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CHAPTER LXIX.
CYRUS THE YOUNGER AND THE TEN THOUSAND GREEKS.
In my sixty-sixth chapter, I brought down the history
of Grecian affairs to the close of the Peloponnesian War, including a
description of the permanent loss of imperial power, the severe temporary
oppression, the enfranchisement and renewed democracy, which marked the lot of
defeated Athens. The defeat of that once-powerful city, accomplished by the
Spartan confederacy—with large pecuniary aid from the young Persian prince
Cyrus, satrap of most of the Ionian seaboard— left Sparta mistress for the time
of the Grecian world. Lysander, her victorious admiral, employed his vast
temporary power for the purpose of setting up, in most of the cities, Dekarchies or ruling Councils of Ten, composed of his own
partisans, with a Lacedaemonian Harmost and garrison to enforce their
oligarchical rule. Before I proceed however to recount, as well as they can be
made out, the unexpected calamities thus brought upon the Grecian world, with
their eventual consequences, it will be convenient to introduce here the
narrative of the Ten Thousand Greeks, with their march into the heart of the
Persian Empire and their still more celebrated Retreat. This incident, lying
apart from the main stream of Grecian affairs, would form an item, strictly
speaking, in Persian history rather than in Grecian. But its effects on the
Greek mind, and upon the future course of Grecian affairs, were numerous and
important; while as an illustration of Hellenic character and competence,
measured against that of the contemporary Asiatics,
it stands pre-eminent and full of instruction.
This march from Sardis up to the neighbourhood of
Babylon, conducted by Cyrus the younger, and undertaken for the purpose of
placing him on the Persian throne in the room of his elder brother Artaxerxes Mnemon—was commenced about March or April in the year 401
B.C. It was about six months afterwards, in the month of September or October
of the same year, that the battle of Cunaxa was fought, in which, though the
Greeks were victorious, Cyrus himself lost his life. They were then obliged to
commence their retreat, which occupied about one year, and ultimately brought
them across the Bosphorus of Thrace to Byzantium, in October or November, 400
B.C.
The death of king Darius Nothus, father both of
Artaxerxes and Cyrus, occurred about the beginning of 404 B.C., a short time
after the entire ruin of the force of Athens at Aegospotami. His reign of 19
years, with that of his father Artaxerxes Longimanus, which lasted nearly 40
years, fill up almost all the interval from the death of Xerxes in 465 B.C The
close of the reigns both of Xerxes and of his son Artaxerxes had indeed been
marked by those phaenomena of conspiracy, assassination, fratricide, and family
tragedy, so common in the transmission of an Oriental sceptre. Xerxes was
assassinated by the chief officer of the palace named Artabanus—who had
received from him at a banquet the order to execute his eldest son Darius, but
had not fulfilled it. Artabanus, laying the blame of the assassination upon
Darius, prevailed upon Artaxerxes to avenge it by slaying the latter; he then
attempted the life of Artaxerxes himself, but failed, and was himself killed,
after carrying on the government a few months. Artaxerxes Longimanus, after
reigning about forty years, left the sceptre to his son Xerxes the second, who
was slain after a few months by his brother Sogdianus,
who again was put to death after seven months, by a third brother, Darius
Nothus, mentioned above.
The wars between the Persian Empire and Athens as the
head of the confederacy of Delos (477—449 B.C.) have been already related in
one of my earlier volumes. But the internal history of the Persian Empire
during these reigns is scarcely at all known to us, except a formidable revolt
of the satrap Megabyzus obscurely noticed in the Fragments of Ctesias. About
414 B.C. the Egyptians revolted. Their native prince Amyrtaeus maintained his
independence—though probably in a part only, and not the whole, of that
country. He was succeeded by a native Egyptian dynasty for the space of sixty
years. A revolt of the Medes, which took place in 408 B.C., was put down by
Darius, and subsequently, a like revolt of the Kadusians.
The peace concluded in 449 B.C., between Athens and
the Persian Empire, continued without open violation until the ruinous
catastrophe which befell the former near Syracuse, in 413 B.C. Yet there had
been various communications and envoys from Sparta to the Persian court,
endeavouring to procure aid from the Great King during the early years of the
war: communications so confused and contradictory, that Artaxerxes (in a letter
addressed to the Spartans, in 425 B.C., and carried by his envoy Artaphernes
who was captured by the Athenians) complained of being unable to understand
what they meant—no two Spartans telling the same story. It appears that
Pissuthnes, satrap of Sardis, revolted from the Persian king, shortly after
this period, and that Tissaphernes was sent by the Great King to suppress this
revolt; in which having succeeded, by bribing the Grecian commander of the
satrap’s mercenary troops, he was rewarded by the possession of the satrapy. We
find Tissaphernes satrap in the year 413 B.C., commencing operations, jointly
with the Spartans, for detaching the Asiatic allies from Athens, after her reverses
in Sicily, and employing the Spartans successfully against Amorges, the
revolted son of Pissuthnes, who occupied the strong maritime town of Iasus.
The increased vigour of Persian operations against
Athens, after Cyrus the younger son of Darius Nothus came down to the Ionic
coast in 407 B. C., has been recounted vigorous in my sixty-fourth chapter,
together with the complete prostration of Athenian power, accomplished during
the ensuing three years. Residing at Sardis and placed in active co-operation
with Greeks, this ambitious and energetic young prince soon became penetrated
with their superior military and political efficiency, as compared with the
native Asiatics. For the abilities and character of
Lysander, the Peloponnesian admiral, he contracted so much admiration, that,
when summoned to court during the last illness of his father Darius in 405
B.C., he even confided to that officer the whole of his tribute and treasure,
to be administered in furtherance of the war, which during his absence was
brought to a victorious close.
Cyrus, born after the accession of his father to the
throne, was not more than eighteen years of age when first sent education down
to Sardis (in 407 B.C.) as satrap of Lydia, of Phrygia, and Cappadocia, and as
commander of that Persian military division which mustered at the plain of
Kastulus—a command not including the Ionic Greeks on the seaboard, who were
under the satrapy of Tissaphernes. We cannot place much confidence in the
account which Xenophon gives of his education—that he had been brought up with
his brother and many noble Persian youths in the royal palace, under the
strictest discipline and restraint, enforcing modest habits, with the
reciprocal duties of obedience and command, upon all of them, and upon him with
peculiar success. It is contradicted by all the realities which we read about
the Persian court, and is a patch of Grecian rather than of Oriental sentiment,
better suited to the romance of the Cyropaedia than
to the Anabasis. But in the Persian accomplishments of horsemanship, mastery of
the bow and of the javelin, bravery in the field, daring as well as endurance
in hunting wild beasts, and power of drinking much wine without being
intoxicated, Cyrus stood pre-eminent, and especially so when compared with his
elder brother Artaxerxes, who was at least unwarlike, if not lazy and timid.
And although the peculiar virtue of the Hellenic citizen —competence for
alternate command and obedience—formed no part of the character of Cyrus, yet
it appears that Hellenic affairs and ideas became early impressed upon his mind;
insomuch that on first coming down to Sardis as satrap, he brought down with
him strong interest for the Peloponnesian cause, and strenuous antipathy to
that ancient enemy by whom the Persian arms had been so signally humbled and
repressed. How zealously he co-operated with Lysander and the Peloponnesians in
putting down Athens has been shown in my preceding chapters.
An energetic and ambitious youth like Cyrus, having
once learnt from personal experience to appreciate the Greeks, was not slow in
divining the value of such auxiliaries as instruments of power to himself. To
co-operate effectively in the war, it was necessary that he should act to a
certain extent upon Grecian ideas, and conciliate the goodwill of the Ionic
Greeks; so that he came to combine the imperious and unsparing despotism of a
Persian prince with something of the regularity and system belonging to a
Grecian administrator. Though younger than Artaxerxes, he seems to have
calculated from the first upon succeeding to the Persian crown at the death of
his father. So undetermined was the law of succession in the Persian royal
family, and so constant the dispute and fratricide on each vacancy of the
throne, that such ambitious schemes would appear feasible to a young man of
much less ardour than Cyrus. Moreover he was the favourite son of Queen
Parysatis, who greatly preferred him to his elder brother Artaxerxes. He was
born after the accession of Darius to the throne, while Artaxerxes had been
born prior to that event. And as this latter consideration had been employed
seventy years earlier by Queen Atossa in determining her husband Darius son of
Hystaspes to declare (even during his lifetime) her son Xerxes as his intended
successor, to the exclusion of an elder son by a different wife and born before
Darius’s
accession, so Cyrus perhaps anticipated the like effective preference to
himself from the solicitations of Parysatis. Probably his hopes were further
inflamed by the fact that he bore the name of the great founder of the
monarchy, whose memory every Persian reverenced. How completely he reckoned on
becoming king is shown by a cruel act performed about the early part of 405
B.C. It was required as a part of Persian etiquette that every man who came into
the presence of the king should immerse his hands in certain pockets or large
sleeves, which rendered them for the moment inapplicable to active use; but
such deference was shown to no one except the king. Two first cousins of
Cyrus—sons of Hieramenes (seemingly one of the satraps or high Persian
dignitaries in Asia Minor) by a sister of Darius—appeared in his presence
without thus concealing their hands, upon which Cyrus ordered them both to be
put to death. The father and mother preferred bitter complaints of this
atrocity to Darius, who was induced to send for Cyrus to visit him in Media, on
the ground, not at all fictitious, that his own health was rapidly declining.
If Cyrus expected to succeed to the crown, it was
important that he should be oh the spot when his father died. He accordingly
went up from Sardis to Media, along with his body-guard of 300 Greeks under the
Arcadian Xenias, who were so highly remunerated for this distant march, that
the rate of pay was long celebrated. He also took with him Tissaphernes as an
ostensible friend; though there seems to have been a real enmity between them.
Not long after his arrival, Darius died, but without complying with the request
of Parysatis that he should declare in favour of Cyrus as his successor.
Accordingly Artaxerxes, being proclaimed king, went to Pasargadae, the
religious capital of the Persians, to perform the customary solemnities. Thus
disappointed, Cyrus was further accused by Tissaphernes of conspiring the death
of his brother, who caused him to be seized, and was even on the point of
putting him to death, when the all-powerful intercession of Parysatis saved his
life. He was sent down to his former satrapy at Sardis, whither he returned
with insupportable feelings of anger and wounded pride, and with a determined
resolution to leave nothing untried for the purpose of dethroning his brother.
This statement, given to us by Xenophon, represents doubtless the story of
Cyrus and his friends, current among the Cyreian army. But if we look at the
probabilities of the case, we shall be led to suspect that the charge of
Tissaphernes may well have been true, and the conspiracy of the disappointed
Cyrus against his brother a reality instead of a fiction.
The moment when Cyrus returned to Sardis was highly
favourable to his plans and preparations. The long war had just been concluded
by the capture of Athens and the extinction of her power. Many Greeks, after
having acquired military tastes and habits, were now thrown out of employment:
many others were driven into exile by the establishment of the Lysandrian Dekarchies throughout
all the cities at once. Hence competent recruits, for a well-paid service like
that of Cyrus, were now unusually abundant. Having already a certain number of
Greek mercenaries distributed throughout the various garrisons in his satrapy,
he directed the officers in command to strengthen their garrisons by as many
additional Peloponnesian soldiers as they could obtain. His pretext was, first,
defence against Tissaphernes, with whom, since the denunciation by the latter,
he was at open war; next, protection of the Ionic cities on the seaboard, who
had been hitherto comprised under the government of Tissaphernes, but had now
revolted of their own accord, since the enmity of Cyrus against him had been
declared. Miletus alone had been prevented from executing this resolution; for
Tissaphernes, reinforcing his garrison in that place, had adopted violent
measures of repression, killing or banishing several of the leading men. Cyrus,
receiving these exiled Milesians with every demonstration of sympathy,
immediately got together both an army and a fleet, under the Egyptian Tamos, to besiege Miletus by land and sea. He at the same
time transmitted to court the regular tribute due from these maritime cities,
and attempted, through the interest of his mother Parysatis, to procure that
they should be transferred from Tissaphernes to himself. Hence the Great King
was deluded into a belief that the new levies of Cyrus were only intended for
private war between him and Tissaphernes—an event not uncommon between two
neighbouring satraps. Nor was it displeasing to the court that a suspected
prince should be thus occupied at a distance.
Besides the army thus collected round Miletus, Cyrus
found means to keep other troops within his call, though at a distance and
unsuspected. A Lacedaemonian officer named Clearchus, of considerable military
ability and experience, presented himself as an exile at Sardis. He appears to
have been banished (as far as we can judge amidst contradictory statements) for
gross abuse of authority and extreme tyranny, as Lacedaemonian harmost at
Byzantium, and even for having tried to maintain himself in that place after
the Ephors had formally dismissed him. The known efficiency and restless
warlike appetite of Clearchus procured for him the confidence of Cyrus, who
gave him the large sum of 10,000 darics, which he employed in levying an army
of mercenary Greeks for the defence of the Grecian cities in the Chersonese
against the Thracian tribes in their neighbourhood, thus maintaining the troops
until they were required by Cyrus. Again, Aristippus and Menon, Thessalians of
the great family of the Aleuadae at Larissa, who had
maintained their tie of personal hospitality with the Persian royal family ever
since the time of Xerxes, and were now in connexion with Cyrus, received from
him funds to maintain a force of 2000 mercenaries for their political purposes
in Thessaly, subject to his call whenever he should, require them. Other
Greeks, too, who had probably contracted similar ties of hospitality with Cyrus
by service during the late war—Proxenus, a Boeotian; Agias and Sophaenetus, Arcadians; Socrates, an Achaean, &c.—were empowered by him
to collect mercenary soldiers. His pretended objects were—partly the siege of
Miletus, partly an ostensible expedition against the Pisidians, warlike and
predatory mountaineers who did much mischief from their fastnesses in the south-east
of Asia Minor.
Besides these unavowed Grecian levies, Cyrus sent envoys to the Lacedaemonians to invoke their aid, in
requital for the strenuous manner in which he had seconded their operations
against Athens, and received a favourable answer. He further got together a
considerable native force, taking great pains to conciliate friends as well as
to inspire confidence. “He was straightforward and just, like a candidate for
command,” to use the expression of Herodotus respecting the Median Deioces; maintaining order and security throughout his
satrapy, and punishing evil-doers in great numbers, with the utmost extremity
of rigour, of which the public roads exhibited abundant living testimony in the
persons of mutilated men, deprived of their hands, feet, or eyesight. But he
was also exact in requiting faithful service, both civil and military. He not
only made various expeditions against the hostile Mysians and Pisidians, but was forward in exposing his own person, and munificent,
rewarding the zeal of all soldiers who distinguished themselves. He attached
men to his person both by a winning demeanour and by seasonable gifts. As it
was the uniform, custom (and is still the custom in the East) for every one who
approached Cyrus to come with a present in his hand, so he n an ally gave away
again these presents as marks of distinction to others. Hence he not only
acquired the attachment of all in his own service, but also of those Persians
whom Artaxerxes sent down on various pretences for the purpose of observing his
motions. Of these emissaries from Susa some were even sent to obstruct and
enfeeble him. It was under such orders that a Persian named Orontes, governor
of Sardis, acted, in levying open war against Cyrus, who twice subdued him, and
twice pardoned him on solemn assurance of fidelity for the future. In all
agreements, even with avowed enemies, Cyrus kept faith exactly, so that his
word was trusted by every one.
Of such virtues (rare in an Oriental ruler, either
ancient or modern), and of such secret preparations, Cyrus sought to reap the
fruits at the beginning of 401 B.C. Xenias, his general at home, brought
together all the garrisons, leaving a bare sufficiency for defence of the
towns. Clearchus, Menon, and the other Greek generals were recalled, and the
siege of Miletus was relinquished; so that there was concentrated at Sardis a
body of 7.700 Grecian hoplites, with 500 light-armed. Others afterwards joined
on the march, and there was, besides, a native army of about 100,000 men. With
such means Cyrus set forth (March or April, 401 B.C.) from Sardis. His real
purpose was kept secret: his ostensible purpose, as proclaimed and understood
by every one except himself and Clearchus, was to conquer and root out the
Pisidian mountaineers. A joint Lacedaemonian and Persian fleet, under the
Lacedaemonian admiral Samius, at the same time
coasted round the south of Asia Minor, in order to lend co-operation from the
seaside. This Lacedaemonian co-operation passed for a private levy effected by
Cyrus himself; for the ephors would not formally avow hostility against the
Great King.
The body of Greeks, immortalized under the name of the
Ten Thousand, who were thus preparing to plunge into so many unexpected perils,
though embarking on a foreign mercenary service, were by no means outcasts, or
even men of extreme poverty. They were for the most part persons of established
position, and not a few even opulent. Half of them were Arcadians or Achaeans.
Such was the reputation of Cyrus for honourable and
munificent dealing, that many young men of good family had run away from their
fathers and mothers; others of mature age had been tempted to leave their wives
and children; and there were even some who had embarked their own money in
advance of outfit for other poorer men, as well as for themselves. All
calculated on a year’s campaign in Pisidia; which might perhaps be hard, but
would certainly be lucrative, and would enable them to return with a well-furnished
purse. So the Greek commanders at Sardis all confidently assured them,
extolling, with the emphasis and eloquence suitable to recruiting officers,
both the liberality of Cyrus and the abundant promise for all men of
enterprise.
Among others, the Boeotian Proxenus wrote to his
friend Xenophon, at Athens, pressing him strongly to come to Sardis, and
offering to present him to Cyrus, whom he (Proxenus) “considered as a better
friend to him than his own country”: a striking evidence of the manner in which
such foreign mercenary service overlaid Grecian patriotism, which we shall
recognize more and more as we advance forward. This able and accomplished
Athenian—entitled to respectful gratitude, not indeed from Athens his country,
but from the Cyreian army and the intellectual world generally—was one of the
class of Knights, or Horsemen, and is said to have served in that capacity at
the battle of Delium. Of his previous life we know
little or nothing, except that he was an attached friend and diligent hearer of
Socrates, the memorials of whose conversation we chiefly derive from his pen,
as we also derive the narrative of the Cyreian march. In my last preceding
chapter on Socrates, I have made ample use of the Memorabilia of Xenophon; and
I am now about to draw from his Anabasis (a model of perspicuous and
interesting narrative) the account of the adventures of the Cyreian army, which
we are fortunate in knowing from so authentic a source.
On receiving the invitation from Proxenus, Xenophon
felt inclined to comply. To a member of that class of Knights, which three
years before had been the mainstay of the atrocities of the Thirty (how far he
was personally concerned we cannot say), it is probable that residence in
Athens was in those times not peculiarly agreeable. He asked the opinion of
Socrates; who, apprehensive lest service under Cyrus, the bitter enemy of
Athens, might expose him to unpopularity with his countrymen, recommended an application
to the Delphian oracle. Thither Xenophon went; but in truth he had already made
up his mind beforehand. So that instead of asking, “whether he ought to go or
refuse,” he simply put the question, “To which of the gods must I sacrifice, in
order to obtain safety and success in a journey which I am now meditating?”.
The reply of the oracle—indicating Zeus Basileus as the god to whom sacrifice
was proper—was brought back by Xenophon; upon which Socrates, though displeased
that the question had not been fairly put as to the whole project, nevertheless
advised, since an answer had now been given, that it should be literally
obeyed. Accordingly Xenophon, having offered the sacrifices prescribed, took
his departure first to Ephesus and thence to Sardis, where he found the army
about to set forth. Proxenus presented him to Cyrus, who entreated him
earnestly to take service, promising to dismiss him as soon as the campaign
against the Pisidians should be finished. He was thus induced to stay, yet only
as volunteer or friend of Proxenus, without accepting any special post in the
army, either as officer or soldier. There is no reason to believe that his
service under Cyrus had actually the effect apprehended by Socrates, of
rendering him unpopular at Athens. For though he was afterwards banished, his
sentence was not passed against him until after the battle of Koroneia in 394 B.C., where he was in arms as a conspicuous
officer under Agesilaus, against his own countrymen and their Theban allies—nor
need we look further back for the grounds of the sentence.
Though Artaxerxes, entertaining general suspicions of
his brother’s ambitious views, had sent down various persons to watch him, yet
Cyrus had contrived to gain or neutralize these spies, and had masked his
preparations so skilfully that no intimation was conveyed to Susa until the
march was about to commence. It was only then that Tissaphernes, seeing the
siege of Miletus relinquished and the vast force mustering at Sardis, divined
that something more was meant than the mere conquest of Pisidian freebooters,
and went up in person to warn the King, who began his preparations forthwith.
That which Tissaphernes had divined was yet a secret to every man in the army,
to Proxenus as well as the rest, when Cyrus, having confided the provisional
management of his satrapy to some Persian kinsmen, and to his admiral the
Egyptian Tamos, commenced his march in a south-easterly
direction from Sardis, through Lydia and Phrygia. Three days’ march, a distance
stated at 22 parasangs, brought him to the Maeander; one additional march of
eight parasangs, after crossing that river, forwarded him to Kolossae, a flourishing city in Phrygia, where Menon
overtook him with a reinforcement of 1000 hoplites and 500 peltasts—Dolopes, Aenianes, and Olynthians. He then marched three days onward to Kelaenae, another Phrygian city, “great and flourishing,”
with a citadel very strong both by nature and art. Here he halted no less than
thirty days, in order to await the arrival of Clearchus, with his division of
1000 hoplites, 800 Thracian peltasts, and 200 Cretan bowmen: at the same time
Sophaenetus arrived with 1000 further hoplites, and Sosias with 300. This total of Greeks was reviewed by Cyrus in one united body at
Celaenae : 11,000 hoplites and 2000 peltasts.
As far as Celaenae, his march had been directed
straight towards Pisidia, near the borders of which territory that city is
situated. So far, therefore, the fiction with which he started was kept up. But
on leaving Celaenae, he turned his march away from Pisidia, in a direction
nearly northward ; first in two days, ten parasangs, to the town of Peltae;
next in two days farther, twelve parasangs, to Keramon-Agora,
the last city in the district adjoining Mysia. At Peltae, in a halt of three
days, the Arcadian general Xenias celebrated the great festival of his country,
the Lykaea, with its usual games and matches, in the
presence of Cyrus. From Keramon-Agora, Cyrus inarched
in three days the unusual distance of thirty parasangs, to a city called Kaystru-Pedion (the plain of Kaystrus),
where he halted for five days. Here his repose was disturbed by the murmurs of
the Greek soldiers, who had received no pay for three months (Xenophon had
before told us that they were mostly men who had some means of their own), and
who now flocked round his tent to press for their arrears. So impoverished was
Cyrus by previous disbursements— perhaps also by remissions of tribute for the
purpose of popularizing himself—that he was utterly without money, and was
obliged to put them off again with promises. And his march might well have
ended here, had he not been rescued from embarrassment by the arrival of
Epyaxa, wife of the Cilician prince, Syennesis, who brought to him a large sum
of money, and enabled him to give to the Greek soldiers four months’ pay at
once. As to the Asiatic soldiers, it is probable that they received little
beyond their maintenance.
Two ensuing days of march, still through Phrygia,
brought the army to Thymbrium; two more to Tyriaeum. Each day’s march is called five parasangs. It was
here that Cyrus, halting three days, passed the army in review, to gratify the
Cilician princess Epyaxa, who was still accompanying the march. His Asiatic
troops were first made to march in order before him, cavalry and infantry in
their separate divisions ; after which he himself in a chariot, and Epyaxa in a harmamaxa (a sort of carriage or litter covered with
an awning which opened or shut at pleasure), passed all along the front of the
Greek line, drawn up separately. The hoplites were marshalled four deep, all in
their best trim—brazen helmets, purple turn us, greaves or leggings, and the
shields rubbed bright, just taken out of the wrappers in which they were
carried during a mere march. Clearchus commanded on the left and Menon on the
right, the other generals being distributed in the centre. Having completed his
review along the whole line, and taken a station with the Cilician princess at
a certain distance in front of it, Cyrus sent his interpreter to the generals,
and desired that he might see them charge. Accordingly the orders were given,
the spears were protended, the trumpets sounded, and one whole Greek force
moved forward in battle array with the usual shouts. As they advanced, the pace
became accelerated, and they made straight against the victualling portion of
the Asiatic encampment. Such was the terror occasioned by the sight, that all
the Asiatics fled forthwith, abandoning their
property—Epyaxa herself among the first, quitting her palanquin. Though she had
among her personal guards some Greeks from Aspendus,
she had never before seen a Grecian army, and was amazed as well as
terrified—much to the satisfaction of Cyrus, who saw in the scene an augury of
his own coming success.
Three days of farther march (called twenty parasangs
in all) brought the army to Iconium (now Konieh), the extreme city of Phrygia,
where Cyrus halted three days. He then marched for five days (thirty
parasangs) through Lycaonia; which country, as being out of his own satrapy,
and even hostile, he allowed the Greeks to plunder. Lycaonia being immediately
on the borders of Pisidia, its inhabitants were probably reckoned as Pisidians,
since they were of the like predatory character; so that Cyrus would be partially
realizing the pretended purpose of his expedition. He thus, too, approached
near to Mount Taurus, which separated him from Cilicia; and he here sent the
Cilician princess, together with Menon and his division, over the mountain, by
a pass shorter and more direct, but seemingly little frequented, and too
difficult for the whole army, in order that they might thus get straight into
Cilicia, in the rear of Syennesis, who was occupying the regular pass more to
the northward. Intending to enter with his main body through this latter pass,
Cyrus first proceeded through Cappadocia (four days’ march, twenty-five
parasangs) to Dana, or Tyana, a flourishing city of Cappadocia, where he halted
three days, and where he put to death two Persian officers on a charge of
conspiring against him.
This regular pass over Taurus, the celebrated
Tauri-Pylae or Cilician Gates, was occupied by Syennesis. Though a road fit for
vehicles, it was yet 3600 feet above the level of the sea, steep, bordered by
high ground on each side, and crossed by a wall with gates, so that it could
not be forced if ever so moderately defended. But the Cilician prince, alarmed
at the news that Menon had already crossed the mountains by the less frequented
pass to his rear, and that the fleet of Cyrus was sailing along the coast,
evacuated his own impregnable position, and fell back to Tarsus; from whence he
again retired, accompanied by most of the its inhabitants to an inaccessible
fastness on the mountains. Accordingly Cyrus, ascending without opposition the
great pass thus abandoned, reached Tarsus after a march of four days, there
rejoining Menon and Epyaxa. Two lochi, or
companies, of the division of Menon, having dispersed on their march for
pillage, had been cut off by the natives; for which the main body of Greeks now
took their revenge, plundering both the city and palace of Syennesis. That
prince, though invited by Cyrus to come back to Tarsus, at first refused, but
was at length prevailed upon by the persuasions of his wife to return under a
safe conduct. He was induced to contract an alliance, to exchange presents with
Cyrus, and to give him a large sum of money towards his expedition, together
with a contingent of troops; in return for which it was stipulated that Cilicia
should be no further plundered, and that the slaves taken away might be
recovered wherever they were found.
It seems evident, though Xenophon does not directly
tell us so, that the resistance of Syennesis (this was a standing name or title
of the hereditary princes of Cilicia under the Persian crown) was a mere
feint; that the visit of Epyaxa with a supply of money to Cyrus, and the
admission of Menon and his division over Mount Taurus, were manoeuvres in
collusion with him; and that, thinking Cyrus would be successful, he was
disposed to support his cause, yet careful at the same time to give himself the
air of having been overpowered, in case Artaxerxes should prove victorious.
At first, however, it appeared as if the march of
Cyrus was destined to finish at Tarsus, where he was obliged to remain twenty
days. The army had already passed by Pisidia, the ostensible purpose of the
expedition, for which the Grecian troops had been engaged; not one of them,
either officer or soldier, suspecting anything to the contrary, except
Clearchus, who was in the secret. But all now saw that they had been imposed
upon, and found out that they were to be conducted against the Persian king.
Besides the resentment at such delusion, they shrunk from the risk altogether;
not from any fear of Persian armies, but from the terrors of a march of three
months inward from the coasty and the impossibility of return, which had so
powerfully affected the Spartan king Cleomenes, a century before; most of them
being (as I have before remarked) men of decent position and family in their
respective cities. Accordingly they proclaimed their determination to advance
no farther, as they had not been engaged to fight against the Great King.
Among the Grecian officers, each (Clearchus, Proxenus,
Menon, Xenias, &c.) commanded his own separate division, without any
generalissimo except Cyrus himself. Each of them probably sympathized more or
less in the resentment well as in the repugnance of the soldiers. But
Clearchus, an exile, and a mercenary by profession, was doubtless prepared for
this mutiny, and had assured Cyrus that it might be overcome. That such a man
as Clearchus could be tolerated as a commander of free and nonprofessional
soldiers is a proof of the great susceptibility of the Greek hoplites for
military discipline. For though he had great military merits, being brave,
resolute, and full of resource in the hour of danger, provident for the
subsistence of his soldiers, and unshrinking against fatigue and hardship, yet
his look and manner were harsh, his punishments were perpetual as well as
cruel, and he neither tried nor cared to conciliate his soldiers, who
accordingly stayed with him, and were remarkable for exactness of discipline,
so long as political orders required them, but preferred service under other
commanders when they could obtain it. Finding his orders to march forward
disobeyed, Clearchus proceeded at once in his usual manner to enforce and
punish. But he found resistance universal; he himself, with the cattle who
carried his baggage, was pelted when he began to move forward, and narrowly
escaped with his life. Thus disappointed in his attempt at coercion, he was
compelled to convene the soldiers in a regular assembly, and to essay
persuasion.
On first appearing before the assembled soldiers, this
harsh and imperious officer stood for a long time silent, and even weeping: a
remarkable point in Grecian manners, and exceedingly impressive to the
soldiers, who looked on him with surprise and in silence. At length he
addressed them: “Be not astonished, soldiers, to see me deeply mortified. Cyrus
has been my friend and benefactor. It was he who sheltered me as an exile, and
gave me 10,000 darics, which I expended not on my own profit or pleasure, but
upon you, and in defence of Grecian interests in the Chersonese against
Thracian depredators. When Cyrus invited me, I came to him along with you, in
order to make him the best return in my power for his past kindness. But now,
since you will no longer march along with me, I am under the necessity either
of renouncing you or of breaking faith with him. Whether I am doing right or
not, I cannot say; but I shall stand by you and share your fate. No one shall
say of me that, having conducted Greek troops into a foreign land, I betrayed
the Greeks and chose the foreigner. You are to me country, friends, allies:
while you are with me, I can help a friend and repel an enemy. Understand me
well: I shall go wherever you go, and partake your fortune.”
This speech, and the distinct declaration of Clearchus
that he would not march forward against the king, was heard by the soldiers
with much delight; in which those of the other Greeks division sympathized, especially as none of
the other Greeks commanders had yet announced a similar resolution. So strong
was this feeling among the soldiers of Xenias and Pasion, that 2000 of them
left their commanders, coming over forthwith, with arms and baggage, to the
encampment of Clearchus.
Meanwhile Cyrus himself, dismayed at the resistance
encountered, sent to desire an interview with Clearchus, but the latter,
knowing well the game that he was playing, refused to obey the summons. He
however at the same time despatched a secret message to encourage Cyrus with
the assurance that everything would come right at last—and to desire further
that fresh invitations might be sent, in order that he (Clearchus) might answer
by fresh refusals. He then again convened in assembly both his own soldiers and
those who had recently deserted Xenias to join him. “Soldiers (said he), we
must recollect that we have now broken with Cyrus. We are no longer his
soldiers, nor he our paymaster; moreover, I know that he thinks we have wronged
him, so that I am both afraid and ashamed to go near him. He is a good friend,
but a formidable enemy, and has a powerful force of his own, which all of you
see near at hand. This is no time for us to slumber. We must take careful
counsel whether to stay or go; and if we go, how to get away in safety, as well
as to obtain provisions. I shall be glad to hear what any man has to suggest.”
Instead of the peremptory tone habitual with
Clearchus, the troops found themselves now, for the first time, not merely
released from his command, but deprived of his advice. Some soldiers addressed
the assembly, proposing various measures suitable to the emergency; but their
propositions were opposed by other speakers, who, privately instigated by
Clearchus himself, set forth the difficulties either of staying or departing.
One among these secret partisans of the commander even affected to take the opposite
side, and to be impatient for immediate departure. “If Clearchus does not
choose to conduct us back (said this speaker), let us immediately elect other
generals, buy provisions, get ready to depart, and then send to ask Cyrus for
merchant-vessels, or at any rate for guides in our return march by land. If he
refuses both these requests, we must put ourselves in marching order, to fight
our way back; sending forward a detachment without delay to occupy the passes.”
Clearchus here interposed to say that, as for himself, it was impossible for
him to continue in command; but he would faithfully obey any other commander
who might be elected. He was followed by another speaker, who demonstrated the
absurdity of going and asking Cyrus either for a guide or for ships, at the
very moment when they were frustrating his projects. How could he be expected
to assist them in getting away? Who could trust either his ships or his guides?
On the other hand, to depart without his knowledge or concurrence was
impossible. The proper course would be to send a deputation to him, consisting
of others along with Clearchus, to ask what it was that he really wanted, which
no one yet knew. His answer to the question should be reported to the meeting,
in order that they might take their resolution accordingly.
To this proposition the soldiers acceded; for it was
but too plain that retreat was no easy matter. The deputation went to put the
question to Cyrus, who replied that his real purpose was to attack his enemy
Abrokomas, who was on the river Euphrates, twelve days’ march onward. If he
found Abrokomas there, he would punish him as he deserved. If, on the other
hand, Abrokomas had fled, they might again consult what step was fit to be
taken.
The soldiers, on hearing this, suspected it to be a
deception, but nevertheless acquiesced, not knowing what else to do. They
required only an increase of pay. Not a word was said about the Great King, or
the expedition against him. Cyrus granted increased pay of fifty per cent, upon
the previous rate. Instead of one daric per month to each soldier, he agreed to
give a daric and a half.
This remarkable scene at Tarsus illustrates the
character of the Greek citizen-soldier. What is chiefly to be noted is the
appeal made to their reason and judgment—the habit, established more or less
throughout so large a portion of the Grecian world, and attaining its maximum
at Athens, of hearing both sides and deciding afterwards. The soldiers are
indignant, justly and naturally, at the fraud practised upon them. But instead
of surrendering themselves to this impulse arising out of the past, they are
brought to look at the actualities of the present, and take measure of what is
best to be done for the future. To return back from the place where they stood,
against the wish of Cyrus, was an enterprise so full of difficulty and danger
that the decision to which they came was recommended by the best considerations
of reason. To go on was the least dangerous course of the two, besides its
chances of unmeasured reward.
As the remaining Greek officers and soldiers followed
the example of Clearchus and his division, the whole army marched forward from
Tarsus, and reached Issus, extreme city of Cilicia, in five days’
march—crossing the rivers Saras and Pyramus. At Issus, a flourishing and
commercial port in the angle of the Gulf so called, Cyrus was joined by his
fleet of 60 triremes—35 Lacedaemonian and 25 Persian triremes: bringing a
reinforcement of 700 hoplites, under the command of the Lacedaemonian
Cheirisophus, said to have been despatched by the Spartan ephors. He also
received a further reinforcement of 400 Grecian soldiers, making the total of
Greeks in his army 14,000, from which are to be deducted the 100 soldiers of
Menon’s division, slain in Cilicia.
The arrival of this last body of 400 men was a fact of
some importance. They had hitherto been in the service of Abrokomas (the
Persian general commanding a vast the force, said to be 300,000 men, for the
king, in Phoenicia and Syria) from whom they now deserted to Cyrus. Such
desertion was at once the proof of their reluctance to fight against the great
body of their countrymen marching upwards, and of the general discouragement
reigning amidst the king’s army. So great indeed was that discouragement, that
Abrokomas now fled from the Syrian coast into the interior, abandoning three
defensible positions in succession—(1) the Gates of Cilicia and Syria; (2) the
pass of Beilan over Mount Amanus; (3) the passage of
the Euphrates. He appears to have been alarmed by the easy passage of Gyrus
from Cappadocia into Cilicia, and still more, probably, by the evident
collusion of Syennesis with the invader.
Cyrus had expected to find the Gates of Cilicia and
Syria stoutly defended, and had provided for this emergency by bringing up his
fleet to Issus, in order that he might be able to transport a division by sea
to the rear of the defenders. The pass was at one day’s march from Issus. It
was a narrow road for the length of near half a mile, between the sea on one
side and the steep cliffs terminating Mount Amanus on the other. The two
entrances, on the side of Cilicia as well as on that of Syria, were both closed
by walls and gates: midway between the two the river Kersus broke out from the mountains and flowed into the sea. No army could force this
pass against defenders; but the possession of the fleet doubtless enabled an
assailant to turn it. Cyrus was overjoyed to find it undefended. And here we
cannot but notice the superior ability and forethought of Cyrus, as compared
with the other Persians opposed to him. He had looked at this as well as at the
other difficulties of his march beforehand, and had provided the means of
meeting them; whereas, on the king’s side, all the numerous means and
opportunities of defence are successively abandoned: the Persians have no confidence
except in vast numbers—or, when numbers fail, in treachery.
Five parasangs, or one day’s inarch from this pass,
Cyrus reached the Phoenician maritime town of Myriandrus,
a place of great commerce, with its harbour full of merchant-men. While he
rested here seven days, his two —generals Xenias and Pasion deserted him,
privately engaging a merchant-vessel to carry them away with their property.
They could not brook the wrong which Cyrus had done them in permitting
Clearchus to retain under his command those soldiers who had deserted them at
Tarsus, at the time when the latter played off his deceitful manoeuvre. Perhaps
the men who had thus deserted may have been unwilling to return to their
original commanders, after having taken so offensive a step. And this may
partly account for the policy of Cyrus in sanctioning what Xenias and Pasion
could not but feel as a great wrong, in which a large portion of the army
sympathized. The general belief among the soldiers was that Cyrus would
immediately despatch some triremes to overtake and bring back the fugitives.
But instead of this he summoned the remaining generals, and after communicating
to them the fact that Xenias and Pasion were gone, added—“I have plenty of
triremes to overtake their merchantman if I chose, and to bring them back. But
I will do no such thing. No one shall say of me that I make use of a man while
he is with me, and afterwards seize, rob, or ill-use him when he wishes to
depart. Nay, I have their wives and children under guard as hostages at Tralles, but even these shall be given up to them, in
consideration of their good behaviour down to the present day. Let them go if
they choose, with the full knowledge that they behave worse towards me than I
towards them.” This behaviour, alike judicious and conciliating, was
universally admired, and produced the best possible effect upon the spirits of
the army, imparting a confidence in Cyrus which did much to outweigh the
prevailing discouragement in the unknown march upon which they were entering.
At Myriandrus Cyrus finally
quitted the sea, sending back his fleet, and striking with his land force
eastward into the interior. For this purpose it was necessary first to cross
Mount Amanus by the pass of Beilan, an eminently
difficult road which he was fortunate enough to find open, though Abrokomas
might easily have defended it if he had chosen. Four days’ march brought the
army to the Chains (perhaps the river of Aleppo), full of fish held sacred by
the neighbouring inhabitants; five more days to the sources of the river Daradax, with the palace and park of the Syrian satrap Belesys; three days farther to Thapsakus on the Euphrates.
This was a great and flourishing town, a centre of commerce enriched by the
important ford or transit of the river Euphrates close to it, in latitude about
35° 40' N. The river, when the Cyreians arrived, was four stadia or somewhat
less than half an English mile in breadth.
Cyrus remained at Thapsakus five days. He was now
compelled formally to make known to his soldiers the real object of the march,
hitherto in name at least disguised. He accordingly sent for the Greek
generals, and desired them to communicate publicly the fact that he was on the
advance to Babylon against his brother, which to themselves, probably, had been
for some time well known. Amons the soldiers, however, the first announcement loud
murmurs, accompanied by accusation against the generals of having betrayed
them, in privity with Cyrus. But this outburst was very different to the
strenuous repugnance which they had before manifested at Tarsus. Evidently they
suspected and had almost made up their minds to the real truth, so that their
complaint was soon converted into a demand for a donation to each man as soon
as they should reach Babylon, as much as that which Cyrus had given to his
Grecian detachment on going up thither before. Cyrus willingly promised them
five minae per head, equal to more than a year’s pay,
at the rate recently stipulated of a daric and a half per month. He engaged to
give them besides the full rate of pay until they should have been sent back to
the Ionian coast. Such ample offers satisfied the Greeks, and served to
counterbalance at least if not to efface the terrors of that unknown region
which they were about to tread.
But before the general body of Greek soldiers had
pronounced their formal acquiescence, Menon with his separate division was
already in the water crossing. For Menon had instigated his men to decide
separately for themselves, and to execute their decision before the others had
given any answer. “By acting thus (said he) you will confer special obligation
on Cyrus, and earn corresponding reward. If the others follow you across, he
will suppose that they do so because you have set the example. If, on the contrary,
the others should refuse, we shall all be obliged to retreat, but he will never
forget that you, separately taken, have done all that you could for him.” Such
breach of communion and avidity for separate gain, at a time when it vitally
concerned all the Greek soldiers to act in harmony with each other, was a step
suitable to the selfish and treacherous character of Menon. He gained his
point, however, completely, for Cyrus, on learning that the Greek troops had
actually crossed, despatched Glus the interpreter to express to them his
warmest thanks, and to assure them that he would never forget the obligation,
while at the same time he sent underhand large presents to Menon separately. He
passed with his whole army immediately afterwards, no man being wet above the
breast.
What had become of Abrokomas and his army, and why did
he not defend this passage, where Cyrus might so easily have been arrested? We
are told that he had been there a little before, and that he had thought it
sufficient to burn all the vessels at Thapsakus, in the belief that the
invaders could not cross the river on foot. And Xenophon informs us that the
Thapsakenes affirmed the Euphrates to have been never before fordable, always
passed by means of boats, insomuch that they treated the actual low state of
the water as a providential interposition of the gods in favour of Cyrus: “the river made way for
him to come and take the sceptre”. When we find that Abrokomas came too late
afterwards for the battle of Cunaxa, we shall be led to suspect that he too,
like Syennesis in Cilicia, was playing a double game between the two royal
brothers, and that he was content with destroying those vessels which formed
the ordinary means of communication between the banks, without taking any means
to inquire whether the passage was practicable without them. The assertion of
the Thapsakenes, in so far as it was not a mere piece of flattery to Cyrus,
could hardly have had any other foundation than the fact that they had never
seen the river crossed on foot (whether practicable or not), so long as there
were regular ferryboats.
After crossing the Euphrates, Cyrus proceeded for nine
days’ march southward along its left bank, until he came to its affluent the
river Araxes or Chaboras, which divided Syria from
Arabia. From the numerous and well-supplied villages there situated, he
supplied himself with a large stock of provisions, to confront the desolate
march through Arabia on which they were about to enter, following the banks of
the Euphrates still farther southward. It was now that he entered on what maybe
called the Desert—an endless breadth or succession of undulations “like the
sea,” without any cultivation or even any tree : nothing but wormwood and
various aromatic shrubs. Here too the astonished Greeks saw, for the first
time, wild asses, antelopes, ostriches, bustards, some of which afforded sport,
and occasionally food, to the horsemen, who amused themselves by chasing them ,
though the wild ass was swifter than any horse, and the ostrich altogether
unapproachable. Five days’ march brought them to Korsote,
a town which had been abandoned by its inhabitants—probably, however, leaving
the provision-dealers behind, as had before happened at Tarsus, in Cilicia,
since the army here increased their supplies for the onward march. All that
they could obtain was required, and was indeed insufficient for the trying
journey which awaited them. For thirteen successive days and ninety computed
parasangs did they march along the left bank of the Euphrates without
provisions, and even without herbage except in some few places. Their flour was
exhausted, so that the soldiers lived for some days altogether upon meat, while
many baggage-animals perished of hunger. Moreover, the ground was often heavy
and difficult, full of hills and narrow valleys, requiring the personal efforts
of every man to push the cars and waggons at particular junctures—efforts in
which the Persian courtiers of Cyrus, under his express orders, took zealous
part, toiling in the dirt with their ornamented attire. After these thirteen
days of hardship they reached Pylae, near the entrance of the cultivated
territory of Babylonia, where they seem to have halted five or six days to rest
and refresh. There was on the opposite side of the river, at or near this
point, a flourishing city named Charmande; to which many of the soldiers
crossed over (by means of skins stuffed with hay), and procured plentiful
supplies, especially of date-wine and millet.
It was during this halt opposite Charmande that a
dispute occurred among the Greeks themselves, menacing to the safety of all. I
have already mentioned that Clearchus, Menon, Proxenus, and each of the Greek
dispute chiefs enjoyed a separate command over his own division, subject
only to the superior control of Cyrus himself. Some of the soldiers of Menon
becoming involved in a quarrel with those of Clearchus, the latter examined
into the case, pronounced one of Menon’s soldiers to have misbehaved and caused
him to be flogged. The comrades of the man thus punished resented the
proceeding to such a degree that, as Clearchus was riding away from the banks
of the river to his own tent, attended by a few followers only, through the
encampment of Menon, one of the soldiers, who happened to be cutting wood,
flung the hatchet at him, while others hooted and began to pelt him with
stones. Clearchus, after escaping unhurt from this danger to his own division,
immediately ordered his soldiers to take arms and put themselves in battle
order. He himself advanced at the head of his Thracian peltasts and his forty
horsemen, in hostile attitude against Menon's division; who on their side ran
to arms, with Menon himself at their head, and placed themselves in order of
defence. A slight accident might have now brought on irreparable disorder and
bloodshed had not Proxenus, coming up at the moment with a company of his
hoplites, planted himself in military array between the two disputing parties,
and entreated Clearchus to desist from further assault. The latter at first
refused. Indignant that his recent insult and narrow escape from death should
he treated so lightly, he desired Proxenus to retire. His wrath was not
appeased until Cyrus himself, apprised of the gravity of the danger, came
galloping up with his personal attendants and his two javelins in hand. “Clearchus,
Proxenus, and all you Greeks (said he), you know not what you are doing. Be
assured that if you now come to blows, it will be the hour of my destruction,
and of your own also, shortly after me. For if your force be ruined, all these
natives whom you see around will become more hostile to us even than the men
now serving with the king.” On hearing this (says Xenophon), Clearchus came to
his senses, and the troops dispersed without any encounter.
After passing Pylae the territory called Babylonia
began. The hills flanking the Euphrates, over which the army had hitherto been
passing, soon ceased, and low alluvial plains commenced. Traces were now dis
covered, the first throughout their long march, of an hostile force moving in
their front, ravaging the country and burning the herbage. It was here
that Cyrus detected the treason of a Persian nobleman named Orontes, whom he
examined in his tent in the presence of various Persians possessing his intimate
confidence, as well as of Clearchus with a guard of 3000 hoplites. Orontes was
examined, found guilty, and privately put to death.
After three days’ march, estimated by Xenophon at
twelve parasangs, Cyrus was induced by the evidences before him, or by the
reports of deserters, to believe that the opposing army was close at hand, and
that a battle was impending. Accordingly, in the middle of the night, he
mustered his whole army, Greeks as well as barbarians; but the enemy did not
appear as had been expected. His numbers were counted at this spot, and it was
found that there were of Greeks, 10,400 hoplites and 2,500 peltasts; of the barbarian
or Asiatic force of Cyrus, 100,000 men, with 20 scythed chariots. The numbers
of the Greeks had been somewhat diminished during the march from sickness,
desertion, or other causes. The reports of deserters described the army of
Artaxerxes at 1,200,000 men, besides the 6000 horseguards commanded by Artagerses, and 200 scythed chariots,
under the command of Abrokomas, Tissaphernes, and two others. It was
ascertained afterwards, however, that the force of Abrokomas had not yet
joined, and later accounts represented the numerical estimation as too great by
one-fourth.
In expectation of an action, Cyrus here convened the
generals along the lochages (or captains) of
the Greeks; as well as to consult about suitable arrangements as to
stimulate their zeal in his cause. Few points in this narrative are more
striking than the language addressed by the Persian prince to the Greeks on
this as well as on other occasions.
“It is not from want of native forces, men of Hellas,
that I have brought you hither, but because I account you better and braver
than any number of natives. Prove yourselves now worthy of the freedom which
you enjoy—that freedom for which I envy you, and which I would choose, be
assured, in preference to all my possessions a thousand times multiplied. Learn
now from me, who know it well, all that you will have to encounter— vast
numbers and plenty of noise ; but if you despise these I am ashamed to tell you
what worthless stuff you will find in our native men. Behave well, like brave
men, and trust me for sending you back in such condition as to make your
friends at home envy you; though I hope to prevail on many of you to prefer my
service to your own homes.”
“Some of us are remarking, Cyrus (said a Samian exile
named Gaulites), that you are full of promises at
this hour of danger, but will forget them, or perhaps will he unable to perform
them, when danger is over” .
“As to ability (replied Cyrus), my father’s empire
reaches northward to the region of intolerable cold, southward to that of
intolerable heat. All in the middle is now apportioned in satrapies among my
brother’s friends; all, if we are victorious, will come to be distributed among
mine. I have no fear of not having enough to give away, but rather of not
having friends enough to receive it from me. To each of you Greeks, moreover, I
shall present a wreath of gold.”
Declarations like these, repeated by Cyrus to many of
the Greek soldiers, and circulated among the remainder, filled all of them with
confidence and enthusiasm in his cause. Such was the sense of force and
superiority inspired, that Clearchus asked him, “Do you really think, Cyrus,
that your brother will fight you?” “Yes, by Zeus (was the reply); assuredly, if
he be the son of Darius and Parysatis, and my brother, I shall not win this
prize without a battle.” All the Greeks were earnest with him at the same time
not to expose his own person, but to take post in the rear of their body. We
shall presently see how this advice was followed.
The declarations here reported, as well as the
expressions employed before during the dispute between Clearchus and the
soldiers of Menon near Charmande, being, as they are, genuine and authentic,
and not dramatic composition such as those of Aeschylus in the Persae, nor historic amplification like the speeches
ascribed to Xerxes in Herodotus, are among the most valuable evidences
respecting the Hellenic character generally. It is not merely the superior
courage and military discipline of the Greeks which Cyrus attests, compared
with the cowardice of Asiatics, but also their
fidelity and sense of obligation, which he contrasts with the time-serving
treachery of the latter; connecting these superior qualities with the political
freedom which they enjoy. To hear this young prince expressing such strong
admiration and envy for Grecian freedom, and such ardent personal preference
for it above all the splendour of his own position, was doubtless the most
flattering of all compliments which he could pay to the listening
citizen-soldiers. That a young Persian prince should be capable of conceiving
such a sentiment is no slight proof of his mental elevation above the level
both of his family and of his nation. The natural Persian opinion is expressed
by the conversation between Xerxes and Demaratus in Herodotus. To Xerxes the
conception of free-citizenship and of orderly self-sufficing courage, planted
by a public discipline patriotic as well as equalizing, was not merely
repugnant, but incomprehensible. He understood only a master issuing orders to
obedient subjects, and stimulating soldiers to bravery by means of the whip.
His descendant Cyrus, on the contrary, had learnt by personal observation to
enter into the feeling of personal dignity prevalent in the Greeks around him,
based as it was on the conviction that they governed themselves, and that there
was no man who had any rights of his own over them; that the law was their only
master, and that in rendering obedience to it they were working fur no one else
but for themselves. Cyrus knew where to touch the sentiment of Hellenic honour,
so fatally extinguished after the Greeks lost their political freedom by the
hands of the Macedonians, and exchanged for that intellectual quickness,
combined with moral degeneracy, which Cicero and his contemporaries remark as
the characteristic of these once high-toned communities.
Having concerted the order of battle with the
generals, Cyrus marched forward in cautious array during the next day,
anticipating the appearance of the king’s forces. Nothing of the kind was seen,
however, though abundant marks of their retiring footsteps were evident. The
day’s march (called three parasangs) having been concluded without a battle,
Cyrus called to him the Ambraciotic prophet Silanus, and presented him with 3000 darics, or ten Attic
talents. Silanus had assured him, on the eleventh day
preceding, that there would be no action in ten days from that time; upon which
Cyrus had told him, “If your prophecy comes true, I will give you 3000 darics.
My brother will not fight at all if he does not fight within ten days”.
In spite of the strong opinion which he had expressed
in reply to Clearchus, Cyrus now really began to conceive that no battle would
be hazarded by his enemies; especially as in the course of this last day’s
march he came to a broad and deep trench (30 feet broad and 18 feet deep),
approaching so near to the Euphrates as to leave an interval of only 20 feet
for passage. This trench had been dug by order of Artaxerxes across the plain,
for a length said to be of twelve parasangs (about forty-two English miles, if
the parasang be reckoned at thirty stadia), so as to touch at its other
extremity what was called the Wall of Media. It had been dug as a special
measure of defence against the approaching invaders. Yet we hear with surprise,
and the invaders themselves found with equal surprise, that not a man was on
the spot to defend it; so that the whole Cyreian army and baggage passed
without resistance through the narrow breadth of 20 feet. This is the first
notice of any defensive measures taken to repel the invasion, except the
precaution of Abrokomas in burning the boats at Thapsakus. Cyrus had been
allowed to traverse all this immense space, and to pass through so many
defensible positions, without having yet struck a blow. And now Artaxerxes,
after having cut a prodigious extent of trench at the cost of so much labour,
provided a valuable means of resistance, especially against Grecian heavy-armed
soldiers, and occupied it seemingly until the very last moment, throws it up
from some unaccountable panic, and suffers a whole army to pass unopposed
through this very narrow gut. Having surmounted unexpectedly so formidable an
obstacle, Cyrus as well as the Greeks imagined that Artaxerxes would never
think of fighting in the open plain. All began to relax in that careful array
which had been observed since the midnight review, insomuch that Cyrus himself
proceeded in his chariot instead of on horseback, while many of the Greek
soldiers lodged their arms on the waggons or beasts of burden.
On the next day but one after passing the undefended
trench, they were surprised, at a spot called Cunaxa, just when they were about
to halt for the midday meal and repose, by the sudden intimation that the
King’s army was approaching in order of battle on the open plain. Instantly
Cyrus hastened to mount on horseback, to arm himself, and to put his forces in
order; while the Greeks, on their side, halted and formed their line with all
possible speed. They were on the right wing of the army, adjoining the river
Euphrates; Ariaeus, with the Asiatic forces, being on the left, and Cyrus
himself, surrounded by a body-guard of 600 well armed Persian horsemen, in the
centre. Among the Greeks, Clearchus commanded the right division of hoplites,
with Paphlagonian horsemen and the Grecian peltasts
on the extreme right, close to the river; Proxenus with his division stood next;
Menon commanded on the left. All the Persian horsemen around Cyrus had
breastplates, helmets, short Grecian swords, and two javelins in their right
hands; the horses also were defended by facings both over the breast and head.
Cyrus himself, armed generally like the rest, stood distinguished by having an
upright tiara instead of the helmet. Though the first news had come upon them
by surprise, the Cyreians had ample time to put themselves in complete order;
for the enemy did not appear until the afternoon was advanced. First was seen
dust, like a white cloud—next, an undefined dark spot, gradually nearing, until
the armour began to shine, and the component divisions of troops, arranged in
dense masses, became discernible. Tissaphernes was on the left, opposite to the
Greeks, at the head of the Persian horsemen, with white cuirasses; on his right
stood the Persian bowmen, with their gerrha,
or wicker shields, spiked so as to be fastened in the ground while arrows were
shot from behind them; next, the Egyptian infantry with long wooden shields
covering the whole body and legs. In front of all was a row of chariots with
scythes attached to the wheels, destined to begin the charge against the
Grecian phalanx.
As the Greeks were completing their array, Cyrus rode
to the front, and desired Clearchus to make his attack with Greeks upon the
centre of the enemy, since it was there that the King in person would be
posted, and if that were once beaten the victory was gained. But such was the
superiority of Artaxerxes in number, that his centre extended beyond the left
of Cyrus. Accordingly Clearchus, afraid of withdrawing his right from the
river, lest he should be taken both in flank and rear, chose to keep his position
on the right, and merely replied to Cyrus that he would manage everything for
the best. I have before remarked how often the fear of being attacked on the
unshielded side and on the rear led the Greek soldier into movements
inconsistent with military expediency; and it will be seen presently that
Clearchus, blindly obeying this habitual rule of precaution, was induced here
to commit the capital mistake of keeping on the right flank, contrary to the
more judicious direction of Cyrus. The latter continued for a short time riding
slowly in front of the lines, looking alternately at the two armies, when
Xenophon —one of the small total of Grecian horsemen, and attached to the
division of Proxenus—rode forth from the line to accost him, asking if he had
any orders to give. Cyrus desired him to proclaim to every one that the
sacrifices were favourable. Hearing a murmur going through the Grecian ranks,
he inquired from Xenophon what it was; and received for answer that the
watchword was now being passed along for the second time. He asked, with some
surprise, who gave the watchword? and what it was? Xenophon replied that it was
“Zeus the Preserver, and Victory”. —“I accept it,” replied Cyrus; “let that be
the word,” and immediately rode away to his own post in the centre, among the Asiatics.
The vast host of Artaxerxes, advancing steadily and
without noise, were now within less than half-a-mile of the Cyreians, when the
Greek troops raised the paean, or usual war-cry, and began to move forward. As
they advanced, the shout became more vehement, the pace accelerated, and at
last the whole body got into a run. This might have proved unfortunate, had
their opponents been other Grecian hoplites; but the Persians did not stand to
await the charge. They turned and fled, when the assailants were yet hardly
within bow-shot. Such was their panic, that even the drivers of the scythed
chariots in front, deserting their teams, ran away along with the rest; while
the horses, left to themselves, rushed apart in all directions, some turning
round to follow the fugitives, others coming against the advancing Greeks, who
made open order to let them pass. The left division of the King’s army was thus
routed without a blow, and seemingly without a man killed on either side; one
Greek only being wounded by an arrow, and another by not getting out of the way
of one of the chariots. Tissaphernes alone—who, with the body of horse
immediately around him, was at the extreme Persian left, close to the
river—formed an exception to this universal flight. He charged and penetrated
through the Grecian peltasts who stood opposite to him between the hoplites and
the river. These peltasts, commanded by Episthenes of
Amphipolis, opened their ranks to let him pass, darting at the men as they rode
by, yet without losing any one themselves. Tissaphernes thus got into the rear
of the Greeks, who continued on their side to pursue the flying Persians before
them.
Matters proceeded differently in the other parts of
the field. Artaxerxes, though in the centre of his own army, yet from his
superior numbers outflanked Ariaeus, who commanded the extreme left of the
Cyreians. Finding no one directly opposed to him, he began to wheel round his
right wing, to encompass his enemies, not noticing the flight of his left
division. Cyrus, on the other hand, when he saw the easy victory of the Greeks
on their side, was overjoyed, and received from every one around him salutations,
as if he were already king. Nevertheless, he had self-command enough not yet to
rush forward as if the victory was already gained, but remained unmoved, with
his regiment of 600 horse round him, watching the movements of Artaxerxes. As
soon as he saw the latter wheeling round his right division to get upon the
rear of the Cyreians, he hastened to check this movement by an impetuous charge
upon the centre, where Artaxerxes was in person, surrounded by the body-guard
of 6000 horse under Artagerses. So vigorous was the
attack of Cyrus, that with his 600 horse he broke and dispersed this
body-guard, killing Artagerses with his own hand. His
own 600 horse rushed forward in pursuit of the fugitives, leaving Cyrus himself
nearly alone, with only the select few called his “Table-Companions” around
him. It was under these circumstances that he first saw his brother Artaxerxes,
whose person had been exposed to view by the flight of the body-guards. The
sight filled him with such a paroxysm of rage and jealous ambition, that he
lost all thought of safety or prudence, cried out, “I see the man,” and rushed
forward with his mere handful of companions to attack Artaxerxes, in spite of
the numerous host behind him. Cyrus made directly at his brother, darting his
javelin with so true an aim as to strike him in the breast, and wound him
through the cuirass; though the wound (afterwards cured by the Greek surgeon Ctesias)
could not have been very severe, since Artaxerxes did not quit the field, but,
on the contrary, engaged in personal combat, he and those around him, against
this handful of assailants. So unequal a combat did not last long. Cyrus, being
severely wounded under the eye by the javelin of a Karian soldier, was cast
from his horse and slain. The small number of faithful companions around him
all perished in his defence: Artasyras, who stood
first among them in his confidence and attachment, seeing him mortally wounded
and fallen, cast himself down upon him, clasped him in his arms, and in this
position either slew himself or was slain by order of the King.
The head and the right hand of the deceased prince
were immediately cut off by order of Artaxerxes, and doubtless exhibited
conspicuously to view. This was a proclamation to every one that the entire
contest was at an end ; and so it was understood by Ariaeus, who together with
all the Asiatic troops of Cyrus deserted the field and fled back to the camp.
Not even there did they defend themselves, when the King and his forces pursued
them; but fled yet farther back to the resting-place of the previous night. The
troops of Artaxerxes got into the camp, and began to plunder it without
resistance. Even the harem of Cyrus fell into their power. It included two
Grecian women, of free condition, good family, and education—one from Phocaea,
the other from Miletus—brought to him by force from their parents to Sardis.
The elder of these two, the Phocaean, named Milto,
distinguished alike for beauty and accomplished intelligence, was made
prisoner, and transferred to the harem of Artaxerxes; the other, a younger
person, found means to save herself, though without her upper garments, and
sought shelter among some Greeks who were left in the camp on guard of the
Grecian baggage. These Greeks repelled the Persian assailants with considerable
slaughter; preserving their own baggage, as well as the persons of all who fled
to them for shelter. But the Asiatic camp of the Cyreians was completely
pillaged, not excepting those reserved waggons of provisions which Cyrus had
provided in order that his Grecian auxiliaries might be certain under all
circumstances of a supply.
While Artaxerxes was thus stripping the Cyreian camp,
he was joined by Tissaphernes and his division of horse, who had
charged through between the Grecian division and the river. At this time
there was a distance of no less than thirty stadia, or three and a half miles, between him and Clearchus with
the Grecian division; so far had the latter advanced forward in pursuit of the
Persian fugitives. Apprised, after some time, that the King’s troops had been
victorious on the left and centre and were masters of the camp—but not yet
knowing the death of Cyrus—Clearchus marched back his troops, and met the
enemy’s forces also returning. He was apprehensive of being surrounded by
superior number’s, and therefore took post with his rear upon the river. In
this position, Artaxerxes again marshalled his troops in front, as if to attack
him; but the Greeks, anticipating his movement, were first in making the attack
themselves, and forced the Persians to take flight even more terror-stricken
than before. Clearchus, thus relieved from all enemies, waited awhile in hopes
of hearing news of Cyrus. He then returned to the camp, which was found
stripped of all its stores; so that the Greeks were compelled to pass the night
without supper, while most of them also had had no dinner, from the early hour
at which the battle had commenced. It was only on the next morning that they
learnt through Procles (descendant of the Spartan
king Demaratus, formerly companion of Xerxes in the invasion of Greece), that
Cyrus had been slain—news which converted their satisfaction at their own
triumph into sorrow and dismay.
Thus terminated the battle of Cunaxa, and along with
it the ambitious hopes as well as the life of this young prince. His character
and proceedings suggest instructive remarks. Both in the conduct of this
expedition, and in the two or three years of administration in Asia Minor which
preceded it, he displayed qualities such as are not seen in Cyrus called the
Great, nor in any other member of the Persian regal family, nor indeed in any
other Persian general throughout the history of the monarchy. We observe a
large and long-sighted combination—a power of foreseeing difficulties and
providing means beforehand for overcoming them—a dexterity in meeting variable
exigences, and dealing with different parties, Greeks or Asiatics,
officers or soldiers—a conviction of the necessity, not merely of purchasing
men’s service by lavish presents, but of acquiring their confidence by
straightforward dealing and systematic good faith—a power of repressing
displeasure when policy commanded, as at the desertion, of Xenias and Pasion
and the first conspiracies of Orontes, although usually the punishments which
he inflicted were full of Oriental barbarity. How rare were the merits and
accomplishments of Cyrus, as a Persian, will be best felt when we contrast this
portrait by Xenophon with the description of the Persian satraps by Isocrates.
That many persons deserted from Artaxerxes to Cyrus—none, except Orontes, from
Cyrus to Artaxerxes—has been remarked by Xenophon. Not merely throughout the
march, but even as to the manner of fighting at Cunaxa, the judgment of Cyrus
was sounder than that of Clearchus. The two matters of supreme importance co
the Greeks were, to take care of the person of Cyrus, and to strike straight at
that of Artaxerxes with the central division around him. Now it was the fault
of Clearchus, and not of Cyrus, that both these matters were omitted, and that
the Greeks gained only a victory comparatively insignificant on the right. Yet
in spite of such mistake, not his own, it appears that Cyrus would have been victorious,
had he been able to repress that passionate burst of antipathy which drove him
like a madman against his brother. The same insatiable ambition and jealous
fierceness when power was concerned, which had before led him to put to death
two first cousins, because they omitted in his presence an act of deference
never paid except to the King in person—the same impulse, exasperated by the
actual sight of his rival brother, and by that standing force of fraternal
antipathy so frequent in regal families, blinded him for the moment to all
rational calculation.
We may however remark that Hellas, as a whole, had no
cause to regret the fall of Cyrus at Cunaxa. Had he dethroned his brother and
become king, the Persian empire have acquired under his hand such a degree of
strength as might probably have enabled him to forestall the work afterwards
performed by the Macedonian kings, and to make the Greeks in Europe as well as
those in Asia his dependents. He would have employed Grecian military
organization against Grecian independence, as Philip and Alexander did after
him. His money would have enabled him to hire an overwhelming force of Grecian
officers and soldiers, who would (to use the expression of Proxenus as recorded
by Xenophon) have thought him a better friend to them than their own country.
It would have enabled him also to take advantage of dissension and venality in
the interior of each Grecian city, and thus to weaken their means of defence
while he strengthened his own means of attack. This was a policy which none of
the Persian kings, from Darius son of Hystaspes down to Darius Codomannus, had ability or perseverance enough to follow
out: none of them knew either the true value of Grecian instruments or how to
employ them with effect. The whole conduct of Cyrus, in reference to this
memorable expedition, manifests a superior intelligence, competent to use the
resources which victory would have put in his hands, and an ambition likely to
use them against the Greeks, in avenging the humiliations of Marathon, Salamis,
and the peace of Kallias.
CHAPTER LXX.
RETREAT OF THE TEN THOUSAND GREEKS.
The first triumphant feeling of the Greek troops at Cunaxa
was exchanged, as soon as they learnt the death of Cyrus, for dismay and
sorrow, accompanied by unavailing repentance for the venture into which he and
Clearchus had seduced them. Probably Clearchus himself too repented, and with
good reason, of having displayed, in his manner of fighting the battle, so
little foresight, and so little regard either to the injunctions or to the
safety of Cyrus. Nevertheless he still maintained the tone of a victor in the
field, and, after expressions of grief for the fate of the young prince,
desired Proclus and Glus to return to Ariaeus, with the reply, that the Greeks
on their side were conquerors, without any enemy remaining ; that they were
about to march onward against Artaxerxes ; and that if Ariaeus would join them,
they would place him on the throne which had been intended for Cyrus. While
this reply was conveyed to Ariaeus by his particular friend Menon along with
the messengers, the Greeks procured a meal as well as they could, having no
bread, by killing some of the baggage animals; and by kindling fire, to cook
their meat, from the arrows, the wooden Egyptian shields which had been thrown
away on the field, and the baggage carts.
Before any answer could be received from Ariaeus,
heralds appeared coming from Artaxerxes; among them being Phalinus,
a Greek from Zakynthos, and the Greek surgeon Ktesias of Cnidus, who was in the service of the Persian king. Phalinus,
an officer of some military experience and in the confidence of Tissaphernes,
addressed himself to the Greek commanders; requiring them on the part of the
King, since he was now victor and had slain Cyrus, to the Greeks surrender
their arms and appeal to his mercy. To this summons, painful in the extreme to
a Grecian ear, Clearchus replied that it was not the practice for victorious
men to lay down their arms. Being then called away to examine the sacrifice
which was going on, he left the interview to the other officers, who met the
summons of Phalinus by an emphatic negative. “If the
King thinks himself strong enough to ask for our arms unconditionally, let him
come and try to seize them.” “The King (rejoined Phalinus)
thinks that you are in his power, being in the midst of his territory, hemmed
in by impassable rivers, and encompassed by his innumerable subjects.”—“Our
arms and our valour are all that remain to us (replied a young Athenian); we
shall not be fools enough to hand over to you our only remaining treasure, but
shall employ them still to have a fight for your treasure.” But though several
spoke in this resolute tone, there were not wanting others disposed to
encourage a negotiation ; saying that they had been faithful to Cyrus as long
as he lived, and would now be faithful to Artaxerxes, if he wanted their
services in Egypt or anywhere else. In the midst of this parley, Clearchus
returned, and was requested by Phalinus to return a
final answer on behalf of all. He at first asked the advice of Phalinus himself; appealing to the common feeling of
Hellenic patriotism, and anticipating, with very little judgment, that the
latter would encourage the Greeks in holding out. “If (replied Phalinus) I saw one chance out of ten thousand in your
favour, in the event of a contest with the King, I should advise you to refuse
the surrender of your arms. But as there is no chance of safety for you against
the King’s consent, I recommend you to look out for safety in the only quarter
where it presents itself.” Sensible of the mistake which he had made in asking
the question, Clearchus rejoined— “That is your opinion: now report our answer.
We think we shall be better friends to the King, if we are to be his friends—or
more effective enemies, if we are to be his enemies—with our arms, than without
them.” Phalinus, in retiring, said that the King
proclaimed a truce so long as they remained in their present position, but war
if they moved either onward or backward. And to this Clearchus acceded, without
declaring which he intended to do.
Shortly after the departure of Phalinus,
the envoys despatched to Ariaeus returned; communicating his reply that the
Persians grandees would never tolerate any pretensions on his part to the
crown, and that he intended to depart early the next morning on his return; if
the Greeks wished to accompany him, they must join him during the night. In the
evening, Clearchus, convening the generals and the lochages (or captains of lochi), acquainted them that the
morning sacrifice had been of a nature to forbid their marching against the
King—a prohibition of which he now understood the reason, from having since
learnt that the King was on the other side of the Tigris, and therefore out of
their reach—but that it was favourable for rejoining Ariaeus. He gave directions
accordingly for a night-march back along the Euphrates, to the station where
they had passed the last night but one prior to the battle. The other Grecian
generals, without any formal choice of Clearchus as chief, tacitly acquiesced
in his orders, from a sense of his superior decision and experience, in an
emergency when no one knew what to propose. The nightmarch was successfully accomplished, so that they joined Ariaeus at the preceding
station about midnight, not without the alarming symptom, however, that Miltokythes the Thracian deserted to the King at the head
of 340 of his countrymen, partly horse, partly foot.
The first proceeding of the Grecian generals was to
exchange solemn oaths of reciprocal fidelity and fraternity with Ariaeus.
According to an ancient and impressive practice, a bull, a wolf, a boar, and a
ram were all slain, and their blood allowed to run into the hollow of a shield;
in which the Greek generals dipped a sword, and Ariaeus, with his chief
companions, a spear. The latter, besides the promise of alliance, engaged also
to guide the Greeks in good faith down to the Asiatic coast. Clearchus immediately
began to ask what route he proposed to take; whether to return by that along
which they had come up, or by any other. To this Ariaeus replied, that the road
along which they had marched was impracticable for retreat, from the utter want
of provisions through seventeen days of desert; but that he intended to choose
another road, which, though longer, would be sufficiently productive to furnish
them with provisions. There was, however, a necessity (he added) that the first
two or three days’ marches should be of extreme length, in order that they
might get out of the reach of the King’s forces, who would hardly be able to
overtake them afterwards with any considerable numbers.
They had now come 93 days’ march from Ephesus, or 90
from Sardis. The distance from Sardis to Cunaxa is, according to Colonel
Chesney, about 1265 geographical miles, or 1464 English miles. There had been
at least 96 days of rest, enjoyed at various places, so that the total of time
elapsed must have at least been 189 days, or a little
How to retrace their steps aos new the problem, apparently insoluble. As to the military force of Persia in
the fields, indeed, not merely the easy victory at Cunaxa, but still more the
undisputed march throughout so long a space left them no serious apprehensions.
In spite of this great extent, population, and riches, they had been allowed to
pass through the most difficult and defensible country, and to ford the broad
Euphrates, without a blow; nay, the King had shrunk from defending the long
trench which he had specially caused to be dug for the protection of Babylonia.
But the difficulties which stood between them and their homes were of a very
different character. How were they to find their way back or obtain provisions,
in defiance of a numerous hostile cavalry, which, not without efficiency even
in a pitched battle, would be most formidable in opposing their retreat? The
line of their upward march had all been planned, with supplies furnished, by
Cyrus; yet even under such advantages, supplies had been on the point of
failing in one part of the march. They were now, for the first time, called
upon to think and provide for themselves; without knowledge of either roads or
distances —without trustworthy guides—without any one to furnish or even to
indicate supplies—and with a territory all hostile, traversed by rivers which
they had no means of crossing. Clearchus himself knew nothing of the country,
nor of any other river except the Euphrates; nor does he indeed in his heart
seem to have conceived retreat as practicable without the consent of the King.
The reader who casts his eye on a map of Asia, and imagines the situation of
this Greek division on the left bank of the Euphrates, near the parallel of
latitude 33° 30', will hardly be surprised at any measure of despair, on the
part either of general or soldiers. And we may add that Klaus had not even the
advantage of such a map, or probably of any map at all, to enable him to shape
his course.
In this dilemma, the first and most natural impulse
was to consult Ariaeus, who (as has been already stated) pronounced, with good
reason, that return by the same road was impracticable, and promised to conduct
them home by another road— longer, indeed, yet better supplied. At daybreak on
the ensuing morning they began their march in an easterly direction,
anticipating that before night they should reach some villages of the
Babylonian territory, as in fact they did; yet not before they had been alarmed
in the afternoon by the supposed approach of some of the enemy’s horse, and by
evidences that the enemy were not far off, which induced them to slacken their
march for the purpose of more cautious array. Hence they did not reach the
first villages before dark; these, too, had been pillaged by the enemy while
retreating before them, so that only the first-comers under Clearchus could
obtain accommodation, while the succeeding troops, coming up in the dark,
pitched as they could, without any order. The whole camp was a scene of
clamour, dispute, and even alarm, throughout the night. No provisions could be
obtained. Early the next morning Clearchus ordered them under arms; and,
desiring to expose the groundless nature of the alarm, caused the herald to
proclaim that whoever would denounce the person who had let the ass into the
camp on the preceding night should be rewarded with a talent of silver.
What was the project of route entertained by Ariaeus,
we cannot ascertain since it was not further pursued. For the effect of the
unexpected arrival of the Greeks as if to attack the enemy—and even the clamour
and shouting of the camp during the night—so intimidated the Persian
commanders, that they sent heralds the next morning to treat about a truce. The
contrast between this message and the haughty summons of the preceding day to
lay down their arms was sensibly felt by the Grecian officers, and taught them
that the proper way of dealing with the Persians was by a bold and aggressive
demeanour. When Clearchus was apprised of the arrival of the heralds, he
desired them at first to wait at the outposts until he was at leisure; then,
having put his troops into the best possible order, with a phalanx compact on
every side to the eye, and the unarmed persons out of sight, he desired the
heralds to be admitted. He marched out to meet them with the most showy and
best-armed soldiers immediately around him; and when they informed him that
they had come from the King with instructions to propose a truce, and to report
on what conditions the Greeks would agree to it, Clearchus replied abruptly,
“Well then, go and tell the King that our first business must be to fight; for
we have nothing to eat, nor will any man presume to talk to Greeks about a
truce, without first providing dinner for them”. With this reply the heralds
rode off, but returned very speedily; thus making it plain that the King, or
the commanding officer, was near at hand. They brought word that the King
thought their answer reasonable, and had sent guides to conduct them to a place
where they would obtain provisions, if the truce should be concluded.
After an affected delay and hesitation, in order to
impose upon the Persians, Clearchus concluded the truce, and desired that the
guides would conduct the army to those quarters where provisions could be had.
He was most circumspect in maintaining exact order during the march, himself
taking charge of the rear guard. The guides led them over many ditches and
channels, full of water, and cut for the purpose of irrigation; some so broad
and deep that they could not be crossed without bridges. The army had to put
together bridges for the occasion, from palm- trees either already fallen or
expressly cut down. This was a troublesome business, which Clearchus himself
superintended with peculiar strictness. He carried his spear in the left hand,
his stick in the right, employing the latter to chastise any soldier who seemed
remiss, and even plunging into the mud and lending his own hands in aid
wherever it was necessary. As it was not the usual season of irrigation for
crops, he suspected that the canals had been filled on this occasion expressly
to intimidate the Greeks, by impressing them with the difficulties of their
prospective march; and he was anxious to demonstrate to the Persians that these
difficulties were no more than Grecian energy could easily surmount.
At length they reached certain villages indicated by
their guides for quarters and provision; and here for the first time they had a
sample of that unparalleled abundance of the Babylonian territory, which
Herodotus is afraid to describe with numerical precision. Large quantities of
corn—dates not only in great numbers, but of such beauty, freshness, size, and
flavour, as no Greek had ever seen or tasted, insomuch that fruit like what was
imported into Greece was disregarded and left for the slaves—wine and vinegar,
both also made from the date palm: these are the luxuries which Xenophon is
eloquent in describing, after his recent period of scanty fare and anxious
apprehension, not without also noticing the headaches which such new and
luscious food, in unlimited quantity, brought upon himself and others.
After three days passed in these restorative quarters,
they were visited by Tissaphernes, accompanied by four Persian grandees and a
suite of slaves. The satrap began to open a negotiation with Clearchus and the
other generals. Speaking through an interpreter, he stated to them that the
vicinity of his satrapy to Greece impressed him with a strong interest in
favour of the Cyreian Greeks, and made him anxious to rescue them out of their
present desperate situation; that he had solicited the King’s permission to
save them, as a personal recompense to himself for having been the first to
forewarn him of the schemes of Cyrus, and for having been the only Persian who
had not fled before the Greeks at Cunaxa; that the King had promised to
consider this point, and had sent him in the meantime to ask the Greeks what
their purpose was in coming up to attack him: and that he trusted the Greeks
would give him a conciliatory answer to carry back, in order thar he might have
less difficulty in realizing what he desired for their benefit. To this
Clearchus, after first deliberating apart with the other officers, replied,
that the army had come together, and had even commenced their march, without
any purpose of hostility to the King; that Cyrus had brought them up the country
under false pretences, but that they had been ashamed to desert him in the
midst of danger, since he had always treated them generously; that since Cyrus
was now dead, they had no purpose of hostility against the King, but were only
anxious to return home; that they were prepared to repel hostility from all
quarters, but would be not less prompt in requiting favour or assistance. With
this answer Tissaphernes departed, and returned on the next day but one,
informing them that he had obtained the King’s permission to save the Grecian
army—though not without great opposition, since many Persian counsellors
contended that it was unworthy of the King’s dignity, to suffer those who had
assailed him to escape. “I am now ready (said he) to conclude a covenant and
exchange oaths with you; engaging to conduct you safely back Greece, with the
country friendly, and with ca regular market for you to purchase provisions.
You must stipulate on your part always to pay for your Pro visions, and to do
no damage to the country : if I do not furnish you with provisions to buy,
you are then at liberty to take them where you can find them.” Well were
the Greeks content to enter into such a covenant, which was sworn, with hands
given upon it, by Clearchus, the other generals, and the lochages on their side, and by Tissaphernes with the King’s brother-in-law on the other.
Tissaphernes then left them, saying that he would go hack to the King, make
preparations, and return to reconduct the Greeks home, going himself to his own
satrapy.
The statements of Ktesias,
though known to us only indirectly, and not to be received without caution,
afford ground for believing that Queen Parysatis decidedly wished the success
to her son Cyrus in his contest for the throne—that the first report conveyed
to her of the battle of Cunaxa, announcing the victory of towards Cyrus, filled
her with joy, which was exchanged for bitter sorrow when she was informed of
his death,—that she caused to be slain with horrible tortures all those, who,
though acting in the Persian army and for the defence of Artaxerxes, had any
participation in the death of Cyrus, and that she showed favourable
dispositions towards the Cyreian Greeks. It may seem probable, further, that
her influence may have been exerted to procure for them an unimpeded retreat,
without anticipating the use afterwards made by Tissaphernes (as will soon
appear) of the present convention. And in one point of view, the Persian king
had an interest in facilitating their retreat. For the very circumstance which
rendered retreat difficult also rendered the Greeks dangerous to him in their
actual position. They were in the heart of the Persian empire, within seventy
miles of Babylon, in a country not only teeming with fertility, but also
extremely defensible, especially against cavalry, from the multiplicity of
canals, as Herodotus observed respecting Lower Egypt. And Clearchus might say
to his Grecian soldiers — what Xenophon was afterwards preparing to say to them
at Kalpe on the Euxine Sea, and what Nicias also
affirmed to the unhappy Athenian army whom he afterwards conducted away from
Syracuse—that wherever they sat down, they were sufficiently numerous and
well-organized to become at once a city. A body of such troops might
effectually assist, and would perhaps encourage, the Babylonian population to
throw off the Persian yoke, and to exonerate themselves from the prodigious
tribute which they now paid to the satrap. For these reasons, the advisers of
Artaxerxes thought it advantageous to convey the Greeks across the Tigris out
of Babylonia, beyond all possibility of returning thither. This was at any rate
the primary object of the convention. And it was the more necessary to
conciliate the goodwill of the Greeks, because there seems to have been but
one bridge over the Tigris; which bridge could only be reached by inviting them
to advance considerably farther into the interior of Babylonia.
Such was the state of fears and hopes on both sides,
at the time when Tissaphernes left the Greeks, after concluding his convention.
For twenty days did they await hid return, without receiving from him any
communication, the Cyreian Persians under Ariaeus being encamped near them.
Such prolonged and unexplained delay became, after a few days, the source of
much uneasiness to the Greeks; the more so as Ariaeus received during this
interval several visits from his Persian kinsmen, and friendly messages from the
King, promising amnesty for his recent services under Cyrus. Of these messages
the effects were painfully felt, in manifest coldness of demeanour on the part
of his Persian troops towards the Greeks. Impatient and suspicious, the Greek
soldiers impressed upon Clearchus their fears that the King had concluded the
recent convention only to arrest their movements, until he should have
assembled a larger army and blocked up more effectually the roads against their
return. To this Clearchus replied, “ I am aware of all that you say. Yet if we
now strike our tents, it will be a breach of the convention and a declaration
of war. No one will furnish us with provisions; we shall have no guides;
Ariaeus will desert us forthwith, so that we shall have his troops as enemies
instead of friends. Whether there be any other river for us to cross I know
not; but we know that the Euphrates itself can never be crossed if there be an
enemy to resist us. Nor have we any cavalry, while cavalry is the best and most
numerous force of our enemies. If the King, having all these advantages, really
wishes to destroy us, I do not know why he should falsely exchange all these
oaths and solemnities, and thus make his own word worthless in the eyes both of
Greeks and barbarians.”
Such words from Clearchus are remarkable, as they
testify his own complete despair of the situation—certainly a very natural
despair—except by amicable dealing with the Persians, and also his ignorance of
geography and the country to be traversed. This feeling helps to explain his
imprudent confidence afterwards in Tissaphernes.
That satrap, however, after twenty days, at last came
back, with his army prepared to return to Ionia, with the King’s daughter, whom
he had just received in marriage, and with another grandee named Orontas. Tissaphernes took the conduct of the march,
providing supplies for the Greek troops to purchase; while Ariaeus and his
division now separated themselves altogether from the Greeks, and became
intermingled with the other Persians. Clearchus and the Greeks followed them at
the distance of about three miles in the rear, with a separate guide for
themselves; not without jealousy and mistrust, sometimes shown in individual
conflicts, while collecting wood or forage, between them and the Persians of
Ariaeus. After three days’ march (that is, apparently, three days, calculated
from the moment when they began their retreat with Ariaeus) they came to the
Wall of Media, and passed through it, prosecuting their march onward through
the country on its other or interior side. It was of bricks cemented with
bitumen, 100 feet high, and 20 feet broad; it was said to extend a length of 20
parasangs (or about 70 miles, if we reckon, the parasang at 30 stadia), and to
be not far distant from Babylon. Two days of farther march, computed at eight
parasangs, brought them to the Tigris. During these two days they crossed two
great shipcanals, one of them over a permanent
bridge, the other over a temporary bridge laid on seven boats. Canals of such
magnitude must probably have been two among the four stated by Xenophon to be
drawn from the river Tigris, each of them a parasang distant from the other.
They were 100 feet broad, and deep enough even for heavy vessels ; they were
distributed by means of numerous smaller channels and ditches for the
irrigation of the soil; and they were said to fall into the Euphrates, or
rather, perhaps, they terminated in one main larger canal cut directly from the
Euphrates to the Tigris, each of them joining this larger canal at a different
point of its course. Within less than two miles of the Tigris was a large and
populous city named Sittake, near which the Greeks
pitched their camp, on the verge of a beautiful park or thick grove full of all
kinds of trees ; while the Persians all crossed the Tigris, at the neighbouring
bridge.
As Proxenus and Xenophon were here walking in front of
the camp after supper, a man was brought up who had asked for the former at the
advanced posts. This man said that he came with instructions from Anrieus. He advised the Greeks to be on their guard, as
there were troops concealed in the adjoining grove for the purpose of attacking
them during the night, and also to send and occupy the bridge over the Tigris,
since Tissaphernes intended to break it down, in order that the Greeks might be
caught without possibility of escape between the river and the canal. On
discussing this information with Clearchus, who was much alarmed by it, a
young Greek present remarked that the two matters stated by the informant
contradicted each other; for that if Tissaphernes intended to attack the Greeks
during the night, he would not break down the bridge, so as both to prevent his
own troops on the other side from crossing to aid, and to deprive those on this
side of all retreat if they were beaten; while, if the Greeks were beaten,
there was no escape open to them, whether the bridge continued or not. This
remark induced Clearchus to ask the messenger what was the extent of ground
between the Tigris and the canal. The messenger replied that it was a great
extent of country, comprising many large cities and villages. Reflecting on
this communication, the Greek officers came to the conclusion that the message
was a stratagem on the part of Tissaphernes to frighten them and accelerate
their passage across the Tigris, under the apprehension that they might
conceive the plan of seizing or breaking the bridge and occupying a permanent
position in the spot where they were, which was an island, fortified on one
side by the Tigris, on the other sides by intersecting canals between the
Euphrates and the Tigris. Such an island was a defensible position, having a
most productive territory with, numerous cultivators, so as to furnish shelter
and means of hostility for all the King’s enemies. Tissaphernes calculated that
the message now delivered would induce the Greeks to become alarmed with their
actual position, and to cross the Tigris with as little delay as possible. At
least this was the interpretation which the Greek officers put upon his
proceeding—an interpretation highly plausible, since, in order to reach the
bridge over the Tigris, he had been obliged to conduct the Greek troops into a
position sufficiently tempting for them to hold, and since he knew that his own
purposes were purely treacherous. But the Greeks, officers as well as soldiers,
were animated only by the wish of reaching home. They trusted, though not
without misgivings, in the promise of Tissaphernes to conduct them, and never
for a moment thought of taking permanent post in this fertile island. They did
not, however, neglect the precaution of sending a guard during the night to the
bridge over the Tigris, which no enemy came to assail. On the next morning they
passed over it in a body, in cautious and mistrustful array, and found
themselves on the eastern bank of the Tigris, not only without attack, but even
without sight of a single Persian, except Girls the interpreter and a few
others watching their motions.
After having crossed by a bridge laid upon
thirty-seven pontoons, the Greeks continued their march to the northward upon
the eastern side of the Tigris, for four days to the river Physkus,
said to be twenty parasangs. The Physkus was 100 feet
wide, with a bridge, and the large city of Opis near
it. Here, at the frontier of Assyria and Media, the road from the eastern
regions to Babylon joined the road northerly on which the Greeks were marching.
An illegitimate brother of Artaxerxes was seen at the head of a numerous force,
which he was conducting from Susa and Ecbatana as a reinforcement to the royal
army. This great host halt ed to see the Greeks pass by; and Clearchus ordered
the march in column of two abreast, employing himself actively to maintain an excellent
array, and halting more than once. The army thus occupied so long a time in
passing by the Persian host that their numbers appeared greater than the
reality, even to themselves ; while the effect upon the Persian spectators was
very imposing. Here Assyria ended and Media began. They marched, still in a
northerly direction, for six days through a portion of Media almost unpeopled,
until they came to some flourishing villages which formed a portion of the
domain of Queen Parysatis; probably these villages, forming so marked an
exception to the desert character of the remaining march, were situated on the
Lesser Zab, which flows into the Tigris, and which Xenophon must have crossed,
though he makes no mention of it. According to the order of march stipulated
between the Greeks and Tissaphernes, the latter only provided a supply of
provisions for the former to purchase; but on the present halt he allowed the
Greeks to plunder the villages, which were rich and full of all sorts of
subsistence—yet without carrying off the slaves. The wish of the satrap to put
an insult on Cyrus, as his personal enemy, through Parysatis, thus proved a
sentence of ruin to these unhappy villagers. Five more days’ march, called
twenty parasangs, brought them to the banks of the river Zabatus,
or the Greater Zab, which flows into the Tigris near a town now called Senn.
During the first of these five days, they saw on the opposite side of the
Tigris a large town called Kaenae, from whence they
received supplies of provisions, brought across by the inhabitants upon rafts
supported by inflated skins.
On the banks of the Great Zab they halted three
days—days of serious and tragical moment. Having been under feelings of
mistrust, ever since the convention with Tissaphernes, they had followed
throughout the whole march, with separate guides of their own, in the rear of
his army, always maintaining their encampment apart. During their halt on the
Zab, so many various manifestations occurred to aggravate the mistrust, that
hostilities seemed on the point of breaking out between the two camps. To
obviate this danger Clearchus demanded an interview with Tissaphernes,
represented to him the threatening attitude of affairs, and insisted on the
necessity of coming to a clear understanding. He impressed upon the satrap
that, over and above the solemn oaths which had been interchanged, the Greeks
on their side could have no conceivable motive to quarrel with him; that they
had everything to hope from his friendship, and everything to fear, even to the
loss of all chance of safe return, from his hostility; that Tissaphernes also
could gain nothing by destroying them, but would find them, if he chose, the
best and most faithful instruments for his own aggrandizement and for
conquering the Mysians and Pisidians—as Cyrus had
experienced while he was alive. Clearchus concluded his protest by requesting
to be informed what malicious reporter had been filling the mind of
Tissaphernes with causeless suspicions against the Greeks.
“Klearchus (replied the
satrap), I rejoice to hear such excellent sense from your lips. You remark
truly, that if you were to meditate evil against me, it would recoil upon
yourselves. I shall prove to you, in my turn, that you have no cause to
mistrust either the King or me. If we had wished to destroy you, nothing would
be easier. We have superabundant forces for the purpose: there are wide plains
in which you would be starved—besides mountains and rivers which you would be
unable to pass, without our help. Having thus the means of destroying you in
our hands, and having nevertheless bound ourselves by solemn oaths to save you,
we shall not be fools and knaves enough to attempt it now, when we should draw
upon ourselves the just indignation of the gods. It is my peculiar affection
for my neighbours the Greeks, and my wish to attach to my own person, by ties
of gratitude, the Greek soldiers of Cyrus, which have made me eager to conduct
you to Ionia in safety. For I know that when you are in my service, though the
King is the only man who can wear his tiara erect upon his head, I shall be
able to wear mine erect upon my heart, in full pride and confidence.”
So powerful was the impression made upon Clearchus by
these assurances, that he exclaimed—“ Surely those informers deserve the
severest punishment, who try to put us at enmity, when we are such good friends
to each other, and have so much reason to be so”. “Yes (replied Tissaphernes),
they deserve nothing less : and if you, with the other generals and lochages, will come into my tent tomorrow, I will tell you
who the calumniators are.” “To be sure I will (rejoined Clearchus), and bring
the other generals with me. I shall tell you at the same time who are the
parties that seek to prejudice us against you.” The conversation then ended,
the satrap detaining Clearchus to dinner, and treating him in the most
hospitable and confidential manner.
On the next morning, Clearchus communicated what had
passed to the Greeks, insisting on the necessity that all the generals should
go to Tissaphernes pursuant to his invitation, in order to re-establish that
confidence which unworthy calumniators had shaken, and to punish such of the
calumniators as might be Greeks. So emphatically did he pledge himself for the
good faith and Phil-hellenic dispositions of the
satrap, that he overruled the opposition of many among the soldiers, who, still
continuing to entertain their former suspicions, remonstrated especially
against the extreme imprudence of putting all the generals at once into the
power of Tissaphernes. The urgency of Clearchus prevailed. Himself with four
other generals—Proxenus, Menon, Agias, and
Socrates—and twenty lochages or captains—went to
visit the satrap in his tent; about 200 of the soldiers going along with them,
to make purchases for their own account in the Persian camp-market.
On reaching the quarters of Tissaphernes—distant
nearly three miles from the Grecian camp, according to habit—the five generals
were admitted into the interior, while the lochages remained at the entrance. A purple flag, hoisted from the top of the tent,
betrayed too late the purpose for which they had been invited to come. The lochages, with the Grecian soldiers who had accompanied
them, were surprised and cut down, while the generals in the interior were
detained, put in chains, and carried up as prisoners to the Persian court. Here
Clearchus, Proxenus, Agias, and Sokrates were
beheaded, after a short imprisonment. Queen Parysatis, indeed, from affection
to Cyrus, not only furnished many comforts to Clearchus in the prison (by the
bands of her surgeon Ktesias), but used all her
influence with her son Artaxerxes to save his life; though her efforts were
counteracted, on this occasion, by the superior influence of Queen Stateira his
wife. The rivalry between these two royal women, doubtless arising out of many
other circumstances besides the death of Clearchus, became soon afterwards so
furious, that Parysatis caused Stateira to be poisoned.
Menon was not put to death along with the other
generals. He appears to have taken credit at the Persian court for the treason
of entrapping his colleagues into the hands of Tissaphernes. But his life was
only prolonged to perish a year afterwards in disgrace and torture—probably by
the requisition of Parysatis, who thus avenged the death of Clearchus. The
queen-mother had always power enough to perpetrate cruelties, though not always
to avert them. She had already brought to a miserable end every one, even
faithful defenders of Artaxerxes, concerned in the death of her son Cyrus.
Though Menon thought it convenient, when brought up to
Babylon, to boast of having been the instrument through whom the generals were
entrapped into the fatal tent, this boast is not to be treated as matter of
fact. For not only does Xenophon explain the catastrophe differently, but in
the delineation which he gives of Menon, dark and odious as it is in the
extreme, he does not advance any such imputation; indirectly, indeed, he sets
it aside.
Unfortunately for the reputation of Clearchus, no such
reasonable excuse can be offered for his credulity, which brought himself as
well as his colleagues to so melancholy an end, and his whole army to the brink
of ruin. It appears that the general sentiment of the Grecian army, taking just
measure of the character of Tissaphernes, was disposed to greater
circumspection in dealing with him. Upon that system Clearchus himself had
hitherto acted; and the necessity of it might have been especially present to his
mind, since he had served with the Lacedaemonian fleet at Miletus in 411 B.C.,
and had therefore had fuller experience than other men in the army of the
satrap’s real character. On a sudden he now turns round, and on the faith of a
few verbal declarations, puts all the military chiefs into the most defenceless
posture and the most obvious peril, such as hardly the strongest grounds for
confidence could have justified. Though the remark of Machiavel is justified by
large experience—that from the shortsightedness of men and their obedience to
present impulse, the most notorious deceiver will always find new persons to
trust him—still such misjudgement on the part of an officer of age and
experience is difficult to explain. Polyaenus intimates that beautiful women, exhibited by the satrap at his first banquet to
Clearchus alone, served as a lure to attract him with all his colleagues to the
second; while Xenophon imputes the error to continuance of a jealous rivalry
with Menon. The latter, it appears, having always been intimate with Ariaeus,
had been thus brought into previous communication with Tissaphernes, by whom he
had been well received, and by whom he was also encouraged to lay plans for
detaching the whole Grecian army from Clearchus, so as to bring it all under
his (Menon’s) command into the service of the satrap. Such at least was the
suspicion of Clearchus, who, jealous in the extreme of his own military
authority, tried to defeat the scheme by bidding still higher himself for the
favour of Tissaphernes. Imagining that Menon was the unknown calumniator who
prejudiced the satrap against him, he hoped to prevail on the satrap to
disclose his name and dismiss him. Such jealousy seems to have robbed Clearchus
of his customary prudence. We must also allow for another impression deeply
fixed in his mind—that the salvation of the army was hopeless without the
consent of Tissaphernes, and therefore, since the latter had conducted them
thus far in safety, when he might have destroyed them before, that his designs
at the bottom could not be hostile.
Notwithstanding these two great mistakes—one on the
present occasion, one previously, at the battle of Cunaxa, in keeping the
Greeks on the right contrary to the order of Cyrus—both committed by Clearchus,
the loss of that officer was doubtless a great misfortune to the army ; while,
on the contrary, the removal of Menon was a signal benefit—perhaps a condition
of ultimate safety. A man so treacherous and unprincipled as Xenophon depicts
Menon would probably have ended by really committing towards the army that
treason for which he falsely took credit at the Persian court in reference to
the seizure of the generals.
The impression entertained by Clearchus, respecting
the hopeless position of the Greeks in the heart of the Persian territory after
the death of Cyrus, was perfectly natural in a military man who could
appreciate all the means of attack and obstruction which the enemy had it in
their power to employ. Nothing is so unaccountable in this expedition as the
manner in which such means were thrown away—the spectacle of Persian impotence.
First, the whole line of upward march, including the passage of the Euphrates,
left undefended; next, the long trench dug across the frontier of Babylonia,
with only a passage of twenty feet wide left near the Euphrates, abandoned
without a guard; lastly, the line of the Wall of Media and the canals which
offered such favourable positions for keeping the Greeks out of the cultivated
territory of Babylonia, neglected in like manner, and a convention concluded,
whereby the Persians engaged to escort the invaders safe to the Ionian coast,
beginning by conducting them through the heart of Babylonia, amidst canals
affording inexpugnable defences if the Greeks had chosen to take up a position
among them. The plan of Tissaphernes, as far as we can understand it, seems to
have been to draw the Greeks to some considerable distance from the heart of
the Persian empire, and then to open his schemes of treasonable hostility,
which the imprudence of Clearchus enabled him to do, on the banks of the Great
Zab, with chances of success such as he could hardly have contemplated. We have
here a fresh example of the wonderful impotence of the Persians. We should have
expected that, after having committed so flagrant an act of perfidy,
Tissaphernes would at least have tried to turn it to account; that he would
have poured with all his forces and all his vigour on the Grecian camp, at the
moment when it was unprepared, disorganized, and without commanders. Instead of
which, when the generals (with those who accompanied them to the Persian camp)
had been seized or slain, no attack whatever was made except by small
detachments of Persian cavalry upon individual Greek stragglers in the plain.
One of the companions of the generals, an Arcadian named Nikarchus,
ran wounded into the Grecian camp, where the soldiers were looking from afar at
the horsemen scouring the plain without knowing what they were
about,—exclaiming that the Persians were massacring all the Greeks, officers as
well as soldiers. Immediately the Greek soldiers hastened to put themselves in
defence, expecting a general attack to be made upon their camp; but no more
Persians came near than a body of about 300 horse, under Ariaeus and
Mithridates (the confidential companions of the deceased Cyrus), accompanied by
the brother of Tissaphernes. These men, approaching the Greek lines as friends,
called for the Greek officers to come forth, as they had a message to deliver
from the King. Accordingly, Kleanor and Sophaenetus
with an adequate guard came to the front, accompanied by Xenophon, who was
anxious to hear news about Proxenus. Ariaeus then acquainted them that
Clearchus, having been detected in a breach of the convention to which he had
sworn, had been put to death; that Proxenus and Menon, who had divulged his
treason, were in high honour at the Persian quarters. He concluded by
saying—“The King calls upon you to surrender your aims, which now (he says)
belong to him, since they formerly belonged to his slave Cyrus’’.
The step here taken seems to testify a belief on the
part of these Persians, that the generals being now in their power, the Grecian
soldiers had become defenceless, and might be required to surrender their arms,
even to men who had just been guilty of the most deadly fraud and injury
towards them. If Ariaeus entertained such an expectation, he was at once
undeceived by the language of Kleanor and Xenophon,
which breathed nothing but indignant reproach; so that he soon retired and left
the Greeks to their own reflections.
While their camp thus remained unmolested, every man
within it was a prey to the most agonizing apprehensions. Ruin appeared
impending and inevitable, though no one could tell in what precise form it
would come. The Greeks were in the midst of a hostile country, ten thousand
stadia from home, surrounded by enemies, blocked up by impassable mountains and
rivers, without guides, without provisions, without cavalry, to aid their
retreat, without generals to give orders. A stupor of sorrow and conscious helplessness
seized upon all. Few came to the evening muster ; few lighted fires to cook
their suppers ; every man lay down to rest where he was ; yet no man could
sleep, for fear, anguish, and yearning after relatives whom he was never again
to behold.
Amidst the many causes of despondency which weighed
down this forlorn army, there was none more serious than the fact that not a
single man among them had now either authority to command or obligation to take
the initiative. Nor was any ambitious candidate likely to volunteer his
pretensions, at a moment when the post promised nothing but the maximum of
difficulty as well as of hazard. A new, self-kindled light—and self-originated
stimulus—was required, to vivify the embers of suspended hope and action, in a
mass paralyzed for the moment, but every way capable of effort. And the
inspiration now fell, happily for the army, upon one in whom a full measure of
soldierly strength and courage was combined with the education of an Athenian,
a democrat, and a philosopher.
It is in true Homeric vein, and in something like
Homeric language, that Xenophon (to whom we owe the whole narrative of the
expedition) describes his dream, or intervention of Oneirus,
sent by Zeus, from which this renovating impulse took its rise. Lying mournful
and restless like his comrades, he caught a short repose ; when he dreamt that
he heard thunder, and saw the burning thunderbolt fall upon his paternal house,
which became forthwith encircled by flames. Awaking, full of terror, he
instantly sprang up upon which the dream began to fit on and blend itself with
his waking thoughts, and with the cruel realities of his position. His pious
and excited fancy generated a series of shadowy analogies. The dream was sent
by Zeus the King, since it was from him that thunder and lightning proceeded.
In one respect the sign was auspicious—that a great light had appeared to him
from Zeus in the midst of peril and suffering. But on the other hand it was
alarming, that the house had appeared to be completely encircled by flames,
preventing all egress, because this seemed to indicate that he would remain
confined where he was in the Persian dominions, without being able to overcome
the difficulties which hedged him in. Yet doubtful as the promise was, it was
still the message of Zeus addressed to himself, serving as a stimulus to him to
break through the common stupor and take the initiative movement. “Why am I
lying here? Night is advancing ; at daybreak the enemy will be on us, and we
shall be put to death with tortures. Not a man is stirring to take measures of
defence. Why do I wait for any man older than myself, or for any man of a
different city, to begin?”
With these reflections, interesting in themselves and
given with Homeric vivacity, he instantly went to convene the lochagi or captains who had served under his late friend
Proxenus. He impressed upon them emphatically the necessity of standing forward
to put the army in a posture of defence. “I cannot sleep, gentlemen; neither, I
presume, can you, under our present perils. The enemy will be upon us at
daybreak—prepared to kill us all with tortures, as his worst enemies. For my
part, I rejoice that his flagitious perjury has put an end to a truce by which
we were the great losers—a truce under which we, mindful of our oaths, have
passed through all the rich possessions of the King, without touching anything
except what we could purchase with our own scanty means. Now, we have our hands
free; all these rich spoils stand between us and him, as prizes for the better
man. The gods, who preside over the match, will assuredly be on the side of us,
who have kept our oaths in spite of strong temptations, against these
perjurers. Moreover, our bodies are more enduring and our spirit more gallant
than theirs. They are easier to wound and easier to kill than we are, under the
same favour of the gods as we experienced at Cunaxa”.
“Probably others also are feeling just as we feel. But
let us not wait for any one else to come as monitors to us : let us take the
lead, and communicate the stimulus of honour to others. Do you show yourselves
now the best among the lochages—more worthy of being
generals than the generals themselves. Begin at once, and I desire only to
follow you. But if you order me into the front rank, I shall obey without
pleading my youth as an excuse—accounting myself to be of complete maturity,
when the purpose is to save myself from ruin.”
All the captains who heard Xenophon cordially
concurred in his suggestion, and desired him to take the lead in executing it.
One captain alone (Apollonides), speaking in the
Boeotian dialect, protested against it as insane; enlarging upon their
desperate position, and insisting upon submission to the King as the only
chance of safety. “How? (replied Xenophon). Have you forgotten the courteous
treatment which we received from the Persians in Babylonia when we replied to
the demand for the surrender of our arms by showing a bold front? Do not you
see the miserable fate which has befallen Clearchus when he trusted himself
unarmed in their hands, in reliance on their oaths? And yet you scout our
exhortations to resistance, again advising us to go and plead for indulgence!
My friends, such a Greek as this man disgraces not only his own city, but all
Greece besides. Let us banish him from our counsels, cashier him, and make a
slave of him to carry baggage.” “Nay (observed Agasias of Stymphalus), the man has nothing to do with Greece
: I myself have seen his ears bored like a true Lydian.” Apollonides was degraded accordingly.
Xenophon with the rest then distributed themselves, in
order to bring together the chief remaining officers in the army, who were
presently convened, to the number of about one hundred. The senior captain of
the earlier body next desired Xenophon to repeat to this larger body the topics
upon which he had just before been insisting. Xenophon obeyed, enlarging yet
more emphatically on the situation, perilous, yet not without hope—on the
proper measures to be taken—and especially on the necessity that they, the
chief officers remaining, should put themselves forward prominently, first fix
upon effective commanders, then afterwards submit the names to be confirmed by
the army, accompanied with suitable exhortations and encouragement. His speech
was applauded and welcomed, especially by the Lacedaemonian general
Cheirisophus, who had joined Cyrus with a body of 700 hoplites at Issus in
Cilicia. Cheirisophus urged the captains to retire forthwith, and agree upon
their commanders instead of the four who had been seized; after which the
herald must be summoned, and the entire body of soldiers convened without
delay. Accordingly, Timasion of Dardanus was chosen
instead of Clearchus ; Xanthikles in place of
Socrates; Eleanor in place of Agias; Philesius in place of Menon; and Xenophon instead of
Proxenus. The captains, who had served under each of the departed generals,
separately chose a successor to the captain thus promoted. It is to be
recollected that the five now chosen were not the only generals in the camp ;
thus, for example, Cheirisophus had the command of his own separate division,
and there may have been one or two others similarly placed. But it was now
necessary for all the generals to form a Board and act in concert.
At daybreak the newly-constituted Board of generals
placed proper outposts in advance, and then convened the army in general
assembly, in order that the new appointments might be submitted and confirmed.
As soon as this had been done, probably on the proposition of Cheirisophus (who
had been in command before), that general addressed a few words of exhortation
and encouragement to the soldiers. He was followed by Eleanor, who delivered,
with the like brevity, an earnest protest against the perfidy of Tissaphernes and Ariaeus. Both
of them left to Xenophon the task, alike important and arduous at this moment
of despondency, of setting forth the case at length,—working up the feelings of
the soldiers to that pitch of resolution which the emergency required,—and
above all extinguishing all those inclinations to acquiesce in new treacherous
proposals from the enemy, which the perils of the situation would be likely to
suggest.
Xenophon had equipped himself in his finest military
costume e at this his first official appearance before the army, when the
scales seemed to tremble between life and death. Taking up the protest of Kleanor against the treachery of the Persians, he insisted
that any attempt to enter into convention or trust with such liars would be
utter ruin; but that if energetic resolution were taken to deal with them only
at the point of the sword, and punish their misdeeds, there was good hope of
the favour of the gods and of ultimate preservation. As he pronounced this last
word, one of the soldiers near him happened to sneeze. Immediately the whole
army around shouted with one accord the accustomed invocation to Zeus the
Preserver; and Xenophon, taking up the accident, continued—“Since, gentlemen,
this omen from Zeus the Preserver has appeared at the instant when we were
talking about preservation, let us here vow to offer the preserving sacrifice
to that god, and at the same time to sacrifice to the remaining gods, as well
as we can, in the first friendly country which we may reach. Let every man who
agrees with me hold up his hand.” All held up their hands; all then joined in
the vow and shouted the paean.
This accident, so dexterously turned to profit by the
rhetorical skill of Xenophon, was eminently beneficial in raising the army out
of the depression which weighed them down, and in disposing them to listen to
his animating appeal. Repeating his assurances that the gods were on their side
and hostile to their perjured enemy, he recalled to their memory the great
invasions of Greece by Darius and Xerxes,—how the vast hosts of Persia had been
disgracefully repelled. The army had shown themselves on the field of Cunaxa
worthy of such forefathers; and they would for the future be yet bolder,
knowing by that battle of what stuff the Persians were made. As for Ariaeus and
his troops, alike traitors and cowards, their desertion was rather a gain than
a loss. The enemy were superior in horsemen; but men on horseback were after
all only men, half occupied in the fear of losing their seats—incapable of
prevailing against infantry firm on the ground—and only better able to run
away. Now that the satrap refused to furnish them with provisions to buy, they
on their side were released from their covenant, and would take provisions
without buying. Then as to the rivers: those were indeed difficult to be
crossed in the middle of their course; but the army would march up to their
sources, and could then pass them without wetting the knee. Or, indeed, the
Greeks might renounce the idea of retreat, and establish themselves permanently
in the King’s own country, defying all his force, like the Myaians and Pisidians. “If (said Xenophon) we plant ourselves here at our ease in a
rich country, with these tall, stately, and beautiful Median and Persian women
for our companions, we shall be only too ready, like the Lotophagi,
to forget our way home. We ought first to go back to Greece, and tell our
countrymen that if they remain poor it is their own fault, when there are rich
settlements in this country awaiting all who choose to come, and who have
courage to seize them. Let us burn our baggage waggons and tents, and carry
with us nothing but what is of the strictest necessity. Above all things, let
us maintain order, discipline, and obedience to the commanders, upon which our
entire hope of safety depends. Let every man promise to lend his hand to the
commanders in punishing any disobedient individuals; and let us thus show the
enemy that we have ten thousand persons like Clearchus, instead of that one
whom they have so perfidiously seized. Now is the time for action. If any man,
however obscure, has anything better to suggest, let him come forward and state
it; for we have all but one object — the common safety.”
It appears that no one else desired to say a word, and
that the speech of Xenophon gave unqualified satisfaction ; for when
Cheirisophus put the question, that the meeting should sanction his
recommendations, and finally elect the new generals proposed, every man held up
his hand. Xenophon then moved that the army should break up immediately, and
march to some well-stored villages, rather more than two miles distant; that
the march should be in a hollow oblong, with the baggage in the centre; that
Cheirisophus, as a Lacedaemonian, should lead the van, while Kleanor and the other senior officers would command on each
flank, and himself with Timasion, as the two youngest
of the generals, would lead the rear guard.
This proposition was at once adopted, and the assembly
broke up; proceeding forthwith to destroy, or distribute among one another,
every man’s superfluous baggage, and then to take their morning meal previous
to the march.
The scene just described is interesting and
illustrative in more than one point of view. It exhibits that susceptibility to
the influence of persuasive discourse which formed so marked a feature in the
Grecian character—a resurrection of the collective body out of the depth of
despair, under the exhortation of one who had no established ascendency, nor
anything to recommend him, except his intelligence, his oratorical power, and
his community of interest with themselves. Next, it manifests, still more
strikingly, the superiority of Athenian training as compared with that of other
parts of Greece. Cheirisophus had not only been before in office as one of the
generals, but was also a native of Sparta, whose supremacy and name was at that
moment all-powerful: Eleanor had been before, not indeed a general, but a lochage, or one in the second rank of officers:—he was an
elderly man, and he was an Arcadian, while more than the numerical half of the
army consisted of Arcadians and Achaeans. Either of these two, therefore, and
various others besides, enjoyed a sort of prerogative, or established
starting-point, for taking the initiative in reference to the dispirited army.
But Xenophon was comparatively a young man, with little military experience:—he
was not an officer at all, either in the first or second grade, but simply a
volunteer, companion of Proxenus; he was moreover a native of Athens, a city at
that time unpopular among the great body of Greeks, and especially of
Peloponnesians, with whom her recent long war had been carried on. Not only
therefore he had no advantages compared with others, but he was under positive
disadvantages. He had nothing to start with except his personal qualities and
previous training; in spite of which we find him not merely the prime mover,
but also the ascendant person for whom the others make way. In him are
exemplified those peculiarities of Athens, attested not less by the
denunciation of her enemies than by the panegyric of her own citizens:
spontaneous and forward impulse, as well in conception as in
execution—confidence under circumstances which made others despair—persuasive
discourse and publicity of discussion, made subservient to practical business,
so as at once to appeal to the intelligence and stimulate the active zeal of
the multitude. Such peculiarities stood out more remarkably from being
contrasted with the opposite qualities in Spartans—mistrust in conception,
slackness in execution, secrecy in counsel, silent and passive obedience.
Though Spartans and Athenians formed the two extremities of the scale, other
Greeks stood nearer on this point to the former than to the latter.
If, even in that encouraging autumn which followed
immediately upon the great Athenian catastrophe before Syracuse, the inertia of
Sparta could not be stirred into vigorous action without the vehemence of the
Athenian Alcibiades, much more was it necessary, under the depressing
circumstances which now overclouded the unofficered
Grecian army, that an Athenian bosom should be found as the source of new life
and impulse. Nor would any one, probably, except an Athenian, either have felt
or obeyed the promptings to stand forward as a volunteer at that moment, when
there was every motive to decline responsibility, and no special duty to impel
him. But if by chance a Spartan or an Arcadian had been found thus forward, he
would have been destitute of such talents as would enable him to work on the
minds of others—of that flexibility, resource, familiarity with the temper and
movements of an assembled crowd, power of enforcing the essential views and
touching the opportune chords, which Athenian democratical training imparted.
Even Brasidas and Gylippus, individual Spartans of
splendid merit, and equal or superior to Xenophon in military resource, would
not have combined with it that political and rhetorical accomplishment which
the position of the latter demanded. Obvious as the wisdom of his propositions
appears, each of them is left to him not only to initiate, but to enforce :
Cheirisophus and Eleanor, after a few words of introduction, consign to him the
duty of working up the minds of the army to the proper pitch.
How well he performed this may be seen by his speech
to the army, which bears in its general tenor a remarkable resemblance to that
of Pericles addressed to the Athenian public in the second year of the war, at
the moment when the miseries of the epidemic, combined with those of invasion,
had driven them almost to despair. It breathes a strain of exaggerated
confidence and an undervaluing of real dangers highly suitable for the
occasion, but which neither Pericles nor Xenophon would have employed at any
other moment. Throughout the whole of his speech, and especially in regard to
the accidental sneeze near at hand which interrupted the beginning of it,
Xenophon displayed that skill and practice in dealing with a numerous audience
and a given situation which characterized more or less every educated Athenian.
Other Greeks, Lacedaemonians or Arcadians, could act with bravery and in
concert; but the Athenian Xenophon was among the few who could think, speak,
and act with equal efficiency. It was this tripartite accomplishment which an
aspiring youth was compelled to set before himself as an aim in the democracy
of Athens, and which the Sophists as well as the democratical institutions—both
of them so hardly depreciated by most critics—helped and encouraged him to
acquire. It was this tripartite accomplishment, the exclusive possession, of
which, in spite of constant jealousy on the part of Boeotian officers and
comrades of Proxenus, elevated Xenophon into the most ascendant person of the
Cyreian army, from the present moment until the time when it broke up, as will
be seen in the subsequent history.
I think it the more necessary to notice this fact,
that the accomplishments whereby Xenophon leaped on a sudden into such
extraordinary ascendency, and rendered such eminent service to his army, were
accomplishments belonging in an especial manner to the Athenian democracy and
education, because Xenophon himself has throughout his writings treated Athens
not merely without the attachment of a citizen, but with feelings more like the
positive antipathy of an exile. His sympathies are all in favour of the perpetual
drill, the mechanical obedience, the secret government proceedings, the narrow
and prescribed range of ideas, the silent and deferential demeanour, the
methodical, though tardy, action of Sparta. Whatever may be the justice of his
preference, certain it is that the qualities whereby he was himself enabled to
contribute so much, both to the rescue of the Cyreian army and to his own
reputation, were Athenian far more than Spartan.
While the Grecian army, after sanctioning the
propositions of Xenophon, were taking their morning meal before they commenced
their march, Mithridates, one of the Persians previously attached to Cyrus,
appeared with a few horsemen on a mission of pretended friendship. But it was
soon found out that his purposes were treacherous, and that he came merely to
seduce individual soldiers to desertion, with a few of whom he succeeded.
Accordingly, the resolution was taken to admit no more heralds or envoys.
Disembarrassed of superfluous baggage and refreshed,
the army now crossed the Great Zab River, and pursued their march on other
side, having their baggage and attendants in the centre, and Cheirisophus
leading the van with a select body of 300 hoplites. As no mention is made of a
bridge, we are to presume that they borded the river,
which furnishes a ford (according to Mr. Ainsworth) stall commonly used, at a
place between thirty and forty miles from its junction with the Tigris. When
they had got a little way forward, Mithridates again appeared with a few
hundred cavalry and bowmen. He approached them like a friend, but, as soon as
he was near enough, suddenly began to harass the rear with a shower of
missiles. What surprises us most is that the Persians, with their very numerous
force, made 10 attempt to hinder them from crossing so very considerable a
river, for Xenophon estimates the Zab at 400 feet broad, and this seems below
the statement of modern travellers, who inform us hat it contains not much less
water than the Tigris, and though usually deeper and narrower, cannot be much
narrower at any affordable place. It is to be recollected that the Persians,
habitually marching in advance of the Greeks, must have reached the river
first, and were therefore in possession of the crossing, whether bridge or
ford. Though on the watch for every opportunity of perfidy, Tissaphernes did
not dare to resist the Greeks, even in he most advantageous position, and
ventured only upon sending Mithridates to harass the rear, which he executed
with considerable effect. The bowmen and darters of the Greeks, few in number,
were at the same time inferior to those of the Persians, and when Xenophon
employed his rear-guard, hoplites and pelstasts, to
charge and repel them, he not only could never overtake any one, but suffered
much in getting back to rejoin his own main body. Even when retiring, the
Persian horseman could discharge his arrow or cast his javelin behind him with
effect—dexterity which the Parthians exhibited afterwards still more signally,
and which the Persian horsemen of the present day parallel with their carbines.
This was the first experience which the Greeks had of marching under the
harassing attack of cavalry. Even the small detachment of Mithridates greatly
delayed their progress, so that they accomplished little more than two miles,
reaching the villages in the evening, with many wounded and much
discouragement.
“Thank heaven (said Xenophon in the evening, when
Cheirisophus reproached him for imprudence in quitting the main body to charge
cavalry whom yet he could not reach)—thank heaven that our enemies attacked us
with a small detachment only, and not with their great numbers. They have given
us a valuable lesson without doing us any serious harm.” Profiting by the
lesson, the Greek leaders organized during the night and during the halt of the
next day a small body of fifty cavalry, with 200 Rhodian slingers, whose
slings, furnished with leaden bullets, both carried farther and struck harder
than those of the Persians hurling large stones. On the ensuing morning they
started before daybreak, since there lay in their way a ravine difficult to
pass. They found the ravine undefended (according to the usual stupidity of
Persian proceedings), but when they had got nearly a mile beyond it,
Mithridates reappeared in pursuit with a body of 4000 horsemen and darters.
Confident from his achievement of the preceding day, he had promised, with a
body of that force, to deliver the Greeks into the hands of the satrap. But the
latter were now better prepared. As soon as he began to attack them, the
trumpet sounded, and forthwith the horsemen, slingers, and darters issued forth
to charge the Persians, sustained by the hoplites in the rear. So effective was
the charge that the Persians fled in dismay, notwithstanding their superiority
in number; while the ravine so impeded their flight that many of them were
slain and eighteen prisoners made. The Greek soldiers of their own accord
mutilated the dead bodies, in order to strike terror into the enemy. At the end
of the day’s march they reached the Tigris, near the deserted city of Larissa,
the vast, massive, and lofty brick walls of which (25 feet in thickness, 100
feet high, seven miles in circumference) attested its former grandeur. Near
this place was a stone pyramid, 100 feet in breadth and 200 feet high, the
summit of which was crowded with fugitives out of the neighbouring villages.
Another day’s march up the course of the Tigris brought the army to a second
deserted city called Mespila, nearly opposite to the
modern city of Mosul. Although these two cities, which seem to have formed the
continuation of (or the substitute for) the once colossal Nineveh or Ninus,
were completely deserted, yet the country around them was so well furnished
with villages and population, that the Greeks not only obtained provisions, but
also strings for the making of new bows, and lead for bullets to be used by the
slingers.
During the next day’s march, in a course generally
parallel with the Tigris and ascending the stream, Tissaphernes, coming up
along with some other grandees and with a numerous army, enveloped the Greeks
both in flanks and rear. In spite of his advantage of numbers, he did not
venture upon any actual charge, but kept up a fire of arrows, darts, and
stones. He was however so well answered by the newly-trained archers and
slingers of the Greeks, that on the whole they had the advantage, in spite of
the superior size of the Persian bows, many of which were taken and effectively
employed on the Grecian side. Having passed the night in a well-stocked
village, they halted there the next day in order to stock themselves with
provisions, and then pursued their march for four successive days along a level
country, until on the fifth day they reached hilly ground with the prospect of
still higher hills beyond. All this march was made under unremitting annoyance
from the enemy, insomuch that though the order of the Greeks was never broken,
a considerable number of their men were wounded. Experience taught them that it
was inconvenient for the whole army to march in one inflexible, undivided,
hollow square, and they accordingly constituted six lochi or regiments of 100 men each, subdivided into companies of 50, and enomoties or smaller companies of 25, each with a
special officer (conformably to the Spartan practice) to move separately on
each flank, and either to fall back or fall in as might suit the fluctuations
of the central mass, arising from impediments in the road or menaces of the
enemy. On reaching the hills, in sight of an elevated citadel or palace with
several villages around it, the Greeks anticipated some remission of the
Persian attack. But after having passed over one hill, they were proceeding to
ascend the second, when they found themselves assailed with unwonted vigour by
the Persian cavalry from the summit of it, whose leaders were seen flogging on
the men to the attack. This charge was so efficacious, that the Greek light
troops were driven in with loss and forced to take shelter within the ranks of
the hoplites. After a march both slow and full of suffering, they could only
reach their night-quarters by sending a detachment to get possession of some ground
above the Persians, who thus became afraid of a double attack.
The villages which they now reached (supposed by Mr.
Comfortable Ainsworth to have been in the fertile country under the
Greeks modern town called Zakhu) were unusually
rich in provisions; magazines of flour, barley, and wine having been collected
there for the Persian satrap. They reposed here three days, chiefly in order to
tend the numerous wounded, for whose necessities eight of the most competent persons
were singled out to act as surgeons. On the fourth day they resumed their
march, descending into the plain. But experience had now satisfied them that it
was imprudent to continue in march under the attack of cavalry ; so that when
Tissaphernes appeared and began to harass them, they halted at the first
village, and, when thus in station, easily repelled him. As the afternoon
advanced, the Persian assailants began to retire; for they were always in the
habit of taking up their night-post at a distance of near seven miles from the
Grecian position, being very apprehensive of nocturnal attack in their camp,
when their horses were tied by the leg, and without either saddle or bridle. As
soon as they had departed, the Greeks resumed their march, and made so much
advance during the night, that the Persians did not overtake them either on the
next day or the day after.
On the ensuing day, however, the Persians, having made
a forced march by night, were seen not only in advance of the Greeks, but in
occupation of a spur of high and precipitous ground overhanging immediately the
road whereby the Greeks were to descend into the plain. When Cheirisophus
approached he at once saw that descent was impracticable in the face of an
enemy thus posted. He therefore halted, sent for Xenophon from the rear, and
desired him to bring forward the peltasts to the van. But Xenophon, though he
obeyed the summons in person and galloped his horse to the front, did not think
it prudent to move the peltasts from the rear, because he saw Tissaphernes,
with another portion of the army, just coming up ; so that the Grecian army was
at once impeded in front and threatened by the enemy closing upon them behind.
The Persians on the high ground in front could not be directly assailed. But
Xenophon observed that, on the right of the Grecian army, there was an
accessible mountain summit yet higher, from whence a descent might be made for
a flank attack upon the Persian position. Pointing out this summit to
Cheirisophus, as affording the only means of dislodging the troops in front, he
urged that one of them should immediately hasten with a detachment to take
possession of it, and offered to Cheirisophus the choice either of going or
staying with the army. “Choose for yourself,” said Cheirisophus. “Well, then
(said Xenophon), I will go, since I am the younger of the two.” Accordingly, at
the head of a select detachment from the van and centre of the army, he
immediately commenced his flank march up the steep ascent to this highest
summit. So soon as the enemy saw their purpose, they also detached troops on
their side, hoping to get to the summit first; and the two detachments were
seen mounting at the same time, each struggling with the utmost efforts to get
before the other—each being encouraged by shouts and clamour from the two
armies respectively.
As Xenophon was riding by the side of his soldiers,
cheering them on, and reminding them that their chance of seeing their country
and their families all depended upon success in the effort before them, a Sicyonian hoplite in the ranks, named Soteridas,
said to him— “ You and I are not on an equal footing, Xenophon. You are on
horseback : I am painfully struggling up on foot, with my shield to carry.”
Stung with this taunt, Xenophon sprang from his horse, pushed Soteridas out of his place in the ranks, took his shield as
well as his place, and began to march forward afoot along with the rest. Though
thus weighed down at once by the shield belonging to an hoplite and by the
heavy cuirass of a horseman (who carried no shield), he nevertheless put forth
all his strength to advance under such double incumbrance, and to continue his
incitement to the rest. But the soldiers around him were so indignant at the
proceeding of Soteridas, that they reproached and
even struck him, until they compelled him to resume his shield as well as his
place in the ranks. Xenophon then remounted, and ascended the hill on horseback
as far as the ground permitted, but was obliged again to dismount presently, in
consequence of the steepness of the uppermost portion. Such energetic efforts
enabled him and his detachment to reach the summit first. As soon as the enemy
saw this, they desisted from their ascent, and dispersed in all directions,
leaving the forward march open to the main Grecian army, which Cheirisophus
accordingly conducted safely down into the plain. Here he was rejoined by
Xenophon on descending from the summit. All found themselves in comfortable
quarters amidst several well-stocked villages on the banks of the Tigris. They
acquired, moreover, an additional booty of large droves of cattle, intercepted
when on the point of being transported across the river, where a considerable
body of horse were seen assembled on the opposite bank.
Though here disturbed only by some desultory attacks
on the part of the Persians, who burnt several of the villages which lay in
their forward line of march, the Greeks became seriously embarrassed whither to
direct their steps; for on their left flank was the Tigris, so deep that their
spears found no bottom, and on their right mountains of exceeding height. As
the generals and the lochages were taking counsel, a
Rhodian soldier came to them with a proposition for transporting the whole army
across to the other bank of the river by means of inflated skins, which could
be furnished in abundance by the animals in their possession. But this
ingenious scheme, in itself feasible, was put out of the question by the view
of the Persian cavalry on the opposite bank ; and as the villages in their
front had been burnt, the army had no choice except to return back one day’s
march to those in which they had before halted. Here the generals again
deliberated, questioning all their prisoners as to the different bearings of
the country. The road from the south was that in which they had already
inarched from Babylon and Media ; that to the westward, going to Lydia and
Ionia, was barred to them by the interposing Tigris ; eastward (they were
informed) was the way to Ecbatana and Susa ; northward lay the rugged and
inhospitable mountains of the Karduchians— fierce
freemen who despised the Great King, and defied all his efforts to conquer
them, having once destroyed a Persian invading army of 120,000 men. On the
other side of Karduchia, however, lay the rich
Persian satrapy of Armenia, wherein both the Euphrates and the Tigris could be
crossed near their sources, and from whence they could choose their farther
course easily towards Greece. Like Mysia, Pisidia, and other mountainous regions, Karduchia was a free territory, surrounded on all
sides by the dominions of the Great King, who reigned only in the cities and on
the plains.
Determining to fight their way across these difficult
mountains into Armenia, but refraining from any public e announcement, for fear
that the passes should be occupied beforehand, the generals sacrificed
forthwith, in order that they might be ready for breaking up at a moment’s
notice. They then began their march a little after midnight, so that soon after
daybreak they reached the first of the Karduchian mountain-passes, which they found undefended. Cheirisophus, with his front
division and all the light troops, made haste to ascend the pass, and having
got over the first mountain, descended on the other side to some villages in
the valley or nooks beneath; while Xenophon, with the heavy-armed and the
baggage, followed at a slower pace, not reaching the villages until dark, as
the road was both steep and narrow. The Karduchians,
taken completely by surprise, abandoned the villages as the Greeks approached,
and took refuge on the mountains, leaving to the intruders plenty of
provisions, comfortable houses, and especially abundance of copper vessels. At
first the Greeks were careful to do no damage, trying to invite the natives to
amicable colloquy. But none of the latter would come near, and at length
necessity drove the Greeks to take what was necessary for refreshment. It was
just when Xenophon and the rear-guard were coming in at night that some few Karduchians first set upon them, by surprise and with
considerable success, so that if their numbers had been greater, serious
mischief might have ensued
Many fires were discovered burning on the mountains—an
earnest of resistance during the next day—which satisfied the Greek generals
that they must lighten the army, in order to ensure greater expedition as well
as a fuller complement of available hands during the coming march. They
therefore gave orders to bum all the baggage except what was indispensable, and
dismiss all the prisoners, planting themselves in a narrow strait, through
which the army had to pass, in order to see that their directions were executed.
The women, however, of whom there were many with the army, could not be
abandoned ; and it seems further that a considerable stock of baggage was still
retained ; nor could the army make more than slow advance, from the narrowness
of the road and the harassing attack of the Karduchians,
who were now assembled in considerable numbers. Their attack was renewed with
double vigour on the ensuing day, when the Greeks were forced, from want of
provisions, to hasten forward their march, though in the midst of a terrible
snowstorm. Both Cheirisophus in the front and Xenophon in the rear were hard
pressed by the Karduchian slingers and bowmen; the
latter, men of consummate skill, having bows three cubits in length, and arrows
of more than two cubits, so Strong that the Greeks when they took them could
dart them as javelins. These archers, amidst the rugged ground and narrow
paths, approached so near and drew the bow with such surprising force, resting
one extremity of it on the ground, that several Greek warriors were mortally
wounded even through both shield and corslet into the reins, and through the
brazen helmet into their heads; among them especially two distinguished men, a
Lacedaemonian named Cleonymus and an Arcadian named Basias.
The rear division, more roughly handled than the rest, was obliged continually
to halt to repel the enemy, under all the difficulties of the ground, which
made it scarcely possible to act against nimble mountaineers. On one occasion,
however, a body of these latter was entrapped into an ambush, driven back with
loss, and (what was still more fortunate) two of their number were made
prisoners.
Thus impeded, Xenophon sent frequent messages
entreating Cheirisophus to slacken the march of the van division; but instead
of obeying, Cheirisophus only hastened the faster, urging Xenophon to follow
him. The march of the army became little better than a rout, so that the
rear division reached the halting-place in extreme confusion; upon which
Xenophon proceeded to remonstrate with Cheirisophus for prematurely hurrying
forward and neglecting his comrades behind. But the other, pointing out to his attention
the hill before them, and the steep path ascending it, forming their future
line of march, which was beset with numerous Karduchians,
defended himself by saying that he had hastened forward in hopes of being able
to reach this pass before the enemy, in which attempt, however, he had not
succeeded.
To advance farther on this road appeared hopeless, yet
the guides declared that no other could be taken. Xenophon then bethought him
of the two prisoners whom he had just captured, and proposed that these two
should be questioned also. They were accordingly interrogated apart; and the
first of them, having persisted in denying, notwithstanding all menaces,
that there was any road except that before them, was put to death under the
eyes of the second prisoner. This latter, on being then questioned, gave more
comfortable intelligence ; saying that he knew of a different road, more
circuitous, but easier and practicable even for beasts of burden, whereby the
pass before them and the occupying enemy might be turned, but that there was
one particular high position commanding the road, which it was necessary to
master beforehand by surprise, as the Karduchians were already on guard there. Two thousand Greeks, having the guide bound along
with them, were accordingly despatched late in the afternoon, to surprise this
post by a nightmarch ; while Xenophon, in order to
distract the attention of the Karduchians in front,
made a feint of advancing as if about to force the direct pass. As soon as he
was seen crossing the ravine which led to this mountain, the Karduchians on the top immediately began to roll down vast
masses of rock, which bounded and dashed down the roadway in such a manner as
to render it unapproachable. They continued to do this all night, and the
Greeks heard the noise of the descending masses long after they had returned to
their camp for supper and rest.
Meanwhile the detachment of 2000, marching by the
circuitous road, and reaching in the night the elevated position (though there
was another above yet more commanding) held by the Karduchians,
surprised and dispersed them, passing the night by their fires. At daybreak,
and under favour of a mist, they stole silently towards the position occupied
by the other Karduchians in front of the main Grecian
army. On coming near they suddenly sounded their trumpets, shouted aloud, and
commenced the attack, which proved completely successful. The defenders, taken
unprepared, fled with little resistance, and scarcely any loss, from their
activity and knowledge of the country; while Cheirisophus and the main Grecian
force, on hearing the trumpet, which had been previously concerted as the
signal, rushed forward and stormed the height in front—some along the regular
path, others climbing up as they could and pulling each other up by means of
their spears. The two bodies of Greeks thus joined each other on the summit, so
that the road became open for farther advance.
Xenophon, however, with the rear-guard, marched on the
circuitous road taken by the 2000, as the most practicable for the baggage
animals, whom he placed in the centre of his division, the whole array covering
a great length of ground, since the road was very narrow. During this interval
the dispersed Karduchians had rallied, and
re-occupied two or three high peaks commanding the road, from whence it was
necessary to drive them. Xenophon’s troops stormed successively these three
positions, the Karduchians not daring to affront
close combat, yet making destructive use of their missiles. A Grecian guard was
left on the hindermost of the three peaks, until all the baggage tram should
have passed by. But the Karduchians, by a sudden and
well-timed movement, contrived to surprise this guard, slew two out of the
three leaders with several soldiers, and forced the rest to jump down the crags
as they could, in order to join their comrades in the road. Encouraged by such
success, the assailants pressed nearer to the marching army, occupying a crag
over against that lofty summit on which Xenophon was posted. As it was within
speaking distance, he endeavoured to open a negotiation with them in order to
get back the dead bodies of the slain. To this demand the Karduchians at first acceded, on condition that their villages should not be burned; but
finding their numbers every moment increasing, they resumed the offensive. When
Xenophon with the army had begun his descent from the last summit, they hurried
onwards in crowds to occupy it, beginning again to roll down masses of rock,
and renew their fire of missiles upon the Greeks. Xenophon himself was here in
some danger, having been deserted by his shield-bearer; but he was rescued by
an Arcadian hoplite named Eurylochus, who ran to give him the benefit of his
own shield as a protection for both in the retreat.
After a march thus painful and perilous, the rear
division at length found themselves in safety among their comrades, in villages
with well-stocked houses and abundance of corn and wine. So eager however were
Xenophon and Cheirisophus to obtain the bodies of the slain for burial, that
they consented to purchase them by surrendering the guide, and to march onward
without any guide: a heavy sacrifice in this unknown country, attesting their
great anxiety about the burial.
For three more days did they struggle and fight their
way through the narrow and rugged paths of the Karduchian mountains, beset throughout by these formidable bowmen and slingers, whom they
had to dislodge at every difficult turn, and against whom their own Cretan
bowmen were found inferior indeed, but still highly usefuL Their seven days’ march through this country, with its free and warlike
inhabitants, were days of the utmost fatigue, suffering, and peril; far more
intolerable than anything which they had experienced from Tissaphernes and the
Persians. Right glad were they once more to see a plain, and to find themselves
near the banks of the river Kentrites, which divided
these mountains from the hillocks and plains of Armenia—enjoying comfortable
quarters in villages, with the satisfaction of talking over past miseries.
Such were the apprehensions of Karduchian invasion, that the Armenian side of the Kentrites,
for a breadth of 15 miles, was unpeopled and destitute of villages. But the
approach of the Greeks having become known to Tiribazus,
satrap of Armenia, the banks of the river were lined with his cavalry and
infantry to oppose their passage—a precaution which if Tissaphernes had taken
at the Great Zab at the moment when he perfidiously seized Clearchus and his
colleagues, the Greeks would hardly have reached the northern bank of that
river. In the face of such obstacles, the Greeks nevertheless attempted the
passage of the Kentrites, seeing a regular road on
the other side. But the river was 200 feet in breadth (only half the breadth of
the Zab), above their breasts in depth, extremely rapid, and with a bottom full
of slippery stones ; insomuch that they could not hold their shields in the
proper position, from the force of the stream; while if they lifted the shields
above their heads, they were exposed defenceless to the arrows of the satrap’s
troops. After various trials, the passage was found impracticable, and they
were obliged to resume their encampment on the left hank. To their great alarm,
they saw the Karduchians assembling on the hills in
their rear, so that their situation, during this day and night, appeared nearly
desperate. In the night Xenophon had a dream —the first which he has told us
since his dream on the terrific night after the seizure of the generals—but on
this occasion of augury more unequivocally good. He dreamt that he was bound in
chains, but that his chains on a sudden dropt off
spontaneously; on the faith of which he told Cheirisophus at daybreak that he
had good hopes of preservation; and when the generals offered sacrifice, the
victims were at once favourable. As the army were taking their morning meal,
two young Greeks ran to Xenophon with the auspicious news that they had
accidentally found another ford near half-a-mile up the river, where the water
was not even up to their middle, and where the rocks came so close on the right
bank that the enemy’s horse could offer no opposition. Xenophon, starting from
his meal in delight, immediately offered libations to those gods who had
revealed both the dream to himself in the night, and the unexpected ford
afterwards to these youths—two revelations which he ascribed to the same gods.
Presently they marched in their usual order,
Cheirisophus commanding the van and Xenophon the rear, along the river to the
newly-discovered ford, the enemy marching parallel with them on the opposite
bank. Having reached the ford, halted, and grounded arms, Cheirisophus placed a
wreath on his head, took off his clothes, and then resumed his arms, ordering
all the rest to resume their arms also. Each lochus (company of 100 men) was then arranged in column or single file, with
Cheirisophus himself in the centre. Meanwhile the prophets were offering
sacrifice to the river. So soon as the signs were pronounced to be favourable,
all the soldiers shouted the paean, and all the women joined in chorus with
their feminine yell. Cheirisophus then, at the head of the army, entered the
river and began to ford it; while Xenophon, with a large portion of the rear
division, made a feint of hastening back to the original ford, as if he were
about to attempt the passage there. This distracted the attention of the
enemy’s horse, who became afraid of being attacked on both sides, galloped off
to guard the passage at the other point, and opposed no serious resistance to
Cheirisophus. As soon as the latter had reached the other side, and put his
division into order, he marched up to attack the Armenian infantry, who were on
the high banks a little way above ; but this infantry, deserted by its cavalry,
dispersed without awaiting his approach. The handful of Grecian cavalry,
attached to the division of Cheirisophus, pursued and took some valuable
spoils.
As soon as Xenophon saw his colleague successfully
established on the opposite bank, he brought back his detachment to the ford
over which the baggage and attendants were still passing, and proceeded to take
precautions against the Karduchians on his own side
who were assembling in the rear. He found some difficulty in keeping his rear
division together, for many of them, in spite of orders, quitted their ranks,
and went to look after their mistresses or their baggage in the crossing of the
water. The peltasts and bowmen, who had gone over with Cheirisophus, but whom
that general now no longer needed, were directed to hold themselves prepared on
both flanks of the army crossing, and to advance a little way into the water,
in the attitude of men just about to recross. When Xenophon was left with only
the diminished rear-guard, the rest having got over, the Karduchians rushed upon him, and began to shoot and sling. But on a sudden the Grecian
hoplites charged with their accustomed paean, upon which the Karduchians took to flight—having no arms for close combat
on the plain. The trumpet now being heard to sound, they ran away so much the
faster ; while this was the signal, according to orders before given by
Xenophon, for the Greeks to suspend their charge, to turn back, and to cross
the river as speedily as possible. By favour of this able manoeuvre, the
passage was accomplished by the whole army with little or no loss, about
midday.
They now found themselves in Armenia, a country of
even, undulating surface, but very high above the level of the sea, and
extremely cold at the season, when they entered it—December. Though the strip
of land bordering on Karduchia furnished no supplies,
one long march brought them through to a village, containing abundance of
provisions, together with a residence of the satrap Tiribazus;
after which, in two farther marches, they reached the river Teleboas,
with many villages on its banks. Here Tiribazus himself,
appearing with a division of cavalry, sent forward his interpreter to request a
conference with the leaders; which being held, it was agreed that the Greeks
should proceed unmolested through his territory, taking such supplies as they
required, but should neither burn nor damage the villages. They accordingly
advanced onward for three days, computed at fifteen parasangs, or three pretty
full days’ march; without any hostility from the satrap, though he was hovering
within less than two miles of them. They then found themselves amidst several
villages, wherein were regal or satrapical residences, with a plentiful stock of bread, meat, wine, and all sorts of
vegetables. Here, during their nightly bivouac, they were overtaken by so heavy
a fall of snow, that the generals on the next day distributed the troops into
separate quarters among the villages. No enemy appeared near, while the snow
seemed to forbid any rapid surprise. Yet at night the scouts reported that many
fires were discernible, together with traces of military movements around ;
insomuch that the generals thought it prudent to put themselves on their guard,
and again collected the army into one bivouac. Here in the night they were
overwhelmed by a second fall of snow, still heavier than the preceding,
sufficient to cover over the sleeping men and their arms, and to benumb the
cattle. The men however lay warm under the snow and were unwilling to rise,
until Xenophon himself set the example of rising, and employing himself without
his arms in cutting wood and kindling a fire. Others followed his example, and
great comfort was found in rubbing themselves with pork-fat, oil of almonds or
of sesame, or turpentine. Having sent out a clever scout named Democrates, who captured a native prisoner, they learned
that Tiribazus was laying plans to intercept them in
a lofty mountain pass lying farther on in their route; upon which they
immediately set forth, and by two days of forced march, surprising in their way
the camp of Tiribazus, got over the difficult pass in
safety. Three days of additional march brought them to the Euphrates river—that
is, to its eastern branch, now called Murad. They found a ford and crossed it,
without having the water higher than the navel; and they were informed that its
sources were not far off.
Their four days of march, next on the other side of
the Euphrates, were toilsome and distressing in the extreme; through a plain
covered with deep snow (in some places six feet deep), and at times in the face
of a north wind so intolerably chilling and piercing, that at length one of the
prophets urged the necessity of offering sacrifices to Boreas; upon which (says
Xenophon), the severity of the wind abated conspicuously, to the evident
consciousness of all. Many of the slaves and beasts of burthen, and a few even
of the soldiers, perished : some had their feet frost-bitten, others became
blinded by the snow, others again were exhausted by hunger. Several of these
unhappy men were unavoidably left behind; others lay down to perish, near a
warm spring which had melted the snow around, from extremity of fatigue and
sheer wretchedness, though the enemy were close upon the rear. It was in vain
that Xenophon, who commanded the rear-guard, employed his earnest exhortations,
prayers, and threats to induce them to move forward. The sufferers, miserable
and motionless, answered only by entreating him to kill them at once. So
greatly was the army disorganized by wretchedness, that we hear of one case in
which a soldier, ordered to carry a disabled comrade, disobeyed the order, and
was about to bury him alive. Xenophon made a sally, with loud shouts and
clatter of spear with shield, in which even the exhausted men joined, against
the pursuing enemy. He was fortunate enough to frighten them away, and drive
them to take shelter in a neighbouring wood. He then left the sufferers lying
down, with assurance that relief should be sent to them on the next day, and
went forward, seeing all along the line of march the exhausted soldiers lying
on the snow, without even the protection of a watch. He and his rear-guard as
well as the rest were obliged thus to pass the night without either food or
fire, distributing scouts m the best way that the case admitted. Meanwhile
Cheirisophus with the van division had got into a village, which they reached
so unexpectedly, that they found the women fetching water from a fountain
outside the wall, and the head-man of the village in his house within. This
division here obtained rest and refreshment, and at daybreak some of their
soldiers were sent to look after the rear. It was with delight that Xenophon
saw them approach, and sent them back to bring up in their arms, into the
neighbouring village, those exhausted soldiers who had been left behind.
Repose was now indispensable after the recent
sufferings. There were several villages near at hand, and the generals,
thinking it no longer dangerous to divide the army, quartered the different
divisions among them according to lot. Polycrates, an Athenian, one of the
captains in the division of Xenophon, requested his permission to go at once
and take possession of the village assigned to him, before any of the
inhabitants could escape. Accordingly, running at speed with a few of the
swiftest soldiers, he came upon the village so suddenly as to seize the
head-man with his newly-married daughter, and several young horses intended as
a tribute for the King. This village, as well as the rest, was found to consist
of houses excavated in the ground (as the Armenian villages are at the present
day), spacious within, but with a narrow mouth like a well, entered by a
descending ladder. A separate entrance was dug for conveniently admitting the
cattle. All of them were found amply stocked with live cattle of every kind,
wintered upon hay; as well as with wheat, barley, vegetables, and a sort of
barley-wine or beer in tubs, with the grains of barley on the surface. Reeds or
straws without any joint in them were lying near, through which they sucked the
liquid; Xenonphon did his utmost to conciliate the
head-man (who spoke Persian, and with whom he communicated through the
Perso-Grecian interpreter of the army), promising him that not one of his
relations should he maltreated, and that he should be fully remunerated if he
would conduct the army safely out of the country into that of the Chalybes,
which he described as being adjacent. By such treatment the head-man was won
over, promised his aid, and even revealed to the Greeks the subterranean
cellars wherein the wine was deposited ; while Xenophon, though he kept him
constantly under watch, and placed his youthful son as a hostage under the care
of Episthenes, yet continued to treat him with
studied attention and kindness. For seven days did the fatigued soldiers remain
in these comfortable quarters, refreshing themselves and regaining strength.
They were waited upon by the native youths, with whom they communicated by
means of signs. The uncommon happiness which all of them enjoyed after their
recent sufferings stands depicted in the lively details given by Xenophon, who
left here his own exhausted horse, and took young horses in exchange, for
himself and the other officers.
After this week of repose, the army resumed its march
through the snow. The head-man, whose house they had replenished as well as
they could, accompanied Cheirisophus in the van as guide, but was not put in
chains runs or under guard; his son remained as an hostage with Episthenes, but his other relations were left unmolested at
home. As they marched for three days, without reaching a village, Cheirisophus
began to suspect his fidelity, and even became so out of humour, though the man
affirmed that there were no villages in the track, as to beat him—yet without
the precaution of putting him afterwards in fetters. The next night,
accordingly, this head-man made his escape, much to the displeasure of
Xenophon, who severely reproached Cheirisophus first for his harshness, and
next for his neglect. This was the only point of difference between the two
(says Xenophon) during the whole march—a fact very honourable to both,
considering the numberless difficulties against which they had to contend. Episthenes retained the head-man’s youthful son, carried
him home in safety, and became much attached to him.
Condemned thus to march without a guide, they could do
no better than march up the course of the river ; and thus, from the villages
which had proved so cheering and restorative, they proceeded seven days’ march
all through snow, up the river Phasis—a river not verifiable, but certainly not
the same as is commonly known under that name by Grecian geographers: it was
100 feet in breadth. Two more days’ march brought them from this river to the
foot of a range of mountains, near a pass occupied by an armed body of
Chalybes, Taochi, and Phasiani.
Observing the enemy in possession of this lofty
ground, Cheirisophus halted until all the army came up, in order that the
generals might take counsel. Here Kleanor began by
advising that they should storm the pass with no greater delay than was
necessary to refresh the soldiers. But Xenophon suggested that it was far
better to avoid the loss of life which must thus be incurred, and to amuse the
enemy by feigned attack, while a detachment should be sent by stealth at night
about to ascend the mountain at another point and turn the position. However (continued he, turning to
Cheirisophus), stealing a march upon the enemy is more your trade than mine.
For I understand that you, the full citizens and peers at Sparta, practise
stealing from your boyhood upward; and that it is held noway base, but even honourable, to steal such things as the law does not distinctly
forbid. And to the end that you may steal with the greatest effect, and take
pains to do it in secret, the custom is to flog you if you are found out. Here,
then, you have an excellent opportunity of displaying your training. Take good
care that we be not found out in stealing an occupation of the mountain now
before us; for if we are found out, we shall be well beaten.”
“Why, as for that (replied Cheirisophus), you
Athenians also, as I learn, are capital hands at stealing the public money—and
that too in spite of prodigious peril to the thief; nay, your most powerful men
steal most of all—at least if it be the most powerful men among you who are
raised to official command. So that this is a time for you to exhibit your
training, as well as for me to exhibit mine.”
We have here an interchange of raillery between the
two Grecian officers, which is not an uninteresting feature in the history of
the expedition. The remark of Cheirisophus, especially, illustrates that which
I noted in a former chapter as true both of Sparta and Athens—the readiness to
take bribes, so general in individuals clothed with official power; and the
readiness, in official Athenians, to commit such peculation, in spite of
serious risk of punishment Now this chance of punishment proceeded altogether
from those accusing orators commonly called demagogues, and from the popular
judicature whom they addressed. The joint working of both greatly abated the
evil, yet was incompetent to suppress it. But according to the pictures
commonly drawn of Athens, we are instructed to believe that the crying public
evil was—too great a licence of accusation and too much judicial trial.
Assuredly such was not the conception of Cheirisophus; nor shall we find it
borne out by any fair appreciation of the general evidence. When the peculation
of official persons was thus notorious in spite of serious risks, what would it
have become if the door had been barred to accusing demagogues, and if the
numerous popular Dikasts had been exchanged for a
select few judges of the same stamp and class as the official men themselves?
Enforcing his proposition, Xenophon now informed his
colleagues that he had just captured a few guides, by laying an ambush for
certain native plunderers who beset the rear, and that these guides acquainted
him that the mountain was not inaccessible, but pastured by goats and oxen. He
further offered himself to take command of the marching detachment. But this
being overruled by Cheirisophus, some of the best among the captains,
Aristonymus, Aristeas, and Nikomachus,
volunteered their services and were accepted. After refreshing the soldiers,
the generals marched with the main army near to the foot of the pass, and there
took up their night-station, making demonstrations of a purpose to storm it the
next morning. But as soon as it was dark, Aristonymus and his detachment
started, and, ascending the mountain at another point obtained without
resistance a high position on the flank of the enemy, who soon however saw them
and despatched a force to keep guard on that side. At daybreak those two
detachments came to a conflict on the heights, in which the Greeks were
completely victorious; while Cheirisophus was marching up the pass to attack
the main body. His light troops, encouraged by seeing this victory of their
comrades, hastened on to the charge faster than their hoplites could follow.
But the enemy were so dispirited by seeing themselves turned, that they fled
with little or no resistance. Though only a few were slain, many threw away
their light shields of wicker or wood-work, which became the prey of the conquerors.
Thus masters of the pass, the Greeks descended to the
level ground on the other side, where they found themselves in some villages
well-stocked with provisions and comforts—the first in the country of the Taochi. Probably they halted here some days; for they had
seen no villages, either for rest or for refreshment, during the last nine
days’ march, since leaving those Armenian villages in which they had passed a
week so eminently restorative, and which apparently had furnished them with a
stock of provisions for the onward journey. Such halt gave time to the Taochi to carry up their families and provisions into
inaccessible strongholds, so that the Greeks found no supplies, during five
days’ march through the territory. Their provisions were completely exhausted,
when they arrived before one of these strongholds, a rock on which were seen
the families and the cattle of the Taochi; without
houses or fortification, but nearly surrounded by a river, so as to leave only
one narrow ascent, rendered unapproachable by vast rocks which the defenders
hurled or rolled from the summit. By an ingenious combination of bravery and
stratagem, in which some of the captains much distinguished themselves, the
Greeks overcame this difficulty, and took the heights. The scene which then
ensued was awful. The Taochian women seized their
children, flung them over the precipice, and then cast themselves headlong
also, followed by the men. Almost every soul thus perished, very few surviving
to become prisoners. An Arcadian captain named Aeneas, seeing one of them in a
fine dress about to precipitate himself with the rest, seized him with a view
to prevent it. But the man in return grasped him firmly, dragged him to the
edge of the rock, and leaped down to the destruction of both. Though scarcely
any prisoners were taken, however, the Greeks obtained abundance of oxen,
asses, and sheep, which fully supplied their wants.
They now entered into the territory of the Chalybes,
which they were seven days in passing through. These were the bravest warriors
whom they had seen in Asia. Their equipment was a spear of fifteen cubits long,
with only one end pointed—a helmet, greaves, stuffed corslet, with a kilt or
dependent flaps—a short sword which they employed to cut off the head of a
slain enemy, displaying the head in sight of their surviving enemies with
triumphant dance and song. They carried no shield—perhaps because the excessive
length of the spear required the constant employment of both hands—yet they did
not shrink from meeting the Greeks occasionally in regular, stand-up fight. As
they had carried off all their provisions into hill-forts, the Greeks could
obtain no supplies, but lived all the time upon the cattle which they had
acquired from the Taochi. After seven days of march
and combat—the Chalybes perpetually attacking their rear—they reached the river Harpasus (400 feet broad), where they passed into the
territory of the Skythini. It rather seems that the
territory of the Chalybes was mountainous; that of the Skythini was level, and contained villages, wherein they remained three days,
refreshing themselves, and stocking themselves with provisions.
Four days of additional march brought them to a sight,
the like of which they had not seen since Opis and Sittake on the Tigris in Babylonia—a large and flourishing
city called Gymnias, an earnest of the neighbourhood
of the sea, of commerce, and of civilization. The chief of this city received
them in a friendly manner, and furnished them with a guide, who engaged to
conduct them, after five days’ march, to a hill from whence they would have a
view of the sea. This was by no means their nearest way to the sea, for the
chief of Gymnias wished to send them through the
territory of some neighbours to whom he was hostile; which territory, as soon
as they reached it, the guide desired them to burn and destroy. However, the
promise was kept, and on the fifth day, marching still apparently through the
territory of the Skythini, they reached the summit of
a mountain called Theches, from whence the Euxine Sea
was visible.
An animated shout from the soldiers who formed the
vanguard testified the impressive effect of this long-deferred spectacle,
assuring, as it seemed to do, their safety and their return home. To Xenophon
and to the rearguard—engaged in repelling the attack of natives who had come
forward to revenge the plunder of their territory—the shout was unintelligible.
They at first imagined that the natives had commenced attack in front as well
as in the rear, and that the vanguard was engaged in battle. But every moment
the shout became louder, as fresh men came to the summit and gave vent to their
feelings; so that Xenophon grew anxious, and galloped up to the van with his
handful of cavalry to see what had happened. As he approached, the voice of the
overjoyed crowd was heard distinctly crying out Thalatta, Thalatta (The sea, the sea), and congratulating each
other in ecstasy. The main body, the rear-guard, the baggage-soldiers driving
up their horses and cattle before them, became all excited by the sound, and
hurried, up breathless to the summit. The whole army, officers and soldiers,
were thus assembled, manifesting their joyous emotions by tears, embraces, and
outpourings of enthusiastic sympathy. With spontaneous impulse they heaped up
stones to decorate the spot by a monument and commemorative trophy; putting on
the stones such homely offerings as their means afforded —sticks, hides, and a
few of the wicker shields just taken from the natives. To the guide, who had
performed his engagement of bringing them in five days within sight of the sea,
their gratitude was unbounded. They presented him with a horse, a silver bowl,
a Persian costume, and ten darics in money, besides several of the soldiers’
rings, which he especially asked for. Thus loaded with presents, he left them,
having first shown them a village wherein they could find quarters, as well as
the road which they were to take through the territory of the Makrones.
When they reached the river which divided the land of
the Passes Makrones from that of the Skythini, they perceived the former assembled in arms on
the opposite side to resist their passage. The river not being fordable, they
cut down some neighbouring trees to provide the means of crossing. While these Makrones were shouting and encouraging each other aloud, a
peltast in the Grecian army came to Xenophon, saying that he knew their
language, and that he believed this to be his country. He had been a slave at
Athens, exported from home during his boyhood; he had then made his escape
(probably during the Peloponnesian War, to the garrison of Dekeleia), and
afterwards taken military service. By this fortunate accident the generals were
enabled to open negotiations with the Makrones, and
to assure them that the army would do them no harm, desiring nothing more than
a free passage and a market to buy provisions. The Makrones,
on receiving such assurances in their own language from a countryman, exchanged
pledges of friendship with the Greeks, assisted them to pass the river, and
furnished the best market in their power during the three days’ march across
their territory.
The army now reached the borders of the Kolchians, found in hostile array, occupying the summit of
a considerable mountain which formed their frontier. Here Xenophon, having
marshalled the soldiers for attack, with each lochus (company of 100 men) in single file, instead of marching up the hill in phalanx
or continuous front with only a scanty depth, addressed to them the following
pithy encouragement: “Now, gentlemen, these enemies before us are the only
impediment that keeps us away from reaching the point at which we have been so
long aiming. We must even eat them raw, if in any way we can do so.”
Eighty of these formidable companies of hoplites, each
in single file, now began to ascend the hill; the peltasts and bowmen being
partly distributed among them, partly placed on the flanks. Cheirisophus and
Xenophon, each commanding on one wing, spread their peltasts in such a way as to outflank the Kolchians, who accordingly weakened their centre in order
to strengthen their wings. Hence the Arcadian peltasts and hoplites in the
Greek centre were enabled to attack and disperse the centre with little resistance;
and all the Kolchians presently fled, leaving the
Greeks in possession of their camp, as well as of several well-stocked villages
in their rear. Amidst these villages the army remained to refresh themselves
for several days. It was here that they tasted the grateful but unwholesome
honey, which this region still continues to produce, unaware of its peculiar
properties. Those soldiers who ate little of it were like men greatly
intoxicated with wine; those who ate much were seized with the most violent
vomiting and diarrhoea, lying down like madmen in a state of delirium. From
this terrible distemper some recovered on the ensuing day, others two or three
days afterwards. It does not appear that any one actually died.
Two more days’ march brought them to the sea, at the
Greek maritime city of Trapezus or Trebizond, founded by the inhabitants of
Sinope on the coast of the Kolchian territory. Here
the Trapezuntines received them twith kindness and hospitality, sending them presents of bullocks, barley-meal, and
wine. Taking up their quarters in some Kolchian villages near the town, they now enjoyed, for the first time since leaving
Tarsus, a safe and undisturbed repose during thirty days, and were enabled to
recover in some degree from the severe hardships which they had undergone.
While the Trapezuntines brought produce for sale into
the camp, the Greeks provided the means of purchasing it by predatory
incursions against the Kolchians on the hills. Those Kolchians who dwelt under the hills and on the plain were
in a state of semidependence upon Trapezus; so that
the Trapezuntines mediated on their behalf, and
prevailed on the Greeks to leave them unmolested, on condition of a
contribution of bullocks.
These bullocks enabled the Greeks to discharge the vow
which they had made, on the proposition of Xenophon, to Zeus the Preserver,
during that moment of dismay and despair which succeeded immediately on the
massacre of their generals by Tissaphernes. To Zeus the Preserver, to Herakles
the Conductor, and to various other gods, they offered an abundant sacrifice on
their mountain camp overhanging the sea; and after the festival ensuing the
skins of the victims were given as prizes to competitors in running, wrestling,
boxing, and the pankration. The superintendence of such festival games, so
fully accordant with Grecian usage and highly interesting to the army, was
committed to a Spartan named Drakontius—a man whose
destiny recalls that of Patroklus and other Homeric heroes, for he had been
exiled as a boy, having unintentionally killed another boy with a short sword.
Various departures from Grecian custom however were admitted. The matches took
place on the steep and stony hill-side overhanging the sea, instead of on a
smooth plain; and the numerous hard falls of the competitors afforded increased
interest to the by-standers. The captive non-Hellenic boys were admitted to run
for the prize, since otherwise a boy-race could not have been obtained. Lastly,
the animation of the scene, as well as the ardour of the competitors, was much
enhanced by the number of their mistresses present.
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