its meeting, *Curia infinitæ propè Arcadam multitudini destinata*. Pausan. l. 8. c. 32. The Greek is οἱ μύριας.

whole free population of Arcadia *, or as much of it as could be brought together. The situation chosen for the new capital was not central, to give the greatest facility for meeting from all parts, but on the southern border, where, according to Diodorus, the leading men had the surest interest, and could most readily collect those whom they might influence in the decision of public measures. The facility which its neighbourhood to the borders of Messenia and Laconia afforded for supporting the one and attacking the other induced the Theban leaders, principal patrons of the undertaking, to favour the choice. Otherwise, being in the vale through which the Alpheus runs, and not far from that river, it may perhaps have united more conveniences than could be readily found elsewhere in so mountainous a country. The office of this numerous assembly was to direct,

[* “ Mr. Mitford thinks that the assembly called the *μύριοι* was composed of the whole free population of Arcadia. But this is not probable. 1. This body possessed only delegated powers: Diod. xv. 59. *κοινήν σύνοδον, καὶ ἐξουσίαν ἔχειν περὶ πολέμου καὶ εἰρήνης βουλευέσθαι*. But, if it was no other than the free population of the country, by whom were its powers delegated? 2. It is designated as a *synod* or *council*, *σύνοδος, συνέδριον*. But an assembly of the people would be rather called *ἐκκλησία*. 3. It does not appear that the *ten thousand* possessed the legislative power; they had only the judicial and executive. But the legislative power resided in the whole assembled people. 4. These three states, *Mantineæ, Tegea, and Megalopolis*, contained together 14,000 or 15,000 citizens: and besides these three there were ten other independent Arcadian states. The *ten thousand* then were not the whole free population. Besides, it is probable that, according to the practice among the Achæans and at Lacedæmon, and in most other Grecian states, the citizens who were under 30 would not be admitted into this assembly. But these composed more than a third of the whole number of citizens, and when those above 30 were 10,000, the citizens from 20 to 30 would be near 4300. These 10,000 then were a deputed body, selected from a larger number. Barthelemy, *Anacharsis*, tom. iv. p. 270., describes from Pausanias the place of assembly as *une vaste édifice, où se tient l'assemblée des dix mille députés*, adding an epithet which Pausanias does not supply. It is not at all likely that this whole number ever actually met. The functions of the assembly would be performed, as in other cases, by a part only of its members. Thus in the Athenian *ἐκκλησία* the business of the state was generally transacted by a fourth part of the citizens; and thus we know from experience in modern parliaments that all the members seldom or never meet; and that affairs are despatched by a very small part of the whole.” Clinton, *Fæsti Hellen.* p. 419.]

in chief, the military and political concerns of all Arcadia; while apparently every town, for its civil government, retained its former separate sovereignty.

SECTION III.

Invasion of Arcadia under Agesilaus. — Superior Conduct of the Theban Leaders. — Invasion of Laconia by the Army of the Theban Confederacy, under Epaminondas. — Resolution of the Athenians to support Lacedæmon. — Retreat of Epaminondas from Peloponnesus. — Restoration of the Messenians. — Distress of Sparta.

It was already winter when Agesilaus entered Arcadia with the Lacedæmonian army, re-enforced only by the contingents of the little towns of Lepreum and Heræa. The combined forces of Arcadia and Elis avoided a battle with him. Part of the Mantinean territory was plundered; and in the skirmishing, attempted for its protection, the Lacedæmonian troops had generally the advantage. But Agesilaus in vain endeavoured to force the enemy to a general action. Pressed therefore by the season, and in some degree satisfied with having a little raised the spirits of the Lacedæmonians by a display of their superiority in the enemy's country, he returned into Laconia and dismissed his forces.

B. C. 370.
Ol. 102. 3.
Xen. Hel. 1. 6.
c. 5. s. 12. & 20.

s. 21.

The leaders of the Theban councils were politicians, far superior to those who conducted the Lacedæmonian government. They had not neglected opportunities for extending the influence of Thebes among neighbouring states: they had made diligent use of those which the interference of Lacedæmon in the affairs of Arcadia, or which the ready means open, through the deficiency of communication in Greece, for misrepresenting that interference, afforded, for

animating the long existing jealousy against Lacedæmon.

Xen. Hel. 1. 6.
c. 5. s. 23. The Phocians owned a subjection to Thebes,

which the general weakness only of the surrounding states, together with the general violence of party-spirit, could have brought them to endure. Assembling then the Bœotian and Phocian forces by their own authority, the Theban leaders managed by negotiation to obtain the willing assistance of the Locrians, of both provinces of the name of the Acarnanians, the Heracleots, the Malians, and of all the Eubœan towns. Deficient in funds for supplying those wants to which so large an army as they collected, though consisting of troops accustomed to supply themselves, would be liable in a winter campaign, they bor-

s. 19. rowed from the Eleans ten talents, perhaps something more than two thousand pounds. Epaminondas was appointed to the command-in-chief.

The Lacedæmonian government, it appears, had either no intelligence of these great preparations, or no suspicion that any thing important could follow during winter. Even

s. 22. the Arcadians did not expect it. Their forces were kept together only for the purpose of revenge against the little commonwealth of Heræa, whose territory they plundered and wasted. The Eleans alone had that confidential communication with the Theban leaders which induced them to wait in arms, in firm reliance on the approach of the Theban army.

Epaminondas did not disappoint their opinion of his activity and perseverance in enterprise. But, in entering Peloponnesus by Corinthia, he showed a want either of that wise moderation and strict justice which his general character, as delivered from antiquity, would give us to expect, or perhaps rather of that authority which a man of such a character would have exerted, had he possessed it, to restrain the wickedness and folly of those committed to his command.

The Corinthians, professing neutrality, had conducted themselves with cautious inoffensiveness toward all the belligerent commonwealths; yet, because they would not take arms against Lacedæmon, their ancient ally, to support the aggression of Mantinea against Tegea, the army under Epaminondas exerted its power in vengeance: lands wasted, trees felled, and houses burnt marked its destructive march. The Arcadians were still busied in similar exertion against the Heræan territory, when intelligence reached them of the arrival of Epaminondas at Mantinea. Immediately they quitted the business of devastation, and hastened to join him. The Theban leaders, learning that the Lacedæmonian army had evacuated Arcadia, and was dismissed, in the usual way of the Greeks, for the winter, considered the purpose of their own winter-expedition as accomplished. The independency of Mantinea on Lacedæmonian command then being secured, the friendly party in Tegea established in power, the disaffection of the little republic of Heræa punished, and the Theban interest in Peloponnesus altogether upon a good footing, they proposed to return home, and allow the usual season of rest also for their forces. But the internal weakness of Lacedæmon, less perceived by the more distant, began already to be justly estimated by the bordering states. The Eleans and Arcadians represented to the Thebans, “ that the sedition of Cinadon, which, without foreign assistance, had threatened the overthrow of the Spartan government, was smothered, not extinguished, by his punishment; that, even if all the subjects of Sparta were faithful, still the excellent discipline of the Thebans, with the numbers of their allies, would make their army clearly superior to any force the Lacedæmonians could bring into the field: but that, in fact, the spirit of revolt in Laconia itself wanted only promise of

Xen. Hel. 1. 6.
c. 5. s. 37.

s. 22.

s. 23.

s. 23. 25.

protection; extreme discontent pervaded all under the highest rank of Lacedæmonian subjects; and, if they marched immediately into the country, the Lacedæmonian government would be unable to collect a force capable of effectual opposition.”

Diodor. l. 15.

p. 499.

Plut. vit. Pelop.

p. 529. t. 1. et

Agasil. p. 1120.

t. 2.

The numbers now assembled ready to join in the invasion of Laconia (if late writers may be believed for such a matter, where contemporaries are silent) were no less than seventy thousand; of whom, according to Plutarch, forty thousand were heavy-armed.

Xen. Hel. l. 6.

c. 5. s. 24, 25.

Nevertheless the Theban generals objected the natural strength of the Lacedæmonian border, the principal passes of which they knew were guarded, and the usual advantages of those who fight within their own territory against strangers. They were still hesitating when deserters successively came in from different parts; all urging the invasion of their country, offering themselves for conductors, and agreeing in the assertion that not only a disposition to revolt pervaded Laconia, but a large part of the people had already refused obedience to the summons for military service.

B. C. 369.

Ol. 102. 3.

January.

Dodw.

These representations at length induced the Theban generals to accede to the wishes of their allies. The frontier of Laconia against Arcadia and Argolis is of that kind of rugged mountainous country in which roads can scarcely be formed, but where streams have first found a course, and then, in the line they have taken, gradually softened its roughness. The best way from Arcadia was by Ion, in the district called Skiritis, near one of the sources of the Eurotas: another, but more difficult pass, led to Caryæ, on the brook Œenus, whose waters

Xen. Hel. l. 6.

c. 5. s. 26.

soon joined that river. It was resolved to penetrate at once by both these ways. The Peloponnesians undertook to force that by Ion, though known to be

guarded by a considerable body, consisting of Lacedæmonian neodamodes and refugee Tegeans, under the command of Ischolaus, a Spartan. The road by Caryæ was assigned to the Thebans; more difficult in itself, but unguarded. The Arcadians were successful against Ischolaus; who, with more courage than judgment, choosing ill his ground for opposing superior numbers, was surrounded, overpowered, and killed, with most of those under him. The Thebans, conducted by some deserters of the country, zealous in revolt, met the Arcadians near Caryæ. Descending then the mountains together, they burnt Sellasia in the vale of the Eurotas, remarkable as the place

Xen. Hel. 1. 6.
c. 5. s. 27.
Ch. 20. s. 5. of
this Hist.

where the haughty interdictions of the Lacedæmonian government, in its prosperity, had sometimes met the ministers of other states. The invading army now found nothing to forbid its progress; which it held along the left bank of the river, plundering and burning as it went. On the second day from Caryæ, it arrived at the bridge conducting immediately to Sparta. That city stood at a small distance from the river, on the right bank. The passage was strongly guarded, and the generals avoided the hazardous attempt to force it. Pillage and flames were spread among the numerous houses on the side where nothing opposed; to the booty from which Xenophon attributes a value marking a deviation from the ancient Spartan simplicity, the ready consequence of conquests, foreign commands, and the circulation of a public revenue.

Nor was it now any longer the time when Spartan ladies could take and use arms like the men. Among the smaller Grecian states the sight of an enemy, often recurring, became less terrible through familiarity. But at Lacedæmon, for centuries, it had almost ceased to be supposed that an enemy could ever be seen there. To the Spartan ladies now the sight even of the smoke, says the

Xen. Hel. 1. 6.
c. 5. s. 28.

contemporary historian, from the buildings fired by the invaders was intolerable. Not only however the consternation of the fearful and inconsiderate, but the reasonable apprehension of the best informed and firmest, was very great. When those distinguished by the name of Spartans, who had arrogated all the powers of government, distrustful of others, endeavoured to occupy the most accessible parts of the unwall'd city, they found themselves in a manner lost in its extent. Distressed by the defection of some of their subjects, and uncertain of the fidelity of others, they had recourse to their slaves. Proclamation was made that able-bodied Helots, who would take arms and faithfully exert themselves in defence of the country, should be rewarded

Xen. Hel. 1. 6.
c. 5. s. 29. with freedom. More than six thousand were enrolled; and then the administration became fearful of the strength which itself had thus created.

1. 7. c. 2. s. 2. Soon however auxiliaries arrived from Corinth, Sicyon, Pellene, Phlius, Epidaurus, Træzen, Hermione, and Haliæ. The interest which bound these to the Lacedæmonian cause being thought secure, the first vehemence of alarm subsided.

1. 6. c. 5. s. 30. Meanwhile at Amyclæ, some way below Sparta, the enemy had crossed the Eurotas, and turned their march toward the city, still marking the way with plunder and devastation. Their cavalry, composed of the united force of Elis, Thebes, Phocis, and Locris, with some Thessalian, powerful for a Grecian army, advanced as far as the hippodrome, or horse-course, and the temple of Neptune, close to Sparta. The Lacedæmonian horse advancing against it, were comparatively so small a force as to appear contemptible: but a body of infantry, which had been concealed in the temple of the Tyndaridæ, issuing, and showing itself prepared to support the horse, the confederate cavalry retired; and the

s. 31.

very superior numbers of the confederate infantry (so far the force of the Lacedæmonian fame prevailed) in some alarm at the same time retreated. Agesilaus however would not allow pursuit. Aply disposing his troops in commanding situations which the neighbourhood of the city afforded, he always threatened, but always avoided action. The confederates withdrew, but to no great distance, and encamped.

It seems implied in the account of Xenophon that reputation, rather than strength, at this time saved Sparta. All accounts indeed mark that the numbers of the invaders far exceeded any ordinary force of Grecian armies. But that flood and hurricane of war, as another contemporary author has called it, which the abilities of Epaminondas had been able to excite and direct to a certain point, the abilities even of Epaminondas could not always duly command. Among his Bœotians he had never allowed any irregularity. He fortified his camp, and placed his guards and outposts, always as if in presence of a superior enemy. But he could enforce no such order among the Arcadians; whose practice was, when they had taken their ground, to lodge their arms and wander for pillage. Unable directly to restrain their passion for plunder, Epaminondas was reduced to endeavour to give it the best direction. In a council of war it was resolved, that to attempt any thing farther against the city would be too hazardous. The march was therefore turned again down the course of the Eurotas; and, through the whole length of the vale to the sea, the unfortified towns and villages were pillaged and burnt. The army arrived, unresisted, at Gythium, the principal or perhaps only naval arsenal of Lacedæmon, and that important place was invested. Numerous Laconian revolvers, who joined by the way, assisted

Xen. Hel. 1. 6.
c. 5. s. 32.

Xen. ut sup.
& vit. Ages.
Theopomp.
apud Plut.
vit. Ages.

Xen. Hel. 1. 6.
c. 5. s. 30.

s. 32.

in the assaults which for three days were repeated against it, but without success.

Xen. Hel. 1. 6.
c. 5. s. 33.
Isoc. Arc. p. 54. Intelligence of the extreme danger of Lacedæmon, quickly conveyed to Athens, excited a strong sensation there; not from any popular friendship for Lacedæmon, but from apprehension for the common independency of Athens and of Greece, threatened by the growing predominance of Thebes. The council, deeming the crisis important, summoned the general assembly. Party-strife seems to have been at this time more than commonly moderate among the Athenians; and no man had that commanding influence which could decisively guide the public mind, in the way of wisdom, like Pericles, or in the way of rashness and folly, like Cleon. Five ministers from

Xen. Hel. 1. 6.
c. 5. s. 34. Lacedæmon were allowed to speak first. Their purpose being to gain the utmost assistance from Athens, they endeavoured to demonstrate, that the friendly connection between Athens and Lacedæmon, which the Lacedæmonians were desirous of cultivating, would produce great advantages to both parties. The Athenians saw the advantages, but they doubted the friendly disposition. A murmur went through the assembly: "In the present pressure of circumstances, professions," it was observed, "would of course be fair; but in a return of prosperity the conduct of the Lacedæmonians would be the same as formerly." "Yet," it was said on the other side, "at the conclusion of the Peloponnesian war, when the Thebans would have subverted Athens, the better disposition of Lacedæmon saved it." This, urged to recollection by the Lacedæmonian ministers, made a powerful impression; and jealousy of Thebes went far to supply the want of confidence in Lacedæmon. Nevertheless the assembly was still divided; some insisting that, the Mantineans being "aggressors, the Athenians could do no otherwise than assist Lacedæmon, if they

would not be false to the treaty they had sworn to ; while others, vehement in the democratical cause, contended that the interference of the Mantineans, in support of the democratical party in Tegea against the oppression of Stasippus, had been right and just."

The deficiency or the uncertainty of political principle, which the disputation, thus reported without a comment, by so able a contemporary as Xenophon, shows to have been general in Greece ¹¹, appears at this day wonderful. The argument of the friends of the democratical cause, if allowed, would have justified the interference of Lacedæmon or of Thebes, in every contest of faction, in every republic of Greece, in Athens itself ; and the argument of those on the other side seems to have been directed, not to establish the general principle, that no commonwealth had a right to interfere in the internal concerns of another, but only the particular case, that the interference with arms, which the Mantineans had exercised in Tegea, was forbidden by the terms of the late treaty. After Xen. Hel. l. 6. c. 5. s. 37. much discussion it was not an Athenian, but the Corinthian and Phliasian ministers who, by urging a particular fact, which interested the feelings of the Athenian multitude, decided the vote. "Whether the Lacedæmonians or the Mantineans," the Corinthian Cliteles said, "in the instance in question have been aggressors, may be a matter of dispute not easily settled. But that, since the general peace, the Corinthians have committed hostility against no state, is sufficiently known. Nevertheless the Thebans, in crossing our territory, have plundered and wasted it as if an enemy's ; carrying off goods and cattle, burning houses, and felling cultivated trees. Can you then, without perjury, refuse us that assistance to which the treaty entitles

¹¹ That it was so, if Xenophon left any doubt about it, is confirmed by Isocrates, in his Archidamus.

the injured ?” The assembly became agitated: murmur was vehement; but the general voice went that the observation of Cliteles was pertinent and just.

The Phliasian minister proceeded to profit from the effect produced by the Corinthian’s speech. “It was obvious,” he said, “that, if the Thebans could once incapacitate Lacedæmon, Athens would be their next object; because Athens then alone, of all the Grecian republics, would remain powerful enough to attempt resistance to their ambition, which evidently aspired to the dominion of Greece. This, urged amid much flattery adapted to the popular temper, was decisive. The multitude called impatiently for the question, and would hear no other speakers. By the vote which followed, the utmost strength of the commonwealth was to be exerted in assistance of Lacedæmon, and Iphicrates was appointed to the command.

The support, powerful as it promised to be, which was thus preparing for Lacedæmon, might have been too late to be effectual, if disregard of union, and neglect of discipline, growing with success, had not rendered it impossible for the able leader of the confederate army to command the exertion of the allies, or even to calculate the force that he could command. The Arcadians, Argives, and Eleans, in numbers, went off with unasked leave, to bear home the booty they had taken. Provisions meanwhile became scarce for the troops remaining: the season pressed, and Epaminondas found it advisable to withdraw hastily out of Laconia.

Iphicrates was already in Arcadia, and opportunity was favourable for reducing the Theban army to great difficulty. But, through some party view apparently, of which we have no decisive information, he was not zealous in the command

which he had undertaken. He had been much blamed for wasting time in Corinth, before he proceeded into Arcadia. Without attempting any annoyance to the Theban army, in its way through that difficult country, he withdrew again to Corinth. It was supposed that his purpose was to dispute the passage of the isthmus, and of the mountains, which he might have made highly hazardous, or perhaps have completely prevented: but his measures rather indicated intention to allow that free way which Epaminondas found. Xenophon, on former occasions the eulogist of Iphicrates, blames his conduct here in strong terms.

This invasion, wasteful but transient, such as Attica had several times suffered from its Peloponnesian enemies, was fatal to the power of Lacedæmon. When Xen. Hel. 1. 7.
c. 2. s. 2. the foreign foe was gone, rebellion still pervaded the country. A large part of those Laconians, distinguished by the name of Pericæcians, and all the Helots, remained in revolt. The able leaders of Thebes took advantage of these circumstances to imitate and extend the policy of the Athenians in the Peloponnesian war. They invited, from all parts, the relics of the Messenian race, to return to their former country, and take their place, once more, among the people of Greece. The chief body of them was that which, formerly, under Athenian protection, had held Naupactus in Ætolia, but, after the conquest of Athens, had been expelled by the Lacedæmonians. Some of these had found refuge among their kinsmen of Rhegium in Italy and Messena in Sicily; but the greater part had accepted an invitation from the Grecian colony of the Evesperitans in Africa, then pressed in war by the neighbouring barbarians. This long unfortunate race now eagerly obeyed the call of the Thebans to return to the country of their forefathers, the fairest acquisition of the

Heraclidæ, the most desirable territory in Peloponnesus, or perhaps in Greece. Epaminondas was patron
Strabo, l. 7. & Plut. Ages. p. 1124. t. 2. of the new city of Messena, built at the foot of Mount Ithome, famous in the ancient wars with Lacedæmon, on whose summit was raised the citadel; but it seems probable that the Argive general Epiteles was the commander upon the spot, who protected the works. The returned Messenians did not spurn an association with rebelling Helots and other slaves; all, or mostly, of Grecian origin, and many of Messenian blood.

Of the particulars however of this very interesting restoration we have little satisfactory; Xenophon, in delicacy apparently to his Lacedæmonian friends, having studiously avoided even the mention of them, though wanted for connection and elucidation of the rest of his narrative. But he could not conceal that Messenia was torn from Lacedæmon; and, for the rest, his testimony, dropped in a word here and there, confirms the concurring accounts of later writers, that it was restored to the descendants, or those reputed descendants, of the ancient Dorian Messenians, with some mixture of other adventurers, for all whom, united, the Messenian name prevailed. The Asiæans and Nauplians, Dorians from Argolis, formerly established, as we have seen, by the Lacedæmonians on the Messenian coast, having been among those subjects of Sparta, who revolted, or favoured the revolt,
Pausan. l. 4. c. 26. were allowed to retain their settlements, and admitted to political association with the restored people. Pausanias, zealous to prove that the returning emigrants were really Messenians, remarks that even their
c. 28. speech was not altered by their peregrination; for, still in his time, after more than five hundred years, the Doric dialect was spoken in Messenia in greater purity than in any other part of Peloponnesus.

Thus was finally lost to the Lacedæmonians the province of Messenia, amounting to half their territory; a possession however of which, while they held it, their institutions seem to have denied them any very profitable use, unless it may be reckoned such to oppose a waste against invasion. But the retreat of the Theban army did not leave them masters even of all Laconia. The district called Skiritis, in that tract of lofty and rugged mountains among which the Eurotas and the Alpheus, the largest rivers of Peloponnesus, have their sources, continued in rebellion. The important town of Sellasia, at the upper end of ^{Xen. Hel. 1. 7.} the Spartan vale, on the great northern road, by ^{c. 4. s. 21.} which support might best come from eastern Arcadia and Argos, was held by the revolters. Pallene¹², in the western fork of the vale up which, by the course of the Eurotas, the other principal northern way led to western Arcadia and Elis, yet held for Lacedæmon. But soon after ^{Diod. 1. 15.} the retreat of the invading army, while perplexity ^{p. 492.} occurred on all sides for the Spartan government, the able general of the Arcadian forces, Lycomedes of Mantinea, returning unexpectedly, carried it by a sudden assault, and put those within to the sword.

SECTION IV.

Bad Arrangement of military Command by the popular Assembly of Athens. — Second Invasion of Peloponnesus by the Thebans under Epaminondas. — Lycomedes of Mantinea. — Alienation of Arcadia from the Theban Interest. — Military Merit of the Arcadians. — Quarrel of Arcadia with Elis.

IN the existing pressure upon Lacedæmon, and upon the states whose interest yet bound them to the Lacedæmonian

¹² This Laconian town must be distinguished from the Achæan city of the same name, for which it has, by some modern writers, been mistaken.

cause, it was of great importance to hold, and, if possible, improve, their connection with Athens. Ministers accordingly were therefore sent thither, fully empowered to agree upon the system of command and the plan of operations for the next campaign. The former alone made any difficulty. The Athenian council, at this time swayed apparently by wise and moderate men, had agreed with the Peloponnesians, that, all circumstances considered, it would be most for the interest of the confederacy, and most equitable, that the Athenians should direct operations by sea, and the Lacedæmonians by land. But a party in Athens, with Cephisodotus for their orator, thought to earn popular favour by opposing this arrangement. When the proposal of the council was laid before the general assembly, (for by that tumultuary meeting, in the degenerate state of Solon's constitution, all the measures of executive government were to have their ratification,) Cephisodotus persuaded the ill-judging multitude that they were imposed upon. In the Lacedæmonian squadron, he said, the trierarchs would be Lacedæmonians, and perhaps a few heavy-armed; but the body of the crews would be Helots or mercenaries. Thus the Athenians would command scarcely any but slaves and the outcast of nations in the Lacedæmonian navy, whereas, in the Athenian army, the Lacedæmonians would command the best men of Athens. If they would have a partition of military authority really equal, according to the fair interpretation of the terms of the confederacy, the command equally of the sea and of the land forces must be divided. Popular vanity was caught by this futile argument; and the assembly voted that the command, both by sea and by land, should be alternately five days with the Athenians, and five with the Lacedæmonians. In this decision of the petulant crowd, singularly adapted to cripple exertion both by sea and land,

B. C. 368.
 Ol. 102. 4.
 February.
 Xen. Hel. 1. 7.
 c. 1. s. 1.

the Lacedæmonians, pressed by circumstances, thought it prudent to acquiesce.

In spring an army was assembled at Corinth to prevent the passage of the Thebans and their northern allies into Peloponnesus. But the superior abilities of the Theban leaders prevailed. They surprised an outpost. Doubting still their means for forcing their way over the rough descent of the Oneian mountains, they communicated with the Lacedæmonian polemarch commanding, and, whether through his treachery or his weakness, they obtained a truce, under favour of which they safely joined the forces of their Peloponnesian allies, the Arcadians, Argives, and Eleans. This junction being effected, they found themselves far superior to the army of the Lacedæmonian confederacy. Without opposition then they punished the attachment of the Epidaurians to the Lacedæmonian interest by ravage of their lands. They attempted then one of the gates of Corinth; but, the Corinthians submitting themselves to the able direction of the Athenian general Chabrias, who was there with a body of mercenaries, they were repulsed with some slaughter. Against so great a superiority of force however the abilities of Chabrias could not prevent the ravage of the Corinthian territory. All Peloponnesus now seemed open to the Thebans, when the pressure of the Thessalian arms, under the tagus Alexander of Pheræ, upon their northern allies, and apprehension of its extending to Bœotia itself, called the Thebans suddenly out of the peninsula. All the Peloponnesians of the confederacy then, assuming leave of absence, parted to their several homes.¹³

B. C. 368.
Ol. 102.4—
103.1.
Xen. Hel. 1. 7.
c. 1. s. 4.

s. 5, 6.

s. 7, 8.

s. 9, 10, 11.
Diod. 1. 15.

¹³ Xenophon, in relating the retreat of the Thebans, and the dispersion of the rest of the army, has not at all accounted for it. That the Thessalian war was the principal cause may however be gathered from a comparison of the

The dissolution of the army of the Theban confederacy gave a most fortunate relief to Lacedæmon. All the leisure it afforded seems to have been wanted for composing troubles within Laconia itself. Offensive operations were left to the auxiliaries, sent by Dionysius then ruling in Syracuse; a body remarkable enough, both in itself and for its actions, to deserve notice. The infantry were Gauls and Spaniards; the cavalry, apparently Sicilian Greek, so excellent that, though scarcely exceeding fifty horsemen, they had given more annoyance to the Lacedæmonians, while wasting the Corinthian lands, than all the rest of the army. After the other troops, on both sides, were withdrawn, this transmarine force alone undertook the invasion of Sicyonia, defeated the Sicyonians in battle, and took a fort in their territory by assault. Gratified then with glory and plunder they embarked, and, with twenty triremes, their convoy, returned to Syracuse.

Xen. Hel. l. 7.
c. 1. s. 12.

Thus far the able leaders of the Theban councils, profiting from the animosity so extensively prevailing against Lacedæmon, had kept their confederacy unanimous and zealous, under the supremacy of Thebes. But it was little likely that, by any management, so many states could be long retained in patient submission to so new a superiority. The long deference of the Grecian republics to Lacedæmonian command, amounting, in many instances, to a zealous, and sometimes extending to a general loyalty toward the superior people, is a political phenomenon perhaps singular in the history of mankind. But that deference was paid to a superiority, not suddenly obtained, but growing from the extraordinary institutions

accounts of Diodorus and Plutarch with what Xenophon says in the former book of the Hellenics (c. 4. s. 35.) ; and the incidental mention of that war by Polybius (l. 8. p. 512.) affords valuable confirmation to this deduction from the other writers.

under which the Lacedæmonians lived; which made them really a superior people, obviously fittest, in the divided and tumultuary state of the Greek nation, to command in war and to arbitrate in peace: whence even still, when the political power of Lacedæmon was so declining, the estimation of {the Lacedæmonian people, we are told, was such that at the Olympian and other national meetings a Lacedæmonian was an object of curiosity and admiration for strangers, more even than the conquerors in the games. The superiority of Athens also, though in few instances, or for a short time only, supported by a loyalty like that which Lacedæmon enjoyed, accruing suddenly, yet had resulted from long preparation. Legislation more perfected, talents and manners more cultivated, and an extraordinary succession of able men at the head of affairs, gave to the Athenians an effectual superiority which the people of other republics saw and felt. But Thebes, without any advantage of ancient prejudice in favour of her pretensions, without any public institutions to be admired, recently emerged from political subjection, possessing indeed a large and disciplined population which might infuse some terror, was yet become so suddenly eminent only through the blaze of talents of a few, and principally of one extraordinary man, leading her councils, and commanding her armies. If therefore, in any other state of the confederacy where military force was not very inferior, a similar blaze of character should occur, that state would presently feel itself equal to Thebes, and be prepared to break a connection involving an admission of her superiority.

Such a character had been for some time rising among the Arcadians in Lycomedes of Mantinea; a man inferior to none of his country in birth, superior to most in property, and who had already distinguished himself in council as a principal promoter of

Xen. Hel. l. 7.
c. 1. s. 12.
Diodor. l. 15.
p. 492.

Isocr. Archid.

the Arcadian union, and in arms at the head of the Arcadian forces. Lycomedes apparently already saw, what afterward became abundantly notorious, that, if any view to the general good of Greece influenced the Theban councils, it was wholly subordinate to the ambition of making Thebes supreme over the Greek nation. This ambition he resolved to oppose. In the general assembly therefore of the Arcadian states, convened in the new city of Megalopolis, he represented that "Peloponnesus, among all its various present inhabitants, was the proper country of the Arcadians alone; the rest were really strangers. Nor were the Arcadians the most ancient only, they were the most powerful of the Grecian tribes; they were the most numerous, and they excelled in strength of body. It was notorious that the troops of no other Grecian people were in equal request. The Lacedæmonians knew their value: they had never invaded Attica without Arcadian auxiliaries; nor would the Thebans now venture to invade Laconia without them. If therefore the Arcadians knew their own interest, they would no longer obey the Thebans, but insist upon equality in command. They had formerly raised Lacedæmon; they were now raising Thebes; and shortly they would find the Thebans but other Lacedæmonians."

Xen. Hel. 1. 7.
c. 1. s. 13.

Flattering thus alternately, and stimulating the Arcadian people, Lycomedes obtained the effective command of them; and the natural consequence of the submission of the multitude's caprice to an able man's control resulted: the Arcadians were successful, and their successes were brilliant. The Argives invaded Epidauria. The renowned Athenian general Chabrias, at the head of the Athenian and Corinthian forces, intercepted their retreat. The Arcadians were in alarm for their allies; an assembly was held; the interest of Lycomedes decided the choice of commanders, and the Arcadian army, against great

disadvantage of ground, brought off the Argives without loss. An expedition was then undertaken into Laconia; the territory of Asine was ravaged, and Xen. Hel. l. 7. c. 1. s. 14. the Lacedæmonian polemarch Geranor, who commanded there, was defeated and killed. Many predatory incursions, in the common way of Grecian warfare, followed; and when any object invited, neither night, says the contemporary historian, nor weather, nor distance, nor difficulty of way deterred; insomuch that the Arcadians acquired the reputation of being the best soldiers of their time.

Disposed as the Arcadians showed themselves s. 15. no longer to admit the superiority of Thebes, their strength, their discipline, and their successful activity in arms, though exerted in the cause of the confederacy, could scarcely fail to excite some jealousy and apprehension in the Theban government. No direct breach ensued, but friendship cooled and became precarious. Meanwhile the new energy of the Arcadian government attracted the regard of the humble and oppressed; always an extensive description of men, and sometimes of states, among the Grecian republics. The people of Elis had long claimed, and generally maintained, a sovereignty over the people of several towns of Elea, and of the whole district called Triphylia, on the border against Messenia. In a strong situation in Triphylia, called Lasion, to assist in curbing the inhabitants they had allowed some Arcadian exiles Diod. l. 15. to establish themselves. This, for a time, answered its purpose: but, as the Arcadians of Lasion were, like the Triphylians, only subjects of the Eleans, and not fellow-citizens, and as the sovereignty of people over people, seldom unoppressive, cannot fail to be humiliating, they at length made common cause with their neighbouring fellow-subjects, particularly the Marganeans and Scil-luntines, in opposition to the Elean government. Xen. Hel. l. 7. c. 1. s. 16.

For support then they turned their view to the new union of Arcadia: they claimed to be Arcadians; and by a petition addressed to the new united government they desired to be taken under its protection. At the same time the Eleans were pressing for assistance from their allies of Arcadia, to recover their former dominion over the towns which the Lacedæmonians had restored to independency. The Arcadians slighted this application, and declared by a public resolution that the petition of the Triphylians was well founded, and that their kinsmen should be free. Elis became in consequence still more alienated from Arcadia than Arcadia from Thebes.

SECTION V.

Congress at Delphi, assembled at the Instance of a Minister of the Satrap of Bithynia. — The Tearless Battle, won by Archidamus Son of Agesilaus. — Expedition of the Thebans into Thessaly under Pelopidas. — Embassies from the principal Grecian Republics to the Persian Court. — Able and successful Conduct of Pelopidas, Ambassador from Thebes. — Congress at Thebes. — Attempt of Thebes to acquire the Supremacy of Greece, through Support of Persia, defeated.

THE growing schism in the opposing confederacy promised great advantage to Lacedæmon. Meanwhile, though, through vices in their civil constitution and ill management in their administration, the Lacedæmonians had lost the best half of their territory, their negotiations abroad still carried weight, and were conducted ably and successfully. It was at the critical time when the political system in Greece to which the rise of Thebes had given birth began to be shaken, and new troubles seemed ready to break out, that Philiscus, a Greek of Abydus, arrived as minister from the satrap of Bithynia, Ariobarzanes; professedly charged to

mediate in the king of Persia's name a general peace among the Grecian republics. Following circumstances proved, and even the contemporary historian, though avoiding the direct avowal, has shown, that this new interference of Persia in Grecian affairs was produced by Lacedæmonian intrigue. It seems however not to have given any considerable umbrage to the Greek nation. Philiscus proposed a congress at Delphi; and deputies from Thebes, and from the states of the Theban confederacy, readily met deputies from Lacedæmon there. No fear of Persia, so the historian, not their friend, testifies, influenced the Thebans: for, Philiscus requiring, as an indispensable article, that Messenia should return under obedience to Lacedæmon, they positively refused peace but upon condition that Messenia should be free.

Xen. Hel. l. 7.
c. 1. s. 17.

This resolution being firmly demonstrated, the negotiation quickly ended, and both sides prepared for war. Philiscus then gave ample proof of his disposition to the Lacedæmonian cause, by employing a large sum of money, intrusted to him by the satrap, in levying mercenaries for the Lacedæmonian service. Meanwhile a body of auxiliaries from Dionysius of Syracuse, chiefly Gauls and Spaniards, as in the former year, had joined the Lacedæmonian army; and, while the Athenians were yet but preparing to march, a battle was fought under the command of Archidamus son of Agesilaus. The united forces of Argos, Arcadia, and Messenia were defeated, with slaughter, if Diodorus might be believed, of more than ten thousand men, and, as all the historians report, without the loss of a single Spartan. After a series of calamities the intelligence of this extraordinary success made such impression at Lacedæmon that tears of joy, says the contemporary historian, beginning with Agesilaus himself, fell from the elders

s. 18.

s. 19—22.

[B. C. 367. Cl.]
Diodorus, l. 15.
p. 495.

and ephors, and finally from the whole people.¹⁴ Among the friends of the Lacedæmonians nevertheless, as Plut. vit. Ages, c. 33. no tear of sorrow resulted, this action became celebrated with the title of the Tearless battle.

The war with Thessaly now pressed upon Thebes. Nevertheless the amount of the power and influence to which that city had arrived, not through any merit of her constitution, as Polybius has observed, but wholly Polyb. l. 2. p. 127. & l. 6. p. 487. by the uncommon abilities of her leading men, and to which, beyond all expectation of her most promising days, she had been from the most adverse circumstances so rapidly raised, is strongly marked by the pressure she was not only able to bear, but to retort with efficacy upon her enemies. Still urging Lacedæmon by her confederates and dependents in Peloponnesus, she not only could afford Polyb. l. 8. p. 112. Diodor. l. 15. p. 492. protection to her northern subjects and allies against the successor of the most formidable potentate of the age, but she could aim at dominion, or influence which would answer the purpose of dominion, among the populous and wealthy, but ill-constituted cities of Thessaly. While the rapacity and ambition of the tagus, Alexander of Pheræ*, occasioned a necessity for measures of protection and defence, the disposition to revolt, which his tyranny had excited among those over whom his authority extended, gave probability to views of aggrandise-

¹⁴ Diodorus, whether from his own invention, or the store of some writer more ingenious, but not wiser, not more a politician or a soldier, than himself, has added much to Xenophon's account of this campaign of Archidamus; dilating indeed more than is consistent with the compressed scheme of his history. It is not likely that either Xenophon's information upon the subject, or his inclination to relate whatever would do honour to the son of Agesilaus, was deficient.

* [* From a marginal memorandum it would appear that Mr. Mitford had intended to make the Thessalian history more connected and complete here by an account of the rise of Alexander and the assassination of Polydorus and Polydamas, related by Xenophon, *Hel. vi. iv. 33, 34.* ed. Schneider. The assassination however of Polydamas and his friends is afterwards briefly stated in s. 3. of chap. xxxiv.]

ment for those who might support the revolt. Accordingly Pelopidas was sent into Thessaly with an army under a commission to act there at his discretion; for the advantage however, not of the Thessalians, who had solicited protection, but of the Bœotian people, who pretended to be common protectors: a kind of commission which it has been usual in all ages for the barefaced ambition of democracies to avow, while the more decent manners of the most corrupt courts, from which such commissions may have issued, have generally covered them with a veil. Pelopidas penetrated to Larissa; and with the co-operation of its people, expelled the tyrant's garrison. Extending negotiation then into Macedonia, he concluded a treaty with Alexander, king of that country, who desired alliance with Thebes, the better to resist the oppression which he felt or feared from the naval power and ambitious policy of Athens, which were continually exerted to extend dominion or influence over every town on every shore of the Ægean. His younger brother, Philip, then a boy, afterward the great Philip, father of the greater Alexander, is said to have accompanied Pelopidas, in his return to Thebes; whether for advantage of education and to extend friendly connection, or, as later writers have affirmed, as a hostage to ensure the performance of stipulated conditions.

Diodor. l. 15.
p. 492. Plut. &
Corn. Nep.
vit. Pelop.

Pelopidas returning to his command in Thessaly, his usual success failed him. According to Diodorus and Plutarch, venturing as voluntary negotiator for his country within the power of the profligate tagus, he was seized and imprisoned. But Polybius imputes his misfortune to positive imprudence, and an expression of Demosthenes would imply that he was made prisoner in battle.¹⁵ Nor were the exertions of the

¹⁵ Αἰχμάλωτος. Demosth. in Aristocr. p. 660. ed. Reiske.

Theban government to avenge him fortunate. The Bœotarchs, who had ventured far into Thessaly with an army said to have been eight thousand foot and six hundred horse, not finding the support expected from the Thessalian people, were reduced to retreat before the greater force of the tagus; and in traversing the Thessalian plain pursued by a superior cavalry, they suffered severely. It is attributed to the ability of Epaminondas, serving in an inferior station, but called forth by the voices of the soldiers to supply the deficiencies of the generals, that the army was not entirely cut off. Negotiation, supported probably by arms, yet not without some concession, procured at length the release of Pelopidas.¹⁶

Diodorus, ut
ant. Plut. v.
Pelopid.
Pausan. l. 9.
c. 15.

¹⁶ We have precisely three words only from Xenophon about the war of Thebes with Thessaly. Deeply interested in the transactions in Peloponnesus, where all passed almost under his eye, his attention seems to have been fixed there; and possibly satisfactory information of affairs in Thessaly may not readily have occurred to him. We are thus reduced to depend upon later writers for the circumstances of a war materially connected with the thread of Grecian history. If Plutarch then should be believed, the force of the Theban arms was exceeded only by the liberality and magnanimity of the Theban policy; the success was so complete that apparently nothing but the most exalted and uncommon disinterestedness prevented the Thebans from remaining masters of Thessaly; and Pelopidas showed heroism and wisdom equally and uniformly great, except that, rather than admit any inferiority in the Theban arms, the biographer has chosen to mark some rashness, some extravagance of passion in his hero on the occasion of his death. But the tale altogether has so much of the romantic, the bombast, and even the puerile, with some contradiction of well-authenticated facts, and some stories bearing their own contradiction, that sober judgment, disgusted, might incline to reject all in a lump, and conclude that, as Xenophon has passed all by, there was nothing worth historical notice. It will be the duty of the modern writer of history however to look farther; and we find testimony from an early and highly respectable author that will require attention. It has been incidentally only that Polybius has been led to mention Pelopidas. He gives no particulars, but he speaks of it as a matter well known in his time, "that the mismanagement of Pelopidas in Thessaly produced serious ill consequences to Thebes, and, especially, great loss of reputation:" "Ἐβλαλέ μὲν Θηβαίους μεγάλα, κατίλυος δὲ τὴν αὐτῶν προγεγενημένην δόξαν. Polyb. l. 8. p. 512. Xenophon's three words, though less strong, are perfectly consonant. Alexander of Pheræ, he says, was χαλεπὸς Θηβαίους πολέμιος (Hel. l. 6. c. 4. s. 35.), "an enemy who altogether pressed hard upon Thebes." Fortunately then for this part of the history, where Xenophon so fails us, and Plutarch, straining at panegyric for his fellow-

The troubles in Thessaly engaged the attention of the Athenians, who had old and extensive connections among its cities. Lacedæmon therefore being now greatly relieved by the victory of Archidamus, by the dissension growing in the Theban confederacy, and by the distraction of the Theban arms in the northern war, it was proposed to send to the support of their Thessalian friends those forces which, of late, had gone yearly into Peloponnesus. But the Lacedæmonian minister representing strongly the pressure of the rebellion in Laconia, still supported by the most powerful states of the peninsula, and urgently soliciting the continuance of co-operation from the Athenian army, about a thousand foot and thirty triremes only were sent to Thessaly, (the sea force perhaps no more than ordinarily was stationed there,) and the former assistance to Lacedæmon was not intermitted.¹⁷

The cordial support of Athens, the force of mercenaries to be added by Philiscus, the growing aversion among the Arcadians to the Theban cause, and the troubles in the northern provinces, with the pressure of the Thessalian arms

countrymen the Bœotians, is so extravagant, we find Diodorus rational. Pausanias has also given some circumstances of the transactions of the Thebans in Thessaly: but the account of Diodorus is the only one in which connection has been attempted; and though inclining to partiality for the Theban heroes, yet, under correction from Xenophon and Polybius, apparently it may deserve some confidence.

Diodorus attributes the first expedition of Pelopidas into Thessaly to the third year of the hundred and second olympiad, presently after the invasion of Laconia; the imprisonment of Pelopidas to the first year of the hundred and third olympiad; the unfortunate expedition, in which Epaminondas saved the army, to the same year; and the liberation of Pelopidas to the year following. The first date agrees with Xenophon, the last not.

¹⁷ According to Diodorus the Athenians sent a thousand foot and thirty triremes, under the command of Autocles, to the assistance of the tagus of Thessaly against the Thebans. Though not usually giving Diodorus credit for great exactness, I do not consider this as inconsistent, either with the general assertion of Xenophon, that Alexander was a troublesome enemy to the Athenians, or with his more particular account of the intention, not pursued, to send their principal land force into Thessaly.

upon the Theban confederacy, together seemed likely to restore a decisive superiority to Lacedæmon, at least within her peninsula; and then, judging from experience, it was not likely to be confined there. But the able directors of the Theban councils had observed that the first and perhaps the most powerful efficient of this change in circumstances had

Xen. Hel. 1. 7.
c. 1. s. 23. been negotiation with Persia; and they resolved to direct also their attention to Persia, and try if

they could not foil the Lacedæmonians by negotiation still more effectually than by arms. A minister from Lacedæmon, Euthycles, was actually resident at the Persian court. Upon this ground a congress of the confederacy was summoned, and, in pursuance of a common resolution, Pelopidas was

[B. C. 367.]
Cl. sent to Susa on the part of Thebes, accompanied by ministers from Argos, Elis, and Arcadia. The Athenians, jealous of the measure, sent their ministers also, Timagoras and Leon.

The choice of the Thebans on this occasion was fortunate: that of the Athenians not so. A man at the head of a party, like Pelopidas, will of course be zealous in the interest of that party; it is his own interest. With a man not a leader, a private interest may have more weight than the share he considers as his own in the party-interest. But, among the Grecian commonwealths, the variety of public interests, and the variety of party interests, was such that, without the interference of individual interests, which nevertheless always might occur in political negotiation, circumstances the strangest, and apparently most unaccountable, were continually liable to arise. Pelopidas slighted the Arcadian minister, Antiochus; perhaps the more readily to

Xen. Hel. 1. 7.
c. 1. s. 24, 25. gain the Athenian Timagoras; with whose co-operation he succeeded completely in the great

object of his mission. He was treated by the Persian court with distinguishing honour. The slight, even to contempt,

which he showed towards the Arcadian minister, sufficed to bring the marked contempt of the court upon that minister and his country.¹⁸ A Persian of rank was appointed to accompany Pelopidas back to Greece, bearing a rescript from the king in which the terms of his friendship were declared. It required that "the Lacedæmonians should allow the independency of Messenia; that the Athenians should lay up their fleet; that war should be made upon them if they refused; and that, if any Grecian city denied its contingent for such war, the first hostilities should be directed against that city; that those who accepted these terms would be considered as friends of the king, those who refused them as enemies."

If we compare the style and spirit of this rescript, and the manner in which it was offered to united Greece, with the terms and circumstances of the peace of Antalcidas, we shall hardly discover what has been the ground of distinction between them; why one has been so much reprobated, while the other, little indeed applauded, has in a manner been thrown out of observation by the imposing abundance of panegyric which the consent of ancient and modern writers has bestowed on the magnanimous patriotism of Pelopidas, and of his great associate in politics as in arms, Epaminondas. But we may perhaps be led to think that political principle has been out of view, both in the panegyric and in the reproach; that the merit of individuals has considerably swayed the general mind; yet that the great distinction has rested on party-spirit. If however, leaving the political principles of Pelopidas in that obscurity which we seem without means very satisfactorily to illuminate, we

¹⁸ Antiochus had been victor in the pancratium (Xen. Hel. 1. 7. c. 1. s. 23.); so that it should seem men of rank and education, even at that day, engaged in that rough contest for honour; unless we should consider the contempt shown him by Pelopidas as in part founded on his low rank and manners.

look to his political abilities, we shall see them exhibited in their fairest light, in real splendour, not by his professed panegyrists, but by the candid contemporary historian, not his friend. They are evident in the success of his Persian negotiation, to which that historian has borne full testimony; and that negotiation must unquestionably have been a business abounding with difficulties, and requiring much discernment to conduct and bring to so advantageous a conclusion.

But the Thebans appear to have been too much elated by their success, in this extraordinary and very important affair, for perfect prudence to hold through their political conduct; whether their able chiefs now erred, or rather popular presumption, in the badness of their constitution, to which

Polyb. l. 6. p. 87. Xen. Hel. l. 7. c. 1. s. 27.

Polybius bears testimony, was not to be restrained. They assumed immediately to be arbiters of Greece. Their summonses for a congress of deputies from the several republics to meet in Thebes were generally obeyed. The Persian, who had accompanied the return of Pelopidas, attended, with the king's rescript in his hand. This was read and interpreted to the congress, while the king's seal appendant was ostentatiously displayed. The Thebans proposed, as the condition of friendship with the king and with Thebes, that the deputies should immediately swear to the acceptance of the terms, in the names of their respective cities. Readily however as the congress had met in Thebes, the deputies did not come so prepared to take the law from Thebes. A majority of them joined in the reply that "they were sent to hear propositions, not to swear to whatever might be proposed. If oaths were expected, the Thebans must inform their several governments of the purport."

The conduct of Pelopidas toward Arcadia and its minister at the Persian court, unaccounted for by Xenophon, scarcely

had been the result of mere caprice or resentment, but probably of some political view; whether, as before observed, to gain the Athenian minister, or to obviate some suspicions or prejudices of the Persians. It was however certainly productive of political inconveniences. Antiochus, deficient as probably he may have been in qualifications for minister at a polished court, was not without some just feeling of the indignity put upon him. At his departure he had refused the customary presents from the Persian court; and when, on his return, he made report of his embassy in that assembly of the Arcadian nation in Megalopolis whose very title, the Ten thousand or the Numberless, marks its tumultuary composition, he made light of the Persian empire and all that it contained: "Bakers, cooks, cup-bearers, and porters," he said, "abounded there: but men fit to fight with the Greeks, though looking diligently, he could see none. Nor did he believe even in the boasted riches of the empire; for," concluding with a joke adapted to impress the multitude he was addressing, "the so much celebrated golden plane-tree, he was sure, would not give shelter to a grasshopper."

This being added to former stimulation, the Arcadian deputies were chosen under an impression not favourable to the Theban cause. The powerful and popular Lycomedes, the first who had stood forward in avowed opposition to the Theban pretensions, was the Mantinean representative. Not simply objecting to the proposed oath, Lycomedes insisted that "Thebes was not the place in which the congress should have been assembled." The Thebans exclaiming, with marks of resentment, that he was promoting discord in the confederacy, he declared his resolution to hold his seat in the congress no longer: and, the other Arcadian deputies concurring with him, they all retired together. The result seems to have been that the congress broke up without coming to any resolution.

Disappointed and thwarted thus, the Thebans could not yet resolve to abandon their project of arrogating that supremacy over the Greek nation which Lacedæmon had so long held; long indeed by the voluntary concession of a large majority of it. They sent requisitions separately to every city to accede to the terms proposed; expecting that the fear of incurring the united enmity of Thebes and of the king, says the contemporary historian, would bring all severally to compliance. The Corinthians however setting the example of a firm refusal, with the added observation, that "they wanted no alliance, no interchange of oaths with the king," it was followed by most of the cities. And thus, continues Xenophon, this attempt of Pelopidas and the Thebans to acquire the empire of Greece finally failed.¹⁹

¹⁹ Plutarch, in relating the Persian embassy, has laboured, with some ingenuity, to draw attention aside from whatever, in his hero's conduct, was most repugnant to the claim for him of being a Grecian, and not merely a Theban, patriot. He has however been either honest or idle enough not specifically to contradict any of the particulars reported by Xenophon, which show that the object of Pelopidas was to make Thebes mistress of Greece. He has omitted all mention of the congress of Thebes and of the general opposition to Pelopidas there; an opposition evidently arising from the cause stated by Polybius for the failure of all attempts to unite the Grecian republics: *διὰ τὸ μὴ τῆς κοινῆς ἐλευθερίας ἕνεκεν, ἀλλὰ τῆς σφετέρας δυναστείας χάριν, ἕκαστον ποιῆσθαι τὴν σπουδὴν* — *because the views and exertions of each were directed to promote, not the common freedom, but its own power.* Polyb. 1. 2. p. 125. Concerning so remarkable a transaction we should have been glad even of such reports as Diodorus might have preserved, to compare with the account of Xenophon: but, perhaps because he found nothing that would support eulogy to his country, he has omitted all notice of it in its proper place, and has barely mentioned it in a following summary panegyric of Pelopidas.

CHAPTER XXVIII.

AFFAIRS OF GREECE FROM THE FAILURE OF THE ATTEMPT TO ESTABLISH THE SUPREMACY OF THEBES OVER THE GRECIAN REPUBLICS, THROUGH THE SUPPORT OF PERSIA, TILL THE DEPRESSION TOGETHER OF THE ARISTOCRATICAL AND DEMOCRATICAL INTERESTS, AND THE DISSOLUTION OF THE ANCIENT SYSTEM OF GRECIAN CONFEDERACY, THROUGH THE EVENT OF THE BATTLE OF MANTINEA.

SECTION I.

Difficult Circumstances of the Theban Administration. — Affairs of Achaia. — Advantageous Constitution of Achaia, and advantageous Character of its People. — Interference of Thebes. — Generous Policy of Epaminondas. — Impolitic Illiberality of the Theban Confederacy. — Miseries, Virtues, and Enjoyments of the People of the smaller Republics exemplified in the History of Phlius.

IF we refuse to Thebes the credit of a glory genuine and pure for her first successful struggle against the tyranny of Lacedæmon, we have Epaminondas himself with us, who would take no part in the revolution till the business of conspiracy, treachery, and assassination was over, and the affair came into the hands of the people at large, ready for leaders, and wanting them. We may have more difficulty to decide upon the merit or demerit of that obstinacy with which the Thebans afterwards persisted in asserting dominion over the cities of Bœotia, and thus denying peace to Greece, when proposed upon a condition which might seem,

on first view, all that true Grecian patriotism could desire, universal independency. For where was to be found the sanction of that peace? Unfortunately the efficacy of any great interest pervading the country was overborne and lost in the multitude of narrow, yet pressing interests, of parties and of individuals, dividing every little community. No sooner would the independency of the Bœotian towns have been established than a revolution would have been made, or attempted, in every one of them. The friends of Thebes once overpowered, and the friends of Lacedæmon prevailing among those towns, how long might Thebes itself have been secure against a second subjection to Lacedæmon, more grievous than the former? As far then as these considerations may apologise for the refusal of accession to the treaty of Athens, so far it may also justify the Persian embassy; though scarcely the haughtiness which success in that negotiation seems to have inspired. But what should have been the farther conduct of Thebes to secure her own quiet, without interfering in the affairs of surrounding states, or how to ensure quiet among those states without the possession and the use of power to control them, is not so easy to determine. For the business of the honest statesman, amid the seldom failing contention of factions within, and the ambition of interested neighbours without, is not so easy and obvious as presumptuous ignorance is commonly ready to suppose, and informed knavery often, with interested purposes, to affirm. How ill Greece was at this time prepared for internal quiet, what follows will but concur with all that has preceded of its history to show.

ACHAIA was more divided, and perhaps more equally divided, into little village republics, without a preponderating town, than any other province of Peloponnesus. Hence, if its people were not among themselves quieter and happier, yet their disturbances, less expanding among their neigh-

bours, less attracted the notice of historians. While the Lacedæmonian influence prevailed in Peloponnesus the little Achæan states were mostly aristocratical republics. In the preponderance acquired by Athens, under Ch. 12. s. 3. & 5. of this Hist. the successive able and liberal administrations of Themistocles, Aristides, Cimon, and Pericles, support from that imperial democracy made the democratical the ruling party in Achaia, and brought Achaia into dependence upon Athens. By the conditions afterward of the Thirty-years' truce, to which the combination of enemies and defection of subjects compelled the Athenians to submit, all interference of Athens being forbidden, aristocracy and the Lacedæmonian interest revived together. They were Ch. 14. s. 1. of this Hist. however not so completely restored but that, when the Peloponnesian war broke out, Pellene alone joining the general confederacy of the Peloponnesian states against Athens, the rest of the Achæan towns maintained a neutrality, till the destructive defeat of the Athenians in Sicily gave a decided preponderance to Lacedæmon.

From that time Achaia seems to have remained moderately quiet, under aristocratical, or perhaps a mixed government: for there seems ground for supposing that a better connection between the higher and lower ranks of citizens, a truer aristocracy with less of oligarchy, whether from advantage of law or of custom and circumstances, was established among the little towns of Achaia than in most other parts of Greece.¹

¹ Polybius says that the merit of the Achæan laws, as they stood in his age, was derived from times of great antiquity (Polyb. Hist. 1. 2.); which might be believed on less authority than that of Polybius, because it is not common for a system, totally new, to acquire stability and flourish at once, like the Achæan, in the time of its confederacy. He calls the Achæan governments democratical; meaning probably no more than that they had a mixture of democracy sufficient to ensure isonomy, equal law, to the many: for Xenophon clearly informs us that, by the old constitutions of the Achæan towns, preserved to his time (Hel. 1.7. c. 1. s. 32.), the wealthier and higher people held the principal share in the government. But it appears evident that Polybius, with certainly the best opportunities of information, could learn little of the history of Achaia;

Polyb. l. 2.
p. 127.

The general character of the Achæans for probity at the same time stood singularly high among the Greeks, while their power was invidious to none; insomuch that, after the battle of Leuctra, the Lacedæmonian and Theban governments agreed to refer a matter in dispute (what it was we are uninformed) to their arbitration. In the war between Thebes and Lacedæmon, as far as we have yet traced it, they seem to have maintained an exact neutrality; except that, in the extreme danger of Sparta itself, in the invasion of Laconia under Epaminondas, the Pellenians,

Xen. Hel. l. 6.
c. 5. s. 29.
Thucyd. l. 2.
c. 9.

always more attached than the rest to the Lacedæmonian interest, sent their mite of assistance to their distressed friends. But the elevation of a new patron for democracy, preponderant among the powers of Greece, not by sea, as Athens formerly, but by land, and which, as experience had shown, could extend its arm with effect into Peloponnesus, appears to have excited new ambition in the democratical leaders; for even among the Achæans parties existed. The democratical party in Achaia communicated with Thebes; and the Theban leaders, in the dilemma in which their failure in the late congress had left them, received the communication with eager attention. Disappointed, and in some degree disgraced in the eyes of all Greece, here appeared a point to which the exertion of the confederacy might be directed, with the plausible pretence of supporting the democratical cause, and the cause of Grecian independency, by delivering Achaia from subjection to Lacedæmon. In the want of such an object, or in the neglect of it, their influence over the confederacy would risk a rapid

so that what we gain from Herodotus, Thucydides, and Xenophon may be considered as everything most material of what was known to antiquity, till that bright period which none of those writers lived to see, but which fell directly under the view of Polybius, and of which his detail is of high value., ,

decay. The establishment then of their influence in Achaia would form a check, which they greatly desired, upon the new refractoriness of some of their Peloponnesian allies, especially the Arcadians. It was therefore resolved, that the army of the confederacy should march into Achaia, and Epaminondas was appointed to the command.

Xen. Hel. 1. 7.
c. 1. s. 29.
Diodorus,
l. 15. c. 496.
B. C. 366. (2)
Ol. 103. 2-3.
Dodw.

On the other side, to prevent this expected invasion of Peloponnesus, the passes of mount Onion on the isthmus were occupied by two bodies of troops; one under a Lacedæmonian, the other under an Athenian officer. But the alliances of Thebes within the peninsula afforded opportunities for rendering such precaution vain. It was attributed to negligence in both the commanders, that the Argive general, Pisias, found means to establish two thousand men on a commanding height, which enabled Epaminondas to enter Peloponnesus without material molestation. He was quickly joined by the Peloponnesian allies, and all together directed their march toward Achaia.

Xen. Hel. 1. 7
c. 1. s. 30.

Meanwhile the principal men of that country, after deliberation on their critical circumstances, instead of either attempting a vain resistance, or betaking themselves to the wretched resource of flight, resolved to trust the liberal character of Epaminondas, and meet him with a declaration of their readiness to commit their fortune into his hands. He did not deceive their opinion of him. Exerting his influence, and perhaps stretching his power, he prevented banishment, yet preserved the constitution of every city inviolate; and, only requiring pledges that they would be faithful to the Theban confederacy, and follow in arms

² Dodwell gives the Achæan business to the year 366, and the Phliasian to the preceding year, 367. They seem to have been going forward about the same time, occupying part of both years.

wheresoever the Thebans might lead, he conducted his army home.³

Diod. l. 15.
Plut. vit.
Pelopid.

Pelopidas, we are told, so held his interest with the Theban people that, from the expulsion

of the Lacedæmonians till his death, he was constantly in the office of Bœotarch by yearly election. The mag-

Ibid.

nanimity and steady virtue of Epaminondas could not so condescend to popular folly and depravity

as to hold popular favour, or even to avoid sometimes disgrace, with that occasional majority of the multitude which wielded, in the moment, the absolute sovereignty of

Thebes. His indulgence toward the principal families of Achaia, highly disappointing to their

opponents, who had depended upon succeeding to the honours and profiting from the estates of fugitives, was un-

satisfactory to the high democratical party throughout the confederacy. The Arcadians especially, predisposed to

blame the measures of Theban councils, joined with the Achæan malcontents in complaining aloud that "the in-

terest of Lacedæmon rather than of their confederacy was considered in the settlement of Achaia." Clamour from

without so assisting party within Thebes, the interest of Epaminondas did not suffice for the support of his own

measure. The Theban people, calling themselves champions of the liberty of Greece, decreed that regulators

should be sent to the Achæan cities. Under the superintendence of the regulators the many drove the principal

men of every Achæan town into banishment, seized of

³ This story is told in the original in these few words: Προσπειρόντων δ' αὐτῶν τῶν βελτίστων ἐκ τῆς Ἀχαιῆας, ἐνδυναστίει ὁ Ἐπαμινώνδας, ὥστε μὴ φυγαδεῦσαι τοὺς κρατίστους, μήτε πολιτείαν μεταστῆσαι, ἀλλὰ πιστὰ λαβεῖν παρὰ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν, ἢ μὴν συμμάχους ἴσσειναι, καὶ ἀκολουθήσειν ἕτη ἂν Θηβαῖοι ἡγῶνται· καὶ οὕτως ἀπῆλθον οἴκαδε. I have endeavoured to give a faithful interpretation of this passage in the text. A mere version, without dilating in some parts, could scarcely be made at the same time faithful and intelligible.

course their estates, and changed the governments to pure democracy.

It soon appeared that the measure of Epaminondas had been a measure of true policy not less than of justice and humanity, and that the popular measure superseding it was as unprofitable as tyrannical; disadvantageous to Thebes, to the confederacy at large, and, in the end, still more to the many in the Achæan towns, whose benefit was more particularly its pretended object. The exiles were numerous, and held still some influence in every town. Uniting, and directing their whole force against each separately, they recovered all. No longer then moderate as before in their politics, they engaged warmly in the Lacedæmonian interest. What their domestic adversaries suffered, the historian has not informed us; but he says that considerable inconvenience followed to the Arcadians, annoyed now on their northern border by the active and zealous enmity of Achaia, while on the southern they were pressed, or constantly threatened, by the force of Lacedæmon.⁴

Under these circumstances the Achæans owed their security principally to the troubles in neighbouring states, engaging the attention of Thebes, and employing the arms of her Peloponnesian allies. The situation of PHLIUS, bordering on Arcadia and Argolis, and in the road from the isthmus to Lacedæmon, made the acquisition of that little city much an object for the confederacy. It was not the less so on account of the remarkable fidelity with

⁴ I have been the more desirous that the learned reader should have ready opportunity to judge of the faithfulness of my interpretation of that passage of Xenophon, given in the preceding note, because I think the passage, with its sequel, does altogether singular credit both to Xenophon and to Epaminondas; insomuch that, I will own, I doubt if the laboured panegyric of Plutarch, were his Life of Epaminondas extant, would so strongly paint the real merit of his hero, to the penetrating and judicious, as this simple and compressed narrative from a political enemy.

which, since the last revolution when Delphion fled, its people had adhered under all fortunes to their engagements with Lacedæmon, and of the spirit and success with which on many trying occasions they had exerted themselves, as well in support of their allies, as in defence of themselves.

Xen. Hel. 1. 7.
c. 2. s. 3. Their zealous activity in the extreme danger of Sparta, when invaded by Epaminondas, was warmly acknowledged by the Lacedæmonians. In revenge on the other hand for this, the Argives, in returning from that expedition, directed the usual ravage of Grecian armies particularly against Phliasia. The Phliasiens, utterly unequal to meet them in the field, nevertheless with only sixty horse pursuing them so completely routed the rear-guard, as to raise their trophy in sight of the Argive army.

It was the misfortune of Phlius, in common with almost all Grecian republics, and the unavoidable consequence of sedition and revolution, to have emigrant citizens more vehemently inimical than any strangers. The miserable insecurity of those little republics is forcibly marked in what the contemporary historian proceeds to relate. While the

s. 4—9. Thebans were the second time invading Peloponnesus, the Eleans and Arcadians, marching through Nemea to join them, were persuaded by the Phliasian exiles accompanying them that the appearance only of support from the army would enable them to recover their city. The exiles and others accordingly, to the number of six hundred, prepared with scaling-ladders, arrived by night under the very walls of Phlius undiscovered, and waited there. The march of the supporting army however was observed from an outpost at Tricranum, and indicated to those in the city by signals. But in the city were some who held intelligence with the exiles. These hastened to give the concerted token for scaling; and the citadel, ill-

guarded, was taken almost without resistance. Alarm rapidly pervaded the town, and the people ran to arms. The exiles, hoping to profit from the first confusion, sallied from the citadel into the town. They were however repulsed, and, as they retreated again into the citadel, the pursuers entered with them. But the Elean, Arcadian, and Argive forces had by this time surrounded the town, and proceeded immediately to scale the walls. The threatening horrors of a storm seemed now beyond the strength of those within to avert; but, by a series of exertions, well-directed, spirited, and persevering, they at length repelled the assailants. Without remission then, applying their whole strength to the recovery of their citadel, they effected it. This was no sooner done than their cavalry boldly sallied. The enemy, baffled in all points, and probably weak in cavalry, were so fearful of the threatened annoyance to their retreat that, in their haste, they left their ladders, their slain, and even some wounded; mostly those lamed by leaping from the walls. Extreme danger thus fortunately, quickly, and for the moment completely surmounted, produced emotions among the Phliasians stronger than perhaps any known in the more generous warfare of modern ages; unless where, recently, France has gone beyond all ancient example in illiberality and ferocity. The spectacle, it appears, was striking, even in those days; the men shaking hands while they circulated congratulations, the women busy with cups, ministering to their refreshment, and shedding tears of joy; and at length (if it may be allowed so literally to translate the strong expression) all actually seized with a weeping laughter.⁵

In the following year the united forces of Arcadia and Argos invaded Phlissia to revenge

Xen. Hel. 1. 7.
c. 2. s. 10.

⁵ Πάντας δὲ τοὺς παρόντας τότε γὰρ ὄντι κλαυσιγέλαος εἶχεν. Xen. Hel. 1. 7. c. 2. s. 9.

their defeat by ravage of the country, and not without hope of so distressing the town as to reduce it to capitulate. The long and severe pressure of a strong democratical party seems to have urged the aristocratical Phliasians to cultivate the cavalry service; so that, among the Peloponnesians, they appeared to have excelled in it. A small body of Athenian horse had joined the Phliasian; and together, supported by a small chosen body of foot, they attacked the Argives and Arcadians broken in crossing a river, and with such success, as considerably to check the intended waste of their fields.

But the unfortunate Phliasians, after the Thebans became masters of Achaia, were so surrounded by enemies, that all their energy and all their success could not enable them to procure subsistence from their fields. Yet they still per-

Xen. Hel. 1. 7.
c. 2. s. 11—15. severed, and still were successful. The Theban commander in Achaia entered their country at

the head of his own troops, with the force of Sicyon and Pellene strengthened with two thousand mercenaries. The Phliasians, finding opportunity to attack the Sicyonians and Pellenians separately, defeated them with such slaughter that the expedition was pursued no farther. Xenophon

s. 16. has thought it matter for particular notice and warm eulogy that, though the wants and poverty of the Phliasians were pressing, a Pellenian, connected by public hospitality with Phlius, being made prisoner, was released without ransom. Deprived of the

s. 17. produce of their own lands, they found means to obtain occasional supplies, sometimes by rapine from their enemies, sometimes by purchase from Corinth, but always through many difficulties and dangers: with difficulty raising the price for their purchases; sometimes by collection among themselves, sometimes by borrowing; and then, on account of the peril of the convoy,

with difficulty finding pledges even for the necessary beasts of burthen.

In extreme distress at length they were so fortunate as to obtain the assistance of the Athenian general Chares, commanding a body of mercenaries at Corinth.⁶ Beyond the direct line of his commission he joined them in protecting a convoy. With such an auxiliary force they arrived at Phlius unopposed, and then they requested Chares to give them his farther protection in carrying their useless mouths to Pellene: for already the revolution in Achaia had taken place, which restored the government of that little city to the party with which the Phliasians had old and intimate connection. He consented, and they arrived there also unmolested. The market of a place so friendly, and with which they had not for a long time been able to communicate, engaged their attention. They knew that, if they encumbered themselves with a convoy, they should certainly be attacked in their return. Nevertheless they provided themselves to the utmost, that their credit and the Pellenian stores would enable them; and, Chares still giving his willing assistance, they fought their way home successfully, and carried in their convoy undiminished. This seems to have been that action of the Nemean glen in which, as we shall find occasion to observe hereafter, credit was earned by Æschines, an Athenian youth, afterward of so much celebrity as an orator.

The small population of Phlius, or the small number of those whom the ruling party could trust with arms, little allowed reliefs in these arduous duties. But their activity supplied the want of number. They had scarcely taken a few hours' rest by daylight after a night of great fatigue when they

⁶ *Ξένους*, s. 20. and *μισθοφόροι*, s. 21.

proposed to Chares a new enterprise. To check their convoys in future, equally from Corinth to Pellene, and to extend waste over their territory with more safety, more certainty, and more constancy, the enemy were fortifying a post at Thyamia, on the Phliasian border, against Sicyonia. Chares consenting, they moved so as, by a rapid march, to reach the place a little before sunset; and they found equally the workmen and the protecting force, in the con-

Xen. Hel. 1. 7.
c. 2. s. 22. temporary historian's description, some cooking,

some baking, some preparing their beds. All completely surprised, all instantly fled. The Phliasi-
s. 25. ans and their allies then profited from the preparation made. Having stationed their guards, they supped, made libations as thanks-offerings for their success, sang the pæan of victory, and went to rest. Immediately

however as their success was ascertained, they sent a messenger to Corinth with the news; and the Corinthian administration, not waiting for daylight, hastened with the most friendly zeal to press carriages, and despatch them, laden with provisions, to Phlius. Meanwhile the indefatigable Phliasi-
 ans applying themselves diligently to complete the fortification of Thyamia, made that, intended for their annoyance and destruction, a post for protecting their territory and securing the communication with Corinth. Convoys passed then daily, and Phlius was abundantly supplied.

The testimony of Xenophon, which he has had evident pleasure in giving, to the merits of the Phliasi-
 ans, will deserve our credit, though he was their political partisan; yet the sincerity of history will require our recollection, that a very strong interest, supported by very strong prejudices, and by the remembrance of past sufferings, bound the Phliasi-
 ans to the line of conduct by which they earned so much honour, instigated their activity, and in a manner

compelled them to firmness. About seven and twenty years had passed since the party, now ruling Phlius, then suffering in exile, vainly petitioned Lacedæmon for assistance toward their restoration. Not till near ten years after, finding a more favourable opportunity, they had succeeded so far as to obtain, through the influence of Lacedæmon, re-admission to residence in the city, and a promise of restoration of their property. But that promise was not fulfilled: justice was denied them by their fellow-citizens; their residence was highly uneasy and precarious; some were compelled to a second flight; and it cost Lacedæmon a troublesome war to give them complete re-establishment. When this was effected, the most active of the democratical party, or those who, with the watchful Delphion, escaped death, took their turn in flight. Under such circumstances, with the Theban confederacy triumphant, there could be no hope of peace for those who held the city without the condition that the democratical exiles should be restored. Thence would follow the predominance of the democratical party under the patronage of a democratical confederacy; and what would then be the situation of its political opponents is obvious to conjecture. But Xenophon, in the course of his long observation of the troubles of Greece, would have had frequent occasion to see that all men, single or in body, are not capable of that firm perseverance and active exertion which their own interest, in difficult and dangerous circumstances, may require; and that those who faint in pursuit of their own good may appear unfaithful to their friends, without intending infidelity. Thus while they incur our blame they may also claim our pity. But hence he would justly conclude, that men who, amid the greatest difficulties, and most threatening dangers, are true at the same time to themselves and to their friends, failing in nothing that their

Ch. 25. s. 4.
of this Hist.

Ch. 26. s. 1. &
4. of this Hist.

own interest, their engagements to others, or a sense of justice, generosity, and honour demands; who, in short, in honesty actively pursue the best policy, deserve admiration and applause; and thus the Phliasians seem to have earned his eulogy, which has perpetuated the renown of their little commonwealth.

SECTION II.

Affairs of Sicyon. — Euphron Tyrant of Sicyon. — Liberal Despotism of Æneas, General of Arcadia. — Principles of Grecian Law of Nations and of Theban civil Jurisprudence illustrated. — Public Honours to the Memory of Euphron.

DURING these transactions of the Phliasians, which, by engaging the attention of the Theban confederacy, contributed to the quiet of Achaia, the affairs of Sicyon, more urging the attention of the Theban government, had still more powerfully the same effect. Sicyon, a Dorian state, frequently at war with the more powerful Dorian state of Corinth on its eastern border, had contracted connections with the Achæan towns, its western neighbours, such as to produce a transfusion of the Achæan institutions into the

Xen. Hel. 1. 7.
c. 1. s. 44. Sicyonian government. At the time of the battle of Leuctra the Sicyonian constitution, after the Achæan model, was a balanced aristocracy. While the Lacedæmonians yet held their full influence in Peloponnesus, Euphron, an able but unprincipled man, acting as their agent for the management of their interest in Sicyon, was first in power there: but, in their inability afterward so to extend their views and exertions, Sicyon, yielding to the pressure of circumstances, became connected with the Theban confederacy, and Euphron lost his pre-eminence. Anxious, beyond all things, to regain it, and careless about the honesty of his means, he represented to the leading

men of Argos and Arcadia that, if the families of property were allowed to hold their rank and influence, Sicyon, on the first opportunity, would become again the ally of Lacedæmon: but, were democracy established, it would be secured in its present connection. With due support then from them, he would engage that a simple vote of the people should effect the change. The proposal, profligate as it was, from Euphron, involving the ruin of those with whom he had been most connected, nevertheless suiting the views of the Argive and Arcadian leaders, they sent the support desired. Euphron then convened the Sicyonian people; and, in presence of the Argive and Arcadian auxiliaries, he proposed, and it was at once voted, "that the government should be changed to a democracy, with perfect equality for all citizens." Election, under awe of the same foreign force, placed Euphron, with four others, at the head of the native military, and raised Adeas, son of Euphron, to the command of a body of mercenaries in the service of the republic.

These leading points being carried, Euphron proceeded presently to show how much more glaring is the temptation, and how much readier the means, to become a complete tyrant in a democracy, or under democratical patronage, than in any other political circumstances. His mercenary army was to be his principal instrument. He directed his attention therefore first to secure its attachment, then to increase its numbers. For both purposes the indispensable efficient was money. To acquire money therefore he scrupled nothing. With command of money he trusted that he could find support in any measure. The public treasury and ordinary revenue of the state being very unequal to his need, he made no difficulty of risking what generally excited violent popular indignation, — to take the sacred treasures from the temples, and convert to his

use the revenues appropriated to sacred purposes. These being still insufficient, he had recourse to oppression of individuals. He encouraged accusations of Laconism; so attachment to the Lacedæmonian party was termed, that party of which himself had been chief. Thus the property of many of the wealthiest families, through confiscation, became at his disposal. When, after a short but rapid course of violences, through the attachment of dependents and the removal of adversaries, he thought himself strong enough, he proceeded to direct his measures against those who might become rivals. Procuring the death of some of his colleagues, and the exile of others, he got all power into his own hands, and became truly tyrant of Sicyon. During these measures within his own little state he directed his attention ably, upon similar principles, to the republics with which it had political connection; and he obviated interference of the confederacy, partly by money, and partly by the ready and effective service of his troops for its purposes, whenever and wherever required.⁷

Where a people had not, for a long time, experienced any severe pressure from a foreign enemy, or very alarming danger, democratical jealousy would sometimes pervade the military system, and make all democratical; as among the Syracusans at the time of the Athenian invasion of Sicily: but wherever frequent wars have occurred, democratical jealousy itself has soon felt the necessity of remitting its severity, so far as to allow, for military matters, some degree of monarchical authority. The Arcadians therefore, whose experience of war, while a divided people, was large, and whose union was effected during a war involving nearly all Greece,

⁷ It were endless to point out all the several circumstances of resemblance in the French and in the worst times of some of the Greek republics; but almost the whole of this history of Euphron might seem, instead of having been written two thousand three hundred years ago, an account of transactions within the last three years from the time of first editing this volume.

in forming their united government committed the military establishment of their democratical townships, under the control of their Numberless assembly, to the authority of one commander-in-chief for the nation. Æneas of Stymphalus, holding that great office, saw with a just indignation the tyranny of Euphron; and, nothing forbidding an arbitrary use of the ill-defined power with which he was vested, he resolved to exert it for a generous purpose. Leading the Arcadian army to Sicyon, where none resisted an ally in his high situation, he marched directly into the citadel. Imitating then the liberal policy of Epaminondas, he called together the principal men in the town, and sent for all who, without a regular sentence, had been forced or frightened into banishment. Apparently the inconveniences resulting from the reversal of the measures of Epaminondas in Achaia had brought the narrow policy of his opponents into disrepute, and enabled the Arcadian general, with the concurrence probably of Epaminondas, to follow a more generous system. Euphron therefore, shrinking before him, had however resources in his abilities and in his daring profligacy. Withdrawing from the city, he communicated with the Corinthian government, and managed to introduce a Lacedæmonian garrison into the port of Sicyon. On the merit of this service then he founded an endeavour to apologise to the Lacedæmonian government for his past conduct, and to regain its confidence. But the Lacedæmonians, though ready to profit from his services, were slow to give him the credit he desired; and in the mean time new opportunity arose to invite the attention of his active and versatile mind, bound by no scruples.

The Arcadian general, apparently little a politician, satisfied with having expelled the tyrant, left the Sicyonians to settle their own affairs, not however in perfect independency; for, to secure their fidelity to the confederacy, the

Xen. Hel. 1. 7.
c. 3. s. 1.

s. 2, 3.

Xen. Hel. 1. 7.
c. 3. s. 4.

command of their citadel (so the Theban authority prevailed in Peloponnesus) was committed to a Theban harmost. But a cordial and lasting coalition between the aristocratical and democratical parties was seldom effected in a Grecian republic, and was not effected in Sicyon. Their differences prevented measures for the recovery of the port. Meanwhile Euphron, versed in the ways of engaging mercenary troops, procured some from Athens, and then offered his assistance to the democratical faction in Sicyon. That faction, to whom the liberality of Æneas and the leading men of the confederacy had denied the partial support to which they thought their democratical merit entitled them, did not scruple to submit themselves again to so unprincipled a leader. Euphron was received into the city, and the force he brought with him sufficed to give his democratical friends, for the moment, a clear superiority over their opponents. But thus, making the Lacedæmonians again his decided enemies, he risked to incur the vengeance also of the Theban confederacy. Intrigue and corruption were his resources. Equally daring and ingenious in his profligacy, with the greatest force of money he could collect he went himself to Thebes.

s. 5.

Those Sicyonians who had been recalled from banishment by the generous despotism of the Arcadian general, informed of Euphron's journey, and of the preparation he had made for it, were in high alarm. To obviate the consequences some of them went directly to Thebes. But their alarm was greatly increased when they saw how well Euphron was received, and to what intimate communication admitted, by some of the Thebans in power. In the vehemence of their fear then of being again subjected to his tyranny, they were ready to dare anything. In the citadel, while the council was sitting there, and apparently without a prospect of making their escape, they assassinated

him. They were immediately apprehended and carried before the council, which was the principal criminal tribunal of Thebes.

It cannot but be matter of just curiosity to know what were the principles and practice of criminal law in Thebes in the age of Epaminondas, when Thebes, after Athens and Lacedæmon, was aspiring at the supremacy of Greece ; and the picture preserved to us by the masterly hand of the contemporary historian is highly curious. A principal magistrate delivered the charge against the assassins thus :—

“ Citizens, we institute a capital accusation against these men for the murder of Euphron. Unjust and impious deeds, which good men avoid and abhor, even the wicked perpetrate commonly in some anxiety for concealment ; but the audaciousness and profligacy of these men has been such that, almost in presence of us the chief magistrates, and of you, to whom it belongs to absolve or condemn, they have assumed to themselves to put a man to death. If they then escape capital punishment, what stranger will hereafter with any confidence enter your city ? Where is the jurisdiction of your state, if any stranger is allowed, at his pleasure, to kill another before it is declared what has been the object of either in coming hither ? We therefore prosecute these men as offenders, in the highest degree, against divine and human laws, and singularly guilty of contempt of the jurisdiction of the state. It depends upon you, after hearing them, to pronounce their doom.”

The Sicyonians denied the charge ; except one, who, in taking the whole blame, boldly claimed merit for the deed : “ To contemn your jurisdiction, Thebans,” he said, “ for one who knows he is at your mercy, is impossible. In what confidence then I killed this man I will declare to you. It was, first, that I thought it just ; and then, that I trusted

you would judge of it justly. For I knew that yourselves, when you arrested Archias and Hypates, for crimes similar to those of Euphron, did not wait for the formality of a trial, but used the means in your power for inflicting instant punishment; holding, that men eminently wicked, notoriously traitors, and usurpers of sovereign authority, are condemned to death by the common sentence of mankind.”

He proceeded then to state the crimes of Euphron against gods and men: stripping the temples of Sicyon, rich in dedicated gold and silver⁸: betraying the Lacedæmonians, betraying the confederacy, tyrannising over his fellow-citizens, raising slaves to honourable situations, and, as his interest instigated, putting to death, banishing, or ruining by confiscation, the worthiest of the people: “After this,” continued the accused, “introducing the Athenians, the most determined of your enemies; with their co-operation opposing your harmost in arms; and, unable so to carry his purpose, finally coming here prepared with money.—Had he come in arms and I had killed him, you would have thanked me. Coming then with money, to procure by corruption your favour⁹, that he might again be master of our city, how, for striking the blow of justice against him, can you justly condemn me? The violence of an open enemy, injurious indeed, is not necessarily unjust; but bribery is intrinsically unjust, injurious, and disgracing.

“If, nevertheless, being my enemy, Euphron had been your friend, I would not pretend to justify killing him in your city: but so grossly a traitor as he was to you, how could he be more my enemy than yours? He came hither, it may be said, freely. But if, before he entered your territory, putting him to death would have been meritorious, how,

⁸ Ἀναθήματα.

⁹ This may seem a strong expression for one in the prisoner's situation to use, but it certainly does not go beyond the original, “Ὁς δὲ ἡγήματα ἔλθε παρασκευασάμενος, ὡς τοῦτοις ὑμᾶς διαφθερῶν, κ. τ. λ.

when he came with the purpose of adding to his former crimes, can it be maintained that he has not suffered justly? Where, among the Greeks, are not traitors, deserters, and tyrants held as outlaws; rejected from divine protection, and out of all compact with men? ¹⁰

“ You have yourselves decided by a decree, that fugitives may be apprehended, throughout the confederacy, and carried to their proper city. Can it then be contended that the exile who returns, unauthorised by a common decree of the confederate states, may not justly be put to death? I affirm that, if you condemn me, you will avenge the most injurious of all your enemies; and, on the contrary, if you determine that I have done well, you will clearly participate in justice, done to yourselves and to all your allies.”

We have already had too many occasions to observe the familiarity of the Greeks with assassination: a crime which the better policy, scarcely less than the better religion and morality, of modern times had taught utterly to abhor, till a singularly profligate faction in France, with the impudently arrogated title of philosophers, lately attempted to give new vogue to the atrocious baseness. If palliation can be for such a crime, (for excuse cannot,) it must arise from political circumstances as unfortunate as those of Greece; among whose diminutive states, unceasingly struggling for an ill-understood civil freedom and an impossible political independency, political difficulties were always existing, and political necessities often arising, which a state of extensive dominion, with large population, cannot know. To those difficulties and necessities apparently should be attributed, in a great degree, the striking imperfections of the Grecian

¹⁰ Ποῦ ἔχον Ἑλλησι σπονδὰς ἀποδιῆσαι ἢ προδόταις, ἢ πάλιν αὐτομόλαις, ἢ τυράννοις; For fuller explanation of the phrase *σπονδὰς ἀποδιῆσαι*, the reader, desirous of it, may see the fourth section of the fifteenth chapter of this History, toward the conclusion; and for confirmation of that explanation, the fifth section of the twenty-third chapter, toward the middle.

administration of justice. Political dangers were for ever pressing around too closely, to allow a strict adherence to fixed law and regular proceeding. The little republic was continually in circumstances in which the senate of more powerful Rome would commit absolute authority to the consuls by charging them to guard against detriment to the commonwealth. It is obvious how political interests would be likely to interfere with the judgment on the death of Euphron. Epaminondas himself, to support his system of liberal policy toward the states engaged or likely to engage in the Theban confederacy, might find it necessary to concur, if not in declaring approbation of the murder of Euphron, yet in screening the assassin. Nevertheless we cannot without some wonder observe the extreme deficiency of principle and confusion of principle, with regard both to what could with advantage be applied to the regulation of the conduct of independent states toward each other, and what might direct the dispensation of justice, within any state, to its own people, which are striking in these speeches reported by Xenophon; speeches intended by him, if not for an exact representation of what was actually said by the persons to whom they are attributed, yet certainly for what was proper, or at least probable, to have been said. Avoiding however, as usual, to give any opinion of his own upon the subject, he proceeds to state the result, "that the Theban council declared Euphron to have suffered justly."

Xen. Hel. 1. 7.
c. 3. s. 8.

That there should remain, in Sicyon, men disposed to do the memory of Euphron honour, those who have been accustomed to observe the ways in which political party-interest is put forward, will not be surprised. It was the business of those with whom he had been principally connected to obviate the probable acquisition of ascendancy by the party which opposed him; and it was with this view that they

held out Euphron to the people as the martyr of the popular cause. They sent to Thebes, requesting his body, which was not denied them, and they buried it with public pomp in the agora, which was among the highest marks of respect for deceased worth; the general custom of the Greeks, as of the Romans, forbidding burial within the walls of a town; and they procured a decree for lasting honours to his memory. What has passed in France, in our own time, will assist to make such transactions more readily and extensively intelligible, and to give means for a just estimate of the value of such public honours. The contemporary historian, commonly confining himself strictly to statement of fact, makes this reflection here: "Thus," he says, "apparently most men appreciate political merit by their private advantages or sufferings resulting from political measures."

SECTION III.

Affairs of Athens. — Athenian Exiles. — Oropus. — Progress of Change in Grecian Politics adverse to Theban Supremacy. — Alliance of Arcadia with Athens. — Insecurity of Person in Greece. — Alienation of Corinth from Athens. — New Pressure upon Lacedæmon. — Magnanimity of Lacedæmon. — Uprightness of Corinth. — Partial Peace. — Injustice of Argos.

THE affairs of Athens, from the restoration of the democracy, now seven and thirty years¹, appear to have been administered with general prudence. The rarity of the mention of them in the contemporary Athenian historian's general account of Grecian affairs implies that, compared at least with other Grecian states, regularity and quiet prevailed there. The steady support which the Athenian government

¹ From B. C. 403 to 366. [Vol. V. p. 64.]

gave to the falling power of Lacedæmon, and the steady yet moderate opposition to the new ambition of Thebes, are positive indications that the popular will was wisely guided, against ancient prejudice, to the true interest of the commonwealth; and the preservation of peace to the Attic territory, while an enemy on its border threatened the most distant parts of Greece, and the acquisition of new glory to the Athenian arms by supporting the allies of the commonwealth in Peloponnesus against such an enemy, evince ability and energy in the administration. Nevertheless, under the Athenian constitution, with the Athenian system of jurisprudence, the Athenian law of treason, and sycophancy flourishing, civil quiet could be but imperfect and precarious. Many Athenians accordingly were at this time suffering in exile; and so familiar, among the Grecian republics, was the flight or banishment of numerous bodies of citizens that, when unattended with extreme violence, they seem to have been thought scarcely matter for historical notice. Xenophon has mentioned the exiles but incidentally, leaving us wholly uninformed of the time, the cause, and every circumstance of this new schism of the Athenian people. For the modern reader some information on the subject seems wanting toward a clear understanding of this part of Grecian history; and a collation of those ancient writers from whom we have memorials of the times will furnish what may be useful.

In the embassy from the principal Grecian states to the Persian court we have seen the Athenian minister, Timocrates, lending himself to Pelopidas, to put forward the

Plut. vit.
Pelop.

Theban interest. Timocrates, as the stories reported of him by Plutarch indicate, was a vain weak man, dazzled by the splendour of the Persian court, delighted with Asiatic pomp and luxury, and fond of displaying presents, such as it remains yet the custom of

Asiatic courts to make, though at the risk of exciting among his fellow-countrymen, according to their different tempers and degrees of information, suspicion, envy, or contempt. Formed however, as he seems to have been, to become the tool of the able Theban, yet it is not likely that, with a colleague protesting against his conduct, he could have been led so to co-operate with the man whom he was particularly commissioned to oppose, if some old party-views had not prepared him, and if the expectation of support from a party did not encourage him. He might however very possibly both wander from the views and miscalculate the strength of his party. On his return, Leon accusing him of neglecting and betraying the interests of the commonwealth, he was brought to trial, condemned, and executed.

Xen. Hel. 1. 7.
c. 1. s. 26.

There remained yet in Athens, as various passages of Lysias and Isocrates testify, a relic of the old aristocratical party of the Four-hundred.

Ch. 21. and 22.
of this Hist.
Isocr. de Pace,
p. 254. v. 2.

In the actual confusion then of interests among the Grecian republics, while the Athenian democracy was allied with the aristocratical confederacy of Lacedæmon against the democratical confederacy of Thebes, if the aristocratical opposition in Athens had communication with the Theban leaders, the complication was not stranger than we have seen, in the course of the Peloponnesian war, during the peace between Athens and Lacedæmon. But that the inherent tyranny of the Athenian democracy pressed severely upon men of property in general, is shown by the most unequivocal testimony of the same great orators, the ablest advocates of the democratical cause. A few leading men, as Isocrates complains, grew rich from the public spoil; while, in the impossibility for any to live in ease and security, the city was filled with lamentation and complaint. The indigent multitude, living by the assemblies and the courts of justice, delighted in accusations, prose-

cutions, and the whole business of sycophancy; encouraged by the men in power, who held their power from that multitude; while men of property were so oppressed with arbitrary orders, sometimes for military service, sometimes for civil office, frequently for contributions to the treasury, and, on any complaint of severity, vexed with demands of exchange of property, that their condition was altogether more uneasy than that of men who never possessed anything.

This sketch of the state of Athens, given to the public in an oration addressed to the Athenian people between twenty and thirty years after the time of which we are treating, but by one fifty years of age, as it speaks of no new state of things, but rather of inveterate evils, may account for the circumstance that many Athenian citizens were in exile. Those unfortunate men then combining made themselves

masters of the town and port of Oropus in Attica, on the border of Bœotia. Those who directed the administration of the commonwealth were greatly alarmed. Fearful probably of disaffection, they did not think it sufficient to assemble the whole force within Attica to make war upon the refugees, but they sent for Chares with the troops he commanded in Peloponnesus. Thus opportunity was afforded for the Sicyonians which they did not neglect. The force under Chares, and the abilities and activity of the commander, had been the principal support of the Lacedæmonian cause in the north of the peninsula. As soon as these were withdrawn, the Arcadians, no longer fearing for their own country, readily gave assistance requested by the Sicyonians, who thus presently recovered their port. Meanwhile the Athenians, unable to obtain any assistance from their allies, little confident in their own means for attacking a fortified place within ready reach of support from Thebes, and perhaps yet more fearful of a party within, than of an enemy without, came to terms which

Xen. Hel. 1. 7.
c. 4. s. 1.
B. C. 363.
Ol. 103. 2-3.

are remarkable : it was agreed that Oropus should be held by the Thebans, in trust, till the matters in dispute, whether between the Athenians of the city and the exiles, or between the Athenian and Theban governments, should be decided by a fair arbitration.¹²

While the supremacy of Greece was yielded by general consent to Lacedæmon, or disputed only by Athens, it was scarcely possible for a citizen of any other state to acquire any considerable eminence in the nation. But the depression, successively of Athens and Lacedæmon, made an opening which Thebes had not so completely filled as to preclude competition. On the contrary, the sudden and totally unexpected elevation of a new candidate for empire among the republics appears to have excited emulation. Lycomedes of Mantinea, a man of large and liberal views, attentive to the circumstances of the surrounding states, obtained assurance that dissatisfaction was growing among the Athenians, in consequence of their not finding that ready return of assistance to which they thought their exertions for their allies entitled them. Though Athens was still the confederate, and Arcadia the enemy, of Lacedæmon, he conceived it possible that a connection might be formed between Arcadia and Athens, advantageous to both, and perhaps extensively advantageous to Greece. He obtained a decree from the assembly of the Ten-thousand, or the Numberless, authorising negotiation for the purpose, and he resolved to be himself the negotiator. The proposal was received at Athens not without surprise, and warmly ex-

¹² *Τοῖς δ' Ἀθηναίοις οὐδεὶς τῶν συμμάχων ἰσοθήσθην, ἀλλ' ἀνεχάρεσαν, Θηβαίοις παρακαταθέμενοι τὸν Ὀρωπὸν μέχρι δίκης.* This passage seems to me to want something. All the translators have agreed to turn it nearly alike, none very intelligibly, and none noticing any difficulty. I have not much doubt of the explanation I have ventured to give ; but I want the information, a want I have before had occasion to mention, what the *δίκη* could be, which might be reasonably trusted for an equitable decision of a matter in dispute between either two independent states or two factions of the same state.

claimed against by many as contrary to the existing engagements with Lacedæmon: but when it was represented how greatly the connection of Arcadia with Athens would tend to obviate the interference of Thebes in Peloponnesus, insomuch that it appeared to promise no less advantage to the Lacedæmonians than to the Athenians themselves, the objections mostly ceased, and a treaty of alliance was concluded. It was stipulated that, if Arcadia should be attacked, Athens should send a body of cavalry to its assistance, but that this auxiliary force should not be bound to march with the Arcadians into Laconia.

Xen. Hel. 1. 7.
c. 4. s. 6.

s. 3.
Lycomedes returning from Athens unfortunately landed at a port of Peloponnesus which happened to be, at that time, full of Arcadian refugees. His death is mentioned by the contemporary historian as what, in such circumstances, followed of course. Though we cease to wonder at this after observing the circumstances of the death of Euphron, yet it is a remarkable instance in addition to so many before occurring of the excessive deficiency of provision for personal security in Greece. The treaty with Athens survived; but the views of the able negotiator, how far of a noble patriotism, how far of selfish ambition, his premature death has left uncertain, mostly seem to have perished with him. To judge however from the scanty mention of him by the historian, his political adversary, Lycomedes, with the best ability and the best inclination, unless exception should be made for Epaminondas, seems to have been in the most favourable circumstances for extending peace and good policy in Greece of any man of his time.

After the death of Lycomedes Grecian politics continued for some time to hold the bent which he had principally given them; but the intuitive eye watching all points in all the republics, and the ably guiding hand, were wanting.

Soon after the accommodation, so unexpectedly effected between Athens and Arcadia, an indiscreet speech in the Athenian assembly alienated Corinth. The situation of Corinth, most advantageous in peace, was most unfortunate whenever war was general in Greece. Its territory, the thoroughfare between the northern and southern provinces, could not fail to suffer frequently, and to be in danger always. As the Grecian confederacies now stood, Corinth, cut off from Lacedæmon by the intervention of hostile states, Arcadia, Elea, and Argolis, could receive ready and effectual support only from Athens. Thence that state had been accustomed so to rely upon Athenian auxiliaries as to have incurred unawares the danger of becoming dependent upon Athens. One of those imprudent orators, by whom, in the Grecian democracies, the policy of wiser statesmen would be constantly liable to be frustrated, speaking to the Athenian people, extolled the wisdom of the Arcadian alliance; and then proceeded to advise the sovereign assembly that its generals should be instructed to hold Corinth also safe for the Athenian people.¹³ This expression, reported at Corinth, alarmed the Corinthians. Immediately exerting themselves to furnish sufficient garrisons of their own people, they relieved the Athenian troops in all the stations within their territory. Careful then to obviate just complaint, they assembled them in the city, and proclaimed by the public heralds that, if any Athenian was aggrieved, he should give his name to the proper magistrate, and justice should be done him. In this conjuncture Chares arrived at Cenchreæ with the Athenian fleet; and Xenophon's cautious account may give to suspect that the Corinthians were not without reason jealous of the purpose. They thanked Chares for his readi-

Xen. Hel. l. 7.
c. 4. s. 5.

¹³ Οπως καὶ ἡ Κόρινθος σώα ἦ τῷ δήμῳ τῶν Ἀθηναίων.

ness to assist them, but refused to admit his fleet into their port. Settling then, with careful punctuality, all accounts with the Athenian troops, they dismissed them. Thus the commanding influence which Athens had for some time held in Corinth ceased.

Xen. Hel. 1. 7.
c. 4. s. 6.

In guarding thus however against treachery from an ally, the Corinthians were aware that they were exposing themselves to the common enemy, to whom, on account of the pass it commanded, their country was so great an object. Their first resource was to strengthen their military with a force of mercenaries, horse and foot; and this sufficed, in the moment, not only to secure their own, but to enable them to extend annoyance into the hostile territories adjoining. Still they were aware that, if the force of the Theban confederacy should be collected against them, they must be overpowered unless they could have support from Athens, upon which they could no longer rely. They managed therefore, by private communication, to sound the Theban government, and they had the satisfaction to receive in direct terms encouragement to send ministers to Thebes. Requesting them to be allowed first to communicate with their allies, that those who were desirous of peace might be parties, the Thebans consented.

Then they sent ministers to Lacedæmon.

s. 8.

“They were bound,” they said, “by interest, by inclination, by old and hereditary friendship as well as by oaths, to the Lacedæmonian alliance. To this they should anxiously desire to adhere, if the Lacedæmonians themselves could show how they might finally resist the confederacy which had been so long and so severely pressing upon them. But if ruin threatened, not Corinth only, but Lacedæmon, then their first wish must be that Lacedæmon would join them in making peace upon the best terms that could be obtained; their second, that they might be released from

their obligations so far as to be allowed, without offence to gods or men, to make peace for themselves; and this they desired, not for their own sakes only, but with the consideration that their destruction would bring no benefit to their allies, whereas, if preserved, they might still, on some future occasion, be useful to Lacedæmon." The determination of the Lacedæmonians, if not prudent, was generous. They not only allowed but advised the Corinthians to make peace; and they declared that "those of their other allies, who were unwilling to continue the war, should be released from their engagements to them: but, for themselves, leaving the event to God, they would persevere in arms, and never submit to be deprived of Messenia, their inheritance received from their fathers."

Xen.-Hel. 1. 7.
C. 4. s. 9.

The Corinthian ministers returning with this answer, negotiation was immediately opened with Thebes. Alliance defensive and offensive, proposed by the Thebans, the Corinthians refused: such an alliance, they said, would be but a change of war; their object was a just and permanent peace. The Thebans, says Xenophon, admiring their resolution, under the dangers which pressed them, to refuse taking a part against their friends and benefactors, acceded to their desire. Peace was made with them in the name of the confederacy, upon condition that both parties should hold their ancient territories as before the war. These terms were extended to the Phliasiens and Epidaurians; and all parties swore to the treaty with the usual solemnities. The Phliasiens then immediately evacuated Thyamia in Sicyonia, expecting that Tricranum¹⁴, in their own territory, then held by Phliasian exiles under the protection of Argos, should be restored to them. But the Argives, having ineffectually solicited the consent of the Phliasian government for the exiles to retain the place,

s. 10.

¹⁴ The name is also found written Tricranium and Tricarantum.

claimed it as a part of Argolis, and placed a garrison of their own troops in it. The Phliasians in vain called for that legal discussion and judicial decision of which we often hear between state and state in Greece without any satisfactory information what it was. The Argives persevered in using the power they possessed to maintain the decision they had themselves already made.

SECTION IV.

Considerations on which the Conduct of Lacedæmon was founded. — Disposition of Athens. — Narrow Views of the Grecian Politicians. — Advantage of the Measures of Agesilaus. — Progress of Dissension among the Peloponnesian Confederates of Thebes. — War of Arcadia and Elis. — Danger of Thebes from Sedition. — Cruelty of the Thebans. — War of Thebes in Thessaly. — Death of Pelopidas.

IN thus freely allowing their Peloponnesian allies to seek security by a separate treaty, and at the same time persevering themselves in refusal to surrender Messenia, the condition of peace required by the Theban confederacy, the Lacedæmonians were guided by a policy, certainly magnanimous, but perhaps not less wise and truly prudent. In the inability of Lacedæmon to protect her allies, the obligations of sacrifices and oaths would not probably have stood long against the pressure of the Theban arms; and in the mean time a forced service, though it may promote a prosperous, would not be likely to give any very efficacious support to a falling cause. But, for themselves, had the Lacedæmonians yielded to the requisition of Thebes, had they purchased peace by the surrender of half their territory, the relief would have

Isocr. Archid.
p. 76. v. 2.

been utterly precarious. The argument which Isocrates has attributed to Archidamus, though shocked with it, we must allow to be forcible; that the

establishment of the Messenians and Helots in freedom, in the neighbourhood of Lacedæmon, would be the more dangerous and the more intolerable as their former treatment had exceeded in severity that of other slaves. But, threatened and distressed as Lacedæmon was, her situation was less desperate than it had been. Peloponnesus had now some experience of the Theban connection. In-
 finite civil disturbances had arisen; civil order,
 such as might ensure domestic quiet, had followed nowhere; and there was evidently nowhere any general satisfaction in any change which it had produced. In Arcadia an avowed jealousy of Thebes prevailed, and symptoms of schism in the confederacy appeared in more than one part. Of all the advantages likely to result from these circumstances Lacedæmon would deprive herself, without any fair hope that submission would procure lasting quiet.

Isocr. Archid.
p. 54—60.

Lacedæmon moreover was not yet without powerful allies. The younger Dionysius, who had succeeded to his deceased father's situation in Syracuse, was disposed to maintain his father's engagements. In Athens, according to the contemporary Athenian orator, without any general disposition truly friendly to Lacedæmon, there was what might answer the purpose for the Lacedæmonians, a disposition, in just attention to the interest of Athens, to oppose the advancement of Thebes. The zealous advocate for universal peace among the Greeks, Isocrates, was one of
 the many Athenians who saw with anxiety the avowed ambition of Thebes, supported by growing power, and conducted by consummate talents. His extant oration, in the form of a speech of the prince Archidamus, son of Agesilaus, to the Lacedæmonian assembly, has been really a political pamphlet, admirably adapted to its purpose; which was, at the same time, to encourage the Lacedæmonians in resist-

Xen. Hel. l. 7.
c. 4. s. 12.

Isocr. Archid.
p. 54.

Isocr. de Pace,
et ad Philipp.
& al.

ance to Thebes, to confirm the Athenians in the Lacedæmonian connection, and to reconcile the Greeks, in general, to the claim of Lacedæmon to the territory of Messenia.*

Dionys. Hal. In that composition, which has earned the particular commendation of an elegant and judicious

critic of the Augustan age, a deficiency, though frequently obvious among the Greek political writers, is nevertheless striking, and worthy of notice: no principle of extensive welfare, no liberal view to the common good of Greece, is put forward; but, on the contrary, the Lacedæmonians are encouraged in that narrow patriotism whose great object

Isocr. Archid. p. 76. & 82. was the exclusive power and happiness of their own commonwealth; recommended however by the observation that, under the acknowledged supremacy of

p. 56. Lacedæmon, civil order and general happiness had been conspicuous in Peloponnesus, and almost peculiar to it; whereas anarchy and discord, public evils and private, many and extreme, had followed the change for the patronage of Thebes.

The caution of Xenophon, enforced by his particular circumstances, has left us very scanty information of the state of parties in Lacedæmon during all that disastrous period which followed the return of Agesilaus from Asia. We gather however that Agesilaus could not always direct

Isocr. Archid. sub fin. measures; and some expressions of Isocrates imply that for some time he did not hold a leading influence. The Theban invasion seems to have restored

Xen. Ages. c. 2. s. 24, 25. Plut. vit. Ages. it to him. His ability then defended Sparta; his liberality assisted to feed the auxiliaries, for which the public treasury was unequal; the mis-

fortunes of the country were attributed to the mismanagement of others, who had held the ministry; and the victory,

[* See the first note on sect. 4. of chap. XXXVIII.]

obtained afterward under the command of his son Archidamus over the Peloponnesian allies of Thebes, would tend powerfully to confirm the renovated power of his party.

Events soon following showed the justness of the views which decided Agesilaus and his friends to advise perseverance in war, rather than submission to humiliating and oppressive terms for a precarious peace. By the separate treaty the nominal strength of Lacedæmon was indeed reduced; but the allies, whose co-operation was lost, were so exposed by situation, and so unequal to their own defence, that it might be questioned if their security in neutrality was not more advantageous to Lacedæmon than their co-operation under perpetual want of protection. The need also of assistance from them was lessened by the dissension growing between the most powerful allies of Thebes, those who by local circumstances most pressed upon Lacedæmon. When the season for action came on the usual succours arrived from Syracuse; the Lacedæmonians assembled their forces, and no interruption occurring from the Theban confederacy, they recovered the important town of Sellasia, which since the Theban invasion had been held by the revolters.

B. C. 365. (15)
Ol. 103. 4.
Xen. Hel. 1. 7.
c. 4. s. 12.

The first movements of the allies of Thebes in Peloponnesus were against one another. In Elis, at this time governed by the aristocratical party, a democratical opposition was patronised by the Arcadians. Irritated anew by this, while anger at the loss of their dependencies in Triphylia through the violent interference of the Arcadians was yet fresh, they resolved to recur to arms; and, attacking the Triphylian

s. 15.

s. 12.

¹⁵ I cannot understand Dodwell's reasons for assigning this event, against the order of Xenophon's narrative, to the beginning of the former campaign, B. C. 366.

town of Lasion, formerly theirs, but now a tributary dependence of Arcadia, they made themselves masters of it. Passion having urged the Elean aristocracy to a measure of violence which appears to have been highly imprudent, we shall less wonder if the Arcadian Numberless assembly, no longer directed by the wisdom of Lycomedes, gave way also to passion; so that all consideration of the great interests, not of Greece only but of the confederacy, was lost under the existing provocation; and it was thought enough for prudence that the strength of Arcadia sufficed for revenge. The strength of Arcadia, without delay, accordingly collected, invaded Elea. The Eleans met it with inferior numbers; and, ill-advisedly coming to action, with disadvantage also of ground, were defeated with considerable slaughter. The towns of the Elean highlands then, excepting only Thraustus, yielded to the summons of the Arcadian generals while they directed their march toward Olympia. No resistance was found there. A garrison was placed in the precinct of the temple of Saturn, which, with an entrenchment thrown around, commanded the Olympian mountain: the neighbouring town of Marganeæ was gained by the voluntary act of the prevailing party among the inhabitants. The Arcadian army proceeded then to Elis, and its advanced guard entered that unfortified town, and penetrated as far as the agora; but, being there charged by the collected Elean cavalry, supported by infantry, it was driven out again with some slaughter.

In the usual way of faction, the distress of their country gave joy to the democratical leaders in Elis, who looked to it as leading to power and party-triumph for themselves. Under the encouragement it afforded they opened a traitorous correspondence with the enemy, and, obtaining the terms they desired, with a pro-

B. C. 565.
Ol. 103. 4.

Xen. Hel. 1. 7.
c. 4. s. 13.

s. 14.

s. 15, 16.

mise of support, they seized the citadel. The aristocratical party however, exerting themselves instantly and vigorously, recovered the fortress; and then the leaders of the democratical party, with about four hundred of their followers, fled. Received as friends by the Arcadians, and encouraged by them, they seized Pylus, a town of Elea under mount Pholoe, less than ten miles from Elis.¹⁶ A settlement thus acquired, and the patronage of a conquering army, gave such credit to their cause that numbers quitted the threatened city to join them.

Under these circumstances the Eleans in possession would probably not have been able long, with their single strength, to support themselves. But the prudent governments of the bordering province of Achaia saw their own danger in the fall of Elis and the preponderance which Arcadia was acquiring in Peloponnesus. The distraction of the confederacy, and especially the violence of the Arcadians against their allies, operated in favour of the Lacedæmonian interest; and already the little commonwealth of Pellene, being under aristocratical government, had ventured to renew its ancient connection with Lacedæmon.¹⁷ The other Achæan cities, professing a desire to avoid hostility with Arcadia, declared however their purpose to protect Elis, and immediately sent troops to give efficacy to their resolution. The Arcadians, their first vengeance against the Eleans being satisfied, yielded to an argument so well

¹⁶ There were three principal places of the name of Pylus in Peloponnesus; the Elean here spoken of, the Triphylian, which, according to Strabo, was Nestor's residence, and the Messenian, which became remarkable in the Peloponnesian war.

¹⁷ Ἡδὴ γὰρ πάλιν προσεκεχωρήκισαν οἱ Πελληνεῖς εἰς τὴν τῶν Λακιδαιμονίων συμμαχίαν. Xen. Hel. l. 7. c. 4. s. 17. Xenophon has, I think, not explained whether the return to the Lacedæmonian confederacy, here spoken of, was after the change occasioned by the march of Epaminondas into Achaia, or after the partial peace, made by the treaty of Thebes, to which the Pellenians may have been parties.

enforced. Desisting from farther attempts against the city, they however ravaged the country, and leaving the democra-
Xen. Hel. 1. 7.
c. 4. s. 19.tical Eleans established in Pylus, a measure with which the Achæans did not interfere, they withdrew home. The return of Elis to its ancient connection with Lacedæmon then became matter of course.

While the able leaders of the Theban councils were perplexed with regard to their interests in Peloponnesus by the violence of the dissensions among their confederates, their attention was called to the circumstances of Thessaly; and still more urgently, to matters arising in Bœotia. Orchomenus, the second city of Bœotia in importance, had been the last to acknowledge the sovereignty of Thebes; and the aristocratical, the most powerful party there, bore that sovereignty with extreme reluctance and dissatisfaction. In Thebes itself, where aristocracy had so long predominated, an aristocratical party was still numerous, but the chiefs
Diod. 1. 15.
p. 498. were in exile. These founded their hope of restoration on the political sentiments prevailing in Orchomenus, and spreading in a smaller degree among those of higher rank in other Bœotian towns. Communication was had among them, and a plot was formed for a revolution.

It was the practice of the Theban government occasionally to order reviews of the whole cavalry of Bœotia. The conspirators on the present occasion were mostly of those serving in the cavalry, and these in Orchomenus alone were three hundred. The time appointed for a review was chosen for the execution of the plot; but, in the difficulty of due caution where numbers are to be engaged, some faithless or disaffected being let into the secret disclosed it to the Bœotarchs. We are without direct information who now guided the Theban councils; but, amid the abominable cruelty of the vengeance taken, that able policy appears which commonly distinguished the measures of the Theban government under

Pelopidas and Epaminondas. The conspirators of the smaller towns were pardoned; the Orchomenian cavalry were brought in chains before the assembled Theban people. An inveterate hatred, traced even to the heroic ages, subsisted, it is said, between the Thebans and Orchomenians. The death of the guilty cavalry therefore did not satisfy popular animosity. At the same time that capital condemnation was pronounced against these, it was decreed that the town of Orchomenus should be levelled, and the whole people sold to slavery. Force only could carry into execution such a decree. The Thebans marched in arms to Orchomenus, already deprived of its leaders and its cavalry, and, becoming masters of the town, put to death all the men, and sold the women and children.¹⁸

The danger which had threatened the existing government of Thebes being, by this dreadful execution, averted, the leading men had leisure to direct their views around: and, while the distractions among their Peloponnesian allies repelled, circumstances in other quarters invited their in-

¹⁸ According to Pausanias (l. 9. c. 15. p. 740.) this transaction took place while Pelopidas and Epaminondas were absent; the former prisoner in Thessaly, the other marching to his relief. According to Diodorus, it was three years after the release of Pelopidas. Mistakes indeed abound in the chronology of Diodorus; but Diodorus was a chronologer, and meant to be exact. Pausanias was an antiquarian; generally, as Dodwell has well observed, much more accurate than Diodorus, but unversed in politics, ill-versed in history, and inattentive to the course of political events.

Xenophon, intent upon transactions in Peloponnesus, in which he was deeply interested, and where everything passed, in a manner, under his eye, has omitted notice of these transactions in Bœotia and in Thessaly.

[“Orchomenus was destroyed by the Thebans during their ascendancy: Pausan. ix. 15. 2. *ἕως ἀπὴν ὁ Ἐπαμινώνας* [in rescuing Pelopidas from Alexander of Pheræ] *Ἵρχομενίους Θηβαῖοι ποιοῦσιν ἀναστάτους ἐκ τῆς χώρας.* Placed by Diodorus, xv. 79. in B. C. 364, after the liberation of Pelopidas. But Pausanias, iv. 27. 5., is consistent with himself: *Ἵρχομενίων οἱ Μινύαι μετὰ τὴν μάχην τὴν ἐν Λεύκτροις ἐκπεσόντες ὑπὸ Θηβαίων ἐξ Ἵρχομενίου.* And Diodorus, xv. 57., mentions the fact as designed in B. C. 370. *ἤρχε Δυσκίνητος.*—*Θηβαῖοι μέγαλη δυνάμει στρατεύσαντες ἐπ’ Ἵρχομενὸν ἐπεβάλλοντο ἕξανδραποδίσασθαι τὴν πόλιν.* It might therefore happen earlier than the year 364.” Clinton, *Fasti Hellen.* p. 397. note z.]

Diod. l. 15.
Plut. &
Corn. Nep.
vit. Pelop.

terference. The aversion among the Thessalian cities to the tyrant tagus, Alexander of Pheræ, notwithstanding the ill success of the Thebans in that country, kept alive a Theban party there. New oppression from Alexander had excited new resistance to his authority; but his abilities and activity enabled him to overbear his opponents. In their distress, they applied to Thebes for assistance, and for commander they requested Pelopidas, whose military talents and popular manners, when formerly commanding in their country, had procured him general favour and esteem. The supreme assembly of Bœotia was summoned: it was decreed that the Thessalian cities should be supported; and accordingly Pelopidas led an army of seven thousand men through the straits of Thermopylæ. Alexander, with a more numerous army, on advantageous ground, awaited his attack, which Pelopidas, perhaps too much trusting in the superiority of the Bœotian heavy-armed, rashly made. Pelopidas himself fell. If Diodorus, Nepos, and Plutarch might be believed, his army nevertheless obtained a complete victory; but the concise account of Alexander by Xenophon, and the incidental mention of the transactions of Pelopidas in Thessaly by Polybius, imply something so different that allowance evidently must be made for exaggeration in the panegyric of the biographers and the report of the later historian. A doubtful victory however, a drawn battle, with a large Bœotian force remaining in the country, may have afforded great relief to the party which had taken arms against the tagus; and then, wherever that party predominated, those honours to the memory of the slain general which Nepos has reported, statues, and golden crowns, and lands to his family, (the estates probably of those whom the party expelled or desired to expel,) would follow in the common course of party measures.

Pelopidas appears to have been a man of an active, enterprising, bold, and generous spirit, very popular manners, and good, but not extraordinary abilities. In the great and arduous circumstances in which his exertion had contributed much to place his country, scarcely equal to the lead of councils, or perhaps of armies, he was nevertheless by his talents and his virtues a most valuable assistant to Epaminondas, with whom he seems to have lived in perfect friendship, above envy and jealousy. His death therefore was a great loss, to his friends, to his country, and to those allies who depended upon his country for support.¹⁹

According to Diodorus, after the death of Pelopidas, the Thebans gained a second great victory in Thessaly, and Plutarch relates that Alexander was completely subdued. Xenophon and Polybius forbid entire credit to this; yet there seems reason for supposing that the affairs of Thebes in Thessaly continued to be ably conducted. The result, as we learn from Xenophon, was a treaty of peace Xen. Hel. l. 7. c. 5. s. 4. and alliance with the tagus, and an accommodation, under the mediation of Thebes, between the tagus and the

¹⁹ We may apparently trust the positive assertion of Nepos and Plutarch, supported by the less explicit testimony of Diodorus, that Pelopidas was one of the leaders, and he would of course be among the most active of them, in the conspiracy by which Thebes was recovered from the Lacedæmonians; though in the detailed account of that remarkable transaction by the contemporary historian, and even in the account given at some length by Diodorus, the name of Pelopidas never occurs. It is in summing up his praises only, where he relates his death, that Diodorus mentions the universal acceptance of the report, which gave the first merit in that business to Pelopidas; and even there he does not say what part Pelopidas took in the business, but rather shows that he had no certain information of it: *Ἐν γὰρ τῇ τῶν φυγάδων καταλήψει, καθ' ἣν ἀνεκτίσαντο τὴν Καδμείαν, ὁμολογημένως ἅπαντες τούτῳ (τῷ Πελοπίδῃ) τὸ πρῶτον τοῦ κατορθώματος ἀπονέμουσι.* This is the whole of his testimony. Yet Plutarch, near two centuries after him, and near five after Xenophon, without stating any authority, has not scrupled to describe the single combat, and the complex contests, of Pelopidas, in the course of a series of nocturnal assassinations, as if he had been present as a quiet spectator, in a theatre, where they were represented before him.

Thessalian cities, which appear to have been altogether creditable and advantageous.

SECTION V.

Invasion of Elea by the Arcadians, of Arcadia by the Lacedæmonians. — Arcadian Eparites, or select Militia. — Liberality in Grecian Law of War. Interference of the Arcadians in the Presidency of the Olympian Festival. — Battle of Olympia.

B. C. 364. Ol.
103.4—104.1.

LACEDÆMON, and the Lacedæmonian cause in Greece, seemed now reviving from threatened dissolution. But leisure was yet wanted to repress or compose revolt and restore civil order in the ancient territory of Sparta, when a new invasion of Elea by the Arcadians, and a new defeat of the Eleans in battle, compelled attention from the Lacedæmonian government to the distress and danger of its first returning ally. Archidamus was therefore placed at the head of an army, with which he invaded Arcadia. He took the town of Cromnus, and, putting three lochi in garrison there, led the rest of his army home.

As far as immediate relief to the Eleans only was in view this measure appears to have been well conceived; but the foresight, not of the statesman only, but of the general also, should have extended farther. The Arcadians, feeling still all the expected uneasiness at the establishment of a hostile post within their country, withdrew their troops from Elea; and, collecting their whole force at Cromnus, hastily surrounded it with a contravallation and circumvallation. The Lacedæmonians, not till their garrison was already blockaded, in much alarm for it, re-assembled their army and committed the command again to Archidamus. The same deficiency of weapons and art of attack, which compelled the

Arcadians to the slow method of blockade against a weakly fortified place with a small garrison, deterred Archidamus from assault upon the Arcadian lines. His object was to allure or provoke the besiegers to quit them; and with this view he carried ravage through the rebellious Lacedæmonian province of Skiritis, and, as far as he could, into Arcadia. But the Arcadian generals were not to be so diverted from their purpose; within their lines they kept their army secure and the blockade close.

Archidamus now saw that, to relieve Cromnus, Xen. Hel. 1. 7. c. 4. s. 22. he must force the lines. The circumvallation, in-closing part of a hill, was commanded by the summit. If he could possess himself of the summit, he thought the Arcadians could not long hold their situation beneath. With this view he was winding his march round the hill, when his advanced guard, composed of targeteers and cavalry, seeing the chosen body of Arcadians called the Eparites without their lines, attacked them. The Eparites seem to have been an establishment made by those able s. 54. men who formed the union of Arcadia. They were a select militia, composed of citizens from every republic of the union, who were to be always ready for the general service. The desultory assault of the Lacedæmonians was received by this well-trained body without moving. It was renewed upon them, and then they advanced against the assailants. Archidamus turned to support his targeteers, leading his heavy-armed along the carriage-road in a narrow column of march. In this weak order he was attacked by the Arcadians, formed in phalanx. The Lacedæmonians, s. 23. who apparently should not have swerved from their first object to make this attack, were unable to withstand the firmer order of the Arcadians: Archidamus himself was severely wounded in the thigh: Chilon, his sister's husband, and not less than thirty other Spartans, mostly of

the highest rank, were killed. Quickly however the Lacedæmonians reached advantageous ground, on which, notwithstanding the pressure upon them, their ready discipline enabled them to form; and then the Arcadians halted. But it appeared that the transgression of those precepts of their great lawgiver, which forbade lasting war and frequent wars with the same enemy, had already been carried too far. Not the Thebans only, but the Arcadians also, began to vie with them in discipline; and that persuasion of their superiority to all mankind, which had assisted formerly to render the Lacedæmonians invincible, was gone by. They were now superior in number, but disheartened by their prince's wound and the death of those around him, while the Arcadians were encouraged by the consideration, always important, that they had been successful assailants upon a retreating enemy. The action was on the point of being renewed, when one of the Lacedæmonian elders, perhaps aware of deficiency in the commanders, exclaimed, "To what purpose are we going to fight? Why should not a truce rather here end the contest?" The proposal of a truce, under such circumstances, always implied acknowledgment of defeat; yet it was approved by the other Lacedæmonians. The Arcadians readily consented: withdrawing to the ground where they had made their first assault, they erected their trophy there, and left the Lacedæmonians to perform at leisure the funeral obsequies of their slain.

Where battle begun might so be stopped, (and it is not from a closet speculator of some centuries after that we have these curious particulars, but a contemporary, versed in the din of war and the crash of armies,) it might be not unreasonably supposed that opportunity for any negotiation, and a disposition to any just accommodation, would be ready. Why then was not negotiation instantly begun; first for the

surrender of Cromnus, with safety for the garrison, and then for solid peace? Nothing like either, as far as appears, was thought of. Civilisation and reflection, amid much practice in war, had led the Greeks, though not to the generosity of modern European warfare, yet to customs adapted to humanise hostility in some degree, and lessen its horrors: but the circumstances altogether of their political system, and the habits which it superinduced, impressed much the idea that warfare was the natural state of man; to be regulated, not obviated, by policy and humanity.²⁰ The Lacedæmonians, after due rites to their dead, withdrew in quiet under cover of the truce, but soon after, returning by night, attacked the Arcadian lines, and, on one point, Xen. Hel. l. 7. c. 4. s. 27 forced them. With numbers however adapted to surprise, but too small to withstand the collected strength of the besieging army, hasty retreat was necessary; and those only of the garrison were relieved who could instantly rush out and join them: the escape of somewhat more than a hundred was prevented by the besiegers.

Then appeared, in all its extent, the impolicy of a measure so alarming and irritating to the Arcadians as the establishment of a Lacedæmonian garrison in their country. Their ill disposition toward Thebes, and especially their jealousy of Theban interference in Peloponnesus, which had contributed perhaps beyond any thing to the relief of Lacedæmon from past dangers, and afforded the best ground of hope for its future security and prosperity, now gave way to their anxiety for riddance from so annoying and threatening an inconvenience. The deficiency in the art of attack of the age, when a garrison of a hundred men might defy an

²⁰ This appears in all the projects, for improving government, of Plato, Aristotle, and others; and in the schemes of Isocrates for obviating the eternal quarrels of the Greeks among themselves only by directing hostility against foreign nations.

army, made all auxiliaries acceptable. For, to prosecute with certain effect the tedious business of a blockade, the force was to be proportioned, not to that within the place attacked, but to that which, from without, might at any time during the long operation attack the besiegers. The assistance of all allies was therefore called for, and the guard of the lines was divided between Arcadian, Argive, Theban, and Messenian forces. Farther attempts to relieve the place were thus deterred, and the little garrison was at length starved into a surrender.

Xen. Hel. l. 7.
c. 4. s. 26.

The detention of the Arcadian forces at Cromnus afforded opportunity for the Eleans to direct their whole strength against their apostate fellow-citizens in Pylus. These, venturing a battle, were defeated, and about two hundred were made prisoners. The Elean citizens among them were all put to death: the rest were sold to slavery. Siege being then laid to Pylus and Marganeæ, both were taken.

s. 28.

The season of the festival of the hundred and fourth Olympiad now approached, while an Arcadian garrison commanded Olympia, and the neighbouring country, adhering to the Arcadian interest, remained in what the Eleans esteemed rebellion against them. The Arcadians, having freed themselves from the annoyance of a Lacedæmonian garrison within their country, did not immediately propose any new aggression against the Eleans, but they resolved not to surrender Olympia to them for the purposes of the festival. A shock was thus hazarded to the prejudices, and an interruption to the enjoyments, of the Greek nation, which might have excited extensive enmity; but means for obviating this, to a considerable degree, were found in the disputed title of the Eleans to the presidency, though they had been uninterruptedly exercising it so many years. The Arcadians would not assume that pre-

sidency in their own name; they affected to restore the sacred right to the Pisæans, who had never ceased to claim it against what they termed the Elean usurpation: and thus was obtained the support of some of the most powerful states of Greece, perhaps dissatisfied, as we have seen Lacedæmon formerly, with the manner in which the Eleans, on some occasions, may have exercised the power conceded to them at the Olympian meeting. The Argives sent two thousand heavy-armed to assist in maintaining the presidency of the Pisæans; and even the Athenians, in favour of their new allies of Arcadia, against Elis the confederate of Lacedæmon, while Lacedæmon was still the confederate of Athens, (so the interests of the Grecian republics became complicated,) sent five hundred horse, which, among Peloponnesian armies, would be a very considerable body of its kind.

On the other hand, the Eleans, claiming the right of presidency at the Olympian festival as a most valuable inheritance from their forefathers, resolved to spare no exertion in asserting it. They engaged the Achæans in their interest; and, waiting then till the time when the concourse would be formed, (for such was the public confidence in the sacred estimation of the place and season that persons led by curiosity or business had flocked, nearly as usual, from every settlement of the Greek nation,) they marched to Olympia.

The Eleans, though engaged in frequent wars, were held in the lowest estimation among the Greeks as a military people; looked upon with a degree of contempt not only by the Arcadians, Argives, and Athenians, but by their own allies the Achæans. The Arcadians therefore, the more confident in their present strength on account of their late successes, took no measures for preventing, or even observing, the approach of an enemy. They

Xen. Hel. 1. 7.
c. 4. s. 30.

Xen. Hel. 1. 7.
c. 4. s. 29.

were attending the exhibition of the games in all leisure ; the horse-race was over ; the pentathlon, or contest of five exercises, was going forward ; the athletes, who had already run, were proceeding to wrestle ; no longer in the course, says Xenophon, who is likely to have been present, but between the course and the altar ; when the alarm was given that the Eleans were already on the verge of the Altis, the enclosure consecrated to the purposes of the celebrity. The Arcadians then hurried into order of battle on the bank of the brook Cladaus, which, washing one side of the Altis, presently joins the Alpheus. The Eleans, advancing in good order on each side of the Cladaus, broke the Arcadian phalanx with the first shock, and then were equally successful against the Argives, hastening to support it. The disordered troops retreated, and the Eleans pursued among the public and sacred buildings, to the space between the council-hall, the temple of Vesta, and the adjoining theatre. There the advantage afforded for defence and for the use of missile weapons by those solid and lofty edifices, enabled the defeated to stand, and the victors suffered some loss before they withdrew to their camp.

s. 32. The Arcadians and their allies however, it appeared, felt themselves very effectually defeated.

No longer thinking of opposing the Eleans in the field, they were all night employed in forming defences ; the scaffolding and sheds, raised for the accommodation of persons attending the celebrity, furnishing materials for a palisade.²¹ By morning they had so fortified the avenues, and so disposed troops on the temple tops, that the Eleans, on a view of the opposition prepared for them, prudently abstained from

²¹ It appears from this circumstance that the spectators and men of business at the Olympian meeting did not view this extraordinary conquest quite so much at their ease as Diodorus has represented.

farther assault. Xenophon has declared his wonder at what they had already done. After mentioning the previous disrepute of their military character, he expresses himself thus: "On this occasion the Eleans showed themselves soldiers, such as the deity, giving courage by inspiration, might make in a day; but the art of men, employed on those not naturally brave, could not in a long time form."

But the poverty of the Grecian states, the disproportion of their public revenue to their military force, except when Athens or Lacedæmon received tribute from many subject republics, generally prevented any regular plan of a campaign, and often denied what should have been the immediate fruit of victory. The Eleans, not strong enough to carry Olympia by assault, not rich enough to subsist long from home, at a loss in any way to push the advantage gained, returned to Elis.

SECTION VI.

Sacrilegious Robbery of the Olympian Treasury by the democratical Administration of Arcadia. — Opposition of Mantinea to the Sacrilege. — Support solicited from Thebes by the Perpetrators. — Remonstrance against Interference from Thebes by the Arcadian Sovereign Assembly. — Congress at Tegea. — Violence of the Theban Commissioner, supported by Epaminondas. — Re-union of Arcadia, Achaia, and Elis, in Alliance with Lacedæmon.

By the retreat of the victorious Eleans the Arcadians were left at liberty to choose their measures. The force of Arcadia might perhaps have sufficed for revenge, but Arcadia, like Elis, wanted pecuniary resources. The Eparites, none probably so poor as not to possess a slave, could generally subsist from their private means while the defence of their own country, or a hasty expedition only into a neighbouring province, was required of them. But already they began to be pressed by their detention at Olympia; far

B. C. 364.
Ol. 104. 1.

from their homes, and yet surrounded by a friendly territory, which put plunder at a distance; uneasy, at the same time, under their late defeat, which would not dispose them to bear with increased patience the inconveniences of want. If to relieve them Olympia was left without an Arcadian force, the considerable acquisitions made through the first successes in the war would be at once lost; and the Pisæans, Triphylians, all those, on pretence of protecting whom the war had been undertaken, must be exposed to the vengeance of the Eleans. These considerations pressed upon the democratical chiefs, now at the head of the Arcadian affairs, while a strong aristocratical opposition still existed in their country. Shame, anger, revenge, interest, ambition, fear, the fear of all those evils usually in the Grecian republics following the loss of popularity, and its attendant power, instigated, and the Olympian treasury was before them. The temptation altogether was greater than they could resist. Careless perhaps about the punishments which, in vulgar opinion, would certainly follow from the vengeance of the gods, they resolved to brave those most severely denounced for the crime of sacrilege throughout Greece by the laws of men, trusting to the means which the crime itself would furnish for their security. They expected assuredly to gain the Eparites, whose support would enable them to overbear opposition within their own country; and they had great confidence in the efficacy of the riches, which they should make their own, for negotiation without.

The amount altogether of the plunder, which, under this resolution, may have been taken from the sacred treasury of Olympia, perhaps was never publicly known; but the source of a pay, established and regularly issued for the Eparites, under authority of the administration of a confederacy of democracies, not to be concealed, appears indeed to have been boldly avowed. Powerful however as the means were

which the democratical chiefs had laid their hands upon for obviating opposition and complaint, they could not prevent the use of the opportunity which their measure afforded to their political opponents for exciting honest indignation and alarming popular superstition. In Mantinea the aristocratical appears to have been the prevailing party. There a decided opposition to the measure was presently resolved upon by those at the head of affairs; and it was conducted with a temperate firmness which made it formidable. A deputation was sent, in the name of the municipal government of Mantinea, to those who directed the administration of the union, declaring, "that the Mantineans, desirous to support, with their best means, the interest of the united Arcadian people, would however avoid implication in the guilt of sacrilege; that they had therefore remitted a sum of money, collected among themselves, equal to their share of the pay at present wanted for the Eparites; and against all sacrilegious use of the Olympian treasure they utterly protested."

Xen. Hel. 1. 7.
c. 4. s. 33.

But the democratical chiefs, who, in considering the different dangers before them, had perhaps thought it safer to commit the crime than either to abandon the direction of public affairs, or struggle in the management of them against the difficulties of public penury, were not now disposed to retreat. Supposing their party sure in the Numberless assembly, they cited the leading men of Mantinea²² before that body to answer for their conduct, as a treasonable opposition to the authority of the united Arcadian government. This citation the Mantineans, doubting the independency or the impartiality of a majority in the assembly, avoided to obey. It is indeed a curious complication of tyranny and weakness, of public corruption and private

²² Τὸς προστάτας αὐτῶν.

insecurity, that is displayed in the contemporary historian's account of the measures of that new united government, which had been proposed to the Arcadians as the perfection of democracy. The assembly proceeded to what was indeed ordinary in Greek jurisprudence, condemnation of the contumacious Mantineans, as if they had been tried and regularly convicted; and a body of Eparites was sent to apprehend them. But the Mantineans, who had resolved to disobey a legal summons, were prepared also to resist force; they shut the gates of their town, and refused admittance to those who came with the authority, or at least in the name, of the sovereign assembly of Arcadia.

Civil war thus was in effect declared. The opposition of the Mantineans could in truth be justified only by what might justify resistance to any established government. Sound political principle, as we have had frequent occasion to observe, was little found in Greece; but superstition, commonly powerful, operated perhaps on this occasion in concurrence with the best political principle, in favour of the Mantinean chiefs. The aristocratical party, throughout Arcadia, would of course be with them. At the same time doubt, shame, fear began to spread among those inclined to the democratical cause; fear of the divine vengeance, and fear of the reproaches and enmity of all Greece; insomuch that many of them also declared against the obnoxious measure. The dreadful idea of involving themselves and their families, to latest posterity, in guilt with gods and men, had a growing effect, which the bold authors of the crime could not repress; and shortly a majority of the Numberless, otherwise the Ten-thousand, repented, so far as to come to a resolution that "no farther trespass upon the sacred treasury should be allowed."

Xen. Hel. 1. 7.
c. 4. s. 34.

This resolution, moderate as it might seem, reduced the authors of the sacrilege, hitherto leaders of the Arcadian

politics, at once to a situation of extreme peril, by depriving them of that source of power to which they had looked for safety. They could no longer hold their influence over the Eparites; many of whom were unable, and many others little willing, to serve out of their own country on their private means. The stoppage of a pay, which was become a public condition of their service, affording a pretence, many went home. By the laws of the union apparently the towns for which they had served were to supply their places. Men of principal property had hitherto avoided enrolment among the Eparites. But they had now seen the danger of trusting to those who had little or nothing what would enable them to take all; and to avoid, says the contemporary historian, being subjected by the Eparites, they resolved to be Eparites. This was another blow to the democratical leaders. No prosecution was yet instituted, or, as far as appears, threatened against them; but, losing thus their influence in the army, after having lost their majority in the sovereign assembly, everything was to be apprehended for those implicated in a crime which by the laws of all Greece was capital, and the punishment generally to be inflicted without trial. One resource remained. Thebes, or at least those who now ruled the Theban councils, had a great interest in supporting them; as their downfall would be in course followed by a renewal of the ancient connection of Arcadia with Lacedæmon. That proud independency which the Arcadians had made their glory, and that jealousy of Theban interference which they had been taught to esteem their essential policy, were no longer considerations for the democratical leaders: they applied urgently and expressly for a Theban army to march into Peloponnesus. "Were it delayed," they said, "Lacedæmonian influence would quickly again rule Arcadia."

How far this measure was necessary to their safety we can only conjecture, forming our judgment by what we find to have been common in Grecian political contests; but, that their power was gone, that their views of ambition were frustrated, unless they could obtain support from Thebes, the contemporary historian has clearly shown. The aristocratical party had so gained ground that a majority in the multitudinous sovereign assembly of Arcadia went with it; not in opposition to the sacrilege only, but generally; a circumstance in itself speaking not a little in favour of the aristocratical leaders. The application of the democratical chiefs to Thebes, and its favourable reception there, becoming known, was taken into consideration. The democratical party seems to have been still too powerful, in the yet but half-formed union of the several Arcadian republics, to be effectually restrained by the sovereign assembly; but, under authority of that assembly, Xen. Hel. 1. 7. c. 4. s. 35. ministers were sent to remonstrate at Thebes against the proposed march of Theban forces into Arcadia, uncalled for by the Arcadian government. This measure being taken, the Elean war and the circumstances of Olympia became next the subjects for debate. In the discussion of these it was observed, "That the charge and presidency of the temple neither of right belonged to the Arcadians, nor were to be coveted by them; that the restoration of both to the Eleans would be most consonant to justice and religion, and most acceptable to the god; that, in truth, no cause for continuing the war with Elis existed;" and thus the assembly decreed. The Eleans gladly consented to a negotiation for peace upon such grounds; a truce was instantly concluded; and deputies from all the Arcadian cities assembling in Tegea received there, in regular form, ministers from Elis.

In this critical moment, when the fate of Greece, for all

futurity, was on the balance, the wisdom, the magnanimity, the enlarged patriotism of a Lycomedes, singularly wanted among the Arcadians, were unfortunately not found; or, if existing anywhere, wanting his active exertion and commanding influence, they were inefficacious. The efforts of the aristocratical leaders could not prevent the insulting appearance of a Theban at the congress, attended Xen. Hel 1. 7.
c. 4. s. 36. by a body of three hundred Bœotian heavy-armed. Swearing, with sacrifice and solemn ceremony, to the observance of the truce, was the first business of the meeting. In this the Theban readily concurred, and objection was made on no part. Banquets were then prepared, the pæan of peace resounded, a thoughtless joy pervaded all; those leading men excepted who had been principals in the sacrilege at Olympia. These could not withdraw their consideration from the disappointment of their ambition by the very measure which gave occasion for the general joy, or from the prosecution to which they had made themselves legally liable, and the persecuting manner in which it was too usual among the Grecian republics to carry measures against a defeated party. The Theban came commissioned to give them such support as circumstances might allow. Communicating with him, they found him full of that patriotism which could throw a veil over honour, revile justice, and condemn oaths, when the interest of his country, or of his party in it, required. Some of the Eparites were yet devoted to the cause of that party. Supported by these, and by the Bœotians, they shut the town-gates, and sent parties around, to seize, in the midst of the general festivity, the leading men of every Arcadian city. The number thus apprehended was such that, the public prison not holding all, the town-house was also filled with them. Yet many escaped; some over the town-walls; some by favour of those who guarded the gates: for, in this business,

says the contemporary historian, the animosity usual in Grecian sedition actuated none but those who feared capital prosecution; and among those who fled were most of the principal Mantineans, whom it had been particularly the object of the conspirators to secure.

Intelligence of this transaction quickly reaching Mantinea, distant only twelve miles, was thence hastened over Arcadia, with admonition added for all the towns to be upon their guard against what might follow. Heralds were then sent to Tegea, bearing a requisition for the liberty of the Mantineans detained there, accompanied by a remonstrance, insisting that no Arcadian should be executed, or even imprisoned, without trial in due course of law; and offering, if any were accused of treason against the union, security from the Mantinean state for their appearance before the great assembly of the nation. It might seem as if something of the spirit of Lycomedes, some idea of just government and true civil freedom, and of the proper manner of asserting them, existed still in Mantinea, and only there.

Xen. Hel. 1. 7.
c. 4. s. 39. The Theban, to whose authority, it appears, the Arcadian conspirators deferred, seems to have been disconcerted by the spirited prudence of the Mantineans. Fearful of the consequences of the violence to which he had been persuaded, he set all his prisoners at liberty; and, next day, assembling as many Arcadians of the different towns as were at hand, and would come at his invitation, he apologised for what he had done; misled, as he pretended, by false intelligence of a plot for delivering Tegea to the Lacedæmonians, and of a Lacedæmonian army approaching. The excuse found little credit, but the apology was accepted, so far that he was allowed to depart quietly. The matter however was then taken into serious consideration by those who directed the Arcadian councils;

and the result seems to have been not precisely what prudence would have dictated to those whose object was to preserve the peace and independency of Arcadia, which had been so endangered without being yet materially injured : they sent ministers to Thebes to accuse the author of the late violence, and to insist that his crime should be punished with death.

Epaminondas was then in the high office of general, commander-in-chief; which in the Theban as in the Athenian democracy seems to have conferred, for its period, a kingly power ; far less regularly controlled, by any constitutional checks, than the authority of the Lacedæmonian kings ; and, when an overbearing party in the tumultuary sovereign assembly favoured, it was, like the power of an Asiatic vizier, the favourite of his despot, uncontrolled. To the general the Arcadians were to address themselves. We do not find Xenophon often vouching for words spoken by his contemporaries with that unqualified assurance with which some, who wrote four or five hundred years after him, have undertaken to give them. On this occasion, the only one on which any censure upon his political enemy Epaminondas appears even implied, he relates what that great man said ; but his caution in so doing deserves notice. Affirming nothing from himself, he states the report which the Arcadian ministers, on their return, made to their government : “ Epaminondas told them,” they said, “ that the Theban commissioner at Tegea had done far better when he seized the principal Arcadians than when he released them : for, the Thebans having engaged in the war only to serve Arcadia, any negotiation for peace, without communication with Thebes, was treason against the confederacy. Be assured therefore,” he added, “ we will march into Arcadia ; and, with our numerous friends there, who have

Xen. Hel. 1. 7.
c. 4. s. 40.

been faithful to the common cause, we will prosecute the war.”²³

The communication of this report put Peloponnesus in a ferment. All the independent interests, if an apposite modern phrase may be allowed, were indignant, yet at the same time alarmed, at the presumption of Thebes to command war for them, within their own peninsula, when they desired peace; and to march an army into their country to enforce such commands. The governments of Arcadia, Elis, and Achaia united in these sentiments. They sent, in common, to Athens, still connected in that alliance with Arcadia which was the last political work of Lycomedes, in some confidence that the Athenians would feel themselves bound by interest, not less than by treaty, to prevent the Thebans from becoming masters of Peloponnesus; and they were not disappointed. They sent with not less confidence to Lacedæmon, though hitherto the enemy of Arcadia, but already engaged anew in friendly connection with Achaia and Elis. The humiliation of Lacedæmon is strongly marked by what followed. A proposal which, in the early days of Agesilaus, would have been scorned and resented,

²³ Diodorus has given a strange inconsistent account of the affairs of Arcadia and Elis which led to the fourth expedition of Epaminondas into Peloponnesus. Not the leading men of the united administration of Arcadia, according to him, but the Mantinean chiefs alone purloined the sacred treasure of Olympia; for no public purpose, but for private lucre; and it was they who, to prevent leisure for inquiry into their conduct, fomented the Elean war. That the chiefs of the united administration had the Olympian treasury in their power appears from his own narrative; but how the Mantineans separately could command it, he neither informs us, nor seems to have stopped to consider; and he appears totally to have forgotten what he had just before related, that it was through the previous existence of war with Elis that any of them could lay their hands upon the Olympian treasury. Possibly he had not ready opportunity to consult Xenophon's clear detail when he enriched his book with this string of absurdities; which seems too gross to have had vogue when the facts were recent, but may have been recommended afterward, by the vehemence of party dispute, to some author (perhaps Dionysiodorus or Anaxis, Bœotian writers of Grecian history, mentioned at the close of his fifteenth book) whose work may have fallen too temptingly in his way.

was now, though far from adapted to promote the common object, readily accepted. The Lacedæmonian government admitted that the combined troops, when within the territory of any state of the new confederacy of Peloponnesian republics, should be commanded in chief by the general of that state, under direction of its government.

SECTION VII.

Principles of Grecian Politics. — Fourth Expedition of the Thebans under Epaminondas into Peloponnesus. — Second Invasion of Laconia. — Battle of Mantinea.

WE may perhaps, on first view, rather wonder at the former submission of the Grecian republics to the Lacedæmonian supremacy than at the assertion now of the right of equality. But it will readily occur that this right of equality, however justly claimed, could not be exercised, when a powerful enemy pressed upon the whole nation, without risking great inconvenience to the common cause. Republics therefore, like individuals, when fear, revenge, or ambition instigated, often conceded their equality for the advantage of military subordination. Hence arose temptation and opportunities for leading and ambitious men, which prevented the possibility of lasting peace in Greece, and must prevent it wherever a democracy may exist strong enough to contend with neighbouring powers. Where gradation of rank is established, and means of rising are open, ambition, undoubtedly for wise purposes implanted in the mind of man, has some opportunity for gratification, even in a settled government in peace; but a democracy in peace is, for the ambitious man, a blank; war or civil disturbance are necessary to him; and, when war or sedition are once afloat, no government so teems with opportunities, none offers so wide a field for ambition,

as democracy. Hence the most ambitious men are commonly zealous for democracy: by far the largest portion of successful usurpers have begun their career as favourites of the multitude: and hence the perpetual wars of Greece, and the perpetual seditions. We have seen what insecurity, public and private, what continual apprehension, what almost continual violences resulted. In a country so constituted, should any commonwealth, acquiring strength to control others, exercise it so as to check mischievous ambition and enforce any tolerable civil order, popularity would of course accrue to it as far as such benefits were extended. Thus, at the time of the Persian invasions, the attachment of the greater part of Greece to Lacedæmon was like that of a clan to an individual chief, or a nation to its hereditary king, to the admitted right of succession in whose family it had owed ages of internal peace. At the same time the rest of Greece, as all the older writers testify, looked to subjection even under the Persian monarch as likely to avert more evils than it would bring. When the superintending power then of Lacedæmon through abuse became intolerable, still the other republics felt the necessity of a head. Thus Athens rose; and when the power abused by Athens became also intolerable, it only reverted to Lacedæmon, to be again abused. Nevertheless the necessity of a superintending authority was so felt among the jarring republics that, when a few extraordinary men had raised Thebes from bondage under Lacedæmon to dominion over Bœotia, her new power of giving protection was no sooner observed than it drew the regard of neighbouring states; and Thebes appears to have been, in considerable extent, invited to aspire to the empire of Greece. But, though among the smaller republics such a rising power was seen with more hope than jealousy, yet the larger, which themselves aspired at supremacy, viewed it through a different medium. Since the battle of Cnidus

and the return of Conon, Athens had been alternately advancing and losing ground, but altogether gradually advancing in strength and in dominion. No aristocracy, oligarchy, or monarchy would so in all points meet and thwart her interest as an imperial democracy. It was thus the same principle which formerly animated Syracuse against Athens that now determined the Athenians to persevere in alliance with Lacedæmon, for the purpose of opposing the ambition and the growing power of Thebes.

It is however remarkable that in this war, in which Athens and Thebes were engaged on opposite sides, we hear of no ravage of the Attic fields by the powerful armies of Bœotia, nor of any attempt against Bœotia in the occasional absence of its forces. Both states sent troops to act against each other, at a distance from the territories of both, in Peloponnesus; both remaining quiet at home, as if by compact: perhaps compact, if not formally expressed, yet really understood, and upheld by a mutual sense of its convenience. The fact has been noticed by Demosthenes, that during the Theban war, the Attic territory enjoyed perfect peace.²⁴ But the genius of Epaminondas, intent upon raising his city, and reckoning the depression of the formerly overbearing land force of Lacedæmon the first thing necessary, would avoid needless implication with Athens by land, while nevertheless, conceiving the bold project of making Thebes a maritime power, he would contest with Athens the command of the sea. That empire, to which, while the strength of Lacedæmon was so fully employed in the war with Thebes, Athens had been silently rising again, the Athenian democracy again exercised tyrannically; and

Isocr. or. ad
Philipp.

²⁴ I think in the oration on the Crown. [The passage adverted to by Mr. Mitford is probably the following: ἐν εἰρήνῃ τὴν Ἀττικὴν ἐκ θαλάσσης εἶναι πάντα τὸν πόλεμον. De Cor. § 67. Demosthenes is here speaking of the war which ended in the battle of Chæronea.]

the discontent among those called its allies, especially the rich islands of Rhodes and Chios, and the important town of Byzantium, invited the attention of Epaminondas. He collected a naval force so unexpectedly, and conducted it so ably, that Laches, who commanded the Athenian fleet on the Asiatic station, though an officer of reputation, was unable to make head against him; and the states of Rhodes, Chios, and Byzantium, renouncing the Athenian confederacy, engaged in alliance with Thebes. But, successful as he thus was in one expedition well timed and rapidly executed, yet he could not maintain the advantage. Within the same year, according to Diodorus, Timotheus, commander-in-chief of the sea and land forces of Athens, relieved Cyzicus in the Propontis when besieged, if not by Epaminondas in person, yet by the armament which had been acting under him, and took the important towns of Torone and Potidæa on the Thracian coast; nor do we read of any farther naval enterprise of the Thebans.

Antiquity has so consented in unqualified eulogy of Epaminondas that it might be hazardous for a modern to question the integrity of his views and the propriety of his conduct, if the passions which evidently and confessedly in some degree instigated him, ambition and the love of glory, were not themselves somewhat differently estimated in the ancient and in the modern moral balance, and if political right and wrong were not also, in ancient and in modern times, distinguished by different criteria. The violence of his interference in the affairs of Arcadia, against the established government of the country, in support of a faction disgraced by a profligate act, seems not to be justified upon any principle that will now be admitted. Motives however of considerable weight for his resolution to march into

[B. C. 362.
Cl.]

Peloponnesus evidently existed. It appears clearly enough, though not directly said by Xenophon,

that Lacedæmonian intrigue had contributed to the revolution in Arcadia; beginning with Mantinea, and finally pervading the united government. Nevertheless this apparently should have been opposed by negotiation, and would hardly justify hostile invasion: Thebes was not attacked, nor any regular ally of Thebes. But the Messenians, whom the Thebans had undertaken to protect in their recovered country, were, through the reviving influence of Lacedæmon in Peloponnesus, certainly in great danger. If then Epaminondas can be vindicated from the appearance of some wantonness of ambition, the right, if such it was, and the duty, which he had created for himself, of protecting the Messenians, are what may most obviously be alleged for him. But another at least probable motive for his famous and fatal expedition may deserve notice. That inherent restlessness in the Grecian political system, which made it incapable of lasting peace, is acknowledged by all the ablest writers of the republican times. Thebes was the head of a great military confederacy; and Epaminondas, at the head of the affairs of Thebes, was not in an easy situation. Very probably he was reduced to make a virtue, as he could, of necessity, by undertaking the direction of the effervescence which he could not still.²⁵

The force that he was able to assemble, zealous to serve under him, might alone have inflamed the ambition of an

²⁵ Barthelemi has done little, and even attempted little, toward any illustration of the politics, or political history, of Greece. In his abundant reading he has given his attention much to the panegyrists of Epaminondas, and it has been a favourite purpose of his own to panegyrisé Epaminondas. Nevertheless he describes him as a mere Theban patriot; not even attempting to show that his views extended to the general freedom and well-being of Greece. He uses the licence which the plan of his work affords, for omitting all notice of the very remarkable circumstances which led to the last Theban invasion of Peloponnesus: and, taking up his hero already with his army in the heart of Arcadia, he avows, without reserve or apology, that the purpose of the expedition was to decide, "si c'étoit aux Thébains ou aux Lacédémoniens de donner des loix aux autres peuples." Anacharsis, ch. 13. p. 264. t. 2. ed. oct.

ordinary man. The Eubœan towns were now united in that confederacy with Thebes, not new among the Grecian republics, which bound their men of military age to march at the order of the imperial people. Numerous Thessalian auxiliaries came from the tagus Alexander of Pheræ, and from the cities which had opposed the tagus; for they were now at peace with one another, and equally in alliance with Thebes. Locris was completely subject to Thebes.²⁶ Phocis, boldly asserting independency, refused obedience to the requisition for its troops: "The terms of our alliance," said the Phocians, "require us to assist the Thebans, if attacked, but not to march with them to attack others."

Leaving this contumacy for future consideration, Epaminondas, to prevent opportunity for checking his way to his great object, hastened to pass the isthmus. At Nemea he halted, hoping thence to intercept the force expected from Athens to join the army of the Lacedæmonian confederacy; but, after some stay, finding himself disappointed by the foresight of the Athenian government, who sent their troops by sea to the Laconian coast, he proceeded to Tegea. Here his Peloponnesian allies met him. Argos, commonly zealous in opposition to Lacedæmon, was at this time free enough from sedition to send forth its strength. The revived state of Messenia was of course warm in the Theban interest; and scarcely less so those Arcadian states which, by rebellion against the united government of their nation, had embraced it. These were principally Tegea, Megalopolis, Asea, and Palantium, with some interspersed village-republics, through weakness and situation, dependent on these. The army altogether, according to Diodorus, consisted of more than thirty thousand

²⁶ Of this we are informed by Xenophon on a former occasion, and therefore perhaps he has omitted to name Locris here.

infantry, and about three thousand horse. The army of the Lacedæmonian confederacy, considerably inferior, assembled about the same time in Mantinea. Xen. Hel. 1. 7 c. 5. s. 1. & 9.

Arcadia was divided, but the greater part joined in the Lacedæmonian alliance; so that the troops of Arcadia, Achaia, and Elis formed its principal force. The Lacedæmonians sent their cavalry and a body of mercenaries, with only a small body of their native infantry, keeping the greater part for emergencies at home.

Epaminondas remained some time with his whole army inactive within the walls of Tegea²⁷; a measure of which Xenophon declares his approbation in terms which seem to mark that, in its day, it had not escaped censure. In the want indeed of a contemporary historian the friend of the Theban general, though with later authors he has been a favourite object of panegyric, yet we find his candid enemy Xenophon really his best eulogist. "That this expedition was fortunate," says that writer, "I s. 3. would not affirm; but, for what human prudence and courage might accomplish, in my opinion Epaminondas failed in nothing. I commend him for keeping his army within the walls of Tegea. He deprived the enemy thus, not only of opportunity to attack him, but of opportunity to observe what might indicate his purposes. Means of preparation nevertheless for himself were readier; and the enemy's motions were open to his observation, equally as if he were encamped without. I commend him also because, though commanding the stronger army, he refrained from attack, while the enemy held advantage of ground." The inactivity however, which Xenophon thus approves, could be advan-

²⁷ Τὸ στρατόπεδον ἐν τῷ τείχει τῶν Τεγεατῶν ἐποιήσατο. The word *στρατόπεδον*, commonly translated, and indeed commonly meaning, *a camp*, was however not confined to that sense, but was used sometimes for what we call *quarters*. This is fully shown by an expression of Xenophon soon following: *καταστρατοπεδυσάμενοι ἐντὸς τείχους, ἐν ταῖς οἰκίαις*. Xen. Hel. 1. 7. c. 5. s. 15.

tageous only for a limited time. The influence arising from the general confidence in the ability and spirit of Epaminondas would indeed enable him to persevere in it longer than a commander of inferior name; but, in rest and confinement, discontent would grow even among his troops, collected from various states; his reputation would suffer, and then

Xen. Hel. 1. 7.
c. 5. s. 9.

his command would become precarious. Meanwhile of some advantages which he had been expecting he found himself disappointed: none of the hostile or neutral states were induced, through any terror of his superiority, or any hope for advantage from the change, to join the Theban cause.

Apparently the wisest conduct of the Lacedæmonian confederacy would have been to persevere in precisely that disposition of their force which had principally occasioned the Theban general's inactivity. The Lacedæmonian heavy-armed remaining at home for the security of their own country, the army assembled at Mantinea had taken a position near that town, so strong as to deter attack, and so advantageous for covering the Mantinean territory that Epaminondas, with the very superior force he commanded, had thought it prudent to abstain from the usual work of ravage. But, in such circumstances, rest itself begets uneasiness. The allies of Lacedæmon feared only the more destructive explosion from the unexpected quiescence of so great a force under so renowned a commander. They could not be satisfied to have the Lacedæmonians remain at home for the protection of their own country, less immediately threatened, while they, with unequal numbers, should bear the brunt of a war so much more than commonly formidable. They were in consequence so urgent in petition and remonstrance that the Lacedæmonian government thought it necessary to concede, and all the best remaining strength of the state marched under the orders of Agesilaus.

This measure relieved Epaminondas. Intelligence no sooner reached him that Agesilaus had left Sparta, and was already at Pellene, than he formed his plan, and proceeded instantly to the execution. Orders were issued for the troops to take their evening meal, and march. The better road to Sparta, and perhaps from Tegea the shorter, by Sellasia, was open; and so deficient was the look-out of the Lacedæmonians that, but for the providential intelligence, so Xenophon calls it²⁸, brought to Agesilaus by a Cretan, Sparta would have been taken, he says, like a bird's nest, destitute of defenders. Agesilaus hastened his return so that he arrived before Epaminondas. His force, the whole Lacedæmonian cavalry and part of the infantry being at Mantinea, was very scanty for the defence of a loosely-built unfortified town against the approaching army. But for the ancient art of war every house was a fortification, and every eminence gave great advantage for the ancient missile weapons. From a housetop the bowman, slinger, and dartman, himself secure, could aim his strokes at those below with superior effect.

Epaminondas, upon his arrival, disappointed of his hope of surprising the place, observed the able disposition for defence made by Agesilaus, and determined his plan of attack accordingly. Making no attempt against the more open parts, where immediate assault was expected, he sent a detachment which, by a circuitous march, seized a height commanding the town. "It may be said," says Xenophon, "that the deity interfered: it may be said that nothing can withstand the desperate: certainly," he proceeds, "it appears extraordinary, that, when Archidamus, with less than a hundred men, advancing over very difficult ground, attacked that height, the Thebans, those

Xen. Hel. 1. 7.
c. 5. s. 10.

Xen. Hel. 1. 7.
c. 5. s. 11.
Diod. 1. 15.
p. 499. Corn.
Nep. vit.
Epam. & Ages.
Plut. vit.
Ages.

Xen. Hel. 1. 7.
c. 5. s. 12.

²⁸ Κεῖνος θεία τινὶ μοίρᾳ προσιλθέν.

men breathing fire, those conquerors of the Lacedæmonians, with advantage of numbers, and with every advantage, did not even wait the assault, but turned; and some of the prime of their army were slain." The Lacedæmonians, elated with such success, pursued intemperately, and lost some men: but Archidamus kept possession of the important post he had carried, raised his trophy, and received the enemy's solicitation for the bodies of the dead, of which he remained master; which, on account of the usual impression on the soldiers, on both sides, was, in the actual circumstances of the Lacedæmonians, a very important advantage.

Plutarch has reported an anecdote of this attack upon Sparta which, though somewhat apparently extravagant, has been too much noticed to be passed unmentioned. Isadas, son of Phœbidas, a youth of a singularly fine person, just anointed in the way of the Greeks after bathing, on alarm sounded, snatching a spear in one hand, a sword in the other, ran out naked, pressed to the foremost rank of the Lacedæmonian troops, and did extraordinary execution among the enemy without receiving a wound: whether, says the writer, some god preserved him, or the idea that he was more than human appalled the enemy. For the merit of his deed he was rewarded with the honour of being publicly crowned by the ephors: for the irregularity of it, he was fined a thousand drachmas, about forty pounds sterling. Plutarch seems to attribute this adventure to the engagement in which the trophy was won by Archidamus, with which it seems utterly inconsistent. With more appearance of probability it might be referred to the assault, not specified by Xenophon, but in which, according to Polybius, the besieging army penetrated as far as the agora of Sparta.²⁹

Xen. Hel. 1. 7.
c. 5. s. 13.

Polyb. 1. 9.
p. 547.

²⁹ Isadas, according to the well-imagined conjecture of Mr. James Byres,

It appears however to have been the success of Archidamus in carrying the commanding post that deprived Epaminondas of the hope of rapid progress against the city. Unprovided then as he was, in a hostile country, hemmed in by mountains, he deemed it inexpedient to wait till the Lacedæmonian army from Mantinea, already marching to the relief of the city, should arrive. Fertile in resources, he founded on the failure of one stroke a plan for another. It was the season of harvest: and the Mantineans, who, while he lay in Tegea, had confined their slaves and cattle within their walls, would endeavour to profit from his absence for getting in their crop. Hastening therefore his return in expectation to find the produce ready for carrying, with the slaves and cattle in the fields, he proposed to make all the prey of his army.

After a march of thirty miles over a lofty mountain barrier, he allowed his infantry some rest in Tegea; but he sent his horse immediately forward into the Mantinean territory. All the labouring slaves, as he foresaw, all the cattle, and many of the Mantinean people, within and beyond the military age, were in the fields. The approach of the Theban cavalry being observed and announced, all was alarm in Mantinea and throughout its narrow territory.

has been intended in that admirable statue in the villa Borghese at Rome, commonly, but enough without reasonable foundation, called the fighting gladiator; the only work extant of the first-rate Greek sculpture in which the human form is represented in strong action; unless the Laocoon in the Vatican should be arranged in the same class of design, or the Wrestlers, in the tribune of the gallery at Florence, may be admitted into the same class of merit. The character of the countenance of the figure in the villa Borghese is Grecian and heroic. The difference of the features of the dying gladiator, rightly so called, in the Capitol, is striking; the expression is very fine; the work is altogether admirable, and the more so because it marks precisely the character it has been intended to represent; not a Greek, for the face is not Grecian; not a hero, for the expression, though showing sternness and fortitude, shows the fortitude of a mind depressed by slavery, and without elevation of thought. Such at least is the impression which it readily conveys to those to whom the forms of Grecian sculpture are familiar.

Xen. Hel. 1. 7.
c. 5. s. 15.

Fortunately a body of Athenian horse was just arrived, but fatigued with a forced march of two days, of extraordinary length along a mountainous road. They had left Eleusis only the preceding day, rested for the night at the isthmus, and, on the morrow, in fear apparently of being intercepted, pressed their way on by Cleonæ to Mantinea without halting. They had just taken their quarters, and men and horses were yet without refreshment, when the Mantineans came to them with the most earnest solicitations for assistance and protection, on which they represented their existence as depending. The Athenians, ashamed, says the historian, weary as they were, being present in such circumstances, to be useless, and anxious to maintain their country's glory, instantly remounted to engage a very superior force of the cavalry of Thebes and Thessaly, the most renowned of Greece. They came quickly to action, and brave men, he proceeds, fell on both sides; but the advantage was wholly with the Athenians: they carried off all their own slain; they restored some of the enemy's under a solicited truce; the boasted criterion always of victory, and, what was a more essential, and indeed a most important advantage, they gave complete protection to the Mantineans, and enabled them to save their property.³⁰

Difficulties now pressed upon Epaminondas. The confederacy of little military republics, which had put so great a force, the best part of their population, under his command, had no public revenues equal to the maintenance of those numbers in the field, far from home. The term of expeditions, which they might undertake, was limited by necessity of circumstances. Magazines, such as attend the

³⁰ Xenophon has not named the Athenian commander; Diodorus calls him Hegelochus: a man previously, he says, of high reputation among the Athenian military.

motions of modern armies, were not even thought of. Already the troops under Epaminondas had suffered want, and that want must go on increasing.

Xen. Hel. 1. 7.
c. 5. s. 19.

But the term of his expedition was not left to his discretion, or to be decided by contingencies; it was absolutely limited by the controlling authority, whether of the Theban government, or of a congress of the confederacy, we are uninformed. It was now near expiring, and the troops of the northern states must be led home.³¹

s. 18.

Defeated in his attempt upon Sparta, and in that which followed upon the Mantinean territory, his reputation could not fail to suffer, notwithstanding the abilities really displayed, if, with an army so superior to the enemy, and so much greater than was commonly seen in Greece, his campaign were marked only by disappointments. He had moreover to consider that his expedition was the immediate occasion of the union of Athens, Elis, Achaia, and the best part of Arcadia with Lacedæmon, in opposition to Thebes, or at least of the actual energy of that union. Were he then to withdraw without victory, those Arcadians, whose cause had been the pretence for the Thebans to interfere in arms in Peloponnesus, must be immediately overwhelmed; and the revived state of Messenia, for whose protection Thebes, but especially Epaminondas, was pledged, would be at the enemy's mercy. A victory was perhaps necessary, not only to avert ruin from those whom he had bound himself to protect, but to make his own return to

³¹ ἔλιπον μὲν ἡμερῶν ἀνάγκη ἴσαιτο ἀπίναί, διὰ τὸ ἐξέπιν τῆ στρατιά τὸν χρόνον. This is among the passages of Xenophon for which we want assistance which, it should seem, we might not unreasonably expect from the later ancient writers who have treated of the actions of Epaminondas; but, among many tales and much panegyric, we find little that deserves the name of history, or that affords any illustration of history. As far as I have ventured explanation, I think I am warranted by what may be gathered from Xenophon himself.

his country not creditable only but even safe. A battle therefore was indispensable; and if he fell, says Xenophon, it was a satisfactory reflection to him that his fall would be glorious, in the endeavour to give Thebes the empire of Greece.

Xen. Hel. 1. 7.
c. 5. s. 19.

“That these should be his sentiments,” proceeds the historian, continuing the eulogy of his enemy, “I think not very wonderful; they are common to men smitten with the love of glory: but, to have so prepared his troops, collected from various states, that they would decline no fatigue, yield to no danger, in want be patient, and in all circumstances orderly and zealous in duty, this I think truly worthy of admiration.” Epaminondas having declared in public orders his resolution to engage the enemy, the utmost alacrity was manifested by the army. The cavalry diligently brightened their helmets; the infantry were seen busy, sharpening their spears and swords, and burnishing their shields: some of the Arcadian heavy-armed desired to be enrolled in the Theban band of clubmen; a circumstance which seems singularly to mark the popularity of the Theban name when Epaminondas commanded. What the band of clubmen was we are not informed: possibly an institution of less utility for the weapon from which it was denominated than for the enthusiasm it inspired, in emulation of Hercules, whom the Thebans proudly called at the same time their god and their fellow-countryman.

s. 21. General zeal thus quickly making preparation complete, Epaminondas, at an early hour of the morning, formed his order of battle, and marched by his left, not directly toward Mantinea, but to the nearest root of mount Mænalus, the western boundary of the vale, in which both Mantinea and Tegea stood. There,
s. 22. on strong ground, within sight of the enemy, he

extended his phalanx and grounded arms ³², as if going to encamp.

According to those terms to which the pressure of adversity had reduced the Lacedæmonians to submit, the army of their confederacy, being in the Mantinean territory, was to be commanded in chief by Mantinean generals, under direction of the Mantinean administration. In the want of the abilities of a Lycomedes, which might have made some amends for the inherent inconveniences of such a regulation, the presence of Agesilaus, though not possessing the nominal command-in-chief, might have been advantageous: some deference might have been paid to his rank and long experience, at least when danger pressed. But Epaminondas seems to have derived the advantage from his expedition against Sparta, that Agesilaus, and a large part of the troops, before destined to re-enforce the army in Arcadia, were retained to protect Laconia against any new attack. Who commanded now in Arcadia we are not informed: their deficiencies only remain reported. Apparently the circumstances which imposed upon Epaminondas the necessity of seeking a battle should have decided them by all means to avoid it. Nevertheless they were prepared, with a very inferior force, two-thirds only of his numbers, according to Diodorus, to contend with his superior talents. His measures, indicating intention to encamp, completely deceived them. After having formed their order of battle with a view to meet him, concluding that his purpose was

³² Ἔθετο τὰ ὄπλα. It is not always possible to find terms in modern language for expressing exactly the circumstances of ancient warfare. In the Grecian service, what principally loaded the foot-soldier of the phalanx was his large shield. To relieve him from the pressure of its weight was of course expedient, whenever it might be safely done. The spear also was weighty, but it might be planted on the ground, and still ready for instant use. To ground the shield required more caution, and seems to have been more particularly implied in the phrase *θέσθαι τὰ ὄπλα*.

not to fight that day, they allowed that order to be in a great degree dissolved, and the preparation of the soldier's mind for action, highly important, in Xenophon's idea, to be relaxed and dissipated.

Epaminondas observed the effect his feint had produced, and proceeded to profit from it: he issued orders to resume arms and march. We have seen it the practice of the Thebans to form their phalanx of extraordinary depth, even to fifty in file; trusting to the effect of breaking the enemy's front, at the risk of suffering themselves in flank. By this method they had formerly gained the battle of Delium against the Athenians, and by this method Epaminondas himself had succeeded, in the glorious day of Leuctra, against the Lacedæmonians. His superiority in numbers enabled him now, in taking the advantage, to obviate the hazard of that method. Resolving to direct his principal effort against the enemy's right, he formed his line in the ordinary manner of the Greeks. His Theban column of attack was a separate body, which he placed in front of his left wing. Following the same principle in the disposition of his cavalry, he divided it on the flanks of his infantry; but, meaning that the cavalry of his left should be the charging body, he gave it a strength that might ensure its superiority, leaving the horse on his right comparatively weak. These therefore he directed to some advantageous ground, with orders not to move from it, unless opportunity of evident advantage should offer; and he provided support for them, in case of need, from a body of infantry.

While, in this advantageous arrangement, Epaminondas led directly toward the enemy, their generals, though they had allowed order nearly to cease in their army, had not provided for holding it in their choice to avoid a battle. His approach therefore produced, with universal alarm, a universal

hurry among their forces. Some, says the contemporary historian, were forming, some running to the ground where they should form, some bridling their horses, some putting on their breastplates; all seeming more like men expecting to suffer than preparing to act. Order however was restored before attack could begin upon them: the Arcadians held the right, as the post of honour which, Diod. 1. 15. by treaty, they claimed within their own country; the Lacedæmonians were posted next to them; the cavalry were divided on the flanks.

The battle began with the cavalry. That of the Xen. Hel. 1. 7. c. 5. §. 25. Lacedæmonian side was without those light-armed foot, practised to act with horse, whose weapons, galling from a distance, prepared for the effect of a charge. The Theban abounded with these; and being moreover very superior in number, they presently overthrew their opponents. The Theban column of infantry then joined action; but, though carefully composed of the best troops, with Epaminondas leading, it found strong resistance from the Lacedæmonian and Arcadian foot. Its persevering force however at length broke the opposing ranks, and then the effect was what the able projector expected. That which had the reputation of being the firmest part of the enemy's line being put to flight, the contagion spread among the inferior troops, and all the infantry gave way.

It seemed now as if victory must be, on the B. C. 362. -- Ol. 104. 3-4. [June. Cl.] Theban side, as complete as superior force directed by superior judgment could make it. But we have had repeated occasion to observe how much of the fate of multitudes may depend on one man. Leading the charge of his column just as success appeared decided, the Lacedæmonians, with their phalanx broken, nevertheless still resisting, Epaminondas received a wound in his breast, and fell. This

disaster engaged the attention of those around ; and, with the information of it rapidly spreading, confusion and dismay pervaded the army. Succession of command seems not to have been duly provided for. The various multitude having no equal confidence in any other officer, authority extending over the whole in a great degree ceased ; or, if any proper regulation had been made, it was overborne by the impulse of hesitation and consternation, so prevailing that scarcely an attempt was made to profit from the victory actually gained.

Xen. Hel. 1. 7.
c. 5. s. 25.

The heavy-armed stood on the ground on which they had fought, vindicating the possession of the dead and wounded, but not moving a step in pursuit. The cavalry turned from those they had put to flight ; and, without a blow against the enemy's retreating infantry, slipped by them to rejoin their own phalanx, as if themselves defeated. The light-armed and targeteers, alone presuming on victory, crossed the field toward the left, without expecting attack or looking for support. The Athenian horse, no longer kept in check by the able disposition made for the purpose, charged and put them mostly to the sword. Epaminondas lived to be informed that his army was victorious, but fainted, it is said, on the extraction of the broken end of the weapon left in the wound, and died soon after.³³

³³ Xenophon simply mentions that Epaminondas fell in the battle. Diodorus, after a puerile detail of feats like those of Achilles in the Iliad, or rather of Virgil's hero in the Æneid, is more circumstantial than any other writer about his death. He mentions no authority for those things said and done, between three and four centuries before him, which Nepos in his own age, and Plutarch and Pausanias, after him, evidently did not quite believe ; yet his story has been generally given as authentic by modern writers. Plutarch, in his Life of Agesilaus, has quoted earlier authors ; a circumstance which, more than any other, may excite regret for the loss of his Life of Epaminondas. For those circumstances reported by Diodorus which, being probable in themselves, are in any degree confirmed by Nepos and Plutarch, neither of whom has copied him, or which afford probable illustration of the contemporary historian's concise narrative, reasonable credit will be allowed.

Under these circumstances of the battle both sides claimed the victory; each army raised its trophy undisturbed by the other; each remained in possession of some of the enemy's dead; and neither would immediately solicit the bodies. But the slain of the Lacedæmonian side seem to have been not only more numerous, but of higher rank, cavalry and heavy-armed; whereas those of the Theban side remaining in the enemy's power were mostly light-armed, or targeteers. Shortly therefore the Lacedæmonians, yielding to what was esteemed a most serious duty, sent their herald with the usual solicitation. After this acknowledgment the Thebans also sent their herald with the same request.

Xen. Hel. 1. 7
c. 5. s. 27.
Plod. 1. 16. p.
513.

“Universal expectation,” says the contemporary historian, “was strangely deceived by this event of so great a battle. Almost all Greece being met in arms, there was nobody who did not suppose that the victors would in future command, and the defeated must obey. But God,” he continues, “decided otherwise. Each party claimed the victory, and neither gained any advantage: territory, town, or dominion, was acquired by neither; but indecision, and trouble, and confusion, more than even before that battle, pervaded Greece.” Tired then with the sad tale of his country's woes, which, in the vain hope of better times, he had now from early youth to advanced age been solicitously observing, he concludes his historical narrative: “Thus far,” he says, “suffice it for me to have related: following events perhaps will interest some other writer.”

Xen. Hel. 1. 7.
c. 5. s. 26, 27.

SECTION VIII.

General Pacification. — Lacedæmon excluded. — Troubles in Arcadia. — Interference of Thebes. — Views of Agesilaus. — Affairs of the East. — War of Evagoras with Persia. — Rebellion of the Persian maritime Provinces. — Expedition of Agesilaus to Egypt. — Death of Agesilaus. — Distraction together of the aristocratical and democratical Interests in Greece, and Dissolution of the ancient System of Grecian Confederacy.

Diod. l. 19.
c. 89. p. 504.
Plut. vit.
Agesil.

IT is a most critical moment at which we lose the invaluable guidance of Xenophon in the maze of Grecian affairs. According to Diodorus and Plutarch, the fermentation, in which the indecisive battle of Mantinea left things, was presently stilled by a general peace, to the terms of which Lacedæmon alone refused accession.* How the adverse republics were brought to a temper for pacification, those writers, little curious about such matters, have left untold; but a collation of the memorials of the times will afford, in a great degree, the information to be desired. From Xenophon we have already learnt that the term limited for the service of the

[* To the authorities cited by Mr. Mitford in the margin Mr. Clinton adds the important testimony of Polybius, iv. 33. 8. ἐκάλουν Λακεδαιμόνιοι μετέχειν τῶν σπονδῶν Μεσσηνίους· ἐπὶ τοσούτον διέσπευσαν Μεγαλοπολίται καὶ πάντες οἱ κοινοῦντες Ἀρκάδων τῆς αὐτῶν συμμαχίας, ὥστε Μεσσηνίους μὲν ὑπὸ τῶν συμμάχων προσδεχθῆναι, καὶ μετασχεῖν τῶν ὅρκων καὶ διαλύσειαν, Λακεδαιμονίους δὲ μόνους ἐκσπόνδους γενέσθαι τῶν Ἑλλήνων. “ Mr. Mitford omits this valuable and material testimony. Xenophon, in the last sentence of his history, speaks the language of a partisan of Lacedæmon. It was not strictly true that οὔτε χώρα, οὔτε πόλει, οὔτ’ ἀρχῆ, οὔδέτεροι οὔδεν πλείον ἔχοντες ἐφάνησαν ἢ πρὶν τὴν μάχην γενέσθαι, ἀκρισία δὲ καὶ ταραχὴ ἔτι πλείων μετὰ τὴν μάχην ἐγένετο ἢ πρόσθεν ἐν τῇ Ἑλλάδι. The Theban confederacy gained their great object by establishing an effectual check to the power of Lacedæmon, and by securing the independence of Messenia. Plutarch then, Agesil. c. 35., consistently with Polybius, implies that a general peace, of which the Messenians enjoyed the benefit, followed the battle of Mantinea.” Clinton, Fasti Hellen. p. 120. It should be observed, that when the concluding words of Xenophon are again cited by Mr. Mitford at the end of § 8., he has in the present edition confirmed them by an additional passage from Demosthenes.]

Theban, and other northern forces, was near expiring when the battle was fought; and we have had numerous occasions to see how usual it was for the armies of the Grecian confederacies, without a peace, without even a truce, to separate after a battle. It seems then certain, that when the credit and abilities of Epaminondas were gone the Theban influence instantly sunk, and the bonds which held the Theban confederacy together were so slackened that it verged rapidly toward dissolution. That fear therefore of preponderance of Thebes, which had united the opposing republics, soon dissipated: and some of them, especially Athens, driven by the dread of a rival democracy to connect itself with the opponents of that interest of which it had been formerly the head, became now rather apprehensive of the superiority which might return to Lacedæmon and the aristocratical cause. Under these circumstances, opportunity for negotiation would be obvious. The states of the Theban confederacy persevered then in insisting upon the independency of Messenia. Those of the Lacedæmonian, Lacedæmon itself only excepted, holding themselves no longer interested as before to oppose this, some perhaps gladly, and the rest after no long controversy, consented. Thus peace appears to have been concluded; Lacedæmon alone remaining at war, nominally, with all the republics of the Theban confederacy.

This relic of war however was of no very threatening aspect, if, by the terms of the treaty between the other states of the two confederacies, the armies on both sides were, as Diodorus affirms, to be dissolved, and the troops to return to their several homes. Nevertheless the fear of exciting united energy anew among the inimical states appears to have prevented any immediate effort of the Lacedæmonians against Messenia. The first ensuing transactions in Greece, noticed by the compiler whom we must

Demosth. or.
pro Megalop.

Diod. 1. 15.
c. 94. p. 507.

now follow, which he attributes to the year after that of the battle of Mantinea, indicate a prevailing disposition in the leading republics to rest under the existing state of things; though the uneasiness of a large number of unfortunate, and perhaps many injured men, urged such to persevere in seeking commotion. On the union of Arcadia the inhabitants of several villages had been compelled, as we have formerly seen, to quit their residences, and migrate to the new capital, Megalopolis. Dissatisfied with the change, they now claimed, under that article of the treaty of peace which required the return of all the troops, on both sides, to their respective homes, to go themselves and re-occupy their ancient country residences. The leading men in Megalopolis vehemently opposed this. We might be at a loss for the motives of each party, had we not seen a solution of the difficulty in Xenophon's account of the dispersion and re-assembling of the Mantineans. Those of the inhabitants of Megalopolis on whom the violence had been put, or the chief of them, were landed men, accustomed to live independently upon their estates, nearly as the smaller barons in the feudal times of western Europe³⁴; of course attached to the aristocratical interest. That such men would be uneasy too on separation from their property to become members of the multitude in a town, and there observed with jealousy by that multitude, instigated by leaders their political enemies, may be readily conceived. They addressed solicitations to Mantinea, Elis, and all the aristocratical republics, to support them in their construction of the late treaty. Upon this the democratical chiefs applied

³⁴ Something of the same kind is said to subsist, with many relics of heroic manners, among the Mainotes, in the Peloponnesian mountains, at this day; whose chiefs, living in castle-fashioned houses, lodge the stranger, hospitably received, as in Homer's time, under the sounding portal, *ὑπ' αἰθούσῃ ἐριδούπῃ*. *Odys.* 1. 3. v. 399.

to Thebes. Energy, with a disposition to pursue the policy of their late illustrious general, so far remained in the councils there that Pammenes, a principal friend of Epaminondas, was sent at the head of three thousand heavy-armed into Arcadia. None then stirring in favour of the unfortunate country-gentlemen, as in England we should call them, they were compelled to submit to the commands imposed upon them; and the more effectually to obviate a renewal of their attempt to secede from the city, their country residences were destroyed.³⁵

In this state of things the situation of the aged king of Lacedæmon, Agesilaus, who had begun to reign when Lacedæmon was arbitress of Greece, and had himself gone far to make her arbitress of Asia, could not but be highly uneasy. Plutarch has ineptly enough censured him for not resting on his humiliated throne. Rest, in any security, is little likely to have been in his choice; and Plutarch's apology for him,

³⁵ According to our editions of Diodorus, the application of the Megalopolitans was to Athens, and Pammenes was an Athenian general, and the three thousand heavy-armed under him were Athenians. Wesseling however has expressed a suspicion of this passage: "Demiror," he says, "Demosthenem, or. de Megalopolit., nihil horum attingere." Thus admonished by Wesseling to look into that oration, it has appeared to me fully implied that, to the time when it was delivered, the Athenian government never had interfered in the affairs of the Megalopolitans. Nor anywhere, but in this passage of Diodorus, do we find the name of Pammenes as an Athenian general. But Pammenes is mentioned by Diodorus himself as a general and statesman of great eminence, and also by Pausanias and Plutarch; by Pausanias especially as having held the command in chief on an occasion when the affairs of Megalopolis were settled, and the security of that new establishment was provided for. Considering then the circumstances of Greece at the time, and in times immediately preceding and following, as far as they are made known to us, there seems no room for doubt but Thebes, rather than Athens, would be the state to which the Megalopolitans would apply for support, and the state most likely to be able and ready to give it. From Thebes indeed it would be almost matter of course, but from Athens little likely to come. Altogether then it appears so indicated that the name Ἀθηναίων has crept into this passage of our copies of Diodorus, through the ignorance or carelessness of transcribers, for Θεβαίων, that I have thought myself warranted, stating thus my grounds, to prefer the reading for which Wesseling has furnished the suggestion.

subjoined to the censure, appears far better founded than the censure itself: "He thought it," says the biographer, "unworthy of him, even at his age, to sit in Sparta, waiting for death, and doing nothing for the public." In truth a Spartan king could do little for the public at home in peace, unless the public good might require his interference in political intrigue, and his influence might make such interference effectual to control the ephors. Agesilaus however, notwithstanding the misfortunes of his reign, which adverse circumstances, together with extraordinary talents among the enemies of his country, produced, appears to have had extensive estimation in his own and the following age, as a wise man and an able politician.³⁶ At this time his party was prevalent in Lacedæmon; and, though approaching his

Xen. Ages.
c. 2. s. 28.

eightieth year, his constitution of body was still vigorous, and his mind still enterprising. Still therefore himself the life and soul of the Lacedæmonian administration, he directed his views to raise his fallen country. Especially it seems to have been his anxious purpose

to recover Messenia. Military strength was not yet so much wanting to Lacedæmon as revenue to give energy to that strength. Every method therefore, that the circumstances of the times would allow, was taken for raising money. According to Plutarch, loans from individuals seem to have been the principal resource; and the credit of Agesilaus what chiefly gave this any efficacy. To sooth and reconcile the Pericæcians, those Laconians of the provincial towns whom the tyrannical oligarchy of the Spartans had alienated, would of course be an important object; and it was probably a measure of policy, with this point in view, and not of base resentment, as Plutarch would have it, to grant

³⁶ Thus Isocrates, when it was his purpose to select, for example, men of the highest reputation for wisdom: Ἀγησίλαος ὁ δόξας εἶναι Λακεδαιμόνιον φρονιμώτατος. Or. ad Philip. p. 364 ed. Auger.

hereditary honours and privileges to Anticrates, a Laconian, who was said to have given Epaminondas his mortal wound. Possibly it may not have been very clearly ascertained by whom, or how, in the tumult of close action, with confusion already begun in the Lacedæmonian line, that wound was given; but among the different reports transmitted to us, what Plutarch has preserved deserves notice: "The historian Dioscorides," he says, "relates that the Laconian Anticrates struck Epaminondas with a spear; but the descendants of Anticrates bear still, among the Lacedæmonians, the surname of Machæriion, from the machæra (a small sword) with which, as they affirm, he gave the fatal blow; and the hereditary exemption from taxes, granted on the occasion, is at this day enjoyed by Callicrates, the head of the family."

Matters were thus preparing in Lacedæmon for the Messenian war, and the great mind of Agesilaus was bent upon wearing out its last energy in that narrow field, to which the pressure of adverse circumstances had reduced and still urged his attention, when events occurred in the East, seeming to offer prospect of a nobler kind. Egypt had been so long in revolt, so far successful against the Persian empire, that the largest part of that rich country, or perhaps the whole, was nearly settled into an independent monarchy. But the Egyptian kings (for so they are called by all the Grecian writers, though rebels in the contemplation of the Persian court) were watchful of opportunities for advantageous foreign connections, and for means of providing diversion for the Persian arms. Success in one province afforded encouragement for those who held command in others, toward the extremities of the empire, to assert independency. Of these none was more invited by situation and circumstances than the friend of the Athenian people, Evagoras, tyrant of Salamis in Cyprus; whom we

have seen acquiring his dominion as a hero, and administering it as a patriot, but still holding it in tributary vassalage under the Persian monarch. The great object of Evagoras was to unite the extensive island of Cyprus under his authority. The people of three principal towns, Amathus, Citium, and Soli, or at least a powerful party in each, opposed this. If they enjoyed liberty in any security in their municipal governments under Persian protection, their opposition may have been not unreasonable; for, though the administration of Evagoras is said to have been just and liberal, and anxiously directed to the cultivation of popularity, yet, even according to the contemporary Athenian rhetorician, his panegyrist, it was completely despotic; the prince not only chose his counsellors and appointed all magistrates, but made laws and exercised judicial powers; so that he was master of the lives and fortunes of his subjects. Isocrates, if indeed he was author of the oration to Nicocles, has not scrupled to say that this was not only a better government than oligarchy or democracy, but the best of governments. The administration may indeed easily have been preferable to that of many of the Grecian republics; and thus men of property were induced to migrate from various parts to live under the benign administration of Evagoras. But the Solians, Citians, and Amathusians nevertheless, considering that the character of such a government depended upon the life of one man, and the chance of what his successor might be, were unwilling to change existing advantages under the despotic sceptre of Persia, seldom interfering with them, for the precarious benefits to be derived from the merit of an absolute prince within their island. Evagoras nevertheless persisted in measures, whether by his own arms, or by supporting a party in every township favourable to his views, for bringing

Diod. l. 14.
p. 447.

Isocrat. ad Nicoclem, p. 66.
& p. 68. t. 1.

p. 110. &
112. t. 1.

those people under his dominion. The adverse party, otherwise unable to resist, solicited protection from Persia.

The danger of losing the command of Cyprus, so critically situated for intercepting the most important maritime communication of the empire, alarmed the Persian court; and it was resolved to repress the growing power of the Salaminian prince by force, if he refused obedience to commands. Evagoras however had prepared himself, by other means than the scanty resources which Cyprus afforded, for supporting his measures and prosecuting his views. He had formed a close connection with the wealthy king of Egypt, Acoris; he had great interest among the Asiatic Grecian towns, and he had carried successful intrigue among the Persian provinces bordering on the Mediterranean. Hecatomnus, who is styled, not satrap, but prince or lord of Caria, a powerful vassal of the empire, apparently of Grecian lineage, wishing for opportunity to follow his example, secretly assisted him with money: Cilicia and great part of Phenicia were ripe for revolt. Knowing then the usual slowness of the Persian councils, he resolved not to wait till the force of the empire should be collected to attack him in Cyprus, but endeavoured to raise business for its arms that might prevent such attack. His successes at first seemed to justify the boldness of his plan. Cilicia joining him, he carried the war immediately into Phenicia; ravaged and plundered the adverse part of that rich province, and took Tyre by storm.

B. C. about
381. or 382.
Ol. 100. (37)

Whether these actions were really more brilliant than the plan altogether was judicious, whether they did not

³⁷ This date is thus nearly ascertained by two passages in the panegyric oration of Isocrates, p. 250. and 274. t. 2. [The dates and duration of the Cyprian war are examined at length by Mr. Clinton in c. XII. of the Appendix to his *Fasti Hellenici*. The opposite statements of Diodorus and Isocrates are contrasted, and the authority of the latter preferred.]

compel the slothful government of Persia to an exertion of its preponderant force which by quieter measures might have been avoided, our information is too deficient to enable us fairly to decide. At length however an army to the amount, according to Diodorus, of three hundred thousand horse and foot, and a fleet of three hundred triremes, was collected for the Cyprian war. Evagoras's fleet, only ninety triremes, of which twenty were Phenician, venturing a battle, was defeated. Driven then to the defence of his island, his land force was little able to withstand the numbers that with the sea open could be poured in upon him. After resistance ably protracted beyond expectation, besieged in Salamis, disappointed in the amount of support received from the king of Egypt, on the verge of utter ruin, he was relieved by intrigue among the Persian officers. Tiribazus, the commander-in-chief, accused by Orontas, the general next under him, of misconduct and disaffection, was removed. Political necessity then urged Orontas, advanced to the chief command, to put an early end to a war which had already cost the Persian court, according to Isocrates, more than ten millions sterling³⁸; and doubting the power of his arms, he proposed a treaty. Evagoras thus, though compelled to surrender all his acquisitions, preserved the dominion of Salamis: holding it indeed as a dependence of the empire, and paying a specified yearly tribute; but allowed, by compact, the proud privilege to communicate with his sovereign as a king with a king.³⁹ This dominion and dignity he held till his death, and transmitted as an inheritance

³⁸ Πλέον ἢ πεντάκις μύρια τάλαντα. Isocr. Evag. p. 308. t. 2. [“The last editor, Mr. Bekker, in his valuable edition of the Attic Orators, has reduced the numbers to a more probable amount, by substituting, on the authority of two MSS., πεντακισχίλια καὶ μύρια, about three millions sterling.” Clinton, Fasti Hellen. p. 280.]

³⁹ In Xenophon's accounts of the tenure of principalities and lordships under

to his family. His eldest son, says the contemporary Athenian orator, was styled king, and the titles of prince and princess distinguished his younger sons and his daughters.⁴⁰ It is by three extant tracts of that respectable writer, addressed to Nicocles, eldest son and successor of Evagoras, who seems to have maintained his father's connection of alliance and citizenship with the Athenian people, that we derive our principal information concerning Evagoras, and the important transactions in which he had so great a share.⁴¹

Thus Cyprus was preserved to the Persian empire. But, in reducing one rebellion, another far more extensive and dangerous was prepared. Gaos, who commanded the fleet, was son-in-law of Tiribazus. Apprehensive that he should be involved in his father's ruin, he revolted, and joined Acoris in Egypt. In the deficiency of the Persian government at this time, in proportion as the fidelity of its officers was liable to be ill rewarded, treason and rebellion were little scrupled among them: its frequent weakness in pardoning

the Persian empire something very like feudal vassalage, as before remarked, is observable. Diodorus's words express the same thing, as nearly perhaps as it could easily be expressed in the words, and according to the ideas, of a people among whom the thing had not obtained. The terms required of Evagoras by Tiribazus were that, reigning in Salamis only, *τελῆ τῶν Περσῶν βασιλεῖ κατ' ἐνιαυτὸν φόρον ὠρισμένον, καὶ ποιῆ τὸ προστὰττόμενον, ὡς δούλος δεσπότης*. The terms granted by Orontas, *βασιλεύειν τῆς Σαλαμῖνος, καὶ τὸν ὠρισμένον δίδόναι φόρον, κατ' ἐνιαυτὸν, καὶ ὑπακούειν βασιλεὺς βασιλεῖ προστάττοντι*.

⁴⁰ Τῶν ἐξ αὐταῦ γενομένων οὐδένα κατέλιπεν ἰδιωτικοῖς ὀνόμασι προσαγορευόμενον, ἀλλὰ τὸν μὲν βασιλεῖα καλούμενον, τοὺς δ' ἄνακτας, τὰς δ' ἀνάσασαι. Isocr. Evag. p. 318. t. 2.

⁴¹ Diodorus, according to our copies of him, affirms that Evagoras was assassinated by a eunuch, named Nicocles, who obtained possession of his kingdom: but the annotators have supposed error in the transcription of that passage, though they would support it, as far as regards the assassination of Evagoras, from a passage in Aristotle's Politics, (l. 5. c. 10.) which possibly some readers may think as doubtful as the passage which it is proposed to correct by it. Indeed the suspicion may appear not wholly unfounded, and the known incorrectness with which Aristotle's works have been transmitted may tend at least to excuse it, that the true reading stated the eunuch to have been killed by Evagoras, instead of Evagoras by the eunuch.

encouraged offence, while its misdirected severity took away the just confidence of integrity; and war allowed, or even encouraged, between the governors of its provinces, was ever ready to be turned against the throne itself. Some years after the reduction of Cyprus, according to Diodorus about the time of the battle of Mantinea, a rebellion of all the western maritime provinces broke out, in which Orontas himself engaged with several other great officers of the empire. Among the leaders, beside Orontas, who was satrap of Mysia, were Ariobarzanes, satrap of Phrygia, Autophradates, of Lydia, Datames, of Cappadocia, and Mausolus, who had succeeded his father Hecatomnus in the principality of Caria; and the historian names, as people joining in it, the Lycians, Pisidians, Pamphylians, Cilicians, Syrians, Phenicians, and all the Asian Greeks.⁴² Matters had been concerted with Tachos, king of Egypt, who was to give his utmost assistance. But, through the faithlessness of the chiefs toward one another, what was immediately most formidable in this rebellion quickly subsided. Orontas, elected general of the confederacy, presently betrayed it; and in consequence all Lesser Asia again yielded obedience to the Persian king. Reomithres, appointed to command fifty ships, and intrusted with a large sum of money to co-operate with Tachos, purchased his own pardon with a part of the money, all the ships, and the heads of many of his associates. This treachery enabled the king's officers quickly to recover Syria.⁴³

⁴² Artaxerxes Mnemon died about this time, and Ochus succeeded, but after the business in Egypt below related, according to Diodorus, l. 15. c. 90. sqq. This however hardly holds together. [See note * at the end of s. 1. c. XLV.]

⁴³ That these were not improbable circumstances, though we have them only from Diodorus, may be gathered from what Xenophon relates of Persian affairs in his account of the expedition of Cyrus. Nevertheless the omission

Chap. 23. s. 1.
& 2. & ch. 24.
s. 3. of this
History.

Diod. l. 15.
c. 90. p. 504.
B. C. 362.
Ol. 104. 3.

Diod. l. 15.
c. 91. Strabo,
l. 14. p. 656.

Then Tachos became apprehensive that the concentrated strength of the Persian empire would be exerted against himself. Long before the time of the younger Cyrus we have seen Grecian mercenary troops in extensive request in the eastern countries; and the retreat of the Cyrean Greeks, and the successes afterward of Agesilaus in Asia, would tend to increase the opinion of their value. The Athenian general Chabrias, among the first in reputation of this active age, had been at one time engaged in the service of Acoris, predecessor of Tachos. With Lacedæmon Tachos himself had alliance, not without some claim of gratitude for assistance afforded. In the general pacification, which had followed an extensive and lasting war in Greece, troops of superior value, and commanders of experience, probably might be readily obtained. Tachos applied to Lacedæmon for a general, making large offers to Agesilaus, if he would himself undertake the command-in-chief of his numerous army; and he engaged Chabrias to command his fleet, consisting, according to Diodorus, of two hundred triremes. Among the numbers whom the cessation of war in Greece had left without employment and without income a large body of troops was easily raised.

Diod. l. 15.
p. 471.

Xen. Ages.
c. 2. s. 29.

c. 2. s. 28.
Diod. l. 15.
p. 506.

It may seem, on first view, an extravagant resolution for a prince of the age of Agesilaus to undertake the command of forces for a foreign sovereign, at such a distance from his own country: but if we consider the situation of a king of Lacedæmon in peace at home, it will not appear so wonderful that, retaining strength and activity, it should be his

of all mention of them in his panegyric of Agesilaus may excite a doubt if the revolt was quite so extensive, or at least so complete, as the account of Diodorus has represented it. Xenophon however mentions the flight of the king of Egypt to Sidon, which marks revolt there; and Isocrates shows that a disposition to revolt was extensive among the maritime provinces. We shall in the sequel find it also lasting.

choice. His views indeed, as they are reported by Xenophon, were extensive, and seem to carry some indication of an intention not to return to Greece; where his part of the divided royalty of Lacedæmon, little inviting for him, might

well be administered by his son Archidamus. Xen. Ages. c. 2. s. 29. Agesilaus, says the philosopher, his friend, was pleased with the proposal from Tachos, because he thought by the same expedition he might requite the Egyptians for benefits conferred on Lacedæmon, he might once more rescue the Asian Greeks from the Persian dominion, and he should have the satisfaction of revenge against the Persian king, whose support to the enemies, while he called himself still the ally, of Lacedæmon, was the cause of the loss of Messenia. The Lacedæmonian government approved the measure; induced apparently by the prospect that means to be furnished by the friendship of the king of Egypt, and perhaps increased by the spoil of Persian provinces, might lead to the recovery of Messenia; an inducement possibly still assisted by the hope afforded to powerful families of partaking in the spoil; for, according to the practice on Plut. vit. Ages. former occasions, thirty Spartans were either appointed by the government, or chosen by Agesilaus, for his counsellors and attendants on the expedition, not, probably, without expectation of sharing its rewards.

Whether the age and infirmities of the king Artaxerxes, or what else impeded the exertions of the Persian government, the measures against Egypt were slow, and little vigorous. Tachos therefore, instead of waiting for invasion, resolved to prosecute, as far as circumstances would allow, the plan concerted with the discontented in the maritime provinces, and carry the war into Phenicia and Syria. But, with the relief of his fears, a change took place in his disposition toward his supporters. Instead of the command-in-chief of all his forces, by the promise of which he had

engaged Agesilaus in his service, he allowed that prince only the subordinate command of the Grecian mercenaries: and committing the fleet to Chabrias, he assumed the nominal command-in-chief himself. What followed, barely touched upon by Xenophon, is variously and very imperfectly and confusedly reported by later writers.⁴⁴ According to Plutarch, Agesilaus submitted to attend the Egyptian prince into Syria, and, together with Chabrias, bore long, though impatiently, his ignorance, petulance, and neglect. Notwithstanding however the charges of Grecian writers against him, we may conceive it very possible that some good and even necessary policy may in part at least have directed the conduct of Tachos. Nevertheless what very shortly followed marks some great deficiency. While he was meditating conquest in Syria two competitors for his throne arose in Egypt; and presently he was so deserted by his people that he took refuge in Sidon. Agesilaus and Chabrias then, courted on all sides, made no difficulty of abandoning Tachos. Between the other two claimants even Xenophon's expression implies that they were decided by the more advantageous offer.⁴⁵ Nectanabis, a near kinsman of Tachos, had been the first to revolt. But his opponent, if we may judge from the support he received from the Egyptian people, had the fairer pretensions. A hundred thousand men presently attended his standard. Perhaps that very support was his ruin, leading him to hold himself high, and to neglect the Greeks, or treat them with haughtiness. Agesilaus and Chabrias were thus decided to join Nectanabis; a man possessing apparently neither ability

⁴⁴ For the circumstances of the Egyptian war, very slightly touched upon by Xenophon, and evidently ill related by Diodorus, apparently Plutarch may best be trusted. His account, the most particular remaining, is the most coherent, and most consistent with Xenophon's.

⁴⁵ One was, according to Xenophon's phrase, *μισέλλην*, literally a *Greek-hater*; the other *φιλέλλην*, a *Greek-lover*.

nor courage, though otherwise not without virtue. Little able either to estimate the value of Grecian troops, or to face danger with them, he superinduced great danger by impeding their exertions. The pressure of his opponent's superiority however at length compelled him to yield himself wholly to the guidance of Agesilaus and Chabrias.

Xen. Ages.
c. 2. s. 30.
Plut. vit.
Ages.
p. 1130. t. 2.

Grecian valour and discipline and science then prevailed against the irregular multitude of the enemy, and Nectanabis was seated on the Egyptian throne. The reward to the Lacedæmonian king and the Athenian admiral, from a prince who, by the testimony of the Greek historians, showed himself not wanting in probity or generosity, might perhaps best be estimated by what has been obtained, in modern times, by merit on parallel occasions from the princes of Hindostan. Contemporary and later writers agree that it was large.⁴⁶

Though Agesilaus was thus finally successful in Egypt, yet all the alluring prospects in Asia, which seem principally to have led him to engage in that distant expedition, were completely closed by the unforeseen turn which things

Xen. Ages.
c. 11. s. 16.
Plut. vit.
Ages.

had taken. His view therefore reverted to Greece; and it became again the great object of his indefatigable mind to recover yet, before he died, that better half of what had been, for two centuries, the territory of Lacedæmon, and ravished from it since he had been Lacedæmon's king. In midwinter he sailed; anxious, says Xenophon, that no part of the follow-

⁴⁶ It appears difficult to account for the numerous instances in which we find Diodorus differing from Xenophon about the names, as well as the actions, of Xenophon's contemporaries. According to him, it was Tachos himself that Agesilaus and Chabrias restored to the Egyptian throne, instead of placing his competitor Nectanabis upon it. If we could suppose for a moment it was possible Xenophon could be so grossly misinformed, yet Plutarch's account, more detailed than that of Diodorus, would suffice to restore his credit. Books, when Diodorus wrote, were dear, cumbersome, and troublesome to consult; and hence perhaps compilers, who consulted many, might sometimes be tempted to trust too much to memory in giving form to their materials.

ing summer should be unemployed against the enemies of his country: but, sickening on the voyage, he put into a port of the Cyrenaic territory, and died there.⁴⁷ His body, embalmed in wax, it is said, because honey, according to the established ceremonial for the Lacedæmonian kings, could not be immediately procured, was carried to Sparta, and, with the usual regal honours, there entombed.

Archidamus, son of Agesilaus, whom we have already seen often commanding the armies, succeeded to his father's share of the divided throne of Lacedæmon. That prince had, on many trying occasions, earned the glory of personal valour; but he seems to have possessed with it rather the quiet prudence of Archidamus, his grandfather, than the enterprising abilities of Agesilaus. Nor was this alone what checked the prosecution of the purposes of the late king. The defection of the Periæcian Laconians, and the encouragement offered for the flight of the numerous slaves, on whose labour Lacedæmon depended for subsistence, had induced the necessity of employing mercenary forces. The connections which Agesilaus had formed in his Asiatic command furnished means to assist the deficient treasury of the state in supporting them. We learn incidentally Xen. Ages. 1
c. 2. s. 27. from Xenophon that the powerful prince of Caria, Mausolus, secretly an enemy, though vassal of the Persian king, was among the wealthy friends who afforded him pecuniary support. After his death these means would probably fail. The riches, however, which he left, the fruit apparently of the Egyptian expedition, seem to have been considerable. All the aristocratical republics of Peloponnesus moreover, Elis, Phlius, the Achæan cities,

⁴⁷ According to Plutarch, Agesilaus lived eighty-four years, of which he reigned forty-one. Xenophon, though personally acquainted with him, does not undertake to be so precise: he says Agesilaus was *about* eighty, ἀμφὶ τὰ ἑγδὲ ἕκοντα, when he went to Egypt.

and some of the Arcadian, were deeply interested in the support of Lacedæmon. But the ruling parties in Argos, and more than half Arcadia, with some smaller states, reckoned their means for existence in their several countries to depend on the maintenance of the restored commonwealth of Messenia. Beyond the peninsula Thebes was ever ready in the same cause, and Athens was a very uncertain ally to Lacedæmon. Under these circumstances apparently it behoved the Lacedæmonian government to direct its utmost endeavours toward the preservation of its own peace, and of the general political quiet of Greece; and, in peace, to direct its views toward the conciliation of the Periœcian Laconians, and the preservation and increase of its diminished stock of slaves, by whom the agriculture was carried on through which Lacedæmon existed. Thus the Messenian country was finally lost to the Lacedæmonians; and the Messenian state, though not acknowledged by Lacedæmon, became effectually re-established, as an independent member of the Greek nation.

The pre-eminence, the empire, as it was often called, which Lacedæmon so long held in Greece, had been some time abolished by those treaties, to which Lacedæmon was a party, conceding equality with her in military command to all the states of her confederacy. It was now, by the loss of the best half of her territory, and the establishment of a democratical commonwealth there, effectually destroyed. A great change was thus made in the system of Grecian politics. A leading state no longer existed in Peloponnesus; a head of the aristocratical interest no longer existed in Greece. With the fall of Thebes, at the same time, whose extraordinary sudden elevation had checked the progress of Athens toward a recovery of empire through a leading influence among the democratical states, the democratical interest remained also divided and without a head.

The constitution of Greece at large, before bad, by these changes became worse; the ancient system of confederacy was dissolved, and no new system arose: a jealousy, just as far as it was directed to obviate an overbearing superiority, but, in its extreme, adverse to all system, order, and peace, became the prevailing political passion. Hostilities indeed, upon any considerable scale, were, through general lassitude and weakness, suspended. Thus, though Lacedæmon gained opportunity to breathe, and recover herself within her remaining narrow territory, yet “indecision, and trouble, and confusion,” in Xenophon’s phrase formerly noticed, were widely spread over the nation.⁴⁸

SECTION IX.

Illustration of the State of Greece. — Seditions, in Argos, Phigalia, Corinth, Megara, Sicyon, Phlius, Thessaly. — Prosperity of Megara, Cos, Sicyon, Rhodes, the Asiatic Cities. — Circumstances promoting the Cultivation of Science, Arts, and Commerce. — Prosperity of Athens.

IN pursuing history through the most interesting age of the Grecian republics, that age in which their political importance among the affairs of nations was greatest, while, among themselves, the display of great abilities and great

† ⁴⁸ If Xenophon, as victim of a party, though supported by the whole tenor of the testimony of the universally respected Isocrates, should be doubted, we have most remarkable confirming testimony from the great leader of the opposing party, Demosthenes: τοῦ γὰρ Φωκικοῦ συστάτος πολέμου (an event occurring not long after that last mentioned in the text) πρῶτον μὲν ὑμεῖς αὐτῶν δίκαιους, ὥστε Φωκίας μὲν βούλεσθαι σωθῆναι, καίπερ ἂν δίκαια ποιούντας ἐρῶντες· Θεσπιαίους δ’ ὅτι οὐκ ἂν ἐρησθῆναι παθεῖσιν, οὐκ ἀλόγως, οὐδ’ ἀδίκως, αὐτοῖς ἐργιζόμενοι· οἷς γὰρ εὐτυχῆκεσαν ἐν Λεύκτροις, οὐ μετρίως ἐκίχρηστο· ἔπειθ’ ἡ Πελοπόννησος ἅπασα διειστήκει· καὶ οὐθ’ οἱ μισοῦντες Λακιδαιμονίους αὐτῶν ἴσχυον, ὥστε ἀνελεῖν αὐτούς, οὐθ’ οἱ πρότερον δι’ ἐκείνων ἀρχόντες κύριοι τῶν πόλεων ἦσαν· ἀλλὰ τις ἦν ἀκριτος καὶ παρὰ τούτοις καὶ παρὰ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἅπασιν “Ἐλλήσιν ἕως καὶ ταραχῆ· De Cor. pp. 230, 231. ed. Reiske. [On the concluding words of Xenophon’s Hellenics, see Mr. Clinton’s remarks cited above, p. 298.]

characters ennobled often the contest with small forces for small objects, and the perfection of science, art, and fine taste made them, for all posterity, objects of attention, respect, and admiration, we have the advantage of the guidance of two contemporary writers of very superior abilities, and very superior opportunities for information. Nevertheless, those writers composing their histories in banishment suffered from democratical policy, we might fear to be misled by some bias thence arising, did not the concurrent voice of antiquity speak to the extraordinary impartiality of one, and, beside the high character of the other, supported by the internal evidence of his narrative, did not testimony strongly confirming what, in that narrative, most presses upon his political opponents, remain to us from contemporaries adverse, some to his politics and some to himself. Occasion has already occurred to observe that Xenophon, deeply interested in the political events of his age, and directing his principal attention to those which particularly affected either Athens or Lacedæmon, has omitted notice of transactions, among the inferior republics, of some importance toward the modern reader's knowledge of the state of the country at large. Where Xenophon fails us the account of Diodorus will seldom be quite satisfactory; yet some details preserved from him will deserve notice, for confirmation of what Xenophon has reported most adverse to republican principles and practice, whether democratical or oligarchal, and for what they add toward a completion of the general picture of the country.

In the contest for the sovereignty of Greece, when Lacedæmon, by the overbearing confederacy of the democratical interest against her, was humbled; when Thebes, from oppression and servitude, rose at once to a degree of imperial pre-eminence; when afterward Arcadia would first contest that pre-eminence with Thebes, and then assert equality

with Lacedæmon; we may wonder where was the ancient pride of Argos, and why her power, formerly so considerable, and her energy in opposition to Lacedæmon, commonly so ready, scarcely have occurred to historical notice. In the silence of Xenophon on this subject the information which we find from Diodorus is valuable.

Diodorus refers to the second year of the hundred and second olympiad a sedition, with executions ensuing, such as, he says, were never elsewhere known among the Greeks. The manner, he proceeds, was thus. The form of the Argive government being democratical, some ambitious men proposed to raise themselves to power by exciting the multitude against those of principal authority, influence, and estimation in the commonwealth. These had ruled hitherto through popular favour. But the opposition drove them to contrary politics; and, at length, finding their situation uneasy and alarming in extreme, they resolved upon the hazardous expedient of attempting a revolution and establishing oligarchy. Before however they could prepare their plot for execution, suspicion of it arose among the popular party, and the most suspected were seized and put to the torture. The chiefs of the conspiracy then, aware of the hasty, unscrupulous, and unmerciful temper of popular sovereignty, to avoid greater misery, instantly destroyed themselves.

B. C. 371-370.
Diod. l. 15.
c. 57. p. 487.

The death of these men however, and the ensuing confiscation of their property, rather excited than satisfied the cruel jealousy and avarice of the multitude. One of those under the rack having named thirty others as privy to the conspiracy, the popular assembly, sovereign, judge, and party, without form of trial, sent all to the executioner, and ordered their property to the public treasury. The popular leaders then resolved not to lose any of the advantages which this temper in the people seemed to offer them. That a conspi-

racy for subverting the democracy had existed being now notorious, it followed, at least as a probability, that numbers were more or less implicated in the guilt. To excite suspicion among the people against almost any was thus easy: suspicion sufficed to procure condemnation; and accusations were extended till more than twelve hundred of the principal Argive citizens were executed. At length the accusers became alarmed at their own success. The people called for more accusations and more confiscation. The demagogues knew no longer either how to feed or how to still the popular fury. In the prevailing disposition to suspect, their hesitation appeared suspicious. The turn among the multitude was observed by those who still feared the progress of accusation, and they were diligent in improving the opportunity. The people, habituated to blood, nevertheless the farther they went in fury became the more fearful of revenge. In this temper they were easily persuaded that the accusers were betraying them; and with the same haste and informality with which such numbers, at their instigation, had suffered, the demagogues were themselves all condemned and executed. Then, proceeds the historian, little commonly sedulous to account for what he relates most extraordinary, the people became calm, and the former quiet and harmony in the city were restored. A circumstance however, which he has reported, appears authentically to mark, not only the manner of the popular justice on this occasion, but also the excess of the popular vengeance. Among the numerous seditions of Argos this, for its enormity, obtained the distinction of a name; it was called the Scytalism, staff-work or bludgeoning.

Whatever then may have been the harmony which, according to the historian, was so instantly restored upon the execution of the demagogues; yet a government liable to such excess of disorder would be little capable of taking the

lead of the affairs of a great confederacy. Still more then, in the weakness superinduced by its destructive political dissensions, it would be likely to yield itself to the guidance of the able directors of the Theban councils, and submit its forces, in common with those of the other commonwealths of the alliance, to be commanded in chief by the great general of the Theban people.

It is a truly curious account, free from inconsistency and the marvellous, remaining from Diodorus, of the consequences of that peace by which independency, under the patronage of Thebes supported by Persia, was assured to all Grecian cities. The most important particulars, unmentioned by Xenophon, sufficiently accord with the tenor of Xenophon's narrative; and the whole deserves notice the more, because, contrary to Xenophon, all Diodorus's partiality was for the cause of Thebes and democracy.

The establishment of the sovereignty of the people in every city⁴⁹, says the historian, produced great disturbances and numerous seditions; especially in Peloponnesus. For, the people there having been mostly accustomed to oligarchal government, their new democratical authority was exercised with eager but unskilful zeal.⁵⁰ Many of the most respectable men, in various cities, were driven into banishment: many, through calumnious and interested accusations, were executed; confiscated property, divided among the people, was as a reward held out to incite hasty and unjust condemnation. To obviate these evils sedition soon grew busy; and, to avoid them, emigration abounded.⁵¹ The pressure fell much upon those who had

Diod. l. 15.
c. 40. p. 477.

⁴⁹ Μετὰ τὴν συγχωρηθεῖσαν τοῖς δήμοις αὐτονομίαν —

⁵⁰ Ἀπειθαγάθως.

⁵¹ This translation of a passage written eighteen hundred years ago, and applying to times four hundred years before, so exactly describes what has just been occurring in France, that it may almost be necessary to desire the reader to look at the original, for proof that it is not a forgery. What follows wants

held the administration of their respective towns under Lacedæmonian patronage. For, as these had generally carried their authority with some haughtiness, the multitude no sooner acquired power than they exercised it under the instigation of resentment. This passion of course became mutual; and if those who had been injured and oppressed recovered power, little contented with justice, they would use it for revenge.

Of this disposition the first, and a very remarkable instance, occurred in the sedition of the little Arcadian city of Phigalia. A number of its principal people, driven away, whether by sentence of banishment, or whether by fear of a worse condemnation, or perhaps of massacre, seized a strong post within the Phigalian territory. Before any effectual measure was taken to dislodge them the season of the Dionysia, the festival of Bacchus, occurred. We have already had occasion to observe instances of the attachment of the Greeks, passionate at the same time and scrupulous, to those festive ceremonies of what they called religion. The Phigalian people, newly become sovereign, would not be debarred of their sacred joys, or restrained in them. They were collected in the theatre, intent upon its amusements, when the exiles entered the town, and carried massacre among them almost unresisted. According to the historian's account their purpose would appear merely revenge; but probably they had a view also to plunder. To hold the place however, when they had mastered it, was totally out of their thought: against the powerful confederacy of which Thebes was the triumphant head, and the democracy of Phigalia a member, it was too much beyond hope. Little beneficial therefore to themselves, this bloody deed brought great inconvenience

only the change of a name or two to make it apply equally to the French as to the Grecian revolution.

upon many of their friends, who had been allowed hitherto a residence in the city. Fearing that revenge, unable to reach the juster objects, might fall upon them if they remained, all fled with the exiles to Lacedæmon.

Nearly about the same time, among the Corinthians, the democratical was the fugitive party. The new prevalence of the democratical cause, under Theban supremacy, encouraged these to hope that they might not only revenge themselves on their opponents, but establish themselves in their stead. A number of them, refugees in the Argolic territory, communicated with some still residing in Corinth, and a plot was concerted for a revolution. To promote this, many of the exiles returned into the city, hoping to remain unobserved: but, suspicion arising among those who held the government, measures were taken so effectually for preventing their escape that, in despair, they killed one another. Then those evils, which the friends of the Phigalian exiles avoided by flying with their conquering comrades, fell upon the friends of the Corinthians, who failed in their plot. Accusations were numerous; many were in consequence executed; and many, happy to find opportunity for flight, saved themselves only by a miserable emigration.

In the democratical government of Megara, an oligarchal party attempted a revolution. Numerous executions followed the failure, and many more were avoided only by flight. In Phlius it was the democratical party that was compelled to fly. The democratical Phliasians, like the oligarchal Phigalians, seized a strong post within the territory of their city; but finding no such opportunity against the vigilant aristocracy of Phlius as the wildness of democratical sovereignty in Phigalia had afforded, they engaged a body of those mercenary troops, which seem now to have been always ready in Greece to accept pay or to earn plunder in any service. Thus strengthened they annoyed

their adversaries in the city greatly: in one action they killed more than three hundred. But, ere long, they experienced the danger of trusting troops unconnected with them by any certain and permanent interest. Opportunity was found to corrupt their mercenaries. In a following battle they were deserted by them, and in consequence were defeated, with such slaughter that the miserable remnant, unable any longer to hold the post in Phliasia, (probably Tricaranum, mentioned by Xenophon to have been occupied by Phliasian exiles,) withdrew to Argos.

In a few general words only Diodorus notices the sedition in Sicyon, of which an account has already been given in some detail from Xenophon; and then, concluding his review, "such," he says, "was the calamitous state of Peloponnesus."

From this account of the consequences of the general peace, which followed the battle of Leuctra and the embassy of Pelopidas into Persia, we may form some conjecture what were the indecision and trouble and confusion, indicated only in those three words by Xenophon, which, notwithstanding the pacification, followed the battle of Mantinea. After then comparing the pictures remaining from the contemporary historian, deeply interested in the aristocratical cause, with those of the compiler who, between three and four centuries after, adopted the prejudices of the opposite party, and observing how they support one another, the sketch of a contemporary orator, though intended to serve a political purpose, may appear no unfair summing up of the state of things in Peloponnesus. "The multitude in Peloponnesus," says Isocrates, speaking in the name of Archidamus prince of Lacedæmon, "and all those whom we distinguish by the name of common people, though they heedlessly enough engaged in the Theban cause, will I think, in future, be more

cautious. For nothing of what they expected has followed from the revolution which they have been so eager to promote. Instead of greater freedom they have acquired only a worse servitude: for, instead of the best of their fellow-citizens, they are now subjected to the worst. Instead of independency they have established a dreadful lawlessness. Accustomed formerly to march with the Lacedæmonians against others, they now see others marching against themselves. Seditions, which formerly they only heard of in distant parts, they now experience almost daily at home. Calamities are so various and extensive, that to decide who suffer most is impossible. Not a city remains uninjured by its neighbours: lands are ravaged, towns plundered, private houses desolated; and those governments are overthrown, and those laws abolished, under which formerly they were the happiest of the Greeks. Mistrust and hatred hence are so become popular passions that no enmity can exceed what exists between fellow-citizens. Where formerly was general plenty, and a concord promoting general enjoyment, now the rich would rather throw their wealth into the sea than give to the numerous poor; while these would be much less delighted in finding a treasure than in stripping the rich of their property. Holy sacrifice is no longer regarded, but murders are committed even on the altars: and there are more exiles now from single cities than formerly from all Peloponnesus."

While such was the state of the southern peninsula, which, when united under the supremacy of Lacedæmon, had taken the lead among the political concerns of the nation, so that Peloponnesian was a name of eminence among the Greeks, that northern province, which possessed in the greatest degree the natural advantages adapted to give political importance, and which lately, under the guidance of one extraordinary man, had actually acquired a threatening

superiority, fell again into no enviable situation. The tyrant tagus of Thessaly, Alexander of Pheræ, after a reign of eleven years, was assassinated, through a plot in which his wife was engaged. Her eldest brother Tisiphonus, a principal in the conspiracy, succeeded to the supreme executive power, and held it still when Xenophon put the finishing hand to his Grecian Annals.⁵² The delivery of his country from the tyranny of Alexander, though by a base midnight murder, gave Tisiphonus a gleam of popularity among his fellow countrymen; for the advantage of the deed they overlooked its foulness. But a country where all conception of what can give stability to law and just government is so wanting, that assassination may find public applause, in the supposition that assassination only can obviate tyranny, will never long be free. Tisiphonus, raised to the dignity of tagus, was allowed to rule, like Alexander and Jason, by an army of mercenaries; because, with its defective constitution, only so probably authority could be carried through Thessaly. In such circumstances, not the virtue only, but the ability of Jason would be requisite to exercise sovereignty so as either to conciliate or to deserve popularity. Tisiphonus wanted either the ability, or the virtue, or both. Opposition, repressed by military power, was punished by numerous executions and banishments; and still opposition was ready wherever it might dare to show itself. Some of the towns obeyed the tagus; some resisted him. Indecision and trouble and confusion seem to have pervaded Thessaly,

⁵² Plutarch says that Thebe, wife of Alexander, was daughter of Jason. (Plut. vit. Pelopid. p. 534. t. 1.) Xenophon and Diodorus both mention the wife of Alexander, sister of Tisiphonus, as a principal in the conspiracy; Xenophon with very particular circumstances, and Diodorus by the name of Thebe (Diod. 1. 15. p. 517.): both equally mention Tisiphonus, brother of Thebe, as successor to Alexander in the dignity of tagus, but neither speaks of them as children of Jason. This omission by the earlier writers appears to afford strong presumption that Plutarch, as too frequently was his way, wrote carelessly.

which had a constitutional chief, not less than Peloponnesus, left without a leading or connecting power : and thus those, whose territorial advantages, as an able contemporary writer has remarked, should have made them the most powerful of the Greeks, became abroad insignificant and at home wretched.

Isocr. de Pace,
p. 248. t. 2.

It may afford some consolation, in contemplating human affairs, that the pressure of evils, in one part of the world, not uncommonly produces a flow of prosperity in others. If, amid extensive confusion, security in civilised society can be found anywhere, the favoured spot will especially attract those whose ability to be useful, giving them value, will make them welcome ; and thus sometimes, in the wreck of nations, all that is most valuable among men becomes concentrated. The spots where, in such circumstances, security will most be found, will generally be among those least favoured by nature for the ordinary purposes of life. Thus, in the middle ages, the marshes of Venice, the mountains of Genoa, and the scarcely accessible cliffs of Amalfi attracted whatever remained of most worth from the wreck of the Roman empire⁵³ ; and, in those earlier times of which we have been

⁵³ Venice and Genoa, with their local inconveniences, have local advantages, beyond that of mere security, which have assisted to extend their prosperity through civilised ages ; but the local inconveniences of Amalfi are such that they repelled, as soon as the security, derived from inaccessibility, was no longer wanted : " Oppressed," in Gibbon's phrase, " by the arms of the Normans, and sacked by the jealousy of Pisa," (Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, ch. 56.) Amalfi never recovered from the blow. Describing, with his usual liveliness of manner, the extraordinary prosperity of Amalfi, Gibbon has omitted notice of its local peculiarities, to which it was so much indebted for its prosperity. Only thirty miles from Naples, and seven from Salerno, there is scarcely any intercourse with Amalfi but by sea. In summer the road over the mountains, whose snows supply Naples with the ice which the habits of the people of all ranks have made almost as necessary as bread, is barely practicable for a mule ; and in winter generally, it is said impracticable, or to be attempted only by an able walker. In the town itself winter is scarcely known ; no north or east wind can blow upon it ; but the reverberated heat of the summer sun is such that a particular construction of the dwellings, adapted to exclude the beam and produce a draft of air, is required to enable even the natives to breathe. Since the ruins of Pæstum have been pointed out to public

treating, amid the complicated troubles of Greece, Megara, situated, like Genoa, on a mountainous coast of the continent, and Cos, a small distant island, flourished singularly. The Megarians, as Isocrates says of them, possessing really neither land nor port, and whose mountains are destitute even of mines, nevertheless through the laborious cultivation of their rocks, and by a diligence in manufacture and commerce which overbore disadvantages of situation, profiting on the contrary from that situation to preserve the peace of their narrow territory amid warring neighbours, had the wealthiest families of Greece.⁵⁴ It was in like manner among the general troubles, and apparently in consequence of them, that the new town of Cos was founded in the island of the same name, and rapidly became very considerable. The island, scarcely twenty miles long and five wide, fortunate in soil and climate, had the advantage of being united in one republic; but not without experiencing the common bane of the Grecian republics, sedition. It was distracted by parties when an earthquake overthrew great part of the principal town. Able men, at the head of the party then holding the administration, took advantage of this event for a bold undertaking. Instead of restoring the old town, called afterward Astypalæa, they removed, with all their adherents, to a new one, which they founded on a more advantageous part of their coast, and to which they would give no other name than that of the

Isocr. de Pace,
p. 248. t. 2.
Xen. Mem.
Socr. l. 1. c. 7.
s. 6.

Diod. l. 15.
c. 76. p. 496.
Strabo, l. 14.
p. 656.

B. C. 366-365.
Ol. 105. 3.
Diodor.

notice, the picturesque beauties of the coast, forming the northern boundary of the bay of Salerno, a coast which Salvator studied, have engaged the attention of travellers and students of landscape-painting; and hence Amalfi has become more known among English travellers than it was formerly, or perhaps is now, to most Neapolitans.

⁵⁴ Xenophon informs us that the great source of the wealth of Megara was a manufacture of coarse cloth, Ἐξαρμιδοποιία. The Megarian citizens were master manufacturers; the journeymen were slaves, bought barbarians. Meta. Socr. l. 2. c. 7. s. 6.

island.⁵⁵ They provided for its security by strong fortifications, raised at great expense; and they improved the advantages, which nature had afforded, for a commodious port. By the opportunities thus furnished for commerce, and by the benefits of a wise administration, a large population was collected; private fortunes grew; public means became considerable; and the new city of Cos, not indeed among the largest, became however one of the most flourishing, and was esteemed the best built and handsomest of Greece.⁵⁶

Megara and Cos, seemingly the most remarkable, were however by no means the only instances of flourishing communities among the troubles by which the Greek nation was convulsed in the course of the next half century following the Peloponnesian war. In Peloponnesus itself Sicyon, notwithstanding its passing disturbances, was a school of the fine arts; and, among the islands, Rhodes appears to have set the advantageous example whence Cos profited. Three principal towns there, Ialysus, Lindus, and Camira, from before Homer's time, had held their separate political establishments. Toward the conclusion of the Peloponnesian war they coalesced into one government; for the seat of which a new city was founded in a very advantageous situation, upon a fine natural harbour. An

Strab. l. 14.
p. 652-654.
Diod. l. 13.

B. C. 408.*
Ol. 93. 1.

⁵⁵ It appears probable that the name Astypalæa, synonymous with the English Alton, Aldborough, old town, was not in use before the founding of the new town.

⁵⁶ The Count de Choiseul Gouffier, in his *Voyage Pittoresque de la Grèce*, describes Cos in the year 1776 thus: "The town of Cos is on the shore; its port is commodious: the whole coast is covered with orange and citron trees, which give it a most delightful appearance; the public [place] is singularly pleasant: a prodigious plane-tree in the centre overspreads the whole with its branches. Bending under their own weight, these might suffer without the attention of the inhabitants, who regard the tree with a kind of religious reverence. In these countries everything offers traces of ancient grandeur; and so the props, which support the decrepit limbs of this respected tree, are magnificent columns of marble and granite. An abundant fountain adds to the charms of this place, always frequented by the inhabitants, who resort to it to transact their affairs, and to enjoy its shelter against the heat of the climate.

[* The Peloponnesian war ended B. C. 404. See Vol. IV. p. 322.

Athenian architect, who had gained reputation by his works at Piræus, was engaged to form the plan, design the walls, gates, and other public buildings, and superintend the execution. To obviate invidious distinctions no other name was given to the new capital than that of the island itself; a measure, among others, the example of which was followed by the Coans. The distraction of the oligarchal and democratical interests, with the ensuing depression of the leading republics, though adverse to the common power of the nation and its means of opposition to a common enemy, and preventive of all civil quiet through the greater part of proper Greece, seems however to have been favourable to the peace and prosperity of some of the distant colonies. When neither the higher people could any longer hope for support from Lacedæmon in the exercise of an oppressive oligarchy, nor the lower were stimulated by Athenian politics to disturb all government not subservient to Athens, the Rhodian constitution settled into a liberal aristocracy. This probably was not instantaneously established in the full perfection which Strabo ascribes to it, nor was it Strabo, ut ant. undisturbed in its growth; but, in the end, the men of higher rank and fortune learnt so to govern that the lower people, through a constant employment of their industry, a careful attention to their wants, a strict and impartial administration of justice, were happy, quiet, and zealously attached to their country and laws. An extraordinary prosperity followed, and lasted for ages.

For a complete picture of Greece in this age, if memorials remained to direct the pencil, a considerable extension of bright colours and fair forms no doubt should find place among the gloomy tints and horrid shapes that have been transmitted as the principal constituents. But as in landscape stormy skies, and rugged mountains, and pathless rocks, and wasteful torrents, every work of nature rude, and

every work of man in ruin, most engage the notice of the painter, and offer the readiest hold for the touches of his art, so in the political world war, and sedition, and revolution, destruction of armies, massacre of citizens, and wreck of governments force themselves upon the attention of the annalist, and are carefully reported to posterity; while the growth of commerce, and arts, and science, all that give splendour to empire, elegance to society, and livelihood to millions, like the extended capital and the boundless campaign, illumined by the sun's midday glare, pleases, dazzles, bewilders, offers a maze of delightful objects, charms rather than fixes the attention, and, giving no prominences, no contrast, no strongly charactered parts, leaves the writer, as the painter, unable to choose out of an expanse and a variety whose magnificent whole is far too great for the limited stretch of picturesque or literary design.

Nevertheless, among the playful sketches and incidental remarks of ancient authors, we find testimony to the prosperity of some of the extensive settlements of the Grecian people. The western colonies are objects for separate consideration. Confining our attention here to the eastern, we may observe that Cnidus, on the Carian coast, appears to have shared in the prosperity of the neighbouring island of Cos. The Cnidian Venus, by Praxiteles, marked by ancient description as the model of more than Plin. 1. 36. c. 5.
Lucian. Amor. one ancient statue preserved to us, though that known by the name of the Medicean, first in merit, is first in fame, was through all antiquity esteemed among the most admirable efforts of the art of sculpture.⁵⁷ It seems to follow, were other testimony wanting, that the community was flourishing which could adorn its temples with the most finished works of artists the most eminent known to fame. In quiet under

⁵⁷ A statue of similar design is in the museum in the Capitol, at Rome; larger than the Medicean, and of less winning delicacy, but altogether of very considerable merit.

Persian sovereignty prosperity seems to have been extensive among the Grecian towns on the Asiatic shore. Halicarnassus, the seat of the Carian princes, for its flourishing state, might deserve to be known better to us; and the Ionian and Æolic cities, allowed the management of their own affairs in peace while they paid the settled tribute to the Persian government, and only forbidden war and disturbance, produced philosophers, and artists, and wealthy merchants, though they offered no statesmen or generals for the notice of history.

The political circumstances of Greece, even the minute division of territory, among all the troubles they produced, had a tendency to promote the cultivation of science and the fine arts. Eloquence was so important in every state that no study by which it might be improved could be indifferent. In democratical governments it was all-powerful; and even in the oligarchal, not only for debate among the Few who ruled, but for persuasion also among the Many, whose obedience was to be ensured, and whose willing service often to be engaged, it was of great moment. Hence perhaps principally arose the habit of study among the Greeks, and the passion for philosophy. The customs then and the circumstances of the country required, in every town, at least three public buildings; a temple for religious ceremonies, a theatre for public amusement, both sometimes used also for public business, and a gymnasium or place of public exercise, where, in shelter against summer heat and winter storms, the youth, within the confinement of a fortified town, might keep themselves in constant preparation for military service, for which, with the weapons of ancient warfare, strength, activity, and personal skill were especially important.⁵⁸ In the larger towns these

⁵⁸ Γυμνάσια, καὶ θεῶν ναοὺς, καὶ τὰλλα πάντα πρὸς βίον ἀνθρώπων εὐδαιμόνων ὑπομνήματα. Diod. l. 5. Diodorus commonly retails ideas of writers of the republican times, and so seems to have been led to give the gymnasium the first place among the requisites of civilised life.

buildings, the temples mostly beyond others, were multiplied; and baths, and the stoâ, portico, or shelter for walking and public conversation, were added. The common property of the people, and accommodated to their favourite enjoyments, it was the pride of every little community to have these buildings of a solidity to withstand time, and of a beauty to engage admiration. When they were to be raised or repaired, no purse was to be shut. The celebrated temple of Diana at Ephesus, one of the Strab. l. 14. p. 640. most magnificent among the Greek settlements, being destroyed by fire little after the time of which we have been treating, every fortune was to be pressed, whether by voluntary contribution or a tax enforced by authority, that it might be restored with superior splendour: even the jewels and golden ornaments of the women's dress were required, or given, to assist the expense.

Hence principally the encouragement to the architect, and to the painter and sculptor, who were to adorn the architecture. The progress thus of science, arts, and fine taste, among those troubles of the republican times of which we have large information, is far less wonderful than their rise in former ages of obscurity. How a Homer was enabled to acquire that judgment for the correction of his fancy, whence Aristotle has pronounced him the model of all eloquence; how the simple form of the Doric temple, cleared from Egyptian and Asiatic sophistication, became the source of pure taste for all the architecture of the nation, chastening still the artist's fancy when in aftertimes he was required to vary forms for the various purposes of civilised and luxurious life, and to add the richest ornaments; and how that chastity and greatness of design became endemial, which are striking in some of the medals of times beyond the oldest historians; these are objects of wonder among which conjecture is bewildered.

But, on the continent of European Greece, in the height

of its troubles, arts, commerce, and science were not confined to the narrow limits of inferior towns, Megara and Sicyon. A wider field was yet open to them, in which not only they might expatiate in some security, but find even peculiar advantages. Megara, and Sicyon, and Cos, and Cnidus bore the characteristics more of civil communities than of political powers. Leaving to others the care of the great interests of the Greek nation, which they could little influence, their administrations gave their attention to preserve the peace of their own little states as they could, and, in that peace, to cultivate commerce and the arts. Wise, and perhaps necessary, in their political impotence, such dependence upon events would have been, for Athens, a weak policy. The obvious danger of losing more through acquiescence than would be hazarded by exertion impelled her to take an active part in the common affairs of Greece. Liable thus, unavoidably, to some degree of political turbulence, nevertheless the administration, generally directed by able yet moderate men, preserved peace, as we have seen, within Attica, while the Athenian arms were seldom unemployed abroad; and, notwithstanding the vices of the Athenian civil constitution, yet, in comparison with many other parts of Greece, person and property in Attica might be esteemed secure. To these then being added the advantages of an extent of territory, narrow indeed, yet far superior to that of most Grecian republics; of a powerful navy, and of that very political importance which forbade perfect quiet; Athens became the great resort of science, arts, and commerce. Piræus, as Isocrates informs us, was the centre of the trade of the age; he calls it the centre of Greece; and, for maritime communication, it might not be improperly so called. Commodities, he says, scarcely to be obtained elsewhere of one kind in each place, were found in abundance, of every kind,

Isocr. Paneg.
p. 186. t. 2.

in Piræus. Eloquence then, from the nature of the government, and from the manner of administering the law, was cultivated as a qualification almost necessary to civilised life; and philosophy engaged earnest attention as a conductor to eloquence. Athens was the place in Greece where means most occurred for the acquisition of wealth, where commerce had most expanse, where the government offered most opportunities, where even learning was a road to riches; and, though great fortune could hardly be held there in quiet and security, yet it might be spent with splendour. Wealth and science were attended of course by the arts, to which science assisted to give the embellishment of fine taste. Thus architecture, sculpture, and painting continued to receive improvements during all the turbulence which followed the Peloponnesian war; and it was during that period that Plato wrote and taught, Lysias and Isocrates pleaded, and Aristotle and Demosthenes were studying, in Athens.

APPENDIX TO THE TWENTY-EIGHTH CHAPTER.

Memorials of Xenophon.

It is impossible for the compiler of Grecian history not to feel a particular interest in the fortunes of another Athenian of that age, the soldier-philosopher-author, who has been his conductor, now through a period of nearly half a century, among those transactions in which he was himself an actor; and the supposition will naturally follow that the reader will not be wholly unimpressed with a similar sentiment. Fortunately memorials remaining, though very inadequate to the gratification of a just curiosity, yet, as far as they go, will perfectly coincide with the purpose of Grecian history, and afford no unimportant addition to the illustration otherwise afforded of the actual state of Greece.

Whether an illustrious man was born in a high or a low situation in society, however otherwise indifferent, cannot be entirely so toward a knowledge of the character, either of the man, or of the times in which he lived ; and especially in Greece, where the opposition between the higher and lower orders formed the prominent point in the character of the national politics, from times before connected history till those when the country ceases to be an object for history. But concerning the ancestry of Xenophon ancient writers have left no farther information than that he was son of Gryllus, an Athenian, of a division of the Attic people which composed the Erchian or Echrian borough of the Ægidean ward. Various indications however concur in tendency to denote that his family was of some consideration, and that he was born rather to affluence than poverty. The scholars of Socrates were mostly of the principal families of Athens ; so much Xenophon himself informs us ; and he was a scholar of Socrates, bred apparently without a profession. His early intimacy with Proxenus, who appears to have been of an eminent family in Thebes, implies a probability at least that he was of connections not greatly inferior in his own country.⁵⁹ The same circumstance, together with his earnestness to leave Athens, just after the restoration of the democracy, as his friend had left Thebes apparently because prospects were not pleasant for him under the prevalence of the democratical party there, marks that his connection with the aristocratical interest, probably inherited, was at least very early formed. The

Diog. Laert.
vit. Xen.

Xen. Anab.
l. 1. c. 1. s. 11.
l. 2. c. 6. s. 9.
& l. 3. c. 1.
s. 4.

⁵⁹ Proxenus, generally marked by Xenophon only as a Bœotian, is distinguished in one passage of the Anabasis as a Theban. (Anab. l. 2. c. 1. s. 8.) He alone, of the Grecian generals, in the service of Cyrus, is styled a friend of the prince, φίλος, (Anab. l. 1. c. 1. s. 11.), one admitted to familiar communication ; the others are called ξένοι, guests received at his table.

confidence then with which Proxenus promised him introduction to Cyrus, and the attention paid him by that prince; his election, after the loss of both those patrons, to a great military command, from no previous military rank, by those who possessed the best claims of previous rank to that very situation; the respect with which, unprotected by his country, he was treated by Spartan officers in the highest foreign commands, by the king, Agesilaus, and finally by the Lacedæmonian aristocracy; all these circumstances, though perhaps each singly might be referred to another cause, seem collectively to afford strong presumptive evidence that he was not originally distinguished for his merit alone, but that his birth and connections had assisted to introduce and give him consideration.

Xenophon, we are told, was eminently favoured by nature with elegance of countenance and person. He was blest, as we learn from himself, with active strength, and a constitution of a firmness fitting him for a soldier's life in any climate. The superior qualifications of his mind had apparently been already observed by Socrates, when, meeting him in a narrow way (if we may credit Laertius for the story), the philosopher stopped him by putting his stick across, and abruptly asked, "Whence comes every good to man?" Answer being made to his satisfaction, he asked again, "How then are men made honest and good?" This producing hesitation, Socrates added, "Follow me then and learn." When Xenophon was invited by Proxenus to the court of Sardis, then about his six or seven and twentieth year, it remains marked in his own account that he esteemed Socrates his best friend and most valuable adviser. Upon that occasion therefore he did not fail to consult him. Both were aware that to engage in the service of Cyrus, the ally of Lacedæmon,

Diog. Laert.
vit. Xen.

Xen. Anab.
l. 4.

Diog. Laert.
vit. Xen.

B. C. 402.
Ol. 95. 2-3.

Xen. Anab.
l. 3. c. 1.
s. 4, 5, 6.

esteemed the enemy of Athens, or at least of the democracy, would afford opportunity, not unlikely to be used, for exciting popular resentment against him. Socrates therefore advised him, as in a case of both difficulty and importance, to consult the Delphian oracle. What confidence the philosopher really had in oracles, as formerly it has been observed, seems difficult to judge: but, as a forbidding response would probably divert his young friend from a hazardous purpose, and an encouraging one would give to that purpose a sanction which the public religion acknowledged and the law respected, the advice appears to have been unquestionably wise. Both the doubt however, and the advice given upon it, seem strongly to confirm the supposition, before stated, that Xenophon was rich and of

Xen. Symp.
c. 4. s. 30.

considerable connections. For restrictions upon foreign travel attached only upon those of some eminence; popular jealousy was little to be apprehended by the needy and obscure; and the Delphian oracle seems to have been accessible only to the rich, and favourable almost only to the profuse. Xenophon went to Delphi; but, bent with all the ardour of youth upon new and great prospects, and urged apparently by uneasiness under the existing administration of his country, instead of asking the oracle, Whether he should go to Sardis; he asked, To which of the gods he should sacrifice and pray for success in his projected journey. The answer favoured him with direct information, which he reported to Socrates; who, he says, dissatisfied with the evasion of his advice, but nevertheless considering the response as amounting to a command to go, recommended "to do as the god directed."

The expense of the journey to Sardis, of residence at a court of much more than the Lydian satrap's usual splendour, and of accompanying the army afterward on its long march into Upper Asia, Xenophon appears to have borne

from his private fortune, unassisted by emolument from any appointment. Nevertheless that he lived upon a high footing, and made even more than common figure, is fully indicated. Without the pretensions of either military rank or civil office, he was in a situation to communicate personally with the Persian prince. This is shown, in the narrative, before he left Sardis, and again, more particularly, on the day of the battle of Cunaxa. When, after the circum-
Ch. 23. s. 2.
of this Hist.
 vention of the generals, a body of cavalry was to be formed, his horses are mentioned in a manner implying that they were more numerous than those of any officer of the Grecian forces, Clearchus only perhaps excepted. These considerations then may assist to account for his elevation, at his early age, at once to the rank of general, over all the officers holding commands in the body under Proxenus, and by their election. .

It was while Xenophon was in Asia, or about the time of his return, that Socrates, whose loss he has so affectionately lamented, and whose worth he has so ably recorded, was condemned and executed. The administration, we may be assured, under which such an event could have place, was not friendly to Xenophon. A decree of banishment was proposed against him, and carried; at what point of time is not ascertained, but it seems to have been within two years after the death of Socrates. In reporting the arrival of the troops under his command in sight
B. C. 401
or 400.
Ol. 94. 4.
or 95. 1.
[B. C. 399.*
Cl.]
 of European ground he takes occasion to mention his own earnestness to return immediately to Athens. We have seen how, first the request, and afterward the adverse conduct, of Anaxibius, the Lacedæmonian
Anab. 1. 7. c. 1.
s. 3.
 commander on the Hellespontine station, interposed delays;
Ch. 23. s. 6. of
this Hist.

[* See Vol. V. p. 127.]

and how at length attachment to his ill-used little army, concurring perhaps with some view of private advantage, induced Xenophon to forego his purpose for a time, and, in midwinter, engage in the service of the Thracian prince

B. C. 399.
Ol. 95½.

Seuthes. In the following spring the opportunity so fortunately occurred for the troops to engage in the Lacedæmonian service, for the war then resolved

against Persia. On this occasion he again declares his purpose of returning directly to Athens;

Anab. 1. 7. c. 7.
s. 35.

adding, that the decree of banishment was not yet passed against him. The earnest request however, he says, of some among his officers whom he most esteemed, that he would retain the command till he had in person delivered them over to the Lacedæmonian commander-in-chief, Thimbron, induced him again to delay his voyage.

It has been evidently among Xenophon's purposes, in his account of the return of the Greeks, to obviate the imputation of having improperly amassed private wealth: an imputation seldom failing to be urged, with or without foundation, in accusations of offences against the commonwealth, at Athens. In relating the entertainment given by Seuthes, immediately on engaging the service of the Cyreans, Xenophon has taken occasion to mention his poverty. It was usual, it seems, for those received at the table of Thracian princes to carry presents. Timasion of Dardanum, from his store of Asiatic spoil, offered a silver cup and a Persian carpet⁶⁰, the latter valued at forty pounds sterling. Xenophon, who had brought from Asia only one slave-servant, and the mere necessary for his return to Athens, made a gratifying speech, which seems to have been favourably received instead of a present. His stipulated pay then, of hardly more than four pounds sterling monthly, for his

⁶⁰ Ταπίδας βαρβαρικάς. Spelman has made an apology for his translation, *Persian carpets*, which it seems hardly to have wanted.

short service with Seuthes, would certainly not make him rich. When the Grecian troops passed into the Lacedæmonian service, while it was still his purpose to return to Athens, the Thracian prince repeated his former liberal offer of the lordship of the port of Bisanthe, and a territory around, and stock for its cultivation, with confirmation of the grant, and assurance of support in it by giving him his daughter in marriage, if he would remain with only a thousand men, pressing the proposal with the observation that he would be safer so than in returning to his country. Nor was this what could occasion hesitation as a novelty; for, under the late empire of Athens, many Athenians had possessed castles and estates in Thrace⁶¹, and some had married into the families of Thracian princes. Among these the connections and possessions of Miltiades and Alcibiades in the Chersonese, and of Agnon and Thucydides on the Strymon, have been objects for historical notice. Xenophon declares his positive refusal of the proposals of Seuthes, without assigning his reasons; which perhaps it might have been difficult to state so as to avoid offence either to the Lacedæmonian or to the Athenian government.

In relating his arrival with the army at Lamp-sacus on the Asiatic side of the Hellespont he speaks again of his poverty, and then he repeats, for the last time, the mention of his purpose to return home; whence it seems probable that intelligence of the decree of banishment reached him not long after. His account of these matters is strongly marked with caution against offence to the two really despotic governments of Athens and Lacedæmon; on one of which he must be necessarily dependent, and the control of neither could he entirely

⁶¹ Καὶ ἐν τῇδε τῇ χώρᾳ ἴσως ἀξιώσεις καὶ τεῖχη λαμβάνειν, ὥστε καὶ ἄλλοι τῶν ὑμετέρων ἔλαβον, καὶ χώραν. Anab. 1. 7. c. 3. s. 9.

avoid. It is nevertheless strongly marked with candour. Evidently, in the outset of his expedition, he was fond of expense and show: and, after he was elected general, careless of saving, generous rather to profusion, and ambitious of popularity, he considered present expense as opening future means. But the decree barring his return to his country probably depriving him of property, certainly cutting off many hopes, made an alteration, necessarily almost total, in views for his future life. Then it became a matter of urgency to consider, less how he might be great than how he might subsist. With alteration of his economy, if he retained his military situation, opportunity was apparently before him. His preparation then to account for the acquisition of wealth, by means without moral reproach in the common estimation of the times, and not only allowed by the religion, but specially warranted, as he asserts, by the declared favour of the gods of his country, yet for which he seems nevertheless with some anxiety to apologise, will deserve notice.

Anab. 1. 7. c. 8.
s. 1.

At Lampsacus he met a friend whom he had known in Attica, Euclides; a Phliasian by birth, and by profession a prophet, whose father, Cleagoras, had earned renown as a painter by his work called the Dreams, in the Lyceum at Athens.⁶² Euclides could not believe Xenophon's declaration, though affirmed with an oath, that one who had been in so great a command, where others with inferior advantages, as Timasion of Dardanum, and the soothsayer Silanus, had acquired considerable wealth, could be under any necessity to sell his horse for an imme-

⁶² Spelman has observed that no notice is found in any other ancient author of this painter or of his works here mentioned, though Pausanias has left a description of the Lyceum, and from Pliny we have accounts of earlier paintings. Possibly the works of Cleagoras may have been removed to Antioch or to Rome, or, among the misfortunes of Athens, they may have been destroyed before the age of those writers.

diate supply. The present of hospitality however from the Lampsacene state, usually made to those in high public situations, enabled Xenophon to offer sacrifice. Euclides attended the ceremony; and, after inspecting the entrails of the victims, declared that he had no longer any doubt of the offerer's poverty. "And I see it probable," he said, "that this will continue: for, if opportunities of gain occur, some obstacle will intervene; and, if no other, you will be yourself the obstacle." Xenophon allowed that this was likely. "But moreover," continued Euclides, "Jupiter Milichius is adverse to you. Have you sacrificed to him, as I was accustomed to do with you at Athens?" He replied, that he had not sacrificed to that god since he had left home. "Then," said Euclides, "do it, and benefit will follow."⁶³

On the morrow Xenophon proceeded with the army to Ophrynum; and there he sacrificed, according to the ancient Attic rites, scorching hogs whole, and the symptoms were propitious.⁶⁴ On the same day the Lacedæmonian commissioners arrived with pay for the troops. They entertained Xenophon at their table; and, learning that the horse he sold had been a favourite, they redeemed it for him, and would take no compensation.

After this the army proceeded, as already has been related in its place, across the Trojan plain and over mount Ida to Antandrus; then along the coast of the gulf to the plain of Thebe, and by Atramyttium, Certonium, and Atarneus, to Pergamus on the river Caicus. Pergamus, afterward the seat of a kingdom, was at this time

⁶³ We want information of the import of many of the titles of the Greek deities. Milichius seems to have meant the character of the supreme god as the kind father of men, in opposition to that of the avenger of sin.

⁶⁴ Spelman has observed that, according to Thucydides, l. 1. c. 126., as explained by his schollast, these were probably cakes, formed in the shape of hogs.

the residence of those Grecian families, descended from Demaratus king of Lacedæmon and Gongylus of Eretria

Ch. 24. s. 1. in Eubœa, which have been already noticed as

holding hereditary lordships, derived from the bounty of the Persian monarchs.⁶⁵ Both had engaged with Cyrus in rebellion against the reigning king, and therefore both would see with joy the prospect of Lacedæmonian protection. Xenophon was entertained in the house of Hellas, mother of Gorgion and Gongylus, then chiefs of the

Anab. 1. 7.
c. 8. s. 4, 5.

Eretrian family. From her he had information that Asidates, a wealthy Persian, lord of the higher part of the rich vale of the Caicus, was, with his family, in his castle there: three hundred men, she told him, might suffice to make all prisoners, whose ransoms, together with the effects to be found, would form a very large booty; and, if he would undertake it, a near kinsman, with others

Ch. 23. s. 6.
of this Hist.

of her friends, should be his guides. This adventure, heretofore mentioned cursorily in the general history, may, among the memorials of Xenophon, deserve more detail for its representation of the manners and character of the age.

The proposed measure appearing, to human reason, practicable and promising, how far the gods would favour it was

Anab. 1. 7.
c. 8. s. 6.

to be inquired through sacrifice. Agasias, an Elean prophet, officiated; and the kinsmen of Hellas, and another of her most confidential friends, Daphnagoras, attended with Xenophon. The appearances of the victims were highly favourable; and the priest declared,

⁶⁵ In the Hellenics (b. 3. c. 1. s. 4.) Pergamus, as well as Teuthrania and Alisarnia, otherwise called Elisarne, is mentioned as the lordship of the family of Demaratus. It appears, in the Anabasis, that the family of Gongylus resided there; perhaps because it was the most considerable town in that part of the country. The fief, if it may be so expressed, of the family of Gongylus was composed of the townships of Gambrium, Palægambrium, Grymium, and Myrina.

in direct terms, according to Xenophon's expression, "that the man might be taken." The expedition accordingly was resolved upon. Xenophon selected from his own army only the lochages whom he most desired to favour: the rest of the party apparently was composed of the Pergamenian lady's people. But, due secrecy not having been observed, when they set forward full six hundred obtruded themselves to follow, and, when booty was in prospect, probably discipline was difficult to enforce. The lochages however, supposing the prey certain, and unwilling to have so many sharers, pushed on with the guides, so that, in the darkness of supervening night, they left the greater part of the interlopers at a loss to find their way.

About midnight the party arrived at the castle; and, depending upon the capture of Asidates himself, with the riches within, they suffered the slaves, with much valuable booty without, to escape. But the castle was stronger than had been supposed; the circuit large, with projecting towers, the walls eight bricks thick, and lofty, and the defenders numerous and able. By daybreak however a perforation was completed; but the solid wall above remaining firm, nothing resulted but a wound to the foremost of the assailants through the thigh with a large spit; and soon as dawn advanced, the well-directed arrows from the parapet and flanking towers made it dangerous even to approach the wall. Meanwhile fire-signals and cries had communicated alarm around, and numerous succours approached; some Persian cavalry, some middle-armed foot, and some even Grecian heavy-armed in the Persian king's pay.⁶⁶

Anab. 1. 7.
c. 8. s. 7.

s. 8.

In this, a private adventure, rather than a military expedition, established order seems to have been very deficient

⁶⁶ Thus, I think, the ὀπλιῖται φρουροὶ must be understood.

Anab. l. 7.
c. 8. s. 9. till, the multitude of the enemy gathering, and danger pressing, fear enforced subordination, and able command became acceptable. It was now less an object to carry off booty than to retire in safety: but the leaders were apprehensive of encouragement to the enemy and discouragement to their own people, should they, by abandoning the prey, give their retreat the character of flight. Forming therefore a hollow square, with the captured oxen, sheep, and slaves in the middle, they directed their march homeward. Nevertheless they were so pursued with bowshots and slings that it was with great difficulty they s. 10, 11. crossed the Caicus, and before the annoyance ceased near half their number was wounded. Probably indeed all might have been cut off but for the support spiritedly led from Pergamus by young Gongylus, who, against his mother's inclination, marched to their relief, while Procles also showed himself with his troops from Alisarnia and Teuthrania. Thus they brought in about two hundred slaves, with cattle, according to Xenophon's expression, just enough for a sacrifice; meaning apparently a meal for the party and their friends.

With the manner of this privateering or pirating expedition Xenophon appears to have been utterly unsatisfied; but he expresses no disapprobation of the object. On the contrary, he resolved upon a second attempt which should Xen. Anab.
l. 7. c. 8. s. 12. be under his own conduct. On the very next day he was careful to have the preparatory rites of sacrifice duly performed; and then, moving at night with his whole army, he made a long stretch into Lydia, meaning to deceive the Persian into the supposition that, the hostile force which alone was formidable to him being far off, his caution might be remitted. But Asidates, receiving information that Xenophon had consulted the pleasure of his gods about a second expedition to be made with his whole

strength, hastened to leave the castle, apparently before intelligence could reach him of the Grecian army's march; and, directing his way up the country, he encamped in some villages near Parthenium. The result is related by Xenophon in very few words. Perhaps he made his forced march not more to deceive Asidates than to avoid a repetition of inconvenient interference from his own troops, and probably he provided for intelligence of all the Persian's motions. With a select party he made the surprise complete. The unfortunate Asidates was taken in his camp, with his wife, children, horses, and all his effects; "and thus," says Xenophon, "the indications in the first sacrifice were accomplished." The army then returned to Pergamus, and great credit appears to have been Xen. Anab. l. 7. c. 8. s. 13. given to Xenophon for his conduct. According to his own expression, "he had no longer occasion to complain of the god," apparently meaning Jupiter Milichius, "for the whole army, generals, lochages, and soldiers, and even the Lacedæmonians present, vied in selecting horses, cattle, and the best of every thing for his share of the booty; so that, instead of wanting assistance, he was thenceforward in circumstances to confer benefits."

With this account of his own acquisition of fortune Xenophon concludes his narrative of the expedition of Cyrus and its consequences; the arrival of Thimbron presently after, to take the command-in-chief, putting an end to all separate and independent operations of the Cyreans. In his Grecian Annals, in which their service afterward, under the several Lacedæmonian commanders in Lesser Asia, is reported, he makes no mention of himself. But in five or six campaigns, mostly successful, in the richest provinces of that rich country, though under the control, not of the commander-in-chief only, but of a Lacedæmonian officer specially appointed to the Cyreans, who would of

course share in all legal plunder before him, yet, even in subordinate command at the head of that body, the opportunities of adding, and in the common estimation of the times creditably adding, to his private wealth would be large. Had the successes of Agesilaus produced any advantageous arrangement of affairs in Lesser Asia promising to be lasting, Xenophon perhaps might have chosen to settle there, even were the return to Athens open to him.

B. C. 394.
Ol. 96. 3.

But the recall of that prince, with the requisition for the Cyrean troops to march into Greece, made a great and anxious change for him. He was rich; but, without a country, he was encumbered with his riches, both those his private property, and those committed to him in trust by the troops he had commanded. It is from the account which he has been solicitous to give to the public of the execution of that trust that we have our chief information concerning his following fortunes, and with it some pictures of the times of singular value.

Ch. 23. s. 5.
of this Hist.

We have seen that when the prize-money, acquired by the Cyrean Greeks in Upper Asia, was in their return divided at Cerasus, a tenth was set aside for the gods, and committed to the generals for dedication. The deities selected to be honoured on the occasion were the Delphian Apollo and the Ephesian Artemis, or, in her Latin name, Diana. Though it has been evidently a principal purpose of Xenophon's narrative of the expedition of

Anab. 1. 5.
c. 3. s. 7.

Cyrus to apologise for himself to his country, yet we find there his free confession that, being banished, he resolved to follow Agesilaus when he returned to Greece, and risk the dangers of the war against that confederacy of which Athens was a member. The dedication remained then still to be made; and, in the deficiency of means for remitting large sums, and the hazard of keeping them, especially for one in the employment of a soldier and

the condition of an exile, his difficulties are likely to have been considerable.

But the commission for the dedication put him in possession of what was, in the circumstances of the times and in his circumstances, an inestimable advantage: it opened a favourable introduction to the priesthood of the two principal temples of the Greek nation in Europe and in Asia. None were so rich, and, unless that of Jupiter at Olympia should be excepted, none so extensively venerated, as those of Apollo at Delphi and Diana at Ephesus. On his departure therefore he divided his wealth. Part, as the sum to be consecrated to Apollo, he carried with him; and when, after the victory of Coronea, Agesilaus made the magnificent dedication of the tenth of his Asiatic spoil at Delphi, Xenophon deposited his humbler offering in the treasury of the Athenian people there, inscribing it, as he tells us, with his own name, and that of his deceased friend Proxenus. The other part, probably equal, or perhaps larger, as the portion of the Ephesian Diana, he committed to the integrity of Megabyzus, sacristan or treasurer of the temple of that goddess at Ephesus. The worship of Artemis or Diana, with the title of the Ephesian, was, it seems, not confined to Ephesus, nor was the dedication to her necessarily to be made there. He therefore enjoined Megabyzus to remit the deposit to him in Greece, should he survive the dangers of the expedition he was going upon, but otherwise to dedicate it himself, in whatever way he might judge most acceptable to the goddess.

After the campaign in Bœotia Xenophon is said to have accompanied Agesilaus to Lacedæmon. Though victory attended that prince in Greece, yet, as we have seen, his recall from Asia was followed by the almost immediate and entire over-

Ch. 25. s. 1.
of this Hist.

Anab. 1. 5.
c. 3. s. 6.

Diog. Laert.
vit. Xen.

Ch. 25. s. 1.
of this Hist.

throw of the Lacedæmonian empire there, through loss of command of the intermediate sea. That revenue, by which alone Lacedæmon had been enabled to maintain a large force of mercenaries and to wage distant war, then ceased; and hence with the campaign in Bœotia Xenophon's military life seems to have ended.

But Lacedæmon could hardly be made a pleasant residence for a stranger, even by the friendship of a king, and that king Agesilaus. Jealousy of strangers was peculiarly a principle of the constitution; and the kings, liable themselves, even in private life, to severe control always, could never calculate the amount or the kind of new embarrassment to arise for them with every yearly change of the ephors. Protection and patronage however, which the spirit of the Lacedæmonian government, denying to strangers within Laconia, prescribed for them everywhere else,

Ch. 24. s. 2.
of this Hist.

were liberally given to Xenophon. Opportunity

arose from the circumstances of the province of Triphylia, between the river Alpheus and the border of Messenia; whose people, claimed by the Eleans as subjects, had been restored to a nominal independency by the arms

Xen. Anab.
l. 5. c. 3. s. 11.

of Lacedæmon. Scillus, one of its towns, ruined

by the Eleans for rebellion, was rebuilt and re-peopled under Lacedæmonian auspices, and, according to

Pausan.
l. 5. c. 6.

Pausanias, given to Xenophon as a kind of lordship, to hold under Lacedæmonian sovereignty.

There however he settled, under Lacedæmonian patronage, having already a family. His sons are mentioned by him-

Diog. Laert.
vit. Xen.

self: of his wife we learn from his biographer only her name, Philesia.

Soon after he was established at Scillus, the faithful sacristan of the Ephesian Diana, using the season of the Olympian festival for a visit there, restored the sum committed to his charge. Then Xenophon

Xen. Anab. l. 5.
c. 3. s. 8.

made an extensive purchase of land near Scillus, in the name of an estate for the goddess; having previously taken the very remarkable precaution to procure an oracular response from Delphi, pointing out with the authority of Apollo the very land that should be purchased for Diana.⁶⁷ Of this estate, and his management of it, he has left us the following account.

“ A brook flows through the estate, of the same name with that which runs near the temple of the Ephesian Diana at Ephesus: both are called Selinus⁶⁸; both abound with fishes, and both have shell-fish.⁶⁹ But the estate of the goddess near Scillus abounds also with beasts of chase of various kinds. From the sacred stock then Xenophon built a temple and an altar; and he constantly set apart a tenth of the produce of the land for a sacrifice to the goddess, with a festival in which all the towns-people and the men and women of the neighbouring villages partake. The goddess entertains with meal, bread, wine, confectionary, the meat of victims from the sacred pastures, and the produce of the chase.⁷⁰ For the sons of Xenophon and the youth of the town, with any of the older men who choose it, make a general hunting for the festival; not only upon the sacred grounds, but extending the chase across the Alpheus, over the neighbouring mountain Pholoe, on the border of Arcadia; and they take wild boars, roes, and deer.

Xen. Anab. 1.5.
c. 3. s. 9.

s. 10.

s. 11.

Strabo, l. 8.
p. 357. Pausan.
l. 8. c. 24.
Xen. ut ant.

⁶⁷ Χωρίον ἀνιῖται τῇ Θεῷ, ὅπου ἀνιῖται ὁ Θεός. Xen. Anab. 1.5. c. 3. s. 8.

⁶⁸ According to our copies, Xenophon wrote this name Σελληνούς, Strabo Σελινούς, Pausanias Σιλινούς.

⁶⁹ Perhaps crawfish.

⁷⁰ Xenophon adds ἀεργύρια, a word to which I am unable to assign a probable meaning, and the translators have omitted all notice of it. [This word, which does not appear in some MSS., is struck out by Zeune, Weiske, and Schneider.]

Xen. Anab. 1.5.
c. 3. s. 12.

“ The place ⁷¹ lies in the way from Olympia to Lacedæmon, about twenty furlongs from the temple of Jupiter in Olympia. The sacred land ⁷² has variety of hill, dale, and woods, with plentiful pasture for swine, goats, sheep, and horses; so that the saddle and draught cattle of those who come to the festival share in their way amply in the cheer. The temple is surrounded by a grove of cultivated trees, furnishing the fruits of every season. Its form, comparing small things with great, is the same with that at Ephesus; and the image of the goddess also resembles the Ephesian, as a statue of cypress-wood may resemble a statue of gold. Near the temple is a pillar inscribed thus: ‘ This is the sacred land of Diana. Whoever holds it and gathers from it, let him sacrifice the tenth yearly, and from the remainder maintain the temple. Who fails thus to do will incur the deity’s animadversion.’ ”

In this very curious detail evidently, with much said, the direct mention of much implied has been prudentially avoided. We have already had frequent occasion to notice, in Xenophon’s writings, respect for the religion of his age, uniformly and zealously expressed; and we have observed ground for supposing that much of his esteem for it arose from observation of the means it afforded, to the officer and to the statesman, in the want of other sanction, for enforcing duties, military, civil, and moral. At the same time we have seen instances of both his humanity and his skill, in directing superstition to purposes the most charitable, and with effect very extensively beneficial. How much, in the deficiency of civil establishments among the Grecian republics, some resource was wanting for giving security to

⁷¹ Ὁ τόπος.

⁷² Ἐνι δ’ ἐν τῶν ἱερῶν τόποι. Neither Xenophon nor Pausanias has marked the distance of the sacred place from the town of Scillus, which in all our maps is apparently too near the coast, and too far from Olympia.

private property, has also in no small degree fallen within our observation. In Greece, Xenophon informs us, land was not esteemed, as with us, the surest foundation of private income, but rather any moveable effects that might have protection within the walls of a town. In Athens then property would be safer than perhaps anywhere else in Greece, unless in Lacedæmon. But how precarious it was in Athens may be gathered from the high rate of usury, in the most flourishing times there. Twelve for the hundred yearly was the lowest usual interest for money; and the cautious lender commonly required monthly payment. Thirty for the hundred was ordinarily given by those who borrowed for commercial adventure; and, on account of the insecurity of contracts, the lender frequently embarked himself with his money or the goods bought with it, to be ready to take his principal again with the interest in the first moment that the borrower should have means of payment. Among commonwealths more subject to foreign oppression, or to sedition breaking out into action, to calculate a rate of interest at all commensurate with the lender's insecurity evidently must have been impossible.

In this state of things, with disadvantages enhanced by his condition of an exile, it behoved Xenophon to find means, if he could, for placing in some safety, for himself and his family, the property he had had the good fortune to amass and preserve. In very early times the temples among the Greeks, and perhaps other nations, had been resorted to for the safe-keeping of treasure; the common dread of violating their sacredness constituting a considerable protection for all within their precincts. Generally treasure so placed seems to have been in some degree, or at least in some portion, dedicated to the deity; yet not so as to deny all future use for civil purposes. Probably weaker states and individuals were obliged,

Ch. 21. s. 2.
of this Hist.

Ch. 3. s. 2. &
c. 7. s. 2. of
this Hist.
Herodot. 1. 5.
c. 36.

or might find it expedient, to pay higher for the good offices of the priesthood, while an imperial state might command them. When the Athenians had established their

Thucyd. 1. 1.
c. 96.

empire over the maritime republics of Greece, so far as to exact a regular tribute from them, the temple of Apollo at Delos was chosen for the common treasury; but the money was deposited there professedly for profane purposes, and to be drawn out at the pleasure of the Athenian government. When, a few years after, the congress of the Peloponnesian confederacy was held at Lacedæmon

to consider of means for maintaining war with
c. 112.

Athens, it was proposed to borrow, from the treasuries of Olympia and Delphi, wealth deposited there for no specific and no common purpose. Farther concerning these sacred depositaries of wealth remaining information scarcely goes, except as Xenophon's account of himself indicates how they might be made useful for purposes of private life. Evidently he used the treasuries of Diana at Ephesus and Apollo at Delphi as banks. The advantage of having such means ready, equally in Greece and in Ionia, was so peculiarly adapted to Xenophon's circumstances that it may countenance the supposition of his having suggested the double dedication voted by the army which he commanded. For as dedication to Diana was not restricted to Ephesus or Asia, so neither would that to Apollo be limited to Delphi or Europe: and, had Xenophon's meditated colony on the Euxine shore been established, or had the successes of Lacedæmon against Persia been less transient, possibly, instead of carrying the worship of the Ephesian Diana into Peloponnesus, he might have extended that of the Delphian Apollo on the southern side of the Ægean. When Agesilaus left Asia neither his hopes of conquest, nor perhaps Xenophon's views to settlement there, were immediately abandoned.

It was Conon's naval victory off Cnidus that confined the arms of the one, and decided the residence of the other, within the limits of Greece.

Then it became necessary for Xenophon to collect his property, or at least to bring it within ready reach; and, if it might be possible in his unfortunate condition of an exile, and in times threatening more than common turbulence in that turbulent country, to provide with it an income of some security for himself and his family, so that, if he must depend upon a foreign government for protection, still he need not depend upon it for subsistence. To assure then to himself and to his posterity a permanence of landed property, such as, under the civil law alone, was perhaps hardly anywhere in Greece to be hoped for, he recurred to religion for assistance. Using the opportunity afforded by the commission from the troops he had commanded in Asia, he procured the estimation of sacredness for any extent of land, by making himself and his heirs nominally trustees for the goddess of what was very effectually their own estate, burdened only with a certain quit-rent and certain services. For, by the conditions expressed in his inscription, they were bound to employ a tenth only of the produce in sacrifice and public festival: and whatever of the other nine tenths was more than requisite to maintain the temple and its appendages would be at their disposal. If then he paid largely to obtain the sacred security, he might probably well afford to do so; because in the proportion that landed property was otherwise insecure, it would of course be cheap. The oracular response from Apollo, directing the circumstances of the purchase, a very strong matter in itself, though dropping in a manner incidentally in the report of the transaction, was probably desired for two purposes: it would amount to a declaration of the god's satisfaction with the management of the sum which had

been lodged in his treasury, how after disposed of we are uninformed, while it gave the most unquestionable authority for the purchase of lands in Peloponnesus for the Ephesian Diana, the exact propriety of which otherwise perhaps might have been open to dispute. It furnishes moreover the clearest indication that Xenophon was upon good terms with the Delphian as well as with the Ephesian priesthood.

The superstition of the middle ages, as much as it has been a subject of indiscriminate invective, nevertheless had its evils not untempered with beneficial effects. When law was unequal to personal protection, the asylum of a monastery, generally open, and in almost all circumstances inviolable, was of high value. But the religious tenets of those days, calculated for the appropriation of temporal advantages exclusively to the clergy, were no way applicable to the security of family-property. Even the baron's chapel, to be safe, must be within his castle-wall. In this point the superstition of Greece was more beneficial: Xenophon's chapel diffused a mystical protection over his castle and his whole estate.

The advantages then of the situation of Scillus, for Xenophon, seem to have been many, and some of them very important. He was there under the immediate protection of the Lacedæmonian government, and yet he was beyond the sphere of its Lycurgian rule, its censorial inspection, and its more importunate jealousy. Separated by lofty mountains from the countries most likely to be the seats of war, and far out of any expected line of march of contending armies, he was yet, by his neighbourhood to Olympia, in the way of communication with all parts, with every distant member of the Greek nation. Every fourth year Greece was in a manner assembled in his immediate neighbourhood; and in case of pressing danger arising from any unforeseen turn in Grecian affairs, the sanctity of the Olympian altars at hand

might be a valuable refuge. Dependent then as he was upon Lacedæmon, yet far removed from the great seats of contention of oligarchy and democracy, perhaps no man of his time in Greece enjoyed great fortune with so many of the advantages of independency. The circumstances of the country itself moreover seem to have been, for a man of his turn, singularly pleasant. According to ancient accounts, confirmed, since the first publication of this volume, by modern, all the various beauties of landscape met in the neighbourhood of Scillus. Immediately about the town and the adjacent temple, with their little river Selinus, enclosed between the hilly woodlands, Diana's property, and the barren crags of Typæum, whence, according to the Olympian law, or report perhaps intended to have the preventive effect of law, it is said women intruding at the games were to be precipitated, we may conceive the finest classical compositions of the Poussins. Up the course of the Alpheus and its tributary streams, toward Erymanthus and the other loftier Arcadian mountains, the sublimest wildness of Titian and Salvator could not fail to abound; while the Olympian hill, with its splendid buildings among its sacred groves, the course of the Alpheus downward, the sandy plain, stretching toward Pylus, Nestor's ancient seat, diversified with its pinasters⁷³, the sea in distance one way, and all the Arcadian mountains the other, would offer the various beauty, the rich grandeur, and the mind-filling expanse of Claude.⁷⁴

Xen. Anab.
l. 5. c. 12.
Pausan. l. 5.
c. 6.

Strabo, l. 8.
p. 345. 351.
Pausan. l. 5.
c. 6.

⁷³ Πίνυς ἀγρία. Pausan. l. 5. c. 6. The tree commonly called *Pinaster* (for its quick growth and picturesque beauty, and also for the value of its timber, deserving the attention of our planters, though, like that beautiful tree the oriental plane, on account of some unaccommodating qualities for their purpose, disliked by our nurserymen) is distinguished by our botanists by the name of *Pinus sylvestris*. Since the first publication of this note it has advanced in favour, principally through its power of withstanding the most violent winds, experienced especially in Cornwall.

⁷⁴ Chandler visited Olympia in the unhealthy season, in haste and in fear.

Plut. de Exil.
p. 1070. &
1074. t. 2.
ed. H. Steph.
Diog. Laert.
vit. Xen.

In this delightful retreat Xenophon is said to have written most of his works, of which all of principal note remain to us. Here, while he meditated on the past, or viewed in secure distance the passing storms, which gave occasion for most of the graver, the immediate circumstances of his own happy situation would at intervals lead to the lighter; those on his amusements, field sports; the management of horses and agriculture; agriculture only incidentally treated, though evidently a favourite topic. In most parts of Greece soil and climate did much for the cultivator; but, among the ravages of war and sedition, frequently occurring, ever threatening, the exertions of art would be hasty and little systematical. The fair lot of the countryman, the loved subject of faithful eulogy for the fortunate poet under the wide shelter of the Roman empire, was hardly a matter even for imagination amid the insecurity of the Grecian republics.⁷⁵ It may be worth while to compare, with his enchanting description of plenty poured from the earth, arms remote, and justice reigning, the portraiture which Xenophon has left us of the husbandman's life, not indeed at Scillus, but in two

Like some of the most beautiful and interesting parts of Italy, the wooded hills about the lake of Bolsena, and the rocky coast of Baia, of which otherwise it may be still truly said in the words of Horace,—

Nullus in orbe locus Baiis præluet amœnis,

it seems the western coast of Peloponnesus is at this day, in the autumnal season, proverbially unhealthy. Chandl. Trav, in Greece.

If Mr. Hawkins, who has had far greater opportunities, should be induced to publish an account of his travels, the world will be better informed concerning that interesting country. The Arcadian mountains, and especially their western steeps, remained, when he visited them, still finely wooded. The rest of Greece, where Herodotus and Thucydides mention extensive woods, have been laid nearly bare, like the once wooded borders of England and Scotland.

⁷⁵ O fortunatos nimium, sua si bona nôrint,
Agrícolas ! quibus ipsa, procul discordibus armis,
Fundit humo facilem victum justissima tellus, &c.

separate districts of the largest and most fruitful province of Greece. It occurs in the description Anab. l. 6. init. of an entertainment given by the officers of the Cyrean army, while encamped near Cotyora, to the ministers of Corylas, prince of Paphlagonia. Among both Greeks and barbarians, as among the eastern nations at this day, the meal was commonly succeeded by dances and pantomimes. After a pantomimical dance, performed to the music of the flute by two Thracians, armed in the manner of their country as targeteers, some Ænians and Magnetes, people of the southern and northern borders of Thessaly, stepped forward, and, in the full armour of the phalanx⁷⁶, exhibited the dance called the Carpæan. "The manner of it," says Xenophon, was thus: "Flutes playing, and time being observed in all motions, one advances as a husbandman. Grounding his arms, he sows, and drives his oxen, often looking around as if in fear. Another approaches as a robber. The husbandman seeing him, runs to his arms, and a combat ensues. The robber prevails, binds the husbandman, and drives off the cattle. Then the dance is varied; the husbandman is victorious, binds the robber's hands behind him, yokes him with the oxen, and drives all off together."

The Magnetes inhabited the dales of Pelion, Strab. l. 7. p. 330. & l. 8. p. 429. along the Ægean shore, and the northern bank of the Peneus, under the heights of Olympus, against Macedonia. The Ænians held the upper part of the valley of the Sperchius, and the northern roots of Cæta, to the border of Ætolia. p. 427. They boasted the purest blood of Grecian race; but neither this proud claim, nor their title to support from the Thessalian confederacy, nor the valour and skill in arms of every husbandman among them, exercised in the daily care even of his

⁷⁶ Ἐν τοῖς ὀπλοῖς.

draught cattle and his seed-corn, nor the strength of their highland fastnesses, in the end availed them. Among the wars of their more powerful western neighbours, ^{Ibid.} the Ætolians, Acarnanians, and Epirots, all Greeks, the Ænians, according to the geographer, were extirpated. Of their neighbours, the Dorians, on the southern side of the ridge of Ceta, a remnant just sufficed to keep the name from perishing.

In Laconia, Elea, Attica, and some other parts of Greece, the situation of the husbandman was less unfortunate. To plough in arms was not commonly necessary; the ploughman and his cattle were at least not liable to attack from the solitary robber. Yet if we consider the state of the country altogether, we shall hardly wonder if what remains from the Greeks of the republican times upon agriculture is not among the most valuable of their writings, and if it affords little instruction for the cultivator under any mild government, long established, only moderately well administered, and able, by its own strength, or its political connections, to keep foreign enemies at a distance.

More than twenty years Xenophon seems to have resided at Scillus, personally undisturbed, though observing often, doubtless with much anxiety, the various turns of the contention between the democratical and aristocratical interests in Greece, excited anew by the injurious haughtiness of Lacedæmon, so soon after her complete triumph over the democratical opposition. But the battle of Leuctra made a

great and unfortunate change for him. Then the ^{B. C. 371.} Eleans, hitherto repressed by an overbearing power, gave vent to their indignation and their ambition;

and, when a general peace was proposed by the ^{Ch. 27. s. 2. of this Hist.} Athenians, upon the terms that all Grecian people should be independent, they alone dissented, with a declaration of their resolution to assert their sovereignty over the

Triphylians. Mindful of the gross evils which can scarcely fail in the subjection of people to people, the Triphylians resisted; and they solicited from Arcadia that protection which Lacedæmon could no longer with the former certainty give. War followed between Arcadia and Elis; violence and confusion superseded law and order, more or less during seven or eight years, in that before peaceful and happy part of Greece; and at length, as we have seen, the sacred precinct itself of Olympia became a field of battle.

B. C. 368.
Ch. 27. s. 4.
of this Hist.

B. C. 364.

B. C. 364.
Ch. 28. s. 5.
of this Hist.

Disturbance to Xenophon's quiet could not fail among these troubles; in which however he seems to have avoided taking a part. According to the biographer, but at what time is not said, he sent his family to Lepreum; he went himself to Elis, apparently to solicit, plead, or negotiate; and finally, with his family, he removed to Corinth. It would be a very advantageous circumstance for him, after the violent contention of the Eleans, that the aristocratical party remained completely masters; and this would be greatly improved by what presently followed, the renewal of alliance between Elis and Lacedæmon. These facts, authenticated by himself, give probability to the report of his journey to Elis; and both together have a confirming consonance to what is related by Pausanias, that the Eleans recovered Scillus; that, a prosecution being instituted against Xenophon before the Olympian council for interference with their dominion under claim of authority from a foreign power, he was either acquitted or pardoned; and that, under protection of the Elean government, as before of the Lacedæmonian, he was allowed to continue his residence at Scillus, and to preserve his property.⁷⁷

Diog. Laert.
vit. Xen.

Ch. 28. s. 4.
of this Hist.

Pausan.
1. 5. c. 6.

⁷⁷ This seems fully implied in the expressions—*τυχόντα δὲ παρὰ Ἑλείων συγγνώμης, ἀδεῶς ἐν Σκιλλοῦντι οἰκῆσαι.*

When, about two years after the battle of Leuctra, the Athenians, abandoning the Theban alliance, took a decided part with Lacedæmon, there remained apparently no political motive to prevent Xenophon's restoration to his country. Then therefore probably it was that, according to the account preserved by Laertius, the same orator, Eubulus, who, in the vehemence perhaps of youthful politics, had proposed the decree for his banishment, with the maturer judgment and softened temper of thirty added years, moved in the Athenian assembly, with equal success, for its reversal. Such a residence however as Xenophon himself has described Athens for eminent and wealthy men, we shall not wonder if, after an absence of more than thirty years, at the age of near sixty, he was not very eager to return to it: Corinth was more commodiously situated for communication with his property at Scillus, or negotiating concerning it.

But, though he avoided needlessly to expose his own elderhood, and the property that was to support his family, to the unbridled intemperance of a misruling multitude⁷⁸, yet he desired that his sons should not omit those duties of Athenian citizens which, of their age, the Attic law required. Both are said to have fought in the Athenian cavalry on the great day of Mantinea, where the elder, Gryllus, earned a glorious death: the younger, Diodorus, survived.

For himself, in his declining age, Corinth probably might be a residence preferable to Scillus. That his connection with that city, and at least his occasional residence there, were of some duration, is implied in an epigram preserved by Laertius, apparently selected from many relating to him. It runs thus: "Though, Xenophon, the Athenians banished

⁷⁸ *Civium ardor prava jubentium.* HOR. Od. 3. 1. 3.

you for the friendship with which you were distinguished by Cyrus, yet hospitable Corinth received you. There you were kindly treated; there you found satisfaction; and there finally you resolved to reside.”⁷⁹ Occasionally perhaps visiting his estate in Triphylia, but mostly under the liberal aristocracy of Corinth, he seems to have passed, in a dignified ease, the remainder of a life, by all accounts long, and, according to the report of Lucian, protracted beyond his ninetieth year.⁸⁰

Lucian. de
Macrob.

79 Εἰ καὶ σὲ, Ξενοφῶν, Κραναοῦ Κίχρησός τε πολῖται
Φεύγειν κατέγνωσαν τοῦ φίλου χάριν Κύρου,
Ἄλλὰ Κόρινθος ἔδικτο φιλόξενος, ἣ σὺ φιληδῶν
Οὕτως ἀρέσκη, κεῖθι καὶ μένειν ἔγνωσ.

⁸⁰ I will own myself not inclined to give any credit to the date assigned, in our copies of Diogenes Laertius, as the term of Xenophon's life, namely, the first year of the hundred and fifth olympiad, about two years only after the battle of Mantinea. Barthelemi, in a note to his fifty-ninth chapter of the Travels of Anacharsis, observing that the battle of Mantinea was fought in the year before Christ 362, about which I believe there is no difference*, adds, that *Xenophon's history* goes five years farther, to the year before Christ 357. What he has meant by the phrase *Xenophon's history*, he has not explained. Xenophon's narrative in his Grecian Annals ends with the battle of Mantinea. His panegyric of Agesilaus goes farther, including the death of that prince; the time of which is not precisely ascertained, but is generally set (perhaps a year or more too early) within two years after the battle of Mantinea. This however alone I think sufficient to invalidate the date of Xenophon's death, as it stands in our copies of Diogenes. But in the Grecian Annals a fact is stated, the succession of Tisiphonus to the tyranny of Pheræ in Thessaly (Hel. l. 6. c. 4. s. 37.), which, according to Diodorus, and to Xenophon too, in Dodwell's reckoning, happened in the fourth year of the hundred and fifth olympiad, the year before Christ 357, just five years after the battle of Mantinea; and perhaps Barthelemi has had this obscurely in his mind, unwilling for the trouble of farther looking after it. Xenophon's mention of the succession of Tisiphonus, does not imply its recency, but rather the contrary: "Tisiphonus," he

[* On the contrary, Blair, the Tables in vol. vii. of Anacharsis, and Bell, in his much-improved English edition of Bredow's Chronology, place the battle of Mantinea B. C. 363: yet, "what is more remarkable," as Mr. Clinton observes, "Mr. Mitford himself †, overlooking his own former opinion, dates the accession of Philip B. C. 360, "in the summer of the *third* year after the battle of Mantinea, which was fought in autumn." And in a subsequent page ‡ he gives the date B. C. 363." Fasti Hellen. p. 278. B. C. 362 is Mr. Clinton's date of this battle, as already given.]

[† Chap. xxxiv. s. 4.

‡ Chap. xxxv. s. 2.]

The estimation in which, living, as well as afterward, Xenophon was extensively held, is marked by some pleasing testimonies. The death of Gryllus gave occasion to many.

Diog. Laert.
vit. Xen.

Epitaphs and panegyrics upon that young man, as Laertius reports from Aristotle, principally intended as compliments to his father, were numerous. The

Pausan. 1. 8.
c. 9. & 11.

Mantinean state rewarded his merit with more costly honours: an equestrian statue of him, placed near the theatre in Mantinea, remained in the time of Pausanias, who travelled through Greece between four and five hundred years after. Even to that time the fame of Gryllus was cherished among the Mantinean people. They attributed to him the first merit in the great battle in which he fell; the second to Cephisodorus, who commanded the Athenian cavalry; and the third only to their own highly respected fellow-citizen Podares. Among the Athenians, already in Xenophon's age, the practice was growing, in paying compliments, and in everything, to run into extravagance. The Attic cavalry, having been the only victorious part of the army of their confederacy at the battle of Mantinea, had a fair claim to public honour. A picture of the battle was therefore placed in the Ceramicus, which Pausanias mentions as remaining perfect when he visited Athens. In this picture it was resolved to honour the memory of Gryllus; and, whether with fair picturesque licence may perhaps be disputed, but against all authority in history, Gryllus was represented giving the mortal wound to Epaminondas.⁸¹ Pausanias also found the memory of

adds, "still held the government." Hence the inference seems reasonable, that Xenophon lived a considerable time after the accession of Tisiphonus, in the year before Christ 357. [B. C. 359. Cl. See *Fasti Hellen.* p. 288.]

⁸¹

. Pictoribus atque poetis
Quidlibet audendi semper fuit æqua potestas.

HOR. Art. Poet. v. 10.


According to all accounts of Gryllus, he fought in the Athenian cavalry. Xenophon, in his narrative of the battle, makes no mention of his son; but he

Xenophon's residence preserved by tradition among the Triphylians, and cherished among the most informed of the Eleans. Scillus was then again in ruin; but the temple of Diana remained; and near it a monument of marble, which Pausanias knew to be from the quarries of mount Pentelicus in Attica, with a figure which the neighbouring inhabitants asserted to be of Xenophon.

marks clearly that the Athenian cavalry was not engaged till after Epaminondas had received his death-blow.

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